Court Opinion

ID: 9579847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:59:16.801093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:50.191657
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). I would deny leave to *406appeal, and dissent from the peremptory reversal of the Court of Appeals. I could join in an order granting leave to appeal to consider the jurisprudentially significant issue, decided without oral argument or plenary consideration in the majority opinion.
i
While the majority prefers the assessment of the circuit judge, who granted the defendant summary disposition, and the reasoning of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, the determination of the majority of the Court of Appeals was not so devoid of reason as to justify peremptory reversal. The majority’s decision to peremptorily reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals belittles its efforts, in the disposition of this case, as reflected in its carefully written published opinion,1 and deprives Kim Howard and Dennis Kitchen and their counsel of an opportunity to fully brief and orally argue in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Because the circuit judge granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), failure "to state a claim on which relief can be granted,” the motion was decided on the basis of the pleadings2 without factual development, and thus this is, in a sense, an interlocutory appeal.
Today’s peremptory order reflects an increasingly common method of deciding cases, a method that does not provide safeguards against hasty and ill-considered decisions, a method that is unsafe.
When this Court grants leave to appeal, there is *407an opportunity to educate the justices concerning the state of the record and the law through oral argument, as well as visually through briefs. A justice who may have missed a significant point of law or fact on perusal of the materials considered before voting for peremptory reversal might be enlightened and persuaded in the course of oral argument.
Also lost, when this Court acts without plenary consideration, is the opportunity for conference discussion after oral argument, and further conference discussion after an opinion has been prepared and circulated.
Peremptory disposition, without plenary consideration, full briefing, oral argument, and an opportunity for the profession to file briefs as amici curiae, should be reserved for cases in which the law is settled and factual assessment is not required.3 In the instant case, factual and legal *408assessment is required. Peremptory disposition is not appropriate.
ii
Kim Howard and Dennis Kitchen, employees of the City of Detroit, commenced this action against Eddie W. and Martha Ann White and the City of Detroit, seeking damages for injuries suffered when the city-owned vehicle in which they were riding collided with the White vehicle. Howard and Kitchen claimed that the collision was caused in part by the failure of the city to maintair a traffic signal at the intersection where the collision occurred in reasonable repair and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel as required by § 2 of the governmental tort liability act.4
The circuit judge granted the city summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) on the basis of the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act.5 The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that "[t]he dual capacity doctrine is an exception to the exclusive remedy provision and allows an employee to state a cause of action in tort against his employer where *409the employer occupies a second capacity that confers upon it obligations independent of those imposed on it as an employer.”6 The Court of Appeals said that the city’s duty under §2 was "totally unrelated to the obligations the city had as plaintiffs’ employer.”7
The duty imposed on the City of Detroit by § 2 of the governmental tort liability act, "to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel,” does not depend on whether the user of the highway is an employee of the City of Detroit. The duty is imposed for the benefit of all users of the highway, without regard to whether they work for the city. It is, therefore, at least arguable— with the consequence that peremptory disposition is not appropriate—that, with regard to its duty under §2, "the employer [the city] has a second identity which is completely distinct and removed from [its] status as employer” within the meaning of Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 421 Mich 641, 653; 364 NW2d 670 (1984).
The majority states, and I agree: "The dual-capacity doctrine is recognized in Michigan. In some circumstances, an employee may bring a civil action against the employer for a work-related injury caused by the employer in a role other than employer.” (Emphasis in original.)8
Recovery is not here sought for a failure of the city to maintain a safe place to work, but rather for injury claimed to have been caused by the city’s failure to discharge a duty imposed on it by statute to keep a highway in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel for all users of the highway. A duty imposed on *410the city for the benefit of all users of the highway, without regard to whether they are employees of the city, is imposed on it "in a role other than employer.”

 195 Mich App 590; 491 NW2d 625 (1992).

 The court rule provides that "[o]nly the pleadings may be considered when the motion is based on subrule (C)(8) or (9).” MCR 2.116(G)(5).

 People v Wright, 439 Mich 914, 914-915 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Roek v Chippewa Valley Bd of Ed, 430 Mich 314, 322; 422 NW2d 680 (1988) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Grames v Amerisure Ins Co, 434 Mich 867, 868-875 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 769-770; 456 NW2d 237 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Wrenn, 434 Mich 885, 885-886 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Harkins v Northwest Activity Center, Inc, 434 Mich 896, 899 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Dep’t of Social Services v American Commercial Liability Ins Co, 435 Mich 508, 515; 460 NW2d 194 (1990) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Yahr v Garcia, 436 Mich 872, 872-873 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Universal Underwriters Ins Co v Vallejo, 436 Mich 873, 873-874 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Stephens, 437 Mich 903, 903-910 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Berkey, 437 Mich 40, 54; 467 NW2d 6 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Turner v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 437 Mich 35, 38-39; 467 NW2d 4 (1991) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Lepior v Venice Twp, 437 Mich 955, 956-966 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Rochester Hills v Southeastern Oakland Co Resource Recovery Authority, 440 Mich 852, 852-856 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); In re Reinstatement of Eston (Grievance Administrator v Eston), 440 Mich 1205, 1205-1207 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); In re Reinstatement of Callanan, 440 Mich 1207, 1207-1209 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); McFadden v Monroe Civil Service Comm, 440 Mich 890, 890-891 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Holly Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources (Holly Twp v Holly Disposal, Inc), 440 Mich 891, 891-893 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Marzonie v ACIA, 441 Mich 522, 535-539; 495 NW2d 788 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); People *408v Waleed, 441 Mich 902, 902-903 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Hardison, 441 Mich 913, 914-916 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Justice, 441 Mich 916, 917-919 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v LaClear, 442 Mich 867, 867-871 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting); Auto-Owners Ins Co v City of Clare, 446 Mich 1, 16-18; 521 NW2d 480 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting); Weisgerber v Ann Arbor Center for the Family, 447 Mich 963, 964-969 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting).
See Schweiker v Hansen, 450 US 785, 791; 101 S Ct 1468; 67 L Ed 2d 685 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error”); Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 457-458; 99 S Ct 698; 58 L Ed 2d 717 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Summary reversal 'should be reserved for palpably clear cases of . . . error.’ Eaton v Tulsa, 415 US 697, 707 [94 S Ct 1228; 39 L Ed 2d 693 (1974)] [Rehnquist, J., dissenting]”).

 MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102).

 MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237(131).

 195 Mich App 592.

 Id., p 593.

 Ante, p 398.