Court Opinion

ID: 9382050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 18:02:56.703744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.770001
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/24/23 P. v. Cedillo CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H049841
                                                                    (Monterey County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. SS981662B)

             v.

 DANIEL ADRIAN CEDILLO,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                I. INTRODUCTION
         In 1999, a jury convicted defendant Daniel Adrian Cedillo of second degree
murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (b)).1 The jury found true the following
enhancement allegations: that defendant committed the crime for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with, a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); that
defendant was a principal in the above offense and that in the commission of the offense,
at least one principal intentionally and personally discharged and personally used a
firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); and that a
principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced
defendant to prison for 40 years to life, but that sentence was later reduced to 16 years to
life as the result of two enhancements being struck.

         1   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
       Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his two former section 1170.95
(now § 1172.6) petitions to have his murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced.
The trial court denied defendant’s petitions. In response to defendant’s first petition, the
trial court found that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief. In denying defendant’s second petition, the trial court simply referred to the
court’s denial of defendant’s first petition. The denial of defendant’s second petition
was issued by a different judge than the judge who denied defendant’s first petition.
Defendant contends that he made a prima facie showing because under recent changes
to the law, aiders and abettors can no longer be convicted of second degree murder based
on implied malice. For reasons that we will explain, we reverse the trial court’s denial
of defendant’s second petition and direct the trial court to consider whether defendant’s
most recent petition under section 1172.6 establishes a prima facie case for relief.
               II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. Factual Background2
       Defendant and other men had a history of causing trouble at a bar in Chualar. On
March 23, 1998, Ignacio Valencia, who co-owned the bar with his wife, went out to
investigate a situation in the bar’s parking lot. Valencia found defendant sitting in a car
with the door open, with two other men nearby. Valencia asked defendant what he was
doing in the car, and defendant responded by calling Valencia names. They began to
argue, and Valencia approached defendant in a threatening manner. Valencia’s wife told

       2 This factual background is a summary of the facts stated in this court’s opinion
in defendant’s direct appeal, case No. H020064. The initial portion of the procedural
background section is also taken from that opinion. A Court of Appeal opinion, whether
or not published, is part of the record of conviction and is properly considered in
determining whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief
under section 1172.6. (People v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 333, overruled in
part on another ground by People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961 (Lewis).) On
December 8, 2022, this court granted the Attorney General’s request to take judicial
notice of our prior opinion.

                                              2
defendant and the other men to leave, but they did not. Valencia then drew a gun and
fired into the air, causing the three men to scatter. As the men left, Valencia’s wife heard
one of the men, Michael Palacio, say in Spanish that Valencia had “bought his death.”
       Valencia then drove to his nearby home, where four of his wife’s children were
present. A few minutes later, one of the children heard gunshots, with one of the shots
entering the house. When the child looked out the window, she saw Valencia lying on
the ground. One of the children then called law enforcement. Sheriff’s deputies who
responded heard shots from what sounded like a .22-caliber automatic weapon, then a
couple of shots from a larger caliber firearm, and then more .22-caliber shots. The
deputies arrived on the scene and saw some men running, including Palacio (whom a
deputy recognized). Deputies also arrested defendant and a third man. A deputy who
responded to Valencia’s residence found Valencia lying face down. Valencia later died
from multiple gunshot wounds. Deputies found a pistol underneath Valencia’s body and
spent casings nearby, and they found a pair of gloves, a .22-caliber rifle, and spent shell
casings across the street from Valencia’s residence. Palacio’s fingerprints were on the
rifle, and some of the casings had been fired from it. Deputies found gang paraphernalia
during a search of Palacio’s home.
       While defendant was in county jail awaiting trial, he had a conversation with a
visitor over the jail’s intercom that was surreptitiously recorded. When the visitor told
defendant that she wanted to be a bartender, defendant responded, “Babe, I killed the bar
owner. Don’t do bartending.”
       At trial, an expert on criminal street gangs in the area testified that he believed
Palacio and defendant belonged to a gang called “Varrio Ghost Town,” and that
Valencia’s killing was committed for the benefit of the gang.
       B. Procedural Background
       Defendant and Palacio were tried together, charged by information with murder.
(§ 187, subd. (a).) The information also alleged enhancements concerning firearm and

                                              3
criminal street gang activity. The jury convicted Palacio of first degree murder and
convicted defendant of second degree murder, and it found the enhancement allegations
against both defendants true. The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life for
the murder, and a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life for a firearm enhancement, for
a total sentence of 40 years to life. The trial court stayed the sentence imposed on
defendant for the other enhancements.
       Defendant and Palacio appealed. (People v. Palacio (Jul. 20, 2001, H020064)
[nonpub. opn.].) One of the issues defendant raised was that there was insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for second degree murder. Defendant asserted that he
was convicted as an aider and abettor of the murder, and there was no evidence that he
shared Palacio’s intent to kill Valencia or that he performed an act to encourage or
facilitate Palacio’s crime. This court found the evidence supported defendant’s
conviction. (Id. at pp. 15-16.) This court also struck the criminal street gang and
discharging a firearm enhancements for both defendants, and it ordered that both
defendants receive additional presentence custody credit. (Id. at p. 19.) On remand, the
trial court imposed a previously stayed firearm enhancement and sentenced defendant to
prison for 16 years to life.
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) took effect on
January 1, 2019, imposing a number of “statutory changes to more equitably sentence
offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 1, subd. (b).) Senate Bill 1437 added section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6), which provided
an avenue for a person convicted in cases involving felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine to file a petition with the sentencing court to
vacate the conviction and to be resentenced.
       Defendant filed a petition under former section 1170.95 in January 2019, asserting
that he could no longer be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes
made to sections 188 and 189. The prosecutor opposed the petition, asserting that

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defendant was not convicted under a theory of felony murder or based on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, and thus he was not entitled to relief. The trial
court then heard argument on the petition. Defense counsel stated as follows:
“Unfortunately, . . . there really, to me, is not any evidence in the record of either a direct
and natural consequences theory. It wasn’t argued at the trial level. [¶] And so -- and I
agree with the prosecution that there has been no change to the aider and abettor
instruction.” The trial court asked defense counsel whether he was conceding the matter,
and defense counsel replied that he was merely submitting the petition for the court’s
consideration, stating, “I think that my client still holds out some sort of hope that he
somehow fits within, you know, the code section . . . .”
       The trial court denied defendant’s petition in May 2019. The trial court ruled that
defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that he fell within the provisions of
former section 1170.95, finding that defendant was not convicted und er the felony-
murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and defendant failed to
establish that he could not presently be convicted of murder.
       Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature codified further changes concerning
murder law and imputed malice.3 Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 775) further amended what is now section 1172.6, providing expanded opportunities
for certain persons to seek relief under this section, along with other changes. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
       Defendant filed another petition in January 2022, soon after these changes took
effect. The trial court denied the second petition on February 8, 2022. The trial court’s

       3 One of these changes was to amend what is now section 1172.6, subdivision (a)
to provide, in part, that a person convicted of “murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine . . . , attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or manslaughter” may file a petition for relief. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 551, § 2.) This legislative change came after the California Supreme Court’s holding
in People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 166 that the natural and probable consequences
doctrine cannot support a conviction for first degree premeditated murder.

                                               5
ruling, which was issued by a different judge than the judge who denied defendant’s
first petition, stated that the earlier judge “denied Petitioner’s Petition for Resentencing
pursuant to [Penal Code] section 1170.95. Accordingly, the Court respectfully declines
to take further action on the [Penal Code section] 1170.95 petition filed on January 10,
2022.” This appeal followed.4
                                     III. DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his petitions without
issuing an order to show cause and conducting an evidentiary hearing. He does not
assert that he was convicted under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Instead, he argues that he was convicted as a direct aider and
abettor to Palacio’s murder of Valencia, and that an aider and abettor who acts with
implied malice cannot be convicted of second degree murder under recent changes to
sections 188 and 189. We do not reach the merits of defendant’s argument because we
find that the trial court erred by not considering the merits of defendant’s second petition
for relief under section 1172.6.
       A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       Whether the trial court properly denies a section 1172.6 petition based on failure
to make a prima facie case for relief involves multiple standards of review. We review

       4  Defendant initially appealed based on the trial court’s denial of his second
petition for relief. He then moved this court for permission to file an untimely notice of
appeal regarding the denial of his first petition for relief. This court granted the motion.
Defendant then filed an amended notice of appeal covering the denial of his first petition
for relief. While defendant’s amended notice of appeal only specifies that he is appealing
the denial of his first petition, the denial of the second petition was the subject of
defendant’s original notice of appeal, defendant’s motion referenced both petitions, and
his brief argues that he is entitled to relief under Senate Bill 775, which was not yet
effective at the time of defendant’s first petition for relief. We therefore interpret
defendant’s amended notice to encompass the denial of his second petition. Because we
grant defendant relief concerning his second petition, defendant’s appeal concerning his
first petition is moot, as his second petition seeks the same relief as his first petition.

                                              6
the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and the court’s application of the law
to those facts de novo. (See People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 981
(Drayton), overruled in part on another ground in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-
970.) Where an appellate court reviews a trial court’s summary denial of a petition for
relief under section 1172.6 and that denial was based on interpretation of the statute, our
review is de novo. (Drayton, supra, at p. 981.)
       Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
(§ 187, subd. (a).) The malice necessary for a killing to constitute murder comes in
two forms, express or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) “Malice is express when there is
manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature.”
(Id., subd. (a)(1).) “Malice is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or
when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.”
(Id., subd. (a)(2).) “The primary difference between express malice and implied malice
is that the former requires an intent to kill but the latter does not.” (People v. Soto (2018)
4 Cal.5th 968, 976.) “Implied malice has ‘ “both a physical and a mental component.
The physical component is satisfied by the performance of ‘an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life.’ . . . The mental component is the
requirement that the defendant ‘knows that his conduct endangers the life of another
and . . . acts with a conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Johns (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 46, 57 (Johns).)
       Prior to Senate Bill 1437’s amendments, the felony-murder rule and the natural
and probable consequences doctrine provided avenues to prove murder without
demonstrating malice (express or implied). “The felony-murder rule made ‘a killing
while committing certain felonies murder without the necessity of further examining
the defendant’s mental state.’ [Citation.] . . . The natural and probable consequences
doctrine made ‘a person who aids and abets a confederate in the commission of a
criminal act . . . liable not only for that crime (the target crime), but also for any other

                                               7
offense (nontarget crime) [including murder] committed by the confederate as a
“natural and probable consequence” of the crime originally aided and abetted.’
[Citation.]” (Johns, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 57-58.) Thus, before Senate Bill 1437,
“the natural and probable consequences doctrine constituted an exception to the
requirement of either express or implied malice for a murder conviction. [Citation.]
Now, since the amendment, the natural and probable consequences d octrine can no
longer support a murder conviction, but the change did not ‘alter the law regarding the
criminal liability of direct aiders and abettors of murder . . . . One who directly aids
and abets another who commits murder is thus liable for murder under the new law just
as he or she was liable under the old law.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Vargas (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 943, 953, fn. omitted.)
       In People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 (Gentile), the California
Supreme Court summarized the changes effected by Senate Bill 1437 as follows:
       “Senate Bill 1437 ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.’ [Citation.]
       “To further that purpose, Senate Bill 1437 added three separate provisions to the
Penal Code. First, to amend the felony-murder rule, Senate Bill 1437 added section 189,
subdivision (e): ‘A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
[qualifying felonies] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the
following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was
not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder
in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony

                                              8
and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.’ . . .
       “Second, to amend the natural and probable consequences doctrine, Senate
Bill 1437 added section 188, subdivision (a)(3) . . . : ‘Except [for felony-murder liability]
as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal
in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’
       “Third, Senate Bill 1437 added section 1170.95 to provide a procedure for those
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to seek relief under the two ameliorative provisions above.”
       The Legislature later imposed further changes through Senate Bill 775,
effective January 1, 2022. The legislative declarations stated that Senate Bill 775:
(1) “[c]larifie[d] that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter
under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] probable consequences doctrine
are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder under the same
theories”; (2) codified the holdings of Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961-970 regarding
“petitioners’ right to counsel and the standard for determining the existence of a prima
facie case”; (3) “[r]eaffirm[ed] that the proper burden of proof at a resentencing hearing
under this section is proof beyond a reasonable doubt”; and (4) “[a]ddresse[d] what
evidence a court may consider at a resentencing hearing . . . .” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.)
Senate Bill 775 also amended what is now section 1172.6, stating that in addition to those
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, a person convicted under any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” can file a petition for relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) Senate Bill 775 also
specified that following submission of briefs on a petition for relief, the trial court

                                               9
“shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima face case for
relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
       In considering a petition for resentencing, the trial court must first decide whether
the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6., subd. (c).) “While the
trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of counsel to
determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for [former] section 1170.95
relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima
facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner
would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the
petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own
documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the
court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’
[Citations.]” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “[T]he prima facie showing the
defendant must make is that he [or she] did not, in fact, act or harbor the mental state
required[] for a murder conviction under current law.” (People v. Duchine (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815.)
       B. Analysis
       During the hearing regarding defendant’s first petition, defense counsel
acknowledged that defendant was not prosecuted under the felony-murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, which were the only bases specified under
former section 1170.95 to seek relief. Thus, defense counsel merely rested on the
petition as submitted. The trial court denied the petition, finding that defendant was not
convicted under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences

                                              10
doctrine, and that defendant failed to show that he could not be convicted of first or
second degree murder under changes to sections 188 or 189.
       By the time of defendant’s second petition, the changes made by Senate Bill 775
had taken effect. Defendant did not allege in his second petition how he could establish
a prima facie case for relief, but the form petition he submitted did assert that he met all
of the statute’s requirements, as amended by Senate Bill 775. Unlike with defendant’s
first petition, the record provides no indication that the trial court received the written
positions of the parties, heard argument on defendant’s second petition for relief, or
stated an independent conclusion as to whether defendant made a prima facie case for
entitlement to relief. The court’s order, issued by a different judge than the judge who
denied defendant’s first petition, merely referenced the court’s denial of defendant’s first
petition, stating that the court “respectfully declines to take further action on” d efendant’s
January 2022 petition.
       Defendant asserts on appeal that he could not presently be convicted of murder
because as an aider and abettor to Valencia’s murder, he could only be convicted upon
a finding of express malice, not implied malice. He argues: “After Senate Bill
Number 1437, murder is the only possible target crime for a defendant accused of aiding
and abetting a murder. Differently put, a defendant charged as an aider and abettor to
murder must act with ‘the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s commission
of [murder].’ [Citation.] It follows that he [or she] must intend to kill -- for one cannot
intend to facilitate a murder without intent to kill.” As defendant acknowledges, “a series
of recent cases” have held the opposite—that a person can be convicted for aiding and
abetting murder based on implied malice. (See Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850
[“[N]otwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and probable consequences
liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to
aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his
or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life”];

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People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 711 (Powell) [“[T]here is no authority for
the proposition that an aider and abettor of second degree implied malice murder must
intend to kill”]; People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 377, 391 [“[D]irect aiding
and abetting implied malice murder remains a valid form of murder liability, because a
person convicted of aiding and abetting implied malice murder is not a person convicted
of murder pursuant to a theory under which malice is imputed based solely on the
person’s participation in a crime”]; People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 979
(Langi) [“Current law thus provides that the actual killer, or a direct aider and abettor of
the killing who knew that his (or her) conduct endangered the life of another and acted
with conscious disregard for life, may be guilty of second degree murder”]; People v.
Superior Court (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 499 [reading Gentile to mean “that an aider
and abettor who acts with implied malice can be guilty of murder entirely apart from the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” and that “Powell is entirely consistent with
Gentile in basing murder liability on the aider and abettor’s own state of mind —
conscious disregard for life.”].)
       Defendant argues that the Supreme Court’s statements in Gentile amount to
unpersuasive dicta, and that the Court of Appeal opinions listed above were wrongly
decided. However, the trial court failed to conduct an independent review of defendant’s
second petition for relief, so this argument could not be developed at the trial court to
determine whether an order to show cause and an evidentiary hearing were necessary,
based on the facts of defendant’s case. The court’s ruling stated that it “decline[d] to
take further action” on defendant’s second petition, referencing its order in response to
defendant’s first petition. This indicates that the trial court did not consider the merits
of the second petition. The record provides no indication that the trial court obtained a
response from the prosecutor and permitted defendant to file a reply to the prosecution’s
response, as specified by section 1172.6, subdivision (c). Likewise, the record does not
indicate that the trial court “h[e]ld a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has

                                              12
made a prima facie case for relief,” as specified by this same section. Nothing in
section 1172.6 indicates that a defendant cannot file a second petition for relief under
this section following a change in the law that affords greater opportunities for seeking
relief.
          The trial court was required to consider the merits of defendant’s second petition
for relief and independently determine whether defendant could make a prima facie case
for relief under section 1172.6, as amended by Senate Bill 775. At the hearing on
defendant’s first petition, his counsel acknowledged that defendant was not convicted
under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and
thus defendant was unlikely to be able to obtain relief under the amendments of Senate
Bill 1437. However, by the time of defendant’s second petition, the law had changed
and relief was not limited just to persons convicted under the felony-murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Defendant alleged in his second petition
that under the amended law, he was eligible for relief, and the trial court was required
to consider anew whether petitioner made a prima facie case for relief, utilizing the
revised requirements for making the prima facie determination. If the trial court
determined defendant made a prima facie case, it was required to issue an order to show
cause. If the trial court determined defendant did not make a prima facie case, the trial
court was required to “provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Either way, this court does not have the benefit of the trial court’s
determination of defendant’s entitlement to relief under his second petition, incorporating
the revisions implemented by Senate Bill 775.
          In two of the cases that have held that second degree implied malice murder
remains a valid theory of culpability for aiders and abettors, the courts have found that
the standard aiding and abetting instruction incorrectly explains the direct aider and
abettor’s requisite mens rea. (See Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714 [finding that
the standard aiding and abetting jury instruction allowed a jury to convict an aider and

                                               13
abettor without requiring the jury to find that the defendant acted with the requisite
mens rea under recent amendments, but finding the error harmless]; Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 980-984 [noting the same issue with the standard aiding and
abetting instruction and finding the trial court erred by deciding at the prima facie stage
that the instructional error was harmless].) In his opening brief on appeal in this court,
defendant did not specifically note this issue concerning the standard aiding and
abetting instruction. The Attorney General’s brief in response quoted the aiding and
abetting instruction, arguing that the jury’s instructions, including the aiding and
abetting instruction, helped ensure defendant was not convicted under a theory of
imputed malice. Defendant’s reply brief then took up the issue of the aiding and
abetting instruction, asserting that the instruction did not require the jury to find that
defendant had “a specific intent to kill.” We express no opinion on this issue and, to
the extent defendant raises the issue on remand, the trial court may consider this issue
in the first instance.
                                     IV. DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s February 8, 2022 order is reversed. The matter is remanded
with directions to appoint counsel, consider whether to issue an order to show cause
concerning defendant’s January 10, 2022 petition, and conduct further proceedings in
accordance with Penal Code section 1172.6. Defendant’s appeal regarding his
January 7, 2019 petition is dismissed as moot.

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                    BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:

WILSON, J.

BROMBERG, J.

People v. Cedillo
H049841