Court Opinion

ID: 9553978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:38:34.086624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:42.100847
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur with the majority opinion of the Court in this case, but I choose to add some comments of my own. There can be no question that Lawson’s approach to the situation with Gareia was insensitive. It quite likely was disappointing to the police department of the City of Cheyenne. The question, however, is whether Lawson committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by failure to investigate Garcia’s allegation of rape more diligently.
It is the law of this case that Garcia did not enjoy a right to a “quality investigation.” Lawson v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 1136 (Wyo.1996). Indeed it is the law of this case that Lawson enjoyed qualified immunity for his failure to investigate Garcia’s allegations. Without citing Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo.1992), we held that Lawson was not charged with knowing that a reasonable police officer would have conducted a more diligent investigation. I am satisfied that our holdings in Lawson and Keehn are correct, although perhaps Keehn could have gone further in analyzing whether an officer owes a duty to an individual citizen as distinguished from the duty owed to the community. The law should not shackle law enforcement officers with a duty to investigate all possible citizen complaints at the hazard of defending a lawsuit.
Be that as it may, Lawson did undertake to do something in this situation, and the question before the court is whether he did it
*1168in a manner that the law accepts. The logic of how an officer can by the same conduct invoke the doctrine of qualified immunity because no reasonable police officer would be charged with knowledge of a rule of law requiring more in the way of investigation and commit the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress escapes me. The definition of and the test for the outrageous conduct required is articulated in Restatement (Seoond) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965):
d. Extreme and outrageous conduct. The eases thus far decided have found liability only where the defendant’s conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by “malice,” or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!”
I submit that conduct that qualifies for immunity as we held in Lawson cannot possibly satisfy this language. The reliance upon the sense of an average member of the community is no more amorphous than the “reasonable prudent man” standard so common to the law of torts generally.
In my opinion, when this court chooses to adopt the Restatement (Seoond) of Torts (1965) as the rule of law for Wyoming, we must accept the collective wisdom that surrounds the black letter rule. That includes the comments and the illustrations in those comments that are an inseparable part of the rule.
Neither, should we ignore the role of the court as a gatekeeper. In this regard the Restatement (Seoond) of Torts § 46 cmt. h (1965) has this to say:
h. Court and jury. It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.
(Emphasis added.) In light of this language, I return to my thesis that conduct which achieves qualified immunity under the law may not reasonably be regarded “as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery” nor is it “necessarily so.” Certainly conduct that would permit the court to send the issue to a jury would have to be recognized by a reasonable police officer as beyond the protection of qualified immunity.