Court Opinion

ID: 9811631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:26:40.181094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:44.776966
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Actually I concur where the majority states: . we cannot say that he judicially admitted to having a final conviction on the charge he sought to expunge.” This holding, in essence, affirms the case. I say this because the issue presented for review is:
Whether it is an abuse of discretion for a court to grant a petition for ex-punction when it was apparent from the record that the petitioner made a judicial admission in the petition for expunction that a plea of nolo contendré [sic] to a class B misdemeanor was made by the petitioner on the criminal charge that the petition was seeking to expunge.
Nowhere in the DPS’s brief do they allege or argue that the pleadings are insufficient or “that the allegations contained in the petition do not demonstrate Steele’s entitlement to an expunction order” (the words of the majority).1 They, in fact, argue the converse; that the pleadings disprove Steele’s entitlement to the ex-punction order because of his alleged judicial admission.
Nevertheless, I will address the majority’s justification of their reversal — the insufficiency of Steele’s pleadings or proof. As to the pleadings, courts have continuously held that in the absence of any special exceptions, a petition shall be construed liberally in the favor of the pleader. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Financial Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 81 (Tex.2000); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 601 (Tex.1993); Attorney Gen. of Tex. v. Lavan, 833 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex.1992); Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex.1982); Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.1977); Cox v. Union Oil Co. of California, 917 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1996, no writ); Sample v. Freeman, 873 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1994, writ denied). The DPS did not except2 to Steele’s extremely inartful and *356ambiguous pleadings, therefore any defects in Steele’s pleadings were waived.3 Consequently, Steele’s pleadings are not an issue on appeal.
As a final observation, the DPS did not raise insufficiency of the evidence and it is unclear if the majority relies upon insufficiency. Nevertheless, the cases are legion that without a complete record, an appellate court cannot consider sufficiency of the evidence points. See Schafer v. Conner, 813 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex.1991); Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex.1968); Blount v. Dutton, 967 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1998, no pet.); Birran v. Don Wetzel & Assocs., 894 S.W.2d 552, 553 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1995, writ denied); Byrd v. Attorney Gen. of State of Tex., Crime Victims Compensation Div., 877 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1994, no writ); Stine v. Koga, 790 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1990, writ dism’d by agr.); Candelier v. Ringstaff, 786 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1990, writ denied); City of Shenandoah v. Jimmy Swaggart Evangelistic Ass’n, 785 S.W.2d 899, 905 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1990, writ denied).
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the trial court.

. The majority's reversal on this point is in contradiction to the dictate of San Jacinto River Authority v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex.1990). This is becoming a pattern with this court. See In re North American Refractories Co., 53 S.W.3d 917, 925 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 2001, no pet. h.)(Burgess, J., dissenting); In re Nasr, 50 S.W.3d 23, 29 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 2001, orig. proceeding)(Burgess, J., dissenting); Continued Care, Inc. v. Fournet, 979 S.W.2d 419, 424 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1998, pet. denied)(Burgess, J., dissenting).

. Rule 91. Special Exceptions
A special exception shall not only point out the particular pleading excepted to, but it shall also point out intelligibly and with particularity the defect, omission, obscurity, duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency in the allegations in the pleading excepted to. Tex.R. Civ. P. 91.

. Rule 90. Waiver of Defects in Pleading
General demurrers shall not be used. Every defect, omission or fault in a pleading either of form or of substance, which is not specifically pointed out by exception in writing and brought to the attention of the judge in the trial court before the instruction or charge to the jury or, in a non-jury case, before the judgment is signed, shall be deemed to have been waived by the party seeking reversal on such account; provided that this rule shall not apply as to any party against whom default judgment is rendered. Tex.R. Civ. P. 90.