Court Opinion

ID: 2964152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:21:23.08897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:51.699184
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1820

                          ROY R. DAMON AND ELEANOR M. DAMON,

                               Plaintiffs - Appellants,

                                          v.

                                  SUN COMPANY, INC.,

                                Defendant - Appellee.

                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1821

                          ROY R. DAMON AND ELEANOR M. DAMON,

                               Plaintiffs - Appellees,

                                          v.

                                  SUN COMPANY, INC.,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

              [Hon. W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                            __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Selya, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                _____________________

               Brian R. Corey, with whom Law Offices of Brian R. Corey  was
               ______________            _____________________________
          on brief for Roy R. Damon and Eleanor M. Damon.
               Michael A. Fitzhugh, with  whom Michael John Miguel, Cynthia
               ___________________             ___________________  _______
          S.  Phelan  and  Fitzhugh &  Associates  were  on  brief for  Sun
          __________       ______________________
          Company, Inc.

                                 ____________________

                                     July 5, 1996
                                 ____________________

                                         -2-

                    TORRUELLA,  Chief Judge.   Plaintiffs  brought suit  in
                    TORRUELLA,  Chief Judge.
                                ___________

          this case claiming misrepresentation  and violation of Mass. Gen.

          L.  ch. 93A,   11.  For the  reasons stated herein, we affirm the

          decision of the district court.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    The   parties  stipulated   to  the   following  facts:

          Defendant  Sun Oil Company, Inc.  (R & M)  ("Sun") owned property

          located  at  225  Brockton Ave.,  Abington,  Massachusetts,  (the

          "property") from 1971  to 1979.   In 1972, Sun  built a  gasoline

          station  with  underground  storage  tanks on  the  property  and

          operated a  retail  gasoline station  thereafter  until  November

          1977.  On or about December 19, 1974, a leaking underground  pipe

          leading from the  underground storage tanks to the pumps released

          approximately 2,000 gallons of  gasoline.  Sun's regional manager

          of  operations,  Robert  Laubinger   ("Laubinger"),  was  on  the

          property  after the leak was  discovered.  On  November 21, 1979,

          the plaintiffs, Roy Damon  ("Damon") and Eleanor Damon (together,

          the  "Damons"), purchased the property from Sun for $90,000.  The

          plaintiffs had  a right to examine  the property by terms  of the

          Agreement of Sale.   The Damons  owned the property from  1979 to

          March  25,  1992 and  operated a  retail  service station  at the

          property from June 12, 1980 to January 31, 1991.

                    On January 31, 1991, the plaintiffs leased the property

          to K. Rooney, Inc. ("Rooney").  Since then, Rooney has operated a

          retail service station on the property.  In November 1991, Rooney

          began  upgrading the station by installing new pumps and Stage II

                                         -3-

          of a vapor recovery  system.  As digging commenced,  the Abington

          Fire Department observed petroleum product pooling in the surface

          excavations,  shut  down   the  construction  and  notified   the

          Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP").  On

          December 19, 1991, the DEP sent a Notice of Responsibility to the

          plaintiffs and  Rooney, requiring  that a  Phase  I Limited  Site

          Investigation  Report  and   Preliminary  Assessment  Report   be

          completed.  A company hired by Rooney performed the investigation

          and issued a report  dated October 1992.  As part  of the Phase I

          investigation,  monitoring  wells were  installed and  samples of

          groundwater  were taken  and  analyzed.    As  a  result  of  the

          discovery  of the  pollution,  Rooney refused  to  pay rent  from

          November  1991  to March  1992.    The  lease  agreement  between

          plaintiffs  and Rooney granted  Rooney an option  to purchase the

          property for $600,000.  Rooney did not exercise its lease option.

          On  March 25, 1992, Rooney purchased the property from the Damons

          by assuming  a first mortgage  in the  amount of  $275,000 and  a

          second  mortgage in  the amount of  $50,000.  Rooney  also made a

          cash payment of $20,000 to plaintiffs.

                    The  district  court's  additional  findings   of  fact

          included the following.  A rupture  of an elbow joint in the pipe

          which connects the  tanks and  the pumps caused  the 1974  spill,

          which closed the station for approximately six weeks.  In June or

          July 1979, Damon attempted  to reach Richard Bunzell ("Bunzell"),

          whose name  was  given on  the "For  Sale" sign  at the  station.

          After  some  unsuccessful  attempts   to  reach  Bunzell,  a  Sun

                                         -4-

          telephone operator  referred Damon  to Laubinger,  Sun's regional

          manager  for service  station maintenance.   The  questions Damon

          asked Laubinger about the property included an inquiry concerning

          the  age of  the building,  and whether  Sun had  experienced any

          problems  with the  station,  particularly with  the  underground

          tanks.  Laubinger knew of the  1974 spill, but did not reveal it.

          Rather,  he  answered that  it was  a  "good station"  which just

          needed to be run by a good operator to  be successful.  After his

          phone conversation  with Laubinger, Damon contacted  Bunzell and,

          after some negotiation, accepted  his offer of $90,000.   In late

          August 1979, Damon  and Bunzell met at  the property to view  the

          property.    Damon asked  about a  depression  he noticed  in the

          blacktop  near the pumps and  Bunzell explained it  was caused by

          the installation of the  first stage of a vapor  recovery system.

          In  response to  Damon's  question of  whether  Sun had  had  any

          problems with the underground storage tanks, Bunzell stated, "No,

          we've had no problems with it.  It's all good."

                    In 1980  Damon had  the three 6,000  gallon underground

          gasoline  tanks tested for tightness by Getty Oil, Co., his first

          gasoline supplier: they tested tight, as they did in May 1984 and

          again in January 1991.  In 1992, no holes were observed in any of

          the underground gasoline tanks  or oil tanks.   The  southern end

          of  the pit  dug  around the  three  gasoline tanks  yielded  the

          highest level  of contamination; 101 cubic  yards of contaminated

          soil were  eventually removed  for off-site treatment.   Finally,

          samples  of  contaminated water  collected  and  examined by  the

                                         -5-

          company  conducting  the 1992  Phase  I study  indicate  that the

          contamination  contained  the  gasoline  additive  MTBE ("MTBE"),

          which was not added to Sunoco gasoline until 1984.

                    The  Damons brought suit  against Sun,  alleging common

          law  misrepresentation and violation of  chapter 93A,    11.  The

          district  court,  after a  four day  bench  trial, found  for the

          Damons on both the misrepresentation and  the chapter 93A counts,

          awarding them $245,000 plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

          In  its appeal,  Sun  now challenges  the  three rulings  of  the

          district  court  --  its denial  of  Sun's  motion  for entry  of

          judgment at the close  of plaintiffs' case in chief, see  Fed. R.
                                                               ___

          Civ.  P.  52(c);  the  district  court's  judgment  and  findings

          pursuant  to trial; and its denial of Sun's post-trial motions to

          alter  and amend the  judgment and findings and  for a new trial,

          see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.
          ___

                                CAUSATION AND DAMAGES
                                CAUSATION AND DAMAGES

                               A.  The Legal Framework
                               A.  The Legal Framework
                                   ___________________

                    The    Damons   charged   Sun    with   the   tort   of

          misrepresentation, also referred to as fraud or deceit.  See Bond
                                                                   ___ ____

          Leather Co.  v. Q.T. Shoe Mfg.  Co., 764 F.2d 928,  935 (1st Cir.
          ___________     ___________________

          1985).   The elements of misrepresentation  are well established:

          in order to recover, plaintiff

                      must allege and prove that  the defendant
                      made a false representation of a material
                      fact  with knowledge  of its  falsity for
                      the purpose of inducing the  plaintiff to
                      act  thereon,  and  that   the  plaintiff
                      relied  upon  the representation  as true
                      and acted upon it to his [or her] damage.

                                         -6-

          Barret  Assocs., Inc.  v. Aronson,  190 N.E.2d  867,   868 (Mass.
          _____________________     _______

          1963)  (quoting  Kilroy v.  Barron,  95  N.E.2d 190,  191  (Mass.
                           ______     ______

          1950)); see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ditmore,  729 F.2d 1, 4
                  ______________________________    _______

          (1st Cir. 1984).   "The party making the representation  need not

          know  that  the statement  is false  if  the fact  represented is

          susceptible of  actual knowledge."   VMark Software, Inc.  v. EMC
                                               ____________________     ___

          Corp., 642 N.E.2d 587, 593 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).   Here, the
          _____

          alleged false  representations are  the statements made  by Sun's

          representatives that  it was a  "good" station, upon  which Damon

          relied in his purchasing decision.  The alleged harm suffered was

          that the Damons bought a gas station in 1979 that would have been

          worth more in 1992 if what the defendant's representatives stated

          had in  fact  been  true.    The damages  were  measured  by  the

          difference  between  the value  of the  property  if it  had been

          uncontaminated,  as the  defendant  represented,  and the  actual

          value of the property as contaminated.

                    Appellant  questions  the  district   court's  findings

          related to  two of these elements:   causation and  damages.  The

          causation  element  requires  that  the  misrepresentation  be  a

          substantial  factor  in the  plaintiff's  actions,  such that  it

          "tend[s]  along with  other  factors to  produce the  plaintiff's

          [harm]."  O'Connor v.  Raymark Indus., Inc., 518 N.E.2d  510, 513
                    ________     ____________________

          (Mass. 1988).  The defendant's conduct need not be the sole cause

          of  the  injury:   "'It  is  enough  that  [plaintiffs] introduce

          evidence from which reasonable men [and  women] may conclude that

          it  is more probable that  the event was  caused by the defendant

                                         -7-

          than  that it  was not.'"    Mullins v.  Pine Manor  College, 449
                                       _______     ___________________

          N.E.2d 331,  339 (Mass.  1983) (quoting  Carey v.  General Motors
                                                   _____     ______________

          Corp.,  387 N.E.2d 583,  585 (1979)).  Damages,  in turn, must be
          _____

          proven  "with  a fair  degree of  certainty."   Pearl  v. William
                                                          _____     _______

          Filene's Sons Co., 58 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass. 1945); see Squeri v.
          _________________                                   ___ ______

          McCarrick,  588 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) ("While proof
          _________

          of damages does  not require mathematical  precision, it must  be

          based on more than mere speculation.").

                    "Following a bench trial,  the court of appeals reviews

          the trier's  factual determinations for clear  error, but affords

          plenary  review to  the trier's  formulation of  applicable legal

          rules."   Smith v. F.W. Morse  & Co., 76 F.3d  413, 420 (1st Cir.
                    _____    _________________

          1996)  (citations omitted);  see Fed.  R. Civ.  P.  52(a); Dedham
                                       ___                           ______

          Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 453, 457 (1st
          _________    ____________________________

          Cir. 1992).  Of course, "to  the extent that findings of fact can

          be shown to  have been predicated upon, or induced  by, errors of

          law,  they will be accorded  diminished respect on  appeal."  Id.
                                                                        ___

          However, as we have noted in regards to causation,

                      [a]pplication of the legal cause standard
                      to the circumstances of a particular case
                      is  a  function ordinarily  performed by,
                      and peculiarly within the  competence of,
                      the factfinder.  The SJC has consistently
                      held questions of causation to be for the
                      factfinder.

          Swift v. United States,  866 F.2d 507,  510 (1st Cir. 1988);  see
          _____    _____________                                        ___

          Dedham Water Co., 972  F.2d at 457 ("As a general rule, causation
          ________________

          questions are  grist for  the factfinder's mill.");  Mullins, 449
                                                               _______

          N.E.2d at 338; see, e.g., Smith, 76 F.3d at 420, 422-24 (applying
                         ___  ____  _____

                                         -8-

          the  clearly erroneous  standard to  district court's  finding of

          causation in Title VII context).    

                                    B.  Causation
                                    B.  Causation
                                        _________

                    The  district court  found  that the  Damons met  their

          burden  of proving "by a  preponderance of the  evidence that the

          2,000 gallon spill was  a substantial factor in the  DEP decision

          that a gasoline contamination sufficient to trigger 21E liability

          existed at the [property]."  (District Court Findings of Fact and

          Conclusions  of  Law, at  8).   Sun  argues  on  appeal that  the

          evidence  that the district court  relied on in  finding that Sun

          more  probably   than  not  was   a  substantial  cause   of  the

          contamination found in 1991  is insufficient as a matter  of law,

          for  three reasons.  Upon review of  the record, however, we find

          that the Damons met their burden of proof, such that the district

          court did not clearly  err in finding that the  causation element

          of misrepresentation has been met.  We address, and dismiss, each

          of Sun's arguments in turn.  

                    First, Sun notes that  the district court conceded that

          "it is unclear how much of the 2,000 gallons [of  the 1974 spill]

          was recovered," (District Court  Findings of Fact and Conclusions

          of Law, at 9), and concludes  from that statement that there  was

          no evidence of what (if any) contamination found in 1991 actually

          dated to  1974.  The fact that there was a release, without more,

          Sun argues, is insufficient to impose liability.  

                    There is more, however:   the district court  found not

          only that there was a release, but also that the clean-up efforts

                                         -9-

          at the time of the release were limited, at best.

                      Defendant's remedial efforts in 1974 were
                      not  conducted for the purpose of ridding
                      the  property  of contamination;  rather,
                      the goal was to make the [property] safe.
                      To  this end, the  focus was  on stopping
                      the flow of gasoline onto the neighboring
                      property --  no effort was  made to clean
                      or  remove  contaminated   soil  on   the
                      [property]  itself.    From the  Abington
                      Fire Department records it is unclear how
                      much  of the 2,000 gallons was recovered.
                      Presumably, the  company hired by  Sun to
                      pump  the trenches was  pumping a mixture
                      of gas  and water,  but no one  knows the
                      relative proportions or the  total amount
                      of mixture pumped.

          (District Court Findings of  Fact and Conclusions of Law,  at 9).

          To  suggest  that  the district  court's  statement  that "it  is

          unclear how  much of the 2,000 gallons was recovered" can be read

          to imply that  it was all recovered is to  misread the context of

          the statement.

                    Additional evidence the lower court found determinative

          in its finding of  causation included the sheer size of  the 1974

          spill (2,000 gallons); the  fact that Robert Cataldo ("Cataldo"),

          plaintiffs' expert, testified that the underground pipe which ran

          from  the pumps to  the tanks created  a channel  along which the

          gasoline  could flow from the rupture and settle under the tanks;

          and  that no gasoline spills  larger than 10  gallons occurred at

          the property between 1974 and 1992, during which time the Damons'

          tanks periodically  tested tight.  Finally, the  court also noted

          that "Cataldo testified, albeit hesitatingly, that in his opinion

          the  1974 spill  was  a substantial  factor  contributing to  the

          contamination found at  the [property] in 1992."  (District Court

                                         -10-

          Findings  of Fact and Conclusions of Law,  at 10).   Clearly, the

          evidence the district  court relied on in  finding causation goes

          beyond the  simple fact that  there was a  release in 1974.   Sun

          does not challenge  any of these  specific findings; indeed,  our

          review of the record finds support for each.  

                    In  making its  argument,  Sun relies  on Providence  &
                                                              _____________

          Worcester R.R. Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 622 N.E.2d 262 (Mass.
          __________________    ____________________

          1993).  In  that case,  contamination was discovered  in 1988  on

          property  owned by  the plaintiff  railroad.   The railroad  sued

          defendant  Chevron,  claiming  that  the 1988  contamination  was

          caused  by  a 1972  leak of  12,000 gallons  of  fuel oil  from a

          storage  facility defendant had maintained on  the property.  The

          court found no causal link between the spills, where there was no

          evidence  that the soil  was significantly saturated  by the 1972

          surface  spill, which  had been  pumped out  the same  day, where

          sixteen  years had passed, and where the question whether the oil

          would remain  in some form  was left  unanswered in  the face  of

          conflicting  evidence.   The  court specifically  noted that  the

          railroad's  expert was not asked  to give an  opinion whether the

          1988 contamination was caused at least in part by the 1972 spill.

          Id. at 264.  
          ___

                    Sun draws  on Providence  & Worcester  as demonstrating
                                  _______________________

          that  evidence  of  the   1974  spill,  in  and  of   itself,  is

          insufficient to impose liability.  That may be true, as far as it

          goes.   The  evidence in  the present  case, however,  shows much

          more.   As in Providence  & Worcester, many  years passed between
                        _______________________

                                         -11-

          the  spills in the present case.   However,  the evidence is that

          the 1974 spill was not cleaned up immediately, as in Providence &
                                                               ____________

          Worcester.    Rather,  the  fire department  logs  indicate  that
          _________

          pumping  did not start until two days after discovery of the leak

          on December  19, 1974:  as late as  February 4, 1975, more than a

          month after  the leak  was first  reported,  gasoline fumes  were

          still being detected  in the  basement of  an adjacent  property.

          Thus,  there  was  evidence  in  this  case  that  the  soil  was

          contaminated by the 1974 spill.  What is more, plaintiffs' expert

          here  did  state that  the 1974  spill  was a  substantial factor

          contributing to the 1991 contamination, as we discuss below.

                    Sun's second attack on  the sufficiency of the evidence

          focuses on  the soil.  In  the face of the  uncontested fact that

          the 1974  spillage  was subsurface,  due to  a leaky  underground

          pump, Sun contends that  no evidence was presented that  the soil

          was contaminated  by Sun, or  that Sun's  failure to clean  up or

          remove soil was wrongful.  In support of its  position, Sun lists

          four  pieces of  evidence regarding  soil testing.   Firstly,  it

          notes  that  soil  samples  taken  in  1992  by  consultants were

          spoiled,  and never analyzed.   While it is  unfortunate that the

          samples were not  analyzed, that fact simply shows we do not have

          all possible information:  it does not shed any light, one way or

          the  other, on whether  the 1974 spillage  contaminated the soil.

          Secondly, Sun points out  that in 1979, Getty Oil  commissioned a

          company to dig around the fill area above  the storage tanks, and

          that  the company never said anything to Damon about contaminated

                                         -12-

          soil, but rather stated  that the area  was clean.  However,  Sun

          points  to  no  evidence that  the  company  was asked  to  do an

          examination  of the soil for  contamination:  it  was testing the

          tanks for  tightness.   Thus, the  third  fact Sun  looks to  for

          support, that Cataldo's environmental company found contamination

          in 1992 around  the same fill pipes that Getty  Oil, in 1980, had

          told Damon  were clean, is not  as conclusive as  Sun would like.

          Set against  the Getty  results is Cataldo's  testimony that  the

          1974 release was a contributing factor in the 1991 contamination.

          Finally, Sun notes that Cataldo testified that there was not much

          thickness of soil, such that "flushing" of the soil by rising and

          falling subsurface  groundwater elevations would  tend to  reduce

          any residual contamination.  However, Cataldo also testified that

          the on-site testing he conducted  in four monitoring wells  found

          volatile  organic compounds  ("VOCs") which  are constituents  of

          gasoline  in the groundwater.  The constituents found in 1991, he

          stated, were  similar to those of the 1974 release.  As he stated

          in his testimony:

                         Q.  .   .  .  .  And   based  on  your
                      examination of the underground conditions
                      at that [property] and the geology of the
                      [property],    and    based   upon    the
                      information of this 2,000 gallon spill in
                      1974,  would you expect  to find  VOCs in
                      the  areas where  you  did  find them  in
                      1992?
                         A.  Yes, I would.
                         Q.  Is the presence of VOCs consistent
                      with the  topography and geology  of that
                      [property] and a spill in 1974?
                         A.  Yes, it is.

          (Day 2, page 76).  On this  record, we find that the evidence was

                                         -13-

          sufficient to find causation.   The evidence to which  Sun points

          does not convince us otherwise, let alone that the district court

          clearly erred in making its finding.  

                    Sun's  third and  final argument  that the  evidence is

          insufficient to  find causation focuses  on Cataldo's  testimony.

          It is  fundamental that "[e]xpert testimony must be predicated on

          facts  legally  sufficient to  provide a  basis for  the expert's

          opinion.  "  In  re Salvatore,  46 B.R. 247,  253 (D.R.I.  1984).
                       ________________

          Thus, "[a]n expert  should not  be permitted to  give an  opinion

          that is  based on conjecture or speculation  from an insufficient

          evidentiary foundation."   Van  Brode Group,  Inc. v.  Bowditch &
                                     _______________________     __________

          Dewey,  633 N.E.2d  424, 430  (Mass. App.  Ct. 1994).   Cataldo's
          _____

          testimony, Sun contends,  did not meet  this criteria.   Although

          Cataldo testified that the 1974 spill was  a "substantial factor"

          in the 1991 contamination,  Sun argues that its cross-examination

          of  Cataldo  revealed  that he  had  no  factual  basis for  that

          conclusion:  indeed, he testified at one point that  he could not

          say that the 1974 spill was "more probably than not" the cause of

          the 1991 contamination.  

                    Sun points to a series  of perceived flaws in Cataldo's

          testimony.   First, Cataldo attested that  although methods exist

          which would  quantify the  amount of  contaminants found in  1992

          which  were  representative  of   the  1974  release,  none  were

          performed here.  He agreed that he did not know how much gas  was

          left on the property after the 1974 release, and that none of the

          work  performed by his  firm had to  do with aging  or dating the

                                         -14-

          petroleum product found on  the property.   Nor did they test  to

          determine what percentage of  the gas found in 1991 was 1974 gas.

          After admitting that the ratios of the BTEX chemical constituents

          were indicative of a more recent -- post-1980 -- release, Cataldo

          testified that he could not  say "one way or the other"  that the

          gasoline constituents encountered in 1992 were more probably than

          not  the result  of the 1974  release.  Thus,  Sun maintains, the

          best Cataldo could testify to at  trial was that the property was

          insufficiently investigated to allow him  to come to any ultimate

          conclusions concerning the  contaminate sources;  that since  the

          1974  release was the only  known release, it  at least partially

          caused  the  1991 contamination;  and that  there  was no  way of

          apportioning what amounts, if any, of the 1991 contamination were

          attributable to  Sun  based on  the  work  done to  date.    This

          opinion, Sun concludes, is insufficient as a matter of law.  

                    We  disagree.   The  issue is  not whether  Cataldo was

          right:  but, rather, whether he had sufficient factual grounds on

          which to draw conclusions.  See Van Brode Group, Inc., 633 N.E.2d
                                      ___ _____________________

          at 430.   On the basis  of our review of the  record, we conclude

          that Cataldo's  expert testimony was predicated  on facts legally

          sufficient to provide a basis for  his conclusions.  There is  no

          doubt that more  testing could  have been done  on the  property,

          which  would  have  been  helpful to  the  factfinder.   However,

          Cataldo  noted that  although  there are  methods  to attempt  to

          quantify  the amount of contaminants dating back to 1974, he does

          not know "if there's anything that really can say, yes or no, how

                                         -15-

          much  there is."  (Day 2, page  133).  He drew his conclusions on

          the basis of his "experience with dealing with gasoline stations,

          residual  contamination,  [and]  the  knowledge   that  the  only

          significant or large release at the [property] was reportedly the

          2,000 gallons in 1974."   (Day 2, page 71).  He and his personnel

          visited the  property, investigated its history,  and made tests,

          from which he drew  his conclusions.  His testimony  reflects his

          research:  asked  how gas spilled in 1974 could  still be present

          in 1992, he stated,

                         A.   Because  the  gasoline  tends  to
                      absorb and holds in  to some of the soil.
                      It  also fills up  the pores  between the
                      soil  and   clings  in  to  that.     The
                      [property]  was paved,  so  that all  the
                      rain  that  falls  in it  doesn't  get  a
                      chance to percolate through, so you don't
                      have that complete  flushing action  that
                      you would in an open field.   Most of the
                      rainwater  probably  channeled  off,  and
                      that's one  of the purposes  of blacktop.
                      So it's my opinion that there would still
                      be   some   remnants   of  the   gasoline
                      remaining.

          (Day 2, page 87).  He later noted that biodegradation alone would

          not have removed contamination of the scale of 2,000 gallons over

          18  years, and that  there had  been a  reported release  of four

          gallons subsequent to 1980, which would  be sufficient to account

          for the levels of MTBE  found.  As the district court  noted, his

          attribution of the contamination,  at least in part, to  the 1974

          contamination,  "has an  additional  earmark  of  trustworthiness

          because it was prepared for a third-party, Rooney, pursuant to an

          order of  the DEP,  and not  in any way  in anticipation  of this

          litigation."  (District Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

                                         -16-

          Law, at 11).   Cf. Venturelli v. Cincinnati,  Inc., 850 F.2d 825,
                         ___ __________    _________________

          832  (1st Cir.  1988)  ("The decision  of  whether an  expert  is

          adequately  qualified  is a  matter  primarily  for the  district

          court.").

                    In   arguing   that   Cataldo's    testimony   provides

          insufficient basis, Sun also relies on Providence & Worcester for
                                                 ______________________

          the  proposition that the Damons were "required to bring forth an

          expert  opinion that the on-site activity on the subject property

          during Sun's  operation of gasoline station  (1972-1977) was more

          probably   than  not   a  substantial   factor  in   causing  the

          contamination  found  on  the  property  in  1992."    (Brief  of

          Appellant,  at 19).  We disregard this argument, for two reasons.

          First,  in  Providence &  Worcester,  although the  SJC  found it
                      _______________________

          significant that  the  railroad's expert  did not  testify as  to

          causation, the  court specifically noted  that it "[did]  not say

          that expert testimony is required to establish causation in every

          soil contamination case."   622  N.E.2d at 264  (noting that  the

          subject "is not one  that jurors would be expected  to understand

          in many circumstances without guidance from an expert").  We will

          not  create  such  a requirement  here.    Second,  even if  that

          requirement  existed, plaintiff  met it.  Cataldo  explicitly, if

          reluctantly,  testified that  the 1974  spill was  "a substantial

          factor"  in  the  contamination  detected  in  1991, a  fact  the

          district court noted twice  in its finding of causation.  In sum,

          then,  we find that  the district  court did  not clearly  err in

          finding  that  Sun's acts  were a  substantial  cause of  the DEP

                                         -17-

          decision that  contamination sufficient to trigger  21E liability

          existed at the property.  

                    We note  that the district court's  task of determining

          causation  on  this record  was not  an  easy one.   Nonetheless,

          "[w]hen   the  evidence  supports   conflicting  inferences,  the

          district court's choice from  among the several inferences cannot

          be clearly erroneous."  Dedham Water Co., 972 F.2d at  462.  Thus
                                  ________________

          we  uphold the district court, and reject Sun's argument that the

          evidence upon which the district court relied is insufficient.  

                         C.  Damages and the Burden of Proof
                         C.  Damages and the Burden of Proof
                             _______________________________

                    The  parties  dispute  who  bore the  burden  of  proof

          regarding  whether the harm was divisible.  The backdrop to their

          dialogue is the fact that the evidence indicates that Sun was not

          the only  owner or operator of the property whose acts led to the

          1991 contamination.  As  the district court stated, the  presence

          of  MTBE  "compel(s)  the  conclusion  that   there  had  been  a

          widespread release of gasoline at the [property] after 1984, when

          MTBE  became  common."   (District  Court  Findings of  Fact  and

          Conclusions of Law, at 10).  Thus, there was at least one release

          of  gasoline  when the  property was  operated  by Rooney  or the

          plaintiffs.   The Damons concede  that the evidence  and findings

          indicate that there was a post-1980 release  of gasoline.  At the

          same  time, there  was no  evidence  of a  spill greater  than 10

          gallons, and  the district  court specifically found  that during

                                         -18-

          the time  the Damons  owned  the property,  no significant  leaks

          occurred.1

                    The  Damons bear  the burden  of proving  that tortious

          conduct by Sun caused  them harm.  See Restatement  (2d) of Torts
                                             ___

            433B(1).  They  were required  to produce evidence  that it  is

          more  likely than not that Sun's conduct was a substantial factor

          in bringing  about the  harm they  suffered.  See  id. comment  a
                                                        ___  ___

          (noting that  "[a]  mere possibility  of  such causation  is  not

          enough").   Sun argues that the Damons  did not meet their burden

          of showing that Sun's conduct substantially caused the harm  they

          suffered.   Accordingly, it maintains, the  burden of identifying

          what  other  actors were  also responsible  for  the harm  and of

          allocating the harm (or showing that it was indivisible) remained

          with the plaintiffs, who did not fulfill that  task.  However, we

          have already  established above that  the district court  did not

          err in finding that  Sun's conduct substantially caused  the harm

          the  Damons suffered.  Therefore,  the burden shifted  to Sun, as

          did the cost of not  meeting it.  See Restatement (2d) of Torts  
                                            ___

          433B(2)  ("Where the tortious conduct  of two or  more actors has

          combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of

          the actors seeks  to limit his liability  on the ground  that the

                              
          ____________________

          1   Sun  argues that  the district  court's factual  findings are
          inconsistent.  We disagree:  the evidence at trial indicated that
          a spill as small as four  gallons could account for the amount of
          MTBE  present, and that Cataldo's research found no record of any
          spills over ten  gallons.   The evidence leads  to the  inference
          that a  spill made  up of  less than ten  gallons, but  which was
          nonetheless spread  out (or  several such spills),  could account
          for the MTBE found. 

                                         -19-

          harm  is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof

          as  to the  apportionment is  upon each  such actor.");  see also
                                                                   ________

          O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st  Cir. 1989) (noting, in
          ______    _______

          CERCLA action, that rule  based on the Restatement (2d)  of Torts

          requires that damages be apportioned only if defendant shows that

          the harm is divisible),  cert. denied sub nom. American  Cyanamid
                                   _____________________ __________________

          Co.  v. O'Neil,  493 U.S. 1071  (1990).  Accordingly,  we find no
          ___     ______

          error in the  district court's apparent allocation of  the burden

          of proof,  and need not enter into  the parties' dispute over who

          bore what burden, and whether divisibility was indeed shown.  

                             SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
                             SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

                    Sun  challenges   the  sufficiency  of   the  evidence,

          contending  that  the  district  court's  findings  were  clearly

          erroneous  and   highly  prejudicial  to  Sun's   case  in  three

          instances.  We examine  such challenges  to the  district court's

          factual findings for clear error.   See O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of
                                              ___ _______    ______________

          America,  Inc.,  780  F.2d  1067,  1076  (1st  Cir.  1986).    To
          ______________

          demonstrate  that the Damons did not meet their burden of proving

          misrepresentation by a preponderance of the evidence, Sun   "must

          show  that  the  verdict was  against  the  great  weight of  the

          evidence,  viewed in the light most favorable to [the Damons], or

          would work a  clear miscarriage of  justice."  Cambridge  Plating
                                                         __________________

          Co. v. Napco, Inc., No. 95-1781, slip op. at 26 (1st Cir. June 3,
          ___    ___________

          1996).  We address each of Sun's contentions in turn.

                           A.  The Alleged Representations
                           A.  The Alleged Representations
                               ___________________________

                    Sun first alleges that the alleged representations were

                                         -20-

          opinions  and not  statements  of fact.    The distinction  is  a

          crucial  one, as  it  is well  established  that the  latter  can

          ordinarily be  the  basis of  a claim  of fraud,  but the  former

          cannot.  See, e.g.,  Briggs v. Carol Cars, Inc.,  553 N.E.2d 930,
                   ___  ____   ______    ________________

          (Mass. 1990) (noting that a statement which is an opinion in form

          "in  some  circumstances may  reasonably  be  interpreted by  the

          recipient  to imply that the  maker of the  statement knows facts

          that justify the opinion"); Coe v. Ware, 171 N.E. 732, 734 (Mass.
                                      ___    ____

          1930).  The determination of whether a statement is of opinion or

          fact is a factual one, see  id., and so we review only for  clear
                                 ___  ___

          error.  

                    The district court held that

                      It  should have  been clear  from Damon's
                      questions [to  Sun's agents] that  he was
                      concerned  about  the  past   and  future
                      integrity of the  entire underground  gas
                      delivery  system;  as Damon  testified at
                      trial, "the  only thing you've  got in  a
                      gas station  is tanks  and pumps  and the
                      lines.  I mean, what else is there?"

          (District Court Findings  of Fact  and Conclusions of  Law, at  7

          n.1). Sun contends that  there is no evidentiary basis for such a

          finding.   Seeking support,  it points  to  the district  court's

          statement during closing arguments that

                      the testimony that [Damon] had, that they
                      told him  it was  a good station,  is not
                      significant  in  my  view because  that's
                      absolutely  an  opinion  rather   than  a
                      statement of fact.

          (Day 4,  page 15), and contends  that by making this  comment the

          district court essentially conceded that there was no evidentiary

          basis  to  find that  the statements  by  the Sun  employees were

                                         -21-

          opinion.  To the contrary, all this statement reveals is that the

          district court changed  its mind  as to the  significance of  the

          statements,  which  is  certainly  within  its  province  to  do.

          Indeed,  that is  the  very mission  of  closing arguments:    to

          convince  the  factfinder that  a party's  view  of the  facts is

          correct. 

                    Similarly,   that   Damon's    testimony   about    the

          conversations could be viewed as inconsistent, as Sun notes, is a

          question  that addresses  Damon's credibility,  not the  district

          court's finding.   Credibility, of  course, is an  issue for  the

          factfinder, and Sun has  shown us no clear error in  the district

          court's judgment on the  matter.  See  O'Brien, 780 F.2d at  1076
                                            ___  _______

          ("No subject matter is more clearly within the exclusive province

          of the fact-finder than this.").

                    Our  review of  the  record  leads  us  to  affirm  the

          district  court's finding  that  the statements  were factual  in

          nature.   First, we note that the evidence supports the findings.

          The  court found  that Damon  asked Bunzell  if  Sun had  had any

          problems  with the  underground storage  tanks, to  which Bunzell

          responded that Sun had had "no problems with it.  It's all good."

          (District Court Findings of  Fact and Conclusions of Law,  at 5).

          This is consistent  with Damon's testimony  at trial.   Bunzell's

          testimony  did  not  contradict  him,  since  he  stated  in  his

          affidavit, entered  at trial, that he neither remembered the sale

          of the property nor recalled any discussion of it or the terms of

          the  sale.  The district court also found that although Laubinger

                                         -22-

          knew about the  1974 spill -- indeed, he  visited the property at

          the time -- he did not reveal the information to Damon.  Instead,

          he  responded to  Damon's  questions about  whether  Sun had  any

          problems with  the  station, particularly  with  the  underground

          tanks, by stating "that it was a 'good station' which just needed

          to be run by a good  operator to be successful."  (District Court

          Findings  of Fact  and  Conclusions  of Law,  at  5).   This  was

          consistent with Damon's testimony  at trial.  Laubinger testified

          that he did not recall having a telephone conversation with Damon

          or  ever not telling anyone  about the release  in discussing the

          property, and the  trial court  was free to  credit Damon's  more

          specific recollection.  

                    Next, in discussing  whether the Bunzell  and Laubinger

          statements were opinions or fact,  the district court noted  that

          Damon's questions were not  just about the current conditions  on

          the  property.  If they had been,  their statements that it was a

          good station  would presumably  have been opinion.   Rather,  the

          district court specified that the  questions also went to whether

          there had been problems in the station in the past of which Damon

          should be  aware, with  the underground  tanks specifically.   In

          that context, reading the  record in the light most  favorable to

          the  Damons,  we do  not find  that the  district court  erred in

          finding  that the Sun  representatives' statements that  it was a

          "good station" were factual.  Indeed, we are hard put to see how,

          where there has been a spill of 2,000 gallons in  1974, which Sun

          knew of, statements five years later that it was a "good station"

                                         -23-

          and that Sun had had "no problems with it" in reply to a question

          regarding  the underground  tanks are  not misrepresentations  of

          fact.

                        B.  Evidence of the Elements of Fraud
                        B.  Evidence of the Elements of Fraud
                            _________________________________

                    Sun's second contention is  that the record contains no

          evidence  of the key elements needed  to prove fraud.  First, Sun

          asserts that the  statements by  Bunzell and  Laubinger were  not

          misrepresentations of material facts,  and thus the first element

          of the  tort has not been  shown.  See Barret  Assocs., Inc., 190
                                             ___ _____________________

          N.E.2d at 868 (noting  that the first element is  that "defendant

          made a false representation of a material fact").  We   disagree.

          There can be no doubt that the statements were misrepresentations

          in terms of the past history of the property:  stating that it is

          a "good station" ignores the  fact that there was a 2,000  gallon

          spill.   It may have  been a "good  station" in 1979,  from Sun's

          perspective:   the spill had  been cleaned up  in accordance with

          the  requirements of the time, and  there is no evidence of other

          problems.  Nonetheless, there had been a problem in the past, and

          to omit that  was to  misrepresent the situation.   The  district

          court found that  the fact was  material, as it gave  credence to

          Damon's  testimony that  his  affiliation with  a car  dealership

          which sold gasoline gave  him a general awareness of  the growing

          importance  of environmental issues,  and that he  would not have

          bought the  station had he  been aware of  the spill.   Thus, the

          statements by the Sun representatives were certainly "'one of the

          principal grounds,  though not necessarily the  sole ground, that

                                         -24-

          caused the  plaintiff[s] "to take the particular  action that the

          wrongdoer  intended   he  would   take  as   a  result   of  such

          representations."'"   Bond Leather Co., 764  F.2d at 936 (quoting
                                ________________

          National  Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Mills Transfer Co., 384 N.E.2d
          _______________________________    __________________

          1263 (Mass.  App.  Ct. 1979)  (quoting National  Shawmut Bank  v.
                                                 ______________________

          Johnson, 58 N.E.2d 849  (Mass. 1945))).  While this  testimony is
          _______

          undoubtedly in Damon's interest, the district court's credence in

          that testimony has not been  shown to be in error.   See O'Brien,
                                                               ___ _______

          780  F.2d at  1076.   Finally, we  have already  established that

          these  were  factual  statements.    Thus,  the  statements  were

          misrepresentations of material facts.

                    Sun  tries to fend off this  conclusion by pointing out

          that  "[s]ellers .  . . are  not liable  in fraud  for failing to

          disclose  every  latent  defect   known  to  them  which  reduces

          materially  the value of the  property and of  which the buyer is

          ignorant."   Nei  v. Burley,  446 N.E.2d  674, 676  (Mass. 1983).
                       ___     ______

          However, it  is well established  that "in Massachusetts .  . . a

          party who  discloses partial  information that may  be misleading

          has a  duty to reveal all the material facts he [or she] knows to

          avoid deceiving the other party."  V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Texaco,
                                             ___________________    _______

          Inc., 757 F.2d  411, 415 (1st Cir. 1985); cf.  Nei, 446 N.E.2d at
          ____                                      ___  ___

          676 (finding  no misrepresentation  where seller "did  not convey

          half truths  . . .  [or] make  a partial disclosure  of the  kind

          which  so   often  requires  a  full   acknowledgement  to  avoid

          deception").   Accordingly,  we  find Maxwell  v. Ratcliffe,  254
                                                _______     _________

          N.E.2d  250, 252 (Mass. 1969), analogous to the Damons' position.

                                         -25-

          In  that  case, potential  buyers of  a  house asked  whether the

          cellar was dry,  and the  brokers represented that  it was,  when

          they had, or should  have had, knowledge that there  was periodic

          water seepage.  The Court found that "because the question of the

          dryness  of  the  cellar  had been  raised  expressly,  there was

          special obligation on  the brokers  to avoid half  truths and  to

          make  disclosure at  least of  any facts  known  to them  or with

          respect to  which they had been  put on notice."   Id. at 252-53;
                                                             ___

          see Greenery Rehabilitation Group, Inc. v. Antaramian, 628 N.E.2d
          ___ ___________________________________    __________

          1291, 1294 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (noting, inter alia, that buyers
                                                    __________

          did not request financial information about tenant from seller in

          finding that situation was not a case of partial disclosure).  

                    Sun also seeks  support from the fact that Damon signed

          an agreement representing that he had inspected  the property and

          would indemnify Sun from  and against liability for violation  of

          environmental   laws.      However,   "Massachusetts   case   law

          unequivocally  rejects  assertion of  an  'as  is'  clause as  an

          automatic defense against allegations  of fraud."  V.S.H. Realty,
                                                             ______________

          Inc., 757 F.2d at 418 (noting also that Uniform Commercial Code  
          ____

          2-316,  which allows  disclaimers in  the sale  of goods  between

          merchants,  does not preclude claims based  on fraud); see Turner
                                                                 ___ ______

          v.  Johnson &  Johnson,  809  F.2d  90,  95-98  (1st  Cir.  1986)
              __________________

          (discussing basis  and limits of Massachusetts  rule that parties

          may not contract out of fraud).   Nei v. Burley, which Sun cites,
                                            ___    ______

          offers it no support.  There, the court relied on  the absence of

          a duty  to disclose  the latent  defect,  not the  fact that  the

                                         -26-

          sellers provided  the buyers with test results,  in finding there

          had been no tort of fraud.  446 N.E.2d at 676-77.

                    Sun  challenges  the  evidentiary  basis for  a  second

          element, that the party  making the representation have knowledge

          of its  falsity.  See  Barret Assocs.,  Inc., 190 N.E.2d  at 868.
                            ___  _____________________

          Clearly Laubinger knew of the 1974 spillage -- he had been on the

          property during the  clean-up, and  was able to  testify in  some

          detail about the  event.  It stretches credence to  posit that he

          would not have knowledge of the  falsity of stating that it was a

          good  station  when  asked about  past  problems.    There is  no

          evidence  that  Bunzell had  actual  knowledge.   However,  under

          Massachusetts law, the party making a misrepresentation "need not

          know  that  the statement  is false  if  the fact  represented is

          susceptible  of actual  knowledge."   VMark  Software, Inc.,  642
                                                _____________________

          N.E.2d at 593 n.9;  see Snyder v. Sperry and  Hutchinson Co., 333
                              ___ ______    __________________________

          N.E.2d 421, 428 (Mass.  1975); Zimmerman v. Kent, 575  N.E.2d 70,
                                         _________    ____

          74 (Mass.  App. Ct. 1991).   The district court  found that while

          inspecting the station Damon asked  Bunzell about a depression in

          the  blacktop, and whether there  had been any  problems with the

          underground storage  tanks, to  which Bunzell replied  "No, we've

          had  no problems with  it.   It's all good."   This is  clearly a

          misstatement  of  facts  "susceptible  of  actual  knowledge"  --

          indeed, Bunzell's name  was listed on the "For  Sale" sign at the

          station:    presumably,  it would  be  his  responsibility  to be

          informed  about  the history  of  the particular  station  he was

          selling.

                                         -27-

                    Relying on  an Odometer Act case  applying Georgia law,

          see Huycke v.  Greenway, 876  F.2d 94, 95  (11th Cir. 1989),  Sun
          ___ ______     ________

          next argues that the Damons did not meet  their burden of proving

          intent to defraud.  In fact, however, "Massachusetts law does not

          .  .  . require  an intent  to deceive,  let  alone an  intent to

          deprive  the  plaintiff of  money,  to prove  misrepresentation."

          Bond Leather Co., 764 F.2d at 937 (citation omitted).
          ________________

                      "[A] long line  of [Massachusetts]  cases
                      [establishes]   that   'the   charge   of
                      fraudulent  intent,  in  an   action  for
                      deceit, may be  maintained by proof  of a
                      statement  made as  of  the  party's  own
                      knowledge, which is  false; provided  the
                      thing  stated is not  merely a  matter of
                      opinion,  estimate  or judgement,  but is
                      susceptible of actual  knowledge; and  in
                      such a  case it is not  necessary to make
                      any  further proof of an actual intent to
                      deceive.'"

          Sperry,  333  N.E.2d at  428  (quoting Powell  v.  Rasmussen, 243
          ______                                 ______      _________

          N.E.2d 167, 168 (1969) (quoting Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffat, 18
                                          ___________________    ______

          N.E.  168, 169  (Mass.  1888))); see  Roadmaster Indus.,  Inc. v.
                                           ___  ________________________

          Columbia  Mfg.  Co., 893  F. Supp.  1162,  1176 (D.  Mass. 1995);
          ___________________

          Zimmerman, 575 N.E.2d at  74.2  The Damons  have met this  burden
          _________

          of showing that the  Sun representatives made a misrepresentation

          of  facts susceptible of actual  knowledge, and so  they have met

                              
          ____________________

          2   While the  decision Bond  Leather Co. v.  Q.T. Shoe  Mfg. Co.
                                  _________________     ___________________
          notes  that, contrary to  Sun's contention, an  intent to deceive
          need not  be proven, it also reads Sperry as requiring an "intent
                                             ______
          that the plaintiff rely on the challenged false statements."  764
          F.2d  at  937.    We  have found  no  case  law  supporting  that
          contention.    Nonetheless,  we  note  that it  is  a  reasonable
          inference that the representations  made by Sun's representatives
          to a  known potential buyer  were made with  the intent that  the
          Damons rely on the statements.

                                         -28-

          their burden as to intent.

                    Sun maintains  that the  district court failed  to find

          that   Sun    intended   the   plaintiffs   to    rely   on   the

          misrepresentations.3    Federal  Rule  of  Civil Procedure  52(a)

          mandates  that  courts  "find   the  facts  specially  and  state

          separately [their] conclusions of  law thereon" when trying facts

          without a jury.  See, e.g., Monta ez v. Bagg, 510 N.E.2d 298, 300
                           ___ _____  ________    ____

          (Mass.  App. Ct. 1987) (noting  that judge did  not make detailed

          findings of fact regarding chapter 93A claims under Mass. R. Civ.

          P. 52(a)).     However, "the judge need only make brief, definite

          pertinent findings  and  conclusions on  the contested  matters."

          Makuc v. American Honda  Motor Co., 835  F.2d 389, 394 (1st  Cir.
          _____    _________________________

          1987).  Here,  while it  did not explicitly  discuss intent,  the

          district  court   set   out  the   elements   of  the   tort   of

          misrepresentation, and found that  Sun's representatives made the

          statements, that they  were not opinions,  and that Laubinger  at

          least knew about the spill when he made his statement.  In short,

          although the  district court  did not  spell out  every pertinent

          point, it  is clear that it  has provided us with  more than mere

                              
          ____________________

          3   Sun  contests that  the district  court's statement  that "it
          should have  been  clear  from  Damon's  questions  that  he  was
          concerned  about  the past  and  future integrity  of  the entire
          underground gas delivery system" (District Court Findings of Fact
          and Conclusions  of Law, at 7  n.1), implies that Sun  did not in
          fact  know  what  Damon   asked  about,  and  so  no   intent  is
          demonstrated on this record.  However, we refuse Sun's invitation
          to  read this  implication into  the district  court's statement,
          especially  as,  in  its findings  of  fact,  the district  court
          specifically   found   that  Damon   had   asked   each  of   the
          representatives about past conditions, particularly regarding the
          underground tanks. 

                                         -29-

          conclusions. 

                               C.  Reasonable Reliance
                               C.  Reasonable Reliance
                                   ___________________

                    Sun's  final  attack on  the  evidence  centers on  the

          element  of reasonable reliance.   See Elias Bros. Restaurants v.
                                             ___ _______________________

          Acorn Enters., 831 F. Supp. 920, 922 (D. Mass. 1993) (noting that
          _____________

          the  reliance element of the  tort has been  defined as requiring

          that it be reasonable).  First, it states that the district court

          was  silent on reasonable reliance.  To the contrary, although it

          did not address the reasonableness  of the reliance, the district

          court  found that Damon "would not have purchased the station for

          $90,000 if he had been aware of the 1974 spill."  (District Court

          Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 8).  

                    Sun points to the fact that the Damons had the right to

          inspect the property prior to sale and did not do so as vitiating

          any  argument of  reasonable reliance,  especially given  Damon's

          acknowledged awareness  of environmental issues.   However, it is

          well  established  under  Massachusetts  law   that  "failure  to

          investigate the veracity of  statements does not, as a  matter of

          law, bar recovery for misrepresentation."  Bond Leather Co.,  764
                                                     ________________

          F.2d at 936.   To find  that the Damons'  failure to  investigate

          effectively bars their claim, as Sun requests, would  run counter

          to the established  case law on  that point.   "Only reliance  on

          'preposterous  or  palpably  false'  representations  vitiates  a

          misrepresentation claim."  Roadmaster  Indus., Inc., 893 F. Supp.
                                     ________________________

          at     1179  (quoting  Zimmerman,  575  N.E.2d  at  76).    Sun's
                                 _________

          representations cannot be so characterized.

                                         -30-

                    Sun's reliance on Maloney  v. Sargisson, 465 N.E.2d 296
                                      _______     _________

          (Mass.  App. Ct. 1984), is misplaced.  There, the Maloneys bought

          property,  and subsequently  discovered that  because of  a drain

          line  to a local reservoir, it could  not be built on.  Sargisson

          was the attorney  with whom  they entered the  purchase and  sale

          agreement.    That  agreement was  made  contingent  on  the land

          passing a  percolation test and deep  hole test to  qualify for a

          building  permit,  with  the tests  to  be  done  at the  buyers'

          expense.   The tests were  done, indicated positive  results, and

          the sale went  through.  Later, however,  it turned out  that the

          tests were done at the wrong time of year, and the results of the

          second  deep hole test were adverse.  The Maloneys sued Sargisson

          alleging, among  other things,  misrepresentation.   The  Appeals

          Court  found  that  the  Maloneys   could  not  have  relied   on

          Sargisson's  statements that "he knew all there was to know about

          the property," that they did not need to hire a  lawyer, and that

          "the lot was a good building lot": 

                      Whatever those alleged statements  may be
                      taken to  mean,  the Maloneys  would  not
                      have  relied upon them to their detriment
                      so far  as they  might have borne  on the
                      capacity of the lot  to pass soil tests .
                      .  .  .  Concerning  that aspect  of  the
                      land's    character,   their    affidavit
                      discloses,  the  Maloneys made  their own
                      examination.

          Id. at 301.
          ___

                    Clearly,  Maloney is  distinguishable from  the present
                              _______

          case.  There, the buyer specified in the  agreement that it would

          make the  tests, and did  so.   A district court  had found  that

                                         -31-

          there was no evidence Sargisson knew or should have known of  the

          existence of the problem, a finding which carried weight as prima

          facie  evidence in the superior  court and was  not questioned by

          the  Appeals Court.   Id. at  300.   There is  no indication that
                                ___

          Sargisson made a  representation as  to the status  of the  soil:

          rather, it is clear that the Maloneys relied on  their own tests.

          Here, the questions went to the past history of the property, not

          just the present condition.   In short, the reasoning  in Maloney
                                                                    _______

          is based on a sufficiently different set of facts such that Sun's

          reliance  on  it fails.4   See  Roadmaster  Indus., Inc.,  893 F.
                                     ___  ________________________

          Supp.  at    1179  (holding that  plaintiff  buyer's  failure  to

          investigate contamination  of soil  at manufacturing plant  as to

          matters of  public record  did not vitiate  its misrepresentation

          claim).

                               D.  Factual Conclusions
                               D.  Factual Conclusions
                                   ___________________

                    Sun  makes the  additional argument  that the  district

          court made  factual findings, where the  facts were controverted,

          without  explaining the  reasoning for  its determination.5   See
                                                                        ___

                              
          ____________________

          4   Sun's reliance  on  Rhode Island  Hosp. Trust  Nat'l Bank  v.
                                  _____________________________________
          Varadian,  647 N.E.2d  1174 (Mass.  1995), a  promissory estoppel
          ________
          case,  is similarly misplaced.  There, the court found that since
          the evidence  did not  warrant a  finding that  a promise  in the
          contractual  sense   was  made,   reliance  by   the  experienced
          businessmen plaintiffs would be unreasonable  as a matter of law.
          Id. at 1179. We fail to see  how that case sheds any light on the
          ___
          misrepresentation charge  here, where the court has  found that a
          misrepresentation was indeed made. 

          5    Sun  also contends  that  several  of  the district  court's
          findings were  irreconcilable and  contradictory.  As  we address
          those allegations  elsewhere in  the opinion, we  do not  discuss
          them here.

                                         -32-

          Fed.  R.  Civ. P.  52(a) (mandating  that  court "find  the facts

          specially and  state separately  its conclusions of  law thereon"

          when  trying facts without  a jury).  "To  satisfy the demands of

          Rule 52(a), a trial  court must do more than  announce statements

          of ultimate fact.  The court must support its rulings by spelling

          out the subordinate facts on which  it relies."  U.S. for the Use
                                                           ________________

          of Belcon,  Inc. v. Sherman Constr. Co., 800 F.2d 1321, 1324 (4th
          ________________    ___________________

          Cir. 1986) (vacating decision  and remanding where district court

          made no  finding on extent of  plaintiff's responsibilities where

          the conflict "turn[ed]  upon [the parties'] respective  duties").

          Our  examination of the findings Sun questions reveal no error by

          the district court.6

                    First,  Sun questions  the credence the  district court

          placed  in Damon's testimony.   Specifically,  it argues  that it

          should  be   provided  with  an  explanation  of  why  the  court

          "disregarded the  uncontroverted testimony of Mr.  Damon that the

          station,  the underground tanks, and the soil was '100% clean' in

          1980  when Getty  examined the  station." (Appellant's  Brief, at

          40).   Sun's phrasing twists the testimony:  Damon testified that

          Getty told  him the  soil was clean,  not that  he knew it  to be

          true.    As we  have  already  noted, Sun  has  not provided  any

          evidence that Getty was  in fact testing the soil:   the district

          court  specifically found that  Getty was  testing the  tanks for
                              
          ____________________

          6  Two of  Sun's contentions, that the district  court's findings
          are insufficient as to intent  and reliance, and that it did  not
          adequately address the factual  basis for Cataldo's exert opinion
          on the property's condition, have been addressed elsewhere in the
          opinion.

                                         -33-

          tightness.   The district  court stated during  closing arguments

          that it also did  not consider that Damon  had made an  admission

          that the property was clean.  

                    Sun  also argues that the  court had to  explain why it

          chose the "version" of his story  Damon told at trial, instead of

          what it  deems "varying" earlier versions  under oath, especially

          as regards what questions he put to the Sun representatives.  Our

          review  of the record does not indicate that Damon's testimony at

          trial  was  so inconsistent  with  his  earlier testimony  as  to

          constitute "'unsupported self-serving testimony that flies in the

          teeth  of  unimpeachable  contradicting  evidence  and  universal

          experience.'"  Venturelli, 850 F.2d at 833 (quoting Insurance Co.
                         __________                           _____________

          of North  Am. v.  Musa, 785  F.2d 370,  374-75 (1st Cir.  1986)).
          _____________     ____

          Indeed, the district court stated that it did not "look upon them

          as  being that  different.   There  are  differences, there's  no

          question,  but  the  extent of  the  differences  is a  difficult

          question, it strikes me."  (Day 4, page 17).  

                    Lastly, Sun contends that the  court did not provide an

          evidentiary basis for  its conclusion, made  in a footnote,  that

          "it  should  have been  clear"  to Sun  what  Damon meant  in his

          questioning.   The  findings  here,  however, are  not  like  the

          inconsistent  and  contradictory  findings  in  Lyles  v.  United
                                                          _____      ______

          States,  759 F.2d 941,  944 (1st Cir.  1985), cited by  Sun.  The
          ______

          court here specifically stated in its findings of fact that Damon

          asked  both  Laubinger  and  Bunzell  about past  problems.    In

          connection  with its  comment  that Sun's  representatives should

                                         -34-

          have  understood the  scope  of Damon's  questions, the  district

          court cited his testimony  that "the only thing  you've got in  a

          gas station is tanks and pumps and the lines.  I  mean, what else

          is there?"  (District  Court Findings of Fact and  Conclusions of

          Law,  at  7 n.1).    A  "judge  need  only make  brief,  definite

          pertinent findings  and conclusions  on  the contested  matters."

          Makuc v.  American Honda Motor Co.,  835 F.2d 389,  394 (1st Cir.
          _____     ________________________

          1987).  The district court met its burden here.  

                                CALCULATION OF DAMAGES
                                CALCULATION OF DAMAGES

                    The district court calculated  the damages for the tort

          claim as $245,000, the difference between the actual value of the

          Damon's property if it  was uncontaminated -- $600,000 --  as the

          defendant's representatives  stated and  the actual value  of the

          property as  contaminated  -- $325,000  -- as  measured when  the

          plaintiffs  sold the property to  Rooney in 1992.7   Sun does not

          contest the  district court's basic measurement,  but argues that

          it should  have  set off  specific  monies against  the  purchase

          price, and  should have accounted  for the Damons'  obligation to

          mitigate damages.  We disagree, for the following reasons.  

                    First, Sun  contends the value of  the indemnity Rooney

          gave  the Damons  from and  against all  environmental liability,

          which it suggests is approximately $104,000, should have been set
                              
          ____________________

          7    Adopting  the  sale  price  suggested  by  Rooney's gasoline
          supplier, the district court  found the fair market value  of the
          property if it had been not been contaminated to be $600,000.  It
          took the actual  sale price as  the measure of  the value of  the
          property as  contaminated:  Rooney  assumed the  $325,000 of  the
          Damons'  first and second mortgages, $10,000 in arrears, and made
          a $20,000 cash payment, for a total of $355,000.

                                         -35-

          off against the  purchase price.   However, as  the Damons  point

          out,  if Sun had not made the misrepresentation, the Damons would

          not be responsible to clean up  the mess.  Had the Damons cleaned

          up   the  property   themselves,  they   would  be   entitled  to

          reimbursement, and,  presumably, the  sale price of  the property

          would have been higher:  reducing the damages by the value of the

          indemnity  would virtually  reverse  this process.   Second,  Sun

          argues that $40,000 should be taken off the damage figure, as the

          Damons did not give Rooney $40,000, as they were required  to per

          their  agreement, to  defray costs of  contamination.   Again, if

          Sun's  representatives  had  not  misrepresented  the  property's

          condition, the Damons would  not have owed that money  to Rooney;

          if they had paid  it to Rooney, it would have  been added to, not

          offset against, the damages (and presumably would be reflected in

          the actual sale price).   Third, Sun argues that  $29,000 in back

          rent  from  Rooney should  have been  offset  as well,  since the

          Damons  did not  seek  it from  him.   However,  once again,  the

          plaintiffs   would  not   have  lost   that  money   without  the

          misrepresentation.    Also,  according  to  paragraph  9  of  the

          Agreement and Lease, Rooney was entitled to opt out of  his lease

          if a governmental authority prevented him from occupying or using

          the property as  a gasoline station.   Thus,  it is unclear  that

          Rooney did, in fact, owe the past rent.

                    Sun  also argues  that  the Damons  failed to  mitigate

          their  losses by not seeking back rent  from Rooney.  In light of

          the  terms  of the  Agreement and  Lease  between Rooney  and the

                                         -36-

          Damons, the fact  that the  Damons were obligated  to pay  Rooney

          $40,000,  which  they did  not, and  the  subsequent sale  of the

          property, we are hard put to accept their reasoning.

                    For   the   above   reasons,   the   district   court's

          determination of damages is affirmed.

                                  CHAPTER 93A CLAIMS
                                  CHAPTER 93A CLAIMS

                    The  district  court  found  that  Sun's  actions  were

          "unfair  or deceptive"  and thus  violated Massachusetts  General

          Laws chapter 93A, section 11.   At the same time, the lower court

          refused  to award multiple damages under section 11, on the basis

          that  "the evidence  of bad  faith or  willful intent  to deceive

          [was]  insufficient to merit a punitive  award."  (District Court

          Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 12).   See Mass. Gen.
                                                             ___

          L. ch.  93A,    11  (allowing  multiple damages  if "the  use  or

          employment  of the . .  . act  or practice was  . .  . willful or

          knowing").  Sun argues on appeal  that the court erred in finding

          it  violated chapter 93A, while the Damons contend that the court

          erred in  refusing multiple damages.   For the  reasons discussed

          below, we affirm the district court's finding that Sun was liable

          under chapter 93A, as well as its refusal of multiple damages.

                        A.  Sun's Liability Under Chapter 93A
                        A.  Sun's Liability Under Chapter 93A
                            _________________________________

                                1.  Standard of Review
                                1.  Standard of Review
                                    __________________

                    We  begin  our analysis  by  reciting  our standard  of

          review.   The  district  court's findings  of  law face  de  novo
                                                                   ________

          review, and its  findings of  fact engender  clear error  review.

          See  Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pacific Sys. Corp., 44 F.3d
          ___  _____________________    __________________________

                                         -37-

          40, 43 (1st Cir. 1995).  We deem a finding of fact to  be clearly

          erroneous "'when  although there is  evidence to support  it, the

          reviewing  court on the entire evidence is left with the definite

          and  firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'"  Id. at
                                                                     ___

          43 (quoting Anderson v. City of  Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573
                      ________    ______________________

          (1985) (citation omitted)).  

                                         -38-

                               2.  The Legal Framework
                               2.  The Legal Framework
                                   ___________________

                    The  district  court  found  that  Sun's  actions  were

          "unfair or deceptive" within  the scope of chapter 93A.   Section

          11 provides a cause of action to 

                      [a]ny  person who engages  in the conduct
                      of any trade or  commerce and who suffers
                      any  loss of  money or property,  real or
                      personal,  as  a  result  of the  use  or
                      employment of another person  who engages
                      in  any trade  or  commerce of  . .  . an
                      unfair  or  deceptive  act   or  practice
                      . . . .

          Mass.  Gen. L.  ch. 93A,    11; see  Mass. Gen.  L. ch. 93A,    2
                                          ___

          (establishing that  "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the

          conduct  of any  trade or  commerce" are  unlawful).   Common law

          misrepresentation  claims provide  a  basis  for liability  under

          section 11.  See, e.g., Sheehy v. Lipton Indus., Inc., 507 N.E.2d
                       ___  ____  ______    ___________________

          781, 785 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987). 

                    Section 11  does not define  what conduct rises  to the

          level of an  "unfair or  deceptive" act.   See Cambridge  Plating
                                                     ___ __________________

          Co.,  slip op.  at  38-39.   In  weighing whether  a  defendant's
          ___

          conduct meets  the statute's requirements, "a  common refrain has

          developed.   'The  objectionable conduct  must attain a  level of

          rascality  that would raise an  eyebrow of someone  inured to the

          rough and tumble  of the world of commerce.'"8   Quaker State Oil
                                                           ________________
                              
          ____________________

          8  The Damons argue that in Massachusetts Employers Ins. Exch. v.
                                      __________________________________
          Propac-Mass, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 435 (Mass. 1995), the SJC abandoned
          _________________
          the "rascality test" in stating that it "view[s] as uninstructive
          phrases  such  as 'level  of  rascality'  and 'rancid  flavor  of
          unfairness'."      Id.  at   438.     Contrary  to   the  Damons'
                             ___
          interpretation, the SJC was simply recognizing that the mentioned
          phrases  do  not,  despite  their frequent  citation,  lend  much
          guidance in  the fact-specific  context of  a chapter 93A  claim.

                                         -39-

          Ref. Corp.  v. Garrity  Oil Co., 884  F.2d 1510,  1513 (1st  Cir.
          __________     ________________

          1989)  (quoting Levings v. Forbes & Wallace Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149,
                          _______    _____________________

          153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)).  In other words, 

                      a chapter 93A claimant must show that the
                      defendant's actions fell "within at least
                      the   penumbra    of   some   common-law,
                      statutory,  or other  established concept
                      of   unfairness,"   or   were   "immoral,
                      unethical,  oppressive  or  unscrupulous"
                      . . . .
           
          Id. (quoting PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d
          ___          _________________    ___________________

          915, 917 (Mass.  1975)); see Tagliente  v. Himmer, 949 F.2d  1, 7
                                   ___ _________     ______

          (1st  Cir. 1991).   As  the SJC  recently stated, in  weighing an

          act's fairness, the  focus is  "on the nature  of the  challenged

          conduct and  on the  purpose and effect  of that  conduct as  the

          crucial factors."  Massachusetts Employers Ins. Exch., 648 N.E.2d
                             __________________________________

          at 438.

                          3.  Sun's Violation of Chapter 93A
                          3.  Sun's Violation of Chapter 93A
                              ______________________________

                    In its  challenge to the district  court's finding that

          Sun  is liable under section  11, Sun maintains  that its conduct

          was not "unfair  or deceptive."   However, its  argument on  that

          basis is conclusory  at best:  Sun points to  neither evidence in

          the record nor case law which would cast into doubt  the district

          court's factual  determination on that  point.9   As neither  Sun
                              
          ____________________

          See Cambridge Plating Co., slip op. at 39.  
          ___ _____________________

          9  Sun does cite to evidence that Damon was a businessmen who had
          sold gasoline  and used underground storage tanks for some thirty
          years prior to buying the property, but only to maintain that the
          court must apply a "heightened standard of an unfair or deceptive
          act  or practice."  We  remind Sun that  "[s]ophistication of the
          parties  is not  mentioned in  chapter 93A  and the  amendment of
          chapter  93A  to  cover  business  entities  did  not  limit  the

                                         -40-

          nor our review of the record provides us with grounds to find the

          district court erred, we affirm  the lower court's application of

          section 11.   See Schwanbeck  v. Federal-Mogul Corp.,  578 N.E.2d
                        ___ __________     ___________________

          789, 803 (Mass. 1991)  (noting that "whether a particular  set of

          acts,  in  their factual  setting, is  unfair  or deceptive  is a

          question  of fact"),  rev'd  on other  grounds,  592 N.E.2d  1289
                                ________________________

          (Mass. 1992).

                    Sun  does  look  to  Winter Panel  Corp.  v.  Reichhold
                                         ___________________      _________

          Chems.,  Inc.,  823 F.  Supp. 963  (D.  Mass 1993),  for support.
          _____________

          There,  plaintiff  alleged that  the defendant  chemical supplier

          made false statements  about its ability to  supply the plaintiff

          with chemicals.   Sun acknowledges  that the  Winter Panel  court
                                                        ____________

          noted  that "[k]nowing non-disclosure of information necessary to

          make affirmative  statements complete or non-misleading will give

          rise  to an  action  for misrepresentation,  including an  action

          under  chapter 93A."  Id. at 975.   Sun nonetheless seeks to save
                                ___

          itself  from  liability by  reliance  on  the court's  additional

          statement  that  "[s]imply  neglecting  to  discuss  [defendant's

          representatives'] lack  of practical experience  with the precise

          methods of production pursued by  Winter Panel, however, does not

          at present seem  to be the kind of knowing omission that achieves

                              
          ____________________

          statute's  protection  to  small,   unsophisticated  businesses."
          V.S.H. Realty,  Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 757 F.2d 411, 418 (1st Cir.
          ____________________    ____________
          1985).  Regardless of  the level of the parties'  sophistication,
          we  apply  the well-developed  standard  for  section 11  actions
          between  two  persons  engaged in  business.    Of course,  their
          relative levels  of sophistication may enter  into the fact-based
          analysis  the court carries out in weighing whether a party's act
          was unfair or deceptive.

                                         -41-

          the level of rascality  necessary to find a violation  of chapter

          93A."   Id.   As we  have already  affirmed the district  court's
                  ___

          finding of misrepresentation, it is manifest that Sun's acts sink

          below the  level  of  "simply neglecting  to  discuss"  the  1974

          contamination.  Winter Panel offers Sun no relief.
                          ____________

                    Sun's  primary argument  against  the district  court's

          holding blurs the line between section  11 liability and multiple

          damages.10   Specifically,  it contends  that since  the district

          court apparently found Sun's conduct was not willful and knowing,

          Sun cannot have engaged in common law fraud.  Since  it could not

          have engaged in fraud, it concludes, its  conduct did not rise to

          the level  of intentional  misconduct, beyond mere  negligence or

          inadvertence, that section 11 demands.  

                    We  disagree.    As  noted above,  the  district  court

          refused to award multiple damages here on the basis that 

                      [m]ultiple damages are not  mandated when
                      misrepresentation occurs.   Only "callous
                      and   intentional   violations"   deserve
                      multiple  damages  treatment.    In  this
                      instance, we believe  the evidence of bad
                      faith or  willful  intent to  deceive  is
                      insufficient to merit a punitive award of
                      multiple damages.

                              
          ____________________

          10   Sun also  makes the  circular argument  that if  its conduct
          amounts  to  negligence,  it  has  not  met  the  requirement  of
          rascality needed for  section 11, since negligence  cannot be the
          basis  for a section 11  violation.  To  the contrary, negligence
          can provide the basis for chapter 93A liability, so long as it is
          paired with an unfair  or deceptive act or  practice -- in  other
          words, negligence  plus rascality equals liability.   See Squeri,
                                                                ___ ______
          588 N.E.2d at 24; Glickman  v. Brown, 486 N.E.2d 737, 741  (Mass.
                            ________     _____
          App. Ct. 1985); see, e.g., Briggs v. Carol Cars, Inc., 553 N.E.2d
                          ___  ____  ______    ________________
          930  (Mass. 1990)  (upholding application  of sections  2 &  9 of
          chapter 93A where defendant made reckless misrepresentation). 

                                         -42-

          (District  Court Findings of Fact  and Conclusions of  Law, at 12

          (citations  omitted)).   As  Sun  itself  indicates, reading  the

          district court opinion as finding that Sun was not at all knowing

          or  willful is inconsistent with the first element of the tort of

          misrepresentation, i.e. that a  party make a false representation

          with the knowledge of its falsity.  See Barret Assocs., Inc., 190
                                              ___ ____________________

          N.E.2d  at  868.   We understand  the  district court  opinion as

          indicating that  there  was evidence  of  bad faith  and  willful

          intent  to deceive, but that  some quantum of  knowing or willful

          violation  must be  met before  a party  is entitled  to punitive

          damages  under chapter  93A. Indeed,  "shades of  culpability are

          supposed to matter in applying the punitive damages  provision in

          the  statute."   Cambridge  Plating Co.,  slip  op. at  42.   Our
                           ______________________

          reading is consistent with  the district court's specific finding

          that  when  Damon  asked Laubinger  if  Sun  had  experienced any

          problems  with  the  station  and  underground  tanks,  Laubinger

          replied  that it was a  "good station," despite  his knowledge of

          the  1974 contamination.  Cf.  VMark Software, 642  N.E.2d at 596
                                    ___  ______________

          n.15  ("We put great stock in the  findings of the trial judge on

          issues such as intent and motivation, since he was in  a superior

          position  to assess the weight and  credibility of the witnesses,

          and   there  is  no  showing   that  his  findings  were  clearly

          erroneous.").

                    The case law supports this reading.  In VMark Software,
                                                            _______________

          Inc. v. EMC Corp., cited  by the district court, the trial  court
          ____    _________

          found  VMark guilty of  misrepresentation, but did  not grant EMC

                                         -43-

          multiple damages under section 11.  EMC claimed that the scienter

          requirement  for  the  tort  of  misrepresentation  automatically

          triggered  section  11's  mandatory  doubling of  damages  for  a

          knowing  violation of chapter 93A.   The court disagreed, finding

          that  although VMArk's  misstatements  were made  with sufficient

          awareness of the facts for it to be liable  under the traditional

          tort  formula, "they were not  made so 'knowingly'  as to warrant

          the punitive sanctions  of double damages under c. 93A."   Id. at
                                                                     ___

          595.  We recently reaffirmed  that "[l]iability under Chapter 93A

          for conduct amounting  to intentional misrepresentation does  not

          automatically trigger punitive damages.   There must be something

          more."  Cambridge Plating Co., slip op. at 42.  Accordingly,  the
                  _____________________

          district court's  conclusion that Sun's actions  were not knowing

          and   willful  enough   to  require   punitive  damages   is  not

          inconsistent with intentional misrepresentation.

                        4.  Multiple Damages Under Chapter 93A
                        4.  Multiple Damages Under Chapter 93A
                            __________________________________

                    Paragraph 5 of section 11 provides for multiple damages

          where  "the court finds that  the use or employment  of the . . .

          act or practice was a willful or knowing violation."  The  Damons

          argue that they should have been granted multiple damages, but do

          not  contend that  the  district court  should  have found  Sun's

          violation   sufficiently  willful  or knowing  to require  double

          damages.11   Instead,  they base  their position  on the  premise
                              
          ____________________

          11  In  their statement of conclusions, the Damons  do posit that
          we should conclude that the district  court's indication that Sun
          was  guilty  of some  level  of bad  faith  or willful  intent to
          deceive suffices  to require  multiple damages under  section 11,
          para. 5.   However, as they offer no support for this contention,

                                         -44-

          that  we should essentially read into section 11 the provision of

          section 9  which awards  multiple damages  for a  defendant's bad

          faith  refusal  to  make  a  reasonable  settlement  offer  after

          demand.12   Their  argument relies  on the  fact that  sections 9

                              
          ____________________

          we deem  it waived.  See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17
                               ___ _____________    _______
          (1st  Cir.) ("[W]e see no reason to abandon the settled appellate
          rule   that  issues   adverted  to   in  a   perfunctory  manner,
          unaccompanied by  some  effort at  developed  argumentation,  are
          deemed waived."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990).
                            ____________

          12  That section provides, in pertinent part:

                      Any person receiving  . . . a demand  for
                      relief who  . . . makes  a written tender
                      of  settlement which  is rejected  by the
                      claimant may, in  any subsequent  action,
                      file the written  tender and an affidavit
                      concerning  its   rejection  and  thereby
                      limit any recovery to the relief tendered
                      if  the  court   finds  that  the  relief
                      tendered  was  reasonable in  relation to
                      the  injury  actually  suffered   by  the
                      petitioner.   In all other cases,  if the
                      court finds for the  petitioner, recovery
                      shall be . .  . up to three but  not less
                      than  two times  [actual damages]  if the
                      court  finds  that . .  . the  refusal to
                      grant relief  upon demand was made in bad
                      faith  with  knowledge  or reason to know
                      that  the act  or practice  complained of
                      violated  said section two. 

          Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A,   9(3).  By comparison, section 11 states,
          in pertinent part:

                      The respondent may tender with his answer
                      . .  . a written offer  of settlement for
                      single  damages.     If  such  tender  or
                      settlement is rejected by the petitioner,
                      and  if the  court finds that  the relief
                      tendered  was  reasonable in  relation to
                      the  injury  actually  suffered   by  the
                      petitioner,  then  the  court  shall  not
                      award more than single damages.

          Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A,   11.

                                         -45-

          and 11 share the goal of promoting reasonable settlement  offers.

          See International Fidelity  Ins. Co. v. Wilson,  443 N.E.2d 1308,
          ___ ________________________________    ______

          1318  (Mass.  1983).   According to  this  logic, to  further the

          statute's goals we  should punish defendants who are liable under

          section 11 and who do not  offer single damages with their Answer

          by inflicting multiple damages  on them, and reward those  who do

          with single damages.  

                    We have previously noted  that "[i]t is unclear whether

          section  11 permits  recovery of  multiple damages  under such  a

          theory where bad faith is proved."  Southworth Mach. v. F/V Corey
                                              ________________    _________

          Pride, 994 F.2d 37, 40  (1st Cir. 1993).  Nonetheless, we  do not
          _____

          hesitate in refusing the Damons' argument.   First, we note  that

          section 9 is  by its terms  inapplicable to transactions  between

          persons engaged in business, and section 11 quite simply does not

          include  language   acting  as  a  counterpart   to  section  9's

          requirement of multiple  damages where  a party does  not make  a

          written tender  of settlement.   See id.   Second, we  note that,
                                           ___ ___

          although it shares  specific goals with section  9, "[s]ection 11

          provides a different procedure  for achieving the same objectives

          of facilitating settlement and fixing damages."  Nader v. Citron,
                                                           _____    ______

          360  N.E.2d 870, 874 (Mass. 1977).  Indeed, the Massachusetts and

          federal  courts have  consistently respected  the differences  in

          procedures  between the two sections.   See, e.g.,  Fickes v. Sun
                                                  ___  ____   ______    ___

          Expert,  Inc.,  762 F.  Supp. 998,  1001  (D. Mass.  1991); Aetna
          _____________                                               _____

          Casualty  and Surety  Co. v.  State Park  Ins. Agency,  Inc., 428
          _________________________     ______________________________

          N.E.2d 376, 377  (Mass. App.  Ct. 1981); see  also Glickman,  486
                                                   _________ ________

                                         -46-

          N.E.2d at 742 &  n.7 (refusing to  analyze section 11 damages  in

          terms  of defendants'  response  to  plaintiffs' demand  letter).

          "Whatever the merits of implying the demand letter  scheme of   9

          into    11, as urged by  defendants, we find no  support for such

          implication in the  language and structure of   11."   Nader, 360
                                                                 _____

          N.E.2d at 874.  Finally, we  note that the district court did not

          find  that Sun's  failure to  tender an  offer of  settlement was

          "made in  bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that the act

          or  practice complained of violated said section 2," as section 9

          demands, and the Damons have not demonstrated any evidence to the

          contrary.  Thus, even if we were to weigh Sun's failure to tender

          an  offer into our analysis, the Damons' challenge to the court's

          damage award would fail.

                    Our  decision  today  does  not clash  with  the  SJC's

          decision in International Fidelity  Ins. Co., despite the Damons'
                      ________________________________

          reliance on  it.  There,  the SJC  weighed the goal  of promoting

          reasonable  settlements in both sections 9 and 11, and found that

          it would  be appropriate to impose  independent liability against

          the multiple defendants  in that case, as to do  so would promote

          settlements.  443 N.E.2d at 1318.  At the same time, however, the

          Court  noted that  "the procedures  set out  in the  two sections

          differ,"  despite  their common  goal.   Id.  (citing  Nader, 360
                                                   ___           _____

          N.E.2d  at 870).  Thus,  we read International  Fidelity Ins. Co.
                                           ________________________________

          not as suggesting we read the damage provisions of section 9 into

          section 11, but as recognizing that their goals are similar while

          their  methods are not.   See Levings v.  Forbes & Wallace, Inc.,
                                    ___ _______     ______________________

                                         -47-

          396  N.E.2d 149,  153 (Mass.  App. Ct.  1979) ("The  remedies and

          procedures in     9 and 11 are related, but not parallel, and the

          conditions  of one section should not be read by implication into

          the  other."); Nader, 360 N.E.2d  at 874 (noting that "analogies,
                         _____

          whatever  their utility,  do not  form a  basis for  the judicial

          rewriting  of statutes"  in refusing  to read section  9's demand

          letter procedure into section 11).

                                   ATTORNEY'S FEES
                                   ATTORNEY'S FEES

                    The  district court  awarded the  Damons $40,620.40  in

          attorney's fees and costs.  See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A,   11 para.
                                      ___

          6  (mandating reasonable  attorney's  fees and  costs be  awarded

          where the court finds a violation of    2).  Sun argues that  the

          award  was not  reasonable, on  the basis  that the  hourly rates

          granted  (specifically,  the  rate  of  $235  an hour  for  court

          appearances  and depositions)  were exorbitant  and unreasonable,

          and  the  contingency nature  of the  engagement.   Based  on our

          review   of  the  record,  we  do  not  find  the  court's  award

          unreasonable.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    For  the  reasons discussed  above,  we  find that  the

          district court's  refusal of Sun's  motion for entry  or judgment

          and motions to alter and amend the  judgment and findings and for

          a  new  trial were  not  an  abuse  of its  discretion.    Having

          considered all the parties' arguments, we find both appeals to be

          lacking  in merit.  Consequently,  we affirm the  decision of the
                                                ______

          district court on all points. 

                                         -48-

                    No costs on appeal to either party.

                                         -49-