Court Opinion

ID: 9707979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:26:33.709508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:40.806597
License: Public Domain

SHIELDS, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority's affirmance of Gary Burdine's conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving serious bodily injury.
However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's reversal of Burdine's conviction of operating a motor vehicle while his driving privileges have been suspended under Ind.Code Ann. § 9-12-2, a class D felony pursuant to Ind.Code Ann. § 9-12-3-1(a)(1) (Burns Repl.1987). The statutory elements of the offense are: 1) operating a motor vehicle and 2) at a time when the operator's driving privileges are suspended as a habitual traffic offender. The terms of IC § 9-12-38-1 do not require the State to show Burdine possessed a criminal intent to violate the law. Therefore, as in Sewell v. State (1988), Ind.App., 452 N.E.2d 1018, involving a conviction for driving while license was suspended [(Ind.Code Ann. § 9-1-4-52) (Burns Repl.1987) ], "the lack of such proof [of criminal intent] is of no moment." 452 N.E.2d at 1020.1

. If, in fact, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles failed to mail the notice described in Ind.Code Ann. § 9-12-2-1 (Burns RepI.1987), Burdine's remedy is with a petition for judicial review under Ind.Code Ann. § 9-12-2-3 followed by a petition for post-conviction relief. Indiana Rule of Post-Conviction Relief 1.