Court Opinion

ID: 9363389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-16 00:00:48.466269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:31.604360
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-10396        Document: 00516611074             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/13/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 21-10396
                                    Summary Calendar                                 FILED
                                                                               January 13, 2023
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
   Jessie Bernabe,                                                                   Clerk

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   D. Rosenbaum, #2639, officer, individually and as an agent of The
   Arlington Police Department; P. Insixiengmay, #2632,
   officer, individually and as an agent of The Arlington Police
   Department,

                                                                 Defendants—Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:18-CV-580

   Before Barksdale, Elrod, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Jessie Bernabe, Texas prisoner # 2144625 and proceeding pro se,
   challenges: the adverse summary judgment, based on qualified immunity,
   against Corporal D. Rosenbaum and Officer P. Insixiengmay (defendants);

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                     No. 21-10396

   and, on two bases, the denial of his motion to compel discovery. (The court
   had previously entered a partial final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
   Civil Procedure 54(b) dismissing, for failure to state a claim, Bernabe’s
   claims against the City of Arlington and his official-capacity claims against
   the two officers. Bernabe did not appeal that partial final judgment. The
   qualified-immunity proceedings began after that judgment.)
          It is more than well-established that a summary judgment is reviewed
   de novo. E.g., Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2016). Such
   judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
   matter of law”; and we may affirm on any ground raised in the district court
   and supported by the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); e.g., Williams v. Banks,
   956 F.3d 808, 811 (5th Cir. 2020).
          In his sworn complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bernabe
   contends defendants used excessive force when, following a foot-chase, they
   deployed their Tasers to apprehend him and take him into custody. When
   an official asserts the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, the burden
   shifts to plaintiff to negate the defense. E.g., Baldwin v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320,
   325 (5th Cir. 2020). “[T]he qualified-immunity inquiry has two prongs: (1)
   whether an official’s conduct violated a constitutional [or statutory] right of
   the plaintiff, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of
   the violation”. Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 990–91 (5th Cir. 2011)
   (emphasis added). In short, both prongs must be satisfied.
          For determining whether qualified immunity applies, facts and
   reasonable inferences are construed in nonmovant’s favor. E.g., Tolan v.
   Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014). Again, both prongs must be satisfied, and
   courts may choose which prong to consider first. E.g., id. at 656. The district
   court concluded each defendant was entitled to qualified immunity under

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   both prongs of the analysis. As discussed infra, Bernabe fails to satisfy the
   first prong. Therefore, we need not reach the second.
          The first prong concerns whether defendants violated Bernabe’s
   Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by using
   excessive force against him. Restated, “[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits
   police from using more force than is reasonably necessary to effect an arrest”.
   Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 980 (5th Cir. 2022). To establish excessive
   force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, plaintiff “must [claim] (1) an
   injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was
   clearly excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3)
   objectively unreasonable”. Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433–34 (5th Cir.
   1996) (citation omitted).
          That Bernabe sustained an injury as a result of being tased is not
   disputed.    In determining the objective reasonableness of defendants’
   actions, we “balance the amount of force used against the need for that
   force”. Id. at 434. Our court considers the use of force “from the perspective
   of a reasonable officer on the scene” without “the 20/20 vision of
   hindsight”. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Along that line,
   the following facts are undisputed.
          Corporal Rosenbaum observed Bernabe’s driving a vehicle that had
   been reported stolen; and knew that during the shift prior to his own, a man
   fitting Bernabe’s description and driving that same stolen vehicle eluded
   another officer following a dangerous high-speed chase. When Corporal
   Rosenbaum pulled behind the stolen vehicle, Bernabe parked it in a
   residential driveway, exited the vehicle, and moved towards the door of the
   residence.
          Corporal Rosenbaum ordered Bernabe to come to him. Although
   Bernabe began to move towards him, he abruptly turned and ran away from

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   him. Corporal Rosenbaum radioed for backup while chasing Bernabe on foot
   for approximately 200 yards through a dimly lit neighborhood. During the
   chase, Corporal Rosenbaum ordered Bernabe to stop, but his commands
   were not heeded.
            Officer Insixiengmay intercepted the foot-chase and ordered Bernabe
   to stop. He continued to run from defendants and climbed through a hole in
   a chain-link fence. After Officer Insixiengmay and then Corporal Rosenbaum
   made it through the hole in the fence, both ordered Bernabe to stop. He
   slowed to a walk but was still moving away from the officers towards a food
   store.
            When he ignored the officers’ final command to stop, both fired their
   Tasers at him. One Taser probe struck Bernabe about the head; the other
   three made contact with the back of his torso. As a result, he was
   incapacitated, and then apprehended and arrested.
            Based on these undisputed facts, Bernabe cannot show that using a
   Taser to apprehend him was objectively unreasonable. E.g., Ikerd, 101 F.3d
   at 434; Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 282–83 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[A] suspect
   cannot refuse to surrender and instead lead police on a dangerous hot
   pursuit—and then turn around, appear to surrender, and receive the same
   Fourth Amendment protection . . . he would have received had he promptly
   surrendered in the first place”.); Pratt v. Harris Cnty., 822 F.3d 174, 178, 181–
   82 (5th Cir. 2016) (determining whether force is reasonable requires
   considering, inter alia, whether suspect “is actively resisting arrest or
   attempting to evade arrest by flight” (citation omitted)). Bernabe claims,
   however, four factual disputes preclude summary judgment.
            First, he contends that, because he had slowed to a walk, the use of
   Tasers to apprehend him was not necessary.             We assume as correct
   Bernabe’s assertion that, by slowing to a walk he was attempting, or

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   preparing, to surrender. He conceded in district court, however, that he did
   not immediately comply with the order to stop and that he was still moving
   away from the officers, without his hands raised, when defendants deployed
   their Tasers. Given this concession and Bernabe’s feigned compliance with
   Corporal Rosenbaum’s initial order, a reasonable officer on the scene could
   have questioned whether the “suspect’s purported surrender [was] a ploy”,
   such that a Taser was necessary to apprehend him. E.g., Salazar, 37 F.4th at
   282. Any factual dispute with respect to whether Bernabe was attempting to
   surrender is therefore immaterial.
          Second, defendants averred they were the only officers on scene when
   Bernabe was tased. Bernabe alleged, though, there were at least ten other
   officers at the scene, making tasing unnecessary to his apprehension.
   Accepting Bernabe’s version of the facts, his continued refusal to comply
   with commands to stop in the presence of that many officers is all the more
   concerning, especially where Corporal Rosenbaum knew Bernabe had very
   recently engaged in dangerous behavior by leading police on a high-speed
   chase to avoid apprehension. Accordingly, the number of officers on scene
   is immaterial to whether using a Taser to apprehend Bernabe was objectively
   reasonable. E.g., Pratt, 822 F.3d at 178, 181–82 (holding when individual
   “aggressively evaded [the officers’] attempts to apprehend him” and
   “continuously failed to comply”, use of Tasers was not “clearly excessive”
   or “unreasonable”).
          Third, Bernabe alleged in his sworn complaint that defendants aimed
   their Tasers at his head, but the officers both asserted they aimed at his torso.
   Fourth, Bernabe referred to synchronization-history reports regarding both
   officers’ Tasers and alleged Officer Insixiengmay deployed his Taser more
   than a minute after Corporal Rosenbaum deployed his. Both officers alleged
   they deployed their Tasers almost simultaneously.           These two factual
   disputes may well be material to determining the reasonableness of the

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   officers’ actions. To preclude summary judgment, however, as discussed
   above, the dispute over a material fact must be “genuine”. Fed. R. Civ.
   P. 56(a).
          Bernabe’s allegation the officers aimed for his head, although sworn,
   was based merely on the following facts: officers were only five-to-eight feet
   away from him when they deployed their Tasers; and one of the Taser probes
   was found tangled in his hair. By his own account, Bernabe’s back was to the
   officers when tased. He could not have seen where the officers were aiming;
   therefore, his conclusional and unsubstantiated allegation about their aim
   was not competent summary-judgment evidence. E.g., Carnaby v. City of
   Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[C]onclusional allegations and
   unsubstantiated assertions may not be relied on by the nonmoving party”.).
          Likewise, Bernabe asserted in district court he did not remember the
   tasing because he was knocked out instantly. His allegation that more than a
   minute passed between the officers’ Taser deployments is based on his own
   interpretation of the synchronization reports later conducted on the two
   deployed Tasers. The officers supported their allegations that they fired
   almost simultaneously with: sworn affidavits based on their own personal
   knowledge; the same Taser synchronization reports relied upon by Bernabe;
   and sworn affidavit testimony from the police department’s primary Taser
   instructor, explaining how the Tasers’ internal clocks work and interpreting
   the Taser synchronization reports as confirming that Officer Insixiengmay
   deployed his Taser only one second after Corporal Rosenbaum deployed his.
          Therefore, Bernabe failed to show a genuine dispute regarding these
   two matters. E.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
   (explaining a “dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is
   such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).

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   Accordingly, there were no genuine disputes of material fact precluding
   summary judgment. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
          Based on the summary-judgment record at hand, defendants are
   entitled to qualified immunity against Bernabe’s Fourth Amendment claims
   because, for the first prong of the two-part analysis for such immunity,
   defendants did not use more force than was reasonably necessary to
   apprehend and arrest him. E.g., Buehler, 27 F.4th at 980; Rockwell, 664 F.3d
   at 990–91. Again, his having failed to satisfy the first prong, it is not necessary
   to reach the second (whether right was clearly established).
          We turn to whether Bernabe’s procedural challenges pertaining to the
   summary-judgment record preclude summary judgment. He contests: the
   court’s conclusion that defendants timely objected to his request for
   documents; and its denial of his motion to compel discovery. In support, he
   contends: defendants’ objections were untimely, and therefore waived,
   because they were filed 33 days after he mailed his requests; and the court
   erred in denying his motion to compel defendants to produce emergency
   personnel services reports, documents on department policies, and physical
   evidence.
          “A district court’s discovery ruling is reviewed for abuse of
   discretion.” Angus Chem. Co. v. Glendora Plantation, Inc., 782 F.3d 175, 179
   (5th Cir. 2015). Under that standard, our court will reverse discovery rulings
   “only where they are arbitrary or clearly unreasonable”. Id. (citation
   omitted). Underlying factual findings are reviewed only for clear error. E.g.,
   Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). A factual finding is
   clearly erroneous only if “the reviewing court[,] on [considering] the entire
   evidence[,] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
   been committed”. Id. at 573 (citation omitted).

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          Because Bernabe mailed his discovery requests on or about 26
   December 2019; and because defendants responded on 28 January 2020, the
   court did not clearly err in finding defendants’ response was mailed 33 days
   after service and was timely. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(C) (stating service
   of document complete when document mailed); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d) (adding
   3 days to period required for action (in this instance, 30 days, pursuant to
   Rule 34 (b)(2)(A)) when service made by mail).
          Further, because defendants had already provided some discovery to
   Bernabe and offered evidence in support of their motions, and Bernabe’s
   challenge is grounded in immaterial or non-genuine disputes, he failed to
   show there was a need for further factual development to determine qualified
   immunity vel non. The court did not err in declining to defer the issue of
   qualified immunity to allow further discovery. E.g., Zapata v. Melson, 750
   F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining when plaintiff pleads “facts which,
   if true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity”, if district court
   “unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the
   facts”, it may defer its ruling on qualified immunity and issue a narrow
   discovery order to clarify necessary facts (citation omitted)). Accordingly,
   the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bernabe’s motion to compel
   discovery or in doing so before determining the qualified-immunity issue.
   E.g., Angus Chem. Co., 782 F.3d at 179.
          AFFIRMED.

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