Court Opinion

ID: 9605793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:42:04.60307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:27.129660
License: Public Domain

Wright, J.
— This is an appeal from a King County Superior Court order releasing certain grand jury evidence after the indictment of several named individuals had been dismissed.
On September 28, 1971, an indictment was returned by the King County grand jury charging appellants Hittle, Hood and Eldridge, present members of the Washington State Liquor Control Board, and appellant Sponburgh, a former member, with offenses in connection with liquor administered over by the liquor board.
After the return of the indictment, on April 30, 1973, the case was assigned to the trial court. On May 29, 1973, respondent, the prosecuting attorney for King County, presented a trial brief to the trial court. Such brief contained some facts derived from the grand jury investigation.■ On May 30-, 1973, appellants moved to quash and suppress' the trial brief and for a protective order sealing it.
^ On June 1, 1973, the trial court, upon appellants’ motion entered an order dismissing the indictment against all appellants herein for the following reasons: (1) the grand jury had not been called pursuant to the requirements of RCW 10.27.030; (2) the grand jury lacked jurisdiction over appellants; (3) appellants were accorded immunity' under RCW 10.52.090; and (4) the indictment was unconstitutionally vague. No appeal was taken from that order. A protective order was concurrently entered sealing all grand jury evidence herein. Such order stated.in two separate paragraphs that it was entered “pending further order of this court.”
*205On June 18, 1973, respondent made a motion for the release of the grand jury evidence which had been sealed by the protective order; and on June 25, 1973, the trial court entered an order for the release of that evidence, effective July 15, 1973. The pertinent portions of the order provide as follows:
It Is Hereby Ordered that the protective order of 1 June 1973 is not quashed:
It Is Further Ordered that the Grand Jury evidence relating to the above entitled case and only such case, be made available on or after 15 July 1973 for the following:
(1) The Attorney General of the State of Washington;
(2) The Prosecuting Attorney of Thurston County;
(3) The Auditor of the State of Washington;
(4) The Governor of the State of Washington; and
(5) The general public.
(Italics ours.)
The italicized portions of the above order are those from which this appeal is taken, and such portions of the order were stayed by this court on July 5, 1973, pending appeal.
The first issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order of June 25,1973.
The argument of appellants on this issue is trifurcated. First, appellants contend that since the trial court dismissed the indictment herein on the basis, among other things, of the grand jury’s lack of jurisdiction, the court itself was without jurisdiction to subsequently enter the order releasing the subject evidence, and since no appeal was taken from the dismissal order, lack of jurisdiction is the law of the case ..and res judicata. Second, appellants contend that the protective order of June 1, 1973, from which respondent took no appeal, was a final order, and was, therefore, not subject to any further action by the court after expiration of the time permitted for a motion for reconsideration. Third, appellants contend that, for the above reasons, respondent failed to timely file his motion for release of the grand jury evidence sealed by the protec*206tive order, and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order releasing such evidence.
The trial court retained jurisdiction to modify the protective order, despite the dismissal of the indictment. Under RCW 10.27.090(4), the prosecuting attorney has access to all grand jury evidence and may introduce such evidence before any trial in which it may be relevant. Thus, the evidence specified in the protective order properly became part of the court record in the instant case.
From the time an action is commenced, the superior court acquires jurisdiction. Const, art. 4, § 1 et seq.; Swan v. Landgren, 6 Wn. App. 713, 495 P.2d 1044 (1972); Daniel v. Daniel, 116 Wash. 82, 198 P. 728, 27 A.L.R. 177 (1921). This includes the control of its own records. RCW 2.28.010; 2.28.150; 2.32.050.
The protective order, which was entered concurrently with the order of dismissal, specifically retained the trial court’s jurisdiction over the above-mentioned evidence by stating in two separate paragraphs that it was sealing all grand jury evidence “pending further order of this court.” Moreover, this protective order was not a final judgment requiring a specific time for the filing of a motion for reconsideration or the perfection of an appeal, because it did not constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties in this action in regard to the release of evidence. See Nestegard v. Investment Exch., Corp., 5 Wn. App. 618, 489 P.2d 1142 (1971); In re Estate of Halle, 29 Wn.2d 624, 188 P.2d 684 (1948); Bishop v. Lynch, 8 Wn.2d 278, 111 P.2d 996 (1941); In re Horse Heaven Irrigation Dist., 11 Wn.2d 218, 118 P.2d 972 (1941). Therefore, the trial court retained jurisdiction for the limited purpose involved herein.
The second issue raised on appeal is whether, for reasons of public policy, the release of grand jury evidence in the instant case should not be allowed on the basis that release of such evidence would interfere with the proper functioning of a state agency or its officers.
In regard to this issue, appellants make two contentions. *207First, appellants contend that RCW 66.08.100 provides that an action against the liquor board or any member thereof must be brought in Thurston County and that board members are not personally liable for acts performed in the course of their duties. Second, appellants contend that the release of the evidence in question can only lead to a “street trial” and disruption of the liquor board’s functions.
Appellants’ first contention constitutes a challenge to the jurisdiction of the grand jury and an assertion of statutory immunity. These issues were favorably decided in behalf of appellants in the trial court’s oral decision on which the order of dismissal was based. And when an indictment is dismissed, unless the matter is then referred to the grand jury, the order of dismissal is a final order. See Annot., 112 A. L. R. 386, at 387 citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 140 Ky. 580, 131 S.W. 391 (1910). Since no appeal was timely taken by respondent under ROA 1-46 from the trial court’s order of dismissal, these rulings became the law of the case. Nevertheless, as pointed out above, the trial court retained jurisdiction over the evidence specified in the order of June 25, 1973. As to appellants’ second contention, the record is devoid of any evidence of harassment or intent to intimidate or hamper the functioning of a state agency.
The third issue raised on appeal is whether the evidence involved herein constituted a grand jury report improperly released by the June 25, 1973, order. Appellants rely upon RCW 10.27.160.
The trial court’s order of June 25, 1973, does not purport to release a grand jury report, nor does the record indicate that respondent was requesting that a grand jury report be released. A grand jury report contains the conclusions, recommendations and suggestions of the members of the grand jury. RCW 10.27.160. In the instant case, respondent requested that certain specified evidence introduced before the grand jury be released.
The fourth issue raised on appeal is whether all the evidence obtained by the grand jury is precluded from use for any purpose whatsoever following the dismissal of the *208indictment on the basis stated by the trial court in the instant case.
First, appellants, relying upon RCW 10.27.030, contend that the grand jury term in which the grand jury indicted appellants was not called by an order signed by a majority of the judges of the King County Superior Court, and was, therefore, illegal and its acts void. Second, appellants contend that the evidence in the instant case therefore comes within the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, so as to preclude its use in any manner whatsoever.
The first contention of appellants was favorably decided in their behalf in the trial court’s oral decision on which the order of dismissal was based; and since no appeal was taken from that final order, this ruling became the law of the case.
As to appellants’ second contention, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine bars the prosecution’s use at trial of any evidence obtained through illegal means. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961); State v. Kinnear, 162 Wash. 214, 298 P. 449, 74 A.L.R. 1400 (1931). However, appellants cite no authority for their assertion that this doctrine bars release of evidence in the instant case; and, therefore, this court will not consider this proposition. State v. Rutherford, 66 Wn.2d 851, 857, 405 P.2d 719 (1965). Thus, for this reason, while cautioning that the evidence to be released in the instant case may be barred for use at trial by the prosecution, we do not here determine that the above-mentioned doctrine precludes the trial court’s jurisdiction to release evidence introduced before the grand jury for any purpose permitted by law.
The fifth issue raised on appeal is whether the June 25, 1973, order complies with the provisions of RCW 10.27.090.
Appellants contend that the requirements of RCW 10.27.090(3) and (5) were not satisfied in the instant case because, they allege, there was no showing of good cause for disclosure of the evidence nor a. demonstration that *209disclosure of the evidence would further the ends of justice. The pertinent portions of RCW 10.27.090 provide:
(3) No grand juror, public or private attorney, city attorney or corporation counsel, reporter, interpreter or public servant who held a witness in custody before a grand jury or special inquiry judge, or witness, principal or other person shall disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury or special inquiry judge or other evidence received by it, except when required by the court to disclose the testimony of the witness examined before the grand jury or special inquiry judge for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with that of the witness given before the court, or to disclose his testimony given before the grand jury or special inquiry judge by any person upon a charge against such person for perjury in giving his testimony or upon trial therefor, or when permitted by the court in furtherance of justice.
(4) The public attorney shall have access to all grand jury and special inquiry judge evidence and may introduce such evidence before any other grand jury or any trial in which the same may be relevant.
(5) The court upon a showing of good cause may make any or all grand jury or special inquiry judge evidence available to any other public attorney, prosecuting attorney, city attorney or corporation counsel upon proper application and with the concurrence of the public attorney attending such grand jury. Any witness’ testimony, given before a grand jury or a special inquiry judge and relevant to any subsequent proceeding against the witness, shall be made available to the witness upon proper application to the court. The court may also, upon proper application and upon a showing of good cause, make available to a defendant in a subsequent criminal proceeding other testimony or evidence:
(a) when given or presented before a special inquiry judge, if doing so is in the furtherance of justice; or
(b) when given or presented before a grand jury, if the court finds that doing so is necessary to prevent an injustice and that there is no reason to believe that doing so would endanger the life or safety of any witness or his family. The cost of any such transcript made available shall be borne by the applicant.
*210The order appealed from permits the release of grand jury evidence to the Attorney General, the prosecuting attorney for Thurston County, the State Auditor, the Governor, and the general public.
The fundamental object of judicial construction or statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature; and in so doing, first resort is to the context and subject matter of the statute itself. In re Estate of Kurtzman, 65 Wn.2d 260, 396 P.2d 786 (1964). Moreover, legislative intent is to be ascertained from the statutory text as a whole, interpreted in terms of the general object and purpose of the legislation. Amburn v. Daly, 81 Wn.2d 241, 501 P.2d 178 (1972); Greenwood v. State Bd. for Com. Col. Educ., 82 Wn.2d 667, 513 P.2d 57 (1973).
RCW 10.27.090(5) expressly makes grand jury evidence available to any other public attorney and prosecuting attorney upon a showing of good cause and the concurrence of the public attorney attending the grand jury. Thus, upon a showing of good cause, the evidence in question may be released to the Attorney General and the prosecuting attorney for Thurston County.
A determination of whether or not grand jury evidence should be disclosed rests within the discretion of the trial court. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1323, 79 S. Ct. 1237 (1959). And where a trial court order is a matter of discretion, it will not be disturbed on appeal except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, i.e., discretion which is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). The burden is on the complaining party to show such abuse. Devine v. Goggin, 69 Wn.2d 144, 417 P.2d 606 (1966).
RCW 66.08.022 provides:
Attorney general is general counsel of board — Duties —Assistants. The attorney general shall be the general counsel of the liquor control board and he shall institute and prosecute all actions and proceedings which may be *211necessary in the enforcement and carrying out of the provisions of this chapter and Title 66.
He shall assign such assistants as may be necessary to the exclusive duty of assisting the liquor control board in the enforcement of Title 66.
An assistant attorney general actually appeared before the trial court seeking release of material to the Attorney General. Therefore, a sufficient showing of good cause was offered to the trial court to support its ruling that the grand jury evidence should be released to the Attorney General.
With respect to the release of evidence to the prosecuting attorney for Thurston County, respondent made a showing to the trial court that there was evidence relating to alleged crimes. In their motion to dismiss, appellants themselves argued that jurisdiction properly lay in Thurston County under RCW 66.08.100 which provides that an action against the liquor board be brought in Thurston County. Therefore, the trial court properly made the grand jury evidence available to the prosecuting attorney for Thurston County.
 With respect to the Governor, that office is not mentioned in RCW 10.27.090. However, article 3, section 5 of the constitution of this state reads:
The governor may require information in writing from the officers of the state upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and shall see that the laws are faithfully executed.
That provision together with RCW 43.06.010 which details the general duties of the Governor, provide for the authority of the Governor to require information from other public officials, and invests the Governor with power to see that the laws are faithfully executed.
One of the widely recognized and followed rules of statutory construction is “that statutes be interpreted to give meaning and effect to each, if possible.” Miller v. King County, 59 Wn.2d 601, 369 P.2d 304 (1962); Henderson v. McCullough, 61 Wn.2d 90, 377 P.2d 244 (1962).
We hold upon the authority of article 3, section 5 of the constitution and RCW 43.06.010 that the Governor is a *212proper public official to receive the grand jury evidence upon the order of the court. We, therefore, affirm that portion of the order.
An expression of one thing in a statute excludes others not expressed. State v. Thompson, 38 Wn.2d 774, 232 P.2d 87 (1951). RCW 10.27.090 does not provide for the release of grand jury evidence to the State Auditor or the general public; and such release of evidence is therefore excluded by implication.
The order appealed from is affirmed as modified.
Hale, C.J., Finley, Hunter, and Hamilton, JJ., and Rummel, J. Pro Tern., concur.