Court Opinion

ID: 9769890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:06:44.182451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:08.984202
License: Public Domain

KLINGEMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The trial court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law which are not included in the majority opinion, and they are herein set forth in a footnote.1
*860The majority has held that under the evidence in the case, Benson, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, should have ascertained the type of business and ownership with which it was dealing, and should have known that the debtor named in the writ of garnishment was the same as the creditor which it owed money; and that the trial court’s finding as to actual notice and knowledge is sufficiently supported by the record. I agree with this holding and will not discuss it further.
However, I disagree with the majority holding that the garnishment judgment cannot stand for the reason that the garnishee did not have a judgment to support the garnishment judgment.
The majority opinion does not discuss or even mention the provisions of Rule 657, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The applicable garnishment statute, Article 4076 of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, provides in subdivision 3 that a writ of garnishment may issue when the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting judgment and makes affidavit that the defendant has not within his knowledge property in his possession within the state subject to execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment. Rule 657, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that in the case mentioned in subdivision 3 of Article 4076, the judgment shall be deemed final and subsisting for the purpose of garnishment from and after the date of its rendition, unless a supersedeas bond shall have been approved and filed in accordance with Rule 364.2
No supersedeas bond was ever filed in said cause.
It is undisputed that a judgment was entered in favor of the garnishor against the defendant, Tom Amonett, on August 30, 1976; that it was never superseded; that it was in effect and a subsisting judgment at the time the writ of garnishment was issued, when such writ was served, when the garnishee paid the defendant and when the garnishee filed its answer. It is also undis*861puted that at the time the garnishment judgment here under attack was rendered, garnishor was a holder of a valid and subsisting final judgment against the judgment debtor.
The established rule in Texas is that a garnishee cannot after service of process prejudice the rights of a plaintiff in a lawsuit, and if he transfers during the penden-cy of the garnishment any of the indebtedness belonging to the defendant in the suit, he does so at his peril. Westridge Villa Apartments v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 438 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Pure Oil Co. v. Walsh-Woldert Motor Co., 36 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1931, writ dism’d).
Under the record, the garnishment judgment here under attack was proper. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Findings of Fact:
(1)On August 30, 1976, a Judgment was recovered by Ron Beall against Tommy Amo-nett for the sum of $1,010.96, $300 attorney’s fees, interest thereon at 10% per annum and costs of court. A total of $1,390.16.
(2) On September 3, 1976, a Writ of Garnishment was served on the Garnishee. On that date, the Garnishee was indebted to Tommy Amonett in the sum of $2,186.50.
(3) On August 11, 1976, Tommy Amonett registered “Auto Sheen Car Cleaning” as an assumed name. *860(4) On September 9, 1976, Garnishee paid the $2,186.50 to Auto Sheen Car Cleaning, solely owned by Tommy Amonett.
(5) On September 24, 1976, Garnishee filed an Answer stating that it was not indebted to Tommy Amonett at the time that the Writ of Garnishment was served when, in fact, it was so indebted at that time to him, and, in spite of the service of said Writ, payed [sic] the herein-above mentioned sum to Tommy Amonett.
(6) On September 29, 1976, the Judgment entered in Cause 106,548 was set aside and a new trial was granted.
(7) On October 14, 1976, after a retrial, Judgment was again entered in favor of the Plaintiff against Tommy Amonett for the sum of $1,137.64, attorney’s fees of $600 and interest thereon at 9% per annum.
(8) No Supersedeas Bond was ever filed in said cause.
(9) Garnishee had done business with Tommy Amonett for a number of months under more than one trade name and had actual knowledge that Tommy Amonett was doing business under the name of Auto Sheen Car Cleaning.
(10) There was such a relationship between Tommy Amonett and Auto Sheen Car Cleaning that warranted investigation on the part of Garnishee in light of the Writ of Garnishment.
Conclusions of Law:
(1)There was a final subsisting Judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Tommy Amonett in accordance with Rule 657 at the time the Writ of Garnishment was applied for, when it was issued, when it was served, and when Garnishee filed its answer.
(2) There was a final subsisting Judgment in favor of Plaintiff against Defendant when this cause was tried..
(3) As the Garnishee was indebted to Tommy Amonett in a sum greater than the amount of the Judgment in Plaintiff’s favor when the Writ was served upon Garnishee, Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment against Garnishee for the amount of the Judgment as of the date when said Writ ■ was served.

. Under the majority opinion, a garnishee, who has been served with a writ of garnishment by a garnishor who has at such time an existing judgment against a debtor, could continue to make payments to such judgment debtor even though the garnishee knows or should .have known that the debtor named in the writ of garnishment was the same as a creditor which it owed money. This could continue for a considerable period of time — until a motion for new trial was filed by the judgment debtor, and if so filed until it is overruled, or overruled by operation of law. During such period of time, funds which would ordinarily be available to the garnishor would be dissipated, often to the garnishor’s prejudice. This totally ignores the provisions of Rule 657, Tex.R.Civ.P., as to finality of judgments for purpose of garnishment.