Court Opinion

ID: 9493090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:57:59.442333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:38.872498
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. The district judge got it right. Taxpayer funds may not be used to support a religious organization. And that is undisputedly what Appellants’ organization is — a religious organization. See Appendix at 3, 5.
As the majority opinion notes, resolution of cases like this one “depend[ ] on the hard task of judging.” See supra at 1059 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 847, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). Indeed, “[s]uch judgment requires the court to draw lines, sometimes quite fine, based on the particular facts of each case.” Id. (emphasis added). The facts of this case are crucial and should not be diluted.
Appellants’ organization, the Tucson National Day of Prayer Committee, applied for financial support from a fund largely consisting of taxpayer money for an event whose stated purpose was to “organize an annual gathering of Tucson Christians.” See Appendix at 3, 5. Appellants did not organize a National Day of Prayer for all Tucson residents of all faiths; their event was for Tucson Christians only. See id. Moreover, Appellants’ application for funding clearly stated that an individual’s membership in their organization, the Tucson National Day of Prayer Committee, would be terminated if the individual would not “pledge” to the Christian belief. Id. In fact, at no time during oral argument or in their briefs on appeal have Appellants denied that their organization is a “religious organization.”
The constitutionality of the congressionally established National Day of Prayer is not at issue here. Appellants’ event, for *1073“Tucson Christians,” should not be confused with the national event that was created by congressional resolution in 1952. The language of the congressional resolution indicates that Congress, in declaring a “National Day of Prayer,” intended the day to be a day for all Americans, of all faiths. As one representative noted, “[n]o single religious group can claim ownership or control of the National Day of Prayer; rather, it truly belongs to all Americans who seek divine guidance for themselves and for the country.” 134 Cong. Rec. H2761-02 (May 12, 1988) (statement of Rep. Dymally).
Thus, this case is not about the constitutionality of the National Day of Prayer. The only issue presented in this case is whether the City of Tucson violated the Constitution by denying Appellants taxpayer funds to subsidize the cost of their event. Because I believe the City acted clearly within the bounds of the Constitution, I would affirm the well-reasoned decision of the district court.
I
Appellants are active sponsors and organizers of the Tucson National Day of Prayer. Appellants requested permits and funding from the City of Tucson (“the City”) to hold the event in the City’s De-meester Outdoor Performance Center (“Demeester bandshell”). Appellants obtained the necessary permits and the event was held as planned, but the City denied Appellants’ request for funding. As a result, Appellants’ organization had to pay approximately $340 to rent equipment used for production of the event.
The City allows members of the public to use its parks for a wide variety of purposes. The Demeester bandshell is located in Tucson’s Reid Park. Pursuant to Tucson Code sections 21-14 and 21-16, specific fees are charged for the use of event equipment, park bandshells, and other facilities owned by the City. Grants are available from the City’s Civic Events Fund, on a limited basis, to help subsidize the cost of civic events. The Civic Events Fund consists of City money from the general fund appropriated by the City’s Mayor and Council each year. The source of the funds includes tax revenue, user fees, and other sources of recurring and non-recurring revenue. Sponsors of events at Reid Park may request a grant from the Civic Events Fund through the City’s' Civic Events Subcommittee (“Subcommittee”).
For the 1997 Tucson National Day of Prayer, the Appellants obtained permits to hold the prayer event in the Demeester bandshell. The event was carried on as planned, and Appellants do not allege that the City’s actions impeded free speech at the event in any way. Rather, Appellants allege that the City discriminated against the organization by refusing to support the Tucson National Day of Prayer financially with funds from the Civic Events Fund. They are mistaken.
The Civic Events Fund exists to encourage and support civic events that celebrate the City’s heritage, increase knowledge and understanding of issues that improve citizens’ quality of life, generate community appeal and participation, contribute to tourism, or are otherwise identified as unique community events. A number of conditions must be met for an event to be eligible for City - support. These conditions,, which are listed in the City’s “Civic Event Policy Statement and Evaluation Criteria” (“Policy”) include: (1) the event must be sponsored by a non-profit organization or by individuals conducting the event on a non-profit basis; (2) the event must be open to the public and cannot discriminate against persons in any manner; and (3) the event sponsor must maintain liability insurance, maintain a financial accounting of the event, and acquire necessary permits from the City. The Policy farther indicates that “events held in direct support of religious organizations” are not eligible for funding from the Civic Events Fund.
The City does not automatically award grants to all eligible events pursuant to the City’s Civic Event Policy. Once the Sub*1074committee determines that an event is “eligible” for funding, the Subcommittee, using “Evaluation Criteria,” assesses the event to determine whether it is one that the City will co-sponsor. To determine whether an event should receive funding, the City considers a number of factors including: (1) the purpose and objectives of the event; (2) the extent to which the event generates broad community appeal and participation; (3) the event’s need for support; and (4) the event’s ability to obtain financial support from other public and private sources. In the past the City has refused to fund a number of nonreligious events as well as events that the Subcommittee determined were “in direct support of religious organizations.” On the other hand, the City has funded events sponsored by religious organizations that did not directly support religious organizations. For example, the City provided funding for a fishing clinic for disabled children that was co-sponsored by the Aid Association for Lutherans.
In this case, Appellants’ event was designed to directly benefit their religious organization. Although Appellants argued that members of all faiths could have participated in the event, according to Appellants’ own application,1 only those who “pledge” to the Christian belief could participate as members of their organization.2 See Appendix at 5. Indeed, the Appellants’ application for funding declared that the purpose of the event was to “organize an annual gathering of Tucson Christians to observe the National Day of Prayer.” Id. at 3, 5. After reviewing the application, the Subcommittee refused to fund the event because it would directly support a religious organization.3
The majority finds that the City’s refusal to fund the Tucson National Day of Prayer violated the First Amendment. I disagree for several reasons. First, the Civic Events Fund is not a limited public forum as the majority asserts. In fact, the majority’s analysis of this case using “forum doctrine” is not appropriate given the nature of the Civic Events Fund. Second, the majority opinion disregards Supreme Court precedent which establishes that there is an important distinction between a government’s refusal to fund protected activity and a government’s actual denial of a person’s constitutional rights. See e.g., National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 2179, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 *1075U.S. 173, 193, 411 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991). Third, the City has a compelling state interest for excluding events that are “in direct support of religious organizations” from funding eligibility — compliance with the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, I would conclude that the City did not violate the Constitution when it refused to co-sponsor an event, that intended to “organize an annual gathering of Tucson Christians,” using taxpayer funds.
II
This is not a case involving the denial of “equal access” to City facilities; rather, it simply involves the denial of taxpayer funding. If the City had denied Appellants access to the Demeester bandshell, which is a traditional public forum, this would be a different case. But Appellants were not denied access to the bandshell. Thus, their Free Speech claim can succeed only if they can demonstrate that the Civic Events Fund is a type of forum protected by the First Amendment.
The majority contends that the Fund is a limited public forum4 and that the City’s refusal to fund events that directly support religious organizations constitutes viewpoint discrimination. I disagree. The majority’s analysis of this case using forum doctrine is not appropriate because the Civic Events Fund is not a forum at all. In addition, the Supreme Court case which the majority urges is controlling, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, is distinguishable.
A. The Civic Events Fund is Not a Forum.
The Supreme Court has identified three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the designated public forum, and the nonpublic forum. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 1641, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998). As explained in Forbes, if governmental property is not a traditional public forum or a designated public forum, it is either a nonpublic forum or is not a forum at all. See id. at 1641. I would find that Civic Events Fund is not a forum at all: (1) because the City’s administration of the Civic Events Fund necessarily requires “editorial discretion,” and (2) when “government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833, 115 S.Ct. 2510.
The Court has recognized that when a government’s administration of public property requires “editorial discretion,” it should not be subject to review to determine if it is engaging in viewpoint discrimination. See Forbes, 118 S.Ct. at 1639-40; Alan E. Brownstein, Alternative Maps for Navigating the First Amendment Maze, 16 Const. Comment. 101, 135 (1999); see also Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring); Fordham Univ. v. Brcnvn, 856 F.Supp. 684, 701-02 (D.D.C.1994). The Supreme Court’s examples of such discretionary decisions include: a university’s selection of a commencement speaker, a public institution’s selection of speakers for a lecture series, or a television broadcaster’s programming selections. See Forbes, 118 S.Ct. at 1639. In Forbes the Court explained that these actions “by [their] nature will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints instead of others.” Id.; see also Chicago Acorn v. Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 701 (7th Cir.1998) (noting that “[wjhenever government is in the business of speech, whether it is producing television programs ... or making grants ... the exercise of editorial discretion is inescapable”) *1076(emphasis added). Consequently, simply because a government subsidy program serves some expressive purpose, government selectivity in funding private speech to further that purpose does not create a forum for First Amendment purposes. See Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2183-85 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the First Amendment “has no application to funding”); Broivnstein, 16 Constit. Comment, at 134-35. Thus, forum doctrine and its prohibition against viewpoint discrimination is not applicable here.5
Moreover, the grant program in the present case is analogous to the grant program in Finley, which the Supreme Court concluded was not a limited public forum. See 118 S.Ct. at 2179. In Finley, the issue was whether the statute, requiring the National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) to consider “decency” when awarding grants, violated the First Amendment. See id. at 2178-79. In analyzing the NEA grant program, the Court did not apply forum doctrine. See id. The Court explained that such analysis was not appropriate because when the government awards NEA grants, it “does not indiscriminately ‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.’ ” Id. at 2178 (distinguishing Rosenberger). Consequently, the Court noted that the subjective and competitive grant process in Finley was significantly different from limited public forum cases because those cases involved “comparably objective decisions on allocating public benefits, such as access to a school auditorium or a municipal theater.” Id. (distinguishing Rosenberger and Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993)). Consequently, the Court concluded that the grant process in Finley was not a limited public forum and that the statute did not violate the First Amendment.
Like the grant process at issue in Finley, the City of Tucson did not create the Civic Events Fund to “indiscriminately ‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.’ ” Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2178 (quoting and distinguishing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834, 115 S.Ct. 2510). And similar to the program in Finley, the process of awarding grants in this case is not an “objective” process. See Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2178 (distinguishing selective grant process in Finley from Lamb’s Chapel and other cases that involved “comparably objective decisions on allocating public benefits, such as access to a school auditorium or a municipal theater”). The Subcommittee in the present case evaluates organizations’ applications for funding and chooses which events to fund based on a number of factors. As noted above, not all eligible events receive financial support from the Civic Events Fund. Accordingly, because the City did not create the Civic Events Fund to “indiscriminately ‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,’ ” analysis under the forum doctrine is not appropriate. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2178.
Additionally, in concluding that the Civic Events Fund is a limited public forum, the majority disregards the critical distinction between a government’s decision not to fund protected activity and the actual deni*1077al of constitutional rights. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549, 103 S.Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983) (the government’s “decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe on that right”); Fordham, 856 F.Supp. at 702. Notably, the Supreme Court has repeatedly and forcefully emphasized this distinction. See e.g., Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2179 (1998); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S, at 193, 111 S.Ct. 1759; Regan, 461 U.S. at 549, 103 S.Ct. 1997; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977). As the Court recently explained in Finley, “although the First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context, we note that the Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake.” 118 S.Ct. at 2179. Simply put, the government has “no obligation to fund the exercise of constitutional rights.” Tipton v. Univ. of Hawaii, 15 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir.1994). In fact, the government:
may “selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, ‘the [g]overnment has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other. ’ ”
Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2179 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 193, 111 S.Ct. 1759) (emphasis added).
The majority does not explain why the important and “ ‘basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity1 ” is not relevant in the present case. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 475, 97 S.Ct. 2376). Nor does the majority explain how, in light of the Court’s instruction that “[a] refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with a disposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity,” id., the City has burdened Appellants’ free speech rights. Consequently, I cannot conclude that simply because the City of Tucson elects to selectively fund civic events, its refusal to fund Appellants’ event violated the. First Amendment.
Furthermore, it is clear that the City was justified in excluding events that were in direct support of religious organizations because “when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program.” Rust, 500 U.S. at 194, 111 S.Ct. 1759. Events that obtain funding from the City of Tucson are advertised as having received City funding, and City employees operate light and sound equipment at these events. Additionally, during these events an announcement is made acknowledging that the City contributed to the services at the event. The majority argues that the City could have modified the policy to “decry any endorsement by the City” when such events are advertised. Supra -at 1072. But the City should not have to engage in such a practice. The City created the Civic Events Fund and is entitled to obtain recognition that it participates as a co-sponsor of civic events in Tucson. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (“when the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes”) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194, 111 S.Ct. 1759).
As Justice Sealia recently noted, “[i]t is preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer subsidy with measures ‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’ ”. Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2183 (Sealia, j., concurring) (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 550, 103 S.Ct. 1997). Here, there is no evidence that the City enacted the Policy to suppress speech or a particular viewpoint. The City excluded events that directly support reli- . gious organizations only to ensure that it complied with the Establishment Clause. This exclusion was permissible and did not violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
*1078B. Rosenberger is Distinguishable.
Contrary to Appellants’ argument, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rosen-berger does not negate the well-established precedent discussed supra. In Rosenber-ger, the Court found that by subsidizing publications of student organizations with money from the Student Activity Fund, the University of Virginia had intended to “open a forum for speech” and “encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.” See id. at 834, 887, 115 S.Ct. 2510. The Court accordingly concluded that the University had created a limited public forum. See id. at 837, 115 S.Ct. 2510. Because the University had created a limited public forum, the Court held that the University could not exclude all publications with religious editorial viewpoints from grant eligibility. See id. Rosenber-ger is distinguishable for several reasons.
First, the funding process in the present case is more akin to the grant process in Finley than the process used in Rosenber-ger. In Rosenberger, funding was available for all student organizations’ publications that met the stated criteria and were “related to the educational purposes of the University,” except those with religious editorial viewpoints. Id. at 824, 115 S.Ct. 2510. Here, the City provides financial support only to the events that meet the Policy’s criteria and that the Subcommittee determines are most deserving. Thus, the City’s grant program is quite different from the objective grant process at issue in Rosenberger.
Second, the Court emphasized in Rosen-berger that the case did not involve “religious organizations.” See id. at 844, 115 S.Ct. 2510. The Court noted that “if the State pays a church’s bills it is subsidizing it, and we must guard against this abuse.” Id. But the Court recognized that subsidizing a religious organization was not a “danger” in Rosenberger because “the student publication is not a religious institution” and “it is not a religious organization as [defined] in the University’s own regulations.” Id. In contrast, it is undisputed that Appellants’ organization is a religious organization. See Appendix at 1, 3, 5.
Third, unlike the City in the present case which co-sponsors civic events, the University in Rosenberger was not promoting its own message.6 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835, 115 S.Ct. 2510. As the Court noted in Rosenberger, all publications that received funding from the Student Activity Fund printed a disclaimer declaring “that the student groups are not the University’s agents, are not subject to its control, and are not its responsibility.” Id. In contrast, as noted above, events that obtain funding from the Civic Events Fund are advertised as being co-sponsored by the City of Tucson. Moreover, an announcement is made at the event declaring that the event is co-sponsored by the City.
Fourth and most importantly, taxpayers did not fund the Student Activity Fund in Rosenberger.7 See 515 U.S. at 841, 115 *1079S.Ct. 2510. The Court in Rosenberger stressed this fact noting that:
[T]he $14 paid each semester by the student is not a general tax designed to raise revenue for the University.... Our decision then cannot be read as addressing an expenditure from a general tax fund. Here, the disbursements from the fund go to private contractors for the cost of printing that which is protected under the Speech Clause of the First Amendment. That is a far cry from a general public assessment designed and effected to provide financial support for a church.
Id. at 841, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (emphasis added). Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Rosenberger also highlighted this point, stating that “[p]ublic funds may not be used to endorse the religious message,” and “[t ]hese decisions [ ] provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities.” Id. at 847, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Thus, the Court sent a very clear message in Rosenberger that taxpayer money may not be used to pay a religious organization’s bills. Indeed, Rosenberger did'not change this rule — it reinforced it.
III
Even assuming that the City’s Policy violated the Free Speech Clause, the Policy is not unconstitutional if it serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). The City of Tucson enacted the Policy that excludes events which directly support religious organizations to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. As even the majority concedes, compliance with the Establishment Clause is a compelling state interest. See supra note 9 at 1066 (citing Capitol Square Rev. and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 758, 761-62, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) and Lamb’s Chapel). Because City demonstrated that the Policy was necessary to avoid violating the Establishment Clause, it is constitutional.8
The Establishment Clause forbids “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement in religious activity.” Committee for Public Education & Religious *1080Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973) (citations omitted). As a majority of the Supreme Court recognized in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989):
this Court has come to understand the Establishment Clause to mean that government may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or organization, may not discriminate among persons on the basis of their religious beliefs and practices, may not delegate a governmental power to a religious institution, and may not involve itself too deeply in such an institution’s affairs.
Id. at 590, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The Court further noted that the Establishment Clause “means at least” that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.” Id. at 591, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947)). The Court explained that, “whether the key word is ‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the essential principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief....” Id. at 593-94, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984)).
It is clear that if the City funded events that directly support religious organizations, the principles stated above would be violated. Appellants’ event, a gathering and prayer service for “Tucson Christians,” is without question, religious activity. The City may not sponsor or provide financial support for such religious activity. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772, 93 S.Ct. 2955. In addition, events that receive financial support from the Civic Events Fund are advertised as being co-sponsored by the City of Tucson. But the City may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or organization. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590, 109 S.Ct. 3086. Finally, the City may not use taxpayer funds, “in any amount, large or small” to support religious activities or organizations. Id. at 591, 109 S.Ct. 3086; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840-41, 115 S.Ct. 2510; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780, 93 S.Ct. 2955.
The majority asserts that the City could fund events that directly support religious organizations because such conferral of incidental benefits does not violate the Establishment Clause. See supra at 1068-69. I agree that the conferral of incidental benefits does not necessarily implicate the Establishment Clause. However, I do not agree that the award of taxpayer funds to support a religious organization constitutes an “incidental benefit.” Indeed, all of the cases cited by the .majority that deal with incidental benefits are distinguishable. See discussion infra.
For example, the majority cites Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). The issue in Widmar, however, was simply whether the University of Missouri’s policy, which allowed all student groups to use its facilities, except for religious groups, was constitutional. See id. at 273, 102 S.Ct. 269. The Court found that the “benefits” to religion were incidental because they merely involved the use of University facilities. In contrast, here, Appellants are seeking more than mere “use” of a forum; they are seeking financial support for their event. This benefit is direct and is not “incidental” not only because taxpayers would be paying the fees owed by Appellants’ organization, but also because money was collected at the event for the organization. Moreover, the Court in Widmar emphasized that “[t]he basis for our decision is narrow” because the University “created a forum generally open to student groups.” Id. at 277, 102 S.Ct. 269. But in the present case the City of Tucson did not make the Civic Events Fund generally available to all non-religious organizations. *1081In addition, the present case is distinguishable from Widmar because in that case the Court pointed out that an “open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices.” Id. at 276, 102 S.Ct. 269. If the City of Tucson awarded public funds to an event designed to “organize a gathering of Tucson Christians,” it would send a message that the City approved of the religious organization. Thus, it cannot be said that the “incidental benefits” involved in Widmar are analogous to the benefits Appellants’ organization sought.
The majority also cites Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984). The issue in Lynch was whether a city could display the creche on city property without violating the Establishment Clause. See id. at 685-88, 104 S.Ct. 1355. The creche had been displayed on the city property for 40 or more years and was only a small portion of a larger display. See id. at 671, 104 S.Ct. 1355. The Supreme Court held that the display of the creche on city property did not violate the Establishment Clause because “whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all religions [was] indirect, remote, and incidental.” Id. at 683, 104 S.Ct. 1355. Unlike the benefits sought in present case, the Court in Lynch noted that “[n]o expenditures for maintenance of the creche have been necessary.” Id. at 684, 104 S.Ct. 1355. In addition, the Court pointed out that Lynch “does not involve a direct subsidy to church-sponsored schools or colleges, or other religious institutions .... ” Id. at 685, 104 S.Ct. 1355. In contrast, if the City in the present case were to fund Appellants’ religious organization, the benefit to that organization would be neither indirect, remote, or incidental. Indeed, the “benefit” would constitute direct financial support of Appellants’- organization because the City would be paying 'that organization’s bills.9 Thus, the benefit sought by Appellants in this case is not analogous to the incidental benefits involved in either Lynch or Wid-mar.
It is also clear that the City of Tucson may not fund evénts that directly support religious organizations under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (1975). In Lemon, the Supreme Court set forth three “tests” to determine whether a government practice violates the Establishment Clause. See id. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105. “Under the Lemon analysis, a statute or practice which touches upon religion, if it is to be permissible under the Establishment Clause, must have a secular purpose; it must neither advance not inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect; and it must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.” County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105). It is undisputed that the purpose of the City’s Civic Events Fund is secular and that it neither advances nor inhibits religion in its principle or primary effect. However, if the City allowed events that directly support religious organizations to apply for funding, it would “foster an excessive entanglement with religion.” Id. The City’s Subcommittee, which evaluates and determines which events should receive funding, would have to pick and choose between various religious organizations, which is clearly impermissible. And the City would be serving as a co-sponsor of- the religious event, providing staff at the event and financial support.
Furthermore, -if the City of Tucson had funded Appellants’ event, the City would have violated the endorsement test. Under the “endorsement test” the appear-*1082anee of government endorsement of religious messages is unconstitutional. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-601; Tucker v. State of California Dept. of Educ., 97 F.Sd 1204, 1215 n. 7 (9th Cir.1996). Although Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the endorsement test in Pinette, five justices supported the test in that case. See 515 U.S. at 786, 787-88, 797-99, 817-18, 115 S.Ct. 2440; see also Tucker, 97 F.3d at 1215 n. 7; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and Voucher Payments: Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 Conn. L.Rev. 243, 253 (1996). Under the endorsement test, “when the reasonable observer would view a government practice as endorsing religion ... it is our duty to hold that practice invalid.” Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Accordingly, the Establishment Clause “imposes affirmative obligations that may require a State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or endorsing a private religious message.” Id. (O’Con-nor, J., concurring). Indeed, “at the very least, [the Establishment Clause] prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief.” Id. at 799, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593-94, 109 S.Ct. 3086).
In the present case, the Civic Events Fund excludes events that directly support religious organizations to avoid the appearance of City-endorsed religious speech. Events that receive funding are advertised as having received City funding. Even if the City were to stop advertising funded events and include a disclaimer, the appearance of endorsement would still exist.10 Citizens of Tucson have access to information about how the City spends taxpayer funds. A reasonable individual, upon learning that the City allocated pub-lie money to subsidize an event for “Tucson Christians,” would perceive that the City supports the Christian faith or religion in general. This is impermissible under the Establishment Clause. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777, 787-88, 799, 115 S.Ct. 2440; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593-94, 109 S.Ct. 3086; Tucker, 97 F.3d at 1215. Recognizing this threat, the City’s funding criteria correctly excludes events that directly support religious organizations.
If the City’s Policy did not exclude events that directly support religious organizations, the City would either have to terminate the grant program entirely, or fund every religious event that requested funding. The Establishment Clause clearly prohibits government from preferring one religion over another. Thus, the City could not continue to selectively award grants to “civic events” because such subjectivity would certainly create excessive entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105.
IV
The use of taxpayer money to pay a religious organization’s bills is a blatant example of an Establishment Clause violation. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841, 844, 115 S.Ct. 2510; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780, 93 S.Ct. 2955. Even assuming that the City had adopted a totally “neutral” policy, the result would be the same— taxpayer money would still be used to pay the bills of religious organizations, which is clearly prohibited by the Establishment Clause. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844, 115 S.Ct. 2510; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780, 93 S.Ct. 2955.
As Justice O’Connor declared in Rosen-berger, there is “no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities.” 515 U.S. at 847, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The majority *1083has not pointed to a single case where the Supreme Court or this court upheld the use of taxpayer funds to directly support a religious organization.
The majority asserts that the City should award grants to “all speakers in the forum on a religiously neutral basis,” and that such conduct would not violate the Establishment Clause. See supra at 1072. Clearly that is not a realistic option here. The City does not have unlimited funds to financially support civic events. Under the current policy, the City evaluates applications and only funds those events that the Subcommittee determines will best further the City’s goals. Moreover, “[t]he Establishment Clause forbids a State to hide behind the application of formally neutral criteria and remain studiously oblivious to the effects of its actions ... and not all state policies are permissible under the Religion Clauses simply because they are neutral in form.” Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777, 115 S.Ct. 2440 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
The City of Tucson’s Civic Event Policy is constitutional. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the district court.
*1084APPENDIX
To Judge Pregerson’s Dissent.
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*1085[[Image here]]
*1086The National Day of Prayer
Application for Civic Event Support Page 2, question 2
Mayor Miller has proclaimed “A Day of Prayer” in our community in coordination with the annual National Day of Prayer. His proclamation clearly states how prayer and especially the observance of a national day of prayer is part of the historical and cultural heritage of our city and nation.
The purpose of our committee is to organize an annual gathering of Tucson Christians to observe this day. We have invited the participation of over 500 Tucson area churches and Christian ministries, including many different denominations and ethnic groups. We have contacted over 25 different public officials, inviting their participation and asking for specific prayer requests. The Air Force community will be represented.
The event will be hosted by a local radio announcer. There will be a time of praise and worship led by both a youth choir and an adult choir. Pastors from nine different churches will lead the participants in prayer for local, state and national issues including die following:
* Improved relationships between different segments of our society.
• National, state and locai leaders and their specific prayer requests.
• Law enforcement and emergency services.
• Youth, families, neighborhoods and the homeless.
• Educators and schools.
Patriotism will be emphasized in die decorations and music.
3.
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*1088[[Image here]]
*1089[[Image here]]
*1090[[Image here]]
*1091[[Image here]]

.The majority claims that "the dissent relies on the Gentalas’ original application for reimbursement from the Fund, and attachments thereto, which state that the National Day of Prayer event was organized for 'Tucson Christians.’ ” See supra at 1068. Indeed, the application for funding clearly indicated that the purpose of the event was "To organize an annual gathering of Tucson Christians to observe the National Day of Prayer,” see Appendix at 5. This is what the Subcommittee had before it when it decided to reject the Genta-las’ application for funding.
Moreover, question 10 on the application asks, "Does your ’ organization require its members to pledge to any specific religious belief?” To which the Gentalas marked "Yes” and wrote in "Christian.” Appendix at 5. The second part of question 10 asks, "If yes, would a person’s membership be terminated if the person would not make such a pledge?” Again, the Gentalas marked "Yes.” Appendix at 5. I am not aware of any case where any court found that a similar organization (that required its members to pledge to a specific religious faith and would terminate a person’s membership if they did not) was not a "religious organization.”

. The majority incorrectly asserts that the Gentalas’ event was a "public prayer service conducted from such a perspective [that] would support members of Jewish and Christian religious organizations....” The prayer service, as Appellants' counsel admitted at oral argument, addressed a Christian perspective only. And the only individuals that spoke at the prayer service were Christians — they were not members of the Jewish faith as the majority opinion suggests.

. Although the Subcommittee did not evaluate whether the event would otherwise meet the criteria for funding, it appears that the event would not because: (1) the Tucson National Day of Prayer Committee was not a non-profit organization; (2) money was collected at the event; and (3) it is highly doubtful that the event "did not discriminate against any persons in any manner” as required by the Policy.

. As noted in DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965 n. 4 (9th Cir.1999), "[t]he contours of the terms ‘designated public forum' and ‘limited public forum’ have not always been clear.” (citations omitted). Here, the majority concludes that the Civic Events Fund is a "limited public forum.” Supra at 1062. It is perhaps more precise to state that the majority finds that the Civic Events Fund is a "nonpublic forum open for a limited purpose." DiLoreto, 196 F.3d at 967. Nonetheless, for purposes of clarity, because the majority uses the term "limited public forum,” I will use that term in my dissent as well.

. Even if I were to analyze this case using forum doctrine, I would still conclude that the City's actions were constitutional, especially in light of this court's recent decision in DiLoreto. See 196 F.3d 958; see also Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir.2000) (ruling that school's refusal to allow religious organization to use facilities was based on content, not viewpoint). In DiLore-to, we ruled that the school district's refusal to permit religious messages on a high school baseball field fence was a "permissible, content-based limitation on the forum, and not viewpoint discrimination.” Id. at 969-70 (emphasis added). In addition, in DiLoreto we rejected the argument that excluding religion as a subject or category always constitutes viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 969. We stated that such an argument "mischarac-terizes the holding in Rosenberger” and we noted that in Rosenberger, "[t]he Court merely held that refusing to fund only religious viewpoints on otherwise-permissible subjects (i.e. pregnancy or homosexuality) was viewpoint discrimination.” Id. at 970.

. This fact also distinguishes the present case from Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, - U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000). In Southworth, the Court ruled that a public university may charge its students an activity fee to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech. See id. The Court, however, emphasized that:
Our decision ought not be taken to imply that in other instances the University, its agents or employees, or — of particular importance — its faculty are subject to First Amendment analysis which controls in this case. Where the University speaks, either in its own name or through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different. The Court has not held, or suggested, that when the government speaks the ndes we have discussed come into play.
Id. 120 S.Ct. at 1357 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the majority’s opinion is the suggestion that the student fees in Rosenberger and the general tax assessments in the present case are not distinguishable, see supra at 1069, despite the Court’s forceful language in Rosenberger that the case "cannot be read as addressing an expenditure from a general tax fund." 515 U.S. at 841, 115 S.Ct. 2510. The majority argues that this distinction does not apply here "[gjiven that the Fund is administered by a City Council composed of duly-elected representatives of the residents of the City of *1079Tucson to provide civic events for the benefits of the residents of the City of Tucson.” Supra at 1069, n. 10. I strongly disagree. That the taxpayer funds are administered by "duly-elected officials” does not insulate this or any other case from concerns about violations of the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause exists, in part, to protect those in the minority, who without protection under the First Amendment, could be forced to live under a majority-imposed religious regime. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) (stating that the "inspiration for the Establishment Clause” was the lesson that "in the hands of the government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce.”).

. In addition to being necessary to avoid violating the Establishment Clause, the Policy is sufficiently narrow. The City’s Policy did not exclude all events with any type of religious theme, it only excluded events that directly support religious organizations. For example, the City funded the fishing clinic for handicapped children which was sponsored by the Lutheran Church, a Mormon Battalion event that celebrated the placement of a monument in a city park which commemorated a historical event in Tucson, and a Las Posadas festival. The majority argues that the City’s decision to fund the Las Posadas event demonstrates that the City is engaging in viewpoint discrimination. See supra at 1065. I disagree. The Las Posadas event was a play that was sponsored by a public school. Although the play told a religious story, the event did not directly support any religious organization and more importantly, the funding of that event was never challenged.
The fact that the City funded these events demonstrates that the City’s Policy is not hostile towards religion. Under the funding criteria, religious, organizations can receive funding for events so long as the event does not directly support the religious organization. The City could have enacted more restrictive criteria that excluded from funding all events that had any relationship with religion, direct or indirect. Instead, the City chose to adopt narrow criteria that would simply ensure that taxpayer money was not used to support religious organizations in violation of the Establishment Clause.

. The majority argues that the benefit is not "direct” because the City of Tucson would not be required to make "direct” money payments to Appellants’ organization. See supra at 1069. I disagree. As Judge Sneed stated during oral argument, such a distinction "doesn’t make any sense — a concession to a particular religious organization in the form of the government spending money on their behalf as opposed to giving them the money to spend for the same cause really doesn't make any sense. In any event, an economic benefit is being made to a religious organization.”

. The majority argues that "[i]t is important, when considering how the situation of the National Day of Prayer event having costs covered by the City's Fund would be interpreted by observers, to note that most of the attendees of the event were probably adults.” See supra note 11 at 1070. There is absolutely no support for this conclusion in the record. There is no evidence that the event was geared towards adults or that most of the attendees were adults. Thus, this argument is based on pure speculation.