Court Opinion

ID: 9861607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:12:32.994856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:42.088095
License: Public Domain

GIVAN, Justice,
dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in its holding that it was reversible error to give jury Instruction No. 81, which reads:
"Possession of a large amount of nareot-ics is circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver."
First, I would point out that neither the record nor the briefs contain the objection made to the giving of this instruction. This is in violation of Ind. Appellate Rule 8.8(A)(7) and thus waives the question. Notwithstanding the waiver, I nevertheless would hold that it was not reversible error to give the instruction.
It is true the instruction could have been more explanatory of the message it intended to convey to the jury, but I cannot agree with the majority that it "implicitly posits that the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was in fact in possession of a large amount of narcotics." I read no such implication into the words of the instruction. The instruction does not say that appellant possessed a large amount of narcotics.
I believe a logical reading of the instruction would have to include the presupposition "if you find that appellant possessed a large amount of narcotics." Other instructions given by the court clearly convey such an implication to this instruction. Nor do I agree with the majority opinion in its statement:
"[lt is not a suggestion as to what evidence of possession of a large amount of contraband narcotics may tend to prove, but is instead a categorical statement of what it does prove, i.e., intent to deliver,"
Again, the instruction does not purport to make a finding of fact, but when read in conjunction with other instructions, it logically must be interpreted to state that the jury may consider circumstantial evidence to find intent to deliver. It does not mandate the jury to make such a finding. Nor do I agree with the majority's observation that the instruction "commands the jury to do so [find intent to deliver] and binds the conscience of the jury to do so." I find nothing mandatory in the instruction.
However, conceding for the sake of argument that the brevity of the instruction, standing alone, could be considered to render it improper, I nevertheless do not find it to rise to the stature of reversible error. Even had the instruction not been given, one must presume that a jury following the logical thought processes would, if they found that appellant in fact did possess a large amount of narcotics, deduce that he might well be a dealer. This fact found by the jury could be coupled with other evidence in the case to support the verdict.
It is difficult to believe that such a simply-stated instruction could possibly have been the kingpin of the verdict when the other evidence in this case and the other instructions given to the jury are considered.
I would therefore affirm the trial court in its entirety.
KRAHULIK, J., concurs.