Court Opinion

ID: 9495701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:08:33.545219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:09.426052
License: Public Domain

LOURIE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision holding that Paradise lacked Article III standing to bring its lawsuit during the period of its administrative dissolution.
The requirements of Article III standing, as set forth in the majority opinion, ante at 1308 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (plurality opinion)), were fully satisfied under the facts of this case. Provided that Paradise had legal capacity under the law of Florida, see infra, it had been granted an exclusive license under the patent1 and hence suffered an injury in fact from infringement; there is a causal connection between injury suffered by a patentee (or one who stands in the patentee’s shoes) and allegedly infringing acts; and it is likely that such injury is redressable by winning a patent infringement suit. Thus, Article III standing was established.
The only issue here is whether the administrative dissolution deprived Paradise of its entitlement to bring the lawsuit. That is a matter of state, viz., Florida law, as the existence and capacity of a corporation are governed by state law.
Paradise was temporarily impaired as a corporation under Florida law. In fact, if Paradise had not been reinstated under chapter 607.1422 of the Florida Statutes, then the only acts it would have been entitled to take would relate to winding up and liquidating its business. Fla. Stat. ch. 607.1421(3). However, chapter 607.1422 revived the corporation and permitted it to carry on its business “as if the administrative dissolution had never occurred.” Fla. Stat. ch. 607.1422(3). Thus, the acts of the corporation while it was administratively dissolved were restored. No Article III issue is involved.
As for the so-called “admission” during oral argument by Paradise, I understand that admission to be only that, during the period of dissolution, before reinstatement, Paradise lacked capacity to do business, which is no more than saying what chapter 607.1421 provides, until chapter 607.1422 has come into effect.
I also do not believe that Enzo governs this case. I see a meaningful difference between a party that had not entered into the contract before suit (the plaintiff in Enzo) and one who had (Paradise), but whose corporate capacity to transact business was temporarily defective. The other cases are similarly distinguishable.
Thus, I would reverse the decision of the district court holding that Paradise lacked Article III standing to bring this suit.

. I do not purport to evaluate here whether the nature of the rights granted under the license entitled Paradise to sue; I assume it for purposes of this issue before us.