Court Opinion

ID: 9957315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 14:04:17.486852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:15.642312
License: Public Domain

2024 IL 129263

                                          IN THE
                                 SUPREME COURT

                                              OF
                           THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                     (Docket No. 129263)

     ROBERT CAMMACHO JR. et al., Appellees, v. THE CITY OF JOLIET, Appellant.

                                  Opinion filed April 4, 2024.

         JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

         Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Holder White, Cunningham, and
      Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion.

         Justice O’Brien took no part in the decision.

                                          OPINION

¶1        Defendant, the City of Joliet (City), appeals the judgment of the appellate court
      that reversed administrative decisions by the City finding plaintiffs, Robert
     Cammacho Jr., 1 James A. Jones, Bruce D. Oliver, David B. Speer, and Jorge
     Urbina, liable for noncompliance with the City’s ordinances prohibiting overweight
     and/or overlength vehicles on nondesignated highways and imposing fines in
     accordance therewith. To resolve this appeal, this court has considered (1) whether
     section 1-2.1-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-2 (West 2020))
     constitutionally preempts the City’s home rule authority to “administratively
     adjudicate” violations of its ordinances 2 and (2) whether the ordinance violations
     at issue are properly subject to administrative adjudication under the Joliet Code of
     Ordinances.

¶2       In this opinion, we find that section 1-2.1-2 does not preempt the City’s home
     rule authority to “administratively adjudicate” 3 violations of its ordinances and
     therefore does not constitute an appropriate basis to reverse the administrative
     decisions of the City’s hearing officer. For this reason, we vacate that part of the
     appellate court’s judgment and overrule that portion of the First District’s opinion
     in Catom Trucking, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 2011 IL App (1st) 101146, ¶¶ 10-11,
     which held that the definition of “system of administrative adjudication” set forth
     in section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code determines a home rule unit’s authority to

         1 The lead plaintiff’s last name is spelled multiple ways in the record; we follow here the spelling

     employed in the appellate court.
          2
            For the first time in its opening brief before this court, the City raises the issue of whether
     section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-2 (West 2020)) constitutionally preempts
     its home rule authority to “administratively adjudicate” its ordinances. In their response brief,
     plaintiffs do not acknowledge or address this constitutional issue. Considerations of forfeiture
     notwithstanding, we address the issue on the merits in the interests of justice and the development
     of a sound body of precedent. See Walworth Investments-LG, LLC v. Mu Sigma, Inc., 2022 IL
     127177, ¶ 94.
          3
            The parties and the courts below defined the issue as whether the City has the authority to
     “administratively adjudicate” the ordinance violations here, so it is important that we identify a
     precise meaning of the term as it is being used herein. Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of
     “administrative adjudication” has changed over time. In 1990, the term was defined as “[t]he process
     by which an administrative agency issues an order, such order being affirmative, negative, injunctive
     or declaratory in form.” Black’s Law Dictionary 45 (6th ed. 1990). However, it is currently defined
     as “[t]he process used by an administrative agency to issue regulations through an adversary
     proceeding.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Here, we are asked to examine a home rule
     unit’s authority to issue an administrative decision regarding the liability of plaintiffs for violation
     of its ordinances, rather than its authority to issue regulations. Thus, we refer to “administrative
     adjudication” as formerly defined.

                                                      -2-
     administratively adjudicate ordinance violations. 4 However, we find the hearing
     officer’s administrative decisions are precluded by the Joliet Code of Ordinances,
     and thus affirm, on different grounds, that portion of the appellate court’s judgment
     that reversed the judgment of the circuit court, as well as the administrative
     decisions of the City.

¶3                                           BACKGROUND

¶4                             A. Complaint for Administrative Review

¶5       Plaintiffs filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Will
     County, stating the following factual basis. The City is known as the “Crossroads
     of Mid-America” because two major interstates, I-80 and I-55, cross within its
     borders and Illinois Route 53, a north-south throughfare and designated Illinois
     truck route, services the City. The City is also the location of a major rail line
     intersection as well as the Chicago Area Waterway System (CAWS), which
     connects Lake Michigan to the Illinois River and ultimately to the Mississippi River
     and the Gulf of Mexico.

¶6        Due in large part to its location, the City was once home to a large United States
     Army ammunitions plant, which operated from World War II through the end of
     the Vietnam War. A large part of these former federal lands has been transferred to
     the Joliet Arsenal Development Authority (JADA), a body politic of the State of
     Illinois. See 70 ILCS 508/1 et seq. (West 2022). Over the years, JADA sold a large
     portion of this land to industrial businesses for redevelopment into logistics parks
     and transport facilities. As a result, there is significant traffic congestion, especially
     commercial truck traffic, which causes concerns for the citizens of the preexisting
     small communities and subdivisions on Illinois Route 53. The complaint for

         4
           As explained in detail later in this opinion, the purpose of section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal
     Code (625 ILCS 5/1-2.1-2 (West 2020)) is to describe the parameters of a “system of administrative
     adjudication” that, if followed by a home rule municipality, would result in an order that is
     immediately enforceable in the same manner as a circuit court judgment. However, this is an appeal
     of the administrative decision itself, which the appellate court reversed on the basis that the hearing
     officer lacked jurisdiction to enter the order. A finding that the decision fails to comply with section
     1-2.1-2 and thus does not qualify for immediate enforceability as a judgment does not constitute
     grounds to reverse the decision of the hearing officer finding plaintiffs liable for the ordinance
     violations and imposing fines. Infra ¶¶ 34-37.

                                                      -3-
     administrative review recognizes that, for this reason, the City enacted a
     comprehensive set of ordinances to address the concerns.

¶7       The City incorporates the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq.
     (West 2020)) into its ordinances (Joliet Code of Ordinances § 19-1 (eff. Oct. 20,
     2020)), designates certain Joliet thoroughfares as approved truck routes (Joliet
     Code of Ordinances § 19-14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2015)), and prohibits commercial trucks
     from operating on any nondesignated state or local roadways (id. § 19-12). Further,
     the City posts multiple “No Trucks” signs along various arterial and residential
     streets that connect to Illinois Route 53 and has a “Truck Enforcement” division
     within its police department to monitor and enforce compliance with commercial
     trucking regulations.

¶8       The complaint states that plaintiffs are commercial truck drivers who traveled
     upon posted “No Truck” routes and upon nondesignated thoroughfares within the
     city and that the City consequently issued to them citations for violation of the
     applicable ordinances. Copies of these citations are contained in the record and
     contain the heading “City of Joliet Ordinance Violation Notice.” They include a
     ticket number, date and time of issue, fine amount, the location of the violation, the
     relevant ordinance number, and a description of the violation. They list the make,
     model, and color of the vehicle involved; license plate number and state; vehicle
     identification number; and plaintiffs’ names and addresses. They state a hearing
     date and time if the fine is not paid, with the hearing to take place in the Joliet
     Municipal Building. Finally, they contain instructions regarding payment of the
     fine, including how to pay, late fees, and a date on which an unpaid balance would
     be sent to a collection agency.

¶9        In the case of each ordinance violation, plaintiffs challenged the City’s
     jurisdiction to administratively adjudicate the ordinance violations at issue, arguing
     plaintiffs were entitled to have the violations dismissed because applicable law
     required that they be adjudicated in the circuit court. The hearing officer overruled
     plaintiffs’ objections and denied their motions to dismiss. Because plaintiffs
     stipulated the facts concerning their noncompliance with the ordinances, the
     hearing officer issued decisions finding plaintiffs liable for the violations and
     imposing fines.

                                             -4-
¶ 10       Plaintiffs attached the decisions of the hearing officer to their complaint for
       administrative review. We set forth the content of the decisions in detail because
       the issue on appeal concerns the City’s jurisdiction to issue the decisions. Each
       decision states that the matter had come on for hearing to determine plaintiffs’
       liability for the violation notice, the code department had jurisdiction over the
       parties and subject matter, due notice had been given, and the hearing officer had
       reviewed the evidence presented and was otherwise fully advised in the premises.
       The decisions order that plaintiffs are “liable”; identify the ordinance that plaintiffs
       violated by ordinance number and title (Joliet Code of Ordinances § 19-21 (eff.
       Dec. 17, 2019) (“Weight restrictions”); Joliet Code of Ordinances § 19-19 (eff.
       Dec. 1, 2015) (“Maximum length”)); and set forth the “judgment total,” “court
       cost,” and “balance due.” The decisions further provide that the fine was a “debt
       due and owing” to the City, that said total “must be paid,” and that “payment of
       fines and penalties operates as a final disposition of the violation.”

¶ 11       Instructions for paying the City online, by phone, by mail, and in person are
       included in the decisions, as well as a statement regarding late penalties for “failing
       to pay the indicated within 25 days of a determination of liability.” Finally, the
       decision provides as follows:

              “The City of Joliet may use all lawful means of collecting this judgment
          including, but not limited to, booting and/or impoundment of your vehicle
          and/or suspension of your driving privileges (for vehicle related offenses)

             Please contact the Joliet Legal Department at (815) 724-3794 if you have
          any questions regarding this notice.

               This administrative order is authorized by City of Joliet ordinance and State
          of Illinois statute. You have a right to appeal this decision pursuant to the
          Illinois Administrative Review Law, 735 ILCS 5/3-101, et seq., by filing a
          proper lawsuit against the City of Joliet and other necessary parties within 35
          days of a final order. If you fail to pay fines, the City may proceed to collection.”
          (Emphasis in original.)

¶ 12       The decisions indicate plaintiffs Cammacho, Jones, Oliver, Urbina, and Speer
       are liable for violations of section 19-21 of the Joliet Code of Ordinances (Joliet
       Code of Ordinances § 19-21 (eff. Dec. 17, 2019)), titled “Weight restrictions,” in

                                                -5-
       the amount of $750 plus $50 court costs, while plaintiffs Speer and Urbina are
       additionally liable for violations of section 19-19 of Joliet’s ordinances (Joliet Code
       of Ordinances § 19-19 (eff. Dec. 1, 2015)), titled “Maximum length,” in the amount
       of $500 plus $50 court costs. Plaintiffs requested that the circuit court vacate the
       City’s imposition of these fines, that the administrative findings of liability be held
       for naught, and that the citations be dismissed. The circuit court rejected plaintiffs’
       request and affirmed the decisions.

¶ 13                               B. Appellate Court Decision

¶ 14       The appellate court reversed the decisions of the circuit court and hearing
       officer. 2022 IL App (3d) 210591, ¶ 1. In so doing, the appellate court followed the
       First District’s opinion in Catom Trucking, 2011 IL App (1st) 101146, ¶ 11
       (quoting 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-2 (West 2008)), which held that, pursuant to section 1-
       2.1-2 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-2 (West 2008)), home rule
       municipalities are prohibited from administratively adjudicating “ ‘traffic
       regulations governing the movement of vehicles,’ ” in addition to “ ‘reportable
       offense[s] under Section 6-204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code [(625 ILCS 5/6-204
       (2008))].’ ” The appellate court here, like the First District in Catom Trucking,
       agreed with plaintiffs that the ordinance violations fit within the “traffic regulations
       governing the movement of vehicles” category and, as a result, that administrative
       adjudication by the City was prohibited by section 1-2.1-2, despite the parties’
       stipulation that they are not “reportable.” Catom Trucking, 2011 IL App (1st)
       101146, ¶ 11. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit
       court and the administrative decisions. Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 30. This court granted the
       City’s petition for leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). We
       also allowed the City of Chicago to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the
       City’s arguments on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 15                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 16       The City urges this court to reverse the decision of the appellate court, leaving
       the administrative decisions intact, for two reasons. First, the City argues that
       section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code is not intended to be a limitation on a home
       rule municipality’s authority to administratively adjudicate violations of its

                                                -6-
       ordinances. Moreover, even if the General Assembly had such an intent when it
       enacted section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code, the City argues the statute does not
       meet the requirements that article VII, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
       Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6) and section 7 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/7
       (West 2022)) place on the General Assembly when it seeks to limit such authority.
       Second, the City argues that, even if section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code were a
       constitutional limit on its home rule authority, administrative adjudication of the
       ordinances at issue are not prohibited by that section, as the ordinances are neither
       “traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles” nor “reportable offense[s]
       under Section 6-204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.” 5 Because the City raises issues
       presenting questions of law involving statutory interpretation and/or
       constitutionality, we employ a de novo standard of review. See Johnson v.
       Department of State Police, 2020 IL 124213, ¶ 13.

¶ 17                     A. Home Rule Authority Under the Illinois Constitution

¶ 18      The parties stipulate that the City is a home rule unit. See Ill. Const. 1970, art.
       VII, § 6(a), (b) (“any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000 are
       home rule units” unless they elect by referendum not to be a home rule unit). This
       court has recognized the broad authority the 1970 Illinois Constitution bestows on
       home rule units. See Lintzeris v. City of Chicago, 2023 IL 127547, ¶ 20. As aptly
       explained by the City of Chicago in its amicus brief, under the previous
       constitutions of Illinois, all municipalities were bound by “Dillon’s Rule,” which
       provided that municipalities possess only those powers expressly granted by state
       law, powers incident to those expressly granted, and powers indispensable to the
       accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the municipal corporation.

           5
             Because this court finds that section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS5/1-2.1-2 (West
       2020)) is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to administrative adjudication of ordinance violations by
       a home rule municipality that would warrant reversal of the decisions, it does not have occasion to
       determine whether the appellate court decisions here and in Catom Trucking properly determined
       the ordinance violations for overweight vehicles were “traffic regulations governing the movement
       of vehicles.” However, because the Joliet Code of Ordinances excepts “reportable” offenses from
       its code hearing unit’s jurisdiction, we do incidentally determine, later in this opinion, that such
       ordinance violations are “reportable.” Infra ¶¶ 49-50.

                                                      -7-
       Pesticide Public Policy Foundation v. Village of Wauconda, 117 Ill. 2d 107, 112
       (1987).

¶ 19       While the 1970 Constitution maintains Dillon’s Rule with respect to non-home-
       rule units of government (see id.), it provides, with respect to home rule units, as
       follows:

           “Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power
           and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs, including,
           but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health,
           safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” Ill. Const. 1970,
           art. VII, § 6(a).

¶ 20       Article VII, section 6, contains specific requirements that must be followed by
       the General Assembly when it provides by statute for any limitation on home rule
       authority. While other subsections of section 6 provide additional instructions for
       limiting a home rule municipality’s power to tax and incur debt specifically,
       instructions for limiting its governmental functions and powers in general are set
       forth in subsections (g), (h), (i), and (m) as follows:

               “(g) The General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of three-fifths of
           the members elected to each house may deny or limit the power to tax and any
           other power or function of a home rule unit not exercised or performed by the
           State other than a power or function specified in subsection (l) of this section.[6]

               (h) The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive
           exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit other than a
           taxing power or a power or function specified in subsection (l) of this Section.

              (i) Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State
           any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General
           Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or
           specifically declare the State’s exercise to be exclusive.

                                                     ***

           6
            Section 6(l) addresses the levying of taxes by special assessment for local improvements or for
       the provision of special services. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(l).

                                                      -8-
               (m) Powers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally.”
           Id. § 6(g), (h), (i), (m).

¶ 21                     B. Applying Section 7 of the Statute on Statutes

¶ 22       Pursuant to the above-detailed subsections, the City’s home rule authority to
       administratively adjudicate its city ordinance violations must be construed liberally
       but can be limited by the General Assembly by statute. Id.; see also Lintzeris, 2023
       IL 127547, ¶¶ 22-23. However, such statutory limitations must be expressly stated.
       Lintzeris, 2023 IL 127547, ¶ 22. In fact, section 7 of the Statute on Statutes, which
       was effective in 1979 and has never been amended, provides:

          “No law enacted after January 12, 1977, denies or limits any power or function
          of a home rule unit, pursuant to paragraphs (g), (h), (i), (j), or (k) of Section 6
          of Article VII of the Illinois Constitution, unless there is specific language
          limiting or denying the power or function and the language specifically sets
          forth in what manner and to what extent it is a limitation on or denial of the
          power or function of a home rule unit.” 5 ILCS 70/7 (West 2022).

¶ 23        As amicus points out, pursuant to section 7 of the Statute on Statutes, when the
       General Assembly means to preempt home rule authority, it uses clear language to
       do so and cites the specific subsection of article VII, section 6, of the Illinois
       Constitution it is invoking. This is required because, as this court made clear in
       Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 186-89 (1992), if a statute does not
       expressly state that there is a limitation on home rule units specifically, the
       concurrent exercise of governmental power by a home rule unit will not be read to
       be restricted. There are countless examples of this specific language throughout the
       Illinois Compiled Statutes, including the Municipal Code. For example, section 1-
       2.1-2 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-2-1.2 (West 2020)) prohibits “[a] unit of
       local government, including a home rule unit,” from enforcing any ordinance that
       prohibits driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. (Emphasis added.)
       Subsection (c) of that section specifically provides that it is “a denial and limitation
       of home rule powers and functions under subsection (g) of Section 6 of Article VII
       of the Illinois Constitution.” Id. § 1-2-1.2(c); see also id. § 1-2-1.5 (prohibiting a
       municipality, including a home rule unit, from enacting an ordinance penalizing
       tenants who contact police or other emergency services and specifying that it is a

                                                -9-
       limitation on such authority that was exercised by the General Assembly pursuant
       to subsection (g)). Thus, where the General Assembly seeks to limit the authority
       of a home rule municipality to tax, or to perform a function of government that the
       State does not itself perform, it references subsection (g). See id. §§ 1-2-1.2(c), 1-
       2-1.5(d).

¶ 24        The Illinois Compiled Statutes are replete with enactments that specify that they
       operate as limitations on home rule authority in accordance with the instructions
       set forth in the other subsections of article VII, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution
       as well. With respect to legislation that provides exclusively for State authority to
       perform a function of government, completely preempting home rule authority, the
       limiting statute references subsection (h) of article VII, section 6 (Ill. Const. 1970,
       art. VII, § 6(h)). See, e.g., 720 ILCS 648/55 (West 2022) (providing the regulation
       of the sale of targeted methamphetamine precursors and targeted packages are
       exclusive powers and functions of the State). With respect to legislation that
       provides for a limitation on the concurrent exercise of power by the State and the
       home rule municipality, the General Assembly references subsection (i) of article
       VII, section 6 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6(i)). See, e.g., 70 ILCS 3720/0.05 (West
       2022) (requiring municipalities, including home rule municipalities, to regulate
       water systems consistently with the provisions of the statute). The presence of this
       language and reference to a subsection of article VII, section 6, thus evidences the
       General Assembly’s characterization of the statute as one operating as a limitation
       on home rule authority and indicates the subsection of article VII, section 6, it is
       intending to invoke. 7

           7
              Amicus submits that, because the enforcement of local ordinances has not been exercised by
       the State, any limitation on such enforcement must be approved by three-fifths of the General
       Assembly and must reference subsection (g) of article VII, section 6. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII,
       § 6(g). As explained later in this opinion, however, a distinction must be made between adjudication
       and enforcement, as some ordinance violations are indeed adjudicated in the circuit court, even if
       the enforcement action is taken by the municipality. Infra ¶¶ 37-38. In fact, if a home rule unit
       wishes to enforce the fine imposed in the same manner as a circuit court judgment, it may be required
       to file an action in the circuit court if it does not meet the requirements of article 1, division 2.1, of
       the Municipal Code. 65 ILCS 5/art. 1, div. 2.1 (West 2020). Thus, adjudication of city ordinance
       violations may arguably be considered a concurrent power not requiring a three-fifths vote and
       reference to subsection (g) but, rather, requiring reference to subsection (i). In any event, article 1,

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¶ 25                    C. Division 2.1 of the Municipal Code Is Not Jurisdictional

¶ 26        Having determined that any limitation on a home rule municipality’s authority
       to exercise any function of government must be specifically set forth by the
       legislature, we turn to division 2.1 of the Municipal Code to ascertain whether such
       limitation is expressly included therein. The appellate court in the instant case, as
       well as in Catom Trucking, applied section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS
       5/1-2.1-2 (West 2020)) to find that, because the ordinances at issue did not meet
       the criteria set forth in the definition of “system of administrative adjudication”
       contained therein, the City had no authority to make an administrative
       determination regarding plaintiffs’ violations of the ordinances. In so doing, these
       courts did not consider whether that section is a constitutional limitation on the
       City’s home rule authority or whether the General Assembly intended it as such. It
       is to these issues that we now turn.

¶ 27       Article 1, division 2, of the Municipal Code addresses municipal ordinances (id.
       art.1, div. 2), and article 1, division 2.1, is specifically titled “Administrative
       Adjudications” (id. art.1, div. 2.1). Thus, in assessing whether the City’s home rule
       authority to administratively adjudicate violations of its ordinances has been
       constitutionally limited by the General Assembly, it is prudent to examine all
       provisions of article 1, division 2.1, including section 1-2.1-2, rather than
       considering that section in isolation. See People v. Clark, 2019 IL 122891, ¶ 20 (in
       conducting a plain language statutory interpretation analysis, a court must view the
       statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory
       provisions and not in isolation).

¶ 28       Notably, section 1-2.1-1 provides that article 1, division 2.1, of the Municipal
       Code “applies only to municipalities that are home rule units.” 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-1
       (West 2020). This is significant because much of the Municipal Code is directed
       toward all municipalities, as reflected in the general definition of “municipality”
       set forth in section 1-1-2 of the Municipal Code. Id. § 1-1-2(1). Thus, the General
       Assembly’s intent that the provisions of division 2.1 apply exclusively to home rule
       municipalities is clear. However, it does not follow that the section was intended to
       operate as a limit on the authority a home rule municipality has to administratively

       division 2.1, of the Municipal Code contains no explicit limiting language or reference to article
       VII, section 6, so there is no need to determine which subsection would apply.

                                                    - 11 -
       adjudicate violations of its ordinances. Nor does it follow that, if it were so
       intended, the statute comports with the constitutional requirements for limiting such
       authority or the requirements contained in section 7 of the Statute on Statutes. See
       5 ILCS 70/7 (West 2022). In fact, in reviewing division 2.1 as a whole, the opposite
       conclusion is apparent.

¶ 29       No provision of article 1, division 2.1, of the Municipal Code contains language
       providing that it is specifically limiting home rule municipality authority under any
       subsection of article VII, section 6 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6). In fact, multiple
       sections expressly indicate that the General Assembly did not intend to limit a home
       rule municipality’s authority to enforce or adjudicate ordinance violations. First,
       section 1-2.1-3 provides that “[t]he adoption by a municipality of a system of
       administrative adjudication does not preclude the municipality from using other
       methods to enforce municipal ordinances.” 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-3 (West 2020).
       Second, section 1-2.1-9 provides that “[t]his Division shall not affect the validity
       of systems of administrative adjudication that were authorized by State law,
       including home rule authority, and in existence prior to the effective date of this
       amendatory Act of 1997.” Id. § 1-2.1-9. Finally, section 1-2.1-10 provides
       specifically that “[t]his Division shall not preempt municipalities from adopting
       other systems of administrative adjudication pursuant to their home rule powers.”
       Id. § 1-2.1-10. Thus, the provisions of division 2.1 notwithstanding, a home rule
       municipality may make liability determinations based on violations of its
       ordinances under any other system put into place before or after the enactment of
       division 2.1. Id.

¶ 30       Not only is division 2.1 replete with language indicating that it is not intended
       to limit home rule authority nor to supplant any system of administrative
       adjudication or other method of enforcing ordinance violations that a home rule
       municipality has in place, the language of section 1-2.1-2 itself contains no such
       indication:

           “Administrative adjudication of municipal code violations. Any municipality
           may provide by ordinance for a system of administrative adjudication of
           municipal code violations to the extent permitted by the Illinois Constitution. A
           ‘system of administrative adjudication’ means the adjudication of any violation
           of a municipal ordinance, except for (i) proceedings not within the statutory or

                                                - 12 -
          the home rule authority of municipalities; and (ii) any offense under the Illinois
          Vehicle Code or a similar offense that is a traffic regulation governing the
          movement of vehicles and except for any reportable offense under Section 6-
          204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.” Id. § 1-2.1-2.

¶ 31       The courts below, as well as the appellate court in Catom Trucking, operated
       under the assumption that the exceptions set forth in the definition of “system of
       administrative adjudication” stated in section 1-2.1-2 describe categories of
       ordinance violations that the City is prohibited from administratively adjudicating.
       But section 1-2.1-2 does not contain the specific language required to operate as a
       limitation on the City’s authority, and as set forth above, other sections within
       article 1, division 2.1, specifically state to the contrary. Accordingly, we find that
       the appellate court misapplied section 1-2.1-2 as a basis to determine the City did
       not have authority to issue administrative decisions finding plaintiffs violated the
       city ordinances and imposing fines, and we vacate that portion of the appellate
       court’s judgment that so held. Moreover, that portion of Catom Trucking, 2011 IL
       App (1st) 101146, ¶ 18, that found that the definition of “system of administrative
       adjudication” in section 1-2.1-2 determines whether a City has jurisdiction to
       administratively adjudicate ordinance violations, is hereby overruled.

¶ 32        While division 2.1 does not limit a home rule municipality’s authority to
       administratively adjudicate violations of its ordinances, we previously noted that it
       does apply exclusively to administrative adjudications of ordinance violations by
       home rule municipalities. See 65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-1 (West 2020). Thus, while not a
       jurisdictional provision, section 1-2.1-2 provides that some ordinance violations are
       outside of a “system of administrative adjudication” to which division 2.1 applies.
       Accordingly, whether the ordinances at issue fall within that definition must have
       some purpose, if not jurisdictional. In order to ascertain the purpose of section 1-
       2.1-2 of the Municipal Code and determine whether it has any bearing on the
       propriety of the administrative decisions before us, we turn to the remaining
       provisions of article 1, division 2.1.

                                               - 13 -
¶ 33                  D. Article 1, Division 2.1, Provides Enforcement Incentives
                                       to Home Rule Units

¶ 34       Provided that an ordinance violation does not fall within the excepted violations
       provided in section 1-2.1-2, section 1-2.1-4 of the Municipal Code establishes
       requirements a city must meet in establishing a “system of administrative
       adjudication, pursuant to [that] Division.” Id. § 1-2.1-4(a). These include
       establishing a code hearing unit within city government and providing by ordinance
       for the jurisdiction of that unit that is consistent with division 2.1. Id. An
       adjudicatory hearing held pursuant to division 2.1 must be presided over by hearing
       officers with power and authority to consider testimony and other evidence,
       subpoena witnesses, and preserve a record of proceedings. Id. § 1-2.1-4(b)(1)-(3).

¶ 35       Section 1-2.1-5 provides that an ordinance establishing “a system of
       administrative adjudication, pursuant to [that] Division” must afford parties due
       process of law by providing notice and opportunity for a hearing as provided for in
       that section. Id. § 1-2.1-5(a). Section 1-2.1-6 provides that formal rules of evidence
       do not govern “in an adjudicatory hearing permitted under this Division.” Id. § 1-
       2.1-6. Finally, section 1-2.1-7 provides that any decision of a hearing officer is final
       for purposes of judicial review and that such decision is subject to review under the
       Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2020)). 65 ILCS 5/1-
       2.1-7 (West 2020).

¶ 36       If a home rule unit of government establishes a “system of administrative
       adjudication” as defined in section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code and that system
       meets all the requirements set forth in sections 1-2.1-3 through 1-2.1-7, then section
       1-2.1-8 provides mechanisms for enforcement of an administrative decision entered
       using such a system. See id. § 1-2.1-8. It is within this section that we find the
       purpose of division 2.1, as it confers enforcement incentives on those home rule
       municipalities that administratively adjudicate ordinance violations in accordance
       with its terms.

¶ 37      Pursuant to section 1-2.1-8(b),

          “[a]fter expiration of the period in which judicial review under the Illinois
          Administrative Review Law may be sought for a final determination of a code
          violation, unless stayed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the findings,

                                                - 14 -
           decision, and order of the hearing officer may be enforced in the same manner
           as a judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Id. § 1-2.1-8(b).

       Similarly, under section 1-2.1-8(d), the home rule municipality is able to record a
       lien on the real estate or personal estate, or both, in accordance with state law, and
       that lien may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment lien pursuant to a
       judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. § 1-2.1-8(d). Such remedies
       would otherwise not be available to the City until it initiated a civil action in the
       circuit court to collect the fine it has imposed. See Village of Lake in the Hills v.
       Niklaus, 2014 IL App (2d) 130654, ¶ 21 (without the enforcement mechanism set
       out in article 1, division 2.1, of the Municipal Code, a municipality would have to
       commence another action in circuit court to convert the administrative decision into
       a collectible judgment, thereby vitiating the incentive to use an administrative
       adjudication system).

¶ 38       Based on the foregoing, we find that a home rule municipality’s conformity
       with section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code when administratively adjudicating an
       ordinance violation determines whether the enforcement mechanisms set forth in
       section 1-2.1-8 are available to it without the need to proceed with the additional
       step of proving the violation in the circuit court in order to obtain a court judgment.8
       See id. However, section 1-2.1-2 does not provide a basis to divest a home rule
       municipality of jurisdiction to hold an administrative hearing to determine whether
       its ordinances have been violated or to impose a fine in accordance therewith.9
       Nevertheless, our finding that the appellate court erred in reversing the decisions of
       the hearing officer based on section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code does not

           8
             Article 1, division 2.1, of the Municipal Code is not the only statutory provision providing
       benefits to home rule municipalities that administratively adjudicate ordinance violations in
       accordance with its provisions. Section 11-208.3 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-208.3 (West
       2020)) allows for administrative adjudication by municipalities of traffic regulations concerning the
       standing, parking, or condition of vehicles; automated traffic law violations; and automated speed
       enforcement system violations in conformity with that section, resulting in the ability of the
       municipality to obtain a judgment in the circuit court in a shortened proceeding.
           9
             A request for modifications to an administrative decision by a home rule municipality that fails
       to meet the criteria in section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-2 (West 2020)) may
       be proper if such modifications are necessary to clarify that the decision does not have the force and
       effect of a court judgment pursuant to section 1-2.1-8 (id. § 1-2.1-8). However, reversal based on
       the municipality’s lack of jurisdiction to make an administrative determination regarding an
       ordinance violation is improper for the reasons stated.

                                                      - 15 -
       completely resolve the issue of the hearing officer’s jurisdiction because, in the
       alternative, plaintiffs argue that the Joliet Code of Ordinances does not allow for an
       administrative adjudication of these ordinance violations. Thus, we turn to the Joliet
       Code of Ordinances to determine whether the hearing officer’s decisions should be
       reversed based on this alternative jurisdictional argument.

¶ 39                               E. Joliet Code of Ordinances

¶ 40       Article I of chapter 3 of the Joliet Code of Ordinances is titled “Administrative
       Adjudication Code.” See Joliet Code of Ordinances § 3-2 (adopted May 15, 2018).
       Its purpose is to “provide a fair and efficient method of the enforcement of
       municipal regulations through the administrative adjudication of violations of the
       municipal code and establish the authority and procedures for the collection of
       unpaid fines and penalties.” Id. § 3-1(a). Article I establishes a “code hearing unit,”
       consisting of an “administrative hearing officer, and other persons designated by
       the city manager to assist the administrative hearing officer in the performance of
       official duties.” Id. § 3-3.

¶ 41       Section 3-5 of the Joliet Code of Ordinances governs the prosecution of
       offenses pursuant to local ordinance, and provides:

              “(a) Whenever a member of the Joliet Police Department charges an
          individual with any offense which is listed in the Code of Ordinances, or is a
          violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code which has been adopted by section 19-1
          of this Code, the manner of charging shall be done pursuant to this section.

              (b) The violator shall be issued either a notice of violation or a uniform
          traffic citation.

              (c) The notice of violation shall be issued in the case of a violation of a non-
          traffic related (non-reportable) violation of the Code of Ordinances. Issuance of
          a notice of violation shall be done in conformity with this article.

              (d) A uniform traffic citation shall be issued in the case of a violation of a
          reportable offense of the Illinois Vehicle Code, pursuant to section 19-1 of this
          Code.

                                               - 16 -
               (e) Any traffic offense requiring reporting to the Secretary of State shall be
           returnable to the Will Court House on the applicable return date.

               (f) Any other ordinance violation or traffic offense which does not require
           reporting to the Secretary of State, shall have a return date in the City Council
           Chambers of Joliet City Hall[,] 150 W. Jefferson Street.” Id. § 3-5.

¶ 42       Section 3-5 of the Joliet Code of Ordinances thus delineates whether an
       ordinance violation is to be adjudicated through the circuit court or through the
       City’s administrative process. Traffic offenses requiring reporting to the secretary
       of state are required to be prosecuted in the circuit court, while “[a]ny other
       ordinance violation or traffic offense which does not require reporting to the
       Secretary of State” is to be adjudicated through the City’s administrative process.
       Id. Accordingly, the City has provided adjudicatory authority to its hearing officers
       based on whether the ordinance violations at issue are required to be reported to the
       secretary of state.

¶ 43       Based on the foregoing, the question of whether the ordinance violations are
       required to be reported to the secretary of state pursuant to state law is a
       determinative inquiry, but the determination is not properly based on section 1-2.1-
       2 of the Municipal Code but, rather, is based on the City’s enactment of section 3-
       5 of the Joliet Code of Ordinances. 10 Pursuant to section 3-5, if the ordinance
       violations are “reportable offenses,” violators are to be issued a uniform traffic
       citation with appearance required in the circuit court should the violator not pay the
       fine by the return date. To determine whether the ordinances are “reportable
       offenses,” we turn to section 6-204 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-204 (West
       2020)).

           10
             While the City may have imposed the “reportable offense” requirement for administrative
       adjudication to ensure that the hearing officer’s decision could be enforced using mechanisms
       otherwise solely available to circuit court judgments as set forth in section 1-2.1-8 of the Municipal
       Code (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-8 (West 2020)), it remains important to distinguish the issue of
       enforceability from the issue of jurisdiction due to the constitutional protections on home rule unit
       authority discussed above. Supra ¶¶ 19-20.

                                                      - 17 -
¶ 44                              F. Reportable Offenses Committed by
                                     Drivers of Commercial Vehicles

¶ 45       Subsection (a) of section 6-204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code imposes a duty on
       the clerk of the circuit court to forward records of convictions for enumerated
       offenses to the secretary of state, who is tasked with cancelling, revoking, or
       suspending driver’s licenses. Id. § 6-204(a). Pursuant to subsection (a)(2), this duty
       applies “[w]henever any person is convicted of any offense under [the Vehicle
       Code] or similar offenses under a municipal ordinance, other than regulations
       governing standing, parking or weights of vehicles,” and excepting a long list of
       enumerated sections of the Vehicle Code. Id. § 6-204(a)(1).

¶ 46       The parties present opposing arguments regarding whether the ordinances at
       issue here are “regulations governing standing, parking or weights of vehicles,” for
       purposes of determining whether the violations are required to be reported.
       However, in the context of commercial motor vehicles, this inquiry is irrelevant
       because the final sentence of section 6-204(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code controls the
       issue of whether these ordinance violations are required to be reported to the
       secretary of state and, thus, are required by the Joliet Code of Ordinances to be
       adjudicated in the circuit court:

                “The reporting requirements of this subsection (a) apply to all violations
           listed in paragraphs (1)[ 11 ] and (2) of this subsection (a), excluding parking
           violations, when the driver holds a CLP or CDL,[ 12] regardless of the type of
           vehicle in which the violation occurred, or when any driver committed the
           violation in a commercial motor vehicle as defined in Section 6-500 of this
           Code.” Id. § 6-204(a)(2).

           11
               Section 6-204(a)(1) requires reporting to the secretary of state in the case of all convictions
       where the Vehicle Code requires the offender’s driver’s license or permit to be suspended. See 625
       ILCS 5/6-204(a)(1) (West 2020).
            12
               A CLP is a commercial learner’s permit, which authorizes a driver to practice driving a
       commercial motor vehicle with a qualified CDL holder sitting in the passenger seat. “How Do I Get
       a Commercial Driver’s License?” U.S. Dep’t of Transp., https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/registration/
       commercial-drivers-license/how-do-i-get-commercial-drivers-license (last visited Mar. 6, 2024)
       [https://perma.cc/S5L7-VR2Y]. A CDL is a commercial driver’s license, which is issued to a CLP
       holder after 14 days, completion of applicable entry-level driver training, and satisfactory
       completion of all three parts of a federally mandated skills test. Id.

                                                       - 18 -
¶ 47       Under the plain language of this provision, all Vehicle Code violations and
       “similar” ordinance violations, except parking violations, are required to be
       reported to the secretary of state when committed by a commercial learner’s permit
       (CLP) or commercial driver’s license (CDL) holder in any vehicle or when
       committed by any driver in a commercial motor vehicle as defined by section 6-
       500 of the Vehicle Code (id. § 6-500). See id. § 6-204(a)(2). Section 6-500(6)(A)
       of the Vehicle Code defines “ ‘[c]ommercial motor vehicle’ ” as “a motor vehicle
       or combination of motor vehicles used in commerce,” with exceptions not
       applicable here, if the vehicle is designed to transport passengers or property and
       meets minimum weight requirements. Id. § 6-500(6)(A). These requirements are

           “a gross combination weight rating or gross combination weight of 11,794
           kilograms or more (26,001 pounds or more), whichever is greater, inclusive of
           any towed unit with a gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle weight of
           more than 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds), whichever is greater; or

               *** has a gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle weight of 11,794
           kilograms (26,001 pounds or more), whichever is greater[.]” Id. § 6-
           500(6)(A)(i), (i-5).

¶ 48       Here, plaintiffs’ complaint for administrative review alleges that they are
       commercial truck drivers and that they drove semitractor trailers over
       nondesignated roads in the City. Thus, it is established that plaintiffs were CDL
       holders at the time of their violations. 13 Because plaintiffs are CDL holders, section
       6-204 of the Vehicle Code requires reporting to the secretary of state of all
       violations of the Vehicle Code and “similar” local ordinance violations they commit

            13
               Plaintiffs also conceded that the semitractor trailers they were driving exceeded the weight
       limit imposed for nondesignated routes in Joliet Code of Ordinances section 19-21 (Joliet Code of
       Ordinances § 19-21 (eff. Dec. 17, 2019)). That ordinance prohibits vehicles with a weight or weight
       rating in excess of 24,000 pounds (12 tons). Id. § 19-21(a). Thus, the record does not establish with
       certainly that the tractor trailers they were driving exceeded the 26,000-pound weight or weight
       rating required to meet the definition of “commercial motor vehicle” set forth in section 6-500(6) of
       the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-500(6) (West 2020)). Thus, it cannot be established by the record
       that violations by any driver of the semitractor trailers would be required by the Vehicle Code to be
       reported to the secretary of state and thus required by Joliet Code of Ordinances section 3-5 (Joliet
       Code of Ordinances § 3-5 (adopted May 15, 2018)) to be adjudicated in the circuit court. However,
       because the record establishes that plaintiffs are commercial truck drivers, it is established that they
       either hold CLPs or CDLs, and their violations are required to be reported regardless of the vehicle
       that they are driving. See 625 ILCS 5/6-204 (West 2020).

                                                       - 19 -
       other than parking violations. 14 Id. § 6-204. It is to the issue of “similarity” that we
       now turn.

¶ 49       The City argues that the ordinances at issue, which regulate the weight and
       length of vehicles driving over nondesignated roads, are not similar to any provision
       of the Vehicle Code. In so doing, the City points to differences in the method it uses
       to measure the weight of vehicles, the maximum weight allowed, and the
       designation of specific truck routes in the City, compared to weight restrictions in
       the Vehicle Code. However, section 6-204 of the Vehicle Code mandates reporting
       of violations of “similar” local ordinances, not identical ones. Thus, we agree with
       plaintiffs that the Vehicle Code regulates the movement of vehicles over a certain
       weight or length, and thus the City’s ordinances, restricting the weight and length
       of vehicles over certain roads within the City, are similar to those provisions.
       Compare id. § 15-111 (establishing the maximum weight per axle), with Joliet
       Code of Ordinances § 19-21 (eff. Dec. 17, 2019); compare 625 ILCS 5/15-107
       (West 2020) (establishing the maximum length of a vehicle), with Joliet Code of
       Ordinances § 19-19 (eff. Dec. 1, 2015).

¶ 50       In sum, we find that violations of the ordinances at issue are “reportable” as that
       term is used in section 6-204 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-204 (West 2020)),
       as well as in section 3-5 of the Joliet Code of Ordinances (Joliet Code of Ordinances
       § 3-5 (adopted May 15, 2018)). As such, the Joliet Code of Ordinances required
       that plaintiffs be issued uniform traffic citations, rather than notices of ordinance

           14
              Amicus argues that the provision in section 6-204 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-204
       (2020)) requiring reporting of all violations listed in section 1040.20(b) of Title 92 of the Illinois
       Administrative Code (92 Ill. Adm. Code 1040.20(b) (eff. Feb. 24, 2023)), except parking violations,
       when the offender is driving a commercial vehicle or holds a CDL or CLP, clarifies that section
       1040.20(b) applies to commercial drivers and commercial vehicles, rather than requiring that all
       offenses listed in section 1040.20(b), excluding parking violations, be reported when committed by
       a commercial driver or in a commercial vehicle. According to this argument, because one of the
       exclusions listed in section 1040.20(b), section 11-1419.01 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-
       1419.01 (West 2020)), applies only to commercial vehicles, that exclusion would be superfluous
       under our interpretation of the provision. However, section 11-1419.01 applies to “motor carriers”
       as well as “commercial vehicles,” with a “motor carrier” defined as any person engaged in
       transportation of passengers or property in a motor vehicle for hire. See id. § 18c-1104(19). Thus,
       amicus’s argument is unsubstantiated. To the contrary, interpreting the provision as amicus suggests
       would render the exclusion of parking violations from commercial driver and commercial vehicle
       reporting requirements superfluous, as such violations are already excluded under section
       1040.20(b). Id. § 11-1419.01.

                                                      - 20 -
       violation, and that plaintiffs be required to appear in the circuit court to have their
       objection adjudicated, rather than at the City’s code hearing unit. Id. For these
       reasons, we find that the Joliet Code of Ordinances did not confer jurisdiction on
       the hearing officer to administratively adjudicate the ordinance violations. Thus,
       the appellate court was correct to reverse the judgment of the circuit court and the
       decisions of the hearing officer, albeit on different grounds, and we affirm that part
       of the appellate court’s judgment that did so.

¶ 51                                      CONCLUSION

¶ 52       Based on the foregoing, we reiterate that section 1-2.1-2 of the Municipal Code
       (65 ILCS 5/1-2.1-2 (West 2020)) does not preempt the City’s home rule authority
       to administratively adjudicate violations of its ordinances and, therefore, does not
       constitute an appropriate basis to reverse the administrative decisions of the City’s
       hearing officer. Rather, the purpose of that section is to describe the parameters of
       a system of administrative adjudication that will result in a judgment that is
       enforceable without further action in the circuit court to prove the violation, an issue
       that is separate from the authority of the home rule municipality to issue the
       administrative determinations themselves.

¶ 53       For these reasons, we vacate that part of the appellate court’s judgment holding
       that a home rule municipality lacks jurisdiction to administratively adjudicate
       ordinances failing to meet the definition of “ ‘system of administrative
       adjudication’ ” set forth in section 1-2.1-2. Id. Nevertheless, we find the hearing
       officer’s administrative decisions are precluded by section 3-5 of the Joliet Code of
       Ordinances (Joliet Code of Ordinances § 3-5 (adopted May 15, 2018)) and thus
       affirm, on different grounds, that part of the appellate court’s judgment that
       reversed the judgment of the circuit court and reversed the administrative decisions
       entered by the City’s hearing officer.

¶ 54      Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part.

¶ 55      Circuit court judgment reversed.

                                                - 21 -
¶ 56   Administrative decisions reversed.

¶ 57   JUSTICE O’BRIEN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

                                            - 22 -