Court Opinion

ID: 9919119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 16:04:19.783012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:48.460717
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed January 17, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1564
                       Lower Tribunal No. 11-24918
                          ________________

            Citizens Property Insurance Corporation,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                         Jose Zamanillo, et al.,
                                 Appellees.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Pedro P.
Echarte, Jr., Judge.

     Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP, and Scot E. Samis and
C. Ryan Jones (St. Petersburg), for appellant.

      Alvarez, Feltman, Da Silva & Costa, P.L., and Paul B. Feltman and
Brian C. Costa, for appellees.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and BOKOR, JJ.

     BOKOR, J.
      It surprises no one that a trial court can’t grant or deny summary

judgment    by    weighing    admissible     evidence    or    making    credibility

determinations. 1 But on appeal, that’s exactly what Citizens suggests the

trial court should have done. Here, Citizens argues, despite any dispute in

the summary judgment record, that the Zamanillos’ (or their expert’s) version

of events isn’t believable, and for that reason the trial court should have

denied summary judgment.          We’ve moved beyond a scintilla of doubt

sometimes being sufficient to defeat summary judgment in Florida by

adopting the federal summary judgment standard.               If there’s a genuine

dispute, based on admissible summary judgment evidence, over a material

issue of fact, a trial court can’t usurp the fact finder’s ultimate role. But absent

contradictory or conflicting statements or evidence, an argument that a

witness simply isn’t believable, or a jury possibly could find differently—

without pointing to disputed facts in the record—isn’t enough to create an

issue of material fact.

      This case has a long and convoluted procedural history.                  The

Zamanillos filed a breach of contract action in 2011 for a claim arising in

1
  See Garcia v. First Cmty. Ins. Co., 241 So. 3d 254, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
(“Of particular relevance here, ‘[i]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
the court may neither adjudge the credibility of the witnesses nor weigh the
evidence.’”) (citing Sierra v. Shevin, 767 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d DCA
2000)).

                                         2
2010, based on home damages including an allegedly unusable bathroom.

Theories of liability changed over time as to how the bathroom was damaged

(from sinkholes to structural settling and sudden collapse), and the trial court

conducted a Daubert 2 hearing and entered a final summary judgment in favor

of Citizens, only to be reversed by this court. 3 Fast forward to 2022, and the

trial court hears the Zamanillos’ final summary judgment motion. In support,

the Zamanillos offer testimony that the toilet doesn’t flush, the shower leaks,

and the bathroom door opens and closes only with significant force. The

Zamanillos combine that evidence with their expert’s testimony that, based

on testing and observations, this portion of the premises suffered a

contractually-covered sudden collapse. 4           Without getting into details

unnecessary for the legal principle at issue here, Citizens contends that the

expert’s testimony is ripe for cross-examination, and further, that a jury could

conclude that a bathroom with a slow or clogged toilet and a hopelessly leaky

shower could still be occupied and used by, say, someone that needs to use

the mirror or vanity or bathroom sink.

2
  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3
  Zamanillo v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 299 So. 3d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).
4
  The relevant policy provision defines collapse to mean “an abrupt falling
down or caving in of . . . any part of a building with the result that . . . any part
of the building cannot be occupied for its intended purpose.”

                                         3
      Citizens’ argument fails for two reasons.        First, Citizens offered

argument, but no evidence. It didn’t offer a contradictory expert report or any

evidence to create an issue of fact regarding the Zamanillos’ contention,

buttressed by their expert, that the toilet and shower didn’t work. While a

jury may be free to weigh expert testimony—indeed, a jury may weigh any

testimony—a jury must have some basis in the evidence presented to reject

the testimony. See Weygant v. Fort Myers Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 640 So. 2d

1092, 1093–94 (Fla. 1994) (holding that it was within jury's province to reject

uncontroverted medical testimony where the plaintiff gave conflicting

testimony in a workers' compensation hearing and gave confusing medical

histories raising the possibility that their medical opinions were based on

inaccurate predicates). Perhaps the expert’s testimony was lacking, ripe for

a battle of the experts, or another Daubert hearing, but here, we have nothing

in the record to create an issue of fact.

      Second, Citizens argues that on the record, a jury could still conclude

that the collapsed bathroom could “be occupied for its intended purpose”

because someone could use the sink or the vanity. The less said about this

argument the better, other than to note that this argument probably wouldn’t

fly under the old scintilla standard, either. No reasonable fact finder could

conclude that a bathroom that one can barely enter and can use only the

                                       4
vanity and mirror in but not the toilet or shower, would be considered fit for

its intended purpose. See, e.g., In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc.

1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 193 (Fla. 2020) (“If the evidence [presented by the

nonmovant] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary

judgment may be granted.”) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986)). Because there’s no triable issue of fact, on the

record before us, final summary judgment was appropriately granted to the

Zamanillos.

      Affirmed.

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