Court Opinion

ID: 9945389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 19:13:30.23608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:28.212336
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
January 23, 2024 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GAVIN QUAEDVLIEG

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County,

No. 118600 Steven W. Sword, Judge FILED
FEB 27 2024
No. E2023-00542-CCA-R3-CD Clerk of the Appellate Courts
REc'd By AGPoy

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Gavin Quaedvlieg, of rape. The Defendant
appeals, contending that the prosecutor impermissibly commented upon his silence at trial
during the State’s rebuttal closing argument and that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for new trial on this issue. The State argues that the Defendant has waived plenary
review of this issue and that he is not entitled to plain error relief. In his reply brief, the
Defendant counters that he has not waived plenary review and that, in any event, he is
entitled to plain error relief. We conclude that the Defendant has waived plenary review
and that he is not entitled to plain error relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.
MONTGOMERY, JR., and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Scott A. Lanzon, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Gavin Quaedvlieg.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Joanie S. Stewart,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 24, 2021, a Knox County grand jury returned a single-count

presentment charging the Defendant with rape, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-13-503. The presentment alleged that the Defendant had sexually penetrated the victim,
B.B.,' where the Defendant “had reason to know that [B.B.] was physically helpless at the
time of the penetration[.]” See id. § 39-13-503(a)(3).

A jury trial ensued on January 9, 2023. The record on appeal does not contain a
transcript of the evidence presented at trial, any exhibits entered at trial, or a transcript or
copy of the trial court’s jury instructions. The appellate record does contain, however, a
transcript of the parties’ closing arguments to the jury. The transcript reveals that,
immediately prior to closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury,

[A]s I told you yesterday, statements of the attorneys are not evidence.
However, their arguments to you can be very helpful to you in understanding
the evidence that you’ve heard, as well as the instructions of law that I will
give you after their arguments. So I do encourage you to listen and consider
very carefully what the lawyers have to say.

Following this instruction, the parties made their closing arguments to the jury.

The arguments for both parties focused on the victim’s credibility as a testifying
witness. The parties also focused much of their arguments on text messages that were
exchanged between the Defendant and the victim both before and after the incident in
question. Near the beginning of the Defendant’s closing argument, defense counsel posed
these questions to the jury: “Do you think that people, all of a sudden, just come up with
facts on their own that help their case three years later? Do you think it’s odd that there’s
one witness in this case?” Defense counsel concluded his closing argument as follows:

And I ask you to have the courage to do what you’re sitting there to
do, what you’re tasked to do, judge the facts. You have someone who’s lying
to you from the start of her testimony until the end. That’s it. And I assure
you, if [the Defendant] had inconsistencies in anything, there’s no one else
testifying, there’s no police, there’s no rape crisis center, there’s no one else,
no one from UT. Think about that.

The State immediately commenced its rebuttal closing argument with the following
statement:

I mean, there’s nobody. It’s just her. He asked you a question, 1s it
strange that there’s one witness when there’s two people in the room? When
there’s two people there, is it strange that there’s one witness? How does

' It is the policy of this court to refer to victims of sexual assault by their initials.

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rape happen? How does sexual assault happen? Does it operate in darkness?
Can it occur within a relationship of trust?

Later, about midway through the State’s rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated,

They’ve talked about, well, I’m sure there’s more out there that you
didn’t hear, that you didn’t hear. We’re talking about two people in a room.
And [B.B.] told you what happened in there. There’s not a video. There’s
not. And you’re being asked to judge the available evidence. But is it
reasonable that that’s the evidence that we would have? Is it reasonable? I
mean, it is what it is.

Nearing the end of the State’s rebuttal argument, the prosecutor argued,

And it’s also important that she took the stand to tell you what
happened, that she has talked about this for three years, what she remembers.
You know, you can judge when you’re—when you’re looking at the
credibility of a witness. You know, there were two people in that room.
Wouldn’t it be easier for her to say, yes, I remember saying no; when he was
on top of me and I woke up from consciousness [sic], I remember saying no,
and he kept going? That’s not what she told you. She told you what she
remembered.

The State concluded its rebuttal argument by again stating that the text messages between
the Defendant and the victim corroborated the victim’s testimony regarding her physical
helplessness at the time of the incident. The Defendant did not object to any portion of the
State’s closing arguments.

On January 10, 2023, the jury convicted the Defendant of rape as charged in the
presentment. On February 3, 2023, prior to his sentencing hearing, the Defendant filed a
motion for new trial, wherein he argued that the prosecutor’s comments during closing
argument entitled him to relief because they impermissibly referenced his decision not to
testify at trial.

At the sentencing hearing on April 4, 2023, a transcript of which is included in the
record on appeal, the State entered into evidence the Defendant’s presentence investigation
report and the Defendant’s psychosexual risk assessment. Additionally, the prosecutor
moved into evidence “the text messages, in their entirety,” and stated, “I can’t remember
if we marked that during the course of the trial.” The trial court stated, “I thought we

=o
did[,]” to which defense counsel responded, “We did.” The trial court accepted the text
messages as an exhibit to the sentencing hearing.”

The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eight years as a Range I offender, with
the sentence suspended to supervised probation following the service of twelve months in
incarceration. The trial court also sentenced the Defendant to community supervision for
life and ordered him to register with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Sexual
Offender Registry. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-524(a)(1), 40-39-201 to -218.

The Defendant’s motion for new trial was heard on May 25, 2023. A transcript of
this hearing is not included in the record on appeal. The trial court denied the motion for
new trial. This timely appeal follows.

II. ANALYSIS

The Defendant argues on appeal that the State commented in its rebuttal closing
argument on his decision not to testify at trial, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent. The State contends that the issue is waived due to the Defendant’s failure to
lodge a contemporaneous objection and his failure to perfect an adequate record on appeal.
In his reply brief, the Defendant counters that the record is adequate for this court to
conduct a meaningful review or, in the alternative, that he is entitled to plain error relief.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person
... Shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” “[T]he Fifth
Amendment’s exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
6 (1964). The Tennessee Constitution provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused... shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself.” Tenn. Const. art. I,
§ 9. Additionally, “[t]he failure of the party defendant to make a request to testify and to
testify in the defendant’s own behalf shall not create any presumption against the
defendant.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-17-103.

For decades, Tennessee law has recognized that prosecutors shall not make
arguments to the jury based upon a criminal defendant’s failure to testify. See Staples v.
State, 14 S.W. 603, 603 (Tenn. 1890) (relying on The Act of 1887, c. 79, a previous version
of current Code section 40-17-103). In 1965, the United States Supreme Court held that

* Because the exhibits from trial were not included in the record on appeal, we are unable to discern
if the “entirety” of the text messages entered at the sentencing hearing were the same messages presented
to the jury or if the jury was presented with a redacted version of those messages.

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the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence
or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). In the intervening years, Tennessee courts have cautioned that
“t]he subject of a defendant’s right not to testify should be considered off limits to any
conscientious prosecutor.” State v. Hale, 672 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tenn. 1984) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Judge v. State, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1976)).

Since Griffin, however, the United States Supreme Court has rejected a broad
reading of its decision in that case that “any ‘direct’ reference by the prosecutor to the
failure of the defendant to testify violates the Fifth Amendment[.]” United States v.
Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1988). In Lockett v. Ohio, for instance, the Court held that
the prosecutor’s description of the state’s evidence as being “unrefuted” and
“uncontradicted” did not violate the Fifth Amendment, where defense counsel had
previously “focused the jury’s attention on [the defendant’s] silence.” 438 U.S. 586, 595
(1978). In Robinson, the Court explained that there is no violation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege where “the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s opportunity to testify is a
fair response to a claim made by defendant or his counsell[.]” 485 U.S. at 32 (where defense
counsel had argued to the jury that the prosecution had breached its “duty to be fair” and
unfairly denied the defendant the opportunity to explain his actions). The Robinson Court
emphasized that claims of this nature must be examined in the context of the trial and that
“it is important that both the defendant and the prosecutor have the opportunity to meet
fairly the evidence and arguments of one another.” /d. at 33 (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at
595).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test for ascertaining whether
a prosecutor’s remarks amount to an improper comment on a defendant’s exercise of the
constitutional right to remain silent and not testify. “This two-part test inquires: (1)
whether the prosecutor’s manifest intent was to comment on the defendant’s right not to
testify; or (2) whether the prosecutor’s remark was of such a character that the jury would
necessarily have taken it to be a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.” State v.
Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 587-88 (Tenn. 2014). If a reviewing court concludes that a
prosecutor’s remarks were constitutionally impermissible under this two-part test, a non-
structural constitutional error has occurred, and the court must determine if the State has
met its burden of demonstrating that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Jd.
at 591 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). When conducting this
analysis, we should consider “the nature and extensiveness of the prosecutor’s argument,
the curative instructions given, if any, and the strength of the evidence of guilt.” Jd. at 591.
Generally, we review de novo a defendant’s claim of improper prosecutorial argument due
to commentary on the defendant’s decision not to testify at trial. See id. at 588.

A. Waiver for Failure to Contemporaneously Object

While we generally apply a de novo standard of review to claims such as the one at
bar, see id., “plain error review is the appropriate standard of review to apply to claims of
alleged prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument when no contemporaneous
objection was lodged at the time of the alleged misconduct but the claim is raised in the
motion for a new trial.” State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692, 700-01 (Tenn. 2022). There is no
dispute here that the Defendant failed to object contemporancously to the State’s arguments
that he is now challenging on appeal. Nor is there any dispute that the Defendant first
raised this issue in his motion for new trial. Pursuant to Enix, the Defendant has waived
plenary review and is entitled only to plain error review.

B. Plain Error Review

In conducting plain error review, our court will reverse for plain error only if the
five following prerequisites are satisfied:

(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a
clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a substantial
right of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the accused did
not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of the error is
‘necessary to do substantial justice.’

State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d
626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). All five factors must be present in the record before
an appellate court will recognize the existence of plain error, and complete consideration
of all the factors is not necessary when it is clear from the record that at least one factor
cannot be established. Jd. at 283. In order to warrant plain error relief, the magnitude of
the error must have been so significant “that it probably changed the outcome of the trial.”
Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 642 (quoting United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 937 (7th Cir.
1988)). A defendant has the burden of persuading the appellate court that plain error exists.
State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tenn. 2007).

The Defendant is not entitled to plain error relief because the appellate record does

not clearly establish what happened in the trial court regarding this issue. We reiterate that
the appellate record does not contain the transcript of the evidence presented at trial, the

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exhibits entered at trial, the trial court’s instructions to the jury, or a transcript of the motion
for new trial hearing. Even outside the context of plain error review, the appellant bears
the burden of preparing a record that conveys “a fair, accurate and complete account of
what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of the appeal.” See Tenn. R.
App. P. 24(b). “[A] defendant is effectively denied appellate review of an issue when the
record transmitted to the appellate court does not contain a transcription of the relevant
proceedings in the trial court.” State v. Draper, 800 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1990).

The Defendant has argued in his brief and at oral argument that his issue is confined
to what occurred during closing arguments, and, because the transcript of the closing
arguments is included in the record, the appellate record contains a complete account of
what occurred below regarding this issue. We disagree. Even if we conducted a plenary
review of the Defendant’s issue—which we are not due to his failure to lodge a
contemporaneous objection—the success of the Defendant’s claim would hinge, in part,
upon our review of “the curative instructions given, if any, and the strength of the evidence
of guilt” as part of a constitutional harmless error analysis. See Jackson, 444 S.W.3d at
591. In the plain error context, in order to satisfy the third prerequisite—i.c., a substantial
right of the Defendant must have been adversely affected—the Defendant must show that
he was prejudiced by the error or, in other words, that the error “must have affected the
outcome of the trial court proceedings.” State v. Maddin, 192 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2005) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993)). Similarly,
in considering whether consideration of the error is necessary to do substantial justice, we
must determine whether “the error was so significant that it ‘probably changed the outcome
of the trial.’” State v. Knowles, 470 S.W.3d 416, 425 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting State v.
Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 808 (Tenn. 2010)). We cannot judge how any alleged error
might have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings when the record does not reflect
what happened at trial. See Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d at 358 (declining plain error relief where
the appellant’s failure to convey a complete transcript of the trial proceedings “clouded the
issue” as it related to the tactical-decision factor).

At oral argument, the Defendant insisted that the transcript of the proof at trial was
unnecessary and invited us to rely instead upon the attorneys’ summation of the proof
during their closing arguments. We decline this invitation. The trial court correctly
instructed the jury prior to closing arguments that “statements of the attorneys are not
evidence.” Indeed, it is well-established that “statements made by counsel during a hearing
or the trial are not evidence” and cannot “be considered in lieu of a verbatim transcript or
statement of the evidence and proceedings.” Draper, 800 S.W.2d at 493.
For these reasons, the record does not clearly establish what occurred in the trial
court. The inadequacy of this record—in itself a sufficient ground for the denial of plain
error relief—prevents this court from determining whether a substantial right of the
accused was adversely affected or whether consideration of the alleged error is necessary
to do substantial justice. The Defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing plain
error. Additionally, to the extent that the Defendant seeks to raise an independent issue
concerning the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial, the Defendant’s failure to
include a transcript of the motion hearing compels us to presume that the trial court
correctly denied the motion. See State v. Braden, 867 S.W.2d 750, 762 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1993).

II. CONCLUSION

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.

KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE