Court Opinion

ID: 9811969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:34:40.953251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:30.729845
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
concurring. I merely wish to emphasize the fact that this Court did not intend by its decisions in Phifer v. Insurance Co., 123 N. C., 410; Cole v. Boyd, 125 N. C., 496, and Payne v. Boyd, Ibid, 499, to limit in any degree, even by disapproval, the power of the court below to allow amended verifications in the interest of substantial justice. The object of those decisions was to compel a sufficient veri-*562ficatio-n, so that a pleader wbo took advantage of the form of the statute would be equally bound by its substantial purpose. In Gole v. Boyd, the Court says: “But the object of verification- is to verify. If it fails to do this, it is worse than useless. If a party wishes to bind his opponent with the obligations of a verified pleading, he must bind himself, and must so state every material allegation that it will not only rest under the moral sanctity of an oath, but that its falsity will fasten upon him the penalties of perjury. This, being the object of a verification, is the true test of its sufficiency.” Again, the Court says in Payne v. Boyd: “We deem it necessary to adhere to the reasonable enforcement of this rule in the interest of substantial justice. In the present case, it does not appear to work any hardship-, and m all cases the party can appeal to the discretionary power of amendment lodged m the court, which we doubt not will be exercised upon all proper occasions.” Where- the allowance of such an amendment tends to a fair trial of the case upon its merits, I think it is eminently proper that the Court should grant it, giving of course to the adverse party a reasonable opportunity to meet the amended pleadings.