Court Opinion

ID: 9889571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 18:01:11.772549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:17.681799
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11581    Document: 43-1     Date Filed: 10/10/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11581
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       ANTWAN GOSS,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cr-60175-WPD-1
                          ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11581

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

       PER CURIAM:
              Antwan Goss appeals his conviction for being a felon in pos-
       session of a ﬁrearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal,
       Goss asserts (1) that the district court clearly erred when it denied
       his motion to suppress evidence because, according to him, the po-
       lice oﬃcers who testiﬁed against him were not credible; (2) that, as
       a result, the oﬃcers had no factual basis for reasonably suspecting
       that he was armed and dangerous for purposes of conducting a pat-
       down search; and (3) that his ﬁrearm would not have been inevita-
       bly discovered because his warrants were non-extraditable. After
       careful review, we aﬃrm.
              The facts are known to the parties, and we repeat them here
       only as necessary to decide the case.
                                       * * *
              “Because rulings on motions to suppress evidence present
       mixed questions of law and fact, we review the district court’s fac-
       tual ﬁndings for clear error and its application of the law to the facts
       de novo.” United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (11th Cir.
       2012) (internal quotations omitted). The facts are construed in fa-
       vor of the party that prevailed below, and we aﬀord substantial def-
       erence to the factﬁnder’s explicit and implicit credibility determina-
       tions. Id. at 1303 (citing United States v. McPhee, 366 F.3d 1269, 1275
       (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.
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       22-11581                Opinion of the Court                          3

       2002) (per curiam)). We accept the district court’s credibility deter-
       mination “unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so incon-
       sistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factﬁnder could
       accept it.” United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1255 (11th Cir. 2015)
       (internal quotations omitted). “Where there are two permissible
       views of the evidence, the factﬁnder’s choice between them cannot
       be clearly erroneous.” United States v. McPhee, 336 F.3d 1269, 1275
       (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). We have also held
       that where two police oﬃcers recall an incident diﬀerently, it is not
       clear error for the factﬁnder to credit one oﬃcer’s testimony over
       the other. See United States v. Stancil, 4 F.4th 1193, 1199 (11th Cir.
       2021) (holding that a magistrate judge was not clearly erroneous in
       crediting oﬃcers’ testimony despite inconsistencies regarding their
       positions relative to the defendant’s car), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 511
       (2021); see also United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir.
       2010) (holding that it was not clearly erroneous to credit an oﬃcer
       who remembered the smell of marijuana when another oﬃcer did
       not recall the smell).
              The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
       people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and eﬀects,
       against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
       and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S.
       Const. amend. IV. A police oﬃcer may lawfully conduct a traﬃc
       stop without a warrant if he has reasonable suspicion that the per-
       son has participated in or is about to participate in criminal activity,
       which includes minor traﬃc violations. United States v. Campbell, 26
       F.4th 860, 880 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (citing United States v.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11581

       Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003); Holeman v. City
       of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2005)), cert. denied, 143
       S. Ct. 95 (2022).
               An oﬃcer may order occupants out of a vehicle during a
       lawful traﬃc stop and conduct a limited search of an occupant’s
       outer clothing for weapons “[i]f the oﬃcer has a reasonable suspi-
       cion that the person may be armed and dangerous.” United States
       v. Bishop, 940 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Arizona v. John-
       son, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009)). Reasonable suspicion exists when “a
       reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted
       in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id.
       (internal quotations omitted). “To determine whether a suspicion
       was reasonable, we evaluate the totality of the circumstances sur-
       rounding the stop, including the collective knowledge of all oﬃcers
       involved in the stop.” Id. at 1249. An individual’s nervousness and
       criminal record are two factors that may contribute to reasonable
       suspicion. Id. at 1249. Another relevant factor is whether the in-
       vestigation takes place “in a high crime area.” Lewis, 674 F.3d at
       1309 (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); United States
       v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 755–56 (11th Cir. 2000)).
              Generally, evidence obtained by unconstitutional means is
       inadmissible because it is “the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Cf.
       Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). But where the
       evidence “inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,”
       this exclusionary rule doesn’t apply. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
       444 (1984).
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       22-11581                Opinion of the Court                          5

              Here, the district court did not err in denying Goss’s motion
       to suppress. See Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1302–03. First, the district court’s
       factual ﬁndings were based on its determination that O’Hara and
       Ventura—the arresting oﬃcers here—were credible, and there is
       nothing in the record to warrant reversal of that credibility ﬁnding.
       See Holt, 777 F.3d at 1255. Moreover, their testimony presented
       “two permissible views of the evidence,” such that the district
       court’s “choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”
       McPhee, 336 F.3d at 1275 (internal quotations omitted).
              Any discrepancies between O’Hara’s and Ventura’s testi-
       mony relate to a rapidly evolving interaction that lasted “mere
       minutes.” In this context, such inconsistencies do not overcome
       the “substantial deference” aﬀorded to the district court’s credibil-
       ity determinations. Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1303 (citing McPhee, 366 F.3d
       at 1275; Floyd, 281 F.3d at 1349). The district court’s resolutions of
       purported discrepancies here were not “contrary to the laws of na-
       ture” or “so inconsistent or improbable” that no reasonable fact-
       ﬁnder could accept the testimony. Holt, 777 F.3d at 1255 (internal
       quotations omitted). To be sure, Goss’ girlfriend, Qwanesia Mitch-
       ell—who was on the phone with Goss for a majority of the traﬃc
       stop—presented an alternate, credible perspective. But her testi-
       mony as to what she heard on the phone does not invalidate
       O’Hara’s and Ventura’s testimony regarding their visual observa-
       tions of Goss’s nervous behavior. McPhee, 336 F.3d at 1275.
              Second, the district court did not clearly err in concluding
       that “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11581

       warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in dan-
       ger.” Bishop, 940 F.3d at 1248 (internal quotations omitted The
       court credited O’Hara’s testimony that Goss consented to the re-
       quest to lift his shirt. Accordingly, once O’Hara saw the bulge in
       Goss’s waistband, it was reasonable to suspect that Goss was armed
       and dangerous, and a pat-down search was therefore justiﬁed.
       Bishop, 940 F.3d at 1248 (citing Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327). The dis-
       trict court also correctly determined, in the alternative, that even if
       the pat-down search was not consensual, it would have been justi-
       ﬁed because Goss was stopped in a high-crime area, appeared nerv-
       ous, and had a criminal history. Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1309 (citing Ward-
       low, 528 U.S. at 124; Gordon, 231 F.3d at 56)); Bishop, 940 F.3d at 1249.
              Third and ﬁnally, we needn’t reach the question whether the
       ﬁrearm would have inevitably been discovered; because there was
       no Fourth Amendment violation, the exclusionary rule does not
       apply. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488; Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444
       (1984).
            For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is
       AFFIRMED.