Court Opinion

ID: 9773758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:57:48.569857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:56.991231
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I reluctantly concur with the majority opinion.
However, for some time, I have begun to doubt the validity of the doctrine of the jural rights which “popped” into our law in 1932. Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).
As the dissent points out, and as the Law Journal Article by Professor Thomas Lewis emphasizes, there is very little, if any, basis for this now routinely accepted doctrine in the Kentucky Constitution or in the Constitutional Debates. Jural Rights Under Kentucky’s Constitution: Realities Grounded in Myth, 80 K.L.J. 953 (1991-92).
Perhaps even more importantly, and recent in years, this Court has moved the jural rights doctrine far beyond its original aegis, so as to restrict even the General Assembly and this Court from changing its precedents, even though created after the adoption of the present constitution.
Although, I believe this Court should carefully consider the powerful arguments set forth in Justice Cooper’s dissent, reliance on precedent is a strong tenet of our common law. Precedent should not lightly be overruled.
The doctrine of stare decisis is a judicial policy implemented to maintain stability and continuity in our jurisprudence. It is based upon the belief that similar cases should be decided in a similar manner. When a court of institutional review announces a principle of law to apply to a general set of facts, the doctrine of stare decisis requires the court, in the absence of “sound legal reasons to the contrary” to adhere to that same principle in future cases where there is a similar factual pattern. Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713, 717 (1984). “Stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is not a universal, inexorable command.” Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238, 44 S.Ct. 302, 309, 68 L.Ed. 646 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The principle of stare decisis does not require us to adhere blindly to previous decisions when we determine those decisions were in error. D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 420, 424 (1980) (citing Daniel’s Adm’r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky. 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471 (1941)). I only concur because I believe there should be extensive debate before this Court changes such an established rule of law. I hope that the logic of the dissent will be the beginning of such a process.