Court Opinion

ID: 9880146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 19:04:46.088124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:08.708483
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MUNDY, Dissenting
  

   Resto was sentenced pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a)(3), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence for persons convicted of certain offenses including 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c), the offense which Resto was found guilty of by a jury. Section 9718(c) of the sentencing statute provides as follows:
  

    (c) Proof at sentencing.-
   
   the provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime and notice of the provisions of this section to the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary additional evidence and shall determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable.
  

   42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(c). This or similar language has been the subject of scrutiny in this Commonwealth since the decision in
   
    Alleyne v. United States
   
   ,
   
    570 U.S. 99
   
   ,
   
    133 S.Ct. 2151
   
   ,
   
    186 L.Ed.2d 314
   
   (2013). I have maintained my personal view that statutes with the above language may be applied in certain situations, notwithstanding the language that deems sentencing enhancing facts as non-elements and directs the sentencing courts to find these non-elemental facts by a preponderance of the evidence, without running afoul of
   
    Alleyne
   
   . However, as a matter of adhering to this Court's precedent regarding mandatory minimum sentencing schemes in Pennsylvania, I would conclude Resto's judgment of sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing. Accordingly, I dissent.
  

   In
   
    Alleyne
   
   , the United States Supreme Court held that pursuant to the rights afforded under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, any fact which by law increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an element of the offense and therefore must be, inter alia, submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Simply put, sentencing statutes may no longer tie the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence to a fact found by a sentencing court by a preponderance of the evidence. Following the
   
    Alleyne
   
   decision, the courts of this Commonwealth were tasked with how to reconcile the new rule with a number of similarly-patterned Pennsylvania sentencing statutes that direct the sentencing court to impose a mandatory minimum sentence if it finds an operative fact by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing.
   
    See, e.g.
   
   , 42 Pa.C.S. § 9713.
  

   For example, in
   
    Commonwealth v. Matteson
   
   ,
   
    96 A.3d 1064
   
   (Pa. Super. 2014), the Superior Court considered the post-
   
    Alleyne
   
   constitutional viability of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a)(3), the sentencing statute at issue in this case. The court concluded the mandatory minimum sentence could withstand an
   
    Alleyne
   
   challenge because "the jury specifically found the element required to impose the mandatory minimum sentence."
   
    Matteson
   
   ,
   
    96 A.3d at 1066
   
   . Implicit in the panel's reasoning in
   
    Matteson
   
   is the notion that the statute could be applied without regard to the procedure the Legislature crafted that required the essential fact be found at sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence, and defining the fact as a sentencing factor rather than as an element of the underlying offense.
   
    See also
   

    Commonwealth v. Tobin
   
   ,
   
    89 A.3d 663
   
   , 665 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2014) (concluding
   
    Alleyne
   
   was not violated by the imposition of a mandatory minimum based on the amount of marijuana found on a drug dealer pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(1)(i) where defendant pleaded guilty and admitted to possessing twenty marijuana plants). Seemingly, then, the relevant inquiry appeared to center on whether there was a violation of the
   
    Alleyne
   
   rule as applied to each defendant, i.e., whether it was necessary for the sentencing court to find the operative fact or whether it had been conceded by the defendant or otherwise found by the jury and not specifically on the statutorily proscribed procedure at sentencing. However, in
   
    Commonwealth v. Newman
   
   ,
   
    99 A.3d 86
   
   (Pa. Super 2014) (en banc), the Superior Court squarely addressed whether the legislatively enacted sentencing procedure at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1 could be severed from the rest of the statute which articulated the necessary fact to impose the mandatory minimum sentence.
   
    1
   
   The court concluded, "[p]lainly, Section 9712.1 can no longer pass constitutional muster" because it requires the sentencing court to increase the minimum sentence if it finds that a defendant was dealing drugs while possessing or in close proximity to a firearm.
   

     Id.
    

    at 98
   
   . It continued that, under the mandates of
   
    Alleyne
   
   , the fact increasing the minimum sentence, i.e., the possession of a firearm, must be included in the indictment and found by a jury.
   

     Id.
    

   In rejecting the Commonwealth's position that the constitutionally offensive subsection could be excised and the remainder of the statute applied if a sentencing jury is empaneled to find the extra-judicial fact, the
   
    Newman
   
   Court concluded that such action would be usurping the role of the Legislature: "[w]e find it is manifestly the province of the General Assembly to determine what new procedures must be created in order to impose mandatory
   minimum sentences in Pennsylvania."
   

     Id.
    

    at 102
   
   .
  

   As a member of the en banc panel in
   
    Newman
   
   , I agreed that Newman's sentence was unconstitutional. However, I disagreed with the majority's holding that the entire sentencing statute was rendered unconstitutional by
   
    Alleyne
   
   .
   
    See
   

     id.
    

    at 104
   
   (Mundy, J., concurring). I expressed my view that voiding the statute as a whole was contrary to the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1925.
   
    2
   
   Specifically, I differed with the majority's reasoning that there was no constitutional way to apply the mandatory minimum sentence pursuant Section 9712.1 once the "proof at sentencing provision" was stricken:
  

   Although [ Section 9712.1 creates] a new aggravated offense, it does not follow that there is "no mechanism" for its application in future cases. To the contrary,
   
    Alleyne
   
   has already specified the mechanism for such an application. The jury should be instructed on the elements of the core crime, in this case [possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance], and the aggravated offense, and the factfinder is free to find a defendant guilty or not guilty of the core and/or the aggravated offense beyond a reasonable doubt as required by the Sixth Amendment. Thereafter, the trial court shall sentence the defendant consistent with the jury's verdict, as required by the Sixth Amendment. ... Section 9712.1(a) gives the elements of the aggravated offense and
   
    Alleyne
   
   and pre-existing procedure provides the method of implementation, a jury verdict with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, no special mechanism is required.
  

     Id.
    

    at 105
   
   .
  

   In
   
    Commonwealth v. Hopkins
   
   ,
   
    632 Pa. 36
   
   ,
   
    117 A.3d 247
   
   (2015), this Court provided further guidance on the issue of the severability of a constitutionally infirm, but legislatively mandated, sentencing procedure, where the sentencing judge is assigned the role of factfinder at sentencing. Our analysis led us to decidedly endorse the severance rationale employed in
   
    Newman
   
   . Hopkins was convicted of possession with intent to deliver and sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence of two years' imprisonment pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6317(a), based on a judicial finding that the drug offense occurred within 1,000 feet of a school. As with other sentencing statutes rendered void under
   
    Alleyne
   
   and
   
    Newman
   
   , Section 6317 provided "[t]he provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime.... The court shall consider evidence presented at trial, shall afford the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary additional evidence and shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence if this section is applicable." 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317(b).
  

   Recognizing that the Statutory Construction Act creates a presumption that
   statutes are severable and shall be enforced unless the valid provisions of the statute are inseparably connected with and dependent upon the void provisions, this Court examined each subsection of the statute to ascertain which provisions were void and whether the mandatory minimum could be applied without consideration of the portions that ran afoul of
   
    Alleyne
   
   . This Court held that the provisions specifying the proximity of the drug transaction to the school and the age of the defendant did not offend
   
    Alleyne
   
   ; however, the remainder of the statute, given the Legislature's clear intent that it was a sentencing statute, was invalid and could not be severed.
  

   In sum, as detailed above, we find that numerous provisions of Section 6317 are unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in
   
    Alleyne
   
   . After
   
    Alleyne
   
   , these aspects of the statute-that the provisions are declared not to be elements of the offense, that notice is not required prior to conviction, that factfinding is conducted at sentencing, that the sentencing court performs factfinding, that the applicable standard is preponderance of the evidence, and that the Commonwealth has the right to appeal where the imposed sentence was found to be in violation of the statute-are now infirm. ...
  

   [T]he General Assembly has unambiguously expressed its intent regarding the nature of this mandatory minimum sentencing statute: it is a
   

     sentencing
    

   statute.... Yet, virtually every provision of Section 6317 enacted by the legislature to effectuate this intent runs afoul of the notice, jury trial, burden of proof, and post-trial rights of the accused after
   
    Alleyne
   
   . These provisions are elaborate, express, and detailed, and are no mere add ons, but, rather, are prominent and central features of the statute. In contemplating the significant rights that come with the United States Supreme Court's marked transformation of sentencing factors into elements of a new aggravated offense, and the resulting evisceration of essential aspects of Section 6317, we find that the unoffending provisions of this statute-the proximity and age requirements-standing alone, are incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance with legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1925. By operation of
   
    Alleyne
   
   , Section 6317 has been stripped of all features that allow it to function as a sentencing statute.
  

    Hopkins
   
   ,
   
    117 A.3d at 259-60
   
   (footnote and some citations omitted; emphasis in original).
  

   This Court again confronted the effect of
   
    Alleyne
   
   on a mandatory minimum sentencing statute in
   
    Commonwealth v. Wolfe
   
   ,
   
    636 Pa. 37
   
   ,
   
    140 A.3d 651
   
   (2016).
   
    3
   
   Wolfe was convicted of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 16 years of age, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7), and received a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to Section 9718(a), which provides that "[a] person convicted of [ 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123 ]
   
    when the victim is less than 16 years of age
   
   shall be sentenced to" a mandatory term of not less than ten years.
   
    See
   
   42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a)(1) (emphasis added). This presented an incongruity
   not faced in
   
    Newman
   
   or
   
    Hopkins
   
   because, in each of these cases, the extra-judicial fact that the sentencing court was required to consider was not subsumed within the elements of the underlying offense. However, pursuant to Section 9718, despite subsection (c)'s directive that "provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime" the requisite fact necessary to impose the mandatory minimum sentence, i.e., the age of the victim, was included as an element of the crime for which Wolfe was being sentenced.
   
    Compare
   
   42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a)(1)
   
    with
   
   18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7). Accordingly, the Commonwealth posited, broadly, that there was no violation of
   
    Alleyne
   
   in the first instance because Section 9718(a) standing alone, could operate to impose the sentence without consideration of the other violative provisions based on the triggering fact being an element of the offense. We disagreed.
  

   [W]e reaffirm our position in
   
    Hopkins
   
   in all material respects and conclude that it applies here. [W]e differ with the Commonwealth's position that Section 9718 does not require judicial fact-finding and that Section 9718(a), standing alone, is all that is required to impose the mandatory minimum sentence. To the contrary, Section 9718 does plainly and explicitly require judicial fact-finding in its subsection (c).
   
    See
   
   42 Pa.C.S. 9718(c) ("The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing ... by a preponderance of the evidence."). Moreover, since subsection (c) is integral to the statute, Section 9718(a) does not stand alone.
   
    See
    
     id.
    

   Similarly, we regard the suggestions by the Commonwealth and its
   
    amicus
   
   that Section 9718(c) can be deemed preempted, moot, dormant, or irrelevant-or can be otherwise disregarded or overlooked-to be tantamount to severance. The severance doctrine is the appropriate mechanism for testing whether some provisions of an otherwise unconstitutional statute may stand.
   
    See
   
   ,
   
    e.g.
   

    Hopkins,
   

    117 A.3d at 259-262
   
   (applying the severance doctrine in determining "whether the statute can survive without [unconstitutionally] invalid provisions"). Accordingly, in our considered judgment, Section 9718 rises or falls based on the application of such principles, and, based on their application in
   
    Hopkins
   
   , it is the latter outcome which must prevail.
  

    Wolfe
   
   ,
   
    140 A.3d at 660-61
   
   . Moreover, we noted that a sentence based on a statute found to be non-severable and unconstitutional is void.
   

     Id.
    

    at 661
   
   . We explained the fact that the jury at Wolfe's trial found the victim to be less than 16 years of age did not alter the procedure in place to impose the mandatory minimum sentence: "although the jury at [Wolfe's] trial plainly decided that the victim was under 16 years of age, the sentencing court was bound to make its own determination at sentencing,
   
    see
   
   42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(c), but it could not do so in a manner consistent with
   
    Alleyne
   
   ."
   

     Id.
    

   The Court held that " Section 9718 is irremediably unconstitutional on its face, non-severable, and void."
   

     Id.
    

    at 663
   
   .
  

   This Court granted review in this matter to revisit the constitutionality of Section 9718. In my view, the answer has been foreshadowed by the
   
    Hopkins
   
   decision and unequivocally answered by
   
    Wolfe
   
   . Notwithstanding the facial absurdity of deeming a conviction for which one is being sentenced as an extra-judicial fact, this Court has declared " Section 9718 does plainly and explicitly require judicial fact-finding in its subsection (c).... Moreover, since subsection (c) is integral to the statute,
   
    Section 9718(a) does not stand alone
   
   ."
   

     Id.
    

    at 660-61
   
   (emphasis added).
  

   The Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court ("OAJC") cannot be reconciled
   with the jurisprudence established in
   
    Hopkins
   
   and
   
    Wolfe
   
   . Those decisions ground their analyses in principles of severance, highlighting, for instance, the legislature's apparent intent in crafting the schemes and the prominence of the relevant subsection delineating the proof-at-sentencing procedure.
   
    See
   

    Hopkins
   
   , 117 A.2d at 259 ;
   
    Wolfe
   
   ,
   
    140 A.3d at 660-61
   
   . Because of the Court's narrow focus on the severability of the offending subsection, the Court has somewhat divorced itself from the broader and foundational question of whether the requirements of
   
    Alleyne
   
   were met and instead held as a matter of Pennsylvania's severability jurisprudence that the statutes were void.
   
    Cf.
   

    Wolfe
   
   ,
   
    140 A.3d 666
   
   -67 (Todd, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that Wolfe's sentence could be unconstitutional where the operative fact was an element of the underlying offense because he "received the benefit of every constitutional right recognized by the high court in
   
    Alleyne
   
   .").
  

   Writing on a clean slate, I would hold Resto is not entitled to relief, just as I have maintained that sentencing statutes are severable and the relevant inquiry is whether the mandates of
   
    Alleyne
   
   have been satisfied.
   
    See
   

    Newman
   
   ,
   
    99 A.3d at 104-05
   
   (Mundy, J., concurring);
   
    see also
   

    Commonwealth v. Fennell
   
   ,
   
    105 A.3d 13
   
   , 18 n. 3 (Pa. Super. 2014) ;
   
    Commonwealth v. Cardwell
   
   ,
   
    105 A.3d 748
   
   , 752 n. 2 (Pa. Super. 2014). However, the slate is not clean, and this Court has unambiguously held that there are no set of circumstances under which these sentencing statutes may be applied in this Commonwealth.
  

   The OAJC posits that a conviction returned by a jury "is not the same as an aggravating fact." OAJC at 21. Further, that the conviction itself serves as "a contemporaneous jury determination" and therefore the
   
    Alleyne
   
   concern of facts determined at sentencing is not present.
   

     Id.
    

   It then concludes that the presumption of severability embodied in the Statutory Construction Act remains operative for this discrete subsection.
   
    Id.
   
   at 21. Respectfully, when read with
   
    Wolfe
   
   , I agree with my concurring colleagues that these points are distinctions without any meaningful difference.
   
    See
   
   Justice Dougherty's Concurring Opinion at 30-31; Justice Todd's Concurring Opinion at 23; 27-30.
  

   Directly addressing the recent decision from this Court in
   
    Wolfe
   
   , which declared Section 9718 void on its face, the OAJC suggests it employed "loose language" without fully considering the operation of Section 9718(a)(3) and further implying that language not specifically tailored to Section 9718(a)(1) should not be closely considered because judicial-drafting is frequently done without consideration of its consequences.
   
    Id.
   
   at 22-23;
   
    see
   

    id.
   
   at 22 n. 3. The suggestion that the specific and clear holding of
   
    Wolfe
   
   was a result of some failure of this Court to foresee how it may be applied in future cases is belied by the decision itself. Indeed, from a dissenting posture, Justice Todd specifically noted that convictions themselves serve as the predicate fact for operation of the mandatory minimum.
   
    Wolfe
   
   ,
   
    636 Pa. 37
   
   ,
   
    140 A.3d 651
   
   , 665 n. 3 (Todd, J., dissenting). The Court nonetheless determined that severability principles precluded the imposition of any mandatory minimum sentence under Section 9718. Plainly, the same result is compelled here.
  

   The
   
    Wolfe
   
   Court, following the decision in
   
    Hopkins
   
   , held that the procedural mandates of Section 9718 are so interwoven with the substantive provisions as to be non-severable and facially unconstitutional.
   
    Wolfe
   
   , 140 A.3d at 663. Furthermore, this Court recently acknowledged that
   
    any
   
   mandatory sentencing procedures fashioned in this manner are no longer valid in Pennsylvania.
  

   As that sentencing provision [ 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1 ] has been rendered unconstitutional on its face by
   
    Hopkins
   
   and
   
    Wolfe
   
   , it is as if that statutory authority never existed.
   
    See
   

    Wolfe
   
   , 140 A.3d at 661 (quoting 16 C.J.S.
   
    Constitutional Law
   
   § 265 (2016) ("[A]n unconstitutional, non-severable statute is 'not law, has no existence, is a nullity, or has no force or effect or is inoperative.' ").
  

    Commonwealth v. Barnes
   
   ,
   
    637 Pa. 493
   
   ,
   
    151 A.3d 121
   
   , 127 (2016).
  

   In my judgment, applying the state law principles of severance to Section 9718 as this Court has in
   
    Hopkins
   
   and
   
    Wolfe
   
   , there is no statutory authority to impose the sentence.
   
    4
   
   Thus, I would conclude the sentence is illegal and was properly vacated.
   
    See
   

    Commonwealth v. Leverette
   
   ,
   
    911 A.2d 998
   
   , 1001-02 (Pa. Super. 2006). Accordingly, I dissent.
  

     Alleyne v. United States
    
    ,
    
     570 U.S. 99
    
    ,
    
     133 S.Ct. 2151
    
    ,
    
     186 L.Ed.2d 314
    
    (2013).
   

     Commonwealth v. Wolfe
    
    ,
    
     636 Pa. 37
    
    ,
    
     140 A.3d 651
    
    (2016).
   

    In
    
     Apprendi
    
    , the high Court determined that any fact that increases a defendant's sentence "beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" is an element to be found by the jury, regardless of the legislature's designation.
    
     530 U.S. at 490
    
    ,
    
     120 S.Ct. 2348
    
    .
   

    Section 6317 provides:
   

     (a) General rule.-
    
    A person 18 years of age or older who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a violation of section 13(a)(14) or (30) of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, shall, if the delivery or possession with intent to deliver of the controlled substance occurred within 1,000 feet of the real property on which is located a public, private or parochial school or a college or university or within 250 feet of the real property on which is located a recreation center or playground or on a school bus, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least two years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title, The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or other statute to the contrary. The maximum term of imprisonment shall be four years for any offense:
   

    (1) subject to this section; and
   

    (2) for which The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of less than four years.
   

    If the sentencing court finds that the delivery or possession with intent to deliver was to an individual under 18 years of age, then this section shall not be applicable and the offense shall be subject to section 6314 (relating to sentencing and penalties for trafficking drugs to minors).
   

     (b) Proof at sentencing.-
    
    The provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime. Notice of the applicability of this section to the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall consider evidence presented at trial, shall afford the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present necessary additional evidence and shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence if this section is applicable.
   

     (c) Authority of court in sentencing.-
    
    There shall be no authority for a court to impose on a defendant to which this section is applicable a lesser sentence than provided for in subsection (a), to place the defendant on probation or to suspend sentence. Nothing in this section shall prevent the sentencing court from imposing a sentence greater than that provided in this section. Sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing shall not supersede the mandatory sentences provided in this section. Disposition under section 17 or 18 of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act shall not be available to a defendant to which this section applies.
   

     (d) Appeal by Commonwealth.-
    
    If a sentencing court refuses to apply this section where applicable, the Commonwealth shall have the right to appellate review of the action of the sentencing court. The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court for imposition of a sentence in accordance with this section if it finds that the sentence was imposed in violation of this section.
   

    18 Pa.C.S. § 6317.