Court Opinion

ID: 9393420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 06:08:38.49597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.156530
License: Public Domain

DISMISS and Opinion Filed May 2, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-23-00246-CR

                REGINALD LAGRANT WALTON, Appellant
                                V.
                    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F22-21005-S

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
         Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Nowell, and Justice Kennedy
                         Opinion by Chief Justice Burns
      Reginald Lagrant Wilson appeals his conviction for murder.          Appellant

pleaded guilty, and the trial court sentenced appellant pursuant to a plea bargain to

twenty years’ imprisonment. We lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly,

we dismiss this appeal.

      On April 14, 2022, appellant was indicted for capital murder for intentionally

causing the death of the deceased in the course of committing robbery. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2). On February 16, 2023, the State reduced the charge

to murder, and appellant, the prosecutor, and the trial court signed a plea agreement
providing for a twenty-year sentence for murder. Appellant pleaded guilty to

murder, and the trial court sentenced appellant to twenty years’ imprisonment.

        The plea-agreement signed by appellant, the prosecutor, and the trial court

included the Court’s Admonitions to Defendant, which included the following:

        If the punishment assessed does not exceed the agreement between you
        and the prosecutor, the Court must give its permission to you before
        you may appeal on any matter in this case except for matters raised by
        written motions prior to trial.

The plea agreement also included Defendant’s Waiver of Rights and Judicial

Admonishments. Paragraph 11 states, “With the Court’s approval, the defendant

herein states that he/she: . . . (11) Waives the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals.”

        At the hearing, the trial court admitted appellant’s signed judicial confession

into evidence. The trial court stated, “Sir, I accept your pleas of guilty. I find that

there is sufficient evidence to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. I will

grant the parties’ requests and accept the plea agreements.”1 The trial court then

sentenced appellant to twenty years’ imprisonment.

        The trial court, appellant, and his counsel signed the Trial Court’s

Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal, which states, “I certify that this

criminal case is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal; the

defendant has waived the right of appeal.” During the plea hearing, the trial court

   1
     In the same hearing, appellant also pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain to aggravated robbery
and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. Appellant does not appeal the aggravated robbery
conviction.
                                                 –2–
told appellant that the certification “acknowledges that you waive your right of

appeal because you’re entering into a plea agreement. Do you understand that?”

Appellant answered, “Yes, ma’am.”

      A defendant in a criminal case has the right of appeal as set out in the Code

of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 44.02. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a) Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2

provides that in “a plea-bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was

guilty . . . and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the

prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant,” a defendant may appeal only “those

matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial,” “after

getting the trial court’s permission to appeal,” or “where the specific appeal is

expressly authorized by statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). When an appellant

waives his right to appeal as part of his plea bargain agreement with the State, a

subsequent notice of appeal filed by him fails to “initiate the appellate process,”

Lundgren v. State, 434 S.W.3d 594, 599, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), and “no

inquiry into even possibly meritorious claims may be made,” Chavez v. State, 183

S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When an appeal from a plea bargain is

not authorized by Rule 25.2, “[a] court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to

ascertain whether an appellant who plea-bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule

25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the

basis for the appeal.” Chavez, 183 S.W.3d at 680.

                                         –3–
      In this case, the record shows appellant and the State agreed appellant would

plead guilty in exchange for a specific recommended punishment. The documents

appellant signed admonished appellant he would have no right of appeal if the trial

court followed the punishment recommendation except for matters raised by written

motion and ruled on before trial or if the trial court granted appellant permission to

appeal. And the documents state appellant “[w]aives the right to appeal to the Court

of Appeals.” The clerk’s record does not contain any motion ruled on before trial,

and the certifications of appellant’s right of appeal show the trial court did not grant

appellant permission to appeal. Therefore, under Rule 25.2(a), appellant has no right

of appeal. See Chavez, 183 S.W.3d at 680.

      Rule 25.2(d) also requires the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal if there is

no certification from the trial court showing the defendant has the right of appeal.

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). The certification affirmatively shows appellant did not have

the right to appeal, and the certification is supported by the record. Therefore, we

must dismiss the appeal. Id.; see Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005).

      We requested appellant and the State to file letter briefs addressing the

jurisdictional issue. Neither responded.

                                           –4–
      We conclude we lack jurisdiction over this appeal from a plea-bargained

conviction. We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

                                          /Robert D. Burns, III/
                                          ROBERT D. BURNS, III
                                          CHIEF JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
230246F.U05

                                        –5–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

REGINALD LAGRANT WALTON,                      On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. F22-21005-S.
No. 05-23-00246-CR           V.               Opinion delivered by Chief Justice
                                              Burns. Justices Nowell and Kennedy
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  participating.

       Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is dismissed for want
of jurisdiction.

Judgment entered May 2, 2023

                                        –6–