Court Opinion

ID: 9766403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:45:58.749443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:22.161848
License: Public Domain

*696ROBERT M. BELL,
Judge dissenting.
The harmless error rule1 applicable in this state is that enunciated in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976). It is:
*697[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed “harmless” and a reversal is mandated. Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of — whether erroneously admitted or excluded-— may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict.
Id. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678 (footnote omitted). The test focuses on the effect of erroneously admitted or excluded evidence on the verdict rendered by the trier of fact. Whether that evidence played a role in the verdict is a question addressed to the reviewing court. Once the appellate court determines that error was committed, reversal is required unless it also determines, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not influence the verdict; harmless error occurs only if the error played no role in the trier of fact’s verdict. State v. Enriquez, 327 Md. 365, 374, 609 A.2d 343, 347 (1992); Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, 522, 601 A.2d 1093, 1097-98 (1992); Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 11, 595 A.2d 448, 452 (1991); Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 42, 553 A.2d 233, 242 (1989).
I agree, unlike the majority, with the petitioner that “in trials by stipulated evidence, the evidence stipulated to should rarely be considered harmless.” See majority opinion at 693. The petitioner merely states a well-settled proposition that harmless error analysis is supposed to be strict, that it “has been and should be carefully circumscribed.” Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 248, 322 A.2d 211, 219 (1974). Indeed, in that case, quoting People v. Jablonski, 38 Mich.App. 33, 195 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1972), the Court stated the proposition even more graphically:
“Continued expansion of the harmless error rule will merely encourage prosecutors to get such testimony in, since they know that, if they have a strong case, such testimony will not be considered to be reversible error, yet if they have a weak case, they will use such testimony to buttress the case *698to gain a conviction and then hope that the issue is not raised on appeal.”
Id. at 248, 322 A.2d at 219. Although the majority does not . expressly so state, the Court rejects that proposition and, so, continues the movement away from harmless error as an extraordinary, rather than ordinary, test. See Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 592-93, 602 A.2d 677, 696-97 (1992) (Bell, J. dissenting).
In the case sub judice, the stipulated evidence consisted of a summary of the testimony of the State’s witnesses, and evidence pertinent to the review of the court’s ruling on the petitioner’s motion to suppress. The testimony of three of those witnesses — two of whom, Mack and Smith were former inmates with the petitioner and the third, Walters, was a Maryland State Police undercover officer — related statements purportedly made to them by the petitioner. This testimony was the subject of the motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. The statement to Smith, which purportedly related the details of the rape, was held by the Court of Special Appeals to have been properly admitted. The opposite conclusion was reached as to those statements, involving the petitioner’s desire to have the rape victim killed, made to Walters and Mack. The Court of Special Appeals, as did the majority, concluded the trial court’s error was, however, harmless. As the majority views it:
The trial judge [nevertheless] had overwhelming evidence of guilt properly before him, consisting of the admission to Smith of the rape, as well as the uncontroverted, stipulated evidence [of the facts and circumstances of the rape].
Majority opinion at 694 (footnote omitted). To reach that conclusion, both the majority and the Court of Special Appeals characterized the statements to Mack and Walters as “lending] only inferential support to the conclusion that Bruno committed rape, i.e. they indicate ‘consciousness of guilt.’ ” Id. at 693.
In harmless error analysis, the issue is not what evidence is available to the trier of fact, but rather what evidence the trier *699of fact, in fact, used in reaching its verdict. See Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 728, 569 A.2d 1254, 1265 (1990); Hook, 315 Md. at 42, 553 A.2d at 242. Thus, using what the majority perceives as an example of a clear case of harmless error, see majority opinion at 692, if there were available seven confessions, but the record revealed that the trier of fact relied only on the seventh, and not the other six, exclusion of the seventh confession would require reversal of the judgment of conviction, notwithstanding the other six confessions. That is so because the seventh confession would have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict. In short, it is not that the evidence has been, or could be, determined to be sufficient, or otherwise sufficient, that is of dispositive importance; rather it is whether the subject evidence actually influenced the trier of fact’s decision to reach a guilty verdict. Hook, supra; Bruce, supra. This is true whether there has been a full trial or simply a trial on stipulated evidence.
Although the reviewing court, in conducting its harmless error analysis, must independently review the record, it cannot lose sight of the role of the trier of fact in assessing whether the State has met its burden of proof. The trier of fact’s role involves, inter alia, weighing the evidence and resolving any credibility issues which might be presented. See Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224, 571 A.2d 1251, 1260-61 (1990); Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203, 522 A.2d 1338 (1987); Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 566, 276 A.2d 214, 221 (1971); Jacobs v. State, 238 Md. 648, 650, 210 A.2d 722, 723-24 (1965). The appellate court does not weigh the evidence — not even when it is assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. See Clemson v. Butler Aviation, 266 Md. 666, 671, 296 A.2d 419, 422 (1972); Gray v. Director, 245 Md. 80, 84, 224 A.2d 879, 881 (1965). The determination of the sufficiency of the evidence requires the appellate court simply to decide whether evidence exists on the basis of which a rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979); Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 167, 512 A.2d 1056, 1057 (1986).
*700In a stipulated case, unless the stipulation otherwise indicates, all of the evidence stipulated to is intended to be, and, in fact, is, considered by the trial court in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. Barnes v. State, 31 Md.App. 25, 35, 354 A.2d 499, 565 (1976). Thus, in a stipulated case there is no need to speculate as to what evidence the trier of fact used in making its determination. While it may be true that less than all of the evidence stipulated to would suffice to sustain a finding of guilt, that is not what the stipulated case contemplates. By holding that the stipulated evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt and to render improperly admitted evidence harmless error, the majority in effect applies an “otherwise sufficient” test, in place of the Dorsey test. See Rubin, 325 Md. at 597, 602 A.2d at 696-97 (Bell, J. dissenting). Under that test, if the evidence is sufficient without the improper evidence, i.e., the jury could have convicted the defendant without it, harm could not result from its admission. Id., 602 A.2d at 696-97. I repeat, the Court, thereby, further expands the harmless error rule so as to make it the general rule rather than the exception. See Younie, 272 Md. at 248, 322 A.2d at 219, citing Jablonski, 195 N.W.2d at 780. This is not to be condoned.
I also find singularly unpersuasive the distinction that the majority draws between the statements. Conceivably, a statement made to an undercover police officer, in which the petitioner seeks to put a contract on the life of the victim, corroborated by another inmate, is more credible and would be more likely to influence the trier of fact’s verdict as to the petitioner’s guilt than simply a statement to a fellow inmate that he was involved in the crime. Certainly, it is well settled that evidence lending inferential support of a defendant’s guilt by establishing consciousness of guilt is highly relevant and, therefore, routinely admitted for that purpose.
I therefore dissent.

. I will not question the proposition the majority so firmly embraces in this case — that harmless error analysis applies whenever, in order to preserve for appeal a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, a defendant enters a not guilty plea and proceeds to trial on stipulated evidence. There may be a rare case, perhaps the example proffered by the majority, see majority opinion at 692, in which the harmless error test enunciated in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976), will be satisfied even though a portion of the stipulated evidence has been held to be inadmissible. I am satisfied, however, that the case sub judice is not such a case.
In this case, the petitioner proceeded to trial on stipulated evidence in order to ensure that he was able to challenge the court’s ruling on his suppression motion without having to go through a full trial. By proceeding in that fashion, the trial court’s decision on guilt or innocence was, and was expected to be, totally predictable; the trial court would find the petitioner guilty. See Bunnell v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 592, 119 Cal.Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086 (1975); see also Jon D. Botsford, Conditioned Guilty Pleas: Post Guilty Plea Appeal of Nonjurisdictional Issues, 26 UCLA L.Rev. 360, 384 (1978). Viewed in this fashion, the petitioner's argument that the procedure he used is equivalent to the conditional guilty plea procedure, in which challenges to evidentiary rulings are permitted, and are recognized in a number of states and the federal courts, has considerable merit. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 290-91 n. 7, 95 S.Ct. 886, 890 n. 7, 43 L.Ed.2d 196, 203 n. 7 (1975) (distinction between the conditional guilty plea and a stipulation mere "infatuation with labels”); Sutton v. State, 289 Md. 359, 366, 424 A.2d 755, 759 (1981).
In Lefkowitz v. Newsome, the United States Supreme Court noted that the procedure whereby a criminal defendant could stipulate to all the state’s evidence while entering a plea of not guilty benefits a defendant who intends to appeal his pretrial claim of unlawful search and seizure without the desire of going through an entire trial. 420 U.S. at 291, 95 S.Ct. at 890, 43 L.Ed.2d at 203. Upon the inevitable entry of judgment of conviction, the defendant is able fully to pursue his state appellate remedies. See id. at 290-91 n. 7, 95 S.Ct. at 890 n. 7, 43 L.Ed.2d at 203 n. 7; see also Bunnell, 13 Cal.3d 592, 119 Cal.Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086 (stipulation procedure a viable method of preserving a defendant’s statutory right of appeal on all issues).
By applying harmless error analysis in a case like the present one, the Court encourages the violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the parties' agreement. Moreover, the Court encourages a party who is unable to anticipate the consequences of a not altogether successful appeal if he or she proceeds on a stipulated case, to proceed to trial simply to obtain review of a challenged motions ruling.