Court Opinion

ID: 9957028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 15:05:49.870857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:03.188304
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                           FABIOLA RAMIREZ,
                               Appellant,

                                     v.

                         DOMINICK MARZANO,
                              Appellee.

                            No. 4D2023-1170

                              [April 3, 2024]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Lorena V. Mastrarrigo, Judge; L.T. Case No. FMCE19-
007440.

    Natalie P. Mescolotto of NM Legal, P.A., Fort Lauderdale (withdrew after
filing briefs), and Tracy B. Newmark and Natalie S. Kay of Kelley
Kronenberg, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

   Robert J. Moraitis and Peter M. Raimondi of Moraitis & Raimondi, LLP,
Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

GERBER, J.

   The mother appeals from the circuit court’s order granting the father’s
verified ex parte emergency motion to temporarily suspend the mother’s
overnight timesharing and/or to prevent the mother from removing the
child from the jurisdiction. The mother also appeals from a non-
evidentiary return hearing order which slightly modified the ex parte order.

    The mother argues the circuit court’s orders violated her due process
rights where: (1) the mother was previously made aware of the father’s
allegations against her at an earlier hearing, and yet the circuit court
verbally directed the father to file an ex parte emergency motion which
could be granted without the mother having an opportunity to respond;
and (2) after granting the father’s ex parte emergency motion, the circuit
court did not provide the mother with a promptly noticed evidentiary
hearing at which she could contest the father’s allegations.

   We agree with both of the mother’s arguments and reverse both orders.
                            Procedural History

    The father filed a motion for contempt alleging the mother had violated
a prior order compelling the mother to take the four-year-old child to
school on her timesharing days unless the child was sick or some other
emergency existed. The father set a hearing on his contempt motion. Both
parties and their counsel attended the hearing. The circuit court indicated
its belief that it could not consider the father’s contempt motion, because
the mother had filed an appeal from the prior order, as well as a motion to
stay the circuit court proceedings pending the disposition of that appeal.

   The father’s counsel then orally requested the circuit court to hear
emergency matters which the circuit court could consider despite the
mother’s pending appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.600(c)(1) (“In family law
matters … [t]he lower tribunal shall retain jurisdiction to enter and enforce
orders … necessary to protect the welfare and rights of any party pending
appeal.”). The circuit court asked if the father’s counsel had notified the
mother’s counsel of the emergency matters before the hearing. After the
father’s counsel responded he had not, the circuit court replied:

      How about both counsels go outside, you advise her of the
      emergency. [Addressing the father’s counsel] I mean, you
      know you can file it as an ex parte emergency motion, but try
      to inform her about it now. And it’s something that we can go
      forward while we are all here dealing with that instead of the
      other motion. We’ll deal with that now instead of the actual
      motion that it is set for. And if not, you can just file it as an
      ex parte emergency motion and I’ll deal with it as soon as you
      file it.

      ….

      [Addressing the mother’s counsel] So go outside and talk
      because you know that [the father’s counsel] can just walk to
      his office, drive to his office, file an ex parte emergency motion
      and I can deal with that without you guys being here. Since
      you are here, I’m asking you guys to go outside and talk.

(emphases added).

   The parties and their counsel stepped out of the courtroom as
instructed, but returned a short time later. The father’s counsel argued
the emergency matters arose from information which he had learned

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during the mother’s deposition taken three weeks earlier. The father’s
counsel learned that during the mother’s timesharing, instead of taking
the child to school in Broward County, the mother had been taking the
child to Orlando to stay with her at a man’s home. However, the mother
would not divulge the man’s identity, background, or living arrangements.

   The mother’s counsel responded that the father’s counsel had not
noticed those emergency matters for hearing or by filing a petition. The
mother’s counsel also responded that no emergency existed, not only in
substance, but also because the father’s counsel had not raised those
matters in the three weeks since the mother’s deposition. A few minutes
later, the following exchange occurred between the circuit court and the
mother’s counsel:

      COURT: It doesn’t have to be an emergency matter, but it can,
      along with that and taking the child out of the county without
      agreement from the father, I think all of that combined, I’m
      sure [the father’s counsel] can write a nice emergency motion,
      ex parte emergency motion for me to address.

      So we are here, so sometimes I think it’s better to be here and
      talk things out before everything has to be put in writing and
      then hand it over to me to decide.

      ….

      MOTHER’S COUNSEL: Your Honor, without an opportunity
      to present evidence on the matter … without my client having
      an opportunity to present evidence and have opportunity to
      be heard, I don’t believe the Court can order emergency relief
      without it being --

      COURT: I’m not doing it today. I’m not doing it today. But
      you know that [the father’s counsel] can actually file it as an
      ex parte emergency motion, which you would not receive notice
      for, and I would rule on my own in my chambers and then
      enter an order and that’s when you would be advised.

      That’s why I’m saying, we are here, he’s made you aware of it,
      so if there’s some form of you guys agreeing to something
      instead of [the father’s counsel] actually going through the
      process and filing this ex parte emergency motion where you
      won’t be part of the decision-making, that’s why I asked you
      guys to go outside and talk to see if you can agree on

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      something instead of [the father’s counsel] having to go through
      the process of putting it in writing and then putting it in my
      hand, which he’s not required to give you notice on ex parte
      emergency motion, right?

      MOTHER’S COUNSEL: Understood.

      COURT: So that’s why I was trying to give you time to go talk
      instead of leaving it up to me when [the father’s counsel]
      properly does it in writing. So maybe you want to go talk again
      after I made that part clear.

      MOTHER’S COUNSEL: Your Honor, I think we probably both
      agree that we are not going to make any progress on this --

      COURT: Okay.

      MOTHER’S COUNSEL: -- issue today.

      COURT [addressing the father’s counsel]: Then file your
      motion … and I will rule on it when it’s in front of me.

(emphases added).

   Over the next few days after the hearing, the parties’ counsel
communicated as the circuit court had directed, but no resolution was
reached.

   Thirteen days after the hearing, the father filed his ex parte emergency
motion to temporarily suspend the mother’s overnight timesharing and/or
to prevent the mother from removing the child from the jurisdiction. As
the father’s counsel had mentioned at the hearing, the father’s ex parte
motion alleged the mother had “continue[d] to travel to Orlando with the
child which includes several overnights per week.” Notably, the father’s
ex parte motion also alleged the child had told the father that “[she] sleeps
in bed with [a grown man]” while in Orlando with the mother, and that the
mother required the child to wear diapers during the four-hour drives back
and forth to Orlando, causing the child to regress developmentally. Thus,
the father’s ex parte motion alleged the father had “an immediate and well-
founded fear for the child’s health, safety, and welfare.”

   Twelve days after the father had filed his ex parte emergency motion,
the circuit court entered an order granting the ex parte emergency motion.
The ex parte order pertinently provided: “Until further order of the Court,

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there shall be no overnight timesharing between [the mother] and minor
child” and “[the mother] shall not remove the child from Broward County.”
However, the ex parte order allowed the mother to pick up the child from
school during the week so long as she returned the child to the father each
evening. The ex parte order further allowed the mother to pick up the child
from the father on weekend mornings so long as she returned the child to
the father each weekend evening.

   The ex parte order also set a return hearing to occur ten days later on
the circuit court’s non-evidentiary uniform motion calendar. Both parties
and their counsel appeared at the return hearing. The father’s counsel
requested the circuit court to extend the ex parte order for at least another
month while the father’s counsel continued his investigation to support a
petition for timesharing modification which would be filed for the circuit
court’s later consideration.

   The mother’s counsel responded that the circuit court should vacate
the ex parte order for three reasons: (1) no basis existed for the father to
have filed an ex parte emergency motion when the matters upon which the
father had based his motion had been raised at the prior hearing over one
month earlier; (2) the father could not file a petition for modification in an
attempt to retroactively cure the ex parte order’s improper entry; and (3)
the circuit court had not set the return hearing as an evidentiary hearing,
but instead on the court’s non-evidentiary uniform motion calendar, which
deprived the mother of due process.

   The circuit court replied that it would set a later evidentiary hearing at
which the parties could testify regarding the matters upon which the father
had based his ex parte emergency motion. But then the circuit court
abruptly pivoted, offering to conduct the evidentiary hearing at that
moment. The mother’s counsel objected, arguing that because the circuit
court had set the return hearing on its non-evidentiary uniform motion
calendar, the mother’s counsel was not prepared for an unnoticed
evidentiary hearing, which would also deprive the mother of due process.
The mother’s counsel argued that if the circuit court was not going to
vacate the ex parte order, the mother alternatively requested the court to
modify the ex parte order to allow the mother to resume weekend overnight
timesharing.

   The father’s counsel responded the father would agree to the mother
resuming weekend overnight timesharing, so long as the mother did not
remove the child from Broward County. The circuit court agreed to that
modification. The circuit court also directed the parties to contact its

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judicial assistant to set an evidentiary hearing regarding the matters upon
which the father had based his ex parte emergency motion.

   After the hearing, the circuit court entered its written order from the
return hearing, allowing the mother to pick up the child from school each
Friday and keep the child until that Sunday evening when she would
return the child to the father. The return hearing order continued to
prohibit the mother from removing the child from Broward County. The
return hearing order otherwise incorporated by reference the ex parte
order’s remaining non-conflicting portions.

   When the mother’s counsel contacted the circuit court’s judicial
assistant to set the evidentiary hearing regarding the matters upon which
the father had based his ex parte emergency motion, the earliest date
available on the circuit court’s calendar was four months later.

                               This Appeal

   The mother chose instead to file this appeal of the circuit court’s ex
parte order and its return hearing order. We have jurisdiction to consider
the appeal of both orders. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(3)(c)(iii)b. (appeals to
the district courts of appeal of nonfinal orders include those orders that
“determine … in family law matters … the rights or obligations of a party
regarding child custody or time-sharing under a parenting plan”).

    The mother argues the circuit court’s orders violated her due process
rights where: (1) the mother was previously made aware of the father’s
allegations against her at an earlier hearing, and yet the circuit court
verbally directed the father to file an ex parte emergency motion which
could be granted without the mother having an opportunity to respond;
and (2) after granting the father’s ex parte emergency motion, the circuit
court did not provide the mother with a promptly noticed evidentiary
hearing at which she could contest the father’s allegations.

   We agree with both of the mother’s arguments. We will address each
argument in turn.

    First, “a motion seeking an ex parte temporary injunction—or for that
matter, seeking almost any immediate ex parte relief—must demonstrate
how and why providing reasonable notice would actually accelerate,
precipitate, or otherwise permit the threatened irreparable injury to occur.”
Smith v. Crider, 932 So. 2d 393, 397 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (emphases added).
Here, the father’s contempt motion based on the mother’s alleged violation
of the prior timesharing order, and the father’s arguments at the hearing

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on his contempt motion, already had put the mother on notice of the
grounds upon which he was seeking relief against the mother. Thus, the
father did not reasonably show that filing an ex parte emergency motion
thirteen days later, based on the same grounds, “would actually
accelerate, precipitate, or otherwise permit the threatened irreparable
injury to occur.” Id.

   Second, after the mother objected to the circuit court having set the
return hearing on its non-evidentiary uniform motion calendar, the circuit
court was unable to set a properly noticed evidentiary hearing regarding
the matters upon which the father had based his ex parte emergency
motion until four months later, thus depriving the mother of a prompt
opportunity to be heard. See Smith, 932 So. 2d at 398 (where a trial court
enters an order temporarily modifying custody of a child without affording
prior notice to the opposing party based on the existence of an emergency
situation, “an opportunity to be heard should be provided to the opposing
party as soon thereafter as possible”); Ashby v. Murray, 113 So. 3d 951,
954 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“[B]efore entering an emergency modification
order, every reasonable effort should be made to ensure both parties have
an opportunity to be heard. If this is not possible ... an opportunity to be
heard should be provided as soon thereafter as possible.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). While we appreciate the very busy
dockets of our trial court colleagues, we do not consider a four-month
delay to obtain an evidentiary hearing regarding the matters upon which
the father had based his ex parte emergency motion to have been “as soon
thereafter as possible.” Id.

   The circuit court’s abrupt attempt to conduct the evidentiary hearing
immediately upon the mother’s objection was not a reasonable solution
either, as the mother did not have adequate notice and opportunity to be
prepared to participate in an unnoticed evidentiary hearing. As our sister
court stated in Juliano v. Juliano, 687 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997):

         While we believe that trial courts should have great
      discretion over their procedures, including the functioning of
      their motion calendars, … [i]t is expected that motion calendar
      hearings are for the purpose of resolving matters which
      require little time and are limited to arguments of counsel.
      While there is nothing to prevent the trial court from hearing
      testimony in uncontested matters, or by agreement of all
      involved, testimony in disputed matters comes as a surprise
      at motion calendar. Accordingly, to avoid sandbagging of
      parties, if the court is to allow testimony in disputed motion
      calendar hearings, specific notice of such intention must be

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      given, with a sufficient interval to prepare and adequate
      opportunity to present contrary testimony prior to ruling.

Id. at 911; cf. Hodge v. Babcock, 340 So. 3d 521, 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)
(quashing order that had required the father to return the parties’ minor
child to the mother, because the trial court violated the father’s due
process right at the hearing which had produced this order, where the
father came to court “expecting a one-hour evidentiary hearing on his
motion, but instead found that his injunction motion had been set on the
trial court’s five-minute motions calendar”).

                  Conclusion and Remand Directions

   Based on the foregoing, we reverse both the order granting the father’s
verified ex parte emergency motion to temporarily suspend overnight
timesharing and/or to prevent the mother from removing the child from
the jurisdiction, as well as the circuit court’s return hearing order.

   At this time, however, months have elapsed since the entry of the two
orders on appeal, during which the parents presumably have obeyed those
orders. Thus, although we reverse the two orders on appeal, we remand
with directions that the two orders on appeal remain in effect, and that the
circuit court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matters upon
which the father had based his ex parte emergency motion within twenty
days from the issuance of our mandate, unless both parties agree to hold
a hearing at a later date. See Smith, 932 So. 2d at 400. At that hearing,
the father must present competent, substantial evidence supporting his
motion. See id.

    We also remand with directions for the case to be reassigned to a
different judge. Despite the father lacking a basis to file an ex parte
emergency motion to obtain the relief which he was seeking against the
mother, the circuit court departed from its neutral role by repeatedly
suggesting at the initial hearing—on eight separate occasions emphasized
above—that the father could, and ultimately should, file such an ex parte
emergency motion. The circuit court also appeared to use the possible
granting of such an ex parte emergency motion as leverage to cause the
mother to discuss resolving the matter by agreement, rather than
providing the mother with a prompt opportunity to respond with evidence.
Such actions were improper. See Fla. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon
3.B.(7)(a) (“A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte
communications, or consider other communications made to the judge
outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending
proceeding except that … [w]here circumstances require, ex parte

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communications for … emergencies that do not deal with substantive
matters or issues on the merits are authorized, provided … the judge
reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or tactical
advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and … the judge
makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance of the
ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to respond.”).

   Neither the parties nor the newly-assigned judge should interpret our
reversal in this appeal as a comment on the parties’ respective positions
on the merits of the matters upon which the father had based his ex parte
emergency motion. We take no such position, which would be premature.

   Orders reversed; remanded with directions.

GROSS and CONNER, JJ., concur.

                           *         *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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