Court Opinion

ID: 9832298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:47:43.335171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:42.375684
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee’s counsel .has presented to this court a motion for rehearing, accompanied *925by an argument and citation of authorities, which indicate considerable industry and ability. That motion has received careful consideration, but our conclusion is that it fails to show that-our former decision of the ease was not correct. '
The gist of the motion is that this court erred in holding that the original contract, which was not in writing, was merged into the written contract embodied in the promissory note executed by the -plaintiff, and made payable to the defendant on demand; and that, inasmuch as the written instrument referred to stipulated that the money loaned to the plaintiff was payable on demand, the former oral agreement to furnish the money for a longer period of time was thereby changed, and the time of payment fixed as stated in the promissory note. We have examined the authorities cited in the motion for a rehearing, and do not believe that they sustain the contention urged. As we understand them, they hold that when a written instrument embodies only a portion of an entire contract, it is permissible to prove the other portion of the contract which is not in conflict with the written instrument. The correct rule upon the subject is stated in 22 Corpus Juris, page 1290, as follows:
“The parts of the agreement proposed to be proved by parol must not be inconsistent with or repugnant to, the intention of the parties as shown by the written instrument; for, to receive parol proof of a part not reduced to writing, which is- directly repugnant to the intention of the parties as expressed in the written instrument, would contravene the rule that parol evidence cannot be received to contradict or vary the terms of a written agreement.”
Many authorities are cited in support of that text, including Swope v. Liberty County Bank, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 281, 113 S. W. 976, and Kelley v. Collier, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 353, 32 S. W. 428, decided by Courts of Civil Appeals of this state, and both of which support the text referred to.
We shall not undertake to review all the cases cited in the motion for rehearing, but content ourselves with quoting from some of them.
In Thomas v. Hammond, 47 Tex. 42, the court held:
“If the matters alleged are, for the purposes of the given suit, a proper part of the transaction to be investigated, and the law does not directly -forbid such matter to be proven by. parol, and the parties have instituted written evidence of only parts of the transaction, not including the parts proposed to be proven orally, then the evidence is entitled to be heard.”
In Harness v. Luttrall (Tex. Civ. App.) 225 S. W. 810, cited in the motion, it is said by the court:
“For it is well settled that, where written instruments form a part of a more comprehensive transaction, the terms of which are not attempted to be expressed in writing, parol evidence as to. such parts of the transaction as were not reduced to'writing is admissible and operative.”
The motion cites the case of Stuart v. Meyer (Tex. Civ. App.) 196 S. W. 615. As showing that the court in rendering the opinion did not intend to vary the rule that parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract, the court quotes from Ruling Case Law, among other things as follows:
“Where the parties have reduced an agreement to writing, the writing is supposed to contain all the agreement, and is the only evidence of it; and all prior or contemporaneous declarations and negotiations between the parties are excluded as evidence of the agreement. « ⅝ * rpjjg same principle declares that the reduction to writing of one feature of an entire transaction, in part execution, thereof, does not preclude proof by parol of the other features. Otherwise stated, the rule is that proof is admissible of any collateral, parol agreement or independent fact which does not interfere with the terms of the written contract.”
In the case of American, etc., Land Co. v. Mercedes Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 155 S. W. 286, cited in the motion, the court says, on page 293, first column, after referring to the rule that parol testimony is not admissible to vary a written contract, as follows:
That “when the original contract was complete within itself and was entirely verbal, and a part only thereof is subsequently reduced to writing, parol testimony as to such part is admissible, not for the purpose of varying or changing that portion which was reduced to writing, but to show what the original contract was in its entirety.”
As we understand them, none of the cases cited hold that when the time for the payment of a debt is .clearly fixed in a written instrument, it is permissible to prove by oral testimony that it was not payable at that time, buif at a different time.
In the early history of'this state’s jurisprudence it was held, in Rockmore v. Davenport, 14 Tex. 602, 65 Am. Dec. 132, that where a bill of exchange was made payable at a particular time, it was not permissible to prove by oral testimony a previous or contemporaneous agreement that the drawer should not be liable to pay the amount of the bill until a later date, for the reason that it proposed to vary by oral evidence the legal effect of a contract in writing. That is what appellee successfully sought to do in this case in the court below, and what this court holds he was not entitled to do. The rule of law referred to is wise and sound, and we see no reason why it. should not be given application in this case.
Motion overruled.