Court Opinion

ID: 9664772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:29:13.133658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:09.934491
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
Respondents filed a motion for rehearing in this case wherein a number of points were presented which we shall consider briefly.
 In the first point, it is said that the court predicated the construction of Sec. 274.300, V.A.M.S., upon the erroneous theory that its enactment was preceded by Sec. 390.0301 of the Public Service Commission Act. It is stated that Sec. 390.030 was enacted in 1931 and Sec. 274.-300 in 1923. Respondents did not mention this particular point in their brief even though it was claimed in the brief of Amici Curiae, filed 10 days before the brief of Dairyland Transportation Corporation, that Sec. 274.300 must be considered in conjunction with Sec. 390.030. There is no merit in respondents’ contention. Statutes relating to the same subject matter must be considered together. This rule applies even though the statutes are found in different chapters and were enacted at *13different times. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 366, pp. 801-813, and cases there cited. See also Donnelly Garment Co. v. Keitel, 354 Mo. 1138, 193 S.W.2d 577, loc. cit. 581 ,(3, 4).
In the second point of the motion, respondents say that “The whole opinion is dicta because it is based upon assumptions of fact not appearing in the record.” They say that there is nothing in the record indicating that Sanitary Milk Producers was organized under Chapter 274, V.A.M.S., as a co-operative association or that it was organized in another state as a co-operative. This is another point made for the first time in the motion for rehearing. All parties throughout this case assumed that Sanitary was a co-operative. The Court of Appeals stated in its opinion (307 S.W.2d 361, loc. cit. 364) that Sanitary was a co-operative. It may also be found in the record. Note the evidence of Russell E. Spaulding:
“Q. State, your name, please. A. Russell E. Spaulding.
“Q. Where do you live? A. Belle-ville, Illinois.
“Q. And what is your occupation? A. I am general manager of Sanitary Milk Producers.
“Q. How long have you been engaged in that business? A. Seven years with Sanitary Milk Producers, and 25 years actively engaged in the same type of business.
“Q. Mr. Spaulding, if you will, describe and tell the Commission something about the nature of the business of Sanitary Dairies. A. Sanitary Milk Producers is a co-operative association composed of 5000 dairy farmers who reside in approximately 25 counties in Illinois and some 68 counties in Missouri, the greater number and the greater volume of milk, of course, coming from Missouri. Sanitary was organized 25 years ago to serve the needs of the dairy farmers and has been doing the job substantially since that time. * * * ”
It is obvious that Sanitary Milk Producers is a co-operative association and therefore there is no merit in this point.
In the third point, respondents say that Sanitary does not obtain all of its milk from its farmer members but some milk'is purchased and obtained from other sources; that, therefore, the exemption should not apply. We shall answer this point by quoting from protestant Dairyland Transportation Corporation’s brief where it is stated, “The shipper, Sanitary Producers, for the purpose of this case, ships in intrastate commerce fluid milk in bulk and at wholesale from Mountain Grove and Lebanon, Missouri, to processors in St. Louis, Missouri. There the milk is pasteurized, bottled and sold at retail. This milk is originally obtained from farm producers around Mountain Grove and Lebanon, Missouri. At Lebanon, for example, Sanitary tests the milk of the individual producers, pours it into common containers or vats, refrigerates it, and then ships this commingled milk of all the producers in Smith-co’s special over-the-road trailer tanks of 5,000 or more gallons capacity.” It is apparent from this statement and the rule of the Public Service Commission that even though all of the milk of Sanitary was obtained directly from producers and shipped to the St. Louis market by Sanitary, it could not be hauled except by a carrier having a permit of convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission. We held the rule of the Public Service Commission to be erroneous and for that reason deemed it to the interest of all parties concerned that the case be remanded to the Commission so the Commission could consider the matter in conformity with our opinion as to the meaning of Secs. 390.030 and 274.300.
Points four and five of the motion for rehearing may be considered together. In some respects these points are duplications of those we have considered and in other respects they are rearguments of *14points decided in the original opinion. There is one point we desire to answer. It is said that the statute 274.300 provides that the exemptions applying to agricultural products shall also apply to' such products “in the possession or under the control of the association.” It is claimed that when Sanitary delivers the milk to the carrier Smithco, the milk is no longer under the control of Sanitary. Here again, we shall quote from Dairyland’s brief where it is said, “Applicant’s single shipper is Sanitary. Despite this, applicant seeks common carrier authority. Moreover, its single shipper would not be satisfied with ordinary common carrier service. Sanitary insists that applicant’s vehicles be kept on its premises for its ‘sole and exclusive use, and you use them when you want them.’ Shipper insists on having ‘first call’ over any other shipper. He does not consider this ‘preferential treatment.’ ” The record fully justifies that statement. Sanitary had full control over the hauling of the milk. Smithco was employed for that purpose. Of course, Smithco was not a common carrier. Smithco may have been a contract carrier for Sanitary. If so, does Sec. 390.061, Cum.Supp. RSMo 1957 Annotations, apply? We need not rule the question since it has not been mentioned all through this case. However, note the first paragraph which reads:
‘‘Except as otherwise provided in section 390.030, no person shall engage in the business of a contract carrier in intrastate commerce on any public highway in this state unless there is in force with respect to such carrier a permit issued by the commission, authorizing such operations.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 390.061 indicates that the legislative policy is, and has been, to exempt from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission the transportation of farm products from farm to market.
We have given the motion for rehearing full consideration and have found it without merit. It is hereby overruled.

. Now V.A.M.S. § 390.031.