Court Opinion

ID: 8309628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-10-17 13:46:33.802059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:44:40.521452
License: Public Domain

Lowell, C. J.
The final decree of this court in the equity suit being for damages in respect to the very same infringements now in *393suit, is a merger of the cause of action as against the corporation. The hardship of the case arises from the course of practice by which security can be had by attachment in actions at law, but not in equity, excepting when an injunction nisi is ordered, and so it has hapxiened that the present action might have been more productive to the plaintiffs than that which they pursued. It does not appear that this point had occurred to plaintiffs when they moved before Judge Shepley Cor a trial of this action. If it had, they might have discontinued the equity suit. As torts are joint and several, the decree does not release the other defendants, there having been no actual satisfaction. The question, then, is whether the directors, stockholders, and workmen of the corporation are liable.
It has been hold that a mere workman who makes a patented article is not an infringer. Delano v. Scott, Gilp. 489; Heaton v. Quintard, 7 Blatchf. 73. The reason given by Hopkinson, J., in the first of these cases, goes far to decide the present. He says that the statute does not mean to class mere agents, servants, etc., as makers and venders of the patented improvement, but the principals, for whose account and benefit they act.
It was conceded, but without being decided, in Lightner v. Brooks, 2 Cliff. 287, and in Lightner v. Kimball, 1 Low. 211, that a director who has acted affirmatively, so to speak, and ordered an infringement by the corporation, would subject himself to an action. But, upon further examination, I think the law is not so. Infringement, is not a trespass. The form of action is case; and this is because the act done is not of itself a direct interference with the tangible property of the plaintiff, but an indirect interference with his paramount right. It is like the building of a house upon a man’s own land, which shuts out a light which his neighbor has a prescriptive right to enjoy. The person who is to pay damages for a disturbance is not every one who has had anything to do with the building, but he who owns it. It would be a great hardship if the directors of a. railway or manufacturing corporation were bound, at their personal peril, to find out that every machine which the company uses is free of all claim of monopoly. No case precisely in point has been cited; but the practice certainly is to ask for damages only against the corporation. Joinder in equity for purposes of discovery and injunction is another matter; but I have not known damages to be asked for against the directors of a corporation, excepting in one case, which did not come to trial, but was discontinued as to the directors.
*394I am of opinion that the only persons who can be held for damages are those who should have taken a license, and that they are those who own or have some interest in the business of making, using, or selling the thing which is an infringement; and that an action at law cannot be maintained a,gainst the directors, shareholders, or workmen of a corporation which infringes a patented improvement.
The plaintiffs are to have 30 days to except to this ruling. At the end of that time the order will be, judgment for the defendants.