Court Opinion

ID: 9784659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:50:40.426348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:57.517370
License: Public Domain

DAVID GAULTNEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The Supreme Court has noted that “[bjecause expert evidence can be hard to evaluate, it can be both powerful and misleading.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tex.1995). Even when expert testimony is relevant and reliable, the trial court may exclude the evidence because its probative value is outweighed by the danger of issue-confusion or the danger of misleading the jury. See id. at 557.
The Texas Legislature found in enacting the SVP statute “that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exists and that those predators have a behavioral abnormality!)]” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.001 (West 2010). Contrary to that finding, Dr. Tennison previously testified that what the statute describes does not exist. Dr. Ten-nison’s view arguably may be relevant to an attack on the statute,1 but issues of law are not presented to the jury for determination. In this proceeding, it is not the jury’s role to set aside the legislative finding. Unless the legislative finding is to be ignored, his belief points to the danger of issue-confusion. The question for the jury is not whether there exist predators who have behavioral abnormalities — the Legislature answered that question when it made the legislative finding and enacted the law. See id. § 841.001.
*251The trial court must determine whether an expert’s testimony will assist the jury. See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 553-56; see also Tex.R. Evid. 702. The State’s motion included the following prior testimony of Dr. Tennison:
Q. Let me just read to you what you said in the White deposition. “I think what the statute is describing does not exist.”
A. That sounds consistent with what I might have said earlier.
Q. Okay. So, following that line of thinking, there’s no sex offender that could meet the statute requirements of behavioral abnormality in the State of Texas?
A. Yes. Based on science, it doesn’t appear that can happen.
Yet at the hearing before the trial court in this case, Dr. Tennison testified as follows:
Q. Okay. Now, so you do believe that there is such a thing as a behavioral abnormality that predisposes someone to commit a sexual offense as defined by the Texas statute?
A. Absolutely, yes. The legal definition refers to something that I believe exists. The only thing I ever said about nonexistence was regarding scientific evidence, not what can be defined legally.
The trial judge may have reasoned that Dr. Tennison’s prior testimony reflected the witness’s actual opinion. The trial court may have concluded that the witness truly believes “there’s no sex offender that could meet the statutory requirements of behavioral abnormality in the State of Texas.” If the trial court concluded that the witness held this view, the court could reasonably question how the witness’s testimony would assist the jury with its assigned task under the statute.
The decision on the admissibility of the evidence lies within the trial court’s discretion. See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 558. Simply because an appellate court believes the evidence should have been admitted, or simply because “the trial court committed a mere error in judgment,” does not mean the trial court abused its discretion. Id. An appellate court cannot reverse the judgment unless the appellate court first concludes the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Id. If the decision is close, “[cjlose calls must go to the trial court.” See Larson v. Downing, 197 S.W.3d 303, 304 (Tex.2006).
There are important procedural distinctions between this case and Hinkle. See In re Commitment of Hinkle, No. 09-09-00548-CV, 2011 WL 2420884 (Tex.App.-Beaumont June 16, 2011, pet. filed). The Hinkle ruling occurred during trial after the jury had heard some of Dr. Tennison’s testimony put on by the State; no continuance was granted. Id. at **6, 11. If Hinkle must stand, the decision should be limited to the peculiar procedural facts and the circumstances of that case. The evi-dentiary ruling occurred before trial in this case. Appellant did not ask for a continuance, or ask for another expert evaluation. He was not deprived of his right to cross-examine a witness called by the State.
Also, before this Court can reverse the judgment, the Court must review “the entire record,” including the excluded evidence, and determine that the exclusion of the evidence “probably resulted in an improper judgment.” See City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753-54 (Tex.1995); see Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a)(1); see generally Robert W. Calvert & Susan G. Perm, Is the Castle Crumbling?— Harmless Error Revisited, 20 S. Tex. L.Rev. 17 (1979). In determining if the exclusion requires a reversal in this case, the question this Court must answer is *252whether the trial court’s ruling “probably caused the rendition” of an improper judgment of civil commitment. See Tex.R.App. 44.1(a)(1). In Mr. Winkle’s case, “the truth seems to be identical with the jury’s verdict.” See 1 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 21, at 890 (1983) (question of new trial for the appellate court).
The entire record overwhelmingly supports the jury’s determination. See Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex.2008) (“[Exclusion is likely harmless ... if the rest of the evidence was so one-sided that the error likely made no difference.”). The record of the pretrial hearing reflects the excluded evidence. Dr. Tennison acknowledged that Mr. Winkle sexually assaulted three elderly women, and that “a sexual assault case is certainly a red flag.” When asked about alcohol intoxication, he gave a lengthy answer, including the concession that “it’s not clear” whether Winkle was “acting reflexively.” Dr. Tennison conceded alcohol was a risk factor and if Winkle drank “he might very well be more likely to commit crimes, perhaps sex crimes, but that would not be an example of behavioral abnormality.” Dr. Tennison offers this view despite previous testimony that, “based on science,” it doesn’t appear that any sex offender could meet the statutory requirements of behavioral abnormality. In this case, Dr. Tennison’s opinion suffers from a lack of probative value. The rest of the evidence was overwhelming. The exclusion of his views “likely made no difference.” See Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co., 267 S.W.3d at 873 (“[I]f the rest of the evidence was so one-sided[,]” “exclusion is likely harmless!.]”); see generally Hundere v. Tracy & Cook, 494 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref. n.r.e.) (prior rule) (The determining factor is whether the evidence had enough probative force that its admission would likely have caused the jury to render a different verdict, considering the “strength and weight of the other evidence!.]”); Otto v. Otto, 438 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1969, no writ) (prior rule). Appellant has not shown an abuse of discretion by the trial court that probably resulted in an improper civil commitment. I would not reverse the judgment.

. But see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) ( ["W]e have never required state legislatures to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes.”).