Court Opinion

ID: 9797152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:14:29.294818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:48.336302
License: Public Domain

Greene, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent, conceding that the undisputed facts of this appeal present a close and difficult question. Where there is no dispute as to the material facts and the legality of the search is a pure legal question under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and related statutory restrictions, I believe an appellate court must be convinced that the State has born its substantial burden of proving the lawfulness of the search and seizure; thus, I believe that extremely close cases must be resolved against the State. See State v. Shelton, 278 Kan. 287, 292, 93 P.3d 1200 (2004).
*295I would initiate an analysis of the legality of the pat-down search of Fewell with an emphasis on some black-letter principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Probable cause to search an automobile does not automatically warrant the search of an occupant of the automobile. State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. 271, 276-78, 64 P.3d 419 (2003) (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586, 92 L. Ed. 210, 68 S. Ct. 222 [1948]). The search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized to that person and cannot be avoided by simply pointing out that there is probable cause to search or seize another person. State v. Anderson, 34 Kan. App. 2d 375, 390, 119 P.3d 1171 (2005), aff'd 281 Kan. 896, 904-06, 136 P.3d 406 (2006) (Court of Appeals opinion quoted with approval citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 [1979]). Exigent circumstances may not be used to support a determination of probable cause to search. State v. Ibarra, 282 Kan. 530, 553, 147 P.3d 842 (2006). In fact, there must be a clear showing of probable cause that evidence might be located on a person as a condition precedent for exigent circumstances to support a warrantless search of that person. See State v. Huff, 278 Kan. 214, 219-21, 92 P.3d 604 (2004); State v. Houze, 23 Kan. App. 2d 336, 337-40, 930 P.2d 620, rev. denied 261 Kan. 1088 (1997).
Here, there is no challenge to the stop of Fewell’s vehicle; the initial basis for the stop (speeding) and the odor of marijuana emanating from the window of the vehicle on the passenger side justified an initial investigatoiy detention of Fewell as the driver of the vehicle. That initial detention was characterized by the officer as “cooperative” and apparently consisted of significant conversation with Fewell. Notably, the officer did not indicate any concern for his safety throughout this encounter, nor did the officer indicate any independent detection of burnt marijuana odor emanating from Fewell’s person. During the conversation, Fewell implicated his passenger as the source of the burnt marijuana odor, and this justified the subsequent detention, conversation, search, and arrest of the passenger. With regard to the burnt marijuana odor, the passenger admitted, “[I]t’s all gone, I smoked it.” Despite extensive conversation with the passenger, however, the record fails to in*296dicate that the passenger in turn implicated Fewell in any criminal activity whatsoever.
After the arrest of the passenger, the officer returned to Fewell and conducted the pat-down search, again without indicating that there was any concern for his safety. After finding a knife in one of Fewell’s pockets, the officer emphasized its “danger,” but this does not support any reasonable belief by the officer that his personal safety required such search at its inception, nor did the district court so hold. Apparently, neither the majority nor I view the search as justified based on a reasonable concern for officer safety, nor should we. See State v. Davis, 28 Kan. App. 2d 75, 81, 11 P.3d 1177 (2000), rev. denied 270 Kan. 900 (2001).
At the point in the encounter where the officer decided to conduct a search of Fewell’s person, we must analyze any and all factors supporting probable cause that Fewell had engaged in criminal activity. As noted by the majority, these are: (i) the initial odor of marijuana emanating generally from the passenger side window of the vehicle; (ii) the admission of the passenger that he had smoked a “blunt” containing marijuana; and (iii) the fruits of the search of the passenger including three packages of marijuana. Can it be said that any of these factors caused any initial suspicion of Fewell’s involvement in criminal activity to “ripen” into probable cause? I respectfully suggest that the answer is clearly no because the course of the investigation led conclusively to the source of the burnt marijuana odor as the passenger. In fact, I note that it was never suggested by the officer that there was any marijuana odor emanating from Fewell’s side of the vehicle, from Fewell’s person, or from Fewell’s breath, nor was there any suggestion that Fewell had engaged in any illegal activity other than speeding. Fewell had proven cooperative, candid, and credible in assisting the officer to ascertain the source of the marijuana odor.
I would simply not reach any exigent circumstances analysis due to the lack of particularized probable cause that Fewell had engaged in any criminal conduct. Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause; probable cause demands information that is more substantial in quantity or content and, generally, requires a higher degree of reliability. See Alabama v. *297White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990). Here, the investigation resulted in lessening any suspicion that Fewell was involved in criminal activity; there was certainly no additional qualitative or quantitative evidence of his involvement. Just as in the Anderson opinions, in Kansas any reasonable suspicion at the inception of the stop that Fewell had been involved in criminal activity should have been lessened by the conclusive discovery of the source for the incriminating odor. Where there has been a singling out or incrimination of the other occupant of the car, coupled with nothing to link Fewell to the criminal activity or to show that both occupants were involved in a common enterprise of drug activity, there was no particularized probable cause to search the person of Fewell. See Anderson, 281 Kan. at 904-07. “[A] person’s mere propinquity to other independendy suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person” Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968) quoted and cited in Anderson, 281 Kan. at 905-06).
Departing from the district court’s analysis and the majority opinion, I disagree that either State v. MacDonald, 253 Kan. 320, 856 P.2d 116 (1993) or State v. Thomas, 28 Kan. App. 2d 70, 12 P.3d 420, rev. denied 270 Kan. 903 (2001), is controlling or instructive here. MacDonald merely supports the principle that the odor of marijuana, standing alone, justifies search of a vehicle; the case does not support the notion that such odor emanating from the vehicle supports probable cause to search the occupants of that vehicle. Thomas addressed a situation where the odor emanated from an individual in custody, and his search was justified in part by a detention facility's recognized security interest in preventing introduction of contraband into the facility. Because of their significant factual disparities, I would not rely on such cases here, and I respectfully suggest that the district court's exclusive rebanee on these cases to justify the search of Fewell was error.
Finally, I recognize that many other jurisdictions have held that mere odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle supports probable cause to search the occupants of the vehicle. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St. 3d 47, 52-53, 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000), cert. *298denied 532 U.S. 908 (2001). Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has yet to so hold. Indeed, I fear that the majority opinion in this appeal will be cited as endorsing such a rule in Kansas, when the facts here do not merit such a broad interpretation of the majority’s opinion. I share the sentiments of the dissenters from other jurisdictions who have expressed concern that allowing unrestricted warrantless searches of individuals based on the uncorroborated detection of a general marijuana odor from a vehicle may open the door for government abuse. See, e.g., Moore, 90 Ohio St. 3d at 54 (Pfeifer and Douglas, JJ., dissenting in part); People v. Stout, 106 Ill. 2d 77, 88-90, 477 N.E.2d 498 (1985) (Simon, J., dissenting).
I would conclude that the district court erred in denying Fewell’s motion to suppress, thus requiring that this court reverse his conviction.