Court Opinion

ID: 9711733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:37:56.641937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.149494
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
Smith, J.
I concur in the result reached in the opinion of Judge Bierly in this case. However, I feel that there are some issues raised which have not been clearly and succinctly discussed and answered in the opinion.
I will not belabor this opinion with a recital of the facts and the issues for the reason that the opinion written by Judge Bierly has covered them completely and correctly.
As discussed in Judge Bierly’s opinion, the appellant has combined his various specifications of alleged errors into two groups; the first is concerned with the doctrine of last clear chance, and the second is concerned with the contributory negligence of a child. Appellant has further set out a third grouping of errors, which pertains to the giving of certain instructions.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give two instructions on the theory of the last clear chance doctrine as the same pertains to appellee Hall.
The appellant maintains that the trial court erred in refusing to give Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 7 and No. 10.
Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 7 reads in part as follows:
“Therefore, if you find from a preponderance of all the evidence that Dean E. Bixenman, by his own negligence, placed himself in a position of peril, and thereafter a defendant in his action discovered or became aware of Dean E. Bixenman’s position of peril, and had the physical and *640mental ability to avoid the injury which caused his death, but negligently failed to exercise ordinary care to do so; and that Dean E. Bixenman was killed as a proximate result of such failure; then you may find that the original negligence of Dean E. Bixenman, if any, does not defeat a recovery by his father, plaintiff herein, against either defendant who in such manner failed to exercise a last clear chance to avoid the injury and death complained of by the plaintiff.” (Emphasis supplied)
Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 10 reads in part as follows:
“If you find from a preponderance of the evidence, if any, that Dean E. Bixenman was negligent, and by his own negligence placed himself in a position of peril, but was unaware of his peril in time to extricate himself, and if you further find that either Mrs. Hall or Mr. Busselberg discovered Dean’s peril in sufficient time to avoid injuring him by the exercise of due care, then you may apply the doctrine of ‘last clear chance’ and find for plaintiff and against either or both of said defendants whom you believe, upon your consideration of all the evidence, failed to exercise such due care.” (Emphasis supplied)
The appellee maintains that these instructions are clearly erroneous because each of the instructions informed the jury that they could find against either defendant who in such manner failed to exercise due care under the “last clear chance” doctrine; that these instructions would certainly mislead the jury for the reason that the appellees, Lake County Agricultural Society and Merritt C. Busselberg, were relieved of any liability by the court at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, and that the appellee, Alice B. Hall, was the only party-defendant at the conclusion of the trial of this cause; that said instructions were not correct and were clearly erroneous under the issues that existed at the conclusion of the submission of this cause.
To support this proposition the appellee has cited the following case: Hamling, Executor, et al., v. Hildebrandt, et al., (1948), 119 Ind. App. 22, 81 N. E. 2d 603.
*641The court in the Hamling case, at page 27, said as follows:
“(4) The appellants complain of the court’s refusal of two instructions tendered by them which embraced the idea that on the issues of fraud and of duress the will was valid, and verdicts for the defendants must be returned on each of those issues. As we have said, those issues were removed from the consideration of the jury by the court’s instruction 2A. The tendered instructions were, therefore, superfluous, and if given they would have been confusing in that the giving of them along with 2A would have told the jury to return a verdict on issues which had been withdrawn from its consideration.”
It is my opinion that this position of the appellee has some merit.
In further answer to the appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to give these instructions, the appellee maintains that the doctrine of “last clear chance” is not applicable to the facts in this case for the reason that the appellee, Alice B. Hall, did not have notice of the perilous position of the Bixenman boy, and did not have an opportuntiy both physically and mentally to avoid the accident. In support of this proposition, the appellee has cited the following cases: Carroll Ewing v. Alice Biddle (1966), 141 Ind. App. 25, 216 N. E. (2d) 863; John Stallings, Gerald Evans, v. Joseph Dick, Jr. (1965), 139 Ind. App. 118, 210 N. E. 2d 82.
The evidence in the case at bar reveals that the appellee, Hall, came up to the intersection in a very slow and cautious manner, looked to the right and saw a truck approaching from the right, and then looked to the left and saw two motor vehicles approaching the intersection from a southerly direction, and, when she saw that she had plenty of time to enter the intersection and to proceed in a northerly direction on Court Street, she started to make her right turn into Court Street and was traveling from six to ten miles an hour when she first saw the Bixenman boy operating his bicycle in a southerly direction on Court Street. The bicycle was traveling at the approximate speed that the truck was traveling and on *642the wrong side of Court Street. She then applied her brakes and swerved her motor vehicle. She did not have either the physical or mental ability to avoid the accident after she discovered Dean Bixenman. From an examination of all the exidence, there is no evidence that the appellee, Hall, had sufficient notice of the illegal operation of the Bixenman boy’s bicycle in time to have avoided the collision herein, or that she negligently failed to avoid the collision after actually seeing the presence of the Bixenman boy on the wrong side of the street. Clearly the evidence discloses that when the appellee, Hall, first saw the Bixenman boy traveling in a southerly direction on the wrong side of the highway, he was directly in front of her and she could not have avoided striking him.
The appellant contends that the appellee, Hall, was negligent in failing to see Dean Bixenman, approaching the intersection. It is my opinion, however, that this argument is fallacious due to the fact that under the doctrine of “last clear chance” the appellee must have actual knowledge of the presence of Dean Bixenman, and then negligently fail to avoid injuring him.
Our court stated, in the case of John Stallings, et al., v. Joseph Dick, Jr., supra, the following:
“. . . The last clear chance doctrine in Indiana contemplates a peril on the part of the plaintiff which is known by the defendant or defendants in time to avoid the injury. Heldt v. Thompson (1927), 86 Ind. App. 270, 271, 157 N. E. 60; Button v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (1944), 115 Ind. App. 210, 219, 57 N. E. 2d 444; Snyder v. N. Y. Cent. R.R. Co. (1936), 101 Ind. App. 258, 269, 194 N. E. 796. . . .”
“. . . The court then stated:
‘. . . The last clear chance contemplates a known peril which can be avoided by due care, not a peril which might have been known by the exercise of due care. In other words, it is the negligent failure to avoid discovered peril that makes applicable the rule of last clear chance.’ ”
“. . . In Button v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, this court held:
*643‘. . . The practical import of the doctrine of last chance is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff if the defendant, aware of the plaintiff’s peril, had in fact a later opportunity than the plaintiff to avoid the injury.
*. . . It is obvious that the doctrine of last .clear chance has no place in a controversy in which (1) the plaintiff was not negligent, and (2) the defendant had no actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s peril.’
“The doctrine of last clear chance is discussed fully and completely in 21 I.L.E., Negligence, § 92, pp. 351, 352. This section of I.L.E. states as follows:
‘For the doctrine of last clear chance to be applied it is essential that the defendant should have had knowledge of plaintiff’s peril and the ability and opportunity to avert the injury. The doctrine of last clear chance affects the cases in which the injured person is guilty of negligence and has no place in a controversy in which plaintiff was not negligent. It applies where plaintiff negligently puts himself in a place of danger from which he cannot extricate himself after he becomes aware of the danger, or where he could have extricated himself had he known of the danger but failed to do so because he was unconscious of the peril.
‘In order to invoke the application of the last clear chance doctrine, defendant must have had knowledge of plaintiff’s danger or situation of peril and of the helpless condition of plaintiff and thereafter failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid harming him. The knowledge of plaintiff’s peril or danger, which will bring a case within the doctrine, . . . must be actual knowledge, and the mere fact that by the use of ordinary care and diligence the peril might have been known to the person who inflicted the injury does not bring a case within the doctrine.’ ”
It is my opinion, therefore, from an examination of all the evidence in this case, the court did not commit reversible error in refusing to give Appellant’s Instructions No. 7 and No. 10.
The next alleged error set out under heading II of appellant’s argument is error of the trial court in giving Defendant’s Instructions No. 2, No. 3 and No. 12, and in refusing to give Plaintiff’s Instructions No. 6, No. 12 and No. 21.
*644Defendant’s Instruction No. 2 reads as follows:
“You are instructed that the fact that the plaintiff’s decedent, Dean Bixenman, was a boy a little over thirteen years of age, does not excuse him from complying with all of the statutes of the State of Indiana pertaining to the operation of bicycles on public highways.”
Defendant’s Instruction No. 3 reads as follows:
“You are instructed that, even though you should believe that Dean Bixenman was ignorant of the statutory provisions concerning the manner of the operation of his bicycle on public highways, it is no excuse for a violation of such statute.”
Defendant’s Instruction No. 12 reads as follows:
“A statute of the State of Indiana, in full force and effect at the time of the accident in controversy, provided as follows:
‘Driving to the left of center of roadway further limitations.— (a) No vehicle or bicycle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions: When approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection. . . .’
“If you find from a fair preponderance of the evidence in this case that at the time of the accident in controversy the Plaintiff’s decedent failed to obey the provisions of this statute, then such conduct upon the part of the Plaintiff’s decedent would constitute negligence. Burns’ 1940 Repl., Sec. 47-2014. Gulley v. Ham (1947), 117 Ind. App. 593; 73 N. E. 2d 188, 190.”
Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 6, as refused by the court, reads as follows:
“If you find from a preponderance of the evidence, if any, that at the time of the matter here in controversy, Dean E. Bixenman was 13 years of age, and that he was operating his bicycle on the left side of the road in violation of a statute or statutes of the State of Indiana, such violation of itself would not prevent a recovery by the plaintiff herein, if you further find that at said time Dean E. Bixenman was exercising the same degree of care for his own safety as *645would ordinarily be exercised by children of like age, knowledge, judgment and experience under the facts, circumstances and conditions disclosed by all of the evidence herein.”
Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 12, as refused by the court, reads as follows:
“A person riding in a public street or highway on a bicycle is required to use ordinary care to avoid being injured by coming in contact with cars or vehicles operated or driven in the street. He also has a right to presume that persons in charge of cars or other vehicles will use ordinary care to avoid injuring him.
“If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Dean Bixenman was killed while in the operation of his bicycle at the time and place referred to in the complaint, and that at said time and place he was using such care as should be ordinarily expected from a boy of like age, knowledge and experience to protect himself from injury by other vehicles being operated in a reasonably careful manner, then you may find that Dean Bixenman discharged his full duty and was not guilty of contributory negligence.”
Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 21, as refused by the court, reads as follows:
“The court instructs the jury that before you may find plaintiff barred from recovery by reason of violation of the statute requiring vehicles to be operated on the right hand side of the read you must also find that a child of similar age, intelligence, and experience would not have operated his bicycle on the left hand side of the road.”
The appellant has grouped his argument to include a consideration of all the above recited instructions under heading II of his argument. It is my opinion that under the facts alleged in the case at bar it is a violation of statutory law for a minor to violate the rules of the road in the operation of his bicycle. In other words, the General Assembly of the State of Indiana specifically sets out what the operator of a bicycle is to do when operating the same on the public highways, and sets out by statute what the conduct should be for *646all persons regardless of age. Rentschler v. Hall (1946), 117 Ind. App. 255, 69 N. E. 2d 619; Carroll Ewing v. Alice Biddle (1966), 141 Ind. App. 25, 216 N. E. 2d 863; Carl Smith v. City of Indianapolis (1964), 136 Ind. App. 616, 199 N. E. 2d 723.
The appellant admits that Dean Bixenman, at the time of the collision in controversy, was entering an intersection on the wrong side of the road, or against traffic, contrary to statute: The appellant then attempts to justify this illegal action by claiming that Dean Bixenman was only thirteen years of age and that the jury should have given some justification for his violation of this statute due to his age. However, from a careful reading of the statute in question it appears the General Assembly did not qualify the duties placed on operators of bicycles according to age — it set up the norm of care for everyone. The court in the Rentschler case stated as follows:
“ (2) The courts of many states have said that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence ‘as a matter of law.’ . . . and our Supreme Court, in Jones v. Cary, supra. [Jones v. Cary (1941), 219 Ind. 268, 37 N. E. 2d 944] said that for a driver to drive to the left of the center of the highway in violation of a statute, without any excuse or reason, constituted negligence ‘as a matter of law.’ Thus, the expressions ‘per se’ and ‘as a matter of law’ have been regarded as substantially interchangeable. We realize it is not every correct statement of the law as announced by the courts that may properly find its way into an instruction to the jury. But we feel that the ordinary jury would probably not understand the meaning of ‘per se,’ and in our opinion the shade of meaning between the two expressions is not sufficiently great, when embodied in an instruction, as to be prejudicial, and we so hold. . . .”
It is my opinion that the appellee, Hall, is entitled to have the jury instructed on her theory of the case. See David Herrin, b/n/f v. John K. Stark, Jr. (1964), 136 Ind. App. 135, 198 N. E. 2d 397.
*647This court in numerous cases has held that there are no exceptions as to age or otherwise in the violation of such statute. This court has decided in numerous cases the question that statutes governing the operation of motor vehicles upon highways applies to all operators of motor vehicles including bicycles, and that no exception should be made as to age.
The court in the case of Carroll Ewing v. Alice Biddle, supra, stated in part as follows:
“The legislature in enacting the above statutes referred to all operators and drivers of motor vehicles. The intent to include all persons is determined in some degree by the fact that the provisions of the motor vehicle code are applied to all persons as set forth in Burns’ § 47-2102, which reads as follows:
‘. . . Every person riding a bicycle upon a roadway shall be subject to the provisions of this act applicable to the driver of a vehicle, . . .’
“In this modern day we must take judicial notice of the hazards of traffic, and travelers must not be forced to anticipate conduct other than that expected of all ordinary citizens. It would be impossible to know if all cars, bicycles and other vehicles were operated by adults, a minor twenty years old, fifteen years old or ten years old. Since there is no exception in the statutes which exempts any one from the provisions thereof, we feel that the law applies equally to all.
“. . . we believe that all must be bound by the ‘rules of the road.’ ”
In summary, it is my opinion, that it is not necessary to determine whether the violation of the statutory regulation in question by Dean Bixenman constituted negligence “per se,” negligence as a “matter of law,” “prima facie evidence,” or “a presumption of evidence,” because, regardless of what it may be designated, any such act of negligence can be justified and rebutted. However, there is nothing in the record evidence in the case at bar that reveals any justification or excuse on the part of Dean Bixenman for violating the statute *648in question. The appellant, however, maintains that justification or excuse stems from the fact that Dean Bixenman was a minor, thirteen years of age. This fact alone offers no justification for the violation. See, Rentschler v. Hall, supra; Carroll Ewing v. Alice Biddle, supra; and Carl Smith v. City of Indianapolis, supra.
It is, therefore, my opinion that the trial court did not commit reversible error in giving Defendant Alice B. Hall’s Instructions No. 2, No. 3, and No. 12, and in refusing to give Plaintiff’s Instructions No. 6, No. 12 and No. 21.
I have examined the evidence most favorable to the appellant concerning the liability of appellees Busselberg and Lake County Agricultural Society, and I am of the opinion that there is a total lack of evidence on the question of their alleged negligence. Therefore, the trial court was not in error when it directed the verdict in their favor.
I also have considered the arguments of appellant set forth under heading III of his brief, in which the appellant maintains that the trial court committed error in giving Defendant’s Instruction No. 12 and No. 20, and the failure of the trial court to give Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 14, and I can find no reversible error in the giving or refusing to give said instructions.
I am of the opinion that the trial court fairly instructed the jury in this cause; that the case was fairly tried; that the court properly overruled appellant’s motion for a new trial and that appellant has failed to set out any error in such ruling.
Judgment affirmed.
Smith, J.
Note. — Reported in 231 N. E. 2d 530.