Court Opinion

ID: 9519296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:13:36.217129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:16.179438
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
The version of events surrounding Richardson’s interrogation, according to the detective in charge of that interrogation, established that Richardson was arrested at 6:30 a.m. Later that same morning the two police interrogators went to his holding cell and asked him if he would *66come down to the detective bureau and appellant stated he would. No other words were spoken at that time. Appellant was taken to an interrogation room. The two interrogators entered the room. The interrogator described the very next events in his testimony given at the hearing on the motion to suppress:
“We put him into one of the interrogation rooms, advised him of his rights, told him that we were investigating the matter and asked him if he had any statement to make.
And what was his response?
He stated that he would. He first gave an oral statement.
* * *
You read them [Miranda rights] off of a card?
Yes, sir.”
The interrogator listened to appellant’s entire statement about what had happened for about ten minutes. Appellant was then read another advisement of rights from a blank waiver and statement form. According to the testimony of the interrogator the following colloquy between appellant and the interrogator then took place.
“Q. And that’s all ?
A. He asked about a lawyer and I says you’ll get one appointed for you in court.
Q. He asked about a lawyer? And you said one would be appointed in court?
A. Right. He didn’t ask to have a lawyer present.
Q. He asked about a lawyer though, didn’t he?
A. Yes, he did.
* * *
Q. But when he asked about a lawyer, you told him one would be provided at arraignment?
A. Yes, I believe I did.”
The State had the burden to demonstrate that Richardson intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to consult with appointed counsel, prior to giving the first oral statement at the interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; Magley v. State, (1975) 263 *67Ind. 618, 335 N.E.2d 811; Nacoff v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 97, 267 N.E.2d 165. The foregoing recital of the facts is the sum and substance of the evidence presented by the State to satisfy that burden. It was insufficient. Between the advisement and the start of the oral statement Richardson did not manifest his intent to relinquish this right. There was no specific statement that Richardson was willing to forego this right. And a waiver of the right to consult with counsel cannot be inferred from simply agreeing to give a statement in the aftermath of an advisement of rights, especially where as in this case the person being questioned subsequently asks questions about how and when he might make a connection with a lawyer upon reading an advisement of rights prior to executing a formal written waiver.
“[A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 386 U.S. 475, 86 S.Ct. 1628.
The conviction of appellant Faulkner should be affirmed and a new trial ordered for appellant Richardson.
Prentice, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 373 N.E.2d 874.