Court Opinion

ID: 9849026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:33:15.791366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:57.617897
License: Public Domain

Justice SCOTT,
concurring:
I join in Justice Kourlis’s well-reasoned opinion and the judgment of the majority. I write separately to emphasize that the search, which took place here, was conducted under a warrant. Barring bad faith, misrepresentations, or illegal conduct on the part of the issuing magistrate or the police officer, the evidence obtained is “properly admissible under a limited constitutional ‘good faith exception’ to the exclusionary rule.” People v. Deitchman, 695 P.2d 1146, 1157 (Dubofsky, J., concurring).
While its reach remains uncertain, I find United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), worthy of note here. In Leon, the Supreme Court held that evidence seized pursuant to a good faith, reasonable reliance upon a warrant later found invalid may be admitted into evidence during the prosecution’s case-in-chief in a criminal trial. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, and that costs associated with application of the rule are justified only where the purpose of deterrence is served. See id. at 920-21, 104 S.Ct. at 3419. As the Court stated:
It is the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically ■sufficient. “[0]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.” Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 921, 104 S.Ct. at 3419 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted); see also Deitchman, 695 P.2d at 1157-58.
The facts of this case involve a police officer acting pursuant to lawful warrants, which were “supported by probable cause and were not overbroad or defective.” Nonetheless, as Justice Kourlis’s opinion states, the government demonstrated good faith. Maj. op. at 12-13. It is obvious that Agent Leonard attempted to stay within the confines of each warrant, and upon discovering a potential deficiency, he appropriately obtained yet another warrant. Furthermore, the officer acted with probable cause, and despite the fact *806that a better crafted warrant would have provided greater particularity, the officer acted reasonably in conducting the search.
Given the officer’s good faith, the purposes of the exclusionary rule would not be furthered by discouraging officers, in general, from carrying out their tasks pursuant to a warrant only to later have evidence excluded because of magisterial error. It would be unfortunate if court rulings discouraged police officers from seeking the authority of a warrant for the purposes of a search or seizure of persons, houses, papers, and effects.