Court Opinion

ID: 9513864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:41:40.547236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:04.463659
License: Public Domain

KAPSNER, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 21] Custody decisions are difficult. In reviewing custody disputes, our duty is to ensure district court judges have followed the legislative command of weighing the best interests of the child factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2. When a trial judge ignores the legislatively imposed best interest factors, writes perfunctory findings that rely on evidence not in the record, or when we cannot determine the basis for a trial court’s decision, we will reverse and send a case back for further analysis and more detailed findings. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 2005 ND 176, ¶ 9, 704 N.W.2d 847; N.D. Human Rights Coalition v. Bertsch, 2005 ND 98, ¶ 15, 697 N.W.2d 1; Huntress v. Griffey, 2002 ND 160, ¶ 8, 652 N.W.2d 351. When a judge evidences bias by using his position as a district court judge to ridicule the parents and children, that judge brings disrespect *21to the judiciary and destroys public confidence in our justice system. See, e.g., Sisk v. Sisk, 2006 ND 55, ¶43, 711 N.W.2d 203 (dissenting opinion). The majority is 'willing to make many inferences to save this decision. I believe it is impermissible to do so under the circumstances. I therefore respectfully dissent.
[¶ 22] When making an initial custody determination, a trial court has a duty to serve the best interests of the child. DesLauriers v. DesLauriers, 2002 ND 66, ¶ 5, 642 N.W.2d 892. A court must weigh the best interests of the child factors set forth under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 when making such a decision. Id. A trial court’s findings on the factors for the best interests of the child under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 should be stated with sufficient specificity to enable a reviewing court to understand the factual basis for a trial court’s decision. Huntress v. Griffey, 2002 ND 160, ¶ 8, 652 N.W.2d 351.
[¶ 23] Here, the trial court did not review the best interest factors when the court made the initial custody decision. The majority argues it is “quite clear” the best interest factors were considered based on the words used by the district court and evidence within the record. Majority opinion at ¶ 8. I have trouble discerning the same level of clarity. Moll-tor’s brief states: “Rather than engaging in the required analysis as mandated by N.D.C.C. 14-09-06.2, the District Court took the opportunity to display its personal anger towards [Molitor] and as a result disparage [Molitor] in every personal manner feasible.” Majority opinion at ¶ 11. From the record we have before us, this appears to be an accurate description. At the conclusion of the initial custody hearing, the court made “Special Findings.” The court made findings chastising Molitor for an incident regarding his sheep farm and a case occurring fifteen years prior to the hearing. The court’s first finding stated:
1) Fifteen years ago, when I went to Amidon to hear the case of the defendant’s cattle grazing in his neighbors’ wheat fields in a desperate attempt to save their own lives, it was apparent that the defendant was running a concentration camp for livestock. Now, fifteen years later the defendant is still starving his sheep. It’s a mystery that the people of Slope County tolerate it.
The majority infers from this finding — or more accurately makes its own finding— that Molitor’s mistreatment of sheep is indicative of his avoidance of gainful employment. Majority opinion at ¶ 8.
[¶ 24] A trial court has an obligation to make findings of fact under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). As an appellate court of review, we do not make independent findings. By scouring the record for sufficient information to support a court’s decision, we are acting as a fact-finder. When a district court provides no indication of the eviden-tiary and theoretical basis for its decision, the reviewing court is left to speculate whether factors were properly considered and the law was properly applied. Clark v. Clark, 2005 ND 176, ¶9, 704 N.W.2d 847. We cannot perform our appellate court function under such circumstances. Id.
[¶ 25] The court’s second special finding is based on an apparent sexist assumption that men cannot raise a family and that women should not have to work outside the home:
2) For about twenty years as nearly as I can tell, the defendant has managed to avoid any kind of gainful employment and he would have starved his own family just like his livestock if his wife had not gone out and worked outside of the home to put food on the table.
*22[¶ 26] The majority infers negative findings under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(b), (e), and (g), but this trial court on remand found the exact opposite. The court found under factor (b): that Molitor has the “capacity and disposition to give the child love, affection and guidance and to continue the education of the child.” Under factor (c), the court determined that Molitor has the “capacity to provide for the material needs of the child.” With factor (g), the court found that Molitor is a “physically fit” parent. These findings appear almost directly contradictory to the court’s other findings, but since the court made the findings, I would be unwilling to make contrary inferences on appeal.
[¶ 27] In addition to contradictory findings, as the majority acknowledges, the judge does not apply the correct law to a motion to change custody. Again, the majority is willing to make an inference to affirm the lack of analysis. On the change of custody motion, the court erroneously applies the best interest factors without ever making a finding that a material change of circumstances has occurred. The district court should have applied the best interest factors during the initial custody determination.
[¶ 28] The same kind of intemperate language used to describe the father is displayed toward the older child whose custody is no longer in question. Describing that child and two of Hewson’s stepchildren, the judge says that Hewson and her new husband were “providing a home to three drug-abusing juvenile terrorists only they didn’t know it.” Such language leaves me no assurance that this decision is based upon anything more than the judge’s anger. The final decision might very well be the correct result, but this record does not demonstrate that the trial judge applied the law to get there. I would reverse and remand for further findings.
[¶ 29]DALE V. SANDSTROM, J., agrees.