Court Opinion

ID: 9670238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:17:13.030122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:03.259175
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the court but disagree with the statement that a juvenile court at a proceeding to terminate parental rights may not take judicial notice of facts or opinions other than as provided in the rules of evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982), was concerned with the standard of proof required in termination proceedings and the necessity that the proceedings satisfy the requirements of fundamental fairness.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), stated:
“ ‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 895 (1961). “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
See, also, Braesch v. DePasquale, 200 Neb. 726, 265 N.W.2d 842(1978).
In Santosky v. Kramer, supra, the Court held that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the process due is determined by the balancing of three factors: the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the state’s chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. In balancing these interests, I believe that due' process is satisfied by use of a standard less drastic than requiring the application of the rules of evidence to materials that the juvenile court may judicially notice. The juvenile court should be able to take judicial notice of reports and other *709materials received at earlier hearings and relevant in reaching a decision as to the proper disposition of the case, provided that the author of such reports or materials is available and can be subpoenaed as a witness and made available for examination by either party or the court. This procedure should be sufficient to satisfy all constitutional confrontation and due process of law requirements, provided that the reports or materials are available to the interested parties sufficiently in advance of the termination hearing so as to allow the parties to compel the attendance of the persons who wrote or prepared the materials. See People in Interest of A. M. D., 648 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1982).
Similarly, the court in Matter of J.R.B., 715 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1986), found that while Santosky held that a termination of parental rights interferes with a fundamental liberty interest of the parent, “the discretionary use of hearsay in the dispositive phase of such proceedings, subject to review for abuse of discretion, is consistent with fundamental fairness.” 715 P.2d at 1174. (Citing Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 73 S. Ct. 1077, 97 L. Ed. 1522 (1953) “(hearsay evidence rule, with all its subtleties, anomalies, and ramifications, will not be read into the fourteenth amendment).” 715 P.2d at 1174.)
A termination of parental rights hearing is the culmination of months and sometimes years of juvenile court involvement with the parties. To restrict the court’s access to its own records and materials of the prior proceedings is to require the court to rehear the evidence received at those prior hearings again. This, I believe, goes too far.
Within the guidelines of notice and opportunity for cross-examination that have been set forth above, the taking of judicial notice by the juvenile court of prior reports and materials should satisfy the fundamental fairness requirements of Santosky.