Court Opinion

ID: 9396666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 15:11:28.697015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.730998
License: Public Domain

THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                             2023 WY 47

                                                                   APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                             May 23, 2023

 STEVEN W. MITCHELL,

 Appellant
 (Plaintiff),

 v.
                                                                   S-22-0245
 PETE RUST, in his personal and official
 capacity,

 Appellee
 (Defendant).

                     Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County
                       The Honorable Suzannah G. Robinson, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Steven W. Mitchell, pro se.

Representing Appellee:
      Thomas A. Thompson of MacPherson & Thompson, LLC.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
FENN, Justice.

[¶1] Steven W. Mitchell filed suit against Pete Rust, the mayor of Green River,
Wyoming. Mr. Mitchell contends Mr. Rust violated his oath of office by refusing to order
an investigation into a witness who recanted her prior statements to law enforcement in
Mr. Mitchell’s underlying criminal matter. The district court dismissed Mr. Mitchell’s
various claims against Mr. Rust as time-barred, barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2022), and
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We affirm.

                                          ISSUES

[¶2]   The dispositive issues are:

              I.     Did the district court err by finding Mr. Mitchell’s
                     claims are barred by the Wyoming Governmental
                     Claims Act?

              II.    Did the district court err by finding Mr. Mitchell’s
                     claims are barred under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

              III.   Did the district court err by finding Mr. Mitchell’s
                     claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel?

                                          FACTS

[¶3] In 1997, Mr. Mitchell was convicted of one count of first-degree murder for the
murder of Tawnya T. Sidwell and two counts of attempted murder for shooting two officers
during their investigation of Ms. Sidwell’s murder. He was sentenced to three consecutive
life sentences. Mr. Mitchell first challenged his convictions with this Court on issues of
Miranda violations, improper admission of involuntary statements, improper joinder of
trials, and prosecutorial misconduct. Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 719 (Wyo. 1999). We
affirmed the judgment and sentence. Id. at 725.

[¶4] Following Mr. Mitchell’s direct appeal, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief
alleging his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for failing “to investigate, develop, support, and provide expert
testimony in regard to [his] voluntary intoxication defense.” Mr. Mitchell argued he was
using methamphetamine before the shootings, and the “extreme (near toxic) levels of
amphetamine/ methamphetamine” in his system led him to hallucinate to the extent that he
acted under the delusion that he was defending his family when he shot the two police
officers. The district court held a hearing and denied the petition. It found Mr. Mitchell
failed to demonstrate the result of his direct appeal would have been different but for
appellate counsel’s failure to raise the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Mr.

                                             1
Mitchell appealed, and we entered an order denying his petition for writ of review on
October 14, 2008.1

[¶5] In April 2009, Pamela Turner, a witness for the State at Mr. Mitchell’s trial,
executed a question-and-answer document (Turner Affidavit) stating she was “willing to
recant any prior statements . . . made to Law Enforcement, or [in] the [p]rosecution against
Steven Mitchell.” Ms. Turner declared in the affidavit that she was under the influence of
methamphetamine and marijuana when she made statements during the investigation, and
her testimony was coerced by the Green River Police Department. After Mr. Mitchell
received the Turner Affidavit, he mailed a copy of it along with a letter to Mr. Rust, in his
capacity as a Green River city councilman. Mr. Mitchell contends this was his first attempt
to contact Mr. Rust regarding the Turner Affidavit.

[¶6] Mr. Mitchell filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for
the District of Wyoming raising claims about the Turner Affidavit and claims similar to
those raised in his direct appeal. Mitchell v. Murphy, No. 08CV231D, 2009 WL 10704912,
at *2–5 (D. Wyo. Sept. 21, 2009). He informed the United States District Court “he was
in possession of newly discovered evidence, namely [the] affidavit of Pamela Turner,
[which stated] she was willing to recant her prior statements made to the government
against Mr. Mitchell and that Mr. Mitchell was innocent.” Id. at *2. The United States
District Court denied the petition as time-barred. Id. at *5. In considering the Turner
Affidavit, the United States District Court determined the Turner Affidavit did not toll the
statute of limitations. Id. at *4. It found: “Given . . . the facts show that Mr. Mitchell
provided an inculpatory statement to law enforcement and that he shot two police officers
seeking to interview him, he has failed to provide new evidence, not present at trial, that
makes it ‘more likely than not that no reasonable juror’ would have convicted him.” Id. at
*4 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)). The United States District Court did
not find equitable tolling was warranted and dismissed the untimely petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Id. at *4–5.

[¶7] Mr. Mitchell requested a certificate of appealability to appeal the United States
District Court’s denial of his habeas petition to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Mitchell
v. Murphy, 359 F. App’x 22, 23 (10th Cir. 2009). The Tenth Circuit denied the certificate
of appealability and dismissed the matter. Id. at 25. It found Mr. Mitchell’s petition was
time-barred and he presented no argument supporting the limitations period was tolled. Id.
at 24. Mr. Mitchell argued the Turner Affidavit tolled the limitations period because the
affidavit showed his actual innocence. Id. at 25. The Tenth Circuit found Ms. Turner stated
in her affidavit she was “‘willing to recant any prior statements that she has made to Law
Enforcement, or the Prosecution, against’ [Mr.] Mitchell; that police tried to convince [her]
‘of times and facts that conflicted with her own memory’ of the crime; that she ‘knows for
a fact that [Mr.] Mitchell was not involved with the murder’; and that she ‘knows for a fact’

1
    Mitchell v. State, S-08-0204 (Oct. 14, 2008) (order denying petition for writ of review).

                                                       2
that other individuals murdered [Ms.] Sidwell.” Id. at 25. The Tenth Circuit held the Turner
Affidavit did not toll the statute of limitations because the “bare conclusions” contained
within it did “not provide actual evidence that would compel any reasonable juror to acquit
[Mr.] Mitchell, particularly in view of the substantial evidence of his guilt.” Id. at 25 (citing
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991)) (“[A]ffidavits must be based upon
personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence; conclusory
and self-serving affidavits are not sufficient.”).

[¶8] Approximately nine years later, after Mr. Rust was elected mayor, Mr. Mitchell sent
Mr. Rust the Turner Affidavit again, reiterating his request for a criminal investigation into
the Green River Police Department. More than one year later, in November 2019, Mr.
Mitchell sent the Turner Affidavit to Mr. Rust a third time.

[¶9] Approximately twelve years after first mailing Mr. Rust the Turner Affidavit, Mr.
Mitchell filed the underlying complaint, alleging Mr. Rust deprived him of his civil rights
and violated his oath of office by failing to take any action with respect to the Turner
Affidavit. Mr. Rust filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Wyoming Rules of Civil
Procedure (W.R.C.P.) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Mr. Rust argued Mr. Mitchell’s claims are
barred by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), the applicable federal law,
and Mr. Mitchell already had an adequate remedy at law through his post-conviction
proceedings. The district court granted Mr. Rust’s motion to dismiss. Mr. Mitchell timely
appealed.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶10] Our standard of review for a motion to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6) is as follows:

              We review motions to dismiss pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1)
              and 12(b)(6) similarly. Our review is de novo, and we employ
              the same standards and examine the same materials as the
              district court: we accept the facts alleged in the complaint or
              petition as true and view them in the light most favorable to the
              non-moving party. However, liberal construction of the
              pleadings does not excuse omission of that which is material
              and necessary in order to entitle one to relief.

              Under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), we [will] affirm dismissal only if
              those facts dictate judgment for the appellee as a matter of law.
              Likewise, under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate
              only if it is certain on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff
              cannot assert any facts that create entitlement to relief.

                                               3
Guy v. Lampert, 2015 WY 148, ¶¶ 12–13, 362 P.3d 331, 335 (Wyo. 2015) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).

                                       DISCUSSION

[¶11] Mr. Mitchell argues Mr. Rust violated his official duties by refusing to order a
criminal investigation after he received the Turner Affidavit. He requested the district
court issue an order authorizing the filing of a lien against Mr. Rust or, in the alternative,
award him damages or issue an injunction compelling Mr. Rust to initiate a criminal
investigation into the Green River Police Department. The district court found Mr.
Mitchell’s claims are barred by the WGCA, by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and he is collaterally
estopped from challenging his conviction.

   I. Was Mr. Mitchell’s claim barred under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act?

[¶12] The district court found Mr. Mitchell’s claims are barred by the WGCA because he
failed to comply with the claims procedure and timing requirements under the WGCA,
Wyoming Statute §§ 1-39-101 through 120. Mr. Mitchell argues he satisfied the timing
requirements under the WGCA by mailing his notice of claim to the Sweetwater County
Clerk.

[¶13] Before a suit based either in contract or tort can be brought against a public
employee acting within the scope of their duties, “the claimant must follow the procedure
outlined in the WGCA and the Wyoming Constitution.” Casey v. Teton Cnty. Hosp. Dist.,
2022 WY 112, ¶ 7, 517 P.3d 536, 539 (Wyo. 2022) (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113,
Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7); Peterson v. Sweetwater Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 929 P.2d 525,
529 (Wyo. 1996) (applying the WGCA notice requirements to claims against a
governmental entity based in contract and stating the “[f]ailure to comply with [Wyoming
Statute § 1-39-113(a)] is an absolute bar to appellants’ claims.”); Milton v. Mitchell, 762
P.2d 372, 374–75 (Wyo. 1988) (applying the WGCA notice procedures to a suit against a
public employee acting in the scope of his duties). As a condition precedent to bringing a
suit against Mr. Rust, Mr. Mitchell was required to present his notice of claim as an
itemized statement in writing to the business office of the governmental entity within two
years of the date of the alleged wrongful act, error, or omission. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-
113(a), (c) (LexisNexis 2021); Casey, ¶ 7, 517 P.3d at 539. After satisfying the notice of
claim requirements, Mr. Rust “is then subject to a one-year statute of limitations for filing
an action in court.” Id.; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 (LexisNexis 2021).

[¶14] “[T]his Court has long held that a party seeking to bring an action against a
governmental entity” or a public employee “must first comply with the constitutional and
statutory requirements by presenting a notice of claim to the entity.” Chapman v. Wyo.
Dep’t of Corr., 2016 WY 5, ¶ 25, 366 P.3d 499, 511 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Harmon v. Star
Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, ¶ 18, 331 P.3d 1174, 1178 (Wyo. 2014)). To avoid

                                              4
dismissal of his complaint, it was incumbent upon Mr. Mitchell to state in his complaint:
(i) the notice of claim was filed in accordance with the WGCA; (ii) the date he filed the
notice of claim; and (iii) the notice of claim complied with the signature and certification
requirements of Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-
113(d); Chapman, ¶ 26, 366 P.3d at 511; Brown v. City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, ¶ 44, 248
P.3d 1136, 1146–47 (Wyo. 2011).

[¶15] Mr. Mitchell makes no mention in his complaint that he presented a written itemized
statement for his notice of claim to the business office of the governmental entity, nor does
he make any mention of complying with Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution.
While the failure to file a cause of action “strictly complying with the WGCA does not
deprive a district court of subject matter jurisdiction, the WGCA’s requirements are
substantive[,]” and the district court may dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for failing to
comply with the WGCA. Chapman, 2016 WY 5, ¶¶ 26–27, 366 P.3d at 511–12; cf. Brown,
2011 WY 35, ¶ 47, 248 P.3d at 1147–48 (allowing amendment of a complaint to show
compliance with the notice of claim requirements). The district court found Mr. Mitchell
failed to establish he complied with the WGCA by presenting his notice of claim to the
appropriate governmental entity and therefore dismissed his cause of action. After
reviewing the complaint, we cannot say the district court erred by dismissing Mr.
Mitchell’s complaint for failing to comply with the notice and pleading requirements under
Wyoming Statute § 1-39-113. See generally Allred v. Bebout, 2018 WY 8, ¶ 32, 409 P.3d
260, 268–69 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting The Tavern, LLC v. Town of Alpine, 2017 WY 56, ¶
21, 395 P.3d 167, 173 (Wyo. 2017)) (“[L]iberal construction of pleadings does not ‘excuse
omission of that which is material and necessary in order to entitle one to relief.’”);
Chapman, 2016 WY 5, ¶¶ 25–27, 366 P.3d at 511–12; Routh v. State, ex rel. Wyo. Workers’
Comp. Div., 952 P.2d 1108, 1116–17 (Wyo. 1998) (“Routh did not even allege the filing
of a claim [under the WGCA] in his . . . complaint, and under Wyoming law that would
serve to justify dismissal of the complaint[.]”).

[¶16] Mr. Mitchell contended in his response to the motion to dismiss that he complied
with the notice requirements under the WGCA by filing a notice with the Sweetwater
County Clerk on March 2, 2020.2 He alleged he had a year, until March 2, 2021, to
commence his lawsuit, which he complied with by timely filing his suit against Mr. Rust
on January 22, 2021. The district court dismissed the first suit without prejudice, and Mr.
Mitchell filed the underlying action in August 2021.

2
  On appeal, Mr. Mitchell claims he complied with the WGCA by mailing his notice of claim to the
Sweetwater County Clerk in November 2019. Mr. Mitchell never raised this argument to the district court
below, claiming instead he filed the notice in March 2020. We decline to consider Mr. Mitchell’s argument
he filed the notice in November 2019. Rogers v. State, 2021 WY 123, ¶¶ 14–15, 498 P.3d 66, 70–71 (Wyo.
2021) (declining to address an argument made for the first time on appeal because the issue has not been
properly developed for review); Kitzke v. State, 2004 WY 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 950, 953 (Wyo. 2004) (“[I]ssues
not brought before the district court may not be reviewed by this [C]ourt upon first impression on appeal.”).

                                                     5
[¶17] Even if we accept the facts alleged by Mr. Mitchell as true and view them in the
light most favorable to him, we cannot say the district court erred by finding Mr. Mitchell’s
claims are barred by the WGCA. “[Wyoming Statute §] 1-39-113(a) requires claimants to
present their claim within two years of when they knew or should have known, with the
exercise of due diligence, of the [public employee’s] ‘alleged act, error or omission.”’
Heimer v. Antelope Valley Improvement, 2010 WY 29, ¶ 17, 226 P.3d 860, 864 (Wyo.
2010). “We have long held that strict compliance with the two-year notice provision is
required to bring a claim against a governmental entity” and failure to notify the
governmental entity within two years is an absolute bar to suit under the WGCA. Casey,
2022 WY 112, ¶ 13, 517 P.3d at 540–41; Stroth v. N. Lincoln Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 2014 WY
81, ¶ 9, 327 P.3d 121, 125–26 (Wyo. 2014).

[¶18] Wyoming Statute § 1-39-113(a) required Mr. Mitchell to use due diligence to
discover any act, error, or omission by Mr. Rust. See Heimer, 2010 WY 29, ¶ 23, 226 P.3d
at 865. The two-year notice requirement “begins to run from the first time claimants are
chargeable with information which should lead them to believe they have a claim.”
Rawlinson v. Cheyenne Bd. of Pub. Utilities, 2001 WY 6, ¶ 12, 17 P.3d 13, 16 (Wyo. 2001).
The occurrence of sending a second letter to Mr. Rust did not extend the two-year notice
requirement. See id. at ¶ 12, 17 P.3d at 16. Wyoming Statute § 1-39-113(a) only extends
the two-year notice requirement, if the claimant establishes the alleged act, error or
omission was: “(i) Not reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or (ii) The
claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period
despite the exercise of due diligence.”

[¶19] Mr. Mitchell concedes he first notified Mr. Rust of alleged wrongdoing by the Green
River Police Department in 2009–2010. He did not attempt to contact Mr. Rust again about
the Turner Affidavit until August 13, 2018. He further concedes he did not file his alleged
notice of claim until March 2, 2020. For Mr. Mitchell’s notice of claim to have been timely,
Mr. Mitchell must show he exercised due diligence and did not know of any alleged
wrongful act, error, or omission by Mr. Rust until approximately nine years after he first
notified Mr. Rust of the allegations in the Turner Affidavit. See Heimer, 2010 WY 29, ¶ 17,
226 P.3d at 864. Mr. Mitchell presents no argument justifying why he did not submit the
required notice within two years after he first notified Mr. Rust of the allegations in the
Turner Affidavit. He further provides no argument the alleged act, error, or omission was
not reasonably discoverable for the nine years it took him to submit his alleged notice of
claim. We therefore decline to address Mr. Rust’s claim he served a timely notice of claim
in compliance with the WGCA any further. See generally WyoLaw, LLC v. Off. of Att’y
Gen., Consumer Prot. Unit, 2021 WY 61, ¶ 37, 486 P.3d 964, 975 (Wyo. 2021) (holding
this Court will not consider arguments unsupported by cogent argument and relevant
authority).

  II. Does 42 U.S.C. § 1983 bar Mr. Mitchell’s claims?

                                             6
[¶20] The failure to strictly comply with the requirements of the WGCA may require
dismissal of a state law claim, but that failure does not bar a § 1983 claim. Chapman, 2016
WY 5, ¶ 26 n.4, 366 P.3d at 511 n.4 (quoting Romero v. City of Miami, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1321,
1327–28 (N.D. Okla. 2014)). Mr. Mitchell contends his claim is a “civil rights action” and
argues federal law governing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies. The district court
applied the applicable law for § 1983 claims and held Mr. Mitchell’s claims are not
cognizable under § 1983 and require dismissal. We agree.

[¶21] A state prisoner may not sue state officials under § 1983 if the underlying cause of
action is to obtain damages where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a
conviction or sentence, which has not previously been invalidated. Nance v. Ward, 142 S.
Ct. 2214, 2222, 213 L. Ed. 2d 499 (2022); McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2156–
57, 204 L. Ed. 2d 506 (2019); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S. Ct. 2364,
2372, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994) (“A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a
conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.”);
15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 136 (May 2023 Update). When a prisoner seeks relief that
would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he comes within the
core of habeas corpus and must proceed in habeas. Nance, 142 S. Ct. at 2221–22 (citing
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S. Ct. at 2364). A state prisoner seeking to invalidate his
confinement “either directly through an injunction . . . or indirectly through a judicial
determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody” may only
proceed in habeas corpus (or similar state procedures). Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,
81, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1247, 161 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2005). “[W]hen a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it
would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.

[¶22] In Heck v. Humphrey, a prisoner serving a 15-year sentence for manslaughter sought
damages under § 1983 against state prosecutors and an investigator. Heck, 512 U.S. at 478–
79. The prisoner alleged misconduct similar to that alleged by Mr. Mitchell. Id. He alleged
the investigator in his underlying criminal investigation, acting under state law, conducted
an unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation, and the investigator and prosecutor
knowingly destroyed evidence and caused an illegal voice identification procedure to be
employed during the prisoner’s trial. Id. The United States Supreme Court held the
prisoner’s damages claim challenged the legality of the conviction and therefore dismissal
of the action was the correct result. Id. at 489–90.

[¶23] Mr. Mitchell alleges Mr. Rust violated his civil rights by “deliberately, knowingly,
and willfully engag[ing] in the ongoing criminal conspiracy, and cover-up, to deprive [Mr.
Mitchell] of Justice, Due Process, and to the Equal Protection of the Law” by purposefully
concealing allegedly felonious conduct by the Green River Police Department in its
investigation of Mr. Mitchell’s underlying criminal conviction. Mr. Mitchell requests an

                                             7
award of $25,000,000 in damages—though he alleges “[m]onetary relief alone cannot
repair the damage [Mr. Rust] has caused”—for “an urgent necessity to end [the] injustice
because [Mr. Mitchell] has been incarcerated for (25) [twenty-five] years in prison for a
murder that he did not commit.” Mr. Mitchell’s claims impugn the integrity of the
underlying investigation and prosecution of his criminal conviction and necessarily implies
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. Mr. Mitchell did not receive a favorable result
in his habeas corpus proceeding, nor did he receive one in his petition for post-conviction
relief. His claims are therefore not cognizable under § 1983, and the district court did not
err in dismissing his claims.3 See McDonough, 139 S. Ct. at 2159 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (“[A] claim like McDonough’s centers on evidence used to
secure an indictment and at a criminal trial, so it does not require speculat[ion] about
whether a prosecution will be brought. It directly challenges—and thus necessarily
threatens to impugn—the prosecution itself.”); Heck, 512 U.S. at 489–90.

    III. Is Mr. Mitchell’s claim barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel?

[¶24] The district court also held Mr. Mitchell’s claims are barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. It noted Mr. Mitchell’s “extensive efforts both in state and federal
courts challenging the legitimacy of his trial and convictions.” In particular, the district
court found Mr. Mitchell, in his petition for habeas corpus to the United States District
Court, already asserted Ms. Turner presented false testimony, and Mr. Mitchell’s principal
complaint, as in his habeas matter, was the Green River Police Department suborned
perjury at his trial. The district court held all four factors for collateral estoppel were
present and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims.

[¶25] “Collateral estoppel precludes a party from raising issues that have been contested
and resolved in a prior proceeding.” Bird v. Lampert, 2019 WY 56, ¶ 10, 441 P.3d 850,
854 (Wyo. 2019).

                Wyoming courts determine whether collateral estoppel bars
                relitigation of issues by examining:

                     (1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was
                     identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2)
                     whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the
                     merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral
                     estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to

3
  Mr. Mitchell also challenges the district court’s holding that his § 1983 claim was barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. Because we find Mr. Mitchell’s claim is not cognizable under § 1983, we decline to
address this claim of error. See Spence v. State, 2019 WY 51, ¶ 2 n.1, 441 P.3d 271, 272 n.1 (Wyo. 2019)
(declining to address a second issue when the first issue was dispositive); Mellott v. State, 2019 WY 23,
¶ 13 n.6, 435 P.3d 376, 382 n.6 (Wyo. 2019) (declining to address appellant’s second argument when her
first argument was dispositive).

                                                      8
                  the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against
                  whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair
                  opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.

Dockter v. Lozano, 2020 WY 119, ¶ 25, 472 P.3d 362, 369 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Rathbun
v. State, 2011 WY 116, ¶ 9, 257 P.3d 29, 33 (Wyo. 2011)).

[¶26] Mr. Mitchell argues the district court erred in finding all four factors were fully
present, and the issue raised in his complaint is not identical to the issue raised in his
petition for habeas corpus. He contends “[t]he only thing identical in this current action is
the Turner [A]ffidavit itself[,]” but he provides no argument addressing why the issues he
currently raises are not identical to the prior action. Instead, he makes a cursory argument
Mr. Rust was not elected to the office of mayor at the time of the habeas corpus petition,
so he should not be considered in privity with the State. He also makes a conclusory
statement, without any analysis or argument, he did not receive a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in his prior case because he was precluded from developing the
allegations contained in the Turner Affidavit.

[¶27] We have carefully reviewed Mr. Mitchell’s brief and find he did not support his
assertions with cogent argument or citation to legal authority. Mr. Mitchell’s brief contains
no analysis of the law to support his legal arguments and provides only unsupported
conclusory statements without any citation to the record supporting his factual contentions.
“While there is a certain leniency afforded the pro se litigant, when a brief fails to present
a valid contention supported by cogent argument or pertinent authority, ‘we consistently
have refused to consider such cases, whether the brief is by a litigant pro se or is filed by
counsel.’” Harrison v. State, 2020 WY 43, ¶ 2, 460 P.3d 260, 261 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting
In the Interest of BASS, 2020 WY 27, ¶ 7, 458 P.3d 857, 859 (Wyo. 2020)); see also Tozzi
v. Moffett, 2018 WY 133, ¶ 26, 430 P.3d 754, 762 (Wyo. 2018) (declining to consider an
argument the district court incorrectly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel because
the argument consisted of a conclusory statement with no legal analysis of the law and its
applicability). We therefore exercise our discretion under Rule 1.03 of the Wyoming Rules
of Appellate Procedure and decline to consider Mr. Mitchell’s contentions with respect to
the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and summarily affirm the district
court’s decision. See Silva v. State, 2014 WY 155, ¶ 10, 338 P.3d 934, 937 (Wyo. 2014).

                                      CONCLUSION

[¶28] The district court did not err when it held Mr. Mitchell’s claims are barred by the
WGCA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We exercise our discretion and decline to consider any
contentions related to the district court’s findings on the doctrine of collateral estoppel
because Mr. Mitchell failed to present cogent argument on this issue. We affirm the district
court’s order granting Mr. Rust’s motion to dismiss.

                                              9