Court Opinion

ID: 9540917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:20:47.73215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:37.963880
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, also specially concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case. I write separately, however, because I do not believe that the automatic-substitution provision contains the good-faith requirement that the majority refers to, and because I do not agree with the majority’s statements suggesting that the provision is constitutionally required. Section 114 — 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 38, par. 114—5) contains two distinct provisions under which an accused may move for substitution of judge. Section 114 — 5(a), at issue here, is the so-called automatic-substitution provision; section 114 — 5(d), not at issue here, provides for motions for change of judge for cause. Section 114 — 5(a) permits an accused to move for substitution of judge “on the ground that such judge is so prejudiced against him that he cannot receive a fair trial. Upon the filing of such a motion the court shall proceed no further in the case but shall transfer it to another judge not named in the motion.” Thus, there is no hearing on the motion, and its allowance is automatic. The provision contains several significant restrictions: the motion must be made within 10 days of the time the cause is placed on the judge’s trial call, and only one judge may be named as prejudiced under the provision, unless the defendant is charged with a Class X felony or an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, in which case two judges may be named. Also, this court has held that the motion must be made before the trial judge makes a substantive ruling in the case. People v. Norcutt (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 256, 262-63. In sharp contrast, the provision for motions for cause, section 114 — 5(d), requires that a movant allege prejudice on the part of the judge and contemplates a hearing on the allegation. Section 114 — 5(d) provides: “Upon the filing of such motion a hearing shall be conducted as soon as possible after its filing by a judge not named in the motion; provided, however, that the judge named in the motion need not testify, but may submit an • affidavit if the judge wishes. If the motion is allowed, the case shall be assigned to a judge not named in the motion. If the motion is denied the case shall be assigned back to the judge named in the motion.” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1986 Supp., ch. 38, par. 114—5(d).) A motion for cause may be made “at any time,” and there is no limit on the number of motions that may be made under that provision. In my view, the automatic-substitution provision, section 114 — 5(a), purports to grant an accused a right to substitution without regard to the good faith of the motion. By its plain terms the statute provides, “Upon the filing of such a motion the court shall proceed no further in the case but shall transfer it to another judge not named in the motion.” That language would appear to admit no inquiry into the good faith or bad faith of an assertion of prejudice, and therefore I question the statements in the majority opinion implying that a motion for automatic substitution of judge must be made in good faith. The source of that requirement appears to be cases decided under earlier, different statutes; I note that we are not faced with the question whether the current provision contains a requirement of good faith. The majority opinion also suggests that the automatic-substitution provision is constitutionally required. (119 Ill. 2d at 481.) I disagree. It is the provision allowing motions for cause, section 114 — 5(d), that more directly effectuates the right of an accused to be tried before an impartial judge. Consistent with that role, section 114 — 5(d) contains none of the restrictions on the timing or frequency of the motion that apply to motions for automatic substitution. The majority purports to find a constitutional purpose for both provisions, however, and in doing so confuses the two. Finally, I wish to emphasize that a relevant consideration in our analysis of section 114 — 5(a) under the separation of powers principle is the longevity of the practice under attack. As the majority opinion demonstrates, the current provision or its predecessors have been enforced by this court for more than a century. During that time the court has been receptive to the substitution provisions, construing them liberally. Thus, I believe that the principles reflected in the statute have become so interwoven with the law of this State, including the opinions of this court, that they should be enforced as accepted by the courts even though there may be some infringement on the powers of the judicial branch. JUSTICE SIMON joins in this special concurrence.