Court Opinion

ID: 9894132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 16:11:08.396095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:23.873031
License: Public Domain

J-S40040-22

                                   2023 PA Super 222

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  ADRIAN ISIAH VILLANUEVA-PABON                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :       No. 756 EDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 14, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003033-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY KING, J.:                                 FILED OCTOBER 31, 2023

       Appellant, Adrian Isiah Villanueva-Pabon, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, following his

guilty plea to rape of a child.1 We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

June 29, 2021, Appellant pled guilty to rape of a child after Appellant had

sexual intercourse and impregnated his step-sister in 2019. On September 9,

2021, Appellant filed a pre-sentence motion to bar the registration

requirements under Revised Subchapter H of the Sexual Offender Registration

and Notification Act (“SORNA II”)2 and to stay proceedings in this case pending

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c).

2 Following Commonwealth v. Muniz, 640 Pa. 699, 164 A.3d 1189 (2017)

(plurality), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1107, 138 S.Ct. 925, 200 L.Ed.2d 213
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S40040-22

the remand decision in Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 659 Pa. 359, 232 A.3d

567 (2020).3 The court denied Appellant’s motion on September 14, 2021.

That day, the court sentenced Appellant to 108 to 240 months’ imprisonment,

plus three years’ probation.            The court imposed lifetime registration

requirements under Revised Subchapter H.4 Appellant was not designated a

sexually violent predator (“SVP”).

       Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on September 22, 2021.

Appellant again sought to stay proceedings in this case pending the remand

____________________________________________

(2018) and Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(“Butler I”), rev’d, 657 Pa. 579, 226 A.3d 972 (2020) (“Butler II”), the
Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted legislation to amend SORNA I. See
Act of Feb. 21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (“Act 10”). Act 10 amended several
provisions of SORNA I and added several new sections found at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9799.42, 9799.51-9799.75. In addition, the Governor of Pennsylvania
signed new legislation striking the Act 10 amendments and reenacting several
SORNA I provisions, effective June 12, 2018. See Act of June 12, 2018, P.L.
1952, No. 29 (“Act 29”). Through Act 10, as amended in Act 29 (collectively,
SORNA II), the General Assembly split SORNA I’s former Subchapter H into a
Revised Subchapter H and Subchapter I. Subchapter I addresses sexual
offenders who committed an offense on or after April 22, 1996, but before
December 20, 2012. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.51-9799.75. Subchapter I
contains less stringent reporting requirements than Revised Subchapter H,
which applies to offenders who committed an offense on or after December
20, 2012. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42. Based on Appellant’s
offense date in this case, the applicable registration requirements fall under
Revised Subchapter H.

3 We discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Torsilieri at length later in this

disposition.

4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14(d)(2) (designating rape under Section 3121

as Tier III offense); 9799.15(a)(3) (providing that individual convicted of Tier
III offense shall register for life).

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decision in Torsilieri.      The court granted the motion in part, staying the

proceedings until December 15, 2021.             On December 15, 2021, the court

extended the stay until February 18, 2022.

       On February 18, 2022, the matter proceeded to a hearing. At that time,

Appellant sought to introduce the following evidence: (1) an affidavit from

Professor Elizabeth J. Letourneau; (2) the expert report of Dr. James J.

Prescott; and (3) a declaration of R. Karl Hanson.            The Commonwealth

objected to the proffered evidence as follows:

          [THE COMMONWEALTH]: Your Honor, [defense counsel] did
          provide me with a copy today of the affidavits and expert
          reports that he was seeking to admit today. We are
          objecting to them being presented to the [c]ourt. They’re
          not authenticated, and they’re hearsay.

          I don’t think on their own they satisfy the defense burden of
          establishing any entitlement to relief on the motion as far
          as—so our position would be that if [Appellant] is entitled—
          can show he’s entitled to any substantive relief, it would
          have to be pursuant to a hearing with experts and show that
          whatever they have to say also apply in this case. …

(N.T. Hearing, 2/18/22, at 6-7). The parties then discussed how the court

would soon lose jurisdiction to decide the post-sentence motion,5 and it might

not have the requisite time in which to review Appellant’s proffered evidence

and render a decision on the merits in any event. (Id. at 7). The court then

suggested that Appellant could file a separate petition to bar application of the

____________________________________________

5 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3) (providing time frame in which court must
decide post-sentence motions).

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registration requirements, at which time the court would hold another hearing,

“if [Appellant feels] that…is an alternative to simply appealing the post-

sentence motion….” (Id. at 10). Defense counsel stated his hope that if he

appealed, this Court would remand for a full evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 10-

11).

       The following exchange then took place:

         [THE COURT]: So at this point I can simply—you can submit
         whatever you would like. I essentially am going to deny it
         based upon the objection of the Commonwealth. You can
         file an appeal to the Superior Court, which will then, I guess,
         remand it.

         But at the same time, it would seem to me that if I
         deny it based upon the fact that the evidence you
         wanted to present is hearsay, I would hate for you not
         to have the opportunity to argue this on the merits or
         wind up waiving the issue or the appellate court say,
         well, maybe you had a good issue, but the objection
         of the Commonwealth is a valid objection.

         You see what I’m thinking? That the appellate courts
         may say, yes, you had a hearing, but the [c]ourt ruled
         that the evidence you presented did not satisfy them
         because it was not admissible.

         I don’t mean to put you into a predicament. I want to give
         you the full opportunity to litigate this, as you will eventually
         be litigating [other similar cases] or waiting for a decision.
         You’re in a procedural posture in [other cases] to await the
         Torsilieri decision.

         [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. So I think as far as today is
         concerned, I would proceed with just if the [c]ourt would
         deny the post-sentence motion, and if there’s something
         outside the PCRA I—if it’s a PCRA or it’s outside the criminal,
         I’m not sure what—

         [THE COURT]: There’s a particular petition.           There’s a

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          particular series of cases that permit you to proceed outside
          the PCRA. Again, I can find it quickly. I just didn’t think
          that that’s where we were headed today.[6] …

          [THE COMMONWEALTH]: Your Honor, just to follow up on
          one thing that the [c]ourt had said, I just would like it to
          be clear on the record we have not objected to the
          defense having a hearing on this matter. The defense
          has taken the position all along that their strategic
          preference was to stay this and hope that Torsilieri
          would resolve the issue.

(Id. at 11-13) (emphasis added).               Subsequently, the court sustained the

Commonwealth’s objection and denied the post-sentence motion. (Id. at 14-

16).

       Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on March 16, 2022. On March

17, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely filed

his Rule 1925(b) statement on April 5, 2022.

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

          1. WHETHER THAT PORTION OF THE SENTENCE IMPOSING
          SORNA REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE
          VACATED BECAUSE SORNA (REVISED SUBCHAPTER H)
          VIOLATES BOTH THE PENNSYLVANIA AND FEDERAL
          CONSTITUTION IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:

             A. WHETHER SORNA (REVISED SUBCHAPTER H) DENIES
             APPELLANT DUE PROCESS UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA
             CONSTITUTUION    BECAUSE    IT   CREATES    AN
             IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT THOSE CONVICTED
____________________________________________

6 The court was referencing Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 660 Pa. 568, 594,

234 A.3d 602, 617 (2020) (stating our Supreme Court “has not yet required
that sexual offender registration statutes be challenged through the PCRA or
some other procedural mechanism”) and its progeny.

                                           -5-
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         OF ENUMERATED OFFENSES “POSE A HIGH RISK OF
         COMMITTING    ADDITIONAL   SEXUAL    OFFENSES”
         DEPRIVING   THOSE    INDIVIDUALS    OF   THEIR
         FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO REPUTATION WITHOUT
         NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD?

         B. WHETHER SORNA (REVISED SUBCHAPTER H) DENIES
         APPELLANT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER THE
         FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED
         STATES CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT UNLAWFULLY
         RESTRICTS LIBERTY AND PRIVACY WITHOUT NOTICE
         AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD?

         C. WHETHER SORNA (REVISED SUBCHAPTER H)
         VIOLATES SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS UNDER THE
         STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS, U.S. CONST.
         AMEND. XIV; PA. CONST. ART I, § 1, BECAUSE SORNA
         DEPRIVES INDIVIDUALS OF INALIENABLE RIGHTS AND
         FAILS TO SATISFY STRICT SCRUTINY?

         D. WHETHER THE RECENT AMENDMENT TO SORNA,
         REVISED SUBCHAPTER H, IS IN ALL MATERIAL RESPECTS
         IDENTICAL TO SORNA AND THEREFORE A PUNITIVE
         LAW?

         E. DOES SORNA (REVISED SUBCHAPTER H), AS A PENAL
         LAW, VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE
         BECAUSE IT USURPS THE EXCLUSIVE JUDICIAL
         FUNCTION OF IMPOSING A SENTENCE?

         F. WHETHER SORNA (REVISED SUBCHAPTER H)
         CONTRAVENES THE 5TH, 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS
         OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE
         CORRESPONDING PROTECTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
         CONSTITUTION BECAUSE AS A CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT,
         SORNA CANNOT BE IMPOSED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS,
         NOTICE   AND   OPPORTUNITY   TO   CONTEST    ITS
         IMPOSITION, AND ENSURING THAT EACH FACT
         NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE MANDATORY SENTENCE
         AND   A   SENTENCE  BEYOND    THE   AUTHORIZED
         STATUTORY MAXIMUM IS SUBMITTED TO A JURY AND
         PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT PURSUANT TO
         APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) AND

                              -6-
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            ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, 1570 U.S. 99 (2013)?

            G. WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF LIFETIME SEX
            OFFENDER REGISTRATION FOR ALL TIER III OFFENSES
            UNDER SORNA, REVISED SUBCHAPTER H IS A CRUEL
            AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE
            EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
            UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
            SECTION 13 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION?

            H. WHETHER APPELLANT’S SENTENCE OF LIFETIME
            REGISTRATION PURSUANT TO SORNA, REVISED
            SUBCHAPTER H, IS ILLEGAL AS IT IS NOT A SENTENCING
            ALTERNATIVE AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 9721 OF THE
            JUDICIAL CODE AND THE TRIAL COURT THEREFORE
            LACKED AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE SUCH A SENTENCE?

            I. WHETHER APPELLANT’S SENTENCE OF LIFETIME
            REGISTRATION PURSUANT TO SORNA IS ILLEGAL AS THE
            STATUTORY MAXIMUM FOR A CONVICTION FOR RAPE OF
            A CHILD OF 40 YEARS?

         2. WHETHER THIS MATTER SHOULD BE STAYED, OR
         REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
         STAY PROCEEDINGS, PENDING A RESOLUTION OF THE
         ISSUES RAISED IN [TORSILIERI, SUPRA]?

(Appellant’s Brief at 5-7) (capitalization in original).

      In his issues combined, Appellant argues Revised Subchapter H is

unconstitutional because it (a) creates an irrebuttable presumption of

dangerousness in violation of the right to reputation protected by the

Pennsylvania Constitution; (b) increases punishment based on facts found by

the legislature as opposed to a jury in violation of Apprendi and Alleyne; (c)

creates an illegal sentence by requiring registration for a period in excess of

the maximum term of incarceration; (d) is excessive under the U.S. and

                                       -7-
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Pennsylvania Constitutions; and (e) violates separation of powers principles.7

For these reasons, Appellant concludes this Court must vacate his registration

requirements, or stay this matter pending resolution of the issues raised in

Torsilieri. We disagree.

       To begin:

          When an appellant challenges the constitutionality of a
          statute, the appellant presents this Court with a question of
          law. See Commonwealth v. Atwell, 785 A.2d 123, 125
          (Pa.Super. 2001) (citation omitted). Our consideration of
          questions of law is plenary. See [id.] (citation omitted). A
          statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be
          declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and
          plainly violates the constitution. See Commonwealth v.
          Etheredge, 794 A.2d 391, 396 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations
          omitted). Thus, the party challenging the constitutionality
          of a statute has a heavy burden of persuasion. See [id.]
          (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Howe, 842 A.2d 436, 441 (Pa.Super. 2004).

       In Torsilieri, the Commonwealth appealed from the order entered in

the Chester County Court of Common Pleas declaring Subchapter H of SORNA

II unconstitutional as violative of several provisions of the United States and

Pennsylvania Constitutions. Specifically, the trial court found that Subchapter

H violated due process through the use of an irrebuttable presumption; that

Revised Subchapter H’s notification and registration requirements were

punitive in nature; and that Revised Subchapter H violated the requirements

____________________________________________

7We note that these were the same arguments the appellee advanced in
Torsilieri. Based on our disposition, we will not elaborate on each of
Appellant’s individual arguments.

                                           -8-
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of Apprendi and Alleyne, imposed sentences in excess of the statutory

maximum, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and violated the

separation of powers doctrines by preventing trial courts from imposing an

individualized sentence. Torsilieri, supra at 383, 232 A.3d at 582.

       Based on the evidence relied upon by the trial court,8 our Supreme Court

decided that the appellee had posed colorable constitutional challenges to

Revised Subchapter H’s registration and notification provisions based on his

asserted refutation of two legislative determinations: “(1) that all sexual

offenders pose a high risk of recidivation and (2) that the tier-based

registration system of Revised Subchapter H protects the public from the

alleged danger of recidivist sexual offenders.” Id. at 387, 232 A.3d at 584.

       In considering these claims, the Court stated it was “unable to conclude

based upon the record currently before [it] whether [the a]ppellee has

sufficiently undermined the validity of the legislative findings supporting

Revised Subchapter H’s registration and notification provisions, especially in

light of the contradictory scientific evidence cited by the Commonwealth

during this appeal which may refute [the a]ppellee’s experts.” Id. at 388,

____________________________________________

8 The appellee had introduced affidavits and supporting documents of three

experts concluding that sex offenders generally have low recidivism rates and
questioning the effectiveness of sex offender registration systems. The
Commonwealth stipulated to the content of the exhibits offered by the
appellee but not their validity or relevance.

                                           -9-
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232 A.3d at 585.9 The Court went on to state that “[i]t is not the role of an

appellate court to determine the validity of the referenced studies based on

mere citations rather than allowing the opportunity for the truths to develop

through a hearing on the merits of the evidence. Accordingly, a remand is

appropriate to allow the parties to address whether a consensus has

developed to call into question the relevant legislative policy decisions

impacting offenders’ constitutional rights.”       Id. at 388, 232 A.3d at 585

(internal footnote omitted).

       In framing the remand, the Court then discussed the extent to which

each of the trial court’s conclusions of unconstitutionality rested on its

crediting of the appellee’s scientific evidence. The Court noted that the trial

court’s analysis of each of the three prongs of the irrebuttable presumption

doctrine relied heavily upon the scientific evidence presented by the appellee.

Id. at 392, 232 A.3d at 587. Thus, the Court concluded that remand was

necessary “to allow the parties to present additional argument and evidence

to address whether a scientific consensus has developed to overturn the

legislative determinations in regard to adult sexual offenders’ recidivation

rates and the effectiveness of a tier-based registration and notification system

as they relate to the prongs of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine.” Id. at

____________________________________________

9 Specifically, the Commonwealth emphasized on appeal a conflict among
social scientists regarding the recidivism rates of sexual offenders and
introduced a then-recent study refuting the appellee’s experts’ conclusions.
See id. at 384-85, 232 A.3d at 583.

                                          - 10 -
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392, 232 A.3d at 587-88.

       Regarding challenges based upon the trial court’s conclusion that

Revised Subchapter H’s registration and notification provisions are punitive,

the Court again “evaluate[d] the degree to which the trial court’s conclusions

[were] based upon the scientific evidence presented by [the a]ppellee.” Id.

at 393, 232 A.3d at 588.           The Court discussed the Mendoza-Martinez

factors10 relevant to whether the effect of a statute is punitive (factors 3 and

5 were not relevant to the analysis), and noted that even where the trial

court’s analysis of the relevant factors did not “overtly rely on [the a]ppellee’s

scientific evidence[,]…in balancing all of the factors, the court may have

weighed [factor 1] more heavily as punitive because of the court’s acceptance

of [the a]ppellee’s expert evidence.” Id. at 396, 232 A.3d at 590. Thus, the

Court said it was “appropriate for the trial court to reevaluate factor 1 after a

full hearing on the scientific evidence.” Id. See also id. at 397-98, 232 A.3d

at 591 (recognizing that similar to factor 1, the trial court’s analysis of factor

____________________________________________

10 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554,
567-68, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963) (delineating seven-factor test as framework for
determining whether statute is so punitive as to negate legislature’s intention
to identify scheme as civil or regulatory: “[w]hether the sanction involves an
affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as
a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already
a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry…”) (internal
footnotes omitted).

                                          - 11 -
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2 did not specifically draw upon the scientific evidence presented by appellee;

nevertheless, “we conclude that consideration of the scientific evidence

presented on remand may alter the trial court’s weighing of this factor”); id.

at 399, 232 A.3d at 592 (regarding factor 4, concluding “that the court’s

analysis of this factor also favors remanding for further consideration in light

of any additional scientific evidence”); id. at 401, 232 A.3d at 593 (noting that

“it cannot be disputed that the trial court’s evaluation of the [a]ppellee’s

experts’ evidence affected its view of the case. Indeed, it expressly references

its evaluation of [factor 6] in its consideration of Factor 7.     Thus, the trial

court’s analysis of this factor also counsels in favor of a remand to develop

the record”); id. at 402, 232 A.3d at 593 (acknowledging that trial court’s

evaluation of factor 7 was also tied to strength of appellee’s scientific evidence,

which may require reevaluation following presentation of any additional

scientific evidence on remand).      Thus, the Court concluded that the trial

court’s “labeling of Revised Subchapter H as punitive was impacted by its

assessment of [the a]ppellee’s expert evidence such that reevaluation of the

balancing of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors is appropriate following

presentation of additional scientific evidence on remand.”       Id. at 403, 232

A.3d at 594.

      As “[t]he trial court’s conclusion that Revised Subchapter H is punitive

inevitably resulted in the court’s determination that the registration

requirements were part of [the a]ppellee’s criminal sentence, and thus,

                                      - 12 -
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subject to the various constitutional and statutory protections[,]” the Court

held that the trial court’s other holdings that Revised Subchapter H violated

Apprendi/Alleyne, constituted an illegal sentence, violated constitutional

provisions related to cruel and unusual punishment, and violated the

separation    of   powers     doctrines,       all   which   flowed   from   the   court’s

determination that Revised Subchapter H is punitive, similarly must be

reevaluated following remand.11 Id.

       Our review of the Court’s analysis in Torsilieri makes clear the

importance of the scientific evidence as it pertained to each of the

constitutional issues raised by the appellee. In fact, the Court emphasized in

its conclusion “that all cases are evaluated on the record created in the

individual case.” Id. at 405, 232 A.3d at 595-96. Thus, the Court declined

to address any of the constitutional issues raised by the appellee, in the

absence of a full evidentiary hearing to resolve those claims.

       Since Torsilieri, this Court has remanded for a full evidentiary hearing

to resolve similar constitutional claims, where the parties did not have an

opportunity for a hearing before the trial court. See, e.g., Commonwealth

v. Mickley, 240 A.3d 957 (Pa.Super. 2020) (vacating order denying motion

____________________________________________

11 Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing.
                                                               On August
23, 2022, the trial court again concluded that Revised Subchapter H was
unconstitutional. The Commonwealth timely appealed to the Supreme Court,
where the case is now pending. The Supreme Court held argument on May
23, 2023, and a decision has yet to be filed. See 97 MAP 2022.

                                           - 13 -
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to bar registration requirements and remanding for evidentiary hearing where

court did not permit defense counsel to offer evidence at hearing, despite

defense counsel’s attempt to do so); Commonwealth v. Snyder, No. 2060

EDA 2019 (Pa.Super. filed Jan 19, 2023) (unpublished memorandum)12

(addressing, upon remand from Supreme Court, claims identical to those

addressed in Torsilieri; because appellant had not offered any specific

scientific evidence or learned testimony in support of his position, this Court

remanded to trial court for evidentiary hearing and opportunity for appellant

to supplement his arguments with scientific evidence); Commonwealth v.

Chittester, Nos. 256 WDA 2020 and 257 WDA 2020 (Pa.Super. filed Jan 4,

2023) (unpublished memorandum) (remanding for appellant to have

opportunity to file post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc asserting his

constitutional challenges to Revised Subchapter H, after which trial court shall

hold hearing to provide both parties opportunity to develop arguments and

present evidence so that court may then weigh evidence in determining

whether appellant has refuted relevant legislative findings supporting

challenged registration and notification provisions of Revised Subchapter H);

Commonwealth v. Escabal, No. 1928 EDA 2021 (Pa.Super. filed Oct. 11,

2022) (unpublished memorandum) (rejecting appellant’s claims to extent he

maintains we may invalidate Revised Subchapter H as matter of law and

____________________________________________

12 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of this

Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value).

                                          - 14 -
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without further factual development before trial court; vacating and

remanding for further proceedings at which parties can present evidence for

and against relevant legislative determinations and challenges at issue).

      Instantly, we initially observe that the procedural history in this case is

distinguishable from cases like Mickley, supra, Snyder, supra, Chittester,

supra, and Escabal, supra, where there was no evidentiary hearing in the

trial court regarding the respective defendant’s constitutional claims.      The

procedural history in this case is also distinguishable than that of Torsilieri,

where the Commonwealth stipulated to the content of the appellee’s proffered

exhibits.   Here, however, the court held a hearing on Appellant’s post-

sentence motion and gave Appellant an opportunity to present evidence in

support of his constitutional claims.         The Commonwealth objected to

admission of Appellant’s proffered evidence on the grounds of hearsay and

lack of authentication. The court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection.

Significantly, Appellant makes no argument on appeal concerning the

propriety of the court’s evidentiary ruling. See Commonwealth v. Kane, 10

A.3d 327, 331 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 689, 29 A.3d 796

(2011) (explaining that this Court will not act as counsel and will not develop

arguments on behalf of appellant).      Instead, Appellant asks this Court to

declare Revised Subchapter H unconstitutional based on the same arguments

advanced in Torsilieri as well as Appellant’s proffered evidence that was

marked but not admitted at the hearing due to the court’s ruling sustaining

                                     - 15 -
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the Commonwealth’s objection.

      Although the Commonwealth made clear that it did not oppose an

evidentiary hearing or an opportunity for Appellant to present expert

witnesses, Appellant made a strategic decision to forego offering live

testimony in the hope that the trial court or this Court would stay any decision

on the merits pending the outcome of the remand hearing in Torsilieri.

Nevertheless, in the absence of any meritorious argument that the court

abused its discretion in sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to the

proffered evidence, we are left with a record that contains no evidence from

which we can evaluate the veracity of Appellant’s constitutional claims. (See

Trial Court Opinion, filed 4/18/22, at 7-8) (stating: “This [c]ourt recognizes

that the costs of presenting the authors of the affidavits might be cost

prohibitive, but other than remanding and putting this case on the proverbial

shelf indefinitely, or creating a new exception to the hearsay rule, no

alternative exists”).

      In other words, due to the trial court’s ruling sustaining the

Commonwealth’s objection to Appellant’s proffered evidence, Appellant

essentially presented no evidence to overcome the presumption of Revised

Subchapter H’s constitutionality. See Howe, supra. See also (Trial Court

Opinion at 8) (stating that in absence of evidence, Appellant has failed to meet

“high burden” required); Commonwealth v. Manzano, 237 A.3d 1175

(Pa.Super. 2020) (holding appellant failed to satisfy his burden to prove that

                                     - 16 -
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Revised Subchapter H provisions applicable to him “clearly, palpably, and

plainly” violated constitution where appellant produced no scientific evidence

whatsoever to support his claims that underlying legislative policy infringes on

appellant’s rights; rather, appellant simply relied on trial court’s initial decision

in Torsilieri declaring statute as unconstitutional in attempt to persuade trial

court   in   his    case   to    reach   same      conclusion);   Commonwealth    v.

Outterbridge, No. 1175 MDA 2021 (Pa.Super. filed July 27, 2022)

(unpublished memorandum) (explaining that appellant raised his Subchapter

H    claims        implicating     irrebuttable      presumption     argument    and

Apprendi/Alleyne argument before trial court but he failed to present any

evidence of scientific studies to support his claim; likewise, appellant

presented no evidence to this Court on appeal; instead, appellant asks us to

resolve his Subchapter H claim as matter of law; however, without any

scientific studies, appellant cannot make colorable argument that General

Assembly’s factual presumptions have been undermined by recent scientific

studies; therefore, appellant has failed to satisfy his burden to prove that

Revised Subchapter H provisions applicable to him, clearly, palpably, and

plainly violate constitution; concluding appellant is not entitled to relief and

affirming).13 Accordingly, we affirm.

____________________________________________

13 We observe that Appellant will not be required to comply with the
registration requirements until he is released from prison, which will not be
until approximately 2030. Should the Supreme Court declare Subchapter H
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 17 -
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       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 10/31/2023

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unconstitutional in the future, Appellant may seek relief at that time under
Lacombe. See Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 A.3d 810 (Pa.Super. 2023)
(rejecting appellant’s request to stay his Revised Subchapter H registration
requirements based on same constitutionality arguments presented in
Torsilieri; explaining that Revised Subchapter H has not been declared
unconstitutional by Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and legislative
enhancements are presumed to be constitutional; noting that appellant will
not be required to comply with registration requirements until he is released
from prison, which will not be for at least 25 years; explaining that appellant
may seek relief under Lacombe if Supreme Court declares Subchapter H
unconstitutional in future).

We recognize that Lacombe dealt with registration requirements under
Subchapter I, whereas Appellant’s reporting requirements arise under Revised
Subchapter H. Nevertheless, this Court has applied this aspect of the
Lacombe decision (relative to the avenue by which challenges to registration
requirements can be raised) in cases involving Revised Subchapter H
offenders. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ward, No. 1580 EDA 2020
(Pa.Super. filed Aug. 9, 2021) (unpublished memorandum) (holding that
lower court had jurisdiction to review appellant’s Revised Subchapter H
SORNA challenges outside framework of PCRA under Lacombe).

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