Court Opinion

ID: 9839682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 19:04:09.237743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:23.793116
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/13/23 P. v. Edwards CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080809

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCE392534)

TONY RAY EDWARDS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Herbert J. Exarhos, Judge. Affirmed.
         Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
         Defendant Tony Edwards faced a potential indeterminate sentence of
25 years to life after a jury convicted him of first degree burglary because
several aggravating factors, including two prior serious felony strikes, were
found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. At sentencing, the trial court
discussed mitigating and aggravating factors and decided that, while
25 years to life was too long, Edwards should spend a significant time in
prison. Without objection from defense counsel, the trial court asked the
parties to work backwards to craft a sentence that would add up to the length
of time it wanted. Ultimately, the trial court imposed the upper term and
sentenced Edwards to 19 years and 8 months in prison.
      Edwards appeals the sentence because, in his view, the trial court did
not comply with the requirements of Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2) for exceeding the middle term. We affirm the judgment for
two reasons. First, Edwards forfeited his objection to the sentencing
procedure because he raised it for the first time on appeal. Second, the trial
court properly exercised its discretion under section 1170 when it found that
aggravating circumstances justified the upper term.
                                       I.
      A jury found Edwards guilty of first degree burglary of a dwelling
occupied by a person other than an accomplice. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460,
subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (c)(21).) The trial court then oversaw a proceeding in
which it found several aggravating factors to be true beyond a reasonable
doubt: Edwards (1) committed the offense while out on bail; (2) committed
the offense while on probation or parole; (3) committed “numerous” crimes of
“increasing seriousness”; (4) served two prior prison terms; and (5) was
previously convicted of two serious felony prior strikes, one in 1998 for in-
store robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and one in 2019 for arson of property (Pen.
Code, § 451, subd. (d)).
      The two prior strikes required the trial court to impose a five-year
enhancement for each prior strike and, for the current conviction, an

                                        2
indeterminate term of 25 years to life. (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (a)(1),
(e)(2)(A)(ii).) The trial court, however, thought “25 to life” was “too much.” It
thus eliminated the 1998 prior strike for sentencing purposes because that
robbery occurred so long ago and the circumstances of the offense did “not
rise to the level that would justify an indeterminate sentence.” The trial
court struck the corresponding five-year enhancement for the same reason.
Without that prior strike and enhancement, Edwards faced a determinate
term of “around [ ] 26 years maximum.”
      At sentencing, in addition to striking one of Edwards’ prior strikes, the
trial court considered mitigating and aggravating factors. The trial court
sympathized with Edwards’ “horrible” childhood. It also found “significant”
that Edwards did not use weapons or violence during any of his thefts and
gave him “credit” for committing them in daytime, which reduces the
likelihood of anyone being home. At the same time, the trial court deemed
Edwards a “career thief” and expressed that “society needs to be protected
from him [for] a significant period of time.”
      To decide the length of time, the trial court asked both sides for
“numbers.” When the prosecutor proposed the upper term, the trial court
found that it could depart upwards because “aggregates have been found to
be true.” The trial court eventually asked the parties to “[d]o the math” to
create a determinate sentence of 20 years. The court acknowledged that it
had never “done a sentence where you’re working backwards from the
numbers,” but decided that the circumstances warranted doing so here.
Edwards’ counsel never objected to this procedure.
      In the end, the trial court selected the upper term, which, together with
the remaining prior strike and other enhancements, resulted in a total
sentence of 19 years and 8 months.

                                        3
                                         II.
      On appeal, Edwards challenges the “manner in which the trial court
reached [his] sentence.” He contends that the court abused its discretion
because it “picked a (seemingly arbitrary) number of years and worked
backward” rather than starting with the middle term.
      The People argue that Edwards forfeited his sentencing challenge and,
in any event, the trial court did not err when it imposed the upper term. We
agree.
                                         A.
      “[C]omplaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its
sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356
(Scott).) Although Edwards did not lodge this objection with the trial court,
he argues that he may do so now because the trial court imposed an
unauthorized sentence.
      We conclude that Edwards forfeited this issue. An unauthorized
sentence is one that “could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance
in the particular case.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.) Edwards’ 19-year,
8-month sentence was not unauthorized because it fell below the maximum
sentence and, “assuming aggravation outweighed mitigation,” the trial court
could lawfully impose the upper term. (Id. at p. 355.) Consequently,
Edwards cannot challenge the “method” the trial court used to reach his
sentence for the first time on appeal.
                                         B.
      Even if Edwards preserved this issue for appeal, we would still affirm
the judgment.

                                         4
      We review the trial court’s sentencing choice for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) Edwards bears the burden
to show that the sentencing decision was “so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 376-377.)
      We conclude that Edwards has not met his burden. Relevant here, the
court may impose a sentence that exceeds the middle term “only when there
are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify” the higher term.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Edwards asserts that this section requires the court to
expressly “start with the midterm” before it can depart upward. But the
sentencing law is not so rigid. It sets out the standard for an upper-term
sentence without detailing the exact steps or words that a trial court must
use to get there. Here, even if “unorthodox,” as Edwards claims, the trial
court’s methodology was not arbitrary. The record reflects that the trial court
weighed mitigating and aggravating factors and properly exercised its
discretion to impose the upper term as required under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2).
                                      III.
      We affirm the judgment.
                                                                 CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

                                       5