Court Opinion

ID: 9572566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:42:49.776797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:30.338344
License: Public Domain

OAKS, Justice
(concurring):
I concur in the affirmance of this conviction. I join in the second portion of Chief Justice Hall’s opinion, which rejects defendant’s second argument (that the statute is facially invalid because of preemption). As to defendant’s first argument (violation of his constitutional right to bear arms), I state separately my reasons for concurring in the conclusion that U.C.A., 1953, § 76-10-503(1) has not been shown to be unconstitutional as applied to defendant in the circumstances of this case.
Section 76-10-503(1) clearly applies to the facts of this case. However, there are four constitutional provisions on which a challenge to the application of that statute might possibly be based: the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, §§ 6 and 24 of the Utah Constitution.
Defendant has not relied on the Second Amendment. It is therefore inadvisable to discuss that amendment in this case, especially when its applicability to state regulation is doubtful at best.1
Neither has defendant contended that § 76-10-503(1) impermissibly discriminates against aliens in violation either of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or of Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution, guaranteeing the “uniform operation” of “[a]ll laws of a general nature.” At least as to the federal claim, this Court has rejected such a contention in State v. Beorchia, Utah, 530 P.2d 813 (1974). If that question is to be re-examined in light of recent holdings, it ought to be in a case where the issue is fully briefed and argued, not omitted entirely as in this case.
Defendant’s constitutional challenge is based entirely upon Utah’s right to bear arms provision, Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 6, quoted in the Chief Justice’s opinion. Relying solely on People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927, 24 A.L.R. 1115 (1922), defendant argues that under our *682constitutional provision the Legislature has no power to prohibit an alien from possessing firearms for the legitimate defense of himself and his property. Since § 76-10-503(1) has no such exception, it is said to be unconstitutional.
Whatever the merit of this defense, it is not at issue in this case. The question of whether an alien might lawfully possess a weapon in this state for his own protection is not before us. Defendant has no standing to litigate an alien’s constitutional right to peaceful possession of a firearm.
As a general rule, a litigant to whom a statute is constitutionally applied lacks standing to make a general attack on the statute on the ground that its application to others or in some other hypothetical situation would contravene the Constitution. Greaves v. State, Utah, 528 P.2d 805, 808 (1974); County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 155, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2223, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2914, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (and cases cited); 16 Am.Jur.2d “Constitutional Law” § 191.2 A defendant can properly raise a constitutional defense in a criminal case “only if he is himself adversely affected thereby in violation of his own constitutional rights.” Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d at 808. That principle of standing, which implements the sound and essential policy of judicial restraint, applies in this case.
This is not a case like People v. Zerillo, supra, which reversed the conviction of an alien in apparently peaceful possession of a gun because of a state constitutional guarantee — similar to Utah’s — of the “right to bear arms for the defense of himself and the state.” The court reasoned that because of that provision the legislature had no power “to constitute it a crime for a person, alien or citizen, to possess a revolver for the legitimate defense of himself and his property.” 219 Mich. at 638, 189 N.W. at 928, 24 A.L.R. at 1117. As a corollary, a general prohibition against possessing firearms could not validly make it a crime for an alien to possess a weapon in preparation for its use for the protected defensive purpose. In view of these constitutional principles, the prosecution in Zerillo apparently had to prove that defendant’s possession was for a forbidden purpose, such as to hunt in violation of the game laws involved in that case. Because that proof was lacking, Zerillo’s conviction was set aside.
The Zerillo precedent does not benefit the defendant in this case because here the uncontested evidence showed that his possession of a weapon was not the type of possession safeguarded by Article I, § 6. All of the evidence of possession in this case, which was uncontested, concerned defendant’s possession of the “burp gun” during a period of approximately 45 minutes immediately before, during, and immediately after he used it for offensive purposes, to shoot the unarmed Cruz outside the bar.
The defendant had no standing to challenge § 76-10-503(1) on the ground that its application to persons possessing firearms “for their security and defense” would violate Art. I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution, because the possession for which he was convicted was shown to be for purposes other than his own “security and defense.” Defendant’s constitutional rights are not being violated by applying § 76-10-503(1) to him on the facts of this case. Greaves v. State, supra.
The law of standing is not subject to being superseded on the basis of the merit of the claimant’s argument of unconstitutionality. “[Standing is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest or the fervor of his advocacy.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, - U.S. -, -, 102 S.Ct. 752, 765, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). And the facts pertinent to standing to raise a constitutional defense are not “irrelevant.”
*683Here there was ample evidence of possession of a dangerous weapon by a person who was not a citizen of the United States, in violation of the express terms of § 76-10-503(1). That evidence was sufficient for a valid jury verdict of conviction, unless that statute is unconstitutional on its face — a contention not made here as to defendant’s first argument — or unless that statute is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant on the facts of this case. Since the uncontested facts of this case show that defendant had no standing to raise the latter defense, I concur in affirming his conviction.3
J. ALLAN CROCKETT, Retired Justice, also concurs in the concurring opinion of OAKS, J.

. The weight of authority holds than an individual’s Second Amendment right to bear arms is guaranteed only against federal, not state, encroachment. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 6 S.Ct. 580, 29 L.Ed. 615 (1886); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876); Commonwealth v. Davis, 369 Mass. 886, 343 N.E.2d 847 (1976); Harris v. State, 83 Nev. 404, 432 P.2d 929 (1967); Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 248 A.2d 521, 28 A.L.R.3d 829 (1968), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 394 U.S. 812, 89 S.Ct. 1486, 22 L.Ed.2d 748 (1969); J. Nowak, Constitutional Law 414 (1978). In view of those authorities, any comments about the meaning of the Second Amendment in this case are obiter dictum.
Although it is possible that the Second Amendment may yet be held to apply to state regulation in some manner, Comment, “The Impact of State Constitutional Right to Bear Arms Provisions on State Gun Control Legislation,” 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 185 (1970), it is unwise to address that complicated issue in a case where it has not been fully briefed.

. An exception is recognized where overbroad statutes may inhibit activity protected by the First Amendment. This exception, founded on “the overriding interest in removing illegal deterrents to the exercise of the right of free speech,” County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 155, 99 S.Ct. at 2223, has no application to the facts of this case.

. The bases of affirmance relied upon in this opinion and in the Chief Justice’s opinion make it unnecessary to consider whether the fully automatic weapon possessed by this defendant is an “arm” for purposes of our constitutional right “to bear arms for ... security and defense .... ” Compare, e.g., State v. Kessler, 289 Or. 359, 614 P.2d 94, 98-100 (1980).