Court Opinion

ID: 9756770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:53:05.092474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:28.894806
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
MURPHY, J.
I agree that the “key to an effective voir dire is allowing venirepersons the meaningful opportunity to digest the individual questions posed to them and to respond fully to each one while the question is at the forefront of their minds[,]” and that the “proper inquiry is not how many jurors were struck, but how many jurors should have been struck.” Every juror who served in the case at bar, however, answered “no” to the question of whether there was “any reason you would not be able to reach a fair and impartial verdict in this case based on the evidence and the law as I explain it?” In my opinion, it is unreasonable to hypothesize that any of those jurors gave an incorrect answer to that question because he or she forgot to *516answer another question that would have revealed an inability to be fair and impartial. I therefore dissent from the holding that Petitioner is entitled to a new trial.
The record shows that Petitioner presented the Court of Special Appeals with two questions, the first of which asked:
Was it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conduct voir dire by asking the venire panel, en masse, seventeen questions consecutively, and by obtaining answers to these questions from the venire individually, at the bench, in response to the court’s question whether the potential juror had any information in response to any of the questions the court asked en masse?
The unanimous opinion affirming Petitioner’s convictions was authored by Hon. Robert L. Karwacki (Retired, Specially Assigned), who — prior to serving on the Court of Special Appeals as well as on this Court — served on the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The two judges who joined Judge Karwacki’s opinion — Hon. Arrie W. Davis and Hon. Albert J. Matricciani, Jr. — also served on the Circuit Court for Baltimore City prior to serving on the Court of Special Appeals. Judge Karwacki’s opinion includes the following analysis:
THE VOIR DIRE
The trial court conducted a voir dire that consisted of two parts — during the first part the court asked the panel, en masse, seventeen questions successively. The second part consisted of the court asking each of the 50 panel members individually to approach the bench, when, in the presence of the State and defense counsel, the trial judge asked each venireperson “do you have any information to give the Court in response to the questions that I’ve asked?” We shall call this question the eighteenth question.
Appellant objected to this manner of conducting voir dire on the sole ground that the “problem is [the venire members] being able to remember all the questions” when called to the bench. The court responded to appellant’s objection by stating that another trial court also used this method; *517the court thought the method complied with case law; and that the court had employed this method numerous times and found it effective. At no time did appellant object to the substance of the court’s eighteenth question.
In response to the potential juror’s answer to the court’s eighteenth question, the court asked another question, as follows, which we shall call the nineteenth question: “Is there any reason you would not be able to reach a fair and impartial verdict in this case based on the evidence and the law as I explain it?” If a potential juror responded to this question in the negative, the court asked another question, as follows, which we shall call the twentieth question: “Do you believe you could do that?” If the juror answered affirmatively to the 19th question, that there was a reason that the juror could not reach a fair and impartial verdict, the court asked for an explanation of the reason. Challenges to the panel were conducted at the end of the individual voir dire process.
In explaining to counsel why he asked follow up question number 20, “Do you believe you could do that?”, the trial judge stated it is “because I — they’re not here to make a determination whether they could be fair and impartial. But the body language and the way they deliver the answer to that question is really what I’m looking for in terms of whether they could be fair and impartial. So it’s not the answer. It’s the body language and the way they give it.”
During challenges for cause, the record reveals that the court considered juror body language. The record also reveals that with some jurors the court did not ask question number 20 because the court got an impression of bias, or, as in the instance of a juror disclosing that she worked with appellant’s mother, an “appearance of impropriety,” so that in the court’s view, it was unnecessary to inquire further.
Many potential jurors disclosed answers to the court’s seventeen questions that revealed bias and the court fully explored the juror’s feelings and obtained further informa*518tion about the source of the bias. For example, with respect to a question the court asked concerning what weight jurors would give to a law enforcement office’s testimony, some jurors said they would give more weight to their testimony, while others said less. With respect to a question concerning jurors’ experiences with the criminal justice system, a number of jurors provided their experiences and feelings, which revealed bias.
The court gave counsel an opportunity to obtain further clarification from potential jurors when they asked to do so. Viewed in its entirety, the voir dire record reveals that the court was probing and patient with the potential jurors.
Appellant contends that both the method the trial court employed — asking the venire panel, en masse, seventeen questions serially and listening to their responses individually at the bench — and the first question the court asked each venireperson at the bench on individual voir dire (question number 18), are infirm, and prevented appellant from obtaining a fair and impartial jury.
Preliminarily, we note that appellant’s trial counsel did not explicitly object to question number 18. However, the two-step voir dire method the court used included question number 18 and we think that it makes sense to examine the entire process to determine whether the court abused its discretion. Moreover, under Maryland Rule 4-323(c), appellant’s objection to question number 18 was preserved because appellant’s trial counsel made known to the court his objection to the court’s entire manner of conducting voir dire____
Appellant first argues that the court’s procedure of asking seventeen questions serially and obtaining answers from the potential jurors individually afterward at the bench, did not provide reasonable assurance that prejudice would be uncovered if present.
*519The standard of review to evaluate a trial court’s “exercise of discretion during voir dire is whether the questions posed and the procedures employed have created a reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discovered if present.” White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 242[, 821 A.2d 459, 464] (2003).
A defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury is provided under both the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and Maryland’s Declaration of Rights, Article 21. The voir dire process is the mechanism by which the right to an impartial jury is assured. In Maryland, the sole goal of voir dire questioning is to ferret out disqualifying bias and prejudice. See, Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9[, 759 A.2d 819, 823] (2000). Bias is revealed by exploration of only two areas of inquiry: whether a juror meets the minimum statutory qualifications for service and whether a prospective juror has a bias with respect to either the pertinent issues in a case or to any “collateral matter reasonable likely to unduly influence” the juror. Id. at 9—10[, 759 A.2d at 823-24],
The voir dire process, and the scope and form of voir dire questions are discretionary with the trial judge, State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 396 [906 A.2d 374, 385] (2006); Dingle at 13, [759 A.2d at 824] and will not be disturbed on appeal unless abused. Logan. Moreover, the trial court has “very wide discretion.” Id.
Under Maryland Rule 4-312(d), the court may conduct voir dire. At its discretion, the court may also conduct individual voir dire out of the presence of other jurors, or en masse. Davis v. State, 93 Md.App. 89, 106-07[, 611 A.2d 1008, 1016-1017] (1992), aff'd 333 Md. 27 [633 A.2d 867] (1993). Typically, the trial judge asks the venire questions, entertaining additional questions from counsel at the court’s discretion. Id.
To fulfill its duty to only empanel jurors who can fairly and impartially render a verdict, the trial judge must make a credibility determination that is the result of the judge’s observation and evaluation of the juror’s demeanor and *520responses to questions. White v. State, 374 Md. 232, 241[, 821 A.2d 459, 464] (2003).
In Maryland, there are three overarching, intertwined principles to guide this Court in deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in its conduct of voir dire in the instant case: 1) the trial court has “very wide discretion” in this area, Logan, 394 Md. 378, 396 [906 A.2d 374, 385], hence, the appellate court grants “great deference” to the trial judge, White, 374 Md. at 241[, 821 A.2d at 464]; 2) the juror voir dire process is prescribed “only as much as is necessary to establish that jurors meet the minimum qualifications for service and to uncover disqualifying bias,” Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431, 433[, 671 A.2d 33, 34] (1996) (emphasis in original); and, 3) the goal to empanel an impartial jury trumps the practice of limited voir dire. Thomas v. State, 139 Md.App. 188, 198[, 775 A.2d 406, 412] (2001) aff'd 369 Md. 202[, 798 A.2d at 566] (2002). Thus, our roadmap is clear.
Resolution of voir dire challenges are obtained by a case-by-case analysis. Thomas, 139 Md.App. at 197[, 775 A.2d at 412]. To evaluate whether the trial court fulfilled its duty to empanel a fair and impartial jury, we must examine the voir dire record in its entirety. White, 374 Md. at 243-44[, 821 A.2d at 465].
In the case sub judice, the venire panel members had to remember their answers to only those questions of the seventeen that the court asked en masse that prompted a positive response. (E.g. that they had, or that a member of their family had, been convicted of a crime; that they or a member of their family had a pending case; that they felt that because the appellant was an African-American that they would be unable to reach a fair and impartial verdict). Called to the bench individually, the jurors had to report their answers, if any, to the court, at which time the court asked follow up questions (numbers 19 and 20).
We do not think that this two-step voir dire method “distorts and frustrates” the purpose of voir dire, which is *521to uncover disqualifying bias. Compare Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 21[, 759 A.2d 819, 830] (2000) (noting that the purpose of voir dire was distorted and frustrated, rather than advanced, because the form of the challenged inquires posed by the Dingle trial court required jurors to self-assess bias).
Appellant next argues that the initial question that the court posed to the potential jurors individually, “do you have any information to give the Court in response to the questions that I’ve asked?” (question number 18), impermissibly shifted from the judge to the individual juror the responsibility to determine impartiality.
It is clear that the fact-finding responsibility to uncover bias during the voir dire process rests with the trial judge. Thomas, 369 Md. 202 [798 A.2d 566]. Thus, for example, in most instances, a compound question that requires a juror to respond only if the juror thought that he or she could not be impartial, impermissibly shifts to the juror the exercise of discretion that must rest with the trial judge. Dingle, 361 Md. at [21] [759 A.2d at 830]. Compare White, 374 Md. 232 [821 A.2d 459] (when prejudice is minimal, use of compound questions that permit a juror to only respond if the juror thought he or she could not be impartial, held not an abuse of discretion). A venire question that impermissibly shifts the bias fact-finding role from judge to juror also impermissibly prevents a party from exploring potential bias. Dingle, 361 Md. at [21] [759 A.2d at 830]. Dingle and White teach that, in general, when a voir dire question that permits the juror to self-assess impartiality is asked, the question will be carefully scrutinized in light of the entire voir dire process, to ensure that the trial judge remains the final arbiter of juror impartiality.
Unlike the tainted questions in Dingle, the question the judge asked appellant’s venire panel did not require the potential juror to determine whether he or she could be impartial. To be asked “do you have any information to *522give the Court in response to the questions that I’ve asked?” leaves to juror discretion the decision to tell the truth whether the juror has “any information” to disclose in response to the contents of the seventeen questions the judge asked, not to whether the juror could be impartial. The discretion to tell the truth would have existed had the judge asked if the juror had a positive response to any of the seventeen questions. The trial judge’s question did not shift to the jurors the judge’s responsibility to determine bias.
In the case sub judice, when a juror told the trial judge that he or she did not have any information to impart, the judge inquired whether there was “any reason you would not be able to reach a fair and impartial verdict in this case based on the evidence and the law as I instruct you?” (the 19th question). When the response was in the negative, the judge usually asked a follow up question: “Do you believe you can do that?” (the 20th question). If the answer to the 19th question was affirmative, the record reflects that the judge questioned the juror about the information the juror provided to determine if the juror was biased or prejudiced. Based on the juror’s answers, the judge asked the 20th question. The record also reflects that a number of jurors were excused for cause.
As Chief Judge Bell instructs, a challenged voir dire process should be examined to determine how the principles underlying the process are applied and to see what role the trial judge took in the selection process. Dingle, 361 Md. at 11 [, 759 A.2d at 824]. In examining the record of the entire voir dire process in the instant case, we see a trial judge acutely aware of, and active in, the process of assessing juror bias and prejudice. While the method of asking the venire panel en masse seventeen questions consecutively without obtaining answers to each question is somewhat flawed, in that it may make it difficult for some jurors to recall the answers to the questions without copies of the questions before them, or paper *523and pencil to record their answers, the record reveals that the trial judge ensured that appellant was provided with a fair and impartial jury. We hold that the trial court did not err and abuse its discretion in its conducting a two-step method of voir dire and in asking on individual voir dire whether the juror had any information to impart in response to the court’s initial questions asked en masse.
(Emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted). I agree with that opinion, as well as with the following suggestion included therein:
Although on the voir dire issue before us we find no abuse of discretion, we note that the method employed may prove difficult at times to some jurors in that they may have to remember answers to more than one question. Therefore, if this method is to be used, we urge that either pencils and paper or typed copies of the questions and pencils be given to the panel.
Although it certainly would be the better practice for a trial judge who asks questions to the venire as a whole to follow that suggestion and/or the examples discussed in the majority opinion, the question presented to this Court is whether the procedures employed in the case at bar “have created a reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discovered if present[?]” In my opinion, the answer to this question is “yes.”