Court Opinion

ID: 9754754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:12:18.886186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:57.206905
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) sustained Karen L. Maletic’s (Licensee) appeal from the suspension of her operator’s license based on the finding that Licensee was not under arrest at the time she refused to submit to a blood test.1 Unlike the majority, I do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in so finding; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The issue of whether a licensee has been placed under arrest for purposes of section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, is one of fact. Pappas v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 669 A.2d 504 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). The relevant inquiry is whether the licensee, at the time the testing request is made, would have inferred from the totality of the circumstances that he or she was under the custody and control of the police officer. Id.
Because the issue of whether Licensee was under arrest at or prior to her refusal to submit to a blood test is one of pure fact, this court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Claimant was not under arrest at the critical time.2 On the issue of arrest, Officer Michael Baird testi*646fied for the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) as follows:
Q. At any time after you had a chance to talk with [Claimant at the accident scene] and she admitted that she had had some drinks, and you noticed — indicated on direct examination that she had slurred speech, did you at that point before she was transported to [the hospital] ever advise her that she was under arrest for suspicion of DUI?
A. No, I did not.
(N.T. at 15-16.)
Q. What was the first conversation you had with [Claimant] at the ER?
A. At the ER I initially asked her how she was and she stated that she was doing okay. At that point I advised her that I was investigating the accident, and I advised her that she was being investigated for driving under the influence, at which point I read her her O’Connell Warnings.
Q. You didn’t tell her she was under arrest for DUI at that point, did you?
A. No, she was not.
Q. You didn’t tell her she was charged with anything at that point, did you?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you ever give her any Miranda Warnings, either at the scene of the accident or in the emergency room?
A. No, I did not, sir.
Q. After you had engaged her in your initial dialogue, when was it that you first asked her to submit to a blood draw, or did you, in fact, ask her to submit to a blood draw separate from the blood draw that was made for medical purposes?
A. No, I did not. At the point I started talking with [Claimant] they were already into the blood draw for medical purposes.
Q. Did you ever tell [Claimant] that after she had undergone whatever medical treatment was advised at that point she was not free to go?
A. No, I didn’t. She was unable to leave the hospital at that point but she was not under my control.
Q. This would be my next question. You didn’t — if she had stayed there it wasn’t because of anything that you had imposed upon her?
A. That is correct.
(N.T. at 18-20.)
Q. Officer, it’s your testimony that you did read the chemical test warnings off the Department Exhibit No. 1 [Form DL-26] to [Claimant] at the hospital, right?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And you read' — including specifically, you read warning No. 1 to [Claimant] at the hospital, correct?
Q. And isn’t it true warning No. 1 on the chemicals testing warning form is: Please be advised you are now under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to [Section] 3731 of the Vehicle Code?
A. That’s correct.
Q. So you had advised [Claimant] she was under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol?
A. That’s correct. I didn’t physically arrest her but she was read the. warnings, which included No. 1.
Q. And she was advised that she was being arrested for DUI?
A. That’s correct.
THE COURT: I thought you said earlier you were only investigating. Did you actually form in your mind an intent to *647charge her at that time, at the time you read this to her, or were you still investigating?
THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honor, it was my conclusion she was intoxicated to the level she was unable to drive.
THE COURT: So she wasn’t under arrest—
THE WITNESS: Not—
THE COURT: — even though you read this form to her?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct. Not physically.
THE COURT: Well, is it fair to say that you didn’t physically take her into custody because you couldn’t; she was in a gurney in the hospital?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct.
THE COURT: And she was being treated for physical injuries sustained in an accident?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Had she not been physically injured and she was just sitting in a chair and appeared to have no physical injuries, was it your intent, being then on the 22nd of November of 2000, if she had otherwise been ambulatory, to have taken her into custody and charged her?
THE WITNESS: That’s correct, Your Honor, I would have placed her under arrest and handcuffed her and transported her to our station.
(N.T. at 25-27.)
In addition, Licensee testified in her own behalf on this issue. Licensee stated that she did not recall Officer Baird reading anything to her. She further testified that it was possible that Officer Baird did read the form to her, but there was too much going on in the emergency room for her to recall. She stated that she was never told that she was under arrest. (See N.T. at 33, 35-39.)
In considering the testimony, the trial court noted that the only evidence suggesting that an arrest had occurred came from Officer Baird’s reading of the Form DL-26 to Claimant,3 which the Department argued constituted an arrest. Officer Baird’s testimony, however, indicated that he made no arrest prior to Licensee’s refusal to submit to the blood test, that he never made mention of a future arrest and that Licensee was in no way confined or restrained by him so that she could not come or go at her leisure. The trial court determined that a statement read in a form by Officer Baird did not vitiate the balance of his testimony establishing that an arrest did not occur. The trial court therefore found as a fact that Licensee was not under arrest prior to her refusal to submit to a blood test.
As the fact finder in a license suspension appeal, the trial court may accept or reject any testimony in whole or in part, subject only to review under the abuse of discretion standard. DiCola v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 694 A.2d 398 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). Bearing this in mind, I would conclude that the trial court’s finding that Licensee was not under arrest at the time she refused to submit to a blood test is supported by substantial evidence of record. *648Here, Officer Baird gave Licensee conflicting messages. First, he directly told her that she was under investigation for driving while under the influence. He then read to her verbatim Form DL-26 that advises the person being read to that he or she is “now under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance pursuant to Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code.” Officer Baird said or did nothing else that would give Licensee the impression that she was under arrest or under Officer Baird’s custody or control. When Licensee refused to submit to the blood test, Officer Baird simply left the hospital. Moreover, in testimony that is somewhat contradictory, Officer Baird essentially admitted at one point that he had not arrested Claimant, that she was not in his custody or control, and that there were no restrictions on her movements, except for those connected with her medical condition.
I note also that the trial court found significant the fact that Officer Baird did not know whether Licensee understood what he had read to her. Under the totality of the circumstances, where, at most, Licensee was given conflicting information, I cannot agree that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Licensee was not under the custody or control of Officer Baird when she refused to consent to the blood test. I cannot conclude, as the Department would have us do, that Officer Baird’s reading of a pre-printed form contradicts his immediately preceding statement that she was simply under “investigation.” To make this conclusion would usurp the trial court’s prerogative as fact finder, for we would then place greater weight upon Officer Baird’s reading of an anonymous form and place lesser weight upon all other evidence that indicated that Licensee was not under the control or custody of Officer Baird, including his own testimony that she was not. The trial court is the fact finder, and the evidence upon which it relied must be viewed in a light more favorable to Licensee as the party who prevailed below. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Malizio, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 57, 618 A.2d 1091 (1992). The Department is im-permissibly asking us to view the evidence more in its favor.
I also note that the Department emphasized Officer Baird’s later testimony that he would have “physically” arrested Claimant had she not been indisposed with medical treatment. Officer Baird’s intentions and suppositions are not, however, particularly relevant to the inquiry of whether Licensee would have inferred under the totality of the circumstances that she was under his custody and control. Nor is it relevant that Officer Baird appeared to draw a distinction in his mind between “physical” arrest and some other undefined species of arrest. Had Officer Baird truly desired to arrest Licensee, he could have done so directly and without contradiction. The evidence, however, does support a different finding, which finding was within the trial court’s purview to make.
I further observe that this case is distinguishable from those cases relied upon by the Department. In Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Uebelacker, 98 Pa.Cmwlth. 436, 511 A.2d 929 (1986), the police officer directly told the licensee at the hospital that “he was going to be arrested” for driving under the influence and that the officer would like for him to submit to a blood test. The issue in that case, however, was whether the officer’s use of the phrase “going to be arrested” was sufficient for the licensee to infer that he was under the control or custody of *649the officer.4 The issue was not, as here, whether the trial court abused its discretion in its credibility and weight determinations regarding the conflicting information provided to a licensee by a police officer.
Similarly, in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Shine, 114 Pa.Cmwlth. 523, 539 A.2d 42 (1988), the officer directly informed the licensee in the hospital that he was going to be arrested for several charges, including driving under the influence. Under those circumstances, we determined that the evidence showed that the totality of the circumstances was sufficient for the licensee to infer that he was under the control or custody of the officer. In Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Jones, 120 Pa.Cmwlth. 88, 547 A.2d 877 (1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 579, 559 A.2d 40 (1989), we determined that an arrest had occurred when the police officer gave the licensee in the hospital Miranda rights, with the explanation that he was going to be placed under arrest for drunk driving. Again, these cases did not present an issue where the fact finder was presented with conflicting evidence from the police officer himself, or where the police officer in one breath indicated that the licensee was under investigation and in the other, purely from having read a pre-printed form, indicated that the licensee was under arrest. The cases relied upon by the Department simply involved whether the police officer’s indication of impending arrest and the delivery of O’Connell warnings placed the licensee under the impression that he was under arrest.
By contrast, in Welcome v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 167 Pa.Cmwlth. 245, 647 A.2d 971 (1994), we determined that a licensee being treated at a hospital following an accident was not under arrest when the investigating officer informed the licensee that he had the right to remain silent, “informed [him] of the implied consent law,”, and requested that he submit to a blood test. Id. at 973. Our decision does not indicate whether the officer’s explanation of the “implied consent law” included the paragraph read by Officer Baird in the present case stating that the licensee was “now under arrest for driving under the influence.” We found significant in Welcome, however, the fact that the officer never restricted the licensee’s freedom at the hospital or indicated that he could not leave or would be placed under arrest for drunk driving. Also, the fact that the licensee would not leave the hospital because of his concern for his children, who were also in the accident and being treated, had no bearing on the fact that he could have left the hospital had he chosen to do so. We also found significant the fact that when the licensee refused to consent to a chemical test, the officer simply left the hospital without “formally” arresting or charging the licensee. Here, the trial court relied upon Welcome in arriving at its decision, and I cannot conclude that the trial court erred by so doing.
Accordingly, I would accept the trial court’s finding that Licensee was not under arrest at the time she was asked and refused to submit to a blood test, and, for that reason, I would affirm the trial court’s *650order sustaining Licensee’s appeal.5 See id.; Jones.

. The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) suspended Licensee’s operating privileges for one year pursuant to section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, for refusing to submit to a chemical test. As the majority correctly states, to establish that a suspension of operating privileges was proper, the Department must prove at a statutory appeal hearing that the licensee (1) was arrested for driving while under the influence by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test, (3) refused to do so, and (4) was warned that a refusal would result in a license suspension. Banner v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 558 Pa. 439, 737 A.2d 1203 (1999). Licensee takes the position that her license suspension could not be sustained because the Department failed to establish both the first and the third elements of its burden. However, I limit this dissent to my belief that the Department failed to establish the first of these elements, that is, that Licensee was under arrest prior to her refusal to submit to a blood test.

. This court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion, or whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Danforth, 530 Pa. 327, 608 A.2d 1044 (1992). Additionally, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed before the trial court. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Malizio, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 57, 618 A.2d 1091 (1992).

. Officer Baird testified that, aside from his verbatim reading of the Form DL-26, he never told Claimant that she was under arrest or was not free to leave, and he never gave her the Miranda rights. Further, he never gave the form to Claimant to read, and he admitted that he did not know whether Claimant understood what he was reading to her. He also admitted that he never physically arrested Claimant or took her into custody. He testified that had she not been injured, he would have arrested her, but again stated that he did not arrest her.

. Because of my disposition of this issue, I would not need to address the Department's second issue concerning whether Licensee made a knowing and conscious refusal to submit to the test. See Welcome.

. We held in Uebelacker that the totality of the circumstances established that the licensee would have inferred that he was under the custody and control of the police officer, where the phrase “was going to be arrested” *650had a sufficient character of immediacy about it.