Court Opinion

ID: 9900334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:09.26174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.381352
License: Public Domain

678                  October 18, 2023               No. 549

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                   STATE OF OREGON,
                    Plaintiff-Respondent,
                              v.
                JASON ANDREW BOYAR,
                   Defendant-Appellant.
              Tillamook County Circuit Court
                   20CR53616; A176596

  Jonathan R. Hill, Judge.
  Submitted February 2, 2023.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Sara F. Werboff, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  MOONEY, J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 328 Or App 678 (2023)                                           679

          MOONEY, J.
          Defendant appeals a Supplemental Judgment and
Money Award imposing restitution based on his “no con-
test” plea to one count of first-degree criminal mischief,
ORS 164.365, and his agreement to “admit liability for res-
titution purposes” for damaging the doors of a public tran-
sit facility owned by the City of Tillamook.1 The amount of
restitution was left open for the court to determine at sen-
tencing. Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s calcu-
lation of restitution to the extent that it includes $6,938 for
the replacement cost of the doors, arguing that “the state
failed to prove the necessity of replacing the doors instead
of performing repairs,” and that, in any event, there was
insufficient evidence to establish the reasonableness of the
replacement cost. He argues, in the alternative, that “the
proper amount of restitution was the fair market value of
the doors at the time they were damaged, accounting for
depreciation.” For reasons we will explain, we affirm.
          We review the trial court’s imposition of restitution
for legal error, remaining mindful that we are bound by the
trial court’s findings, including reasonable inferences, if they
are supported by any evidence in the record. State v. Lobue,
304 Or App 13, 16, 466 P3d 83, rev den, 367 Or 257 (2020). We
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the state.
State v. Smith, 291 Or App 785, 788, 420 P3d 644 (2018).
          A sentencing court is required to order restitution
if it “finds from the evidence presented that a victim suf-
fered economic damages.” ORS 137.106(1)(a). It imposes res-
titution in an amount “that equals the full amount of the
victim’s economic damages as determined by the court.” Id.
Restitution is intended to be “penal, not compensatory[,]”
State v. Dillon, 292 Or 172, 180, 637 P2d 602 (1981), and yet
ORS 137.103(2) nevertheless defines “economic damages”
much the same as that term is defined for civil matters
under ORS 31.705(2)(a). Thus, when imposed as restitution,
economic damages are the “objectively verifiable out-of-
pocket losses that a person could recover against the defen-
dant in a civil action arising out of the defendant’s criminal
activities.” State v. De Verteuil, 304 Or App 163, 167, 467
   1
       Defendant accepted the district attorney’s written plea offer.
680                                            State v. Boyar

P3d 80 (2020). A trial court measures property damage by
determining the “reasonable and necessarily incurred costs
due to loss of use of property and reasonable costs incurred
for repair or for replacement of damaged property, which-
ever is less.” ORS 31.705(2)(a). The state bears the burden of
proving the economic damages that it seeks to include in a
defendant’s sentence as restitution. ORS 137.106(1)(a); State
v. Aguirre-Rodriguez, 367 Or 614, 620, 482 P3d 62 (2021).
         Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the state pre-
sented sufficient evidence that the cost to repair the doors
would be greater than the cost to replace them. Photographs
of the damaged doors were submitted into evidence at the
restitution hearing. The state called the transit center’s
operations coordinator to testify about the damage to the
doors, the ongoing security and water damage issues, and
the need to quickly repair the doors to eliminate those
issues. That witness explained that the need for expediency
was especially acute because the transit facility remained
open to the public during the period of repair. The operations
coordinator also testified that the doors had to be replaced
because they could not be repaired for a variety of reasons,
including that the damaged doors would not “fit right” and
they would not “lock properly.”
         The state also called the city’s claims adjuster who
testified about the industry-wide program used to calculate
the damage estimate. The state produced documentation
of the costs incurred to replace the doors including (1) the
itemized cost estimate for the damage ($6,938 for replace-
ment doors, $1,320 for glass repair, and $530 to temporarily
secure the doors and windows), (2) an email from the con-
tractor describing the scope of the repair work and explain-
ing that “there is nowhere in Tillamook to source [the] mate-
rials” that would be required to repair the doors, and (3) the
contractor’s invoice for the total amount of $8,788.
         The testimony and documentary evidence estab-
lishes that the doors could not readily be repaired and that,
even if they could be repaired, it would cost less to replace
them. Under those particular circumstances, the court
could conclude that the cost of replacement was less than
Cite as 328 Or App 678 (2023)                              681

for repair, and impose the replacement cost of the doors as
restitution.
         We reject defendant’s remaining contention that
the proper restitution award would have been the reason-
able market value of the doors, accounting for depreciation.
To support his argument, defendant relies on De Verteuil, a
case in which we concluded that the proper award of resti-
tution for damage to a car seat and a vehicle roof rack was
the value of the items “at the time and place that defen-
dant’s criminal conduct destroyed [them].” 304 Or App at
170. But De Verteuil—a case concerning damage to personal
property—does not stand for the proposition that the correct
measure of damages is always the reasonable market value
of the property. Rather, as we have mentioned, De Verteuil
requires that a trial court determine what amount a victim
“could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising
out of the defendant’s criminal activities.” Id. at 167.
         In civil cases involving damage to real property, trial
courts apply one of two approaches to calculate damages.
When an injury to real property is permanent, the appro-
priate measure of damages is the “lost market value” of the
property caused by the defendant’s criminal act. McCormick
v. City of Portland, 191 Or App 383, 391, 82 P3d 1043,
rev den, 337 Or 616 (2004). When the injury is temporary, or
“reasonably susceptible to repair,” the appropriate measure
of damages is “the cost of restoring the property to its orig-
inal condition[.]” Id. We apply those principles here because
doors are generally considered fixtures “that, by being phys-
ically annexed or affixed to real property, become[ ] acces-
sory to the real property and part and parcel of it.” Oldham
v. Fanno, 168 Or App 573, 577, 7 P3d 672 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, the injury to the
transit station was temporary, the appropriate measure of
damages is the reasonable “cost of restoring the property to
its original condition[.]” McCormick, 191 Or App at 391. The
trial court did not err in imposing restitution in the amount
required to restore the property to its original condition by
replacing the doors.
        Affirmed.