Court Opinion

ID: 9844813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:09:37.567453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:43.775862
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. The fair report privilege1 does not protect the news conference and press release for four reasons. First, the District Attorney was not acting in his official capacity when he held the press conference. Second, the common-law fair report privilege has never been construed broadly enough protect press releases which are not based on official reports. Third, the fair report privilege as expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 611, should not cover a press release which was not based on an official report. Fourth, OHahoma’s statutory enactment of privilege in 12 O.S.1991 § 1443.1 abrogated the common law doctrine of fair report, and is thus the law as to whether a statement in OHahoma is privileged. Section 1443.1 does not privilege the statements made in this case.
Suit was brought by Ace Wright, a private individual not connected with the district attorney’s office or the police department. His claim arose from a press conference called by the District Attorney, in which the District Attorney released a written statement of a private telephone conversation between two police officers. The conversation was NOT excerpted from any official report or judicial proceeding. It was simply two officers talking informally about future plans for an investigation. Charges were not filed against *994Ace Wright, and there was no indication in the record that the District Attorney was considering filing charges.
Wright insists that the District Attorney’s purpose in calling the press conference was to discredit his political opponent. The news conference and press release apparently occurred during a heated election battle for District Attorney. The press release focused on the halt of an drug investigation. The District Attorney was not commenting on an ongoing investigation, but was attempting to shift the blame for the halted investigation to his political opponent.
1. THE OFFICIAL DUTIES OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
First, the acts of the district attorney of holding the press conference were in no way related to his official duties. Since he was not acting his official capacity, the privilege cannot apply. Kirby v. Pittsburgh Courier Publ. Co., 150 F.2d 480, 482 (2nd Cir.1945); Wood v. Constitution Publ. Co., 57 Ga.App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937).
In Short v. News-Journal Co., 58 Del. 592, 212 A.2d 718 (1965), a news release of the chief of delinquent accounts of the IRS was considered privileged. There, however, the chief was directly responsible — under regulations of the IRS — to release enforcement news to enhance compliance with tax laws and regulations. Relying on Section 611, the court found this to be within the privilege because one of the enumerated duties of the chief was press releases.
The duties of a district attorney are expressly set forth in 19 O.S.1991 § 215.4 et seq. The duties include the prosecution and investigation of criminal activity, 19 O.S.1991 § 215.4, the giving of advice to the board of county commissioners and other boards, 19 O.S.1991 § 215.5, administrative duties such as hiring a first assistant and filing an annual accounting, 19 O.S.1991 § 215.9 and 11, and attending grand juries, 19 O.S.1991 § 215.13. The statutes continue by stating that the powers and duties of the district attorney are those “powers, duties and functions provided by law for the county attorney ...” 19 O.S.1991 § 215.16. There is no mention of a duty to hold press conferences for political purposes. Furthermore, a district attorney is constrained by 5 O.S.1991, Ch. 1, App. 3-A, Rule 3.6, from making certain types of extrajudicial statements to the press.
I have found no Oklahoma case which supports the majority’s position that it is an official duty of the district attorney to hold press conferences for political purposes. While in some instances a press conference might fall within the boundaries of the enunciated duties, it did not in the present case.2 There was no ongoing investigation or prosecution. There was no completed prosecution upon which the district attorney was commenting. There is no indication in the record that the district attorney was seeking to revive a past investigation or contemplating the filing of charges. He was simply trying to win an election.
Magness v. Pledger, 334 P.2d 792, 795 (Okla.1959) supports this position. There, this Court was faced with the question of whether a petition by a citizen to the Attorney General was a privileged report. The petition alleged wrongdoing on the part of county officials. In holding that the petition was not privileged, we relied on the fact that the Attorney General was not charged by statute with the duty of investigating allegations by citizens. The powers and duties of the Attorney General are “not unlimited and do[ ] not extend to matters beyond the power, authority and duties conferred.... ” Id.
In Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499 (5th Cir.1980) cert. denied 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1353, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1980), the Fifth Circuit explained the duties of a prosecutor and defined the boundaries of absolute immunity with regard to a civil rights suit. The facts showed that a search warrant was executed at the plaintiffs place of business. The assistant district attorney accompanied the police officers to execute the warrant, and all the jewelry in the store was seized even though only one item was possibly sto*995len property. The press arrived subsequently, and the prosecutor announced that over $75,000.00 in stolen property had been seized. The court granted the motion to suppress and required the return of all but one of the items to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs brought suit for slandering their business reputation. The court held that the assistant district attorney was not entitled to absolute immunity from suit in this instance because “immunities are extended to governmental officials only when ‘overriding considerations of public policy nonetheless deman[d] that the official be given a measure of protection from personal liability to ensure his ability to function effectively.” Id. at 503.3 To determine whether the prosecutor was immune the court focused on the “functional nature of the activities.” Id. at 504, quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).
Here, the prosecutor was acting in the absence of a ease being filed. There were no ongoing judicial proceedings against the plaintiffs. Because the statements were not “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” his statements to the press were extrajudicial, and thus not entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 506, quoting Imber, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. at 995.
Likewise, in Catalano v. Pechous, 69 Ill.App.3d 797, 25 Ill.Dec. 838, 846, 387 N.E.2d 714, 722 (1st Dist.1978) cert. denied 451 U.S. 911, 101 S.Ct. 1981, 68 L.Ed.2d 300 (1978), the court found that to be entitled to protection under the fair report privilege, the official must be acting in matters legitimately connected to and drawn from official responsibilities. Id. 69 Ill.App.3d at 806-807, 25 Ill.Dec. at 846, 387 N.E.2d at 722. There, the city clerk was held to be acting outside official duties when he made statements to the press about a public meeting. Even though the clerk’s duties included keeping records to be made available to the public, his comments were outside the scope of the statutory duties. He was thus not entitled to rely on the fair report privilege.
II. The Common Law Privilege of Fair Report
A. English Doctrine
The historical notions of privilege date as far back as 1559, wherein courts held privileged certain statements made in the course of judicial proceedings. Croke v. Grene, K.B. 27/1190, m. 60 (1559); see Select Cases on Defamation to 1600 (Selden Society 1985).4 In England, as the idea of privilege emerged, it took the form of protecting news reports of court trials. Curry v. Walter, 126 Eng.Rep. 1046, (C.P.1796); Dawkins v. Rokeby, L.R. 7 Q.B. 744 (1875); see generally Levy, Emergence of a Free Press. (1985). The fair report privilege, as it became known, was later extended to parliamentary accounts and debates. King v. Wright, 101 Eng.Rep. 1396 (K.B.1799); Wason v. Walter, L.R. 4 Q.B. 73 (1868). When it became apparent that the courts were unwilling to extend the fair report privilege beyond those instances already covered, the Parliament enacted legislation to privilege reports of official meetings lawfully convened. See Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment: The Case for a Constitutional Privilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 469, 478 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Defamation and the First Amendment).5 Again in 1952, the Parliament ex*996tended the fair report privilege to includes public meetings held for a lawful purpose. See Defamation and the First Amendment, at 526 n. 269.
Contrary to the assertion in the majority opinion, I have found no cases in which a press release containing the transcript of a non-public conversation was held privileged.6 In fact, as the majority notes, the underlying basis of the fair report privilege is that the press, as an agent of the public, should be permitted to print reports of those events open to the public. Here, the telephone conversation was not open to the public nor were its contents part of any official proceeding. It was not part of a judicial or legislative record. It was simply the written statement of a telephone conversation. The policies behind the English fair report privilege do not lend support for its extension into this new area.
B. American Privilege of Fair Report
Since the English doctrine of fair report privilege was not in existence until after the settlers of the colonies had arrived in America, the states did not accept in total the English privilege of fair report. Thus, the fair report privilege, as developed by American courts, is similar to but not an exact mirror of the English doctrine. D. Dobbels, Edwards v. Nat’l Audobon Society, Inc.: A Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation Should Be Rejected, 33 Hastings L.J. 1203, 1205 n. 16 (1982) (hereinafter cited as Edwards v. Nat’l Audobon); V. Harper, F. James and O. Gray, The Law of Torts, §§ 5.23 and 5.24 (2d Ed.1986). The policies behind the privilege are consistent with those enunciated by the English courts; to accommodate the public and social interest in the availability of information about official proceedings and meetings. See Edwards v. Nat’l Audobon, at 1207. Each state has determined whether the privilege is applicable and to what extent.7 However, only a minority of jurisdictions have extended the privilege to a public, non-official proceeding.8 Most have held the privilege to be much more narrowly proscribed than is urged by the majority opinion. To avoid the swallowing of the law of libel, most courts recognize strong limitations on the privilege. The majority opinion casts aside this concern, and leaves private individuals without a remedy for defamation, even when the defamation does not arise from an official proceeding.
In most jurisdictions, the extent of the privilege has been decided by the legislature. Many states have enacted legislation similar to that in Oklahoma, and hold that to be the *997state’s rule of privilege.9 Courts have applied the privilege in varying degrees, but generally circumscribe its boundaries to privilege only legislative, judicial, executive or other official proceedings. See The Law of Torts, supra; Jones v. Neighbor Newspapers Inc., 142 Ga.App. 365, 236 S.E.2d 23 (1977).
As for the situation presented in this case, courts generally hold that informal police remarks are not privileged because “extrajudicial defamation of the citizenry by the police is not a vital process of democratic government.” The Law of Torts, at 206. Further, the fact that the conversation was later transcribed into written form does not make it privileged as an “official” document.
In McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 76 Mich. 338, 43 N.W. 431 (1889), the court held that newspaper articles were not privileged. A citizen had been arrested for the illegal sale of stamps; he was later released and the charges dropped. The reporter published two articles about the arrest, noting that earlier there had been a crime involving the stealing of stamps. The court remanded the case for a trial:
[T]he reporter of a newspaper has no more right to collect stories on the street, or even to gather information from policemen or magistrates out of court, about a citizen, and to his detriment, and publish such stories and information as facts in a newspaper, than has a person not connected with a newspaper to whisper from ear to ear the gossip and scandal of the street. If true, such publication or such speaking may be privileged, but, if false, the newspaper as well as the citizen must be responsible to any one who is wronged and damaged thereby.
Id. 43 N.W. at 437.
This is the general rule: Statements made by police officers in a preliminary investigation are not privileged, nor are informal statements made by prosecutors in interviews or press releases.10 In Yerkie v. Postnewsweek Stations, Michigan, Inc., 470 F.Supp. 91 (D.Md.1979), the plaintiff brought a defamation action for a report alleging criminal conduct. The federal district court held that the privilege did not apply to statements of the prosecuting attorney which were not yet part of a judicial proceeding:
While a privilege applicable to reports of official proceedings applies to a report of the fact of arrest or the fact that a charge has been made, it does not apply to statements made by the police, by the complainant or other witnesses or by the prosecuting attorney as to the facts of the ease or evidence expected to be given which have not yet been made a part of the judicial proceeding or of the arrest process. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 611, Comment D. In the instant ease, there was never an arrest or judicial proceeding and the qualified privilege relating to the reports of such proceedings is not applicable. ■
Id. at 93-94. The court continued by stating United States Supreme Court had forbidden *998the privilege to be extended on the basis of newsworthiness.11
In Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper, 424 A.2d 78 (D.C.Ct.App.1980) cert. denied 451 U.S. 989, 101 S.Ct. 2327, 68 L.Ed.2d 848 (1980), a private citizen brought suit for defamation resulting a newspaper article which stated that he shot his wife during a quarrel. In fact, the shooting was accidental. The article was based on a “hot line” dispatch from the police. The court held that the newspaper could not rely on the fair report privilege. Id. at 88. Relying on the comments in the Restatement (Second) and Section 611, the court held that this was not an instance in which the privilege applied. Public policy behind the privilege did not extend to this type of situation:
This log representing the oral police communication from which the Star composed its article does not carry the dignity and authoritative weight as a record for which the common law sought to provide a reporting privilege.
Id. at 89. See also Colpoys v. Gates, 118 F.2d 16 (D.C.Cir.1940) (U.S. Marshall was not privileged in making a press release)
One respected treatise explains the reasons which such communications should not be privileged as fair report:
In the constantly growing state executive bureaucracies and in the sprawling county and municipal governments there are many inferior officials who are political hacks with little, if any, real sense of social responsibility. Giving such persons a conditional privilege to defame an innocent person may given them the power to destroy him because of his inability to prove that the conditionally privileged occasion was abused ... When the inferior state official, or the municipal official, makes a report to a superior, in the performance of his duty, the number of persons who hear or read the defamation is limited and they are, presumably, interested in receiving accurate reports. A serious defamatory charge is likely to be kept confidential and may result in farther investigation and correction of the falsehood. The situations which are devastating, and can irreparably harm a person’s good name are those in which there is publication to person who have no duty to keep the information confidential or to take official action with respect to it ... The issuance of press releases by inferior official, on their own authority, should not be considered as a publication in the performance of official duties. A press release may be read by millions. A ruling that there is a conditionally privileged occasion for an inferior official to hand out a press release is a temptation to publicity-hungry little men and women which many will be unable to resist. Sound public policy does not require this shield of protection. It is to be hoped that the courts will not hesitate, except in an extraordinary case, to rule that the inferior officials press release is no part of the performance of his official duties.
L. Eldredge, The Law of Defamation 504-505 (1978). Accord. W.P. Prosser et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 114 (5th Ed.1984).
Based on these views, I do not agree that the district attorney’s press release was privileged under the American common law. It is not the type of statement which requires protection to ensure the public’s right to information. It was not contained in a formal report filed by the police, nor filed in any court proceeding. The statement of the district attorney would have been just as persuasive had the name of Ace Wright been omitted to protect his reputation.12 As an *999informal oral communication between police officers, it does not carry with it the “dignity and authoritative weight of a record for which the common law sought to provide a reporting privilege.” See Phillips, supra. If false, it is exactly the type of statement for which liability is imposed under the laws of libel.
III. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, SECTION 611
The majority opinion also relies on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 611 as justification for the extension of the fair report privilege to the present case. However, the comments follomng Section 611 expressly reject the idea that the privilege extend to the press releases dealing with nonofficial business.
As the majority correctly states, Section 611 states that reports of “official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern” are privileged. But comment (h) following Section 611 makes clear that the Restatement does not contemplate the 'extension of the privilege to instances like those present in our case:
h. Arrest. An arrest by an officer is an official action, as a report of the fact of the arrest or of the charge of the crime made by the officer in making or returning the arrest is therefore within the conditional privilege covered by this Section. On the other hand statements made by the police or by the complainant or other witnesses or by the prosecuting attorney as to the facts of the case or the evidence expected to be given are not yet part of the judicial proceeding or of the arrest itself and are not privileged under this Section. (Emphasis Added)
In Phillips, supra, the court relied on comment (h) to hold that the police “hot line” was not an official report so as to fall within the privilege. Quoting directly to Section 611 and comment (h), the court stated “[n]ot being an arrest record nor a record required by statute or some other authority, but instead merely constituting a hearsay statement by police of facts of a ease, the hot line will not qualify as an official record for purposes of this privilege.” 424 A.2d at 89. See also Yerkie, 470 F.Supp. at 94; Coleman v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, 149 A.2d 193 (1959).
Likewise, in Kelley v. Hearst Corp., 2 A.D.2d 480, 157 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1956), the defendant newspaper asserted the fair report privilege. In remanding the case, the court relied on Section 611 as an accurate statement of New York law regarding the privilege. However, the court continued by pointing out that mere investigations and suspicions of police officers are not “official proceedings” so as to be privileged. In Kelley, the article stated that “police said” the plaintiff had threatened to kill his wife. However, the statements were not shown to be in an official report, and thus they were not necessarily privileged. See also Heard v. Neighbor Newspapers, Inc., 259 Ga. 458, 383 S.E.2d 553 (1989) (construing a similar statutory provision, court held that statement contained in report of an investigator of the Dept, of Human Resources was not privileged); Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo.Ct.App.1982) cert. denied 459 U.S. 1226, 103 S.Ct. 1233, 75 L.Ed.2d 467 (1982) (victim’s name released by police to the newspaper was held not privileged because it was not part of an official report or judicial proceeding yet).13
The majority adopts a broad view of Section 611, and cites several cases as authority *1000for this interpretation. However, the cases are not supportive of its position. Fortney v. Stephan, 237 Mich. 603, 213 N.W. 172 (1927); Abram v. Odham, 89 So.2d 334 (Fla.1956); Phoenix Newspapers v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P.2d 150 (1957); Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.1956); Pulvermann v. A.S. Abell Co., 131 F.Supp. 617 (D.Md.1955) and Garby v. Bennett, 166 N.Y. 392, 59 N.E. 1117 (1902) do not cite Section 611 of the Restatement, and in no way support the idea that the privilege of fair report extend to proceedings of an unofficial nature. These cases dealt with comments about public officials or political candidates, or comments made by legislators when introducing legislation. In the two cases cited which do rely on Section 611 of the Restatement (Second), the cases dealt with official reports requested by the Governor. Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, 187 A.2d 586 (1963); Brandon v. Gazette Publ. Co., 234 Ark. 332, 352 S.W.2d 92 (1961).
Furthermore, only a minority of states have opted for such a broad interpretation of the privilege to cover meetings of “public concern.”14 Generally, states have declined to follow the sweeping implications of the Restatement (Second) and refuse to extend the fair report privilege to these occasions. See e.g., Yerkie v. Post-Newsweek Stations, supra; Venn v. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 201 F.Supp. 47 (N.D.Tenn.1962); Jones v. Neighbor Newspapers, Inc., supra.
IV. The Statutory Privilege and the Common Law
The majority asserts that the statute dealing with privilege, 12 O.S.1991 § 1443.1, does not replace the common law privilege of fair report because the common law afforded more protection than does the statute, and thus remains in effect. There are two flaws with this reasoning. First, the common law — as developed by American courts — has never extended the fair report privilege to protect press conferences in which news releases disseminate information not contained in any official, judicial, legislative or executive report. Second, even if such an extension could be found in the American common law, Section 1443.1 specifically enunciates those instances in which the privilege is to be extended, and has replaced the common law.
The privilege of fair report as defined in Section 1443.1 has been part of Oklahoma’s statutory law since 1910. Rev.Laws 1910, § 2381. The form of the statute has remained substantially the same over the years.15 The statute restates the fair report privilege as understood and adopted by a majority of the states. See, e.g., Kan.Stat. Ann. § 411.060 (1990); N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 337 (1956); Tex.Civ.Code Ann. § 5432 (Vernon 1960). While the language of Section 611 in the Restatement (Second) suggests a more broad rule, states have carefully circumscribed their adoption of this provision. See, e.g., Phillips, 424 A.2d at 88-89. Even the comments in the Restatement (Second) indicate that it was not meant to be so broad as to engulf the private individual’s remedy for libel.16
The American common law has never permitted the fair report privilege to encompass *1001those situations beyond which the Oklahoma statute permits. Both contemplate the protection of statements based on official reports, whether they be, judicial or legislative in nature. Cobb v. Oklahoma Publ. Co., 42 Okla. 314, 140 P. 1079 (1914); Levine v. CMP Publ., 738 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.1984). Both protect official reports which are identifiable by the reader as based on an official report or public record. Id. at 668. As justification for the limitation, Billet v. Times Democrat Pub. Co., 107 La. 751, 32 So. 17 (1902) explained that there is no reason to extend the privilege beyond those instances enumerated by statute. By striking a balance, the interests of a free press are preserved while also keeping in tact the individual’s interest in being free from defamation. Restatement (Second) § 611, comment (a); Edwards v. Audobon Society Inc., supra.
Our statute expressly lists the instances in which a publication is privileged. It is simply a codification of the law which has always been followed in Oklahoma. See Cobb, supra; Spencer v. Minnick, 41 Okla. 613, 139 P. 130 (1914). Title 12 O.S.1991, § 2 states that the common law remains in effect only to the extent that it has not been modified by statutory law. Clearly, Section 1443.1 codifies and expressly defines the fair report privilege to be applied in Oklahoma. Unlike the situation wherein there is no indication that the legislature was aware of common law rights, see Tate v. Browning-Ferris Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1226 n. 38 (Okla.1992), the language used in the statute privileging legislative, judicial and other official proceedings shows an understanding of the privilege as adopted by American courts.
CONCLUSION
Any one of these four reasons would compel me to reject the majority’s invocation of the fair report privilege to affirm the trial courts’ dismissal. I would reject applicability of the neutral reportage privilege for the reason that Ace Wright is admittedly a private person, and that court-created privilege, even in the few jurisdictions that have adopted it, applies only to suits brought by public figures. See Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster, P.C. v. Turner Broadcasting System, 844 F.2d 955, 961 (2nd Cir.1988). I would reject defendant’s reliance on the statutory privilege, as it clearly does not apply. I would allow the suit to proceed in libel under existing law.
I concur that the trial court correctly dismissed Wright’s claim based on the tort of outrage.
I am authorized to state that Vice Chief Justice LAVENDER joins in these views.

. The majority sua sponte invokes the common law and/or Restatement sponsored “fair report privilege" to affirm. Were I writing for the majority I would address the "neutral reportage privilege" as created by Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2nd Cir.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1002, 98 S.Ct. 647, 54 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977) and urged by the newspaper. Because the neutral reportage privilege has never been, and should not be, extended to make privileged those statements about private persons, such as Ace Wright, it is unnecessary to speculate whether the privilege should be adopted by Oklahoma were it invoked in some later case brought by a public figure, a proper case for consideration of the doctrine.

. See Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) and McCormick v. Specter, 220 Pa.Super. 19, 275 A.2d 688 (1971) for instances when a prosecutor and a public defender are permitted to hold press conferences.

. Quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980).

. See also Levy, L.W., Emergence of a Free Press (1985).

. It is important to note that this privilege was not formally enunciated until long after the settlement of the first colonies in America. Although the majority opinion correctly asserts that we, as a state, adopted the common law as an aid to the general statutes of Oklahoma, several Oklahoma cases explain that the common law adopted is that of England at the time the settlers landed in America. In McKennon v. Winn, 1 Okla. 327, 33 P. 582, 584-85 (1893) the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained this principle:
The English-speaking people brought the common law to America with them, in the first settlement of the colonies ... and such of the English statutes adopted prior to the settlement of our colonies as were of general application, and suit to our conditions....
... [W]hen people from all parts of the United States on the 22d day of April, 1889, settled the country known as Oklahoma, built cities, towns, and villages, and began to carry on trade and commerce in all its various branches, they brought into Oklahoma, with them, the *996established principles and rules of the common law, as recognized and promulgated by the American courts, and as it existed when imported into this country by our early settlers, and unmodified by American or English statutes. (Emphasis Added).
See also Meyer v. White, 79 Okla. 257, 192 P. 801 (1920); Creekmore v. Redman Ind., Inc., 671 P.2d 73, 76-77 (Okla.Ct.App.1983).
Thus, in the present case, the American common law is that which is relevant. English common law in the area of the fair report privilege serves only as a helpful backdrop. This view— the one followed by this Court — is in line with the holdings of a majority of jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Criqui, 105 Kan. 716, 185 P. 1063 (1919); Hannah v. State, 212 Ga. 313, 92 S.E.2d 89 (1956); Cooper v. Runnels, 48 Wash.2d 108, 291 P.2d 657 (1955). For a summary of states following this view, see 15 C.J.S. § 4 and 13.

.See majority opinion, footnote 1, wherein the majority asserts that at common-law, the privilege included news conferences. None of the cases cited as support for this statement involved a press release of an unofficial document. Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, 187 A.2d 586 (1963) involved the release of a report commissioned by the Governor of the state. It was an official report directed by the Governor to be filed following a thorough investigation of organized crime. In Phoenix Newspapers v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P.2d 150 (1957), the newspaper reported a political debate held at a town meeting. In Fortney v. Stephan, 237 Mich. 603, 213 N.W. 172 (1927), the newspaper printed articles accusing the sheriff of misconduct in office. Garby v. Bennett, 166 N.Y. 392, 59 N.E. 1117 (App.1901) involved statements made about a state legislator and legislation he had introduced. It was based on statements made while he was acting as a legislator.

. For a thorough review of the history of the emergence of special privileges in America, see Levy, supra.

. See Pinn v. Lawson, 72 F.2d 742, 744 (D.C.Cir.1934) (church meeting); Morin v. Houston Press Co., 103 S.W.2d 1087, 1090 (Tex.Civ.App.1937) (campaign speech).

. See Jones v. Neighbor Newspapers, Inc., 142 Ga.App. 365, 236 S.E.2d 23 (1977); Stewart v. Enterprise Co., 393 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Ct.App.1965); Painter v. E.W. Scripps Co., 104 Ohio App. 237, 4 O.O.2d 388, 148 N.E.2d 503 (1957); Kelley v. Hearst Corp., 2 A.D.2d 480, 157 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1956); Kelly v. Independent Publ. Co., 45 Mont. 127, 122 P. 735 (1912); Billet v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 107 La. 751, 32 So. 17 (1902).

. Lancour v. Herald & Globe Ass’n, 111 Vt. 371, 17 A.2d 253 (1941) (a preliminary police investigation is not privileged); Burrows v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 255 S.W. 925 (Mo.App.1923) (article was not privileged even though there was a written police report because the news in the article was obtained from a desk sergeant); Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Bowen, 182 S.W. 61 (Tx.Ct.App.1915) (newspaper published article about plaintiff being held for a murder and court held the article not privileged because not based on documents filed in an official proceeding authorized by law); Kelly v. Independent Publ. Co., 45 Mont. 127, 122 P. 735 (1912) (article not privileged because it was based on oral reports of a sheriff before any charges were filed); Billet v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 107 La. 751, 32 So. 17 (1902) (neither common convenience nor the interests of society require that the suspicions of police officers be published to the world and thus, such suspicions whether written or oral are not privileged); Jastrzembski v. Marxhausen, 120 Mich. 677, 79 N.W. 935 (1899) (information given by a police officer, but not contained in a court file was not privileged). See also The Law of Torts, supra.

. Here, the majority opinion states that because the district attorney's statement was of public interest, it was privileged. The United States Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) expressly rejected a similar argument, and held that newsworthiness was not an adequate criteria to warrant the publication of material. Although Gertz did not address the "public interest” idea with regard to fair reporting, it specifically held that constitutional protection could not be based on the public’s interest in a newsworthy story.

. The relevancy of the matter contained in the report has also been the basis for denying coverage by the privilege. If the defamatory statement is not necessary and relevant to the purpose of the publication, it is not privileged. Sullivan v. Strahorn-Hutton-Evans Comm'n Co., 152 Mo. *999268, 53 S.W. 912 (1899); Hines v. Shumaker, 97 Miss. 669, 52 So. 705 (1910); Lathrop v. Sundberg, 55 Wash. 144, 104 P. 176 (1909). See also Huntley v. Ward, 6 C.B. (n.s.) 514, 141 Eng.Rep. 557 (1859). See generally L. Eldredge, supra at § 93. One court has denied the extension of the privilege because the newspaper article had a greater “sting” than did the judicial documents. Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 91 Ill.App.3d 735, 47 Ill.Dec. 429, 415 N.E.2d 434 (1st Dist.1980).

. Those statements which have been held privileged under Section 611 include news releases dealing with official reports by the Governor, Brandon v. Gazette Publ. Co., 234 Ark. 332, 352 S.W.2d 92 (1961) and Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, 187 A.2d 586 (1963), and articles based on official investigation by the state coroner's office, Painter v. E.W. Scripps Co., 104 Ohio App. 237, 4 O.O.2d 388, 148 N.E.2d 503 (1957). See also Tilles v. Pulitzer Publ. Co., 241 Mo. 609, 145 S.W. 1143, 1146 (1912); Note, Privilege to Republish Defamation, 64 Colum.L.Rev. (1964).

. See Pinn v. Lawson, 72 F.2d 742, 744 (D.C.Cir.1934) (privilege included a church board meeting); Pulvermann v. A.S. Abell Co., 131 F.Supp. 617 (D.Md.1955) (Maryland law permitted the extension of the privilege to a political campaign speech); Warren v. Pulitzer Publ. Co., 336 Mo. 184, 78 S.W.2d 404 (1934) (privilege included a church hearing and trial).

. The statute was amended to delete a portion of the statute which stated certain instances in which malice of the publisher could be presumed. This portion was held unconstitutional in Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla.1976), relying on Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974).

.Comment (d) states that the privilege applies to official proceedings such as judicial proceedings, reports of executive officers, reports of legislative officers. However "[i]t it not clear whether the privilege extends to a report of an official proceeding that is not public or available to the public." Another comment in the Restatement urges that the doctrine be extended to cover any meeting of public concern.' However, this idea has met with criticism. One commentator has suggested that the Restatement does not accurately define the privilege, but extends it well beyond the boundaries accepted by American courts. F. Harper, F. James and O. Gray, The Law of Torts § 5.24 (2d Ed.1986). Furthermore, no court, until today, has extended it to this level.