Court Opinion

ID: 9942270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 18:12:29.204444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:53.091337
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 JACOB SINGER AS TRUSTEE OF THE      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MICHAEL SINGER 2005 GST EXEMPT      :        PENNSYLVANIA
 TRUST FOR JACOB SINGER              :
                                     :
                                     :
              v.                     :
                                     :
                                     :
 DAVID SINGER, MICHAEL SINGER,       :   No. 767 EDA 2023
 INC. T/A MICHAEL SINGER REAL        :
 ESTATE AND MAZARS USA LLP AND       :
 KIRK ELDRIDGE                       :
                                     :
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: MAZARS USA LLP AND       :
 KIRK ELDRIDGE                       :

            Appeal from the Order Entered February 22, 2023
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                   Civil Division at No(s): 220701119

 JACOB SINGER AS TRUSTEE OF THE      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MICHAEL SINGER 2005 GST EXEMPT      :        PENNSYLVANIA
 TRUST FOR JACOB SINGER              :
                                     :
                   Appellant         :
                                     :
                                     :
              v.                     :
                                     :   No. 1225 EDA 2023
                                     :
 DAVID SINGER, MICHAEL SINGER,       :
 INC. T/A MICHAEL SINGER REAL        :
 ESTATE AND MAZARS USA LLP AND       :
 KIRK ELDRIDGE                       :

              Appeal from the Order Entered April 12, 2023
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                   Civil Division at No(s): 220701119
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BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                         FILED FEBRUARY 20, 2024

       These two related appeals, which we consolidate sua sponte, involve the

20-count complaint Jacob Singer filed against David Singer, Michael Singer,

Inc. (“MSI”) and Kirk Eldridge and Mazars USA LLP (last two parties

collectively,    “Mazars”).      In    the     complaint,   Jacob   Singer   alleged

mismanagement of the Michael Singer 2005 GST Exempt Trust for Jacob

Singer (“the Trust”) and sought transfer of the management of the Trust’s

assets from David Singer and MSI to himself. Shortly after filing the complaint,

Jacob Singer filed an emergency petition for injunctive relief in which he

essentially requested the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas to enjoin

David Singer and MSI from continuing to manage the assets of the Trust and

to order David Singer, MSI and Mazars to produce financial documents related

to the Trust. The trial court denied that petition, and Jacob Singer challenges

that denial in the appeal docketed at 1225 EDA 2024.

       Meanwhile, in response to the complaint, Mazars filed preliminary

objections seeking to compel Jacob Singer to arbitrate his claims against

Mazars. The trial court entered an order overruling the preliminary objections,

and Mazars appeals that order in the appeal docketed at 767 EDA 2024. We

affirm both orders.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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      As an initial matter, we note that we have jurisdiction over these appeals

even though they seek relief from interlocutory orders. Our Rules of Appellate

Procedure specifically provide that we have jurisdiction over appeals from

interlocutory orders denying injunctive relief, such as the order denying Jacob

Singer’s request for an emergency preliminary injunction. See Pa.R.A.P.

311(a)(4). We also have jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders

overruling preliminary objections seeking to compel arbitration, such as the

ones filed by Mazars and overruled by the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8);

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 7320(a)(1); Davis v. Ctr. Mgmt. Grp. LLC, 192 A.3d 173,

180-181 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      While we have jurisdiction over the appeals from these preliminary

orders, we note that because of the preliminary stage of the proceedings, the

trial court primarily gleaned the background underlying these appeals from

the pleadings. We borrow liberally from the trial court’s recitation of that

background, which is supported by our independent review of the record.

      In 2005, Michael Singer, Jacob Singer’s father and a real estate

developer, established the Trust for the benefit of Jacob Singer and his family.

Jacob Singer is the Trustee of the Trust, which contains millions of dollars in

real estate holdings. In 2022, and upon the retirement of his father, Jacob

Singer “began to take a more hands-on approach with the assets in the

[Trust].” Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/2023, at 2. He discovered that MSI, a

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corporate entity owned by Michael Singer and Jacob Singer's brother, David

Singer, had been managing the assets in the Trust.

      Upon this discovery, Jacob Singer asked David Singer to turn over the

management of the Trust’s assets to him, along with the management and

financial documents pertaining to the assets. David Singer allegedly refused.

Accordingly, Jacob Singer “sought assistance in obtaining financial information

concerning the Trust assets from [Mazars], which was an accounting firm that

prepared yearly income taxes for the Trust.” Complaint ¶ 19. Mazars also

allegedly refused to provide this information.

      Jacob Singer filed a complaint against David Singer, MSI and Mazars on

July 14, 2022. In the complaint, Jacob Singer made general allegations that

David Singer and MSI were mismanaging the Trust’s real estate holdings. He

alleged he had inspected some of the properties held by the Trust, without

specifying which properties, and that those properties he inspected were in

disrepair. He also broadly alleged that David Singer and MSI commingled

rental payments on Trust properties with MSI accounts, that “millions of

dollars” of rent generated from the Trust properties were unaccounted for and

that David Singer and MSI had transferred rights and interests in the Trust

assets without Jacob Singer’s permission.

      Jacob Singer also alleged Mazars improperly withheld Trust-related

documents from him and acted in concert with David Singer and MSI to

fraudulently transfer assets of the Trust. In total, the complaint contained six

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counts each against David Singer and MSI: fraudulent conveyance, fraud,

conversion, accounting, replevin, and conspiracy and four counts each against

Kirk Eldridge and Mazars: conversion, accounting, replevin, and conspiracy.

Jacob Singer sought the immediate transfer of the management of the Trust’s

assets to him as well as the production of documents related to the

management of the Trust.

      As noted above, in the wake of filing his complaint, Jacob Singer filed

an emergency petition for preliminary injunctive relief on July 22, 2022. In

essence,   the   petition   contained    the   same   general       allegations   of

mismanagement as those in the complaint. Based on those allegations, Jacob

Singer sought to have the trial court grant emergency injunctive relief in the

form of enjoining David Singer and MSI from managing the Trust’s assets and

prohibiting them from any future involvement with the Trust’s real estate

properties. He also asked that the court compel David Singer, MSI and Mazars

to turn over financial and tax documents related to the Trust. Jacob Singer

summarily asserted that he would suffer irreparable and immediate harm if

the trial court failed to order such emergency injunctive relief.

      Meanwhile, in response to the complaint, Mazars filed preliminary

objections seeking to compel Jacob Singer to arbitrate his claims against

Mazars. According to Mazars, such arbitration was required by the arbitration

clause in Mazars’ engagement letter governing the preparation of 2021 tax

returns for several entities, including the Trust.

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      The trial court denied Mazars’ preliminary objections on February 22,

2023. It also denied Jacob Singer’s petition for injunctive relief on April 12,

2023, concluding that Jacob Singer had failed to prove immediate and

irreparable harm that could not adequately be compensated by damages.

Jacob Singer and Mazars filed separate notices of appeal, with Jacob Singer

appealing the order denying emergency injunctive relief and Mazars appealing

the order overruling its preliminary injunctions.

      Both Jacob Singer and Mazars complied with the trial court’s order

directing them to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of

on appeal. The trial court filed a single opinion for the two appeals, urging this

Court to affirm both its order overruling Mazars’ preliminary objections and its

order denying Jacob Singer’s request for a preliminary injunction.

      Considering the circumstances underlying these two appeals, we find it

judicious to consolidate the matters sua sponte. However, we will address

each appeal separately. We turn first to Jacob Singer’s appeal challenging the

court’s denial of his emergency petition for injunctive relief.

      In his first claim, Jacob Singer alleges the trial court erred by denying

his request for an emergency preliminary injunction on the basis that he had

not shown an irreparable and immediate injury. This argument lacks merit.

      Our review of an order refusing or granting a preliminary injunction is

highly deferential and limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion.

See Summit Towne Centre, Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc.,

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828 A.2d 995, 1000 (Pa. 2003). We will affirm a trial court’s order refusing or

granting a preliminary injunction if there are “any apparently reasonable

grounds” on the record which support the disposition. Id. at 1001.

      The granting of a preliminary injunction is considered an extraordinary

remedy meant to be granted only when the party seeking the injunction has

shown a clear right to the relief sought. See Soja v. Factoryville

Sportsmen’s Club, 522 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Pa. Super. 1987). The purpose of

a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable

harm which might occur before the merits of the case can be determined. See

id.

      The proponent of a preliminary injunction faces a heavy burden of

persuasion and must establish all six of the “essential prerequisites” for the

granting of a preliminary injunction. See Summit Town Centre, 828 A.2d at

1001 (listing all six of these “essential prerequisites”). The first of those

prerequisites requires a party seeking a preliminary injunction to show that

an injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that

cannot be adequately compensated by damages. See id. If the party fails to

establish this prerequisite, or any one of the essential prerequisites, there is

no need for the trial court to address the other five prerequisites. See id.

      Here, the trial court denied Jacob Singer’s petition for an emergency

preliminary injunction because he failed to show an immediate and irreparable

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harm that could not be compensated by damages. In support, the trial court

explained:

      [Jacob Singer] has not alleged any immediate harm. The [Trust]
      has existed since 2005 and has been managed since then by MSI.
      During those seventeen years, [Jacob Singer] does not appear to
      have had any issue with how the company oversaw the [Trust’s]
      assets. While [he] alleges that it was his renewed interest in the
      [Trust] in 2022 that led him to uncover MSI’s and David Singer’s
      alleged malfeasance, it is difficult to tell from [Jacob Singer’s]
      broad and conclusory allegations what [MSI and David Singer]
      have actually done to mismanage the assets. Lacking in the
      Complaint and Petition is the necessary concrete evidence of an
      irreparable harm. Accepting [Jacob Singer’s] allegations at face
      value, there is nothing averred in the Complaint that a simple
      accounting could not recompense – certainly nothing so urgent
      that would require recourse to the extreme remedy of an
      injunction.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/2023, at 5.

      The trial court proceeded to conclude that Jacob Singer had also failed

to show an injury that was irreparable. To that end, the court noted that “if

the injunction was not granted, MSI would continue to manage the [Trust’s]

assets, as it has done without apparent incident for the past seventeen years

– [Jacob Singer’s] threadbare recitals of mismanagement notwithstanding.”

Id. at 5. The court also observed that the abuses alleged, such as the disrepair

of the Trust’s properties and commingling of rents and other payments, were

easily calculable and compensable by money damages if found to have

occurred. See id.

      We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that Jacob

Singer’s nonspecific accusations of mismanagement of the Trust’s real estate

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properties during the years-long management of those properties by MSI do

not establish immediate and irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive

relief. See Summit Towne Centre, 828 A.2d at 1002 (stating that a party

seeking a preliminary injunction must provide concrete evidence of harm to

establish the immediate and irreparable harm prerequisite).

      Jacob Singer baldly alleges, however, that the loss of control of real

property constitutes an irreparable harm and the trial court erred by failing to

find such irreparable harm here. We disagree.

      In the first place, while an injunction can be an appropriate remedy

when real property rights are concerned, the blanket statement made by

Jacob Singer ignores the fact that the power to grant or refuse an injunction

“rests in the sound discretion of the court under the circumstances and the

facts of the particular case.” Rick v. Cramp, 53 A.2d 84, 88 (Pa. 1947).

      In any event, we fail to see how the cases cited by Jacob Singer to

support his argument, Peters v. Davis, 231 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1967) and New

Eastwick Corp. v. Philadelphia Builders Eastwick Corp., 241 A.2d 766

(Pa. 1968), compel a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by

denying injunctive relief in the circumstances of this case. Peters considered

whether a party was entitled to an injunction ordering the removal of the

portions of a dwelling that were intentionally and deliberately built in violation

of express building line restrictions contained in a deed. See Peters, 231 A.2d

at 751-752. This is not the situation here.

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      New Eastwick Corp. also dealt with an injunction in a context different

from the one presented by this appeal. There, our Supreme Court held that

New   Eastwick   Corporation   was       entitled   to   an   injunction   prohibiting

Philadelphia Builders Eastwick Corporation from interfering with New Eastwick

Corporation’s ownership rights to an urban renewal area in Philadelphia after

an option for Philadelphia Builders Eastwick Corporation to purchase part of

the urban renewal area had expired. See New Eastwick Corp., 241 A.2d at

767-768, 771. The Court found irreparable harm under the circumstances of

that case, far different from those here, and specifically on the basis of the

“unique and intrinsic value” of the land in question. Id. at 770. Given the

marked difference between the cited cases and the instant one, this argument

does not provide any basis for relief.

      Jacob Singer also summarily asserts that the misappropriation of funds

and the attempt to conceal that misappropriation, which he broadly alleges

David Singer and MSI engaged in, demonstrates irreparable injury. This

argument also does not warrant any relief.

      We first note that, in making this assertion, Jacon Singer does not

explain how he could not be compensated by damages for the allegedly

misappropriated funds by David Singer and MSI. See Summit Town Centre,

828 A.2d at 1001 (stating that a party seeking a preliminary injunction must

show that an injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable

harm that cannot be adequately compensated by damages). Instead, he cites

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to a string of cases without meaningfully discussing how these cases support

a finding of irreparable harm or the granting of a preliminary injunction in the

instant case. Because of the lack of legal argument, this issue is waived for

appellate purposes. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 212 A.3d 1114, 1131

(Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that an appellant waives a claim when he fails to

properly develop that claim, including citation to relevant legal authority and

a meaningful discussion of how that authority supports his claim). Even if this

claim were not waived for lack of development, we fail to see how the cases

cited by Jacob Singer, all with circumstances readily distinguishable from

those here, require us to find trial court error in the case at hand.

       We also recognize that in his reply brief, Jacob Singer argues for the

first time that he was entitled to an emergency preliminary injunction because

David Singer and MSI are violating the law in a number of ways and these

violations of the law create per se irreparable injury. This is a new argument,

and therefore outside the proper scope of a reply brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2113;

Commonwealth v. Williams, 909 A.2d 383, 386 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2006).1 As

such, it is improper for us to address it.

____________________________________________

1  “An appellant . . . has a general right to file a reply brief. The scope of the
reply brief is limited, however, in that such brief may only address matters
raised by appellee and not previously addressed in appellant's brief. See Note,
Pa.R.A.P. 2113

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      Based on the above, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

denial of a preliminary injunction and instead find there are apparently

reasonable grounds for that denial. No relief is due.

      In his second claim, Jacob Singer asserts the trial court improperly

denied his emergency petition for injunctive relief without first holding a

hearing. This claim also fails.

      We find, as an initial matter, that this claim is waived. While Jacob

Singer summarily complains in his initial brief that the trial court should have

first scheduled and held a hearing before denying his emergency petition for

an injunction, he cites to absolutely no legal authority to support this claim. It

is waived for that reason. See Miller, 212 A.3d at 1131 (stating that a claim

that fails to cite to and discuss supporting legal authority is waived pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 2119). Even if this claim were not waived, we find no error on the

part of the trial court.

      Pa.R.C.P. 1531 governs injunctions. Jacob Singer ultimately cites to Rule

1531 for the first time in his reply brief in response to David Singer and MSI’s

argument that the Rule did not require the trial court to hold a hearing before

denying injunctive relief. Jacob Singer counters that the trial court was

required to hold a hearing under Rule 1531. To the extent this argument is

properly before us, see Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 218 n.8

(Pa. 1999) (stating “a reply brief cannot be a vehicle to argue issues raised

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but inadequately developed in [the] appellant’s original brief”), it provides no

basis for relief.

      Rule 1531 provides in pertinent part:

      A court shall issue a preliminary or special injunction only after
      written notice and hearing unless it appears to the satisfaction of
      the court that immediate and irreparable injury will be sustained
      before notice can be given or a hearing held, in which case the
      court may issue a preliminary or special injunction without a
      hearing or without notice. In determining whether a preliminary
      or special injunction should be granted and whether notice or a
      hearing should be required, the court may act on the basis of the
      averments of the pleadings or petition and may consider affidavits
      of parties or third persons or any other proof of which the court
      may require.

Pa.R.C.P. 1531(a).

      As David Singer and MSI point out, the trial court did not issue a

preliminary injunction here, instead denying the petition for injunctive relief

on the basis that Jacob Singer had not established the requisite immediate

and irreparable harm. They assert that under Rule 1531, “it is within the trial

court’s discretion to conduct a hearing or not if the trial court is going to deny

the preliminary injunction.” Appellees’ Brief at 50. To their point, this Court

has stated that “there is no absolute duty on the court to grant an evidentiary

hearing on an application for a preliminary injunction; it is a matter for the

discretion of the trial court” and the decision to forego a hearing will be

reversed only where there is an abuse of discretion. Franklin Decorators,

Inc. v. Hende-Jon Furniture Showrooms, Inc., 489 A.2d 246, 247 (Pa.

Super. 1985). Jacob Singer does not explain how the trial court committed

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such an abuse of discretion here, instead merely offering conclusory and

general allegations that it did so. See Appellants’ Brief at 38-39; Appellants’

Reply Brief at 7. It is clear that Rule 1531(a) gives discretion to the trial court

in determining whether a hearing is to be scheduled:

      In determining whether . . . a hearing should be required, the
      court may act on the basis of the averments of the pleadings or
      petition and may consider affidavits of parties or third persons or
      any other proof which the court may require.

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1531. Accordingly, even if this claim were not waived, no relief

would be due.

      In his third and final issue, Jacob Singer argues the court erred by failing

to grant injunctive relief “compelling [David Singer and MSI] to produce

requested financial information in response to [his] motion to compel

discovery after the court erroneously determined the financial information

could be obtained through [the] normal discovery [process].” Appellant’s Brief

at 39. This final claim also fails.

      In the first instance, Jacob Singer once again does not cite to any legal

authority in support of his claim, and it is once again waived for that reason.

See Miller, 212 A.3d at 1131. Moreover, we question whether we have

jurisdiction over this claim. As David Singer and MSI point out, “Although it is

undisputed that [this] Court has jurisdiction to review the trial court’s denial

of [Jacob Singer’s] request for a preliminary injunction, [Jacob Singer]

improperly raises [claims asking this Court to review the trial court’s discovery

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rulings] under the guise of a preliminary injunction appeal.” Appellees’ Brief

at 53.

         Even if we have jurisdiction over this claim, and even if it were not

waived, Jacob Singer completely fails to explain how granting a preliminary

injunction compelling the transfer of financial documents long held by one

entity to him would do anything but disturb the status quo, rather than

maintain it. See Soja, 522 A.2d at 1131 (stating the purpose of a preliminary

injunction is to preserve the status quo). We can see no reason why the long

established discovery process under the rules of civil procedure would not be

sufficient.

         As we conclude Jacob Singer’s claims challenging the court’s denial of

injunctive relief are either waived, meritless or both, we affirm the trial court’s

order denying Jacob Singer’s emergency petition for a preliminary injunction.

         In the second appeal in this consolidated case, Mazars appeals the trial

court’s order overruling its preliminary objections based on improper venue.

Mazars argues Jacob Singer is required to arbitrate his claims against Mazars,

and therefore the trial court erred by not dismissing those claims and sending

those claims to arbitration. We also find no relief is due in this second appeal.

         In general, our review of a trial court’s order overruling preliminary

objections seeking to compel arbitration is limited to determining whether the

court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the trial

court abused its discretion. See Davis, 192 A.3d at 180; Lugo v. Farmers

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Pride, Inc. 967 A.2d 963, 970 (Pa. Super. 2009) (this Court generally reviews

an order overruling preliminary objections based upon improper venue for an

abuse of discretion or legal error).

         Here, as noted above, Jacob Singer filed a complaint against Mazars, an

accounting firm which had previously prepared tax returns for the Trust. The

complaint alleged, among other things, that Mazars had failed to turn over

requested financial documents related to the Trust and was improperly

interfering with Jacob Singer’s management of the real estate holdings of the

Trust.

         Mazars filed preliminary objections, asserting, inter alia, that Jacob

Singer was required to arbitrate his claims against Mazars pursuant to an

engagement letter dated December 16, 2021, governing Mazars’ preparation

of the 2021 tax return for entities managed by MSI, including the Trust. 2 That

letter is addressed to David Singer and MSI and signed by David Singer only.

It also contained a provision requiring any controversies arising out of the

work performed by Mazars to be adjudicated by mediation and then

arbitration.

         The trial court overruled the preliminary objections. It explained in its

Rule 1925(a) opinion that Mazars had not established that there was a valid

____________________________________________

2 When resolving preliminary objections seeking to compel arbitration, the trial

court may look to additional evidence outside of the complaint. See Davis,
192 A.3d at 183; Pa.R.C.P. 1028 (c)(2).

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agreement to arbitrate between Jacob Singer and Mazars. Mazars appealed,

and it raises the single issue on appeal that the trial court erred by reaching

this conclusion. We disagree.

      When a trial court considers whether it should compel a civil action to

be sent to arbitration, it must determine: (1) whether a valid agreement to

arbitrate exists and if so, (2) whether the dispute falls within the scope of that

agreement. See Davis, 192 A.3d at 180. Agreements to arbitrate will only be

upheld where it is clear the parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed to

arbitrate. See Quiles v. Financial Exchange Co., 879 A.2d 281, 287 (Pa.

Super. 2005).

      Here, there is no dispute that the engagement letter stated that Mazars

had been retained to provide tax returns for the year 2021 for entitles listed

in an exhibit attached to the letter, and that the Trust is one of the listed

entities. Nor is there any dispute that this letter contained an agreement to

arbitrate. At the same time, there is also no dispute that the engagement

letter is addressed to David Singer and MSI and signed only by David Singer.

There is no dispute, then, that Jacob Singer did not sign this letter which

contained the agreement to arbitrate. Accordingly, as the trial court astutely

noted, the question becomes whether David Singer or MSI had the authority

to bind the Trust to the agreement to arbitrate through an agency relationship.

See Traver v. Reliant Senior Care Holdings, Inc. 228 A.3d 280, 286 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (stating that even if a party does not sign an arbitration

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agreement, he may be compelled to arbitrate under that agreement based on

principles of agency).

      In Pennsylvania, an agency relationship can be established in one of four

ways. See McIlwain v. Saber Healthcare Group, Inc., LLC, 208 A.3d 478,

485 (Pa. Super. 2019). First, there can be express authority, which exists

when the principal explicitly states the agent has the authority to act on his

behalf. See id. Second, there is implied authority, which exists where the

agent’s actions are “proper, usual and necessary” to carry out the granting of

express agency. Id. (citation omitted). Third is apparent agency, which exists

where the principal causes people with whom the alleged agent deals to

believe the principal has granted the agent authority to act. See id. Fourth

and finally, there is agency by estoppel, which occurs when the principal fails

to take reasonable steps to disavow the third party of their belief that the

purported agent was authorized to act on behalf of the principal. See id.

      Here, the trial court found there was no agency relationship between

Jacob Singer and Mazars. In support, it explained:

      [T]here is no evidence establishing the authority, if any, that
      David Singer and/or MSI were operating under when they
      attempted to bind [the Trust] to the terms of Mazars’ engagement
      letter. Indeed, the nature of that authority goes to the essence of
      this case. Mazars does not point to any provisions of [the Trust]
      agreement nor any other documents authorizing David Singer
      and/or MSI to bind Jacob Singer or [the Trust] to arbitrate their
      disputes with Mazars. Without such authority, and without any
      arbitration agreement signed by Jacob Singer, the court cannot
      order Jacob Singer and [the Trust] to arbitration in this matter.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/2023, at 7.

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      We see no error in the court’s determination that Mazars had not shown

that an agency relationship existed between Jacob Singer and David Singer or

MSI so as to bind him or the Trust to the engagement letter containing the

arbitration agreement. As the trial court indicated, and Jacob Singer

highlights, Mazars did not produce any evidence showing Jacob Singer gave

express authority to David Singer to sign the engagement letter on the Trust’s

behalf or to bind the Trust to arbitrate any disputes with Mazars. See Traver,

228 A.3d at 287 (stating that express authority only exists where the principal

deliberately and specifically grants authority to the agent as to certain

matters). We reject out of hand Mazars’ contention that there was express

authority because Jacob Singer did not produce any evidence that he had not

expressly given such authority. Such an argument turns the burden of proof

to establish agency on its head. See Petersen v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc.,

155 A.3d 641, 645 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating that the party asserting the

existence of an agency relationship bears the burden of proof). As such, we

see no error in the court’s conclusion that Mazars did not establish either

express authority or implied authority, which flows from the principal’s grant

of express authority.

      Mazars argues, however, that David Singer and MSI had apparent

authority to act on Jacob Singer and the Trust’s behalf and that agency by

estoppel applies to Jacob Singer and the Trust. In support of both contentions,

Mazars repeatedly emphasizes that Jacob Singer was aware over the years

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that Mazars was preparing tax returns for the Trust and never represented to

Mazars that it was not authorized to do so. According to Mazars, Jacob Singer

did not reject or renounce Mazar’s services until his May 2022 letter seeking

to terminate Mazars’ services for the Trust. Mazars maintains this course of

conduct led it to reasonably believe David Singer and MSI had the authority

to engage Mazars on behalf of the Trust and Jacob Singer. This claim does not

warrant relief.

      First, as Jacob Singer points out, Mazars does not allege that Jacob

Singer used David Singer or MSI for tax services in the past, but rather used

Mazars. Jacob Singer does not dispute that he used Mazars to prepare the tax

returns for the Trust in the past. Instead, he essentially argues that the

missing link in Mazars’ argument is how his history of using Mazars to prepare

the Trust’s tax returns shows that David Singer or MSI had apparent authority

to bind the Trust to arbitration if a dispute arose. We agree.

      We note that Mazars has not pointed to any documents regarding the

preparation of prior years’ tax returns for the Trust that identify the

involvement of David Singer or MSI in the preparation of those returns. Nor

does it point to any documents regarding the preparation of the past tax

returns that contained arbitration agreements which specifically bound the

Trust to arbitration for disputes arising from the preparation of those returns.

Under these circumstances, we agree that Mazars has failed to establish that

the history of Jacob Singer using Mazars to prepare tax returns for the Trust

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translated into a reasonable belief that David Singer and MSI had the apparent

authority to bind the Trust to an arbitration agreement in the 2021

engagement letter. See id.

      As for Mazars’ agency by estoppel argument, we add that agency by

estoppel is “essentially a determination of agency by after-the-fact actions by

the principal.” Id. at 648. Mazars argues the 2021 engagement letter binds

the Trust to arbitration, but it points to actions taken by Jacob Singer before

the letter’s execution. It does not point to any after-the-fact actions which

intentionally or carelessly caused Mazars to believe an agency relationship

existed and that Jacob Singers failed to take steps to clarify no such

relationship existed. See id. (providing agency by estoppel doctrine requires

principal to intentionally or carelessly cause third party to believe an agency

relationship existed or, knowing the third party held such a belief, did not take

steps to clarify the facts).

      Based on all the above, we see no error in the trial court’s conclusion

that Mazars failed to show David Singer and MSI had the authority to execute

the arbitration agreement on Jacob Singer’s behalf and therefore that no valid

agreement to arbitrate disputes exists between Jacob Singer and Mazars.

Accordingly, we find no basis on which to disturb the trial court’s order

overruling Mazars’ preliminary objections seeking to compel arbitration.

      Appeals Docketed at 1225 EDA 2024 and 767 EDA 2024 Consolidated

Sua Sponte. Order denying Jacob Singer’s petition for emergency preliminary

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injunction in 1225 EDA 2024 affirmed. Order overruling preliminary objections

to compel arbitration in 767 EDA 2024 affirmed.

Date: 2/20/2024

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