Court Opinion

ID: 9897822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:25:34.146481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:02.819359
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Humphreys, Malveaux and Fulton
              Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia

              ERIC LAMONT GREEN
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0861-22-4                                   JUDGE JUNIUS P. FULTON, III
                                                                                SEPTEMBER 5, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                  FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
                                               Daniel S. Fiore, II, Judge1

                              Peter M. Baskin (Peter M. Baskin, PC, on brief), for appellant.

                              Timothy J. Huffstutter, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
                              Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     On February 17, 2022, following a bench trial, the Circuit Court of Arlington County

              convicted Eric Green of one count of eluding in violation of Code § 46.2-817(B) and one count of

              reckless driving in violation of Code § 46.2-862 for events occurring on January 23, 2021, and one

              count of being a violent felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2 for events

              occurring on January 30, 2021. Green now appeals, assigning error to the trial court’s denial of his

              motions to suppress the evidence stemming from his January 30, 2021 encounter with law

              enforcement. Green further challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of eluding and

              reckless driving. Because the law-enforcement officers possessed reasonable articulable suspicion

              sufficient to detain Green on January 30, and the level of force applied was not more than necessary

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                        Judge Fiore presided over the trial, denied the second motion to suppress, and signed
              the final orders in this case. Judge Judith L. Wheat presided over the hearings regarding, and
              ruled on, the first motion to suppress.
to detain Green and investigate the situation, and because the evidence presented at trial supported

the convictions, we affirm the rulings of the trial court.

                                           BACKGROUND2

        In the early morning hours of January 23, 2021, Arlington County Police Detective Seibert

was sitting in a marked police cruiser observing northbound traffic on Interstate 395. Using his

“assigned measure unit” laser devise (LIDAR)3 to measure the speed of passing traffic, Detective

Seibert observed a silver Infiniti sedan (the “subject vehicle”) driving approximately 124 miles per

hour, greatly exceeding the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit. As the subject vehicle passed him,

Detective Seibert turned on his emergency lights and followed, attempting to initiate a traffic stop.

After traveling “a brief distance” on Interstate 395, the subject vehicle “abruptly took the exit for

Glebe Road.” Detective Seibert lost sight of the subject vehicle but drove through a nearby

neighborhood “just basically looking for any Infiniti[es] that may be back there.” He ultimately saw

the subject vehicle again “parked on the right side of the roadway[.] . . . [He] could tell there was a

little bit of steam coming from the exhaust, so [he] knew that the vehicle was on.” Upon sighting

the subject vehicle again, “[Detective Seibert] activated [his] emergency equipment.” The subject

vehicle then “took off at a high rate of speed, basically just did a U-turn,” and ran through a solid

        2
         When reviewing both the denial of a motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict, “we ‘consider the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the prevailing party at trial.’” Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 146, 156 (2017) (quoting
Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560 (2017)). “In reviewing the denial of a motion
to suppress based on the alleged violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, we
consider the evidence introduced at both the suppression hearing and the trial.” Bagley v.
Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1, 12-13 (2021).
        3
          LIDAR, or “Light Detection And Ranging,” is “the technology of measuring target
range using reflected light.” LIDAR devices are used in traffic enforcement by “determin[ing]
target range and speed based on the time-of-flight of laser light pulses reflected off a target.”
LIDAR device is synonymous with “laser speed-measuring device” and “LIDAR unit.”
NHTSA, LIDAR Speed-Measuring Device Performance Specifications, DOT HS 809 811
(2013), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/809811-
lidarspeedmeasuringdevice.pdf.
                                               -2-
red light. Detective Seibert turned off his emergency equipment and did not pursue the subject

vehicle any further. At the time of the incident on January 23, 2021, Detective Seibert “had no idea

who was driving” the subject vehicle.

        After giving up his pursuit of the subject vehicle, Detective Seibert went to the police station

where, using the vehicle’s description and license plate number, he entered the subject vehicle into

the VCIN/NCIC4 database. The NCIC report described the vehicle and advised officers “to use

caution. The vehicle fled a traffic stop in Arlington on 1/23/2021 at 0200 hours. If located, stop, ID

occupants, secure vehicle for evidence.” A “BOLO” or “be on the lookout” was also put out for the

subject vehicle. As Detective Seibert explained, BOLOs are “usually put out right away after an

incident . . . . Most likely, the vehicle is still on the roadways, so that’s put out in an attempt for

local jurisdictions and . . . state police to . . . have their attention drawn toward any vehicles with

that tag, or make, model, or color.”

        On January 30, 2021, early in the morning, Virginia State Trooper Kashmer was patrolling

Interstate 66 East when he received an alert on the subject vehicle from a nearby license plate

reader. When a trooper receives a license plate reader hit, they “get like a ringing tone on [their]

computers and then [they] have to run the tag to determine what the actual hit is.” Trooper Kashmer

ran the license plate through NCIC, but “didn’t have time to read through the . . . NCIC hit, other

than the fact that it was the stolen vehicle that came through the [license plate reader],” before he

spotted the subject vehicle. Joined by Arlington County Police Officer Roussin, in a separate police

car, Trooper Kashmer followed the subject vehicle, which was operating lawfully, into a CVS

parking lot, where it backed into a parking spot. Trooper Kashmer and Officer Roussin blocked the

subject vehicle in and conducted a “felony stop.”

        4
        VCIN/NCIC refers to the Virginia Criminal Information Network/National Crime
Information Center.
                                           -3-
       Trooper Kashmer and Officer Roussin exited their cars, drew their weapons “for officer

safety,” and ordered the driver, Green, out of the subject vehicle. Green stepped out of the subject

vehicle and was immediately placed in handcuffs, without incident. The officers re-holstered their

guns, which “were [not] drawn for more than about 14 seconds.” Trooper Kashmer initially told

Green that he was being detained because the car was reported stolen. Green provided his driver’s

license and replied that he was the owner and had not reported his car stolen. At that time, Trooper

Kashmer returned to his vehicle and pulled the NCIC report. About two minutes after the stop

commenced, Trooper Kashmer used the NCIC report to confirm that Green was the owner of the

subject vehicle. He then had time to read the NCIC report and learned that the subject vehicle was

not reported stolen but was “described as a felony vehicle by reason of the felony of eluding” for an

incident on January 23, 2021.

       After Green was detained in handcuffs, Officer Roussin approached the subject vehicle to

determine if there were any other occupants. Shining his flashlight through the front passenger

window, Officer Roussin observed no other occupants; instead he saw part of a pistol grip and gun

magazine protruding from an unzipped backpack that sat on the front passenger floorboard and

rested against the seat. Within five minutes of the stop, three or four other Arlington County police

officers had arrived and Officer Roussin alerted them to the presence of the gun in Green’s car.

       Officer Kumar, one of the Arlington County police officers who was dispatched to the scene

to assist in the felony vehicle stop, observed Green standing by Trooper Kashmer’s car and read

Green his Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), rights. In addition to Officer Kumar’s patrol

car, approximately four other law-enforcement vehicles were in the CVS parking lot with their

emergency lights on.

       Detective Seibert was called to the scene and arrived shortly after Officer Kumar. Detective

Seibert conferred with the officers on scene and, approximately ten minutes after his arrival,

                                                 -4-
approached Green and began to question him about the January 23 eluding incident. In his

statement to Detective Seibert, Green admitted that he was driving the subject vehicle the previous

Friday night around 2:00 a.m.5 Green claimed he was suffering from a panic attack at the time. He

recalled being parked in a neighborhood when he saw a police officer arrive, but told Detective

Seibert that he did not think the officer was there for him because he had not done anything wrong.

Green, a convicted felon, also acknowledged that he knew the gun was in the car.

        Prior to trial, Green moved to suppress any evidence and statements “obtained as a result of

[his] illegal arrest, said arrest being without probable cause” and any evidence “obtained as a result

of the illegal search [of his] vehicle, said search being without probable cause, and without a search

warrant.” The court denied both motions to suppress, as well Green’s motions to strike the

evidence, and convicted him of eluding, reckless driving, and possession of a firearm after

previously having been convicted of a violent felony. The trial court overruled Green’s motion to

set aside the verdict, and this appeal followed.

                                             ANALYSIS

                                        1. Standards of Review

        When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we are “bound by the trial

court’s factual findings unless those findings are plainly wrong or unsupported by evidence,” but we

review “the trial court’s application of the law de novo.” Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va.

163, 168-69 (2008). “[A] defendant’s claim that evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth

Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo on appeal.” King v.

Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 717, 721 (2007). “Thus, ‘we give deference to the factual findings of

the trial court but independently decide whether, under the applicable law, the manner in which the

challenged evidence was obtained satisfies constitutional requirements.’” Shiflett v.

        5
            The eluding incident occurred around 2:00 a.m. on the morning of Saturday, January 23.
                                                -5-
Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 141, 145-46 (2005) (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666,

672 (2004)).

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support

it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting

Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the

relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting

Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the

conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion

might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72

Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

        2. The stop was a lawful investigative detention, supported by reasonable suspicion.

       The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against “unreasonable

searches and seizures.” “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes three categories of

police-citizen [contacts]: (1) consensual encounters, (2) brief, minimally intrusive investigatory

detentions based upon specific, articulable facts, commonly referred to as Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968),] stops, and (3) highly intrusive arrests and searches founded on probable cause.” Blevins v.

Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 412, 420-21 (2003) (first alteration in original) (quoting Wechsler v.

Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 162, 169 (1995)). There is no doubt that “stopping an automobile and

detaining its occupants constitute[s] a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendmen[t].”

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-37 (1984) (second and third alterations in original)

                                                 -6-
(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). The question raised by Green in his

motion to suppress and on appeal is whether his encounter with law enforcement on January 30,

2021, was a “brief, minimally intrusive investigatory detention[],” or a “highly intrusive arrest[].”

Blevins, 40 Va. App. at 421.6

        Green argues that the encounter amounted to an arrest because he “was ordered out of his

vehicle at gunpoint and immediately handcuffed, his vehicle blocked in its parking space by police

vehicles, and . . . was surrounded by at least 4 armed, uniformed officers within arm’s reach.” We

disagree.

        “The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness

in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’”

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19). “As a

general matter, society’s concern for the safety of law enforcement officials when they are

‘conducting [their] duties is of paramount importance.’” Moore v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App.

277, 283 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 146, 151

(1991)). “Terry recognized the reasonableness of a minimal intrusion on personal privacy to insure

[sic] the safety of an officer investigating, in a public place, a reasonable suspicion of lawbreaking.”

Id. at 286.

        None of the cases Green cites support his argument that the government’s use of force in

this case—the limited use of their firearms and the decision to handcuff Green during the

investigation—was unreasonable and transformed the investigative detention into an arrest. Relying

on Sattler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 366 (1995), Green argues that we “specifically

condemned” an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that “would allow the police to conduct all

        Green concedes that he “do[es not] disagree with the [trial c]ourt’s determination that
        6

there was a reasonable basis to stop the vehicle.”
                                                -7-
traffic encounters at gunpoint, in their sole discretion, and handcuff everyone stopped,” a result he

claims would inevitably follow an affirmance in this case. However, in Sattler we held

               [that an] officer’s generalized policy of frisking all persons does not
               satisfy the restrictions imposed by Terry. “Indeed, if everyone is
               assumed to be armed and dangerous until the officer is satisfied that
               he or she is not, then officers would be able to frisk at will—a result
               not contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.”

20 Va. App. at 369 (quoting New Jersey v. Garland, 636 A.2d 541, 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

1994)). We considered whether the officer in Sattler had “specific and articulable facts upon which

to conclude that Sattler was armed and dangerous,” and thus properly subjected to a Terry frisk, id.,

not whether the officer, possessing reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot, had acted

unreasonably in his method of detaining Sattler for further investigation. The Fourth Circuit cases

Green cites are similarly inapposite as they analyze the level of suspicion necessary to conduct

Terry frisks. See United States v. Powell, 666 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Sakyi, 160

F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1998).

       To the contrary, in this case we analyze the officers’ decision to draw their weapons for a

few seconds to conduct a felony stop on a vehicle and their decision to place Green in handcuffs

while continuing their investigation. This use of force and restraint is, unquestionably, an intrusion

on Green’s personal security and constitutes a seizure of Green’s person, but it is not equivalent to a

pat down of his person, as occurred in Sattler. The question is whether the officers acted reasonably

under the circumstances. There is no “litmus-paper test for distinguishing . . . when a seizure

exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) (alteration

in original). “[I]n ‘evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense

and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.’” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16

Va. App. 851, 856 (1993) (quoting DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 586 (1987)), aff’d

en banc, 18 Va. App. 454 (1994). “While the ‘investigative methods employed should be the least

                                                 -8-
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of

time,’ the ‘scope of the intrusion permitted will vary [with each case].’” Id. at 856-57 (alteration in

original) (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 500).

        Green argues that the use of firearms and handcuffs was unreasonable and more than the

least restrictive means necessary because there were no “fact[s] or circumstances known to Trooper

Kashmer or [O]fficer Roussin and individualized to the driver, Green, on January 30[,] 2021, to

support his immediately being handcuffed at gunpoint.” However, we have consistently held that

“[b]rief, complete deprivations of a suspect’s liberty, including handcuffing, ‘do not convert a stop

and frisk into an arrest so long as the methods of restraint used are reasonable to the

circumstances.’” Id. at 857 (quoting United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir.

1989)); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 49, 55 (1995). The officers’ use of their firearms

to obtain control over the situation and conduct an investigative stop likewise “does not necessarily

elevate a lawful stop into a custodial arrest.” Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 554, 566

(1998) (quoting United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995)).

        In the dark, early morning hours of January 30, Green was ordered out of his vehicle at

gunpoint by two uniformed law-enforcement officers who believed Green to be in possession of a

stolen vehicle. Within 14 seconds, the officers re-holstered their weapons and handcuffed Green.

The officers testified, and the trial court accepted, that they drew their weapons in conducting the

felony stop for “officer safety” purposes. This intrusion on Green’s personal privacy was

                                                  -9-
reasonable under these circumstances and therefore did not transform the investigative detention

into an arrest.7

   3. The officers did not unlawfully extend the stop beyond the time necessary to accomplish its
                                             “mission.”

        Green asserts that the seizure was unlawful because it was “prolonged beyond the time

reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of investigating the allegedly stolen vehicle.

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350-51 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v.

Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). The initial “mission” of the stop on January 30, 2021, was to

investigate what Trooper Kashmer believed to be a stolen vehicle. Within two minutes of the stop,

law enforcement confirmed that Green owned the subject vehicle, which had not been reported

stolen but was sought for eluding. Thus, Green argues, the mission of the stop was complete and he

should have been immediately released.

        As the Supreme Court stated in Caballes, and reaffirmed in Rodriguez, “a traffic stop

‘prolonged beyond’ [the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s mission] is ‘unlawful.’”

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357. Inquiries such as “checking the driver’s license, determining whether

there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and

proof of insurance” are de minimis and serve to ensure the safety of the officer and the highways,

and thus “stem[ ] from the mission of the stop itself.” Id. at 355-56. Moreover, “[i]f an officer

develops independent reasonable suspicion or probable cause that an occupant has committed an

additional traffic offense or crime, the officer may extend the stop for a reasonable amount of

        7
          Green also argues that the seizure was an arrest and not an investigative detention
because “[t]here was no investigation.” As the trial court found, however, the officers did
investigate their suspicion of Green’s criminal activity. After detaining Green for, initially,
possession of a stolen car, the officers’ investigation confirmed Green’s identity, learned that he
owned the car, reviewed the NCIC report and confirmed that the car was sought for eluding, and
called in Detective Seibert, who put the report into the NCIC database, to continue the
investigation.
                                                 - 10 -
time in order to confirm or dispel that new suspicion.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App.

462, 482 (2020).

        Within two minutes of the stop, Trooper Kashmer and Officer Roussin not only

determined that Green was the owner but also that the car was wanted for eluding. Thus,

although the initial “mission” of the stop was accomplished, a new “mission” arose.

Consequently, the officers were permitted to extend the length of the stop to investigate their

newly developed reasonable suspicion that Green was involved in an eluding incident the week

before.8

                                     4. The gun was in plain view.

        Green argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the gun found in his

car because the police searched his car without probable cause. However, because the gun was in

plain view, protruding from an open bag, visible through the front passenger side window, and

observed by the officer without entering the car, it was not found as a result of a search at all.

        The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches only protects an

individual when he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item searched. “[A]n individual

has no reasonable expectation of privacy in items that are in plain view.” Commonwealth v.

Thornton, 24 Va. App. 478, 483 (1997) (quoting Arnold v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 313, 318

(1993)). As such, the plain view doctrine “only applies to seizures because, by definition, if a police

officer has a legal right to be in a place where he observes an item in plain view, no ‘search’ takes

place, and it is only the seizure of the item that implicates the Fourth Amendment.” Cauls v.

Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 90, 98 (2009) (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987)).

Before the plain view doctrine applies, three requirements must be satisfied:

        8
          Because both the initial stop and the investigation were lawful, Green’s statements are
not the fruit of the poisonous tree.
                                                - 11 -
                1) that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving
                at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed, 2) that
                the incriminating character of the evidence must be immediately
                apparent, and 3) that the officer have a lawful right of access to the
                object itself.

Id. at 99 (quoting Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 643, 648 (2009)).

        Because the stop and investigative detention were lawful, Officer Roussin did not violate the

Fourth Amendment when merely looking through the window of Green’s car. As noted, the gun,

with its incriminating character apparent, was visible to Officer Roussin and in plain view. The

officer’s use of his flashlight to illuminate the interior of the car “[did] not transform his observation

into a search.” Gibson v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 744, 751 (2007) (quoting Marshall v. United

States, 422 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1970)). Because Green’s assignment of error challenges only the

search of the car and not the seizure of the firearm, our analysis ends here.9 See Simmons v.

Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 69, 75 n.4 (2014) (“Rule[ ] . . . 5A:20(c) require[s] us to hold that this

issue is waived because it was not part of appellant’s assignment of error on . . . brief.”).10

                               5. The evidence was sufficient to convict.

        Green’s challenge to the reckless driving conviction is limited to his claim that his “criminal

agency . . . was not proven absent the post arrest statement of the Appellant.” Because all of

        9
        Regardless, we note that by the time the officers seized the gun, they had confirmed
Green’s status as a convicted felon.
        10
          Green argues in his eighth assignment of error that “[t]he trial court abused its
discretion in basing its vehicle search ruling upon the verbal testimony of the searching officer,
which testimony is contradicted by that officer[’]s written report of the arrest and search event.”
Green claims that because Officer Roussin’s report, written the day after the arrest, noted that
Green was the sole occupant of the car, Officer Roussin violated Green’s Fourth Amendment
rights by “clearing” the vehicle of any additional passengers. By extension, Green asserts that
the gun was found only because of Officer Roussin’s illegal “clearing” of the vehicle. Because
the gun was visible in plain view from a position in which Officer Roussin was lawfully present,
we reject this assignment of error.
                                                - 12 -
Green’s statements were properly admitted into evidence, the trial court did not err in convicting

Green of reckless driving.

        Pertaining to the eluding conviction, Green argues for the first time on appeal that the

elements of eluding were not proven because “Green’s vehicle was stopped when Detective Seibert

momentarily activated his emergency equipment.” Green argues that “[t]he clear language of [the

eluding] statute requires the driver of the vehicle signaled by the officer to be in motion, and then

fail ‘. . . to bring his motor vehicle to a stop.’” However, Green failed to make this argument to the

trial court. Although Green mentioned in his motion to strike that “the car was from a parked

position,” he never once argued at trial that the car’s position at the time it is signaled to stop is an

element of the offense. Instead, Green emphasized that “the officer . . . didn’t finish the pursuit”;

“very shortly after the car allegedly driven by Mr. Green went out of sight, the officer turned his

emergency equipment off.” Arguing lack of evidence of intent, Green questioned: “And from a

position of being parked, how is someone to know that the officer intends to stop them as opposed

to anybody else that’s there?” Turning to the endangerment element of eluding, Green argued:

                Normally officers stop vehicles that are in motion for violating the
                traffic laws. In this case, we have a parked vehicle that when the
                officer turned on his light, he just normally proceeded out into traffic
                and made an illegal left turn through a light. And that was it. The
                officer turned off his equipment and didn’t pursue. So he didn’t
                endanger himself and . . . any signal that might have been given
                initially was discontinued.

        “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection

was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to

enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” Rule 5A:18. “The purpose of this contemporaneous

objection requirement is to allow the trial court a fair opportunity to resolve the issue at trial, thereby

preventing unnecessary appeals and retrials.” Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 185, 195

(2015). Because none of Green’s arguments in his motion to strike the eluding charge pertain to the

                                                  - 13 -
question of whether the vehicle must be in motion when police attempt to initiate a traffic stop, the

trial court was not on notice of this argument and it is waived under Rule 5A:18. Furthermore,

“[a]lthough Rule 5A:18 contains exceptions for good cause or to meet the ends of justice, [Green]

does not argue these exceptions and we will not invoke them sua sponte.” Williams v.

Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 341, 347 (2010).

        Green’s remaining assignment of error challenging the eluding conviction asserts that “[t]he

trial court abused its discretion in basing its finding of guilt on the charge of eluding[ ] upon the

verbal testimony of the police officer” where the officer’s “testimony is contradicted by the video

recording of the eluding event.” Specifically, Green contends that Detective Seibert’s testimony

that on January 23 Green sped away after Detective Seibert activated his emergency equipment was

contradicted by video evidence that the car “moved normally into the traveled portion of the

roadway from a parked stopped position . . . and proceeded to drive away.”

        “Determining the credibility of witnesses . . . is within the exclusive province of the [trial

court], which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they

testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (first alteration in original)

(quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304 (1993)). In examining the sufficiency of

the evidence, our deference to the trial court does not end with conclusions on witness

credibility. Rather,

                [w]e owe deference to the trial court’s interpretation of all of the
                evidence, including video evidence that we are able to observe
                much as the trial court did. Such deference stems not from the trial
                court being in a superior position to view the video evidence but
                from the difference in our respective roles. As factfinder, a trial
                court views video and other evidence to determine what it believes
                happened; we, on appellate review, view video evidence not to
                determine what we think happened, but for the limited purpose of
                determining whether any rational factfinder could have viewed it
                as the trial court did.

Meade v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 796, 806 (2022).
                                                  - 14 -
        Despite his testimony occurring over a year after the eluding incident, Detective Seibert’s

testimony was largely consistent with what was depicted on his body worn camera footage. As the

trial court observed, having heard and seen the witnesses and the body worn camera footage, Green

“sped at such a high rate of speed, he literally vanished until a faint sighting of tail lights proceeding

through a controlled intersection,” which “endangered his life.” Detective Seibert’s testimony was

not inherently incredible and there was abundant evidence in the record to support the eluding

conviction.11

                                            CONCLUSION

        Having developed reasonable suspicion that Green was in possession of a stolen car,

law-enforcement officers lawfully stopped and detained him to investigate a felonious offense.

During that investigation, reasonable suspicion of a different crime, felony eluding, materialized,

and the detention was properly extended to further investigate that offense. Because the

investigative detention was lawful, none of Green’s statements made to law enforcement were the

fruit of the poisonous tree. A firearm was visible in plain view, from a lawful vantage point,

        11
          In discussing the alleged inconsistencies between Detective Seibert’s testimony and his
body worn camera footage, Green appears to argue on brief that the evidence failed to exclude
all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. Assuming without deciding that this argument was
encompassed by one of Green’s assignments of error, we disagree. As we recently held:

                [I]t is the fact finder, not this Court, that determines whether a
                defendant’s hypothesis is reasonable. Giving due deference to the
                trier of fact, this Court may only review a factual finding to
                determine if it is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”
                If the result is one that reasonably could be reached after
                consideration of the totality of the circumstances, then we may not
                substitute our judgment of any factual findings.

Fary v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 331, 347 (2023) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 466 (2017)). Green’s hypothesis of innocence, that he did not know
Detective Seibert’s signal to stop was directed at him, was presented to the trial court, which had
the opportunity to consider it. Having so considered, the trial court was not plainly wrong in
rejecting Green’s hypothesis of innocence and accepting the Commonwealth’s evidence of guilt.
                                               - 15 -
protruding from a bag sitting on the front passenger floorboard. Therefore, the trial court properly

denied Green’s motions to suppress. Further, the evidence at trial amply supported Green’s

convictions. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

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