Court Opinion

ID: 9757706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:55:48.586391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:43.242675
License: Public Domain

DAVID GAULTNEY, Justice,
dissenting.
If the jury watched a two hour video of the witness doing what he swore he could not do, should the witness be believed? The Supreme Court has said “the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex.2003); Benoit v. Wilson, 150 Tex.273, 239 S.W.2d 792, 796 (1951) (“The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts proved, the credibility of *252the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.”).
“Jury trials are essential to our constitutionally provided method for resolving disputes when parties themselves are unable to do so.” In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d 204, 211 (Tex.2009). When the trial judge decides credibility issues differently from the jury and sets aside the jury’s verdict on that basis alone, the judge acts in an area normally reserved for the jury. A jury, like any decision-maker, may be wrong, and a trial court’s grant of a new trial to prevent injustice does not usurp the function of the jury as the trier of facts. See Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3rd.Cir.1960). Judicial control ensures a fair jury trial.
But where no undesirable or pernicious element has occurred or been introduced into the trial and the trial judge nonetheless grants a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the trial judge in negating the jury’s verdict has, to some extent at least, substituted his judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury.... It then becomes the duty of the appellate tribunal to exercise a closer degree of scrutiny and supervision than is the case where a new trial is granted because of some undesirable or pernicious influence obtruding into the trial.
Id. Simply stated, no judge is free to substitute the judge’s view for that of the jury on the issue of witness credibility merely because the judge disagrees with the jury. See Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex.1987).
The majority says we should “focus on the process by which the trial court reached its discretionary decision, not upon the result of that determinationf,]” but that cannot be entirely right. A new trial is properly granted to prevent an injustice; however, if the verdict is just, setting aside the verdict may be the injustice. The trial judge must have a “valid basis” “to substitute his or her own views for that of the jury[.]” In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d. at 212. “The reasons should be clearly identified and reasonably specific,” but must also establish a “valid basis” for setting aside the jury verdict. Id. at 212, 215.
The majority concludes that the trial court followed the right “process” in ruling that the jury’s answer to the past-damages question is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Again, I respectfully disagree. The ruling does no more than state boilerplate conclusions without reasoning.1 A finding of negligence and proximate cause does not automatically require an award of past damages. See Waltrip v. Bilbon Corp., 38 S.W.3d 873, 879-80 & n. 2 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. denied).2 If the testimony *253of past damages cannot be rejected by the jury in this case, why not? If the jury’s credibility determinations are unreasonable, why? See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 820 (Tex.2005) (stating that the jury’s decisions regarding credibility must be reasonable).
When this Court sets aside a jury verdict because the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, we must “detail the evidence relevant to the issue” and “clearly state why” the verdict is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly demonstrates bias. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). We must also “state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence in support of the verdict.” Id.; see also Citizens Nat’l Bank in Waxahachie v. Scott, 195 S.W.3d 94, 96 (Tex.2006). The Supreme Court has explained that “[a] trial court’s actions in refusing to disclose the reasons it set aside or disregarded a jury verdict is no less arbitrary to the parties and public than if an appellate court did so.” In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 212. The reasons must be specified and understandable. See id. at 213. “[N]o court is free to substitute its judgment for that of the jury.” Larson, 730 S.W.2d at 641.
A trial judge should have no need or requirement to write the equivalent of an appellate opinion explaining why the judge reasons the jury verdict is clearly wrong and unjust, but it is not too much to require the trial judge to provide an answer beyond standardized phrases. “When a court of appeals disturbs the judgment of a lower tribunal, merely saying that the court has reviewed all the evidence and reaching a conclusion contrary to that of the trier of fact is not enough. Instead, the court should explain, with specificity, why it has substituted its judgment for that of the trial court.” Scott, 195 S.W.3d at 96. Similarly, the trial court should explain, with specificity, why it has substituted its judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury. If a trial court concludes that the jury verdict is clearly wrong, and the work of the jury must be undone to prevent an injustice, a reasoned explanation for that conclusion is required.
In this case, the trial judge has not explained with specificity why the jury’s past damage findings are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and the verdict unjust, nor why he has substituted his judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury. The trial court has not complied with the requirements of In re Columbia Medical Center or the Supreme Court’s specific instructions in this case. See In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 212-15; In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 661, 663 (Tex.2010) (“We direct the trial court to specify its reasons for disregarding the jury verdict and ordering a new trial.”). Because the trial court has not complied with the Supreme Court’s instructions, the writ should issue to compel rendition of judgment on the jury verdict. See generally Tex. State Bd. ofExam’rs In Optometry v. Carp, 388 S.W.2d 409, 417 (Tex.1965).

. The majority observes this Court has long criticized the use of the phrase "and/or.” See Christus Health Se. Tex. v. Broussard, 306 S.W.3d 934, 938 & n. 1 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2010, no pet.); Willis Sears Trucking Co. v. Pate, 452 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1970, no writ) (pleading "and/or" violated rule 45(b)'s requirement that a pleading consist of a statement in plain and concise language); Am. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Webster, 118 S.W.2d 1082, 1084 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1938, writ dism’d) ("[T]o our way of thinking the abominable invention 'and/or/ is as devoid of meaning as it is incapable of classification by the rules of grammar and syntax.”). This Court has not been alone. See Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 56 (2d ed. 1995) (The expression “and/or has been vilified for most of its life — and rightly so.”). The term is indecisive and ambiguous, and suggests a linguistic shell game, but the clumsy phrase is not the problem here. The survival of the question "why” is.

. The trial court did not find an irreconcilable conflict between the jury’s award of $0 for past damages and the award of future damages. The court did not address whether the *253award of future damages is supported by the evidence.