Court Opinion

ID: 9453575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:17:49.868969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:43.159133
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
Judge Johnsen and Judge Barnes are of the opinion that the District Court’s denial of Lessard’s habeas corpus petition is entitled to be affirmed. Judge Ely is of the opinion that the District Court’s disposition was proper as to all of Less-ard’s asserted claims except one, on which he is expressing his dissenting view. Lessard is a California state prisoner under a life sentence for conviction of first-degree murder.
The claim on which we thus differ is one of several charges made by Lessard that the prosecution had knowingly concealed and suppressed matters of evidence favorable to him. All of the claims of suppression (and other unfair-trial claims, such as the alleged use of perjured testimony) were made the subject of an evidentiary hearing before a special master appointed by the California Supreme Court in a habeas corpus proceeding permitted to be instituted in that Court under its original jurisdiction, and of a plenary determination by the Court, on the master’s record and report, of the lack of merit in each of them. See In re Lessard, 62 Cal.2d 497, 42 Cal.Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d 39. Lessard’s conviction had previously been affirmed on an appeal from the judgment *89of conviction. People v. Lessard, 58 Cal.2d 447, 25 Cal.Rptr. 78, 375 P.2d 46.
The situation as to the claim here being discussed differs from that as to Less-ard’s other claims of suppression in the respect that the latter were the subject of express reference to the master and the former was not, and that the master accordingly made no findings upon it as he did on the others which had been referred to him. The lack of reference was due to the fact that Lessard had not made specification or indication of the particular claim in his habeas corpus petition. The master regarded himself as only authorized to make findings upon the issues referred to him. He permitted, however, both Lessard and the State to make full testimonial development of the unreferred claim and included the evidence thereon in the record which he transmitted to the California Supreme Court. And the California Supreme Court allowed presentation and argument to be made of the claim on the master’s record, the same as in the case of his other claims of suppression.
Since the California Supreme Court was dealing with the habeas corpus petition in its original jurisdiction, it constituted in the situation the trier of the facts. In relation to its performance of this function, Lessard had, as noted, been accorded a full evidentiary hearing before the master, both on the referred claims and the unreferred claim involved. Thus the question as to the propriety of the District Court’s disposition of the particular claim is not a matter of lack of evidentiary hearing. Lessard does not contend before us, nor did he in the District Court, that he has any further evidence which could be offered in respect to the claim. The issue therefore simply is whether the California Supreme Court as trier of the facts made such resolution and indication, or findings, as competently to demonstrate and adequately to support its determination of lack of merit in Lessard’s claim of suppression, and as fairly to entitle the District Court to make acceptance thereof.
The majority of the panel here believe that the situation was of this nature and that the District Court could properly treat it, within the language of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, 83 S.Ct. 745, 757, 9 L.Ed.2d 770, as one in which “the state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the relevant facts”.
The murder involved had been committed in the deceased’s room at a motel in San Francisco. He was stabbed to death with a knife. He had been carrying approximately $800 on his person from having cashed a check for his summer earnings as a school teacher. During the afternoon, after he had checked into the motel, he went across the street to a tavern, where he fell into drinking companionship with Lessard, a previous felon. Shorty after 6:00 p. m., Lessard absented himself for about 15 minutes, went to a restaurant-supply store located in the neighborhood, and purchased a boning knife. In making selection of the knife he desired, he left his fingerprints upon one of the other knives which he had examined. He returned to the tavern, and about 6:30 p. m. he left with the deceased and went across the street to the latter’s motel.
The deceased’s body was discovered in his room at 11:00 a. m. the next day. Fingerprints of Lessard were found upon an ashtray in the room, a drinking glass and the handle of a toilet bowl. A pink shirt with a distinguishing sheen or glisten, stained with blood, lay rolled up on the bed. There was testimony at the trial that Lessard was wearing such a shirt in the tavern. Also, the daughter of the proprietor of the supply-store, who was waiting in the store for her father, testified that the purchaser of the boning knife had on such a shirt.
Two years elapsed before the police succeeded in catching up with Lessard. They were able to locate and identify him, by means of his fingerprints, only because he had then become an inmate of a federal penitentiary, under a Dyer Act sentence. Lessard had made a hasty *90departure from San Francisco on the night of the murder, taking a 9:30 p. m. bus for Seattle, Washington. After he had been located by the state authorities in the federal penitentiary, he denied to them that he had been in San Francisco at the time of the murder. He claimed that he had not been in the city for approximately ten years. Later he changed this period to a month before the murder, but he continued to assert that he had not been there at the time of the crime. He further insisted that he had never been in either the tavern or the motel involved. On his trial he made a switch and admitted that he had been in the deceased’s motel room during the evening of the crime and that he had stolen the deceased’s wallet, which he said he took from the victim’s coat pocket while the latter was in the bathroom.
On his motion for a new trial, Lessard again shifted his position, claiming that he had not been in the motel room, but that when he and the deceased left the tavern they got into the deceased’s automobile to drive to another bar; that they stopped on the way for the deceased to make a call; and that during the time the deceased was out of the car Lessard opened up the glove compartment, saw the deceased’s wallet lying there, appropriated it, and then exited from the scene.
Lessard’s attitude throughout, as his voluminous papers manifest, has been that if one set of asserted facts doesn’t work, try another. Thus the master’s findings on one of the claims of suppression referred to him included the following: “I find the petitioner to be unworthy of belief. He has made so many incorrect statements, inconsistent statements and downright falsehoods herein that his testimony above-referred to is wholly unreliable, and so far as it is in conflict with other evidence in the case, I find it to be untrue”.
As to all of Lessard’s alleged claims of suppression, the deputy prosecutor, who had handled the trial, testified generally before the master that “there was no ■ withholding of any evidence by the prosecuting attorney or by any other officer, to his knowledge”. On the elements involved, we think the California Supreme Court could properly conclude and evaluatively hold as to the instant claim that “We do not believe * * * that the facts * * * demonstrate a suppression of evidence in denial of due process”.
The Court made the following statement and appraisal in respect to whether the prosecution had knowingly or deliberately engaged in a concealment and suppression (62 Cal.2d at 511-513, 42 Cal.Rptr. at 592, 399 P.2d at 48):
“Finally, petitioner constructs an argument involving the asserted knowledge of the prosecution that a visitor at the motel inquired for the victim at 6:00 p. m. on the 16th [the date of the crime]. The argument rests upon the fact that on the day after the killing a police inspector questioned the telephone operator of the motel, Mrs. Gustavson; that she testified at the reference hearing that she told the inspector that a man in a ‘grey suit with sort of pinkish specks’ asked for the victim at 6:00 p. m.; that she rang the room, and that the victim said: T am expecting him’. She then allowed this unidentified stranger to proceed back to the victim’s room. She said that she remembered the time because a guest had just inquired about the 6 p. m. telephone night rates. Mrs. Gustavson also testified that the officers brought a suspect to her for identification; that she told them that the man so presented was taller than the actual visitor; that the former was shabby looking, but the latter neatly dressed.
“The prosecution did not tell the defense about these statements. According to Mr. Michos, an attorney for the petitioner subsequent to the trial, the prosecutor, Mr. Giubbini, told him about the statements only after the trial. The prosecutor had then said that he had not further pursued the *91matter because he felt Mrs. Gustavson to be unreliable and the incident unimportant.
“We do not believe, however, that the facts of this case demonstrate a suppression of evidence in denial of due process. Police officers interviewed Mrs. Gustavson the day after the murder, in June 1959. She told them that a man visited the decedent; yet the officers could do little with the general statements which she gave them; they testified, in any event, that they considered the testimony unreliable. Thereafter, almost two years expired before defendant’s apprehension and trial. Due process does not require that officers, two years after the discovery of information, must remember facts that have become stale with time and that they must sum sponte disclose them to the petitioner or his attorneys. We cannot find that the prosecution ‘deliberately supress-ed’ evidence which long before they had considered to be unreliable or that failure to resuscitate such forgotten statements ‘was a material deception and that there was knowledge thereof on on the part of the prosecuting officer. * * *(Emphasis added.)
The California Supreme Court credited the testimony for the prosecution, as it had a right to do in its prerogative of trier of the facts, that Mrs. Gustav-son’s statements had not impressed at the time as having any apparent significance or being reliable. It took into account the further fact that two years had thereafter gone by before Lessard was apprehended. In these circumstances, it refused to believe “that there was knowledge thereof on the part of the prosecuting officer” at the time of the trial; it regarded the situation as one of “facts that have become stale with time”; and it held that “failure to resuscitate such forgotten statements” could not be declared to be a suppression.
It would be both rational and realistic for the California Supreme Court to believe and find that Mrs. Gustavson’s statements had ceased to be carried on the mind and recollection of the prosecutor, after the processes of the investigation had developed such an overwhelming incriminating web about Lessard — his tavern associationship with the deceased and his accompaniment of him to the motel; his intervening purchase of the boning knife; the infliction of the death by stabbing; the fingerprints of Lessard contained in the room and on the other knife in the store; the discarding at the scene of the crime of the bloodstained individualistic shirt such as Less-ard had been wearing; and Lessard’s hasty flight to somewhere else and his continued non-return to San Francisco. Confirmation that there had not been a concealment or suppression on the part of the prosecution in relation to the trial would seem to be added also by the fact that, after the prosecutor had apparently been asked to go over the case with new counsel for Lessard and had made review of the entire matter in his mind, he had not hesitated to mention this aspect to Lessard’s counsel. It would hardly seem likely that he would have engaged in such frankness as to the matter, if on the trial there had been an attempted concealment or suppression as to it.1
Mrs. Gustavson’s testimony, if it had been brought out on the trial, would have materiality, but it could hardly be regarded as being able to have much force against the inexorable array of incriminating circumstances with which Lessard was surrounded. It was not in the circumstances evidence of such fundamental aspect on guilt or innocence as *92would make absence thereof alone present a possible question on due process as to conviction, irrespective of whether concealment and suppression had existed in relation to it. Lessard regards it of importance as enforcing his argument that he could not have committed the murder, since the coroner’s original report had stated that the death had ocur-red from 10 to 12 hours before the discovery of the body at 11:00 a. m. and since his departure from San Francisco on a 9:30 p. m. bus would have made it impossible for him to have been at the motel within the range of this period. But the jury had been left with no difficulty as to this argument — and would hardly been likely to have had any more on Mrs. Gustavson’s testimony' — on the basis of the testimony by the coroner that the formal report had been prepared by a deputy coroner, and that while it represented such judgment as had been formed at the time, it was nevertheless only an estimate and death could have occurred within a range of as much as 14 hours before the discovery of the body.
On Lessard’s other claims the panel, as has been indicated, is in accord that the District Court did not err in the disposition which it made. Of these, the claim most strenuously argued here is that of illegal search and seizure as to a white shirt belonging to Lessard, which his wife had permitted the officers to take, and which was used on the trial to show a similarity in laundry mark with that of the pink shirt which has been referred to above.
The California Supreme Court had rejected the claim of illegal search and seizure on the ground that Lessard’s trial counsel had not only failed to object to the admissibilty of the allegedly tainted evidence “but he stated that he did not object to it and, additionally, did not present the issue on appeal”. 62 Cal.2d at 503, 42 Cal.Rptr. at 587, 399 P.2d at 43. Lessard has made the statement at several places in his papers that his counsel believed at the time that objection to the admission of the shirt would have opened up aspects of collateral information and implications which would have been more harmful in the trial than to permit the shirt to go in without objection. In fact, in his habeas corpus petition Lessard expressly recognized and accepted this position, stating that “petitioner respectfully submits had there been an objection it would only of [sic] compounded the prejudice petitioner was then laboring under * * * ”.
Characteristically, he later sought to shift from this position and seeks to argue here as a justification for no objection having been made that it would have been futile to make objection under California law, notwithstanding the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081. The transcript of proceedings in the state trial court, however, demonstrates that defense counsel was aware of the constitutional implications attending the prosecution’s offer of the evidence and that he deliberately chose not to object. With this record before it, the District Court was entitled, in the exercise of sound discretion, to deny relief in the situation as to the claim upon the ground that there had been a deliberate bypassing of orderly state procedures under which the claim of search and seizure could have been raised. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438, 83 S.Ct. 822, 848-849, 9 L.Ed.2d 837. See also Nelson v. People of State of California, 9 Cir., 346 F.2d 73.
Lessard’s assertion of rights under Es-cobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, is without merit, the trial as to his guilt having commenced prior to June 22,1964. Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882. While the question of the appropriate penalty in the situation had been permitted to be made a matter of a second trial under California law, this bore no relationship to and was without any effect upon the finality of the previous conviction proceedings.
Affirmed.

. The situation here differs from that in Lee v. United States, 9 Cir., 388 F.2d 737, where after the prosecution had been ordered by the court to disclose the identity of any witness favorable to the defense, it chose not to tell defense counsel that “at about the time of the robbery a witness had observed a person vaulting a high fence behind the bank”, until after the jury had commenced its deliberation, and where even at that time it refused to provide counsel with the name of the witness.