Court Opinion

ID: 9810203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:43:26.141166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:28.635621
License: Public Domain

Sweeny, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. The record clearly reflects a pattern of highly inflammatory, prejudicial and improper comments made by plaintiffs’ counsel during his summation. Taken as a whole, those comments deprived defendants, particularly the City of New York, of a fair trial. I would therefore remand this case for a new trial on all issues.
There are certain well-settled principles established that apply to all trials. Basic to our adversarial system of justice is the principle that “all litigants, regardless of the merits of their *65case, are entitled to a fair trial” (Habenicht v R. K. O. Theatres, 23 AD2d 378, 379 [1st Dept 1965]). A trial court has “broad authority to control the courtroom, rule on the admission of evidence, elicit and clarify testimony, expedite the proceedings and to admonish counsel and witnesses when necessary” (Campbell v Rogers & Wells, 218 AD2d 576, 579 [1st Dept 1995], citing Matter of Brostoff v Berkman, 170 AD2d 364, 365 [1st Dept 1991], affd 79 NY2d 938 [1992]). Trial counsel is “afforded wide latitude in presenting arguments to a jury in summation” and where the attorney “remains within the broad bounds of rhetorical comment in pointing out the insufficiency and contradictory nature of [a party’s evidence], such remarks do not deprive the [opposing party] of a fair trial” (Chappotin v City of New York, 90 AD3d 425, 426 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 19 NY3d 808 [2012]). At the end of a lengthy trial, it may be inevitable that some improper remarks will be made during closing arguments. Not all such remarks will require a new trial, so long as they are limited in nature, are deemed harmless in view of the totality of the evidence, and do not contaminate the proceedings to the extent of depriving a party of a fair trial. In addition, counsel must be quickly admonished and the jury must be given immediate curative instructions (see e.g. Genza v Richardson, 95 AD3d 704, 705 [1st Dept 2012]; Chappotin, 90 AD3d at 426; Pareja v City of New York, 49 AD3d 470 [1st Dept 2008]). Thus, the “wide latitude” given to counsel in summation is not without its limitations.
“The underlying principle is that litigants are entitled, as a matter of law, to a fair trial [,] tree from improper comments by counsel or the trial court” (Rodriguez v City of New York, 67 AD3d 884, 886 [2d Dept 2009]). Where counsel’s conduct violates this principle, the courts have not hesitated to set aside a verdict tainted by such conduct. Here, the summation “had as its continuing theme” personal attacks on defense counsel, charges that defense witnesses outright lied, allusions of subornation of perjury by counsel and “assertions of personal knowledge and personal opinion as to the case and the credibility of witnesses” (Caraballo v City of New York, 86 AD2d 580, 581 [1st Dept 1982]). A few examples will serve to convey the tone of this summation.
Early in his summation, counsel began by vouching for his own credibility and casting aspersions on the integrity of opposing counsel by saying:
“When Jim and Eileen Gregware came to me to represent them, all can I do is give it my all, if *66somebody’s coming to me, yes, I will do whatever I can, within the bounds of decency, of honesty, to ■represent them. I will not cross that line, it will never happen if I’m trying the case. . . . But its wrong when lawyers stand before you and give you fast and loose synopses of the case. When lawyers do that, I have to tell you, there’s something very, very wrong with our system . . . The credibility of the lawyer is equally important [as the witnesses’].”
He went on to state that “believability and credibility, that is all that we have as lawyers.”
Counsel then transitioned into the first of repeated characterizations of defense witnesses as liars in directly addressing counsel for the City (Mr. Wang) and counsel for defendant contractor (Mr. Baxter) stating: “Credibility, Mr. Wang? Really? Your own witness lied. And to Mr. Baxter: Your own witnesses lied.” Shortly thereafter, while commenting on the testimony of a defense witness, plaintiff’s counsel stated: “I wonder if Mr. Wang even believes that [testimony] when his own witness said something like that.” During the course of his summation, counsel repeatedly denigrated each and every defense witness, calling them “liars” and unworthy of belief; calling the City’s expert a “phony baloney” on at least three occasions; characterizing a police officer’s testimony as “disgusting and reprehensible” and repeatedly charging that both the witnesses and counsel were “trying to deny justice to Jim and Eileen Greg-ware.” Indeed, variations on this phrase became an overarching refrain in support of counsel’s theory of a tightly woven conspiracy between defense counsel, particularly counsel for the City and the witnesses called to testify for the defense, and was used with various embellishments at least seven times during the course of the summation, usually in the form of “Why are they trying so hard to deny justice to Jim and Eileen Gregware?”
Additionally, counsel repeatedly vouched for his own credibility, using phrases such as “I was there, I did the deposition, I read it carefully”; inserted his personal beliefs and feelings as to the credibility of various defense witnesses including his clients and experts; and even made veiled references as to possible misconduct by defense counsel in the preparation for trial of those witnesses. This is clearly evident with respect to the police officer witness who testified. It is true, as the majority points out, that the jury had ample reason to question the *67testimony of the police officer, who testified at prior depositions that he had no recollection of this accident but was able to testify as to details of the accident at trial. Counsel properly pointed out and hammered this rather large discrepancy to the jury during cross-examination and summation. But instead of leaving it to the jury to determine what weight, if any, to give to this testimony, counsel substituted his own personal opinion of, and indignation at, this testimony by repeatedly harping on his theme of an alleged defense conspiracy to deny plaintiffs justice, using less than oblique accusations of defense counsel’s subornation of perjury. One example will suffice to prove this point:
“It is infuriating to me that they would go this far to try to change the testimony of an officer who stated under oath hundreds of times that he didn’t remember, that he didn’t know ... I was so infuriated that an officer, again, who was duty bound to uphold the law would come into this courthouse, come in here and somehow tell you that it is okay to speak with lawyers who weren’t there and then have memory. Ladies and gentlemen, when a police officer comes in this courtroom and a police officer comes in here and is fed information by his attorneys, his attorneys who he knows for a fact were not there, and they are telling him what happened and then Mr. Wang stands up and says, oh, he knows exactly where the accident happened—
“MR. WANG: Objection.
“THE COURT: This is fair comment on the evidence.
“MR. RUBINOWITZ: Mr. Wang tells you, he certainly knows . . . but the problem is this, you have an officer, an officer who is duty bound to uphold the law is doing something that is so terribly wrong, and I’m trying to tell you because it is so wrong for an officer to swear to tell the truth and tell less than the truth under oath, it’s wrong.”
Continuing in this same vein, counsel stated: “I have a lot of respect for the New York City Police Department and its officers, and we all should, but that man is not one of New York City’s finest. If anything, he is one of New York City’s wors[t].” He also addressed the City’s counsel directly, stating: “Mr. Wang, I don’t blame you for being looking down . . . why in the world is a police officer allowed to take the stand and tell *68less than the truth?” To compound the error, the court, rather than sustaining the objection to the comment that the police officer was being “fed information by his attorneys,” stated this was “fair comment on the evidence,” giving, in effect judicial, imprimatur to counsel’s allegations of subornation of perjury.
The conspiracy theme continued with plaintiffs’ counsel referring to the City’s expert as a “phoney baloney” at least three times, and counsel stating: “I’m asking you when you go into the jury room to say this, it is appropriate for the City of New York to stoop so low to call somebody like [the City’s expert] to deny Jim Gregware and Eileen Gregware justice?” Counsel drew attention to the discussion of the expert’s fee, stating: “You need an opinion, he will give you an opinion. Pay for it, he will give you an opinion.” In observing that under cross-examination, the expert said the City was his biggest client, counsel stated: “Would you like to keep the cash register rolling? Sure, who wouldn’t? When you put a phoney baloney on the witness stand, it is not right, and that man should not be testifying at all anymore.”
Toward the end of his summation, counsel repeated his personal opinions of the City’s witnesses, particularly the police officer and its expert, stating:
“And when they [i.e., the City’s attorneys] present a witness like that police officer, I’ll say this to you. I have certain words to describe that police officer. And I’m gonna use these words specifically, because it is something that angers me terribly, and it should anger you. What that police officer did in this courtroom was disgusting, it was reprehensible. To have a man who’s bound to uphold the law, come into this courtroom and tell less than the truth. It is unacceptable. And to have a man like [the City’s expert] come into this courtroom and tell you that he has done a full, fair, thorough and complete review and evaluation, that is also disgusting and it is terrible, it is reprehensible, and it should not be allowed . . . And those were two major witnesses put on by Mr. Wang and his lawyers.”
I certainly take no issue with the majority’s observation that counsel was entitled to “express skepticism” regarding the police officer’s testimony, particularly regarding his. “radically improved memory,” or counsel’s arguing to the jury that the defense witnesses were not worthy of belief because of *69discrepancies and inconsistencies in their testimony. Robust cross-examination and argument are to be expected as part of zealous advocacy. Had counsel stopped at expressing skepticism, even repeatedly, and left the issue for the jury’s determination, there would be no issue. But here, counsel’s expression of “skepticism” went well beyond the pale of fair comment. In fact, the majority concedes that the repeated references to defense witnesses as “liars” was inappropriate. I disagree with the majority’s position that these remarks were harmless because they were “isolated and constituted fair comment on the evidence.” The record clearly reflects that they were neither. In truth, counsel had much to work with regarding these witnesses. However, that only makes his characterizations, personal opinions, and attacks all the more prejudicial and regrettable. They were designed to create an inflammatory and prejudicial atmosphere against the defendants and, given the virulence and repetition of the statements, it cannot be said that they did not have their intended effect on the jury. Indeed, the majority tacitly recognizes this fact by its determination to remand this matter for a trial on the allocation of damages.
Nor can I agree with the majority that the City’s assertion that counsel vouched for his own credibility is a distortion of the record. The few instances quoted here (and there were more) suffice to demonstrate that these assertions were not isolated but rather were pervasive and part and parcel of an overall theme which, taken as a whole, served to inflame the passions of the jury, contaminate the proceedings and deny defendants a fair trial.
Each and every one of the above comments, when repeated without curative instructions, has been held to constitute grounds for a new trial. For example, we have ordered a new trial where counsel
“made himself an unsworn witness and attempted to vouch for the credibility of his clients [,] . . . implied that defense counsel made up the defense raised by the defendants, . . . labeled the defendants’ expert a hired gun and insinuated that the defense experts were unworthy of belief because they were being compensated” (Nuccio v Chou, 183 AD2d 511, 514-515 [1st Dept 1992], lv dismissed 81 NY2d 783 [1993]).
*70Likewise, where counsel bolstered his case in summation “by repeated accusations that the witnesses for the other side are liars” and that defendant’s experts are “willing to testify falsely for a fee” (Clarke v New York City Tr. Auth., 174 AD2d 268, 277-278 [1st Dept 1992]), a new trial was ordered (see also Rodriguez v New York City Hous. Auth., 209 AD2d 260, 261 [1st Dept 1994] [new trial ordered where “(p)laintiffs counsel improperly intimated that defendant’s medical expert was unworthy of belief because he was compensated for his appearance at trial”]).
Similarly, we set aside a verdict where counsel, in twice claiming that the City was fabricating evidence “vouched for his own credibility and sought to bolster it as well by improperly invoking his status as a member of the bar” (Valenzuela v City of New York, 59 AD3d 40, 45 [1st Dept 2008]). In Valenzuela, counsel stated “he never created half truths or tried to fool the jury and had not done so in this case” (id.), not unlike the comments plaintiffs’ counsel made here, stating: “I will not cross that line” regarding the bounds of honesty and decency.
A new trial was also ordered where plaintiff’s counsel in summation repeatedly impugned the integrity of defense counsel and defense witnesses, the result of which “could only have been devastatingly prejudicial to defendants and amounted to a violation of their right to a fair trial” (Berkowitz v Marriott Corp., 163 AD2d 52, 54 [1st Dept 1990]). In Berkowitz, we found counsel’s statement that defense counsel “possibly . . . doesn’t even believe himself some of the things that he said, but he has to do what he has to do” to be “egregious” (id.). In this regard, Pareja v City of New York (49 AD3d 470 [2008]) is instructive. There, counsel’s remarks concerning opposing counsel were brief, and not so inflammatory that they affected the outcome of the trial. Despite the fact that we did not order a new trial, we stated: “We nonetheless observe that the remarks of defense counsel were uncalled for. There is no justification for attacking the credibility of opposing counsel. The veracity of counsel is simply not a subject for summation” (id. at 470). Here, the repeated attacks on the integrity of opposing counsel “and the irrevelant fact that [defendant’s] counsel was a member of a large, well-known law firm,” coupled with an “implicit charge of subordination of perjury, cannot allow us to rule out the strong possibility that such remarks influenced the verdict” and thus require a new trial (Wein*71berger v City of New York, 97 AD2d 819, 819-820 [2d Dept 1983]).*
In Kohlmann v City of New York (8 AD2d 598, 598 [1st Dept 1959]) when faced with similar conduct, we held, “It is regrettable that despite the apparent strength of the plaintiffs’ case a new trial must be ordered in the interests of justice.” Based on the record in this case and the lessons of our prior holdings, we should remand the matter for a new trial.
Clark and Kapnick, JJ., concur with Manzanet-Daniels, J.; Sweeny, J., dissents in a separate opinion in which Tom, J.P., concurs.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered October 15, 2013, modified, on the láw and the facts, to grant the City’s motion for summary judgment on its cross claim, and to remand the matter for a new trial on the issue of the apportionment of liability as between the City and Burtis, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

 Plaintiffs’ counsel here also made several references in his summation to the fact Mr. Wang and the attorneys assisting him at trial were from a large, well-known firm.