Court Opinion

ID: 9648521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:25:06.26749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:02.397951
License: Public Domain

BOYD, Justice.
I respectfully dissent from the decision affirming the judgment. In sustaining objections to the interrogation of appellee Hasley relative to his abandoned pleading, his subsequent allegations of contributory negligence, when he acquired knowledge of facts indicating contributory negligence, and appellant’s efforts to complete his bill of exception, I think the learned trial court fell into error which calls for a reversal.
Appellees’ position is that since Hasley was not an expert it was proper to exclude his testimony about the trial tactics and theories adopted by his counsel, and that any answers he might have made could have no bearing on the question whether in fact there was contributory negligence in the case; and further that appellant has not shown that harm resulted from the exclusion of the evidence.
The inquiry involved more than a criticism of trial tactics. And while answers to some of the questions might have amounted to conclusions, it must be remembered that the witness was a defendant, and had pleaded negligence approximately in the language used in the questions. He had authorized his counsel to file the original answer, and was therefore responsible for its allegations or lack of allegations. The situation was the same as it would have been had Hasley personally written every word of 'both answers. Appellant was not at the moment trying only to disprove the existence of negligence on the part of either of the Rays. Had that been his only purpose, the objection that answers to his questions would embody conclusions of law would have presented a different matter.
I think the point involves a consideration of the admissibility of, and the right to interrogate Hasley about, the original answer, as well as other aspects of the right of cross-examination.
A party is not required to allege all or any of his special defenses in his original answer; but there is no rule that prevents him from doing so. Hasley had the right to wait more than sixteen months after filing his original answer before amending and setting up for the first time the alleged negligence- of the Rays; but that in no way affects appellant’s right to subject Hasley’s reasons for, the delay in making such defense, and any claim of knowledge of the facts themselves, to every scrutiny known *425to the law. The issue of contributory negligence was a vital factor in the trial, the unfavorable finding on the issue having deprived appellant of a verdict.
The right to cross-examine an adverse witness is valuable, is absolute, and should not be abridged; and especially is this so when the witness is a party and has.testified to make out his own case. It is only after the right has been fully and fairly exercised that the court in its discretion may curtail the cross-examination. The object of cross-examination is to destroy or weaken the witness’ testimony by testing his veracity, recollection, prejudices, motives, and good faith. Any evidence which can fairly be said to thus weaken his testimony, however slight its probative force may be, is competent, any objection thereto necessarily being addressed to its weight, which is for the jury, and not to its admissibility.
Abandoned pleadings are competent evidence to show admissions against interest. Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. De Walt, 96 Tex. 121, 70 S.W. 531, 97 Am.St.Rep. 877; Austin v. Jackson Trust & Savings Bank, 59 Tex.Civ.App. 155, 125 S.W. 936, writ refused; Warburton v. Wilkinson, Tex.Civ.App., 182 S.W. 711; First Nat. Bank of Hereford v. Hogan, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W. 880, writ refused; National Cattle Loan Co. v. Armstrong, Tex.Civ.App., 8 S.W.2d 767, writ refused. But it is not essential to their admissibility that abandoned pleadings either show admissions against interest or that they contradict subsequent pleadings. Omissions in pleadings may be shown as well as contradictions. And when abandoned pleadings possess the characteristic of independent relevancy, they may be re-, ceived to prove some fact in the case, to show that the pleader made a different claim or defense at another time, to raise unfavorable inferences as to1 good faith in a belated claim or defense, or to impeach the pleader as a witness. 31 C.J.S., Evidence, § 304,' p. 1082.
It has been held that where in a defendant’s third answer a defense of fraud was set up, his two abandoned answers, contain,-ing no allegation of fraud, were admissible to show that the defense of fraud may have been an afterthought. Walser v. Wear, 141 Mo. 443, 42 S.W. 928. In Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 85 A. 529, which was an action for damages for ejecting the plaintiff from rooms and assaulting her, the original complaint, an amendment thereto, and a substituted complaint, were held to be admissible to show that in none of them did the plaintiff allege that she had been assaulted. Where an attorney in his original bill in a suit for professional services claimed the amount of $75, and his amended bill asked for $200, the court said that the original bill was admissible to affect the plaintiff’s credibility as a witness, and for other purposes. Leavitt v. Deichmann, 30 Okl. 423, 120 P. 983.
The abandoned pleading being admissible, I think it follows that appellant had the right to interrogate Hasley about it, about the amended answer, and about when he acquired any knowledge of facts indicating contributory negligence.
The materiality of- the proffered evidence was apparent. The issue as to appellant’s contributory negligence was controverted. The evidence was almost entirely circumstantial, and could support an inference favorable to either side. The existence of some of the circumstances was disputed. No witness testified that appellant’s arm extended through the window; indeed, no witness testified that his arm was even in the window at the time of the collision. Appellant admitted that when he fell asleep1 his elbow was on the window sill, and that, his forearm was down at an angle, inside the car. He denied that his arm protruded outside the window. But that it did might be inferred from the severity of its injury and the fact that the contact of the vehicles was slight. Appellee. Hasley testified that he made a close examination of the car and saw no damage to it other than to the vent glass, and that the truck, needed no repairs as a result of the collision, its only damage being a .cracked reflector. George Ray testified that in -addition to the shattered vent glass on his- car, there was a crack in the main door glass and an indentation on the. *426front door post. He further testified that as he was about to pass the truck, it slowed down and without any signal moved to its left until it extended about a foot across the center line, and the impact took place when his car was alongside the truck. The possibility is not ruled out that the swerving of the car to the left to pass, and avoid contact with, the truck could have been the cause of appellant’s arm being outside the window, if it was, at the time of the collision. That could conceivably happen to a person whether asleep or awake.
Nor can I agree that error is not apparent since appellant failed to show that harm resulted from the exclusion of the testimony sought to be elicited. It is true that Has-ley’s answers are not in the bill of exception. That is one ground of appellant’s complaint. But it is not necessary for him to show that the answers would have been favorable. When objections are sustained to questions propounded to an adverse party, we must assume that the answers would not have been unfavorable to the party seeking them. Were it possible to do so, appellant might be required to incorporate the answers in the record; but we must not overlook the.fact that appellant was. not in appellee Hasley’s confidence.
On Motion to Retax Costs
MASSEY, Chief Justice.'
Along with appellant’s motion for rehearing he presented for the first time a motion to retax costs.
Appellant’s motion relates to the transcript only and not to the statement of facts. A part of the transcript consists of a' supplemental transcript containing the amended petition upon which the appellant went to trial. Since under provisions of T. R. C. P. 376 the clerk of the trial court is charged with the duty of including this as a part of the original pleadings upon which trial was had, and since the clerk did not include the pleading in the original transcript, any question as to whether the costs of this supplemental transcript should or should not be charged to the appellant is removed because there was no agreement between the parties that such pleading need not be included as a part of the record.
As to the balance of the transcript, it appears that appellant filed his appeal bond on September 22, 1953, and ordered the instruments he desired incorporated in the transcript on October 1, 1953. On October 5, 1953, the appellees filed their request with the clerk ordering in addition, among other instruments, their special exceptions to the appellant’s pleadings, their exceptions to the court’s charge, their motion for instructed verdict, their requested special issues which were refused, and the record made of appellant’s argument to the jury.
The appellant’s brief was not filed in this court until November 27, 1953. In the brief the appellant sought a reversal of the judgment and a remand of the cause for another trial. He did not seek rendition of a judgment in his favor from this court. Therefore the usefulness of the items stated above to have been ordered by the appellees as part of the transcript became valueless to the appellees in so far as they might have intended to use them in connection with cross-assignments of error, in the event appellant should seek to have the judgment reversed and rendered in this court. The transcript, which included these instruments, was filed in this court on October 28, 1953. This was a month prior to date appellant’s brief was filed with us, and since the contrary is not shown, presumptively the date appellees were first on notice as to just what the appellant would rely on in this court both as to points of error and prayer for relief based thereon.
So, by the time appellees were in position to know that they had ordered matter immaterial to the appeal the clerk had already done his work on it and included it in the transcript. The clerk was entitled to tax costs therefor in his cost bill. The record does not show that there was any attempt by the appellant to lay a predicate whereby he might get costs retaxed against *427the appellees in the event he lost .in the appellate court by invoking the provisions of T. R. C. P. 377-a and filing with the clerk of the court a statement of the points upon which he intended to rely upon the appeal, or by doing anything at all to induce the appellees to accept an abbreviated transcript. Therefore the appellant is not in position to complain of the inclusion in the transcript of the matter complained of and neither may he be heard to complain-that the costs thereof were taxed against him as the losing party on the appeal.
The motion to retax costs is denied.