Court Opinion

ID: 9953421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 05:06:19.741943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:18.354399
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                     March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   9:15 a.m.

v                                                                    No. 366417
                                                                     Marquette Circuit Court
CARMEN CHIRL TOLONEN,                                                LC No. 2019-058321-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and K. F. KELLY and MURRAY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i).
The trial court deferred the proceedings and placed defendant on probation under MCL 333.7411.
After the probationary term expired, the trial court determined that defendant had violated the
terms of her probation, and it revoked her deferred-adjudication status and entered a judgment of
sentence. Defendant now appeals by leave granted. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we
affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

       Defendant was charged with multiple drug-possession offenses after police officers
discovered various drug paraphernalia, two of which contained residue of drugs, when they
searched her backpack during a traffic stop. Defendant and the prosecutor reached a plea
agreement under which, in exchange for defendant pleading guilty to possession of
methamphetamine, the remaining charge would be dismissed.1 The trial court accepted
defendant’s guilty plea. At sentencing on October 16, 2019, all of the parties agreed that defendant
was a good candidate for sentencing pursuant to MCL 333.7411(1), which allows a trial court to

1
  The remaining charge that was dismissed was possession of less than 25 grams of a controlled
substance, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v). Several other charges in Lower Court Docket Nos. 18-1872-
FH and 18-5571-SI were also dismissed in exchange for defendant’s guilty plea. Lower Court
Docket Nos. 18-1872-FH and 18-5571-SI are not at issue on appeal.

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place an offender on probation and defer entering an adjudication of guilt in cases involving certain
controlled substance offenses. On October 22, 2019, the trial court issued orders placing defendant
on probation for 12 months and deferring an adjudication of guilt in accordance with MCL
333.7411. On November 5, 2020, upon the request of defendant’s probation officer, the trial court
issued an order extending the term of defendant’s probation by 12 months.

        On February 1, 2021, defendant’s probation officer filed a request and summons for
probation violation, alleging that defendant violated the terms of her probation by failing to report
to him on January 12, 2021. Soon after, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the alleged probation
violation and discharge her from probation. Relying on People v Vanderpool, 505 Mich 391; 952
NW2d 414 (2020), defendant argued that the trial court did not have continued jurisdiction to
extend her probation because her probation period had expired prior to the court’s order attempting
to amend it, so she was no longer on probation after October 22, 2020, and was therefore no longer
required to report to her probation officer. Defendant argued that, because it no longer had
jurisdiction, the trial court was obligated to discharge her from probation and dismiss her
possession charge. In its response, the prosecution argued that Vanderpool was distinguishable
because defendant had been placed on probation with a deferred sentence pursuant to MCL
333.7411(1), whereas the defendant in Vanderpool had been sentenced and subsequently placed
on probation pursuant to MCL 771.1. The prosecution further asserted that defendant was not
automatically entitled to a dismissal of her charge under MCL 333.7411 merely because her
probationary period had expired.

        After several hearings were held to address the issue, all of the parties agreed that, pursuant
to Vanderpool, 505 Mich at 397, 403-405, the trial court did not have continued jurisdiction to
modify defendant’s probationary period after the fixed probationary term had expired and, as a
result, could not proceed on the January 2021 probation violation. However, the trial court
concluded that it maintained jurisdiction to proceed with sentencing pursuant to MCL 333.7411(1),
reasoning that MCL 333.7411 “contemplate[d] continued jurisdiction such that some action is
necessary to close the matter, either a dismissal or a non-dismissal and an entry of a conviction.”
The court, after reviewing the evidence of defendant’s noncompliance with the original probation
order, held that defendant did not comply with the terms of probation and adjudicated her guilty.2

       This appeal followed.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

        Resolution of the issue on appeal hinges on the interpretation of MCL 333.4711. “This
Court reviews de novo questions of both statutory interpretation and constitutional law.”
Vanderpool, 505 Mich at 397 (citations omitted). “The purpose of statutory interpretation is to
give effect to the intent of the Legislature. If a statute is clear, we enforce it as plainly written.
However, if a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we must engage in judicial

2
 Defendant failed to appear at the June 3, 2021 hearing as well as a subsequent hearing on June
25, 2021, so the trial court issued a bench warrant. Defendant was not arrested on the bench
warrant until December 7, 2022.

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construction and interpret the statute.” People v Parker, 319 Mich App 410, 414; 901 NW2d 632
(2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        As in the trial court, on appeal defendant argues that the trial court no longer had
jurisdiction after her probationary period expired on October 22, 2020, and therefore did not have
the authority to discharge her unsuccessfully from probation and enter an adjudication of guilt on
December 20, 2022. Instead, pursuant to Vanderpool, the trial court was automatically required
to discharge defendant from probation and dismiss the charges against her in accordance with
MCL 333.7411(1).

       MCL 333.7411(1) permits a trial court to defer entering a judgment of guilt while placing
a defendant on probation in cases involving certain controlled substances, and it provides:

               When an individual who has not previously been convicted of an offense
       under this article or under any statute of the United States or of any state relating to
       narcotic drugs, coca leaves, marihuana, or stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
       drugs, pleads guilty to or is found guilty of possession of a controlled substance
       under section [MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v)], [MCL 333.7403(2)(b), (c), or (d)], or of
       use of a controlled substance under [MCL 333.7404], or possession or use of an
       imitation controlled substance under [MCL 333.7341] for a second time, the court,
       without entering a judgment of guilt with the consent of the accused, may defer
       further proceedings and place the individual on probation upon terms and
       conditions that shall include, but are not limited to, payment of a probation
       supervision fee as prescribed in section 3c of chapter XI of the code of criminal
       procedure, 1927 PA 175, MCL 771.3c. The terms and conditions of probation may
       include participation in a drug treatment court under chapter 10A of the revised
       judicature act of 1961, 1961 PA 236, MCL 600.1060 to 600.1084. Upon violation
       of a term or condition, the court may enter an adjudication of guilt and proceed as
       otherwise provided. Upon fulfillment of the terms and conditions, the court shall
       discharge the individual and dismiss the proceedings. Discharge and dismissal
       under this section shall be without adjudication of guilt and, except as otherwise
       provided by law, is not a conviction for purposes of this section or for purposes of
       disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime,
       including the additional penalties imposed for second or subsequent convictions
       under [MCL 333.7413]. There may be only 1 discharge and dismissal under this
       section as to an individual.

In Vanderpool, 505 Mich at 404, the Court held that a trial court may modify a term of probation
by either extending or discharging the term, but it must do so before the term of probation expires.
If a trial court fails to extend the term of probation on or before its expiration date, then probation
terminates and the trial court has no continued authority to modify it. Id. at 403-405.

       The text of MCL 333.7411 does not address how a trial court must proceed if the
probationary period expires before it determines whether an adjudication of guilt is warranted.
Moreover, the holding in Vanderpool, see 505 Mich at 395, 397-398, specifically relates to terms
of probation imposed pursuant to MCL 771.1, under which a defendant’s guilt has already been
adjudicated before the probationary period begins; it does not address probation pursuant to MCL

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333.7411, under which a defendant’s guilt has not been adjudicated prior to or during the
probationary period. This Court, however, has previously interpreted MCL 333.7411 and
explained how deferral and probation under the statute operates:

               In deferral proceedings under MCL 333.7411(1), an individual either pleads
       guilty or is found guilty of certain controlled substance offenses. The trial court
       does not adjudicate guilt when the plea is tendered. Instead, the trial court defers
       proceedings and places the individual on probation. If the individual complies with
       the terms of probation, the trial court discharges the individual without an
       adjudication of guilt and dismisses the proceedings. If the individual fails to fulfill
       the terms of probation, the trial court enters an adjudication of guilt. [People v
       Benjamin, 283 Mich App 526, 530; 769 NW2d 748 (2009).]

See also Carr v Midland Co Concealed Weapons Licensing Bd, 259 Mich App 428, 432-433, 435;
674 NW2d 709 (2003). “The apparent purpose of the statute is to grant trial courts discretion to
provide an ultimately noncriminal sanction for first-time offenders who commit less serious drug
crimes.” People v Ware, 239 Mich App 437, 441; 608 NW2d 94 (2000).

        We conclude that the trial court maintained jurisdiction over defendant after the
probationary period expired and had the authority to unsuccessfully discharge defendant from
probation and enter an adjudication of guilt. While the trial court could no longer modify
defendant’s term of probation after October 22, 2020, unlike the defendant in Vanderpool,
defendant’s case had not been adjudicated; rather, adjudication had been deferred so that defendant
could participate in a probation program pursuant to MCL 333.7411(1). See Vanderpool, 505
Mich at 403-405. Although the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify defendant’s term of
probation, the trial court was still required to determine whether defendant was entitled to receive
the intended benefit of MCL 333.7411(1): discharge from probation and dismissal of the charge.

        Defendant contends that because the trial court was required to discharge her from
probation, it was also required to dismiss her charge. Defendant fails to acknowledge, however,
that whether she obtained a dismissal was contingent on her successful completion of probation.
See Benjamin, 283 Mich App at 530; Carr, 259 Mich App at 432-433, 435. MCL 333.4711(1)
required the trial court to first determine whether defendant had fulfilled the terms of her probation
during the 12-month period before it could either dismiss the charge or enter an adjudication of
guilt. The trial court determined that defendant had failed to fulfill the terms of her probation and,
pursuant to MCL 333.4711(1), a guilty plea “will automatically result in a conviction and
sentencing upon failure by the defendant to successfully complete the program[.]” Carr, 259 Mich
App at 435. To dismiss the charge despite defendant’s failure to comply with the terms of her
probation would contradict the clear intent of MCL 333.7411 and grant defendant a significant
benefit that she did not actually earn. See Carr, 259 Mich App at 432-433, 435; Benjamin, 283
Mich App at 530.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                              /s/ Christopher M. Murray

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