Court Opinion

ID: 2964814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:30.611864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:01.549734
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
       No. 96-2213
                           ROBERTO TIRADO-ACOSTA, ET AL.,
                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,
                                         v.
                         PUERTO RICO NATIONAL GUARD, ET AL.,
                               Defendants, Appellees.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
                    [Hon. Carmen C. Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                             Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                             and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                ____________________
            Rafael F.  Castro Lang with whom  F. Castro Amy was  on brief for
       appellants.
            Sylvia Roger Stefani, Assistant  Solicitor General, Department of
       Justice, 
                with 
                    whom 
                         Carlos
                               Lugo Fiol, Solicitor General, and Edda Serrano
       Blasini, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees.
                                ____________________
                                    July 9, 1997
                                ____________________

                 BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.   Plaintiffs in this action,  all
            members of  the Puerto Rico  National Guard,  were called  to
            active 
                  duty 
                       in the Persian Gulf War.  Prior to active duty and
            briefly upon their return, they were employed full-time in  a
            National Guard program  to assist in drug interdiction.   Not
            long after their return,  the plaintiffs' assignment to  this
            program 
                   was 
                      terminated 
                                 by the Puerto Rico National Guard.  When
            the 
               plaintiffs sued, the district court ruled that they had no
            statutory 
                     right to reemployment in such a program.  We affirm.
                 The  basic facts are  not in dispute.   The Puerto  Rico
            National Guard, like the National Guards in all 50 states, is
            a hybrid organization.  National Guards are ordinarily  under
            the  control  of state  (or,  in  the case  of  Puerto  Rico,
            Commonwealth)
                         officials, but are organized pursuant to federal
            statute, 
                    and 
                        in war time or other emergencies, Guard units may
            be brought under federal  control.  See U.S. Const., art.  I,
            sec. 8, cl. 16; 32 U.S.C. S 101, et seq.
                 In 
                   1989, 
                        Congress 
                                 authorized federal funding to permit the
            local National Guards to support drug interdiction and  other
            counter-drug activities.    32 U.S.C.  S  112.   Section  112
            provided 
                    that each state desiring to participate would draw up
            its own plan subject to approval by the Secretary of Defense.
            Despite this and other authority over the program granted  to
            the Secretary  of  Defense,  the statute  required  that  the
            National 
                    Guard personnel involved in these operations be under
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            local 
                 control and "not in Federal service," id. S 112(c)(1), a
            requirement  apparently  designed  to  mesh  with  the  Posse
            Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1385, limiting the use of  federal
            troops for domestic law enforcement purposes.
                 Most National Guard  members ordinarily serve only  part
            time, but there are exceptions.  Section 112 itself  provided
            that  subject to  Secretary  of  Defense  regulations,  local
            National Guard members  could, pursuant to a state plan,  "be
            ordered 
                   to 
                      perform full-time National Guard duty under section
            502(f)  of this title  for the purpose  of carrying out  drug
            interdiction 
                        and counter-drug activities."  32 U.S.C. S 502(f)
            allows  National Guard  personnel to  be assigned  additional
            duties, apart from ordinary drills and field exercises,  with
            the provision appropriate for "pay and allowances."
                 Beginning 
                          in 
                             1989, 
                                  the 
                                      Puerto Rico National Guard used the
            federal funds  provided under section  112 for  a variety  of
            counter-drug projects.   In one of the projects, Puerto  Rico
            National Guard personnel assisted the U.S. Customs Service in
            inspecting cargo containers arriving and leaving Puerto  Rico
            ports and airports.  Each of the plaintiffs in this case is a
            Puerto Rico National  Guard member who  was assigned to  work
            full-time in 1989 to  1990 in this phase of the  counter-drug
            program.  Minor variations aside, each plaintiff worked under
            orders couched in the following terms:
                      You are  ordered to  Active Duty  special
                      work (ADSW) for the period indicated plus
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                      allowable 
                               travel time.  Upon completion of
                      the period of ADSW unless sooner relieved
                      or extended by proper authority you  will
                      return 
                            to 
                               the place where you entered ADSW
                      and are relieved from such duty.
                 According to the memorandum of understanding between the
            Puerto Rico National Guard and the Customs Service, "National
            Guard personnel employed in support of [the Customs  Service]
            for counter-drug operations will be under the command of, and
            directly 
                    responsible to their military chain of command."  The
            memorandum also  said  that "all  missions will  be  executed
            through 
                   the 
                      military 
                               chain of command; i.e., tactical direction
            of the troops . . . will be left solely to the National Guard
            Officers in Charge/Noncommissioned Officer in Charge."
                 Thus, the plaintiffs  working in  the drug  interdiction
            program 
                   were 
                       ultimately 
                                  commanded and controlled by Puerto Rico
            National Guard officers, and they were paid for their work by
            the Puerto  Rico National Guard  from funds  provided by  the
            federal government.  However, much of the plaintiffs' day-to-
            day work was directed by Customs Service officials.  The work
            itself 
                  did 
                      not 
                         entail 
                                the use of any specialized military skill
            but  consisted  mainly  of  unloading  and  reloading   cargo
            containers or inspecting their contents.
                 The 
                    plaintiffs' pay and allowances for full-time National
            Guard duty in  the program were substantial (e.g., $1,400  to
            $2,000  per  month).   Each  plaintiff  worked  under  orders
            assigning 
                     him such duty for a relatively brief period, ranging
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            from 
                2 
                  days 
                       to 61 days, but the orders were regularly renewed.
            At 
              trial 
                    the 
                       plaintiffs 
                                  testified that they believed that these
            orders 
                  would 
                        be 
                          renewed 
                                  indefinitely so long as funding for the
            drug interdiction program continued.  They said that they had
            been given assurances that they would not be dismissed unless
            they failed to perform their work satisfactorily.
                 In January 1991, all of the plaintiffs were called  into
            active service  on account of the  Persian Gulf War and  left
            their  positions  in the  drug  interdiction  program.    The
            plaintiffs completed their  active federal  military duty  in
            early 
                 July 
                      1991 
                          and 
                              were 
                                   reassigned by the Puerto Rico National
            Guard 
                 to 
                    the 
                        drug interdiction program for the period July 11,
            1991 
                to 
                   September 
                            30, 
                                1991.  On October 1, 1991, the plaintiffs
            were released from  full-time duty in the program, and  their
            positions taken by other Guard personnel.
                 In 
                   September 
                             1992, the plaintiffs brought suit in federal
            district court in Puerto Rico seeking reinstatement and  back
            pay.   The principal claim  brought against  the Puerto  Rico
            National Guard "and/or the United States of America" was that
            defendants  had violated  the  plaintiffs' rights  under  the
            Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act ("the Veterans' Act"), then
            codified 
                    at 
                       38 U.S.C. S 2021 et seq., by not retaining them in
            their full-time  drug-interdiction positions following  their
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            return  from the  Gulf  War.   The  United States  was  later
            dismissed as a defendant.1  
                 The Puerto  Rico  National Guard  moved to  dismiss  the
            complaint on  several grounds, including  failure to state  a
            claim, non-justiciability, Eleventh Amendment immunity,  non-
            exhaustion of administrative remedies, and untimeliness.  The
            district 
                    court deemed most of these defenses lacking in merit;
            and it  said that  the merits could  not be resolved  without
            developing 
                      a 
                       factual 
                               record.  Accordingly, after discovery, the
            district 
                    court 
                         conducted 
                                   a bench trial in August 1995 and heard
            testimony from both sides.  
                 In 
                   a 
                     written 
                            decision 
                                     issued August 16, 1996, the district
            court dismissed the complaint.  It ruled that the  plaintiffs
            did not  have  reemployment rights  under the  Veterans'  Act
            because their drug  interdiction positions were "military  in
            nature" and therefore beyond the statute's intended coverage;
            the 
               court 
                     did not reach or resolve the defendants' alternative
            statutory 
                     defense 
                            that 
                                 the plaintiffs be excluded from coverage
            because 
                   their 
                         posts 
                              were 
                                   "temporary."  See 38 U.S.C. S 2021(a).
            The district court entered  judgment for the defendants,  and
            this appeal followed. 
                 1The complaint also alleged that two individual Guard
            officers had violated 42 U.S.C. S 1983 by refusing to retain
            the plaintiffs in the program; but this claim was contingent
            on a showing of violation of the Veterans' Act and requires
            no further discussion.
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                 In our view, the district court was clearly right in its
            construction of the  federal statute, and  we affirm on  that
            ground without addressing other  defenses.  Where the  result
            would 
                 be 
                    the 
                        same, this court has often rejected claims on the
            merits without resolving possible jurisdictional  objections.
            Hachikian
                     
                     v. 
                        FDIC
                           , 
                             96 
                                F.3d 502, 506 n.4 (1st Cir. 1996).  Here,
            the case ought to be  decided promptly, in view of the  delay
            already 
                   suffered by the plaintiffs, and the legal issue is one
            that can be decided definitively only by a federal court.  
                 We begin  with the  terms of  the Veterans'  Act.   This
            statute, enacted  in 1978,  carried forward  the policy  that
            Congress 
                    first 
                         adopted 
                                 in 1940 to provide employment protection
            for veterans  returning  from military  service.   Monroe  v.
            Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1981).  Although  the
            Veterans' Act has itself been superseded by a new enactment--
            the 
               Uniform 
                      Services 
                               Employment and Reemployment Act, 38 U.S.C.
            S 4301 et seq.--the new statute applies only to reemployments
            initiated on or after October 13, 1994.  110 Stat. 3336.
                 The Veterans'  Act  main section  granting  reemployment
            rights is  38 U.S.C. S  2021, which  provides protection  for
            anyone "inducted into the Armed Forces of the United  States"
            under the selective service statute.  A companion section, 28
            U.S.C. S 2024, extends similar protection, by cross-reference
            back to  section 2021, to  several other  classes of  persons
            including reservists and others called to "active duty (other
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            than 
                for 
                    the 
                        purpose of determining physical fitness and other
            than for training) . . . ."  Concededly, the plaintiffs  were
            called to active duty in 1991.
                 Section 2021(a) provides that an inductee (or by  cross-
            reference a reservist  called to active  duty) "who leaves  a
            position 
                    (other 
                           than 
                               a 
                                 temporary position) in the employ of any
            employer" 
                     is 
                        entitled to reemployment if sought within 90 days
            after  release  from  the  military.    The  conditions   and
            obligations  vary somewhat  depending  on whether  the  prior
            employer was governmental or private, but it is common ground
            that the  statute protects  prior employment  by the  federal
            government, the states, and the Commonwealth of Puerto  Rico.
            See  38  U.S.C.  S  2021(a);  id.  S  101(20)  (defining  the
            Commonwealth as a state for this purpose).
                 Although 
                         the 
                             Veterans' Act covers "a position (other than
            a temporary  position) in the  employ of  any employer,"  the
            defendants argue that  the statute was  not meant to  protect
            prior employment in a military position.  We consider at  the
            outset whether the statute,  which contains no such  limiting
            term, 
                 should 
                        be 
                          so 
                             construed; and, finding that it should be so
            read, we then return to the question whether the  plaintiffs'
            former positions in the  drug interdiction program should  be
            regarded as unprotected military  positions.  Both are  legal
            questions, but of slightly different character.  
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                 As we have noted,  no express term in the Veterans'  Act
            limits a  protectible  former  "position" to  a  position  in
            civilian  employment  or   excludes  from  the  category   of
            protectible 
                       positions a military assignment.  Nevertheless, it
            is 
              apparent 
                       to 
                         us 
                            that 
                                 the statute must be thus construed.  The
            evidence for this conclusion is provided by the structure and
            purpose of the statute, by extrinsic policy safeguarding  the
            autonomy  of  military organizations,  and  by  the  lack  of
            precedent  extending  reemployment  protection  to   military
            positions.
                 First, the very design of the Veterans' Act makes  clear
            its  central aim was  to protect those  who were inducted  or
            otherwise drawn  into military life  and thereby required  to
            surrender 
                     their 
                          civilian 
                                   jobs.  The Supreme Court, for example,
            has  spoken of  the Veterans'  Act as  relating to  "military
            service after which a member of the Armed Forces retains  the
            right to civilian employment."  King v. St. Vincent's  Hosp.,
            502 
               U.S. 
                    215, 
                        216 
                            (1991).  Congress probably did not insert the
            word "civilian" before  "position" simply  because it  seemed
            unnecessary to add a term made almost redundant by context.  
                 Each of the provisions providing reemployment protection
            is 
              directed 
                       at 
                         persons 
                                 who cross the barrier from civilian into
            military life:   the  inductee (section  2021), the  enlistee
            (section 2024(a)), the  reservist entering  upon active  duty
            (other than  for physical  fitness testing  or for  training)
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            (section 2024(b)), and certain persons who enter upon  active
            duty for training or inactive duty training (subsections  (c)
            and 
               (d)). 
                      
                      It 
                        is 
                           persons 
                                   who leave "a position" to perform such
            duties and thereafter seek to "be restored to such  position"
            who are protected.  38 U.S.C. S 2021(a).
                 There is simply no  hint in all this that when  Congress
            sought to  protect prior employment,  it intended to  protect
            prior  employment in a  military capacity.   It is true  that
            civilian 
                    employees of state and federal military organizations
            are 
               themselves 
                         protected 
                                   if called to active duty.  See Panigua
            v. Department  of  the Air  Force,  13 M.S.P.R.  306,  307-09
            (M.S.P.B. 1982).  But such civilian employees of the military
            are akin  to civilian employees  of any  other department  of
            government.  Military employees are a different matter.
                 This brings us  to a further, reenforcing reason why  we
            decline to  read the  Veterans' Act  to protect  reemployment
            rights 
                  in 
                    former 
                           military positions.  The courts have long been
            reluctant to interfere with internal military decisionmaking,
            including 
                     personnel decisions.  With only rare exceptions, the
            courts 
                  have 
                       taken 
                            the 
                                view that assignments within the military
            structure 
                     are matters to be decided by the military and not by
            the  courts.  See  Orloff v. Willoughby,  345 U.S. 83,  93-94
            (1953).  The reasons are too obvious to need elaboration.
                 In some situations, this view is expressed by deeming  a
            controversy to be nonjusticiable, Wright v. Park, 5 F.3d 586,
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            589-91 
                  (1st 
                       Cir. 1993); in others, it takes the form of giving
            great deference to  the military's judgment on the matter  at
            hand.  Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 261 (8th Cir. 1996).
            But  the  underlying  notion  is  that  matters  of  military
            organization,
                         personnel and operations are extremely sensitive
            and that courts will do more harm than good by  interfering. 
            Congress 
                    can 
                        provide otherwise by statute, but rarely does so.
                 Thus, we conclude that Veterans' Act protections do  not
            extend to affording anyone reemployment rights in a  military
            position.    However generously  the  Veterans'  Act  may  be
            construed  to protect  prior civilian  employment, Tilton  v.
            Missouri P.R.R., 376  U.S. 169, 181 (1964), Congress did  not
            intend 
                  that 
                      anyone 
                             should have a preemptive claim to his former
            position  as an air  force pilot or  an army tank  commander.
            Whether the plaintiffs' positions in the Puerto Rico National
            Guard 
                 drug 
                      interdiction program should be viewed as sharing in
            this 
                "military" character is a different issue to which we now
            turn.
                 It 
                   is 
                      clear 
                            from section 112 and the orders issued to the
            plaintiffs that their participation in the drug  interdiction
            program 
                   was 
                      the 
                          performance of "full-time National Guard duty."
            The 
               drug 
                   interdiction 
                                statute, 32 U.S.C. S 112(b), provides for
            Guard personnel  to perform such  National Guard duty  "under
            section 502(f)" to carry  out drug interdiction; and  section
            502(f) 
                  allows Guard members to be ordered to perform "training
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            or  other  duty"  in addition  to  assembly  for  drills  and
            encampment. 
                        
                        The 
                           orders 
                                  issued to the plaintiffs made reference
            to section 502(f) and, in certain cases, section 503 which is
            a companion provision involving joint exercises with the army
            or the air force.
                 In addition, the evidence shows that the plaintiffs were
            participating in the  drug interdiction  program pursuant  to
            military 
                    orders and were subject to the command and control of
            Guard 
                 officers. 
                            
                           Indeed, 
                                   it appears likely that the plaintiffs'
            full-time 
                     positions 
                              in 
                                 the drug interdiction program might have
            allowed 
                   them 
                        to claim reemployment rights in any civilian jobs
            they 
                held 
                     at 
                       the 
                           time 
                                they entered upon full-time duty.  See 38
            U.S.C. S 2024(c)(d); id. S 101(22)(C).  In all events,  full-
            time National  Guard duty by  a Guard  member under  military
            orders appears to us quintessentially military in character. 
                 It 
                   is 
                      quite 
                            true that the physical tasks performed by the
            plaintiffs could have been,  and commonly were, performed  by
            customs 
                   officers 
                           who 
                               were not in military service.  But this is
            common:  one can be a cook or a pilot or a  radio operator in
            either military  or civilian  life.   National Guard  members
            called to duty to  build up the dikes  in a flooded area  are
            still part  of the military even  though they are engaged  in
            construction work.  Given  Congress' intent to protect  prior
            civilian jobs  for those serving in  the military, it is  the
            nature 
                  of 
                     the employment--not its functions--that is decisive.
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                 The same result follows from extrinsic policy.  It would
            directly offend the tradition of non-interference in military
            assignments  for a  court to  direct that  the plaintiffs  be
            restored to performing  specific functions as National  Guard
            members assigned to full-time  duty in the drug  interdiction
            program.  The Puerto Rico National Guard cited as reasons for
            its reshuffling of personnel  "unity of command" and  "rank."
            The 
               plaintiffs 
                          say 
                             that 
                                  these objectives could have been met by
            a 
             different 
                      reorganization that retained their jobs; but making
            these evaluations is just what courts are reluctant to do.
                 It remains  to refer  briefly to  cases involving  Guard
            employees governed by the  National Guard Technicians Act  of
            1968,  32 U.S.C.  S 709.   These  technicians are  "full-time
            civilian 
                    employees 
                             of 
                                the National Guard" who are also, in most
            cases, required to hold "concurrent National Guard membership
            as a condition for their civilian employment."  H.R. Rep. No.
            90-1823, at 2 (1968).  E.g., Wright, 5 F.3d at 587 (full-time
            aircraft maintenance specialist).
                 In 
                   a 
                     number 
                            of 
                              cases, 
                                     a 
                                       National Guard technician has been
            called to active service and forced to surrender his civilian
            technician duties with  the Guard.   The question has  arisen
            whether  this technician  position  is  protected  under  the
            Veterans' 
                     Act 
                        after 
                              active duty ends.  One district court ruled
            in 
              favor 
                    of 
                       coverage, although it assumed rather than analyzed
            the statutory-coverage issue,  and several other courts  have
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                                        -13-

            been willing to assume such coverage          in denying  th
            technician's reemployment protection on other grounds.2
                 H
                                                 arguendo               e
                  ow 
                    this 
                         court 
                              would 
                                    decide such a case is unclear.  There
            is  language  in  Wright v.  Park  that  would  lean  against
            protection, although the rights claimed by the technician  in
            that 
                case 
                     were not under the Veterans' Act but under the Civil
            Rights 
                  Act, 
                       42 U.S.C. SS 1983, 1985, and the federal and state
            whistle-blower  statutes.   On  the  other  hand,  a  passing
            reference in the new reemployment statute that has supplanted
            the Veterans'  Act may give  some support  to National  Guard
            technicians who claim reemployment protection.  See 38 U.S.C.
            S 4304(4)(B);  see also H.R. Rep.  No. 103-65, at 21  (1994).
            However such cases  might be decided, we think that  National
            Guard  technicians  are  clearly  distinguishable  from   the
            plaintiffs in this case. 
                 National Guard technicians are employed full-time by the
            Guard in  a civilian  capacity.   In this  respect, they  are
            arguably protected  under the  Veterans' Act  like any  other
            civilian 
                    employees 
                              of 
                                a 
                                  federal or state military organization.
            The difficulty,  where such  civilian positions  are tied  to
            membership in the National Guard, is that reinstatement would
            require either that the  military tie-in be waived or that  a
                 2See Witter v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Guard, 462 F. Supp.
            299, 305-06 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see also Polos v. United States,
            621 F.2d 385, 389-90 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Leistiko v. Secretary of
            Army, 922 F. Supp. 66, 76 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
                                        -14-
                                        -14-

            military  position also  be made  available.   The issue  was
            avoided in Witter  because plaintiff in  that case no  longer
            sought reemployment but merely monetary compensation.  462 F.
            Supp. at 306.
                 In 
                   any 
                       event, the plaintiffs in the present case were not
            employed 
                    as 
                       technicians with the curious dual capacity of that
            position:   full-time  civilian  employment with  an  adjunct
            military role.  The plaintiffs' only status was as "full-time
            National Guard" members assigned, under a state plan approved
            by the Secretary of Defense, to work under military orders in
            the drug interdiction program.  Even assuming that this court
            might 
                 follow 
                        Witter
                              
                              and 
                                  extend protection to technicians--which
            is far from clear--this would not affect our decision in  the
            present case  that the plaintiffs  are not  protected by  the
            Veterans' Act.
                  To 
                    this 
                         point, we have said little about the new federal
            statute 
                   which, as of October 1994, supplants the Veterans' Act
            and provides  a  new  framework for  reemployment  rights  of
            veterans. 
                      
                      This new statute does not apply to the present case
            and is not direct evidence of the intent of the Congress that
            enacted the Veterans' Act.  But the new statute is in certain
            respects 
                    a 
                     reenactment 
                                 of the Veterans' Act in somewhat clearer
            language, 
                     and 
                         it 
                           would 
                                 certainly be deserving of mention if the
            new 
               version 
                      were 
                           strongly favorable either to the plaintiffs or
            the defendants.
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                                        -15-

                 The 
                    fact 
                         is 
                            that the new statute carries forward the same
            ambiguity 
                     in 
                        literal language that afflicts the Veterans' Act.
            It protects, subject to certain conditions, "any person whose
            absence 
                   from 
                        a 
                         position 
                                  of employment is necessitated by reason
            of service in the uniformed services . . . ."  About the most
            to be said is  that the new statute provides that  "full-time
            National 
                    Guard duty" is included in the definition of "service
            in the uniformed services," 38 U.S.C. S 4303(13), reenforcing
            our view that the plaintiffs here passed over to the military
            domain 
                  when 
                      they 
                           accepted full-time National Guard duty as part
            of the drug interdiction program.
                 Affirmed.
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