Court Opinion

ID: 9745905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:41:55.143706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:06.191149
License: Public Domain

G.B. Smith, J.
(dissenting). The issue in both of these cases is whether the defendant validly waived his right to be present during questioning of prospective jurors concerning their ability to be fair and impartial. Because the record in each does not indicate that defendant was present or that the defendant made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant’s right to be present, I would remand these cases to the trial court for an appropriate determination of whether the defendants were present or whether they made adequate waivers.
A defendant has a statutory right to be present during any questioning of a prospective juror about his or her impartiality (CPL 260.20; People v Antommarchi, 80 NY2d 247 [1992]; People v Sloan, 79 NY2d 386 [1992]). A defendant may waive the right to be présent but the choice to do so must be “knowing and intelligent” (People v Vargas, 88 NY2d 363, 375-376 [1996]; People v Spotford, 85 NY2d 593 [1995]). In these cases the record does not indicate that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendants’ right to be present during the questioning of prospective jurors.
Defendant Velasquez was convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The evidence was that defendant killed a woman with whom he had checked into a hotel in Brooklyn, New York, on April 29, 1999.
In Velasquez, the record reveals only the following with respect to Antommarchi:
“the court: Come up counsel. While the jury is coming in, let’s talk about logistics.
*51(Bench conference off the record)
“defense counsel: Waived.
“the court: Antommarchi waived.”
Defendant contends that there was no knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to be present at the sidebar questioning of prospective jurors. In his brief the defendant states:
“Nothing in this terse and cryptic exercise in ‘lawyer ese’ suggested that appellant was aware of and understood the right he was giving up, or that he consented to this strategy. Nor was the slightest effort made to ensure that he understood the right he was relinquishing. The court failed to ask appellant a single question. It never inquired whether defense counsel had discussed the waiver with his client, and counsel made no representations that he had. Neither the court, the prosecutor, nor defense counsel articulated nor even alluded to the substance of the right, so as to alert appellant to the action taken on his behalf. Under these circumstances, there was no valid Antommarchi waiver.”
The People contend that the record is sufficient to conclude that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of defendant’s right to be present but that if this Court disagrees, the matter should be remanded for a hearing. The Appellate Division majority concluded that the circumstances indicate that defendant made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to be present. The dissenters, on the other hand, concluded that the record did not reveal that the defendant was made aware of his right to be present and a remand for a hearing was appropriate.
Defendant Foster was convicted of robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 15, 10 and 10 years, respectively. The evidence was that on December 11,1997, in Bronx County, defendant and another robbed a student of a chain and that on December 16, 1997, defendant attempted to rob the same complainant of his coat. On December 17, 1997, defendant and another robbed a different complainant of a chain.
In Foster, defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he was excluded from robing room discussions with prospective jurors. The People argue that defendant has failed *52to present a record that is adequate for review but that the Appellate Division’s factual finding that defendant was present precludes further review by this Court. The Appellate Division concluded, “Review of defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to be present at robing room discussions with prospective jurors is precluded by the lack of a record establishing his absence [citations omitted]. To the extent the record permits review, it indicates that defendant was present during the robing room conferences at issue.” (295 AD2d 107, 107-108.)
As stated, defendant has a right to be present for the examination of a prospective juror’s ability to serve impartially. The presumption of regularity, relied on by the majority, can be rebutted by an appropriate hearing by the trial court as to whether or not the defendant was present for questioning about the qualifications of jurors or knowingly and intelligently waived his right to be present. There is no evidence in these two records that the court reporter, judge, defense attorney, prosecutor or other court personnel are no longer available to give testimony.
The presumption of regularity has been used in a variety of cases including when an exhibit was lost (People v Yavru-Sakuk, 98 NY2d 56 [2002]); or when stenographic notes were lost (People v Glass, 43 NY2d 283 [1977]; People v Strollo, 191 NY 42 [1908]) and when there was an assertion that a judge may have issued a search warrant after taking testimony which had not been made a part of the record (People v Dominique, 90 NY2d 880 [1997]). The presumption of regularity should not be used as a substitute for the reconstruction of a record (People v Harrison, 85 NY2d 794 [1995]; People v Glass, supra). Thus, concluding from a rebuttable presumption, and without a hearing, that the defendant was present or that he voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly waived his right to be present for the questioning of jurors was inappropriate in this case.
Accordingly, I would remand both cases to the trial court for a hearing on defendants’ Antommarchi rights.
Judges Ciparick, Rosenblatt, Graffeo and Read concur with Chief Judge Kaye; Judge G.B. Smith dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion.
In each case: Order affirmed.