Court Opinion

ID: 9362920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 15:09:04.776016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.723708
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                            Court of Appeals

                               NO. 2021-CA-0645-MR

RICHARD YATES                                                            APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 14-CR-00052

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                   APPELLEE

                                      OPINION
                                     AFFIRMING

                                    ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND GOODWINE,
JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Richard Yates, pro se, (“Appellant”) appeals from

an order of the Fulton Circuit Court denying his motion to vacate his conviction

pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42. He argues that

the circuit court erred in failing to conclude that his trial counsel was ineffective.

After careful review, we find no error and affirm the order on appeal.
                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

              Appellant’s underlying convictions have been adjudicated by the

Kentucky Supreme Court via direct appeal on two occasions – in 2014 and 2018.

In the interest of judicial economy, we adopt the high Court’s recitation of the

procedural history and facts as set out in Yates v. Commonwealth, 539 S.W.3d 654

(Ky. 2018). The Court stated:

                     “Sally”[1] was a fourteen-year-old high school
              freshman in 2010, and lived with her mother and her
              stepfather, Richard Yates. Sally’s mother worked the
              night shift at a local retail store and was often out of the
              family home during overnight hours. During this time,
              Yates would supervise Sally.

                     At the time, Sally was dating an eighteen-year old
              upperclassman, Austin. Yates learned about her
              relationship with Austin and initially told Sally that her
              mother would not approve of her relationship with an
              older boy, threatening to tell her mother about the
              relationship. He told her that if her mother found out
              about the relationship, her boyfriend would go to jail for
              being in a relationship with a minor. The two argued for
              several hours before Yates escalated his threats,
              eventually telling Sally that Austin would go to jail and
              be “hurt” by other inmates once they found out he had
              been with a minor. At some time during the
              confrontation, Yates told Sally that if she would “do
              something sexual” with him, he would, in exchange, not
              tell her mother about her relationship with Austin.

                    Following Yates’s proposition, Sally eventually
              decided to “do something sexual” with Yates. At trial,

1
 A pseudonym was used for the victim throughout the trial and appellate proceedings due her
age and the nature of the offenses.

                                             -2-
             Sally testified that although she had “consented” to
             having sex with Yates, she felt she had to in order to
             protect Austin. After deciding to have sex with Yates,
             Sally entered his bedroom in the middle of the night.

Id. at 657-58.

             A sexual assault then occurred, which the Supreme Court described in

some detail. The Court went on to state:

                    Sally testified that she told her mother and a friend
             about the sexual assault. Her friend ultimately believed
             Sally was telling the truth, but her mother did not. In
             July 2011, Sally asked a friend’s mother, Ginger
             Alexander, if she could stay with her on nights when
             Sally’s mother was working. Alexander asked why she
             would make that request, and Sally told her about the
             sexual assault. Alexander encouraged Sally to report the
             incident to police, which she did. Local authorities took
             a statement from Sally and obtained a search warrant for
             the Yates’s residence. At the residence, local police
             recovered a sex toy in a plastic bag from between the
             mattress and box spring in Yates’s bedroom, several
             computers, as well as several other items.

                   When police confiscated Yates’s computers, he
             requested that he be able to remove the passwords from
             the computers in order to assist the police. Police
             informed him that he would not be able to access the
             computers and asked for his password. Yates wrote it
             down on a business card so that his wife could not see
             and told the officer, “It’s not what it seems like.” The
             password was “Toriistight” – Tori being a nickname of
             Sally’s.

                   Yates went to trial based on these events and a
             Fulton Circuit Court jury convicted him of first-degree
             rape and first-degree sexual abuse. He was sentenced to
             twenty years’ imprisonment on the rape charge and five

                                         -3-
years’ imprisonment on the sexual abuse charge. Those
sentences were set to run consecutively, for a total of
twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Yates then appealed
his original conviction to this Court. In our opinion
in Yates v. Commonwealth, 430 S.W.3d 883 (Ky. 2014),
we held that there was insufficient evidence to prove
first-degree rape, and that an evidentiary error required
reversal on the first-degree sexual abuse charge.
Therefore, we reversed Yates’s convictions and
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Pertinently, we noted:

      Because the Commonwealth did not prove
      the forcible-compulsion element,
      Appellant’s conviction for first-degree rape
      cannot stand and must be reversed. This
      means that he may be retried for any lesser-
      included offenses that were included in the
      instructions at trial. The trial court,
      however, only instructed on the lesser
      offense of unlawful transaction with a
      minor, not third-degree rape. For that
      reason, if Appellant is retried, he cannot be
      convicted of third-degree rape.

Id. at 895.

       Following this Court’s remand for a new trial, the
Commonwealth indicted Yates on six charges, four of
which were not charged in the first trial. Therefore, in
addition to charges of first-degree unlawful transaction
with a minor and first-degree sexual abuse, Appellant
faced charges in his second trial for incest, use of a minor
in a sexual performance, first-degree unlawful
imprisonment – and, in spite of this Court’s explicit
directive to the contrary – third-degree rape. The trial
court dismissed the third-degree rape charge and the jury
convicted Yates of the remaining five charges. The jury
recommended a sentence of seventy years, which the trial
court imposed.

                            -4-
Id. at 658-59.

                The Court went on to affirm Appellant’s convictions for unlawful

transaction with a minor and sexual abuse,2 along with the corresponding sentences

totaling 25 years. It dismissed the convictions of incest, use of a minor in a sexual

performance, and unlawful imprisonment.

                On February 19, 2019, Appellant, pro se, filed a motion in Fulton

Circuit Court for relief pursuant to RCr 11.42 alleging that his trial counsel was

ineffective when the matter was retried on remand. He moved to proceed in forma

pauperis and requested that counsel be appointed. In response to this request, the

trial judge appointed counsel from the Department of Public Advocacy. After

reviewing Appellant’s motion, appointed counsel moved to withdraw stating that

counsel determined Appellant’s motion not to be one that a reasonable person

would be willing to bring at his own expense. The circuit court granted counsel’s

motion to withdraw, and later entered an order denying Appellant’s motion for

relief. This appeal followed.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

                To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant

must show two things:

                First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
                performance was deficient. This requires showing that

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 530.064 and KRS 510.110.

                                             -5-
             counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
             functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
             the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
             that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
             This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
             serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
             whose result is reliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674

(1984). “[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably

effective assistance.” Id.

                    An error by counsel, even if professionally
             unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the
             judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no
             effect on the judgment. The purpose of the Sixth
             Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a
             defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance
             on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any
             deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial
             to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance
             under the Constitution. (Internal citation omitted).

Id. at 691-92, 104 S. Ct. at 2066-67. “It is not enough for the defendant to show

that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id.

at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

Additionally, “a hearing is required only if there is an issue of fact which cannot be

                                          -6-
determined on the face of the record.” Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d

742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993).

                            ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

               Appellant, pro se, argues that the Fulton Circuit Court erred in failing

to conclude that, per RCr 11.42, he did not receive the effective assistance of

counsel to which he was entitled. Appellant first asserts that his trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to use records from the Lincoln Trails Psychiatric Center to

impeach Sally’s testimony at trial.3 He directs our attention back to the first trial,

noting that defense counsel took 90 days to request that the circuit court release the

Lincoln Trail records. He notes that some of the Lincoln Trail documents were

read into the record at the first trial, which he claims were exculpatory. Appellant

argues that had his defense counsel more fully investigated the Lincoln Trail

documents, more exculpatory statements might have been found to impeach

Sally’s claim of Appellant’s sexual misconduct at the second trial. The substance

of Appellant’s argument on this issue is that counsel’s failure to fully investigate

and utilize the Lincoln Trail records demonstrated her failure to provide the

effective assistance of counsel to which he was entitled.

3
  “Sally” received counseling at Lincoln Trail after the sexual assault, though the scope of the
treatment is not set out in the record. In Appellant’s 2014 appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court
found that on December 28, 2010, an unknown person with the initials “J.H.” noted in Sally’s
file that Sally denied that Appellant engaged in any improper sexual acts. J.H. apparently was
never identified. The Supreme Court ruled that on remand for retrial, defense counsel was
entitled to question Sally about her alleged prior inconsistent statement.

                                               -7-
              In the weeks leading up to the second trial, Appellant’s counsel twice

moved for leave to use the Lincoln Trail records at trial to impeach Sally’s

testimony. The Commonwealth moved in limine to bar the use of the documents,

in part because “J.H.” was never identified. On the morning of the second trial, the

Fulton Circuit Court entered an order barring Appellant’s usage of the records to

impeach Sally’s testimony at trial.4

              In considering Appellant’s motion for RCr 11.42 relief on this issue,

the circuit court found that defense counsel made every reasonable effort to utilize

the records at the second trial by way of two motions, and that the circuit court’s

ruling denying counsel’s motions was an issue of law resolved by the court and not

an act of malfeasance of defense counsel. This conclusion is supported by the

record and the law. The circuit court found, and we agree, that the court’s ruling

should have been raised, if at all, on direct appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court

and not via an RCr 11.42 motion. A convicted person is required to raise via direct

appeal all issues at trial of which he knew or should have known. Lucas v.

Commonwealth, 380 S.W.3d 554, 555-56 (Ky. App. 2012). At the time of his

second appeal, Appellant was aware of the circuit court’s ruling denying his

4
 On page 5 of its written argument, the Commonwealth states that the trial court granted defense
counsel’s motion to allow the use of the Lincoln Trail records to impeach Sally’s testimony.
This statement may refer to what occurred at the first trial rather than the second trial.

                                              -8-
counsel’s motion to use the Lincoln Trail records. As such, this issue should have

been raised, if at all, on direct appeal. We find no error.

             Appellant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to locate, interview, and subpoena counselors or doctors from Lincoln Trail or

other places whose testimony might have swung the case in her favor. Citing

United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702 (3rd Cir. 1989), Appellant argues that defense

counsel exhibits deficient performance by making no effort to locate and interview

witnesses whose testimony could have supported an effective defense.

             There is a strong presumption of trial counsel’s effectiveness, which

may not be overcome by mere speculation. Parrish v. Commonwealth, 272

S.W.3d 161, 171 (Ky. 2008). Appellant argues what might have happened if his

trial counsel were more diligent in uncovering additional witnesses. As noted in

Parrish, though, this is precisely the kind of speculation which the presumption of

counsel’s competence is designed to combat. Appellant’s speculation as to what

might have occurred does not demonstrate that counsel made errors so serious as to

not be the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, nor that counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, supra. We find no error.

             Appellant’s third argument is that his trial counsel was ineffective in

failing to have a purple vibrator found at the scene, and which Sally said Appellant

used on her during the sexual assault, tested for Sally’s DNA. Appellant asserts

                                          -9-
that as there was no physical evidence that an assault occurred, the only physical

evidence the Commonwealth could have produced would have been Sally’s DNA,

if any, found on the vibrator. Appellant argues that if no DNA were found on the

vibrator, it would have been exculpatory and would have undermined the

Commonwealth’s case against him.

             Appellant’s argument is purely speculative, and there is no basis for

concluding that testing the vibrator for DNA would have bolstered Appellant’s

defense. If a DNA test returned no findings, or found the DNA of someone other

than Sally, it would have little if any exculpatory value in the context of all of the

evidence presented by the Commonwealth. It is also possible that Sally’s DNA

could have been found on the vibrator, which would not be helpful to the defense.

In addition, the Commonwealth notes that several months elapsed between the

sexual assault the execution of the search warrant, during which time any DNA on

the vibrator could have been lost. Irrespective of this, Appellant’s argument is

purely speculative as to the possible results of a DNA test, and the usefulness of

those results to Appellant. As such, it falls well short of demonstrating a

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s alleged failure to pursue DNA testing,

the results of the proceeding would have been different.

             Appellant next argues that his trial counsel improperly failed to

impeach Sally’s testimony at trial by pointing to conflicting statements she made in

                                         -10-
an August 2, 2011 recorded interview. He contends that the video would have

revealed inconsistencies in Sally’s trial testimony, including whether the sexual

assault occurred on a weekday or weekend, and whether she spoke about the

assault while at Lincoln Trail. Appellant argues that counsel’s failure to fully

exploit Sally’s inconsistent statements demonstrates counsel’s failure to provide

the effective assistance to which he was entitled.

             Counsel’s decision to challenge Sally’s trial testimony, if at all, and

the manner in which that is accomplished, constitutes a trial strategy. We will not

second-guess in hindsight matters involving trial strategy. Robbins v.

Commonwealth, 365 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Ky. App. 2012). Further,

             [n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct
             can satisfactorily take account of the variety of
             circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of
             legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a
             criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere
             with the constitutionally protected independence of
             counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have
             in making tactical decisions. Indeed, the existence of
             detailed guidelines for representation could distract
             counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous
             advocacy of the defendant’s cause. Moreover, the
             purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth
             Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal
             representation, although that is a goal of considerable
             importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to
             ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.

                                         -11-
             As defense counsel’s decision not to employ the August 2, 2011

recorded interview at trial constitutes a trial strategy which we may not second-

guess, there is no basis for concluding that counsel was not functioning as the

“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment, nor that counsel

engaged in deficient performance that prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687, 104 S.

Ct. at 2064. Accordingly, we find no error on this issue.

             Appellant goes on to assert several additional alleged deficiencies

committed by his defense counsel in preparation for trial or at trial, which he

argues demonstrate counsel’s ineffectiveness. He argues that counsel improperly

failed to object to the testimony of Ginger Alexander, in whom Sally confided

about the sexual assault. He also contends that counsel provided ineffective

assistance in failing to conduct adequate pretrial investigation; that counsel should

have objected to the Commonwealth’s closing argument; that counsel should have

attacked the scope and nature of the search warrant; and, that counsel was deficient

in her review of the 2012 trial proceeding. The substance of these arguments is

that counsel’s errors in the preparation for or execution of her trial performance

were so deficient as to constitute ineffective assistance per Strickland.

             We have closely examined these claimed deficiencies, both

individually and in the context of counsel’s overall trial performance. Our

examination has uncovered no deficient performance as envisioned by Strickland.

                                         -12-
Appellant has not shown that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,

nor that the deficient performance deprived Appellant of a fair trial whose result is

reliable. Strickland, supra. The record demonstrates that Appellant received

effective assistance on these issues.

             Lastly, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in failing to grant

an evidentiary hearing on his RCr 11.42 motion. We disagree. No hearing is

required where the motion may be resolved by reference to the record. Fowler v.

Commonwealth, 634 S.W.3d 605, 609 (Ky. App. 2021), discretionary review

denied (Dec. 8, 2021). Appellant’s arguments are justiciable by reference to the

record. Thus, the circuit court did not err in adjudicating his motion without a

hearing.

                                  CONCLUSION

             In order to prevail on an RCr 11.42 motion alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel, an appellant must overcome the strong presumption that

counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Appellant has not

overcome that presumption, and has fallen short of demonstrating a reasonable

likelihood that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for

counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance. The record supports the Commonwealth’s

                                         -13-
contention that Appellant’s trial counsel provided the effective assistance to which

Appellant was entitled. For these reasons, we affirm the order of the Fulton Circuit

Court denying Appellant’s motion for RCr 11.42 relief.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Richard Yates, pro se                     Daniel Cameron
Sandy Hook, Kentucky                      Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Jenny L. Sanders
                                          Ken W. Riggs
                                          Assistant Attorneys General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                                        -14-