Court Opinion

ID: 9763180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:38:21.840113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:39.842420
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
concurring and dissenting. I concur with the Court that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant, but I dissent to Part II because any error in the jury waiver was de minimis and harmless. *203Defendant, his lawyer, the prosecutor, and the trial judge signed a document entitled in bold print WAIVER OF RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL, which said:
I, the Defendant named above, am charged with the crime of Domestic Assault an offense that is not punishable by death or life imprisonment. I have been informed by the Court and my lawyer that I have the right to have my guilt or innocence determined by a jury after trial. I fully understand that right. I understand that, if I choose to have a jury trial, the jury would be made up of twelve members of the community, and my lawyer and I would take part in choosing which jurors would hear my case. I also understand that, to be convicted, all twelve members of the jury would have to agree that I am guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
I hereby waive (give up) my right to a trial by jury. I agree to a trial by Court, which means that the Judge alone will decide if I am innocent or guilty after a trial without a jury.
In addition, the trial court spoke to defendant personally in open court in his attorney’s presence and determined that defendant “understood” he was “giving up [his] right to a jury trial” and that he had signed the WAIVER document “freely and willingly.” Nevertheless, this Court requires a more informed waiver in the form of the trial court’s oral repetition of information contained in the written waiver.
In fact, this case does not bring into question defendant’s “understanding” of what he was giving up. Defendant does not claim he did not understand his waiver nor does he say that he has changed his mind about waiving trial by jury. For all we know, we remand so that defendant may have another bench trial. This case, then, turns on the insistence on technical form regardless of substance, thereby ignoring V.R.Cr.E 52(a) (error not affecting substantial rights should be “disregarded”).*
*204It is indeed difficult to fathom any violation of V.R.Cr.E 23(a). Defendant was addressed personally in open court and was informed of his right to a jury trial. The details of the right were explained in the document that defendant signed, and in the context of this case, the procedure seems to me to meet the requirement of the rule. If defendant failed to understand the contents of the form and his lawyer’s explanation of waiving a jury, a judge’s reading of the form from the bench would hardly improve defendant’s understanding. The difference between trial by judge and trial by jury is not a difficult concept to grasp. Presumably, defense counsel fully advised defendant about the decision to waive the jury. Usually, jury waiver is counsel’s idea in assessing trial strategy. By placing the trial court here in error, the elevation of form over substance is unreasonably high.
The Court relies on State v. Coita, 153 Vt. 18, 21, 568 A.2d 424, 426 (1989), to hold that prejudice is irrelevant and “strict compliance with the rule” is required. I do not read Coita, which I wrote, as reaching this case. There we reversed because the court did not affirmatively indicate its consent to trial by court. We stated:
Silent acquiescence to a waiver does not assure us that the court thought about the decision — not only from the defendant’s point of view, but from the prosecutor’s perspective and in the interests of justice.
The court’s approval of a waiver may trigger a colloquy with the parties resolving any doubts as to what prompted the waiver and the wisdom of it.
Id. at 20, 21, 568 A.2d at 425, 426. Thus, in Coita “strict compliance with the rule” required the trial judge to affirmatively indicate the court’s consent to waiver of jury trial by defendant. “Strict compliance” in that regard happened here. The judge signed the waiver and spoke to defendant about waiving the jury, and determined that defendant understood. No doubts about the waiver were raised and defendant to this day has not suggested there were any doubts.
I would affirm the conviction.

 Because any error was harmless, it could not amount to plain error. V.R.Cr.P. 52(b) (plain error must affect substantial rights). Defendant, who had counsel, did not object to the colloquy under V.R.Cr.P. 23(a); he raises this issue for the first time on appeal. In the comparable situation under V.R.Cr.P. 11, where the defendant fails to object before the trial court, we review alleged errors in a plea colloquy only for plain error. State v. Thompson, 162 Vt. 532, 534, 650 A.2d 139, 140 (1994). V.R.Cr.P. 23(a) “requires the court to conduct an inquiry analogous to that required by [V.R.Cr.P.] 11.” V.R.Cr.P. 23,