Court Opinion

ID: 9692030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:37:15.144258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:29.909912
License: Public Domain

*1093CONCURRING STATEMENT BY
TODD, J.:
¶ 1 I agree with the Majority’s thorough analysis of the language of the statute in question and, hence, join in its holding that minor passengers are not bound by the vehicle owner’s imputed selection of the limited tort option by failing to maintain automobile insurance. I recognize as well, however, the inconsistency pointed out by Judge Hudock in his thoughtful concurring statement that the result reached herein has the effect of affording greater rights to the minor children of irresponsible drivers who have failed to purchase liability insurance than to the minor children of insured parents who have selected the limited tort option coverage. I stop short, however, of joining Judge Hudock’s Concurrence because I cannot join in his suggestion that the legislature correct this inconsistency “by amending the statute to make clear that one who operates a motor vehicle without liability insurance is deemed to select a limited tort option for herself and for all occupants of the vehicle.”
¶2 While I agree with Judge Hudock that it is the legislature’s prerogative to revisit this issue and address this inconsistency, I would suggest that the legislature consider a solution which takes into consideration both the purposes of the MVFRL in requiring financial responsibility and the public policy of this Commonwealth concerning the protection of the rights of children, even from their parents’ ability to compromise those rights, whether purposefully or inadvertently. See e.g., Nicholson v. Combs, 550 Pa. 23, 34, 703 A.2d 407, 412 (1997) (one parent cannot bargain away his or her children’s right to support from the other parent); Moore v. Moore, 535 Pa. 18, 25, 634 A.2d 163, 166-67 (1993) (in child custody cases, “the concept of waiver would be inappropriate ... where the welfare of the child is the ultimate concern of the Court”); Storms v. O’Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 556 (Pa.Super.2001) (purpose of Pa.R.C.P.2039(a), requiring court approval of compromise, settlement or discontinuance of any actions to which a minor is a party, is to prevent settlements that are unfair to minors and ensure that the minor receives the benefit of the money awarded); Shaner v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 40 Pa. D. & C.4th 308, 313-14 (C.P. Dauphin 1998) (parents do not possess the authority to release the claims or potential claims of a minor child merely because of the parental relationship), aff'd without opinion, 738 A.2d 535 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999). This public policy, as enunciated by the courts of this Commonwealth, is consistent with that of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1231 (Co.2002) (holding that under Colorado law a parent may not release a minor’s own prospective claims for negligence), and cases cited therein.