Court Opinion

ID: 9663652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:46:35.475394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:54.459890
License: Public Domain

Rawlings, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The instructions given to the jury in this ease were so conflicting, indefinite 'and uncertain as to have been prejudicially misleading or at best confusing. Among other things I am concerned about the element of causal relationship between the claimed intoxication and the offense charged, which is neither consistently applied nor clearly explained by the challenged instructions. See State v. Kellison, 233 Iowa 1274, 11 N.W.2d 371; State v. Graff, 228 Iowa 159, 290 N.W. 97; State v. Richardson, 216 Iowa 809, 249 N.W. 211; State v. Baratta, 242 Iowa 1308, 49 N.W.2d 866; State v. Schumacher, 195 Iowa 276, 191 N.W. 870; and State v. Walker, 192 Iowa 823, 185 N.W. 619.
And, though we have previously held to the contrary, I am inclined to the view that information secured from a participant in an automobile accident by an investigating officer is by statute given the status of privileged communications, and as such inadmissible in a criminal case. To hold otherwise is but to say information so obtained may be used to the prejudice of the individual so reporting. Section 321.271, Code, 1962; State v. Flack, 251 Iowa 529, 101 N.W.2d 535; Goodman v. Gonse, 247 Iowa 1091, 1104, 76 N.W.2d 873; and Ehrhardt v. Ruan Transport Corp., 245 Iowa 193, 202, 203, 61 N.W.2d 696. See also State v. Sabins, 256 Iowa 295, 297, 127 N.W.2d 107, and Masteller v. Board of Control, 251 Iowa 234, 238, 100 N.W.2d 111.
In my humble opinion it is statutorily and constitutionally improper to hold that information elicited by an investigating officer from a participant in an automobile accident for reporting purposes can be used against the informant for any purpose in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
I would reverse 'and remand for a neiv trial.