Court Opinion

ID: 9948082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 15:08:42.326021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:04.571791
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1100-22

RICARDO M. MELENDEZ,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANTHONY P. ROTONDO,
CITY OF JERSEY CITY,
and JERSEY CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT,

     Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________

                   Submitted February 26, 2024 – Decided March 6, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla and Vinci.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-4283-20.

                   Benevento Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for appellant
                   (Christopher Lee Benevento, on the brief).

                   Peter J. Baker, Corporation Counsel, attorney for
                   respondents (Brittany M. Murray, First Assistant
                   Corporation Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Plaintiff Ricardo M. Melendez appeals from a November 3, 2022 order

granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Officer Anthony P. Rotondo,

the City of Jersey City, and the Jersey City Police Department. Based on our

review of the record and the applicable principles of law, we affirm.

      Plaintiff was injured when the bicycle he was riding struck a marked

Jersey City police vehicle operated by Officer Rotondo. Plaintiff was traveling

eastbound downhill on Newark Avenue in Jersey City. Prior to the accident,

Officer Rotondo was also traveling eastbound on Newark Avenue.

      Officer Rotondo received a dispatch call directed to another unit seeking

an officer to respond to a nearby Dunkin' Donuts. He believed the call was in

connection with an irate and angry individual at the Dunkin' Donuts. Officer

Rotondo's unit was not the primary vehicle dispatched to the Dunkin' Donuts,

but he responded to the call as backup to assist the primary vehicle.

      Plaintiff contends the police event information form relating to the call

states, "caller needs an officer at the Dunkin['] Donuts to see video footage of

how they treated him yesterday and to see who stole his belongings . . . male is

very ir[]ate and angry towards police." Plaintiff does not dispute that Officer

Rotondo received the dispatch call.

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      To get to the Dunkin' Donuts, Officer Rotondo needed to make a U-turn

to proceed westbound on Newark Avenue. The officer turned into the wide

center median area between the eastbound and westbound lanes. His car was

perpendicular to the lanes of traffic as he waited in the median for westbound

traffic to stop and allow him to turn into the westbound lane. Officer Rotondo

contends he activated his overhead lights and manually, intermittently sounded

his siren to stop traffic. Plaintiff neither recalls seeing the overhead lights nor

hearing the siren.

      As plaintiff was riding eastbound on Newark Avenue approaching the

point where Officer Rotondo was waiting in the median, traffic stopped in front

of him. Plaintiff swerved left into the westbound lane to avoid the stopped

eastbound traffic and attempted to ride in front of Officer Rotondo's vehicle

which was, by that time, moving forward into the westbound lane. Plaintiff

struck the driver-side front quarter panel of the police vehicle near the front tire.

He was thrown from the bike and suffered a dislocated and fractured left elbow.

      Plaintiff filed his complaint in this matter alleging Officer Rotondo

operated his vehicle in a negligent, careless, and reckless manner, and the City

of Jersey City is vicariously liable for his actions.        Following discovery,

defendants moved for summary judgment based on "good-faith immunity" under

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the New Jersey Tort Claims Act ("TCA"), N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. On October 21,

2022, the court heard oral argument and ordered an evidentiary hearing because

the facts were "a little confusing."

      On November 3, 2022, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing at

which Officer Rotondo and plaintiff testified. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the court noted there was "not a . . . significant difference between the testimony

of the parties." For example, Officer Rotondo testified he activated his overhead

lights and siren, while plaintiff was unable to recall if he saw the lights or heard

the siren. The court found credible Officer Rotondo's testimony regarding the

dispatch call for an irate and angry individual at Dunkin' Donuts but noted what

the officer heard or did not hear "is really irrelevant." The court found Officer

Rotondo was responding to a call involving emergent circumstances that

required quick action noting, "[o]bviously you [can] tell that from the

dispatcher's [police event information] report." It also found Officer Rotondo

was "acting objectively reasonably[,]" and granted defendants' motion based on

good-faith immunity.

      On appeal, plaintiff contends: (1) the court erred by granting summary

judgment because whether Officer Rotondo was executing or enforcing the law

is a question of fact for the jury; and (2) the court improperly usurped the jury's

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role as fact finder with respect to whether Officer Rotondo activated his

overhead lights and siren, was engaged in executing or enforcing the law, and

acted objectively reasonably.

      We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard

that governed the trial court's decision. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78

(2022). We owe no special deference to the motion judge's legal analysis. RSI

Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018) (quoting

Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199

(2016)). Summary judgment should be granted when "the competent evidential

materials submitted by the parties," viewed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, show that there are no "genuine issues of material fact

and . . . the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law."

Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 23-24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat

v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)).

      "The most basic duty of a police officer is to enforce the law.            In

discharging this duty, police officers may use all reasonable means to uphold

the law and apprehend perpetrators." Canico v. Hurtado, 144 N.J. 361, 365

(1996) (internal citation omitted). Under the TCA, "[a] public employee is not

liable if [the employee] acts in good faith in the execution or enforcement of any

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law." N.J.S.A. 59:3-3. This immunity applies to a police officer's operation of

a motor vehicle "within the scope of [the officer's] duties" and in response to

emergent circumstances, such as a crime in progress, where the officer acted

with "objective reasonableness" or with subjective "good faith." Canico, 144

N.J. at 365-67.

      The Court in Canico explained:

            Although we recognize that people ordinarily do not
            use the term "good faith" to describe the operation of
            motor vehicles, we believe that the Legislature intended
            that the term could encompass the operation of police
            vehicles. A public employee, although negligent, may
            still act in good faith. Marley v. Palmyra Bor., 193 N.J.
            Super. 271, 295 (Law Div. 1983). To pierce [N.J.S.A.
            59:]3-3's qualified immunity, a plaintiff must prove
            more than ordinary negligence. See id. at 294 (stating
            that recklessness usually denies good faith).

            [Id. at 365.]

      The Court also held, "[i]n many cases, the question of 'good faith' presents

a question of fact to be resolved at a plenary hearing." Ibid. (citing Fielder v.

Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 132 (1995)). "Summary judgment under [N.J.S.A. 59:3-

3], however, is appropriate if public employees can establish that their acts were

objectively reasonable or that they performed them with subjective good faith. "

Ibid. (citing Hayes v. Mercer Cnty., 217 N.J. Super. 614, 622 (App. Div. 1987)).

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      We are satisfied the court correctly determined Officer Rotondo was

entitled to immunity and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. We

affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the court's oral opinion. We add

the following comments.

      Plaintiff's contention that the court usurped the function of the jury by

conducting a plenary hearing to determine the applicability of good-faith

immunity is not persuasive. Canico held that when the determination of "good

faith" presents a question of fact, the applicability of good-faith immunity

should be resolved at a plenary hearing. 144 N.J. at 365. Here, the court

properly conducted a plenary hearing to resolve the factual questions presented

in this case.

      Moreover, as the court recognized, the factual disputes identified by

plaintiff were not relevant to the good-faith immunity analysis. Plaintiff does

not dispute that Officer Rotondo received a call for assistance directed to another

unit and responded to the location as backup. Because Officer Rotondo was

responding to a call for police assistance, he was entitled to the protection of

good-faith immunity.

      Plaintiff's reliance on Caicedo v. Caicedo, 439 N.J. Super. 615 (App. Div.

2105), is misplaced. In Caicedo, a police officer was involved in a motor vehicle

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accident while transporting a prisoner to the police station. Id. at 620. We held

that under the facts of that case, the officer was not acting in the execution or

enforcement of any law so as to afford good-faith immunity. Id. at 626. We

noted, if the officer "was responding . . . to a crime scene, to an accident call

with unknown injuries, or to some other situation requiring . . . immediate

attention, we have little doubt that the result we reach would be different." Id.

at 627.

      In this case, Officer Rotondo made the decision to respond to the dispatch

call for police assistance. He was not engaged in a ministerial act such as

transporting a prisoner. Officer Rotondo was entitled to good-faith immunity

because he was responding to a call for assistance even if, as plaintiff contends,

the call turned out to be non-emergent in nature.

      Likewise, the alleged factual dispute over Officer Rotondo's use of his

lights and siren was not material for two reasons. First, plaintiff did not offer

any competent evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. In response to

Officer Rotondo's testimony that he engaged his overhead lights and siren,

plaintiff testified he did not "recall" seeing the lights or hearing the siren.

Plaintiff failed to offer competent evidence to contradict Officer Rotondo's

testimony and, therefore, failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

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        Second, to defeat the claim of immunity, plaintiff must prove more than

ordinary negligence. Plaintiff did not offer any evidence that Officer Rotondo

operated his vehicle in a careless or reckless manner. Even if plaintiff could

prove Officer Rotondo did not activate his overhead lights and siren, plaintiff

would not be able to prove more than ordinary negligence under the facts of this

case.

        To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments, it is

because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

        Affirmed.

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