Court Opinion

ID: 9391754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 06:10:45.300004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.326625
License: Public Domain

Affirm and Opinion Filed April 25, 2023

                                    S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00303-CR
                               No. 05-22-00304-CR

                        ROYAL LEE WARE, Appellant
                                   V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
             Trial Court Cause Nos. F-2160249-M & F-2160250-M

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before Justices Carlyle, Garcia, and Miskel
                            Opinion by Justice Miskel
      Appellant Royal Ware was indicted for three offenses: possession of cocaine

with intent to deliver in an amount of 4 grams or more but less than 200 grams, a

felony of the first degree; possession of phencyclidine with intent to deliver in an

amount of 1 gram or more but less than 4 grams, a felony of the second degree; and

with possession of a firearm by a felon, a felony of the third degree. The indictments

included enhancement paragraphs to account for Ware’s prior felony convictions for

possession and burglary. Ware entered an open plea of guilty to the charges, which,
as enhanced, carried a punishment range of 25 years to life. The trial court assessed

punishment at life in prison and sentenced Ware accordingly.

        On appeal, Ware argues his sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime

committed. He asserts that sentencing a man in his sixties to a term of life

imprisonment for a nonviolent offense violates the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel

and unusual punishment.1

        We hold that Ware did not preserve this argument for appellate review. Even

if he had, Ware’s sentence is not unconstitutional. We therefore affirm.

               I.      The Eighth Amendment Claim was not Preserved

        To begin, we address preservation because we “may not reverse a judgment

of conviction without first addressing any issue of error preservation.” Darcy v.

State, 488 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (cleaned up). Constitutional

rights, including the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, may be

forfeited. Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no

pet.); see Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding

complaint of cruel and unusual punishment under the Texas Constitution was not

        1
          Ware also challenges his sentence under the parallel provisions of the Texas Constitution. We do
not address this argument separately because “the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded there is
no significant difference between the protections afforded” by the state and federal constitutions with
respect to cruel and unusual punishment. Forbit v. State, No. 05-19-00946-CR, 2021 WL 1884655, at *1
(Tex. App.—Dallas May 11, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing, inter alia,
Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
                                                  –2–
preserved). For error to be preserved, the record must show appellant made a timely

request, objection, or motion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).

      Ware did not object after his sentence was pronounced, and though he filed a

motion for new trial, it did not mention the complaint he now raises on appeal.

Therefore, the Eighth Amendment claim was not preserved for appellate review.

       II.    The Sentence was not Unconstitutionally Disproportionate

      Assuming preservation for the sake of argument, Ware still would not prevail.

Generally, a sentence within the statutory range of punishment—like Ware’s

sentence—is not excessive, cruel, or unusual under the Eighth Amendment, and we

will not disturb it on appeal. State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016). The sentencer’s discretion to impose any punishment within the

prescribed range is “essentially unfettered.” Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).

      However, even a sentence falling within the statutory range of punishment

must be proportionate to the crime. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).

Embodied in the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment is the principle

that punishment should be graduated and proportioned to the offense. Graham v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has described

this as “a narrow principle that does not require strict proportionality between the

crime and the sentence,” Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322, and “a very limited” and

“somewhat amorphous” form of review, Chavez, 213 S.W.3d at 323–24. The

                                        –3–
prohibition against grossly disproportionate sentences is applied “only in the

‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)

(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring)). Only twice has the U.S. Supreme Court held that a non-capital

sentence imposed on an adult was constitutionally disproportionate. Simpson, 488

S.W.3d at 323.

      We begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the

sentence. Graham, 560 U.S. at 60. In making this comparison, we examine (1) the

sentence’s severity in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society,

(2) the offender’s culpability, and (3) the offender’s prior adjudicated and

unadjudicated offenses. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323. In the rare case in which this

threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, the court

should then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other

offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime

in other jurisdictions. Id.

      The gravity of Ware’s most recent offense was significant. According to trial

testimony, Ware sold controlled substances to undercover officers four times in

October 2021. When police raided the drug house where he was living, they

recovered 532 baggies of crack cocaine, 14 larger vials of phencyclidine (PCP), and

a handgun, which Ware was prohibited from possessing as a felon. “Texas law

classifies the distribution of illegal drugs as a grave harm to society . . . .” Bolar v.

                                          –4–
State, 625 S.W.3d 659, 669 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.) (cleaned up).

“[T]he greater the amount of illicit drugs possessed, the more likely use is

widespread and delivery to others is intended, and the greater the harm to society.”

Id. at 670.

      In weighing the gravity of Ware’s offense, we place on the scales not only his

current felony, but also his history of felony recidivism. See Ewing v. California,

538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (plurality op.). According to trial testimony, Ware’s record

of felony offenses began in 1990, when he received four burglary convictions.

Another conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance followed in 1991.

In 1993, he was sentenced as a habitual offender to 25 years in prison for a

possession offense. After he was paroled in 2002, he sold crack cocaine to an

undercover officer, for which he was sentenced to eight years’ confinement in 2003.

In 2009, he was again arrested, this time for choking a woman. He received

probation, which was revoked in 2013 after he accrued still more convictions for

possession, burglary, and theft. By the time of Ware’s most recent offense, he had

amassed eleven felony convictions in all, and his four chances at probation and five

separate stints in prison did not appear to have had a rehabilitative effect. At

sentencing, the trial court summed up Ware’s 32-year criminal career by calling it

“one of the worst criminal records that I’ve seen in the number of years that I’ve

been on the bench.” When faced with recidivism of this kind, “Texas was entitled

to place upon [Ware] the onus of one who is simply unable to bring his conduct

                                        –5–
within the social norms prescribed by the criminal law of the State.” See Rummel v.

Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980).

      Solem directs us to “grant substantial deference to the broad authority that

legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments

for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing

convicted criminals.” 463 U.S. at 290. Considering the facts of this case, and

deferring to the Legislature’s and trial court’s judgments, we hold that this is not one

of the rare cases in which a sentence within the applicable range violates the Eighth

Amendment. See Robinson v. State, 906 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995,

no pet.) (rejecting an Eighth Amendment challenge of a life sentence for cocaine

distribution with multiple prior felonies; “The trial court was well aware that

Appellant had already been given numerous chances to change his ways, and that all

attempts at drug rehabilitation had failed. We hold that Appellant’s life sentence

was justifiably assessed . . . .”).   Because Ware’s sentence does not meet the

threshold of a grossly disproportionate punishment, we do not examine the other

factors concerning comparative sentencing. See Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323.

                                          –6–
      We overrule Ware’s sole issue and affirm the judgments.

                                        /Emily Miskel/
                                        EMILY MISKEL
                                        JUSTICE

Do Not Publish.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
220302F.P05

                                      –7–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

ROYAL LEE WARE, Appellant                    On Appeal from the 194th Judicial
                                             District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00303-CR                V.         Trial Court Cause No. F-2160249-M.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Justices Carlyle and Garcia
                                             participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 25th day of April, 2023.

                                       –8–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

ROYAL LEE WARE, Appellant                    On Appeal from the 194th Judicial
                                             District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00304-CR                V.         Trial Court Cause No. F-2160250-M.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice Miskel.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Justices Carlyle and Garcia
                                             participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 25th day of April, 2023.

                                       –9–