Court Opinion

ID: 9532322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:20:18.038869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:44.012635
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN dissenting: I believe tire question posed by this case is not whether the limb was inherently dangerous, but whether the position of the limb, in its unnatural state, made it inherently dangerous. In my view, the cases cited by the majority are distinguishable. In each, the injury was not caused solely by the natural objects but was contributed to by the positive acts of a person. In Donehue and Landman the dirt and sand were thrown by a child. In Krakowiak, the plaintiff herself ran up the mound of earth causing her collision with the tree. See also, Reeves v. City of Springfield (1972), 5 Ill.App.3d 880, 284 N.E.2d 373. As stated in Donehue, at page 379: “* * * An injury is not actionable which could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated, and which would not have resulted had not some new and independent cause intervened to produce it. Driscoll v. Rasmussen Corp., 35 Ill.2d 74.” (Emphasis added.) In the instant case no intervening act is claimed. While ordinarily a tree branch five feet long and eight inches wide, per se, cannot be said to be inherently dangerous, a branch of that dimension left leaning against a tree could, to a reasonably prudent person, pose a foreseeable risk of danger to children playing near it. Under the facts of this case, it cannot be said as a matter of law that defendant is not liable. Whether the log in its position was inherently dangerous, was a material question to be determined by a jury. I would reverse the summary judgment of the lower court and remand this cause for further hearing.