Court Opinion

ID: 9752300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:56:30.402725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:49.179665
License: Public Domain

Gibson, J.,
dissenting. I believe the Labor Relations Board correctly concluded that the State did not comply with Article 14(4) of the collective bargaining agreement in dismissing Cynthia Gregoire as a state employee. Accordingly, I dissent from the Court’s reversal of that decision.
Article 14(4) of the collective bargaining agreement provides:
*76Whenever an appointing authority contemplates dismissing an employee, the employee will be notified in writing of the reason(s) for such action, and will be given an opportunity to respond either orally or in writing. The employee will normally be given 24 hrs. to notify the employer whether he or she wishes to respond in writing or to meet in person to discuss the contemplated dismissal. The employee’s response, whether in writing or in a meeting, should be provided to the employer within four days of receipt of written notification of the contemplated dismissal.
On February 18, 1994, Cynthia Gregoire received a memorandum entitled “Investigatory Meeting” from her supervisor, David Tucker, stating that he was “contemplating disciplinary action in accordance with Article 14” in connection with her handling of the delinquent account of her husband’s business. The memorandum invited her to attend the “investigatory meeting” on February 23 (later rescheduled to February 28), but did not state that the appointing authority, or Tucker as the authorized representative, was contemplating dismissal as a possible disciplinary action. Tucker was not, in fact, contemplating dismissal at the time he sent the memorandum, and he had not discussed the possibility of dismissal with the Department’s appointing authority, Commissioner Susan Auld. Neither Gregoire nor her VSEA representative was aware before or during the February 28 meeting or prior to her dismissal that dismissal was contemplated. Tucker ended his February 18 memorandum, “After reviewing any new information, I will conduct further inquiry as is appropriate, and then contact you.” The next communication Gregoire received was the letter of termination from Commissioner Auld.
The Board’s interpretations of collective bargaining agreements are entitled to great deference because of its expertise in such matters. In re Vermont State Employees’ Ass’n, 164 Vt. 214, 216, 666 A.2d 1182, 1183 (1995). Ordinarily, we will not disturb the Board’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Merrill, 151 Vt. 270, 273, 559 A.2d 651, 653 (1988). We will uphold the Board’s order if its findings of fact, taken as a whole, justify its ultimate conclusion. Vermont State Employees’ Ass’n, 164 Vt. at 216, 666 A.2d at 1183. The expertise of the Board in construing collective bargaining agreements is presumed, and substantial deference must be accorded the Board’s constructions. In re Gorruso, 150 Vt. 139, 143, 549 A.2d 631, 634 (1988).
*77“Where contract language is clear, the parties are presumed to be bound by its plain and ordinary meaning.” Vermont State Colleges Staff Fed’n, AFL Local 4023 v. Vermont State Colleges, 157 Vt. 645, 646, 596 A.2d 355, 357 (1991) (mem.). The majority states that the plain language of Article 14(4) says nothing about requiring explicit notice of a contemplated dismissal. But Article 14(4) provides that an employee will normally be given twenty-four hours to indicate to the employer whether she wishes “to discuss the contemplated dismissal” and that she may respond in writing or in a meeting “within four days of receipt of written notification of the contemplated dismissal.” (Emphasis added.) This language clearly requires explicit written notice whenever dismissal is being considered.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), the United States Supreme Court “recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood,” id. at 543, stating that the “opportunity to present reasons . . . why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.” Id. at 546 (emphasis added). The collective bargaining agreement makes clear what is implicit in Loudermill — that the employer must give written notice to an employee of any contemplated dismissal. The Board concluded that the agreement requires such notice, and that notification simply that “disciplinary action” is being contemplated is not sufficient.
Federal courts construing Loudermill have reached the same conclusion. See Calhoun v. Gaines, 982 F.2d 1470, 1476 (10th Cir. 1992) (implicit in notice required before dismissal of public employee is requirement that employee be made aware that employment is in jeopardy); Matthews v. Harney County, Or., 819 F.2d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1987) (.Loudermill requires notice to employee of pendency or contemplation of dismissal action in advance of any pretermination hearing); cf. Post v. Harper, 980 F.2d 491, 494 (8th Cir. 1992) (although employer not required to tell employee that hearing is pretermination hearing, employee needs to know that job is in jeopardy).
The majority ignores one of the major purposes of the notice requirement in the collective bargaining agreement. The United States Supreme Court pointed out in Loudermill that “[e]ven where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes effect.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543. Having received no notice that her job was in jeopardy, Gregoire and her VSEA repre*78sentative were deprived of an opportunity to argue against such sanction. The Board recognized this truth, and the majority, in rejecting the Board’s decision, is simply substituting its own opinion for that of the Board without giving due deference to the Board’s expertise.
I respectfully dissent, and am authorized to say that Justice Johnson joins in this dissent.