Court Opinion

ID: 9658327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:55:35.097974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:53.642538
License: Public Domain

Otis, Justice
(dissenting).
Whatever may have been the trial court’s actual intention, it is undisputed that on May 8, 1958, it imposed a valid sentence committing defendant to the State Reformatory. Execution of the sentence was stayed until the expiration of a prior sentence which defendant was then serving. It is significant that the court did not stay the imposition of sentence. Had it done so, the sentence it attempted to impose on December 11, 1961, would have been perfectly valid. The only effect of the court’s sentence in 1958 was to make that term run concurrently with the one for which the defendant was then confined.
The majority holds in effect that Minn. St. 1961, § 610.33, allowed' a new and different sentence to be imposed in 1961, at the time defendant’s previous term expired, because his conviction and sentence in 1958 occurred at a time when he was already in an institution. I respectfully suggest that this is not what the statute says. It does not provide that under these circumstances a subsequent sen-*317fence may be imposed at the conclusion of the sentence for which defendant is serving, but provides only that the new term shall not begin until the expiration of all prior terms. Again, the statute merely requires that sentences run consecutively, a directive which courts frequently ignore. In other words, had the court in 1958 imposed' a sentence of commitment, the term of the sentence would not begin to run until all prior terms for which defendant was confined had expired. But, there is nothing in § 610.33 which in any way authorizes a valid sentence to be changed or extended once it has been imposed.
The majority opinion construes Minn. St. 1961, §§ 610.37 and 610.38, in a way which is completely contrary to the wording of the statutes themselves. Section 610.38 provides in part:
“Such stay shall be for the full period of sentence; and during such time the person so sentenced may be placed on probation * * (Italics supplied.)
By the plain language of § 610.38 this does not mean that the court may change the sentence to probation “during such time.” It means that the original sentence may require that defendant be on probation “during such time” — the period of the stay. This is clear from the language of § 610.37 which unequivocally states:
“The several courts of record of this state having jurisdiction to try criminal causes shall have power, upon the imposition of sentence by such court * * * to stay the execution of such sentence which the court has imposed * * (Italics supplied.)
The statute goes on to limit the court’s right to impose probation subsequent to the original sentencing by stating:
“* * * [^4]¿ any time after the imposition of sentence in all cases where the sentence imposed is to a county jail, work farm or workhouse, any such court of this state shall have like power * * (Italics supplied.)
Obviously, the right to change a sentence to probation is limited to those cases where the original sentence is for a misdemeanor or a gross misdemeanor.
*318It has long been the rule in Minnesota and elsewhere that a validly imposed sentence may not be extended, reduced, or modified after the term of court has expired. In State v. Carlson, 178 Minn. 626, 228 N. W. 173, we said:
“*■ * * Except where otherwise provided by statute, it is the settled and apparently the universal rule that where the court has imposed a valid sentence it cannot change or modify such sentence after the expiration of the term at which it was imposed.”
There we pointed out that the court did have the power to postpone the imposition of sentence, and had this procedure been followed in the instant case no problem would have arisen.
We referred to the Carlson case with approval more recently in State ex rel. Bennett v. Rigg, 257 Minn. 406, 102 N. W. (2d) 17. It has been suggested that any different rule would constitute double jeopardy. The authorities on the subject have been collected in 15 Minn. L. Rev. 828 and in Rubin, The Law of Criminal Correction, p. 145, note 134.
In the instant case we allow a term which properly expired on December 11, 1961, to be further extended by the same court for the same offense 2V£ years after imposition of the sentence. I respectfully submit that this does violence to fundamental principles under which sentencing powers are properly limited. In overruling or ignoring our own precedents we fail to give proper regard to the serious impact our decision will have on the entire sentencing process.
I would reverse.