Court Opinion

ID: 9860420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:21:36.205811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:22:19.645173
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CARTER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with two of the three conclusions reached by the majority in the present case. First, I agree with the majority that the trial court properly allocated the proceeds of the sheriffs sale pursuant to section 16 of the Mechanics Lien Act (770 ILCS 60/16 (West 2006)) using a proportionality approach. See Moulding-Brownell Corp. v. E.C. Delfosse Construction Co., 304 Ill. App. 491, 494, 26 N.E.2d 709, 712 (1940). Second, I agree with the majority that an award of LaSalle’s reasonable attorney fees is mandatory under section 15 — 1512(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/15 — 1512 (West 2006)). I dissent, however, because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion regarding whether LaSalle should be allowed to recover, under a theory of subrogation, the development expenses it paid. In my opinion, an application of the decisions in Clark v. Moore, 64 Ill. 273 (1872), and Detroit Steel Products Co. v. Hudes, 17 Ill. App. 2d 514, 520-21, 151 N.E.2d 136, 139 (1958), requires that LaSalle be allowed to recover the development expenses it paid. No lien existed as to those expenses because LaSalle paid them off. Had LaSalle not done so, the providers of those services would have filed lien claims and Edon and Eagle would be required to share their proceeds with those claimants. Thus, Edon and Eagle are receiving an unjust enrichment. See Detroit Steel Products Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d at 521, 151 N.E.2d at 139. Based on the case law cited, I would allow LaSalle to recover the development expenses it paid as a priority over the mechanics’ lien claimants. For the reasons stated, I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part from the majority’s order.