Court Opinion

ID: 9829904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:43:04.241736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:08.641797
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.'
Appellant Asbury testified, in part, as 7<A lows:
“At the time this contract was made and entered into we were up in Mr. Cooper’s office in Olney, and Mr. Cooper said the bank must guarantee the check or there would be no trade, and he called my attention to another similar contract lying on his desk. Mr. Tucker and I agreed to this. I saw Mr. Tucker the next das’- after the contract was made. I met him between 11 and 2 o’clock. On this occasion Mr. Tucker come running up to my ear and said the bank said they wouldn’t pay the draft, and I told him that was all right, it was all right with me. I supposed the deal was all off because he told me all the time that the money had to be in the bank or guaranteed by the bank, and I supposed by that, that the deal would be off. This was the next day after the contract was made and signed.
“About three or four days after this I saw Mr. Tucker again, but I don’t recall what was said about the contract on this occasion, gome time in the latter part of March, 1930, I received a telegram from Mr. Tucker, and I did not do anything upon receipt of that telegram. * * * I .supposed the abstract was ready for me when he sent me that telegram. The contract was made on February 21, 1930, and his telegram to me was sent on March 20,1930. No, sir, I did not answer the telegram. After receiving the telegram from Mr. Tucker I believe I had a letter from you (Mr. Counts, attorney for plaintiff), and I stated in my letter to you the reasons why I didn’t go ahead with the contract. I never told Mr. Tucker anything about his wife not signing the lease at the time he signed it. I dispute that part of his testimony. After I wrote you a letter I later called at your office and told you in substance that Mr. Tucker didn’t have any cause of action against me because my bank failed to guarantee payment of the draft, and that Mr. Tucker was not bound under the contract and that he could not bind me. Mr. Tucker also told me that the day we made the contract or early the next morning. That’s the only reason I have, for not carrying out the contract. I didn’t say at that time that I stopped payment of the check. I didn’t stop payment of the check until two months after that, two months after the trade was off, some time in April or May.
“I made no objections to Mr. Tucker’s title because I was never furnished with an abstract. I did not tell Mr. Tucker that I couldn’t afford to take the lease then as the Routon well had come in dry. I was watching the progress of the drilling in that neighborhood, and when that well was being drilled I was over there every few days. If that well had come in a producer I don’t suppose Mr. Tucker would have let me have the lease. If *397he would let me have the lease, in the event that well came in a producer, I expect it would he hard to trade with him again.”
Counsel ior appellee calls our attention to that testimony, and based thereon insists, in effect, that the same shows an anticipatory breach of appellant’s contract to have the Cisco hank guarantee the payment of the cheek prior to the time appellee was obligated to furnish the abstract of title, and quotes the following from the decision- of the Commission of Appeals in Burks v. Neutzler, 2 S.W. (2d) 416, 418: “Where, one party to a contract, by his conduct or misconduct, shows -a fixed intention to abandon it, the other party is justified in treating it as abandoned.” And in line with that decision counsel also •stresses the opinion of the Commission of Appeals in Moore v. Middleton, 12 S.W.(2d) 995, and Greenwall Theatrical Circuit Co. v. Markowitz, 97 Tex. 479, 79 S. W. 1069, 65 L. R. A. 302.
However, appellee in his pleadings did not rely for recovery on the theory of an anticipatory breach of the contract by Asbury. On the contrary, in his pleadings he alleged that the abstract required of him in the contract was furnished, showing a valid title in Tucker, and that the breach of the contract by Asbury occurred thereafter, which was nearly a month after the supposed anticipatory breach of the contract by Asbury. As said by Justice Brown in Kilgore v. Northwest Texas Baptist Educational Ass’n, 90 Tex. 139, 37 S. W. 598, 600: “The intention t.o abandon the contract at some future date is no breach of it; but, when that intention is declared in positive terms and unconditionally, it has the effect, in so far as the promisor is able to do so, to repudiate the contract itself, and to terminate the contractual relations between the parties. This affords to the other party the opportunity to accept the declarations,- if he chooses to do so, and thus make effective the declarations of intention not to perform, rendering the contract thereby one that is broken on the part of the prom-isor himself. But, to have this effect, the declaration of an intention not to perform the contract in the future must be unconditional in its terms.”
See, also, Moore v. Jenkins, 109 Tex. 461, 211 S. W. 975.
Even though it could be said that the testimony quoted was sufficient prima facie to show a positive and unconditional intention on the part of Asbury to repudiate the contract and to terminate the same as between him and Tucker — -which it seems is at least doubtful — yet by reason of plaintiff’s pleading noted above .and testimony •offered by him in support thereof, he is in no position now to rely on the supposed anticipatory breach of the contract by As-bury in support of the judgment rendered. Nor was there any pleading that defendant waived the furnishing by plaintiff of the abstract- of title.
Under plaintiff’s pleadings and evidence offered, it was incumbent upon him to make out a prima facie case by showing that he tendered to the defendant an abstract of title as was required under the contract, and in the absence of the discharge of that burden he was not entitled to a recovery. The cases cited by appellee do not support a conclusion to the contrary, and are distinguishable from the present suit by reason of the facts involved in them.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.