Court Opinion

ID: 9572122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:38:40.693426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:35.449396
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice,
partially concurring and partially dissenting, with whom McCLIN-TOCK, Justice, joins.
I would agree with the majority’s conclusion that, given the irregular character of the disposition herein, the bank violated the notice requirements of § 34-9-507(1), W.S. 1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.
Although the parties concede that the damages recoverable are those for conversion under § 34-9-505(1), W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp. — a concession with which I have some concern, since there was a disposition within ninety days — no damages as of the time of the conversion (when title was improperly transferred to Darlington) were shown. The only damage evidence bearing upon the trailer’s value at this time shows that it was worth less than the outstanding debt. As a result, plaintiff could take nothing under that portion of his claim. International Distress Signals v. McDowell, Wyo., 519 P.2d 224, 226. There being no evidence that the bank acted in bad faith, and no indication that plaintiff ever sought recovery on the basis of an implied contract, I fail to see any justification in applying any exception to the traditional measure of damages for conversion.
Rather than forcing a strained construction of damage rules, and rather than finding a non-appealing party to be a joint tortfeasor, I would have held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, under the minimum penalty provisions of § 34-9-507(1), supra, the sum of $608.12 from the bank. The statutory penalty is tailored to deter creditor misbehavior, without requiring proof of actual damage. White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 26-14 (1972). We need not misuse other rules of law to achieve that result.