Court Opinion

ID: 9513225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:33:02.356547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:46.905177
License: Public Domain

NEUMANN, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶24] Because Wishnatsky’s interests are adequately represented by the existing defendants, I would affirm the trial court’s order denying his motion to intervene as a defendant.
[¶ 25] In Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980, 106 S.Ct. 383, 88 L.Ed.2d 336 (1985), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained the applicant for intervention as of right has the burden of proving each of the following four elements, the lack of any one of which requires denial of the motion:
“(1) the application must be timely; (2) the applicant must have a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation[;] (3) the applicant’s interest must be impaired by disposition of the action without the applicant’s involvement; and (4) the applicant’s interest must not be represented adequately by one of the existing parties to the action.”
To intervene as of right the applicant must have a “direct, substantial, and legally pro-tectable interest” in the subject matter of the lawsuit and not merely an interest which is *530tangential or collateral to the lawsuit. Fisher, 546 N.W.2d at 356.
[¶ 26] Wishnatsky asserts two grounds for intervention which he claims give him a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest in this lawsuit. First, Wishnatsky asserts he will suffer potential economic loss as a result of the receivership. In the past FLS employed Wishnatsky on a contract basis to write custom computer programs for its credit counseling activities. FLS also occasionally paid Wishnatsky to do research. HCM paid some of Wishnatsky’s overhead expenses incurred in providing voluntary assistance to pro-life attorneys. Wishnatsky asserts he has lost these sources of income because the court-appointed receiver will not hire him to do these tasks.
[¶27] I am not persuaded Wishnatsky’s expectation of income from future contracts with these non-profit corporations constitutes a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest justifying intervention in this lawsuit. Wishnatsky’s interest is a mere expectancy of future income which is both too remote and too contingent to constitute a direct interest justifying intervention. See Portland Audubon Society v. Model, 866 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir.1989) (economic interests in outcome of ease not constituting contractual right is not a “protectable interest” justifying intervention as of right); see also Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487, 493 (N.D.1978) (potential future earnings are too tenuous to be a property right).
[¶ 28] Wishnatsky urges us to recognize “the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage” and claims, if recognized, that cause of action gives him a direct interest in the subject of this lawsuit justifying intervention. I disagree. If Wish-natsky believes he has a tort action for a wrong committed against him by the receiver, or anyone else, that is a separate and independent matter from this lawsuit by the Attorney General to stop fraudulent practices by the defendants. The rule permitting intervention is not intended to allow for the creation of whole new suits by intervenors, nor can intervention be used as a means to inject collateral issues into an existing action. Washington Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Co., 922 F.2d 92, 97 (2nd Cir.1990). Wishnat-sky’s economic interest in performing future services for FLS or HCM is not a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest justifying his intervention in this lawsuit.
[¶ 29] As a second ground for intervention, Wishnatsky asserts he has a First Amendment right to receive ministry from HCM which is jeopardized by the lawsuit. Wish-natsky claims HCM sponsored pro-life speakers and other events that are not provided by any other church in the community. He asserts the receiver’s refusal to allow HCM to continue these sponsorships infringes his free speech and religious free exercise rights under the United States Constitution, which justifies intervention in this lawsuit.
[¶ 30] The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment encompasses a right to receive information and ideas. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 48 L.Ed.2d 346, 355 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 2581, 33 L.Ed.2d 683, 691 (1972). Similarly, the Free Exercise of Religion Clause under the First Amendment affords protection to observe and practice one’s religious beliefs unburdened by state law or regulation, unless there is a compelling state interest to justify the burden. See, e.g., State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631, 635-636 (N.D.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 99, 93 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986). For purposes of this motion, I assume, without deciding, that Wishnatsky has a direct, substantial, and legally protectable First Amendment interest in this lawsuit. Nevertheless, his motion to intervene must fail because he has not demonstrated his interest is inadequately protected by the existing defendants.
[¶ 31] To be allowed intervention as of right under Rule 24(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., the applicant must demonstrate his interest is not adequately represented by existing parties. In Brody By and Through Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1123 (3rd Cir.1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit lists three grounds, any one of *531which, if demonstrated, will constitute inadequate representation:
“(1) that although the applicant’s interests are similar to those of a party, they diverge sufficiently that the existing party cannot devote proper attention to the applicant’s interests; (2) that there is collusion between the representative party and the opposing party; or (3) that the representative party is not diligently prosecuting the suit.”
The applicant for intervention must provide specific reasons showing that the existing defendants may inadequately represent the intervenor’s interests and that disposition of the action will impair the intervenor’s ability to protect those interests. See, e.g., Kiamichi R. Co., Inc. v. National Mediation Bd., 986 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir.1993). Wish-natsky has failed to make the necessary showing on this element.
[¶ 32] The existing defendants have vigorously defended this lawsuit, opposing the Attorney General’s allegations and the appointment of the receiver. Wishnatsky makes no claim the existing defendant’s interests diverge even slightly from his own interests. The defendant’s objectives are to continue the same services and ministry Wishnatsky seeks to preserve as a recipient of them. Thus, Wishnatsky’s protectable interests are parallel to those of the existing defendants. Wishnatsky has not alleged any collusion between the existing defendants and the State. Nor has he alleged that the defendants are not diligently defending this lawsuit or devoting sufficient tíme and attention to the interests he deems important. Consequently, the protectable interests Wishnatsky has in the outcome of this lawsuit are adequately represented by the existing defendants and, for that reason, he is not entitled to intervention under Rule 24(a), N.D.R.Civ.P.
[¶ 33] MESCHKE, J., concurs’.