Court Opinion

ID: 9916273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 17:01:15.436544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:56.032496
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12062    Document: 48-1     Date Filed: 01/09/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12062
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       DAVID ANTOINE LUSTER,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 5:03-cr-00052-TES-CHW-2
                           ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12062

       Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              David Luster, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the denial of
       a motion for a sentence reduction based on a retroactive guideline
       amendment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and a motion for a sen-
       tence reduction based on extraordinary and compelling reasons un-
       der 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). After careful review, we affirm the
       denial of his motions.
                                         I.
              In 2004, Luster pled guilty to eight counts of bank robbery,
       see 18 U.S.C. § 2113, and two counts of brandishing a firearm during
       a crime of violence, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Between 2002 and
       2003, Luster and an accomplice engaged in eight, armed bank rob-
       beries resulting in losses totaling more than $600,000.
              When Luster was sentenced, § 924(c)(1)(C) required district
       courts to impose a 25-year mandatory minimum consecutive sen-
       tence for any “second or subsequent conviction under [§ 924(c)].”
       18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C) (2002). And “[t]he Supreme Court had in-
       terpreted the 25-year mandatory minimum as applying to second
       (and third, and fourth, and so on) § 924(c) convictions within a sin-
       gle prosecution.” United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 1196, 1210 (11th
       Cir. 2020) (citing Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131–32 (1993)).
       As a result, the district court imposed the minimum 25-year con-
       secutive sentence for the second § 924(c) conviction. The court
       also ordered more than $600,000 in restitution. We affirmed
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       22-12062               Opinion of the Court                        3

       Luster’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal. United States v.
       Luster, 129 F. App’x 599 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished table deci-
       sion).
               In 2018, § 403 of the First Step Act amended § 924(c)(1)(C)
       so that the 25-year mandatory minimum did not apply to multiple
       § 924(c) convictions resulting from a single prosecution. See First
       Step Act of 2018 § 403(a), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221–
       22; see also Smith, 967 F.3d at 1210. Rather, the 25-year minimum
       applies only when a defendant violates § 924(c) “after a prior con-
       viction under this subsection has become final.” See 18 U.S.C.
       § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). But Congress did not make the amendment to
       the stacking provision retroactive. See First Step Act, § 403(b); see
       also Smith, 967 F.3d at 1210–13 (holding that § 403 does not apply
       retroactively).
              In April 2022, Luster filed a motion to reduce his sentence
       under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 599 to U.S.S.G.
       § 2K2.4. He contended that, because he had been sentenced both
       for carrying a firearm during a crime of violence under § 924(c) and
       for the underlying crime of violence, the sentencing court imper-
       missibly double counted conduct by applying sentencing enhance-
       ments for brandishing a firearm during the robberies.
             Then, in May 2022, Luster filed a “Motion for Reduction in
       Sentence Under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).” He argued that he had shown
       extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence re-
       duction because, were he sentenced when he filed the motion, he
       would have been subject to a significantly reduced sentence in light
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12062

       of § 403 of the First Step Act. He also contended that restitution
       would not have been authorized after the Supreme Court’s deci-
       sions in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), and
       Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021).
              The district court entered an order expressly denying the
       April 2022 motion under § 3582(c)(2). The court explained that
       Amendment 599 was in effect at the time of sentencing and so did
       not authorize a retroactive sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2).
       The text of the order made no mention of the May 2022 motion for
       compassionate release. Nonetheless, the relevant docket entry de-
       scribes the court’s order as denying both motions. Luster timely
       appealed.
                                        II.
              We review de novo a determination of eligibility for a
       § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243,
       1251 (11th Cir. 2021); see United States v. Colon, 707 F.3d 1255, 1258
       (11th Cir. 2013). We review the denial of an eligible prisoner’s
       § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
       Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). We may affirm for any
       reason supported by the record. United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d
       1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008).
                                        III.
              District courts lack the inherent authority to modify crimi-
       nal sentences but may do so when authorized by a statute or rule.
       United States v. Edwards, 997 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir. 2021). Luster
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       22-12062               Opinion of the Court                         5

       relies on two statutory provisions that permit sentence reductions
       in certain limited circumstances.
              First, under § 3582(c)(2), the district court may reduce a sen-
       tence that was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently
       been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C.
       § 3582(c)(2); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Second, under
       § 3582(c)(1), courts may reduce the sentences of defendants when
       warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” 18 U.S.C.
       § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. But neither provision au-
       thorizes a sentence reduction on the facts of this case.
              Section 3582(c)(2) does not apply because Luster was not
       sentenced based on a sentencing range that was “subsequently . . .
       lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
       (emphasis added). Amendment 599 was in effect as of November
       2000, well before Luster’s sentencing in April 2004. United States v.
       Pringle, 350 F.3d 1172, 1176 (11th Cir. 2003). Even assuming the
       sentencing court erred in applying the amended guideline at sen-
       tencing, § 3582(c)(2) “does not authorize a resentencing” to correct
       mistakes in an original sentence. Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S.
       817, 831 (2010); see also United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1220
       (11th Cir. 2005).
              Likewise, Luster failed to show that a reduction was author-
       ized under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before granting a reduction under
       this provision, the district court must find that (1) an extraordinary
       and compelling reason exists under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy state-
       ment, (2) the reduction is supported by the § 3553(a) factors, and
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-12062

       (3) granting a reduction would not endanger others. United States
       v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345–46 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v.
       Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). “Because all three con-
       ditions . . . are necessary, the absence of even one would foreclose
       a sentence reduction.” Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1238.
               When the district court ruled on Luster’s motion in May
       2022, the commentary to § 1B1.13 outlined medical, age, and fam-
       ily circumstances which qualiﬁed as suﬃciently “extraordinary and
       compelling.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)–(C) (Nov. 2021).
       While the commentary also authorized relief for “other reasons,”
       id. § cmt. n.1(D), we held in Bryant that such other reasons must be
       determined by the Bureau of Prisons, not by the courts. See Bryant,
       996 F.3d at 1262–65. So a district court could not grant a reduction
       for reasons other than those listed in § 1B1.13. Id.
              In Bryant, for example, the defendant, like Luster, argued
       that he presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief
       because “he would not be subject to a 25-year mandatory mini-
       mum if he were sentenced today.” 996 F.3d at 1250–51. We re-
       jected this ground as not consistent with § 1B1.13, explaining that
       it was not a medical, age, or family circumstance outlined in the
       commentary, and that the Bureau of Prisons had not determined it
       was an “other reason[]” warranting relief. See id. at 1262–65; see
       U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.(A)–(D).
             Bryant was based on the same version of § 1B1.13 that was
       in eﬀect when the district court denied Luster’s motion. So as in
       Bryant, Luster’s § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion, based on the First Step
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       22-12062               Opinion of the Court                        7

       Act’s amendments to § 924(c) “stacking” provision and another
       change in the law, not on any medical, age, or family circumstance
       outlined in the commentary, did not present an extraordinary and
       compelling reason under § 1B1.13. See id.
              Notably, in November 2023, while this appeal was pending,
       an amended version of § 1B1.13 became eﬀective which expressly
       added new grounds for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in
       response to the First Step Act. See U.S. Sentencing Commission,
       Adopted Amendments (Eﬀective November 1, 2023),
       https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendments/adopted-amend-
       ments-eﬀective-november-1-2023 (last visited December 21, 2023).
       In particular, the amendments added a new category in the guide-
       line text for “Unusually Long Sentence[s],” which may qualify as
       extraordinary and compelling where, among other things, “a
       change in the law . . . would produce a gross disparity between the
       sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the
       time the motion is ﬁled.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (Nov. 2023).
               But that substantive change, which altered the text of the
       guideline to create a new ground for relief, does not apply retroac-
       tively in this appeal. See United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181,
       1184 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that only “clarifying” amendments
       are given retroactive eﬀect on appeal; “substantive” amendments
       are “not applied retroactively”); United States v. Summers, 176 F.3d
       1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A]lteration of actual Guideline lan-
       guage strongly suggests that a substantive change was being
       made.”). Accordingly, we do not consider whether Luster can
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                       22-12062

       establish an extraordinary and compelling reason under the new
       § 1B1.13(b)(6). We note that nothing in § 3582(c)(1)(A) prevents
       Luster from ﬁling a new motion for a sentence reduction based on
       the new version of § 1B1.13.
               Finally, Luster maintains that the district court failed to con-
       sider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See, e.g., United
       States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (11th Cir. 2021) (courts must
       “consider all applicable § 3553(a) factors” when resolving
       § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions). But even assuming the court erred in
       that regard, the error was harmless because Luster’s failure to
       demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason under
       § 1B1.13 (Nov. 2021) was alone suﬃcient to “foreclose a sentence
       reduction.” Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38.
              For these reasons, the district court properly denied Luster’s
       April 2022 motion for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) and his May
       2022 motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 1
       We affirm.
               AFFIRMED.

       1 To be specific, we affirm the denial of the motions reflected at docket entries

       259 and 261 on the district court’s docket. We note that Luster has filed an
       array of other unsuccessful motions for a sentence reduction.