Court Opinion

ID: 9940270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 20:02:32.937005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:42.144373
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/13/24 P. v. Bennett CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B328092

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. BA304246)
         v.

MICHAEL BENNETT,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los Angeles, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Allen G. Weinberg, Allen G. Weinberg,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
      No appearances for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    I.     INTRODUCTION

      Defendant Michael Bennett appeals from the trial court’s
order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 We affirm.

                     II.   BACKGROUND

A.    Facts2

       On December 30, 2005, defendant, a gang member, was
involved in a car-to-car shooting. Driving his girlfriend’s
Mustang, defendant followed his cohorts’ Saturn into rival gang
territory. The Saturn pulled in front of a parked white Caprice in
which victims Chaundi Grant and Gerald Kelly were seated. One
of defendant’s cohorts in the Saturn fired shots at the Caprice,
wounding Grant who then drove off. The Saturn chased the
Caprice and was then joined by defendant’s Mustang which took
the lead. Shots were fired from the Mustang, hitting the Caprice
several more times. The Mustang then drove off. Defendant was
arrested along with other members of his gang for, among other
crimes, the attempted murders of Grant and Kelly.

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2     The facts are taken from the unpublished opinion in the
direct appeal in this matter, People v. Johnson (Nov. 17, 2009,
B209800).

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B.    2008 Conviction

      In April 2008, in an amended information, the Los Angeles
County District Attorney (District Attorney) charged defendant
in counts 2 and 3 with, among other crimes, the attempted
murders of Grant and Kelly in violation of sections 664 and 187,
subdivision (a).3 Among other allegations, the District Attorney
alleged as to both counts that the attempted murders were
willful, deliberate, and premeditated. As to count 2—the
attempted murder of Grant—the District Attorney further
alleged that a principal used and discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b) through (d) and (e)(1) and that defendant
personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b)–(d). And, as to count 3—the attempted murder
of Kelly—the District Attorney alleged that a principal personally
used and discharged a firearm within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (e)(1) and that defendant
personally used and discharged a firearm within the meaning of
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c).
      The jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder on
counts 2 and 3 and found true, as to both counts, the allegations
that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and
premeditated and that a principal personally used and
intentionally discharged a firearm; but the jury found the

3     Defendant was charged with and convicted of other crimes,
but they are not subject to this appeal.

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personal use and discharge of a firearm allegations not true as to
defendant.
        The trial court sentenced defendant on count 2 to a term of
40 years to life and, on count 3, to a consecutive term of 40 years
to life.
        On appeal from the judgment of conviction, a different
panel of this Division reversed it on various grounds unrelated to
this appeal, but affirmed it as to counts 2 and 3. (People v.
Johnson, supra, B209800.)

C.    Section 1172.6 Petition

       On July 25, 2022, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing. He argued that, based on the facts of the
shootings, he could only have been convicted under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as he was not the actual
shooter. According to defendant, under recent amendments to
section 188, malice could not be imputed to him based solely on
his participation in the crimes.
       The District Attorney opposed the motion.
       On December 1, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the
motion for resentencing. The parties submitted on the papers,
and the court denied the motion, finding that defendant had
failed to meet his prima facie burden of demonstrating that he
was eligible for relief. The court noted that the jury had not been
instructed on a natural and probable consequences theory or on a
theory of implied malice. Accordingly, the court concluded that
defendant was not eligible for relief as a matter of law.
       On January 10, 2023, defendant filed a notice of appeal.

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D.    Delgadillo Brief

       On July 3, 2023, appointed counsel for defendant filed a
brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo).
       On August 28, 2023, defendant filed a supplemental brief
arguing that the jury instructions were ambiguous and allowed
the jury to impute the required malice to him based solely on his
participation in the crimes.4 In support of his contention,
defendant cited to People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972
(Langi); People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257
(Maldonado); and a noncitable case.

                         III.   DISCUSSION

       As defendant concedes, the jury was not instructed on
either the natural and probable consequences doctrine or a felony
murder theory of liability. Citing Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th
972 and Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, he maintains
that the jury instructions included ambiguous language that
could have permitted the jurors to impute malice to him based
solely on his participation in a crime, without having to find that
he personally acted with malice. We disagree.

4    After filing his supplemental brief, defendant, without
counsel, filed a December 1, 2023, letter requesting a hearing
pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 and, after this
matter had been submitted, a January 22, 2024, motion
requesting a substitution of appointed counsel. Both requests are
denied.

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       Here, the jury found not true the allegation that defendant
personally used and discharged a firearm in the commission of
the attempted murders, but found true the allegation that a
principal used and discharged a firearm. The jury therefore
rejected any theory that defendant was the actual shooter, but
nevertheless found him guilty of the attempted murders of Grant
and Kelly. Because there was no instruction on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, the only other theory of liability
for attempted murder available to the jurors was under the aider
and abettor doctrine, upon which they were instructed.5
      The instruction on attempted murder6 advised the jurors
that to prove that crime, the prosecution was required to show a
direct but ineffectual act by one person towards killing a human
being and that the person taking that act harbored a specific
intent to kill. Thus, the only theory available to the prosecution
was express, not implied, malice attempted murder, and, in

5     The jury was instructed on aider and abettor liability with
CALJIC No. 3.01, which provided, in pertinent part: “A person
aids and abets the commission . . . of a crime when he or she: [¶]
(1) With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator,
and [¶] (2) With the intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and [¶]
(3) By act or advice aids, promotes, encourages, or instigates the
commission of the crime.”

6     The jury was instructed on attempted murder with CALJIC
No. 8.66 which provided in pertinent part: “In order to prove
attempted murder, each of the following elements must be
proved; [¶] (1) A direct but ineffectual act was done by one
person towards killing another human being; and [¶] (2) The
person committing the act harbored express malice aforethought,
namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.”

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finding defendant guilty of that crime, the jury necessarily found
that the shooter had the intent to kill and defendant, as an aider
and abettor, knew of that intent and acted intentionally to
facilitate that crime.
       Moreover, the jury also found true the allegation that
defendant, in the commission of the attempted murders, acted in
a willful, deliberate, and premeditated7 manner. This finding
further demonstrates that the jury could not have convicted
defendant of attempted murder based on a theory of implied
malice. Accordingly, the reasoning in Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th 972 does “not apply because that case involve[d]
implied malice. Here. . . appellant’s conviction for attempted
murder demonstrates that he was convicted of . . . murder with
express rather than implied malice.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 547.) Therefore, defendant is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law and the trial court did not err in denying
his petition. (Id. at p. 548.)

7     On the willfulness allegation, the jury was instructed with
CALJIC No. 8.67, which provided, in pertinent part: “It is also
alleged in Counts 2 and 3 that the crime attempted was willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder. If you find defendant
guilty of attempted murder, you must determine whether this
allegation is true or not true. [¶] ‘Willful’ means intentional.
‘Deliberate’ means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a
result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and
against the proposed course of action. ‘Premeditated’ means
considered beforehand.”

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                      IV.   DISPOSITION

      The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                           KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             BAKER, J.

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