Court Opinion

ID: 9864701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 15:01:06.158836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:51.618276
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1066    Document: 55    Page: 1   Filed: 09/25/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

      WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC, DBA BRAZOS
        LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT,
               Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

                     GOOGLE LLC,
                    Defendant-Appellee
                  ______________________

                   2022-1066, 2022-1067
                  ______________________

     Appeals from the United States District Court for the
 Western District of Texas in No. 6:20-cv-00581-ADA, 6:20-
 cv-00582-ADA, Judge Alan D. Albright.
                  ______________________

                Decided: September 25, 2023
                  ______________________

     BRIAN MATTHEW KOIDE, Koide IP Law PLLC, Arling-
 ton, VA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented
 by NATHAN K. CUMMINGS; SEAN D. BURDICK, Burdick Pa-
 tents, PA, Boise, ID.

    JENNIFER L. SWIZE, Jones Day, Washington, DC, ar-
 gued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JOHN R.
 BOULE, III, EDWIN GARCIA, TRACY A. STITT; THARAN
Case: 22-1066     Document: 55      Page: 2     Filed: 09/25/2023

 2                       WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

 GREGORY LANIER, Palo Alto, CA; ISRAEL                    SASHA
 MAYERGOYZ, Chicago, IL.
                ______________________

      Before LOURIE, LINN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
 LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
      WSOU Investments LLC, dba Brazos Licensing and
 Development (“WSOU”) appeals from two final judgments
 of invalidity of the United States District Court for the
 Western District of Texas. In WSOU Investments, LLC
 dba, Brazos Licensing and Development v. Google LLC, No.
 6:20-CV-00581 (W.D. Tex. 2021), the district court granted
 a joint stipulation of the parties, holding claims 1 and 16 of
 U.S. Patent 7,304,563 (“the ’563 patent”), among others, in-
 valid as indefinite under the court’s claim construction.
 J.A. 1, 612–15. Similarly, in WSOU Investments, LLC dba,
 Brazos Licensing and Development v. Google LLC, No.
 6:20-CV-00582 (W.D. Tex. 2021), the district court granted
 a joint stipulation of the parties, holding claims 1, 9, 16,
 and 24 of U.S. Patent 8,238,681 (“the ’681 patent”) invalid
 as indefinite under the court’s claim construction. J.A. 2,
 1257–60. For the reasons articulated below, we affirm.
                         BACKGROUND
     Although WSOU owns both the ’563 and ’681 patents,
 the two patents disclose unrelated inventions. We there-
 fore discuss each of the patents in turn, followed by a sum-
 mary of the district court proceedings.
                       I. The ’563 Patent
      The ’563 patent is directed to a mobile communication
 terminal with an alarm clock facility. ’563 patent, Ab-
 stract. The claims at issue use two types of alarms. The
 first type is generated by the mobile communication device
 initiating a connection to a second network-connected de-
 vice. See id. col. 5 ll. 48–54, col. 7 ll. 1–5. For example, the
 mobile communication device may call another phone or
Case: 22-1066     Document: 55     Page: 3    Filed: 09/25/2023

 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                           3

 turn on a stereo system to generate the first type of alarm.
 Id. col. 5 ll. 22–26. The second type of alarm is signaled
 locally by the mobile communication device. See id. col. 5
 ll. 55–58, col. 7 ll. 6–10.
      The term at issue in claim 1 is “alerting unit configured
 to issue an alert,” which appears in the claim as follows:
     1. A mobile communication terminal, comprising:
     a clock configured to maintain an indication of the
     current time;
     a memory configured to store a definition of an
     alert time; and
     an alerting unit configured to issue an alert when
     the current time matches the alert time, the alert-
     ing unit being configured to issue the alert by initi-
     ating a connection to another communication
     terminal over a network so as to cause that other
     terminal to locally signal the incidence of the con-
     nection incoming thereto,
     wherein the alerting unit comprises a signaling
     unit configured to locally signal to a user, and the
     alerting unit is configured to issue the alert by
     causing the signaling unit to locally signal to the
     user,
     wherein the memory is configured to store an indi-
     cation of whether the alerting unit is configured to
     issue the alert using the signaling unit, and the
     alerting unit is configured to issue the alert using
     the signaling unit in accordance with that indica-
     tion, and
     wherein the alerting unit is configured to issue the
     alert by initiating the connection to the other com-
     munication terminal at a predetermined time off-
     set from signaling the user using the signaling
     unit.
Case: 22-1066     Document: 55      Page: 4       Filed: 09/25/2023

 4                       WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

 Id. col. 5 ll. 43–67 (emphases added).
      Similarly, the term at issue in claim 16 is “issuing
 means for issuing an alert,” which appears in the claim as
 follows:
     16. An apparatus for alerting a user by means of a
     mobile communication terminal, the apparatus
     comprising:
     maintaining means for maintaining an indication
     of the current time;
     storing means for storing in a memory a definition
     of an alert time; and
     issuing means for issuing an alert when the current
     time matches the alert time by initiating a connec-
     tion to another communication terminal over a net-
     work so as to cause that other terminal to locally
     signal the incidence of the connection incoming
     thereto
     wherein the means for issuing an alert comprises
     signaling means for locally signaling to the user,
     wherein the means for issuing an alert issues the
     alert by causing the signaling means to locally sig-
     nal to the user,
     wherein the storing means stores an indication of
     whether the means for issuing an alert is to issue
     the alert using the signaling means, and
     wherein the means for issuing an alert issues an
     alert by initiating a connection to the other commu-
     nication terminal at a predetermined time offset
     from signaling the user by the signaling means.
 Id. col. 6 l. 62–col. 8 l. 7 (emphases added).
Case: 22-1066      Document: 55       Page: 5     Filed: 09/25/2023

 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                               5

                       II. The ’681 Patent
      The ’681 patent is directed to an autofocus feature in a
 digital camera. ’681 patent, col. 1 ll. 8–12. The autofocus
 feature separates images into windows of interest
 (“WOIs”), id. col. 6 ll. 22–42, which the patent more specif-
 ically refers to as “sub-WOIs,” id. col. 6 ll. 42–45. The
 claimed invention further divides each sub-WOI into “a
 plurality of parts,” which are each assigned a “focus value
 mask.” Id. col. 12 ll. 53–58, col. 13 ll. 55–60, col. 14 l. 64–
 col. 15 l. 3, col. 16 ll. 17–22. The invention then requires
 the execution of an autofocus algorithm, using the assigned
 focus value masks as inputs, wherein:
     the plurality of parts of the at least one sub-window
     of interest comprise a first part closest to a center
     of the at least one sub-window of interest, a third
     part farthest from the center of the at least one sub-
     window of interest, and a second part in between
     the first part and the second part, where the first
     part has a weighted focus value of Value1, the sec-
     ond part has a weighted focus value of Value2, and
     the third part has a weighted focus value of Value3,
     where Value1, Value2, and Value3 each represent a
     rational value assigned to a corresponding focus
     value.
 Id. col. 12 l. 60–col. 13 l. 3, col. 13 l. 62–col. 14 l. 5, col. 15
 ll. 6–16, col. 16 ll. 24–34 (emphasis added).
                 III. District Court Proceedings
      WSOU filed suit against Google LLC (“Google”) for in-
 fringement of fifteen patents owned by WSOU, including
 the ’563 and ’681 patents. J.A. 45–71, 684–707. The dis-
 trict court issued a single claim construction order that cov-
 ered all fifteen cases, J.A. 3–10, and based on the court’s
 constructions, the parties stipulated to final judgments of
 invalidity for indefiniteness for claims 1 and 16 of the ’563
 patent and claims 1, 9, 16, and 24 of the ’681 patent, among
Case: 22-1066     Document: 55     Page: 6    Filed: 09/25/2023

 6                      WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

 others, J.A. 1–2, 612–15, 1257–60. After WSOU appealed,
 the district court provided a memorandum in support of its
 claim constructions. J.A. 638–83.
      Regarding the ’563 patent, the parties agreed that the
 “issuing means for issuing an alert” limitation of claim 16
 was subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. 1 J.A. 653. The court
 determined that the claimed functions of the “issuing
 means” were (1) “initiating a connection to another commu-
 nication terminal over a network” and (2) “causing the sig-
 naling means to locally signal the user.” J.A. 656 (quoting
 ’563 patent, col. 7 ll. 2–3, 8–10). As for the first function,
 the court held that the specification did not provide an ad-
 equate structure corresponding to the claimed function,
 but rather (1) only provided additional functional lan-
 guage, (2) merely disclosed a general-purpose computer,
 and/or (3) improperly relied on a person of ordinary skill in
 the art’s knowledge as a gap-filler for actual disclosure in
 the specification. J.A. 656–57. As for the second function,
 the court acknowledged (1) that “the means for issuing an
 alert” comprises signaling means for locally signaling to
 the user and (2) that WSOU “point[ed] out structure for lo-
 cally signaling the user.” J.A. 657. However, the court
 found that disclosure of structure was inadequate for “is-
 suing means” because it failed to include structure for “how
 the issuing means causes the signaling means to locally sig-
 nal the user.” Id. (emphasis in original). The court ex-
 plained that the issuing means may indeed include the
 structure for the signaling means; however, additional

     1   The America Invents Act of 2011 changed the num-
 bering of the relevant subsection from “§ 112, ¶ 6” to
 “§ 112(f).” Because the substance of the subsection did not
 change, this decision will refer to the relevant subsection
 as “§ 112, ¶ 6,” in keeping with the numeration at the time
 of the patent filing.
Case: 22-1066     Document: 55      Page: 7    Filed: 09/25/2023

 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                           7

 structure is required to show the steps for causing the sig-
 naling means to do so. Id.
      Additionally, the district court determined that the
 “alerting unit” limitation of claim 1 was a means-plus-func-
 tion term subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, despite WSOU’s
 arguments to the contrary. J.A. 678–79. After finding that
 “alerting unit” in claim 1 performed the same two functions
 as “means for issuing an alert” in claim 16, the court deter-
 mined that “the term ‘unit’ is defined only by the function
 it performs” and that the ’563 patent uses the terms “unit,”
 “processor,” and “means” interchangeably. J.A. 679. The
 court then held that the ’563 patent failed to disclose suffi-
 cient structure for “alerting unit” for the same reasons that
 it failed to disclose sufficient structure for “means for issu-
 ing an alert.” J.A. 679–80.
      Regarding the ’681 patent, the district court deter-
 mined that the phrase “second part in between the first
 part and the second part” was indefinite because it was
 nonsensical. J.A. 650–52. The court noted that the self-
 contradictory language of that term “does not allow a
 reader to differentiate between the first instance of ‘a sec-
 ond part’ from the second,” even in the context of the spec-
 ification and prosecution history. J.A. 651.
    WSOU timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
                          DISCUSSION
      “Regarding questions of claim construction, including
 whether claim language invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, [¶] 6, the
 district court’s determinations based on evidence intrinsic
 to the patent as well as its ultimate interpretations of the
 patent claims are legal questions that we review de novo.”
 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346
 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.
 v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 331 (2015)). “Indefiniteness
 is a question of law that is also reviewed de novo.” Robert
Case: 22-1066       Document: 55     Page: 8    Filed: 09/25/2023

 8                        WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

 Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1098 (Fed. Cir.
 2014) (citing Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198
 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
     We will address the WSOU’s arguments regarding the
 ’563 patent first, before considering its arguments concern-
 ing the ’681 patent.
                        I. The ’563 Patent
     WSOU raises two issues concerning the district court’s
 determinations regarding the ’563 patent. First, WSOU
 argues that the court erred in determining that the “alert-
 ing unit configured to issue an alert” limitation of claim 1
 was subject to means-plus-function treatment under
 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. Appellant’s Br. at 31–40. Second,
 WSOU asserts that the ’563 patent discloses adequate
 structure corresponding to the claimed functions per-
 formed by the “alerting unit” of claim 1 and the “means for
 issuing an alert” of claim 16. Id. at 40–44. Those issues
 will be discussed in turn.
     A. The Applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 to “Alerting
                              Unit”
     “The first step [of a means-plus-function analysis] is to
 determine whether a claim limitation is drafted in means-
 plus-function format, which requires us to construe the
 limitation to determine whether it connotes sufficiently
 definite structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art.”
 Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
 2022) (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (“The standard
 is whether the words of the claim are understood by per-
 sons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently defi-
 nite meaning as the name for structure.”)). As we have
 previously explained, “the use of the word ‘means’ in a
 claim element creates a rebuttable presumption that § 112,
 [¶] 6 applies.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348 (internal cita-
 tion omitted). The converse also holds true, as “the failure
 to use the word ‘means’ also creates a rebuttable
Case: 22-1066     Document: 55     Page: 9    Filed: 09/25/2023

 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                          9

 presumption . . . that § 112, [¶] 6 does not apply.” Id. (in-
 ternal citation omitted).
     As claim 1 here does not include the term “means,” the
 presumption against mean-plus-function treatment ap-
 plies. To rebut that presumption, Google argues (1) that
 “‘unit’ serves as a placeholder for almost anything that can
 perform a particular function,” (2) that the surrounding
 language in the claim is purely functional and thus pro-
 vides no structure, and (3) that the specification does not
 ascribe any structure to “alerting unit,” only using that
 term twice alongside the same purely functional language
 that appears in the claim. Appellee’s Br. at 33–36.
     We agree with Google and the district court that the
 term “unit,” in a vacuum, is defined only by the function it
 performs, much like terms such as “element” or “means.”
 See J.A. 679; see also M.P.E.P. § 2181 (including “unit for”
 on its list of “non-structural generic placeholders that may
 invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112[, ¶ 6]”). A “unit” could be almost
 anything. Despite WSOU’s arguments on the contrary, we
 also agree that, in the context of claim 1, the terms sur-
 rounding and modifying “unit” such as “alerting,” “config-
 ured to issue an alert,” “initiating a connection,” and
 “locally signal” are purely functional and do not connote
 any structure, much less a “sufficiently definite” structure,
 as required by Williamson and Dyfan. None of that lan-
 guage “endows the claimed [term] with a physical or struc-
 tural component.” Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550
 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Likewise, the instances
 of “alerting unit” in the specification share that same
 flaw—the additional surrounding language only indicates
 additional function, rather than structure.
     Furthermore, we agree with the district court’s reason-
 ing that “nothing in the patent differentiates [‘alerting unit
 configured to issue an alert’ and ‘means for issuing an
 alert’]” and that the interchangeable use of “unit” and
 “means” leads to the conclusion that neither term discloses
Case: 22-1066     Document: 55      Page: 10    Filed: 09/25/2023

 10                      WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

 sufficient structure. J.A. 679. We thus conclude that
 Google has successfully rebutted the presumption against
 means-plus-function treatment, as it has “demonstrate[d]
 that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite struc-
 ture.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (internal citation and
 quotations omitted).
     To the extent that WSOU argues that evidence regard-
 ing a skilled artisan is necessary in that analysis, see Ap-
 pellant’s Br. at 33–34, it improperly attempts to substitute
 a skilled artisan’s knowledge for the actual disclosure of
 sufficient structure in the claims or specification. “[T]he
 fact that one of skill in the art could program a computer
 to perform the recited functions cannot create structure
 where none otherwise is disclosed.” Williamson, 792 F.3d
 at 1351 (emphasis added) (citing Function Media, L.L.C. v.
 Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013)); see also
 Diebold Nixdorf, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.3d 1291,
 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[N]one of our cases mandate that a
 party seeking to overcome the presumption against appli-
 cation of § 112, [¶] 6 can only do so by presenting extrinsic
 evidence that one of ordinary skill would fail to understand
 that a term connotes a definite structure.” (emphasis in
 original)).
      Moreover, both parties seem to argue that precedent
 dictates the outcome of this case, see Appellant’s Br. at 34–
 40 (arguing strict adherence to Dyfan); Appellee’s Br. at 38
 (arguing that Fiber, LLC v. Ciena Corp., 792 F. App’x 789
 (Fed. Cir. 2019) should apply), but these arguments are of
 little value given how contextually dependent the first step
 of the means-plus-function analysis is, as the outcome
 turns on the specific patent at issue. Neither Dyfan nor
 Fiber discusses the term “unit,” much less in the context of
 the ’563 patent.
     Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s holding that
 “alerting unit configured to issue an alert” in claim 1 of the
Case: 22-1066    Document: 55      Page: 11    Filed: 09/25/2023

 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                         11

 ’563 patent is a means-plus-function limitation subject to
 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6.
  B. Disclosure of Corresponding Structure for the Means-
          Plus-Function Terms in Claims 1 and 16
     Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, “alerting unit con-
 figured to issue an alert” in claim 1 is a means-plus-func-
 tion limitation. Furthermore, neither party disputes that
 “issuing means for issuing an alert” in claim 16 is also
 claimed in means-plus-function format. Having thus de-
 termined that both of those terms are subject to 35 U.S.C.
 § 112, ¶ 6, we proceed to the second step of the of the
 means-plus-function analysis, in which we “determine
 whether the specification discloses sufficient structure that
 corresponds to the claimed function.” Williamson, 792 F.3d
 at 1351.
     In making that determination, “[t]he court must first
 identify the claimed function.” Id. (internal citation omit-
 ted). “Then, the court must determine what structure, if
 any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the
 claimed function.” Id. “Where there are multiple claimed
 functions, . . . the patentee must disclose adequate corre-
 sponding structure to perform all of the claimed functions.”
 Id. at 1351–52 (citing Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 675
 F.3d 1302, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). We have elaborated
 that “[w]hile the specification must contain structure
 linked to claimed means, this is not a high bar.” Biome-
 dino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed.
 Cir. 2007). However, “[i]t is not enough simply to list a cer-
 tain structure in the specification; that structure must also
 be clearly linked to a claimed function in order to be a cor-
 responding structure for that function.” Med. Instrumen-
 tation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205,
 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
     In this case, the district court identified the two undis-
 puted claimed functions performed by both the “alerting
 unit” and the “issuing means for issuing an alert” as “(1)
Case: 22-1066     Document: 55      Page: 12    Filed: 09/25/2023

 12                      WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

 initiating a connection to another communication terminal
 over a network; and (2) causing the signaling means to lo-
 cally signal to the user.” J.A. 656, 679–80 (internal cita-
 tions and quotations omitted). We begin by discussing the
 first identified claimed function below.
     The ’563 patent’s specification discloses that a
 “[m]obile phone 1 comprises a central processing unit 10,
 which controls the operation of the phone in accordance
 with software stored in a read only memory 11.” ’563 pa-
 tent, col. 3 ll. 21–23. Nevertheless, we agree with Google
 that that passage is merely a general description of the mo-
 bile phone depicted in Figure 1. Nothing in that passage
 or the surrounding language clearly links the disclosed
 structure, if it is that, to the claimed function of “initiating
 a connection to another communication terminal over a
 network.” Moreover, even if there were some clear link be-
 tween that language and the claimed function, we have
 “consistently required that the structure disclosed in the
 specification be more than simply a general[-]purpose com-
 puter or microprocessor.” Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign,
 Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Aristo-
 crat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d
 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
      Similarly, the ’563 patent’s specification discloses a
 “communication subsystem 18,” which comprises “an an-
 tenna 19 and a communication engine 20.” ’563 patent, col.
 3 ll. 32–35. Although “antenna” may be structural, we
 agree with Google and the district court that “communica-
 tion engine” is described with purely functional language.
 The surrounding language provides that “[t]he communi-
 cation engine 20 is connected between the antenna and the
 processor 10.” Id. col. 3 ll. 35–36. However, that language
 merely describes the location of the communication engine,
 rather than what it is or how it operates. The lack of spe-
 cific structure is confirmed by the disclosure that “[a]t least
 some functional elements of the communication engine
 may be implemented on a common chip with one or more
Case: 22-1066    Document: 55      Page: 13     Filed: 09/25/2023

 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                          13

 parts of the central processing unit.” Id. col. 3 ll. 39–42.
 We therefore agree with the district court’s determination
 that “[s]uch ‘high level’ disclosure of results to be obtained,
 but no detail as to how to perform the operation to achieve
 those results, does not satisfy [§] 112, ¶ 6.” J.A. 656 (citing
 In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
     Even though the ’563 patent mentions two exemplary
 communication protocols, neither provides sufficient struc-
 ture corresponding to the claimed function. In particular,
 the specification discloses that “[t]he mobile phone may be
 operable in accordance with any suitable communication
 protocol. Examples include GSM and 3G (UMTS).” ’563
 patent, col. 3 ll. 45–47 (emphasis added). Google and the
 district court rely on Biomedino, properly characterizing
 that communication protocol language as “a bare state-
 ment that known techniques or methods can be used [that]
 does not disclose structure.” 490 F.3d at 953; J.A. 657.
 “The inquiry is whether one of skill in the art would under-
 stand the specification itself to disclose a structure, not
 simply whether that person would be capable of imple-
 menting a structure.” Id. In any case, the communication
 protocol language in the ’563 patent merely corresponds to
 the general operation of the mobile phone and is not
 “clearly linked” to the claimed function of “initiating a con-
 nection to another communication terminal over a net-
 work.”
    The ’563 patent’s specification contains one additional
 passage relevant to this issue:
     The . . . alarm is an alarm generated by means of a
     call to another phone. In the alarm setting mode
     the user can select a telephone number for use in
     the second type of alarm. The telephone number is
     stored in non-volatile memory 21. . . . When the
     alarm is active and the clock matches the entered
     time and optionally date the processor generates
Case: 22-1066    Document: 55      Page: 14     Filed: 09/25/2023

 14                      WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

      the alarm of the second type by calling the tele-
      phone number.
     ’563 patent, col. 4 ll. 9–20. However, Google correctly
 notes that that language is also not “clearly linked” to the
 claimed function. That leaves a skilled artisan uncertain
 whether the “processor,” the “communication engine,” or
 some other component (or combination thereof) described
 in the specification is the structure corresponding to the
 claimed function of “initiating a connection to another com-
 munication terminal over a network.”
     To the extent that WSOU argues that the “interpreta-
 tion of what is disclosed in the specification must be made
 in the light of knowledge of one skilled in the art,” Appel-
 lant’s Br. at 43 (quoting Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 950), it in-
 vites us to improperly use the knowledge of a skilled
 artisan as a gap-filler, rather than a lens for interpretation,
 see Function Media, 708 F.3d at 1319 (“Having failed to
 provide any disclosure of the structure for the [claimed]
 function, [the patentee] cannot rely on the knowledge of
 one skilled in the art to fill in the gaps.”). WSOU argues
 that a skilled artisan would “understand the structure in-
 volved with a mobile phone using GSM and/or 3G (UMTS)
 mobile telephony standard(s)” and “know how to program
 the processor to have the phone place a call with GSM/3G
 (UMTS) mobile telephony chip.” Appellant’s Br. at 43.
 However, those arguments are irrelevant as “[t]he indefi-
 niteness inquiry is concerned with whether the bounds of
 the invention are sufficiently demarcated, not with
 whether one of ordinary skill in the art may find a way to
 practice the invention.” ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software,
 Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 519 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Aristocrat,
 521 F.3d at 1337). “[T]he understanding of one skilled in
 the art in no way relieves the patentee of adequately dis-
 closing sufficient structure in the specification.” Atmel, 198
 F.3d at 1380.
Case: 22-1066    Document: 55      Page: 15    Filed: 09/25/2023

 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                         15

     Because we have determined that the ’563 patent’s
 specification does not disclose sufficient structure that cor-
 responds to the first claimed function performed by the
 “alerting unit configured to issue an alert” and the “issuing
 means for issuing an alert,” we need not discuss the second
 claimed function, as “the patentee must disclose adequate
 corresponding structure to perform all of the claimed func-
 tions.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–52 (emphasis added)
 (internal citation omitted). In the context of a claim gov-
 erned by § 112, ¶ 6, “if the patentee fails to disclose ade-
 quate corresponding structure, the claim is indefinite.” Id.
 at 1352 (citing Noah Sys., 675 F.3d at 1311–12). Accord-
 ingly, we affirm the district court’s determination that
 claims 1 and 16 of the ’563 patent are invalid as indefinite.
                      II. The ’681 Patent
     WSOU raises two issues concerning the district court’s
 determination regarding the ’681 patent. First, WSOU ar-
 gues that the court erred in determining that claims 1, 9,
 16, and 24 of the ’681 patent were invalid as indefinite
 based on the nonsensicality of the claim limitation “second
 part in between the first part and the second part.” Appel-
 lant’s Br. at 45–56. Second, WSOU asserts that the ’681
 patent discloses adequate structure corresponding to the
 claimed function performed by the “means for assigning”
 limitation of claim 24. Id. at 56–62. We begin by discuss-
 ing the “second part” claim limitation.
     A patent is invalid as indefinite if “its claims, read in
 light of the specification delineating the patent, and the
 prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable cer-
 tainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the inven-
 tion.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S.
 898, 901 (2014). One circumstance in which claims are in-
 definite is where the claims, as properly construed, are
 nonsensical. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of New
 York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
 2016) (“The claims are nonsensical in the way a claim to
Case: 22-1066    Document: 55      Page: 16    Filed: 09/25/2023

 16                     WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

 extracting orange juice from apples would be, and are thus
 indefinite.” (internal citation omitted)). Generally, the
 terms of a claim are properly construed when they are
 given their ordinary and customary meaning, which is the
 meaning that the terms would have to a skilled artisan at
 the time of invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
      Neither party disputes that “second part in between
 the first part and the second part” should be given its plain
 and ordinary meaning, as understood by a skilled artisan
 in light of the specification and prosecution history. How-
 ever, Google contends that the plain and ordinary meaning
 of the claim is nonsensical, given the self-referential nature
 of a “second part” existing “in between the first part” and
 itself. Appellee’s Br. at 47. Google notes that the specifi-
 cation and claims use that exact phrasing on multiple oc-
 casions, leading one to believe that it was not a mere
 typographical error or mistake. Id. at 47–48. Conversely,
 WSOU insists that the specification and prosecution his-
 tory imparts a plain and ordinary meaning of “second part
 in between [the boundary of] the first part and [the outer
 boundary of] the second part” to a skilled artisan. Appel-
 lant’s Br. at 48 (bracketed portions indicating WSOU’s pro-
 posed clarifications to the claim language). WSOU relies
 largely on Figure 3 of the ’681 patent, id. at 47–49, and the
 examiner’s allowance of the contested language in an office
 action during prosecution, id. at 49–51.
     Our examination of the ’681 patent’s specification
 matches that of the district court. The self-contradictory
 language of the limitation renders the claims indefinite be-
 cause it “does not allow a reader to differentiate the first
 instance of ‘a second part’ from the second.” J.A. 651.
 Google is correct that “[t]he specification provides no fur-
 ther explanation to escape the nonsensical [plain and ordi-
 nary meaning of the] limitation.” Appellee’s Br. at 47.
 Although WSOU points us to Figure 3, nothing in the fig-
 ure supports importing WSOU’s “boundary” language into
Case: 22-1066    Document: 55      Page: 17     Filed: 09/25/2023

 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                          17

 the claim limitation. In fact, the term “boundary” does not
 appear whatsoever in the ’681 patent’s specification.
     Likewise, our analysis of the ’681 patent’s prosecution
 history mirrors that of the district court. The office action
 cited by WSOU was unrelated to any indefiniteness rejec-
 tion and instead dealt with rejected dependent claims that
 would become allowable if written in independent form.
 J.A. 224. Furthermore, although the contested language
 was listed in the examiner’s reasons for allowance, the lan-
 guage was not “introduced” by the examiner as WSOU im-
 plies. See Appellant’s Br. at 51. Indeed, WSOU admits
 that the language appeared in the originally filed claim.
 Id. at 50. We agree with the district court’s rejection of
 WSOU’s argument on the basis that “if the [c]ourt were to
 accept this argument, no party could ever raise an indefi-
 niteness challenge because every claim term ever held in-
 definite was originally approved by a patent examiner.”
 J.A. 652 (quoting Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recrea-
 tional Prod. Inc., 2016 WL 6832623, at *16 (D. Minn.
 2016)).
     As we have explained repeatedly and consistently,
 “courts may not redraft claims, whether to make them op-
 erable or to sustain their validity.” Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-
 Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal
 citations omitted). “Even ‘a nonsensical result does not re-
 quire the court to redraft the claims of the [patent at issue].
 Rather, where as here, [when] claims are susceptible to
 only one reasonable interpretation and that interpretation
 results in a nonsensical construction of the claim as a
 whole, the claim must be invalidated.’” Id. (citing Process
 Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357
 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). “[W]e do not redraft claims to contradict
 their plain language in order to avoid a nonsensical result.”
 Haemonetics Corp. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 607 F.3d
 776, 782 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). Fol-
 lowing that longstanding practice, we decline to redraft the
Case: 22-1066    Document: 55     Page: 18    Filed: 09/25/2023

 18                     WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

 claim limitation at issue to include WSOU’s additional
 “boundary” language.
      To the extent that WSOU again emphasizes the lack of
 evidence regarding a skilled artisan’s knowledge in this
 case, we again decline to accept that argument. “In some
 cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as under-
 stood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent
 even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases in-
 volves little more than the application of the widely ac-
 cepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips,
 415 F.3d at 1314. In this case, we are not persuaded by
 WSOU’s argument that a skilled artisan’s knowledge
 would alter the plain and ordinary meaning of the “com-
 monly understood” language of “second part in between the
 first part and the second part,” even in the context of the
 ’681 patent’s specification and prosecution history.
     Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s holding that
 claims 1, 9, 16, and 24 of the ’681 patent are invalid as in-
 definite. We therefore need not reach the parties’ argu-
 ments concerning the means-plus-function limitation of
 claim 24, as that claim includes the same “second part” lan-
 guage that was discussed in the preceding analysis.
                        CONCLUSION
      We have considered WSOU’s remaining arguments but
 find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the de-
 cision of the district court is affirmed.
                        AFFIRMED