Court Opinion

ID: 9404908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 18:09:21.745714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:17.924054
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Tupps, 2023-Ohio-2097.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                              CRAWFORD COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                              CASE NO. 3-22-48

        v.

JASON TUPPS,                                             OPINION

        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court
                           Trial Court No. 21-CR-0313

      Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded

                              Date of Decision: June 26, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Christopher Bazeley for Appellant

        Drew Wood for Appellee
Case No. 3-22-48

MILLER, P.J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jason Tupps, appeals the October 31, 2022

judgment of sentence of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

                          I. Facts & Procedural History

       {¶2} Tupps and the victim in this case, L.T., were married in July 2018.

However, by the summer of 2021, the marriage was disintegrating and the two were

arguing frequently. L.T. started to make audio recordings of these arguments

because, in her words, it made her “feel safer * * * in case something was to

happen.” (Aug. 23, 2022 Tr. at 55-56). L.T. eventually recorded some 40 hours of

her arguments and conversations with Tupps. After an argument on the evening of

August 28, 2021, L.T. went to bed but forgot to turn off the recording application

on her cell phone. During the night, her cell phone captured audio of what L.T. later

described as Tupps forcibly penetrating her vagina with his fingers. Following the

incident, L.T. continued to live with Tupps. On September 9, 2021, Tupps and L.T.

got into another argument at their home in Crestline. An audio recording made

during the confrontation documented what L.T. alleged to be an act of domestic

violence committed by Tupps against her.

       {¶3} On September 28, 2021, the Crawford County Grand Jury indicted

Tupps on one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a first-degree felony,

                                         -2-
Case No. 3-22-48

and one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a first-degree

misdemeanor. On October 7, 2021, Tupps appeared for arraignment and pleaded

not guilty to the counts of the indictment.

       {¶4} On August 10, 2022, the State filed a motion requesting the trial court

instruct the jury at Tupps’s trial regarding adoptive admissions under Evid.R.

801(D)(2)(b). The State argued a jury instruction on adoptive admissions was

required because on one of the audio recordings made by L.T., “[L.T.] accused

[Tupps] of digitally penetrating her by force; [Tupps] did not deny the accusation;

[and] [Tupps] remained silent for a period of several seconds before changing the

subject of the conversation.” (Doc. No. 29).

       {¶5} A jury trial in the matter commenced on August 22, 2022. Before

opening statements, the trial court heard arguments concerning the admissibility of

the audio recording as an adoptive admission. Tupps maintained that his silence on

the audio recording did not satisfy the requirements for an adoptive admission under

Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(b) because he ultimately disavowed L.T.’s accusation later in the

recording. The trial court overruled Tupps’s objections and determined the jury

would be permitted to consider whether Tupps’s silence on the recording constituted

an adoptive admission.      The trial court later instructed the jury on adoptive

admissions as requested by the State.

                                         -3-
Case No. 3-22-48

       {¶6} On August 24, 2022, the jury found Tupps guilty of rape as charged in

the indictment and not guilty of the domestic-violence charge. The trial court

accepted the jury’s verdicts and continued sentencing pending the preparation of a

presentence investigation report.

       {¶7} A sentencing hearing was held on October 31, 2022. At the hearing,

the trial court sentenced Tupps to an indefinite term of five to seven and a half years

in prison. The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on October 31, 2022.

                             II. Assignments of Error

       {¶8} On November 14, 2022, Tupps timely filed a notice of appeal. He raises

the following five assignments of error for our review:

                            First Assignment of Error

       Tupps’s conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence that
       Crawford County was the appropriate venue.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       The trial court abused its discretion by providing, and then
       emphasizing, a jury instruction regarding Tupps’s silence.

                            Third Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred when it failed to advise Tupps of the R.C.
       2929.19(B)(2)(c) factors at sentencing.

                           Fourth Assignment of Error

       The hearing provision in R.C. 2929.271(C) is vague and violates
       Tupps’s rights to due process.

                                         -4-
Case No. 3-22-48

                            Fifth Assignment of Error

       The Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional.

                                  III. Discussion

A. First Assignment of Error: Did the trial court commit plain error by
accepting the jury’s guilty verdict without adequate proof of venue?

       {¶9} In his first assignment of error, Tupps argues that the State failed to

prove the rape offense was committed in Crawford County and the trial court

therefore erred by accepting the jury’s guilty verdict on that count. Specifically,

Tupps maintains that while the State presented testimony from L.T. that the rape

occurred in “the bedroom,” it failed to prove that “the bedroom” was the bedroom

in Tupps and L.T.’s home in Crestline.

i. Venue & Plain Error

       {¶10} “‘Venue’ commonly refers to the appropriate place of trial for a

criminal prosecution within a state.” State v. Williams, 53 Ohio App.3d 1, 5 (10th

Dist.1988). “Venue is not a material element of any crime but, unless waived, is a

fact that must be proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Barr, 158 Ohio

App.3d 86, 2004-Ohio-3900, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.). “Therefore, unless the prosecution

proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime alleged was committed in the

county where the trial was held or the defendant waives this right, the defendant

cannot be convicted.”     Toledo v. Taberner, 61 Ohio App.3d 791, 793 (6th

Dist.1989).

                                         -5-
Case No. 3-22-48

       {¶11} “Ideally, the prosecutor will directly establish venue,” but it “need not

be proven in express terms.” Id. “Rather, it can be established by all of the facts

and circumstances viewed in the light most favorable to the State.” State v. McVety,

3d Dist. Logan No. 8-16-19, 2017-Ohio-2796, ¶ 10. Courts evaluating claims that

venue has not been proven have “broad discretion to determine the facts which

would establish venue.” Id.

       {¶12} Like any other error or deficiency in the proceedings of a trial court,

the State’s purported failure to produce evidence sufficient to establish venue is an

issue that ought to be brought to the trial court’s attention, typically as part of a

Crim.R. 29 motion. It is undisputed that Tupps failed to notify the trial court in this

case of the supposed deficiencies in the State’s evidence relating to venue, and as a

consequence, Tupps has preserved only plain error for review. See id. at ¶ 11. But

notwithstanding Tupps’s failure to raise the issue before the trial court, his

conviction must be reversed if the State failed to present evidence sufficient to

demonstrate venue beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Jackson, 3d Dist. Seneca

No. 13-14-30, 2015-Ohio-1694, ¶ 7-8.

ii. The trial court did not commit plain error as there was sufficient evidence
to establish venue in Crawford County.

       {¶13} During direct examination, the prosecutor elicited statements from

L.T. confirming that the home where she resided with Tupps is located in Crestline,

Crawford County, Ohio. (Aug. 23, 2022 Tr. at 49, 52-53). Through this line of

                                         -6-
Case No. 3-22-48

questioning, the prosecutor went part of the way to directly establish that venue was

proper in Crawford County. However, the prosecutor neglected to conduct a

focused follow-up inquiry of L.T.—such as asking whether the rape occurred in

Crestline or whether it happened in the bedroom of the marital home—that would

have firmly established Crawford County as the proper venue. As a result, venue

was not proven in express terms. Even so, reviewing the totality of L.T.’s testimony

at Tupps’s trial, it is evident that “the bedroom” L.T. repeatedly referred to in her

testimony was her bedroom in the marital home in Crawford County.

       {¶14} Over the course of her testimony, L.T. made many statements tending

to show that the rape offense was committed in the marital home. For example, on

direct examination, the prosecutor asked L.T. what she did with her cell phone when

she went to bed on the evening of August 28, 2021. She responded, “I do what I

normally do, put it on my nightstand and plug it in and lay down.” (Aug. 23, 2022

Tr. at 59). L.T.’s answer suggested that August 28, 2021, was an otherwise routine

evening (i.e., one spent at home rather than at a hotel or a friend’s home) and that

she concluded her day as she usually does when at home.

       {¶15} In addition, L.T. testified regarding a container of lubricating jelly that

Tupps used to facilitate the rape offense. She stated that the jelly was present in the

bedroom on August 28, 2021, and the sound of Tupps opening the jelly container

could be heard on the audio recording that captured the events of that evening.

                                          -7-
Case No. 3-22-48

(Aug. 23, 2022 Tr. at 61-62, 67). On cross-examination, Tupps’s defense counsel

asked L.T. whether the lubricating jelly was in “your [L.T.’s] bedroom August 28th

into 29th.” (Aug. 23, 2022 Tr. at 158). L.T. responded that the lubricating jelly was

in her bedroom and that it was stored in a drawer across the bedroom rather than in

the nightstand. (Aug. 23, 2022 Tr. at 158). All this testimony, taken together,

indicated that the rape occurred in the bedroom where the lubricating jelly was

stored and that this bedroom was in the marital home.

       {¶16} Moreover, L.T. testified on cross-examination that she believed she

was at home the whole day on August 28, 2021. (Aug. 23, 2022 Tr. at 176). Tupps’s

defense counsel also engaged L.T. in the following line of questioning that, at a

minimum, implied that the rape occurred in the bedroom of the couple’s home in

Crestline:

       [Defense Counsel]: Okay. And the police came out to your residence
                          and took pictures of the bedroom where it
                          allegedly occurred?

       [L.T.]:              False.

       [Defense Counsel]: Did they take pictures?

       [L.T.]:              No, they did not.

       [Defense Counsel]: You would have allowed them to come in and
                          take all the pictures they wanted, so we can see
                          what the bedroom looked like?

       [L.T.]:              Yes.

                                         -8-
Case No. 3-22-48

      [Defense Counsel]: But we don’t have that, so I am going to ask you
                         questions about it. Standard-sized bedroom?

      [L.T.]:                 Yes.

       [Defense Counsel]: Is it a master bedroom for the property?

       [L.T.]:                Master bedroom, yes.

(Aug. 23, 2022 Tr. at 199).

      {¶17} Finally, on direct examination, L.T. testified that, after Tupps

assaulted her, she laid back down and went to sleep. (Aug. 23, 2022 Tr. at 68). She

testified that she did not then contact the police. (Aug. 23, 2022 Tr. at 68). On

cross-examination, Tupps’s defense counsel sought to clarify why L.T. did not reach

out to law enforcement:

      [Defense Counsel]: You gave several reasons on direct examination
                         as to ultimately what kind of held you up and
                         going and reporting it on August 29th, do you
                         remember those questions * * *?

      [L.T.]:                 Somewhat, yes.

      [Defense Counsel]: Sure. And I believe you gave answers initially,
                         we were at home and I did not feel that I could
                         leave at the time?

      [L.T.]:                 Yes.

(Aug. 23, 2022 Tr. at 217). This line of questioning also suggested that the rape

occurred at the couple’s home in Crestline.

                                         -9-
Case No. 3-22-48

       {¶18} Therefore, considering all the facts and circumstances in evidence in

a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the State presented substantial

credible evidence supporting the conclusion that venue in Crawford County had

been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we find the trial court did

not commit plain error by accepting the jury’s guilty verdict.

       {¶19} Tupps’s first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Second Assignment of Error: Did the trial court commit plain error by
giving an adoptive-admission jury instruction or repeating a portion of it?

       {¶20} In his second assignment of error, Tupps argues that the trial court

erred by instructing the jury regarding adoptive admissions under Evid.R.

801(D)(2)(b) and by repeating one line of the jury instruction. Tupps does not

challenge the admissibility of the adoptive admission, as such, but rather the

particular instruction given by the trial court.

i. Jury Instructions Generally & Standard of Review

       {¶21} “Trial courts have a responsibility to give all jury instructions that are

relevant and necessary for the jury to properly weigh the evidence and perform its

duty as the factfinder.” State v. Shine-Johnson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-194,

2018-Ohio-3347, ¶ 25. “Requested jury instructions should ordinarily be given if

they are correct statements of law, if they are applicable to the facts in the case, and

if reasonable minds might reach the conclusion sought by the requested instruction.”

State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 240. “The relevant

                                          -10-
Case No. 3-22-48

principle for jury instructions is not one of abstract correctness, but is whether an

instruction—even if a correct statement of law—is potentially misleading.” State

v. White, 142 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492, ¶ 52.

       {¶22} As a general matter, “[j]ury instructions are within the trial court’s

discretion, which an appellate court will not disturb absent an abuse of discretion.”

State v. Orians, 179 Ohio App.3d 701, 2008-Ohio-6185, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.). Here,

however, Tupps did not object to the specific adoptive-admission instruction

prepared by the trial court.     In fact, Tupps’s defense counsel expressed his

satisfaction with the instruction to be given to the jury. (Aug. 24, 2022 Tr. at 255).

Nor did Tupps object to the trial court’s repetition of one line of the adoptive-

admission instruction. Consequently, because Tupps did not object to the adoptive-

admission instruction either as formulated by the trial court or as actually given to

the jury, he has forfeited all but plain error on appeal. See State v. Kean, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 17AP-427, 2019-Ohio-1171, ¶ 65.

       {¶23} For plain error to apply, the trial court must have deviated from a legal

rule, the error must be plain, i.e., an obvious defect in the proceeding, and the error

must have affected the defendant’s “substantial rights.” State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio

St.3d 21, 27 (2002). “[T]o demonstrate that the trial court’s error affected a

substantial right, the defendant must establish that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for the trial court’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been

                                         -11-
Case No. 3-22-48

otherwise.” State v. Sutton, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-21-11, 2022-Ohio-2452, ¶ 50.

We take “[n]otice of plain error * * * with the utmost caution, under exceptional

circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long,

53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

ii. Adoptive Admissions

       {¶24} Adoptive admissions are governed by Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(b), which

provides that “[a] statement is not hearsay if * * * [t]he statement is offered against

a party and is * * * a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or

belief in its truth * * *.” “‘A defendant may demonstrate his adoption of a

nonparty’s out-of-court statement through his demeanor, conduct, words, or even

silence.’” State v. Bertuzzi, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-13-12, 2014-Ohio-5093, ¶ 94,

quoting State v. Gibson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 09-CA-05, 2010-Ohio-1121, ¶ 15.

       {¶25} “There are obvious risks in attributing a statement of a third person to

be that of a party * * *.” 1980 Staff Notes, Evid.R. 801. To mitigate these risks,

courts have laid down strict requirements before a statement can be considered as

an adoptive admission:

       “In order for an adoptive admission to be applicable, the declarant
       must have made the statement in the presence of the party against
       whom the statement is offered at trial. In addition, the party must have
       heard and understood the statement, must have been free to disavow
       it, and must have either expressly acknowledged the truth of the
       statement or remained silent when a reasonable person would have
       denied its truthfulness.”

                                         -12-
Case No. 3-22-48

Gibson at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Comstock, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 96-A-0058,

1997 WL 531304, *5 (Aug. 29, 1997). “Absent these determinations, a statement

of a third person cannot be an admission by acquiescence of a party opponent.”

1980 Staff Notes, Evid.R. 801. Additionally, even when these criteria are satisfied,

the fact finder need not find that the defendant adopted the third party’s statement.

The trier of fact is permitted, but not obligated, to infer that the defendant acquiesced

to the truth of the third party’s statement. See United States v. Hampton, 843

F.Supp.2d 571, 578-579 (E.D.Pa.2012) (applying the analogous Fed.R.Evid.

801(d)(2)(B)); Zeller v. State, 123 Ohio St. 519, 523 (1931).

iii. The trial court did not commit plain error with respect to the adoptive-
admission jury instruction.

       {¶26} The trial court in this case instructed the jury on adoptive admissions

as follows:

       Evidence has been admitted, indicating that the Defendant remained
       silent after being confronted by [L.T.] in State’s Exhibit 2 [one of the
       audio recordings made by L.T.]. Consider the circumstances
       surrounding the statement. If you find that the Defendant understood
       the statement, and that the Defendant was free to deny the truth of the
       statement, and that a reasonable person would have denied the
       statement, if the statement were untrue, you may, but are not required
       to infer that the Defendant acknowledged the statement of [L.T.] as
       true. You may, but are not required to infer that the Defendant
       acknowledged the statement of [L.T.] as true.

(Aug. 24, 2022 Tr. at 368-369).

                                          -13-
Case No. 3-22-48

       {¶27} With respect to Tupps’s first argument—that the trial court was

mistaken in even giving a jury instruction on adoptive admissions—we conclude

that the trial court did not err, let alone commit plain error, by issuing this

instruction. To begin, an adoptive-admission instruction was clearly applicable to

the facts of the case. In State’s Exhibit 2—a recording of an in-person conversation

between Tupps and L.T.—L.T. asks Tupps, “What would they think if I told them

the fact that you ripped my panties off and shoved your fingers up inside me?”

When L.T. finishes speaking, Tupps is silent for approximately nine seconds. When

Tupps next speaks, he does not respond to what L.T. said but instead asks L.T.

whether she recalled a night that his mother visited them. There is nothing in State’s

Exhibit 2 or elsewhere in the record to suggest that Tupps might not have heard or

understood what L.T. said or that he was unable to make a denial. Therefore, an

adoptive-admission jury instruction was relevant to the facts of the case, and the

jury could reasonably reach the conclusion permitted by the instruction.

       {¶28} Furthermore, the instruction was a correct statement of the law

pertaining to adoptive admissions. The jury was accurately instructed on the

necessary conditions for Tupps’s silence to be deemed an adoptive admission and

informed that the inference was permissive rather than mandatory. Finally, the

specific instruction was more appropriate as providing only a general instruction on

inferences would have been misleading or less than completely helpful to the jury.

                                        -14-
Case No. 3-22-48

The jury in this case was provided with a legally accurate instruction on its ability

to draw inferences from the evidence. (Aug. 24, 2022 Tr. at 367). However, the

inference permitted under the adoptive-admission rule is one that can be made only

when a narrow set of circumstances are found to be present. Hence, a specific jury

instruction on adoptive admissions was required for the jury to understand why

State’s Exhibit 2 was in evidence and to properly evaluate it. Otherwise, there

would have been a risk that the jury might erroneously infer an adoptive admission

from circumstances not supporting the inference, make some other impermissible

inference from State’s Exhibit 2, or use State’s Exhibit 2 for an improper purpose.

Thus, the instruction was needed for the jury to properly weigh the evidence and

fulfill its duty as the trier of fact. See White, 142 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492,

at ¶ 53. For this reason, and those discussed above, we conclude that the trial court

did not commit plain error by giving the jury an instruction on adoptive admissions.

       {¶29} As to Tupps’s second argument—that the trial court committed plain

error by repeating the final line of the instruction—we conclude that even if the trial

court erred, Tupps has failed to establish that he was prejudiced. Tupps contends

that the trial court’s repetition of the last line of the instruction affected the outcome

of his trial because the State, quoting the instruction in its closing arguments, urged

the jury to treat Tupps’s silence as an adoptive admission, and “[t]he trial court’s

double emphasis amounted to an implicit statement to the jury that the trial court

                                          -15-
Case No. 3-22-48

agreed with the State’s assessment that Tupps’s silence amounted to an admission.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). He claims that “[t]he instruction misled the jury into

believing that both the State and the trial court were unified in their opinion and

expected them to reach the same conclusion.” (Appellant’s Brief at 4).

       {¶30} Tupps’s argument is unpersuasive. For one, the repeated portion of

the adoptive-admission instruction did not itself direct the jury to find that Tupps’s

silence constituted an adoptive admission. Nor did it suggest this result. Rather,

the final line of the instruction used neutral language and stressed to the jury that it

had no obligation to infer that Tupps’s silence amounted to an acknowledgement of

the truth of what L.T. was saying. We fail to see how the jury, being twice instructed

that it was not required to reach a particular conclusion, would consequently be

more inclined to reach that conclusion, and Tupps has not pointed to anything in the

record indicating that the jury was so disposed.

       {¶31} Additionally, “‘[a] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in

artificial isolation but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.’” State

v. Jalowiec, 91 Ohio St.3d 220, 231 (2001), quoting State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d

136 (1979), paragraph four of the syllabus. Here, the trial court also instructed the

jury, “Your verdicts must be based solely on the evidence and on the law as I have

given it to you in these instructions. Nothing that I have said or done is intended to

suggest what your verdicts should be, that is entirely for you to decide.” (Aug. 24,

                                         -16-
Case No. 3-22-48

2022 Tr. at 378). With this instruction, the risk that the jury would interpret the trial

court’s repetition of the final line of the instruction as an endorsement of the State’s

position on the significance of Tupps’s silence, and thus as an indication of the trial

court’s belief about Tupps’s ultimate guilt, was minimized.

       {¶32} In sum, Tupps has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had the trial court

not repeated the last line of the adoptive-admission jury instruction. Therefore, we

conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error.

       {¶33} Tupps’s second assignment of error is overruled.

C. Third Assignment of Error: Is Tupps’s sentence contrary to law because
the court did not fully comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)?

       {¶34} In his third assignment of error, Tupps argues that his prison sentence

is contrary to law because the trial court failed at his sentencing hearing to provide

him with all of the notifications required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).

i. Standard of Review for Felony Sentencing

       {¶35} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence

“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not

support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is

otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002,

¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.

                                          -17-
Case No. 3-22-48

at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the

syllabus.

ii. Tupps’s sentence is contrary to law.

       {¶36} Under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2):

       [I]f the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a
       prison term is necessary or required, the court shall do all of the
       following:

       ***

       (c) If the prison term is a non-life felony indefinite prison term,
       notify the offender of all of the following:

       (i) That it is rebuttably presumed that the offender will be released
       from service of the sentence on the expiration of the minimum prison
       term imposed as part of the sentence or on the offender’s presumptive
       earned early release date, as defined in section 2967.271 of the
       Revised Code, whichever is earlier;

       (ii) That the department of rehabilitation and correction may rebut
       the presumption described in division (B)(2)(c)(i) of this section if, at
       a hearing held under section 2967.271 of the Revised Code, the
       department makes specified determinations regarding the offender’s
       conduct while confined, the offender’s rehabilitation, the offender’s
       threat to society, the offender’s restrictive housing, if any, while
       confined, and the offender’s security classification;

       (iii) That if, as described in division (B)(2)(c)(ii) of this section, the
       department at the hearing makes the specified determinations and
       rebuts the presumption, the department may maintain the offender’s
       incarceration after the expiration of that minimum term or after that
       presumptive earned early release date for the length of time the
       department determines to be reasonable, subject to the limitation
       specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code;

                                         -18-
Case No. 3-22-48

       (iv) That the department may make the specified determinations and
       maintain the offender’s incarceration under the provisions described
       in divisions (B)(2)(c)(i) and (ii) of this section more than one time,
       subject to the limitation specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised
       Code;

       (v) That if the offender has not been released prior to the expiration
       of the offender’s maximum prison term imposed as part of the
       sentence, the offender must be released upon the expiration of that
       term.

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v).      R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) contains a “mandatory

directive.” State v. Greene, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220160, 2022-Ohio-4536, ¶

6; State v. Hodgkin, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-08-048, 2021-Ohio-1353, ¶ 24

(“By indicating that the sentencing court ‘shall do all of the following’ and ‘notify

the offender of all of the following,’ the legislature clearly placed a mandatory duty

upon the trial court rather than granting it discretion.”). “[I]f a trial court fails to

provide notice of all R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) notifications at a sentencing hearing, the

sentence is contrary to law.” State v. Bentley, 4th Dist. Adams No. 21CA1147,

2022-Ohio-1914, ¶ 10.

       {¶38} Tupps was sentenced to a non-life indefinite prison term of five to

seven and a half years in prison for first-degree felony rape. Accordingly, the trial

court had an obligation to comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) and to provide Tupps

with all of the notifications set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v) on the record at

his sentencing hearing. However, as the State concedes on appeal, the trial court

failed to do so. As a result, we conclude that Tupps’s sentence is contrary to law

                                         -19-
Case No. 3-22-48

and that Tupps must be resentenced. Greene at ¶ 9-11; Bentley at ¶ 9-11; Hodgkin

at ¶ 24-25; State v. Wolfe, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020CA00021, 2020-Ohio-5501, ¶

36-39.

         {¶39} Tupps’s third assignment of error is therefore sustained, and we

remand the matter for resentencing so that the trial court may comply fully with

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). In light of our remand for resentencing, we need not reach

the merits of Tupps’s fourth and fifth assignments of error concerning the

constitutionality of R.C. 2929.271(C) and other provisions of the Reagan Tokes

Law. Bentley at ¶ 15, citing App.R. 12(A)(1)(c) (declining to consider challenge to

the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law after vacating sentence and

remanding for resentencing so that the trial court could comply with R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c)); see Wolfe at ¶ 39 (after remanding for resentencing in

compliance with R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), declining to consider assignments of error

relating to merger and consecutive sentences).

                                 IV. Conclusion

         {¶40} For the foregoing reasons, Tupps’s first and second assignments of

error are overruled. However, Tupps’s third assignment of error is sustained.

Having found error prejudicial to Tupps with respect to his sentence, we reverse the

judgment of the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas as to that matter and

                                       -20-
Case No. 3-22-48

remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we

affirm.

                                                   Judgment Affirmed in Part,
                                                        Reversed in Part, and
                                                            Cause Remanded

WILLAMOWSKI and WALDICK, J.J., concur.

/jlr

                                     -21-