Court Opinion

ID: 9492504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:42:35.427893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:20.209972
License: Public Domain

*567WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
After learning that he would be sentenced to life in prison, Marvin Damon, who had previously confessed to committing a total of fifteen murders in furtherance of a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE), see 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(e) (West Supp.1999), moved to vacate his plea agreement (to one count of murder in furtherance of a CCE) on the ground that he was not in control of his faculties at the time he entered his plea due to the influence of the medication that he had taken earlier. The district court, which had repeatedly observed and addressed Damon during the course of the preceding year, conducted an extensive Rule 11 colloquy with Damon to ensure that his plea was freely and voluntarily entered. Notwithstanding the fact that nothing in the record suggests that Damon was not fully in possession of his faculties, the majority today holds that the district court’s failure to make further inquires about the medication Damon took earlier rendered the Rule 11 hearing inadequate.
In so holding, the majority completely ignores the test established by this Court in United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574 (4th Cir.1974), for determining whether drugs impaired a defendant’s ability to plead guilty, and it instead adopts (and then applies) the rigid tests established in United States v. Cole, 813 F.2d 43 (3d Cir.1987), and United States v. Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d 588 (1st Cir.1991) — two cases that are easily distinguishable from the instant case. Because Damon has failed to demonstrate that his mental faculties were impaired by the medication he took prior to pleading guilty, as this Court’s precedent requires, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the district court conducted an adequate inquiry pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure when it concluded that Damon was competent to plead guilty and that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Accepting a guilty plea from a defendant when he is legally incompetent is, of course, a violation of due process. See Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1480 (4th Cir.1985); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) (noting that competency is essential to a fair trial); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (holding that the conviction of an incompetent defendant violates due process). The test for mental competence is whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960).1
On appeal, Damon alleges that he was not in control of his faculties at the time he entered his plea due to the influence of the medication he had taken earlier. In order to prevail on this point under Dusky, Damon must demonstrate “that his mental faculties were so impaired by drugs when he pleaded that he was incapable of full understanding and appreciation of the charges against him, of comprehending his constitutional rights and of realizing the consequences of his plea.” United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574, 578 (4th Cir.1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons that follow, I do not believe that Damon has met this burden.
Although the district court did not verbally ascertain the specific dosage of Ati-van and Desyrel that Damon had taken earlier, the district court’s failure to further explore this issue did not render the *568Rule 11 hearing inadequate. As required by this Court in Truglio, the district court, after learning that Damon had taken medication during his stay at the hospital, asked Damon whether he understood (1) the charges against him, (2) the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, (3) the terms of his Plea Agreement, and (4) the consequences of his guilty plea. Damon answered each question in the affirmative and in a coherent fashion. Damon also told the district court that he was satisfied with his attorneys and that.he was in fact guilty of the offense to which he pled guilty. The district court also asked Damon’s lawyers whether they had any reason to question Damon’s competence to plead guilty. Although aware that Damon had taken some medication earlier, his lawyers, both of whom were highly experienced due to the fact that Damon was subject to the death penalty, answered no. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (noting that the representations of the defendant’s lawyers at a Rule 11 hearing constitute a formidable barrier in a subsequent challenge to the defendant’s competency); United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1306 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that “competency of counsel certainly is a strong component of a properly-conducted Rule 11 hearing”).
Based upon Damon’s answers during the Rule 11 hearing and the representations of his lawyers, it is clear that he was competent to stand trial and thus to plead guilty and that he entered an informed, intelligent, and voluntary plea of guilty. See, e.g., Roach, 757 F.2d at 1480; Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 314-15 (4th Cir.1984). There is absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate that Damon was not in full possession of his faculties at the time of the Rule 11 hearing. Thus, there was no reason for the district court, which had handled Damon’s case throughout the preceding year and was in the best position to judge Damon’s competence at the time of the Rule 11 hearing, to conduct any further inquiry regarding the medication that Damon had taken earlier. Accord United States v. Dalman, 994 F.2d 537, 539 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that defendant who was taking four different types of medications was competent to enter plea of guilty, and district court was under no obligation to question him further concerning the nature of the medications and their potential effects upon his decision to plead guilty or his ability to understand the plea proceedings, because he understood the questions asked by the district court and responded in a coherent fashion).
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the majority mistakenly relies on the First Circuit’s decision in United States v. Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d 588 (1st Cir.1991), and the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cole, 813 F.2d 43 (3d Cir.1987).2 Both cases are easily distinguishable from the instant case. ' In Parra-Ibanez, the defendant, who had a history of psychiatric treatment and drug abuse, told the district court during the Rule 11 hearing that he had taken three different types of medication within the past 24 hours. See 936 F.2d at 591. After pleading guilty, the defendant began to exhibit additional psychological problems. See id. at 592. Under these circumstances, the First Circuit ruled that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing on the effects *569of the medication. See id. at 596-98. None of the concerns raised by the First Circuit in Parrar-Ibanez are present here. Damon had no past history of mental illness and, unlike the defendant in Parra-Ibanez, there is absolutely no evidence that the medication had any effect on Damon during the Rule 11 hearing or thereafter. In Cole, the defendant stated during the Rule 11 hearing that he had used drugs within the last 12 hours. See 813 F.2d at 44. The district court, however, misunderstood the defendant and was under the impression that he denied any drug use during the Rule 11 hearing. See id. at 46-47. Thus, the facts in Cole are also very different from the facts in the instant case.
In the end, I am convinced that the district court adequately considered Damon’s competency to plead guilty. Damon attempted to commit suicide after signing his plea agreement. Thus, the minor amounts of medication that he later took could not have affected his decision to plead guilty. Moreover, based upon his own representations (and those of his attorneys), there is no evidence that Damon lacked the ability to consult with his lawyers with a reasonable degree of rational understanding during the Rule 11 hearing or that he did not understand the nature of the proceedings against him. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788. Damon’s actions after pleading guilty support this conclusion.
Three days after the Rule 11 hearing, Damon appeared in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond and pleaded guilty to two additional counts of murder. At that hearing, the Circuit Court judge specifically found Damon’s plea to be knowing and voluntary. Thereafter, Damon admitted during his debriefing with DEA agents that he had actually committed a total of fifteen murders. Tellingly, it was not until three months after the Rule 11 hearing— at sentencing, when he learned that he would receive a life sentence — that Damon suddenly asserted that he was not competent during the Rule 11 hearing.
As this Court recently noted, “it is essential to an orderly working of the criminal justice system that guilty pleas tendered and accepted in conformity with Rule 11 ... be presumed final.” United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir.1995). Here, the district court conducted the Rule 11 hearing precisely as this Court required in Truglio. Accordingly, Damon’s guilty plea should be treated as final.
II.
In sum, I believe that the district court properly ensured during the Rule 11 hearing that Damon’s plea was freely and voluntarily entered. Accordingly, I would affirm.

. Although Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), dealt with a defendant's competency to stand trial, the standard for competence to enter a plea of guilty is the same as that for competence to stand trial. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993).

. Damon also relies on the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rossillo, 853 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir.1988), which the majority, in my opinion, wisely avoids. In Rossillo, the Second Circuit held that once the district court raised the issue of intoxicants and received an ambiguous response, the district court's failure to obtain a clear response from the defendant on the issue rendered the Rule 11 hearing fatally inadequate notwithstanding the fact that the record was devoid of any evidence that the defendant was incompetent. See id. at 1067. The decision in Rossillo was decided over a persuasive dissent. See id. at 1067-71 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). In fact, the Second Circuit has since read the panel’s decision in Rossillo very narrowly. See United States v. Lora, 895 F.2d 878, 881 (2d Cir.1990).