Court Opinion

ID: 9656564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:51:12.266704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:31.993150
License: Public Domain

Upon Petition for Rehearing.2
On March 14, 1958, the following opinion was filed:
Thomas Gallagher, Justice.
These actions were instituted by the state to have determined that it is the owner of certain lake beds within the state under which lie valuable deposits of iron ore. The prayer for relief in the various complaints therein is as follows:
“Wherefore plaintiff prays judgment that it is the owner in fee simple of such lands constituting the lake bed of * * * [name of] Lake and the river bed of the stream connecting * * * [name of] Lake and *547* * * [name of] Lake * * * as aforesaid, and the sole owner of all iron ores and other minerals on, in, or under said lands, together with the exclusive right to enter on said lands and explore for and remove such iron ore and other minerals, together with the right to regulate, control, and divert the waters of * * * [name of] Lake, and that the defendants and none of them have any estate or interest in or lien upon said lands, or the iron ores or minerals thereon, or thereunder, and for its costs and disbursements herein.”
Defendants are the owners of the shores bordering on the lakes described in the various actions and are legally designated “riparian owners,”3 or “riparian proprietors.”
Contrary to the claim of the attorney general stated in his petition for reargument, this litigation is not a contest between certain mining companies and the school children of the state. It is concerned solely with the ownership of certain lake property as between the state and the riparian owners thereof, most of whom are private citizens. As such, it is governed by legal principles and applicable laws to the same extent as it would be if it concerned any two individuals. Under our constitutional form of government, this court cannot by judicial fiat delegate to the state a power to deprive its citizens of their property without just compensation therefor, regardless of whether such property be in the form of minerals, dwellings, farms, or industries. When we divorce ourselves from any desire to give these lake beds to the state simply because they contain valuable iron-ore deposits, and apply the legal principles applicable in litigation between private citizens under our constitution and laws, the issues become clearly defined and readily determinable.
It is well settled that, in any case which has been decided here, a rehearing is not authorized merely to permit the losing party an opportunity to again present arguments which have already been considered by the court in arriving at its decision. Before a rehearing may be granted, there must be a showing that this court has overlooked some material fact or some controlling principle of law. Unless there is such *548a showing, the decision should stand.4
It is also elementary that on appeal a case must be determined on the theory upon which it was tried 5 As stated in Northland Pine Co. v. Melin Bros. Inc. 142 Minn. 233, 235, 1716 N. W. 808:
“A party to an action cannot in the trial court adopt a theory of the cause of action, or of the relative rights of himself and other parties, and obtain findings and judgment in accordance therewith, or invite error in the proceedings, and on appeal complain of the judgment which he sought or of errors which he helped make. Of the correctness of this general doctrine there is no question.”
See, also, Edelstein v. Duluth, M. & I. R. Ry. Co. 225 Minn. 508, 516, 31 N. W. (2d) 465, 470.
The rule is likewise well established that a trial court’s finding on a question of fact must be sustained on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support it.6 The sole issue presented for determination at the trial was whether the described lakes or any of them were navigable under applicable Federal tests when Minnesota entered the Union. Had such navigability been established, then the beds under such lakes, including iron-ore deposits therein, would belong to the state rather than to riparian owners. Both parties submitted evidence on this issue. The trial court found that such evidence was insufficient to establish that the lakes, with the exception of Little Rabbit Lake, were navigable under the Federal tests at the time Minnesota was admitted to the Union.
Accordingly, upon this appeal the only question presented for determination was whether the evidence submitted at the trial sustained the *549trial court’s finding on the issue of navigability. Because of the importance of the question, this court granted the parties to the appeal unlimited time for oral argument and an entire day was consumed by them in presenting their respective contentions to this court. Thereafter, we made a careful and extended examination of the entire record consisting of over 2,000 pages in 5 volumes. Our examination disclosed substantial evidence to sustain the trial court’s finding on the principal issue and hence under the rule above stated we were obligated to affirm it. As far as such evidence is concerned, the petition for rehearing presents nothing which was not submitted in the prior briefs and oral arguments of the parties or carefully considered by this court. It would follow that there is nothing to be gained by reargument of the fact question.
But as to applicable legal principles, the state now takes the position that the Federal tests for determining navigability of waters should not have been applied, but that some more liberal state rule should govern therein. Aside from the merits of this contention which will be considered later, the rule is well established that a party may not try his case under a legal theory chosen by him, and, being unsuccessful therein, subsequently complain upon appeal here that such chosen theory was really not the correct one after all. However, in view of public interest in this case and because of certain misleading impressions therein created through publicity releases emanating from the attorney general’s office, we shall herewith consider and determine this present contention of the state notwithstanding that it is directly opposite to the position under which the case was tried and submitted by it.
Prior to Minnesota’s admission to the Union, all lands lying east of the Mississippi River and northwest of the Ohio River, which include the lands involved in this litigation, were part of the Northwest Territory, ceded to the United States by Virginia on March 1, 1784.7 Under the deed of cession, the United States held title to this territory in trust for the new states to be formed out of it. As such states were formed and admitted to the Union, they entered the Union on the same basis as did the original 13 colonies. This included the right of absolute *550ownership by such states of their respective navigable waters and soils thereunder.8 As stated in Martin v. Waddell, 41 U. S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410, 10 L. ed. 997, 1013:
“* * * when the Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution * *
That the title of Minnesota to its navigable waters and the soil beneath them rests upon such sovereignty at the time of its admission to the Union no one seems to doubt. The attorney general now argues, however, that each state, including Minnesota, may determine which waters were navigable at the time of its admission to the Union under its own laws as to navigability rather than under the Federal laws with respect thereto.
Until the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 S. Ct. 197, 70 L. ed. 465, it was not always clear what law governed the question of navigability.9 That case arose in Minnesota. The issue therein was whether the bed of Mud Lake belonged to the riparian owners thereof or to the United States, and determination of the issue was dependent upon whether Mud Lake was navigable at the time of Minnesota’s admission to the Union. The trial court there found that under state law and tests as to navigability this lake had been navigable at such time. The circuit court of appeals affirmed this decision.10 As to the applicable law in determining navigability, it stated (294 F. 166):
“* * * in the determination of the rights of riparian owners to the lands under the water upon which their lands border, what shall be deemed a navigable water must be determined by the law of the state in which the riparian lands lie * * (Citing many of the cases now *551relied on by petitioner.)
This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States.11 However, in the decision by the latter, it was held that the trial court and circuit court of appeals had not applied the correct rule in determining navigability. With respect thereto, it was stated that (270 U. S. 55, 46 S. Ct. 199, 70 L. ed. 469):
“Both courts below found that the lake was navigable. But they treated the question of navigability as one of local law to be determined by applying the rule adopted in Minnesota. We think they applied a wrong standard. Navigability, when asserted as the basis of a right arising under the Constitution of the United States, is necessarily a question of federal law to be determined according to the general rule recognized and applied in the federal courts. * * * To treat the question as turning on the varying local rules would give the Constitution a diversified operation where uniformity was intended.” (Italics supplied.)
In commenting on. this decision after an exhaustive examination of the cases on the subject, Professor Edward S. Bade has said:
“* * * If any doubt remained that the United States Supreme Court had changed its views as to the law applicable to the determination of navigability vel non, United States v. Holt State Bank dispelled it.”12
This position was reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 51 S. Ct. 438, 75 L. ed. 844. This involved an action brought by the United States to quiet title to land constituting the bed of certain portions of the Colorado River and its tributaries. There the United States claimed that the waters were not navigable and that hence the state of Utah, upon becoming a member of the Union, did not acquire title to the beds thereunder. With respect to applicable law for determination of the question, the Supreme Court of the United States said (283 U. S. 75, 51 S. Ct. 440, 75 L. ed. 849):
*552“* * * The question of navigability is * * * determinative of the controversy, and that is a federal question. * * * State laws cannot affect titles vested in the United States.” (Italics supplied.)
In United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S. 1, 55 S. Ct. 610, 79 L. ed. 1267, the question involved in the present case was again considered and determined. There the question was whether lands under certain shallow lakes were acquired by the state in its sovereign capacity or otherwise; or whether the United States retained title thereto. Determination of the question involved determination of the navigability of the waters. The court there stated (295 U. S. 6, 55 S. Ct. 612, 79 L. ed. 1270):
“* * * If the waters were navigable in fact, title passed to the State upon her admission to the Union. * * * If the waters were nonnavigable, our decision must then turn on the question whether the title of the United States to the lands in question, or part of them, has passed to the State.”
With respect to navigability, the court said (295 U. S. 14, 55 S. Ct. 615, 79 L. ed. 1274):
“* * * if the waters are not navigable in fact, the title of the United States to land underlying them remains unaffected by the creation of the new State. * * * Since the effect upon the title to such lands is the result of federal action in admitting a state to the Union, the question, whether the waters within the State under which the lands lie are navigable or non-navigable, is a federal, not a local one. It is, therefore, to be determined according to the law and usages recognized and applied in the federal courts, even though, as in the present case, the waters are not capable of use for navigation in interstate or foreign commerce.” (Italics supplied.)
With respect to the claims of Oregon that it was the owner of the title to the lake beds in consequence of grants of uplands by the United States, the court, after discussing some of the cases, commented as follows (295 U. S. 27, 55 S. Ct. 621, 79 L. ed. 1281):
“The laws of the United States alone control the disposition of title to its lands. The States are powerless to place any limitation or resfrie*553tion on that control. * * *
“The State, in making its present contention, does not claim as a grantee designated or named in any grant of the United States. It points to no rule ever recognized or declared by the courts of the State that a grant to individual upland proprietors impliedly grants to the State the adjacent land under water. * * * The case is not one of the reasonable construction of grants of the United States, but the attempted forfeiture to the State by legislative fiat of lands which, so far as they have not passed to the individual upland proprietors, remain the property of the United States.” (Italics supplied.)
These principles have been accepted by this court and by the attorney general as governing law since County of Becker v. Shevlin Land Co. 186 Minn. 401, 243 N. W. 433. That case involved the navigability of Otter Tail River. While the state was not a party to the litigation, the language of this court in affirming a finding that Otter Tail River was a navigable stream is significant. There we said (186 Minn. 403, 243 N. W. 434):
“* * * As we read the record the court’s finding is sustained, and the rule of navigability as announced in U. S. v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 S. Ct. 197, 70 L. ed. 465, is satisfied. * * * Lands underlying navigable waters become the property of the state upon its admission to the union unless in its sovereign capacity the United States has previously alienated them.”
In State v. Longyear Holding Co. 224 Minn. 451, 29 N. W. (2d) 657, 227 Minn. 255, 35 N. W. (2d) 291 (appeal dismissed, Longyear Holding Co. v. Minnesota, 336 U. S. 948, 69 S. Ct. 884, 93 L. ed. 1104),13 at the trial the state prevailed on the issue of navigability. In holding that the evidence then submitted was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s finding thereon, we stated (224 Minn. 456, 29 N. W. [2d] 661):
“The only fact issue presented at the trial was whether Syracuse Lake was a navigable public lake within the federal tests of navigability at the time of Minnesota’s admission to statehood, so that title to the bed *554thereof remained in the state upon such admission. * * *
* * * * *
“It is well settled that the test of navigability to fix ownership of lake beds must be determined as of the date of a state’s admission to the Union and under the federal decisions with reference thereto. [Citing cases.]” (Italics supplied.)
In the state’s brief in the Longyear case, we find the following:
“Only one issue of fact was presented to the Trial Court. The issue so presented was whether Syracuse Lake in St. Louis County was in fact a navigable public lake within the federal tests of navigability, which if met resulted in the passing of title to the bed of the lake to the State of Minnesota upon its admission to statehood.14 * * *
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“Preliminary to a discussion of the evidence as to navigability, we submit a brief summary of the authorities as to the date as of which navigability shall be determined, the rule to be applied in determining navigability, and the tests of navigability under that rule.
“1. Navigability to fix ownership of lake bed and riparian rights should be determined as of the date of admission of Minnesota to the Union.
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“2. The question of navigability for the purpose of determining title to the bed of a lake is a federal question and should be determined under the federal rules as to navigability.
“U. S. v. Utah and U. S. v. Holt State Bank, supra, * * *.
“3. The general test of navigability as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States is stated in U. S. v. Holt State Bank supra, as follows: [thereafter follows the quotation from that case].” (Italics supplied.)
In Bingenheimer v. Diamond Iron Min. Co. 237 Minn. 332, 54 N. W. (2d) 912, the state prevailed on the fact issue in the trial court. We reversed, holding that the evidence there was insufficient to sustain a finding of navigability under the Federal rule. As to the applicable *555law, we said (237 Minn. 342, 54 N. W. [2d] 918):
“Whether a body of water is navigable for the purpose of determining title is a federal question, and the federal, not the state, tests of navigability must be applied. [Citing cases.]
“States organized in the public domain, as was Minnesota, became vested upon admission to the Union with title to the beds of all waters then navigable and not previously granted by the United States, subject, of course, to the paramount power of the United States over such waters by virtue of its power to regulate commerce.”
In the brief of the state in the Bingenheimer case submitted by Victor J. Michaelson, special assistant to the attorney general, who presented the argument in the instant case, we find the following:

“The question of navigability is a federal question and should be determined under the federal rule as to navigability..

“U. S. v. Utah and U. S. v. Holt State Bank, supra, and cases therein cited.” (Italics supplied.)
Following these cases came State, by Burnquist, v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 63 N. W. (2d) 278, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 685. While that case did not involve ore in the bed of the lake, the state did claim title to the lake bed on the theory that the lake was navigable when Minnesota became a state. There the trial court found that the lake was -not navigable and in affirming this conclusion, we said (241 Minn. 116, 63 N. W. [2d] 287):
“Navigability for purposes of determining title to water beds is a federal question controlled by the federal test of navigability. * * *
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“* * * it is now clearly the law that the determination of whether a water bed passed to a state upon its admission to the Union and the nature and extent of the title conveyed by the original patents from the United States to riparian landholders is a federal question and not an issue to be resolved by local law.” (Italics supplied.)
On appeal in the Bollenbach case, the brief of the attorney general sets forth the following significant statement:
“A landmark in the law of navigation in Minnesota is U. S. v. Holt *556State Bank, supra. Here the Court held Mud Lake to be navigable and established the test to be followed in determining whether a lake was navigable * * (Italics supplied.)
Finally, in the instant case as to the applicable rules of law in determining navigability, the attorney general in his original brief recognized and relied upon the Federal tests of navigability as formulated by the United States Supreme Court in the cases cited. Thus he there stated:
“The question of navigability for the purpose, of determining title to the bed of a lake is a federal question and should be determined under the federal rules as to navigability.” (Italics supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing references and quotations that not until the present petition for rehearing was filed did the attorney general take any position other than that the Federal tests of navigability were applicable.
Students of law and authors of various articles and texts who have made a study of this subject have come to the same conclusion. A noteworthy article by Professor Edward S. Bade of the Law School of the University of Minnesota, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 305, 311, previously referred to herein, comments on the rule as follows:
“* * * in the states formed out of the United States public domain, the United States originally had ‘the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, federal and state, over all the territories, so long as they remained in a territorial condition’ and had power to make grants of this public domain, including lands under water, navigable or non-navigable, as it saw it. Its policy was not to convey away lands under navigable waters and it seldom did so. States organized in this public domain, upon admission to the Union, became vested with title to the beds of all waters then navigable if not previously granted by the United States, subject, however, to the paramount power of the United States over such waters in virtue of its power over interstate and foreign commerce, and perhaps its admiralty jurisdiction.”
Professor Bade then discusses some of the cases and concludes that (24 Minn. L. Rev. 317):
“The United States retained the full proprietary powers over all parts *557of tbe public domain which did not pass to the state as before stated and which had not been previously disposed of.
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“* * * jf the beds of non-navigable waters do not pass with a grant of the adjacent upland, then they remain in the United States. The state cannot claim to become the owner of the beds of such non-navigable waters by virtue of grants of the abutting upland to individual patentees.”
With respect to Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 11 S. Ct. 808, 35 L. ed. 428, which is relied upon heavily by petitioner in support of its claim that the state law applies in determining navigability, Professor Bade had this to say (24 Minn. L. Rev. 318):
“In the light of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions heretofore mentioned, it would seem that state courts generally have misapprehended the purport and effect of Hardin v. Jordan- First they seem to have assumed that under that decision, the state test of navigability determined what waters were public waters, and consequently vested the state with title to the beds of all waters thus determined to be public. And second, the state courts seem to have regarded Hardin v. Jordan as laying down a rule of property instead of a rule of interpretation with reference to federal grants.”
As a footnote, Professor Bade says (24 Minn. L. Rev. 318) :
“Lamprey v. State (1893) 52 Minn. 181, 192, 53 N. W. 1139, 1140, 38 Am. St. Rep. 541, 18 L. R. A. 670 is a complete expression of this misconception. It runs through the Minnesota cases thenceforth. In fairness to the state courts let it be said that the federal courts, including the federal supreme court, entertained the same view.”
In Patton, Titles, § 83, the authors in the original text issued in 1938 stated:
“Except as private rights have been acquired * * * it is a settled principle in the United States that the soil under navigable waters, as defined, by each separate state, is in the sovereign.” (Italics supplied.)
In the 1952 pocket part the authors felt compelled to qualify this *558statement as follows:
“ ‘As defined by each separate state’ appears to be entirely true in the case of original states only. States formed from federal territory acquired both their sovereignty and their land by grant. In the case of waters and waterbeds which come to them as an incident of sovereignty, the test of navigability is that maintained by the granting power and not some more liberal test formulated by their courts or legislatures.” (Italics supplied.)
In 56 Am. Jur., Waters, § 461, after an exhaustive discussion of this entire subject,15 the rule as to the applicable law is stated as follows:
“The question whether waters within a state are navigable, so that title to the underlying lands may be considered to have passed from the United States to the state upon its admission to the Union, is a Federal question and not a local one, and is therefore to be determined according to the law and usages recognized and applied in the Federal courts, even though the waters are not capable of use for navigation in interstate or foreign commerce.” (Citing United States v. Utah, supra; United States v. Oregon, supra.)
In Bulletin No. 4 of the division of waters, Minnesota Department of Conservation, issued February 1951, under the auspices of Chester S. Wilson, commissioner, and Sidney A. Frellsen, director of the division of waters, appears an article by Mr. Michaelson, assistant attorney general, wherein he comments on the question here presented as follows:
“* * * The test of navigability of waters within the United States is to be determined by the federal rule applied as of the time when a state was ádmitted to the union as a sovereign state. The federal rule has been repeatedly stated by the United States Supreme Court and followed and applied by the courts of the states. In United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 56, 70 L. Ed. 469, there was involved the question of navigability of Mud Lake situated in the state of Minnesota. * * *
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“In Minnesota the determination as to whether a stream or lake is navigable must be determined under the federal rule, and as of the *559date when Minnesota was admitted to the Union, which is May 11, 1858.” (Italics supplied.)
Based upon decisions cited, the conclusion is inescapable that what Minnesota owned in its sovereign capacity as a state upon admission to the Union and what was retained by the United States as part of the public domain clearly involves a Federal question. Whatever we may have assumed the law to be prior to United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, it is clear that since that decision the waters over which Minnesota may assert ownership as an incident of statehood due to their navigability must be determined under Federal law. We have followed that reasoning since County of Becker v. Shevlin Land Co. 186 Minn. 401, 243 N. W. 433, decided in 1932, and it is equally clear that the attorneys general of the state have been of the same opinion, at least since State v. Longyear Holding Co. supra.
We are not unmindful of the importance to the state of valuable ore deposits. However, we must also respect the rights of the citizens of this state who are riparian owners entitled to such ore unless the state can establish that the waters under which such ore is to be found were navigable under Federal tests at the time Minnesota was admitted to statehood. The laws of Minnesota are intended to protect the property rights of its citizens as well as to preserve the rights of the state. We are sworn to uphold and apply constitutional provisions, recognizing the right of private ownership, and we would be guilty of abrogating our obligations as members of the judicial branch of this government were we to ignore such constitutional safeguards.
Inasmuch as this court correctly applied the tests for navigability formulated by the Federal courts in the opinion previously filed herein, there can be no reason for granting a rehearing on the issue of applicable law.
The state relies upon Petraborg v. Zontelli, 217 Minn. 536, 15 N. W. (2d) 174, in support of a claim that it has been determined that Rabbit Lake, one of the bodies of water involved in the present proceeding, has previously been held navigable contrary to the present decision. That case involved the right of defendant to drain one part of the lake for the purpose of removing iron ore thereunder. A riparian owner on *560that part of the lake not included in the drainage project brought the action seeking to restrain defendant. Therein both parties conceded that, for the purpose of such litigation, Rabbit Lake is a public body of water governed by laws applicable to public or navigable lakes and accordingly we were not required to pass upon the question. One comment therein, however, should be clarified. It is stated (217 Minn. 552, 15 N. W. [2d] 183) that:
“* * * It is a well-settled policy of this state that ‘meandered lakes belong to the state in its sovereign capacity in trust for the public.’ ”
Meandered lakes are not necessarily navigable lakes. Meandering a lake does not determine the question of its navigability.16 Meander lines by government surveyors are mainly for the purpose of determining the quantity of land which is to be paid for by a prospective purchaser. The government surveyors had no power to determine navigability.17
The briefs amici curiae submitted in support of the petition for rehearing deal mainly with the importance of the lakes and streams to the people of the state from a recreational and tourist standpoint. We are not unmindful of this, but we are not dealing with the rights of the state to exercise control over its waters, nor is the question whether the Bollenbach case was decided on the correct theory before us. It was decided correctly upon the theory upon which the attorney general then chose to submit it. The question of public dedication was not submitted or determined herein. There will be time enough to decide the extent to which the state may exercise control over its waters which may be nonnavigable under Federal tests when a case involving this issue is presented.
Further, in the instant case the state is not seeking to protect its lakes and streams for recreational purposes or to encourage tourists. As a matter of fact, it is seeking the right to drain certain lakes, at least temporarily, in order to remove ore deposited beneath them. If it *561should be held that by some simple device or local test for determining navigability the state may claim title to lake beds regardless of whether such lakes were navigable under Federal tests at the time of the state’s admission to the Union, then it would follow that the state could take unto itself the power to control, divert, drain, or otherwise exercise dominion over every stream, creek, or pond within the state without compensation and regardless of the loss to the riparian owners thereof.18
But the most direct and definite answer to the fears expressed in the briefs amici curiae with reference to the recreational features of our Minnesota lakes is that the right of protection or control of the state waters for such or any like features has not been asserted by the state and is not involved in the present litigation in any way whatever.
The petition for rehearing is denied.

Commissioner C. R. Magney who wrote the original opinion has taken no part in the disposition of this petition for rehearing.

See, 56 Am. Jur., Waters, § 273.

Standard Clothing Co. v. Wolf, 219 Minn. 128, 17 N. W. (2d) 329; Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 85 (119); 1 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 469.

We axe not concerned with an exception to this general rule which permits us to consider a question raised here for the first time if such question is plainly decisive of the whole controversy on the merits, as where it conclusively appears on the record that there is no cause of action or defense. Cf. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Sprague, 140 Minn. 1, 167 N. W. 124; Skolnick v. Gruesner, 196 Minn. 318, 265 N. W. 44; Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N. W. (2d) 375, 24 N. W. (2d) 41; Ray v. Homewood Hospital, Inc. 223 Minn. 440, 27 N. W. (2d) 409.

 1 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 411.

See, Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 212, 11 L. ed. 565.

Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 212, 11 L. ed. 565; Martin v. Waddell, 41 U. S. (16 Pet.) 367, 10 L. ed. 997; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 14 S. Ct. 548, 38 L. ed. 331.

See, for instance, Harrison v. Fite (8 Cir.) 148 F. 781.

United States v. Holt State Bank (8 Cir.) 294 F. 161.

United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 46 S. Ct. 197, 70 L. ed. 465.

Bade, Title, Points and Lines in Lakes and Streams, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 305. 313.

See, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 484.

See respondent’s brief, p. 2.

See, § 451, et seq.

County of Becker v. Shevlin Land Co. 186 Minn. 401, 243 N. W. 433; Bingenheimer v. Diamond Iron Min. Co. 237 Minn. 332, 54 N. W. (2d) 912.

Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 42 S. Ct. 406, 66 L. ed. 771; Harrison v. Fite (8 Cir.) 148 F. 781; see, Schurmeier v. St. Paul & P. R. Co. 10 Minn. 59 (82).

As to the rights of riparian owners, see Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N. W. 1139, 18 L. R. A. 670, 38 A. S. R. 541; Shell v. Matteson, 81 Minn. 38, 83 N. W. 491; Hanson v. Rice, 88 Minn. 273, 92 N. W. 982; Tucker v. Mortenson, 126 Minn. 214, 148 N. W. 60; Schmidt v. Marschel, 211 Minn. 539, 2 N. W. (2d) 121, all of which in effect hold that the owners of land bordering on the shore of a meandered nonnavigable lake own the bed of the lake in severalty, the boundary lines of each abutting tract being fixed by extending from the meander line on each side of the tract lines converging to a point in the center of the lake.