Court Opinion

ID: 9732715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:32:44.337637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:31.876369
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(dissenting). This opinion was assigned to Judge Kaufman for the preparation of the Court’s opinion. I accept in its entirety his recitation of facts and his statement of the procedural sequence in this case.
I further agree with my colleague that the constitutional guarantee of due process requires that *21plaintiff be afforded the opportunity for a hearing at which she can raise whatever arguments or defenses she chooses in response to the Secretary of State’s decision to suspend her driving privileges.
I am, however, unable to agree with his conclusion as to the unconstitutionality of MCLA 257.303a; MSA 9.2003(1).
The instant case requires that this Court attempt to reconcile what at first glance are two ostensibly inconsistent expressions of legislative intent contained in the Michigan Vehicle Code.
Section 303a of the vehicle code, MCLA 257.303a, supra, provides in relevant part:
"Upon the admission of any person to a hospital for care and treatment of a mental illness or at any time thereafter until the person is no longer hospitalized for treatment of a mental illness, the medical superintendent of any hospital at which the person is a patient for treatment shall notify the department if the person has an operator’s or chauffeur’s license and has become afflicted with mental or physical infirmities or disabilities rendering it unsafe for him to drive. Upon receipt of such notice the department shall suspend the license of the person. The license shall remain suspended and no renewal license shall be issued until the medical superintendent of the hospital at which the person is a patient for care and treatment of a mental illness shall notify the department that the condition no longer exists. ” (Emphasis added.)
In contrast with this provision is § 322 of the same vehicle code, MCLA 257.322; MSA 9.2022, relating to the license appeal board and which states as relevant to our purposes:
"Any person, conceiving himself aggrieved by any final determination of the commissioner denying an *22application for an operator’s or chauffeur’s license or suspending or revoking the operator’s or chauffeur’s license of such person, may appeal therefrom to the board and the board shall have the power and authority after hearing to affirm, modify, or set aside, any fínal determination of the commissioner denying an application for an operator’s or chauffeur’s license or suspending or revoking an operator’s or chauffeur’s license* * * ."(Emphasis added.)
When interpreting statutes relating to the same general subject matter or having the same basic purpose, they should be construed as consistent and complimentary to each other so as to avoid the appearance of irreconcilable conflict. DeVito v Blenc, 47 Mich App 524; 209 NW2d 728 (1973), People v Ransom, 54 Mich App 738; 221 NW2d 466 (1974). Additionally, this Court has a duty to construe statutes as constitutional, if possible. State Highway Commission v Mobarak, 49 Mich App 115; 211 NW2d 539 (1973).
On the one hand, the Legislature has said that when the Secretary of State has suspended the driver’s license of a person institutionalized at a mental hospital because the superintendent has given notice that it is unsafe for that individual to operate a motor vehicle that the license shall remain suspended until the superintendent gives notice that the condition no longer exists. Per contra, our lawmaking body has also provided a general procedure whereby parties aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of their driving privileges may appeal to the appeal board, which in turn may modify or vacate any final determination of the commissioner relative to suspension or revocation of a driver’s license.
Taken literally, MCLA 257.303a, supra, would have the effect of reducing a hearing before the *23appeal board to a sham or a farce since the appeal board could not order driving privileges reinstated unless the superintendent of the institution certified that the patient was no longer under a disability. Such a construction of the statute would render totally nugatory the provision in MCLA 257.322, supra, with respect to the appeal board having the right and power to reinstate a license suspended or revoked by the commissioner. Nor would this procedure comport with Bell v Burson, 402 US 535; 91 S Ct 1586; 29 L Ed 2d 90 (1971), Mitchell v W T Grant Co, 416 US 600; 94 S Ct 1895; 40 L Ed 2d 406 (1974), and the plethora of other case authority cited in Judge Kaufman’s well-reasoned opinion, relative to the due process rights of a party where he stands to be deprived of substantial property rights.
I cannot attribute to the Legislature an intention to provide a hearing which is, in substance, no hearing at all. Presumptively the law-making body meant precisely what it clearly said when it provided that the appeal board could "modify, or set aside, any final determination of the commissioner * * * suspending or revoking an operator’s * * * license”. (Emphasis added.) That being the case, I would hold that MCLA 257.322, supra, controls and that the provision in MCLA 257.303a relative to renewal of drivers’ licenses for hospitalized mental patients is for naught. By excising the offending provision, I would reconcile otherwise inconsistent provisions of the vehicle code and simultaneously give effect to the policy objectives behind each statute. This construction meets the constitutional challenges raised by the plaintiffappellee.
Now there remains only to meet the contention of my colleague that it is a denial of due process to *24suspend one’s driver’s license where there has not been a prior opportunity for a hearing on the merits.
This precise issue was recently summarized concisely in these terms:
"The ultimate question in Burson was the nature of the governmental interest justifying the use of summary authority in the suspension of drivers’ licenses. The Court found that 'the only purpose’ of summary suspension was to help private individuals to secure any judgment they might recover from the uninsured motorist. It may well be that such a use of summary authority serves a legitimate governmental purpose, especially since accident victims who do not receive compensation from those who have caused their injuries may require public assistance. But the legitimacy of the government’s interest does not necessarily justify protecting it by summary action. If there was, in Bur-son, an emergency necessitating summary action, the state made no attempt to demonstrate it.
"The decisions in these four cases — Goldberg v Kelly, 1 Sniadach v Family Finance Corp,2 Wisconsin v Constantineau,3 and Bell v Burson4 — indicate that the Supreme Court is prepared, after weighing certain factors, to override a legislative determination that summary action is necessary or permissible. The factors to be considered include the severity of the impact of summary action on the individual’s means for survival, his livelihood, and his reputation; the likelihood that the summary action will be taken erroneously; the degree to which it will disable the individual from participating in a subsequent hearing; and the adequacy of the subsequent hearing to protect his interests.
*25"Although summary action remains a striking exception to the due process requirement of a prior hearing, the Supreme Court has indicated that the state is justiñed in acting summarily, and hence does so without denying due process, when the state’s interest in acting promptly to protect the public against a serious threat to its safety, health, or economic well-being outweighs the individual’s interest in having an opportunity to be heard before the state acts, perhaps in error, in ways that may cause him signiñcant injury.” (Emphasis added.) Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 Chicago U L Rev 1, 25-26 (1972).
Irrespective of whether the "emergency situation” standard or the "balancing of interests” test, alluded to in Judge Kaufamn’s opinion, is applied to the facts of the instant case, I see no constitutional impediment to a temporary ex parte suspension of the driver’s license of a hospitalized mental patient when the superintendent, pursuant to MCLA 257.303a, supra, has certified that the person’s mental or physical condition renders it unsafe for him to drive. The statute evidences a purpose to protect the public from a person concerning whom there is a reasonable ground to believe operation of a motor vehicle would create a risk of injury to himself or others. Obviously, the interest of the state in protecting the public is substantial, and it is not unreasonable under the circumstances to permit summary action to the limited extent of temporarily suspending the right of a mental patient to drive pending a prompt hearing before the appeal board upon timely request by the petitioner. The procedure as visualized in MCLA 257.322, supra, would adequately protect a petitioner’s rights while, at the same time, affording the public the protection to which it is reasonably entitled.
*26Because of deficiencies in the notice given to plaintiff-appellee relating to the suspension of her license, which defendant concedes with admirable professional candor, the initial proceeding was infirm ab initio.
I would reverse the order of the trial judge setting aside the suspension of plaintiff-appellee’s license, and remand the cause for further proceedings before the appéal board after adequate notice to plaintiff-appellee of her right to appeal the order of suspension of the Secretary of State which was based solely on the determination of the medical superintendent.

 Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254; 90 S Ct 1011; 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970).

 Sniadach v Family Finance Corp, 395 US 337; 89 S Ct 1820; 23 L Ed 2d 349 (1969).

 Wisconsin v Constantineau, 400 US 433; 91 S Ct 507; 27 L Ed 2d 515 (1971).

 Bell v Burson, 402 US 535; 91 S Ct 1586; 29 L Ed 2d 90 (1971).