Court Opinion

ID: 9544532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:56:38.908296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:08.577339
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C.J.,
(dissenting). I dissent.
Latipac [Latipac, Inc v The Superior Court of Marin County, 64 Cal 2d 278; 411 P2d 564 (1966)] does not support the majority’s finding of substantial compliance in this case. As the majority acknowledges, the finding of substantial compliance in Latipac was based on three criteria. One criterion was that the contractor’s qualifications as a licensee had been "officially confirmed” throughout the period of contract performance. A careful reading of the dissent in Latipac shows the Court’s reliance on this criterion was a slight extension of California law and was crucial to the decision.
In the present case the contractor seeking recovery has not shown that its qualifications were "officially confirmed” throughout the period of performance of the contract. The majority has not found otherwise. Although the majority concludes the Latipac test has been met in this case, its conclusion is based on the reason that "there is no *586proof that Casey was not a competent and responsible contractor throughout the term of the contract”. This reasoning confuses "license” and "official confirmation” with "qualification in fact”. In reality the majority’s ruling today is much broader than the holding in Latipac.
The majority’s extension of Latipac is contrary to the clear language of the residential builders act. The majority justifies this extension by reasoning that the purposes of the residential builders’ act will not be served by exacting a forfeiture from the contractor in this case. These matters, however, may not be considered in an action barred by the clear language of the licensing act. Justice Mosk made this point well in his Latipac dissent. Regarding the California Contractors Licensing Law, he wrote:
" 'In each * * * case, how the aims of policy can best be achieved depends on the kind of illegality and the particular facts involved. [Citations.] But we are not free to weigh these considerations in the present case. Section 7031 represents a legislative determination that the importance of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in the contracting business outweighs any harshness between the parties, and that such deterrence can best be realized by denying violators the right to maintain any action for compensation in the courts of the state [citation].’ (Italics added.)” 64 Cal 2d 278, 289 quoting Lewis & Queen v N M Ball Sons, 48 Cal 2d 141, 151; 308 P2d 713 (1957).
Prior Michigan cases are in accord with Justice Mosk’s position. See, e.g., Bilt-More Homes, Inc v French, 373 Mich 693; 130 NW2d 907 (1964), and Chilson v Clevenger, 12 Mich App 56; 162 NW2d 303 (1968).
While I am sympathetic in this case to the equitable claims of the contractor and to the policy concerns of the majority, I believe such claims should be addressed to the Legislature.