Court Opinion

ID: 9623249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:30:29.819297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:09.968219
License: Public Domain

JACOBSON, Judge,
dissenting:
This is a hard case and from such a case bad law may flow. Given the hearing officer’s determinations that the claimant now suffers from a herniated disc and that the herniation is causally connected to his prior industrial injury, an award denying him compensation would appear unjust. However, the principles of res judicata are not concerned with the justness of a given result, only with finality. Unless we are prepared to abandon those principles here, this award must be affirmed.
To put this matter in proper perspective, the key evidence involved both in the reopening hearing of 1977 (which resulted in an award denying compensation which became final) and the reopening hearing of 1978 was the interpretation of a myelogram performed by Dr. Eisenfeld on May 12, 1977. This myelogram and its accompanying report were the subjects of direct medical testimony at the first reopening hearing. At that hearing, the score was three to two — Drs. Rand, Reid and Tabor were of the opinion that the defect noted by that myelogram at the L-5,6 level of the petitioner’s spine was the result of a spondylitic ridge and was not evidence of a herniated disc; Drs. Eisenfeld and Bisla were of the opinion that this defect represented a herniated disc.
Dr. Bisla’s testimony at the first hearing is illustrative of the herniated disc school of thought:
Q. And what is the purpose of a mye-logram?
A. To rule out if there was any ruptured disc in the lower part of the back.
Q. And what did that myelogram reveal?
*446A. He had a ruptured disc in the lum-bosacral spine.
Q. Was that the myelogram performed at approximately May 12, ’77, by Dr. Eisenfeld?
A. That is correct.
Q. After you received the results of the myelogram, did that have any significance on your previous findings or previous analysis?
A. Yes, that showed that the patient’s primary problem is due to the ruptured disc in the lumbosacral spine which is producing the inflammation which is responsible for the tenderness, pain and limited range of motion.
The spondylitic ridge school of thought is represented by the testimony of Dr. Reid at that same hearing:
Q. Now, at that time do you recall reviewing a myelogram film that had been taken sometime in or about May of ’77?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Do you recall some radiological report that indicated there was a herniated disc?
A. Yes, I recall that.
Q. Now, did you look at that film?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What was your opinion relative to the findings contained therein?
A. I didn’t agree with the report. There is a defect on the myelogram but it is related to a spondylitic ridge at the [L-5/6] interspace. It is a bony defect, not a herniated disc.
The importance of this testimony is that at the first reopening there was placed directly in issue the question of whether the May 12, 1977 myelogram showed that the petitioner suffered a herniated disc which was an industrial responsibility or a bony ridge which was unrelated to the previous industrial injury. The conflict in the medical testimony presented on this issue was resolved against the petitioner. The award containing that resolution was allowed to become final.
The evidence at the first reopening hearing is to be compared with that at the second reopening hearing. Dr. Kelley, who performed surgery on the petitioner and testified that a herniated disc at the L5,6 level was revealed, was questioned concerning the relevancy of the May 12, 1977 mye-logram:
Q. And did you arrive at a diagnosis after examining him?
A. Yes. After examining him and reviewing the myelogram, I arrived at the diagnosis of a protruding disc.
Q. At what level?
A. What I chose to call the L-5,6 level.
Q. And did you have a myelographic report to review before arriving at this diagnosis?
A. I believe I did.
Q. Would you give us the date of the myelogram, for the record?
A. The date of the myelogram was 5-12-77.
Q. That’s the one by Dr. Eisenfeld?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you take that myelogram into account, as well as your clinical findings, in arriving at the diagnosis of a herniated or protruded disc at L-5,6?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you make any particular recommendations or undertake any particular measures for his care and treatment at that time?
A. I recommended that he have surgery.
At this point, we should pause and analyze this testimony. What Dr. Kelley is saying is that in his opinion, based upon exactly the same evidence that was previously presented to a hearing officer (plus his own observations), the petitioner had a herniated disc. This, of course, is contrary to the conclusions reached by the previous hearing officer based upon the same type of opinion evidence. In the words of Standard Brands Paint Co. v. Industrial Commission, 26 Ariz.App. 365, 367, 548 P.2d 1177, 1179 (1976) this:
*447. was no more than additional evidence of a diagnosis of the [claimant’s] physical condition which had been presented at the original hearing.
As Standard Brands Paint Co. held, this is insufficient to support a finding of a new disability and I do not believe that the majority, based upon this opinion testimony alone, would hold otherwise.
The only thing “new” presented at the second reopening hearing was Dr. Kelley’s testimony that, in fact, petitioner did suffer a herniated disc at the L-5,6 level as revealed by visual inspection at the time of surgery. However, this testimony, like Dr. Kelley’s opinion testimony, is of the same character — “additional evidence of a diagnosis which had been presented at the original hearing.” The only difference between Dr. Kelley’s opinion testimony and his factual visual testimony is the probative value to be accorded to it. As correctly concluded by the hearing officer: “The testimony of Dr. Kelley while strong was merely newly discovered evidence relating to a condition that had been previously considered.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority attempts to avoid this evi-dentially supported conclusion by characterizing the testimony of Drs. Rand and Reid as indicating “that the herniated disc found in Dr. Kelley’s operation was either a new condition or that it was a condition undiscovered by them at the time of the prior hearing.” In my opinion, this is a mischar-acterization of both doctors’ testimony.1 The “condition” under consideration at both hearings was a defect at the L-5,6 level revealed by a myelogram taken on May 12, 1977. The question presented at both hearings was whether that defect had its origin in an industrial setting. At the second reopening hearing, both Drs. Rand and Reid testified that they specifically considered the defect revealed by the myelogram at L-5,6 level in reaching their prior opinion that this condition was not industrially induced. In my opinion, by no stretch of the imagination was the defect at the L-5,6 level a “new or previously undiscovered condition.” It was there, it was considered, and it was ruled upon. The simple truth is that Drs. Reid, Rand and Taber were wrong in their diagnosis of petitioner’s condition. But that does not make it “new or previously undiscovered,” it simply shows that doctors are not infallible.
The majority opinion cites Crocker v. Industrial Commission, 124 Ariz. 566, 606 P.2d 417 (Ariz.1980) in support of its conclusion that the diagnosis of petitioner’s herniated disc is a new or previously undiscovered condition. I must admit that Crocker does cause me pause as it appears to equate “previously undiscovered” with diagnostic capability, a concept I thought was rejected, in the absence of a change of physical condition, by Aetna Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Ariz. 110, 563 P.2d 909 (App.1977), rev. denied. Crocker does not overrule Aetna but attempts to distinguish it. Be that as it may, in Crocker, the reason for the claimant’s condition (pain) had been undiagnosed at the time of the original closing. As stated in Crocker (and in the abstract I agree):
When a disability in existence at the time of the previous award has not been discovered at the time of the award, the claimant is entitled to a reopening upon discovery by the very terms of A.R.S. § 23-1061(H).
124 Ariz. at 566, 606 P.2d at 420.
In this case, petitioner’s condition had been diagnosed at the time of the original closing (albeit incorrectly) and the “disability” (defect at L-5,6) fully considered. Under these circumstances, Crocker is distinguishable.
To use the words of the majority, “the bottom line” of their holding is that if a claimant is able to show that a prior award of the Commission which has become final is wrong, then that claimant is entitled to *448reopen. If this be the principle of law established here, I await with some misgivings a carrier’s petition to rearrange a claimant’s previously established permanent disability award, not on the basis of any changed physical condition, but simply on the grounds that the carrier can now prove the prior award was incorrect. This ruling may afford some present consolation to the petitioner here, but I view the future with trepidation.
I would affirm this award on the basis of res judicata. Black v. Industrial Commission, 89 Ariz. 273, 361 P.2d 402 (1961); Terrell v. Industrial Commission, 24 Ariz.App. 389, 539 P.2d 193 (1975).

. In fact, a close reading of Dr. Reid’s testimony reveals that he is still not convinced that petitioner suffered from a “true herniation,” that is, a disc protrusion sufficient to involve the nerves in the spine. Given the admitted slow recovery by the petitioner following surgery, this opinion may have some validity.