Court Opinion

ID: 9543434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:45:37.226774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:21.014165
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LUND, dissenting: I dissent from the majority opinion and suggest my brethren’s misinterpretation of the drainage cases cited in their opinion and in this dissent. In applying the discovery rule to the facts of this case, the trial court was aware that the plaintiffs first knew of the injury in 1977. It was apparent, because of no problem with flooding before the bridge construction, that the subsequent recurrent and intermittent overflows were due to the 1976 construction. Plaintiffs contend that the injury is continuous, resulting from the recurrent and intermittent overflow. They argue Jones v. Sanitary District (1911), 252 Ill. 591, 97 N.E. 210, is controlling. The Jones decision was based on a pleading issue and stands for the proposition that where the continuance and operation of a permanent structure is not necessarily injurious to land but may or may not be so according to the manner of its operation, taken with the forces of nature, there is a continuing injury. In Jones, a statutory provision provided for a constant flow from the drainage canal. Operational procedures which allowed increased flow, with resulting flooding downstream, would be actionable at anytime. In Vette v. Sanitary District (1913), 260 Ill. 432, 103 N.E. 241, an opinion written by the author of Jones, the existence of the structure, not the operation, was the cause of the Vette lands having “become at times overflowed with the waters from the Illinois River.” (Emphasis added.) (260 Ill. 432, 435, 103 N.E. 241, 242.) In Vette, the court found that there was a “marked difference between the situation presented in this case and that presented in the Jones case.” (260 Ill. 432, 437, 103 N.E. 241, 243.) The statute of limitations was declared applicable as a bar to the cause of action. The court stated: “[W]here the continuance and operation of a permanent structure are necessarily injurious, then damages for all the injury sustained must be recovered in one suit. In the case at bar the declaration expressly alleged that any additional water caused to flow artificially into the Illinois river would prevent the use of appellee’s lands as farm lands and would injure and destroy his crops ***.” 260 Ill. 432, 438, 103 N.E. 241, 243. A retaining wall constructed on the dominant land was alleged to have changed the direction of water flow, with resulting unnatural quantities going across the servient land in Firestone v. Fritz (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 685, 456 N.E.2d 904. Firestones argued against the statute of limitations contending they were entitled to recovery for damage done by each rainfall. The Firestone court, in holding that separate causes could not be brought based on the successive injury, stated: “When a structure is placed on dominant land which unreasonably increases the flow onto the servient land, a cause of action may accrue upon the completion of the structure if it is a permanent structure which is necessarily injurious by reason of its construction. (Suehr v. Sanitary District (1909), 242 Ill. 496, 499.) If, however, the structure is not apparently injurious, but may be used in a way which may or may not result in injury, the cause of action does not accrue until the use of the structure causes injury. (Jones v. Sanitary District (1911), 252 Ill. 591, 599. See also Aetna Life & Casualty v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co. (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 765, 770, aff'd sub nom. Western American Insurance Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 126.) The fact that flooding may be uncertain in time, duration and extent does not prevent an improvement, which displays obvious potential to cause an unnatural overflow upon completion, from constituting an immediate, permanent injury. Shaw v. Sanitary District (1915), 267 Ill. 216, 220; Wheeler v. Sanitary District (1915), 270 Ill. 461, 465-66.” 119 Ill. App. 3d 685, 688, 456 N.E.2d 904, 907. In the case now before us, the alleged cause of the overflow is the 1976 construction and not abnormal flowage indicated in Starcevich v. City of Farmington (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 443 N.E.2d 737. In that it may appear in conflict with this opinion, I would elect to not follow Starcevich because of the conflict with the supreme court opinion cited herein. Anderson v. Sutter (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 458 N.E.2d 39, also places importance on whether the flooding is effected by the existence of the structure or by the operation of the structure. Anderson dealt with the question of proper notice under section 8— 102 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 85, par. 8 — 102). The city raised the level of a dam, allegedly injuring dominant land owned by Anderson. The court stated: “Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege the date on which their lands were first flooded nor the dates of any subsequent flooding. The complaint does not allege whether their lands have been continuously flooded since construction of the dam or whether the flooding is intermittent. It is likewise not entirely clear whether plaintiffs contend that the construction of the dam or the operation of the dam’s radial gate is the cause of their injury. This information is necessary to determine whether the period for giving notice under section 8 — 102 has lapsed.” 119 Ill. App. 3d 1070,1076-77, 458 N.E.2d 39, 44. As indicated by the previous decisions of the reviewing courts of this State, there need not be constant flooding to effect a permanent injury. If a permanent structure is constructed in such a way as to cause constant flooding or causes land to be subjected to intermittent overflow, permanent injury takes place. If the structure causes the intermittent overflow not because of its existence but because of its operation, then various overflows are actionable. The conclusion herein is both logical and practical. Plaintiffs are aware that the road structure is causing annual flooding. If each flooding is a separate actionable injury, litigation would involve the crop production loss from each overflow and require a long history of litigation. The present ruling allows for one cause of action with the measure of damages relating to the diminution in the value of the affected acreage and possibly allowing for the removal of the nuisance. The theory followed by the majority will allow an action for damages whenever a dominant tract of land suffers flooding caused by a township or county bridge or culvert regardless of when the obstruction was installed, two years ago or 75 years ago. Damages would be limited by the five-year limitation, but, in theory, actions could be commenced after each flooding caused by the offending structure. The trial court was correct in entering summary judgment based on the limitations issue.