Court Opinion

ID: 9740723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:40:52.214741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.979467
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: The defendant appeals contending that the prosecution failed to prove him guilty of intimidation beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also contends that the statement made by his codefendant’s counsel during closing argument that 75% was the line at which reasonable doubt is passed mandates a reversal. If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found each element of intimidation beyond a reasonable doubt, an appellate court should affirm the defendant’s conviction. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277.) After reviewing the record, I believe that the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Therefore, I would affirm. As the majority notes, the purpose of the intimidation statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 12—6(a)(1)) is to prohibit the making of threats which are uttered to force others to act against their will. (People v. Tennin (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 520, 525, 515 N.E.2d 1056, 1059.) The "gravamen of the offense is improper influence on another.” (Tennin, 162 Ill. App. at 525, 515 N.E.2d at 1059.) Viewing the defendant’s conduct in the totality of the circumstances, I believe that a rational trier of fact could conclude that his conduct had a "reasonable tendency under the circumstances to place another in fear that the threat-maker will perform the threatened act.” Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968), 280 F. Supp. 938, 962, rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Boyle v. Landry (1971), 401 U.S. 77, 27 L. Ed. 2d 696, 91 S. Ct. 758. In this case, the record indicates that three vehicles pulled up on both sides of the officers’ vehicle. Several men exited their vehicles and stood in front of the officers’ vehicle, while the defendant’s brother stood near the driver’s side window. Testimony indicates that the men were yelling at the officers, and that the defendant told Officer Thomas that he had no "f’ing business here and "if you know what’s good for you you will keep your asses on the other side of the river.” Additionally, the presence of guns and the fact that the confrontation took place in a hostile atmosphere cannot be ignored. The record indicates that Officer Thomas told the defendant that the officers had permission to hunt and asked the defendant what he was going to do about keeping the officers off the land. The defendant replied by asking him to get out of his vehicle and "we’ll get it on right here.” The logical inference from the defendant’s statements is that if Officer Thomas did not stay out of the area, or at least off of Mr. Nowers’ land, the defendant would inflict physical harm upon him. I find this conduct within the scope and purpose of the intimidation statute. The defendant argues and the majority agrees that there was no "specific act threatened” and that, as a result, no rational jury could conclude that he intended to threaten Officer Thomas as contemplated under the statute. I find this argument unpersuasive. When the circumstances are such that the threat of physical harm can be inferred, it is unnecessary that the defendant state exactly how he proposes to harm the victim. (See People v. Valko (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 462, 559 N.E.2d 104 (affirming intimidation conviction of defendant who told victim "something would happen” to him if he revealed the sex acts of the defendant).) While the cases cited by the majority on this issue are factually dissimilar from the present case, I do not believe that these cases limit the number of situations in which a jury could find that the crime of intimidation has been committed. There was ample evidence entered at trial to support the conclusion that the defendant warned Officer Thomas that he did not want Thomas hunting in the area and threatened them with physical harm if he did not heed his warning. Because I would affirm the defendant’s conviction, I address the defendant’s contention that his trial was prejudiced by the statements of counsel for his codefendant. At trial, counsel for the codefendant told the jury during closing argument that 75% was the line beyond which the prosecution must pass to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. I first note that closing arguments were not reported and the record does not reveal exactly what was said during closing arguments. In the bystander report, the trial judge stated that codefendant’s counsel "made an argument to the jury that a percentage of evidence is needed to find someone guilty beyond a reasonable doubt *** [although] as the trial judge I am unable to remember the exact percentage used.” It is necessary for counsel to object at trial and in a written post-trial motion to preserve an issue for review. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130.) The defendant made no objection to the comments made by his codefendant’s counsel during closing argument either at trial or in a post-trial motion. However, the defendant argues that this court should apply the plain error doctrine and review the comments made by codefendant’s counsel during closing argument. The plain error doctrine will only be invoked when the evidence is closely balanced or the error was of such magnitude that the defendant was denied a fair trial. (People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 39-40, 568 N.E.2d 461, 468.) As previously discussed, my review of the record indicates that the evidence in this case was not closely balanced. Furthermore, although I agree that it was erroneous for trial counsel to attempt to attach a percentage to the self-defining concept of reasonable doubt (People v. Speight (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 365, 374, 606 N.E.2d 1174, 1177; People v. Garcia (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 779, 784-85, 431 N.E.2d 1234, 1239; People v. Jenkins (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 395, 398, 411 N.E.2d 1047, 1049), I note that the trial judge instructed the jury that any attempt to define the burden of beyond a reasonable doubt was erroneous, that "each word is very important and the burden is self-defining and cannot be defined.” I find that this instruction cured any error and that the defendant received a fair trial. See People v. Roe (1992), 228 Ill. App. 3d 628, 592 N.E.2d 596 (finding prosecutor’s attempt to define reasonable doubt did not deprive defendant of a fair trial). I respectfully dissent.