Court Opinion

ID: 9684197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:50:10.964745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:53.934775
License: Public Domain

*684R. L. Kaczmarek, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority finds that the circuit court did not have a justifiable basis to order the removal of defense counsel. On this point, I agree and join in that portion of the Court’s opinion. However, my colleagues find that the removal of appointed counsel is a structural error that infects the entire trial and that therefore requires automatic reversal. I respectfully dissent from that finding.
In People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392; 521 NW2d 538 (1994), the Supreme Court enumerated several errors that rise to the level of a structural defect in the constitution of the trial mechanism. Id., 405. These errors were
the total deprivation of the right to trial counsel, an impartial judge, excluding grand jury members who are the same race as defendant, denial of the right to self-representation, denial of the right to a public trial, and a constitutionally improper reasonable doubt instruction. [Id.]
Clearly, the Supreme Court contemplated rights under the United States Constitution fundamental to a fair trial. The Sixth Amendment provides that the accused in all criminal prosecutions shall "have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” US Const, Am VI. While the case under consideration does implicate the Sixth Amendment, the deprivation that Ms. Durfee argues she suffered is not an error of the magnitude contemplated in Anderson; although indigent defendants do have a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, they do not have a right to appointed counsel of their own choosing. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 441; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); Caplin & Drysdale v United States, 491 US 617, 624; 109 S Ct 2646; 105 L Ed 2d 528 (1989). Where criminal defendants are *685not denied their Sixth Amendment right, the error resulting from the improper removal of counsel cannot amount to a structural defect in the constitution of the trial mechanism. The proper inquiry therefore is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Anderson, supra, 405-406.
It is well settled in Michigan that "statements concerning a principle of law not essential to determination of the case are obiter dictum and lack the force of an adjudication.” Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 422 Mich 594, 597-598; 374 NW2d 905 (1985). In People v Abernathy, 153 Mich App 567, 569-570; 396 NW2d 436 (1985), this Court found that the conduct of the defendant’s counsel was grossly incompetent or, at the least, contumacious. The Court also noted that the defendant made no showing of prejudice. Id., 572. Because the Court relied on the defendant’s failure to show prejudice to justify the removal of trial counsel, I would argue that the discussion of prejudice and application of that doctrine is not obiter dictum. Indeed, if the defendant made a positive showing of prejudice in Abernathy, then the Court would have faced a more complicated issue that would have required a different analysis.
Requiring a showing of prejudice would bring improper removal of counsel claims in line with ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought under Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). Under Strickland, a convicted defendant must show that counsel’s performance at trial was deficient and that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result. Id., 687. Following the rubric of Strickland, a convicted defendant challenging the removal of trial counsel should show that counsel was not grossly incompetent, physically incapacitated, or guilty of contu*686macious conduct. After showing that trial counsel was improperly removed, a convicted defendant should then show that the defendant suffered some form of prejudice as a result of the removal. The prejudice need not be substantial; Anderson requires that error be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the harmless-error doctrine to apply. Anderson, supra, 406.
The appellant here has not asserted prejudice. The record reflects that she was represented by counsel at all critical points of the criminal trial process, either by Mr. Hess or by Mr. Sutton. The trial judge adjourned the sentencing for three weeks after Mr. Hess’ removal to allow adequate time for Mr. Sutton to prepare. Consequently, appellant does not challenge Mr. Sutton’s efficacy. More importantly, appellant does not argue that the removal of prior counsel affected the sentence itself. Ultimately, prejudicial error requiring reversal must exhibit itself somewhere; in this case the logical point is sentencing. However, appellant challenges the sentence only on procedural grounds, arguing that the trial judge impermissibly considered a charge pending in another county. Appellant does not, and cannot, claim that the alleged error was a result of the removal. I would conclude that the appellant has not demonstrated any prejudice.
The circuit court committed error in improperly removing appellant’s trial counsel. However, I would affirm the sentence because the appellant has not asserted any prejudice, and I would therefore conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I join in part m of the majority opinion.