Court Opinion

ID: 9778082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:31:39.24053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:03.547427
License: Public Domain

*852BLACKMAR, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I am unable to concur in the assessment of a death sentence in this case because of the admission of the testimony that the victim had said that she was afraid of the defendant.
I quite agree that, to the extent the victim’s state of mind is material, her own declarations may be admitted under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. My problem is that I am unable to see how her testimony that she feared the victim has any tendency to support an inference that he killed her. The statement has the vices of hearsay in that it cannot possibly be pierced by cross-examination. See United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 778 (D.C.Cir.1974); State v. Miller, 664 S.W.2d 229 (Mo.App.1983).
The state glibly cites State v. Ford, 639 S.W.2d 573 (Mo.1982); State v. Jackson, 663 S.W.2d 312 (Mo.App.1983) and State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410 (Mo.App.1979) for the general proposition that the victim’s state of mind is relevant. None is in point. Ford and Jackson involved claims of self-defense in which the court felt that the testimony of fear had a tendency to demonstrate that the victim was not an aggressor. Singh included a statement that the victim feared guns, by reason of which the jury might think it unlikely that she had taken up a firearm.
Here the defendant tendered a theory of accidental discharge not occasioned by the actions of the victim. The victim’s statement about fear of the defendant does not logically refute this claim. The prejudicial effect in suggesting deliberation, premeditation, and possible disposition toward violence is made manifest. The principal opinion suggests that admission was a matter of discretion. Because there is no justifiable reason for admitting the evidence, any discretion was abused.
I am very much inclined to believe that the error did not prejudice the finding of guilty and that the conviction need not be reversed. I also believe that, if we are to have a death penalty, the death sentence is not disproportionate to the cases cited in the principal opinion nor to State v. Johns, 679 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. banc 1984), even though there are quite a few more aggravated cases in which death was not decreed. When the state seeks the ultimate penalty, however, this Court should take a strict view of trial error. I would therefore set aside the death sentence and would remand the case for a new trial on the punishment phase, or for resentencing, such as the state might elect.