Court Opinion

ID: 9520401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:39:06.060554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:10.216673
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARTMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority decision on all points in this case except the discussion and disposition of whether defendant Cecil Thomas should have been advised of his eligibility for TASC as an alternative to sentencing and the potential advantages to him of electing such treatment, particularly where, as here, the liberty interest is involved. Thomas initially sought a TASC evaluation; however, he withdrew that request after “consulting” with his attorney. The majority here concludes that the circuit court reasonably could have assumed that defense counsel informed Thomas of the consequences of his decision. Although the assumption may have been reasonable, the statute, by explicit direction, makes mandatory the requirement that “the court shall advise him” of the alternatives to sentencing. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111%, par. 6323. It may well be that defense counsel “advised” Thomas of the contents of this statute. The record is entirely silent as to what that “advice” may have been or may not have been. On the other hand, the withdrawal of his application, an unusual step for one with Thomas’ history, was never explained and the record is devoid of any support for an assumption that Thomas is given the information necessary upon which to make an informed election. People v. Strange (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 43, 49, 465 N.E.2d 616; People v. Davis (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1098, 420 N.E.2d 1035. Having set forth in detail the terms and conditions upon which sentencing alternatives may be granted, it is unsatisfactory in my view to accept an assumption that defense counsel's conversation, of unknown length or specificity, if any, adequately substituted for. the mandatory legislative direction to the court to advise an individual of his or her right to elect an alternative program. The mere fact that a defendant may be aware of a program does not carry with it the inference that he or she may know of the contents of that program upon which to make an informed decision. It takes little additional judicial effort to make those points with a potentially eligible defendant as set forth in the statute so as to assure not only a defendant, but society as a whole, that appropriate efforts were made to remove one of the causes for continuing crime through implementation of this statutory program. For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the sentence of Thomas and remand with directions that he be advised properly by the court of the statutory election available to him.