Court Opinion

ID: 9367513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 23:05:14.955758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:00.836032
License: Public Domain

01/31/2023

                                          DA 21-0161
                                                                                          Case Number: DA 21-0161

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                          2023 MT 21N

STATE OF MONTANA,

               Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

JACOB OVERLEASE,

               Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DC-19-295A
                       Honorable Peter B. Ohman, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                       Samir F. Aarab, Boland Aarab PLLP, Great Falls, Montana

                For Appellee:

                       Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Tammy K Plubell, Assistant
                       Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                       Marty Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney, Eric N. Kitzmiller, Bozeman,
                       Montana

                                                   Submitted on Briefs: September 21, 2022

                                                              Decided: January 31, 2023

Filed:

                                 Vir-6A.-if
                       __________________________________________
                                         Clerk
Justice Dirk Sandefur delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. The case title, cause number, and disposition will be included in our

quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2     Jacob Overlease appeals his August 2020 judgment of conviction on jury trial in the

Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, on the offense of Driving

Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense, a felony in violation

of §§ 61-8-401 and -731, MCA (2019). We affirm.

¶3     While on patrol around 11:30 p.m. on June 16, 2019, a Gallatin County Sheriff’s

Deputy encountered an oncoming pickup truck, driven by a man later identified as

Overlease, travelling eastbound on the paved highway frontage road outside of Three

Forks, Montana. The deputy later testified that, after seeing the truck “swerve over near

the guardrail,” and then overcorrect back over the center line, she turned around to follow

and then saw the truck turn off into a roadside rest area at the Headwaters State Park. The

deputy then took up a position on a connecting road between the frontage road and the rest

area to wait and see if the truck would leave the rest area, at which point she could then see

any further driving irregularity. When she did not see the truck leave after a few minutes,

the deputy drove into the rest area where she saw the pickup parked unattended with the

driver’s door open and headlights on.

¶4     The deputy exited her patrol car to attempt to locate the driver on foot, and

eventually found him lying on his back in the grass. Upon contact and initial questioning,
Overlease explained that he pulled into the rest area to let his puppy dog out of the truck

after it unexpectedly began vomiting while they were traveling down the road. The deputy

recalled that Overlease initially stated that he had previously consumed about four

alcoholic beverages that evening after working in Butte, Montana. She also recalled seeing

an open alcoholic beverage container in his truck, to which Overlease explained that he

had just opened it before the puppy started vomiting. The deputy later testified, inter alia,

that she did not see any indication of dog vomit in the truck. Based on the various

circumstances observed, and Overlease’s appearance and manner of speech, the deputy

subjected him to consensual field sobriety testing. After he refused to consent to her

request that he submit to a portable breath test, the deputy arrested Overlease for DUI and

driving with a suspended driver’s license. He later consented to a post-arrest Intoxilyzer

8000 breath test which indicated a 0.160 breath/blood alcohol content.            The State

subsequently charged Overlease in district court with felony DUI, fourth or subsequent

offense, and misdemeanor driving with a suspended license. At the outset of initial trial

setting in February 2020, Overlease pled guilty to the misdemeanor.

¶5     Following an initial mistrial on the felony DUI due to a hung jury, the case again

proceeded to jury trial on the felony in August 2020. Only two witnesses testified, the

investigating sheriff’s deputy and Overlease. After the State rested its case-in-chief,

Overlease testified and denied that he had been driving under the influence of alcohol

before the deputy arrived at the scene. He asserted that he became under the influence only

after stopping at the rest area. He testified that, after his puppy vomited in the truck, he

stopped to let it out of the truck and to clean up and use the restroom. The deputy testified
that Overlease initially told her that, when his puppy started vomiting before he turned into

the rest area, he had just opened his first beer—one of two 24-ounce alcoholic

beverages/beers that he said he had earlier purchased upon stopping at a Town Pump store

in Whitehall, Montana, on the way from Butte. He testified that he consumed both, before

the deputy arrived, over a period of approximately 30 minutes while he was waiting on the

grass at the rest area for his puppy to return after running off. However, in contrast to his

more limited on-scene account of events to the deputy, Overlease further asserted at trial

that he also stopped and was waiting at the rest area because he had cell service there and

was waiting for his girlfriend to text him on her way home to Clarkston, Montana, from

her job in West Yellowstone.1 He testified that he then intended to wait for her to come

and pick him up at the rest area, where he planned to leave his puppy locked in his truck

until he returned in the morning, so that he and his girlfriend could have dinner together in

Clarkston where he lived. On redirect following the State’s cross-examination challenge

of his new account regarding his girlfriend, Overlease explained that the deputy never

asked him about it and that he did not mention it because he was preoccupied with

answering her questions.

¶6       The instruction set on the applicable law given to jury by the court prior to closing

arguments included, inter alia, the following witness credibility assessment instruction:

         You alone are the sole judges of the credibility or believability of all the
         witnesses testifying in this case. You are also the judges of the weight or the
         importance to be given their testimony. . . . In determining the facts in this
         case, it may be necessary for you to determine what weight should be given

1
    Clarkston, Montana, is about ten miles down the road from the Headwaters State Park rest area.
       to the testimony of each witness. To do this, you should carefully consider
       all the testimony, the circumstances under which each witness testified, and
       every matter in evidence which tends to indicate whether a witness is worthy
       of belief. . . . [Inter alia,] [y]ou may consider the extent to which the
       witnesses are either supported or contradicted by other witnesses or evidence
       in this case.
                                          . . .

       If you believe that any witness has lied about important matters in the case,
       you must reject that false testimony. You can view the rest of that witness’
       testimony with distrust and you have the choice of either rejecting the
       remaining testimony, or finding such testimony is worthy of belief. The rule
       about rejecting false testimony and suspecting the remainder does not apply
       if a witness is unintentionally mistaken as to some matters or facts, or gives
       evidence concerning unimportant matters without trying to deceive the court
       or jury.

In his closing argument, the State prosecutor later referenced the credibility instruction, to

wit, as pertinent:

       [A]t this time, I would like to take your attention to [the jury instruction]
       about testimony that you believe is false. . . . It says something to the effect
       that if you believe a witness has lied about important matters in the case, you
       must reject that testimony, and you can view the rest of that witness’
       testimony with distrust, and you may reject the remaining testimony. When
       someone gets on the stand to testify as a witness, they’re putting their
       credibility on the line. Therefore, under that instruction, what I’m suggesting
       . . . is that you can view Mr. Overlease’s testimony, with regards to when he
       was drinking, with distrust because his testimony simply doesn’t make
       sense, and because this instruction applies to all witnesses who
       testify . . . . There simply wasn’t enough time for him to consume the alcohol
       he says he consumed, from the time he parked, to when [the deputy]
       contacted him, if he did everything else that he claimed he did.

       If he was really waiting for his girlfriend to pick him up, and he had been
       there that long, why didn’t he say that to [the deputy]? Why have this whole
       discussion about who’s going to tow the truck, locking the truck up, what’s
       going to happen to [the dog]? . . . If he knows his girlfriend is really coming
       there that evening, why be concerned about leaving his truck there and have
       somebody steal his tools? He knows his girlfriend’s coming. What this
       means . . . is [his] testimony on these points is not worthy of your belief, if
       you look at the jury instructions on how to consider and weigh the credibility
       in light of the testimony.

(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel immediately interjected and generally objected to

“any prosecutorial discussion of credibility of witnesses.” Without ruling, the District

Court noted the objection and told the prosecutor to “[m]ove on.”

¶7     Upon deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the felony DUI charge. The

District Court later sentenced Overlease to a 13-month term of commitment to the Montana

Department of Corrections (DOC) for placement in an appropriate correctional facility or

program with recommendation for placement in the DOC “Watch” Program, followed by

probation for the balance of the 13-month term, and a consecutive three-year suspended

DOC commitment.2 Overlease timely appeals.

¶8     Criminal prosecutors generally “have wide latitude” during trial closing and rebuttal

arguments to, inter alia, “comment on and argue for any position or conclusion regarding

the nature, quality, or effect of the [trial] evidence in relation to the applicable law and the

[State’s] burden of proof” if “based on the [record] evidence, applicable law as stated in

the jury instructions, and his or her analysis of the evidence.” State v. Miller, 2022 MT 92,

¶ 22, 408 Mont. 316, 510 P.3d 17 (emphasis original—internal punctuation and citations

omitted). On the other hand, “[a]s applicable to the States as a matter of substantive due

process implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Sixth Amendment

to the United States Constitution, and Article II, Sections 24 and 26, of the Montana

2
 The court further sentenced him to a concurrent six-month suspended term in the county jail on
his prior guilty plea to the offense of driving on a suspended license.
Constitution, similarly guarantee criminal defendants the right to a fair trial before an

impartial jury.” Miller, ¶ 21. “Also implicitly guaranteed to the criminally accused as

fundamental liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause are the

related rights to the presumption of innocence and the requirement that the government

prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Miller, ¶ 21. Those

fundamental constitutional fair trial rights thus “impose or implicate a number of highly

nuanced restrictions on the otherwise broad latitude that prosecutors have” regarding jury

argument at trial. Miller, ¶ 22. Further constraining prosecutors’ generally wide latitude

are applicable rules of evidence, and the statutory command that “the jury is the exclusive

judge of the credibility, veracity, weight, and effect of the evidence.” Miller, ¶¶ 22 and 24

(citing §§ 26-1-201 through -203, MCA). Thus, as pertinent here, prosecutors generally

may neither “express a direct personal opinion or belief that a witness, or his or her

testimony, was or was not credible, believable, reliable, or truthful,” nor “directly

characterize a witness statement as a lie, or a witness or the accused as a liar or as having

lied.” Miller, ¶¶ 23-24 and 28-29 (citations omitted).

¶9     On balance then, “in contrast to a statement of or akin to a direct personal opinion”

regarding the credibility of the trial testimony or pretrial statements of a witness or the

accused, “prosecutorial closing arguments and comments are generally proper if made in

the context of discussing the evidence, how it relates or corresponds to the law as stated in

the jury instructions (including specified witness veracity and credibility assessment

guidelines), and reasonable inferences supported by the evidence.” Miller, ¶ 26 (emphasis

omitted).   “While expression of direct personal opinions on witness credibility are
improper, the prosecutor may nonetheless comment on, suggest, point-out, and argue

reasonable inferences that [the] jury may draw from the evidence including, inter alia,

comment on the credibility of witnesses as a comment on the evidence based on conflicts

and contradictions in testimony.” Miller, ¶ 27 (emphasis added—internal punctuation and

citations omitted). Prosecutors may also “properly point out inconsistencies between the

defendant’s trial testimony and any pretrial statements or pre-Miranda silence to support

an inference and argument” that he or she “changed his [or her] story after having time to

think about the consequences.” Miller, ¶ 30 (internal punctuation and citation omitted).

They may similarly ask and argue as to which of multiple accounts provided by the

defendant was the truth. Miller, ¶ 30 (citation omitted).

       [W]hile often highly nuanced, the dividing line between an improper and
       proper prosecutorial argument or comment regarding witness credibility or
       truthfulness or the guilt of the accused is whether, in the context of the
       entirety of the particular . . . argument at issue, the argument or comment is
       more akin to a statement of the prosecutor’s personal opinion or direct
       characterization of the accused or a witness as “lying” or a “liar” (or his or
       her testimony as a “lie”), or rather, an argument or comment based on the
       prosecutor’s analysis of the evidence regarding the nature, quality, or effect
       of the evidence and supported inferences in relation to the applicable law.

Miller, ¶ 27 (emphasis original). In contrast, however, it is improper for prosecutors to

misstate, misrepresent, or mischaracterize the law as stated in the court’s instructions. State

v. Labbe, 2012 MT 76, ¶¶ 23 and 27, 364 Mont. 415, 276 P.3d 848 (citation omitted).

¶10    Here, Overlease asserts that the District Court erroneously allowed improper

prosecutorial closing argument and comments including misstatement of the law,

incomplete paraphrasing of the witness credibility assessment instruction, a statement of

personal opinion regarding the credibility of Overlease’s trial testimony, and
characterization of him as a “liar” whose testimony was “not worthy of belief.” However,

assuming, arguendo, that his far more detailed assertions of error on appeal were preserved

for appeal within the scope of his more general objection at trial, see, e.g., State v. Sanchez,

2008 MT 27, ¶ 50, 341 Mont. 240, 177 P.3d 444, the prosecutor did not directly

characterize Overlease as a liar, or any of his testimony as a lie. Nor did the prosecutor’s

partial paraphrase of the substantive essence of the witness credibility assessment

instruction substantially misstate, misrepresent, or mischaracterize the pertinent law as

stated in the instruction. See supra. See also §§ 26-1-302(7), (9), -303(3), and (5), MCA;

Montana Criminal Jury Instruction 1-102 and -103 (2009). Even to the extent that it

arguably did, Overlease does not assert, nor has he shown, that the subject instruction given

to the jury by the court was an inaccurate or incomplete statement of the pertinent law.

¶11    Moreover, the prosecutor’s use of the pronoun “I,” and “suggest[ion] . . . that [the

jury] can view” the subject testimony “with distrust because [it] simply doesn’t make

sense,” was neither akin to nor a statement of direct personal opinion. (Emphasis added.)

Rather, it was an express reference to the previously given jury instruction and, in context,

an essentially correct argument on the instruction as applied to the subject trial evidence.

Likewise the prosecutor’s statements in reference to discrepancies or logical incongruity

in Overlease’s testimony that he stopped and was waiting at the rest area to be picked up

by his girlfriend, to wit:

       What this means . . . is [his] testimony on these points is not worthy of your
       belief, if you look at the jury instructions on how to consider and weigh the
       credibility in light of the testimony.
In context, the prosecutor’s statements and rhetorical questions at issue were thus

permissible and proper arguments on the witness credibility assessment instruction as

applied to the pertinent trial evidence. We hold that the District Court did not erroneously

allow the prosecutor to make improper or inaccurate arguments on the subject jury

instruction and pertinent evidence.

¶12    We decide this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c)

of our Internal Operating Rules. Affirmed.

                                                 /S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

We concur:

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE