Court Opinion

ID: 9907471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 16:06:42.801386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:39.455095
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 23-0375
                             Filed December 6, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MASON DANIEL HAMPTON,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jesse Ramirez, District

Associate Judge.

       Mason Daniel Hampton appeals his conviction of operating while

intoxicated. AFFIRMED.

       Billy J. Mallory and Trevor A. Jordison of Mallory Law, West Des Moines,

for appellant.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

       Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

       Mason Daniel Hampton appeals his conviction of operating while

intoxicated, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress

evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop.

       The night of September 18, 2022, Iowa State Patrol Trooper Ratzesberger

stopped a vehicle driven by Hampton for speeding. Based on Hampton’s license,

Trooper Ratzesberger determined Hampton was required to have an ignition

interlock device installed in the car and carry necessary paperwork but lacked both.

Trooper Ratzesberger could also smell “an odor of alcohol” emitting from the

vehicle, but he could not determine if the source was Hampton, the passenger, or

something else. He asked Hampton to join him in his squad car, and Hampton

followed him. Trooper Ratzesberger testified that Hampton had bloodshot, droopy

eyes and the smell of alcohol was so strong in the patrol vehicle that he had to roll

down the window for fresh air. When asked, Hampton declined to perform field

sobriety tests, but he agreed to provide a blood alcohol concentration (BAC)

sample “at the station.” He eventually blew a .131 BAC and was charged with

operating while intoxicated, second offense.

       During the proceedings, Hampton moved to suppress the evidence

resulting from the traffic stop, claiming it was obtained in violation of his federal

and state constitutional rights. After a hearing on the motion, the district court

denied it based on clear Iowa precedent. Following a trial on the minutes, the

district court ultimately convicted Hampton. He timely appealed.

       “When a defendant challenges a district court’s denial of a motion to

suppress based upon the deprivation of a state or federal constitutional right, our
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standard of review is de novo.” State v. Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 2019)

(citations omitted). “We give deference to the district court’s fact findings due to

its opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, but we are not bound by

those findings.”   State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2017) (citation

omitted).

       Hampton challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress on

constitutional grounds. While he acknowledges the officer’s actions were proper

under the federal constitution, he argues we should adopt a more stringent

standard under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution that requires the officer

to have reasonable suspicion of safety concerns before ordering a defendant out

of a motor vehicle. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977)

(holding “that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation,

the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating

the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures”).

But we have previously rejected this heightened standard. State v. Hanrahan,

No. 12-0012, 2013 WL 4009675, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2013) (concluding

“the trooper acted well within constitutional bounds in escorting [the defendant] to

his squad car and engaging him in conversation while typing a warning ticket”).

Moreover, “[b]ecause our supreme court has remained consistent with federal

jurisprudence . . . , we will not deviate from the course.” State v. Wenzel, 987

N.W.2d 473, 486 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022).           We therefore decline to adopt an

alternative view at this time.

       Hampton further contends that Trooper Ratzesberger violated his

constitutional rights because he lacked reasonable suspicion when ordering him
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out of the car. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. But we disagree

with Hampton’s recollection of the record. Upon our review, we find no violation of

rights because Hampton voluntarily consented. See State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d

554, 572 (Iowa 2012); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219

(1973). Trooper Ratzesberger asked Hampton to join him in the squad car, and

Hampton accepted. To the extent Hampton intends to argue he was coerced or

did not voluntarily consent to going to the officer’s squad car, we find his argument

waived and decline to consider it because he provides no supporting argument.

See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (waiving issues inadequately argued on

appeal).

       Because the officer did not violate Hampton’s constitutional rights, we affirm

the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

       AFFIRMED.