Court Opinion

ID: 9411000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 16:00:55.656092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:02.064614
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 20-5043                                                               September Term, 2022
                                                                          FILED ON: July 25, 2023

HENRY GETER,
                           APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE,
                  APPELLEE

                                Appeal from the United States District Court
                                        for the District of Columbia
                                            (No. 1:16-cv-00482)

         Before: WILKINS and KATSAS, Circuit Judges.1

                                                JUDGMENT

       This appeal was considered on the briefs and arguments of the appellee and the Court-
appointed amicus.2 The Court has fully considered the appeal and has determined that it does not
warrant a published opinion. See Fed. R. App. P. 36; D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated
below, it is:

         ORDERED that the district court’s judgment be AFFIRMED.

        The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers from discriminating against any
qualified individual based on a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA defines such
discrimination to include a failure to make reasonable accommodations for such individuals. Id.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who
assert protection under the statute. Id. § 12203(a).

        Henry Geter drove a delivery truck for the Government Publishing Office. This job
required him to possess a commercial driver’s license (CDL). In 2009, Geter suffered a back
injury, became unable to drive, and began collecting worker’s compensation benefits. In 2010,

         1
           Senior Judge Silberman was a member of the panel before his death on October 2, 2022. Judges Wilkins
and Katsas have acted as a quorum in this judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
         2
           We appointed J. Scott Ballenger as amicus curiae in support of the appellant. Mr. Ballenger and his student-
counsel ably discharged their responsibilities, and the Court thanks them for their service.
Geter returned to work, suffered another back injury, and again went on paid leave. In June 2013,
Geter unsuccessfully sued GPO for various kinds of alleged employment discrimination.

         In November 2013, GPO ordered Geter to return to work with a valid CDL. In response,
Geter claimed that the painkillers he was taking for his back injury made him unable to renew his
license. Geter asked his supervisor, Gregory Robinson, for a temporary transfer to a desk job. By
letter dated December 16, 2013, Robinson again directed Geter to return to work with a valid CDL.
As for the requested accommodation, Robinson told Geter: “If it is in fact your desire to seek a
reasonable accommodation, you need to inform me specifically what accommodation/s you are
seeking. In addition, you must provide medical documentation detailing your condition to the
Agency’s Chief Medical Officer by Friday, December 27, 2013.” J.A. 119. Geter continued to
seek a temporary desk job, but he failed to provide GPO with the requested medical
documentation. In April 2014, GPO fired Geter for not having a valid CDL and thus being unable
to perform the essential functions of his job as a driver. The Merit Systems Protection Board and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission both affirmed GPO’s decision.

         In this case, Geter contends that GPO unlawfully failed to accommodate his disability by
refusing to assign him to a light-duty position while his back healed. Geter also contends that GPO
fired him in retaliation for his requesting an accommodation and filing the earlier lawsuit. The
district court granted summary judgment to GPO. Geter v. GPO, 436 F. Supp. 3d 227 (D.D.C.
2020). We now affirm.

       To prevail on his first claim, Geter must prove that GPO denied his request for a reasonable
accommodation. Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Because Geter failed to
respond to GPO’s reasonable request for medical documentation of his injury, he cannot do so.

        The process of determining an appropriate reasonable accommodation requires an
“interactive process” between the employer and the disabled employee. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3).
This process involves “a flexible give-and-take between employer and employee so that together
they can determine what accommodation would enable the employee to continue working.” Ward,
762 F.3d at 32 (citation omitted). If an employee prematurely and unreasonably abandons the
give-and-take, the employer is entitled to summary judgment. See id. at 32–35; Stewart v. St.
Elizabeths Hosp., 589 F.3d 1305, 1308–09 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

        In this case, Geter did just that by failing to provide GPO with any medical documentation
of his disability. Geter objects that his personnel file already contained such documentation. But
the most recent documentation in Geter’s file was a medical report that was then over a year old,
and it stated that Geter “should be able to return to his work activities.” J.A. 96. Geter further
objects that he never received Robinson’s letter requesting the documentation. But the letter was
delivered both to Geter’s home address and to his attorney, which counts as delivery to Geter. See
Rao v. Baker, 898 F.2d 191, 196–97 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

       Geter’s retaliation claim is also without merit. For ADA retaliation claims that rest on
circumstantial evidence, we apply the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Johnson v. Interstate Mgmt. Co., 849 F.3d
1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2017). GPO has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing

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Geter—he could not drive a delivery truck without a CDL. The remaining question is whether
Geter produced sufficient evidence that this stated reason was pretextual and that the actual reason
was retaliation for protected activity. He has not.

        Geter’s lead pretext theory is that GPO failed to allow Geter to work in a light-duty position
but made that accommodation for other injured drivers. This kind of argument requires showing
that the comparators are similarly situated to the plaintiff. Royall v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers,
AFL-CIO, 548 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Here, Geter must show that GPO accommodated
other drivers who lacked a CDL.

        Although a handful of injured GPO drivers received temporary light-duty assignments,
there is no admissible evidence that any of them lacked a CDL. To be sure, one declaration stated
that Robinson accommodated two injured drivers who had lost their CDLs. But it was not made
under the penalty of perjury, which is required for unsworn statements. 28 U.S.C. § 1746; D.D.C.
Local Rule 5.1(f). And “while an unsworn statement may be considered on summary judgment”
as an affidavit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), “an unsworn statement that has not
been made under penalty of perjury cannot.” United States ex rel. Doe v. Heart Sol., PC, 923 F.3d
308, 315 (3d Cir. 2019).

       Moreover, several of Geter’s comparators engaged in protected activity and yet were not
fired. For example, one filed an EEO complaint in 2016 and was accommodated in 2017 and
2018. Another filed an EEO complaint in 2002 and was accommodated between 2010 and 2012.
And a third filed an EEO complaint in 2016 and was accommodated in 2017 and 2018. GPO’s
accommodation of other drivers who had filed EEO complaints significantly undercuts any
inference that it refused to accommodate Geter based on his engaging in similar protected activity.

       For these reasons, we affirm the grant of summary judgment for GPO.

        Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is
directed to withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition
for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(1).

                                            Per Curiam

                                                               FOR THE COURT:
                                                               Mark J. Langer, Clerk

                                                       BY:     /s/
                                                               Daniel J. Reidy
                                                               Deputy Clerk

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