Court Opinion

ID: 9946522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 20:03:27.145505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:38.640741
License: Public Domain

DCOURT OF CHANCERY
                                          OF THE
                                    STATE OF DELAWARE
KATHALEEN ST. JUDE MCCORMICK                                       LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
        CHANCELLOR                                                   500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
                                                                    WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734

                                        February 29, 2024

     Michael Hanrahan                                  Edward B. Micheletti
     Stacey A. Greenspan                               Lauren N. Rosenello
     Corinne Elise Amato                               Michelle L. Davis
     Kevin H. Davenport                                Peyton V. Carper
     Christine N. Chapplear                            Claire K. Atwood
     Prickett, Jones, & Elliott, P.A.                  Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
     1310 N. King Street                               920 N. King Street
     Wilmington, DE 19801                              Wilmington, DE, 19801

                   Re:    Sjunde AP-fonden v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., et al.
                          C.A. No. 2022-1001-KSJM

      Dear Counsel:

            This letter addresses Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under 8

      Del. C. § 251(c)(7) for a copy of the Merger Agreement, the Microsoft Defendants’

      motion to dismiss, and Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. 1

                               Plaintiff’s Section 251(c)(7) Claim

            Section 251(c)(7) provides that “in lieu of filing the agreement of merger . . .

      the surviving or resulting corporation may file a certificate of merger or consolidation

      . . . which states . . . that a copy of the agreement of consolidation of merger will be

      1 This letter uses the defined terms set forth in the Memorandum Opinion resolving

      Defendants’ motion to dismiss. C.A. No. 2022-1001-KSJM, Docket (“Dkt.”) 125.
C.A. No. 2022-1001-KSJM
February 29, 2024
Page 2 of 6

furnished by the surviving or resulting corporation, on request and without cost, to

any stockholder of any constituent corporation.” 2

       Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to produce an agreement of merger to

plaintiff as required by Section 251(c)(7). 3 Plaintiff asserted this claim before the

merger closed. 4      Defendants argue that Section 251(c)(7) does not “require a

constituent corporation in a merger . . . to provide a stockholder with a copy of the

merger before the merger closes.” 5

       On this point, my reading of Section 251(c) is consistent with Defendants’

interpretation. When the surviving corporation opts to file a certificate of merger in

lieu of the agreement of merger, 6 then the surviving corporation must provide a

stockholder with a copy of the agreement of merger on request under Section

251(c)(7). 7 That obligation does not arise until after the surviving corporation files

the certificate of merger, which is after the merger closes.

       Before that time, the corporation can provide a “brief summary” of the merger

agreement in lieu of the merger agreement for the purpose of seeking stockholder

2 8 Del. C. § 251(c)(7).

3 Dkt. 87 at 46–47.

4 Dkt. 97.

5 Dkt. 102 at 34.

6 8 Del. C. § 251(c) (sixth sentence).

7 8 Del. C. § 251(c)(7).
C.A. No. 2022-1001-KSJM
February 29, 2024
Page 3 of 6

approval. 8 Perhaps a stockholder could obtain a full copy of the merger agreement

through other mechanisms, like Section 220 of the DGCL. 9 Plaintiff did not do that.

         Plaintiff’s Section 251(c)(7) claim, asserted before the merger closed, was not

ripe. It should be dismissed. It could be re-pled. But is seems pretty obvious that

Plaintiff should be provided a copy of the Merger Agreement—the full agreement with

all of its attachments. 10 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s construction of Section

251(c)(7) is commercially unreasonable because it would “require the disclosure of

proprietary of confidential information” and “immaterial information[.]” 11 This court

has held, however, that “the certificate of merger alternative was not designed to

avoid disclosure of all merger terms to the stockholders of the constituent

corporations.” 12 Rather, it was intended to “serve the dual purpose of avoiding the

expense of filing a lengthy merger agreement and avoiding public disclosure of all the

merger terms.” 13

         Given this clear directive of Delaware law, Defendants have probably already

mooted the issue, obviating the need to resolve this aspect of the motion to dismiss or

8 8 Del. C. § 251(c) (third sentence).

9 8 Del. C. § 220.

10 See generally Jackson v. Turnbull, 1994 WL 174668, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1994)

(“[W]hen a certificate of merger is filed instead of the merger agreement itself, the
surviving corporation must, among other things, furnish a copy of the agreement
without charge to any stockholder upon request.”).
11 Activision Defs.’ Opening Br. at 38.

12 Jackson, 1994 WL 174668, at *5.

13 Id.
C.A. No. 2022-1001-KSJM
February 29, 2024
Page 4 of 6

for Plaintiff to replead anything; it is unclear based on the record before me. Please

report on the status of this issue at your convenience. Meet and confer first, of course.

                 The Microsoft Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss

      The Microsoft Defendants argue that they are not the right defendants for any

of the statutory claims (except maybe the Section 251(c)(7) claim, which this letter

decision discusses separately). They advance a standing challenge. They further

argue that Delaware law does not recognize a claim for aiding and abetting the

statutory violations at issue. These are all interesting arguments that find various

levels of support in Delaware law. But Plaintiff’s statutory claims as to the Microsoft

Defendants fails for the simple reason that Plaintiff did not allege that the Microsoft

Defendants did anything at all in connection with the Section 251 and Section 141

issues, much less something wrong. That is because Section 251(b), the first three

sentences of Section 251(c) at issue, and Section 141 all impose obligations on a board

of directors or merging corporation to its own stockholders. 14 Although a merger sub

is an actionable defendant for purposes of Plaintiff’s Section 251 claim, Plaintiff is

not a stockholder of the merger sub here. Plaintiff’s claims under Section 251(b),

14 See generally City of N. Miami Beach Gen. Empls.’ Ret. Plan v. Dr. Pepper Snapple

Gp., Inc., 189 A.3d 188, 197 (Del. Ch. 2018) (“[T]his court has interpreted the term
‘constituent corporations’ to mean only those legal entities actually being combined
in a transaction.” (citing In re Inergy L.P., 2010 WL 4273197, at *10–11 (Del. Ch. Oct.
29, 2010) (finding that parent company was not a constituent corporation when the
parent acquired the target through a merging subsidiary))); see also Lewis v. Ward,
2003 WL 22461894, at *4 n.18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2003) (stating that the stockholders
of a parent corporation of a merging subsidiary in a triangular merger “generally do
not have the right to vote on the merger”), aff’d, 852 A.2d 896 (Del. 2004).
C.A. No. 2022-1001-KSJM
February 29, 2024
Page 5 of 6

Section 251(c) (other than Section 251(c)(7)), and Section 141 as to the Microsoft

Defendants are dismissed.

         Plaintiff’s conversion claim, though predicated on the statutory provisions, has

greater traction against the Microsoft Defendants. 15 The Microsoft Defendants argue

that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead conversion, 16 but I disagree. They also argue

that Plaintiff failed to plead a predicate statutory violation, 17 but I rejected that

argument in the Memorandum Opinion addressing the other aspects of the parties’

motion to dismiss. The Microsoft Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for

conversion is denied.

                Plaintiff’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

         Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on its claims under Section 251(b),

Section 251(c), and Section 251(d). I dismissed the claim under Section 251(d) and

stated my view on Plaintiff’s claim under Section 251(c)(7) in this decision. That

leaves Plaintiff’s motion as to Section 251(b) and the first three sentences of Section

251(c). The motion is denied.

15 See generally Tansey v. Trade Show News Networks, Inc., 2001 WL 1526306, at *7

(Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2001) (entering summary judgment in favor of stockholder against
all defendants, including the acquirer, on conversion claim due to statutory
violations).
16 Microsoft Defs.’ Reply Br. at 12–14.

17 Id.
C.A. No. 2022-1001-KSJM
February 29, 2024
Page 6 of 6

       “There is no right to a summary judgment.” 18 This court has refused requests

for leave to file motions for summary judgment where such proceedings “are apt to

waste, rather than conserve, the resources of the parties and the court.” 19 A trial

court’s decision to deny summary judgment is afforded great deference. 20

       I usually deny summary judgment, or leave to move for summary judgment,

due to material disputed facts. Here, I find the legal issues raised by the parties so

nettlesome as to defy resolution on a cold paper record. The parties did a good job

briefing and arguing these issues, but I could benefit from further briefing argument

on this topic, and potentially expert reports. Plus, there is a lot left to litigate in this

action; keeping these issues in the mix will result in only a minor incremental and

not an undue burden.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                          Sincerely,

                                          /s/ Kathaleen St. Jude McCormick

                                          Chancellor

cc:    All counsel of record (by File & ServeXpress)

18 Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 262 (Del. 2002) (cleaned up); Stone & Paper

Invs., LLC v. Blanch, 2020 WL 6373167, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2020) (same).
19 Orloff v. Shulman, 2007 WL 1862742, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 20, 2007).

20 Telxon, 802 A.2d at 262 (“A trial court’s denial of summary judgment is entitled to

a high level of deference and is, therefore, rarely disturbed.” (internal citations
omitted)).