Court Opinion

ID: 9529241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:49:08.483652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:43.014072
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice.
The major issue that must be resolved in this case is whether the inclusion in the instruction on the elements of aggravated assault and battery of the phrase, “a deadly weapon, to wit: shoes ...,” provided an opportunity for the jury to invoke an impermissible presumption. Other issues are urged with respect to the right to an instruction on the lesser included offense of simple battery, claimed to present Earl Warren’s (Warren) theory of the case; error in not severing Warren’s trial from joint trial with other defendants; and the contention that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict. We hold that no error occurred in connection with Warren’s trial, and the judgment and sentence entered by the district court is affirmed.
In his Brief of Appellant, Warren states these issues:
I. Did the trial court err by refusing to give an instruction on “simple” battery?
II. Did jury instruction No. 9 create an impermissible irrebuttable presumption on the deadly weapon element of aggravated assault and battery?
III. Did failure to instruct the jury on “simple” battery deny appellant’s right to have his theory of the case presented to the jury?
IV. Was plain error committed by not severing the appellant’s trial from the trial of the other defendants?
V.Was there sufficient evidence to convict appellant of aggravated assault?
In its Brief of Appellee, the State of Wyoming (State) synthesizes the same issues into four, as follows:
I. Did the trial court err by consolidating the Appellant’s trial with that of the three other defendants?
II. Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to give an instruction on “simple” battery?
III. Did the Court err in giving jury instruction number nine defining the elements of aggravated assault and battery?
IV. Was there sufficient evidence to support a conviction of aggravated assault and battery?
The crime for which Warren was convicted was committed in the course of a brawl that occurred in the parking lot of the Holiday Inn at Riverton at about 1:30 A.M. on September 10, 1989. A complete narrative of the events surrounding Warren’s crime is not necessary. The conflict in its several ramifications was one of those inexplicable, dipsomaniacal confrontations, and only certain aspects of what occurred have any pertinency in this appeal. Another chapter of the story may be found in the opinion of the court in Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361 (Wyo.1992). It is sufficient to note that, in the course of the conflict, Lindberg Shongutsie pounded the skull of the victim, Richard Ferris, Jr., with a baseball bat, a 4" x 4" chunk of wood and, perhaps, other bludgeon-like instruments. While Ferris lay sprawled on the pavement of the motel parking lot, apparently unconscious, witnesses observed Warren kick Ferris once or twice in the head. Warren was wearing shoes described as Hush Puppies™. Although Ferris weighed approximately 200 pounds, and Warren weighed only 150 pounds, the kicks that were delivered were described as having been accomplished with sufficient force to move the victim’s limp body by causing it to rotate some 90 degrees.
As a product of the night’s events, Lind-berg Shongutsie was convicted of second *306degree murder for killing Ferris. Warren was convicted of aggravated assault and battery with a deadly weapon because he was found guilty of kicking Ferris in the head. Russell Warren, Warren’s brother, was convicted of aggravated assault and battery committed upon a different victim in the course of the fight. Rebecca Shon-gutsie, Lindberg Shongutsie’s wife, was acquitted of a charge of aggravated assault and battery in which the alleged victim was Ferris. The four defendants were tried together in a single proceeding and in front of a single jury.
Critical testimony with respect to the offense of aggravated assault and battery1 came from a pathologist. The pathologist conducted the autopsy on the body of Ferris on the evening of September 15, 1989, shortly after Ferris died from the injuries he had suffered in the brawl that occurred on September 10. The pathologist’s conclusion with respect to the cause of death was: “brain death, secondary to the central nervous system lacerations and contusions and skull fractures, which was secondary to the blunt traumatic injury to the head.” The pathologist also testified that some of the abrasions and bruises on Ferris’ head could have been caused by the kicks delivered by Warren. His testimony then continued:
Q. [By defense counsel for Lindberg and Rebecca Shongutsie] And I think you already told us that the fractures that you observed were consistent as having been produced by a block of wood or a bat or any object that was capable of administering substantial force to that portion of the head.
A. That’s correct, yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Whether we’ve mentioned them or not?
A. Whether we’ve mentioned them or not.
Q. You indicated earlier that you didn’t think that a person wearing Hush Puppies[™] was likely to inflict the type of fractures you observed if he kicked a person.
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Okay, Did you make any assumption about the force with which that kick was applied?
A. No, I really didn’t. I was assuming probably all force of kicks by an average individual.
Q. Okay. Would an average kick— well, let me ask you first. Did you make a determination as to the size of Mr. Ferris?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. How big was he?
A. Mr. Ferris had a measured length of, on the autopsy table, of six feet, one inch, we estimated his weight at about 200 pounds.
Q. Okay. Would the average kick that you are talking about be sufficient to reorient the body of a person that size by 90 degrees?
A. I’m not sure what you mean by reorient. You mean move the body 90 degrees? Is that what you mean?
Q. Right.
A. Is Mr. Ferris lying down at this point or standing?
Q. Lying down.
A. That would be a strong kick.
Q. Okay. Now, factoring that into your opinion, could that type of kick have either caused or created additional damage?
A. Well, a kick will cause damage. I have not said that a kick will not cause damage.
Q. Sure.
A. So I’m not really sure I understand your question.
Q. I mean on a kick of that type, if you had a small skull fracture, could it enlarge the fracture?
*307A. If a kick were applied to an area that was previously injured, yes, it would cause more severe damage to that area or more extensive damage than if there were no injury there in the first place. Especially if there were a skull fracture in that area, if — and at that point the skull is already fractured and the brain may already be damaged, a kick to that area would accelerate or accentuate or aggravate the brain damage.
Q. Okay. And so we’re clear, this young person didn’t die because he had a skull fracture, did he?
A. He died because his — well, his brain died because he had injury to the brain.
Q. That’s right. It was the injury that occurred inside the skull. Isn’t that what really caused the death?
A. The injury occurred inside the skull. The brain was damaged.
Q. Okay. And so any force that would apply with such consequence to cause injury inside the brain, whether it be— result in a fracture or not, could cause death; isn’t that true?
A. In this particular case, if other injuries were already present in the brain and the skull fractures were present, any additional injury would exacerbate or add to brain injury.
Q. The real problem, as I understand it, is the bleeding and the pressure and the damage to the brain inside the skull. It’s not the fact that the skull is cracked.
A. That’s correct. You can have brain injury without having a skull fracture.
Q. Right. And in fact, it’s not unusual for death to result from brain injury without skull fracture; isn’t that true?
A. It occurs not uncommonly, yes.
In his testimony, the pathologist agreed the injuries to the right side of the victim’s head were not as serious as the injuries to the back of his head. He testified that the injuries to the right side could have been caused by soft shoes. He also agreed the abrasions and bruises to Ferris’ head could have been caused by his falling to the pavement in the parking lot, and that it would be difficult for a man of 150 pounds to cause the body of a 200 pound man to rotate 90 degrees by kicking him in the head. He stated, however, that this could be accomplished. The pathologist further agreed with the proposition that the injuries to the right side of the head would probably not have been life-threatening. That was tempered, however, by his previous testimony that, given a victim in Mr. Ferris’ circumstances, the situation was different from that of a person who had not suffered any injury at all prior to any kicking.
It is in the context of this factual background that Warren complains about an impermissible instruction incorporating a presumption. His specific contention is that Instruction No. 9 led the jury to presume that his shoes were deadly weapons and, since no objection was made to the instruction, he urges that the giving of the instruction constitutes plain error. The instruction read:
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
Earl Warren is charged with aggravated assault and battery in violation of Section 6-2-502(a)(ii), W.S., 1977, as amended. Pertinent portions of that statute provide as follows:
“a person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he ... intentionally or knowingly causes ... bodily injury to another with a deadly weap-on_”
Earl Warren is charged with one count of aggravated assault and battery. The elements are:
EARL WARREN — COUNT I
1. That the defendant, Earl Warren,
2. on or about September 10, 1989,
3. in Fremont County, Wyoming,
4. intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury
5. to another person, Richard Ferris, Jr.,
6. with a deadly weapon, to wit: shoes.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements *308has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.
If on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.
In support of his argument, Warren cites Wyo.R.Evid. 303(c) which states:
(c) Instructing the jury. — Whenever the existence of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the court shall instruct that it may regard the basic facts as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact but is not required to do so. In addition, if the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a defense, the court shall instruct the jury that its existence, on all the evidence, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Warren also invokes a definition of the phrase “to wit” to support his argument. Our review of the definition of the term “to wit” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2418 (1986) results in the conclusion that, in this instruction, “to wit” is used only to advise the jury that the deadly weapon alleged in the information was Warren’s shoes.
The instructions, read together, guided the jury to an understanding that each of the elements of the alleged crime had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. That requirement encompassed the allegation, and demanded that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt, that Warren had used a deadly weapon. With respect to that element of the offense, the jury also was instructed as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 7
[[Image here]]
A “deadly weapon” is any instrument or object which is capable of producing and likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm (which means a hurt or injury of a serious nature. It need not be an injury of a permanent character.). The term “deadly weapon” can include instruments not generally considered to be weapons.
[[Image here]]
When the instructions are read together, as our rules require, they were adequate and appropriate for the purpose of informing the jury that the deadly weapon the state alleged to have been used by Warren was his shoes and, even though shoes might not generally be considered a deadly weapon, the jury could find they could be so characterized under the circumstances of this case. The thrust of the pathologist’s testimony was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that, under the circumstances, Warren’s shoes were deadly weapons. We note that even Warren does not maintain that shoes cannot be considered a deadly weapon under any circumstances. We also recognize that courts in other jurisdictions have found shoes to be deadly weapons in various circumstances. State v. McFadden, 25 Conn.App. 171, 593 A.2d 979 (1991); State v. Shubert, 102 N.C.App. 419, 402 S.E.2d 642 (1991); State v. Taylor, 485 So.2d 117 (La.Ct.App. 2 Cir.1986); Craft v. State, 158 Ga.App. 745, 282 S.E.2d 203 (1981); Helton v. State, 372 So.2d 390 (Ala.Cr.App.1979); Orrill v. State, 509 P.2d 930 (Okl.Cr.App.1973); Grass v. People, 172 Colo. 223, 471 P.2d 602 (1970); State v. Born, 280 Minn. 306, 159 N.W.2d 283 (1968).
Warren’s reliance on Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), both of which deal with presumptions, is misplaced. This is not a case in which the jury was given an instruction that permitted the jury to presume the existence of an element of the crime. An analysis of the instructions quoted above, in light of how they would be understood by a reasonable juror, persuades us that the jury could only understand that it was their duty to weigh and determine the question of whether the shoes were a deadly weapon under the circumstances presented by this case. See Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750 (Wyo.1987); Krucheck v. State, 671 P.2d 1222 (Wyo.1983), appeal after remand 702 P.2d 1267 (1985). They also were told that, as a part *309of the charge, the State had alleged the shoes were deadly weapons.
Furthermore, as one of his principal arguments to the jury, Warren contended that a shoe simply is not a deadly weapon as contemplated by Wyo.Stat. § 6-2-502 (1988). The instructions afforded Warren a full opportunity to apprise the jury of the impact of those instructions in terms of his defense to the crime charged.
We hold that the jury was accurately instructed. The evidence would permit the jury to determine correctly that the shoes, as used by Warren under the circumstances of this case, were a deadly weapon. It is clear that Warren was, or should have been, aware when he kicked Ferris that Ferris already was seriously injured and severe kicks with shod feet, even though in soft shoes, could have produced grave injury or death under the circumstances. Since we find no error was present, we do not consider this issue in the context of plain error. We content ourselves simply with noting that, under the plain error rule, Warren has not demonstrated the violation of any clear or unequivocal rule of law.
Warren also argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of simple battery defined in Wyo.Stat. § 6 — 2—501(b) (1988) as follows:
A person is guilty of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.
It is important to this case to recognize that Warren did not offer an instruction on this claimed lesser included offense.
What transpired at the jury instruction conference is this:
[COUNSEL FOR WARREN]: Your Hon- or, on behalf of Earl Warren, we request an instruction for the lesser included crime of battery. I think the evidence in this case supports that.
If you take into consideration the definition of deadly weapon, the jury may very well find that there was no deadly weapon used, but that the defendant touched the victim.
THE COURT: [Counsel for the State]? [COUNSEL. FOR THE STATE]: State would argue that battery is not supported by the evidence in this case, Your Honor. Particularly taking into consideration the testimony of the pathologist, that while the Hush Puppy[™] shoes may not in and of themselves cause skull fractures, for example, they could cause other breaks to the facial bones, and I believe those certainly fall within the definition of serious bodily injury.
THE COURT: All right. The Court rejects the proffered instruction. I’m— think that may be a problem for you, [Counsel for the State].
Go ahead. Any others?
[COUNSEL FOR THE STATE]: No. I don’t have anything else.
This record does not demonstrate any objection to the refusal of this instruction. In Muniz v. State, 783 P.2d 141 (Wyo.1989), we held that the record must contain a clear statement sufficient to inform the trial court of the basis of asserted error. See Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024 (Wyo.1983).
With respect to Warren’s argument that he was denied an instruction on his theory of the case because the trial court refused to give the instruction on simple battery, our rule is that a defendant is entitled to have instructions on his theory of the case if those instructions sufficiently inform the jury of the theory of defense and if competent evidence exists to support the law expressed in the instructions. Amin v. State, 811 P.2d 255 (Wyo.1991); McInturff v. State, 808 P.2d 190 (Wyo.1991); Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544 (Wyo.1990). No instruction was offered by Warren in this instance, although it would have been a simple matter for either counsel or the trial court to have fashioned an appropriate instruction.
The more critical issue is the requirement that there be evidence to support such an instruction. Warren’s defense clearly was that he had not kicked Ferris; he was not contending that he had kicked *310Ferris in a matter which might constitute a simple battery rather than an aggravated battery. The evidence on this point presented to the jury the question of whether Warren in fact had delivered at least two viciously applied kicks to the victim’s badly injured head, and whether those kicks could have inflicted extremely serious injuries to Ferris. There was no question presented as to whether Warren had kicked Ferris in a manner that would not lead to that result.
Further, Warren’s defense was not that the shoes were not a deadly weapon, even though he so argued to the jury. No evidence was offered by Warren that a shoe is not a deadly weapon, and the only evidence on the issue came from the pathologist who testified that a kick with a shoe inflicted upon a man with a fractured skull could be extremely damaging and could have produced serious injury in and of itself and, certainly, could have produced additional injury in the case in which the person kicked has multiple skull fractures.
So far as theory of the case is concerned, we are confronted with a situation well known in our jurisprudence, i.e., a case in which the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the charged crime. The State presented evidence demonstrating all elements of the crime of aggravated assault and battery. Warren simply denied that he had kicked the victim. Under these circumstances, no lesser included offense instruction is warranted under the claim that it was a theory of the case instruction. Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021 (Wyo.1985); Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150 (Wyo.1978). For this further reason, the trial court did not err in refusing to give a theory of the case instruction on simple battery.
Relying upon State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1988), Warren urges us to develop a new construct for considering the propriety of lesser included offense instructions. The process presented in Jef-fries, and the legal authorities upon which it relies, are intriguing, but we are satisfied with the traditional analysis that we have applied with respect to the necessity for lesser included offense instructions. We decline to adopt the rationale of the Iowa court. We hold that the district court did not err in refusing to give the lesser included offense instruction.
In yet another assertion of error, Warren argues that the district court should not have conducted the trial for all four defendants in one proceeding. Under our rules and our precedent, it is clear that the joinder of cases for trial is within the discretion of the district court, and we do not fault or adjust the trial court’s ruling unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown, together with prejudice resulting from that abuse of discretion. Wyo. R.Crim.P. 11(a), 12 and 13; Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91 (1988), appeal after remand 810 P.2d 93 (Wyo.1991); Amin, 695 P.2d 1021.
Warren’s argument focuses mainly on the fact that evidence came in as a result of the joinder which he asserts would not have been admissible if he had been tried separately. For example, he points to the evidence presented in the form of: (1) the testimony of the pathologist, including the “gruesome” photographs that were used to show the injuries to Ferris’ skull and brain; (2) the testimony of witnesses that Warren’s brother, Russell, had cut another victim of the fight twice with a knife; (3) the testimony by witnesses that Rebecca Shon-gutsie also had kicked Ferris and she hoped they had killed Ferris.
The facts that justify the jury’s verdict as to Warren arise out of a brawling fight or melee that lasted only a few minutes. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to sort out and compartmentalize, defendant by defendant and case by case, the events that occurred that night. The State is entitled to have leeway in presenting the factual picture to the jury. Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43 (Wyo.1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 262, 78 L.Ed.2d 246 (1983); and see State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985); Shelton v. State, 287 Ark. 322, 699 S.W.2d 728 (1985); 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 716 and 717 (1989). The evidence that Warren insists was prejudicial was nothing more than that, i.e., evidence which served to relate to *311the jury the whole story of what took place in those fateful, fatal few minutes. The only evidence that may not have touched upon Warren’s case related to the conduct of his brother, Russell, and it is clear from the record that the jury could not have relied upon Russell Warren’s conduct in addressing the issues in Warren’s case.
We hold that there was no error committed by the district court in joining the trials of the four defendants. Warren has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion and any prejudice that might have resulted from such an abuse of discretion.
Finally, with respect to the contention that there was not sufficient evidence to convict Warren of aggravated assault, we invoke the usual rule for analysis of sufficiency of the evidence. Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299 (Wyo.1991). There is no need for a lengthy recitation. This argument by Warren is simply an adjunct to those propounded earlier with respect to whether his shoes were deadly weapons under the circumstances of this case and whether the kicks he administered to Ferris were of a deadly nature. We already have resolved the essence of these claims in addressing the argument concerning the instructions. We hold that the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the State, is adequate to sustain Warren’s conviction for aggravated assault and battery with a deadly weapon.
The judgment and sentence of the trial court is affirmed in all respects.

. For purposes of this case, aggravated assault and battery is defined in Wyo.Stat. § 6-2-502 (1988) as follows:
(a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he:
[[Image here]]
(ii) Attempts to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon;
[[Image here]]
(b) Aggravated assault and battery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years.