Court Opinion

ID: 9792445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:29:31.096454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.888107
License: Public Domain

VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
dissenting.
This is an action for damages. Plaintiff alleged a breach of contract and of a covenant against encumbrances against sellers and fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation against realtors. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Seeborg v. General Motors Corporation, 284 Or 695, 699, 588 P2d 1100 (1978), I would hold that there are genuine issues of material fact that should have been submitted to the trier of fact.
The record presents genuine issues of material fact. First, did sellers contract to convey four separate, buildable lots? Second, did the realtors act as agents for both plaintiff and sellers? It is undisputed that (1) realtors’ employe Brandvold gave plaintiff a document from a title company that showed Lot 11, a 10-acre tract, was divided into four separate tax lots, (2) plaintiff thereafter made a drawing that showed Lot 11 in four separate lots, (3) Brandvold subsequently made a similar drawing that was contained in the earnest money agreement, (4) the earnest money agreement gave the acreage for each “lot,” and it allocated a portion of the total purchase price to each “lot,” and (5) the contract of sale provided that Lot 11 consisted of four separate parcels of land, each of which was individually described by metes and bounds. On the basis of this uncontradicted evidence, I find incomprehensible the majority’s conclusion that there is “no evidence” that sellers promised to sell plaintiff four separate, buildable lots.
The majority holds that the contract is not ambiguous. I strongly disagree. Certainly the assertion by the majority that there is “no evidence that the parties used or understood the term ‘parcel’ in a technical or otherwise *824peculiar sense” is not supported by the record. On the contrary, the record would support a finding that plaintiff believed he was purchasing four separate, buildable lots.
The majority states:
“The reference to parcels with or without metes and bounds descriptions is not a promise, and does not imply a promise, that each or any of the parcels described is ‘legally partitioned’ or ‘could be independently developed for any lawful use, including the construction of private residences.’ ” 62 Or App at 814.
The majority cites no authority for this proposition, one that in my view is dubious. Whether the parties’ reference to “parcels” was an implicit promise to convey four separate, buildable lots is certainly an issue of material fact.
The majority finds it significant that plaintiff did not advise defendants of his intention to develop the property. In the context of a summary judgment that is irrelevant. The issue is whether the parties contracted to buy and to sell four separate, buildable lots. Plaintiffs deposition testimony clearly demonstrates that “within the perimeters of the deal that was negotiated,” he thought that Lot 11 was already divided into four legally separate parcels, see 62 Or App 820, n 3.
I also disagree with the majority that there is no evidence that realtors represented that Lot 11 consisted of four separate, buildable lots or that the two mobile homes on Lot 11 were there legally. On this record, the trier of fact could find that realtors failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. Realtors were representing plaintiff as well as sellers. There is an issue of material fact about the duty of realtors under the circumstances affirmatively to inform plaintiff about the true character of the land and the status of the trailers when it was, or at least should have been, obvious to a broker that plaintiff thought he was buying four separate, buildable lots and that the trailers were legally on the land.
I dissent.