Court Opinion

ID: 9469778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:49:00.265467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:33.862700
License: Public Domain

GEORGE CLIFTON EDWARDS, Jr., Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Respectfully I dissent. In Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978), Justice Stewart’s opinion for the court held:
In summation, we hold that an entry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the building, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional entries to investigate the cause of the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing administrative searches. See Camara, 387 U.S., at 534-539 [87 S.Ct., at 1733-1736]; See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. [541], at 544-545 [87 S.Ct. 1737, at 1739-1740, 18 L.Ed.2d 943]; Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., ante [436 U.S.], at 320-321 [98 S.Ct., at 1824-1825]. Evidence of arson discovered in the course of such investigations is admissible at trial, but if the investigating officials find probable cause to believe that arson has occurred and require further access to gather evidence for a possible prosecution, they may obtain a warrant only upon a traditional showing of probable cause applicable to searches for evidence of crime. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 [85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684],
436 U.S. at 511-12, 98 S.Ct. at 1950-51. (Emphasis added).
Since I believe the facts in our instant case involved a situation where the Drug Enforcement Agency had “probable cause” that the crime had occurred and “require[d] further access to gather evidence for possi*76ble prosecution,” I would hold that a probable cause showing was required by the Fourth Amendment for the second search in this case.
For this reason and those ably presented by District Judge Wilson’s opinion, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.