Court Opinion

ID: 9747841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:38:15.690201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:27.831097
License: Public Domain

WOODS (Fred), J.,
Concurring and Dissenting. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the award of $4,153.53 to plaintiff as costs on the prior appeal must be included in the recovery obtained in the second trial for purposes of determining whether plaintiff was a prevailing party pursuant to defendant’s offer under section 998 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. The majority opines that since the defendant prevailed upon plaintiff to defer collection of the previously awarded costs, such costs must necessarily be included in the calculation of the total award at the second trial. The majority suggests in dictum that had the defendant paid the costs or, inferably, had the plaintiff reduced the award on the prior appeal to a judgment then the prior award would have been excludable. The issue is one of first impression. I find the majority opinion on the issue strained. The majority overlooks or chooses to disregard the fact that right to collect the prior award on appeal became “vested” on the day that the costs were awarded, i.e., on December 11,1990. The vesting date preceded the judgment in the second trial (July 15, 1992) by two and one-half years and defendant’s section 998 offer of June 1991 by approximately one and one-half years. It is true that the “Memorandum of Costs (Worksheet)” provided by the Los Angeles County Superior Court Clerk’s Office, approved by the Judicial Council, does contain ample blank spaces for insertion of a claim for costs on a prior appeal. However, this form for convenience of litigants is not determinative of the date of vesting of a prior award for costs on appeal in favor of a party. The majority interpret First Nat. Bank v. Stansbury (1931) 214 Cal. 190, 192 [5 P.2d 11, 78 A.L.R. 358] Supera v. Moreland Sales Corp. (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 517, 520-521 [82 P.2d 963], and O’Hare v. Peacock Dairies, Inc. (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 562, 564 [82 P.2d 1112], as unavailing to defendant in this case since defendant interprets these cases as merely stating that a successful party on appeal has the right to execute on its award of costs on appeal even before the underlying case is decided. To the contrary, I find the language of these cases exemplified in Stansbury that “there is no interdependence between the judgment for costs of the former appeal and any judgment which may subsequently enter in the main case” to be controlling. Stansbury is compelling under the doctrine of Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].
*981For the reasons above stated, I would find that the plaintiff was not the prevailing party when the prior award for costs on appeal is excluded since the amount of those costs reduced plaintiffs recovery in the second trial below the terms and conditions of defendant’s “section 998 offer.” I find no compelling policy argument which would require the inclusion of such costs in determining which party is the “prevailing party.” As a matter of logic I would find it to be the better policy to exclude these previously “vested” costs.
Except for this dissent, I concur in the remainder of the majority opinion.
The petition of appellant George S. Gradow for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 15, 1994.