Court Opinion

ID: 9522781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:16.715119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:55.529740
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 42. concurring. I agree with the majority opinion that decides this case more as an adequacy-of-proof case than an admissibility-of-evidence case. This is exactly how the Commissioner of Labor decided the case, because no issue of evidence admissibility was raised there.13 As the majority opinion explains, *254the evidence was inadequate to show specific causation, and summary judgment was properly granted. I cannot agree with the dissent that this Court, the superior court and the Commissioner “have exceeded their proper roles in this case and evaluated the evidence put forward by claimant to determine whether claimant should ultimately prevail on the merits.” Post, ¶ 47. I agree with the Commissioner that “it is merely possible, not probable” that claimant’s firefighter work caused his lymphoma.
¶43. I write in concurrence only to point out that this is another in the line of cases that attempts to resolve appellate jurisdiction in workers’ compensation cases based on unworkable and inconsistent distinctions. See Stoll v. Burlington Elec. Dep’t, 2009 VT 61, ¶ 11, 186 Vt. 127, 977 A.2d 1282 (Dooley, J., dissenting). The majority says that the fact that judgment was granted as a matter of law in this case does not mean the case should have been appealed to this Court under 21 V.S.A. § 672, rather than to the superior court, because the superior court’s “inquiry under Rule 702 was plainly fact-based.” Ante, ¶ 13. Whether an evidentiary ruling, or a ruling on the adequacy of the evidence to reach a fact-finder, is “fact-based” is beside the point. Since the evidentiary issue arose only during the superior court appeal, it cannot be the basis to hold that claimant should have appealed to this Court in the first instance. Moreover, even if we look at the superior court’s evidentiary ruling, that ruling is one of law — it clearly is such that our review here is a “review of questions of law.” 21 V.S.A. § 672. All evidentiary rulings are “fact-based,” but that does not make them rulings on questions of fact.
¶44. The real inquiry here should be into the nature of the Commissioner’s decision on appeal. As I noted above, the Commissioner looked at all the evidence and ruled that “it is merely possible, not probable” that claimant’s firefighter work caused his lymphoma. This ruling was the functional equivalent of granting *255judgment as a matter of law to insurer. Thus, the Commissioner was saying that even if she believed every bit of evidence offered by claimant it was not enough to get claimant over the line from possibility to probability. Just like the decision of the superior court, the Commissioner’s decision is one of law, not fact. Under Stoll, 2009 VT 61, ¶¶ 7-8, this case was appealed to the wrong court, and the appeal should be dismissed. The majority’s rationale for distinguishing Stoll and the statute puts more mud in muddy water.
¶ 45. I am concurring because, whatever the rationale for the majority’s decision, we should allow cases like this to go to the superior court and not require that they go exclusively to this Court. This ease represents some loosening of the rigid rule of Stoll; how much and in what way remains to be seen.

 There is no indication that the employer made a Dcmbert objection before the hearing officer that took the evidence for the Commissioner. Nor is there any indication whether the Commissioner would have recognized such an exception. In workers’ compensation proceedings, “process and procedure . . . shall be as summary and simple as reasonably may be.” 21 VS.A. § 602. The Administrative Procedure Act statute on rules of evidence in administrative proceedings does not apply to workers’ compensation proceedings. See 3 V.S.A. §§ 810, 816(a)(3). As *254authorized by 21 V.S.A. § 602, the Commissioner has adopted rules specifying the procedure in workers’ compensation hearings. Rule 7.1000 of the Workers’ Compensation Rules provides: “The Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Evidence as applied in Superior Court shall, in general, apply to all hearings conducted under 21 V.S.A. § 663, except as provided in these Rules, and only insofar as they do not defeat the informal nature of the hearing.” Workers’ Compensation and Occupational Disease Rule 7.1000, 3 Code of Vt. Rules 24 010 003-4, available at http://labor.vermont.gov/portals/0AVP%20Safety/Rules%20146%204%2006.pdf.