Court Opinion

ID: 9860527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:24:58.070558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:16:06.646490
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JOHNSON, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s disposition of the cause and, therefore, concur in the result. However, I cannot join my colleagues because, once again, they rely on Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 85 S. Ct. 824, and its Illinois offspring. I continue to assign error to the rule of Swain. I also continue to believe that People v. Wheeler (1978), 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, and its progeny express the better view. People v. Loggins (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 684, 694, 480 N.E.2d 1293, 1301 (Johnson, J., concurring); People v. Lavinder (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 662, 671, 430 N.E.2d 243, 248 (Johnson, J., dissenting). In Swain v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude black persons from a jury in a criminal trial solely on account of their race did not deny a defendant equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The court held, however, that a defendant would prevail on such a claim if he could demonstrate that a prosecutor in a county was systematically excluding persons from juries for racially motivated reasons “in case after case.” (Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 774, 85 S. Ct. 824, 837.) The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly declared the principles articulated in Swain to be controlling in Illinois. People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 373, 392-95, 478 N.E.2d 291, 298-300; People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 138-39, 457 N.E.2d 1202, 1204; People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 252, 273-80, 454 N.E.2d 220, 229-33. Scholars, attorneys, and the general public have criticized the rule of Swain because it (1) defeats the goal of a fair jury that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution expresses, (2) contains a standard that is unfair to defendants and is almost unattainable, and (3) destroys the appearance of justice in our courtrooms. People v. Loggins (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 684, 696-98, 480 N.E.2d 1293, 1302-04 (Johnson, J., concurring). People v. Wheeler expresses the better view. There, the Supreme Court of California held that a prosecutors misuse of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from juries violated a defendant’s right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, guaranteed by the California Constitution. People v. Wheeler (1978), 22 Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903; see also Commonwealth v. Soares (1979), 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499; State v. Crespin (1980), 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716. The third division of this court concurred with the Wheeler-type standard in People v. Payne (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046, relying on the impartial jury guarantee of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. The third division held that when it reasonably appeared to a trial court that the State was using its peremptory challenges solely to exclude black jurors because of their race the burden shifted to the State to demonstrate that the exclusions were for reasons other than race. (106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1040, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1050.) Relying on its previous decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this approach and reaffirmed its allegiance to Swain. (People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202.) Two United States Courts of Appeals have adopted the Wheeler approach, Booker v. Jabe (6th Cir. 1985), 775 F.2d 762, and McCray v. Abrams (2d Cir. 1984), 750 F.2d 1113. As the majority noted, the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to review and heard argument on the question of whether it is a violation of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution for the State to use its peremptory challenges to systematically exclude blacks from the jury in a case solely because of their race. Batson v. Kentucky (1985), 471 U.S. 1052, 85 L. Ed. 2d 476, 105 S. Ct. 2111. The majority also correctly notes that we may not overrule or modify decisions of our supreme court. (Agricultural Transportation Association v. Carpentier (1953), 2 Ill. 2d 19, 27, 116 N.E.2d 863, 867; People v. Nurse (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 590, 594, 475 N.E.2d 1000, 1004.) Thus, until a higher court resolves this issue, defendants should preserve adequate records of their voir dires so that, someday, a reviewing court may hold that a particular defendant has met the “case after case” standard of Swain. Even under the Wheeler approach, a defendant still must preserve a record showing a prima facie case that a prosecutor has excluded persons from the jury solely on account of their race. (People v. Wheeler (1978), 22 Cal. 3d 258, 280, 583 P.2d 748, 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 905; People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 342, 359, 430 N.E.2d 1046, 1054.) I agree with the majority that the defendant before us did not fulfill this requirement. From August 1985 to the present, at least 10 additional defendants have contended that prosecutors in this State misused their peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from their juries: People v. Amos (1985), 140 Ill. App. 3d 14, 488 N.E.2d 290; People v. Wilson (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 726, 487 N.E.2d 1015; People v. Richardson (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 598, 487 N.E.2d 716; People v. Thomas (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 163, 486 N.E.2d 1362; People v. Smith (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 21, 486 N.E.2d 1347; People v. Kimbrough (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 481, 485 N.E.2d 1292; People v. Gutierrez (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 774, 483 N.E.2d 944; People v. Green (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 361, 483 N.E.2d 606; People v. Walker (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 177, 483 N.E.2d 301; People v. Williams (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 126, 483 N.E.2d 306. The number of defendants raising this claim is large and ever-increasing. People v. Frazier (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 151, 156-57, 469 N.E.2d 594, 598-99 (listing 46 cases). I share the majority’s abhorrence of this practice, which a justice of our supreme court described as “unconstitutional, unAmerican and unconscionable.” (People v. Alford (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 568, 579-80 (appeal denied, Simon, J., dissenting).) Insofar as the majority correctly applied the present law of Illinois to the facts of this case, I concur in the result.