Court Opinion

ID: 9595971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:44:51.386235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:28.329995
License: Public Domain

Judge Greene
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that under the current law in this State,1 the Agreement, because it was executed in contemplation of “resumption of cohabitation,” is not a separation agreement within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10.1. See In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 391, 230 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1976) (intent to live separate and apart is “the heart of a separation agreement”). I also agree, for the reasons given by the majority, that the support and property provisions of the Agreement are not integrated and that reconciliation therefore voids the executory provisions of the Agreement.
Although not a separation agreement within the meaning of section 52-10.1, I believe the Agreement qualifies as a valid contract within the meaning of section 52-10.1 do not agree with the majority that the Agreement is void on the grounds it is “inconsistent with public policy.” I acknowledge that the public policy in 1968, as articulated in the Matthews opinion relied on by the majority, would not support the agreement at issue and require that it be rejected as invalid. The Matthews opinion does not, however, represent the current public policy with regard to postmarital contracts. The North Carolina General Assembly first evidenced a change in public policy as to marital agreements in 1981 with the adoption of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(d). This statute permits parties “[bjefore, during or after marriage” to agree to the distribution of the marital property at the time of their separation. Thus, an agreement entered pursuant to this *719statute is valid even though the parties continue to live together after its execution. Buffington v. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97 (1984). In 1987 the General Assembly again indicated its choice of public policy when it adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA). N.C.G.S. ch. 52B (1987). Prior to the adoption of the UPAA, the public policy forbad some premarital agreements on the grounds that they encouraged divorce. 1 Suzanne Reynolds, Lee’s North Carolina Family Law § 1.13(B) (5th ed. 1993). Under the UPAA, parties who anticipate marriage are permitted to contract with regard to support and property rights that may arise upon divorce. N.C.G.S. § 52B-4(a) (1987). Thus with regard to property settlement agreements and premarital agreements, the General Assembly has decided that such agreements do not incite divorce or separation but instead promote marital stability by defining the expectations and responsibilities of the parties.
There is no justification for adhering to a different public policy with regard to non-property postmarital agreements, especially when the agreement, as in this case, is entered into between married parties who are not living together. Indeed because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52B-4(a), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(d) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10(a) each relate to contracts in the family, they should be construed together to ascertain the legislative intent. See Carver v. Carver, 310 N.C. 669, 674, 314 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1984). When read in pari materia, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-10(a) must be construed to reflect the same public policy accepted by the General Assembly in its adoption of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52B-4(a) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(d). Therefore, the Agreement must not be read as discouraging the marriage but instead as encouraging it. Indeed the fact that the parties resumed their marital relationship soon after the Agreement was executed indicates it encouraged, rather than discouraged, resumption of the marriage. As such the Agreement is not inconsistent with the public policy of this State and is enforceable. I would reverse and remand.

. The requirement that in order to execute a valid separation agreement the parties must have a present intent to live separate and apart, has been criticized. Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 18.1 (2d ed. 1988). Professor Clark notes that the rule was based on the idea that to permit married parties living together to contract with regard to property division and support rights would in someway be “conducive to divorce.” Id. “It was never made quite clear why [such an agreement] . . . was always and necessarily conducive to divorce, but the courts assumed that it was.” Id. He argues that “[n]ow that fault is no longer the basis for the grounds for divorce . . . little is to be served by continuing to reject separation agreements on the ground that they are conducive to divorce.” Id. “The new [divorce] statutes make it plain that there is no longer any general public policy opposed to divorce. ... It therefore seems no longer rational to require that the parties separate before they may make a valid separation agreement.” Id. Although I agree with Professor Clark, I am bound by the previous decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court holding to the contrary.