Court Opinion

ID: 9424186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:10:42.796601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:48.698451
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
with whom Mr. , Justice Black and Mr. Justice Stewart join,
, dissenting.
I join in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black; however, since my position goes somewhat beyond his discussion I add my views separately.
*78I assume we could all agree that the search in question must be held valid, and the contraband discovered subject to seizure and forfeiture, unless (a) it is “unreasonable” under the Constitution or (b) it is prohibited by a statute imposing restraints apart from those in the Constitution. The majority sees no constitutional violation; I agree.
The controlling statutes set out in notes 1 and 2 of the majority opinion affirmatively define the conditions and times when agents may enter premises and inspect. Under 26 U. S. C. § 5146 (b) agents may enter to inspect “any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such dealer on such premises.” The time when this may be done is fixed as “during business hours.” Section 7606 of 26 U. S. C., set forth in note 2 of the majority opinion, provides that agents may enter any building where taxable articles are kept, “so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said articles or objects.”
The government agents needed neither a warrant nor these statutes to secure entry to this place of business since it was as open as any business establishment that seeks to sell goods and services to the public. The agents need to rely on the statutes only to carry out their duty to inspect after accomplishing entry. This was recognized implicitly by Congress in limiting the inspection to “business hours” and daytime. Congress went beyond mere entry; it provided for inspection. Inspection authorization would be meaningless if the agents could not open lockers, cabinets, closets, and storerooms and indeed pry open cases of liquor to see the contents.
Surely Congress was not unaware that purveyors of liquor do not leave their wares or stores or reserve supplies lying casually about; on the contrary they keep supplies under lock in various ways, including lockers, cabinets, closets, or storerooms; this practice is so universal it can be judicially noticed.
*79Here the agents acted explicitly under statutes containing the language “so far as it may be necessary”; this is simple and clear and for me it is plainly broad enough to permit inspection of all spirits “kept or stored ... on such premises” whether in lockers, cabinets, closets, or storerooms. Congress having prescribed this as a reasonable means of enforcing the inspection necessary to tax collection, I see no basis for any court to say it cannot be done.
That Congress provided an added penalty for those who refuse access for inspection is irrelevant. We can assume this was to encourage licensed purveyors to comply promptly to facilitate inspections. The majority views the $500 fine as the Government’s exclusive remedy for the non-cooperation of the taxpayer. Congress could hardly be so naive as to give to the licensee the option to choose between the risk of a $500 fine against the certain discovery, if he is in violation, of a large store of liquor subject to forfeiture. At current prices $500 would represent four or five cases of spirits. The alternative of securing a warrant touches on the constitutional issues which the majority does not rely on. We should note, of course, that the majority holding eliminates any basis for a forfeiture of the contraband liquor and leaves the Government to another lawsuit to collect a $500 fine.
With deference I submit the majority has needlessly complicated a relatively simple issue of statutory construction with undertones of constitutionally limited searches. The words “so far as it may be necessary” are quite plain and we all agree no issue of constitutional dimensions is presented.