Court Opinion

ID: 9711408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:31:11.858086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:04.600125
License: Public Domain

Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
As the majority correctly notes, “[t]he primary question presented on this appeal is whether a motor vehicle lessee may invoke the provisions of a manufacturer’s warranty under the MagnusonMoss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312.” Ante, 186 N.J. at 432, 896 A.2d at 455 *437(2006). In its analysis, the majority also correctly notes that the scope of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is limited to statutorily defined “consumers” and that there are three categories of “consumers” under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.1 To the extent that both the Appellate Division and the majority conclude that plaintiff Christopher Ryan, the lessee of an automobile and not a purchaser of that automobile who claims the benefit of a written (not an implied) warranty, does not satisfy the first category of a statutorily defined “consumer” under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, that is, “a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer product,” I concur. Further, to the extent the majority disagrees with the Appellate Division and concludes that plaintiff does not satisfy the second category of a statutorily defined “consumer” under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act—“any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to the product”—I also concur.
However, I must part company with the majority in its endorsement of the Appellate Division’s conclusion that plaintiff does qualify as a “consumer” under the third and final category of the definition set forth in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: “any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract).” (emphasis supplied). Instead of relying, as the majority does, on Voelker v. Porsche Cars N. Am. Inc., 353 F.3d 516 (7th Cir.2003), a decision of a federal intermediate court of appeals applying state law, I embrace the thoughtful, cogent and, in my view, thorough analysis of the New York Court of Appeals in DiCintio v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 97 N.Y.2d 463, *438742 N.Y.S.2d 182, 768 N.E.2d 1121 (2002), where Chief Judge Kaye convincingly demonstrates that, in order for a claim to be cognizable under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the plaintiff must be a “consumer” who is entitled to claim the benefit of either a “written warranty” or a warranty implied by operation of State law. It is the interplay between these statutory definitions that requires that a “consumer” must be the purchaser of the product under warranty.
As Chief Judge Kaye explains, in its definitions the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires a sale of the product as a condition precedent to the existence of the “implied or written warranty” separately required in the statutory definition of a “consumer.” Id. at 470, 742 N.Y.S.2d 182, 768 N.E.2d at 1124. See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (defining “written warranty” as requiring the coalescence of two separate elements: (1) either a “written affirmation of fact or written promise” or “any undertaking in writing” and (2) that such written affirmation of fact, written promise or undertaking in writing be “made in connection with the sale of a consumer product....”); 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (defining “implied warranty” as one “arising under State law ... in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product.”).
The analysis, therefore, is simple and straightforward. In order to claim the remedies available under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the claimant must fall squarely within its statutory definitions. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, by its own explicit terms, requires that there be a “sale of a consumer product” to a “consumer” before its remedial measures in respect of the enforcement of either an “implied or written warranty” can be reached.2 Plaintiff here did not purchase the car; he leased it *439from Ms car dealer. In those circumstances, CMef Judge Kaye said it best:
In sum, because [plaintiffs] transaction with [his lessor] was a lease rather than a sale, and there is no other relevant sale, there is no “written warranty” or “implied warranty” under the [Magnuson-Moss] Warranty Act and [plaintiff] is not a “consumer.” Because he is not a consumer, [plaintiff] can find no relief in the substantive sections of the [Magnuson-Moss] Warranty Act.
[DiCintio v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., supra, 97 N.Y.2d at 475, 742 N.Y.S.2d 182, 768 N.E. 2d at 1127.]
Chief Judge Kaye’s clear logic is compelled by the unambiguous terms of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
For affirmed as modified—CMef Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN and WALLACE—6.
For concurrence in part; dissent in part—Justice RIVERA-SOTO—1.

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does not use the term "categories" in respect of the several statutory definitions of "consumer" set forth at 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3); the concept of "categories" of "consumers" is nothing more than a judicially-created gloss on the statutory definition. See, e.g., Peterson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 281 Wis.2d 39, 697 N.W.2d 61, 66 n. 10 (2005).

 As counsel for plaintiff recognized at oral argument, New Jersey acknowledges other available remedies specifically addressing the repair of automobiles. See generally Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 254-55, 872 A.2d 783 (2005). Counsel candidly admitted that the issue before us is not whether this particular plaintiff is without a remedy—for plaintiff readily admits the availability of other remedies on his warranty claim—but simply counsel's *439claim for attorney’s fees available under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, yet unavailable elsewhere. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). We therefore now expand the reach of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act not because there is a gap in remedies to the consumer, but to allow for attorney fee-shifting that is generally disfavored in our law, see In re Estate of Vayda, 184 N.J. 115, 120-25, 875 A.2d 925 (2005), but otherwise permitted under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.