Court Opinion

ID: 9558892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:18:35.61141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:39.354418
License: Public Domain

Munson, J.
(dissenting)—I would reaffirm the principle set forth in Veradale Valley Citizens' Planning Comm. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 22 Wn. App. 229, 558 P.2d 750 (1978). One who has been granted a property right— approval of a preliminary plat—has a right to expect finality of that action if an application for writ of review, *635although made within 30 days after approval, does not name the landowner. The landowner who has not been named as a party in a review proceeding, at the expiration of that time, may proceed with the development of the property. Deschenes v. King County, 83 Wn.2d 714, 521 P.2d 1181 (1974).
The majority perceives Veradale in terms of a discussion of the equities and that the "essence of the Veradale decision is prejudice and estoppel." I perceive Veradale in none of these terms. Here, as in Veradale, the writ of certiorari brought by the petitioners did not name the owners of the property. The 30-day period for commencement of review outlined in RCW 58.17.180, expired without naming the owners. Veradale held the owners of the property who had either been the instituting applicants of a proposed plat or obviously had a vested interest in its approval were indispensable parties to the action. Four factors were set forth in reaching that result:
(1) The successful property owner-applicant is a necessary party because he is "most affected" by the granting of the writ of review, and he should be a party to any proceeding, the purpose of which is to invalidate or affect his interests. ... (2) As a quasi-judicial body, a zoning board has no legal interest in the ultimate decision, but represents the public interest, and is primarily concerned with assisting the court to make a proper judgment. . . . By contrast, a property owner would have a very real interest in opposing the demands of others who seek to reverse the decision of the zoning board on appeal. (3) There is nothing in the statutes concerning the writ of certiorari to indicate that an adversary proceeding is not contemplated. (4) A judgment made by the court in a review by certiorari would not be binding upon the property owners who were not made parties, and it, therefore, could not take away the property interests they have established under our zoning laws.
(Footnote and citations omitted.) Veradale Valley Citizens' Planning Comm. v. Board of County Comm'rs, supra at 232-33.
*636I construe the 30-day period within which to bring a writ of review as a statute of limitations. A writ not brought within that time should not be heard. It is not proper to join subsequent to the running of the 30-day period a party whose identity is known and whose interest under Veradale makes him an indispensable party. See Hill v. Withers, 55 Wn.2d 462, 348 P.2d 218 (1960).
The majority holds that while RCW 58.17.180 requires an application for writ of review to be filed within the 30-day period, RCW 7.16, concerning writs, does not require service within that period. The use of a writ of certiorari has been expanded beyond its concept as envisioned in 1895. Today it is used in administrative law matters never conceived in the nineteenth century.
Notwithstanding, the issue of service is not well taken. Even if the Browns had been served, not being named in the proceeding, the service would have done no more than make them aware of the proceeding. They candidly admit they were already aware of the proceeding, but not being named as parties they had no burden to answer. Meadowdale Neighborhood Comm. v. Edmonds, 27 Wn. App. 261, 268, 616 P.2d 1257 (1980), acknowledges there was no duty to intervene in the absence of being a named party. Thus, the tentative commencement doctrine which has grown out of RCW 4.16, as discussed in Citizens Interested in the Transfusion of Yesteryear v. Board of Regents, 86 Wn.2d 323, 544 P.2d 740 (1976); Fox v. Groff, 16 Wn. App. 893, 559 P.2d 1376 (1977); Hansen v. Watson, 16 Wn. App. 891, 559 P.2d 1375 (1977), does not apply.12 Rather, the general rule is that once the time for filing an action has expired, the effect of such joinder is to extend the statute of limitations. See Annot., Change in Party After Statute of Limitations Has Run, 8 A.L.R.2d 6, 112-18, §§ 53, 54 (1949).
The majority then speaks to CR 19(a) regarding joinder. Veradale at page 234 analyzed that rule and concluded: *637"Here, complete relief cannot be obtained when the Board [of county commissioners] is the only named respondent." Veradale at page 235 further held:
Ordinarily, joinder of additional defendants should be permitted; however, granting such relief in this instance would have the effect of extending the time period for review. Where the time period has run, making joinder not feasible, the court must then determine under CR 19(b) whether in equity and good conscience the action should nevertheless proceed or should be dismissed.
(Footnote omitted.)
CR 19(b) does take into consideration prejudice and equity, but only in the context of whether the case should proceed in the absence of the indispensable parties; Vera-dale concluded that it should not. Here, no homes had been constructed and the only affirmative action taken was the commencement and resolution of a private condemnation action (presently before this court on appeal). But the basic issue does not go away: to proceed without the property owners would not and could not resolve their interests. In fairness and equity, the matter should not proceed; CR 19 is not applicable.
Next, the majority analyzes CR 15(c) which in some instances would allow the naming of additional parties after a statute of limitations has run. There are two conditions to be satisfied before that rule is applicable:
[T]he party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.
The first condition may be satisfied here; the Browns knew the action had been instituted. However, the second condition has not been met; there is no mistake concerning the identity of the proper parties. G-3 Properties and the Browns own neighboring properties and both parties attended at least some of the hearings before the board of county commissioners.
*638G-3 Properties knew the identity of the owners of the property seeking plat approval. This is not a misnomer or mistaken identity situation.
In footnote 10 to the majority opinion is an implication that the court in Meadowdale might have adopted the relation back theory had there been timely service upon a necessary party. I question that assumption. In Meadowdale Neighborhood Comm. v. Edmonds, supra at 270, the court said it would not discuss the relation back "except to note that in the absence of proper service within the applicable time limit, there is nothing to which the amendment . . . could relate back." Nonetheless, a party who was not named within the 30 days has a right to rely upon the nonjoinder in concluding no review will be brought after that period has expired under RCW 58.17.180.
The relation back theory was discussed in Veradale at page 238 and held inapplicable.
First, the appellants are attempting to introduce and not substitute a new party to the proceedings long after the statutory time period for review has passed. Second, the appellants were not misled as to the identity of either the plat sponsor or the landowner. . . . Finally, the factor of prejudice cannot be discounted since all three subdivision sites are now complete. Thus, we conclude that the relation-back doctrine under CR 15(c) is not available.
Here, there has been no completion of any subdivision, but the first two reasons are applicable; the Browns were not parties and no one was misled as to their identities. Respondents need not meet each of the three factors; two out of three is sufficient.
G-3 Properties also contends that CR 6(b)13 is applicable, citing Andrus v. County of Snohomish, 8 Wn. App. *639502, 507 P.2d 898 (1973). I disagree. In Andrus at page 507, the court set forth the procedures outlined in RCW 7.16 governing the procedure for writs of certiorari and then stated:
CR 6(b) grants to the superior court the discretion to enlarge a time of performance requirement in a court order, not performed within the time specified because of excusable neglect, when a motion is made for enlargement after the expiration of the specified period. We read the record before us as presenting such a motion to the trial court.
Here, no request for a court order extending time is involved, nor was the failure to join the Browns within the 30-day period excusable neglect. CR 6(b) is inapplicable.
As to the cross appeal, I would concur with the majority and affirm the trial court's denial of the Browns' motion to dismiss for improper service. On the remaining issue, I would affirm.
Reconsideration denied December 2, 1980.
Review granted by Supreme Court January 30, 1981.

Had the Browns been named but not served, we might have a different question.

CR 6(b):
"When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion, (1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or, (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period, permit the act to be *639done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), 59(d), and 60(b)."