Court Opinion

ID: 9901161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 15:08:10.209022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:27.587687
License: Public Domain

State of New York                                                      OPINION
Court of Appeals                                        This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision
                                                          before publication in the New York Reports.

 No. 63
 The People &c.,
         Respondent,
      v.
 Pablo Pastrana,
         Appellant.

 Mark W. Zeno, for appellant.
 Nicole Neckles, for respondent.
 Hon. Letitia James, New York State Attorney General, intervenor.

 TROUTMAN, J.:

       In June of 2015, defendant was driving a vehicle that was stopped at a roadblock set

 up by police on a bridge leading from Manhattan into the Bronx on the same day as the

 annual Puerto Rican Day Parade. After officers smelled marijuana in the car, they
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conducted a search, during which they recovered a loaded firearm. In 2018, defendant was

convicted, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree,

criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree, and unlawful possession of marijuana.

The Appellate Division affirmed (205 AD3d 461 [1st Dept 2022]), and a Judge of this

Court granted defendant leave to appeal (38 NY3d 1135 [2022]). We reject defendant’s

contentions on this appeal as without merit or unpreserved.

                                              I.

       Defendant first contends that the People did not meet their burden at the suppression

hearing to demonstrate the constitutional validity of the roadblock pursuant to which his

vehicle was stopped. We conclude that the lower courts properly determined that the

People met their burden.

       At the suppression hearing, the People offered the testimony of a detective who was

responsible for questioning the driver of vehicles that were stopped pursuant to the

roadblock. That detective testified that he was assigned to conduct a vehicle checkpoint

on the bridge in question, and that the purpose of the checkpoint was vehicle safety. To

that end, the detective asked each driver he approached to produce their driver’s license,

insurance, and registration. The detective would also check for “improper inspections,

equipment, [and] seat belts.” The purpose of the roadblock was not specifically to check

for drunk drivers, but the detective testified that if police found an intoxicated driver, they

would take appropriate action. The checkpoint was conducted during daylight hours and

marked by cones and two vans.

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       The detective further testified that the procedure for the checkpoint was to stop

every third car that passed through. The detective was not responsible for counting cars

and directing them to pull over, but he testified that defendant’s car was pulled over

pursuant to this established procedure. The detective asked defendant to roll down the

windows in the vehicle, and when defendant complied, there was a strong odor of

marijuana coming from the vehicle. The detective testified that he observed marijuana in

plain view in the car. The detective then commenced a search of the car, and after noticing

a strong odor of marijuana near the glove box, he opened it, finding a larger quantity of

marijuana and a loaded firearm. Defendant was then arrested.

       The detective’s testimony satisfied the People’s burden to demonstrate a permissible

primary programmatic purpose for the roadblock, that it was maintained “in accordance

with a uniform procedure which afforded little discretion to operating personnel,” and that

the checkpoint was conducted with fair warning to motorists and with precautions

regarding motorist safety (People v Scott, 63 NY2d 518, 526 [1984]; see generally City of

Indianapolis v Edmond, 531 US 32 [2000]). That testimony established that the primary

purpose of the checkpoint was roadway safety, not general crime control (see Indianapolis,

531 US at 44; People v Jackson, 99 NY2d 125, 131-132 [2002]; Matter of Muhammad F.,

94 NY2d 136, 145-146 [1999], cert denied 531 US 1044 [2000]). It further established

that the checkpoint was maintained in accordance with a uniform procedure that gave little

discretion to operating personnel, i.e., every third car was stopped (see Scott, 63 NY2d at

526). Finally, the detective’s testimony established that the roadblock was conducted with

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adequate precautions that gave fair warning to motorists (cf. Muhammad F., 94 NY2d at

147).

        Defendant’s challenge to the validity of the checkpoint is, in large part, essentially

a challenge to the credibility of the detective’s testimony. But this Court has no power to

revisit the factual finding of the suppression court that the detective’s testimony was

credible (see People v Concepcion, 38 NY2d 211, 213 [1975]). Moreover, to the extent

defendant contends that the decision to set up a roadblock was discriminatory, that

contention is not supported by the record. The roadblock was set up on the day of the

National Puerto Rican Day Parade, and the record demonstrates that the post-parade traffic

was particularly heavy. Thus, the reasonable inference to be drawn from the detective’s

testimony is that the roadway safety checkpoint was chosen for that date and location

because of the large volume of traffic that would be crossing the bridge.

        The People’s evidentiary showing as to the authorization for the roadblock certainly

could have been more robust (see e.g. Scott, 63 NY2d at 523 [written documentation

regarding authorization for roadblock]; Jackson, 99 NY2d at 128 [testimony from senior

officer responsible for initiating the roadblock]). Nevertheless, we conclude that the

detective’s testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom were sufficient,

albeit barely, to satisfy the People’s burden.

                                              II.

        Defendant further contends that the Marihuana Regulation and Taxation Act

(MRTA) should be applied retroactively to his case to render the search of his vehicle

unlawful. The Appellate Division has rejected that contention (see e.g. People v Boyd, 206

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AD3d 1350, 1354 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1149 [2022]; People v Babadzhanov,

204 AD3d 685, 686-687 [2d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1069 [2022]; People v

Vaughn, 203 AD3d 1729, 1730 [4th Dept 2022], lv denied 38 NY3d 1036 [2022]). We

agree with the Appellate Division and therefore conclude that defendant’s contention is

without merit.

       The MRTA, which became law in 2021 (see L 2021, ch 92), added Penal Law §

222.05, which provides that with certain exceptions not relevant here, the odor of cannabis

or burnt cannabis, or the possession of cannabis in the amounts authorized by the MRTA,

shall not be the basis for a “finding or determination of reasonable cause to believe a crime

has been committed” (id. § 222.05 [3]). In short, Penal Law § 222.05 (3) provides that the

odor of marijuana or possession of marijuana in legally authorized amounts can no longer

be the basis for a police search.

       Penal Law § 222.05 became effective on March 31, 2021, nearly six years after the

search of defendant’s vehicle was conducted. If the search of defendant’s vehicle had been

conducted after that effective date, it would not be valid under the MRTA, given that it was

based solely upon the odor of cannabis. Defendant contends, however, that this provision

of the MRTA should be applied retroactively to invalidate searches that occurred before

the effective date of the statute.

       “ ‘It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that retroactive operation is

not favored by courts and statutes will not be given such construction unless the language

expressly or by necessary implication requires it’ ” (People v Galindo, 38 NY3d 199, 207

[2022], quoting Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 584

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[1998]). Nothing in the text or legislative history of the MRTA requires or supports the

conclusion that the legislature intended for the newly-enacted Penal Law § 222.05 to apply

retroactively to invalidate searches that were conducted before the effective date of the

statute.* The fact that Penal Law § 222.05 was to take effect “immediately” merely

supports the conclusion that as of March 31, 2021, law enforcement could no longer

conduct searches based solely on the odor of cannabis. “[T]he date that legislation is to

take effect is a separate question from whether the statute should apply to claims and rights

then in existence,” and the legislature’s expression that a statute is to take effect

immediately is equivocal in a retroactivity analysis (Majewski, 91 NY2d at 583).

       Importantly, the legislature included provisions in the MRTA intended to remedy

past discriminatory practices regarding the policing of marijuana, including provisions

regarding vacatur of prior marijuana-related convictions (see CPL 440.46-a). Thus, when

the legislature intended the MRTA to impact convictions that became final before the law’s

effective date, it provided express provisions to that effect. There is no similar expression

of legislative intent with respect to Penal Law § 222.05. Moreover, applying the MRTA

*
  We reject defendant’s assertion that an appeal to the Appellate Division from a judgment
of conviction and sentence is a “criminal proceeding” within the meaning of Penal Law §
222.05 (3). The Criminal Procedure Law separately defines “criminal court” and
“intermediate appellate court” and contains different provisions applicable to each court
(see CPL 1.20 [19], [22]; CPL article 450). Pursuant to these provisions, intermediate
appellate courts review appeals as of right from criminal proceedings, but an appeal as of
right does not itself constitute a “criminal proceeding” (see CPL 1.20 [18]). Like Judge
Halligan, we do not address whether Penal Law § 222.05 applies in a post-enactment
suppression hearing regarding a pre-enactment search, as that issue is not before us (see
Halligan, J., dissenting op at 2 n 1).

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retroactively to invalidate searches that have already occurred would not deter any police

misconduct because, as defendant concedes, at the time police searched his car in 2015, a

search based on the odor of marijuana was lawful. Defendant points to no provision in the

text or legislative history of the MRTA that would support the staggering impact of the

retroactive application he proposes: the vacatur of scores of convictions, even those for

weapons possession or violent crimes, because the police conducted a search based on the

odor of marijuana that was lawful at the time. Nothing in the text of the statute or the

legislative history supports a conclusion that this was the legislature’s intent.

                                             III.

       Finally, defendant contends that his conviction of criminal possession of a weapon

in the second degree is unconstitutional pursuant to the Second Amendment to the United

States Constitution, relying on the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle

& Pistol Association, Inc. v Bruen (597 US —, 142 S Ct 2111 [2022]). For the reasons

explained in People v Cabrera (decided today), we conclude that defendant’s contention

is unpreserved for appellate review.

       Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

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RIVERA, J. (dissenting):

       I agree for the reasons discussed by the majority that defendant Pablo Pastrana’s

challenge to the roadblock that led to the search of his vehicle and the eventual discovery

of an unlicensed loaded firearm and illegal amounts of marijuana is without merit, and that

the Marijuana Regulation and Taxation Act is not retroactive. However, for the reasons I

discuss in my dissent in People v Garcia, decided today, defendant’s Second Amendment

facial challenge under New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v Bruen (142 S Ct 2111

[2022]) is preserved but meritless.

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       Defendant’s alternative as-applied constitutional challenge to the ban on licensing

people with felonies requires remittal for further development of a record for appellate

review. Defendant has standing to raise both of these claims for the reasons discussed in

Garcia. I agree with the majority that the lack of an adequate record renders it impossible

at this juncture to consider defendant’s claim that there is no historical tradition to support

New York’s universal prohibition on people with felonies obtaining gun licenses.

However, defendant had no reason to develop such record pre-Bruen. And the prosecutor

had no opportunity to establish a historical tradition to justify the restrictions and the

sentence because until Bruen that was not the standard by which to assess these types of

constitutional challenges. Instead, courts in New York, and throughout the country, applied

intermediate scrutiny’s means-end test in deciding whether the gun regulation is

substantially related to achieving an important governmental interest, such as public safety

(see, e.g., Kachalsky v County of Westchester, 701 F3d 81, 85 [2d Cir 2012]; People v

Hughes, 22 NY3d 44, 50-51 [2013]; Kanter v Barr, 919 F3d 437, 447 [7th Cir 2019]).

       I would remand for development of the record in accordance with the test articulated

in Bruen. Otherwise, we risk depriving defendant “of a State forum in which his arguments

could be heard” (People v Patterson, 39 NY2d 288, 296 [1976], affd sub nom. Patterson v

New York, 432 US 197 [1977]). Remittal is especially appropriate given that other

defendants—convicted after Bruen was issued—are raising the same (preserved) claims in

our courts. We should not deny defendant the same opportunity to build a record and for

the prosecutor to do the same. Our “procedural rules should be so designed as to keep

unjust results to a minimum” (People v Finch, 23 NY3d 408, 416 [2014]).

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HALLIGAN, J. (dissenting):

       I would hold that the People did not meet their burden at the suppression hearing to

demonstrate the constitutional validity of the roadblock where Pastrana’s car was stopped.

As the majority correctly notes, Detective Veit testified at the suppression hearing that the

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goal of the checkpoint was vehicular safety, which is a permissible primary programmatic

purpose (Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648, 658 [1979]). But when measured against our

prior cases, the record does not adequately establish that the selection of the checkpoint’s

particular date and location would be effective in serving that objective, or that the

checkpoint was properly authorized.1

       Both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have used a balancing test to determine

whether a suspicionless stop is reasonable (see People v Abad, 98 NY2d 12, 16-17 [2002],

citing Brown v Texas, 443 US 47, 50 [1979]). One element, termed the “effectiveness”

factor, is “the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest” (id. at 17). Here,

the People offered no testimony as to why this date and location were selected for the

checkpoint. The majority concludes a reasonable inference can be drawn that it was

because a large number of cars would be crossing the bridge, given the parade scheduled

for that day. That may indeed have been why the roadblock was conducted at that time

and place, but the People did nothing to establish the point.

       More concerning is the absence of any testimony regarding how the checkpoint was

authorized. In People v Scott, this Court emphasized that “a plan embodying explicit,

neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers” is essential to adequately protect

1
  With respect to whether the Appellate Division properly declined to apply the MRTA’s
probable cause provision to reverse defendant’s conviction, I agree with the majority that
the statutory term “criminal proceeding” cannot fairly be read to encompass direct appeals
at the Appellate Division (Penal Law § 222.05 [3]). Whether that provision, which governs
a “finding or determination of reasonable cause,” applies to a post-enactment suppression
hearing concerning a pre-enactment search is a closer question in light of the statutory text,
and given that it is not squarely presented, I would not reach it here.
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Fourth Amendment concerns (63 NY2d 518, 525-526 [1984], quoting Brown, 443 US at

51). Such a plan should ensure that “officers in the field” do not have “unfettered

discretion” in order to reduce the risk of arbitrary invasions (Matter of Muhammad F., 94

NY2d 136, 142 [1999], quoting Brown, 443 US at 51; see also United States v Martinez-

Fuerte, 428 US 543, 559 [1976] [“The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by

officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the

effective allocation of limited enforcement resources”]; Delaware, 440 US at 654-655

[Fourth Amendment requires safeguards to “assure that the individual’s reasonable

expectation of privacy is not subject to the discretion of the official in the field”] [internal

quotation marks omitted]).

       Scott provides an example of how this can be accomplished: the checkpoint there

was “established pursuant to a written directive of the County Sheriff” that detailed the

purpose for the stops and procedures for selecting sites and conducting the stops, and the

locations were “selected in advance by senior personnel” (Scott, 63 NY2d at 522-524).

“[T]he specific procedures devised and promulgated to law enforcement personnel by the

head of their department” allowed the court to conclude that the checkpoint “was being

maintained in accordance with a uniform procedure which afforded little discretion to

operating personnel,” among other factors (id. at 526; see also Abad, 98 NY2d at 15 [noting

that guidelines for livery cab stop program were “spelled out” in Police Department

Operations Order]).

       As with the reason for selecting the particular date and location for the checkpoint,

proper authorization was not established by the People. Detective Veit testified that when

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on patrol, “[w]e receive a specific assignment”; that on the day in question, he “was

assigned to the Puerto Rican Day Parade, and [his] assignment was a vehicle checkpoint

on the University Heights bridge and Fordham Road”; and that this was a “unique

assignment.” Whether that suffices to show proper authorization is not a question of the

detective’s credibility, but whether the record includes any information indicating how, or

by whom, the checkpoint was approved. To the extent any additional inference could have

been drawn from Detective Veit’s comments, it would stretch too far to ensure that officer

discretion was sufficiently constrained for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

Order affirmed. Opinion by Judge Troutman. Judges Garcia, Singas and Cannataro concur.
Judge Rivera dissents in an opinion. Judge Halligan dissents in a separate opinion, in which
Chief Judge Wilson concurs.

Decided November 21, 2023

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