Court Opinion

ID: 9742302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:10:28.798408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:30.791902
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, concurring: I concur with the holding of the court in this case and write only to point out, what I perceive to be, the unconstitutional provision contained in section 5 — 6—3.1(g) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 6—3.1(g)), and to prevent a possible misconstruction of the court's opinion. The opinion notes that the provision of this section of the statute does not make an order of supervision a final adjudication on the merits. The provision of this section of the statute, the opinion notes, only makes an order of supervision final “for the purposes of appeal”; that is, this section attempts to make other than final judgments appealable. Section 6 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that “the Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of Circuit Courts.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6. The opinion in this case seems to treat the provision of section 5 — 6—3.1(g) of the Unified Code of Corrections as a statutory provision supplementing our Rule 604(b) (107 Ill. 2d R. 604(b)) in an area where the legislature has concurrent jurisdiction with this court to promulgate rules of procedures so long as they do not infringe upon the inherent power of the judiciary. That is not the case. This is an attempt by the legislature to make an order that is not a final judgment appealable. That authority is vested solely in the supreme court by our constitution, and any attempt by the legislature to enact legislation in that area is an infringement on this court’s constitutional authority and is unconstitutional. The opinion in this cáse should not be viewed as an approval by this court of such an infringement or as an acknowledgment that the legislature has any concurrent jurisdiction in this area. The provision of section 5 — 6— 3.1(g) has no effect on the appealability of this interlocutory order in this case because of the provision of our Rule 604(b), which makes an order of supervision appeal-able. However, I do not want this opinion to be viewed as an invitation to the legislature to attempt to make other interlocutory orders appealable in areas where this court has not so provided. In People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 62, relying on section 7 of the 1964 amendment to article VI of the Illinois Constitution of 1870, which contained the same provisions as that quoted above from section 6 of article VI of the present constitution, this court held unconstitutional provisions of a statute which provided that if an appeal, is taken from a conviction of a forcible felony, the defendant shall not be entitled to bail and the sentence of imprisonment shall not be stayed pending appeal. This court stated the constitution has placed responsibility for rules governing appeals in the supreme court, and not in the General Assembly. 40 Ill. 2d at 66. In People v. Taylor (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 136, this court considered a statute which made certain interlocutory orders nonappealable, whereas, under a rule of this court, such orders were appealable. Again, relying on section 7 of article VI of the 1964 amendment to the Illinois Constitution of 1870, this court held the statute unconstitutional, stating: “Section 7 covers the subject matter of instant concern and provides: ‘The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of the Circuit Court.’ By this section the constitution vests in the Supreme Court sole authority to provide by rule for appeals to the appellate court from other than final judgments. Pursuant to this authority this court has adopted Rule 604 which provides for appeals from orders the substantive effect of which results in the dismissing of a charge for grounds enumerated in section 114 — 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence. Accordingly that portion of section 109 — 3(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which declares that the State may not appeal from the interlocutory orders referred to therein is void.” (People v. Taylor (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 136, 140.) This area then is not one in which the legislature and the supreme court exercise concurrent jurisdiction, but is one in which the supreme court alone may act. Any attempt by the legislature to legislate with regard to the appealability of other than final orders is void.