Court Opinion

ID: 9769513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:53:06.923415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:52.919762
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
The difficulty we find ourselves in today was caused by the choice of language in our original opinion. The majority’s effort has been to clarify that language and I join them in that effort. However, I write separately because I fear the majority opinion potentially blurs the critical distinction between mistrials granted in response to “ordinary” reversible error and those granted because of “prosecutorial overreaching.”
When a mistrial is granted in response to the former, jeopardy does not bar retrial. See Alvarez v. State, 864 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex.Cr.App.1993)(“[M]anifest necessity for a mistrial would exist ‘if a verdict of conviction could be reached but would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedur*733al error in the trial.’ ” Quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464, 98 S.Ct. 1066, 1070, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973), and citing Sewell v. State, 696 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Schaffer v. State, 649 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); and, Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex.Cr.App.1981)).
However, when a mistrial is declared as a result of “prosecutorial overreaching,” retrial is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Texas Constitution. Art. I, Sec. 14, Tex. Const. This is so because the request for a mistrial granted as a result of prosecutorial overreaching cannot be consensual.1
In the instant case, the trial judge found the State elicited the objectionable testimony “... for the purpose of interjecting prejudicial material into the trial ... [a]nd the prosecution’s intent was to inject those statements and those conclusions, rather, for their prejudicial purposes against the defendant.” In light of these findings, a mistrial was granted. These findings are supported by the record from the Plea in Bar hearing, where the prosecutor testified he was aware of, but consciously disregarded the risk his conduct would result in a mistrial.2
With these comments, I join the opinion of the Court.

. Additionally, the majority is absolutely correct in stating: "where the trial court has granted a motion for mistrial [as in the instant case], that decision is, for all intents and purposes, not subject to review on appeal ...” Ante at — ; slip op. pg. 3. This statement is correct because, in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the mistrial, the reviewing court must defer to the findings of the trial court. Ex parte Davis, 957 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). See also. Ex parte Turner, 545 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 288 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); Ex parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461 (Tex.Cr.App.1996). Most recently, in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), we held:
... Our decision also is meant to reaffirm the long-standing rule that appellate courts should show almost total deference to a trial court’s findings of fact especially when those findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor — i.e., in reviewing a trial court's ruling on an "application of law to fact question,” the appellate courts should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.

. Specifically, that records reflects the following colloquy:
DEFENSE: All right. And, again, but [sic] you asking him for something like this, wouldn't you expect, if you would ask him — or some hearsay— or some questions will require hearsay answers, that I would stand up and object?
PROSECUTOR: I would expect you would. You’re an experienced attorney.
DEFENSE: All right. And especially in light of the fact that I filed a Motion in limine that was granted in that particular area?
PROSECUTOR: That’s true. In light of this record, Judge McCormick is incorrect when he states the record "does not prove the prosecutor was aware but consciously disregarded the risk that an objectionable event for which he was responsible would require a mistrial at the defendant’s request.” Post at — , slip op. pg 3 (McCORMICK, J. dissenting).