Court Opinion

ID: 9517389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:15:45.283187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:01.906395
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE JONES, dissenting: There is simply no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that defendant’s confession was involuntary and the trial court’s finding was necessarily against the manifest weight of the evidence. I accordingly respectfully dissent. The majority properly states that in determining whether a confession is voluntary the totality of the circumstances are to be considered and that some of the factors to be considered include the relentlessness of interrogation, failure to warn of constitutional rights and defendant’s age, experience and education. I believe the record affirmatively shows that none of these factors were transgressed and that the totality of the circumstances plainly indicate that the confession was voluntarily given. The trial court expressly found that the Miranda warnings were given, that the father’s warning not to talk without an attorney was not a request for an attorney and that the defendant’s response to his father’s admonition was not an assertion of rights. Those findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and in my opinion preclude a finding of involuntariness. In People v. Prim the supreme court held a confession to be voluntary although a request for parental presence was denied, in People v. Rosochacki, 41 Ill. 2d 483, 244 N.E.2d 136 (1969), held the same where defendant’s request was to see a priest. This case is no different than Prim and Rosochacki in its facts and those cases require a finding of voluntariness here. I would reverse the order of suppression entered by the trial court.