Court Opinion

ID: 9453456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:13:56.686765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:40.081549
License: Public Domain

KALODNER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part, concurring in part):
I would dismiss the appeal in the instant case for want of jurisdiction for these reasons: (1) the appellant did not file a Notice of Appeal in the District Court within thirty days after the District Court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and (2) a certificate of probable cause was not granted to the appellant within the stated thirty-day period.
The majority, on this score, acknowledges that Section 2107, Title 28 U.S.C.A. and Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in specified subscription to § 2107, make mandatory the filing of a Notice of Appeal in the District Court “within” thirty days after a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding is entered by that Court. It further acknowledges that a Notice of Appeal was not filed in the instant case until “more than a month and a half after the denial of the [appellant’s] petition for habeas corpus”.
The majority also acknowledges that Section 2253, Title 28 U.S.C.A. in specific terms provides that “an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals” from a District Court’s order denying habeas corpus relief, “unless" a certificate of probable cause is obtained from the District Court or a “circuit justice or judge”, and that Rule 81(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides that “The requirements of” § 2253 “remain in force”. It further acknowledges that a certificate of probable cause was not granted in the instant case until “thirty-nine days after the denial of the petition for habeas corpus”.
It may be noted parenthetically that the majority has failed to note that Rule 11(4) of this Court provides that in an appeal from a final decision of a district court in a habeas corpus proceeding “there must be filed with the notice of appeal in the district court a certificate by the judge who rendered the decision or by a circuit judge that there is probable cause for the appeal”, (emphasis supplied)
Despite its acknowledgment that Sections 2107 and 2253, and Rules 73(a) and 81(a) (2), independently, make mandatory, as a prerequisite to the existence of our appellate jurisdiction, the timely filing of a notice of appeal and the obtaining of a certificate of probable cause, and its further acknowledgment there was a failure to satisfy these prerequisites in the instant case, the majority by the novel device of promulgation of a series of “new appellate rules” has re-legislated Sections 2107 and 2253 and revised the stated Rules of Civil Procedure.
It has done so by the simple expedient (1) of judicially fashioning “an application for a certificate of probable cause” into the “notice of appeal” required by Section 2107 and Rule 73(a); and (2) in nullifying the requirement of Section 2253, Rule 81(a) (2) and our Rule 11(3), that a certificate of probable cause must be granted before an appeal may be “taken to the court of appeals”.
It is settled that a federal court of appeals cannot promulgate a rule which is in conflict with a statute relating to *859appeals and that such a rule is void. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Pillsbury, 301 U.S. 174, 177, 57 S.Ct. 682, 81 L.Ed. 988 (1937).
In pursuing its present course, the majority has chosen not to take cognizance of the fact that this court, and other circuits, in cases subsequently discussed, have held that satisfaction of the requirements of the statutes and Federal Rules here involved is mandatory and jurisdictional.
Independent of this consideration, is the further critical inescapable fact that the Congress of the United States, and it alone, can ordain the jurisdiction of federal courts, other than the Supreme Court of the United States.
All federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, are established by Congress under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution.1 They derive their jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress as explicitly expressed in legislative enactment and Congress may restrict conferred jurisdiction at its discretion. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-234, 43 S.Ct. 79, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922), and the cases therein cited.
“The Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power ‘of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exelusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.’ (citing cases).” Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187, 63 S.Ct. 1019, 1022, 87 L.Ed. 1339 (1943).
This Court has explicitly given effect to the Constitutional prohibition against judicial legislation by federal courts under the guise of fashioning remedies.
In doing so we said:
“Courts have inherent power to construe legislation and to fashion remedies to effectuate the legislative design but they do not have power to legislate, directly or indirectly, nor can they amend legislation to extend its clearly defined limits under the shelter of their power to fashion remedies.
“The Constitution of the United States has reserved to the Congress the power to legislate. Article I, section 1 provides that ‘All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, and shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives’.
“Not even the Supreme Court of the United States can usurp the legislative power reserved to the Congress by the Constitution. The Supreme Court itself has time and again paid homage to the doctrine of the separation of powers decreed by the Constitution and declared that judicial legislation is abhorrent to, and in violation of, the Constitutional scheme.” American Dredging Company v. Local 25, Marine Division, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 338 F.2d 837, 850 (3 Cir. 1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 935, 85 S.Ct. 941, 13 L.Ed.2d 822 (1965).
As earlier stated, this Court, time and again, has ruled that satisfaction of the requirements of Sections 2107 and 2253 and the related Federal Rules is “mandatory” and “indispensable” to vesting us with appellate jurisdiction.
In Plant Economy, Inc. v. Mirror Insulation Company, Inc., 308 F.2d 275 (3 Cir. 1962) we dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that it was filed after the expiration of the thirty-day appeal period fixed by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2107 and Rule 73(a).
In doing so, Judge Biggs, then Chief Judge, speaking for the Court, said at page 278:
“We recognize that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be construed liberally to bring about a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. Any requirement of compli*860anee with barren technical formalities is to be avoided. But it cannot be denied that certain formalities are indispensable if litigation is to be just, speedy and inexpensive. This fundamental and most important objective can be achieved only by adherence to rather than rejection of the rules.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Again, in Healy v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 181 F.2d 934 (3 Cir. 1950), cited and followed in Plant Economy, Inc., supra, we dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that there had been a failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Speaking through the writer of this dissent, we there said at pages 936-937:
“We are not oblivious of the trend away from those niceties which so often in the past harassed both litigants and the courts. But we are not here insisting upon mere satisfaction of barren formal technicalities. Howsoever liberal we may wish to be, it cannot be gainsaid that certain formalities 2 are indispensable to ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ litigation, and these attributes of our federal judicial system are forthcoming only upon adherence to, rather than upon rejection of, the Rules. It is of the highest importance that the appellate function be free óf, and protected from, the needless jurisdictional doubts so simply avoidable by compliance with a few specific instructions. The alternative can but induce a laxity destined to obscure the lines of proper appellate conduct, with consequent expense and hardship to the litigants, whose duty it is in the first instance to see to it that the record is in proper form for the relief sought.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Other circuits are in accord.
In Richland Knox Mutual Insurance Company v. Kallen, 376 F.2d 360 (6 Cir. 1967), the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a cross-appeal because it had not been filed within the thirty-day period fixed by Section 2107 and Rule 73(a).
In doing so the court said at page 363: “It is clear that the filing of the notice of appeal within the prescribed time limits is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the right of appeal is lost if the notice of appeal is not timely filed with the district court.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It may be noted parenthetically that the 6th Circuit cited on the score of the stated holding Plant Economy, Inc. v. Mirror Insulation Company, supra.
To the same effect see County of Imperial, in and for the State of California v. United States, 348 F.2d 904, 905 (9 Cir. 1965); Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Seaboard Surety Company, 327 F.2d 709, 710 (10 Cir. 1964); Mondakota Gas Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 194 F.2d 705, 706 (9 Cir. 1952), cert. den. 344 U.S. 827, 73 S.Ct. 28, 97 L.Ed. 643, rehearing den. 349 U.S. 969, 75 S.Ct. 878, 99 L.Ed. 1290; St. Luke’s Hospital v. Melin, 172 F.2d 532, 533 (8 Cir. 1949); Mosier v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 132 F.2d 710 (2 Cir. 1942).
The Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that when an appeal is not taken “within the time prescribed by law” that a federal court of appeals is “without jurisdiction.” George v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 293 U.S. 377, 379, 55 S.Ct. 229, 230, 79 L.Ed. 439 (1934). In that case, this Court was reversed when it entertained an appeal where the decree of the District Court was entered on March 31, 1933 and the appeal was net taken until May 18, 1933. See, too, Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 442, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962).
The Supreme Court has also held that its own appellate jurisdiction is limited to those cases where review is sought within the period prescribed by statute. Federal Trade Commission v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344 U.S. 206, 213, 73 S.Ct. 245, 97 L.Ed. 245 (1952); Matton Steamboat Co., Inc. v. *861Murphy, 319 U.S. 412, 63 S.Ct. 1126, 87 L.Ed. 1483 (1943). In the latter case the court said, at page 415, 63 S.Ct. at page 1128:
“The purpose of statutes limiting the period for appeal is to set a definite period of time when litigation shall be at an end, unless within that time the prescribed application has been made; and if it has not, to advise prospective appellees that they are freed of the appellant’s demands. Any other construction of the statute would defeat its purpose.” (Emphasis supplied.)
While the majority pays lip service to the “mandatory” requirement of Section 2107 and Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that a “notice of appeal” must be filed within thirty days of the denial of a writ of habeas corpus, it amends the statute and Rule by its holding that “an application for a certificate of probable cause will be treated as a notice of appeal if no formal notice of appeal has been filed”.
The majority’s reliance on Mihailoviki v. State of California, 364 F.2d 808 (9 Cir. 1966) as supporting authority for its stated holding is in error. In that case, the court deemed the appellant’s “request for a certificate of probable cause and for leave to file his appeal in forma pauperis,” as timely notice of appeal, 364 F.2d 809. (Emphasis supplied.) In the instant case, the appellant did not file an application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis within thirty days of the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, either in the District Court or this Court.
Moreover, in holding that a mere application for a certificate of probable cause may be treated as a notice of appeal, the majority ignores the specific provision in Rule 73(b), F.R.Civ.P., that “the notice of appeal shall specify the parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or part thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken.”
Exhaustive research has failed to disclose a single case in which any federal court ever held, as the majority does, that “A certificate of probable cause need not be sought or obtained within the period of thirty days from the denial of the petition for habeas corpus”. (Emphasis supplied.) The cases cited by the majority are inapposite and afford no nourishment to its holding.
This Court, in the cases cited and overruled by the majority, and other courts of appeals which have considered the question, have unanimously held that a certificate of probable cause must be sought within thirty days from denial of habeas corpus relief.
The prevailing view was stated in Ex parte Farrell, 189 F.2d 540, at page 544 (1 Cir. 1951), cert. den. sub. nom. Farrell v. O’Brien, 342 U.S. 839, 72 S.Ct. 64, 96 L.Ed. 634 as follows:
“An appeal from an order of a United States district court dismissing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, where the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a state court, may not be taken to the court of appeals for review (1) unless notice of appeal is filed within thirty days after the entry of such order, 28 U.S.C. § 2107, and (2) unless the judge who rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause, or at least unless the issuance of such certificate is applied for, within the thirty-day period, 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Following the analogy of the Matton case, supra [Matton Steamboat Co., Inc. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 412, 63 S.Ct. 1126, 87 L.Ed. 1483 (1943)], if such application is made to the district judge and by him denied, the case cannot be got before the court of appeals for review unless within the thirty-day period another application for the issuance of a certificate is presented to a circuit judge or the circuit justice, or * * * to the court of appeals itself”.
The holding in Farrell was adhered to by the First Circuit in two cases in 1964 — Landry v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 336 F.2d 189, 190, and Zimmer v. Langlois, 331 F.2d 424.
*862In Landry, the appellant had filed in the district court timely notice of appeal and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis which that court granted. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the appellant had not sought a certificate of probable cause for his appeal “and the time has now run for such application under the decision of this court in Ex parte Farrell * * * ” 336 F.2d 190.
In Zimmer where the district court had denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on February 24, 1964 and an application for a certificate of probable cause on March 12, 1964, the court of appeals denied an application made to it on April 4, 1964 for a certificate of probable cause on the ground that it had been presented after the expiration of “the 30 days for appeal” from the February 24, 1964 order of the district court. In doing so the court cited Farrell.
In United States ex rel. Geach v. Ragen, 231 F.2d 455 (7 Cir. 1956), it was held that a certificate of probable cause could not be issued by a federal appellate judge or court where 30 days had elapsed since the entry of the district court’s order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus even though notice of appeal had been filed within the 30-day period. In doing so the court said (p. 457):
“The application to one of the judges of this Court * * * for a certificate of probable cause, being made after the thirty day appeal period, was made too late. This Court is without power to grant the application, even if it were otherwise thought that there had been probable cause for the appeal.”
Analogous here is Poe v. Gladden, 287 F.2d 249, 250-251 (9 Cir. 1961), where the entry of judgment in a habeas corpus proceeding was made on September 28, 1959; application for a certificate of probable cause, which was subsequently granted, was filed on November 2, 1959 and notice of appeal was filed December 4, 1959. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction for the assigned reason that the certificate of probable cause had not been applied for until more than 30 days after the entry of the district court’s judgment; and “The appeal is not saved by the fact that a certificate of probable cause has been issued herein.”
In concluding summary, the vice of the majority’s disposition may be epitomized as follows:
(1) It judicially “amends” to the point of nullification two Acts of Congress —sections 2107 and 2253 — in usurpation of the Congressional legislative function and in disregard of Constitutional limitations and settled judicial doctrine;
(2) It violates the teaching of Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Pillsbury, supra, that a federal court of appeals cannot promulgate a rule which is in conflict with a statute relating to appeals;
(3) It contravenes Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to taking of appeals — Rules 73(a) and Rule 81(a) (2) — promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States;
(4) It contravenes the specific provision in Rule 11(4) of this Court, applicable to the instant case, that “there must be filed with the notice of appeal a certificate * * * that there is probable cause for the appeal.” (emphasis supplied);
(5) It applies the “new rules” to the instant case in contravention of the settled doctrine that “new” or “prospective” rules cannot be retroactively applied. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512, 70 S.Ct. 322, 94 L.Ed. 299 (1950).
I have limited my discussion in this dissent to the critical issue of appellate jurisdiction presénted by the situation in the instant case. My silence with respect to the wide-ranging obiter dicta aspects of the majority’s opinion is not to be construed as giving sanction to them.
I note in passing that were we able to reach the merits of this appeal I would *863conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing the petition for the habeas corpus writ on the ground that the petitioner had failed to exhaust the post-conviction remedy provided by N.J.R.R. 3:10A. In this respect I agree with Judge VAN DUSEN’s opinion. We have recently held that a federal court will not assume that a state court will construe a state post-conviction statute so as to make it inadequate or ineffective. In the Matter of the Petition of Barry, 388 F.2d 592 (3 Cir., opinion filed January 18, 1968) and United States ex rel. Singer v. Myers, 384 F.2d 279 (3 Cir. 1967).
Judge McLAUGHLIN joins in the views expressed.

. Section 1, Article III provides:
“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Oourt, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”

. Rule 1, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.