Court Opinion

ID: 7818482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:45:11.945662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:40.161620
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, dissenting. I dissent from the remittitur. I can agree that the award is liberal, but I cannot arrive at the conclusion that the lack of medical testimony as to pain and suffering or emotional shock left the jury to speculation only in fixing damages. If this be the case, then most verdicts for this element of damages are based upon speculation, for there are few objective symptoms of this result from an injury and the “pain barrier” of individuals differs as much as any personality trait or element of physical makeup can possibly vary. A seven-month-old baby has only one means of evidencing pain and suffering and emotional upset. That is by crying. She could not communicate internal pain to her physician or to a jury as an adult might. All of us know that many internal injuries are undetected until the injured person can describe pain and its location to a physician. This baby was entitled to be compensated for the nature, extent and duration of her injury, and any pain, suffering or mental anguish experienced and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future, and not just for visible results of her injury, putting aside the question whether a child should have a cause of action against a third person negligently injuring his parent.1 A perfectly normal baby, who had previously cried little, would for six or eight weeks awaken screaming, jerking all over and crying hysterically, first in the hospital, later in her grandmother’s home and then after she was returned to her own home. Crying spells lasted as long as 30 minutes at a time. She was apparently left with a fear of being alone. On the day of the trial she still required the constant attendance of one or the other of her parents. Her grandmother testified that the baby was sick and that she sometimes called the doctor at night about the child’s illness. She admitted that not all of the sickness was directly related to the automobile accident. She told of one occasion in the hospital shortly after the child’s injury when the pediatrician gave the baby two shots to quiet her. I would affirm the judgment in favor of all the appellees.   See arguments, pro and con, Annot., 59 A. L. R. 2d 454 (1958). We have held that a minor is entitled to recover compensation for the loss of parental love, care, supervision and training in wrongful death actions. This loss is considered to be a “pecuniary injury” under the wrongful death statute. See Bridges v. Stephens, 238 Ark. 801, 384 S. W. 2d 490.