Court Opinion

ID: 9570509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:23:53.457151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:24.317609
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
KOBAYASHI, J., WITH WHOM LEVINSON, J., JOINS
I dissent.
The reasoning of the majority of the court in concluding that the appellant did not have the requisite minimum contacts (McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)) with the State of California is, indeed, illusive and illogical.
In the instant case, the subject matter sought by appellee and held by appellant is $7,144.24 plus interest. Said amount constituted a one-fourth portion of the estate of Theodore Granstedt, Sr., who died in Santa Clara County, California. Appellant participated in the initial intestate proceedings and accepted the distribution of his alleged share of the estate. When a will was discovered, subsequently, naming appellee’s father as the sole residuary legatee, appellant filed a contest to the *608probate of the will and in connection with the contest, took depositions and answered interrogatories, though he subsequently withdrew the contest of the will. The will was admitted to probate and thus the probate court held that appellant was not entitled to the amount appellant had received in the initial proceeding. Thereafter appellee brought action to collect from appellant the distributive share that was paid to appellant erroneously. Judgment entered in this last action is at issue herein. All the above legal proceedings occurred in the State of California and appellant participated as above stated though he was a resident of Hawaii and not a resident of California.
How the majority of the court can conclude that the causes of action herein are unrelated to the actions of appellant in the State of California in the receipt of the monies in question is beyond this writer’s comprehension. All acts of the appellant and all causes of action herein deal with the same distributive share which appellant received erroneously. Furthermore, the court in Santa Clara, California, in its judgment stated:
that because of his contacts with this state in connection with the issues raised in this proceeding, the State of California can exercise personal jurisdiction over the said THEODORE GRANSTEDT, JR.
I agree with the majority that the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of personal jurisdiction which state courts may exercise over nonresidents served outside of the forum state and that said expansion has been done on a case by case basis.
In said expansion three basic factors have evolved denoting the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of state court jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. The Supreme Court of Texas in O’Brien v. Lanpar Company, 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966), quoting the Supreme Court of Washington, Tyee Construction Co. v. *609Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 62 Wash.2d 106, 381 P.2d 245, 251 (1963), outlined the three basic factors which must coincide if jurisdiction over a nonresident is to be sustained, to-wit:
(1) The nonresident defendant... must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state;
(2) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction; and
(3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.
I am of the opinion that the appellant had the requisite minimum contact with the State of California, that the facts of the instant case meet the above three basic factors, and that the trial court was correct in granting full faith and credit to the judgment of the Santa Clara court.