Court Opinion

ID: 9470757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:15:16.701339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:05.642257
License: Public Domain

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in part 3. of the majority opinion. I likewise agree that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant attorney fees for the services of her attorney, Sylvia Roberts, and I concur in the introductory portion of part 1. of the majority opinion, in part l.(c) thereof, and in so much of l.(b) thereof as is based upon “the government’s recalcitrance in complying with her request.”
However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the “public benefit” factor did not mandate an award of attorney fees and that appellant’s request was almost exclusively related to and motivated by personal concerns, with any connection between the documents requested and a public benefit being most limited, incidental, and remote. Not every minor or remote public benefit suffices. See Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir.1978); Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 433 (5th Cir.1980).1 Just because a governmental employee’s individual employment grievance alleges matters which may reflect on the proper performance of her employer’s official duties does not necessarily mean the grievance is a matter of public concern; and even if some aspects of the grievance may touch upon matters which genuinely are of public concern, if they do so “in only a most limited sense” the matter may still be “most accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy.” Cf. Connick v. Myers, - U.S. -, - - -, -, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 1693, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 720-21, 724 (1983) (First Amendment limitations on discipline for governmental employee speech).
Nevertheless, in my opinion the government’s extreme recalcitrance in withholding the requested records and its lack of a reasonable basis for doing so, which are clearly established here, of themselves mandate an award of attorney fees under the circumstances of this case.
*1059I also respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that an attorney litigant proceeding pro se is eligible for an award of attorney fees under the FOIA. As the majority observes, we held in Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir.1981), that a nonattorney pro se litigant was not eligible for an attorney fees award under the Privacy Act (which we construed as being identical in these respects to the FOIA), but expressly left the present question open. However, I do not believe that Congress intended to discriminate between pro se FOIA litigants solely on the basis of whether they were licensed to practice law. Cf. Hannon v. Security National Bank, 537 F.2d 327 (9th Cir.1976) (unlicensed law graduate litigating pro se not eligible for attorney fees under Truth-in-Lending Act). I agree with the statement of Judge Thomas A. Clark, made in his dissenting opinion in Lovell v. Alderete, supra, respecting an issue not reached by the majority there, that “[o]ne cannot justifiably assert that an attorney representing himself is more entitled to a fee [under the FOIA] than a lay person representing himself.” 630 F.2d at 438.
In Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 987 (5th Cir.1981), we held a nonattor-ney pro se litigant was not eligible for an attorney fees award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and noted that “an act allowing attorney’s fees is ‘not passed for the benefit of attorneys but to enable litigants to obtain competent counsel .... ’ Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir.1974).” Similarly, in Crooker v. United States Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir.1980), the Court noted the purpose of the FOIA attorney fees provision as “removing ‘barriers’ to the average person’s ability to secure compliance with the Act.” See also, to the same effect, Crooker v. United States Department of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 920 (1st Cir.1980) (“... eliminating the obstacle of attorney fees ... ”). This purpose is not subserved by a distinction which favors pro se litigants who are licensed attorneys over those who are not.
Our result in Barrett was influenced by the view that:
“Persons contemplating legal action should be encouraged to consult with attorneys. Litigation may not be necessary. Frustrations and misunderstandings or failures of understanding by the intended complainant may be quickly soothed and resolved by counsel.” Id. at 1089-90.
Essentially the same sentiments appear to have motivated the Fourth Circuit to hold that an attorney pro se litigant was not eligible for an attorney fees award under the Truth-in-Lending Act. White v. Arlen Realty & Development Corp., 614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.1980).2
Our result in Barrett was also influenced by reading the Privacy Act and the FOIA attorney fees provisions as allowing recovery only for “attorney fees ... incurred” by the litigant. 651 F.2d at 1089. By a parity of reasoning, it seems plain that these words contemplate and refer to a situation where services are performed for the litigant by some other person or persons. Attorney “fees” are not generated by a person doing something for himself or herself; and “incurred” likewise imports a relationship to one or more others. We have held that a litigant need not be legally obligated to pay his attorney in order for the latter’s services to form the basis for a statutory award of attorney fees. But the rationale of those holdings does not support the award of attorney fees to a pro se litigant, attorney or otherwise. For exam-*1060pie, we stated in Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 538-39 (5th Cir.1970):
“What is required is not an obligation to pay attorney fees. Rather what — and all — that is required is the existence of a relationship of attorney and client, a status which exists wholly independently of compensation, as witness the effective service of counsel in the defense of criminal cases, the assertion of post-conviction habeas remedies and the now widespread organized services on behalf of the poor.
“... the fees allowed are to reimburse and compensate for legal services rendered and will not go to the litigants, named or class.” (Footnotes omitted.)
Plainly we contemplated that the services for which the award was made would be those rendered to the litigant by someone else.
There is arguably a loss of economic efficiency in motivating a lawyer pro se litigant to rely exclusively on another as counsel, rather than using his own skills. However, this same loss of efficiency applies, though to a lesser extent, respecting non-lawyer litigants. For example, such litigants, if compensated for what they did, might by their own efforts relieve their counsel of much that he would otherwise have to do. Further, gains in economic efficiency will tend to be reduced to the extent the award of fees to the attorney pro se litigant is on the same basis that would have obtained had the litigant and attorney been different persons. Moreover, avoidance of “personal embroilment and lack of objectivity,” White, supra, may itself be an efficiency gain. See Barrett at 1089-90. In my opinion, the considerations of economic efficiency in this setting do not warrant paying attorney pro se litigants for the same things for which we refuse to pay nonattorney pro se litigants. An attorney has no greater right to litigate pro se than does a nonattorney. I do not believe that Congress contemplated any such discrimination. Moreover, I believe the statutory wording plainly contemplates payment for services rendered to the litigant by someone else, not payment for what the litigant does for himself. I therefore respectfully dissent from the holding in part 2. of the majority opinion.

. I also observe that it has not been determined that the government or any of its officials acted improperly toward appellant in her capacity as an Assistant United States Attorney. Cf. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 842 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842, 100 S.Ct. 82, 62 L.Ed.2d 54 (1979).

. The Court stated:
“... effective legal representation is dependent not only on legal expertise, but also on detached and objective perspective. The lawyer who represents himself necessarily falls short of the latter.” Id at 388.
It further noted that there the attorney pro se litigant demonstrated “personal embroilment and lack of objectivity.” Id That sort of personal embroilment and lack of objectivity, as distinguished from professional zeal and undivided loyalty to the client, is not entirely absent from this case, understandable though it may be in human terms. See part 3. of majority opinion.