Court Opinion

ID: 9659935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:59:03.724356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:13.214859
License: Public Domain

GREEN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
The question presented is whether, in the face of the stipulated standards of appellate review, we may modify a trial judge’s order merely upon request of the Attorney General.
In this appeal by Lorenzo Martinez, the imprisoned adjudicated father, the Attorney General attempts to concede a mathematical error by the trial judge in calculating the support award against a presumed minimum wage earner, an error not raised by Martinez in his brief. The AG asks this court to downwardly modify the trial judge’s award, and the majority has complied. I respectfully dissent.
The AG is correct that in the absence of evidence of the net resources of the obligor, the trial court shall presume an income equal to the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour week. See Tex. Fam.Code § 154.068 (Vernon 1996). However, determining the resources available to the obligor is only the first step in the process. The court must also determine the number of minor children involved, the amount the obligor is required to pay under the guidelines, and whether additional factors justify a variance from the guidelines. See id. § 154.123 (listing additional factors for court to consider).
The majority ignores the fact that the trial judge seems to have decided to vary from the guidelines by ordering Martinez to pay $45 per month more than the amount specified. The judge was authorized to do this if, on considering the evidence and the factors listed in the statute, it was in the best interest of the child to do so. See id. Yet in the absence of any evidence that the trial court did not intend to deviate from the guidelines, the AG acts against the interest of the child it .purports to represent by suggesting a *703downward modification of the support order, claiming a mathematical error.
In a case such as this one, where findings of fact are neither requested nor filed, the trial court’s judgment implies all necessary findings of fact to support it.1 W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 29 St. mary’s Law J. 351, 497 (1998). However, the implied findings may be reviewed for sufficiency of the evidence when a reporter’s record is filed, as it was in this case. Id. at 497-98.
Here, the evidence includes uncontested testimony that Martinez will soon be eligible for parole, he is a former member of the United States Air Force, and has a bachelor’s degree in meteorology. Mendiola, the child’s mother, specifically requested $200 a month, without reference to Martinez as a minimum wage earner. She also indicated that her child had no health insurance. Thus, a deviation from the guidelines is supported by the evidence. See In Interest of Hidalgo, 938 S.W.2d 492, 498 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1996, no writ) (former employment may be considered by trial court in varying from guidelines). We are therefore unable to say it was not the intent of the trial court to do exactly what it did, or that it was not acting within its discretion when it did it.
We may not substitute our opinion — or indeed the opinion of the Attorney General— for the amount of child support deemed to be in the best interest of the child. That judgment and discretion is reserved for the trial court. Accordingly, although I concur that Martinez’ appeal points should be overruled, the trial court’s order should be affirmed as is.

. The Family Code’s requirement that the trial court file findings of fact if the support order varies from the guidelines is waived if no request for findings is made. See Tex. Fam.Code § 154.130 (Vernon 1996); Tenery v. Tenery, 932 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex.1996).