Court Opinion

ID: 9719596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:56:54.191997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:31.270342
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Crumlish, Jr. :
I join in portions of Judge Rogers’ Dissenting-Opinion but respectfully and emphatically express my disagreement with the tone and legal conclusions of the majority.
I.
A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and Diligently.1
In the discharge of our adjudicative responsibilities, we are admonished to exercise total independence in fidelity to the law, to be unswayed by partisan interests, adverse criticism, public clamor, peer pressure or popular acclamation. The Court’s extended apology which precedes the substance of its opinion erroneously ignores the diligence and impartiality which the Canon commands. Being uncompromisingly committed to this principle, I must take exception.
Further, before I assert my disagreement with its conclusions, I must challenge the reasoning by which the majority reaches those conclusions. On page one, it writes, “we must not permit this personal experience to influence our legal conclusions.”
While I grant its verity as relating to the process of unbiased decision making, I must reject this reason*571ing when it is utilized to ignore the uncontradicted recorded facts; for it is the responsibility of the Judiciary to apply the known certainty of the law to the record — no more, no less.
Judges, by definition, are human beings who have gifts of sense, emotion and reason which enable them to formulate judgments guided only by the ordained precepts of law. In attempting to resolve conflicts, we must always be conscious of this simple truism.
Succinctly stated, the issue confronting this Court is whether the financial remuneration of trial Judges of this Commonwealth is inadequate, the consequence of which must be the breakdown of the judicial machinery. Adequacy of compensation and the potential for serious impairment of judicial independence are not abstractions to be measured in a vacuum, but must be microscopically examined in terms of the responsibilities which face a jurist because of juridical position, societal demand and familial ties. His marital status, number of dependents, educational demands, geographic situs and standing in the community are all necessary factors to consider in assessing financial security, competence to faithfully execute duties independently, and the ability of the bench to continue to attract able jurists.
Therefore, unlike the majority, I cannot ignore human nature, and I bedrock my legal conclusions upon the uncontroverted facts of record and the natural inferences therefrom, which lead me to the only conclusion that compensation as presently provided is so inadequate as to jeopardize the unfettered perpetuation of judicial remedy.
II. Adequacy oe Compensation
A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary2
*572I adopt the cogent legal analysis of Judge Rogers. However, additional comment is in order and I will address the fallacious standard of proof imposed upon the petitioners. The majority, if I follow its reasoning correctly, insists that petitioners demonstrate, by a series of events, that the erosion of judicial compensation has threatened or impaired the efficiency and independence of the Judiciary or caused an immediate and irreparable collapse of the judicial branch.
In addition, it holds that evidence of inadequacy of the petitioners’ compensation vis-a-vis their peers on the District Court of the United States and private practitioners; difficulty in recruiting and retaining able jurists; the unprecedented astronomical rise in the cost of living; and detailed revelation of serious, devastating economic sacrifices which trial judges must make as a part of their public service do not carry this burden.
This standard, in my judgment, goes beyond the instruction of Glancey v. Casey, 447 Pa. 77, 288 A.2d 812 (1972), blindly ignores the preventative nature of that instruction, and patently violates the Code of Judicial Conduct’s exhortation to protect and defend the independence of the Courts.
'The mandate requiring an “adequate compensation” to be provided for all “services” required of these judges is as imperative as that which prohibits its diminution during their continuance in office. The first is as obligatory as the last, springing equally with it from the great frame of government established by the people themselves as the paramount law, which neither legislators, governors, nor judges are at liberty to disregard. . . . It is for the safety of the people and not for the benefit of the judges that the latter were protected from legislative usurpation. To insure their independence it was as *573necessary to provide that they “shall receive an adequate compensation for their services ” as to declare that the compensation when “fixed by law” shall not be “diminished during their continuance in office. ” ’ (Emphasis added.)
Glancey v. Casey, 447 Pa. at 86, 288 A.2d at 816-17, citing In Re Courts of Lancaster, 4 Clark 439 (1849).
More importantly, by requiring that petitioners show judicial impairment by evidence of strikes, slowdowns, and other grievance mechanisms utilized in the private sector, the majority impinges upon the constitutionally-protected right of access to the Courts provided in Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution :
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.... (Emphasis added.)
By oath, I swore to uphold this Commonwealth’s Constitution, and I cannot uphold a principle of judicial writing which would violate any section of this Constitution.
Therefore, I agree with Judge Rogers’ interpretation of Glancey that judicial compensation must be constitutionally adequate; that stipulated facts unequivocally provide support for petitioners’ position; and that any result which would extend the burden of proof or place irrational demands upon the Judiciary to demonstrate more than inadequacy is fallacious, unreasonable and unconstitutional.
III. Reduction in Judicial Compensation
Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be compensated by the Commonwealth as provided by law. Their compensation shall not be *574diminished during their terms of office, unless by law applying generally to all salaried officers of the Commonwealth.3
Likewise, I reject the majority’s holding that petitioners’ compensation has not been “diminished” in violation of Article 5, Section 16(a) of the Constitution. The stipulated facts and affidavits in this record unequivocally establish that the- current inflationary spiral has caused a substantial lessening of judicial buying power,4 and that the Judiciary has suffered greater than any other class at the hands of the legislature, which from time to time has approved additional compensation for other salaried officers of the Commonwealth. The majority, however, would require for remedy either a direct legislative act diminishing judicial salaries or, as in this case, indirect action having as its purpose or intent the singling out of the Judiciary. The clear language of the Constitution does not distinguish between direct and indirect legislative action and provides that judicial compensation may not be diminished unless by law applying generally to all salaried Commonwealth officials.
IV. The Relief Sought
Finally, the majority would dismiss petitioners’ action for failure to join the proper parties. Again, I disagree. It is the function of the Court Administrator to prepare requisitions for judicial compensation payments, and the Treasurer to make payment upon receipt of these requisitions. Clearly, these parties have *575the power and duty to provide the requested relief. If insufficient funds are available in the general fund to provide for such increases, then the duty lies with the Court Administrator and Treasurer to mandamus the legislature to appropriate additional funds.
Putting aside all fears, I would order respondents to execute the required vouchers for services rendered as provided in the report of the Commonwealth Compensation Commission to be calculated from the effective date provided in that report.

 Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.

 Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1.

 Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. 5, §16(a).

 During the period June 30, 1972-June 30, 1979, salaries of associate Judges of Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas were adjusted by 12.5%. The cost-of-living index prepared by the United States Department of Labor shows a cost-of-living increase of 55.7% for the period 1972-1978, and a 73.3% cost-of-living increase for the period June 30,1972-June 30,1979.