Court Opinion

ID: 9769990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:10:17.86221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:09.727777
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant, West Texas Equipment Company, in its motion for rehearing contends with vigorous argument that we committed reversible error in remanding this cause instead of rendering. Appellee filed no motion for rehearing within the 15-day period allowed under Rule 458, V.A.T.R. but after the time had elapsed for doing so filed what is designated as “Appellee’s Reply Brief To Appellant’s Motion For Rehearing And Cross-Assignments of Error”.
If any party files an Application for Writ of Error to the Supreme Court within the specified time “ * * * any other party who was entitled to file such an application within such time but failed to do so shall have ten days additional time within which to file it”. Rule 468, V.A.T.R. as amended. However, we are not aware of any rule which permits affirmative relief by appellee in a Court of Civil Appeals where the trial court’s judgment was reversed and such party did not file a motion for rehearing within the 15-day period allowed under Rule 458, V.A.T.R. There*871fore, we have no authority to consider cross-assignments of error urged by appellee which were filed after the designated period for filing a motion for rehearing.
We follow with considerable difficulty appellant’s first contention in its motion for rehearing. It cites Walker v. Chambers, 407 S.W.2d 949 (Tex.Civ.App.) (Fort Worth 1966) as authority for asserted error of our court in holding that where only one party files a motion for summary judgment the denial thereof is interlocutory, and thus unappealable. In the cited case a motion was apparently granted for summary judgment. In our case it was denied. We fail to see the analogy in the cited case to ours. If we understand Ackerman v. Vordenbaum, (supra), the trial court’s judgment in overruling appellant’s motion for summary judgment was interlocutory and unappealable, regardless of the merits of such motion.
In its next complaint appellant asserts error of our court in overruling “a part” of its Point 4. That point gave us considerable concern in our original opinion, as it has in the motion for rehearing. The point is argumentative, admittedly multifarious, and difficult to analyze. If we understand the thesis of appellant’s argument in this contention it is that included somewhere in its Point 4 is a “no evidence” question, i. e. there was not any evidence to support the jury’s answer of “none” to the only issue submitted. If the point properly raises such contention then we concede we may have been in error in remanding rather than in rendering for there clearly is not any probative evidence to support an answer of “none” to the verified, sworn account sued upon. There was not any affirmative defense of avoidance in the pleadings upon which appellee went to trial and there was not any probative evidence to support an avoidance. However, as we analyze the point it raises a procedural matter that would not call for rendition, i. e. “Because the only ‘value’ evidence in the record was $824.84 sued for, the trial court. * * * 2. erred * * * in entering a ‘take nothing’ judgment for defendant * * * because the ‘none’ answer of the jury was based on inadmissible and unpleaded matters of avoidance”. (Emphasis added.)
The second point urges error in denying an in limine motion concerning contemplated introduction of certain evidence. The third point has to do with the improper admission of such evidence. The 5th point asserts error in the form of the judgment rendered upon the jury verdict. We have discussed the first and fourth points.
The judgment recites: “And it appearing to the Court from the stipulation of counsel, the undisputed facts and the verdict of the Jury that judgment should be rendered for the defendant”.
Where the only “value” evidence was that offered by appellant and even appellee himself admitted to owing two items, we are unable to see how the quoted recitation in the judgment could be proper. There is no stipulation in the record we have been able to find that precludes recovery for appellant and the undisputed facts are contrary to the recitation that “ * * * from the stipulation of counsel, (and) the undisputed facts * * * judgment should be rendered for defendant.”
We have reversed and remanded because we believe a proper point has not been raised to justify rendition and not in order to give appellee “another bite at the apple”. See Mr. Justice Calver’s article titled “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence”, Points of Error page 361 at page 368 and 369, Vol. 38, Texas Law Review, the cited cases in the article of Yarbrough v. Booher, 141 Tex. 420, 174 S.W.2d 47, 150 A.L.R. 1369 (1943); Williams v. Safety Casualty Company, 129 Tex. 184, 102 S.W.2d 178 (1937); and Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Patton, 117 Tex. 1, 295 S.W. 913 (1927). These authorities, together with Rule 434, V.A.T.R. indicates to us a proper disposition of the case is remand rather than rendition.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.