Court Opinion

ID: 9858109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:14:48.784494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:38.131124
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.
George Vitko appealed from a judgment of the district court, Northwest Judicial District, granting his wife, Hazel Vitko, a divorce. Hazel Vitko cross-appealed. Both parties challenge the distribution of the marital estate. We affirm.
George and Hazel Vitko were married in 1949. At the time of trial, George Vitko was 76 years old. Hazel was 67. Hazel is a retired registered nurse who, according to the trial court, ran the household and raised the couple’s four children. George is a World War II veteran and construction worker and owns his own construction company.
The trial court found the earning capacities of the parties to be limited “to any income obtained from their property holdings; social security benefits; military disability benefits!;] and interest earned on accounts.” The marital estate was valued at $583,070. Hazel was awarded property valued at $342,-244. George received the remaining property, valued at $240,826. As part of the $342,-244 awarded to Hazel the trial court included $50,000 in “spousal support” to be paid in two installments of $25,000 each.
George argues that much of his property was acquired with his military disability payments and, therefore, should not be included in the marital estate. He mis*103takenly relies on statutes which exempt certain benefits from attachment, lien, or judgment. See NDCC §§ 28-22-03; 28-22-03.1. Although the exemption statutes apply to divorce judgments in certain instances, e.g., Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920 (N.D.1984), George provides us with no cases or other law in which the distribution of marital property in a divorce is governed by the exemption statutes. In fact, the trial court is required to consider as part of the marital estate all of the real and personal property accumulated by the parties, regardless of its source. Freed v. Freed, 454 N.W.2d 516 (N.D.1990).1
It is true that military retirement pay that is waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits is not marital property to be divided in equitable distributions. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989); 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West 1983 & Supp.1994). Some state courts have interpreted Mansell to preclude treating any veterans’ disability benefits as property divisible upon divorce. E.g., Wallace v. Fuller, 832 S.W.2d 714 (Tex.Ct.App.1992); but see Riley v. Riley, 82 Md.App. 400, 571 A.2d 1261 (1990) [distinguishing Mansell because the disability payments at issue were not in lieu of retirement pay]. However, even those state courts which have recognized that Mansell precludes the division of veterans’ disability benefits in property distributions have concluded “that when making property distributions or awarding alimony the trial court may consider military disability retirement pay as future income ... relevant to a determination of the parties’ ultimate economic circumstances.” In re Marriage of Kraft, 119 Wash.2d 438, 832 P.2d 871, 875 (1992); see also Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1, 15 (N.D.1989) (VandeWallé, J., concurring) [“Thus I do not read the majority opinion as establishing so rigid a rule that Social Security benefits must be entirely ignored in reaching an equitable division of property.”].
This narrow interpretation of the Mansell holding is entirely justified considering the standard the United States Supreme Court uses when reviewing the issue of whether Congressional actions preempt state domestic relations law. Mansell, supra; Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S.Ct. 2029, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979). Even in Mansell, the Court expressed its reluctance to recognize federal preemption of state domestic relations law:
“Because domestic relations are preeminently matters of state law, we have consistently recognized that Congress, when it passes general legislation, rarely intends to displace state authority in this area.... Thus we have held that we will not find pre-emption absent evidence that it is “ ‘positively required by direct enactment.’ ” ... The instant case, however, presents one of those rare instances where Congress has directly and specifically legislated in the area of domestic relations.”
490 U.S. at 587, 109 S.Ct. at 2028 (citations omitted). Absent express language preempting state law in this area, the Supreme Court will not find implied preemption unless it is “positively required by direct enactment” or unless the absence of preemption does “ ‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests.” Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581, 99 S.Ct. at 808. Thus, we need not give a broader preemptive effect to the *104Mansell holding than the Mansell court itself recognized in the “precise and limited” language of a particular federal statute.
The trial court expressly excluded George’s disability benefits, as well as George’s and Hazel’s social security benefits, from the equitable property distribution. However, citing Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257 (Alaska 1992), it considered the disability income “so as to determine the financial circumstances of each party to the divorce.”
Although labeled “spousal support,” the $50,000 really has more of the indicia of a property settlement.2 The trial court includes it in its valuation of Hazel’s share of “a fair and equitable distribution of the property of this marriage.” It is not clearly subject to modification at any time and the record does not reflect that Hazel’s remarriage would relieve George of his requirement to pay. See Redlin v. Redlin, 436 N.W.2d 5, 8 (N.D.1989) [listing factors to be considered in deciding whether an amount to be paid by one spouse is part of a property division or is in the nature of spousal support].3 But see In re Marriage of Sahara, — Mont. —, 878 P.2d 908 (Mont.1994) [upholding a lump sum “maintenance” award and holding that it survived the recipient’s remarriage]. Albeit forthcoming military disability payments are not marital property, it is clear that George possessed sufficient other property to warrant the trial court’s distribution. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 7 Haw.App. 496, 780 P.2d 581 (1989) [deciding not to address the issue of whether husband could be required to pay for wife’s Survivor Benefit Plan from his disability pay because husband had ample other resources from which to draw the payments].
Included in Hazel’s award of property was a farm valued at $239,000. The court specifically considered that this property was inherited by Hazel within “the last five years of the 45 year marriage and it would not be equitable nor fair to view that property as equal marital property.” The court noted that when excluding the value of the inherited farm, Hazel received $103,244 and George received $240,826 in property assets.
Hazel contends that because the farm constituted the greater part of her distribution, she received little of the marital assets acquired by the couple as a result of their marriage. Under the circumstances of this case, we find no error in the trial court’s awarding the family residence to George. Therefore, we find no merit in Hazel’s cross-appeal.
We treat a trial court’s distribution of marital property as findings of fact subject to the “clearly erroneous” standard of review. Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P.; Anderson v. Anderson, 504 N.W.2d 569 (N.D.1993). Our review of the record and the court’s findings reveals that the trial court’s distribution of the Vitko marital property is not “clearly erroneous.” Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
SANDSTROM and NEUMANN, JJ., and VERNON R. PEDERSON, Surrogate Judge, concur.
LEVINE, J., concurs with opinion.
*105VERNON R. PEDERSON, Surrogate Judge, sitting in place of MESCHKE, J., disqualified.

. Even if we were to agree with George that disability benefits received during marriage are separable marital property, our decision today would not be affected. We are faced with a set of facts similar to that found in Holmes v. Holmes, 7 Va.App. 472, 375 S.E.2d 387 (1988). In that case, a Virginia court of appeals decided that, notwithstanding the husband's "bald assertions,” it was “unnecessary to address ... arguments that certain exempt disability funds retain their exempt status after being deposited in accounts and that these funds need not be maintained separately and distinctly from marital funds because we conclude that the husband did not carry his burden in establishing that the sources of his bank account funds were his disability pay." Id. 375 S.E.2d at 395. See also In re Marriage of Hapaniewski, 107 Ill.App.3d 848, 63 Ill.Dec. 535, 438 N.E.2d 466 (1982) [deciding that exempt property becomes marital property once the two are “commingled”].
However, most courts see the status of disability payments as the court did in Rickman v. Rickman, 124 Ariz. 507, 605 P.2d 909, 911 (Ct.App.1980): "It is our opinion that the monthly checks received by appellant from the Veterans Administration for service-connected disabilities, after dissolution of the marriage, are his separate property." (Emphasis added).

. It should be noted that the trial court lumped the "spousal support" payment into two payments partly because George’s past actions had exhibited a recalcitrance in making regular support payments. The court may have been attempting to avoid recurring problems with the enforcement of the "spousal support” order. C.f. Weigel v. Kraft, 449 N.W.2d 583 (N.D.1989) [recognizing it was in the trial judge’s discretion to order spousal support to be paid in a lump sum instead of monthly installments in lieu of payor’s noncompliance with court order to document expenditures].

. The trial court listed three reasons for awarding the "spousal support.” It reasoned:
"First of all, she is a disadvantaged spouse in that she will no longer be able to reside within the family home that she has lived in for forty plus years. Secondly, she has been a disadvantaged spouse for years as a result of the unsubstantiated allegations made against her by the Defendant. Thirdly, the farm property that she was awarded was inherited property and has only been within the family for the last 5 years of the 45 year marriage and it would not be equitable nor fair to view that property as equal marital property.”
Two of the three reasons listed, Hazel’s not being able to reside in the family home and the timing of the inheritance, look more like equitable property distribution considerations than like spousal support concerns.