Court Opinion

ID: 9545257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:09:05.035659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:24.649883
License: Public Domain

RAPER, Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I dissent in part and concur in part. The majority has selected the most insignificant issue in the case upon which to reverse. The record discloses that the defendant never at any time contended that he was so intoxicated that he was unable to form an intent to kill. It is to the contrary. The defendant took a firm stand that he knew clearly what he was doing at all times. He relied upon his recollection of events leading to the shooting of his victim, which he set out in a statement to the police, as a basis for his defenses of accident or self-defense. If he had consumed so much liquor as to not be able to form an intent, he would likewise be unable to recall the details of his crime, which he so vividly did.
There was no record kept of opening and closing statements, so it is impossible to determine whether the defendant ever argued the point. The only mention by counsel of drinking was by one single question to one juror in the voir dire and that was to the effect that the defendant should not be prejudiced because a “little bit” of drinking was involved.1 There was not one word said in defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal that the defendant was too intoxicated to form an intent to kill. His sole defenses were that the killing was an accident or in self-defense. The record is completely barren of any theory of any defense based upon intoxication.
The defendant did not testify on his own behalf. None of the defendant’s evidence intimated any drunkenness on his part. The defendant’s own statement introduced into evidence as a part of the State’s evidence discloses no evidence of drunkenness, the defendant consistently, asserting that he was not drunk and knew what he was doing. His statement is lucid and rational.
Defendant’s cross-examination of officer Johnson, who took the statement, was not directed to establishing how drunk the defendant was but to establish how honest and accurate defendant was in the statements he made to the police. In his brief, defendant’s counsel argues that the defendant's statement was corroborated in over 100 instances by the testimony of officer Johnson.
During the trial, there was no emphasis at all placed upon defendant’s state of intoxication as bearing upon his capacity to form the necessary premeditation or intent nor was it ever any part of the theory of his case as reflected by the record.
There was no such evidence of the defendant’s state of drunkenness that the court would be required to give an instruction on the application of such evidence. Such an instruction only becomes important when the evidence is such that the jury could find that the defendant “was so drunk as to be incapable of premeditation, or of forming any deliberate intent.” Gus-*416tavenson v. State, 1902,10 Wyo. 300, 322, 68 P. 1006, 1010. The defendant’s own declaration that he knew what he was doing completely refutes any now afterthought of his counsel that such an instruction was necessary. There is no evidence that defendant was in such a state. Those who saw him shortly after commission of the crime could only say he had been drinking. No one testified that he was drunk. The two officers who arrested him in a bar, not long after the killing, testified he was not drunk. In the absence of evidence of drunkenness and particularly when the defendant himself repeatedly asserted he was not drunk and knew what he was doing, we have no right to assume that the jury would have any basis to find he was too inebriated to shape premeditation and intent.
Mere evidence of drinking prior to the commission of a crime does not establish intoxication and require the giving of an instruction thereon. People v. Turville, 1959, 51 Cal.2d 620, 335 P.2d 678, cert. den. 360 U.S. 939, 79 S.Ct. 1465, 3 L.Ed.2d 1551, citing People v. Price, 1913, 207 Cal. 131, 277 P. 316. Where there is evidence of drinking but no evidence of intoxication and the defendant does not claim intoxication, there is no justification for an instruction covering such a theory. Igo v. State, 1954, Okl.Cr.App., 267 P.2d 1082.
In a homicide case, there is no requirement to instruct a jury on the matter of intoxication, where the defendant does not rely upon it as a defense. People v. Miller, 1962, 57 Cal.2d 821, 22 Cal.Rptr. 465, 372 P.2d 297. The mere fact that the defendant may have been drinking prior to the commission of a homicide is not enough to require an instruction on intoxication, in the absence of a showing that the drinking had such a substantial effect on him that he could not harbor intent. State v. Edgin, 1974, 110 Ariz. 416, 520 P.2d 288.
The evidence must be such that a jury would be warranted in considering intoxication as creating a reasonable doubt as to the capacity of the defendant to entertain the intent to commit the alleged crime. It is not error to refuse an instruction on intoxication when the evidence is not such as to justify a jury seriously considering it in determining intent. State v. Gunn, 1942, 102 Utah 422, 132 P.2d 109.
It is a well-settled concept in this and other jurisdictions as well that only such instructions should be given as arise from and can be based upon the evidence. Thomas v. State, Wyo.1977, 562 P.2d 1287; Oldham v. State, Wyo.1975, 534 P.2d 107; Shoemaker v. State, Wyo.1968, 444 P.2d 309.2 There was no evidence present here which would justify the jury even considering that the defendant was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing, particularly when he personally refuses to take such a position.
The trial judge obviously saw the full lack of any reliance by defendant upon intoxication, than we are able to discern in the absence of a full record of opening and closing statements. Additionally, there can be undesirable implications to the defense of a defendant arising from the offered instructions, specifically that position which states that “Drunkenness shall not be an excuse for any crime” * * * taken directly from § 6-16, W.S.1957. The defendant was in all likelihood better off without the instruction. I can understand the State offering the instruction; it would have been to its advantage. I cannot see how the outcome of the trial would have possibly been any different with a drunkenness instruction.
While I would likewise affirm the conviction for killing the unborn child of the victim, Donna Poole, in violation of § 6-71, W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp., that statute also carries with it an element of intent, being worded as follows:
“Whoever unlawfully kills an unborn child, or causes a miscarriage, abortion or premature expulsion of a fetus, by any assault or assault and battery wilfully *417committed upon a pregnant woman, knowing her condition, is guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than fourteen years.” (Emphasis added.)
“Wilfully” is synonymous with “intentional.” Hay v. Peterson, 1896, 6 Wyo. 419, 45 P. 1073, 1078, 34 L.R.A. 581. See also 45 Words and Phrases, “Willful; Wilfully,” pp. 274, et seq.
The majority is inconsistent in requiring a new trial for killing Donna Poole but not the child. If there was some illusory chance that the defendant was unconscious, as the standard required by Gustavenson v. State, supra, then he ought to have the benefit of the same bonus as to the unborn child, as well. Scienter is basic to the crime of killing an unborn child.
I have no disagreement with the remaining portions of the majority opinion. I would have fully affirmed the district court in every respect.

. “Mr. Laird:
* * * * * *
“Is there anyone here who is a member of any group or belongs to any religious affiliation that opposes drinking of any alcoholic beverages?
“There is going to be some testimony that some of the participants in the situation were drinking a little bit. Anybody that frown [sic] on that, anybody here who because of any religious affiliation doesn’t believe in drinking alcohol? Anybody?
* * * * * * (Emphasis added.)

. The trial judge is under no obligation to instruct the jury on a defense theory not clearly supported by the evidence. Des Jardins v. State, Alaska 1976, 551 P.2d 181; State v. Ferrick, 1973, 81 Wash.2d 942, 506 P.2d 860, cert. den. 414 U.S. 1094, 94 S.Ct. 726, 38 L.Ed.2d 552; State v. Caruthers, 1974, 110 Ariz. 345, 519 P.2d 44; Wyatt v. State, 1961, 77 Nev. 490, 367 P.2d 104.