Court Opinion

ID: 9919156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 17:00:47.611851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:40.826727
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                 No. 22-50154

               Plaintiff-Appellee,          D.C. No.
                                         3:21-cr-01021-
 v.                                          DMS-2

LUIS MARIN,
                                            OPINION
               Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                 No. 22-50155

               Plaintiff-Appellee,          D.C. No.
                                         3:21-cr-01021-
 v.                                          DMS-1

LUIS CHAVEZ,

               Defendant-Appellant.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
          for the Southern District of California
      Dana M. Sabraw, Chief District Judge, Presiding

           Argued and Submitted July 19, 2023
                  Pasadena, California
2                          USA V. MARIN

                     Filed January 17, 2024

     Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Danielle J. Forrest,
     Circuit Judges, and Richard D. Bennett,* Senior District
                             Judge.

                   Opinion by Judge Nguyen

                          SUMMARY**

                          Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed two defendants’ convictions for
violating 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) of the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act, which prohibits possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute while on board a covered
vessel.
    Defendants were arrested after the U.S. Coast Guard
interdicted their speedboat, which was carrying at least 1,000
kilograms of cocaine, on the high seas off the coast of
Ecuador. The vessel carried no nationality flag, but both
defendants made a verbal claim of Ecuadorian nationality for
the vessel. The Ecuadorian government neither confirmed
nor denied nationality. The United States treated the vessel
as stateless (i.e. without nationality) and exercised
jurisdiction. Under § 70502(d)(1)(C), a vessel is stateless

*
 The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States Senior District Judge
for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                        USA V. MARIN                         3

when the master claims registry but “the claimed nation of
registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that
the vessel is of its nationality.”
    Defendants challenged the government’s jurisdiction,
arguing the provision under which jurisdiction was exercised
is unconstitutional because (1) Congress’s authority to
“define and punish . . . Felonies committed on the high
Seas,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (the “Felonies Clause”),
is limited by international law principles; and (2)
§ 70502(d)(1)(C), enacted under the Felonies Clause,
conflicts with international law as to when a vessel may be
treated as stateless.
    Without deciding whether the Felonies Clause is
constrained by international law, the panel held that the
definition of “vessel without nationality” under
§ 70502(d)(1)(C) does not conflict with international law.
The panel therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of
defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment.

                         COUNSEL

Kenneth J. Troiano (argued), Kenneth J. Troiano Attorney at
Law, San Diego, California; Martin G. Molina (argued),
Law Office of Martin G. Molina, San Diego, California; for
Defendant-Appellant.
Mark R. Rehe (argued), Nicole Bredariol, and P. Kevin
Mokharti, Assistant United States Attorneys; Daniel E. Zipp,
Assistant United States Attorney, Appellate Section Chief,
Criminal Division; Randy S. Grossman, United States
Attorney; United States Department of Justice, San Diego,
California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
4                        USA V. MARIN

                          OPINION

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:

    Luis Marin and Luis Chavez (“defendants”) appeal their
convictions for violating 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) of the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), which
prohibits possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute while on board a covered vessel. Defendants were
arrested after the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted their “go-
fast” speedboat, which was carrying at least 1,000 kilograms
of cocaine, on the high seas off the coast of Ecuador. The
vessel carried no nationality flag, but both Marin and Chavez
made a verbal claim of Ecuadorian nationality for the vessel.
The Ecuadorian government, however, neither confirmed
nor denied nationality. The United States treated the vessel
as stateless (i.e. without nationality) and exercised
jurisdiction. Id. § 70503(b). Under § 70502(d)(1)(C), a
vessel is stateless when the master claims registry but “the
claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and
unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.” Id.
§ 70502(d)(1)(C).
    Defendants challenge the government’s jurisdiction,
arguing the provision under which jurisdiction was exercised
is unconstitutional because: first, Congress’s authority to
“define and punish . . . Felonies committed on the high
Seas,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (known as the “Felonies
Clause”), is limited by international law principles; and
second, § 70502(d)(1)(C), enacted under the Felonies
Clause, conflicts with international law as to when a vessel
may be treated as stateless. We need not decide whether
Congressional power under the Felonies Clause is implicitly
constrained by international law because even assuming so,
                             USA V. MARIN                                5

§ 70502(d)(1)(C) is consistent with international law. We
therefore affirm the district court’s denial of defendants’
motion to dismiss the indictment.
    I. Background
    On March 18, 2021, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted a
go-fast vessel1 on the high seas, about 655 nautical miles
west of the Galapagos Islands, Ecuador. The vessel did not
display any flags or indicia of nationality. Prior to boarding,
Coast Guard officers saw visible packages on deck. Marin
and Chavez were the only men on board, and they both
identified themselves as master of the vessel and verbally
claimed Ecuadorian nationality for the vessel. One of them
spontaneously stated that there were drugs in the cargo hold.
    The Coast Guard officers initiated a “forms exchange”
under a bilateral United States-Ecuador agreement, whereby
they contacted Ecuadorian authorities to confirm or deny
registry of the vessel under their nationality. See United
States v. Alarcon Sanchez, 972 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2020).
Ecuadorian authorities at first confirmed the nationality of
the vessel and authorized full law enforcement boarding.
The Coast Guard officers found a modified hatch in the deck
that had been replaced with space containing a white
powdery substance that field-tested positive for cocaine.
    The Coast Guard officers then received a second
response from Ecuadorian authorities stating that they could

1
  “A ‘go-fast’ boat is about forty feet long, typically made of fiberglass,
with multiple outboard engines, and is often used to transport cocaine.”
United States v. Gamboa-Cardenas, 508 F.3d 491, 494 n.3 (9th Cir.
2007). “Coast Guard officials refer to such vessels as ‘go-fast’ boats
because they can travel at high rates of speed, which makes them a
favored vehicle for drug and alien smuggling operations.” United States
v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1153 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006).
6                          USA V. MARIN

neither “confirm nor deny nationality of the vessel.” The
Coast Guard proceeded to treat the vessel as stateless and
arrested Marin and Chavez. The officers removed over
1,000 kilograms of cocaine from the vessel.
    Marin and Chavez were indicted for conspiracy to
distribute cocaine while on board a covered vessel, in
violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1) & 70506(b) (Count 1),
and two counts of possession of a controlled substance on
board a vessel with intent to distribute, in violation of 46
U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) (Counts 2 and 3). Pursuant to written
plea agreements, Chavez entered guilty pleas to two counts
of violating § 70503(a)(1) on September 29, 2021; and
Marin entered guilty pleas to the same charges on November
3, 2021.2
    On January 20, 2022, before defendants were sentenced,
the First Circuit, in a now-withdrawn opinion, held that
§ 70502(d)(1)(C) of the MDLEA, the same provision at
issue here, is unconstitutional. See United States v. Dávila-
Reyes, 23 F.4th 153 (1st Cir. 2022). Dávila-Reyes first
concluded that Congress’s ability to define felonies on the
high seas under the Felonies Clause is implicitly limited by
international law. Id. at 173–86. That court then held that
the § 70502(d)(1)(C) is unconstitutional because it conflicts
with accepted definitions of a stateless vessel under
international law. Id. at 186–95.
    On April 21, 2022, in reliance on Dávila-Reyes, Marin
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which Chavez
joined. The district court denied defendants’ motion to

2
  At sentencing, the government dismissed Count 1, the conspiracy
charge, pursuant to the plea agreement, and agreed to dismiss Count 3
because the substance tested for cocaine rather than methamphetamine
as charged.
                             USA V. MARIN                                 7

withdraw their guilty pleas but invited them to renew the
issue at sentencing by way of a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendants did so, and on June
30, 2022, the district court denied the motions to dismiss.
The district court held that Congress’s power to legislate
under the Felonies Clause is not constrained by international
law. It did not decide the second question—whether 46
U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) violates international law.
    The district court sentenced each defendant to 72 months
of imprisonment, followed by 5 years of supervised release.3
     Less than a week after defendants were sentenced, the
First Circuit withdrew its panel opinion in Dávila-Reyes
after voting to rehear the case en banc. 38 F.4th 288 (1st Cir.
2022). Subsequently, in an en banc decision, the First
Circuit affirmed the convictions on narrow grounds, holding
that the government could have asserted jurisdiction because
the vessel “was not authorized to fly the flag of any state,” a
standard “proper” under international law, and was thus
stateless “for reasons independent of the vessel being the
kind of vessel that § 70502(d)(1)(C) describes.” United
States v. Dávila-Reyes, 84 F.4th 400, 417 (1st Cir. 2023)
(citing United States v. Rosero, 42 F.3d 166, 171 (3d Cir.
1994)) (“Under international law, ‘[s]hips have the
nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly.’”)

3
  The district court informed defendants of their right to appeal despite
appellate-waiver provisions in their plea agreements. On appeal, the
government maintains that the appellate waivers should be enforced but,
as it acknowledges, our circuit has held that “claims that the applicable
statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to state an offense
are jurisdictional claims not waived by the guilty plea.” United States v.
Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v.
Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989)) (cleaned up). Accordingly,
we address the merits of the appeal.
8                       USA V. MARIN

(quoting Convention on the High Seas art. 5(1), opened for
signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
(entered into force Sept. 30, 1962)).
    II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We
review de novo the constitutionality of a statute.” United
States v. Hansen, 25 F.4th 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2022)
(quoting United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 432 (9th
Cir. 2016)).
    III. Discussion
    The Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offences against the Law of Nations.” U.S. Const. art.
I, § 8, cl. 10. This constitutional provision contains three
distinct grants of power: (1) to define and punish piracies
committed on the high seas, (2) to define and punish felonies
committed on the high seas (the Felonies Clause), (3) and to
define and punish offenses against the law of nations. See
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158–59
(1820).
    Relevant here is the Felonies Clause, which provides the
basis for the MDLEA. See United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d
709, 721 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a federal statute is a
valid exercise of the Felonies Clause if it “proscribes felony
offenses and expressly applies to international waters”). The
MDLEA makes it unlawful for an individual to “knowingly
or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or possess with
intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance”
on board “a vessel of the United States or a vessel subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States.”            46 U.S.C.
§ 70503(a)(1), (e)(1). That prohibition “applies even though
                            USA V. MARIN                               9

the act is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.” Id. § 70503(b). A vessel “subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States” includes “a vessel without
nationality.” Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A). A vessel is considered
“without nationality” under the MDLEA under multiple
circumstances, including when the master makes a claim of
registry, but the country of claimed registry “does not
affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of
its nationality.”4 Id. § 70502(d)(1)(C).
    Defendants argue that Congress’s Felonies-Clause
power is bounded by international law jurisdictional
principles, and the definition under the MDLEA goes
beyond what international law deems a stateless vessel (i.e.,
a vessel without nationality).
    Without deciding whether the Felonies Clause is
constrained by international law, we hold that the definition
of “vessel without nationality” under 46 U.S.C.
§ 70502(d)(1)(C) does not conflict with international law.
Accordingly, we uphold defendants’ convictions under the
MDLEA. Although the district court did not reach this issue,
we may affirm on any basis, “whether or not relied upon by
the district court.” Muniz v. UPS, Inc., 738 F.3d 214, 219
(9th Cir. 2013).

4
  Two other situations enumerated, non-exhaustively, by the MDLEA,
are when the master makes a claim of registry, but the nation in question
denies the claim, id. § 70502(d)(1)(A), and when “the master or
individual in charge fails,” in response to questioning by U.S. law
enforcement, “to make a claim of nationality or registry for th[e]
vessel,” id. § 70502(d)(1)(B).
10                      USA V. MARIN

     A. Our      prior     decisions  upholding      the
        constitutionality of the MDLEA do not answer the
        issue defendants raise.
    Although      we have      previously     upheld    the
constitutionality of the MDLEA, those cases do not dictate
the results here, as the government suggests, because we
have not previously addressed the precise issues defendants
raise.
     We have noted that “[a]s an exercise of congressional
power pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 10, this court
clearly has held that the MDLEA is constitutional.” United
States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citing United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir.
1990)). In Moreno-Morillo, the vessel was deemed stateless
because the Colombian government neither confirmed nor
denied that the ship was Colombian. Id. at 831. Defendants
argued that the MDLEA was unconstitutional because drug-
trafficking is “not among the felonies and piracies on the
high seas that Congress is empowered to define.” Id. at 824.
We rejected this argument, holding that the prohibition of
possession of drugs with intent to distribute on certain
vessels was within Congress’s “power to ‘define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Aikins, 946 F.2d 608, 613 (9th Cir.
1990)).
    The government acknowledges that Moreno-Morillo did
not address the same challenge to § 70502(d)(1)(C) that
defendants raise but argues that its upholding of the
constitutionality of the MDLEA on “facts having the exact
same jurisdictional basis” should foreclose defendants’
constitutional challenge here. However, “[q]uestions which
merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of
                          USA V. MARIN                         11

the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having
been so decided as to constitute precedents.” Cooper Indus.,
Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170 (2004) (quoting
Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)). Although the
government argues that the constitutional jurisdictional
challenge raised by defendants is simply a matter of
“arguments [that] have been characterized differently or
more persuasively by a new litigant,” United States v.
Ramos-Medina, 706 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2013), no prior
Ninth Circuit panel has addressed whether the MDLEA’s
definition of “stateless vessel” conflicts with international
law in violation of the Constitution.
    The government also highlights that we held in Davis
that “compliance with international law does not determine
whether the United States may apply the [MDLEA] to
[defendant’s] conduct.” Davis, 905 F.2d at 248. But Davis
addressed a different question than the one presented here.
In Davis, we upheld the constitutionality of the MDLEA’s
extraterritorial application to the defendant because that
application satisfied the “[o]nly two restrictions . . . on
giving extraterritorial effect to Congress’ directives”: (1)
Congress must “make clear its intent to give extraterritorial
effect to its statutes,” and (2) application of the statute to the
acts in question must not violate due process. Id. (citations
omitted). We rejected the defendant’s argument that
compliance with international law determines whether the
United States may apply the MDLEA to his conduct, as
“[i]nternational law principles, standing on their own, do not
create substantive rights or affirmative defenses for litigants
in United States courts.” Id. at 248 & n.1 (citing United
States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 1990)).
    Unlike in Davis, defendants do not argue here that
“[i]nternational principles, standing on their own . . . create
12                          USA V. MARIN

substantive rights or affirmative defenses.” Id. at 248 n.1.
Rather, they argue that Congress’s powers to enact laws
pursuant to the Felonies Clause is constrained by
international law, and further that the MDLEA’s definition
of statelessness is inconsistent with international law—
issues which we have never before addressed.5 We turn,
then, to the merits of defendants’ argument.
     B. Section 70502(d)(1)(C)’s definition of a “vessel
        without nationality” is not inconsistent with
        international law.
    As defendants acknowledge, international law allows
jurisdiction over stateless vessels. See, e.g., United States v.
Rubies, 612 F.2d 397, 403 (9th Cir. 1979) (“In the interest of
order on the open sea, a vessel not sailing under the maritime
flag of a State enjoys no protection whatever, for the
freedom of navigation on the open sea is freedom for such
vessels only as sail under the flag of a State.”) (quoting 1
L.F.L. Oppenheim, International Law § 546 (7th ed. 1948));
United States v. Aybar-Ulloa, 987 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir.).
While “foreign flag vessels are generally accorded the right
of undisturbed navigation on the high seas,” Rubies, 612
F.2d at 402, stateless vessels are “international pariahs,”
United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995).
Stateless vessels “represent ‘floating sanctuaries from
authority’ and constitute a potential threat to the order and
stability of navigation on the high seas.” United States v.

5
  In fact, Davis, which involved a foreign-flagged vessel, suggested only
that international law could be a “rough guide” for a due process
analysis, id. at 249 n.2, an analysis we declined to extend to stateless
vessels, given the “radically different treatment afforded to stateless
vessels as a matter of international law.” United States v. Caicedo, 47
F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, Davis responds to neither of the
two issues defendants here raise.
                              USA V. MARIN                           13

Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982)
(quoting Herman Meyers, The Nationality of Ships 318
(1967)). “By attempting to shrug the yoke of any nation’s
authority, they subject themselves to the jurisdiction of all
nations.” Caicedo, 47 F.3d at 372.
     A ship can only sail under the flag of one country. U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 92(1), opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into
force Nov. 16, 1994) (“UNCLOS”);6 Convention on the
High Seas art. 6(1), opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30,
1962) (“GCHS”);7 Aybar-Ulloa, 987 F.3d at 5 (“[E]very
vessel must sail under the flag of one, and only one, state.”).
Each country is responsible for determining “the conditions
for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of
ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.” GCHS,
art. 5(1). And each country “must effectively exercise its
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and
social matters over ships flying its flag.” Id.
    International law and practice recognize three situations
when a vessel is, or becomes, a stateless vessel. See Ted M.
McDorman, Stateless Fishing Vessels, International Law
and the U.N. High Seas Fisheries Conference, 25 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 531, 533 (Oct. 1994). First, a ship that sails under
the flags of two or more nations using them as a matter of

6
 While the Senate has never ratified the UNCLOS, it was signed by the
President and is generally recognized by the United States as reflecting
customary international law. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d
599, 635 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“[W]ith the exception of its deep seabed
mining provisions, the United States has consistently accepted UNCLOS
as customary international law for more than 25 years.”).
7
    The United States ratified the GCHS in 1961.
14                      USA V. MARIN

convenience may be treated stateless. UNCLOS, art. 92(2);
GCHS, art. 6(2). Second, a vessel may be stateless where
the nation of the vessel is not recognized by the questioning
state. McDorman, supra, at 534 (citing Molvan v. Att’y-Gen.
for Palestine [1948] AC 351 (PC)). Third, a vessel is
stateless “if it has been deprived of the use of a flag” by the
country the vessel claims as its flag or if “the vessel’s
claimed State of nationality denies that such is the case.” Id.
   Defendants argue that outside of these circumstances, the
United States may not broaden the definition of a stateless
vessel. But under the Lotus principle:

       Far from laying down a general prohibition to
       the effect that States may not extend the
       application of their laws and the jurisdiction
       of their courts to persons, property and acts
       outside their territory, [international law]
       leaves them in this respect a wide measure of
       discretion which is only limited in certain
       cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other
       cases, every State remains free to adopt the
       principles which it regards as best and most
       suitable.
       ...
       [A]ll that can be required of a State is that it
       should not overstep the limits which
       international law places upon its jurisdiction;
       within these limits, its title to exercise
       jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.

S.S. Lotus (1927), PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 9, at 19. Understanding
the purpose of international law to be “regulat[ing] the
                              USA V. MARIN                                15

relations      between    ...    co-existing     independent
communities,” the Permanent Court of International Justice
(“PCIJ”) found “no rule of international law” regarding the
specific jurisdictional question there at issue, and thus
concluded the disputed exercise of criminal jurisdiction was
not “contrary to the principles of international law.” Id. at
18, 30–31. Here, “no rule of international law” addresses
whether a state may consider a vessel to be without
nationality and exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances
set forth in § 70502(d)(1)(C).8 Thus, doing so is not contrary
to international law under the Lotus principle.
    Defendants argue that there is a rule of international law
which § 70502(d)(1)(C) “displaces.” Dávila-Reyes, 23
F.4th at 187. They argue that an oral claim to nationality
constitutes a prima facie showing of nationality, which can
only be rebutted by a denial—rather than merely a failure to
confirm or deny—by the claimed flag state. But no rule of
international law requires this approach. Indeed, the case
defendants cite for this proposition clarifies that it “is not
enough that a vessel have a nationality; she must claim it and
be in a position to provide evidence of it.” United States v.

8
  One international law scholar has stated the “absence of any state
claiming allocation” of a ship is a ground for statelessness, but the factual
circumstances upon which the statement was based are distinguishable.
See HERMAN MEYERS, THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPS 317 (1967)
(discussing the Lucky Star, which “could be regarded as stateless on two
grounds: fraudulent use of a flag and . . . absence of any state claiming
allocation,” where the ship “displayed the flag of Lebanon, but had no
registration papers” to prove such nationality, and the Lucky Star’s
operators “produced temporary registration certificates, issued by the
Consul-General of Guatemala [which] were not valid under Guatemalan
law”). This discussion does not disrupt—and tends to support—the
conclusion that jurisdiction under § 70502(d)(1)(C) is not contrary to
international law.
16                           USA V. MARIN

Matos-Luchi, 627 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010) (emphasis added)
(citing Andrew W. Anderson, Jurisdiction over Stateless
Vessels on the High Seas: An Appraisal Under Domestic and
International Law, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 323, 341 (1982)).
Defendants do not identify a rule of international law
requiring an oral claim to nationality be rebuttable only by a
denial by the claimed flag state.9 In fact, such a rule could
lead to the untenable result that neither the boarding state nor
the claimed flag state have jurisdiction over a vessel so long
as the claimed flag state does not confirm or deny
nationality—undermining international law’s role of
facilitating the “achievement of common aims.”10 S.S. Lotus
(1927), PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 9, at 18. We have no reason to
conclude that exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances set
forth in § 70502(d)(1)(C) “overstep[s] the limits which
international law places upon . . . jurisdiction.” Id. at 19.
    Defendants argue that the United States can simply seek
the permission of the claimed flag state if it can neither
confirm nor deny the claimed nationality of the vessel, but
that is a policy decision for Congress to make, not one that

9
   Defendants also cite out-of-circuit decisions to support their
proposition, but these cases are inapposite, because they involve claims
of nationality where government action was predicated on statutes
requiring a vessel be American, not stateless. United States v. Bustos-
Guzman, 685 F.2d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating ship’s U.S. flag
was “prima facie proof” of nationality, and citing the flag, its U.S.
registry, and U.S. owner as sufficient evidence to establish the vessel was
American (citing The Chiquita, 19 F.2d 417, 418 (5th Cir. 1927) (stating
ship’s Honduran flag is “prima facie proof” of nationality, and finding it
was “immaterial” that the ship may not have proper Honduran registry,
because there was “no doubt that the vessel was completely divested of
her American nationality”))).
10
  See also An Hertogen, Letting Lotus Bloom, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 901,
912 (2015).
                             USA V. MARIN                               17

is required by international law. It is not our role to create
new international legal principles by inference, as
defendants attempt to do by arguing that “[b]y implication,
[a vessel] is not stateless under any other circumstance[s]”
than the ones already defined by international law.11 Our
conclusion is buttressed by the numerous district courts that
have all rejected challenges like the one here since the now-
withdrawn Dávila-Reyes decision was issued. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pierre, No. 21-CR-20450, 2022 WL
3042244, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2022) (collecting cases).
    Because there is no rule of international law speaking to
this jurisdictional question, the United States does “not
overstep the limits which international law places upon its
jurisdiction,” S.S. Lotus (1927), PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 9, at 19,
in choosing to treat vessels as stateless where the claimed
nation responds that it can neither confirm nor deny the
registry. We therefore need not address defendants’
argument that Congress’s powers to enact laws pursuant to
the Felonies Clause is constrained by international law to
conclude that defendants’ challenge to § 70502(d)(1)(C) of
the MDLEA fails. We affirm defendants’ convictions.
     AFFIRMED.

11
   Indeed, after the PCIJ concluded in S.S. Lotus, in relation to the
specific issue in that case, that “there is no rule of international law in
regard to collision cases to the effect that criminal proceedings are
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the State whose flag is flown,” S.S.
Lotus (1927), PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 9, at 30, the international community
developed a rule precisely to that effect. See UNCLOS, Art. 97; GCHS,
Art. 11.