Court Opinion

ID: 9830531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:16:17.352754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:08.047998
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Appellant complains of the failure to pass upon two assignments of error, It was deemed unnecessary to pass upon the same in view of the ruling that title passed by the foreclosure proceedings. But, since it is insisted that the assignments be passed upon, it will be done.
The case was tried without a jury. We are not advised of the theory upon which the trial court based its judgment. One of the assignments is that the evidence as to possession and the payment of taxes is insufficient to support the judgment upon the appellee’s plea of title under the 5 years’ statute of limitation. Our conclusion upon this is that the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of continuous, peaceable, and adverse possession by tenants cultivating, using, and enjoying the land for the requisite period prior to the institution of the suit, but is insufficient to show the payment of the taxes by appellee. L. E. Brannin testified that he paid the taxes, but it is not shown that in so doing he was acting for or in behalf of appellee.
The other assignment is:
“Because the court erred in rendering judgment for the defendant upon the theory that -there was a superior outstanding legal title for the reasons, first, that before beginning the trial of the case the parties h-greed to a common source, and second, because the evidence does not show an outstanding legal title superior to plaintiff’s title.”
Upon the trial it was agreed that title to all of the land was vested in appellee except the undivided is3/seo interest recovered by Teston by the judgment of February 3, 1910, in the Waples Platter Grocery Company suit against Benson and others, and that the only issue in the present suit was the title to said undivided interest.
Appellee offered in evidence a deed, duly acknowledged and recorded, executed by appellant and wife, conveying to C. H. Shar-man an undivided 30/si interest in the 81%-acre tract. This deed was dated September • — •, 1910, and conveyed an interest slightly in excess of said i83/3e0 interest. The appellants’ testimony affirmatively established the validity of this deed, and that he had never reacquired the title which it passed to Sharman. We do not understand how it can be asserted that the evidence does not. show an outstanding title superior to the plaintiff’s vested in Sharman.
The evidence affirmatively disclosing that prior to the institution of the suit plaintiff had parted with whatever title he had, and that he had not reacquired the same, defeats any right of recovery which he might otherwise have had, and the fact that the parties claim under a common source does not preclude the appellee from relying Tjpon the outstanding title to defeat the plaintiff’s suit. Rice v. Ry. Co., 87 Tex. 90, 26 S. W. 1047, 47 Am. St. Rep. 72; Jones v. Lee (Tex. Civ. App.) 41 S. W. 195; Staley v. King (Tex. Civ. App.) 144 S. W 308; Caruthers v. Hadley (Tex. Civ App.) 134 S. W. 757; McBride v. Loomis (Tex. Com. App.) 212 S. W. 480; Moss v. Union Bank, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 216; McCready v. Lansdale, 58 Miss. 881.
 For the reasons indicated herein, and in the main opinion, we think the proper *791judgment lias been rendered, but it is not amiss to call attention to two lines of authorities in this state which have not been presented in the briefs and which also support the affirmance.
When Dowdy conveyed to the Richardsons he expressly reserved a vendor’s lien to secure the payment of purchase-money notes. The superior legal title remained in Dowdy. Dowdy transferred the notes and all of his “right, title, interest, estate, claim, and demand both legal and equitable in and to said land and every part thereof,” to Mrs.‘ Rivers. The judgment of foreclosure was in favor of her executors, and established these notes as a lien upon the land. Appellee, as executor and devisee of Mrs. Rivers, succeeded to all of her right and estate as respects the notes and the superior title.
The first line of cases to which we refer are those which hold that when land is “charged with a debt for which it is sold, then, independently of the legal proceedings under which it was sold, the purchase money must be restored before it can be recovered.” Northcraft v. Oliver, 74 Tex. 168, 11 S. W. 1121; Jolly v. Stallings, 78 Tex. 605, 14 S. W. 1002.
The leading case in the other line of authorities is Ufford v. Wells, 52 Tex. 612, followed in Foster v. Powers, 64 Tex. 247; Cattle Co. v. Boon, 73 Tex. 548, 11 S. W. 544; Bradford v. Knowles, 86 Tex. 509, 25 S. W. 1117, and others. These cases in effect hold that a vendor in an executory contract for the sale of land, who has sued his vendee to enforce the lien, without making a subsequent purchaser of the land a party, and has bought in the land under the foreclosure decree, may recover the land from such purchaser unless .the latter shall offer to pay the unpaid purchase money They hold that such purchaser is not a necessary party to the foreclosure 'proceedings, but that his right to redeem, when sued for the land, is not lost In such cases the purchaser under the foreclosure recovers upon the superior legal title vested in him independent of the title which he acquired under the foreclosure, and in order to defeat the action such purchaser must tender the amount due upon the purchase price. Applying the principle of those cases, the appellee Brannin has the superior legal title, independent of the foreclosure sale, and appellant could not recover without tendering the amount due upon the purchase-money notes which passed to appellee in the manner stated above. Pierce v. Moreman, 84 Tex. 596, 20 S. W. 821. This he did not do. The latter line of cases was decided prior to the adoption of the Limitation Act of 1905 and subsequent amendments (articles 5694, 5695, Vernon’s Sayles’ R. S.), but appellee Brannin peaceably repossessed himself of the land and has remained in such possession for more than five years prior to the institution of this suit.
Independent of the foreclosure proceedings, .there has been an effectual rescission of the executory sale by the appellee, who is the representative and holder of the superior legal title reserved by Dowdy. Under the circumstances, appellee’s rights under the rescinded sale are unaffected by the act mentioned. Bunn v. City of Laredo (Tex. Com. App.) 245 S. W. 426; Pecos Mercantile Co. v. McKnight (Tex. Civ. App.) 256 S. W. 933.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.