Court Opinion

ID: 9729587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:43:31.769156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.868571
License: Public Domain

Carter, J.,
dissenting.
The question presented in this case is the meaning of the words “final judgment” as used in section 5, L. B. 17, Extraordinary Session, 1963. This section states in part: “Except as to those transactions on which an action at law or in equity has been reduced to a final judgment as of the effective date of this act, the penalty provisions of * * * (L. B. 17) shall apply to all transactions made prior to the effective date of this act.”
The general rule is that a statute which the Legislature could properly make retroactive, which takes effect pending an appeal, should be decided on the law existing at the time of decision in the appellate court. I concur with the majority on this point. It is the holding of the majority opinion, however, that the questioned language is a restriction on the general rule and that any case that has been placed in the form of a judgment is not entitled to the benefit of the retroactive provisions of the act.
The words “final judgment” have varied meanings. Whether or not a judgment is final depends upon the sense in which it is used. A text writer has stated it as follows: “In determining whether a judgment is ‘final,’ no hard and fast definition or test applicable to all situations can be given, since finality depends somewhat on the purpose for which, and the standpoint from which, the judgment is being considered, and it may be final for one purpose and not for another.” 49 C. J. S., Judgments, § 11, p. 35.
I state without fear of contradiction that no case can be found that determines the precise point before us. The majority opinion relies on cases from this jurisdiction defining “final judgment” for the purpose of taking an appeal under our appeal statute. But the term “final judgment” as used in the statute before us does not in*310volve a procedural matter -but 'a ’substantive one. The definition of the term “final judgment” in a procedural statute is-not at all applicable to its use in a statute on an unrelated subject matter.
The majority opinion relies largely on the case of In re Bailey, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 746, 265 App. Div. 758. I concede the; quoted portion -of the : case appears to; support the majority holding.- But an examination of the whole opinion reveals thát it too- was dealing with si. procedural • blatter,- which was the controlling factor in the decision, as -shown by -the following fromi that opinion: -“Whilé Section 61-a is found in the General Corporation Law, it is by its terms made a part, of the costs statutes of the State and in determining the meaning of terms used therein, it must be assumed that they are used in the same sense as in the Civil Practice-Act which mákes -general provisions for-the same subject.”
The majority opinion states; as- a more potent reason for the result reached,' that' the'statute involved in City of Beatrice v. Gage County, 130 Neb. 850, 266 N. W. 777, used the expression “taken to apply to any case now pending in which judgment has not become final in a court of last resort.”- As 1 -understand the reasoning of the author; this precludes the5 úse of any other language in a statute tó 'indicate that the fihal 'terminatión of the íitigation was intended;' This' assertion implies that legislature's' aré 'bound as aré courts to adhere to and to be consistent with previous"action. This is, -of course, not true. One legislature -cannot bind another, arid a later "legislature is not bound'to-use identical teifris'to accomplish the sainé result. The controlling rule is: What did the Legislature intend in using the questioned nomenclature',_ and not how sorhé previotis legislature chose' to^express itself 'in some' collateral matter.-'In my judgment the statute involved'in'the Gage County 'case is not authority for anything iri "thé instant case.'
I submit. that the authorities" -cited in thé'májoritv opinion do not support-the result reached. I submit *311further'’that the - ease* should be decided ,on recognized rtiles of statutory-'cohstruction. - N
-In' determining the intént of the Legislature in the usé of- an ambiguous provision, it is proper to eonsidér, as-an* aid to construction, the history of the legislation, the object to be accomplished, and the evils or- mischief sought to be remedied. The origin of the legislation with which we are here concerned arose in our holding the 1959- Nebraska Installment Sales Act unconstitutional in Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N. W. 2d 528,, arid the 1963 Nebraska Installment Sales Act unconstitutional in Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N. W. 2d 844. These holdings, in connection with our previous decisión in Powell v. Edwards, 16.2 Neb. 11, 75 N. W. 2d 122, subject installment loan contracts] declared to be invalid under the Installment Sales Acts, to the penalties-of thé Installment Loan Act, which penalties' provided’ for file loss of principal, , interest, and charges.
Lending' agencies thereupon, assumed a position of injured innocence, asserting that the number and amount of such invalid loans was' such that the economy of the state ‘was threatened with serious consequences. A special session of the Legislature was cáíled and L. B. 17,'among others, was enacted, specifically providing fob its retroactive effect.
' The purpose of the act was to validate all previous installment sale contracts, not just , some of them, and to jreduce the penalty to a loss of interest and charges. This is'made cléar by the title to the act which provides: “An Act to amend *."* * relating to installfnent loans; to chahge the penalties' and the’ remedies relating' to instálljnént loans; to.declare that these amendments shall apply, retroactively to existing’ installment'.loans made prior to the effective date of ;this, act'; * * It will beobsérvéd that the title contained’nib words Of limitation upon loans made prior' to the effective date'of the act:;'
The object óf the legislation was to validate instalL ment contracts entered into' previous ’to-the-effective *312date of the act. Its purpose was to give validity to all previous installment contracts and to provide a new penalty for their violation with retroactive effect. There is nothing in the act to indicate that any installment contracts were to be excepted from its operation other than the words excepting those that had been reduced to final judgment.
At the same session of the Legislature at which L. B. 17 was enacted, the Legislature enacted L. B. 16, dealing with the same subject matter, and the latter may be considered in determining the intent of the Legislature in the present act. In section 3 of L. B. 16 it is provided: “In the event any such agreement is judicially determined to constitute, in whole or in part, a loan with interest, the applicable limit on such interest shall be that set forth in section 45-101, Revised Statutes Supplement, 1961, * * * and the sole remedy or defense available to such a buyer by reason thereof shall be that prescribed in section 45-105, Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943.” The judicial determination therein referred to contemplates the existence of a judgment. The intent of the provision is clear that the Legislature intended no limited operation of the act. From this it must be conclusively inferred that no such limited operation was intended in L, B. 17.
At the same session of the Legislature L. B. 19 was enacted. In that statute the general intent of the Legislature to validate all installment contracts entered into prior to the effective date of L. B. 17 is shown by the following language in section 1, subsection (4), thereof: “Common fairness and natural justice dictate that persons who contracted in good faith in accordance with such statutes, if judicially determined to be unconstitutional, should not be penalized or one party placed at a disadvantage to the other by reason thereof.” It was clearly the intent of the Legislature by the foregoing to validate all installment contracts previously made, and not validate some, but not others.
*313While L. B. 16 and L. B. 19 were declared unconstitutional in Davis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 176 Neb. 865, 127 N. W. 2d 907, this is not a bar to their consideration in determining the intent of the Legislature in enacting L. B. 17. Board of Commissioners v. State, 184 Ind. 418, 111 N. E. 417. In the last-cited case the court said: “Of course, the legislative intent, express or implied, must be given effect when ascertained. In seeking such intent, however, courts may invoke the aid of other acts of the legislature at the same session, even if such acts are unconstitutional or were vetoed.”
It is my conclusion that after considering the history of the legislation, the related statutes enacted at the same legislative session, the multiple meanings of the term “final judgment,” the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, and the specific situation the Legislature had before it, the Legislature intended the words “final judgment” to mean a judgment that terminated the litigation in which contractual rights have been finally merged and vested in the judgment, and the judgment thereby placed beyond the power of the courts or legislatures to disturb as to its finality. A judgment from which an appeal has been taken has not, of course, reached such a finality. Under the holding of the majority, the retroactive benefit of the statute is denied to a lender whose contractual rights have been determined in any court, whether it be the justice, municipal, county, or district courts, even if an appeal is pending. I cannot bring myself to believe that the Legislature intended any such result. To me, the Legislature used the words “final judgment” in its general and colloquial sense, and not in any technical sense, which makes its meaning synonymous with a judgment completely adjudicating the litigation and beyond the power of courts or legislatures to' interfere.
Whatever may have been the methods employed or the motivations or pressures involved in its passage, the intention of the Legislature appears abundantly *314clear to be contrary to the majority holding. I submit that the majority opinion is not supported by applicable case law of this or any other jurisdiction. I submit also that it cannot be sustained under the ordinary rules of statutory construction. I submit further that it is contrary to the manifest intention of the Legislature and produces a result that was not within the legislative contemplation. Under such circumstances I deem the judicially imposed limitation on the retroactive effect of the statute to be unreasonable and a nullification of the plain legislative remedy the Legislature sought to provide. Being firmly convinced of the validity of my position, I am obliged to voice my disagreement with the majority opinion.
Brower, J., concurs in this dissent.