Court Opinion

ID: 9663002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:25:41.499765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:44.764446
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
The dissent of March 6, 1996 is withdrawn and the following substituted. I respectfully dissent. The majority holds certain facts gave rise to reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot. Even taking those facts as true, within the “totality of the circumstances” and viewing them in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, see State v. Carter, 915 S.W.2d 501 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), they are not, as a matter of law, specific articulable facts which created a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
Where events are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, detention based upon those events is unlawful. Johnson v. State, 658 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). The suspicious conduct relied upon by the officers must be sufficiently distinguishable from that of innocent people under the same circumstance to clearly, if not conclusively, set the suspect apart from them. Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
There is a tenuous balance between winning the war on drugs and preserving Fourth Amendment protections. We must not achieve the former by destroying the latter. We are a mobile society, heavily reliant upon the automobile and the highway system. While those automobiles and highways are often used to transport drugs, far more innocent activity occurs.
While recognizing the “totality of the circumstances” criteria, it is necessary to analyze each of the facts relied upon by the majority.
“1. Appellant was travelling late at night;” — “Late at night” is an extremely subjective characterization, especially in this era of all night television and 24 hour business establishments. The officers first noticed Davis at approximately 1:00 a.m. Late, early or neither?1 Courts have held being on the roadway late at night or early in the morning is not indicative of criminal activity. See Benton v. State, 576 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); Scott v. State, 549 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.Crim.App.1976).
“2. He did not own the vehicle; it was borrowed;” — Actually Officer Bivins testified it was his experience that a businessman usually rents a vehicle, if he does not own one, rather than borrow one. Consequently his focus was borrowed versus rented, rather than borrowed versus owned. In either event, the status of the vehicle is not probative. So long as the vehicle was not stolen, and the officers confirmed it was not, whether Davis owned it, rented it or borrowed it is of no consequence vis a vis criminal activity.
“3. As soon as officers stopped him, he immediately got out of his car and came back to the patrol car. During most of the stop, appellant stood well away from his car as well as the patrol car and the videocam-era which was running throughout the stop. The officers interpreted his conduct to mean that he was distancing himself from his car, as if to keep the officers away from it;”— Officer Bivins testified Davis exited his vehicle and “met me at my door as I was getting out of the patrol unit.” Bivins asked Davis if he had been drinking. Davis stated he had not, but was tired. Bivins then, “for officer’s safety reasons”, left Davis at the patrol car and went to Davis’ vehicle to talk with the passenger. He stated he “just really talked with her basically to take a safe look to make sure there wasn’t anything in the car.” Bivins did not expand on his reasoning other than to reiterate his conclusion that Davis did not want the officers “to be up near his *791car”. The facts of the evening belie Bivins’ conclusion. Davis’ action actually drew Bivins to the vehicle rather than away from it. Davis’ actions have many innocent interpretations. He may have wanted to show the officers he posed no threat to their safety. He may have wanted to demonstrate he was not intoxicated, by allowing them to view his walk, his eyes, his speech, etc. He may have been wanting to “make points” by coming to the authority figures rather than forcing them to come to him.
4 Appellant was ‘really nervous’;”— Nervousness, when suddenly confronted by a police officer who asks questions, is as indicative of innocence as of guilt. Many people react nervously to being approached by police. Daniels v. State, 718 S.W.2d 702, 707 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885, 107 S.Ct. 277, 93 L.Ed.2d 252 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). It is not indicative of guilt for a person to be nervous. Montano v. State, 843 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
“5. He was dressed poorly; his attire was not typical of the businessman that he claimed to be;” — The videotape shows Davis is wearing jeans, tennis shoes and a Dallas Cowboys T-shirt. Apparently Bivins believes businessmen who invest in real estate should maintain a certain standard in travel clothing. Perhaps he wanted Davis to drive from Houston to New York in a suit and tie. One case which noted a defendant’s dress was Baker v. State, 478 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tex.Crim.App.1972)2. The court noted the fact that Baker was barefooted, had long hair, and was shabbily dressed did not furnish the state with a valid “stop and frisk” situation. Nor should Davis’ dress or lack of it be a factor creating reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in this case.
“6. His story was inconsistent with that of his passenger. ’’ — When Bivins initially approached the passenger, he questioned her. She told him her name, she was from New York, they were coming to Houston and she was merely riding with Davis. Bivins went back to Davis and asked him basically the same questions. Davis said he was from New York and had been to Houston to look at some apartment buildings for possible investment. On direct examination, Bivins testified Davis said he had hired the passenger to help assess the property. However, on cross-examination, Bivins admitted Davis never said the passenger was “hired”, but that she was just along for the trip. If this is the inconsistent statements the majority uses, I fail to find any inconsistency.3 Assuming there is some inconsistency, it certainly is insignificant. It points out the purported dilemma; if two people tell the same exact story, it is suspicious because the stories are “too pat”; if two people tell slightly different stories, it is suspicious because there are “inconsistencies”. But in fact, there is no dilemma because neither scenario is necessarily suspicious.
Although the majority does not rely upon the out-of-state vehicle as a factor, Officer Bivins did. In Faulkner v. State, 549 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) the court noted that “out-of-county tags” were not evidence of wrongdoing and did not justify a temporary detention. In a concurring opinion on state’s motion for rehearing, Judge Phillips stated: “If classified according to a numerical scale of probative evidence of suspicious conduct or circumstances, the fact that an automobile operated on a public street bears an out of county license plate would rate a zero.” Id. at 4.
These facts, separately or collectively, fail to create a reasonable suspicion that, specifically, marijuana was in the vehicle or, generally, any criminal activity was occurring. The facts provide the basis for Officer Bivins’ “hunch” that something was in the vehicle. A telling point in the hearing was when Bivins recounted his comments to the drug dog handler. When asked the question: “Then you made this statement: ‘All we can do is go around it; if we’re lucky we’ll hit and we’ll go in and look.’ ”; Bivins replied “That’s correct”. The Fourth Amendment, in my *792view, protects late-night, out-of-state travelers from being subjected to detentions that provide officers the opportunity to “get lucky”.
Once Officer Bivins had determined Davis was not intoxicated nor had he committed any other violations, the detention of him and his vehicle was improper. The motion to suppress should have been granted. Consequently, I would reverse and remand.

. "I say tomato (toe-may-toe); You say tomato (toe-mah-toe).” Ira Gershwin, Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off, from Shall We Dance, (RKO 1937).

. This case held the Texas vagrancy statute unconstitutional.

. The audio portion of the video tape captured the passenger telling Officer Weatherford a story consistent with Davis’ account.