Court Opinion

ID: 9906004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 19:00:48.631457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:03.703390
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10793        Document: 00516984803             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/30/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                       No. 23-10793                                   FILED
                                     ____________                             November 30, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   Durand Toson,                                                                      Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Myisha S. Taylor, Captain, Robertson Unit; Veronica A.
   Ference, Counsel Substitute III, Robertson Unit; FNU Whitfield,
   Unit Grievance Investigator, Montford Unit; Michael W. Collier,
   Investigator II, TDCJ French Robertson Unit,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:22-CV-61
                     ______________________________

   Before Jones, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Durand Toson, Texas prisoner # 2206334, sued the defendants under
   42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging retaliation against him for filing a sexual
   harassment complaint against an officer at the Texas Department of Criminal
   Justice’s Robertson Unit. Toson alleged that the defendants retaliated

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10793      Document: 00516984803           Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/30/2023

                                     No. 23-10793

   against him by charging him with disciplinary violations; failing to provide
   notice of, and thus an opportunity to appear at, his disciplinary hearing, at
   which he was convicted; forging his signature acknowledging receipt of the
   notice of charges; providing ineffective assistance of counsel at the hearing;
   and failing to adequately handle his ensuing administrative grievances. The
   district court concluded that Toson’s due process claims against Myisha
   Taylor and Veronica Ference were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
   (1994), and that, in any event, he failed to state a claim for relief as to all
   defendants, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The court dismissed the claim
   against Whitfield for improper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
          In connection with his appeal of the dismissal of his civil action, Toson
   moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), thereby challenging the
   district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See
   Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). We will grant IFP status if
   Toson’s appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits. See Howard v.
   King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). Although there is a nonfrivolous
   argument that the district court erred by finding Toson’s due process claims
   against Taylor and Ference Heck-barred, we nonetheless deny the IFP
   motion and dismiss the appeal because Toson’s underlying substantive
   claims are frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24.
          With respect to Taylor’s and Ference’s alleged violation of Toson’s
   due process rights in the conduct of his disciplinary hearing, see Wolff v.
   McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 566 (1977), Toson’s resulting punishment—
   the loss of various inmate privileges and a negative adjustment in his custodial
   status—did not plausibly impose “atypical and significant hardship” on him.
   Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Prisoners have no recognizable
   due process liberty interest in their custodial classification or various inmate
   privileges. See Butts v. Martin, 877 F.3d 571, 590 (5th Cir. 2017); Whitley v.
   Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 889 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Booth v.

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                                      No. 23-10793

   Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). And the effect of Toson’s classification
   adjustment on his subsequent denial of parole is at best speculative. See
   Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997). Toson also had no right
   to counsel in his disciplinary proceedings. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570.
          Toson likewise failed to assert a plausible denial of his due process
   rights with respect to Michael Collier’s handling of his administrative
   grievances because prisoners have no federally protected liberty interest in
   having grievances resolved to their satisfaction. See Geiger v. Jowers, 404
   F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005). Toson further fails to assert a nonfrivolous
   argument that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his claim
   against Whitfield for improper venue. See Balawajder v. Scott, 160 F.3d 1066,
   1067 (5th Cir. 1998); Caldwell v. Palmetto State Sav. Bank of S.C., 811 F.2d
   916, 919 (5th Cir. 1987).
          Toson failed to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against the
   defendants because he did not allege a chronology of events from which
   retaliation may plausibly be inferred. See DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 388
   (5th Cir. 2019). Toson’s harassment complaint was filed the same day as his
   disciplinary hearing and five days after disciplinary charges were filed. He
   now alleges, for the first time, that the complaint was filed on the same day
   as—but before—his disciplinary hearing. We do not consider facts that were
   not before the district court. See Theriot v. Par. of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491
   n.26 (5th Cir. 1999). In any event, on the pleaded facts, such an allegation is
   implausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
          Lastly, insofar as Toson alleged that the defendants conspired to
   violate his civil rights, that claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact because
   Toson failed to state a facially plausible claim of an underlying constitutional
   deprivation as to any of his claims. See Bevill v. Fletcher, 26 F.4th 270, 274-
   75 (5th Cir. 2022); Morris v. McAllester, 702 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 2012).

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                                     No. 23-10793

          Toson’s appeal does not involve any legal points arguable on their
   merits and is frivolous. See Howard, 707 F.2d at 220. Accordingly, the
   motion to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as
   frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24.
          The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a strike against
   Toson under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532,
   535-40 (2015); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996),
   abrogated in part on other grounds by Coleman, 575 U.S. at 537. Toson has
   accrued a prior strike based on the district court’s dismissal of another civil
   action as frivolous or for failing to state a claim. See Toson v. Freeman et al.,
   No. 1:22-cv-85, 2023 WL 4998063 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 24, 2023). Accordingly,
   Toson is WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be able
   to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or
   detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical
   injury. See § 1915(g).

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