Court Opinion

ID: 9507734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 21:24:56.561601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:23.047953
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE WEBER
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County. The order issued after hearing on a show cause motion in which Sandra Smith (Sandra) sought to have Keith Smith (Keith) held in contempt for *68failure to pay child support. The court refused to find Keith in contempt and ordered Sandra to allow visitation under a modified visitation schedule. Sandra appeals. We affirm the district court.
Appellant raises four issues on appeal:
(1) Did the district court err in refusing to find Keith in contempt?
(2) Did the district court err in failing to order Keith to make past-due support payments?
(3) Did the district court err in modifying Keith’s visitation rights where the issue was not raised in Sandra’s motion?
(4) Did the district court err in failing to allow Sandra to make a full and adequate presentation of evidence in support of her motion?
The Smiths divorced in 1976. Their decree awarded custody of the couple’s daughter, Natalie, to Sandra, subject to Keith’s right of reasonable visitation, and required Keith to pay all of Natalie’s medical expenses plus $100 per month for her support. The dissolution apparently went smoothly in the first years. The couple lived together briefly in 1980 and then parted again. Since their final separation, they have waged a continuous visitation-support battle.
In late 1980, the District Court ordered Keith and Sandra to seek counseling to assist them in working out a visitation schedule. The counseling failed to achieve the desired result; Keith remained unable to arrange for visitation. In 1981, he petitioned for modification of his visitation rights, asking the court to establish a specific visitation schedule. Sandra cross-petitioned, asking that Keith be held in contempt for failure to pay child support. A specific visitation schedule was established.
The present encounter began in early 1983 when Keith and Natalie, with Sandra’s consent, made plans to spend a holiday together. After Sandra’s last-minute refusal to allow Natalie to accompany her father on the already-arranged trip, Keith again sought judicial assistance. The court or*69dered the special visitation and required Sandra to cooperate in making the necessary preparations. After a vituperative scene and frayed tempers, Natalie left for the holiday with her father. Four months later, Sandra brought this action.
Under the decree, Keith is required to pay $100 per month as child support and is also required to pay all reasonable medical, dental, hospital, doctor, optical and drug expenses for Natalie. The affidavit of the clerk of court establishes that Keith was sixteen months behind in his $100 per month child support payments. Sandra filed her affidavit and application for an order requiring Keith to pay the arrearage and hearing was held before the District Court. Sandra was represented by counsel and Keith appeared pro se. Both Sandra and Keith testified. In addition, the District Court interrogated the parties and Keith in particular. The District Court found that Keith was not in contempt of the court order and had made a diligent effort to comply with the court’s order. In addition, the district court ordered the specific visitation schedule granting Keith weekend visitation rights every other weekend.
I
Did the district court err in refusing to find Keith in contempt?
The district court stated in its order that Keith had testified that because of his physical and mental condition he was unable to make all the support payments required; that he was a real estate salesman and because of the depressed market for real estate in Great Falls, he was unable to make sufficient income with which to support himself and to pay the child support; and that he had made $100 per month support payments for thirteen months during the last two years. The court then stated:
“The Court finds that [Keith] is not in contempt of this Court’s Order and has made a diligent effort to comply with this Court’s Order.”
*70The court did not make a specific order as to contempt other than this finding and conclusion.
While a more detailed series of findings would have been preferable, there is substantial evidence to support the court’s statements as to Keith’s testimony and there is substantial evidence to support the factual conclusion that Keith had made a diligent effort to comply with the order of the district court. Sandra contends that the record shows that Keith had made car payments, house payments, and had otherwise supported himself. Sandra argues these facts indicate that Keith had not exercised a diligent effort to make support payments. This contention is without merit in light of the substantial evidence standard of review applied by this Court. In re Marriage of Concepcion (Mont. 1984), [212 Mont. 191,] 687 P.2d 718, 720, 41 St. Rep. 1675, 1677. This Court will not re-weigh conflicting evidence.
Because of Keith’s inability to pay, the district court refused to find him in contempt. It would have been better had the court addressed in more detail Sandra’s request for a contempt order regarding sixteen months of delinquent payments. Some frustration is natural where an attempt to force payment of delinquent child support payments results only in a summary conclusion. Unfortunately, no alternative was presented to the court. Sandra presented no specific evidence regarding Keith’s ability to pay. While this is not a satisfactory solution to the problem, we find that the district court did not commit reversible error by refusing to find Keith in contempt.
II
Did the district court err in failing to order Keith to make past-due support payments?
Sandra argues that the failure to order Keith to make payments was in effect a cancellation of past-due payments. There is no express cancellation in the order and such a cancellation cannot reasonably be inferred from the language of the order.
*71As previously noted, it would have been preferable that the court discuss in more detail what might be done with regard to the delinquent support payments. However, the court’s refusal to again order Keith to make support payments is not reversible error. That obligation remains effective by virtue of the previous orders of the court. No action was taken which modified the existing requirement to make support payments.
While the court did not specifically order payment of past-due child support, the court did admonish Keith regarding his parental support obligation:
“. . . [Sandra’s husband] has no obligation to support your daughter. You better get that through your head. That is your daughter and it is your obligation to support that child. It doesn’t matter if he is making a million dollars, it is your obligation to support that child.

a

“. . . of course, [Keith] is required to make those [past due] support payments if he is able to. That order stands, of course.”
These statements are inconsistent with Sandra’s contention that the court cancelled past-due payments.
We hold that there was no error in refusing to order Keith to make past due support payments.
Ill
Did the district court err in modifying Keith’s visitation rights where the issue was not raised in Sandra’s motion?
Sandra contends it was error for the district court to modify the visitation order where the only issue for hearing was whether Keith should be held in contempt for failure to pay child support.
As previously mentioned, both Sandra and Keith personally testified. Keith represented himself pro se and was quite vocal. The district court participated to a substantial degree in questioning the parties, which was appropriate in *72light of Keith’s pro se appearance. In the course of testimony, it became clear that visitation rights were being considered by both Sandra and Keith. Sandra testified, and the Court found, that Sandra had refused to grant visitation because Keith was not current with child support payments. On the other hand, Keith testified that it did not seem reasonable to him to make child support payments when he was being denied his visitation rights. It is apparent that all parties, including the District Judge, had become extremely frustrated with this visitation-support dilemma.
The district court concluded that Sandra had denied Keith rights of reasonable visitation because he was not current with child support payments. The court concluded that it was necessary to set out specific visitation periods for Keith with his daughter, Natalie, because Sandra was not agreeable to granting reasonable visitation rights. The court therefore specifically ordered that commencing September 16, 1983, Keith would have weekend visitation rights every other weekend commencing at 4 p.m. on Friday and ending at 8 p.m. on Sunday. Keith was to provide transportation. There is substantial evidence to support the District Court’s conclusions.
As pointed out by the District Court, this is but a chapter in the long, continuing controversy between the parties. In Gall v. Gall (1980), 187 Mont. 17, 19, 608 P.2d 496, 498, we stated:
“Under section 40-4-217(3), MCA, the trial court may modify visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best interest of the child.”
In Gall, we concluded it was not error for the trial court to modify the visitation rights of the husband. In a similar fashion, we here conclude that it was not error for the trial court to modify Keith’s visitation rights.
IV
Did the district court err in failing to allow Sandra to *73make a full and adequate presentation of evidence in support of her motion?
Although the hearing terminated because of the frustration of all parties including the District Court, the record does not support Sandra’s contention on this issue. The transcript shows that Sandra’s counsel was allowed to cross-examine Keith and that Sandra testified until her own counsel excused her. She did not offer any specific evidence regarding Keith’s ability to pay.
The District Court’s order is affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HASWELL deems himself disqualified and, therefore, did not participate in this decision.