Court Opinion

ID: 9811061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:07:11.330852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:25.289548
License: Public Domain

MekriMON, C. J.
dissenting: The Court overruled all the exceptions of the defendants to the report of the referee. It, in effect, approved and adopted the latter’s finding of fact, particularly and affirmatively, that the plaintiff had exacted usury from Bobbitt & Hines. There was no objection to the findings of fact. Then, upon the pleadings and the report, including the findings of fact, it gave judgment for the plaintiff for the balance ascertained to be due to it from Bobbitt & Hines on the 31st day of October, 1886, less credits, but allowed no interest upon such balance, upon the ground that the plaintiff took usury from them from time to time on account of moneys advanced to them, and thereby forfeited its right to have interest on such balance agreed to be paid by the defendants. The plaintiff insists that the Court erred in refusing to allow such interest.
The facts were ascertained, and the Court seeing and considering the whole record should have given such judgment thereupon as the plaintiff was entitled to have, and it was erroneous to give any other. Then, did the Court give the proper judgment? I think not; that it misapprehended the purpose of the several covenants sued upon, and failed to interpret them correctly. They were not part or of the con*538tract between the plaintiff and Bobbitt & Hines, whereby the former agreed to advance money from time to time during the period specified to the latter; they were separate and collateral to that contract, and the simple purpose of them was to render the defendants responsible to the plaintiff for any balance of such advancements that might be due to it by virtue of the contract upon its termination, not exceeding the aggregate sums of money specified in the covenants, such balance to bear interest until paid at the rate of eight per centum per annum. The covenants so expressly declare and provide. The plaintiff did not “advance” or lend to the defendants any money during the time specified by virtue of such covenants, or any stipulation contained in them, nor was it intended it should, nor did it, exact from them on such account ¡my usury. The usuiy was exacted from Bobbitt & ITines, partners, on accouut of moneys advanced-to them from time to time during the period specified under their contract as partners, with the plaintiff. Nor did the latter exact usury from them as to the present cause ■ of action, but as to the contract between it and them as partners.
The liability of the defendants, the extent thereof, and particularly the measure thereof, must be determined by a ju»t interpretation of the several covenants sued upon. They each contain this explanatory obligatory provision: “The foregoing obligation is made to secure the Bank of Oxford, in part, for an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars, should it agree to advance to Bobbitt & Hines, copartners , in the .management of the Meadows Warehouse. The amount due at any time shall be evidenced by the account which the Bank of Oxford agrees to open with the said Bobbitt & Hines, and is to include and to secure all amounts drawn by them for any purpose whatsoever. * * * *
“ This agreement terminates on the 31st of October, 1886, and the obligors hereto shall be held bound for whatever *539balance may then appear to be due the said Bank of Oxford, with interest thereafter at the rate of eight per cent, per annum, not to exceed the sum of one thousand dollars.”
Now, this plainly implies that it was contemplated by the parties that the plaintiff would from time to time, within the period designated, advance to Bobbitt & Hines, partners, money not exceeding five thousand dollars, and if it should do so, then the defendants respectively would each be obliged to pay the plaintiff any balance of such advancements Bobbitt & Hines might owe it at the termination of that contract with it in that respect, not exceeding the sum each of the defendants covenanted to pay with interest at the rate stated. It was stipulated that the amount so due the plaintiff should be evidenced by the account it should open with Bobbitt & Hines, and that such account should “include and secure all amounts drawn by them for any purpose whatever.” But the words “ amounts drawn by them for any purpose whatever” do not imply for every possible purpose, or for any purpose legal or illegal; they imply, giving them their broadest meaning in favor of the plaintiff, amounts drawn in good faith for any legal purpose whatever; they do not imply amounts drawn for any illegal purpose within the knowledge of the plaintiff, and particularly any illegal purpose to be shared in or for the benefit of the plaintiff. It is not to be presumed or merely inferred that the parties to the covenants, whether covenantors or covenantees, contemplated or intended any such advancements of money or amounts to be drawn for illegal purposes or any illegal transactions, or that the plaintiff would knowingly make such advancements for illegal purposes. They contemplated and intended the utmost good faith on the part of the plaintiff towards the defendants, and the covenants of the latter are to be interpreted in that light. Hence the defendants did not covenant to pay to the plaintiff any usury charged against, exacted from or paid, or agreed to be paid by Bob*540bitt & Hines under their contract with it, to which their covenants sued upon had reference and to which they had relation collaterally; nor did they covenant to pay a balance of money due from them to the plaintiff augmented by such charges, exactions, or payments of usury, or the same agreed to be paid. There is nothing in the covenants that indicates a purpose to pay a balance thus, created in whole or in part.
The defendants covenanted to pay the plaintiff any such balance in its favor for money advanced. It might be contended that this implied money actually advanced — paid directly to Bobbitt & Hines; but it must be observed that the account which the plaintiff agreed to open with them was intended to embrace “all amounts drawn by them for any purpose whatever.” This fairly implies and embraces any “ amount drawn ” to pay the plaintiff lawful interest for the advances of money to them. The reasonable and just implication is that the defendants expected that the plaintiff would charge and require to be paid lawful interest upon such advances, and that they obliged themselves to be responsible on that account. The defendants were therefore liable, oach. to the plaintiff for a sum of money not exceeding that specified in the covenant executed by them on account of any balance of such advancements made to Bobbitt & Hines, partners, which balance should be ascertained by adding interest upon advancements unpaid until the 31st day of October, 1886, at the rate of six per cent, per annum. The rate of eight per cent, per annum cannot be allowed, because there was no agreement in .writing for that rate. The balance ascertained to be due to the plaintiff on the day last mentioned (that was the day after which further advancements could not be made as contemplated by the covenant of defendants) bore interest until paid at the rate of eight per cent, per annum — the covenants so expressly provided. The Court, seeing the whole record and learning from the *541report of the referee, approved by it, the amount of the balance due the plaintiff, should have given judgment in its favor for that balance including interest as above indicated.
It will be observed that no question as to usury paid by Bobbitt & Hines, partners, to the plaintiff properly arises in this case. The action is founded upon the covenants specified in the complaint, and, as said above, the liability of the defendants is determined by a proper interpretation of those covenants.
Per curiam. Error,