Court Opinion

ID: 9940564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 19:04:08.981127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:01.164553
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2022-2403
                  _____________________________

DONNIE L. PICKFORD,

    Appellant,

    v.

TAYLOR COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Taylor County.
Darren K. Jackson, Judge.

                        February 14, 2024

B.L. THOMAS, J.

     In Pickford v. Taylor County School District, 298 So. 3d 707,
708 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), this Court reversed the trial court’s order
striking Mr. Pickford’s affidavit submitted in opposition to the
District’s motion for summary judgment and reversed summary
judgment entered on the employment discrimination claim. On
remand the trial court again erred in striking the affidavit on
various grounds and erred in granting summary judgment in favor
of the District. Again, we reverse.

     At the outset of the order granting the motion to strike various
paragraphs of Pickford’s affidavit, the trial court found that each
of the paragraphs identified in the motion, specifically paragraphs
4-7, 9, 11-14, 19-22, 27, 29-31, 33-38, consist of “conclusory, vague,
and speculative allegations as well as lacking specific details.”
Additionally, the trial court found that each of the above-listed
paragraphs was “inadmissible as they are not based on personal
knowledge.” The trial court additionally found various paragraphs
were irrelevant, mere assertions, conclusory, self-serving,
misrepresentations, refuted by sworn testimony, moot, or
referenced statements made by employees that were outside the
scope of employment and did not have authority to bind defendant.

     All of the reasons given by the trial court are factually or
legally incorrect.

    The trial court erred in concluding that Pickford failed to
establish his prima facie claim of race discrimination and entering
summary judgment. To establish a claim for race discrimination,
Pickford must show that he (1) was a member of a protected class;
(2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees outside
the protected class were treated more favorably. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792; Fla. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Bryant,
586 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

     The record contains disputed issues of material fact showing
that Pickford was qualified for his teaching position at the
elementary school, and was replaced by a less qualified white
male. The District has offered conflicting explanations and
justifications for Pickford’s termination, only offering alleged
performance deficiencies after the commencement of this
litigation. Pickford also identified two sufficiently similar
comparators. In addition to his replacement, Pickford identified
another substitute teacher who allegedly was treated more
favorably. To the extent the District disagrees with this assertion,
that is a disputed issue of material fact.

     Additionally, the District’s ever-evolving reason for
terminating Pickford is evidence that the proffered reason is
pretextual. See Norris v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 900 F.2d
1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1990) (“. . . the fact that a defendant’s rationale
has shifted over time would seem likely to generate serious
adverse inferences as to the pretextual nature of its explanations”);
see also Edwards v. U.S. Postal Serv., 909 F.2d 320, 324 (8th Cir.

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1990) (“In light of this record, filled with changing and inconsistent
explanations, we can find no legitimate nondiscriminatory basis
for the challenged action that is not mere pretension”). “[A]
plaintiff withstands summary adjudication by producing sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that the
defendant’s articulated reasons for its decision are not believable.”
Howard v. BP Oil Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 520, 526 (11th Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted).

    REVERSED.

OSTERHAUS, C.J., and WINOKUR, J., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Marie A. Mattox and Ashley N. Richardson, Marie A. Mattox, P.A.,
Tallahassee, for Appellant.

David M. Delaney, Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L.,
Gainesville, and Edward G. Guedes, Weiss Serota Helfman Cole &
Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables; Natasha Mickens, Dell Graham, PA,
Gainesville, for Appellee.

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