Court Opinion

ID: 9913144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 22:01:45.072665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:29.909592
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/26/23 Nazari v. Walter Kidde Portable Equipment CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

 ARTHUR NAZARI, Individually                                    B324236
 and as Trustee, etc. et al.,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. 19STCV32605)
           Cross-complainants and
           Appellants,

           v.

 WALTER KIDDE PORTABLE
 EQUIPMENT, INC.,

           Cross-defendant and
           Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jill T. Feeney, Judge. Affirmed.
     Grant, Genovese & Baratta, Lance D. Orloff, and Destini C.
Blunt, for Cross-complainants and Appellants.
     McGuireWoods, Nicholas J. Hoffman, and S. Virginia
Bondurant Price, for Cross-defendant and Respondent.
       Haik Minassi (Minassi or decedent) suffered fatal injuries
from a fire that started in his apartment while he was sleeping.
The smoke alarm inside his unit did not sound. His successors-
in-interest filed a lawsuit against the decedent’s landlords, cross-
complainants and appellants Arthur Nazari (Nazari) and
Caroline Mosessian (Mosessian), individually and as trustees of
the Nazari-Mosessian Revocable Trust, for damages relating to
his death.
       Nazari and Mosessian filed a cross-complaint against the
smoke alarm’s manufacturer, cross-defendant and respondent
Walter Kidde Portable Equipment, Inc. (Kidde), alleging the
alarm was defective. Kidde moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Nazari and Mosessian could not establish causation
as to any of their cross-claims because the undisputed facts
established that someone intentionally disabled the alarm after it
left Kidde’s control. The trial court granted the motion and
entered judgment, from which Nazari and Mosessian appeal. We
affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    The Fire and Appellants’ Cross-Complaint
      Nazari and Mosessian own and manage an apartment
complex in Glendale, California. In July 2018, they leased an
apartment to Minassi. Before Minassi moved into the unit,
Nazari’s and Mosessian’s maintenance worker purchased a Kidde
model i9010 smoke alarm from Home Depot and installed it in
Minassi’s unit. The maintenance worker tested the alarm and
confirmed it was functioning properly.
      Nazari described Minassi as a heavy smoker. The
maintenance worker corroborated this, stating Minassi was

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smoking every time he saw him. During one of their interactions,
Minassi complained to the maintenance worker that the alarm
was making a lot of noise and asked him to uninstall it. The
maintenance worker told him he could not do so.
       On May 31, 2019, Minassi was asleep in his apartment
when a fire broke out inside his unit. None of Minassi’s
neighbors heard a smoke alarm at any time. His neighbors
noticed smoke coming out of his air conditioning unit and called
911. First responders entered the apartment and found him
unconscious on the floor. Minassi was transported to the
hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries more than a month
later.
       Minassi’s successors-in-interest filed a lawsuit against
Nazari and Mosessian. They alleged that the smoke alarm in the
unit did not activate and alert Minassi to the fire because it was
improperly and negligently installed.
       Nazari and Mosessian subsequently asserted cross-claims
against Kidde for indemnification, apportionment of fault,
declaratory relief, general negligence, and products liability as
the manufacturer of the alarm. They claimed the alarm was
defective when it left Kidde’s control.

B.    Kidde’s i9010 Smoke Alarm
      Kidde manufactured the i9010 smoke alarm in May 2016.
Unlike smoke alarms powered by 9-volt or AA batteries, the
alarm has a sealed-lithium battery with a lifespan of many years.
The lithium battery is internal and cannot be accessed by the
user or removed. To install the alarm, its mounting plate is
screwed to a wall or ceiling, and the alarm is then twisted onto
the mounting plate. This activates a switch on the alarm’s circuit

                                3
board that turns the alarm on and powers the battery. The
lithium battery is intended to last for 10 years under normal
operating conditions.
       On the back of the alarm, there is a label that provides
information and warnings. It explains how to permanently
disable the alarm. A screwdriver is inserted into a specific area
on the back of the alarm, marked with a cross-hatched square.
The inserted screwdriver is then used to push a switch to the left,
discharging the battery and rendering the alarm disabled.
Specifically, the label states, “To deactivate: Break out the
cross[-]hatched area above and, with a screwdriver or similar
tool, slide the exposed piece towards the center of the alarm.
This will deactivate the alarm and discharge the battery.”
Immediately below the cross-hatched square, the following words
of caution appear: “!!WARNING!! [¶] DO NOT DEACTIVATE
THE ALARM UNTIL THE END OF ALARM LIFE SIGNAL IS
HEARD. THE END OF ALARM LIFE SIGNAL IS AN
INTERMITTANT [SIC] CHIRP (EVERY 45 SECONDS). ONCE
THE ALARM IS DEACTIVATED, IT WILL NO LONGER
FUNCTION, CANNOT BE REACTIVATED, AND MUST BE
REPLACED.” The label adds that once the battery is discharged,
“[t]he alarm will then be safe for disposal.”

C.     Laboratory Examination of the Smoke Alarm
       In September 2021, the parties conducted a laboratory
examination of the remnants of the smoke alarm from the
decedent’s apartment. Kidde’s expert, Stephen Olenick,
determined that at the approximate location of the cross-hatched
area, the label was torn and “folded accordion-style[,] indicating
that [the switch at the rear of the alarm] ha[d] been pushed to

                                 4
the left and disabled.” In the cross-hatched access area, there
was tearing indicative of an initial stab mark that likely lifted
the label out of the way so that the switch could be pushed.
Additionally, Olenick found that the heat from the fire did not
breach the smoke alarm’s battery, which could have drained it if
it did. Olenick concluded, based on the inspection, that the alarm
was permanently disabled before the fire and after it was
installed in the decedent’s unit. Nazari and Mosessian do not
dispute the conclusion that the alarm was disabled prior to the
fire. They insist the decedent was the person that disabled the
alarm.

D.     Kidde’s Motion for Summary Judgment
       Kidde moved for summary judgment as to Nazari’s and
Mosessian’s cross-complaint, arguing the undisputed facts
established that someone intentionally disabled the smoke alarm
after it left Kidde’s control. Kidde contended that as a result,
Nazari and Mosessian could not establish causation for any of
their cross-claims.
       In opposition, Nazari and Mosessian argued there was a
triable issue of fact as to whether the risks of the design of the
alarm outweighed its benefits. Nazari and Mosessian further
argued there was a triable issue as to whether the alarm
contained an adequate warning because the labeling could lead a
user to mistakenly discharge the battery. They submitted a
declaration from their expert, Phil Van Herle, P.E., in support of
their opposition.
       In reply, Kidde asserted that Van Herle’s declaration was
based on speculation and conjecture, and thus, was insufficient to
raise a triable issue of fact. Further, Kidde contended that the

                                5
undisputed act of a third party intentionally disabling the alarm
severed any link between Kidde and Minassi’s death.
      The trial court granted Kidde’s motion.1 The court
concluded Kidde met its burden of showing that Nazari and
Mosessian could not establish causation for any of their cross-
claims because the evidence demonstrated the smoke alarm was
not defective, and the causal link between Kidde and decedent’s
injuries was broken by an independent intervening force. The
court then found Nazari and Mosessian failed to raise a triable
issue of fact. Although they argued that a user could mistakenly
discharge the battery, the court explained, “Van Herle engage[d]
in rank speculation with respect to [d]ecedent’s actions,” as there
was no evidence the decedent was confused by the alarm’s layout
or warnings. Nazari and Mosessian timely appealed.

                            DISCUSSION
A.     Standard of Review
       “Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘where no triable
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’” (Regents of the University of
California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.) A cross-
defendant moving for summary judgment must show that one or
more elements of the cross-complainant’s cause of action cannot
be established or that there is a complete defense. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the cross-defendant meets this
burden, the burden shifts to the cross-complainant to present
evidence creating a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.) “There
is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence

1     No reporter’s transcript of the hearing is part of the record on
appeal.

                                   6
would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact
in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the
applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, fn. omitted.)
       “We review the trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment
motion de novo, liberally construe the evidence in favor of the
party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of the opponent.” (Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness
USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631, 637.) “We must affirm a
summary judgment if it is correct on any of the grounds asserted
in the trial court, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.”
(Ibid.)

B.    Kidde Met its Initial Summary Judgment Burden
      Nazari and Mosessian contend the trial court erred in
finding Kidde met the moving burden of proof on summary
judgment. We disagree.
      In moving for summary judgment, Kidde needed to show
that Nazari and Mosessian could not establish one or more
elements of their causes of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) Each cross-claim asserted by
Nazari and Mosessian requires a showing that Kidde’s alleged
wrongful conduct was the proximate cause of the claimed
damages.2

2      Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 680,
687 [“The elements of any negligence cause of action are duty, breach
of duty, proximate cause, and damages”]; Demara v. The Raymond
Corp. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 545, 553 [a plaintiff in a products liability
case may seek recovery on theories of both strict liability and
negligence; under each theory, “the plaintiff must prove that the

                                    7
       Kidde argued Nazari and Mosessian could not prove that
Kidde caused any of the damages alleged in the cross-complaint.
The evidence showed that the smoke alarm possessed a built-in
mechanism to disable the internal battery once the alarm needed
to be replaced. The alarm was not in a disabled condition when it
left Kidde’s control. The built-in mechanism was used to disable
the alarm before the fire.
       Nazari and Mosessian acknowledge the trial court
determined “the decedent’s act of disabling the fire alarm was an
intervening factor that broke the causal chain.” Nazari and
Mosessian do not in their opening brief challenge the trial court’s
finding negating the causation element of their cross-claims.3
Causation is a separate element that must be proven under
either a design defect or failure to warn theory, which are the
theories Nazari and Mosessian advance on appeal. (Demara v.
The Raymond Corp., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 558 [“a plaintiff
proceeding under the consumer expectation test must present a

design was a substantial factor in causing an injury”]; Major Clients
Agency v. Diemer (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1131 [“The basis of an
action for equitable indemnity is a joint legal obligation to another for
damages. [Citation.] . . . ‘[T]here can be no indemnity without liability’
[citation], meaning that if the record does not establish that a
defendant is a concurrent tortfeasor responsible in some measure for
the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, that defendant is not subject to a
claim for indemnity by another defendant”]; Mendoza v. Club Car, Inc.
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 287, 305 [apportionment of fault not required
against defendants who are not at fault].

3      In their reply brief, Nazari and Mosessian cite to Camacho v.
JLG Industries Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 809 in asserting they raise
triable issues of fact pertaining to causation. Camacho is
distinguishable in that there was no undisputed intervening factor
that broke the causal chain.

                                    8
prima facie case of the requisite causation and must produce
evidence that the product failed to satisfy ordinary consumer
expectations as to safety”]; Torres v. Xomox Corp. (1996) 49
Cal.App.4th 1, 16 [whether a plaintiff seeks damages for failure
to warn on a strict products liability or negligence theory, proof
that the failure to warn was a legal cause of injury is a requisite
element for recovery]; Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8
Cal.4th 548, 572 (Soule) [“A manufacturer is liable only when a
defect in its product was a legal cause of injury”].) Thus, the
summary judgment may be affirmed on the basis that the finding
of a lack of causation between Kidde’s actions and the claimed
damages has not been appealed.

C.     Nazari and Mosessian Do Not Raise a Triable Issue of
       Material Fact
       Nevertheless, Nazari and Mosessian argue they produced
sufficient evidence to raise triable issues of fact concerning (1)
whether the alarm was defectively designed under the consumer
expectation test and (2) whether the alarm had an adequate
warning. We disagree.

      1.     Nazari and Mosessian Did Not Raise Arguments
             Regarding the Consumer Expectation Test in the Trial
             Court
      Nazari and Mosessian assert that the trial court erred by
refusing to consider how the consumer expectation test applies to
landlords that purchase smoke alarms. However, Nazari and
Mosessian failed to raise this argument sufficiently for the court
to consider. We conclude the claim is forfeited.

                                 9
       “‘“[I]t is fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily
not consider claims made for the first time on appeal which could
have been but were not presented to the trial court.” . . . Such
arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally
deemed forfeited.’ [Citation.]” (Truck Ins. Exchange v. AMCO
Ins. Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 619, 635.) It is not appropriate “to
reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not
have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an
opportunity to consider. [Citation.] . . . Bait and switch on
appeal not only subjects the parties to avoidable expense, but also
wreaks havoc on a judicial system too burdened to retry cases on
theories that could have been raised earlier.” (JRS Products, Inc.
v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th
168, 178; see Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th
645, 649 [“[t]he critical point for preservation of claims on appeal
is that the asserted error must have been brought to the
attention of the trial court”].)
       When a party opposes a motion for summary judgment, it
must develop the theories upon which its opposition depends and
identify the evidence necessary to support such theories.
(Magallanes de Valle v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 914, 924.) It is not enough simply to mention a
theory. (Natkin v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.
(2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 997, 1011.) The theory must be presented
sufficiently for the moving party and the court to know that it is
being relied upon so that they can respond to and analyze it.
(Ibid.) A party opposing summary judgment should not wait
until judgment is entered, and then appeal on the basis of an
alternate theory and evidence that it declined to utilize in the
first instance.

                                10
       In the context of strict products liability, the existence of a
design defect may be established under one of two alternative
tests: the consumer expectation test or the risk-benefit test.
(Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 21, 30, citing Barker
v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 429–430.) Each test
has different elements and requires different evidence. (Kim,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 30; see also CACI §§ 1203 and 1204.)
Nazari and Mosessian cite no authority showing that broadly
arguing a product was defectively designed is sufficient to
preserve arguments concerning both the consumer expectation
test and the risk-benefit test for appeal.
       In opposing Kidde’s motion for summary judgment, Nazari
and Mosessian acknowledged that a design defect may be proved
using the consumer expectation test or the risk-benefit test, but
they proceeded to argue the risk-benefit test should be applied in
their case. Nazari and Mosessian specifically argued, “[A] triable
issue of fact exists as to whether the risks of the design of the
Kidde Smoke Alarm outweigh[ ] its benefits.” They did not
analyze how the consumer expectation test would apply to their
case or identify what evidence would relate to the test. Indeed,
they did not submit a declaration speaking to their expectations
of the alarm.4 (See Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp., supra, 6 Cal.5th
at p. 30.) Thus, Kidde had no cause to reply to the argument, and
the trial court had no cause to consider it. Nazari and Mosessian,

4     On appeal, Nazari and Mosessian contend they submitted
evidence from their expert showing the smoke alarm failed the
consumer expectation test. “[E]xpert witnesses may not be used to
demonstrate what an ordinary consumer would or should expect.”
(Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 567.) Further, their expert did not
actually opine that ordinary consumers would expect that an alarm
could not be intentionally disabled.

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thus, forfeited this argument. (Truck Ins. Exchange v. AMCO
Ins. Co., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 635; Magallanes de Valle v.
Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 924.)

      2.      Nazari and Mosessian Do Not Raise a Triable Issue
              Under a Failure to Warn Theory
       Next, Nazari and Mosessian contend there is a triable issue
of fact as to whether the subject smoke alarm contained an
adequate warning because the deactivation switch design and
warnings can result in a user accidentally discharging the
alarm’s battery. We conclude Nazari and Mosessian do not raise
a triable issue of fact.
       California law recognizes that a product may be defective
based on inadequate warnings. (Webb v. Special Elec. Co., Inc.
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 180.) A claim based on failure to warn
requires that “the plaintiff . . . prove the defendant’s failure to
warn was a substantial factor in causing his or her injury.”
(Huitt v. Southern California Gas Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
1586, 1604 (Huitt).) “The natural corollary to this requirement is
that a defendant is not liable to a plaintiff if the injury would
have occurred even if the defendant had issued adequate
warnings.” (Ibid.)
       In this case, a user could use a tool, such as a screwdriver,
to access the cross-hatched area on the back of the smoke alarm,
move a switch to the left, and permanently disable the lithium
battery. Immediately below the cross-hatched area was the
following language: “!!WARNING!! [¶] DO NOT DEACTIVATE
THE ALARM UNTIL THE END OF ALARM LIFE SIGNAL IS
HEARD. . . . ONCE THE ALARM IS DEACTIVATED, IT WILL

                                12
NO LONGER FUNCTION, CANNOT BE REACTIVATED, AND
MUST BE REPLACED.” Consequently, the alarm’s labeling
warned users that once the alarm was deactivated, the alarm
would be inoperable.
       Nazari and Mosessian do not dispute that the decedent
intentionally disabled the alarm. Nazari and Mosessian argue,
based exclusively on the declaration of their expert, Van Herle,
Minassi could have mistakenly discharged the smoke alarm’s
battery. Van Herle opined, “Based on the subject design,
instruction and warning labeling and layout[,] it appears
reasonably possible that Minassi may have thought he had
temporarily turned off the detector, possibly for a nuisance
sounding alarm, not realizing that once he did that[,] it could not
be turned back on and that he would have deenergized the 10-
year life battery within it.”
       However, Van Herle offers no facts to support his
speculation that Minassi meant to temporarily turn off the smoke
alarm or may have been confused by the alarm’s instructions.
“‘[A]n expert’s opinion based on assumptions of fact without
evidentiary support [citation], or on speculative or conjectural
factors [citation], has no evidentiary value [citation].” (Sanchez v.
Kern Emergency Medical Transportation Corp. (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 146, 155.) “Similarly, when an expert’s opinion is
purely conclusory because unaccompanied by a reasoned
explanation connecting the factual predicates to the ultimate
conclusion, that opinion has no evidentiary value because an
“‘expert opinion is worth no more than the reasons upon which it
rests.’” (Ibid.; see Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25
Cal.4th 763, 777 [“‘proof of causation cannot be based on . . . an

                                 13
expert’s opinion based on inferences, speculation and
conjecture’”].)
       To the extent Van Herle states subsequent changes in the
alarm’s design and warning indicate “there is a possibility” that
the warning has been problematic, Van Herle is expressly
speculating. While he points out that the subject alarm and the
one made seven years later are different, he does not provide
evidence to show why the changes were made. He does not show
the changes were in fact made in response to problems or that the
later warning is actually more effective.5 His speculation and
conjecture are insufficient to create a triable issue of material
fact. (Joseph E. Di Loreto, Inc. v. O’Neill (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th
149, 161.)
       Lastly, Nazari and Mosessian contend that the warning is
not consistent with American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) standard Z535.4-2011. But the ANSI standards provide
they are “completely voluntary” and do not “preclude anyone . . .
from manufacturing, marketing, purchasing, or using products,
processes, or procedures not conforming to the standards.” There
is no showing that by not following ANSI’s standards, Kidde
breached the applicable standard of care.
       Nazari and Mosessian, therefore, do not create a triable
issue of fact concerning whether the warning was a substantial
factor in causing Minassi’s injuries. (Huitt, supra, 188
Cal.App.4th at p. 1604 [failing to issue a warning is “not a
substantial factor in bringing about plaintiffs’ harm, unless

5     The later warning deleted the following language found on the
subject alarm: “DO NOT DEACTIVATE THE ALARM UNTIL THE
END OF ALARM LIFE SIGNAL IS HEARD. . . . ONCE THE ALARM
IS DEACTIVATED, IT WILL NO LONGER FUNCTION, CANNOT BE
REACTIVATED, AND MUST BE REPLACED.”

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plaintiffs would have learned of the warning and altered their
conduct because of the warning”].)

                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Kidde is awarded costs on
appeal.

                                         MORI, J.
     We concur:

           CURREY, P. J.

           ZUKIN, J.

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