Court Opinion

ID: 9901946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 18:08:36.182491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:41.788570
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Barnett Mgt. v. Columbia Res. Homeowners Assn., 2023-Ohio-4220.]

                             COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                            EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

BARNETT MANAGEMENT,                                  :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :
                                                                            No. 112922
                v.                                   :

COLUMBIA RESERVE                                     :
HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION

                Defendant-Appellant.                 :

                              JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 22, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-22-966515

                                          Appearances:

                 Alan J. Rapoport, for appellee

                 Jonathan E. Rosenbaum, for appellant

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:

I.    Introduction

                  Defendant-appellant Columbia Reserve Homeowners’ Association

Inc. (“HOA”) appeals the trial court’s grant of plaintiff-appellee Barnett
Management’s (“Barnett”) motion to disqualify HOA’s counsel. We reverse the trial

court’s judgment.

              HOA is the homeowners’ association for the Columbia Reserve

residential development located in Columbia Station, Ohio in the county of Lorain.

Barnett was the property management firm for HOA. In March 2022, Barnett sued

HOA in Cleveland Heights Municipal Court to recover legal expenses expended for

services performed on the HOA’s behalf in city of Cleveland Heights. Barnett

claimed entitlement to recover pursuant to the indemnification provision of the

parties’ 2015 management agreement.

              On behalf of HOA, counsel Jonathan E. Rosenbaum (“Rosenbaum”)

filed a motion to dismiss or to transfer the case to Lorain County. HOA asserted that

the validity of the management agreement was an issue in two pending cases in

Lorain County involving several parties including HOA and Barnett. HOA also

answered and counterclaimed for a sum that exceeded the municipal court’s

jurisdiction, and on May 16, 2022, the case was transferred to the Cuyahoga County

Court of Common Pleas.

              On August 4, 2022, Barnett filed the motion to disqualify at issue in

this case. Barnett claimed that Rosenbaum’s representation of HOA in the instant

case and of Jack Hall (“Hall”), a plaintiff in the Lorain County cases constituted a

conflict of interest. In September 2018, Hall, an owner and HOA member at the

Columbia Reserve development filed the first of the Lorain County cases pro se

against Barnett, property developer Columbia Reserve, Ltd., and others. Causes of
action included violations of the Columbia Reserve Community Development

Declaration, Articles, and By-Laws (“Declaration”). Hall sought to compel the

developer to relinquish control of HOA and asserted mismanagement by Barnett.

              In October 2018, Rosenbaum entered his appearance as counsel for

Hall in that case and, in June 2021, Rosenbaum moved for leave to file an amended

complaint. In October 2021, while waiting for a ruling on the motion, Rosenbaum

filed a second suit on behalf of Hall in Lorain County that also included a challenge

to Barnett’s property management activities. In January 2022, Hall was elected as

a member and president of HOA’s three-member board (“HOA Board”).                 In

February 2022, Barnett issued a notice purportedly terminating the management

agreement with Columbia HOA.

              On February 17, 2022, HOA Board voted to retain Rosenbaum “to

continue Hall’s efforts on behalf of the owners through their HOA.” Appellant’s

brief, p. 3. “In the engagement letter, both Hall and HOA specifically waived any

potential conflicts of interest and consented to the dual representation of both Hall

and HOA in compliance with Ohio Prof. Cond. R. 1.7 and 1.13. Hall and HOA did so

after being advised to consult with independent counsel.” Id.

              While the motion to disqualify was pending, in December 2022 the

Lorain County cases were settled and dismissed with prejudice. On June 15, 2023,

the trial court granted Barnett’s motion to disqualify Rosenbaum in a summary

entry. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were not requested.

              HOA appeals.
II. Assignment of Error

               HOA assigns a single error: The trial court erred when it disqualified

HOA’s counsel.

III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

               An order “‘granting a motion to disqualify opposing counsel is a final

appealable order’” under R.C. 2505.02, Grimes v. Oviatt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

104491, 2017-Ohio-1174, ¶ 37, quoting Wilhelm-Kissinger v. Kissinger, 129 Ohio

St.3d 90, 2011-Ohio-2317, 950 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 10; see also Russell v. Mercy Hosp., 15

Ohio St.3d 37, 39, 472 N.E.2d 695 (1984). “[A]n order granting disqualification

immediately and definitely affects the party it deprives of chosen counsel * * * [and]

it typically imposes a permanent effect because it is unlikely to be reconsidered as a

trial progresses.” (Citations omitted.) Wilhelm-Kissinger at ¶ 9-10.

               A trial court has broad discretion in determining a motion to

disqualify counsel. Quiros v. Morales, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89427, 2007-Ohio-

5442, ¶ 14, citing Spivey v. Bender, 77 Ohio App.3d 17, 601 N.E.2d 56 (6th

Dist.1991). A trial court also has wide discretion to exercise its “‘inherent authority

to supervise members of the bar appearing before it’” including an attorney’s

inability to “‘comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility when representing

a client.’” Wynveen v. Corsaro, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105538, 2017-Ohio-9170,

¶ 14, quoting Fried v. Abraitis, 2016-Ohio-934, 61 N.E.3d 545, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing

Royal Indem. Co. v. J.C. Penney Co., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 501 N.E.2d 617 (1986), and

Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 31 Ohio St.3d 256, 510 N.E.2d 379 (1987).
               An unreasonable, unconscionable, and arbitrary decision by a trial

court in granting or denying a motion to disqualify counsel constitutes an abuse of

discretion and will be reversed upon appellate review. Where there is “‘no sound

reasoning process that would support the decision,’” the trial court’s decision is

deemed to be unreasonable. Wynveen at ¶ 15, quoting Fried at ¶ 11, and citing

Centimark Corp. v. Browning Sprinkler Serv., Inc., 85 Ohio App.3d 485, 620

N.E.2d 134 (8th Dist.1993).

               The party moving for disqualification bears the burden of

demonstrating the necessity for removal. WFG Natl. Title Ins. Co. v. Meehan, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105677, 2018-Ohio-491, ¶ 24, citing Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v.

Teague, 71 Ohio App.3d 719, 724, 595 N.E.2d 392 (11th Dist.1991).

IV. Discussion

               The issue proffered in Barnett’s motion to disqualify and reiterated

on appeal is that a conflict-of-interest problem exists under Ohio’s Prof.Cond.R. 1.7

(“Rule 1.7”) because Rosenbaum was representing Hall in Lorain County where

Barnett was a defendant, and HOA in the instant case concurrently. The rule

addresses conflicts of interest involving current clients:

      (a) A lawyer’s acceptance or continuation of representation of a client
      creates a conflict of interest if either of the following applies:

      (1) the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another
      current client;

      (2) there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s ability to consider,
      recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action for that client
      will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another
      client, a former client, or a third person or by the lawyer’s own personal
      interests.

Rule 1.7(a)(1)-(2).

                  Barnett focuses on Rule 1.7(a)(2) and 1.7(b)(1).

      (b) A lawyer shall not accept or continue the representation of a client
      if a conflict of interest would be created pursuant to division (a) of this
      rule, unless all of the following apply:

      (1) the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
      representation to each affected client.

Rule 1.7(b)(1).

                  HOA counters that Barnett lacked standing to raise the potential

conflict issue, failed to meet its burden of proof, and that Hall and HOA waived any

such conflict in the engagement letter.

                  “As a general rule, a stranger to an attorney-client relationship lacks

standing to complain of a conflict of interest in that relationship.” Morgan v. N.

Coast Cable Co., 63 Ohio St.3d 156, 159, 586 N.E.2d 88 (1992), paragraph one of

syllabus.

      Typically, courts do not disqualify an attorney on the grounds of
      conflict of interest unless there is (or was) an attorney-client
      relationship between the party seeking disqualification and the
      attorney the party seeks to disqualify. In re Yarn Processing Patent
      Validity Litigation v. Leesona Corp., 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.1976), and
      cases cited therein; see, also, Dana Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
      Mut., 900 F.2d 882 (6th Cir.1990). Many courts that have dealt with
      the issue of whether disqualification of counsel is proper have looked
      to their respective codes of professional responsibility for guidance.
      Our research indicates that courts in Ohio are not an exception to this
      practice.

(Fn. omitted.) Id.
                  In determining whether to disqualify a party’s attorney based on a

conflict of interest, Ohio courts have applied the test set forth in Dana Corp. v. Blue

Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of N. Ohio, 900 F.2d 882, 889 (6th Cir.1990). (Fn.

omitted.) Stanley v. Bobeck, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92630, 2009-Ohio-5696, ¶ 13.

The Dana test requires a court to determine whether:

      (1) a past attorney-client relationship must have existed between the
      party seeking disqualification and the attorney he or she wishes to
      disqualify; (2) the subject matter of the past relationship must have
      been substantially related to the present case; and (3) the attorney must
      have acquired confidential information from the party seeking
      disqualification.

Id., citing Dana at 889, Morgan at 159.

               There has been no past attorney-client relationship between Barnett

and Rosenbaum. “If a party moving to disqualify an attorney cannot meet the first

prong of the Dana test, that party lacks standing to seek the disqualification.” Id.,

citing Morgan at syllabus. Barnett is unable to pass the first prong of the test.

Therefore, additional analysis is not required.

               The assignment of error is sustained.

V.   Conclusion

                  The trial court’s judgment is reversed and remanded for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR