Court Opinion

ID: 9614813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:28:34.360575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:39.316721
License: Public Domain

Justice Martin
dissenting.
I concur in the holding by the majority that there is no error in the guilt phase of defendant’s trial and conviction. However, I dissent from the holding of the majority that the McKoy error entitles the defendant to a new sentencing proceeding.
The State concedes that the unanimity instructions violated the mandate of State v. McKoy, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), but it argues that the error was harmless. The majority finds that the error was prejudicial; I cannot concur in that decision. Of course, the State has the burden of showing that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(b) (1988).
*271In this case the trial court submitted sixteen possible mitigating circumstances to the jury, and the jury unanimously found twelve of the mitigating circumstances submitted and rejected four of them. The first of these is that the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(l) (1988). Without a detailed recitation of the evidence, it does show that since the age of sixteen the defendant had been convicted of or pled guilty to-receiving stolen goods, larceny, assault with a deadly weapon, and issuing a worthless check. There was also evidence of other criminal activity, such as, possession of a sawed-off shotgun, dealing in drugs, stealing, and possession of marijuana. Each of these convictions and other criminal activity constitute significant prior criminal activity on the part of the defendant. The meaning of “significant” is that the activity is likely to have influence or effect upon the determination by the jury of its recommended sentence. State v. Wilson, 322 N.C. 117, 147, 367 S.E.2d 589, 609 (1988) (Martin, J., concurring). Surely, the jury would be affected in its deliberations and determination of whether to recommend the death sentence by this series of prior convictions and criminal conduct on the part of the defendant. These are not the kind of activities that a jury would be likely to find completely irrelevant on the issue of sentencing. Therefore, no reasonable juror would have found an absence of significant history of prior criminal activity under the evidence of this case. It is clear that if the error in the McKoy instructions in this case had been absent the result would have been the same.
Likewise, as to the non-statutory mitigating circumstance that the defendant learned to read on his own while in jail, even if found by the jury or a juror, it would not, in my opinion, have resulted in a change in the jury’s recommendation. The evidence is contradictory in this case as to whether the defendant learned to read in jail, and if so, when he went through this educational process. He testified that he read the statements that he gave the officer before he signed them. He also argued that he learned to read in jail during 1981 and 1984, when he was arrested and convicted of other crimes which was, of course, prior to the killing in this case. I do not see how the defendant’s culpability for this crime is lessened because the defendant learned to read in jail serving time for other crimes before this crime was committed. Further, the jury found in mitigation that the defendant lacked the benefit of a normal education, and that he can function ade*272quately and appropriately in a structured setting with prior guidance and discipline. This is indeed a slender reed upop which to rely in striking down the jury’s recommendation as to the appropriate penalty of this shotgun killing witnessed by two eyewitnesses who testified for the State.
As to the mitigating circumstance of the defendant’s age at the time of the offense, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7), the defendant was twenty-two years and six months of age. This Court held in State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 343, 346 S.E.2d 596 (1986), that there was no hard and fast rule as to what age could be considered by the jury as such mitigating circumstance. Rather, this evidence had to be considered along with all of the other evidence in the case in determining whether it had any mitigating value. In the Johnson case this Court found that it was not error to fail to submit this circumstance to the jury even though there was testimony that the defendant was an immature person for his age based upon the fact that he was a bed wetter, that he lacked emotional stability, and that he was fired from his first employment. I find the evidence in the present appeal to be much less persuasive than that in Johnson. Here, defendant’s intelligence level was in the low average range, he was employed, and he was an excellent worker. It appears beyond a reasonable doubt that, even if this mitigating circumstance had been found by the jury, it would not have changed any juror’s mind as to the recommendation. I find it to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
As to the catchall mitigating circumstance, defendant argued such things as his showing a positive response while in the custody of foster parents, that his juvenile drug abuse was permitted by his mother, that he was deprived of an opportunity to learn societal values, and that the social service and court system failed to respond to his situation. These facts were already concluded and subsumed in other factors submitted to the jury, such as, that the defendant was reared by a dysfunctional mother, that he grew up in a situation with no stability or guidance, that he was emotionally abused and neglected as a child, that he can function adequately in a structured setting of proper guidance, that he has a father and foster parent who love him, and that he did not have the benefit of a normal education as a child. All of these mitigating factors were found by the jury. It appears that the factors now argued by the defendant under the catchall were all included and subsumed in the specific mitigating circumstances *273which the jury found. Therefore, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no error with respect to the catchall. N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (1988).
In light of the uncontested evidence as to the brutal and uncalled for murder in this case, evidently over a $10.00 debt that the victim allegedly owed to the defendant in payment for drugs, no reasonable juror would have returned a different recommendation had there been no McKoy error. I find that the McKoy error here is indeed harmless beyond any reasonable doubt.
I vote that the jury’s recommendation of the death sentence be affirmed.
Justices MEYER and Mitchell join in this dissenting opinion.