Court Opinion

ID: 9891782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 17:06:09.618924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:41.257399
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/19/23
                     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                       FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION ONE

 DALE DUNCAN et al.,
        Plaintiffs and Respondents,
                                            A164470
 v.
 ANNE KIHAGI et al.,                        (City and County of San
                                            Francisco Super. Ct.
        Defendants and Appellants.
                                            No. CGC-15-545655)

       This is the second time that appellants Anne Kihagi, Christina
Mwangi, and Zoriall LLC (the landlords) have challenged a $2.7 million
judgment against them. A jury concluded they harassed and unlawfully
evicted their tenants, respondents Dale Duncan and Marta Munoz Mendoza.
After we affirmed the judgment in Duncan v. Kihagi (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
519 (Duncan I), the landlords moved to vacate the judgment, claiming it was
“void.” They argued the tenants were barred from obtaining relief in this
action because they had failed to pursue their legal remedies in unlawful
detainer proceedings after giving up possession of their unit. Because this
argument misapprehends the statute that governs surrendering possession of
property in unlawful detainer proceedings (Civ. Code, § 1952.3 (§ 1952.3)), we
affirm the trial court’s order denying the landlords’ motion.

                                       1
                                    I.
                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                               BACKGROUND
      As we detailed in Duncan I, Duncan in 1994 moved into a rent-
controlled unit in a five-unit building on Hill Street in San Francisco. He was
living there with Mendoza and their daughter when, in June 2014, the
building was purchased by Zoriall, an LLC owned by Kihagi and Mwangi.
Starting in August 2014 and for a little over a year until Duncan and his
family were forced to move, the new landlords took away various property-
related benefits, ignored or delayed responding to maintenance and upkeep
issues, were uncommunicative and uncooperative, and became increasingly
hostile.
      The procedural history of this case is somewhat complex. While they
were still living in their unit, the tenants initiated these proceedings when
they sued the landlords in May 2015 (No. CGC-15-545655, “Duncan 1”). In
their first amended complaint filed that same month, they alleged causes of
action for (1) nuisance, (2) breach of contract, (3) negligence, (4) harassment
in violation of San Francisco’s Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration
Ordinance (Rent Ordinance, S.F. Admin Code ch. 37), and (5) unfair business
practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).
      The following month, on June 25, 2015, two unlawful detainer actions
were filed against the tenants. Zoriall filed one (No. CUD-15-652719, “the
Zoriall unlawful detainer action”), and Mwangi filed a separate one
(No. CUD-15-652720, “the Mwangi unlawful detainer action”).
      The tenants in July 2015 filed an answer in the Mwangi unlawful
detainer action in which they asserted affirmative defenses of retaliation and
violation of the Rent Ordinance. Then on August 31 they filed a “Notice of
Surrender of Possession” in the action. The notice stated that the tenants

                                       2
vacated the premises on August 31. The notice further stated that the
matter thus became an “ordinary civil action” under section 1952.3. That
statute provides that if a landlord brings an unlawful detainer action and the
tenant surrenders possession before trial (making possession no longer at
issue), the case becomes an ordinary civil action in which the landlord may
obtain any relief to which he or she is entitled. (§ 1952.3, subd. (a)(1).) In
such an ordinary civil action the tenant, too, may “by appropriate pleadings
or amendments to pleadings, seek any affirmative relief.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).)
In general, if a defendant named in a complaint fails to allege any related
cause of action by way of a cross-complaint in the action, the defendant “may
not thereafter in any other action assert against the plaintiff the related
cause of action not pleaded.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a).) But as
discussed further below, this provision does not apply in an unlawful detainer
action unless after delivering the property to the landlord, the tenant files a
cross-complaint or an amended answer. (§ 1952.3, subd. (a)(2).) The
landlords claim here that because the tenants did not file a cross-complaint
in the unlawful detainer actions, they were barred from pursuing their claims
against the landlords in their already pending separate action.
      In April 2016, the tenants filed an additional complaint against the
landlords (No. CGC-16-551512, “Duncan 2”) alleging that Mwangi had
initiated an unlawful owner move-in eviction. This complaint alleged only
two causes of action: (1) wrongful owner move-in eviction in violation of the
Rent Ordinance and (2) negligence.
      Duncan 1 was consolidated with the Zoriall unlawful detainer action in
August 2017, but the unlawful detainer action was later severed. It is
unclear how the unlawful detainer actions were resolved. Counsel for Zoriall
and Mwangi represented at the hearing on their motion to vacate judgment

                                        3
that those actions were left “in abeyance” when the tenants’ complaint
proceeded to trial.
      Around the time trial started, the tenants on September 1, 2017, filed a
second amended complaint that consolidated Duncan 1 and Duncan 2, with
no substantive changes. The amended complaint included all causes of action
previously alleged: (1) nuisance, (2) breach of contract, (3) negligence,
(4) violation of the Rent Ordinance (harassment), (5) unfair business
practices, (5) violation of the Rent Ordinance (wrongful owner move-in
eviction), and (6) another negligence cause of action.
      Following a jury trial, jurors found the landlords liable for two separate
violations of the Rent Ordinance: wrongful eviction and tenant harassment.
This court affirmed in Duncan I on August 9, 2021, and the remitter issued
on November 2. The landlords nonetheless filed six “motions to vacate
judgment after trial” on various grounds. (Capitalization omitted.) The
single motion that is the subject of this appeal argued that the judgment was
void based on the “primary rights theory.” In the motion, the landlords
claimed that the trial court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
tenants’ claims after they surrendered possession of their rental unit.
According to the landlords, such a relinquishment of possession waives a
tenant’s right to a wrongful-eviction claim, and the judgment was thus “void
[on] its face.”
      The tenants opposed the motions and argued they were without merit,
frivolous, and “designed to waste resources and time and [to be] a procedural
tactic to cause delays and to create unnecessary fees and costs.” Following a
hearing, the trial court denied all of appellants’ motions, including the one
arguing that the judgment against them was void under the primary right
theory.

                                        4
                                       II.
                                  DISCUSSION
      The landlords renew their argument that the judgment the tenants
obtained following a jury trial must be set aside as void (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 473, subd. (d)) based on the primary right theory. The argument fails.
      The argument turns on the effect of the tenants surrendering
possession of their unit before trial in either of the unlawful detainer actions.
In general, unlawful detainer actions are “summary in character; . . .
ordinarily, only claims bearing directly upon the right of immediate
possession are cognizable [citations]; and . . . cross-complaints and affirmative
defenses, legal or equitable, are permissible only insofar as they would, if
successful, ‘preclude removal of the tenant from the premises.’ ” (Vella v.
Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255, italics added.) If the tenant surrenders
the property such that possession is no longer at issue, though, the landlord
may expand the relief sought by way of an amended complaint. (§ 1952.3,
subd. (a)(1).) The tenant, too, “may, by appropriate pleadings or amendments
to pleadings, seek any affirmative relief, and assert all defenses, to which he
[or she] is entitled, whether or not the lessor has amended the complaint.”
(§ 1952.3, subd. (a)(2).) In other words, once a tenant sued for unlawful
detainer surrenders possession as set forth in section 1952.3, the tenant may
seek affirmative relief that would not have otherwise been available in an
unlawful detainer proceeding. (Fish Construction Co. v. Moselle Coach
Works, Inc. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 654, 660 (Fish Construction).)
      Relying on the primary right theory, the landlords turn this principle
on its head, contending that unless the tenant seeks affirmative relief in the
unlawful detainer proceeding the tenant is barred from seeking it at all.
According to them, as soon as Duncan and Mendoza relinquished possession
of their unit, “any causes of action or damages related to the issue of

                                        5
Respondents’ primary right of possession was completely resolved in favor of
Appellants.” We are not persuaded.
      “The primary right theory is a theory of code pleading that has long
been followed in California. It provides that a ‘cause of action’ is comp[o]sed
of a ‘primary right’ of the plaintiff, a corresponding ‘primary duty’ of the
defendant, and wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that
duty. [Citation.] The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it
is indivisible: the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single
cause of action. [Citation.] A pleading that states the violation of one
primary right in two causes of action contravenes the rule against ‘splitting’ a
cause of action.” (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681.)
      “The primary right theory has a fairly narrow field of application. It is
invoked most often when a plaintiff attempts to divide a primary right and
enforce it in two suits. The theory prevents this result by either of two
means: (1) if the first suit is still pending when the second is filed, the
defendant in the second suit may plead that fact in abatement [citations]; or
(2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the
plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar
under the principles of res judicata. [Citation.] The latter application of the
primary right theory appears to be most common: numerous cases hold that
when there is only one primary right an adverse judgment in the first suit is
a bar even though the second suit is based on a different theory [citation] or
seeks a different remedy.” (Crowley v. Katleman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682.)
Neither scenario occurred here.
      More fundamentally, the theory is simply inapplicable in the
circumstances presented here. Again, “only the right to possession is in
issue” in a summary unlawful detainer action. (Fish Construction, supra,

                                         6
148 Cal.App.3d at p. 658; see also 10 Miller et al., Cal. Real Estate (4th ed.)
§ 34:196, p. 34-660 [“The primary objective of an unlawful detainer
proceeding is to recover possession of the leased premises.”].) “To preserve
the summary nature of these proceedings, the rule developed that ordinarily
affirmative defenses may not be asserted. [Citation.] Only defenses which
are directly relevant to possession may be considered.” (Fish Construction at
p. 658.) Section 1952.3 codifies the rule that if the tenant gives up possession
of the property after the initiation of unlawful detainer proceedings but
before trial, the action becomes an ordinary one for damages. (Fish
Construction at p. 658.) In other words, when the tenants gave up
possession, they surrendered only the very narrow issue of current possession
of their unit. Section 1952.3, subdivision (a)(2) then permitted them to seek
any affirmative relief they were otherwise entitled to that was not otherwise
available in an unlawful detainer action.
      True, the tenants proceeded with their own complaints and did not
seek relief by filing a cross-complaint in the unlawful detainer actions. But,
contrary to the landlords’ insistence, they were not required to do so. In
general, where a defendant to a lawsuit fails to allege any related causes of
action by way of a cross-complaint, that defendant “may not thereafter in any
other action assert against the plaintiff the related cause of action not
pleaded.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a).) This requirement to allege
all related claims does not apply in unlawful detainer actions, however,
unless one of two things happens: the tenant (1) files a cross-complaint or
(2) files an answer to any amended complaint the landlord files after the case
becomes a regular civil action. (§ 1952.3, subd. (a)(2).) The legislative
committee comment following section 1952.3 states that the “limitation of the
application of the compulsory cross-complaint statute . . . protect[s] the

                                        7
defendant [tenant] against inadvertent loss of a related cause of action.”
(Legis. Comm com., 10A West’s Ann. Civ. Code (2022 ed.) p. 111.) In other
words, if a tenant chooses to file a cross-complaint in an unlawful detainer
action after surrendering possession, all possible causes of action must be
alleged. Here, the tenants had no reason to file such a cross-complaint after
surrendering possession of their unit since they already had filed a separate
complaint. And they apparently had no reason to file an amended answer,
since there is no indication that after the tenants surrendered possession the
landlords sought any further relief in the unlawful detainer actions. It is
simply not true that the tenants improperly “ ‘split’ a cause of action into
successive suits,” as the landlords claim.
      The landlords’ reliance on de la Cuesta v. Benham (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 1287 is misplaced. The case held that a trial court had
abused its discretion in concluding there was no prevailing party for purposes
of awarding attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717. (de la Cuesta at
p. 1296.) The landlord had recovered 70 percent of the back rent it claimed
the tenant owed and the tenant had vacated the premises the day before trial
was initially scheduled to begin. (Id. at p. 1296.) The fact that the tenant
moved out was characterized as “a clear victory for the landlord.” (Ibid.) No
cross-complaint or separate complaint by the tenant was at issue, though, so
the court was not asked to consider whether the “clear victory” precluded
affirmative claims against the landlord.
      Here, the only legal claim the tenants abandoned when they moved out
of their unit was the narrow issue of current possession, the sole focus of the
unlawful detainer proceedings. The landlords apparently do not dispute for
purposes of this appeal that the tenants had other valid legal claims against
them. But they insist that those claims were either waived when the tenants

                                        8
surrendered current possession of their unit, or the claims should have been
litigated in the unlawful detainer actions. As there is no legal support for
these arguments, we reject them.
                                      III.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order is affirmed. The tenants shall recover their costs
on appeal.

                                       9
                                          _________________________
                                          Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Margulies, J.

_________________________
Banke, J.

Duncan et al. v. Kihagi et al. A164470

                                     10
Trial Court:

      Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco

Trial Judge:

      Hon. Andrew Y.S. Cheng

Counsel:

      Greenstein & McDonald, Steven J. McDonald, Ariel Gershon, for
Plaintiffs and Respondents

      Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, LLP, Ryan B. Polk, Kevin Liu, for
Defendants and Appellants

Duncan et al. v. Kihagi et al. A164470

                                     11