Court Opinion

ID: 9757382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:38:12.422014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:38.841322
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
with whom TERRY, Associate Judge, joins, concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part:
I continue to subscribe to the views expressed in the opinion of the division vacated by the en banc court, Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University v. Georgetown University, 496 A.2d 567, 587 (D.C.1985) (Gay Rights I). Thus, I continue to believe that Georgetown University may not lawfully refuse to accord the plaintiff gay rights groups “University recognition,” which means (1) status equal to that of the other student groups formally recog*47nized by the university, including permission to use the university name, and (2) the tangible benefits uniformly available to other recognized groups such as office space, supplies and equipment, a telephone, computer label and mailing services, student advertising privileges, financial counseling, and the opportunity to apply for lecture fund privileges and for other funding. I therefore concur, as far as it goes, in the result proposed by Judge Mack, joined by Chief Judge Pryor and Judge Newman, requiring the university to make the second category of (tangible) benefits available to the gay rights groups. But I respectfully dissent from the views of those three colleagues, as well as Judges Belson and Nebeker, who would deny the first category of (intangible) relief plaintiffs have requested.1
Georgetown has not cross-appealed the trial court’s ruling that the university has violated the Human Rights Act. Nonetheless, five of my colleagues have addressed the statute. Judges Mack, Pryor, and Newman distinguish between two types of impact: while agreeing that Georgetown has violated the Act in a “tangible” respect, they justify Georgetown’s “intangible” discriminatory conduct by saying the Act does not reach it. In contrast, Judges Belson and Nebeker, while not accepting this dichotomy, doubt that Georgetown has violated the Act in any respect but conclude a remand would be necessary to determine whether their surmise is true. They leave open the possibility that, if improperly motivated, Georgetown has violated the Act by failing to accord not only the tangible, facilities benefits but also the intangible, recognition status. As to the constitutional issue, Judges Mack, Pryor, and Newman conclude that the Act, as far as it reaches, does not violate Georgetown’s first amendment rights, whereas Judges Belson and Nebeker believe that no application of the Act to Georgetown on this record can survive a constitutional defense. None of these analyses is persuasive.
I propose to show, in Part I, why Judges Mack, Pryor, and Newman erroneously distinguish between tangible and intangible benefits in evaluating the reach of the Human Rights Act and in sustaining the constitutionality of the Act only as to the former. Next, in Part II, I reject Judge Belson’s contention, adopted by Judge Ne-beker, that although the Human Rights Act enjoins discrimination based on “preference or practice,” it can never reach discrimination directed at “speech” or “advocacy.” It can, since one’s speech is an essential part of who one is as a person and thus reflects one’s preference or practice. Furthermore, even assuming the validity of Judge Belson’s distinction, the Act can extend to discrimination directed at speech, depending on the motive behind, or the means of accomplishing, the discrimination.
As to the constitutional issue, which I believe is the only issue in the case, Gay Rights I, 496 A.2d at 568,1 address in Part III why the free exercise clause of the first amendment does not accord Georgetown the right, in derogation of the Human Rights Act, to withhold from the gay rights groups the complete “University recognition” — the intangible, official status with attendant tangible benefits — they seek. Basically, Georgetown does not have an absolute first amendment right to withhold any aspect of such recognition, and, on this record, the university does not otherwise have that right because a compelling governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden the Act places on Georgetown’s exercise of its religious beliefs.
*48Finally, in Part IV, I discuss why Judge Belson’s effort, joined by Judge Nebeker, to protect Georgetown on first amendment grounds from having to grant plaintiffs access to the tangible benefits is altogether misplaced. As Judge Belson acknowledges, the university expressly waived at oral argument any first amendment objection to providing such benefits (called “relatively insignificant” in its brief). His analysis, therefore, is altogether gratuitous. In any event, the Supreme Court cases on which Judge Belson relies actually support plaintiffs’ position.
I.
A.
On appeal, both at division and en banc, Georgetown University has never questioned the trial court’s ruling that the university’s refusal to “recognize” the two gay rights groups as official student organizations violates the District of Columbia Human Rights Act’s prohibition against discrimination by an educational institution as to use of its “facilities and services” based upon “sexual orientation.” D.C. Code § 1-2520(1) (1987). In fact, Georgetown has stated in its brief a desire “not to appeal separately that ruling” and thus has sought to defend itself on appeal solely on the ground that the Act, as applied, is unconstitutional under the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
Judge Mack, however, citing the “deeply rooted doctrine that a constitutional issue is to be avoided” to the extent possible, attempts to decide the case first under the Act and, as a consequence, purports not to reach the constitutional question insofar as it pertains to the intangible, status element of “university recognition.” Ante at 16, & n. 13.2 She argues that compelled “University recognition” of gay rights groups would constitute compelled speech endorsing the groups' values, that the university has an absolute first amendment right not to be forced to speak in any way, and that the Human Rights Act, therefore, cannot properly be construed to require the university to speak in derogation of its religious principles. Because, however, the Act expressly mandates nondiscriminatory access to “facilities and services,” Judge Mack finds she must squarely face the first amendment problems with forcing the university to provide tangible benefits. She concludes that the District of Columbia’s compelling interest in enforcing the Act substantially outweighs Georgetown’s first amendment interest in withholding facilities support from student gay rights groups. As a result, according to Judge Mack, the plaintiffs are entitled to gain tangible benefits from this litigation but no acknowledged status.3
*49In reality, however, Judge Mack, as well as Chief Judge Pryor and Judge Newman who join her, do address and resolve the constitutionality of both the tangible and intangible elements of “University recognition.” In construing the Act not to apply to the plaintiffs’ requested status as a “recognized” group, Judge Mack does not rely exclusively on a statutory ground for decision in the classic sense that constitutional concerns need not be addressed, e.g., when the court relies exclusively on plain language, on legislative history, or on a dis-positive legal doctrine. See, e.g., Capitol Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 81 L.Ed.2d 580 (1984) (federal preemption doctrine obviates need to reach first amendment issue). Rather, she declines to find a “recognition” requirement in the Act primarily because of her expressed desire to “protect[ ] its constitutionality” as applied. Ante at 16.4 This desire to save the statute from constitutional infirmity reflects a doctrine quite different from the doctrine favoring a statutory over a constitutional ground for decision when both are independently available; for Judge Mack, a constitutional analysis determines the statutory analysis. Accordingly, whether this court concludes that the Act stops short of requiring “University recognition” in order to preserve its constitutionality, or were to hold instead that the Act does extend to status but is unconstitutional as applied, the result would essentially be the same: either approach depends on a lengthy constitutional analysis. As a practical matter, therefore, in seeking to “ ‘ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided,’ ” United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 175-76, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1706, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983) (citation omitted), Judge Mack has provided a clear answer: it is “no.”
Moreover, the theoretical tools Judge Mack and her colleagues employ to show that denying the status of “University recognition” does not violate the Human Rights Act are inadequate to the task. As elaborated below, the Human Rights Act demands more than nondiscriminatory access to tangible benefits; and, in any event, the distinction drawn between tangible and intangible benefits does not serve to enhance the constitutionality of the Act. As I see it (and to this extent I agree with Judges Belson and Nebeker), compelled “University recognition” either is constitutional in both its aspects or is altogether unconstitutional; there is no middle ground.
B.
If Judge Mack and her colleagues are correct — if gay rights groups must have access to tangible benefits equal to that of other groups but may lawfully be excluded from the list of officially “recognized” student groups having access to the same benefits — then the Act permits a “separate but equal” access to university facilities and services reminiscent of the justification that once permitted blacks on public buses, but only in the back. The Act’s protections are not so narrow.
The Human Rights Act, D.C.Code § 1-2520 (1987), provides in relevant part: *50Judge Mack agrees with the trial court that Georgetown University has denied facilities and services to the student gay rights groups on the basis of sexual orientation. By stating, however, that the Act does not require the university to accord the status, in contrast with the tangible benefits, of “University recognition,” Judge Mack ignores the fact that her own interpretation, just as clearly, will result in discrimination that violates the Act: it will “restrict... or condition the use of, or access to, ... facilities and services ... based upon sexual orientation.” As a result of this court’s decision today incorporating Judge Mack’s proposed result, supra note 1, the gay rights groups’ access to tangible benefits will be restricted to and conditioned upon their not receiving the same University citizenship rights inherent in every other group’s use of the same facilities and services. To me, that conditional access is an obvious affront to human dignity, amounting to a form of discrimination at least as intolerable as the denial of tangible facilities and services. Cf. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (actionable sexual harassment under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 not limited to “economic” or “tangible” discrimination but includes “hostile environment” as well). I have no difficulty concluding that withholding such a significant form of citizenship in a university community results in a demeaning, and thus conditional, access to facilities and services that violates the plain language of the statute.
*49It is an unlawful discriminatory practice, subject to the exceptions in § l-2503(b), for an educational institution:
(1) to deny, restrict, or to abridge or condition the use of, or access to, any of its facilities and services to any person otherwise qualified, wholly or partially, for a discriminatory reason, based upon the race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, political affiliation, source of income or physical handicap of any indi-vidual_ [Emphasis added.]
*50An analogy to a similar form of discrimination helps underscore the point. Suppose, hypothetically, that a local private college religiously wedded to the views of the clergy who once offered a Biblical defense of slavery,5 or to the more recently expressed views of Bob Jones University,6 sought to limit black student groups to the tangible benefits of student activities by stressing that, because of their racial inferiority and/or their advocacy of racial intermarriage, they could not be officially “recognized” by the college on a par equal with other groups, such as a student chapter of the local Masonic lodge. Or, suppose that the same local college admitted self-acknowledged homosexuals to all degree-granting programs but carried them on all official college rosters, including the commencement program, under the exclusive heading of “evil” students. I cannot imagine anyone seriously would contend that the Human Rights Act does not prohibit such second-class, restricted access to college facilities and services — that the Act tolerates such a “hostile environment.” Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 2409.
It appears to me, therefore, that because the Act expressly bars discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well as race, sex, age, and other specified characteristics — and because it does not say that one form of discrimination may be less unlawful than another — the Act thus clearly proscribes all aspects of Georgetown’s non-recognition of student gay rights groups, just as it would proscribe similarly discriminatory treatment of racial groups.7 I therefore perceive no basis in Judge Mack’s opinion for disturbing the trial court’s ruling that Georgetown’s refusal to accord “University recognition,” as such, violated the Human Rights Act. Again, it follows: the only substantial question is *51whether the free exercise clause of the first amendment protects any aspect of Georgetown’s discriminatory policy.8
C.
Just as Judge Mack’s distinction between tangible, and intangible benefits is not helpful in defining the reach of the Human Rights Act, it provides little enlightenment for resolving the constitutional question that is at the heart of Judge Mack’s statutory analysis. Judge Mack distinguishes tangible from intangible benefits because she believes that compelling the university to give equal access to the intangible benefit of “recognition” would force it to speak in conflict with its religious tenets, whereas government-ordered access to tangible benefits would compel only conduct, not speech. The difference is critical, Judge Mack contends, because the first amendment absolutely forbids the government to compel speech but does not necessarily bar compelled conduct burdening religious practice. Consequently, she says, only the demand to provide the status of “University recognition” automatically violates the free exercise clause; requiring the mere “conduct” of giving equal access to tangible benefits, while burdening Georgetown’s free exercise rights, is nonetheless constitutionally permitted if justified by a compelling state interest. See ante at 20-22.
(1)
As elaborated in Gay Rights I and later in this opinion, I do not believe that either the intangible or the tangible benefits of “University recognition,” if required, would violate Georgetown’s free exercise rights. But, if Judge Mack were correct that compelled verbal “recognition” of the student groups would be a compelled religious stand in violation of the first amendment, I do not comprehend how enforcement of student access to visible, tangible benefits such as an office, a telephone, mailing services, and advertising privileges financed by the university would be any less evidently an unconstitutional requirement. Forced financial support for particular ideas is, in general, no less a required endorsement than compelled verbal support: depending on the circumstances, compelled financial support may well constitute an infringement of first amendment protections. See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 236-36, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1799-1800, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Judge Mack’s analysis virtually ignores this constitutional reality.
(2)
Furthermore, contrary to Judge Mack’s premise, even if one views forced “recognition” as a form of compelled speech, it is not for that reason automatically unconstitutional. Judge Mack equates “recognition” with “endorsement” and “endorsement” with “speech,” which she asserts the government cannot compel even when its actions are grounded in a compelling state interest such as ending discrimination based on sexual orientation. Her analysis is too simple, for it glides over a crucial question: assuming that “recognition” is a form of “endorsement,” what exactly is it an endorsement of — a student group’s values or, instead, merely a group’s right to exist on campus and to advocate its values? The former is speech; the latter may not be.
Judge Mack states that “recognition” constitutes “endorsement,” meaning “religious approval of or neutrality towards the student groups.” Ante at 19. She treats the question as a factual issue settled by the trial court subject only to the clearly erroneous standard of review. On the contrary, however, the nature of the “endorsement” that “recognition” represents is ultimately a legal rather than a purely *52factual question, and, in any case, the trial court did not supply the answer.
It should be obvious that the constitutional significance of an act, such as the giving of “University recognition,” is a question of law which the court of appeals must evaluate in detail. The constitutional significance of an act as “speech” or as “endorsement” of a particular moral or ideological position, therefore, must be understood as an objective question. If the actor’s subjective view of what an act means were to determine whether compelling the act is unconstitutional, then every private actor would hold a veto over all our civil rights laws; an employer, for example, could interpret having to hire members of all races on an equal footing as a statement of approval of their moral equality — a statement which, under Judge Mack’s analysis of free speech or free exercise immunity, the employer could not be compelled to make. There is no simple legal standard for translating the constitutional concepts of speech and endorsement into an empirical question of fact comparable, for example, to the question of a person’s motive for an act of discrimination. The constitutionality of compelling a given act suggests questions too intimately bound up with a history of Supreme Court opinions addressing a great variety of demands on private actors to be treated as an ordinary factual issue for resolution in the trial court.
In the present case, therefore, we may accept the trial court’s finding of fact that Georgetown sincerely views “recognition” as “endorsement,” but that only begins the inquiry. Thus, Judge Mack’s deference to the trial court’s finding only serves to avoid a responsibility that this court must squarely face: to argue through the controversial problem of what “recognition” means constitutionally — an analysis that this court is in as good a position as the trial court to make, since the question is, fundamentally, one of law.9
Furthermore, even if the trial court’s characterization of “recognition” as “endorsement” were purely a finding of fact, the trial court simply did not make the kind of finding Judge Mack claims it made. In Judge Bacon’s order upholding Georgetown’s free exercise defense, the judge stated that “[t]he major purpose of ‘university recognition’ is official endorsement, an endorsement which the University believes will conflict with the normative teachings of the Church on homosexuality.” This finding does not specify what kind of moral or ideological position such “recognition” is an “endorsement” of. Moreover, the trial court’s order provides no basis for believing the court itself understood its finding to be one of constitutional fact or even of constitutional significance. The trial court’s order, therefore, cannot provide the foundation for Judge Mack’s constitutional argument that “recognition” means endorsement of the sort absolutely forbidden by the Constitution.
(3)
Turning to the constitutional question itself, I agree with Judge Mack that regulations literally compelling someone to speak moral or ideological statements are directly and extremely intrusive upon the individu*53al’s freedom of belief and expression; probably no countervailing state interest could render such compulsions constitutional. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (holding states cannot force schoolchildren to say pledge of allegiance to flag); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961) (holding government cannot require declaration of belief in God as condition of holding public office). In contrast, however, regulations requiring one actor to provide a forum for, and in this way to subsidize, the speech of another may prove far less intrusive on first amendment rights than a regulation forcing a person to speak with his or her own voice; therefore, a state interest may well exist sufficient to justify such compelled support of someone else’s views. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (“Notwithstanding that it burdens protected speech,” law requiring public utilities to include in billing envelopes statements regarding energy issues prepared by others “could be valid if it were a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest”); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (mandatory contributions to Social Security, despite religious objections, did not violate first amendment because compelling state interest justified that burden on religion); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980) (state law requiring shopping center to permit distribution of pamphlets on its property did not violate owner’s first amendment rights); Abood, supra (although public employee’s mandatory union dues may not, consistent with first amendment, be used to support “ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining,” such mandatory dues may be used to support collective bargaining even though such activities are highly ideological to some members of union).
Judge Mack argues from the premise that requiring Georgetown to give “recognition” is constitutionally the same as requiring school children to recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag (Barnette) or state office-holders to affirm their belief in God (Torcaso). Only in this way can she conclude that, in this case, we have a simple example of compelled speech absolutely forbidden by the Constitution. But, in equating compelled “recognition” with the forced ideological statements at issue in Barnette and Torcaso, Judge Mack has pulled one sentence about “endorsement” from the trial court order and made it the linchpin of a sophisticated constitutional theory on which the trial court itself did not rely. In fact, however, that trial court finding is perfectly consistent with the view expressed in Gay Rights I, 496 A.2d at 573-74, that on this record “recognition” represents, at most, official “endorsement” of the gay student groups’ right to organize on campus and pursue their own moral agenda. Thus, requiring Georgetown to “recognize” the gay rights groups may amount to no more than compelled “tolerance” by one entity of the beliefs and speech of another (the kind of forced toleration that is at the very heart of all our civil rights laws) and, to the extent such “recognition” brings tangible benefits, compelled subsidization of another’s speech.10
Judge Mack’s assumption that “recognition” means “endorsement” of a recognized group’s values, then, slides over the central question whether legally compelled “recognition” constitutes forced speech expressing approval of or neutrality toward another’s values, or merely amounts to required toleration of someone else’s speech. A precise answer to this question is essential because Supreme Court decisional law has created this distinction. Cases like Pacific *54Gas & Electric, Lee, and Abood, on which Judge Mack herself relies, along with PruneYard, which she attempts to distinguish, establish beyond doubt that a compelling state interest can, in some circumstances, justify forcing a private actor such as Georgetown to provide a forum and related support for someone else’s speech with which it does not agree. I agree with the trial court (Judge Braman) that the Human Rights Act clearly protects the student groups’ right to equal treatment on campus. I also accept Georgetown’s claim that “recognizing” the gay rights groups, even to the extent of compelled toleration, burdens its exercise of religion. Contrary to the course Judge Mack has taken, however, I conclude, as did the trial court (Judge Bacon), supra note 10, that there is no absolute constitutional bar on such compelled “recognition.” Instead, as elaborated below, a compelling state interest may overcome the specific burden that official toleration (rather than merely the de facto toleration Georgetown now practices by permitting student body endorsement) would impose on the university.
(4)
In sum, in making a constitutional distinction between tangible and intangible benefits, Judge Mack does not discuss why compelled provision of tangible benefits for a group with an announced cause is not constitutionally equivalent to compelled verbal support.11 Nor does Judge Mack satisfactorily explain why cases such as Pacific Gas & Electric and Abood, on which she explicitly relies, do not support the student groups’ claim to “recognition” status, given her conclusion that eradicating discrimination based on sexual orientation is a compelling state interest. The lesson I draw from the long line of Supreme Court decisions on which Judge Mack relies is that no formal distinction between intangible and tangible benefits, or between “speech” and “conduct,” can resolve the constitutionality of requiring Georgetown to grant the status and the benefits of “University recognition.”
D.
Despite Judge Mack’s purported reliance on statutory construction for part of her analysis, I have tried to show that her interpretation of the reach of the Act is too limited. I have also tried to show, in any event, that her interpretation is entirely governed by constitutional analysis that fails to define “recognition” or “endorsement” with sufficient precision and that further suffers from internal inconsistency in attempting to create a meaningful distinction between tangible and intangible aspects of “University recognition.” Thus, we need to take a fresh look at the only real issue on appeal: “whether Georgetown’s unwillingness to ‘recognize’ the gay rights groups — as that concept is to be understood — must be excused on the ground that the Human Rights Act, as applied, impermissibly interferes with the University’s constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.” Gay Rights I, 496 A.2d at 568. I return to this central question in Part III. First, however, I wish to address Judge Belson’s effort to show that, although he believes a remand would be necessary to clarify the university’s motives, the Human Rights Act would not bar Georgetown’s actions toward the gay rights groups if motivated solely by a desire to suppress advocacy of homosexual conduct.
*55ii.
In contrast with Judge Mack, Judge Bel-son reads the Human Rights Act in a way that may not proscribe any of Georgetown’s discriminatory conduct. He argues that the Act’s reference to “sexual orientation” only forbids discrimination based on sexual “preference or practice,” not discrimination based on “advocacy,” meaning “promotion of ideas or activities.” Post at 65. If Georgetown engaged only in the latter sort of discrimination, he says, it did not violate the Act. But for his disposition of the appeal on constitutional grounds, on the assumption that Georgetown has violated the Act, Judge Belson would remand for further proceedings to clarify the university’s motives.
There are two problems with Judge Bel-son’s analysis. First, given the trial court findings on which he relies — and which are supported by the record — no remand is necessary to determine the university’s motives for purposes of evaluating whether Georgetown has violated the Human Rights Act. Indeed, on the basis of the findings by both trial judges in the statutory and constitutional phases of the proceedings — which Judge Belson himself suggests we can rely on for purposes of analyzing all issues in this case — the student groups are entitled to prevail on the statutory issue. Second, Judge Belson incorrectly argues that the Act can never, consistent with the Constitution, interdict discrimination directed at “speech” or “advocacy.”
A.
According to Judge Belson, Georgetown claims it denied “University recognition” because it disagreed with the ideas the gay rights groups were propagating, not because the groups were composed primarily of homosexuals. Judge Belson perceives, however, that the trial court (Judge Bra-man) mistakenly understood the Human Rights Act to forbid discrimination against a group on account of its advocacy. Post at 65. Consequently, suggests Judge Bel-son, the trial court appears to have concluded, erroneously, that Georgetown’s own stated reasons for its actions violated the Act, and thus, he says, the court improperly granted summary judgment for the students on the statutory issue. Judge Belson further suggests, however, that this court can evaluate the appropriateness of summary judgment under the Act by reference to additional findings by Judge Bacon in connection with her evaluation of Georgetown’s free exercise defense. Post at 66-67. Judge Belson then acknowledges that Judge Bacon’s findings do not warrant summary judgment for the university under the Act; they do not establish that the only basis for the university’s discrimination was the student groups’ promotion of ideas or of activities. Accordingly, he concludes, but for the appropriateness of disposing of the case solely on constitutional grounds, he would remand to the trial court “for findings of fact and conclusions of law addressed specifically to the statutory issues,” post at 66-67, in particular the university’s motives.
Judge Belson is correct in noting, post at 67 n. 9, that Judge Bacon found “the President of Georgetown University, the Dean of the Law Center, and defendants’ expert witness” — in attempting to justify Georgetown’s discriminatory actions on religious grounds — applied Catholic teachings with two realities in mind: “[t]he gay student organizations, as evidenced by their charters and their activities, were participating in and promoting homosexual life styles.” (Emphasis added.) We thus have an express finding of discrimination based not only on advocacy (“promoting”) but also, in Judge Belson’s words, post at 65, on “status as a member of a protected group” (“participating” in homosexual lifestyles). It is not clear, therefore, why Judge Belson fails to acknowledge that Judge Bacon supplied a supplementary finding sufficient to sustain Judge Bra-man’s ruling that the university violated the Human Rights Act. Judge Mack’s lengthy analysis of the record, ante at 26-29, unquestionably validates the finding that the university was motivated not merely by aversion to the gay rights groups’ “promotion of ideas or activities,” post at 65, but also by disdain for their status, i.e., their sexual “preference or *56practice.” D.C.Code § 1-2502(28) (1987) (definition of “sexual orientation” quoted by Judge Belson, post at 65).
Given my colleagues’ emphasis on statutory analysis, it is important to emphasize that, if the full court were to come to grips with the question whether summary judgment or a remand is the more appropriate avenue for resolution of the statutory issue on this record, we would unanimously agree, at least as to tangible benefits, that the university is not entitled to judgment. Moreover, even if a remand were required, the only practical purpose, according to Judge Belson’s analysis, would be to determine whether Georgetown’s only motive in denying “University recognition” was to block advocacy; if the motives were mixed — if one of the reasons for the university’s discriminatory withholding of recognition was an aversion to homosexual preference or practice — then Judge Belson himself, I gather, would agree the Act has been violated, since the statute bars discrimination if “wholly or partially” based upon “sexual orientation.” Id. § 1-2520.
Finally, I understand Judge Belson to agree that if, upon remand, the court were to find that the university’s motives were mixed, then the university would have violated the Act by withholding the intangible (status), as well as the tangible (facilities), benefits; he does not join in Judge Mack’s reading of the Act that would exclude a requirement of nondiscriminatory, verbal recognition from the reach of the Act. Thus, four of the seven judges on this case (Belson, Nebeker, Ferren, Terry) agree that if Georgetown was motivated, in part, by an aversion to the plaintiff groups’ homosexual preference or practice — as Judges Mack, Pryor, Newman, Ferren, and Terry agree it was — then the university’s failure to accord recognition status, as well as facilities support, violated the Human Rights Act.
Judge Bacon has made findings of fact indicating mixed motives, and the record supports those findings. Judge Belson, however, does not face up to that reality; inexplicably, he leaves room for the possibility that Georgetown, despite Judge Bacon’s findings that augment Judge Bra-man’s, may not have violated the Act. And yet, in shifting to his constitutional analysis, he adopts as a working “premise” what the record and the trial court’s findings, at best, establish for the university: that Georgetown denied recognition to the student groups “in large part,” but not exclusively, “because of the groups’ sponsorship and promotion of ideas and activities.” Post at 67. That record-based premise, drawn from sound trial court findings that the university discriminated by reference both to advocacy and to lifestyle, clinches the argument that Georgetown has violated the Act in denying “University recognition.” No remand would be necessary to establish that violation.
B.
There is a more general, though fundamental weakness of Judge Belson’s analysis — of his unqualified proposition that the Act cannot be construed to forbid the suppression of “speech” or “advocacy.” The distinction between discrimination based on advocacy and on status will not work. Part of who a person is, is what he or she says; to deny the right to speak is to deny an essential aspect of one’s person. In this sense, therefore, an asserted right to discriminate against someone’s advocacy of homosexuality is clearly a claimed right to discriminate against the person on the basis of one’s sexual “preference” and thus “sexual orientation.” D.C.Code §§ 1-2502(28), -2520(1) (1987).
Assume, however, it is true, as Judge Belson contends, that the Act does not forbid discrimination motivated solely by a desire to prevent the speech activities of a group. Two caveats are in order. First, the means chosen to discriminate against advocacy (here, non-recognition of the plaintiff groups) does not necessarily prove that the underlying motive is merely to prevent the propagation of a repugnant doctrine on campus. The university’s action may be directed solely at speech activities (let us assume it is), but that action may still be illegal under the Act if motivated, even in part, by dislike for those *57who prefer or practice homosexuality. I believe Judge Belson agrees.12
Second, even if the university were motivated solely by a desire to shut down offensive speech activities, the means chosen to counter repugnant speech might nonetheless violate the Act. Even if the Act were construed not to forbid discrimination against homosexual ideas, it unquestionably does forbid discrimination against homosexuals because of their ideas. Discrimination that goes beyond the ideas to the person violates the Act no matter what the motive. See D.C.Code § 1-2532 (1987) (any practice having “effect or consequence” of violating Act is unlawful). Accordingly, even if censorship in this context, when properly motivated, were lawful, an act excluding or degrading a group to accomplish censorship would not be lawful.
As indicated, I believe any effort to distinguish under the Act between legal discrimination against ideas and illegal discrimination against persons fails to take into account that ideas — and advocacy — are an essential part of the person. But even if the distinction could be made, it is not easy to draw, in part because means capable of achieving the former may amount to the latter. I believe Judge Belson has overlooked, both in his analysis and in its application, the possibility that Georgetown’s refusal to recognize the plaintiff groups, if only because of an aversion to their advocacy, is likely to be — indeed, inevitably is in the context of a university — an overly broad response that effectively discriminates against persons in violation of the Act.
Because every member of the court, for one reason or another, proceeds to decide the case on the premise that the Human Rights Act has been violated, no more analysis of the Act itself would be useful. I therefore turn to the constitutional issue. As I see it, the Act cannot constitutionally require Georgetown to approve, condemn, or even express its neutrality toward the moral value of homosexuality, but the Act constitutionally may, and does, require that Georgetown tolerate others in the university environment who espouse that moral value; and, given the nature of a university, such toleration presupposes “University recognition” — as I now shall elaborate.
III.
The fundamental question is: whether plaintiffs’ request for “University recognition” — meaning full citizenship as student groups at Georgetown University — may be denied, even though in violation of the Human Rights Act, because of Georgetown’s first amendment rights. I developed my argument why the answer is “no” — why Georgetown’s constitutional defense fails— in the division opinion over two years ago, Gay Rights I, 496 A.2d at 574-82, and I will not repeat it all here. But as to the crucial issue — indeed, the principal conceptualization that divides the court — I want to emphasize again that, on this record, “University recognition” or “endorsement” of the plaintiff student groups does not mean, explicitly or implicitly, a statement of approval — or even of neutrality — toward homosexuality, gay rights, or related matters. Because of the nature of the university, the Human Rights Act in no way compels Georgetown to take a position in violation of its right to free exercise of religious beliefs.
In context — and context is critically important — the Act only requires Georgetown not to discriminate against student groups that wish to express their own views in what I believe we may call, without fear of contradiction, a typical private university marketplace of ideas, which inherently stands for freedom of expression. That marketplace is analogous, for constitutional purposes, to the shopping center in *58PruneYard, supra. There, the Supreme Court held that the first amendment rights of the shopping center owner did not justify barring pamphleteers from exercising their own free speech rights in the common areas open to the public. A legal requirement that Georgetown make its university-wide forum available on a nondiscriminatory basis to all student citizens of the university does not, in my view, imply in any way that the university corporation/administration itself can be reasonably identified with the views of any particular student organization or that the university, as such, has a position — pro, con, or neutral — on any particular message a student group happens to spread. The Human Rights Act, therefore, does not require Georgetown to espouse any view or to intimate even a neutral opinion.13
The Human Rights Act’s demands, as they bear on Georgetown University, stand in sharp contrast with laws that have compelled individuals to utter particular speech, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (compelled ideological message on state license plate); Torcaso v. Watkins, supra (required oath of belief in God for notaries public); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, supra (compelled pledge of allegiance to flag), or to disseminate a message of others in a “hitherto private forum,” Pacific Gas & Electric, 475 U.S. at 12 n. 8, 106 S.Ct. at 910 n. 8 (1986) (plurality opinion) (compelled inclusion of flyer from ratepayer’s organization with utility bill to customers); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974) (required inclusion in newspaper of reply by political candidate whose character and record newspaper had assailed).
There is a recognized constitutional distinction between a requirement that others be permitted to express what are clearly their own ideas in your forum, when you manifestly provide a public forum (Prune-Yard), and a requirement that you must express the ideas of others (Wooley; Torcaso; Barnette) or must spread, and thus implicitly affirm, those ideas in your own private forum, absent a dissociative statement (Pacific Gas & Electric; Tomillo). For reasons elaborated at division, Gay Rights I, 496 A.2d at 577-82, I believe the PmneYard analysis is controlling here.14 While there obviously are differences between a private university and a private shopping center, the fact that each, for entirely different reasons, has become a traditional forum for the expression of diverse, often conflicting ideas provides a context compelling a conclusion that, by definition, even a private university proprietor cannot reasonably be associated with any idea it does not affirmatively embrace. At most, therefore, “University recognition” of a gay rights group implies no more than the university’s “official tolerance,” Gay Rights I, 496 A.2d at 574, of still another student organization in a pluralistic environment — a tolerance to be expected, indeed taken for granted, in any university that purports to be open to free expression of ideas, and thus a tolerance that implies no university position whatsoever about the ideas any group stands for.15 To tolerate another’s values or *59speech is not to approve of them; nor is it to express indifference or neutrality. It is simply an expressed willingness to let someone else have a say without indicating what you think about it.16 This distinction between toleration and endorsement (or, more generally, between toleration and taking a position of some sort) lies at the heart of the first amendment’s demand that government tolerate dissident beliefs and speech; it is equally essential to our civil rights statutes. Conceptually, perhaps, one could quibble about whether government-compelled toleration amounts to forced conduct or forced speech; but, for constitutional purposes, the salient point is that, in context, such “University recognition” does not suggest the university is taking a position on the group that it tolerates/recognizes. Thus, required “recognition” does not run afoul of the absolute protection against compelled utterances accorded by Wooley, Barnette, and Torcaso. As I see it, therefore, only in refusing to recognize a student group expressly for ideological or theological reasons is the university making a statement about the group’s ideas and thus making its own position known.17
Obviously, the Human Rights Act does not get in the way of Georgetown’s first amendment right to make any statement it wants to make condemning the views of a group of its own students. But, even more importantly, in officially recognizing the gay rights groups, Georgetown would not, in effect, be forced to make its own position clear by issuing such a responsive statement condemning the gay student groups’ aims. In Pacific Gas & Electric and Tomillo, the law had forced conversion of a private forum into a public forum, overriding the prerogatives of the proprietors to restrict communication to agendas and opinions of their own. As a consequence, the proprietors were likely to feel compelled to respond, or to withhold provocative messages altogether, to assure that their audiences would not confuse the proprietors’ views with those of anyone *60else. In contrast, Georgetown University is, by its very nature, a forum for its students, teachers, administrators, and alumni. It is akin to a public forum in that a variety of constituent groups has automatic access, there is a tradition of wide open debate, and thus, given this very nature of a university, there is no implication that the corporation/administration — the academic proprietor — would reasonably feel identified with, and thus compelled to dissociate itself from, the views of student groups as diverse as the Jewish Students Association, the Organization of Arab Students, the Young Americans for Freedom, the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, the Women’s Rights Collective, and the Gay People of Georgetown University. See Gay Rights I, 496 A.2d at 573-74. Any such statement of disassociation, in context, would be gratuitous.
In short, the Human Rights Act requirement that Georgetown officially “recognize” its student gay rights groups does not force the university to “speak” in violation of its free exercise rights.
IV.
That should end the matter but for Judge Belson’s effort to persuade the court to permit Georgetown to withhold on constitutional grounds even the tangible benefits the student plaintiffs seek.18 Judge Belson takes Judge Mack to task for concluding that Georgetown may be ordered to provide tangible benefits to gay rights groups without violating the university’s first amendment rights. As indicated earlier, I agree there can be no meaningful constitutional distinction between enforced intangible “recognition” and compelled tangible benefits. But I do not agree that Judge Belson has a legitimate basis for asking this court, under the circumstances, not to order Georgetown to provide the half loaf of tangible benefits a majority of the en banc court believes required. See supra note 1.
On appeal, Georgetown has chosen to defend solely on its asserted right to withhold “recognition.” Although Georgetown has not conceded that it must provide the narrow set of tangible benefits inherent in “University recognition,” supra note 11, the university has not raised a separate defense to compelled provision of the tangible benefits. In fact, in its brief Georgetown characterized the tangible benefits as “relatively insignificant,” and at en banc oral argument, as Judge Belson recognizes, post at 69, n. 14, Georgetown specifically disavowed any argument that compelled provision of tangible benefits constituted a forced subsidy of speech which in itself would violate the university’s first amendment rights. On appeal, therefore, the university has sought to play down the significance of the tangible benefits and to prevent the court from pinning its constitutional analysis to the denial of tangible benefits that accompanies the denial of “recognition.”
Perhaps the university considers such a subsidy legally insignificant because it already is willing to provide some of that *61subsidy anyway (in connection with the permitted student government charters) by allowing the plaintiffs access to meeting rooms, to the student activities calendar, and to the services of the Director of Student Activities. Or perhaps, more fundamentally, the university simply does not want a matter of high principle to be diminished, and the parties and the courts distracted, by legal haggling over relatively small amounts of money. Alternatively, perhaps Georgetown, anticipating the approach proposed by Judge Mack, sought to avoid that result by advocating an all-or-nothing analysis in which the university had greater confidence than in a bifurcated one. Whatever Georgetown’s reasoning, the university has elected not to address the intangible/tangible dichotomy and, as I see it, has therefore waived any separate defense specifically going to tangible benefits.
In any event, I believe that both Abood and Pacific Gas & Electric support plaintiffs’ right to tangible, as well as intangible benefits. In Abood, the Supreme Court noted that a local union representing public employees may lawfully impose compulsory service fees on non-members whom the union represents in collective bargaining pursuant to an agency shop arrangement, provided that, consistent with the first amendment, such fees may not be used on behalf of any objecting employee for “ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining,” 431 U.S. at 236, 97 S.Ct. at 1800, such as expression of political views or contributions to political candidates. In Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court, relying heavily on Tomillo, held that a state public utilities commission order requiring utility companies to send flyers of a ratepayers’ organization to their customers along with the utility bills violated the first amendment, “absent a compelling interest.” 475 U.S. at 17, 106 S.Ct. at 912.
Although Abood and Pacific Gas & Electric held that public employees and utility companies, respectively, could not be forced to finance, and thus in effect to sponsor, any idea they found objectionable, the Court was careful to demonstrate the limits on those opinions. In Abood, the Court stressed that financial contributions could be compelled in furtherance of collective bargaining, 431 U.S. at 236, 97 S.Ct. at 1800, even though an “employee may very well have ideological objections to a wide variety of activities undertaken by the union in its role of exclusive representative” —including, for example, “moral or religious views about the desirability of abortion ... [which do] not square with the union’s policy in negotiating a medical benefits plan.” 431 U.S. at 222, 97 S.Ct. at 1793. And in Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court was careful to note that “the Commission’s order could be valid if it were a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest.” 475 U.S. at 19, 106 S.Ct. at 193.
As applied to the present case, therefore, Abood and Pacific Gas & Electric would support, not stand in the way of, the constitutionality of plaintiffs’ nondiscriminatory access to “University recognition,” including tangible benefits from the university. Required recognition with related financial support of student organizations (which, institutionally, are central to university life) is analogous, for purposes of this case, to compelled dues for support of collective bargaining: despite ideological disagreement, an employee is compelled to support collective bargaining, and a university is required to give nondiscriminatory access to student activity benefits, because public policy has put a premium on such bargaining and on such nondiscriminatory student activity programs. Because first amendment interests are implicated, however, the government must have a “compelling state interest,” Pacific Gas & Electric, 475 U.S. at 19, 106 S.Ct. at 913, to justify such a premium, and the burden imposed must be “narrowly tailored,” id., to achieve the state’s objective and must “substantially outweigh[ ] whatever burden” is placed on the exercise of first amendment rights. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) (free exercise); see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1055, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (free exercise); Gay Rights I, 496 A.2d at *62576-77, 581 & n. 19 (discussing Supreme Court cases).
V.
For reasons elaborated at length earlier, Gay Rights I, 496 A.2d at 575-82, I am satisfied that “the District’s expressed interest in eliminating discrimination in educational institutions on the basis of sexual orientation is as ‘compelling’ or ‘overriding’ as it is in the more traditional areas of race and sex.” Id. at 576 (citations omitted). In this connection, I agree with Part YI of Judge Newman’s concurring opinion. Moreover, “[t]he District of Columbia’s interest in enforcing the Human Rights Act’s prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation ‘substantially outweighs whatever burden’ the Act places on Georgetown’s ‘exercise of [its] religious beliefs.’ ” Id. at 582 (quoting Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 604, 103 S.Ct. at 2035). That includes not only the burden of intangible “recognition,” as discussed earlier, but also the burden of the tangible benefits of facilities and services which Georgetown has not expressly questioned but which, analytically, present the same issue. Accordingly, I believe the law requires Georgetown University and its Law Center to grant “University recognition,” in full, to the Gay People of Georgetown University and to the Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center, respectively.

. As I understand the plethora of opinions in this case, five judges agree that the free exercise clause of the first amendment does not stand in the way of a Human Rights Act requirement that Georgetown permit the plaintiff gay rights groups to use university facilities — the so-called tangible benefits — on the same basis that other University-recognized groups are permitted to do so. Two judges would hold that the Act, unhindered by the Constitution, requires Georgetown to grant the plaintiffs complete "University recognition,” i.e., not only the tangible benefits but also the intangible benefits of a status equal to that of other officially recognized student groups. Finally, as I understand the record and the opinions in this case, the plaintiff groups are not legally barred from using the university's name. See infra note 3.

. When parties have not raised a statutory issue or a court of appeals has not passed upon it, the Supreme Court has commonly addressed the issue to "'ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.’ ” United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 175-76, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1706, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 297, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932)). Almost invariably, however, the Court has asked the parties to brief the statutory issue. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 679-80, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2902, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985); Capitol Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 697-98, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 2699, 81 L.Ed.2d 580 (1984); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2743, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). But see Grace, 461 U.S. at 176, 103 S.Ct. at 1706 (statutory issue apparently raised for first time at oral argument but that did not resolve case and Court reached constitutional issues). In the present case, the only brief we have on the statutory issue supporting Georgetown was volunteered by amicus curiae Arthur Spitzer. Appellants filed a response in their reply brief.

. Although Judge Mack holds that the student groups have no right to the status of "University recognition," she notes that the university has dropped its counterclaim to prevent the plaintiff groups’ use of the university’s name. Ante at 14 n. 12. By thus indicating that this issue no longer is alive, Judge Mack necessarily implies that this litigation does not preclude the plaintiff groups from continuing to identify themselves by reference to their affiliation with the university, e.g., the "Gay People of Georgetown University.” I agree. Inherent in my own analysis, joined by Judge Terry, is a conclusion that the plaintiff groups may continue to use the Georgetown University name. I see nothing in any of the other opinions, aside from Chief Judge Pryor’s, that would indicate otherwise.

. Although Judge Mack does state, in one con-clusional paragraph, that the trial court’s "construction of the statute ... conflicts with its literal meaning,” ante at 21, she apparently concedes that the statutory language itself does not plainly foreclose plaintiffs' request for “recognition" in connection with their use of university facilities and services; the "literal meaning” of the statute has to be derived with the help of ten pages of constitutional analysis. Ante at 21-25.

. See, e.g., J. Fletcher, Studies on Slavery; J. Priest, Bible Defense of Slavery ...; Rev. T. String-fellow, Slavery, Its Origin, Nature and History; Its Relation to Society, to Government, and to True Religion; Rev. F.A. Ross, Slavery Ordained of God, all cited in A. Craven, The Coming of the Civil War 162-63 & 453 n. 14 (2d ed. 1957).

. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983).

. Judge Mack’s view that the Act simply does not reach Georgetown’s decision not to "recognize” the student groups makes the university’s motive for its decision irrelevant. Thus, even if the university were to claim it acted out of hatred for homosexuality, rather than out of a religious obligation not to be institutionally associated with the plaintiff groups, the Act, according to Judge Mack’s analysis, would equally protect Georgetown’s right not to grant “University recognition.” Similarly, under such reasoning, a motive of racial hatred in no way would undercut a university's right under the Act not to "recognize” a black or Asian or Hispanic student organization.

. Theoretically, there is a possibility that the level of constitutional scrutiny of discrimination based on sexual orientation may be less strict than the level of scrutiny applicable to discrimination based on race, when the government's interest in enforcing the Human Rights Act is weighed against the interest of a party who asserts a constitutional right to discriminate. But that possibility — which I need not address— has no bearing on whether the Act would make the discrimination unlawful; the issue, rather, would be whether unlawful discrimination of one sort, but not of another, would be excused on constitutional grounds.

. Judge Mack gives two reasons for concluding the trial court’s finding that "recognition” means "endorsement” is not clearly erroneous: first, that Georgetown itself viewed "recognition” as a form of endorsement, thus of speech; and, second, that granting "University recognition” is a discretionary decision by the university. Ante at 19. Neither reason is applied consistently in the opinion, for both factors apply equally to the tangible benefits resulting from "University recognition.” Judge Mack concludes that forced provision of tangible benefits does not violate the constitutional prohibition on compelled endorsement, but Georgetown itself made clear that it views having to give tangible benefits also as a compelled endorsement, and the granting of such benefits is just as discretionary with the university as is the granting of the intangible benefit of "recognition.” Moreover, neither reason is persuasive ground for Judge Mack’s assumption that “recognition" amounts to spoken endorsement of homosexuality in the sense that reciting the pledge of allegiance to the flag amounts to spoken endorsement of patriotic values. As elaborated in the text above, the constitutional significance of "recognition" cannot be determined by Georgetown’s subjective interpretation of that act, and, in any case, the trial court never stated its finding in such precise terms as Judge Mack requires to justify her conclusion.

. It is interesting to note that the trial court did not develop or rely upon the theory of compelled "speech" absolutely forbidden by the Constitution. Instead, the court accepted that compelled recognition is "contrary to Catholic religious beliefs" and proceeded to inquire whether the government’s interest in combatting discrimination against student gay rights groups was, under the circumstances, sufficient to justify the burden. The trial court concluded it was not.

. Judge Mack notes the university has not argued on appeal that a legal requirement to provide tangible facilities and services, in contrast with intangible "recognition" or “endorsement," violates first amendment rights. See ante at 26 n. 21. In Georgetown’s supplemental brief for en banc argument, I find only such statements as “this case involves much more than simply the question of access to facilities" and ”[t]he few additional tangible benefits plaintiffs could obtain by the grant of official recognition are minimal at best." I find no concession that the university’s free exercise defense does not embrace compelled provision of tangible benefits of any kind. It is true that, as noted in Part IV infra, at oral argument Georgetown expressly disavowed reliance on an argument that compelled provision of the tangible benefits at issue violated the first amendment. But Georgetown’s decision to waive any separate first amendment defense to providing tangible benefits in no way saves the sharp theoretical distinction, on which Judge Mack so heavily relies, between compelled endorsement and compelled subsidization of another’s speech.

. As Judge Bacon’s findings, buttressed by Judge Mack’s analysis of the record, make clear, Georgetown's motive cannot be characterized solely as a desire to frustrate speech; the university has made clear that the ultimate reason it does not want to be seen as approving advocacy of the moral dignity of homosexuality is precisely that Catholic orthodoxy condemns those who practice a homosexual lifestyle. Of course, that one’s hostility to a group of people is grounded in moral or religious objections makes it no less illegal under the Human Rights Act than would hostility founded in mere emotional animus.

.It is interesting to note that Georgetown has accepted federal funds for various purposes, representing, as required by statute, that no project assisted with those funds shall ever be used for "a sectarian activity.” 20 U.S.C. § 1132e(c) (1982). Even if this statutory responsibility, as such, does not have a direct bearing on Georgetown’s refusal to recognize the student groups for religious reasons, I do believe the university’s acceptance of federal funds under this condition amounts to a representation, on which students reasonably can be expected to rely, that sectarian concerns will not derogate from the tolerance of all points of view reasonably to be expected in a university community — especially from a governing authority that manifestly is willing to expand its facilities, and thus its educational mission, with the help of public money.

. Judge Mack’s and Judge Belson’s efforts to distinguish PruneYard are, to me, unpersuasive primarily because they do not deal with the nature of a university.

. The university equates "recognition" with "endorsement” meaning "approval.” I have previously noted that the trial court's finding that ”‘[t]he major purpose of "university recognition” is official endorsement'” is “not 'clearly erroneous.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Gay Rights I, 496 A.2d at 572. But, as also noted, this finding *59about the "purpose” of recognition is ambiguous; it thus requires an evaluation of both the "practical and [the] normative meaning[s]” of "endorsement," an analysis the trial court did not provide. Id. at 573. Because the constitutionality of the Human Rights Act, as applied, turns on whether required "recognition” or “endorsement” amounts, in effect, to a coerced v expression of religious approval or neutrality— or to something else — the meanings of those terms must be defined as precisely as possible and thus ultimately defined as a matter of law by this court. As discussed earlier, Judge Mack’s deference to the trial court for the meaning of "endorsement,” therefore, is wrong for two reasons: the trial court did not provide a meaningful definition, and, in any event, this court must be the interpreter of a term that has primarily a constitutional/legal, not factual, definition. As indicated in the text above, I would define "the University recognition/endorsement here ... [to] mean no more than ‘official tolerance’ of gay rights groups.” Id, at 574.

. Judge Belson argues that Georgetown, by permitting student body endorsement of the plaintiff groups, "has tolerated fully the activities of the student groups in the market place of ideas that is a university.” Post at 68 n. 12. That is simply not true; “student body endorsement” is, relative to “University recognition,” a second-class status that inherently reflects less toleration of the plaintiffs’ activities than of the activities of other student groups.

. Georgetown suggests that compelled speech burdening religious beliefs is more odious to the Constitution than compelled speech violating non-religious beliefs. Judge Mack appears to agree, for she distinguishes the present case from Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 903, 89 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), in part on the ground that the latter involved only a free speech defense rather than a (presumably weightier) free exercise claim. Ante at 24 n. 19. Georgetown, however, has provided no authority to indicate that religious speech rights as such receive greater protection than non-religious speech rights. In fact, the precedents suggest no difference in the level of protection. The compelled-speech cases on which both Judge Mack and Georgetown principally rely concerned forced speech in violation of a person’s religious beliefs, but two of these decisions struck down the government actions solely on free speech grounds equally applicable to cases implicating no specifically religious beliefs. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1435, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed.2d 1628 (1943); see also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 864-65 (1978). The third case struck down a religious oath as a condition of public office but gave no indication that freedom of religious conscience deserved greater protection than freedom of conscience generally. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961).

. Judge Belson would affirm the judgment for Georgetown only because he resolves the constitutional issue in Georgetown’s favor. It is interesting to note that, although Judge Belson would remand for determination of the university’s motive, in order to evaluate whether the Human Rights Act has been violated, he is willing to "discuss the constitutional issues here on the premise that Georgetown denied recognition to the student groups at least in large part because of the groups’ sponsorship and promotion of ideas and activities." Post at 67. He acknowledges, however, that Georgetown’s "free speech defense would be diluted to the extent, if any, that Judge Bacon’s findings can be read to imply that Georgetown acted on the basis of the sexual orientation of individuals.” Post at 68 n. 10. It appears clear, therefore, that if Judge Belson’s constitutional analysis depends upon a university motivated "in large part" by a desire to suppress speech, and if he is not sure on this record how large a part that motivation played (obviously not large enough to avoid violation of the Human Rights Act as a matter of law), then a remand presumably should be required to determine whether there is, in fact, any reason for addressing that constitutional defense. Rather than dealing directly with this obvious deterrent to applying his constitutional analysis, Judge Belson states in a footnote that a diluted free speech defense "would not affect Georgetown’s free exercise defense.” Id. He does not explain why the latter would receive greater protection than the former, and I do not understand that it does. See supra note 17.