Court Opinion

ID: 9730405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:11:38.66681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:06.288375
License: Public Domain

RATLIFF, Chief Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Walter Voss, the Executor of the Estate of Willard N. Voss, Deceased, (collectively "Willard's estate") appeals the negative judgment on his cross-claim for negligence against two banks. We affirm.
ISSUE
We restate the issue on appeal as:
Is the court's finding that the banks were not negligent contrary to law?
FACTS
(On December 10, 1985, Lennice Voss was admitted to Milan Health Care Center due to Alzheimer's disease. At that time, five certificates of deposit ("CDs") totalling $55,500 had been issued jointly to Willard and Lennice, who were husband and wife. One CD was issued by Friendship State Bank, No. 9422. The other four CDs were issued by Fifth Third Bank of Southeastern Indiana ("Fifth Third Bank"). One of the CDs from Fifth Third Bank, No. 800008101800, had originally been in Willard's name only. In 1986, Willard went to *1241the Fifth Third Bank and orally requested Lennice's name be removed from the four CDs. The standard procedure of the bank was to mark through the unwanted name, and this was done to the four CDs. Lenn-ice was never contacted regarding the change. The Friendship CD also reflected that Lennice's name had been crossed out and a notation stating, "Removed July 14, 1986, by order of Willard N. Voss, himself, July 14, 1986". Thereafter, all interest checks for the CDs were issued to Willard individually.
Willard died on November 29, 1989, and Lennice died on January 19, 1990. On May 31, 1991, Lennie Lynd, administratrix of Lennice's estate, filed a complaint asserting ownership of all five CDs on the basis of joint ownership with rights of survivor-ship. Willard's estate filed a cross-claim against the banks alleging that they negligently failed to transfer the CDs to his individual name. The trial court found that CD No. 800008101800 belonged to Willard's estate because all of the money in the CD had been deposited by Willard. However, the court could not discern where the money funding the other four CDs had originated. Therefore, upon determining that the attempts to remove Lennice's name were invalid, the court held the four CDs belonged to Lennice's estate through rights of survivorship. The court found that the banks were not negligent and entered judgment in favor of the banks on Willard's estate's cross-claim.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Willard's estate is appealing a negative judgment which necessitates a showing that the judgment is contrary to law. Beneficial Mortgage Co. v. Powers (1990), Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d 793, 795, trans. denied. On appeal, we will reverse a negative judgment only when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id.
The essential question is whether the banks were negligent in marking out Lennice's name on the CDs without informing Willard to comply with IND.CODE § 32-4-1.5-5. 1.0. § 32-4-1.5-5 requires a written order be given to a financial institution to change the form of a joint account. Willard did not make any written order, but requested the deletion orally, which the trial court found to be ineffective. To prove negligence, Willard's estate had the burden of establishing a duty owed from the banks to Willard, the failure of the banks to conform their conduct to the requisite standard of care, and injury to Willard proximately resulting from such failure. See Rubin v. Johnson (1990), Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d 324, 828-29, trons. denied.
The trial court did not find any evidence of negligence by the banks for failing to carry out Willard's desire to dispose of Lennice's interest in the CDs. The court stated "It is clear from the face of the certificates of the Fifth Third Bank that the bank may act on the order of any of the parties named on the certificate. This was not a 'transfer' such as would require a written notice under those provisions." Record at 70. The court further stated that LC. §§ 82-4-1.5-5 and 32-4-1.5-9 "absolve the financial institutions from the duty to inquire as to the source of funds or their proposed application and empowers them to pay to 'any one or more' of the parties.... - Had [Willard] cashed in the [CDs] and applied the monies to his own use, the bank would not have been responsible, nor should they be here." Record at 70-71; see Kuehl v. Terre Haute First National Bank (1982), Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 (I.C. § 32-4-1.5-9 precludes bank's liability for making payments).
Assuming arguendo that the banks breached a duty to inform Willard to place in writing his order to remove Lenn-ice's name from the CDs, Willard's estate fails to prove the element of injury to establish negligence. Even if Willard had *1242complied with I.C. § 82-4-1.5-5, his attempt to strike Lennice's name from the CDs would have been ineffective. A joint account can be terminated only by mutual agreement of the joint tenants. Clausen v. Warner (1948), 118 Ind.App. 340, 344, 78 N.E.2d 551, 552, trans. denied. Moreover, one joint tenant of money in a joint bank account cannot divest the other of his joint ownership by withdrawing the money without the other's knowledge and consent. Id.; see also Rogers v. Rogers (1982), Ind.App., 437 N.E.2d 92, 96. Neither joint tenant can dispose of the interest of the other in life. Id. It follows that the striking of one of the joint tenant's names from the account is ineffectual. See In re Estate of Macak (1973), 14 Ill.App.3d 261, 302 N.E.2d 436 (husband's attempt to remove wife's name from joint CD was not effective because a joint tenancy agreement cannot be terminated by a unilateral action of one of the parties, even if each has the authority to draw out all of the money from the account); Gallagher Estate (1945), 352 Pa. 476, 43 A.2d 132 (husband had no power to destroy joint savings account by having wife's name stricken where wife was insane and unable to consent to terminate her interest).1
Lennice's estate would still have acquired the CDs by right of survivorship. The banks' failure to inform Willard to make his request in writing did not cause the result of the CDs being given to Lennice's estate. This result would have occurred even if Willard had been advised and complied with I.C. § 32-4-1.5-5. See Paskas v. Illini Federal Savings & Loan Association (1982), 109 Ill.App.3d 24, 64 Ill.Dec. 642, 440 N.E.2d 194 (bank not liable for paying funds from joint account to one of the joint tenants). Willard's estate fails to show injury resulting from the banks' failure to advise him properly.
Affirmed.
ROBERTSON, J., concurs.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs with separate opinion.

. Some states have adopted the opposite position that the right of a joint depositor to withdraw all the funds from a joint account encompasses the right to delete the name of another on a joint account. See McEntire v. Estate of McEntire (1979), 267 Ark. 169, 590 S.W.2d 241; Kacirek v. Mangan (Colo.Ct.App.1971), 489 P.2d 342; Bealert v. Mitchell (Ky.Ct.App.1979), 585 S.W.2d 417; Wright v. Commercial and Savings Bank (1982), 51 Md.App. 398, 445 A.2d 30; Hoffman v. Vetter (1962), 117 Ohio App. 233, 24 Op.2d 1, 192 N.E.2d 249. Even if this position were followed in Indiana, the result of this case would be the same because banks are not liable in Indiana if one depositor withdraws all of the funds from a joint account. See LC. § 32-4-1.5-9.