Court Opinion

ID: 9943216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 21:01:53.759058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:32.088077
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1338      Doc: 29            Filed: 02/21/2024   Pg: 1 of 7

                                               UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                 No. 23-1338

        AMANDA LITTLE,

                     Plaintiff – Appellant,

        v.

        NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

                     Defendant – Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. David C. Keesler, Magistrate Judge. (3:22-cv-00029-DCK)

        Submitted: January 12, 2024                                   Decided: February 21, 2024

        Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and KING and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Heytens wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge
        Diaz and Judge King joined.

        ON BRIEF: Quintin D. Byrd, Q BYRD LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
        Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, Tamika L. Henderson, Special Deputy Attorney
        General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina,
        for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        TOBY HEYTENS, Circuit Judge:

               Suits asserting claims under Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act

        ordinarily must be filed within 90 days of receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal

        Employment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), 12117(a). The

        issue here is whether that requirement bars Amanda Little’s suit against the North Carolina

        Department of Justice. The district court concluded it did and dismissed Little’s complaint.

        Seeing no reversible error, we affirm.

               Little filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that the Department discriminated

        against her based on sex and disability and retaliated against her for protected conduct. She

        received a right to sue letter on December 6, 2018. Several months later, Little sued the

        Department in state court, and the Department removed to federal court. More than a year

        into the litigation, Little asked the Department to consent to a voluntary dismissal without

        prejudice, citing health issues she said were preventing her from prosecuting her claims.

        The Department agreed on the condition Little reimburse it for $680 in mediation costs.

        Little obliged, and the parties stipulated to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.

               About a year later, Little refiled the same claims in state court, and the Department

        removed again. The Department then moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting it was

        untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after Little received her right to sue letter.

        The district court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss.

               On appeal, Little makes three arguments: (1) her second suit is timely because of a

        North Carolina rule of civil procedure permitting cases voluntarily dismissed without

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        prejudice to be refiled within a year, see N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1); (2) the Department is

        equitably estopped from relying on the 90-day deadline because of its actions surrounding

        her earlier voluntary dismissal; and (3) the district court should have applied equitable

        tolling to allow her suit to proceed.

               As the Department correctly notes, Little’s first and second arguments—the North

        Carolina procedural rule and equitable estoppel—were never raised in the district court. *

        Little thus may not obtain reversal based on those arguments unless she “establishes

        fundamental error or a denial of fundamental justice.” In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285

        (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks removed). That bar is an even higher one than the “plain

        error” standard we apply to forfeited arguments in criminal cases. Id. at 285–86. But even

        when reviewing for plain error, “we consider only whether, at the time of appellate

        consideration, the settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit establishes that an error

        has occurred.” United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks

        removed).

               Neither of Little’s forfeited arguments meets this high standard. Start with Little’s

        argument for applying North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), which allows “any

               *
                  Little’s reply brief makes a cursory assertion that she preserved her equitable
        estoppel argument by arguing for equitable tolling in opposing the Department’s motion to
        dismiss. The only authority Little cites for that proposition is an unpublished, out-of-circuit
        decision that discussed the sufficiency of a complaint in a case where the limitations issues
        (including any tolling questions) were governed by Tennessee law, not federal law.
        See Billingsley v. Doe #1, No. 21-6023, 2022 WL 4088511, at *4–5 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2022).
        Unlike the Billingsley complaint, moreover, Little’s complaint did not just neglect to “use
        the term equitable estoppel”—it made no assertions related to estoppel at all. Compare id.
        at *5 (quotation marks removed), with JA 39–53. Under these circumstances, we conclude
        Little’s filings in the district court failed to preserve an argument about equitable estoppel.
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        claim . . . dismissed without prejudice” to be refiled “within one year after such dismissal.”

        Whether that state court procedural rule should have tolled the federal limitation period is

        far from a settled question. Little cites no cases in which similar state law provisions have

        been applied to actions brought under federal statutes in federal court, and there are

        available counterexamples. See, e.g., Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 432–

        33 (1965) (rejecting argument that a similar Ohio saving statute applied to suits in federal

        court). Indeed, this Court has issued unpublished opinions rejecting similar arguments. See

        Birch v. Peters, 25 Fed. Appx. 122, 123 (4th Cir. 2001); Stokes v. Pullen, No. 97-1038,

        1997 WL 577642, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 18, 1997).

               Little’s efforts to invoke equitable estoppel fare no better. That doctrine applies if

        “a defendant has misled a plaintiff, causing that plaintiff to delay filing a viable suit until

        after that suit becomes barred by a statute of limitations.” Caviness v. Derand Res. Corp.,

        983 F.2d 1295, 1302 (4th Cir. 1993). To benefit from equitable estoppel, Little must show

        “intentional misconduct” that caused her to miss the filing deadline. Edmonson v. Eagle

        Nat’l Bank, 922 F.3d 535, 549 (4th Cir. 2019). But the complaint makes clear it was Little

        who first approached the Department seeking a stipulated dismissal, and Little does not

        allege the Department did or said anything to conceal information or mislead her about the

        applicable timelines. Instead, Little asserts that when she asked the Department to consent

        to her dismissing her own suit, the Department needed to tell her that the limitations period

        would bar her from refiling. Little identifies no “settled law” establishing that a defendant’s

        failure to advise a represented plaintiff about her own legal rights constitutes intentional

        misconduct sufficient to invoke equitable estoppel. Walker, 934 F.3d at 378 (quotation

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        marks removed).

               Little also argues that equitable estoppel should apply because she and the

        Department entered “a valid, implied tolling agreement.” Little Br. 17. That argument is

        both forfeited and unpersuasive. Little cites no authority for her claim that the

        Department’s agreement to a dismissal without prejudice was enough to create a

        contractual “waiver of any time-based affirmative defense,” Little Br. 19, and she identifies

        no words or actions by the Department that communicated an intent to waive the limitations

        period.

               We turn now to the argument Little did preserve—that the 90-day limitations period

        should be equitably tolled. Because this is an appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss,

        we review the district court’s decision de novo. See Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 143 (4th

        Cir. 2014). We are unpersuaded by Little’s arguments.

               Equitable tolling applies “in those rare instances where—due to circumstances

        external to the party’s own conduct—it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation

        period against the party and gross injustice would result.” United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d

        507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks removed). “[T]o be entitled to equitable tolling,”

        the party seeking it must show “(1) extraordinary circumstances, (2) beyond [her] control

        or external to [her] own conduct, (3) that prevented [her] from filing on time.” Id.

               Little’s medical issues—which she describes as “sensorineural hearing loss in her

        right ear” that “affected [her] cognitive functioning” (JA 40)—fall short of what this Court

        has deemed sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. In United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507

        (4th Cir. 2004), for example, this Court said a plaintiff ’s “schizoaffective disorder and

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        generalized anxiety disorder” did not warrant tolling. Id. at 513. The Court emphasized that

        equitable tolling applies “only in cases of profound mental incapacity,” like the sort

        resulting in “institutionalization or adjudged mental incompetence.” Id. (quotation marks

        and citation removed). Although Little’s medical issues would no doubt have been a burden

        on her litigation efforts, they do not rise to that level.

               That leaves only Little’s contention that it was the Department’s “misconduct” in

        misleading her that was “extraordinary and outside [her] control.” Little Br. 30. But this

        again misunderstands the Department’s obligations as an adverse party. The Department

        did not induce (or even invite) Little to dismiss her first suit. In fact, when Little approached

        the Department seeking a stipulation of dismissal, the Department gave her an incentive

        not to by insisting she pay its mediation fees. Although Little cites the request for payment

        as an example of the Department’s bad faith in a general sense, it is hard to see how the

        Department’s act of making Little’s decision to dismiss more costly somehow encouraged

        her to dismiss her original suit. Finally, the Department’s failure to be “forthcoming with

        its intent” to later raise the 90-day limitations period as a defense (Little Br. 30) is not an

        “extraordinary” circumstance given that the Department was an adverse party and Little

        was represented by counsel. *

               In sum, we see no reversible error. We dispense with oral argument because the

        facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this Court and

               *
                 To the contrary, Little’s failure to consider the limitations period or seek a waiver
        from the Department is no more than a “garden variety claim of excusable neglect” that is
        insufficient to establish equitable tolling. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United
        States, 577 U.S. 250, 257–58 (2016).
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        argument would not aid the decisional process. The district court’s judgment is

                                                                                     AFFIRMED.

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