Court Opinion

ID: 9928813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:10:55.671894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:44.364243
License: Public Domain

J-S35044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SAWUD DAVIS                                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 511 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 22, 2023
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0003752-2012

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                           FILED: JANUARY 26, 2024

       Sawud Davis, pro se, appeals from the order dismissing, as untimely,

his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). See

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Although he purports to surmount the PCRA’s

jurisdictional time-bar by arguing that a recently acquired letter between the

Commonwealth and his plea counsel establishes a newly discovered fact, see

id., § 9545(b)(1)(ii), the PCRA court concluded that said letter does not

contain any newly discovered facts. We agree and affirm.

       As background:

             On October 24, 2012, [Davis] was charged with three counts
       of criminal homicide, one count of criminal attempt to commit
       criminal homicide and four counts of robbery as a result of a
       shooting which occurred on July 7, 2012 in Plymouth Borough,
       Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. [Davis] was charged as a principal
       or accomplice in connection with the homicide and robbery
____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S35044-23

       charges. Although [Davis] was 16 years old at the time the crimes
       were committed, he was prosecuted as an adult.

             Trial was scheduled to commence on January 6, 2014.
       Rather than proceed to trial, [Davis] withdrew his petition for
       decertification and pled guilty to three counts of criminal homicide
       as murder of the third degree and one count of robbery on
       December 20, 2013. [Davis’s] guilty plea was made part of the
       record and contained an agreed upon sentence of twenty to forty
       years on the three homicides and five to ten years on the robbery.
       All sentences were to run concurrent so [Davis’s] aggregate
       sentence was twenty to forty years. Both the Commonwealth and
       [Davis] waived a pre-sentence investigation as part of the guilty
       plea agreement.

              [Davis] did not file a direct appeal. On June 6, 2014, he filed
       his first motion for post conviction collateral relief. A motion to
       withdraw his first PCRA petition was granted by Order dated July
       28, 2014. [Davis] filed his second motion for post conviction relief
       on September 19, 2018. This motion was supplemented by
       counsel in a petition filed on January 17, 2019.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/26/23, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

       After ultimately concluding that Davis’s second PCRA petition was

untimely, the court dismissed it. This Court affirmed that dismissal. See

Commonwealth v. Davis, 705 MDA 2019, 2019 WL 5858069 (Pa. Super.,

filed Nov. 8, 2019) (unpublished memorandum). A short time later, Davis then

filed a third PCRA petition, which, too, was eventually dismissed by the PCRA

court, and his corresponding appeal was also dismissed by this Court when

Davis did not file an appellate brief.

       On January 13, 2023, Davis filed the present PCRA petition, his fourth.1

____________________________________________

1 On this same date, Davis also filed a supplemental PCRA petition, which
included, as an exhibit, the letter in question.

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In concluding that this petition, too, was untimely, the PCRA court issued a

notice of its intention to dismiss pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal

Procedure 907.2 The court dismissed his petition on March 22, 2023, and Davis

filed a timely notice of appeal.

       As this case stems from the denial of PCRA relief, “we examine whether

the PCRA court's determination is supported by the record and free of legal

error.” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 114 A.3d 401, 409 (Pa. 2015) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). To seek relief under the PCRA, a

petitioner must satisfy the jurisdictional requisite of timeliness. See

Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849, 853 (Pa. Super. 2016). Absent

an exception, PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date a

judgment of sentence becomes final. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930

A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes

final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

____________________________________________

2 In response, Davis filed a motion for leave to file an amended PCRA petition.

While there is some record ambiguity as to the timeliness of Davis’s response
to the court’s Rule 907 notice vis-à-vis the prisoner mailbox rule, the court
concluded that “[a] review of the motion reveals the same argument made by
[Davis] in his supplemental PCRA petition regarding a letter allegedly
containing a favorable plea deal.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/26/23, at 3
(unpaginated). While he describes the motion for leave as one that could
“address the timeliness issues[,]” Appellant’s Brief, at 26, Davis provides no
more elucidation as to how his motion for leave contains any new or better-
defined bases to establish jurisdiction, and for purposes of the present appeal,
both he and the court appear to have similarly defined the factual
underpinnings of Davis’s attempt to circumvent the PCRA’s time-bar.

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or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

      Relevant to the present matter, one of the PCRA’s time-bar exceptions

requires a petitioner to allege and prove that “the facts upon which the claim

is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]” Id., § 9545(b)(1)(ii). A claim

predicated on this exception requires a petitioner to file his or her petition

“within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” Id., §

9545(b)(2).

      Davis entered into a guilty plea on December 20, 2013 and was

sentenced on that same date. As he did not file a direct appeal, his judgment

of sentence became final on January 21, 2014, when his time for seeking

direct review with this Court expired. See id., § 9545(b)(3) (indicating that a

judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review ... or

at the expiration of time for seeking the review”); Pa.R.A.P. 903, Note (noting

that Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908, applies to computation of

time under the appellate rules and weekends and holidays are excluded from

the period for calculating an appeal). Accordingly, Davis’s petition is facially

untimely and for the PCRA court, and by extension this Court, to have

jurisdiction, Davis was required to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s

time-bar.

      Davis contends that, to circumvent the time-bar, he submitted a

November 25, 2013 letter, allegedly acquired on or about December 12, 2022,

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between the Commonwealth and his counsel establishing that he could have

cooperated in exchange for “a more favorable plea agreement.” Appellant’s

Brief, at 13. This letter, he believes, provides a newly discovered fact.

Replicated in full, the letter states:

              I see that Judge Vough has severed the Shawn
       Hamilton/Sawud Davis Trial. In accordance with our latest
       telephone     conversations,     it  is   [the   Commonwealth’s]
       understanding that you will be speaking with Mr. Davis to see if
       he has any intention of cooperating in the case against his brother
       [Hamilton] in exchange for a plea in his case. If he has any
       intention of pursuing this course of action, [the Commonwealth]
       need[s] to know that by December 13 in order to put all of the
       pieces in place to resolve his case and prepare for trial. If [the
       Commonwealth] do[es] not resolve the case with him before the
       Hamilton trial, [the Commonwealth] will proceed with the
       Decertification in March and, assuming that [the Commonwealth]
       [is] successful, [the Commonwealth] will proceed to trial against
       him on all counts. In short, if he wants to resolve his case now is
       the time to do it.

              Further, if you believe it would be helpful, [the assistant
       district attorney] would certainly join you for a meeting with Mr.
       Davis to discuss this in greater detail.

Supplemental PCRA Petition, 1/13/23, Exhibit 1.

       While not specifically mentioned in his PCRA petition,3 Davis asserts in

his appellate brief that the genesis of him learning about this letter was when

he had been “informed by his co-defendant that his trial counsel informed him

____________________________________________

3 Davis’s PCRA petition begins the PCRA-related chronology at the December

12, 2022 date, which is when he apparently “obtained his case file via[]mail
and learned that … [his plea counsel] failed to inform him of a more favorable
plea offer prior to advising [him] to plead guilty.” Supplemental PCRA Petition,
1/13/23, at ¶ 4.

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during the proceedings of both, [Davis] and [Davis’s] co-defendant[’s] case

that the Commonwealth was offering [Davis] leniency in exchange for [his]

cooperation in the case against his co-defendant.” Appellant’s Brief, at 8.

Hearing about this potential “leniency” in June 2022, Davis writes that from

this discussion, he was told that the Commonwealth was prepared to offer him

“six to twelve years in exchange for [his] cooperation[.]” Id., at 10.

       Even excepting Davis’s lack of explanation as to why it took his co-

defendant, who is also Davis’s brother, approximately eight years to suddenly

inform him of this alleged plea offer, the letter does not provide any indicia

that, in fact, a six-to-twelve-year offer, or anything resembling such an offer,

ever existed. Instead, without more, the notion that a better deal was

available to him is a speculative averment, at best. Parsing its language, the

letter is written in such a way that Davis would have needed to first assent to

cooperation against his co-defendant prior to the Commonwealth extending a

plea offer with definite terms.

       Although not dispositive, Davis did, in fact, plead guilty pursuant to an

agreement with the Commonwealth on December 20, 2013, less than one

month after the Commonwealth’s letter was written.4 The record reflects that

____________________________________________

4 Davis does not provide, with any level of specificity, an overview of events,

even from his own perspective, between the November letter and the
December plea agreement.

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Hamilton also entered into a plea agreement on that same date.5 In Davis’s

deal, although he was charged with three homicides, an attempted homicide,

and four robberies and “was facing the possibility of three life sentences given

the likelihood that had he gone to trial, he would have been convicted,” Trial

Court Opinion, 5/26/23, at 6 (unpaginated), Davis only received an aggregate

sentence of twenty to forty years’ incarceration. It strains credulity to believe

that a six-to-twelve-year offer was ever “on the table.”

       Notwithstanding the fact that both Davis and Hamiton pleaded guilty

and were sentenced on the same date, distilled down, the Commonwealth’s

letter establishes only that it was Davis’s prerogative to cooperate against his

co-defendant in exchange for what was, on November 25, 2013, an indefinite

plea. Without any evidence that there was a genuine offer of six-to-twelve

years or that the letter somehow placed Davis in a position to bargain for a

better deal than the plea agreement he actually entered into, the letter,

standing alone, contains no “new facts” that reinforce the ultimate claim of a

specifically described, yet theretofore undisclosed, plea offer that is materially

distinct from the entered-into plea agreement.

       Because Davis’s fourth PCRA petition was filed more than one year after

his judgment of sentence became final, and he has not pleaded and proved

____________________________________________

5 Hamilton was sentenced on December 20, 2013 to three consecutive life
sentences in addition to a consecutive twenty-to-forty-year sentence. See
Guilty Plea/Sentencing Proceedings, 12/20/23, at 72-73.

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any newly discovered facts within the meaning of the PCRA’s time-bar

exception, the PCRA court, in finding no jurisdiction, properly dismissed his

petition. We therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal of Davis’s petition as

untimely.

      Order affirmed.

      Judge Panella joins this memorandum.

      Judge McLaughlin concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/26/2024

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