Court Opinion

ID: 9659149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:33:18.510466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:04.522419
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
It seems to me that the position of the bankruptcy trustee creates an inherent unfairness, whether intentional or otherwise, when the trustee’s handling of the payment of claims in the bankruptcy proceeding requires the bonding company to pay more than it would have been required to pay had there been no bankruptcy proceeding. This is particularly true when the trustee, not the bonding company, is in a position to take control of the grain, sell it and disburse and dispose of the proceeds without regard to the bonding company’s interest and to the benefit of certain other creditors.
Although the trustee’s actions may create unfairness, that unfairness may be appropriate in many instances. But, in this instance, that unfairness is magnified by the majority’s treatment of the Nygard offset. I am not convinced that the Bankruptcy Court considered the matter of the offset in a manner which it intended would be res judicata when subsequently Nygard was not paid from the bankruptcy estate because there was no durum on hand at the time of the insolvency nor any other funds from which to pay the claim. Thus the trial court found that the bankruptcy court “provided that when the claim was paid, Mr. Nygard would pay the $48,948.00 check.” I do not understand the import of that finding. Does it mean that the Bankruptcy Court intended to say that “although we are not going to pay your claim, Mr. Nygard, whenever and by whomever it is paid, the offset cannot be allowed?” It is not clear to me that the bankruptcy court intended its statement to bind the State court in its application of the State law governing warehouse bonds.
I understand the need for deference outlined in the majority opinion and in the proper instance when the intent of the bankruptcy court is clear and unequivocal I would render that deference. I do not agree this is the appropriate case in which to defer because I am not convinced that *867the trial court or the majority s construction of the bankruptcy court’s decision was intended under these circumstances. In the absence of clear proof that the bankruptcy court intended its statement concerning the offset to restrict the normal application of our State law in the instance in which the claim was not paid in the bankruptcy proceeding, I would not conclude the doctrines of res judicata or judicial deference are applicable or appropriate to the Nygard claim against the bond in proceeding under State law. C.f. State v. Liberty Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 427 N.W.2d 307 (N.D.1988) [Courts are reluctant to infer preemption and it is burden of party claiming that position to prove it] cert. denied, 488 U.S. 956, 109 S.Ct. 393, 102 L.Ed.2d 382. See also Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430 (N.D.1977) [Principle of Comity not a rule of law and does not exist by matter of right, but in discretion of court].
I would affirm the decision of the trial court except insofar as the Nygard offset is concerned. As to that matter, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and reinstate the applicable portion of the Public Service Commission’s report.