Court Opinion

ID: 9853885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:43.875305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:13.447177
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I must concur because of the Supreme Court of Georgia’s pronouncement in Emory Univ. v. Levitas, 260 Ga. 894 (401 SE2d 691) (1991), that “substantial,” as the word is used in OCGA § 50-13-19 (h) (5), means “any.” In applying the standard, it also equates “substantial” and “any” with “some.” Id. at 899. Thus, OCGA § 50-13-19 (h) (5) can be read: “Clearly erroneous in view of any reliable, probative evi*868dence on the whole record,” as well as “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.”
Like OCGA § 50-13-19 (h) (5), which governs superior court review of agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act, OCGA § 5-4-12 (b) states: “The scope of review shall be limited to all errors of law and determination as to whether the judgment or ruling below was sustained by substantial evidence.” This statute, which governs the superior court review on writ of certiorari to an inferior judicatory or person exercising judicial powers (see OCGA § 5-4-3), applies in this case.
Due to the decision in Levitas, the distinction drawn in the separate opinion in Smith v. Elder, 174 Ga. App. 316, 317-319 (329 SE2d 511) (1985), between “any” evidence and “substantial” evidence is not given legal status in Georgia. It should be otherwise. I would agree with Justice Hunt’s dissent on this point in the Levitas case and with the dissent of Justice Hall in Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 587-588 (242 SE2d 101) (1978). They view the substantial evidence test as providing a broader scope of review than the any evidence test.
The two words have different meanings, and words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning, except for words which are terms of art or have a particular meaning in a specific context. OCGA § 1-3-1 (b). See Osborne Bonding &c. Co. v. State of Ga., 224 Ga. App. 590, 591 (481 SE2d 578) (1997). The courts are obliged to construe the legislative intendment in the context of their use in the statutes. OCGA § 1-3-1 (a). See Bibb County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 440 (2) (86 SE2d 511) (1955) (the words of a statute are always to be construed in connection with their context); OCGA § 1-3-1 (a). It is not a matter of higher courts appropriating to themselves a greater degree of oversight over lower judicatories but rather a matter of fulfilling their proper role as assigned by the law, an allocation made by the legislature of the scope of review desired.
As to common meaning, according to Webster’s Third International Dictionary, when the term “any” is used as an adjective as it is here, it means “to any extent, in any degree, at all.” And the term “substantial,” when used as an adjective, means, among other ways of putting it, “considerable in amount, value, or worth; having a solid or firm foundation; soundly based; carrying weight.” The American Heritage Dictionary (2nd college ed.) defines “any” as “one or some, regardless of kind, quantity, or number” and “substantial” as “considerable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent.” There is a difference in plain English.
In ruling as it did in Levitas, the Supreme Court depended on the rationale in Dept. of Human Resources v. Montgomery, 248 Ga. 465, 466 (1) (284 SE2d 263) (1981), but in Montgomery the court *869equated “substantial evidence” with “any evidence” merely because in Georgia the standard used to review the grant or denial of a directed verdict is the latter. It created the following syllogism: The United States Supreme Court held that substantial evidence is the same amount as would justify refusal to direct a verdict;1 the standard in Georgia used to review the grant or denial of a directed verdict is the any evidence test; therefore “substantial evidence” as used by the Georgia legislature in Code Ann. § 89-1717 (b) (5) (now OCGA § 45-19-39 (b) (5)) means “any evidence.”
Decided October 21, 1997.
Clifford E. Hardwick TV, Overtis H. Brantley, Lisa S. Morchower, for appellant.
Brenda A. Raspberry, for appellee.
According to Montgomery, the same holds true for OCGA §§ 45-20-9 and 50-13-19. The same must be said for OCGA § 5-4-12 (b), which is couched in identical wording.
Consequently, I am compelled to concur.
It should be noted that in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 236 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), the Supreme Court held that the proper standard for testing if a. magistrate validly issued a search warrant is to assume that the magistrate had a “ ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud(ing)’ ” that probable cause existed. The court identified and discussed the strength of the indicia of the basis and never used the word “any” as a synonym. This Court applies that standard. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 190 Ga. App. 324, 326 (2) (378 SE2d 908) (1989).
Compare the Georgia test for review of trial court rulings on motions to suppress: fact findings should not be disturbed “ ‘if there is any evidence to support [them].’ ” Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1) (440 SE2d 646) (1994); Edwards v. State, 219 Ga. App. 239, 244 (3) (464 SE2d 851) (1995). This Court has also used a “substantial basis” test for the same review purpose. See, e.g., Raulerson v. State, 223 Ga. App. 556, 557 (2) (479 SE2d 386) (1996).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope, Judge Smith and Judge Ruffin join in this special concurrence.

 Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm., 383 U. S. 607, 620 (86 SC 1018, 16 LE2d 131) (1966), which interpreted the Federal Administrative Procedure Act’s use of “substantial evidence” as meaning “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 620.