Court Opinion

ID: 9527587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:31:42.583872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:55.446963
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the result reached and the reasoning used by the majority.
It appears that the majority is disregarding the parties’ stipulation which was the basis for the judgment and is considering that Mrs. Fobes has not become self-supporting and Mr. Fobes had a substantial increase in income since the divorce was granted and, therefore, it is only equitable that the maintenance payments be continued. There is no reasoning given why the payments may be converted to permanent rather than an extension of a year or two of temporary maintenance. If permanent maintenance is entered, Mr. Fobes will have to show a change in circumstances to have the payments lessened in amount or to be terminated. It also seems irrelevant to me to consider or even state that Mr. Fobes’ income has appreciated over what it was at the time of the stipulation.
There is no finding in this record that Mrs. Fobes is unemployable. Regardless, the majority is willing to grant her permanent maintenance since she has failed in her attempts to become self-supportive. She has only dedicated her activities to two areas of employment which she would choose, social work and private nursing. There does not appear to be any duty for her to become self-supportive in some field other than social work or private nursing and yet she has not been found to be unemployable but only not to be a malingerer.
*83The majority states: “It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to modify the judgment and order a further hearing to determine the amount of maintenance to be paid.” Page 82. It appears the court would not find an abuse of discretion to raise the amount of maintenance and also convert it from temporary to permanent. That would emasculate the stipulation of the parties and it would appear the property distribution should be reexamined.
The court concludes Dixon v. Dixon, 107 Wis. 2d 492, 319 N.W.2d 846 (1982), applies in this case since “[t]he court could have entered such an order whether or not the parties had agreed to it.” Page 80. Here, the court is referring to the fact the court could have ordered the three year maintenance at $250 per week. However, the distinction from Dixon is here the court accepted the parties’ stipulation and in Dixon the order of maintenance was after a full hearing. It is not what the court could have done in Dixon that is controlling but what it did was based on a full hearing with the judge making the decisions as to property division and maintenance. Here the parties made that choice and by stipulation bound themselves to the judgment being entered. That is not a Dixon case.
In Marriage of Rintelman v. Rintelman, 118 Wis. 2d 587, 348 N.W.2d 498 (1984), we held a husband to a stipulation allegedly because his agreement for lifetime maintenance in spite of his wife’s remarriage could not have been ordered by the court without his agreement. Therefore, considering Dixon and Rintelman and the instant case, the only maintenance term in a stipulation that is now binding is one where the trial court would not have had the authority to impose it after a contested hearing.
The unfairness is that by this decision, the entire matter is not reopened and considered but only the main*84tenance. We said in Rintelman that we would not open the agreement since we did not know the bargaining that went on between the parties. However, in this case, the majority ignores that important aspect of jRintelman. In Rintelman, we stated: “Under the circumstances it is reasonable to assume that the parties bargained as approximate equals, and that the final result was a product of give and take on both sides.” Id. at 597. Also, we stated the “agreement was freely and knowingly negotiated. The trial court examined the entire stipulation and incorporated it into its judgment.” Id. at 598.
The court improperly approves of opening up the judgment to review the appropriateness of permanent not limited maintenance and also the amount of each payment. The court should also open up the property division of the original settlement and consider whether the award to Mrs. Fobes was too great considering an award of lifetime maintenance and now that it may be at a higher level than in the stipulation and judgment. After all her share of the property has appreciated in value since 1980 also.
I dissent. I am authorized to state that Mr. JUSTICE WILLIAM A. BABLITCH joins this dissent.