Court Opinion

ID: 9903058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:29:03.760802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:05.181139
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                     FIFTH DISTRICT

                                   NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                   FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                   DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

ROBERT RACHON BROOKS,

           Appellant,

v.                                Case No. 5D23-11
                                  LT Case No. 16-2018-CF-8376-AXXX-MA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

         Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed June 16, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Duval County,
Meredith Charbula, Judge.

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and
Justin F. Karpf, Assistant Public Defender,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and
Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

JAY, J.

     A jury found Appellant guilty of shooting deadly missiles, possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon, and three counts of attempted second-

degree murder. We affirm Appellant’s convictions and sentences in all
respects, and write only to address his claim that the trial court erred when it

denied his motion to suppress statements from his post-arrest interview with

police.

                                       I.

      On July 31, 2018, Appellant fired multiple shots at an occupied vehicle.

The next day, officers obtained a warrant for his arrest. A uniformed SWAT

officer from the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (“JSO”) executed the warrant

two weeks later. The SWAT officer informed Appellant that he was under

arrest pursuant to a warrant, but the officer did not identify the nature of

Appellant’s alleged crimes.

      After the arrest, two JSO detectives interviewed Appellant at the police

station. At the outset of the interview, Appellant asked whether he was being

arrested. One of the detectives responded that it “remains to be seen.” The

detectives then advised Appellant of his Miranda1 rights. Appellant verbally

acknowledged his understanding of each right and signed the Miranda form.

      Later in the interview, Appellant asked if he was allowed to have a

lawyer present. The detectives answered affirmatively and indicated that the

interview would end if Appellant requested counsel. They told Appellant that

“there is a warrant for your arrest,” and they would not get to hear his side of

      1   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                       2
the story if the interview ended. Appellant asked why he was being arrested.

One of the detectives answered that he would tell Appellant before they were

finished.

      Appellant resumed talking with the detectives. They twice interrupted

him to confirm that he wished to continue without a lawyer present. Appellant

answered affirmatively. While Appellant admitted to being in the area in

question, he never confessed to the shooting or even to hearing the

gunshots. Ultimately, the detectives told Appellant why he was under arrest.

      Appellant moved to suppress the statements he made in his interview.

He claimed that the detectives failed to honor his right to counsel and that

the arresting SWAT officer failed to comply with section 901.16, Florida

Statutes (2018). Subject to certain exceptions, that statute directs officers to

inform arrestees of “the cause of arrest” when executing a warrant.

      The trial court held a two-part evidentiary hearing. Afterwards, the court

entered a detailed order rejecting both of Appellant’s suppression

arguments. The court found that the arresting officer substantially complied

with section 901.16 and that Appellant never unequivocally invoked his right

to counsel. In this appeal, Appellant argues that the court erred in both

respects.

                                       3
                                      II.

      “A motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law and fact.”

Evans v. State, 989 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). “In considering

rulings on a motion to suppress, ‘an appellate court reviews legal conclusions

using a de novo standard, but generally defers to the factual findings of a

trial court.’” State v. Trinidad, 351 So. 3d 109, 112 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022)

(quoting Ferryman v. State, 919 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)).

                                     A.

      First, Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his

suppression motion based on section 901.16. That statute provides:

            A peace officer making an arrest by a warrant shall
            inform the person to be arrested of the cause of
            arrest and that a warrant has been issued, except
            when the person flees or forcibly resists before the
            officer has an opportunity to inform the person, or
            when giving the information will imperil the arrest.
            The officer need not have the warrant in his or her
            possession at the time of arrest but on request of the
            person arrested shall show it to the person as soon
            as practicable.

§ 901.16, Fla. Stat. (2018).

      The Florida Supreme Court has held that section 901.16 is subject to

a substantial compliance analysis because the statute does not have “a

constitutional dimension.” See Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648, 659 (Fla.

1995) (“Arrest statutes such as [sections 901.16 and 901.17] are subject to
                                      4
a substantial compliance analysis because they direct ministerial acts not of

a constitutional dimension.” (internal citations omitted)); cf. Perkins v. State,

576 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. 1991) (noting that penal statutes “must be strictly

construed according to their letter” because due process demands that

criminal statutes precisely identify prohibited conduct). Under certain

circumstances, an officer substantially complies with section 901.16 when

he informs the arrestee about the existence of the arrest warrant, even if he

fails to identify the charged offense at the time of the arrest. See Conti v.

State, 540 So. 2d 934, 935–36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)2 (holding that a

substantial compliance standard applies to section 901.16 and affirming the

denial of a motion to suppress that was based in part on section 901.16 in a

case where the officer informed the appellant that there was an outstanding

warrant for his arrest, but that he did not know the specific cause for the

warrant); see also City of Miami v. Nelson, 186 So. 2d 535, 537 n.1 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1966) (“Furthermore, while [section 901.17] requires that an officer

effecting an arrest without a warrant inform the person to be arrested of his

authority and the cause of the arrest, the fact that the person to be arrested

is not informed of the cause of the arrest until subsequent thereto does not

      The Florida Supreme Court favorably cited Conti in Johnson. See
      2

Johnson, 660 So. 2d at 659.
                                 5
necessarily deprive him of his rights.”). That is precisely what happened in

this case when the arresting officer advised Appellant of the warrant, and

Appellant fails to otherwise demonstrate on appeal that the arresting officer

violated the statute.3 Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that the

arresting officer substantially complied with the statute.

      Even if Appellant could show a violation of the statute, he does not

identify any authority that provides him with the remedy he seeks—that is,

the suppression of his statements. The plain text of the statute includes no

such remedy. See § 901.16, Fla. Stat.; see, e.g., Ham v. Portfolio Recovery

Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946–47 (Fla. 2020) (reiterating that the “words

of a governing text are of paramount concern” and that unless context

suggests otherwise, courts read statutes according to their plain, obvious,

and common-sense meaning (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012))); see also Lab’y

      3  The arresting officer testified that he did not notify Appellant of the
specific charge because his unit generally relies on the investigating officers
to do so. Appellant does not argue on appeal that the arresting officer’s
proffered reason is itself illegitimate or otherwise establishes error. We
therefore do not consider this issue. See Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100,
1117 n.14 (Fla. 2006) (“[A]ny arguments not expressly included in Simmons’
brief to this Court are not considered in this appeal.”); Davis v. State, 153 So.
3d 399, 401 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“[T]he burden rests on the appellant to
demonstrate reversible error.”).

                                       6
Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2022) (“In interpreting a

statute, our task is to give effect to the words that the legislature has

employed in the statutory text.”).

      Moreover, the absence of suppression as a remedy in section 901.16

is conspicuous because the Legislature has expressly included that remedy

in other criminal procedure statutes. For example, the stop and frisk statute,

which immediately precedes section 901.16, provides that no evidence

obtained in violation of the statute is admissible in any Florida court. See §

901.151(6), Fla. Stat. Such is also true of the statutes governing drone

searches and intercepted wire or oral communications. See §§ 934.50(6),

.06, Fla. Stat. By not including a similar provision in section 901.16, the

Legislature has spoken “loudly and clearly.” See In re Guillen, 972 F.3d 1221,

1226 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d

1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2011)). And when a legislative body “knows how to say

something but chooses not to, its silence is controlling.” Id. (quoting Myers,

640 F.3d at 1285). “[I]t is our duty to respect . . . what [the Legislature] . . .

didn’t write.” Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (2019).

Thus, adopting Appellant’s suppression “argument would result not in a

construction of the statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it.” In re Guillen,

972 F.3d at 1226 (citation and quotation omitted).

                                        7
                                     B.

     Appellant also maintains the trial court should have granted

suppression based on his Miranda claim—specifically, that the detectives

used the threat of an arrest to coerce him into answering questions even

though he invoked his right to counsel. Here again, we find no error.

     Before starting their interview, detectives advised Appellant of all his

Miranda rights. Appellant acknowledged his understanding of those rights

verbally and in writing. He then began answering questions. He stopped

during one of his answers to ask whether he could have a lawyer present.

     On these facts, we see no basis for disturbing the trial court’s finding

that “[a]ny reasonable police officer, observing Mr. Brooks’ demeanor and

tone of voice,” would view his inquiry “not as an unequivocal request for

counsel, but instead as a genuine question” about what was allowed during

the interview. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 253 So. 3d 64, 71 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2018) (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress in a case where the

detectives “reasonably interpreted” the suspect’s question, “Can I call my

lawyer?” as an inquiry “about whether he could contact an attorney as

opposed to expressing a desire to terminate the interview and speak with

counsel at that precise moment”).

     In responding affirmatively to Appellant’s inquiry, the detectives

                                     8
reminded him that the right to counsel was among those rights they advised

him of at the start of the interview. By clearly and accurately answering

Appellant’s question, the detectives fulfilled their obligation under the law.

See Almeida v. State, 737 So. 2d 520, 525 (Fla. 1999) (holding that if a

suspect asks a clear question during custodial interrogation about his

constitutional rights, officers “must stop the interview and make a good-faith

effort to give a simple and straightforward answer”); see also State v.

Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 305 (Fla. 2001) (clarifying that Almeida does

not require officers to “act as legal advisors or personal counselors for

suspects,” but only to “be honest and fair when addressing a suspect’s

constitutional rights”).

      The detectives also notified Appellant that if he wanted a lawyer, they

would stop the interview, which would prevent them from hearing his version

of events. Again, the detectives conveyed accurate legal information. See

Ferguson v. State, 200 So. 3d 106, 108 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (noting that

under Miranda, officers must immediately stop interviewing a suspect if he

requests counsel). Equipped with this information, Appellant resumed

answering questions. He twice confirmed that he wished to talk to the

detectives without a lawyer present:

                                       9
           [First Detective]: Okay. Hold on. Before we continue
           to talk --

           [Second Detective]: Do you want to talk to us now?

           [Appellant]: Yeah.

           [Second Detective]: So you want to --

           [First Detective]: You want to talk to us?

           [Second Detective]: Without the lawyer?

           [Appellant]: I’ll talk to you, right.

                 ....

           [First Detective]: Okay. I just want -- before we
           continue, I just want to [ask] you -- to make sure that
           you understand, we’re not pressuring you, we’re not
           trying to make you talk or anything else, because we
           can’t force you to do anything you don’t want to.

           So you do want to talk to us?

           [Appellant]: Well, yeah, I guess so.4

     Having never made an unambiguous request for counsel, Appellant

cannot prevail on his Miranda claim. See Ferguson, 200 So. 3d at 108 (“[I]f

a suspect makes an equivocal or ambiguous request for counsel, police

officers are not required to stop the interrogation or ask clarifying

     4
       The interview recording was played multiple times at the suppression
hearing. Any de minimis differences reflected in the transcription of each
playing is immaterial to our analysis.
                                       10
questions.”). Indeed, he twice verified his desire to continue the interview

without a lawyer. Appellant’s allegation that detectives used the threat of an

arrest to coerce his interview participation is undermined by the fact that the

SWAT officer had already told him he was under arrest pursuant to a warrant.

Furthermore, while they initially told Appellant that it “remains to be seen”

whether he would be arrested, the detectives ultimately told him “there is a

warrant for your arrest” before he made the statements he later sought to

suppress. And contrary to what Appellant suggests, the detectives were not

obligated to disclose the reason for his arrest before continuing their

interview. See McKenzie v. State, 125 So. 3d 906, 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)

(holding that “Almeida does not require the interrogating officer to answer a

question relating to the substance of the interrogation”); Barger v. State, 923

So. 2d 597, 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“[W]e find the trial court correctly held

that the statement ‘I want to know what I am being charged with’ was not a

prefatory question concerning Barger’s constitutional rights. Therefore, the

officers were not required to answer the question before continuing the

interview.”); State v. Jones, 763 So. 2d 1180, 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“The

failure of law enforcement officials to inform a suspect in custody of the

subject matter of the interrogation, i.e., what offenses he or she will be

questioned about, does not affect the suspect’s decision to waive the Fifth

                                      11
Amendment privilege in any constitutionally significant manner.”).

                                      C.

      Finally, even if Appellant could show that his suppression motion was

meritorious, he cannot show that its denial was reversible error. “Miranda

violations are subject to a harmless error analysis.” Deviney v. State, 112

So. 3d 57, 79 (Fla. 2013). In a harmless error analysis, the “question is

whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.”

State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1139 (Fla. 1986).

      Here, given the remainder of the State’s evidence, there is no

reasonable possibility that if the court had suppressed Appellant’s interview

with detectives, the jury would have acquitted Appellant or found him guilty

of lesser crimes. Appellant never confessed to the shooting—or even to

hearing the gunshots. The most inculpatory admissions Appellant made

were that he drove a silver car around Monaco Drive on July 31st and that

he “flicked . . . off” his former girlfriend while in the area. Given the other

evidence available to the State, we conclude there is no reasonable

possibility that any error here affected the verdict. See, e.g., Davis v. State,

153 So. 3d 360, 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“In this case, the error in admitting

Appellant’s statements was harmless, as the improperly admitted statements

were cumulative of other evidence presented at trial.”); McKenzie, 125 So.

                                      12
3d at 912 (holding that even if the trial court should have suppressed the

appellant’s interview statements due to a violation of his right to counsel, the

error was harmless because the only fact that he conceded was being in the

area around the time of the offense, which the State proved through the

testimony of another witness).

      Indeed, Appellant’s statements in the interview were trivial compared

to those he later made in recorded phone calls from the county jail. Simply

put, this was not a case that depended on Appellant’s post-arrest interview.

See Miles v. State, 60 So. 3d 447, 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Marstiller, J.,

concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“I have no trouble, under the

circumstances of this case, concluding that the trial court’s error in admitting

Appellant’s statements denying guilt did not contribute to the guilty

verdicts.”).

                                      III.

      In sum, the trial court did not err when it denied Appellant’s motion to

suppress. And even if the court had erred in this regard, the error would not

warrant a new trial because there is no reasonable possibility that the trial’s

result hinged on the outcome of Appellant’s motion.

      Finding no reversible error as to this issue or any of the others raised

by Appellant, we affirm his convictions and sentences.

                                      13
     AFFIRMED.

EISNAUGLE and KILBANE, JJ., concur.

                               14