Court Opinion

ID: 9496076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:17:40.645457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:21.697892
License: Public Domain

*445GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
A review of the district court’s analysis makes clear that the court found that Lineback had failed to establish a “fair and just reason” for withdrawing his guilty plea under the first six Bashara factors. This court has previously held that where a defendant fails to show such a reason, the court need not consider the seventh Bashara factor of whether the withdrawal would prejudice the government. United States v. Alexander, 948 F.2d 1002, 1004 (6th Cir.1991).
In the present case, however, the district court proceeded to comment on the potential prejudice to both the government and the victims if Lineback were permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. These comments, in my opinion, were irrelevant to the denial of Lineback’s withdrawal motion in light of the district court’s determination that he had failed to establish a fair and just reason for withdrawal. Because I agree that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lineback’s motion, I concur in the result reached by the lead opinion.
On the other hand, I find troubling the district court’s mention of the emotional anguish to the victims as a factor to be considered in denying Lineback’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. I also disagree with the district court’s assessment that the “prejudice suffered by the victims here would result in prejudice to the Government.” (Lead Op. at 444) For these reasons, I write this concurring opinion to discuss the propriety of a district court’s consideration of prejudice to the government in the form of prejudice to the victims.
Generally, prejudice to the government has been found in cases where the entering of a guilty plea and then a subsequent motion to withdraw has made the government’s case more difficult than it would have been if the guilty plea had never been entered. E.g., United States v. Bryant, 640 F.2d 170, 172 (8th Cir.1981) (finding prejudice where three trials of codefend-ants had already occurred, giving the defendant a preview of the government’s case); United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600 (3d Cir.1973) (finding prejudice because physical evidence had been discarded); United States v. Vasquez-Velaseo, 471 F.2d 294 (9th Cir.1973) (finding prejudice because of the death of the chief government witness). The lead opinion, however, follows the reasoning of an opinion from the Eighth Circuit and suggests that prejudice to the victim, in the form of emotional anguish, can result in prejudice to the government. United States v. Morrison, 967 F.2d 264 (8th Cir.1992). This implies that prejudice will be found in forcing the government and its witnesses to prepare for trial in an emotionally-charged case that they thought had been resolved by the entry of a guilty plea.
Unlike my colleagues, I do not believe that the reasoning of Morrison applies here. In Morrison, the court noted that the guilty plea was entered on the eve of trial. The defendant’s subsequent attempt to withdraw the plea was found to be prejudicial because it would have forced the government to prepare a second time for trial, and caused the victim to suffer the mental anguish of a second preparation. Our case is distinguishable because there is nothing in the record to suggest that Lineback’s plea was made at a time when the government had already prepared for trial. Rather, the government here would simply be required to prepare and put on its proof as though the guilty plea had never been entered. The government has submitted nothing to indicate that preparation would be any more difficult. at this point than it would have been had Lineback never entered a guilty plea.
*446In my opinion, prejudice must mean something more than that the government will be forced to put on its proof, or that a witness will have to prepare for trial and testify in the first instance. United States v. Allen, 981 F.Supp. 564, 572-73 (N.D.Iowa 1997) (interpreting Morrison and other Eighth Circuit cases as requiring prejudice “beyond the necessity of taking a matter to trial, which merely requires the exercise of the defendant’s constitutional rights, instead of ‘pleading it out.’ ”).
The lead opinion seems to compare the position of the government and victims immediately before Lineback’s motion to withdraw was filed with what their position would be if his guilty plea is allowed to be withdrawn, and comes to the conclusion that the government will be in a less favorable position after the withdrawal. This, in my opinion, is not the correct comparison to determine prejudice. If it were, then there would always be a finding of prejudice to the government upon the withdrawal of a guilty plea. I would instead compare the position of the government and victims before Lineback pled guilty with what their position would be if the plea is allowed to be withdrawn. Based upon the record before us, I would conclude that they are similarly situated in all relevant aspects, thus precluding any basis to find prejudice.