Court Opinion

ID: 9581253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:13:03.211494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:48.695715
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
As in the Interest of S.L.H., 342 N.W.2d 672 (S.D.1983), I would again affirm the trial court in toto, thus joining a termination of parental rights but hereby deviate from the remand aspect of the majority opinion. I spiritually join the concurrence in part-dissent in part writing of Justice Wollman, in this regard: I vote to simply remand to the trial court to thereupon enter a judgment nunc pro tunc which would allude to Settled Record 75-76 wherein Judge Hurd specifically stated in his decision that termination was the only alternative available to the court consistent with the best interests of the child. “Nunc pro tunc” is a phrase applied to acts allowed to be done after the time when they should be done, with a retroactive effect; i.e., with the same effect as if regularly done. People v. Manieri, 4 Misc.2d 567, 569, 148 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (1955). “Nunc pro tunc” judgment is a judgment entered to make the record speak the truth and the function of such entry is to correct the judicial records insofar as they fail to record a judgment by the court; where the court has acted and its action has not been recorded, an entry “nunc pro tunc” is proper and fully authorized. State v. Durham, 49 Ohio App.2d 231, 233-34, 360 N.E.2d 743, 746 (1976). “Nunc pro tunc” means “now for then” and when applied to entry of a legal order or judgment, it normally refers, not to a new or de novo decision, but to the judicial act previously taken, concerning which the record is absent or defective, and the later record-making act constitutes but later evidence of the earlier effectual act. Briseno v. Perry, 417 So.2d 813, 814 (Fla.App.1982). Therefore, no further evidence need be taken. This case has been remanded once and we need not remand again, for we may control the remand by the procedure I suggest. Let repose of this litigation set in like sleep in the night.
The mother had been a heavy drug abuser for many years (marijuana, alcohol, cocaine, speed). This little boy had been in foster care over half of his life. As in S.L.H., B.A.R. suffered from maternal deprivation, neglect, and abuse. This consisted of, but was not limited to, a skull fracture, beatings with a spatula, bruises over the entire body, being placed in a bathtub of hot water long enough to cause a reddened area from the waist down the lower trunk, and diapers not being used so that the child defecated on the floor. Similar to S.L.H., the child had very poor motor development and appellant mother refused to recognize the problem. Not unlike the mother in S.L.H., this mother wanted absolutely no interference by any agency, counselor, or physician into the life of herself and this little boy. Considering that various services had been offered to her since April 1980, she had ample opportunity to change her attitude and life to become a good mother. As late as January 1983, she avowedly was not ready to have her son returned to her custody. In a sense, the little boy waited for two and one-half years for his mother to take care of him. She would not come forward and mother the child. Must he languish in foster care, year after year, while the candle of his young life burns and grows dim? His needs are of today and not tomorrow. S.L.H., 342 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Hurd judiciously terminated her parental rights. In re B.E., 287 N.W.2d 91 (S.D.1979); In re V.D.D., 278 N.W.2d 194 (S.D.1979); In re D.K., 245 N.W.2d 644 (S.D.1976).