Court Opinion

ID: 9962554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 20:11:29.916234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:01.919583
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Griffin, 2024-Ohio-1568.]

                                         COURT OF APPEALS
                                      ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO                                 :       JUDGES:
                                              :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
        Plaintiff-Appellee                    :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                                              :       Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs-                                          :
                                              :
DAKOTA GRIFFIN                                :       Case No. 23 COA 018
                                              :
        Defendant-Appellant                   :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                              Appeal from the Court of Common
                                                      Pleas, Case No. 23-CRI-086

JUDGMENT:                                             Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                     April 23, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                                For Defendant-Appellant

CHRISTOPHER R. TUNNELL                                CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY
110 Cottage Street                                    9200 Montgomery Road
Third Floor                                           Suite 8A
Ashland, OH 44805                                     Cincinnati, OH 45242
Ashland County, Case No. 23 COA 018                                                      2

King, J.

       {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Dakota Griffin appeals the October 24, 2023 judgment

of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-Appellee is the state of Ohio. We

affirm the trial court.

                          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶ 2} On March 9, 2023, Griffin and his brother went to the home of Griffin's ex-

girlfriend. There they committed a home invasion and an assault upon the ex-girlfriend's

new boyfriend. As a result, on April 13, 2023, the Ashland County Grand Jury returned

an indictment charging Griffin with one count of aggravated burglary, a felony of the first

degree, and two counts of complicity to felonious assault, felonies of the second degree.

       {¶ 3} On September 18, 2023, following plea negotiations with the state, Griffin

entered pleas of guilty to an amended charge of one count of attempted aggravated

burglary, a felony of the second degree and both counts of felonious assault. A

presentence investigation was ordered and the matter was set over for sentencing.

       {¶ 4} On October 24, Griffin appeared for sentencing. The trial court merged the

complicity charges and ordered Griffin to serve an aggregate total of four to six years

incarceration.

       {¶ 5} Griffin filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for

consideration. He raises one assignment of error as follows:

                                             I

       {¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY ADVISE GRIFFIN OF THE

POSSIBILITY OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR A VIOLATION OF POST

RELEASE CONTROL (PRC) BEFORE HE PLED GUILTY."
Ashland County, Case No. 23 COA 018                                                           3

       {¶ 7} In his sole assignment of error, Griffin argues that during its plea colloquy,

the trial court failed to advise him that he could be ordered to serve any sentence for a

violation of PRC consecutive to a sentence for any new felony committed while on PRC.

We disagree.

       {¶ 8} When reviewing a plea's compliance with Crim.R. 11(C), we apply a de novo

standard of review. State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108-109, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990);

State v. Groves, 5th Dist. Fairfield Nos. 2019 CA 00032, 2019-Ohio-5025, ¶7.

       {¶ 9} Criminal Rule 11 requires guilty pleas to be made knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily. Although literal compliance with Crim.R. 11 is preferred, the trial court

need only "substantially comply" with the rule when dealing with the non-constitutional

elements of Crim.R. 11(C), and strictly comply with the constitutional notifications. State

v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 475, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981), citing State v. Stewart, 51

Ohio St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977); State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-

5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 31.

       {¶ 10} As to the constitutional notifications, before accepting a plea, a trial court

must inform a defendant that by entering his plea, he waives important constitutional

rights, specifically: (1) the right to a jury trial; (2) the right to confront witnesses against

him; (3) compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; (4) the right to require

the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial; and (5) that

the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself. Veney, ¶ 19. If the trial court

fails to strictly comply with these requirements, the defendant's plea is invalid. Id. at ¶ 31.

       {¶ 11} As to the non-constitutional rights, a trial court must notify a defendant of:

(1) the nature of the charges; (2) the maximum penalty involved, which includes, if
Ashland County, Case No. 23 COA 018                                                        4

applicable, an advisement on post-release control; (3) if applicable, that the defendant is

not eligible for probation or the imposition of community control sanctions; and (4) that

after entering a guilty plea or a no contest plea, the court may proceed directly to judgment

and sentencing. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)(b); Veney at ¶ 10-13. For these non-constitutional

rights, the trial court must substantially comply with the mandates of Crim.R. 11. State v.

Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). "Substantial compliance means

that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the

implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving." Veney at ¶ 15.

       {¶ 12} During its plea colloquy the trial court in this matter advised:

              Now, if you are sent to prison on this case, when you get out, you

              are going to be subject to a mandatory term of what's called post-

              release control, that is mandatory in your case from 18 months to

              three years. And when you are on post-release control, you have

              certain rules and conditions you have to abide by.

              If you violate those rules, the Parole Board could send you back to

              prison in 9-month increments for each rule violation, but never more

              than one-half of your originally stated term in total for all rule

              violations.

       {¶ 13} Transcript of Plea (T.) 14.

       {¶ 14} Also during the plea hearing, Griffin acknowledged he read, understood and

signed a Waiver of Constitutional Rights and Plea of Guilty and had discussed the
Ashland County, Case No. 23 COA 018                                                       5

document with his counsel before signing. T. 7. The document included the following

notification:

                The Court further finds that the Defendant understands that if he is

                now on felony probation, parole, under a community sanction, or

                under post release control from prison, this plea may result in

                revocation proceedings and any new sentence could be imposed

                consecutively. If the Defendant is on post release control from prison

                and the Court chooses to revoke the Defendant's post release control

                and impose a prison sanction, the additional prison term must be

                served consecutive to the prison term imposed in this case.

       {¶ 15} Waiver of Constitutional Rights and Plea of Guilty, docket at 21, page 2.

       {¶ 16} The document further advised Griffin:

                A violation of any post release control rule or condition can result in

                a more restrictive sanction while Defendant is under post release

                control, and increased duration of supervision or control, up to the

                maximum term and reimprisonment even though the Defendant may

                have served the entire stated prison term imposed upon him by this

                Court for all offenses. If the Defendant violates conditions of

                supervision while under post release control, the Parole Board could

                return him to prison for up to nine months for each violation, for a
Ashland County, Case No. 23 COA 018                                                         6

              total of ½ of the originally stated term. If the violation is a new felony,

              the Defendant could receive a prison term of the greater of one year

              or the time remaining on post release control, in addition to any other

              prison term for the offense.

       {¶ 17} Id.

       {¶ 18} Griffin informed the court that he was not on PRC, probation, or community

control at the time he entered his pleas. T. 6.

       {¶ 19} Griffin concedes that while the trial court did not mention the possibility of

consecutive sentences in its plea colloquy, that information was contained in the Waiver

of Constitutional Rights and Plea of Guilty. In similar cases, this court has found "that

where the written plea form fills in information regarding post-release control missing from

the plea colloquy, the trial court has substantially complied with Crim.R. 11 for PRC

purposes." State v. Brown, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 13CA13, 2013-Ohio-5515 at ¶ 30. See

also State v. Alexander, 5th Dist. Stark No.2012CA00115, 2012-Ohio-4843, and State v.

Munyan, 5th Dist. Licking No. 08-CA0-88, 2009-Ohio-2348.

       {¶ 20} As in Brown, the facts of this sentencing provide us no reason to stray from

our position on the matter of proper notification of PRC. Griffin was fully advised of post

release control and the consequences for violating PRC orally and in writing. His sole

assignment of error is therefore overruled.
Ashland County, Case No. 23 COA 018                                                   7

       {¶ 21} The judgment of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

By King, J.,

Gwin, P.J. and

Baldwin, J. concur.