Court Opinion

ID: 9740597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:38:13.154989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.084775
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN, dissenting: The accused shall ‘he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation (U.S. Const, amend. VI) or, otherwise stated, the accused shall have the right to “demand the nature and cause of the accusation” (III. Const, art. I, § 8). These constitutional mandates have been supplemented by statute. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, § 111 — 3(a)(3).) Consequently, an indictment must allege the necessary elements of the offense charged. It is by this standard that the validity of an indictment is tested. When the standard is met, the natural result will bes to enable the defendant to prepare his defense and to avoid double jeopardy.1 By omitting any necessary element, the indictment fails to charge the accused with the criminal offense (People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 494 (1950)) is void (People v. Wallace, 57 Ill.2d 285, 288 (1974)) and thereby bars a plea of double jeopardy (People v. Somerville, 88 Ill.App.2d 212, 215-18, appeal denied, 37 Ill.2d 627 (1968)). Also see Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 93 S.Ct. 1066 (1973). From 1845 to 1962, it was unnecessary, for the crime here charged, to plead any act constituting a substantial step toward commission of the intended offense. During that time, the instant crime would have been categorized under the general classification of “assault” which was defined as “an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.” (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 38, § 55.) It is to be noted that assault was synonymous with attempt. The earlier statute provided that “Whoever attempts to commit murder by poisoning, drowning, strangling or suffocating another, or by any means, shall be guilty of * * * assault with intent to murder * * IH. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 38, § 59. The change occurred in 1961 when the legislature enacted a general attempt section designed to govern attempts to commit all offenses previously covered by specific provisions relating to individual offenses. (Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 8 — 4, at 513 (1972).) One of the first cases to interpret the section was People v. Richardson, 32 Ill.2d 497, 502 (1965). There the sufficiency of proof, not the indictment, was at issue; however, the court set forth the necessary elements by stating: “All that need be shown in a charge of attempt is the intent to commit a specific offense (here, theft from the person) and an overt act constituting a substantial step toward commission of that offense (here, the insertion of defendant’s hands into John Overbea’s pockets). These elements have been established.” Research of subsequent supreme court cases wherein tire validity of the charge of attempt has been challenged and the verbiage of the indictment has been expressed, reveals that in each instance the indictments contained facts describing the act which constituted a substantial step toward the commission of the intended offense. See People v. Woodward, 55 Ill.2d 134, 135 (1973); People v. Lonzo, 59 Ill.2d 115, 116 (1974). The majority relies on tire cited cases of People v. Williams and People v. Lonzo. At issue in Williams was whether, in addition to the necessary elements of attempt, the indictment must also include the required elements of the intended offense. The court, answering the question in the negative, relied in part upon State v. Doran, 99 Me. 329, 332, 59 A. 440, 442 (1904), by quoting a portion of that decision. In Doran, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine preceded the Williams quote with the statement: “According to the great weight of authority, however, as well as upon sound reason, the ulterior felony intended need not be set out as fully and specifically as would be required in an indictment for the actual commission of such felony.” 99 Me. 329, 333, 59 A. 440, 442. The indictment in Doran read: “[T]he defendant, ‘with force and arms the car numbered 18656 of the Boston & Maine Railroad 999 feloniously, wilfully and maliciously did attempt to break and enter for the purpose of committing a felony.’ ” (99 Me. 329, 330, 59 A. 440, 440.) It is noteworthy to mention that in the Doran case, the court found the indictment insufficient, stating: “The indictment contains neither a description of the overt act done by the accused in attempting to commit the crime charged, nor a specification of the particular felony which the defendant is charged with attempting to commit, after breaking and entering the car. * * * ‘An indictment for an attempt to commit burglary must not only allege the attempt and intent but it is essential that it also allege the overt acts relied upon as constituting the attempt’ ” 99 Me. 329, 331-32, 59 A. 440, 441. In Lonzo, an attempt theft case, the appellate comt reversed the judgment on the grounds that the complaint was insufficient for not alleging ownership of the property involved. The supreme court, in reversing, found ownership to be an element of the completed offense not necessary to the charge of attempt theft, and reiterated the rule set forth in Williams. More pertinent, however, is the fact that the complaint in Lonzo described the overt a.ct the case sub judice, the issue does not concern the pleading of the elements of the intended offense, but whether the elements of the crime of attempt are sufficiently set forth in tire indictment. Hie indictment charges “that on the sixth day of March, 1971, 999 Ronald Richard Mass, « * * committed the offense of Attempt, in that [he], with intent to commit the offense of Murder, attempted to kill and murder Louis Cotti.” The specific intent pleaded is murder but the “act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense” is lacking, unless it can be said that the act is “attempted to kill and murder Louis Cotti.” As defendant argues, however, attempt is the offense itself and cannot also be the act which constitutes a substantial step. In short, defendant is charged with attempt murder, in that he, with intent to murder, attempted to murder. The majority also finds support in People v. Fowler, 8 Ill.App.3d 927 (1972), which relied upon People v. Drink, 85 Ill.App.2d 202 (1967), and the authorities cited therein. Authorities cited in both these cases do not speak to the issue before us for at the time of those decisions it was unnecessary, under the statute, to plead an act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the intended offense. The * * overt act is the essence of the offense.’ ” (Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 8 — 4, at 512 (1972).) Therefore, I am of the opinion, contrary to Fowler and Drink, that by not stating the act, the indictment herein, failed to charge an offense and was void. I would reverse.   To test the validity of a criminal charge, some courts, without regard to the indictment’s inclusion of the necessary elements of the crime, have, from a reading of the indictment, concluded that the accused could properly prepare his defense and avoid further prosecution for the same offense. I submit that this “test” is without guidelines and is therefore no test at all;. that such procedure allows various interpretations to be drawn dependent upon the views or visceral reaction of the individual reader.