Court Opinion

ID: 9618794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:17:18.969157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:32.199461
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The gist of this “controversy” is found in the fifth paragraph of the Court’s opinion. There the Court states that the parties brought the suit because they “wished to know the effect the condemnation suit [which might be brought] would have on various owners of land adjacent to Twin Falls Canal Company’s canal system,” and wanted to be advised in advance of “the proper measure of damages in the event Canyon View’s plan was implemented through condemnation proceedings.”
That the appeal should be dismissed is self-evident. The district court should not have entertained the action in the first place. That neither of the parties raises the non justiciability of the controversy does not mean that the trial court was obligated to render what can only be considered a strictly advisory opinion. Every question put to the Court could and would necessarily be resolved in a condemnation action, had one been brought. But until such an action is brought, the courts of this state are not empowered to render purely advisory opinions. That the questions are important, and the answering thereof might well serve to aid in bringing the parties together so that they can resolve their differences without going to court in a truly adversary proceeding, is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the courts. Thomas v. Riggs, 67 Idaho 223, 175 P.2d 404 (1946); Miller v. State Board of Education, 56 Idaho 210, 52 P.2d 141 (1935).
The parties here may be unable to agree, but they are not presently caught up in any controversy. As with any other potential litigants, where they are unable to resolve their different views and enter into a contract, legal advice is available elsewhere than from the courts. If still unable to agree, and if Canyon View decides to test out its right to condemn against Twin Falls Canal Company, the applicable statutes are as available to guide it, and the courts as open to receive it, as for any other person or entity.1
In Wood v. Class A School District No. 25, 78 Idaho 75, 298 P.2d 383 (1956), Justice Taylor in writing for a unanimous Court quoted Chief Justice Hughes’ language in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937) for the proposition that a “controversy” in the constitutional sense “must be one that is appro*616priate for judicial determination. . A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot.” 78 Idaho at 78, 298 P.2d at 385. Justice Taylor then went on to say:
“It follows that the controversy must be one that is real and substantial, and if the complaint fails to disclose some legal interest in the plaintiff, no justiciable controversy is presented for defense.” Id.
Recently, after stating that there should be some delineation of the rule that a declaratory judgment action cannot be used to secure an advisory opinion, the Wyoming Supreme Court in Cranston v. Thompson, 530 P.2d 726 (1975), adopted two statements from the courts of Kansas and Tennessee:
* * Courts will not render advisory opinions on abstract questions of law about which there is only a disagreement rather than an actual controversy between the parties. * * * ’ Wagner v. Mahaffey, 195 Kan. 586, 408 P.2d 602, 605.
“ ‘The Declaratory Judgments Act gives courts no power to determine future rights or controversies in anticipation of events that have not occurred * * Glasgow v. Fox, 214 Tenn. 656, 383 S.W.2d 9, 13.” 530 P.2d at 728-29.
The Arizona Supreme Court, in Moore v. Bolin, 70 Ariz. 354, 355, 220 P.2d 850, 851 (1950), similarly said, quoting from 16 Am. Jur. Declaratory Judgments § 9 at 282 (1950):
“It is well settled that a proceeding for a declaratory judgment must be based upon an actual controversy. No proceeding lies under the declaratory judgment acts to obtain a judgment which is merely advisory or answers a moot or abstract question.”
That court proceeded to quote with approval from an annotation at 87 A.L.R. 1205 at 1215 (1933):
“ ‘A declaratory relief statute only justifies a declaration of rights upon an existing state of facts, not one upon a state of facts which may or may not arise in the future. Nor will future rights be determined in anticipation of an event that may never happen. * * * ’
“The writer of the note cites many cases sustaining the general rule as stated, supra, when declaratory relief is sought as to facts involving future events, and in the same note as to facts involving contingent events.” 220 P.2d at 852.
Concluding, the Arizona court held:
“It is the court’s view that the facts pleaded by appellant do not show a present existing controversy which permits the court to adjudicate any present rights. The allegations merely show an intent to do certain things in the future all of which are dependent upon future events and contingencies within control of the appellant.” Id.
Obviously Canyon View’s promotion will be vastly aided if it can pursue its program armed with a judicial decree spelling out in advance its rights as against Twin Falls Canal Company. But it is for attorneys— not the courts — to oblige Canyon View with that advice, especially in the form of a Supreme Court opinion with apparent res judicata effect against Twin Falls Canal Company and its members and shareholders. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Helco Products v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943), in speaking of the use of advisory judicial opinions by private business, observed:
“Much of the uncertainty of business management could, perhaps, thus be eliminated. What a comfort it would be, if a declaratory judgment could be made as available as an interoffice memorandum, whenever a board of directors meets to consider a proposed new venture. But that millennium has not yet arrived.” 137 F.2d at 684.
I do join the Court in making proper obeisance to the decision heralding the arrival of that millennium.
DUNLAP, J., pro tern., concurs.

. In recent months other parties with problems have gone into the courts for resolution, proceeded through trials, and presented their appellate briefs in this Court only to be finally told that their actions and appeals were dismissed as improperly brought or taken. Winn v. Winn, 101 Idaho 270, 611 P.2d 1055 (1980); Revello v. Revello, 100 Idaho 829, 606 P.2d 933 (1980); Pichon v. Broekemeier, 99 Idaho 598, 586 P.2d 1042 (1978).
In each of those cases the parties were properly in this Court seeking final resolutions to truly adversary proceedings already litigated and determined in district court. Here, by contrast, unless Canyon View initiates a condemnation action, time of the district court and this Court will have been expended in fruitless endeavor. It is difficult for me to reconcile our acceptance of this case with our refusal to consider the merits in those above mentioned.