Court Opinion

ID: 9380531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 15:00:28.223575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:25.860425
License: Public Domain

22-930
Scott v. Greene

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                                   SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

       At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 20th day of March, two thousand twenty-three.

       PRESENT:         Reena Raggi,
                        Richard C. Wesley,
                        Steven J. Menashi,
                                 Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________

KATHY SCOTT,

                  Plaintiff-Appellant,

          v.                                                          No. 22-930

ROBERT GREENE, JOHN DOE(S), JANE DOE(S),
CHRISTINE HENG, ANGELA DUKATE, ROSEMARY
JOHNSON, CLINTON CHAPUT, JOSEPH AGIUS,
THOMAS WAGNER, FNU Dukate, FNU Johnson, FNU
Wombledorf, FNU Agis,
                 Defendants-Appellees. *
____________________________________________

For Plaintiff-Appellant:                   JOEL S. SANSONE, Law Offices of Joel
                                           Sansone, Pittsburgh, PA.

For Defendants-Appellees:                  WILLIAM M. BROWN (Tara E. Levens, on the
                                           brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for
                                           Vanessa Roberts Avery, United States
                                           Attorney for the District of Connecticut,
                                           New Haven, CT.

         Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut (Merriam, J.).

         Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

         Plaintiff-Appellant Kathy Scott, an inmate at Federal Correctional
Institution Danbury (“Danbury”), filed this Bivens action against several prison
officials alleging deliberate indifference to her medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants on the ground that Scott had not exhausted her administrative
remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e. This appeal ensued. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and
procedural history.

         On appeal, Scott concedes that she did not complete Danbury’s
preestablished grievance process for any of the medical issues on which she bases

*   The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly.

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her deliberate indifference claim. Instead, she argues that the PLRA does not
require her to exhaust her administrative remedies under the circumstances of this
case.

        The Supreme Court has explained that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
is “mandatory,” so a court may not “excuse a failure to exhaust.” Ross v. Blake, 578
U.S. 632, 638-39 (2016); see also Donnelly v. CARRP, 37 F.4th 44, 53 (2d Cir. 2022)
(“Mandatory claim-processing rules are mandatory.”). The PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement includes only one exception: “An inmate … need not exhaust
unavailable [remedies].” Ross, 578 U.S. at 642. A grievance process provides an
available remedy when the process is “capable of use to obtain some relief for the
action complained of.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The type of relief
offered is not relevant to the availability inquiry: An inmate must exhaust her
administrative remedies “regardless of the relief offered through administrative
procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).

        The Ross Court recognized three circumstances in which a remedy is not
“available” for purposes of the PLRA: (1) when the grievance process is a “simple
dead end” because officers are “unable or consistently unwilling” to provide relief;
(2) when the administrative scheme is “so opaque” that it becomes “incapable of
use”; and (3) when administrators “thwart” inmates seeking relief by means of
“machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” 578 U.S. at 643-44. We have
noted that these categories are not exhaustive. Rucker v. Giffen, 997 F.3d 88, 93 (2d
Cir. 2021).

        Scott’s main argument on appeal is that the grievance process at Danbury
“could not replace [her] wrongly pulled tooth,” “fix [her] damaged ankle,” or
“restore [her] eyesight.” Appellant’s Br. 10. A court also cannot provide those
remedies. No matter. Scott’s argument is irrelevant to the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement. Scott must exhaust her administrative remedies “regardless of the
relief offered” by those procedures. Booth, 532 U.S. at 741.

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         Scott does not argue that the grievance process at Danbury provided no
relief whatsoever, that officers obstruct inmates from obtaining relief, or that the
grievance procedures are incapable of use. See Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44. Nor could
she—for three reasons. First, Scott received medical treatment for some of the
physical ailments that serve as a basis for her deliberate indifference claims. For
example, after injuring her ankle, Scott was taken to the emergency room, received
an x-ray, was examined by an orthopedist, and eventually underwent surgery.
Second, Scott used Danbury’s grievance procedure several times during the
relevant period for issues not related to this case. Third, to the extent that Scott
sought damages as a remedy for her injuries, Danbury’s grievance procedure
could have directed her to file an administrative tort claim, a parallel grievance
system that the PLRA would require her to exhaust before coming to federal court.
See Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2007). These facts indicate that Danbury
can provide remedies in response to grievance claims. Accordingly, Scott has not
established that Danbury failed to provide an “available” remedy. She therefore
was required to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to bringing this action,
which she admittedly failed to do.

                                   *      *     *

         We have considered Scott’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are
without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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