Court Opinion

ID: 9598138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:05:57.589855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:25.939625
License: Public Domain

MILLER,
Justice, concurring:
While I concur in the result reached by the majority, I do not agree with the reasoning used to reach that result. The majority utilizes theories of “contractual waiver” and “social welfare model” that purportedly arise from the probationer’s relationship to the State and society. The issues here involved are claims of illegally seized evidence and an invalid inculpatory statement. These issues are of constitutional dimensions and, in my view, cannot be properly disposed of on these theories.
The absurdity of a “contractual waiver” theory in this case is that the probationer signed no express waiver or consent to a warrantless search and seizure of her possessions. Under settled constitutional principles, a waiver of constitutional rights simply does not arise by implication but must be given in a voluntary, clear and unequivocal manner. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Even where an express waiver has been given by a parolee or probationer which subjects him to search and seizure at any time as a part of his release conditions, some courts have concluded that such a waiver is not voluntary because it is given in order to avoid further confinement or punishment. E.g., United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F.Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y.1975); People v. Bremmer, 30 Cal.App.3d 1058, 106 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1973); People v. Peterson, 62 Mich.App. 258, 233 N.W.2d 250 (1975); Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976); 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.10(b) (1978).
The “social welfare model” theory is equally infirm since it rests on the tenuous premise that because rehabilitative goals are presumably being pursued in probation and parole there is no need to apply constitutional procedural safeguards to the “privacy rights” of the probationer or parolee. Certainly, the United States Supreme Court has rejected this concept in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), and Morrissey v. Brew*93er, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), by setting a number of procedural due process rights surrounding probation and parole revocation. This is the position that we have adopted in Louk v. Haynes, 159 W.Va. 482, 223 S.E.2d 780 (1976). See State v. Cooper, 167 W.Va. 322, 280 S.E.2d 95 (1981); State v. Ketchum, 169 W.Va. 9, 289 S.E.2d 657 (1981). Much the same argument — that pursuit of rehabilitative goals will warrant a reduction in constitutional safeguards — was rejected in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). Notwithstanding the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile process, the Supreme Court concluded that constitutional procedural due process rights applied to juvenile hearings.
A more acceptable method of determining the propriety of using illegally seized evidence in a probation revocation hearing is to begin with the recognition that because of the supervisory control exercised by the probation officer and the probationer’s conditional freedom, there is a diminished expectation of privacy. Therefore, a warrantless visitation may be made to a probationer’s home or apartment by his probation officer. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Martinez, 1 Cal.3d 641, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734 (1970), cert. denied sub nom., Martinez v. Craven, 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 71, 27 L.Ed.2d 88; cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971). As Workman recognizes, once the probation officer is lawfully on the premises, he may act as any other law enforcement officer:1
“Thus he may search and seize articles as an incident to a lawful arrest. Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1950). Since his authority to visit places him lawfully in the probationer’s home, he can seize contraband and instruments or evidence of crime in plain view. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73, 91 S.Ct. 2022, [2037-2042] 29 L.Ed.2d 564 [581-587] (1971). For his own safety, he can frisk the probationer without consent, and he can conduct a search with consent. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).” 585 F.2d at 1208.
The fact that the probation officer had a right to visit the probationer’s apartment is all that is necessary to decide the search issue in the present case because there was technically no search by the probation officer 2 but a receipt by him of the probation*94er’s mail voluntarily turned over to him by her roommate. There is no suggestion in the record that the probation officer opened or read any of the mail although some of the mail had been opened by the probationer’s roommate. The probation officer subsequently delivered the mail to the probationer, who opened it in his presence and discussed some of its contents. In the course of this discussion, she made certain inculpatory statements.3
Her inculpatory statements were introduced at the revocation hearing. The introduction of these inculpatory statements gives rise to the second issue: whether she should have been given Miranda warnings by the probation officer, since she was in jail custody. The basic design of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was to forestall the admission of confessions arising from “incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.” 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707. To accomplish this goal, the Court required that the accused be given a statement of his rights. Consent by the accused to waive these rights was then required before questioning could take place as a “protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphere of the interrogation.” 384 U.S. at 465, 86 S.Ct. at 1623, 16 L.Ed.2d at 718.
Most courts have refused to make Miranda applicable to questioning by a probation or parole officer on the basis that there exists a supervisory relationship between the officer and the probationer or parolee — which should not be unduly constricted by imposing Miranda warnings each time questioning is undertaken. E.g., Thompson v. State, 356 So.2d 757 (Ala.Cr. App.1978); People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024 (1975); State v. Lassai, 366 So.2d 1389 (La.1978); State v. Generoso, 156 N.J.Super. 540, 384 A.2d 189 (1978); Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973); Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 669 (1977).4
Other courts have stressed the routine, noncustodial nature of the probation inter*95view. E.g., People v. Knight, 75 Ill.2d 291, 26 Ill.Dec. 699, 388 N.E.2d 414 (1979); State v. Generoso, supra. People v. W., 24 N.Y.2d 732, 249 N.E.2d 882, 302 N.Y. S.2d 260 (1969); Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 669 (1977). It may also be acknowledged that Miranda has never been held to apply to all interrogations but only those that are of a custodial nature. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976).
Several courts have also found that custodial interrogations which produce an in-culpatory statement and form the basis of a probation revocation charge may not be admitted in the absence of an appropriate Miranda warning. E.g., State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 416, 542 P.2d 1115 (1975); In re McMillan, 51 Ill.App.3d 940, 10 Ill.Dec. 106, 367 N.E.2d 494 (1977); Jackson v. State, 508 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Here, the probationer was in custody. From the record, it appears that the probation officer was not responsible for her detention. The probationer had apparently been lodged in jail on an alleged probation violation independent of the information that the probation officer later obtained from the discussion of the mail. As previously noted, the probation officer delivered this mail to her at the jail and according to him, “I handed Miss Hughes the twenty-two pieces of mail and she opened them in front of me and we discussed the contents of them.” It was during the course of this proceeding that she made the inculpatory statements.
Had the record in this case demonstrated that the probationer was incarcerated and that the purpose of the interrogation was to elicit inculpatory statements that would support the charge for which she was incarcerated, I would then require the giving of Miranda warnings. While the majority admits in note 7 that an involuntary confession may be still suppressed at a probation revocation hearing, they do not illuminate what is meant by the term “involuntary.” Even prior to the Miranda decision, a confession that was the product of coercion, either psychological or physical, was involuntary and therefore inadmissible. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940); State v. Fortner, 150 W.Va. 571, 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966). Miranda placed a procedural barrier against custodial interrogations. Unless the waiver of the Miranda rights was obtained, the custodial interrogation was inadmissible although it might have been “voluntary” in the pre-Miranda sense. In my view any custodial interrogation by a probation or parole officer that is centered on eliciting from the probationer or parolee inculpatory statements regarding his parole or probation violations should be preceded by Miranda warnings.
Finally, Miranda rights relate not only to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination but the Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present before custodial interrogation can commence. State v. Clawson, 165 W.Va. 588, 270 S.E.2d 659, 665-66 (1980). The majority treats the right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing as a general proposition and ignores the right to counsel at a custodial interrogation under Miranda. The right to counsel, however, turns upon the same point of inquiry — whether the custodial interrogation is deliberately designed to elicit information that will buttress the revocation charge which brought about the probationer’s incarceration. If the interrogation is of such a nature then Miranda warnings must be given and an appropriate waiver of the right to counsel and right against self-incrimination obtained before the interrogation begins.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice HARSHBARGER joins me in this concurrence.

. It appears to be generally accepted that the right to conduct warrantless searches given to probation and parole officers under their administrative powers is not ordinarily extended to police officers who have no supervisory power over probationers or parolees. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hallman, 365 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1966); State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1976); State v. Shirley, 117 Ariz. 105, 570 P.2d 1278 (App.1977); People v. Coffman, 2 Cal. App.3d 681, 82 Cal.Rptr. 782 (1969); People v. Knight, 75 Ill.2d 291, 26 IIl.Dec. 699, 388 N.E.2d 414 (1979); State v. Davis, 375 So.2d 69 (La. 1979); State v. Nettles, 287 Or. 131, 597 P.2d 1243 (1979); State v. Proctor, 16 Wash.App. 865, 559 P.2d 1363 (1977).

. The majority speaks too broadly when they say "the great majority of courts have held that the exclusionary rule is not applicable in probation revocation proceedings, Annot. 77 A.L.R.3d 636 (1977).” (at p. 10, 1981) A reading of the cases in this field discloses that courts have been greatly troubled over this question. The leading case, Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975), was decided by a sharply divided court with the majority concluding that "[tjhis is not to say that we will uphold every search by a parole officer. In a given case, what is done may be so unreasonable as to require that the search be held to violate the Fourth Amendment.” 521 F.2d at 252. The Fourth Circuit has held that a warrant is required in the absence of plain view or some exigent circumstance. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978). As a matter of fact, I am aware of no court which has adopted an absolute per se rule that the exclusionary rule will never apply. See State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907, 914 (Alaska 1976) (“We can conceive of circumstances which would lead to the application of the exclusionary rule to revocation of probation proceedings.”); Harris v. State, 606 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Ark.App.1980) ("[T]he trial court may permit the introduction of ... evidence that might be subject to a motion to suppress under the doctrine of Mapp v. Ohio, at least where there has been a good-faith effort to comply with the law.”); In re Martinez, 1 Cal.3d 641, 647 n. 6, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 386 n. 6, 463 P.2d *94734, 738 n. 6 (1970) ("A dimunition of Fourth Amendment protection, however, can be justified only to the extent actually necessitated by the legitimate demands of the operation of the parole process.”); Grubbs v. State, 373 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla.1979) (”[A]n individual does not absolutely forfeit the protection of the fourth amendment ... merely by assuming the status of a probationer.”); Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 94, 590 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1979) ("To justify a warrantless search by a parole or probation officer, the officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of the parole or probation has occurred.”); State v. Bollinger, 169 N.J.Super. 553, 564, 405 A.2d 432, 438 (1979) ("[Tjhese searches should only be conducted by probation officers, at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner.”); State v. Gardner, 95 N.M. 171, 619 P.2d 847, 850 (1980) ("The requirement to submit to a search must be ‘reasonable’ both under the Constitution, [United States v.] Consuelo-Gonzalez, [521 F.2d 259, (9th Cir. 1975) ] ... and under the statute, § 31-20-6(F) [N.M.S.A.1978].”); Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 Pa.Super. 190, 361 A.2d 846, 850 (1976) ("[Ojnce the rationale that justifies informal treatment of parolees ceases, the parolee’s Fourth Amendment rights must be given full consideration.”).

. The entire testimony on this issue was from the probation officer. The probationer elected not to testify at the revocation hearing:
“A Yes. I took twenty-two pieces of mail that I had received on September 29th from her former roommate, Rosanna Ferguson. The mail had come — as explained by Miss Ferguson, had come to her residence and Christine was no longer living there and she said T didn’t want to have any more contact with her,’ and asked me if I could please give her that mail, and I said that I would.
"Q So you took that mail to the Kanawha County Jail?
“A Yes.
"Q Was it opened or unopened when you took it there?
"A The mail was partially opened. There were some things that Miss Ferguson had opened. She said to me that she had opened them because it was just too tempting not to. She said she had an idea about what they were. I took those to Chief Probation Officer, Benwood Stout, and he suggested I take them on over to Christine, who was in the jail at that time.
"Q What happened during this interview with Miss Hughes on October 7th, 1979?
"A I handed Miss Hughes the twenty-two pieces of mail and she opened them in front of me and we discussed the contents of them.”

. Several courts have recognized that interrogation by police officers as distinguished from probation or parole officers may require Miranda warnings since the former have no administrative supervision over probationers or parolees. Therefore, no official relationship exists that permits general interrogation by police officers as to the probationer's conduct. E.g., State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 416, 542 P.2d 1115 *95(1975); People v. Knight, 75 Ill.2d 291, 26 Ill. Dec. 699, 388 N.E.2d 414 (1979); Jackson v. State, 508 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).