Court Opinion

ID: 9577741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:37:32.566244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:09.845317
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I agree with the majority that the crimes committed by Kenneth D. Oxborrow justify a sentence of 15 years. I disagree, however, with the majority's adoption of the "abuse of discretion" standard of review for criminal sentences. The reasons given by the majority for its conclusion are unsupported by the language of the act or its legislative history. I also disagree with the majority's rejection of Minnesota's "doubling" rule.
I
Standard of Review
The majority lists three sources to support its adoption of the abuse of discretion standard: (1) the language of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, (2) the recommendations of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission, and (3) a Washington court's interpretation of the juvenile justice act. None of these arguments is persuasive. First, the language of the act quoted by the majority does not support the majority's argument. The majority points to RCW 9.94A.010, which provides that:
The purpose of this chapter is to make the criminal justice system accountable to the public by developing a system for the sentencing of felony offenders which structures, but does not eliminate, discretionary decisions affecting sentences . . .
(Italics mine.) The majority also points to RCW 9.94A.390, which provides a nonexclusive list of factors "which the court may consider in the exercise of its discretion to impose an exceptional sentence”. (Italics mine.) Neither provision establishes an abuse of discretion standard of *540review. RCW 9.94A.010 constitutes a grant of limited, structured discretion. RCW 9.94A.390 mentions "its discretion" only incidentally, without defining the nature of the court's discretion. The fact that these provisions grant a limited amount of discretion to trial courts does not support the majority's conclusion that the proper standard of review is whether the trial court abused that discretion.
Second, the majority points out that the Sentencing Guidelines Commission recommended that the Legislature prescribe the abuse of discretion standard for judicial review. The majority fails, however, to acknowledge the significant aspect of this recommendation: the Legislature refused to adopt it. The language quoted by the majority appears in RCW 9.94A.120(3) without the recommended abuse of discretion standard. In fact, the abuse of discretion standard does not appear anywhere in the sentencing reform act or the Sentencing Guidelines Commission's Implementation Manual.
Finally, the majority relies on allegedly similar language from Washington's juvenile justice act to argue that judicial constructions of that act should control judicial construction of this act. When the sentencing reform act was originally drafted, the provision describing the appropriate circumstances for an exceptional sentence was quite similar to the analogous provision in the juvenile justice act. D. Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 9.3, at 9-5 (1985). However, the Sentencing Guidelines Commission replaced the language drawn from the juvenile justice act with language from Minnesota's determinate sentencing guidelines. The Commission believed that the Minnesota standard better accomplished the purposes of an exceptional sentence than did the Washington juvenile justice act standard. D. Boerner, § 9.3, at 9-6. The Commission therefore unanimously recommended that the Legislature adopt the Minnesota standard, and the Legislature concurred. D. Boerner, § 9.3, at 9-6. In light of the Legislature's rejection of the juvenile justice act standard, the majority's argument that this court should rely on decisions under the juvenile *541justice act is not persuasive.
In other areas of law, appellate review traditionally serves as a legal mechanism to reconcile the myriad decisions of individual trial judges. Ozanne, Bringing the Rule of Law to Criminal Sentencing: Judicial Review, Sentencing Guidelines and a Policy of Just Deserts, 13 Loy. U. L. J. 721, 724 (1982). Under indeterminate sentencing schemes of criminal law, however, appellate courts are unable to produce a useful set of guiding principles. Ozanne, supra at 723; see also D. Boerner, § 9.2. Under such systems trial court judges are expected to use their own "learning, education, experience [and] philosophy" to decide how long to incarcerate an individual. Ringold, A Judge's Personal Perspective on Criminal Sentencing, 51 Wash. L. Rev. 631, 641 (1976). Legislatures do not provide any coherent principles with which appellate courts can reconcile these inevitably disparate decisions. D. Boerner, supra; Ozanne, supra. The result is close to chaos:
The sentencing powers of the judges are, in short, so far unconfined that, except for frequently monstrous maximum limits, they are effectively subject to no law at all. Everyone with the least training in law would be prompt to denounce a statute that merely said the penalty for crimes "shall be any term the judge sees fit to impose." A regime of such arbitrary fiat would be intolerable in a supposedly free society, to say nothing of being invalid under our due-process clause. But the fact is that we have accepted unthinkingly a criminal code creating in effect precisely that degree of unbridled power.
M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 8 (1973).
Appellate review of sentencing decisions therefore is a key element in sentence reform. See, e.g., D. Boerner, § 9.2; Knapp, What Sentencing Reform in Minnesota Has and Has Not Accomplished, 68 Judicature 181 (1984); Ozanne, supra at 721, 723; Comment, The Standard of Appellate Review for Criminal Sentences in Illinois, 1981 So. Ill. U. L.J. 261, 262; Consistent Sentencing, 63 Mich. B.J. 13 *542(1984). In Illinois, for example, the Illinois Legislature specifically replaced the abuse of discretion standard of review in an effort to improve the effectiveness of its determinate sentencing scheme. Comment, supra at 262-64. Determinate sentencing acts provide legislatively established sentencing policies and goals that appellate courts can use as tools with which to judge sentence lengths. D. Boerner, supra; Ozanne, supra at 741. Appellate courts must use these tools, however, to insure that individual trial courts properly apply the principles established by the Legislature.
The abuse of discretion standard advocated by the majority for review of exceptional sentences is inadequate for the purposes of sentencing reform. The abuse of discretion standard is extremely deferential. Under this standard an appellate court will overturn a trial court's decision only if the court's action was "manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons." State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). Only one Washington court has ever reversed a criminal sentence as an abuse of discretion. See State v. Potts, 1 Wn. App. 614, 464 P.2d 742 (1969); State v. Armstrong, 106 Wn.2d 547, 553, 723 P.2d 1111 (1986) (Goodloe, J., dissenting). Under this standard appellate courts cannot conduct the review necessary to achieve the uniformity and proportionality envisioned by the drafters of the sentencing reform act.
Arbitrary or oppressive treatment of offenders by a trial judge in sentencing is not prevented by the abuse of discretion standard. . . . [ujnder the abuse of discretion standard, reviewing courts rarely consider improper influences or equalization of sentences imposed at the trial level. The issue of fairness of a sentence is secondary to the issue of legality. The abuse of discretion standard does not encourage the appellate court to look beyond the issue of legality to prevent arbitrary or oppressive sentences.
(Footnotes omitted.) Comment, supra at 270-71.
An abuse of discretion standard of review is appropriate *543when (1) concerns of judicial economy dictate that the trial court be responsible for the decision, or (2) the trial judge is in a better position to make the decision because he can observe the parties. Neither circumstance is present here. First, in the sentencing reform act the Legislature addressed concerns of judicial economy by authorizing appeal of only those sentences that are exceptional. RCW 9.94A.210(1), (2). "By varying the access to sentence review in relation to sentences inside and outside the guidelines, the Washington legislature has . . . eliminated a major practical objection to appellate review of sentences." Ozanne, supra at 748. Second, the sentencing reform act has shifted the focus of a sentencing decision from observation of the individual defendant to objective consideration of statutory policies and guidelines. The length of an exceptional sentence thus should now be based on articulated factors instead of intuition, and a reviewing court can now weigh the factors considered by the trial court against the requirements of the act when it reviews a decision. See Comment, supra at 274. Under the new act, the abuse of discretion standard is no longer appropriate for reviewing the length of criminal sentences.
II
Doubling Rule
In addition to adopting the abuse of discretion standard of review, the majority rejects the Minnesota "doubling" rule. The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that generally a court that imposes a sentence outside of the sentencing guidelines should not impose a sentence more than double the presumptive sentence length. State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1981). However, in "severe aggravating circumstances" the court will affirm longer sentences. See, e.g., State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. 1982).
In this case I would hold that "severe aggravating circumstances" support Oxborrow's 15-year sentence. The Legislature has provided an illustrative, nonexclusive list *544of aggravating circumstances that justify an exceptional sentence. See RCW 9.94A.390. Oxborrow's first degree theft and violation of a cease and desist order constitute exceptional examples of two of the four listed factors. First, Oxborrow knew that his victims were "particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to extreme youth, advanced age, disability, or ill health," RCW 9.94A.390(2); his victims included both elderly and blind individuals. Second, Oxborrow's crimes were a "major economic offense." RCW 9.94A.390(3). The scam involved "multiple victims." RCW 9.94A.390(3)(a). Between 900 and 1,200 investors participated in his scheme. Of these, over 500 lost everything they had invested. The offense involved "monetary loss substantially greater than typical for the offense". RCW 9.94A.390(3)(b). While first degree theft requires a theft of at least $1,500, RCW 9A.56.030, Oxborrow defrauded investors of $1 million after he received the court's cease and desist order. The scheme involved "a high degree of sophistication or planning", and lasted for 5 years. RCW 9.94A.390(3)(c). Finally, Oxborrow used a show of Christian piety to gain the trust of investors, and "used his . . . position of trust... to facilitate the commission of the offense." RCW 9.94A.390(3)(d). It is difficult to imagine a case that would better deserve a sentence close to the statutory maximum. In light of the extreme nature of Oxborrow's conduct, the trial court properly imposed a sentence of 15 years.
However, even though I agree with the majority that in this case the trial court properly imposed a sentence more than twice the length of the presumptive sentence, I do not agree that this court should categorically reject Minnesota's rule. The majority paints an inaccurate picture of the Minnesota rule. For example, the majority implies that under the Minnesota rule a trial court can never impose the statutory maximum sentence for a crime. This is not true. From the first time that it announced the rule, the Minnesota court has emphasized that courts faced with aggravating circumstances should neither automatically impose *545twice the presumptive sentence nor consider a doubled sentence an absolute upper limit:
After careful consideration of the problem in light of that experience, we conclude that generally in a case in which an upward departure in sentence length is justified, the upper limit will be double the presumptive sentence length. This is only an upper limit and we do not intend to suggest that trial courts should automatically double the presumptive length in all cases in which upward departure is justified nor do we suggest that we will automatically approve all departures of this magnitude. On the other hand, we cannot state that this is an absolute upper limit on the scope of departure because there may well be rare cases in which the facts are so unusually compelling that an even greater degree of departure will be justified.
State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d at 483. The Minnesota approach thus is flexible enough to accommodate cases as extreme as this one.
The majority also argues that the rule is arbitrary. In contrast, the director of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission has publicly praised the doubling rule of State v. Evans, supra. See Knapp, supra. When Minnesota's determinate sentencing guidelines first came into effect, many Minnesota judges were unused to the seemingly short sentences. These judges were not accustomed to the fact that determinate sentences represent "real" time, during which no opportunity for parole exists. As a result, Minnesota trial court judges frequently imposed sentences close to the statutory maximum in cases that did not warrant such long incarceration. The doubling rule of State v. Evans, supra, has helped Minnesota judges impose sentences that are more uniform and proportional, and empirically closer to the standards established by the Minnesota Legislature. Knapp, supra at 187.
Finally, the majority suggests that the Minnesota courts have had trouble applying the doubling rule. The only trouble experienced by the Minnesota courts has been the trouble experienced by any court trying to make a princi*546pled decision when comparing "apples and oranges." Commentators have praised Minnesota's efforts, even after adoption of the doubling rule. See, e.g., D. Boerner, § 9.3, at 9-10; § 9.22(b); Knapp, supra; Ozanne, supra at 745 n.99.
This court should follow the example of the Minnesota court and attempt to establish a body of common law principles for imposing exceptional sentences. The length of a Washington presumptive sentence often is only a fraction of the length of the statutory maximum sentence, and Washington judges are as unused to these short sentences as the Minnesota judges were. Without the doubling rule a trial court has no guidance whatsoever when deciding where to fix the exceptional sentence. The doubling rule is necessary to insure that the principled guidelines envisioned by the drafters of the sentencing reform act become reality.
A major hope of those who have advocated sentencing reform of this type has been that it would produce a "common law" of sentencing, in which the time-honored methods of the common law — reasons for decisions, appellate review of those reasons and the further articulation and rearticulation of reasons in the light of new circumstances — would be applied to sentencing. ... If this expectation is met, sentencing decisions in Washington will, to a significantly greater extent than ever before, be based on principle and guided by reason, and much of the promise of the reform will be realized.
D. Boerner, § 9.3, at 9-9 through 9-10; see also § 9.22(b).
The Washington Legislature chose to leave some discretionary power in the trial courts when it established the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. Throughout the act, however, the Legislature balances discretion against guidelines and restrictions. Appellate review is the act's most important check on the discretionary power of trial court judges to impose exceptional sentences. I do not agree with the majority that this court should review exceptional sentences only for abuses of discretion. This court should adopt the Minnesota doubling rule, and this court should *547also subject exceptional sentences to the full power of review.
Pearson and Goodloe, JJ., concur with Utter, J.
Reconsideration denied October 28, 1986.