Court Opinion

ID: 9912597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 20:02:27.484691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:25.086101
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Venegas CA1/4

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A166131
                           v.                                          (San Francisco County Super. Ct.
 GUILLERMO VENEGAS,                                                    Nos. SCN17455101, CT01844694)
         Defendant and Appellant.

         In 2001, a jury convicted defendant Guillermo Venegas of first degree
murder with a financial-gain special circumstance.1 The trial court sentenced
him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In 2022,
San Francisco’s District Attorney filed a request to resentence Venegas under
Penal Code2 former section 1170.03 (now section 1172.1).3 The trial court
declined to permit the district attorney’s successor to withdraw the
resentencing request, but the court denied the request on the merits, finding
Venegas would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if
released. Venegas appeals. We affirm the court’s order.

         1 Venegas also went by the name Marcos Ranjel.

         2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

         3 We will refer to the statute by its current designation, section 1172.1.

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                              I. BACKGROUND
   A. Venegas’s Conviction and Sentence
      An indictment filed in April 1999 charged Venegas with murder (§ 187;
count 1) and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021,
subd. (a)(1); count 2). As to count 1, the indictment alleged Venegas
personally used a firearm in the murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and alleged the
special circumstance that the murder was intentional and was committed for
financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)). On April 11, 2001, the jury found
Venegas guilty of the charges and found the firearm and special-circumstance
allegations to be true. On April 26, 2001, the trial court sentenced Venegas
to LWOP for the count 1 murder charge, plus a four-year consecutive term for
the personal firearm use enhancement. The court stayed a two-year term on
the count 2 firearm possession charge pursuant to section 654. In August
2003, this court affirmed that judgment. (People v. Ranjel (Aug. 22, 2003,
A094861) [nonpub. opn.].) Rather than recite the factual background on
which Venegas’s special-circumstance murder conviction was based, we will
assume familiarity with it.
   B. The Request for Resentencing
      On April 28, 2022, the People filed a section 1172.1 petition for recall
and resentencing, asking the court to resentence Venegas to a “life with
parole” sentence. Venegas filed briefs in support of resentencing. Following
the recall of the San Francisco District Attorney and the assignment of a new
deputy to the resentencing proceedings, on August 10, 2022, the People filed
a motion to withdraw the pending section 1172.1 petition. In support of the
withdrawal motion, the People argued in part that section 1385.1, which
prohibits a trial court from striking a special-circumstance finding made by a
jury, barred resentencing Venegas to a non-LWOP term, because

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section 1385.1 could only be superseded by a statute enacted by two-thirds of
both houses of the Legislature—a threshold that section 1172.1 did not meet.
      The trial court held a hearing on the section 1172.1 petition on
August 22, 2022. Given how long the petition had been pending, the court
declined to allow the prosecutor to withdraw it. The court also concluded
section 1385.1 did not bar it from granting relief. In anticipation of reaching
the merits of the petition, the court allowed the prosecutor to submit
statements from the victim’s next of kin, all of whom opposed it.
      At that point, the prosecutor returned to the issue of section 1385.1,
arguing that both the initial prosecutor and Venegas had contemplated
effecting the resentencing by striking the special circumstance, which
section 1385.1 prohibited. The court responded that, if it were to grant relief,
it would implement the resentencing by vacating Venegas’s entire conviction
and imposing in its place a judgment of first degree murder without the
special circumstance, which the court believed would not violate
section 1385.1’s prohibition against striking the special circumstance. The
court also noted the district attorney’s office, prior to the recall election, had
previously concurred with the view that section 1385.1 did not bar the
resentencing proposed in the petition.
      Turning to the merits of the petition, the court noted that, under
section 1172.1, when a resentencing request is from a district attorney (or
another specified official), there is a “presumption favoring recall and
resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds
the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) The court further
recognized “post conviction factors” that it could consider: “disciplinary
record, rehabilitation, time served, diminished physical capacity, whether or

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not there’s a reduced risk for future violence since the original sentencing,
and whether or not continuing incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.” And the court stated that it was “supposed to consider whether or
not the defendant was a victim of . . . child abuse, and neglect, sexual
violence, and some other things . . . and whether or not the defendant was a
youth at the time of the offense.”
      Having laid out these considerations, the court observed that Venegas’s
case “could easily have been a death penalty case in almost any other
jurisdiction in California.” The court surmised that “the death penalty was
not sought” based on defense counsel’s advocacy in invoking Venegas’s
troubled upbringing. The court also observed that Venegas had killed the
victim “in a particularly cruel and vicious way for money” and that he “was
32 years old at the time of the offense” rather than “a youth.”
      The court acknowledged, however, that the murder itself “cannot be the
only thing that drives the Court’s decision,” so it had examined “over 800
pages of [Venegas’s] record in prison.” The court noted that, beginning in
2015, a number of years after Venegas entered prison, he began taking self-
help classes “and seems to be starting on the track.” But Venegas’s prison
record included numerous negative factors as well. The record included “a
two-on-one fight” in July 2006 where Venegas and a confederate “assaulted
and battered another inmate”; “another two-on-one fight in the yard” in April
2010 where Venegas and “another inmate assault[ed] a third inmate”;
Venegas’s possession of drug paraphernalia in January 2011; his involvement
in “drug sales” in April 2012; and “a positive drug test for methamphetamine”
in 2012. The drug offenses were particularly concerning given that “drugs
seem to have driven a lot of the behavior that [Venegas] experiences and

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problems he has.” Prison officials suspected in 2012 that Venegas was a
member of the “Paisas,” a “Security Threat Group.”
      Most recently, Venegas had been involved in a 2018 riot. While
Venegas had represented that “he was just caught up and [a] victim of
circumstance and just happened to be there,” the court noted that “about 180
people who were there . . . just moved away and didn’t become involved in the
assaultive conduct.” Moreover, “[o]thers on the yard had gotten down when
they were told to and [Venegas] did not.” And “shortly after the riot,”
Venegas “admitted that he was in fact a member” of the “Paisas,” who had
been classified as “a Security Threat Group” in the prison.
      The trial court recognized that Venegas stated he wished to leave the
Paisas and participated in rehabilitative programming, including educational
classes and “self-help work, groups, things like that.” The court also
recognized Venegas’s placement in the “low risk group” of the CDCR
[California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation] risk assessment,
but the court explained that “[w]ithin three years of release, . . . persons in
the low risk group” still posed substantial recidivism risks: “48 percent of
them will be arrested and 18 percent of them will commit a violent felony.”
In the end, the court concluded that Venegas’s “relatively recent[]”
involvement with the Paisas, participation in a riot, and substance abuse
overrode the presumption in favor of recall and resentencing. The court
therefore denied the section 1172.1 petition.
      Venegas filed a timely notice of appeal on September 8, 2022.
                              II. DISCUSSION
   A. The Statutory Framework
      “Prior to January 1, 2022, section 1170, former subdivision (d)(1)
(former section 1170(d)(1)) ‘authorize[d] the Secretary of the CDCR to
recommend to the superior court that the court recall a previously imposed

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sentence and resentence the defendant. [Citation.] The CDCR
recommendation furnishe[d] the court with jurisdiction it would not
otherwise have to recall and resentence and [was] “an invitation to the court
to exercise its equitable jurisdiction.” ’ ” (People v. Braggs (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 809, 817, fn. omitted.) “ ‘Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1–7) (Assembly Bill 1540) came into effect
on January 1, 2022, and moved the recall and resentencing provisions of
former section 1170(d)(1) to new section 1170.03.’ ” (Ibid.)
      “Effective June 30, 2022, ‘[t]he Legislature . . . renumbered
section 1170.03 to section 1172.1, but made no substantive changes.’ ”
(People v. Braggs, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 818.) Section 1172.1 provides a
trial court may recall and resentence a defendant at any time upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of the CDCR or other specified public
official, including the district attorney of the county in which the defendant
was sentenced. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) Section 1172.1 also provides that, if
the “resentencing request is . . . from” a specified official, including the
district attorney, then “[t]here shall be a presumption favoring recall and
resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if a court finds
the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) “Subdivision (c) of
section 1170.18 in turn defines an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety as ‘an unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a new
violent felony within the meaning of [section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)].’
This ‘subdivision of section 667 identifies eight types of particularly serious

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or violent felonies, known colloquially as “super strikes” ’ ” (Braggs, at
p. 818), one of which is murder.4
   B. Analysis
      We need not address whether the district attorney had a proper basis
to seek to withdraw the request to resentence Venegas (see People v. Vaesau
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 132, 151), because the trial court did not permit
withdrawal of the request. We also decline to address whether section 1385.1
prohibited the requested relief here. (See People v. Garcia (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 240, 257, review granted Jan. 11, 2023, S276858.) Assuming
the court was correct to reach the merits, we will simply decide whether it
was within its discretion to deny resentencing relief. (People v. E.M. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082 [abuse of discretion standard applies in reviewing
a trial court’s denial of recall under § 1172.1].) Finding no abuse of
discretion, we will affirm.

      4 The eight types of violent felonies or “super strikes” are:  “(I) A
‘sexually violent offense’ as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code. [¶] (II) Oral copulation with a child who is
under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than the defendant as
defined by Section 288a, sodomy with another person who is under 14 years
of age and more than 10 years younger than the defendant as defined by
Section 286, or sexual penetration with another person who is under 14 years
of age and more than 10 years younger than the defendant, as defined by
Section 289. [¶] (III) A lewd or lascivious act involving a child under 14 years
of age, in violation of Section 288. [¶] (IV) Any homicide offense, including
any attempted homicide offense, defined in Sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive.
[¶] (V) Solicitation to commit murder as defined in Section 653f.
[¶] (VI) Assault with a machinegun on a peace officer or firefighter, as
defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (d) of Section 245. [¶] (VII) Possession
of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a)
of Section 11418. [¶] (VIII) Any serious or violent felony offense punishable
in California by life imprisonment or death.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I–
VIII).)

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      In determining whether Venegas posed an unreasonable risk of
committing a designated violent felony, the trial court could properly consider
the fact Venegas previously did commit such an offense—a special-
circumstance murder. (See People v. Strother (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 563, 566,
573 [upholding denial of resentencing under Propositions 36 and 47, in part
because defendant’s prior offenses were close to being super strikes].) And as
noted, the court did not rely solely on Venegas’s offense of conviction; it also
carefully considered the record of his conduct in prison. (See ibid. [trial court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding defendant’s convictions, in
combination with other factors such as his prison record, showed he posed an
unreasonable risk of committing a super strike].)
      The court noted that, while in prison, Venegas committed assaults in
2006 and 2011, continued to use drugs until at least 2012, was involved in a
prison riot in 2018, and was affiliated with a gang at that time.5 One area of
particular concern to the court was Venegas’s involvement with drugs, a
problem that apparently had played a role in his decision to participate in the
underlying murder-for-hire. The court reasonably considered Venegas’s
misconduct in prison in assessing the risk he would commit a future violent
felony, while also acknowledging the positive steps he had taken in recent
years, including seeking to dissociate himself from the gang and participating
in educational and self-help programs. The court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding, based on a balanced and thoughtful assessment of the record,
that Venegas continued to present a risk of committing a violent felony and
that resentencing was not appropriate here.
      Venegas’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. In re Powell
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1530, cited by Venegas, does not establish the court

      5 Venegas does not dispute that this conduct occurred.

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here abused its discretion by considering Venegas’s assaults and drug use in
prison between 2006 and 2012. In Powell, during a 29-year period of
incarceration, the defendant had “committed no violent or assaultive act” and
had not abused drugs or alcohol. (Powell, at p. 1539.) Venegas, in contrast,
had committed assaults (not including the riot incident, which does not
appear to have been assaultive) and used drugs much closer in time to the
court’s hearing on the resentencing petition. It was not irrational for the
court to consider this portion of Venegas’s record.
      As to his gang involvement, Venegas suggests some inmates may join
gangs only to ensure their personal safety, rather than out of a desire to
continue a criminal lifestyle. For this proposition, he cites People v. Landry
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 52., which stands for nothing of the sort. In the course of its
opinion, the Landry court simply describes—without endorsing—testimony
from a defense expert about the reasons inmates may have for joining gangs.
(Id. at p. 67.)
      But more fundamentally, even granting the logic of the proposition,
which is certainly plausible, Venegas does not point to any evidence
suggesting he joined a gang only for self-protection. The trial court here was
not obligated to place the most benign construction on Venegas’s admitted
gang membership, and the court properly could harbor concern about
Venegas’s gang involvement, which continued until 2018. The court
appropriately credited Venegas for his efforts to leave the gang, while noting
his involvement with the gang was still “relatively recent[].”
      Finally, Venegas suggests his participation in a prison riot does not
support a conclusion he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,
because the prison records only show he failed to follow protocol and sit down
when violence erupted, not that he personally committed violent acts. But

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the court reasonably could consider (as one factor in its assessment of
Venegas’s record and risk of future dangerousness) the fact that, unlike many
other prisoners, Venegas did not move away or get down when he had the
opportunity to do so. The record, including Venegas’s offense of conviction
and his conduct in prison, supports the court’s overall conclusion that, despite
some progress, he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety (i.e.,
there was an unreasonable risk he would commit a designated violent felony)
and that resentencing therefore was not appropriate. (§§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2),
1170.18, subd. (c).)
                            III. DISPOSITION
      The order denying the section 1172.1 petition for recall and
resentencing is affirmed.

                                                    STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
HIRAMOTO, J.*

      * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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