Court Opinion

ID: 9745801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:32:26.241059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:04.716645
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCORMICK, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority’s conclusion that defendant is entitled to a new trial because of the use of incompetent, prejudicial evidence (Hernandez’ testimony) by the trial court. A remand for a trial de nova on all issues would be a proper order in this matter because the suppressed testimony of Hernandez was also considered by the trial court as corroborative of Julian’s testimony and credibility. However, the majority opinion proceeds further and concludes that, as a matter of law, Julian’s in-court identification was sufficiently independent of the State’s improper use of the suppressed lineup evidence. Hence, this conclusion of law is binding on the trial court in the new trial. I dissent from this conclusion of law. At trial, Julian testified that at the time of the shooting he was standing on a neighbor’s porch on south Morgan Street. Later, Julian testified that he was on 32nd Street at the time of the shooting. Before the grand jury, Julian testified that he was on his own front porch, a third location. The shooting incident occurred at approximately 11:30 p.m. in an alley illuminated by artificial light. Julian was admittedly 206 feet from the place of the incident. The trial court commented that, "J do not know that it is impossible as suggested by the defense to recognize a person from 68 yards away. *** The key is that you know the individual. Now, in this case Julian testified that he had seen the defendant at least four times and knew him from the area.” (Emphasis added.) However, Julian could not recall the dates of the three occasions he had seen defendant prior to the shooting. Julian did not give the police defendant’s name or his physical description. At the time of defendant’s arrest, defendant did not match the description of any known offender in this case. Julian testified that he did not recognize defendant at first, but that he eventually recognized him in a lineup. Julian made an in-court identification of defendant as the shooter, but stated that he had been shown a photograph of the lineup prior to his taking the stand to testify. The lineup, including the photograph, had previously been suppressed by the trial court. The law recognizes that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony and reliability must be determined under the totality of the circumstances. (Manson v. Braithwaite (1977), 432 U.S. 98, 114, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140, 154, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2253.) If a witness has seen a previously suppressed lineup photograph, the witness’ identification testimony should be suppressed. The burden is on the prosecution to show, by clear and convincing evidence (People v. Duarte (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 110, 398 N.E.2d 332) that the identification is uninfluenced by and independent of the suppressed evidence (People v. Taylor, 163 Ill. App. 3d 346, 516 N.E.2d 649). The courts have recognized that, once an improper photograph is shown to a witness, there is some danger that the witness is apt to retain in his memory the photographic image, rather than the person actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent courtroom identification. Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 383-84, 19 L. Ed. 1247. 1253. 88 S. Ct. 967. 971. The majority cites Wade and the six factors which should be analyzed in determining if an identification is independent. A discussion of the applicability of these factors to the facts of this case, contrary to the majority’s analysis, in fact inescapably leads to a conclusion that the in-court identification is unreliable and is not independent of the suppressed photograph: (1) The witness’ opportunity to observe the criminal act: I need not repeat my previously stated comments regarding distance and lighting conditions. (2) The discrepancy, if any, between pre-lineup descriptions of the suspect and the witness’ description: The facts of this case create a scenario more lacking than a mere discrepancy in the description of defendant. Julian was questioned by the police relative to his observation of the shooting. Julian did not inform the police that the offender was someone he knew from the neighborhood. Julian did not give a physical description of defendant as the offender. (3) Any identification made by other witnesses before the lineup: In this case there was no identification by another witness (except the excluded testimony of Hernandez). (4) The identification, if any, of defendant from photographs before the lineup: Julian did not identify defendant from a photograph prior to the lineup. (5) The failure to identify defendant on a prior occasion: Julian admits that he did not recognize defendant at the scene of the shooting. He testified that he first recognized defendant at the suppressed lineup. (6) The length of time between the alleged crime and the lineup (in-court) identification: Two years and two months elapsed from the date of the crime to the date of the in-court identification. None of these factors supports the conclusion that the in-court identification is independent and purged of the taint of the suppressed photograph. There is no corroboration of Julian’s in-court identification, and the totality of the circumstances cries out for a finding that said identification is tainted and unreliable. The cases cited by the majority are distinguishable from the case at bar. In Crews, the witness viewed the assailant from close range for 5 to 10 minutes under excellent lighting conditions and identified the defendant just one week from her initial observation of him. In Curtis, the witness had been in the presence of the defendant for 15 to 30 minutes under excellent conditions and his description closely matched the defendant’s actual appearance. The case at bar is more akin to the Taylor case cited by the majority. In Taylor, the witness, who had not previously identified the defendant, was shown a photograph of a suppressed lineup. The in-court identification occurred two years after the crime and the earlier description of the defendant differed significantly from the defendant’s actual appearance. In the Taylor case, we held that the State failed to meet its burden. Similarly, in. the case at bar, the State failed to meet its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification by Julian was independent and reliable. Finally, the majority’s reliance on the trial court’s determination that Julian was a credible witness, to further lend support to its Wade analysis to the facts of this case, is misplaced. While the majority acknowledges that for the purpose of a finding of guilty it cannot determine the extent of the trial courts’ reliance on Hernandez’ testimony from that of Julian’s testimony, it fails to recognize that the same troublesome problem exists relative to the court’s reliance on Hernandez’ testimony in determining the credibility of Julian’s testimony and in-court identification. Hernandez’ testimony was corroborative of Julian’s and, as the majority observes, "the judge stated that both Hernandez and Julian were credible and that Julian’s testimony 'coupled with the admittedly unsavory Hernandez is enough to convict.’ ” (268 Ill. App. 3d at 232.) This comment, like those the majority articulates in ruling that Hernandez’ testimony prejudiced defendant, clearly indicates that the court relied on Hernandez’ testimony in determining the credibility of Julian’s testimony and in-court identification of defendant. Just as the extent of the judge’s reliance on Hernandez’ testimony in finding defendant guilty cannot be ascertained, the extent of the judge’s reliance on Hernandez’ testimony in determining Julian’s credibility, and consequently defendant’s guilt, cannot be ascertained. For the reasons stated, I would reverse the trial court’s finding that Julian’s in-court identification was independently reliable and admissible in court.