Court Opinion

ID: 9524052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:49:36.83654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:48.636881
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
(concurring). I write to answer the dissent.
Privacy and reputation are precious commodities. This case involves a private citizen whose privacy is about to be invaded and his reputation about to be potentially damaged by a district attorney's unilateral *196decision to release his personnel and telephone records. This citizen wants to be heard, and he wants a judge to review the district attorney's decision before the release. The dissent would deny him the right to be heard and the right of review. The dissent would allow the district attorney the unilateral, unchecked authority to release these records. Privacy and reputation are far too valuable to leave this private citizen unheard and unprotected. Common criminals, under our system of justice, are afforded more.
The majority's conclusion that such rights are available is not only consistent with prior Wisconsin case law and statutory enactments, it is consistent with fundamental notions of justice and fairness. Although the decision is not grounded on due process considerations, they are well heeded. The root requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is " 'that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he [or she] is deprived of any significant protected interest.'" Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (footnote omitted). The government must provide notice and some kind of hearing before it can lawfully deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property. By requiring the government to follow appropriate procedures, the Due Process Clause promotes fairness in such decisions. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
In his classic statement, Justice Brandéis characterized "the right to be let alone ..." as the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by a civilized society. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 434 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a protectable liberty interest is implicated "[w]here a person's good name, *197reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him .Id. at 437.
The dissent expresses well and capably the legal conclusion to which it believes the law inexorably draws it. It is a position for which a legal argument can be made. But it has one major flaw. It is a cold legal analysis which does not touch real life. We are not talking here about government contracts, minutes of some town board meeting, or the like. We are talking about a private citizen's concern that his reputation and privacy will be damaged, perhaps irreparably, by the release of his personnel and private telephone records.1
The words "public record" are sterile, faceless, bloodless words, but at times conceal within them the *198lives of real people, and contain the potential for untold damage to privacy and reputation.2 Public records in the hands of the district attorney, a secondary rather than a primary custodian of those records, may contain uncorroborated or untrue hearsay, raw personal data, or a myriad of accusations, vendettas, or gossip. Much if not all of this data may serve only to titillate rather than inform.
Once released, this data can be quoted with impunity. A titillated society quickly moves on to the next headline; the revealed person carries the consequences forever.
Our society consistently expresses great concern for victims of crime. Is not a private citizen whose reputation is about to be shredded, or whose privacy about to be ripped open to public view, potentially as great a victim? Are we to say that a district attorney in the process of daily business will never make a mistake in the release of "public records?" The damage, once done, cannot be undone. And the damage can be monumental. Shakespeare had it right: "He who steals my purse steals trash; . . . But he that filches from me my good name ... makes me poor indeed."
Surely the potential victim ought to have a right to be heard and a right of review by a neutral and detached judge when there is so much at stake.
The dissent speaks of delay. A few days delay is a small price to pay for such important interests. Inap*199propriate delay, or special circumstances requiring expeditious decisions, can be dealt with quickly and summarily by the courts.
Privacy and reputation, once lost, are rarely retrieved. They deserve, at the very least, the protection afforded by the right to be heard and the right to judicial review. Justice and fairness demand no less.

One commentator describes the problem as follows:
Problems arise as a result of the collection of personal data, however, because individuals often have little control over its dissemination. Over time, information may easily become misinformation because individuals cannot control, and thus cannot correct, the information that is disseminated. Moreover, personal facts which do not become distorted may be of such a highly sensitive and personal nature that, although correct, they are potentially harmful and embarrassing if disseminated carelessly. Individuals must be protected from such unwarranted personal intrusions. The government, although a logical source of protection from violations of personal privacy, is probably the greatest information collector and does not always vigilantly protect personal privacy. In order for the government to act efficiently, it must have certain information about its citizens. The government, however, should also protect each individual's privacy interests. The inherent conflict between the government as "collector" and the government as "protector" casts doubt on the efficacy of relying on state and federal legislatures to protect individuals' interest in informational privacy.
Francis S. Chlapowski, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, Note, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 133, 133-34 (1991) (footnotes omitted).

 A1990 Harris survey states that "seventy-nine percent of Americans are 'concerned about threats to their personal privacy.' Nearly seventy-five percent believe 'they have lost all control over how personal information about them is circulated and used by companies.'" Carol R. Williams, A Proposal for Protecting Privacy During the Information Age, 11 Alaska L. Rev. 119, 119-20 (1994) (footnotes omitted).