Court Opinion

ID: 9747555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:20:40.527063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:24.487304
License: Public Domain

O’NEILL, J.,* Dissenting.
Fifteen years ago, defendant and three accomplices committed a violent hate crime on a public street. Early in 1995, defendant accepted a favorable disposition which included a felony no contest plea, probation, and a 39-day jail term. In 2003, defendant was deported for reasons not clear from this record, but apparently based in part on the 1995 convictions, as well as additional felonies committed at a later time. In 2007, defendant, unable to enter the United States legally, moved through counsel to vacate the 1995 convictions on the ground that the People’s charging theory was invalidated by a Court of Appeal decision rendered in 2003. I respectfully dissent from a decision that allows a belated collateral attack under these circumstances by a defendant no longer subject to the jurisdiction of any California court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 28, 1994, Arthur Vasilyan drove his brother and two other males to an area near the intersection of Santa Monica Boulevard and Hilldale Avenue, where all four men began yelling at two pedestrians with epithets to the effect, “Come on fag[g]ot. Come on fight, fag[g]ot. I’m going to fuck you up.” “Do something about it, fag[g]ot.” “What are you looking at?” “Fucking faggots.” The Vasilyans and their companions then got out of the car, physically attacked their targets, and fled. A witness wrote down the license plate number, and, shortly thereafter, Vasilyan and the others were detained, identified in a street lineup, and arrested.
In September 1994, a magistrate found there was sufficient evidence to hold Vasilyan to answer three counts charging him with violating Penal Code section 422.7.1
On February 7, 1995, Vasilyan agreed to waive his constitutional rights and plead no contest to two counts charging him with violating section 422.7. In *456conjunction with the waiver of rights, the prosecutor also advised Vasilyan as follows: “The law requires that I tell you if you’re not a citizen of the United States, consequences of pleading guilty to this offense may result in your deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” When asked whether he understood this, Vasilyan answered, “Yes.” The trial court thereafter found that Vasilyan had expressly, knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights, that his plea was freely and voluntarily made with an understanding of its consequences, and that there was a factual basis for his plea. The court placed Vasilyan on probation for 3 years, on condition he serve 39 days in county jail, with 39 days of custody credits, perform 80 hours of community service, and pay $200 to the victim restitution fund.
Vasilyan’s probation was revoked in March 1996, and eventually reinstated, based on a new felony case. In that matter, Vasilyan pleaded guilty to 10 counts of burglary and fraudulent use of a credit card, and received a new probation grant and jail sentence in July 1996.
In April 2003, the United States Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) issued a warrant authorizing Vasilyan’s arrest for violation of the immigration laws, and, in May 2003, ICE served Vasilyan with a copy of the warrant. The exact nature of the immigration charges against Vasilyan is not documented in the record; he asserts the deportation proceedings are a consequence of his 1995 convictions. The prosecutor argued otherwise, as will be discussed below.
On June 30, 2003, Division Six of this court ruled that section 422.7 is a “penalty provision,” and does not define a substantive criminal offense. (People v. Wallace (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1699 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 324] (Wallace).)
In February 2004, federal immigration officials deported Vasilyan for having committed an “aggravated felony.”
On June 21, 2007, Vasilyan filed a motion to vacate his 1995 convictions, or, in the alternative, petitions for writs of error coram nobis or habeas corpus. The sole ground argued by Vasilyan in his original 2007 filing was that he had not understood the immigration consequences of his 1995 plea because his lawyer at the time of the 1995 plea hearing had provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise him of those consequences, and by failing to assure that Vasilyan had the assistance of an Armenian translator at the hearing. In a supporting declaration, Vasilyan stated that his 1995 convictions had “resulted in [his] being . . . removable/deportable from the United States” and made him “inadmissible to *457the United States.” He further stated that he did “not recall ever being made aware [by counsel] that by entering the no-contest pleas [he] would be subject to such consequences.”
On December 7, 2007, Vasilyan filed an amended motion and petition in which he argued—based on the Wallace decision—that the trial court was required to vacate his 1995 convictions for violating section 422.7 because they were of “no legal effect” from their inception. The amended papers added to the requested remedies a “petition for writ of audita querela.”2 Further, Vasilyan requested that, if no other remedy was available, the court grant him “declaratory relief so that interested parties may be placed on notice that his [1995] convictions . . . have no legal effect.”
At the December 10, 2007 superior court hearing, Vasilyan’s counsel’s argument focused on Wallace. Counsel argued relief should be granted as a matter of equity because Vasilyan stood convicted of “something which is not a criminal offense.” The prosecutor argued that the case involved a legal rather than factual mistake; Vasilyan’s lack of diligence required denial; and Vasilyan’s deportation had resulted not from his 1995 convictions, but as a direct result of a later conviction and prison sentence for felony drug charges, evading a peace officer, and hit and mn.
The court denied relief on all grounds, stating the following reasons and findings;
—Vasilyan, having been deported to his Armenian homeland, was not in state or federal custody, and was therefore not entitled to bring a habeas corpus petition;
—Coram nobis was unavailable because Vasilyan had not been diligent in seeking relief, which he should have pursued, if not immediately after conviction, at the time of the deportation proceedings or the Wallace decision;
—Relief pursuant to section 1016.5 was unavailable because Vasilyan in fact understands English, as evidenced by his long-term residence in the United States, attendance at a Pasadena high school and use of English during the instant crimes as well as in court and interviews by the probation officer, *458and because Vasilyan had not shown that he would not have entered the plea had he been advised differently about its immigration consequences.
The court noted that Vasilyan’s appeal to the court’s sense of equity was severely undercut by his overall criminal record and the nature of the instant offenses, including the use of extremely vile hate crime epithets against the 1995 victims.
Although the court did not expressly discuss the audita querela writ petition, it clearly indicated it was denying relief on all theories asserted by Vasilyan. The court also found that Vasilyan’s claims that he did not understand English and that his original attorney was ineffective as to advice on immigration consequences were not supported by the record. The court noted the practical problem that Vasilyan was seeking to vacate his convictions without submitting himself to the court’s jurisdiction for further proceedings on new aggravated assault charges that could be filed. Finally, the court expressed the view that the “mislabeling” of the 1995 charges against Vasilyan was not a fundamental or constitutional error because the plea was based on conduct that would have supported other felony hate crime charges had section 422.7 not been utilized.
On January 24, 2008, Vasilyan filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.

Conventional Remedies

As the majority tacitly concedes, defendant’s delay in seeking relief has made standard remedies unavailable.
Denial of a petition for habeas corpus is not appealable (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 767, fn. 7 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729]; In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 876 [87 Cal.Rptr. 681, 471 P.2d 1]). Further, Vasilyan lacks standing for habeas corpus in any event because he is not in California custody or otherwise deprived of liberty to the extent required for purposes of the writ. (People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1072 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 344, 202 P.3d 427]; In reAzurin (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 20, 23-27 [104 Cal.Rptr.2d 284].) Consequently, I would dismiss the purported appeal from the denial of habeas corpus, which disposes entirely of any claim that Vasilyan was ineffectively represented by counsel at the time of the plea. That claim can only be raised by means of a direct appeal or habeas corpus petition. (People v. Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 987 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 161].) Vasilyan’s *459claim that he did not understand his plea proceedings is also a matter which goes beyond the record and could only be properly raised in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Coram nobis was properly denied because Vasilyan’s challenge to his 1995 convictions raised an issue of law—the validity of a conviction for violating section 422.7—not an issue involving newly discovered facts affecting his convictions. (See People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226, 230 [42 Cal.Rptr. 1, 397 P.2d 993].) As explained recently by our Supreme Court, coram nobis requires discovery of a fact unknown to the parties and the court at the time of the judgment that, “if known, would have prevented rendition of the judgment.” (People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1093 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 355, 202 P.3d 436] (Kim).) Even constitutional issues “cannot be vindicated on coram nobis” if they do not meet the required test. (Id. at p. 1095; see, e.g., People v. Blalock (1960) 53 Cal.2d 798, 801 [3 Cal.Rptr. 137, 349 P.2d 953].) In Kim, the court held that claimed misunderstandings concerning deportation and other collateral consequences of a guilty plea were not cognizable on coram nobis. (Kim, at p. 1102; see also People v. McElwee (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1352 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 448] [mistaken belief as to length of sentence]; People v. Ibanez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 537, 547 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 536] [ignorance of possibility conviction will have civil consequences under Sexually Violent Predator Act].)
Further, the trial court properly relied on Vasilyan’s lack of diligence, which is an appropriate ground for denying coram nobis. (People v. Shorts (1948) 32 Cal.2d 502, 513 [197 P.2d 330].) The petition was brought 12 years after the convictions, four years after the Wallace decision, and four years after the initiation of Vasilyan’s deportation proceedings. (See Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1100 [lack of diligence established where petition was filed eight years after conviction and almost seven years after the defendant was first subjected to an attempt to deport him].) Finally, as noted in Kim, the failure to pursue other available remedies is also a proper reason to deny coram nobis, even where such failure is not the petitioner’s fault. (Id. at p. 1099.) Appellant could have made his claim during the trial proceedings, on direct appeal, or in a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus.
To the extent Vasilyan sought statutory relief pursuant to section 1016.5,3 the motion was properly denied because the appropriate warning as to *460immigration consequences was given at the time of the plea, and Vasilyan has not established an inability to understand English. (See People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470, 1477 [240 Cal.Rptr. 328].) Further, as the trial court found, Vasilyan has demonstrated no prejudice from any assumed language barrier because he has not shown either (1) a likelihood he would not have entered his plea (in return for probation and a short jail sentence) had he fully understood the possible immigration consequences, or (2) that he was deported solely as a result of the 1995 convictions. (See People v. Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876, 884 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 76, 50 P.3d 781].)
Nonstatutory requests to vacate or set aside judgments essentially duplicate coram nobis, and are normally treated as such. (See People v. Griggs (1967) 67 Cal.2d 314, 316 [61 Cal.Rptr. 641, 431 P.2d 225]; People v. Miranda (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1132, fn. 6 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 610].) To the extent the majority has identified authority for an exception in the case of a void judgment, further discussion appears below.
As mentioned earlier, Vasilyan contends, without citation to California authority, that the common law writ of audita querela is alive and well in this state, as it apparently is in federal court. This is a highly questionable claim. (See Arechiga v. Housing Authority (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 657, 660 [324 P.2d 973] [audita querela does not exist in California civil cases, its function having been preempted by certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure].) I have located no California criminal case answering the question definitively. I would decline to hold such a remedy exists on the present facts, which, as noted by the trial court, do not cry out for equity so long after a prosecution based on such egregious conduct. Even assuming that audita querela exists and encompasses Vasilyan’s situation, I see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of such relief. Vasilyan’s long-delayed petition does not claim factual innocence, nor does he claim conviction without notice of the factual underpinnings of the case against him. What the trial court called the “mislabeling” of the charges could have been raised by Vasilyan at any time, just as it was raised on direct appeal in 2003 by the defendant in Wallace.
n.

Nonstatutory Motion to Vacate

In light of the absence of any standard remedy, the majority’s characterization of the original proceedings as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is crucial to Vasilyan’s right to belated collateral relief. I agree with the *461majority that a truly void judgment should be subject to collateral attack at any time. However, I respectfully disagree that the instant trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Unlike Andrews v. Superior Court (1946) 29 Cal.2d 208 [174 P.2d 313], where a statutory “police court” lacked the power to litigate juvenile matters, there is no question that the superior court in the present case had the authority to proceed on charges brought against a defendant like Vasilyan based on assaultive felony conduct committed in the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
The majority concludes, in effect, that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction in 1994 because a Court of Appeal decision rendered years later, applied retroactively, established that the criminal allegations in Vasilyan’s case were mislabeled. I conclude that, at worst, the acceptance of Vasilyan’s no contest plea was in excess of the original trial court’s jurisdiction, and Vasilyan should be estopped from challenging the proceedings based on his acceptance of a very favorable “time served” probationary sentence. (See 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Jurisdiction and Venue, § 8, pp. 95-96.)
The cases cited by Witkin and Epstein are instructive. Most recently, it was held that a defendant who failed to disclose she was a minor when convicted of grand theft was estopped from later challenging the court’s jurisdiction to convict and sentence her as an adult. (People v. Level (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1213 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 551].) In People v. Collins (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 849 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 367], a plea agreement included a requirement that the defendant testify truthfully in later proceedings. When the prosecutor later asserted a breach of that term and moved to set aside the agreement, the defendant was estopped to assert the court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear such a motion. (See also In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343, 348 [62 Cal.Rptr. 1, 431 P.2d 625] [although the expiration of a probation term normally precludes revocation, a defendant who successfully sought a continuance without informing the court probation would expire before the new date was estopped to object to the belated proceedings].)
Also instructive is People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 334 [240 Cal.Rptr. 708], where a defendant’s nine-year prison sentence included five years based on defendant’s admission that a federal felony conviction included all elements of a California serious felony, when, as a matter of law, it did not. The Court of Appeal noted that such a “conclusive legal falsehood” is ordinarily open to collateral attack as “an unlawful act in excess of the trial court’s statutory authority and thus in excess of its jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 342.) The court then addressed whether Ellis’s consent to a plea bargain that included admitting the validity of the prior estopped a later claim of error. It concluded that the strong public policy against defendants pleading *462guilty to “crimes they did not commit” was outweighed by the policy against allowing defendants to “trifle with the courts” by claiming error after agreeing to a favorable plea bargain. (Id. at pp. 345-347.)
A similar analysis should be applied to the present case. The favorable plea bargain agreed to by Vasilyan, coupled with his delay in making complaint and the fact that he is not even before the courts of California should result in estoppel of his claim of error.
It should be added that the defect in the original charging document did not materially affect the disposition of the case. As can be seen from the factual summary above, there is no question that the evidence at the preliminary examination supported at least misdemeanor assault and battery charges. Had Vasilyan raised the defect in a timely fashion, such charges could have been added and would have been elevated to felonies by the very statute at issue here, section 422.7. In the alternative, the prosecution could have sought misdemeanor convictions for violations of section 422.6, subdivision (a),4 a charging section closely related to the erroneously charged section 422.7. Either prosecution tactic would undoubtedly have resulted in the same probationary sentence that was actually imposed. Thus, the original trial court’s error was really harmless in any event.
III.

Proceedings on Remand

Finally, I respectfully disagree with the absence of guidance to the court below on remand. I understand the majority opinion to authorize a nonstatutory equitable motion to vacate the judgment. Such an action is most often utilized in civil cases to set aside a judgment based on excusable legal mistake. (See 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 215, p. 823.) Because the superior court will be sitting as a court of equity, I would direct it to impose appropriate conditions on such relief so as to afford fundamental fairness to the People. For example, if the People so request, they should be allowed to file an amended information or a new complaint and either proceed against Vasilyan if he is before the court, or seek a warrant for Vasilyan’s arrest based on the amended charges. *463Another option would be to condition relief on Vasilyan’s agreement that a new judgment be entered reflecting misdemeanor convictions for violations of section 422.6, subdivision (a), which, as discussed above, is the best outcome Vasilyan could have hoped for had he raised the charging defect in a timely fashion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the purported appeal from the denial of habeas corpus, and affirm the trial court’s denial of all other forms of relief.

 Judge of the Ventura Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

 All further section references are to the Penal Code.

 According to Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) page 141, column 1, audita querela is “[a] writ available to a judgment debtor who seeks a rehearing of a matter on grounds of newly discovered evidence or newly existing legal defenses.” It has also been noted, in the case cited by Vasilyan, that, “[wjhile . . . , coram nobis is used to attack a judgment that was infirm, for reasons that later came to light, at the time it was rendered, audita querela was a means of attacking a judgment that was correct at the time rendered but which is rendered infirm by matters which arise after its rendition.” (U.S. v. Reyes (5th Cir. 1991) 945 F.2d 862, 863, fn. 1.)

 Section 1016.5, subdivision (a) requires notification to defendants that a guilty or no contest plea may result in deportation or denial of naturalization. Subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part: “If, after January 1, 1978, the court fails to advise the defendant as required by this section and the defendant shows that conviction of the offense . . . may have the consequences for the defendant of deportation . . . , the court, on defendant’s motion, shall vacate the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea . .. and enter a plea of not *460guilty. Absent a record that the court provided the advisement required by this section, the defendant shall be presumed not to have received the required advisement.”

 Section 422.6, subdivision (a), provides: “No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States in whole or in part because of one or more of the actual or perceived characteristics of the victim listed in subdivision (a) of Section 422.55.” Subdivision (c) of the same section provides for misdemeanor punishment of violations of subdivision (a).