Court Opinion

ID: 9891951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 21:05:43.484849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:39.861797
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 221389-U

                                                                         FOURTH DIVISION
                                                                 Order filed: October 19, 2023

                                        No. 1-22-1389

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                           IN THE

                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                       )   Appeal from the
                                                           )   Circuit Court of
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 )   Cook County.
                                                           )
v.                                                         )   No. 97 CR 8756
                                                           )
ERIC VANN,                                                 )   Honorable
                                                           )   Thomas J. Byrne,
       Defendant-Appellant.                                )   Judge, presiding.

       JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment.

                                         ORDER

¶1   Held: The defendant’s newly discovered evidence of actual innocence is both material
           and of a conclusive character and sufficient to survive second-stage dismissal when
           the evidence consists of an affidavit from an eyewitness stating that a codefendant
           actually committed the crime for which the defendant was convicted, and the
           weighing of that new evidence against the other evidence of guilt, including the
           defendant’s own inculpatory statement, is a matter reserved for third-stage
           proceedings.
No. 1-22-1389

¶2     Appellant Eric Vann (“the defendant”) appeals the circuit court’s second-stage dismissal

of his successive petition for postconviction relief filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act

(Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014)). In the petition, the defendant raised a claim of actual

innocence based on an affidavit from an eyewitness asserting that another person had committed

the murder for which the defendant was convicted. The circuit court dismissed the petition on the

basis that the defendant had not shown that this new testimony would probably change the result

on retrial in light of the other evidence of guilt. Because the circuit court’s analysis involved an

inappropriate weighing of the evidence at the second stage of proceedings and because the

defendant has made a substantial showing that the new evidence is of a conclusive character, we

reverse the dismissal of the petition.

¶3     On February 18, 1997, Gracie Binion was shot and killed by a stray bullet from an apparent

gang-related shooting. The defendant was arrested three days later on February 21. Following his

arrest, the defendant was identified in a lineup and later signed a written statement admitting to

having been the shooter.

¶4     A few weeks later, the defendant, who was then seventeen years old, filed a motion to

suppress his written statement, asserting that he was never given his Miranda rights and that the

statement was involuntary and coerced through police intimidation, deception, and pressure. The

circuit court held a hearing on the motion, at which the following testimony was produced.

¶5     Sergeant James Boylan testified that he and several other officers arrested the defendant

around 11:30 p.m. on February 21. The defendant was brought to a police station, placed in a

lineup, and then brought to an interview room. Boylan read the defendant his Miranda rights and

then spoke with the defendant for approximately ten to fifteen minutes. At about 12:30 a.m.,

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No. 1-22-1389

Boylan returned to the room, this time with Assistant State Attorney Vickie Klegman. According

to Boylan, Klegman then again read the defendant his rights, and the defendant indicated that he

understood them.

¶6     Boylan testified that the defendant agreed to speak with him and Klegman and that, when

given several options for how to provide them with a statement, the defendant elected to provide

a written statement. The defendant ultimately signed that statement at around 4:00 a.m. Boylan

denied doing anything to coerce or deceive the defendant, and specifically denied ever telling the

defendant that signing the statement was effectively a not-guilty plea, denied pounding his hand

with his fist, and denied questioning the defendant constantly. Boylan also testified that the written

statement that the defendant signed at 4:00 a.m. contained printed Miranda warnings and that the

defendant’s signature was present under those warnings.

¶7     Klegman’s testimony largely echoed Boylan’s. She testified that she first spoke with the

defendant around 12:30 a.m., at which point she gave the defendant his Miranda warnings and

asked if he wished to give a statement. Klegman gave the defendant three options, one of which

was for Klegman to write down a summary of what the defendant told her. The defendant chose

that option. Klegman then asked Boylan to leave the room, at which point she asked the defendant

how he was doing and how he was being treated. According to Klegman, the defendant “indicated

that he was fine.” Klegman explained to the defendant that she was going to leave to speak with

other people in the station and would return later to take his statement.

¶8     Klegman testified that she then took written statements from two other people in the interim

and returned to take the defendant’s statement at 4:00 a.m. At that time, she again read the

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No. 1-22-1389

defendant his rights as they were printed on the top of the statement form, and the defendant signed

an acknowledgement. She then took the defendant’s statement with Boylan present.

¶9     The defendant, however, gave a very different account of events. He testified that,

following the lineup, two officers brought him into an interview room, where they were joined by

an Assistant State’s Attorney. One officer questioned the defendant for approximately twenty

minutes. According to the defendant, there was an officer next to the officer who was questioning

him and another officer “in the back.” There was always at least one officer in the room at all

times. The defendant stated that “every time the officer that questioned me another officer came,

just constantly came closer towards me, just telling me ‘just say you shot,’ ‘just say this’ and I was

confused.” The defendant also claimed that he was handcuffed to a chair during questioning.

¶ 10   According to the defendant, while Boylan stood about an arm’s length away from him, the

officer standing to the side yelled at him in a threatening manner. This other officer also repeatedly

hit his fist into his palm in a similarly threatening manner. The defendant testified that he was

never read his Miranda rights, but he acknowledged that he generally understood what those rights

were. The defendant further claimed that Boylan told him that, if he signed the written statement,

“my plea would be not guilty towards the statement that they told me to sign.” The defendant also

stated that “[they] told me it would be for my benefit if I signed the papers if I didn’t know nothing

concerning this if my plea would be not guilty towards what they was questioning me for.”

¶ 11   Following this testimony, the circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress,

finding that the defendant had been advised of his rights and that the defendant gave the written

statement freely and voluntarily.

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No. 1-22-1389

¶ 12   The case eventually proceeded to a trial, where the defendant and his codefendant, Michael

Taylor, were tried jointly. The defendant elected a jury trial and Taylor elected a bench trial.

¶ 13   Phylan Jackson testified that she had known Taylor for eight years and the defendant for

five years. At the time of trial, she was in a relationship with Taylor, who was the father of her

child. On February 18, 1997, she was walking home from school when she saw five or six boys

standing on the corner of 61st Street and S. Martin Luther King Drive in Chicago. She heard one

of the boys say, “Look at that n**** standing right there.” She then saw the defendant standing

across the street by an alley off of Vernon Avenue. About fifteen seconds later, Jackson heard

gunshots, and she then started running down 61st Street toward Eberhart Avenue. After she heard

the shots, she saw the defendant walking down Vernon. Jackson never saw the defendant holding

or pointing a gun, and she could not tell where the gunshots had come from.

¶ 14   Michael Cudmore testified that he was in a liquor store at the corner of 61st Street and

King Drive at the time of the shooting. While he was in the store, he heard two gunshots. He then

stepped outside and heard four more shots. He observed the person who fired the shots and

described him as a black male wearing a blue down coat, baggie pants, and sneakers. However,

Cudmore did not believe that he got a good enough look at the suspect’s face to make a reliable

identification. Cudmore testified that the shooter was standing on the sidewalk and was not in an

alleyway. The shooter fired from east to west and then turned and ran to the east towards Vernon

Avenue.

¶ 15   Lindaryl Byrd testified that, at the time of trial, he was in prison for robbery and aggravated

battery, and he admitted to having prior drug charges. In February 1997, Byrd was a member of

the Black Disciples gang (“BD”). He knew the defendant and Taylor and testified that they were

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No. 1-22-1389

members of a rival gang, the Gangster Disciples (“GD”). According to Byrd, the two gangs were

“shooting all the time.”

¶ 16   Byrd testified that, on February 18, 1997, he was on the corner of 61st Street and King

Drive when Taylor got off the bus coming home from school, and the two exchanged words and

threw gang signs. Byrd saw Taylor holding a “silver .380 automatic” handgun, and Taylor said

that he was going to “come back up there and shoot.” Byrd testified that Taylor then left and

returned twenty or thirty minutes later with the defendant, who was driving his red two-door car.

According to Byrd, Taylor stood on the corner and tried to distract Byrd’s group, while the

defendant came “out the alley and shot four times.” Byrd then saw both Taylor and the defendant

run back towards Eberhart Avenue.

¶ 17   On cross-examination, Byrd denied throwing bottles at the defendant’s car, as the

defendant had claimed in his written statement, although he acknowledged that he had on another

occasion. There was also some confusion over whether Byrd saw the defendant actually driving

the red car. When asked when he first saw the defendant, Byrd initially suggested that he only saw

the car and not the driver: “[The defendant] pulled up. I didn't see him. I knew he drove a red two-

door car. I guess he parked on Vernon, went to some little gangway over there and came out the

alley, fired about four shots.” When pressed on this and asked whether he ever saw the defendant

in the car, Byrd replied, “I seen him because he came out the alley we was looking. He fired four

shots ran back towards Eberhart.”

¶ 18   Chicago Police Department forensic investigator John Karalow next testified that he

recovered four .25 semiautomatic cartridge cases from the sidewalk near 405 E. 61st Street. And

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No. 1-22-1389

Illinois State Police forensic scientist Barbara Wilkins further testified that she tested five cartridge

cases for fingerprints but was unable find any.

¶ 19    Sargeant James Boylan testified that on February 20, 1997, he and his partner, Detective

Michael McDermott, received information regarding the homicide at 61st and King and attempted

to locate Taylor. When Boylan learned that Taylor was at school, he and McDermott picked up

Taylor and brought him to the police station. Following a discussion with Taylor, Boylan

attempted to speak with Phylan Jackson, and he eventually spoke with her on the phone around

9:00 p.m. Based on his interactions with Taylor and Jackson, Boylan then sought to find the

defendant. He went to the apartment where the defendant was staying, placed him under arrest,

and brought him back to the station.

¶ 20    Boylan testified that he placed the defendant in an interview room, removed his handcuffs,

and left the room. Boylan returned twenty minutes later, around midnight, with McDermott.

Boylan then read the defendant his Miranda rights and explained why he had been arrested.

According to Boylan, the defendant acknowledged his rights and agreed to speak with them. The

defendant then provided a narrative account of what had happened on the night of the shooting. In

Boylan’s words, “[the defendant] stated that he had observed Michael Taylor on the street and

Michael Taylor had told him that BD had been messing with him earlier in the day. He said later

he heard there had been a shooting up on 61st Street. After that he encountered Mike Taylor again

who handed him a silver handgun and asked him to put it up or hide it for him.”

¶ 21    Boylan then left and had a conversation with Assistant State Attorney Vickie Klegman.

The two returned to the interview room around 12:30 a.m., at which point Klegman interviewed

the defendant.

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No. 1-22-1389

¶ 22   Klegman testified that she was called into the police station around 8:30 p.m. on February

21, 1997. When she arrived, she spoke with Boylan and McDermott, and around 12:30 a.m. she

interviewed the defendant with both detectives present. According to Klegman, the defendant was

not handcuffed when she entered the room. She introduced herself to the defendant and explained

her role, including that she was a prosecutor and not his lawyer. She also informed the defendant

of his Miranda rights, following which he agreed to speak with her. They spoke for about twenty

minutes, at which point Klegman gave the defendant three options for providing a statement, and

he elected to provide a statement in writing. Klegman then asked Boylan to leave the room so that

she could speak to the defendant alone. She asked how he had been treated and he responded that

he had been treated “fine.” She asked if he wanted anything to eat or drink or if he wanted to use

the restroom, and he declined. Klegman explained that she was going to leave to speak with some

other people and would return later, and the defendant said that was fine.

¶ 23   Klegman returned to the room at 4:00 a.m. and took the defendant’s statement with both

detectives present. Before beginning the statement, Klegman again read the defendant his Miranda

rights from a preprinted section of the statement form. The defendant said he understood his rights

and signed an acknowledgement on the form. She then wrote down the defendant’s account of the

shooting, and, when they had finished, she read it aloud back to him and allowed him to make any

corrections. Klegman then took a Polaroid photograph of the defendant and signed the statement.

¶ 24   Klegman then read the statement aloud for the court and the jury. In it, the defendant stated

that on February 18, 1997, he was driving his two-door, rust colored, 1977 Cutlass, with someone

named Will Smith in the passenger seat. The two were driving near 61st Street and King Drive for

about fifteen minutes when the defendant saw Michael Taylor on the corner of 61st and Eberhart.

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No. 1-22-1389

They drove up to Taylor, who was then standing on the passenger side by Smith. Taylor told the

defendant that the BDs were trying to get him when he got off of the bus coming home from

school. Taylor told the defendant to be careful. Taylor then showed the defendant and Smith a gun

that he was carrying. The defendant and Smith then drove away. The defendant dropped Smith off

near a store on 63rd Street and Eberhart, and the defendant then drove home and parked his car in

a vacant lot on Vernon. The defendant stayed at his house for ten to fifteen minutes, then left.

¶ 25   The defendant walked straight up Vernon to 61st Street, then turned on to 61st and walked

toward Eberhart. When he reached the corner of 61st and Eberhart, the defendant again saw Taylor,

who told the defendant to “hold it down.” Taylor then gave the defendant a chrome handgun. A

BD then threw a bottle and hit the defendant’s car.

¶ 26   After Taylor handed the defendant the gun, the defendant walked down Eberhart towards

62nd Street. He then walked up 62nd Street to an alley between Vernon and King Drive, and then

down the alley towards 61st Street. He reached the mouth of the alley where it meets 61st Street,

and he saw a group of BDs hanging out on the corner. The defendant then fired the gun two to

three times toward the group of BDs. He then walked back down the alley to 62nd Street, before

turning down 62nd Street and into an alley between Vernon and Eberhart. The defendant then hid

the gun between two bricks in the alley. He went back the next day to retrieve the gun because he

thought that Taylor would want it back. He hid the gun under his god-sister’s mattress.

¶ 27   The State then rested its case, and the defendant called three witnesses to testify about the

circumstances surrounding his arrest. That testimony is not particularly relevant to the issues on

appeal and, therefore, need not be recited.

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No. 1-22-1389

¶ 28   Following the presentation of evidence, the jury convicted the defendant of first-degree

murder, and he was sentenced to fifty years in prison. This court affirmed his conviction and

sentence on appeal. The defendant then filed four petitions for postconviction relief in 2004, 2006,

2007, and 2013, all of which were dismissed or denied.

¶ 29   In 2015, the defendant filed the present successive petition for postconviction relief in

which he raised a single claim of actual innocence. The defendant asserted that he had received a

letter from Phylan Jackson in March 2015 in which Jackson stated that she knew that it was

actually Taylor, and not the defendant, who shot and killed Binion. The defendant alleged that he

asked Jackson to swear to that information in an affidavit, and Jackson did. The defendant attached

a copy of both the letter and the affidavit to his petition. The affidavit stated the following:

                “ I am *** [Phylan Jackson] and I am signing and sending this affidavit to *** [the

       defendant] because he’s in prison for a crime that he did not commit. I testified at *** [the

       defendant’s] trial and due to [the] time span[] I can not recall every single word I said. I

       can, however, recall that I never mentioned the fact that I saw my boyfriend at the time,

       Michael Taylor[,] shoot a gun in the direction of the woman that got shot that day. I chosed

       [sic] not to mention what I saw to anyone because[,] after I told Michael that I saw him

       shoot the lady[,] Michael told me to never ever tell anyone what I saw and because I feared

       and loved him, I kept my mouth shut for all of these years. Michael died a few years back

       and I decided to reach out to *** [the defendant] after listening to a discussion on one of

       the Chicago news channels about the violence occurring in Chicago; my conscious [sic] I

       cannot hold this any longer. After I contacted *** [the defendant,] he seemed skeptical and

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No. 1-22-1389

       asked that I send him a sworn affidavit of which I am doing. Also I want to tell the judge

       that I am sorry that I did not speak up earlier.”

¶ 30   The defendant later filed a supplemental petition seeking sentencing relief pursuant to

People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327. However, he later conceded and abandoned that issue following

the decision in People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010.

¶ 31    The circuit court appointed counsel for the defendant and advanced the petition to the

second stage. At that point, the State moved to dismiss the petition. Following a hearing, the circuit

court granted the State’s motion, finding that the defendant failed to prove that Jackson’s proffered

testimony would be conclusive and probably change the result if presented in a new trial. This

appeal follows.

¶ 32    The Act provides for a three-stage review of petitions for postconviction relief. People v.

Ayala, 2022 IL App (1st) 192484, ¶ 95. When a defendant files a successive petition, he must

obtain leave of the court to file. Id. ¶ 96. If the court grants leave to file, the petition is advanced

to the second stage of proceedings. Id. At the second stage, the State may either file an answer to

the petition or a motion to dismiss. Id. ¶ 97. “ ‘Where the State seeks dismissal of a postconviction

petition instead of filing an answer, its motion to dismiss assumes the truth of the allegations to

which it is directed and questions only their legal sufficiency.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Miller, 203

Ill. 2d 433, 437 (2002)). The circuit court “must then determine ‘whether the petition and any

accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.’ ” Id.

(quoting People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001)). If the defendant makes such a substantial

showing, the petition is advanced to the third stage, where the circuit court “acts as factfinder,

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No. 1-22-1389

determines witness credibility and the weight to be given particular testimony and evidence, and

resolves any evidentiary conflicts.” Id. (quoting People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34).

¶ 33   When a petition is dismissed at the second stage, our review concerns a pure question of

law that we conduct de novo. Id. ¶ 98. “Since this stage involves purely a legal determination,

‘[t]he inquiry [at the second stage] does not require the trial court to engage in any fact-finding or

credibility determinations.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 29) (alteration

retained). “ ‘Unless the petitioner's allegations are affirmatively refuted by the record, they are

taken as true, and the question is whether those allegations establish or “show” a constitutional

violation.’ ” Id. (quoting Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35). For a claim asserting actual innocence,

the defendant must make a substantial showing that the evidence supporting his claim is “newly

discovered, material and not merely cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would

probably change the result on retrial.” People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 46 (citing People v.

Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (2009)).

¶ 34   The State in this case argues that the defendant’s petition fails to satisfy the materiality and

conclusive-character elements of the actual-innocence standard. First, regarding materiality, the

State contends that the information contained in Jackson’s affidavit would not be material because

her statement that she saw Taylor fire a gun merely implicates Taylor and does not exculpate the

defendant. In the State’s words, Jackson’s new account “suggests that Taylor may have been a

shooter but does not say that petitioner was not a shooter.” (Emphasis in original.) But we do not

agree with the State’s view of Jackson’s affidavit.

¶ 35   “Material means the evidence is relevant and probative of the petitioner's innocence.”

People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96 (citing People v. Smith, 177 Ill.2d 53, 82–83 (1997)).

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No. 1-22-1389

And Jackson’s affidavit meets that standard. Contrary to the State’s assertion, while Jackson does

say that she saw “Taylor shoot a gun in the direction of the woman that got shot,” implicating

Taylor as, in the State’s words, “a shooter,” Jackson also states that she “saw *** [Taylor] shoot

the lady” and that the defendant was “in prison for a crime that he did not commit.” When we view

these statements together, it seems clear that Jackson is not merely implicating Taylor; rather, she

is saying that it was Taylor, and not the defendant, who shot Binion. Accordingly, we have little

trouble concluding that her new statement is material, as it is probative of the defendant’s

innocence.

¶ 36   Second, the State also contends that the defendant failed to show that Jackson’s affidavit

would be conclusive. Evidence is conclusive if, “when considered along with the trial evidence,

[it] would probably lead to a different result.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47 (citing

Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96). When analyzing conclusiveness, the ultimate question “is

whether the evidence supporting the postconviction petition places the trial evidence in a different

light and undermines the court's confidence in the judgment of guilt.” Id. ¶ 48 (citing Coleman,

2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97).

¶ 37   The State argues that the statements in Jackson’s affidavit are not conclusive because they

do not undermine the evidence that implicated the defendant in the shooting, namely Jackson’s

testimony that the defendant was at the scene of the shooting, Byrd’s testimony that the defendant

was the shooter, and the defendant’s own statement to police that he fired two or three shots in the

direction of the BDs. However, the State’s analysis of this issue is flawed. Boiled down, the State’s

argument is essentially weighing Jackson’s new statements against the other evidence and

concluding that Jackson’s new account is not sufficient to outweigh the other evidence of guilt

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No. 1-22-1389

and, therefore, would not change the result. But that is not how we are supposed to examine the

evidence at the second stage of a postconviction proceeding.

¶ 38   At the second stage, we are not concerned with making credibility determinations or

weighing the new evidence against the old. Rather, that is the exclusive domain of the circuit court

during the third stage of proceedings. See Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34 (stating that is the

circuit court’s duty at the third stage “to determine witness credibility, decide the weight to be

given testimony and evidence, and resolve any evidentiary conflicts”).

       “At the dismissal stage of a post-conviction proceeding, all well-pleaded facts that are not

       positively rebutted by the original trial record are to be taken as true. The inquiry into

       whether a post-conviction petition contains sufficient allegations of constitutional

       deprivations does not require the circuit court to engage in any fact-finding or credibility

       determinations. The Act contemplates that such determinations will be made at the

       evidentiary stage, not the dismissal stage, of the litigation. Due to the elimination of all

       factual issues at the dismissal stage of the post-conviction proceeding, a motion to dismiss

       raises the sole issue of whether the petition being attacked is proper as a matter of law.”

       People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998).

Indeed, at the second stage, we must accept the new evidence as true and assume that a hypothetical

jury would believe it, unless the new evidence is positively rebutted by the record. See Sanders,

2016 IL 118123, ¶ 48 (concluding that a codefendant’s recantation was positively rebutted by the

trial record and was, therefore, not conclusive, when the recanting codefendant claimed that the

victim had only been shot once, but the medical examiner had testified at trial that the victim had

in fact been shot twice); see also People v. Wilson, 2022 IL App (1st) 192048, ¶ 75 (“If taking

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No. 1-22-1389

[that] affidavit testimony as true means anything at all, it must mean that a juror, hearing from [the

new witness] at a hypothetical retrial, would believe his testimony.” (alterations and emphases in

original) (quoting People v. Brooks, 2021 IL App (4th) 200573, ¶ 44)).

¶ 39    Accordingly, at this stage we are not concerned with whether the new evidence is more

convincing than the other evidence in the record. Rather, we are concerned only with the character

of the new evidence and whether it is of such a nature that it “places the trial evidence in a different

light and undermines the court's confidence in the judgment of guilt.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849,

¶ 48 (citing Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 97). And in this case, Jackson’s affidavit meets that

standard. Indeed, when an affidavit “provides evidence that a different party is guilty, *** [it] is

of such a conclusive character as to lead to a different result on retrial.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849,

¶ 76; see also People v. White, 2014 IL App (1st) 130007, ¶¶ 26–29 (finding that a new affidavit

identifying someone else as the murderer was sufficient to establish conclusiveness at the pleading

stage even when the affidavit conflicted with trial evidence of multiple witnesses identifying the

defendant, and noting that an opposite conclusion would require the court to weigh evidence and

make credibility determinations, tasks that are reserved for the third stage); People v. Harper, 2013

IL App (1st) 102181, ¶ 49 (“[W]here newly discovered evidence is both exonerating and

contradicts the State's evidence at trial, it is capable of producing a different outcome at trial.”).

¶ 40    While it is true that the State at trial produced what was essentially a signed confession

from the defendant, the defendant has contested the voluntariness and reliability of that statement

and has alleged that it was coerced, and his argument on that point cannot be dismissed out of

hand, as it is true that there are some inconsistencies between the contents of his statement and the

other trial evidence. Furthermore, and more importantly, at this second stage of proceedings, we

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No. 1-22-1389

cannot use the defendant’s statement to negate the conclusiveness of Jackson’s affidavit unless it

somehow acts as a positive and objective rebuttal of the affidavit, which it does not. Confessions

are generally given great weight because people usually only confess to crimes that they actually

committed, but it is not our job at this second stage to give it that weight. Rather, the relative

weighing of the evidence is reserved for the third stage. At this second stage, we are concerned

only with the character of Jackson’s affidavit, and, because it points the finger at Taylor rather

than the defendant, the defendant has made a substantial showing that it is of a conclusive

character.

¶ 41   In sum, because Jackson’s affidavit identifies someone other than the defendant as the

person who shot the victim in this case, and because that allegation is not positively rebutted by

the record, the affidavit is of a conclusive character. The defendant’s petition should, therefore, be

advanced to the third stage, where the credibility and weight of Jackson’s allegations may be

properly analyzed. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of the defendant’s petition

and remand for the court to conduct third-stage proceedings.

¶ 42   Reversed and remanded with instructions.

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