Court Opinion

ID: 9745705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 10:13:52.251683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:41.634866
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 18, 2023.

                                            In The

                        Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                                   NO. 14-21-00460-CV

                          GULSHAN R. JALLAN, Appellant
                                               V.
                        PNA INVESTMENTS, LLC, Appellee

                       On Appeal from the County Court No. 1
                              Galveston County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. CV-0083953

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Gulshan R. Jallan (“Jallan”) appeals a judgment in favor of
appellee PNA Investments, LLC (“PNA”) following a bench trial.1 In five issues,
Jallan argues: (1) there is legally insufficient evidence that Jallan is personally
liable based on the personal guaranty in the record; (2) there is legally and
factually insufficient evidence that Parkway owes PNA $500,000.00; (3) there is

       1
        While there were four additional defendants to PNA’s suit in the trial court, only Jallan
has appealed the trial court’s judgment.
insufficient evidence that Parkway’s breach of the contract caused PNA
$500,000.00 in damages; (4) there is legally and factually insufficient evidence
supporting the $126,000.00 damage award for rent and “NNN” expenses; and (5)
the trial court erred in finding that PNA satisfied its duty to mitigate damages. We
affirm.

                               I.   BACKGROUND

      On May 9, 2019, PNA filed suit for breach of contract and conversion
against Jallan, Anil Rameshchandra Vyas, Vikas Jain, Gurbax Singh (collectively
the “individual defendants”), and Parkway Express, LLC (“Parkway”). PNA
alleged it leased premises to Parkway for 180 months for the operation of a
convenience store. During months 121 to 180 of the lease, Parkway agreed to pay
$11,000.00 per month in rent, plus taxes, insurance, utilities, maintenance, and all
other operating costs, referred to by the parties as NNN expenses.

      PNA alleged that Parkway failed to pay rent and NNN expenses for March
2019, leading PNA to issue a default letter and demand payment to Parkway.
Parkway failed to respond and to make payments due under the lease, and PNA
terminated the lease on March 19, 2019.

      PNA sought $22,000.00 owed in past due rent, reasonable attorney’s fees,
expenses incurred to enforce and collect the amounts owed, all amounts owed
under § 11.3 of the lease, and direct and consequential damages. PNA also alleged
that the individual defendants guaranteed Parkway’s obligations under the lease.
Finally, PNA alleged that Parkway damaged the premises, necessitating
approximately $300,000.00 in repairs, and that Parkway removed property it was
not entitled to remove, causing additional damages of approximately $275,000.00.

      On May 11, 2021, PNA’s lawsuit was tried to the bench. PNA presented

                                          2
testimony from Samuel Virani (“Virani”), the president and managing member of
PNA. 2 Virani testified that PNA has owned the property at issue since 2002; that
Parkway signed the lease with PNA in 2006; and that on June 23, 2006, the four
individual defendants executed a personal guaranty on the lease between Parkway
and PNA. Virani testified that the personal guaranty was signed by the four
individual defendants at the same time as the lease. Virani also testified regarding
the damage caused to the premises by Parkway and the equipment removed by
Parkway when it vacated the premises.

        Virani further explained that in order to lease the premises to PNA’s new
tenant, 7-Eleven, PNA had to pay 7-Eleven $500,000.00 for 7-Eleven to remodel
and repair the store and replace all of the necessary equipment for its operation.3
Virani also testified that the cost of replacing all of the equipment damaged or
stolen by Parkway was approximately $521,000.00 and the trial court admitted into
evidence an exhibit where Virani specified the cost to repair or replace certain
items.4

        On May 11, 2021, the trial court signed a final judgment, ordering that PNA
recover $657,368.48 from the defendants, jointly and severally, plus attorney’s
fees and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

        On June 7, 2021, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of

        2
            The other testimony at trial came from the attorneys for each party regarding attorneys’
fees.
        3
       The lease between PNA and 7-Eleven provides that PNA shall pay 7-Elevent a tenant
improvement allowance in the amount of $500,000.00.
        4
        Virani’s damage sheet states the cost of the following equipment: “Equipment coffees
machine,” $2,000.00; “Fountain drink,” $15,000.00; “Ac not working,” $30,000.00; car wash,
$250,000.00; “Gas tank clean,” $5,000.00; “Counter registers[]2,” $30,000.00; counter racks,
$5,000.00; deli equipment, $15,000.00; “Freezers -4,” $40,000.00; drive through menu board,
$20,000.00; roof $11,000.00; fix the pumps, $11,000.00; put new pumps, $80,000.00; “to
remove larger mobile boxes,” $7,000.00.

                                                  3
law. The trial court found that: Parkway failed to pay rent for March 2019;
Parkway breached the terms of the lease; PNA terminated the lease on March 19,
2019; the NNN expenses at the time of default were $3,000.00 per month; Parkway
owes PNA $126,000.00 under the lease for rent and NNN expenses; and Parkway
owes PNA $500,000.00 “for repairing, altering, renovating, partitioning, enlarging,
remodeling, or otherwise putting the Premises into a condition acceptable to and
reasonably necessary to obtain new tenants and/or for the cost of reletting the
premises.” The trial court also found that Jallan entered into a valid and
enforceable guaranty guaranteeing each and every obligation under the lease and
that the personal guarantee was attached and affixed to a lease agreement dated
July 1, 2006. The trial court determined that PNA was to recover $680,168.48 from
the defendants, jointly and severally.

      This appeal followed.

                                 II.     DISCUSSION

      In his first four issues, Jallan argues: (1) the evidence is legally insufficient
that he is personally liable on the lease agreement based on the guaranty in the
record; (2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient that Parkway owes
PNA $500,000.00; (3) there is insufficient evidence of causation concerning the
$500,000.00 damages award; and (4) there is legally and factually insufficient
evidence of the $126,000.00 damage award to PNA for rent and NNN expenses.

A.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

      When specific findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed and a
reporter’s record is before the appellate court, the findings will be sustained if there
is evidence to support them, and the appellate court will review the legal
conclusions drawn from the facts found to determine their correctness. Trelltex,

                                            4
Inc. v. Intecx, L.L.C., 494 S.W.3d 781, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2016, no pet.); see Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.
1991). Findings of fact have the same force and dignity as a jury’s verdict and are
reviewable under the same standards of legal and factual sufficiency. Anderson,
806 S.W.2d at 795; Foley v. Capital One Bank, N.A., 383 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

      When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding and indulge every
reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d
802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could
and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id.

      When a legal sufficiency challenge concerns an issue on which the appellant
does not bear the burden of proof, we review it under a “no evidence” standard.
See id. at 810. A no-evidence challenge will be sustained when (a) there is a
complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law
or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital
fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla,
or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. Serv.
Corp. Intern. v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Tex. 2011). Evidence is more than
a scintilla if it “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded
people to differ in their conclusions.” Ford Mtr. Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598,
601 (Tex. 2004). If, however, the evidence does no more than create a mere
surmise or suspicion and is so slight as to necessarily make any inference a guess,
then it is no evidence. Id.

      In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we must examine the
entire record, considering both the evidence in favor of, and contrary to, the

                                          5
challenged findings. See Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406–
07 (Tex. 1998); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). We may set aside
the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as
to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 407; Barnhart v. Morales,
459 S.W.3d 733, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). The
amount of evidence necessary to affirm is far less than the amount necessary to
reverse a judgment. Barnhart, 459 S.W.3d at 745. The trial judge is the sole judge
of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id.

      We review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. State v. Heal, 917
S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1996); Potcinske v. McDonald Prop. Inv., Ltd., 245 S.W.3d 526,
529 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). When performing a de novo
review, we exercise our own judgment and redetermine each legal issue. Trelltex,
Inc., 494 S.W.3d at 790. To make this determination, we consider whether the
conclusions are correct based on the facts from which they are drawn. Potcinske,
245 S.W.3d at 529.

B.    GUARANTY & PERSONAL LIABILITY

      Jallan first argues that there is legally insufficient evidence that he is
personally liable to PNA pursuant to a personal guaranty because there was no
meeting of the minds between the parties.

      A guaranty agreement creates a secondary obligation whereby the guarantor
promises to be responsible for the debt of another and may be called upon to
perform if the primary obligor fails to perform. Abel v. Alexander Oil Co., 474
S.W.3d 795, 800–01 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Wasserberg
v. Flooring Servs. of Tex., LLC, 376 S.W.3d 202, 205–06 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). To recover under a guaranty contract, a party must
show proof of (1) the existence and ownership of the guaranty contract; (2) the
                                          6
terms of the underlying contract by the holder; (3) the occurrence of the conditions
upon which liability is based; and (4) the failure or refusal to perform the promise
by the guarantor. Abel, 474 S.W.3d at 800.

      According to the rule of strictissimi juris, a guarantor may require that the
terms of his guaranty be strictly followed, and that the agreement not be extended
beyond its precise terms by construction or implication. Id.; see McKnight v. Va.
Mirror Co., 463 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. 1971). Before we can apply the rule of
strictissimi juris, however, we must examine the terms of the guaranty based on the
language of the contract. Abel, 474 S.W.3d at 800. “Furthermore, agreements
executed at the same time, with the same purpose, and as part of the same
transaction, are construed together.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d
124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The interpretation of a guaranty is a
question of law we review de novo. Abel, 474 S.W.3d at 800; see Gulf Ins. v.
Burns Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Tex. 2000).

      The trial court found that “[t]he personal guarantee was attached and affixed
to a Lease Agreement dated July 1, 2006 . . . .” On appeal, Jallan does not argue
that the personal guarantee was not attached to the lease agreement. Virani testified
that the lease and the guaranty documents were executed together and there was no
evidence or testimony to the contrary. Additionally, the guaranty states that it
incorporates the lease agreement for all purposes. Accordingly, we construe these
documents together. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135; In re
Raymond James & Assocs., Inc., 196 S.W.3d 311, 320 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (“When one document is incorporated into another
by reference, the two documents must be construed together.”); see also McKnight,
463 S.W.2d at 430 (“After the terms of a guaranty agreement have been
ascertained, the rule of strictissimi juris applies, meaning that the guarantor is

                                         7
entitled to have his agreement strictly construed and that it may not be extended by
construction or implication beyond the precise terms of his contract.”).

      Jallan argues that the differing dates indicate there was not a meeting of the
minds between the parties. This argument implicitly challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence of the trial court’s finding that Jallan and PNA entered into a valid
and enforceable lease agreement.

      The elements of a valid contract are (1) an offer, (2) an acceptance, (3) a
meeting of the minds, (4) each party’s consent to the terms, and (5) execution and
delivery of the contract with the intent that it be mutual and binding. USAA Tex.
Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 501 n. 21 (Tex. 2018); Tyco Valves &
Controls, L.P. v. Colorado, 365 S.W.3d 750, 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2012), aff’d, 432 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. 2014). In construing a written contract, our
primary concern is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the
instrument. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983). To determine the
parties’ intent, we review the entire agreement and supply the terms obviously
intended. Ussery Invs. v. Canon & Carpenter, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ dism’d); see also Waterford Harbor Master
Assoc. v. Landolt, No. 14-13-00817-CV, 2015 WL 293262, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 22, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). When a written
contract is worded so that it can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or
interpretation, it is unambiguous and the court construes it as a matter of law.
Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393.

      When interpreting a contract, we also examine the entire agreement in an
effort to harmonize and give effect to all provisions of the contract so that none
will be meaningless. See Frost Nat’l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d
310, 312 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d

                                          8
223, 229 (Tex. 2003). No single provision taken alone will be given controlling
effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with reference to the whole
instrument. Webster, 128 S.W.3d at 229. If we are unable to harmonize the
provisions and give effect to all its clauses, then the contract is susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation and is thus ambiguous. See Frost Nat’l Bank,
165 S.W.3d at 312.

      If a contract is susceptible to two constructions, one of which would render
it valid and the other invalid, then the construction validating it must prevail.
Harris v. Rowe, 593 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex. 1979). Thus, for example, courts will
construe a contract in favor of mutuality of obligation. See Tex. Gas Utils. Co. v.
Barrett, 460 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. 1970). Additionally, courts construe contracts
from a utilitarian standpoint bearing in mind the particular business activity sought
to be served and will avoid when possible and proper a construction which is
unreasonable, inequitable, and oppressive. Frost Nat’l Bank, 165 S.W.3d at 311;
Reilly v. Rangers Mgmt., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. 1987).

      Here, while the lease is dated July 1, 2006, the guaranty in the record states
that it “is attached and affixed to a Lease Agreement dated June 1, 2006.” The
guaranty states that the “guarantee is extended as an inducement and in
consideration of [PNA] entering into said lease agreement with [Parkway], which
[PNA] would not otherwise do.” This is some evidence supporting the trial court’s
implicit finding that there was a meeting of the minds and its explicit findings that
the personal guarantee was attached and affixed to the lease. See City of Keller,
168 S.W.3d at 807. After examining the entire agreement as a whole in an effort to
harmonize and give effect to the guaranty, we conclude that “June 1” in the lease
agreement is an error and it may be interpreted as a matter of law as covering the
lease agreement dated July 1. See Health United Fam. Care, Inc. v. GFIC Mgmt.,

                                          9
Inc., No. 01-98-01196-CV, 2001 WL 395004, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Apr. 19, 2001, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Under these circumstances, holding
appellants liable to appellee on the guaranty does not alter or extend the terms of
the guaranty, but gives effect to the original intention of the parties.”); see also,
e.g., White v. Harrison, 390 S.W.3d 666, 678–79 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no
pet.) (“We conclude the reference to different street addresses in the Lease and
Guaranty is an obvious mistake and that the documents evidence a clear intent that
White be the personal guarantor of VSC’s obligations under the Lease.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that there is legally sufficient evidence that the guaranty
is a valid and enforceable agreement and that, pursuant to the terms of the
guaranty, Jallan is personally liable for all amounts owed by Parkway. See City of
Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807.

       Jallan also argues that the guaranty cannot be enforced because it was
executed prior to the lease it purports to guarantee. However, Jallan cites no
authority in support of this argument. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must
contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate
citations to authorities and the record.”). Accordingly, we reject this argument.

       We overrule Jallan’s first issue.

C.     $500,000.00 DAMAGES AWARD

       In his second issue, Jallan argues that the $500,000.00 award to PNA is
supported by legally and factually insufficient evidence because “[n]o evidence of
probative value was admitted to support $500,000 in damages” and because the
lease agreement fails to comply with Texas Property Code § 93.012.5

       5
         Jallan does not argue that the damages are not recoverable under PNA’s breach of
contract claim, nor does he present any discussion or analysis concerning the damages
recoverable in a breach of contract cause of action. See Tex. R. App. P 38.1(i). Jallan simply
                                             10
       1.     Evidence of Damages

       The trial court found that “[u]nder the lease, Parkway owes PNA
$500,000.00 for repairing, altering, renovating, partitioning, enlarging, remodeling
or otherwise putting the Premises into a condition acceptable to and reasonably
necessary to obtain new tenants and/or for the cost of reletting the premises.”

       The lease provides:

       11.3 Upon termination of this Lease in any manner above provided, or
       by summary proceedings or otherwise, Tenant shall pay to Landlord
       forthwith, without demand or notice, the sum of the following:
       ...
       (b) the cost of making all repairs, alterations and improvements
       required to be made by Tenant hereunder, and of performing all
       covenants of Tenant relating to the condition of the Premises during
       the term and upon expiration or sooner termination of this Lease;
       ...
       Landlord shall also recover the cost and expenses, including but not
       limited to reasonable attorney and broker fees and expenses, paid or
       incurred by Landlord in connection with:
              ...
              (iii) care, maintenance and repair of the Premises while vacant;
              (iv) reletting the whole or any part of the Premises (which
              reletting may be for a period or period’s of time less than the
              unexpired term hereof or extending beyond the term hereof);
              (v) repairing, altering, renovating, partitioning, enlarging,
              remodeling or otherwise putting the Premises, either separately
              or as a part of larger Premises, into condition acceptable to
              and reasonably necessary to obtain new tenants.
       Such costs and expenses shall be deemed prima facie to be the
       amounts thereof invoiced to the Landlord or actually expended or
       incurred therefore by Landlord, if reasonably necessary to restore the

argues there is insufficient evidence to support the award of $500,000.00 in damages to PNA.

                                              11
      property to the condition at time of tenant’s initial occupancy.
(emphasis added).
      Here, Virani testified that when the premises were leased to Parkway, the
property was in great shape and all the equipment needed for its operation was in
working condition. Virani testified that after Parkway left the premises, the
property needed substantial repairs, as Parkway took out all of the equipment and
left what was broken and inoperable. Virani explained that the equipment and
fixtures that Parkway removed when it vacated the premises belonged to PNA. The
premises were left in need of replacements or repairs to the coffee machine,
counter registers, counter rack, deli equipment, car wash, air conditioning unit, gas
pumps, walk-in cooler, roof equipment, fountain drink machine, registers, deli
equipment, drive-thru menu board, telephone system, environmental tank system,
freezers, compressors, and built-in computers.

      Virani testified that PNA’s subsequent tenant, 7-Eleven, conditioned its
lease with PNA on a complete remodel and remediation of the store. Virani
explained that 7-Eleven requested that PNA pay $500,000.00 for 7-Eleven to
repair, remodel, and remediate the store from the condition Parkway left it in and
in order for PNA to obtain 7-Eleven as its new tenant.

      We conclude there is legally sufficient evidence that PNA incurred
$500,000.00 in damages from the condition of the premises after Parkway vacated
them. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807.

      Next, Jallan argues that the evidence supporting the $500,000.00 damages
award is factually insufficient because none of Virani’s testimony concerning the
$521,000.00 in costs for the replacement and repairs of certain items is supported
by any actual evidence. Contrary to Jallan’s argument, Virani’s testimony that
PNA had to pay 7-Eleven $500,000.00 to remodel and repair the premises in order

                                         12
to become PNA’s new tenant is supported by the lease between 7-Eleven and PNA
and Virani’s testimony that he wrote a check to 7-Eleven for that amount. Viewing
all of the evidence in the record, we conclude that the evidence is factually
sufficient to support the $500,000.00 damage award. See Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 407;
Barnhart, 459 S.W.3d at 745.

      Finally, Jallan argues that PNA did not designate Virani as an expert
witness. However, the evidence underlying the $500,000.00 damage award was not
introduced as expert testimony produced by Virani. Thus, we reject this argument.

      In its reply brief, Jallan argues that the $500,000.00 award cannot be
supported by the evidence that PNA paid $500,000.00 to 7-Eleven to remodel and
repair the premises. However, in its appellate brief, Jallan only challenged the
evidence provided by Virani for the cost of repairs and replacements, independent
of the evidence that PNA paid $500,000.00 to 7-Eleven repairing and renovating
the premises so that it could be leased to 7-Eleven. Accordingly, this argument has
been waived. See Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Douglas, 544 S.W.3d
486, 495 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (“Arguments raised
for the first time in a reply brief are waived.”); see also Hagberg v. City of
Pasadena, 224 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)
(“[W]hen a judgment or order may have been based upon grounds not challenged
on appeal, a court of appeals must normally affirm.”); Britton v. Tex. Dep’t of
Crim. Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)
(“Generally speaking, an appellant must attack all independent bases or grounds
that fully support a complained-of ruling or judgment.”).

      2.    Texas Property Code § 93.012

      Jallan also argues under his second issue that the evidence supporting the
$500,000.00 damage award is legally and factually insufficient because the lease
                                        13
agreement fails to comply with Texas Property Code § 93.012, which provides:

      (a) A landlord may not assess a charge, excluding a charge for rent or
      physical damage to the leased premises, to a tenant unless the amount
      of the charge or the method by which the charge is to be computed is
      stated in the lease, an exhibit or attachment that is part of the lease, or
      an amendment to the lease.
      (b) This section does not affect a landlord’s right to assess a charge or
      obtain a remedy allowed under a statute or common law.
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 93.012(a)–(b).

      Jallan argues that the lease agreement here “wholly fails to state how the
claimed charges should be computed” “or adequately define what a ‘reasonable
and necessary’ amount would be,” in contravention of § 93.012(a). However,
Virani’s testimony is clear that the $500,000.00 it paid to 7-Eleven is rooted on
physical damages to the premises caused by Parkway. See id. Thus, based on the
plain language of the statute, § 93.012 does not apply to the $500,000.00 award.
See id. (“A landlord may not assess a charge, excluding a charge for . . . physical
damage to the leased premises . . . .”) (emphasis added).

      We overrule Jallan’s second issue.

      3.    Causation

      In his third issue, Jallan argues there is insufficient evidence that Parkway’s
breach of the contract caused PNA $500,000.00 in damages, citing a single case
from the Dallas Court of Appeals. See Curtis v. AGF Spring Creek/Coit II, Ltd.,
410 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). In Curtis, the Dallas
Court reversed an award of damages on the basis that there was nothing in the
record to support a finding that the amount of damages was caused by the
defendant’s breach. Id. Unlike Curtis, here Virani testified that the $500,000.00 in
damages was caused by Parkway when it left the premises in disrepair and PNA

                                          14
had to pay 7-Eleven to repair and remodel the premises. The lease provides that
Parkway was to return the premises in the same condition as it received them, and
Virani testified that Parkway did not and that Parkway removed all of the
equipment from the property. The lease further provided that PNA was to recover
from Parkway the cost of repairing the premises in order to obtain a new tenant.
Accordingly, we reject Jallan’s reliance on Curtis and overrule his third issue.

D.     $126,000.00 AWARD FOR RENT AND “NNN” EXPENSES

       In his fourth issue, Jallan argues there is insufficient evidence supporting the
$126,000 damage award for rent and NNN expenses. 6

       The trial court found that Parkway agreed to pay $11,000.00 in rent during
months 121 to 180 of the lease and that “NNN expenses at the time of the default
were $3,000.00 per month.” The trial court further found that “Parkway owes PNA
$126,000.00 for rent and NNN expenses ($14,000.00 x 9 months).” The lease
provides:

       11.3 Upon termination of this Lease in any manner above provided, or
       by summary proceedings or otherwise, Tenant shall pay to Landlord
       forthwith, without demand or notice, the sum of the following:
       ...
       (c) an amount equal to “liquidated damages” or “indemnity
       payments”, as Landlord elects, determined and payable as set forth
       below. . . . “Indemnity payments” means all the rent and other
       payments reserved under this Lease which would have come due and
       owing hereunder, from time to time, during the unexpired term less, to
       the extent not previously deducted or credited, the rent and other
       payments actually collected and allocable to the Premises or to the
       portions thereof relet by the Landlord.
       Here, PNA elected to collect indemnity payments under the lease. Parkway’s

       6
          “NNN” expenses are defined in the lease as taxes, insurance, utilities, maintenance, and
all other operating costs.

                                               15
monthly rent was $11,000.00, and it was obligated under the lease to pay operating
costs, including taxes, insurance, and utilities, as well as a late fee of $500. In
2019, the Harris County taxes on the property were $11,613.37. The Clear Creek
Independent School System taxes on the property were $15,544.62 This totals
$27,157.99 per year in taxes, which equals $2,263.17 per month. There is also a
utility bill for March 19, 2019, through April 19, 2019, totaling $1,356.66. The
amount of taxes due per month in March 2019 ($2,263.17), plus the utility bill for
the period of March 19 through April 19 ($1,356.66), plus the amount of monthly
rent ($11,000.00) is $14,619.83, which is greater than the $14,000.00 found by the
trial court. We conclude there is legally sufficient evidence supporting the trial
court’s findings that “NNN" expenses at the time of the default were $3,000.00 per
month.”

      While Jallan asserts that the evidence is factually insufficient, Jallan presents
no discussion or analysis on appeal explaining why the evidence in the record is
factually insufficient to support this finding by the trial court, and we decline to
make arguments for Jallan. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Ryan v. Abdel-Salam, 39
S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (“When a
party fails to include any citation of authority or discussion of relevant facts to
support its sufficiency contention, ‘we will not perform an independent review of
the record and applicable law to determine whether the error complained of
occurred.’” (quoting Happy Harbor Methodist Home, Inc. v. Cowins, 903 S.W.2d
884, 886 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ))); see also Fredonia State
Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. 1994) (observing that error
may be waived by inadequate briefing); Bruce v. Cauthen, 515 S.W.3d 495, 513
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (concluding that appellant
waived a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence because appellant

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failed to direct the court to any record evidence or provide any analysis explaining
how the evidence presented was factually insufficient).

      We overrule Parkway’s fourth issue.

E.    DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES

      In his fifth issue, Jallan argues the trial court erred in finding that PNA
satisfied its duty to mitigate damages. As such, Jallan argues, “the damages should
be reversed accordingly.”

      “A landlord has a duty to mitigate damages if a tenant abandons the leased
premises in violation of the lease.” Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 91.006(a). This duty
requires that the landlord use objectively reasonable efforts to re-lease the premises
when the tenant vacates in breach of the lease, and it is an affirmative defense that
the defendant tenant must plead. See Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades
Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 299–300 (Tex. 1997). The landlord’s failure to use
reasonable efforts to mitigate damages bars the landlord’s recovery against the
breaching tenant only to the extent that damages reasonably could have been
avoided. See id. The tenant bears the burden of proving both the landlord’s failure
to mitigate and the amount by which the landlord could have reduced his damages
but for that failure. See id.; Cole Chem. & Distrib., Inc. v. Gowing, 228 S.W.3d
684, 687 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).

      Here, even if PNA failed to mitigate its damages, Jallan failed to prove the
amount by which PNA could have reduced its damages and failed to cite any
evidence or provide any argument in support of the amount by which PNA could
have reduced its damages. Accordingly, we reject Jallan’s argument that the
damages should be reversed. See Cole Chem. & Distributing, Inc., 228 S.W.3d at
687 (“We need not determine whether the trial court erred in finding that Cole did

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not make reasonable efforts to mitigate because we conclude that even assuming
Cole’s efforts were inadequate, Gowing failed to prove the amount of damages that
could have been avoided if Cole had mitigated.”).

      We overrule Jallan’s fifth issue.

                              III.   CONCLUSION

      The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                    /s/ Margaret “Meg” Poissant
                                                    Justice

Panel consists of Justices Spain, Poissant, and Wilson.

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