Court Opinion

ID: 9853955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:58:15.446634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:24.255316
License: Public Domain

WEDEMEYER, EJ.
¶ 13. (dissenting). I write separately because, based on the facts presented, I would reverse the trial court's decision and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 14. The purpose of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(l)(a) is to give the governmental unit notice that an injury has occurred and offer it an opportunity to investigate. Nielsen v. Town of Silver Cliff, 112 Wis. 2d 574, 580, 334 N.W.2d 224 (1982). The statute requires the injured party to identify the circumstances of the claim within 120 days of the event. Probst v. Winnebago County, 225 Wis. 2d 753, 757-58, 593 N.W.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1999).
*758¶ 15. Here, there is no dispute that the December 5 incident report was a written report provided to the County within the 120-day notice period. The dispute concerns whether the information provided therein is sufficient to put the County on notice that Patricia may file a claim. I conclude that the incident report, although not ideal, satisfies the basic requisites of the statute. The report was filled out by Patricia, who provided her printed name, address and description of what happened. It identified the accident site, the cause of the accident, and the fact that she injured her knee. In response to the report, the County inspected the accident site, took photographs, and removed the hazard. Thus, the report satisfied both purposes of the statute.
¶ 16. The trial court ruled in favor of the County because the December 5 report was marked "incident" only and not marked "injury." I do not find this factor dispositive. Although it would have been preferable if Patricia had marked both boxes, the substance of the report clearly revealed that she injured her knee during the incident. This was sufficient to provide notice to the County that an injury occurred. The case law does not require strict compliance with the statute, DNR v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 198, 515 N.W.2d 888 (1994); rather, it demands only substantial compliance, see State v. Town of Linn, 205 Wis. 2d 426, 435, 556 N.W.2d 394 (Ct. App. 1996).
¶ 17. My review demonstrates that the December 5 report constitutes substantial compliance with the notice of injury statute. The report provided the County with the basic circumstances of the incident and indicated that Patricia had hurt her knee as a result of the incident. As a direct result of the report, the County *759conducted an investigation, took photographs to preserve the evidence, and removed the sign which caused the problem.
¶ 18. Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the Morans' complaint. I would reverse the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.