Court Opinion

ID: 9746809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:39:05.706603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:17.066838
License: Public Domain

Liss, J.,

dissenting:

As pointed out by the majority, the issue in this case ".. . is a clean legal question of whether malice, within the contemplation of the law of arson, consists exclusively of mental state A (the specific and affirmative intent to do harm) or also embraces *533the less routine, variant mental state B (the reckless doing of a dangerous act with wanton indifference to the consequences).”
The majority opts for the "variant mental state B (the reckless doing of a dangerous act with wanton indifference to the consequences).”
The evidence that the majority found to be sufficient to show such "reckless doing of a dangerous act with wanton indifference to the consequences” is
"that other residences lay in reasonably close proximity to the appellant’s home that was burned and were inferably in possible danger if the fire had somehow spread.”
Even if we assume the majority’s view of the law to be correct, there is no evidence whatsoever of what proximity the other residences were to appellant’s home. Thus even under appellee’s reading of Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469 (1975), the affirmance is wrong. Such surmise from an empty record does not comply with the sufficiency of the evidence requirement of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), upon appellate review, i.e., evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime charged.
More pointedly, I find appellee’s view of the Court of Appeals’ holding to be entirely contrary to the express language of Brown. The Court of Appeals stated squarely that nothing short of intended harm to other or harm in fact to others will permit an inference of malice when one burns one’s own building.
", . . While malice might reasonably be read into actions which are directed toward others or their property, such an inference would be unjustified in this case where the record is devoid of any evidence that Brown intended to harm or did in fact harm others as a result of having the clubhouse burned.” 285 Md. at 476-77 (Emphasis added.)
In regard to the analogy the majority draws from the malice in homicide law, it appears that the Court of Appeals *534was totally unimpressed with that same reasoning. The majority quoted Perkins, Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1969) p. 218; so did we in Brown v. State, 39 Md. App. 497, 507-08 (1978). The majority quoted further from Holmes in his Common Law (1881) p. 53; so did we in Brown, 39 Md. App. at 508. The majority quoted from Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 693 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197 (1976); so did we in Brown, 39 Md. App. at 507, etseq. In fact, most of the textual quotes in Brown were drawn from Evans, see Brown, 39 Md. App. at 507-08. That is also true in this case. It is apparent that the Court of Appeals expressly rejected this precise reasoning process, the same analogies and the same contentions, in reversing us in Brown.
I must respectfully dissent both as to factual sufficiency and as to the law as espoused by the Court of Appeals.