Court Opinion

ID: 9427632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:26.918923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:08.635126
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens join,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
For the reasons stated in my opinion in Parham v. J. R., ante, p. 625 (concurring in part and dissenting in part), I *651agree with the Court that Pennsylvania’s preadmission psychiatric interview procedures pass constitutional muster. I cannot agree, however, with the Court’s decision to pretermit questions concerning Pennsylvania’s postadmission procedures. See ante, at 650 n. 9. In my view, these procedures should be condemned now.
Pennsylvania provides neither representation nor reasonably prompt postadmission hearings to mentally retarded children 13 years of age and younger. For the reasons stated in my opinion in Parham v. J. R. I believe that this is unconstitutional.
As a practical matter, mentally retarded children over 13 and children confined as mentally ill fare little better. While under current regulations these children must be informed of their right to a hearing and must be given the telephone number of an attorney within 24 hours of admission, see 459 F. Supp. 30, 49, 51 (ED Pa. 1978) (Broderick, J., dissenting),* the burden of contacting counsel and the burden of initiating proceedings is placed upon the child. In my view, this placement of the burden vitiates Pennsylvania’s procedures. Many of the institutionalized children are unable to read, write, comprehend the formal explanation of their rights, or use the telephone. See App. 1019a (testimony of L. Glenn). Few, as a consequence, will be able to take the initiative necessary for them to secure the advice and assistance of a trained representative. New will be able to trigger the procedural safeguards and hearing rights that Pennsylvania formally provides. Indeed, for most of Pennsylvania’s institutionalized children the recitation of rights required by current regulations will amount to no more than a hollow ritual. If the children’s constitutional rights to representation and to a fair hearing are to be guaranteed in substance as well as in form *652and if the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are to be satisfied, then waiver of those constitutional rights cannot be inferred from mere silence or inaction on the part of the institutionalized child. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938). Pennsylvania must assign each institutionalized child a representative obliged to initiate contact with the child and ensure that the child’s constitutional rights are fully protected. Otherwise, it is inevitable that the children’s due process rights will be lost through inadvertence, inaction, or incapacity. See 459 F. Supp., at 44 n. 47; Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1050-1051 (ED Pa. 1975).

See also Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 16, § 9960.6 (c) (Purdon Supp. 1979) (Pennsylvania Public Defender obliged to represent institutionalized children in commitment and related proceedings).