Court Opinion

ID: 9824765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:20:12.011175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:02.991667
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On the 27th day of April, 1915, this court rendered an opinion in this case affirming the judgment of the lower court.
The record shows that about the month of January, 1909, the plaintiff in error, movant herein, commenced an action in the district court of Carter county against one Clay Blackwell, and caused an order of attachment to be issued and levied on his property in controversy herein. Service was obtained by publication and judgment rendered, attachment sustained, and property sold on execution. The plaintiff in error herein, who was judgment creditor in that case, bought the property at sheriff’s sale, obtained a sheriff’s deed, and sold it to a man by the name of J. A. Skipworth. Skipworth sold to *20U. S. Joines, the defendant in error herein; all parties conveying by warranty deeds in substantial compliance with the form prescribed by the statutes of Oklahoma, the material part of which is as follows:
“At the delivery of said deed the grantor is lawfully seisgd in his own right of an absolute estate in fee simple of, in, and to said premises; that the same are free, clear, and discharged of and from all former grants, titles and charges of whatever nature and kind soever, and that he will warrant and forever defend the same unto said party of the second part (grantee), his heirs and assigns, against said party of the first part (grantor) and all and every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or so claim the same.” ,
- . While Joines, the defendant in error herein, was still holding the premises under the deeds mentioned, Blackwell, the original judgment debtor, moved the court to set aside the original judgment, and all actions and proceedings therein, on the ground that:
“He had at all times been a resident of this state, which was known to plaintiff, and because the property attached and sold was his homestead, and was not described as the law requires in the summons by publication.”
The court sustained the motion, and in so doing entered the following order and judgment:
“This day came on to be heard the motion of the defendant to set aside and vacate the judgment rendered against him in this cause, on the 6th day of February, 1909, because he had not been regularly served and had entered no appearance in this cause. That he had at all times been a resident of this state, which was known to the plaintiff, and because the property attached and sold was his homestead and was not described as the law requires in the summons by publication; and the court being. *21fully advised in the premises, and after hearing the testimony and argument of counsel, is of the opinion that said motion should be granted. It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that said judgment be and the same is hereby set aside and held for naught and void, and that all proceedings had thereunder are void, and that the sale made of lot No. 1 in block No. 401A, of the city of Ardmore, the attached property in said cause, was void and is hereby vacated and set aside; and that said cause be reinstated on the docket, for such proceedings as may hereafter be had by this court.”
It appears from the foregoing journal entry that “after hearing the testimony (on the motion) and argument of counsel,” the court sustained the motion and “ordered and decreed that said judgment be set aside and held for naught and void, and that all proceedings had ■ thereunder are void, and the sale made of said lot, the attached property in said cause, was void, and is hereby vacated and set aside, and that said cause be reinstated on the docket, for such other proceedings as may hereafter be had in this court.”- After hearing the testimony, all proceedings were set aside. The attachment was dissolved, the execution quashed, the sale set aside, the sheriff’s deed held for naught, leaving the property in the same condition, as free and clear from the proceedings of the court, as though no action had ever been commenced.
After the judgment was held to be absolutely void and set aside, and the attachment, execution, sheriff’s sale, and sheriff’s deed all declared to be void, the. defendant in error, being the second and' last grantee from the plaintiff in error, quitclaimed the property to the original owner, and commenced this action against the plaintiff in error to recover on the breach of warranty, and on trial obtained judgment against him. Defendant appealed to *22this court, and the case was affirmed. Thereupon plaintiff in error filed this application for rehearing.
As grounds for rehearing, counsel for plaintiff in error make three assignments, as follows:
(1) The court overlooked the contention of plaintiff in error that the trial court erred in admitting the judgment roll showing that the original judgment had been set aside, for the reason that an order setting aside a judgment is interlocutory and not appealable.
(2) The court overlooked the great line of authorities holding that the covenants of title and seisin do not run with the land, and in holding in this case that covenants of title and seisin do run with the land.
(3) The court overlooked the great line of authorities holding that a purchaser at a judicial sale or that an innocent purchaser at such sales takes title to the property which will not be disturbed after said judgment has been set aside and reversed.
In the first contention counsel overlooked the fact that it is not the setting aside of the judgment that affects the defendant in error. He has no interest in the final result of the judgment. He is only interested in the judgment of the court so far as it affects the setting aside of the execution, and thereby the sale and sheriff’s deed to the land. When the execution is quashed or set aside, the deed necessarily follows and falls. The order of the court is that all proceedings be set aside and that the “sale made of the attached property was void and is hereby vacated and set aside.” Counsel certainly cannot, in the face of the statute and decisions, contend that such an order is not final and appealable.
*23Section 5237, Rev. Laws 1910 (section 6068, Comp. Laws 1909), provides:
“An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment, and an order affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application in an action after judgment, is a final order, which may be vacated, modified or reversed, as provided in this article.”
In passing upon and construing this section, this court, in Barnett v. Bohannon, 27 Okla. 368, 112 Pac. 987, says:
“From the order recalling and quashing the execution; plaintiff has, by petition in error and case-made, brought the case to this court for review, and two questions are presented for our consideration: First, is the order appealable; and, second, did the court commit error in quashing the execution? Section 5237, Rev. Stat. 1910 Ann., provides that a final order, which may be vacated, modified, or reversed by the Supreme Court, is one made ‘upon a summary application in an action after judgment.’ In considering this identical language as it was found in the statutes of ¡Wisconsin, the Supreme Court of that state, in the case of Ernst v. The Steamer Brooklyn, 24 Wis. 616, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Dixon, held that an application to set aside an execution issued in an action, or the levy made under it, or for a stay of proceedings upon it, or to direct the judgment to be satisfied of record, would fall within the meaning of this language, and hence appealable. Other authorities, based upon statutes of similar import, in which orders of this character have been held appealable, may be noted as follows: Little v. Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. R. Co., 2 Ind. T. 551 [53 S. W. 331]; Orr v Haskell, 2 Mont. 350; Gilman v. County of Contra Costa, 8 Cal. 52, 68 Am. Dec. 290; Wright v. Rogers, 26 Ind. 218; McAlister v. State ex rel. Heath et al., Ind. 56.”
*24Further comment or citation of authorities is unnecessary. The action of the court in setting aside the execution, sheriff’s sale, and deed was a final order and appeal-able, and the court did not err in admitting the journal entry in evidence.
The second contention is equally untenable. The deeds from plaintiff in error to Skipworth, and from Skip-’ worth to defendant in error, were, in substance, the form provided by the statutes of Oklahoma. If any difference, the covenants of warranty are broader in these deeds than in the statutory form. The principal contention of counsel is that in these deeds the covenants.of warranty of title do not run with the land, and in support of this theory they cite, as especially in point, the cases: Faller v. Davis, 30 Okla. 56, 118 Pac. 382, Ann Cas. 1913B, 1181, and Brady v. Bank of Commerce, 41 Okla. 473, 138 Pac. 1020.
In the first place, the question involved herein was not in either of the cases cited. The question in those cases was whether the language of warranty was broad enough to cover the covenant of seisin (possession), and, if so, whether it was necessary for plaintiff, in an action •for breach of warranty under the particular deeds, to allege an eviction, or, in other words, would an action for a breach of warranty lie, while the plaintiff was in possession of the premises? In many of the states it would not, but in this state, as stated by Justice Sharp, supra, the covenants of seisin and good right to convey are synonymous, and, if either covenant is broken, it is broken as soon as made, and an action for the breach will lie at once without waiting for eviction.
The trouble with counsel is that he confounds the old common-law covenant of seisin, which meant only coven*25ant of possession, with its later generally adopted meaning, which, as now generally accepted, means a general covenant of warranty of title. In further explanation of this, Justice Sharp, after quoting the deed, says (30 Okla. 60, 61, 118 Pac. 384, 385):
“The deed contains no express covenant of seisin, but is a warranty deed, made in compliance with the requirements of chapter 18 of Comp. Laws 1909. Section 1202 (section 1162, Rev. Laws 1910) of said statutes is as follows: ‘A warranty deed, made in substantial compliance with the provisions of this act, shall convey to the grantee, his heirs or assigns, the whole interest of the grantor in the premises described, and shall be deemed a covenant on the part of the grantor, that at the time of making the deed he is legally seised of the indefeasible estate in fee simple of the premises and has good right and full power to convey the same; that the same are clear of all incumbrances and liens, and that he warrants (to) the grantee, his heirs and assigns, the quiet and peaceable possession thereof, and will defend the title thereto against all persons who may lawfully claim the same, and the covenants and warranty shall be obligatory and binding upon any such grantor, his heirs, and personal representatives, as if written at length in such deed.’ From the foregoing section, it will be seen that a warranty deed made in substantial compliance with the statute shall be construed the same as if it contained an express warranty of seisin and right to convey, as well as certain other covenants of warranty; and the deed in this case must be construed as if each of the said warranties were contained therein. In Clapp v. Herdman, 25 Ill. App. 513, it is said in this connection: ‘The deed which appellants executed to appellee must, by the terms of the statute, be held to contain a covenant that, at the time of the making and delivery thereof, they were “lawfully seised Of an indefeasible estate in fee simple in and to the premises therein described and had a good right and power to convey the same.” ’ The statutory covenant ia *26more comprehensive than the ordinary covenant of seisin, as used in ordinary conveyancing, and is not satisfied by seisin in fact or an actual possession to the grantee. This covenant of seisin is, in legal effect, a covenant of title and, though the maker of the premises .conveyed, yet, unless by his deed he is invested with an indefeasible estate in the premises, his covenant of seisin is broken, and the covenantee has the right at once to bring his action for the breach. Tiffany on Real Property, secs. 394, 395; 4 Kent, Comm. 472; 11 Cyc. 1068 et seq.; Greenby v. Wilcocks, 2 John. (N. Y.) 1, 3 Am. Dec. 379; Brandt v. Foster, 5 Iowa. 287.”
And then he proceeds with the following language:
“Such being the law, when is a covenant broken? In the United States a large majority of the courts have held that, if covenants of seisin are broken at all, they are broken as soon as made, and consequently cannot run with the land, nor pass to an assignee. In a few jurisdictions, however, the contrary view has been adopted, while in others statutes have been enacted which either, directly or indirectly, accomplish the same end. Among these states adopting the view that the covenant of seisin, if broken, is broken when made, are Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington. Not being confined by any statute and from the examination of the authorities we have made, we incline to the view observed in the great majority of the sister states, and believe that the reason for the rule there applied better comports with the conditions existing in this state, and that legal, and not actual, seisin should be looked to in determining whether or not the covenant of seisin is broken.”
The question considered is: When is the covenant broken? Does the breach happen when the deed is first made? Or must the grantee wait to commence his action *27for breach until he is put out of possession. Again, what particular covenant was the justice speaking of? He says covenants of seisin are broken, if broken at all, when made. He evidently had reference to the common-law covenant of seisin (possession), for he proceeds to say that such covenants cannot run with the land, and cites as authority therefor the states of Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Nebraska, Texas, and several other states. We have taken the pains to examine the. laws and decisions of these states, and find that they make the distinction between the old common-law covenant of seisin, which meant possession only, and the statutory covenant of seisin, as used in this state, and explained in Faller v. Davis, supra, by the language:
“The statutory covenant is more comprehensive than the ordinary covenant of seisin, as used in ordinary conveyancing, and is not satisfied .by seisin (possession) in fact or an actual possession to the grantee. This (statutory) covenant of seisin is, in legal effect, a covenant of title.”
The old covenant of seisin, being only a covenant of possession, did not go to the title, but was simply a personal covenant, mere chose in action, not affecting the title to the land, and, of course, could not run with the land, for the reason that, under the common law, choses in action were not assignable, and that is evidently just what was meant by Justice Sharp. In one of the very earliest cases in Arkansas (Logan v. Moulder, 1 Ark. 313, 33 Am. Dec. 338), that court says:
“The covenants of seisin, of right to convey, and against incumbrances are personal covenants, not running with the land, nor passing to the assignee; they are mere choses in action, not assignable .at common law.”
*28In the same case the court says:
“Covenants of title and quiet enjoyment are real covenants and run with the land.”
In Ross v. Turner, 7 Ark. 132, 44 Am. Dec. 531, it is said:
“The covenants of seisin and of right to convey are personal covenants, not running with the land, nor passing to the assignee, but are declared to be mere choses in action, not assignable at common law. The covenants of warranty and of quiet enjoyment are in the nature of a real covenant and run with the land and descend to the heirs and are made transferable to the assignee.”
Referring again to the same subject, that court, in Beauchamp v. Bertig, 90 Ark. 351, 119 S. W. 75, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 659, say:
“This court early recognized the distinction between personal covenants (using the word ‘personal’ with reference to situs) and covenants that run with the land, and therefore savor of the realty. In Logan v. Moulder, 1 Ark. 313, we held that covenants of warranty belong to the latter class. See, also, Ross v. Turner, 7 Ark. 132 [44 Am. Dec. 531]. We believe the authorities with practical unanimity hold to this rule, observing the distinction announced by this court between personal covenants and those that run with the land. Rawle on Covenant for Title, secs. 202, 213; 1 Wharton on Conflict of Laws, sec. 276D, pp. 630, 631.”
In St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Sanders, 91 Ark. 153, 121 S. W. 337, the following facts appear: A man by the name of Hampton entered into a contract with the railway company conveying certain right of way, and as part of the consideration the company agreed to erect and maintain certain levees against overflow of the grantor’s land. Hampton died. The land descended to his wife and *29daughter. The wife conveyed, by warranty deed, her half interest to the daughter. The levee failed. The daughter brought suit under the contract. On appeal to the Supreme Court this language was used:
“A covenant of a railway company to build a levee which will protect the covenantees’ field from overflow is a covenant which runs with the land.”
The same rule applies in California. Under the statutes in that state, certain parties could not testify in a case -in which they were interested. In Blackwell et al. v. Atkinson et al., 14 Cal. 470, the facts in substance were that one party conveyed a tract of land by warranty deed. The grantee deeded to a second party by warranty deed. The title failed, and action was brought by the second grantee on breach of warranty. On the trial the original vendor was offered as a witness; objection was made for the reason that he was interested, and therefore incompetent. In passing upon the question the Supreme Court says:
, “It is well settled that a vendor with warranty of title is not in general competent as a witness for his vendee in any controversy concerning the title. Where the action concerns the title to personal property, the rule seems to be that the vendor is a competent witness for a second or any subsequent vendee; the objection going only to his credibility. The reason is that the vendor is liable upon his warranty only to his immediate vendee, and his interest is therefore of too remote and contingent a character to constitute a legal disqualification, however much it may detract from the credibility of his testimony. But the reason of the rule, and consequently the rule itself, have no application where the controversy concerns the title to real estate. In the latter case, the covenant of warranty runs with the land, and the liability of the vendor is directly to the person evicted, and not exclusively to his vendee. His interest in the event of the con*30troversy is, therefore, a present, certain, and vested interest. He is bound by his covenant to defend the title or pay the value of the land, and he will not only gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment, but the record of the judgment will be legal evidence for or against him in any subsequent action for a breach of the covenant.”
That doctrine has ever since prevailed in California, and it is the settled law of that state that covenants of warranty which are inherent to and affect the title to real estate run with the land.
The same rule applies in New York. In Geizzler v. De Graf, 166 N. Y. 344, 59 N. E. 995, 82 Am. St. Rep. 663, that court says:
“In this state, since the enactment of the Code making choses in action assignable, it has been held that the covenant against incumbrances passes with the land through conveyances to a remote grantee. Coleman v. Bresnahan, 54 Hun. 619, 8 N. Y. Supp. 158; Clark v. Priest, 21 App. Div. 174, 47 N. Y. Supp. 489. But it has been held in the case at bar that it does not, and that proposition is based upon the common-law rule and upon a former decision of the same court. Seventy-Third Street Bldg. Co. v. Jencks, 19 App. Div. 314, 46 N. Y. Supp. 2. With this conflict of views concerning the nature and effect of the covenant against incumbrances, and the remedy for a breach of it, this court should adopt the rule best adapted to present conditions and which seems most likely to conform to the intention of the parties and to accomplish the purpose for which the covenant itself is made. The covenant is for the protection of the title, and there is no good reason why it should not be held to run with the land, like the covenant of warranty or quiet enjoyment. The principle which was at the foundation of the common-law rule, that choses in action were not assignable, having become obsolete, there is no reason, that I can perceive, why the rule should survive the reason *31upon which it was founded. We hold, therefore, that the covenant against incumbrances attaches to and runs with the land and passes to a remote grantee through the line of conveyances, whether there is a nominal breach or not when the deed is delivered.”
We here call attention to the rule in Nebraska. In Real v. Hollister, 17 Neb. 661, 24 N. W. 333, the deed recites:
“The grantors * * * convey and warrant to. * * * the following described real estate. * * * While this deed may Hot be such an one as under the law of this state would amount to a deed of full covenants of warranty, yet it shows upon its face to have been an effort to make a warranty deed. * * * This being, in our view, beyond question, the conveyance from * * * Real to defendant in error must be treated as one of full covenants of title which run with the land. The covenant of warranty is said to be the most effective of the covenants in American deeds, and in some of the states the only one in general use. * * * It runs with the land and passes with the fee to any subsequent grantee of the same title. * * * And the last vendee with warranty may therefore maintain an action for a breach of the covenant against the first or any other warrantor.”
The doctrine is now, and always has been, the rule in Nebraska.
We come now to the state of Texas, as one of those cited by counsel in which he claims the covenants of title do not run with the land, and we are tempted to say here that counsel has made the same mistake as to the law in that state that he labored under in all the other several states cited by him, as upholding the rule for which he so vigorously and contentiously contends. That court says in substance:
“It is well settled that the covenant of warranty of title to land is continuous and runs with the land. Flani*32ken v. Neal, 67 Tex. 629-633, 4 S. W. 212; Williams v. Turner, 50 Tex. 137-142; Saunders v. Flaniken, 77 Tex. 662, 14 S. W. 236; Stone v. Sledge, 87 Tex. 49-56, 26 S. W. 1068, 47 Am. St. Rep. 65.”
Again:
“The obligation of the covenant accompanies all conveyances of the land, and passes to each successive purchaser.” Flaniken v. Neal, supra; Williams v. Turner, supra.
Also:
“The covenant * * * inures to the benefit of the last vendee.” Rutherford v. Montgomery, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 319-324, 37 S. W. 625; Williams v. Turner, supra.
So far as we have been able to ascertain, all the other states cited by counsel are in perfect harmony with the cases above cited. These cases fully sustain the rule laid down in the original opinion herein, and do not conflict, but are in perfect harmony, with Faller v. Davis and Brady v. Bank of Commerce, supra, when read with an understanding of the different covenants, as modified by our statutes and fully explained by Justice Sharp, supra.
The third and last contention of counsel in support of his application for rehearing is:
“That a purchaser at a judicial sale takes title to the property, which will not be disturbed after said judgment has been set aside and reversed.”
That question was fully and clearly settled in the original opinion in this case. The contention is based on section 5176, Rev. Laws, which is as follows:
“If any judgment or judgments, in satisfaction of which * * * lands or tenements are sold, shall at any time thereafter be reversed, such reversal shall not defeat or affect the title of * * * purchaser or purchasers; *33but in such caseg, restitution shall be made by the judgment creditors, of the money, for which such lands or tenements were sold, with lawful interest from the day of sale.”
The writer hereof admits that this section has been more or less troublesome to him for a great many years; that its exact meaning seemed to be uncertain and doubtful, 'and the result, if put into actual practice, always appeared to be unreasonable, unjust, and unfair. The statute, taken alone, simply as an academic proposition, might be subject to the construction placed upon it by counsel for plaintiff in error. When this case was originally before the court, the writer hereof made diligent investigation to, if possible, come to a proper understanding of the meaning of that section, and we were rewarded by finding a decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas, which fully explains the section and construes it squarely and absolutely against the contentions of counsel for mov-ant herein. The case we refer to is Hubbard v. Ogden, 22 Kan. 671, in which the court says:
“This section has application solely to bona fide purchasers, who are not parties to the erroneous judgment, nor responsible therefor, and who do not have reason to believe that such erroneous judgment will be reversed or vacated by the appellate court. * * * It applies only to strangers to the judgment, who have purchased under the honest belief that the judgment is sufficient. It w;ould not be in consonance with justice or equity to allow a party who had procured an erroneous judgment, and who had procured property thereunder, to retain the fruits of such judgment after it had been set aside and annulled by the superior court.”
The language of the court in that case is clear and distinct, and ought not to be misunderstood. As said by the court, the section above referred to applies solely to *34bona fide purchasers, who are not parties to the erroneous judgment, nor responsible therefor. Does counsel take the position that his client was not a party to that action, or that he was not responsible therefor, or that he was a Stranger to the judgment? If he does not, he cannot, under this decision, ask the court to apply that section in protecting his client in the purchase of the real estate under the judgment obtained by service by publication, when the court finds, as a matter of fact, after hearing the testimony, as shown by the journal entry, that the plaintiff in the original case obtained service by publication, and attached the particular property when he knew that the defendant was not' only not a nonresident, but that he was at the time living in the property attached, claiming it as his homestead. Does not counsel think that the language of the Kansas court would be peculiarly applicable to his case, wherein it says:
“Such a proceeding would not be in consonance with justice or equity to allow the party who had procured an erroneous judgment, and who had procured property thereunder, to retain the fruits of such judgment, after it had been set aside and annulled by the court” ?
The states of Ohio and Iowa have the same statutes, and their courts construed them, in substance, the same as the Kansas court.
In his application for rehearing, counsel for movant request the court not to become prejudiced against him because of his vigorous attack on the original opinion in this case. Such a request was entirely unnecessary. The writer hereof, who was also the writer of the original opinion, while fully realizing the caustic and vigorous manner in which the opinion was attacked, felt absolutely no bias or prejudice, but rather regret, because of it, for *35the reason that he felt and still feels that the original opinion was absolutely correct; that it was supported by practically a uniform line of decisions of the courts of this country, including the Supreme. Court of Oklahoma. Evidently counsel fully relied upon and thoroughly believed in their contentions, but they were simply mistaken in the law. We might add here, and with the kindest and best feelings, that such attacks are uncalled for and, as a rule, react upon the author. In a practice of nearly 40 years we have many times been disappointed at decisions, and at the time felt that the court was absolutely and entirely mistaken; but as time rolled on, and we had opportunity to reflect upon the propositions, after the ■ heat and smoke of the battle had cleared away, we began to realize that possibly we were mistaken, and that the ruling of the court was probably correct. We believe in time it will so appear to counsel in this case.
The motion for rehearing should be denied.
By the Court: It. is sp ordered. *