Court Opinion

ID: 3579479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:30:51.712914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:07:20.182215
License: Public Domain

I agree with Judge CULLEN in his exposition of the principles applicable to this case. It may possibly be useful to add to this very clear and able exposition of the law some suggestions with a view of eliminating from the case certain considerations that are misleading and wholly foreign to the questions involved and a word with respect to the functions *Page 194 
of the writ of habeas corpus and the procedure thereon in cases of interstate extradition. It is declared by statute to be a state writ to inquire into the cause of detention and in a proper case to discharge the person from all restraint of his liberty. In some cases the writ cannot issue at all, namely in cases where the restraint or detention is by virtue of a mandate from a court or judge of the United States in cases where such court or judge has exclusive jurisdiction. Neither can it issue in a case where the party is detained by virtue of the final judgment or decree of any competent tribunal civil or criminal. (Code, sec. 2016.)
The applicant for the writ must show affirmatively in his petition that he is not detained under any such process, and should it appear upon the hearing that he is, then he must be remanded. (Code, secs. 2032-33.) In other words, when certain facts are made to appear as the cause of the detention the inquiry can go no farther, but must stop and the applicant must be remanded, however unjust in point of fact his detention may be. In all other cases there are no limitations upon the scope of the inquiry, but it must proceed until the issue is determined according to the rules of law applicable to such a case. The burden in the first instance is upon the officer or party who detains the person to show that such detention is authorized by some legal authority.
The relator in this case was not detained under process from any court, civil or criminal, but under an executive warrant commanding the defendant to deliver him to an agent of another state, to be brought to that state for trial upon a charge of crime alleged to have been committed in that state, and hence all the facts were open to inquiry. The defendant made return to the writ that he detained the relator under this warrant, but exhibited no other document or paper to sustain the warrant. The warrant on its face stated that it had been represented to the governor of this state by the governor of the state of Tennessee that the relator was charged in that state with the crime of larceny and false pretenses and that he had fled from that state and taken refuge in this state. *Page 195 
These statements on the face of the warrant were to be taken as presumptively true in the first instance, and, if the inquiry rested there, the defendant had made out a prima facie case to justify the detention. It is important here to note and to keep always in view that when the defendant presented the executive warrant without any other document or paper or any other proof of the facts therein stated he raised only a presumption. The warrant did not conclusively establish the facts recited. It was so held by this court (People ex rel. Lawrence v. Brady,56 N.Y. 182), and the law as laid down in that case has never been modified but has been repeatedly approved. Indeed, I do not understand that there is now any difference of opinion as to the legal effect of the warrant as evidence. It raised a presumption but nothing more. I am not aware of any case in any court of controlling authority where it was held to be conclusive and no reason is given why it should be.
But a mere legal presumption is good and justifies an act only until it is removed by proof of some other fact, and when so removed the act stands without authority or justification. That, in my opinion, is just what happened in this case as will appear hereafter. It must be borne in mind all the time that we know nothing and can know nothing judicially concerning the facts or circumstances of the larceny and false pretenses charged in the warrant. The record does not even contain the indictment or any paper or proof as to the facts, if any, that transpired in the demanding state. All we know or can know are the things recited in the warrant. The statute provides (Code, sec. 2039) that the relator may, under oath, deny any material allegation of the return or state any fact to show that his detention was illegal or that entitled him to his discharge. The relator did so traverse the return and thus put the facts stated in the warrant in issue. The court thereupon was required to proceed in a "summary way to hear the evidence" and dispose of the case as justice required. The relator proved one material fact conclusively and that was that he was not within the demanding state at the *Page 196 
time of the commission of the crime as that fact was averred in the indictment. I do not mean that his oath on that point was conclusive, but the proof was of a higher character, namely, the stipulation of the respective attorneys in open court. These were admissions upon the record that import absolute verity for all the purposes of the inquiry and they had the legal effect to remove every presumption to the contrary that arose from the face of the warrant. (1 Greenleaf's Ev. sec. 186.) It is important to understand the real scope and effect of these admissions. They were (1) That three indictments were attached to the requisition papers upon which the warrant was issued and as they were not produced we know nothing as to their contents except as stated in the admission and that statement was: (2) That all of them were found on February 26, 1902, and the alleged crimes were charged in the indictments to have been committed on May 1, 1901, May 8, 1901, and June 24, 1901, respectively. So that we simply know that the relator was charged with three distinct offenses of larceny and false pretenses committed on the dates above stated. (3) It was also admitted and stipulated that the relator was not within the state of Tennessee between May 1, 1899, and July 1, 1901, but was in that state on July 2, 1901.
These are all the facts that the demanding state elected to disclose upon the hearing of the writ of habeas corpus as the grounds for taking the relator from this state against his will into another jurisdiction. Not a single fact is before us that raises any question as to the constructive presence of the relator in the demanding state on the dates named in the indictment or that would warrant even the suspicion that he committed the crimes charged by means of an innocent agent. All that is said upon that subject is pure conjecture without any fact upon which to build up the speculation. On the record before us the relator was presumptively personally present in the demanding state at the dates named and there took and carried away the property claimed to have been stolen or he did not and could not commit the offense charged *Page 197 
in that state at all. It having been conclusively established that the relator was not in the demanding state on the dates when the crimes are charged to have been committed, it follows that he could not have committed the offenses and certainly could not have fled from the justice of the demanding state. The authorities are unanimous in holding that a person cannot be a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state who was not in that state when the crime charged is alleged to have been committed. Constructive presence furnishes no basis for executive action. The cases on that subject are collected in a note to the case of State of North Carolina v. Hall (28 L.R. An. 289). The presumption arising from the recitals in the executive warrant was completely overthrown by the admissions upon the hearing before the court that the relator was not in the demanding state at the dates when it was alleged that the crimes were committed, and this left the warrant, under which the relator was in custody, without any basis upon which to rest.
This proposition is met only in one way and by one line of argument which should now be noticed. It is suggested that since the relator was in the demanding state on the 2d day of July, 1901, for a few hours on a temporary errand of business, that he may have committed some or all of the crimes charged while there on that day, and that since the precise dates stated in the indictment are not material, it may be shown upon the trial that he actually did commit the crimes on that day and hence this court should send the relator to the demanding state for trial. This suggestion may possibly have the merit of ingenuity, but as a method of reasoning or argument, or as a judicial utterance in a case involving personal liberty, it is to be hoped that this court will not adopt it. The state of Tennessee and its agent were represented at the hearing upon the writ by able counsel. All the facts and circumstances constituting the alleged crimes were open to inquiry. It could have been shown that there was or might have been a mistake in stating the dates in the indictment, or it could have been shown that the crimes were actually *Page 198 
committed on the 2d day of July following, but nothing of the kind was claimed or even suggested. The demanding state, its agent and counsel, for some reason, elected to withhold all proof of the facts and circumstances of the alleged larcenies and to stand upon the bare recitals in the warrant. The prima facie
proof that the state gave, consisting only of the recitals of the warrant, that the relator was personally present there at the dates named and committed the crimes, was superseded and removed by the solemn and conclusive admissions in open court that he was not there at the time, and consequently could not have fled from justice. When the prosecution alleges and proves a larceny committed at a designated time and place, and makes no claim that it was committed at any other time or place, and the accused then shows by conclusive proof that he was not in the state on the days designated, nor for a year before, nor for eight days after, and the case rests upon these facts alone, without any proof to justify even a suspicion that the crime was committed eight days after the date laid in the indictment, it would be a strange rule of law that would permit the case to go to the jury in order to procure a finding that, after all, the time laid in the indictment was a mistake and the crime was committed by the accused at the later date.
But the case of Roberts v. Reilly (116 U.S. 80) is cited to sustain this line of argument, and an expression of the learned judge who spoke for the court is made prominent. This court and every other court has often commented upon the value of isolated judicial expressions in an opinion as authority. The facts of the case upon which the decision was based must be compared with the one in hand in order to enable us to interpret the decision and the language of the opinion. The difference in the facts of that case and the one at bar is so radical and fundamental that it will be seen at a glance that it has no application.
(1) In that case the state of New York, the demanding state, took a very different course from that adopted by the demanding state in the case at bar. It did not rest its right *Page 199 
upon the recitals of the warrant, but produced all the papers upon which it issued, thus disclosing to the court all the facts and circumstances constituting the crime charged. The warrant was there supported by all the preceding facts and the recitals became wholly immaterial; not so here, since the recitals give us all the light we have, and they are conclusively contradicted by the admissions of record.
(2) Not only did the court have all the papers before it, but proof was given dehors the record as to all the facts and circumstances of the crime. There was full disclosure and nothing was withheld, so that at the close of the hearing the question whether the accused was or was not a fugitive from justice was one of fact. Not so in this case, since, after the admissions, we have not a single fact left to show that the relator fled from the state of Tennessee.
(3) In that case there was nothing but the oath of the accused that he was not in the demanding state at the time charged in the indictment, and that was of no consequence against all the other proof to show that he was. His oath was not conclusive, whereas in the case at bar we have an admission that is conclusive that he was not in the state at the time, and nothing to place against it unless we are to presume that the crime was committed on the 2d day of July, when no one claims that it was. The court ought not to presume that the crime was committed on that day against the allegations of the indictment and without any claim from any source that it was. If presumptions are to be made in such a case, they should be in favor of personal liberty and not against it.
But the question whether the relator committed larceny in the state of Tennessee at any time when he was personally present there is not really in the case at all, since there is not now and never was any serious claim that he was in that state when the crimes charged were committed, otherwise than constructively. Constructive presence in the demanding state is the sole basis of the claim that the relator fled from its justice, and as already suggested, there is no case or authority that I *Page 200 
am aware of that sustains such a claim. All the cases are the other way, and we must either disregard these cases or adopt the fiction that the offenses were really committed by the relator while he was in the state on July 2d 1901.
It may before closing be profitable to call special attention to a case quite similar, since it shows how such cases as this are considered and disposed of by courts in the demanding state of Tennessee. I refer to the case of State of Tennessee v.Jackson (1 L.R. An. 370) which is quite instructive. It appears that Jackson resided in Chicago. He sold to the prosecutor, who resided at Chattanooga, a horse, the bargain having been made by correspondence. The horse was shipped to the purchaser by rail at the place last named and he remitted by mail to Jackson at Chicago the purchase price. When the horse arrived his qualities were found to be such that the purchaser claimed to have been defrauded out of the price by false and fraudulent statements. He proceeded to obtain a warrant from a justice of the peace at Chattanooga against Jackson in Chicago, charging him with obtaining money by fraud and placed the warrant in the hands of a detective who made an affidavit that Jackson had fled from the state of Tennessee and had taken refuge in the state of Illinois. On this affidavit and warrant he procured a requisition from the governor of Tennessee on the governor of Illinois for the delivery to him of Jackson. Armed with these papers the detective proceeded to Illinois and obtained a warrant from the governor of that state for the arrest of Jackson. He arrested him on the warrant, hurried him off to Tennessee and there had him tried before the justice of the peace, convicted and sent to jail. It will thus be seen that Jackson was not only extradited from his home in another state but actually tried and convicted in the demanding state. But Jackson sued out a writ of habeas corpus in Tennessee and was discharged on the ground that all the proceedings were based upon a falsehood, namely, that he had fled from Tennessee where he had never been before.
The opinion of the court is very brief but pointed. After *Page 201 
citing the act of Congress the learned judge said: "According to the provisions of this law there must be not only the commission of the crime, but the person charged must be a fugitive from the state in which it was committed before the executive authority can be called into action. Jackson was not a fugitive. He had not in all his life been in Tennessee; had never fled from it; and his case did not fall within the positive terms of this law. The oath of the detective was false, and the Governors of the two states imposed upon. The whole proceeding was a fraud upon the law. If this arrest and imprisonment are to be maintained the opportunities for wrong and abuse of law will be great and widespread. Commercial transactions are largely conducted by mail and by telegraph. If the seller at one end of the line and the buyer at the other, with the aid of detectives, in cases of dispute and controversy among them, are to be allowed, under such proceedings as these, to have the citizens of one state carried to another state for trial under the allegation that the person charged has fled, instances of oppression may not be few."
It would be quite difficult to point out any material distinction between that case and the one at bar. It is quite clear that should we send the relator to Tennessee he would be entitled there to his discharge by the same court that discharged Jackson on the facts now before us. That court held that the accused party could not be deprived of his liberty by executive action based upon the false affidavit of a detective that he had fled from Tennessee to Illinois. That, in my opinion, is a safe precedent to follow in this case. Some one in this case has made just such an affidavit. That must follow from the admission that the relator was not in the demanding state at the times stated in the indictment as the dates when the alleged crimes were committed. On the hearing in this case upon the return of the writ, the state of Tennessee could have shown all the facts and circumstances of the alleged crime for which it had demanded the surrender to it of the person of the relator, as this state did in the Roberts Case (supra). But instead of taking that course all the facts and circumstances *Page 202 
are left clouded in mystery, except so far as they are disclosed by the admissions referred to. When it admitted that the relator was not in the state at the times laid in the indictment, and gave no other light as to the facts, the case for detention failed. The state of Tennessee does not ask for the surrender of the relator on the ground that he committed any crime in that state on the 2d day of July, 1901, nor does it even suggest that its prosecuting officer made any mistake in stating the 24th of June as the true date of the commission of the offense. The relator is claiming the benefit and protection of the laws of this state which guarantee to him his liberty against all unlawful restraint. If he has actually fled from the justice of the demanding state, of course he ought to be surrendered; but it is admitted that he did not, and it is safe to say that no one believes for a moment that he did except, possibly, in the same way and in the same sense that Jackson fled from the same state in the case cited. Personal liberty must rest in this state upon a very frail and unsafe basis if this court can be induced to send the relator to Tennessee upon such a vague and fanciful conjecture as that which is at the foundation of the fiction that he may in fact have committed the crime on the 2d of July, and that the prior dates stated by the prosecuting officer of that state are the result of some error or mistake. When the state of Tennessee, or some one authorized to speak for it, is willing to assure us that the suggestion is based upon fact and not upon fiction, it will be timely then to entertain it, but until then the courts of this state should treat its solemn admission upon the record according to its fair scope and meaning, which obviously is that the relator was not in the state when the crimes charged were committed. I am in favor of reversing the order.