Court Opinion

ID: 9402307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 16:14:41.193835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.939738
License: Public Domain

J-A06003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    CASTLE REALTY, LLC                            :       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                  :            PENNSYLVANIA
                                                  :
                v.                                :
                                                  :
                                                  :
    PAUL LYNCH INVESTMENTS, INC.                  :
                                                  :
                        Appellant                 :       No. 712 WDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered May 19, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Civil Division at
                           No(s): No. 2019-10519

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                    FILED: June 15, 2023

        Appellant, Paul Lynch Investments, Inc., appeals from the May 19, 2022

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County that made

final the January 13, 2022 order, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 341.1         In the January 13, 2022 order, the trial court granted

judgment on the pleadings in favor of Castle Realty in the amount of

$87,500.00,      plus     pre-judgment         interest    ($16,164.66),   as   well   as

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1Rule 341 states that “an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order
of a government unit or trial court.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). A “final order” is
defined as, inter alia, an order that “disposes of all claims and of all parties[.]”
Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). Upon entry of the May 19, 2022 order, disposing of
Appellant’s counterclaim against Castle Realty, LLC (“Castle Realty”), the
January 13, 2022 order was rendered a final, appealable order.
J-A06003-23

post-judgment interest.2 We affirm the January 13, 2022 order, in part, and

vacate the January 13, 2022 order, in part, and remand this case in

accordance with this memorandum.

       The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:

       [Castle Realty] is a real estate brokerage firm based in Lawrence
       County, Pennsylvania. [Appellant] engaged [Castle Realty] to
       market and sell two commercial properties owned by [Appellant]
       and located in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania.

       On November 9, 2017, [Castle Realty] and [Appellant] entered
       into a commercial listing contract, granting [Castle Realty] the
       right to sell a logistics and shipping warehouse [(“Property #1”).]
       The contract to sell Property #1 [(“Contract #1”)] was for a period
       of one [] year, commencing on November 15, 2017, at a listing
       price of $600,000.00.

       On January 11, 2018, [Castle Realty] and [Appellant] entered into
       another commercial listing contract, granting [Castle Realty] the
       right to sell [another building owned by Appellant (“Property
       #2”).] The contract to sell Property #2 [(“Contract #2”)] was for
       a period of one [] year, commencing on January 12, 2018, at a
       listing price of $1,350,000.00.

       ...

       On July 29, 2018, [Castle Realty] received an offer from [a
       potential buyer] to purchase Property #2 for a price of
       $1,000,000.00. After presenting the offer to [Appellant] in August
       2018, [Appellant] informed [Castle Realty] that the offer was too
       low. No further actions came of this exchange until [Castle Realty]
       learned that both properties had been sold by [Appellant].
       Specifically, Property #1 was sold on October 18, 2018, to [Buyer
       #1] for $650,000.00 and Property #2 was sold on October 31,
       2018[, to Buyer #2, who was the potential buyer that submitted
       an offer to Castle Realty on July 29, 2018 for the purchase of
____________________________________________

2 The January 13, 2022 order awarded Castle Realty post-judgment interest
in the amount of $17.04 per day from November 23, 2021, until payment of
the judgment. Trial Court Order, 1/13/22.

                                           -2-
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        Property #2. The sale of Property #2 to Buyer #2 was] part of a
        like-kind exchange, [netting] actual cash consideration of
        $1,100,000.00.

        [Appellant] never informed [Castle Realty] of either sale and
        never paid [Castle Realty] a commission resulting from either sale.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/22, at 7-9.

        On May 22, 2019, Castle Realty filed a complaint against Appellant,

setting forth claims of breach of contract (Count 1), conversion (Count 2),

and, in the alternative, unjust enrichment (Count 3).           On July 8, 2019,

Appellant filed an answer to Castle Realty’s complaint, which raised new

matter as well as a counterclaim for breach of contract.3 Castle Realty filed a

response to Appellant’s answer, new matter and counterclaim on July 25,

2019.

____________________________________________

3 As part of its new matter, Appellant asserted that Castle Realty “set a sale
price of $600,000.00 on [Property #1] without any type of appraisal or
assessment of the value of the property” and “made no attempt to document
the fair market value of the property.” Appellant’s Answer, New Matter, and
Counterclaim, 7/8/19, at ¶¶36-37. Appellant contends that it renovated the
property, including installing a new roof, and that Appellant notified Castle
Realty that “the listing price [was] no longer a fair listing price for the property
and asked that the listing agreement be terminated until such time as [a] new
lease could be negotiated with the tenant and a proper fair market value of
the property could be made.” Id. at ¶40. Appellant avers that Castle Realty
“had no understanding of the value of [Property #1] and did not attempt to
revisit the site and evaluate the property value after the renovations were
complete so that a new listing price and agreement could be entered into.”
Id. at ¶45.

Appellant’s counterclaim was based upon a breach of an oral contract,
whereby Appellant alleges “[Castle Realty] breached its oral agreement with
[Appellant] to act as [Appellant’s] agent in the purchase of a [property
unrelated to the properties involved in the instant case].” Id. at ¶57.

                                           -3-
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      On June 30, 2021, Castle Realty filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings as to, inter alia, Count 1, and requested that Appellant’s

counterclaim be dismissed with prejudice on the ground, inter alia, that it was

untimely pursuant to the four-year statute of limitations. Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings, 6/30/21, at ¶¶57-60. Appellant filed a response to Castle

Realty’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on September 28, 2021.

      On November 23, 2021, the trial court granted judgment on the

pleadings in favor of Castle Realty in the amount of $35,000.00 on Count 1,

and dismissed Counts 2 and 3 of Castle Realty’s complaint with prejudice.

Trial Court Order, 11/23/21. In that same order, the trial court also dismissed

the claims Appellant raised in its new matter, but was silent as to Appellant’s

breach of contract counterclaim against Castle Realty. Id. On December 13,

2021, Castle Realty filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that it was

entitled to judgment in the amount of $87,500.00, as well as pre-judgment

interest and post-judgment interest. On December 14, 2021, the trial court

entered an order permitting Appellant to file a response to Castle Realty’s

motion for reconsideration within 20 days of said order.     Appellant filed a

response to Castle Realty’s motion for reconsideration on January 6, 2022.

      On January 13, 2022, the trial court granted Castle Realty’s motion for

reconsideration, awarding judgment on Count 1 in the amount of $87,500.00,

as well as pre-judgment interest in the amount of $16,164.66 and

post-judgment interest at a rate of $17.04 per day from November 23, 2021,

                                     -4-
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until the date judgment is paid.4 Trial Court Order, 1/13/22. On February 14,

2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal, which was docketed in this Court at

201 WDA 2022.

       On February 14, 2022, Castle Realty filed a praecipe for writ of

execution, seeking collection of the judgment in the amount of $105,546.98,

plus costs to be added by Lawrence County. That same day, the trial court

issued the writ of execution.

       On March 31, 2022, this Court issued a per curiam order directing

Appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be quashed on the ground

the January 13, 2022 order was not a final, appealable order. Per Curiam

Order, 3/31/22 (201 WDA 2022). Appellant filed a response with this Court

on April 11, 2022. In an April 28, 2022 per curiam order, this Court quashed

Appellant’s appeal because “[c]ontrary to Appellant’s argument, the trial court

has not dismissed Appellant’s counterclaim, and the [January 13, 2022 order]

is, therefore, not a final order.” Per Curiam Order, 4/28/22 (201 WDA 2022).

       On May 19, 2022, the trial court entered an order nunc pro tunc that,

inter alia, dismissed Appellant’s counterclaim against Castle Realty and

____________________________________________

4 Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration on January 24, 2022, which the
trial court denied as untimely. Trial Court Order, 2/1/22. The trial court
explained that Appellant’s motion for reconsideration was untimely because
“the substance of the [m]otion for [r]econsideration seeks the [trial c]ourt’s
review and recission of [its] order dated November 23, 2021.” Id.; see also
PNC Bank, N.A. v. Unknown Heirs, 929 A.2d 219, 226 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(holding that, a motion for reconsideration must be filed within 30 days of the
entry of the disputed order).

                                           -5-
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designated the January 13, 2022 order as a final, appealable order.              Trial

Court Order Nunc Pro Tunc, 5/19/22. In a separate order issued that same

day, the trial court, inter alia, denied Appellant’s motion to strike all writs of

execution issued on February 14, 2022.5 Trial Court Order, 5/19/22, at ¶6.

On May 31, 2022, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 19,

2022 trial court order, requesting, inter alia, that the trial court strike all writs

of execution issued on February 14, 2022. On June 14, 2022, Appellant filed

a notice of appeal.6        The trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure 1925(b). Trial Court Order, 6/21/22. Appellant filed a

Rule 1925(b) statement on July 15, 2022, and the trial court filed its Rule

1925(a) opinion on August 15, 2022.

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       [1.]   Did the pleadings in this case support [an order] granting
              [Castle Realty’s] motion for judgment on the pleadings?

       [2.]   Was the praecipe for the writ of execution filed by [Castle
              Realty] and corresponding writ of execution issued by the
              Lawrence County prothonotary filed and issued prematurely
              and prior to the expiration of the time period for the filing of

____________________________________________

5Although a copy of Appellant’s motion to strike the writs of execution issued
on February 14, 2022, does not appear in the record before us, there is a trial
court order denying the same. Therefore, we presume that said motion was
presented to the trial court.

6Appellant’s June 14, 2022 notice of appeal was docketed in this Court at
712 WDA 2022.

                                           -6-
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            an appeal in said matter therefore requiring said writ of
            execution to be stricken[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

      Appellant’s first issue challenges the trial court’s order granting

judgment on the pleadings in favor of Castle Realty on its breach of contract

claim (Count 1).

      Our review of a trial court's decision to grant judgment on the
      pleadings is plenary. We apply the same standard of review as
      the trial court: we confine our review to the pleadings and relevant
      documents, and we accept as true all well-pleaded statements of
      fact in favor of the non-moving party. Judgment on the pleadings
      may be entered when there are no disputed issues of fact[,] and
      the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus,
      we will affirm the trial court when the moving party's right to
      succeed is certain.

Baumbach v. Lafayette College, 272 A.3d 83, 88 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Venema v. Moser

Builders, Inc., 284 A.3d 208, 212 (Pa. Super. 2022) (stating, “[o]n appeal,

our task is to determine whether the trial court's ruling was based on a clear

error of law or whether there were facts disclosed by the pleadings which

should properly be tried before a jury or by a judge siting without a jury”

(citation omitted)). Thus, the question before this Court in the case sub judice

is whether the factual allegations in Appellant’s pleadings, together with the

allegations contained in Castle Realty’s pleadings that Appellant admits as

                                     -7-
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true, are sufficient to support a verdict in favor of Castle Realty. 7 Grimes v.

Enter. Leasing Co. of Philadelphia, LLC, 105 A.3d 1188, 1193 (Pa. 2014).

       It is well-established that “[t]o successfully maintain a cause of action

for breach of contract [a] plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of a

contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the

contract, and (3) resultant damages.” Hart v. Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 332

(Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 897 A.2d 458 (Pa. 2006).

       The fundamental rule in interpreting the meaning of a contract is
       to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the contracting parties.
       The intent of the parties to a written agreement is to be regarded
       as being embodied in the writing itself. The whole instrument
       must be taken together in arriving at contractual intent. Courts
       do not assume that a contract's language was chosen carelessly,
       nor do they assume that the parties were ignorant of the meaning
____________________________________________

7 While a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion for summary
judgment involve similar considerations by a trial court, the motions differ in
relation to the trial court’s scope of inquiry. Aubrey v. Precision Airmotive
LLC, 7 A.3d 256, 266 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 42 A.3d 289 (Pa.
2012). Specifically, “a motion for judgment on the pleadings is limited to the
averments contained in the pleadings, [while] a motion for summary
judgment may rely on outside material contained in the record.” Aubrey, 7
A.3d at 266. Typically, “the pleadings in an action are limited to (1) a
complaint and an answer thereto, (2) a reply if the answer contains new
matter, a counterclaim or a cross-claim, (3) a counter-reply if the reply to a
counterclaim or cross-claim contains new matter, [and] (4) a preliminary
objection and a response thereto.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1017(a) (paragraph formatting
omitted).

Thus, in the case sub judice, the trial court’s review of Castle Realty’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings was limited to a review of (1) Castle Realty’s
complaint and Contract #1 and Contract #2, which were attached as exhibits
to the complaint, (2) Appellant’s answer to the complaint, new matter, and
counterclaim, and (3) Castle Realty’s reply to Appellant’s new matter and
answer and new matter to Appellant’s counterclaim.

                                           -8-
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      of the language they employed. When a writing is clear and
      unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents
      alone.

      Only where a contract's language is ambiguous may extrinsic or
      parol evidence be considered to determine the intent of the
      parties. A contract contains an ambiguity if it is reasonably
      susceptible of different constructions and capable of being
      understood in more than one sense. This question, however, is
      not resolved in a vacuum.        Instead, contractual terms are
      ambiguous if they are subject to more than one reasonable
      interpretation when applied to a particular set of facts. In the
      absence of an ambiguity, the plain meaning of the agreement will
      be enforced. The meaning of an unambiguous written instrument
      presents a question of law for resolution by the court.

Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418, 429-430 (Pa.

2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Because Appellant’s issue in

the case sub judice surrounds the interpretation of a contract thereby raising

a question of law, our review of the entry of judgment on the pleadings is

de novo. Cogley v. Duncan, 32 A.3d 1288, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      In granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Castle Realty on its

breach of contract claim, the trial court found that,

      the parties are in agreement that [Contract #1 and Contract #2]
      were both identical in delineating the duties and obligations of
      each party and that each contained the [following] language[:]

         ["In the event of a sale, transfer, or exchange of the
         property listed herein by whomsoever made or effected,
         including [Appellant], or if [Castle Realty] procures a
         purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy the property at the
         listing price within the period of time this contract is in force,
         [Appellant] agrees to pay [Castle Realty] a commission of
         [5%] of the selling price.”

         “[I]f within one year of this agreement, [Appellant] enters
         into an agreement of sale or transfers/exchanges the
         property with any person to whom the property was shown,

                                       -9-
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        presented, or submitted by [Castle Realty,] the sale or
        transfer shall be conclusively presumed to have been made
        by [Castle Realty] and the commission shall be paid by
        [Appellant] to [Castle Realty].”]

     However, [Appellant] denies that [Castle Realty] had the exclusive
     right to market and sell [Property #1 and Property #2] at the time
     of their sales. [Appellant] further states that [it] requested
     [Castle Realty] remove Property #1 from the market in order to
     complete such improvements to the property that it would need
     to be re-priced and re-listed at a later date.          In addition,
     [Appellant] states that [it] informed [Castle Realty] that Property
     #2 was being financed with a certain type of loan which
     necessitated selling Property #2 with other properties secured by
     that financing in order to be able to sell them free of liens.

     ...

     [Appellant’s] answer specifically and affirmatively admits all three
     elements of a breach of contract claim. First, [Appellant] admits
     that contracts existed between [Castle Realty] and [Appellant] for
     [Property #1 and Property #2]. Second, [Appellant] admits that
     it breached material duties imposed by those contracts by
     acknowledging the failure to compensate [Castle Realty] as
     required. While [Appellant], in its Answer, averred that it sought
     to terminate [Contract #1 and Contract #2, Appellant] does not
     allege how or when it made such a request, nor does it allege that
     [Castle Realty] agreed to terminate those contracts. [Contract #1
     and Contract #2] are clear and unambiguous as to when and how
     they may be terminated. Specifically, [Contract #1 and Contract
     #2] could be terminated at any time “after 365 days had elapsed
     from the commencement date of the agreement by [Appellant]
     giving ten (10) days notice in writing delivered to [Castle Realty]
     by certified mail with return receipt.” [Contract #1 and Contract
     #2] expressly state that the one-year period had been determined
     “as the result of negotiations between [Castle Realty and
     Appellant].”    The contracts also clearly and unambiguously
     provide that [Castle Realty] retained the exclusive right to sell
     [Property #1 and Property #2] for a period of one (1) year,
     commencing on November 15, 2017[,] and January 12, 2018,
     respectively. [Property #1 and Property #2] were sold on October
     18, 2018, and October 31, 2018, respectively.

     By acknowledging that it failed to pay [Castle Realty] the
     commission required under the contracts, [Appellant] admits that

                                    - 10 -
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      [Castle Realty] suffered damage as a result of the breach. Thus,
      pursuant to the facts admitted by [Appellant], it is clear that (1)
      valid, enforceable contracts existed between [Castle Realty] and
      [Appellant] regarding [Property #1 and Property #2]; (2)
      pursuant to those contracts, [Appellant] had a duty to pay 5%
      commissions on the sales of [Property #1 and Property #2] during
      the contractual one-year terms; (3) [Property #1 and Property
      #2] were sold during the contractual one-year terms; (4)
      [Appellant] failed to pay [Castle Realty] the agreed-upon 5%
      commissions[;] and (5) [Appellant] has not pleaded any lawful
      excuse exists for its nonpayment.

      Applied to the facts before [it, the trial court concludes] that at
      the moment [Property #1 and Property #2] were sold, [Appellant]
      was contractually obligated to remit to [Castle Realty] its 5%
      commission fees on each property. Thus, [Appellant] is in breach
      of contract.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/21, at 3, 5-7 (footnotes, record citations, original

brackets, and extraneous capitalization omitted).

      A review of the pleadings demonstrates that Appellant admitted that it

entered into “an exclusive listing contract” for Property #1 and Property #2

that “granted Castle Realty the exclusive right to sell” the properties. See

Appellant’s Answer to Complaint, New Matter and Counterclaim, 7/8/19, at

¶¶6-8; see also Complaint, 5/22/19, at ¶¶6-8. Appellant further admits that

Contract #1 and Contract #2, which were attached as exhibits to the

complaint, “share identical terms with respect to the duties and obligations of

the parties.”   See Appellant’s Answer to Complaint, New Matter and

Counterclaim, 7/8/19, at ¶9; see also Complaint, 5/22/19, at ¶9. Thus, we

concur with the trial court, and the pleadings support, that Appellant conceded

the existence of the contracts that formed the basis of Castle Realty’s breach

                                    - 11 -
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of contract claim and that the duties and obligations of the parties are

contained within the terms of those agreements.

     Contract #1 and Contract #2 state, in pertinent part, that

     TIME PERIOD OF LISTING – THE TIME PERIOD OF THIS LISTING
     IS NEGOTIABLE. This exclusive right to sell agreement shall be
     effective for a period of one (1) year commencing on [November
     15, 2017, regarding Property #1, and January 12, 2018, regarding
     Property #2] (commencement date) and shall automatically
     terminate at the expiration of the one (1) year listing period. This
     agreement may also be terminated at any time after 365 days
     have elapsed from the commencement date of this agreement by
     [Appellant] giving ten (10) days[] notice in writing delivered to
     [Castle Realty] by certified mail with return receipt. The time
     period of this listing has been determined as the result of
     negotiations between [Castle Realty and Appellant.] This listing
     shall not be terminated unless all of the above requirements have
     been exercised. After the termination of this agreement or any
     extension thereof, [Castle Realty’s] authority shall continue as to
     any outstanding offers pending at the time of such termination. If
     within one year of the termination of this agreement, [Appellant]
     enters into an Agreement of Sale or transfers/exchanges the
     property with any person to whom the property was shown,
     presented or submitted by [Castle Realty], the sale or transfer
     shall be [conclusively] presumed to have been made by [Castle
     Realty] and the commission shall be paid by [Appellant to Castle
     Realty].

     ...

     In the event of a sale, transfer or exchange of the property listed
     herein by whomsoever made or effected, including [Appellant] or
     if [Castle Realty] procures a purchaser ready, willing, and able to
     buy the property at the listing price within the period of time this
     contract is in force, [Appellant] agrees to pay [Castle Realty] a
     commission of [5%] of the selling price[.]

Complaint, 5/22/19, at Exhibit A ¶¶32-41, ¶¶49-52 (extraneous capitalization

and emphasis omitted); see also Complaint, 5/22/19, at Exhibit B ¶¶32-41,

¶¶49-52 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

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       By the clear and unambiguous language of the listing contracts,

Appellant and Castle Realty agreed that Castle Realty would have the

exclusive right to sell Property #1 and Property #2 for a period of one year,

commencing on November 15, 2017, and January 12, 2018, respectively.

Each contract automatically terminated one year from the commencement

date.8   If a property sold while the listing contract was in force, Appellant

agreed to pay Castle Realty a commission on the sale at a rate of 5% of the

purchase price, regardless of whether the property was sold by Appellant or

Castle Realty procured a buyer.

       Appellant agreed that it sold Property #1 on October 18, 2018, for

$650,000.00.       See Appellant’s Answer to Complaint, New Matter and

Counterclaim, 7/8/19, at ¶16; see also Complaint, 5/22/19, at ¶16.

Appellant further agreed that it sold Property #2 on October 31, 2018, but

denied that the buyer had been “identified by Castle Realty” and that the sale

was “part of a like-kind exchange, receiving actual cash consideration of

$1,100,000.00.”       See Appellant’s Answer to Complaint, New Matter and

____________________________________________

8 Although each contract stated Appellant had to right to terminate the
contract upon providing written notice by certified mail, return receipt
requested, with the termination effective ten days after notice was provided,
the parties agreed that the right to terminate only accrued after the expiration
of 365 days from the commencement date. As such, because the parties
agreed that the right to terminate the listing contract only accrued upon the
expiration of 365 days from the commencement date, Appellant had no right
to unilaterally terminate the listing contract during the one-year period
following the commencement date because the listing contract automatically
terminated one year (365 days) after the commencement date.

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Counterclaim, 7/8/19, at ¶17; see also Complaint, 5/22/19, at ¶17.

Appellant asserted, instead, that the sale of Property #2 was “part of a

combined sale with an additional parcel of property that was part of a []

financing package which included two buildings and [required that the two

buildings] be sold together.”         See Appellant’s Answer to Complaint, New

Matter and Counterclaim, 7/8/19, at ¶17.          Appellant further asserted that it

“informed [Castle Realty] that [Property #2] was [] financed with a [certain]

finance package and had to be [] sold together [with the second building and

that Appellant] requested [Castle Realty] either terminate [Contract #2] or

modify the agreement to include both [properties].” Id.

      We concur with the trial court that, based upon the admissions and

assertions by Appellant and the clear and unambiguous language of the listing

contracts, Castle Realty is entitled to a commission on the sale of Property #1

and Property #2 at a rate of 5% of the selling prices. Appellant’s assertion

that it requested Castle Realty to remove Property #1 from the market or to

terminate or modify the listing contract for Property #2 is unavailing as a

defense to Castle Realty’s right to a commission on the sale of both properties.

The   listing   contracts   clearly    and   unambiguously     stated   that,   upon

commencement, the listing contracts were enforceable for a period of one year

(365 days) and that if the properties sold within that one year, Castle Realty

was entitled to a commission regardless of whether Castle Realty procured the

buyer or Appellant sold the properties on its own. Each property was sold

during the one-year period in which the respective listing contract remained

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in force. Thus, Castle Realty was entitled to a commission of 5% of the selling

price of each property. As such, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of

law in the trial court order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of

Castle Realty.

       We cannot, however, concur with the trial court that Castle Realty is

entitled to judgment in the amount of $87,500.00, as a reflection of the

commissions it earned on the sale of both properties. 9 Property #1 sold for

$650,000.00 and Castle Realty is entitled to a commission in the amount of

$32,500.00 ($650,000.00 x 5%).                 Property #2, based upon Appellant’s

admissions and assertions, which must be accepted as true in favor of

Appellant, as the non-moving party, sold during the enforceable period

contemplated by the listing agreement as part of a multi-property real estate

transaction involving Property #2 and another property. The total selling price

of the real estate transaction that included Property #2 was $1,100,000.00.

Castle Realty’s listing contract (Contract #2) was for the sale of Property #2

and did not contemplate the sale of the other property. Thus, the pleadings

demonstrated with the requisite clarity that Appellant is liable to Castle Realty

____________________________________________

9 The judgment in the amount of $87,500.00, as calculated by the trial court,
is comprised of a 5% commission earned on Property #1, $32,500.00
($650,000.00 x 5%), as well as a 5% commission earned on Property #2,
$55,000.00 ($1,100,000.00 x 5%).          For reasons explained infra, the
commission earned on Property #2 cannot be calculated using the full selling
price of $1,100,000.00 because this selling price was reflective of the transfer
of Property #2 and a second property, which was not contemplated by the
agreement set forth in Contract #2.

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for a 5% commission on the portion of the $1,100,000.00 total sale price

attributable to Property #2. Because the exact selling price of Property #2,

exclusive of the other property, is unclear from the pleadings, we remand this

case to the trial court so the trial court may convene an evidentiary proceeding

to determine the portion of the $1,100,000.00 selling price attributable to

Property #2. The portion of the selling price attributable to Property #2, as

determined by the trial court, will then be used to calculate the 5%

commission Castle Realty is entitled to receive on the sale of Property #2.

The trial court is directed to then enter an order for judgment on the pleadings

with judgment comprised of $32,500.00 plus the commission earned on the

sale of Property #2, in addition to pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.10

       In its second issue, Appellant challenges the issuance of a writ of

execution on February 14, 2022, on the ground that Castle Realty’s praecipe

for writ of execution was prematurely filed during the 30-day period following

the January 13, 2022 order. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11.

       Since execution lies within the [trial] court's equitable powers, it
       is the [trial] court's responsibility to see that the execution process
       is not abused. Thus, the [trial] court's decision to deny or grant
       an execution will not be overruled absent an abuse of discretion.

____________________________________________

10The trial court will need to calculate a new pre-judgment interest amount
based upon the total amount of commission Castle Realty is entitled to receive.
The post-judgment interest may be calculated using the rate of $17.04 per
day from November 23, 2021, until payment of the judgment, as previously
set forth in the trial court’s January 13, 2022 order.

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Scampone v. Grane Healthcare Co., 169 A.3d 600, 631 (Pa. Super. 2017),

appeal denied, 188 A.3d 387 (Pa. 2018).

       Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3102 states that “a judgment shall

be enforced by a writ of execution[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P. 3102. Pennsylvania Rule

of Civil Procedure 3103 states that “[e]xecution shall be commenced by filing

a praecipe for a writ of execution with the prothonotary of any county in which

judgment has been entered.”11           Pa.R.Civ.P. 3103(a).   Rule 3103 does not

prescribe a time period within which a party, in whose favor a judgment has

been entered, may seek execution of the judgment. Stated differently, Rule

3103 does not require a party seeking execution of a judgment to wait until

the expiration of the 30-day period in which to file an appeal before filing a

praecipe for writ of execution. Instead, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure

3121 provides that execution of a judgment may be stayed, inter alia, “upon

the entry of bond with the prothonotary, by any person or party in interest,

with security approved by the prothonotary, in the amount of plaintiff's

judgment, including probable interest and costs, or in such lesser amount as

____________________________________________

11 Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the
writ of execution on the ground Castle Realty’s praecipe for writ of execution
was filed during the 30-day appeal period. For the reasons discussed supra,
the filing of a praecipe for writ of execution on February 14, 2022, did not fall
within the 30-day period in which to file an appeal because the January 13,
2022 order was not a final order. The 30-day period in which to file an appeal
did not start to run until the issuance of the May 19, 2022 order nunc pro tunc
that disposed of all parties and all claims. Mindful of this correction, we shall
consider Appellant’s claim as one asserting that Castle Realty’s praecipe for
writ of execution was invalid because it was filed prematurely.

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the court may direct, naming the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as obligee,

and conditioned to pay the amount due within ninety (90) days of the entry

of bond, unless the time for payment be further extended by the court[.]”

Pa.R.Civ.P. 3121(a)(2).       Thus, a defendant against whom a judgment has

been entered may seek a stay of execution by filing an appropriate bond with

the trial court pursuant to Rule 3121(a). Appellant, in the case sub judice,

did not seek such a stay of execution upon entry of judgment against it.

Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion in the issuance of the writ of

execution.12

       For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm that portion of the January

13, 2022 order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Castle Realty.

We vacate that portion of the January 13, 2022 order designating judgment

in the amount of $87,500.00 plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest

and remand this case in accordance with this memorandum.

       January 13, 2022 order affirmed, in part.     January 13, 2022 order

vacated, in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

____________________________________________

12 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1735 provides an automatic stay
of execution upon “[t]he filing of appropriate security in the amount required
by or pursuant to [Chapter 17 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure] within 30 days from the entry of the order appealed from.”
Pa.R.A.P. 1735(a). In the instant case, there is no record that Appellant filed
the appropriate security with this Court to automatically stay the execution.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/15/2023

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