Court Opinion

ID: 9898193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:04.437545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:13.020065
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                            SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
                                                          In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                         WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                            DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                           )         No. 39102-7-III
                                               )
                     Respondent,               )
                                               )
              v.                               )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                               )
SERAFIN MORAN-SANTIAGO,                        )
                                               )
                     Appellant.                )

       LAWRENCE-BERREY, A.C.J. — Serafin Moran-Santiago appeals his conviction for

rape of a child in the third degree. He argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain his

conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he and the

victim were not married. He also challenges a condition of community custody as

unconstitutionally vague.

       We conclude the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction,

accept the State’s concession related to the community custody condition, and remand for

the trial court to modify “romantic/sexual relationships” to “dating/sexual relationships.”
No. 39102-7-III
State v. Moran-Santiago

                                          FACTS

       On the night of April 28, 2021, 15-year-old A.G.1 was home in Spokane drinking

alcohol with a friend while her parents were at work. A.G.’s brother also was home.

That night, Serafin Moran-Santiago, a friend of A.G.’s father and the fiancé of A.G.’s

aunt, arrived at the home.

       Mr. Moran-Santiago lived in Florida but flew to Spokane to recover from surgery

on his ruptured appendix. He called both his fiancée and A.G.’s father for a ride from the

airport, but neither was available because both were working.

       Mr. Moran-Santiago decided to rent a car to drive to A.G.’s father’s house. When

he arrived, he saw A.G. and her friend on the ground screaming. He called A.G.’s father

to tell him about the girls and asked that he come home. Instead, A.G.’s father called

A.G.’s mother, who left work to check on the girls. Mr. Moran-Santiago waited outside

for A.G.’s mother to arrive.

       When A.G.’s mother arrived, A.G.’s friend no longer was at the house. A.G.’s

       1
         To protect the privacy interests of the minor child, we use her initials throughout
this opinion. Gen. Order for Court of Appeals, In re Changes to Case Title (Wash. Ct.
App. Aug. 22, 2018) (effective September 1, 2018), http://www.courts.wa.gov/
appellate_trial_courts.

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No. 39102-7-III
State v. Moran-Santiago

mother was upset by her daughter’s intoxicated condition. But she had to return to work,

so she asked Mr. Moran-Santiago and A.G.’s brother to watch A.G.

      Mr. Moran-Santiago and A.G.’s brother joined A.G. on the back porch, where she

was listening to music. Later that evening, Mr. Moran-Santiago twice asked A.G.’s

brother to leave the patio. A.G.’s brother complied with the second request and went

inside to his room downstairs to play video games.

      Once Mr. Moran-Santiago was alone with A.G., he put her hand on his penis.

Mr. Moran-Santiago next told A.G. to stand up. He directed her to a table, stood behind

her, removed her shorts, and had sexual intercourse with her. Afterward, A.G. and Mr.

Moran-Santiago went inside the house and sat on the couch until A.G.’s mother returned

home. A.G. went to bed without telling her mother what happened.

      When A.G. awoke the next day, she thought the rape was just a dream. But when

she went to the bathroom, she noticed the smell of semen in her underwear.

      A.G. called her friend and told her that her “uncle” raped her. Rep. of Proc.

(RP) at 68. A.G.’s mother learned about the rape through the mother of A.G.’s friend and

took A.G. to a local hospital emergency room. Once there, a nurse performed a sexual

assault examination on A.G.

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No. 39102-7-III
State v. Moran-Santiago

       An analyst with the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory compared oral,

vaginal, perineal, and right and left thigh skin swabs collected from A.G. with a DNA2

sample taken from Mr. Moran-Santiago. The analyst found the presence of spermatozoa

on the vaginal swab that matched Mr. Moran-Santiago’s DNA profile.

       Procedure

       The State charged Mr. Moran-Santiago with rape of a child in the third degree.

During trial, the State’s witnesses testified consistent with the facts above.

       Mr. Moran-Santiago testified in his defense. He testified multiple times that he

was the boyfriend of A.G.’s aunt. He denied that anything sexual occurred between A.G.

and him. When testifying why he was nervous around her, he explained, “[The light from

inside the house shining through the windows to the patio] matters to me because even if

I’m the aunt’s boyfriend, I don’t have a right to be in a dark place with a child.” RP at

183.

       The trial court’s to-convict instruction included an element of child rape in the

third degree that required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that A.G. was not

married to Mr. Moran-Santiago when they had sexual intercourse. The jury found Mr.

Moran-Santiago guilty.

       2
           Deoxyribonucleic acid.

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No. 39102-7-III
State v. Moran-Santiago

       The court sentenced Mr. Moran-Santiago to 13 months of confinement and 36

months of community custody. The court also imposed a condition of community

custody that Mr. Moran-Santiago challenges on appeal:

       11) Do not enter into romantic/sexual relationships without the prior
       approval of your CCO[3]and/or Therapist and not without disclosing your
       criminal history as verified by your CCO and/or Therapist.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 73.

       Mr. Moran-Santiago timely appealed.

                                        ANALYSIS

       SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       Mr. Moran-Santiago contends the evidence was insufficient to convict him

because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that A.G. and he were not

married. We disagree.

       “The sufficiency of the evidence is a question of constitutional law that we review

de novo.” State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). When a defendant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the proper inquiry is, “whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have

found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d

       3
           Community custody officer.

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No. 39102-7-III
State v. Moran-Santiago

1068 (1992). As noted in the trial court’s instructions to the jury, “[a] reasonable doubt is

one for which a reason exists and may arise from the evidence or lack of evidence. It is

such a doubt as would exist in the mind of a reasonable person after fully, fairly, and

carefully considering all of the evidence or lack of evidence.” CP at 43. Our review is

highly deferential to the jury’s decision. State v. Davis, 182 Wn.2d 222, 227, 340 P.3d

820 (2014).

       A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences

that reasonably can be drawn therefrom. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. All reasonable

inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most

strongly against the defendant. Id. Circumstantial evidence is not to be considered any

less reliable than direct evidence. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99

(1980).

       Under RCW 9A.44.079(1), a person is guilty of rape of a child in the third

degree when the person has sexual intercourse with another who is at least 14 years old

but less than 16 years old and the perpetrator is at least 48 months older than the victim.

In 2021, the legislature amended the statute by removing the element that required the

State to prove that the victim and the defendant were not married at the time of the

intercourse. See former RCW 9A.44.079(1) (1988); S.B. 5177, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess.

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No. 39102-7-III
State v. Moran-Santiago

(Wash. 2021). The amendment became effective April 26, 2021, two days before the

charged crime. Compare S.B. 5177, with CP 1.

       The State concedes that the inclusion of the former element in the to-convict

instruction required it to prove that element. See State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97, 102,

954 P.2d 900 (1998) (“In criminal cases, the State assumes the burden of proving

otherwise unnecessary elements of the offense when such added elements are included

without objection in the ‘to convict’ instruction.”); State v. Lee, 128 Wn.2d 151, 159,

904 P.2d 1143 (1995) (“Added elements become the law of the case . . . when they are

included in the instructions to the jury.”). Accordingly, the State had to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that A.G. and Mr. Moran-Santiago were not married at the time of the

intercourse.

       Mr. Moran-Santiago argues the State failed to present any evidence of A.G.’s

marital status, so the evidence it presented was insufficient to support the disputed

element. We disagree.

       The State presented evidence that on the date of the charged crime, A.G. was 15

years old and Mr. Moran-Santiago was 40 to 45 years old. A.G. lived in Spokane and Mr.

Moran-Santiago lived in Florida. Mr. Moran-Santiago testified he had dated A.G.’s aunt

for three years and when describing being with A.G. on the lighted porch, remarked, “I’m

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No. 39102-7-III
State v. Moran-Santiago

the aunt’s boyfriend, I don’t have a right to be in a dark place with a child.” RP at 183.

Finally, A.G. told her friend that her “uncle” had raped her. RP at 68. Construing the

evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State, we

conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

A.G. and Mr. Moran-Santiago were not married on the day of the charged crime.

       Mr. Moran-Santiago, citing State v. Arndt, 179 Wn. App. 373, 320 P.3d 104

(2014), argues that his conviction must be reversed unless the evidence shows it was

“impossible” that he was not married to A.G. Appellant’s Br. at 10. We disagree.

       In Arndt, we were asked to determine whether an Oregon conviction for third

degree rape should be counted toward the defendant’s criminal history for sentencing

purposes. Id. at 388-89. When discussing the legal comparability of the Oregon and

Washington offenses, we noted that the Oregon statute was broader, partly because

Washington required the State to prove that the defendant and the victim were not

married. Id. at 388. When discussing the factual comparability prong, we noted, “Arndt

did not make any admission or stipulation [in the Washington sentencing proceeding]

regarding marital status and the record from the Oregon proceeding [did] not reflect the

marital status of Arndt or the victim.” Id. at 389. We concluded, “[i]nferences from

Arndt’s testimony at sentencing in the present case or from the Oregon marriage statute

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No. 39102-7-III
State v. Moran-Santiago

are not sufficient for a Washington sentencing court to conclude that the fact

that Arndt and the victim were not married was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. (emphasis added).

       In a footnote, we additionally wrote, “The State’s arguments do not show that it

was impossible for Arndt and the victim to have been married.” Id. at 389 n.10 (emphasis

added). Mr. Santiago seizes on the word “impossible” in arguing that Arndt requires his

conviction to be reversed unless the State proved it was “impossible” for him to have

been married to A.G. The word “impossible” in the footnote does not accurately reflect

the analysis in the body of the opinion. In the body of the opinion, we expressly applied

the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. See id. at 389.

       We distinguish Arndt on the basis that here, there was significant evidence from

which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Moran-

Santiago and A.G. were not married.

       COMMUNITY CUSTODY CONDITION 11

       Mr. Moran-Santiago argues that community custody condition 11, which requires

that he obtain approval before entering into “romantic/sexual relationships,” is

unconstitutionally vague. The State concedes this argument and we accept the State’s

concession.

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No. 39102-7-111
State v. Moran-Santiago

       We have previously held that the phrase "romantic relationship" used in a

community custody condition is unconstitutionally vague. State v. Peters, 10 Wn. App.

2d 574, 591, 455 P.3d 141 (2019). Recently, the Washington State Supreme Court held

that the phrase "dating relationship" is not unconstitutionally vague. In re Pers. Restraint

ofAnsell, No. 100753-1, slip op. at 8-14 (Wash. Aug. 10, 2023),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1007531.pdf. We remand for the trial court to

strike the word "romantic" and substitute the word "dating," to read "dating/sexual

relationships."

       We affirm the conviction and remand for the trial court to amend community

custody condition 11.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

                                                                           . c... J.
WE CONCUR:

s~I                                       Birk, J.*

       * The Honorable Ian S. Birk is a Court of Appeals, Division One, judge sitting in
Division Three pursuant to CAR 2l(a).

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