Court Opinion

ID: 9791630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:14:54.132335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:37.488622
License: Public Domain

*763CARDINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result but dissent from that portion of the opinion under “Standard of Care.” This case involves an accident in which appellee touched a low voltage line and fell. Low voltage electricity is not ultrahaz-ardous. It is something encountered in ordinary, normal daily activities when plugging in the coffee pot or toaster. It is like driving a car, something everyone does in the business of daily living; and so the activity is ordinary, and the duty is ordinary care. But the opinion assumes the activity (low voltage electricity) to be ultrahazardous and states the duty for one dealing with “dangerous agencies” as “ordinary care under all of the circumstances.” It concludes: “This is the standard of care regardless of whether a dangerous instrumentality is involved. It is not necessary to have degrees of care because the legal standard remains constant.” At 762.
I believe degrees of care are helpful because they move the law beyond a vague generality that no one can apply with any consistency; they are helpful in informing citizens more clearly what conduct is expected of them and what may result in liability; and I believe this, although it might be contrary to what is said to be the “enlightened” view. Finally, I believe courts rely too much upon the alleged “enlightened” or “modern” view propounded mostly by others with little trial or practical experience.
My problem with the majority’s statement that “the standard of care [when dealing with extrahazardous activity] is ordinary care under all the circumstances,” is that it is misleading. At 762. The statement leaves a jury with the impression that dealing with high voltage electricity is just an ordinary, everyday activity, no more significant than what is usually encountered. It is simply unfair to the injured party who most often suffers life threatening injuries or death. High voltage electricity (7,200 or 14,000 volts) is not “ordinary.”
The majority opinion later states: “[W]e believe the standard is correctly stated as ordinary or reasonable care but what constitutes ordinary care increases as the danger increases,” at 762, and then, quoting from Ruhs v. Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.1982), states that
[e]xercising reasonable care under “all the circumstances” is still the standard, but greater care is required because the nature of the business is ultrahazardous.
At 762. When the court states that greater care is required when an ultrahazardous activity is involved, that is an accurate statement. But the court is then incorrect in holding that although greater care is required, the jury must not be told of it. I would hold that the jury be so instructed, and I would approve such instruction.
The majority opinion states plainly, however, that it does not approve of an instruction informing the jury that “greater care is required” when an ultrahazardous activity is involved. Therefore, henceforth, an injured person should be prepared to produce evidence for the jury of the dangerousness of the activity, the accident frequency, statistical information totalling and describing the nature and magnitude of injuries, the likelihood of death, safety precautions available, safety training and programs, safety devices, and expert testimony upon all these elements and the ultrahazardous nature of the activity so that the jury can identify and apply the proper greater standard of care required “under all of the circumstances.”
Further, I disagree with that part of the majority opinion which states that Wyoming common law recognizes only one standard of care in negligence actions, regardless of the dangerousness of the instrumentality involved. The majority states, I believe incorrectly, that “we * * * have consistently stated ever since [Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Like, 381 P.2d 70 (Wyo.1963) ], the standard of care is ordinary care under all of the circumstances.” At 762. This court, in Pan Am., at 73-74, stated in pertinent part the following:
Counsel for the oil company have insisted that the standard of care, against which the acts of defendant-company should be measured, is that which on the average is exercised in the industry. The case of Citizens Coach Company v. Collier, 233 Ark. 912, 348 S.W.2d 873, and other au*764thorities are cited. For the most part, however, the cases cited have to do with businesses which involve very little risk as compared to the ultrahazardous activity involved in the instant case. The difference, we think, will become apparent from our subsequent discussion.
* ⅜ * * * ⅜
Attorneys for Pan American admit in their brief that the drilling and completion of an oil well “is always a hazardous undertaking,” and that serious accidents can and do occur. * * *
* * * * ⅜ *
A higher degree of care is required in dealing with a dangerous agency than in the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk. This care is sometimes described as a high degree of care, or a very high degree of care, or in some instances as the utmost care or extreme care.
⅜ # ⅜ ⅜ # ⅜
While no absolute standard of duty in dealing with dangerous agencies can be prescribed, it is safe to say in general terms that every reasonable precaution suggested by experience and the known dangers of the subject ought to be taken.
The sum of all of the above is that the Pan American court acknowledged the activity as extrahazardous, and, although its statement of law is less than clear, the preponderance of what is stated and a fair summary is that “a higher degree of care is required in dealing with a dangerous agency than in the ordinary affairs of life,” and that the jury should be so informed.
In Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo.1989), an injured employee sued several eoemploy-ees for culpable negligence. The trial court granted each of the coemployee defendants summary judgment. On appeal to this court, we reversed summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed concerning the question of culpable negligence of several of the coemployee defendants. Id. at 197-98. In the process of determining that material questions of fact existed, we discussed the duty of care owed by these coemployees. Justice Golden, writing for the majority, stated:
In this case, the outer boundary of this delegated duty is defined by the additional factor that mining is considered an extra-hazardous activity in Wyoming, W.S. 27-12-106 (1977), involving the use of dangerous agencies. Persons knowingly dealing with a dangerous agency must exercise the care commensurate with the danger involved. Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Like, 381 P.2d 70, 74 (Wyo.1963). As such, the degree of care of those entrusted with the duty to provide a safe workplace is greater than under the ordinary circumstances of life or business where little or no risk is involved. This standard of care requires that every reasonable precaution suggested by experience and the known dangers of the subject ought to be taken. [emphasis added]
Case, 776 P.2d at 192.
Clearly, this court has applied a higher standard of care to those dealing with extra-hazardous instrumentalities, and so instructing lay jurors has long been an established practice in the state. If a majority of this court desires to overrule what I consider precedent, it may do so; but it should acknowledge that it is overruling precedent.
I concur in the majority opinion in this case because I believe that appellee was not entitled to an instruction on the higher standard of care for extrahazardous instrumen-talities because the accident involved low voltage wires which are not extrahazardous instrumentalities.