Court Opinion

ID: 9538559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:37:42.797104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:58.723533
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Justice,
dissenting:
I regret that I must dissent. We have now done away with any semblance ,of court control over the DUI case docket and given the prosecutor and the defendant authority to extend any DUI trial without guidance from the court or constraint by the rules.
In State v. Guerrero, 159 Ariz. 568, 570, 769 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1989) we held:
A defendant ... can waive his objection to denial of even the constitutional right to a speedy trial by not raising it in a timely manner. State v. Adair, 106 Ariz. 58, 60, 470 P.2d 671, 673 (1970).
I dissented, stating:
What the majority opinion does is completely gut the 150 day speedy trial rule of Hinson v. Coulter, 150 Ariz. 306, 723 P.2d 655 (1986), and the provision of Rule 8.2(e), Ariz.R.Crim.P., 17 A.R.S., which states that the time limits “may not be extended by stipulation or waiver____” Under the majority’s ruling, defendants and prosecutors will be allowed to avoid the speedy trial requirements of Hinson and Rule 8 by merely doing nothing.
Id. 159 Ariz. at 571, 769 P.2d 1014. The majority in Guerrero gave lip service to Hinson. Today, the majority goes too far by completely reversing Hinson.
Driving under the influence is the most destructive crime in this or any other state. More people are killed or maimed by drunk drivers than by criminals who murder or assault their victims. It injures the rich, the poor, the young, the old, the driver and the passenger without discrimination. The victims usually have no way to avoid the alcohol-impaired driver. The property loss is staggering.
Today the majority takes the enforcement of the speedy trial rule in DUI cases from the court and gives it to the tender mercies of dilatory defendants and overworked prosecutors.
The majority, however, finds that the problem is resolved, stating:
Hinson’s primary goal of quickly removing drunk drivers from our streets is now accomplished by the “Administrative Per Se law,” A.R.S. § 28-694, and the Implied Consent Statute, A.R.S. § 28-691, which became effective on January 1, 1988. These laws allow a police officer to seize the driver’s license of any driver whose BAC is .10 or higher or who refuses to submit to a breath or blood test.
At 190, 823 P.2d at 57.
Even if this statute passes constitutional muster, I believe it is naive to think that it will accomplish our goal of quick removal of the drunk driver from our streets. The cases that come before us usually involve defendants who are driving with a license that is already revoked. Indeed, the defendant in Hinson was indicted for 7 counts of DUI with two prior convictions. The defendant in Guerrero was arrested for DWI, driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.10 and for driving with a suspended or revoked license. This defendant had two prior convictions. Merely suspending the license at the time of the arrest is not going to “quickly” remove drunk drivers from our streets.
The majority also states:
*196With regard to the dimming over time of witnesses’ opinions and observations most witness opinions and observations obviously dim with time. Moreover, this may actually be less of a problem in DUI cases than in other criminal cases because identification of the defendant is rarely an issue, and DUI trials usually do not involve the questioning of numerous witnesses to piece together events and conversations that occurred over various periods of time. Thus, the “fleeting” nature of evidence in DUI cases is not a sufficient justification for the special application of rule 8 in DUI cases mandated by Hinson.
At 190-191, 823 P.2d at 57-58.
I agree that DUI cases are easier to try. Therefore, they can and should be disposed of quickly. As we noted in Hinson, “It should not be impossible to prosecute a suspected drunk driver within a reasonable time after arrest. The cases do not require long investigative delays, as most of the evidence is gathered contemporaneously with arrest.” 150 Ariz. at 310, 723 P.2d at 659.
I believe that the rule in Hinson accurately follows the intent of the legislature and, just as important, it affords greater protection to the public.
I dissent.