Court Opinion

ID: 8310709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-10-17 13:47:58.431611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:44:42.944756
License: Public Domain

Bond, J.
The court has listened with interest to the argument of the counsel upon the point now made that, since the act of 1884 which segregated the taxes levied by law and collected by its treasurers, the right to tender coupons in payment of the state school tax was no longer allowable. By the act of 1871 the coupons tendered in the case by the plaintiff in payment of his state taxes were *243made receivable for all public taxes 'and dues. The supreme court of the United States has decided that this was a contract between the state and the coupon holder which no subsequent legislation could impair, and we cannot now see why the fact that the legislature has altered the method of collecting the school tax, or the method of its distribution, or the fact that it has segregated it from the gross tax collected, can alter its contract to receive its own evidences of debt in payment of that'tax. It is a public due. The tender of a coupon is tlie tender of a receipt of so much money already in the state treasury. If the money represented by the coupon is not in the treasury, it is as much the duty of the state to have-it there as it is to support the public schools. The one is as much a sacred trust as the other. So far as it may be maintained that the act of 1884 forbids the receipt of tax-receivable coupons for any state tax, to that extent it is in violation of the constitution of the United States, as has been decided again and again by the supreme court, and no device of division or segregation or distribution of any particular state tax will avoid this fatal defect.
The circuit judge then delivered the following instructions to the jury:
Bond, J. If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiffs in this action, being citizens of Virginia, were indebted to the state in the sum of f> 128.24 for taxes due upon the property owned by them in Rappahannock county, in that state, and that, in payment thereof, they tendered to Miller, treasurer of the said county, entitled to receive the same, coupons of the bonds of the state of Virginia receivable for public taxes, and that said treasurer refused to receive the same in payment thereof, and that notwithstanding such tender the defendant levied upon the property of the plaintiffs, advertised and sold the same, and so collected the tax, then the said Miller was a trespasser, and is liable to the said plaintiffs for his trespass.
And if the jury find from the evidence in the cause that the other defendants to this action, or either of them, advised and counseled the said Miller to commit the trespass above described, by advising him not to receive the said coupons, but to make the said levy, with a promise of indemnification if he was mulcted in damages for his conduct, promising the assistance of counsel to defend him, then the said defendants are jointly liable with the said Miller, the treasurer, for the trespass alleged; and the jury may find such of the defendants guilty or not guilty as they may find they did or did not so advise, counsel, and abet the above-mentioned trespass.
And the jury are instructed that it is the law of the land that upon the tender of the tax-receivable coupons for the payment of taxes, whether received or not, the taxes are paid, and any levy upon the property of the tax-payer, after such tender, is a trespass (any state law to the contrary notwithstanding) for which damages are recover*244able; and if the said levy is made with a knowledge, at the time, that it is illegal, while the tax-payer remonstrates that it is illegal, and claims the protection of the law of the land, then the jury may find that said levy was malicious, and are not confined to giving actual damages, but may give punitive or exemplary damages, as they may find the facts to be.
And the jury are instructed that the meaning of the word “malice” in law is not personal hate or ill will of one person towards another, but it refers to that state of mind which is reckless of law and of the legal rights of the citizen in a person’s conduct towards that citizen; and the object of the law, in permitting the jury to give exemplary damages or smart money in cases like this, is not only to indemnify the plaintiffs for the loss sustained, but to prevent similar actions upon the part of these and other defendants in the future.
The court instructs the jury that the plaintiffs were under no obligation to pay their taxes in money, and surrender their coupons for identification and verification, but they had a right, under the law, to stand upon their tender of coupons, and to refuse to pay in money and surrender their coupons for identification.
The jury found a verdict for $150 damages. The cóunsel for the plaintiffs moved to set the verdict aside upon the ground of inadequacy, but the circuit judge overruled the motion, saying that he could not tell how far the jury might have been influenced by the argument respecting the decision of the Virginia court of appeals on the school-tax question, which it would have been legitimate for the jury to consider in mitigation of damages.