Court Opinion

ID: 9913001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 17:01:05.725205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:44.365792
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 26 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-10279

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                2:21-cr-00253-RFB-BNW-1
 v.

JULIO ARENCIBIA,                                MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Nevada
                 Richard F. Boulware II, District Judge, Presiding

                    Argued and Submitted November 17, 2023
                            San Francisco, California

Before: FORREST and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and OLIVER,** District
Judge.
Partial Dissent by Judge FORREST.

      Defendant Julio Arencibia appeals from the district court’s amended

judgment and sentence, dated November 9, 2022. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Reviewing the district court’s interpretation

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The Honorable Solomon Oliver, Jr., United States Senior District
Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, its application of the Guidelines to the facts

of the case for abuse of discretion, and its factual findings for clear error, United

States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), we vacate

and remand for resentencing.

      Arencibia pleaded guilty in federal district court to one charge of felon in

possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Arencibia to 14 months’

incarceration, to run consecutive to any state sentence that may later be imposed

based on related conduct, and it imposed special conditions of supervised release.

One of those special conditions of supervised release impermissibly delegates to

the probation officer, “in consultation with the treatment provider,” supervision

over Arencibia’s participation in a mental health treatment program; accordingly,

we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. See United States v. Nishida,

53 F.4th 1144, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2022) (vacating sentence containing special

conditions of supervised release with identical delegation provisions).

      Arencibia also argues that vacatur is warranted because the district court

failed to apply section 5G1.3(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines or to adequately

explain its decision to impose a consecutive sentence. Section 5G1.3(c) provides

that where, as here, “a state term of imprisonment is anticipated to result from

another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction . . . , the

sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the

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anticipated term of imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) (emphasis added). We

have held that, in exercising its discretion to impose a concurrent or consecutive

sentence under section 5G1.3(d) of the Sentencing Guidelines, “[t]he district court

need not ‘always specifically justify its choice between concurrent and consecutive

sentences’ but may support its consecutive sentence by clearly explaining ‘its

choice of the sentence as a whole with reference to the factors listed in § 3553(a).’”

United States v. Shouse, 755 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United

States v. Fifield, 432 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir. 2005)). We make no ruling as to

whether it was appropriate to impose a consecutive sentence under the facts of this

case. But it is unclear whether the district court interpreted and applied § 5G1.3(c)

correctly because the district court neither (1) specifically justified its departure

from the Guidelines’ mandate of a concurrent sentence, nor (2) supported that

departure with reference to the factors listed in § 3553(a). On resentencing the

district court should consider whether to apply or depart from section 5G1.3(c).

      Because we vacate and remand for resentencing, we need not and do not

reach Arencibia’s argument that the district court’s amendment of a clerical error

in the original judgment violated Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

      VACATED and REMANDED.

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                                                                               FILED
United States of America v. Arencibia, No. 22-10279                             DEC 26 2023
Forrest, J., dissenting in part:                                            MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                             U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

      I agree that a remand is required as relates to the challenged special condition

of supervised release. See United States v. Nishida, 53 F.4th 1144, 1155 (9th Cir.

2022). I disagree, however, that the district court failed to sufficiently explain or

support its decision to impose a consecutive sentence. Because I conclude that the

district court adequately justified its sentence, I address Arencibia’s argument that

the district court impermissibly amended the final judgment under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 36.

                                             I.

      Section 5G1.3(c) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines provides that

when “a state term of imprisonment is anticipated to result from another offense that

is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction . . . , the sentence for the

instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the anticipated term of

imprisonment.” While this is mandatory language, a district court retains discretion

to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines. See United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d

769, 784 (9th Cir. 2008). But “[i]f [the court] does so, . . . [it] must adequately explain

the reason(s) for the deviation.” Id. A “court’s failure to provide a justification for its

decision not to apply” an applicable sentencing provision is error. Id.1

      1
      The majority relies on the legal standard articulated in United States v.
Shouse, 755 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2014), which provides that “[t]he district court
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      Here, the district court did “specifically justif[y] its departure from the

Guidelines’ mandate of a concurrent sentence.” Maj. Dispo. at 3. After considering

“the arguments of counsel” and “the guidelines in this case,” the district court

imposed a downward variance of 14 months’ imprisonment but ordered Arencibia’s

federal sentence to run consecutive to any state sentence he received. The district

court explained its decision as follows:

      I think that [a 14-month sentence is] a short enough sentence that it
      addresses just the possession, but it addresses possession with – while
      another felony is being committed. And if the State determines that
      there’s a more serious State offense related upon [Arencibia’s] conduct,
      then he will be sentenced on that. But I think a 14-month sentence on
      its own apart from that conduct is appropriate here and it’s appropriate
      to run them consecutive.

This reasoning explains why the district court concluded that a consecutive, rather

than concurrent, sentence is appropriate in this case. As such, in my view, the district

court appropriately justified its decision not to apply § 5G1.3(c).

need not always specifically justify its choice between concurrent and consecutive
sentences but may support its consecutive sentence by clearly explaining its choice
of the sentence as a whole with reference to the factors listed in § 3553(a).” Maj.
Dispo. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). In my view, the
present case is more akin to Armstead because that case likewise involved a
mandatory sentencing provision. 552 F.3d at 784. Shouse, on the other hand,
involved a sentencing provision affording district courts “broad discretion” whether
to run a sentence “concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively.” 755 F.3d
at 1108 (citation omitted). But here the district court sufficiently justified its
consecutive sentence under both Armstead and Shouse.
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                                             II.

      Because the majority remands for resentencing related to § 5G1.3(c), it does

not address Arencibia’s argument that the district court improperly amended the

judgment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Rule 36 provides that

“[a]fter giving any notice it considers appropriate, the court may at any time correct

a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in

the record arising from oversight or omission.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. This rule “is a

vehicle for correcting clerical mistakes but it may not be used to correct judicial

errors in sentencing.” United States v. Penna, 319 F.3d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 2003). We

review a district court’s decision to amend a criminal judgment under Rule 36 for

clear error. See United States v. Dickie, 752 F.2d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir. 1985) (per

curiam). Clear error exists only when we are left with “a ‘firm conviction’ that the

district court ‘misinterpreted the law’ or ‘committed a clear abuse of discretion.’” In

re Klamath Irrigation Dist., 69 F.4th 934, 941 (9th Cir. 2023).

      Initially when the district court ordered the 14-month sentence, it stated that

the sentence would “start today.” But the district court was struggling with how to

impose a consecutive sentence because Arencibia had not yet been sentenced (or

even tried) in state court, and it solicited the parties’ input on how to achieve its

intended sentence. After further considering the issue, the district court announced

that it would “run the [federal] sentence consecutive . . . to [Arencibia’s] [s]tate

                                            3
[c]ourt sentence,” without repeating that the sentence would start that day. The

district court subsequently found that the statement in the final judgment that the

sentence would “commence this day” was a clerical error. Under these

circumstances, the district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous, and I would affirm

on this issue.

      I respectfully dissent in part.

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