Court Opinion

ID: 9533546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:32:33.538595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:05.074724
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion. I write separately to more fully explain the context in which this case is presented and to express more fully my reasons for awarding back pay up to, but not beyond, the point at which the hearing officer announced his decision.
I.
Just cause existed for Barraza’s termination. She was found to have wilfully refused to carry out certain reasonable requests by her employer and she was found to be incapable of doing some of the things that were required of her. She is therefore entitled to no damages for being fired. However, as this case is presented, both parties agree that there was a procedural due process violation associated with her firing and that she is entitled to some damages because of this violation.
For purposes of this appeal the borough does not take issue with the superior court’s finding that Barraza’s right to a fully adverse pre-termination hearing was violated. Borough Ordinance 11.05.2 does provide for a *1384pre-termination hearing.1 The hearing offered is not the same as a court trial as there is no opportunity to confront adverse witnesses and cross-examine them.
Does Alaska law require a court trial-like proceeding before a government employee can be fired? Our most complete ease in this area is Storrs v. Municipality of Anchorage, 721 P.2d 1146 (Alaska 1986), where we stated that ordinarily a public employee has a right to an “adversarial hearing” before dismissal.2 Id. at 1150. However, what we said before mentioning the right to an adversarial hearing may tend to suggest that the contemplated hearing need not be as complete as a full trial. The full paragraph reads as follows:
In Nichols v. Eckert, 504 P.2d 1359, 1365 (Alaska 1973), the court ruled that a post-termination hearing was constitutionally deficient because the discharged employee was not permitted to call witnesses on her behalf. Although a full judicial hearing is not required, the employee must be allowed to present a defense by testimonial and other evidence. Id. Three justices concurred in an opinion concluding that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the hearing should occur prior to termination. Id. at 1366. We therefore conclude that a public employee ordinarily has the right to an adversarial hearing before he may be effectively dismissed.
Storrs, 721 P.2d at 1150. Our summary in Storrs of the issue in Nichols is accurate. The deprivation complained of in that ease was the right of the dismissed teachers to call witnesses on their behalf. We stated: “[W]e conclude that appellants must be given the opportunity to present their own defense by testimony and other evidence.... A full judicial hearing is not necessary_” Nichols, 504 P.2d at 1365.
In the present case, the personnel rules gave Barraza, in a pre-termination hearing context, the opportunity to present witnesses by affidavit as well as notice of the reasons for the proposed action, the right to answer orally or in writing, and the right to be represented by an attorney. Arguably, this was enough to satisfy the rudiments of the adversarial hearing requirement under Nichols and Storrs. Given the posture of this case as it is presented to us, we need not and do not decide this question.
II.
We now know that Barraza would have been terminated even if her due process rights had been observed punctiliously. Thus here, as in Revelle v. Marston, 898 P.2d 917 (Alaska 1995), the absence of a nexus between the assumed violation and her termination can justify the conclusion that back pay is not warranted. Revelle at 928. Interests separate from her interest in continued employment with the borough should be looked at in an effort to determine whether back pay is warranted. From an employee’s standpoint the relevant interests involved are these:
(1) The employee needs an accurate decision.
(2) The employee needs notice of the decision. This tells her either that she should go back to work or look for new work.
(3) The employee needs a prompt decision. Promptness often is needed if the rem*1385edy of reinstatement is to be realistic, and it avoids the hardship associated with being unemployed and not knowing whether one should seek another permanent job.
In this ease Barraza was notified that she had lost on June 21, 1990. The hearing officer’s decision of that date was in writing and was announced because, as the hearing officer stated, “the parties are entitled to a timely decision.” Although formal findings and conclusions were to be prepared and forwarded to the parties at a later date, the hearing officer left little doubt as to the finality of his decision. He wrote in the June 21, 1990 decision: “Any party may appeal this decision to the superior court in accordance with North Slope Borough ordinances, state statutes, and court rules.”
How are the interests identified above advanced by running back pay to the time of the hearing, to the time of the announced decision, or to the time of entry of final findings of fact and conclusions of law? The employee’s interest in accuracy is not particularly time sensitive. That interest is furthered by having a hearing and by requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law but it would be difficult to make a case that the decision is more accurate if made later, or if made earlier.
The other two interests, notice and promptness, are time sensitive. It is better for the employee economically, in terms of the availability of remedies, and probably emotionally, to receive a prompt decision. The employee may be damaged by delay to the extent that she has not sought alternative sources of employment while waiting for the post-termination hearing decision. This damage can be seen as independent of lost wages from the job from which she has been terminated and to which she may have no continuing right if, as in this case, the substantive grounds on which her termination is based are legally justified. Further, as a secondary goal, an award of damages up to the time of the decision may tend to encourage a prompt decision. Often however, as in this case and as in Storrs and Casey v. City of Fairbanks, 670 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1983), the promptness of the decision will be beyond the control of the employer.
Until Barraza knew the reasons for the hearing officer’s decision and received findings of fact and conclusions of law she could not appeal. Of what importance is the right of appeal to the back pay issue? The exercise of an appeal advances the employee’s interest in accuracy. However, if this interest is to receive recognition, back pay should run until the appeal is decided either at the first or second tier of the court system. An employee might argue that until the case is finally decided on appeal she would be justified in not seeking another job because of the possibility of ultimately obtaining court ordered reinstatement. The reasonableness of such a decision would, in general, be doubtful given the lengthy delays unfortunately but typically involved in the appellate process.
To run back pay in favor of an employee who was fired for just cause until judicial appellate processes are completed would impose an excessive financial burden on public employers. Every dismissed employee would receive, in effect, a couple of years of severance pay. This financial burden, in turn, would inhibit the discharge of employees who should be discharged, and hinder the efficiency of government operations.
Based on the foregoing, my conclusion is that it was appropriate under the circumstances of this case to extend the damage award to the time of the decision of June 21, 1990. That was the point at which Barraza had reasonably definite knowledge that she had lost her challenge and knew, or should have known, that the time had come for her to seek alternative employment. Running the award for a longer period is not justified as the government’s interests in fiscal integrity and an efficient public service outweigh the potential benefits to the employee.

. Borough Ordinance 11.05.2 provides:
Borough Service employees who hold permanent status against whom dismissal, demotion or suspension for more than 30 days as proposed is [sic] entitled to:
11.05.2(1) Five days written notice stating the specific reasons for the proposed action;
11.05.2(2) An opportunity to answer orally or in writing and to furnish affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of the answer;
11.05.2(3) Be represented by an attorney;
11.05.2(4) A written decision and specific reasons therefore at the earliest practicable date.

. This statement is dictum, as the holding of Storrs was that the collective bargaining agreement validly substituted a post -termination hearing for pre-termination proceedings that would otherwise have been required. That post-termination hearing was to take place before the superior court (since the union declined to pursue Storrs’ termination grievance) but Storrs waived his right to a "prompt post-termination hearing" before the court by not requesting one and refusing a trial type hearing when one was eventually offered. Id. at 1150.