Court Opinion

ID: 9401918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 17:03:42.613807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.007155
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/14/23 In re Alison S. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

In re ALISON S. et al., Persons                                   B320594
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.                                                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. Nos.
                                                                  19CCJP02693A-C)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

JIMMY G. et al.,

         Defendants and Appellants.

     APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Conditionally affirmed and
remanded with directions.
       John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Jimmy G.
       Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Leonela S.
       Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Veronica Randazzo, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       ______________________
       Leonela S. and Jimmy G., the mother and presumed father
of eight-year-old Alison S., six-year-old Jazper G. and three-year-
old Jaycee G., appeal the juvenile court’s orders denying their
petitions to reinstate reunification services and terminating their
parental rights, contending the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services failed to comply with its duty
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2,
subdivision (b),1 to ask extended family members whether the
children are, or may be, Indian children. They also contend the
juvenile court erred in failing to make the required findings
under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.).
       We agree the Department’s inquiries regarding the
children’s possible Indian ancestry were insufficient;
conditionally affirm the orders denying the petitions to reinstate
reunification services and terminating parental rights; and
remand the matter for full compliance by the Department and
the juvenile court with the inquiry and, if appropriate, notice
provisions of ICWA and related California law.

1     Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
stated.

                                 2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. The Dependency Proceedings
      On August 22, 2019 the juvenile court sustained in part a
dependency petition filed pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), on behalf of Alison and Jazper, finding
true allegations concerning domestic violence between Jimmy
and Leonela, Leonela’s inability to protect the children from
Jimmy’s violence and Jimmy’s history of substance abuse and
mental and emotional issues.2 The court declared the children
dependents of the court, removed them from the custody of their
parents and ordered reunification services and monitored visits
for Leonela and Jimmy.3
      On July 1, 2020 the court sustained the petition filed
pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), on behalf of
Jaycee following his birth, declared Jaycee a dependent child of
the court and removed him from Leonela’s and Jimmy’s custody.
Reunification services were again ordered for both parents.
      Following review hearings pursuant to sections 366.21,
subdivisions (e) and (f), and 366.22 to evaluate Leonela’s and
Jimmy’s progress on their case plans, reunification services were
terminated for both parents for all three children. On
January 10, 2022 Jimmy filed a section 388 petition seeking
reinstatement of reunification services. On March 15, 2022

2     The whereabouts of Oscar C., Alison’s biological father,
were unknown. The court on August 22, 2019 found Jimmy was
Alison’s presumed father.
3     Maternal cousins Michael G. and Jennifer G. were present
in court at the August 22, 2019 disposition hearing. Nothing in
the record indicates they were ever asked about Leonela’s
family’s possible Indian ancestry.

                                 3
Leonela filed a similar section 388 petition. A hearing on the
petitions was scheduled for May 18, 2022, the same date as the
section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing for the
children.
       After argument on May 18, 2022 the court denied the
section 388 petitions. Turning to the proceedings pursuant to
section 366.26, the court found neither Leonela nor Jimmy had
established the beneficial parental relationship exception to
adoption and terminated their parental rights to Jazper and
Jaycee. The court continued the section 366.26 hearing for Alison
to permit the Department to effect proper notice on her biological
father, Oscar C. On August 17, 2022 the court terminated
Leonela’s, Jimmy’s and the biological father’s parental rights to
Alison.
       Leonela and Jimmy filed timely notices of appeal from the
May 18, 2022 orders denying their section 388 petitions and
terminating parental rights to Jazper and Jaycee and from the
August 17, 2022 order terminating parental rights to Alison.
      2. The Department’s ICWA-related Inquiries and Notices
       The ICWA-010(A) form attached to the initial dependency
petition filed April 29, 2019 stated Leonela had denied that
Alison or Jazper had any known Indian ancestry. In her ICWA-
020 form filed April 30, 2019, Leonela checked the box indicating
she had no Indian ancestry “as far as I know.” The same day
Jimmy filed an ICWA-020 form stating he may have Apache
ancestry through the children’s deceased paternal great-
grandmother Petra V.P.G. and paternal grandfather Jose G.
“in Mx.” At the detention hearing the juvenile court deferred
making an ICWA finding as to Alison because of the absence of
her biological father. The court directed the Department to

                                4
investigate Jimmy’s claim and to send ICWA notices as may be
required.
       Jimmy told a Department investigator during a telephone
call on May 29, 2019 that he was affiliated with an Apache Tribe
and had his enrollment number. The following day during an in-
person interview Jimmy explained Petra V.P.G. had been part of
the Tarahumara Tribe, a subdivision of the Apache Tribe. He
understood the tribe was not federally recognized and said he did
not have an enrollment number. The Department’s June 19,
2019 jurisdiction/disposition report advised the court it would
continue to further investigate Jimmy’s Indian ancestry.
       On November 1, 2019 with the filing of the dependency
petition on behalf of Jaycee, Leonela and Jimmy provided new
ICWA-020 forms. Leonela checked the box stating she was or
may be a member or eligible for membership in a federally
recognized Indian tribe and filled in Apache as the tribe’s name.
Jimmy’s indicated he may have Indian ancestry in the Apache or
Tarahumara Tribes. The juvenile court directed the Department
“to interview mother and father and any other knowledgeable
relatives.”4
       A last minute information report filed February 20, 2020
stated the Department had asked Leonela about Indian ancestry
and requested relative information. Leonela indicated she did

4     When it sustained the second amended petition on behalf of
Alison and Jazper on August 22, 2019, the juvenile court found it
had no reason to know either child was an Indian child. All
parties agree that initial no-ICWA finding was superseded by
subsequent orders of the court directing the Department to
further investigate Alison, Jazper and Jaycee’s possible Indian
ancestry.

                                5
not have information for her relatives to include on ICWA
notices.
       As reported to the court on July 1, 2020, on March 24, 2020
the social worker spoke to Barbara V., the maternal
grandmother, “who provided some relative information.” The
report continued that Barbara V. provided the telephone number
for the maternal great-great-aunt, Adal L., who also “provided
some ICWA relative information.” The substance of the
information provided by Barbara V. and Adal L. was not
described (that is, whether it directly concerned the family’s
possible Indian ancestry, consisted of biographical information
for inclusion on ICWA-030 notices such as the place of relatives’
births or was simply further contact information).
       On June 26, 2020 the social worker spoke to paternal aunt
Jennifer N., who provided relative information for use in ICWA
notices. Jennifer N. told the social worker Lidia G., the paternal
grandmother, and Francisca M., a paternal great-grandmother,
lived with her and only spoke Spanish. The social worker
reported to the court that she told Jennifer N. the Department
would arrange for someone to speak to those relatives to obtain
accurate information for the ICWA-030 notices. The record does
not reflect that any follow-up with the Spanish-speaking relatives
occurred.
       At the jurisdiction hearing on Jaycee’s petition on July 1,
2020, the court asked Jimmy whether he had Indian ancestry.
Jimmy responded he had ancestors who were members of native
tribes in central Mexico that migrated to New Mexico where they
“became Apaches.” Describing the question as “complex enough,”
the court directed the Department to make sure it had all
available information and to allow the Apache Tribe and the

                                6
federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to sort it out. The court
observed, “Basically it’s up to the Apache Tribe to decide whether
such a person is eligible for membership or not. I think we do
need to wait and see what the tribal authorities say.” The court
then addressed Leonela and asked whether she had Indian
ancestry. Leonela responded, “My mother does know, but she has
to find out from her aunt that knows somebody that has—that
was registered to it.” The court noted that it sounded like
information was still being gathered on the maternal side, as well
as the paternal side, and directed the Department to continue
working with both parents and speaking to their relatives to
develop all available information for inclusion in ICWA notices to
the tribes and the BIA.
       On September 16, 2020 the Department’s investigator
contacted maternal aunt Diana C., who said she did not know
anything about being Native American and told the investigator
the maternal grandmother did not want to discuss the matter.
(Leonela, who had been adopted as a teen by her maternal uncle
Jose G. and his wife, had previously disclosed she did not speak
to her mother.) Diana also stated, “My sister just wants to have
the kids placed on a reservation because she wants it to be easier
to get the kids back.” Also on September 16, 2020 the
investigator spoke to maternal aunt Marilyn S., who said she had
no information regarding the family’s Indian ancestry but
provided biographical information regarding the maternal
grandmother and grandfather.
       The following day, September 17, 2020, at the six-month
review hearing for Alison and Jazper and the disposition hearing
for Jaycee, Leonela asserted she had Indian ancestry (tribe
unknown) through her aunt Ethel (the children’s maternal great-

                                7
aunt).5 The court directed the Department to attempt to reach
the maternal great-aunt, gather any information she might have
and then provide notice under ICWA. The court set a
nonappearance progress review date (initially for November 18,
2020) to further address ICWA issues.
      Both Leonela and Jimmy provided additional information
concerning the children’s lineage in late December 2020. Jimmy
reported that he had spoken to the children’s great-grandmother
Francisca M., who told Jimmy she was unaware whether anyone
in the family “has a tribal number, lived or went to school on a
reservation.” The Department stated it had contacted maternal
great-aunt Virgie V., who said she had no knowledge of any
potential Indian ancestry.
      On December 30, 2020 the Department mailed ICWA-030
notices to the BIA and to the Secretary of the United States
Department of the Interior on behalf of Alison, identifying
Leonela and Oscar C. as her parents, her maternal grandmother
(Barbara V.) and both maternal great-grandmothers (Pilar G.V.
and Lucina V.). On the same day the Department mailed
ICWA-030 notices to the seven federally recognized Apache
Tribes, as well as to the BIA and the Secretary of the Interior, on
behalf of Jazper and Jaycee, identifying the children’s parents,
paternal grandparents (Lidia G. and Jose V.P.), maternal
grandparents (Barbara V. and Octavio S.), one maternal great-
grandmother (Lucina V.) and all four paternal great-

5     We recognize that many modern genealogists and family
historians suggest the terms grandaunt and great-grandaunt are
more accurate than great-aunt and great-great-aunt.
( [as of June 14, 2023]; archived at
https://perma.cc/6VKL-PL57.)

                                 8
grandparents (Francisca M., Petra V.P.G., Rogelio D. and
Leonardo G.).6
       In a January 28, 2021 last minute information report, the
Department advised the court that the Tonto Apache Tribe had
indicated there was no ancestral history for Jazper and Jaycee
and the Yavapai Apache Nation stated Jazper was not eligible for
tribal membership. According to the report, all other certified
mail receipts for the ICWA-030 notices remained pending.
        At the January 29, 2021 progress hearing, set by the
Department to complete ICWA requirements, the court, referring
to the Department’s last minute information report, observed
that some ICWA notices were still outstanding. Accordingly, the
court put the matter over to the next hearing date, March 18,
2021 (the 12-month-review for Alison and Jazper and six-month
review for Jaycee).7 However, notwithstanding the court’s
deferral of the ICWA issue, the minute order for the January 29,
2021 hearing recited: “The Court finds that the Department has
completed notices to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Secretary
of the Interior and the appropriate tribes and finds ICWA does
not apply.”8

6      The ICWA-030 notices contained the dates and places of
birth for many, but not all, of the relatives identified.
7     None of the Department’s reports in the record on appeal
indicates that responses to the ICWA-030 notices were received
from the other five Apache Tribes.
8     We have previously expressed our concern that, when
reviewing the record in dependency cases, we all too often
encounter minute orders that include findings not made and, on
occasion, as here, directly conflict with statements by the court as
reported in the hearing transcript. (See, e.g., In re T.G. (2020)

                                 9
      The status review report for Jaycee’s March 18, 2021
six-month review hearing, apparently relying on the erroneous
minute order, stated the court on January 29, 2021 had found
ICWA did not apply. ICWA was not discussed at the March 18,
2021 hearing, and no ICWA findings were made. Like all other
reports from the Department after January 29, 2021 that even
mentioned ICWA, the March 16, 2022 status report filed before
the hearing on the parents’ section 388 petitions and
section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing stated the
court on January 29, 2021 had found ICWA did not apply. ICWA
was not discussed during those hearings at which parental rights
to Jazper and Jaycee were terminated, and the court made no
express ICWA findings. Similarly, the August 17, 2022 report for
Alison’s section 366.26 hearing again simply stated the court on
January 29, 2021 found ICWA did not apply, and the minute
order terminating parental rights to Alison contained no ICWA
finding.
                          DISCUSSION
       1. ICWA-related Inquiry Requirements
       ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R.
§ 23.101 et seq. (2023)) set minimal procedural protections for
state courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing
them in foster care or adoptive homes. (In re Y.W. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 542, 551.) The statute authorizes states to
provide “‘a higher standard of protection’” to Indian children,
their families and their tribes than the rights provided under
ICWA. (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287-288;

58 Cal.App.5th 275, 298, fn. 20.) This case vividly illustrates the
harmful effect of this continuing practice.

                                10
see 25 U.S.C. § 1921.) In addition to significantly limiting state
court actions concerning out-of-family placements for Indian
children (see In re T.G., at pp. 287-288), ICWA permits an Indian
child’s tribe to intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise
jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding (see 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(c); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8).
       To ensure Indian tribes may exercise their rights in
dependency proceedings as guaranteed by ICWA and related
state law (see In re Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 5), an
investigation of a child’s possible Indian ancestry must be
undertaken and, where appropriate, notice provided to interested
tribes. (See § 224.2, subd. (a) [imposing on the court and child
protective services agencies “an affirmative and continuing duty
to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child”].)
The duty to inquire “begins with the initial contact” (§ 224.2,
subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective
services agencies to ask relevant involved individuals
whether the child may be an Indian child. (In re Rylei S. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316; § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).)
       Section 224.2, subdivision (b), requires the child protective
agency to ask “the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the
child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (See In re
T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 290; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a)(1).) If the court or child protective agency “has
reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding,
but does not have sufficient information to determine that there
is reason to know that the child is an Indian child,” the court and

                                 11
the Department “shall make further inquiry regarding the
possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as
soon as practicable.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (e);
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).) If the further inquiry
“results in a reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the
formal notice requirements of section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S.
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 224.3 [notice under ICWA “shall be provided” if
the court, social worker, or probation officer “has reason to know
. . . that an Indian child is involved”].)
        “‘The duty to develop information concerning whether a
child is an Indian child rests with the court and the Department,
not the parents or members of the parents’ families.’” (In re
Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 317; accord, In re Antonio R.
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 430; In re Benjamin M. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 735, 742 [“the agency has a duty to gather
information by conducting an initial inquiry, where the other
party—here the parent . . . has no similar obligation”].)
      2. The Department Failed To Fully Comply with Its Duty of
         Inquiry Under Section 224.2, Subdivision (b)
       ICWA defines “extended family member,” if not separately
defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe, as “a
person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian
child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-
law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).) Welfare and Institutions
Code section 224.1, subdivision (c), provides “extended family
member” is defined as provided in ICWA.
       The Department’s reports confirmed its social workers or
investigators contacted a number of Leonela’s and Jimmy’s

                                12
extended family members: two maternal aunts, the maternal
grandmother and a paternal aunt, as well as other relatives not
included within the definition of extended family member (a
maternal great-aunt and a maternal great-great-aunt9). The
Department on appeal insists it made a genuine, good faith effort
to investigate the children’s possible Indian ancestry and
contends nothing more is required to comply with section 224.2,
subdivision (b).
       We agree with the Department’s implicit argument that
section 224.2, subdivision (b), does not establish an absolute (and
often impossible) standard mandating that every living extended
family member be interviewed. What is required, however, is
that the Department interview all known and available maternal
and paternal extended family members and make reasonable
efforts to identify and thereafter to interview any other extended
family members, as well as other individuals who have an
interest in the child, regarding the child’s possible Indian
ancestry. Here, although we do not suggest the Department
failed to act in good faith, its efforts fell short.
       Specifically, the Department did not interview, or make
any showing of reasonable efforts to contact and interview, the
children’s maternal grandfather or the two maternal cousins who
attended the disposition hearing. With respect to Jazper and

9     The Department in its respondent’s brief states it
interviewed the children’s maternal great-grandmother, Adal L.
However, the July 1, 2020 last minute information report
identified Adal L. as the children’s great-great-aunt, and its
ICWA-030 notices listed the maternal great-grandmother as
Lucina V.

                                13
Jaycee,10 the Department did not interview either of their
paternal grandparents. Although the Department asserts on
appeal it interviewed the paternal great-grandmother, the report
it cited to support that claim stated only that Jimmy had
described his conversation with that relative to a social worker,
not that the Department’s social worker contacted her (or even
attempted to do so). In addition, the Department identified
numerous other family members in its reports and other
documents whom it did not interview (or explain why it could not
do so), including the paternal great-grandparents, the maternal
great-grandmother and a maternal great-aunt. While it certainly
made a real attempt to determine the children’s possible Indian
ancestry, the Department did not satisfy its duty of inquiry under
section 224.2, subdivision (b). (See, e.g., In re M.B. (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 617, 629-630 [Department did not conduct
adequate inquiry into child’s possible Indian ancestry prior to
terminating parental rights because it failed to contact the child’s
maternal grandmother, did not determine whether the maternal
grandfather was available for an interview and did not ask
ICWA-related questions of a maternal great-aunt who had been
identified as the child’s prospective adoptive parent]; see also In
re Jayden G. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 301, 311 [Department
violated California law by failing to ask maternal and paternal
extended family members about their Indian ancestry despite

10    Because Oscar C., Alison’s biological father, was never
located and never participated in the dependency proceedings,
the Department suggests none of Alison’s paternal family
members could be interviewed about her possible Indian
ancestry. Although that is not necessarily true, we need not
dispute the Department’s contention to decide the case.

                                 14
having contact with maternal grandmother and maternal cousin
and information about paternal grandfather’s residence].)
      3. Remand Is Necessary for Compliance with the
         Department’s and the Juvenile Court’s ICWA-related
         Inquiry Obligations
       In In re Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at page 436, we
explained, “[I]n determining whether the failure to make an
adequate initial inquiry is prejudicial, we ask whether the
information in the hands of the extended family members is
likely to be meaningful in determining whether the child is an
Indian child, not whether the information is likely to show the
child is in fact an Indian child. In most circumstances, the
information in the possession of extended relatives is likely to be
meaningful in determining whether the child is an Indian child—
regardless of whether the information ultimately shows the child
is or is not an Indian child.” (See In re Rylei S., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 325 [“the failure to fully comply with a
mandatory duty may be harmless error, so long as the record
affirmatively reflects that the protections intended to be afforded
through the exercise of that duty have been provided”]; see also
In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 744 [“in ICWA
cases, a court must reverse where the record demonstrates that
the agency has not only failed in its duty of initial inquiry, but
where the record indicates that there was readily obtainable
information that was likely to bear meaningfully upon whether
the child is an Indian child”].)11

11   The issue of the proper standard of prejudice to apply when
the Department has committed ICWA inquiry error is now
pending in the Supreme Court (In re Dezi C. (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 769, review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578).

                                15
       In In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at page 325,
responding to the Department’s mischaracterization of our prior
decisions as holding that any ICWA-related inquiry error, no
matter how trivial, required an automatic reversal, we described
a hypothetical situation in which the agency’s failure to contact
all of a child’s close relatives would not require a remand.12 We
then explained the difference between that example and the case
before us was that the hypothetical agency, “unlike the
Department, made a genuine effort to investigate the child’s
Indian status by complying in good faith with the mandate of
section 224.2, subdivisions (b) and (e).”
       Ignoring the context in which we made that statement, the
Department urges us to find its omissions in this case were
harmless because it acted in good faith, even if imperfectly, and
because none of the relatives contacted indicated the family had
ancestry in a federally recognized tribe. Neither In re Rylei S.,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 309, nor any of our other recent decisions
on the issue of prejudice, held that good faith by the Department
is sufficient to excuse its failure to comply with the express
statutory mandate of section 224.2, subdivision (b). To the
contrary, we have consistently held that, because we do not know
what we do not know, prejudice has been established when the
record reflects that information from extended family members

12    We provided the following hypothetical: “The child
protective agency interviews the maternal grandfather; several,
but not all of his four siblings; and the maternal grandfather’s
surviving parent, none of whom indicates the family has any
Indian ancestry.” (In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 325.) The failure to interview the grandfather’s remaining
siblings, we said, “would certainly be harmless absent some
additional unusual circumstance.” (Ibid.)

                                16
who were not contacted was “likely to be meaningful in
determining whether the children involved were Indian
children—whether the information ultimately showed they were
or established they were not.” (In re Rylei S., at p. 324; accord,
In re Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.)
      That standard of prejudice is clearly satisfied here.
Although Jimmy repeatedly indicated his family may have
Apache ancestry, the Department interviewed only one paternal
aunt; and nothing in the record indicates any effort was made to
contact the paternal grandparents or paternal great-
grandparents, even though their identification on the ICWA-030
notices suggests there may have been contact information
available for at least some of them.13
      The Department’s efforts to interview Leonela’s family
were better but still too incomplete to be considered harmless
error. Maternal cousins who were present in court were never
contacted, nor was the maternal grandfather. And the
Department’s reports are devoid of any information concerning
attempts to contact maternal great-aunt Ethel after she was
identified by Leonela as the person with knowledge of the
family’s tribal ancestry and the juvenile court directed the
Department to attempt to contact her. To be sure, Leonela
seemed to retract her claim of Indian ancestry after growing

13    The Department does not contend any errors in failing to
comply with its obligation to interview extended family members
were harmless because it sent ICWA-030 notices to the seven
Apache Tribes. Nor could it. Those notices omitted much of the
biographical information required by section 224.3,
subdivision (a)(5); and, as the juvenile court repeatedly
recognized in its orders to the Department, one of the purposes of
those interviews is to gather the required information.

                                17
frustrated with the Department’s attempts to develop her family
lineage and further investigate the question. But, as discussed,
the Department’s obligation to interview extended family
members is not dependent on a parent’s statement of Indian
ancestry. Here, responses from additional maternal relatives
would have provided meaningful information with which to
assess Leonela’s earlier assertion of possible tribal ancestry.
      The shortcomings in the Department’s inquiries of
Leonela’s and Jimmy’s extended family members were amplified
by the juvenile court’s failure to exercise its oversight
responsibility. As discussed, at the January 29, 2021 progress
hearing the juvenile court deferred making any ICWA findings
pending receipt of additional responses to ICWA-030 notices sent
by the Department. Due to an erroneous minute order stating
ICWA findings had been made on that date, and the
Department’s repeated reliance on that error in the ICWA section
of subsequent reports, the court never reviewed the adequacy of
the Department’s ICWA inquiries and never made any findings—
express or implied—as to the sufficiency of the evidence in the
record to support a no-ICWA finding. For all these reasons,
remand for full compliance with ICWA-related inquiry and, if
appropriate, notice requirements is necessary.

                               18
                        DISPOSITION
      The orders denying the section 388 petitions and
terminating parental rights are conditionally affirmed. The
matter is remanded to the juvenile court for full compliance with
the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California
law and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

                                     PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur:

            SEGAL, J.

            FEUER, J.

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