Court Opinion

ID: 9501926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 08:09:40.694053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:55.058893
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 3, 2023

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-22-00650-CR,
                             NO. 14-22-00651-CR

                  RASHID MUSTAFA ZEIGLER, Appellant
                                       V.

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 177th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                 Trial Court Cause Nos. 1488454 and 1489084

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Rashid Zeigler was sentenced to deferred adjudication for a period
of eight years for two counts of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. Alleging
that appellant violated various terms and conditions of his community supervision,
the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt. Following a hearing, the trial court
revoked appellant’s community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of both offenses
of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, and sentenced him to twenty-five
years’ imprisonment. On appeal, appellant challenges the revocation, arguing that
the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the
terms of his supervision. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                    Background

      On August 9, 2016, the trial court sentenced appellant to deferred
adjudication. In addition to a number of other standard conditions of community
supervision, appellant was ordered to (1) commit no offense and report any arrests
within 24 hours; (2) present verification of employment as directed; and (3) pay
fines, fees, and court costs.

      On January 25, 2021, the State filed its motion to adjudicate, alleging that
appellant violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision by: (1)
committing the criminal offense of aggregate theft; (2) using, possessing, or
consuming Delta-9-Carboxy THC; (3) failing to present verification of employment;
(4) failing to pay fees, fines, and court costs as directed; and (5) ingesting, using,
possessing, or consuming alcohol or an alcoholic beverage.

      The trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion on April 13, 2022. At the
revocation hearing, the State abandoned two of the alleged violations in its motion
and proceeded only with the allegations that appellant: (1) committed aggregate
theft, (2) failed to present verification of employment, and (3) failed to pay fees,
fines, and court costs. The State called three witnesses, and appellant called one
witness. Following the hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion and
assessed appellant’s punishment on each case at twenty-five years’ imprisonment to
run concurrently in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

      On May 13, 2022, appellant filed a motion for new trial in each case. The trial
court denied each motion on June 23, 2022. Appellant timely filed written notices of

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appeal, and this appeal followed.

                                    Governing Law

      We review a trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision for an
abuse of discretion. See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013); Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A revocation
hearing is not a criminal prosecution, and the degree of proof required to establish
the truth of the allegation in a motion to revoke community supervision is not the
same. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 864–65. The trial court has discretion to revoke
community supervision when a preponderance of the evidence supports at least one
of the State’s alleged violations of the conditions of community supervision.
Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This standard is met
when the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that the
defendant violated a condition of his community supervision. See Rickels, 202
S.W.3d at 764. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
order. Guerrero v. State, 554 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2018, no pet.). The trial court is the sole trier of fact and determines the credibility
of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony in revocation hearings. Id.
The trial court abuses its discretion in issuing a revocation order when the State fails
to meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant
violated a condition. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984); Guerrero, 554 S.W.3d at 273–74.

      Proof of a single violation is sufficient to support revocation of community
supervision. Guerrero, 554 S.W.3d at 274. Thus, to prevail on appeal, appellant is
required to challenge all of the findings that support the revocation order. Garcia v.
State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

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                                          Discussion

       In a single issue, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
revoking his deferred adjudication community supervision because the State failed
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the terms of his
supervision.

       As stated above, one ground for revocation was that appellant committed
aggregate theft while on community supervision.1 Section 31.09 of the Penal Code
provides that, “[w]hen amounts are obtained in violation of [Chapter 31: Theft]
pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct, whether from the same or
several sources, the conduct may be considered as one offense and the amounts
aggregated in determining the grade of the offense.” Appellant contends that the
evidence was insufficient to prove that he committed aggregate theft.

       Hershel Hughes, a general manager for Petco, testified at the revocation
hearing. In his testimony, Hughes explained how appellant fraudulently refunded
merchandise on several occasions. Merchandise that was never purchased was
brought to the cash register. Appellant would process the returns on the unpaid
merchandise and refund the customer in cash. In some cases, appellant would allow
the customer to leave the store with the refund and merchandise that was just
returned. Hughes explained that the store’s return policy typically requires a
manager code, but appellant’s position was a “GALOD,” which means that he was
a leader on duty and did not require another manager to approve the return.

       A loss prevention investigation was initiated. The fraudulent returns were

       1
          Because we conclude that the evidence supported revocation based on this ground, we
need not consider whether the trial court also found that the other two grounds—failure to present
verification of employment and failure to pay fees, fines, and court costs—also supported
revocation or whether those grounds were supported by evidence. See Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26.

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captured on surveillance video, and the transaction receipts were linked to
appellant’s specific employee ID number. On January 5, 2021, appellant gave a
written statement to Hughes and also spoke with Randall Snead, the store’s loss
prevention investigator. In his written statement, appellant stated:

      I Rashid, sometimes do bogus returs [sic] to guess [sic]. – did these type
      of returs [sic] mabey [sic] 10-20 times where I return all they items or
      some items. without taking the items back and let them keep the money.
      Then after that they would give me some money anywhere from $10
      [to] $60. I started doing this around Oct. because of lack of money.
      Total amount in refunds cash $800 merchandise lost [sic] of 500-600.
      Joshua Lawhorn, an officer with the Pasadena Police Department also
testified. He stated that he was dispatched for an employee theft call. After speaking
with Snead and meeting with Hughes, Officer Lawhorn collected appellant’s written
statement and store receipts and submitted them as evidence of the theft.

      As stated above, the burden of proof was only a preponderance of the
evidence. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763. By granting the State’s motion, the trial
judge, who was the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight to be afforded to
testimony, see Guerrero, 554 S.W.3d at 273, found Hughes and Officer Lawhorn to
be credible. Moreover, appellant provided a written statement admitting to the
fraudulent transactions. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial judge’s
finding that appellant committed aggregate theft in violation of the conditions of his
community supervision. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
Because this ground for revocation of appellant’s community supervision is
supported by the evidence, we need not consider whether the other grounds were
also supported by evidence. See Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26.

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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                                            /s/ Frances Bourliot
                                            Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Margaret “Meg” Poissant.
Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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