Court Opinion

ID: 9965497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 17:01:03.639539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:09.631218
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-3284     Document: 010111042161   Date Filed: 05/02/2024   Page: 1
                                                                             FILED
                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       May 2, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                     Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                         Clerk of Court
  LANCE OLDRIDGE,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                       No. 22-3284
                                              (D.C. No. 6:21-CV-01284-EFM-KGG)
  ROBERT LAYTON; ANNA HATTER,                               (D. Kan.)

        Defendants - Appellants,

  and

  CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS;
  GORDON RAMSAY; WANDA GIVENS;
  JOSE SALCIDO,

        Defendants.

  LANCE OLDRIDGE,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                       No. 23-3070
                                              (D.C. No. 6:21-CV-01284-EFM-KGG)
  WANDA GIVENS; JOSE SALCIDO,                               (D. Kan.)

        Defendants - Appellants,

  and

  CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS; ROBERT
  LAYTON; GORDON RAMSAY; ANNA
  HATTER,

        Defendants.
Appellate Case: 22-3284     Document: 010111042161        Date Filed: 05/02/2024        Page: 2

                           _________________________________

                               ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                           _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        Lance Oldridge sued the City of Wichita and several of its employees after his

 dismissal from the police department, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The

 government defendants appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. We

 accept as true the district court’s determination of the facts relevant to qualified

 immunity at this stage of the case. And the district court’s findings at this stage

 support Oldridge’s claim that he was terminated for exercising his First Amendment

 rights and that those rights were clearly established. His claims based on retaliatory

 investigation, however, are not supported by clearly established law, so the

 defendants to that claim are entitled to qualified immunity.

        Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand for further

 proceedings.

                                    I. Background

        In its order denying qualified immunity, the district court found the following

 facts to be in dispute.

        *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
                                             2
Appellate Case: 22-3284     Document: 010111042161        Date Filed: 05/02/2024    Page: 3

         Lance Oldridge was a longstanding Wichita Police Department (WPD) veteran

 who was assigned to the Professional Standards Bureau and later the WPD academy.

 He was terminated in 2019 after a series of disputes with his supervisors.

         The controversy arose as follows. In 2019, the Wichita Eagle published an

 article quoting statements that WPD Chief Gordon Ramsay had made in a deposition

 in a case related to questionable police practices. According to that article, Chief

 Ramsay was concerned that police officers—including, potentially, Oldridge—had

 engaged in misconduct during criminal investigations. The article reported that Chief

 Ramsay had testified that he had reassigned several officers as a result. Although not

 named directly, those officers impliedly included Oldridge.

         In response to the article, Chief Ramsay issued a public statement claiming

 that the reassigned officers “committed no legal or WPD internal violations.” Order

 at 3.

         Based on that public statement, Oldridge believed that Chief Ramsay had been

 caught in a lie: he had testified in his deposition that police officers had committed

 WPD violations, but he had said the opposite in the public statement issued after the

 deposition. Accordingly, Oldridge delivered a dossier containing Chief Ramsay’s

 deposition, his public statement, and copies of Kansas statutes pertaining to false

 communications to the Sedgwick County District Attorney. This supposedly

 provided a basis to support a prosecution of Chief Ramsay for violating Kansas law.

         The district attorney, after reviewing the materials, sent Oldridge an email

 opining that Chief Ramsay had not committed a crime. Undeterred, Oldridge sent a

                                             3
Appellate Case: 22-3284     Document: 010111042161        Date Filed: 05/02/2024     Page: 4

 similar packet to the sheriff, although he apprised the sheriff of the district attorney’s

 negative review of his complaint. After consulting with the district attorney, the

 sheriff informed Oldridge that he believed Chief Ramsay had not committed perjury

 and that he would not launch an investigation. He also contacted Chief Ramsay to

 inform him of Oldridge’s efforts.

       Chief Ramsay told his staff about Oldridge’s accusations. WPD deputy chiefs

 Jose Salcido, Anna Hatter, and Wanda Givens met with the district attorney to

 discuss the matter. After that meeting, they decided that Deputy Salcido and Deputy

 Givens would request an internal investigation into Oldridge’s conduct.

       At the beginning of the investigation, Oldridge was told that he had failed to

 inform the sheriff of his prior communications with the district attorney. But

 Oldridge produced documents showing that this accusation was false, since he had in

 fact informed the sheriff of his prior correspondence with the district attorney. The

 department nonetheless suspended Oldridge without pay pending the investigation

 and took the unusual step of confining him to his residence during the workweek.

       Although Oldridge’s documents refuted the investigation’s original basis, the

 WPD amended its investigation to add a general allegation that he had engaged in

 conduct intended to discredit the WPD. At the investigation’s conclusion, Deputy

 Hatter recommended terminating Oldridge. Her memorandum to City Manager

 Brandon Layton discussed Oldridge’s statements to the district attorney and the

 sheriff, but suggested that the basis for termination centered on his allegedly

                                             4
Appellate Case: 22-3284     Document: 010111042161          Date Filed: 05/02/2024      Page: 5

 derogatory and debasing statements about the police chief to his coworkers, his

 untruthfulness, and his breach of a prior confidentiality agreement.

        Oldridge filed a grievance protesting this outcome, which led to an arbitrator’s

 recommendation of reinstatement. Layton rejected that recommendation and

 terminated Oldridge. After Oldridge’s appeal, a state court affirmed the termination

 decision, finding it was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and

 capricious.

        Oldridge filed this suit in federal court, alleging claims under the First and

 Fourteenth Amendments, Title VII, and the Kansas Act Against Discrimination. The

 district court denied summary judgment on Oldridge’s First Amendment retaliation

 claims. The defendants only challenge the constitutional claims in this interlocutory

 appeal.

                                           II. Analysis

        The defendants contend the district court erred in denying their claim to

 qualified immunity.

        A. Legal Framework

               1. Qualified Immunity

        “A § 1983 defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity is an affirmative

 defense that creates a presumption that the defendant is immune from suit.” Truman

 v. Orem City, 1 F.4th 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2021) (brackets internal quotation marks

 omitted). The doctrine is designed to shield “officials from civil liability so long as their

 conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
                                               5
Appellate Case: 22-3284    Document: 010111042161         Date Filed: 05/02/2024      Page: 6

 reasonable person would have known.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (internal

 quotation marks omitted). To overcome this presumption, plaintiffs must show “(1)

 the officers’ alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) it was clearly

 established at the time of the violation, such that every reasonable official would

 have understood, that such conduct constituted a violation of that right.” Reavis v.

 Frost, 967 F.3d 978, 984 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). A

 plaintiff can show that the right was clearly established by reference to a Supreme

 Court or Tenth Circuit opinion, or to the established weight of authority from other

 circuits. Truman, 1 F.4th at 1235. “[T]he contours of the right must be sufficiently

 clear so that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that

 right,” but we need not undertake a “scavenger hunt for prior cases with precisely the

 same facts.” Id. (brackets omitted).

       Ordinarily, we only have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments, but

 our precedents recognize a narrow exception for orders denying qualified immunity.

 Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 409 (10th Cir. 2014). “Under this limited

 jurisdiction, we may review: (1) whether the facts that the district court ruled a

 reasonable jury could find would suffice to show a legal violation, or (2) whether that

 law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. at 409 (internal

 quotation marks omitted). “[I]f a district court concludes that a reasonable jury could

 find certain specified facts in favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court has indicated

 we usually must take them as true—and do so even if our own de novo review of the

                                             6
Appellate Case: 22-3284     Document: 010111042161        Date Filed: 05/02/2024    Page: 7

 record might suggest otherwise as a matter of law.” Id. at 409–410 (citing Roosevelt-

 Hennix v. Prickett, 717 F.3d 751, 753 (10th Cir. 2013)).

               2. First Amendment Retaliation

        “A public employer may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes

 that employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech.” Helget v.

 City of Hays, 844 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks

 omitted). Under the First Amendment, a public employee’s speech is entitled to

 protection from employer retaliation if both: (1) the “employee spoke as a citizen on

 a matter of public concern,” rather than “pursuant to their official duties”; and (2) the

 employer did not have “an adequate justification for treating the employee differently

 from any other member of the general public.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 237

 (2014) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)). Ultimately, courts

 must “balanc[e]… the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting

 upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in

 promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”

 Id. at 236 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)) (second

 alteration in original).

        Our cases apply a five-step test under Garcetti/Pickering to determine whether

 dismissal of an employee violated the First Amendment:

               (1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an
               employee’s official duties; (2) whether the speech was on a
               matter of public concern; (3) whether the government’s
               interests, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
               public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff’s free

                                             7
Appellate Case: 22-3284     Document: 010111042161         Date Filed: 05/02/2024       Page: 8

               speech interests; (4) whether the protected speech was a
               motivating factor in the adverse employment action; and
               (5) whether the defendant would have reached the same
               employment decision in the absence of the protected
               conduct.

 Helget, 844 F.3d at 1221. “The first three steps concern questions of law for the

 courts, and the last two concern questions of fact.” Id. at 1222.

        Under Helget, our consideration is “whether the government’s interests, as

 employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh

 the plaintiff’s free speech interests.” Id. at 1221. “The only public employer interest

 that outweighs the employee’s free speech interest is avoiding direct disruption, by the

 speech itself, of the public employer’s internal operations and employment relationships.”

 Id. at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A public employer need not show that

 the employee’s speech in fact disrupted internal operations and employment

 relationships,” but only that “the speech could potentially become so disruptive to the

 employer’s operations as to outweigh the employee’s interest in the speech.” Id.

 (brackets omitted).

        B. Application

               1. Layton/Hatter

        Layton and Hatter contend the district court erred in concluding that clearly

 established law would have notified them that Oldridge’s termination violated the First

 Amendment. We disagree. The district court correctly concluded that a reasonable

                                              8
Appellate Case: 22-3284    Document: 010111042161        Date Filed: 05/02/2024     Page: 9

 jury could find that Oldridge’s free speech interests outweighed the defendants’

 interest in avoiding disruption.

       The parties only dispute the district court’s application of the second and third

 Garcetti/Pickering factors.

       Applying the second factor, the district court concluded that Oldridge’s

 statements to the DA and sheriff about Chief Ramsay’s alleged perjury were on a

 matter of public concern. We agree. It is well-established under our precedents that

 speech about alleged criminal behavior by law enforcement is of public concern. In

 Wulf v. City of Wichita, for example, we concluded that a letter written by a police

 officer to the Kansas Attorney General alleging that WPD leaders violated the First

 Amendment and Kansas law was on a matter of public concern. 883 F.2d 842, 857

 (10th Cir. 1989).

       Applying the third factor, the district concluded that Layton and Hatter had

 provided no evidence to suggest that their interest in promoting efficiency

 outweighed Oldridge’s interest in free speech. We agree. As the district court

 explained, (1) the defendants “failed to perform any sort of factual analysis

 whatsoever in support of their naked assertion that Plaintiff’s statements to the DA

 and the Sheriff would disrupt efficiency in the WPD,” and (2) since Oldridge’s

 “statements were made privately to the DA and the Sheriff,” there was minimal

 potential for disruption. Order at 15.

       It is true we afford greater latitude to law enforcement in dismissing employees,

 since “loyalty and confidence among employees is especially important in a law

                                            9
Appellate Case: 22-3284      Document: 010111042161          Date Filed: 05/02/2024     Page: 10

  enforcement setting.” Helget, 844 F.3d at 1223. But even law enforcement

  employers must show evidence of potential disruption to internal operations when

  dismissing an employee due to speech about a matter of public concern. For

  example, in Wulf, we concluded that provoking “idle gossip and talk” across the

  department was insufficient to show disruption to internal operations, as were “purely

  speculative allegations of disruption.” Id. at 861-862. Layton and Hatter pointed to

  no evidence that Oldridge’s statements would have provoked actual disruption to

  WPD operations—let alone that their interests in preventing disruption outweighed

  Oldridge’s interest in free speech.

         Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the disputed facts

  could support a First Amendment violation.

         Defendants contend nonetheless that a First Amendment violation was not

  clearly established in these circumstances. They point to our decision in Lytle v. City

  of Haysville, arguing that the balancing test weighs in favor of the government

  because Oldridge did not pursue internal reporting mechanisms and his statements

  were not objectively reasonable. 138 F.3d 857, 861 (10th Cir. 1998). In Lytle, we

  considered whether a dismissed police officer’s interest in free speech outweighed

  disruption to the police department caused by his coworkers “no longer trust[ing] him

  with confidential information regarding [an] investigation, or any other sensitive police

  matter.” Id. at 867. In that case, the plaintiff went to the local media with a claim that

  officers had committed murder while on the job, and the claim was then published. The

  plaintiff had not made the allegations internally at all. We explained that the plaintiff’s

                                               10
Appellate Case: 22-3284      Document: 010111042161         Date Filed: 05/02/2024      Page: 11

  interests were “significantly diminished by his failure to pursue his concerns within the

  Department and by the lack of a reasonable factual basis for his allegations,” while his

  employer’s interests were “entitled to substantial weight.” Id. It is therefore inadequate,

  under Lytle, for an employer to simply show that the employee’s interests were

  diminished—the employer also must show that its own interests outweighed that of the

  employee. The defendants refer to negative “effects on WPD morale and efficiency

  [that] were foreseeable results” of Oldridge’s speech, Aplt. Br. at 48, but unlike the Lytle

  defendants, they offer no evidence showing Oldridge’s non-public allegations generated

  negative effects on morale and efficiency. See Lytle, 138 F.3d at 867. Absent evidence

  of disruption, their argument amounts to nothing more than “purely speculative

  allegations” of disruption, which are insufficient to outweigh Oldridge’s free speech

  interest. Wulf, 883 F.2d at 862.

         According to the district court, a reasonable jury could conclude that City

  Manager Layton fired Oldridge at the recommendation of Hatter in retaliation for his

  protected speech. Order at 5. Under the facts that the district court found to be in

  dispute, Wichita’s interest in employee discipline was outweighed by Oldridge’s

  interest in free speech under clearly established law. The district court therefore did

  not err in denying qualified immunity to defendants Layton and Hatter.

                2. Givens/Salcido

         Givens and Salcido appeal the district court’s denial of their qualified immunity.

  The district court found that their role in Oldridge’s dismissal was more limited than that

  of Layton and Hatter. They did not make the decision to dismiss Oldridge, but they

                                               11
Appellate Case: 22-3284      Document: 010111042161         Date Filed: 05/02/2024        Page: 12

  helped launch the investigation that led to his dismissal. Oldridge alleges that they

  launched this investigation in retaliation of his protected speech.

         Assuming this constitutes a constitutional violation, Oldridge must point to clearly

  established precedents that forbid analogous behavior, such that “a reasonable official

  would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Truman, 1 F.4th at 1235.

  While it is clearly established that dismissing an employee constitutes improper First

  Amendment retaliation, see Wulf, 883 F.2d at 863, none of our precedents clearly hold

  that launching an investigation with a retaliatory motive constitutes First Amendment

  retaliation. Since Givens and Salcido were not responsible for firing him, and instead

  merely instigated an investigation that eventually led to his termination, they are

  entitled to qualified immunity.

         Oldridge argues that he can overcome Givens and Salcido’s immunity since they

  “set in motion a series of events that the defendants knew or reasonably should have

  known would cause others to deprive the Plaintiff of his constitutional rights.” Aple. Br.

  at 35 (quoting Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 1994)). In Trask, we

  considered a § 1983 suit against probation officers who visited the home of an offender

  recently discharged from probation. The offender refused to open the door when the

  officers knocked, so the officers called in law enforcement backup. When the law

  enforcement officers arrived, they arrested the offender’s boyfriend and charged him with

  obstruction of an officer. The issue on appeal was whether the probation officers were

  liable for the law enforcement officers’ arrest of the felon’s boyfriend. We

  acknowledged that the probation officers “caused” the boyfriend’s arrest, but we noted

                                               12
Appellate Case: 22-3284      Document: 010111042161          Date Filed: 05/02/2024      Page: 13

  that the boyfriend’s appearance at the door bearing knives and his false statement to the

  officers were “superseding acts” that potentially limited the probation officers’ liability.

  Id. at 1046-1047. We therefore remanded the case to the district court to determine “how

  much of Mr. Trask’s unlawful detention and arrest were proximately (or legally) caused

  by the probation officers’ conduct.” Id. at 1047.1

         We agree with Oldridge that a § 1983 defendant can be liable for the foreseeable

  consequences of his actions, but it does not reduce his burden to show that his rights were

  clearly established at the time of the violation. To overcome qualified immunity, “[t]he

  ‘clearly established’ standard also requires that the legal principle clearly prohibit the

  officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before him,” which requires “a high

  degree of specificity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (Thomas,

  J.) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). The facts of Trask are too

  dissimilar to this case for it to be authoritative in the qualified immunity context. The

  defendants in Trask were probation officers who called for law enforcement backup when

  visiting a felon’s home—a decision that was highly likely to result in an arrest. None of

  the claims involved First Amendment retaliation at all. That fact pattern is far removed

  from Givens and Salcido’s decision to launch an investigation into Oldridge’s alleged

  workplace misconduct.

         1
           The defendants criticize the district court’s reliance on Van Deelen v.
  Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1155–1156 (10th Cir. 2007) (Gorsuch, J.). But as Oldridge
  notes, the district court merely cited this case for its enunciation of the
  Garcetti/Pickering factors, rather than for its factual applicability.
                                                13
Appellate Case: 22-3284     Document: 010111042161          Date Filed: 05/02/2024     Page: 14

         Since Oldridge has not offered authorities showing that launching an investigation

  with retaliatory intent violates the First Amendment, we reverse the district court’s denial

  of Givens’ and Salcido’s qualified immunity.

                                      III. Conclusion

         We affirm the district court’s denial of Ms. Hatter’s and Mr. Layton’s qualified

  immunity and we reverse the district court’s denial of Ms. Givens’ and Mr. Salcido’s

  qualified immunity.

                                                Entered for the Court

                                                Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                                Circuit Judge

                                              14