Court Opinion

ID: 9851593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:15:33.455542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:07.743666
License: Public Domain

*140HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
Because I cannot agree that the allegedly “similar” prior transaction had any tendency to prove that Payne committed the crimes charged herein, and because the evidence of that prior transaction is likely to have influenced the jury’s determination as to Payne’s guilt, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
It is fundamental to our system of criminal justice that evidence of a defendant’s general character is irrelevant and inadmissible. Character evidence is excluded because a jury must determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence based solely on evidence relevant to the crime charged, and not based on a belief that the defendant has a criminal character or a general propensity to commit bad acts. . . . [Evidence of a prior crime is character evidence of the worst sort because such evidence indicates a criminal character. As such, it has great potential for leading a jury to convict a defendant of a crime based solely on the defendant’s character.
(Citations, footnotes and emphasis omitted.) Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 628 (458 SE2d 643) (1995) (Sears, J., concurring specially).
While the general rule disallowing the admissibility of prior bad acts is qualified by the long-standing, limited exception for cases where the prior bad act bears a “logical connection” with the current crime such that “proof of the [former] tends to establish the [latter],” Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395, 408-409 (5) (46 SE 897) (1904), this case exemplifies the extent to which this limited exception has been stretched over time. If it can be said that proof of an accused’s one-time violent rape of a thirty-two-year-old ex-girlfriend accomplished by forcible entry into her home tends to establish the three-year-long molestation of a pre-adolescent stepdaughter living in the accused’s home, then proof of any prior sex crime, no matter how dissimilar in nature from the crime charged, can be said to be probative of the commission of any other sex crime. Though the appellate courts of this State have consciously construed the exception for similar transactions most broadly in the context of sex crimes, see Barrett v. State, 253 Ga. App. 357, 358 (1) (559 SE2d 108) (2002), we have never approved such an expansive construction as the majority adopts herein.
To the contrary, our courts have expressly held that sex crimes against children “require[ ] a unique bent of mind.” Boynton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 778, 780 (3) (653 SE2d 110) (2007). Accord Turner v. State, 245 Ga. App. 476, 478 (2) (538 SE2d 125) (2000). Thus, while *141it has been held that “there is no ‘per se rule whereby evidence of a sexual offense involving an adult victim is always inadmissible in cases in which the sexual offense was perpetrated on a minor,’” Barrett, supra, 253 Ga. App. at 358 (1), our courts have allowed such evidence only where “the similarities between the present offense and [the] similar transaction [are] numerous and obvious.” Kingsley v. State, 268 Ga. App. 729, 730 (1) (603 SE2d 78) (2004). See Maynard v. State, 282 Ga. App. 598, 604 (3) (639 SE2d 389) (2006) (reversing conviction because “no logical connection existed between the [prior] acts . . . and the crimes for which [defendant] was on trial”); Perry v. State, 263 Ga. App. 670, 671 (2) (588 SE2d 838) (2003) (reversing conviction for improper admission of prior transaction evidence, stating, “a nonviolent sexual encounter with a minor [does not] show[ ] a predilection to commit forcible rape against an adult”); Bloodworth v. State, 173 Ga. App. 688 (1) (327 SE2d 756) (1985) (inappropriate sexual overtures to adult not admissible in trial for child molestation). See also Smith v. State, 249 Ga. App. 39, 41 (1) (547 SE2d 598) (2001) (“[defendant’s] rape of an adult woman would not show that he had a lustful disposition toward children, and his molestation of a child would not show that he had a bent of mind to rape an adult”). Compare Barrett, supra, 253 Ga. App. at 358 (fact that prior act involving adult tended to show motive and state of mind, as well as similarity in specific sexual acts performed, supported admissibility of prior transaction evidence).
The majority uncritically adopts the State’s argument that the prior transaction evidence here was admissible to show Payne’s “course of conduct” and “bent of mind.” However,
“bent of mind” and “course of conduct” have evolved into amorphous catch-phrases, difficult to define and slippery in application. While they may be legitimate purposes for introducing independent crime evidence under some circumstances, careful analysis of the relevance of the evidence is especially important when those purposes are claimed. Such careful scrutiny is essential because a person’s bent of mind is dangerously close to being his character, and a person’s course of conduct could easily show nothing more than a mere propensity to act in a certain manner.
(Citations and footnotes omitted.) Farley, supra, 265 Ga. at 630 (Sears, J., concurring specially). Accord Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence, § 11.13, pp. 189-190 (2d ed. 2002) (“[u]sing phrases like ‘bent of mind’ or ‘course of conduct’ totally obscures the distinction between legitimate evidence and the prohibited evidence of character”). Indeed, this Court has acknowledged in a similar context that *142the admission of evidence regarding sex paraphernalia belonging to the defendant should be limited to situations in which the items “show[ ] defendant’s lustful disposition toward the sexual activity with which he is charged or his bent of mind to engage in that activity.” (Emphasis supplied.) Simpson v. State, 271 Ga. 772, 774 (1) (523 SE2d 320) (1999). In other words, there must be some connection between the paraphernalia and the specific sex acts of which the defendant is accused in order to render such inflammatory evidence more probative of the defendant’s “bent of mind” than prejudicial to the jury’s perception of him. Considering that possession of sex paraphernalia, while arguably offensive, is not inherently criminal, this principle should hold equally true, if not more so, in cases where the evidence in question relates to a prior sex crime.
Decided March 9, 2009.
Brian Steel, for appellant.
David McDade, District Attorney, James E. Barker, James A. Dooley, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
In this case, the prejudicial effect of the prior transaction evidence cannot be overstated. The truth of the victim’s allegations was hotly contested, impeached by her own pre-trial recantations and denial of the allegations at trial. There was no physical evidence to substantiate that any sexual contact had ever occurred. There was testimony supportive of the victim’s possible reasons for advancing false allegations, including the victim’s own admission that she would lie to get what she wanted. In short, “the evidence was in sharp conflict and the evidence of prior conviction [ ] may have been the deciding factor in the jury’s verdict.” Wimberly v. State, 180 Ga. App. 148, 150 (1) (348 SE2d 692) (1986). Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Sears and Justice Carley join in this dissent.