Court Opinion

ID: 9518090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:42:52.490388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:19.054263
License: Public Domain

*418ALEXANDER, J.,
dissenting.
[¶ 52] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 53] The Court’s action today licenses the Board of Environmental Protection (Board) to invoke the unreasonable interference with scenic or aesthetic uses standard in 38 M.R.S. § 480-D(l) (2008), to approve or reject proposed shorefront improvements solely on the basis of whether the Board, or project opponents, like the looks of the project or not. As is often said: “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” Because standards of beauty or aesthetics are essentially personal and unquantifiable, our constitutional due process standards do not permit the approval or disapproval of applications to be based on vague standards such as beauty or aesthetics that can be arbitrarily and capriciously applied without giving any guidance as to what is necessary for approval or disapproval.
[¶ 54] The Board’s support for its rejection of the Ulianos’ proposed dock is stated across ten single-spaced pages of rambling and obscure reasoning. In its order, the Board concludes that the dock “would have a significant adverse impact on the scenic and aesthetic value of the wetland” and “on the uses of the area by boaters in Eastern Bay and, in particular, kayakers and small boat users who frequent the near shore area.” The Board appears to justify rejecting the application by noting that “the proposed pier would be in a viewshed that is not extensively developed.” The Board did not define “viewshed” for us, but it appears to mean what you can see from somewhere else — ■ particularly a nearby, private club whose members led the opposition to the Ulianos’ project. Thus, the Board observes that “[t]he visual impact of the proposed project on boaters in Eastern Bay would diminish with increased distance, but the pier would continue to be visible at many points throughout the Bay especially when reflecting the sunlight.”
[¶ 55] The Board seems to conclude that since others, particularly “beach combers,” “boaters,” “kayak groups,” and members of the nearby private club, could see the Ulianos’ proposed pier, and it would represent an alteration of their “viewshed,” the proposal would unreasonably interfere with existing scenic and aesthetic uses.9 If this proposal can be rejected on this basis, then any alteration of any existing shorefront, lakefront or riverfront can be similarly rejected. Most areas with such waterfronts have them own unique natural beauty. None of the language in 38 M.R.S. § 480-D(l), the Board’s regulations, or the Board’s order provides any hint of what an applicant could present to win approval of a change in the waterfront once neighbors or water users object that the project might change their “viewshed” in some way.
[¶ 56] We have held repeatedly that findings in administrative orders, when required by law, must be sufficiently specific to permit understanding and meaningful appellate review. Schwartz v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 2006 ME 41, ¶ 10, 895 A.2d 965, 970; Hannum v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 123, ¶12, 832 A.2d 765, 769. See also 5 M.R.S. § 9061 (2008); 1 M.R.S. § 407(1) (2008). In fact, we said the same thing in our previous remand of this case. Uliano v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot. (Uliano I), 2005 ME 88, ¶¶ 23-25, 876 A.2d 16, 21-22.
*419[¶ 57] Despite our direction in the prior remand, the Superior Court found that the Board’s rambling narrative did not permit meaningful appellate review.
It is clear that the Board’s “findings” are done in a narrative format that does not make for meaningful appellate review in accordance with the direction of the Law Court in its 2005 review of this matter [citing Uliano /].
[¶ 58] If our prior precedent is to be respected, that finding alone should require a remand for clear findings that facilitate meaningful appellate review. As the trial court found, when an administrative agency “fails to make sufficient and clear findings of fact and such findings are necessary to judicial review, we will remand the matter to the agency or board to make the findings.” Carroll v. Town of Rockport, 2003 ME 185, ¶ 30, 837 A.2d 148, 157; see also Christian Fellowship & Renewal Ctr. v. Town of Limington, 2001 ME 16, ¶¶ 11-19, 769 A.2d 834, 838-41. Sufficient, clear findings are particularly important if an agency acts pursuant to a vague standard that is difficult to quantify.
[¶ 59] In Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, 752 A.2d 183, we held that an ordinance that required a project applicant to show that a project would “conserve natural beauty” was unconstitutionally vague and violative of due process standards. That standard, like the scenic and aesthetic uses standard here, provided little direction as to what was required for project approval and invited rejection of applications based on nothing more objec-five than the reviewer’s sense of “beauty.” In Kosalka, we cautioned land use regulatory agencies that individuals seeking to make improvements to their property “are entitled to know with reasonable clarity what they must do under state or local land use control laws to obtain the permits or approvals they seek.” Id. ¶ 12, 752 A.2d at 186.
[¶ 60] Prior to Kosalka, we had struck down an ordinance reliant on a “compatible with existing uses” standard as failing “to articulate the quantitative standards necessary to transform the unmeasured qualities ... into specific criteria objectively usable by both the Board and the applicant. ...” Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d 575, 577 (Me.1987). See also Cope v. Town of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223, 225 (Me.1983) (ordinance void for vagueness that allowed denial of application upon determination that use would “adversely affect the health, safety or general welfare of the public,” or would “alter the essential characteristics of the surrounding property”); Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 241 A.2d 50, 52-54 (Me.1968) (ordinance void for vagueness that allowed denial of application upon determination that use would be “detrimental to the neighborhood”).
[¶ 61] As we noted in Kosalka, a land use control, to pass the due process test, must answer two questions: (1) “what must an applicant do to obtain a permit,” and (2) “under what set of facts should the [Board] grant or deny the application.” 2000 ME 106, ¶ 16, 752 A.2d at 187.10
*420[¶ 62] The Board’s findings applied to Uliano’s application do not suggest answers to either of these questions. Whether something unreasonably interferes with existing scenic and aesthetic uses or alters someone’s “viewshed” are questions that can be answered only in the eyes of the beholder. That standard and its application by the Board offer no “quantitative standards necessary to transform the unmeasured qualities ... into specific criteria objectively usable by both the Board and the applicant....” Wake-lin, 523 A.2d at 577. As every pier, every development, will have some scenic and aesthetic impact, any pier or other alteration of someone’s “viewshed” can be approved or disapproved purely on the whim of the reviewer, without any objective criteria to guide the applicant, appellate reviewers, or future applicants.
[¶ 63] The Board’s order is also ambiguous in its treatment of the “reasonable alternative” requirement. The order appears to apply the reasonable alternative requirement to the application only because the application fails the scenic and aesthetic test in the eyes of the Board beholders. If so, then the invalidity of the scenic and aesthetic test ends the necessity to consider reasonable alternatives. If the reasonable alternative requirement is an independent requirement, then it too has vagueness problems. However, because the scenic and aesthetic uses issue must be resolved in the Ulianos’ favor, fairness requires that the reasonable alternatives issue be reexamined in light of the changed outcome on the dominant scenic and aesthetic uses issue.
[¶ 64] I would vacate the Superior Court’s judgment and remand to the Superior Court for further remand to the Board of Environmental Protection with direction to: (1) determine that the scenic and aesthetic uses standards applied to deny the Ulianos’ application are void for vagueness and inapplicable to the Ulianos’ application, and (2) reconsider the reasonable alternatives issue in light of the determination that the scenic and aesthetic uses criteria are not enforceable and must not be considered in any way in determining the need, if any, to consider any reasonable alternative.

. Significantly, the Board found that the proposed pier would not interfere with actual existing uses such as launching boats from the nearby private club, walking on any existing beach, or boating in the bay. The Board indicated that area where the proposed pier would be constructed was a steep, rocky embankment.

. The Court's opinion attempts to minimize Kosalka and the other opinions in which we have decided that land use control regulations were void for vagueness, suggesting that due process requires more rigorous review of municipal regulations than of State regulations. The Court suggests, therefore, that terms viewed as void for vagueness when appearing in municipal regulations can be viewed as sufficiently specific when appearing in State regulations. This fanciful position is perhaps necessary to allow the Court to distinguish our prior opinions that have found terms very similar to the terms at issue here void for vagueness. But this position is utterly lacking in support in application of our constitutional, due process standards that apply equally to the State and municipalities.