Court Opinion

ID: 9734131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:26:03.911875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.890236
License: Public Domain

*190EAGEN, Justice
(dissenting).
The proof at trial in this case established that the appellant Starkes and a fellow “gang” member entered into a plan to rob a forty-seven-year-old male in Philadelphia who was known for imbibing intoxicants too freely and too often. When Starkes and his companion arrived at the residence of their intended victim, they found him as expected, inebriated. In an effort to compel him to hand over any available money, the victim was beaten with the butt of a thirteen-inch butcher knife and when he failed to respond to these assaults, he was then stabbed in the back with the knife by Starkes. The blade of the knife penetrated the victim’s body to a depth of seven inches causing a fatal wound. Starkes and his co-felon then searched the person of the victim, propped his body up against a wall, removed the phone from the hook and Tied the scene.
Two days after the crimes, Starkes was taken into police custody and confessed. A majority of this Court now say this confession was constitutionally invalid as a matter of law because Starkes’ mother, who admittedly was with him and counseling him at all times relevant to the confession, was not advised by the police of her son’s constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent.
I cannot subscribe to this position. An individual’s constitutional rights are a personal matter and the crucial issue in this and similar cases is whether the maker of the confession (herein Starkes) fully understood his rights and waived them knowingly and intelligently. It is not disputed that Starkes was personally fully warned of his rights and said he understood them. In my view, whether he did and then effectively waived these rights was an issue of fact. Two evidentiary hearings on this issue transpired in the trial court, first before a judge on the motion to suppress and then before a trial jury of twelve citizens. In both instances, the triers of fact found Starkes knew his rights and knowlingly and intel*191ligently waived them before he confessed. I am not persuaded these findings should be overruled.
I dissent.
JONES, C. J., and POMEROY, J., join in this dissenting opinion.