Court Opinion

ID: 9907524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 17:08:06.714529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:34.391104
License: Public Domain

J-S24010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                    :
                v.                                  :
                                                    :
                                                    :
    HECTOR LUIS ROMAN-ROSA                          :
                                                    :
                       Appellant                    :   No. 111 MDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 13, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-CR-0000218-2021

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 6, 2023

       I cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prejudicial effect

of jointly trying the two informations could not have contributed to

Defendant’s guilty verdict. Therefore, I would vacate Defendant’s judgment

of sentence and remand for separate trials.

       With regard to the issue of whether to join or sever offenses,1 our

standard of review is as follows:

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   See Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 582 states, in relevant part:

       Rule 582. Joinder—Trial                 of   Separate   Indictments   or
       Informations

       (A) Standards

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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       The general policy of the laws is to encourage joinder of offenses
       and consolidation of indictments when judicial economy can
       thereby be effected, especially when the result will be to avoid the
       expensive and time consuming duplication of evidence. Whether
       to join or sever offenses for trial is within the trial court’s
       discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent a
       manifest abuse thereof, or prejudice and clear injustice to
       the defendant.

Commonwealth v. Ernst, 242 A.3d 389 (Pa. Super. 2020) (emphasis

added), citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1150-51 (Pa.

Super. 2020). The Majority concludes that the trial court abused its discretion

when it denied defendant’s motion to sever the charges where there “was very

little commonality between the two sets of crimes beyond the fact that

[Defendant]      targeted     his    [then-]girlfriends’   daughters.”        Majority

Memorandum, at 17. Despite this conclusion, the Majority deems the effect

of this abuse of discretion as harmless error because:

          •   The verdicts indicate that the jury separated the charges
              and, by returning a not guilty verdict for Y.C., concluded no
              crime occurred regarding Y.C.;

          •   The jury acquitting Defendant of both charges with regard
              to Y.C. shows that the jury rejected Y.C.’s testimony in total;

____________________________________________

          (1) Offenses charged in separate                 indictments   or
          informations may be tried together if:

          (a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible
          in a separate trial for the other and is capable of separation
          by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion; or

          (b) the offenses charged are based on the same act or
          transaction.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1)(a)-(b).
                                           -2-
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         •   There is a presumption that the jury would not have credited
             Y.C.’s testimony for purposes of convicting Defendant with
             respect to K.R.; and

         •   It is confident that the jury faithfully applied the law by not
             finding Defendant guilty of the Y.C. charges based on fact
             that “it clearly credited K.R.’s testimony”

Majority Opinion, at 22, 25.

   The majority comes to the conclusion that admission of the Rule 404(b)

evidence was harmless error despite the fact that it thrice acknowledges this

case presents “a close call.” Indeed, in determining that the trial court erred

by not severing the charges with regard to the two victims, the Majority had

to find that the trial court committed a “manifest abuse of discretion,” a finding

that implicitly requires a determination that the defendant has experienced

undue prejudice.     See Commonwealth v. Brookins, 10 A.3d 1251 (Pa.

Super. 2010). With these standards in mind and the legal conclusions reached

by the Majority with regard to the failure to sever and the admission of Rule

404(b) evidence, I cannot deem such errors as harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.

   It is difficult to imagine a situation where this error could not have

contributed to the Defendant’s verdict, especially in light of the likelihood that

Y.C.’s testimony bolstered the credibility of K.R.’s testimony, regardless of

whether the jury convicted Defendant of the Y.C. charges.      Commonwealth

v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 137 (Pa. 2007) (reason for barring Rule 404(b)

evidence is not one “of relevance, but of policy, i.e., because of a fear that

such evidence is so powerful that the jury might misuse the evidence and

convict based solely upon criminal propensity”). In particular, Y.C. may likely

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have provided the proverbial “push” the jury needed to get over the hump to

find Defendant guilty with regard to K.R. I find this to be especially likely in

cases where a jury is faced with a Defendant who is alleged to have harmed

not just one, but two minor victims, and where credibility played a major role

in the factfinder’s ultimate determination. See Commonwealth v. Hicks,

156 A.3d 1114, 1157 (Pa. 2017) (Wecht, J., dissenting) (“It is natural and

well-nigh inevitable . . . that a juror will conclude that, if a person has

assaulted women before, he likely will do so again.”).         See also Majority

Opinion, at 18 (“We conclude that this poses a close call, especially given the

role of credibility in these types of cases.”); id. at 21 (“credibility is paramount

in sexual abuse cases”).

   Accordingly, I conclude that the prejudicial effect of the court’s erroneous

evidentiary ruling was significant and not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. Because I cannot find that the failure to sever resulted in “no actual

prejudice” to defendant, see id. at 19, I would vacate Defendant’s judgment

of sentence and remand for separate trials. Commonwealth v. Yocolano,

169 A.3d 47, 64 (Pa. Super. 2017); see also Shaffner v. Commonwealth,

72 Pa. 60, 65 (Pa. 1872) (“It is not proper to raise a presumption of guilt, on

the ground[] that[,] having committed one crime, the depravity it exhibits

makes it likely he would commit another.”).

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