Court Opinion

ID: 9412078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 20:03:56.043176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:26.876421
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/28/23 P. v. Lara CA2/3

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a).
 This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B320246

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                          Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. SA100932
          v.

 KEVIN CHAVEZ LARA,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lauren Weis Birnstein, Judge. Affirmed.
      Linda L. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, William H. Shin and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
            _______________________________________
                         INTRODUCTION
       Defendant Kevin Chavez Lara pled no contest to one count
of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence. The court
placed Lara on summary probation and ordered him to pay
restitution to the victim’s family. Lara contends the court erred
when it included in the amount of victim restitution the attorney
fees the victim’s family incurred in obtaining a settlement from
Lara’s insurance provider. We affirm.

                          BACKGROUND

       In 2019, Lara was driving a car when he hit a curb, drove
over the sidewalk, and crashed into two power poles. Juan Carlos
Lopez, a passenger in Lara’s car, was killed in the crash. Police
found an empty bottle of vodka, a helium tank, balloons, and beer
at the scene. Lara, who had been inhaling helium with Lopez
before the incident, tested positive for cannabis.
       In 2021, Lara pled no contest to one count of vehicular
manslaughter with gross negligence (Pen. Code,1 § 192, subd.
(c)(1)). The court placed Lara on summary probation for one year
and imposed various fines and fees, including $7,500 in
restitution to the California Victim’s Compensation Board.
       In 2022, the court held a restitution hearing. The People
presented the following information about the expenses incurred
by Lopez’s family arising out of the underlying incident. The
family paid $24,006.10 for funeral-related expenses, consisting of:
$21,133 for a burial site and Lopez’s burial; $2,414.10 for a
gravesite plaque and the plaque’s installation; and $448 for
Lopez’s autopsy and a copy of the autopsy report.
       Lopez’s family obtained a civil settlement from Lara’s
insurance policy for $25,000, which was deposited into a client

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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trust account managed by the family’s attorney. The family
received $11,041.67 from that settlement, after various
deductions were made, including $8,333.33 as a contingency fee
paid to the family’s attorney.
      The parties agreed that the family’s total out-of-pocket
expenses, after accounting for the $11,041.67 settlement payment
and other compensation the family received for the accident,
totaled $5,464.43. The court ordered Lara to pay $13,797.76 in
victim restitution, consisting of $5,464.43 for the family’s out-of-
pocket expenses plus $8,333.33 for the amount of attorney fees
the family’s attorney deducted from the insurance policy
settlement.2
      Lara appeals.

                           DISCUSSION

       Lara contends the court erred in calculating the amount of
victim restitution. Specifically, he argues the court awarded
Lopez’s family more than its actual economic losses when it
included the attorney fees that the family incurred in obtaining a
settlement payment from Lara’s insurance provider. As we
explain, the court properly awarded Lopez’s family attorney fees
as victim restitution.
       The California Constitution requires the trial court to order
victim restitution for losses suffered “as a result of criminal
activity.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A).) Restitution

2 The same total—i.e., $13,797.76—can be reached using the following

calculation: $32,339.43 for the family’s total expenses, consisting of
$24,006.10 for funeral expenses plus $8,333.33 for attorney fees paid in
connection with obtaining a settlement payment from Lara’s insurance
provider, less $18,541.67 for compensation the family already received,
consisting of $11,041.67 from the insurance provider’s settlement and
$7,500 from the Victim’s Compensation Board, which the court had
already ordered Lara to pay as restitution.

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must be ordered “in every case in which a victim has suffered
economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct.” (§ 1202.4,
subd. (f).) Economic loss includes, among other things, “[a]ctual
and reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs of collection
accrued by a private entity on behalf of the victim.” (Id., subd.
(f)(3)(H); see also People v. Pinedo (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1403,
1405–1406 (Pinedo).)
       A restitution order serves several purposes, including
indemnifying crime victims for their losses and “rehabilitat[ing]
and deter[ring] the defendant from future criminal activity.”
(People v. Nonaka (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 998, 1002.) Thus, a “civil
settlement between a victim and the defendant’s insurer does not
relieve the defendant of his restitution obligation to the state.”
(Ibid.) Nevertheless, a settlement payment made to a victim on
the defendant’s behalf must be used to offset a restitution award
so far as that payment is “ ‘for items of loss included in the
restitution order.’ ” (Ibid.)
       We review the trial court’s restitution order for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Crisler (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1507.)
       In Pinedo, our colleagues in Division Six held the trial court
properly included as victim restitution a contingency fee paid to
the victim’s attorney who obtained a civil settlement from the
defendant’s insurer. (Pinedo, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1406–
1407.) The court reasoned that the defendant’s drinking and
driving directly caused the victim’s losses that were covered by
the settlement, so the legal expenses the victim incurred to
recover those losses from the defendant’s insurer also resulted
from the defendant’s criminal conduct. (Id. at pp. 1405–1406.)
Since there was no evidence that the defendant’s insurer paid the
victim’s attorney fees and nothing in the record suggested the
settlement was increased to cover those costs, the court rejected
the defendant’s argument that the inclusion of attorney fees in

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the restitution award resulted in a double payment to the victim.
(Id. at p. 1406.)
       The same is true here. The People presented evidence that
Lopez’s family obtained a settlement from Lara’s insurance
provider after Lara crashed his car, the incident underlying
Lara’s conviction. The family was required to pay its attorney a
contingency fee—i.e., one-third of the total settlement—for the
attorney’s help in obtaining that settlement. Lara doesn’t dispute
that but for his criminal conduct, Lopez’s family could not have
pursued a settlement with Lara’s insurer. It follows, then, that
Lopez’s family also would not have incurred $8,333.33 in attorney
fees but for Lara’s criminal conduct. (See People v. Maheshwari
(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1409 [fees that a victim incurs
because of the defendant’s criminal conduct are recoverable as
victim restitution].)
       Nothing in the record suggests Lara’s insurance provider
agreed to pay the family’s attorney fees as part of the $25,000
settlement or that the settlement amount was otherwise inflated
to cover attorney fees. (People v. Fulton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th
876, 886–887 [once the People make a prima facie showing of the
victim’s losses, the burden shifts to the defendant to show those
losses do not qualify for victim restitution].) Consequently, the
attorney fees Lopez’s family incurred in obtaining a settlement
payment from Lara’s insurance provider were “ ‘proper,
necessary, and a logical result of [Lara’s] criminal conduct.’ ”
(Pinedo, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1406.) Nor does an award of
those fees constitute a double payment of restitution to the
victim’s family. (Ibid.) The court, therefore, did not abuse its
discretion when it included the family’s attorney fees as part of
its victim restitution order. (See § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(H).)

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                            DISPOSITION
      The victim restitution order is affirmed.

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                               LAVIN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

      EGERTON, J.

      HEIDEL, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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