Court Opinion

ID: 9714323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:35:15.905314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:25.196702
License: Public Domain

*353Ryan, J.
I dissent.
The Court of Appeals, on remand, properly applied the well-established general rule which distinguishes the offenses of larceny and false pretenses, as this Court stated the rule in People v Martin, 116 Mich 446, 450-451; 74 NW 653 (1898).
The essence of the Martin distinction can be extracted thus:
"We think the rule to be gathered from the authorities may be stated to be: In larceny, the owner of the thing stolen has no intention to part with his property therein; in false pretenses, the owner does intend to part with his property in the thing, but this intention is the result of fraudulent contrivances. If the owner did not part with his property in the thing, but simply delivered the possession, the ownership remaining unchanged, for the purpose of having the person to whom the property was delivered use it for a certain special and particular purpose, for the owner, the title would not pass, and its felonious conversion would be larceny. A distinction is made between a bare charge for special use of the thing, and a general bailment; and it is not larceny if the owner intends to part with the property and deliver the possession absolutely, although he has been induced to part with the goods by fraudulent means. If, by trick or artiñce, the owner of property is induced to part with the possession to one who receives the property with felonious intent, the owner still meaning to retain the right of property, the taking will be larceny; but if the owner part with not only the possession, but right of property also, the offense of the party obtaining the thing will not be larceny, but that of obtaining the goods by false pretenses.” (Emphasis supplied.) 116 Mich 450.
In the case before us the scheme employed by the defendant is known as "ringing the changes” and is analyzed as follows:
*354" 'Ringing the changes’, a trick frequently practiced on shopkeepers and salesmen, is effected by tendering a large bill or coin in payment of a small purchase, and, after the correct change has been given, asking for other change and repeating the request until, in the confusion of mind created by so many operations, the thief obtains more money than he should. This is held to be larceny, notwithstanding in each operation the shopkeeper or salesman voluntarily delivered the money asked for, since it is obvious that he intended to part with the title to only such money as constituted the correct change(Emphasis supplied.) 52A CJS, Larceny, § 36, p 465.
Stated another way, the literal meaning of “false pretense” connotes the receiving of the victim’s property by virtue of a misrepresentation of fact which induces the victim to voluntarily relinquish both possession and title. In the “ringing the changes” scheme, the accused never makes any representation to the victim at all, and the victim never realizes that he is losing the money delivered in excess of the correct change. Thus, while the victim voluntarily relinquishes possession, he does not relinquish title to that portion of the money that exceeds the correct change. This absence of intent of the victim to pass title renders the taking trespassory,1 thereby supplying the pri*355mary necessary element in larceny which is absent in false pretenses. All authorities concur in substantiating the foregoing analysis. 2
For the foregoing reasons, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Coleman, C.J., and Williams, J., concurred with Ryan, J.

 In Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed), pp 245-246, the term "trespassory taking”, as it is used in relation to larceny, is explained as follows:
"It must be emphasized that a 'trespassory taking’ of a chattel has no reference to a trespass on or to real estate. Such a trespass is neither required, nor sufficient, for larceny. An altogether different kind of trespass is involved here — the trespass de bonis asportatis (trespass for goods carried away), to use the ancient label. For this trespass it is necessary to find that someone other than the wrongdoer had possession of the money or chattel, and that this possession was brought to an end by a taking by the wrongdoer (or by another at his instigation), under such circumstances as to amount in law to trespass. In general it may be said that the taking of possession from another is always a trespass unless the other consents thereto, or there is some special authority for the taking — as for example where *355a sheriff takes a chattel under a writ of attachment. It may be added that consent obtained by fraud, force or intimidation is the same as no consent so far as trespass is concerned (if fraud does not result in the acquisition of title).”
See also id., pp 246-248.

 Howell v State, 28 Ala App 249; 182 So 96 (1938); see also 32 Am Jur 2d, False Pretenses, § 4, p 182; 50 Am Jur 2d, Larceny, §§ 2, 7, 26-27; 12 Mich Law & Practice, False Pretenses, § 1, pp 313-314; 15 Mich Law & Practice, Larceny, §§ 1-2, pp 370-373; 3 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (1978 rev ed) § 1796, p 844. Accord, United States v Johnson, 575 F2d 678, 680 (CA 8, 1978); United States v Rogers, 289 F2d 433, 438-439 (CA 4, 1961); United States v Posner, 408 F Supp 1145, 1150-1151 (D Md, 1976).