Court Opinion

ID: 9765581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:08:10.410769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:11.807283
License: Public Domain

STONE, Judge.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and the verdict [Grimm v. Gargis, Mo., 303 S.W.2d 43, 52—53(16), 74 A.L.R.2d 599; Horrell v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo., 277 S.W.2d 612, 618(12)], and having due regard for the important considerations bearing upon the question as to whether the verdict was excessive [Kiger v. Terminal R. Ass’n of St. Louis, Mo., 311 S.W.2d 5, 15(19); Rodefeld v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo., 275 S.W.2d 256, 262(11, 12)], examination of many cases dealing with this problem (notwithstanding that no two cases are poured in the same factual mold) impels the conclusion on my part that, even in this period of easy money and continuing inflation, the verdict was grossly excessive and, with respect for the rule of reasonable uniformity of awards for similar injuries and disabilities, a judgment for more than $7,500 cannot be justified and should not be permitted to stand. Agreeing with the holding in the principal opinion that nothing indicates misconduct by the jury in assessing damages in an excessive amount as a result of bias and prejudice [Skadal v. Brown, Mo., 351 S.W.2d 684, 690(14)] and thus that the mistake in returning an excessive verdict can be cured and corrected without a new trial, I would require, as a condition to affirmance, a re-mittitur in the sum of $5,000. For that reason alone, I dissent.