Court Opinion

ID: 9883197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:38:24.163429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:21.996414
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
concurring in the result.
[¶ 37] When two good arguments can be made for either of two contrary positions as to the meaning of a term in a document, an ambiguity exists. Garofalo v. Saint Joseph’s Hosp., 2000 ND 149, ¶ 7, 615 N.W.2d 160. Surely this trust agreement is ambiguous!
[¶ 38] This case comes to the Court on appeal from a summary judgment after cross-motions in the trial court for summary judgment and the trial court’s conclusion that the interpretation of the trust agreement was a matter of law. The trial court also tells us that if we determine that the trust is so hopelessly conflicting so as to be unenforceable, the trust fails.
[¶ 39] I am concerned with the posture of the case before this Court. In Metcalf v. Security Intern. Ins. Co. the Court observed that:
[T]he interpretation of the parties’ intentions as to the meaning of certain words *170or phrases in a written contract may involve either a question of law or a question of fact depending on whether or not the interpretation requires the use of extrinsic evidence. If the parties’ intentions in a written contract can be ascertained from the writing alone, then the interpretation of the contract is a question of law for the court to decide. If, however, the parties’ intentions cannot be determined from the writing alone and reference must be made to extrinsic evidence, then those questions in regard to which extrinsic evidence is adduced are questions of fact to be determined by the trier-of-fact.
261 N.W.2d 795, 799 (N.D.1977) (citations omitted).
[¶ 40] The majority opinion attempts to resolve the ambiguity of the parties’ intent from the document itself. In so doing the majority must hold a specific sentence of the trust “as inconsistent with the main intention of the parties in executing the trust agreement” and “conclude it is inoperative.” To hold otherwise would negate the conclusion that Phillip, the surviving trustor, could convey the property in fee to himself because it would be inconsistent with the provision that he only had a life estate in some of the property, i.e., the home. The majority relies on a provision of the trust that says the primary beneficiaries of the trust are Phillip and Josephine Pender to determine the main intent of the parties. I agree, but I am not convinced that the provision regarding the home is inconsistent with the primary beneficiary language. If there is extrinsic evidence to explain the trustors’ intent in the meaning of the trust language, this is a case that should have been tried, not resolved on cross-motions for summary judgment. Neither party has suggested that such evidence is available. Both parties ask us to interpret the trust as a matter of law but they espouse opposite interpretations.
[¶ 41] If extrinsic evidence is available to explain the intention of the parties and the meaning of the trust document I would reverse the trial court’s summary judgment for Pender, affirm the denial of summary judgment for Langer and Weiss, and order the matter be tried. Neither party has asked for that relief on appeal. According to the trial court we are left with the option of construing the intent of the parties from the instrument itself or holding that it fails because it is so conflicting as to make it unenforceable. The majority has taken the former option. I am not completely convinced the majority’s construction is correct; nor am I convinced the construction Langer and Weiss would have us adopt is correct. Neither do I believe the document is hopelessly conflicting. Rather, I expect extrinsic evidence adduced at trial might shed greater light on the intention of the parties and the meaning of the provisions in the trust agreement. However, given the limited options the parties have presented to the court for resolution of this matter, I cannot disagree with the result reached in the majority opinion.
[¶ 42] Gerald W. Vande Walle, C. J.