Court Opinion

ID: 9457134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:13:21.237873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:13.828986
License: Public Domain

McCREE, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
I do not believe the majority correctly states the law applicable to either issue.
To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant a continuance, the majority would balance appellant’s “right to adequate representation of counsel at trial, and the public interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice.” This approach is inconsistent with our decision in United States v. Johnston, 318 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.1963), in which we held that the Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant who is informed shortly before trial that counsel of his choice will not be available to represent him, must be afforded a “fair opportunity and reasonable time to employ counsel of his own choosing.” Id. at 291. We held that a period from Friday to the following Tuesday, the day of trial, “was not a reasonably sufficient time to give appellant fair opportunity to select and employ counsel of his own choosing,” and we also stated: “[a]ctually it seems to us that appellant was not prejudiced by the action of the District Judge in this respect but this situation does not satisfy appellant [’s] rights under the Sixth Amendment [citations omitted].” Id. at 291.
The majority’s attempts to distinguish Johnston are unconvincing. It is argued that Balk (the successful appellant in Johnston) personally asserted his desire to obtain an attorney other than his chosen attorney’s associate; whereas, in this case the defendant personally did neither. However, this states a distinction which makes no substantial difference. It appears that appellant was not informed that his attorney would not be present at trial on November 14 until two or three days before that date. When so informed, he first attempted through Mr. Fink, Mr. Louisell’s relatively inexperienced associate, to obtain a continuance until Louisell could be present, and that effort consumed an additional day until late in the afternoon on November 12. The task of obtaining substitute counsel willing to enter a criminal case on November 12 or 13 to be tried at 8:30 a.m. on November 14 in Centreville, Michigan, easily surpasses the difficulty faced by Mr. Balk in his case. It would seem unnecessary to require appellant to object to proceeding with Mr. Fink as his attorney, when *1252Fink himself stated to the court in appellant’s presence:
I find it much more favorable from my standpoint * * * to try the case in Wayne County.
I don’t know that I have any rapport with a nonurban jury * * *. [I]n fact, I have never been out of the city * * *. If I am going to rep-
resent a man on a 5-year felony charge, I want it to be a place where I’m used to and where I will feel most comfortable.
* * * * * *
Here you have, your Honor, a man stipulating on the record that he wants to stay in Wayne County, the place of his home vicinage. In any event, at the time the motion was made for a change of venue, it was contemplated then that Mr. Louisell would try the case. At this particular posture it has become obvious that I am going to try this case for Mr. Gia-calone upon the Court’s order. If I am asking to stay in Wayne County, Mr. Giacalone is asking to stay in Wayne County, why should we all go up to Centreville ? * * *
I don’t feel competent to try a trial in Centreville and I mean that sincerely. I wouldn’t know what questions to ask on voir dire.
The decision in Johnston does not turn upon Balk’s unsuccessful attempt to obtain substitute counsel on short notice. In fact his chosen attorney was unavailable because he elected to use the day set for trial to prepare an argument to be presented to the Michigan Supreme Court. A continuance most likely would have resulted in the availability of Balk’s original attorney of choice. That is what appellant sought here, but he was given neither that consideration nor a reasonable time to obtain acceptable alternative counsel.1
It is further asserted that the continuance sought would have been too long, perhaps four months, because of other foreseeable obstacles to Mr. Louisell’s participation in this case. The first answer to this argument is that a four month delay to permit representation by an attorney of his choice does not seem inordinate when a man who had only one misdemeanor conviction was faced with the possibility of five years of imprisonment.
Second, the assertion that appellant had previously been granted two continuances is simply not supported by the record. On September 30, 1968, appellant admittedly requested an adjournment of the scheduled October 8 trial to October 21, in order to provide time for hearings and arguments on preliminary motions. However, during proceedings in the District Court, appellant asserted without contradiction that the case had been adjourned until October 21 pursuant to an October 4 request by the prosecution. The case was thereafter diligently pursued, and following disposition of preliminary motions, the trial date was set in consideration of counsel’s long-standing appointment to enter a hospital on November 10 for sophisticated cardiovascular diagnostic tests.
Further, the trial judge was not limited to a choice between immediate trial or a four month delay. He might have delayed the trial a few days to permit appellant to obtain acceptable substitute counsel. Here, only 40 hours elapsed between the time when the court denied a continuance until trial, and most of this time was outside of normal business hours. This is less time than that held inadequate for securing other counsel in Johnston. Since it appears that the State’s case was based entirely upon the testimony of police officers who searched appellant’s home, the potential inconvenience to witnesses from delay in *1253this case was minor compared to that in Johnston. Id. at 290.
In stating that the real issue is whether appellant had competent counsel and was properly represented, the majority would overrule, sub silentio, our decision in Johnston. As authority for this decision, they cite Williams v. United States, 332 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 976, 85 S.Ct. 672, 13 L.Ed.2d 566 (1965). However, in that 2-1 decision, the dissenting judge pointed out that the majority rejected our Johnston rule. He stated, id. at 40, that
[t]he denial of a continuance for his employed counsel was unfair [citation omitted], and this unfairness was aggravated by the court’s forcing petitioner to trial without his employed counsel, instead of giving him further reasonable time to employ a substitute. United States v. Johnston, 318 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1963). This procedure was “fundamental unfairness” [citation omitted]. It is of no relevance that substitute counsel has not been shown to have been incompetent or inept. United States v. Johnston, 318 F.2d 288, 291 (6th Cir. 1963). * * *
And even if it were appropriate to balance competing factors, I would not find the balance struck to be a fair one. It is difficult to imagine a case in which the witnesses would be more accessible to the prosecution, or more likely to remain so, than they were in this case.
I do not perceive the relevance of appellant’s failure to offer sworn or written statements regarding Mr. Louisell’s condition. Following at least two telephone conversations between the trial court and Mr. Louisell’s doctors, it would seem that the situation was clear. After the initial tests, Louisell’s doctors advised him to remain in the hospital a few days for additional tests. Although his life would not have been jeopardized had he failed to do so, the rescheduling of the tests at a busy medical center would have presented substantial difficulties. It therefore appeared advisable to complete the tests as the physicians advised.
The trial court listed ten reasons for his conclusion that Mr. Louisell’s absence was a ruse to promote delay.2 Six of those reasons (numbers 1-6) emphasized the irrelevant fact that appellant did not assert that Mr. Louisell was physically incapable of trying the case. Two other asserted reasons (numbers 7 and 8) merely express the trial judge’s frustration and suspicion. The ninth asserted reason, appellant’s failure *1254to seek substitute counsel, has been considered above. Finally, the court referred to appellant’s failure to state under oath the time when he was first informed that Mr. Louisell would not be available for trial. This last factor is the only one material to the propriety of denying a continuance, but it does not appear that appellant’s prior knowledge of the scheduled tests was the subject of discussion at the time the court reached its decision. Instead, the focus was upon the status of the tests and the judgments of Mr. Louisell’s doctors. In this regard, after a telephone conversation involving the court, one of Mr. Louisell’s doctors, Mr. Fink, and state counsel, the following colloquy occurred:
Mr. Goussy: * * * the doctor saying after he came into the hospital, that he wished to keep Mr. Louisell further because of some tests that they wished to run on something that had shown up.
The Court: Mr. Fink wants to supplement the record by stating that the doctor took issue with the statement by me on the telephone that Mr. Loui-sell’s entry was elective.
Mr. Goussy: I don’t recall him taking issue with that, no.
The Court: Well, I don’t think he took issue, but I think he rather quickly described the circumstances, indicating that he, the doctor, wanted Mr. Louisell in at that time.
Mr. Fink: I think that’s a fair statement. I also just wanted to supplement it to this extent, that any plan to keep Mr. Louisell past the 13th was only arrived at after Mr. Loui-sell’s entry into the hospital; and when the doctor indicated — at least, I got the inference that he had found something that had, well, worried him or opened his mind to thinking along another direction, and that he wanted to pursue that.
Since it appears that the decision to keep Mr. Louisell beyond November 13 was made after he entered the hospital on November 10, the implication of an earlier plot by appellant and his counsel was gratuitous.3 The physicians’ judgments that further tests were indicated should be enough to excuse the attorney. We should not announce a rule which requires a showing that life is endangered before counsel may obtain a continuance for medical reasons. I do not understand the trial judge to have found that a conspiracy existed between Mr. Loui-*1255sell and his doctors, who were specialists of international repute serving on the staff of University Hospital in Ann Arbor, Michigan, a teaching facility of the University of Michigan.
I proceed to the second issue, since granting the writ because of the denial of the opportunity to be represented by counsel of appellant’s choice would presumably result in a new trial and would leave unanswered the serious question of the validity of the search which revealed the blackjack. I conclude that the search was illegal for two reasons. First, the primary purpose of the arresting officers was to make a general exploratory search of appellant’s home, and second, the search was too extensive to be upheld as incident to the arrest.
The majority opinion adopts the conclusion of the trial judge who found that “the weapons * * * were seized quite early in the law enforcement enterprise as the direct product of a lawful good faith arrest and limited search, incident thereto.” This determination is supportable only by segmenting this “law enforcement enterprise” into disCrete .episodes — an approach which is without support in law and distorts reality.4 This technique makes it appear that the arrest occurred in or near appellant’s bedroom and that the search of the dresser drawer where the blackjack was found was simply an incident thereof. It strips of legal significance the undisputed events which preceded and followed this discovery.
The conclusion that appellant, without coercion, proceeded from the front foyer where he first admitted the officers to the upstairs bedroom where the inculpating discovery occurred illustrates the distortion which occurs from viewing the several incidents of that morning as isolated events. Without prologue, no one would impute anything but innocence to a suggestion that a man in sleepwear should put on outdoor clothing before going to the police station. However, that is not what happened here.
As the trial court found, appellant, in response to a command from Sergeant Mull, promptly answered the front door and admitted the officers. Sergeant Mull, carrying a sawed-off shotgun, and *1256several other officers walked into the house. Mull informed appellant, who was wearing “shorty pajamas” and a robe, that he was under arrest for conspiracy to extort and quickly searched him. This took place in the front foyer of the house.
Before Mull had finished reading the warrant, Giacalone announced that he was ready to leave. Meanwhile, as some indication of the real purpose of the expedition, other officers, instead of limiting their search to the foyer, fanned out through the first floor and basement, ostensibly making “a quick eye inspection for persons who might hinder the arrest or assist the defendant to escape.” There appears no motivation for appellant to have announced his readiness to go in his robe as he stood in the front foyer other than his desire to limit the officers’ intrusion into the privacy of his home which they had no warrant to search. Nevertheless, Sergeant Mull moved into the dining room “where the light was better for reading * * * the warrant” and advised defendant of his Miranda rights.
Upon completion of the reading of the warrant, appellant again announced that he was prepared to go to the station. Again Sergeant Mull deferred their departure and suggested that appellant change to street clothes. Appellant contended that Sergeant Mull ordered him to change clothes and that Mull had already stated that there was to be a search of appellant’s bedroom. One of the arresting officers also testified that Mull announced then that he intended to conduct a search. Nevertheless, the trial court found that Mull’s suggestion was “* * * not a directive or an order ; that Vito Giacalone readily accepted it without any sense of duress or compulsion; [and] that Mull’s suggestion was made in good faith, without hidden or ulterior motive * * 5
The conclusion that appellant accepted the suggestion voluntarily is unsupportable, and it should be rejected. It is inconsistent with appellant’s two previous announcements that he was prepared to leave. As the Supreme Court stated in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 316, 83 S.Ct. 745, 758, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963):
This Court has consistently held that state factual determinations not fairly supported by the record cannot be conclusive of federal rights. [Citations omitted]. Where the fundamental liberties of the person are claimed to have been infringed, we carefully scrutinize the state-court record. [Citations omitted].
*1257Also, acquiescence to the “suggestion” of a policeman armed with a sawed-off shotgun, wearing a sidearm and commanding a posse of eight officers can hardly be viewed as volitional. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). Under these circumstances, we can appropriately reach our own conclusion regarding the coerciveness of Mull’s suggestion. As the Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507, 73 S.Ct. 397, 446, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953) (opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for a majority of the Court):
Where the ascertainment of the historical facts does not dispose of the claim but calls for interpretation of the legal significance of such facts, [citation omitted] the District Judge must exercise his own judgment on this blend of facts and their legal values. Thus, so-called mixed questions or the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication with the federal judge.
For instance, the question whether established primary facts underlying a confession prove that the confession was coerced or voluntary cannot rest on the State decision. [Citations omitted].
See Townsend v. Sain, supra, 372 U.S. at 309 n. 6, 83 S.Ct. 745. .A fortiori in this case, where the trial court’s conclusions are predicated upon a legally erroneous piecemeal view of the activities of the seach party they should not be considered binding.
A segmented view of events and an unrealistic concept of consent would justify the search of virtually all of appellant’s home. During the course of the search appellant was led into each of the three or four other upstairs bedrooms. He was then conducted to the kitchen, to the family room, and to the basement where he was required to open locked doors for the searchers. Several of the officers testified that appellant requested that he be allowed to accompany them on their search because he didn’t want his house torn up. One officer recalled the statement as follows: “ * * * Mr. Giacalone, if my memory is correct, said that, ‘Go ahead and search, but don’t tear the house up like you did the last time.’ ” There is no more tenable basis for considering the search of appellant’s bedroom separately than there is for separately considering the search of each room in appellant’s house.
My conclusion that the search was all one is further strengthened by the fact that the officers’ primary purpose in arresting Giacalone was to conduct a search of his home. And the latter fact is itself enough to invalidate the search. United States v. James, 378 F.2d 88 (6th Cir.1967); United States v. Harris, 321 F.2d 739 (6th Cir.1963).
The trial judge characterized the activities of the Internal Revenue Service and Sterling Heights Police components of the arresting expedition as follows:
Despite their uncontroverted protestations in the record to the contrary, I believe on the basis of circumstantial evidence that the IRS had some objective other than the mere reduction of Vito Giacalone to state police custody. Similarly contrary to the undisputed testimony of the Sterling Heights police officers, but on the basis of inferences arising from the evidence, I believe that they had some goal or purpose in addition to the mere arrest of Vito Giacalone on the extortion conspiracy warrant.
He also found that:
* * * , It had been agreed from the start that any tangible evidence would be turned over to Mull. * * * Mull was in charge throughout.
Events subsequent to the discovery of the blackjack further impugn the motives of the arresting officers. As the trial judge found:
From information which the officer [s] had prior to this arrest, they were aware of a safe concealed under *1258the bedroom closet floor. They pulled up some loose floorboards to gain access. Upon the request of the officers, the defendant opened the safe. The officer inspected its content.
About an hour was spent in appellant’s bedroom.
The search in the bedroom was followed by a thorough, systematic far-ranging search of the house which lasted about an hour more. Every room received at least a quick eye inspection. Certain rooms were gone over thoroughly and meticulously by expert searchers.
The officers testified that in their extensive search they were looking for concealed respondents named in 14-man warrant, for means and instru-mentantes of the extortion conspiracy, for evidence of the conspiracy, and for offensive weapons. Regarding the quest which followed the bedroom investigation, the officers were rather hard put to describe any particular instrumentality or piece of evidence for which they were searching.
* * -X- X- * *
As a part of the extensive search and investigation, about a dozen color photographs were made by Sergeant Mull in various rooms of the house. He also answered several telephone calls while search was being made * X- *
* -x- X- X- X- *
To be sure, in terms of numbers, the chief law enforcement agency in the arrest crew, with its four special agents, was the Internal Revenue Service of the United States. True also that upon the evidence in this record, IRS had nothing to do with the investigation of the extortion conspiracy. Admittedly, there were also two officers from the Sterling Heights Police Department in the arrest crew, although that Police Department was not directly concerned with the extortion conspiracy investigation. Further, it must be conceded that the most active searchers in the home were from the Sterling Heights police force and the Internal Revenue Service.
It thus appears inescapable that the officers intended from the beginning to conduct and did conduct a general exploratory search. Although, as the trial judge found, the arrest warrant was obtained in good faith, the selection of the time and place of its execution and the manner of its execution make it abundantly clear that the search was the primary purpose of the officers’ visit to appellant’s home. See United States v. James, supra; United States v. Harris, supra.
But even if the primary purpose of the officers was not to conduct a search but to effect the arrest, the search exceeded constitutionally permissible bounds. As Judge Learned Hand stated in United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir.1926):
After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among his papers in search of whatever will convict him, appears to us to be indistinguishable from what might be done under a general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more protection, for presumably it must be issued by a magistrate. True, by hypothesis the power would not exist, if the supposed offender were not found on the premises; but it is small consolation to know that one’s papers are safe only so long as one is not at home.
I agree that the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), reh. denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S.Ct. 36, 24 L.Ed.2d 124 (1969), are not applicable to this case. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971). But there is no need to repeat here the thorough analysis, made by the Court in Chimel, of the development of the law of searches and seizures incident to arrests. The Supreme Court has never approved as incident to an arrest a search as exten*1259sive as that conducted in this case.6 See generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), in which Mr. Justice Stewart stated, at 456, 91 S.Ct. at 2033:
[T]his Court has repeatedly held that, even under [United States v.] Rabin-owitz [339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950,)] “[a] search may be incident to an arrest ‘only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.’ * * * ” (Emphasis in original) [Citations omitted.]
The most extensive search approved by the Court occurred in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947), overruled, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). See also Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971). In Harris, the searchers spent five hours searching a four-room apartment, located on a single floor, and seized an envelope containing several draft cards illegally possessed by Harris. In upholding the search, the Court reaffirmed the principle that “[e]ach case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances [citations omitted].” 331 U.S. at 150, 67 S.Ct. at 1101. See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). And the difficulty of determining in each case whether a search is unlawful under the uncertain standards applied by the majority in Harris was stressed by Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent. 331 U.S. at 197, 67 S.Ct. 1098. But the Supreme Court later indicated more clearly, in Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 2051, 23 L.Ed.2d 728 (1969) (per curiam), that the pre-Chimel line is not to be drawn significantly beyond Harris. In Von Cleef the Court held illegal, under pr e-Chimel standards, a three hour search of a 16 room house which resulted in the seizure of several thousand articles. As the Court stated in that case:
Even the facts of Harris v. United States, supra — in which the search of a four-room apartment and the seizure of an envelope containing altered Selective Service documents were sustained on the ground that they were contemporaneous with a lawful arrest —are a far cry from those of this case. * * * [W]e have no hesitation in concluding that the action of the police here in combing a three-story, 16-room house from top to bottom and carting away several thousand papers, publications, and other items cannot under any view of the Fourth Amendment be justified as “incident to arrest.”
395 U.S. at 816, 89 S.Ct. at 2052.
There is no convincing precedent sustaining, as incident to a valid arrest, a search of the scope and intensity of that in this case. Appellant was convicted by the use of evidence seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. His reputation as a major criminal figure should not deny him the constitutional protection created for every person. The words of two former Supreme Court Justices are applicable here:
* * x if onjy -¿he fate 0f the [appellants] were involved, one might be brutally indifferent to the ways by which they get their deserts. But it is precisely because the appeal to the Fourth Amendment is so often made by dubious characters that its infringements call for alert and strenuous resistance. Freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, easily summon powerful support against encroachment. The prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure is normally invoked by those accused of crime, and criminals have few friends. The implications of such encroachment, however, reach far beyond the thief or the black-marketeer. I can*1260not give legal sanction to what was done in this case without accepting the implications of such a decision for the future, implications which portend serious threats against precious aspects of our traditional freedom.
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 156-157, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 1104, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
* * * In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means — to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal — would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
I would order the issuance of the writ.

. On November 13, Mr. Ivan Barris, Mr. Louisell’s partner, settled a ease which had theretofore precluded his participation in the blackjack trial, and he appeared to represent appellant on November 14. At that time lie asserted appellant’s rejection of both himself and Mr. Fink as trial counsel.

. [1] In view of the elective, non-emergency, diagnostic nature of Mr. Louisell’s hospitalization—
[2] In view of his positive assurances before the brief delay was granted that he would be out, fit and able to try the blackjack case, on November 14—
[3] In view of the extraordinary skill and vigor with which Mr. Louisell was trying cases as late as Friday, November 8, the last working day immediately before he was hospitalized—
[4] In view of the fact that he left the hospital on November 16—
[5] In view of the great talent and energy he displayed in the trial of cases as early as November 18, soon after he left the hospital, indeed, on the second working day after the completion of the blackjack trial—
[6] In view of the absence of any sworn evidence of his disability to try the blackjack case—
[7] In view of the Court’s insistence that Mr. Louisell guarantee his presence at trial as a condition for the short adjournment between gun and blackjack trials—
[8] In view of the convenient excuse for a long delay presented by Mr. Louisell’s hospitalization and the marathon Rubino trial, if only the trial of the blackjack case could be avoided for a few days—
[9] In view of Mr. Giacalone’s failure to seek counsel other than those in the office of Louisell and Harris—
[10] In view of the absence of sworn testimony showing the time the defendant first became aware that Mr. Louisell would not try the blackjack case—
[order and numbering supplied].

. I observe that the trial judge was of the opinion that appellant was a major figure in organized crime. In an opinion denying bail pending appeal the court stated:
Second, based on the investigation of the probation department and the testimony given under oath before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Investigations of the 88th Congress (testimony which, I might add, was given by honest, knowledgeable men who testified subject to the penalty of perjury) I am satisfied that Vito Giacalone is, and for virtually all of his adult life has been a participant in a large-scale organized criminal conspiracy.
In reversing the refusal to allow bail pending appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
The moving papers state without contradiction that the defendant is 46 years of age, married and has 7 children ranging up to the age of 18 years, has a large home and has roots deeply imbedded in the community. While the defendant has frequently been arrested, his only prior conviction was in 1960 for a misdemeanor for which he was sentenced to 90 days in the Detroit House of Correction and a $300 fine.
There being substantiality to the appeal, we should not deny bond unless we are convinced that bail should be denied because of the danger of flight, potential of harm to the community or risk to the proper administration of justice.
Jjs *1* *1*
The crime of which defendant has been convicted is not an assaultive crime. The blackjack was not found on his person but in a dresser drawer in his bedroom. The defendant has no record of conviction for commission of assaultive crime. Iiis reputation as an evil doer is not a relevant consideration. People v. Giacalone, 16 Mich. App. 352, 360-361, 167 N.W.2d 871, 876 (1969).

. The cases relied on by the trial court do not support this approach: In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the Court held that an unsigned confession admitted against Wong Sun was not the “fruit” of his illegal arrest and was hence admissible ; and that the illegal seizure of heroin admitted into evidence against him “invaded no right of privacy of person or premises which would entitle Wong Sun to object to its use at his trial.” Id. at 492, 83 S.Ct. at 419. The heroin had been seized as a result of the illegal arrest of one of Wong Sun’s co-defendants and this issue turned on lack of standing.
In Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939), the Court reversed the affirmance of appellant’s conviction, by the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings, theretofore erroneously denied by the District Court, to determine whether evidence used against him was the “fruit” of messages intercepted by the government in violation of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605.
In Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 31, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925), the Court sustained the searches of Ag-nello and his codefendants, who were arrested immediately after government agents had witnessed an illegal sale of narcotics, and the seizure of narcotics either revealed by those searches or in plain view at the scene of the arrest. However, the Court held illegal the subsequent search of Agnello’s house several blocks from the scene of the arrest.
In Vanella v. United States, 371 F.2d 50 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 920, 87 S.Ct. 883, 17 L.Ed.2d 790 (1967), the court sustained a search of Vanella’s residence incident to his arrest upon a warrant for conspiracy to violate narcotics laws, but held illegal the search prior to arrest of a person found in Vanella’s home.
In Hayden v. Warden, 363 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1966), rev’d, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967), the court held that evidence of only “evidential value” had been illegally seized at the time of Hayden’s arrest despite the fact that the seqreh which revealed the evidence was itself illegal.

. I observe that Sergeant Mull’s testimony on cross-examination was demonstrably inaccurate in some respects:
Q Well, in any event you have acknowledged that you made one call, phone call to Lieutenant Schwartzend-ruber?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you told Lieutenant Schwartz-endruber did you not, “We can’t bring him in yet because we’re not through with the search”?
A No, sir.
Q You say you didn’t?
A That’s right.
Q Do you remember — so we don’t have any misunderstanding Mr. Mull, I am asking you if it is not a fact that you told Lieutenant Schwartzendruber when you called him that you couldn’t bring him in yet because you hadn’t completed the search?
A Not that I recall."
Q Do you remember being asked this question and your giving this answer, page 62 of the preliminary examination?
“Q You called him (referring to Schwartzendruber), to tell him that you were — you would be bringing Mr. Gia-calone in?”
And the answer: “Yes.”
Q That you hadn’t completed the search yet?
And your answer: “Yes, sir.”
* * * Is it your testimony then that you were searching the upstairs of the house not Mr. Giacalone’s bedroom for weapons?
A And other persons.
Q And other persons?
A Yes.
Q Is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Well, first of all let’s talk about the weapons. Page 75 of the preliminary examination.
“Q Now were you looking in these bedrooms for guns?
And the answer: No.”

. I am aware of no Supreme Court decision which has upheld, as incident to an arrest, a pre-CMmel search on a floor different from that on which the arrest was made.