Court Opinion

ID: 9555217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 06:00:19.952679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:45.910109
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KARI FISHER,                                    DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DC-1221-22-0004-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,                     DATE: August 10, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Sabastian S. Piedmont, Esquire, Syracuse, New York, for the appellant.

           Byron D. Smalley, Esquire, and Davina Minnix, Washington, D.C., for the
             agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction . For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                             2

     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Washington Regional
     Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant is employed as a GS-14 2 Attorney in the agency’s Office of
     Chief Counsel.     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1; Tab 16 at 23-24.            On
     October 3, 2021, the appellant filed the instant IRA appeal alleging that she had
     been subjected to several personnel actions in retaliation for her protected
     whistleblowing disclosures and activities and requesting a hearing on her appeal.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 1-4. With her initial appeal, the appellant provided a copy of a
     close-out letter from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) dated July 29, 2021.
     Id. at 6-7.
¶3         The administrative judge issued an IRA Jurisdictional Order in which she
     apprised the appellant of the applicable law and burden of proof requirements for
     an IRA appeal and ordered her to submit evidence and argument establishing
     Board jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 3 at 1-7. The administrative judge also directed the
     appellant to file a statement detailing each of her alleged protected disclosures or
     activities, numbered and in chronological order, and each personnel action she
     was subjected to, also numbered and in chronological order, along with an
     explanation for how she exhausted each specific claim with OSC. Id. at 7-9.
¶4         After the parties submitted their jurisdictional pleadings, IAF, Tabs 14-18,
     the administrative judge issued an initial decision concluding that the appellant
     failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she made a protected disclosure or
     engaged in protected activity that was a contributing factor in the agency’s
     decision to take a personnel action against her. IAF, Tab 21, Initial Decision (ID)

     2
       The appellant’s initial appeal identifies her position’s occupational series as “GS -9,”
     and her grade as “14.” Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1. Other pleadings make
     clear that she currently occupies a GS-14 Attorney position with the agency. Petition
     for Review File, Tab 1 at 6.
                                                                                       3

     at 1-7.   Specifically, the administrative judge acknowledged the appellant’s
     allegations that she made numerous disclosures during the period from 2001
     through 2017 but observed the appellant did not file her OSC complaint until
     nearly 20 years after the first purported disclosure, in January 2021. ID at 4.
     Noting the significant length of the delay, and crediting the agency’s argument
     that it was prejudiced by the appellant’s delay in seeking corrective action, the
     administrative judge concluded that the purported disclosures and retaliatory
     personnel actions the appellant alleged she was subjected to during the period
     from 2001 through 2017 were barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.         ID
     at 4-5.
¶5         Addressing the appellant’s alleged protected activities, the administrative
     judge acknowledged that the appellant submitted a grievance under the agency’s
     collective bargaining agreement in 2017, several equal employment opportunity
     (EEO) complaints from 2017 through 2021, an Occupational Safety and Health
     Administration (OSHA) complaint in 2021, a complaint with the Office of
     Government Ethics in 2021, and a complaint to several U.S. Senators in
     October 2021.    ID at 6.     However, she noted that the Board’s expanded IRA
     jurisdiction under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 20 12
     (WPEA) covers claims arising under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) (which concerns
     protected activity seeking to remedy a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)), but not
     those arising under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii).       ID at 6.    Reviewing the
     substance of the appellant’s complaints, the administrative judge concluded that
     they did not concern remedying violations of section 2302(b)(8).        ID at 6-7.
     Consequently, she concluded that the appellant also failed to nonfrivolously
     allege that she engaged in any protected activity and dismissed the appeal for lack
     of jurisdiction. ID at 6-7.
¶6         The appellant has timely filed a petition for review of the initial decision,
     arguing that the administrative judge erred in concluding that she failed to
     nonfrivolously allege that she engaged in any protected activity that was a
                                                                                       4

     contributing factor in any personnel action and in concluding that her protected
     disclosures during the period from 2001 through 2017 were barred by the doctrine
     of laches. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 25-29. The agency has filed a
     response in opposition to the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 4. The appellant
     has filed a reply. PFR File, Tab 5.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7         The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has
     exhausted her administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous
     allegations that: (1) she made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)
     or engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
     (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor
     in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action.    Salerno v.
     Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016). The Board generally
     treats OSC exhaustion as a threshold determination before considering whether
     the appellant’s claims constitute nonfrivolous allegations of protected disclosures
     or protected activities.     See Carney v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     121 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶¶ 4-5 (2014) (stating that the first element to Board
     jurisdiction over an IRA appeal is exhaustion by the appellant of her
     administrative remedies before OSC and that the next requirement is that she
     nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure or engaged in
     protected activity).   Accordingly, we will first consider whether the appellant
     exhausted her administrative remedy with OSC and, if that threshold requirement
     is met, then consider whether she made nonfrivolous allegations that she made a
     protected disclosure or engaged in a protected activity that was a contributing
     factor to an agency personnel action. See Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5.
                                                                                       5

     The appellant failed to establish that she exhausted her administrative remedies
     with OSC regarding some of the challenged personnel actions.
¶8        To satisfy the exhaustion requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an appellant
     must have provided OSC with a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation into
     her allegations of whistleblower reprisal. Chambers v. Department of Homeland
     Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. Generally, exhaustion can be demonstrated through
     the appellant’s initial OSC complaint, evidence the original complaint was
     amended (including but not limited to OSC’s determination letter and other letters
     from OSC referencing any amended allegations), and the appellant’s written
     responses to OSC referencing the amended allegations. Mason v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8 (2011). Alternatively, exhaustion may
     be proved through other sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or
     declaration attesting that the appellant raised with OSC the substance of the facts
     in her appeal.    Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11.          The purpose of requiring
     an appellant to exhaust her remedies with OSC before filing an IRA appeal wit h
     the Board is to give OSC “the opportunity to take corrective action before
     involving the Board in the case.” Id. Thus, “the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA
     appeal . . . is . . . limited to those issues that have been previously raised with
     OSC.” Id.
¶9        In the initial decision, the administrative judge did not make any specific
     findings concerning which of the appellant’s claims she exhausted with OSC, but
     she appears to have implicitly concluded that the appellant exhausted all of the
     claims contained in the appellant’s amended jurisdictional response.      ID at 3;
     IAF, Tab 16 at 4-16. That response contains a numbered chronological list of 27
     disclosures during the period from October 2001 through April 2021, 1 3 protected
     activities during the period from January 2016 through June 2021, and various
     personnel actions the appellant was subjected to during the period from 2006
     through 2021, including 45 specific vacancy announcements for which she
     applied but was not selected. Id. at 7-16.
                                                                                                 6

¶10         In a July 29, 2021 3 letter summarizing its investigation, OSC noted that it
      sent the appellant a preliminary determination letter stating that it did not have
      sufficient context to evaluate the over 800 emails the appellant submitted as a
      part of her OSC complaint and requested that the appellant produce a timeline of
      her allegations.    IAF, Tab 16 at 51.         The appellant eventually produced the
      requested timeline and provided it to OSC, and OSC considered it in conducting
      its investigation. Id. In a separate close-out letter also dated July 29, 2021, OSC
      identified the protected disclosures and activities it investigated in connection
      with the appellant’s complaint.        IAF, Tab 1 at 6.        The letter also identified
      numerous personnel actions the appellant alleged the agency subjected her to
      since 2008, including threatening discipline, undertaking efforts to have her
      involuntarily committed or resign/retire from her position, negative performance
      appraisals from 2017 through 2021, a letter of counseling, denied leave and
      telework requests, and nonselections for positions. Id.
¶11         Importantly, in the close-out letter, OSC identified 37 specific positions for
      which the appellant alleged she had applied but was not selected since 2008 ,
      listed by the position vacancy announcement number and the year the position
      was posted. Id. at 6 n.1. Most of the 37 vacancies OSC identified are the same
      ones the appellant identified in the “Timeline of [prohibited personnel practices]
      and Whistleblowing” document she provided in her amended jurisdictional
      response.    Compare id., with IAF, Tab 16 at 87-88, 103-04.                 However, the
      following eight nonselection positions were included on the appellant’s timeline,
      as numbered, but were not among those that OSC identified that it investigated as
      a part of the appellant’s complaint:        (7) CCSH-11-09 (Assistant to the Branch
      Chief Detail – 2010); (10) Detail Positions (Two) with the ITA Front Office

      3
        The letter is dated July 29, 2020, but it is clear from the context that is a typographical
      error and the letter should instead be dated July 29, 2021. See IAF, Tab 1 at 6-7
      (identifying July 29, 2021, as the date OSC closed its investigation).
                                                                                     7

      Executives (Announced January 28, 2021); (11) CCJD-21-28 (Assistant to the
      Branch Chief Detail – 2021); (12) CCJD-21-139 (Assistant to the Branch
      Chief Detail – 2021); (1) CCTW-07-77 (General Tax Attorney, PSI - 2006); (30)
      CCJD-20-D57 (FO Tax Law Specialist – 2020); (31) CCJD-21-16 (B4 Senior
      Counsel – 2021); (32) CCJD-21-37 (B4 and B5 STRs – 2021). Compare IAF,
      Tab 1 at 6 n.1, with Tab 16 at 87-88, 103-04.
¶12        The appellant also did not identify her nonselection for those vacancy
      announcements as retaliatory personnel actions in her OSC complaint , nor did she
      provide any of the over 800 emails she apparently provided to OSC detailing her
      complaints. IAF, Tab 16 at 19-49. Additionally, the appellant acknowledged that
      she continued to update the timeline document after OSC issued its close out
      letter, and the version of the timeline document she submitted to the record
      includes references to events that took place well after she filed her initial
      complaint with OSC, so it is unclear whether she raised with OSC all of the
      claims she listed on the timeline below. IAF Tab 16 at 56 n.1, 79-84.
¶13        To establish Board jurisdiction over a claim, the appellant must prove
      exhaustion with OSC by preponderant evidence, not just present a nonfrivolous
      allegation of exhaustion. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(1). Additionally, the exhaustion
      requirement in 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3) for an IRA appeal precludes the Board from
      considering a personnel action that was not brought to OSC ’s attention. Mason,
      116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8.    Based on the record before us, we conclude that the
      appellant exhausted her claims that she was subjected to the following personnel
      actions identified in OSC’s close-out letter: a hostile work environment; threats
      of reassignment and/or removal; denials of leave and telework requests; negative
      performance appraisals from 2017 through 2021; a letter of counseling; and
      nonselection for the 37 positions identified in OSC’s letter. IAF, Tab 1 at 6-7.
      However, we conclude that the appellant failed to demonstrate that she exhausted
      with OSC her claims that she was not selected for the following vacancy
      announcements identified in her amended jurisdictional response, but not
                                                                                             8

      included in OSC’s letter: (7) CCSH-11-09 (Assistant to the Branch Chief Detail –
      2010); (10) Detail Positions (Two) with the ITA Front Office Executives
      (Announced January 28, 2021); (11) CCJD-21-28 (Assistant to the Branch Chief
      Detail – 2021); (12) CCJD-21-139 (Assistant to the Branch Chief Detail – 2021);
      (1) CCTW-07-77 (General Tax Attorney, PSI - 2006); (30) CCJD-20-D57 (FO
      Tax Law Specialist – 2020); (31) CCJD-21-16 (B4 Senior Counsel – 2021);
      (32) CCJD-21-37 (B4 and B5 STRs – 2021).
¶14         Unlike the exhaustive review of all the personnel actions OSC investigated,
      OSC’s letter does not specifically address all 27 alleged disclosures and 13
      alleged protected activities during the period from October 2001 through
      June 2021 that the appellant identified in her jurisdictional response, and instead
      generally references a number of these claims and notes that the appellant’s
      allegations spanned her “20-year career as an attorney at the IRS.” IAF, Tab 16
      at 7-12, 51-54.    Additionally, although the appellant’s complaint to OSC also
      does not include an exhaustive list of these purported disclosures and activities, it
      does identify a number of these claims and make reference to the fact that
      additional details regarding the protected disclosures and activities were provided
      to OSC in a supplemental document. Id. at 44-48. Thus, between the appellant’s
      OSC complaint and OSC’s letter confirming that the appellant supplemented her
      initial complaint with the timeline document that includes each of the claims
      contained in her amended jurisdictional response, we find that the appellant
      exhausted the 27 alleged disclosures and 13 alleged protected activities listed in
      her amended jurisdictional response. 4 Id. at 7-12; see Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8,
      ¶ 11; Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8.

      4
        We note that the administrative judge appears to have considered a letter dated
      October 12, 2021, that the appellant sent to several U.S. Senators as a potential
      protected disclosure or activity. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 11 at 11 -15. However, this letter is
      dated after OSC issued its close-out letter on July 29, 2021, and so the appellant could
                                                                                              9

      The administrative judge correctly determined that some of the appellant’s claims
      are barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.
¶15         The appellant argues on review that the administrative judge erred in
      concluding that her protected disclosures were barred by the doctrine of la ches.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 28-29. She argues that to invoke laches, the agency must
      demonstrate both that the appellant’s delay was unreasonable and that it was
      materially prejudiced by the appellant’s delay, and the agency cannot establish
      either condition in this case. Id. at 28-29. Specifically, she argues that despite
      the agency’s assertion that witnesses have retired or left the agency and thus are
      unavailable, the fact that witnesses have retired does not, alone, establish that
      they are unavailable. Id. at 28. She also asserts that the agency’s argument that it
      would be prejudiced due to the unavailability of documents related to the
      appellant’s claims is conclusory and the agency has not adequately demonstrated
      that documents were actually lost and that it is prejudiced. Id. at 28-29. The
      appellant further argues that her delay in filing the appeal was caused by her
      belief and reassurances from agency management that the issues she disclosed
      were being remedied. Id. Finally, she argues that laches is an equitable defense
      and therefore it is premature to apply laches at the jurisdictional stage. Id. at 28.
¶16         The equitable defense of laches bars an action when an unreasonable delay
      in bringing the action has prejudiced the party against whom the action is taken.
      Johnson v. U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 6 (2014). The Board has
      acknowledged that laches may apply as a defense in an IRA appeal and may be
      applied before reaching the merits of the appeal. Brown v. Department of the Air
      Force, 88 M.S.P.R. 22, ¶¶ 3, 7-10 (2001). The party asserting laches must prove
      both unreasonable delay and prejudice. Johnson, 121 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 6. Under
      laches, the mere fact that time has elapsed from the date a cause of action first

      not have exhausted her administrative remedies for this claim.     IAF, Tab 1 at 6-7,
      Tab 11 at 11-15.
                                                                                      10

      accrued is not sufficient to bar suit; rather, the delay must be unreasonable and
      unexcused. Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
      There are two types of prejudice that may stem from a delay in filing suit. Id.
      at 1378. The first type, defense prejudice, concerns the Government’s ability to
      mount a defense due to the loss of records, destruction of evidence, fading
      memories, or unavailability of witnesses.      Id.   The second type, economic
      prejudice, centers on consequences, primarily monetary, to the Government
      should the appellant prevail. Id.
¶17        In the initial decision, the administrative judge credited the agency’s
      argument that it was prejudiced by the appellant’s unreasonable delay in
      requesting corrective action because the appellant ’s disclosures span a more than
      20 year period and many of the employees the appellant identified in connection
      with her disclosures have long since retired or left the Federal Government and
      are unavailable, and even if the agency were able to locate the individuals, it was
      likely that their recollections of these events had faded. ID at 5. In making this
      finding, however, the administrative judge did not distinguish between the
      appellant’s older disclosures and retaliatory personnel actions and her more
      recent claims.
¶18        Reviewing the appellant’s disclosures, we agree with the administrative
      judge’s finding that Disclosures 1 through 11, dating to the period from 2001
      through early 2014, are barred by laches. IAF, Tab 16 at 7 -9; ID at 4-5. The
      most recent of those disclosures occurred at least 6 years before the appellant
      filed her request for corrective action with OSC in January 2020. IAF, Tab 1 6
      at 96; see Mercer v. Department of Health and Human Services, 82 M.S.P.R. 211,
      ¶ 11 (1999) (concluding that the length of the delay is, for purposes of applying
      laches, based on the date of the last pertinent event in that case, which was when
      OSC terminated its investigation and not when the appellant ’s Board appeal rights
      first vested). The Board and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
      have regularly found similar delays to be unreasonable and applied laches to bar
                                                                                          11

      such claims. See Pepper v. United States, 794 F.2d 1571, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir.
      1986) (stating that a 6-year delay was inexcusable in concluding that the claim
      was barred by laches); Brown, 88 M.S.P.R. 22, ¶¶ 3, 8-10 (2001) (finding a 6-year
      delay to be unreasonable and applying the doctrine of laches to bar an IRA
      appeal); but see Social Security Administration v. Carr, 78 M.S.P.R. 313, 330
      (1998) (finding that a 3 1/2-year delay was not unreasonable based on the specific
      facts of that case), aff’d, 185 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Special Counsel v.
      Santella, 65 M.S.P.R. 452, 465–66 (1994) (finding that OSC’s 3-year delay in
      bringing a disciplinary action was not unreasonable).
¶19         Additionally, the agency has offered specific arguments to support its
      assertion that it is prejudiced by the appellant’s delay, noting that the subjects of
      most of the early disclosures have either long since retired or left the agency, and
      in some instances have left the country. IAF, Tab 15 at 8. The agency also notes
      on review that the appellant did not first file any grievance or EEO complaint
      until August 2017, and so prior to that date the agency would not have been on
      notice that it needed to flag and retain files in anticipation of potential litigation.
      PFR File, Tab 4 at 12-13.         Conversely, the appellant has not offered any
      reasonable explanation for her lengthy delay, stating only that she was relying on
      assurances from agency management that the issues disclosed were being
      remedied. PFR File, Tab 1 at 29.
¶20         As the appellant correctly notes, a witnesses’ retirement does not, alone,
      establish her unavailability for the purposes of establishing prejudice. PFR File,
      Tab 6 at 10-11; see Pueschel v. Department of Transportation, 113 M.S.P.R. 422,
      ¶ 8 (2010).    However, the unavailability of many of the potential witnesses,
      coupled with the likely loss of relevant documents and records, and the likelihood
      of faded memories related to these events is sufficient to establish that the agency
      would be prejudiced by the appellant’s significant and unexplained delay.
      Johnson, 121 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 9 (finding that the unavailability of some relevant
      witnesses, coupled with the loss of documents that could refresh their
                                                                                        12

      recollections of events, was sufficient to establish prejudice against the agency
      based on the appellant’s 8-year delay in filing her appeal); cf. Hoover v.
      Department of the Navy, 957 F.2d 861, 862-64 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (declining to
      apply laches despite a 5-year delay in filing a petition for enforcement, where the
      agency failed to submit sufficient specific evidence to support its assertion of
      prejudice).
¶21         The same is true of the nonselections that occurred prior to 201 7. In its
      jurisdictional response, the agency produced a sworn declaration from the Branch
      Chief of the Classification and Benefits Branch attesting to the agency ’s
      document retention policy. IAF, Tab 15 at 27-29. As outlined in the policy, the
      agency destroys records related to job vacancies, including applications, resumes,
      vacancy candidate lists and ratings, certificates of eligibles, interview records and
      notes, job offer acceptances/declinations, and more within 2 years after the
      vacancy is closed by a hire or nonselection.       Id. at 27-28.   The agency also
      destroys excepted service appointment records for filling permanent or temporary
      vacancies within 5 years after a candidate enters on duty, is no longer under
      consideration, or declines an offer.    Id. at 28-29.    Consequently, despite the
      appellant’s assertion otherwise, the agency has produced sufficient evidence
      demonstrating that it is no longer in possession of many of the relevant records
      related to the nonselections that occurred prior to 2017, and so the agency has
      also demonstrated that it would be prejudiced by the appellant ’s delay in seeking
      corrective action related to these claims. See Johnson, 121 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶¶ 4,
      8-9 (agreeing with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s claims
      were barred by laches based, in part, on the agency’s uncontested assertion that it
      was prejudiced because the relevant documents were likely destroyed pursuant to
      the agency’s 5-year document retention policy).
¶22         In sum, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency has
      produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it would be unreasonably
      prejudiced by the appellant’s significant unexplained delay in seeking corrective
                                                                             13

action related to Disclosures 1 through 11, encompassing the period from
October 2001 through early 2014, and so those claims are b arred by the doctrine
of laches. IAF, Tab 16 at 7-9. However, we conclude that the administrative
judge erred in finding that Disclosures 12 through 27, encompassing the period
from August 2014 through April 2021, were also barred by laches. IAF, Tab 16
at 9-10. The agency also established that it would be unreasonably prejudiced by
the appellant’s unexplained delay in seeking corrective action related to the
following nonselection personnel actions, as numbered in the appellant ’s
amended response:    (1) CCNH-15-55 (Assistant to the Branch Chief Detail –
2015); (3) CCVL-16-50 (Assistant to the Branch Chief Detail – 2016); (4) Detail
Position of Technical Advisor, Office of the Special Counsel, National Taxpayer
Advocate (Announced February 3, 2014); (5) Detail Position of Technical
Advisor, Office of the Special Counsel, National Taxpayer Advocate (Announced
August 14, 2014); (6) Detail Positions (Two) with the Division Counsel, Wage &
Investment (Announced July 15, 2014); (8) CCLO-08-90 (Assistant to the Branch
Chief Detail – 2008); (2) CCCM-ERB-12-64 (B1 Branch Chief - 2012); (3)
CCJL-ERB-13-55 (Special Counsel, Litigation - 2013); (4) CCJL-ERB-13-72 (B2
Senior Counsel - 2013); (5) CCNF-ERB-15-23 (B5 STR - 2015); (6) CCCM-
ERB-14-36 (B6 Senior Counsel - 2014); (7) GS-ERB-10-51 (B2 STR – 2010); (8)
CCCM-ERB-16-20       (B2   Branch   Chief   –   2016);   (9) CCCM-ERB-16-46/52
[announced twice] (B1 STR – 2016); (10) & (11) GS-ERB-09-24 (B5 & B7 STR
– 2009); (12) CCNF-ERB-16-08 (B5 STR – 2015); (13) GS-ERB-10-34 (B6 STR
– 2010); (14) & (15) CCNF-ERB-15-13 (2 Special Counsels – 2015); (16)
CCCM-ERB-16-11 (Special Counsel – 2016); (17) CCNF-ERB-15-33 (B7 Senior
Counsel – 2015); (18) CCCM-ERB-16-27 (B5 Senior Counsel – 2016).           IAF,
Tab 16 at 14-15. Each of these vacancies was announced at least 5 years ago, and
the agency has indicated that the relevant documents for the vacancies were
destroyed in conformity with its document retention policy.       See Johnson,
121 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶¶ 4, 8-9.
                                                                                     14

      The appellant made nonfrivolous allegations that she made at least one protected
      disclosure or engaged in at least one protected activity and was subjected to at
      least one covered personnel action.
            The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that the agency took at least one
            personnel action against her.
¶23         In cases such as this one, when the appellant has alleged multiple personnel
      actions, the Board has jurisdiction when the appellant exhausts her administrative
      remedies before OSC and makes a nonfrivolous allegation that at least one
      alleged personnel action was taken in reprisal for at least one alleged protected
      disclosure.    Usharauli v. Department of Health          and Human Services,
      116 M.S.P.R. 383, ¶ 19 (2011). As previously discussed, the appellant exhausted
      her administrative remedies before OSC and is not barred by laches from raising
      the following personnel actions taken against her in reprisal for her protected
      disclosures or activities:    she was threatened with discipline, including
      reassignment or removal; she received lowered performance appraisals from 2017
      through 2021; she was issued a letter of counseling; her leave and telework
      requests were denied; and the agency failed to select her for the identified
      positions advertised after 2017. See supra ¶ 22.
¶24         Regarding the appellant’s claim that she was threatened with reassignment
      or removal, it is well established that a threatened personnel action is a covered
      personnel action under the WPEA.       IAF, Tab 16 at 79 (noting that she was
      threatened with termination following a written counseling in October 2019, and
      again threatened with termination in January 2020); see Rebstock Consolidation
      v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 10 (2015) (explaining
      that the term “threaten” in 5 U.S.C. § 2302 should be interpreted broadly and can
      encompass warnings of possible future discipline).      A negative performance
      evaluation is also a personnel action for purposes of an IRA appeal. 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(viii); IAF, Tab 16 at 76, 78-79, 80 (stating that she was issued
      derogatory performance reviews in 2017-2020).
                                                                                       15

¶25        Additionally, a counseling memorandum can constitute a threatened
      personnel action when it warns of future discipline. IAF, Tab 16 at 79 (noting
      that the appellant was counseled verbally and in writing and was threatened with
      termination in October 2019); see Campo v. Department of the Army, 93 M.S.P.R.
      1, ¶¶ 7-8 (2002). A denial of annual leave can constitute a decision concerning
      benefits, and thus constitute a personnel action for purposes of an IRA appeal.
      IAF, Tab 16 at 79 (noting that in January 2020, the appellant was denied
      advanced annual and medical leave); see Marren v. Department of Justice,
      50 M.S.P.R. 369, 373 (1991).       A cancelation of a telework agreement can
      constitute a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii) to the extent
      that it represents a significant change in working conditions . IAF, Tab 16 at 79
      (noting that in October 2019, management altered the appellant’s ability to
      telework); see Rumsey v. Department of Justice, 120 M.S.P.R. 259, ¶ 23 (2013).
      A nonselection is also a personnel action for the purposes of an IRA appeal. IAF,
      Tab 16 at 14-15 (identifying the list of positions the appellant was not selected
      for in retaliation for her protected disclosures and activities); see Ruggieri v.
      Merit Systems Protection Board, 454 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
¶26        Finally, a “hostile work environment” may establish a personnel action in
      an IRA appeal only if it meets the statutory criteria under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A), i.e., constitutes a significant change in duties, responsibilities,
      or working conditions.       See Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      2022 MSPB 17, ¶¶ 16-18.       Although the Board has held that the “significant
      change” personnel action should be interpreted broadly to include harassment and
      discrimination that could have a chilling effect on whistleblowing or otherwise
      undermine the merit system, only agency actions that, individually or
      collectively, have practical and significant effects on the overall nature and
      quality of an employee’s working conditions, duties, or responsibilities will be
      found to constitute a personnel action covered by section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). Id,
      ¶ 16. In determining whether a hostile work environment is present, the Board
                                                                                       16

      will consider the totality of the circumstances, including agency actions that may
      not individually rise to the level of a personnel action. Id., ¶ 18. In Skarada, the
      Board found that an appellant nonfrivolously alleged he was subjected to a
      personnel action when an agency excluded him from meetings and conversations,
      subjected him to multiple investigations, accused him of fabricating data violating
      the Privacy Act, refused his request for a review of his position for possible
      upgrade, yelled at him on three occasions, and failed to provide him the support
      and guidance needed to successfully perform his duties. Id., ¶ 18.
¶27        Here, the appellant has provided an extensive list of wrongful actions she
      alleges were undertaken by the agency from 2014 onward that she claims amount
      to a hostile work environment, including, for example, the following: she was
      recorded, listened to on phone lines, and spied on at the worksite; other
      employees used her timesheets; she was consistently subjected to harassment,
      gossip, and false rumors about her physical characteristics and features; she was
      falsely accused of being in sexual relationships with agency supervisors; she was
      accused of being “crazy”; she was sexually harassed and stared at; she was
      professionally sabotaged; she was mocked and intimidated; she was accused of
      holding certain political views; and she was subjected to unnecessary background
      investigations. IAF, Tab 16 at 9-10, 69-70, 73-74, 79, 88-93.
¶28        Based on the existing record, we find that the appellant’s contentions
      regarding her hostile work environment claim, if accepted as true, collectively
      amount to a nonfrivolous allegation of a significant change in working conditions.
      See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 18; see also Sistek v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 955 F.3d 948, 955 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (noting that retaliatory investigations
      are not personnel actions in and of themselves, but such investigations may
      contribute towards “a significant change in working conditions” that can arise to
      the level of a personnel action); Spivey v. Department of Justice, 2022 MSPB 24,
      ¶ 10; Covarrubias v. Social Security Administration, 113 M.S.P.R. 583, ¶¶ 8, 15
      n.4 (2010) (finding that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of a
                                                                                       17

      significant change in working conditions when she alleged, among other things,
      that her supervisors harassed her and closely monitored her whereabouts, to
      include following her to the bathroom), overruled on other grounds by Colbert v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 12 n.5 (2014).
¶29        In summary, after careful review, we conclude that the appellant
      nonfrivolously alleged that she was subjected to the following personnel actions:
      (1) threats of discipline, including reassignment or removal; (2) lowered
      performance appraisals from 2017 through 2021; (3) a letter of counseling;
      (4) denial of leave; (5) denial of telework; (6) a significant change in her working
      conditions; and (7) nonselection for the following positions as numbered in her
      amended jurisdictional response: (2) CCVL-17-09 (Assistant to the Branch Chief
      Detail – 2017); (9) CCKM-19-65 (Assistant to the Branch Chief Detail – 2019);
      (1) CCCM-ERB-17-21 (B7 STR - 2017); 19) CCCM-ERB-18-06 (B3 Branch
      Chief - 2018); (20) CCCM-ERB-18-46 (B4 Branch Chief – 2018); (21) & (22)
      CCCM-ERB-18-38 (2 Special Counsels – 2018); (23), (24) & (25) CCCM-ERB-
      18-39 (B1, B2, & B3 STR – 2018); (26), (27) & (28) CCCM-ERB-18-53 (B1, B2,
      and B7 Senior Counsels – 2018); (29) CCCM-ERB-18-78 (B4 STR – 2018). As
      to the appellant’s remaining nonselection claims, as previously noted, the
      appellant either failed to exhaust them or they are barred by laches.         Supra
      ¶¶ 13, 22.

            The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected
            disclosure or engaged in protected activity in connection with Disclosures
            16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 24, and Protected Activities 7, 8, and 9.
¶30        A nonfrivolous allegation of a protected whistleblowing disclosure is an
      allegation of facts that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a
      matter that a reasonable person in his position would believe evidenced one of the
      categories of wrongdoing specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).               Salerno,
      123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 6. The test to determine whether a putative whistleblower
      has a reasonable belief in the disclosure is an objective one:           whether a
                                                                                       18

      disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily
      ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the actions of the
      agency evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a
      gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
      public health or safety. Id.
¶31         The remaining disclosures that are not barred by the doctrin e of laches are
      Disclosures 12 through 27. IAF, Tab 16 at 9-10, 69-84. Disclosures 18, 19, 20,
      21, and 24 concern EEO complaints the appellant filed during the period from
      December 2017 through February 2021. IAF, Tab 16 at 10, 75 -78, 80-81. The
      Board recently reaffirmed that filing an EEO complaint is a matter relating solely
      to discrimination and is not protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).        Edwards v.
      Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 10-13, 20, 22-23, aff’d, No. 2022-1967,
      2023 WL 4398002 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2023); see Williams v. Department of
      Defense, 46 M.S.P.R. 549, 554 (1991).       Further, there is no indication in the
      record that the substance of her EEO complaints sought to remedy a violation of
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).         The appellant did not provide copies of the EEO
      complaints or a detailed description of the contents of the complaints below, and
      what little information she did provide about the complaints indicates that they do
      not concern remedying a violation of whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8).
¶32         Instead, the EEO complaints, as described by the appellant, concerned her
      personal objections to various employment matters, such as lowered performance
      ratings, reduced credit hours and telework opportunities, and denied promotions .
      IAF, Tab 16 at 75-78, 80-81, 85-86. Consequently, the appellant has failed to
      nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure or engaged in
      protected activity in connection with these claims. Cf. Mudd v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7 (2013) (recognizing that under the
      WPEA, the Board’s jurisdiction in IRA appeals was expanded to cover claims of
                                                                                             19

      reprisal for EEO complaints in which the appellant sought to remedy
      whistleblower reprisal).
¶33         Similarly, Protected Activities 7, 8, and 9 concern step 1 and step 2
      grievances      the   appellant   filed   related   to   lowered   performance   ratings ,
      discrimination, and her nonselection for a position. IAF, Tab 16 at 11, 75, 84.
      None of the appellant’s grievances concerned remedying a violation of
      whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), and so the Board lacks IRA
      jurisdiction over these activities. See Young v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      961 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (stating that “[s]ection 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii),
      which is not included in the list of prohibited personnel practices for which the
      Board can issue corrective action, covers retaliation for exercising any appeal,
      complaint, or grievance right other than one seeking to remedy a violation of
      section 2302(b)(8)[,] [r]etaliation for filing those other types of complaints is
      remediable through different mechanisms, and not by an IRA appeal to the
      Board”); Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7.               Accordingly, we conclude that the
      appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that the Board has jurisdiction over these
      grievances. 5

      5
        The appellant identifies Disclosures 16 and 17 as her filing of union grievance s on
      these same issues. IAF, Tab 16 at 10. Accordingly, we need not separately consider
      these claims.
                                                                                           20

            The appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure in
            connection with Protected Activity 3. 6
¶34         For Protected Activity 3, the appellant alleges that in 2016, she reported to
      her manager that a secretary in her branch made an unauthorized disclosure of
      taxpayer information. IAF, Tab 16 at 11, 73. The appellant also alleged that she
      was obligated to disclose the unauthorized disclosure of taxpayer information.
      Under section 6103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a),
      it is unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States to willfully
      disclose taxpayer information to any unauthorized person, and violators can be
      subject to criminal penalties. I.R.C. § 6103; see Payne v. United States, 289 F.3d
      377, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d 451, 457
      (2d Cir. 1979). Additionally, section 7431 of the IRC, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7431(a)-(c),
      authorizes affected taxpayers to bring a civil action for damages based on the
      unlawful disclosure of taxpayer information.         I.R.C. § 7431; see Lampert v.
      United States, 854 F.2d 335, 336 (9th Cir. 1988). Therefore, the appellant could
      have reasonably believed that she was disclosing a violation of law in connection
      with her reporting of an agency secretary’s purportedly unlawful disclosure of
      taxpayer information. See Schlosser v. Department of the Interior, 75 M.S.P.R.
      15, 21 (1997) (concluding that an appellant could establish a reasonable belief
      that he made a protected disclosure by showing that he was familiar with the
      alleged illegal conduct and was therefore in a position to form such belief, and

      6
        As previously discussed, the appellant demonstrated that she exhausted this disclosure
      with OSC. Supra ¶ 14. We recognize that the appellant identified this disclosure as a
      protected activity. IAF, Tab 16 at 11. To the extent she was asserting that her
      disclosure was protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) as a disclosure to an agency
      “component responsible for internal investigation or review,” we disagree. Congress
      expanded protected activities to include such disclosures in December 2017; however,
      that expansion is not retroactive. Edwards, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 29-33. In any event, we
      find, as discussed here, that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she made a
      protected disclosure. For the sake of consistency with the appellant’s designation, we
      have continued to refer to her disclosure as “Protected Activity 3.”
                                                                                       21

      that his belief was shared by other similarly situated employees). Consequently,
      we conclude that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that Protected Activity 3 is
      a disclosure protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i).           See Hupka v.
      Department of Defense, 74 M.S.P.R. 406, 410-11 (1997) (concluding that a
      disclosure of a potential Privacy Act violation can constitute a protected
      disclosure); Zygmunt v. Department of Health and Human Services, 61 M.S.P.R.
      379, 382 (1994) (same).

      The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that Protected Activity 3 was a contributing
      factor in the agency’s decision to take a personnel action.
¶35        To satisfy the contributing factor criterion at the jurisdictional stage, an
      appellant need only raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the fact or content of her
      disclosure or protected activity was one factor that te nded to affect the personnel
      action in any way. See Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 12. Whether the appellant’s
      allegations can be proven on the merits is not part of the jurisdictional inquiry.
      Lane v. Department of Homeland Security, 115 M.S.P.R. 342, ¶ 12 (2010).
¶36        One way to establish this criterion is the knowledge/timing test, under
      which an appellant may nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure or activity was a
      contributing factor in a personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as
      evidence that the official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure or
      activity, and that the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a
      reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure or activity was a
      contributing factor in the personnel action. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); see Salerno,
      123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 13. With regard to the knowledge prong of this test, an
      appellant may establish, for jurisdictional purposes, that a disclosure or activity
      was a contributing factor in a personnel action by nonfrivolously alleging that the
      official taking the personnel action had actual or constructive knowledge of the
      disclosure or activity.     See Wells v. Department of Homeland Security,
      102 M.S.P.R. 36, ¶ 8 (2006). Regarding the timing portion of the test, the Board
      has held that a personnel action taken within approximately 1 to 2 years of an
                                                                                        22

      appellant’s disclosures satisfies the timing prong. See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17,
      ¶ 19 (observing that a personnel action taken within approximately 1 to 2 years of
      the appellant’s disclosure satisfies the timing factor of the knowledge/timing
      test); Mastrullo v. Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 21 (2015) (same).
      Additionally, for the timing prong the relevant inquiry is the time between when
      the agency official taking the action had actual or constructive knowledge of the
      disclosure or activity—not necessarily the date of the disclosure or activity
      itself—and the time that the action was taken. See Wells, 102 M.S.P.R. 36, ¶ 8.
¶37        The appellant alleged that immediately after she disclosed the potential
      unauthorized disclosure of taxpayer information to her manager, the manager and
      her “co-worker friends” retaliated against her by subjecting her to a hostile work
      environment, including by sexually harassing her, spying on her, monitoring her,
      and misusing their official positions by holding case files that she needed in order
      to perform her duties for extended periods of time.       IAF, Tab 16 at 73; see
      Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 18; Covarrubias, 113 M.S.P.R. 583, ¶¶ 8, 15 n.4.
      Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the appellant has nonfrivolously alleged
      that at least one protected disclosure or protected activity was a contributing
      factor in the creation of a hostile work environment that constituted a significant
      change in her working conditions.

      We remand the appeal for the administrative judge to further develop the record
      and make new findings on the issue of jurisdiction.
¶38        As previously discussed, the administrative judge erred by determining that
      all of the appellant’s purported disclosures and personnel actions during the
      period from 2001 through 2017 were barred by laches—even those that occurred
      within 6 years of the date the appellant filed her co mplaint with OSC. Supra
      ¶ 22. We also determined that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that
      Disclosures 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 24, and Protected Activities 7, 8, and 9,
      are within the Board’s IRA jurisdiction. Supra ¶¶ 30-33. However, because the
      administrative judge dismissed all of the appellant’s disclosures as barred by
                                                                                              23

      laches, including those that occurred after 2014, she did not make any findings
      concerning whether the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she made a
      protected disclosure with respect to any of the remaining claims.                 Further,
      although the administrative judge generally determined that the appellant’s 2017
      grievance, 2017 through 2021 EEO complaints, 2021 complaint to OSHA, and
      2021 complaint to the OGE were not protected activities because they did not
      concern remedying a violation of whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8), the analysis of these claims was cursory and did not offer any
      details about the nature of the appellant’s specific claims in each complaint or
      address the individual claims with any degree of specificity. 7 ID at 6-7; IAF,
      Tab 16 at 19-49, 69-84.
¶39         Based on our review of the record, we have concluded that the appellant
      nonfrivolously alleged that she made at least one protected disclosures with
      respect to Protected Activity 3 and nonfrivolously alleged that she was subjected
      to at least one personnel action when she was subjected to a retaliatory hostile
      work environment that caused a significant change in her working conditions. 8
      The Board’s ordinary practice is to make a jurisdictional finding in an IRA appeal
      based on the parties’ written submissions.         See Spencer v. Department of the

      7
         Additionally, a number of these complaints appear to concern disclosures of
      information under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) as opposed to appeals, complaints, or
      grievances under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(8) (identifying
      categories of “disclosures” of information protected under that section), 2302(b)(9)
      (identifying types of activities protected under that section).
      8
        Due to how complex and numerous the appellant’s claims are, our discussion here is
      limited to addressing our ultimate inquiry which is whether she has established
      jurisdiction over her claims; that is, whether she has nonfrivolously alleged that at least
      one protected disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in at least one personnel
      action. See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 13 (explaining that, in cases when an appellant
      has alleged multiple personnel actions, the Board has jurisdiction over the appeal when
      the appellant exhausts her administrative remedy and makes a nonfrivolous allegation
      that at least one alleged personnel action was taken in reprisal for at least one alleged
      protected disclosure).
                                                                                          24

      Navy, 327 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Shope v. Department of the Navy,
      106 M.S.P.R. 590, ¶ 5 (2007). In certain circumstances, however, the Board has
      remanded the appeal for the administrative judge to further develop the record on
      the issue of jurisdiction and to issue a new jurisdictional finding. See Wilcox v.
      International Boundary and Water Commission, 103 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶¶ 15-16;
      Wells, 102 M.S.P.R. 36, ¶¶ 4, 9-10.
¶40           Additionally, an initial decision must identify all material issues of fact and
      law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the
      administrative judge’s conclusions of law and her legal reasoning, as well as the
      authorities on which that reasoning rests.         Spithaler v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980).           Given the extensive nature of the
      appellant’s claims and the fact that the administrative judge’s laches findings
      precluded a full review of the allegations the appellant exhausted with OSC, we
      remand the appeal for the administrative judge to make new jurisdictional
      findings.     On remand the administrative judge shall make new findings
      concerning whether the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she made a
      protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity in connection with the
      following claims that are not bared by laches, as identified in the appellant’s
      amended jurisdictional response: Disclosures 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 23, 25, 26, and
      27, and Protected Activities 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13. The administrative judge
      shall    subsequently     make    findings    concerning    whether    the   appellant
      nonfrivolously alleged that these disclosures or activities were a contributing
      factor in the agency’s decision to take, fail to take, or threaten to take any of the
      previously identified personnel actions. Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5. If the
      administrative judge determines that the appellant established Board jurisdiction
      over her IRA appeal, she is entitled to a hearing on the merits of her claim, which
      she must prove by preponderant evidence. Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5. If the
      appellant proves by preponderant evidence that a protected disclosure or activity
                                                                                       25

      was a contributing factor in one of the personnel actions, the administrative judge
      shall order corrective action unless the agency proves by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent the protected activity .
      Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e).

                                           ORDER
¶41        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
      Regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                   /s/ for
                                               Jennifer Everling
                                               Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.