Court Opinion

ID: 2965058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:34:41.162203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:20.672162
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 97-1187

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  ERIC GRAY SNYDER,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                              _________________________

               Victoria L. Nadel for appellant.
               _________________
               James F. Lang,  Assistant United States Attorney,  with whom
               _____________
          Donald K.  Stern, United States  Attorney, was on brief,  for the
          ________________
          United States.

                              _________________________

                                   January 29, 1998

                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.  A jury found defendant-appellant
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

          Eric  Gray Snyder  guilty of  being a  felon in  possession of  a

          loaded firearm,  in violation of  18 U.S.C.   922(g)(1).   Snyder

          appeals.  We affirm his conviction.1

                    The appellant  has  cultivated a  hothouse  of  issues.

          Some  are  hardier  than  others.   We  address  seven  of  them,

          rejecting the remainder    all of which are  patently meritless  

          without editorial  comment.   We discuss the  facts of  the case,

          insofar  as necessary,  in  connection  with  our  discussion  of

          particular issues.

                    1.   The  Events  of  January 8-10.    The  appellant's
                    1.   The  Events  of  January 8-10.
                         _____________________________

          principal Fourth Amendment claim is that the Boston police lacked

          reasonable  suspicion  to  detain  him on  January  8,  1995, and

          likewise lacked probable cause to arrest him on January 10, or to

          search a locked briefcase in the trunk of his car coincident with

          the arrest.  On  this basis, he contends that the  district court

          erred in refusing to suppress  evidence obtained during and after

          the  stop,  arrest, and  search.   We  review de  novo  the trial

          court's  determinations  of  reasonable  suspicion  and  probable

          cause, but defer to the trial court's subsidiary findings of fact

          (accepting those  findings unless  they  are clearly  erroneous).

          See United States v. Young, 105 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997).
          ___ _____________    _____

                    The  governing  legal  standards are  familiar.    "[A]

                              
          ____________________

               1In  a  separate cross-appeal,  No. 97-1233,  the government
          challenges the district  court's leniency in sentencing.  The two
          appeals were consolidated  for purposes of oral  argument, but we
          have elected to write a separate opinion for each.

                                          2

          police  officer  may  in  appropriate  circumstances  and  in  an

          appropriate   manner   approach   a  person   for   purposes   of

          investigating  possibly criminal behavior even though there is no

          probable cause to make an arrest."  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22
                                              _____    ____

          (1968).   Such  an investigatory  stop  requires only  reasonable

          suspicion, based on "specific and articulable  facts," id. at 21,
                                                                 ___

          that,  viewed  through the  eyes  of  a  prudent police  officer,

          warrant  the  intrusion.   Like  reasonable  suspicion, "probable

          cause  is  a  fluid  concept     turning  on  the  assessment  of

          probabilities  in  particular  factual contexts."    Illinois  v.
                                                               ________

          Gates,   462  U.S.  213,  232  (1983).    This  "totality-of-the-
          _____

          circumstances" approach "recognize[s] the  value of corroboration

          of  details of an  informant's tip  by independent  police work."

          Id. at 241.
          ___

                    We need  not dwell  on the  events of  January  8.   It

          suffices to say that the  district court's findings, made after a

          three-day  evidentiary hearing,  are  plainly  supportable.   The

          record,  fairly read,  conduces  to  a  finding that  the  police

          protagonist,  Officer Doogan, had  reasonable suspicion, based on

          specific  and   articulable  facts,  sufficient   to  justify   a

          relatively brief detention.

                    While we  dwell  at greater  length  on the  events  of

          January  10, we  are  satisfied  that  a  m lange  of  adequately

          corroborated information and circumstances generated the probable

          cause  necessary  for Doogan  to  arrest  Snyder  and search  his

          vehicle on that date.  We explain briefly.

                                          3

                    Snyder was not a stranger to Doogan, who had some prior

          suspicions about Snyder's involvement in nefarious activities (as

          witness the detention of January 8).  Doogan had learned,  by way

          of a tip  from an unnamed informant,  that on January  9, Snyder,

          driving  a black  Honda, had  been in  possession of  a briefcase

          containing a  handgun.2   On January 10,  Doogan received  a page

          from John Hawk, an informant  who had occasionally worked for him

          in the  past.  Doogan  telephoned Hawk, who reported  that Snyder

          had  just robbed  him at  gunpoint, stolen  a quantity  of Valium

          tablets, and  sped off in  a black  Honda accompanied by  a known

          criminal (Diaferio).   Hawk also  said that the men  were heading

          for Roslindale.   Doogan  knew that Diaferio  lived at  17 Murray

          Hill Road, Roslindale, a known drug haven that had figured in the

          January 8 detention.  Believing that the men were likely  to turn

          up at 17 Murray Hill  Road, Doogan arranged a police surveillance

          at that address.   Shortly thereafter, Snyder arrived,  driving a

          black Honda and accompanied  by Diaferio.   He parked the car  on

          the street.  At  this point, the police had enough information in

          support of Hawk's report to establish probable cause that Snyder,

          a previously convicted  felon, had committed a crime  and that he

          possessed not only the avails of the robbery but also a handgun.

                    The officers  converged on Snyder and Diaferio, frisked

          the two men,  and found no weapons.  They then searched the black

                              
          ____________________

               2Another  detective  passed  this  tip   to  Doogan,  having
          garnered it from an informant  who worked with the federal Bureau
          of Alcohol,  Tobacco, and  Firearms and  the Massachusetts  State
          Police.

                                          4

          Honda.   The vehicle's trunk  yielded a briefcase.   Doogan shook

          the briefcase  and felt something  heavy inside it.   When Doogan

          pried  open the  corner  of  the locked  briefcase,  he saw  what

          appeared to  be a  gun.   Doogan then  forced the  lock open  and

          confiscated  a  fully  loaded  Colt  semi-automatic  .32  caliber

          pistol.  The police arrested Snyder and took him into custody.  A

          later search  of his  person at  the station  house turned up  26

          Valium tablets in his pants pocket.

                    The  search was  lawful.   Snyder parked  his car  on a

          public highway.   A warrantless  search is justified even  in the

          case of a stationary vehicle parked on a public road based on its

          inherent mobility and the reduced expectation of privacy afforded

          to  vehicles.   See California  v. Carney,  471 U.S.  386, 392-93
                          ___ __________     ______

          (1985).   Thus,  under  a  recognized  exception  to  the  Fourth

          Amendment, a police  officer may search such a  vehicle without a

          warrant if there  is probable cause to  believe that a crime  has

          been  committed  and  that  contraband  or  evidence  of  illegal

          activities will  be found there.   See Carroll v.  United States,
                                             ___ _______     _____________

          267 U.S.  132, 153-54 (1925);  United States v. Panitz,  907 F.2d
                                         _____________    ______

          1267,  1271 (1st  Cir. 1990).   By the  same token,  a diminished

          expectation of  privacy extends  to personal  property within  an

          automobile.   If the police have  probable cause to search a car,

          they also may inspect the interior of any closed container within

          it that reasonably might be thought to contain a proper object of

          the  search.   See California  v. Acevedo,  500 U.S.  565, 579-80
                         ___ __________     _______

          (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982).
                  _____________    ____

                                          5

                    These principles are dispositive  here.  As  previously

          indicated, Officer  Doogan had probable  cause to believe  that a

          crime had been  committed and that  a search of the  Honda likely

          would produce  evidence of it  (i.e., the Valium tablets  and the

          gun).  It follows that  Doogan had a right not only to search the

          Honda  for the  gun, but  also  to search  the briefcase  for it.

          Accordingly,  the  district court  did  not  err  in denying  the

          appellant's motion to suppress.

                    2.    Sufficiency  of  the  Evidence.    The  appellant
                    2.    Sufficiency  of  the  Evidence.
                          ______________________________

          challenges  the sufficiency  of the  government's proof,  arguing

          that the  evidence  adduced  cannot  support a  finding  that  he

          knowingly possessed the  firearm.  This argument  is procedurally

          defaulted.  See United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d 1190, 1206-07 (1st
                      ___ _____________    ____

          Cir. 1994) (holding that grounds not urged below in support  of a

          motion for judgment  of acquittal are  deemed waived on  appeal).

          There  is,  of course,  an  exception  for  convictions that  are

          "clearly and  grossly unjust,"  id. at  1207, but  that exception
                                          ___

          does not apply here.

                    Leaving procedural default to one side, the standard by

          which sufficiency challenges are reviewed is straightforward:

                    An appellate court plays a very circumscribed
                    role  in  gauging  the  sufficiency  of   the
                    evidentiary foundation upon  which a criminal
                    conviction  rests.    The  court  of  appeals
                    neither   weighs  the   credibility  of   the
                    witnesses nor attempts  to assess whether the
                    prosecution  succeeded  in  eliminating every
                    possible   theory    consistent   with    the
                    defendant's innocence.   Instead, its task is
                    to   canvass   the   evidence   (direct   and
                    circumstantial) in  the light  most agreeable
                    to  the prosecution  and decide  whether that

                                          6

                    evidence, including all  plausible inferences
                    extractable  therefrom,  enables  a  rational
                    factfinder  to conclude  beyond a  reasonable
                    doubt  that   the  defendant   committed  the
                    charged crime.

          United  States  v.  Noah,  130  F.3d 490,  494  (1st  Cir.  1997)
          ______________      ____

          (citations  omitted).   The evidence  in this case  easily passes

          muster under the Noah test.  After all, the standard demands that
                           ____

          a reviewing court  resolve all credibility conflicts in  a manner

          compatible with the  verdict.  See United States  v. Santiago, 83
                                         ___ _____________     ________

          F.3d 20, 23  (1st Cir. 1996).   Here, a rational jury  could have

          chosen to  believe Hawk and  therefore could have found  not only

          constructive possession, but also actual possession.

                    3.  Exculpatory  Evidence.  The appellant says that the
                    3.  Exculpatory  Evidence.
                        _____________________

          government failed  to disclose certain  exculpatory evidence,  in

          violation of its  duty under Brady  v. Maryland, 373 U.S.  83, 87
                                       _____     ________

          (1963).  This contention was  never raised in the district court;

          and, moveover, the record indicates that the evidence in question

          in fact  was made  known to the  appellant before  or during  the

          trial.   Consequently, his  complaint is for  delayed disclosure,

          rather than non-disclosure, and he has utterly failed to show any

          prejudice stemming from the delay.   The claim of error therefore

          fails.  See  United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d  1161, 1178 (1st
                  ___  _____________    _________

          Cir. 1993).

                    4.   Jury Instructions.   The appellant  calumnizes the
                    4.   Jury Instructions.
                         _________________

          district  court's   instruction  to  the  jury   on  constructive

          possession.  The challenged instruction is virtually identical to

          that which we criticized in United States v. Booth, 111 F.3d 1, 2
                                      _____________    _____

                                          7

          (1st Cir. 1997).  Here,  like in Booth, the defendant interjected
                                           _____

          no contemporaneous objection  to the instruction, and  our review

          is for plain error.  See id.
                               ___ ___

                    In Booth, we  concluded that the language  used, though
                       _____

          infelicitous,  did  not  require reversal.    We  reach  the same

          conclusion here.  Taking the charge as a whole, see United States
                                                          ___ _____________

          v. Weston, 960 F.2d  212, 216 (1st Cir.  1992), and weighing  the
             ______

          strength of the government's case   a case which, in our view, is

          stronger than that presented in Booth   we find that any error in
                                          _____

          the constructive possession instruction was harmless.

                    5.    The   Summation.    The  appellant   accuses  the
                    5.    The   Summation.
                          _______________

          prosecutor  of committing  three sins  in the  course  of closing

          argument:   improper  vouching;  commenting upon  the defendant's

          right  to  remain  silent;  and  commenting  upon  facts  not  in

          evidence.  The appellant's trial counsel did not object to any of

          the remarks   and for good reason.  While all three practices are

          to be condemned, none of them occurred here.   We add only that a

          defendant who  fails to lodge a contemporaneous  objection to the

          prosecution's  summation  is  in a  perilously  poor  position to

          complain that  a seemingly appropriate  comment conceivably could

          have been  taken by  jurors in  some other  (improper) way.   See
                                                                        ___

          United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300, 307-08 (1st Cir. 1992).
          _____________    _____

                    6.    Estrella.    During  the  sentencing  phase,  the
                    6.    Estrella.
                          ________

          district court  applied this  court's recent  decision in  United
                                                                     ______

          States v. Estrella, 104 F.3d 3, 5-8 (1st Cir. 1997),  when ruling
          ______    ________

          that Snyder's prior  criminal record rendered him  subject to the

                                          8

          provisions of the Armed Career  Criminal Act.  The appellant asks

          us to  reconsider Estrella, but  offers no new reasons  for doing
                            ________

          so.  We  have held before,  and today reaffirm, that  prior panel

          decisions  are binding  upon  newly  constituted  panels  in  the

          absence of  supervening authority.   See United States  v. Objio-
                                               ___ _____________     ______

          Sarraff, 108 F.3d  421, 421 (1st Cir. 1997)  (per curiam); United
          _______                                                    ______

          States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 1995); United States
          ______    ________                                  _____________

          v.  Wogan, 938 F.2d  1446, 1449  (1st Cir.  1991).   The district
              _____

          court  appropriately followed Estrella  in this instance,  and we
                                        ________

          are unable to reexamine Estrella's holding at this time.3
                                  ________

                    7.   Ineffective Assistance.   The appellant  presses a
                    7.   Ineffective Assistance.
                         ______________________

          claim,  which  he did  not  advance below,  that  trial counsel's

          performance   was  constitutionally   deficient.     Such  claims

          ordinarily are  fact-based and, with rare exceptions, will not be

          heard for the first time on direct  appeal.  See United States v.
                                                       ___ _____________

          Mala, 7 F.3d  1058, 1063 (1st Cir. 1993)  (listing representative
          ____

          cases).  The  appellant's challenge is factbound and  there is no

          basis  for deviating from the usual rule.   Thus, we dismiss this

          aspect of the  appeal without prejudice to  the appellant's right

          to renew the  claim on a petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  

          2255.

                    We need  go no further.   From aught that  appears, the

                              
          ____________________

               3Subsequent to  oral argument  of this  appeal, the  Supreme
          Court  granted certiorari in Caron v.  United States, 66 U.S.L.W.
                                       _____     _____________
          3444 (U.S. Jan.  9, 1998) (No.  97-6270).  The Court's  answer to
          the  question certified  in Caron  possibly could  require  us to
                                      _____
          reexamine Estrella.   We will  deal with this possibility  in the
                    ________
          opinion resolving the government's cross-appeal.

                                          9

          appellant was fairly tried and  lawfully convicted.  The judgment

          of conviction (but not the sentence) will therefore be

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                                          10