Court Opinion

ID: 9629233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:39:30.716489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:17.106180
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Justice
(dissenting):
I dissent from the majority opinion. Initially, I do not perceive the distinction that the majority makes between the Federal and Arizona tests for determining the validity of an investigative detention. The majority opinion seems to assert that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), only requires an officer to perceive unusual circumstances before he makes an investigative detention. The majority opinion states that Terry “did not hold that some indication that the activity is related to crime was an essential ingredient of the test of the police action.” This is not the case.
The holding of Terry, supra, is couched in the following terms:
“We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot * * (Emphasis added.) 88 S.Ct. at 1884.
Terry also states that:
“ * * * a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible] criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” (Emphasis added.) 88 S.Ct. at 1880.
Therefore, even under the Federal test, the unusual or suspicious conduct that an officer stops to investigate must be unusual or suspicious, because it relates to possible crime.
The recent United States Supreme Court opinion in Brown v. Texas, No. 77-6673, (U.S. Supreme Court, June 25, 1979), reiterates this requirement that the unusual or suspicious activity which prompts an investigative detention, must relate to possible crime. In that case, defendant Brown was stopped by two police officers, because he was in an area known for its high incidence of drug traffic, because he looked suspicious, and because the officers had never seen him in the area before. When Mr. Brown refused to tell the officers his name, he was arrested for violating a Texas law that made it a crime to not give your name and address to an officer who lawfully stopped and requested the information. The Supreme Court held that application of the Texas statute to the defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights, because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe that he was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct.
The majority opinion cites Brown, supra, for the proposition that a balancing need be done “to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasion solely at the unfettered discretion of officers.” Seemingly, the majority has neglected to notice that Brown, supra, also states that “[i]n the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest and appellant’s right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference.” Brown v. Texas, - U.S. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 2641.
In State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332, 553 P.2d 1206 (1976), and State v. Hocker, 113 Ariz. *313450, 556 P.2d 784 (1976), we adopted the same type of test as Terry, supra, and Brown, supra, citing Irwin v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 1 Cal.3d 423, 82 Cal.Rptr. 484, 462 P.2d 12 (1969):
“There must be a reasonable suspicion by the law enforcement officer that ‘some activity out of the ordinary’ is or has occurred, some suggestion to connect the detained person with the unusual activity, and some indication that the activity is related to crime.” State v. Hocker, 113 Ariz. 450, 457, 556 P.2d 784, 791.
The California Supreme Court has subsequently rejected dictum in Irwin, supra, which stated that the suspicious events must not be as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity. In re Tony C., 21 Cal.3d 888, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957 (1978). That case, however, did not overrule Irwin and stated that the holding of Irwin was not based upon the dictum. Although this Court cited Irwin in both Fortier and Hocker, we have never adopted the above dictum.
I, therefore, disagree that Fortier and Hocker must be overruled. The distinction that the majority opinion trys to make between Terry and these cases simply does not exist. Moreover, the majority is offering law enforcement false security when it states that “[w]e do not believe that an officer, when he commences an investigation, need be convinced that ‘criminal activity is afoot.’ ” Neither the Arizona, California nor United States Supreme Court cases require that an officer be convinced that criminal activity is afoot before he makes an investigatory check.
The officer may start any surveillance that he chooses, on the basis of suspicious or even innocent-appearing activities, and he may maintain this check or surveillance as long as he wishes. The cases do not in the slightest deter him from doing this. Instead, they merely deter the police officer from either arresting or temporarily detaining a person, or from' searching or seizing his possessions before the officer has formed a founded articulable suspicion that some criminal activity is afoot and that the person is in some way connected to that activity. If his suspicion is “reasonable,” within an objective definition of what a reasonable person under the same situation would perceive, Terry, supra then and only then, may the officer intrude upon the privacy of a person, which is afforded by the United States and Arizona constitutions.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that an officer needs to be able to stop and question an individual about unusual activity that does not somehow indicate to the officer that “criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry, supra. After coming to this conclusion, however, and overruling Hocker, supra, and Fortier, supra, in the process, the majority then attempts to justify the arresting officer’s actions under the very standard that is articulated in these cases. The majority seems to suggest that potential criminal activity was afoot and does so by stating that “[sjince the vehicle appeared to be abandoned, there was a reasonable suspicion that it could have been stolen.” This is a misstatement of the facts. The “reasonable suspicion” that the car could have been stolen is not logically inferable from any view of the record in this case.
At the motion to suppress, the arresting officer indicated that he had received no reports of stolen vehicles, or any other type of disturbance in the area. Moreover, he testified that he had no idea why the truck was there when he went to investigate it; he just wanted to see what was going on. The defendant explained to the officer why he left the vehicle unattended and showed his license to prove he was of drinking age. There is not even any reason to believe that the driver acted intoxicated or that the officer suspected him of drunk driving. The officer merely thought he smelled liquor on the defendant’s breath and checked to see if he was of drinking age. Moreover, the defendant’s vehicle was parked approximately one fourth mile from a restaurant that was owned and operated by his parents, and may actually have been located on land that belonged to the driver’s father.
Although the majority of this Court may have suspected under these circumstances *314that this was a stolen vehicle, that is not the proper test of the officer’s actions under either state or federal case law. The test is whether the officer suspected that the vehicle was stolen and whether his suspicion was reasonable, when weighed against what a reasonable person with similar experience would have suspected under those circumstances. Terry, supra. The arresting officer in this case never testified that he suspected the vehicle to be stolen. He stated that he approached the vehicle “because it’s a little strange at 1:40 a. m. in the morning to have a vehicle sitting out in the desert.” An officer cannot make an investigatory detention simply because it is 1:40 a. m. This might be an infringement on defendant’s fundamental right to travel, which is not limited to daytime hours. The suspicious activities that an officer can investigate must be more than the wanderings of an insomniac, or one who works night shift at a restaurant in the desert.
The officer’s request to see the defendant’s registration was based on nothing more than an “inarticulate hunch.” The United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to sanction such actions. Terry, supra. Because of the absence of any facts that would indicate that “criminal activity may be afoot,” Terry, supra, the check of the car’s registration, as an investigative search, violated the requirements of Arizona and Federal law.
The real issue in this case is whether the officer legitimately asked to see the defendant’s registration, pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-305(D), which states that a car’s registration is subject to inspection by members of the highway patrol or any peace officer.
In State v. Ochoa, 112 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d 1097 (1976), however, we held that officers may not randomly stop vehicles to inspect for vehicle registrations. We stated that:
“[A.R.S. § 28-305(D) does not authorize] the stopping of travelers upon public highways for the purpose of ascertaining whether the driver is violating the law. In this we think there is a valid distinction between a stop made for the purpose of investigating a crime already known to have been committed and a stop for the purpose of discovering crime in the first instance.” (Emphasis added.) Ochoa, 112 Ariz. 582 at 584, 544 P.2d 1097 at 1099.
See also State v. Villagrana, 115 Ariz. 285, 564 P.2d 1252 (App.1977); State v. Gutierrez, 27 Ariz.App. 226, 553 P.2d 1211 (1976).
The issue before this Court, then, is whether A.R.S. § 28-305(D) can be used to “discover crime in the first instance,” after a legitimate investigation of a stopped vehicle has failed to reveal any potential criminal activity. For the very reasons that we discussed in Ochoa, I see no reason for making such a distinction. If an officer cannot use this statute to stop a car for the purpose of discovering crime, there is also no reason why he should be able to use it to ferret out crimes that may involve a stopped car.1
“[The Constitution protects] travelers upon the public highways from harassment by government agents if there is no basis to support a founded suspicion of criminal activity. Founded suspicion requires some reasonable ground for singling out a person as one who was involved or about to be involved in criminal activity.” Ochoa, 112 Ariz. 582 at 584, 544 P.2d 1097 at 1099.
I believe that the Court of Appeals opinion properly disposed of this case. I would, therefore, have denied review of the Court of Appeals opinion.

. At the motion to suppress, the arresting officer testified that although he asked to see the defendant’s car registration he does not recall looking at it once he saw the marijuana. It is clear to me that this officer was not in good faith checking the registration of a potentially stolen vehicle, but was simply using the request for registration as a pretext to discover crime in the first instance. This conduct was disapproved by the Court of Appeals in State v. Rosenberg, 24 Ariz.App. 341, 538 P.2d 770 (1975).