Court Opinion

ID: 9559781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:35:34.37984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:43.543472
License: Public Domain

Grady, C. J.,
(concurring in the result)—I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion but not by the method used. It is very clear from the record, regardless of who may have had the burden of proof at any particular time, that the condition of appellant had so improved that she was no longer a totally and permanently disabled per*416son. A search of the record assures one that the failure to give the proposed instruction was not prejudicial. My disagreement with the majority opinion relates to the question of burden of proof at various stages of an industrial insurance case.
Óur statute provides that on appeal from the decision of the board to the superior court (1) the findings and decision of the board shall be prima facie correct and (2) the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same. There is no statutory provision with reference to burden of proof in a hearing before the board whether the party be the claimant or the department. In most of the cases, the claim of the injured workman has been denied by the department in whole or in part. On appeal to the board, the claimant had the affirmative of the issues and, by common recognition, had the burden of proof of the facts upon which he based his claim. This principle was recognized and applied in the case of O’Toole v. Department of Labor & Industries, 182 Wash. 202, 46 P. (2d) 388. The decision of the department is not supported by any presumption that it is correct. Olympia Brewing Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, 34 Wn. (2d) 498, 208 P. (2d) 1181. We have considered other cases where the department has allowed a claim and the employer has appealed to the board. The department may assume the burden of establishing the right of the claimant to the benefits of the act, but there is no presumption in its favor. Olympia Brewing Co. v. Department of Labor & Industries, supra.
In the case before us, the department was the aggressor. It sought to set aside its order previously made determining appellant to be a totally and permanently disabled person. By all rules of any procedure, when the department was called before the board it should have had cast upon it the burden of justifying its decision that appellant was no longer totally and permanently disabled.
WhetL the board decides the question of permanent and total disability against a claimant, then the statute changes the situation. The decision of the .board , is deemed prima *417facie correct, and on appeal to the superior court by the claimant the burden is upon him to satisfy or persuade the jury that, from what appears in the record made before the board, its ruling was not correct. The probative value of the prima facie correctness of the decision of the board is very important, and in combating such evaluation the claimant is entitled to have the jury informed upon whom rested the burden of establishing the facts upon which the decision of the board was based; otherwise, the claimant is placed in a disadvantageous position unfair to him, especially when we consider that he has the burden of overcoming the prima facie correctness of the decision against him.
If the proposed instruction or one of similar import had been given, the jurors would have been in a better position to have evaluated the decision of the board under review than they were without the information such instruction would have conveyed.
Ordinarily, it would not be deemed helpful to make any statement in a dissenting opinion with reference to a question of prejudicial error; however, the subject has been misunderstood, and many judgments have been reversed and new trials ordered when the error complained of was such that it could not have affected the result reached by the jury. In many cases, there has been a failure to recognize the prerogative of an appellate court when reviewing a record to determine from it whether a claimed error was so prejudicial that in all probability it affected the result reached; and this applies to both civil and criminal cases. One school of thought is to the effect that, when error has been committed, prejudice will be presumed and the one in whose favor the error was committed has the burden of showing that no prejudice resulted. The other school of thought is that the burden rests on the one adversely affected to show that the error was prejudicial to him. The text and case citations will be found in 24 C. J. S. 845, Criminal Law, § 1888, and 5 C. J. S. 810, Appeal and Error, § 1677. The type of error referred to is not one where the *418party affected has been deprived of some substantial right, but relates to those errors falling under the classification of harmless error, which classification usually depends upon the circumstances of the particular case rather than upon specific rules of law.
In the field of criminal law, this court encountered some difficulty in a case where the error was considered to have been presumptively prejudicial. In State v. Redwine, 23 Wn. (2d) 467, 161 P. (2d) 205, by a divided court, it was decided that, when reviewing a case, it became necessary for the appellate court to give full consideration to the record and to make a determination whether the presumption had been overcome and that prejudice did not result. Later, after there had been a substantial change in the personnel of the court, the minority view prevailed in State v. Robinson, 24 Wn. (2d) 909, 167 P. (2d) 986. In that case, it was said that the test approved by the majority in the Redwine case was “foreign to any in the English-speaking world.” The minority pointed out that the writer of the opinion had overlooked some very elementary law set forth in 24 C. J. S. 841, Criminal Law, § 1887.
The Robinson case might be considered authoritative if it were not for many cases since decided, both civil and criminal, in which, without specifically mentioning the test recognized in the Redwine case, it was applied to. the particular situations then before the court. A very definite illustration of this view is State v. Wilson, 38 Wn. (2d) 593, 231 P. (2d) 288. In that case, the error was substantial, and one with reference to which it could well be said prejudice would be presumed. However, this court on review scrutinized the record and concluded therefrom that the error could not have affected the result and declined to reverse the judgment. Reference to our cases subsequent to the Robinson case makes it very clear that, on review, the rule and the test applied in the Redwine case guided us in determining whether or not reversible error had been committed. Our duty to scrutinize the whole record is stated in State v. Britton, 27 Wn. (2d) 336, 178 P. (2d) 341.
*419Applying the test referred to, I have no trouble in concluding that the error in refusing to give the proposed instruction was not prejudicial.