Court Opinion

ID: 9902214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:04:33.174462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.757528
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                            NO. 2023-CA-0428-WC

LATISHA HUDSON                                                     APPELLANT

                 PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
v.             OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
                       ACTION NO. WC-17-74136

FORD MOTOR COMPANY; JEWISH
HOSPITAL; HONORABLE ROLAND
CASE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE; SCOTT FARNER; AND
WORKERS’ COMPSENSATION
BOARD                                                               APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Appellant, Latisha Hudson, appeals the Workers’

Compensation Board’s (the Board) affirmation of an administrative law judge’s

(ALJ) July 7, 2022 opinion and order resolving Appellant’s claims for past medical
benefits in favor of Appellee, Ford Motor Company. After reviewing the record,

we affirm.

             In April 2012, Appellant began working for Appellee performing

repetitive physical work duties on a production assembly line. The record

indicates she worked on the assembly line uninterrupted until she took extended

maternity leave due to a high-risk pregnancy. She began maternity leave in June

2016, and she gave birth to a daughter in January 2017.

             After being away off work for approximately ten months, she returned

on April 11, 2017. She testified returning to work “felt like it was my first day

stepping into [the] Ford [assembly plant] like I did back in April of ’12.” “[M]y

overall body was sore[,]” she said. But the soreness did not go away.

             She asked her supervisor’s permission to be treated and soon saw

physicians who treated her. She stopped working for Appellee in July 2017,

although she did not formally part from Appellee’s employment until May 2018.

             Meanwhile, on November 18, 2017, Appellant filed a Form 101 – an

application to resolve an injury claim. In this form, Appellant claimed that on

April 17, 2017 – six days after returning to work – she suffered a work-related

injury that manifested as pain in her wrists, elbows, shoulders, and upper back.

Doctors diagnosed Appellant with either carpel tunnel syndrome or cubital tunnel

syndrome in her wrist.

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             Appellant claimed payment from Appellee for the past medical

treatment of her injuries. Appellee disputed the claim, arguing Appellant’s injuries

occurred during the ten months she was on maternity leave and, in any event, were

not a result of her repetitive actions at work. An ALJ conducted a hearing on this

matter concerning Appellant’s claim for past medical benefits.

             The parties presented several doctors’ opinions and their medical

evaluations of Appellant. Three doctors, Dr. Loeb, Dr. Farner, and Dr. Gupta,

indicated Appellant’s injuries were not work related. Dr. Farrage indicated

Appellant’s injuries were work-related. In its July 7, 2022 opinion, the ALJ agreed

with Dr. Loeb, Dr. Farner, and Dr. Gupta’s assessments of the cause of Appellant’s

injuries and rejected Appellant’s claim for past medical benefits. On review, the

Board affirmed the ALJ’s order, finding no error in the ALJ’s decision. This

appeal follows.

             On appeal, Appellant argues the ALJ decided the issue of past medical

benefits contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence in her favor. The

Board’s decision must be supported by substantial evidence, and when appellate

court’s review the Board’s orders, “a court cannot substitute its evaluation of the

weight and credibility of the evidence for that of the [Board’s].” Smyzer v. B.F.

Goodrich Chem. Co., 474 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky. 1971). “Substantial evidence

means evidence of substance and relative consequence having the fitness to induce

                                         -3-
conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Pierce v. Kentucky Galvanizing Co.,

606 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Ky. App. 1980) (citing Smyzer, 474 S.W.2d at 369).

             Here, there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s order

affirming the ALJ’s decision. Of the four doctors who evaluated Appellant, three

diagnosed her injuries as having been caused during her leave from employment

and not by the work she performed for Appellee. She had not worked at

Appellee’s plant for ten months and claimed her injury occurred a mere six days

after starting work again. Three of the physicians opined this was not medically

probable that she could have developed her injury in six days.

             In evaluating the evidence, including the cumulation of the

physicians’ testimony, this Court sees nothing indicating the ALJ erred by

evaluating the evidence and reaching the conclusions he did and, specifically,

regarding the issue of causation.

             Appellant cites no caselaw to support her claim that the testimony of

the three doctors does not constitute substantial evidence. To the contrary,

Kentucky’s caselaw makes clear that no error occurred here. In Pierce v. Kentucky

Galvanizing Co., Pierce suffered a heart attack at his home. Pierce, 606 S.W.2d at

166. Ultimately, the court determined the cause of this heart attack was coronary

heart disease. Id. at 167. Pierce worked for the Kentucky Galvanizing Co. and

claimed the strenuous physical labor he performed at work caused his heart attack.

                                        -4-
Id. However, this was the only evidence Pierce provided tending to show his work

caused his heart attack, and the link between physical exertion and the heart attack

in that case was tenuous at best. Id. at 167-68. Contrary to this, Pierce had several

substantial risk factors associated with heart attacks. Id. at 167. Accordingly, this

Court determined the substantial weight of the evidence did not support Pierce’s

claims that his heart attack was caused by his work. Id. at 168.

             Appellant here faces similar evidentiary problems as the appellant in

Pierce who only presented evidence the physical strain of his work caused his

injuries; Appellant here points only to the repetitive nature of her work as causing

her injuries. However, while both the injuries suffered by Appellant here and the

heart attack appellant suffered in Pierce could theoretically be caused by their

work, substantial evidence existed to the contrary. Therefore, we cannot say the

Board’s decision to affirm the ALJ’s decision goes against the substantial weight

of the evidence.

             When hearing workers’ compensation claims, it is an ALJ’s duty to

weigh evidence and determine the veracity of the testimony they hear. Bound by

this standard, the ALJ did not err when it gave more credibility to Dr. Loeb, Dr.

Farner, and Dr. Gupta.

             Accordingly, the Board did not err when it affirmed the ALJ’s

decision concerning Appellant’s claim for past medical benefits.

                                         -5-
           We affirm.

           ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE FORD
                          MOTOR COMPANY:
Ched Jennings
Louisville, Kentucky      Scott E. Burroughs
                          Brian W. Davidson
                          Louisville, Kentucky

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