Court Opinion

ID: 9755509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:40:40.836339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:07.793913
License: Public Domain

HINOJOSA, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony concerning the urinalysis test results and in revoking appellant’s community supervision. Because I disagree with the majority’s holding, I respectfully dissent.
Under Texas Rule of Evidence 702, the trial court must determine whether proffered scientific expert testimony is “sufficiently reliable and relevant to help the jury in reaching accurate results.” Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). The Kelly standard is not limited to novel scientific evidence, but applies to all scientific evidence offered under Rule 702. Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Hartman v. State, 946 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The proponent of the evidence must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the evidence is sufficiently relevant and reliable to assist the fact finder in accurately understanding other evidence or determining a fact issue. Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 560-61 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).
To be considered reliable, evidence must satisfy three criteria pertaining to its validity and application: (1) the underlying theory must be valid; (2) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (3) the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in question. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573. All three of these criteria must be proved to the trial court by clear and convincing evidence before the scientific evidence may be admitted. See id. To be reliable, it must be shown that the evidence has as its basis “sound scientific methodology.” Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). “This demands a certain technical showing.” Id. Accordingly, it is through the assessment of reliability that trial courts “weed out” testimony pertaining to “junk science,” or otherwise inadequately tested scientific theories. Id.; see Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (proponent has burden of proving that the evidence is “relevant and rehable and not mere ‘junk science’ ”).
In determining reliability, the trial court may also consider seven nonexclusive factors that have been identified by the court of criminal appeals: (1) the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be determined; (2) the qualification of the expert testifying; (3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique; (4) the potential rate of error of the technique; (5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique can be explained to the court; and (7) the experience and skill of the person who applied the technique on the occasion in question. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573; Forte v. State, 935 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd). This is a flexible inquiry, and trial courts may consider other factors that are helpful in determining the reliability of *707scientific evidence. McGann v. State, 30 S.W.3d 540, 546 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd); Forte, 935 S.W.2d at 177. Once a particular type of scientific evidence is well established as reliable, a court may take judicial notice of that fact, thereby relieving the proponent of the burden of producing evidence on that question. Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542 n. 4; Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).
When we review a trial court’s admission of scientific evidence, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. Prystash v. State 3 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Griffith v. State, 983 S.W.2d 282, 287 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). In other words, the appellate court must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542; Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Under this standard, we must determine whether the trial court’s decision fell within the zone of reasonable disagreement given the evidence presented and the requirements of rule 702. Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 574. The admissibility of scientific testimony is a mixed question of law and fact, and the appellate court is authorized to conduct a de novo review because the issue does not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the State’s witnesses. Jackson, 17 S.W.3d at 672 n. 8 (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)); Hines v. State, 38 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
The majority opinion holds that the trial court abused its discretion because the testimony of the State’s witness, “does not satisfy two of the three criteria announced in Kelly; that is, the validity of the underlying scientific theory and the validity of the technique applying the theory,” and cites the State’s failure to adduce evidence on every one of the seven Kelly factors. After reviewing the record, I do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony concerning the positive results of appellant’s urinalysis test for the presence of marihuana for two reasons.
First, such testing has been held by courts in other jurisdictions to be reliable. “[I]t is beyond debate that urinalysis has achieved a sufficient level of scientific reliability to be accepted into evidence by our courts.... Urinalysis technology is hardly novel and has become a conventional means of drug-testing, the results of which have been deemed reliable.” Carter v. State, 706 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind.1999). Furthermore, the ADX technology at issue here has also been held reliable: “The ADX test is a fluorescein polarization immunoassay test (FPIA) that is used to detect marijuana and other drugs in biological fluids. When properly performed, FPIA tests for cannabinoids are generally accurate.” Koenig v. Vannelli, 971 F.2d 422, 422 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (citing Richard H. Schwartz, M. D., Urine Testing in the Detection of Drugs of Abuse, 148 Archives of InteRnal Medioine 2407 (Nov.1988)); see Penrod v. State, 611 N.E.2d 653, 654 (Ind.App.2d 1993) (holding the ADX urinalysis machine “has gained general scientific acceptance”). Kelly and its progeny are aimed at preventing mere theory and “junk science” from being presented as true science in the courtroom. See Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542. The ADX urinalysis technology is widely accepted in legal, medical and scientific communities, and cannot by any stretch of the imagination be viewed as an unproven theory or “junk science.” Furthermore, the list of factors in Kelly is nonexclusive, and the Kelly test is meant to be flexible. See Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573; McGann, 30 S.W.3d at 546; Forte, 935 S.W.2d at 176. Therefore, the trial court was free to con*708sider other factors, including its own knowledge or common knowledge concerning the general acceptance of such testing. The trial court was entitled to rely on such general acceptance, thus relieving the proponent of the burden of producing evidence on that question. Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542 n. 4; Emerson, 880 S.W.2d at 764.
Secondly, even without considering the test’s general acceptance, I conclude the State adduced sufficient evidence to show that the test results in question were reliable. For these reasons, I would hold the trial court’s admission of this evidence is “within the zone of reasonable disagreement,” and would affirm the trial court’s order revoking appellant’s community supervision. Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.