Court Opinion

ID: 9897446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:39.459619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:53.418756
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Mar 22 2023, 8:48 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Daniel H. Pfeifer                                          MEMORIAL HOSPITAL D/B/A
Peter D. Hamann                                            BEACON HEALTH AND FITNESS
Ryan G. Milligan                                           John M. McCrum
Jeffrey J. Stesiak                                         Louis W. Voelker
Pfeifer Morgan & Stesiak LLP                               Kyle G. Grothoff
South Bend, Indian                                         Eichhorn & Eichhorn
                                                           Hammond, Indiana
                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
                                                           SPEAR CORPORATION
                                                           Lyle R. Hardman
                                                           Hunt Suedhoff Kearney LLP
                                                           South Bend, Indiana
                                                           Beverly J. Mack
                                                           Huelat & Mack P.C.
                                                           LaPorte, Indiana
                                                           Scott A. Ruksakiati
                                                           Tyson & Mendes
                                                           Chicago, Illinois
                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
                                                           PANZICA BUILDING CORPORATION
                                                           Martin J. Gardner
                                                           Christopher J. Uyhelji
                                                           Andria M. Oaks
                                                           Gardner & Rans P.C.
                                                           Granger, Indiana

                                            IN THE
     COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023                               Page 1 of 27
Jennifer Pennington                                        March 22, 2023
and Joshua Pennington,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CT-1573
Appellants-Plaintiffs /Cross-Appellees,
                                                           Appeal from the St. Joseph
        v.                                                 Superior Court
                                                           The Honorable Cristal C. Brisco,
Memorial Hospital of South                                 Judge
Bend, Inc. d/b/a Beacon Health                             Trial Court Cause No.
and Fitness,                                               71D04-1804-CT-160
Appellee-Defendant/Cross-Appellant,

Spear Corporation, and Panzica
Building Corporation
Appellees-Defendants.

                                 Opinion by Judge Bailey
                        Chief Judge Altice and Judge Riley concur.

Bailey, Judge.

                                     Case Summary

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023                      Page 2 of 27
[1]   Jennifer and Joshua Pennington filed a Fourth Amended Complaint alleging,

      among other things, that Jennifer sustained personal injuries in a swimming

      pool designed and constructed by Spear Corporation (“Spear”) and Panzica

      Building Corporation (“Panzica”), which was owned and operated by

      Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc. d/b/a Beacon Health and Fitness

      (“Beacon”). The trial court granted summary judgment to Spear and Panzica

      and partial summary judgment to Beacon. Some of the parties pursued

      separate interlocutory appeals, and this Court accepted jurisdiction and

      consolidated the matters for appeal. 1 We affirm.

                                                     Issues
[2]   The Penningtons present three issues for review:

              I.       Whether the trial court abused its discretion by striking
                       deposition testimony from Dr. Thomas Sawyer regarding
                       the applicable standard of care for swimming pool design;

              II.      Whether the trial court abused its discretion by striking
                       three exhibits from the Penningtons’ designated materials;
                       and

      1
       By an order of October 11, 2022, Court of Appeals Cause Numbers 22A-CT-1573 and 22A-CT-1950 were
      consolidated under Cause Number 22A-CT-1573. Pursuant to Appellate Rule 46(D), the Penningtons are
      Appellants/Cross-Appellees, and Beacon is the Appellee/Cross-Appellant. Panzica and Spear are Appellees.
      Some prior defendants have been dismissed from this action.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023                          Page 3 of 27
              III.     Whether summary judgment was improvidently granted to
                       Spear on the negligent design count.2

      On cross-appeal, Beacon argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the

      premises liability negligence claim.3

                             Facts and Procedural History
[3]   In January of 2015, Beacon contracted with Panzica to design and build a

      health and fitness center in Granger, Indiana. Panzica served as the principal

      architect and project designer/builder. Panzica created project plans and

      subcontracted with Spear to create drawings and designs for the multipurpose

      pool to be used for lap swimming and water aerobics.

[4]   As completed, the pool measured 28’ by 75’ with entry available either by stairs

      or by a 4’ wide descending ramp intended to accommodate persons with limited

      mobility. There was a 5’6” by 3’6” wing wall adjacent to the stairs and a 47’

      wing wall adjacent to the ramp. The opening between the two wing walls was

      22’6”, wide enough to accommodate water aerobics. The water level was

      regulated by a fixed sensor, designed to keep the water so that it “breaks [at] the

      edge of the pool.” (App. Vol. IX, pg. 213.) Four lanes were designated for lap

      2
        Summary judgment was granted to Spear and Panzica on the failure to warn claim, without opposition
      from the Penningtons.
      3
        Beacon’s interlocutory appeal does not include the trial court’s order on Count II, failure to warn and
      instruct about dangers inherent in the pool as constructed.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023                              Page 4 of 27
      swimming, one of which bordered the 22’6” opening. Flags were placed 15’

      from the end of the pool to guide backstroke swimmers.

[5]   In November of 2016, Beacon opened its Beacon Health & Fitness facility for

      patrons. On November 16, Jennifer went to the facility to swim before

      commencing her work day as a family physician. Jennifer entered the

      southernmost lane – that closest to the opening in the wing walls – and began

      her typical exercise routine which involved various swim strokes. At some

      point, Jennifer was positioned on her back and using backstrokes when she

      apparently drifted into the gap between wing wall abutments. The crown of her

      head collided with concrete, allegedly causing serious injury.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023      Page 5 of 27
[6]   On April 10, 2018, the Penningtons filed a Complaint for Damages. As

      amended, the complaint stated five counts. Count I alleged that Beacon, Spear,

      and Panzica failed to exercise reasonable care in designing the lap pool.

      Specifically, the Penningtons alleged:

              The design failures include, but are not limited to, the following:
              (a) a flawed design process; (b) swimming lanes that are narrower
              than applicable standards; (c) a wing wall design and structure
              that creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury; (d) a wing wall
              design that permits the wing wall to be submerged in violation of
              applicable regulations and building standards; and (e) failing to
              include adequate guidance and safety measures.

      (Beacon’s App. Vol. II, pg. 5.)

[7]   Count II alleged that Beacon, Spear, and Panzica failed to warn and instruct

      about dangers inherent in swimming in the lap pool as constructed.

      Specifically, the Penningtons alleged:

              [E]ach breached that duty by, among other things, failing to (a)
              warn about or instruct the appropriate parties regarding
              backstroke swimming in the pool lane adjacent to the wing wall;
              (b) instruct Beacon to provide or provide adequate warning
              signage or instructions; and (c) instruct Beacon to provide or
              provide adequate guidance aids such as floating lane lines.

      (Id. at 6.)

[8]   Count III stated a claim against Beacon, individually, for negligent

      maintenance and operation:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023         Page 6 of 27
               Beacon breached its duty by failing to exercise reasonable care in
               the maintenance and operation of the swimming pool and failing
               to remedy dangerous conditions, including but not limited to (a)
               failing to maintain and operate the lap pool with appropriate
               water levels; (b) failing to provide guidance aids and safety
               features such as floating lane lines and adequate padding; and (c)
               failing to provide adequate warnings and instructions.

       (Id. at 7.)

[9]    Count IV alleged that Spear and Panzica were negligent in the construction of

       the project. Specifically, the Penningtons alleged:

               Spear and [Panzica] breached their duty to the Penningtons by,
               among other things, the following: (a) [Panzica] failed to
               adequately supervise Spear in the construction and completion of
               the lap pool; (a) [sic] [Panzica] and Spear failed to give adequate
               consideration to safety; (b) [Panzica] and Spear failed to
               recognize and address conditions that could cause injury to the
               swimmer; and (c) [Panzica] and Spear failed to complete the
               project in conformance with industry standards and regulations.

       (Id. at 8.) Count V stated a derivative claim for Joshua’s loss of Jennifer’s

       services and companionship.

[10]   In March of 2022, Beacon and Spear filed motions for summary judgment, in

       which Panzica later joined. In sum, their contentions were that: pool

       construction had complied with the Indiana Administrative Code; no safety

       concerns had been raised during inspection; and placement of the wing walls

       was open and obvious. Beacon designated affidavits and deposition testimony

       indicating regulation compliance. Spear designated the deposition testimony of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023        Page 7 of 27
       pool designer and licensed professional engineer Matthew Reynolds, opining

       that the pool design was not unsafe and that professional design standards had

       not been breached.

[11]   The Penningtons opposed the motions for summary judgment, contending that

       the opening between wing walls was unnecessarily wide and that the water level

       was high enough to obscure swimmer perception of wing walls. Thomas

       Sawyer Ed.D., the Penningtons’ proffered expert witness, took the position that

       the defendants could have been negligent, notwithstanding compliance with

       applicable regulations.

[12]   Beacon filed a motion to exclude Dr. Sawyer’s deposition testimony. On May

       4, 2022, the trial court issued an order providing that Dr. Sawyer would not be

       entirely barred from offering an opinion. However, his opinion testimony was

       restricted to that which did not concern pool construction or design but only

       concerned the management and operation of the aquatic facility.

[13]   On May 12, 2022, the trial court conducted a summary judgment hearing, at

       which argument of counsel was heard, primarily concerning disputes over

       evidentiary submissions. The defendants asked the trial court to strike the

       Penningtons’ submissions of: design meeting minutes; emails produced in

       discovery by defendants and a former defendant; design drawings; and

       photographs that depicted the addition of padding on a wing wall and the

       pool’s water level twenty months after the incident.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023      Page 8 of 27
[14]   On June 10, the trial court issued an order on the evidentiary disputes and the

       pending motions for summary judgment. The court found admissible Exhibit 4

       (design meeting minutes) and Exhibit 8 (pool drawings) and took judicial notice

       of pool building standards. The court found inadmissible Exhibit 6 (labeled as

       a design binder), Exhibit 7 (emails partially concerning remedial measures), and

       Exhibit 12 (pool photographs that the court deemed untimely and irrelevant

       submissions).

[15]   In light of the designated expert testimony that professional architectural

       standards had not been breached with the design of the pool, which was

       uncontroverted by expert testimony of a breach, the trial court granted

       summary judgment to Spear and Panzica on the design negligence claim.

       Summary judgment was granted to Beacon on claims other than “sub-part (c) of

       Count 3,” purportedly restricting trial to less than all factual allegations

       pertinent to Count III, the premises liability claim. Appealed Order at 10. The

       trial court stated that “whether Beacon should have operated the Pool in a

       manner different is one subject to a dispute of material facts, mainly in the

       testimony of Dr. Thomas Sawyer on the operations of pool facilities.” Id.

       According to the order, the Penningtons were to proceed to trial upon their

       allegation that Beacon “failed to provide adequate warnings and instructions.”

       Id.

[16]   In sum, the trial court determined that a single conclusion could be drawn as to

       negligence in design; that is, the architect-designers did not breach professional

       standards in the inclusion of features of the pool. On the other hand, the trial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023             Page 9 of 27
       court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to negligence in

       operational decisions. The designated materials indicate that decisions made by

       Beacon included: designating for lap swimming four lanes (one of which

       allowed swimmers to proceed past the opening between the wing walls) as

       opposed to fewer and wider lap lanes; not utilizing a rope in the opening

       between the wing walls; and placement of the flags to guide backstroke

       swimmers.4

[17]   On June 30, 2022, the trial court entered judgment for Spear as a final and

       appealable order, and the Penningtons appealed that judgment. Beacon

       initiated a separate interlocutory appeal, and this Court accepted jurisdiction

       and consolidated the two appeals. On appeal, the Penningtons contend that

       summary judgment was improvidently granted on the design negligence claim;

       Panzica (joined in argument by Spear) presents argument to the contrary; and

       Beacon contends that the premises liability claim should not proceed to trial.

       4
         The Penningtons have contended that the pool was operated with a water level high enough to obscure a
       backstroke swimmer’s clear vision of the wing walls. Beacon’s aquatics facility coordinator averred that
       “pool water is pumped continuously through filters and rises to the level of a gutter system which collects the
       water near the top of the pool walls, enabling it to re-circulate through the gutter” and also averred: “The
       water level is maintained by an automatic sensor at the level of the gutter, which was installed by the builder
       of the pool. Once the water reaches the sensor, the water will automatically stop filling the pool.” Finally,
       he averred: “Given the automatic nature of the water sensor, this level of water – which goes to the edge of
       the gutter but not over the top of the pool walls – has remained constant since the multipurpose pool was
       opened for use, and there have been no reported malfunctions in the sensor’s operation.” (Affidavit of Brad
       Jasinski, pgs. 2-3.) No change had been made since installation; however, it is not clear that the sensor was
       absolutely fixed such that a change could not be made. The designated materials do not foreclose an
       inference that Beacon had some means of manipulating or relocating the sensor that controlled the water
       level.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023                               Page 10 of 27
                                  Discussion and Decision
                             Jurisdiction and Procedural Posture
[18]   The Indiana Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in appeals from final judgments.

       Ind. Appellate Rule 5(A). A “final judgment” is one which “disposes of all

       claims as to all parties....” App. R. 2(H)(1). Here, the Fourth Amended

       Complaint set forth five counts against three named defendants in the

       aggregate, with each named defendant responding to four counts.5 The trial

       court’s order of June 10, 2022, did not dispose of all claims as to all parties.

       Indiana Trial Rule (C) provides that a summary judgment upon less than all of

       the issues involved or with respect to less than all the claims or parties is

       interlocutory unless “the court in writing expressly determines that there is no

       just reason for delay and in writing expressly directs entry of judgment as to less

       than all the issues, claims or parties.”

[19]   Spear obtained trial court certification of the order for summary judgment in its

       favor and the Penningtons appealed that certified final order.6 Spear responded

       and Panzica obtained permission from this Court to join Spear’s brief; Panzica

       has not sought certification of the June 10, 2022, order as it pertains to Panzica.

       5
        Additional defendants named by Beacon – Design Organization and Panzica II – were dismissed and were
       not named as defendants in the Fourth Amended Complaint.
       6
        The Notice of Appeal filed in 22A-CT-1950 stated that the order being appealed was the order of June 10,
       2022. However, that order was interlocutory, with Count III proceeding to trial. On June 30, 2022, the
       order as to Spear was declared a final and appealable judgment. The Penningtons could thus appeal that
       portion of the June 10 order. Also, on September 19, 2022, this Court accepted jurisdiction of Beacon’s
       discretionary interlocutory cross-appeal, to which the Penningtons could respond.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023                          Page 11 of 27
       Subsequent to the filing of the Penningtons’ appeal, Beacon obtained

       certification of the trial court order denying Beacon summary judgment on the

       premises liability claim against it. On September 19, 2022, this Court accepted

       jurisdiction of Beacon’s cross-appeal, to which the Penningtons could then

       respond. This Court also ordered that the appeals be consolidated.

[20]   Beacon points out that, as to the order for partial summary judgment in

       Beacon’s favor on the negligent design and failure to warn claims (Counts I and

       II), no party has complied with the requirement for certification. As such, as

       the partial summary judgment order pertains to Beacon on these counts, the

       orders are interlocutory and not the subject of current appellate review.

[21]   Additionally, Beacon claims that the Penningtons cannot contest, in this

       appeal, what Beacon appears to characterize as a ruling in its favor on some

       portions of Count III, the premises liability claim. Beacon interprets the order

       on Count III as follows: “The only remaining part of the claim was the alleged

       failure to provide adequate warnings to swimmers on the use of the

       southernmost lane, particularly to those swimmers engaged in the backstroke.”

       Appellant’s Brief at 16. According to Beacon, “the trial court only adjudicated

       certain allegations within that count, e.g., the allegation that Beacon failed to

       maintain appropriate water levels and the allegation that it failed to provide

       adequate safety features, such as lane lines and padding.” Beacon Reply Brief

       at 18.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023       Page 12 of 27
[22]   But summary judgment is not a means for resolution of factual disputes and

       “should not be used as an abbreviated trial, even where the proof is difficult or

       where the court may believe that the non-moving party will not succeed at

       trial.” Pierson ex rel. Pierson v. Serv. Am. Corp., 9 N.E.3d 712, 715 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2014), trans. denied. Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the designated

       evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

       and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind.

       Trial Rule 56(C). We review de novo whether the trial court properly granted

       summary judgment. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).

[23]   As these are summary judgment proceedings, the trial court was not in a

       position to adjudicate factual disputes. The parceling of a claim within a claim

       based upon resolution of factual disputes is inconsistent with our summary

       judgment standard. In short, in summary judgment proceedings, the trial court

       does not act as a factfinder to narrow the issues of fact pertinent to a claim that

       proceeds to trial. We will review de novo – based upon the law and the record

       of designated materials – whether Beacon is entitled to summary judgment on

       Count III, the premises liability claim.

                           Expert Testimony – Evidence Rule 702
[24]   The Penningtons first contend that the trial court abused its discretion when it

       excluded the proffered expert testimony by Dr. Sawyer that the pool was

       negligently designed because, among other things, the opening between wing

       walls was unnecessarily wide, and the design featured no padding for

       abutments. Dr. Sawyer acknowledged that the pool design complied with
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023         Page 13 of 27
       applicable Indiana codes and industry standards but asserted that more

       consideration could have been given to safety concerns.

               The admission or exclusion of expert testimony lies within the
               sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed absent
               an abuse of that discretion. Hannan v. Pest Control Servs., Inc., 734
               N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. Indiana
               Evidence Rule 702, governing expert testimony, contains two
               requirements for a witness to qualify as an expert: “(1) the
               subject matter is distinctly related to some scientific field,
               business or profession beyond the knowledge of the average lay
               person; and (2) the witness is shown to have sufficient skill,
               knowledge or experience in that area so that the opinion will aid
               the trier of fact.” Bacher v. State, 686 N.E.2d 791, 800 (Ind. 1997).

       Miller v. Bernard, 957 N.E.2d 685, 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis added).

[25]   Panzica acted as chief architect and received design input from Spear in relation

       to the pool. The standard of care for design professionals is well established:

               The responsibility of an architect is similar to that of a lawyer or
               physician. Lukowski v. Vecta Educational Corp., 401 N.E.2d 781,
               786 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). “When he possesses the requisite skill
               and knowledge, and in the exercise thereof has used his best
               judgment, he has done all the law requires.” Id. Thus, the key
               question in determining whether an architect has been negligent
               is not whether error occurred, but whether the architect breached
               a duty to exercise “the degree of competence ordinarily exercised
               in like circumstances by reputable members of the profession....”
               Walters v. Kellam & Foley, 172 Ind. App. 207, 360 N.E.2d 199, 206
               (1977). Absent a special agreement, an architect does not imply
               or guarantee a perfect plan. Lukowski, 401 N.E.2d at 786.
               Furthermore, an architect “is not a warrantor of his plans and
               specifications. The result may show a mistake or defect,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023        Page 14 of 27
               although he may have exercised the reasonable skill required.”
               Id. (quoting Bayne v. Everham, 197 Mich. 181, 163 N.W. 1002
               (1917)).

       Mayberry Café, Inc. v. Glenmark Constr. Co., 879 N.E.2d 1162, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2008), trans. denied.

[26]   In his deposition, Dr. Sawyer expressed the view that the pool featured an

       unsafe or inadequate design, notwithstanding code compliance. As to his

       qualifications to render an opinion on whether a pool designer breached the

       standard of care, Dr. Sawyer testified as follows.

               Q: And will you agree, sir, that since you’re not a licensed
               architect or a licensed professional engineer that you have never
               designed from an engineer’s perspective or an architect’s
               perspective a pool in the State of Indiana?

               A: I agree.

               Q: So is it true that your name has never been submitted as a
               design professional of record for any pool anywhere in the
               United States?

               A: That’s correct.

               Q: And is it true that you have no experience in how to engineer
               the design of a swimming pool?

               A: That’s correct.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023       Page 15 of 27
        Q: And is it true that you don’t have any education in how to
        engineer the design of a swimming pool?

        A: That’s correct.

        Q: And you don’t have any training as to how to engineer the
        design of a swimming pool; is that true?

        A: That’s correct.

        Q: And do you agree that since you’re not trained, educated or
        licensed as an engineer that you’re not qualified to give an
        opinion as to the standard of care applicable to an engineer who
        signs and stamps a set of pool drawings?

        A: That’s correct.

        Q: And since you’re not a licensed architect by education,
        training or licensure, do you agree that you’re not qualified to
        give an opinion as to the standard of care applicable to an
        architect who may be signing or stamping a set of plans which
        include pool drawings?

        A: That’s correct.

        Q: Your expertise is really how to safely operate an aquatic
        facility; is that right?

        A: That’s correct.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023         Page 16 of 27
       (Pennington App. Vol. III, pg. 64.) As such, the witness was not shown to have

       “sufficient skill, knowledge or experience in that area so that the opinion will

       aid the trier of fact.” Bacher, 686 N.E.2d at 800.

[27]   The Penningtons attempt to characterize their negligent design claim as simply

       presenting a “premises liability case” and argue that such a case is to be

       evaluated under traditional principles of negligence. Appellant’s Brief at 31.

       They direct our attention to Hiatt v. Brown, 422 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1981). There, an injured Indianapolis International Airport patron, a “stranger

       to the architect-owner relationship,” obtained reversal of a summary judgment

       granted to the architect, because there existed a genuine issue of material fact as

       to the architect’s alleged negligence. Id. at 738. Nonetheless, this claim was not

       one which survived summary judgment in the absence of expert testimony.

       Rather, there had been presented “expert testimony by deposition that Brown

       did not follow the ordinary standards of architectural practice in failing to study

       available information regarding [a] jet blast problem.” Id. at 737. Hiatt does

       not support the Penningtons’ assertion that a breach of professional negligence

       standards may be shown absent expert testimony.

[28]   Additionally, the Penningtons point out that Dr. Sawyer, a retired professor of

       Kinesiology, Recreation, and Sport at Indiana State University, has a

       comprehensive background including teaching about facility development and

       design. Indeed, the trial court ruled that designated evidence consistent with

       Dr. Sawyer’s field of expertise – safe operations of an aquatic facility – would

       be admissible. But the Penningtons have not shown that the trial court abused

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023       Page 17 of 27
       its discretion by excluding deposition testimony that the defendants were

       negligent because they produced an unsafe design, when Dr. Sawyer had no

       training, background, experience, or expertise in development of a pool design.

                    Admissibility of Summary Judgment Materials
[29]   Indiana Trial Rule 56 permits parties to submit affidavits and evidence in

       support of their motions for summary judgment. That rule states in relevant

       part:

               [A] party shall designate to the court all parts of pleadings,
               depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of
               judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for
               purposes of the motion. . . .Supporting and opposing affidavits
               shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
               would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
               that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
               therein. Sworn or certified copies not previously self-
               authenticated of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
               affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.

       Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)-(E). “Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

       the trial court will consider only properly designated evidence which would be

       admissible at trial.” Zelman v. Capital One Bank (USA) N.A., 133 N.E.3d 244,

       248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “Unsworn statements and unverified exhibits do not

       qualify as proper Rule 56 evidence.” Seth v. Midland Funding, LLC, 997 N.E.2d

       1139, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We accord great deference to the evidentiary

       rulings of the trial court and will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. Blevins

       v. Clark, 740 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). An abuse of discretion

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023        Page 18 of 27
       occurs when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts

       and circumstances set before it. Id.

[30]   The Penningtons challenge the exclusion of Exhibit 6, materials related to

       design ostensibly provided in discovery by dismissed defendant Design

       Organization. They also challenge the exclusion of Exhibit 7, containing in

       relevant part an email produced in discovery by Beacon, wherein a principal of

       Panzica stated: “Our client as well as your and our firm have a condition that

       exposes all of us to liability for injury.” (App. Vol. IV, pg. 217.) Finally, the

       Penningtons challenge the exclusion of Exhibit 12, proffered photographic

       evidence purportedly showing water levels at an unsafe height in the pool and

       also showing that padding had been added to a wing wall abutment.

[31]   Exhibit 6 consists of emails, photographs, handwritten notes, materials lists,

       and design plans selected from discovery materials; it was apparently

       mislabeled as “Spear Design Binder.” Appealed Order at 5. The trial court

       excluded Exhibit 6 as “documents grouped together without authentication,

       foundation, or explanation.” Id. We find no abuse of discretion in the

       exclusion of miscellaneous documents curated from discovery products and

       mislabeled, unsworn and unverified in their proffered form.

[32]   The trial court excluded pool photographs taken twenty months after the

       incident as lacking in relevance because the photographs did not depict the

       conditions at the time of the incident or soon thereafter. The trial court also

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023        Page 19 of 27
       observed that the photographs showed padding, a remedial measure. Indiana

       Evidence Rule 407 provides:

               When measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury
               or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures
               is not admissible to prove:

               • negligence;

               • culpable conduct;

               • a defect in a product or its design; or

               • a need for a warning or instruction.

               But the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such
               as impeachment or--if disputed--proving ownership, control, or
               the feasibility of precautionary measures thereafter.

[33]   Underlying Rule 407 is a public policy based on fear that permitting proof of

       subsequent remedial action will deter a defendant from taking action that will

       prevent future injuries. Strack and VanTil, Inc. v. Carter, 803 N.E.2d 666, 670

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Evidence of repair may constitute an admission by the

       defendant but it may instead “connote the defendant’s exercise of care beyond

       that required by the law: the defendant turns to measures beyond those

       required by reasonable care.” Id. at 671. As such, ‘“[a] person may have

       exercised all the care which the law required, and yet, in light of the new

       experience, after an unexpected accident has occurred, and as a measure of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023      Page 20 of 27
       extreme caution, he may adopt additional safeguards.”’ Id. (quoting Terre Haute

       & I.R. Co. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15, 23 N.E. 965 (1890)). Here, the exclusion of

       photographs showing remedial measures in place twenty months after the

       incident was not an abuse of discretion.

[34]   Arguably, Exhibit 7, suggesting action might be warranted to avoid exposure to

       liability, amounts to a party admission that a hazardous condition existed. See

       Ind. Evidence Rule 804. But summary judgment was granted to the defendants

       on the design negligence claim due to the negation of the element of breach of

       duty. An expression of concern about a need for remedial measures after an

       incident is not equivalent to an admission that the design architects breached a

       duty of care. In these circumstances, the exclusion of the email did not affect

       the Penningtons’ substantial rights. The exclusion of Exhibit 7 does not alter

       the summary judgment analysis upon the negligent design claim.

                  Summary Judgment on Design Negligence Claim
[35]   The Penningtons argue that the trial court improvidently granted summary

       judgment to Spear and Panzica on the design negligence claim.7 Pursuant to

       Rule 56(C) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, summary judgment is

       appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving

       party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When we review a grant of

       7
         The order granting summary judgment to Panzica remains interlocutory, although Panzica was granted
       leave to join in the brief of Spear.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023                       Page 21 of 27
       summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as that of the trial court.

       Shambaugh & Son, Inc. v. Carlisle, 763 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ind. 2002). We consider

       only those facts that the parties designated to the trial court. Id. The Court

       must accept as true those facts alleged by the nonmoving party, construe the

       evidence in favor of the nonmovant, and resolve all doubts against the moving

       party. Id.

[36]   A trial court’s order on summary judgment is cloaked with a presumption of

       validity; the party appealing from a grant of summary judgment must bear the

       burden of persuading this Court that the decision was erroneous. Indianapolis

       Downs, LLC v. Herr, 834 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. We

       may affirm the grant of summary judgment upon any basis argued by the

       parties and supported by the record. Payton v. Hadley, 819 N.E.2d 432, 438

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). However, Trial Rule 56(H) specifically prohibits this

       Court from reversing a grant of summary judgment on the ground that there is a

       genuine issue of material fact, unless the material fact and the evidence relevant

       thereto shall have been specifically designated to the trial court.

       AutoXchange.com, Inc. v. Dreyer and Reinbold, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 40, 45 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2004).

[37]   “To prevail on a theory of negligence, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the

       defendant owed plaintiff a duty; (2) that it breached the duty; and (3) that

       plaintiff’s injury was proximately caused by the breach.” Winfrey v. NLMP, Inc.,

       963 N.E.2d 609, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Summary judgment is rarely

       appropriate in negligence cases. Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023       Page 22 of 27
       2004). “This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are

       governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person – one best applied by

       a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. “However, a defendant may obtain

       summary judgment in a negligence action when the undisputed facts negate at

       least one element of the plaintiff’s claim.” Pelak v. Indiana Indus. Servs., Inc., 831

       N.E.2d 765, 769 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[38]   Here, relative to the breach of duty element, the defendants to the negligent

       design claim designated the engineering report and deposition testimony of

       Matthew Reynolds. Reynolds offered his “professional opinion based upon a

       reasonable degree of engineering certainty, that the incident swimming pool is

       reasonably safe for its intended use.” (App. Vol. III, pg. 41.) Reynolds

       additionally stated that the pool was compliant with the Indiana Administrative

       Code, which permits wing walls; its features were common in the aquatics

       industry; the pool met standards of care relative to other Indiana facilities he

       had researched; he had found no defects; and he did not consider the pool

       unreasonably dangerous. The defendants also designated materials indicating

       that the pool had passed the inspection required for a public facility.

[39]   A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden to make a prima facie

       showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the party is

       entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Am. Mgmt., Inc. v. MIF Realty, L.P., 666

       N.E.2d 424, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Once the moving party satisfies this

       burden through evidence designated to the trial court pursuant to Trial Rule 56,

       the nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings, but must designate specific

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023         Page 23 of 27
       facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id. To withstand

       summary judgment after the defendants made a prima facie showing that the

       professional standard of care had not been breached, it was incumbent upon the

       Penningtons to come forward with some designated evidence of a breach. They

       did not do so. Summary judgment was not improvidently granted on the

       design negligence claim under review.

                   Summary Judgment on Premises Liability Claim
[40]   At the summary judgment hearing, Beacon and the Penningtons agreed that

       Jennifer was an invitee onto land and that Count III, denominated a claim for

       negligent maintenance and operation, was a premises liability claim governed

       by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, which provides:

               A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused
               to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

               (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover
               the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable
               risk of harm to such invitees, and

               (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger,
               or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

               (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the
               danger.

[41]   The Restatement instructs that Section 343 should be read together with Section

       343A. Restatement § 343, cmt. a. Section 343A(1) provides:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023          Page 24 of 27
               A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm
               caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose
               danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should
               anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.

[42]   Beacon argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on the premises liability

       claim because the designated materials negate the element of duty here. Absent

       a duty, there can be no breach. Peters v. Forster, 804 N.E.2d 736, 738 (Ind.

       2004). In a negligence action, the existence of a duty is generally a pure

       question of law. Indiana Dep’t of Transp. v. Howard, 879 N.E.2d 1119, 1122 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2008). However, factual questions may be interwoven, rendering the

       existence of a duty a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by the

       fact-finder. Id.

[43]   Beacon asserts that no duty can be imputed to it because “Beacon had no actual

       or constructive knowledge of any dangerous condition inherent in the pool

       design and no reason to expect that Jennifer Pennington or any other lap

       swimmer would not observe the observable and exercise reasonable care while

       using the pool.” Beacon’s Brief at 20. We agree with Beacon that the summary

       judgment record reveals that there was no “dangerous condition inherent in the

       pool design.” See id. And there is no dispute that Jennifer had a duty to

       exercise reasonable care for her own safety. However, the allegations against

       Beacon were not limited to failure to warn of inherent defects in the pool. The

       Penningtons also alleged that Beacon made operational decisions such that the

       pool was unsafe for an invitee conducting the activity at issue, i.e., swimming

       backstroke in the lap lane nearest the opening between wing walls.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023        Page 25 of 27
[44]   Confining its argument to fixed attributes of the pool, Beacon’s position is that

       it had no reason to suspect a danger and that harm to Jennifer was not

       foreseeable within the context of duty. But our Indiana Supreme Court has

       recognized that the landowner’s duty of reasonable care extends not only to

       harm caused by a condition on the land but also may be extended to activities

       being conducted thereon. Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316, 323 (Ind. 2016).

       However, “the landowner-invitee ‘duty to protect’ is not limitless, because some

       harms are so unforeseeable that a landowner has no duty to protect an invitee

       against them.” Id. at 324.

               [I]n the duty arena, foreseeability is a general threshold
               determination that involves an evaluation of (1) the broad type of
               plaintiff and (2) the broad type of harm. In other words, this
               foreseeability analysis should focus on the general class of
               persons of which the plaintiff was a member and whether the
               harm suffered was of a kind normally to be expected—without
               addressing the specific facts of the occurrence.

       Id. at 325.

[45]   Here, the broad type of plaintiff would be patrons of the pool and the broad

       type of harm would be injury from a patron’s impact with the pool. It is

       foreseeable within the context of duty that a patron might collide with an

       abutment of a pool, albeit designed and constructed in conformance with

       reasonable professional standards. Beacon does not act as the insurer of the

       patron’s safety, see id. at 326, but rather could be expected to take reasonable

       precautions to lessen the potential for collision or to prevent injury when a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023       Page 26 of 27
       collision happens. Assuming, as we must, that the pool was designed such that

       it was not inherently unsafe, it is nonetheless without dispute that there exists a

       lengthy opening between concrete abutments. Beacon as landowner made the

       decisions as to what activities could be conducted within and in proximity to

       the gap and with what notifications.

[46]   Beacon has failed to demonstrate that it had no duty in these circumstances. As

       to breach of duty, the designated materials reveal a dispute as to whether

       Beacon unreasonably failed to restrict lap swimming to only lanes appropriate

       for that purpose, to provide adequate signage and barriers, or to maintain the

       water level for clear visibility of submerged or substantially submerged wing

       walls. Beacon has failed to “affirmatively negate it’s opponent’s claim.”

       Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003. The trial court did not err in denying summary

       judgment to Beacon upon the premises liability claim.

                                                Conclusion
[47]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking a portion of the deposition

       testimony of the Penningtons’ designated expert witness; nor did the trial court

       abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings. Summary judgment was not

       improvidently granted to Spear on the design negligence claim. Summary

       judgment was properly denied to Beacon upon the premises liability claim.

[48]   Affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1573 | March 22, 2023        Page 27 of 27