Court Opinion

ID: 9403773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 17:04:37.931185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:09.291200
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/21/23 Tucker v. Heritage Custom Estates Association CA4/1

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 KEVIN TUCKER,                                                                D079968

            Plaintiff and Appellant,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
                                                                              00021905-CU-BC-NC)
 HERITAGE CUSTOM ESTATES
 ASSOCIATION,

            Defendant and Respondent.

          APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert P. Dahlquist, Judge. Affirmed.
          David A. Kay for Plaintiff and Appellant.
          Law Offices of Howard F. Burns and Howard F. Burns for Defendant
and Respondent.

          Kevin Tucker was assessed fines by his homeowner’s association,
Heritage Custom Estates (Heritage), for parking a trailer in his driveway in
violation of the association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs).
Thereafter, Heritage brought a lawsuit against Tucker to recover the fines
and other associated costs, which led to a default judgment against Tucker in
2006 in the amount of $24,202.50.
      In 2008, Tucker entered into a settlement agreement with the
association that required him to pay $5,600 within 30 days of the execution of
the agreement. Tucker failed to pay and in 2009 Heritage began efforts to
enforce the default judgment. These efforts eventually led to two lawsuits
against Heritage, one by Tucker and one by his wife Teresa, attempting to
avoid the consequences of the default judgment. The cases were consolidated
and, after trial, the court rejected all of the Tuckers’ claims and entered

judgment in favor of Heritage.1
      Kevin Tucker now appeals, asserting the trial court erred because
(1) the settlement agreement constituted a novation of his obligation to pay
the default judgment; (2) the settlement agreement converted the default
judgment into a $5,600 security interest obligating him to pay no more than
that amount; and (3) contrary to the trial court’s finding, he lawfully
tendered “$5,600 and appropriate interest” to Heritage supporting his claim
for specific performance of the settlement agreement. None of these

arguments has merit. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.2

1     This appeal concerns only Tucker’s lawsuit and not Teresa’s.

2     Just before oral argument, Heritage filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal based on the disentitlement doctrine and a request for this court to
take judicial notice of several court orders made against Tucker in other
proceedings. The motion to dismiss and request for judicial notice are denied
as moot in light of this opinion affirming the judgement.
                                        2
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In July 2006, Heritage brought a limited civil lawsuit against Kevin
Tucker in San Diego Superior Court (Case No. IN53684) asserting he violated
Heritage’s CC&Rs by parking a trailer in his driveway and on the nearby
street. Heritage’s complaint alleged that Tucker ignored Heritage’s notices to
park the vehicle elsewhere or face daily fines, and that Heritage assessed
Tucker fines of $100 per day for a period of eight weeks until the trailer was
removed. The lawsuit sought to recover total fines of $21,200, plus interest.
      In the fall of 2006, Heritage obtained a default judgment of $24,202.50
against Tucker, consisting of $21,200, plus $1,760 in interest, $342.50 in
costs, and $900 in attorney fees. The default judgment was served on Tucker
and his lawyer in July 2007.
      In March 2008, Tucker and Heritage entered the aforementioned
settlement agreement. Under the agreement, Tucker was obligated to pay
Heritage $5,600 “in the form of a check payable” to Heritage and delivered to
its counsel within 30 days of the execution of the agreement. If payment was
not rendered within 30 days, the agreement imposed interest on all
outstanding sums in the amount of 10% per year. The settlement agreement
required Heritage to “execute a request for dismissal with prejudice of the
complaint” upon payment by Tucker. The agreement also contained claim

                                       3
releases for both parties. Heritage released all claims against Tucker, except

“any liability or obligation created by” the agreement.3
      After the agreement was executed, Tucker failed to tender a check to
Heritage. In 2008 or 2009, Heritage began to pursue collection of the default
judgment and served Tucker with notice to appear at a judgment debtor’s
examination. In 2010, a bench warrant was issued for Tucker for failing to
appear for the debtor examination. The record here contains no further
evidence of action by Heritage to collect the debt until December 2016, when
“Heritage issued a written notice rescinding the 2008 settlement agreement”
and served Tucker with a copy of the rescission notice. In January 2017, the
court in the initial case brought by Heritage denied Tucker’s motion to
enforce the settlement agreement and, alternatively, to set aside the default
judgment.
      In May 2018, Tucker filed the instant lawsuit seeking to uphold the
settlement agreement and avoid payment of the default judgment. Tucker
alleged claims for equitable enforcement of the settlement agreement,
equitable estoppel, breach of contract, “vacation of the judgment for lack of
personal service,” violation of Tucker’s civil rights, and intentional
interference with contractual relations. Heritage filed an answer to the
complaint, raising the affirmative defenses of failure to state a claim, statute
of limitations, litigation privilege, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and

3      The provision releasing Tucker, numbered 2.1 in the agreement,
contains a drafting error, which the trial court attributed to drafting
counsel’s use of an old agreement as a template. It states liability is released
by Heritage, “except as reserved in section 2.5 below....” However, section 2.5
is a “waiver of rights pursuant to Civil Code Section 1542.” The trial court
found section 2.1 was meant to refer to section 2.4, titled “Matters Not
Included In The Released Matters,” which states “[t]he released matters do
not include any liability or obligation created by this Agreement.”
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judicial estoppel. Heritage amended its answer before trial to add an
allegation that it rescinded the settlement agreement by notice to Tucker on
December 23, 2016. Heritage amended its answer again after trial to add the
affirmative defense of laches.
      The case proceeded to a one-day court trial in March 2021. After trial,
the court issued a thorough ruling outlining the history of the underlying
lawsuit and the related litigation, and rejecting all of Tucker’s claims. The
trial court made several findings. It concluded Tucker was not entitled to
specific performance of the settlement agreement since he had failed to
perform his obligations thereunder. It found Tucker had not presented any of
his claims in a timely manner, and improperly sought to enforce an
agreement that was executed over 13 years earlier. Further, the court found
that Tucker was improperly attempting to overturn the prior decisions of the
court in the case filed by Heritage in 2006 that resulted in the default
judgment against Tucker.
      Finally, the trial court rejected Tucker’s assertion that, as part of the
settlement agreement, “Heritage gave up the right to pursue enforcement of
the judgment against” Tucker and “released all claims against [him] except
for the obligation to pay the $5,600 settlement amount.” Instead, the court
concluded that the language of the settlement agreement was clear that the
default judgment would remain operative until Tucker paid the settlement
amount. The trial court pointed to several provisions in the settlement
agreement in support of its determination: (1) Section 1.2, providing that the
“underlying lawsuit would be dismissed ‘upon payment by DEFENDANT
[Mr. Tucker] to PLAINTIFF [Heritage] of the SETTLEMENT SUM”;
(2) section 1.4, stating the default “judgment would be vacated ‘[u]pon
payment of the SETTLEMENT SUM’ ”; and (3) section 1.5, stating that “the

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abstract of judgment, previously issued by the Court, would be released or
withdrawn by Heritage ‘[u]pon payment of the SETTLEMENT SUM.’ ” The
court found these specific provisions concerning the default judgment
prevailed over the general release provision that Tucker relied on.
      After the court’s ruling, judgment was entered in Heritage’s favor.
Tucker now appeals the final judgment.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Tucker challenges the trial court’s interpretation of the settlement
agreement, arguing for the first time on appeal that the agreement
constituted a novation of the default judgment that required him to pay no
more than $5,600 and extinguished any liability arising from the default. He
also contends that the settlement agreement converted the default judgment
to a $5,600 security interest, and that his claim for specific performance was
not precluded by his own failure to perform because he “tendered” $5,600 to
Heritage.
                                        I
                                Legal Principles
      We apply established appellate standards of review for this judgment
following a bench trial. We begin with the settled principle that the
interpretation of a contract generally presents a question of law for this court
to determine anew unless the interpretation turns on the credibility of
conflicting extrinsic evidence. (Hess v. Ford Motor Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 516,
527; ASP Properties Group, L.P. v. Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257,
1266.) When a contract is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations
based on conflicting extrinsic evidence requiring the resolution of credibility
issues, its interpretation evolves into a question of fact to which the
reviewing court applies the substantial evidence standard of review. (Id. at

                                        6
pp. 1266‒1267.) Where the evidence is undisputed and the parties draw
conflicting inferences, the reviewing court will independently draw inferences
and interpret the contract. (Id. at p. 1267.)
      The court endeavors to effectuate the mutual intentions of the parties
as it existed at the time of contracting insofar as it is ascertainable and
lawful. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) “We discern the parties’ intention based on the
written contract alone, if possible, but may also consider the circumstances
under which the contract was made and its subject matter. [Citations.] We
consider the contract as a whole, and interpret contested provisions in their
context, not in isolation, with the aim of giving effect to all provisions, if
doing so is reasonably possible. [Citations.] [¶] In interpreting a contract, we
give the words their ordinary and popular meaning, unless the parties or
usage have given the words a specialized or technical meaning.” (Camacho v.
Target Corp. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 291, 306.)
                                         II
                                     Analysis
      Tucker first asserts that under Civil Code section 1530, the parties’

settlement agreement was a novation of the default judgment.4 Heritage
responds that Tucker did not raise this novation argument in the trial court;
therefore, he cannot assert it for the first time on appeal. We agree with
Heritage. In response to Heritage’s assertion that this argument is new,
Tucker quotes the allegations in his complaint, then asserts that “Heritage

4     Civil Code section 1530 defines novation as “the substitution of a new
obligation for an existing one.”
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clearly understood [from the quoted language] that Kevin was arguing that
the default judgment had been replaced by the Settlement Agreement.”
      Tucker points to nothing in the record before this court to show that in
the trial court he argued the settlement agreement constituted a novation
under the Civil Code. Rather, the record shows only that he argued the
language of the settlement agreement released him from liability for the
default judgment. These arguments are not, as Tucker claims, synonymous.
Accordingly, Tucker’s assertion that the court erred by not finding the
settlement agreement was a novation under the Civil Code is waived and we
decline to exercise our discretion to consider it for the first time on appeal.
(See Vasquez v. SOLO 1 Kustoms, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 84, 96 (Vasquez)
[“A party is not permitted to change his position and adopt a new and
different theory on appeal. To permit him to do so would not only be unfair to
the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing litigant.”].)
      Tucker next asserts that the default judgment served only as a security
interest for the settlement amount of $5,600 and precluded Heritage from
seeking to enforce the full amount of the default. He states that the parties
“contemplated that Heritage would retain rights to execution under the
default judgment to collect the $5,600 ow[ed] to it” and that Heritage “used
the default judgment to collect more than what was owed to it.” As with his
prior assertion, Tucker did not raise this security interest argument in the
trial court. Rather, Tucker argued only that the settlement agreement
should be interpreted to release his liability under the default judgment. We
again follow the general waiver rule and decline Tucker’s request to consider
this theory for the first time on appeal. (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at
p. 96.)

                                        8
      Finally, Tucker asserts that he made an effective tender of the
settlement amount, entitling him to specific performance of the settlement
agreement. This argument lacks merit. “ ‘The standard elements of a claim
for breach of contract are: “(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or
excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damage to
plaintiff therefrom. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A suit to recover
damages for breach of contract is an ‘action at law in which a right to jury
trial ordinarily exists.’ ” (Darbun Enterprises, Inc. v. San Fernando
Community Hospital (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 399, 409 (Darbun).)
      “A plaintiff may seek specific performance, an equitable remedy, as an
alternative to damages .... [Citation.] To obtain specific performance, a
plaintiff must make several showings, in addition to proving the elements of
a standard breach of contract.” (Darbun, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.)
Relevant here, a “ ‘plaintiff who seeks specific performance must ordinarily
perform all conditions precedent to the defendant’s obligation.’ ” (Realmuto v.
Gagnard (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 193, 204.) “A grant or denial of specific
performance is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” (Real Estate
Analytics, LLC v. Vallas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 463, 472.)
      The trial court determined specific performance of the contract was not
available to Tucker since he had not performed or tendered performance of
his obligation to pay $5,600 to Heritage. Pointing to an allegation in his
complaint and certain trial testimony, Tucker asserts this finding was error
and that he did tender performance. “ ‘[A] tender is an offer of performance
made with the intent to extinguish the obligation (Civ. Code, § 1485). When
properly made, it has the effect of putting the other party in default if he
refuses to accept it. ... [¶] ‘However, a tender to be valid must be of full
performance (Civ. Code, § 1486), and it must be unconditional. (Civ. Code,

                                        9
§ 1494; [citations].)’ [Citation.] Tender must also be in good faith. (Civ.
Code, § 1493.) If the party making the offer is unable or unwilling to
perform, the tender is of no effect. (Civ. Code, § 1495; [citation].)”
(Crossroads Investors, L.P. v. Federal National Mortgage Assn. (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 757, 789.)
      To be released from the default judgment, the settlement agreement
required Tucker to pay the settlement sum within 30 days of the execution of
the agreement “in the form of a check payable to [Heritage] and delivered to
counsel for PLAINTIFF.” There is no evidence in the record before this court
that supports Tucker’s assertion that he tendered payment. Rather, the
undisputed evidence shows Tucker failed to provide a check for $5,600 to
Heritage’s counsel within 30 days of entering the settlement agreement,
resulting in Heritage’s efforts to enforce the default judgment.
      The evidence Tucker points to in his appellate briefing does not show
otherwise. In support of his argument, he references an allegation in his
complaint, which states that he “informed the court in the [default judgment
case] and [Heritage], of the Settlement Agreement and its terms on or about
August 26, 2016. At that time, Plaintiff tendered payment of $5,600.00 plus
accrued interest thereon, as provided in the Settlement Agreement. HOA, by
its statements and actions, rejected that tender.” This unsupported
assertion, drawn from Tucker’s pleading, is not evidence that he tendered
payment. Tucker also cites his own trial testimony in which he references an
“Exhibit 3” as evidence of a tender of payment. This document, however, was
not admitted into evidence by the trial court and was not lodged in this court.
Further, the cited testimony does not identify what the exhibit is. This
testimony does not show that Tucker tendered payment to Heritage.

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     In short, Tucker has not shown the court’s determination that he did
not tender payment to Heritage, as required by the settlement agreement,
was error. Reversal of the judgment on this basis is not warranted.
                               DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Costs of appeal are awarded to respondent
Heritage Custom Estates Association.

                                                         McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

KELETY, J.

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