Court Opinion

ID: 9791357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:09:35.078706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:35.729406
License: Public Domain

TONGUE, J.,
dissenting.
I also dissent, but for different reasons.
In Carnation Lbr. Co. v. McKenney et al, 224 Or 541, 356 P2d 932 (1960), this court adopted the rule that because “the courts must always be open to the citizen to claim his rights without fear of being amerced by heavy damages should his cause fail,” the measure of damages in actions for malicious prosecution should be limited to the special damages suffered by the plaintiff. This court recognized, however (at 543), that in adopting that rule it had chosen to follow the decisions on “a great number” of cases which “hold that in the absence of interference with the person or property or some special injury such an action will not lie.” To the same effect, see Balsiger v. American Steel, 254 Or 204, 206, 451 P2d 868, 458 P2d 932 (1969), and Crouter v. United Adjusters, Inc., 259 Or 348, 364-65, 485 P2d 1208 (1971).
In this case, the majority now holds that only special damages which directly affect person or property and which do so because of the manner of defendant’s prosecution of the case may be recovered. The effect of the majority opinion is to further narrow the scope of recovery in such actions by eliminating recovery for any other type of “special injury” or “special damage.” I disagree with the imposition of this further limitation.