Court Opinion

ID: 9640260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:01:56.997125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:25.114613
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         AUG 22 2023
                                                                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAFFON GLYMPH,                                   No. 22-35735

                Plaintiff-Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01704-JHC

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
CT CORPORATION SYSTEMS;
COMPUCOM SYSTEMS, INC.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Washington
                      John H. Chun, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted August 15, 2023**

Before:      TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

      Laffon Glymph appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

her employment action alleging retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave

Act (“FMLA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo

a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Procedure 12(b)(6). McGinity v. Procter & Gamble Co., 69 F.4th 1093, 1096 (9th

Cir. 2023). We reverse and remand.

      The district court dismissed Glymph’s FMLA claim for failure to allege a

causal connection between Glymph’s FMLA-protected leave and her termination,

and for failure to allege a willful violation of the FMLA, which would allow

Glymph to benefit from the FMLA’s three-year statute of limitations. In her

amended complaint, however, Glymph alleged that she was fired approximately

eleven days after returning from approved FMLA leave. Liberally construed,

Glymph’s allegations establish that her leave was causally connected to her

termination and that defendant’s termination of Glymph was willful. See Olson v.

United States ex rel. Dep’t of Energy, 980 F.3d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[T]o

benefit from the FMLA’s three-year statute of limitations [for willful violations of

the Act], a plaintiff must show that her employer either knew or showed reckless

disregard for whether its conduct violated the Act.”); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island

Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[C]ausation can be inferred from

timing alone where an adverse employment action follows on the heels of

protected activity . . . [b]ut timing alone will not show causation in all cases; rather,

in order to support an inference of retaliatory motive, the termination must have

occurred fairly soon after the employee’s protected expression.”); see also

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be

                                           2                                     22-35735
liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” (internal

citation, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted)). We reverse and remand for

further proceedings on Glymph’s FLMA claim.

      REVERSED and REMANDED.

                                          3                                   22-35735