Court Opinion

ID: 9538943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:44:18.604616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:17.824409
License: Public Domain

Prager, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which reverses the district court in its award of custody of the two minor children to the father. In awarding custody to the mother in this case we have departed from our customary role as an appellate court and have assumed the role of a trial judge by weighing testimony and substituting our judgment for that of the trial court. The evidence at the trial disclosed a clear-cut issue of fact as to the capacity of Mrs. St. Clair to provide for the emotional development of the children. There was much testimony as to bizarre conduct on the part of Mrs. St. Clair over an extended period of time. In addition, two qualified physicians testified that in their best judgment it would not be conducive to the good emotional development of the children for Mrs. St. Clair to have their custody. I refer specifically to the testimony of Dr. Frank O’Connell who delivered both of the St. Clair children and was the family doctor of the St. Clairs for a number of years. At the trial Dr. O’Connell testified as to Mrs. St. Clair’s emotional problems and concluded without reservations that Mrs. St. Clair’s taking care of the children would not be conducive to their good emotional development. In addition, there was the testimony of Dr. Warren L. Phillips, president of the Kansas Psychiatric Association. At the trial in December 1970 he testified that he had interviewed Mrs. St. Clair as recently as three months before the trial in September in three separate' interviews. He was of the opinion that in September 1970 she was functioning as an obsessive-compulsive personality and that in his opinion it would not be for the best intrests of the children for Mrs. St. Clair to have their custody.
The trial court had the burden of resolving one of its most difficult problems, to determine custody of minor children. The trial court had the highly important advantage over this court, which we have so often been compelled to recognize and state, of seeing the parties, observing their demeanor, assessing their character, weighing their testimony and considering the best interests of the children under all the circumstances. We have only the cold narrative of printed *503facts before us. It alone cannot possibly adequately portray the whole picture as witnessed by an able and discerning trial judge, the trier of the facts. (Moloney v. Moloney, 167 Kan. 444, 448, 206 P. 2d 1076.)
By reversing the order of custody we, of necessity, hold that notwithstanding the highly important advantage the trial court had over this court that court acted arbitrarily and not in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. In my judgment a careful analysis and review of the entire record does not permit us to reach that conclusion.
For these reasons I would affirm the judgment of the trial court awarding custody of the two boys to their father.
Fontron and Fromme, JJ., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.