Court Opinion

ID: 9831015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:42:31.152699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:29.422153
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant, in his motion for a new trial, insists that appellant had the right and it was his duty to pay the commission to Schus-ter, “the agent who caused” the first acceptable offer to be made to him; that it was error not to sustain appellant’s motions for judgment at the close of the evidence, and, after the verdict was rendered, and bases his contention on his statement that in this ease the evidence does not show an exclusive listing of the property with appellee, but does show a listing with other agents; and that the evidence shows that Sehwabe acted impartially as between agents.
In view of the evidence, it certainly would have been error to have granted appellant’s motion for judgment, or to have rendered judgment for Sehwabe thereafter in view of the jury’s finding that Schuster was not the procuring cause of the sale of the property to Armijo, to whom Sehwabe made the deed.
We said in the opinion: “Had Schuster made the sale to either Armijo or Jabalie, a materially different condition in the facts would arise, and appellant’s proposition would have some foundation in the facts and in the law, as announced in Edwards v. Pike, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 30, 107 S. W. 586, referred to by appellant.” We think appellant has either overlooked that statement in the opinion, or has failed to appreciate its significance. If Schuster was not instrumental in effecting the sale to either Armijo or Jabalie, it would be wholly immaterial that the property was listed with him, or any other agent, or that Sehwabe acted impartially between the agents. If Schuster did not sell the property and no agent other than Kemp & Cold-well did, appellant’s first two propositions become abstract, having no facts upon which to base his propositions. It is not contended that Sehwabe made the sale himself, or that a commission was not due to the agent who made the sale. The court having submitted the case on special issues, and the jury having found that Kemp & Coldwell was the procuring cause of the sale to Armijo for the use and benefit of Jabalie, the court was then without authority to render judgment for Sehwabe; the limit of the court’s power under such circumstances being to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. Heimer v. Yates (Tex. Com. App.) 210 S. W. 680. Again, if Jabalie was the real purchaser, and Armijo was not, but was only representing Jabalie in the purchase, and acting only at the suggestion and direction of Jabalie in buying, which the evidence shows and the jury found, Schuster not claiming to have sold to Jabalie, was in no wise instrumental in effecting the sale, and not entitled to a commission. Jaba-lie, in buying, had the right to take the title in whomsoever he pleased, and, in taking the title in Armijo, did not have the effect to defeat appellees of the commission.
We need not discuss other parts of the motion.
The motion is overruled.