Court Opinion

ID: 9522524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:27:50.431508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:08.617475
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE TULLY, dissenting: I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion as I believe the record contains sufficient evidence, when construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant is liable to plaintiff. The summary judgment procedure’s purpose is to determine if there are any genuine issues of triable fact. (Kobus v. Formfit Co. (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 533, 538, 221 N.E.2d 633.) “While use of the summary judgment procedure is to be encouraged as an aid in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit [citation], it is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and therefore should be allowed only when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.” (Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867.) “In determining whether a moving party is entitled to summary judgment, the trial court must consider the entire record and construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent.” (Emphasis added.) (Dietz v. Spalla (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 742, 745, 542 N.E.2d 855.) “If fair-minded persons could draw different conclusions from the evidence, the issues should be submitted to a jury to determine what conclusion seems most reasonable.” Artis v. Fibre Metal Products (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 228, 231, 450 N.E.2d 756. Regarding falls on ice, snow or water, the court in Stypinski v. First Chicago Building Corp. (1991), 214 Ill. App. 3d 714, 571 N.E.2d 717, outlined a plaintiff’s burden as follows: “In Illinois, in order to recover as a consequence of a fall on ice, snow or water, a plaintiff must establish that the accumulation was unnatural in origin and was created directly or indirectly by the landowner. [Citations.] In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant was responsible for an unnatural accumulation of water, ice or snow which caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” (214 Ill. App. 3d at 716.) In the case sub judice, I believe plaintiff met this burden. Here, there was Coleman’s testimony that on the date of plaintiff’s fall he noticed a Heinemann’s truck at or near the Dominick’s entrance where plaintiff fell. Coleman stated that the driver of the truck was washing out the inside of the trailer, leaving water on the pavement, causing the pavement and sidewalk to become slippery. On previous occasions, Coleman noticed that approximately two gallons of water would be left on the area of pavement where the sidewalk abutted the asphalt just west of the store entrance. Coleman stated that he witnessed this happen between 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. twice a week for five years prior to plaintiff’s fall. Coleman further testified that water, residue and asphalt, even in the absence of ice or snow, created a slippery condition. Additionally, Ballasch testified that it was his usual practice to end his delivery route at the Dominick’s at Brementowne Mall, where he would deliver cabinets containing products. This procedure would end at about 7:45 a.m., whereupon Ballasch would go to lunch for one half-hour and then return to the store and pick up empty cabinets. Ballasch stated that he occasionally cleaned out the trailer with buckets containing four to five gallons of water which he obtained from the Heinemann’s bakery within the store. On occasion, Ballasch would clean out the trailer both before and after going to lunch. At those times when he washed out the truck, the right side of the trailer would be open, adjacent to the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. The 7:45 a.m. time at which Ballasch regularly rinsed out the trailer was approximately 10 minutes before the time of plaintiff’s arrival at the store on the date of the accident. Thus, it is not unreasonable for the trier of fact to infer that defendant, through Coleman, had actual or constructive knowledge that Ballasch was creating a potentially dangerous condition by allowing the water, flowing from his trailer, to collect on the asphalt immediately in front of the store. Furthermore, it is equally reasonable to conclude that a jury could also infer that the slippery or “frosty” conditions which plaintiff testified were present on the day of the accident were attributable to Ballasch’s having washed out the trailer that day. Therefore, I believe that when construing the record liberally in favor of plaintiff it is possible for a fair-minded jury to find in favor of plaintiff. Consequently, the trial court was in error to have entered summary judgment against plaintiff. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and remand this cause for further proceedings.