Court Opinion

ID: 9789529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:37:51.611113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:22.953636
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice:
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action and judgment was entered for defendant Mountain Bell. Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative a Motion for a Directed Verdict. (Plaintiffs acknowledge that this alternative motion was actually a motion for a new trial). These motions were denied by the trial court and this appeal followed.
It is important to understand the basis of the jury’s verdict. Even assuming defendant wrongfully disconnected plaintiffs’ home phone, the jury decided plaintiffs had suffered no compensable damage. Certainly not having access to a telephone in one’s home may be inconvenient, but the jury decided that based upon the evidence presented at trial, plaintiffs could not recover. The evidence showed that plaintiffs did have yet another phone just two doors away from his residence, which was clearly applied for after notice and in anticipation of the disconnect, and installed just one day before the home phone actually was disconnected. The burden of showing wherein he has been harmed must necessarily fall upon the plaintiff, and by failing to carry that burden plaintiff loses his cause of action.1 Under basic principles of judicial review, we should not upset the jury’s verdict un*854less it is unreasonable or in direct conflict with the evidence.2 I do not believe such a showing has been made on this appeal.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, I do feel compelled to address some of the points raised in the majority opinion as to whether or not a public utility has the right to deny service at one address because of failure to pay for past service rendered at another address. The majority decision correctly notes that there is a split of authority on the issue. However, the better rule seems to allow the public utility such a right unless its actions are arbitrary, unjust, inequitable, or without legal right under the particular circumstances.3 The trend seems to be that there exists such a right of cut-off when it is founded either in (1) a provision of the current service contract between the parties; (2) a statute generally governing the conduct of public utilities; or (3) a rule of regulation promulgated by the company itself, usually as part of its filed tariff.4 In this case, the defendant has properly filed tariffs which cover the situation, as follows:
L-4 In the event a subscriber is indebted to the Telephone Company for charges and services rendered at a prior time, of any nature, or for service at more than one number or location, and the subscriber does not pay the charges or satisfy such indebtedness, the Telephone Company may charge and bill such indebtedness against the account of the subscriber’s present service or to the account of the subscriber’s present service where more than one number or location is being served.
Q-2 The Company may, after notification of intent to the subscriber, temporarily suspend or terminate the service for nonpayment of any sum due the Company. [Emphasis added].
These are alternative remedies available to the Telephone Company. In the instant case, defendant realized that to try to collect the business debt by billing the home account would be a useless effort and therefore opted to give notice (which was done on numerous occasions) and then to disconnect the service. I believe this is permitted on the facts before the court. It should also be noted that the fact that one account was for business use and the other was for personal use is of no consequence.5 The evidence clearly shows that although called his “business” account, the business was a dba and the phone was for plaintiffs’ personal use.
Finally, a public policy argument supports the judgment for defendant. There is a legal maxim which says in effect that no one can benefit from his own wrongdoing. To permit plaintiffs to recover damages for failing to pay their debts is a strange distortion of justice. The majority opinion suggests that the telephone company could also have collected the business phone ar-rearages through ordinary judicial means. This is true; however, normal collection processes cost money, which cost in turn must be passed on to those customers who properly pay their debts. There must be a balancing effect to insure that innocent, upstanding customers are not harmed by the selfish acts of another.
This is not to suggest that in every instance a utility company would be justified in discontinuing service to a delinquent customer, but under the facts of this case I would affirm the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s judgment.
WILKINS, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of HALL, J.

. See First Security Bank of Utah, N. A. v. Wright, Utah, 521 P.2d 563 (1974); Soter v. Wasatch Development Corp., 21 Utah 2d 224, 443 P.2d 663 (1968).

. Arnold Machinery Company v. Intrusion Prepakt Inc., 11 Utah 2d 246, 357 P.2d 496 (1960); Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966).

. Water Supply Board v. Williams, 53 Ala.App. 560, 302 So.2d 534 (1974). See, U.C.A., 1953, 54-3-1.

. Annot.: Utility Cut-off — Default at another address, 73 A.L.R.3d 1292 (1976).

. Dworman v. Consolidated Edison Co., 26 A.D.2d 535, 271 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1966).