Court Opinion

ID: 9957836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 15:00:38.95527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:51.341906
License: Public Domain

21-6588
     Madhavarapu v. Garland
                                                                                      BIA
                                                                               Verrillo, IJ
                                                                             A206 569 662

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                              SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 5th day of April, two thousand twenty-
 4   four.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                  JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
 8                  MICHAEL H. PARK,
 9                  MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   SREEKANTH MADHAVARAPU,
14           Petitioner,
15
16                  v.                                             21-6588
17                                                                 NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                   Jon E. Jessen, Law Offices Jon E. Jessen, LLC,
24                                     Stamford, CT.
1    FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
2                                        Attorney General; Justin R. Markel, Senior
3                                        Litigation Counsel; Sharon M. Clay, Trial
4                                        Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
5                                        United States Department of Justice,
6                                        Washington, DC.

7          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

8    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

9    DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10         Petitioner Sreekanth Madhavarapu, a native and citizen of India, seeks

11   review of an October 26, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming a December 4, 2018,

12   decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

13   withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

14   (“CAT”). In re Sreekanth Madhavarapu, No. A206 569 662 (B.I.A. Oct. 26, 2021), aff’g

15   No. A206 569 662 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Dec. 4, 2018). We assume the parties’

16   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

17         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as the final agency determination. See

18   Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). We review the agency’s factual

19   findings “under the substantial evidence standard,” and we review questions of

20   law and the application of law to fact de novo. Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d

21   67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless
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1    any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

2    8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

3          An asylum applicant bears the burden to demonstrate eligibility for relief.

4    Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). An applicant must establish either past persecution or a

 5   well-founded fear of future persecution, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b), and that “one

 6   central reason” for the harm was or would be a protected ground.             8 U.S.C.

 7   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). “The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the

 8   applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the

 9   trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to

10   specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.          In

11   determining whether the applicant has met the applicant’s burden, the trier of fact

12   may weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of record. Where

13   the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that

14   corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless

15   the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the

16   evidence.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).

17         The agency may find testimony credible but “still decide that the testimony

18   falls short of satisfying the applicant’s burden of proof, either because it is

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1    unpersuasive or because it does not include specific facts sufficient to demonstrate

2    that the applicant is a refugee.” Pinel-Gomez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 523, 529–30 (2d

3    Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted)); see also Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 28

4    (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that “in some cases . . . an applicant may be generally

5    credible but his testimony may not be sufficient to carry the burden of persuading

6    the fact finder of the accuracy of his claim of crucial facts if he fails to put forth

7    corroboration that should be readily available”). This lack of corroboration can

8    be an independent basis for the denial of relief if the agency identifies reasonably

 9   available evidence that should have been presented. Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 28–

10   31.    Before denying a claim solely on an applicant’s failure to provide

11   corroborating evidence, an IJ must “(1) point to specific pieces of missing evidence

12   and show that it was reasonably available, (2) give the applicant an opportunity to

13   explain the omission, and (3) assess any explanation given.” Id. at 31. “No court

14   shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the availability

15   of corroborating evidence . . . unless the court finds . . . that a reasonable trier of

16   fact   is   compelled   to   conclude    that   such   corroborating     evidence    is

17   unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).

18          While Madhavarapu was generally consistent and responsive during his

                                               4
1    testimony, the IJ found that he did not meet his burden because of a lack of

2    corroboration of key aspects of his claim, and inadequate explanations for the

3    missing evidence.      Madhavarapu alleged that he was harassed, detained,

4    interrogated, and tortured as a suspect in the 1999 assassination of a politician,

 5   Purushotham Rao. He alleged that he had been Rao’s assistant and cousin. To

 6   prove his claim, he submitted affidavits from his father and wife, a single

 7   photograph of his injuries, news articles about Rao’s assassination by Naxalites, 1

 8   country conditions evidence, and a copy of his own wedding invitation addressed

 9   to Rao. As set forth below, the agency reasonably declined to give weight to the

10   evidence presented and identified other reasonably available evidence that could

11   have been submitted.

12           First, as proof of his familial relationship to Rao, Madhavarapu submitted

13   his own wedding invitation with “Sri P. Purushotham Rao” written on the bottom

14   and testified that he prepared the invitation and addressed it to Rao.      The IJ

15   reasonably afforded minimal weight to the “self-prepared” invitation and found

16   that the wedding invitation did not serve as sufficient proof of Madhavarapu’s

17   familial relationship to Rao. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013)

     1   The Naxalites are a Maoist revolutionary group.
                                               5
1    (“We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an

2    applicant's documentary evidence.”). Similarly, the IJ was not required to credit

3    affidavits from Madhavarapu’s father and wife as confirmation that he was related

4    to Rao. Id.; see also Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (concluding

5    that “the IJ acted within her discretion in according . . . little weight” to letters from

6    applicant’s wife and friend “because the declarants (particularly [the applicant’s]

7    wife) were interested parties and neither was available for cross-examination”).

8          Second, as to evidence of his injuries and the medical treatment he received,

9    the single photograph of Madhavarapu’s foot did not confirm the extensive

10   injuries he claims to have endured at the hands of the Indian police, or his multi-

11   day hospitalizations in 2000 and 2012. He alleged that his father was told that

12   only Madhavarapu could obtain the records in person and that his father admitted

13   him to the hospital under an alias that his father could not remember. But his

14   father’s affidavit did not confirm these allegations.            And Madhavarapu’s

15   testimony about his own telephone conversations with hospital personnel does

16   not compel a conclusion that the evidence was unavailable because he did not

17   know the name of anyone he spoke with, and he did not make a written request

18   for the records. Given the lack of confirmation from his father and the lack of

                                                 6
1    detail about the attempts to get the records, the record does not compel a

2    conclusion that hospital records were unavailable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).

3          Third, as to his work as a personal assistant for Rao, Madhavarapu testified

 4   that he had no proof that he worked for Rao because it was informal, and he was

5    not paid. But he conceded that he could have obtained letters from other people

6    who worked for Rao and from the lawyer who helped obtain his release from

7    police custody in India, but that he did not think he needed proof beyond what he

8    already provided.    This explanation is not compelling because, in 2014, U.S.

9    Citizenship and Immigration Services asked Madhavarapu for specific evidence,

10   including medical records, proof of his relationship to Rao, and proof that he

11   worked for Rao, putting him on notice that these documents were necessary to

12   corroborate his claim.

13         Further, as the IJ concluded, absent evidence corroborating Madhavarapu’s

14   claim that he was targeted by the authorities as a suspect in his cousin’s

15   assassination, country conditions evidence of human rights violations does not

16   confirm that Madhavarapu would be subject to such abuses. See Wang v. Ashcroft,

17   320 F.3d 130, 143–44 (2d Cir.2003)) (holding that evidence that some prisoners in

18   China are tortured was not sufficient to “establish[] that someone in [petitioner’s]

                                              7
1    particular alleged circumstances is more likely than not to be tortured”). And none

2    of the articles about Rao’s assassination mention Madhavarapu or refer to anyone

3    employed by Rao as a suspect, and the articles do not reflect an ongoing

4    investigation.

5          In sum, the IJ did not err in finding that Madhavarapu failed to satisfy his

 6   burden of proof: he did not establish that medical records or records of his

 7   employment with Rao were unavailable, the IJ did not err in giving little weight

 8   to family affidavits and Madhavarapu’s self-prepared wedding invitation, and

 9   there was no objective evidence linking the assassination to Madhavarapu or Rao’s

10   employees more generally.      See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), 1252(b)(4)(B); Wei

11   Sun, 883 F.3d at 28. This burden finding is dispositive of asylum, withholding of

12   removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief stemmed from

13   Madhavarapu’s claim that he was a suspect in Rao’s assassination. See Lecaj v.

14   Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010).

15         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

16   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

17                                          FOR THE COURT:
18                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
19                                          Clerk of Court

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