Court Opinion

ID: 9617681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:59:46.145984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:17.400618
License: Public Domain

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON:
I dissent.
I do not believe that the trust deed speaks as of the time of the death of the surviving trustee. This trust deed was neither revocable nor amendable, it conveyed legal ownership of the corpus to the trustees, and at the time it was executed and delivered the transaction was complete and beyond the trustor’s power to recall. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, secs. 41, 42, pp. 270, 271.
*33I believe-the intention of the trustor which must be determined here is that intention which she had in 1929, the time the deed was executed. Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N. C. 644, 24 S. E. (2d) 621, 628; Trowbridge v. First-Stamford Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 182 Misc. 180, 44 N.Y.S. (2d) 43; Brock v. Hall, 33 Cal. (2d) 885, 206 Pac. (2d) 360, 11 A.L.R. (2d) 672; In re Nicol’s Trust, 3 Misc. (2d) 898, 148 N.Y.S. (2d) 854; Barnes v. Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 326 Ill. App. 687, 63 N. E. (2d) 264; 90 C.J.S. Trusts, sec. 161a. “The rules of construction are well settled. The intention of the grantor is that intent revealed by the words used in the trust instrument and not his secret wishes, desires or thoughts after the event.” Emphasis added. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Macfadden, Sup., 65 N.Y.S. (2d) 395, 397.
In my opinion the scope of the class of beneficiaries was established once and for all in 1929, and the only thing to be done at the date of the death of the surviving trustee was to determine who then came within the class described by the language of the deed. Smyth v. McKissick, supra. “# * * the eventualities must be adapted to the terms of the trust, not the trust to the events.” Hills v. Travelers Bank & Trust Co., 125 Conn. 640, 7 A. (2d) 652, 655, 123 A.L.R. 1419. “It is a rule of equity that once a trust is created it is thereafter to be treated as a trust. A trust deed takes effect when it is made, and the com struction that would he given to it at that time holds true throughout the life of the instrument. An inter vivos trust speaks as of the day of its execution and delivery.” Emphasis added. 90 C.J.S. Trusts, sec. 161a, p. 16.
Evidence is required to overcome any presumption and to overcome the presumption against the inclusion of adopted children within the meaning of the word “issue,” it appears to me that some affirmative evidence must be produced to show that the trustor intended to include possible future adopted children as members of the class of beneficiaries. As the majority opinion states, this court is limited when searching for this intent. *34to the language of the deed as illuminated by the circumstances surrounding its execution unless it finds the deed ambiguous.
To me, none of the “surrounding circumstances” presented by the record indicate any reason to think that the possibility of adopted children was considered when the trust deed was drafted, executed and delivered. In 1929, when this trust deed was made, Marian Holter had not yet married. The adoption did not take place until 1938, seven years after her marriage in 1931. The record does not indicate that there were adopted children anywhere in the trustor’s family in 1929.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I think we must assume that the word “issue” was used in its primary and generally accepted ^sense. R.C.M. 1947, sec. 93-401-18. Two recent cases in this court have decided beyond a doubt that the word “issue” as commonly accepted does not include adopted children. In re Kay’s Estate, 127 Mont. 172, 260 Pac. (2d) 391; In re Miller’s Trust, 133 Mont. 354, 1958, 323 Pac. (2d) 885. These cases defined the word as it existed prior to the time the opinions were written and are in accord with the vast majority of reported cases, some very old. They did not establish a prospective rule only, for that would be legislation. In the face of the Kay ease and the Miller case, I cannot concur with the majority’s statement that the use of the word “issue” makes the deed ambiguous.
It is my thought therefore that extrinsic evidence such as the will should not be considered.
But even if the will is considered, the respondent’s position is no better. The passage of twelve years between the execution of these documents, the intervening facts of Marian’s marriage and subsequent adoption of a child, in my opinion, all militate against assigning probative value to the will so far as events which took place in 1929 are concerned. The will shows the trustor’s sentiments in 1941, three years after the adoption, but it does not indicate what she thought in 1929.
In addition, the definition contained in the will states that adopted children are included within the meaning of the word *35“ ‘issue’ herein.” Emphasis added. It would seem that in order to apply this definition to the trust deed the majority must find that at the time the will was drafted the limiting word “herein” was intended to include the trust deed as well as the will of which it was a part. I cannot subscribe to such a finding.