Court Opinion

ID: 9674153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:24:04.645313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:25.873976
License: Public Domain

STORCKMAN, Judge
(dissenting).
Since I am unable to agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that it was not intended by the 1945 Constitution that the City of St. Louis be invested with the powers enumerated in § 18, I feel that I should make known the reasons for my dissent.
In approaching the question of whether the City of St. Louis is entitled to include in its charter provisions with respect to county offices and officers, we should keep in mind the well-established rules of construction.
In constitutional construction the instrument must be read as a whole and the court should resolve seemingly conflicting provisions by harmonizing and rendering every word operative if possible, so as to give effect to the whole. State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman, 363 Mo. 245, 250 S.W.2d 701, 705 [3].
All provisions of the constitution bearing upon a particular subject are to be considered together and effect given to the whole. State on inf. of McKittrick v. Williams, 346 Mo. 1003, 144 S.W.2d 98, 103 [10].
For convenient reference the series of sections dealing generally with county charters will be referred to as section 18. Likewise the sections 31-33, dealing specifically with the City of St. Louis will be referred to as section 31 unless otherwise indicated.
The fundamental inquiry is whether the 1945 Constitution shows an intent that the City of St. Louis as a county has a right to designate its county offices and officers and fix their salaries by charter provisions. More narrowly the question is whether an intent is shown to exclude the City of St. Louis from the benefits of § 18 and to limit it to a charter solely relating to municipal functions.
Each of these series of sections contain cross-references which are broad enough to include the other. Section 18(a) provides that any such county “may frame and adopt and amend a charter for its own government as provided in this article.” Section 31, relating specifically to the City of St. Louis, is in the same article with § 18.
*477Section 31 provides that the city shall continue with its present charter “subject to changes and amendments provided by the constitution or by law, and with the powers, organization, rights and privileges permitted by this constitution or by law.” This cross-reference to “powers, organization, rights and privileges permitted by this constitution” is certainly broad enough to refer to § 18.
Provisions of the 1875 Constitution authorized a charter for the City of St. Louis but did nothing more than refer generally to adopting and amending the charter in much the same language now used in §§ 19 and 20 of the present constitution relating to cities of more than 10,000. The new language of § 31 must be given significance in accordance with well-recognized rules of construction. We see no logical reason why it cannot be properly said that the new language added in § 31 refers to and makes available to the City of St. Louis “the powers, organization, rights and privileges permitted” by § 18 of the constitution.
The first part of the last sentence of § 31 is a restriction; the changes and amendments must be subject to the constitution or law. The second part of the sentence denotes a grant or permission that was not in the former constitution; it says “with the powers, organization, rights and privileges permitted by this constitution or by law.” The whole constitution is referred to by the section and the whole includes all of its parts. To hold otherwise is to treat these new references as meaningless.
A most significant factor is that the recognition of the City of St. Louis “as a county” is contained in § 31. If §§ 31-33 relate, as contended, solely to municipal functions, then there is no possible reason why this recognition should be placed where it is. A construction that renders a constitutional provision meaningless should not be adopted by the courts. State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman, 363 Mo. 245, 250 S.W.2d 701, 705 [4].
Unless the City of St. Louis is necessarily excluded from the benefits and rights accorded to other counties, it would seem that there was an intent to include it because the City of St. Louis is recognized as a county and has more than the minimum population required.
If the constitution intends the provision for county charters to apply to the City of St. Louis, it could hardly be expected that the constitution would require the City of St. Louis to have two separate charters. The line of demarcation between municipal and county functions in the City of St. Louis is often quite indistinct. What is a municipal function and what is a county function has been the source of litigation in numerous cases over the years. This uncertainty is also shown in the Debates of the Constitutional Convention relating to this and other matters affecting the City of St. Louis.
If two separate charters are not required, then it would be most incongruous and unnecessary to have one charter body frame the organic law relating to the city and another for county functions. The chances of their harmonizing would be slight. The constitution provides what might reasonably be expected, one Board of Freeholders to write one charter for the City of St. Louis embracing both the city and county functions.
Sections 18(f) through 18(7) are general provisions relating to the mechanics for the formation and adoption of county charters. The provisions of 32(a), 32(b) and 33 are specific provisions relating solely to the City of St. Louis. It is a well-recognized rule of construction that where a conflict is presented between general and specific provisions, the specific will prevail. We see no violence in applying this rule to the present situation. In fact, it tends to harmonize and give effect to all of the constitutional provisions dealing with this subject matter.
Although it is by no means conclusive, the fact that the general assembly has reo *478ognized in § 50.010 that county charter provisions might be adopted pursuant to §§ 31 through 33 is of some weight. A contemporaneous legislative construction is entitled to and will be given serious consideration. Rathjen v. Reorganized School Dist., Mo., 284 S.W.2d 516, 526 [18].
There does not seem to be any valid reason why § 18(b) could not be applied to the City of St. Louis by a Board of Freeholders selected under § 31 et seq. The City of St. Louis as a county does not presently have a county court and all legislative functions of the city are presently vested in the Board of Aldermen. The present form of organization and administration for county purposes has not been attacked by the state as insufficient. This type of legislative body is required by § 32(b) and there is no reason why it could not handle whatever, if any, additional legislative functions there are on the county side. The city, of course, would have to provide, as it does now, public officers to perform the powers and duties delegated by the state to it as a county.
Apprehension is expressed that the City of St. Louis as a county might, or perhaps would be compelled, to take over from the state control of the police department if it adopts a county charter. It appears, however, that there is less reason for concern that this could be done in the City of St. Louis than, for example, in Kansas City if Jackson County were to adopt a county charter. I am unwilling to concede that this could occur in either place. Some of the reasons the City of St. Louis as a county could not disturb the existing police force setup are as follows:
1. Charter counties can exercise this municipal function only in the area of the county outside of incorporated cities and there is no such area in St. Louis. The territorial area of the City of St. Louis as a city and as a county exactly coincide. There is no county area outside of the city limits. Section 18(c) is expressly limited in its application; it provides that charter counties “may provide for the vesting and exercise of legislative power pertaining to public health, police and traffic, building construction, and planning and zoning, in the part of the county outside incorporated cities; * *
Because- there is no county area outside of the city limits, the City of St. Louis would have no basis for claiming under that section the right to organize an additional police force. The other municipal functions mentioned have been performed by the city for many years without dire results.
2. It is recognized that in cities as well as in unincorporated areas the preservation of the peace and the protection of property “is a governmental duty, which devolves upon the state, and not upon its municipalities, any further than the state, in its sovereignty, may see fit to impose upon or delegate it to the municipalities.” State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason, 153 Mo. 23, 54 S.W. 524, 529. There can be no county police force in the City of St. Louis except to the extent the general assembly imposes such “powers and duties” upon the city and its officers. The general assembly presently has the right, as it has done, to deprive the sheriff of St. Louis of his police powers and vest them in state officers, the police board of the City of St. Louis. Since the 1945 Constitution was adopted, sheriffs are no longer constitutional officers and the office could be abolished completely if the general assembly saw fit to do so. There is no limitation in § 18 on the “powers and duties” that the general assembly may withhold from the political subdivisions and vest in state officers instead. A fairly recent assertion of this power by the general assembly is the formation of the state highway patrol, a state agency for traffic regulation and law enforcement. Because of the peculiar status of the City of St. Louis, this power of the state over law enforcement is more evident and demonstrable than in the case of the other four counties presently eligible to adopt county charters.
*4793. The general assembly retains jurisdiction to determine what state powers and duties shall he delegated to counties and county officers for performance, as distinguished on the other hand from directing what county officers shall perform the powers and duties so delegated and fixing the salaries of county officers. Section 18(b) provides: “The charter shall provide * * * for the exercise of all powers and dtrfies of counties and county officers prescribed by the constitution and laws of the state.” Under this the general assembly may not only grant powers but may impose duties to be exercised by the charter counties and its officers. There is no conflict between this section and § 18(e) which provides that: “ * * ⅜ no law shall provide for any other office or employee of the county or fix the salary of any of its officers or employees.” In other words, the general assembly can determine the powers and duties to be granted or imposed upon the charter counties, but it cannot designate what officer shall perform them or set the salary of the county officers. This leaves the charter county free to allocate among its county officers the performance of powers and duties provided by law and to fix the salaries of its officials accordingly. If this is a good provision for other charter counties (and I think it is very salutary as did the delegates and evidently the people in adopting the constitution), I can see no justification for withholding it from the City of St. Louis. The greater population of the city would not be sufficient reason, because the day may not be far distant when the population of St. Louis County, and perhaps other counties, will exceed that of the City of St. Louis, hemmed in as it is by its unchangeable boundaries.
In the case of State ex inf. of Dalton ex rel. Shepley v. Gamble, Mo., 280 S.W.2d 656, 657, we were dealing with “the authority of the newly created police department of St. Louis County to take over and perform the law enforcement functions heretofore vested in the sheriff and constables of St. Louis County.” We held in that case that the sheriff was a county officer and that St. Louis County, as a charter county, had the right to determine “what officer or agency will be designated to perform the duties” enjoined upon the county sheriff by state law. 280 S.W.2d 656, 660 [6, 7], Whether the state had the right to withdraw the performance of “powers and duties” with respect to law enforcement from county officers and vest them in state officers or agencies was not involved and the case should not be considered as authority on that question. We think this is made clear by extending the quotation from the Shepley ■ case to include the sentence in italics, 280 S.W.2d 656, 660 [4, 5] : “A county under the special charter provisions of our constitution is possessed to a limited extent of a dual nature and functions in a dual capacity. It must perform state functions over the entire county and may perform functions of a local or municipal nature at least in the unincorporated parts of the county. These are constitutional grants which are not subject to, but take precedence over, the legislative power. St. Louis County alone has the right to determine ‘the number, kinds, manner of selection, terms of office am,d salaries’ of its county officers.”
Greater clarity would have resulted if the first part of the second sentence quoted had been qualified to read: “It must perform the state functions delegated to it over the entire county,” but such limitation is certainly implied or, at least, not excluded. Nor do we think that this question is ripe for decision in this case. All that is involved here is whether the City of St. Louis is entitled to partake of county charter powers, whatever they are.
The statement in respondent’s brief that: “The primary purpose [is] to ascertain the intention of the framers of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945” is misleading. As stated in State ex rel. Harry L. Hussman Refrigerator & Supply Co. v. City of St. Louis, 319 Mo. 497, 5 S.W.2d 1080, 1084 [4]: “We are here concerned with what under the general rules of construction this constitu*480tional provision must be deemed to have said. ‘The organic law is subject to the same general rules of construction as other laws, due regard being had to the broader objects and scope of the former, as a charter of popular government. The intent of such an instrument is the prime object to be attained in construing it.’ ” The weight to be given the debates is stated in State ex inf. of Dalton ex rel. Sheply v. Gamble, Mo., 280 S.W.2d 656, 661 [9]. The debates of the constitutional convention are inconclusive on the question here involved. The delegates from St. Louis, Jackson, Jasper and Buchanan counties were intensely interested in securing these charter privileges for their counties. Their opinions that it did not apply to the City of St. Louis are certainly not admissions against their interests. The failure of other delegates to express opposite opinions certainly would not create an estoppel. Even if the delegates who spoke did intend, such intent would not prevail if the language used is susceptible , of a contrary intent.
If the intent were not to include the City of St. Louis, then it can be said most appropriately that an express exception should have been inserted removing the doubt and the inclusion which otherwise results from the broad language and the cross-references employed. Where no exceptions are made in terms, none will be made by mere implication or construction. State ex rel. Scott v. Dircks, 211 Mo. 568, 111 S.W. 1, 4.
I can see nothing inconsistent or disturbing about extending the applicable provisions of § 18 to the City of St. Louis. The policy or wisdom of extending these1 privileges to charter counties was decided by the people who adopted the constitution; it is not a matter for the court’s consideration. McGrew v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 230 Mo. 496, 132 S.W. 1076; McGrew v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 258 Mo. 23, 166 S.W. 1033.
The City of St. Louis is within the class of eligible counties. It is not expressly excluded. Under well-established rules of construction, a fair and reasonable interpretation of these broad constitutional provisions is that the City of St. Louis was intended to have the same benefits as other charter counties.
I regret that time does not permit a better organized and more succinct statement of my views.