Court Opinion

ID: 9673613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:15:08.284963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:23.070425
License: Public Domain

T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
{dissenting). This matter is before us on an order to show cause why a writ of superintending control  in the nature of mandamus should not issue directing the circuit judge to reinstate a default regularly entered by plaintiffs against the named defendant in an action in the circuit court for the county of Arenac.
Plaintiffs began their action in the original case by issuance of summons on May 27, 1961. Defendant therein was personally served on June 2, 1961. Plaintiffs filed their declaration on June 9,1961, and on June 30,1961, defendant was defaulted for failure to appear and answer. We are informed that the entry of the default was listed in both the September 1961 and December 1961 calendars of the court.
The record also discloses that plaintiffs’ counsel made a bona fide effort to obtain 'a day certain upon which to introduce proofs to have a default judg*49ment entered from June 30th until a date was finally fixed as December 12, 1961. This date counsel confirmed by letter to the clerk of the circuit court.
On December 6, 1961, the attorneys later to represent the defendant received an Arenac county term calendar by reason of representation of other clients, which listed the actions pending against the defendant and which showed him to be in default. Defendant’s counsel knew the insurer of the defendant and immediately communicated this information to that company. Investigation by the company revealed that the summons had been misfiled. On December 7, 1961, having learned of the default a day earlier, counsel entered an appearance for the defendant and the following day moved to set aside the default, supporting the motion with affidavits of merit. Answer thereto was made. In consequence of these pleadings, the December 12th hearing to take proofs on the judgment was not held. Several agreed adjournments were entered into and the motion to set aside the default was not heard until May 20, 1963. An order setting aside the default was entered on July 15, 1963.
Plaintiffs appealed to this Court as a matter- of right the order setting aside the order of default. Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal as of right, since the order was interlocutory. Plaintiffs, in answering defendant’s motion to dismiss, asked (a) that the motion to dismiss be denied, or (b) that the appeal taken of right be treated as an application for leave to appeal, or (c) that a writ of superintending control issue directing the trial judge to vacate the order setting aside the original default. We dismissed the appeal as taken. No opinion accompanied our dismissal of the appeal.
On February 25, 1964, plaintiffs filed this direct application for superintending control. We granted *50an order to show cause. The circuit judge made his return, and the question for consideration is the grant or denial of the motion to vacate his order setting aside the default.
Appellee contends that our rejection of the request for a writ of superintending control, when it was sought alternatively in the answer to the motion to dismiss the appeal, is conclusive and that the correctness of the order vacating the default is res judicata.
Our dismissal of the improperly taken appeal of right was not an adjudication of the grant or denial of right of review. Neither was it an adjudication on the merits of the application for superintending control as alternatively sought with the petition to consider the appeal taken as an application for leave to appeal. Our order of dismissal of the appeal of right, without elaboration, adjudicated only that no appeal of right lay from the interlocutory order vacating the default.
Appellants urge in their first stated question that the failure to appear because of the misfiling of the summons by the insurer, after service on the insured and delivery by him to the insurer, is not good cause for setting aside the default regularly entered. Secondly, they contend that assuming no abuse of discretion, the court was without jurisdiction to set aside the default after the 4-month period specified by former Court Rule No 28, § 4 (1945).2
*51We discuss the questions in inverse order.
I cannot agree with the reasoning of Justice O’Hara in applying GCR 1963, 520, effective January 1, 1963.
The trial judge in his order of July 15, 1963, setting aside the entry of default, said:
“The right to set aside a default judgment seems to rest upon the interpretation of Court Rule 28, §§ 1 through 4, with section 4 of said rule being applicable in this case, which reads substantially as follows :
“ ‘In all cases where personal service shall have been made upon a defendant, and proceedings taken after default on the strength thereof, his default shall not be set aside unless the application shall have been made within 4 months after such default is regularly filed and entered.’
“The above court rule is substantially the same as GCR 1963, 520, which court rule makes reference to GCR 1963, 528, the latter rule sets forth on what grounds a default may be set aside.
“In reading the court rule, the court feels that it contemplated some further action being taken as a result of said default having been filed or entered, such as the entry of a judgment.”
GCR 1963, 14, provides:
“These rules will take effect on January 1, 1963. They govern all proceedings in actions brought after that date and also all further proceedings in actions then pending except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be feas*52ible, or would work injustice, in which event, the former procedure applies.”
Justice O’Hara, without any reason, has proceeded to apply the new rules.
The trial judge applied former Court Rule No 28. It would seem to us that we are bound to apply the old rules, as he did, with reference to the subject matter of this suit. Although his opinion does not state either of the reasons in GCR 1963,14, we think we have to presume that the trial judge either found it would not be feasible to apply the new rules or that it would work an injustice to apply them.
The trial judge, however, in applying the old rules applied them erroneously. He seemed to believe there was no significant difference between former Court Rule No 28, §§ 1 through 4, and GCR 1963, 520 and 528. GCR 1963, 520, is substantially different in that it provides :
. “A Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 528. If personal service was made upon the party against whom the default was taken, it shall not be set aside unless application to have it set aside is made either before the entry of judgment or within 4 months after the default was regularly filed or entered except as provided in Rule 628.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is to be noted that former Court Rule No 28 deals with the setting aside of an entry of default and not a default judgment. It says it should not be set aside unless the application shall have been made within 4 months after such default is regularly filed and entered. The new rule provides that it may be set aside either before entry of judgment or within 4 months after the default was *53regularly filed or entered, except as provided in Eule 528.
In commenting on section 4 of former Court Eule No 28, Jason Honigman asserts that “In order for the 4-month, mandatory limitation to apply, the rule requires that proceedings be taken on the strength of the default. In practical effect it means that the default has been followed up by entry of a judgment or decree based thereon.” Honigman Michigan Court Eul.es Annotated (1949), p 275.
Despite this quotation, only 3 reported appellate decisions involve the precise issue with which we are concerned: the setting aside of an entry of default after the 4-month period and prior to entry of judgment.
In the ease of Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 187 Mich 444, the Court in a two-sentence opinion by Justice Ostrander, said (p 446): “I do not think the rule should be construed so as to make what was done a ‘proceeding’ within its meaning. The writ will issue.” Three of the Justices concurred with Justice Ostrander, in effect holding that the plaintiff’s note of issue and demand for a jury did not constitute “proceedings.” Justice Bird, joined by Justices Steere and Moore, in a dissenting opinion said (pp 445, 446):
“The following definitions of the word ‘proceeding’ are found in Words and Phrases (vol 6, pp 5632, 5633):
“ ‘Proceeding means the performance of an act. The term “proceedings” in its more general sense in law means all steps or measures adopted in the prosecution or defense of an action.’
“ ‘A proceeding in a civil action is an act necessary to be done in order to attain a given end. It is a prescribed mode of action for carrying into effect a legal right/
*54“ ‘The word “proceeding” is applicable to every step taken by a suitor to obtain the interposition or action of a court.’
“ ‘In its most comprehensive sense, the term “proceeding” includes every step taken in a civil action except the pleadings.’ ”
Justice Bird went on to say (p 446):
“It is not uncommon to use the term ‘proceeding’ to designate a suit or action in its entirety, but I am impressed, as applied to this rule, it is not used in that general sense, but is used in a restricted sense with reference to any necessary step that might be taken after default to entitle one to a judgment. * # * For this reason we are constrained to hold that filing the note of issue and the demand for a jury was a step or proceeding in the ease within the meaning of this rule.”
Justice McAlvay did not participate in this case.
While this is a dissenting opinion, the majoritj^ opinion, not having had a majority of the 8-member Court, establishes no precedent, at least according to some present writing.
In the case of Vozbut v. Pomputis, 277 Mich 212, plaintiff was appealing the lower court’s granting of defendants’ motion to set aside their default judgment almost one year seven months after default was regularly entered. After quoting Court Buie No 28, §4 (1933) (substantially the same as Court Buie No 28, §4 [1945]), the Court, without mentioning the case of Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, supra, decided that (p 215) “the default for failure to plead was regularly entered after personal service and appearance; the default should not have been set aside.”
The third case is Detroit Trust Co. v. Sosensky, 300 Mich 353, where the Court, without discussing the issue, refused to set aside the lower court’s *55denial of defendant’s motion to set aside a default on the grounds of laches.
The reasoned dissent in the Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. Case, together with the Vosbut Case, compels us to conclude that in all cases where personal service shall have been made upon a defendant, and proceedings taken after default on the strength thereof, his default shall not be set aside unless the application shall be made within 4 months after such default is regularly filed or entered.
In this context, proceedings means “In a general sense, the form and manner of conducting juridical business before a court or judicial officer; regular and orderly progress in form of law; including all possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment.” Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed 1951), p 1368. See, also, dissent in Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, supra.
Justice Voelker writing for the Court in White v. Sadler, 350 Mich 511, 521, 522, said:
“Our Court has traditionally been strict on setting aside defaults once regularly entered. Where a default following personal service is regularly-taken, the court rule providing that it shall not be set aside after a certain time (presently 4 months) has generally been regarded as mandatory (Hensey v. Hensey, 331 Mich 518; Gombasy v. Gombasy, 318 Mich 139; Watkins v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 247 Mich 237), and this rule, however harsh, has been subject to few exceptions, the most notable being that of fraud (Hensey v. Hensey, supra), which is not urged or suggested here.”
The statement given above was quoted by Justice Black in his opinion in Haenlein v. Saginaw Building Trades Council, A.F.L., 361 Mich 263, 266.
*56When plaintiffs caused entry of default, placing of matter on calendar in two terms, negotiated and obtained a date for taking proofs for the actual entry of judgment, “proceedings” were taken within the meaning of former Court Rule No 28, so that the 4-month mandatory provision in the rule was operative.
In view of our disposition of this question, it is not necessary to discuss the first question.
The writ of superintending control should issue directing the circuit judge to reinstate the default previously regularly entered by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs should have costs.
Souris and Adams, JJ., concurred with T. M. ■ Kavanagh, C. J.

 “Any order entered under this rule may be set aside on special motion for cause shown, in the discretion of the court, on terms. In actions at law, the party desiring to have a default set aside shall, as soon as practicable after he shall know or have reason to believe that the default has been filed or entered, file and serve an affidavit of merits, and make application to the court to have the default set aside. In suits in equity, to entitle a defendant to an order setting aside his default for want of appearance or answer, ho shall proffer a sworn answer showing a defense on the merits as to the whole or a part of the plaintiff’s case. In all cases where personal service shall have been made upon a defendant, *51and proceedings talcen after default on the strength thereof, his default shall not he set aside unless the application shall he made within 4 months after such default is regularly filed or entered. And in any ease where personal service shall have been made upon a defendant, an order setting aside his default shall be conditioned upon his payment to the plaintiff of the taxable costs incurred in reliance on said default, and the court may impose such other conditions as shall be deemed proper.” (Emphasis supplied.)