Court Opinion

ID: 9893356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 18:00:46.376338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:30.791342
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          OCT 26 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AREGINA VAHANYAN, et al.,                        Nos. 21-590, 22-1043

             Petitioners,                        Agency No. A075-621-602

                                v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                    Argued and Submitted October 6, 2023
                          San Francisco, California

Before: W. FLETCHER, TALLMAN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

      Aregina Vahanyan and her son, Armen Vahanyan, (collectively, “the

Vahanyans”) petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)

dismissal of their appeal. The Vahanyans are natives of the former Soviet Union.

Aregina claims statelessness, and Armen is a citizen of Armenia. In 2004, an

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Immigration Judge (“IJ”) revoked Aregina and Armen’s asylum status after they

admitted lead petitioner Aregina had submitted a fraudulent asylum application

in 1998. The BIA subsequently adopted and affirmed the IJ’s finding of a

frivolous asylum bar and denied the Vahanyans’ motion to remand based on

ineffective assistance of counsel and subsequent motion to reconsider. Matter of

Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994). The Vahanyans now petition for

review, alleging the BIA erred in 1) finding that Aregina knowingly filed a

frivolous asylum application, subjecting her to the frivolous asylum bar; 2)

dismissing their due process claims; and 3) denying their ineffective assistance

of counsel claims. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount

them here. We deny the petitions.

      1. The BIA did not err in concluding that lead petitioner Aregina Vahanyan

had knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application, barring her from the benefits

of asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6). Ahir v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 912, 916 (9th

Cir. 2008). There is no dispute that Aregina’s second asylum application was

fraudulent. Aregina argues, however, that the IJ’s frivolousness finding was

improper because her 1995 application lacked a written warning as to the

consequences for filing a fraudulent application, and the warning in her 1998

application was not read to her in her native language before signing. Simply

put, she asserts the frivolous filing bar should not apply to her because she did

not understand the consequences of lying to the United States Government to

obtain immigration benefits.
                                       2
                                                                21-590, 22-1043
      We review the BIA’s denial of asylum for substantial evidence. Guo v.

Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2018). Here, substantial evidence

supports the BIA’s finding that Aregina knowingly submitted a fraudulent asylum

application. Aregina signed her 1998 application, which contained a bold-font

warning informing her of the frivolous asylum bar, using her fraudulent name.

      The 1998 application lists a preparer from an immigration rights center,

states that a translator was present, and was signed before an asylum officer

attesting that Aregina ratified the truth of her application and confirmed her

understanding of the document in his presence. The Vahanyans offer no proof to

counter these facts but instead ask the court to rely solely on Aregina’s insistence

that she was not made aware of the consequences.1 Even if we viewed Aregina’s

testimony as credible, and considered that no adverse credibility finding was

made, substantial evidence would still support the BIA’s finding that Aregina was

aware that she was filing a fraudulent asylum application. See Garland v. Ming

Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1680 (2021) (“Even if the BIA treats an alien’s evidence as

credible, the agency need not find his evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet

the burden of proof.”). Based on the record before us, substantial evidence

supports the BIA’s decision.

1
  Petitioners attempt to bolster the argument that Aregina did not receive notice
by additionally challenging 1) the BIA’s proper burden shifting to Aregina once
a preemptive determination was made; 2) the fact the IJ did not make an explicit
adverse credibility finding; and 3) that the evidence does not include direct
testimony from the interviewing asylum officer stating he read her this notice.
These assertions are not supported by the record.
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                                                                21-590, 22-1043
      2. Moreover, the BIA did not err in dismissing the Vahanyans’ due process

claims. Derivative petitioner Armen did not raise the issue of due process

violations when he appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA. The Government properly

objected to this issue being raised here. See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S.

411, 417–20 (2023). An applicant’s failure to properly raise an issue to the BIA

generally constitutes a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, thus precluding

us from considering the issue. See Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 942,

948 (9th Cir. 2021); Sekiya v. Gates, 508 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2007).

      As for Aregina’s due process claims, the BIA did not err in finding that

Aregina failed to establish prejudice.     To warrant remand for due process

violations, we look to see if the errors asserted made the “proceeding . . . ‘so

fundamentally unfair’ that [Aregina] ‘was prevented from reasonably presenting

[her] case.’” Yang v. Rosen, 840 F. App’x 131, 132 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rizo

v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 2016)); see also Grigoryan v. Barr, 959

F.3d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 2020).

      Here, Aregina asserts her due process rights were violated because 1) the

Immigration Court could not locate transcripts for her removal proceedings

between 2004 and 2010; and 2) the IJ admitted Exhibit 6, her original 1995

asylum application and denial, without proper certification of chain of custody.2

2
 Aregina did not raise a due process claim for Exhibit 8 on appeal to the BIA,
which the Government properly objected to before us. The issue is thus waived.
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. at 423 (2023).
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                                                              21-590, 22-1043
However, she cannot establish prejudice—neither issue would have impacted

Aregina’s removal proceedings in a manner so fundamentally unfair that it

prevented her from presenting her case.

      Taking Aregina’s statements as true, little happened in her removal

proceedings between 2004 and 2010, as Aregina and her husband were both ill

and the IJ repeatedly waived her presence when continuing proceedings.

Substantive removal proceedings did not occur until 2013 when the DHS filed

Form I-261. Moreover, the inclusion of Exhibit 6, which both parties recognize

to be the Vahanyans’ truthful first application and subsequent DHS denial letter,

were not the source of the court’s frivolous asylum application finding. The

source of the frivolous asylum bar is Aregina’s second 1998 asylum application,

in which she provided false names and a false narrative of alleged persecution.

Exclusion of Exhibit 6 would not have changed the results of the proceedings.

See Loomba v. Holder, 391 F. App’x 588, 589 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding no

prejudicial effect). Accordingly, Aregina did not establish prejudice sufficient to

overturn the BIA decision.

      3. Finally, the BIA did not err in denying the Vahanyans’ motion to remand

for ineffective assistance of counsel. 3 “Ineffective assistance of counsel in a

deportation proceeding is a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment if

3
  Armen did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim prior to this
appeal. This claim is waived as to Armen. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S.
at 423 (2023).
                                      5
                                                             21-590, 22-1043
the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from

reasonably presenting his case.” Ortiz v. I.N.S., 179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.

1999) (quoting Lopez v. I.N.S., 775 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1985)). Aregina

asserts that her counsel failed “to file [an] application for adjustment of status

coupled with a fraud waiver,” thus preventing her from later pursuing that form

of relief.   The BIA denied Aregina’s motion to remand, explaining that her

former counsel “reasonably waited to file an application for adjustment of status,

in order to see if the [IJ’s] frivolous finding would pose a bar to relief.” We agree.

The tactical decision to wait to file an adjustment of status application until after

the IJ’s decision was both a subjective and strategic choice that does not display

a lack of competency. We do not have the authority to correct purely strategic

errors made by lawyers on behalf of their clients. Ortiz, 179 F.3d at 1153 (internal

citation omitted).

       PETITIONS DENIED.

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