Court Opinion

ID: 9866334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 04:01:42.197104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:20:30.107774
License: Public Domain

In the above opinion,
Woodson, J.
(dissenting) says:
“I dissent from the majority opinion for the reason that the same rule of law applies to the facts of this case as if the injury had been inflicted by an automobile instead of being caused by the messenger’s body negligently coming in physical contact with the plaintiff. The messenger was performing the master’s business at the time he injured the plaintiff, and had it not been for that fact he would not have been pursuing the journey which resulted in the injury, and the mere fact that he sidestepped a few feet to gratify some personal desire does not change the rule. In that case, as in this, he would have been about the master’s business and the negligence in the one is identical with that in the other; the authorities cited abundantly so hold. ’ ’
While the Phillips case, supra, has never been directly overruled, still there is language in later decisions of the Supreme Court that we must accept as the last ruling case on the point involved that, at least by implication, overrules the Phillips case as applied to the fact as it appears in the case at bar.
In the ease at bar the defendant Filler is admitted to have used his ear in matters pertaining to his employment and the branch manager Wood specifically testified that he had no objection to Filler using the ear in his business.
In the case of Margulis v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 324 Mo. 1. c. 424, wherein all of the Judges of Division One of the, Supreme Court concur, it is said:
“Where, with the express or implied assent of the employer, the employee uses a vehicle which the employee owns in the discharge of his duties, the employer will be liable for any injury occasioned by its negligent operation by the employee while acting within the scope of his employment. [42 C. J., see. 900, p. 1128; 6 Labatt on Master and Servant, sec. 2282.]”
After a careful consideration of all cases cited in the briefs together with text comment and cases found in digests, we conclude that the law of the State of Missouri, according to the latest controlling cases, is correctly stated in Schmitt v. American Press (St. Louis Court of Appeals), 42 S. W. (2d) 969, 1. c. 972, as follows:
“No hard and fast rule can be laid down by which it would be possible to determine in every instance whether the driver of a motor vehicle, in the general employ of another, was acting within the scope of his employment at a given time, but rather each case is to be decided largely upon its own facts, merely keeping in mind the basic idea that the use of the vehicle at the time must have been in the service of the employer, or while about his business. [Borah v. Zoellner *358Motor Car Co. (Mo. App.), 257 S. W. 145; Wrightman v. Glidewell, 210 Mo. App. 367, 239 S. W. 574.] Of course, it makes no difference upon the question of the employer’s ultimate liability that the vehicle may belong to the servant himself, provided only that- the servant was driving if at the time and with the actual or implied consent of his employer and in the discharge of - the duties owed by the servant to him. [Margulis v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 324 Mo. 420, 23 S. W. (2d) 1049; Burgess v. Garvin, 219 Mo. App. 162, 272 S. W. 108; Gordner v. St. Louis Screw Co., 201 Mo. App. 349, 210
S. W. 920.]”
Having' reached the above conclusions as to the law, we, from a study of the evidence conclude that an issue of' fact was made for the jury on the question of whether or not Filler, the employee, was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident in question.
The case seems to have been fairly and orderly tried and properly submitted. Judgment affirmed.
All concur.