Court Opinion

ID: 9867307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 15:48:55.243805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:34.334285
License: Public Domain

*317B aballo, J.,
read a dissenting opinion, maintaining that the assignment of the judgment, having been intended by Malcolm for the benefit of Garvey, and Boach with knowledge of this, having procured it to be made to himself by representing to Malcolm that he, Boach, came from Garvey, and was acting for his benefit, and the assignment having thus been delivered to and. received by Boach, in the assumed character of Garvey’s representative, Boach, in fact, received it as trustee for Garvey.
That Garvey had the right to affirm this trust, and claim the benefit of it, though created without his previous authority, knowledge, or privity.
And that the title having passed by a perfect assignment, the trust could be enforced, though voluntary. (4 Kent Com., 307; 4 Johns. Ch., 136; 1 Johns. Cas., 205 ; 1 Johns. Ch., 119, 473; 3 Johns. Ch., 261; 5 Hill, 586; Bill v. Cureton, 2 M. & K., 510; Petre v. Epinasse, 2 M. & K., 496 ; Adams Eq., 31; 11 Wend., 249, 250.)
That the maxim “ Orrmis ratihabitio retroharitur, et mandato equiparatiir,” was applicable to this case. (Dunlap’s Paley on Agy. 324; Broom’s Leg. Max., 835; 6 M. & Gr., 242; 4 Exch. B., 798, 799.)
That to entitle Garvey to adopt and enforce the trust, it was not necessary, either that he should have had any previous title or right to the property, or that any relation should have previously existed between him and Boach, by virtue whereof Boach owed a duty to Garvey, other than that which sprang out of the transaction itself, citing Marriot v. Marriot (1 Stra., 666, 673); 1 Phil. Ch., 133, 145; 5 Beavan, 469; 9 Ves., 516; 3 Ves., 155; 7 Sim., 644; 3 My. & Cr., 229; 11 Ves., 638; Sweet v. Jacocks (6 Paige, 359); 1 Ball & Beatty, 409; Story Eq., § 256, 781.
That Boach could not be permitted to set up his own fraudulent intent to appropriate the property to himself, in negation of the trust in favor of Garvey, which he ostensibly assumed, and by assuming which he obtained the assignment.
That Garvey’s rights were, therefore, the same as if Boach *318had actually intended, at the time he took the assignment, to hold it for Garvey’s benefit. He actually took it for Garvey, notwithstanding any secret intent he may have had to defraud him.
That Garvey could not be deprived of his right to affirm the trust, by any subsequent dealing between Malcolm and Eoaeh, to which he was not a party. (4 J. Ch., 136; 1 How., 476; 2 M. & K., 496; 3 M. & K, 36, 43; 5 SHfll, 585, 586.)
For affirmance, Ch. J. Allen, Grover and Folger, JJ.; for reversal, Eapallo and Peckham, JJ.
Judgment affirmed.