Court Opinion

ID: 9665312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:44:40.293372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:14.679948
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the summons commanding appellant to appear before the juvenile court for disposition of the motion for discretionary transfer was valid. In doing so, they overrule Johnson v. State, 594 S.W.2d 83 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), and ignore the specific language of V.T.C.A., Family Code, § 54.02(b).
The summons, in pertinent part, stated:
“You, Kenneth Stuart Hardesty, are hereby commanded to appear before the Juvenile Court ... for a hearing on the Motion for Discretionary Transfer as prayed for in the attached petition.”
V.T.C.A., Family Code, § 54.02(b) expressly provides that “the summons must state that a hearing is for the purpose of considering discretionary transfer to criminal court.” (emphasis added) In Johnson, supra, we held that where the summons of citation accompanying the transfer petition did not state that the hearing was to be for the purpose of considering discretionary transfer to district court for criminal proceedings, such omission rendered the summons fundamentally defective and thus served to deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction to hear the motion to transfer.
Johnson controls the disposition of the instant case. The order revoking probation and the original judgment should be reversed. By overruling Johnson, the majority disregards the explicit requirements of V.T.C.A., Family Code, § 54.02(b).
To such action, I must dissent.
ODOM, CLINTON and TEAGUE, JJ., join this dissent.