Court Opinion

ID: 9890811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 15:09:32.92572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:24.160341
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued October 12, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00711-CV
                            ———————————
  ASCENT AVIATION, LLC, MICHAEL D. KING, AND KAREN KING,
                         Appellants
                                        V.
                  DOVENATOR HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 268th District Court
                           Fort Bend County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 21-DCV-284065

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      On December 17, 2021, the trial court entered a default judgment against

appellants Ascent Aviation, LLC, Michael D. King, and Karen King. Appellants

filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and motion for new trial on January
5, 2022, but they did not file a notice of appeal until October 3, 2022. For the

reasons outlined below, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                       Background and Procedural History

      Appellee Dovenator Holdings, LLC (Dovenator) filed suit against appellants

on June 4, 2021, asserting claims for breach of contract and fraud/fraudulent

inducement arising out of a loan agreement between the parties. After attempting

to serve appellants eight times at two locations, Dovenator filed a motion for

substituted service on July 6, 2021, and the trial court granted the motion. The

order permitted Dovenator to effectuate service by delivering a copy of the

citation, petition, and order to someone over the age of sixteen at the Kings’ usual

place of abode or their principal place of business; or by securely affixing copies of

the citation, petition, and order to the gate at the Kings’ residence.

      In accordance with the trial court’s order, Dovenator served appellants by

attaching copies of the relevant documents to the gate at the King’s residence on

August 12, 2021. When appellants still did not answer or otherwise appear in the

lawsuit, Dovenator moved for default judgment against appellants on October 21,

2021. Dovenator sought a judgment establishing appellants’ liability and awarding

damages to Dovenator in the amount of $725,812.93, plus post-judgment interest,

attorneys’ fees, and expenses. Though no record from the proceeding appears

before us, the appellate record indicates that the associate judge conducted a virtual

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hearing on the motion for default judgment on November 17, 2021. 1 The associate

judge then signed the default judgment against appellants on November 19, 2021,

as requested by Dovenator.

      On November 29, 2021, appellants filed an answer to Dovenator’s suit and a

counterclaim alleging fraud and intentional misrepresentation. However, on

December 17, 2021, the presiding judge signed the default judgment.2 Appellants

filed a “Motion for New Trial and Request to Set Aside Default Judgment” on

January 5, 2022, claiming that they did not learn they had been sued until Karen

King found the suit papers in the dirt outside her home on November 27, 2021. The

trial court set the motion for hearing on January 14, 2022; however, due to an

ongoing trial, the court continued the hearing to February 4, 2022. The day before

the scheduled hearing, the trial court’s administrator advised the parties the hearing

would need to be continued again due to inclement weather, and the parties

selected March 25, 2022 as the new hearing date.

1
      Appellants claim they did not receive notice of the hearing.
2
      Though the associate judge signed the default judgment on November 19, 2021,
      notice was not issued in accordance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 239a until
      after the presiding judge signed the default judgment on December 17, 2021. See
      TEX. R. CIV. P. 239a (“Immediately upon the signing of the [default] judgment, the
      clerk shall mail written notice thereof to the party against whom the judgment was
      rendered at the address shown in the certificate, and note the fact of such mailing
      on the docket.”). The parties agree that December 17, 2021 is the operative date of
      the default judgment.
                                           3
      Ultimately, during the March 25, 2022 hearing, the associate judge

suspended the proceedings, and the hearing on the motion for new trial resumed on

April 1, 2022.3 Though the associate judge orally granted the motion at the

conclusion of the hearing, she did not sign a written order granting the motion for

new trial until April 4, 2022, after the expiration of the court’s plenary power.

      On August 23, 2022, Dovenator filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s

April 4, 2022 order granting a new trial, arguing that because the trial court’s

plenary power expired on April 1, 2022, the order was void. Following a hearing,

the trial court granted Dovenator’s motion to vacate the order granting a new trial

on September 29, 2022. Appellants filed their notice of appeal on October 3,

2022.4

      On appeal, Dovenator contends that to the extent appellants attempt to

appeal the default judgment, we lack jurisdiction because appellants’ notice of

3
      As the parties repeatedly pointed out during the proceedings, April 1, 2022 was
      the 105th day after the filing of the motion for new trial—the last day of the trial
      court’s plenary power. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e) (providing that trial court
      retains plenary power to “vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment” for
      thirty days after motions for new trial are overruled, whether by written order or
      by operation of law, whichever occurs first). Here, the motion for new trial was
      deemed overruled by operation of law seventy-five days after the December 17,
      2021 default judgment, or on March 2, 2022. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c).
4
      Appellants did not file a notice of appeal challenging the default judgment. Rather,
      appellants’ notice of appeal explicitly states that they “appeal the Order to Set
      Aside and Vacate the Court’s April 4, 2022 order originally granting Defendants’
      Motion for New Trial which was signed and entered into by this Court on
      September 29, 2022.” (emphasis in original).

                                           4
appeal, due ninety days after entry of the default judgment, was not timely filed.5

Dovenator further argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the

trial court’s September 29, 2022 order vacating its April 4, 2022 order because that

order is not an appealable, final judgment.

                               Jurisdictional Analysis

      Before we can address the merits of this case, we must first determine

whether we have jurisdiction over the appeal. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air

Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Without a timely filed notice of

appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1; In re

K.L.L., 506 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

      Generally, a notice of appeal is due within thirty days after the judgment is

signed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. However, the deadline to file a notice of appeal is

extended to ninety days after the date the judgment is signed if, within thirty days

after the judgment is signed, any party timely files a motion for new trial, motion

to modify the judgment, motion to reinstate, or, under certain circumstances, a

request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a).

      Here, it is undisputed that appellants timely filed a motion for new trial on

January 5, 2022. Therefore, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1,

5
      Dovenator filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional grounds. After
      reviewing the briefing of the parties and relevant legal authority, we conclude that
      appellants’ notice of appeal was untimely, and we lack jurisdiction to consider
      their appeal.
                                           5
appellants had ninety days from the December 17, 2021 default judgment to file

their notice of appeal—or by March 17, 2022. Instead, appellants did not file their

notice of appeal until October 3, 2022.

      Appellants argue that even if they had filed a notice of appeal within ninety

days as instructed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, that notice “would

have been moot at the time of filing said notice of appeal premised on the

undisputed fact that the trial court, on April 1, 2022, granted Appellants’ motion

for new trial.” That would have been the case had the trial court granted the motion

for new trial within its plenary power. However, the trial court did not sign the

order granting appellants’ motion for new trial until April 4, 2022, after its plenary

power expired. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(c), appellants’ motion

for new trial was deemed overruled by operation of law seventy-five days

following entry of the December 17, 2021 default judgment, or on March 2, 2022.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c). At that point, appellants still had fifteen days left to

file a notice of appeal from the trial court’s default judgment, or until March 17,

2022 (ninety days after the entry of the default judgment). See TEX. R. APP. P.

26.1(a). The timely filing of a notice of appeal of the default judgment by March

17, 2022 would not have impacted appellants’ motion for new trial. In fact, rule

329b contemplates a situation where both a motion for new trial and a notice of

appeal are filed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e) (“If a motion for new trial is timely

                                          6
filed by any party, the trial court, regardless of whether an appeal has been

perfected, has plenary power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or

reform the judgment until thirty days after all such timely-filed motions are

overruled, either by a written and signed order or by operation of law, whichever

occurs first.”) (emphasis added).

      Appellants, both in their merits briefing and in response to Dovenator’s

motion to dismiss the appeal, outline numerous arguments as to why the trial court

retained jurisdiction until April 4, 2022. However, none of these arguments pertain

to this Court’s jurisdiction. Without a timely filed notice of appeal, this Court does

not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1; In re K.L.L.,

506 S.W.3d at 560. Even if the trial court had ruled on the motion for new trial

within its plenary power, this would not have extended the time for appellants to

file a notice of appeal because “the time for filing a notice of appeal runs from the

signing of the final judgment, not the subsequent denial of a motion for new trial.”

Morris v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 01-19-00610-CV, 2019 WL 4677365, at *2

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 26, 2019, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.)

(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1); N. Cent. Baptist Hosp. v. Chavez, No. 04-20-00590-

CV, 2021 WL 983351, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 17, 2021, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (same); Meuth v. Meuth, No. 03-18-00860-CV, 2019 WL 332270, at *1

n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 25, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); see also

                                          7
Naaman v. Grider, 126 S.W.3d 73, 74–75 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that

where trial court signed final judgment on May 3, and denied motion for new trial

by written order on June 1, notice of appeal filed August 25 and purportedly taken

from June 1 order was untimely; June 1 order was not final judgment and could not

be construed as modifying, correcting or reforming May 3 judgment so as to reset

appellate timetable).

      Further, “[a]n order denying a motion for new trial is not independently

appealable.”6 Fletcher v. Ahrabi, No. 01-12-00794-CV, 2012 WL 6082915, at *1

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2012, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.);

see also Wilson v. Avendano, No. 01-21-00631-CV, 2021 WL 5903920, at *1

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 14, 2021, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.)

(“[A]n order denying a post-judgment motion does not exist separate from the

underlying, appealable judgment, and is not independently appealable.”).

Therefore, the final, appealable judgment in this case is the trial court’s December

17, 2021 default judgment.

      To the extent appellants argue that their appeal is taken from the September

29, 2022 order vacating the April 4, 2022 order, we likewise determine that the

6
      If, however, the trial court grants a motion for new trial within its plenary power,
      even after it has been overruled by operation of law, this effectively reinstates the
      case on the court’s active docket and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction
      over the appeal. See North Burnet Gun Store, LLC v. Tack, 604 S.W.3d 587, 590
      (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.).

                                            8
September 29, 2022 order is not independently appealable. Appellants contend that

the September 29, 2022 order modified the default judgment and should be

classified as a “correction under [rule] 316” which “would therefore reset the

appellate timetable.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 316 (providing that “[c]lerical mistakes in

the record of any judgment may be corrected by the judge in open court according

to the truth or justice of the case after notice of the motion therefor has been given

to the parties interested in such judgment”).

      The Texas Supreme Court considered and rejected a similar argument in

Naaman, 126 S.W.3d at 74–75. Here, as in Naaman, nothing about the September

29, 2022 order corrected or modified the December 17, 2021 default judgment.

The order makes no mention of the default judgment but instead states that “the

Court’s Order of April 4, 2022 is to be vacated.” The September 29, 2022 order

“left the [default] judgment undisturbed”; therefore, rule 316 does not save

appellants’ untimely notice of appeal. See Naaman, 126 S.W.3d at 74.

      Here, because neither the April 4, 2022 order on the motion for new trial nor

the September 29, 2022 order vacating the April 4, 2022 order are “independently

appealable,” see Fletcher, 2012 WL 6082915, at *1; Naaman, 126 S.W.3d at 74–

75, and because appellants failed to file a timely notice of appeal of the trial court’s

December 17, 2021 default judgment (a final, appealable order), we lack

                                           9
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Wilson, 2021 WL 5903920, at *1; Fletcher,

2012 WL 6082915, at *1.

                                   Conclusion

      We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a),

43.2(f).

                                                         Amparo Guerra
                                                         Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Rivas-Molloy, and Guerra.

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