Court Opinion

ID: 9638082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:32:44.721585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:03.527015
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Associate Judge
(dissenting).
This case presents a simple issue: Are we to deny appellant review of a criminal conviction1 because he unwittingly paid a $150 fine before noting his appeal? I cannot agree with a rule which places procedural niceties above the fair and effective administration of justice.
The record reveals that appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of mootness prior to oral argument. Appellant entered an opposition thereto and, after due deliberation, we unanimously denied the motion. Appellee, nevertheless, renewed the contention in its brief and a majority of the court now finds the contention dispositive. I would affirm our prior ruling.
Appellant attached an affidavit to his opposition which stated:
“Immediately following sentencing, I was taken down to a cell block in the courthouse building. I did not receive advice from anyone as to my right to appeal or my right to be released from prison on bail bond during an appeal. I thought that I could appeal my conviction, although I was not certain. But I did believe that the only choice open to me, even if I did appeal, was to pay the fine or to begin the 60 day sentence. I telephoned my wife from the courthouse about 12:30 p. m. At about 3:15 p. m. she came down with the $150, which she had obtained from five of my relatives and we paid the fine and I was then released.” 2
Despite these assertions, the majority opinion recites:
“There is no claim that the payment was made by mistake. The most that can be said on his behalf is that he paid the fine in order to avoid a default, for which a jail sentence would have followed. Whatever his intention is not material, * *
It is wrong to summarily reject appellant’s sworn statement. While a proper request to the trial court would have stayed *90payment of the fine or permitted appellant to post it in lieu of bail, there is no indication that appellant was advised of his procedural rights. His affidavit, in fact, is completely to the contrary. Under such circumstances this court has never previously refused to hear the merits of an appeal. Compare Rosenau v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 147 A.2d 445 (1959); Thomas v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 129 A.2d 852 (1957); Davis v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 91 A.2d 14 (1952). I would proceed to a consideration of the merits.
Secondly, I find that the majority position is legally untenable. Hanback v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 35 A.2d 189 (1943), a majority decision of this court more than two decades ago, stands for the general proposition that the payment of a fine, like the service- of a sentence, eliminates the subject matter of the dispute by satisfying the judgment. It proceeds upon the theory that since a defendant no longer has a legal interest in the litigation, a “case or controversy” has not been presented for appellate review.3 While Hanback has had some recent adherents,4 many authorities reject its rationale.5 Thtis, claims of mootness have been denied where, as here, payment of a fine did not indicate acquiescence in the judgment;6 where payment was made under protest;7 and where, some possibility existed of recovering the fine.8 In the District of Columbia it is apparent that such possibility exists. See Code 1961, § 1-902. Moreover, this court has held that payment of a judgment in a civil case will not necessarily constitute waiver of the right to appeal since the amóunt paid may be recovered from the judgment holder if the appeal is successful. Morfessis v. Marvins Credit, D.C.Mun.App., 77 A.2d 178, 180, 26 A.L.R. 2d 1082 (1950). Today’s application of a harsher rule in criminal appeals seems manifestly unjust.
Insofar as Hanback rests upon St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 63 S.Ct. 910, 87 L.Ed. 1199 (1943), I doubt its continued validity. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have significantly modified the St. Pierre holding. Wetzel v. Ohio, 371 U.S. 62, 83 S.Ct. 111, 9 L.Ed.2d 26 (1962); Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 909, 4 L.Ed.2d 963 (1960); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 67 S.Ct. 224, 91 L.Ed. 196 (1946). 9 These decisions have established the proposition that an appeal is not moot when collateral legal disadvantages survive a sen*91tence served or a fine paid. In United States v. Morgan, supra, 346 U.S. at 512-513, 74 S.Ct. at 253, 98 L.Ed. 248, the Court said:
. “Although the term has been served, the results of the conviction may persist. Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties, civil rights may he affected. * * * ” (Footnote omitted.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Code Section 22-104 provides:
“Every person upon his second conviction of any criminal offense punishable by fine or imprisonment or both may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding fifty per centum greater, and to suffer imprisonment for a period not more than one half longer than the maximum fine and imprisonment for the first offense.”
I am unable to understand how the majority can ignore this Code section. It subjects appellant to the precise kind of collateral legal consequence which the Supreme Court has found sufficient to withstand a mootness claim.
Further, in Parker v. Ellis, supra, 362 U.S. at 593-594, 80 S.Ct. at 920, 4 L.Ed.2d 963, the Chief Justice, joined by three of the present members of the Court, wrote a vigorous dissent in which he stated:
“ * * * Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which also seriously affects his reputation and economic opportunities. * * * ” (Footnote omitted.) 10
Only two of the Justices expressly controverted this position. Hence the reliance upon St. Pierre is seriously questionable.11
Turning again to appellant’s affidavit, it recites:
“I am trained as an Electronics Equipment Repairman, and have previously been employed, from 1960 to 1963, by a company making flight equipment for the United States Government. This job required a security clearance of ‘secret’, which I had. At present I have an application in to work for the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, which I believe would require a similar security clearance.
“I believe that a criminal conviction on a charge of intentionally filing a false report would count against me in the requirements of trustworthiness, honesty, and reliability that are required for security clearance.” 12
The nature of appellant’s work makes it abundantly clear that if his conviction stands his opportunities for employment will be substantially curtailed. I think this is another collateral consequence sufficient to remove the mootness bar. Wetzel v. Ohio, supra; Pollard v. United States, supra.
On the record before us appellant stands convicted of a criminal offense. He has suffered a $150 fine and will undergo future legal disadvantage and economic hardship because he made a report suggesting several police officers were unduly harsh in arresting another citizen. At the conclusion of the case, the trial judge imposed the novel sentence of requiring appellant to write an essay about the merits of the police department.13 Appellant’s attempt to *92fulfill this strange assignment was found wholly unsatisfactory by the trial judge. Thereupon the alternate sentence of $150 fine or sixty days in jail was imposed. Appellant paid the fine and obtained his release from jail. This court has now deprived him of his right to challenge his conviction. I find such a result repugnant to the impartial administration of justice.

. Article 19, Section 5 of the Police Regulations of the District of Columbia provides: “Any person who shall make or cause to be made to the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, or to an officer or member thereof, a false or fictitious report of the commission of any criminal offense within said District, or a false or fictitious report of auy other matter or occurrence of which said Metropolitan Police Department is required to receive reports, or in connection with which said Metropolitan Police Department is required to conduct an investigation, knowing such report to be false or fictitious; * * * shall he punished by a fine not exceeding $300 or by imprisonment not exceeding ten days.”

. Appellant was represented by court-appointed counsel in the trial court and by retained counsel on appeal.

. For an analysis of this theory see 103 U. Pa.L.Rev. 772-775, 779-782 (1951).

. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ferrer, 275 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1960); Gillen v. United States, 199 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1952).

. Johnson v. State, 172 Ala. 424, 55 So. 226 (1911); In re Lincoln, 102 Cal.App. 733, 283 P. 965 (1929); People v. Shambley, 4 Ill.2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954); Bower v. State, 135 N.J.L. 564, 53 A.2d 357 (1947); State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, 269 P. 793, 59 A.L.R. 1265 (1928); Roby v. State, 96 Wis. 667, 71 N.W. 1046 (1897).

. Commonwealth v. Fleckner, 167 Mass. 13, 44 N.E. 1053 (1896); Village of Avon v. Popa, 96 Ohio App. 147, 121 N.E.2d 254 (1953).

. Papaliolios v. Durning, 175 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1949); Davis v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 91 A.2d 14 (1952).

. Funkhouser v. United States, 282 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1960); State v. Fisher, 9 Terry 486, 48 Del. 486, 106 A.2d 766 (1954); Duncan v. State, 190 Md. 486, 58 A.2d 906 (1948); People v. Marks, 64 Misc. 679, 120 N.Y.S. 1106 (1909).

. See also, Coleman v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 191, 317 F.2d 891 (1963); Richards v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 212 F.2d 453 (1954), cert. denied 358 U.S. 886, 79 S.Ct. 126, 3 L.Ed.2d 114 (1958); Kyle v. United States, 288 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1961); Funkhouser v. United States, supra, note 8; Pledger v. United States, 272 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1959); Hartwell v. United States, 107 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1939).

. See also, cases cited in notes 6-8, supra.

. See the discussion of Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 909, 4 L.Ed.2d 963 (1960), in 28 U.Chi.L.Rev. 363 (1961).

. On oral argument it was learned that appellant’s application for employment with the National Security Agency had been rejected.

. Compare Canon 21, Canons of Judicial Ethics (1957).