Court Opinion

ID: 9965232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 21:00:35.700129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:48.771418
License: Public Domain

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                                              PUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4299

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff – Appellee,

                      v.

        AUSTIN KYLE LEE, a/k/a Justin,

                             Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (7:18-cr-00153-FL-1)

        Argued: May 5, 2023                                              Decided: April 30, 2024

        Before RUSHING and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Benjamin and Senior Judge Keenan joined.

        ARGUED: Nicholas James Giles, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for
        Appellant. Lucy Partain Brown, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: George E. Rudebusch, Richmond,
        Virginia, Sean A. McClelland, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Washington, D.C.; Arin Melissa
        Brenner, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Roanoke, Virginia, for
        Appellant. Daniel P. Bubar, Acting United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant
        United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
        North Carolina, for Appellee.
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        RUSHING, Circuit Judge:

               A jury found Austin Kyle Lee guilty of numerous federal drug and firearm offenses.

        A judge found additional facts that increased Lee’s mandatory minimum sentence for those

        crimes. On appeal, Lee argues that this judicial factfinding violated his Sixth Amendment

        right to a jury trial. The Government agrees but contends that the district court’s procedural

        error was harmless because proof of the relevant facts was overwhelming and

        uncontroverted. Because any error was harmless, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                                      I.

               After serving more than four years in a New York prison for selling cocaine, Lee

        was released in late 2015. He moved to North Carolina and resumed selling drugs. A

        search of his residences ultimately revealed distribution quantities of a fentanyl–heroin

        mixture, cocaine, and marijuana; handguns and ammunition; packaging material; and over

        $200,000 in cash.

               A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Lee with

        conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of

        heroin, five kilograms or more of cocaine, and a quantity of marijuana, in violation of 21

        U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (Count One); three counts of distributing heroin between

        October 2016 and February 2018, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Counts Two

        through Four); possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and

        quantities of marijuana and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count Five);

        possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Six); and possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18

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        U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (Count Seven). In connection with Counts One and Five, the

        indictment further alleged that Lee had a prior conviction for a “serious drug felony” for

        which he served more than twelve months’ imprisonment, from which he was released

        within fifteen years of commencing the instant offenses. J.A. 38–40. If proven, Lee’s prior

        serious drug felony conviction would trigger a higher statutory sentencing range pursuant

        to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and (B). Lee’s appeal exclusively challenges the procedure

        the district court used to determine whether the serious drug felony enhancement applied. 1

                                                     A.

               Section 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) each increase the applicable mandatory minimum

        sentence when a defendant commits certain drug crimes “after a prior conviction for a

        serious drug felony . . . has become final.” 2 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (B). A “serious

        drug felony” is (1) “an offense described in section 924(e)(2) of Title 18” for which the

        defendant (2) “served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months” and (3) was

        released “within 15 years of the commencement of the instant offense.” 21 U.S.C.

        § 802(57). Section 924(e)(2) includes, as relevant here, “an offense under State law,

               1
                 Lee also submitted a motion to file a pro se supplemental brief raising other issues.
        Because Lee is represented by counsel who has filed a merits brief, he is not entitled to file
        a pro se supplemental brief. See United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 569 n.1 (4th
        Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we deny his motion.
               2
                 Before the First Step Act of 2018, this enhancement hinged on whether the
        defendant had a prior conviction for a “felony drug offense,” which meant a drug crime
        punishable by more than a year in prison. 21 U.S.C. § 802(44); First Step Act of 2018,
        Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a)(2), 132 Stat. 5194, 5220–5221 (2018). The First Step Act
        narrowed the enhancement by substituting “serious drug felony or serious violent felony”
        in place of “felony drug offense.” § 401(a)(2), 132 Stat. at 5220–5221.
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        involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or

        distribute, a controlled substance . . . , for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten

        years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The serious drug felony

        enhancement increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a Section 841(b)(1)(A)

        offense like Count One from 10 years to 15 years and, for a Section 841(b)(1)(B) offense

        like Count Five, increases the sentencing range from 5 to 40 years to 10 years to life.

               Another statutory provision, Section 851, sets forth the procedure for determining

        whether a prior conviction triggers the sentencing enhancement. See 21 U.S.C. § 851.

        Section 851 requires the Government, before trial or a guilty plea, to file a notice

        identifying the prior conviction on which it relies for the enhancement. Id. § 851(a)(1).

        “[A]fter conviction but before pronouncement of [the] sentence,” the district court must

        inquire whether the defendant “affirms or denies that he has been previously convicted” as

        the notice alleges. Id. § 851(b). If the defendant denies any allegation in the notice or

        claims the prior conviction is invalid, he files a written response. Id. § 851(c)(1). The

        district court then must conduct an evidentiary hearing “to determine any issues raised by

        the response which would except the person from increased punishment,” and that hearing

        “shall be before the court without a jury.” Id. The Government has “the burden of proof

        beyond a reasonable doubt on any issue of fact,” save for challenges to the constitutionality

        of the prior conviction. Id. § 851(c)(1)–(2). After the hearing, “the court determines”

        whether the defendant “is subject to increased punishment by reason of [the] prior

        conviction[]” and “shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law” at the request of

        either party. Id. § 851(c)(1), (d)(1).

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                                                      B.

               In accordance with Section 851, the Government filed a notice of its intent to seek

        an increased penalty based on Lee’s prior conviction for a serious drug felony, namely, his

        conviction for selling cocaine in violation of New York Penal Law § 220.41. It included a

        certificate of disposition from the New York Supreme Court confirming Lee’s conviction

        and sentence as well as a certificate of incarceration from the New York State Department

        of Corrections and Community Supervision specifying the dates of Lee’s incarceration and

        release.   The Government also submitted documents demonstrating that, with Lee’s

        criminal history, his New York offense carried a maximum sentence of at least ten years.

               Both Lee and the Government contended that it was for the jury—not the judge—

        to decide the facts necessary to establish the serious drug felony enhancement.              In

        particular, they asserted that the jury must decide whether Lee had served more than 12

        months in prison for the New York offense and whether he was released within 15 years

        of commencing the federal offenses. The district court disagreed and rejected the parties’

        proposed jury questions about the serious drug felony elements. In the court’s view,

        Section 851 assigned responsibility for finding all facts necessary to impose the serious

        drug felony enhancement exclusively to the judge, not the jury, and that assignment did

        not run afoul of Lee’s constitutional right to a jury trial. See United States v. Lee, No. 7:18-

        CR-153-FL-1, 2021 WL 640028 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2021).

               Although the jury was not asked to decide the duration or recency of Lee’s

        imprisonment for the New York drug offense, related evidence was introduced at trial as

        part of proving his felon status for purposes of the firearm charge. For example, the

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        Government introduced as Exhibit 83 a certified copy of Lee’s New York indictment and

        certificate of disposition showing that he was convicted in 2011 of criminal sale of a

        controlled substance and sentenced to six years in prison. Exhibit 84 was the New York

        certificate of incarceration showing that Lee was incarcerated from January 10, 2011, to

        December 23, 2015, when he was conditionally released on parole. Lee’s North Carolina

        probation officer testified that she began supervising him in December 2015 when he was

        released from prison and his supervision was transferred from New York. And Lee himself

        testified that he was released from prison in New York at the end of 2015, after serving

        “about five years” for selling cocaine. J.A. 749.

               The jury convicted Lee on all counts, and the district court scheduled a Section 851

        hearing. Before the hearing, Lee filed a pro se submission (despite being represented by

        counsel) claiming that his New York conviction had been vacated based on a motion he

        filed in state court in July 2020. At the hearing, Lee’s counsel “persist[ed] in” that position

        but did not “have any documentation to show that the judgment was vacated.” J.A. 984–

        985. The Government presented argument on each element of the serious drug felony

        enhancement, relying on evidence presented at trial and noting that the New York

        certificate of disposition was certified by the clerk of court in January 2021.

               The district court found the Government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

        Lee had a prior conviction for a serious drug felony. See United States v. Lee, No. 7:18-

        CR-153-FL-1, 2021 WL 1108586 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2021). First, the court determined

        that Lee’s New York conviction qualified as an offense “described in section 924(e)(2),”

        21 U.S.C. § 802(57), because it involved distributing a controlled substance and the

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        maximum term of imprisonment was ten or more years. The court rejected Lee’s “bare

        assertion” that his conviction had been vacated because he offered “no evidence” to support

        it and the Government’s evidence showed the New York court certified his conviction as

        of January 2021. Lee, 2021 WL 1108586, at *4. Second, the district court found that Lee

        served “more than four years” in prison for the offense, well exceeding the twelve-month

        threshold for a serious drug felony. Id. at *3. Third, the court found that Lee was released

        from prison on the New York offense “within 15 years of the commencement of the instant

        offense,” in fact “within one year at the earliest and three years at the latest.” Id. As a

        result, the court concluded that Lee was subject to the statutorily mandated increased

        punishment for Count One, under Section 841(b)(1)(A), and for Count Five, under Section

        841(b)(1)(B).

               The district court sentenced Lee to 340 months’ imprisonment—280 months on

        Counts One through Five to be served concurrently, 120 months served concurrently for

        Count Seven, and 60 months served consecutively for Count Six—all to be followed by

        ten years’ supervised release. Lee timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28

        U.S.C. § 1291.

                                                    II.

               The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution entitles a person accused

        of a crime to a trial by jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI. “‘[F]acts that increase the prescribed

        range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ are elements of the crime,”

        and thus, the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants “the right to have a jury find those

        facts beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111 (2013)

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        (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). This includes facts that

        increase the statutory maximum or the mandatory minimum. Id. at 111–112. The Supreme

        Court has recognized one “narrow exception” to this rule: a judge may find “the fact of a

        prior conviction” even when that finding increases a defendant’s statutory sentencing

        exposure. Id. at 111 n.1 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998));

        Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (same); see also Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 511

        (2016) (“[O]nly a jury, and not a judge, may find facts that increase a maximum penalty,

        except for the simple fact of a prior conviction.”).

               The district court concluded that the serious drug felony determination fell within

        this exception for the fact of a prior conviction. See Lee, 2021 WL 640028, at *4 (citing

        Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230). Lee disagrees. He argues that the serious drug

        felony enhancement required proof of three facts. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(57). The first—

        that he had a prior conviction for an offense described in Section 924(e)(2)—could be

        found by the judge without a jury consistent with Almendarez-Torres. But the other two

        facts—that he served more than 12 months in prison and was released within 15 years of

        the commencement of the instant offenses—must be found by a jury because they are not

        encompassed within the fact of the prior conviction. The duration and recency of his

        imprisonment, Lee argues, were not “necessarily established” by his prior conviction or

        found by a prior jury. United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 169, 172 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). Far from “inher[ing] in the fact of [his] conviction,” United

        States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2005), these facts can only be determined

        by events occurring since that conviction. See United States v. Fields, 53 F.4th 1027, 1037–

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        1038 (6th Cir. 2022) (finding this argument “persuasive” but declining to “definitively

        decide this constitutional issue” because the district court in that case submitted the

        duration and recency questions to the jury).

               The Government agrees with Lee’s argument this far but observes that the

        constitutional error—like most trial errors—is subject to harmless error review. See

        Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 222 (2006); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7

        (1999). Under that standard, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not

        affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). When a district

        court fails to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, we will disregard the error only if

        “proof of the missing element is ‘overwhelming’ and ‘uncontroverted.’” United States v.

        Legins, 34 F.4th 304, 322 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 266 (2022) (quoting Neder,

        527 U.S. at 17–18); see also United States v. Catone, 769 F.3d 866, 874 (4th Cir. 2014)

        (“An Apprendi error is harmless ‘where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable

        doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence,

        such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error.’” (quoting Neder, 527

        U.S. at 17)). The Government says that standard is satisfied here.

               We agree with the Government. Assuming, without deciding, that the district court

        erred by deciding for itself the duration and recency of Lee’s prior incarceration as

        necessary to establish the serious drug felony enhancement, rather than submitting those

        questions to the jury, that error was harmless. Both elements were “uncontested and

        supported by overwhelming evidence.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 17. Regarding duration, Lee

        did not contest at the Section 851 hearing, and does not contest on appeal, that he served

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        more than 12 months in prison for his prior offense. Exhibit 84 reflects that he was

        incarcerated for over four years, and Lee himself testified at trial that he served “about five

        years” in prison. J.A. 749. As for recency, Lee again did not and does not dispute that the

        instant offenses commenced within 15 years of his release from prison. The conspiracy

        and possession crimes of Counts One and Five began in 2018 at the latest. Exhibit 84

        shows that Lee was released from prison in December 2015, and at trial he and his parole

        officer both testified that he was released in late 2015. It is therefore “clear beyond a

        reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found [Lee] guilty” had these two

        elements been submitted to it. Neder, 527 U.S. at 18; see Legins, 34 F.4th at 324.

               Lee counters that he did contest the Government’s proof by asserting at the Section

        851 hearing that his prior conviction had been vacated. But Lee’s vacatur argument

        addresses the fact of his prior conviction, a fact that he concedes the judge may decide so

        long as Almendarez-Torres remains good law. It has no bearing on the duration and

        recency questions he claims were erroneously withdrawn from the jury.

                                                     III.

               Any procedural error in the district court’s determination that the serious drug

        felony enhancement applied to increase Lee’s statutory sentencing range was harmless.

        Lee concedes that, under existing law, the judge could decide the fact of his prior

        conviction without a jury. And the Government’s proof of the other two elements—

        concerning the duration and recency of his incarceration for that offense—was

        overwhelming and uncontroverted. The judgment of the district court is

                                                                                         AFFIRMED.

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