Court Opinion

ID: 9594075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:26:56.647859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:04.643372
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
The majority allows classified state employees to engage in partisan political activities during the performance of their official duties as public employees. I cannot agree with this holding and respectfully dissent.
I. THE MICHIGAN POLITICAL FREEDOM ACT
A. THE RELEVANT STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The majority finds that Rule 1-5.7 of the Michigan Civil Service Commission violates Const 1963, art 11, § 5 and the political freedom act, MCL 15.401 et seg; MSA 4.1702(1) et seg., because the rule applies to employees’ activities outside the commission’s regulatory power. Ante at 735-740. I cannot agree.
The constitution gives the commission authority over classified state employees. Const 1963, art 11, § 5. However, the scope of this authority is also defined by the political freedom act. MCL 15.401 et *741seq.; MSA 4.1702(1) el seq. Council No 11, AFSCME v Civil Service Comm, 408 Mich 385; 292 NW2d 442 (1980). Under the act, the commission may prohibit political activity by a state employee “during those hours when that person is being compensated for the performance of that person’s duties as a public employee.” MCL 15.404; MSA 4.1702(4). The majority reads this to allow the commission to regulate such activity “when two conditions are met: (1) the employee is being compensated by the employer, and (2) such compensation is for the performance of the employee’s duties as a public employee.” Ante at 734.
However, I disagree with the first prong of the majority’s test. In this prong, the majority adds the words “by the employer” to the statutory language. However, the act does not identify the source of the compensation. Thus, when correctly inteipreted, the statute does not allow. a classified employee to engage in political activity whenever he is being compensated for the performance of the duties of a public employee. The source of the compensation is irrelevant. This Court should not be so quick to read additional language into a clear statute.
Nor is this a distinction without a difference. The majority uses this first prong to find that the commission exceeded its authority in terms of the seventeen employees who invoked the union officer leave provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 735. The majority determines that these employees were not compensated by the employer because the state was reimbursed for the total costs of these employees’ wages and benefits. Id. Thus, according to the majority, their activity is protected by the political freedom act. However, under the correct reading of *742the statute, the source of the compensation is irrelevant. Rather, the fact that these employees were compensated merely presents the question whether they were engaged in the performance of their duties as public employees.1
B. THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES AS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
The majority also concludes that activities done while on union leave are not part of the duties of public employees. I disagree with this conclusion. First, the state, as employer, controls the duties of its employees. This Court has recognized that the commission has “plenary and absolute powers in its field,” and its actions are subject to limited judicial review. Viculin v Dep’t of Civil Service, 386 Mich 375, 398; 192 NW2d 449 (1971). The commission has the authority to regulate job specifications, discipline, and job performance. Council No 11, supra at 406-407. Consistent with this authority, it is clear that the union could not remove these employees from their normal duties without the consent of the commission. Rather, the union must request the release of represented employees for union leave, and the commission has the ability to refuse this request. Also, these employees were presumably subject to discipline by the state had they failed to attend the assigned union function. Thus, it is clear that the commission assigned these employees to work as “employees of the Union.”
Second, the majority assumes that union activities are always contrary to the employer’s interests. Ante at 738. This leads the majority to conclude that *743employees on union leave must not be performing their duties as public employees while on union leave. Id. I cannot agree with this analysis. While parties may enter the collective bargaining process with interests that are “to an extent antagonistic,” NLRB v Ins Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 US 477, 488; 80 S Ct 419; 4 L Ed 2d 454 (1960), that does not necessarily mean that labor unions and management always have diametrically opposed interests. Union activities often provide mutual benefit to both the union and the employer.2 When properly used, union leave contributes to a peaceful and productive relationship between the state and its employees. This, in turn, provides a benefit to the state by improving state services. Thus, the state does reap a benefit from union leave. This is consistent with the state’s willingness to assign its employees to union leave, and leads to the conclusion that union leave is very much a part of employees’ duties as public employees.
The majority relies on Tegels v Kaiser-Frazer Corp, 329 Mich 84; 44 NW2d 880 (1950), to support the proposition that an employee on union leave is not performing the duties of a public employee. However, this reliance is misplaced. Tegels addressed the question whether the employee’s injury was sustained in the course of employment under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. Tegels was limited to its facts, and expressly stated that such cases are to be determined on their facts. Id. at 86-87. Moreover, the facts *744of Tegels are distinguishable from this case. In Tegels, the employee was injured on an unpaid lunch hour, during which he was “free to come and go as [he] pleased.” Id. at 85. In this case, all but one of the employees were compensated for their time. Further, they had been assigned to union leave by their employer and were not free to use the time as they pleased. Thus, I do not believe that Tegels is persuasive in this case.3
Similarly, the majority’s resort to private sector federal labor law is also unavailing. The majority cites three cases, BASF Wyandotte Corp v Local 227, Int’l Chemical Workers Union, 791 F2d 1046 (CA 2, 1986), NLRB v BASF Wyandotte Corp, 798 F2d 849 (CA 5, 1986), and Communications Workers of America v Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc, 670 F Supp 416 (D DC, 1987), for the proposition that “compensation to employees on leaves of absence for union business is not compensation for work performed for the employer.” Ante at 737, n 7. I am not persuaded.
These cases all deal with the application of § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 USC 186(a). That statute prohibits payments by an employer to unions or their representatives. Id. The act is aimed at the prevention of bribery of union officials. NLRB, supra at 855. However, there are several exceptions to the act’s prohibition. 29 USC 186(c). The first authorizes payments to a union representative if that individual’s “established duties” include labor rela*745tions. 29 USC 186(c)(1). It is this exception that concerned each of the three cases cited by the majority.
These opinions were clear that they were not examining whether the employees’ activities were for the employer, but only whether the employee was a bona fide employee of the employer. Id,.; Local 227, supra at 1049; NLRB, supra at 855-856. Each opinion found that employees on union leave were employees of the employer, so that compensation for time spent on union leave was proper under § 302. Local 227, supra at 1049-1050; NLRB, supra at 855-856; Communications Workers, supra at 423-424. This finding was reached despite the fact that the employees’ union activities were not for “direct services to the employer.” Local 227, supra at 1049.
The majority apparently seeks to twist the “direct services” comment in Local 227 to mean that these employees were found not to be working for their employers in any form while on union leave. However, the actual holdings of these cases belie this result. The fact that compensation for these employees was found to be proper under the Labor Management Relations Act required a finding that the employees were still “bona fide” employees of their employers while performing union activities while on union leave. Indeed, union leave was found to offer an indirect benefit to the employer. Communications Workers, supra at 422. Thus, these opinions actually stand for the proposition that, though union activities may not be “direct services” to the employer, such activities are still part of the employment duties of union members. If these federal private sector cases have any relevance in this case, they support the proposition that the activities of state employees *746while on union leave are part of their duties as public employees and within the authority of the commission.
Third, the majority’s inclusion of political activity in the phrase “union activities” violates the collective bargaining agreement and the political freedom act. Political activity is a prohibited subject of bargaining under the commission rules that authorize collective bargaining. Civil Service Rule 6-2.1(l)(3). Thus, there is no authority in the contract for the assignment of an employee to political activity. This prohibition is also found in § 5 of the political freedom act:
A public employer, public employee or an elected or appointed official may not personally, or through an agent, coerce, attempt to coerce, or command another public employee to pay, lend, or contribute anything of value to a party, committee, organization, agency, or person for the benefit of a person seeking or holding elected office, or for the purpose of furthering or defeating a proposed law, ballot question, or other measure that may be submitted to a vote of the electors. [MCL 15.405; MSA 4.1702(5).]
I cannot understand how the assignment of a state employee to work on a political campaign is consistent with this provision. Rather, the majority’s holding forces the commission to violate both the collective bargaining agreement and the political freedom act. Thus, I must conclude the majority’s conclusion is flawed.
Employees on union leave are performing their duties as public employees. Employees are assigned to these types of leave by the state. Further, legitimate union activities contribute to a productive relationship between the state and its employees. Thus, the state, as employer, derives a benefit from those *747activities. The majority’s holding to the contrary violates both the political freedom act and the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, excluding the one employee who may not have been compensated, I would find that the application of Rule 1-5.7 to these employees did not violate the act.
H. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The plaintiffs contend that Rule 1-5.7 is a content-based restraint on the freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The majority does not reach this issue because of its finding that the rule violates the political freedom act. However, I would hold that the rule violates neither the act, nor the First Amendment.
States have the authority to regulate the speech of their employees under certain conditions. The First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech when that speech is on a matter of public concern and is not outweighed by the interests of the state employer. Waters v Churchill, 511 US 661, 668; 114 S Ct 1878; 128 L Ed 2d 686 (1994) (plurality opinion); Connick v Myers, 461 US 138, 142; 103 S Ct 1684; 74 L Ed 2d 708 (1983); Pickering v Bd of Ed of Township High School Dist 205, Will Co, Illinois, 391 US 563, 568; 88 S Ct 1731; 20 L Ed 2d 811 (1968).
Political activity is clearly a matter of public concern. However, there is no dispute in this case that, given the history of the civil service in Michigan, the state has a highly significant, compelling interest in the elimination of political activity in the ranks of the classified civil service during time spent in the performance of official duties. Council No 11, supra at 397-407, see also Wachsman v City of Dallas, 704 F2d *748160, 166-167, 172 (CA 5, 1983), cert den 464 US 1012 (1983). Further, as discussed above, the rule is limited to specific conduct while an employee is performing the duties of a public employee. I would find that the state’s interest in preventing political activity while on actual duty overrides the employee’s interest in engaging in such activity.
However, the state may not target speech because of its content. The United States Supreme Court has clearly set forth the law in this area. The Court has stated that “the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.” Rosenberger v Rector & Visitors of Univ of Virginia, 515 US 819, 828; 115 S Ct 2510; 132 L Ed 2d 700 (1995). The government may not permit the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny the use to those wishing to express a more controversial, less-favored view. However, I disagree that Rule 1-5.7 discriminates in this manner.
The rule is evenhanded in its application. It uniformly prohibits certain political activities by employees engaged in the performance of their actual duties. The rule then defines “actual duty” to include all times when the employee is performing the duties of a state employee: scheduled work hours, overtime, and union leave. No employees on actual duty are allowed to engage in the political activities listed in Rules 1-5.1 and 1-5.5. Therefore, the state has uniformly denied the use of actual duty time as a forum for political speech. Thus, I would find that Rule 1-5.7 does not violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
*749m. EQUAL PROTECTION
The employees and their union contend that Rule 1-5.7 violates the protection provided by the Equal Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution.4
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation. [Const 1963, art 1, § 2.]
The plaintiffs contend that the application of Rule 1-5.7 violates this provision by restricting their off-duty political activity in a way that does not apply to nonunion members. I disagree.
The Equal Protection Clause requires the state to treat people in similar circumstances in a similar fashion. Vacco v Quill, 521 US _. _; 117 S Ct 2293, 2297; 138 L Ed 2d 834 (1997); Moore v Spangler, 401 Mich 360, 370; 258 NW2d 34 (1977). The Michigan Equal Protection Clause is to be interpreted as extending the same projections as those afforded by the federal constitution. Armco Steel Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 419 Mich 582, 591; 358 NW2d 839 (1984); Fox v Employment Security Comm, 379 Mich 579, 588; 153 NW2d 644 (1967); Harville v State Plumbing & Heating, Inc, 218 Mich App 302, 305-306; 553 NW2d 377 (1996).
As detailed above, I feel that union leave is time spent in the performance of the duties of a public *750employee. Thus, the rale uniformly applies to all employees while performing such duties. The union’s argument to the contrary is belied by the fact that union members are the only state employees entitled to union leave. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals that “the adoption of plaintiffs’ views would lead to disparate treatment, because then only union employees could engage in partisan political activity while they are on duty.” 208 Mich App 479, 494; 528 NW2d 811 (1995).
To any extent that the rule does treat union members differently, there is no violation of equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has approved of regulations on the political activity of members of a state’s classified civil service that did not apply to other state employees. Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 607, n 5; 93 S Ct 2908; 37 L Ed 2d 830 (1973). This case is similar to Broadrick in that, just as classified employees are unique compared to other state employees, union members are different from nonrepresented employees. Thus, they will, on occasion, be treated differently than other employees, especially in regard to benefits to which only they are entitled, such as union leave. In short, the designation of union leave as “actual duty” time does not violate equal protection.
IV. VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH
The plaintiffs also allege that the rule is vague and overbroad. The plaintiffs contend that the rule is vague because it states that union leave is for “union activities deemed to be in the best interests of the state and not including partisan political activity” without explicitly defining “partisan.” Further, they *751claim that the rule is overbroad because it may apply to both partisan and nonpartisan activities. However, both these arguments are flawed.
A statute or rule is impermissibly vague if it is 1) overbroad in its restriction of First Amendment freedoms, 2) does not give fair notice of the prohibited conduct, and 3) is so indefinite as to confer “unstructured and unlimited discretion on the trier of fact to determine whether an offense has been committed.” Woll v Attorney General, 409 Mich 500, 533; 297 NW2d 578 (1980), citing Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108-109; 92 S Ct 2294; 33 L Ed 2d 222 (1972).
First, the rule is not overbroad. A statute is over-broad if it applies to conduct that the state may not constitutionally control, as well as to activity that it may legitimately regulate. Grayned, supra at 114-115, see also People v McCumby, 130 Mich App 710, 714; 344 NW2d 338 (1983). This interference with speech must not only be “ ‘real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Osborne v Ohio, 495 US 103, 112; 110 S Ct 1691; 109 L Ed 2d 98 (1990), reh den 496 US 913 (1990), quoting Broadrick, supra at 615.
This rule does not substantially interfere with conduct that the state cannot prohibit. Rather, it addresses a specific list of political activity by state employees when they are performing their duties as state employees. Under the constitution and the political freedom act, the state can regulate this behavior. This prohibition is consistent with the recognized interest of the state in preventing politics from interfering with the performance of classified state *752employees. Council No 11, supra at 397-405. Thus, I would find that this statute is not overbroad.
Second, the rule gives fair notice of the conduct prohibited. The rule specifically identifies that the political activities enumerated in Rules 1-5.1 and 1-5.5 are forbidden during actual duty time. There is no contention that this list is vague in itself. Indeed, the list is similar in specificity to that which was found not to be vague in Broadrick.5 Rather, the plaintiffs seek to read the rule as if the mention of partisan political activity were exclusive, meaning that only partisan political activity is forbidden on union leave. However this is not the case. Rather, the rule clearly states that all activities listed in Rules 1-5.1 and 1-5.5 are forbidden. The fact that both partisan and nonpartisan political activity are barred from working hours is clear upon a reading of Rules 1-5.1, 1-5.5, and 1-5.7.6
Finally, Rule 1-5.7 does not give unlimited discretion to any potential trier of fact. Rather, it specifically identifies and defines the prohibited activities. Thus, I would find that the rule is not constitutionally defective for vagueness or overbreadth.
V. CONCLUSION
This is a significant and sensitive case. The issues presented go to the heart of the state’s provision of services to the taxpayers. The civil service in this state has a “tortured” history as a result of the intrusion of political activity into the duties of its employees. Council No 11, supra at 400, n 13. The people of this state have clearly expressed a desire to remove *753politics from the civil service. However, through the political freedom act, they have also made it clear that the free speech rights of state employees are to be protected. However, I feel that the majority incorrectly defines union leave, finding that it is not time spent in the performance of the duties of a state employee. In so doing, it upsets the balance the citizens of this state have so carefully established. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
Riley and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.

 However, I do agree that no determination can be reached concerning the one employee who used his own time. Id. at 739-740.

 See Herndon v UAW Local No 3, 56 Mich App 435; 224 NW2d 334 (1974) (finding that union activities provide a benefit to the employer so that a union steward processing grievances who assaulted a coemployee was in the same employment as the coemployee under subsection 827[1] of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. MCL 418.827[1]; MSA 17.237[827][1]).

 Further, the modem trend in worker’s compensation law is to view union activities as being within the scope of employment because of the mutual benefit received by the union and the employer. See 2 Larson, Workers’ Compensation, § 27.33(c), pp 5-414 through 5-417.

 The plaintiffs also claim that the rule violates the Due Process Clause. Const 1963, art 1, § 17. However, they couch their argument in terms of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, I will not treat their due process argument separately.

 Id. at 607-608.

 The same state interests that justify the limitation of partisan political activity also apply to nonpartisan activity. Wachsman, supra at 165-170.