Court Opinion

ID: 9930026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 23:02:15.710526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:58:02.497909
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/5/24 In re J.D. CA1/5
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FIVE

    In re J.D., et al., Persons Coming
    Under the Juvenile Court Law.

    SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH
    AND SOCIAL SERVICES
    DEPARTMENT,
                                                             A167852
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.                                                       (Solano County
                                                              Super. Ct. No.
    A.T., et al.,
                                                             J45190; J45191)
           Defendants and Appellants.

          Defendants and appellants A.T. (Mother) and J.D. (Father) appeal the
juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights as to their twin
children after a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26.1 Mother contends the court erred in ruling that the parental-benefit
exception did not preclude the termination of her parental rights. Father
argues that he was entitled to a continuance to explore tribal customary
adoption, that plaintiff and respondent Solano County Health and Social
Services Department (Department) did not discuss with the relative

1         All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                                        1
caregivers the possibility of a guardianship, and that the court erred in
finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable to him. Each parent joins
in the other’s arguments. We will affirm.
                    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      The Department filed its initial petition pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (b)(1) to declare then-seven-month-old twins(the subject of this
appeal), as well as their half-siblings, dependents of the juvenile court. The
petition alleged that the children had been exposed to domestic violence, that
both parents had a history of drug use, and that Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine at the twins’ birth. At the initial hearing, Father was
declared the twins’ presumed father, and the children remained in their
parents’ custody.
      On April 2, 2021, the juvenile court granted the Department’s request
for a protective custody warrant for the twins after the parents missed
several drug tests, Mother tested positive for amphetamines, THC, and
methamphetamines, the Department received a referral concerning
continuing drug use and violence in the home, and Mother denied the social
worker access to the children. The Department filed an amended dependency
petition, and the children were detained.
      A. Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing and Appeal
      After a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on June 18, 2021,
the juvenile court sustained allegations of substance abuse and domestic
violence and found that the twins were subject to section 300, subdivision (b).
The twins were placed out of home, and the parents were offered
reunification services. The parents’ case plan included assessments and
treatments for mental health and substance abuse, individual counseling,
parenting education, and random drug testing.

                                       2
      Mother appealed the jurisdiction and disposition orders, arguing that
the Department failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 (ICWA). The Department stipulated to a reversal and limited remand
on that ground. We reversed the juvenile court’s ICWA findings and
remanded for ICWA compliance (A163016).
      B. Sixth Month Status Review
      The Department filed a Six-Month Status Review Report on November
29, 2021, recommending that reunification services be terminated. The
report indicated that the Department had contacted the Kiowa tribe and
learned that the minors were eligible for membership. The social worker
helped Father submit membership applications that same day.
      The Department’s report advised that Father and Mother had
separated. Mother lived with a boyfriend; Father lived in a sober living
environment, and a worker assisted him with housing.
      Mother continued to have substance use issues, was not in a substance
abuse treatment program, continued to miss drug tests, and tested positive
for methamphetamine. She was terminated from therapy for poor
attendance but completed online domestic violence and anger management
classes. She was scheduled to visit the twins twice a week for one hour and
had not missed any visits. Mother was attentive, loving, and engaged with
the twins, but did better when the maternal grandmother attended visits
with her.
      Father did not comply with his case plan. He had not engaged in
counseling, parenting education, or substance abuse treatment. He
completed only five of 25 drug tests, and all five were positive for
methamphetamine and marijuana. Father visited the twins twice per week

                                        3
for an hour; he was very loving and his visits went well overall, but he had
difficulty keeping an eye on both children.
      C. New Disposition Hearing After ICWA Was Found to Apply
      Because of the remand for ICWA compliance, the juvenile court held a
new disposition hearing on March 23, 2022. The Department advised that
the twins were now enrolled members of the Kiowa tribe and ICWA applied.
A Qualified Indian Child Welfare Expert submitted a written declaration and
testimony. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that continued
parental custody was likely to cause serious emotional or physical damage to
the twins, that active efforts were made to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family, and that the twins’ placement was appropriate. Pursuant to a
stipulation, the court ordered an additional six months of reunification
services and set a combined six/12-month review hearing.
      D. Six/12-Month Status Review
      The Department filed a status review report in September 2022,
recommending termination of reunification services as to both parents.
      According to the Department’s report, Mother had told the social
worker that she moved into a sober living environment, but the social worker
confirmed that she had not. Mother completed 30 days of inpatient
treatment from March 8, 2022 to April 6, 2022, but thereafter participated in
only 11 of 30 drug tests. She tested positive for methamphetamine four
times, positive for alcohol one time, and positive for THC four times. She
attempted to deceive on her drug test samples twice. She told the social
worker that she was in a detoxification facility for a week, but the social
worker confirmed she was there for just two days. Mother participated only
partially in outpatient drug treatment. She reported that she was engaged in
mental health services, but the treatment provider confirmed she was

                                       4
removed from services due to her missed sessions. She did not appear for five
of 11 sessions of her domestic violence program but did complete some
parenting education.
      Father was reportedly homeless, and the housing worker was unable to
contact him. He did not comply with the counseling component of his case
plan, had not participated in parenting education or substance abuse
treatment, and missed all 44 drug tests during the reporting period.
      Mother had visits with the twins twice a week for an hour. The visits
were positive overall, but they remained supervised due to her inability to
maintain sobriety, her failure to follow recommendations for in-patient
treatment, and her lack of consistency with Therapeutic Visitation Services
(TVS). Mother was referred to TVS to obtain additional coaching during
visitation and to practice age-appropriate parenting strategies, but she did
not follow through.
      Father attended most of his weekly visits, which were still supervised.
The children were observed to respond to Father only about 65 percent of the
time, indicating an attachment issue. According to the visitation worker, it
was evident that Father loves the twins and enjoys spending time with them
and his visits were positive for them, but they needed therapy to address the
attachment issues. The twins were “very stiff” when they first walked into
visits with Father, and they were very irritable and fussy on the nights after
his visits.
      At the contested review hearing on November 1, 2022, the Department
made an offer of proof that arrangements were made for Father to be
transported to inpatient substance abuse treatment, which he claimed to be
interested in. Although an Uber driver dropped him off at the program, he

                                       5
did not enter. The parents objected to the recommendation to terminate
reunification services and submitted the matter for decision.
      The juvenile court terminated reunification services for Mother and
Father and set a selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26.
The parents were allowed to visit the twins twice per month for four hours
per month.2
      E. Section 366.26 Report
      In its February 2023 report for the section 366.26 hearing, the
Department recommended a permanent plan of adoption for the twins. The
twins had been placed with a maternal great-uncle and great aunt in
December 2022, and those relative caregivers wanted to adopt them.
      The Kiowa tribal representative reported that the tribe supported
adoption by the relative caregivers if the twins did not reunify with their
parents. She confirmed the tribe’s support for legal adoption with
termination of parental rights, rather than a tribal adoption.
      The children were assessed as generally adoptable. They were happy
toddlers who were growing and thriving in their placement with the relative
caregivers. They had no unmet needs. They could count to 16 and sing songs
such as the “ABC song.” They slept through the night and enjoyed attending
daycare three days per week. They had adjusted well to their placement and
were extra clingy to the relative caregivers after visits with their parents.
They had developed a routine, sought the relative caregivers for comfort, and

2
      The parents’ attorneys filed notices of intent to file a writ petition from
the order setting the section 366.26 hearing (A166496). (Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 8.450 & 8.452.) Their attorneys later filed letters stating they found no
arguable issue. (See Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570.)
No petition was filed, and the matter was dismissed.

                                        6
called the caregivers “daddy” or “papa” and “mom” or “mommy.” The
caregivers were engaging and positive with them.
      The former FFA (foster family agency) social worker reported that
there was a period when Mother did not attend visits consistently, claiming
she overslept or forgot. During visits, Mother and Father were attentive and
played with the twins, but the twins did not show any distress or hesitation
saying goodbye to them. The twins easily left the visits with the social
worker and appeared happy when they saw their relative caregivers.
      One of the relative caregivers supervised Mother’s visits for January
and February 2023. Mother was 55 minutes late to her visit on January 29,
2023. She and the maternal grandmother, who accompanied her, gave the
twins their phones and at times did not watch the children; the caregiver had
to chase down one of the twins as he ran toward the door.
      During the reporting period, Father missed one visit in November
2022. He attended two visits in December 2022, struggling at times to
engage both children at once. He visited on January 11, 2023, but never
appeared for his visit on January 23, 2023. The Department placed Father
on a visitation contract, requiring him to confirm his visits two hours
beforehand or they would be canceled; he failed to timely confirm his visit for
February 23, 2023, and it was cancelled. As a result, there was no visit in
February.
      The ICWA expert declaration reported that the tribe agreed to adoption
by the relative caregivers as opposed to a tribal customary adoption. The
expert agreed that continued parental custody was likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the twins, and that active efforts had been
made and services offered to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and
reunite the family. The expert observed that the children were in an ICWA

                                       7
preferred relative placement, which was the most appropriate and least
restrictive placement that met the twins’ needs.
      F. Mother’s Section 388 Petition
      In March 2023, Mother filed a petition under section 388, requesting
reinstatement of reunification services. The Department opposed, reporting
that since the termination of reunification services on November 1, 2022,
Mother had attended only six of 10 visits, she was 45 minutes late to a visit
in April and did not focus her full attention on the twins during the visit, she
had not enrolled in outpatient treatment, she failed to appear for a scheduled
drug test, and she was not returning the social worker’s calls.
      At a hearing on May 9, 2023, the juvenile court ruled that Mother
failed to make a prima facie showing and denied the section 388 petition.
      G. Contested Section 366.26 Hearing
      The contested section 366.26 hearing was held on May 11, 2023.
Mother was present. Father was not. His attorney did not know why he was
absent and requested a continuance. The Department objected, noting that
the social worker left written notice of the hearing along with Father’s gas
cards at the Department’s office and Father had signed for them. In addition,
the social worker had spoken to Father that week and reminded him of the
hearing. The court gave Father’s counsel time to phone and text him, but
Father did not respond. The court denied the continuance, finding that
Father had attended the previous hearing and was aware of this one.
      Social worker Kate Liouh testified that she had performed
approximately 200 adoption assessments over her 15 years in the adoption
unit. She observed the twins in their placement, where they had been for five
months. They had a very good relationship with their caregivers, seemed
very comfortable in the home, and sought out the caregivers for comfort when

                                       8
upset. Liouh testified that the twins were adoptable and the relative
caregivers wanted to adopt them.
      Liouh recounted issues with Mother’s visits, as reported by the relative
caregiver who supervised them. Mother had attended only six of 10 visits
during the reporting period, and the children had no difficulty transitioning
away from her at the end of visits.
      Father had also attended only six of 10 visits, and the twins had no
difficulty transitioning away from him. During one visit, Father attempted to
give the twins a hug, and one of them tried to get away from him. During
Father’s most recent visit on April 20, 2023, he lost his temper multiple times
when the children fought over toys and one spilled water. When one of the
twins cried for “mommy,” referring to the relative caregiver, Father yelled,
“she’s not your mommy!” When Liouh tried to intervene, he raised his voice
at her too.
      Mother testified that during her reunification period (which ended in
May 2023), she missed visits around times she was going into treatment
programs, but she claimed that the twins would run to her and call her
“Mommy,” that she comforted them when they got hurt, that she did
activities with them, that they were happy to see her, and that they would
cry when visits ended. Mother believed it would hurt the twins if her
parental rights were terminated because she was a mother figure to them
and was in their lives since they were born.
      On rebuttal, Liouh testified that she did not recall from the file or the
FFA social worker that the children screamed or cried at the end of Mother’s
visits, and based on her own observations in September 2023, the twins left
the visits easily.

                                       9
      Liouh opined that the benefits of adoption outweighed the benefits of
maintaining the parent-child relationship in this case. She added that the
relative caregivers wanted to make the “commitment of adoption,” and “if
given the choice[,] they wanted to adopt.”
      The tribal representative who attended the hearing recommended
termination of parental rights and adoption by the relative caregivers. The
ICWA expert’s declaration, which was accepted in lieu of live testimony,
concluded that the twins’ placement was “exceptionally positive,” safe, stable,
and secure, and the caregivers gave the twins the love, support, and
nurturing they needed. The ICWA expert confirmed that the tribe agreed
with the case plan.
      Father presented no evidence. His attorney asked the juvenile court to
select guardianship as the permanent plan.
      Mother’s lawyer argued that Mother established a beneficial
relationship with the twins and that severance of parental rights would be
detrimental to them.
      The juvenile court found the twins to be generally adoptable. Although
Mother had maintained consistent visitation and had a relationship with the
children, the relationship was not substantial. The court explained: “I didn’t
hear that this relationship was a substantial relationship, that it is a
substantial positive emotional attachment such that severing of parental
rights would cause substantial harm to them, and that harm would outweigh
the stability and the permanency of adoption.” The court considered the fact
that the twins were very young, that they lived away from Mother’s care for
nearly a year and a half, that they formed attachments with their caregivers,
and that they were finally in a place where they had caregivers willing to
provide them with permanency. The court found beyond a reasonable doubt

                                       10
that continued custody of the twins by the parents was likely to result in
serious physical and emotional damage to them, because it would disrupt
their stability and the consistency they had in their placement. In addition,
the court observed that Mother had not made any changes since termination
of reunification services to address the issues that brought her before the
court. The court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and
selected adoption as the permanent plan. Mother and Father filed timely
notices of appeal.
                               II. DISCUSSION
      Under section 366.26, the juvenile court selects from permanent plans
including adoption, legal guardianship, long-term foster care, and, where
applicable, tribal customary adoption. (§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1)–(b)(7).) Where,
as here, the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
child is likely to be adopted, the court must terminate parental rights and
order the child placed for adoption unless the “court finds a compelling reason
for determining that ‘termination would be detrimental’ based” on one of the
statutorily enumerated exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Autumn H.
(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573–574 (Autumn H.).) It is the parent’s burden
to show that exceptional circumstances should preclude adoption and
termination of parental rights. (Autumn H, at p. 574; In re A.S. (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 131, 152 [juvenile court presumes that terminating parental
rights is in the child’s best interests, and the parent has the burden to
demonstrate a compelling reason for deciding that termination would be
detrimental to the child due to one of six reasons enumerated in the statute].)
      Here, Mother and Father argue that the juvenile court should have
applied the parental-benefit exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(i). We disagree.

                                       11
      A. Parental-Benefit Exception
      The parental-benefit exception applies where “[t]he parents have
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The
parent must prove three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2)
a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3)
the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631–632 (Caden C.).) The first two elements
are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 640.) The third element
requires the juvenile court to “assess[] what the child’s life would be like in
an adoptive home without the parent in his life . . . by weighing the harm of
losing the [parental] relationship against the benefits of placement in a new,
adoptive home,” and that finding is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
            1. Mother Failed to Establish the Exception
      The Department concedes that, although Mother had periods when she
did not visit the children and only attended 60 percent of available visits
between the termination of her reunification services and the section 366.26
hearing, her visitation was reasonably consistent. However, Mother did not
establish the other two elements of the exception.
                   a. Beneficial Relationship Element
      The second element, whether Mother’s relationship was beneficial to
the children, required Mother to show that the twins had a “substantial,
positive, emotional attachment” to her. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 636; Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The focus is on the
child, and the relationship may be evaluated by considering factors such as
the child’s age, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the

                                        12
positive and negative effects of their interactions, and the child’s needs.
(Caden C., at p. 632; Autumn H., at p. 576.)
      Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that there
was no substantial attachment between the twins and Mother. The twins
were eight months old when they were removed from Mother’s care. By the
time of the section 366.26 hearing, they were almost three years old and had
spent over two years—the vast majority of their lives—outside of her care.
Mother had visitation twice per week (until services were terminated), but
she had not progressed beyond supervised visits. She failed to follow through
with TVS to obtain coaching and age-appropriate parenting strategies. From
the termination of services until the section 366.26 hearing, visits were
available twice per month, but Mother attended only six of 10 of them.
According to Liouh’s testimony and the social worker’s recorded observations,
the twins transitioned easily away from Mother at the end of her visits, and
the twins were more irritable and fussier after her visits.
      Mother points to her own testimony that the children would run to her
and call her “Mommy,” that she engaged in activities with them, that she
comforted them when they got hurt, that she and the children were
affectionate with one another, that they were happy to see her, and that they
would hug her and not want to let go when arriving and would cry and
scream when visits ended. However, Mother’s accounts of her visits were
contradicted by Liouh’s testimony, Department reports, and other evidence in
the case. We defer to the credibility assessments of the juvenile court, and it
is not our role to reweigh the evidence. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
942, 947; Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) Substantial evidence
supports the court’s conclusion that the relationship was not substantial.
(See In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 924 [“pleasant and cordial”

                                       13
parent-child visits are not enough by themselves to mandate a permanent
plan other than adoption].)
                  b. Detriment Element
      As to the third element, Mother had to show that the twins’
relationship with Mother was so important to them that the security and
stability of a new home would not outweigh its loss. (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 633–634.) She fails to demonstrate that the juvenile court
abused its discretion in concluding that she failed to do so.
      As mentioned, there was ample evidence that the twins had no
substantial relationship or bond with Mother. On the other hand, there was
ample evidence that an adoptive home would provide the twins with security
and stability. The twins were well-adjusted, happy, comfortable, growing,
and thriving in their placement with their relative caregivers and prospective
adoptive parents. The relative caregivers were positive and engaging with
the twins, who had no unmet needs. The twins had developed a routine and
sought the caregivers for comfort. The twins called the caregivers “daddy” or
“papa” and “mom” or “mommy.” Mother conceded that the relative caregivers
were taking excellent care of the children, and she believed they would
continue their commitment to the children. As the juvenile court further
noted, the twins were very young and they had been out of Mother’s care for a
substantial amount of time. Finally, the tribe agreed with the termination of
parental rights and legal adoption.
      Mother argues that the juvenile court improperly considered whether
she had “resolved the problems resulting in the dependency.” She notes that
the court stated, in explaining part of its reasons for its ruling: “I considered
the fact that since family reunification services ended in November, I didn’t
see and I didn’t hear any changes as they pertain to mom that indicated to

                                       14
me that the issues that brought her before the Court were actually addressed.
[¶] I do find and I find this beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody
of the child by the parent is likely to result in serious emotional and physical
damage to the child and that is because again it would disrupt the stability of
these minors, the consistency that they have in their placements, the fact
that I’m not convinced mother’s issues that brought her before the Court have
been addressed to the point that there are no safety concerns for the minors.”
(Italics added.) She argues that Mother’s ongoing problems cannot be
considered under Caden C.
      Mother is incorrect. Caden C. stated that a parent’s inability to
overcome the issues that led to the dependency cannot be used as a
“categorical bar” to the parental-benefit exception. (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at p. 637, italics added.) As Caden C. explains, “the parent’s
struggles with issues such as those that led to dependency are relevant only
to the extent they inform the specific questions before the court: would the
child benefit from continuing the relationship and be harmed, on balance, by
losing it.” (Ibid., italics added.) That was the general context in which the
juvenile court mentioned Mother’s struggles here. In any event, unlike
Caden C., the court in this case did not rely solely on the parent’s continued
struggles with substance abuse and failure to reunify. Here, substantial
evidence indicated there simply was not a sufficiently significant
relationship, the loss of which would outweigh the benefits of adoption, in
light of the twins’ age, time away from parental care, and the detriment that
would arise from a disruption of their current care.3 Mother fails to
demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

3     Mother’s reliance on In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1228–1229
and In re Dy.P. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 153, 168 is misplaced. In those cases,

                                       15
            2. Father Failed to Establish the Exception
      Father claims that he “met his burden to prove all three of [the]
elements” of the parental-benefit exception “and the juvenile court relied on
improper factors in deciding otherwise.” But Father did not invoke the
parental-benefit exception in the juvenile court. In any event, he fails to
demonstrate the exception would apply to him.
                   a. Forfeiture
      The failure to raise a statutory exception to adoption and termination
of parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing forfeits the issue on appeal.
(In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 292 [no sua sponte duty to
consider sibling relationship exception to adoption, so parent’s failure to raise
it in the juvenile court precludes her from raising it on appeal from
termination of her parental rights]; In re D.P. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282,
1292–1293 [forfeiture applies in dependency proceedings].)
      Father did not appear at the section 366.26 hearing, his attorney
presented no evidence on his behalf, and his attorney did not raise the
parental-benefit exception specifically. Father’s argument for the parental-
benefit exception, raised for the first time on appeal, is forfeited.
                   b. The Exception Did Not Apply
      Even if Father had not forfeited the issue, there was more than enough
evidence to support the rejection of the parental-benefit exception as to him.
      As mentioned, the second element of the exception requires the parent
to show that the child has a “significant, positive, emotional attachment” to
the parent. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)

the record was not clear that the juvenile court had relied on facts other than
the failure to overcome the issues that led to the dependency (without linking
that failure to the elements of the exception) or other improper factors.

                                        16
Considerations include the child’s age, the portion of the child’s life spent in
parental custody, the positive or negative effect of the interaction between the
parent and the child, and the child’s particular needs. (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 632.) Here again, the twins were removed from Father’s care at
eight months of age, and by the time of the section 366.26 hearing, they were
34 months old and had spent 26 of those months out of Father’s care. During
visits with Father, as late as the 12-month review, the twins were responding
to Father only 65 percent of the time and needed therapy to address their
attachment issues. They were stiff at the start of his visits and were fussier
and more difficult to comfort on the days Father visited. In the six months
before the section 366.26 hearing, Father participated in only six of 10 visits.
One of the twins had tried to escape from his attempt to hug them. Finally,
the twins easily transitioned from Father’s visits back to their caregivers.
      As to the third element, ample evidence, which we have already
described, supported the conclusion that any detriment to the twins in
terminating their relationship with Father was outweighed by the
permanency and stability of adoption.
      Father argues that the twins looked forward to his visits, he was
loving, and his visits were “generally good.” However, he ignores the
evidence to the contrary, and it is not our role to reweigh the evidence. He
fails to demonstrate error.
      C. Father’s Request to Continue the Section 366.26 Hearing
      Father contends “the juvenile court made an error of law when it
denied [his] counsel’s request to continue the section 366.26 hearing for
father’s presence, . . . specific to Indian children that allows for a continuance
for father to present tribal adoption as the more appropriate plan.” He notes
that section 352 gives the court discretion to continue a hearing upon a

                                        17
parent’s request and showing of good cause, provided the continuance is not
contrary to the minor’s interest (such as the minor’s need for prompt
resolution of custody status). (§ 352, subds. (a)(1), (2).) He also notes a
provision in section 366.24, which allows the juvenile court to continue a
section 366.26 hearing to allow a tribe to complete the proceedings necessary
for a tribal customary adoption. From this, he concludes the court had the
power to grant Father a continuance for this purpose. But Father never
requested a continuance for that purpose, and there was no basis for him to
do so.
               1. Forfeiture
         Father’s counsel requested a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing
solely on the ground that Father was absent and had not been in contact with
his attorney. There was no request to continue the matter so he could pursue
tribal customary adoption as the permanent plan. Furthermore, Father was
aware of the section 366.26 hearing as of the termination of reunification
services on November 1, 2022, but he never asked for an analysis of tribal
customary adoption at any of the five court hearings between the
six/12-month review and the section 366.26 hearing. Father has therefore
forfeited this argument. (In re D.P., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1292–1293;
In re I.P. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1526 [parent forfeited argument that
tribal customary adoption should have been considered by failing to assert it
in the juvenile court].)
         In his reply brief, Father argues that he did not forfeit the argument
because his lawyer sought a continuance of the hearing, and because the
issues at stake at the hearing included section 366.24 after the court had
found that the children were Indian and that ICWA applied. Not so. The
tribe had not pursued tribal adoption, so section 366.24 was not at issue.

                                         18
Father’s other arguments pertaining to whether he has standing are
immaterial.
              2. Tribe’s Right, Not Father’s
      Contrary to Father’s argument, section 366.24, subdivisions (c)(6) and
(c)(7), do not afford a parent the right to request a continuance to explore
tribal customary adoption.
      Section 366.24, subdivision (c)(6) states: “If the tribe identifies tribal
customary adoption as the permanent placement plan for the Indian child,
the court may continue the selection and implementation hearing governed
by Section 366.26 for a period not to exceed 120 days to permit the tribe to
complete the process for tribal customary adoption and file with the court a
tribal customary adoption order evidencing that a tribal customary adoption
has been completed.” (Italics added.) The statute allows only the tribe, but
not a parent, to identify tribal customary adoption as the permanent plan.
The tribe did not pursue tribal customary adoption, so section 366.24,
subdivision (c)(6), does not apply.
      Section 366.24, subdivision (c)(7) allows birth parents, among others, to
“present evidence to the tribe regarding the tribal customary adoption and the
child’s best interest.” (Italics added.) But that does not change the fact that
only the tribe can propose tribal customary adoption as the permanent
placement. Here, the tribe did just the opposite: it agreed with the legal
adoption by the relative caregivers as proposed by the Department.
      Father’s reliance on In re H.R. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 751 is misplaced.
There, the court of appeal determined that tribal customary adoption is the
preferred permanent plan for an Indian child if it is recommended by the
child’s Indian tribe. (Id. at pp. 761–762.) Tribal customary adoption is not

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available unless the tribe consents and participates. (Id. at p. 766; see In re
I.P., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1528–1529.) That did not occur here.
      D. Option of Relative Guardianship
      Father contends the social worker failed to tell the relative caregivers
about the relative guardian exception to adoption. According to Father, this
failure “deprived the juvenile court [of] any meaningful opportunity to
ascertain the child’s best interests under section 366.26, subdivision (h)(1)
and whether [the] relative guardian exception under section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(A) applied to preserve parental rights.” Therefore, Father
argues, the “court’s findings that no exceptions to adoption applied and
adoption was the best permanent plan for the children are not supported by
substantial evidence.” The argument is meritless.
      First, Father failed to raise the argument below. At the contested
366.26 hearing, Father’s counsel asked the juvenile court to select legal
guardianship as the permanent plan, but never argued that the court could
not terminate parental rights because the Department had failed to speak to
the care providers about possible permanency options. Thus, Father forfeited
the argument. (In re D.P., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1292–1293.)
      Second, Father’s assumption that the Department did not discuss the
option of guardianship with the relative caregivers is speculative. In fact,
substantial evidence supports the contrary conclusion: that the Department
did discuss relevant placement options with the caregivers. Liouh testified
that she usually talks to the caregivers about permanency and, in this case,
the caregivers did not say they refused to do a guardianship, but that they
wanted to adopt “if given the choice.” (Italics added.) This suggests they
were aware of at least two choices—adoption and legal guardianship.
Furthermore, Father cites no authority to support his argument that the

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Department was required to discuss every permanency option with the
relative caregivers.
      Third, the relative guardian exception to adoption does not apply here.
It applies only where the “child is living with a relative who is unable or
unwilling to adopt the child because of circumstances that do not include an
unwillingness to accept legal or financial responsibility for the child, but who
is willing and capable of providing the child with a stable and permanent
environment through legal guardianship, and the removal of the child from
the custody of their relative would be detrimental to the emotional well-being
of the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A); italics added.) Here, the relative
caregivers were willing to adopt the twins.
      Finally, and regardless of the foregoing, the juvenile court was not
deprived of the ability to appropriately assess permanency options. Both
parents’ attorneys asked the court to enter a guardianship rather than
adoption as the permanent plan. The option of a tribal adoption was not
possible, because the tribe did not pursue it. Overwhelming evidence
supports the conclusion that the court chose the best permanent plan for the
twins, consistent with section 366.26.
                               III. DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.

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                            CHOU, J.

We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.

In re J.D. / A167852

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