Court Opinion

ID: 9663531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:41:50.029285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:51.400236
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
Although I concur in the result of this writing, there are cases cited to support its holding which, over a period of a decade, I have academically disagreed with, so do not wish to place my imprimatur on those holdings.
In Baltzer, cited in the majority opinion, I concurred specially and set forth a decade of writings and holdings on alimony in this Court. I do not wish to deviate from the spirit of ten years’ effort by unconcernedly concurring in this opinion, and so re-adopt, hereby, the spirit of one decade’s research and writing.
In Bradeen, also cited in the majority opinion, I dissented and set forth seven cases to what I termed the “growing, flourishing alimony business /decisional law of this state.” Bradeen, 430 N.W.2d at 91. In my special writing in Baltzer, I specifically saw fit to set forth the differences between rehabilitative alimony and (a) temporary alimony, (b) reimbursement alimony, (c) permanent support, (d) restitutional alimony, (e) property awards, and (f) child support, by citing special writings in this Court. Baltzer, 422 N.W.2d at 592.
By referring to the special writing in Baltzer, ten years of alimony writings in this Court may be gathered for students of domestic relations law in this state; then seven cases cited in the dissent in Bradeen may be added to supplement the history of the flourishing alimony business/decisional law of this state. Since Bradeen, two more divorce cases have been handed down by this Court, namely, Hilbrands v. Hilbrands, 429 N.W.2d 750, 753 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., dissenting), and Pengra v. Pengra, 429 N.W.2d 754, 757 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).1 Hilbrands, however, was a divorce case involving property settlement and did not involve alimony. Though virtually all of the assets were accumulated during the course of the marriage in Hilbrands, this Court affirmed a 70% award of property to wife and 30% award to husband. I decried unfair treatment to men in divorce cases in South Dakota, and expressly said so, Hilbrands, 429 N.W.2d at 754. In Pengra, the circuit judge had the temerity (apparently), under the evidence, to reduce alimony payments, after full hearings, from $725 per month to $594.50 per month. This Court, predictably, reversed this reduction in alimony to which I dissented. My dissent, inter alia, was based upon the fact that a professor had attained the age of sixty years and earnestly desired to cut down his workload. But the message rang out clearly: Work on, work on for alimony.
In this case, due to mixed signals emanating from this Court over a period of years, a circuit court judge, who is now retired, was clearly unable to distinguish permanent alimony, rehabilitative alimony, and restitutional alimony. In Hautala, cited in the majority opinion, and distinguished in my special writing in Baltzer, I analyzed previous decisions, cited in the majority in Hautala, for the proposition that the cited decisions in the Hautala majority were inapposite. Said case was decided January 6, 1988. As my Indian Brothers say, not too many moons ago. I called the majority opinion inherently flawed and I was opposed to the ten-year rehabilitative alimony award for the reason *747that it is contrary to all respectable authority in the United States. In citing Shafer v. Shafer, 283 S.C. 205, 320 S.E.2d 730 (1984), a respectable authority’s decision was highlighted for its rationale that
a trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony of $300 per month for sixty months was remanded by the appellate court to the trial court for a redetermination where there was no factual finding as to the rehabilitative goal that the alimony was to serve; and, additionally, where the duration bore no reasonable relationship to wife’s educational timetable.
Hautala dissent, 417 N.W.2d at 884-85.
In my opinion, one of the reasons that the circuit court judge either erred or mistakenly awarded the wrong kind of alimony was because of this statement in Hautala, 417 N.W.2d at 882: “[T]he issue is not the name placed on alimony, but whether the record supports the award.” I deplored that all-sweeping generic language then, and I deplore it now. It is like saying, “Let’s award her alimony, but the name we put on it doesn’t make one particle of difference.” Well, those words have come home to roost in the case now before us. Further, I deplore this lack of clarity of expression and language because it permits trial judges to loosely award alimony. For years, I have written and tried to distinguish the conceptual theory/reasons underlying an award of alimony, which reasons create the type of alimony to be or not to be awarded. If you pursue a general, misty, sweeping viewpoint towards an award of alimony, without riveting in on the facts and the purpose of the award, as a judge or Justice or lawyer, you get caught in a conceptual trap. I am further opposed to these awards of alimony being based upon the citation of secondary authorities, such as a broad statement in a treatise like C.J.S. or Am.Jur.2d. True, they are indeed respectable authorities. However, alimony awards, like all cases, must be based upon a case-by-case analysis. These general statements should be the beginning of the research, not the end. Relying on encyclopaedias, can bog you down — stifling the specifics of an issue. It can obscure the case-by-case analysis which is so vital to a good judgment. For this Court to now reaffirm bad law on the books (Hautala’s wide-sweeping declaration), which is an open sesame to error for trial judges in the future, is somewhat akin to watching a carpenter hit himself, with a hammer, twice on the thumb.

. Hopefully, these above citations should inform the reader of an up-to-date bibliography of alimony cases in this state.