Court Opinion

ID: 9757080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:17:54.834079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:34.655464
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge,
dissenting:
Section 303 of The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act1 provides in part:
“Such agreement shall constitute an acceptance of all the provisions of article three of this act, and shall operate as a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any form or amount of compensation or damages for any injury or death occurring in the course of employment, or to any method of determination thereof, other than as provided, in article three of this act.”
It is well settled under this statute that if an injury or death is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, an employee may not bring a common law trespass action to recover damages from his employer. See Hamler v. Waldron, 445 Pa. 262, 284 A.2d 725 (1971); Hyzy v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 384 Pa. 316, 121 A.2d 85 (1956); McIntyre v. Strausser, 365 Pa. 507, 76 A.2d 220 (1950). This is true whether or not the claim is meritorious. Nicklos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 346 F.Supp. 185 (E.D.Pa.1972). On the other hand, a common law trespass action to recover for injuries which are not compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is not barred. Perez v. Blumenthal Brothers Chocolate Co., 428 Pa. 225, 237 A.2d 227 (1968). *473Therefore, there is a fundamental distinction between non-meritorious claims for compensable injuries and claims for noncompensable injuries. In this case, if appellee’s injury is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, he may not recover in trespass even though his claim is non-meritorious. If appellee’s injury is not compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, his trespass action is not barred.
I agree with the majority that, in this case, appellee filed his claim under The Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act.2 I do not agree that appellee had the option of disregarding his remedy under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Occupational diseases present a unique situation in Workmen’s Compensation Law because recovery for injuries sustained due to an occupational disease is available under both the Occupational Disease Act and the Workmen’s Compensation Act.3 The majority’s holding that a claimant disabled by an occupational disease may institute his claim pursuant to either Act is supported by case law, see Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Wlodarczyk, 21 Pa.Cmwlth. 495, 347 A.2d 763 (1975), and by treatise. See A. Barbieri, Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation and Occupational Disease (1975). However, I interpret these sources as referring to situations where the claim may be established under either statute, freeing the claimant to choose the statute which provides the most beneficial remedy. It simply makes no sense to say that a claimant may elect to pursue his claim under a statute which denies recovery, while foregoing his rights under a statute which provides a recovery, thereby gaining the right to sue in trespass. Such a rationale totally ignores one of the basic purposes of Workmen’s Compensation legislation, which is to eliminate the necessity of trespass actions. Greer v. United States Steel Corp., 237 Pa.Super. 597, 352 A.2d 450 (1975). I would hold that if an injury *474due to an occupational disease is compensable under either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the Occupational Disease Act, the appropriate remedy must be regarded as exclusive.
The difficulty with this case is that we cannot determine whether appellee’s injury is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. As the majority observes, even though appellee filed his claim pursuant to the Occupational Disease Act, the Workmen’s Compensation referee decided that recovery was unavailable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The referee’s relevant holdings are as follows:
“The claimant’s disabling lung disease may or may not be industrially related.
The claimant having failed to meet the burden imposed by Section 108(n) and 301(c), (2), [(c)(2)] of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended January 31, 1973, in proving all of the elements necessary to sustain a finding that his total disability is caused by an occupational disease within the meaning of the Act, must have his prayer for compensation denied.”
It is unclear whether the referee regarded appellee’s injury as noncompensable or his claim nonmeritorious.
The Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board interpreted the referee’s decision as if it had been decided under the Occupational Disease Act. Thus, we have no factual determination as to the compensability of appellee’s injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Furthermore, that question of fact, crucial to this case, cannot be resolved in the lower court. In Greer v. United States Steel Corp., supra, a claimant bypassed his Workmen’s Compensation remedies and attempted initially to satisfy his claims for employment-related injuries in a common law trespass action. The defendant contended that the claimant was limited to his Workmen’s Compensation remedies. We held:
“The claimant here has made the factual and legal determination that his claim is not compensable by filing *475bis action in the nature of trespass, while the legislature has created a forum with expertise in these matters to make this determination. The legislature has in fact removed from the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas all matters relating to Workmen’s Compensation and directed that appeals from the Workmen’s Compensation Board be taken to the Commonwealth Court so that an expert and consistent line of decisions would evolve.
Whether the proofs ultimately establish compensability is for the compensation referee, board and court to determine.” 237 Pa.Super. at 600-01, 352 A.2d at 451-52.
The gist of our holding in Greer was that whether a claim is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act must be determined initially through the Workmen’s Compensation system. Therefore, appellee’s claim must be relegated to the Workmen’s Compensation Board for appropriate action. See Williams v. Spaulding Bakeries, Inc., 464 Pa. 29, 346 A.2d 3 (1975).
I would reverse the order of the lower court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WATKINS, President Judge, joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, art III, § 303 (77 P.S. § 481), as amended. Section 303 was most recently amended by the Act of December 5, 1974, P.L. 782, No. 263, § 6. However, this amendment does not apply to appellee’s claim.

. Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 566, No. 284, § 101 (77 P.S. § 1201) et seq., as amended.

. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, arts. I, III, §§ 108, 301(c)(2) (77 P.S. §§ 27.1, 411(2) (Supp. 1976-77)), as amended.