Court Opinion

ID: 9473733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:38:21.629974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:42.554019
License: Public Domain

BARRETT, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur with Judge Logan’s opinion in this case because I believe it is consistent with the majority opinion in Francis v. Franklin, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). However, my views correspond with the Franklin dissenters (Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor). I agree with the dissenters’ views, which in conclusion were stated thusly:
It appears that under the Court’s approach it will reverse a [state] conviction if a “reasonable juror” hypothetically might have understood the charge unconstitutionally to shift a burden of proof, even if it was unlikely that a single juror had such an understanding. I believe that it must at least be likely that a juror so understood the charge before constitutional error can be found. Where as here a Sandstrom error is alleged involving not a conclusive presumption, but a rebuttable presumption, language in the charge indicating the State’s general burden of proof [beyond a reasonable doubt] and jury’s duty to examine all surrounding facts and circumstances generally should be sufficient to dissipate any constitutional infirmity. Otherwise we risk finding consti*684tutional error in a record such as this one, after finely parsing through the elements of state crimes that are really far removed from the problems presented by the burden of proof in Winship. [In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1979)]. I do not believe that the Court must inject itself this far into the state criminal process to protect the fundamental rights of criminal defendants.
— U.S. at -, 105 S.Ct. at 1985.