Court Opinion

ID: 9939643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 10:10:51.402063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:41.711508
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________
           No. 02-23-00274-CV
      ___________________________

ROBERT WILLIAM SCOTT BAUER, Appellant

                     V.

       JAMIE LYN BAUER, Appellee

   On Appeal from the 153rd District Court
           Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 153-327827-21

   Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                    I. Introduction

      Appellant Robert William Scott Bauer (Scott) appeals the trial court’s final

judgment that was rendered upon a motion for entry of judgment by his ex-wife

Appellee Jamie Lyn Bauer. In two issues, Scott argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by rendering a final judgment (1) that was allegedly not in “strict and literal

compliance” with the parties’ Rule 11 settlement agreement and (2) that was rendered

despite the trial court’s possessing information that should have reasonably caused the

trial court to inquire further about whether Scott had in fact agreed to the proposed

agreed judgment that became the final judgment. Because Scott’s attorney alerted the

trial court, prior to the signing of the final judgment, that he was out of the country

and needed additional time to review the proposed judgment, the trial court was in

possession of information that was reasonably calculated to prompt the trial court to

make further inquiry into the party’s consent thereto. Accordingly, we hold that the

trial court abused its discretion by rendering the final judgment, and we reverse the

trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

                                   II. Background

      The parties divorced in 2012. A number of agreements were reached at the

conclusion of the divorce, including that Scott would pay spousal maintenance and

support, child support, and other amounts to effectuate a fair and equitable division

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of the marital estate. To effectuate those agreements, Scott executed a promissory

note, a guaranty, and a security pledge agreement.1 Scott failed to pay the amounts

due and owing under the note at maturity.

      Jamie demanded payment under the note, but Scott failed to pay all amounts

due and owing.2 In addition, Jamie discovered that Scott had breached the security

pledge agreement in numerous respects, including but not limited to failing to deliver

and maintain the collateral with the escrow agent to hold in trust, failing to keep the

collateral free from liens and encumbrances, and failing to notify Jamie of material

changes in and to the collateral and changes related to the collateral that affected the

security interest. Jamie pleaded that Scott had transferred over $1 million out of

Braxton Acquisitions and into other entities controlled by Scott without informing her

and had utilized Braxton Acquisitions’ assets to pay numerous personal expenses.

      1
        According to Jamie’s petition, pursuant to the security pledge agreement, Scott
pledged his ownership interest in Braxton Acquisitions, LLC as collateral for the note
and agreed to (a) deliver and maintain the collateral with an escrow agent to hold in
trust; (b) pay the debt reflected in the note; (c) “keep the collateral free from liens”;
and (d) not “sell, transfer, or further encumber any of the collateral.” Scott also
agreed to notify Jamie of any material change in the collateral and any change that
might affect the security interest. The security pledge agreement further provided,
among other things, that upon the occurrence and during the continuance of a default
by Scott, his rights in and to Braxton Acquisitions would immediately cease and be
vested in Jamie and that his right to dividend payments from Braxton would cease and
be vested in Jamie.

      He made two payments: one in the amount of $300,000, and the other in the
      2

amount of $204,478.24.

                                            3
      Jamie filed an original petition, asserting causes of action for suit on the note,

suit on the guaranty, breach of the security pledge agreement, and fraudulent transfer.

Scott answered with a general denial and pleaded various affirmative defenses.

      The parties proceeded to trial and reached a resolution during the second day

of the trial. Jamie’s attorney read the agreement into the record, and each of the

parties stated that he or she had agreed to the terms that were listed in the bullet

points that were read on the record.

      Thirty days later, Jamie filed a motion for entry of judgment that attached a

proposed judgment. In the motion, Jamie’s counsel noted that the parties had agreed

in the Rule 11 agreement that the judgment would be entered within thirty days of the

settlement. Jamie’s counsel further noted that she had attempted to obtain feedback

from Scott’s counsel on the proposed judgment but that he had not provided any

comments or revisions and had informed Jamie’s counsel that he would not be able to

review the documents because he was leaving for Mexico the next day.

      The following morning, Scott’s attorney responded by sending a letter to the

trial court. In the letter, Scott’s attorney acknowledged that the thirty-day time frame

had passed but noted that “time was not made of the essence.” He requested that the

trial court defer consideration of the proposed judgment “until next week” because he

was out of the country and would review and respond to Jamie’s attorney upon his

return.   He further stated, “I anticipate the parties will submit jointly approved

documents on Monday of next week.” Rather than wait as Scott’s attorney had

                                           4
requested, the trial court signed the final judgment that Jamie had submitted that same

day. 3

         Scott thereafter filed a motion to modify judgment or for new trial. The

motion was overruled by operation of law, and this appeal followed.

   III. The Trial Court Possessed Information Necessitating Further Inquiry
                         Before Signing the Judgment

         In his second issue, Scott argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

rendering the final judgment because the record demonstrates that Scott did not

consent to the final judgment. Jamie responds that the trial court did not err by

enforcing the parties’ Rule 11 agreement and rendering a final judgment “even if Scott

did not consent.”4 Jamie’s response effectively concedes that Scott did not consent to

the final judgment. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by

rendering the final judgment without Scott’s consent.

         The Dallas Court of Appeals has set forth the law applicable to the situation

before us:

       The final judgment does not state that it is “Agreed as to Form and
         3

Substance” or have the attorneys’ signatures.

         Although Jamie attempts to reframe the underlying proceeding as an
         4

enforcement proceeding, she did not follow the required steps to do so by pursuing a
separate claim for breach of contract, nor did the trial court allow the parties to have
full, fair discovery and to have their cases decided on the merits. See generally Ford
Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 663 (Tex. 2009). Further, Jamie admits that she
did not file a motion for summary judgment to enforce the parties’ Rule 11
agreement, and her efforts contending that her motion for entry of judgment can be
construed as a summary-judgment motion fail because, as noted in Scott’s reply brief,
she did not plead and prove a breach of the Rule 11 agreement.

                                            5
      A party has the right to revoke his consent at any time before the court
      renders judgment. Sohocki[ v. Sohocki], 897 S.W.2d [422,] 424 [(Tex.
      App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1995, no writ)] (citing Samples
      Exterminators v. Samples, 640 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam)).
      “A judgment based on an agreement cannot be rendered, even if the
      requirements of Rule 11 are met, if the consent of one of the parties has
      either been withdrawn or is lacking at the time the agreed judgment is
      rendered; such judgment is void.” Id. ([first] citing Kennedy[ v. Hyde], 682
      S.W.2d [525,] 528–[29 (Tex. 1984)]; [and then citing] Samples, 640 S.W.2d
      at 875). When a trial court has knowledge that a party to a suit does not
      consent to a judgment, it should refuse to sanction the agreement by
      making it the judgment of the court. Id. (citing Burnaman v. Heaton, 240
      S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. 1951)). The proper inquiry is whether the
      information in the trial court’s possession is clearly sufficient and of such
      a nature as to put the court on notice that a party’s consent is lacking
      and to require the court to make further inquiry before rendering
      judgment. Id. An agreed judgment will be set aside if rendered “when
      the court is in possession of information [that] is reasonably calculated
      to prompt the court to make further inquiry into the party’s consent
      thereto, which inquiry, if reasonably pursued, would disclose the want of
      consent.” Burnaman, 240 S.W.2d at 291–92[.]

Cooper v. Cooper, No. 05-20-00507-CV, 2021 WL 1747856, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas

May 4, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Here, both Jamie’s motion to enter judgment and Scott’s attorney’s letter put

the trial court on notice that Scott had not reviewed, much less consented to, the

proposed final judgment that Jamie had submitted to the trial court. This information

was clearly sufficient and of such a nature as to put the trial court on notice that

Scott’s consent was lacking and to require the trial court to make further inquiry

before rendering judgment. See id.; Le Jeune v. Robbins, No. 10-16-00360-CV, 2021 WL

824991, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); Cantu v. Mercy

Health Ctr., No. 04-06-00010-CV, 2006 WL 3085703, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—San

                                           6
Antonio Nov. 1, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). The record does not reflect that the trial

court held a hearing or made any inquiries; instead, the record reflects that the trial court

signed the proposed judgment submitted by Jamie several hours after Scott’s attorney’s

letter was filed. Based on the record before us,5 we sustain Scott’s second issue. 6

                                     IV. Conclusion

       Having sustained Scott’s second issue, which is dispositive of this appeal, we

reverse the trial court’s final judgment and remand the case to the trial court “with

instructions to enter an agreed judgment in strict or literal compliance with [the]

parties’ Rule 11 [s]ettlement [a]greement and only with consent of all parties at the

time the judgment is entered.”7

                                                         /s/ Dabney Bassel
                                                         Dabney Bassel
                                                         Justice

Delivered: February 8, 2024

       Our holding is limited to the specific facts presented here and should not be
       5

read to excuse counsel from reviewing documents in a timely manner, nor should it
be extrapolated to require trial courts to inquire any time that counsel asserts that he
or she has not reviewed the documents without providing further explanation for
such failure.
       6
        Because this issue is dispositive of Scott’s appeal, we need not address his first
issue challenging terms that were added to or omitted from the final judgment. See
Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Furthermore, although Scott asks that we take judicial notice of
(1) the clerk’s file for the parties’ family-law case and (2) the contents of the Tarrant
County Clerk’s property records, we decline to do so as judicial notice of such records
was not necessary to dispose of this appeal.
      This is the relief that Scott prayed for on appeal, and we therefore limit the
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remand to the relief that he specifically requested.

                                              7