Court Opinion

ID: 9491650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:19:36.724858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:51.845511
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Although I agree with the result the majority reaches, I respectfully part company with my colleagues on two issues.
In my view, the district court erred in allowing joinder-under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b). The part of Rule 8(b) relevant to this case provides that “[t]wo or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in ... the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.” The case for joinder must be made on the face of the indictment. The indictment in this case is ambiguous and does not allege with sufficient specificity that Daniel was linked to the drug crimes. Although an inference that Daniel laundered drug money or that Daniel’s laundering was used to finance the drug conspiracy might be drawn from the alleged facts scattered throughout the indictment, such guesswork is insufficient to allow joinder.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1) states, in part, that “[t]he indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” When read in conjunction with Rule 8(b), Rule 7(c)(1) requires greater specificity in linking the laundering and drug crimes than this indictment provides. This court has previously noted the specificity requirement in United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir.1987). In deciding whether joinder was improper under Rule 8(b) on the grounds that the indictment failed to allege sufficiently a conspiracy among the co-defendants, the court stated that “[a]n indictment must state all of the elements of the offense charged; it must inform the defendant of the nature of the charge so that he may defend himself; and it must enable the defendant to plead the judgment as a bar to any later prosecution for the same offense.” Id. at 1412.
The indictment did not sufficiently and specifically link Charles’ drug crimes with *404Daniel’s laundering. Count Twenty-eight merely charges Daniel with laundering of the proceeds of an unlawful activity; it does not specify which unlawful activity that might be — embezzlement or drug dealing. Notably, the overt acts section of that Count only refers to embezzlement. The majority also points out that another' count alleges that Charles and Gentile intended to finance their drug operation with embezzled- money laundered through Daniel. This attempt at linking the laundering with drugs certainly is not stated on the face of the indictment.. The indictment alleges that Gentile embezzled funds for the purpose of purchasing drugs; it does not allege that Gentile embezzled funds to be laundered through Daniel for the purpose of purchasing drugs. There is no allegation that Daniel knew the laundered proceeds had anything to do with drugs. At no point, therefore, does the indictment clearly explain Daniel’s “partieipatpon] in the ... same series of acts or transactions constituting” a drug conspiracy. Rule 8(b).
Although I think the district court erred in allowing joinder under Rule 8(b), I agree that the error was harmless. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (holding that harmless error analysis applies to Rule 8 misjoinder). The limiting instructions given by the district court were sufficient to make clear to the jury that it should not consider drug evidence against Daniel.
The issue of the scope of redirect is also troublesome. I agree with the majority that the district court erred in not allowing Daniel to explain the nature of his “conviction.” I do not agree that Daniel waived the issue at either the district court or court of appeals level. Daniel’s attorney did sufficiently object at trial to the reference to Daniel’s bond forfeiture as a conviction. See Tr. at 1697-98, 1853. Additionally, Daniel’s initial brief in this court clearly raised the argument. See Appellant’s Br. at 31. Although it is a close issue, I agree that the district court’s error was harmless. The manner in which Daniel conducted the affairs of his business is sufficient evidence of Daniel’s guilt. The error therefore did not exert “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946).