Court Opinion

ID: 9797841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:30:26.896039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:58:44.735514
License: Public Domain

Agosti, J.,
with whom Leavitt, J., agrees,
dissenting:
I would grant the petition for a writ of mandamus. I disagree with the test enunciated in Motenko v. MGM Dist., Inc.1 I would *137apply the significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 175 (1971) which states the following:
In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.2
The principles of section 6 referred to in section 175 are stated in section 6(2) and are as follows:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
The Restatement comments to section 6(2) are instructive. These factors are not meant to be exclusive, nor are they listed according to their importance; the weight to be assigned to each factor will vary according to different areas of choice of law.3
When this court adopted the Motenko standard, it borrowed and modified section 145 of the Restatement. The exact language of section 145 bears examination here:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
*138(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
Once again, the comments to section 145 are instructive. This rule is cast broadly and generally but notes that, where it is possible, the Restatement has also enunciated particular, more precise rules for some specific torts.4 Following the general rule of section 145 are a number of sections which enunciate the choice of law test for specific torts. For example, section 146 applies to personal injuries; section 147 applies to injuries to tangible things; section 148 applies to fraud and misrepresentation; section 149 applies to defamation; section 175 applies to a right of action for death.
In Motenko, a personal injury case, this court referred to section 146 but focused on the language of section 145 when it criticized the Restatement approach. I believe that because the Restatement enunciated a specific test for torts involving personal injuries and wrongful death, reference to section 145 was unnecessary. Instead, referring to sections 146 and 175, the law of the state where the injury occurred applies unless another state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. In making the determination of whether another state has a more significant relationship, the rule points to a consideration of the factors enumerated in section 6(2). Those factors, each and every one of them, boil down to policy considerations which affect the parties and the states involved. The “significant relationship” test examines not only factual matters like where the injury occurred, but also the forum and non-forum states’ relationships to the case and what interests and policies of each state are implicated according to which state’s law is chosen.
I am struck by the comments of Justice Cliff Young in his concurring opinion in Motenko. In agreeing with the result reached by the majority while disagreeing with the new test enunciated by the majority, he considered Nevada’s strong public policy of protecting its tourist industry.5 This very important consideration supports the majority’s decision to apply Nevada law in Motenko. Unfortunately, application of the test adopted in Motenko never permits a court to consider the important policy questions which inevitably arise in choice of law controversies. The Motenko test does not incorporate the specific reference in sections 146 and 175 to the policy considerations of section 6(2). As the Motenko dissent observed, the majority test is quantitative rather than qualitative.6
*139I would also note that since not all the factors of the Motenko test will be relevant to every choice of law controversy, and since the rule requires that two or more factors must be met before the law of a non-forum state may be applied, it is unlikely that anything but Nevada law will ever apply. As such, I agree with the observation made by the dissent in Motenko that the majority has in reality not abandoned the “vested rights” rule at all. I also agree with the dissent’s critique of the “vested rights” rule.7
While the Motenko test might seem to promote predictability and uniformity, prized interests of the Motenko majority,8 I question its reasonableness.
First, because two justices dissent to Nevada law being applied to the California plaintiffs’ causes of action, and because I and the justice who concurs with me join them in this conclusion, we comprise a majority and California law will be applied to those causes of action. Thus, California law will apply to some but not all the plaintiffs in this action. The goal of uniformity is not achieved within the case itself. Predictability is also not apparent. The justices who here concur in part and dissent in part disagree with the majority as to the result achieved through application of the Motenko test to the California plaintiffs. It was precisely upon the observation that under the Restatement test “[different judges can weigh the same factors to reach opposite conclusions”9 that the Restatement test was rejected in favor of the modified version adopted by the majority in Motenko. It is not reasonable to adopt a test that suffers from the same defects as the rejected test.
Ironically, the Restatement recognizes that the values of predictability and uniformity enumerated in section 6(2)(f) may not always be achieved. As pointed out in its commentary, “[predictability and uniformity of result are of particular importance in areas where the parties are likely to give advance thought to the legal consequences of their transactions,” but predictability and uniformity can ‘ ‘be purchased at too great a price. In a rapidly developing area, such as choice of law, it is often more important that good rules be developed than that predictability and uniformity of result should be assured through continued adherence to existing rules.”10 In the case before us today, as well as in Motenko, the parties cannot be said to have given advance thought to the legal consequences of their transactions. These are negligence cases.
Second, I believe that applying Nevada law in this case is unreasonable since virtually every fact and circumstance giving *140rise to the causes of action, except for the domicile of some of the plaintiffs, points to the application of California law. This terrible accident occurred in California. Under the Restatement approach, the law of California applies because that is where the injury occurred, unless Nevada has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in section 6. Nevada has no relationship, significant or otherwise, to the occurrence of the accident. Nevada has a relationship to some of the plaintiffs but to none of the defendants. It seems to me that Nevada’s relationship to some of the plaintiffs is not significant enough to warrant the selection of Nevada law over California’s. Nevada has no strong articulated public policy that would favor such a result. In contrast, California certainly has a strong interest in the enforcement of its traffic laws; the allegation has been made that the driver of the truck from which the pipes fell was driving under the influence of alcohol and that his driving contributed to the accident.11
I favor the Restatement approach, not as described in Motenko, but as set out in the Restatement. I would apply that test here and I would conclude that it is appropriate to choose California law. Therefore I would grant the relief prayed for in the writ.

 112 Nev. 1038, 921 P.2d 933 (1996).

 See also Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 146 (1971), which deals with personal injuries and is identical in all respects to section 175.

 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt. c (1971).

 Id. § 145 cmt. a.

 Motenko, 112 Nev. at 1043, 921 P.2d at 936 (Young, L, concurring).

 Id. at 1048, 921 P.2d at 939 (Steffen, C. J., dissenting).

 Id. at 1047, 921 P.2d at 938-39 (Steffen, C. J., dissenting).

 Id. at 1041, 921 P.2d at 935.

 Id.

 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt. i (1971).

 See Griffith v. White, 929 F. Supp. 755, 759 (D. Vt. 1996), where the court concluded that the state where the drinking occurred has a greater interest in having its laws applied since that state has an inherent interest in protecting the public from drunk drivers. See also Wert v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 634 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Mo. 1986).