Court Opinion

ID: 9694385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:39:45.726261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:00.665590
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy :
While I concur in the decision of the Court, I t.binlr it appropriate to emphasize that this is the first time we have held that an indigent parent who is a respondent in a proceeding for involuntary termination of his *35or her parental rights in a child is constitutionally entitled to he represented throughout by counsel.1
Notwithstanding that the law we now announce was not the law at the time of the hearing below, and that there was no request for counsel, the trial judge did advise the respondent (appellant here) that the hearing would be continued, if she wished, to enable her to obtain counsel. The respondent stated that by reason of her employment she could not appear at a subsequent time if the case were continued. After the hearing was concluded, however, and a decree nisi entered, the respondent did follow the suggestion of the court and obtained counsel through the Legal Aid Committee of the Lawrence County Bar Association. Counsel then filed numerous exceptions2 to the decree nisi which were disposed of in the court’s thorough opinion accompanying the final decree. While I agree that, unless knowingly waived, the right to counsel must embrace the crucial hearing stage of a proceeding, it appears that the trial court did in this case and in light of the law then prevailing evidence scrupulous fairness to the respondent.
I point out, finally, that the right to counsel claim was not presented to the court below. It is raised for *36the first time on this appeal by new (appellate) counsel for appellant. This is justified only on the ground that a basic and fundamental right was involved. See Commonwealth v. Jennings, 442 Pa. 18, 25, 274 A. 2d 767 (1971); White v. Moore, 288 Pa. 411, 136 A. 218 (1927).

 This decision is warranted, I think, not only by analogy to the rights to counsel which have been accorded to a criminal defendant and by the rationale of Matter of Ella R. B., 30 N.Y. 2d 352, 285 N.E. 2d 288 (1972) relied on by the Court, but also by such cases as Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971) (filing fee required for initiating a divorce proceeding prevented access to the courts, in violation of due process), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972) (because of the importance of the right to custody of one’s children, due process was violated when the State denied a hearing on parental fitness to an unwed father).

 The pleading filed was entitled “Petition to Strike Off Judgment, Stay Proceedings and Dismiss Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights”, but since no final order had been entered it was treated by the court as properly filed exceptions to the decree nisi.