Court Opinion

ID: 9720251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:22:37.379996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:14.396896
License: Public Domain

Opinion
WALLIN, Acting P. J.
 Plaintiff Peter Lindgren appeals an order granting defendant Baker Engineering Corporation’s motion for summary judgment.1 We affirm.
I
Peter Lindgren brought suit against Kenton and Sue Martin and Baker Engineering Corporation based on an automobile accident in which Lindgren was allegedly injured.2 The accident occurred on March 1, 1983, and involved Lindgren’s vehicle and an automobile driven by Sue Martin. The Martins’ car was purchased from Baker Engineering pursuant to an *1353installment sale contract under which the final payment was due March 1, 1983, the date of the accident.
Baker Engineering moved for summary judgment, alleging as undisputed material facts (1) that Baker Engineering delivered endorsed registration and ownership certificates to Kenton Martin on March 1, 1983, prior to the accident and (2) as an alternative ground for summary judgment, that the Martins’ insurance carrier paid Lindgren $25,000 in settlement. Lindgren opposed the motion on the basis that (1) there were “controverted facts regarding when the . . . transfer of the certificate of ownership and the certificate of registration of the subject vehicle actually took place” and (2) his settlement with the Martins specifically reserved the right to proceed against the assets of Baker Engineering. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion.
II
A motion for summary judgment is to be granted “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
We agree with the trial court that Baker Engineering was entitled to judgment as a matter of law as a result of the Martins’ settlement with Lindgren. We therefore do not address Baker Engineering’s further contention that the ownership and registration certificates were delivered to Kenton Martin prior to the accident.3
In support of its summary judgment motion, Baker Engineering submitted, inter alia, the declaration of the senior litigation examiner and custodian of records of the Martins’ insurance carrier, who stated the Lindgrens were paid $25,000 in settlement of their action as to the Martins. Lindgren acknowledges receipt of this payment, but argues it was in no way intended to release the Martins from the litigation. He notes he specifically reserved the right to execute against the assets of Baker Engineering.
*1354An automobile owner’s liability for another person’s negligent operation of his vehicle is governed by Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151.4 An owner’s liability under those sections is limited to $15,000 for injury to one person in a single accident. In Fenley v. Kristoffersen (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 139, 141 [156 Cal.Rptr. 187], the court held that a plaintiff’s “$15,000 settlement. . . with the negligent driver dischargefd] the owner’s statutory liability under Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151.” Because an owner’s liability is secondary to that of the operator and essentially serves as a guarantee of their joint liability, “any payment made by the operator . . . must be applied first to satisfy the liability of the guarantor.” (Heves v. Kershaw (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 340, 344 [17 Cal.Rptr. 837].) “Heves applied the rule that a satisfaction of a judgment against joint tortfeasors operates to release the other joint tortfeasors and that if there has been a partial satisfaction of a judgment it operates to diminish the amount of the claim against other persons liable for the same harm .... [Citations.]” (Dow v. Britt (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 868, 873 [112 Cal.Rptr. 710] [holding a son’s partial satisfaction of a judgment discharged his parents’ vicarious liability under Vehicle Code sections 17707 and 17708].)
Thus, any liability of Baker Engineering was limited to $15,000 and was discharged by the $25,000 payment made on behalf of the Martins. This is true regardless of Lindgren’s reservation of the right to proceed against Baker Engineering’s assets and his assertion the Martins were not released from this action.
Our colleague’s dissent questions the rule followed here. However, this rule has been consistently applied by courts which have addressed this issue. The Legislature has had ample opportunity to amend the statute if the courts have wrongly interpreted it. It has not done so. The cases cited by the dissent are inapposite. Young v. Berry Equipment Rentals, Inc. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 35 [127 Cal.Rptr. 200] involved the proper calculation of a vehicle owner’s liability where the plaintiff had previously received worker’s compensation for his injury. Broome v. Kern Valley Packing Co. (1935) 6 Cal.App.2d 256 [44 P.2d 430] affirmed an owner’s liability even though no judgment had been rendered against the codefendant operator. Lopez v. Blecher (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 736 [192 Cal.Rptr. 190] determined that a *1355third party driver who had entered into a good faith settlement with the plaintiff was properly discharged from indemnity liability to the owner of a separate vehicle involved in the accident.
The judgment is affirmed.
Sonenshine, J., concurred.

 Although an order granting summary judgment is not appealable unless judgment has been rendered (Dover v. Sadowinski (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 113, 115 [194 Cal.Rptr. 866]), we “construe the order to incorporate a judgment ‘in the interests of justice and to avoid delay.’ [Citation.]” (Cohen v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 669, 671 [242 Cal.Rptr. 84].))

 Peter Lindgren’s wife also brought suit. Baker Engineering Corporation’s motion for summary judgment was denied as to her because of improper notice.

 The only proof of this contention presented by Baker Engineering was the declaration, supplemental declaration and deposition of the company’s president, Robert Klar. Mr. Klar’s declaration stated the certificates were delivered “on or about March 1, 1983,” although his supplemental declaration and deposition were more definitive as to the March 1 delivery date. Prior to the summary judgment hearing, Lindgren unsuccessfully sought to obtain the deposition of Kenton Martin on this issue.

 Vehicle Code section 17150 provides: “Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle ... by any person using or operating the same with the permission ... of the owner.”
Vehicle Code section 17151, subdivision (a) reads in pertinent part: “The liability of an owner ... is limited to the amount of fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) for the death of or injury to one person in any one accident. . . .”