Court Opinion

ID: 9518860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:03:55.911373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:28.745293
License: Public Domain

Levin, P. J.,
{concurring). I agree with my colleagues that the trial judge’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and hence we should affirm his order.
I cannot join in the portions of the Court’s opinion concerning procedural aspects of the case.
I
Footnote 1 of the Court’s opinion states that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been brought as a motion for accelerated judgment. In my opinion a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning the charitable immunity defense was entirely proper.1
The grounds upon which a motion for accelerated judgment may be brought are particularized in GCB 1963, 116.1. The substantiality of the defendant’s charitable immunity defense could not be tested by invoking any of the specific grounds stated in rule 116.1.
II
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment raised one question and one question alone: Was there a *11genuine issue as to any material fact? The record and the trial judge’s opinion granting the summary judgment show that there was a genuine issue as to the material fact of charitable immunity. However, the plaintiff was content to have the judge anticipate his role as trier of fact in this nonjury case and to decide the question presented by the motion for summary judgment on the basis of the testimonial and other evidence of record. (See footnote 1.)
That the plaintiff waived her right to a trial of the “genuine issue” appears from the fact that plaintiff filed proposed findings of fact with the trial judge, and also appears from the fact that the plaintiff’s brief on appeal voices no objection to the trial judge’s disposition by summary judgment of the genuine factual issue.
It is because the plaintiff consented to the procedures that were followed not because the “course of action by the trial judge was equivalent to trying the issue of charitable status separately, GrCR 1963, 505.2”, that we should not disturb the trial judge’s order deciding the genuine issue of material fact on the merits without a trial hearing.
A trial judge’s “course of action” not reflected in an order entered pursuant of GrCR 1963, 505.2 is not the equivalent of a rule 505.2 order directing a separate trial of a claim or issue.
Ill
The majority suggests that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to apply for leave to appeal, that the order here on appeal was appealable as of right. I cannot agree.
This is an appeal from an order disposing of less than all plaintiff’s claims. GrCR 1963, 518.2 provides *12that when more than one claim for relief is presented ’ the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to less than all the claims “only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment”. Absent such a determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims does not terminate the action as to any of the claims and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims. In consequence, such an order or other form of decision is not a final judgment and is not appealable as of right.
The order now before us did not contain a determination and direction pursuant to rule 518.2 and, therefore, it was not appealable as of right.

 Actually the motion of the defendant whieh was granted in the order here on appeal was a “motion to dismiss”. However, plaintiff’s answer to such motion to dismiss expressly eliose to treat it as a motion for summary judgment under GCB 1963, 117.2(1) (3). Plaintiff’s proposed findings of fact on the charitable immunity issue ran 19 pages and elosod with the request that the court deny defendant’s “motion for summary judgment”.