Court Opinion

ID: 9680246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:27:33.049128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:27.240059
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court. My disagreement with the majority opinion is based on the opinion that in this situation there is absolutely no evidence that Cooper suffered embarrassment and humiliation by any reasonable definition of the terms. The findings of fact by the Commission that Cooper was humiliated and embarrassed by Fraser telling her “he had fired her for her own benefit” and the remarks in the letter to the Division for Unemployment Insurance that he had dismissed Cooper “in her best interest and the coming child” and that Mrs. Cooper regarded the coming child as an “inconvenience” and that she showed a “disregard for her condition,” simply cannot warrant a reasonable finding of embarrassment and humiliation. Embarrassment and humiliation denote shame, disgrace, degradation, distress, anguish, etc. See Perkins v. Ogilvie, 148 Ky. 309, 146 S.W.2d 735 (1912), which states that humiliation is a phase of mental anguish. This record does not directly or by inference detail any fact which would justify an award for embarrassment and humiliation. Thus I am of the opinion the Commission’s findings are clearly erroneous. “Anger and hurt” are not terms of embarrassment and humiliation as approved by the majority opinion.
It is apparent to me that the Commission is using the vehicle of “embarrassment and humiliation” to impose punitive damages in the nature of a fine which exceeds the statutory authority granted to the Commission.
Although I do not find it necessary to reach the constitutional question here, I am disturbed by the statement in the majority opinion recognizing that the intangible elements of damages for embarrassment and humiliation are historically assigned to juries, and then makes a quantum leap in *857jurisprudence that such fact finding for that and similar intangible elements of injury, such as pain and suffering, could properly be left to an administrative agency on the grounds of “experience” as opposed to an “inexperienced” jury. This poses some interesting constitutional questions which can be explored more fully in a future case. Suffice to say, administrative bodies created by statute generally operate within narrowly defined limits in adjudicating disputes and making awards. The constitutional right to a jury trial should have some meaning. Atlas Roofing Co., cited in the majority opinion, involved “fines” imposed by OSHA and this power delegated to OSHA was validated solely on the ground that health and safety of the workers were involved. Atlas is no authority for the situation here at all.
Finally, the majority opinion finds among the safeguards “provision for a full due process hearing.” The trouble with this is “due process” here may require a jury.
Accordingly I dissent.
STERNBERG, J., joins in this dissent.