Court Opinion

ID: 9676631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:29:04.962865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:49.887712
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Justice,
dissenting in part.
Respectfully, I suggest that the majority has misinterpreted KRS 44.070(1) and frustrated the intent of the General Assembly with respect to the right of the Commonwealth to receive a credit for sums paid by others to compensate a damaged party. The Board of Claims Act constitutes a limited waiver of the Commonwealth’s right of sovereign immunity. Without the Act, there would be no liability on the Commonwealth for its negligent acts by virtue of Section 231 of the Constitution of Kentucky. As such, we have held that the Legislature may limit application of its waiver and impose such other restrictions as it sees fit upon the right of recovery against the Commonwealth. In University of Kentucky v. Guynn, Ky., 372 S.W.2d 414 (1963), this proposition was stated as follows:
“As a matter of grace, such a remedy may be granted, withdrawn or restricted af the will of the Legislature.” Id. at 416.
Recently, in Kentucky Center for the Arts v. Berns, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 327 (1991), we said:
“Where sovereign immunity exists by reason of the Constitution, the General Assembly may extend-or limit waiver as it sees fit_” Id. at 329.
In the first section of the Board of Claims Act, KRS 44.070(1), the General Assembly declared in the broadest possible terms as follows:
“Furthermore, any damage claim awarded shall be reduced by the amount of payments received or right to receive payment from workers’ compensation insurance, social security programs, unemployment insurance programs, medical, disability or life insurance programs or other federal or state or private program designed to supplement income or pay claimant’s expenses or damages incurred.”
A reasonable reading of the foregoing leads unmistakably to the conclusion that the General Assembly intended to grant the Commonwealth a credit for sums paid by any other source in compensation for the damages. Such a reduction in the liability of the Commonwealth is perfectly consistent with the limitation on total damages allowable and the types of actions which may give rise to liability via the Board of Claims. Rather than depend upon the inapplicable rule of statutory construction found in Louisville Water Co. v. Wells, Ky.App., 664 S.W.2d 525 (1984)1, we should rely on “rule one” of statutory construction as set forth in Gateway Construction Company v. Wallbaum, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 247 (1962), as follows:
“The best way in most cases to ascertain such intent or to determine the meaning of a statute is to look to the language used, but no intention must be *170read into the statute not justified by the language. The primary rule is to ascertain the intention from the words employed in enacting the statute and not to guess what the Legislature may have intended but did not express. Resort must be had first to the words, which are decisive if they are clear. The words of the statute are to be given their usual, ordinary, and everyday meaning.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 249.
My views on this issue are well expressed in the Court of Appeals’ majority opinion by Judge Stumbo as follows:
“KRS 44.070(1) clearly shows the legislative intent that no claimant be unjustly enriched at the commonwealth’s expense. While we think the statute applies on its face, even if it did not, we think that we must allow a credit to the Department for the payments made by the Lebanon Fire Department. We are aware that this holding, at first blush, seems to violate the rule of Stratton v. Parker, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 817 (1990), by allowing a non-settling tort-feasor to benefit from payments made by the settling one. Strat-ton involved an action between private parties, in which the settling tort-feasor was found not at fault at trial. Here, the nonsettling party is not a private party; it is the commonwealth, which can be sued only because the legislature has specifically allowed it. This being so, the limits of the commonwealth’s liability have been specifically defined and the commonwealth has been statutorily granted a benefit not allowed private individuals. Just as the Board can only award an individual claimant a maximum of $100,000, it can receive a credit for payments made from other sources.”
For the reasons stated, I dissent.

. In my view, the rule of construction that the enumeration of particular things excludes other items which are not specifically mentioned is inapplicable here. In addition to the enumeration, KRS 44.070(1) contains a broad catch-all which grants the Commonwealth a credit for "other federal or state or private program designed to supplement income or pay claimant’s expenses or damages incurred.” The terms "private program" and "damages incurred” are insurance and tort terms which clearly embrace settlement by a tortfeasor or its insurer. Moreover, the Act twice uses "insurance” and "programs" in conjunction with one another.