Court Opinion

ID: 9780987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 15:05:41.481247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:24.370703
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 352
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                      DIVISION I
                                      No. E-22-601

 HERMAN HAMPTON                               Opinion Delivered August 30, 2023
                              APPELLANT
                                              APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
                                              BOARD OF REVIEW
 V.
                                              [NO. 2022-BR-00238]
 DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF           AFFIRMED
 WORKFORCE SERVICES, AND
 UNCLE CHARLIE’S AUTO
                       APPELLEES

                               BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

       Appellant Herman Hampton appeals the denial of his claim for unemployment

benefits. We affirm.

       On July 7, 2021, the Division of Workforce Services (DWS) issued a determination

denying Hampton’s application for unemployment benefits. DWS found that Hampton was

discharged from work for misconduct in connection with work pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.

§ 11-10-514 (Supp. 2021) because he was absent from work and failed to properly notify his

employer. Hampton appealed the agency’s denial to the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal). Neither

Hampton nor his employer appeared at the August 3, 2021 hearing to present testimony

regarding Hampton’s separation from work, and on the basis of the evidence provided, the

Tribunal found that Hampton had been dismissed for misconduct in connection with work.
Hampton timely appealed to the Board of Review (Board), asserting that there was new

evidence that he did not commit misconduct in connection with work, and he could not

present the evidence because the hearing officer closed the hearing before he could attend.

The Board remanded the case to the Tribunal to conduct a reopening hearing to determine

whether Hampton had good cause for failing to appear at the August hearing. The Tribunal

found that Hampton had shown good cause for failing to appear, and a new hearing was

scheduled.

       Hampton was the only witness at the January 6, 2022 hearing. Hampton testified that

on September 17, 2019, he explained to his employer’s mother (who was also the business

manager) that he needed to go to California to be with his daughter who was having a

medical emergency. Hampton worked through September 19, and after work, he left for

California. When he arrived back at work on September 24, Hampton’s employer told him

that he no longer required Hampton’s services as a mechanic. The Tribunal affirmed DWS’s

decision to deny benefits, relying on Hampton’s July 6, 2021 written claimant’s statement to

DWS. The Tribunal affirmed DWS’s decision to deny benefits, finding that Hampton had

indicated that

       he did not return immediately due to having problems with his car and that he could
       not get back to work when he was scheduled. He further indicated that he contacted
       the employer a day or so later. He then was informed by the employer that he was
       discharged. Therefore, the claimant was discharged from last work for misconduct in
       connection with the work on account of no call no show.

       Hampton appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Board. The Board affirmed the

Tribunal’s determination, also finding that in Hampton’s July 6 claimant’s statement, he

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explained that he was discharged in September 2019 because he “was supposed to be back

on a certain day and my car broke down and I couldn’t get back when I was supposed to. It

was a day or so later that I called them, and they said they had to let me go. I don’t remember

the exact date or anything.” The Board found that Hampton’s earlier written statement

conflicted with his later testimony at the hearing; thus, even without testimony from the

employer, Hampton’s own disqualifying statement that he missed work without notifying

his employer was most credible, and it established misconduct in connection with work.

Hampton timely filed his notice of appeal.

       On appeal, Hampton asserts for the first time that he called his employer before he

was absent from work to inform his employer that he would be late getting back from

California due to car trouble; thus, Hampton asserts that he did not engage in misconduct

in connection with work. We decline to address the merits of this argument. It was not made

below, and this court does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Rossini v.

Dir., 81 Ark. App. 286, 101 S.W.3d 266 (2003). Moreover, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-

529(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 2021) prohibits this court from receiving any additional evidence or

testimony, and this court does not consider evidence that is not a part of the record on

appeal. See Vasquez v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 575, 337 S.W.3d 552.1

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         Additionally, Hampton asserts that he was fired for absenteeism; however, the record
reflects that Hamton was discharged for misconduct in connection with work regarding his
failure to inform his employer when he knew he would be absent from work.

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       We now turn to Hampton’s argument that sufficient evidence does not support the

finding that he was discharged for misconduct in connection with work. Board decisions are

upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Blanton v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 205,

575 S.W.3d 186. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that reasonable minds might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We view the evidence and all reasonable

inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Id. Even

if the evidence could support a different decision, our review is limited to whether the Board

could have reasonably reached its decision based on the evidence presented. Id. Issues of

credibility of the witnesses and weight to be afforded their testimony are matters for the

Board to determine. Welch v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 498, at 2, 588 S.W.3d 787, 788. However,

our function on appeal is not merely to rubber-stamp Board decisions. Taylor v. Dir., 2018

Ark. App. 442, 558 S.W.3d 420. Whether a claimant undertook an act of misconduct

sufficient to prevent the receipt of unemployment benefits is a question of fact. Schock v. Dir.,

2022 Ark. App. 264, 646 S.W.3d 251. In the unemployment-compensation context,

misconduct is defined as “(1) disregard of the employer’s interests; (2) violation of the

employer’s rules; (3) disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has a right

to expect of his employees; or (4) disregard of the employee’s duties and obligations to the

employer.” Moody v. Dir., 2014 Ark. App. 137, at 6, 432 S.W.3d 157, 160. To constitute

misconduct, there must be the element of intent. Taylor, supra. Mere inefficiency,

unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity,

inadvertencies, ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or

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discretion do not constitute misconduct. Id. There must be an intentional or deliberate

violation, a willful or wanton disregard, or carelessness or negligence of such degree or

recurrence as to manifest wrongful intent or evil design. Id. It is the employer’s burden to

establish misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

       Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light

most favorable to the Board’s findings, we affirm. In Parker v. Ramada Inn, 264 Ark. 472,

572 S.W.2d 409 (1978), our supreme court held that the claimant, who missed work because

he overslept, violated the standard of behavior that the restaurant operator had a right to

expect. Likewise, here, we cannot say that the Board erred in relying on Hampton’s written

statement that he was absent from work without timely informing his employer. We affirm

the Board’s decision that Hampton’s conduct was a violation of a standard of behavior that

his employer had a right to expect. As stated above, our judicial review is limited to whether

the Board reached a reasonable conclusion based on the evidence before it, and here, the

Board based its conclusion on Hampton’s own statement.

       Additionally, Hampton asserts that his employer did not dispute his claim or offer

conflicting evidence; thus, substantial evidence does not support the Board’s finding of

misconduct in connection with work. Hampton’s argument is not well taken. As we discuss

above, Hampton’s own written statement supports the Board’s finding of misconduct in

connection with work, and the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their

testimony are matters to be resolved by the Board. See Cely v. Dir., 2022 Ark. App. 384, 653

S.W.3d 394. We affirm.

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      Affirmed.

      KLAPPENBACH and WOOD, JJ., join.

      Alvin L. Simes, for appellant.

      Dawn R. Kelliher, for separate appellee Dr. Charisse Childers, Director, Arkansas

Division of Workforce Services.

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