Court Opinion

ID: 9684085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:46:21.725364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:50.979548
License: Public Domain

Darrell Hickman, Justice, dissenting. Because the trial judge did not technically comply with Rule 24 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, this guilty plea is set aside. The most important question is not addressed and that is whether the plea was voluntarily entered. In determining whether this rule was complied with, we have always used the standard of substantial compliance, not technical compliance. Shipman v. State, 261 Ark. 559, 550 S.W.2d 454 (1977); Clark v. State, 271 Ark. 866, 611 S.W.2d 502 (1981). In the recent case of McFarland v. State, 284 Ark. 533, 684 S.W.2d 233 (1985), we refused to void a search because of a violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure since neither prejudice nor constitutional violations were found. The United States Supreme Court, on whose decisions the Rules of Criminal Procedure are based, has taken the same approach. In United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979), in which Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was not strictly complied with, the court stated: “. . . Nor can any claim reasonably be made that the error here resulted in a ‘complete miscarriage of justice’ or in a proceeding ‘inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.’ As a basis for this reasoning, the Supreme Court quoted from two basic cases. In Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, it was said: The failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an error of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus. It is an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. It does not present ‘exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent. . .’ In U.S. v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, the court said: Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice. The impact is greatest when new grounds for setting aside guilty pleas are approved because the vast majority of criminal convictions result from such pleas. Moreover, the concern that unfair procedures may have resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant is only rarely raised by a petition to set aside a guilty plea. McDaniel signed a comprehensive agreement to plead guilty which unquestionably shows to what charge he was pleading guilty, the range of possible sentence, and every detail required except the particular facts concerning these crimes. The prosecuting attorney supplied this information; it did not come from the mouth of the judge. Apparently for that reason alone this guilty plea is set aside. No consideration at all is given to whether the plea was voluntary. At the plea hearing the trial court asked McDaniel if he was entering a plea of guilty of his own free will. He answered yes. At the Rule 37 hearing, McDaniel was asked if he voluntarily entered the plea, and he answered that at that time it was voluntary. Trial courts and appellate courts are inundated with petitions to set aside guilty pleas and jury verdicts. The most common grounds alleged in such cases are ineffective assistance of counsel and technical violations of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rarely is any question raised of the truth of the matter, which is the guilt or innocence of the defendant. It is understandable how two years after the fact, McDaniel forgets that he was forced to face on a given day the judge or the jury to answer for serious and violent criminal behavior. He chose to face the judge. Now he finds all sorts of reasons to set aside his guilty plea and sentence. The state and the victims will have to salvage what they can. Hopefully the state’s case will not be prejudiced by the passage of time; undoubtedly McDaniel will not be prejudiced. Our role is not to blindly sit in judgment of trial courts and lawyers expecting perfection on form. Our role is to take the world as it is and see that defendants receive fair treatment which means substantial compliance, not perfect compliance, with the rules of procedure. The majority, in its zeal, has ignored the most important question which is: was the plea voluntary and was the defendant the victim of unfair procedures? I would affirm the trial judge’s findings. Hays, J., joins.