Court Opinion

ID: 9585478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:00:56.05331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:47:19.147908
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In Collum v. State, 211 Ga. App. 158 (438 SE2d 401) (1993), we held for the first time that the failure to satisfy Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9 alone mandates that a subsequent motion to withdraw guilty plea must be granted. Though I concurred specially in Collum, I am now convinced that case was wrongly decided.
Since the majority bases its decision on USCR 33.9, I first note that USCR 33.12, which deals specifically with the matter at hand, provides that “[i]n the absence of a showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty ... as a matter of right once sentence has been pronounced by the judge.” (Emphasis supplied.) The majority’s holding necessarily implies that it is in all cases a “manifest injustice” under USCR 33.12 to fail to make the record counselled in USCR *80833.9. I cannot agree. A plain reading of USCR 33.9 simply does not support that position.
In fact, the question of whether the present inquiry properly turns on the adherence to prophylactic rules has been previously addressed. In Ford v. State, 248 Ga. 241 (282 SE2d 308) (1981), the Supreme Court observed that such rigidity is not mandated under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969). The Supreme Court echoed that sentiment in 1985 by adopting a “factual basis” rule that is couched in terms that are neither objective, precise, nor obligatory. See 1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. I; 253 Ga. at 863.1 would disapprove any dicta to the contrary in Watt v. State, 204 Ga. App. 839, 840 (420 SE2d 769) (1992), and I would overrule Collum v. State, supra, in light of the prior holding of the Georgia Supreme Court in Ford v. State, supra.
The majority opinion fully demonstrates the lack of any “manifest injustice” which would mandate the withdrawal of Evans’s guilty plea as a matter of right under USCR 33.12, or as a constitutional imperative under Boykin. Moreover, “after the pronouncement of a sentence, a ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court,” and “will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly abused.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scott v. State, 185 Ga. App. 568, 570 (365 SE2d 127) (1988).
Finally, I have no difficulty whatsoever determining the factual basis for the plea in this particular case, as the record contains an application for a search warrant with supporting affidavit. The affiant, a juvenile investigator, relates the 13-year-old victim’s statement to him, and that statement fully describes the rape alleged. See OCGA § 24-3-16. The act described by the victim and related in the investigator’s affidavit would indeed support a forcible rape conviction.
As the majority notes, the trial court heard the State’s opening statement before Evans changed his plea. It also should be noted that the record shows the trial court conducted a Brady examination of the State’s file on the morning of trial, before opening statements and before Evans pled guilty.
The trial court’s failure to make whatever inquiry that it “should” have made on the record under USCR 33.9 for the sole purpose of facilitating appellate review was therefore harmless. See Scurry v. State, 194 Ga. App. 165 (390 SE2d 255) (1990); Wright v. State, 143 Ga. App. 247 (237 SE2d 714) (1977). In other words, if the reviewing court can determine the existence of a factual basis for the plea based on the state of the record and transcript when the trial court accepted the plea, then the record is satisfactory for review purposes without need for further factual inquiry by the trial court on the record prior to sentencing on that plea.
Since I otherwise agree with the majority’s treatment of the is*809sues presented, I would affirm.
Decided March 18, 1994
Reconsideration denied April 1, 1994
Arleen E. Gardenhire, for appellant.
Johnnie L. Caldwell, Jr., District Attorney, Daniel A. Hiatt, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong, Judge Andrews, and Judge Johnson join in this dissent.