Court Opinion

ID: 9840678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 19:05:16.439259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:00:02.359676
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/19/23 Jacobs v. Ritchie CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 JESSICA JACOBS,                                                 B325951

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                    21STCV40908)

 STEVEN RAY RITCHIE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Helen Zukin and Craig D. Karlan, Judges.
Affirmed.
         Steven Ray Ritchie, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Jessica Jacobs, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                ________________________
       Steven Ray Ritchie, representing himself as he did in the
trial court, appeals the judgment entered in favor of Jessica
Jacobs after a bench trial at which the trial court found in favor
of Jacobs (also self-represented) on her claim for unlawful
detainer. Ritchie contends he was denied his right to a jury trial,
the court improperly treated the complaint for forcible detainer
as one for unlawful detainer and the court’s findings were not
supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. Jacobs’s Unlawful Detainer/Forcible Detainer Action
         and the Parties’ Conflicting Versions of Events
      On November 5, 2021 Jacobs filed her complaint for forcible
detainer or, in the alternative, unlawful detainer, and on
April 21, 2022 the operative first amended complaint against
Ritchie, using Judicial Council of California approved form UD-
100. The property at issue is an undeveloped lot in Topanga
Canyon located at 1870 Old Topanga Canyon Road.
      In the operative pleading Jacobs averred that an earlier
unlawful detainer action had been dismissed because there was
no lease agreement between her and Ritchie and then a forcible
detainer action had been dismissed because there possibly was a
lease agreement. Accordingly, Jacobs alleged, “In an abundance
of caution, Plaintiff served Defendant with a 3 day notice to quit
for unlawful detainer and 5 day notice to quit for forcible
detainer.” Jacobs also alleged that she believed Ritchie had
forged a lease document and, “even if it were authentic, it would
be void against Plaintiff’s recorded deed,” citing Civil Code
section 1214. With the amended complaint Jacobs filed Plaintiff’s
Mandatory Cover Sheet and Supplemental Allegations—

                                 2
Unlawful Detainer, using Judicial Council mandatory
form UD-101.
       Declarations were attached to the operative complaint from
Lauren Goldman (Ivester),1 who owned the property from late
2019 to August 2020, and Chantal von Wetter, a real estate agent
who negotiated a sales contract between Ivester and Jacobs, who
owned a neighboring property. According to Ivester, she and
Ritchie (a former boyfriend) had attempted to negotiate a lease
agreement, but no lease was signed because Ritchie never
provided the required $25,000 deposit. During the negotiations
Ivester sent Ritchie the signature page of a draft lease “as a
confirmation that I was willing to lease it to him if he brought the
$25,000 to my office. He never did.” Although Ivester did not
meet with, or speak to, Jacobs during the sale transaction, she
did confirm in writing prior to the purchase that there was no
lease agreement for the property. For her part, von Wetter
stated that Jacobs told her Ritchie was claiming an interest in
the property. The agent asked Ivester about the claim and was
told Ritchie had no ties to the property. However, von Wetter
suggested to Jacobs that she ask Ritchie to produce the lease for
her inspection.2
       On July 21, 2022 Ritchie moved to relate what he described
as the pending unlawful/forcible detainer action with the other
actions between the parties and to declare Jacobs a vexatious
litigant. Ritchie’s version of events was set forth in a declaration

1    To be consistent with the parties’ and the trial court’s
usage, we refer to Lauren Goldman by her former name, Ivester.

2    Ritchie’s answer to the first amended complaint, filed
May 2, 2022, is not included in the record on appeal.

                                 3
attached to the motion. According to Ritchie, he purchased the
property at issue. Before the close of escrow Ritchie borrowed the
purchase money from Ivester, and they agreed to have title
placed in her name as collateral. Thereafter, he and Ivester
agreed to execute a 20-year lease at $1 per year with an option
for Ritchie to purchase the property for $50,000 or to repay the
loan within the 20-year lease period. They both signed the lease
in January 2020. In March 2020 Ritchie moved onto the land
and started developing it. In August 2020, because “Ivester was
angry that I had been with another woman,” Ivester notified
Ritchie she had sold the property and was evicting him.
      2. The Requests To Set a Trial Date
       Jacobs filed a request to set the case for trial on May 3,
2022.3 Ritchie on May 5, 2022 filed a counter-request to set the
case for trial and requested a jury trial.
       Jacobs on June 6, 2022 filed a document titled Request to
Review Case Assignment, which identified two other cases
between Jacobs and Ritchie (one for unlawful and forcible
detainer, which had been dismissed; the second for ejectment and
quiet title, which was still pending), explained the difficulty she
and Ritchie were encountering in having the action heard, and
asserted the only issue to be considered was the validity of
Ritchie’s lease document. Jacobs again requested the matter be
set for trial.4

3      Ritchie did not include Jacobs’s request in his designation
of the record on appeal.
4    On June 23, 2022 Ritchie filed an answer to Jacobs’s
June 6, 2022 request to the court, which he combined with a
motion to dismiss Jacobs’s “unlawful/forcible detainer

                                 4
       On July 27, 2022 Jacobs filed an ex parte application to set
trial. The document explained (as a “clarification on forcible
detainer action”) that the only matter at issue was the existence
and validity of the lease that Ritchie claimed existed for the
property.
       On July 28, 2022, with both parties present, the court
granted the ex parte application in part and set the matter for a
nonjury trial on September 7, 2022. The case was transferred to
a new department after Jacobs timely filed a peremptory
challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, and the
trial date was thereafter continued to October 26, 2022.
      3. The December 8, 2022 Amended Order After Hearing
       According to the seven-page amended order after hearing
filed December 8, 2022,5 at the bench trial both parties appeared
in propria persona, submitted documents and made arguments
regarding the evidence.6 The court found in favor of Jacobs on
her claim for unlawful detainer against Ritchie.

petition.” (The proof of service simply referred to the document
as a motion to dismiss unlawful detainer.)
5      On November 22, 2022 the trial court filed its original order
after hearing. Although attached to Ritchie’s case information
statement, the November 22 order was not designated for
inclusion in the record on appeal. The amended order was issued
following Ritchie’s filing of a motion for new trial or alternatively
for correction of record and an ex parte application for
reconsideration or in the alternative to correct the record.
6     The record on appeal does not include a reporter’s
transcript from the trial or an agreed or settled statement, and
Ritchie did not designate any minute orders from the trial that
may have identified who testified and what documents were
introduced into evidence.

                                 5
       Summarizing the background facts, the court stated Ivester
and Ritchie had been in a multi-year romantic relationship that
ended in November 2019. On or about December 24, 2019 Ivester
purchased the subject property for $75,000. After Ivester
purchased the property, Ritchie took possession of it. Ivester
sought to evict Ritchie in mid-August 2020 and two weeks later
sold it to Jacobs and her husband. Ritchie claimed to have a
valid and enforceable 20-year lease with Ivester that provided for
an annual rent of $1 and granted him an option to purchase the
property for $50,000. The court observed that it was undisputed
that Ritchie had not recorded the purported lease and did not
provide a copy of it to Jacobs prior to her purchase of the
property.
       The amended order stated Jacobs testified she was aware
Ritchie was occupying the property before she purchased it and
inquired about his rights with Ivester, Ivester’s listing agent and
Ritchie. Ivester and the agent said there was no lease; Ritchie
said there was but claimed he had lost his only copy of it. Ritchie
testified he and Ivester had executed the 20-year lease and
acknowledged he was unable to provide Jacobs a copy of it when
she asked. His friend Dexter Woods testified he saw a copy of the
executed lease when he moved into a trailer previously occupied
by Ivester.
       In its rulings the court first rejected Ritchie’s contentions
that Jacobs’s action was only for forcible detainer and the court’s
original order had improperly analyzed the claim as one for
unlawful detainer. The court noted the original complaint and
amended complaint both identified the cause of action as forcible
detainer or, in the alternative, unlawful detainer, and Ritchie’s
answer to the amended complaint referred to it as one for

                                 6
unlawful detainer and included allegations that “sound in
unlawful, not forcible[,] detainer, such as his assertion that
Jacobs’ claim was based on his alleged failure to pay rent.” The
court found that Ritchie “was fully aware this case concerned
allegations of unlawful detainer and has waived any argument
that this action should be narrowly construed to only assert
claims of forcible detainer by failing to raise this objection prior
to or during trial.”
       Turning to the existence of the lease, the court found the
testimony of Ritchie’s friend that he happened to see a fully
executed copy of the lease in his trailer not credible7 and Ritchie’s
testimony concerning the lease unpersuasive. Accordingly, it
ruled Ritchie had not carried his burden of proving there was a
lease. As a result, Jacobs established the elements of her
unlawful detainer action by showing Ritchie continued in
possession of the property after the termination of Ivester’s
ownership and without the consent of Jacobs, citing Marquez-
Luque v. Marquez (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1513, 1518.
       The court then ruled, even if there had existed a valid
lease, it would be unenforceable as to Jacobs pursuant to Civil
Code sections 1214 and 12178 because it had not been recorded

7     The court cited testimony that the trailer had been
professionally cleaned before the friend moved in and no copy of
the lease was found at that time.
8      Civil Code section 1214 provides, “Every conveyance of real
property or an estate for years therein, other than a lease for a
term not exceeding one year, is void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof,
in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance
is first duly recorded, and as against any judgment affecting the

                                  7
before Jacobs acquired the property and recorded title and Jacobs
did not have actual or constructive notice of the lease, having
made a good faith effort to determine the veracity of Ritchie’s
claim to own a leasehold interest.
       Judgment in favor of Jacobs was entered December 16,
2022. Ritchie filed a premature notice of appeal on December 1,
2022, following the court’s initial order after hearing but before
the court amended its order in response to Ritchie’s motions. We
treat the notice as filed immediately after entry of judgment.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.108(d)(2).)
                          DISCUSSION
       “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.
[Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle of appellate
practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of
reversible error.’ [Citations.] ‘In the absence of a contrary
showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial
court’s action will be made by the appellate court. “[I]f any
matters could have been presented to the court below which
would have authorized the order complained of, it will be
presumed that such matters were presented.”’ [Citation.] ‘“A
necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate

title, unless the conveyance shall have been duly recorded prior
to the record of notice of action.”
      Civil Code section 1217 provides, “An unrecorded
instrument is valid as between the parties thereto and those who
have notice thereof.”

                                  8
for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of
the trial court should be affirmed.”’ [Citation.] ‘Consequently,
[the appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record.
[Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609; accord, Maria P.
v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296 [to overcome
presumption on appeal that an appealed judgment or order is
presumed correct, appellant must provide an adequate record
demonstrating reversible error]; Ballard v. Uribe (1986)
41 Cal.3d 564, 574 [“[i]t is well settled, of course, that a party
challenging a judgment has the burden of proving reversible
error by an adequate record”].)
       Here, Ritchie’s inadequate designation of the record
precludes meaningful review of two of the three issues he has
raised on appeal (his right to a jury trial and the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s findings), and the
presumption of correctness requires that we affirm the judgment.
      1. Ritchie’s Right to a Jury Trial
       Emphasizing he made a timely request for a jury trial (and
had a fee waiver), Ritchie argues the trial court erred in setting
the matter for a bench trial and contends denial of his right to a
trial by jury requires reversal of the judgment in favor of Jacobs.
According to Ritchie, Jacobs’s numerous filings caused the court
to overlook his request. Jacobs contends Ritchie waived his right
to a jury trial, “agree[ing] (both in front of Judge Karlan and
Judge Zukin) that the unlawful detainer issue of the lease would
be a bench trial.”
       Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 631, subdivision (f),
which explains the grounds for finding waiver of a party’s request

                                 9
for a jury trial, Ritchie notes the record on appeal does not
include a written consent to waive trial by jury, as specified in
subdivision (f)(2), or a minute order memorializing his oral
consent in open court to waive a jury, as provided in
subdivision (f)(3). But Ritchie acknowledged in his reply brief his
consent to a bench trial, explaining, “[S]ince it was a forcible
detainer action, Appellant did not pursue a jury trial as he would
have done for a U.D. action, had he been properly and lawfully
forewarned of one.” And the case register included in the clerk’s
transcript reflects a minute order following a case management
conference the month after Jacobs and Ritchie submitted their
requests to set the case for trial, several minute orders entered
after Jacobs filed her ex parte application to expedite trial setting
and a minute order dated September 7, 2022 that identified the
action as “non-jury trial.” Any one of those minute orders, none
of which was designated for inclusion in the record, might have
satisfied the requirement for entry of an order confirming an oral
jury waiver under section 631, subdivision (f)(3), and authorized
conducting a bench trial.
       The incomplete record is fatal to Ritchie’s jury trial claim.
As explained in Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at page 609, if
matters could have been presented in the trial court that would
have justified proceeding as the court did, we are obligated to
presume in support of the judgment that they were. It was
Ritchie’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error by an
adequate record. He failed to carry that burden.

                                 10
      2. The Trial Court Properly Adjudicated Jacobs’s
         Complaint As Alleging a Cause of Action for Unlawful
         Detainer
       In overlapping arguments Ritchie contends he was
deprived of a fair opportunity to prepare a defense because
Jacobs alleged a cause of action for forcible detainer but tried an
action for unlawful detainer and the trial court abused its
discretion in treating the lawsuit as one for unlawful detainer.
As the trial court ruled, the record belies Ritchie’s claim he was
unaware of the issues that would be tried.9
       Jacobs’s amended complaint was on the Judicial Council
approved form for unlawful detainer actions and attached notices
to quit for both unlawful detainer (three days) and forcible
detainer (five days). In her amended complaint and various other
filings, Jacobs explained she was seeking relief in the alternative
for unlawful and forcible detainer. Ritchie recognized the
alternative nature of Jacobs’s pleading when he moved to dismiss
“Plaintiffs [sic] Unlawful/Forcible Detainer Petition” in June

9     As part of his argument that the trial court abused its
discretion in trying Jacobs’s case as one for unlawful detainer,
Ritchie notes a prior unlawful detainer action filed by Jacobs had
been dismissed and was on appeal. Ritchie contends it was
improper to proceed with another unlawful detainer action under
those circumstances. Because of the sparse record before us, we
are unable to determine whether Ritchie timely raised this
argument in the trial court. Moreover, Ritchie fails to address
Code of Civil Procedure section 1176, subdivision (b), which
provides a new cause of action for unlawful detainer is not barred
by the appeal of a prior action. Because the earlier unlawful
detainer lawsuit is not included in the record on appeal, we are
unable to determine the applicability of this provision to the case
at bar.

                                11
2022 and his motion to relate cases a month later. The trial court
also noted that in his answer to the amended complaint (which
was not included in the record on appeal), Ritchie made
assertions that sounded in unlawful, not forcible, detainer.
Moreover, throughout this proceeding the only issue was whether
a valid and enforceable lease existed giving Ritchie a right to
possession of the property. Ritchie had ample notice of that
question and apparently presented testimony and documentary
evidence at trial to support his claim.
      3. Ritchie Forfeited His Substantial Evidence Claims
       A tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer when he or she
continues in possession of property without a valid lease or
agreement and without the permission of the landlord. (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 1161.1.) In defense to Jacobs’s claim of unlawful
detainer, Ritchie argued in the trial court that he and Ivester had
entered a 20-year lease (with an option to buy) that gave him a
right to continued possession of the property. Evaluating the
evidence before it and weighing the credibility of the witnesses,
the trial court determined Ritchie failed to carry his burden of
proof in establishing the validity of the lease.
       Challenging the trial court’s analysis, Ritchie contends
Jacobs presented insufficient evidence to support her claim for
unlawful detainer. As discussed, the record on appeal does not
contain a reporter’s transcript from the evidentiary hearing or an
agreed or settled statement. Other than the trial court’s
summary of the testimony and other evidence as recited in its
amended order after hearing, we simply do not know what
happened at trial.
       Because there is no record of the oral proceedings at trial
and nothing else in the record on appeal to indicate what

                                12
evidence was before the trial court, Ritchie has forfeited any
claim the findings necessary for the judgment in favor of Jacobs
are not supported by substantial evidence. (See Fernandes v.
Singh (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 932, 941 [appellant could not
challenge a finding by the trial court for lack of substantial
evidence because there was “no reporter’s transcript of the trial”];
People ex rel. Harris v. Shine (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 524, 533
[absence of a reporter’s transcript generally prevents review of a
substantial evidence argument]; Estate of Fain (1999)
75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 [“[w]here no reporter’s transcript has
been provided and no error is apparent on the face of the existing
appellate record, the judgment must be conclusively presumed
correct as to all evidentiary matters”]; see generally Jameson v.
Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 [“‘“if the record is inadequate for
meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the
trial court should be affirmed”’”]; Randall v. Mousseau (2016)
2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935 [“Failure to provide an adequate record on
an issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant.
[Citation.] Without a record, either by transcript or settled
statement, a reviewing court must make all presumptions in
favor of the validity of the judgment”].)
                          DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Jacobs is to recover her costs on
appeal.

                                           PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur:

            FEUER, J.                      MARTINEZ, J.

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