Court Opinion

ID: 9703117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:40:40.654067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:27.244697
License: Public Domain

*487BECK, J.,
concurring and dissenting:
Factual Background
Bañas began his employment with Matthews as a sandblaster (Record at 6a) and advanced to the position of tooler, which he held for 14 or 15 years preceding his discharge (Record at 17a). It was undisputed that Bañas was a skilled craftsman and his job performance was good (Record at 120a). In fact, Bañas had been selected to work on an important job for Matthews, the making of Elvis Presley’s grave marker (Record at 19-20a).
After he was hired, Bañas received from Matthews a copy of a booklet entitled “Matthews — You and Your Company.” This employee handbook contained the following provision relating to personal jobs:
Employees are not generally permitted to work on personal jobs during company time or on company premises. However, supervisors will often cooperate by giving permission for you [the employee] to use our equipment and waste material for your personal work.
There was testimony at trial that doing personal jobs, euphemistically called “government jobs,” was a commonplace event at the Matthews plant. Bañas’ immediate supervisor, Jack Campbell, testified that he had never turned down a request for permission to do a “government job.”
Bañas asked for and received permission to do a personal job using a sheet of scrap bronze from the company shop. There is conflicting testimony on whether Bañas told his supervisors, when making the request, that the personal job in question was a grave marker. Campbell, the immediate supervisor, who acknowledges that the request was made, maintains that he did not know that Bañas intended to make a grave marker. He stated that he believed, when granting permission, that Bañas had in mind a small item such as a license plate or house numbers which were the customary items made by employees for their own use, after permission was obtained. Bañas maintains that he told Campbell that he wanted to make a grave marker. Bañas acknowledges that he also used a bronze vase from company stock *488as part of the marker. He asked a secretary (one in a nonsupervisory position) for permission to use the vase.
At trial the vice-president of the company, the plant manager, and the general foreman testified that Matthews employees may not make grave markers for personal use. The company policy is to sell grave markers only to cemeteries, not to individuals. Record at 272a, 275a, 294a, 299a, 324a. A document, “Bronze Division Procedures,” offered in evidence by Matthews, stated:
There has been some vagueness and misunderstanding about our policy in connection with the sale of bronze memorials to employees. If we permit employees to purchase bronze memorials directly from Matthews for the installation at any cemetery it presents difficulties and misunderstandings with our customers [cemeteries]. For the good of all concerned it should be thoroughly understood that we cannot run the risk of offending our customers by permitting employees to buy direct from Matthews. Every employee who desires to purchase a bronze memorial should contact the cemetery office and arrange for said purchase. There is no objection if the employee indicates to the cemetery that he or she is an employee of Matthews. The employee should also make certain that the official order is being placed through the cemetery.
Record at 274-75a.
This document was distributed only to those in managerial and supervisory positions at Matthews and not to personnel on Bañas’ level. Record at 299a.
Matthews learned from Resurrection Cemetery that a Matthews grave marker had been installed without sale through the cemetery. Matthews then conducted a private investigation and determined that while at work, Bañas had made the marker from company materials and had then removed the marker from the company premises. During a meeting between Bañas and Matthews supervisory personnel involved with the investigation of the grave marker’s manufacture and removal, a Matthews supervisor, Francis *489Donnelly, said, “We can’t have thieves around here.” Record at 53a. Based upon the investigation, Bañas’ employment with Matthews was terminated.
Following Bañas’ termination, the plant superintendent, Charles Krepp, spoke with Bañas’ former co-workers who were concerned because of Bañas’ sudden departure. Krepp told them that Bañas had been fired for unauthorized talcing of company property, that Bañas violated the law as well as company rules, and that Bañas could have been indicted on criminal charges.
Punitive Damages
I dissent from the majority because I find that a review of the record reveals that more than enough evidence was adduced under the clear and convincing test to create a question for the jury as to whether Bañas should have been awarded punitive damages.1
Applying the actual malice standard to the present case, I find sufficient evidence of record which, believed by the jury, would establish Matthews’ actual malice by clear and convincing proof and entitle Banas to punitive damages. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374 (1984), appeal pending, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 3496, 87 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985). Hence, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Matthews’ motion for a judgment n.o.v. which alleged that there was inadequate evidence upon which to submit the punitive damages *490issue to the jury. See Heffernan v. Rosser, 419 Pa. 550, 215 A.2d 655 (1966).
Preliminarily, I note that the question is not whether as thirteenth jurors, our court would have found actual malice but rather, whether there was evidence in the record from which a rational jury could have found clear and convincing proof of actual malice. See Hepps; Heffernan; Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank N.A., 318 Pa.Super. 90, 464 A.2d 1243 (1983).
Because in addressing this question our court is deciding whether the trial court erred in denying Matthews’ motion for a judgment n.o.v. on punitive damages, the record must be reviewed in the light most favorable to Banas as the verdict-winner below. Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984). “[A]ny doubts should be resolved in favor of the verdict.” Tyus v. Resta, 328 Pa.Super. 11, 17, 476 A.2d 427, 430 (1984). Accordingly, our court must accept as fact that which the jury obviously found in holding Matthews liable for defamation, namely, that Bañas was given permission to make the grave marker and that Matthews supervisory personnel made false statements about Bañas’ being a thief.
With respect to the award of punitive damages, the inquiry must focus on the knowledge and state of mind of the Matthews supervisors (Messrs. Krepp and Donnelly) who uttered the defamatory remarks about Bañas. Because at worst the Matthews supervisors received conflicting information on whether Bañas had received permission to make a marker, I conclude that the jury could not have found that the Matthews supervisors knowingly made false statements about Bañas. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). However, because the contradictory information about Ba-ñas’ having permission raised serious doubts concerning Bañas’ being a thief, and because despite such conflicting data, Matthews did not question Bañas’ immediate supervisor (Jack Campbell) about whether he gave Bañas permission to make a grave marker, I also conclude that the jury *491could reasonably have found that the Matthews supervisors exhibited a reckless disregard for the truth by avowing that Banas was a thief. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968).
The majority reasons that Donnelly could not have been acting with actual malice when he made the “We can’t have thieves around here” statement because he must have disbelieved Bañas’ protestations that he had permission. But I view Donnelly’s state of mind when he made the statement as a question for the jury. Clearly, Donnelly’s words are consistent with disbelief of Bañas, but the jury would have to determine whether that apparent disbelief was a reckless disregard of evidence indicating that Donnelly’s statement was false.
Central to my analysis are the following salient background facts established by the record: (1) Bañas was a good and reliable employee with a twenty-year, unblemished employment record with Matthews; (2) the performance of personal jobs was commonplace within the Matthews plant; (3) there was evidence that the alleged Matthews’ policy (“Bronze Division Procedures”) prohibiting the construction of a cemetery marker as a personal job was communicated only to supervisory personnel, not to employees like Bañas, and finally, (4) when Bañas was questioned, he did not deny making the marker with company material.
A discussion of the significance of these facts is required. Since Matthews’ supervisors had been instructed that Matthews’ employees were to obtain grave markers only by purchasing them from cemeteries, any supervisor who gave an employee like Bañas permission to make a marker as a personal job would be acting improperly. The jury could infer that a supervisor who gave such permission would be motivated to deny it to protect himself. Since this inference is a matter of common-sense reasoning, the jury could charge Krepp and Donnelly with a like understanding of the circumstances.
*492Krepp and Donnelly knew that Bañas did not deny making the marker. The jury could have inferred that they acted recklessly in defaming Bañas and that they were in part motivated to select Bañas as an example for other employees as part of a general crackdown on personal jobs.
With regard to Matthews’ investigation of the specific Bañas marker incident, although the record contains conflicting evidence, the jury could have found that Bañas’ immediate supervisor (Campbell) was never asked whether he had given Bañas permission to make the marker. Moreover, the testimony of the private investigator hired by Matthews to investigate the incident, Nicholas Domek, supports Bañas’ side of the story. Domek testified at trial that he was asked to determine who made the marker and in the course of his investigation he spoke with Mr. Logue, Bañas’ brother-in-law and father of the deceased. Logue then called Bañas on the telephone and allowed Domek to speak to him. Bañas, speaking directly to Domek, admitted making the marker, stated he had permission and said he had no objection to the use of his name in Domek’s report to Matthews.2 See Record at 206a-13a. The jury could have found that Matthews’ supervisory personnel (Krepp and Donnelly) were aware of Domek’s report and therefore knew that Bañas freely admitted making the marker with the knowledge that his employer would receive the report. There was also evidence in the record that Bañas did not attempt to conceal the marker in the plant while he was making it, that it was left in plain view on his workbench, and that he carried it out of the plant under his arm covered only with some brown paper to prevent scratching. From these facts the jury could infer first that Bañas clearly felt *493he had nothing improper to hide and second that the Matthews supervisors could be charged with the knowledge that Bañas had acted in a manner totally inconsistent with his having stolen the marker.
In holding that Bañas has not made a case for punitive damages sufficient to go to the jury, the majority finds that the trial judge erred in not granting Matthews’ motion for judgment n.o.v. The case law is clear that judgment n.o.v. should be entered only when the facts are such that no two reasonable persons could disagree that the verdict was improper. Cummings v. Nazareth Borough, 427 Pa. 14, 233 A.2d 874 (1967). In light of the litany of evidence produced at trial supporting the inference that Matthews’ supervisory personnel (Donnelly and Krepp) acted recklessly in defaming Bañas, the majority’s conclusion that the question of punitive damages should not be presented for jury consideration is in my view untenable.
The majority states that Bañas’ claim is predicated upon the assumption that Campbell, Bañas’ immediate supervisor, would have admitted giving Bañas permission to make a marker as a personal job. I maintain that such an assumption is irrelevant to the question whether Krepp and Donnelly acted with reckless disregard for the truth {Sullivan actual malice) when they labeled Bañas a thief. The resolution of the question does not depend on what Campbell would have said but on whether Donnelly and Krepps could be viewed as acting with reckless disregard for the truth because they defamed Bañas without first asking Campbell whether Bañas had permission to make a marker.
The majority acknowledges that the evidence of record could support a finding that Campbell was never asked if he had given Bañas permission to make a marker as a personal job.3 Yet the majority argues that such evidence is insuffi-*494dent to raise a jury question as to the reckless publication of the defamatory remarks concerning Bañas. The jury could have found that when confronted with conflicting stories about Bañas’ having permission for a marker, Krepp and Donnelly acted with reckless disregard for the truth by branding Bañas a thief without having first inquired of Campbell whether Bañas had received permission to make the marker.
Consequently, I would hold that there existed sufficient evidence in the record to allow the jury to decide whether, by clear and convincing proof, defamatory statements about Bañas were uttered with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.4 Accordingly, I would not disturb the punitive damages award.
Like the majority I would hold that Sullivan actual malice is the appropriate standard for gauging whether a plaintiff in a defamation action is entitled to punitive damages. Geyer v. Steinbronn, (Nos. 02639-02641 Philadelphia 1982, filed December 6, 1985). However, I find the majority’s punitive damages analysis incomplete because the ma*495jority fails to consider the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985).
Because an award of punitive damages in a defamation action in effect penalizes speech,5 the determination of the appropriate criterion for such an award necessarily mandates an examination of the United States Supreme Court’s opinions discussing the dynamic tension between the First Amendment guarantee of free expression and the States’ interest in allowing private individuals to protect their reputations.
In Gertz the United States Supreme Court declared that “the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages ... when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge or falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,” i.e., on a showing of Sullivan actual malice. Id., 418 U.S. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 3011. But in a later opinion, Dun & Bradstreet, the United States Supreme Court restricted the scope of Gertz by stating that “recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases absent a showing of ‘actual malice’ does not violate the First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern.”6 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at —, 105 S.Ct. at 2948, 86 L.Ed.2d at 605. The majority’s opinion in the case sub judice neither cites Dun & Bradstreet nor addresses the punitive damages standard delineated in Dun & Bradstreet.
*496Since the present appeal does not involve speech on a matter of public concern, our court is not constitutionally required to gauge the award of punitive damages in the case sub judice by application of the Sullivan actual malice test. Dun & Bradstreet. Nevertheless, I conclude that actual malice is the proper standard for awarding punitive damages.
To date, Pennsylvania defamation law on punitive damages in non-public interest cases has been inconsistent. For example, in a case involving a private plaintiff and a private defendant, Laniecki v. Polish Army Veterans Association, 331 Pa.Super. 413, 423, 480 A.2d 1101, 1106 (1984), we “observe[d] that Pennsylvania has embraced Section 908 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts” which allows punitive damages upon proof of “outrageous conduct,” i.e., an act done with an evil motive or with reckless indifference to the rights of others. See Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984) (non-defamation case in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolved the punitive damages issue according to Section 908 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). Thereafter, in Walder v. Lobel, 339 Pa.Super. 203, 488 A.2d 622 (1985), we departed from the Restatement approach and cited Hepps for the proposition that punitive damages are justified in defamation cases only upon a demonstration of actual malice.
In the present appeal, the majority also quotes Hepps as controlling authority for use of the Sullivan actual malice standard for punitive damages. Although I regard Hepps as instructive on the punitive damages question, I do not believe Hepps is entirely apposite to the case sub judice. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Hepps predates the United Supreme Court’s opinion in Dun & Bradstreet. Hepps is explicitly based on the United States Supreme Court’s Gertz opinion which required proof of actual malice to justify a punitive damages award to a private figure plaintiff in a suit against a media defendant. Hepps, 506 Pa. at 329, 485 A.2d at 388. Neither Gertz nor Hepps distinguishes for purposes of punitive damages be*497tween defamation actions involving public concerns and those involving private concerns. See Dun & Bradstreet. Moreover, the defamatory speech in Hepps involved a matter of public interst7 (five investigative articles printed in a newspaper of general circulation) whereas the defamatory remarks in the instant case, like those in Dun & Bradstreet (defamatory statements made in a credit report issued to five Dun & Bradstreet subscribers), concern a matter of solely private interest.
Despite inconsistent Pennsylvania precedent and the freedom under Dun & Bradstreet to establish a standard other than actual malice, I nevertheless conclude that punitive damages cannot be obtained without proof of Sullivan actual malice. Geyer.
I endorse the actual malice norm because I am convinced that the goals sought to be achieved through defamation law are better served by the Sullivan actual malice standard than by the common-law malice standard of Section 908 of the Restatement. See Geyer.
Both the Restatement common-law malice (ill-will malice, outrageous conduct) and Sullivan actual malice delineate behavior more egregious than the ordinary negligence needed to establish the underlying tort liability in private plaintiff-private defendant defamation cases. See Delahanty. Common-law malice of the type described by Section 908 of the Restatement refers to the defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff whereas actual malice as outlined in Sullivan refers to the defendant’s attitude toward the truth. See Hepps; Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 Harv. L.Rev. 847 (1985).
Therefore, the inquiry becomes which type of conduct to punish and deter through the vehicle of punitive damages, i.e. whether to punish a defendant because he publishes outrageously or with ill will or whether to punish a defendant because he lacks respect for the truth and thereby
*498harms the plaintiff. See Delahanty. The common-law malice of the Restatement connotes intent to harm the plaintiff and involves behavior which is morally blameworthy. See J. Sales, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of a Bygone Era at 5-6 (1984), citing Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal.L. Rev. 1, 21-22 (1982). Sullivan actual malice centers on the defendant’s awareness of the falsity or probable falsity of his defamatory utterance and the defendant’s choice to publish defamatory remarks despite recognized risks.
In the context of actual malice, a defendant makes a defamatory statement with a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of his statement if the defendant entertains serious doubts about the truth of his statement. St. Am-ant. Therefore, the defendant’s knowingly or recklessly publishing a defamatory falsehood, i.e. the defendant’s exhibiting Sullivan actual malice, requires a high level of scienter and evidences the defendant’s deliberate’ decision to publish defamatory remarks for his own advantage regardless of the high risk of harming the plaintiff’s reputation.
Whereas common-law malice may result from an irrational hatred, actual malice may stem from a choice to proceed despite risks. Courts and laws cannot realistically deter a defendant from disliking a plaintiff, but they can encourage a defendant to exercise sufficient care in making public pronouncements about a plaintiff.
Therefore, I agree with the majority that actual malice is the appropriate standard for awarding punitive damages in a defamation action that does not involve a matter of public concern. Geyer.
The Contract Claim
Unlike the majority, I conclude that Bañas placed squarely before the Superior Court the issue of whether the Matthews handbook modified his at-will employment status. Bañas argued that it did and that Matthews discharged him in breach of the handbook for making, with permission, a grave marker as a personal job.
*499I find the majority’s opinion lacks clarity. On the one hand, the opinion appears to hold that Bañas was an at-will employee who could be fired for any reason or no reason and that the question of the handbook is not before the court. The majority opinion concludes, “The employer handbook cases, therefore, are irrelevant to this case.” At 484.
On the other hand, the majority’s opinion examines the effect of the handbook by stating,
“Appellant’s [Matthews’] handbook nowhere provided that an employee would be dismissed only if the facts warranted it. If the handbook had contained, if not expressly at least by clear implication, a just cause provision, then appellee’s [Bañas’] claim might have merit; indeed, it would have merit if this Court were to decide to accept and follow the reasoning of cases such as Tous-saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, supra. But as we have said, that is a decision that must await a case in which the action is brought for breach of a just cause provision.”
At 484-485 (emphasis in original) (footnotes deleted). I do not understand the majority’s injection of just cause dismissal language. The majority introduces the just cause issue sua sponte. I can only conclude that the majority’s just discussion is purely advisory. The parties never raised the issue of a just cause dismissal and the majority has found that the employee handbook is not before the court and therefore refuses to determine if the handbook in any way modified Bañas’ at-will status. Since the majority declines to rule on the effect of the handbook in the instant appeal, I assume that in a later case if this court decides the issue whether a handbook can modify conditions of employment, the court would not be bound by the advisory just cause dicta in the majority’s present opinion.
Contrary to the majority’s analysis, I hold, as did the trial court, that the Matthews’ employee handbook is clearly an issue in this case. It is only the majority’s unique interpre*500tation of the facts in this case that excludes the majority’s consideration of the handbook.
Although the Matthews’ employee handbook does not establish job security for Bañas with respect to a specified tenure (length) of employment, the handbook acts as a framework in which to examine Bañas’ at-will-employment status. Just as prior court decisions have carved out public policy exceptions to the at-will-employment doctrine, see, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa.Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1981), this court could, if it chose, permit at-will-employment status to be modified on the basis of the contractual effect of an employee handbook. I believe that Bañas has today presented this court with the precise question whether provisions in an employee handbook can alter at-will-employment status so that an employer cannot discharge an employee for actions that complied with the provisions of the employee handbook.8
Matthews contends that Bañas could be discharged at any time, for any reason irrespective of the provisions of the Matthews’ employee handbook. For this reason, Matthews contests the propriety of the trial court’s following jury instructions:
If an employer puts out a book and tells a fellow he can do a personal job, even though they say work must be performed on company orders, they do have an exception. If the employee goes and gets permission he’s permitted to do the particular job and then he turns around and is fired, even though this isn’t part of any contract signed by anybody the company as a matter of right cannot put *501that man out on the sidewalk, there’s a breach of contract created by estoppel____
Record at 436a. The court further charged the jury:
Now let’s assume that you believe there is indeed a breach of contract here. Now, to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel, ... [w]e have no written contract here, but as a matter of equity a contract is created in the law if these certain conditions exist: That is Matthews made the statement concerning personal jobs, which was a condition of employment, ... and that [Bañas] establishes to your satisfaction that Bañas could reasonably rely on that.
Record at 440a.
Bañas concedes that he was generally an at-will employee in the sense that he had no contractual right to a specified duration of employment. But he argues that this status should not place him at the caprice of his employer. I agree with Bañas and would hold that his at-will status was modified by the Matthews’ employee handbook provisions which formed the basis of a unilateral contract limiting the employer’s power to terminate the employee.
The Employee Handbook as Unilateral Contract
It is hornbook law that when a party makes a promissory offer which invites acceptance by performance rather than by return promise, the rendering of the requested performance creates a completed unilateral contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 45 and Comment (a) thereunder (1981). In the employment context, the distribution to an employee or employees of a handbook detailing certain rights, policies and procedures constitutes a unilateral offer of an employment contract with those conditions. The employee supplies the necessary acceptance of the offer and consideration by continuing to perform the duties of his job. See, e.g., Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983) (“Her continued employment after formal delivery of the handbook provides sufficient consideration for modifying the employment agreement by inserting the *502handbook provisions.”); Comment, Employment-at-Will in Pennsylvania: Employee Manuals Provide Contract Remedies for Discharged Employees, 58 Temple L.Q. 243 (1985).
The same considerations of fairness and equity which have led many of our sister states9 to reject the position that “an employee handbook on personnel policies and procedures is a corporate illusion ‘full of sound ... signifying nothing,’ ” Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 462, 443 N.E.2d 441, 443, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195 (1982), likewise compel me to conclude that employers’ statements of policy and procedure contained in handbooks distributed to employees should be accorded contractual significance.
Employers derive substantial benefits in personnel relations from the use of employee handbooks. Comment, supra, at 262. “The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and the conviction that he will be treated fairly.” Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 613, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (1980); see also Weiner, 57 N.Y.2d at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197 (plaintiff rejected other job offers relying on job security provisions of handbook and was instructed to follow handbook when dealing with employees he supervised); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper *503Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) (“[W]e hold that if an employer ... creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, those promises are enforceable components of the employment relationship.”). Improved employee relations and better morale increase productivity which in turn increases profitability. Therefore, it is just to require the employer to fulfill the expectations of fair treatment he has created.10
Characterizing an employee handbook as a unilateral offer of employment, takes into account the employer’s concern to augment, modify and even withdraw the offer contained in the handbook in response to the employer’s changing needs and circumstances. When an employer distributes a new handbook or portion thereof, the employer makes a new offer of employment. The terms of the new offer are defined by the contents of the new handbook, and the new offer becomes effective on the date the new handbook is distributed. Or, when a handbook is withdrawn, i.e. revoked, the new offer becomes effective on the date that the employer notifies the employee of the revocation of the handbook. Employees accept the new offer and provide consideration by continuing their employment. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, Minn., 333 N.W.2d 622 (1983). The Minnesota court viewed this procedure as offering an advantage to employers who can thereby avoid the transaction costs of contracting separately with each employee. Id. Moreover, under this analysis an employer remains free to issue statements which are not contractually binding, so long as such statements are accompanied with an appropriate, conspicuous disclaimer. See Woolley v. Hoff-mann-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985) *504(“All that need be done is the inclusion in a very prominent position of an appropriate statement that there is no promise of any kind by the employer contained in the manual.”).
I conclude that the provisions of a handbook distributed to employees can constitute an offer of a unilateral contract which an employee may accept by remaining on the job, and that once accepted, the provisions of the handbook are binding on both parties as conditions of employment until modified by a subsequent offer and acceptance of new conditions. Therefore, I would hold that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that the Matthews’ employee handbook could be construed as part of an employment contract between Bañas and Matthews, and that the conduct of Matthews could be considered a breach of contract. The trial court described the contract arising from the handbook as a “contract by estoppel.” Although it would have been preferable if the trial court had conceptualized the handbook as a unilateral contract, the trial court’s charge does not constitute reversible error. In determining on appeal whether a trial court’s instructions are erroneous, the appellate court must examine the charge as a whole, and isolated inaccuracies are not grounds for reversal if the charge as a whole is not misleading or prejudicial. Acker-man v. Delcomico, 336 Pa.Super. 569, 486 A.2d 410 (1984). Since the charges on the significance to be accorded the employee handbook were predicated on a contract theory, and were thus correct as a whole, the jury’s verdict need not be disturbed on these grounds. Since Matthews raises no other challenges to that portion of the jury’s verdict which awarded Bañas damages for breach of contract, I would affirm, that portion of the judgment.
Conclusion
I find no merit in any of Matthews’ allegations of error. Consequently, I would affirm the trial court.
JOHNSON, J., joins in this opinion.

. An additional point of divergence is the majority’s reliance on Rutt v. Bethlehems’ Globe Publishing Co., 335 Pa.Super. 163, 484 A.2d 72 (1984) , as support for the proposition that negligence is the proper standard for determining if a conditional privilege to defame has been abused. While I agree that negligence is the appropriate standard, I find that the relevant and natural precedent for that proposition is found in Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 506 Pa. 304, 485 A.2d 374 (1984), appeal pending,-U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 3496, 87 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985) . Rutt expressly limits its discussion to the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), privilege as applied to media defendants while Hepps does not. Hepps contains broad language about the abuse standard applicable to all possible conditional privileges recognized under Pennsylvania law.

. These are the only facts which Domek reported concerning whether Bañas had permission for the marker, and these facts support Bañas’ version of the incident. Nevertheless, the majority asserts that Krepp and Donnelly could rely on the investigator’s report to support their belief that Bañas stole a grave marker. Actually, Domek was instructed merely to discover who made the marker, not whether permission was given for the marker to be made as a personal job. Thus, I do not regard the investigator’s report as in any manner supportive of a belief that Bañas was a thief.

. Because the record could easily support a finding that Campbell was never asked whether he had given Bañas permission for a marker, I do not agree with the majority’s assertion that "Krepp met with the foremen and had been told by them that they had never given approval for a grave marker to be made as a personal job.” This assertion is, at the very least, partially contradicted by Campbell’s *494testimony that he was never asked if he had given Bañas permission to make a marker as a personal job.

. A corporation is bound by its agent’s acts if the agent acted within his express, implied or apparent scope of authority. Lokay v. Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc., 342 Pa.Super. 89, 492 A.2d 405 (1985). Therefore, a corporation may be "held liable for punitive damages solely on the basis of vicarious liability” for the acts of its agent. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Genteel, 346 Pa.Super. 336, 499 A.2d 637 (1985); Philadelphia Traction Co. v. Orbann, 119 Pa. 87, 12 A. 826 (1888). " ‘Apparent authority’ arises when a corporation permits its agent to assume a certain power or authority, or represents him as having it.” Lokay, 342 Pa.Super. at 98, 492 A.2d at 409. In the present case, thé Matthews employee handbook stated that “supervisors will often cooperate by giving permission for [employees] to use [Matthews] equipment and waste material for [employees’] personal work.” Thus, the Matthews handbook conveyed at the least apparent, if not express, authority on Bañas’ supervisor(s) to give Bañas permission for a personal job. Accepting, as this court must, the jury’s determination that Bañas received permission from a supervisor to make the grave marker, I would affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Matthews was vicariously liable for the defamatory remarks of its agents (Krepp and Donnelly) since Bañas could not be deemed a thief if he acted with a supervisor’s permission.

. See R. Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 349 (1980).

. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion joined by Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor. The Chief Justice concurred on the ground that Gertz did not apply because the allegedly defamatory statements did not relate to a matter of public concern. In his separate opinion, Justice White agreed with Justice Powell that inasmuch as the case sub judice did not involve a matter of public concern, Gertz was not controlling. Justice White then reiterated his position that Gertz should be overruled and that common-law defamation principles should govern plaintiffs who are neither public officials nor public figures. Thus, although Dun & Bradstreet is a plurality decision, it represents a majority viewpoint on the standard for awarding punitive damages in defamation cases which do not concern matters of public interest.

. Since Hepps involved a matter of public concern, the actual malice standard for punitive damages would apply to Hepps under either the reasoning of Gertz or Dun & Bradstreet.

. Employers’ statements of specific policies, practices, and treatment in employee handbooks have been enforced against employers as contractual rights by various courts. See, e.g., Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3rd Cir.1984); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). This is what Bañas seeks — enforcement of a particular promise about permission for personal jobs, which promise appears as a provision in Matthews’ employee handbook.

. At least thirteen states now recognize contract claims based on the terms of an employee handbook. See, e.g., Salimi v. Farmers Insurance Group, Colo.App., 684 P.2d 264 (1984); Staggs v. Blue Cross of Maryland, 61 Md.App. 381, 486 A.2d 798 (1985); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, Minn., 333 N.W.2d 622 (1983); Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983); Southwest Gas Co. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668 P.2d 261 (1983) ; Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985); Hillis v. Meister, 82 N.M. 474, 483 P.2d 1314 (1971); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla.Ct.App.1976); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) ; see also Comment, The Role of the Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment at Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U.Pa.L.Rev. 227, 245 n. 94 (1984).

. For further discussion of the policy considerations which support giving contractual significance to employee manuals, see Comment, Employment-At-Will in Pennsylvania: Employee Manuals Provide Contract Remedies for Discharged Employees, 58 Temple L.Q. 243, 259-66 (1985).