Court Opinion

ID: 9839231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 17:01:19.995151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:53.586251
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                             SEP 12 2023
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                                 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: NANCY ANN HOWELL,                          No.   21-60031

               Debtor,                            BAP No. 20-1172

------------------------------
                                                  MEMORANDUM*
NANCY ANN HOWELL,

               Appellant,

 v.

LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW S BISOM;
EISENBERG LAW FIRM,

               Appellees.

                           Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
                            Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
                Spraker, Gan, and Faris, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

                             Submitted September 12, 2023**
                                San Francisco, California

Before: FERNANDEZ, KLEINFELD, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

      *
        This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
         The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      Nancy Ann Howell appeals pro se from the judgment of the Bankruptcy

Appellate Panel (BAP) affirming the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment in

Counsel’s1 adversary action. Counsel had previously obtained an adverse

judgment against Howell in the amount of $48,080.94 (the California Judgment) in

Counsel’s suit for breach of contract and fraud in the Superior Court of California,

County of Orange (the California Action). The bankruptcy court determined that

debt was nondischargeable. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). We review de novo,2

and we affirm.

      The bankruptcy court properly applied issue preclusion arising from the

California Judgment to the elements of duty and damages in the nondischargeablity

action. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 283–85, 111 S. Ct. 654, 657–58, 112

L. Ed. 2d 755 (1991); see also Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240,

1245–46, 1246 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal law); Boschma v. Home Loan Ctr., Inc.,

129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 874, 890 (Ct. App. 2011) (California law).

      With regard to Howell’s duty to disclose material facts to Counsel, an

identical issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the California

      1
          Law Offices of Andrew S Bisom and Eisenberg Law Firm.
      2
       See Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2001);
Gayden v. Nourbakhsh (In re Nourbakhsh), 67 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam).
                                           2
Action. See Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 207 P.3d 506, 514 (Cal. 2009); Lucido

v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Cal. 1990). The California jury found

that Howell had entered into a contract with Counsel. Howell’s duty to disclose

arose from that relationship as a matter of both California3 and federal law,4

particularly in light of the evidence of duty adduced at trial in the California

Action. See Hernandez, 207 P.3d at 514.

      Likewise, an identical issue5 regarding damages from Howell’s fraud was

actually litigated and necessarily decided in the California Action. The jury found

that Counsel suffered $48,080.94 in damages from Howell’s fraud—the same

amount that Counsel later asked the bankruptcy court to determine was

nondischargeable—and that finding was essential to the California Judgment. See

Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 320–21, 123 S. Ct. 1462, 1467, 155 L. Ed. 2d 454

(2003); Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1226. Thus, the California Judgment was preclusive as

to the issue of damages from Howell’s fraud. Moreover, the bankruptcy court

properly determined that the $48,080.94 debt arose from fraud and was thus

      3
          See Hoffman v. 162 N. Wolfe LLC, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 820, 827 (Ct. App.
2014).
      4
          See Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir. 1996).
      5
          See In re Harmon, 250 F.3d at 1246; Boschma, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 890.
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nondischargeable. See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 218, 118 S. Ct. 1212,

1216, 140 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1998).

      Finally, we reject Howell’s argument that her debt to Counsel is nevertheless

dischargeable because it was obtained by “a statement respecting the debtor’s . . .

financial condition.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). On the contrary, Howell’s fraud

was accomplished via concealment (e.g., an omission),6 which is not a “statement”

within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(A). See Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v.

Appling, __ U.S. __, __, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1758–59, 1763, 1763 n.4, 201 L. Ed. 2d

102 (2018); see also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 76–77, 77 n.13, 116 S. Ct. 437,

446–47, 447 n.13, 133 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1995).

      We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters

not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett

v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Law Offices of

David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006).

      AFFIRMED.

      6
        See Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th
Cir. 1996).
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