Court Opinion

ID: 9412011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:11:14.790469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:24.409593
License: Public Domain

J-S22044-23

                                   2023 PA Super 137

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TROY JORDAN WHITMIRE                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1302 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 24, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County
                 Criminal Division at CP-10-CR-0000460-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:                             FILED: July 28, 2023

       Troy Jordan Whitmire (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after the trial court convicted him of two counts of driving

under the influence (DUI)—controlled substance.1 We affirm.

       The trial court explained:

              Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Nicholas Dahlstrom
       testified [at Appellant’s non-jury trial] that he has been employed
       by the Pennsylvania State Police [(PSP)] for approximately four
       and a half years as a patrol trooper. He testified that on January
       9, 2021, he encountered [Appellant] while investigating a report
       of harassment between [Appellant] and his sister, Kara Whitmire.
       Ms. Whitmire was granted an emergency [protection from abuse
       order (]PFA[)]. Trooper Dahlstrom contacted [Appellant] via
       phone and asked him to come to the Butler PSP barracks to be
       served the emergency PFA, to which [Appellant] agreed. N.T.,
       Non-Jury Trial, July 8, 2022, pg. 19. On cross-examination,
       [Trooper Dahlstrom] explained that [Appellant] was asked to
       come to the barracks to be served the emergency PFA because
       when the trooper attempted to serve [Appellant] in the field, he
       was unable to locate [Appellant]. Id. at 28.
____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i) and 3802(d)(2).
J-S22044-23

           According to [Trooper Dahlstrom’s] testimony, [Appellant]
     arrived at the [PSP] barracks at approximately 10:30 p.m. The
     trooper walked out to the lobby area to meet [Appellant] and
     advised him of the PFA. While speaking with [Appellant, Trooper
     Dahlstrom] observed [Appellant] rambling about the people listed
     on the most wanted poster in the lobby and about the people in
     Butler who use drugs. The trooper asked [Appellant] if he had
     taken any drugs that day and [Appellant] responded that he
     smoked marijuana earlier that day. Id. at 20.

            [Trooper Dahlstrom] testified that he went to the
     communications room to ask if Trooper Treadway was available
     for a drug recognition evaluation. Trooper Dahlstrom testified that
     [Appellant] drove himself to the [PSP] barracks that evening. He
     based that on the fact that [Appellant’s] vehicle was outside with
     nobody else inside and [Appellant] said he drove his vehicle [to
     the barracks] from the Bruin area. Id. at 21. The Commonwealth
     submitted Commonwealth’s Exhibit “3,” which is the [PennDOT]
     DL-26 [chemical test warnings] form that Trooper Dahlstrom read
     to [Appellant]. Both [Appellant] and [Trooper Dahlstrom] signed
     the form and [Appellant] agreed to submit to a blood draw. The
     Commonwealth also offered Commonwealth’s Exhibit “4,” which
     is the paperwork provided by the phlebotomist at Butler Memorial
     Hospital and shows that [Trooper Dahlstrom] witnessed
     [Appellant’s] blood draw, signed [the accompanying form,] and
     noted the date and time. Both exhibits were admitted without
     objection.

           Trooper Treadway did conduct a drug recognition evaluation
     of [Appellant] approximately 20 to 25 minutes after [Appellant]
     arrived at the barracks. Id. at 22. At approximately 11:30 p.m.,
     Trooper Dahlstrom transported [Appellant] to Butler Memorial
     Hospital for a blood test. [Trooper Dahlstrom] read the DL-26
     blood test warnings to [Appellant]. The trooper testified that
     [Appellant] understood the warnings, signed the document and
     agreed to submit to a blood test. Id. The test was administered
     at approximately 11:55 p.m. Id. at 23. The Pennsylvania State
     Police sent the blood sample to NMS Labs for analysis. Id. at 24.
     Trooper Dahlstrom received the lab results on February 1, 2021[;
     the results] showed active and inactive ingredients of marijuana.
     Id. at 25. [Trooper Dahlstrom] testified that he has encountered
     and observed approximately 100 people under the influence of
     marijuana over the course of [his] employment as a trooper and

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     that [Appellant’s] behavior       was    consistent    with   those
     observations. Id. at 26.

            Next, Trooper Philip Treadway testified that he is a patrol
     trooper, drug recognition expert and drug recognition expert
     instructor. The parties stipulated that the trooper would testify as
     an expert in drug recognition. Id. at 35-36. Trooper Treadway
     testified to the 12-step evaluation conducted by a drug recognition
     expert and specifically, his findings regarding [Appellant]. The
     breath alcohol test [Appellant performed] eliminated alcohol as an
     impairing substance. Next, [Trooper Treadway] interviewed the
     arresting officer, Trooper Dahlstrom, who related that [Appellant]
     was acting erratically in the lobby and [Trooper Dahlstrom] had
     concerns that [Appellant] might be drug impaired. Next, Trooper
     Treadway ruled out other potential reasons for [Appellant’s]
     impairment, such as lack of sleep, food, drink, [or] medical
     impairment. Id. at 37.

           Trooper Treadway continued with his testimony, noting that
     [Appellant’s] sense of time was off by more than an hour.
     [Appellant] presented extreme mood swings[; Appellant was]
     joking and relaxed one moment to being paranoid and
     argumentative the next and having a very short attention span.
     [Appellant] denied using prescription or illicit drugs. [Trooper
     Treadway testified that Appellant’s] first pulse check was elevated
     and his eye examination showed a lack of convergence. Id. at
     38.

            Next, Trooper Treadway testified that the modified Romberg
     balance test indicated [Appellant’s] lack of time perception, i.e.,
     [Appellant] estimated 13 seconds to be 30 seconds. [Appellant’s]
     eyelids showed tremors[,] which points to potential recent
     marijuana usage. [Appellant] proceeded to the walk and turn
     test[,] which indicated eight out of eight possible clues of
     impairment. The trooper noted[, with respect to the walk and turn
     test,] that the decision point to arrest roadside only requires two
     of the eight validated clues of impairment. Id. at 39.

           The next test was the one leg test, which [Appellant]
     demonstrated three out of four clues of impairment on his first
     attempt and two out of four on the second attempt. [Appellant]
     also demonstrated a great lack of attention to counting on this
     test. Id. Next was the finger to nose test, which showed
     [Appellant’s] lack of perception of distance. [Trooper Treadway]

                                    -3-
J-S22044-23

     then checked [Appellant’s] vital signs, which indicated that his
     pulse was elevated, blood pressure [was] elevated and body
     temperature [was] normal.          The eye exam showed that
     [Appellant’s] eyes were dilated above the DRE (Drug Recognition
     Evaluation) range and there was a yellow-green coating on his
     tongue, both of which indicate recent cannabis usage.
     [Appellant’s] third pulse check was elevated. The trooper asked
     [Appellant] about his drug usage and explained the results of the
     evaluation. [Appellant] stated that he smoked medical marijuana
     four or five hours [before arriving at the PSP barracks]. Trooper
     Treadway recommended to Trooper Dahlstrom that [Appellant] be
     transported to the hospital for a blood test. Id. at 40.

            Trooper Treadway also gave his opinion, as a DRE expert,
     that [Appellant] “was not currently safe to operate a motor vehicle
     in the Commonwealth and that was due to recent cannabis
     usage.” Id. at 40-41. His opinion was rendered based on his
     training and experience to a reasonable degree of DRE certainty.
     Id. Commonwealth’s Exhibit “6,” the drug influence evaluation
     report, was admitted without objection.          Trooper Treadway
     testified that [during Appellant’s arrest,] he overheard [Appellant]
     and Trooper Dahlstrom talking about what would happen to
     [Appellant’s] car since he drove [to the PSP barracks] and there
     was no other driver to remove it from the barracks. Id. at 42.
     Trooper Treadway testified that [Appellant] did acknowledge that
     it was his car. Id. Trooper Treadway testified that he did not
     have knowledge of [Appellant’s] admission to Trooper Dahlstrom
     that [Appellant had] smoked marijuana earlier that day prior to
     conducting the drug recognition evaluation. Id. at 47.

           The Commonwealth called Donna Pepsun to testify. The
     parties stipulated that Ms. Pepsun would testify as an expert in
     toxicology. She is a forensic toxicologist with NMS Laboratories
     and prepared a report on [Appellant’s] blood specimen in this
     case. Id. at 4-5. The report was submitted into evidence as
     Commonwealth’s Exhibit “2” with no objection. She testified that
     she found 15 nanograms per milliliter of Delta-9 THC, 85
     nanograms per milliliter of Delta-9 Carboxy THC and 3.7
     nanograms per milliliter of 11-Hydroxy Delta-9 THC in the blood
     specimen. Id. at 9-10. She testified that these levels indicate
     acute use of marijuana, i.e., use of marijuana within a couple of
     hours of the blood draw. Id. at 11. “Especially associated with
     smoking marijuana.” Id. at 13.

                                    -4-
J-S22044-23

Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/23, at 2-3.

       Appellant’s non-jury trial occurred on July 8, 2022.2    The trial court

found Appellant guilty of two counts of DUI—controlled substance. On August

24, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve 72 hours to 6 months

in jail, and imposed a $1,000 fine.3

       Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion (PSM) on August 26,

2022. Appellant claimed he was entitled to judgment of acquittal because

the evidence was insufficient to convict him of DUI. PSM, 8/26/22, ¶¶ 8-11,

16. He further stated: “[Appellant] also asks the [c]ourt to reconsider the

affirmative defense that he was ‘entrapped’ by the State Police in actual

effect….”     Id. ¶ 12; id. ¶ 13 (“The defense was not rebutted by the

Commonwealth.”).          Finally, Appellant asked the trial court to “stay the

imposition of [] sentence pending post-sentence litigation.” Id. ¶ 21.

       By order entered October 13, 2022, the trial court granted Appellant’s

request to stay the imposition of sentence, but denied the PSM in all other

____________________________________________

2 Appellant raised the affirmative defense of entrapment.
                                                       See N.T., 7/8/22,
at 65-66 (Appellant’s counsel arguing entrapment defense and asking trial
court to “consider” the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury
Instruction on entrapment, Pa. SSJI (Crim.) 8.313).

3 The trial court imposed no penalty on Appellant’s DUI conviction at 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2).

                                           -5-
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respects.4 This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant raises three issues for review:

       I.   Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to
            prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] actually
            drove or operated a motor vehicle while under the influence to
            sustain his conviction?

       II. Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to
           sustain [Appellant’s] conviction for driving under the influence
           when it relied solely upon the mere presence of marijuana in
           [Appellant’s] blood without proving any kind of impairment
           since it was uncontested that [Appellant] had lawfully
           prescribed medical marijuana?

       III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred as a
            matter of law when it did not credit [Appellant’s] “entrapment”
            defenses at his bench trial and subsequently denied
            [Appellant’s] post-sentence motion asking for judgment of
            acquittal?

Appellant’s Brief at 10 (capitalization modified).

       Because Appellant’s first two issues are related, we address them

together. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

convictions of DUI—controlled substance. See id. at 17-28. He initially claims

the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “was

driving, operating, or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.” Id. at 22.

____________________________________________

4 In its order, the trial court stated that it held a hearing on Appellant’s PSM

“on September 23, 2022.” Order, 10/13/22. However, the certified record
does not contain a docket entry or transcript of the hearing. See Order,
9/12/22 (scheduling hearing on the PSM for September 23, 2022).

                                           -6-
J-S22044-23

According to Appellant, the “Commonwealth relie[d] solely upon Appellant

appearing at the PSP [b]arracks as circumstantial evidence that he was driving

… or being in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle.” Id. at

20. Appellant emphasizes the “Commonwealth presented no evidence of the

alleged vehicle driven, no evidence of ownership or operation, … [or] evidence

as to keys or other indicia of driving.” Id. at 22.

      In his second issue, Appellant

      challenges the legality and sufficiency of the evidence as to the
      essential element of driving, operating, or being in actual physical
      control of a motor vehicle while impaired. … Appellant has
      averred that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction
      as the Commonwealth did not present any actual evidence of his
      level of impairment and relied solely upon the per se illegal nature
      of [m]arijuana.

Id. at 24 (emphasis in original).       Appellant further claims there is an

impermissible conflict between Pennsylvania’s Medical Marijuana Act (MMA),

35 P.S. §§ 10231.101-10231.2110, and the statutory provisions under which

Appellant was convicted, 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i) and 3802(d)(2).

Appellant’s Brief at 27-28.

      Contrary to Appellant, the Commonwealth claims the DUI convictions

are supported by “sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove [Appellant]

drove or operated his vehicle on the incident date[,]” including Appellant’s

admission to police that he drove to the PSP barracks. Commonwealth Brief

at 5. The Commonwealth emphasizes this Court’s holding in Commonwealth

v. Young, 904 A.2d 947 (Pa. Super. 2006), that “an eyewitness is not

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J-S22044-23

required to establish one was driving, operating, or in actual physical control

of a motor vehicle, but, rather, the Commonwealth may establish the same

through wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 954; Commonwealth Brief at

11.

       The Commonwealth also claims, “Regardless of whether the marijuana

[in Appellant’s system] was medical or not, the current state of the law in

Pennsylvania still prohibits one from driving with any amount of marijuana in

their system.”5 Id. at 6. According to the Commonwealth, “until the General

Assembly amends the Vehicle Code to address the conflict with the Medical

Marijuana Act, [Appellant] is not entitled to the relief he now seeks.” Id. at

14.

       Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a

question of law and is subject to plenary review under a de novo standard.6

Commonwealth v. Smith, 234 A.3d 576, 581 (Pa. 2020). When reviewing

a sufficiency challenge, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at

trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most

____________________________________________

5 The Commonwealth accurately states: “While it is true that [Appellant] told

the state police he had a prescription for medical marijuana, there is nothing
in the trial record qualifying as veritable proof that [Appellant] actually is a
person authorized to obtain and use medical marijuana.” Commonwealth
Brief at 14-15 (citation and footnote omitted).

6 To the extent Appellant’s second issue implicates statutory interpretation,

we apply a de novo standard of review and plenary scope of review.
Commonwealth v. Watts, 283 A.3d 1252, 1255 (Pa. Super. 2022).

                                           -8-
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favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to prove every element of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d

887, 889 (Pa. Super. 2011). “[T]he facts and circumstances established by

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.”

Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 740 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc)

(citation omitted). “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving

every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly

circumstantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the trier of fact has

the authority to determine the weight of the evidence and credibility of the

witnesses and is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Id. at 741.

      With respect to DUI, the Motor Vehicle Code (MVC) provides:

      (d) Controlled substances. – An individual may not drive,
      operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
      vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

         (1) There is in the individual’s blood any amount of a:

            (i) Schedule I controlled substance, as defined in …
            The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic
            Act[.]

                                    ***

         (2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
         combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the
         individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual
         physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i) and (d)(2).

      Regarding Subsection 3802(d)(1)(i), this Court has stated, “for the

Commonwealth to meet its burden of proof [under this Subsection], it need[s]

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to prove: (1) that [a]ppellant was in actual physical control or operated the

motor vehicle and (2) that he had a schedule I controlled substance in his

blood.”    Commonwealth v. May, 271 A.3d 475, 480 (Pa. Super. 2022).

There     is   no    requirement   under      Subsection    3802(d)(1)(i)   that   the

Commonwealth establish the defendant was impaired while driving, id., unlike

Subsection          3802(d)(2),    which      requires     proof   of   impairment.

Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 42 A.3d 302, 307 (Pa. Super. 2012). With

respect to Subsection 3802(d)(2), our Supreme Court has explained that the

statute does not require “expert testimony to establish that the defendant’s

inability to drive safely was caused by ingestion of a drug, even if it is a

prescription drug, or drug combination.”            Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32

A.3d 1231, 1238 (Pa. 2011).

        In addition, the MVC provides: “The fact that a person charged with

[DUI] is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or controlled substances is

not a defense to a charge of [DUI].” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3810.

        The MMA permits qualifying individuals to lawfully consume marijuana

in Pennsylvania. See 35 P.S. §§ 10231.101-10231.2110. Notwithstanding,

the list of Schedule I controlled substances set forth in the Controlled

Substances Act (CSA) currently includes marijuana. See 35 P.S. § 780-

104(1)(iv); Commonwealth v. Dabney, 274 A.3d 1283, 1291 (Pa. Super.

2022) (“[M]edical marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance for

                                           - 10 -
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purposes of Section 3802(d)(1).”); Watts, 283 A.3d at 1256 (applying

Dabney).

     This Court has expressly held: “[B]ecause the MMA does not address

driving and marijuana, but the [MVC] does, these statutes are not

conflicting. Consequently, it is illegal to drive with any amount of

marijuana, medical or otherwise, in one’s system.” Watts, 283 A.3d at

1256 (emphasis added; footnote and citation omitted).      Watts also relied

upon this Court’s en banc decision in Commonwealth v. Stone, 273 A.3d

1163 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), where we noted that although

     the MMA anticipates the removal of marijuana from Schedule I,
     …[t]o date, the General Assembly has not enacted legislation
     amending the MMA, CSA, or the DUI statutes to remove marijuana
     from its Schedule I designation under state law.

Id. at 1172 (citation, footnotes, and brackets omitted). The Court continued:

     Given the newness and temporary programmatic nature of the
     MMA, its interpretation could change such that its juxtaposition
     with Pennsylvania DUI statutes may be altered through legislative
     action or other changes to federal and state law as well as the
     appellate disposition of our Supreme Court. However, at this
     juncture as an appellate court, we are charged to interpret the law
     as it is now, not what we want it to be, or what it might be in the
     future. See Commonwealth v. Ruffin, … 16 A.3d 537, 543 n.12
     (Pa. Super. 2011). … [M]arijuana remains a Schedule I controlled
     substance under current Pennsylvania law and, therefore, the
     Commonwealth is not required to prove that the marijuana in an
     individual’s bloodstream is non-medical marijuana for purposes of
     proving DUI.

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Stone, 273 A.3d at 1174 (footnotes omitted);7 see also Watts, 283 A.3d at

1256 n.2 (“It is not within this Court’s authority to modify the law but only to

interpret it as written.”).

       Instantly, the trial court concluded that Watts is controlling. Trial Court

Opinion, 1/3/23, at 4.        We agree.        Appellant acknowledges the holding in

Watts, Appellant’s Brief at 24-27, but claims it was wrongly decided,

“inconsistent with the law and science,” and results in the preposterous result

that “every user of medical marijuana is per se DUI regardless of the question

of impairment.” Id. at 26 (punctuation modified); see also id. at 27 (noting

the “Pennsylvania Legislature currently is working to remedy [the] conflict

[between the MMA and DUI statutes] through the introduction of Senate Bill

No. 363, Session of 2023”). However, unless and until our General Assembly

takes action to amend the statutes, we must apply existing law. Stone, 273

A.3d at 1174 (“as an appellate court, we are charged to interpret the law as

it is now, not what we want it to be, or what it might be in the future.”).

____________________________________________

7 We further observed:

   “Other states have designated medical marijuana as a Schedule II
   controlled substance for purposes of state law, while non-medical
   marijuana remains classified as a Schedule I controlled substance.
   See, e.g., MCL 333.7212(1)(c), 333.7214(e) (Mich.); R.C.
   3796.01(B) (Ohio), Ohio Admin. Code 4729:9-1-01(D)(23).”

Stone, 273 A.3d at 1172 n.12 (emphasis in original).

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J-S22044-23

      The trial court cogently explained its rationale for rejecting Appellant’s

claim that the Commonwealth failed to prove all elements of 75 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 3802(d)(1)(i) and (d)(2):

      The record reveals [Appellant] told Trooper Dahlstrom that he
      drove to the barracks that evening. No one else was in the vehicle
      or outside the vehicle when [Appellant] arrived. [Appellant] spoke
      with the trooper about arranging to have someone drive the
      vehicle off the barracks property. [Appellant] acknowledged that
      it was his car and told Trooper Dahlstrom that he drove himself to
      the barracks. This court viewed the evidence, along with all
      reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth. To that end, this court concluded [Appellant]
      drove himself to the barracks that evening and that there is no
      merit to this issue.

                                    ***

      Contrary to [Appellant’s] argument, both troopers testified to
      [Appellant’s] impairment. Trooper Dahlstrom’s first encounter
      with [Appellant] in the barracks lobby alerted him to possible
      impairment. Trooper Treadway’s lengthy drug evaluation led to
      the conclusion that [Appellant] was impaired for purposes of
      establishing DUI violations. The blood test results confirmed the
      presence of acute use of marijuana.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/23, at 4 (emphasis added).

      The trial court’s reasoning is supported by the record and the law. See

id. We thus conclude the trial court, sitting as fact-finder, did not abuse its

discretion in finding that the evidence sufficiently proved all elements of DUI—

controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bowens, supra (fact-

finders are free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence); Young, 904

A.2d at 954 (for a DUI conviction, the Commonwealth can prove the

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defendant’s control of a vehicle through wholly circumstantial evidence).

Accordingly, Appellant’s first and second issues do not merit relief.

      In his final issue, Appellant claims the trial court erred in rejecting his

entrapment defense at trial and in his PSM. See Appellant’s Brief at 29-34.

Appellant emphasizes Trooper Dahlstrom’s testimony about how he initiated

contact with Appellant:

      We were told … [about] a possible residence [Appellant] was at
      that [the PSP] went to. [Upon arriving at Appellant’s suspected
      residence, PSP did not find Appellant, but spoke with] … some
      associates of [Appellant,] who then agreed to call [Appellant] via
      the [social media application] Snapchat[,] at which point
      [Appellant] agreed he would meet us back at PSP Butler.

N.T., 7/8/22, at 27-28; Appellant’s Brief at 31.

      According to Appellant:

      Law enforcement sought out Appellant.           Law enforcement
      contacted Appellant through an unknown third-party Snapchat
      user. … Law enforcement directed Appellant to appear at the
      [PSP] barracks and directed him out of his house, enticed him to
      put himself in the position to be DUI given his medical marijuana
      usage. … Appellant avers that PSP employed a method of
      persuasion and induced him to appear at the Barracks. The
      actions of law enforcement created a substantial risk that, given
      Appellant’s medical marijuana usage, he was violating Section
      3802(d) when he was not otherwise committing an offense.

Id. at 32 (some capitalization modified). Appellant claims he “established the

[improper police] conduct, through cross-examination, to a preponderance of

the evidence standard.” Id. at 33.

      The Commonwealth counters that the trial court properly rejected the

entrapment defense, which Appellant failed to prove beyond a preponderance

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of the evidence.    See Commonwealth Brief at 18-21.         According to the

Commonwealth,

      the state police in no way entrapped [Appellant] into committing
      a DUI offense. Trooper Dahlstrom merely asked [Appellant] to
      come to the state police barracks in order to serve him with a PFA.
      The trooper had no knowledge that [Appellant] had recently
      smoked marijuana, or that he would even drive himself to the
      barracks, all factors supporting the Commonwealth’s position that
      police did not induce or encourage [Appellant] to drive while under
      the influence of marijuana.

Id. at 18.

      The Crimes Code defines the defense of entrapment, in pertinent part,

as follows:

      A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation
      with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose
      of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces
      or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting
      such offense by … employing methods of persuasion or
      inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense
      will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to
      commit it.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 313(a)(2).        Section 313 further provides that a defendant

raising an entrapment defense bears the burden of proving the defense

beyond a preponderance of the evidence.             Id. § 313(b); see also

Commonwealth v. Watson, 292 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa. Super. 2023) (defining

“preponderance of the evidence” as “tantamount to a more likely than not

inquiry.” (citation omitted)).

      Pennsylvania courts apply an objective test when evaluating an

entrapment defense. Commonwealth v. Marion, 981 A.2d 230, 239 (Pa.

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Super. 2009); see also Commonwealth v. Joseph, 848 A.2d 934, 939 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (“the inquiry focuses on the conduct of police, not the

predisposition of the defendant.”). This Court has explained:

      Merely affording the opportunity, through police artifice and
      stratagem, for the commission of a crime by a person who already
      has the requisite intent is not entrapment. Rather, the defense of
      entrapment is aimed at condemning certain impermissible
      conduct which falls below standards for the proper use of
      governmental power.

Joseph, 848 A.2d at 939 (citations, ellipses and quotation marks omitted).

“Where police do no more than afford appellant an opportunity to commit an

illegal act, their actions are not considered sufficiently outrageous police

conduct to support an entrapment defense.”           Marion, 981 A.2d at 239

(citations and quotation marks omitted).       Therefore, the availability of the

entrapment defense does not preclude police from acting “so as to detect

those engaging in criminal conduct and ready and willing to commit further

crimes should the occasion arise.       Such indeed is their obligation.”    Id.

(citation omitted).

      Instantly, the trial court, sitting as fact-finder, explained:

      The testimony at trial reveals no evidence of entrapment. Trooper
      Dahlstrom testified that he attempted to serve [Appellant] with
      the emergency PFA in the field. When that was unsuccessful, he
      was able to contact [Appellant] and asked him to come to the
      barracks to be served. No trickery or deception is evident from
      the record, nor do the tactics used by the police indicate that a
      law-abiding person would be led to commit a crime.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/3/23, at 5.

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      Again, our review reveals that the trial court’s reasoning is supported

by the record and the law, and we agree with its conclusion. See id. The

record belies Appellant’s claim that “PSP employed a method of persuasion

and induced him to appear at the [b]arracks.” Appellant’s Brief at 32. We

are also persuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument:

      [Appellant] equates entrapment with the fact that the trooper
      asked him to come to the barracks, which then left him no choice
      but to drive himself while under the influence of his medical
      marijuana. This argument misstates the entrapment analysis, as
      [Appellant] attempts to characterize himself as entrapped
      because he happened to use medical marijuana, not whether
      Trooper Dahlstrom actually emboldened [Appellant’s] marijuana
      usage.

Commonwealth Brief at 20; see also id. at 21 (correctly noting, “Trooper

Dahlstrom clarified at trial that he did not give [Appellant] any explicit

instruction on how to get to the barracks.” (citing N.T., 7/8/22, at 28-29, 32-

33)). The PSP did “no more than [to] afford [A]ppellant an opportunity to

commit an illegal act.” Marion, 981 A.2d at 239 (“Where police do no more

than afford appellant an opportunity to commit an illegal act, their actions are

not considered sufficiently    outrageous     police   conduct   to   support   an

entrapment defense.” (citations omitted)); see also Pa. SSJI (Crim.) 8.313

(“A defendant is not entrapped merely because the police gave him or her an

opportunity to commit a crime or merely because the police outwitted him or

her.”). For these reasons, Appellant’s third issue does not merit relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/28/2023

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