Court Opinion

ID: 9828200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:12:15.637277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:45.621366
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee insists with much earnestness that the presumption that the mortgagor intended to convey only such land as he owned, coupled with his warranty of title, was sufficient to constitute constructive notice to appellant of appellee’s prior mortgage, and that therefore appellee’s mortgage should be held to be superior to that in favor of appellant. Authorities are cited to sustain that contention, such as Waterhouse v. Gallup (Tex. Civ. App.) 178 S. W. 773; Huffman v. Eastham, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 227, 47 S. W. 35; 18 Corpus Juris, 243, p. 278. Those authorities! are, essentially, to the effect that if, by deed, the grantor conveys all his interest in a certain survey or tract, which is definitely identified in the deed, or which can be identified by aid of extrinsic evidence applied to data given therein, such as indicated in the case of Continental Supply Co. v. M., K. & T. Ry Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 268 S. W. 444, cited in our opinion on original hearing, then the deed is not void for lack of sufficient description. The cases of Waterhouse v. Gallup, and Huffman v. Eastham, cited above, are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, in that the surveys or tracts out of which conveyances of the interests of the grantors were made were sufficiently described in the deeds, under that rule. Manifestly, the requirements of the statute of frauds that a conveyance of land must be in writing cannot be avoided by indulging a presumption that the grantor intended to convey a certain tract or parcel, but which was not sufficiently described in the deed, or by reason of the fact that the deed contained a warranty of title. To hold otherwise would defeat the plain purpose and language of the statute of frauds and render it ineffective. And in Hermann v. Likens, 90 Tex. 448, 39 S. W. 282, the following was quoted with approval and followed from White v. Luning, 93 U. S. 514, 23 L. Ed. 938, to wit:
“In regard, however, to the description of the property conveyed, the rules are the same, whether the deed be made by a party in his own right, or by an officer of the court.”
To the same effect are other decisions cited in Hermann v. Likens. See, also, Mackechney v. Temple Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 197 S. W. 744.
Appellee invokes another rule of decision, to the effect that a conveyance of a tract of land, which is specifically described in the deed, will operate to pass title to any interest the grantor may own in the tract, even though the same be less than the whole tract. But that rule has no application, since it cannot be said that the description is void for uncertainty, the effect of the rule being that the deed to the whole conveys title to each and every part to which the grantor holds title.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.