Court Opinion

ID: 9584591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:50:27.406545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:09.814639
License: Public Domain

ZLAKET, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
¶ 51 I respectfully dissent, believing that death is not the appropriate penalty in this case. Having recently expressed my concerns with the pecuniary gain aggravating factor, see State v. Greene, 192 Ariz. 431, 444, 967 P.2d 106, 119 (1998) (Zlaket, C.J., dissenting), I will not repeat them here. I am persuaded, however, that the court today continues down the “slippery slope” that is A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5).
¶ 52 True, the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Greene. As the majority notes, there is evidence here of a “calculated scheme” to kill for pecuniary gain. Op. at ¶ 17 (p. 349, 982 P.2d p. 824). Nonetheless, I do not find this crime so “shocking or repugnant” that it rises above other murders and cries out for the death penalty. State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 63, 628 P.2d 943, 946 (1981) (capital punishment is “reserved for only the most aggravating of circumstances”). I also cannot disregard the viewpoint of those attorneys who initially prosecuted the defendant. Both of them, being entirely familiar with the facts and the law, stated at resentencing that this was nothing more than a “run of the mill” murder ease, inappropriate for a capital sentence. Believing that such extraordinary testimony was “irrelevant,” the trial judge simply ignored it.
¶ 53 While the opinions of prosecutors regarding sentencing are certainly not binding on courts, neither should they be so easily dismissed. Judges have always listened to and weighed the sentencing recommendations of the state’s attorneys. After all, it is the prosecutor who alone decides whether the death penalty will be sought in a murder case. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 15.1(g)(1) (requiring the government to disclose its intent to ask for the death penalty within 30 days of arraignment). The prosecutor also has complete control over the presentation of evidence in aggravation. State v. Murphy, 113 Ariz. 416, 418, 555 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1976). “[I]f no aggravating circumstances are presented at a hearing, the trial court must impose a life sentence.” Id. (emphasis added); see also A.R.S. § 13-703(E).
¶ 54 The majority, while acknowledging clear error in the trial court’s relevance ruling, nevertheless dismisses the lawyers’ testimony here as “grossly insufficient to warrant a change in sentence,” Op. at ¶ 24 (p. 350, 982 P.2d p. 825). Once again, the inexact and highly subjective nature of the “weighing” process is exposed. It is most troubling that those trained in the law and working with the same facts can be so far apart in their assessments, especially when life hangs in the balance. It is all the more astounding when we consider that a prosecutor’s opinion regarding sentencing can hardly be viewed as neutral under most circumstances. To my mind, the attorneys’ recommendations against imposing the maximum penalty in this murder case deserve greater weight than either the trial judge or the majority has accorded them.
¶ 55 The (F)(5) pecuniary gain aggravator covers such a wide range of behavior that it easily lends itself to uneven application. At one end of the spectrum is the unforeseen killing during a robbery. See, e.g., State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 804 P.2d 72 (1990) (death sentence reduced to life in prison). At the other is the intricately planned and egregious murder of one spouse by another, as in State v. Willoughby, 181 Ariz. 530, 549, 892 P.2d 1319, 1338 (1995) (“The quality and strength of [aggravating and mitigating fac*357tors] must ... be considered.”). In between are exceedingly variable circumstances. Admittedly, the facts of this killing lean more toward Willoughby than Fierro. Our ease law mandates, however, that death is reserved for the worst of the worst. See, e.g., Fierro, 166 Ariz. at 548, 804 P.2d at 81 (“We will not uphold imposition of the death penalty unless either the murder or the defendant differs from the norm of first degree murders or defendants.”). In my view, both this crime and its perpetrator fall short of the mark.
¶ 56 I disagree as well with the majority’s failure to accord significance to other important evidence. The prosecutors sought the death penalty in spite of their shared belief that this was not a capital case. They did so because the inflexible policy of the Yavapai County Attorney was to automatically seek capital punishment in every case where evidence of at least one statutory aggravating factor was present. We have held, however, that “[a] decision to seek the death penalty requires careful and thoughtful consideration of our death penalty statute, orneases construing it, and all evidence relevant to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Holmberg v. De Leon, 189 Ariz. 109, 110, 938 P.2d 1110, 1111 (1997) (citation omitted). As stated earlier, this decision can only be made by the prosecutor, who is ethically required to be a “minister of justice.” Ariz. R.S.Ct. 42, ER 3.8 cmt. He or she has an obligation transcending political considerations and the unrestrained drive to win that so often infects the adversarial process. See Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 103, 677 P.2d 261, 266 (1984) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)). This responsibility must include the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in seeking the death penalty. Simple recognition that not all murders are the same, and no two murderers are alike, demands that each case receive individual scrutiny. While it may not be the court’s place to tell the executive branch how to conduct its affairs, we are free to treat a failure to exercise such discretion as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance, and I would do so here. •
¶ 57 I am also dissatisfied with the majority’s acceptance of the sentencing disparity between Susan Johnson and this defendant. My colleagues cite the fact that the defendant was the shooter as justification for their position. However, the prosecutor and Susan’s own lawyer both testified that she masterminded and solicited the killing of her husband, duping the defendant into committing the crime. While that certainly does not excuse his conduct, it does tend to make a mockery of equal treatment under the law. She lives, he dies.
¶ 58 Susan Johnson’s participation in the killing was every bit as significant as that of the defendant, even though she may not have pulled the trigger. Her mitigating circumstances were no more persuasive than his— neither had prior records of significance, both had families and difficult backgrounds. In some ways, I believe Susan is even more culpable than the defendant. He killed a stranger for love and money. The ease against her, however, reaches the Willoughby extreme. She killed, out of pure greed, someone whose trust and confidence she had garnered, a spouse to whom she had professed love and fidelity.
¶ 59 In State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 865 P.2d 779 (1993), we upheld the death penalty for a mother who planned, but was not present at, the killing of her 4-year-old son by a boyfriend. In finding the killing depraved, we observed that the child had been “delivered into the hands of his killers by the person upon whom he should have been able to rely for protection and compassion — his mother.” Id. at 125, 865 P.2d at 786. Although similar reasoning should apply to Susan, she inexplicably has been allowed to live. This sentencing disparity is, to my mind, left unanswered by the majority.
¶ 60 I do not believe that the (F)(5) aggravator, standing alone as it does here, outweighs these troublesome considerations. I would reduce defendant’s sentence to life imprisonment.
STANLEY G. FELDMAN, Justice, concurs.