Court Opinion

ID: 9692503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:55:54.00086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:34.936320
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice.
Defendant brought this appeal following his jury conviction of breaking and entering in violation of § 708.8, The Code. In his brief and argument he concedes there was no error in connection with the actual trial or jury instructions. His sole assignment challenges a pretrial ruling in which the trial court held the State established good cause for its failure to indict or inform against him within 30 days after he was held to answer on the charge. We affirm the trial court.
Donald Franklin Hathaway (defendant) was arrested for the offense in the early morning hours of May 8, 1975 at a bowling alley in Iowa City. On May 19, 1975 defendant appeared for preliminary hearing and was held to answer.
The State did not present the case to a grand jury but rather elected to proceed by the filing of a county attorney’s information as authorized by § 769.2, The Code. On Wednesday, June 18, 1975, exactly 30 days following the preliminary hearing the State sought to present and file the county *736attorney’s information. Section 769.8, The Code, requires such an information to be approved by a district judge or associate district judge before it can be filed. On June 18, 1975, it was learned all judges of the 6th judicial district (which includes Johnson County) were attending a judicial conference in Des Moines, Iowa, from June 18 through June 20, 1975. Such conferences are authorized by § 684.20, The Code. We can judicially note they are regularly called twice annually. Attendance by all district court judges is expected.
Because no district court judges were in Johnson County, nor in the 6th judicial district, the county attorney’s information was left in the office of clerk of court after being sworn to before a deputy. On Monday, June 23, 1975, the first day a judge was available in the county, the information was presented to Judge Robert Osmundson and approved. It was filed the same day with the clerk of court, 35 days after defendant had been held to answer.
Defendant immediately filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of § 795.1, The Code, which provides: “When a person is held to answer for a public offense, if an indictment be not found against him within thirty days, the court must order the prosecution to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown. * * *
Defendant’s motion was resisted by the State and was presented to Judge Osmund-son who overruled it. The case was thereafter tried before Judge Schaeffer. In appealing his conviction and sentence defendant’s sole challenge is addressed to Judge Osmundson’s ruling on the motion to dismiss.
I. Although we do not subscribe to the rationale of Judge Osmundson in his ruling we believe he reached the right conclusion. We think the State established good cause for the delay within the meaning of the statute.
In State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1972) we discussed the question of good cause which might excuse a trial delay beyond the 60 day period prescribed by § 795.2. The parties dispute whether Jen-
nings is applicable to the instant case. Defendant points out it involved a trial delay under § 795.2 rather than an indictment delay under § 795.1. Moreover defendant points to language in Jennings which he believes supports his position:
“This does not mean, however, particularly under existing judicial districting, chronic crowded dockets, sickness of a trial judge, or the unavailability of judges due to vacation schedules will alone suffice as good cause for trial delay.” (Emphasis supplied.) 195 N.W.2d at 356.
State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579 (Iowa 1976) was another trial delay case under § 795.2. In Goff we held the defendant’s right to a speedy trial could not be denied because one judge was on vacation and another ill, leaving only two judges to serve eight courthouses weekly. In State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156 (Iowa 1975) we held the accused had been denied his right to a speedy trial under § 795.2. We acknowledged “[n]on-chronic ‘court congestion,’ arising out of unique, non-recurring events and resulting in only a short delay may constitute ‘good cause’ satisfying the § 795.2 exception. (Authorities). But nowhere [did] we find persuasive authority indicating a court congestion ‘good cause’ may arise from the State’s deliberate election to ignore all of several plain and well-known statutory procedures for providing a jury to try a defendant.” 225 N.W.2d at 158.
Defendant argues these cases indicate “good cause” was not established here, even as the term is defined under § 795.2. He then argues good cause under § 795.1 should be even harder to show because the 30 day limitation imposed by that section is more easily controlled by the prosecutor. Defendant points out many factors beyond the prosecutor’s control are involved in the matter of bringing a case to trial within the 60 days required by § 795.2.
We agree the two limitations set up by the sections are in many respects similar and in many respects differing and that good cause is apt to be harder to show under § 795.1 than under § 795.2. Never*737theless we believe the circumstances disclosed here constitute good cause for the prosecution’s failure to file the information within the 30 day period of limitation.
There were no judges in the district at the time. This absence was the direct cause of the delay and was obviously beyond the control of the prosecutor. The 30 day period of limitation is necessarily but relatively short. Judicial conferences are called on a somewhat regular basis. But there is nothing to indicate the prosecutor was advised all judges would be out of the district when the 30 day period expired. Therefore we do not believe the prosecutor should be charged with knowledge of the dates of the judicial conferences.
Defendant suggests the prosecution was practicing a form of brinkmanship in delaying presentation of the information until the 30th day. However the statute accords 30 full days to prosecutors to submit and file county attorney informations. They should be carefully prepared. In view of the relatively short period involved it is in no way unprecedented when an information is presented on the last available date.
We believe the facts in this case are typical of what the legislature intended in setting up the “good cause” exception. We believe good cause was shown.
AFFIRMED.
All Justices concur except McCORMICK, MASON and RAWLINGS, JJ., who dissent.