Court Opinion

ID: 9737713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:32:54.683072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.862272
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Although I agree with the majority opinion with respect to the need to timely file a motion to correct errors and perfect an appeal I believe the intent of Indiana Rules *328of Procedure, Trial Rule 60(B)(8), was to provide an avenue whereby the trial judge in his discretion can vacate a previous judgment in order to achieve justice.
Dean Harvey has characterized Trial Rule 60(B)(8) as a catchall provision allowing the court to vacate a judgment within the residual power of a court of equity to do justice. Further, the provision is to be liberally construed to grant relief to a party on broad equitable grounds, where, under all the circumstances, a need for relief is clearly demonstrated. 4 W. Harvey, Indiana Practice § 60.17 at 215, 216 (1971).
The majority recognizes that a trial court’s decision concerning a Trial Rule 60(B) motion can only be reversed for a clear abuse of discretion. Discretion is a privilege accorded a judge within the confines of justice to act in accordance with what is fair and equitable. State on Relation of Thrasher v. Hayes, (1978) Ind.App., 378 N.E.2d 924. Such an abuse of discretion has been described as an erroneous conclusion and judgment, clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Campbell v. Campbell, (1979) Ind.App., 396 N.E.2d 142.
Given the trial court’s broad discretion in the matter, specific decisions must turn on the facts of a particular case. The trial judge should be given the requisite latitude to act on such a motion in a liberal fashion with an eye toward doing what is just. The fact that a motion to correct errors was not filed should be a factor for the trial judge to consider when ruling on the Trial Rule 60 motion, but once the trial court’s determination is made, this court should not second-guess the decision. Rather, we should look to determine if there is evidence to support the trial judge’s action, and if so, it should be affirmed. If, however, the facts of the particular ease do not reveal that a just result would be reached, then the granting of the Trial Rule 60 motion, when it is being used as a substitute for a timely appeal, would be an abuse of discretion.
Here, the trial judge recounted the dilemma faced in his prior decision, caused in part by Gaddis’s attorney’s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law as requested by the court. The extraordinary circumstances relied on by the trial judge in granting the motion included the facts that: there was error manifest on the face of the record; the parties would stand in the same position in which they stood immediately prior to the judgment entered on May 12, 1978; correction of the May 12, 1978 judgment would not injure any innocent third parties, and; the administration of justice would be served by the court granting the relief prayed for.
I believe the record reveals a just reason for the trial judge’s decision. Hence, under the factors of this case, I would not find his action to be an abuse of discretion. While I recognize the importance of certainty as it relates to the finality of a judgment, I am cognizant that at times, the overriding interest of the administration of justice requires the renewed scrutiny of an action once thought decided. I find that such an interest is served by the trial judge’s decision in this case. Therefore, I would not find his actions to be an abuse of discretion and consequently, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.