Court Opinion

ID: 9953036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 14:08:26.81567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:36.932600
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3575-20
                                                                   A-1963-21

K.K.,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

D.W. Jr.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

D.W. Jr.,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

K.A.K.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________

                   Submitted March 4, 2024 – Decided March 21, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla and Chase.
            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
            Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County,
            Docket Nos. FV-13-0959-21 and FV-13-0337-22.

            D.W. Jr., appellant pro se.

            Law Offices of Curt J. Geisler, attorneys for respondent
            (Curt J. Geisler and Amy E. Lefkowitz, on the briefs).

PER CURIAM

      These consolidated appeals stem from allegations of domestic violence

between the same parties. In A-3575-20, defendant D.W. Jr. ("D.W.")1 appeals

from the court's entry of a final restraining order ("FRO") against him, obtained

by plaintiff K.A.K. ("K.K.") In A-1963-21, D.W. appeals from the dismissal of

his temporary restraining order ("TRO") against K.K entered three days later.

We affirm in both matters.

                                          I.

      The facts were adduced at the FRO hearings in A-3570-20 and the motions

in A-1963-21. On January 25, 2021, K.K. applied for and received a TRO in

Monmouth County against D.W. K.K. reported a prior history of domestic

violence between the couple, including an incident where D.W. grabbed K.K.

1
   The parties' initials are used to protect confidentiality, pursuant to Rule
1:38-3(d)(9)-(10). Additionally, because they switch from plaintiff to defendant
and vice versa we use their initials throughout the opinion.

                                                                           A-3575-20
                                          2
by the hair and forced her into a wall. K.K.'s grandparents, S.M. and R.M., were

included in the TRO. K.K. then amended the TRO to add further details about

claims of domestic violence and previous acts of domestic violence.

      In February 2021, before the FRO hearing commenced, the court quashed

a subpoena D.W. had issued to Matthew B. Abrams, an attorney who represented

R.M. in an estate planning matter, because Abrams was not present at any

meeting with D.W. Further, D.W. stated he intended at trial to call F.D., K.K.'s

ex-boyfriend, to testify about the truthfulness of K.K.'s allegations against D.W.

The court barred F.D. from appearing because his testimony would be irrelevant

and speculative.

      At the FRO hearings, K.K. presented testimony from five witnesses and

testified on her own behalf. D.W. presented testimony from ten witnesses,

testified on his own behalf, and played surreptitious recordings he made of

phone calls with K.K.

      K.K. first testified to her history with D.W. She testified she works in

New York City but lived with her grandparents in Freehold during the COVID-

19 pandemic while maintaining her New York City apartment.              While in

Freehold, she became interested in helping with the property and investigated

setting up solar panels. She found D.W.'s solar panel installation business on

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                                        3
Google. Although she spoke with D.W.'s father on the phone, D.W. met with

her and S.M.

        Later, K.K. invited D.W. to dinner with the intention of proposing he

perform per diem electrical work for her family, but she thought they had a

personal connection after the dinner concluded. They started casually dating in

August 2020.      Early in their relationship, D.W. disclosed he had been

incarcerated. By September 2020, K.K. tried to end the relationship because she

thought it was progressing too quickly. She returned to her apartment in New

York City and recalled D.W. calling her and texting her often. She informed

him she was only interested in a friendship, which did not reduce the number of

times he called or texted her. She explained at times he would be very nice to

her, but at other times he would become angry and "take stuff out" on her. At

one point, he accused her of spending time with ex-boyfriends.

        In October 2020, to compensate him for helping with electrical work at

her grandparents' home, K.K. obtained sod for free and helped place it in D.W.'s

yard at his home in Jackson. While she was helping place the sod in his yard,

D.W. became angry at K.K., threw tools out of his car, and backed his car into

hers.

        Also in October 2020, D.W. revealed to K.K. that he disclosed her

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                                       4
sensitive personal family matters about an inheritance to an attorney he knew.

He provided K.K. with the name of the attorney and instructed her to call him.

K.K. became uncomfortable and alarmed by D.W.'s intrusion into her family

life, but he claimed his intention was only to help her. She repeatedly asked

D.W. to stop disclosing information about her family's interpersonal

relationships.   Later, she discovered D.W. was recording their phone

conversations without her permission.

      Also in October 2020, D.W. showed up at her grandparents' home without

permission, which K.K. had already explained to him he should never do as it

would cause her grandmother distress. Meanwhile, D.W. told K.K. he was alone

and sad, which caused her to feel guilty and invite him to dinner occasionally.

K.K. described D.W.'s behavior as "weird" because he acted like he did not have

to leave her grandparents' home when he was asked to.

      K.K. recalled, in mid-October, D.W. slapped her after they were intimate

at his home in Jackson. Afterwards, K.K. lightly slapped him back. However,

the altercation ended when D.W. hit K.K. "so hard, [she] knew not to keep

playing the slap-back game" with him. Immediately after he hit her, he grabbed

her hair and forced her head to face upwards towards the ceiling. D.W.'s actions

caused her to drop a towel she had wrapped around her body.

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                                        5
      On Halloween that year, D.W. asked K.K. to put out candy for the trick-

or-treaters at his home in Jackson. Despite being busy, she did so. When she

arrived with the candy she purchased, she also decorated the home. When D.W.

learned K.K. could not stay for the evening, he became angry and punched the

decorations off the porch. After she left, she felt guilty she did not stay with

him that evening.

      By November 2020, K.K. was still trying to end the relationship but also

felt bad for D.W. because he claimed he had medical problems. When she would

stop calling him, he would call relentlessly to apologize and be "really nice"

only to become extremely angry with her again shortly afterwards. When K.K.

repeatedly told D.W. he needed anger management and therapy, D.W. sent her

a text message suggesting he was going to harm himself.

      Subsequently, there was a portion of November and December 2020

where K.K. did not see D.W. However, they still communicated on the phone.

While she understood he wanted to be her boyfriend, she was not interested in

being that serious with him and told him so.

      In early December 2020, D.W. texted K.K. to claim he was suffering from

an unspecified emergency and for her to call him immediately. Upon calling,

K.K. discovered D.W. did not have an emergency, but rather only wanted to

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                                       6
talk. As the days passed, he continued to pressure her to call him through

repeated text messages and phone calls. K.K. invited D.W. to spend Christmas

Eve with her because he claimed he was alone and did not have a place to go.

      On December 27, 2020, K.K. called D.W. to tell him about a cat she

helped find a home for, and, in response, D.W. accused her of using him. During

that call he stated he no longer wanted to see her, which K.K. testified made her

feel happy and relieved. However, the next day, D.W. started calling and texting

her repeatedly about restarting their romantic relationship. She did not respond.

      On New Year's Eve, D.W. started sending K.K. numerous messages

through online platforms, such as Instagram. When K.K. did not respond, D.W.

sent messages implying he was going to harm himself. In subsequent messages,

he called her a "b***h," a "hoe," and a "lying b***h." He said "f*** you" and

accused her of "want[ing] to do f****d up s**t to [him]." Next, he started

sending her photographs of personal items she left at his home.

      K.K. answered a phone call from D.W. on January 3, 2021, because he

had again showed up at her grandparents' home without permission, which

scared her. During that call, he pressured her to stay on the phone with him for

over an hour and to have another phone call with him in a few days. A few days

later, D.W. tried to arrange to see K.K. to allow her to retrieve her personal

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                                       7
items, but ultimately his messages turned aggressive, and he demanded she

return a gold chain he gave her as a Christmas gift.

      K.K. agreed to return the chain. That same day, he threatened to "f**k

with" her and put a lien on her grandparents' property. That call was followed

up with several instances of D.W. calling K.K. and hanging up. Next, D.W.

stated he was "depressed," and again implied he was going to harm himself.

      The two then spoke on the phone, and D.W. requested K.K. come to his

home to have intercourse, which she declined.          Afterwards, D.W. made it

difficult for K.K. to meet with him to retrieve her belongings. For example,

after they scheduled a day to meet at his house for the retrieval, D.W. arrived

late and K.K. discovered he had not boxed up her items. K.K. returned the chain,

but while inside his house, D.W. began throwing items around and following

K.K. around the home for all but ten seconds. D.W. then accused her of

returning a necklace that was different from the one he had given her. K.K.

became nervous and called the Jackson police. D.W. then accused K.K. of

stealing $10,000 in cash from his home. He also threatened that S.M.'s (her

grandfather's) attorney was prepared to file a lawsuit against her on D.W.'s

behalf for the gold chain and money and to release audio recordings allegedly

proving K.K. tried to unduly influence S.M. and engage in "nefarious acts."

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                                       8
      D.W. then attempted to meet with K.K.'s family to discuss the solar

project. On January 24, 2021, S.M. told K.K. that D.W. had come to his

attorney's office and played recordings of conversations between K.K. and D.W.

in which K.K. was cursing and venting about her family. Shortly thereafter,

K.K. obtained the initial TRO against D.W. After obtaining the TRO, D.W.

posted photographs on social media showing him within a few blocks of K.K.'s

apartment in New York City.

      S.M. testified he owns the home located in Freehold. He was present when

D.W. appeared at his lawyer's office. S.M. further testified they did not discuss

the solar project during that meeting, and he had not spoken to D.W. since that

day. S.M. maintained he never leased any part of the land in question to a solar

company or finalized the solar project.

      Matthew Genovese, a telecommunications officer with the Jackson Police

Department, testified K.K. had met with D.W. to return a piece of jewelry, but

D.W. disputed that the piece of jewelry was the proper item. At one point, D.W.

claimed K.K. had stolen the jewelry and he wanted to press charges against her.

      Anthony Riso, a patrolman with the Jackson Police Department, testified

he responded to D.W.'s home on January 15, 2021. K.K. was trying to return a

gold chain that D.W. gave her as a gift. D.W. did not believe it was the same

                                                                           A-3575-20
                                          9
gold chain and a dispute ensued. K.K. reported to Officer Riso it was the correct

gold chain and, also, that she feared D.W. would make false allegations against

her. A short time later, K.K. asked a different officer to take a picture of the

gold chain she returned, but D.W. refused to allow the officer to take a

photograph. A few moments later, D.W. exited the home and accused K.K. of

stealing $10,000 in cash that he kept in an unsecured "cubby" near the front

door.

        Joseph Pante, a police officer with the Jackson Police Department,

testified he went with Officer Riso to D.W.'s home. K.K. asked him to take

photographs of the gold chain she was returning to D.W., but D.W. refused to

cooperate. A few moments later, D.W. accused K.K. of stealing $10,000 in cash.

        A former coworker of K.K.'s testified K.K. received an unusual number

of phone calls from D.W. on September 12, 2020. The court allowed the

testimony because it was incorporated in the Complaint when K.K. stated she

tried to end the relationship and D.W. called and texted her relentlessly.

        D.W. testified he had a criminal history, namely a marijuana cultivation

conviction and a possession of a firearm conviction, both from 2008. 2 In relation

2
  D.W. admitted during cross-examination that he was also indicted for felony
reckless conduct in 2004, but entered into a plea agreement that placed him on
probation.
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                                       10
to those convictions, D.W. possessed seventeen marijuana plants, 2,733 rounds

of ammunition, and seven guns, including an Uzi machine gun. He spent nine

years in federal prison as a result. Afterwards, he started working for his father's

solar company, where he is currently the vice president.

      D.W. testified he initially met K.K. after she called his father to inquire

about a solar project. D.W. discussed the details of a possible solar project with

her. A few weeks later, they started dating. D.W. stated he celebrated Christmas

2020 with her family, but K.K. tried to throw him out of the home after she

engaged in a verbal altercation with her mother. After the parties ended their

romantic relationship, he wanted her to remove her personal items from his

house. D.W. alleged when K.K. was collecting her personal items, she stole an

envelope containing $10,000. Additionally, when she returned a gold necklace

he gave her as a gift, D.W. suspected it was not the original necklace. He

claimed K.K. called the police that evening to cause a distraction, allowing her

to steal the money.     Additionally, K.K. wanted a $300,000 finder's fee in

connection with the solar project. He believed K.K. told her family about his

criminal history to interfere with the solar project deal.

      R.S., K.K.'s uncle, testified he first met D.W. when D.W. purchased an

antique cabinet from him. He also accompanied K.K. to D.W.'s house when she

                                                                              A-3575-20
                                        11
collected her personal items.     He recalled K.K. exited the home with an

envelope, which she opened in front of him. It contained only a card, and he

declined when she offered to have him read it.

      Amber Neely, a New Jersey State Trooper, testified D.W. came to the

police barracks on January 28, 2021, because he was concerned a business

agreement he had for a solar deal would be impacted by the active TRO against

him.3 Trooper Neely prepared an amendment to the TRO that allowed D.W. to

be on K.K.'s family's property in Freehold to conduct business related to the

solar deal.

      Yasmeen Khaleel, Esq., testified she represented S.M. in estate planning

matters and previously represented R.M.        D.W. attended a meeting where

Khaleel represented S.M., and D.W. discussed a solar project on a property

owned by a business entity partially controlled by S.M. She recalled S.M.

arguing with D.W. about the specifics of the project, location of the solar panels,

and whether a certain deadline could be met. K.K. was not present at the

meeting, and she was no longer dating D.W. at the time of that meeting.

Ultimately, a contract for solar panels was not executed by the entity because

3
  The court called Trooper Neely out of order "out of respect for Trooper Neely's
schedule" and pursuant to the court's authority under N.J.R.E. 611 to take
witnesses out of order.
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                                       12
one of the owners was not amenable. K.K. was not an owner of the entity.

      William Wright, Esq., testified he represented S.M. in matters of estate

planning. Wright was present at the meeting where D.W. discussed the solar

project.   After the meeting, Wright sent a notice to the business entity's

shareholders to hold a special meeting to discuss D.W.'s solar project proposal.

At some point in the meeting, D.W. stated K.K. wanted a "finder's fee" in

connection with the project and claimed she stole $10,000 from him. It was

Wright's understanding that K.K. and D.W. initially had a business relationship

that later developed into a romantic relationship. D.W. wanted the solar project

to move forward even though K.K. had terminated their personal relationship.

       A resident of New York City testified she started dating D.W. on January

30, 2021. She testified she traveled throughout New York City with D.W. in

February 2021 and took pictures of him at various spots throughout. Further,

D.W. told her he did not post pictures of them together on his social media page

because of a problem he was having with K.K.

      D.W.'s father testified he gave D.W. $10,000 in cash in a yellow envelope

for safekeeping and it disappeared shortly thereafter. On cross-examination, he

stated the money was from his attorney. However, he could not recall when it

was given to him but stated he gave the money to D.W. the day after he received

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                                      13
it. He claimed the money was a refund for an overpayment to his lawyer who

gave him the money in cash instead of a check or money order and that his

attorney brought the cash to his office in Jackson.

      S.M. Jr., K.K.'s uncle, testified he and his father are both part-owners of

the business entity, and his father was interested in participating in a solar

contract on a property they shared an ownership interest in. He saw emails about

the possibility of a solar contract with D.W.'s company, but the deal was not

completed. He learned after the fact that K.K. hoped she would receive a

commission in relation to the solar project.

      K.K.'s aunt testified she personally observed D.W. being "a little abusive"

and "disrespectful" towards K.K. She disputed D.W.'s claim that K.K. tried to

throw D.W. out of her family's house on Christmas Day in 2020. On New Year's

Day in 2021, D.W. expressed his interest in proceeding with a solar project on

a piece of land owned by K.K.'s family. On cross-examination, she recalled

K.K. reported to her that D.W. was abusive towards her when she was helping

him place sod on his lawn.

      An employee of D.W.'s father testified he was present when K.K. helped

D.W. with his lawn. He was unhappy K.K. attempted to direct him on how to

complete the lawn project. He did not see D.W. throw tools at or threaten K.K.

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                                      14
      Kenneth Ross, Esq., an attorney who represented S.M., Jr., testified D.W.

tried to move the solar project forward after his relationship with K.K. ended

and that K.K. mentioned D.W.'s criminal history as an issue with the solar

contract. On cross-examination, Ross revealed K.K. did not raise the issue of

D.W.'s criminal history with him directly, but rather that someone else told him

K.K. raised the issue. Ross confirmed D.W. presented him with documents

regarding his criminal history.

      On Friday, June 25, 2021, the court found defendant committed predicate

acts of domestic violence and a FRO was needed to protect K.K. The court also

granted K.K.'s application for counsel fees subject to the filing of a certification

of services.4

      Three days after the Monmouth Vicinage court issued the FRO, D.W.

went to the Ocean County Court House and filed a TRO against K.K. He alleged

K.K. compelled her mother to make false allegations against him and harass

him. D.W. also stated the parties had a prior history of domestic violence

because K.K. allegedly scratched him in September 2020, hit him and slapped

4
  K.K.'s attorney filed a certification of services totaling $33,455.20 in relation
to K.K.'s application for counsel fees. On August 16, 2021, the court awarded
K.K. $28,335 in attorney's fees. The court set forth its reasoning in a statement
of reasons, as well as on the record on June 25, 2021.

                                                                              A-3575-20
                                        15
him in October 2020, and made false allegations against him in April 202 1.

      K.K. filed a motion to transfer venue to Monmouth Vicinage. The motion

was granted. However, D.W. filed a motion for reconsideration, which the

presiding judge of the Family Part in Ocean Vicinage denied.

      D.W. then moved to recuse the judge who presided over the initial FRO

trial against him. The judge scheduled a hearing on the recusal motion, but D.W.

did not appear despite receiving notice, so the judge adjourned the matter for

one week. D.W. again did not appear, despite receiving notice. The court

concluded his absence was deliberate and then determined she was not required

to recuse herself under the applicable case law and court rules.

      K.K.'s counsel filed a motion in limine to dismiss the TRO on the basis

that D.W. made the application to harass K.K. and her family and, also, to

relitigate matters that were resolved at the original FRO hearing. D.W. opposed

the motion and then moved for leave to amend his TRO.

      The court granted K.K.'s motion to dismiss D.W.'s TRO. It concluded the

factual basis for D.W.'s TRO was "almost identical" to the assertions D.W. made

as affirmative defenses in the FRO trial, which were rejected as not credible.

Moreover, it found D.W. was "playing games with the court" with his allegations

that he did not receive notice of the court hearings on his own recusal motion.

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                                      16
The court determined the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to all but one of

the allegations in D.W.'s TRO against K.K.

      The court explained the only remaining unresolved allegation from the

prior litigation was whether K.K. allegedly had her mother make false

allegations against D.W. the night before the court rendered its decision entering

the FRO against him. The court concluded allegations that K.K.'s mother made

false statements would be against K.K.'s mother, not K.K., because overall,

D.W. could not establish K.K. had a purpose to harass him.

      D.W. moved for reconsideration of the court's decision to dismiss his

TRO. K.K. filed a cross-motion for attorney's fees. Both motions were denied

because the parties agreed to withdraw them.

                                       II.

      Our review of a court's decision after a bench trial is limited. C.C. v.

J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). In reviewing "a trial court's

order entered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we grant substantial

deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal conclusions based

upon those findings." J.D. v. A.M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306, 312-13 (App. Div.

2023) (quoting N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215 (App. Div. 2015)).

Trial court findings are "binding on appeal when supported by adequate,

                                                                            A-3575-20
                                       17
substantial, credible evidence." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 11 (App. Div.

2018) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).

      "We defer to the credibility determinations made by the trial court because

the trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them

testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the

veracity of a witness.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting

Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412).      Deference is particularly appropriate "when the

evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility. " In re

Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997).

      We do not disturb a trial judge's factual findings unless they are "so

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." S.D. v.

M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417, 429 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at

412). "We accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely

hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference

between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise.'" C.C., 463

N.J. Super. at 428 (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)).

      The purpose of the PDVA is to "assure the victims of domestic violence

the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453

                                                                               A-3575-20
                                        18
N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492,

504 (App. Div. 2007)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Consequently, "[o]ur law is

particularly solicitous of victims of domestic violence," J.D., 207 N.J. 458, 473

(2011) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584

(1997)), and courts "liberally construe [the PDVA] to achieve its salutary

purposes." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400.

      A judge must engage in a two-step analysis when determining whether to

grant an FRO under the PDVA. Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125, (App.

Div. 2006). First, the judge must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the credible

evidence, the plaintiff has proven the occurrence of one or more of the predicate

acts enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Ibid. See also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)

(providing an FRO may only be granted "after a finding or an admission is made

that an act of domestic violence was committed"); R. 5:7A(d) (mirroring the

language of N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)). Second, the judge must determine whether

an FRO is warranted to protect the plaintiff. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126; see

also J.D., 207 N.J. at 476 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)) (explaining the judge

must find "relief is necessary to prevent further abuse").

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                                       19
                                       III.

                                        A.

      As a threshold matter, D.W. alleges the court lacks "personal" jurisdiction

over him and subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Our Court has held

New Jersey courts "have all requisite subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a

complaint seeking relief under the [PDVA]" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(a).

Shah v. Shah, 184 N.J. 125, 135-39 (2005). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28(a),

a plaintiff may apply for relief under the PDVA where the alleged act of

domestic violence occurred, where the defendant resides, or where the plaintiff

resides or is sheltered. For a court to have personal jurisdiction over a party,

that party must reside in New Jersey or in cases of non-residents, must have

minimum contacts with New Jersey. Id. at 139-40; see also Blakey v. Cont'l

Airlines, Inc., 164 N.J. 38, 66-69 (2000) (discussing minimum contacts needed

to establish personal jurisdiction).

      D.W. does not dispute he is a resident of New Jersey, so his allegation

concerning personal jurisdiction fails on its face. To the extent D.W. argues the

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, this argument also fails.

See Shah, 184 N.J. at 135-39 (holding all New Jersey courts possess subject

matter jurisdiction over complaints under the PDVA).

                                                                             A-3575-20
                                       20
      D.W. also complains the court never concluded a specific act of domestic

violence occurred in Monmouth County. However, this allegation is belied by

the record. The court specifically found D.W. appeared at K.K.'s grandparents'

home in Freehold on two occasions without permission and that those acts

caused her to fear for her safety. Additionally, K.K. sheltered at the family home

in Freehold for much of the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, the court had venue

over this matter because two of the alleged acts of domestic violence occurred

in Monmouth County.

                                       B.

      D.W. also claims the court's factual findings and conclusions of law were

not supported by the record and, therefore, the FRO was not warranted. Rather,

D.W. "firmly believes that the facts relied upon by the lower court are both

misstated and should be interpreted differently." Even if K.K.'s allegations were

taken as true, they would not satisfy the standard needed to obtain an FRO .

      When analyzing whether an FRO would be issued, the court explained

K.K. and D.W. were in a qualifying relationship because they agreed they dated

and were intimate with each other. Next, the court concluded the predicate act

of criminal coercion, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5, was established because defendant

engaged in behavior to restrict or infringe upon K.K.'s freedom of action. For

                                                                            A-3575-20
                                       21
example, he threatened to accuse K.K. of an offense, disclose private

information that would cause K.K. to lose her credibility in her business, and

acted in a matter to harm K.K.'s health, safety, business, career, financial

condition, reputation, and personal relationships.

      The court also concluded the predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-

4, was established because D.W. made repeated communications to K.K. and

engaged in a course of conduct both intended to alarm and annoy her.

Specifically, he called her hundreds of times and texted her repeatedly, despite

her stating she was no longer interested in a relationship with him. He also

recorded their private conversations, refused to accept her rejection of him,

threatened her, and claimed he would harm himself as a form of manipulation.

Further, he tried to drive a wedge between K.K. and her family, threatened to

share information about K.K.'s largest client to damage her reputation, and

inserted himself into K.K.'s family matters.

      The court determined an FRO was necessary to protect against future

violence or immediate threat of harm. In this regard, the court found K.K. was

"very, very compelling." She credibly testified she needed protection from D.W.

because he wanted to upset, control, and confuse her. The court determined the

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                                      22
evidence adduced at trial demonstrated D.W. was obsessed with K.K. and he

would not leave her alone unless the FRO was entered.

      Domestic violence is described as a "pattern of abusive and controlling

behavior injurious to its victims." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 398 (quoting Peranio v.

Peranio, 280 N.J. Super. 47, 52 (App. Div. 1995)). That is exactly what the

court presented in its comprehensive legal and factual analysis of the evidence

adduced at trial, which included witness testimony from seventeen individuals,

documentary evidence, and audio recordings. There was adequate evidence in

the record to support the trial court's findings, and there is no evidence in the

record that would compel findings to the contrary.

                                       C.

      D.W. contends the court failed to afford him due process. First, he argues

the court prevented witnesses from testifying that would have shown K.K. to be

dishonest and, also, by controlling the order of witnesses and the presentation

of evidence. Second, he claims the court forced him to present defense witnesses

before K.K. finished presenting her case-in-chief because he was unaware of the

allegations against him, and K.K. was allowed to tailor her allegations to the

witness testimony. Third, he alleges the court considered evidence outside of

the contents of the TRO without giving him notice, "forced him to defend every

                                                                           A-3575-20
                                      23
interaction" with K.K., and "subjected him to moving target allegations."

Fourth, he contends the court's inclusion of an additional protected party in the

FRO violated his due process rights by restricting his freedoms unnecess arily

and there was no evidence he had caused K.K. harm.

      D.W.'s due process claims lack merit. The trial lasted for ten days over

the course of several months. There is no indication he lacked the time to

prepare. Additionally, there is support in the record for the court's decision to

preclude D.W. from calling Abrams and F.D., K.K.'s ex-boyfriend. The court

properly precluded their testimony because they lacked personal knowledge of

material facts. Also, the record reflects D.W. was aware of, and consented to,

the court calling the witnesses out of order to accommodate the schedules of the

police officers. Regardless, the court had the inherent power to control the order

of the witness testimony. N.J.R.E. 611(a) (allocating broad authority to the trial

court over the sequence of witnesses).

      D.W.'s claim that the court erred when it added family members as a

protected party in the FRO is also without merit. The evidence adduced at trial

demonstrated D.W. attempted to insert himself into various aspects of K.K.'s

life and her family's life. For example, D.W. appeared at her family's property

in Freehold without invitation on two occasions. Also, he appeared at meetings

                                                                            A-3575-20
                                       24
between K.K.'s family and their attorneys without invitation. The testimony and

evidence demonstrate D.W. threatened to harm K.K., her family, and her

family's finances.

                                       D.

      D.W. alleges the court's award of attorney's fees was erroneous and

excessive. He states he "prevailed on two of the four predicate acts." Moreover,

he blames the fees K.K. incurred on the court's decisions to: make him present

his witnesses "before ever hearing K.K.'s allegations;" hear testimony outside

the scope of the TRO; and take breaks during the trial. Finally, he alleges K.K.'s

attorney double-billed for her time by charging for entire trial days while also

working on other cases.

      Counsel fee awards under the PDVA are compensatory. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

29(b)(4). Therefore, the PDVA allows the court to award attorney's fees as a

remedy for a violation and counsel fees can be awarded if they are reasonable.

Ibid.; see also McGowan v. O'Rourke, 391 N.J. Super. 502, 507 (App. Div.

2007) (allowing for attorney's fees in domestic violence matters). The court

does not apply the traditional counsel fee application analysis to a PDVA

counsel fee award. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4); see also N.G. v. J.P., 426 N.J.

Super. 398, 422 (App. Div. 2012) (stating the award of counsel fees in domestic

                                                                            A-3575-20
                                       25
violence matter requires no special showing because fees are a form of monetary

compensation); McGowan, 391 N.J. Super. at 507-08 (stating the traditional

analysis does not apply when awarding fees in a domestic violence matter). "[A]

reviewing court will disturb a trial court's award of counsel fees 'only on the

rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion.'" Litton

Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009) (quoting Packard-

Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001)).

      Here, there was ample, credible evidence in the record to support the

court's conclusion that attorney's fees were warranted, and, as a result, there was

no abuse of discretion. The trial lasted for ten days over a period of months, and

there were seventeen witnesses called. The allegations included D.W.'s claims

that K.K. interfered in a solar panel project that he wanted to finalize with her

family. As a result, the court heard testimony from various attorneys and K.K.'s

family members about those interactions and meetings.             D.W. presented

numerous audio recordings that allegedly demonstrated K.K.'s interference with

the solar project. D.W. also challenged K.K.'s claim that she did not disclose

his prior criminal history to her family, which resulted in additional evidence

being presented at trial. What is more, in terms of the domestic violence

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                                       26
allegations, the court heard extensive testimony from K.K. and D.W. about the

frequent interactions that caused K.K. alarm.

      K.K. was clearly the prevailing party, having proven that D.W. committed

the predicate domestic violence acts harassment and criminal coercion, and the

need for the protection of an FRO. Moreover, the court considered and reduced

the amount of fees to reflect that she did not prove the predicate acts of stalking

and contempt of a domestic violence order.

      The court recognized the hours spent on the matter, combined with K.K.'s

attorney's hourly rate, were reasonable when compared with the rate charged by

other attorneys who practice in this area of law. The record does not support

any of D.W.'s challenges to the counsel fee award. The court did not abuse its

discretion.

                                       IV.

                                        A.

      D.W. argues there was not good cause to transfer his TRO against K.K.

from Ocean Vicinage to Monmouth Vicinage. He contends the predicate offense

for his TRO took place at his residence in Jackson and K.K. is a resident of New

York. He further states the motion to transfer venue was made "ex parte" and

without providing him with notice.

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                                       27
      The New Jersey Domestic Violence Procedures Manual provides as

follows: "Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29 and Rule 5:7A, a FRO hearing is to be

held 'in the county where the ex parte restraints were ordered, unless good cause

is shown for the hearing to be held elsewhere."5 Sup. Ct. of N.J. & Att'y Gen.

of N.J., New Jersey Domestic Violence Procedures Manual, § IV(H)(1) at 71

(Apr. 22, 2022).

      D.W. filed his domestic violence complaint on the first business day

following entry of the FRO against him. The substance of his TRO included

allegations that were litigated in the FRO. Therefore, the Monmouth Vicinage

judge was fully familiar with the prior allegations, the parties, and their

relationship having conducted the domestic violence trial. As a result, there was

ample good cause to grant the motion to transfer venue.

      D.W.'s claim that he did not have notice of the motion lacks merit. The

record on appeal reflects K.K.'s counsel informed D.W. and the court of her

intention to seek a venue transfer and the court sent all communications to the

email address he provided and had been using.

5
        The      manual         may         be       found       online         at
https://www.njcourts.gov/sites/default/files/courts/family/dvprcman.pdf.

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                                      28
                                        B.

      D.W. claims the trial judge should have recused herself from his

application for a FRO because she was biased against him after presiding in the

first FRO hearing. We are unconvinced.

      Pursuant to Rule 1:12-1(g), a judge shall be disqualified from sitting in

any matter if there is any "reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased

hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead . . . the parties to believe

so." It is improper for a judge to withdraw upon the mere suggestion that the

judge is not qualified "unless the alleged cause of recusal is known to [the judge]

to exist or is shown to be true in fact." Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster

Corp., 212 N.J. Super. 350, 358 (App. Div. 1986); see also State v. Marshall,

148 N.J. 89, 276 (1997) (explaining judges should not err on side of caution by

granting recusal motions). An adverse ruling against a party is not considered

to be bias. Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 318 (App. Div. 2008).

      The decision to recuse lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge.

Jadlowski v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 283 N.J. Super. 199, 221 (App.

Div. 1995). "When examining a trial court's exercise of discretionary authority,

we reverse only when the exercise of discretion was 'manifestly unjust' under

the circumstances." Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition

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                                       29
Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Union Cnty.

Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 (App. Div. 2007)).

      Here, the trial judge did not abuse its discretion when she declined to

recuse herself. The record reflects no objective evidence of bias and the fact

D.W. received an adverse ruling from the judge does not, itself, warrant the

judge's later disqualification. Marshall, 148 N.J. at 95. Moreover, a judge's

mere participation in a previous proceeding is not a ground for disqualification.

State v. Walker, 33 N.J. 580, 591 (1960); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.

Servs. v. L.C., 346 N.J. Super. 435, 438-39 (App. Div. 2002) (stating that a judge

is not disqualified from ruling over a termination matter because the same judge

presided over the earlier protective services action); State v. Flowers, 109 N.J.

Super. 309, 312 (App. Div. 1970) (explaining recusal is not warranted when a

judge decides subsequent proceedings).

                                       C.

      D.W. argues the court misapplied the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Collateral estoppel prevents the re-litigation of issues formerly adjudicated and

fully disposed of. Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J. Super. 558, 565-66 (App. Div.

2002). The notion of judicial efficiency prevents the duplication of lawsuits

with the same issues, the same parties, and the same witnesses. Cogdell v. Hosp.

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                                       30
Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 26 (1989); see also State v. Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181,

186 (1977) (explaining that collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of any issue

decided in prior action).

      For collateral estoppel to apply, the issues must be identical to the ones

presented in the prior proceedings, the issues must have been actually litigated

in the prior proceeding, the court must have entered a final judgment, the issues

raised in the new complaint must have been essential to the prior judgment, and

the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party in

the earlier proceeding. Olivieri v. YMF Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521 (2006).

An appellate court's review of a trial court's decision to invoke collateral

estoppel is made pursuant to a de novo standard.          Selective Ins. Co. v.

McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 173 (App. Div. 2000).

      Here, the court correctly concluded collateral estoppel prevented the court

from re-hearing testimony and re-deciding issues that were fully decided in the

FRO hearing. The court examined in detail the parties' history of domestic

violence, including acts from September and October 2020, evaluated K.K.'s and

D.W.'s claims about what occurred in their relationship, and determined K.K.

did not disclose D.W.'s criminal history to her family. Importantly, D.W. was

given the opportunity to present testimony and respond to all of K.K.'s claims,

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                                      31
which he then included in his domestic violence complaint filed just three days

after the hearing. See Twp. of Brick v. Vannell, 55 N.J. Super. 583, 587-88

(App. Div. 1959) (holding the court could take judicial notice of trial record of

prior court proceeding).

      This case is distinguishable from L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J. Super. 76 (App.

Div. 2014), upon which D.W. relies. In L.T., the plaintiff alleged assault in a

Law Division tort case after successfully obtaining an FRO against the

defendant. Id. at 81-82. The trial court applied the doctrine of collateral

estoppel and barred the defendant from defending against the plaintiff's

allegations of assault. Id. at 83-84. Noting the summary nature of an FRO trial

as compared to the procedure in the Law Division, and the higher standard of

proof for the punitive damages sought by the plaintiff in the intentional tort

action, we reversed.

      Unlike the offending party in L.T., here, the parties are not burdened with

defending against allegations under a higher standard of proof. Nor are they

defending against allegations in a new court with procedures differing from

those used in the original FRO trial. Therefore, we reject D.W.'s argument that

collateral estoppel should never be applied in domestic violence cases. The

judge correctly concluded D.W. was collaterally estopped from alleging the

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                                      32
prior incidents that were raised and found not credible as part of his defense in

the first case.

      The remaining allegation in D.W.'s domestic violence complaint was his

contention that there was "irrefutable evidence" K.K. forced her mother to make

false allegations against D.W. on the phone the night before the court entered

the FRO. The court concluded there was no evidence K.K. had acted with

purposes to harass and to the extent the mother's conduct was harassing, those

allegations could be made against the mother, not K.K.

      Harassment through a third person is proven by showing it was the

defendant's

              conscious object to use [the third-person] as an
              instrument of harassment.

                    ....

              . . . There is rarely direct proof of intent, and purpose
              may and often must be inferred from what is said and
              done and the surrounding circumstances. . . . Prior
              conduct and statements may be relevant to and support
              an inference of purpose.

              [State v. Castagna, 387 N.J. Super. 598, 605-06 (App.
              Div. 2006).]

      Our review of the record convinces us the judge did not err. D.W. failed

to demonstrate via the surrounding circumstances or the alleged conduct and

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                                        33
statements of K.K.'s mother that K.K. intended to use her to harass him. Rather,

the evidence shows K.K. did everything within her power not to have contact

with D.W.

      To the extent we have not specifically addressed D.W.'s remaining claims,

we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed in A-3575-20 and affirmed in A-1963-21.

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                                       34