Court Opinion

ID: 9763478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:46:38.398366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:44.180154
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
concurring. I concur in the result reached by the majority and with its analysis of the relationship between the operating-under-the-influence statute, N. J. S. A. 39:4-50 (a) and the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, N. J. S. A. 24:21-1 et seq. From that point, however, I would reach the conclusion that methaqualone is within the coverage of N. J. S. A. 39:4-50 (a) by a somewhat different route.
Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a “narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug” in violation of N. J. S. A. 39:4-50(a). He was arrested after driving erratically and at a high speed through a residential neighborhood. When, at the request of the arresting officer, defendant left his car, *330he walked only with difficulty, swaying and staggering, and was unable to perform simple balance tests. This, considered with subsequent analysis of a urine sample taken at the time of arrest and revealing a drug generically known as methaqualone in defendant’s system, would support a conclusion that defendant was under the influence of that drug.
At trial, the State’s expert witness described methaqualone as a sedative with properties similar to the barbiturates. He indicated that it functions as a central nervous system depressant which may impair judgment and motor coordination for a period of up to eight hours.
The majority holds that this evidence establishes that defendant was under the influence of a “narcotic drug,” as the term is used in N. J. S. A. 39:4-50(a). It offers several variant definitions for “narcotic” but all identify the central characteristic of a narcotic drug as its power to induce a stupor in the user. I am not satisfied that the present record establishes that methaqualone is a “narcotic drug” within any of the alternative definitions proffered by the .majority.1
Criminal statutes are, of course, to be interpreted in.light of the “mischief and evil sought to be suppressed” so as to give effect to the legislative purpose. State v. Meinken, 10 N. J. 348, 352 (1952). The purpose behind N. J. S. A. 39:4-50(a), properly noted by the majority, is “to prevent the operation of motor vehicles by those whose faculties are so impaired as to present a danger to the safety of others as well as themselves.” Ante at 325. While N. J. S. A. 39:4-50 (a) specifically refers to “narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drugs,” the Legislature appears not to have *331been concerned with the precise pharmacological definitions of these terms but rather with the fact that they represent classes of drugs known to impair the ability of the user to drive safely. I would therefore construe this statutory language to refer to any drug which powerfully affects the central nervous system so as to produce significant impairment of perception, judgment, or muscular coordination. This is merely an application of the familiar principle of statutory construction that “particular words may be enlarged or restricted in meaning by their associates and the evident spirit of the whole expression.” Salz v. State House Commission, 18 N. J. 106, 111 (1955); In re Marvin, 97 N. J. Super. 62, 72 (App. Div. 1967) aff’d 53 N. J. 147 (1969) cert. den. 396 U. S. 821, 90 S. Ct. 62, 24 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1969).
Such an interpretation does not offend either the principle of strict construction of penal statutes, State v. Provenzano, 34 N. J. 318, 322 (1961); State v. Meinken, 10 N. J. 348 (1952); State v. Angelo’s Motor Sales, 125 N. J. Super. 200, 207-8 (App. Div. 1973) aff’d sub nom. State v. Parmigiani, 65 N. J. 154 (1974); State v. Gattling, 95 N. J. Super. 103, 108 (App. Div. 1967) certif. den. 50 N. J. 91 (1967), or the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 N. J. 529, 539 (1960). Both of these rules of statutory construction are subordinate to the higher principle that insofar as possible, statutes should be construed by the courts so as to realize rather than defeat the legislative purpose. Cf. United States v. Walton, 514 F. 2d 201 (D. C. Cir. 1975) (federal statute prohibiting distribution of derivatives of Cannabis sativa L. construed to include all products containing the active ingredient found in marijuana, whether derived from that species or some other).
So construed, N. J. S. A. 39:4-50 (a) plainly covers methaqualone, and it is on that basis that I would reverse.
P ashman, J., concurring in the result.
*332For reversal — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman and Clieeokd — 5.
For affirmance — None.

Aceording to information published by manufacturers of methaqualone, the drug is technically a hypnotic agent rather than a narcotic. In .clinical doses it induces drowsiness. 1974 Physicians Desk Reference 1253 (1974). At the time of the trial below, methaqualone was thought to be non-addietive. Id. More recent reports indicate that it is addictive if taken, in large doses without medical supervision. Id. at A-24 (Supp. A 1974).