Court Opinion

ID: 9474412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:56:32.566152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:03.996284
License: Public Domain

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
To comply with statutory and constitutional requirements, the Coast Guard must have a reasonable suspicion that drug smuggling is occurring before it can stop and board foreign vessels in international waters. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir.1980). The Coast Guard *1548did not have a reasonable suspicion that the JIM HAWKINS was being used to smuggle contraband into the United States. Therefore, I dissent.
I.
The initial inquiry is: whether the Coast Guard had authority to stop and board the JIM HAWKINS, a foreign vessel, on the high seas. “A warrantless seizure or search in the complete absence of authority — a lawless governmental intrusion — is unconstitutional per se.” Williams, 617 F.2d at 1074.
If the Coast Guard can point to some authority for its search and seizure, the question becomes whether, acting pursuant to this authority, the Coast Guard satisfied fourth amendment “reasonableness” requirements.
The Coast Guard points to 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) for its authority to stop and board foreign vessels in international waters. Williams held that such statutory authority exists whenever the Coast Guard has a reasonable suspicion that a vessel is being used to smuggle contraband into the United States. If the Coast Guard holds a reasonable suspicion that drug smuggling is occurring before it stops and boards a foreign vessel, the action does not contravene the fourth amendment’s requirement that all searches and seizures be reasonable. Williams at 1089.
The Coast Guard in this case, however, did not have a reasonable suspicion that the JIM HAWKINS was engaged in drug smuggling, therefore, its actions in stopping and boarding the vessel failed to comply with statutory and constitutional requirements, and the contraband recovered as a result of the illegal search and seizure should have been suppressed.
II.
Whether reasonable suspicion exists in a particular case depends on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Brig-noni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2582 n. 10, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). A hunch or generalized suspicion of criminal activity, however, is insufficient. United States v. Villamonte-Mar-quez, 652 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir.1981), rev’d on other grounds, 462 U.S. 579, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983).
Coast Guard Commander Pettit testified to six factors from which he inferred that the JIM HAWKINS was being used for drug smuggling: (1) the vessel was traveling along a route frequented by drug smugglers; (2) the vessel had a Grand Cayman home port signature on its stern even though built and registered in the United States; (3) the vessel was riding low in the water; (4) the vessel’s water line was dirty; (5) the vessel was proceeding by motor instead of sail; and (6) the vessel denied the Coast Guard permission to board. These innocuous factors could not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. At most, Commander Pettit had a hunch, acted on it, and happened to be right.
I do not contend that “circumstances must be completely inconsistent with innocent activity before they may support reasonable suspicion”. I do not contend, however, that reasonable suspicion must be based on more than an officer’s subjective beliefs or hunches as to whether criminal activity exists. The government must be able to point to articulable facts from which the presence of illegal activity may be inferred. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884, 95 S.Ct. at 2582.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Coast Guard could have reasonably suspected that the JIM HAWKINS was bound for the United States. The majority relies on two factors to arrive at its conclusion: (1) “the vessel was headed northeast — not directly toward the United States but ... in a direction and from a locale which made this country a reasonable possibility as a destination”; and (2) “the vessel was traveling along a route known to be frequented by drug smugglers heading for the United States.”
The majority reasons that these factors dispose of the issue as to whether reason*1549able suspicion existed that the JIM HAWKINS was headed for the United States because “propensity to the border in previous experience with traffic patterns may be taken into account in deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop a car in a U.S. border area to check for illegal aliens.”
First, the factors cited by the court could not have given rise to a reasonable suspicion that the JIM HAWKINS was headed for the United States. Given the vessel’s northeasterly path, the most reasonable assumption is that it was not bound for this country. Second, “the substantial differences between a vessel and a landlocked vehicle ... preclude any assumption that the cases defining what is reasonable on land ... control the question what is reasonable on the high seas.” Williams, 617 F.2d at 1084.
III.
The majority’s conclusion that the Coast Guard’s boarding of the JIM HAWKINS was constitutional because the United Kingdom consented to it is also erroneous. The majority found that the Coast Guard had authority to board the JIM HAWKINS pursuant to 19 U.S.G. §§ 1581(h) and 1587(a). These statutes allow “officers of the Customs” to board and examine foreign vessels if the vessels’ flag state consents.
The United Kingdom consented to the boarding of the JIM HAWKINS; nevertheless, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the Coast Guard’s authority for the boarding was statutorily derived. Consent to board the JIM HAWKINS was given pursuant to the United States/United Kingdom Bilateral Narcotics Agreement.
The question becomes, then, whether acting pursuant to this authority, the Coast Guard satisfied fourth amendment requirements in stopping and boarding the JIM HAWKINS. “The factors bearing on the reasonableness of the seizure of a vessel on the high seas can be assessed only in light of the statute or other source of authority that is said to have permitted the seizure.” Williams, 617 F.2d at 1083.
The U.S./U.K. agreement provides in pertinent part:
The government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland agree that they will not object to the boarding by the authorities of the United States, outside the limits of the territorial sea and contiguous zone of the United States ... of private vessels under British flag in any case in which those authorities reasonably believe that the vessel has on board a cargo of drugs for importation into the United States in violation of the laws of the United States.
Thus, the U.S./U.K. agreement embodies the same standard as 14 U.S.C. § 89(a): Reasonable suspicion that drug smuggling into the United States is occurring must exist before the Coast Guard can stop and board vessels sailing under the United Kingdom flag.
The Coast Guard did not have reasonable suspicion that the JIM HAWKINS was being used to smuggle contraband into this country.