Court Opinion

ID: 9405868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 15:13:39.338352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.662727
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 59

                  SUPREME COURT             OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2022AP140-FT

COMPLETE TITLE:        In the matter of the mental commitment of
                       M.R.M.:

                       Walworth County,
                                 Petitioner-Respondent,
                            v.
                       M.R.M.,
                                 Respondent-Appellant.

                          ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION FILED:         June 29, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         February 20, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Walworth
   JUDGE:              Kristine E. Drettwan

JUSTICES:
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZIEGLER,
C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by
Megan        Sanders-Drazen   and     the   Wisconsin   Defense   Initiative,
Madison. There was an oral argument by Megan Sanders-Drazen.

       For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Cortney J. Iverson, assistant corporation counsel. There was an
oral   argument   by   Cortney   J.   Iverson,   assistant   corporation
counsel.

                                      2
                                                                 2023 WI 59
                                                         NOTICE
                                           This opinion is subject to further
                                           editing and modification.   The final
                                           version will appear in the bound
                                           volume of the official reports.
No.    2022AP140
(L.C. No.   2021ME9)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                     :            IN SUPREME COURT

In the matter of the mental commitment of
M.R.M.:

                                                              FILED
Walworth County,
                                                         JUN 29, 2023
            Petitioner-Respondent,
                                                          Samuel A. Christensen
      v.                                                 Clerk of Supreme Court

M.R.M.,

            Respondent-Appellant.

DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZIEGLER,
C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. ROGGENSACK, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.

      APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Walworth

County, Kristine E. Drettwan, Judge.   Reversed.
                                                            No.   2022AP140

    ¶1    REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.         M.R.M. was involuntarily

committed1 and forcibly medicated for six months following a

mental health crisis.     When Walworth County sought to extend

M.R.M.'s commitment, he filed a jury demand at least 48 hours

prior to his rescheduled final hearing date.        The circuit court

denied that jury demand as untimely, held a final hearing, and

extended his commitment for 12 additional months.

    ¶2    We   subsequently   decided   Waukesha   County    v.   E.J.W.,

2021 WI 85, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, holding that a jury

demand is timely if it is filed at least 48 hours before a

rescheduled final hearing.     M.R.M. contends that E.J.W. applies

retroactively to his case.     He further argues that reversal of

the extension order,2 rather than reversal and remand, is the

proper remedy because the circuit court would lack competency on

remand.

    1  Wisconsin law allows for the involuntary commitment of
individuals who are "(1) mentally ill; (2) a proper subject for
treatment; and (3) dangerous to themselves or others." Langlade
County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶29, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942
N.W.2d 277; see also generally Wis. Stat. § 51.20 (2021-22).
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the
2021-22 version.
    2  Wis. Stat. § 51.20 and our case law use "extension order"
and "recommitment order" interchangeably.      Compare Waukesha
County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, ¶17, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d
590 ("extension orders"), with D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶44
("recommitment orders"). We use "extension order" because it is
the language included in the statutory provision which governs
commitment beyond the initial commitment period. See Wis. Stat.
§ 51.20(13)(g)3. (referring to the filing of an "application for
extension of a commitment").

                                  2
                                                                          No.     2022AP140

    ¶3      We hold that E.J.W. applies retroactively and that the

circuit court's denial of M.R.M.'s jury demand was erroneous.

We further hold that remand is inappropriate because the circuit

court    lacks   competency         on   remand   when,   as       in    this    case,   an

extension     order      is    reversed      on      appeal    and       the     preceding

commitment order has expired.

                                             I

    ¶4 M.R.M. was involuntarily committed in Walworth County in

January 2021 for a period of six months.                           In July 2021, the

County     petitioned         the     circuit     court       to    extend       M.R.M.'s

commitment for 12 months.                The circuit court adjourned the date

originally set for the final                 hearing so        M.R.M. could retain

counsel.     At least 48 hours before the August 12 rescheduled

final hearing, M.R.M. filed a jury demand.

    ¶5      The circuit court concluded that M.R.M.'s jury demand

was untimely based on Marathon County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20,

392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898, which held that Wis. Stat. §
51.20(11)(a) "requires a subject individual to request a jury

trial at least forty-eight hours before 'the time set for final

hearing,'    not    at    least       forty-eight      hours       before       the   final

hearing actually occurs."                R.J.O., 392 Wis. 2d 157, ¶41.                   The

circuit     court     then     held      a   bench     trial       and    extended       his

commitment for 12 months.

    ¶6      After the final hearing but before M.R.M. filed this

appeal we decided E.J.W., which overruled R.J.O. in part and
held that a jury demand is timely if it is filed at least 48

                                             3
                                                                       No.     2022AP140

hours    before   a   rescheduled   final       hearing   takes     place.          See

E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶¶38-39, ¶38 n.9.                M.R.M.'s jury demand

would have been timely if E.J.W. had been decided before his

rescheduled final hearing.

     ¶7     M.R.M.    filed   an   appeal       which   the    court     of    appeals

certified to this court.           He raised two issues:                (1) whether

E.J.W. applies retroactively, and (2) if it does, whether the

appropriate remedy for the denial of M.R.M.'s jury demand is

reversal or reversal and remand.3

                                      II

     ¶8    The    retroactivity      of     a     prior       decision        and   the

appropriate remedy on appeal are both questions of law we review

de novo.     See Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶15, 402

Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733; State ex rel. Krieger v. Borgen, 2004

WI App 163, ¶7, 276 Wis. 2d 96, 687 N.W.2d 79.

     3 In briefing before both the court of appeals and this
court M.R.M. also asserted that the circuit court failed to
comply with the requirement in D.J.W. that "circuit courts in
[extension] proceedings . . . make specific factual findings
with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the [extension] is based." 391 Wis. 2d
231, ¶3.     When we accept a certification, we "acquire[]
jurisdiction over all issues, not merely the issues certified."
See Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Thompson, 2018 WI 57, ¶9 n.4, 381
Wis. 2d 609, 912 N.W.2d 364.    We need not address this issue,
however, because we reverse the circuit court's extension order
on the grounds that it erroneously denied M.R.M.'s jury demand.

                                      4
                                                                       No.   2022AP140

                                             III

                                             A

       ¶9 We first address whether our holding in E.J.W. applies

retroactively to M.R.M.'s case.4                   If it does, then the circuit

court's denial of M.R.M.'s jury demand was erroneous.

       ¶10     There is a general presumption that civil decisions

apply retroactively.           See Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶69,

274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.                    The County argues, however,

that       E.J.W.   should    not    be   applied     retroactively.         We    have

previously recognized three factors that guide us in deciding

whether a civil decision should apply only prospectively.                         These

factors       are   set    forth     in   Kurtz      v.   City   of    Waukesha,     91

Wis. 2d 103,        109,     280    N.W.2d    757    (1979),     and   adopted     from

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).5                          See Trinity

Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶76, 302 Wis. 2d

299, 735 N.W.2d 1.           They are:

       (1) Does the rule establish a new principle of law,
       either by overruling clear past precedent on which
       litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of
       first impression whose resolution was not clearly
       foreshadowed?

       4   Neither party asked us to overrule E.J.W.

       The United States Supreme Court abandoned the Chevron
       5

factors in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S.
86 (1993), which mandated retroactivity in all civil cases. See
id. at 90.      We have nevertheless continued to apply the
Chevron/Kurtz factors.   See, e.g., State v. Schulpius, 2006 WI
1, ¶27 n.6, 287 Wis. 2d 44, 707 N.W.2d 495 (declining to
overrule Kurtz). Neither party asks us to reconsider Kurtz.

                                             5
                                                          No.   2022AP140

     (2) Will retroactive operation further or retard the
     operation of the new rule?

     (3) Will retroactive application produce substantial
     inequitable results?
Id., ¶77.6

     ¶11     The   first   factor——whether     the   decision   clearly

overruled past precedent——weighs against retroactively applying

E.J.W.     In R.J.O., the court of appeals held that a jury demand

must be made 48 hours before the first time set for a final

hearing.     See 392 Wis. 2d 157, ¶41.       This rule governed ch. 51

cases for 18 months before this court concluded in E.J.W. that a

jury demand is timely if it is made at least 48 hours before a

rescheduled final hearing.       See 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶3.           This

represents a clear break with the past precedent governing jury

demands.

     6 We have not been entirely consistent in how we treat these
factors.   Some decisions treat them as factors to "weigh" or
"consider" while others treat them as a "test" or "threshold,"
each element of which the party seeking only prospective
application of a decision must satisfy. Compare Kurtz v. City of
Waukesha,   91   Wis. 2d 103,   109,   280  N.W.2d   757   (1979)
("consideration of the factors"); State ex rel. Brown v.
Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15, 259 Wis. 2d 630, 658 N.W.2d 427
(same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, ¶70, 274 Wis. 2d 220,
682 N.W.2d 405 (describing Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the
issue"); with Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112, 485 N.W.2d
376 (1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied in
order for a decision to apply prospectively."); Trinity
Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88, ¶77, 302 Wis. 2d
299, 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors are met, the judicial
holding in question should not be applied retroactively.").

     We need not resolve these inconsistencies because either
approach leads to the same conclusion in this case:      E.J.W.
applies retroactively.   Accordingly, we assume for purposes of
this discussion that Kurtz sets forth factors to weigh.

                                   6
                                                                                  No.    2022AP140

       ¶12   Although the first factor weighs against retroactively

applying E.J.W., the second and third factors weigh heavily in

favor of retroactivity.                 The second factor asks if retroactively

applying the new rule would further or impede its operation.

See Kurtz, 91 Wis. 2d at 109.                           To answer this question, our

cases    have        looked        to,       for        example,       whether      retroactive

application          of    the     new       rule       would    further       "the      specific

objective embodied in" a statute, and whether meaningful relief

could be granted through retroactively applying the new rule.

Wenke, 274 Wis. 2d 220, ¶73; see also State ex rel. Buswell v.

Tomah Area Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 71, ¶48, 301 Wis. 2d 178, 732

N.W.2d 804.

       ¶13   Here,         there       are       two    reasons       why     applying     E.J.W.

retroactively would further——not impede——its operation.                                    First,

doing so would give effect to the legislature's policy choices,

reflected       in        ch.    51,       "to    afford        due    process      protections

including jury trials" to all persons subject to commitment.

E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶32.                           To that end, the legislature
adopted Wis. Stat. §               51.20(11)(a), which states that                        a jury

demand is timely so long as it is filed at least 48 hours prior

to the time set for the final hearing.                           See E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d

471,     ¶28.              This        statute          reflects        the       legislature's

"determin[ation]            that       a     minimum       of     48    hours'      notice     is

sufficient      for        the   circuit         court     to    secure     the    presence    of

jurors and the County to prepare for a jury trial in a mental

health commitment case."                     Id., ¶29.           Second, applying E.J.W.
retroactively would provide meaningful relief to M.R.M.                                       The
                                                    7
                                                                    No.    2022AP140

circuit court "cannot go back" in time and grant M.R.M. a jury

trial after the extension order has expired.                    See Buswell, 301

Wis. 2d 178,        ¶48.        Nevertheless,     reversing       that    unlawful

extension      order     will   further   E.J.W.'s     operation    by    relieving

M.R.M.       from   the    order's    collateral      consequences,       such     as

restrictions        on    his   constitutional    right    to    bear     arms    and

liability for the cost of his care.               See Sauk County v. S.A.M.,

2022 WI 46, ¶¶19-27, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162.

       ¶14    The    third      factor——whether       retroactive       application

would produce substantial inequities——also weighs in favor of

retroactivity.           "The equity factor requires            us to take into

account the desirability of treating similarly situated parties

alike."       State v. Thiel, 2001 WI App 52, ¶16, 241 Wis. 2d 439,

625 N.W.2d 321.          E.J.W. and M.R.M. are similarly situated.               Both

were denied a jury trial even though their jury demands came at

least 48 hours before their rescheduled final hearings.                           The

availability of a jury trial upon timely demand is one of ch.

51's     "many      provisions     designed      to    offer     procedural       and
substantive protections to the person subject to commitment."

E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶31.             And for that reason, it would be

inequitable to deprive M.R.M. of his right to a jury trial under

the same circumstances that were present in E.J.W. by applying

that holding only to future cases.

       ¶15    In sum, the Chevron/Kurtz analysis does not provide a

reason for departing from our presumption of retroactivity in

civil cases.         Accordingly, we hold that the rule announced in

                                          8
                                                                  No.     2022AP140

E.J.W. applies retroactively and that M.R.M.'s jury demand was

therefore timely.

                                         B

    ¶16 Having concluded that E.J.W. applies retroactively, we

next consider the proper remedy for the circuit court's denial

of M.R.M.'s jury demand.              M.R.M. argues that reversal is the

appropriate      remedy     because   when   the   circuit    court     failed   to

enter a lawful extension order before the preceding commitment

order expired, it lost competency to conduct further proceedings

on remand.       Before addressing that argument, we begin with some

background on competency.

                                         1

    ¶17 Article VII, § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides

circuit courts with subject-matter jurisdiction in "all matters

civil and criminal."           Subject-matter jurisdiction is distinct

from a circuit court's competency, which "refers to the court's

power     to    exercise     its   subject    matter    jurisdiction        in   a
particular case."          M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶35.          Thus, although a

circuit        court   is      almost    never      without     subject-matter

jurisdiction,7 it may nonetheless lack competency to exercise

    7  There are exceptions to Mikrut's broad statement that
circuit courts always have subject-matter jurisdiction.    See,
e.g., State ex rel. CityDeck Landing LLC v. Cir. Ct. for Brown
Cnty., 2019 WI 15, ¶32, 385 Wis. 2d 516, 922 N.W.2d 832 (noting
the Wisconsin Arbitration Act "comprises one constitutionally-
permissible   exception   to   a   circuit   court's   original
jurisdiction").

                                         9
                                                                             No.     2022AP140

that jurisdiction on account of "noncompliance with statutory

requirements pertaining to the invocation of that jurisdiction."

Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶2, 273 Wis. 2d

76, 681 N.W.2d 190.

       ¶18    Chapter         51     contains         numerous         such        statutory

requirements.           For example, a circuit court loses competency if

it fails to comply with Wis. Stat. § 51.20(7)(a)'s requirement

to hold a probable cause hearing "within 72 hours after the

individual arrives at the facility."                    Dodge County v. Ryan E.M.,

2002 WI App 71, ¶5, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592.                               Similarly,

failing to hold a final commitment hearing within 14 days of

detention as required by § 51.20(7)(c) results in a loss of

competency over an initial commitment proceeding.                            See State ex

rel.   Lockman         v.   Gerhardstein,       107    Wis.    2d     325,    328-29,     320

N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1982).

       ¶19    The       circuit     court    can      also     lose    competency        over

extension proceedings.              In G.O.T. v. Rock County, 151 Wis. 2d

629, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1989), the circuit court twice
extended an initial commitment order beyond the six-month limit

imposed      by    §    51.20(13)(g).           Although       G.O.T.'s       jury    demand

"authorized the trial court to temporarily extend the commitment

to accommodate that demand," the circuit court lost competency

to   extend       the    commitment      a   second     time    after      the     statutory

deadline passed.            Id. at 633.

       ¶20    The upshot of these cases is that some of the time

limits    imposed        by   ch.   51   are    so    "'central       to   the     statutory
scheme'" that if the circuit court fails to comply with them, it
                                               10
                                                                          No.   2022AP140

loses competency to proceed in a particular case.                          Mikrut, 273

Wis. 2d 76, ¶10 (citing State v. Bollig, 222 Wis. 2d 558, 567-

68, 587 N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998)).

                                             2

      ¶21    To     understand          M.R.M.'s    argument      that    because        the

circuit     court      lacks    competency,        reversal    is   the    appropriate

remedy, it is necessary to distinguish between two important

dates.      The first important date, August 12, 2021, is the date

on which M.R.M.'s initial six-month commitment order expired.8

The   circuit     court       had   competency      to   extend     M.R.M.'s      initial

commitment only before that date.                     See G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d at

633 (explaining that "the trial court must hold the extension

hearing     before      the    [prior]     commitment     expires"        because    Wis.

Stat.     § 51.20(13)(g)1.          limits    initial    commitment        order    to    a

period    "not    to    exceed      6    months"   and   extension       orders     to   "a

period     not    to   exceed       one    year.").      And    the      circuit    court

attempted to do just that.                 Before M.R.M.'s initial commitment
order expired, the circuit court held a final hearing in which

it granted a 12-month extension order.                        The second important

date, August 12, 2022, is when that extension order expired.

      8The initial six-month commitment order was set to expire
on July 29, 2021.   However, the circuit court briefly extended
that commitment due to M.R.M.'s request to postpone so he could
secure counsel.      Accordingly, the circuit court retained
competency over the proceedings until August 12, 2021.       See
G.O.T. v. Rock County, 151 Wis. 2d 629, 633, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct.
App. 1989).

                                             11
                                                                         No.     2022AP140

      ¶22      In appeals challenging an extension order, it is all

but certain that the first date——the expiration of the initial

six-month commitment order——will have passed by the time the

appeal is resolved.            And it is also likely, though less certain,

that the second date——the expiration of the challenged extension

order——will also have passed.                  Here, both dates are behind us.

For that reason, reversal is the appropriate remedy in this case

based on a straightforward application of M.W.                        That case held

that when "the specific [order] at issue"——here, the challenged

12-month extension order——expires while on appeal, reversal is

the     appropriate         remedy       because      the   circuit      court     lacks

competency to conduct further proceedings on remand.                           M.W., 402

Wis. 2d 1, ¶37.

      ¶23      M.R.M., however, makes a different argument.                       Rather

than focus on the expiration of the unlawful extension order, he

contends       that    a    circuit      court      loses   competency    to     conduct

proceedings       on       remand      when   the    preceding   commitment        order

expires.       In other words, he asks us to conclude that competency
on remand is determined from the expiration of the preceding

commitment order (the first date in 2021), not the expiration of

the unlawful extension order (the second date in 2022).                                We

agree    and    hold       that   it    is    the   expiration   of   the      preceding

commitment order that determines whether the circuit court has

competency on remand.

      ¶24      As we have explained previously, "[t]he circuit court

must hold a hearing on the petition for extension before the
previous order expires or it loses competency to extend the
                                              12
                                                                                     No.      2022AP140

commitment."          M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36; see also G.O.T., 151

Wis. 2d at 635.            And in order to extend someone's commitment at

that    hearing,      the      circuit      court          must    "determine[]              that   the

individual is a proper subject for commitment . . . [and] order

judgment       to   that     effect."            Wis.      Stat.       §    51.20(13)(g)3.            A

circuit     court       that    enters       an       unlawful             extension       order——by

wrongfully denying a timely jury demand, for example——has not

complied with these statutory obligations.                                 See G.O.T., 151 Wis.

2d at 632-33.         And importantly for competency purposes, once the

preceding       order       expires,        it    has        not       complied          with   these

requirements        within     the    statutory            time        limits      for     holding    a

final hearing.             See Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(g)1. (setting forth

the maximum time periods for initial commitments and extension

orders).        Because those time limits are mandatory and ensure

that individuals are in fact "a proper subject for commitment"

at the time a commitment or extension order is imposed, they are

central        to     the      statutory          scheme           of        ch.       51.          See

§ 51.20(13)(g)3.; see also G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d at 633; Lockman,
107    Wis. 2d at       330    (explaining            that       the    14-day       deadline       for

holding    a    final       hearing     after         an    individual          is       detained    is

"mandatory and cannot be varied at the discretion of the trial

court.").       Accordingly, the failure to enter a lawful extension

order before the preceding order expires results in a loss of

competency.           See     Shawano       County         v.     S.L.V.,          No.    2021AP223,

unpublished         slip     op.,     ¶20    (Wis.          Ct.     App.        Aug.      17,    2021)

(reaching       the   same      conclusion).                As     argued       by       M.R.M.,    the
expiration of the unlawful extension order——the second date——is
                                                 13
                                                                          No.       2022AP140

therefore irrelevant because the circuit court lost competency

to hold an extension hearing when the preceding commitment order

expired.       See     Eau   Claire     County      v.     J.M.P.,     2020AP2014-FT,

unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. June 22, 2021) (holding

that    a    circuit     court's       competency        is     determined          by     the

commitment order preceding the unlawful extension order, not the

unlawful extension order itself).

                                             3

       ¶25   Before     closing,        we       briefly       explain        why        these

conclusions are consistent with our decision in Portage County

v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509.                             In that

case, we rejected the defendant's "domino theory" that reversing

an    extension      order   would     "necessarily           invalidate       all       later

extension[ orders]."            J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶¶15, 21.                          In

doing so, we held that the validity of a previous commitment

order has no bearing on the validity of an extension order.                                See

id., ¶21.
       ¶26   There is an important difference, however, between how

we evaluate the validity of a commitment order, as in J.W.K.,

and how we determine whether a circuit court has competency, as

in    this   case.      To   assess     a    commitment        order's     validity,        a

reviewing     court     looks    to    the       sufficiency      of     the     evidence

supporting that order.           See id. ("[T]he circuit court may order

the extension if the County proves its case under the statutory

criteria."); see also Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(e) ("The petitioner
has    the   burden    of    proving    all      required      facts     by     clear      and

                                            14
                                                                  No.     2022AP140

convincing    evidence.").       The   validity    of    a    prior    commitment

order     could   never     be   relevant    when       determining       whether

sufficient evidence supports an extension order.                      See J.W.K.,

386   Wis.   2d   672,   ¶21.    By    contrast,   the       expiration   of   the

immediately preceding commitment order is always relevant when

we determine whether a circuit court had competency to grant an

extension order.         See M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36.                As we have

explained previously, because the time limit for entering an

extension order is central to ch. 51's statutory scheme, the

circuit court's competency to enter such an order is contingent

on the immediately preceding order not having expired.                    See id.

And when an extension order is reversed on appeal, as is the

case here, the circuit court's competency on remand is still

tied to the expiration of that immediately preceding commitment

order.      Because this case and J.W.K. analyze different issues,

our holdings are not in tension.9

      ¶27    In sum, the circuit court may issue an extension order

only before the preceding commitment order expires.                     See M.W.,

      9Justice   Roggensack's    dissent   misunderstands    the
distinction between the validity of an extension order and the
circuit court's competency to conduct proceedings on remand.
Despite the dissent's claims to the contrary, nothing in this
decision affects the validity of any commitment order M.R.M. may
be subject to currently.

     Moreover, our conclusion that the circuit court lost
competency to conduct further proceedings on remand when it
failed to enter a lawful extension order before the preceding
commitment order expired does not mean that the circuit court
would necessarily lack competency to extend any commitment order
that M.R.M. may be subject to currently or to consider a new
petition for commitment.

                                       15
                                                           No.    2022AP140

402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶36.        If that extension order is reversed on

appeal, the circuit court's competency to conduct proceedings on

remand depends on whether the preceding commitment order has

expired.10    See G.O.T., 151 Wis. 2d at 632-33.         In this case,

because the circuit court denied M.R.M.'s timely jury demand,

its extension order is unlawful.           And because the preceding

commitment order has expired, the circuit court lacks competency

to conduct proceedings on remand.         Therefore, reversal is the

appropriate remedy.

     By     the   Court.—The   decision   of   the   circuit     court   is

reversed.

     10While this case involves an initial six-month commitment
order and a 12-month extension order, the same logic applies to
cases involving consecutive 12-month extension orders.   When an
extension order is reversed on appeal, a circuit court's
competency on remand depends on whether the preceding commitment
order has expired.

                                   16
                                                               No.     2020AP140-FT.rgb

      ¶28    REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.              (concurring).

      [T]he common law . . . stands or falls with the
      admission of legal principles obtained not by command,
      but by retrospective estimates of right and justice.
Paul Vinogradoff, Common-Sense in Law 207 (1913).

      ¶29    The majority reaches the correct outcome; however, its

analysis is incompatible with "[t]he true traditional view" that

"courts      have     no     authority        to     engage"     in        "prospective

decisionmaking[.]"          Harper v. Va. Dep't of Tax'n, 509 U.S. 86,

106 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).                   Among other errors, the

majority conflates this court's judicial power with legislative

power.      Unlike the legislature, the judiciary generally has only

the power to "expound" on existing law——not the authority to

"pronounce . . . new          law[.]"          Intro.,     William          Blackstone,

Commentaries *69.          "[A] judicial . . . act" is "a determination

of what the existing law is in relation to some existing thing

already done," while "a legislative act" is "a predetermination

of   what    the    law    shall   be   for   the    regulation       of    all    future

cases."       Harper,       509    U.S. at     107    (quoting    Thomas          Cooley,

Constitutional Limitations *91).                   An overruled decision loses

not only its future application but any retroactive effect as

well; once the court corrects its error of interpretation, the

decision is for all purposes erased:

      The theory is, not that . . . [an] overruled decision
      made   law,  which  is  changed   by . . . [a]   later
      decision, but that the earlier decision, being a
      mistake, never was the law, but that the law is and
      always has been as expounded in the later decision.
      This . . . is not at all like changing the existing
      body of law by the repeal of a statute; it is more
      like "removing a cloud" from the law.     It does not
      regard the prior decision as law, though bad law,
                                1
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      which must be altered, but as mere color of law
      without any substance.     Hence the overruling of a
      decision relates back to the date of the overruled
      decision,   operating    retrospectively,   upon   all
      transactions which can be reached by it, and the prior
      decision stands as though it had never been made.
Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Law of Judicial Precedents

or the Science of Case Law 689–90 (1912).

      ¶30   In   derogation    of   this    longstanding     principle,        the

freewheeling test adopted in Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, which

the majority employs in this case, offends the separation of

powers by dislodging the legislature from its lawmaking function

whenever the court decides to craft a more "just" result than

the law would otherwise produce.           91 Wis. 2d 103, 280 N.W.2d 757

(1979).     This court has a duty to overrule Kurtz, which was

premised on a United States Supreme Court decision from which

the Court retreated 30 years ago.            Id. at 109 (quoting Chevron

Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), limited by Harper, 509 U.S. at

89   (majority   op.)).       For   decades,     this   court    has      employed

decision-avoidance    mechanisms      to   preserve     Kurtz,       contravening

its duty to act within the limited scope of power the people

vested in the judiciary.        Because the court continues to cling

to lawmaking power the people never gave it, I do not join the

majority opinion but respectfully concur.

      ¶31   Retroactive   application       of   precedent      is    a    deeply-

rooted traditional rule in common law jurisprudence.1                 One United

States Supreme Court justice "was prepared to hazard the guess

      1The traditional rule has "a few exceptions," "collateral
review and vested rights," which are not at issue in this case.
Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 308
(2016).

                                      2
                                                          No.    2020AP140-FT.rgb

that '[j]udicial decisions have had retrospective operation for

near a thousand years.'"          Harper, 509 U.S. at 106 (Scalia, J.,

concurring) (quoting Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349,

372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).              "For most of our history,

the    [United      States]   Supreme    Court     followed    the   common-law

tradition     and    the   Founders'    guidance,    largely    keeping    to   'a

general rule of retrospective effect[.]'"               Bryan A. Garner et

al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 310 (2016) (quoting Robinson

v.    Neil,   409    U.S. 505,   507    (1973)).      Currently,     the    Court

follows the traditional rule, as do "[m]ost states[.]"                     Id. at

313.    Wisconsin is an exception.

       ¶32    In the twentieth century, the United States Supreme

Court briefly abandoned the traditional rule, only to return to

it near the end of that century.             As relevant to this case, the

United States Supreme Court wrote the following in Chevron Oil

v. Huson, a 1971 decision:

       In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity
       question, we have generally considered three separate
       factors.     First,   the   decision   to  be   applied
       nonretroactively must establish a new principle of
       law, either by overruling clear past precedent on
       which litigants may have relied or by deciding an
       issue of first impression whose resolution was not
       clearly foreshadowed.    Second, it has been stressed
       that 'we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in
       each case by looking to the prior history of the rule
       in question, its purpose and effect, and whether
       retrospective operation will further or retard its
       operation.'   Finally, we have weighed the inequity
       imposed by retroactive application, for '(w)here a
       decision of this Court could produce substantial
       inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is
       ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice
       or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity.'

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                                                                         No.    2020AP140-FT.rgb

404    U.S. at      106–07         (citations      omitted)       (modifications        in     the

original).

       ¶33    Two serious deficiencies plague this "new approach."

Garner       et    al.,        The    Law     of       Judicial    Precedent,          at     311.

Fundamentally, it created "serious constitutional problems[.]"

Id.    In the words of Justice Antonin Scalia, "'the province and

duty of the judicial department [is] to say what the law is,'

not what the law shall be."                       Harper, 509 U.S. at 107 (quoting

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).                                     Judges

interpret law; they do not make it.                          To apply precedent only

prospectively          suggests        the    court's     decision       changed      the    law,

which cannot be.               See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323

(1987) ("In truth, the Court's assertion of power to disregard

current      law       in    adjudicating         cases    before    us        that   have    not

already run the full course of appellate review, is quite simply

an assertion that our constitutional function is not one of

adjudication but in effect of legislation.")                          (quoting Mackey v.

United States, 410 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring
in the judgment))).                "Even when a 'former determination is most

evidently contrary to reason . . . [or] contrary to the divine

law,' a judge overruling that decision would 'not pretend to

make     a    new           law,     but     to    vindicate       the     old        one    from

misrepresentation.'"                 Harper, 404 U.S. at 107 (quoting Intro.,

Blackstone, Commentaries *70).

       ¶34    "Nonretroactivity also raised obvious equal-protection

concerns          by         treating        similarly        situated . . . [parties]
differently:            often the Court would apply a new rule only to

                                                   4
                                                                      No.    2020AP140-FT.rgb

the . . . [party] lucky enough to have appealed his case to the

Court at just the right moment."                         Garner et al., The Law of

Judicial Precedent, at 311.                 As the United States Supreme Court

later   explained,       "it    is    the     nature       of    judicial      review      that

precludes us from '[s]imply fishing one case from the stream of

appellate      review,     using       it     as     a     vehicle       for   pronouncing

new . . . standards,           and    then    permitting         a   stream     of       similar

cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule.'"

Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679).

    ¶35     Relatedly,          "Chevron           Oil     created          confusion        and

inconsistent results[.]"               Garner et al., The Law of Judicial

Precedent, at 312.             As an amorphous judicial invention, the

Chevron   Oil     test,    unsurprisingly,               can    be   applied        to    reach

whatever result the judge favors.                   Such inconsistent application

also amplifies equal-protection concerns.

    ¶36     In    1993,    the       United       States       Supreme      Court    all    but

abandoned Chevron Oil.                In    Harper v. Virginia Department of

Taxation, the Court explained:

    When this Court does not "reserve the question whether
    its holding should be applied to the parties before
    it," . . . an opinion announcing a rule of federal law
    "is properly understood to have followed the normal
    rule of retroactive application" and must be "read to
    hold . . . that its rule should apply retroactively to
    the litigants then before the Court."
509 U.S. at 97–98 (majority op.) (quoting James B. Beam Co. v.

Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 539 (1991) (lead op.)) (second ellipsis

in the original).         As interpreted and applied federally, "Harper

means   that     new   rules     of    civil       cases       are   now     almost      always
applied retroactively" absent an express reservation in the case
                                              5
                                                                                  No.       2020AP140-FT.rgb

announcing        the     rule.              Garner       et    al.,       The    Law        of    Judicial

Precedent,        at    312;       see       also   Green        v.    Humama          at     Home,    Inc.,

unpublished slip. op, No. 16-cv-7586 (AJN), 2017 WL 9916832 *8–9

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) ("[U]nless a court explicitly reserves

the     question        of        retroactivity,               its     decision             'is    properly

understood        to    have       followed         the        normal      rule         of    retroactive

application.'           Humana has not presented a compelling reason why

this    [c]ourt         should         consider       the       Chevron          Oil     factors.         As

explained above, there is nothing in Weil II to suggest that the

D.C.      Circuit         expressly             reserved              on      the           question      of

retroactivity.               As    a     result,       under         Harper,       the       Chevron     Oil

factors are inapplicable."                          (quoting Harper, 509 U.S. at 97–

98)).

       ¶37       Fourteen         years       before           Harper,       this       court       applied

Chevron Oil in Kurtz.                     Kurtz, 91 Wis. 2d at 108–09.                             In that

case,    however,        this          court    applied          Chevron         Oil        to    determine

whether      a    recent          United       States          Supreme       Court          decision     had

retroactive effect.                    Id.      On questions of federal law, this
court    follows        federal          precedent.              Johnson         v.     Wis.      Elections

Comm'n, 2021 WI 87, ¶21, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469.                                                 As

evidenced by the majority opinion in this case, Kurtz has been

carelessly        extended         to     govern      the        retroactivity               of   Wisconsin

precedent as well.                 Despite Harper's course correction 30 years

ago, this court continues to apply Kurtz.

       ¶38       This   court          has    avoided          addressing         the        soundness    of

Kurtz    for      decades,         typically          invoking         the    party          presentation
principle.         See State ex rel. Brown v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶41,

                                                      6
                                                                No.    2020AP140-FT.rgb

259 Wis. 2d 630, 658 N.W.2d 427 (Sykes, J., dissenting) ("As the

majority    notes,     although      the    State    mentioned        Harper    in   its

brief, it declined to take a position on whether we ought to

enunciate a uniform standard of retroactivity . . . ; Brown did

not even cite Harper.         While it is clear that Chevron Oil is no

longer good law and Kurtz should therefore be revisited, I agree

that the question is better left for another case[.]"                        (Citation

omitted)); State ex rel. Giffin v. Smith, 2004 WI 36, ¶65, 270

Wis. 2d 235, 677 N.W.2d 259 (Sykes, J., concurring) ("Here, as

in Brown, the parties did not brief the issue of Wisconsin's

continued reliance on Chevron Oil in light of Harper.                          For that

reason, . . . we need not address here whether to conform our

law to Harper.").

      ¶39   Even when the issue has been raised, however, this

court has avoided it.           The majority in this case attempts to

justify     applying    the     Kurtz      test     by   relying       on    State    v.

Schulpius, 2006 WI 1, ¶27 n.6, 287 Wis. 2d 44, 707 N.W.2d 495.

In that case, this court determined the retroactivity question
was   irrelevant     because      the      respondent     had   forfeited        a   key

objection.    Id., ¶27.       Nevertheless, this court commented on the

retroactivity    issue     in    a   footnote.           In   full,    the     footnote

states:

      Schulpius urges this court to overrule its decision in
      Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 280
      N.W.2d 757 (1979), and adopt the rule of Harper v.
      Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113
      S. Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) on the retroactive
      application of a new rule of law. We decline to do so
      here.   However, even if this court were to adopt the
      rule of Harper on retroactivity, we do not believe it

                                            7
                                                             No.    2020AP140-FT.rgb

       would impact on this case. Harper held that when the
       United States Supreme Court:

               applies a rule of federal law to the parties
               before it, that rule is the controlling
               interpretation of federal law and must be
               given full retroactive effect in all cases
               still open on direct review and as to all
               events, regardless of whether such events
               predate or postdate our announcement of the
               rule.

       Id. at 97, 113 S. Ct. 2510. Because Schulpius failed
       to appeal the November, 2000 order within 90 days of
       entry of the order, as per Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1),
       Schulpius's case was not open on direct review at the
       time of this court's decision in Morford.
Id.,    ¶27    n.6.       This   conclusory    footnote,     which       offers   no

reasoning and largely reads like dicta ("even if this court were

to adopt the rule of Harper on retroactivity, we do not believe

it would impact on this case") is inconsistent with this court's

law-declaring      function.       See   State   ex   rel.     Wis.      Senate   v.

Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988) ("[I]t is

this court's function to develop and clarify the law.").                       This

court is not supposed to ignore "major questions of substantive

law" by employing "superficial" reasoning.              Citizens Study Comm.
on Jud. Org., Report to Governor Patrick J. Lucey 78 (1973) (on

file at the David T. Prosser Jr. State Law Library).                      Had this

court in Schulpius analyzed whether Kurtz should be overruled,

perhaps Schulpius would have present utility, but in the absence

of such an analysis, Schulpius has none.              See also Wenke v. Gehl

Co.,    2004    WI 103,    ¶75   n.43,   274   Wis. 2d 220,        682   N.W.2d 405

("Even if we followed the Harper approach, we would nonetheless
apply    this     ruling     retroactively,      as   Harper        disavows      any

                                         8
                                                           No.   2020AP140-FT.rgb

exceptions to the rule of retroactive application in the civil

context.").

      ¶40     Sometimes decision avoidance is appropriate; however,

when an issue concerns the parameters of judicial power, the

court should decide it.          Because Kurtz is objectively wrong,

this court has a duty to overrule it.              State v. Johnson, 2023 WI

39,   ¶49,    407     Wis. 2d 195,     990    N.W.2d 174    (Rebecca     Grassl

Bradley, J., concurring) (citing Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v.

City of Waukesha, 2022 WI 57, ¶42, 403 Wis. 2d 1, 976 N.W.2d 405

(Rebecca     Grassl   Bradley,   J.,    concurring)).        Kurtz     poses    an

especially grave threat to the rule of law because this court

appropriated power in the absence of authority.                  Specifically,

it equated law with precedent interpreting law, blurring the

fundamental    distinction    between        the   legislative   and   judicial

domains.     Cf. id., ¶76 ("The judiciary takes an oath to uphold

the United States Constitution, not precedent. . . .                   Our oath

obligates us to overturn 'judge-made constitutional law,' when

'divorced' from the United States Constitution."                 (Quoting Lino
A. Graglia, Constitutional Law Without the Constitution:                       The

Supreme Court's Remaking of America, in "A Country I Do Not

Recognize":     The Legal Assault on American Values 1–2 (Robert H.

Bork ed., 2005))).         It would be "crazy not to worry that if

judges consider themselves free to disregard the Constitution's

separation of powers they might soon find other bothersome parts

of the Constitution equally unworthy of their fidelity."                    Neil

M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the

                                       9
                                                                        No.    2020AP140-FT.rgb

Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 911

(2016).

      ¶41    The United States Supreme Court's decision in Harper

illuminates     another       aspect     of        this    court's      error      in   Kurtz.

Precedent may be overturned when "[c]hanges or developments in

the law have undermined the rationale behind a decision."                                 State

v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶50, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813

(quoting    Bartholomew        v.    Wis.     Patients         Comp.      Fund    &   Compcare

Health    Servs.      Ins.,    2006      WI    91,        ¶33,    293     Wis. 2d 38,       717

N.W.2d 216).         Chevron Oil spawned Kurtz, but Harper deflated

Chevron Oil, thereby undermining the foundation of this court's

reasoning in Kurtz.           See Friends of Frame Park, 403 Wis. 2d 1,

¶89   (explaining      a   similar        series          of   events      undermined       the

rationale behind several court of appeals decisions).

      ¶42    Kurtz     also    borders        on     "unworkable,"            providing     yet

another reason to overrule it.                     See Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190,

¶50 (quoting Bartholomew, 293 Wis. 2d 38, ¶33).                               The erosion of

the   traditional       rule        of   retroactivity            "generated . . . many
incompatible    rules      and      inconsistent           principles."            Desist    v.

United      States,     394         U.S. 244,        258         (1969)       (Harlan,      J.,

dissenting).       The majority cannot even explain what the actual

Kurtz test is——despite Kurtz being 44 years old.                                 The majority

admits:

      We have not been entirely consistent in how we treat
      these factors.   Some decisions treat them as factors
      to "weigh" or "consider" while others treat them as a
      "test" or "threshold," each element of which the party
      seeking only prospective application of a decision
      must satisfy.   Compare Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91
      Wis. 2d 103,     109,     280     N.W.2d 757    (1979)
                                              10
                                                                No.    2020AP140-FT.rgb

      ("consideration of the factors"); State ex rel. Brown
      v. Bradley, 2003 WI 14, ¶15, 259 Wis. 2d 630, 658
      N.W.2d 427 (same); Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103,
      ¶70, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405 (describing
      Chevron factors as "bear[ing] on the issue"); with
      Browne v. WERC, 169 Wis. 2d 79, 112, 485 N.W.2d 376
      (1992) ("[A]ll three Chevron factors must be satisfied
      in order for a decision to apply prospectively.");
      Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007 WI 88,
      ¶77, 302 Wis. 2d 299, 735 N.W.2d 1 ("If these factors
      are met, the judicial holding in question should not
      be applied retroactively.").

      We need not resolve these inconsistencies because
      either approach leads to the same conclusion in this
      case:   E.J.W. applies retroactively.  Accordingly, we
      assume for purposes of this discussion that Kurtz sets
      forth factors to weigh.
Majority op., ¶10 n.6.          If the rule of law is to be more than

the rule of judges, the vagueness and subjectivity inherent in

Kurtz cannot stand.

      ¶43    For all of these reasons, this court should overrule

Kurtz and restore the traditional rule of retroactivity that

previously prevailed for a millennium.                Its application in this

case is straightforward.              In Waukesha County v. E.J.W., this

court    interpreted    Wis.    Stat.       § 51.20(11)(a)      (2019–20).           2021

WI 85,    399   Wis. 2d 471,         966    N.W.2d 590.         In    doing    so,    it

partially overruled a court of appeals decision, Marathon County

v.   R.J.O.,    2020   WI   App 20,        392   Wis. 2d 157,        943   N.W.2d 898.

This court in E.J.W. did not——indeed, could not——alter the fixed

meaning of § 51.20(11)(a).             R.J.O. was not "the law" but "the

opinion" of judges who (as the majority saw it) "mist[ook] the

law."       Blackstone, Commentaries, *71.                Because this court in

E.J.W. did not reserve the retroactivity issue, E.J.W. applies
retroactively——even         though    lower      courts    in   this       state   were

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required to follow the incorrect interpretation in R.J.O. until

this court overturned it.

    ¶44   The majority could have simply applied the traditional

rule of retroactivity in a few short paragraphs, but instead

preserves a faulty test the United States Supreme Court deserted

three decades ago.        Although "liberty can have nothing to fear

from the judiciary alone" it has "every thing to fear from its

union with either of the other departments[.]"                    The Federalist

No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).           "The accumulation of all powers,

legislative,   executive,     and      judiciary,      in   the     same   hands,

whether   of   one,   a    few,   or    many,    and    whether      hereditary,

selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very

definition of tyranny."       The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison).

The majority perpetuates the augmentation of judicial power with

the legislative power through unquestioned, dogmatic adherence

to now-defunct precedent.         In doing so, the majority disfigures

the structural separation of powers and treads a path to tyranny

the constitution does not abide.            I do not join it.

                                       12
                                                                             No.    2022AP140-FT.akz

       ¶45     ANNETTE       KINGSLAND        ZIEGLER,         C.J.          (dissenting).           I

dissent because M.R.M.'s recommitment contains no legal error.

Almost two years ago in Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85,

399    Wis. 2d 471,          966     N.W.2d 590,         a     majority          of    this    court

erroneously interpreted the unambiguous command under Wis. Stat.

§ 51.20(11)(a)         that        "[a]   jury    trial       is     deemed         waived    unless

demanded at least 48 hours in advance of the time set for final

hearing."       The E.J.W. majority held "that when a final hearing

is rescheduled, § 51.20(11)(a) allows a jury demand to be filed

up until 48 hours prior to a rescheduled final hearing."                                        Id.,

¶3.     The majority's conclusions today only serve to highlight

E.J.W.'s       error.         E.J.W.      was    wrong        when      it    was     decided,      it

remains      wrong     today,       and   the     majority's          failure         to    overrule

E.J.W. sends our interpretation of § 51.20(11)(a) further out to

sea.     Instead of ruling E.J.W. applies retroactively, I would

overrule E.J.W. and conclude M.R.M. waived his right to a jury

trial at his recommitment hearing.

       ¶46     I also conclude that the circuit court did not run
afoul of our decision in Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41,

391    Wis. 2d 231,          942    N.W.2d 277,         where      we      instructed         circuit

courts    in    ch.     51    recommitment            proceedings          "to      make    specific

factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of

Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based."

Id., ¶3.        The circuit court thoroughly explained its factual

findings.         It     is    clear       the        court    concluded            there     was   a

substantial       likelihood          that,      if    M.R.M.        was      not     recommitted,
M.R.M.'s impaired judgment would again make him a danger to

                                                 1
                                                                  No.   2022AP140-FT.akz

himself or others and a proper subject for commitment under Wis.

Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.               The circuit court therefore complied

with    our    instruction       in    D.J.W.          M.R.M.'s   argument       to   the

contrary amounts to a complaint that the circuit court did not

use     "magic       words"      by     specifically        citing        or     quoting

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c.            Even if the circuit court's explanation did

not comport with D.J.W., that error would be harmless because we

have no trouble discerning the basis for M.R.M.'s recommitment.

Accordingly, M.R.M.'s recommitment contained no error, and that

recommitment should be affirmed.

                                              I

       ¶47     Our state constitution provides, "The right of trial

by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at

law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury

trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner

prescribed by law."            Wis. Const. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).

As is true in other civil cases, juries in ch. 51 commitment

proceedings are waived absent a jury demand.                       Sheboygan County
v.     M.W.,    2022    WI    40,     ¶52,    402   Wis. 2d 1,      974    N.W.2d 733

(Ziegler, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that ch. 51 proceedings

are civil cases and, "absent a jury demand," factual findings

are     left    to     the    circuit        court).       In     accord       with   our

constitution, Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) prescribes the manner in

which a jury is waived in ch. 51 proceedings:                      "A jury trial is

deemed waived unless demanded at least 48 hours in advance of

the time set for final hearing, if notice of that time has been

                                              2
                                                             No.      2022AP140-FT.akz

previously provided to the subject individual or his or her

counsel."

    ¶48     The   statutory      text   is    plain.       Under        Wis.    Stat.

§ 51.20(11)(a), the circuit court sets the time for the final

hearing.    The commitment subject must submit a jury demand "at

least 48 hours in advance" of that time.                  Id.      If the subject

does not do so, then "[a] jury trial is deemed waived."                             Id.

Here, the circuit court set the time of M.R.M.'s final hearing

for July 28, 2021.      He was informed:

    If you want a jury trial, it must be demanded or
    requested at least 48 hours in advance of the trial
    date. In the event the request is not made within 48
    hours in advance of the trial date, you automatically,
    under the statutes, waive your right to a jury trial.
M.R.M.   failed   to    demand   a   jury    trial   at    least       48   hours    in

advance of his trial date.           Therefore, at that time, M.R.M. was

deemed to have waived his right to a jury trial.                        Even though

the court rescheduled his final hearing, M.R.M. could not later

demand a jury trial because he already waived that right.                           The

waiver occurred 48 hours before the time set for final hearing,

"not . . . forty-eight hours before the final hearing actually

occurs."     Marathon County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, ¶41, 392

Wis. 2d 157,      943    N.W.2d 898,         overruled      by        E.J.W.,       399

Wis. 2d 471.       M.R.M.     waived    a     jury   trial       in     the    manner

prescribed by law, and the law provides no mechanism for him to

claw back that waiver.

    ¶49     However, "[t]he majority in [E.J.W.] replaced [this]

clear jury waiver standard in chapter 51 commitment proceedings
with a shifting and unpredictable rule" which "depart[ed] from

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                                                                  No.    2022AP140-FT.akz

sound   judicial      administration        [and]    is   not     supported      by   the

plain   text."        E.J.W.,   399    Wis. 2d 471,         ¶41      (Ziegler,       C.J.,

dissenting).       Since the day E.J.W. was decided, it has been

"detrimental     to    coherence      and       consistency     in      the   law"    and

"unsound in principle."         Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of

Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶¶98-99, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.

    ¶50    The majority in E.J.W. fundamentally misunderstood the

concept of waiver.        Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(11)(a) defines the

point in time at which waiver occurs.

    Thus,   the   only  question   under   []§ 51.20(11)(a)
    . . . is procedural: at what time and date was [the]
    deadline to submit a jury demand or have it deemed
    waived?        Section    51.20(11)(a)    provides    a
    straightforward and rational answer: "[A]t least 48
    hours in advance of the time set for final hearing."
E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶47 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).                             Once

that waiver occurs, the "jury right [is] permanently waived."

Id., ¶54 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).                     "'[W]aiver,' under the

plain language of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a), is not conditional

or subject to revocation.             It is a final extinguishment of a

right."   Id., ¶59 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).                         "A waiver when

once made cannot be recalled, revived, expunged, or revoked, nor

can the right waived be reclaimed . . . ."                      31 C.J.S. Estoppel

and Waiver § 93 (2023).            Once a jury trial is deemed waived

under § 51.20(11)(a), that waiver is effective going forward.

This is true regardless of whether the circuit court reschedules

the final hearing.        The right to a jury trial has been waived,

and nothing has restored it.

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                                                                          No.     2022AP140-FT.akz

       ¶51    By      concluding          "that       when       a       final        hearing       is

rescheduled, [Wis. Stat.] § 51.20(11)(a) allows a jury demand to

be    filed    up     until       48    hours       prior    to      a    rescheduled           final

hearing," the majority in E.J.W. altered the statutory text.

399    Wis. 2d 471,         ¶3.          It   effectively            inserted         a    provision

permitting a right once waived to be restored.                                        E.J.W. thus

amended the "the manner prescribed by law" for waiving a jury

trial in ch. 51 proceedings.                     Wis. Const. art. I, § 5.                      E.J.W.

also undermined consistency in the law, creating a special rule

for   jury     trial    waivers         in    ch.    51   proceedings            as       opposed   to

waivers that take place in any other context.                                    The majority's

interpretation in E.J.W. contravened both the statutory text and

the law generally.

       ¶52    The majority's opinion in this case only serves to

highlight E.J.W.'s errors and the consequences of those errors.

In concluding E.J.W. should be afforded retroactive application,

the    majority       in    part        relies       on   "the       legislature's            policy

choices," among those the apparent choice "to afford due process
protections" in ch. 51 civil commitment proceedings.                                         Majority

op., ¶13 (quoting E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471, ¶28).                                 The majority's

invocation of due process principles, both here and in E.J.W.,

further       inches        judicial           interpretation              of         Wis.      Stat.

§ 51.20(11)(a) away from the statutory text.                                    It puts a due

process       gloss    on     a        statutory      provision,          which           "ha[s]    no

relevance to the issues in this case."                       E.J.W., 399 Wis. 2d 471,

¶45 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).                      Section 51.20(11)(a) is not a
bulwark protecting the right to a jury trial in ch. 51 civil

                                                 5
                                                               No.       2022AP140-FT.akz

commitment proceedings.              It is simply "the manner prescribed by

law" by which "a jury trial may be waived."                   Wis. Const. art. I,

§ 5.     The majority's analysis infers a far greater purpose than

the text fairly implies, building upon the errors that began

with E.J.W.

       ¶53     Giving     E.J.W.       retroactive         effect        rather      than

overruling it will also throw circuit court dockets into chaos.

In an equally flawed decision, a majority of this court created

a   bright-line        rule   that    recommitment    orders    are        never    moot.

Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶3, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975

N.W.2d 162.        It did so based on "[a] theoretical and unproven

collateral consequence" of recommitment, which "has never been a

standalone reason to conclude that a case is not moot."                              Id.,

¶40 (Ziegler, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).                           By

giving        E.J.W.    retroactive      effect,     the    majority        opens    the

floodgates,       inviting      innumerable      challenges         to    recommitment

orders that have long since expired.

       ¶54     "Precedents     should    be    respected,     but        sometimes    the
[c]ourt errs, and occasionally the [c]ourt issues an important

decision that is egregiously wrong.                  When that happens, stare

decisis is not a straitjacket."                Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health

Org., 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2280 (2022).                            Here, the

majority "do[es] more damage to the rule of law by obstinately

refusing to admit [its] errors, thereby perpetuating injustice,

than     by     overturning     [this]     erroneous       decision."             Johnson

Controls, Inc., 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶100.                      I would correct this

                                           6
                                                                     No.       2022AP140-FT.akz

mistake     by    overruling          E.J.W.,         and     therefore    conclude        that

M.R.M.'s recommitment did not violate Wis. Stat. § 51.20(11)(a).

                                             II

    ¶55     M.R.M.          also   argues        his        recommitment       was   unlawful

because the circuit court's explanation of its decision did not

follow D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231.                       In D.J.W., we instructed "that

going forward circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to

make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision

paragraph        of     Wis.       Stat.     § 51.20(1)(a)2.              on     which      the

recommitment is based."                Id., ¶3.             M.R.M. argues "the circuit

court ran afoul of D.J.W. by failing to set forth either the

requisite    findings         of   fact     or     the      dangerousness       standard     it

deemed proven."

    ¶56     "For        a    person     to       be     subject     to     a     chapter     51

involuntary commitment, three elements must be fulfilled:                                   the

subject    individual          must    be    (1)      mentally     ill;    (2)       a   proper

subject    for        treatment;      and    (3)       dangerous     to    themselves        or

others."     Id., ¶29 (citing Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)1.-2.).                                In
an initial commitment, the county must provide evidence of the

potential commitment subject's current dangerousness under one

of five subdivision paragraphs in ch. 51:

         a. Evidences    a  substantial  probability  of
    physical harm to himself or herself as manifested by
    evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide
    or serious bodily harm.

         b. Evidences    a  substantial   probability   of
    physical harm to other individuals as manifested by
    evidence  of   recent  homicidal   or  other   violent
    behavior, or by evidence that others are placed in
    reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious
    physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent overt
                              7
                                                No.   2022AP140-FT.akz

    act, attempt    or   threat   to   do   serious   physical
    harm. . . .

         c. Evidences such impaired judgment, manifested
    by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions,
    that there is a substantial probability of physical
    impairment or injury to himself or herself or other
    individuals. . . .

         d. Evidences behavior manifested by recent acts
    or omissions that, due to mental illness, he or she is
    unable to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical
    care, shelter or safety without prompt and adequate
    treatment so that a substantial probability exists
    that death, serious physical injury, serious physical
    debilitation,   or   serious  physical   disease   will
    imminently ensue unless the individual receives prompt
    and adequate treatment for this mental illness. . . .

         e. For an individual, other than an individual
    who is alleged to be drug dependent or developmentally
    disabled, after the advantages and disadvantages of
    and alternatives to accepting a particular medication
    or treatment have been explained to him or her and
    because   of    mental   illness,    evidences    either
    incapability of expressing an understanding of the
    advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication
    or treatment and the alternatives, or substantial
    incapability of applying an understanding of the
    advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to his or
    her mental illness in order to make an informed choice
    as to whether to accept or refuse medication or
    treatment; and evidences a substantial probability, as
    demonstrated   by  both   the  individual's    treatment
    history and his or her recent acts or omissions, that
    the individual needs care or treatment to prevent
    further disability or deterioration and a substantial
    probability that he or she will, if left untreated,
    lack services necessary for his or her health or
    safety and suffer severe mental, emotional, or
    physical harm that will result in the loss of the
    individual's ability to function independently in the
    community or the loss of cognitive or volitional
    control over his or her thoughts or actions. . . .
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.
    ¶57   In a recommitment hearing, current dangerousness may

be proved by demonstrating the treatment following the initial
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                                                                   No.    2022AP140-FT.akz

commitment      "ameliorated         [the       dangerous]     behavior,        but     if

treatment were withdrawn, there may be a substantial likelihood

such behavior would recur."                Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI

54, ¶19, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509.

    If the individual has been the subject of inpatient
    treatment    for     mental     illness,    developmental
    disability, or drug dependency immediately prior to
    commencement of the proceedings as a result of a
    voluntary   admission,   a  commitment    or   protective
    placement    ordered    by    a     court   under    this
    section . . . , the requirements of a recent overt
    act, attempt or threat to act under par. (a)2. a. or
    b., pattern of recent acts or omissions under par.
    (a)2. c. or e., or recent behavior under par. (a)2. d.
    may be satisfied by a showing that there is a
    substantial    likelihood,   based     on  the    subject
    individual's treatment record, that the individual
    would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment
    were withdrawn. . . .
Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am).

    ¶58       The    issue    in      D.J.W.      was   whether          "the   evidence

introduced     at    the     recommitment        hearing     was    insufficient        to

support   a    conclusion      that    D.J.W.      is   'dangerous'        pursuant      to

either    §§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c.          or    2.d.     and     51.20(1)(am)."             391
Wis. 2d 231, ¶3.        Resolving this issue proved difficult because

"[i]t was not clear at either the initial commitment hearing or

the extension hearing on which subdivision paragraph of Wis.

Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. the commitment was based."                         Id., ¶36.       To

avoid future difficulties of this sort, "we determine[d] that

going forward circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to

make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision

paragraph      of    § 51.20(1)(a)2.        on     which     the    recommitment         is
based."       Id.,   ¶40.      The     purpose     of   this   requirement         is    to

                                            9
                                                                    No.    2022AP140-FT.akz

provide notice of the statutory basis for recommitment to both

the subject and reviewing courts.                   Id., ¶¶42-44 ("[I]t provides

clarity    and      extra       protection         to      patients       regarding          the

underlying basis for a recommitment" and "will clarify issues

raised on appeal of recommitment orders and ensure the soundness

of judicial decision making.").

    ¶59        However,    our     decision        in    D.J.W.    did    not    create        a

"magic words" requirement.                "The court in D.J.W. did not hold

that a circuit court's failure to cite a statutory reference is

enough to overturn a valid mental health commitment."                            M.W., 402

Wis. 2d 1,       ¶45    (Ziegler,         C.J.,         dissenting).1           It     merely

"reiterated the long-established principle that circuit courts

must explain their reasoning and legal conclusions when they

decide    civil    cases."         Id.,      ¶64   (Ziegler,       C.J.,    dissenting).

"Nowhere in       D.J.W.    did we state that appellate courts would

reverse    any    and     all     recommitment          orders    that,    on    a    cursory

review, lack citation to an initial commitment pathway."                                 Id.,

¶55 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).                    Furthermore, ch. 51 compels
that a reviewing court undertake a harmless error review even if

it finds the circuit court failed to adequately explain the

facts and law.            Under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c), "The court

shall,    in    every     stage    of   an    action,       disregard      any       error    or

defect in the pleadings or proceedings that does not affect the

substantial rights of either party."                        D.J.W.'s instruction to

    1  The majority in M.W. did not disagree with my analysis of
D.J.W. It failed to reach the D.J.W. issue in that case, just
as the majority does here.

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                                                                            No.   2022AP140-FT.akz

circuit courts in no way absolves us of our statutory obligation

to apply harmless error review in ch. 51 proceedings.

     ¶60    The circuit court in this case did not run afoul of

D.J.W.     The record sufficiently demonstrates that the circuit

court     made        factual    findings        supporting            a    determination        of

dangerousness          under     Wis.     Stat.          § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.           using       the

alternative       evidentiary          method       in    § 51.20(1)(am).                In    other

words, the record demonstrates that the circuit court found "a

substantial likelihood, based on [M.R.M.'s] treatment record,

that" "there [would be] a substantial probability of physical

impairment or injury to himself . . . or others" "if treatment

were withdrawn" due to M.R.M.'s "impaired judgment."

     ¶61    The circuit court relied heavily on the testimony of a

psychiatrist           who     examined       M.R.M.             The       psychiatrist         also

submitted        to     the     circuit       court       a    14-page        written         report

detailing M.R.M.'s treatment history, the psychiatrist's account

of   interviewing            M.R.M.,     an    examination             of    M.R.M.'s         mental

status,    psychiatric           diagnosis,         and       opinions        regarding        civil
commitment.            His    report     discussed         the    January         2021   incident

prompting M.R.M.'s initial commitment:                           M.R.M. "walking around

his property with a loaded gun making suicidal and homicidal

remarks" and, "[u]pon arrival at the ER, . . . yell[ing] that he

was going to take everybody out."                             The psychiatrist's report

concluded    M.R.M.           "suffers    from      Schizoaffective               Disorder"      and

that M.R.M.'s condition "only improved as a result of subsequent

involuntary       psychotropic           treatment."             The        psychiatrist        also
stated in his report that he was "concerned about the current

                                               11
                                                                    No.   2022AP140-FT.akz

plan to reduce medication dosages until symptoms of psychosis

re-emerge" and opined that "commitment extension is warranted in

order     to    allow      staff      to   intervene        when       [M.R.M.]    becomes

symptomatic again, given that he already has no insight into his

mental     illness,        treatment       needs     and    concerns       about     prior

dangerousness        while     less      actively     symptomatic."          His    report

further concluded,

    [T]here is a substantial likelihood that he would
    become a proper subject for commitment if treatment
    were withdrawn. At the current time, his risk of harm
    to himself and others through judgment impaired by
    paranoid psychosis, leading him recklessly brandishing
    a weapon in public amid suicidal and homicidal threats
    has been mitigated by the oversight of medication
    compliance under the conditions of civil commitment.
    ¶62        At    the     recommitment           hearing,       the      psychiatrist

testified in a manner consistent with his report.                             He stated

M.R.M.    "suffers      from    schizoaffective            disorder[,      which]    is    a

treatable mental illness."                 He also testified M.R.M. "has told

every one along the way that he does not believe that he suffers

from a mental illness or need[s] treatment when all evidence

suggests otherwise."            Based on his review of clinical records

and independent examiner reports discussing M.R.M.'s treatment

history,       the   psychiatrist          testified,       "I     believe    it    is     a

substantial likelihood that [M.R.M.] would exhibit or experience

the same type of symptoms he exhibited back in January with the

associated dangerousness if treatment were withdrawn," which he

described as "judgment impaired by paranoid psychosis."

    ¶63        Based on the psychiatrist's testimony and report, the
circuit    court      "found       his     opinions     and      his     insight    to    be

                                             12
                                                                         No.      2022AP140-FT.akz

credible, to be thoughtful."                       The court "f[ou]nd by clear and

convincing evidence, here, [M.R.M.] does have a mental illness

whether    he        wishes         to    admit    it     or    not.         At     least      five

psychiatrists believe that he does . . . ."                             It "agree[d] that

[M.R.M.]   is        a    proper         subject    for      treatment.           He    has    been

responding      to       the    medication         or   medications        that        he's    been

receiving . . . since                the     incident     in    January."              The    court

remarked     that         "[w]hat         happened      in     January       was       incredibly

serious, incredibly frightening, incredibly dangerous not only

to   [M.R.M.],        but      to    other    people,        too."     The     court         further

explained, "[I]f you choose not to believe you have the mental

illness or don't want to take the medications, the person you're

potentially hurting[,] and there's clear and convicting evidence

of that, is not only yourself, but it's others, too."                                  The court

told M.R.M.,

      I think that if you are not under the commitment that
      you will not take your medication; you will not avail
      yourself of the other treatments in addition to
      medication and we will be right back where we were in
      January and maybe this time somebody really will be
      hurt.
The court found, "because of [M.R.M.'s] poor insight into his

having this illness and needing treatment . . . and attempts to

manipulate           care           providers . . . I'm              concerned          at       the

forcefulness of which he wants to have a weapon back in his

hands."         It       therefore         concluded      there      was     "a     substantial

likelihood that [M.R.M.] would again become a proper subject for

treatment relatively quickly and would again be dangerous."

                                                  13
                                                                              No.    2022AP140-FT.akz

       ¶64     M.R.M. complains that, based on the circuit court's

findings, he "is left to guess what specific threat the circuit

court believed he posed" under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.                                          This

is simply not true.             The circuit court repeatedly voiced its

concern      that     something     similar           to    the       January        2021    incident

where       M.R.M.    brandished       a    gun        could          occur     if    he     was    not

recommitted.          This was based on both the January 2021 incident

and M.R.M.'s conduct during treatment denying the existence of

his    condition.          Additionally,          the       psychiatrist's                report    and

testimony both referenced M.R.M.'s "impaired judgment."                                            Based

on    the    circuit      court's    findings,             it     takes       little       effort    to

understand          the   circuit      court          found          M.R.M.     would       pose     "a

substantial         probability     of      physical            impairment           or    injury    to

himself . . . or           other     individuals"                due       to       his     "impaired

judgment" under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.                          The circuit court relied on

M.R.M.'s      treatment       record       and    the       psychiatrist's                conclusions

from    that        record,   which        showed          that       M.R.M.        had     "judgment

impaired       by    paranoid      psychosis."                  The    court        believed       this
affliction could recur, and M.R.M. "would be a proper subject

for commitment if treatment were withdrawn."                                        § 51.20(1)(am).

M.R.M.'s       quarrel     therefore        appears             to    be   with       the     circuit

court's failure to use "magic words" by either quoting or citing

the applicable subdivision paragraph.                             D.J.W. does not require

this.        Even if it did, we must disregard such an error as

harmless under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(10)(c) because the statutory

basis for M.R.M.'s recommitment is easily discerned from the
record.

                                                 14
                                                               No.    2022AP140-FT.akz

                                        III

      ¶65      M.R.M.'s    recommitment       is    devoid     of     legal    error.

Instead of ruling E.J.W. applies retroactively, I would overrule

E.J.W. and conclude M.R.M. waived his right to a jury trial at

his recommitment hearing.          E.J.W. was wrong when it was decided,

it remains wrong today, and the majority's failure to overrule

E.J.W.    sends     our   interpretation      of    Wis.    Stat.    § 51.20(11)(a)

further out to sea.         The majority's conclusions today only serve

to highlight E.J.W.'s error, and we should take this opportunity

to overrule it.

      ¶66      I also conclude that the circuit court did not run

afoul of our decision in D.J.W.                The circuit court thoroughly

explained its factual findings.            It is clear the court concluded

there    was    a   substantial    likelihood       that,    if     M.R.M.    was   not

recommitted, M.R.M.'s impaired judgment would again make him a

danger to himself or others and a proper subject for commitment

under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.                 The circuit court therefore

complied with our instruction in D.J.W.                     M.R.M.'s argument to
the contrary amounts to a complaint that the circuit court did

not     use    "magic     words"   by   specifically         citing     or    quoting

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c.         Even if the circuit court's explanation did

not comport with D.J.W., that error would be harmless because we

have no trouble discerning the basis for M.R.M.'s recommitment.

Accordingly, M.R.M.'s recommitment contained no error, and that

recommitment should be affirmed.

      ¶67      For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

                                        15
                                                                        No.   2022AP140-FT.pdr

      ¶68    PATIENCE         DRAKE    ROGGENSACK,        J.   (dissenting).                The

majority opinion concludes that because a commitment extension

order was entered in error due to denial of a jury request that

was   deemed       untimely,      the    circuit      court    lost           competency    to

proceed     further      in    regard    to    the    effect       of     M.R.M.'s      mental

illness on the State's ability to bring him to trial.1                                  In so

concluding,       the    majority       opinion   directly         conflicts         with   our

decision     in    Portage      Cnty.     v.   J.W.K.,      2019        WI    54,    ¶21,   386

Wis. 2d     672,    927       N.W.2d    509,   with       regard    to        circuit   court

competency for orders issued subsequent to a defective order.

The   majority          opinion's       holding      on    competency           is    totally

unnecessary to resolving the jury request issue for which we

granted review and it also has the potential to terminate the

treatment that M.R.M. likely is receiving today based on an

order that would have had to be entered before expiration of the

extension order that we review today.2

      1Majority op., ¶3.  The majority opinion concludes that a
commitment extension order for M.R.M. entered August 13, 2021 is
invalid because M.R.M.'s request for a jury trial was not
honored based on a decision from this court that occurred after
the circuit court addressed M.R.M.'s jury trial request.      To
clarify, the circuit court correctly applied Marathon Cnty v.
R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898, to
M.R.M.'s jury trial request, which was the controlling law at
the time of the circuit court's decision.      I choose not to
address that portion of the majority opinion that deals with
retroactivity.
      2The majority opinion ignores that this dissent is grounded
in the findings of four psychiatrists who have personally
examined M.R.M. and have found that he is dangerous due to a
substantial probability of physical harm to himself. While most
people with mental illness are not a danger to themselves or
others, the record before us conclusively shows that M.R.M.
needs medical care because of the substantial probability that
                                1
                                                                          No.    2022AP140-FT.pdr

       ¶69        As I explain below with my review of the record before

us, the majority opinion is wrong under our precedent and it

puts M.R.M. at significant risk of inflicting self-harm and/or

harm       to    others     because   the    majority           opinion      makes      necessary

medical          care     more    difficult        to     receive.           Accordingly,        I

respectfully dissent.

                                      I.    BACKGROUND

       ¶70        In January of 2021, M.R.M. came to the attention of

law enforcement because he was carrying a loaded gun and making

suicidal and homicidal statements.                       He is reported to have been

"screaming"         and     "stated   several           times    he    was      going    to    kill

people      and     then    himself    and    at        one    point    said      he    is    Jesus

Christ."3          The gun M.R.M. was waving while he screamed was a

"loaded glock 27 (.40 cal[iber]) pistol, [that had] a round in

the chamber" and seven rounds in the magazine.4

       ¶71        M.R.M. is reported to have told the admitting nurse at

Aurora          Lakeland    Emergency       Room    that        "the    numbers         told    him

everyone had to die, and he had to kill himself as well.                                       [He]
stated       he    has     been   diagnosed    with           schizophrenia       and    bipolar

disorder and would then laugh and say, 'No, I am not.'"5

he will inflict physical harm on himself.

       R. 1:
       3                Statement of Emergency Detention by Law Enforcement
Officer.
       4   Id.

       R. 1: Village of Genoa City Police Department Incident
       5

Report (emphasis added).

                                               2
                                                               No.    2022AP140-FT.pdr

     ¶72    He    was     transported         to   Winnebago         Mental    Health

Institute       (WMHI)    and       was   examined         initially      by   three

psychiatrists.6          At   the    Probable      Cause    Hearing,      Dr. Pjerla

testified:

          A [M.R.M.] was admitted to Winnebago on an
     emergency detention. So I was to evaluate and assess
     whether he required further hospitalization.

            Q    And what day did the examination occur on?

            A    The 20th.

     . . . .

          Q Doctor, can you estimate how much total time
     you spent with [M.R.M.]?

          A In person over the last two days, maybe 45
     minutes.    And then reviewing records, talking and
     obtaining collateral information, discussing things
     with the team, another 45 minutes to an hour.

          Q And,    Doctor,  what   records  or                  collateral
     information have you been able to review?

          A I was able to review the information from the
     crisis report, the emergency detention, the emergency
     room documentation, some collateral information from
     [the] patient's mother as well.

     . . . .

          Q After your examination of [M.R.M.], do you
     have an opinion as to whether he has a mental illness?

            A    Yes.

            Q    And what is your opinion?

            A    I believe he does.

     . . . .

     6 Dr. Srananthi Pjerla, Dr. Marshall Bales and Dr. Leslie
Taylor are licensed psychiatrists.

                                          3
                                                             No.   2022AP140-FT.pdr

               Q
             Do you have an opinion as to whether [M.R.M.]
     is a proper subject for treatment of his mental
     illness?

               A   I believe he is.

     . . . .

          Q And, Doctor, do you have an opinion as to
     whether [M.R.M.] is a danger to himself or to others?

               A   Yes, I believe he is.

          Q And         what   is   the    nature    of   risk     that   you
     believe?

          A So I believe that he was dangerous to himself
     when he pointed a gun at his head and was threatening
     to kill himself.   Now, [M.R.M.] has said that he was
     not intending to do this, but that he was just
     pretending in order to scare his mother. [M.R.M.] has
     said that he did not believe that the gun was loaded.
     But on review of some of the information, it does
     appear that the gun was loaded.     So I believe that
     [M.R.M.'s] thought process and confusion about reality
     contributed to those behaviors and the suicide gesture
     or attempt.    He also made threats to kill other
     people.[ ]
             7

     ¶73       During   Dr. Bales's       exam,   [M.R.M.]    repeated     he   was

Jesus Christ and that "everyone had to die."8                Since admission to

WMHI, M.R.M. admitted "he was intent on killing himself but that
his mother talked him out of it.                    He was distinctly manic,

hyperverbal, labile, dysphoric, agitated, and defensive, stating

he did not have a mental health problem."9                Dr. Bales found that

     7 R. 79 at 6-10:          Dr. Pjerla's testimony at probable cause
hearing.
     8   R. 21:     Report of Examination (by Dr. Bales, M.D.).
     9   Id.

                                           4
                                                              No.    2022AP140-FT.pdr

M.R.M. is dangerous because there is a "substantial probability

of physical harm to himself."10

     ¶74    Dr. Bales also said:

     [M.R.M.] is a 43-year-old Caucasian male who suffers
     from a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or
     perception. He has been dangerous in ways noted. His
     condition is treatable, and he is a proper subject for
     treatment. Based on the above, it is my opinion with
     a reasonable degree of medical certainty that he does
     meet   the    criteria  for   a  six-month Chapter   51
     commitment with an order to treat.          The least
     restrictive environment is inpatient on a locked
     psychiatric unit. At the discretion of his inpatient
     treating physician, he can transition to outpatient
     care when stable. He will benefit from psychotherapy,
     case    management,    psychiatric   care, and    other
     services.[ ]
                11

     ¶75    Another        psychiatrist,        Dr. Taylor,         also    examined

M.R.M., his intake records, talked with his mother and with his

brother-in-law.         She confirmed that M.R.M. is dangerous due to a

"substantial probability of physical harm to himself . . . [and]

[a] substantial probability of physical harm to other subjects

as manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent

behavior."12          Based on the above history, M.R.M. was committed

for six months in January 2021.
     ¶76    In     July    2021,   Walworth     County   petitioned        to    extend

M.R.M.'s    commitment,         with    an   adjourned   recommitment           hearing

scheduled       for    August   12,    2021.    Dr. Robert    Rawski       testified

about his examination of M.R.M.13              He said that he spent about an

     10   Id.
     11   Id.
     12   R. 23:       Report of Examination (by Dr. Taylor).
     13   R. 66:       Dr. Rawski is a licensed psychiatrist.
                                        5
                                                                   No.   2022AP140-FT.pdr

hour and 45 minutes talking to M.R.M. and he spent about three

hours reviewing his records and constructing a report.                                 His

testimony included the following:

       Q.     [W]hat is your opinion and what is his diagnosis?

       A. I believe to a reasonable degree of medical
       certainty that [M.R.M.] suffers from schizoaffective
       disorder.   That is a treatable mental illness.      It
       features a substantial disorder of thought, mood and
       perception   that   grossly   impairs   his   judgment,
       behavior, capacity to recognize reality and the
       ability to meet the ordinary demands of life.

       . . . .

       Q. Do you have an opinion whether based on [M.R.M.]'s
       treatment record that he would be a proper subject for
       commitment if treatment were withdrawn?

       A. Yes.    I believe it is a substantial likelihood
       that he would exhibit or experience the same type of
       symptoms he exhibited back in January with the
       associated    dangerousness    if     treatment    were
       withdrawn. . . .      The   likelihood   of   that   is
       significant given his poor insight into his mental
       illness and need for treatment.[14]
       ¶77    After that hearing, M.R.M. again was found to have a

mental illness that was a proper subject for treatment, and that

he met the statutory standards for dangerousness.                             The circuit

court signed and entered a commitment extension on August 13,

2021    for    12    months   "from       the       expiration   date    of    the   prior

commitment      order."15          The    "prior      commitment   order"       to   which

reference      was    made    is    the    original       commitment     that     expired

August 12, 2021.         Therefore, the extension order that is subject

to these proceedings expired by its terms on August 11, 2022.

       14   R. 66 at 11-14.
       15   R. 53:   Order of Extension of Commitment.
                                                6
                                                                           No.   2022AP140-FT.pdr

       ¶78     Given that M.R.M. has a mental illness that causes him

to be a danger to himself and to others, it is likely another

commitment extension was processed on or before August 11, 2022,

such    that    M.R.M.        currently        is       receiving         treatment     for     his

illness.       Because health care records are confidential, we do

not know the current status of his treatment today, but the

record       informs     us       that       four       licensed        psychiatrists          have

concluded that he is dangerous to himself and to others.

                                       II.    DISCUSSION

       ¶79     The    majority         opinion          concludes         that    the    circuit

court's      denial    of     a    jury      trial          in   regard    to    the    one   year

extension order that began in August 2021 and expired in August

2022 was a "failure to enter a lawful extension order before the

preceding      order     expires,"           and       results     in     the    circuit      court

losing competency to conduct further proceedings.                                  It cites an

unpublished          court        of     appeals            decision       to     support       its

conclusion.16

       ¶80     In    briefing,         M.R.M.           addressed         the    relevance       of
competency very differently from the position of the majority

opinion herein.         In his briefing, M.R.M. explained "it's whether

a   reviewing        court    that       deems         an    unexpired      commitment        order

unlawful should reverse it outright or also remand the case for

a new trial. . . .             [However, the] circuit court cannot hold a

new trial on an old commitment petition, as it will invariably

       Majority op., ¶24, citing Shawano Cnty. v. S.L.V.,
       16

No. 2021AP223, unpublished slip op., ¶20 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 17,
2021).

                                                   7
                                                              No.    2022AP140-FT.pdr

lose competency before remand [to hold a new trial]."17                             The

majority    opinion's      conclusion       that    the   circuit     court     loses

competency to conduct further proceedings presents an unlimited

loss of competency, far beyond M.R.M.'s position that competency

to hold a new trial within the time frame of the extension order

likely would be lacking.

     ¶81    The majority also concludes that the date the one year

extension order expired is "irrelevant because the circuit court

lost competency to hold an extension hearing when the preceding

commitment order expired."          The majority opinion again cites an

unpublished court of appeals decision to support its assertion.18

     ¶82    What is unstated, but held nonetheless by the majority

opinion, is that once an order is determined to be unlawful any

orders that are connected to that order are also invalid because

the circuit court had no competency to issue valid subsequent

orders.     This creates the same "domino theory" that we held in

J.W.K.    "[was]    not    supported    by    the    text    of     the     statute."

J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶21.
     ¶83    To explain further, in J.W.K. we held:                  "Reversing the

expired    2016    order   for   insufficient        evidence       would    have   no

effect on subsequent recommitment orders because later orders

stand on their own under the language of the statute."                       Id., ¶1

(emphasis    added).       J.W.K.   had      argued,      similar    to     what    the

     17   M.R.M. brief, p. 13.
     18Majority op., ¶24 (citing Eau Claire Cnty. v. J.M.P.,
2020AP2014-FT, unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. June 22,
2021).

                                        8
                                                                      No.     2022AP140-FT.pdr

majority holds today, that "reversal of the 2016 order would

mean    the    circuit       court     lacked      competency       to    issue     the   2017

extension order."            Id., ¶15.

       ¶84     The       majority    opinion       says,    "There       is    an   important

difference, however, between how we evaluate the validity of a

commitment order, as in J.W.K., and how we determine whether a

circuit court has competency, as in this case."19                               That may be

true, but prior to this matter, circuit courts did not lose

competency          to    issue     orders   prior     to     the    preceding        order's

expiration date even if an order was later declared unlawful.

       ¶85     Here, the extension order was held unlawful because a

jury trial was denied and a loss of competency followed.20                                   In

J.W.K., "An appellate court's later conclusion that the evidence

was    insufficient         to     support   the     August    2016       extension       order

would not retroactively change the fact that at the time the

circuit court entered the extension order in July 2017, the

prior       order    had     not    expired;       therefore,       the       circuit     court

retained competency to enter the unchallenged July 2017 order."
Id., ¶22.

       ¶86     We    explained       in   J.W.K.     Wis.     Stat.       § 51.20(13)(g)1.

contemplates "consecutive orders of commitment," and as long as

"the extension is made prior to the expiration of the previous

commitment order, the circuit court may order the extension if

       19   Majority op., ¶26.

       "Accordingly, the failure to enter a lawful extension
       20

order before the preceding order expires results in a loss of
competency." Id., ¶24.

                                               9
                                                               No.     2022AP140-FT.pdr

the County proves its case under the statutory criteria."                          Id.,

¶21.21       We     also     concluded      that     "reversing      the      [earlier]

commitment     order       does    not   retroactively     deprive      the    circuit

court that issued a subsequent commitment order of competency."

Id.      Our holding rejected the concurrence/dissent's position in

J.W.K..22

      ¶87    It is the same "loss of competency" contention that we

rejected from the dissent in J.W.K. that the majority opinion

articulates in the case now before us:                    "[B]ecause the circuit

court denied M.R.M.'s timely jury demand, its extension order is

unlawful.          And    because    the    preceding     commitment       order   has

expired,      the        circuit    court    lacks     competency        to    conduct

proceedings on remand."23

      ¶88    The majority opinion cites G.O.T. v. Rock Cnty., 151

Wis. 2d     629,    445    N.W.2d    697    (Ct.   App.   1989)   to    support     its

       The concurrence/dissent in Portage Cnty. v. J.W.K., 2019
      21

WI 54, ¶36, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509, (Dallet, J.,
concurring/dissenting), also argued that if an extension order
was invalid the "chain of commitment was broken" and the county
had to begin the commitment process as though there had been no
prior finding of incompetence.

       In J.W.K. we rejected the same competency argument the
      22

majority holds in favor of today:

      If current dangerousness was not established at the
      August 2016 extension hearing, the August 2016
      extension   was  invalid.     As   such,  the   initial
      commitment order would have expired prior to it being
      extended and the circuit court would have lacked
      competency to enter any subsequent extension orders.

Id., ¶34       (Dallet,       J.,    concurring/dissenting)          (emphasis
added).
      23   Majority op., ¶27.

                                            10
                                                                    No.    2022AP140-FT.pdr

global, prospective loss of competency.24                    In G.O.T., the circuit

court repeatedly extended a commitment beyond the amount of time

that    Wis.    Stat.      § 51.20(13)(g)           permitted,     and    the    court     of

appeals concluded that the circuit court did not have competency

to ignore a statutory directive.                    Id. at 633.     G.O.T. reviewed a

past court act.            It did not establish a prospective loss of

competency       for      "any     subsequent        extension      orders,"        as     the

majority opinion has done.

       ¶89     There are real-life dangers in setting up a "domino

effect" whenever the circuit court makes an error that causes

the    overturning        of     all   subsequent      orders.           One   is   that    a

majority opinion of this court takes away the only means the

State has to protect a repeatedly dangerous person from harm to

himself and/or to others.

       ¶90     The extension order under review here, by its terms,

expired in August of 2022.                    It is likely that an extension of

treatment was ordered then.                   If so, subsequent treatment would

be on-going now; however, the majority opinion has the potential
to    terminate      it   with     its    conclusion       that    the    circuit        court

lacked competency to issue subsequent extension orders.

                                   III.       CONCLUSION

       ¶91     The     record      before       us    clearly       shows       that      four

psychiatrists have concluded that M.R.M. is dangerous because he

is substantially likely to cause physical harm to himself and/or

others.        Concluding        that     circuit     courts      lack    competency       to

provide      needed     care     for     an   individual     that    is     dangerous       to

       24   Id., ¶19.

                                               11
                                              No.   2022AP140-FT.pdr

himself and others is unsupported in the law and irresponsible.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

                               12
    No.   2022AP140-FT.pdr

1