Court Opinion

ID: 9901268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 16:06:57.971371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:34.294461
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                      No. 22-1471
                               Filed November 21, 2023

STEVEN BOWMAN,
     Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, IOWA
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, IOWA PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS BOARD, and IOWA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
     Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David W. Nelmark,

Judge.

      A self-represented plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of his petition for

judicial review. AFFIRMED.

      Steven Bowman, Ames, self-represented appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Andrew Ewing, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellees.

      Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.

Langholz, J., takes no part.
                                          2

BULLER, Judge.

       The Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) disciplined employee Steven

Bowman in 2019. Instead of submitting a grievance within the agency, Bowman

grieved the discipline directly to the Department of Administrative Services (DAS).

DAS denied the appeal as untimely, and Bowman appealed to the Public

Employment Relations Board (PERB). The State moved to dismiss Bowman’s

appeal to PERB, and PERB granted the motion because a timely appeal to DAS

was required for PERB to acquire jurisdiction. See Iowa Code § 8A.415(2) (2019).

Next Bowman petitioned for judicial review, naming the State, DOT, DAS, PERB,

and the Attorney General1 as defendants. All defendants but PERB moved to

dismiss, arguing Bowman had not perfected timely service. The district court

agreed and dismissed all parties other than PERB before directing Bowman to file

proof of service on PERB within fourteen days. Following a hearing, the district

court dismissed Bowman’s petition based on deficient service. Bowman appeals.

       On review for correction of errors at law, we affirm the district court. See

Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. The plain language of chapter 17A requires either personal

service or service by mail.      Iowa Code § 17A.19(2) (2022).          This service

requirement “shall be jurisdictional.” See id. Bowman did not personally serve

PERB or mail his petition. Thus, his petition was not timely served on its face.

       Bowman asserts an email to a former DAS attorney was sufficient to satisfy

chapter 17A. Emailing a petition to opposing counsel can be sufficient in some

1 An Assistant Attorney General initially appeared for PERB, then withdrew her

appearance, only for the Solicitor General to appear for PERB after the other State
defendants were dismissed. The reasons for this jockeying are described in the
transcript, but we conclude the issue is immaterial to our disposition of this appeal.
                                           3

circumstances.     See Ortiz v. Loyd Roling Constr., 928 N.W.2d 651, 655

(Iowa 2019). But we see two insurmountable problems with Bowman’s argument

here. First, the attorney represented DAS, not PERB or any other defendant, and

the Code requires service on “all parties named in the petition.” Iowa Code

§ 17A.19(2). Second, the attorney had withdrawn from the case before Bowman

e-mailed her, and she no longer represented DAS (or worked for the State).

Bowman knew this, as he e-mailed the attorney at her new private-law-firm email

address. We find the service exception recognized in Ortiz is inapplicable.

       Bowman also suggests he effected service because he believes the

chapter 17A lawsuit was somehow filed in PERB’s electronic filing system. There

is no evidence in this record that the 17A lawsuit was transmitted to the PERB filing

system, only that—as the district court put it—“something was filed with PERB.”

Setting aside any question as to what was filed where, Bowman cites no authority

that filing in another electronic system accomplishes service of original notice for

purposes of litigation. We are aware of none. See generally Iowa Rs. Elec. P.

(regulating the courts’ electronic filing system).

       Finally, we acknowledge Bowman’s various general complaints about state

government. But he cites no legal authority that would justify relief on these bases.

Like the district court, we can understand why Bowman may have felt his attempts

to serve the defendants were adequate. But “jurisdiction does not attach, nor is it

lost, on equitable principles. It is purely a matter of statute.” Cunningham v. Iowa

Dep’t of Job Serv., 319 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Iowa 1982). We are compelled to

enforce the service deadline set by the General Assembly.

       AFFIRMED.