Court Opinion

ID: 9959510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 20:08:14.979741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:38.877488
License: Public Domain

04/11/2024
                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                            AT NASHVILLE
                                  March 5, 2024 Session

CLAYTON SUGG WILSON, JR. v. REBECCA LYNN BLOCKER WILSON

                 Appeal from the Chancery Court for Lincoln County
                          No. 14519 J.B. Cox, Chancellor
                      ___________________________________

                            No. M2023-01026-COA-R3-CV
                        ___________________________________

This appeal concerns the award of attorney’s fees in a post-divorce dispute. Clayton Sugg
Wilson, Jr. (“Father”) and Rebecca Lynn Blocker Huston (“Mother”) were divorced in
2017, at which time Mother was named the primary residential parent of the parties’ one
minor child, and Father was ordered to pay child support as well as one-half of their child’s
uninsured medical expenses. Four years later, Father filed a petition to modify his child
support obligation, claiming that his income had decreased so much that Mother should
pay him child support. Mother opposed Father’s petition and filed a petition for civil
contempt and to enforce the parties’ permanent parenting plan, claiming that Father had
repeatedly failed to pay his child support obligation and his share of their child’s uncovered
medical expenses. The trial court found Father in civil contempt and awarded Mother an
arrearage judgment. Based on his 2020 income, the court reduced Father’s monthly child
support obligation. The court awarded Mother her attorney’s fees in bringing the contempt
action. Father then filed a motion for apportionment of Mother’s attorney’s fees, which the
trial court denied, finding that the fees awarded to Mother were reasonable. Father appeals
the trial court’s denial of his motion for apportionment of fees. We affirm the trial court in
all respects. Finding that Mother is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary
attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-
103(c), we remand for a determination and award thereof.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
                                  and Remanded

FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. NEAL
MCBRAYER and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JJ., joined.

Timothy P. Underwood, Pulaski, Tennessee, for the appellant, Clayton Sugg Wilson.

Courtney Lutz Creal, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Rebecca Lynn Blocker
Huston.

                                            -1-
                                               OPINION

                                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On April 17, 2017, Mother and Father were divorced by final decree in the Chancery
Court of Lincoln County. Mother and Father have one child together, who was born in
2010. Because their child was a minor at the time of the divorce, the final decree of divorce
incorporated a permanent parenting plan, wherein Mother was designated as the primary
residential parent and each party was granted equal parenting time.

       Father is self-employed and owns and operates various businesses with his brother
and father.1 The trial court assessed Father’s income at $8,812.23 per month, assessed
Mother’s income at $5,681.87 per month,2 and ordered Father to pay Mother $535.00 per
month in child support and to reimburse Mother for one-half of the minor child’s uninsured
medical expenses within thirty days of Mother providing him with the receipt.

       In June 2021, Father filed a petition to modify his child support obligation, arguing
that his income had decreased dramatically due to the closure of several of his family
businesses. Based solely on his 2020 tax returns, Father requested that the trial court assess
his gross monthly income at $1,992.70, which would require Mother to pay him $465.00
per month in child support. Mother filed an answer opposing Father’s petition.

       Then, in April 2022, Mother filed a petition for contempt and to enforce the
permanent parenting plan. Mother claimed that Father had failed to pay his child support
obligation from December 2020 through January 2022 and that he had failed to reimburse
her for half of the minor child’s uncovered medical expenses from September 2018 to
February 2021. Mother requested that the court find Father in criminal contempt or, in the
alternative, in civil contempt; however, Mother later elected to drop the criminal contempt
charge and pursue civil contempt only. Mother also requested that she be awarded a
judgment in the amount of the outstanding child support arrearages, totaling $7,490.00,
and the outstanding medical expenses, totaling $1,081.76.

      Upon filing the petition for contempt, Mother’s attorneys sent discovery requests to
Father to determine his income. Father responded by claiming that he had no bank
accounts. Suspecting that this was not true, Mother’s attorneys subpoenaed every bank in
the Lincoln County area to determine the location of Father’s bank accounts. These
subpoenas revealed that Father had various bank accounts in his name, and that $3.6

        1
          These family businesses include a lawn and landscaping business, a plant business, a farm, and a
rental real estate business in which Father has varying degrees of ownership.
        2
            Outside of her income, the record does not contain information regarding Mother’s employment.

                                                   -2-
million had been deposited in these accounts. Mother then enlisted a tax attorney and
certified public accountant to evaluate the $3.6 million cash flow.

       The competing petitions were consolidated for trial. The day before the hearing on
the petitions, Mother filed a proposed child support worksheet3, where she asked the court
to find that Father had a monthly income of $184,527.47, or $2,214,329.64 per year.4
Mother then requested that Father’s child support obligation be set at $2,100.00 per month.

        On October 4, 2022, the trial court held a bench trial on the parties’ petitions and
heard testimony from Mother and Father. Father testified that he has no bank accounts and
that, although certain accounts might show him as the sole or a co-owner of the account,
he only has signatory privileges on those accounts. He also claimed that he had no
knowledge regarding whether the approximately $3.6 million in deposits into the various
accounts in his name were loan proceeds, income made from sales, or transactions back
and forth between accounts. He further testified that his father is in charge of bookkeeping
and depositing checks for all of the family business entities, and that the only money that
he receives is an allowance of $350.00 per week provided by his father, unless the
partnerships that he is a part of pay out other monies to him.

       After the trial, Mother submitted an attorney’s fee affidavit seeking $35,661.73 in
attorney’s fees that she had incurred from June 10, 2021 through October 4, 2022.

       On November 21, 2022, the court filed its memorandum and findings from the
bench trial. The court first considered Father’s petition to modify his child support
obligation, and Mother’s alternative argument that, if his child support were to be modified,
it should be modified upward. The court found that, based on Father’s testimony and the
money flowing through his bank accounts, it was “reasonable to question Father’s
credibility when dealing with his income.” The court noted that Father “rests solely on the
tax return as a basis for a modification of his child support payments.” Likewise, Mother
“did not offer any expert opinion as to what Father’s income is” and “merely urge[d] the
court to count up all 3.6 million dollars flowing through these various accounts and use
that top figure as his income, without regard to any allowable expenses whatsoever.”

       Finding that neither of the parties’ proposals “place[d] the Court in a position to
easily determine Father’s income,” and that it would not be fair to “penalize Mother by
taking an average of her 2020 and 2021 income[s] when Father, who is the movant, cannot
show the Court an income figure for 2021,” the court looked to the parties’ 2020 incomes
to determine whether a significant variance existed to justify a modification of Father’s

        3
          We note that Mother’s proposed child support worksheet did not constitute a counter-petition to
Father’s petition to modify child support.
        4
        At trial, Mother testified that Father’s annual income was much closer to $3.6 million based on
the money flowing through the bank accounts in Father’s name.
                                                  -3-
child support obligation. Based on Father’s tax return and testimony, the court assessed
Father’s 2020 income at $8,242.00 per month. The court assessed Mother’s 2020 income
at $6,479.00 per month.

       After comparing Father’s 2020 income with the income imputed to Father in the
previous order, the court found that there was a “net difference in income of greater than
15%.” Additionally, the court found that “recalculating the child support obligation also
yielded a difference of 15% in support.” Thus, the court found that modification of the
support order was warranted, and decreased Father’s support obligation from $593.00 per
month to $299.00 per month moving forward. However, the court denied Father’s request
that Mother be required to pay him $465.00 per month in child support.

       Regarding Mother’s petition for civil contempt, the court found that Father was
“clearly in civil contempt of this court” and that “Mother is entitled to a lump sum judgment
in the amount of unpaid support,” totaling $8,571.76. The court also found that it was
“appropriate to award attorney fees to Mother for her having to bring this action in
contempt” and that the attorney’s fees submitted by Mother’s counsel were reasonable,
“especially in light of the difficulty created and maintained by Father’s arcane accounting
shell game.”

       In January 2023, Father filed a motion for apportionment of attorney’s fees,
requesting a reduction of Mother’s attorney’s fee award on the basis that he was the
prevailing party in his petition to modify and that Mother’s attorney’s fees were
unreasonable. Although Father did not dispute that Mother was the prevailing party on the
contempt petition, he claimed that the attorney’s fees awarded to Mother should be reduced
because they contained fees related to the issue of modification, for which he was the
prevailing party. Thus, Father claimed that the court should apportion the fees incurred by
Mother that were attributable to her contempt petition and reduce her award of attorney’s
fees accordingly.

        In May 2023, Mother’s attorney filed a supplemental affidavit, which noted that
“the outcome of this case was successful in two ways.” First, the trial court found Father
“in contempt for willfully violating the Court’s order by failing to pay child support.”
Second, although the court reduced Father’s monthly child support obligation, it
nevertheless found that Father was “still required to pay support to Mother” even though
“in his original petition, Father alleged that Mother should pay him support.” The affidavit
also stated that the expenses incurred to discover Father’s various bank accounts were
necessary to contest Father’s petition to modify his support obligation and were necessary
to support Mother’s petition for contempt, as the accounts demonstrated both “Father’s
current income” and “that Father had willfully failed to pay his child support for Mother’s
Petition for Civil Contempt despite having the ability to pay.”

                                            -4-
       On June 6, 2023, the court held a hearing on Father’s motion for apportionment of
attorney’s fees, at which time the court considered the reasonableness of Mother’s
attorney’s fee award. In so doing, the court looked to the time, labor, and difficulty of the
matter, along with the factors set forth in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.5.

       On June 21, 2023, the trial court filed its memorandum and order on Father’s motion
for apportionment, wherein it denied Father’s motion, finding that the attorney’s fees and
expenses requested by Mother were reasonable. The court then awarded Mother a judgment
against Father in the amount of $35,661.73.

           This appeal followed.

                                                   ISSUES

       Father presents two issues on appeal. Mother presents two additional issues. We
consolidate and rephrase the issues presented as follows:

      I.       Whether the trial court erred in its award of attorney’s fees to Mother.

     II.       Whether Mother is entitled to her attorney’s fees on appeal.

                                        STANDARD OF REVIEW

       A determination of attorney’s fees is within the sole discretion of the trial court and
will be upheld unless the trial court abuses its discretion. Kline v. Eyrich, 69 S.W.3d 197,
203 (Tenn. 2002); Shamblin v. Sylvester, 304 S.W.3d 320, 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). Our
Supreme Court has held that it will find an abuse of discretion only if the trial court “applied
incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employ[ed] reasoning that causes an injustice to
the complaining party.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249
S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008); see also Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524
(Tenn. 2010).

                                                ANALYSIS

                                 I.     ATTORNEY’S FEES AT TRIAL

      Father contends that the trial court erred in its award of attorney’s fees to Mother.5
Although he concedes that Mother was the prevailing party on the issue of civil contempt,

           5
          In the section of his appellate brief dedicated to this issue, Father makes several arguments that
were not raised in the trial court. He also fails to properly support several of these arguments with citations
to the record. We consider these arguments waived. See Boren v. Hill Boren PC, No. W2021-00478-COA-
                                                    -5-
he argues that the trial court should have apportioned the legal fees between the petition
for contempt and the petition to modify because he claims that “no reasonable minds could
disagree that [Father] was the prevailing party on the Petition to Modify, as his child
support was actually reduced after a thorough analysis by the Trial Court.”

       Mother counters that the trial court did not err in awarding her attorney’s fees given
that she was “the prevailing party on [her] Petition for Contempt” and that she was “the
substantially prevailing party on Father’s Petition to Modify Child Support.” Mother
claims that she was the prevailing party on the petition to modify because “Father was not
successful in convincing the Trial Court to accept his proposed income or that Mother
should be the child support obligor” and he was also “not successful in arguing for a
material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” Thus, Mother contends that she
was “successful ‘on [a] significant issue of litigation.’”

        Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), a prevailing party may recover
reasonable attorney’s fees incurred, inter alia, in civil contempt actions and actions to
enforce decrees for child support. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). Specifically, the
statute reads:

        A prevailing party may recover reasonable attorney’s fees, which may be
        fixed and allowed in the court’s discretion, from the nonprevailing party in
        any criminal or civil contempt action or other proceeding to enforce,
        alter, change, or modify any decree of alimony, child support, or
        provision of a permanent parenting plan order, or in any suit or action
        concerning the adjudication of the custody or change of custody of any
        children, both upon the original divorce hearing and at any subsequent
        hearing.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) (emphasis added).

       The “prevailing party” determination is a fact-intensive inquiry. Fannon v. City of
LaFollette, 329 S.W.3d 418, 432 (Tenn. 2010). A party “need not attain complete success
on the merits of a lawsuit in order to prevail.” Buckley v. Carlock, 652 S.W.3d 432, 445
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2022) (citation omitted). Instead, to achieve “prevailing party” status, a
party must be awarded some judicially sanctioned relief on the merits of his or her claim.
Qualls v. Camp, No. M2005-02822-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2198334, at *6 (Tenn. Ct.
App. July 23, 2007) (citations omitted); see also Fannon, 329 S.W.3d at 431 (Noting that
a prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney’s fees is one who has succeeded on

R3-CV, 2023 WL 3375623, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2023) (“It is well-settled law, for instance, ‘that
an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal.’”) (citation omitted); see also Bean v. Bean,
40 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (“Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate
Procedure and the rules of this Court waives the issues for review.”).

                                                     -6-
any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing
suit) (citation omitted). The relief awarded by the court must “materially alter[] the legal
relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that
directly benefits the plaintiff.” Id. at *7 (citations omitted).

       With regard to Mother’s petition for contempt, the trial court found that Father “is
clearly in civil contempt of this court” and awarded Mother “a lump sum judgment in the
amount of the unpaid support” along with her attorney’s fees “in having to bring this action
in contempt.” It is clear from these findings, and undisputed by the parties, that Mother
was the prevailing party on her petition for contempt.

        With regard to Father’s petition to modify child support, the trial court declined
Father’s request that his gross monthly income be set at $1,992.70 and that Mother be
required to pay him $465.00 in monthly child support. Instead, the trial court imputed his
gross monthly income at $8,242.00, reduced his monthly child support obligation from
$535.00 to $299.00, and found that Father would remain the child support obligor.
Although the court reduced Father’s monthly child support obligation, Mother was able to
defend the petition to modify such that Father’s support obligation was not reduced to the
extent that he demanded. The court also did not “materially alter” the legal relationship
between the parties or “modify” Mother’s behavior as Father remained the child support
obligor and Mother was not made to pay Father monthly child support. We find that Mother
was sufficiently successful in resisting the petition to modify as to achieve “prevailing
party” status. See C.S.C. v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. E2006-01155-COA-R3-CV, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2007) (“[T]he Plaintiffs obtained sufficiently successful results
in the overall litigation to achieve ‘prevailing party’ status.”).

       Because Mother was the prevailing party on the petition for civil contempt to
enforce the child support decree and she prevailed to a greater degree than Father on his
petition to modify child support, in which he sought to compel Mother to pay him child
support but failed, Mother is entitled to her reasonable attorney’s fees under Tennessee
Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). Father contends that Mother’s attorney’s fee award of
$35,661.73 was unreasonable,6 because, inter alia, it would be unjust to require Father to
pay “over $35,000.00 in attorney fees . . . while only getting a reduction of $19,824.00,
which would be realized over the next seven years[.]” However, Father fails to make a
persuasive argument.

       In Tennessee, “The trial court’s determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee is “a
subjective judgment based on evidence and the experience of the trier of facts.” Wright ex

        6
           In support of this contention, Father again makes several arguments in his brief that were not
raised in the trial court and/or are not properly supported by citations to the record in accordance with the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the rules of this court. As noted above, we consider these
arguments to be waived.
                                                   -7-
rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011) (citing United Med. Corp. of
Tenn., Inc. v. Hohenwald Bank & Trust Co., 703 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Tenn. 1986)). There is
“no fixed mathematical rule” for determining what a reasonable fee is. Id. (citing
Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., 104 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)).
Accordingly, as previously stated, an award of attorney’s fees is within the discretion of
the trial court and will be upheld unless the trial court abuses its discretion. Id. (citations
omitted).

       Trial courts may consider a number of factors in evaluating the reasonableness of
an attorney’s fee award, including those set forth in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.5. Ellis v. Ellis, 621 S.W.3d 700, 708 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019).
That rule provides, in pertinent part:

       (a) The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee
           include the following:

              (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
                  the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform
                  the legal service properly;

              (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance
                  of the particular employment will preclude other
                  employment by the lawyer;

              (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
                  services;

              (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

              (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
                  circumstances;

              (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with
                  the client;

              (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or
                  lawyers performing the services;

              (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;

              (9) prior advertisements or statements by the lawyer with
                  respect to the fees the lawyer charges; and

                                             -8-
              (10)   whether the fee agreement is in writing.

Id. (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5). A trial court “may decide which factors merit
greater weight under the particular circumstances of a case.” Luna L. Grp., PLLC v.
Roberts, No. M2021-00699-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 2961379, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July
27, 2022) (quoting Wright, 337 S.W.3d at 186)).

       In the instant case, the trial court entered a thorough memorandum and order on
Father’s motion for apportionment of attorney’s fees, wherein it went to great lengths to
identify its rationale and evaluate whether Mother’s attorney’s fees were reasonable.

       Specifically, the court referenced the adverse credibility findings that it made
against Father stating that it would be “patently inequitable” to apportion Mother’s
attorney’s fees since “[t]he reason that the attorney fees are so high is Father’s lack of
candor and his lack of compliance with discovery requests.” The court also noted: “Had
Father ever complied with discovery requests or actually shown his true income to anyone,
this process would be significantly less difficult. The responsibility for the time and effort
expended by mother is his alone and he should bear the responsibility.”

        The court also considered the factors in Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5, finding
that the attorney’s fee affidavit submitted by Mother’s attorney was a credible
representation, that the charges in the billing statements submitted by Mother’s attorneys
were credible, and that the rates of Mother’s attorney, and the other attorneys consulted on
the matter, were in line with their level of expertise and the difficulty created by Father’s
conduct. The court also stated that “Father, Mr. Clay Wilson, has the same last name as his
father. . . . Hence, the time and effort necessary is increased as is the novelty.” The court
found that Mother’s attorney and other members of her firm were effectively precluded
from accepting other employment during the time that they were working on the instant
case, and that the fee charged by Mother’s attorney “is not inconsistent with fees charged
by other lawyers similarly situated.” Moreover, the court noted that “[t]he amount of time
involved was exacerbated by the conduct of Father and this outweighs any lack of result
obtained by Mother” and that Mother’s attorney was operating under a written contract for
hourly fees which she had been under for years.

       It is clear that the trial court underwent the proper procedure in evaluating the
reasonableness of Mother’s attorney’s fee award and that it carefully considered the
majority of the factors enumerated in Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5. For these reasons,
we find no error in the court’s conclusion that Mother’s attorney’s fees were reasonable.
See Robinson v. City of Clarksville, 673 S.W.3d 556, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023) (“[O]ur
appellate standard of review is limited in cases involving an inquiry into the reasonableness
of an award of attorneys’ fees, especially where the trial court has gone through the factors
at RPC § 1.5 and has undergone the proper procedure to determine a reasonable fee.”).

                                            -9-
      Based on all of the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
award of attorney’s fees to Mother.

                          II.   ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL

        Mother seeks to recover her attorney’s fees on appeal under Tennessee Code
Annotated § 27-1-122 and/or Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). With respect to §
27-1-122, Mother claims that she is entitled to her appellate attorney’s fees because “the
likelihood of Father succeeding on appeal is slim” and, thus, “Father’s appeal is frivolous.”
Mother also claims that she is entitled to her appellate attorney’s fees under Tennessee
Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c) if this court finds her to be the prevailing party on appeal.

       Parties to post-divorce proceedings seeking to recover appellate attorney’s fees may
request an award of attorney’s fees under two statutes: Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-
122 and Tennessee Code Annotated § 3-5-103(c). Eberbach v. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467,
475 (Tenn. 2017). Parties may seek attorney’s fees under either or both statutes. Id.

                                             A.

        Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122 provides that a court may award “just
damages” against an appellant where it appears that an appeal was frivolous or taken solely
for delay. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. An award of attorney’s fees under § 27-1-122
rests in the appellate court’s discretion. Whalum v. Marshall, 224 S.W.3d 169, 180 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2006). This court has held that such discretion should be “interpreted and applied
strictly so as not to discourage legitimate appeals.” Davis v. Gulf Ins. Grp., 546 S.W.2d
583, 586 (Tenn. 1977).

       We do not find Father’s appeal to be so devoid of merit as to justify deeming his
appeal frivolous. See Knowles v. State of Tenn., 49 S.W.3d 330, 341 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)
(A frivolous appeal is one that is “devoid of merit or . . . has no reasonable chance of
success.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Mother is not entitled to recover her appellate
attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122.

                                             B.

       However, we find that Mother is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary
attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-
5-103(c). As noted earlier, this statute provides:

       A prevailing party may recover reasonable attorney’s fees, which may be
       fixed and allowed in the court’s discretion, from the nonprevailing party in
       any . . . civil contempt action or other proceeding to enforce, alter, change,

                                           - 10 -
       or modify any decree of . . . child support, . . . both upon the original divorce
       hearing and at any subsequent hearing.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c).

        Mother’s actions in this case, including her petition for civil contempt, her request
for an arrearage child support judgment, as well as her opposition to Father’s petition to
reduce his child support obligation, were for the purpose of protecting their child’s interest.
The purpose of awards under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c) is to protect the
children’s interests, not the custodial parent’s legal remedies. Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d
780, 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Thus, requiring parents who precipitate child support
proceedings to underwrite the costs if their claims are ultimately found to be unwarranted
is appropriate as a matter of policy. Id. “In cases involving the . . . support of children, . . .
it has long been the rule in this State that counsel fees incurred on behalf of minors may be
recovered when shown to be reasonable and appropriate.” Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d
352, 360 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Deas v. Deas, 774 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Tenn. 1989)).
Although “[t]here is no absolute right to such fees, . . . their award in . . . support
proceedings is familiar and almost commonplace.” Id. (quoting Deas, 774 S.W.2d at 169).
Further, in awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 36-5-103(c),
the court may consider proof of inability to pay, but such consideration will not be
controlling. Id. (citing Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)).

       Because Mother is clearly the prevailing party in this appeal, she is entitled to her
appellate attorney’s fees and expenses under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c).
Accordingly, we remand this issue to the trial court to determine the amount of the fees
and costs Mother is entitled to recover and to enter judgment accordingly.

                                       IN CONCLUSION

      The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of appeal are assessed against the appellant,
Clayton Sugg Wilson.

                                                       ________________________________
                                                       FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.

                                              - 11 -