Court Opinion

ID: 9939350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 20:08:25.688219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:57.989299
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Toledo Clinic, Inc. v. Felix, 2024-Ohio-489.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      LUCAS COUNTY

Toledo Clinic, Inc.                                      Court of Appeals No. L-23-1037

        Appellee                                         Trial Court No. CI0202102235

v.

Ashvin Felix                                             DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                        Decided: February 9, 2024

                                                   *****

        Jared J. Lefevre and Charles E. Hatch, for appellee.

        Francis J. Landry and Katherine A. Pawlak Macek, for appellant.

                                                   *****

        DUHART, J.

        {¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common

Pleas granting appellee Toledo Clinic, Inc.’s motion to confirm arbitration award

pursuant to R.C. 2711.09 and denying appellant Ashvin Felix’s motion to vacate and/or

modify arbitration award. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is

affirmed.
                                        Background

                                 Employment Agreement

       {¶ 2} This case arises from an employment agreement that was executed in early

2017 between Felix, a physician, and Toledo Clinic, Inc. (“Toledo Clinic”). Under the

contract, Felix, “the Professional,” agreed to operate several urgent care facilities on

behalf of the clinic on a full-time basis and, in exchange, the clinic agreed to reimburse

Felix for certain business expenses and to provide facilities and support services adequate

for the performance of Felix’s duties under the agreement. The contract further provided

that upon termination of the agreement “any unresolved deficit of the Professional

existing as of the notice date of such termination shall be paid to the Toledo Clinic by the

Professional.” “Deficit” was defined in the contract to mean “the amount by which any

and all expenses incurred by the Toledo Clinic in connection with employment of the

Professional with the Toledo Clinic exceeds collections for professional services and

other income turned over to the Toledo Clinic * * *.”

       {¶ 3} In a letter dated December 2, 2019, Toledo Clinic notified Felix that it was

terminating the agreement without cause, pursuant to paragraph 13(c) of their contract,

and that March 2, 2020, was the effective date of the termination.

                                        Arbitration

       {¶ 4} On January 21, 2020, Felix filed a demand for arbitration, which asserted

claims for breach of contract, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation,

2.
fraudulent inducement, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. Toledo Clinic

filed an answer denying Felix’s claims and, further, stating that Felix’s claims were

barred by his “prior material breach of the contract.” In addition, Toledo Clinic filed a

counterclaim for breach of contract asserting that Felix was obligated to pay an

unresolved deficit to the clinic in the amount of “at least $608,796.28.” Both parties

subsequently filed motions for summary judgment.

                                  A. Summary Judgment

       {¶ 5} In an order dated September 17, 2020, the arbitrator denied the parties’

motions for summary judgment on their respective breach of contract claims and granted

the clinic’s motion for summary judgment as to Felix’s claims for fraudulent

concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent inducement.

       {¶ 6} Felix’s fraud claims were based on alleged promises that he would be the

exclusive urgent care provider at the clinic. The arbitrator found that Felix “did not

testify in his deposition that he was promised exclusivity, only that it existed at the time

of contract execution.” She further found that “[t]he Clinic’s insistence on an

employment agreement with no promise of exclusivity put [Felix] on notice that the

Clinic was reserving its right to have another urgent care provider,” yet “[h]e chose to

sign the Employment Agreement anyway.”

3.
                                    B. Interim Award

       {¶ 7} The arbitrator subsequently issued an interim award, dated January 15, 2021,

wherein she determined that Felix was the “prevailing party” and, as such, “shall be

awarded costs and reasonable allowance for attorney’s fees.” In rendering this decision,

the arbitrator found that Toledo Clinic breached the contract by denying Felix adequate

support during the time period of “2017 through April of 2019.” Specifically, the

arbitrator found that Toledo Clinic violated the agreement when it failed to “fully assume

the business expense of a marketing and business growth consultant,” when it failed to

“attend to the administrative function of providing and credentialing staff,” and when it

engaged a competitor “to conduct a similar if not comparable business right in the same

neighborhood.”

       {¶ 8} The arbitrator additionally found that Felix, beginning in May 2019, failed to

comply with his “contractual promise to devote full-time efforts to Toledo Clinic.”

Based on this finding, the arbitrator concluded that Felix was responsible for the

“accumulation of deficit from May 1, 2019 until the end of his employment with Toledo

clinic.”

       {¶ 9} The matter was then remanded to the parties for negotiations relating to

damages owed to Toledo Clinic by Felix, consistent with her individual findings of fact

under the contract, as stated in the interim award. Among these individual findings were

determinations that: 1) the salary for marketing and business growth consultant Tim

4.
Schramko is an expense that is in “the category of business expenses” that are allocated

to Toledo Clinic; and 2) a $50,000 addition to Felix’s deficit that was made by the clinic

in March 2020 was untimely and, thus, “shall not count towards any deficit payable by

[Felix].”

        {¶ 10} The parties failed to resolve the damages issues between them, and so they

submitted briefs on the matter to the arbitrator.

     C. Interim Award Regarding Damages and Determination of Prevailing Party

        {¶ 11} On April 16, 2021, the arbitrator issued an “Interim Award Regarding

Damages and Determination of Prevailing Party.” In issuing the award, the arbitrator

determined that because “Toledo Clinic’s accounting records were the ones referenced by

both parties in the course of their dealings,” “[i]t follows that the calculation of [Felix’s]

deficit should be based on Toledo Clinic’s deficit account records.” The arbitrator noted

that “[a]side from contesting certain categories of expenses and the time period covered

by the report, [Felix] has made no assertion that [Toledo Clinic’s] numerical calculations

are erroneous. The arbitrator expressly disregarded an addendum that was included on

Felix’s damages submission on the grounds that it was “unsigned, unsworn and

unauthorized,” and, further, was “not referred to in [Felix’s] brief.”

        {¶ 12} Upon her review of Toledo Clinics accounting records, the arbitrator

concluded that Toledo Clinic’s total deficit came to $671,003.65, but she also concluded

that the clinic could not collect the full amount, because it stood in breach of its

5.
contractual obligation to provide adequate support to Felix from January 2017 through

April 2019.

       {¶ 13} The arbitrator then went on to state that “[d]uring the months of May 2019

through March 2020, records of patient visits show a dramatic decrease in [Felix’s]

performance, such that the accumulating deficit could no longer be attributed to [Toledo

Clinic’s] lack of support.” The arbitrator characterized Felix’s unavailability after April

2019 as a “lapse in his performance obligation,” and emphasized that regardless of

whether such lapse is “labeled a breach of contract,” “it operated to dominate as the

reason for the unprofitability of [Toledo Clinic’s] urgent care enterprise.”

       {¶ 14} Noting that Felix had prevailed on the “main issue” of breach of contract

by inadequate support, the arbitrator restated her earlier decision naming Felix as the

prevailing party in the dispute.

       {¶ 15} A “Surplus Deficit Report” that was submitted by Toledo Clinic calculated

$187,950.83 as the deficit for the period of May 2019 through March 2020. Subtracting a

depreciation amount of $3,839.21 from the $187,950.83 figure, the arbitrator calculated

the final deficit amount to be $184,111.62. Thus, Felix was ordered to compensate

Toledo Clinic in the amount of $184,111.62. Felix, as the prevailing party, was further

ordered to submit a calculation of costs and attorney fees for payment by the clinic.

       {¶ 16} On June 4, 2021, the arbitrator issued a final award, wherein she ordered

that the damages owed by Felix to Toledo Clinic would be offset by costs and attorney

6.
fees of $48,565.81. Following an additional $300 offset for excessive administrative fees

that were previously incurred by Felix, the total award to Toledo Clinic came to

$135,245.81.

            Application to Confirm Arbitration Award in the Trial Court

       {¶ 17} On June 7, 2021, Toledo Clinic filed a complaint and application to

confirm arbitration award in the trial court, pursuant to R.C. 2711.09. On July 9, 2021,

Felix filed an answer with counterclaim and application to modify or vacate arbitration

award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.11. In his answer, Felix asserted the following

affirmative defenses, including: 1) The arbitrator was guilty of misconduct in refusing to

hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; 2) The arbitrator was guilty of

misconduct in misapplying the law which has prejudiced the rights of Defendant; 3) The

arbitrator exceeded and imperfectly executed her powers such that a mutual, final and

definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; 4) There was an evident

material miscalculation of figures in the award; 5) There was an evident material mistake

in the descriptions contained in the award; and 6) The arbitrator has awarded upon a

matter not submitted to her. In his application to vacate the arbitrator’s award under R.C.

2711.10, Felix asserted that the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear

evidence pertinent and material to the controversy and in misapplying the law, which

prejudiced the rights of the defendant. He further stated that the arbitrator exceeded and

imperfectly executed her powers such that a mutual, final and definite award upon the

7.
subject matter submitted was not made. In his application to modify the arbitrators award

under R.C. 2711.11, Felix asserted that there was an evident material miscalculation of

figures in the award, that there was an evident material mistake in the descriptions

contained in the award, and that the arbitrator awarded upon a matter not submitted to

her.

       {¶ 18} Competing motions were subsequently filed by Toledo Clinic and Felix,

with Toledo Clinic moving to confirm the arbitration award and Felix moving to vacate

or modify the award. In a judgment entry dated February 1, 2023, the trial court granted

the motion to confirm the arbitration award and denied the motion to vacate and/or

modify the arbitration award. Addressing Felix’s claims that the arbitrator “ignored

sections of his arbitration briefs and/or evidence presented by him,” the trial court

determined that “[w]hile the arbitrator may not have used [Felix’s] arguments/evidence in

the manner [Felix] hoped, it does not mean the arbitrator explicitly ignored them.”

Finding that the arbitrator’s award “draws its essence from the parties’ contract,” the trial

court ultimately declined to vacate the award.

       {¶ 19} In rendering its decision, the court went out of its way to clarify that

although the court had misgivings of its own about the fairness of the award, the award

was, in fact, within the arbitrator’s power to grant:

              Regardless of whether the Court may have reached a different

       finding and/or fashioned a different award (or no award at all), the record

8.
     does not appear to present a scenario so egregious that the Court has the

     power to vacate the arbitrator’s award. [Felix] was obligated under [the

     agreement] to pay his operating deficits to [Toledo Clinic] upon

     termination. The Court does not find the arbitrator acted outside her

     authority when finding that [Toledo Clinic] breached the employment

     contract by failing to sufficiently support [Felix’s] urgent care center(s)

     through April of 2019. The Court agrees that [Felix] should not be

     responsible for deficits incurred during [Toledo Clinic’s] breach. However,

     the arbitrator found [Felix] also breached the employment contract from

     May 2019 through March 2020 to the extent that [Toledo Hospital’s]

     failure to support [Felix’s] urgent care center(s) could not be considered the

     cause of the deficits. As such, the arbitrator found [Felix] was liable for the

     accrued deficit while he was in breach, and [Toledo Clinic] was liable for

     the accrued deficit while it was in breach. * * *

            ***

            While the Court may not necessarily agree with this interpretation of

     the facts, it cannot say the arbitrator’s determination and award is so

     outlandish that it does not draw its essence from the parties’ agreement.

     The arbitrator’s determination reflects an attempt to place the deficits

     incurred with the respective party responsible for them. While this Court

9.
       may have reached a different determination as to [Toledo Clinic’s]

       responsibility for deficits that accrued after years of failing to live up to its

       contracted-for bargain to support [Felix’s] urgent care center(s), the

       arbitrator’s award nevertheless draws its essence from the employment

       contract. As such, the Court is not empowered to vacate the arbitration

       award.

       {¶ 20} Addressing Felix’s motion to modify the award based on Felix’s claim that

the arbitrator awarded on matters not submitted to her -- specifically, that the arbitrator

found a breach of contract against Felix where no such claim was raised by the clinic --

the trial court pointed to Toledo Clinic’s Answer and Counterclaim to Felix’s demand for

arbitration, wherein the clinic asserted that “[a]ll or some of Felix’s claims are barred by

his prior material breach of the contract,” and wherein the clinic asserted counterclaims

for breach of contract based on Felix’s failure to repay an unresolved $608,796.28 deficit

to the clinic. In light of these assertions by Toledo Clinic, the trial court concluded,

“Even if the crux of argument at arbitration was not related to [Felix’s] alleged breach of

contract from May 2019 through March 2020, this matter was nevertheless technically

before the arbitrator. As such, the Court cannot find the arbitrator awarded on a matter

not submitted to her.”

       {¶ 21} Finally, the court considered Felix’s argument that his obligations under the

contract ceased as a result of Toledo Clinic’s material breach of failing to adequately

10.
support Felix’s urgent care clinics. Citing Miller v. Management Recruiters Int’l, Inc.,

180 Ohio App.3d 645, 2009-Ohio-236, 906 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 26-27 (8th Dist.) for the

proposition that “‘[w]hen disputing parties agree to submit their controversy to binding

arbitration, they agree to accept the result, even if it is legally or factually wrong,’” the

trial court concluded that it was without power to determine whether Toledo Clinic’s

breach of the parties’ contract was a material breach such that it voided any further

contractual obligations by Felix.

       {¶ 22} Felix timely appealed from the trial court’s decision.

                                    Assignments of Error

       {¶ 23} Felix asserts the following assignment of error on appeal:

              I. The trial court erred in confirming the arbitration award instead of

       vacating the award.

              II. The trial court erred in confirming the arbitration award instead

       of modifying the award.

                                           Analysis

                                         Arbitration

       {¶ 24} In agreeing to have their disputes settled by an arbitrator, the parties in this

case have agreed to accept the arbitrator’s view of the facts and the meaning of the

contract between them. See Carothers v. Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, 2023-Ohio-1907,

215 N.E.3d 1217, ¶ 9 (6th Dist.), citing Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Auth v.

11.
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 627, 91 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 742 N.E.2d 630 (2001).

“When agreeing to arbitration, the parties agree to accept the arbitrator’s award even if it

results in a legally or factually inaccurate decision.” Internatl. Ass’n. of Firefighters

Local 92 v. Toledo, 136 Ohio App.3d 56, 60-61, 735 N.E.2d 960 (6th Dist.1999); see also

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local Union No. 200, 42 Ohio St.2d 516, 522, 330

N.E.2d 703 (1975) (Noting that it has been held that even a grossly erroneous decision is

binding in the absence of fraud). “The parties do not forgo the substantive rights of their

disputes in arbitration, but they trade the procedures and review of a judicial forum for

the simplicity, informality and expediency of an arbitral forum.” Carothers at ¶ 9, citing

Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct.

3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985).

       {¶ 25} “In order to uphold the strong public policy favoring private settlement of

grievances, the General Assembly has limited the role of judicial review [of arbitration

awards].” Lake Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities v. Professional Ass’n.

for Teaching of Mentally Retarded, 71 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 641 N.E.2d 180 (1994). R.C.

Chapter 2711 governs arbitrations and sets forth the methods by which to challenge an

arbitration award. See Warren Educ. Ass’n. v. Warren City Bd. of Educ., 18 Ohio St. 3d

170, 172-173, 480 N.E.2d 456 (1985).

       {¶ 26} “When reviewing a trial court’s decision to confirm, modify, vacate, or

correct an arbitration award, an appellate court should accept findings of fact that are not

12.
clearly erroneous but should review questions of law de novo.” Portage Cty. Bd. of

Developmental Disabilities v. Portage Cty. Educators’ Ass’n. for Developmental

Disabilities, 153 Ohio St.3d 219, 2018-Ohio-1590, 103 N.W.3d 804, ¶ 2. An appellate

court’s review on appeal is not a de novo review of the merits of the dispute as presented

to the arbitrator. See Carothers at ¶ 15, citing Zeck v. Smith Custom Homes & Design,

LLC, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110574, 2022-Ohio-622, ¶ 12. (Additional citations

omitted.) Instead, R.C. 2711.15 review is confined to the trial court’s order and the

question of whether any of the statutory grounds for vacating an award exist. See

Carothers at ¶17; Zeck at ¶ 12.

       {¶ 27} “The authority of an arbitrator to interpret and enforce a contract is drawn

from the contract itself.” Cedar Fair. L.P. v. Falfas, 140 Ohio St.3d 447, 2014-Ohio-

3943, 19 N.E.3d 893, ¶ 5. “So long as arbitrators act within the scope of the contract,

they have great latitude in issuing a decision. An arbitrator’s improper determination of

the facts or misinterpretation of the contract does not provide a basis for reversal of an

award by a reviewing court, because ‘[i]t is not enough * * * to show that the [arbitrator]

committed an error – or even a serious error.’” Id. at ¶ 6, quoting Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v.

AnimalFeeds Internatl. Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 176 L.Ed.2d 605

(2010). In addition, arbitrators have “‘broad authority to fashion a remedy, even if the

remedy contemplated is not explicitly mentioned’ in the applicable contract.” Id.,

13.
quoting Queen City Lodge No. 69, Fraternal Order of Police, Hamilton Cty., Ohio, Inc.

v. Cincinnati, 63 Ohio St.3d 403, 407, 588 N.E.2d 802 (1992).

       {¶ 28} An arbitrator acts within her authority to craft an award “so long as the

award ‘draws its essence’ from the contract – that is, ‘when there is a rational nexus

between the agreement and the award, and where the award is not arbitrary, capricious or

unlawful.” Cedar Fair at ¶ 7, quoting Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation and

Dev. Disabilities v. Mahoning Cty. TMR Edn. Ass’n., 22 Ohio St. 3d 80, 488 N.E.2d 872

(1986), paragraph one of the syllabus. Where there is “a good-faith argument that an

arbitrator’s award is authorized by the contract that provides the arbitrator’s authority, the

award is within the arbitrator’s power, but an award ‘departs from the essence of a

[contract] when: (1) the award conflicts with the express terms of the agreement, and/or

(2) the award is without rational support or cannot be rationally derived from the terms of

the agreement.’” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting Ohio Office of Collective Bargaining v. Ohio Civ.

Serv. Emps. Ass’n., Local 11, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 59 Ohio St.3d 177, 572 N.E.3d 71

(1991), syllabus; see also, Miller v. Gunckle, 96 Ohio St.3d 359, 2002-Ohio-4932, 775

N.E.2d 475, ¶ 19 (“In the absence of language restricting the authority of an arbitrator to

review a particular subject matter or to award a particular remedy, courts will generally

hold than an arbitrator has the authority to make the award and to fashion a remedy even

though the agreement is silent on the issue of remedial authority.”).

14.
            Application to Vacate Arbitration Award Under R.C. 2711.10

       {¶ 29} R.C. 2711.10 provides that, upon the application of any party, the court of

common pleas shall make an order vacating an arbitration award if:

              (A) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.

              (B) There was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the

       arbitrators, or any of them.

              (C) The arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone

       the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence

       pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by

       which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.

              (D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed

       them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter

       submitted was not made.

       {¶ 30} This court has clarified that “‘the misbehavior of an arbitrator may only

serve as the basis for vacating an arbitration award under R.C. 2711.10(C) if it results in

prejudice.’” Fowler v. Menards, 2018-Ohio-4052, 113 N.E.3d 568, ¶ 28 (6th Dist.),

quoting Hoffbauer v. Wayne Homes, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-990750, 2000 WL

1062044 *3 (Aug.4, 2000).

15.
                Allegations of Arbitrator Misconduct under R.C. 2711.10(C)

       {¶ 31} Felix initially argues that the arbitrator engaged in misconduct under R.C.

2711.10(C) in ignoring the addendum that was included in his counsel’s submission on

damages. The addendum, submitted in addition to the evidence and arguments submitted

by his counsel, set forth Felix’s own explanation and calculation of the amount that he

believed was owed to him. Following objections by the clinic, the arbitrator ultimately

declined to consider the addendum on the grounds that it was an “unsigned, unsworn, and

unauthorized submission.” Instead -- as evidenced in the findings contained in the

interim award regarding damages -- the arbitrator elected to focus on and address the

calculations that were provided by Felix’s counsel.

       {¶ 32} As Felix’s addendum represented only a portion of the documentation on

damages that was submitted by Felix in the arbitration, and as the record establishes that

the arbitrator did consider other such evidence pertinent and material to Felix’s

calculation of damages, we do not find that the omission resulted in prejudice to Felix

such that the award should be vacated. Nor do we find that the arbitrator was guilty of

misconduct in selecting which and whose figures would be accorded weight.

Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the arbitration

award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(C).

16.
      Allegations that the Arbitrator Exceeded or Imperfectly Executed Her Powers
                                  Under R.C. 2711.10(D)

        A. Allegations that the Arbitrator Exceeded her Powers by Holding Felix
                   Responsible for Duties to be Fulfilled by the Clinic

         {¶ 33} Felix next argues that the arbitrator “exceeded her powers” under R.C.

2711.10(D) when she “held Dr. Felix responsible for duties to be fulfilled by [the

clinic].” Essentially, Felix complains that in light of the clinic’s breaches, both before

and after May 2019, the arbitrator’s decision to hold Felix accountable for the

accumulation of deficit after April 2019 was arbitrary and without any “rational nexus to

the contract in this decision.”

         {¶ 34} Upon de novo review, we find the arbitrator, who was empowered to

decide all issues and claims related to the employment contract, acted within the scope of

the contract. We further find that her award was within her broad authority to fashion, as

it draws its essence from the employment contract and does not conflict with any express

terms of the contract.

         {¶ 35} As indicated above, the trial court disagreed with the arbitrator’s decision,

but also determined that it was not empowered to vacate the arbitration award on this

ground. Indeed, “[t]he fact that the common pleas court reviewing an award under R.C.

2711.10 “may have arrived at a different conclusion than did the arbitrator is immaterial.

The common pleas court does not balance the equities, weigh the evidence or assess the

credibility of witnesses.” Carothers at ¶ 28, quoting Motor Wheel Corp. v. Goodyear

17.
Tire & Rubber Co., 98 Ohio App.3d 45, 52, 647 N.E.2d 844 (8th Dist.1994.) (Additional

citations omitted.)

      B. Allegations that the Arbitrator Exceeded her Powers by Ignoring Felix’s
                             Termination “Without Cause”

       {¶ 36} Felix additionally argues that the arbitrator exceeded her power “when she

ignored the termination letter which stated Dr. Felix was terminated without cause.”

With this argument, Felix challenges the arbitrator’s finding that Felix -- like the clinic --

breached the employment agreement. In so doing, Felix attacks both the arbitrator’s view

of the facts and her related attempt to allocate the deficits incurred in connection with the

contract. Because this argument ignores the fact that a court reviewing an arbitration

decision “must be deaf to claims that an arbitrator made factual or legal errors,” Sicor

Secs., Inc. v. Albert, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22799, 2010-Ohio-217, *3, it is properly

dismissed as without merit.

C. Allegations that the Arbitrator Exceeded Her Powers by Ignoring Portions of the
                  Employment Contract in Fashioning Her Award

       {¶ 37} Felix next argues that the arbitrator exceeded her power “when she ignored

key portions of the contract in assessing the accounts receivable.” In the interim award

regarding damages, the arbitrator cited the following contract provision in support of her

conclusion that “all receivables generated by [Felix] are the property of [the Clinic], and

therefore should not be set off:”

18.
       All accounts receivable and fees arising from services rendered by the

       Professional, wherever performed, shall belong to the Toledo Clinic and the

       Professional shall not be entitled to any portion of such fees or receivables

       for any reason whatsoever, it being specifically agreed that the

       compensation to be paid by the Toledo Clinic to the Professional as set

       forth in Paragraph 3 shall be his full compensation for all professional

       services rendered.

The arbitrator further found that because the contested accounts receivable were at least a

year old or older at the time of her decision, it was “not reasonable to view such

receivables as an asset.”

       {¶ 38} According to Felix “[i]t is not rational to award the accounts receivable to

Toledo Clinic when Dr. Felix is held responsible for the salaries of the providers who

provided the services.” He further argues that the decision “does not draw its essence

from the contract, but instead, substitutes the arbitrator’s own beliefs and thoughts for

that of clear contract language.” We disagree. Not only does the award clearly draw its

essence from the contract, it does not conflict with any express terms of the contract, and

it is based upon fact-finding and legal conclusions by the arbitrator that this court is not

permitted to review.

       {¶ 39} Felix further complains that the surplus deficit reports provided by the

Toledo Clinic “contain categories not included in the [applicable] definition of

19.
‘expenses,’” including amounts for depreciation and interest, and that such amounts

should not be included in any final deficit calculation. In connection with this complaint,

we note that arbitrator determined in her interim award regarding damages that

“expenses” are “cash expenditures paid by Toledo Clinic,” and that depreciation was not

eligible for inclusion in the calculation of unresolved deficit. She also found, however,

that interest, as a cash expense, was properly included.

       {¶ 40} More importantly, we find, once again, that the findings to which Felix

objects were properly made by the arbitrator who was empowered to decide all issues and

claims related to the employment contract. We further find that the award draws its

essence from the contract and does not conflict with any express terms of the contract.

       {¶ 41} Finally, Felix argues that the arbitrator exceeded her authority when she

determined that Felix was in breach of the contract during the period from May 2019 to

December 2019 and that -- as a result of this improper fact finding -- she crafted an award

that was not based on the claims in front of her. In making this argument, Felix reiterates

that the clinic terminated him without cause and, further, posits that the clinic never

asserted a claim against him for a breach of contract that was said to have occurred prior

to his termination.

       {¶ 42} In this instance, Felix’s asserted factual basis, reasoning and conclusion are

all flawed. First, the clinic’s answer and counterclaim to Felix’s demand for arbitration

assert both: 1) a defense that “[a]ll or some of Felix’s claims are barred by his prior

20.
material breach of the contract;” and 2) a claim for breach of contract claim based on

Felix’s failure to repay a deficit sum to the clinic. Although the arbitrator, in determining

the prevailing party, did state that the main issue in the dispute was whether the clinic

breached the employment agreement, she acknowledged that there were, in addition,

“collateral claims.” Many of these claims involved allegations of Felix’s part in the

eventual failure of his urgent care venture.

       {¶ 43} That the arbitrator attempted to allocate financial responsibility for the

overall deficit in conformity with the evidence is clear. The law provides that “[i]n the

absence of language restricting the authority of an arbitrator to review a particular subject

matter or to award a particular remedy, courts will generally hold that an arbitrator has

the authority to make the award and to fashion a remedy even though the agreement is

silent on the issue of remedial authority.” Miller, 96 Ohio St.3d 359, 2002-Ohio-4932,

775 N.E.2d 475, at ¶ 19. Further, “‘[a]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing

or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority’ a court should not

overturn the decision, even if ‘convinced he committed serious error.’” Painesville City

Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio Ass’n. of Pub School Emps., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-

L-100, 2006-Ohio3645, ¶ 37, quoting United Paperworkers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO v.

Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987); see also Carothers,

2023-Ohio-1907, 215 N.E.3d 1217, at ¶ 41-46 (although appellant did not specifically

ask for non-compete clause to be rewritten, where the issue submitted to arbitration was

21.
the enforceability of the non-compete and where the arbitration clause contained no

restriction to be fashioned by the arbitrator, the arbitrator was found to have the authority

to issue an advisory opinion and to order revisions to the geographic and temporal

restrictions in the partnership agreement’s non-compete clause.). Thus, contrary to

Felix’s claim, the arbitrator’s allocation of financial responsibility was not error.

       {¶ 44} In fashioning the remedy in this case, the arbitrator acted within her

authority inasmuch as there is a rational nexus between the agreement and the award, the

award is not arbitrary, capricious or unlawful, and the award does not conflict with the

express terms of the agreement.

    D. Allegations that the Arbitrator Exceeded her Powers When She Ignored
  Evidence that Toledo Clinic Cut Down Hours at the Urgent Care in an Effort to
                             Decrease Felix’s Earnings

       {¶ 45} Felix also argues that the arbitrator exceeded her powers when she ignored

evidence that the clinic reduced hours at the urgent care, rendering Felix unable to work

full-time as required under the contract. We disagree that the arbitrator “ignored” this

evidence. In determining as part of her fact-finding that the “lapse” in Felix’s

performance obligation “operated to dominate as the reason for the unprofitability of

Felix’s urgent care enterprise,” the arbitrator merely rejected Felix’s interpretation of the

facts. To the extent that the decision impacted her award, it comports with our earlier

determination that the award, fashioned in part on the basis of this decision, draws its

essence from the contract.

22.
         {¶ 46} For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court appropriately refused

to vacate the arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded her powers.

      E. Allegations that the Arbitrator Imperfectly Executed Her Powers when she
      Misapplied the Law in Disposing of the Claims for Fraudulent Concealment,
               Fraudulent Inducement, and Fraudulent Misrepresentation.

         {¶ 47} Felix next argues that the arbitrator imperfectly executed her powers when

she “misapplied the law” in disposing of his claims for fraudulent concealment,

fraudulent inducement, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Specifically, Felix claims that

the arbitrator misapplied the parol evidence rule in connection with his claim that in

entering into a business relationship with the clinic he relied upon a promise by the clinic

that he would be the exclusive urgent care provider.

         {¶ 48} At the outset of her analysis of Felix’s claims for fraud, the arbitrator

observed that Felix never testified in his deposition that he was promised exclusivity,

only that he was the exclusive urgent care provider at the time the contract was executed.

She further found that the clinic’s insistence on an employment agreement with no

promise of exclusivity, despite Felix’s prior request for one, put Felix on notice that the

clinic was reserving its right to have another urgent care provider. Finally, she pointed

out that the terms of the agreement provide that it is the “Entire Agreement” between the

parties, “thereby expressly excluding any prior representations or understandings as

binding.” On the basis of these facts, the arbitrator concluded that “[t]here is no genuine

23.
issue as to any material fact regarding the fraud claims, and viewed in the light most

favorable to Felix, the facts provide no support for allegations of [fraud].”

       {¶ 49} In this appeal, Felix argues that the arbitrator misapplied the parol evidence

rule inasmuch as the parol evidence rule “is not applicable to preclude the admission of

parol or extrinsic evidence to prove that a written contract was induced by fraud.” Aside

from the fact that Felix does not appear to have submitted any extrinsic evidence in

support of his claim – which, of course, militates in favor of the arbitrator’s decision --

we remain mindful that courts “do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an

arbitrator,” Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Auth. v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local

627, 91 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 742 N.E.2d 630 (2001), and that “even a grossly erroneous

decision” may be binding in the absence of fraud. Goodyear, 42 Ohio St.2d 516, 330

N.E.2d 703, at 522. As Felix makes no allegation of fraud in connection with the award,

we do not find that the arbitrator imperfectly executed her powers in such a way, or to

such an extent, that the award should be vacated.

       {¶ 50} Because we do not find that any grounds exist for vacating the arbitration

award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10, Felix’s first assignment of error is found not well-taken.

In his second assignment of error, Felix argues, in the alternative, that the arbitrator’s

award should be modified.

24.
            Application to Modify Arbitration Award Under R.C. 2711.11

       {¶ 51} R.C. 2711.11 provides that, upon the application of any party, the court of

common pleas shall make an order modifying or correcting an arbitration award if:

              (A) There was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an

       evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property

       referred to in the award;

              (B) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to

       them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the

       matters submitted;

              (C) The award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits

       of the controversy.

       {¶ 52} In this case, Felix argues that the arbitrator’s award should be modified

because the arbitrator allegedly: 1) awarded upon a matter not submitted to her, pursuant

to R.C. 2711.11(B); and 2) miscalculated damages, pursuant to R.C. 2711.11(A).

  Allegations that the Arbitrator Awarded Upon a Matter Not Submitted to Her,
                            Pursuant to R.C. 2711.11(B)

       {¶ 53} Once again, Felix argues that the arbitrator awarded on a matter not

submitted to her when she determined that he breached the employment contract with the

clinic. As indicated above, breach of contract was raised by the clinic both as a defense

and as a counterclaim against Felix. Even in the absence of such a claim or defense,

however, allocation of the deficit among the responsible parties was within the

25.
arbitrator’s authority, because, as we have repeatedly stated in this decision, there is a

rational nexus between the agreement and the award, the award is not arbitrary,

capricious or unlawful, and the award does not conflict with the express terms of the

agreement.

       {¶ 54} Felix similarly argues that the arbitrator awarded on a matter not submitted

to her when she determined that Felix “breached the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing.” This finding, which was expressed in the arbitrator’s interim award, was made

in the context of the arbitrator’s consideration of Felix’s claim for such against the clinic.

The arbitrator stated only that “[b]y the end of their relationship, the obligation of good

faith and fair dealing was disrespected equally by both parties, providing neither with

access to a remedy on this basis.” Under Ohio law, “every contract contain[s] an implied

duty for the parties to act in good faith and to deal fairly with each other.” Littlejohn v.

Parrish, 163 Ohio App.3d 456, 2005-Ohio-4850, 839 N.E.2d 49, ¶ 27. Thus, breach of

this implied covenant is at issue whenever breach of contract is claimed, and, in this case,

was well within the arbitrator’s authority to determine. Id. at ¶ 23 (good faith and fair

dealing is part of the contract, not an independent claim).

             Allegations that the Arbitrator Miscalculated Felix’s Damages

       {¶ 55} Finally, Felix asserts that the arbitrator miscalculated his damages.

Specifically, Felix asserts that the arbitrator “refused to calculate” the appropriate

damages and lost profit he claims to have suffered. Rather than asserting a

26.
miscalculation of figures, however -- which is a matter that is subject to our review -- this

claim goes to the merits of the dispute as presented to the arbitrator, which is clearly

beyond our purview.

       {¶ 56} Felix additionally claims that, pursuant to the findings in the arbitrator’s

interim award, the final award should be modified to include: 1) the $50,000 that was

improperly added to his deficit in March 2020; and 2) Tim Schramko’s salary “of $127,

411.50.” As indicated above, the arbitrator determined in her interim award that a

$50,000 addition to Felix’s deficit that was made by the clinic in March 2020 was

untimely and, therefore, would not count toward any deficit payable by Felix. She

further found that Tim Schramko’s (unspecified) salary was in the category of business

expenses allocated to Toledo Clinic.

       {¶ 57} In the subsequently issued interim award regarding damages, the arbitrator

determined that the clinic’s total deficit came to $671,003.65, but that the clinic could not

collect the full amount because it stood in breach of the employment agreement from

January 2017 through April 2019. Relying on the $187,950.82 figure that was set forth in

Toledo Clinic’s “Surplus Deficit Report,” and then subtracting a depreciation amount of

$3,839.21, the arbitrator concluded that $184,111.62 was the final deficit amount for the

period of May 2019 through March 2020. (In making this decision, the arbitrator noted

that Felix made no assertion that the clinic’s numerical calculations were erroneous.)

27.
       {¶ 58} Given the record before us, it is impossible to discern whether or not the

offsets that were discussed in the interim award, and which are now claimed by Felix,

were ever factored into Toledo Clinic’s final award, as set forth in the subsequently

issued interim award on damages. Because we recognize that “a strong presumption

favors the regularity and integrity of an arbitrator’s award,” Cincinnati v. Queen City

Lodge No. 69, Fraternal Order of Police, 164 Ohio App.3d 408, 2005-Ohio-6225, 842

N.E.2d 588, ¶14 (1st Dist.), absent evidence to suggest that the offsets were not, in fact,

factored into the final deficit amount, we cannot modify the amount of the award on the

grounds that Felix currently asserts. Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error

is not well-taken.

                                        Conclusion

       {¶ 59} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Appellant is to pay the costs of appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                         Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

28.
                                                                      Toledo Clinic, Inc.
                                                                         v. Ashvin Felix
                                                                              L-23-1037

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                          ____________________________
                                                      JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                              ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, J.                                   JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                              ____________________________
                                                      JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

29.