Court Opinion

ID: 7820571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:53:06.325295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:43.759566
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, dissenting. I agree that the search made in this case cannot be upheld as an automobile search, or as a search incident to a lawful arrest. It appears to me that it was too broad in scope and extent to be justified as incidental to the arrest of appellants. I do not agree that there was no probable cause for arrest, however. I disagree on the question of consent to search and I draw inferences from the testimony that are decidedly different from those drawn by the majority. I do not think that the trial court’s holding can be said to be clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, as we must say, in order to reverse that holding. State v. Osborn, 263 Ark. 554, 566 S.W. 2d 139. I would also point out that, in order to be clear and positive, it is not necessary that evidence be undisputed.1 State v. Sherrick, 98 Ariz. 46, 402 P. 2d 1 (1965), cert. den. 384 U.S. 1022, 86 S. Ct. 1938, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1024 (1966). Even if we equate “clear and positive” testimony with “clear and convincing evidence” (which I do not), the fact that the evidence is disputed is not determinative of the question. Kelly v. Kelly, 264 Ark. 865, 575 S.W. 2d 672 (1979). We said in Kelly that the latter degree of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and is simply that degree of proof that will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. If we made appropriate allowances for the superior position of the trial judge in evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, it is clear to me that the “clear and positive” test was met and that we cannot say that the finding of the trial court was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Both police officers arrived at Toll Manufacturing Company within a few minutes after the burglar alarm was first sounded. Ledbetter was only a minute or two behind Woods. Woods testified that when he saw the car lights come on, the burglar alarm was still audible and that, as he came around the building, he saw the lights go off. He said that, after a period of about 30 seconds, he saw the lights come on again, in the same spot, but then their movement indicated that the vehicle was moving backwards. According to his estimate, the car was somewhere between 100 and 300 yards from the Toll Building, but on the perimeter of the Toll parking lot. Until he arrived at the vehicle he thought the car was on the parking lot. Woods said that he called Ledbetter’s attention to these lights. This officer said that, since he felt that the occupants of the car had caused the burglar alarm, he and Ledbetter went immediately to prevent this vehicle from leaving. Woods immediately noticed that the automobile bore an out-of-state license and that a U-Haul trailer was attached to it. The trailer was padlocked. Woods said that he first asked the driver and his companion to step out of the car and asked for identification. He stated that after they gave him their driver’s licenses, he advised appellants that he had reason to believe that they were involved in a burglary at the Toll Manufacturing Company and that he was placing them under arrest for burglary. Woods testified that he advised appellants of their rights, and then asked them what they had in the trailer. He stated that one of them (Moore, he believed), answered that it was dental equipment he was taking to his brother. According to Woods, after Moore explained further, he asked, “Well, do you mind if I see in the dental equipment you have in the trailer because we have had the burglary alarm going off” and Moore responded, “Here’s the keys, go ahead and look” and handed him the keys with which Woods unlocked the trailer. Sgt. Ledbetter said that, upon arrival at the Toll Manufacturing Company premises, he and Woods proceeded to the building to check it, and as they “started up,” he observed the headlights of the automobile come on and saw that the vehicle started moving east at a slow speed. He did not see the lights come on and go off. He said that he never did go all the way around the building and that Woods was “spotlighting” the building to see if he could find an “entry hole” in it. Ledbetter said that the officers identified themselves when they stopped appellants and that appellants furnished identification upon request and were very cooperative. He corroborated the testimony of Woods as to the advice given to appellants, the request for permission to look inside the trailer and the obtaining of the keys. He said that he was standing up in front of the car, but that he heard Woods say something about a burglary and heard something said about dental lab chairs or dental equipment. He said that the boxes in which the marijuana was found bore labels reading, “Four chairs per box. ” Ledbetter said that he suspected appellants of burglary because of the suspicious movements of the vehicle at a scene where a burglar alarm was going off about 200 yards away and, from past experience, he knew burglars used U-Haul trailers to haul away their loot. Robert J. Raley, Sr., plant manager at Toll Manufacturing Company, was alerted and came to the plant after the officers and Terry McGuire, the plant superintendent, had arrived. He felt sure that an outside inspection of the building, which revealed that no doors were open or windows were broken, had been made, but he did not observe it. He did not think the officers had been at the scene long enough to check every lock, window and door to determine whether someone had been in the place. He said that preparations were being made for the party to go inside the building when the car was turning around and that he and McGuire told the sheriff’s deputies that maybe someone that had been involved in the burglary was over there. He said that the officers left immediately. He stated that there was nothing unusual about the officers stopping a car leaving a place from which its occupants could have had access to the building. McGuire said that the officers had driven around the building and made a visual check and reported that they did not find any visible evidence of open doors or anything showing visible entry, but that nobody had really made a check of the plant before Officers Woods and Ledbetter left, and that he and Raley had to await the arrival of another officer to come and make a visual check. McGuire did not see the lights blink on and off, but he had been looking in another direction and happened to look toward the car and saw it with the lights on. It appeared to him that the car was “backing out” because he saw the “back-up” lights on it. The evidence that the movements of the automobile on the perimeter of the parking lot while the burglar alarm was still sounding and at a time when the check of the building had not been completed was a basis for the officers to reasonably suspect that the occupants of the automobile were committing, or had committed, a felony. Under these circumstances it was proper for the officers to stop appellants and obtain identification and determine the lawfulness of their conduct. Rule 3.1, Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. The officers would have been derelict in the performance of their duties, if they had not done so. To say the very least, the officers had reasonable cause to believe that the occupants of the vehicle were witnesses to the offense of burglary, a felony, and had the right to obtain identification of these persons and to ascertain what information they had about the burglary. Rule 3.5, Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. When the officers saw that the out-of-state automobile was towing a U-Haul trailer, they had reasonable cause to believe that the occupants had committed the felony of burglary, knowing that such a trailer was commonly used by burglars to conceal and haul stolen property. See Sanders v. State, 259 Ark. 329, 532 S.W. 2d 752; Rowland v. State, 263 Ark. 77, 561 S.W. 2d 304; Perez v. State, 260 Ark. 438, 541 S.W. 2d 915; Williams v. State, 258 Ark. 207, 523 S.W. 2d 377; Johnson v. State, 249 Ark. 208, 458 S.W. 2d 409, Wickliffe v. State, 258 Ark. 544, 527 S.W. 2d 640. They had the right to arrest these suspects. Rule 4.1, Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although appellants presented a horror story about the actions of the officers, the trial court resolved the question of credibility against them, and this court is bound by that determination. State v. Osborn, 263 Ark. 554, 566 S.W. 2d 139. I would affirm the judgment. I am authorized to state that the Chief Justice joins in this opinion.   Not all jurisdictions accept the proposition that any more than a preponderance of the evidence is required to establish consent to search. See, e.g., People v. James, 19 Cal. 3d 99, 137 Cal. Rptr. 447, 561 P. 2d 1135 (1977); State v. Buckner, 223 Kan. 138, 574 P. 2d 918 (1977); U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974). We adopted the “clear and positive” degree of proof in Hock v. State, 259 Ark. 67, 531 S.W. 2d 701. While there is some question about this degree of proof being required in every case where justification for a warrantless search is based upon an allegation of consent, I think that it is certainly the proper rule when the defendant is under arrest when the “consent” is given, or when the evidence shows no more than acquiescence to an assertion of lawful authority by the searching officers. See Rodriquez v. State, 262 Ark. 659, 559 S.W. 2d 925; Hock v. State, supra; White v. State, 261 Ark. 23-D, 545 S.W. 2d 641. Thus, I consider the “clear and positive” rule to be applicable to this case.