Court Opinion

ID: 9959120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 19:00:45.53361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:28.460053
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10323   Document: 35-1    Date Filed: 04/10/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-10323
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       RESHAWN ARMSTRONG,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
       DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
       FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                               Defendants-Appellees.
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       2                   Opinion of the Court                23-10323

                         ____________________

                Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the Northern District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 7:21-cv-01678-LSC
                         ____________________

                         ____________________

                               No. 23-11367
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       RESHAWN ARMSTRONG,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
       DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
       FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.
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       23-10323               Opinion of the Court                        3

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                      D.C. Docket No. 7:23-cv-00086-LSC
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Reshawn Armstrong appeals the dismissal of her complaints
       against the U.S. Attorney General, the U.S. Department of Justice,
       the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the United States. She argues
       that (1) the district court erred in denying a motion she made to
       correct a clerical error and to be given extra time to respond to the
       defendants’ request for an extension; (2) the district court erred in
       dismissing her complaints as shotgun pleadings and denying her
       motions for reconsideration; and (3) the district court judge should
       have recused himself from her cases.
                                            I
              We review decisions on both motions for extensions of time
       and requests for continuances for abuse of discretion. See Advanced
       Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 77 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1996);
       Hashwani v. Barbar, 822 F.2d 1038, 1040 (11th Cir. 1987). “An abuse
       of discretion occurs when a district court commits a clear error of
       judgment, fails to follow the proper legal standard or process for
       making a determination, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10323

       fact.” Yellow Pages Photos, Inc. v. Ziplocal, LP, 846 F.3d 1159, 1163
       (11th Cir. 2017).
              Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 specifies the forms of
       pleadings and requires that a request for court order must be made
       by motion. Rule 7.1 explains who must file disclosure statements
       and what must be contained therein. Neither contains a deadline
       to respond to motions. Though there are many 21-day deadlines
       in the Rules of Civil Procedure, none relate to general motions for
       an extension or a general deadline for responding to all motions.
       See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), 12(a)(1), 12(f)(2), 15(a)(1), 26(d)(2)(A),
       26(f)(1), 26(f)(4)(A), 27(a)(2), 53(f)(2), 71.1(d)(2)(A)(v), 71.1(e)(2),
       81(c)(2).
              A court may correct clerical mistakes “on motion or on its
       own, with or without notice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a). Any errors
       that do not affect the substantial rights of a party, i.e., errors that
       are harmless, must be disregarded. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R.
       Civ. P. 61; Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 45 F.4th
       1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2022).
               Ms. Armstrong has not demonstrated any reversible error
       with regard to her motion to correct the initial order and to be
       given time to respond to the defendants’ motion for an extension
       to answer her complaint. First, even assuming the district court
       erred in denying her motion insofar as it requested a correction,
       such error was harmless as the district court did correct the name
       on its initial order. Second, the district court did not abuse its dis-
       cretion in denying her request to be given more time to respond.
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       23-10323                  Opinion of the Court                              5

       Contrary to Ms. Armstrong’s claimed allowance of 21 days to re-
       spond, the district court was not required to allow any specific time
       for her to respond to the defendants’ request for an extension. She
       cites to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(d), but Rule 7 does not
       have a subsection (d). She also cites to Rule 7.1, but it deals with
       disclosure statements. In any event, she has not shown prejudice
       resulting from the district court’s failure to allow her to respond to
       the defendants’ motion for extension of time to answer the com-
       plaint. 1
                                             II
               “We review a dismissal on Rule 8 shotgun pleading grounds
       for an abuse of discretion.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d
       1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018). Denial of motions for reconsideration
       are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Fla. Ass’n of Rehab.
       Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d
       1208, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000).
             District courts have an inherent power to control their
       docket. See Vibe, 878 F.3d at 1295. This includes dealing with shot-
       gun complaints. Id. These complaints “waste scarce judicial re-
       sources, inexorably broaden[] the scope of discovery, wreak havoc
       on appellate court dockets, and undermine[] the public’s respect for
       the courts.” Id. (quotation omitted). There are four main types of
       shotgun complaints: (1) a complaint where each count realleges

       1 Reading Ms. Armstrong’s brief liberally, we have looked at the Local Rules

       of the Northern District of Alabama, but they do not contain any rules setting
       out when responses to motions are due.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                    23-10323

       previous allegations so that “the last count [is] a combination of the
       entire complaint” and includes large amounts of irrelevant infor-
       mation; (2) a complaint which is “replete with conclusory, vague,
       and immaterial facts”; (3) a complaint which fails to separate each
       claim for relief into a different count; and (4) a complaint which
       alleges multiple claims against multiple defendants in each count,
       without identifying which defendants are responsible for which
       claims. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313,
       1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015).
              If a court identifies that a complaint is a shotgun complaint,
       it generally must give the litigant one chance to replead, with in-
       structions on the deficiencies. See Vibe, 878 F.3d at 1296. The
       chance to replead may be a dismissal without prejudice and, be-
       cause “[w]hat matters is function, not form,” the instructional re-
       quirement can be satisfied by a motion to dismiss that sufficiently
       explains the defects of the complaint. See Jackson v. Bank of Am.,
       N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018). If the amended com-
       plaint does not remedy the defects and the plaintiff does not move
       to amend, then the court may dismiss the complaint with preju-
       dice. See Vibe, 878 F.3d at 1296.
               “[P]ro se pleadings are held to a less strict standard than
       pleadings filed by lawyers and thus are construed liberally.” Alba v.
       Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). But we have held
       that “failure to raise an issue in an initial brief on direct appeal
       should be treated as a forfeiture of the issue.” United States v. Camp-
       bell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95
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       23-10323                Opinion of the Court                            7

       (2022); see also Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681
       (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long held that an appellant abandons a
       claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises
       it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and au-
       thority.”). Pro se litigants are not immune to the rules of forfeiture.
       See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
               Even assuming that Ms. Armstrong did not forfeit the dis-
       missal of her complaints by misconstruing the bases on which the
       district ruled, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dis-
       missing them and denying her motions for reconsideration.
               First, Ms. Armstrong’s amended complaint in her action in-
       itiated in 2021 is a shotgun complaint because it fails to identify
       which defendants are responsible for which claims. Thus, the dis-
       trict court did not err in dismissing it without prejudice and deny-
       ing reconsideration.
               Second, Ms. Armstrong’s complaint in her 2023 action suf-
       fers from precisely the same defects, none of which are remedied
       by her reorganization. The requirement that she be given a chance
       to replead with instructions on the deficiencies is satisfied by the
       prior dismissal without prejudice of a nearly identical complaint,
       explaining the deficiencies thereof. On this basis, the district court
       did not err in dismissing her complaint with prejudice and denying
       reconsideration.
                                          III
             We generally review a district judge’s refusal to recuse for
       abuse of discretion. See Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th
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       8                         Opinion of the Court                     23-10323

       Cir. 2001). If a plaintiff does not move to recuse the judge below,
       an argument on appeal that the judge should have recused them-
       selves sua sponte is reviewed for plain error. See Hamm v. Members
       of Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983).
       Plain error occurs where there is error, the error is plain, and a
       party’s substantial rights have been affected. See Yates v. Pinellas
       Hematology & Oncology, P.A., 21 F.4th 1288, 1297 (11th Cir. 2021).
              A district judge is required to recuse himself “in any proceed-
       ing in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28
       U.S.C. § 455(a). Similarly, a party may seek recusal of a district
       judge by filing an affidavit stating that the judge is biased or preju-
       diced and stating the grounds for believing in such bias. See 28
       U.S.C. § 144. 2
              In either case, the bias “must stem from extrajudicial sources
       and must be focused against a party to the proceeding.” Hamm, 708
       F.2d at 651; see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548–56
       (1994). An exception exists “if a judge’s remarks in a judicial con-
       text demonstrate such pervasive bias and prejudice that it consti-
       tutes bias against a party.” Hamm, 708 F.2d at 651; see also Liteky,
       510 U.S. at 551. Neither the “judge’s comments on lack of evi-
       dence, rulings adverse to a party, nor friction between the court

       2 The Code of Conduct for United States Judges similarly requires impartiality

       and disqualification whenever a “judge’s impartiality might reasonably be
       questioned.” Judicial Conference of the United States, Code of Conduct for
       United States Judges Canon 2A, 3, 3C(1) (2019).
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       23-10323                Opinion of the Court                          9

       and counsel constitute pervasive bias.” Hamm, 708 F.2d at 651; see
       also Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Due process may also require recusal
       where the judge has a pecuniary interest in the outcome or where
       “the probability of actual bias . . . is too high to be constitutionally
       tolerable.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 876–77
       (2009).
               Here the district judge neither abused his discretion in not
       recusing himself in Ms. Armstrong’s 2021 case, nor plainly erred in
       failing to do so in her 2023 case. Most of the bases Ms. Armstrong
       cited for recusal were merely adverse rulings, none of which
       showed “pervasive bias and prejudice.” Hamm, 708 F.2d at 651.
       The rest were apparently baseless allegations of misconduct unsup-
       ported by any evidence in the record.
                                             IV
              We affirm the dismissal of Ms. Armstrong’s complaints.
              AFFIRMED.