Court Opinion

ID: 9376181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 22:00:22.486185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:04.896135
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 21-1515

                         UNITED STATES,

                            Appellee,

                               v.

                   STEVEN TUCKER, a/k/a CHILL,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

         [Hon. Joseph N. Laplante, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                  Kayatta, Lipez, and Thompson,
                         Circuit Judges.

     Megan A. Siddall, with whom Christina N. Lindberg and Miner
Siddall LLP were on brief, for appellant.

     Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Jane E. Young, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

                        February 23, 2023
               THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.             The defendant, Steven Tucker,

appeals    his      convictions    for       sex    trafficking    of   a   minor   (in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591), use of an interstate facility to

promote unlawful activity (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952), and

maintaining a drug-involved premises (in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 856).        In    this    direct    appeal,       Tucker   raises    two   issues:

(1) whether he was entitled to a mistrial after the trial judge

dismissed two jurors just before the jury started deliberating,

and (2) whether he is entitled to a new trial when, several weeks

after    the     jury   returned      the    guilty    verdicts,    the     government

disclosed that it had inadvertently withheld impeachment evidence

about one of its witnesses.              For the reasons we explain below, we

affirm.

                                      Background

               Before delving into the events on which the two appellate

issues     are      based,    we   hit       the    highlights     of   the   factual

underpinnings of Tucker's counts of conviction to provide a wide-

lens view of the conduct for which the jury found Tucker criminally

culpable.       See United States v. Laureano-Salgado, 933 F.3d 20, 24

(1st Cir. 2019) (explaining similar set up).                       We present "the

pertinent facts in the light most agreeable to the verdict,

deferring some details to our analysis of the issues raised on

appeal."       United States v. Blanchard, 867 F.3d 1, 3 n.1 (1st Cir.

                                            - 2 -
2017) (quoting United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.

2012)).

           The testimony at Tucker's four-day jury trial revealed

that, between October 2013 and July 2014, Tucker ran a robust

heroin trade and prostitution venture out of his address of record

on Walnut Street in Manchester, New Hampshire.                    Serving as both a

pimp and a drug dealer during this time, Tucker fed the heroin

addictions of several women, incentivizing their sex work by

withholding    or   providing       heroin        (as   well    as    withholding       or

providing food) depending on their earnings from day-to-day.                            The

testifying witnesses included a few of these women, all of whom

were in recovery and struggling to stay sober.1

           The women arranged the sex work through Backpage.com.

Now defunct, the Backpage website had allowed any user to post

advertisements      for        products     or     services,         including     under

categories    for   "adult       entertainment"         or   "escorts,"      with       the

postings   sortable       by    geographic        area.2       Jane    Doe   No.    1   v.

Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016); see also United

     1 At the time of their testimony, the women had been sober
for somewhere between several months to a couple of years. Most
also testified that they had experience with cycles of sobriety
and relapse.

     2 Backpage.com ceased to exist in 2018 after its chief
executive agreed to shut it down as part of a plea deal he
negotiated to resolve the conspiracy and money laundering charges
filed against him in federal court. Maggie Astor, Guilty Pleas
From C.E.O. of Backpage, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 2018, at A21.

                                          - 3 -
States v. Blanchard, 867 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2017).                    For $7 per

post (paid with a prepaid Visa card Tucker provided), Tucker or

one of the women posted an ad with their individual photo and phone

number and then waited for the phone to ring to schedule a time to

meet up.     Many of the sexual encounters took place at Tucker's

Walnut     Street    residence,      others     at    hotels     in    Manchester,

Massachusetts, or Rhode Island.

            The     roster   of    women   working     in   Tucker's     "stable"3

included at least nine women with two or three of them working on

any given day.      When each sexual encounter ended, the women handed

Tucker all or part of the money they had been paid, and he gave

them heroin.      At times, he also gave them money for clothes, rent,

food, and cigarettes.        One of the women estimated that she and the

others completed around five "dates" per day on weekdays and "up

to ten" on weekends, receiving hits of heroin from Tucker three or

four times a day.

            Shifting     our      attention    to    some   of   the    individual

relationships between Tucker and these women, Tucker and Jasmine4

(the underage woman on whom the government based the trafficking-

     3 In this context, "stable" means "a group of victims who are
under the control of a single pimp." Linda Smith, Renting Lacy:
A Story of America's Prostituted Children xvii (Shared Hope
International, 2009).

     4 The parties agreed at trial to refer to the witnesses by
their first names. We follow suit.

                                       - 4 -
of-a-minor count) first met when she was around 14 years old and

he was dating her aunt.    Approximately three years later, they ran

into each other and exchanged phone numbers.           At his invitation,

Jasmine visited him at the Walnut Street house.          Three days later

she posted her first ad on Backpage.      Jasmine, who had been sober

before    reencountering   Tucker,   started   using    heroin   again   --

courtesy of Tucker -- "to cover up the pain" of her sex work.            In

October 2013, Jasmine, while working for Tucker, turned 17 years

old.     Jasmine testified that Tucker knew her age at the time she

worked for him; she told Tucker how old she was and said that he

"[k]ind of avoided it" ("it" being the topic of her age).          Haley,

who both worked for Tucker and dated him during most of the time

in question, had known Jasmine was only 17 years old and also

testified that Tucker knew Jasmine's age and neither said nor did

anything about it.     Morgan, another sex worker who also had been

in a relationship with Tucker (overlapping significantly with the

same time period as Haley), also gave testimony about Tucker's

knowledge of Jasmine's age.      She told the jury that Tucker told

her Jasmine was underage during an incident in which they had all

been detained in a highway traffic stop and a needle and drugs had

been found in the car they were in.       Tucker had been angry with

Jasmine for not taking the fall for them over the drug find, given

her juvenile status.

                                 - 5 -
          After three days of witness testimony,5 the jury was set

to begin deliberating but got delayed because the trial judge found

out that a couple of jurors made comments about the case to each

other during the trial.   We will lay out all the details soon --

for now it's enough to know that the trial judge investigated the

information brought to his attention, dismissed two jurors, and

denied a mistrial motion Tucker had filed because of the alleged

juror misconduct.   The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three

indicted counts later that day. A few months later, the government

revealed to the defense that it had inadvertently failed to

disclose that one of its trial witnesses (Morgan) had been arrested

before trial on a New Hampshire drug charge.      The felony state

charge had been pending at the time of Morgan's testimony and --

also at the time of trial -- the U.S. Attorney's Office had been

considering whether to prosecute Morgan in federal court for the

same alleged drug sale conduct.    Based on this revelation, Tucker

once again moved for a new trial, which, after a hearing, the trial

judge denied. Now before this court, Tucker challenges the denials

of each of these two motions.     We start our work with the juror-

related motion for mistrial.

     5   The other trial witnesses included other sex workers
addicted to drugs, another Walnut Street house resident, the Walnut
Street house property manager, Tucker's sister, and Tucker's
nephew.

                                - 6 -
                               Juror Comments

           Bear    with   us    as    we     summarize   the   sequence      of

conversations that led to Tucker's motion for mistrial; to provide

the necessary context for Tucker's arguments we need to paint the

full picture.     By the end of the third day of trial, the defense

rested, the trial judge provided instructions to the jury, both

the prosecution and defense delivered their closing arguments, and

the court chose the alternate jurors.            The next morning, before

deliberations got underway, one of the jurors brought a concern

about   another   juror   to   the   court's    attention.     Juror   No.    1

apparently told another juror partway through Trial Day 3 that, on

the day before he had reported for jury duty, he looked up the

court schedule for the next day and, based on the schedule posted

on the court's website, guessed he had been summonsed for jury

duty in Tucker's case.     He also commented that he thought the case

was really old.

           The court investigated by speaking with Juror No. 1, who

admitted to looking at the district court's website the day before

reporting and he saw a schedule that included jury selection for

Tucker's case.    He denied discussing the case with anyone after he

was selected for Tucker's jury.         He disclosed that he had deduced

                                     - 7 -
the age of the case from the testimony about the events which had

taken place in 2013 and 2014 (the trial was held in March 2019).

          At defense counsel's request, the judge spoke with each

of the other seated jurors to determine whether they'd had any

conversations with Juror No. 1. Two of the remaining seated jurors

relayed that they had overheard another juror commenting about

looking up the court schedule, but had not known which juror had

spoken at the time or to whom.    After the judge and the attorneys

discussed what they had learned, the judge -- at Tucker's request

and over the government's objection -- dismissed Juror No. 1.    The

judge did so because this juror's demeanor during the court's

questioning of him had appeared defensive -- at times combative -

- and the judge was concerned that the questioning process may

have "impacted [Juror No. 1's] duty to be fair and impartial."

          The court then questioned the first alternate juror

(Juror No. 4) to ensure she was still qualified.    In response to

the court's inquiry about whether she knew if any jurors had

violated the court's instructions about not discussing the case or

accessing media, she said that, one day at the lunch break, as the

jurors were walking out of the courtroom, Juror No. 7 -- who Juror

No. 4 perceived throughout the trial to be "agitated" and "intense"

-- said to another male juror:       "I can't believe that.     That

witness was . . . ."   But before Juror No. 7 could complete his

thought Juror No. 4 told him to stop talking, and he did.     Juror

                                 - 8 -
No. 4 also reported that, the day before, the same Juror No. 7

said "we should be able to wrap this up today" in a tone she

understood to mean he thought the outcome was very clear.    Juror

No. 4 also heard Juror No. 7 make a "derogatory" comment about

defense counsel and when he did several jurors told him to be

quiet.    Juror No. 4 insisted that overhearing these comments had

not affected her ability to be fair and impartial.

           Based on this new information, the trial judge suggested

to the defense counsel and prosecutors that he again speak with

each juror individually to inquire about the comments Juror No. 4

reported overhearing.    In response, defense counsel moved for a

mistrial, asserting that Juror No. 7 had tainted the entire jury

pool.    Counsel argued that the juror clearly had made up his mind

and was expressing his thoughts to other jurors, had indicated he

wanted to get the trial over with, and had been described in

general as one who could have       an aggressive approach during

deliberations, all of which resulted in jury corruption.        The

government objected, commenting that defense counsel was blowing

two isolated comments out of proportion.    The court reserved its

ruling until after it had an opportunity to "examine the other

jurors" to investigate and assess whether this one juror "had

impact enough that even excusing him would not be sufficient to

alleviate any problems he may have caused."

                                - 9 -
          When called to speak with the judge and the parties,

Juror No. 7 said he had made a comment that he thought the jury

would "be here for a while" but denied making any comments about

the lawyers in the case or their performances.           The court did not

confront him directly with the statements Juror No. 4 had relayed

-- an approach both parties agreed was prudent so Juror No. 7 would

not be placed in a defensive posture.            The examination of the

remaining jurors did not turn up any other venire members who had

heard Juror No. 7's purported comments.            Nonetheless, defense

counsel renewed his motion for a mistrial, claiming one of the

jurors must have been lying.       The court disagreed, labeling Juror

No. 4's report about Juror No. 7's comments "amorphous."

          Backing   up   briefly    to   the   court's   second   round   of

speaking with each juror, Juror No. 9 did say that she'd overheard

two jurors (Nos. 1 and 11) commenting that some of the questions

defense counsel asked the witnesses sounded redundant.             By this

point, Juror No. 1 had already been dismissed, so the court only

followed up with Juror No. 11 -- the second alternate -- who did

admit to commenting at some point about the redundancy of some of

defense counsel's questions.       Tucker then insisted that a mistrial

was warranted because the factual inconsistencies which emerged

from the judge's inquiry of each juror about who said what and

when and which juror overheard something meant that "the jury has

been, you know, deliberating in some cases out loud" and Juror No.

                                   - 10 -
11 (the alternate who could replace Juror No. 7) had herself made

a   comment    about    the   redundancy   of   the   defense   counsel's

questioning.    In the alternative, the defense requested the court

discharge Juror No. 7.         The government countered there was no

indication Juror No. 7 had engaged in any actual misconduct.

          The trial judge ultimately denied the motion because,

after speaking with each juror twice, he was "thrilled" to discover

that "they followed the instructions as carefully as human beings

can generally be expected to follow them" given that it's not

"unusual for one juror to mention to another that something is

monotonous . . . I'm not surprised that occasionally a sideline

comment is made about a witness or about a lawyer and a lawyer's

effectiveness."        The judge discussed each of the comments the

jurors alleged they heard and concluded there had been no juror

misconduct because either the comment couldn't be conclusively

interpreted as pro or con prosecution or defense, the alleged

comment was not corroborated by any other panel member, or the

comment was an innocuous observation that any juror may have made.

In the judge's view, Juror No. 4 had drawn a lot of inferences

based on just a few words spoken by Juror No. 7, and whatever Juror

No. 7 said hadn't influenced any of the other jurors.             In the

judge's words:

     So I didn't see anything in these discussions with the
     jurors today that amounted to being in my view juror
     misconduct  or   manifest   necessity,   which  is   a

                                  - 11 -
       circumstance involving juror misconduct, among other
       things,   which  is   of  such   an  overwhelming  and
       unforeseeable nature that the conduct of the trial or
       reaching a fair result is impossible and which
       necessitates the declaration of a mistrial.    I don't
       think we've reached that point here.

He did grant the alternative relief Tucker requested, dismissing

Juror No. 7 over the government's objection though "not based on

misconduct but more I guess I would call it in an abundance of

caution."     The judge also found Juror No. 11 qualified to replace

Juror No. 7.

             That backdrop in place, before this court Tucker argues

that the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied the

mistrial motion.      Before examining Tucker's specific contentions

on this issue, we provide a quick primer about how trial judges

are    to   handle   suspected    juror    misconduct.     The     overarching

principle is that "an impartial jury is an integral component of

a fair trial and must be jealously safeguarded."           United States v.

Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th 1, 38 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied Rivera-

Alejandro v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 729 (2021), and cert. denied

Rivera-George v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1184 (2022), and cert.

denied Rivera-Alejandro v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1185 (2022)

(quoting Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 160 (1st Cir.

2013)).     Therefore, "the trial court has a duty to investigate

[an]   allegation    [of   jury   taint]     promptly,"   United    States   v.

Therrien, 847 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v.

                                    - 12 -
Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 289 (1st Cir. 2002)), determining first

"whether a taint-producing event actually occurred and, if so, the

extent or pervasiveness of the resulting prejudice," id. (citing

United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 258 (1st Cir. 1990)).                  "If

the   trial    court   finds    both   a   taint-producing      event   and    a

significant     potential      for   prejudice,    it   must   then   consider

possible measures to alleviate that prejudice."                  Id. (citing

Bradshaw, 281 F.3d at 289).             "If the potential for prejudice

remains too high even after the trial court's best efforts, then

the court must grant any resulting motion for a mistrial."                    Id.

(citing Bradshaw,      281 F.3d at 289).           However, "[g]ranting a

defendant's request for a mistrial is 'a last resort, only to be

implemented if the [jury] taint is ineradicable.'"              Id. (quoting

United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1184 (1st Cir. 1993))

(second alteration in original).

              "When reviewing the denial of a mistrial request, we

. . . 'consider the totality of the circumstances to determine

whether the defendant has demonstrated the kind of clear prejudice

that would render the court's denial of his motion for a mistrial

a manifest abuse of discretion.'"             Id. (quoting United States v.

Trinidad–Acosta, 773 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 2014)).                  In other

words, "[s]o long as the district judge erects, and employs, a

suitable framework for investigating the allegation and gauging

its effects, and thereafter spells out [his] findings with adequate

                                     - 13 -
specificity       to    permit    informed   appellate    review,    the   court's

'determination deserves great respect and should not be disturbed

in the absence of a patent abuse of discretion.'"                 Maldonado-Peña,

4 F.4th at 38-39 (quoting United States v. French, 977 F.3d 114,

122 (1st Cir. 2020)) (cleaned up).

                Tucker primarily attacks the trial judge's denial of the

motion for mistrial in two ways.                First, he contends the trial

judge used a standard (that of "manifest necessity") that is not

applicable when -- as here -- the defendant is the party seeking

the mistrial.6          Second, Tucker asserts the trial judge made the

wrong call about the absence of actual juror misconduct and the

lingering effect of the jurors' comments on the remaining jurors.

We'll start our work on this issue with Tucker's claim that the

trial judge applied the wrong standard to the mistrial motion.

                As summarized above, the trial judge provided a detailed

take       on   why    he   was   denying    Tucker's    motion   for   mistrial,

articulating his reasoning why he found no juror misconduct or

"manifest necessity," but dismissing two jurors anyways.                   Tucker

zeroes in on the judge's use of the phrase "manifest necessity."

      Manifest necessity is the standard applied to determine
       6

whether the government is entitled to a mistrial over the
defendant's objection. See United States v. McIntosh, 380 F.3d
548, 553 (1st Cir. 2004). "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause . . .
bar[s] retrial of a defendant after a mistrial ordered over the
defendant's objection unless the mistrial was occasioned by
manifest necessity." Id.

                                       - 14 -
This phrase is relevant when a court must determine whether the

Double Jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution bars a retrial

after a mistrial is ordered over a defendant's objection; double

jeopardy principles do not bar a retrial, however, when "the

mistrial was occasioned by manifest necessity" -- e.g., a hung

jury.     United States v. Brown, 426 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2005)

(quoting United States v. McIntosh, 380 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir.

2004)).    When a defendant is the party requesting a mistrial then

he or she is "ordinarily . . . deemed to have waived any subsequent

claim of double jeopardy" and so the manifest necessity standard

does not come into play.     McIntosh, 380 F.3d at 554; see United

States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976) (stating "[d]ifferent

considerations obtain . . . when the mistrial has been declared at

the defendant's request").    Here, Tucker moved for the mistrial,

so he is correct -- the manifest necessity consideration is not

applicable here.

            But our analysis does not end there.    The record reveals

a couple of hitches with Tucker's attack on the trial judge's use

of this inappropriate standard as an error:        Not only did he not

object to the use of this standard below, he (as the government

points out) actually invited the judge to use it, kicking off his

argument for a mistrial with "Frankly, you know the standard is

manifest necessity."    The trial judge's mention of the standard

was clearly invited by the defense and Tucker may not now benefit

                               - 15 -
from an invited error.       See United States v. Gottesfeld, 18 F.4th

1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2021) (concluding waiver applied to an appellate

argument about why an attorney's motions to withdraw should have

been granted after the defendant/appellant had asked the trial

judge to deny these motions); United States v. Amaro-Santiago, 824

F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting the defendant's challenge

on appeal to the trial court's delayed issuance of a curative

instruction because the defendant had asked the court to hold off

until the next day).         Regardless, the trial judge did not rely

solely on determining whether there was "manifest necessity" for

a mistrial. Rather, he reasoned through all the information before

him, concluded there was no misconduct, implemented corrective

measures   out   of   (his   words)   "an   abundance   of   caution,"   and

determined the remaining jurors were not influenced by the comments

of the dismissed jurors.7

     7 Anticipating the government's response to his challenge to
the standard on which he contends the trial judge impermissibly
relied, Tucker also argues that the government waived any argument
that the trial judge adjudicated the motion for mistrial using the
appropriate standard. This is so because, according to Tucker,
the government suggested to the trial judge that this court could
decide the juror misconduct issue in the first instance. We read
the record differently. The government, while arguing against the
defendant's bid for a mistrial, asserted that whichever way the
trial judge ruled there would be no downside to Tucker -- i.e., if
the court granted the motion then Tucker would get a retrial, and
if the court denied the motion then the issue was undoubtedly
preserved for appeal so if this court decided the trial judge
abused his discretion then Tucker would get a retrial.         The
government was not asking the trial judge to punt the issue to
this court to take the first pass on it.         Moreover, as the

                                  - 16 -
           Shifting to Tucker's second line of attack on the denial

of his juror related mistrial motion, he asserts that even if the

judge could be viewed as having applied the right standard, his

finding that there was no juror misconduct was clearly wrong

because "[t]here is evidence in the record that some jurors engaged

in predeliberation or were biased and that others were exposed to

that predeliberation and bias."              Tucker highlights the trial

judge's discussion of three statements allegedly made by Juror No.

7 that were -- as the judge put it -- "problematic enough to

require our attention": (1) that "the case should wrap up quickly,"

(2) a "disparaging comment about defense counsel" in comparison to

the prosecutors, and (3) the incomplete statement of "I can't

believe that.   That witness" before Juror No. 4 shut him up.             The

way Tucker sees it, these three statements indicated prejudice

against the defense and the trial judge could not be confident the

other jurors were not affected by these comments.                  So, from

Tucker's   vantage,   the   judge    should    have   concluded   there   was

misconduct.

government states in its responsive brief, if the trial court had
understood the government to be requesting that it punt on the
issue, the trial judge clearly did not embrace this suggestion.
The judge's denial of the mistrial motion was based on his
conclusion that there was no misconduct but that it could and did
take remedial measures to remove any possible taint from the jurors
who had made comments heard by others.

                                    - 17 -
           Tucker also argues that the remedial measures taken by

the judge -- excusing the two jurors and asking the remaining

jurors if they could remain impartial -- failed to cure the

problem.   As his reasoning goes, the judge could not be 100% sure

that the comments did not affect the remaining jurors and therefore

the taint could not be completely cured.

           The government rejoins that even if the judge was clearly

wrong to conclude there was no juror misconduct, there was no

effect on Tucker because the judge dismissed the two offending

jurors.    The government also points out that the judge conducted

a thorough investigation into the allegations about the comments

and found no evidence that other jurors were affected.

           Our review of the record shows that the trial judge

carefully considered the comments that Juror No. 4 reported she

overheard Juror No. 7 utter and reasonably concluded there were "a

lot of inferences and leaps involved in that that are not explicit

in the record and that were not corroborated by any other juror."

We note that while Juror No. 4 reported that several jurors shushed

Juror No. 7 after she heard him make a disparaging comment about

defense counsel, none of the other jurors, when asked, said they

heard the comment.   And all reaffirmed their ability to render a

fair and impartial verdict.

           Our review of the record also shows the trial judge bent

over backwards, likely doing more than was minimally necessary

                               - 18 -
when a credible claim of jury misconduct is brought to the court's

attention.      With diligence and sensitivity, he questioned each

juror at least twice and thoughtfully considered whether the

information his inquiries unearthed meant Tucker was entitled to

a   mistrial.     In   addressing    Tucker's   concerns,    he   reasonably

exercised his discretion to excuse two jurors -- eliminating the

potential for them to behave improperly during deliberations.

Further, we perceive no       patent abuse of discretion with            his

ultimate conclusion that the remaining jurors were still qualified

to deliberate and that mistrial was unwarranted.            He even went so

far as to read the transcript of his conversation with Juror No.

11 to himself and then into the record before securing both

parties' agreement that Juror No. 11 was qualified to deliberate

as a member of the jury.     See Therrien, 847 F.3d at 18 ("Given the

circumstances, we are reassured that the trial court's inquiry and

repeated warnings effectively ascertained the extent and degree of

any prejudice suffered by Therrien, mitigated the effects of that

prejudice, and was 'appropriate and reasonable.'" (quoting United

States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72, 86 (1st Cir. 2000))); see also

Maldonado-Peña, 4 F.4th at 39-40 (concluding the trial judge's

careful and thoughtful consideration of a jury's potential bias

revealed through a note sent to the judge during trial resulted in

a "reasonable and appropriately measured" response); Therrien, 847

                                    - 19 -
F.3d at 18 n.11 (collecting cases addressing a trial judge's abuse

of discretion vel non in denying a motion for mistrial).

              On the whole, the reported juror misconduct was quite

minimal.      As the experienced trial judge aptly observed, it is

hardly a cause for any heightened concern that a juror might

briefly comment about the lawyers or the pace of the trial.               There

was no suggestion that any juror was biased against any group or

person.    Nor was there a suggestion that a juror misled the court

in voir dire.     Nor was there any claim that material, extra-record

information was involved.

                       Suppressed Impeachment Evidence

              In Tucker's second challenge to his convictions, he says

he   was   entitled     to   a   new   trial    because   the   government   had

suppressed impeachment information about one of its witnesses.

              This information came to Tucker's attention when, a

couple of months after the jury returned the guilty verdicts,

Tucker sent a written request to the government for "evidence

probative to all sentencing issues."            In its written response, the

government (memorializing a phone call it had already made to

defense counsel) disclosed that it had "inadvertently failed to

disclose possible impeachment information about" Morgan                    (who,

recall, testified about dating and working for Tucker as well as

about   the    other    women    who   worked   for   him).     The   government

explained that the prosecutors had known prior to the trial that

                                       - 20 -
Morgan "had been arrested on state drug charges by the Manchester,

NH Police Department" but, at that time, had not intended to call

her to testify at Tucker's trial and so had not included her on

its witness list or disclosed her arrest to Tucker.          A week before

trial, the government decided to call Morgan to testify but, "in

the whirlwind of trial preparation," forgot to disclose the state

arrest and charge information to Tucker. The letter also explained

that, approximately six weeks after trial, one of the federal

prosecutors noticed Morgan's name on an initial appearance hearing

calendar in the federal courthouse and "learned for the first time"

that his office had filed an indictment against Morgan based on

the state charge for the sale of one gram of fentanyl to one of

Manchester police's confidential sources.

           In response, Tucker filed a motion for new trial pursuant

to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33,8 asserting that the

failure to disclose Morgan's pretrial arrest, state charge, and

possible   prosecution   by   the    federal   government9   violated   the

     8 Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows
the district court, "[u]pon the defendant's motion" to "vacate any
judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so
requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). The discovery of new evidence
falls squarely within this rule and "must be filed within 3 years
after the verdict."   Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1).    Tucker timely
filed his motion 7 months after the jury returned the guilty
verdicts.

     9 Morgan's state felony charge was referred to the U.S.
Attorney's Office shortly after her arrest by the Manchester Police
Department, but the federal prosecutors (different prosecutors to

                                    - 21 -
government's obligations under Brady and Giglio,10 and arguing that

if this impeachment evidence had been disclosed prior to trial

then Tucker would have had a reasonable likelihood of a not guilty

verdict.11   The government did not dispute that it suppressed

"potential impeachment evidence" about Morgan but stressed the

"inadvertent" nature of the suppression and contended Tucker had

not been prejudiced by the nondisclosure because the evidence had

little impeachment value when examined against the trial judge's

pre-trial evidentiary rulings (in which he indicated he would allow

cross-examination about witnesses' prior convictions and pending

the ones responsible for Tucker's prosecution) did not decide to
pursue a federal charge against her until after Tucker's trial
ended.
     10 "Under Brady, the government offends due process if it
causes prejudice to the defendant by 'either willfully or
inadvertently' suppressing 'exculpatory or impeaching' evidence in
its custody or control that is 'favorable to the accused.'" United
States v. Peake, 874 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United
States v. Connolly, 504 F.3d 206, 212 (1st Cir. 2007)); see
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).         As we've
observed, in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972),
"the Supreme Court applied Brady's disclosure obligation to
'information   potentially    useful  in   impeaching    government
witnesses.'" United States v. Calderón, 829 F.3d 84, 88 n.3 (1st
Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Misla–Aldarondo, 478 F.3d 52,
63 (1st Cir. 2007)).
     11 Tucker also argued in his Rule 33 motion that he was
entitled to a new trial on the combined basis of the Giglio
violation, other alleged less-than-timely discovery disclosures
prior to trial, trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance
during Morgan's cross-examination, and allowing all the witnesses
to be referred to by their first names only. These other alleged
grounds for Tucker's motion are not carried forward in his
appellate arguments.

                              - 22 -
charges but not prior arrests), the admitted impeachment evidence,

and other overwhelming testimony corroborating Morgan's.

          Following a hearing, the trial judge denied Tucker's

motion, acknowledging the failure to disclose the pending charges

against Morgan likely denied Tucker "the opportunity to truly cross

[her] about that pro-[g]overnment bias" but also stating that these

impeachment points "would [not] have been significantly augmented

by cross-examination using the inadvertently withheld evidence."

The judge concluded that:

     [F]urther evidence about a pending charge wouldn't have
     added much to Tucker's impeachment of Morgan's
     credibility [because t]here was already evidence that
     she was testifying under immunity both on direct and
     cross[,] . . . evidence that she lied to . . . [p]olice,
     that she had a drug addiction, . . . was a drug addict,
     had a prior conviction on her record.

In   addition,    he   found   that   Morgan's   testimony   had   been

"significantly corroborated" for each element of the three charges

against Tucker.     The judge also expressed his frustration at the

sequence of events that led to the inadvertent suppression of the

evidence and the resulting questions the defendant and the public

could reasonably have about the fairness of the trial process,

even though his confidence in the outcome of the trial ultimately

was not shaken.12

     12We agree. Of the two issues Tucker brings to us this one
is more troubling. Tucker spills a little ink arguing that the
trial judge should not have denied the new trial motion because
the judge himself thought Tucker was entitled to a new trial.

                                 - 23 -
            On appeal, Tucker asserts the trial judge's decision to

deny the new trial motion was simply wrong.                   In our review of

Tucker's claimed error, we review the trial judge's denial of a

new-trial motion for abuse of discretion, finding such "only when

no reasonable person could agree with the judge's decision."

Laureano-Salgado, 933 F.3d at 29.             "This is as it should be," id.,

the trial judge "has a special sense of the ebb and flow of the

trial . . . [so] we afford substantial deference to the [judge's]

views   regarding      the      likely     impact    of    belatedly      disclosed

evidence," United States v. Peake, 874 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 2017)

(deletion and citations omitted).             "We also keep in mind that the

new-trial   remedy     'must      be   used   sparingly,     and   only    where   a

miscarriage      of   justice     would    otherwise      result.'"       Laureano-

Salgado, 933 F.3d at 29 (quoting United States v. Conley, 249 F.3d

38, 45 (1st Cir. 2001)).

            To    prevail    on    a     new-trial   motion    based      on   newly

discovered evidence, ordinarily the defendant must show "that the

Tucker is referring to the judge's comment that "if it were . . .
'up to me' I'd order a new trial." The way Tucker interprets this
comment, the judge thought "there was a reasonable probability of
a different result." But when the judge's full comment is read in
the context of his decision denying Tucker's motion for a new
trial, it's clear this statement was part of his express
frustration with the prosecutors and with the situation created by
their unintentional suppression of the impeachment evidence, and
that the judge was simply acknowledging that a feeling of
unfairness could linger for Tucker.

                                       - 24 -
evidence (1) was either unknown or unavailable to him during the

trial; (2) could not have been uncovered sooner with diligence;

(3) is material, not just cumulative or impeaching; and (4) is

sufficiently     compelling      that     it   would   probably    produce    an

acquittal at a retrial."         Id. at 28 (string citing cases parroting

this well-established standard).           This court has acknowledged this

is "a hefty burden" for the defendant.           Id.   When, however (and as

here), the defendant's new-trial motion is based on an alleged

Brady or Giglio violation, the third and fourth prongs are merged

and   tweaked,   creating    a     more   defendant-friendly      standard    for

showing the defendant's prejudice. To be sure, the defendant "must

still satisfy the first and second elements (unavailability and

due diligence)," but "the third and fourth elements (materiality

and prejudice) [are replaced] with 'a unitary requirement that the

defendant need demonstrate only a reasonable probability that, had

the evidence been disclosed to the defense in a timely manner, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.'"                  Id. at 28-

29 (quoting Peake, 874 F.3d at 69).              "So rather than having to

show 'actual probability that the result would have differed,' a

defendant   need   show     only    'something    sufficient      to   undermine

confidence' in the jury's verdict."              Id. at 29 (quoting United

States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 504 (1st Cir. 2010)) (additional

internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                     - 25 -
            Both sides agree that the first two elements (evidence

was unknown to the defendant during the trial through no lack of

diligence on his part) are met.              The point of contention centers

on the merged inquiry into materiality and prejudice and whether

there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial

would have been different if Morgan's pending state charge and

potential prosecution by the feds had been disclosed prior to

trial.     As the parties argue, this merged materiality/prejudice

inquiry    turns   on    four   factors       distilled   from     our   previous

discussions      and    assessments     of     the   "reasonable     likelihood"

standard:     Whether the impeachment evidence (1) is strong, (2)

impeaches on a collateral issue,                (3) is cumulative of other

evidence    on   the    record,   and     (4)    the   impeachable       witness's

substantive testimony is corroborated by other evidence in the

record.     See United States v. Paladin, 748 F.3d 438, 444-48 (1st

Cir. 2014). As we have said before, "[t]he strength of impeachment

evidence and the effect of suppression are evaluated in the context

of the entire record to determine materiality," id. at 444 (citing

Conley, 415 F.3d at 189), "[e]vidence is immaterial where it is

cumulative or merely impeaches a witness on a collateral issue,"

id. (citing United States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.

2000)), and "suppressed impeachment evidence has little probative

value if additional evidence strongly corroborates the witness's

                                      - 26 -
testimony    the     suppressed         evidence      might     have   impeached,"      id.

(quoting Conley, 415 F.3d at 189).

            Tucker     argues       each       factor    cuts    in    his    favor;   the

government    disagrees       for       all    but    one   factor.      We    start   our

discussion with the factor on which the parties do agree:                              that

the suppressed impeachment evidence was not collateral.                          Evidence

is collateral when it is not "relevant for a purpose other than

mere   contradiction         of    the    .     . .    [witness's]     . . .     in-court

testimony."    Id. at 448 (quoting United States v. Beauchamp, 986

F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993)).                   This court has indicated, however,

that a "witness's self-interest or motive to testify falsely is

generally considered to be a non-collateral issue."                            Beauchamp,

986 F.2d at 4.        Tucker contends that the suppressed impeachment

evidence was not merely collateral because it went directly to

Morgan's credibility as a key witness and that, without this

impeachment    evidence,          the    jury    was    left    with    the    misleading

impression that she had no ongoing motive for bias in favor of

pleasing the government. The government agrees that the suppressed

information here is not collateral.                     We agree with the parties,

see id., and move on.

            The strength of the suppressed evidence factor considers

whether the impeachment value is "merely marginal."                          Paladin, 748

F.3d at 444 (quoting Mathur, 624 F.3d at 505).                         If the value is

marginal,     then     the        withheld      evidence       will    be     "manifestly

                                          - 27 -
insufficient to place the trial record in 'such a different light

as to undermine confidence in the verdict.'"   Id. (quoting Mathur,

624 F.3d at 505).     Tucker again asserts that the suppressed

impeachment evidence would have revealed the depth of Morgan's

potential for bias in that Tucker was denied the opportunity to

argue "that her criminal conduct was ongoing and that she had a

reason to shade her testimony in favor of the government."      He

says that the district court was wrong to conclude that the

suppressed evidence wouldn't have increased any doubt of Morgan's

credibility because a motive for bias at the time of the trial

testimony is different than other forms of bias inherent to a

witness as a result of their life experiences (e.g., Morgan's drug

addiction and previous convictions).

          For its part, the government contends that the potential

impeachment value of the suppressed evidence was "weak" because

the jury actually heard Morgan had a pending felony charge at the

time of her testimony (though not the nature of the charge or that

it was a state case and not (yet) also a federal prosecution) and

her acknowledgment that her testimony in this case wouldn't affect

the result of that pending charge.        Here's how some of the

questioning played out at trial:      At the beginning of Morgan's

testimony, the government asked her about her criminal history.

     Q. Now, you have a conviction for felony possession of
     drugs; is that right?
     A. Yes.

                             - 28 -
      Q.   And was there an occasion in Las Vegas where you
      gave a false name to a law enforcement officer?
      A. Yes.
      Q. And you currently have a pending felony, right?
      A. Yes.
      Q. And is it your understanding that no promises are
      being made in exchange for your pending felony?
      A. Yes.
      Q. So, you understand that your testimony today is not
      going to impact that, right?
      A. Yes.

      . . .

      Q.   Okay.    So, Morgan, I'm going to ask you some
      questions that, if you answer them truthfully, may
      incriminate you.
      A.   Okay.
      Q.   And you are aware that you've been given immunity
      today, right?
      A.   Yes.
      Q.   So, you won't be prosecuted for what you testify
      about today. Do you understand that?
      A.   Yes.
      Q.   But you also understand that you must testify
      truthfully today?
      A.   Yes.

In   addition,   partway   through   Morgan's   direct   testimony,   she

answered questions about the time New Hampshire police pulled over

a car she was riding in and she "got arrested with [Tucker's]

drugs."

           Tucker's cross-examination did not ask any follow-up

questions about her conviction or pending felony charge.       Instead,

the cross focused on Morgan's activities while working for Tucker

and primarily explored why she had not told the police (when she

had contact with them) about the harm she claimed she suffered

                                - 29 -
from him as well as whether she worked for another pimp during the

same time period she worked for Tucker.

          Responding to Tucker's assertions about the strength of

the suppressed impeachment evidence, the trial judge called it

"not particularly strong," a characterization we agree with given

that the jury heard the fact of the pending felony charge and

Tucker had an opportunity (even if he didn't use it) to explore it

during cross.      See Paladin, 748 F.3d at 444 (confidence in a

verdict is not undermined by suppressed impeachment evidence of

marginal value).     The trial judge next examined whether the new

information was cumulative of impeachment evidence in the trial

record   or     whether   Morgan's   testimony     was   significantly

corroborated.    We examine these factors next.

          Starting    with   cumulativeness,   "[s]uppressed   evidence

that is cumulative of evidence presented at trial is immaterial."

Paladin, 748 F.3d at 446 (quoting United States v. Avilés-Colón,

536 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2008)).          The inquiry here focuses on

whether the witness to whom the withheld impeachment evidence

applies was "already impeached at trial by the same kind of

evidence."    Id. (quoting Conley, 415 F.3d at 192) (deletion and

emphasis omitted).

          Tucker argues the suppressed information about Morgan's

pending charge was not cumulative of other impeachment evidence

presented at trial as the government itself asked Morgan whether

                                 - 30 -
she had any prior convictions or contact with the justice system.

Morgan answered by admitting to a few prior run-ins with the law.

She acknowledged a prior conviction for felony possession of drugs,

a time when she had given a false name to a police officer in

Vegas, and to a pending felony charge, though the government did

not ask for details of any of these contacts with the justice

system and Morgan did not offer any additional details.            Tucker

homes in on the difference between using a prior conviction to

impeach Morgan's credibility and a pending prosecution as motive

for testifying in a way that will please the government.        The pro-

government bias is even worse here, says Tucker, because the same

office prosecuting Tucker had been considering prosecuting Morgan

for the conduct underlying the state felony drug charge that Morgan

knew was pending at the time of trial.         Tucker insists that his

trial   defense   counsel   would   have   structured   Morgan's   cross-

examination differently had this key impeachment evidence not been

suppressed.

           Not so fast, counters the government.        Morgan could only

be biased in favor of making a good impression on the federal

prosecutors if she knew they (or their office) were considering

their own prosecution based on the alleged conduct underlying her

pending state charge, but there was no indication that she knew

before or during her trial testimony that her state charge had

been referred to the U.S. Attorney's office. Regardless, continues

                                - 31 -
the government, the jury knew Morgan was testifying under an

immunity agreement,13 so it was aware that Morgan had a current

relationship with the prosecution and a reason to curry favor with

it.   The additional information about the possibility of a federal

charge was therefore, according to the government, cumulative of

all the other impeachment fodder indisputably on the record.

           We believe the government has the better argument here.

Whether or not Tucker picked up on the pending felony inquiry

during Morgan's direct examination, he knew about the immunity

agreement and the potential bias this could create because Morgan

would be motivated on this front to keep the government happy.14

       The trial judge provided a special instruction to the jury
      13

after Haley's testimony and before Morgan's about what it means to
testify under the promise of immunity and reiterated the
instruction after Morgan's testimony: "[Y]ou should determine
whether or not the witness's testimony has been colored in any way
because of the grant of immunity."

      14We also note that the trial judge explicitly indicated
pending charges were ripe fodder for challenging a witness's
credibility during cross-examination. During the final pre-trial
conference, the trial judge (when discussing the admissibility of
prior convictions and pending charges) said that "pending charges
go to bias, go to credibility, even if it's in another
jurisdiction. . . . [I]t's fair cross-examination to ask a witness
if they are facing criminal charges somewhere and the usual follow-
up about wanting to curry favor with law enforcement. . . . [Y]ou
can inquire as to pending charges on cross-examination but not as
to the nature of those charges." Morgan testified two days later.
There is no doubt that Tucker had several bases for impeaching
Morgan's credibility. That he did not either explore or exploit
the information about her then-pending charge does not help Tucker
meet his burden to show a reasonable probability that had the
suppressed evidence been revealed before or during trial, the jury

                               - 32 -
See Paladin, 748 F.3d at 447 ("A prejudicial Brady violation has

not   been   effected,   however,    where      the    defendant   already   had

available to him evidence that would have allowed for impeachment

on the same or similar topics.")          As in Paladin, the details (if

deemed admissible at trial) about Morgan's pending state felony

and referral to the federal prosecutors for consideration "would

have permitted one additional avenue to accomplish" showing the

jury that Morgan had a motive to testify in a way to please the

government and was, thus, not a credible witness.                  See id.    We

therefore    agree   with   the   trial   judge's        conclusion   that   the

suppressed evidence was cumulative of other impeachment evidence.

             We proceed now to the last factor of our four-point

inquiry:     Corroboration.       As we mentioned above, "[s]uppressed

impeachment evidence has little probative value if additional

evidence     strongly    corroborates     the    witness's     testimony     the

suppressed evidence might have impeached."                Id. at 448 (quoting

Conley, 415 F.3d at 189).      Tucker stresses that Morgan's testimony

was crucial to the count for trafficking of a minor because she

was the only witness to provide any detail about how Tucker knew

or should have known that Jasmine was a minor during the time

would have reached a different verdict.               See Paladin, 748 F.3d at
447.

                                    - 33 -
period in question.15      The government responds that both Jasmine

and   Haley    provided   corroborative   testimony   that   Tucker   knew

Jasmine was underage, so the jury could easily have reached the

same verdict even if it ultimately discredited Morgan's testimony.

Let's take a look at what evidence the trial produced on the issue

of corroboration.

              As we summarized above, Morgan testified that Tucker

told her Jasmine was only 17 years old after the three had been

stopped on the highway and Morgan got arrested for the drugs found

in the backseat of the car.     Tucker was "pissed" because the needle

found in the backseat had been Jasmine's, but she hadn't fessed up

to claim ownership. Morgan understood from Tucker that had Jasmine

owned up then she wouldn't have been in much trouble because of

her age (i.e., she would have been treated as a juvenile offender).

When Jasmine was on the stand, she testified that she had told

Tucker her age and he "kind of avoided it."       Haley, for her part,

testified that when she learned Jasmine was underage, she tried to

talk to Tucker about it but he "told me that she was of age and I

      15During the trial judge's oral decision denying Tucker's
motion for new trial, he went through each element of each count
and stated which witness had also provided testimony from which
the jury could have concluded the element had been met. As the
government points out, Tucker only argues about the lack of
corroboration with respect to the knowledge element of the
trafficking-of-a-minor count, so we follow his lead and examine
whether there was in fact corroborating testimony on this element
only.

                                 - 34 -
got into an argument with him."     She then stated she was present

when he did find out Jasmine was in fact underage and said he did

not do anything with the information.

          Tucker tries to convince us that Haley and Jasmine's

testimonies   cannot   be   considered   corroborative   of   Morgan's

testimony because Morgan provided greater detail about Tucker's

knowledge.    While neither Haley nor Jasmine provided a detailed

context for Tucker knowing Jasmine was underage, each directly

stated that she was present when he learned Jasmine's age.16     This

is consistent with Morgan's testimony that, during the relevant

time period, Tucker knew Jasmine's age, even if not exactly

duplicative of his acknowledgement of his knowledge.      The absence

of the detail in Haley's and Jasmine's testimonies does not detract

from their uncontroverted statements that Tucker knew Jasmine's

age and corroborated Morgan's testimony on this point.17

     16When the trial judge discussed the testimony in the record
that corroborated Morgan's, he mentioned Haley "testif[ied] that
Jasmine couldn't buy cigarettes because she was under 18," but, as
Tucker has been quick to point out, this is a part of Haley's
testimony to which the judge had sustained an objection on hearsay
grounds. Tucker suggests this was a clearly wrong finding of fact
on which the trial judge relied. A close look at Haley's testimony
reveals she made that comment when she was describing when and how
she knew Jasmine was underage. So the judge's misrecollection of
the record has no bearing on what Tucker knew and when, but Haley's
other (and admitted) testimony corroborated Morgan's about the
fact of Tucker's knowledge.

     17We also acknowledge that, during cross-examination of these
witnesses, Tucker's trial counsel may have, for strategic reasons,
not wanted to probe the testimony about Tucker's knowledge of

                                - 35 -
            Summing up the factors in controversy, we find the

suppressed       impeachment    evidence    about     Morgan     was    immaterial

because the evidentiary strength was weak, the information about

her pending state charge and her potential federal charge was

merely cumulative of other impeachment evidence on the record, and

Morgan's     testimony     about     Jasmine's       age     was      sufficiently

corroborated by other witnesses.            See id. at 444.            Accordingly,

though     the    undisclosed     information       was    not      collateral   we

nonetheless conclude that its suppression does not undermine the

confidence in the jury's guilty verdicts because there was not a

reasonable probability of a different outcome had the government

produced    the    information    about    Morgan's       pending    state   charge

before or during trial.         See id. at 450.      The trial judge did not,

therefore, abuse his discretion when he denied Tucker's motion for

a new trial.       See Laureano-Salgado, 933 F.3d at 28-29.

                                   Last Words

            All that is left to say is Tucker's convictions are

affirmed.

Jasmine's age and the circumstances surrounding his knowledge.
But the weight to be given to properly admitted evidence was up to
the jury. See United States v. Cruz-Ramos, 987 F.3d 27, 38 (1st
Cir. 2021) ("[D]etermining where the truth lies is the sort of
work that falls squarely within the jury's province." (quoting
United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 46 (1st Cir. 2007))).

                                    - 36 -