Court Opinion

ID: 9790257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:49:39.613077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:27.814822
License: Public Domain

HERNANDEZ, Chief Judge (dissenting in part, concurring in part). I agree with the opinion insofar as it holds that this Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal. However, I disagree as to applicability of the compensating tax deduction to Kaiser’s mining equipment. Section 7-9-77 provides that a deduction from compensating tax may be taken for “[fjifty percent of the value of agricultural implements, farm tractors, aircraft or vehicles that are not required to be registered under the Motor Vehicle Code * * *.” Section 66-3-1 of the Motor Vehicle Code provides: Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer and pole trailer, when driven or moved upon a highway, shall be subject to the registration and certificate of title provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code except: ****** B. any such vehicle which is driven or moved upon a highway only for the purpose of crossing such highway from one property to another; ****** D. any special mobile equipment as herein defined * * *. Kaiser contends that the dragline and continuous miner are covered by §§ 66-3-l(B) and 66-3-l(D). I agree. The evidence clearly shows that this equipment would only be driven or moved upon a highway for the purpose of crossing that highway to another property. The dragline, as noted, once crossed a paved road and left six-inch depressions in its surface. The continuous miner has not been shown to have ever even crossed a paved road. Both pieces of equipment thus meet the requirements of § 66-3-l(B). “Special mobile equipment” is defined as “every vehicle not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property and incidentally operated or moved over the highways * * § 66-l-4(B)(60). The record shows that the equipment is not designed or used primarily for transportation of persons or property. The dragline and continuous miner are similar to the construction equipment listed in the partial enumeration of § 66 — 1—4(B)(60) in that respect; both pieces of equipment are lacking design features which allow such transportation. Kaiser’s mining equipment is within the general terms of “special mobile equipment,” according to the Motor Vehicle Code’s defining subsection, regardless of whether the equipment is “self-contained” or not. The basis for finding a requirement that special mobile equipment be “self-contained” is nowhere evident in the statute or GR Regulation 14.17:4. The mining equipment is similar in purpose and operation to other equipment listed in the statute and regulation, and meets the criteria of the Motor Vehicle Code as a vehicle not subject to registration. The Gibbons & Reed case is not applicable, in my opinion, given the facts of this case. That case involved a piece of equipment which ran on “approximately 5.6 miles of two-parallel lines of 70-pound-railroad rail,” and which was operated by “15-ton locomotives, operated either by electric batteries or diesel fuel.” Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 80 N.M. 462, 464, 457 P.2d 710 (1969). In addition, the “mole” was used to transport people and property into the mine tunnels. Such equipment clearly does not fit within the general descriptive terms of “special mobile equipment,” but Kaiser’s equipment is not at all like the “mole” in Gibbons. The continuous miner operates on caterpillar treads, powered by an electric motor. It does not transport people or supplies. The dragline operates on “walking shoes” and is also powered by an electric motor. Both are similar in design, operation, and purpose to the “road construction or maintenance machinery” and “ditch-digging apparatus” mentioned in § 66-l-4(B)(60). Accordingly, I would hold that the Decision and Order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not in accordance with law, so the compensating tax deduction is applicable to Kaiser’s equipment.