Court Opinion

ID: 9377191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 08:00:12.002279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:12.526520
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MANOLO MAURIZ,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
            Appellant,                          DA-0752-16-0260-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: March 6, 2023
  SECURITY,
            Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Lorenzo W. Tijerina, Esquire, San Antonio, Texas, for the appellant.

      Kelleen O’Fallon, Esquire, and Keyur Shah, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
        for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                          Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                           Raymond A. Limon, Member
                           Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
  Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
                                                                                         2

                                      FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed the agency’s removal action. Generally, we grant petitions such as this
     one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
     has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
     review.   Therefore, we DENY the petition for review.          Except as expressly
     MODIFIED by our analysis of the appellant’s discrimination claim, in which we
     VACATE the portion of the initial decision that made findings regarding that
     claim, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         Prior to his removal, the appellant was a Federal Air Marshal, SV -1801,
     with the agency’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA), in Houston,
     Texas. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 8 at 27. Federal Air Marshals
     are required to maintain a Top Secret security clearance. IAF, Tab 8 at 127. The
     agency suspended and then revoked the appellant’s clearance, effective
     December 18, 2015, after he failed to file an appeal of its revocation. Id. at 52,
     55.
¶3         Based on the sole charge of inability to maintain a Top Secret security
     clearance, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal. Id. at 51. The proposal
                                                                                      3

     notice provided the appellant 7 days from the date of receipt, January 12, 2016, in
     which to submit written and oral responses. Id. at 50, 52. On January 15, 2016,
     the appellant sought a 15-day extension of the period in which to reply, and the
     deciding official granted an extension until January 29, 2016. Id. at 44-49. On
     January 27, 2016, the appellant requested an additional extension of time in
     which to reply. Id. at 37-43. The deciding official denied his request. Id. at 36.
     The appellant failed to submit a written or an oral response before the extended
     reply period ended, and the agency issued its final decision upholding the
     proposed removal. Id. at 28-32.
¶4        The appellant filed this appeal and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. After
     holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge found that the agency
     proved the charge by preponderant evidence. IAF, Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID)
     at 3-5. He found that the appellant did not establish that the agency violated his
     right to due process or committed a harmful procedural error when it denied his
     second request for an extension of time to reply to the notice of proposed
     removal. ID at 5-8. The administrative judge further found that the appellant’s
     affirmative defense alleging discrimination based on national origin was not
     properly before the Board because the agency’s action was premised on the
     revocation of a security clearance, but he made alternative findings that the
     appellant failed to prove the merits of the defense. ID at 8-11. Finally, he found
     that the penalty was reasonable and promoted the efficiency of the service. ID
     at 11. He thus affirmed the removal action. Id.

                                        ANALYSIS
¶5        Because the appellant was a TSA employee, this appeal is governed by the
     provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.            Winlock v.
     Department of Homeland Security, 110 M.S.P.R. 521, ¶ 5 (2009) (citing
     Connolly v. Department of Homeland Security, 99 M.S.P.R. 422, ¶ 9 (2005)
     (finding that TSA employees are covered by the personnel management system
     that is applicable to employees of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
                                                                                              4

     under 49 U.S.C. § 40122)), aff’d, 370 F. App’x 119 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The TSA
     Administrator, however, has modified the FAA personnel system as it ap plies to
     TSA employees, and those modifications are controlling.                 Id., ¶¶ 5-6.   TSA
     Management Directive (MD) 1100.75-3 sets forth policies and procedures for the
     agency’s use of “non-disciplinary, corrective, disciplinary, and adverse actions to
     address unacceptable employee performance and conduct.”              IAF, Tab 8 at 90.
     MD 1100.75-3 mirrors 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 in some of its provisions, in that it
     requires the agency to give an appellant written notice of its proposed action, an
     opportunity to respond, and notice of the decision. 3 Compare id. at 93, 107-16,
     with 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Additionally, any removal, suspension, or demotion must
     promote the efficiency of the service. IAF, Tab 8 at 93.

     The administrative judge properly found that the agency’s action was supported
     by preponderant evidence.
¶6           The agency’s sole charge in this appeal was that the appellant was unable to
     maintain his Top Secret security clearance. Id. at 51-54. The agency asserted
     that, pursuant to MD 1100.88-1 ¶ 7.G, Law Enforcement Position Standards and
     Hiring Requirements, the appellant was required to maintain a Top Secret security
     clearance and his inability to do so disqualifies him from his position. 4 Id. at 52.
¶7           The Board lacks the authority to review the merits of an agency decision to
     suspend or revoke a security clearance.           Department of the Navy v. Egan,
     484 U.S. 518, 530-31 (1988). Instead, in an appeal of an adverse action based on
     an agency’s decision to deny, revoke, or suspend a security clea rance, the Board
     generally will only review whether the employee’s position required a security
     clearance; the clearance was denied, revoked, or suspended; and the employee

     3
       MD 1100.75-3 also incorporates the harmful error standard in that it states that failure
     to follow the provisions of the directive are grounds for reversal of an agency action, if
     such failure caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would
     have reached in the absence of the failure. Compare IAF, Tab 8 at 95, with 5 C.F.R.
     §§ 1201.56(c)(1), 1201.4(r).
     4
         MD 1100.88-1 is included in the agency file. IAF, Tab 8 at 74-87.
                                                                                          5

     was provided with the procedural protections set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 7513.
     Rogers v. Department of Defense, 122 M.S.P.R. 671, ¶ 5 (2015) (citing Hesse v.
     Department of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Egan, 484 U.S.
     at 530-31)).    In appeals of TSA adverse actions, the agency follows the
     procedural protections in its internal directive, MD 1100.75-3, rather than those
     in 5 U.S.C. § 7513. Buelna v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R.
     262, ¶ 14 (2014). The Board also will review whether the agency afforded the
     appellant due process. Id., ¶ 15.
¶8         The record supports, and the appellant did not dispute, that he was required
     to maintain a Top Secret security clearance as a Federal Air Marshal and that his
     clearance was revoked. IAF, Tab 8 at 55-66, 81, 127. The administrative judge
     thus properly found that the agency met these two elements of proof. ID at 3-5.

     The agency did not violate the appellant’s right to due process by declining to
     grant an additional extension of time in which to submit written and oral
     responses.
¶9         The appellant argues on review that the agency denied his right to due
     process by intentionally denying him the opportunity to present an oral or written
     reply to the notice of proposed removal after he proposed dates upon which to
     schedule an oral reply. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4, 8-11, 14-15;
     IAF, Tab 8 at 34-39.       In adverse actions based upon security clearance
     determinations, due process requires an employee being deprived of his property
     interest to be given “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
     meaningful manner.’”      Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 16 (quoting Mathews v.
     Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The Board analyzes the due process issue
     under the balancing test set forth in Mathews, which weighs:          (1) the private
     interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the
     interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
     or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest. Id. (citing
     Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). Under the second Mathews factor, the employee must
                                                                                        6

      be afforded the opportunity to invoke the deciding official’s discretion to
      consider any existing viable alternatives to the adverse action. Id., ¶ 22.
¶10         Under the first factor, we find that the appellant’s private property interest
      was significantly affected by the agency’s decision. As for the third factor, the
      agency had a compelling interest to withhold national security information from
      unauthorized persons.    Egan, 484 U.S. at 527.      As for the risk of erroneous
      deprivation of the appellant’s property interest, we agree with the administrative
      judge’s conclusion that the agency did not deprive him of a meaningful
      opportunity to be heard. ID at 5-7. The agency gave him written notice of the
      proposed removal, the reasons for the proposed action, and a 7-day period in
      which to respond. IAF, Tab 8 at 51-54. The agency also notified him of his right
      to be represented. Id. at 53. At his request, the agency extended the original
      reply period by 10 days. Id. at 44-49. When the appellant requested a second
      extension, the agency informed him—prior to the extended reply period
      expiring—that no additional extension would be granted.         Id. at 36-43.   The
      agency issued the written decision after the extended reply period ended, and no
      response had been received. Id. at 28-43.
¶11         The Board has held that an agency commits a due process violation when it
      fails to consider a response that is timely by the agency’s own terms. Alford v.
      Department of Defense, 118 M.S.P.R. 556, ¶ 7 (2012).            Here, however, the
      appellant submitted nothing that we would deem to be a timely response under the
      agency’s terms. In his notice extending the original reply period, the deciding
      official stated, “The response period (to complete both written and oral
      responses) is therefore extended to the close of business on January 29, 2016.”
      IAF, Tab 8 at 46 (emphasis added). Further, the agency’s instructions for the
      initial 7-day reply period state that the appellant had the right “ to reply to this
      proposal orally and/or in writing and furnish any evidence in support of [his]
      reply within 7 calendar days” after the date he received the proposal. Id. at 52.
      We find that the unambiguous terms of the initial and extended reply periods
                                                                                          7

      required the appellant to present his oral and written responses—and not just to
      attempt to schedule an oral response—by a date certain.
¶12         The appellant asserts that his January 15 and January 27, 2016 letters were
      requests for a date, time, and location certain for giving an oral response. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 9. The subject-matter line on the January 15, 2016 letter referenced
      a date certain to reply orally, but the body of the letter did not elaborate upon that
      request. IAF, Tab 8 at 48. In the January 27, 2016 letter, the appellant offered
      the week of February 23 through February 27, 2016, in which to schedule an oral
      response. Id. at 39. That week, however, was well beyond the January 29, 2016
      deadline by which both written and oral responses were to have been completed.
      Compare IAF, Tab 8 at 46 (stating that the response period to complete both
      written and oral responses ended on January 29, 2016), with Massey v.
      Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 226, ¶¶ 7-10 (2013) (finding that the
      agency violated the appellant’s due process rights when the proposal notice
      afforded her the opportunity to schedule her oral response during the reply
      period). For these reasons, we find that the appellant failed to submit either an
      oral or a written response within the agency’s designated timeframe.
¶13         The appellant argues that the agency’s proffered reply period was nothing
      more than “an empty formality.”         PFR File, Tab 1 at 11.         We disagree.
      Predecisional due process requires that the agency provide an appellant with an
      opportunity in which to respond to the agency’s proposal, which the appellant
      received from January 12 through January 29, 2016. See Kinsey v. Department of
      the Navy, 59 M.S.P.R. 226, 229 (1993) (citing Darnell v. Department of
      Transportation, 807 F.2d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“An opportunity to present is
      quite different from a presentation in fact.”) (emphasis in original)).           The
      appellant clearly would have preferred a longer period in which to respond for the
      reasons set forth in his letters asking the deciding official for extensions. IAF,
      Tab 8 at 39, 48. Nevertheless, if a tenured public employee is entitled to a full
      post-decisional hearing, such as the appellant’s Board hearing , a predecisional
                                                                                      8

      trial-type hearing is not required, and fundamental due process requirements are
      satisfied if the employee has a predecisional opportunity to present, either in
      person or in writing, reasons why the proposed action should not be taken.
      Pumphrey v. Department of Defense, 122 M.S.P.R. 186, ¶ 8 (2015) (citing
      Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); Ray v.
      Department of the Army, 97 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 22 (2004), aff’d, 176 F. App’x 110
      (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
¶14        The removal action here is based on a single charge of failure to maintain a
      required security clearance, and we find no indication that the matters to be
      addressed in a reply were particularly numerous or complex. We have considered
      the appellant’s reasons for requesting an extension, including his attorney’s
      asserted scheduling issues, but, under the circumstances, we find that the 17 -day
      predecisional reply period afforded to the appellant was of sufficient length to
      satisfy the requirements of minimum due process under the Constitu tion.      See
      Henderson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 536, ¶¶ 3, 13 (2016)
      (holding that 7 days was a reasonable, and constitutionally adequate, period of
      time for a predecisional reply to a notice of proposed suspension based on a
      criminal indictment), aff’d, 878 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Pumphrey,
      122 M.S.P.R. 186, ¶ 8 (holding that a 14-day predecisional reply period allowed
      the appellant a meaningful opportunity and reasonable time to respond to a notice
      of proposed furlough and was constitutionally sufficient); cf. Ray, 97 M.S.P.R.
      101, ¶¶ 6, 14, 22 (finding that a 29-day predecisional reply period satisfied
      minimum due process requirements regarding a removal action based on nine
      specifications of conduct unbecoming a Federal employee, even considering
      circumstances that included the number and complexity of the charges, the
      volume of supporting evidence, the difficulties imposed by distance, a nd
      scheduling constraints concerning an oral reply).
¶15        Intertwined with the appellant’s due process arguments is his assertion that
      he was denied a hearing before a “neutral” or unbiased deciding official. PFR
                                                                                        9

      File, Tab 1 at 4, 8, 14-15.   The appellant’s arguments regarding the deciding
      official’s alleged bias that he made before the administrative judge pertain to his
      belief that the deciding official discriminated against him based on national
      origin. IAF, Tab 10 at 6. As we explain infra ¶ 23, the Board cannot adjudicate
      the appellant’s discrimination claim because doing so would require the Board to
      consider the validity of the security clearance determination, which it cannot do.
      See Putnam v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶¶ 18-19
      (2014).   For all of these reasons, we conclude that the administrative judge
      properly found that the appellant failed to establish that the agency violated his
      right to due process when it did not grant him an additional extension of time in
      which to submit written and oral responses to the notice of proposed removal.

      The agency did not commit harmful error by not granting an additional extension
      of time in which to submit written and oral responses.
¶16        The appellant also argues on review that the agency’s alleged denial of his
      right to offer a written or an oral response was harmful error. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 4, 8-11, 15. The appellant asserts that, if he had been given such a response,
      the deciding official might have exercised his discretion to consider transferring
      him to a Transportation Security Officer (Airport Screener) position, which does
      not require a security clearance. Id. at 4, 10. The appellant included with his
      petition for review an internet vacancy announcement seeking to hire
      Transportation Security Officers in the San Angelo, Texas area. Id. at 17-23.
¶17        The vacancy announcement is not in the record from the proceeding before
      the administrative judge. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d), the Board generally will
      not consider evidence submitted for the first time with the petition for review
      absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the
      party’s due diligence.   Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214
      (1980). Although this particular announcement would not have been available
      before the record closed, IAF, Tab 11 at 6, there were likely similar
      announcements available at the time. To the extent the appellant relies on this
                                                                                              10

      vacancy announcement to establish that positions existed to which he could have
      been assigned without a security clearance, we find that he has not established
      that such information was unavailable to him before the record closed despite his
      due diligence.      See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d) (“To constitute new evidence, the
      information contained in the documents, not just the documents themselves, must
      have been unavailable despite due diligence when the record closed.”).
¶18           Moreover, an appellant who seeks to introduce new evidence must show
      that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the
      initial decision. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980).
      The appellant’s submission here would not warrant a different outcome because
      the administrative judge properly concluded that the agency did not commit
      harmful procedural error by denying him an additional extension of the period for
      submitting written and oral responses. ID at 7-8. To prove harmful procedural
      error, an appellant must establish that an agency committed a procedural error
      that was likely to have caused it to reach a conclusion different from the one it
      would have otherwise reached in the absence or cure of the error. 5 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.4(r). The appellant bears the burden of proof on this affirmative defense.
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C).        As explained above, the agency followed the
      procedures set forth in MD 1100.75-3 by giving the appellant written notice
      stating the charge and a description of the evidence supporting the charge, 6 as
      well as an opportunity to respond orally and in writing. IAF, Tab 8 at 51-54. The
      appellant failed to avail himself of the opportunity to respond.

      5
          Similarly, MD 1100.75-3 ¶ 6.L states:
               A failure to comply with the provisions of this directive, the
               accompanying Handbook, or Appendices may be grounds for reversing an
               action only if it caused TSA to reach a conclusion different from the one it
               would have reached in the absence of the failure.
      IAF, Tab 8 at 95.
      6
       The agency supplied copies of the materials supporting the charge. IAF, Tab 8 at 53,
      55-89.
                                                                                       11

¶19         Additionally, the appellant failed to show that any statute or regulation
      required the agency to consider assigning him to an alternative position.       See
      Flores v. Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 287, ¶ 12 (2014). The deciding
      official testified that he was unaware of any right of reassignment under such
      circumstances, and, in any event, a candidate for any position at TSA must be
      eligible for a security clearance. Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of the
      deciding official).   On review, the appellant asserts that there are positions at
      TSA that do not require a security clearance. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 10. We find,
      however, that the existence of any such position is immaterial to th e outcome of
      this appeal. In the absence of a statute or regulation requiring the agency to seek
      out alternative employment, the Board lacks the authority to review whether the
      lesser sanction of reassignment to a nonsensitive position would have been
      feasible.   Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 287, ¶ 12 (citing Griffin v. Defense Mapping
      Agency, 864 F.2d 1579, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Thus, we will not disturb the
      administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to establish that any
      harmful procedural error occurred. ID at 7-8.

      The administrative judge did not abuse his discretion when he declined to admit
      the transcript of the deciding official’s deposition.
¶20         On review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge summarily
      sealed the record and closed the hearing, preventing him from introducing
      portions of the deciding official’s deposition transcript. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-13.
      The appellant submitted these portions of the transcript with his petition for
      review. Id. at 24-46. The record shows that the appellant sought to introduce the
      entire transcript on May 19, 2016, after the prehearing conference had taken place
      and the May 6, 2016 Order and Summary of Telephonic Prehearing Conference
      had been issued. IAF, Tabs 11, 16. The agency objected because the deciding
      official was set to testify in person. IAF, Tab 17 at 4. The agency also asked the
      administrative judge to remove the appellant’s filing from the Board’s e-Appeal
      Online Repository because the deposition had been marked as containing
                                                                                            12

      Sensitive Security Information (SSI). Id. at 9. The agency explained that the
      record would have to be sealed if the transcript were admitted into evidence. Id.
      at 9-10.
¶21         The administrative judge did not seal the record.         Instead, he ruled that
      portions of the deposition could be used to impeach the deciding official’s
      testimony, but the deposition in its entirety would not be admitted. HCD. Before
      testimony began, the administrative judge asked the agency to identify the
      portions of the transcript containing SSI. HCD. The agency stated that the SSI in
      the transcript was general background information and not relevant to the issues
      on appeal. HCD. At the end of the hearing, when the appellant had not cited to
      any portion of the transcript for impeachment purposes, the administrative judge
      declined to admit the transcript. 7 HCD.
¶22         We find no abuse of discretion in the administrative judge’s rulings, which
      were within his sound discretion. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(3), (6), (8). In any
      event, the transcript also fails to meet the Board’s definition of new evidence, and
      the appellant had the opportunity to use it for impeachment purposes during the
      hearing.    IAF, Tab 16; see Alvarado v. Department of the Air Force,
      103 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶¶ 25-26 (2006) (finding that the administrative judge did not err
      or abuse his discretion by not considering testimony proffered at a prior hearing
      when, among other things, neither party was precluded at a later hearing from
      using the record from the prior hearing to refresh a witness’s recollection or
      impeach his credibility), aff’d, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (D.N.M. 2009), aff’d,
      490 F. App’x 932 (10th Cir. 2012); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d).

      7
        The appellant’s submissions that include portions of the transcript nevertheless remain
      in the physical record, which is appropriately marked as containing SSI, but are not
      available through the Board’s electronic case repository. IAF, Tab 16; PFR File, Tab 1.
                                                                                           13

      To the extent that the administrative judge made findings on the issue of
      discrimination, we vacate those findings.
¶23         Finally, as the administrative judge properly noted, the Board cannot
      adjudicate whether an agency’s adverse action, which is premised on the
      suspension or revocation of a security clearance, constitutes impermissible
      discrimination or retaliation. ID at 9-10; see Putnam, 121 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶ 18;
      Pangarova v. Department of the Army, 42 M.S.P.R. 319, 322-24 (1989).
      Accordingly, the Board lacks the authority to adjudicate the appellant’s
      discrimination claim. To the extent that the administrative judge made findings
      concerning the discrimination claim in the initial decision, ID at 10-12, we vacate
      those findings.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
      within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
      chosen forum.

      8
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        14

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                15

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     16

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in s ection
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisd iction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                17

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.