Court Opinion

ID: 9703568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:00:38.601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:50.067612
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 40. (dissenting). For the reasons set forth below, I must dissent.
¶ 41. The proposed ordinance here compromises the principles of representative government and *567thereby raises constitutional concerns. Additionally, while the majority correctly notes that direct legislation initiated pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 9.20 is subject to four implicit limitations, I believe that this ordinance violates at least two of those limitations, in that it applies to administrative not solely legislative actions, and it attempts to modify statutorily prescribed procedures. As a result, the proposed ordinance conflicts with the direct legislation statute, since, in essence, it tries to replace the village board with the village electors as the decision maker. In doing so, it impairs powers delegated to the Mount Horeb Village Board by the legislature.
Representative Government Principles/Constitutional Issues
Analysis
¶ 42. I begin, like the majority, with recognition of the concept of our republican form of government, as provided for in the guarantee clause of section 4, Article IV of the United States Constitution.1 As the majority itself recognizes, direct legislation is contrary to the principles of our representative system, in that it fails to protect against the possibility of tyranny by the majority.
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.
*568The Federalist, No. 51 (James Madison)
¶ 43. The key word in the above quote is "republic". Our founding fathers chose a representative form of government over a direct democracy. In developing the republican form of government that exists today, a three-branch government was carefully crafted, to include separate powers and authority for each branch, so that there are checks and balances to protect against fear of tyranny by the majority.
¶ 44. Because our founding fathers rejected a direct democracy and instead adopted a representative democracy, direct legislation, in the form of initiative and referendum, is appropriately limited. In Wisconsin, direct legislation is a statutory right, rather than a constitutional right. Meade v. Dane County, 155 Wis. 632, 145 N.W. 239 (1914). As such, we have narrowly interpreted statutory provisions concerning direct legislation. See Landt v. City of Wisconsin Dells, 30 Wis. 2d 470, 478-79, 141 N.W.2d 245, 249-50 (1966).
¶ 45. The Wisconsin Constitution does not reserve to the people either a general right of initiative or referendum. Instead, the people of Wisconsin delegated all lawmaking powers to the legislature with the adoption of the state constitution. Wis. Const. Art. IV § 1.
Administrative Analysis
¶ 46. As noted previously, initiative involves legislative acts and cannot extend to administrative actions. Heider v. Common Council of City of Wauwatosa, 37 Wis. 2d 466, 474, 155 N.W.2d 17, 21 (1967). "Where [an ordinance] is administrative in character, it is outside the scope of initiative action and ... it becomes a matter of judicial disposition to determine whether or not the actions of the electorate under [Section 9.20] are proper ...." Id. at 474.
*569¶ 47. The more a direct legislation proposal intrudes on city and village functions, the more likely that it will be held to be administrative in character. When a direct legislation proposal affects or controls governmental decisions, this court has looked to the nature of the governmental entity involved in the decision. In Heider, we held that a proposed resolution that would limit the actions of a plan commission was invalid, in that "city planning is an administrative function" performed by "the city plan commission — an administrative body." Id. at 476.
¶ 48. Here, the ordinance requires the Mount Horeb Village Board to identify in the wording of a capital expenditure referendum the "specific purpose, location and cost of the [capital improvement] project." Thus, the ordinance seeks to control more than just spending decisions. The location, and the purpose, of the proposed capital project are also at issue. Location decisions are generally functions controlled by an administrative body. For example, as noted in the amicus brief of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities, the location of a water tower is regulated by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Wis. Admin. Code § NR 811.57. Similarly, the location of public buildings and location of parks, streets, airports and other such items, is a shared function of a plan commission — an administrative body — with a city council or a village board. Wis. Stat. § 62.23(5). The provisions of Wis. Stat. § 62.23 are applicable to villages, such as the Village of Mount Horeb. Wis. Stat. §61.35. Community Alert's proposed ordinance certainly seems more administrative than legislative in nature. The authority for direct legislation is not appli*570cable to administrative decisions. See State ex rel. Althouse v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 97, 255 N.W.2d 449 (1977).
Modification of Statutory Procedures
¶ 49. We disagree with the majority in regard to its conclusion that the proposed ordinance does not modify the statutory municipal borrowing procedures.
¶ 50. "(W)here a statute has conferred a procedure upon a [municipal] body, electors may not demand the submission of a question which [under the direct legislation statute] would modify the statutory authority." Heider, 37 Wis. 2d at 477 (citations omitted).
¶ 51. Based on the constitutionally delegated authority discussed previously, it seems clear that Wisconsin law does not favor a broad reading of the initiative power. In Heitman v. City of Mauston, 226 Wis. 2d 542, 595 N.W.2d 450 (1999), the court of appeals concluded that an ordinance proposal under Wis. Stat. § 9.20, which attempted to prohibit the City of Mauston from approving the building of a ch. 980 facility on city land, was in essence a zoning ordinance. The court of appeals held that the proposed prohibition was "pervasive," and was an attempt "to do by initiative what the Common Council itself, cannot do, i.e., avoid the substantive and procedural safeguards" of the state zoning statutes. Id. at 554. The proposed ordinance was the type of ordinance electors cannot implement under Section 9.20. Id. at 553. Likewise, here, the Community Alert initiative conflicts with the municipal borrowing statutes, Wis. Stat. ch. 67, and with the procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 66.0621 relating to construction projects and the revenue obligations involved. See Denning v. City of Green Bay, 271 Wis. 230, 234-35, 72 N.W.2d 730, *571732-33 (1955). The direct legislation proposal attempts to modify comprehensive procedures adopted by the legislature.
¶ 52. Here, the proposed ordinance would alter the legislatively created structure of village government,- and undermine the statutory authority granted to the Mount Horeb Village Board. If adopted, the proposed ordinance would make the village electors, not the village board, the final decision maker, as to whether the village should proceed on any project involving a capital expenditure of one million dollars or more.
¶ 53. The legislature granted the village board authority to acquire property or manage village finances. It did not provide a general right for village electors to review the exercise of these powers by referendum, whether they involve a capital expenditure or not. Rather, the right of village electors to require a referendum, in response to an exercise of those powers, is limited to specific circumstances, such as bond issues. See Wis. Stat. § 67.05.
¶ 54. The majority correctly assumes that the ordinance would implicate municipal borrowing, because most projects which cost one million dollars or more require borrowing. Wisconsin Stat. ch. 67 provides a comprehensive scheme for municipalities desiring to borrow. Prior to a bond issue, the village board must pass a resolution authorizing borrowing. Wis. Stat. § 67.05(1). For the majority, if not all, of large capital projects (such as those involving libraries), a referendum must then be submitted to the electors for approval of the bond issue. Wis. Stat. § 67.05(5)(b).
¶ 55. Assuming that the proposed ordinance operates prior to the passage of the initial resolution authorizing borrowing, the village electorate first would *572vote to approve the capital project. If the voters allowed the project to go forward, the village board could then pass a resolution authorizing borrowing. It must then resubmit the question of whether to permit the issuance of bonds. In effect, under the ordinance proposed here, the electorate must approve the proposed project twice, because without bonding, the project would more than likely fail. The resulting cumbersome procedure represents a modification of the statutory requirements for borrowing.
¶ 56. Wisconsin law does not appear to permit such a modification. In Flottum v. City of Cumberland, 234 Wis. 654, 666-67, 291 N.W. 777,782 (1940), this court held that a direct legislation petition, requesting a referendum on the municipal purchase of a power plant, improperly modified statutory procedures. We found that Section 66.06 (now 66.0621) provided the mechanism for this type of purchase. Section 66.06 granted the common council the authority to pass a resolution authorizing the purchase, and allowed the submission of the question for referendum. Flottum, 234 Wis. at 666. Thus, we held that the electorate could not request submission of the question by direct legislation under Section 10.43 (now 9.20), when a separate procedure was already in place. See also Henderson v. Hoesley, 225 Wis. 596, 601, 275 N.W 443, 445 (1937) (holding direct legislation not appropriate where "the resolution, if it had been adopted. .. would in effect have provided that the proposed action... be again submitted to the voters of the city for their approval or disapproval").
¶ 57. It could be argued that this case is distinguishable, because the proposed ordinance could conceivably operate prior to the second referendum, whéreas in Flottum and Henderson the ordinance *573would have resulted in a second referendum. This distinction is not dispositive, however, because the cumulative effect is the same: multiple referenda, modifying statutory procedures.
¶ 58. The ordinance here directly affects the financing of capital projects, an area governed by Wis. Stat. ch. 67. Thus, for that reason, Flottum and Henderson appropriately control the outcome of this case.
¶ 59. Based on Heider, Flottum, Henderson, Denning, Heitman, and the strong commitment to a representative democracy present in Wisconsin law, the court of appeals' decision should be reversed.
¶ 60. Unfortunately, there are some who wish to disrupt the wheels of government solely for the purpose of disruption. The majority opinion provides them with a blueprint and an imprimatur. Although the majority certainly does not intend this result, the law of unintended consequences may well prevail.
¶ 61. For the reasons discussed, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 62. I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and JON E WILCOX join this dissent.

 "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government. .. ." U.S. Const. art. IV §4.