Court Opinion

ID: 9427093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:19:42.659981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:04.866041
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Given the Court’s reading of the Voting Rights Act in prior decisions, and particularly in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969), and Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), I concur in the judgment of the Court. In addition, I concur in Part III of the Court’s opinion.
Although my reservations as to the constitutionality of the Act have not abated,* I believe today’s decision to be correct under this Court’s precedents and necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, as construed in Allen and Perkins. In view of these purposes it does not make sense to limit the preclearance requirement to political units charged with voter registration. As the majority observes, ante, at 124, such a construction of the statute could enable covered States or political subdivisions to allow local entities that do not conduct voter registration to assume responsibility for changing the electoral process. A covered State or political subdivision thereby could achieve through its instrumentalities what it could not do itself without preclearance.
*140I agree with the Court that a more sensible construction of § 5, in view of and in accord with the statute’s purpose, is to treat the governmental units responsible for changes in the electoral process within a designated State or political subdivision as the equivalent of the State or political subdivision. This construction also accords with Congress’ understanding, cited by the District Court, that the designation of a State would imply the designation of its political subdivisions. In such a situation, the reason for including the political subdivisions is not that they are defined in § 14 (c) (2) and therefore might have been designated separately. Their eligibility for designation apart from the State is without significance once the entire State has been designated. Rather, the political subdivisions are covered because they are within the jurisdiction of the designated unit and might be delegated its authority to enact or administer laws affecting voting. Because the same is true of a governmental unit like the city of Sheffield that is not a “political subdivision” within the meaning of § 14 (c)(2), I agree with the Court that it too is subject to § 5 and must comply with its requirements.

See Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 595 (Black, J., dissenting) (1969); Georgia v. United States, 411 U. S. 526, 545 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting). My reservations relate not to the commendable purpose of the Act but to its selective coverage of certain States only and to the intrusive preclearance procedure.
I agree with much of what Mr. Justice Stevens says in dissent, but unless the Court is willing to overrule Allen and its progeny — a step it has refrained from taking — I view those decisions as foreshadowing if not compelling the Court’s judgment today. I nevertheless record my total agreement with Mr. Justice Stevens’ view of the Act’s preclearance requirement, post, at 141.