Court Opinion

ID: 9570956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:27:49.191432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:42.489897
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully with the majority opinion except for Division 6, from which I dissent.
If the act of sodomy were the sole evidentiary basis for both the sodomy conviction and the child molestation conviction of Gary Horne, I would agree with the majority opinion that under Green v. State, 170 Ga. App. 594 (317 SE2d 609) (1984), a merger occurred. However, the indictment alleged other acts of child molestation in addition to the sodomy, and the evidence adduced at trial included a plethora of other incidents, completely separate and distinct from the act of sodomy, that would support the child molestation conviction.
Specifically, the indictment charged Gary Horne with child molestation by (1) exposing his genitals to the victim, (2) by performing sodomy on the victim, and (3) having the victim sit on the defendant’s lap. The evidence adduced to support this child molestation charge was (1) the victim’s testimony that Gary Horne had exposed his genitalia by masturbating in her presence 10 to 20 times over the period of a year; (2) the evidence concerning the act of sodomy; and (3) the victim’s testimony about an incident when Gary Horne had her sit on top of him while he was lying on a bed so that his erected penis touched her vagina. Even though the evidence concerning the act of sodomy was the same evidence used to prove the sodomy charge, all of the episodes of masturbation and the lap-sitting incident certainly independently and separately support the conviction for child molestation. Under McCollum v. State, 177 Ga. App. 40 (338 SE2d 460) (1985), Gary Horne’s convictions for child molestation and sodomy both should be affirmed.
Further, the jury was authorized to infer that the pornographic photographs introduced into evidence promulgated, promoted, and portended the permissiveness and perversion of mental and physical abuse and molestation, and acted as a type of Bundy “blueprint” of anticipated assaults and acts, or as a type of “pied piper” approach, to try to round up or turn the victim on. See Megar v. State, 144 Ga. App. 564, 568 (241 SE2d 447) (1978). See also Howell v. State, 172 *537Ga. App. 805 (324 SE2d 754) (1984). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Decided July 14, 1989
Rehearing denied July 28, 1989
Hackel & Hackel, Thomas M. Hackel, for appellants.
Harry D. Dixon, Jr., District Attorney, Richard E. Currie, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.