Court Opinion

ID: 9666485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:17:26.876966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:30.646602
License: Public Domain

Sam Robinson, Associate Justice, dissenting. The majority holds that before a venireman.can be questioned concerning his interest in or connection with a particular liability insurance company, he must first be questioned with reference to whether he has any interest in or connection with any liability insurance company. As support for the rule only two cases are cited: Pekin Stave & Mfg. Co. v. Ramey, 104 Ark. 1, 147 S. W. 83, and Williams v. Cantrell, 114 Ark. 542, 170 S. W. 250. The majority quotes Judge Frank Smith extensively from Williams v. Cantrell. Cooper v. Kelly, 131 Ark. 6, 198 S. W. 94, was decided by practically the same court that decided Williams v. Cantrell. Judge Frank Smith, who wrote the opinion in Williams v. Cantrell, helped make the opinion in Cooper v. Kelly, which was written by Judge Wood. In Cooper v. Kelly, the attorney representing the defendant refused to give the name of the insurance company carrying the indemnity insurance. The Court said: “. . . counsel for the appellee, over the objection of the appellants, asked one juror on his voir dire whether or not he represented any accident or casualty insurance company, to which question the juror answered, ‘No. ’ And appellee’s counsel asked another juror whether or not he was under any obligation to any accident insurance company or was the agent of any such company. The juror answered, ‘No.’ And other jurors were asked, ‘Do you know of any accident company or any agent of any such company that has any influence or control over you in the city of Hot Springs?’ to which they answered, ‘No.’ And another juror was asked whether he knew that parties in public business were insured against accidents that occurred, and the juror answered, ‘Yes.’ Then the juror was asked, ‘Do you know of any insurance company or casualty company or any agent of such company, in Hot Springs or anywhere else, to whom you are under obligations ? ’ And the juror answered ‘No.’ Still another juror was asked, ‘Do you know any of these accident casualty companies ? ’ and the answer was,.‘Know all of them, I suppose.’ Question, ‘They haven’t any hold on you? Answer, ‘None that I know of, nobody else.’ ” In holding that it was not error for the trial court to permit questioning of the veniremen as above indicated, the Court said: “. . . In both of those cases [referring to Pekin Stave & Mfg. Co. v. Ramey and Williams v. Cantrell] it is expressly recognized that it is within the province of an attorney representing a plaintiff to question veniremen concerning their relation to any casualty company whom the attorney might know or might honestly believe to have insured the defendant against loss for the injury which the plaintiff had sustained at the hands of the defendant. “Had nothing more occurred in the above cases, relied upon by the appellants, than the mere asking of the questions therein propounded, doubtless this court would not have condemned as erroneous and prejudicial the rulings of the trial court in permitting such questions. Doubtless counsel for appellees in the instant case were permitted a broad scope of inquiry concerning the venirer men’s connection with any casualty insurance company in Hot Springs or elsewhere by reason of the conduct of the appellant’s counsel in refusing to discover whether or not he represented any casualty company, and, if so, in refusing to divulge the name of such company. Had such information been given to appellee’s counsel, we may assume that the court would have restricted the inquiry accordingly.” [Emphasis supplied] From the above language of the Court in Cooper v. Kelly, construing Pekin Stave & Mfg. Co. v. Ramey and Williams v. Cantrell, it appears that the proper way for an attorney to question a venireman in regard to any interest in or connection he may have with an insurance company that is the real party in interest in the lawsuit then being tried is to question such venireman with reference to his connection or interest in the particular insurance company involved, and not just any insurance company. Later, when Judge Frank Smith was still on the Court, Judge McHaney wrote Ellis & Lewis v. Warner, 182 Ark. 613, 32 S. W. 2d 167, where it is pointed out that in Cooper v. Kelly that case was distinguished from Pekin Stave & Mfg. Co. v. Ramey and Williams v. Cantrell. Judge McHaney said, in Ellis & Lewis v. Warner, that according to the rule in Pekin Stave & Mfg. Co. v. Ramey and Williams v. Cantrell, the attorney for the plaintiff has the right to question a venireman concerning his relation with any casualty company whom he might have reason to believe was interested in the outcome of the litigation. As I see it, Pekin Stave & Mfg. Co. v. Ramey and Williams v. Cantrell do not support a rule to the effect that counsel seeking to ascertain if a venireman has an interest in or connection with an insurance company which is one of the real parties in interest must first ask the venireman about his connection with any insurance company. In fact, according to the construction put on those cases in Cooper v. Kelly and Ellis & Lewis v. Warner, the rule appears to be just the opposite, that is, if counsel knows, or has good reason to believe, that a certain insurance company is one of the real parties in interest, and in good faith wants to know if a prospective juror has any connections that would make him an undesirable juror in the opinion of counsel, then the venireman should be asked about that particular insurance company, and not just any insurance company. The majority states that “Mr. McMillan, representing the defendants, informed the court that the company in question was in fact insuring the defendants in the case. He went on to say that there was a conflict in the county between the farmers supporting the Farm Bureau and those supporting the Farmers Union, both of which had insurance companies, that at least two members of the jury were decidedly biased against the Farm Bureau, and that to indicate that the Farm Bureau was a defendant would affect those men.” In these circumstances it was of the utmost importance that counsel for plaintiff learn, if possible, whether any of the veniremen were biased in favor of the Southern Farm Bureau Insurance Company, since that company was the real party in interest on the defense side of the case. Counsel for defendant knew there were two veniremen who were prejudiced against that insurance company. Apparently counsel for plaintiff had no information on the subject, but if there were two veniremen prejudiced against the insurance company, by like token there could be two or more who were biased in favor of the insurance company. A careful trial lawyer representing the plaintiff in all probability would not want a person on the jury where liability insurance was involved if such person had a close relative who worked for any liability insurance company. In Halbrook v. Williams, 185 Ark. 885, 50 S. W. 2d 243, counsel for appellant asked all the members of the panel if they bad “any connection or relationship with the Standard Casualty & Surety Company of New York”; and, further, if they “had such relationship with any such company or any surety company that insures persons against liability”. In affirming the trial court in permitting these questions to be asked on voir dire examination, this Court said: ‘ ‘ The jurors or some of them might have had some relationship or connection with the particular company mentioned or some other surety company so as to make them undesirable jurors, and still not have been connected with any agency or held any stock in the particular company. We have many times held that similar questions may properly be asked the veniremen for the purpose of intelligently exercising the right of challenge. Smith-Arkansas Traveler Co. v. Simmons, 181 Ark. 1024, 28 S. W. 2d 1052; Ellis & Lewis v. Warner, 182 Ark. 613, 32 S. W. 2d 167; Bourland v. Caraway, 183 Ark. 848, 39 S. W. 2d 316; Sutton v. Webb, 183 Ark. 865, 39 S. W. 2d 314. No error was committed, therefore, in this regard.” The trial court has wide discretion regarding the scope of the voir dire examination and in my opinion there was no abuse of that discretion in the case at bar. For the reasons set forth herein, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice MoFaddin joins in this dissent.