Court Opinion

ID: 9790466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:53:26.780941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.690209
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
Like Justice Golden, in his concurring opinion, I am satisfied with the denial of relief to Frenzel. I dissent, rather than concur, because of the rationale espoused in the majority opinion. In light of the legislative inhibition upon the jurisdiction of the courts in such an instance, it is simply wrong for the Court to consider Frenzel’s claim on its merits.
The legislature has provided:
(a) A claim under this act is procedurally barred and no court has jurisdiction to decide the claim if the claim:
(i) Could have been raised but was not raised in a direct appeal from the proceeding which resulted in the petitioner’s conviction;
(ii) Was not raised in the original or an amendment to the original petition under this act; or
(in) Was decided on its merits or on procedural grounds in any previous proceeding which has become final.
Wyo. Stat. § 7-14-103 (1995) (emphasis added). The majority opinion notes the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed in 1993. In addressing Fren-zel’s claims in this case, the Court is silently but positively permitting the filing of a second petition for post-conviction relief, contrary to the statute.
This case serves to demonstrate the wisdom of the rulings in Birr v. State, 878 P.2d 515 (Wyo.1994), dismissed after grant of rehearing, 895 P.2d 43 (Wyo.1995), and De-Spain v. State, 865 P.2d 584 (Wyo.1993). If those cases were applied and followed, instead of being ignored in the majority opinion, we would not be departing from the statutory mandate. I assume the majority must intend to overrule those two cases sub silentio because the rulings are clearly contrary to the action of the majority in addressing Frenzel’s claims on the merits. Unfortunately, the silent divergence from precedent simply leaves the law in a state of confusion.
I would hold that the district court was correct in its ruling denying relief to Frenzel for what is ineluctably a second effort to achieve post-conviction relief, contrary to the statute. Further, I would make it clear to our trial bench that they are without jurisdiction in such an instance because they are entitled to look to the substance of the relief sought rather than simply focus on the Rule of Criminal Procedure alluded to in the pleading.