Court Opinion

ID: 9913019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 17:08:34.157467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:46.529619
License: Public Domain

J-S41026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CHRISTOPHER COURTNEY MCCALLA                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1469 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 6, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0001038-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                           FILED: December 26, 2023

       Appellant, Christopher Courtney McCalla, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on July 6, 2022, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s

post-sentence motion on November 17, 2022. We affirm.

       The trial court ably summarized the underlying facts of this case:

         [On] February 16, 2021 at approximately 12:21 [p.m.,]
         Trooper Timothy Reilly (herein "Trooper Reilly") was on patrol
         on State Route 28 in the area of the Natrona Heights exit.
         Trooper Reilly observed a vehicle in front of him swaying in
         its lane of travel, traveling below the speed limit to an unsafe
         degree, and after running the vehicle's license plate
         discovered that the vehicle's registration was expired.
         Trooper Reilly proceeded to conduct a traffic stop.

         Trooper Reilly testified that upon approaching the vehicle and
         making contact with the driver he immediately smelled a
         strong odor of burnt marijuana emanating from inside of the
         vehicle.  [Appellant] could not produce a license but was
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S41026-23

       identified as Christopher McCalla from his social security card
       and passport. [Appellant] was able to produce a registration
       card for the vehicle which indicated that the registration was
       expired. [Appellant] stated to the Trooper that he did not
       have insurance for the vehicle.

       During this interaction, Trooper Reilly observed that
       [Appellant] had glassy, watery, bloodshot and "very droopy"
       eyelids. Trooper Reilly observed that [Appellant’s] pupils
       seemed to be pinpoint. Further, Trooper Reilly observed
       [Appellant’s] speech was drawn out and slow, his
       mannerisms were very slow and that he was having a hard
       time answering questions. Trooper Riley testified that while
       speaking to [Appellant], he appeared to be very tired.

       Trooper Reilly believed [Appellant] was showing signs of
       impairment and requested [Appellant] perform standardized
       field sobriety tests based on those observations. During the
       walk-and-turn test, [Appellant] failed to stay in the start
       position, took eight steps instead of nine, and then did an
       improper turn. [Appellant] took nine steps backward but
       missed heel-to-toe steps on steps three and seven. The next
       test conducted was the one-legged stand.          [Appellant]
       swayed throughout and put his foot down three times in 26
       seconds. Trooper Reilly discontinued the test at 26 seconds
       because [Appellant] never raised his foot back up. Trooper
       Rielly testified both test results indicated [Appellant] was
       impaired at the time.

       Trooper Rielly performed two Advanced Roadside Impaired
       Driving Enforcement (herein "ARIDE") tests which are
       primarily focused to detect impairment from a controlled
       substance. The tests conducted were "lack of convergence"
       and the modified Romberg test to which [Appellant’s]
       performance indicated signs of impairment. Trooper Reilly
       continued the ARIDE evaluation and asked [Appellant] to
       open his mouth. He observed [Appellant’s] tongue was tinted
       green and that his taste buds were raised, which he testified
       was an indicator of recent marijuana use according to his
       training.

       [Appellant] was taken into custody and agreed to submit to
       drug recognition expert (herein "DRE") evaluation.
       [Appellant] refused to undergo a blood test and signed the

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         DL26 form.    The Commonwealth admitted into evidence,
         Exhibit One the DL26 form and Exhibit Two the Trooper's
         body cam footage depicting the field sobriety tests.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/23, at 1-3 (citations omitted).

       Following a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of driving under the

influence of a controlled substance (“DUI”)1 and, on July 6, 2022, the trial

court sentenced Appellant to serve six months of probation for his conviction.

See N.T. Sentencing, 7/6/22, at 6-9. Appellant’s timely post-sentence motion

was denied by operation of law on November 17, 2022 and Appellant filed a

timely notice of appeal. Appellant raises one claim on appeal:

         Whether the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to
         convict [Appellant] of DUI under Section 3802(d)(2) where
         the testimony consisted only of boilerplate accusations of
         impairment, and it failed to prove that [Appellant] drove in
         an unsafe manner?

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

       We review Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge under the

following standard:

         The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
         evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
         in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
         sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
         element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying
         the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
         our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we
         note that the facts and circumstances established by the
         Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
         innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
         resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2).

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        and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact
        may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
        Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
        element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
        of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
        above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
        evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
        trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
        and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe
        all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Callen, 198 A.3d 1149, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

      Appellant was convicted of DUI under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). This

section declares:

        An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical
        control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the
        following circumstances:

                                      ...

            (2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
            combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the
            individual's ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual
            physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2).       “[T]o convict a defendant under [Section

3802(d)(2)], the Commonwealth must establish three elements: 1) that the

defendant drove; 2) while under the influence of a controlled substance; and

3) to a degree that impairs the defendant's ability to drive safely.”

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 309 (Pa. Super. 2023).

      In general, Section 3802(d)(2) does not require “expert testimony to

establish that the defendant's inability to drive safely was caused by ingestion

of a drug, even if it is a prescription drug, or drug combination.”

                                      -4-
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Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231, 1238 (Pa. 2011). The section

also “does not require that a drug be measured in the defendant’s blood” and

it does not “specify any particular manner by which the Commonwealth is

required to prove that the defendant was under the influence of a drug.” Id.

at 1239. “Instead, impairment evidence should be drawn from the totality of

the factual circumstances.” Spence, 290 A.3d at 309.

      The trial court explained why the evidence supported Appellant’s Section

3802(d)(2) conviction:

        Trooper Reilly observed [Appellant’s] vehicle swaying within
        its lane of traffic and traveling at an unsafely slow speed on
        a major state highway.           Upon making contact with
        [Appellant’s] vehicle[, Trooper Reilly] observed the smell of
        burnt marijuana and noticed [Appellant’s] physical
        symptoms, which in his training and experience, indicated
        [Appellant] was under the influence. Finally, [Appellant’s]
        poor performance on field sobriety tests and ARIDE tests [led
        the Trooper] to believe [Appellant] could not safely operate
        his vehicle on the roadway due to impairment.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/23, at 3-4.

      On appeal, Appellant takes issue with the trial court’s statement, in its

February 2023 opinion, that “Trooper Reilly observed [Appellant’s] vehicle

swaying within its lane of traffic.” See id.; Appellant’s Brief at 19. According

to Appellant, this factual finding contradicts the trial court’s earlier statement

from the bench, where it declared:

        I've reviewed the testimony and evidence in this case
        including the dash cam that we all watched. . . . The video
        was a dash cam. And I will say that I did not observe that
        [Appellant] was weaving and swaying. So that's not a factor
        in my decision, the factors that I have considered. However,

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         from the video -- in fact from the video his driving was
         appropriate. He stayed within the lanes for the short period
         of time that we got to observe on the video. And he used his
         turn signals at the appropriate times.

N.T. Trial, 6/7/22, at 2-3.

      At the outset, the factual findings the trial court made in its February

2023 opinion and during its June 2022 statement from the bench do not

necessarily conflict.    During Trooper Reilly’s testimony, Trooper Reilly

explained that, when he first noticed Appellant, Appellant was “weaving in

[his] lane of travel” but that Appellant “actually stopped weaving in [his] lane

of travel . . . when [he] got closer to [Route] 28.” N.T. Trial, 6/6/22, at 10-11.

Specifically, Trooper Reilly testified:

         [Trooper Reilly]: While traveling west on Burtner Road, I
         observed [Appellant’s vehicle] in front of my patrol vehicle. I
         observed that the vehicle was weaving in its lane of travel.
         It then turned onto the onramp. It turned left from Burtner
         Road onto the onramp to get onto PA-28.

                                          ...

         So the vehicle, while it was traveling west on Burtner Road,
         was weaving in its lane of travel. And then when it was on
         the onramp it was weaving.         At that time, I ran the
         registration through my mobile data terminal, through the
         CAD system, which was showing that the registration was
         expired 11 of '20. We proceeded onto PA 28 Southbound.
         The vehicle was traveling between 50 and 55 miles per hour,
         which is a posted 65 miles per hour zone, which is very
         dangerous for that roadway.

                                          ...

         [The Commonwealth]: Are you able to tell me how many
         times you saw the vehicle weaving?

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          [Trooper Reilly]: Approximately, three or four times. When I
          got behind it on the onramp when it got closer to 28, it
          actually stopped weaving in its lane of travel and proceeded
          onto 28.

Id.

      Given this testimony, it is not inconsistent for the trial court to declare

that, “for the short period of time that we got to observe on the [dash cam]

video,” it observed Appellant driving appropriately and, at the same time,

crediting Trooper Reilly’s testimony that, when the Trooper first noticed

Appellant, Appellant was “weaving in [his] lane of travel” and Appellant

“actually stopped weaving in [his] lane of travel . . . when [he] got closer to

[Route] 28.” See id. From this testimony, it appears as though Trooper Reilly

saw Appellant weaving prior to recording Appellant’s vehicle on his dash

camera.

      Further, and regardless, the evidence was clearly sufficient to support

Appellant’s DUI conviction.      First, Trooper Reilly testified that, when he

approached Appellant’s vehicle, he observed Appellant in the driver’s seat of

the vehicle and smelled “a strong odor of burnt marijuana coming from within

the vehicle.” N.T. Trial, 6/6/22, at 11-12. Second, Trooper Reilly testified

that he observed outward signs that Appellant was impaired by marijuana.

Specifically, Trooper Reilly testified:

          [Appellant’s] eyes were glassy, watery, and bloodshot. His
          eyelids were very droopy. His pupils seemed to be pinpoint.
          His speech was [drawn] out and slow. His mannerisms were
          very slow and he was having a hard time answering
          questions. While speaking to him, he appeared very tired.

                                          -7-
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Id. at 12.

       Finally, Trooper Reilly testified that Appellant further demonstrated the

depth of his impairment when Appellant failed to successfully perform the

multiple field sobriety tests that Trooper Reilly administered.2     See id. at

14-20.

       Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, this evidence

is sufficient to establish that Appellant drove his vehicle “under the influence

of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impair[ed Appellant’s]

ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement

of the vehicle.” See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2); see also Griffith, 32 A.3d

at 1240 (holding the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s

Section 3802(d)(2) conviction where the evidence demonstrated that the

defendant:     was having a hard time standing; was having a difficult time

lighting a cigarette because her hands were shaking; was unable to perform

three field sobriety tests; and, had later blood tests that revealed the presence

of valium and nordiazepam); c.f. Commonwealth v. Graham, 81 A.3d 137

____________________________________________

2 We further note that Appellant refused Trooper Reilly’s request to submit to

a blood test. N.T. Trial, 6/6/22, at 20. This evidence “may be considered
along with other factors” as supporting a conviction under Section 3802(d)(2).
See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(e) (“In any summary proceeding or criminal
proceeding in which the defendant is charged with a violation of section 3802
. . . , the fact that the defendant refused to submit to chemical testing as
required by subsection (a) may be introduced in evidence along with other
testimony concerning the circumstances of the refusal. No presumptions shall
arise from this evidence but it may be considered along with other factors
concerning the charge”).

                                           -8-
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(Pa. Super. 2013) (holding:       the evidence was sufficient to support the

defendant’s conviction for driving under the combined influence of alcohol and

a drug or combination of drugs, in violation of Section 3802(d)(3), where the

evidence established that the defendant: “drove her vehicle in a slow, odd,

and reckless manner; continued to speak on her telephone when the officer

approached her vehicle; had slurred, slow speech and glassy, bloodshot eyes;

required assistance to exit her vehicle; required assistance to stand; failed

every one of the officer's field sobriety tests; . . . emanated an odor of alcohol”

and admitted that she had recently ingested three prescription drugs);

Commonwealth v. Feathers, 660 A.2d 90 (Pa. Super. 1995) (holding: the

evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for driving under

the influence of alcohol, under the general impairment statute, where the

evidence demonstrated that the defendant had glassy, bloodshot eyes, slurred

speech, a strong odor of alcohol on her breath, was unable to stand without

support, and failed field sobriety tests); Commonwealth v. Kowalek, 647

A.2d 948 (Pa. Super. 1994) (the Commonwealth’s evidence established a

prima facie case that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe

driving where the officer testified that the defendant “had a strong odor of

alcohol about him and bloodshot eyes . . . [,] had difficulty producing his

driver's license and registration, had slurred speech and was unable to stand

on one foot for more than three seconds”).

      Appellant’s sufficiency claim thus fails.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

 12/26/2023

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