Court Opinion

ID: 9571334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:52.159485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:18.178068
License: Public Domain

*255TEIGEN, Judge
(concurring specially and dissenting in part).
I concur in the result and in the syllabus of the majority except for Syllabus No. 4 and that part of the opinion written to support it.
The majority have given the trial court’s findings in this case “the same weight as a jury verdict”. The majority have reasoned that, under Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., which states that the “findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses,”
“It follows that if we are to apply this rule, we must apply as a corollary the rule that is applied in jury cases when a sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict is questioned, and that is that in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict (here,- judge’s findings) the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.”
This court adopted verbatim the above quoted portion of Rule 52(a) from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the object of attaining uniformity, and also to have the benefit of the decisions of the federal courts interpreting their rules. Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 2585, sets forth the results of their examination into the federal cases, and the advisory committee notes, as to the meaning of the “clearly erroneous” rule. It states as follows:
“Rule 52(a) provides that ‘findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.’ Thus the findings are presumptively correct. The burden is on the appellant to persuade the reviewing court that a finding was ‘clearly erroneous.’ In the colorful phrase of one court, the findings ‘come here well armed with the buckler and shield’ of Rule 52(a).
“This respect for the findings of the trial court cannot be pressed too far. It is simply wrong to say, as one court has, that the ‘findings will be given the force and effect of a jury verdict.’ History is clear that the draftsmen of the rule rejected proposals to apply the limited review of a jury verdict to findings of a judge. Thus it is not accurate to say that the appellate court takes that view of the evidence that is most favorable to the ap-pellee, that it assumes that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in his favor, and that he must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences. All of this is true in reviewing a jury verdict. It is not true when it is findings of the court that are being reviewed. Instead, the appellate court may examine all of the evidence in the record. It will presume that the trial court relied only on evidence properly admissible in making its findings in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary. It must give great weight to the findings made and the inferences drawn by the trial judge, but it must reject his findings if it considers them to be clearly erroneous.
“Although there is force to the observation that ‘it is idle to try to define’ what is meant by ‘clearly erroneous’, the definition announced by the Supreme Court in 1948 has been reiterated many times by that Court and the courts of appeals and is the definitive test in reviewing findings:
“A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
“In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous the rule requires that due regard be given to the opportunity of *256the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Nevertheless, on the better view, the standard of review set out in Rule 52(a) applies in all nonjury cases and the findings cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous even though they are based on documentary evidence or on inferences from undisputed facts. The conclusions of law of the trial judge arc. not protected by the ‘clearly erroneous’ test.
“The appellate court, in reviewing findings, does not consider and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere fact that on the same evidence the appellate court might have reached a different result does not justify it in setting the findings aside. It may regard a finding as clearly erroneous only if the finding is without adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view of the law. Insofar as a finding is derived from the application of an improper legal standard to the facts, it cannot stand.
“If a finding is not supported by substantial evidence, it will be found to be clearly erroneous. Some cases state a converse proposition that a finding that is supported by substantial evidence cannot be clearly erroneous. This is not the law. If the findings are against the clear weight - of the evidence or the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the appellate court will set the findings aside even though there is evidence supporting them that, by itself, would be substantial.”
On the basis of this history I am of the opinion that we should adhere to our interpretation of Rule 52(a) as set forth in Kee v. Redlin, 203 N.W.2d 423 (N.D.1972).
However, viewing the evidence in the light which I suggest, I conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact must be sustained.