Court Opinion

ID: 9865137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:25:03.525764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:33.516654
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Butler,
dissenting.
My views with reference to this case do not accord with those of the majority. I therefore dissent.
The Lamar Building and Loan Association sued Cora June Reschke and her husband, O. R. Reschke, and others to foreclose a deed of trust of certain lots in Springfield, for the non-payment of $1,261.63. The trust deed was given by Margaret Truax to secure the payment of $1,000 and interest, payable in small monthly installments until her stock in the association should have matured in accordance with the by-laws. By mesne conveyances, title to the property became vested in Cora June Reschke, who purchased it from 1ST. H. Truax. The Reschkes filed an answer and a cross-complaint. The court found for the Reschkes and enjoined the association from foreclosing the trust deed.
1. There was evidence tending to prove that before they paid the purchase money, the Reschkes called at the office of the association and informed its secretary, J. H. Myers, who had charge of the loan and who later verified the complaint and testified at the trial, that they were dealing for the purchase of the property, and understood that the association held a loan ag’ainst it, and they asked what balance remained unpaid; that he told them that there were thirteen nineteen-dollar payments remaining to be paid on it, making $247; that the Reschkes relied *87upon that statement and bought the property, retaining $247 from the purchase price; and that they paid more than the $247 in installments to the association. The court made a general finding for the Beschkes, and held that the association, by its representations, was estopped from demanding from them more than $247, which amount they had paid to the association in installments.
Counsel for the association call our attention to certain apparent contradictions in the evidence.
It is said that the deed received by the Beschkes was dated and recorded February 25, 1928, whereas the Beschkes testified that the deal was closed and the deed received and recorded in April, after Myers gave them the information concerning the amount remaining unpaid. It is argued that they must have obtained the information after they bought and paid for the property, and therefore were not prejudiced by the information given to them. The trial occurred four years after the conversation, and while their recollection of what occurred may have remained clear, their recollection of dates may not have been so clear. That such a conversation did occur before the Beschkes paid the purchase price is established by abundant evidence and was found by the court. Beschke testified that in April, in the presence of his wife, he told Myers that they were on the deal for this property, and wanted to know what was against it; that at Myers’s request, a clerk in the office made out a statement (Exhibit 1) showing $59 "past due at that time; that witness told Myers that that did not suit them, that they wanted to know what was against‘the property; that Myers looked at the books and said, “Thirteen payments more on it, nineteen dollars a payment”; that in the presence of Myers, witness thereupon wrote in pencil on Exhibit 1 the figures just given and the multiplication of 19 by 13, making a total of 247. “Q. You saw Mr. Myers and got his statement before you closed the deal? A. Before we closed the entire deal.” Mrs. Beschke testified substantially to the same effect. She said that *88they told Myers that they were figuring on closing the deal and wanted to know exactly what was against the property, and that he furnished the information as stated above. She said several times that the conversation was in April, and that the deed was received after the conversation, but she does not seem to have been certain of the date. “Q. But you didn’t get it [the deed] before the 15th of April? A. I said I wouldn’t say exactly; I say the deal wasn’t closed until after we saw Mr. Myers, but I couldn’t tell the exact date. * * * Q. Now, as a matter of fact, Mrs. Reschke, you purchased this from Mrs. Truax on the 25th day of February, and your deed was recorded the same day? A. But we didn’t close the deal until in April. * * * Q. And as a matter of fact, you had already bought this property, and the deed had already gone of record? A. We had made the deed, but we hadn’t closed the deal.” The uncontradicted testimony is to the effect that after they received the information from Myers they paid the purchase price, and that they deducted therefrom only $247 because of the secretary’s statement to them concerning the amount remaining unpaid.
Myers testified that the Reschkes came into the office and told him that they were interested in the property and wanted to find out the condition of the loan. “Q. Would you state positively that they did not tell you they intended to purchase this property? A. No.” He denied having told the Reschkes that $247 remained to be paid on the loan.
Our attention is also called to the fact that the Reschkes testified that Myers told them that there remained unpaid thirteen monthly installments of $19 each, amounting to $247, whereas the books of the association showed a balance of $1,400 unpaid and that the installments were not $19 each. The association must have had many accounts on its books; and evidently the clerk looked at the wrong account and gave the Reschkes the figures appearing in that account. The original promis*89sory note and trust deed are before us. The note is made payable in installments of eighteen (not nineteen) dollars per month. In the trust deed the typewritten amount of the monthly installments (whatever it was) has been erased and there have been substituted with pen and ink the word “twenty” (not nineteen) and in parentheses “$20” (not $19). These alterations are not explained. Whether they were made before or after the execution and delivery of the trust deed does not appear; nor does it appear whether they were made before or after the recording of the trust deed. The trial court no doubt believed, and it was justified in believing, that the giving of the wrong figures to the Reschkes was merely another instance of carelessness such as characterized the preparation of the note and the trust deed.
After hearing the witnesses testify and observing their appearance and demeanor on the witness stand, and considering the apparent contradictions to which counsel call attention, the trial court found that the defendants settled with their grantor on the basis of the information given them by the plaintiff’s agent that $247 was the amount remaining unpaid; and that they paid that amount to the plaintiff in installments. The court also made a general finding in favor of the defendants, and held that the plaintiff is estopped from demanding a larger sum from the defendants. I respectfully submit that this court is not justified in setting aside the trial court’s findings and holding.
2. But it is said that the plea of estoppel is insufficient because it contains no allegation that the representations were made with the intention that they should be acted upon.
In substance, the plea is that the Reschkes purchased the property at an agreed price; that before paying the purchase price, having knowledge of the existence of the trust deed securing to the association the payment of the note in monthly installments, they consulted the association with reference to the amount of the indebtedness *90remaining unpaid; that the association informed them that there remained due a balance of $247, which was payable in thirteen monthly installments of $19 each; that placing full and implicit reliance upon the statements and representations so made, they paid to the owner of the property the purchase price agreed upon, less $247; and that thereafter the defendants paid to the plaintiff $274, which was in excess of the amount that the plaintiff informed them remained due and payable, and that the defendants thereby paid and' satisfied the note. The objection to the sufficiency of the plea was made for the first time at the trial; and making such an objection for the first time at the trial is not encouraged by the courts, and when so made will be overruled if by fair implication or most liberal construction the pleading can be held to be sufficient. Musgrove v. Brown, 93 Colo. 559, 27 P. (2d) 590; 49 C. J. p. 822.
Objection to a pleading for insufficiency can be raised at any time. If, therefore, the defect was such as to prejudice the substantial rights of the plaintiff, the judgment should be reversed; otherwise, it should not be reversed because of such defect. Section 84 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “The court shall in every stage of an action disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the parties, and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.” And see Id. section 439.
The object of pleading’ is to inform the adverse party of the cause of action or defense relied upon by the pleader, so that he may have an opportunity to meet and defeat it, if possible, upon the trial. Soden v. Murphy, 42 Colo. 352, 94 Pac. 353; Myers v. Hayden, 82 Colo. 98, 257 Pac. 351. The answer in this case made it clear that the pleader relied upon the defense of estoppel. It was pleaded at considerable length, but it was defective in omitting’ the one element to which attention has been called. But, as we have seen, the evidence is to the effect *91that the Reschkes fully informed the association’s secretary of the pendency of their deal for the property. When the secretary furnished the information concerning the balance remaining unpaid he knew the purpose for which the Reschkes sought it, and it follows, as a necessary inference, that he was aware of their intention to act upon the information and furnished it with the intention that they should act upon it. The plaintiff was Dot misled by the defect in the plea.
The controlling question is whether the substantial rights of the plaintiff were adversely affected by the defect in the plea and the ruling of the court admitting the evidence in support of the plea. Clearly they were not; hence we are forbidden by the Code provision quoted above to reverse the judgment because of such defect and ruling.
The trial court properly refused to compel the Reschkes to bear a loss that was due to no fault on their part, but that resulted solely from the carelessness of the association’s secretary. The court, by its judgment, placed the loss upon the association, where it belongs. The judgment, it seems to me, should be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Campbell and Mr. Justice Hilliard concur in this dissenting opinion.