Court Opinion

ID: 9945214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 16:04:33.601444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:24.810612
License: Public Domain

IN THE
            ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                            DIVISION ONE

                          In re the Matter of:

                KATHERINE WHITT, Petitioner/Appellee,

                                   v.

                 MARCO MEZA, Respondent/Appellant.

                       No. 1 CA-CV 23-0256 FC
                         FILED 2-27-2024

          Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                          No. FC2021-003483
               The Honorable Daniel G. Martin, Judge

    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

                              COUNSEL

Stanley David Murray, Attorney at Law, Scottsdale
By Stanley David Murray
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

State 48 Law Firm, Scottsdale
By Bryce Johnson, Robert Hendricks, & Stephen Vincent
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
                             WHITT v. MEZA
                            Opinion of the Court

                                 OPINION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s opinion, in which
Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1            Marco Meza (“Father”) appeals several rulings in the decree
dissolving his marriage to Katherine Whitt (“Mother”). We vacate the
characterization of the Chase bank account (“Chase account”) that Father
co-owned with his mother (“Grandmother”) as community property
because Grandmother’s non-marital property cannot be transmuted to the
community. As a result, we also vacate the equalization judgment for the
community bank accounts and offer instructions on the pre- and
post-marital portion of the Chase account. We affirm the superior court’s
calculation of the community’s equitable lien on Father’s separate real
estate. But we vacate and remand the vehicle equalization judgment
because the evidence does not support the amount of the community’s
interest found by the court. We affirm the rest of the decree.1

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2           Mother and Father married in 2015 and have three children.
Father opened the Chase account with Grandmother before the marriage
and they deposited their earnings into the Chase account. After the
marriage, Father and Grandmother continued to deposit their earnings into
the Chase account. Mother and Father used the Chase account to pay for
living expenses during the marriage, though they also had bank accounts

1      The parties raise other issues that do not meet the criteria for
publication. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(b); ARCAP 28(b). We address those
issues in a separate, contemporaneously filed memorandum decision. See
Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(h); Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 594, ¶ 2, n.3 (App.
2017).

                                      2
                           WHITT v. MEZA
                          Opinion of the Court

in their names.2 The Chase account had a balance of around $42,000 on the
marriage date. It grew to around $98,500 on the date of service. The day
after service, Grandmother withdrew the entire balance.

¶3            Father bought a home before the marriage but paid the
mortgage with community funds during the marriage. Mother agreed the
home is Father’s separate property but asserted the community had an
equitable lien. The parties also owned five vehicles, two bought during the
marriage. Father bought the other three vehicles before the marriage but
made payments with community funds.3

¶4            As relevant to this appeal, the superior court awarded Mother
$51,212 as an equalization judgment for her share of the “community
depository accounts.” The court awarded the home to Father and found
Mother’s interest in the community’s equitable lien on the home was
$14,469. The court found one vehicle (Rav4) was Father’s separate property,
awarded one vehicle to Mother (2006 Acura), and awarded the three other
vehicles to Father (Subaru, 2007 Acura, and Toyota Highlander) with an
equalization judgment of $15,625 owed to Mother.

¶5            Father sought post-decree relief, which the superior court
partially granted on an issue irrelevant to the appeal. After the court
entered an appealable decree, Father appealed. We have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) and (2) and Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure
(“Rule”) 78(c).

2     According to Mother’s pretrial statement, the subject bank accounts
had these balances at the time of service: Mother’s Bank of America account
#5269 ($612); Mother’s Bank of America account #3881 ($822); Father’s
BBVA account #4246 ($291); Father’s BBVA account #4659 ($5,038); Father
and Grandmother’s joint Chase account ($98,530).

3      Father does not dispute Mother’s value assessment for the vehicles
at the time of service. The vehicle’s values are as follows: 2006 Acura
($4,370); 2009 Toyota Highlander ($8,353); 2014 Subaru Impreza ($27,015);
and 2007 Acura MDX ($6,250). Although the fifth vehicle, the Rav4, was
never assigned a value, Mother conceded that it was Father’s sole and
separate property.

                                    3
                              WHITT v. MEZA
                             Opinion of the Court

                                DISCUSSION

A.    The Superior Court Did Not Have to Make Written Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law After It Directed the Parties to Submit
Proposed Decrees.

¶6            Father argues that the superior court erred by failing to make
written findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 82(a). Neither
party requested findings under Rule 82(a). But Father argues on appeal that
the court invoked Rule 82’s requirement for written findings and legal
conclusions when it ordered the parties to submit proposed decrees. We
disagree.

¶7             For Rule 82(a) to apply, a party must request findings. See
Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 82(a)(1) (“If requested before trial, the court must make
separate findings of fact and conclusions of law.”) (Emphasis added.). Rule
82(a) does not encompass the court’s authority to order parties to submit
proposed forms of a decree. The court’s authority to request proposed
judgments comes from its “inherent power to do those things which are
necessary for the efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.” Fenton v. Howard, 118
Ariz. 119, 121 (1978). Thus, the court did not invoke Rule 82 when it ordered
the parties to submit proposed decrees.

¶8            Without the requirement that the superior court make written
findings, our standard of review presumes the superior court found every
fact necessary to support its decision. See Francine C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
249 Ariz. 289, 297, ¶ 19 (App. 2020); Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 135 (App.
1990). We will affirm the decree if it is supported by reasonable evidence
and view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding it. See
Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 17 (App. 2015).

B.   The Superior Court Erred by Finding the Entire Chase Account
Was Community Property.

¶9            Father and Grandmother had a joint Chase account at the time
of the marriage with a balance of around $42,000. Mother did not dispute
the $42,000 amount and conceded that Grandmother continued to deposit
unspecified amounts into the Chase account throughout the parties’
marriage. Mother also recognized that the parties used the Chase account
for “community expenses” during the marriage. And the parties agreed
that Father continued to deposit his earnings into the Chase account. While
Father made withdrawals from the Chase account throughout the marriage,
there was no evidence that he used these funds for separate expenses.

                                        4
                            WHITT v. MEZA
                           Opinion of the Court

Neither party offered evidence that Grandmother withdrew her funds from
the account until she withdrew all funds after service.

¶10           After the trial, the court adopted Mother’s position that the
entire Chase account was community property and ordered Father to pay
an equalization judgment of $51,212 “for Mother’s share of the community
depository accounts.” The court reached the $51,212 amount as follows. The
total amount in all accounts was $105,293. Half of that amount was $52,646.
The court awarded Mother her named accounts, which totaled $1,434—
subtracting $1,434 from $52,646 leaves $51,212—the amount of the
equalization judgment.

¶11            Father argues that the entire account was not transmuted to a
community account because it contained marital and non-marital property.
Father also claims the approximately $42,000 in the account on the marriage
date is undisputedly Grandmother’s non-marital and Father’s separate
property, and it was error to award Mother any of those funds.

¶12           Grandmother has an undisputed but undetermined interest
in the pre-marital funds in the Chase account and the funds she deposited
into the account during the marriage, less anything she withdrew. Mother
argues that because Father failed to trace his pre-marital separate property
and Grandmother’s deposits and withdrawals, the entire account became
commingled and is, therefore, community property. Not so.

¶13           Grandmother’s funds in the account are not marital property
and can never become such because she was never married to Father or
Mother. In a dissolution proceeding, the court has the authority to assign
each spouse their sole and separate property and equitably divide the
community property, but it lacks the authority to assign non-marital
property. See A.R.S. § 25-318(A) (authorizing the court to divide property
in a dissolution). As a result, Grandmother’s funds are not subject to
transmutation simply because they were combined in an account
containing the parties’ community property. See In re Marriage of Cupp, 152
Ariz. 161, 164 (App. 1986) (The rule of “transmutation of separate property
to community property occurs only when the identity of the property as
separate or community is lost.”). Because Grandmother was not a spouse
in the dissolution, her property is neither “separate” nor “community.”
Grandmother’s funds are non-marital property and not subject to
transmutation.

¶14         As between Mother and Father, the funds Father deposited
after the marriage are presumably community property. See A.R.S.

                                     5
                            WHITT v. MEZA
                           Opinion of the Court

§ 25-211(A) (All property acquired during the marriage by either spouse is
community property unless an exception applies.). But that does not allow
the superior court to order Father to pay Mother one-half of all funds in the
account. Mother had no right to any share of the funds Grandmother
deposited into the account. See A.R.S. § 14-6211(A) (“During the lifetime of
all parties an account belongs to the parties in proportion to the net
contribution of each to the sums on deposit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence of a different intent.”).

¶15           Father also asserts that the $42,000 account balance on the
marriage date is not subject to allocation because it was a combination of
Grandmother’s and Father’s pre-marital funds. See A.R.S. § 25-213(A) (The
property a spouse owned before marriage is that spouse’s separate
property.). A spouse’s pre-marital property remains separate property
unless transmuted by agreement or operation of law. Potthoff v. Potthoff, 128
Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1981). “The mere fact that the property was
commingled does not cause it to lose its separate identity, as long as the
separate property can still be identified.” Cupp, 152 Ariz. at 164; see also
Cooper v. Cooper, 130 Ariz. 257, 259 (1981) (same); Noble v. Noble, 26 Ariz.
App. 89, 95 (1976) (Commingling does not cause transmutation “so long as
the funds remain traceable.”). Father has the burden of proving with clear
and satisfactory evidence what portion of his funds should not be found
transmuted. Cooper, 130 Ariz. at 259-60.

¶16            At least some of the $42,000 account balance on the marriage
date was traceable and did not lose its identity. See Cupp, 152 Ariz. at 164
(Separate funds remained traceable where spouse bought “easily
identifiable assets” with commingled separate funds “within a very short
time after receiving those funds.”). The Chase account fluctuated during
the marriage, but it never fell below $39,400. And there is no evidence in
the record that Father used the Chase account for separate expenditures
during the marriage. Thus, some funds in the account on the marriage date
are identifiable despite the later addition of community funds. See Cupp, 152
Ariz. at 164. The superior court erred when it included all funds in the
Chase account as community property. While Father and Grandmother
may dispute their share of the pre-marital funds ($39,400), the community
has no interest in them.

¶17          As to any amount above the $39,400 balance, the superior
court must determine Grandmother’s non-marital interest in the Chase
account before it can determine the community’s interest. We vacate the
allocation of “the community depository accounts” and remand for
reconsideration consistent with this opinion.

                                     6
                              WHITT v. MEZA
                             Opinion of the Court

C.   Grandmother May Be an Indispensable Party in Determining the
Ownership of the Chase Account.

¶18            The parties dispute whether Grandmother was an
indispensable party to the litigation over the Chase account. We need not
decide on that issue because we are remanding the case to correct the
abovementioned errors. Still, we address their arguments to guide the court
because the issue may arise on remand. See Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 246 Ariz.
126, 131, ¶ 17 (App. 2019); State v. Abdi, 226 Ariz. 361, 366, ¶ 18 (App. 2011).

¶19           Neither party asked the court to join Grandmother as an
indispensable party, and the court did not order her to be joined. Whether
a party is indispensable4 (sometimes called a necessary party) is a mixed
question of fact and law that must be determined on the facts of each case
and that we review de novo. See Gerow v. Covill, 192 Ariz. 9, 14, ¶ 19 (App.
1998); Friends of Black Forest Reg’l Park, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 80 P.3d

4     Before the 1966 amendments to the Arizona Rules of Civil
Procedure, parties to an action were known as three types:
       (1)    Proper parties: Parties who may be joined because the
       case involves a common question in which a person has an
       interest, but complete relief may nevertheless be granted
       without joinder.
       (2)    Necessary parties: Parties who should be joined
       because complete relief cannot be granted without joinder,
       but that party’s interest is severable. Siler v. Superior Court, 83
       Ariz. 49, 54 (1957).
       (3)    Indispensable parties: Parties who must be joined
       because the case cannot be adjudicated without such party’s
       involvement. Bolin v. Superior Court, 85 Ariz. 131, 134-35
       (1958); Siler, 83 Ariz. at 54.
2 Ariz. Prac., Civil Trial Practice § 11:5 (2d ed.) (cleaned up). The supreme
court amended Rule 19 in 1966 to discard the “judicial gloss in terms of
indispensable, necessary, and proper parties.” See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19, State
Bar Committee Note to 1966 Amendment; see also Riley v. Cochise County, 10
Ariz. App. 55, 58 (1969). The 1966 amendments retained the “basic principle
that parties must be joined where this is required by ‘equity and good
conscience.’” See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19, State Bar Committee Note to 1966
Amendment (citations omitted). The supreme court adopted restyled rules
in 2017 but did not change the thrust of Rule 19.

                                       7
                               WHITT v. MEZA
                              Opinion of the Court

871, 881 (Colo. App. 2003). Although Father did not raise the issue below,
the failure to join an indispensable party is not waivable and may be raised
for the first time at the appellate level. City of Flagstaff v. Babbitt, 8 Ariz. App.
123, 127 (1968); Gerow, 192 Ariz. at 14, ¶ 19. So a court should always be
mindful of the risk of entering a voidable order if an indispensable party is
not joined. See Shinn v. Ariz. Bd. of Exec. Clemency, 254 Ariz. 255, 262, ¶ 26
(2022) (“Voidable orders or judgments, in contrast, are binding and
enforceable, enjoy all of the ordinary attributes of a valid order or judgment
until they are reversed or vacated, and may only be modified on direct
appeal or by a proper and timely post-judgment motion.”) (cleaned up);
Babbitt, 8 Ariz. App. at 127 (A judgment rendered without an indispensable
party is merely voidable and not void.).

¶20            A court may join a third party in a domestic relations action
when joinder is “necessary for the exercise of its authority.” A.R.S.
§ 25-314(D). A party is indispensable when their “interest in the controversy
is such that no final judgment or decree could be entered, doing justice
between the parties actually before the court and without injuriously
affecting the rights of others not brought into the action.” Gila Bend v. Walled
Lake Door Co., 107 Ariz. 545, 549 (1971); see also Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 33(c)
(Courts must use the civil procedure rules in family cases for joinder,
interpleader, or intervention.); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (A party is necessary
when the court cannot provide complete relief in their absence, the absent
party’s interests would be impaired or impeded by a judgment, or an
existing party may be subject to substantial risk of inconsistent
obligations.). Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 19 aims to ensure the joinder
of all interested parties in a single action and avoid a multiplicity of
litigation. Ariz. Title Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Kelly, 11 Ariz. App. 254, 255 (1970). And
a party who should be joined but refuses to participate may be brought in
as a defendant or an involuntary plaintiff. Vance v. Vance, 124 Ariz. 1, 4
(1979).

¶21           Based on the current record, Father’s argument appears to
have merit. Mother argues Grandmother was not an indispensable party
because her interests likely aligned with Father, who could protect
Grandmother’s portion of the Chase account but failed to do so. Father
argues it was necessary to join Grandmother because her interest in the
Chase account was adverse to his pre-marital separate property and the
community interest, and, without her, there is a substantial risk of
inconsistent obligations.

                                         8
                             WHITT v. MEZA
                            Opinion of the Court

¶22             Based on the facts here, Father could not adequately represent
Grandmother’s interest without her agreeing to the representation because
their interests are adverse. The greater Grandmother’s interest in the
account is, the smaller Father’s and the community’s interests would be.
Because Grandmother was not afforded the opportunity to assign her
interest or be joined as a party, she could not participate in determining
how much of the Chase account she owned. Grandmother had a right to
appear and protect her property interest, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i)
(Joinder is necessary if disposing of a person’s interest in their absence may
“as a practical matter impair or impede that person’s ability to protect the
interest.”), or to waive her right to appear. Due process requires that before
an individual is deprived of a property interest, that person must have
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Johns v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 169
Ariz. 75, 79 (App. 1991) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79
(1971)).

¶23            As noted, Grandmother withdrew all funds in the account the
day after service. This withdrawal did not protect her interest or prevent
more litigation over the funds. Father or Mother could demand repayment
of the community’s share of the account from Grandmother, which might
lead to rulings inconsistent with the decree. Moreover, on this record,
Grandmother’s share may be even more than the amount she withdrew if
her total deposits minus withdrawals exceed the sum she took. This risk
reinforces the need to either obtain Grandmother’s waiver or join
Grandmother as an indispensable party despite her withdrawal of the
funds and the fact that the equalization judgment was against Father, not
her. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii).

¶24           Mother also argues that Grandmother was not an
indispensable party because, like Gerow, 192 Ariz. at 15, ¶¶ 22-23, the decree
resolved the dispute between Mother and Father without adversely
affecting Grandmother’s interests. But this fact is unknown, as the superior
court’s decree awarding the entire account to Father subject to an
equalization judgment to Mother did not resolve what the community
funds were. As a result of the error, the equalization judgment awarding
Mother one-half of the fund’s value created a substantial risk of inconsistent
obligations for Father. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). Thus, Grandmother
appears to be an indispensable party.

¶25            On remand, the superior court can determine whether
Grandmother is indispensable. If she is, Grandmother may waive her right
to participate or agree to have Father represent her interest. We leave it to
the court to fashion an appropriate path forward with the issue before it.

                                      9
                             WHITT v. MEZA
                            Opinion of the Court

D.  The Court Correctly Determined the Marital Lien on the
Community Home.

¶26           Mother did not dispute that the community home was
Father’s separate pre-marital property. She claimed the community had an
equitable lien because the parties paid the mortgage on Father’s separate
property with community funds throughout the marriage. When Father
refinanced the home loan in July 2019, Mother signed a disclaimer deed.

¶27           The superior court awarded the home to Father and
determined that Mother’s share of the equitable lien was $14,469. We apply
de novo review to the court’s characterization of assets or debts as
community or separate, but we review the court’s division of those assets
and debts for an abuse of discretion. Hammett v. Hammett, 247 Ariz. 556, 559,
¶ 13 (App. 2019).

       1.    Father Failed to Show Prejudice When the Superior Court
       Mistakenly Listed the Home as Community Property Because the
       Court Awarded the Home to Father as His Separate Property.

¶28            Father argues the superior court erroneously characterized
the home as community property in the decree based on the following
language: “Father is awarded the following community property as his sole
and separate property . . . [a]ll right, title, interest, and equity in the real
estate consisting of the home . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Although the decree
lists the home as community property, this misstatement is harmless error
because the court awarded the home to Father as his separate property.
Mother received half of the community’s equitable lien in the home,
suggesting she had no ownership interest in the separate property home.

¶29           Even so, Father contends the error is not harmless because by
characterizing the home as community property, the superior court “must”
have factored the $60,000 in equity into the equitable division of property,
which “may have spurred the trial court to award Mother more than it
otherwise would have.” Father fails to explain how or what specific
property division was inequitable because of the misstatement. As a result,
we reject the unsupported argument.

       2.    Father Waived His Argument That the Court Should Use a
       Different Date to Calculate the Community’s Equitable Lien.

¶30           Father argues it was error to use the date of the marriage
(November 10, 2015) instead of the date Mother signed the disclaimer deed
(July 18, 2019) in calculating the equitable lien under the formula outlined

                                      10
                             WHITT v. MEZA
                            Opinion of the Court

in Drahos v. Rens, 149 Ariz. 248 (App. 1985), and Barnett v. Jedynak, 219 Ariz.
550 (App. 2009) (“Drahos/Barnett formula”).

¶31           Father did not argue about which date to use before the trial.
Instead, he argued that Mother had no interest in the home. In his post-trial
motion to alter or amend the decree, Father argued for the first time about
which date (marriage or refinance) should be used. Arguments raised for
the first time in a post-trial motion are typically waived. See Conant v.
Whitney, 190 Ariz. 290, 293-94 (App. 1997).

¶32           Father argues that waiver should not apply to him because he
could not have raised the Drahos/Barnett formula error before the court
issued the decree. We reject the argument. Father knew of Mother’s
proposed Drahos/Barnett calculation at trial yet maintained that the
community had no equitable lien. He could have objected to Mother’s
position and raised his alternative Drahos/Barnett calculation at trial.5 Thus,
Father has waived the argument.

E.   The Subaru is Father’s Separate Property, and the Record Does Not
Support the Amount of the Vehicle Equalization Judgment.

¶33          As noted above, the decree addressed five vehicles. It
awarded Mother the 2007 Acura and Father four vehicles, including a Rav4
and a Subaru. Mother did not dispute that the Rav4 and Subaru were
Father’s pre-marital separate property. But Mother sought an equalization
judgment for half the Subaru’s value because they used community funds
for some Subaru car payments after the marriage. The court awarded
Mother a $15,625 equalization judgment for her share of the vehicle equity
without explaining how it arrived at the figure.

¶34           Father argues the superior court erred because it awarded
him only “one-half of all right, title, interest, and equity” in the Subaru and
the Toyota Highlander without awarding the other half to Mother. This was
harmless error. The court did not award Mother the “other half” of these
vehicles but awarded her an equalization judgment. On remand, the court

5      Our supreme court issued its opinion in Saba v. Khoury, 253 Ariz. 587
(2022), two weeks before trial. Thus, to the extent that that Father now relies
on the Saba opinion, it was available at the time of his pretrial statement
(September 21, 2022), trial (September 27, 2022), and opening brief
(September 28, 2023). Father’s failure to argue it until the reply brief waives
the issue.

                                      11
                              WHITT v. MEZA
                             Opinion of the Court

should amend the decree to clarify that it awarded Father all interest in the
Subaru and Highlander referred to in the decree.

¶35           Father also asserts that the decree erroneously listed the Rav4
and Subaru as community property and assigned them to Father as his
separate property. This is also harmless error. Though the wording in the
decree purports to award “the following community property” to Father,
these two vehicles were undisputedly Father’s pre-marital separate
property. There was also no evidence of the Rav4’s value, so the court could
not have considered it in calculating the equalization judgment. The
incorrect language does not warrant reversal.

¶36          Father contends it was error to include the value of the Subaru
in the equalization judgment because it was his separate property. See
A.R.S. § 25-213(A). Property bought before marriage on credit or with
borrowed funds acquires the status of separate property at the time of the
purchase. See Brucklier v. Brucklier, 253 Ariz. 579, 583, ¶ 16 (App. 2022)
(Property acquires its character as community or separate depending on its
owner’s marital status at the time of acquisition.). And regardless of the
community or separate nature of the funds used to satisfy the debt, it
remains such. Flynn v. Allender, 75 Ariz. 322, 325 (1953) (citing 41 C.J.S.,
Husband and Wife, § 483); Brucklier, 253 Ariz. at 584, ¶ 21 (“Commingling
can transmute financial accounts but not tangible assets.”).

¶37           While the Subaru was and remains Father’s separate
property, the community has an equitable lien for the community funds
used to pay toward the separate debt. See Flynn, 75 Ariz. at 326; see also
Cameron v. Cameron, 148 Ariz. 558, 559 (App. 1985). Father argues that the
appropriate equitable lien calculation is the formula outlined in Valento v.
Valento, 225 Ariz. 477, 482, ¶¶ 14-16 (App. 2010), which calculates a
community’s equitable lien for a depreciating asset. The Valento formula is
valid for calculating a lien on a depreciating asset. But in Cameron, we also
affirmed an equitable lien calculation that deducted the car’s depreciation
from the principal payments made by the community. 148 Ariz. at 559. The
court could have used either method, but it used neither.

¶38            The superior court has the discretion to determine the best
method for calculating an equitable lien to “achieve substantial justice
between the parties.” Saba, 253 Ariz. at 592, ¶ 16 (quoting Cockrill v. Cockrill,
124 Ariz. 50, 54 (1979)). Mother’s burden was to prove the community’s
interest in Father’s separate property. See DeFrancesco v. DeFrancesco, 248
Ariz. 23, 24, ¶ 4 (App. 2019) (The burden of proof is on the party asserting
an interest in the other spouse’s property.). Mother’s only evidence was the

                                       12
                            WHITT v. MEZA
                           Opinion of the Court

purchase price ($34,495) and the Subaru’s current value ($27,015). The
record does not show how the current value corresponds to the amount the
community contributed in car payments. As a result, we vacate the vehicle
equalization judgment and remand for reconsideration.

                   ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

¶39           Mother requests an award of attorney’s fees and costs on
appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324. While neither party took unreasonable
positions, the financial disparity between the parties warrants awarding
Mother her reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal after compliance with
ARCAP 21. As the prevailing party on appeal, Father is entitled to his costs
under A.R.S. § 12-342(A) after compliance with ARCAP 21.

                             CONCLUSION

¶40           We affirm the community’s equitable lien on Father’s
separate property home and the trial attorney’s fees award. We vacate the
equalization judgment for the parties’ bank accounts because the court
characterized the entire Chase account as community property. On remand,
the court must determine whether Grandmother is an indispensable party,
determine her interest in the Chase account, separately determine the
separate or community nature of the funds in the Chase account, and
exercise its discretion to allocate the community funds consistent with
A.R.S. §§ 25-213 and -318. We also vacate the vehicle equalization judgment
and remand for reconsideration because the record does not support the
amount attributed to the community’s interest in Father’s separate
property, the Subaru. Because we vacate the two equalization judgments
and remand for reconsideration, it may affect the spousal maintenance
analysis and award. Thus, we instruct the court to reconsider the
maintenance award on remand. If there is a change to the spousal
maintenance award, the court must also reconsider the child support order.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

                                      13