Court Opinion

ID: 9700275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:18:08.672475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:06.370137
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus,
dissenting:
I cannot agree that the trial judge’s use of the dictionary definition of “substantial” to define “substantial factor” placed upon appellants a greater burden than that required by Pennsylvania law. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
The general rule on jurors’ questions appears in Worthington v. Oberhuber, 419 Pa. 561, 215 A.2d 621 (1966):
There may be situations in which a trial judge may decline to answer questions put by the jury, but where a jury returns on its own motions indicating confusion, the court has the duty to give such additional instructions on the law as the' court may think necessary to clarify the jury’s doubt or confusion.
Id. at 563, 215 A.2d at 621. Accord: Scarborough by Scarborough v. Lewis, 359 Pa.Super. 57, 69-71, 518 A.2d 563, 570 (1986), rev’d on other grounds, 523 Pa. 30, 565 A.2d 122 (1989); Smick v. City of Philadelphia, 161 Pa. Commw. 622, 630-32, 638 A.2d 287, 291 (1994). When a jury’s confusion is disclosed, the trial judge must have discretion in determining how best to resolve the confusion. Scarborough, 359 Pa.Super. at 69-73, 518 A.2d at 570-71. See Smick, 161 Pa. Commw. at 630-32, 638 A.2d at 291 (“[t]his rule commits to the sound discretion of the trial judge the scope of such additional instructions as he or she decides to give to a jury that has expressed confusion.”).
In order to obtain a new trial based on the trial court’s treatment of the jury’s question, the moving party must demonstrate in what way the trial error caused an incorrect result. Nebel v. Mauk, 434 Pa. 315, 253 A.2d 249 (1969). To carry its burden of showing a causal connection between the error and the result, the moving party must show at least a “substantial possibility of an incorrect result after consideration is given to the particular facts of the ease in question, with attention also to the nature of the response required. to answer the particular question put to the judge.” Reilly v. Poach, 227 Pa.Super. 522, 525 at Note 2, 323 A.2d 50, 52 at Note 2 (1974) (emphasis supplied).
*639Scarborough, 359 Pa.Super. at 71, 518 A.2d at 570. See Reilly, 227 Pa.Super. at 522-26, 323 A.2d at 51-52 (“[w]hile the fact that the question was asked would indicate that some confusion existed, a new trial should not be ordered unless it can be shown that the confusion worked to the detriment of the losing party[;][i]n order to obtain a new trial the moving party must demonstrate in what way the trial error caused an incorrect result.”).
Appellants claim that in defining the term “substantial” as “considerable in quantity, significantly large,” the trial court strayed significantly from the standard jury instruction and held the appellants to a higher burden of proof, thereby causing an incorrect result. I disagree.
The appellants’ argument falls far short of showing the requisite “substantial possibility of an incorrect result.” Scarborough, 359 Pa.Super. at 71, 518 A.2d at 570. It is undisputed that our supreme court has never adopted the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions, Commonwealth v. Smith, 548 Pa. 65, 80 n. 11, 694 A.2d 1086, 1094 n. 11 (1997); however, the trial court’s standard instruction has not been directly called into question. Rather, I am not convinced that the trial judge improperly deviated from its original instruction in citing the dictionary definition when asked to clarify the term “substantial.” To the contrary, the judge was well within his discretion to explain the term using its common meaning after the jury expressed confusion with the original charge. Scarborough, supra; Smick, supra.
As the majority correctly points out, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111 (1977), cited with approval the comments to section 431 of the Restatement. Specifically, comment (a) states in part: “The word ‘substantial’ is used to denote the fact that the ... conduct has such an [ejffeet in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense ...” Ford, 474 Pa. at 595, 379 A.2d at 114 (emphasis added). See Rafter v. Raymark, 429 Pa.Super. 360, 370-72, 632 A.2d 897, 902 (1993) (the substantial factor analysis is the legal causation test for asbestos actions; a claimant must show that they had been injured by asbestos exposure and the exposure was a substantial contributing factor in their injuries). While there is no mention of the terms “significantly large” or “considerable” found in the Restatement comment, such terms, under a “reasonable man” standard, are not a significant departure from “substantial factor” or “cause,” especially when used in the “popular sense” (e.g., a dictionary definition). Ford, supra. As referenced in the standard suggested jury instructions, “substantial” in the “substantial factor” test means “significant.” See Wagner v. Anzon, 453 Pa.Super. 619, 632-34, 684 A.2d 570, 577 (1996). Here, the trial judge utilized the term “significant” in his clarification instruction. Thus, I cannot agree with the conclusion that the terms “significantly large” or “considerable” imposed a higher burden of proof on appellants to the extent that the dictionary definition caused an incorrect result to be rendered in this case. Scarborough, supra.
In fact, our appellate courts have, in analogous situations (albeit in the criminal context), acknowledged the use of dictionary definitions for purposes of clarification. In Commonwealth v. Hood, 392 Pa.Super. 388, 572 A.2d 1287 (1990), a fine was imposed upon appellant for violating Pennsylvania’s Dental Law. 63 Pa.C.S.A. § 129(e). Appellant argued that the court’s jury charge concerning the meaning of the word “employ,” found in section 129(e), was erroneous because it was based upon the Webster’s Dictionary definition. Noting that non-teehnical terms must be given their common and approved usage, this court determined that the dictionary definition of “employ” was an adequate and fair summary of the term and was sufficient to properly guide the jury in its deliberations. See Commonwealth v. Funke, 306 Pa.Super. 542, 452 A.2d 857 (1982) (the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury when it defined the term “processing,” as found in 35 P.S. § 780-102, by reading the dictionary meaning of the word; it is the trial judge’s duty to clarify issues and make principles understandable in plain language and, therefore, it was not error to define the term in the common dictionary *640sense). See also Takes v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 440 Pa.Super. 101, 655 A.2d 138 (1995), rev’d in part on other grounds, 548 Pa. 92, 695 A.2d 397 (1997) (“pattern instructions can be incomprehensible to the lay juror, and judges should make an effort to explain the law in plain English.”). The trial judge in the instant case was clearly permitted to supplement the wording of the standard instruction with a dictionary definition where, as here, the standard instruction created confusion for the jury. The supplemental definition provided by the trial court was a permissible exercise of judicial discretion and was not so far removed from the original instruction so as to cause an incorrect result. Scarborough, supra.