Court Opinion

ID: 9483523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:23:00.426644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:40.247648
License: Public Domain

POOLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because Hays could have invoked his right to be present at sentencing using the procedures provided under the IAD, and in light of the fact that he did not exhaust the remedies available to him under the IAD and impeded California’s efforts to procure his presence for sentencing, I respectfully dissent.
The IAD provides two means by which a prisoner may be brought to another state for the disposition of pending charges. Article IV provides that a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged may be made available to a requesting state upon written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities in the state where the prisoner is serving his sentence. See Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 18 U.S.C.App. § 2, art. IV(a). Article III of the IAD provides that a prisoner shall be brought to trial in a state which has lodged a detainer against him within 180 days of his giving notice of the place of his imprisonment and of his request for a final disposition to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction. See id., art. 111(a).
California filed a detainer against Hays on July 16, 1984. The detainer was lodged on July 20, 1984. Once California filed the detainer, Hays became subject to the procedures of the IAD.1
No further action was taken by California or Hays until January 7, 1986, when Hays filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging denial of his right to a speedy trial and California’s waiver of jurisdiction over him by extraditing him to Idaho. The hearing on Hays’s motion was postponed until his case was referred on May 7, 1986, to a probation officer for a supplemental presentencing report. By an order dated May 30, 1986, an Idaho district court quashed California’s detainer, stipulating with Hays that the detainer lodged against him and the subsequent request for custody were in error, presumably because of California’s failure to request custody at the time the detainer was filed. There is no requirement under either the California or Idaho version of the IAD that a state request custody at the time a detainer is *483filed. . See Cal.Penal Code § 1389 (West 1982 & 1992 Supp.); Idaho Code § 19-5001(d)(1) (Michie 1992). The detainer was returned to California on June 6, 1986.
On July 2, 1986, the California court denied the motion to dismiss and sentenced Hays to 12 years imprisonment. The court found that, .by opposing his return to Idaho, Hays waived his right to be present at sentencing, and sentenced him in absentia. Hays has yet to request that he be brought to California under the provisions of the IAD. The question remains whether Hays is entitled to habeas relief; the answer is no.
Other circuits have denied habeas relief when a prisoner has failed to exhaust the state remedies available to- him under the IAD. See Norton v. Parke, 892 F.2d 476, 479-80 (6th Cir.1989) (prisoner challenging extradition action must resort to the remedies provided by the IAD before seeking federal habeas relief), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060, 110 S.Ct. 1533, 108 L.Ed.2d 772 (1990); Grant v. Hogan, 505 F.2d 1220 (3d Cir.1974) (prisoner seeking relief from a detainer lodged against him must pursue his remedies under the IAD before seeking federal habeas relief); cf. Kane v. Virginia, 419 F.2d 1369, 1373 (4th Cir.1970) (petitioner cannot prevail on speedy trial claim in federal habeas corpus proceeding unless he demanded a speedy trial). In the context of a speedy trial claim, the Fourth Circuit in Kane v. Virginia held that a prisoner is entitled to federal habeas relief if: (1) the prisoner demanded a speedy trial; (2) the state failed to make a diligent effort to obtain him for trial; and (3) that he has exhausted his state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by seeking dismissal of the charges against him because of unconstitutional delay. Kane, 419 F.2d at 1373. Foremost among these requirements is a demand by the prisoner for disposition of the case. The Supreme Court has implicitly required such a demand before granting a prisoner relief. See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383-84, 89 S.Ct. 575, 579-80, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969); cf. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 364-65, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1849-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) (defendant’s alleged failure to invoke the IAD did not result in waiver as he had made numerous requests for a speedy trial). Hays has yet to make a demand to be present for sentencing; in fact, he undermined efforts to secure his presence by stipulating with Idaho authorities to the alleged invalidity of the detainer.
The majority notes that under California Penal Code § 1389, California could not sentence Hays in absentia without making a good-faith effort to secure his presence, and finds that California did not use reasonable diligence to procure Hay’s presence. To the contrary, California met the requirements of the IAD and could reasonably conclude that it was in the interests of justice to sentence Hays in absentia. Due process would only have been violated had Hays demanded sentencing and then been denied his right to be present. See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383-84, 89 S.Ct. 575, 579-80, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969) (failure of State to secure a prisoner’s presence for trial against whom it has filed a detainer after repeated demands by the prisoner violates the Due Process Clause) (Opinion of Harlan, J.); cf. id. at 383, 89 S.Ct. at 579 (under the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial, the state has a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good faith effort to bring a prisoner serving a term in another state to trial); Tinghitella v. California, 718 F.2d 308, 313 (9th Cir.1983) (“Even were we to conclude that sentencing is included within the speedy trial guarantee, the constitutional duty of the state to make a diligent, good-faith effort to sentence, and thus petitioner’s right to be sentenced, arises only upon the petitioner’s demand.”).
It is not Hays’s failure to assert his right by itself which constitutes waiver; his actions in quashing the detainer with the knowledge that all that remained of his trial was the pronouncement of sentence, in light of his failure to initiate proceedings under the IAD, constitute waiver. We may, under certain circumstances, infer waiver from a defendant’s acts. See United States v. Edwards, 897 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 560, 112 L.Ed.2d 567 (1990). This is just such a circumstance.
*484The majority rewards Hays for his circumvention of the California criminal justice system, something which I am not willing to do. I dissent.

. Even if the California court had subsequently issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequen-dum to the Idaho prison authorities, the writ would have been construed as a request for custody under the IAD. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 363, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1848, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978).