Court Opinion

ID: 9564979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:12:47.536691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:17.903858
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
specially concurring.
Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to resign because he knew too much. Even assuming that a forced resignation can be the equivalent of a dismissal, which we need not decide,1 plaintiff fails to state a claim. A wrongful discharge claim lies when an employer dismisses an employe because the *544employe pursued a recognized societal obligation. Patton v. J. C. Penney Co., 301 Or 117, 121-22, 719 P2d 854 (1986).2 In this case, plaintiff has not alleged dismissal because of any conduct on his part. Rather, the real gist of his claim is that his employer did not like him (or was nervous about having him around) and had no good reason to let him go. That simply is not enough to support a wrongful discharge claim. Accordingly, dismissal was proper.
Because I would resolve this case as stated above, it becomes necessary to go further and to deal with the “implied in fact” and “implied in law” arguments made by plaintiff.3 He concedes that there is no precedent recognizing his claim of breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to decisions to terminate at will employes. The rule that he proposes is so broad that it would literally swallow the at will rule, which has long been recognized as prevailing in this state. As we observed in Kofoid v. Woodard Hotels, Inc., 78 Or App 283, 287, 716 P2d 771 (1986), we should not be recognizing exceptions to the at will rule not yet recognized by the Supreme Court.
Therefore, I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I prefer to take a different route to get there.

 It may be that the pleadings in this case are defective under any interpretation of the concept of “discharge,” but I have deep reservations regarding the majority’s bare conclusion that a forced resignation does not constitute a discharge. The doctrine of “constructive discharge” is alive and well in many jurisdictions throughout the country and may — for all anyone knows — be the law in Oregon.

 Plaintiff does not argue that his claim falls within the second exception to the at will rule, that is, discharge of an employe for pursuing a private, employment-related right of established public interest. Delaney v. Taco Time Int’l., 297 Or 10, 15-16, 681 P2d 114 (1984).

 It would seem to me that these arguments are really nothing more than an attempt by plaintiff to revive the voluntariliy dismissed contract claim. Plaintiff wants to create, rather than to enforce, a bargain.