Court Opinion

ID: 9450889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:00:16.379908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:29.183643
License: Public Domain

BURGER, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in the majority’s treatment of the standing1 and jurisdiction 2 issues and in their affirmance of Jacksonville Broadcasting’s disqualification. And I agree with the broad proposition relied on by my colleagues that our scope of review of Commission action is limited. In observing those limits we are often compelled to affirm agency action on records which could well have led us to a different, even a completely opposite, conclusion. But this case, to me, falls within that narrow area where we ought to reverse Commission action because the very basis of the Commission’s choice to disqualify one, while refusing to dis*82qualify the other, of two applicants is untenable because a distinction between the two is without substantial record support. The Commission disqualified the Jacksonville group because of attempted but unsuccessful efforts to reach the Commission by ex parte contacts although the bulk of the evidence on this score relied upon by the Commission shows that the objective of these contacts was to urge the Commission to disregard political considerations and decide the case on its merits and on the record evidence. I do not challenge the Commission’s power to draw their own inferences, even though I might read that evidence as of a less “sinister cast” than do they. What I see as grave error is the use of a double standard in evaluating misconduct.
Using two standards, as I see it, the Commission found no fault in the successful applicant, who is reasonably shown on this record to have been guilty of conduct at least as objectionable as that which disqualified Appellant. I would not try, however, to balance an appraisal of comparative misconduct, but would disqualify both applicants; I make comparisons only to illustrate what seems to me the irrationality of the Commission’s conclusions and to demonstrate that it employed a double standard of ethics. It is important that this be spelled out.
The Commission’s wrath was directed at Jacksonville Broadcasting Corporation in part because to Jacksonville’s subsequent knowledge Congressman Her-long called the late Commissioner Mack, his fellow Floridian, to inquire about rumors that political influence was about to lead the Commission to reverse the award to Appellant under the Examiner’s preliminary report at that time tentatively approved by the Commission. Congressman Herlong was so disturbed by Mack’s ensuing confession of misconduct that he at once reported the incident to the Chairman of the Committee on Legislative Oversight of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Later, in testifying before the Commission, the Congressman said Commissioner Mack had told him he, Mack, had committed himself to vote for the “Mitch Wolfson” group, Intervenor here, that he had made this commitment before coming to Washington to sit on the case, and that he had to stand by his commitment.
To read sinister implications into Congressman Herlong’s actions, which the Congressman promptly made a matter of public record to his colleagues, is at least surprising. I suppose it not unlikely that it was Herlong’s disclosures to Congress which led the Commission to recall and reopen the case on its own motion. Mitchell Wolfson, a dominant figure of the Intervenor, who controls three other Commission licensed communications channels,3 testified that he had not sought or received any ex parte prehear-ing commitment from Mack. Although the supplemental Commission hearings were held at a time when Commissioner Mack was available, he was not called. The Commission was therefore faced with solid and credible evidence from a member of Congress that he had been told by Mack of an obviously illegal advance commitment to support the Inter-venor regardless of the evidence. The only evidence tending to meet this grave accusation was Wolfson’s testimony that he, Wolfson, had no knowledge of the matter. We are left by the Commission to assume that Mack made this commitment to the Wolfson group without any request — or inducement — from Wolfson or one of his associates. That Wolfson and Mack had contacts with each other is suggested by the “Dear Mitch. * * Sincerely, Dick” letter in which I®ack thanked Wolfson for gifts of “liquid refreshments” and “flowers * * * and delicacies” sent to Commissioner and Mrs. Mack. There is also evidence that various politically prominent Florida personages and Washington lawyers had made known their views to the Commis*83sion indirectly in support of Intervenor and in opposition to Appellant. I cannot take seriously any suggestion that this was exclusively the innocent activity of public spirited citizens with no “ax to grind” after the sordid history of this case had become well known to Congress and the public. Indeed the Office of the General Counsel of the Commission, after detailed analysis of the evidence developed at the reopening hearing, concluded that principals of Florida-Georgia were “inextricably” involved in these activities and accordingly recommended Florida-Georgia’s disqualification to the Commission. See Reply Brief for Appellant, pp. 2-3.
It has been rare for this court in its holdings, or even for individual members in dissent, to undertake re-examination of the weight of evidence before the Commission, and this process has been generally limited to situations where applicants engaged in grossly improper activities in pursuit of their applications. (See e. g., Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 226, 261 F.2d 55 (1958); WORZ, Inc. v. FCC, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 268 F.2d 889 (1959), and other remand cases). But here the Commission has made a finding that one applicant is disqualified while another is given a clean bill” in the face of evidence of ex parte contacts by the successful party at least as offensive as — and in my view worse than — those penalized by the Commission. My conclusions on “comparative misconduct” are not based on a reevaluation of credibility of witnesses, for appellate judges are not free to engage in such excursions; credibility is for fact finders. Rather my conclusions rest on undisputed evidence; this is highlighted by the failure of the Commission even to ask Commissioner Mack for his version of the conversation with Heriong or whether he had been approached by anyone for the Wolfson group. The testimony of Congressman Heriong as to Commissioner Mack’s statements to him stands unchallenged; the Commission did not in any way cast doubt on Herlong’s testimony.4 Mitchell Wolfson’s testimony can do no more than afford a basis for a finding — if he was believed — that he, Wolfson, secured no ex parte commitment from Mack. The circuitous methods of those who engage in backdoor communications with the Commission are all too familiar to us and the Commission’s failure even to invite Mack to clear up this grave charge, which goes to the very heart of the disputed issue here, casts *84an indelible shadow over the entire process.
I repeat that I would not venture to balance the misconduct of Appellant against that of Intervenor for the purpose of giving the award to Appellant rather than Intervenor. But I can find no record basis for the Commission to hold that the rather bumbling and naive efforts of Appellant to find out who was “undermining its award” was evil beyond redemption, while Intervenor was blameless. Under a single standard of conduct both Appellant and Intervenor — ■ or neither — should have been disqualified.
I would remand to the Commission with directions to vacate its award to the Intervenor and begin anew with both Intervenor and Appellant disqualified along with all shareholders of either who hold a substantial amount of stock. Only by such a process can we cleanse this award of its long and unsavory background.

. The Commission relies upon our decisions in Simmons v. FCC, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 145 F.2d 578 (1944), and Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 84 U.S. App.D.C. 341, 173 F.2d 646 (1949), for the proposition that Appellant has no standing to raise the propriety of the Commission’s failure to disqualify its competitor, Florida-Georgia, if the record contains substantial evidence to support its own disqualification. The latter case is not in point, however, since it held merely that one applicant was not aggrieved by the award of tiow-mutually exclusive authority to another. And Simmons is readily distinguishable. There we found that an applicant whose antenna placement would be a hazard to air navigation had no standing to challenge a mutually exclusive award to another, since its own application could not be granted in any event. The clearly correct decision in that case does not automatically govern the present facts. For the instant situation goes to the integrity of the Commission’s processes in a fundamental manner. As we said in WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 253, 261, 296 F.2d 375, 383, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 841, 82 S.Ct. 63, 7 L.Ed.2d 40 (1961):
Surreptitious efforts to influence an official charged with the duty of deciding contested issues upon an open record in accord with basic principles of our jurisprudence eat at the very heart of our system of government— due process, fair play, open proceedings, unbiased, uninfluenced decision. He who engages in such efforts in a contest before an administrative agency is fortunate if he loses no more than the matter involved in that proceeding.
The public interest clearly requires Appellant to be permitted this appeal — if for no other reason than the possibility that this court might have concluded to tell the Commission that it must begin all over again from the beginning. When a regulatory agency so far departs from protecting the public interest, some means must be found to ventilate the processes employed.

. I do not think that Southwestern Publishing Co. v. FCC, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 251, 243 F.2d 829 (1957), requires a contrary result. We there dismissed an appeal by an injured subsidiary which had not been a party to the litigation conducted by its parent corporation at the Commission. That case involved a real difference in parties not present here.

. R. 7133-7134.

. The Commission neatly disposed of Mack’s statement to Heriong by saying, “Commissioner Mack’s statement to Congressman Heriong forms the basis of a finding only that he made the statement, and not as to its accuracy. With respect to Wolfson and Morida-Georgia, the statement is hearsay and incompetent to form the basis of a finding of fact.” What astonishing sophistry! Indeed what impertinence! As a matter of technical evidence law, of course, Mack’s statement would be admissible against Mm as a party admission, were he a litigant, but inadmissible (except in some jurisdictions) against others as not strictly a common-law “declaration against interest.”
But the Commission is not bound by such nice evidentiary distinctions and indeed does not ordinarily stand on them; it is permitted — in fact required in the public interest — to consider reliable evidence which might be inadmissible in court. The statement attributed to Mack was quickly made a matter of public record by a member of the United States Congress whose version was not shaken by cross-examination at the Commission hearings. And certainly Mack’s statement — amounting to a confession of misconduct on his part made to a close acquaintance — was not one to be lightly made. I am not impressed by the suggestion made by counsel for Intervenor at the hearings and adopted in the Commission’s brief before us that Mack told a “little white lie” in order to be rid of an annoying phone call. Rubbish! Even if the Commission’s hypersensitivity concerning hearsay could justify its refusal to give any weight to the Herlong-Mack incident as against Intervenor, its zeal for strict evidentiary niceties cannot excuse its failure to pursue the subject further by calling upon Mack for an explanation. Mack presumably did not make a commitment to the birds in the tress but to flesh and blood men.