Court Opinion

ID: 9906478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-03 08:29:43.375405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:32.835554
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 30, 2023

                                             In The

                         Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                                    NO. 14-22-00614-CV

                      FIDELIS JOHNSON BADAIKI, Appellant
                                                V.
       PINE FOREST PARK PLACE, AND AMERICAN EAGLE AUTO
                       STORAGE, Appellees

                 On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4
                               Harris County, Texas
                          Trial Court Cause No. 1092824

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Fidelis Johnson Badaiki, pro se, sued Bryan Miller d/b/a Classic Towing
LLC, 1 Pine Forest Park Place, and American Eagle Auto Storage for violations of
the Texas Towing and Booting Act. See Tex. Occ. Code §§ 2308.001, 2308.404.
After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Badaiki and

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           Prior to trial Badaiki non-suited his claims against Bryan Miller d/b/a Classic Towing
LLC.
awarded him damages under the Act. Badaiki appeals the trial court’s judgment
asserting that the trial court erred in failing to award (1) statutory damages under
section 2308.404(c) of the Occupations Code, (2) damages for injury to his
vehicle’s suspension system alleged to have occurred when his vehicle was towed,
(3) prejudgment interest, and (4) post-judgment interest. See Tex. Occ. Code §
2308.404(c). No appellee’s brief has been filed.

                           GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES

      A judgment shall conform to the pleadings. Tex. R. Civ. P. 301; see also
Mullen v. Roberts, 423 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. 1968) (“It is a rule that . . . a default
judgment . . . must accord with the pleadings.”). “[A]s a general rule plaintiffs are
required to plead for prejudgment intertest sought at common law as an element of
damages, whereas statutory or contractual interest may be predicated on a prayer
for general relief.” Benavidez v. Isles Const. Co., 726 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex. 1987).
Exemplary damages must be specifically pleaded. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 56; see also
First Nat’l Bank of Irving v. Shockley, 663 S.W.2d 685, 691 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi-Edinburg 1983, no writ) (“Since plaintiff’s petition did not allege that the
alleged misconduct by the bank was committed knowingly, the trial court could not
and our Court cannot deem such an allegation as proved or confessed.”). “It is
impermissible in a default judgment to render judgment for damages in excess of
the damages specifically pleaded.” Capitol Brick, Inc. v. Fleming Mfg. Co., Inc.,
722 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. 1986).

      In a no-answer default judgment, a judgment may be entered on the
pleadings alone, and all facts properly pled are deemed admitted. Whitaker v.
Rose, 218 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). “For
liquidated damages, a trial court can render default judgment if it can verify the
damages by referring to the allegations in the petition and the written instruments.”

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Id. (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 241). For unliquidated damages the trial court must hear
evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 243; see also Whitaker, 218 S.W.3d at 220. “[A]
defaulting defendant does not admit that the event sued upon caused any of
plaintiff’s alleged injuries.” Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729,
732 (Tex. 1984).     “The causal nexus between the event sued upon and the
plaintiff’s injuries must be shown by competent evidence.” Id.

      Under section 2308.404 of the Texas Towing and Booting Act:

      (a) A towing company, booting company, or parking facility owner
          who violates this chapter is liable to the owner or operator of the
          vehicle that is the subject of the violation for:
             1) Damages arising from the removal, storage, or booting of
                the vehicle; and
             2) Towing, storage, or booting fees assessed in connection with
                the vehicle’s removal, storage, or booting.
      ...
      (c) A towing company, booting company, or parking facility owner
          who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly violates this chapter is
          liable to the owner or operator of the vehicle that is the subject of
          the violation for $1,000 plus three times the amount of fees
          assessed in the vehicle’s removal, towing, storage, or booting.

Tex. Occ. Code § 2308.404.

                                   BACKGROUND

      Badaiki filed suit in the justice court and appealed to the county civil court at
law, de novo. In his original petition in the justice court, which became part of the
record in the county civil court at law, Badaiki requested $294.16 for the costs of
the tow and the storage fees assessed, as well as $20.00 for the costs of the
photographs. Badaiki attached the receipt for payment of the towing and storage
fees. Badaiki did not allege or plead that appellees Pine Forest Park Place and
American Eagle Auto Storage “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly” violated
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the Towing and Booting Act. There is also no general prayer for relief contained
in the petition.

       Just before trial, Badaiki non-suited Bryan Miller d/b/a Classic Towing
LLC. The trial court conducted a bench trial and rendered judgment in favor of
Badaiki against Pine Forest Park Place and American Eagle Auto Storage for
$314.16 in “Towing and Storage Charges.” Badaiki filed a motion to modify the
judgment requesting that the trial court modify the final judgment to include
prejudgment and post-judgment interest, damages to the vehicle’s suspension
system, and statutory damages under section 2308.404(c). The trial court denied
Badaiki’s motion.

                                    BADAIKI’S PLEADINGS

       Badaiki did not allege or plead any facts that would establish that Pine
Forest and American Eagle “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly” violated the
Towing and Booting Act. See Shockley, 663 S.W.2d at 691; see also Whitaker,
218 S.W.3d at 220. Badaiki also failed to plead any damages to his vehicle alleged
to have occurred when his vehicle was towed. Thus, neither the trial court nor this
court can deem such allegations as proven or confessed.2 See Shockley, 663
S.W.2d at 691. Badaiki similarly failed to plead for prejudgment or post-judgment
interest in his petition. See Benavidez, 726 S.W.2d at 25. As a result, the petition
did not state a cause of action for these additional damages against appellees and
the trial court did not err in failing to award such damages. 3 See Tex. R. Civ. P.

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         Even if the pleading was sufficient to give fair notice of such a claim, Badaiki has failed
to point to evidence in the record demonstrating, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of
the issue or that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241–42 (Tex. 2001).
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         Even if the petition could be construed to request prejudgment interest, the decision of
whether to award prejudgment interest under equitable principles is within the trial court’s
discretion. Henry v. Masson, 453 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
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301; see also Shockley, 663 S.W.2d at 691 (“[T]he plaintiff’s petition did not
allege that any of the alleged misconduct . . . was committed knowingly. The
petition did not state a cause of action for these ‘additional damages’ . . . the
default judgment for these ‘additional damages’ cannot stand.”).

                                        CONCLUSION

       We overrule Badaiki’s sole issue on appeal and affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

                                             /s/       Ken Wise
                                                       Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Poissant.

Badaiki has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding him
prejudgment interest. See id. at 49–50 (where serious and genuine dispute regarding ultimate
liability existed, decision not to award prejudgment interest under equitable principles was not
abuse of discretion); Pickens v. Alsup, 568 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App.—Austin 1978, writ ref’d
n.r.e.) (same). Other than arguing his entitlement to prejudgment interest, Badaiki has not shown
how the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award him prejudgment interest. On the
record here we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision was so arbitrary or unreasonable as
to amount to a clear error of law. See Henry, 453 S.W.3d at 50.

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