Court Opinion

ID: 9735629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:26:13.232636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:00.485788
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GORDON, dissenting: I must regrettably dissent from the decision of this court. Although the marketing scheme of defendant Direct American Marketers (hereinafter Marketers) may well be violative of the provisions of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (hereinafter Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1992)), plaintiffs admitted conduct precludes him from seeking any recovery under the relevant provisions of that act. This plaintiff testified in his deposition that he only read the notices that he received "in a cursory fashion” and that he only looked to see if they bore his name and if they provided for a cash reward. He explicitly stated that he did not "read it carefully in any other way.” Plaintiff admitted that when he placed his "900” calls he did not know whether he had won a cash award. He said, "I was responding to instructions in the hope that I did win a cash reward.” He then stated that he called rather than wrote because he was eager to find out. Plaintiff testified that he recalled, among other things, making as many as 11 "900” calls within a single hour and a half, and 13 such calls on October 26, 1991. He further admitted that he persisted in making innumerable calls notwithstanding that each time he received only coupons, which he then gave to his housekeeper. He also testified that he knew that he would be charged for the "900” calls and that he could have used the mail as an alternative. When asked what induced him to respond to these notices, he replied "my name was on them and I thought that my name being on these meant something.” Based upon plaintiffs own testimony, the record is clear that he was induced to place his "900” calls by the mere receipt of a personalized notice announcing that he won a prize, which, by his own admission, could have consisted of coupons rather than cash. Thus, it is clear from the record that he was not induced to act by any violations of the disclosure requirements under the Consumer Fraud Act or the Pay-Per-Call Services Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter Pay-Per-Call Act) (815 ILCS 520/1 et seq. (West 1992)). Rather, he was induced to act by a more subtle manipulation, namely, the combined impact of having his printed name embossed in the body of the notice coupled with the use of the term "award.” This combination in effect tantalized plaintiff into making expensive phone calls in the "hope that [he] did win a cash award” notwithstanding his knowledge that such an award was not promised and that his repeated telephone experience dispelled that likelihood. (Although plaintiff was 85 years old, no issue was raised of incompetence or mental impairment.) Such inducement through this type of psychological manipulation is not in itself actionable absent misrepresentation or failure to make adequate disclosure as required bjr statute. Thus, while defendants’ mailings may in fact be replete with violations of statutory disclosure provisions required under the Consumer Fraud Act and the Pay-Per-Call Act, those violations, according to Zekman’s testimony, could not have been the cause of his damage. Plaintiff premised his claim for recovery upon the contention that there need not be a cause and effect relationship between defendants’ violations and plaintiff’s conduct so long as such violations were in fact present. The majority have acknowledged that this argument is vacuous with respect to private rights of action under the Consumer Fraud Act. The existence of violations without further proof of causality suffices only for purposes of injunctive relief. See Tarin v. Pellonari, 253 Ill. App. 3d 542, 554, 625 N.E.2d 739, 747-48 (1993) stating: "We also find that plaintiff could not have recovered under the Consumer Fraud Act. The Consumer Fraud Act provides a private cause of action in cases only where the plaintiff can show that he suffered damage as a result of the unlawful conduct proscribed by the statute. (Duran v. Leslie Oldsmobile, Inc. (1992), 229 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1040.) As the Duran court aptly explained: '[A]lthough a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act may occur in the absence of damages, a private cause of action does not arise absent a showing of both a violation and resultant damages. [There is] a distinction between a violation absent damages, which the Attorney General may prosecute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 121½, par. 263), and a violation causing damages, which either the Attorney General or a private party may pursue (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 121½, par. 270a).’ (Emphasis in original.) (Duran, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 1040.)” Thus, there must be a causal relationship between the violation and the injury, which, in cases of fraud, cannot conceivably exist without some degree of reliance. It is true that, under the Consumer Fraud Act, a plaintiff need not establish the full-blown reliance required in proving common law fraud. See Smith v. Prime Cable, 276 Ill. App. 3d 843, 658 N.E.2d 1325 (1995). It would seem, for example, that a court need not scrutinize as closely whether the plaintiff had a right to rely as opposed to a duty to independently investigate. But, there can be no recovery of damages without showing that plaintiff did, in fact, actually rely upon the representations or omissions of the defendant. See Duran v. Leslie Oldsmobile, Inc., 229 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 594 N.E.2d 1355 (1992). As noted by the majority, this is the obvious import of the requirement under section 10a of the Consumer Fraud Act that plaintiff "sufferf[ ] damage[s] as a result of a violation of this Act.” 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West 1994). The cases have referred to this interrelationship as one of "proximate cause.” E.g., Stehl v. Brown’s Sporting Goods, Inc., 236 Ill. App. 3d 976, 603 N.E.2d 48 (1992); Wheeler v. Sunbelt Tool Co., 181 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1108, 537 N.E.2d 1332, 1346 (1989). However, such proximate cause by inherent necessity requires that there be some degree of reliance. Otherwise, there is no conceivable way by which a deception can otherwise work upon its victim to cause damage. For this court now to find an issue of fact, notwithstanding Zekman’s effective disclaimer of any reliance upon the violative portions of the defendant’s mailings, gives undue validation to plaintiff’s contentions that no reliance whatsoever is required. Alternatively, it would give credence to the underlying contention that any manipulative sales promotion is privately actionable if it induced expenditure by catering to human fantasy or weakness. Unfortunately, it is a matter of common knowledge and experience that such manipulative techniques are common to much of the advertising and promotional endeavors employed in the sale of otherwise legitimate products and not simply reserved for marginal or dubious schemes or promotions such as this one. The requirement that there be a causal relationship between the specific violations and the damage incurred should therefore not be compromised even though the promotion or scheme is otherwise opprobrious and deserving of strict governmental scrutiny and regulation. Since I believe that summary judgment in favor of defendant Marketers should be affirmed, it should also be affirmed, a fortiori, with respect to the remaining defendants whose liability, in effect, is derivative of Marketers.