Court Opinion

ID: 9948866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 06:05:25.075125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:11.900281
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                   revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                             STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL RADKE and KATHLEEN RADKE,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    March 7, 2024
                Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v                                                                   No. 359866
                                                                    Ingham Circuit Court
CHARLES TRUESDELL, doing business as                                LC No. 20-000513-NO
TRUESDELL INDUSTRIES,

                Defendant-Appellee,

and

RONALD SWENSON,

                Defendant.

                                          ON REMAND

Before: PATEL, P.J., and CAMERON and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       This case returns to this Court on remand1 for analysis under our Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95; ___ NW2d ___ (2023), which changed
how courts analyze open and obvious conditions in premises-liability claims. Because plaintiff
Michael Radke was a licensee, not an invitee, Kandil-Elsayed does not control the outcome of this
case. Therefore, we affirm.

1
    Radke v Truesdell, ___ Mich ___; 997 NW2d 218 (2023) (Radke II).

                                                -1-
                 I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The facts of this case are not in dispute, and were previously set forth by this Court in
Radke v Truesdell, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 29,
2022 (Docket No. 359866), pp 1-2 (Radke I):

                In 2019, Ronald Swenson hired general contractor Truesdell to construct
       Swenson’s new home in Williamston, Michigan. Swenson is a hobby electrician
       and Truesdell agreed that Swenson could complete much of the electrical
       installation in the home. Michael and Swenson were long-time friends who often
       helped each other with home projects. On October 9, 2019, when Swenson’s home
       was under construction, Swenson invited Michael to his home to help him install
       light fixtures on the front porch. While there, Michael went to retrieve a wooden
       plank from the home’s exterior. As he was walking backwards through the garage
       carrying the plank, he bumped into a wall, causing Michael to step backwards and
       fall through a large opening to the basement. Although a subcontractor was going
       to install stairs from the garage to the basement, he had yet to do so, and there were
       no barriers surrounding the opening. Michael was severely injured in the fall.

               The Radkes filed this lawsuit alleging negligence against Truesdell for
       Michael’s injuries and a derivative claim for loss of consortium on Kathleen’s
       behalf. Truesdell moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
       contending that Michael’s claim sounded in premises liability. He further argued
       that Michael could not recover under premises liability because the opening was
       open and obvious and Truesdell had no duty to safeguard Michael, a licensee, from
       this danger. Moreover, no special aspects existed which could render Truesdell
       liable for Michael’s injuries. The trial court agreed and granted the motion for
       summary disposition.

In Radke I, this Court affirmed the grant of summary disposition. This Court agreed with the trial
court that the Radkes’ claims sounded in premises liability and Truesdell had possession and
control over the home when Michael fell. Id. at 3-4. This Court further concluded that Truesdell
owed Michael no duty to warn of the open and obvious danger because Michael was a licensee,
not an invitee. Id. at 4-6. This Court declined to address the Radkes’ argument “that the opening
in the garage floor was unreasonably dangerous and, therefore, special aspects existed such that
Truesdell had a duty to protect Michael from the danger,” because the special-aspects exception
conferred a duty upon a premises possessor with respect to invitees, and there was no genuine
issue of fact that Michael was not an invitee. Id. at 6.

        Later, our Supreme Court, in Kandil-Elsayed, 512 Mich at 148-149, substantially altered
the legal framework governing premises-liability claims. Because our decision in Radke I relied
on the former open and obvious framework, the Court vacated Radke I and remanded the case to
this Court for reconsideration in light of Kandil-Elsayed. Radke v Truesdell, ___ Mich ___; 997
NW2d 218 (2023) (Radke II).

                                                -2-
                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         “This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition,
as well as questions of statutory interpretation and the construction and application of court rules.”
Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 416; 789 NW2d 211 (2010). A motion is properly
granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) when “there is no genuine issue with respect to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 415. This
Court “must examine the documentary evidence presented and, drawing all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party, determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. A
question of fact exists when reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from
the evidence.” Id. at 415-416.

                In presenting a motion for summary disposition, the moving party has the
       initial burden of supporting its position by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or
       other documentary evidence. The burden then shifts to the opposing party to
       establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Where the burden of proof at
       trial on a dispositive issue rests on a nonmoving party, the nonmoving party may
       not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must go beyond the
       pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact
       exists. If the opposing party fails to present documentary evidence establishing the
       existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly granted. [Quinto v
       Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362-363; 547 NW2d 314 (1996) (citations
       omitted).]

                                          III. ANALYSIS

        “In a premises liability action, a plaintiff must prove the elements of negligence: (1) the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages.” Buhalis v Trinity
Continuing Care Servs, 296 Mich App 685, 693; 822 NW2d 254 (2012) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). The duty owed a visitor depends on whether the visitor is a trespasser, a licensee,
or an invitee. Kandil-Elsayed, 512 Mich at 111. Invitees are afforded the highest level of care.
Sanders v Perfecting Church, 303 Mich App 1, 5; 840 NW2d 401 (2013). Even so, under our
former jurisprudence, a land possessor had no duty to protect invitees from open and obvious
dangers. Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 517; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), overruled by
Kandil-Elsayed, 512 Mich 95 (2023). Kandil-Elsayed overruled Lugo, holding that the open and
obvious nature of a condition does not relate to the land possessor’s duty. Kandil-Elsayed, 512
Mich at 133. Instead, Kandil-Elsayed concluded that whether a condition is open and obvious is
relevant to whether the defendant breached their duty of care. Id. at 144. Assuming an otherwise
actionable premises-liability claim has been established, the open and obvious nature of the
condition informs whether the plaintiff’s damages should be reduced on the basis of comparative
fault. Id. at 144, 148-149.

        This shift in the analysis of the open and obvious doctrine does not change the outcome of
this case, because Michael was a licensee, not an invitee. The question whether a condition was
open and obvious is not relevant to whether a land possessor breached their duty of care to a
licensee, because land possessors only owe a duty to warn licensees of hidden dangers. See Stitt

                                                 -3-
v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596; 614 NW2d 88 (2000) (“A landowner
owes a licensee a duty only to warn the licensee of any hidden dangers the owner knows or has
reason to know of, if the licensee does not know or have reason to know of the dangers involved.”).
Thus, we conclude that Kandil-Elsayed is inapplicable to this case, and we need not reverse on
this basis.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Sima G. Patel
                                                            /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
                                                            /s/ Anica Letica

                                                -4-