Court Opinion

ID: 9371160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 17:09:03.274263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.881872
License: Public Domain

J-A25001-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 CHRISTIANNA WALDINGER                     :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                      Appellant            :
                                           :
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 BRADLEY M. WOKULICH                       :   No. 478 WDA 2022

                   Appeal from the Order Entered April 8, 2022,
                   in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,
                        Civil Division at No(s): 10201-2019.

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                     FILED: FEBRUARY 15, 2023

      Christianna Waldinger appeals from the order of partial summary

judgment in favor of Bradley M. Wokulich, which precluded Waldinger from

recovering any non-economic damages in this motor vehicle accident case.

The trial court concluded that Waldinger had limited tort coverage and she did

not suffer a serious injury as a matter of law. Upon review, we affirm in part

and reverse in part.

      On March 28, 2018, Waldinger and Wokulich were in an automobile

accident in Erie, Pennsylvania.     Waldinger filed a complaint alleging that

Wokulich caused the accident and that she suffered serious and permanent

injuries as a result. At the time of the accident, Waldinger was insured under

an insurance policy where she elected the "Limited Tort Option" under the

Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”).       This
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election precluded her from recovering non-economic damages except in

limited circumstances.

      After the close of discovery, Wokulich filed a motion for partial summary

judgment asserting that there were no genuine issues of material fact and

Waldinger did not suffer a serious injury, either a serious impairment of body

function or serious permanent disfigurement, as a result of the accident.

Wokulich claimed that Waldinger could not recover any non-economic

damages under the MVFRL and judgment on these claims should be entered

in his favor.

      In deciding Wokulich’s motion, the trial court set forth the undisputed

facts as follows:

      On September 23, 2019, [Waldinger] was deposed in this matter.
      . . . [Waldinger] testified that immediately following the accident,
      she had pain in her right knee, chest, and "her right hand and
      wrist were extremely swollen and started to bruise."

      [Waldinger] was taken to the hospital by the paramedics, where
      she underwent a CAT scan and x-rays. [She] was "released after
      a few hours," discharged with pain medication, instructed to ice
      her wrist and knee, and anything else bruised, and return if she
      exhibited any "concussion-type illness," such as dizziness or
      bruising. She did not return to the hospital for any further
      treatment. As a result of her injuries, [Waldinger] missed a total
      of three (3) days of work.

      [Waldinger] testified that after the accident, she received the
      following medical treatment: an MRI at Tri-State Pain Institute
      ["Tri-State"]; treatment at Young Chiropractic from April through
      August of 2018, and; treatment with Orthopedic & Sports Medicine
      ["Sports Medicine"] from June through October of 2018.
      [Waldinger] underwent surgery on her right wrist in 2018 and has
      a permanent two (2) inch scar on her wrist from the procedure.

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      Additionally, [Waldinger] explained that she still has daily "chronic
      pain" in her right hand and wrist and cannot lift more than five (5)
      pounds. She testified that the pain generally begins in the
      morning when she squeezes the shampoo bottle and continues
      when she completes tasks such as pouring milk and using a round
      brush on her hair. Additionally, [Waldinger] testified that her
      hand "goes numb" when she is writing and/or typing at work all
      day, her pain is aggravated when she kneels, and she suffers from
      what she describes as [] "feeling like a pinched nerve" in her neck.
      [Waldinger] also testified that she never requested, or needed,
      accommodations to continue at her employment and that she did
      not experience any negative impacts on any hobbies or activities
      that she enjoyed prior to the accident.

      [Waldinger] provided a report from Doctor D. Patrick Williams
      ["Dr. Williams"], who treated her at Sports Medicine. The report
      reflects that Dr. Williams treated [Waldinger] for her knee and
      wrist injury beginning on June 6, 2018. Dr. Williams reported
      treating [her] wrist with injections to relieve her pain. When the
      injections were unsuccessful, [Waldinger] underwent surgery to
      "release the first dorsal compartment of her right wrist." The
      surgery [on October 11, 2018] was successful and without
      complication. On October 22, 2018, [Waldinger] represented that
      her pain was "very well controlled" and that she was "having no
      difficulty with her wrist." Furthermore, Dr. Williams described
      “[Waldinger’s] prognosis of her knee and wrist as "excellent."
      Finally, Dr. Williams opined, "[a]t this point, I do not think she will
      need any further treatment regarding her wrist or knee."

Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/22, at 1-3 (citations omitted).

      On January 19, 2022, the trial court granted Wokulich’s motion for

partial summary judgment dismissing Waldinger’s claims for non-economic

damages. Waldinger filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court

denied.   Alternatively, Waldinger requested that the court dismiss her

remaining claim for economic damages with prejudice, so that she could take

an immediate appeal. Following argument, the court granted this request and

dismissed the case in its entirety.

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      Waldinger filed this timely appeal.     Waldinger and the trial court

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

      On appeal, Waldinger raises the following two issues:

      I.    Whether the trial court erred in granting Wokulich’s motion
            for partial summary judgment where a genuine issue of
            material fact existed as to the nature and extent of
            Waldinger’s injuries, as well as whether she sustained a
            serious impairment of a bodily function which should have
            been determined by the trier of fact.

      II.   Whether the trial court erred in granting Wokulich’s motion
            for partial summary judgment where a genuine issue of
            material fact existed as to whether Waldinger sustained a
            permanent disfigurement which should have been
            determined by the trier of fact.

See Waldinger’s Brief at ii, 11, 24.

      Waldinger claims that the trial court erred in granting Wokulich’s motion

for partial summary judgment. Specifically, Waldinger argues that the trial

court erred in finding that she did not sustain a serious injury as a result of

the accident, i.e., a “serious impairment of a body function” and/or “serious

permanent disfigurement,” as required under the MVFRL to recover non-

economic damages.

      In her first issue, Waldinger claims that the trial court erred when it

concluded she did not sustain a serious impairment of body function.

According to Waldinger, the evidence established that she injured her neck,

right knee, right hand and wrist. She received treatment for these injuries

which included being seen at the emergency room after the accident,

chiropractic care, injections and surgical intervention.   In 2020, two years

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after the accident, Waldinger received another injection for her wrist and had

an MRI which showed that she had recurrent tenosynovitis and a small tear of

her Triangular FibroCartilage Complex (“TFCC”).

      Further,   Waldinger    maintains    that   her   deposition   testimony

demonstrated that these injuries seriously impaired her ability to perform

various daily activities.   Waldinger explained that it is painful for her to

perform typical daily activities which involve feeling, lifting and using her

dominant hand. According to Waldinger, this evidence, when viewed in the

light most favorable to her as the non-moving party, which the trial court

failed to do, shows that reasonable minds could differ as to whether she

sustained a serious impairment of body function.          Waldinger therefore

maintains that this determination should have been submitted to a fact finder

and summary judgment was improper. Waldinger’s Brief at 23-24.

      The trial court concluded that, although Waldinger sustained injuries

from the accident, the medical evidence did not establish that her injuries

constituted a serious impairment of a body function. In reaching its decision,

the court relied on McGee v. Muldowney, 750 A.2d 912, 915 (Pa. Super.

2000); this precedent requires a plaintiff to present objective medical

evidence, and not just subjective complaints, to support the existence of a

serious impairment. Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/22, at 6. Because Waldinger did

not present such evidence, the court granted summary judgment in

Wokulich’s favor.

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     Our standard of review regarding an order granting a motion for

summary judgment is well settled:

     An appellate court may reverse a grant of summary judgment if
     there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion. But the
     issue as to whether there are no genuine issues as to any material
     fact presents a question of law, and therefore, on that question
     our standard of review is de novo. This means we need not defer
     to the determinations made by the trial court.

     To the extent that an appellate court must resolve a question of
     law, we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the
     context of the entire record.

     [I]n evaluating the trial court's decision to enter summary
     judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the
     summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that
     where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
     party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment
     may be entered.... Lastly, we will view the record in the light most
     favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the
     existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
     against the moving party.

Albert v. Sheeley's Drug Store, Inc., 234 A.3d 820, 822 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted). To withstand a motion

for summary judgment, a non-moving party “must adduce sufficient evidence

on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof

such that a jury could return a verdict in his favor. Failure to adduce this

evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ertrel v. Patriot–

News Co., 674 A.2d 1038, 1042 (Pa. 1996).

     In relevant part, the Pennsylvania MVFRL provides:

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      (4) Limited tort alternative. — Each person who elects the limited
      tort alternative remains eligible to seek compensation for
      economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the
      consequence of the fault of another person pursuant to the
      applicable tort law. Unless the injury sustained is a serious
      injury, each person who is bound by the limited tort
      election shall be precluded from maintaining an action for
      any noneconomic loss . . . .

75 Pa.C.S.A § 1705(d) (emphasis added). Although a plaintiff who has elected

the limited tort option can recover all medical and out-of-pocket expenses,

such a plaintiff cannot recover for pain and suffering or other non-economic

damages unless the plaintiff's injuries fall within the definition of “serious

injury.” See id. A “serious injury” is defined as “[a] personal injury resulting

in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious

disfigurement.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702.

      Our Supreme Court has determined that the “serious impairment of

body function” threshold contains two inquiries:

      a) What body function, if any, was impaired because of the injuries
      sustained in a motor vehicle accident?

      b) Was the impairment of the body function serious? The focus
      of these inquiries is not on the injuries themselves, but on
      how the injuries affected a particular body function.
      Generally, medical testimony will be needed to establish
      the existence, extent, and permanency of the impairment.
      . . . In determining whether the impairment was serious, several
      factors should be considered: the extent of the impairment, the
      length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment required to
      correct the impairment, and any other relevant factors. An
      impairment need not be permanent to be serious.

Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733, 740 (Pa. 1998) (emphasis added).

“Further, evidence of how a particular injury affects a specific plaintiff,

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including how that injury negatively impacted the person's ability to perform

his or her chosen profession, is relevant in determining whether a plaintiff has

suffered a serious impairment of a body function.” Vetter v. Miller, 157 A.3d

943, 948 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      The determination of whether a serious injury has been sustained

“should be made by the jury in all but the clearest of cases.” Washington,

719 A.2d at 740; Brown v. Trinidad, 111 A.3d 765, 770–71 (Pa. Super.

2015). However, summary judgment may be granted where a limited-tort

plaintiff only presents subjective allegations of a serious impairment without

objective medical evidence. McGee, 750 A.2d at 914 (stating that a plaintiff

must generally present “objective medical evidence as to the degree of any

impairment and extent of pain suffered.”).

      Applying the analysis set forth in Washington to this case, we observe

that the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to Waldinger,

established she injured her right knee, neck, back, and, in particular, her right

hand and wrist as a result of the accident. These injuries affected her ability

to kneel, lift, squeeze, feel sensation in her hand, and use her dominant hand.

      Further, in considering whether these impairments were serious, the

evidence demonstrated that, following the accident, Waldinger was treated at

the emergency room and released just a few hours later; she was directed to

ice her knee and wrist and return if the pain worsened or she suffered

concussion type symptoms. Although she did not return to the hospital, she

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was treated for her injuries for approximately 6 months which included

chiropractic care, injections and surgery.

      Additionally, the evidence established that Waldinger missed 3 days of

work after the accident. Although Waldinger did not need any modifications

or accommodations to continue her employment, her hand goes numb when

she types and writes all day at work.

      Further, Waldinger testified about how her injuries affect her.     It is

painful for her to kneel. She suffers from what she described as a pinched

nerve in her neck. Most notably, Waldinger has chronic pain in her hand and

wrist which starts in the morning and continues through the day. It hurts

when she performs daily tasks such as squeezing the shampoo bottle, pouring

milk into her cereal, and using a brush on her hair. She cannot lift things

more than 5 pounds. The pain has persisted even after the surgery.

      Arguably, based on her subjective complaints reasonable minds could

differ as to whether Waldinger’s impairment was serious. This is particularly

so given that Waldinger injured her dominant hand and needed surgery to

treat it. She continues to experience pain and is still unable to do various

daily activities. We are mindful that the need and ability to use one’s hand

and wrist is important and extensive in daily life.

      Significantly, however, the objective medical evidence Waldinger

presented showed that she sustained injuries as a result of the accident, but

this evidence did not establish that she sustained a serious impairment of body

function. To support her case, Waldinger provided the expert report of Dr.

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Williams, who treated her for her hand/wrist and knee injuries, dated March

2020. Dr. Williams diagnosed Waldinger with a "small avulsion fracture of the

tibial tubercle with associated patellar tendinitis and right wrist de Quervain's

tenosynovitis." He initially treated her for pain with injections in her wrist,

which provided minimal relief. Ultimately, on October 11, 2018, Waldinger

had surgery on her right wrist without complication. When Dr. Williams saw

Waldinger after the surgery, Waldinger indicated that “[h]er pain was very

well controlled . . . and that she was having no difficulty with her wrist. . . . ”

“She was to follow up as needed.”

       In his report, Dr. Williams opined that her prognosis for her injuries was

excellent. He further stated that when he saw Waldinger in October of 2018,

“she was doing very well in regard to her knee and wrist. At this point, I do

not think she will need any further diagnostic testing or treatment concerning

her wrist or knee.” Dr. Williams noted that his opinions were given based on

the fact that, as of the time of his report, he had not seen Waldinger since

October 2018.1
____________________________________________

1 Waldinger asserts that she had further follow up in June 2020 with a different
orthopedic group. However, Wokulich contends that this occurred after the
close of discovery and as such was never produced in a supplemental
discovery response. Although it was attached to Waldinger’s response in
opposition to Wokulich’s motion, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4007.4
places a party under a duty to amend a prior responsive pleading if that party
obtains information upon the basis of which he knows that the response,
though correct when made, is no longer true. Rule 4019 states that the court
may prohibit introduction of designated evidence at trial if a party fails to
make proper discovery or to obey an order of court respecting discovery. See
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Notably, Dr. Williams’ report did not indicate the extent of Waldinger’s

pain or the extent to which her injuries impacted her life following the

accident. Additionally, the report did not provide any information to support

Waldinger’s ongoing complaints and claims that her injuries continue to affect

her. Instead, Dr. Williams gave Waldinger a good prognosis without any need

for further treatment. Consequently, even when viewing the evidence in the

       light most favorable to Waldinger, because the objective medical

evidence does not support Waldinger’s subjective claims, we conclude that

reasonable minds could not differ that she did not suffer a serious injury as a

result of the accident. Accordingly, the trial court did not error or abuse its

discretion in granting summary judgment on this issue in Wokulich’s favor.

       In her second issue, Waldinger similarly claims that the trial court erred

when it concluded she did not suffer from a serious permanent disfigurement.

Waldinger argues that the evidence showed she has a two-inch scar on the

side of her wrist from the surgery. She testified that the scar has not faded

____________________________________________

Leahy v. McClain, 732 A.2d 619, 624 (Pa. Super. 1999). Given these
circumstances, the trial court did not consider this additional evidence. We
note that Rule 1035(b) allows a party to supplement the record to produce
evidence to overcome a motion for summary judgment. See Monroe v.
CBH20, LP., ___ A.3d ___, 2022 WL 17087072 at *13 (Pa. Super. November
21, 2022). However, Waldinger did not raise this as a specific error on appeal
and therefore any argument that we may properly consider this evidence is
waived.

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even after 4 years and is blatantly visible; she cannot cover the scar with

clothing all the time. Additionally, according to Waldinger, people have asked

her about the scar and that it is a “little bit” embarrassing.      Waldinger

maintains that, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to her as the

non-moving party, which the trial court failed to do, reasonable minds could

differ whether her scar is a serious permanent disfigurement.        As such,

Waldinger contends that this issue should have been left for the fact finder to

decide rendering summary judgment improper. Waldinger’s Brief at 25.

      The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the scar on Waldinger’s

wrist was not a serious permanent disfigurement. Although Waldinger had a

scar on her wrist, the court noted that Waldinger offered no evidence as to

how the scar affected her daily life; mere embarrassment is not enough.

Further, Waldinger did not seek any follow up medical treatment for her scar.

Consequently, the trial court granted Wokulich’s motion for summary

judgment. Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/22, at 7.

      Initially, we observe that the MVFRL is silent as to what constitutes a

“serious permanent disfigurement.”       Additionally, there is no appellate

authority defining this phrase as contemplated by the MVFRL. The dissenting

opinion in Holland ex rel. Holland v. Marcy, 817 A.2d 1082, 1096–97 (Pa.

Super. 2002), aff'd sub nom. Holland v. Marcy, 883 A.2d 449 (2005)

referenced by Levin v. Potts, III, 2019 WL 8438486 (Pa. Com. Pl. Sept. 17,

2019), on which the trial court relied, while offering some guidance, is not

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precedential.2 Therefore, before we can address whether Waldinger adduced

sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment in this case, we must

consider the meaning of serious permanent disfigurement.

       To do so, we first consider the dictionary definitions of the terms of

serious, permanent and disfigurement, “which offer adequate direction for

statutory interpretation consistent with the Statutory Construction Act.” See

____________________________________________

2 In Holland, the dissent considered whether a single scar on the plaintiff’s
forehead constituted a serious permanent disfigurement so that the recovery
of non-economic damages should be submitted to a jury. Noting the lack of
appellate authority, the court considered guidance from New Jersey caselaw
interpreting similar language in a New Jersey statute.

       In Falcone v. Branker, 135 N.J.Super. 137, 342 A.2d 875
       (1975), the Superior Court of New Jersey employed a sound
       analysis for determining when a scar constitutes permanent
       serious disfigurement for purposes of its statutory equivalent to
       the limited tort option of the MVFRL. The [c]ourt examined case
       law regarding the definition of permanent serious disfigurement in
       the workers' compensation area and concluded that to fall within
       that definition, the scar must impair the symmetry or appearance
       of the plaintiff such that he is unsightly, misshapen, imperfect, or
       deformed in some manner. The Court also opined that a facial scar
       that mars to such an extent as to attract attention would be a
       serious disfigurement. According to the Falcone court, whether a
       disfigurement fulfills the statutory definition is determined by the
       following objective factors: the scar's appearance, coloration,
       existence and size. It noted, however, that a scar that becomes
       progressively less apparent with time would not be
       permanent.        See     also Hammer         v.    Township      of
       Livingston, 318 N.J.Super. 298, 723 A.2d 988 (1999).

Holland, 817 A.2d at 1096-97. The dissent concluded that the plaintiff’s scar
was significant enough to create a jury question as to whether it concistuted
a permanent serious disfigurement. Id. at 1097.

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Zator v. Coachi, 939 A.2d 349 (Pa. Super. 2007). In relevant part, “serious”

is defined as “not trifling (not lacking in significance) . . .        excessive or

impressive in quality, quantity, extent, or degree.”3        4   “Permanent” means

“continuing or enduring without fundamental or marked change (as in

permanent injuries).”5 “Disfigurement” is the act or instance of disfiguring . .

. something that disfigures, as a scar.”6 In turn, “disfigure” means “to mar

the appearance or beauty of; deform; deface . . . .”7 It also is defined as: “to

impair (as in beauty) by deep and persistent injuries.”8

____________________________________________

3   “Serious.”   Merriam Webster.com. Dictionary, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/serious. Accessed 17 Jan.
2023.

4 When considering the existence of a “serious impairment of body function,”
we have stated “[o]bviously, the word “serious” must be understood as
“significant” and “important”, involving an injury with consequences that are
more than just minor, mild or slight.” Dodson v. Elvey, 665 A.2d 1223, 1234
(Pa. Super. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 720 A.2d 1050 (1998).
5  “Permanent.”   Merriam Webster.com. Dictionary, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/permanent. Accessed 17 Jan.
2023.

6 “Disfigurement.” Dictionary.com, https://ww.dictionary.com/disfigurement
Accessed 17 Jan. 2023.

7  “Disfigure.”    Dictionary.com,             https://www.dictionary.com/disfigure.
Accessed 17 Jan. 2023.

8   “Disfigure.” Merriam Webster.com. Dictionary,                 Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disfigure.             Accessed 17 Jan.
2023.

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       Additionally, the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 1

et seq., offers some guidance. The Act provides for the award of benefits

where a claimant sustains a “serious and permanent disfigurement” resulting

from a work injury. 77 P.S. § 513(22). To recover, such disfigurement must

be of a “character to produce an unsightly appearance” and such recovery is

limited to a disfigurement of the head, neck or face.9 Id. We observe that

“unsightly” means “distasteful or unpleasant to look at.”10      Notably, when

considering whether a scar warrants compensation, it has been observed that:

       [t]he “unsightly appearance” requirement has produced the
       commonsense rule that not every mark or residual of an injury to
       the head, neck or face will constitute disfigurement. The claimant
       may well suffer some alteration . . . yet not be entitled to any
       award at all.

                                          ***

       The claimant must prove not merely that he or she has a scar or
       other blemish, but that the complained-of mark is disfiguring.

Walker v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Health Consultants), 42 A.3d

1231, 1236 (Pa. Commw. 2012) (quoting DAVID B. TORREY AND ANDREW E.

GREENBERG, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:42 (3d ed.

2008) (emphasis added).          Personal examination of the claimant’s physical

____________________________________________

9 The MVFRL does not contain the same limiting language that a serious
permanent disfigurement must occur to the head, neck or fact.

10  “Unsightly.” Merriam Webster.com. Dictionary,             Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unsightly.         Accessed 17 Jan.
2023.

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appearance rather than looking at a photograph is preferred; the accuracy of

a photograph depends on various factors such as lighting, camera quality, skill

of the photographer, focus etc. Walker, 42 A.3d at 1235–36 (citing Hastings

Indus. v. Com., W.C.A.B. (Hyatt), 611 A.2d 1187 (Pa. 1992)).

      Based upon this guidance, we conclude that a “serious permanent

disfigurement” requires that one’s appearance, form or beauty be affected or

marred in a displeasing, harmful way which is significant and not minor and

will not change, go way or be diminished.         We recognize that such a

determination   can   be   very   subjective.    Consequently,   taking   from

Washington, we set forth a similar inquiry to apply.

      What disfigurement, if any, resulted from the motor vehicle
      accident?

      Was the disfigurement permanent?

      Was the disfigurement serious? In determining whether the
      disfigurement is serious, several factors should be considered:
      appearance, obviousness, size, shape, symmetry, coloration, and
      any other relevant factors.

      Applying the foregoing here, we first observe that the particular

disfigurement at issue is a scar. As noted above, a scar in and of itself is

disfiguring. Nevertheless, we recognize that not every scar is permanent or

serious.

      Regarding the permanence of Waldinger’s scar, the evidence showed

that 4 years had passed since the accident and Waldinger’s scar remained

unchanged.    As the trial court determined, this evidence was sufficient to

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establish that Waldinger’s scar was permanent. Although generally competent

medical evidence is required to support a factual finding that a disfigurement

is permanent, it is not necessary where circumstances permit the fact finder

to determine from his own observations whether the disfigurement is

permanent.    EPurex Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 445 A.2d

267, 269 (Pa. Commwlth. 1982), abrogated by Hastings, 611 A.2d at 1187.

Such circumstances may exist where a period of time has passed between the

occurrence of the injury and the examination of the disfigurement. Id.; but

cf. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Pizzo, 346 A.2d 588 (Pa.

Commw. 1975) (referee could not properly take judicial notice of the

permanence of an eye injury resulting in closing of right eyelid and

squinting). Thus, we agree with this conclusion even though no medical

evidence was presented to establish permanency.

      As for whether Waldinger’s scar was serious, the evidence showed that

the scar was on Waldinger’s wrist and was two inches long. Considering the

relevant factors to determine if a disfigurement is serious, we disagree with

the trial court that this is the clearest of cases. Instead, we find that, when

viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Waldinger, reasonable

minds could differ as to whether Waldinger’s scar is a serious disfigurement.

We base our conclusion on the size of the scar and its location. Two inches is

not so insignificant. The scar is in a prominent place on Waldinger’s body. As

Waldinger claimed, it cannot always be concealed. Further, we observe that

one’s hands are constantly in use and readily visible most of the time. These

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factors directly relate to the extent to which the scar detracts from Waldinger’s

appearance, which is the critical inquiry in a “serious permanent disfigurement

case.”

      In granting summary judgment, the trial court did not consider the

effect Waldinger’s scar had on her appearance. Instead, it focused on the

impact Waldinger’s scar had on her life. Unlike the serious impairment of body

function analysis, this not the appropriate inquiry. Certainly, the impact a

disfigurement has on an individual, such as whether it is embarrassing or

creates self-esteem issues is relevant but, it is not the primary factor. Instead,

the inquiry is the effect on the person’s appearance.

      Additionally, the trial court relied on Waldinger’s failure to offer medical

evidence showing that she sought any follow up treatment for her scar.

Although treatment of a disfigurement may be a relevant factor in determining

whether a disfigurement is serious, it is also not the primary consideration.

Again, the pertinent inquiry is how the injury affects the plaintiff’s appearance.

Unlike the serious impairment of a body function question, medical evidence

is not necessary to determine whether a scar impacts one’s appearance.

      When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Waldinger, we

conclude that reasonable minds could differ as to whether her scar constitutes

a serious permanent disfigurement. As such, a jury question exists regarding

whether Waldinger sustained a serious permanent disfigurement and is

entitled   to   any   non-economic    damages     arising   from   the   accident.

Consequently, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of

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Wokulich on the question of serious disfigurement. We therefore reverse the

court’s order granting summary judgment on her claims for non-economic

damages.

     Order reversed. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/15/2023

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