Court Opinion

ID: 9765534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:05:38.300798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:10.940704
License: Public Domain

*106Gibson, J.,
dissenting. Because I believe that Vermont’s lost-property statute, 27 V.S.A. §§ 1101-1110, rejected by the Court herein, outlines the rights and responsibilities of both true owners and finders of stray domesticated animals, including dogs, and that, under the provisions of that statute, Boy (a/k/a Max) should be returned to defendant, I respectfully dissent.
The Court does not appear to dispute the long-settled, common-law rule that a finder of lost personal property has title that is superior to all but the true owner, see Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d 211, 221 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980); that Vermont’s lost-property statute reflects this common-law principle; or that the statute governs ownership and compensation rights in disputes over stray domesticated animals such as livestock. Instead, the Court asserts that the statute’s application to “stray beasts” does not include pet dogs.
We have not previously needed to decide whether a dog is a “beast” under our lost property and impounding statutes.1 See Vosburgh v. Kimball, 130 Vt. 27, 30, 285 A.2d 766, 768 (1971). There is no indication, however, that the Legislature intended to exclude certain species of domesticated animals. Nor is there any logical reason to separate dogs from other domesticated animals, see Mungo v. Bennett, 119 S.E.2d 522, 523 (S.C. 1961) (grouping horses, mules, cattle, dogs, and cats), all of which are legally classified as personal property. See Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985) (dogs have legal status as personal property); State v. M’Duffie, 34 N.H. 523, 526 (1857) (“Dogs are... as much the subject of property or ownership, as horses, cattle or sheep.”); accord Thiele v. City of Denver, 312 P2d 786, 789 (Colo. 1957); Levine v. Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Smith v. Costello, 290 E2d 742, 743 (Idaho 1955); Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp. Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); cf. Conti v. ASPCA, 353 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Civ. Ct. 1974) (where finder of escaped pet parrot refused to return bird to owner, court found parrot was domesticated and ordered return to owner under common-law rule of lost property). Further, the dictionary defines “beast” as “an animal *107as distinguished from a plant,” and “a lower animal as distinguished from man,” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 96 (1981)’, making no distinction between dogs and other animals.
In this case, the Court follows neither the lost-property statute nor the generally accepted common-law rule. Instead, without benefit of citation to any supporting authority, the Court fashions its own solution in a manner that will be difficult, if not impossible, to apply in a consistent manner in future cases. The Court asserts that the statute applies only to animals having “significant value.”2 167 Vt. at 101, 102, 702 A.2d at 632, 633. Exclusion of dogs from the lost-property statute based on lack of market value is indefensible, however. The statute deals solely with rights of ownership and compensation for expenses. The statute’s notice provisions apply to any stray animal regardless of value, while a finder of goods or money must post notices only if the value is $3 or more, 27 V.S.A. § 1101; if the value of found property exceeds $10, additional newspaper notice is required. Id. § 1103. Thus the issue of value arises only in determining the type of notice a finder must give..
To the extent that the financial value of pets, as opposed to livestock, is relevant, other jurisdictions have acknowledged in different settings that pet dogs do have value beyond that reflected by a pure market-value analysis and have adopted means to measure that value. See Levine, 197 So. 2d at 331-32 (owner of pet Chihuahua could recover compensatory damages for intrinsic value and perhaps punitive damages); Jankoski, 510 N.E.2d at 1087 (actual value of pet dog could include sentimental value); Fredeen v. Stride, 525 P.2d 166, 168 (Or. 1974) (jury could consider mental distress as element of damages for loss of pet dog under certain circumstances); see generally E Barton & E Hill, How Much Will You Receive in Damages From the Negligent or Intentional Killing of Your Pet Dog or Cat?, 34 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 411 (1989). Thus, a pet dog of even mixed breeding could have significant financial value, and the Court’s distinction on the basis of financial value is unjustified.
Further, a clear line cannot always be drawn between animals kept for economic reasons and those kept as pets. Many people who keep *108livestock become emotionally attached to individual animals. Conversely, dogs may be owned primarily or solely for their economic value as work dogs or breeding stock. And there are animals that fall somewhere in between, such as pleasure horses — livestock that are not kept for their economic value, but are, in effect, large pets. To separate some species of domesticated animals from others on an attempted livestock-pet dichotomy is a purely arbitrary interpretation of the statute.
Although the Court believes its holding will encourage finders of lost animals to take them in and give them a home, I am concerned about the consequences of removing pets from the animal-theft protections of the lost-propérty statute. The lost-property statute was designed in part to remové incentives for animal theft and make it difficult for the finder to profit from selling a stray animal. See 27 V.S.A. § 1105 (if finder sells unwanted stray animal, proceeds of sale go to town after reimbursing finder for expenses). The Court, however, holds that any person who “finds” a dog and makes a “reasonable” effort to locate the owner may claim title to the animal superior to that of the true owner after an undefined “reasonable” amount of time.
Despite the Court’s professions to the contrary, I cannot agree that plaintiff made a “reasonable effort” or “diligently attempted” to locate the dog’s owner. 167 Vt. at 103, 104, 702 A.2d at 633. Although she posted notices, they simply read “lost dog” and listed a phone number, without describing the dog’s breed, sex, approximate age (puppy or adult), color, markings or distinctive features, or whether the dog had a collar. While plaintiff also requested community-service radio ads, these ran for two days only, and there is no indication they were any more detailed than her posted notices. Thus, plaintiff failed to provide even the minimal notice necessary to qualify as “reasonable,” much less comply with the lost-property statute. See Chaffee v. Harrington, 60 Vt. 718, 720-21, 15 A. 350, 351 (1888) (requirements of statute relating to rights and duties of finder of stray beast must be strictly complied with; plain purpose of statute in requiring that animal be described by natural or artificial marks is that owner and others who see ads may be able to recognize or identify animal).
An unfortunate consequence of the Court’s opinion will be to give those who operate the nation’s black market in stolen pets an easier means to gain title and profit from pets that are not their own. The history of attempts to curb the trade in stolen pets demonstrates the seriousness of the problem. Due in large part to the pervasiveness of *109pet theft, Congress enacted the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) in 1966. 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (1988) (purpose includes “protect[ing] the owners of animals from the theft of their animals”); R. Masonis, The Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act and the Proposed Regulations: A Glimmer of Hope in the Battle Against Abusive Animal Research, 16 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 149, 153 (1988) (statute prompted by need to curb illicit trade of stolen household pets). The law requires licensing and record keeping for all dealers and research facilities using live dogs and cats. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2133, 2134, 2136, 2140 (1988).
In 1987 the United States Department of Agriculture noted that there was still evidence of “buying and selling obviously stolen animals and of a few research facilities obtaining animals under questionable circumstances,” observing that the net effect of certain activities was to “encourage animal theft for profit.” 61 Fed. Reg. 10,298, 10,305, 10,307 (1987). Enforcement in the past was lax, with only three criminal prosecutions and 122 administrative prosecutions against AWA violators from 1968 to 1980. Masonis, supra, at 156-57. In response, the statute was amended in 1990, see 7 U.S.C. §§ 2158-2159 (Supp. 1990), to further discourage the theft and sale of pets and allow, where possible, stolen pets to be reunited with their owners. N. Wilks, The Pet Theft Act: Congressional Intent Plowed Under by the United States Department of Agriculture, 1 Animal L. 103, 103 (1995). Nonetheless, criticism for failure to enforce the act continues. Id. at 122-24.
The Vermont Legislature acknowledged the problem of pet theft in 1968 when it also criminalized the theft of domesticated animals.3 1967, No. 365 (Adj. Sess.), § 7 (now codified, as amended, at 13 V.S.A. § 361(a)). It is difficult, however, to prove criminal intent when dogs in particular are known to be able to escape from fenced yards or from tethers and willingly respond to offers of food or attention from strangers. Thus, owners seeking to recover their lost pets will often look to the civil law for a remedy. Today’s decision largely closes that avenue of relief.
*110Because the statute provides a clear, consistent, and just approach to settling disputes between finders and owners of stray domesticated animals, and because it includes safeguards to protect pet owners from theft, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to say that Chief Justice Allen joins in this dissent.

 Vermont’s impounding law also applies to “beasts” and allows a person to impound any “beast” found on his land doing damage. 20 VS.A. § 3411. Like the lost-property statute, where the true owner is unknown, the impounder must post notice. Id. § 3420. The impounder may sell the animal if the owner fails to appear within thirty days and claim it, but must return it when the owner appears and compensates the impounder for the damage and for the expense of keeping and advertising the animal. Id. § 3421.

 The Court also supports its holding with the assertion that pet dogs are not sold at auction. 167 Vt. at 102, 702 A.2d at 632, 633. In fact, however, it is not uncommon for dogs and cats to be sold at auction to research facilities. See 7 U.S.C. § 2137 (“It shall be unlawful for any research facility to purchase any dog or cat from any person except an operator of an auction sale subject to section 2142 of this title or a person holding a valid license as a dealer or exhibitor . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also 27 VS.A. § 1105 (providing for sale of unclaimed property at public auction).

 A person commits the crime of interference with domestic animals if he “confines or secretes a domestic animal owned by another, with the intention of concealing its identity or the identity of its owner” or if he conceals “the fact that the animal is licensed by removing the collar, harness or identification . . . from any . . . domestic animal owned by another.” 13 VS.A. § 361(a) (original version at 13 VS.A. § 482). The crime is punishable by imprisonment for up to one year or a fine up to $2,000, or both. Id. § 361(b).