Court Opinion

ID: 9701477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:20:40.639012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:15.836391
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). With some regret I find that in this criminal proceeding defense counsel did not perform with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law.
It is impossible to say with any confidence whether the armed robbery committed in Genesee County and the shoot-out with the police officer in Lapeer County should have been joined because they arose out of the same transaction. The majority has decided that defendant was not denied his constitutional right to freedom from double jeopardy. Perhaps it is justifiable under Crampton v 54-A District Judge, 397 Mich 489; 245 NW2d 28 (1976), but it is very difficult for me to reconcile the facts in this case with the facts which unlocked Rolston in People v Rolston, 51 Mich App 146; 214 NW2d 894 (1974). Perhaps it would be possible to throw under a blanket all defendant’s wishes "to leave the counties” in which he was subject to apprehension, as Rolston wished to leave the country. In any event, the time sequence here is well within the contemplation of the time sequences in Rolston, People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), and People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323; 217 NW2d 22 (1974).
*376The intent and goal problem is not so simple. The majority has decided defendant’s intent and goals were different in each crime as did the Supreme Court in Jackson. However, a realistic view of the instant proceedings bespeaks a substantially similar intent and goal herein. Defendant’s actions were focused upon the goal of robbing the grocery store and returning to a secure place with the loot. The interim shooting episode was arguably a part of his overall plan and intent as was the actual taking of money and although it is a separate and distinct offense it is part of the same episode. Compare People v Haynes, 100 Mich App 306; 298 NW2d 732 (1980), citing People v Flores, 92 Mich App 130; 284 NW2d 510 (1979). Taken together, these actions could be said to comprise but one criminal transaction, the trial for which should have joined all potential charges.
Because of the above analysis, I must disagree with the majority’s holding that defendant received the effective assistance of counsel. In Beasley v United States, 491 F2d 687, 696 (CA 6, 1974), the case from which our Supreme Court adopted the "ordinary training and skill” effective assistance standard, the Federal Court of Appeals also held:
"Defense counsel must investigate all apparently substantial defenses available to the defendant and must assert them in a proper and timely manner.”
In People v Green, 96 Mich App 104, 109; 292 NW2d 142 (1980), this Court held that a determination of ineffective assistance, based upon counsel’s failure to raise a defense, would depend on "whether the defense which counsel failed to raise was a substantial one”. And in People v Foster, 77 Mich App 604, 609; 259 NW2d 153 (1977), the *377Court defined the term substantial as "whether the assertion of a defense might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial”, citing People v Lewis, 64 Mich App 175, 185; 235 NW2d 100 (1975).
I am unable to agree with the majority’s apparent conclusion that assertion of defendant’s same transaction/double jeopardy defense could not have affected the outcome of his trial. The facts of this case do not fall clearly within the class of cases finding two or more distinct offenses, for which individual trials could be held.- Had defense counsel raised the double jeopardy question prior to trial, the lower court "might have” found the defense valid and quashed the entire proceeding. Defense counsel’s failure to assert the double jeopardy defense under the facts presented was a patent failure to adequately protect defendant’s interests and should not be countenanced by this Court. It was a "serious mistake”. I would reverse defendant’s conviction or at the very least remand the case to the trial court for further findings at a hearing in which the defendant, through counsel, would offer a factual and legal predicate for a same transaction/double jeopardy defense.