Court Opinion

ID: 9883809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:20:36.037661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:31.420953
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Eehearing, or in the Alternative to Transfer to Court en Banc.
PEE CURIAM.
Appellants complain of the court’s holding that there is no merit in their contention that the teachers are indispensable parties to a complete determination - of plaintiffs’ cause of action. Appellants admit that their motion to dismiss did not specifically point to the teachers as the alleged indispensable parties. Appellants also admit that “there was no specific mention of the point in the judgment,”, but they claim that the contention was by implication ruled against them in the judgment; and that “there is no reason to invoke'the harsh rule of waiver-in this case. ” Appellants further object to the court’s action in stating thkt the issue is,“not here for decision” and then ruling “the point on the merits against the contention of appellants without giving’ any reasons for its ruling except for the citation of a case,” which case appellants seek to distinguish. Since the issue was ruled in’the opinion, perhaps the matter should have been- further discussed. ■
The present action was instituted by the plaintiffs; as taxpayers, to -prevent certain unlawful practices in the management and control of the particular schools and to enjoin the alleged unlawful expenditure of public funds by the named defendants. Plaintiffs’ position was that the schools in question were in fact being managed, administered and controlled in- the interest of a particular religious denomination contrary to certain constitutional provisions, and that, as a result thereof, the defendants were hnlawfuEy expending public funds in support thereof. In their motion for a rehearing appellants concede that “the pole star-of the inquiry here is simply this; Are the schools here ‘free public schools?’ ” There can be no doubt that such is the chief issue. In the action the plaintiffs sought no relief against the teachers. The teachers were not necessary parties to a determination of the issues between the parties-plaintiffs and defendants-as to whether the schools in question were free public schools, or whether such schools were being managed, controlled 'and administered so as *142to promote the interests of a particular religious denomination, or as to whether the expenditure of the tax funds' by defendants was lawful or unlawful. The controversy existing between plaintiffs and defendants was subject to- a full and complete' determination without the necessary presence or intervention of any other interested parties. The matter of the existence of any lawful or unlawful contractual relationships between the defendant districts and the teachers in the respective- schools was not decisive or material to the issues on trial between the parties to this action, nor could the validity or invalidity of any such contracts' constitute a defense to the plaintiffs’ action.
The action was instituted on .January 12, 1951. It was tried and submitted March 25, 1952. The decree in question was entered on April 21, 1952 and the injunctive and restraining provisions of the decree became effective on June 15,1952. The teachers’ contracts were, of course, subject to cancellation on notice on or before April 15th of 1951 and 1952, as provided by Section 163.090, RSMo 1949, but whether cancelled or not, the existence or not of such contract could constitute no defense to plaintiffs’ action.
■ If defendants ha'd wanted the teachers brought in as parties to the action they should have presented- the matter to the trial court in the manner provided by statute. See Sections 507.050, 509.340 and Supreme Court Rule 3.06. If the teachers wanted to intervene as parties to the action they should have made their application to the trial court.
Appellants have not pointed out wherein the said teachers Were indispensable parties to the disposition of any issue between plaintiffs and defendants. They say that no notice has been given the teachers; that their contracts are still in- éffeet; and that this court has affirmed the trial court’s judgment without the presence of the teachers as parties. Appellants also say that the determination of the appeal “leaves the teachers discharged without due process of law and also leaves the whole controversy- unsolved as to them.” However, there is no contention that, in view of the judgment as entered, any issue is unsolved as between the parties to the action. On this record we must and do hold that the nun teachers in defendant schools were not necessary parties to plaintiffs’ action and, in no.sense, were they indispensable parties without whose presence there coiild not be a complete determination of the controversy set forth in the pleadings as existing between plaintiffs and defendants. The matter of the validity of contracts between the districts' and the teachers has not been presented to or determined by .this court. Neither the • contracts nor the teachers were before this court.
Appellants further insist that they raised in the trial court a contention that ‘ ‘ the scope of the' inquiry in the trial court should have been limited to facts, evidence and events that took place in the classrooms”; and that the trial court’s orders should, have been limited tor matters transpiring on the 'classrooms. -’They say that they *143raised the question in the motion to strike certain portions of the agreed statement of facts; and that in their motion for a new trial they specifically complained of the admission in evidence of the facts in the agreed statement of facts which they sought to have stricken therefrom. As stated in the opinion, appellants have presented no valid assignment in this court calling for a review of the trial court’s action in either overruling appellants’ motion to strike said evidence or in admitting the said facts in evidence over objection. The final assignment presented in this court essentially concerns only the sufficiency of the evidence in the record to support the judgment with respect to whether the schools in defendant districts were free public schools. That issue has been ruled in the opinion.
Other contentions in the motion have been considered and determined adversely to appellants. The motion for rehearing or to transfer to court en banc is overruled.