Court Opinion

ID: 9945340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:16:49.335758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:27.012883
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                      Washington State
                                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Division Two

                                                                                      February 27, 2024

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                        DIVISION II
 ALASKA NORTHWEST INDUSTRIES INC.,                                 No. 56633-8-II
 a Washington corporation, and GARY J.
 LUNDGREN, TDL DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a
 Washington limited liability company,
 ALASKA-NORTHWEST INDUSTRIES,
 INC., a Washington corporation,

                Respondents/Cross-Appellants,               UNPUBLISHED OPINION

        v.

 ANN R. DEUTSCHER and RANDALL
 BERG, both individually and as a marital
 community,

                Appellants/Cross Respondents,

 ANN R. DEUTSCHER and RANDALL
 BERG, both individually and as a marital
 community,

                Appellants/Cross Respondents,

        v.

 TIFFANY LUNDGREN, individually, and
 RONALD SHECKLER and JEAN
 SHECKLER, individually and as a marital
 community,

                Respondents/Cross-Appellants.

       CHE, J. ⎯ Ann Deutscher-Berg and Randall Berg (Bergs) appeal the denial of their

prescriptive easement claims and the grant of attorney fees. Alaska Northwest Industries, Inc.,

Gary Lundgren, TDL Development, LLC, and Alaska-Northwest Industries, Inc. (collectively,

ANWI) filed a conditional cross-appeal regarding attorney fee issues.
No. 56633-8-II

        ANWI sought to eject the Bergs from ANWI’s lot on Ketron Island. The Bergs

counterclaimed, arguing they had adversely possessed a large portion of ANWI’s lot and

acquired prescriptive easements. ANWI conceded that the Bergs adversely possessed the cabin

the Bergs were occasionally residing in, as well as surrounding curtilage. After a bench trial, the

trial court granted the Bergs all of the land ANWI conceded and denied the Bergs’ remaining

claims. The trial court determined that ANWI was the prevailing party and awarded attorney

fees.

        We hold (1) substantial evidence supports the finding that the Bergs constructed the cabin

driveway, but to the extent that finding of fact (FOF) 1.32 could be interpreted as finding that

ANWI drew a boundary line running predominately north-south to grant the Bergs the entire

cabin driveway, we hold that such an interpretation is not supported by substantial evidence,

(2) the Bergs failed to establish any prescriptive easements, (3) the trial court did not violate

CR 54(d)(2) by considering ANWI’s request to establish the amount of attorney fees, (4) the trial

court properly determined that ANWI was the prevailing party, and (5) the trial court did not err

in considering compromise negotiations solely to determine the amount of time ANWI expended

in the settlement process. As we do not reverse on any of the attorney fee issues, we decline to

consider ANWI’s cross-appeal. Thus, we affirm. As ANWI prevails on appeal, we grant ANWI

reasonable appellate attorney fees regarding adverse possession.1

1
 The Bergs did not appeal the adverse possession determination directly. But the Bergs
appealed the trial court attorney fee order, which implicates the adverse possession determination
below.

                                                  2
No. 56633-8-II

                                               FACTS

                                           I. BACKGROUND

        Ketron Island is a small island located southwest of Steilacoom. ANWI owns

approximately 90 parcels of real property on Ketron Island—about 70 percent of the island. The

Bergs own a neighboring parcel to an ANWI parcel. ANWI seemed to own what the trial court

termed Lot 006, and the Bergs owned Lot 002. Disagreements over the boundaries of those

parcels gave rise to the present litigation.

        Generally, Ketron Island residents used their homes sporadically, for summering or

vacationing. West Beach is the only easily accessible beach on the island. Lot 006 contains the

entirety of West Beach. ANWI and its predecessors in interest allowed any Ketron Island

resident and their guests to use West Beach at any time without seeking overt permission.

        The residents and their guests used this area for social gatherings, fishing, camping, and

vehicle parking—including parking for boats, cars, and other recreational vehicles. ANWI and

its predecessors in interest also allowed any resident to use the North and South Driveways to

access West Beach to facilitate neighborly use of the beach. Prior to 2018, ANWI had never

restricted anyone’s access to the driveways.

        Lot 002 is a largely rectangular plot immediately to the south of Lot 006. Lot 002 is also

bordered to the east by Lot 006. There is a general access road to the east of Lot 002 known as

Merry Lane. On the south end, Lot 002 is bordered by another of ANWI’s parcels, Lot 007.

There is a cabin that is located mostly within the boundaries of Lot 006.

        There are two driveways that provide access to West Beach from Merry Lane. One of

the driveways enters through the north end of the east boundary of Lot 006, which is called

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No. 56633-8-II

North Driveway. The other enters further to the south, which is called South Driveway. Both of

the driveways are entirely on Lot 006. One way to access the cabin is by traveling on the South

Driveway and making a sharp left turn onto a mixed grass and gravel road. We refer to that road

as the cabin driveway.

        The present dispute has its roots in 1926. That year, YLA—an entity comprised of local

high school alumni—acquired Lot 002. YLA built a small, rustic cabin in the 1930s, which the

members used for occasional social gatherings. Importantly, YLA constructed a cabin on the

northern border of Lot 002 such that most of the cabin resided on Lot 006. The Branchflower

family acquired Lot 002 and the cabin in 1997 and continued to use it sparingly.

        The Branchflowers sold Lot 002 and the cabin to Ann Deutscher in October 2002. In

December of that year, Deutscher’s lawyer sent a letter to ANWI maintaining that Ann owned

the portion of Lot 006 that her cabin encroached upon. It is unclear if ANWI responded. The

following year, Deutscher’s lawyer sent another letter to the attorney who represented Gary

Lundgren around 2002—proposing that Deutscher receive property 40 feet north of the cabin

running parallel to the east-west boundary line between Lot 002 and 006, and a nonexclusive

permanent easement at the southeast corner of Lot 006. Deutscher married Randall Berg in

2008.

        Gary Lundgren’s daughter, Tiffany Lundgren, began spending more time on the island

around 2018. In August 2019, Tiffany, acting on behalf of ANWI, sent a letter to the Bergs

revoking their access to use West Beach and the South and North Driveways.

Contemporaneously, ANWI granted a roadway easement to the Bergs on Lot 007 to provide

effective access to their parcel.

                                                4
No. 56633-8-II

       In June 2020, ANWI filed a lawsuit against the Bergs for quiet title and trespassing.

ANWI sought title to the entirety of Lot 006, including the Bergs’ cabin. In response, the Bergs

counterclaimed for, among other things, adverse possession of the southern parts of Lot 006 and

prescriptive easement.

       The following year, ANWI conceded that the Bergs owned the cabin via adverse

possession. The Bergs moved for partial summary judgment on their adverse possession and

prescriptive easement claims, among other things. The trial court granted partial summary

judgment quieting title of the cabin to the Bergs but denying their other claims.

       In ANWI’s trial brief, it conceded that the Bergs had acquired by adverse possession

more of Lot 006, which it characterized as manicured curtilage. Specifically, ANWI conceded

that the Berg’s new north boundary should be just north of the tree line, and the new east

boundary should be just east of the manicured curtilage—or the cabin driveway. ANWI attached

an exhibit to their trial brief depicting this conceded boundary with a yellow line. That

concession did not include a small portion of the cabin driveway—outside of the tree line—right

before the cabin driveway intersects with the South Driveway.

       The Bergs argued they were entitled, via adverse possession, to land substantially north

of the tree line, including parking and a portion of West Beach, and land substantially east of the

cabin driveway. The Bergs also argued that they were entitled to prescriptive easements

regarding the aforementioned parking, a footbridge that the Bergs would use to access their cabin

after parking on West Beach, the North and South Driveway, and footpaths from the footbridge

going down to West Beach, and the cabin driveway.

                                                 5
No. 56633-8-II

       We describe the trial court’s factual findings relevant to the prescriptive easement issues

below.2

A.     North and South Driveway

       The Bergs used the North and South driveways to access their cabin. The trial court

found that maybe the Bergs used these driveways more than others due to the proximity of their

cabin, but their use was not different from others in character.

B.     Parking on West Beach, Footbridge, Beach Pathways, and General West Beach Use

       North of the tree line on West Beach, the Bergs would park their vehicles when they

stayed at the cabin. To cross through the tree line to their cabin, the Bergs would use a small

footbridge running over a creek feature. The Bergs reconstructed this small footbridge when

they acquired the cabin. Just north of the tree line, the Bergs would use a footpath running east

to west to access West Beach and the adjacent waterfront.

       Near the east-west tree line, the Bergs constructed two sections of fencing that either fell

or were taken down. Neither section existed more than five years. And the trial court found the

fences were not constructed or maintained in a hostile manner.

       The trial court found, “Prior to 2018 [ANWI] and its predecessors in interest welcomed

all those who owned property on Ketron Island and their guests to use West Beach. Such

uninhibited use by nonowners of Lot 006 was open, anytime access to anywhere on West

Beach.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 3248. And residents used the beach for a myriad of recreational

2
  Of note, the trial court found that “Lot 002 consists of 2.39 acres.” Clerk’s Papers at 3243.
The Bergs used to pay taxes on 2.39 acres for Lot 002. The Bergs submitted a declaration that
alleged that Lot 002 plus the land they claimed via adverse possession equals 2.39 acres in total.

                                                 6
No. 56633-8-II

activities like beach combing. Residents also parked cars and recreational vehicles on West

Beach.

C.       Cabin Driveway

         The trial court found, “The segment of the yellow line that runs predominately north-

south was drawn by the [ANWI] to grant the [Bergs] title to the land under the short vehicular

driveway that the [Bergs’] constructed to . . . connect Lot 002 to the West Beach South

Driveway.” CP at 3246 (referencing CP at 1730).

         Relevantly, but not contained in the findings, Thomas Palmer testified that the cabin

driveway did not exist when he installed the utilities at the cabin for the Branchflowers, and the

cabin driveway did not exist during the Branchflowers’ ownership of the cabin. Randall Berg

testified that he would apply gravel to the cabin driveway as needed. Randall also testified that it

may have been six years since he last applied gravel to the cabin driveway. But Randall testified

that he maintained the driveway on an annual basis by bolstering certain areas. And he would

sometimes use the cabin driveway to unload his vehicle closer to the cabin.

                               II. RULING AND POST-TRIAL MATTERS

         In January 2022, the trial court determined that the Bergs acquired only the portion of Lot

006 that ANWI conceded in their trial brief by adverse possession, but no more. The trial court

determined that the Bergs’ use of the North and South Driveways, the footbridge and related

pathways, and parking on West Beach were permissive neighborly accommodations until 2018.

The trial court denied all of the Bergs’ prescriptive easement claims, including the claim related

to the cabin driveway.

                                                  7
No. 56633-8-II

       The trial court noted that both parties had requested attorney fees, and that it may award

costs and attorney fees in both adverse possession and prescriptive easement actions. The trial

court awarded attorney fees to ANWI as the prevailing party under RCW 7.28.083(3)—the

amount of which was to be determined at a later date under CR 54(d). Finally, the trial court

ordered the parties to cooperate and create a legal description of the new boundary.

       On April 7, 2022, the trial court entered an order establishing a new boundary based on

the parties’ agreement. That order shows that the Bergs now own most of the cabin driveway,

but not the small portion just before the cabin driveway intersects with the South Driveway.

       On April 15, 2022, ANWI moved to establish the amount of the attorney fee award. In

their motion, ANWI extensively discussed settlement negotiations with the Bergs. ANWI

attached the Declaration of Scott Weaver in support, which included extensive documentation of

the settlement negotiations. The Bergs moved to strike ANWI’s motion and the related

declaration for violating ER 408 and the Uniform Meditation Act, chapter 7.07 RCW. In a

separate filing, the Bergs also argued that the motion to establish the amount of attorney fees was

not timely under CR 54(d).

       The trial court granted the motion to strike the Weaver declaration in part, found ANWI’s

motion timely, awarded $425,000 in attorney fees to ANWI, and considered the settlement offers

“only for the purpose of considering the time, effort, and resources expended in making such

offers in an attempt to resolve this case.” CP at 4293-94. The trial court specified that it “did not

consider facts presented in the Weaver Declaration relating to unsuccessful settlement

negotiations and/or allegedly unreasonable conduct relating to settlement negotiations as such is

not admissible in determining the amount of the fees requested.” CP at 4290 n.1.

                                                 8
No. 56633-8-II

          The Bergs appeal the trial court’s prescriptive easement ruling and the grant of attorney

fees. ANWI conditionally cross-appeals in the event we remand for any of the attorney fee

issues.

                                             ANALYSIS

                                      I. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

          The Bergs assign error to numerous factual findings. ANWI assigns error to FOF 1.32.3

          The trial court’s findings in adverse possession cases present mixed questions of law and

fact. Harris v. Urell, 133 Wn. App. 130, 137, 135 P.3d 530 (2006). We review the trial court’s

findings for substantial evidence. Id. Where there is enough evidence to persuade an impartial

rational person of the truth of the finding, substantial evidence exists to support that finding. Id.

If the findings are supported, we then review whether the findings support the conclusions of

law. Id. Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. Id.

          Under RAP 10.3(a)(4), a party’s brief should contain “[a] separate concise statement of

each error a party contends was made by the trial court.” Each challenged FOF requires “a

separate assignment of error.” RAP 10.3(g). We “will only review a claimed error which is

included in an assignment of error or clearly disclosed in the associated issue pertaining thereto.”

RAP 10.3(g). “Without argument or authority to support it, an assignment of error is waived.”

State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).

          Aside from FOF 1.9, the Bergs fail to mention any findings after enumerating their

assignments of error. The Bergs do not develop their argument as to any finding or explain why

3
 A respondent may properly assign error to a factual finding without having to file a cross-
appeal of the underlying order. State v. Kindsvogel, 149 Wn.2d 477, 481, 69 P.3d 870 (2003).

                                                   9
No. 56633-8-II

any finding is not supported by the record. For its part, ANWI assigns error to FOF 1.32. The

other FOF are verities on appeal.

A.     FOF 1.9

       FOF 1.9 provides, in part, “Lot 002 consists of 2.39 acres.” CP at 3243. The Bergs argue

that the original size is roughly 54,000 feet, which would have been around one acre. It does not

appear that the Lot 002 was originally 2.39 acres, so the finding appears unsupported. Instead,

the amount of property the Bergs claimed by adverse possession was 2.39 acres.

       But the significance of the error with FOF 1.9 is unclear. The Bergs do not argue that a

conclusion of law is erroneous because the finding about the original lot size is unsupported, nor

do the Bergs seeks reversal on this basis. And the original size of Lot 002 is not relevant to the

prescriptive easement claims and attorney fee issues that the Bergs raise on appeal. Thus, this

unsupported finding is not grounds for reversal.4

B.     FOF 1.32

       FOF 1.32, in part, provides,

       The segment of the yellow line that runs predominately north-south was drawn by
       [ANWI] to grant the [Bergs’] title to the land under the short vehicular driveway
       that the [Bergs] constructed to . . . connect Lot 002 to the West Beach South
       Driveway.

CP at 3246 (emphasis added). ANWI argues that there is not substantial evidence to show

(1) the Bergs constructed this driveway, and (2) ANWI drew this yellow line to grant the Bergs

this driveway.

4
 When a finding is unsupported by substantial evidence but does not ultimately affect the
conclusions of law, that error does not warrant reversal. State v. CLA Estate Servs., Inc., 23 Wn.
App. 2d 279, 290, 515 P.3d 1012 (2022), review denied sub nom. State v. CLA Estate Servs., 200
Wn.2d 1028 (2023), and cert. denied, 23-29, 2024 WL 71910 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2024).

                                                10
No. 56633-8-II

       First, substantial evidence supports the finding that that the Bergs constructed the cabin

driveway. The Bergs point us to Palmer’s testimony. Palmer testified that the cabin driveway

did not exist when he installed the utilities at the cabin for the Branchflowers, and the cabin

driveway did not exist during the Branchflowers’ ownership of the cabin. As the Bergs were the

owners following the Branchflowers, the inference is that the Bergs constructed the cabin

driveway. This is sufficient.

       Next, FOF 1.32 states, the yellow line was “drawn by [ANWI] to grant the [Bergs’] title

to the land under the short vehicular driveway that the [Bergs] constructed . . .” CP at 3246

(emphasis added). Rephrased, FOF 1.32 states that ANWI drew the segment of yellow line

running predominately north-south to grant the Bergs title to the land under the cabin driveway.

It is unclear what the trial meant by using the term “under” in this context.

       To the extent FOF 1.32 could be interpreted as ANWI drew the segment of yellow line

running predominately north-south to grant the Bergs the entire cabin driveway, we agree with

ANWI that such an interpretation is not supported by substantial evidence. ANWI submitted an

exhibit showing the bounds of their concession. ANWI drew the yellow line to recognize the

new boundary—“east of the cabin, the new boundary should be adjusted to just east of the

manicured curtilage.” CP at 1713. That concession does not appear include a small portion of

the cabin driveway right before it intersects with the South Driveway.

       Moreover, that small portion of the cabin driveway is outside of the tree line. To the

extent FOF 1.32 could be interpreted as ANWI drew the segment of yellow line running

predominately north-south to grant the Bergs the entire cabin driveway, we hold that substantial

                                                 11
No. 56633-8-II

evidence does not support that FOF. Rather, ANWI drew the yellow line to define the scope of

its concession.5

                                  II. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS

       The Bergs argue that the trial court erred by determining that the hostile use element of

their prescriptive easement claims was not established as to the North and South Driveways, the

footbridge, the West Beach footpaths, the West Beach parking near the footbridge, the “tidelands

and shoreline,”6 and the small portion of the cabin driveway that intersects with the South

Driveway that they did not acquire via concession. Br. of Appellants at 18. We disagree.

       Prescriptive easements are not favored by law. Gamboa v. Clark, 183 Wn.2d 38, 43, 348

P.3d 1214 (2015).

       To establish a prescriptive easement, the person claiming the easement must use
       another person’s land for a period of 10 years and show that (1) he or she used the
       land in an “open” and “notorious” manner, (2) the use was “continuous” or
       “uninterrupted,” (3) the use occurred over “a uniform route,” (4) the use was
       “adverse” to the landowner, and (5) the use occurred “with the knowledge of such
       owner at a time when he was able in law to assert and enforce his rights.”

Id. (quoting Nw. Cities Gas Co. v. W. Fuel Co., 13 Wn.2d 75, 85, 123 P.2d 771 (1942)). The

party asserting the prescriptive easement bears the burden of establishing the elements. Id.

       Adverse use generally means the land use occurred without the owner’s permission. Id.

at 44. But we presume that someone enters another’s land with the owner’s permission in three

5
 While we agree with ANWI on this part of their substantial evidence argument as to FOF 1.32,
we note that ANWI is not seeking affirmative relief. As such, the error in FOF 1.32 is not
grounds for reversal—but a fact we consider while engaging in our analysis of the other issues.
6
 The Bergs argue on appeal that they established a prescriptive easement as to “tidelands and
shoreline.” Br. of Appellant at 17-18. The Bergs don’t define what they are referencing in other
portions of their brief. We construe this claim as arguing for a prescriptive easement for general
access to areas near the shore on West Beach.

                                                12
No. 56633-8-II

circumstances: (1) cases involving unenclosed land, (2) when one can reasonably infer that the

land use was permitted by neighborly acquiescence, or (3) when the owner created or maintained

a road that their neighbor used in a noninterfering manner. Id.

       It is a low bar to establish a reasonable inference of neighborly acquiescence. Id. at 51.

It may occur when the claimant uses a private footpath through the neighbor-owner’s beachfront

property without express permission in conjunction with the owner and others and without

incident. Id.

       In Gamboa, the Gamboas used their neighbors’ road as a driveway to access their home.

Id. In contrast, their neighbors used the road to farm grapes. Id. Our Supreme Court held that

there was a reasonable inference of neighborly acquiescence as the parties used the road for their

own reasons, contemporaneously, and without conflict. Id.

       The permissive use presumption can be overcome by presenting facts to show that the

user was adverse and hostile to the owner’s rights, or if the owner implied by their actions that

the user has an easement right. Id. at 51-52. To show the former, the claimant must present

evidence they “interfered” with the owner’s land use. Id. For example, the Gamboa court cited

Nw. Cities Gas wherein the claimant interfered with the owner’s land use by creating and

maintaining a defined road across another’s premises. Id. (citing 13 Wn.2d at 90-91). To that

end, evidence that the claimant constructed the road for their exclusive use supports a hostile use

determination. Cuillier v. Coffin, 57 Wn.2d 624, 627, 358 P.2d 958 (1961).

       When the use arises from mutual neighborly acquiescence or from an express grant of

permission, the use is “‘permissive in its inception,’” which creates a higher burden. Gamboa,

183 Wn.2d at 45 (quoting Roediger v. Cullen, 26 Wn.2d 690, 713, 175 P.2d 669 (1946)). To

                                                13
No. 56633-8-II

overcome this higher burden, the claimant must show a distinct and positive assertion of a claim

of right. Id. at 45-46.

A.      North Driveway, South Driveway, West Beach Parking, West Beach Footpaths, and West

Beach Shoreline and Tidelands

        Based on the trial court’s findings, the Bergs’ use of the North Driveway, South

Driveway, West Beach parking, West Beach footpaths, and West Beach shoreline and tidelands

was permitted by neighborly acquiescence. ANWI and its predecessors welcomed all property

owners on the island to use West Beach at any time without seeking overt permission. Likewise,

ANWI and its predecessors allowed all property owners to use the North and South Driveways to

access the beach without comment.

        And property owners used the beach for various social gatherings and parking of all sorts.

While the Bergs may have used the driveways more than other property owners, there is no

evidence that such use interfered with ANWI’s use. Because the use of the North and South

Driveways, parking, related footpaths, and shoreline was permitted by neighborly acquiescence,

the Bergs must show a distinct and positive assertion of a claim of right to overcome the

permissive in its inception presumption.

        To that end, the Bergs make several arguments: (1) the 2002 and 2003 letters to ANWI

and their legal counsel established hostile use of all of Lot 006, (2) the Bergs cannot be a hostile

user as to some parts of Lot 006 and permissive as to other parts, and (3) because the use of all

the claimed prescriptive easements are “inextricably linked” to the adversely possessed cabin,

the hostile use element is satisfied as to every prescriptive easement claim. Br. of Appellants at

35.

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No. 56633-8-II

       First, we note that our review is based on whether the factual findings support the

conclusions of law. Harris, 133 Wn. App. at 137. The trial court did not make factual findings

about the 2002 and 2003 letters. The Bergs do not argue that the trial court’s findings are

inadequate; rather, they merely assign error to a myriad of findings and fail to develop many of

those arguments. Even considering the letters, they do not change the aforementioned

determination.

       The 2002 letter referenced only the cabin and clarification of the boundary. The 2003

letter again references the cabin and also a driveway that is no longer maintained on the south

east corner of Lot 006. That letter also proposes a new boundary 40 feet north of the cabin.

Neither letter even mentions the North and South Driveways, the footpaths, the footbridge, the

cabin driveway, the parking, nor the shoreline. As such, those letters are largely irrelevant to

these issues.

       Next, the Bergs do not provide authority to support their argument that they cannot be a

hostile user as to some parts of Lot 006 and permissive as to other parts. We assume that there is

no authority to support this proposition as counsel has failed to cite any, and we are not are

required to search out supporting authority. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122,

126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962). As such, we find this argument unpersuasive. We similarly reject the

Bergs’ related argument that they established adversity as to all the claimed prescriptive

easements because such use was inextricably linked to the adversely possessed cabin.

       The Bergs cannot show a distinct and positive assertion of right as to any of the

aforementioned claims. Therefore, we hold that the Bergs’ use of the North and South

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No. 56633-8-II

Driveways, West Beach footpaths, West Beach parking, and West Beach shoreline and tidelands

was not adverse to ANWI.

B.     Cabin Driveway and Footbridge

       The Bergs argue that the trial court improperly bisected the cabin driveway and the

footbridge because the Bergs cannot be simultaneously hostile and permissive users to the same

pieces of infrastructure. To that end, the Bergs rely on ANWI’s concessions to show that that

they met all the elements of prescriptive easements as to parts of the cabin driveway and the

footbridge.

       The fact that ANWI conceded some of the cabin driveway does not establish that the

Bergs adversely possessed all of the cabin driveway. Indeed, because ANWI conceded some of

the cabin driveway, the Bergs were relieved of their burden of proof as to that portion of the

cabin driveway.7 Additionally, it is not clear that ANWI conceded the footbridge based on their

pretrial concession.8 The Bergs still bear the burden of establishing adversity as to these two

pieces of infrastructure, especially where the Bergs later agreed to a new boundary with ANWI

that did not include the entire footbridge.

       There is no evidence to suggest that the use of the cabin driveway and footbridge arose

from neighborly acquiescence. ANWI and its predecessors’ general grant of permission

extended to West Beach and its access roads. There is no evidence to suggest that ANWI and its

7
 Moreover, a concession on a question of law is not binding on us. In re Pers. Restraint of
Pullman, 167 Wn.2d 205, 212 n.4, 218 P.3d 913 (2009).
8
 The trial court ruled that the Bergs did not acquire a prescriptive easement for the footbridge.
But the trial court granted the Bergs the portion of Lot 006 ANWI conceded and ordered the
parties cooperate to create a legal description of the new boundary. The parties agreed to a new
boundary, which the court enforced. Apparently, this new boundary bisects the footbridge.

                                                16
No. 56633-8-II

predecessor allowed anyone to use property south of the tree line where the cabin resided. Nor is

there evidence that anyone other than the Bergs used either of these pieces of infrastructure.

        Nevertheless, these claims involve unenclosed land. And so, the Bergs must overcome

the general presumption of permissive use by presenting evidence that their use was adverse and

hostile to the owner’s rights. Nw. Cities Gas Co., 13 Wn.2d at 87. The nature and location of

the claimant’s use are important considerations. Id. at 88.

        In Nw. Cities Gas, the claimant company laid out a defined road across the unenclosed

premises of another. Id. at 90. The claimant annually improved the road and regularly used the

road for transportation of heavy materials for industrial purposes. Id. at 90-91. The claimant

also encouraged the public to use the road to access their property. Id. Our Supreme Court held

that the evidence was sufficient to overcome the presumption of permissive use. Id.

        In Mountaineers v. Wymer, the claimant used a 200 feet long road across the unenclosed

land of another for accessing cottages, camping facilities, and a theater. 56 Wn.2d 721-22, 355

P.2d 341 (1960). The claimant posted a roadway entrance sign with the claimant’s name and no

trespassing signs. Id. Moreover, the claimant also maintained a gate at the road’s entrance and

occasionally locked said gate. Id. Our Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to

overcome the presumption of permissive use. Id. at 724.

        The present facts are clearly distinguishable from the aforementioned cases. As to the

footbridge, the trial court’s findings merely show that after parking on West Beach, the Bergs

would use a small footbridge, they reconstructed, to cross over a creek feature and through the

tree line.

                                                17
No. 56633-8-II

       Likewise, the findings show that the Bergs constructed the cabin driveway. The record

establishes that the Bergs would apply gravel to the cabin driveway as needed. While Randall

testified he maintained the driveway on an annual basis by bolstering certain areas, he also

testified that it may have been six years since he last applied gravel to the cabin driveway.

Randall also testified that he would sometimes use the cabin driveway to unload his vehicle

closer to the cabin.

       The location of these uses adjoins land that ANWI allowed any Ketron Island property

owner to enjoy as a neighborly accommodation—West Beach and the access driveways to West

Beach. The character of the Bergs’ use was variable and not continuous as the cabin was not

used as a full-time residence. Under these circumstances, we hold that the Bergs have failed to

present sufficient evidence to overcome the permissive use presumption. In summary, all of the

Bergs’ arguments related to prescriptive easement fail.

                                       III. ATTORNEY FEES

       The Bergs argue that the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees to ANWI because

(1) ANWI’s motion for attorney fees was months late, (2) ANWI was not the prevailing party,

and (3) the trial court erroneously considered settlement communications in making its award.

We disagree.

A.     Timeliness

       We review the interpretation of a court rule de novo. N. Coast Elec. Co. v. Signal Elec.,

Inc., 193 Wn. App. 566, 571, 373 P.3d 296 (2016). We interpret court rules in the same manner

as statutes—giving effect to the plain meaning of the rule as a means of enforcing the drafter’s

intent. Id. “Where a court rule is ambiguous, we look to the drafter’s intent by ‘reading the rule

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No. 56633-8-II

as a whole, harmonizing its provisions, and using related rules to help identify the legislative

intent embodied in the rule.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jafar v. Webb, 177

Wn.2d 520, 526-27, 303 P.3d 1042 (2013)).

       In pertinent part, CR 54 provides,

       (a) Definitions.

               (1) Judgment. A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the
       parties in the action and includes any decree and order from which an appeal lies.
       A judgment shall be in writing and signed by the judge and filed forthwith as
       provided in rule 58.

               (2) Order. Every direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing,
       not included in a judgment, is denominated an order.

       ....

       (d) Costs, Disbursements, Attorneys’ Fees, and Expenses.

       ....

               (2) Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses. Claims for attorneys’ fees and expenses,
       other than costs and disbursements, shall be made by motion unless the substantive
       law governing the action provides for the recovery of such fees and expenses as an
       element of damages to be proved at trial. Unless otherwise provided by statute or
       order of the court, the motion must be filed no later than 10 days after entry of
       judgment.

       In N. Coast Elec. Co., in August 2014, North Coast requested costs and attorney fees in

its summary judgment motion with the amount to be determined at a later date. 193 Wn. App. at

569. In December, the trial court granted North Coast’s summary judgment. Id at 570. In

February, North Coast filed a motion for an award of costs and fees specifying the amount of

costs and attorney fees requested with supporting documentation. Id. We held that the August

2014 request in the summary judgment motion complied with the plain language of CR 54(d)(2)

“because it claimed attorney fees and expenses, was made by motion, and provided the facts and

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law necessary for a court to make a determination, and the motion was filed no later than 10 days

after judgment was entered.” Id. at 573.

        The Bergs improperly characterize ANWI’s April 15, 2022 motion to establish the

amount of the attorney fee award as an untimely motion requesting attorney fees under CR 54(d).

ANWI merely sought to establish the amount of the fees in that motion.

        In the judgment entered on January 3, 2022, the trial court found that both parties asked

the court to award them attorney fees and costs. And the trial court determined that ANWI was

entitled to fees as the prevailing party, but deferred ruling on the amount of the fee award.

Where the court already determined that a party was entitled to attorney fees, CR 54(d)(2) does

not prevent the trial court from considering a motion to establish the amount of the attorney fee

award filed more than 10 days after the court entered the judgment. As such, we hold that the

trial court was not prevented from considering the motion to establish the amount of the attorney

fees.

B.      Attorney Fee Awards under RCW 7.28.083(3)

        i. Statutory Construction

        The Bergs argue that a party may not prevail within the meaning of RCW 7.28.083 if

they lose title to some portion of property by adverse possession. We disagree.

        When engaging in statutory interpretation, we seek to ascertain and enforce the intent of

the legislature. Hum. Rights Comm’n v. Hous. Auth. of City of Seattle, 21 Wn. App. 2d 978, 985,

509 P.3d 319 (2022). We first examine the plain meaning of the text, considering the context of

the statute and the relevant statutory scheme. Id. In doing so, we seek to avoid interpreting the

statute in such a way as to lead to absurd results. Id.

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No. 56633-8-II

       We must give effect to all of the text of the statute and not add any words. Id. If the

statute is unambiguous—not subject to two or more reasonable interpretations—after engaging

in the aforementioned analysis, our inquiry ends. Id. RCW 7.28.083(3) provides,

       The prevailing party in an action asserting title to real property by adverse
       possession may request the court to award costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.
       The court may award all or a portion of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees to the
       prevailing party if, after considering all the facts, the court determines such an
       award is equitable and just.

       That provision does not define prevailing party. The prevailing party is generally the

party who receives judgment in their favor. Emerick v. Cardiac Study Ctr., Inc., P.S., 189 Wn.

App. 711, 732, 357 P.3d 696 (2015). We note that “if both parties prevail on major issues, both

parties bear their own costs and fees.” Dave Johnson Ins., Inc. v. Wright, 167 Wn. App. 758,

783, 275 P.3d 339 (2012).

       In certain attorney fee situations where neither party wholly prevailed, state courts have

employed the substantially prevailing party analysis. See Peterson v. Koester, 122 Wn. App.

351, 364, 92 P.3d 780 (2004). Under that framework, when neither party completely prevails,

the court must determine who the substantially prevailing party is by examining the extent of the

relief afforded to the parties. Emerick, 189 Wn. App. at 732.

       It would be inconsistent to interpret prevailing party in RCW 7.28.083(3) as a party who

acquires title in an adverse possession action, no matter how small, regardless of the scope of

their claim. Under that interpretation, parties could claim wide swaths of land via adverse

possession, increasing litigation complexity and costs, prevail as to a relatively small section, and

then be entitled to attorney fees. We reject such an interpretation. Instead, we apply the

substantially prevailing party framework to RCW 7.28.083(3).

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No. 56633-8-II

       ii. Prevailing Party Determination

       The Bergs argue that ANWI was not the prevailing party because it lost title to

substantial portions of Lot 006 through concessions and the prescriptive easement claims should

not have been considered in the prevailing party determination. We disagree.

       The prevailing party determination is a mixed question of law and fact that we review

under an error of law standard. Emerick, 189 Wn. App. at 732. We have previously held that

RCW 7.28.083(3) did not apply to prescriptive easement claims as they are not actions asserting

title to real property. McColl v. Anderson, 6 Wn. App. 2d 88, 93, 429 P.3d 1113 (2018). Shortly

thereafter, Division One included dicta in an opinion suggested that a party could recover

attorney fees incurred on prescriptive easement claims under RCW 7.28.083(3) because

prescriptive easements and adverse possession were often treated as equivalents and the elements

were the same. Workman v. Klinkenberg, 6 Wn. App. 2d 291, 305-06, 430 P.3d 716 (2018).

       Division One later “limit[ed] the holding in Workman to the facts of that case—when

claims involving prescriptive easement also involve claims of adverse possession.” Sw.

Suburban Sewer Dist. v. Fish, 17 Wn. App. 2d 833, 840-41, 488 P.3d 839 (2021). We note that

in Workman the claimant sought a prescriptive easement over the exact same space that the

claimant sought to adversely possess. 6 Wn. App. 2d at 295. Additionally, Division One held,

consistent with McColl, that a party who asserts solely a prescriptive easement claim is not

entitled to attorney fees under that statute. Sw. Suburban Sewer Dist., 17 Wn. App. 2d at 841.

We agree with Division One’s holding in Southwest Suburban Sewer District v. Fish.

       Here, the Bergs’ “claims involving prescriptive easement also involve claims of adverse

possession.” Id. at 840-41. The Bergs asserted title to a large portion of Lot 006 via adverse

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No. 56633-8-II

possession. This portion appears to include the footbridge, related footpaths, the cabin driveway,

and some of the shoreline, which the Bergs now argue that they have a prescriptive easement

over.

        And all of the prescriptive easement claims stem from the Bergs’ use of the cabin and the

surrounding curtilage. Indeed, the Bergs contend, on appeal, that the driveways, parking, and the

footbridge are “inextricably linked” to the use of the cabin property. Br. of Appellants at 35.

Because the prescriptive easements claims are inextricably linked to the adverse possession

claims, we hold that the trial court could properly consider the prescriptive easement claims

when making its prevailing party determination under RCW 7.28.083(3).

        Next, while both parties prevailed to some extent during this action, ANWI substantially

prevailed in this action. While the Bergs acquired the cabin and surrounding curtilage, the Bergs

failed to acquire large portions of Lot 006 that they claimed. Specifically, the Bergs sought a

large portion of West Beach, including the footpaths and the footbridge, which they failed to

acquire. The Bergs also sought a large portion of Lot 006 east of the cabin driveway, which they

failed to acquire. Finally, the Bergs also claimed prescriptive easements for use of the footpaths,

footbridge, cabin driveway, North and South Driveways, shoreline, and parking on West Beach,

all of which they failed to acquire. While the amount the Bergs acquired is certainly not

insignificant, under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not err in determining

that ANWI was the prevailing party—as it substantially prevailed.

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No. 56633-8-II

C.     Settlement Communications

       The Bergs argue that the trial court erred by considering compromise negotiations in

determining the Bergs’ liability in violation of the Uniform Meditation Act and ER 408. We

disagree.

       We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Brothers v. Pub. Sch. Emps. of

Wash., 88 Wn. App. 398, 406, 945 P.2d 208 (1997). ER 408 provides as follows:

       In a civil case, evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
       accepting or offering or promising to accept a valuable consideration in
       compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either
       validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim
       or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations
       is likewise not admissible. . . . This rule also does not require exclusion when the
       evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
       witness, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
       criminal investigation or prosecution.

       In Humphrey Indus., Ltd. v. Clay St. Assocs., LLC, the trial court awarded attorney fees

against a party for bad faith conduct for, in part, rejecting a pretrial settlement offer and a CR 68

offer of judgment. 170 Wn.2d 495, 508, 242 P.3d 846 (2010). Holding that evidence of conduct

in settlement negotiations “is inadmissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its

amount,” our Supreme Court reversed. Id. Relying on Humphrey, Division One rejected the

argument that a fee award should be reduced based on unreasonable conduct during settlement,

holding “[e]vidence of settlement negotiations of an underlying claim are not admissible as to

proving attorney fees for that claim.” Ewing v. Glogowski, 198 Wn. App. 515, 522, 394 P.3d

418 (2017).

       RCW 7.07.030(1) provides that mediation communications are not subject to discovery

or admissible in evidence. “‘Mediation communication’ means a statement, whether oral or in a

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No. 56633-8-II

record or verbal or nonverbal, that occurs during a mediation or is made for purposes of

considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, or reconvening a mediation or

retaining a mediator.” RCW 7.07.010(2). And “‘Mediation’ means a process in which a

mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a

voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.” RCW 7.07.010(1). These statutes are part of the

Uniform Mediation Act, which has a limited scope. RCW 7.07.020. To that end, the party

asserting a privilege always bears the burden of establishing the privilege applies in the given

situation. Sharbono v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 139 Wn. App. 383, 418, 161 P.3d 406

(2007).

          First, the Bergs failed to establish the mediation privilege applies here. The Bergs only

mention the relevant statutes in two paragraphs. They do not cite the record to challenge specific

communications. Nor do the Bergs explain whether the unspecified communications fall within

the scope of the Uniform Mediation Act. Thus, they have failed to show that the privilege

applies here.

          Second, in both Humphrey and Ewing, the courts were considering the underlying

conduct for reasonableness or bad faith. Here, the Bergs moved to strike the Weaver declaration

containing the compromise negotiations. The trial court granted that motion in part.

          In the trial court’s attorney fee order, it specified, “This Court did not consider facts

presented in the Weaver declaration relating to unsuccessful settlement negotiations and/or

allegedly unreasonable conduct relating to settlement negotiations as such is not admissible in

determining the amount of the fees requested.” CP at 4290 n.1. But the trial court did consider

the settlement offers “for the purpose of considering the time, effort, and resources expended in

                                                    25
No. 56633-8-II

making such offers in an attempt to resolve this case.” CP at 4293. This is distinguishable from

Humphrey and Ewing. The trial court considered the settlement offers solely for considering the

time expended during the settlement negotiations, which is permissible under the “other

purpose” language in ER 408.

       Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

                                IV. CONDITIONAL CROSS-APPEAL

       ANWI argues that if we remand to the trial court regarding any of the attorney fee issues,

we should instruct the trial court to consider the substantive settlement discussions in making its

post-judgment fee award. Because ANWI’s cross-appeal is conditioned on us ordering remand

for attorney fees issues, and we do not do so, we decline to address the ANWI’s arguments.

                                 V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

       Both parties request attorney fees on appeal under RCW 7.28.083.

       We may award fees on appeal under RAP 18.1(a)-(b) if “applicable law grants to a party

the right to recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review” and the party properly

requests it. We may award reasonable appellate attorney fees regarding the adverse possession

claim⎯which on appeal essentially is limited to the attorney fee issue—under RCW 7.28.083(3)

in this case. ANWI is the prevailing party on appeal regarding trial court attorney fees.

       Determining such an award is equitable and just, we award ANWI reasonable appellate

attorney fees regarding the adverse possession issue only, subject to their compliance with RAP

18.1. While the express adverse possession determination was not appealed, the appeal of the

attorney fee order implicates the adverse possession determination below.

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No. 56633-8-II

       However, ANWI is not entitled to attorney fees regarding the prescriptive easement issues

addressed on appeal under Sw. Suburban Sewer Dist., 17 Wn. App. 2d at 841, and McColl, 6 Wn.

App. 2d at 93.

                                        CONCLUSION

       We affirm.

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                    Che, J.
 We concur:

 Maxa, J.

 Cruser, A.C.J.

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