Court Opinion

ID: 9592195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:11:23.235044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:34.484957
License: Public Domain

CARMODY, Chief Justice (dissenting). Reluctantly, I am unable to concur in the opinion of the court. My basic disagreement is upon two separate, although in some ways related, points discussed in the opinion. My first objection relates to the majority’s disposition of the claim that there are sufficient definite legislative standards to guide the state agencies in carrying out the “projects,” as defined in the Act. I cannot agree. Section 11-10-2, N.M.S.A. 19S3, 1963 Pocket Supp., which is quoted by the majority, provides, in part, “to authorize the financing of certain public facilities used or useful in the performance of state functions”; then § 11-10-5(A) provides, in substance, that the construction, maintenance, repair and operation of any “project or projects” are essential governmental functions. We then must refer to § 11-10-3(C), which defines “projects,” and, for the purpose of this case, § 11-10-3 (C) (1) enumerates a multitude of things which the State Park and Recreation Commission is authorized to undertake. The wide grant of authority under this subsection is so general and broadly encompassing that I feel it bears repeating here. The entire subsection reads as follows: “C. ‘Project’ means any of the following public works, either singly or in any combination of public works embraced within any one [1] of the following enumerated paragraphs: “(1) Public works, undertaken and carried out by the state park and recreation commission in state parks and in other park and recreation areas owned, leased or controlled by the state, comprising recreation facilities for the use, accommodation, convenience, enjoyment and welfare of the general public, including but not limited to cabins, lodges, lavatories, bathhouses, stables, commercial and service facilities, other buildings and structures, camps, campsites, trailer parks, vehicular parking facilities, water, sewerage and other utilities, trails, roads, bridges, tunnels, overpasses, viaducts, underpasses, scenic parkways and drives, marinas, basins, harbors, docks, piers, wharves, aircraft landing strips and terminals and other facilities for sports, games, entertainment and other recreational and cultural activities including but not limited to swimming, boating, fishing, camping, skiing, riding, picnicking, hiking, climbing, golfing, hunting, tennis, sightseeing, motoring, music, art and drama; * * (Emphasis added.) Thus the State Park and Recreation Commission is authorized to do any of the things specifically enumerated, and apparently all others which they, in their unbridled judgment, determine is a recreational or cultural activity for the welfare of the general public. Once this Commission makes the decision (assuming, of course, it is approved by the Authority itself), it thereby becomes, under the Act, an “essential governmental function.” In this connection, Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d ed., Unabridged, defines “recreational” as an adjective of “recreation,” which is defined as: “Act of recreating, or state of being recreated; refreshment of the strength and spirits after toil; diversion; play; also a mode or means of getting diversion or refreshment. Syn.- -See Play. Ant. — See Work.” and defines “cultural” as an adjective of “culture,” which is in turn partially defined as: “Act of developing by education, discipline, etc.; the training or refining of the moral and intellectual nature. * * * The state of being cultivated; esp., the enlightenment and refinement of taste acquired by intellectual and aesthetic training; the intellectual content of civilization; refinement in manners, taste, thought, etc. * * * Con-versance with and taste in fine arts, humanities, and broad aspects of science ; — distinguished from vocational, technical, or professional skill or knowledge. * * * Syn. — See Civilization.” It seems that the legislature has delegated to the State Park and Recreation Commission and the State Authority not just the authority to make findings of fact hut to actually make law in the determination that a particular project is an essential governmental function. Fully recognizing that the legislature must, of necessity, delegate to other agencies the power necessary to accomplish the purpose of legislation, nevertheless, the present Act goes further than this and cannot he sustained. In my judgment, the Act here involved is contrary to art. Ill, § 1, of the Constitution of New Mexico, and I believe the court’s opinion is at variance with our decisions in State ex rel. Sofeico v. Heffernan, 1937, 41 N.M. 219, 67 P.2d 240; and State ex rel. Holmes v. State Board of Finance, 1961, 69 N.M. 430, 367 P.2d 925. Although this court has many times discussed the question of “standards,” I fully recognize that the term “standards” is not always - given the same construction in decisions not only in New Mexico hut in other state jurisdictions. I would prefer that' the questions to be answered by the court in a case of this type, relating to the claimed unconstitutionality of a statute, would he by the more practical method as suggested by Professor Davis. See 1 Administrative Law, Treatise, Davis, § 2.15. See also Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of Northern Ky., Inc. (Ky.1961), 352 S.W.2d 203. In any event, whether called “standards” or something else, the Act is sadly deficient in that there is no provision for any control over the State Park Recreation Commission or the Authority other than the broad generalizations contained in the definition of “projects.” I would also point out that there is no provision anywhere in the Act for a hearing, for any procedural safeguards, or legislative supervision ; there is nothing in the statute which would afford protection against unfairness, arbitrariness or favoritism. My second objection to the decision today announced is the court’s determination that the title of the Act gives reasonable notice of its subject matter. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the only matter before us in this case and all that is determined by the court’s opinion is the constitutionality of the Act insofar as it concerns the State Park and Recreation Commission. The other subsections of § 11-10-3 (C), viz., 3, 4 and 5, are, in no sense, at issue in this case. With this in mind, the entire title of the Act is here set out: "An act relating to state projects financed by revenue bonds; - creating the New Mexico state authority and defining its powers and duties; authorizing the authority and agencies of the state to construct, finance, operate and lease projects and to issue revenue bonds therefor without a pledge of property taxes or the faith and credit of the state; authorizing the acquisition of property; providing for toll and other charges sufficient to pay such bonds and project operating expenses; exempting the bonds, their transfers and the incomes therefrom from taxation; authorizing revenue refunding bonds and bond anticipation notes; prescribing the rights and remedies of the holders of the bonds; and providing for the leasing of projects.” My brethren say that this title gives reasonable notice of the subject matter, yet the State Park and Recreation Commission is not named except as included in “agencies of the state,” even though this same commission is specifically granted, as I previously have attempted to point out, the authority to determine that recreational or cultural activities almost without number are essential governmental functions. So also the title refers to “projects,” without any intimation of the broad sweep of authority granted to the State Park and Recreation Commission apd the Authority as to-their determination-as--to what are-“projects.”- ’ ' I fully recognize that we have consistently held that no law will be held unconstitutional unless its invalidity is so apparent as to leave no reasonable doubt; also that the title cannot be expected to be a complete index to the provisions of the statute. However, the very purpose of art. IV, § 18, is to prevent fraud or surprise upon the legislature of hidden or concealed provisions of which the title gives no intimation. See State v. Ingalls, 1913, 18 N.M. 211, 135 P. 1177; Fowler v. Corlett, 1952, 56 N.M. 430, 244 P.2d 1122; First Thrift and Loan Association v. State, 1956, 62 N.M. 61, 304 P.2d 582; and Ballew v. Denson, 1958, 63 N.M. 370, 320 P.2d 382. I also realize and am in full sympathy with our holdings that the term “subject” as used in the Constitution is to be given a broad and extended meaning and to be liberally construed, so that all matters having a logical or natural connection may be embraced in the act. See Johnson v. Greiner, 1940, 44 N.M. 230, 101 P.2d 183; State ex rel. Taylor v. Mirabal, 1928, 33 N.M. 553, 273 P. 928, 62 A.L.R. 296; and State v. Miller, 1928, 33 N.M. 200, 263 P. 510. It is so apparent to me, nevertheless, that the particular portion of the Act with which we are concerned contains such a broad comprehensive grant of authority to the State Park and Recreation • Commission and the Authority that it seems obvi-eras that there was a lack of sufficient notice to the legislature, or to anyone reading the title, that the Act itself contained the sweeping authority which it purports to grant. I believe this is exactly the type of statute which was intended to be prohibited by art. IV, § 16, of our Constitution. I quite understand that in our regular biennial sessions of the legislature, one of which is in session at the present time, it is almost impossible for the members of that honored body to familiarize themselves with the contents of all the bills that come before them. I find it hard to believe that the members of the legislature in 1963, who voted to approve the Act here involved, could have realized the far-reaching consequences made possible by the passage of this legislation, and most certainly unless each individual studied the Act in full, he had no notice of the enormous powers granted to the State Park and Recreation Commission and the Authority —certainly it could not have been determined from a mere reading of the title. One further deficiency in the title (and I do not mean to say that there may not be others) is the complete lack of any notice of the content of the provisions of § 11-10-26 relating to the inapplicability of all laws inconsistent with the Bond Act. Certainly, such a broad provision, which is not an implied repealer but is apparently something else, should have been noted in the title. In no sense do I wish to be understood as objecting to the beneficial purpose apparently intended by the Act, my quarrel merely being on a legal basis and designed not only to voice my personal alarm but to perhaps alert the members of the legislative branch of our state government to the dangers involved in the enactment of a statute such as this. My disagreement with the majority, going as it does to the very foundation of the constitutionality of the Act, makes unnecessary any discussion of the remaining points set out in the opinion, but should not be considered as an expression of approval of the disposition made as to the other issues. I dissent.