Court Opinion

ID: 9697460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:17:20.358474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.724848
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that the record before us establishes an independent basis for the in-court identification of Harvey Silver. To the contrary, I am convinced that as a matter of law it must be concluded that Mrs. Collier’s observations during the incident did not provide the basis for her belated in-court identification. Moreover, I also reject the judgment of the plurality of the Superior Court Panel that the introduction of Mrs. Collier’s in-court identification was harmless error. I therefore dissent.
Normally, an eyewitness to an event is competent to testify as to that occurrence, including the identification of the participants therein. Cf. Commonwealth v. Davis, 491 Pa. 363, 421 A.2d 179 (1980). Attacks upon the accuracy of the witness’s account of the event raises questions of credibility to be resolved by the finder of fact. Commonwealth v. Davis, 466 Pa. 102, 351 A.2d 642 (1976); Commonwealth v. *243Tate, 229 Pa.Super. 202, 323 A.2d 188 (1974). However, where the testimony of that witness has been tainted through impermissibly suggestive identification procedures, so as to likely lead to a misidentification, due process is offended if that identification is admitted at trial. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969); Simmons v. U. S., 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). As the majority correctly noted, the exposure to suggestive influences alone is not the determining factor, but rather the reliability of the proffered identification as a result of that exposure is the linchpin. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); see Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). The test for determining the reliability of such identification evidence was explicitly articulated by the U. S. Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaite, supra:
The factors to be considered are set out in Biggers. 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401. These include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.
432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253.
The concept of an independent basis in this context suggests that the witness’ view of the criminal at the time of the crime was sufficient to assure that the subsequent identification flowed from that encounter itself and was not molded by later suggestive influences. Neil v. Biggers, supra; Simmons v. U. S., supra; Commonwealth v. Fowler, 466 Pa. 198, 352 A.2d 17 (1976) (plurality opinion). In such case the suggestive influences are irrelevant since the stimulus for the identification flows from the event and the probability of misidentification because of the suggestive influences is negated.
*244The majority premises its finding of an independent basis for the identification upon Mrs. Collier’s opportunity to observe appellant during the incident. What the majority ignores is the obvious fact, that although she may have had the opportunity to have formed a clear picture of appellant from that exposure, she in fact did not. As noted in Manson, we must look not only to the opportunity to observe, but also to indication of the witness’s attentiveness in making such an observation, and the accuracy of her perceptions from that observation.
Mrs. Collier testified that her exposure to the participant alleged to have been appellant was minimal. Although she was present during a period of from two to three minutes while the individual was speaking to Mrs. Fox, the proprietess of the establishment that was robbed, she was not paying attention to him and that his back was to her. When questioned by the police shortly after the incident, the only description she was able to offer was that he was a black male, á little shorter in height than she, and appeared to be wearing a black coat. The night of the incident Mrs. Collier attended a lineup in which appellant, his brother and five other individuals participated. At a time when Mrs. Collier’s recall of the event should have been at its best, she was unable to identify appellant although she did identify his brother as one of the participants.
At the preliminary hearing, approximately three weeks later, Mrs. Collier was initially confused because of the similarity in appearance between appellant and his twin, but ultimately identified the twin brother again as a participant and failed to identify appellant. At both the lineup and the preliminary hearing Mrs. Fox identified appellant and his brother. It is also significant that although Mrs. Collier perceived the similarity in appearance between the brothers at the time of the preliminary hearing, she apparently did not recognize that resemblance from her exposure to the men at the time of the crime.
From the foregoing, it defies human experience to conclude that the in-court identification, months after the *245event, resulted from Mrs. Collier’s observation of appellant at the time of the robbery. Since the instant record reflects no prior association between appellant and Mrs. Collier before the robbery, it is obvious that the events following the robbery inspired the belated identification. It is equally fallacious to argue that the subsequent impermissibly suggestive procedures were irrelevant because they failed to produce an immediate identification.1 A belated response to these impermissibly suggestive procedures provides, accepting the witness’s sincerity, the only logical explanation for the in-court identification.
I also must reject the argument that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978). That Fox positively and unequivocally identified appellant as one of the perpetrators is not persuasive. At some point where there are a number of identifications of an accused by persons witnessing an event, the improper admission of one of those identifications may properly be treated as being harmless. However, such is not the case where there are only two eyewitness identifications. In spite of the Commonwealth’s characterization of Mrs. Fox’s identification evidence against appellant as positive and unequivocal, it was within the province of the finder of fact to accept or reject it. Commonwealth v. Arms, 489 Pa. 35, 413 A.2d 684 (1980); Commonwealth v. Rose, 463 Pa. 264, 344 A.2d 824 (1975). It cannot be said that the concurring testimony of Mrs. Collier did not come to play in the jury’s acceptance of Mrs. Fox’s identification of appellant. Moreover, the remaining evidence linking appellant to the offense was circumstantial in nature and not as conclusive as an eyewitness identification, if believed. It, *246therefore, cannot be said that the in-court identification did not contribute to the verdict and was therefore harmless.
Accordingly, I would reverse the Judgments of Sentence and award a new trial.
FLAHERTY and HUTCHINSON, JJ., joined in this opinion.

. We note the majority vainly attempts to undercut the impermissibly suggestive quality of the lineup and preliminary hearing confrontations. However, by conceding the necessity of establishing the independent basis, they admit the impermissibly suggestiveness of the earlier confrontations. Moreover, we have recognized that confrontations wherein the accused is identified by his participation in the proceedings are highly suggestive. Commonwealth v. Sexton, 485 Pa. 17, 400 A.2d 1289 (1979).