Court Opinion

ID: 9364089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 14:11:43.3408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:35.492154
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 2

                  SUPREME COURT           OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2020AP877

COMPLETE TITLE:        Rachel Slabey,
                                 Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
                            v.
                       Dunn County, Wisconsin, Dennis P. Smith, Brenda
                       LaForte, Marshall L. Multhauf and Paul Gunness,
                                 Defendants-Respondents,
                       Dunn County Sheriff's Office, Ryan Boigenzahn,
                       John Doe One, John Doe Two and John Doe Three,
                                 Defendants,
                       Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corporation,
                                 Intervenor.

                         REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                         Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 323, 964 N.W.2d 549
                                    (year – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         January 18, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         October 10, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Dunn
   JUDGE:              Maureen D. Boyle

JUSTICES:
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN,
JJ., joined. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Cristina M. Wirth, Martha H. Heidt, and Bye, Goff &
Rohde, Ltd., River Falls. There was an oral argument by Cristina
M. Wirth.
    For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief filed by
Samuel C. Hall, Jr., Timothy M. Johnson, Molly K. Woodford, and
Crivello Carlson, S.C., Eau Claire. There was an oral argument
by Samuel C. Hall, Jr.

    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mark L. Thomsen, Lynn
R. Laufenberg, Kimberly D. Sweatt, and Gingras, Thomsen & Wachs,
LLP, Madison, and James D. Rogers and Wisconsin Association for
Justice, Madison, for the Wisconsin Association for Justice.

                                2
                                                                        2023 WI 2
                                                               NOTICE
                                                 This opinion is subject to further
                                                 editing and modification.   The final
                                                 version will appear in the bound
                                                 volume of the official reports.
No.    2020AP877
(L.C. No.   2017CV277)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                           :            IN SUPREME COURT

Rachel Slabey,

             Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,

      v.

Dunn County, Wisconsin, Dennis P. Smith, Brenda                     FILED
LaForte, Marshall L. Multhauf and Paul Gunness,

             Defendants-Respondents,                           JAN 18, 2023

Dunn County Sheriff's Office, Ryan Boigenzahn,                    Sheila T. Reiff
                                                               Clerk of Supreme Court
John Doe One, John Doe Two and John Doe Three,

             Defendants,

Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Corporation,

             Intervenor.

ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN,
JJ., joined. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.               Affirmed.

      ¶1     ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.            This is a review of

an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, Slabey v. Dunn
County,     No.   2020AP877,   unpublished   slip      op.    (Wis.     Ct.     App.
                                                                         No.        2020AP877

July 7, 2021), affirming the Dunn County circuit court's1 order

granting summary judgment in favor of Dunn County on Rachel

Slabey's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.                 We affirm.

     ¶2      Slabey       argues    that   her    § 1983       claim    against         Dunn

County survives summary judgment because she presented evidence

sufficient      for   a    reasonable      jury   to    find    that     Dunn       County2

violated her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

to   the    United        States     Constitution       when     then-Dunn           County

Correctional       Officer    Ryan    Boigenzahn       sexually        assaulted        her.

According to Slabey, Dunn County is liable because the "County

was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to

Slabey     by   failing      to     thoroughly      investigate,        appropriately

discipline, and adequately supervise Boigenzahn."                       Slabey argues

that the circuit court erroneously granted Dunn County summary

judgment and that the court of appeals erred in affirming that

result.

     ¶3      We conclude that Slabey's § 1983 claim against Dunn

County     fails   because,        under   Monell      v.   Department         of    Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), no reasonable fact finder could

conclude that Dunn County was the causal, moving force behind

the sexual assault.          A § 1983 plaintiff suing a municipality for

a constitutional deprivation must prove that the municipality

caused——that is, was the moving force behind——the constitutional

     1   The Honorable Maureen D. Boyle presided.
     2 All references to "the County" are to Dunn County unless
otherwise noted.

                                           2
                                                                                No.     2020AP877

deprivation.          This requires evidence "that the municipal action

was taken with 'deliberate indifference' as to its known or

obvious consequences."             Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v.

Brown,      520     U.S.   397,   407    (1997)    (quoting         City       of     Canton    v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).                  Here, there is insufficient

evidence       demonstrating         Dunn       County     acted        with         deliberate

indifference to a known or obvious consequence that Boigenzahn

would sexually assault Slabey.                  The circuit court was correct to

grant       Dunn      County      summary       judgment       on      Slabey's          § 1983

constitutional         deprivation       claim.          We    affirm          the    court     of

appeals.

               I.     FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

       ¶4      Ryan     Boigenzahn       began     working        as       a    correctional

officer ("CO") at the Dunn County Jail in April 2011.                                   As part

of his training, Dunn County required Boigenzahn to attend the

Jail       Academy    at   Nicolet      College.         There,     Boigenzahn           took    a

month-long, 160-hour course where, according to Boigenzahn, he

learned "what it is to be a corrections officer in the state of
Wisconsin."          Boigenzahn was also required to participate in the

course's Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 ("PREA")3 training.

Boigenzahn         admitted    during     his    deposition         that       he     "learn[ed]

through that training . . . that sexual contact between inmates

and prisoners was" prohibited by law.                         He passed the training

course,       and     he    received      his     certification            from        the     Law

Enforcement Standards Board in June 2012.                              Boigenzahn worked

       3   34 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30309 (2018).

                                            3
                                                                No.   2020AP877

third shift at the jail as a CO, which was from 10:30 p.m. to

7:00 a.m.

       ¶5     Dunn   County   also   required    Boigenzahn   to   review   and

certify that he reviewed all Dunn County policies, including the

County's fraternization, sexual misconduct, and PREA policies.

Boigenzahn signed these policies, stating, "I certify that I

have        read,    understand,      and       will   comply      with     the

policies . . . ."       Dunn County's fraternization policy includes,

in relevant part:

       Employees of the Dunn County Sheriff's Office shall
       not:

       a.     Have a relationship with an inmate/prisoner or
              the spouse of an inmate/prisoner under the
              supervision or custody of the Dunn County Jail,
              for one year after their release.

       b.     Have a relationship with individuals whom the
              employee knows is [sic] incarcerated in a state
              correctional facility or a county jail other than
              the Dunn County Jail, or under the supervision of
              the    Wisconsin   Department    of   Corrections
              (Probation/Parole), or for one year after their
              release.

       c.     Have personal contacts that are usually one-to-
              one   such  as   dating,   knowingly  form   close
              friendships, correspond without an exception
              granted or have visits that are not job related,
              for a period of one year after their release.

       d.     Accept or give gifts, provide services       in
              exchange for work performed, for one year after
              their release.

       e.     Encourage or allow to occur, the exchange of
              personal or departmental information between the
              employee and an inmate.

                                       4
                                                    No.   2020AP877

The sexual misconduct/PREA policy prohibits all staff, including

COs like Boigenzahn, from engaging in sexual misconduct, which

the policy defines as follows:

    Sexual Misconduct is any behavior or act of a sexual
    nature directed toward an inmate, detainee, victim,
    witness, or complainant by any employee, volunteer,
    vendor, contractor, visitor or agency representative.

    1.    This includes acts or attempts to commit such
          acts including, but not limited to, sexual
          assault, sexual abuse, sexual harassment, sexual
          contact,   conduct   of   a    sexual   nature or
          implication,   obscenity    and   unreasonable or
          unnecessary invasion of privacy.

    2.    Sexual misconduct also includes, but is not
          limited to, conversations or correspondence that
          suggests   a  romantic   or  sexual   relationship
          involving any person mentioned above.

    3.    Sexual misconduct is not limited to unwanted
          sexual contact.     Sexual misconduct is also a
          range of behaviors or situations that include
          inappropriate remarks, sexualized name-calling,
          correspondence,    conversations,    inappropriate
          displays, fondling, inappropriate viewing, and
          sexual contact with individuals vulnerable to the
          authority of the justice system or any other
          person in a work setting.         Such acts are
          inappropriate in a work setting and presumed to
          be unwelcome.

    4.    Romantic relationships between supervisors and
          those under their supervision are presumed to be
          coercive and may be deemed sexual harassment or
          misconduct.
Dunn County's sexual misconduct/PREA policy also requires staff

to report and investigate all alleged violations:

    A.   Reporting Requirements

    1.   Any employee or staff member who knows or
         reasonably suspects that any employee may be or has

                                  5
                                                                       No.    2020AP877

           been involved in sexual misconduct is required to
           inform   the  Jail   Captain.     To  protect   the
           reputations and integrity of all persons engaged in
           such a process, including the accuser, the accused,
           and the alleged victim, all such reports shall be
           dealt with as matters of highest discretion both
           before and after they have been submitted to
           appropriate authorities.

           . . . .

    4.     Upon   receiving  a   report of   possible  sexual
           misconduct or harassment, the Jail Captain shall
           notify the Chief Deputy. The Chief Deputy shall in
           turn notify the Sheriff and other Command Staff as
           appropriate and needed.

    B.     Investigation

    1.     All reported violations of sexual misconduct,
           including sexual assault and harassment, will be
           investigated and, as warranted, will be resolved
           through appropriate disciplinary processes and/or
           criminal proceedings in accordance with applicable
           state and federal laws.
Dunn County requires all staff, including COs like Boigenzahn,

to regularly complete policy reviews.                   According to Boigenzahn's

training    log,        he    completed       at    least   eight   reviews   of    the

County's fraternization, sexual misconduct, or PREA policies.

After each policy review, Boigenzahn certified that he read and

understood the policy.

    ¶6      On July 31, 2015, a CO informed Sergeant Michael Owens

that inmate J.W.B. expressed that staff needed to "keep a close

eye on [the] 'male COs.'"                    Sergeant Owens immediately began

investigating.               He    first     interviewed     J.W.B.      During     the

interview,       J.W.B.       said    that    she    observed    Boigenzahn   passing

notes between inmates on July 28, 2015.                         Sergeant Owens also
"asked     her     if        one     of    [the]    officers     was   developing    a

                                               6
                                                                          No.     2020AP877

relationship with an inmate."                      J.W.B. said "no, nothing like

that."     Sergeant Owens also reviewed surveillance footage of the

alleged incident and recorded phone conversations between the

inmates suspected of note-passing.                    He discovered no evidence of

misconduct and determined "[t]he allegation [was] not supported

on a factual basis."             Sergeant Owens recorded the results of his

investigation        in    a     report    and,      according     to   County    policy,

forwarded that report to his supervisor.

      ¶7     On August 6, 2015, a different inmate, B.M., said to

Sergeant Douglas Ormson that "she actually had a lot of respect

for the staff at the Jail, except for one person who she felt

was in danger of 'crossing the line.'"                       Sergeant Ormson asked

B.M. who she was referring to and to elaborate.                         B.M. identified

Boigenzahn     and        said    he    "was    too     chummy   with     some    of     the

females."      B.M. said she saw another inmate, A.D., "playfully

slap[]     Officer    Boigenzahn          on   the     chest,"   and    that     A.D.   and

Boigenzahn "talked quite a bit."                     Sergeant Ormson asked B.M. "if

she   felt   that     anything         else    had    happened."        B.M.    said    "she
didn't think so, but she felt that if there was an opportunity

where there were no cameras around she felt something might

happen."     B.M. also told Sergeant Ormson how "all the females in

the Jail talk about that, and about [Boigenzahn's] willingness

to talk to them," and how Boigenzahn "maybe liked the attention

from the females."             Sergeant Ormson "asked her again if she had

witnessed anything sexual or even heard any rumors about that

type of relationship," and B.M. said she hadn't "but again said
her feeling was that was a possibility if things progressed."
                                               7
                                                                          No.     2020AP877

B.M. said she "knows that there is a 'bright line' that staff

aren't supposed to cross" and felt "if Officer Boigenzahn hasn't

already crossed that line that he is getting dangerously close

to doing it."

       ¶8     The next day, Sergeant Ormson discussed this matter

with Sergeant Owens, who stated he heard similar allegations,

and Sergeant Rachel Vold.            The three decided that Sergeant Vold

would        review     surveillance         footage     to       investigate          the

allegations.          Sergeant Vold reviewed two weeks of surveillance

footage and found two concerning instances.                    On July 29, 2015,

while delivering medications to inmates, Boigenzahn "playfully

reach[ed] out his foot to step on [A.D.]'s foot."                         On August 6,

2015, again while delivering medications, Boigenzahn "gesture[d]

with his head as if motioning someone to come in his direction,

and also with his right arm.            [A.D.] then [came] running over to

him. . . . [A]s she walk[ed] away she brush[ed] him with her

hand    on    his     shoulder/chest   area."          Pursuant      to    Dunn    County

policy, Sergeant Vold forwarded this information to the Jail
Captain on August 10, 2015.            The Jail Captain told Sergeant Vold

to interview A.D., which she did later that day.

       ¶9     During     that   interview,     Sergeant       Vold    informed        A.D.

that "at no time should there ever be any sort of contact with

an officer, male or female, whatsoever."                  Sergeant Vold "went on

to   ask     [A.D.]    if   there   [were]    any   instances        where      she   felt

uncomfortable [because of] any male or female officer."                               A.D.

said that Boigenzahn made her feel uncomfortable.                         A.D. reported
that three months prior, she and Boigenzahn "accidentally bumped
                                         8
                                                                     No.     2020AP877

hands" and that A.D. "pulled her hand back, where [Boigenzahn]

then responded that it was alright[;] he didn’t mind."                           A.D.

"went    on    to    say    that   other       female    inmates . . . told       her

[Boigenzahn] seems to be 'obsessed' with her and that they have

observed him standing and watching her sleep."                       Sergeant Vold

asked A.D. "if there were any other instances or officers that

made her feel uncomfortable, to which she responded no."

    ¶10       Later that same day, the Jail Captain and the Dunn

County     Chief     Deputy     interviewed       Boigenzahn    regarding      these

allegations.        Boigenzahn initially denied passing notes between

inmates, but he admitted to doing so once the Jail Captain and

Chief Deputy reminded Boigenzahn that he could be terminated for

lying.     Boigenzahn said he made a "dumb mistake passing the note

and it w[ould] not happen again."                    They also showed Boigenzahn

the videos of him and A.D., but he denied that there was any

inappropriate        conduct.       The    Jail      Captain   and   Chief    Deputy

further discussed "policy violations, co-worker mistrust, and

inmates who now think there is a relationship between [A.D.] and
CO Boigenzahn."            Boigenzahn explained that he "tries to gain

rapport or cooperation with inmates but now sees that he needs

to be sterner."

    ¶11       Pursuant to Dunn County policy, the matter was then

brought to the Dunn County Sheriff.                  Based on the results of the

investigation, the Sheriff decided that Boigenzahn violated Dunn

County's policies which prohibited fraternization and unbecoming

conduct.       The    Sheriff      decided      to    impose   discipline.        The
available options were performance counseling, oral reprimand,
                                           9
                                                                             No.     2020AP877

written      reprimand,    unpaid        suspension,          and    termination.         The

Sheriff      initially    "was       planning      on    terminating         [Boigenzahn].

But [he thought that Boigenzahn] really had been a pretty good

jailer on a lot of other notes, . . . so the decision was made

to give him a three-day suspension and try and say wake up."

Accordingly,       on     August       26,     2015,          Dunn    County       suspended

Boigenzahn for three days without pay.                         When communicating the

Sheriff's      disciplinary          decision,          the     Chief      Deputy      warned

Boigenzahn:

      I expect you will take this opportunity to correct
      your improper conduct in the future, fully meet the
      duties and responsibilities required of you and
      observe all the rules and procedures of your job. If
      you fail to do so, you will subject yourself to
      further disciplinary action, including discharge and
      termination of your employment with the County.
Boigenzahn returned to work on August 29, 2015.                                The Sheriff

also considered moving Boigenzahn to the day shift so he could

be   under    greater     supervision        because          more   staff    worked     that

shift, but the Sheriff decided against this because "it would

affect somebody on day shift that would be bumped off from that

shift and forced onto the night shift."

      ¶12     About     nine    months      later,      in    May    2016,    inmate     A.D.

reported      to      Sergeant       Vold     that         Boigenzahn        again      acted

inappropriately.               She    stated        that       Boigenzahn          frequently

contacted      inmate     B.S.        A.D.        stated      that    on     one     occasion

Boigenzahn accepted a note that was sexual in nature from B.S.

Surveillance footage showed that on April 17, 2016, at 2:32
a.m., Boigenzahn spent 12 minutes out of camera view and near

                                             10
                                                                             No.    2020AP877

B.S.'s bunk.          Boigenzahn later admitted that he did receive the

note from B.S.          On May 19, 2016, the County placed Boigenzahn on

administrative leave, and on May 31, 2016, he was terminated.

       ¶13     About        one    month       after    Dunn     County         terminated

Boigenzahn, on June 27, 2016, inmate Slabey was heard saying,

"[Boigenzahn]         must     have    stuck    his    hand    down    somebody      else's

pants, too."           According to Slabey, she said this "jokingly."

Investigator          Dan    Westlund,      however,    who    was     at    the    jail   to

interview       Slabey        regarding      an     unrelated        matter,       overheard

Slabey's remark.             He immediately reported what he heard to the

Jail       Captain.         Pursuant   to    County    policy,       the     Jail   Captain

called her supervisor, the Chief Deputy, and the matter was

reported to the Sheriff.               The Sheriff requested that an outside

agency investigate Slabey's allegations.                       The Menomonie Police

Department then investigated the allegations against Boigenzahn.

       ¶14     The      criminal         investigation          regarding           Slabey's

statement revealed that on March 25, 2016, about seven months

after       Boigenzahn       was   first       disciplined      by     the     County,     he
sexually assaulted Slabey.                  Boigenzahn entered the Huber Dorm4

and talked with Slabey and her bunkmate.                      Slabey was on the top

       The Huber Dorm is an open area with bunk beds for inmates
       4

on Huber work release. See generally Wis. Stat. § 303.08 (2019-
20).

                                               11
                                                    No.   2020AP877

bunk in a location that was apparently out of camera view.5

According to Slabey, she "made a comment [to Boigenzahn] about

do you ever get in trouble . . . . And he's like yeah, I've

gotten in trouble before, he's like, but I can –- pretty much

saying he didn't care, you know."   It is undisputed that during

this time, Boigenzahn began touching Slabey and put his hand

down her pants.   Slabey told Boigenzahn, "no," and he pulled his

hand out.     According to Slabey, Boigenzahn said, "you're not

going to tell on me, are you. . . . And [Slabey] told him no,

I'm not going to tell on you."      Radio checks were typically

conducted after ten minutes of not hearing from a CO on rounds

and, according to Boigenzahn, he did receive a radio check the

night of the assault.   There was however no radio check during

the 45 minutes Boigenzahn was with Slabey and her bunkmate.

Boigenzahn was charged and subsequently convicted and sentenced

to prison for second-degree sexual assault by correctional staff

contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(h) (2016-17).

    ¶15     Notably, it was just two days prior to the sexual
assault that, pursuant to Dunn County policy, Boigenzahn had

attended a legal update session that included PREA training.

Boigenzahn admitted that, at the time of the sexual assault, he

    5  According to Slabey's deposition, also on or about
March 25, 2016, Slabey asked Boigenzahn "if [she] could move
down to the bottom bunk . . . because it was open."       Slabey
claimed Boigenzahn "told [her], why would you want to move there
because this one is off camera view up here, and he said that
[she] couldn't move." Slabey took this to mean at the time that
it would be easier for her to have contraband if she remained on
the top bunk.

                               12
                                                                                    No.      2020AP877

knew       it    was    against       state      law,    against       County       policy,       and

against PREA.

       ¶16       On    November       15,   2017,       Slabey       commenced        this    action

against Dunn County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the

County      violated        her     rights       under       the    Eighth      and    Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.6                               Dunn County moved

for    summary         judgment,       arguing        that     it    was   not      liable     under

§ 1983          because     "the      County       did       not     act     with      deliberate

indifference to [Slabey's] safety," "there is no evidence upon

which       a    jury     could     find     a    Dunn       County    policy,        custom,      or

practice violated her constitutional rights," and "[Slabey's]

substantive due process rights were not violated by the County."

Slabey          opposed       summary       judgment,         arguing        that      there      are

"sufficient           facts    to     support     a     jury       finding    [of]     deliberate

indifference" and that "Dunn County's informal custom/policy of

ignoring         dangers      to    female       inmates       caused      Slabey's       [sexual]

assault."

       ¶17       The    circuit       court      held    a    hearing      on    Dunn     County's
motion and subsequently issued a written decision granting Dunn

County summary judgment.                      The court concluded, "There is no

evidence          that        [Dunn     County's]            training         practices          were

       In her petition for review, Slabey asserted claims against
       6

not just Dunn County but also several individual defendants
employed by the County.       In her briefing, however, Slabey
asserts claims only against Dunn County and therefore has
abandoned her claims against the individual defendants.      A.O.
Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Companies, 222 Wis. 2d 475, 492,
588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[A]n issue raised on appeal,
but not briefed or argued, is deemed abandoned.").

                                                  13
                                                                                   No.     2020AP877

constitutionally deficient and that the County was aware of the

deficiency and failed to abate the deficiency."

       ¶18    Slabey appealed the circuit court's order.                                 The court

of appeals affirmed, concluding there is "no evidence upon which

a reasonable fact finder could rely to conclude [Dunn County

was]     deliberately          indifferent           to   a     substantial             risk    that

Boigenzahn      would         sexually     assault        an    inmate."            Slabey,       No.

2020AP877, ¶1.

       ¶19    Slabey      petitioned        this      court         for    review,        which   we

granted.

                                II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW

       ¶20    "We independently review a grant or denial of summary

judgment,      applying         the      same   method         as    the        circuit    court."

Hoida,       Inc.   v.    M&I       Midstate      Bank,        2006        WI    69,     ¶15,     291

Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17.                     "While our review is independent

from the circuit court and court of appeals, we benefit from

their analyses," both of which concluded that summary judgment

is   appropriate.             DSG   Evergreen        Fam.      Ltd.       P'ship    v.     Town   of
Perry, 2020 WI 23, ¶15, 390 Wis. 2d 533, 939 N.W.2d 564.                                          "We

will   affirm       a    grant      of   summary      judgment            when    there     are   no

genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled

to   judgment       as    a    matter     of    law."          Baumeister          v.     Automated

Prods., Inc., 2004 WI 148, ¶11, 277 Wis. 2d 21, 690 N.W.2d 1.

"A factual issue is 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-

moving    party."         Midwest        Neurosciences          Assocs.,          LLC     v.    Great

                                                14
                                                                         No.    2020AP877

Lakes    Neurosurgical     Assocs.,        LLC,     2018    WI     112,        ¶80,    384

Wis. 2d 669, 920 N.W.2d 767.

                                 III.    ANALYSIS

     ¶21   The   parties    do    not     dispute    that       Slabey     suffered      a

constitutional deprivation because she was sexually assaulted by

Boigenzahn.7     The issue in this case is not whether Boigenzahn

committed a sexual assault.             He did, and what he did to Slabey

was terribly wrong.        But a claim against Boigenzahn is not the

claim we analyze today.       Whether Dunn County is liable to Slabey

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an altogether separate legal inquiry.

In analyzing that issue, we must consider the exacting standards

set forth in Monell, 436 U.S. 658.                  In short, Slabey asserts

that "Dunn County was deliberately indifferent to a substantial

risk of harm to Slabey by failing to thoroughly investigate,

appropriately discipline, and adequately supervise Boigenzahn."8

     ¶22   Because   the    only        issue   before     us    is   whether         Dunn

County is liable to Slabey under § 1983, we must analyze the

standards outlined in Monell.                 We begin with an overview of

     7 Though the issue is not before us, for purposes of this
review, we assume without deciding that Boigenzahn violated
Slabey's constitutional rights.
     8 Slabey raised an additional issue in her opening brief,
arguing that Dunn County is not entitled to qualified immunity.
However, Dunn County does not argue here that it is entitled to
qualified immunity.    Nor could it.   It is well settled that
municipalities cannot assert qualified immunity.    Owen v. City
of   Independence,   445   U.S.   622   (1980)   (holding   that
municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity); see also
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 248 n.9 (2011)
(recognizing the same).

                                         15
                                                                      No.   2020AP877

municipal liability under § 1983.                  See Monell, 436 U.S. 658.

Specifically,         the     causation         requirement     in     Monell      is

dispositive.      We then conclude that Slabey failed to demonstrate

that   Dunn    County's     action    or    inaction     was   the    moving    force

behind her constitutional deprivation.                   Because Slabey cannot

demonstrate the requisite causation, we need not analyze the

other criteria of a municipality's liability in a § 1983 claim

under Monell.

                       A.   Monell Liability Generally

       ¶23    Unlike any liability that may exist for an individual

like Boigenzahn, in order for a municipality to be liable in a

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she

can satisfy the exacting standards set forth by Monell.                         Under

§ 1983,

       Every person who, under color of any statute,
       ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
       or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
       causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
       States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
       to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
       immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
       be liable to the party injured . . . .
In   Monell,    436    U.S.    658,   the       United   States      Supreme    Court

interpreted "person" within the meaning of § 1983 as including

local governing bodies.          Monell involved public employees whose

employers "had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant

employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves

were   required    for      medical   reasons."          Id.   at    660-61.      The
employees sued the Department of Social Services and Board of

                                           16
                                                                No.     2020AP877

Education of the City of New York for damages under § 1983.                  Id.

at 660-62.        The Court held that the employees could sue these

local governing units:

      Congress did intend municipalities and other local
      government units to be included among those persons to
      whom   § 1983   applies.      Local  governing  bodies,
      therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for
      monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as
      here,    the   action    that    is   alleged   to   be
      unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
      statement,    ordinance,    regulation,   or   decision
      officially adopted and promulgated by that body's
      officers.
Id. at 690 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).

      ¶24    However, the Court also explained that "Congress did

not   intend      municipalities    to    be   held   liable   unless    action

pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a

constitutional tort."         Id. at 691.      "[A] municipality cannot be

held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor——or, in other

words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory."          Id. (emphasis omitted).         "Instead,

it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may

fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury

that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983."

Id. at 694.       Monell and its progeny thus require a plaintiff to

satisfy each of the following to prove municipal liability under

§ 1983:     (1)   "identify   a    municipal   'policy'   or   'custom'     that

caused the plaintiff's injury"; (2) "the municipal action was
taken with the requisite degree of culpability"; and (3) there

                                         17
                                                                               No.     2020AP877

is "a direct causal link between the municipal action and the

deprivation of federal rights."                    Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 403-

04.    Because this case is resolved on the third requirement,

causation, we need not address the first two.

                   B.   Section 1983 Causation Under Monell.

      ¶25     To prevail in her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Dunn County, Slabey must demonstrate that the County caused her

constitutional          deprivation.         Slabey       argues    that       causation     is

satisfied         because     (1)    "Dunn         County       failed     to    thoroughly

investigate        claims     that   Boigenzahn's            conduct      would      cross    a

line";    (2)      "Dunn    County     failed        to     appropriately        discipline

Boigenzahn in light of the clear risk of harm that his conduct

posed to inmates generally and Rachel Slabey specifically"; and

(3)   Dunn    County       "failed     to    properly       supervise      Boigenzahn        to

prevent      any    further    escalation          of     his    misconduct."           Slabey

argues that these acts of the County caused her constitutional

deprivation         because     they        "caused       Boigenzahn's          conduct      to

escalate to Slabey's assault."
      ¶26     "Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has

not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an

employee to do so, rigorous standards of . . . causation must be

applied      to    ensure    that    the     municipality         is     not    held    liable

solely for the actions of its employee."                         Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S.

at 405.       Monell requires plaintiffs to "demonstrate a direct

causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of

federal rights."            Id. at 397.            "[M]ere 'but-for' causation is
insufficient."           Harte v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 864 F.3d 1154, 1204
                                              18
                                                                                No.    2020AP877

(10th    Cir.    2017)    (quoting          Bryan       Cnty.,    520      U.S.       at    410).

Rather, a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim under Monell must

demonstrate that a municipality was not just a cause, but the

"moving force" behind the constitutional deprivation.                                      Monell,

436 U.S. at 694-95.

       ¶27    Monell's    causation          requirement         is   a    high       bar     for

plaintiffs to clear.                 "[L]esser standards . . . would require

the federal [and state] courts endlessly to 'second-guess' the

wisdom of municipal [programs], a task inappropriate for the

federal [and state] judiciar[ies]."                      Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch.

Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing City of Canton,

489 U.S. at 392).           The requirement is "applied with especial

rigor    when    the    municipal         policy    or        practice     is     itself      not

unconstitutional,        for     example,         when     the    municipal           liability

claim    is     based    upon    inadequate             training,     supervision,            and

deficiencies in hiring."                  Schneider v. City of Grand Junction

Police Department, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation Claims & Defenses
§ 7.12 (2013)).         In such cases, a § 1983 plaintiff "must" prove

causation by showing "that the municipal action was taken with

'deliberate       indifference'            as      to     its      known        or     obvious

consequences.       A showing of simple or even heightened negligence

will    not   suffice."         Bryan      Cnty.,       520    U.S.   at    407       (citation

omitted).        Evidence       of    a    "pattern       of     tortious       conduct"       is

typically       necessary   to        establish         that    the   municipal            action

"rather than a one-time negligent administration of the program
or factors peculiar to the officer involved in                                  a particular
                                             19
                                                                      No.   2020AP877

incident, is the 'moving force' behind the plaintiff's injury."

Id. at 407-08 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91); see

also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) ("[W]here

the   policy      relied     upon     is        not   itself    unconstitutional,

considerably      more     proof    than     the      single   incident     will   be

necessary in every case to establish . . . the causal connection

between the 'policy' and the constitutional deprivation.").

      ¶28    Slabey acknowledges that hers is a "single incident"

case because of the "absence of prior sexual assaults of female

inmates by male guards."            She argues that, although the single-

incident     theory   governs      her     claim,     she   nonetheless     prevails

under that theory because "Dunn County acted with deliberate

indifference to a significant, obvious risk of sexual violence

to all female inmates."

      ¶29    Though not impossible, it is exceedingly rare that a

§ 1983 plaintiff under Monell can prove causation based on a

single      incident.9      The     United       States     Supreme   Court    first

      9This rigorous standard is what drives our analysis.
Section 1983 plaintiffs suing municipalities must clear a high
bar——a bar that is even higher when alleging liability based on
a "single incident." For those who would relax this standard by
conflating it with our standard of review on summary judgment,
doing so would massively broaden the "single incident" exception
and "only invite jury nullification of Monell." City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 399 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

                                           20
                                                                     No.    2020AP877

recognized the possibility of such a claim in City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378.            In City of Canton, officers failed to

seek    medical    attention     for    an     arrested    suspect    despite    the

suspect sitting on the floor of the patrol car, responding with

"an     incoherent   remark"      when       asked   if     she    needed   medical

attention, "slump[ing] to the floor on two occasions," and lying

on the floor.            Id. at 381.         The plaintiff argued that the

officers "were not provided with any special training (beyond

first-aid training) to make a determination as to when to summon

medical care for an injured detainee."               Id. at 382.       The Supreme

Court    noted    that    a   claim    based    on   a    single   incident   might

survive in some cases:

       [I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned
       to specific officers or employees the need for more or
       different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy
       so likely to result in the violation of constitutional
       rights, that the policymakers of the city can
       reasonably   be   said   to  have   been  deliberately
       indifferent to the need.

     If this were not the well-established standard, we could
instead reinvent § 1983 law and analyze how Dunn County might
have merely allowed, rather than caused, Slabey's constitutional
deprivation.   However, that would be a sea change in the law.
Causation under Monell requires much more than "but-for"
causation.   Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 404, 410 (1997) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).     "In virtually every instance
where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated
by a city employee, a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to
something the city 'could have done' to prevent the unfortunate
incident."    City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392.     Whether Dunn
County could have done more is not the applicable legal
standard.

                                         21
                                                                             No.      2020AP877

Id. at 390.             In such a situation, "the need to train . . . can

be said to be 'so obvious,' that failure to do so could properly

be characterized as 'deliberate indifference' to constitutional

rights."      Id. at 390 n.10 (citation omitted).                    The Supreme Court

dismissed the § 1983 claim and concluded that "the evidence in

the    record . . . does            not    meet      th[is]       standard       of      § 1983

liability."         Id. at 392.

       ¶30    The Supreme Court again considered, but rejected, an

argument that this "single-incident" theory applied in Board of

Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397.                                    There,

the § 1983 plaintiff argued that the municipality was liable for

an    officer's         use   of   excessive        force   because        it    failed        to

adequately screen the officer's background prior to hiring him,

and that such screening would have uncovered that the officer

was    previously         "charged    with     assault      and    battery,        resisting

arrest, and public drunkenness."                      Id. at 412-13.               The Court

reasoned,     "[e]ven         assuming     without     deciding      that       proof     of    a

single    instance         of     inadequate       screening      could     ever      trigger
municipal liability, the evidence in this case was insufficient

to    support       a    finding     that,    in     hiring      [the   officer],          [the

Sheriff] disregarded a known or obvious risk of injury."                                 Id. at

412.

       ¶31    The       Supreme    Court     also   considered       and    rejected        the

single-incident theory posed in Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51

(2011).      In Connick a § 1983 plaintiff sued a municipality for a

constitutional deprivation caused by a prosecutor's failure to
turn   over     exculpatory         evidence.         Id.   at     55-56.          The    Court
                                              22
                                                                             No.    2020AP877

reasoned    that        because   prosecutors            already        received          legal

training    on    the    issue,   the    § 1983      plaintiff's         constitutional

deprivation was not "so predictable that failing to train the

prosecutors amounted to conscious disregard for defendants[]."

Id. at 71 (emphasis omitted).                     The Court therefore concluded

that this case did not fall within the "narrow range of 'single-

incident'     liability       hypothesized          in     Canton       as     a    possible

exception    to    the    pattern       of    violations      necessary            to     prove

deliberate indifference in § 1983 actions."10                     Id. at 71-72.

     ¶32    The    Tenth      Circuit        in   Schneider       v.    City       of     Grand

Junction Police Department, 717 F.3d 760, similarly rejected use

of the single-incident theory in a § 1983 claim.                                   There, an

officer sexually assaulted a 911 caller while responding to the

call.     Id. at 763.         The plaintiff argued that, in light of a

prior complaint against the officer, the municipality failed to

adequately investigate, discipline, and supervise the officer.

Id. at 766.       The court rejected each of these claims against the

municipality.           The   court      relied       on    the        facts       that     the
municipality "conducted the criminal investigation regarding the

[prior] complaint," and it "disciplined [the officer] with a pay

cut and probation" along with a "notice of discipline [informing

     10In each of these cases where the Supreme Court
hypothesized that single-incident theory could apply, the
plaintiffs brought failure-to-train claims, and the Court
considered the possibility that the theory might apply only in
such cases.   We note that Slabey's claim is based on alleged
failures to investigate, discipline, and supervise Boigenzahn,
but not a failure to train him.

                                             23
                                                              No.    2020AP877

the officer] that his conduct was unacceptable."              Id. at 775,

777.    As for the failure-to-supervise claim, the court found "no

evidence that additional controls or sanctions . . . would have

had any more deterrent effect than the already-present threats

of discharge and criminal punishment."        Id. at 780.

       ¶33   Similarly, the First Circuit in Santiago v. Fenton,

891 F.2d 373, 382 (1st Cir. 1989), rejected a § 1983 claim that

was based on a single incident.          The officer in Santiago used

excessive     force   against   the      plaintiff,     who   argued       the

municipality failed to discipline the officer for an earlier

incident.      Id.    The   court   nonetheless       concluded     that   the

municipality was entitled to summary judgment on the failure-to-

discipline claim and stated:

       The city and the department undisputedly had a policy
       of investigating complaints that expressly included
       the   disciplining    of   officers   in   appropriate
       circumstances.     In both of these instances the
       department conducted an investigation and hearing but
       decided that discipline was not appropriate.     As we
       have indicated before, we cannot hold that the failure
       of a police department to discipline in a specific
       instance is an adequate basis for municipal liability
       under Monell.
Id.

       ¶34   Slabey places great reliance on the Seventh Circuit's

decision in J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2020)

(en banc), where a § 1983 plaintiff succeeded on the single-

incident theory.11    In J.K.J., the Seventh Circuit concluded that

       Four judges on the en banc panel dissented:
       11                                                             Circuit
Judges Easterbrook, Brennan, Bauer, and Sykes.

                                    24
                                                                                   No.        2020AP877

Polk County, Wisconsin, acted with deliberate indifference "in

the face of an obvious and known risk that its male guards would

sexually    assault       female          inmates."              Id.    at        381        (emphasis

omitted).      That case involved two inmates at the Polk County

Jail who "endured repeated sexual assaults at the hands of [a]

correctional officer."             Id. at 370.

      ¶35   When      Polk    County           had    earlier          learned          of     similar

allegations     against        a     different          guard,         it     "imposed          minor

discipline on the guard but from there took no institutional

response——no review of its policy, no training for guards, no

communication      with      inmates       on    how       to    report       such       abuse,     no

nothing."      Id. at 370-71.              The jail's Captain "knew of sexual

comments male guards made about female inmates" and "admitted to

himself participating in [it]."                      Id. at 382.             The Captain also

knew that an officer's conduct "began with watching [the inmate]

shower, grew to requests to expose her body for him, and in time

intensified to forcibly touching her in a sexual manner——all the

while ordering her to 'keep quiet.'"                            Id.     Importantly, "with
red   lights   flashing,           Polk    County       chose         the    one        unavailable

option——doing      nothing.          It        did   not    change          its    sexual        abuse

policy, institute a training, inquire of female inmates, or even

call a staff meeting."               Id. at 383.                Although Polk County did

investigate     and    reprimand           a    guard       for       inappropriate            sexual

behavior, jail officials assured him that it was "not a big

deal."   Id.

      ¶36   Unlike     Polk    County,           this   record         reflects          that     Dunn
County in fact required significant, relevant training of its
                                                25
                                                                            No.    2020AP877

officers and took nearly immediate action upon a complaint of

noncompliant conduct.            Dunn County thoroughly investigated the

August 2015 complaint and acted in a timely manner to impose

unpaid leave on the officer.              Boigenzahn was sternly warned for

the policy violations, which were passing notes between inmates

and non-sexual physical contact with an inmate.                            He was warned

that his behavior would not be tolerated and that he could be

terminated.       Leave    without       pay    was    one    of     the    most    severe

options    of    discipline,       just    short        of    termination.              When

Boigenzahn      returned    to    duty,        he   was      required       to    continue

training and monthly policy reviews.

     ¶37   Nine months had gone by with Boigenzahn working as a

CO, and there was no indication of his noncompliance.                             The very

next time the County learned that Boigenzahn was noncompliant

because    he    had   received      a    note        from    an     inmate,       he   was

terminated.       In fact, unlike the facts in Polk County, Dunn

County first gained knowledge of this off-camera sexual assault

only after the County had already terminated Boigenzahn.
     ¶38   Slabey      argues      Dunn    County          acted     with        deliberate

indifference to a known or obvious consequence that Boigenzahn

would sexually assault an inmate when it "failed to thoroughly

investigate     claims     that    Boigenzahn's            conduct    would       cross    a

line," "failed to appropriately discipline Boigenzahn in light

of the clear risk of harm that his conduct posed to inmates

generally and Rachel Slabey specifically," and when it "failed

to   properly     supervise       Boigenzahn          to     prevent        any    further
escalation of his misconduct."             However, this allegation in the
                                          26
                                                                             No.    2020AP877

August 2015 complaint was thoroughly investigated.                             The County

officials reviewed two weeks of surveillance video, interviewed

inmates,      and    concluded     that     Boigenzahn          committed      a    serious

violation     of    County   policy.         The       evidence       demonstrated      that

Boigenzahn      passed     notes   between        inmates       and    had    inmate      non-

sexual contact.        The County acted within a month from allegation

to discipline.         The matter did not languish.                     Despite several

less severe options, Boigenzahn was suspended for three days

without pay and sternly warned, "If you fail to [correct your

improper      conduct],      you     will        subject        yourself      to    further

disciplinary action, including discharge and termination of your

employment with the County."              He was also given additional PREA

training two days before the assault.                       For about nine months

after Boigenzahn returned, Dunn County had no reason to believe

he was noncompliant.

       ¶39    Nonetheless, Slabey argues that the County should have

done more and, because it did not, it caused her constitutional

deprivation.         In   other    words,        she    argues     that      the    County's
deliberate indifference "caused Boigenzahn's conduct to escalate

to    Slabey's      assault."        However,          Slabey    offers      insufficient

evidence of how the County was deliberately indifferent given

its     policies,         training,       investigation,              discipline,         and

additional stern warning of termination for conduct quite unlike

a    sexual   assault.          According        to     Slabey,       the    only   way    to

safeguard against the wrong that was done to her would be that

the    County       should    have     terminated          Boigenzahn,          constantly
supervised him, or not allowed him to have any contact with
                                            27
                                                                       No.    2020AP877

female inmates.12          However, the record reflects that three COs

worked the night shift, with two splitting up to do rounds in

different parts of the Jail and the third staying in the central

office.13         Additionally,       staffing       restrictions     prevented    the

County from moving Boigenzahn off the night shift.                           In other

words, constant supervision or moving Boigenzahn were unworkable

options given Dunn County's Jail; therefore, the only acceptable

option in hindsight would have been to terminate Boigenzahn for

passing     notes       and   nonsexual        conduct.        Accepting     Slabey's

arguments would make the County liable on a respondeat superior

theory,     a    result    the     Supreme     Court   has    explicitly     rejected.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

     ¶40        In short, Dunn County is entitled to summary judgment

because there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable fact

finder to conclude that Dunn County was the moving force behind

her being sexually assaulted.                     Boigenzahn sexually assaulting

Slabey    was     the     result    of   his      action,    which   was   completely

forbidden by Dunn County and the criminal law.                       It is hindsight

     12Slabey also identifies the County's failure to conduct a
radio check during the 45 minutes that Boigenzahn was with
Slabey, and its failure to make sure Slabey's bunk was in view
of a surveillance camera as acts of deliberate indifference.
However, these demonstrate the kind of "one-time negligent
administration of [a] program" that is insufficient to satisfy
Monell causation. Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 408.
     13 The Jail Captain testified in her deposition that
typically three COs worked the night shift, and that one of them
stayed in the central office at all times. Boigenzahn testified
in his deposition that two COs "split up" to do facility-wide
checks.

                                             28
                                                                         No.     2020AP877

alone that underlies Slabey's causation theory.                          Causation in

the context of a § 1983 claim requires much more.                              "[L]esser

standards . . . would           require       the    federal   [and    state]     courts

endlessly to 'second-guess' the wisdom of municipal [programs],

a task inappropriate for the federal [and state] judiciar[ies]."

Doe, 15 F.3d at 453 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392).

Taken together, these facts do not demonstrate that the known or

obvious consequence of the County's action or inaction was that

Boigenzahn would sexually assault an inmate.

       ¶41   Overall, Slabey's allegations do not rise to the level

of a cognizable § 1983 claim against Dunn County.                        Just because

the     County        could    have,     in    hindsight,      done      some     things

differently, does not mean that the County was the moving force

behind the assault.             Section 1983 "does not provide plaintiffs

or     courts    carte        blanche    to    micromanage      local        governments

throughout the United States."                     Connick, 563 U.S. at 68.           The

standards of a § 1983 claim under Monell are exacting.                          Slabey's

claim does not survive that scrutiny.
                                   IV.    CONCLUSION

       ¶42   Slabey argues that her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against

Dunn    County    survives       summary      judgment      because    she     presented

evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Dunn

County    violated       her    rights     under      the   Eighth    and    Fourteenth

Amendments       to    the    United    States      Constitution      when     Boigenzahn

sexually assaulted her.                 According to Slabey, Dunn County is

liable because the "County was deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of harm to Slabey by failing to thoroughly
                                              29
                                                                        No.    2020AP877

investigate, appropriately discipline, and adequately supervise

Boigenzahn."      Slabey argues that the circuit court erroneously

granted Dunn County summary judgment, and that the court of

appeals erred in affirming that result.

    ¶43     We conclude that Slabey's § 1983 claim against Dunn

County fails because, under Monell, no reasonable fact finder

could conclude that Dunn County was the causal, moving force

behind     the   sexual   assault.         A     § 1983    plaintiff          suing    a

municipality for a constitutional deprivation must prove that

the municipality caused——that is, was the moving force behind——

the constitutional deprivation.                This requires evidence "that

the municipal action was taken with 'deliberate indifference' as

to its known or obvious consequences."              Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at

407 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388).                     Here, there is

insufficient     evidence   that   Dunn    County       acted     with    deliberate

indifference to a known or obvious consequence that Boigenzahn

would sexually assault Slabey.        The circuit court was correct to

grant    Dunn    County     summary    judgment           on    Slabey's         § 1983
constitutional     deprivation     claim.         We    affirm     the        court   of

appeals.

    By     the   Court.—The   decision      of    the     court    of     appeals     is

affirmed.

                                      30
                                                                            No.      2020AP877.jjk

       ¶44     JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.                  (dissenting).         "The confinement

setting is a tinderbox for sexual abuse."                          J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty.,

960 F.3d 367, 381 (7th Cir. 2020).

       ¶45     While women are vulnerable almost everywhere in our

society, they are especially at risk in correctional settings

where an estimated 25 to 41 percent of incarcerated women are

sexually abused.             Hannah Brenner et al., Bars to Justice: The

Impact of Rape Myths on Women in Prison, 17 Geo. J. Gender & L.

521,    537-38       (2016).         In   such       settings      female       prisoners     are

dependent on guards (who are disproportionately male) for their

very existence.             This includes "their safety as well as their

access to food, medical care, recreation and even contact with

family       members."         J.K.J.,         960    F.3d    at     381.         Due    to   the

imbalances of power, the correctional context is ripe for abuse

as    "[p]rison       rape     represents        the     intersection           of     masculine

elitism      and     deprivations         of   civil     rights."           Maureen      Brocco,

Facing       the   Facts:      The    Guarantee         Against         Cruel     and    Unusual

Punishment in Light of PLRA, Iqbal, and PREA, 16 J. Gender Race
&    Just.    917,    917    (2013).           Sexual    abuse       is    about      power   and

control      and     "this     psychosocial          dynamic       is     amplified      in   the

prison context."         Id.

       ¶46     Victims       of    sexual        abuse       often      confront        profound

physical, social, and psychological effects.                              These effects can

be    debilitating       and      overwhelming,         and     they      are    magnified     in

confinement settings.              "Victims often endure great physical pain

and sustain various injuries.                    Moreover, any episode of sexual
assault could ultimately prove deadly since incarcerated victims

                                                 1
                                                                   No.   2020AP877.jjk

are at an increased risk of contracting sexually transmitted and

other communicable diseases such as HIV, AIDS, tuberculosis, and

hepatitis B and C."           Kevin R. Corlew, Congress Attempts to Shine

a Light on a Dark Problem: An In-Depth Look at the Prison Rape

Elimination Act of 2003, 33 Am. J. Crim. L. 157, 160 (2006).

      ¶47   To    combat      the   scourge    of   sexual     assaults      in    the

confinement setting, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination

Act   (PREA)     in   2003.      But   the    enactment   of   a    law    aimed   at

stopping prison rapes does not in and of itself put an end to

sexual violence.        Prisons and jails must take steps to prevent

and detect sexual misconduct.            And important to this case, when

sexual abuse does occur, it is incumbent on the judicial system

to hold to account those who are responsible in order to protect

vulnerable inmates.           It is here where the majority falls short.

In wrongly concluding that the circuit court's grant of summary

judgment for Dunn County should be upheld, the majority allows

the county to escape all responsibility for (1) ignoring clear

warning signs that former Dunn County correctional officer Ryan
Boigenzahn had engaged in inappropriate and escalating behavior

with female inmates, and (2) creating the circumstances that

allowed Boigenzahn to sexually assault Rachel Slabey while she

was incarcerated in the Dunn County Jail.

                                         2
                                                                 No.    2020AP877.jjk

                               I.   BACKGROUND

    ¶48    Boigenzahn sexually assaulted Slabey1 while she was in

her bunk in the Dunn County Jail on March 25, 2016.2                     It was the

middle of the night in the Huber Dorm.3                 Boigenzahn was tasked

with checking the women's dorm despite his recent suspension for

violating the jail's fraternization policy.                  Boigenzahn surveyed

the women's dorm alone, unmonitored, and entirely unsupervised.

That night, Boigenzahn spent 45 minutes in Slabey's dorm, an

extraordinarily       long   time   compared     to    the    few   seconds       that

guards usually took to check the dorm during the night.                            And

although the Dunn County Jail practice is for the central office

of the jail to conduct radio checks when an officer fails to

report    back   to    the    central       office    after    10      minutes,    no

supervisor checked in on Boigenzahn during the 45 minutes he was

in the dorm, despite his known history of fraternization.                           By

    1  Normally, to protect the dignity and privacy of Slabey, a
victim of sexual assault, I would use initials or pseudonyms to
identify her. However, because Slabey filed this lawsuit using
her real name, I do not follow that practice for her here. To
protect the dignity and privacy of other inmates, who were
witnesses or victims of Boigenzahn, I use initials.
    2  Mindful that this is a summary judgment review, I will set
out the factual background necessary to understanding this case
by presenting Slabey's evidence as true while drawing all
reasonable inferences in her favor, as the court must when
reviewing a summary judgment decision.       See Burbank Grease
Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 WI 103, ¶40, 294 Wis. 2d 274,
717 N.W.2d 781.
    3  A Huber facility is a county correctional facility that
houses inmates who have been granted leave privileges (typically
work release) under Wis. Stat. § 303.08(1).      See Wis. Stat.
§ 303.09.

                                        3
                                                               No.   2020AP877.jjk

all accounts, no one was monitoring Boigenzahn as he abandoned

his duties to prowl around Slabey's dorm.

    ¶49    The jail assigned Slabey to the only bunk in the dorm

that was entirely unmonitored by security cameras, a fact both

Boigenzahn   and    Slabey   knew.          Boigenzahn   himself     previously

denied   Slabey's    request    to    be    moved   to   a    different    bunk.

Additionally,      the   jail    recently       transferred      Slabey      from

administrative segregation, causing her concern that if she did

anything to "make a scene" or displease Boigenzahn, she would be

transferred back.        And, unsurprisingly, Slabey did not think

that anyone would believe her or protect her if she spoke up and

complained about Boigenzahn.          In a word, Slabey was vulnerable.

    ¶50    Armed     with       the     knowledge        of    his      victim's

vulnerabilities, Boigenzahn entered the Huber Dorm, found Slabey

and her bunkmate, D.S., and began talking with them.                 One of the

topics of conversation was Boigenzahn's reputation for spending

an inappropriate amount of time with female inmates.                      Slabey

"made a comment [to Boigenzahn] about do you ever get in trouble
. . . . And [Boigenzahn was] like yeah, I've gotten in trouble

before, he's like, but I can——pretty much saying he didn't care,

you know." As he was talking to the inmates, Boigenzahn began

touching Slabey, first by rubbing her hand.                   Slabey tried to

protect herself by moving away and lying down, but Boigenzahn

persisted.   He went after her, grabbing her pants, then her leg,

then Boigenzahn shoved his hand down Slabey's pants and inside

her underwear.

                                        4
                                                                    No.    2020AP877.jjk

    ¶51     While Boigenzahn was sexually assaulting her, Slabey,

now completely defenseless, went silent.                    She did not want to

call attention to his actions "because it was so quiet in there"

and she "didn't want to have a scene or have him say something

like,     oh,     [she]   did      something       and     put     [her]        back    in

[segregation]."           During     the       sexual     assault,        Slabey       felt

"confused," "in shock" and "didn't know what to do."                                After

sexually assaulting her, Boigenzahn asked Slabey if she would

tell anyone.        Slabey told him no, and soon after, Boigenzahn

left the Huber Dorm.

    ¶52     This sexual assault did not occur without warning.                          It

was not a freak occurrence, a force majeure that could have

neither    been     foreseen    nor       prevented.            Instead,        sheriff's

department      officials——importantly          here,     the    Sheriff        himself——

first   ignored     the    clear    warning       signs    that     Boigenzahn         had

already engaged in inappropriate and escalating behavior with

female inmates, and then created the circumstances that allowed

Boigenzahn to sexually assault Slabey.
    ¶53     Prior to the sexual assault, the Sheriff had ample

warning    that    Boigenzahn      was,    in     the    words     of     one    inmate,

"dangerously close to crossing the line."                   Sheriff's department

officials were first alerted to Boigenzahn's conduct in July

2015, about eight months before the sexual assault.                                Inmate

J.W.B. informed a correctional officer, and subsequently a jail

sergeant, that officials needed to "keep a close eye on" the

                                           5
                                                                          No.   2020AP877.jjk

male correctional staff.4                    When asked for an example, J.W.B.

explained     that       on    two    separate       occasions,     an    officer     passed

notes      between      female       and     male    inmates.       J.W.B.        originally

refused      to    identify          the    officer     in    question      for    fear     of

retaliation,           but    upon     further       questioning,        she      identified

Boigenzahn.         Passing notes was a violation of the Dunn County

Jail's fraternization policy, one that historically resulted in

suspension        or    termination.           Despite       the   seriousness       of    the

allegations, the sergeant only reviewed surveillance video for

one   of    the    two       instances      J.W.B.    reported,     and    he     failed   to

question Boigenzahn or the inmates directly.                        After this cursory

investigation, the sergeant concluded that there was no factual

basis for J.W.B's claims.

      ¶54     About one week later, another inmate, B.M., told a

different     sergeant         that        Boigenzahn   was     dangerously        close   to

"crossing the line," and that he had been getting "too chummy"

with some of the female inmates.                     B.M. said that she had not yet

witnessed         anything      sexual,        but    she    believed      "that     was     a
possibility if things progressed."                    As an example, she told this

      4When questioned whether her concerns were "in regards to
fraternization," J.W.B. indicated that she did not understand
what fraternization meant. The sergeant then asked whether the
officer "was developing a relationship with an inmate." J.W.B.
answered in the negative, but there was no additional
explanation of what the sergeant meant by "relationship" in that
context nor any additional attempt to understand what J.W.B.
understood "relationship" to mean.    This exchange illustrates
how important it is to ensure that female inmates (as well as
guards) understand "what abuse entails," particularly since
"they may come from life experiences that have blurred the lines
of abnormal and normal relationships."    J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty.,
960 F.3d 367, 375 (7th Cir. 2020).

                                                6
                                                              No.     2020AP877.jjk

sergeant that Boigenzahn had been talking with another inmate,

A.D., when A.D. playfully slapped Boigenzahn on the chest.                      B.M.

said that if there was an opportunity when there were no cameras

around, "something might happen," and "all the females in the

Jail talk about that."          If Boigenzahn hadn't already crossed the

"bright line" that staff are not supposed to cross, B.M. said,

"he [was] getting dangerously close to doing it."

       ¶55    In response to the above reports, sheriff's department

officials reviewed surveillance footage and found two incidents

that    corroborated      B.M.'s      concerns.      First,      on    July     29,

Boigenzahn entered the Huber Dorm, stepped out of camera range

for a few minutes, then stepped back into view when another

officer entered the room.             While the other officer was handing

out breakfast, Boigenzahn reached out and "playfully" stepped on

A.D.'s foot.       She then stepped back on his foot.                 Second, on

August 6, Boigenzahn entered the dorm and shut the door behind

him.     He    gestured   "as    if   motioning   someone   to      come   in    his

direction," at which point A.D. ran over to him and "brush[ed]
him with her hand on his shoulder/chest area."

       ¶56    Sheriff's department officials then questioned A.D.,

asking her whether any officer ever made her feel uncomfortable.

A.D. "immediately" informed the officials that Boigenzahn made

her    feel    uncomfortable       and    provided   the    following         three

examples.      First, she described an instance where her hand and

Boigenzahn's hands accidentally touched.              She pulled her hand

away and apologized, but he responded that "it was alright, he
didn't mind."       Second, other inmates told her that Boigenzahn

                                         7
                                                                          No.    2020AP877.jjk

seemed to be "obsessed" with her, and they observed him standing

and    watching   her    sleep.        Third,       she    explained       that     he    just

"lingered too long" around her.                     Like J.W.B., A.D. explained

that she did not report Boigenzahn sooner because she was afraid

of retaliation.         In response to A.D.'s statements, the sergeant

pressed A.D. and asked "if there had ever been anything more

than statements made or him watching her."                          In doing so, the

sergeant seemingly dismissed A.D.'s claim that Boigenzahn was

obsessed with her, watched              her sleep,          and lingered too long

around her, as if that information alone were unimportant to the

investigation.

       ¶57   Sheriff's      department             officials        then         met      with

Boigenzahn and questioned him about the inmates' allegations.

Boigenzahn initially lied to the officials and denied passing

notes between inmates, only confessing after he learned that he

would be terminated if he were not truthful.                        He denied that he

acted inappropriately toward A.D., which officials also found to

be false.
       ¶58   Despite     knowing       that       Boigenzahn       had,     at     the    very

least, violated the jail's fraternization policy and attempted

to conceal and lie about his violations, the Sheriff decided

against terminating Boigenzahn.                    The Sheriff made this choice

despite the fact that violations of the fraternization policy

"historically"     resulted       in    termination,         and    despite        the    fact

that    Boigenzahn's     lying,    in     and      of     itself,    was        grounds    for

termination.      The Sheriff opted instead for a far more lenient
response and suspended Boigenzahn for three days before allowing

                                              8
                                                                       No.    2020AP877.jjk

him to return to work——in the same position——where he continued

to have unfettered access to vulnerable women inmates.                                  The

Sheriff did not put Boigenzahn on a different shift, one where

more staffing would allow for more supervision.                              He did not

assign   Boigenzahn        to    a   different     section,      away        from   female

inmates.        He   did    not      bar    Boigenzahn        from   having         further

unsupervised contact with female inmates; in fact, he did not

assign any staff to further monitor or investigate Boigenzahn at

all.     Instead, the Sheriff sent an officer who violated jail

policies, lied to officials, and raised such serious red flags

that multiple inmates reported him despite fears of retaliation,

back to guard female inmates on the lightest-staffed shift with

little   to    no    monitoring.           And   that    is    how     former       officer

Boigenzahn accessed, cornered, and sexually assaulted, Slabey on

March 25, 2016.

                                     II.   ANALYSIS

       ¶59    When Dunn County took Slabey into custody, it assumed

an   affirmative     duty       to   protect     her   from    harm.         DeShaney    v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489                       U.S. 189,           199-200

(1989) ("When the State takes a person into its custody and

holds [her] there against [her] will, the Constitution imposes

upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for

[her] safety and general well-being.").                   Sexual assault is one

of those harms, for while the Eighth Amendment "does not mandate

comfortable prisons," sexual assault "is simply not part of the

penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society."      See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-834 (1994)

                                            9
                                                                  No.    2020AP877.jjk

(internal citations omitted).               Sexual offenses "tend . . . to

cause    significant    distress      and    often      lasting     psychological

harm," Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012),

and there is little doubt that Slabey's Eighth Amendment rights

were violated when Boigenzahn sexually assaulted her.                       The only

question here is whether Slabey may hold Dunn County accountable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "plainly imposes liability on a

government that, under color of some official policy, 'causes'

an employee to violate another's constitutional rights."                           See

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 692 (1978).

       ¶60   While    the     standards      for     establishing          municipal

liability     under     §     1983    are     rigorous,         "they      are     not

insurmountable."        J.K.J.,      930    F.3d   at    378.       In     order    to

establish liability and survive summary judgment on her claim

against Dunn County, Slabey must bring sufficient evidence for a

jury to reasonably find that Dunn County (1) had an official

policy, custom, or decision, (2) that demonstrated the requisite
level of culpability, and (3) caused her injury.                         See Bd. of

Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-

404 (1997).         I will discuss each of these elements in turn

before explaining why a jury could reasonably find for Slabey on

each.

       ¶61   First, Slabey must identify an official Dunn County

policy or custom that caused her injury.                  Monell, 436 U.S. at

690.    The Supreme Court has recognized that a decision by an
official     with     final    policy-making         authority          meets    this

                                       10
                                                                            No.     2020AP877.jjk

requirement——that              is,    municipal          liability       attaches       when    "a

deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from

among     various            alternatives         by     the    official       or     officials

responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the

subject matter in question."                     Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 483 (1986).                Inaction, as well as action, may serve as

the     basis        for        municipal          liability,        depending          on     the

circumstances.               Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61-62 (2011)

("[a] policy of inaction in light of notice that its program

will     cause       constitutional               violations        is     the      functional

equivalent      of       a    decision      by    the    city     itself   to     violate      the

Constitution." (internal citations omitted)).

       ¶62   Second,            Slabey           must     establish        Dunn         County's

culpability,         which      under    Monell         means     that   she     must    provide

sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the county's actions

demonstrated         a       "deliberate         indifference"       to     the     "known     or

obvious"     consequence             that    a     constitutional          violation         would

occur.       Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S.                      at 407.      While a pattern of
constitutional violations is "ordinarily necessary" to establish

the    requisite         notice      that    an     official      course    of      conduct     is

inadequate, the risk of a constitutional violation may be so

obvious      that        the     municipality's            actions       could      demonstrate

deliberate indifference to that risk.                           See Connick, 563 U.S. at

64.     The Supreme Court in City of Canton v. Harris provided the

following example of deliberate indifference: if city policy-

makers, having armed their police officers with firearms, fail
to train those officers on the constitutional limitations on

                                                  11
                                                                           No.    2020AP877.jjk

deadly force, that failure could be characterized as deliberate

indifference.         City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390

n.    10    (1989).         The    Seventh      Circuit       in   Glisson        v.   Indiana

Department of Corrections provided another example: the failure

to establish coordinated care protocols for inmates with chronic

illnesses could reflect deliberate indifference if a jury found

the    need     for     those       protocols        obvious,       even     absent      prior

constitutional violations.                 Glisson v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 849

F.3d 372, 382 (7th Cir. 2017).                  And in J.K.J. v. Polk County the

Seventh Circuit provided another, one relevant to this case: the

failure to institute more robust policies to prevent the sexual

assault of female inmates in the face of a guard's escalating

behavior can demonstrate deliberate indifference to the known or

obvious risk of sexual assault.                 J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 385.

       ¶63     Third, Slabey must establish sufficient evidence for a

jury to find that Dunn County's actions caused her injury.                                   That

is, the official actions must be the "moving force" behind the

constitutional violation.                  Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 400 (1997).
A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions

of    its     employee       solely    because       it   employed         that     employee.

Monell,       436     U.S.    at      691.          Instead,       the     plaintiff         must

"demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action

and the deprivation of federal rights."                        Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S.

at 404.

       ¶64     Slabey established sufficient evidence for a jury to

find    for    her     on    each     of     these    three    requirements            by:    (1)
identifying a course of action by a final policy-maker——namely,

                                               12
                                                                        No.    2020AP877.jjk

the Sheriff's choice to return Boigenzahn to his standard shift

with no additional supervision; (2) alleging sufficient evidence

for a jury to conclude that the risk of sexual assault was so

predictable     that     the    Sheriff's        course    of        action    constituted

deliberate indifference; and (3) alleging sufficient evidence to

show   that    the     Sheriff's       course    of    action        caused    the     sexual

assault.      Her § 1983 claim against Dunn County should therefore

survive      summary    judgment.          I    address        how    Slabey     met    each

requirement in more detail below.

                A.     Official Policy, Custom, or Decision

       ¶65    Slabey     met     the     first        requirement        for     municipal

liability     under     § 1983     because       she    identified        a    "deliberate

choice to follow a course of action" by a final policy-maker.

See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483.                   As Slabey points out, and Dunn

County does not dispute, the Sheriff was the final policy-maker

for staffing and disciplinary decisions at the Dunn County Jail.

And he, as that final policy-maker, deliberately chose to adopt

a particular course of action——to retain Boigenzahn and send him
back   to    guard     female    inmates       alone,     on    the    lightest-staffed

shift, with no additional supervision, investigation, or follow-

                                           13
                                                                           No.    2020AP877.jjk

up.5        The Sheriff had "various alternatives" to his course of

action.         See     Pembaur, 475         U.S.      at     483.         One     of         those

alternatives was to terminate Boigenzahn.                           Termination was not

just an option, but (as the Sheriff acknowledged), the typical

disciplinary          response      for    violations        of      the    fraternization

policy.       Another alternative was to adjust Boigenzahn's schedule

to     accommodate      increased         supervision        and     monitoring          of    his

behavior.         The     Sheriff         considered        these    alternatives,             but

instead       chose     the   one     course      of    action       that        would    allow

Boigenzahn to spend significant time alone and unmonitored with

female inmates.

        ¶66    Slabey may not have identified a written policy that

caused her injury, but she does not need to.                           Monell liability

attaches where "a deliberate choice to follow a course of action

       Because Slabey focused on this particular course of
        5

action, this dissent will too. However, I note that in similar
cases, plaintiffs have presented expert testimony identifying a
variety of additional measures that jails must take to protect
female inmates from sexual assaults.      These measures include
"informing guards of the inherent vulnerability the confinement
setting presents to female inmates, educating jailers on the
symptoms of an inmate suffering from the trauma of abuse,
requiring officers to report each other's misconduct, or taking
any time to otherwise instruct guards on matters of prevention
and detection."   J.K.J., 960 F.3d 367 at 379.    Prevention and
detection measures also include: a designated PREA coordinator,
staff training on what to look for and how to report abuse as
well as how to make inmates feel comfortable coming forward,
taking additional care with job assignments within facilities,
ensuring that all inmates understand their right to be free from
sexual abuse and harassment as well as making sure inmates
understand what abuse entails, and a confidential way for
inmates to report abuse. Id. at 375. An additional, vital, and
seemingly obvious prevention measure is not allowing male guards
to be alone and unmonitored with female prisoners.       Cash v.
Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 331 (2d Cir. 2011).

                                             14
                                                                           No.    2020AP877.jjk

is made among various alternatives by the official or officials

responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the

subject matter in question."                 Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483.                   Slabey

sufficiently identified that deliberate choice here.

                                     B.    Culpability

       ¶67     Slabey also met the culpability requirement because

she presented enough evidence for a jury to reasonably find that

the     Sheriff's      official           course    of    action      was        taken        with

deliberate indifference to the                     known or obvious              risk that a

sexual assault would occur.                   Whether the risks were known or

obvious      and      whether        the     Sheriff        acted     with         deliberate

indifference are questions of fact.                      See Sherrod v. Lingle, 223

F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000).                     Next I demonstrate how a jury,

assessing      the    facts    of    this     case,      could     reasonably        conclude

that: (1) Boigenzahn’s prior behavior created a known or obvious

risk    that    he    would    sexually       assault       an    inmate     and        (2)    the

Sheriff's      decision       to    send     Boigenzahn        back   to     guard       female

inmates reflected deliberate indifference to that                           risk.
                1.    Known or Obvious Risk of Sexual Assault

       ¶68     When    evaluating           Boigenzahn's           prior         conduct        to

determine      whether    the       risk     of    sexual      assault      was     known       or

obvious, it is important to note that "consent is not an issue"

when    a    correctional          officer    has     "sexual       contact        or    sexual

intercourse with an individual who is confined in a correctional

institution if the actor is a correctional staff member."                                     Wis.

Stat.    §§ 940.225(2)(h),            940.225(4).         In      enacting        Wis.     Stat.
§ 940.225(2)(h),        the     legislature         barred       consent    from        being    a

                                              15
                                                                              No.    2020AP877.jjk

defense in this context because it recognized that the power

imbalance         between      correctional         staff       and      inmates          in     the

confinement        setting,       coupled      with       restrictions              on   inmates'

freedom,       make     it   impossible       for    inmates        to    freely         consent.

Because      an    inmate      cannot    consent         to    sexual     conduct          with   a

correctional staff member, an inmate's "words or overt actions

that might indicate a freely given agreement to have sexual

intercourse        or    sexual        contact"     in        the   outside          world       are

irrelevant        in    this    instance.          See    Wis.      Stat.       § 940.225(4).

Accordingly, the deliberate indifference inquiry must be viewed

through      the    correct      lens    of   the        confinement          setting.           And

through this lens, conduct that merely foreshadows consensual

sexual    contact       in     other    contexts     may      serve      as    notice       of    an

obvious risk of sexual assault in the confinement setting.                                       See

Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 337 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting

that    because        (like    Wisconsin)         New    York      state       law      did     not

tolerate any sexual contact between guards and prisoners, jail

officials "were thus obligated to do the same in carrying out
their affirmative duty to protect prisoners from harm.").

       ¶69     A jury aware of the distinctive nature of sexual abuse

in the correctional setting could, based on Slabey's evidence

and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, make three

factual      findings:         (1)     Boigenzahn         engaged        in     inappropriate

behavior with female inmates, based on the corroborated reports

of     three       different         inmates;       (2)       Boigenzahn's               behavior,

particularly with A.D., was not just inappropriate, but sexually
charged; and (3) Boigenzahn had a propensity to lie and conceal

                                              16
                                                                        No.    2020AP877.jjk

inappropriate behavior unless directly confronted, and sheriff's

department officials knew about this propensity.                        Based on these

findings, a jury could reasonably conclude that the Sheriff had

notice that Boigenzahn was engaging in a pattern of escalating

and   inappropriate         behavior         toward       female    inmates——including

physical conduct——that was likely to lead to sexual assault.                               I

will address each of the potential factual findings in turn.

      ¶70    First,    based         on    the   corroborated       reports      of    three

different inmates, a jury could find that Boigenzahn engaged in

inappropriate behavior with female inmates, some of which was

physical    in     nature.          Two    of    those    inmates     warned     sheriff's

department officials that the behavior was likely to escalate,

or "cross the line" if it had not already.                         One of the inmates,

A.D., reported that Boigenzahn "made her uncomfortable," told

her that "he didn't mind" when their hands accidentally touched,

and, according to other inmates, even watched her while she

slept.      Additionally,            Sheriff's         department     officials       viewed

video surveillance of Boigenzahn which corroborated some of the
inmates' reports.

      ¶71    Second,        a       jury        could      reasonably         infer     that

Boigenzahn's       behavior,         particularly        with   A.D.,    was     not   only

inappropriate,        but        sexually            charged.       Just       because     a

municipality       labels       behaviors        as    "fraternization"        instead    of

sexual misconduct does not mean that the majority should defer

to that characterization, or assume that a jury must.                              As Dunn

County's     own    sexual          misconduct         policy   acknowledges,         sexual
conduct     encompasses         a    "range      of     behaviors,"     including,       for

                                                17
                                                                              No.    2020AP877.jjk

example,      "conduct            of     a   sexual     nature       or   implication"         and

"unreasonable or unnecessary invasion of privacy."                                  A jury could

reasonably conclude that Boigenzahn's physical conduct with A.D.

was   "conduct         of     a   sexual      implication."           A   jury       could     also

reasonably conclude that "obsessing" over an inmate and watching

her   sleep       is     an       "unreasonable         or     unnecessary          invasion    of

privacy."

      ¶72    The majority errs when it dismisses Boigenzahn's prior

behaviors        and        mischaracterizes            them    as    "nonsexual."              See

majority op. at ¶¶36, 39.                    In doing so, the majority incorrectly

draws inferences in Dunn County's favor, rather than Slabey's

favor.      See Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 2006 WI

103, ¶40, 294 Wis. 2d 274, 717 N.W.2d 781 (when reviewing a

summary judgment decision, "we draw all reasonable inferences

from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party.").         Sheriff's department officials viewed                             surveillance

footage     of    Boigenzahn            quite   literally       "playing       footsie"        with

A.D., which even the Oxford English Dictionary recognizes as
"surreptitiously touching a person's foot or ankle with one's

foot . . . as           a     playful         expression        of    sexual         attraction"

(emphasis        added).               Officials    also       viewed     footage       of     A.D.

stroking Boigenzahn's chest and shoulder after he beckoned her

over to him.           And A.D. reported that Boigenzahn told her that he

"didn't     mind"       when       their      hands      touched.         A    jury,     viewing

Boigenzahn's behavior in the proper context of the confinement

setting and drawing on their life experiences and common sense,

                                                   18
                                                                        No.    2020AP877.jjk

could    reasonably          conclude      that     his   actions        were     sexually

charged.

       ¶73    Third,     a     jury      could     find   that    Boigenzahn        had     a

propensity to lie and conceal inappropriate behavior, and that

the sheriff's department officials knew about his dishonesty.

Officials       knew    that    Boigenzahn         initially     lied    about     passing

notes between male and female inmates, and only confessed when

told     that    he     would       be    terminated      for     being        untruthful.

Additionally, Boigenzahn himself admitted to officials that he

"tends not to tell the truth."                   And finally, officials knew that

Boigenzahn appeared to intentionally stand out of camera view in

the Huber Dorm.          A jury could find that the Sheriff knew that he

could not trust Boigenzahn due to his deceptive tendencies, yet

chose    to     put     him    back      in   the    female      dorm,        without     the

supervision or monitoring that Boigenzahn clearly needed.

       ¶74    Taking all of these facts and inferences together, a

jury could find that there was a known or obvious risk that

Boigenzahn's behavior would escalate to sexual assault.                                   The
jury could find that the Sheriff received notice from multiple

female inmates that Boigenzahn's behavior was escalating, had

become       physical,        and     would      cross    the    line     from      merely

inappropriate to predatory, if it had not already.                               The jury

could find that this escalating behavior was, at the very least,

"conduct of a sexual implication" that——along with the inmates'

warnings——created notice of an obvious risk that sexual assault

would occur.           The jury could find that Boigenzahn had already
lied to sheriff's department officials and attempted to evade

                                              19
                                                                No.   2020AP877.jjk

detection for his behaviors——thus, he could not be trusted and

clearly required supervision and monitoring.                   Taking all these

facts together in the context of the confinement setting, with

its stark power imbalance between guards and female inmates, the

jury    could    reasonably    conclude        that      Boigenzahn's    behavior

created a known or obvious risk that he would sexually assault

an inmate.

  2.     Deliberate Indifference to the Known or Obvious Risk of

                               Sexual Assault

       ¶75    A jury, having found that Boigenzahn's actions created

an obvious risk that sexual assault would occur, could further

find that the Sheriff's decision to put Boigenzahn back on his

normal shift reflected deliberate indifference to that risk.

       ¶76    In determining that the Sheriff was not deliberately

indifferent,     the   majority     suggests      that   the   Sheriff's   chosen

course of action——suspending Boigenzahn for three days——was a

"severe" response to Boigenzahn's behavior, and that the Sheriff

chose it over less severe options.                See majority op. at ¶¶36,
38.    This   does   not   square   with    the    Sheriff's    admission     that

"historically fraternization turns into a termination," and that

a short suspension was the "minimum" appropriate disciplinary

action for passing notes.           The Sheriff's disciplinary response

was lenient, based on his own admissions, and does not preclude

a finding of deliberate indifference as a matter of law.                       See

Cash, 654 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding a jury finding of

deliberate indifference even though the sheriff's department had
previously suspended a guard for misconduct).

                                       20
                                                                     No.    2020AP877.jjk

      ¶77    The     majority        also     concludes      that    the      Sheriff's

decision to send Boigenzahn back to guard the female prisoners

on   the    night    shift     was    not     deliberate    indifference       in     part

because     moving     Boigenzahn        to    a   different       shift    with     more

supervision "would affect somebody on day shift that would be

bumped off from that shift and forced onto the night shift."

See majority op. at ¶11.               But the administrative inconveniences

inherent to protecting constitutional rights in the confinement

setting are no excuse for failing to protect those rights.                             For

instance, the difficulty in finding the time and staff to train

officers     about     the     constitutional      limits     on    excessive        force

before     handing     those    officers       firearms    would    not     preclude     a

finding of deliberate indifference.                 See Canton, 489 U.S. at 390

n. 10.      Nor would any difficulties, staffing or otherwise, in

enacting "centralized treatment protocols for chronically ill

inmates."        See Glisson, 849 F.3d at 382.                Replacing one staff

member      or    changing      one     staff      member's    schedule         is     not

"unworkable," as the majority suggests, see majority op. at ¶39,
but in fact a relatively small undertaking compared to adopting

a    new    training       program     or     revamping    healthcare       protocols;

therefore, it is difficult to understand why the inconvenience

of doing either would preclude a jury from finding for Slabey on

the deliberate indifference element of the Monell test.                                The

Sheriff     may     have     decided    to     retain     Boigenzahn       despite     his

behavior toward female inmates in part because replacing him

would be inconvenient, and "[Boigenzahn] had been a pretty good
jailer on other notes," but the choice still demonstrated a

                                              21
                                                                            No.   2020AP877.jjk

deliberate indifference to the "note" that mattered here——the

safety of female inmates.

                                      C.    Causation

       ¶78    Slabey also established enough evidence for a jury to

reasonably      find     that       the    Sheriff's       course      of    action     caused

Slabey's injury.

       ¶79    Much of the same evidence that supports Slabey's claim

on the culpability requirement also supports it on the causation

requirement.           Specifically,         evidence       of    an   obvious       risk   of

sexual       assault    can     support       both     a    finding         of    "deliberate

indifference"          and     "an        inference        of     causation——that           the

municipality's indifference led directly to the very consequence

that was so predictable."                 Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409-410.                 If

a jury could reasonably conclude that the risk of sexual assault

was obvious enough that the failure to take action constituted

deliberate indifference, it may take "but a small inferential

step" for a jury to find that the failure to take action caused

the    injury.         J.K.J.,       960     F.3d     at    384.        Causation,        like
culpability, is a fact question for a jury——"finding causation

is not a mechanical exercise like working a math problem and

getting an answer, but instead requires jurors to view evidence

in    its    totality,       draw    on    their     life       experiences       and   common

sense, and then reach reasonable conclusions about the effects

of particular action and inaction" (emphasis in original).                                  Id.

at 384–385.       Here, Slabey established enough evidence for a jury

to do so.

                                              22
                                                                    No.    2020AP877.jjk

    ¶80        Slabey's evidence "paved multiple roads for the jury

to travel" to find that the Sheriff's actions caused her injury.

See id. at 385.            A jury could find that if the Sheriff had

pursued the typical course of action and terminated Boigenzahn

for his violations of the fraternization policy (and arguably,

the sexual misconduct policy, as discussed above), Boigenzahn

would not have had access to sexually assault Slabey or any

other    inmate.      A    jury    could   alternatively         find     that    if    the

Sheriff had instead switched Boigenzahn to a shift that allowed

for more supervision, Boigenzahn would have been prevented from

spending a significant amount of time alone and unmonitored with

female inmates, and thus would have either been dissuaded from

sexually assaulting an inmate for fear of the consequences, or

denied the opportunity to sexually assault an inmate at all.                              A

jury could also infer that the Sheriff's failure to take any

additional     action      to   protect    female     inmates      both     emboldened

Boigenzahn      and   silenced       inmates        who    now    understood           that

objecting to his behavior was essentially futile.                         Since any of
these inferences would be reasonable, a jury could conclude from

Slabey's evidence that the Sheriff's course of action caused the

sexual assault to happen.

    ¶81     The Sheriff's actions were the "moving force" behind

Slabey's injuries.          See Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 400.                    This is

not a case where a plaintiff is attempting to prove causation

simply    by    showing     that    she     would    not    have     been        sexually

assaulted "but for" the municipality's original decision to hire
the perpetrator.          See id.    Instead, Slabey established that her

                                           23
                                                                     No.    2020AP877.jjk

sexual assault was caused by the Sheriff's decision to put a

guard with a known history of inappropriate and arguably sexual

conduct toward female inmates back in a position where he would

be alone and unmonitored with those inmates.                           The Sheriff's

decision      was   thus   not     only   a    "but    for"    cause       of   Slabey's

injuries, but "closely related to the ultimate injury."                                 See

Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.             A jury could therefore reasonably find

that Slabey has met the causation requirement.

       ¶82    Because Slabey established sufficient evidence that a

final   policy-maker         acted    with     deliberate      indifference        to    a

serious      risk   of   sexual    assault,     and    in    doing   so     caused    her

sexual assault, she has met all three requirements for Monell

liability.      Based on the evidence Slabey provided, a jury could

reasonably find that the Sheriff knew that he was essentially

sending a fox back to guard the hen house, and in doing so was

deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of Dunn

County inmates.          Therefore, Slabey's § 1983 claim against Dunn

County should survive summary judgment.
                                  III.    CONCLUSION

       ¶83    Based on the evidence Slabey provided, a jury could

find that Dunn County Sheriff's Department officials ignored the

clear   warning      signs    that    Boigenzahn       had    already       engaged     in

inappropriate and escalating behavior with female inmates and

then    created     the    circumstances        that    allowed      Boigenzahn         to

sexually assault Slabey.              The Sheriff's deliberate course of

action enabled Boigenzahn to escape detection for 45 minutes as
he was working alone, unsupervised, and unmonitored in the Huber

                                          24
                                                                         No.   2020AP877.jjk

dorm on the night he sexually assaulted Slabey.                          Slabey provided

sufficient       evidence    for    a    jury       to    reasonably     find     that    the

Sheriff's        course     of     action          both    demonstrated         deliberate

indifference and was the causal "moving force" behind the sexual

assault.         Slabey's    § 1983      claim       against      Dunn    County      should

therefore survive summary judgment.

      ¶84    When municipalities take inmates into custody, they

assume a responsibility to protect them from sexual assault.

But this responsibility means little if the justice system is

unwilling to hold municipalities accountable when they fail to

protect their inmates.              When municipalities are not held to

account, measures like PREA, enacted to eliminate sexual assault

in   jails   and       prisons,    are    reduced          to   little     more    than    a

perfunctory policy for correctional staff to sign, then freely

disregard.       Dunn County threw a match into the tinderbox when it

sent Boigenzahn back to guard female inmates.                            The majority's

failure to hold Dunn County accountable is akin to standing idly

by as the fire burns.
      ¶85    I    am    authorized       to    state       that   Justice       ANN    WALSH

BRADLEY joins this dissent.

                                              25
    No.   2020AP877.jjk

1