Court Opinion

ID: 9518543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:55:32.359255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:31.180671
License: Public Domain

Carter, J.,
concurring.
The dissent in this case attempts to make difficult that which appears to be a rather simple problem when properly analyzed.
The real question, as I view it, is whether or not the testator created a tenancy in common or a joint tenancy when he conveyed a life estate to his three children. I submit that it was the former. There is not one word in this will to indicate that a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common with survivorship was intended. It is a well-known rule in this state that tenancies in common are favored and that joint tenancies will not be found in the absence of language indicating a clear intent to create one.
Upon the decease of a tenant in common his interest descends to his children in the absence of language vesting it elsewhere. Consequently, upon the death of one of the tenants in common his interest vests immediately in his children, share and share alike. The fault in the dissent is contained in the unwarranted premise that the life estate created a survivorship in the *757surviving life tenant when there is not the semblance of any such intent.
The majority is charged in the dissent with ignoring section 76-117, R. R. S. 1943. This act applies only when a conveyance of property is made to two or more persons as tenants in common for life or for a term of years which is terminable at their deaths “with an express remainder, * * * (a) to the survivor of such persons, or (b) upon the death of all the life tenants.” There is no provision of the will that brings the case within the scope of this statute. Even the Nebraska Law Review article quoted in the dissent reflects this limitation upon the scope of section 76-117, R. R. S. 1943.
The will provided that in the event no children were born naturally to his daughter, the testator gave their share in the real estate to the “children of my sons Harold and Leonard, share and share alike.” If the position taken in the dissent is the correct one, there was no need whatever for this provision. It becomes superfluous under such an interpretation. The rule is that the intent of the testator will be gathered from the four corners of the will. This means that the intent of the testator is to be determined from the whole will and not only from those provisions that appear to support any specific theory.
I submit that the conclusion of the majority is consistent with all provisions of the will and properly reflects the intent of the testator. The confusion in the case, if any, is injected by the dissent and not the majority opinion.