Court Opinion

ID: 2965131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:35:51.138112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:03.626113
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

          No. 97-1498

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                           EDWIN GUNN, a/k/a GREGORY GUNN,
                                 a/k/a GREGORY WELLS,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                _____________________

               George F.  Gormley, by appointment  of the Court,  with whom
               __________________
          John D. Colucci  and Gormley  & Colucci, P.C.  were on  brief for
          _______________      ________________________
          appellant.
               Donald  L. Cabell,  Assistant United  States Attorney,  with
               _________________
          whom Donald  K. Stern, United  States Attorney, was on  brief for
               ________________
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  February 10, 1998
                                 ____________________

                    Per  Curiam.    Defendant-appellant Edwin  J.  Gunn was
                    Per  Curiam.
                    ___________

          indicted for  being a  felon in  possession of  a firearm  and of

          ammunition, both in  violation of 18 U.S.C.    922(g)(1), and was

          convicted of possessing the firearm.  At sentencing, the district

          court found Gunn to be an armed career criminal, as defined in 18

          U.S.C.   924(e), and sentenced him to  216 months in prison and a

          five-year term of supervised release.   Gunn now appeals both his

          conviction and his sentence.  We affirm.

                    Gunn first  argues that  his conviction  should be  set

          aside   because  the  government  failed  to  establish  that  he

          possessed the  firearm "in or  affecting commerce."  18  U.S.C.  

          922(g).   He  contends that,  under  the test  enunciated by  the

          Supreme Court  in United  States v. L pez,  514 U.S.  549 (1995),
                            ______________    _____

          Congress's exercise of its  Commerce Clause power can only  reach

          activities that involve  the use  of the  channels of  interstate

          commerce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or activities

          that substantially affect  interstate commerce.  Noting  that the

          only  evidence adduced  at trial as  to the  firearm's connection

          with  interstate or  foreign commerce  was that  the firearm  was

          manufactured  in Argentina,  Gunn  concludes that  this  evidence

          failed  to  establish   that  his  mere  possession  of  the  gun

          substantially affected interstate commerce.

                    This first  argument fails because the  government does

          not  need  to   prove  that  Gunn's   possession  of  a   firearm

          substantially affected commerce.   We have repeatedly  held that,

          after L pez,  "it remains the  law that where a  federal criminal
                _____

                                         -2-

          statute contains a jurisdictional element requiring proof that an

          object  was 'in or affecting' commerce,  the government need only

          meet the 'minimal nexus' test enunciated in Scarborough v. United
                                                      ___________    ______

          States, 431 U.S. 563, 577 (1977)."  United States v. Cardoza, 129
          ______                              _____________    _______

          F.3d 6, 11  (1st Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Smith, 101
                                       ________ _____________    _____

          F.3d 202, 215 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.
                                         ____________

          Ct. 1345 (1997); United  States v. Blais, 98  F.3d 647, 649  (1st
                           ______________    _____

          Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___  U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1000  (1997);
                      ____________

          United States v. D az-Mart nez, 71 F.3d 946, 953 (1st Cir. 1995).
          _____________    _____________

          The minimal nexus test is  satisfied by evidence that the firearm

          was manufactured  in a state  or country  other than  the one  in

          which the  firearm was  possessed; it does  not require  that the

          defendant  be the person  to have transported  the firearm across

          state lines, or  that the defendant be otherwise  involved in the

          "in or affecting commerce" aspect  of the case.  Scarborough, 431
                                                           ___________

          U.S. at 577.   The evidence provided  by the government at  trial

          was sufficient to establish the required minimal nexus.

                    Gunn  also  claims  that the  district  court  erred in

          sentencing him  as an "armed  career criminal," which  is defined

          under 18  U.S.C.    924(e)(1) as "a  person who  violates section

          922(g) . . . and has three previous convictions . . . for a . . .

          serious drug offense,"  because his three prior  drug convictions

          did not  qualify as "serious  drug offense[s]."  Under  18 U.S.C.

            924(e)(2)(A)(ii),  a "serious drug  offense" is defined  as "an

          offense under State  law, involving . . .  possessing with intent

          to .  . . distribute,  a controlled substance, .  . . or  which a

                                         -3-

          maximum term of  imprisonment of ten years or  more is prescribed

          by  law."   Even  though  his three  prior  convictions were  for

          violations of Mass.  Gen. Laws ch.  94C,   32A,  which carries  a

          maximum penalty  of ten years  in state prison, Gunn  argues that

          the convictions were not  for "serious drug offenses" because  he

          was prosecuted for  those offenses in  certain lower courts  that

          lacked  competence  to  sentence  him  to  the  ten-year  maximum

          sentence.

                    We  reject this argument and affirm Gunn's sentence for
                                                 affirm

          the  reasons  expressed  in the  district  court's  memorandum of

          decision.  See  United States v. Gunn, 962 F. Supp. 214 (D. Mass.
                     ___  _____________    ____

          1997).

                                         -4-