Court Opinion

ID: 9951055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 15:21:04.859397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:52.717073
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1301-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ENDY ROLANDO CRUZ CRUZ,
a/k/a GUSTAV GONZALEZ,
GUSTAVO MORALES, and
GUSTAVO MORALESGONZALEZ,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________

                   Argued February 26, 2024 – Decided March 15, 2024

                   Before Judges Sabatino, Marczyk, and Chase.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Cumberland County, Municipal Appeal
                   No. 2-22.

                   Elizabeth M. Trinidad argued the cause for appellant
                   (Trinidad Law Office, LLC, attorneys; Elizabeth M.
                   Trinidad, on the briefs).

                   Jeffrey Nicholas Krachun, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
                   the cause for respondent (Jennifer Webb-McRae,
            Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney; Jeffrey
            Nicholas Krachun, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Endy Rolando Cruz Cruz appeals from a November 16, 2022

Law Division order upholding his municipal court convictions and sentence of

a six-month suspension of driving privileges with associated fines and court

costs. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

                                       I.

      The only witness to testify at trial was New Jersey State Police Trooper

Quanzell Lambert. He testified that on October 11, 2019, he was in uniform and

in a marked patrol car stationed along Route 49 in Fairfield Township when he

observed a vehicle speeding and failing to maintain its lane. Trooper Lambert

initiated a traffic stop and approached the vehicle. He identified himself as a

State Police Trooper and asked the driver for identification and other documents.

Trooper Lambert testified he observed "a little language barrier," however,

defendant "could understand some. It was pretty broken, but he understood

some things and I was trying to speak in Spanish as best I could to get him to

understand."

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                                       2
      Trooper Lambert testified defendant produced identification from Mexico

but no proof of a valid driver's license. Suspecting defendant was intoxicated

because of his behavior and physical demeanor, Trooper Lambert instructed

defendant to exit the vehicle and perform field sobriety tests. During the testing,

Trooper Lambert determined defendant failed and should be placed under arrest.

At the end of testing, Trooper Lambert instructed defendant to turn around to

complete another test, and when he did, Trooper Lambert grabbed defendant's

hands and placed them behind his back to handcuff him. At that time, defendant

broke the officer's grip and turned around to face him. Trooper Lambert then

placed defendant face down on the hood and brought his hands behind his back

to handcuff him. Trooper Lambert testified the action of breaking his grip was

the basis for the resisting arrest charge. He also testified after defendant was

handcuffed and searched, defendant used his torso and legs to push back against

Trooper Lambert to avoid being placed in the patrol car.

      The State then played footage from the patrol car's dashboard camera,

which was entered into evidence as S-3. The dashcam video captured Trooper

Lambert identifying himself to the car's occupants as a police officer and

defendant responding, "No English." Trooper Lambert then attempted to ask

defendant if he had been drinking, using both English and the Spanish word

                                                                             A-1301-22
                                        3
"cerveza" ("beer"), to which defendant responded in the negative. The video

showed Trooper Lambert administering four field sobriety tests in front of

defendant's car. Defendant responded to some of Trooper Lambert's instructions

and questions by speaking Spanish, "No entiendo" ("I don't understand") or with,

"No English.     Sorry."    The video shows Trooper Lambert physically

demonstrating some of the field sobriety tests to defendant.

      Trooper Lambert then instructed defendant, "Turn around. Next test, turn

around." As defendant turned around, on his own he raised both hands over his

head. Trooper Lambert then took both defendant's hands into his hands and

started to pull them down behind defendant's back to defendant's waist area,

while simultaneously saying "move your hands behind your back." As he moved

defendant's hands down, defendant broke the grip, turned to face Trooper

Lambert and asked in Spanish, "Qué pasó?" ("What happened?").           Trooper

Lambert said, "Yo, yo, yo, yo. Hands behind your back. Put your hands behind

your back." In order to secure defendant, Trooper Lambert turned him around,

placed him over the hood of the car, unclipped his handcuffs, and handcuffed

him without further incident. As the handcuffs were being placed on defendant,

he told his passenger, in Spanish, to call her sister.    After defendant was

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                                       4
handcuffed, he began asking Trooper Lambert for "abogado" ("lawyer") while

also repeating, "No English."

       The video shows Trooper Lambert escorted defendant to the area outside

the rear passenger door of his patrol car. From this point, both Trooper Lambert

and defendant were outside the view of the dashcam, but the microphone

attached to Trooper Lambert's body-worn camera captured the audio of their

interactions. While continuing to ask for a lawyer, defendant told Trooper

Lambert, "Hey, hey, mi mujer? Mi mujer, okay? Mi mujer?" ("my woman") to

which Trooper Lambert responded, "You're making it harder than it needs to

be."

       The dashcam captured defendant's passenger opening her car door, taking

out her phone, and attempting to communicate with defendant and Trooper

Lambert. She told Trooper Lambert, in English, the person on the phone was

her sister.1 Trooper Lambert instructed her to get back in the vehicle, which she

did. However, she soon stood up from the vehicle again and remained by her

open door.

1
  Other footage from S-3 shows the passenger's family member later arrived and
served as a translator between the police officers, passenger, and defendant.

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                                       5
      Approximately five minutes after the handcuffing, the audio recording

captured the opening of the patrol car door. Defendant again asked for an

attorney, and Trooper Lambert can be heard saying, "Get in the car, bro."

Defendant can be heard calling loudly to the passenger. The passenger walked

away from the car, still on the phone, and out of view of the dashcam. The audio

recording captures loud, overlapping, and repeating conversations: Trooper

Lambert telling the passenger to get back in the vehicle, the passenger telling

Trooper Lambert, "My sister, okay?" and defendant calling the passenger's

name2 and telling her, "Graba la video! Graba!" ("Record a video! Record!").

The dashcam shows the passenger briefly returning to the car, but then re-

approaching Trooper Lambert and defendant. The dashcam appears to shake

slightly for approximately thirty seconds before the audio captures the sound of

the patrol car door closing.

      Trooper Lambert testified during that portion of the recording, in which

neither he nor defendant were visible, and in which the passenger moved in and

out of view, he was trying to place defendant into his patrol car, but defendant

physically resisted those efforts. Trooper Lambert testified defendant "was

2
   The passenger's name is not reflected in the record, but in the recording,
defendant addresses her by the common nickname "Flaca."
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                                       6
using his feet and legs, his torso, to like stop me from . . . putting him in the

vehicle." Trooper Lambert's body-worn camera was knocked from his person

as he placed defendant in the car.      Trooper Lambert testified because the

passenger was approaching, he "forcibly pushed [defendant] in the vehicle just

in case [the passenger] got a weapon or anything . . . ."

      On cross-examination, Trooper Lambert was asked whether he ever told

defendant he was under arrest. Trooper Lambert testified, "I did, ma'am. I never

got to get it fully out. I said your (sic) under arrest, and that's when he pulled

away." After the dashcam video was replayed a second time, the following

ensued:

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So you never said the word
            arrest, did you, Trooper?

                   ….

            [LAMBERT]: I did. I just didn't fully – what did you
            say? It's on the – whatever is said on there, because like
            you said, it was vehicles flying by.

                  There was a lot of other things going on. You
            might have not fully heard the word come out of my
            mouth but I – you could hear me advising him he was
            under arrest and he's breaking my grip.

      Defense counsel also asked, "when you wanted [defendant] to turn around,

he turned – for what you said was the last test; right? . . . The next test. You

said next test." Trooper Lambert replied, "Yes, ma'am." He explained:

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                                        7
            Ma'am, so I do that so people when – what I do, as far
            as I say that because I don't want people to freak out
            when I sa[y] they're under arrest. So I – if they're under
            the influence, they'll just, oh, I got another test. I'm
            doing well.

                  And then I'll put their hands behind their back
            and then I'll place them under arrest and tell them
            they're under arrest. I don't do that as a test to trick. It's
            more of to say for my safety, so they don't overreact
            because a lot of people don't want to hear that they're
            being placed under arrest.

Trooper Lambert also conceded he communicated through physical gestures

how he wanted defendant to complete the tests.

      On redirect, Trooper Lambert was asked whether defendant knew he was

being placed under arrest, to which Trooper Lambert testified, "[t]hat's

unknown" and "[i]t was up to him." Trooper Lambert also testified his placing

handcuffs on defendant's wrists was a physical cue to alert defendant he was

being placed under arrest.

      Defendant was ultimately issued citations for speeding, N.J.S.A. 39:4-98;

driving without a license, N.J.S.A. 39:3-10; and obstruction of windshield for

vision, N.J.S.A. 39:3-74; as well as a summons for two disorderly persons

offenses, resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1), and obstruction of

administration of justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). Trooper Lambert testified he did

                                                                             A-1301-22
                                          8
not issue a ticket for driving while intoxicated ("DWI") because an alcohol

breath test reflected a blood alcohol concentration of "double zero."

      The defense did not call any witnesses. After closing arguments, the

municipal court judge found defendant guilty of the motor vehicle violations:

speeding, driving without a driver's license, and driving with an obstructed view.

The court also found defendant guilty of resisting arrest and obstruction of

justice. As to the disorderly persons resisting arrest charge, the court found an

adequate basis for Trooper Lambert to have arrested defendant for DWI. As to

whether defendant understood the nature of the interaction to be an arrest, the

court remarked:

                  I think there are some things that are just
            universal in modern society that require no language
            understanding . . . [including] when an officer is in
            uniform is going to put you under arrest. That's pretty
            much a universal cultural understanding when an
            officer puts his hands on you with handcuffs, that you
            are under arrest.
      The court found defendant's repetition of the word "abogado," the Spanish

word for "lawyer," as well as defendant's responsiveness to some of Trooper

Lambert's instructions, indicated his understanding he was being arrested. The

municipal court judge then imposed fines and costs totaling $1,704, including a

$507 penalty for driving without a license, and $350 for each disorderly persons

                                                                            A-1301-22
                                        9
charge. Additionally, defendant's driving privileges were suspended for six

months.

      Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence for a trial de novo before

the Law Division. Defendant argued the municipal court judge's findings were

inconsistent because the court found both that Trooper Lambert's instructions to

turn around were a ploy to make defendant believe he was undergoing a fifth

field sobriety test, and that Trooper Lambert had provided sufficient warning

defendant was being placed under arrest. Defendant also argued the law should

not be interpreted to place expectations on arrestees based on gestures and

nonverbal conduct alone, as those may not be sufficient to give rise to the

knowledge an arrest is taking place. Defendant referenced federal guidelines

for law enforcement communicating with those of limited English-language

proficiency, which defendant argued were binding on New Jersey law

enforcement officers.

      Defendant also maintained the statute for resisting arrest requires a clear

announcement an arrest is taking place, and asking for an attorney should not be

found tantamount to knowledge of an arrest. In defendant's view, the State had

not proven beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of the impending arrest had been

communicated to the defendant in a manner a reasonable person in his position

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                                      10
would understand. Defendant also argued because the word "arrest" was not

audible on the video, it was not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that he heard

any announcement. Defendant also argued the maximum penalty for driving

without a license was disproportionate and imposed without making the

requisite individualized finding of aggravating and mitigating factors.

      In a written opinion rendered on November 16, 2022, with an

accompanying order, the Law Division judge upheld defendant's convictions

and sentence. The court found the record substantiated the municipal court's

findings as to defendant's sufficient understanding of the circumstances. While

the court acknowledged the recording did not capture Trooper Lambert stating,

"you are under arrest," it held defendant's "understanding of his arrest did not

have to derive solely from verbal understanding" and his understanding could

have derived from limited English understanding, body language, physical

gestures, and Trooper Lambert's actions, all which demonstrated Lambert's

intent to arrest defendant. The judge rejected defendant's reliance on State v.

Kane, 303 N.J. Super. 167, 182 (App. Div. 1997), and State v. Marquez, 202

N.J. 485, 508 (2010), as both legally and factually distinguishable , and found

the State carried its burden to prove defendant guilty of both resisting arrest and

obstructing administration of law beyond a reasonable doubt.

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                                       11
      The imposition of a $507 penalty for driving without a license was

affirmed, and consequently defendant's argument the fine was disproportionate

to the disorderly persons fines was rejected. The Law Division judge also held

the municipal court judge sufficiently placed his reasons for the sentence on the

record.

      This appeal follows with defendant making the following arguments:

            POINT I
            THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTANDS STATE
            V. KANE, 303 N.J. SUPER. 167 (APP. DIV. 1997),
            GIVEN THAT THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF
            KANE –RELATING TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT
            REQUIREMENTS FOR A CONVICTION UNDER
            [N.J.S.A.] 2C:29-2 (RESISTING ARREST)— DO
            NOT HINGE ON WHETHER THE UNDERLYING
            ARREST WAS LAWFUL OR NOT.

            POINT II
            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT
            STATE v. MARQUEZ, 202 NJ. 485 (2010) "HAS NO
            RELATION TO APPELLANT'S CASE" AND IT
            ERRED BY DISTINGUISHING MARQUEZ SOLELY
            ON THE BASIS OF MR. MARQUEZ SPEAKING NO
            ENGLISH WHATSOEVER.

            POINT III

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND
            THAT ASKING FOR AN ATTORNEY IS
            TANTAMOUNT TO HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF AN
            ARREST OF ONE'S SELF, EITHER ABOUT TO
            OCCUR OR HAVING ALREADY OCCURRED.

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                                      12
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT IMPLIED
THAT BEING A POLICE OFFICER, UNIFORMED
[AND] ON DUTY, PROVIDED A SUFFICIENT
LEGAL BASIS FOR TROOPER LAMBERT TO BE
ABLE TO ARREST [DEFENDANT] AND THEN
PUNISH HIM FOR HIS NATURAL CONFUSION &
FEARFUL REACTION.
POINT V

IN LIGHT OF THE TWO TITLE 2C CHARGES,
UNDER A TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED
OUT OF HAND THE RELEVANCE OF
[DEFENDANT] NOT HAVING BEEN CHARGED
WITH DUI AS A RESULT OF HIS WARRANTLESS
ARREST IN OCTOBER 2019.

POINT VI

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR
BY UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS, REACHED
BELOW, THAT AN "ARREST BY IMPLICATION"
(VIA PHYSICAL PRESENCE AND NON-VERBAL
ACTIONS) IS SUFFICIENT FOR A CONVICTION
TO LIE UNDER [N.J.S.A.] 2C:29-l(a) [AND]
2C:29-2(a)(l), THAT IS: THE RESISTING ARREST
& OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE STATUTES.

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY FOUND THAT
[DEFENDANT] HAS ARGUED THAT HE
"UNDERSTOOD NOTHING" SAID TO HIM IN
ENGLISH, WHEN IN FACT HE HAS ARGUED HE
IS "LEP" (= LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENT).

                                               A-1301-22
                    13
            POINT VIII
            [DEFENDANT] REITERATES THAT MAXIMUM
            PENALTIES COULD NOT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED
            ON HIM FOR VIOLATING [N.J.S.A.] 39:3-10
            WITHOUT AN INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENT,
            AND ARGUES THE LAW DIVISION COMMITTED
            GROSS LEGAL ERROR BY CLAIMING THAT
            "BEING CONVICTED" WAS BASIS ENOUGH FOR
            SENTENCING [DEFENDANT] TO A SUSPENSION
            OF PRIVILEGES AND MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE
            FINE.

                                        II.

      Appellate review of a de novo conviction in the Law Division, following

a municipal court appeal, is "exceedingly narrow." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J.

463, 470 (1999). We "focus[] on whether there is 'sufficient credible evidence

. . . in the record' to support the trial court's findings." State v. Robertson, 228

N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). Under

the "two-court rule," we "ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent

findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent

a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." Id. at 148 (quoting Locurto,

157 N.J. at 474). This deferential standard applies to a trial court's fact-finding

based on video evidence. State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 272 (2019).

      Appellate review of a sentencing court's determination is guided by an

abuse of discretion standard.     State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 272 (2021). Such

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                                        14
deference applies so long as "the trial judge follows the Code and the basic

precepts that channel sentencing discretion." State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425,

453 (2020) (quoting State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)).

                                        A.

      Defendant argues his respective convictions of resisting arrest and

obstruction of justice were improper due to the Law Division's misapplication

of Kane, 303 N.J. Super. at 167, and State v. Branch, 301 N.J. Super. 307 (App.

Div. 1997). Defendant first posits under Kane, law enforcement officers must

verbally announce their intent to arrest prior to an arrest for a conviction for

resisting arrest to stand. In defendant's view, the State had not proven beyond a

reasonable doubt the fact of the impending arrest had been communicated to

defendant in a manner a reasonable person would understand.

      The resisting arrest statute provides, "Except as provided in paragraph (3)

[detailing the bases for a third-degree offense], a person is guilty of a disorderly

persons offense if he purposely prevents or attempts to prevent a law

enforcement officer from effecting an arrest." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1) (emphasis

added).   After delineating the different levels of this offense, the statute

continues, "It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the law

enforcement officer was acting unlawfully in making the arrest, provided he was

                                                                              A-1301-22
                                        15
acting under the color of his official authority and provided the law enforcement

officer announces his intention to arrest prior to the resistance."      N.J.S.A.

2C:29-2(a) (emphases added).

      A conviction for obstructing administration of law also requires the State

to prove a defendant acted purposely:

            A person commits an offense if he purposely obstructs,
            impairs or perverts the administration of law or other
            governmental function or prevents or attempts to
            prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an
            official function by means of flight, intimidation, force,
            violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by
            means of any independently unlawful act.

            [N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 (a) (emphasis added).]

This level of culpability is defined as follows:

            A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of
            his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious
            object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause
            such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to
            attendant circumstances if he is aware of the existence
            of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they
            exist.
            [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1) (emphasis added).]

      In Kane, a man attended an official Congressional hearing being held in

Manville. 303 N.J. Super. at 169. After he repeatedly attempted to address the

committee chair from the crowd, "four or five policemen who were in attendance

to maintain order seized [Kane], carried him out, handcuffed him, and took him

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                                        16
to police headquarters where he was charged." Id. at 169-70. In municipal

court, an officer testified he "advised [the defendant] he was under arrest,"

although Kane denied any officer said anything to him before removing him. Id.

at 170-71. The municipal court judge found that after ignoring the police

officers' instructions, "defendant was effectively put under arrest." Id. at 171.

The case was tried de novo before a Law Division judge who reviewed video

footage of the meeting. The judge found the committee chair "told the police to

'escort the defendant out'" which was sufficient notice of the defendant's

impending arrest. Id. at 172.

      On appeal, we reversed, finding the recordings and the officers' testimony

reflected only a short interval of time in which the defendant could have been

notified of his impending arrest. Id. at 175. We were "convinced that not all of

the warnings and the notification of arrest described by police officers could

have been given to defendant." Id. at 175-76. This led us to conclude the State

failed to prove the advance warning beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 176.

Because the arrest was found to be unlawful, a conviction for resisting required

the State to prove both the announcement and that the officers were acting under

the color of their official authority. Id. at 182. The conviction was therefore

reversed. Ibid.

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      By the plain meaning of the statute, the announcement requirement is not

an element of the crime of resisting arrest that the State must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt in all cases. Rather, the State's failure to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt the announcement requirement was satisfied will provide a

standalone basis for the reversal of a conviction only where the arrest itself was

unlawful. Unlike in Kane, the arrest in this case is undisputed as lawful.

Therefore, the defense of unlawful arrest is not available to defendant, and so

whether the State proved a verbal announcement is not relevant to the analysis

of the particular facts of this case.

                                        B.

      Even though the announcement requirement is inapplicable to defendant's

lawful arrest, the State nonetheless bore the burden to show defendant acted

purposely, which necessarily includes proving beyond a reasonable doubt he

understood the attendant circumstances. The ability of an officers' words and

actions to impart that understanding, such that resisting the arrest could be

proven purposeful, has been explored by our courts.

      In Branch, a plainclothes officer identified himself as police and told the

defendant to stop, but the defendant fled. 301 N.J. Super. at 321. The defendant

was tackled and was being placed under arrest when he resisted and pulled a

                                                                            A-1301-22
                                        18
weapon on the officer. Ibid. Branch challenged his conviction under N.J.S.A.

2C:29-2(a) because the detective did not specifically state, "You're under

arrest."3 Ibid. We rejected the failure to announce as a categorical bar to the

finding of the requisite mens rea, stating it "would only be one factor to be

considered in the overall sequence of events leading to the arrest." Ibid.

      In State v. Ambroselli, the defendant was found walking through a

neighborhood with torn clothing and bleeding profusely from a head wound.

356 N.J. Super. 377, 381 (App. Div. 2003). When an officer attempted to speak

with him, the defendant swung at her and fled, and then swung at the other

officers she called for backup. Id. at 381-82. The officers subdued the defendant

with pepper spray and handcuffed him but did not specifically inform him he

was being placed under arrest. Id. at 382. The defendant was charged with both

aggravated    assault   and   third-degree   resisting   arrest   under   N.J.S.A.

2C:29-2(a)(3), both offenses requiring the defendant to have acted purposely.

Id. at 383.

      During the jury charge, the judge initially read language closely mirroring

the definition of "purpose" under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1), but then "added his own

3
  This was argued not under the announcement requirement, but to attack the
State's proof of a purposeful mens rea. 301 N.J. Super. at 321.
                                                                             A-1301-22
                                      19
gloss on the definition: 'And again, this is not written in the law but you can

consider the definition of purposeful and maybe the contrary definition of by

accident.'" Id. at 385. We overturned the conviction in Ambroselli based on

these "fatally flawed" charges on the requisite mental state. Id. at 386. Given

the defendant's debilitated physical condition and considerable blood loss at the

time of the arrest, the possibility of jury confusion over whether the defendant's

mental state satisfied the requisite purpose mandated reversal of the convictions.

Id. at 388.

      Here, both the municipal and trial courts found even without clear

evidence of a formal verbal announcement, defendant's responsiveness to some

of Trooper Lambert's English-language requests, as well as context clues and

signals, provided sufficient proof defendant understood an arrest was taking

place, and that he was guilty of resisting that arrest. Both courts also found

defendant's resistance to being placed in the patrol car, well after being placed

in handcuffs, supported his conviction of obstruction beyond a reasonable doubt.

      Defendant's understanding "with respect to attendant circumstances,"

necessary for a finding of purposeful mens rea, could only be derived from

contextual clues.    N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1) (emphasis added).          Essentially,

defendant argues he was mistaken about the facts of the attendant circumstances.

                                                                            A-1301-22
                                       20
A mistake as to a matter of fact, such as whether an arrest is taking place, can

serve as a defense if it "negatives the culpable mental state required to establish

the offense[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:2-4(a)(1). "[E]ven an 'unreasonable' mistake, i.e.,

negligence, may negate the mental state required for criminal liability when . . .

purpose[] is required for conviction[.]" State v. Wickliff, 378 N.J. Super. 328,

334-35 (App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Sexton, 160 N.J. 93, 105-07 (1999)).

      Given the testimony and video evidence, the State could not prove beyond

a reasonable doubt at the point in the interaction when defendant turned to face

Trooper Lambert and broke the grip, his manifest purpose was to resist arrest.

The video evidence and audio recording capture defendant repeatedly telling

Trooper Lambert he did not understand his instructions during the sobriety tests.

When asked, "[d]id [d]efendant know you were placing him under arrest?"

Trooper Lambert replied, "That's unknown. That's up to [him]."            Trooper

Lambert acknowledged he told defendant to turn around under the stated pretext

that he was conducting another field sobriety test.          The video captures

defendant's apparent lack of understanding when Trooper Lambert grabbed

defendant's hands while defendant was faced away from Trooper Lambert and

then he turned to Trooper Lambert and asked "Qué pasó?" ("What happened?").

The audio and video evidence reflect the unbuttoning of Trooper Lambert's

                                                                             A-1301-22
                                       21
handcuffs after defendant broke the attempted grip, was turned back around,

placed on the hood of the car by Trooper Lambert, and after his hands were

restrained behind his back.

      However, after Trooper Lambert handcuffed defendant, walked him

towards his police car, and opened the back door, there would be no similar

doubt as to defendant's understanding of the circumstances at that later point in

time. By the time of the interactions at the patrol car between defendant, the

passenger, and Trooper Lambert, defendant had been in handcuffs for over five

minutes. It is not reasonable to find he mistakenly believed he was not being

arrested at that point. Both lower courts credited Trooper Lambert's unrebutted

testimony concerning defendant's movements and the shaking of the dashcam

video as evidence defendant physically resisted being placed in the patrol car.

As succinctly stated by the Law Division judge, "[defendant's] conduct . . .

physically resisting the officer's efforts to place him in the patrol car . . . support

[defendant's] conviction beyond a reasonable doubt." Defendant's appellate

brief also concedes, "[i]t is undisputed that there was a physical scuffle between

Trooper Lambert and [defendant] around the time that both men had reached the

trooper's patrol car." As such, while the resisting arrest charge was not proven

                                                                                A-1301-22
                                         22
beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction for obstruction was, by evidence of

his subsequent attempt to avoid being placed in the patrol car.

                                         C.

      Defendant next argues the Law Division erred by declining to apply

Marquez, 202 N.J. at 508, which concerned a defendant's ability to understand

the statutorily mandated consequences of refusing to submit to an alcohol breath

test, to charges of resisting arrest and obstruction. In Marquez, the defendant

was arrested for DWI.      Id. at 489.    The defendant spoke no English and

confirmed that to the arresting officer, who nonetheless read an extensive

statement, written in English and detailing the consequences of refusing to

submit to an alcohol breath test. Ibid. At trial, the State did not dispute the

defendant's lack of understanding.       Id. at 490.   He was convicted both in

municipal court and on de novo review at the Law Division for refusing to

submit to the test under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4(a), and we affirmed. Ibid.

      Our Supreme Court reversed, finding both the refusal statue and the

implied consent statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2, "require proof that law enforcement

officials inform motorists of the consequences of refusal by conveying

information in a language the person speaks or understands . . . ." Ibid. This

conclusion rested on an analysis of the legislative intent behind both statutes and

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the plain meaning of "inform."       Id. at 499-500 and 506-07.        The Court

summarized the refusal statute as a requirement for officers to request drivers to

submit to a test and the implied consent statute as guiding officers on how to

make that request. Id. at 501.

      The Court determined when the statutes are read together, a conviction

requires the officer to both request the test and inform the defendant of

consequences of refusal. Id. at 503. The directive that officers "inform" meant

"they must convey information in a language the person speaks or understands."

Id. at 507. Even though the conviction was reversed, the Court cautioned the

statutes should not be read to require the State prove a defendant's subjective

understanding of the warnings, only whether the defendant was "properly

informed in a language they speak or understand . . . ." Id. at 513.

      Defendant argues the same concerns animating Marquez "should be

extended to non-exigent situations in which a Spanish-speaking individual is

about to be placed under warrantless arrest."          The Court in Marquez

acknowledged where motorists did not speak English, "some other effort must

be made" to inform them of the consequences of refusal to submit to an alcohol

breath test, but it deferred to the Motor Vehicle Commission "to fashion a proper

remedy with the assistance of the Attorney General." 202 N.J. at 510-11. See

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also State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 503 (1995) (encouraging the Attorney General

to develop bilingual Miranda warnings).

      Unlike the informed consent and refusal statutes at issue in Marquez, the

resisting arrest and obstruction statutes do not place affirmative duties on police

officers, except in the case of the "announcement requirement," which as we

discussed above, applies only to unlawful arrests. Additionally, as we have

previously recognized, arrests are fluid in nature, and detentions often pose

safety risks. See, e.g., State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 411 (2015) (recognizing, in

the context of obtaining telephonic warrants, concerns about the "safety of

police officers and a car's driver and occupants detained on the side of a heavily

traveled highway or road"). It would be unreasonable to do what defendant

suggests and broaden the holding in Marquez to all roadside detentions. The

Supreme Court has not imposed such an obligation in its case law. See Witt,

223 N.J. at 414-15 (complicated exigent-circumstances tests "do[] not provide

greater liberty or security to New Jersey's citizens and . . . place[] on law

enforcement unrealistic and impracticable burdens" where officers are handling

"fast-moving and evolving events that require prompt action").

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                                          III.

      Finally, defendant renews his prior challenges to his sentencing, namely

(1) the court violated proportionality by imposing a fine for a traffic offense

higher than the fine for each of the disorderly persons charges; (2) the court

failed to give adequate reasons on the record for the sentence under N.J.S.A.

39:3-10 because State v. Moran, 202 N.J. 311, 328-29 (2010), required the court

to consider a number of factors before imposing the maximum punishment; and

(3) the court should have dismissed the minor charges and merged the resisting

arrest charge with the obstruction of justice charge.

      Fines levied for convictions of disorderly persons offenses are statutorily

capped at $1,000. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3. The fine for driving without a license is

also statutorily prescribed.     N.J.S.A. 39:5-31.      Where the Legislature has

prescribed penalties, "courts will not interfere . . . unless it is so clearly arbitrary

and without rational relation to the offense or so disproportionate to the offense

as to transgress the Federal and State constitutional prohibitions against

excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202,

211 (1971) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VIII; N.J. Const. art. I, § 12). No such

showing of excessive or cruel punishment is made here, and so defendant's

proportionality argument as to the monetary fines must fail.

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      Defendant's challenge to the suspension of his driving privileges

misapprehends the statutory scheme applied by the court.            Authority and

procedure for a court's revocation of driving privileges comes from multiple

sources: the Criminal Code, the Motor Vehicle Code and case law construing

it, and for convictions for driving without a license, the specific provision of the

Motor Vehicle Code found in N.J.S.A. 39:3-10(u).

      N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(c) authorizes the court to suspend the driving privileges

of a person convicted of a disorderly persons offense "in the course of which a

motor vehicle was used." The court is required to "consider the circumstances

of the violation, and whether the loss of driving privileges will result in extreme

hardship and alternative means of transportation are not readily available."

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(c). The court is also required to "state on the record the

reasons for imposing the sentence" as well as its findings related to any

aggravating and mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 to -3, which applies

to impositions of terms of imprisonment or probation as well as fines levied in

addition to sentences of imprisonment or probation. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(e).

      Separately, N.J.S.A. 39:5-31 permits the court to revoke a person's driver's

license "where such person shall have been guilty of such willful violation of

any of the provisions of [the Motor Vehicle Code] as shall, in the discretion of

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the magistrate, justify such revocation."      In Moran, our Supreme Court

addressed the meaning of "willful violation" in the context of a conviction under

N.J.S.A. 39:4-96, the reckless-driving statute. 202 N.J. at 324. The Court

distinguished willful violations from other violations as "a matter of degree" to

"ensure that municipal court judges invoke N.J.S.A. 39:5-31 only in . . . cases

that present aggravating circumstances." Ibid. The Court issued a directive to

municipal and Law Division judges to consider the following factors before

imposing a license suspension:

            the nature and circumstances of the defendant's
            conduct, including whether the conduct posed a high
            risk of danger to the public or caused physical harm or
            property damage; the defendant's driving record,
            including the defendant's age and length of time as a
            licensed driver, and the number, seriousness, and
            frequency of prior infractions; whether the defendant
            was infraction-free for a substantial period before the
            most recent violation or whether the nature and extent
            of the defendant's driving record indicates that there is
            a substantial risk that he or she will commit another
            violation; whether the character and attitude of the
            defendant indicate that he or she is likely or unlikely to
            commit another violation; whether the defendant's
            conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to
            recur; whether a license suspension would cause
            excessive hardship to the defendant and/or
            [dependents]; and the need for personal deterrence.

            [Id. at 328-29.]

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      Additionally, the Court mandated the judge "articulate the reasons for

imposing a period of license suspension" as "a further safeguard against

arbitrariness in sentencing." Id. at 329 (citing State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 122

(1987)).

      Finally, N.J.S.A. 39:3-10(u) describes the appropriate penalties for

driving without a license, stating:

            A person violating this section shall be subject to a fine
            not exceeding $500 or imprisonment in the county jail
            for not more than [sixty] days, but if that person has
            never been licensed to drive in this State or any other
            jurisdiction, the applicant shall be subject to a fine of
            not less than $200 and, in addition, the court shall issue
            an order to the commission requiring the commission
            to refuse to issue a license to operate a motor vehicle to
            the person for a period of not less than 180 days.

      Defendant argues the court was required to find aggravating and

mitigating factors prior to imposing a six-month suspension of his driving

privileges and the maximum statutory fine. Defendant relies on Moran to

support his contention. Defendant's argument conflates suspensions imposed

under the Criminal Code with those imposed under the Motor Vehicle Code.

Although defendant was ultimately convicted of disorderly-persons offenses, it

could not fairly be said that "a motor vehicle was used" when he purportedly

resisted arrest or obstructed justice simply because these offenses were

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committed after a roadside detention. Further, no imprisonment, probation, or

fine in connection with imprisonment or probation was at issue, so an assessment

of aggravating and mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 to -3 was not

required.

      Rather, the suspension was issued in connection with defendant's proven

violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, which included N.J.S.A. 39:3-10. If the

court had revoked defendant's privileges based only on the speeding or

obstructed view violations, then the court would have been required to make the

individualized finding using the factors in Moran to determine whether

defendant committed "willful violations." However, because defendant was also

convicted under N.J.S.A. 39:3-10, and because there was no evidence he had

ever been a licensed driver in any jurisdiction, a fine in excess of $200 and a

six-month suspension was statutorily mandated by N.J.S.A. 39:3-10(u).

      Therefore, even though an individualized Moran analysis normally applies

to any suspension imposed because of a motor vehicle violation, in this case, the

six-month suspension was a statutorily mandated outcome.           Further, this

suspension would have lapsed even before the trial de novo before the Law

Division, and so defendant's challenge is moot. To the extent defendant is only

challenging the monetary penalty levied, a Moran analysis applies only to the

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suspension, not the imposition of a monetary penalty. The $507 fine levied was

properly greater than the $200 minimum.

      Our careful review of the record reveals defendant's remaining arguments

lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

We therefore vacate the conviction and sentence for resisting arrest, N.J.S.A.

2C:29-2(a), and affirm the convictions and sentences for speeding, N.J.S.A.

39:4-38; driving without a license, N.J.S.A. 39:3-10; and obstruction of

windshield for vision, N.J.S.A. 39:3-74; as well as the summons for disorderly

persons obstruction of administration of justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).

      Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for modification of the

judgment of conviction. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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