Court Opinion

ID: 9375829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 22:03:20.217415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:02.074553
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/23 P. v. Camacho CA2/3
Opinion on remand from Supreme Court
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  THE PEOPLE,                                                         B312190

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. BA027667)
           v.

  FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMACHO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James R. Dabney, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with direction.
      Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Daniel C. Chang and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     _________________________
       In 1992, a jury convicted Francisco Javier Camacho of first
degree murder, attempted murder, second degree robbery, and
two counts of attempted second degree robbery. The jury also
found true the special circumstance allegation that the murder
was committed while Camacho was engaged in the commission of
robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) and that he personally
used a firearm in the commission of the offenses (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)). He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole,
plus a consecutive five years for the section 12022.5, subdivision
(a) enhancement, as well as concurrent determinate terms for the
other convictions. A different panel of this Division affirmed
Camacho’s conviction. (People v. Camacho (Dec. 1, 1995,
B071909) [nonpub. opn.].)
       Following our affirmance, Camacho petitioned for
resentencing under section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).2 The
trial court denied his request without appointing counsel,
concluding that the true findings on the special circumstance
allegation precluded relief. Camacho did not timely appeal.
Shortly thereafter, Camacho filed a supplemental request with
the assistance of counsel, raising several new legal authorities.
The trial court adhered to its decision. In May 2022, a majority

      1
       All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
      2
        Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) For consistency and to ensure that our citations are to the
most current version of the resentencing statute, we will refer
only to section 1172.6 for the remainder of this opinion.

                                 2
panel of this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief.
(People v. Camacho (May 17, 2022, B312190) [nonpub. opn.].)
Camacho petitioned for review.
      On July 20, 2022, our Supreme Court granted review and
has now transferred the matter back to this court with directions
to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong).
      The parties agree Strong requires we reverse the superior
court’s order denying Camacho’s supplemental petition for
resentencing and that this case should be remanded to the
superior court for issuance of an order to show cause under
section 1172.6, subdivision (c) and further proceedings under
subdivision (d) of the same section. We agree.
                         BACKGROUND3
      The convictions resulted from two separate armed
robberies involving multiple victims on one September night in
1990. The incidents involved Camacho and two other suspects,
Petayah Little4 and Eldridge Richardson. During the first
robbery, around 10:00 p.m., Camacho and Little approached
victims Allen Watkins and Wycliffe Campbell, both of whom were

      3
        The background is from the prior opinion in this matter,
People v. Camacho, supra, B312190, of which we have taken
judicial notice by our own motion, and from the prior opinion
addressing Camacho’s direct appeal (People v. Camacho, supra,
B071909), of which we have already taken judicial notice at the
Attorney General’s request. (Evid. Code, §§ 451, 459.)
      4
       Little was under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
during the pendency of Camacho’s case.

                                 3
sitting in Campbell’s car, which was parked in front of
Campbell’s family home. Camacho tapped his gun on the driver’s
side window and demanded money, while Little stuck his
revolver in the passenger’s side window. Watkins surrendered
two dollars. Desiring more money, Camacho and Little marched
the victims into the family home and began firing. Watkins was
shot and injured. About one hour later, at a location nearby,
victim Linden5 Glave was sitting in a car when held at gunpoint
by Camacho and Little. After a struggle, Glave was shot and
killed. Camacho and Little ran to a waiting car. A police officer
in the area heard tires screeching, and a car chase ensued.
During the car chase, one suspect jumped out of the car and ran
off. The pursuit continued until Richardson and Little were
arrested. Camacho was apprehended two weeks later.
       At trial, Camacho offered an alibi and the testimony of
Little. Little testified that he committed the crimes, not with
Camacho, but with “ ‘G.’ ” Regarding the murder, Little testified
that G placed Glave in a chokehold and then Little shot Glave.
       In rebuttal, a police officer testified that Little made a
statement on the night of the offense admitting that he
committed the crimes with Camacho and that Camacho shot
Glave.
       Relevant here, the jury was instructed with CALJIC
No. 8.80.1 for the robbery-murder special circumstance. The jury
was not instructed on the theory of natural and probable
consequences.

     5
      The record contains two different spellings: Linden and
Lindon.

                                4
       As previously noted, the jury convicted Camacho of first
degree murder (of Glave), attempted murder (of Watkins), second
degree robbery (of Watkins), and two counts of attempted second
degree robbery (of Glave and Campbell). The jury found true the
robbery-murder special circumstance allegation pursuant to
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) and found true that Camacho
personally used a firearm pursuant to section 12022.5,
subdivision (a) in the commission of all the offenses. The trial
court sentenced Camacho to life without the possibility of parole,
plus a consecutive five years for the section 12022.5, subdivision
(a) enhancement and ordered the determinate terms for the other
convictions to run concurrently. His sentence was affirmed by
this court.
       In 2019, after the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), Camacho petitioned for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 (the 2019 petition).
Without appointing counsel, the trial court summarily denied the
petition. The court based its decision on the record of conviction.
The court found that Camacho had failed to establish a prima
facie case for relief because the jury found true the special
circumstance allegation pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(17). The court also noted that the jury found the personal use
of firearm allegation true. Camacho did not timely appeal.
       In 2021, with the assistance of counsel, Camacho filed a
supplemental request for relief under section 1172.6 (the 2021
supplemental petition). This petition sought relief only as to the
murder conviction of Glave and raised new legal authority which
was decided after the trial court’s summary denial of the 2019
petition. The trial court again summarily denied the 2021
supplemental petition, declining to revisit its decision despite a

                                 5
“split of authority on [the] issue.” Camacho appealed, and a
majority panel of this court affirmed the decision of the trial
court.6 Camacho petitioned to the California Supreme Court.
       The Supreme Court granted Camacho’s petition for review,
and in December 2022, remanded the matter back to our court
with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in
light of Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698. Strong concluded that a
special circumstance finding predating People v. Banks (2015) 61
Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522
(Clark), both of which substantially narrowed and clarified the
class of defendants who are major participants acting with
reckless indifference to human life during a felony, does not
preclude eligibility for resentencing. As we now explain and as
the People concede, remand is now required.
                            DISCUSSION
       Senate Bill 1437, which took effect on January 1, 2019,
limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it
relates to murder. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–
843.) As relevant here, Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-
murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e) which provides
that a participant in the perpetration of qualifying felonies is
liable for felony murder only if the person: 1) was the actual
killer; 2) was not the actual killer, but with the intent to kill,
acted as a direct aider and abettor; or 3) the person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless

      Before reaching that conclusion, we also concluded that
      6

Camacho’s 2019 petition did not procedurally bar his
supplemental request.

                                6
indifference to human life, as described in section 190.2,
subdivision (d). (Gentile, at p. 842.)
       Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure whereby persons
convicted of murder under a now-invalid felony-murder theory
may petition for vacation of their convictions and obtain
resentencing. As relevant here, a defendant is eligible for relief
under section 1172.6 if the defendant meets three conditions:
1) the defendant must have been charged with murder under a
theory of felony-murder; 2) the defendant must have been
convicted of first or second degree murder; and 3) the defendant
could no longer be convicted of first or second degree murder
because of changes to sections 188 and 189, effectuated by Senate
Bill 1437.7 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If the petitioner makes a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief, the trial court shall issue
an order to show cause (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) and hold an
evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of
proving “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder” under the law as amended by Senate Bill 1437.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

      7
        To be clear, section 1172.6 also provides relief to
individuals with qualifying convictions for attempted murder and
manslaughter. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a); see also Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 4 [amending section 1172.6 to expand scope of
convictions subject to possible relief].) Because this appeal
pertains only to the 2021 supplemental petition, and that petition
sought resentencing on Camacho’s murder conviction only, we
limit our discussion of the statute to Camacho’s murder
conviction.

                                 7
      Camacho has challenged the trial court’s order denying the
2021 supplemental petition on the ground it erred when it found
he was ineligible for resentencing based on the jury’s robbery-
murder special circumstance findings, even though they predated
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Banks and Clark.
      In Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pages 718 to 720, our high
court determined that a true finding on a felony-murder special-
circumstance allegation, decided before the Banks and Clark
decisions, does not serve to preclude, as a matter of law,
resentencing relief under section 1172.6. It reasoned that both
Banks and Clark represented the type of significant change in
the law traditionally found to warrant a re-examination of
earlier, litigated decisions. Thus, pre-Banks and Clark special
circumstance findings do not preclude relief at the prima facie
stage of the resentencing procedure under section 1172.6,
subdivision (c). Camacho falls within that category of cases.
Therefore, pursuant to Strong, he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).8

      8
        As explained above, the 2021 supplemental petition
sought relief only as to the conviction for the murder of Glave,
and this court’s remand for further proceedings is limited to that
conviction only. We express no opinion on whether (or not)
Camacho’s conviction for the attempted murder of Watkins,
which was not challenged in the 2021 supplemental petition, is
eligible for relief pursuant to section 1172.6.

                                 8
                         DISPOSITION
      The order denying Francisco Javier Camacho’s 2021
supplemental petition for relief is reversed, and the matter is
remanded with direction to the trial court to issue an order to
show cause and to conduct an evidentiary hearing in accordance
with Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           NGUYEN (KIM), J.*

We concur:

                        LAVIN, Acting P. J.

                        EGERTON, J.

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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