Court Opinion

ID: 9634234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:06:51.991765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:48.603384
License: Public Domain

[J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                 EASTERN DISTRICT

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                :   No. 796 CAP
                                                 :
                      Appellee                   :   Appeal from the Order entered on
                                                 :   May 5, 2022 in the Court of
                                                 :   Common Pleas, Lancaster County,
               v.                                :   Criminal Division at No. CP-36-CR-
                                                 :   0002879-2010.
                                                 :
    JAKEEM LYDELL TOWLES,                        :   SUBMITTED: December 2, 2022
                                                 :
                      Appellant                  :

                                  CONCURRING OPINION

JUSTICE WECHT                                           DECIDED: August 22, 2023
        Nearly ten years after his first-degree murder conviction became final under the

Post Conviction Relief Act, 1 Jakeem Towles obtained an affidavit from Antwain Robinson.

Robinson had testified against Towles at trial. Robinson testified that he was with Towles

before, during, and after the May 7, 2010 murder of Cornell Anton Stewart, Jr., and the

attempted murder of John Wright. In his March 5, 2020 affidavit, Robinson stated that he

testified for the Commonwealth because “investigators threatened me that if I did not

cooperate with them and testify at Jakeem Towles’ [ ] trial, I could be charged with crimes

related to the incident and I could go to jail.”2 Robinson stated that he “believed them and

1       42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546 (“PCRA”). Pursuant to the PCRA, a “judgment becomes
final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration
of time for seeking the review.” Id. at § 9545(b)(3).
2       See Maj. Op. at 5 (citing Second PCRA Petition, Appendix).
. . . was scared.” 3 Armed with this affidavit, on May 4, 2020, Towles filed a facially

untimely second PCRA petition. Towles claimed that the Commonwealth induced false

testimony from Robinson and withheld this information in violation of Brady v. Maryland. 4

       Towles argued that his second PCRA petition was timely because it fell within the

PCRA’s timeliness exceptions for governmental interference and newly discovered facts.5

Towles claimed that he acted with due diligence in asserting his claim within the one year

time requirement of Section 9545(b)(2). 6      To establish due diligence, our case law

requires a petitioner to plead and prove that the information upon which the claim is

3       Id. The PCRA court referred to Robinson’s “alleged signature” on the affidavit and
speculated that counsel may have drafted the affidavit. PCRA Ct. Op. at 16, n.10. From
this, the Majority states that the PCRA court “did not look favorably upon Robinson’s
affidavit,” Maj. Op. at 24, and characterizes the affidavit as “discredited.” Id. at 26, n.18.
While the PCRA court may have questioned whether Robinson signed the affidavit, it
made no finding that that Robinson did not do so.
4       373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring the government to disclose all favorable evidence
that is material to guilt or punishment).
5      Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(ii) provides:
       (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent
       petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes
       final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
       (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by
       government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the
       Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the
       United States; [or]
       (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
       petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
       diligence.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
6     “Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within
one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2).

                             [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 2
predicated could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence. 7 As

we have explained,

       Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be determined on a case-
       by-case basis. Due diligence does not require perfect vigilance and
       punctilious care, but rather a showing by the [party] that a reasonable effort
       has been put forth. 8

       By its express terms, the PCRA requires a petitioner to establish due diligence only

with respect to the exception for newly discovered facts. The PCRA imposes no such

requirement for the exception premised upon governmental interference. In light of the

inescapable and clear statutory language, I agree with Justice Donohue that our

precedent grafting a due diligence requirement onto the governmental interference

exception is misguided, and should be revisited. 9

       Nonetheless, I join the Majority in its assessment of Towles’ failure to demonstrate

what the plain language of the governmental interference exception does require: that

Towles prove that the government unlawfully interfered with his ability to present his

claim. Robinson did not testify at the PCRA hearing. District Attorney Larson and

Detective Arnold credibly testified that no one threatened or manipulated Robinson into

cooperating against Towles. Without any evidence of governmental interference, Towles

failed to establish the requirements of this timeliness exception.

7      Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008).
8      Commonwealth v. Hill, 736 A.2d 578, 588 (Pa. 1999) (cleaned up); see also Maj.
Op. at 22.
9      See Conc. Op. at 2.

                             [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 3
       I cannot join the Majority’s rejection of the applicability of the newly discovered

facts exception. The Majority treats both timeliness exceptions as if they are one and the

same and as if they share the same statutory prerequisites. They are not and they do

not.   The Majority analyzes the newly discovered facts exception using the same

reasoning that it uses to reject the applicability of the governmental interference

exception.    According to the Majority, because Towles did not establish that the

Commonwealth induced Robinson’s testimony, Towles “failed to establish the operative

newly discovered factual predicate upon which his claim is premised” 10

       This one-size-fits-all analysis ignores the plain language of the exceptions and

conflates the merits of Towles’ Brady claim with Towles’ obligation to plead and prove

that the “fact” upon which the Brady claim was predicated had been unknown to him. This

“fact” is the allegation that the Commonwealth induced Robinson’s testimony. 11 Towles

learned of this “fact” upon receiving Robinson’s affidavit. Relying upon that affidavit,

Towles pleaded and proved that the fact of an alleged inducement was not known to him

until March 5, 2020. This is all that the first part of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires. 12

       Prior to Commonwealth v. Bennett, 13 confusion reigned regarding what Section

9545(b)(1)(ii) required of a petitioner in order to establish jurisdiction in the PCRA court.

This Court previously had referred to this subsection incorrectly as the “after-discovered

10     Maj. Op. at 26.
11      Or, as the PCRA court considered it, “the fact that Mr. Robinson may have been
testifying for the Commonwealth against his good friend because of threats or promises
or deals. . . .” PCRA Ct. Op. at 17.
12   42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (“the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner . . . .”).
13     930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007).

                              [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 4
evidence” exception, 14 conflating the jurisdictional requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)

with the merits required to support a claim for relief under Section 9543(a)(2)(vi). 15 In

Bennett, we recognized that this “shorthand reference was a misnomer, since the plain

language of subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require the petitioner to allege and prove a claim

of ‘after-discovered evidence.’” 16 Applying the Statutory Construction Act to the plain

terms of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), this Court held that “it simply requires petitioner to allege

and prove that there were ‘facts’ that were ‘unknown’ to him and that he exercised ‘due

diligence.’”17   The Bennett Court recognized that, “[b]y imprecisely referring to this

subsection as the ‘after-discovered evidence’ exception, we have ignored its plain

language. Indeed, by employing the misnomer, we have erroneously engrafted Brady-

like considerations into our analysis of subsection (b)(1)(ii).” 18

       Bennett unequivocally held that the PCRA creates a statutory separation of the

jurisdictional requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) from the merits requirements of

§ 9543(a)(2). All that Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires in order to establish jurisdiction is,

14     See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 643 (Pa. 1999) (referring
incorrectly to the “newly discovered facts” timeliness exception as the “after discovered
evidence” exception).
15     To be eligible for relief, this provision requires a petitioner to plead and prove that
the conviction or sentence resulted from “[t]he unavailability at the time of trial of
exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become available and would have changed
the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi).
16     Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1270.
17     Id. at 1270.
18     Id.

                              [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 5
(1) that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were not known to the petitioner, and

(2) that the facts could not have been ascertained with the exercise of due diligence. 19

       In Bennett, we cautioned against conflating the timeliness and merits. 20 Today,

the Majority recreates the error that Bennett corrected, holding that the timeliness

exception of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to plead and prove the merits of

the underlying claim. Proving the existence of the fact upon which a claim is predicated

is distinct from establishing that the fact is true or that it warrants relief on the underlying

claim. Commonwealth v. Robinson is illustrative. 21 There, the Opinion in Support of

Reversal (“OISR”) explained that newspaper articles reporting problematic emails

involving a former Justice of this Court were the “facts” upon which a claim of judicial bias

was predicated, i.e., the fact “that [former Justice] Eakin sent and received offensive

emails” for purposes of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). 22 Whether the newspaper articles upon

which Robinson’s claim was based were later proven to be untruthful or factually

inaccurate, or whether the emails were inadequate to establish actual bias by a sitting

jurist, were questions that concerned the merits, not jurisdiction. 23 The Robinson OISR

faithfully applied the two parts of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) as separate statutory

requirements, in accordance with Bennett’s mandate. Whereas the Opinion in Support

19     Id. at 1271-72.
20     Id. at 1271.
21     204 A.3d 326 (Pa. 2018).
22     Id. at 341 (OISR).
23    Id. at 342-43 (OISR) (observing that the issue of whether there was a connection
between the emails and Robinson’s case was a question that went to the merits of the
underlying claim, not to the timeliness of the petition).

                              [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 6
of Affirmance (“OISA”) in Robinson attempted to conflate the PCRA’s distinct provisions

(akin to what today’s Majority does), asserting that “the mere existence [of the emails]

does not demonstrate the fact of bias,” the Robinson OISR correctly responded that the

“newly discovered ‘fact’ here is the email communications by Eakin, not the existence of

bias.” 24

        Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 25 we held that a newspaper report about

an FBI press release regarding the unreliability of microscopic hair comparison analysis

contained two newly discovered facts for purposes of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) that served

as predicates for the underlying claim that the petitioner’s sentence resulted from faulty

hair comparison analysis. 26 In finding the timeliness exception satisfied, we did not delve

24      Id. at 343 (OISR).
25      173 A.3d 617 (Pa. 2017).
26      As we explained:
        There are two newly discovered facts upon which Chmiel’s underlying claim
        is predicated, both of which were made public for the first time in the
        Washington Post article and the FBI press release. First, the FBI publicly
        admitted that the testimony and statements provided by its analysts about
        microscopic hair comparison analysis were erroneous in the vast majority
        of cases. The FBI’s revelation reverberated throughout the country, marking
        a “watershed in one of the country’s largest forensic scandals,” see
        Appendix B at 1, precisely because it constituted a public admission by the
        government agency that had propounded the widespread use of such
        scientifically flawed testimony. The revelation was the first time the FBI
        acknowledged that its microscopic hair analysts committed widespread,
        systemic error by grossly exaggerating the significance of their data in
        criminal trials. The Washington Post article acknowledged the novelty of the
        FBI’s disclosures: “While unnamed federal officials previously
        acknowledged widespread problems, the FBI until now has withheld
        comment because findings might not be representative.” See Appendix B
        at 2. Second, the FBI press release included the revelation that the FBI had
        trained many state and local analysts to provide the same scientifically
        flawed opinions in state criminal trials.
(continued…)

                             [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 7
into the merits of the underlying claim. We permitted the petitioner to file the petition.

Then, and only then, could the PCRA court consider the merits of the claim.

      And in Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 27 where the petitioner raised a claim of judicial

bias, the fact upon which this claim was predicated was the group of emails involving

former Justice Eakin as reported in newspapers. 28 It was only upon the publication of

these newspaper reports that Blakeney learned that former Justice Eakin had exchanged

the offensive emails upon which Blakeney’s claim was based. 29           In reaching this

conclusion, the OISR confronted the PCRA court’s assertion that Blakeney’s

“submissions do not constitute fact, but rather a theory that the emails reflect a fact.”30

Chmiel, 173 A.3d at 625.
27    193 A.3d 350 (Pa. 2018).
28     Id. at 361 (OISR as to timeliness) (“The claim that Blakeney raised in the Petition
is one of judicial bias, premised upon the argument that Justice Eakin's participation in
Blakeney's direct appeal and PCRA appeal violated various constitutional guarantees.
The fact upon which the claim is predicated is the group of emails, and the bias of Justice
Eakin that they suggest.”).
29    As the OISR explained:
      With the publication of the newspaper reports, Blakeney, an African-
      American and a Muslim, learned that a member of this Court had
      exchanged emails denigrating African-Americans and Muslims. Blakeney
      also learned that Justice Eakin had exchanged many other offensive emails
      with members of the prosecution, suggesting a relationship of sufficient
      closeness that threatened Justice Eakin's objectivity. These newly
      discovered facts revealed the potential for judicial bias that Blakeney
      believes unconstitutionally infected his appeals before this Court. The claim
      of judicial bias is predicated upon the existence and content of offensive
      emails transmitted by a sitting member of the court of last resort empowered
      to adjudicate Blakeney's two appeals (save for any resort to a federal
      forum).
Blakeney, 193 A.3d at 361 (OISR).
30    Id. at 362 (OISR).

                            [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 8
We found this assertion puzzling, explaining that the newspaper reports revealed the

content of the emails, and the emails revealed the predicate for the claim of judicial bias.31

The Blakeney OISR also criticized the OISA’s view that a petitioner is required to prove

the new fact upon which the claim is predicated. The Blakeney OISR explained that

“[s]ubstantiating the veracity of the fact upon which the claim is predicated is a question

for merits review of the claim.” 32

       The analysis employed by this Court in Chmiel and by the OISRs in Blakeney and

Robinson is the same analysis that must be applied here. The newly discovered fact here

is Robinson’s inducement allegation (as contained in the March 2020 affidavit), just as

the newly discovered fact in Blakeney and Robinson was the circulation of inappropriate

emails (as reported by newspapers), and just as the newly discovered facts in Chmiel

were contained in an FBI press release (as reported by media outlets). Today’s Majority

would require Towles to demonstrate that the Commonwealth actually induced

Robinson’s testimony in order for Towles to overcome the timeliness hurdle, in the same

way that the OISA in Robinson would require the petitioner therein to establish timeliness

by demonstrating judicial bias.

       The OISA in Robinson was wrong then, and the Majority is wrong now. “[T]he

[timeliness] exception set forth in subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require any merits analysis

of the underlying claim. Rather, ‘the exception merely requires that the ‘facts’ upon which

31     Id. (“There was nothing theoretical about the disparagement that the emails
revealed. Rather, the emails revealed facts about a High Court jurist who participated in
Blakeney's direct appeal and PCRA appeal, and those facts served as the predicate for
a claim of judicial bias.”).
32     Id. at 364 (OISR).

                              [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 9
such a claim is predicated must not have been known to appellant, nor could they have

been ascertained by due diligence.’” 33 Using the correct legal framework, it is clear that

Towles established the first requirement of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii): that the fact upon which

his Brady claim was predicated was not known to him. 34

       The second requirement of Section 9454(b)(1)(ii) requires Towles to establish that

the fact could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. The PCRA

33     Bennettt, 930 A.2d at 1271-72
34     To open the door to the PCRA courtroom, a petitioner is required to plead and
prove the existence of a previously unknown predicate fact. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).
The predicate “fact” for purposes of the newly discovered facts exception is Robinson’s
allegation of the Commonwealth’s inducement. Towles is required to plead and prove
that the fact of Robinson’s allegation was unknown to him. Robinson’s affidavit is to
Towles’ claim what the emails were to Robinson’s claim. Maj. Op. at 26, n.17 (citing
Robinson, 204 A.3d at 330-31).
       On the merits of the Brady claim, the PCRA court noted that Towles relied upon
Robinson’s affidavit, and found that Robinson’s failure to appear made it impossible to
“determine the affiant’s credibility.” PCRA Ct. Op. at 19. Combined with other credited
evidence, this defeated Towles’ underlying Brady claim. Id. The Majority relies upon this
merits-based holding to conclude that “no credible evidence of record establishes that
Robinson, in fact, claimed that the Commonwealth induced his testimony, let alone that
the inducement actually happened.” Maj. Op. at 25.
       Once again, I disagree. There is a distinction between Towles being unable to
prove that the inducement happened and being unable to prove that Robinson, in fact,
alleged that the inducement happened. This is not an instance where a PCRA petitioner
submitted a falsified affidavit. Rather, Towles came to the PCRA court with an affidavit
in hand affirming that the Commonwealth induced testimony. The fact that the PCRA
court later found that it could not determine the affiant’s credibility for purposes of the
underlying Brady claim does not mean that the allegation never happened. The PCRA
court’s inability to assess Robinson’s credibility goes to the merits of the Brady claim, not
to whether Robinson made the allegation in the first place.
       The Majority’s overly narrow interpretation of Section 9545(b)(2)(ii) will prematurely
close the door to petitioners seeking to establish their eligibility for post-conviction relief.
To illustrate my concern, imagine a petitioner who obtains new exculpatory evidence.
The Majority would require the petitioner to establish the credibility or validity of this
evidence as part of establishing the timeliness of the PCRA petition. In my view, these
requirements go to the merits of the underlying claim, not to the timeliness exception.

                             [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 10
court focused upon three junctures at which it believed that Towles failed to exercise due

diligence in locating Robinson and in obtaining his statement before March 5, 2020:

during cross-examination at trial; at the filing of Towles’ first PCRA petition; and during

investigations by current counsel, the Federal Community Defender Office (“FCDO”),

after 2015.

       According to the PCRA court, Towles first displayed a lack of due diligence at trial.

The PCRA court noted that Towles’ trial counsel was aware that Robinson was

cooperating with the Commonwealth, feared prosecution, and had been directed not to

speak to Towles’ defense team. Yet trial counsel did not cross-examine Robinson to

probe the possibility that he was testifying under threats or promises by the

Commonwealth. The PCRA court believed that it would have been reasonable for trial

counsel to probe Robinson’s motives for testifying at trial, and that declining to cross-

examine Robinson about his motives was unreasonable, thereby demonstrating a lack of

due diligence.

       I disagree with the PCRA court’s evaluation of trial counsel’s performance, as the

court employed a flawed lens.          Instead of asking whether the unique factual

circumstances demonstrate that Towles put forth a reasonable effort, as due diligence

demands, the PCRA court examined Towles’ efforts with the clarity of hindsight. This

clarity was not available to Towles or to counsel until many years later.

       This sort of assessment transgresses the prohibition against hindsight evaluations

in weighing claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. One of the prongs of a claim of counsel

ineffectiveness requires the petitioner to prove that counsel’s course of conduct lacked a

                            [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 11
reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client’s interests. 35        In assessing the

reasonableness of an attorney’s performance under a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, we view counsel’s performance “not in hindsight, but from counsel’s perspective

at the time.”36 As we have explained,

       [a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
       made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
       circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
       conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. This is so because it is all
       too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel, and all too easy for
       a court to deem a particular act or omission unreasonable merely because
       counsel's overall strategy did not achieve the result his client desired. 37

       Our retrospective view of counsel’s efforts for purposes of one aspect of the PCRA

(due diligence for a timeliness exception) is problematic in light of our condemnation of

the same for purposes of another aspect of the same statute (claims of counsel

ineffectiveness). The PCRA court’s assessment of due diligence relied exclusively upon

the distorting effects of hindsight, reconstructed the circumstances of counsel’s conduct,

and evaluated the attorney’s efforts not from the attorney’s perspective at the time but

35     Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 830 (Pa. 2005) (“Thus, the constitutional
ineffectiveness standard requires the defendant to rebut the presumption of professional
competence by demonstrating that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the
particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis
designed to effectuate his interests; and (3) but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.”).
36   Commonwealth v. Jones, 815 A.2d 598, 615 (Pa. 2002) (Opinion Announcing the
Judgment of the Court).
37       Id. at 615–16 (cleaned up); see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993)
(observing that the requirement of “contemporary assessment” recognizes that “from the
perspective of hindsight there is a natural tendency to speculate as to whether a different
trial strategy might have been more successful”); Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096,
1108 (Pa. 2012) (“A claim of ineffectiveness generally cannot succeed through
comparing, in hindsight, the trial strategy employed with alternatives not pursued.”) (citing
Commonwealth v. Miller, 819 A.2d 504, 517 (Pa. 2002)).

                            [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 12
from the court’s perspective many years later. While, from our appellate perch, we refuse

to second-guess counsel’s conduct in the face of allegations of ineffectiveness, we

simultaneously do exactly that in our due diligence analysis. Although an ineffectiveness

inquiry would not deem an act or omission unreasonable merely because it was

unsuccessful, the due diligence inquiry requires the petitioner to have pursued every

alternative, regardless of whether any would have been successful. In both cases, it is

the Commonwealth that benefits and the PCRA petitioner who shoulders the nearly

insurmountable burden.

      In addition to relying upon the Commonwealth’s disclosure obligations for

information that might be useful for cross examination, 38 trial counsel conducted his own

pre-trial investigation of Robinson.   Trial counsel repeatedly attempted to interview

Robinson, including at the county jail where Robinson was incarcerated. Each time,

Robinson refused to cooperate. In April 2011, Robinson indicated that he had been told

by someone not to talk to the defense team.

      The PCRA court cast aside counsel’s multiple attempts to interview Robinson,

characterizing these efforts as unreasonable. According to the PCRA court, there was

only one reasonable course of conduct: to cross examine Robinson at trial. Because it

would have been reasonable to cross-examine Robinson, the PCRA court believed that

anything else was unreasonable. 39 This is a non-sequitur. The reasonableness of one

approach does not render all alternative approaches unreasonable.          For example,

imagine that counsel had cross-examined Robinson in order to discover Robinson’s

38    See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985).
39    See Maj. Op. at 24.

                            [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 13
motive for testifying. Imagine further that counsel had done so instead of attempting to

interview Robinson before trial. Would trial counsel’s failure to attempt to interview

Robinson before trial render counsel’s cross-examination unreasonable? This illustrates

the deficiency in using hindsight as a barometer for due diligence. There is always

something else that could have been done, something that a court can latch onto as a

more reasonable tactic, or something that simply makes more sense when we look back

years later. That a court may find a better choice does not, ipso facto, render all of

counsel’s actions unreasonable. We must consider the action from counsel’s perspective

at the time.

       If we were examining counsel’s trial strategy within a claim of counsel

ineffectiveness, we would ask whether counsel, upon cross-examination, had any

reasonable basis not to probe the possibility of a deal with the Commonwealth. We would

answer this question without resorting to the crutch of hindsight, and without comparing

the course of conduct chosen to the universe of possible alternatives.

       Evaluating counsel’s conduct under a claim of ineffectiveness, I have no doubt that

we would find that, given counsel’s lack of success in interviewing Robinson before trial,

counsel would have acted reasonably in declining to explore Robinson’s motivation for

testifying for the first time at trial. At the time of trial, counsel is operating in the service

of one objective: an acquittal. Defense counsel is not seeking to lay the groundwork for

due diligence just in case it turns out that the Commonwealth was violating its disclosure

obligations under Brady by withholding favorable evidence and just in case the client may

later have to establish a timeliness exception for a facially untimely PCRA petition.

Counsel had no idea what Robinson would say if asked, because, despite counsel’s

                             [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 14
extensive efforts, Robinson had deliberately avoided speaking with counsel before trial.

In front of the jury, it is not unreasonable for counsel to elect to avoid the risk of asking a

question to which counsel does not know the answer. 40 Without any indication that there

were improper motives being supplied by the Commonwealth, and without any

information from Robinson directly, it would have been irresponsible for counsel to

explore Robinson’s motivations in front of a jury. Pursuing a line of questioning without a

predicate factual basis, and without knowing the witness’s likely answers, could cause

counsel to appear dishonest, amateurish, or both. It could diminish counsel’s credibility

with the jury and seriously handicap counsel’s ability to advocate for the client. It could

produce testimony that hurts the client’s case. Reasonable counsel would safeguard the

client’s interests and counsel’s own credibility with the jury. Reasonable counsel does

not squander jurors’ goodwill by pursuing a line of questioning to which counsel does not

know the likely answer.

       The PCRA court also discerned a lack of due diligence in the efforts that Towles’

attorneys made to locate and interview Robinson following Towles’ first PCRA petition.

Lawyers and investigators from the FCDO made multiple visits to Robinson’s address

and his parents’ address.      Ultimately, in March 2020, they succeeded in obtaining

Robinson’s affidavit. The PCRA court determined that the FCDO’s ultimate success in

locating and speaking with Robinson in 2020 at Robinson’s address indicated that

counsel’s prior unsuccessful efforts lacked due diligence. 41 The PCRA court held that,

40     See, e.g., Tom Branigan, Cross-Examination of Technical Experts, 94 MICH. B.J.
58, 60 (2015) (referencing the adage to “[n]ever ask a question on cross to which you do
not know the answer”).
41     PCRA Ct. Op. 5/5/2022 at 16.

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instead of continuing to seek Robinson at his and his parents’ home addresses,

reasonable counsel should have pursued other methods of locating him, such as

contacting Robinson’s prior counsel of record or his probation officer. Because there

were reasonable alternatives, the PCRA court concluded that Towles’ (ultimately

successful) efforts were unreasonable, demonstrating a lack of due diligence.

       The PCRA court transformed due diligence into a moving target, retrospectively

evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s ultimately successful efforts by measuring

them now against speculative alternatives that counsel could have pursued then. With

the benefit of hindsight, and with the liberty to move the goal posts, it is easy to look back

now at what was done then and contrast it with what else could have been done. But the

question is not whether a petitioner could have done more, for the answer to that will

always be “yes.” The question is whether the petitioner or petitioner’s counsel “put forth

a reasonable effort to obtain the information upon which a claim is based.” 42

       Imagine that, instead of trying to find Robinson at his address, counsel

unsuccessfully had tried to arrange a meeting through Robinson’s attorney or probation

officer. Would the PCRA court hold that those unsuccessful efforts were unreasonable

because Robinson was available at his own residence? I fear that it would. What if

counsel had attempted to contact Robinson’s attorney, but not his probation officer?

Would that be unreasonable? It is one thing to scour the universe of potential alternatives

that were not pursued; it is quite another to ask whether the path chosen, a path that

ultimately was successful in obtaining Robinson’s affidavit, was reasonable.

42     Commonwealth v. Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075, 1091 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted).

                            [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 16
       Instead of focusing upon additional or alternative steps that counsel could have

taken, I would confine the due diligence analysis to the reasonableness of the steps that

counsel did take. It was reasonable for counsel to attempt to locate Robinson repeatedly

at his and his parents’ last known addresses. The reasonableness of these efforts is

demonstrated by their ultimate success.

       Although I cannot agree with the PCRA court’s analysis of due diligence at trial or

after the first PCRA petition with respect to the newly discovered facts timeliness

exception, the record supports the PCRA court’s holding that Towles failed to establish

the due diligence necessary to demonstrate that his second PCRA petition was timely

filed. As the PCRA court found, Towles has made no attempt to establish what efforts he

undertook to locate Robinson to obtain a statement in connection with his first PCRA

petition.

       Thus, I join Sections I, II, and III of the Majority’s opinion. I concur only in the result

of Section IV, affirming the PCRA court’s dismissal of Towles’ second PCRA petition as

untimely. I agree with the Majority that Towles failed to establish the governmental

interference exception. I disagree with the Majority’s treatment of the newly discovered

facts exception. Rather than holding that Towles failed to establish the fact upon which

his underlying claim was predicated, I would hold that Towles failed to establish that he

acted with due diligence.

                             [J-87-2022] [MO: Brobson, J.] - 17