Court Opinion

ID: 9860224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:14:59.397806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:23.310494
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE McNAMARA delivered the opinion of the court: This was an action for damages arising from injuries sustained by the 11-year-old plaintiff, Bruce Allen Palmer, when his leg was caught in the agitator mechanism of a fertilizer spreader designed and manufactured by defendant, Avco Distributing Corporation. A jury returned a verdict for plaintiff against Avco in the amount of *492,000. The trial court denied Avco’s motion for judgment n.o.v. and entered judgment on the verdict. The trial court also denied Avco’s motion for partial satisfaction of the judgment in the amount of *273,000. Avco appeals. Plaintiff cross-appeals from the trial court’s denial of his post-trial motion for an additur of *250,000 or, in the alternative, for a new trial on the issue of damages only. The machinery involved in the injury is known as the Avco Model 114, a fertilizer spreader designed in 1964 and manufactured in 1966. The Model 114 consists of a hopper, 74 inches high, 77 inches long and 93 inches wide, which rests on a two-wheeled frame designed to be pulled by a tractor. The hopper can hold up to 8,000 pounds of fertilizer. Two sides of the hopper are angled at 40 degrees so that the fertilizer will run through the spreader. An agitator, 5 feet in length, is located at the bottom of the hopper. If engaged, the agitator moves only when the spreader is being pulled forward by a tractor. As the spreader is pulled forward, the agitator guides fertilizer into openings at the bottom of the hopper. It also breaks up lumps of fertilizer caused by dehydration. Running parallel over the length of the agitator is a baffle which consists of two 4-inch sides joined at a 90 degree angle. The baffle serves to relieve the pressure placed on the agitator by the weight of the fertilizer without restricting the flow. The edges of the baffle are approximately 5 inches from the sides of the hopper. Viewed from above, the placement of the baffle conceals the agitator mechanism. Running lengthwise across the top of the hopper is a metal bar designed to hold a canvas cover for the hopper. While it is an optional feature, this bar was on the Model 114 involved in the occurrence. The Avco Model 114 was designed to be operated by one man. From his position in the tractor seat, the operator has all the spreader controls within reach, including a lever which disengages the agitator even when the spreader is being pulled forward. A warning sign, using the language recommended by the standards of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers, was attached to the front of the hopper. This sign read: “BE CAREFUL 1. Keep all shields in place. 2. Stop machine to adjust and oil. 3. When mechanism becomes clogged disengage power before cleaning. 4. Keep hands, feet and clothing away from power-driven parts. 5. Keep off implement unless seat or platform is provided. Keep others off.” On April 27, 1973, plaintiff, then 11 years old, and his brother, aged 13, accompanied Allen Miller and his two sons to the Edward Kalvelage farm for the purpose of borrowing Kalvelage’s Avco Model 114 spreader. Miller brought the Model 114 back to his farm and proceeded to transfer fertilizer from his spreader to the Model 114. Miller and the four boys shoveled a full load of fertilizer into the Model 114, breaking up chunks of fertilizer as they did so. The Model 114 was then pulled out to the field. Miller was driving the tractor; one of his sons and the two Palmer boys were riding on the top of the spreader. Plaintiff testified he was riding on the spreader just for something to do. After approximately 40 or 50 minutes, Miller stopped the tractor arid his son climbed out of the hopper. After Miller started up the tractor again, plaintiff, while holding the bar above the hopper, caught his left leg in the agitator mechanism at the bottom of the hopper. Because of the positioning of the baffle, plaintiff neither saw nor knew of the existence of the agitator beneath. Miller knew about the agitator, but never warned the children. As a result of the accident, plaintiff suffered amputation of his left leg below the hip. Plaintiff’s complaint named Avco and International Minerals & Chemical Corporation, the distributor of the Avco Model 114, in a products liability suit. Plaintiff also filed suit against Miller, Miller Farms, Inc., and Kalvelage. Miller filed a third-party complaint against Avco and International Minerals seeking indemnity in the event that Miller and Miller Farms were found hable to plaintiff. Prior to the commencement of trial, plaintiff entered into a loan agreement with Miller, Miller Farms, Kalvelage, and their liability insurance carrier, Country Mutual Insurance Company. (We shall set forth the terms of the loan agreement later in this opinion.) Those defendants were thereupon dismissed from the suit. Plaintiff also entered into a loan agreement with International Minerals, and it was dismissed as a defendant. At trial, both sides presented testimony as to whether plaintiff’s use of the fertilizer spreader was reasonably foreseeable and whether the Avco Model 114 was unreasonably dangerous. Three witnesses, Allen Miller, Wilmer Halfeldt and Ron Reichert, testified for plaintiff that they owned farms. Each had ridden on fertilizer spreaders, either for the purpose of breaking up clumps of fertilizer or just to go along for a ride. All three witnesses testified that they had seen farmers, farm personnel, and other persons riding on spreaders. Gene A. Honn, an adviser with the department of agriculture of the University of Illinois, Dr. Norval Wardle, a retired professor of agricultural and safety engineering at the University of Iowa, and Dr. John Siemens, a professor of agricultural engineering at the University of Illinois, testified as expert witnesses on behalf of plaintiff. Honn testified that while travelling throughout Illinois he had noticed farm personnel riding on fertilizer spreaders. Honn had personally ridden on spreaders of various types. Dr. Wardle testified that he had seen farmers riding on fertilizer spreaders for the purpose of breaking up clumps of fertilizer. Dr. Wardle expressed an opinion, based upon a review of literature pertaining to the Avco Model 114 and an inspection of the spreader itself on the morning before testifying, that the Avco Model 114 was unreasonably dangerous for the following reasons: fertilizer has a tendency to clog; the baffle gives a false sense of security because it appears to guard the agitator; the agitator is not in fact guarded, but is open 5 inches on each side of the baffle; the operator’s manual does not contain instructions informing the farmer about the problem of clogging; and the warning on the spreader does not specifically draw attention to the hazard of the agitator at the bottom of the hopper. Dr. Siemens concluded that the Avco Model 114 was unreasonably dangerous based upon his inspection of it and the relevant literature. His reasons underlying this conclusion were substantially the same as those given by Dr. Wardle. Dr. Siemens had never seen anyone riding on a fertilizer spreader while it was in use, but his opinion was based on such a possibility. Both witnesses offered suggestions for alternative designs of both the agitator mechanism and protective covering. These alternative designs had not been tested and both witnesses agreed extensive testing would be necessary to determine the feasibility of such alternatives. Neither witness was a licensed engineer. Three witnesses, Dean Johnson, Jack Watson, and Murlin Tuotten, testified on behalf of Avco. They were farmers and had neither ridden nor seen anyone ride in the hopper of a fertilizer spreader for any purpose. The standard practice is for the operator to stop the tractor and break up clumps of fertilizer while the spreader is stationary. Ralph Morr, an engineer with Avco, testified that in his opinion the Avco Model 114 is not unreasonably dangerous for its intended use. Morr based his opinion on the fact that the Model 114 was designed to be operated by one man and that the agitator would stop automatically if the operator stopped the tractor. Thus, the agitator would pose no threat to the operator if he had to get inside the hopper to break up the clumps of fertilizer. Neither Avco nor any company had tested or utilized the suggestions for alternate designs made by plaintiff’s experts. Morr was of the opinion that none of the alternatives suggested were technically feasible. A prototype of Model 114 was tested for three years in the field by Avco personnel before it was marketed. During that period, there were no reports of iniuries resulting from use of the machine. Randall C. Swanson, a farmer and part-time agricultural consultant, testified for Avco. Swanson concluded that the Model 114 was not unreasonably dangerous for its intended use for several reasons. First, an injury cannot occur inadvertently because a person can come into contact with the agitator at the bottom of the hopper only by intentionally getting into the hopper. Secondly, the warning placed on the machine was adequate because it advised the operator as to its operation and cautioned against cleaning or adjusting it when parts were moving. Finally, since the Model 114 was designed to be operated by one man, there was no reason for any other person to be involved in its operation. Swanson believed that allowing children to ride in the hopper indicated a complete disregard for their safety on the part of the operator. Defendant initially contends that, as a matter of law, Avco was under no duty to design á fertilizer spreader so as to prevent injury arising out of an unintended use. Avco maintains that the scope of Model 114’s intended use is not broad enough to include the activity of an 11-year-old boy riding in the hopper. Citing Winnett v. Winnett (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1, Avco argues that plaintiff’s action in strict tort liability must fail because the occurrence giving rise to his injury was not “objectively reasonable to expect” when the spreader was put to its intended use. In Winnett a four-year-old child was injured when she placed her fingers in the conveyor belts of an operating farm forage wagon. In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint, the supreme court, holding that the occurrence was not foreseeable, stated at pages 12-13, “Foreseeability means that which it is objectively reasonable to expect, not merely what might conceivably occur.”  When plaintiff’s cause of action sounds in strict tort liability and the defense of misuse is raised, the question becomes whether such “misuse” was foreseeable by a reasonably prudent manufacturer. A manufacturer may be hable for a use that is not intended, in the strict sense, if from the circumstances it appears that the manufacturer knew or should have known of such use. (Kerns v. Engelke (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 323, 369 N.E.2d 1284, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E.2d 859.) Whether a particular use is objectively reasonable to expect is normally a question of fact for the jury’s determination. Kerns v. Engelke.  We believe sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to permit the triers of fact to determine it was objectively reasonable to expect that farmers, farm personnel and children would ride in the hopper of the Model 114 spreader. Four witnesses testifying for plaintiff stated that they personally had ridden on fertilizer spreaders and that they had seen other persons riding on such spreaders. Dr. War die also testified that he had seen persons riding on fertilizer spreaders. Unlike Winnett, where there was an isolated incident of a child being in the vicinity of potentially dangerous machinery, the evidence indicates here that it was somewhat common practice, of which Avco knew or should have known, for persons, including children, to ride in the hopper of a fertilizer spreader.  Moreover, we believe there was sufficient evidence to warrant the jury’s determination that the Avco Model 114 spreader, at the time of the occurrence, was unreasonably dangerous for its foreseeable use. Dr. War die, plaintiff’s expert witness, so concluded based on the facts that the b afile concealed the presence of the agitator and that the attached warning did not specifically call attention to the hazard of the agitator. Dr. Wardle’s conclusion was supported by Dr. Siemens. It was the jury’s province to determine, first, whether the use to which the spreader was being put at the time of plaintiff’s injury was objectively foreseeable and, secondly, if it was, whether the spreader was unreasonably dangerous for this foreseeable use. We cannot say that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, so overwhelmingly supports a verdict for Avco that a contrary verdict cannot stand. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying Avco’s motion for judgment n.o.v. Avco next contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of *273,000, the amount of the payments under two loan agreements. By the terms of the loan agreement plaintiff entered into with Miller, Miller Farms, Kalvelage and their liability insurance carrier, Country Mutual Insurance Company, Country Mutual agreed to advance to plaintiff the sum of *266,000 as an interest-free loan repayable upon the following terms: “Repayment shall be made only in the event that a judgment is rendered against Avco Distributing Corporation, in favor of the Plaintiff, Bruce Allen Palmer, in excess of Five Hundred Thousand (*500,000) Dollars and collection actually made thereon, and then only to the limited extent of Twenty (20%) Percent that the actual net recovery and collection exceeds said sum of Five Hundred Thousand (*500,000) Dollars.” In return, Miller, Miller Farms and Kalvelage were dismissed from the suit and plaintiff agreed not to execute any contemplated judgment against those parties. The agreement also contained a clause declaring it was the specific and unqualified intent of the parties that the transaction be deemed a loan and not a release by plaintiff of a claim against the defendants or a covenant not to sue. Full disclosure of the existence and terms of the loan agreement was made to the trial court and Avco three days before trial began. Plaintiff also entered into a loan agreement with International Minerals in exchange for *7,500. The terms of this agreement do not appear of record. Avco, in effect, seeks to treat the agreements as covenants not to sue which, under well-established law, must be deducted from any judgment obtained against the remaining defendant. Hayes v. Abernathy Taxi Association, Inc. (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 367, 290 N.E.2d 289; Kurth v. Amee, Inc. (1972), 3 Ill. App. 3d 506, 278 N.E.2d 162. In Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382, the case which first sanctioned the use of loan agreements, the court also made clear that they are not proper under all circumstances. In Reese there were two defendants, either of whom could have been directly liable to plaintiff for the entire amount of the judgment. Despite the fact that it was questionable whether the contracting defendant could have obtained indemnity from the non-contracting defendant, the court upheld the validity of the agreement which would, in effect, shift the entire loss to the noncontracting defendant in the event plaintiff prevailed. The following factors were deemed important: (1) the agreement was entered into before trial; (2) the contracting defendant was dismissed from the case so as not to confuse or mislead the jury; and (3) the existence and terms of the agreement were brought to the jury’s attention. Subsequent cases have held loan agreements void where one or more of the above factors were lacking. In Harris v. Algonquin Ready Mix, Inc. (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 445, 322 N.E.2d 58, the court invalidated the loan agreement, holding that it constituted an attempt at indirect indemnification under circumstances where indemnification would not have been proper. The loan agreement had been entered into by plaintiff and a co-defendant after judgment was obtained against both defendants and after the contracting defendant had failed to prevail on its counterclaim and third-party claim. Similarly, in Kerns v. Engelke (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 323, 369 N.E.2d 1284, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E.2d 859, agreement was held void where no claim for indemnification had been made by the contracting defendants. This court, citing Harris, noted that the loan agreements should be limited to “situations where the contracting defendant might otherwise be entitled to indemnification or to prejudgment situations where the liability of the parties has not been determined.” (54 Ill. App. 3d 323, 340. See also Rucker v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 770, 381 N.E.2d 715.) In Gatto v. Walgreen Drug Co. (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 513, 337 N.E.2d 23, cert, denied sub nom. Gatto v. Calumet Flexicore Corp. (1976), 425 U.S. 936, 48 L. Ed. 2d 178, 96 S. Ct. 1669, the defect lay not in the agreement, but in plaintiff’s failure to dismiss the contracting defendants and reveal the existence and terms of the agreement to the trial court, opposing counsel and the jury. Moreover, the noncontracting defendant could not have been held directly liable to plaintiff. The trial court was therefore placed in the position of trying a nonexistent controversy between parties which had secretly resolved their claims.  The foregoing cases are readily distinguishable from the present case. The circumstances surrounding the execution of the loan agreements between plaintiff and Country Mutual and between plaintiff and International Minerals comport with the requirements of Reese. The agreements were entered into prior to trial before the liability of any of the co-defendants had been determined. Avco could have been sued individually and held directly liable to plaintiff. There was no attempt at concealment of the existence and terms of the agreements, and the contracting defendants were promptly dismissed from the suit. Under the circumstances of this case the utilization of loan agreements was permissible. Avco asks us next to look not at the circumstances surrounding the execution of the loan agreement with Country Mutual, but at the terms of the agreement itself. Avco maintains that the fact that plaintiff’s obligation of repayment is conditioned upon execution of judgment against Avco in excess of *500,000 invalidates the agreement and warrants a reduction in the judgment against Avco in the amount of the loan. We do not agree. The existence of the loan agreement was first brought to the jury’s attention during Avco’s cross-examination of Miller. On redirect examination, the jury was informed that Country Mutual would not recover any portion of the loan if the verdict against Avco was less than *500,000. It was explained that Country Mutual would recover the full amount of the loan in the event there was a verdict for *1,800,000. Plaintiff thereafter called counsel for Country Mutual who testified to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the loan agreement and explained its terms in greater detail.  That repayment is conditioned upon an event which may or may not occur, in the present instance, a verdict greater than *500,000, does not, in our opinion, alter the essential character of the transaction as a loan. Nor do we believe the fact that Country Mutual is not repaid dollar for dollar out of any verdict against Avco renders the loan agreement invalid. The unique provisions of the present agreement eliminate what the dissenters in Reese termed an “unwholesome effect” of loan agreements: the shifting of the entire loss to one party. Under the agreement in the present case, Country Mutual agrees to bear at least a portion of the loss to the extent that the verdict against Avco is less than *1,800,000. Thus, the contracting defendant is not entirely absolved of responsibility for plaintiff’s loss. Moreover, Avco does not argue that a loan agreement such as the one entered into in Reese would have been improper in the present case. Its objections are based solely on the conditional nature of plaintiff’s obligation to repay. Yet, had plaintiff and Country Mutual executed the type of agreement approved in Reese, Avco would be in exactly the same position it occupies under the present agreement. Avco would still be obligated to pay to plaintiff the entire amount of the present judgment. The only party to gain from a Reese-type agreement would be Country Mutual; it would be repaid completely out of the recovery had by plaintiff against Avco. Consequently, we do not understand Avco’s attempt to benefit from County Mutual’s voluntary waiver of repayment in the event the amount is less that *500,000.  Nor do we believe that the type of agreement executed in the present case results in a double recovery for plaintiff. In a different context, in Henson Robinson Co. v. Industrial Com. (1944), 386 Ill. 232, 53 N.E.2d 881, it was held that even though an employer is entitled to credit for Workmen’s Compensation benefits paid in the event the injured employee recovers from a third party, the employer may waive the right to indemnification. The result was that the employee was allowed to retain not only the amount of the settlement or recovery from the third party, but also the amount of benefits paid. The court found that since the employer had the right to demand indemnification out of the amount recovered from the third party, there necessarily existed the concomitant right to waive indemnification and that this did not constitute a double recovery. Similarly, under the loan agreement, the right of indemnification, and thus the right to waive indemnification, belongs to Country Mutual. We do not believe the fact that the waiver is written into the instrument in any way alters Country Mutual’s position. Avco, in effect, seeks to benefit from the provisions of a voluntary, private agreement by which Country Mutual agrees to underwrite, to a certain extent, plaintiff’s loss. We find nothing covert or inequitable in a private agreement to waive indemnification which would warrant a reduction of the judgment against Avco to the extent of the waiver. Consequently, we hold that Avco is not entitled to a partial reduction of judgment. We also must comment on Avco’s contention that the loan agreement must be considered a covenant not to sue. Avco first alluded to the existence of the loan agreement during its cross-examination of Miller. Such questioning was proper to show bias on the part of the witness. (Casson v. Nash (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 164, 384 N.E.2d 365.) Plaintiff was then properly permitted to place all the terms of the loan agreement before the jury, subject to an appropriate limiting instruction. (American State Bank v. County of Woodford (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 123, 371 N.E.2d 232.) Were we to hold that the agreement was, in fact, a covenant not to sue, mention of the agreement by Avco would have constituted reversible error (American State Bank v. County of Woodford), and Avco would not be allowed to profit from its own error in the form of a reduction of the judgment against it. Plaintiff has cross-appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motions for an additur of *250,000 or, in the alternative, for a new trial on the issue of damages only. Dr. Anthony L. Brown testified for plaintiff that he was plaintiff’s treating physician. Plaintiff’s left leg was amputated below the hip. Plaintiff remained in the hospital from April 27 to June 15, 1973. As a result of the amputation, plaintiff required several skin grafts. Dr. Brown’s bill totalled *1,800. Plaintiff’s mother testified that the total medical expenses amounted to *17,275. Dr. Jack Arbit, a clinical psychologist, testified as to the psychological effect of the injury upon plaintiff. Plaintiff manifested feelings of anxiety and depression and further counseling and psychotherapy would be necessary. John Henderson, an economist, testified on the subject of plaintiff’s future earning potential. He stated that, in general, employers are more unwilling to hire a handicapped person just entering the labor market than they are to continue to employ a person who became handicapped in the course of his employment. He projected plaintiff’s future lost income at the minimum of *340,836.  Courts are reluctant to interfere with the discretion of the jury as to the amount of damages to be awarded, and generally we will not overturn the jury’s finding for inadequacy of its award unless the award is palpably inadequate or one against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Kelley v. Cross (1967), 79 Ill. App. 2d 342, 223 N.E.2d 555.) The discretion of the jury should not be interfered with as long as the assessment of damages is within the range of the evidence, the instructions proper, and there is no improper exclusion of evidence. (Brown v. St. Johns Hospital (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 367 N.E.2d 155.) In the present case, the jury considered the evidence as to damages and rendered its verdict. There is a reasonable relationship between the damages awarded and the injuries sustained by plaintiff. We cannot say that the jury’s verdict is inadequate. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. McGILLICUDDY, J., concurs.