Court Opinion

ID: 9486730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:57:54.986644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:53.867676
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
While I concur in parts II, III, IV, and V of Judge Arnold’s opinion, and I concur in the result reached in this decision, I write separately to express my concern in this case about the unexplained delay of the district court in taking any action after receiving the psychiatric report on Jones’s competence in July, 1992. I recognize that in overruling this circuit’s decision in United States v. Ray, 768 F.2d 991 (8th Cir.1985), the Supreme Court, in Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986), held that Congress intended to exclude from the Speedy Trial Act’s seventy day limitation all the time between the filing of a motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a delay in holding that hearing is “reasonably necessary.” 476 U.S. at 330 (referring to § 3161(h)(1)(F)).
In Henderson, the Supreme Court noted that subsection (F) excludes time in two situations: “The first arises when a pretrial motion requires a hearing: subsection (F) on its face excludes the entire period between the filing of the motion and the conclusion of the hearing.” Id. at 329, 106 S.Ct. at 1876. “The second situation concerns motions that require no hearing and that result in a ‘prompt disposition.’” Id. In the second situation, the promptness requirement was “intended to provide a point at which time will cease to be excluded, where motions are decided on the papers filed without hearing.” Id. The “point at which time will cease to be excluded” is defined by subsection (J), “which permits an exclusion of thirty days from the time a motion is actually ‘under advisement’ by the court.” Id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(J)).
While I realize that the above language in Henderson is arguably dicta, since Henderson addressed a pending motion to suppress which requires a hearing; I, nevertheless, believe that the Court’s rationale is instructive in this case. It is clear in this circuit that once a defendant has been determined to be competent to stand trial, a hearing on competency is not required. See United States v. Goodman, 590 F.2d 705, 708 n. 5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985, 99 S.Ct. 1801, 60 L.Ed.2d 248 (1979). Therefore, I agree with Judge Arnold that subsection (J)’s thirty day exclusion is applicable. Therefore, I concur with Judge Arnold that the Speedy Trial clock began to run from August 22 through December 7, 1992, during which time the district court took no action.
The defendant, on December 7, 1992, did say to the court that “I am not using any sort of delaying tactics, it is not my intent to get this trial postponed.” He claimed a due process violation because of the “delay ... for a psychiatric evaluation.” I construe his December objection to relate to the earlier order for a competency examination. The district court, however, on its own motion in the exercise of its discretion, and I believe in the interest of justice, had ordered a psychiatric examination to be satisfied about the defendant’s competency to stand trial. See United States v. Antwine, 873 F.2d 1144, 1149 n. 7 (8th Cir.1989) (excluding delay resulting from proceedings to determine competency under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A)). It was the later delay until December 7, 1992, however, that caused the potential problem in this case. While the defendant and his counsel may have waived a legitimate speedy trial objec*1317tion before December 7, 1992, the successful prosecution of this often arrested defendant may have been placed in jeopardy by the district court’s inexplicable failure to act. Nevertheless, I conclude that the defendant failed to make a timely objection specifically challenging the delay between the receipt of the psychiatric report and the December 7, 1992, trial date. Therefore, I agree with Judge Arnold that the defendant waived his statutory right to a speedy trial.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.