Court Opinion

ID: 9599575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:19:52.468595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:45.694302
License: Public Domain

BUMGARDNER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision.
I believe Zelenak v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 295, 487 S.E.2d 873 (1997) (en banc), controls this case. In Zelenak, the defense was duress, and the issue was whether the threat to the defendant “caused her reasonably to believe that per*373forming the criminal conduct was her only reasonable opportunity to avoid imminent death or serious bodily harm.” Id. at 300, 487 S.E.2d at 875. This Court, sitting en banc, held that the trial court properly excluded expert psychological opinion because it was an opinion on the ultimate issue.
In this case, the defense is self-defense, and the issue is whether the defendant “reasonably feared death or serious bodily injury at the time of the shooting.” However, the majority holds that the trial court improperly excluded expert psychological opinion because it was not an opinion on the ultimate issue. The majority dismisses Zelenak in a footnote and adopts the reasoning of the dissent. I do not believe that precedent can be dismissed so simply. In Zelenak the defense was duress; in this case the defense was self-defense. In both, the mental element necessary to establish the defense was the subjectively reasonable fear of the defendant. If psychological opinion was not permissible in one, it cannot be permissible in the other.
The majority disregards the clear holding of Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 324 S.E.2d 682 (1985). That case held as follows: “we hold that evidence of a criminal defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense is, in the absence of an insanity defense, irrelevant to the issue of guilt.” Id. at 717, 324 S.E.2d at 688. The Court refused to adopt a diminished capacity theory of criminal responsibility. Further, the Court interpreted the evidence as an attempt to introduce expert opinion on the ultimate fact. In its conclusion, the Court stated the fundamental reason for such exclusion:
The state of knowledge in the fields of medicine and psychiatry is subject to constant advance and change. The classifications and gradations applied to mental illnesses, disorders, and defects are frequently revised. The courts cannot, and should not, become dependent upon these subtle and shifting gradations for the resolution of each specific case.
Stamper, 228 Va. at 716, 324 S.E.2d at 688.
Stamper is controlling precedent. It was neither limited nor refined by Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 259-60, *374389 S.E.2d 871, 879-80, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 221, 112 L.Ed.2d 177 (1990), as the majority suggests. Rather, it was followed with approval in all respects as it has been in later cases. See Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 456, 423 S.E.2d 360, 367-68 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1036, 113 S.Ct. 1862, 123 L.Ed.2d 483 (1993).
I believe the trial court correctly excluded this opinion evidence based on the direct precedent of Zelenak and the controlling rationale of Stamper. I would affirm the convictions.