Court Opinion

ID: 9787027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:09:01.381061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.491618
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, J.,
dissenting, in which BURKE, J., joins.
[¶ 30] I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion in several respects. First, I do not believe Mother has standing to bring the issues in this appeal. At this stage of the proceedings, there will be no further attempts to reunify Mother with the children. As the majority opinion informs us, termination of Mother's parental rights is a given. Under the cireumstances, Mother has no legally cognizable personal stake in the outcome of the determination of the permanency goal for the children. It is true that, until terminated, Mother retains residual parental rights, but these rights do not include a right to determine the permanent placement of the children. Certainly, it is appropriate for Mother to have a voice in the proceedings below as to her preference for permanent placement, but that is a far different concept from legal standing to bring this appeal.
[¶ 31] Further, the issues Mother presents are couched in terms of the constitutional right to familial association. Her right to familial association is not at issue in this appeal. Rather, practically, it is Uncle and Aunt's right, if any, that is at issue. Mother has no standing to present arguments on behalf of Unele and Aunt. See In re Adoption of CF, 2005 WY 118, ¶ 41, 120 P.3d 992, 1005 (Wyo.2005) (Mother has no standing to argue violation of Grandfather's alleged right to familial association). For these reasons, I would find Mother has no standing to prosecute this appeal and would decline to consider it further.
*882[¶ 32] I also have concerns with the remainder of the majority opinion's analysis. The majority opinion seems to accept that Uncle and Aunt have a constitutional right to association with the children. Wyoming has never recognized an uncategorical constitutional right to familial association by extended relatives. I would not concede this point so easily because the recognition of such rights has profound implications. Extended relatives would be entitled to the same procedural and due process protections as parents. Thus, a relative would presumptively be entitled to custody of a related child. The child could not be placed elsewhere without a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the relative is incapable of providing an adequate home for the child. No further best interest analysis would be allowed.
[¶ 83] This presumption in favor of relative placement goes against current Wyoming legislative mandates as expressed in statutes. For instance, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-208(iil) (LexisNexis 2009) provides that relative placement is preferred "when it is in the best interest of the child." The Child Protection Act requires the juvenile court to review permanent placement plans to ensure they are in the best interests of the children involved. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-8-431(k) (LexisNexis 2009). These statutory provisions, and others also requiring a best interest analysis, would be unconstitutional as applied to relatives. I do not believe this appeal, given its procedural difficulties and the lack of a comprehensive briefing of this constitutional issue, provides the appropriate backdrop for a determination by this Court of an issue of such great importance.
[¶ 34] As it now stands, the Child Protection Act expresses a preference for relative placement. This preference tilts the balance in favor of relative placement if all else in the best interest analysis is equal. In this case both Uncle and Aunt and the Foster Parents were acknowledged to be able to provide a safe, nurturing environment for the children. If no other factors were involved, the decision should be for placement with Uncle and Aunt. This case, however, as with all cases, does not exist in a contextual vacuum. The situation was summed up in the report from the bonding study on Unele and Aunt:
This is a situation in which there are two eminently suitable homes for the children involved. Each home is capable of providing these children with nurturing, comfort and emotional support as well as constructive expectations and the structure and limits children need to grow up to be responsible people. The relevant question in making the placement decision should have to do with whether the desirability of keeping children connected to their family of origin outweighs the potential negative ef-feets of requiring the children to give up the bonds they have formed to one family in order to begin again with a new family. There are many arguments supporting both sides of this question and the decision-making process should focus on how those arguments apply to the particular situation involving [the children]. The answer to the referral question, "do [Unele and Aunt] have the skills and ability to form healthy attachments with [the children]" is "yes, they do." [Foster Parents] have proven clearly over the course of the past year that they also possess these skills and abilities and have used them to the childrens' benefit. The fortunate thing for [the children] is that whichever direction the Muiltidisciplinary Team and the Court choose to take in terms of placement for these children, the children will emerge from the foster care system with a home and family that can support their healthy growth to maturity.
[¶ 35] As mentioned, there were different arguments in favor of each placement. Some of the arguments were discussed in an MDT meeting:
[The assistant district attorney] predicted that the Team members would not unanimously agree on one recommendation, and recommended that [the chil-drens'] permanency plan should be with the [Foster Parents]. [Daughter's therapist] agreed, and pointed out that [Son] "lost his mom," is attached to [Foster Parents], and should not be separated from them. [The attorney for Uncle and Aunt] noted that [Daughter's therapist] had stat*883ed in a previous MDT that critical bonding occurs in the first three years of life, and asked if [Son] would still be able to bond with [Unele and Aunt]. [Daughter's therapist] responded that it was possible, but if that occurred, [Son] would experience two losses, the loss of [Foster Parents] and the loss of his mother. She continued that if [Son] remains with [Foster Parents] he would only have ome loss, the loss of [Mother]. [The attorney for Uncle and Aunt] asked when [Son] was taken from [Mother], and [Daughter's therapist] responded that although [Son] was only three days old when he was placed in foster care, the loss of his mother would still impact him at some point in his life. [Daughter's therapist] explained that loss could affect a child's brain development as well as having an emotional impact.
[¶ 36] Pursuant to statutory mandates, the juvenile court held a hearing to determine which placement would be in the best interests of the children. The juvenile court took great pains to ensure everyone was able to speak his piece. After the hearing, the juvenile court issued a thorough and very thoughtful order. The possibility of permanent placement with Uncle and Aunt was given full consideration. In the end, however, the juvenile court determined that the permanency plan goal should be placement of the children with Foster Parents for adoption. In doing so, the juvenile court determined all the factors did not weigh equally between the two placements. Of special concern was the age of Son. Son's young age brings into play very real psychological attachment issues. The juvenile court determined removing Son from Foster Parents would not be in his best interest. Daughter also benefitted from the stability she had found in her life with Foster Parents. Whether this Court would make the same decision in the first instance is not the question. I fail to see anything in the record evidence that would allow this Court to find the juvenile court erred in this matter.
[¶ 37] I understand the grief this causes Uncle and Aunt, but minimizing the grief of the children takes priority. The cireum-stances of this case are unfortunate for Uncle and Aunt. First, they live three hundred miles away from Casper. Thus, it was inappropriate for them to have temporary physical custody of the children while reunification with Mother was the permanency goal. All the parties, including Mother, agreed on this point. Further, for whatever reason, the reality for the children is that visitation between them and Uncle and Aunt was limited during the reunification period. Then there is the age of the children. As noted, their young age, especially Son's, raises emotional developmental issues. These realities can only be ignored at the expense of the children. The juvenile court chose not to do so. This Court should not second-guess that decision.
[T 38] Finally, I believe the majority opinion goes too far in outright ordering placement of the children with Uncle and Aunt. At issue in this appeal is the goal of the perma-neney plan. This is only the beginning of the process. Much remains to be accomplished before permanent placement of the children with Uncle and Aunt becomes a reality, not least of which is the termination of Mother's parental rights. In the meantime, cireum-stances may change. The juvenile court, the MDT, and the DFS should retain the flexibility to continue to protect the best interests of the children throughout the process.