Court Opinion

ID: 9557795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:57:38.917927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:01.860699
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
First, I take issue with the majority opinion’s holding that grand jury witnesses have no right to consult with counsel outside the jury room, in the absence of a statute providing such a right. While we have held, in People v. Downer, 192 Colo. 264, 557 P.2d 835 (1976), that a grand jury witness may not insist on the presence of his attorney inside the grand jury room, we have never addressed the fundamental issue whether, independent of statute, a witness has a right to consult counsel outside the grand jury room. The majority opinion in effect assumes in passing a negative answer to that crucial threshold question, virtually without discussion.
I am aware that, in a plurality opinion, four members of the United States Supreme Court have asserted that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a witness counsel inside the grand jury room because at that point no “criminal proceedings” have yet been instituted against him. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976). But a plurality opinion is not precedent. And not even a plurality of the Mandujano court opined that there is no constitutional right to counsel outside the grand jury room. In fact Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, pointed out in an opinion concurring in the result, that no Supreme Court case had ever squarely presented the question of a grand jury witness’ right to counsel. Id. at 603, 96 S.Ct. 1789, at 48 L.Ed.2d at 238. As Justice Brennan pointed out, many legal scholars have argued that there may well be a constitutional right to counsel before the grand jury in view of the expanding right to counsel and its “substantive affinity” to and consequent “co-extensiveness” with the privilege against self-incrimination. Ibid. And see Id. n. 20.
*504Even if the Supreme Court had decided that the United States Constitution does not guarantee counsel to grand jury witnesses, there would remain the serious question whether such a right is guaranteed by the Colorado Constitution, either in Article II, sections 16 and 18, or elsewhere. It has been well said that, “State courts, no less than federal, are and ought to be the guardians of our liberties.”1 Therefore it follows that, “State courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”2
This court has previously recognized that it is free to evoke state constitutional provisions in adopting broader protections of fundamental rights than those espoused by the United States Supreme Court. E.g., People v. Hayhurst, 194 Colo. 292, 571 P.2d 721 (1977).
My point in not that there necessarily exists a constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel in grand jury proceedings. My point is rather that this court should not merely assume that no such right exists, and base other holdings on that assumption. The right — if it exists — is too important to be brushed aside so lightly. Rather we should directly confront and decide the question after carefully considering the authorities which have acknowledged that there is a right to consult freely with counsel immediately outside the grand jury room. See, e.g., United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. DeSapio, 299 F.Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
As the majority opinion itself recognizes, there are strong arguments that Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), provide a legal and conceptual basis for holding that there is a constitutional right to counsel in the grand jury context. Majority opinion, (at p. 5, n. 1 of the slip opinion) 195 Colo. 494, 580 P.2d 25. See also the persuasive argument of Mr. Justice Brennan in United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 602-09, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 1789-1792, 48 L.Ed.2d 212, 237-242 (1976) (concurring opinion).
In my opinion, the answer to this question is neither so clearcut nor obviously well-settled as the majority opinion would seem to indicate. The potential and reality of grand jury abuse have been well-documented,3 and *505this real danger warrants our close consideration of the need for protection of the rights of witnesses before those bodies. To hold, as the court does today, that there is no constitutional right to counsel at grand jury proceedings, is a dangerous precedent.
Second, even assuming arguendo that prior to enactment of section 16-5-204(4)(d), C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Supp.), consulting counsel outside the grand jury room was only a “practice” and not a right, I strongly disagree with the majority opinion’s premise that enactment of that statute effected an “implied repeal” of the long-standing practice. The prior practice was certainly well-known at the time of the statute’s passage, and any legislative intent to render the new statutory procedures exclusive could easily have been expressed. The lack of any such expression evinces an intention that the established practice remains as an alternative.
In construing any statute, the starting point must be the plain, ordinary meaning of the words chosen by the General Assembly to express its intention.
The language of section 16-5-204(4)(d) clearly reflects an intent that its procedures be alternatives to, rather than exclusive of, the prior practice. For example, the statute provides that a witness “shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel during any time that such witness is being' questioned in the presence of such grand jury,” but states that “counsel may be present in the grand jury room with his client during such questioning.” (Emphasis added.)
This juxtaposition of mandatory and permissive language in the same sentence clearly indicates an intent to provide a statutory right to the assistance of counsel, but to permit the use of counsel inside the grand jury room at the witness’ option. The majority opinion, however, misconstrues this plain language to require that if a witness desires the assistance of counsel at all, counsel must function within the grand jury room and therefore be subject to the oath requirement and the limitation on representing multiple clients.
With similar import, section 16-5-204(4) (d) states that an “[ajttorney present in the grand jury room shall take an oath of secrecy.” (Emphasis added.) Obviously that language implies that an attorney not “present in the grand jury room” need not take the oath. Had the legislature intended the construction adopted by the majority opinion the statute would have simply required the oath of all attorneys representing clients at grand jury proceedings, not just of those “present in the grand jury room.” Rather, as the trial court concluded, the statutory language clearly implies that an attorney may choose not to take the oath and meet his client outside the grand jury room.
Similarly, and with the same import, other language of the statute prohibits multiple client representation for attorneys who “provide counsel in the grand jury room.” (Emphasis added.) This language implies that *506there are no restrictions on multiple client representation imposed on attorneys who provide counsel outside the jury room, since such attorneys would not hear the grand jury proceedings and therefore would not be able to communicate what has been heard to other clients who are scheduled to appear as later witnesses before the grand jury, that implication accords with the statute’s purpose to protect secrecy of grand jury proceedings.
While I recognize that principles of statutory construction dictate that a statute fairly susceptible to more than one interpretation should be construed so as to uphold its constitutionality, if possible, I am equally mindful of our obligation to uphold the state constitution. In this case only a strained construction of section 16-5-204(4)(d) can support the conclusion that its procedures were intended to be exclusive and to forbid the prior practice. The majority opinion, in attempting to avoid the strong equal protection challenge raised against the statute, simply ignores the statute’s plain language. In my opinion, we should seek to determine the clearly stated intent of the statute unburdened by any concern for the constitutional consequences. Then, and only then, should we consider and decide the equal protection claim.
Even if the majority opinion’s construction of section 16-5-204(4)(d) were correct, the statute’s attempt to forbid lawyers from representing two or more clients before a grand jury, without the grand jury’s consent, unconstitutionally infringes on this court’s authority to regulate the practice of law.
It is well-established that regulation of law practice in Colorado is a matter exclusively in the province of this court. People v. Buckles, 167 Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404 (1968); Denver Bar Association v. Public Utilities Commission, 154 Colo 273, 391 P.2d 467 (1964). Attempted exercise of that power by any other body violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Colo. Const., Art. III.
The statute here in question unduly restricts the right of every person to free choice of an attorney. Moreover it encroaches on this court’s authority to regulate attorney’s representation of multiple clients by purporting to empower each grand jury to determine whether each attorney appearing before it will be permitted to represent more than one client. Prior to enactment of this statute, representation of multiple clients in the same matter was limited only by the canons of ethics promulgated by this court, e.g., the conflict of interest restrictions set out in Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under those canons several clients who desired to be represented in a matter by the same attorney, whether to economize on legal fees or otherwise, were free to so elect. Even if there were a conflict of interest among the multiple clients, they could all employ the same attorney provided they consented to the joint representation with full knowledge of the conflict. Now, an attorney’s right to represent more than one client before a grand jury depends, not merely on the uniform, *507statewide guidelines established by this court, but on the vicissitudes of each temporary, local grand jury, unrestrained by any rules in deciding which attorney may, and which may not, represent more than one client.
In effect, section 16-5-204(4)(d) removes regulation of one aspect of law practice from the supervisory power of this court and places it in the hands of various groups of lay grand jurors unassociated with this court and unguided by any standards. The legislature’s power to regulate the grand jury system,4 does not authorize it to interfere with the judiciary’s long-recognized exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.
Nor is this infirmity justified by recitation of the legislative interest in preserving the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. Without denying the validity of that legislative concern, it nonetheless may not be effected by a means that unconstitutionally invades judicial prerogatives. If the legislature feels that additional rules governing attorneys are needed to protect grand jury secrecy, an appropriate, mutual respect due between equal, coordinate branches of government requires that that need be brought to this court’s attention together with any suggested additions to the rules governing conduct of attorneys.
Today’s majority interpretation of section 16-5-204(4)(d), by forbidding any one attorney from representing more than one grand jury witness, will impose needless expense and duplication of legal services. Grand jury witnesses with nearly identical interests (e.g., the many members of a labor union) will each have to retain and pay a separate attorney to prepare for and appear at the proceedings, even where there is no conflict of interest. There has been no suggestion of attorney misconduct requiring this new rule. Any attorney who by misconduct might violate grand jury secrecy rules or otherwise prejudice the administration of justice before a grand jury can be dealt with by this court’s grievance committee. A blanket prohibition by the legislature against multiple representation is unjustified and impermissible.
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the general assembly possesses the power to regulate multiple client representation before grand juries, the method adopted in section 16-5-204(4) (d) obviously amounts to unconstitutional delegation of power.
As a general rule the legislature may validly delegate legislative power to an administrative body only if it provides sufficient standards to guide the exercise of that power. E.g., Elizondo v. State, 194 Colo. 113, 570 P.2d 518 (1977).
In this case, however, the general assembly has delegated one aspect of the power to regulate the grand jury system to the body that is to be regulated, and, in addition, has done so with no limitation on any grand *508jury’s exercise of that power. The result is that each grand jury, a non-continuing body of lay citizens, has been granted the complete and unfettered discretion to determine on an entirely ad hoc basis whether a particular attorney will be permitted to represent more than one client. There are absolutely no procedural standards to guide or restrict the exercise of that power, and there are no safeguards against its abuse.
Therefore, even if the representation of multiple clients before grand juries were a matter for legislative control, and even if grand juries were administrative agencies to which legislative power could appropriately be delegated, the delegation effected by section 16-5-204(4)(d) would still be a blatant violation of well-established constitutional principles governing delegation of legislative powers. Elizondo v. State, supra.
I am authorized to state that MR. JUSTICE GROVES joins in this dissent.

 W. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977). See also S. Mosk, The New States’ Rights, 10 Calif. L. Enforcement 81, 82 (1976).

 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 491.

 E.g., Rodis, A Lawyer's Guide to Grand Jury Abuse, 14 Crim. L. Bull. 123 (1978); Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative Agency of the Prosecutor?, 2 New Mexico L. Rev. 141 (1972); Note, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and Undue Influence, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (1972).

 Colo. Const., Art. II, Sec. 23.