Court Opinion

ID: 9588507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:58.056481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:36.914068
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On motion for rehearing, we have reexamined the evidence and related arguments pertaining to the asserted illegal search and seizure once again advanced and renewed on behalf of both Botts and Gravley. We are satisfied that our original disposition of this issue was correct and will adhere thereto.
In relation to Case No. 72952, Botts v. State, appellant Botts contends that in our opinion we ignored prosecutorial misconduct in that during examination by the district attorney of one of the arresting officers concerning the officer’s observations of Ms. Botts at the scene of her arrest, the officer testified to her silence after she had been given Miranda warnings. Botts contends that such questioning has been condemned by this court in Phillips v. State, 165 Ga. App. 235 (299 SE2d 138) and Lowe v. State, 136 Ga. App. 631 (222 SE2d 50).
The facts in the Botts case reflect that shortly after the police officers arrived to talk with Gravley, Botts left the residence in an automobile. About 10-15 minutes later, she returned and sat on the front porch of the residence. She observed the police officers escorting Gravley with his hands cuffed behind his back toward a police car. Though disputed, it appears that Gravley called out in a loud voice to Botts words to the effect that she should say nothing until they had seen an attorney. After Gravley had been removed from the scene in a police vehicle, the officers continued to look for other marijuana that might be growing on the premises. After the inspection was completed, one of the officers walked to where Ms. Botts was seated and advised her of her Miranda rights. He then told her that he would not arrest her at that moment but that he would take out a warrant for her arrest for growing and possessing marijuana. Because she had small children, he told her when it was convenient and later on during that day she should appear at the sheriff’s office with a bondsman and surrender herself on the marijuana charge and she would be allowed to make bond.
After the district attorney had elicited the above information, he inquired of the police officer as to whether Ms. Botts had registered any emotional or facial surprise or other manifestation of emotion. The officer stated Ms. Botts remained neutral in expression and ac*411tions.
When this evidence was elicited, the defense objected that the answer called for a conclusion or an unsupported opinion. Later in redirect examination, the same subject was pursued by the defense counsel.
On the next day (the second day of trial), counsel for the first time and citing Phillips and Lowe, supra, contended that the questioning concerning Ms. Botts’ expressions and actions violated her Miranda right by attempting to breach her right to remain silent.
We find no Miranda violation under these circumstances. Both Phillips, supra and Lowe, supra, involved situations where the defendant, after having been advised of the right to remain silent, was asked specifically why he did not verbally respond by way of explanation when confronted with an incriminating situation. Thus in both Phillips and Lowe, the court was dealing with reference to a failure of a testimonial response, and thus a direct reference to the suspect’s verbal silence in the face of an inculpating situation.
In this case, the only thing presented was a third party’s physical observation of Ms. Botts. No verbal or mental response by Ms. Botts was elicited by way of question. She was not asked to make any statement nor to explain any situation. This is tantamount to an expert testifying to the alcoholic content of blood properly drawn or a suspect being able to wear an incriminating garment or fit his foot into a foot impression. Other examples are a police officer’s observations of intoxication at the time of confrontation on testimony that when confronted the suspect fled. These latter situations, while incriminating, have never been deemed violative of Miranda rights for none involve testimonial nor coerced admissions by a suspect. Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 516-517 (192 SE2d 350); see State v. Armstead, 152 Ga. App. 56 (1) (262 SE2d 233).
One critical issue in the case of Botts involved whether she had a proprietary interest in the garden and was knowledgeable of the contents of the garden sufficient to sustain her guilt of possessing and growing marijuana. She denied knowing what was growing in the garden though she admitted she lived on the premises and she was aware that her live-in companion Gravley may well have used marijuana. That she voluntarily exhibited by facial expression or action not amounting to words no surprise that marijuana was found growing in the garden was very relevant in relation to the jury’s determination of her knowledge.
Though this issue was not previously addressed, we find no merit in the enumeration of error and adhere to our affirmance of conviction in relation to Ms. Botts.
Rehearing denied.
*412Decided December 4, 1986
Rehearing denied December 19, 1986
H. Michael Bray, for appellants.
Rafe Banks III, District Attorney, Garry T. Moss, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.