Court Opinion

ID: 9716174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:29:38.715337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:42.568795
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen:
I would hold that the court below, sitting in equity, had no jurisdiction for two reasons. In the first place, the questions raised are not ripe for judicial determination. No tax has been assessed against appellee. Appellee’s complaint asserts only that if construed and applied against it, the tax in question will be unconstitutional. In such a situation, the rule set forth by Chief Justice Horace Stern in Knup v. Philadelphia, 386 Pa. 350, 353, 126 A. 2d 399, 400 (1956) is applicable a court will take jurisdiction only in a case in which a challenged statute, ordinance, or rule of court has been actually applied to a litigant; it does not undertake to decide academically the unconstitutionality or other alleged invalidity of legislation un*582til it is brought into operation so as to impinge upon the rights of some person or persons.”
Secondly, the equity court below had no jurisdiction because the exclusive remedy to raise these constitutional questions is through the administrative procedure established in The Fiscal Code. Where the legislature has provided a specific remedy or method of procedure, that procedure is deemed to be exclusive. Act of March 21, 1806, P. L. 558, 4 Sm. L. 326, §13; Cathcart v. Crumlish, 410 Pa. 253, 189 A. 2d 243 (1963). Hence, if the questions raised by this complaint in equity could be determined by following the administrative procedures set forth in The Fiscal Code, that remedy must be pursued.1
Under section 1103 of The Fiscal Code,2 petitions for resettlement of taxes can be presented to the Board of Finance and Revenue which possesses the power to “resettle the account upon such basis as it shall deem according to law and equity.” Section 1104 of The Fiscal Code3 permits a further de novo appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County.
The majority asserts that the Board of Finance and Revenue does not have the power to independently judge the validity or constitutionality of a taxing statute and therefore resort in this case to the administrative procedure would be useless.
*583In Merchants’ Warehouse Company v. Gelder, 349 Pa. 1, 36 A. 2d 444 (1944), we held that the Board of Claims is a quasi-judicial body and consequently required to exercise its independent judgment — uninfluenced by the advice of the attorney general — with regard to questions of law and fact presented to it. It cannot be doubted that the Board of Finance and Revenue is also a quasi-judicial body, and I would hold that it is similarly empowered to independently judge the constitutionality of taxing statutes in determining the resettlement of assessments.
It is true that cases can be found stating that equity has jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of taxes where there is a “want of power” to tax. In Young Men’s Christian Association v. Reading, 402 Pa. 592, 167 A. 2d 469 (1961), however, we significantly restricted that doctrine by holding that a “want of power” to tax does not include claims of total exemption from taxation. We there stated: “The efficacy of the rule that a statutory remedy must be pursued, if one exists, in preference to any other proceeding is hardly questionable; its application to a tax assessment proceeding whereby those most familiar with the intricacies of tax assessments are able to review the controversy thoroughly is unquestionable.” (402 Pa. at 595).
If the administrative procedure is preferable to determine questions of exemption, it is likewise preferable for the determination of constitutional questions. New judges have had experience in the technical field of state taxes and hence are aware of the problems and implications of various state taxes. Yet constitutional questions may well turn upon such considerations. Why should a taxpayer be permitted by seeking an injunction in equity to deprive the courts of the benefits of this administrative expertise?
Unlike the situation presented in Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce v. Torquato, relied upon *584by tbe majority, appellee will in no way be Farmed or prejudiced if directed to first pursue its administrative remedies.
Accordingly, I dissent.

 In White v. Young, 402 Pa. 61, 166 A. 2d 663 (1960), we held that an interlocutory order dismissing defendant’s preliminary objection that an adequate remedy existed at law was not appealable. The issue here, however, is not whether an adequate remedy at law deprives equity of jurisdiction it would otherwise possess, but whether equity initially has any jurisdiction because of the Act of 1806. White v. Young, therefore, is inapplicable.

 Act of April 9, 1929, P. L. 343, §1103, as amended by the Act of July 13, 1957, P. L. 838, §14, 72 P.S. §1103 (Supp. 1962).

 Act of April 9, 1929, P. L. 343, §1104, as amended by the Act of July 13, 1957, P. D. 838, §14, 72 P.S. §1104 (Supp. 1962).