Court Opinion

ID: 9705264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:00:56.15716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:09.331797
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, J.,

concurring in the denial of the motion for reconsideration:

I concur in this Court’s denial of the State’s motion for reconsideration, as I continue to believe that the proffered hearsay testimony of Helen Douglass, as to what the deceased victim told her, should have been admitted. Nevertheless, upon further reflection during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, I have come to the conclusion that our holding concerning the admissibility of the testimony should not rest upon a constitutional ground. Without intimating any disagreement with the constitutional discussion in Judge Davidson’s opinion, I simply believe that the constitutional question should not be reached in this case. Instead, our holding that Helen Douglass’ testimony was admissible should be based entirely on this State’s common law. This is in accord with our established policy that ordinarily a constitutional question should be avoided if a case can properly be decided upon a nonconstitutional ground.1
*231The Maryland law of evidence, unlike that in some other jurisdictions, is largely uncodified. It has developed on a common law basis, through the decisions of the courts. Although Judge Smith in his dissenting opinion correctly indicates that no prior Maryland case requires the admission of the hearsay testimony concerning Tommy Foster’s threats, this is not determinative of the state law issue. As we have pointed out on many occasions, very recently by Chief Judge Murphy for the Court in Harrison v. Mont. Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 460, 456 A.2d 894 (1983), "the common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism — its ability to keep pace with the world while constantly searching for just and fair solutions ....” 2
If, as the majority of this Court believes (see p. 212, supra), considerations of fairness require that the hearsay testimony be admitted under the circumstances of this case, such a holding can rest on the common law of evidence just as easily (if not more so) as on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fairness is not a quality associated only with the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Rather, as the above-quoted language from the Harrison case indicates, the search for fairness is part of the dynamism of the common law.
The proffered testimony regarding Tommy Foster’s threats should not automatically be deemed inadmissible because it does not fall within any of the traditional categories of exceptions to the hearsay rule. Long ago Judge Learned Hand, in a district court opinion adopted by the Second Circuit, held that a particular hearsay statement, which was not admissible under "any express authority in point,” should not be rejected "because it fulfills both the *232requisites of an exception of the hearsay rule, necessity and circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness.” G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 F. 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1913). More recently, in Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388, 397-398 (5th Cir. 1961), in an opinion by Judge John Minor Wisdom, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a document was admissible not "as a 'business record,’ nor as an 'ancient document,’ nor as any other readily identifiable and happily tagged species of hearsay exception. It is admissible because it is necessary and trustworthy, relevant and material....” Other cases have taken the same position. See Butler v. Southern Pacific Company, 431 F.2d 77, 79-80 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945, 91 S.Ct. 1196, 28 L.Ed.2d 325 (1971); United States v. Barbati, 284 F.Supp. 409, 411-412 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); People v. Interest of W.C.L., 650 P.2d 1302, 1304-1305 (Colo.App. 1982); State v. Letterman, 47 Or.App. 1145, 616 P.2d 505, 508-509, 12 A.L.R.4th 1009 (1980), aff'd 291 Or. 3, 627 P.2d 484 (1981). See also Thomas v. Owens, 28 Md.App. 442, 450-451, 346 A.2d 662 (1975); Letendre v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 518, 524, 289 N.Y.S.2d 183, 188, 236 N.E.2d 467 (1968).
The principle set forth in the G. & C. Merriam Co. and Dallas County cases has been used to reverse and order a new trial when the trial judge had refused to admit hearsay evidence. For example, in Johnstone v. State, 92 Nev. 241, 548 P.2d 1362 (1976), the defendant was charged with two murders. Two other men had previously been convicted for their part in the same murders. Johnstone maintained that he was not present at the time of the murders, and he attempted at his trial to introduce the testimony of a detective who had spoken to a married couple staying at the motel where the murders took place. This couple had told the detective that they had seen two unkempt men prowling near the victims’ room. Although it was inferable from this evidence that Johnstone was not with the other two men at the time of the murders, the trial court excluded the detective’s testimony on hearsay grounds. The Supreme *233Court of Nevada reversed. While holding that the statement was admissible on Nevada statutory grounds, the court pointed out that the statute endorsed the principles set forth by Judge Learned Hand in the G. & C. Merriam Co. case and Judge Wisdom in the Dallas County case. Recognizing that neither the absent couple nor the detective had any motive to lie, the court held the reliability requirement had been met and that the testimony should have been admitted.
The holdings in the above-discussed cases have been embodied in the recently enacted Federal Rules of Evidence, in Rule 803 (24). The provision in pertinent part states:
"(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. ...”
According to the committee note regarding Rule 803 (24),
"[t]he committee believes that there are certain exceptional circumstances where evidence which is found by a court to have guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to or exceeding the guarantees reflected by the presently listed exceptions, and to have a high degree of probativeness and necessity could properly be admissible.
The case of Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., Ltd., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961) illustrates the point.”
See also 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence § 803 (24)[01] (1981 ed.).
*234I am not prepared at this time to take the position that any hearsay evidence is admissible which a trial judge believes to be necessary and trustworthy. Rule 803 (24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence has, at least in this State, led to some excesses with which I could not agree. My view as to the admissibility of Helen Douglass’ testimony need not and does not go beyond the type of hearsay evidence involved in this case.
As Judge Davidson’s opinion points out, in Maryland hearsay evidence of an accused’s threat to kill the victim has long been held admissible. I would hold that, in a criminal case, hearsay evidence of threats made to the victim by someone other than the defendant is admissible if the evidence meets the requirements of necessity and reliability. For the reasons set forth in Judge Davidson’s opinion, the requirements of necessity and trustworthiness were met in this case. Consequently, as a matter of state evidence law, I believe that Helen Douglass’ proffered testimony should have been admitted.

. Recent cases recognizing this policy include Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 363 n.6, (majority opinion), 365, (dissenting opinion), 464 A.2d 228, 237 (1983); Avara v. Baltimore News American, 292 Md. 543, 554 n. 7, 440 A.2d 368 (1982); Employ. Sec. v. Balto. Lutheran H. S., 291 Md. 750, 754 n. 2, 436 A.2d 481 (1981); Town of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291 Md. 331, 336, 435 A.2d 425 (1981); Temoney v. State, 290 Md. 251, 259 n. 6, 429 A.2d 1018 (1981); Caplan Bros. v. Village of Cross Keys, 277 Md. 41, 45, 353 A.2d 237 (1976).

. Accord: Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 274, 462 A.2d 506 (1983); Moxley v. Acker, 294 Md. 47, 51-52, 447 A.2d 857 (1982); Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 217, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981); Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 182, 438 A.2d 494 (1981); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 42-43, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Condore v. Prince George’s Co., 289 Md. 516, 530-532, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981); Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 590, 414 A.2d 929 (1980); Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 714-715, 404 A.2d 1073 (1979); Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 340-342, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979); Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967).