Court Opinion

ID: 9962327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 15:19:20.651097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:22.834197
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Chaney, White and Senior Judge Annunziata
              Argued at Fairfax, Virginia

              WARREN ANTHONY WINSTEAD
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.        Record No. 0794-23-1                                JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
                                                                                    APRIL 23, 2024
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GLOUCESTER COUNTY
                                                  Jeffrey W. Shaw, Judge

                                 (Michael T. Soberick, Jr.; Dusewicz & Soberick, on brief), for
                                 appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

                                 Justin M. Brewster, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                                 Attorney General; Lucille M. Wall, Assistant Attorney General, on
                                 brief), for appellee.

                        Warren Anthony Winstead appeals his convictions, in a jury trial, for assault and battery,

              strangulation, and wounding in the commission of a felony under Code §§ 18.2-51.6, -53, and -57.

              He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Finding no error, we affirm

              the judgment of the trial court.

                                                          BACKGROUND

                        On appeal, we view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

              prevailing party in the circuit court, and we accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all

              reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.” Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 573

              (2008).

                        *
                            This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
        John Coleman was a friend of Winstead’s mother, Shirley Smith, and often helped her with

home and yard maintenance. Coleman had left his utility trailer on her property, which he had

previously used for the maintenance and yard work.

        On May 21, 2022, Winstead told Coleman on a phone call that he had made repairs to the

trailer and was using it on his own job site to store trash and debris; when Coleman asked for the

trailer to be returned to him, Winstead said that he would return the trailer the following Monday. A

week later, on May 28, 2022, Winstead called Coleman and argued about the repairs he had made to

the trailer; Coleman complained that Winstead had not asked for permission to take, use, or repair

the trailer. Coleman called Smith afterward and said that he planned to pick up the trailer from her

home.

        Warren Winstead was at the home when Coleman arrived and let Coleman into the house.

Smith was not at the home when Coleman entered. Coleman and Winstead argued over the trailer.

As Coleman left the home and stood on the porch, he heard Winstead make a comment. When

Coleman asked Winstead what he had said, Winstead got “in” Coleman’s face, and Coleman

ordered him to step back. Winstead cursed Coleman, who turned to leave. Winstead punched

Coleman in the chest with both hands, and Coleman fell. As he tried to stand, Winstead punched

him in the left eye. When Coleman fell back a second time, Winstead “jumped” on Coleman,

straddling him on the floor. Winstead “pound[ed]” Coleman on the top of his head about four

times. While continuing to punch the left side of Coleman’s face, Winstead used his left hand to

grab Coleman’s throat and hold him down against the porch. Winstead struck Coleman’s face more

than 20 times. Coleman was unable to move and could not break Winstead’s grip on his throat.

Coleman was unable to breathe due to Winstead’s choking, and he felt close to passing out when his

vision started going dark.

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        Coleman begged Winstead to stop the assault, but Winstead repeated for him to “shut up.”

Coleman managed to inch away from Winstead, who eventually stopped the attack. He did not stop

to collect his trailer, but took a picture of it as he headed to his car. Winstead yelled for him to “get

the hell out” of the property, jumped off the porch, and ran toward Coleman as he drove away.

        After Coleman left the property, he called law enforcement; the responding officer took

pictures of his injuries which showed significant bruising to the left side of his face, left eye, and his

neck. A hospital examination disclosed a hematoma in the left orbital rim and on the right side of

his neck, along with abrasions, bruising, and swelling. Coleman continued to feel pain for several

days from these injuries.

        Winstead testified at trial and claimed that Winstead and Coleman engaged in a fistfight as

Winstead tried to make Coleman leave. Winston asserted that as he escorted Coleman from the

house after their argument, he “bumped against” Coleman’s back, and Coleman responded by

punching Winstead in the face. Winstead further asserted that he pushed Coleman out the door,

grabbed him “by his collar, by his neck” and struck Coleman, telling him to leave the property.

Winstead claimed that Coleman fell after Winstead struck him.

        Winstead introduced two photographs taken three days after he was charged, showing a cut

under his left eye and marks on the right side of his neck. Winstead sought no medical treatment or

police intervention after the encounter. During cross-examination, the Commonwealth impeached

Winstead with his nine prior felony convictions.

        Winstead was indicted for aggravated malicious wounding, strangulation, and wounding in

the commission of a felony under Code §§ 18.2-51.2, -51.6, and -53.1 After the Commonwealth

presented its evidence, the trial court struck the aggravated enhancement of malicious wounding,

        1
         Winstead was also charged with abduction under Code § 18.2-47, but was never
arraigned; the offense was nolle prossed by the Commonwealth before the jury trial started.
                                               -3-
finding insufficient evidence of permanent injury. After all evidence was presented, the jury

found Winstead guilty of misdemeanor assault and battery as a lesser-included offense of

malicious wounding, wounding in the commission of a felony, and strangulation. The trial court

sentenced Winstead to 5 years and 12 months of incarceration. This appeal followed.

                                            ANALYSIS

       Winstead argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of all offenses. “On

review of the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘the judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and

will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Ingram v.

Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 59, 76 (2021) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460

(2018)). “The question on appeal, is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Yoder v.

Commonwealth, 298 Va. 180, 182 (2019)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction,

‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might

differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth,

69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 288 (2017)).

       “The fact finder, who has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, has the sole

responsibility to determine their credibility, the weight to be given their testimony, and the

inferences to be drawn from proven facts.” Rams v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 12, 26-27

(2019) (quoting Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 94, 105 (2010)). “When ‘credibility issues

have been resolved by the [fact finder] in favor of the Commonwealth, those findings will not be

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong.’” Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 291

(2011) (quoting Corvin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 296, 299 (1991)). Any “[p]otential

inconsistencies in testimony are resolved by the fact finder.” Id. at 292. Such conflicts are not

revisited on appeal “unless ‘the evidence is such that reasonable [persons], after weighing the

                                                -4-
evidence and drawing all just inferences therefrom, could reach but one conclusion.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Molina v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 338, 369, aff’d, 272 Va.

666 (2006)). The fact finder is “free to believe or disbelieve, in part or in whole, the testimony

of any witness.” Bazemore v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 203, 213 (2004) (en banc) (citing

Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 547 (1991)). In addition, “[i]n its role of judging

witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the

accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Flanagan v.

Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702 (2011) (quoting Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App.

505, 509-10 (1998)). Moreover, the jury was permitted to consider Winstead’s prior felony

convictions in assessing his credibility. See Code § 19.2-269.

       A person commits an assault when he “attempt[s] or offer[s], with force and violence, to

do some bodily hurt to another.” Parish v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 324, 329 (2010)

(quoting Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 463, 468 (2000)). The offense becomes battery

upon the “wil[l]ful or unlawful touching” of the victim. Id. at 330 (alteration in original)

(quoting Wood v. Commonwealth, 149 Va. 401, 404 (1927)). The offense of strangulation

occurs when a person, without consent, “impedes the blood circulation or respiration of another

person by knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully applying pressure to the neck of such

person” and causes a “wounding or bodily injury.” Code § 18.2-51.6. When a person

“unlawfully shoot[s], stab[s], cut[s], or wound[s] another” in attempting or committing a felony,

then he is guilty of wounding in committing a felony under Code § 18.2-53.

       Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient for

the jury to find Winstead guilty of all charges. Coleman’s testimony, supported by the

photographs and medical documentation, established that Winstead attacked and knocked him to

the ground. That evidence is sufficient to sustain an assault and battery conviction. Once he was

                                                 -5-
on the ground, Winstead choked Coleman, intentionally restricting Coleman’s respiration, and

caused bodily injury in the form of bruising and contusions on the neck. This evidence is

sufficient to sustain a conviction for strangulation. In effectuating that strangulation, Winstead

continually punched Coleman more than 20 times, causing bodily injury to Coleman’s face and

left eye. These wounds, inflicted while committing the strangulation, were sufficient to sustain

Winstead’s conviction for wounding in commission of a felony.

       Winstead argues that this evidence was overcome by his testimony and photographs. But

the jury was entitled to weigh the credibility of all the evidence and disregard Winstead’s

testimony. Coleman sought law enforcement and medical assistance after the encounter;

Winstead did not. Coleman’s photographs show significantly greater injuries than Winstead’s

and were taken by other witnesses able to confirm Coleman’s condition. Winstead was

impeached with a significant criminal history; Coleman was not. We therefore do not revisit on

appeal the jury’s credibility conclusion that the encounter occurred in the way Coleman testified

rather than Winstead’s version. See Towler, 59 Va. App. at 292.

                                         CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

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