Court Opinion

ID: 9884825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:15:59.213653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:41.043461
License: Public Domain

*636GARRITY, Judge,
dissenting.
I fully agree with the majority’s discussion of the legal principles and their application. However, it is quite apparent that our ruling today overstates the effect on the appellant of the trial court’s due process violations. The error below, egregious though it may have been, did not affect the outcome; therefore, it amounted to harmless error.
On January 24, 1984, Shirley Smith was convicted of unlawfully carrying a handgun. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Ward, J.) sentenced her to three years’ imprisonment but suspended all but three months of the sentence and placed her on supervised probation for a period of three years.
On December 7, 1984, the same judge presided over the appellant’s probation revocation hearing. Appellant was charged with violating Rule # 1, Rule # 4, and Rule # 10 of the terms of her probation. Rule # 1 stated that the appellant must report to her probation agent. Rule # 4 commanded the appellant to obey all laws. Rule # 10 was a special condition directing the appellant to attend a drug rehabilitation program.
On September 11, 1984, the appellant was arrested and charged with possession of heroin. As noted in the majority opinion, Ms. Smith was convicted of this charge.
There is no question that the judge, by involving himself through his law clerk in the investigation of the appellant’s alleged violations of her probation, violated the appellant's due process rights. Such violations are apparent even though there is a lesser due process standard for such probation hearings. See, Fuller v. State, 64 Md.App. 339, 495 A.2d 366 (1985). Yet these violations alone do not suffice for reversal.
There is a clear test for determining whether the error was harmless. “[A]n appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless the reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, *637beyond reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict....” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665 (1976); cited with approval in Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 355 A.2d 455 (1976); see Holloway v. State, 26 Md.App. 382, 395, 339 A.2d 319 (1975). Again, the standard remains the same even when the error is as significant as the one in this case.
What is of importance, from an examination of the cases which discuss harmless error, is the realization that if the error goes to a substantial constitutional right ... that unless the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt ... that the defendant would undoubtedly have been found guilty ... its employment will always be error----
Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 246, 322 A.2d 211 (1974), quoted with approval in Holloway v. State, 26 Md.App. at 395-96, 339 A.2d 319. Therefore, the majority, after explaining the due process violation below, should have continued its analysis of the record to determine whether the error was harmless.
In this case, it is quite clear that the appellant did, in fact, violate one of the conditions of her probation. Her conviction on possession of heroin is quite clear and undisputed. There is no reasonable doubt about her failure to obey all laws. Thus, the untainted and self-evident violation of the probation caused the revocation.
A probationer is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he actually abides by the conditions of this probation. Probation may not be revoked unless the probationer has in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of this probation. *638Probation is a matter of grace____ [A]ll that is required is that the facts before him be such that the judge reasonably could be satisfied that the conduct of the probationer has not been what he (or she) agreed it would be if he (or she) were given liberty.
*637Dean v. State, 291 Md. 198, 202, 434 A.2d 552 (1981).
The judge’s improper conduct at the hearing, which is the subject of the majority’s opinion, affected the determination of the other two alleged violations by the appellant. Here, it is quite clear that the probationer did, indeed, violate a condition of her probation. It is this violation that alone caused the revocation and made the other errors harmless.
*638Horsey v. State, 56 Md.App. 667, 671-72, 468 A.2d 684 (1983), quoting from Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575 (1965).
Unquestionably, the judge below committed error. His actions were properly condemned by this court. For the purposes of the revocation of the appellant’s probation, however, there were insufficient grounds for reversal of that revocation. Therefore, I dissent.