Court Opinion

ID: 9574431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:04:50.128211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:32.371023
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice
(concurring in result).
While I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, I do because I do not believe that the performance of field sobriety tests is subject to any constitutional privilege. I do not agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that “the defendant was not in custody, or otherwise significantly deprived of his freedom.” To the contrary, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant was “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in [a] significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
The courts have developed two tests for determining at what point Miranda applies: (1) the “focus” test of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), and (2) the objective-subjective test. See Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation?, 25 S.C.L.Rev. 699 (1974). See also State v. Paz, 31 Or.App. 851, 572 P.2d 1036 (1977). Under the “focus” test, Miranda applies when the investigation focuses on a particular suspect and the officer has probable cause to believe that a particular crime has been committed. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, Utah, 541 P.2d 1114 (1975). See also Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970). Under the objective-subjective test, Miranda applies if the actions of the police and the surrounding circumstances, fairly construed, would reasonably have led the defendant to believe that he was not free to leave at will. See Smith, supra, at 710-14.
I agree with the majority opinion’s statement of the general rule that “temporary detention for the purpose of investigating alleged traffic violations is not synonymous with in-custody interrogation which requires a Miranda warning.” See, e.g., State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz.App. 251, 431 P.2d 691 (1967) (recognizing that Miranda warnings are unnecessary for the investigation of “routine” traffic offenses); Annot., 31 A.L. R.3d 565 (1970); Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1076 (1969). However, the circumstances of the present case do not constitute the investigation of a “routine” traffic offense, but rather the investigation of a serious criminal act, driving while under the influence of intoxicants. See U.C.A., 1953, §§ 41-6-44 to -44.30 (1982 & Interim Supp.1982 & Spe*1173cial Supp.1982). I believe that the defendant was in custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his freedom within the meaning of the Miranda decision.
Under the focus test, there is no question that the officer’s investigation focused on the defendant. Furthermore, at the point where the officer requested the defendant to alight from the vehicle to perform the field sobriety tests, the officer had reasonable cause to believe that the particular crime of driving while under the influence had been committed. As stated in the majority opinion, the officer (1) observed the defendant’s car cross the center line three times within a one-block distance, (2) smelled an odor of alcohol coming from the car’s interior, and (3) noticed that the defendant’s speech was slurred. In State v. Darnell, 8 Wash.App. 627, 508 P.2d 613 (1973), the court stated:
Once the trooper had stopped the vehicle for traveling at an exceedingly slow speed and crossing the center line, had sensed the strong odor of alcohol in defendant’s vehicle, and observed defendant’s physical condition, he desired to further confirm his suspicions by physical tests. It was at that point that the investigation focused on defendant specifically for the crime charged. Once the trooper’s reasoning brought him to request these tests, Miranda applied, not to the tests about to be performed, but to any statements defendant might make during the giving of such tests.
Id. at 629-30, 508 P.2d at 615. Moreover, under the objective-subjective test, the officer’s requests that defendant alight from his vehicle to perform field sobriety tests would reasonably have led the defendant to believe that he was not free to leave at will. See Smith, supra. Thus, under either test, the defendant was in custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his freedom within the meaning of Miranda, supra.
The basic aim of the Miranda warning is to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. See Miranda, supra, at 444. Despite the differences in the language of the federal and various state constitutions, the privilege against self-incrimination has been held in an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions to be a bar only against compelling “communications” or “testimony” and not against requiring a suspect or accused to provide “real or physical evidence.” See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); 1 C. Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law § 2:31 (1969); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2263 & 2265 (McNaughton Rev.1961); Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 31 (1982). The defendant contends that the field sobriety tests violate his privilege against self-incrimination under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. However, the overwhelming weight of authority holds that, although a suspect or accused cannot be “compelled” to perform roadside or field sobriety tests, such tests do not violate an accused’s privilege against self-incrimination because they are nontestimonial in nature. See, e.g., People v. Ramirez, 199 Colo. 367, 374 n. 8, 609 P.2d 616, 620 n. 8 (1980) (citing cases from nineteen jurisdictions); State v. City of Tucson, 12 Ariz.App. 529, 472 P.2d 952 (1970); 3 R. Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases: Criminal-Civil § 32.02[4] (1982 & Supp.1982).
The defendant bases his contention that the field sobriety tests violate his privilege against self-incrimination under the Utah Constitution on the case of Hansen v. Owens, Utah, 619 P.2d 315 (1980). His reliance is well placed. However, I would overrule the Hansen decision. I believe that it was wrongly decided and runs contrary to the present construction of the privilege as overwhelmingly interpreted. See Comment, Hansen v. Owens-Expansion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Unknown Limits, 1981 Utah L.Rev. 447.
In conclusion, I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion but disagree with its analysis. The roadside or field sobriety tests do not violate a suspect’s or accused’s privilege against self-incrimination under the Utah Constitution. Thus, whether the defendant was in custody and *1174therefore entitled to the Miranda warning is irrelevant to the admissibility of that evidence.
HALL, C.J., dissents.