Court Opinion

ID: 9784039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:36:24.292667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:47.615256
License: Public Domain

JACK CARTER, J.,
dissenting.
This “final judgment” does two things: (1) it states the defendants won the jury trial; and (2) it grants the defendants attorneys’ fees. That is all it does. It does not address the merits of the case. The only indication that this order is a final judgment is the title. The jury made a factual determination, but the document has no legal declaration that such determination authorizes the rendition of a judgment; none was rendered.
Generally when a trial on the merits is conducted and some parties or causes of action are not explicitly disposed of in the judgment, it is presumed that those were essentially abandoned and the judgment is final. Vaughn v. Drennon, 324 S.W.3d 560 (Tex.2010); Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715 (Tex.2003) (judgment failing to dispose of all parties presumed final). But in order to make such a presumption, there must be a judgment upon which the presumption may be based. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex.1966). “The Aldridge presumption of finality does not apply to ... dispositions that do not adjudicate the merits of the case,....” 2 William V. Dorsaneo III, Texas Litigation Guide § 131.06 (Lexis through 2011).
If a judgment is rendered by merely stating one party prevailed in the jury trial, why is a judgment even necessary? In essence, that makes the jury verdict the final judgment. The rule of procedure requires that a judgment “give the party all the relief to which he may be entitled.” TEX.R. CIV. P. 301. If the jury verdict entitled the defendants to a legal declaration that plaintiffs take nothing, they did not receive the relief to which they were entitled.
If there is any doubt as to the finality of the judgment, then the intention of the court is interpreted by the language of the decree and the entire record, sometimes aided by the conduct of the parties. Vaughn, 324 S.W.3d at 563 (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 203). The language of the decree should at least raise a question of the finality of the judgment before we engage in the presumption that it is. The determination of the finality is not affected by the trial court’s ability to reconsider the order. “It is the court’s order that counts, not the stated reasons or qualifications.” Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 574 (Tex.1984) (orig. proceeding), disapproved of on other grounds by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex.1992).
*275The procedural sequence of events does not assist in determining this is a final judgment. Following the jury trial in September 2009, the attorneys’ fee hearing was conducted and this order was entered on December 11, 2009. Even looking at matters outside the order, it appears that this order was intended as an interlocutory order, reciting that defendants had won the jury verdict, were entitled to attorneys’ fees, and establishing the amount of attorneys’ fees to be incorporated into a final judgment.
The majority opinion takes solace in the fact that the trial court denied Good’s motion to modify, correct, or reform the judgment and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as support for a conclusion that the attorneys’ fee order was really a final judgment. But these motions do not treat the attorneys’ fees order as a final judgment. The post-trial motions only involved whether the attorneys’ fee order was proper; Good alleged that no pleading supported the attorneys’ fee order, no admissible evidence of attorneys’ fees was introduced, and the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees. Defendants made several counter-arguments, but the entire controversy was the propriety of attorneys’ fees. Good’s only specific prayer in each motion was that the trial court “deny the Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees....” If anything, these motions and their denial support an inference that the attorneys’ fee order was interlocutory and the parties were still attempting to litigate that issue before ultimately incorporating the attorneys’ fee finding into a final judgment. The post-trial motions and order do not support the argument that the order was an effective final judgment.
Since this order makes no disposition of the merits of the matter, it is not a final judgment. I dissent to the majority opinion treating it as one. I would dismiss this proceeding.