Court Opinion

ID: 9808120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:28:30.880129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:04.217045
License: Public Domain

ClaRK, C. L,
dissenting: The statute of 1901 (chapter 24) forbids anyone to “bring’) any quantity of spirituous liquor, however small, into the county of Burke, for any purpose whatever, even for the owner’s own use (wine excepted), by making it in the county, even out of one’s own grain or fruit. It has been held universally that nothing in the Constitution prevents the expression of the will of the people to that effect by their representatives in the Legislature. It would require much ingenuity to frame a constitutional provision that would enable the Legislature to- forbid the “bringing in” liquor, in any quantity, for any purpose whatever, by its manufacture in the county, and would at the same time disable the people, speaking through their Legislature,' from prohibiting the “bringing it in” across the county line, when manufactured perhaps in an adjoining county.
If there is such a constitutional provision, no one has been able to" find it. Certainly it has not been referred to or pointed out in the opinion of the Court. There is no express power conferred by the Constitution to hold any statute unconstitutional, and such power has not been asserted by any court anywhere outside of the United States. Three centu.ries ago Sir Edward Coke, tentatively but not judicially, put such doctrine forward in England, and he was so completely overwhelmed by the contrary argument by my Lord Bacon that it has never since been recognized as sound doctrine in England, and.has been ever denied since by all the courts of the English-speaking world (and by all others) save this. Here, soon after the Revolution, the courts assumed this power without any constitutional provision conferring it. It has now long been acquiesced in by the courts, but with this well-recognized limitation, that there must be a constitutional *637provision and there must be a statute in conflict with it, and the statute must, “beyond reasonable doubt (Ogden v. Sanders, 12 Wheat., 213; Sutton v. Phillips, 116 N. C., 504; Cooley Const. Lim., 254 [7th Ed.]), conflict with the provision in the Constitution.” A statute cannot be held unconstitutional “on general principles,” nor because the lawyer or lawyers on a court may think that the larger number of lawyers and others in the Legislature have enacted a law unadvisedly or unwisely, or that it is harsh or too comprehensive. If the lawmaking body has jurisdiction of the subject, how it shall legislate upon it is a matter for their discretion. The courts have no veto power.
If the Legislature has power to absolutely prohibit .the manufacture of liquor, in any quantity, for any purpose, it must have the power to prohibit its importation from other points in the State. As to importations across the State line, that point is not before us, but it is notable that every bill now pending in Congress to prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquor into prohibition States is worded like the statute (1907, ch. 806) now before us, and does not restrict the prohibition to such liquor only when imported “with intent to sell.”
Conceding that the provision of the statute before us, which restricts the importation of intoxicating liquor into Burke County in quantity of more than a half-gallon a day by any one person, would forbid the importation of a larger quantity per day by him, even though it might be -for his own consumption, is not that as much as one could safely consume per day, and would not the importation of a larger quantity per person per day be prejudicial to the public health and, pre-sumedly at least, for the use of others ? In limiting each person to a half-gallon per day for his own use (for the law permits no sale) the Legislature was not niggardly. Besides, if the manufacture, though exclusively for one’s own use and out of one’s own apples and peaches, in the county can be forbidden by statute without breaking the Constitution, why *638• cannot tbe importation of the same article across the county .line, in a greater quantity than a half-gallon per day, even for one’s own use, be prohibited by the same power? The truth is that, the Legislature having jurisdiction of the subject, the limitations upon its exercise rest in the wisdom and sound judgment of the Legislature, subject only to review by the people, not by the courts.
The act contains exceptions .allowing importations in unlimited quantity “by druggists for medical purposes” and for use by the hospitals and sanitariums in the county, and it is clear that, even at the limit of one-half gallon per day to each person, enough can be brought in for all necessary and proper purposes. Certainly the ministers can thus get enough for communion purposes, for they cannot buy it after it is brought in, sale being forbidden by the uncontested part of the act. The Legislature was not so liberal when it passed the admittedly valid act forbidding the manufacture of liquor in the county, even for one’s own use, or its sale for the use of others.
The act prohibits the bringing “into” the county of more than one-half gallon of liquor by any person on any one day. By no construction can that be held to forbid the carrying it “through” the county. The theological controversy over the form of baptism was subtle and critical, but it never occurred to anyone to assert that the Greek word eis (into) meant dia (through). Certainly the members of the Legislature must be credited with knowing the difference between two such common Anglo-Saxon words as “into” and “through,” and that, when they forbade any person “bringing into” the county more liquor per day than he could be reasonably supposed to bring for his own use, to-wit, a half-gallon, they did not intend to prohibit “carrying it through” the county. On the contrary, it was exactly what they wished — that, if it got in there in larger quantity, it should be carried on through and out of the county.
If this is a bad law, public opinion as formulated by the *639Legislature placed it on tbe statute book, and the same power can repeal it. The courts should not do so. As General Grant, when President, well observed, “The best way to secure the repeal of a bad law is to enforce it.” It does not make an act unconstitutional that no preceding act like, it has been pass'ed, for this must have been the case at some time of every kind of statute. Every declaration of the legislative will must, when first made, have been without a precedent. “The world moves, and we must move with it.” There are, however, other statutes like this: Laws 1901, ch. 112, “To prohibit the manufacture, sale and importation of liquor into Lincoln and Catawba Counties,” and Laws of 1907, ch. 380, “To prevent * * * the transportation or delivery of intoxicating liquors into Rutherford County” (secs. 2 and 7).
If the Legislature can make it illegal to manufacture liquor at all, it can make it illegal to import it at all. If it has power to make it unlawful to sell it, it can make it unlawful to buy it, for it is the same transaction. It is a vain thing to prohibit liquor being “manufactured” in a county if the Legislature is powerless to prohibit it being “imported” from another county. To “import” is to “bring in” across the county line, either by one’s self or by an agent.
Hoke, J., also dissents from the opinion of the Court.