Court Opinion

ID: 9455286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:17:33.224105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:32.384811
License: Public Domain

LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in parts II and III of Judge Bazelon’s opinion. As to part I, I concur in the result and in the concluding discussion that the right to counsel and hearing at waiver proceedings established by subsequent decisions is not retroactively applicable to this 1961 waiver determination by the Juvenile Court. Invalidation of the waiver would preclude any appropriate remedy in furtherance of the objective of juvenile rehabilitation which is the predicate of appellant’s claim.
In view of the dominant quality of this aspect of the case, I have not undertaken an array and weighing of the various factors that may require careful calibration in some other case involving the retroactive issue.
However, even my more limited approach to the issue requires some delineation of the matters where my view is different from Judge Bazelon’s.
The difference between us seems in part a matter of degree and burden of persuasion. I am apparently readier than he to say that new standards in the law should be denied retroactive effect. The opinion in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969) points out that retro-activity may be withheld because of the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of new standards. I am apparently readier to give credence to the likelihood of a disruptive effect on the administration of justice even though it has not been quantified or made the subject of formal demonstration.1
I am apparently also readier to entertain a denial of retroactivity on the basis of a combination of the possible effect on administration of justice, and the fact of a widespread practice, without inquiring into the exact nature of “reliance” on old standards. Desist teaches that “reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards” is a factor for consideration. The Supreme Court decisions thus far have involved reliance on authoritative Supreme Court precedents in constitutional law. The question arises, whether such authoritative appellate decisions are necessary to establish the factor of “reliance.” I would think not. It seems to me that powerful considerations against retroac-tivity exist whenever a decision (a) upsets a widespread practice that had evolved, in some matter of administration and procedure, by action of judges, or court officials, or for that matter officials of the executive branch concerned with the administration of justice, and (b) the practice, though not expressly authorized by statute or authoritative decision, was within a zone of reasonableness judged by the standards and understanding of the time. Whether the established or prevailing practice was explicitly sanctioned by authoritative ruling seems to me to be relevant but far from decisive.2 It would obviously hamstring, rather than further, the adminis*1141tration of justice to confine the practices of the officials concerned to those actions that have been authoritatively prescribed by appellate decision. The corollary is that the practices these officials develop in order to administer justice, and the judgments and dispositions made in what was reasonably considered a furtherance of the public interest, should be accorded a recognition as de facto reality that survives even in the face of de jure invalidation by decision.
The existence of an established or prevailing practice has revelance both as to the effect retroactive application would have on the administration of justice and as to the assessment of whether the “reliance” factor may be invoked.
In Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S.Ct. 1498, 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969), the Supreme Court declined to apply retroactively its ruling in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). McCarthy involved Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which precludes a district judge from accepting a plea of guilty “without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea [was] made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.” It held that the failure of the district judge to comply with the rule required that the guilty plea be set aside and the defendant permitted to plead anew. In Halliday, denying retroactivity, the Court referred to the language in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 298, 87 S.Ct., at 1970, requiring the weighing of the “prior justified reliance upon the old standard and the impact of retroactivity upon the administration of justice.” Halliday did not seek to establish a “justified” reliance on the old standard except by reference to the fact that the failure to apply the terms of the Rules was widespread.3
The approach of the Juvenile Court in handling waiver proceedings without hearings and counsel prior to Black v. United States,4 was sufficiently within the zone of reasonableness in the climate of the time to warrant denying full retro-activity to Black and Kent v. United States.5 I joined in Black, and thought it important to sustain the right of counsel there indicated. But I cannot blink the fact that there was another side to the issue. This pre-1965 approach was no intransigent or rigid foot-dragging adherence to a dusty rule that had been palpably eroded by time and changed conditions. It had substantial support in a decision as then recent as our 1960 ruling in Wilhite.6 This was not direct authoritative precedent, but as I have already noted, I do not regard this factor as critical.
Underlying my premise that the Juvenile Court’s pre-Black procedure was within the then zone of reasonableness is the consideration that the absence of counsel at the waiver proceeding did not undermine the integrity of the fact-finding process. The waiver determination was not insignificant; it was an important fork in the road. But it was not a final determination or disposition. The possibility that the absence of counsel resulted in an injustice by the Juvenile *1142Court judge who was trying to reach the result he deemed sound in the light of his appraisal of the file does not weigh so heavy in the balance as to offset the mischief that would be generated by erasing the product of a procedure that seemed reasonable in the past and can not now practicably be reconstituted in the mold set for the determinations of today.
*1141In McCarthy we noted that the practice we were requiring had been previously followed by only one Circuit; that over 85% of all convictions in the federal courts are obtained pursuant to guilty pleas; and that prior to Rule ll’s recent amendment, not all district judges personally questioned defendants before accepting their guilty pleas. Thus, in view of the general holding in McCarthy, and in view of the large number of constitutionally valid convictions that may have been obtained without full compliance with Rule 11, we decline to apply McCarthy retroactively. IVe hold that only those defendants whose guilty pleas were accepted after April 2, 1969, are entitled to plead anew if their pleas were accepted without full compliance with Rule 11.
*1142To avoid misunderstanding I add that my comments against retroactivity are intended for the kind of retroactivity sought in the case at bar, by motion to apply Kent (or Black) in a collateral attack on habeas corpus or its statutory equivalent, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to judgments that became final before 1965. In Black we specifically provided for Juvenile Court waiver proceedings for cases where “convictions have not become final.” 7
The kind of retroactivity that opens up final judgments to collateral attack is properly avoided as to judgments that were within the zone of reasonableness of the standards of the time, even though not explicitly validated by authoritative appellate decisional precedent.

. Compare Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 251, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 1035, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969). “We have no cause to doubt that the number of state convictions obtained in reliance on pr6-Kata decisions is substantial.”

. I note that this court recently refrained from full retroactivity even where an established practice was contrary to the express pronouncement of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 413 F.2d 1061 (April 24, 1969) (On Petitions for Rehearing).

. See 394 U.S. at 833, 89 S.Ct., at 1499:

. 122 U.S.App.D.C. 393, 355 F.2d 104 (1965).

. 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966).

. Wilhite v. United States, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 281 F.2d 642 (1960).

. 122 U.S.App.D.C. at 397, 355 F.2d at 108.