Court Opinion

ID: 9741062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:48:54.598928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:22.052089
License: Public Domain

*439M. F. Cavanagh, J.
(concurring). I am in agreement with the result and reasoning of the majority but believe further discussion on the question of the applicability of the doctrine of mitigation is warranted.
The majority analysis relies primarily upon Shiffer v Gibraltar Schools, 393 Mich 190; 224 NW2d 255 (1974), and Hamtramck Civil Service Commission v Pitlock, 44 Mich App 410; 205 NW2d 293 (1973), to establish the proposition that a back pay recovery must be subject to mitigation by subtracting wages actually earned. Plaintiff asserts, however, that these cases are not applicable to the present facts since they did not involve public employees. His argument is that a wrongfully discharged public officer is entitled to full back pay without the application of the doctrine of mitigation. See People ex rel Benoit v Miller, 24 Mich 458 (1872), Wilkinson v Common Counsel of City of Saginaw, 111 Mich 585; 70 NW 142 (1897), Newberry v Smith, 157 Mich 181; 121 NW 746 (1909).
This conclusion is supported by dictum in Parker v Township of West Bloomfield, 60 Mich App 583; 231 NW2d 424 (1975). That opinion concluded that a local police officer was, as a public employee, entitled to full back pay without subtracting wages actually earned — if there was a statutory provision entitling him to back pay. Although plaintiff’s discharge was wrongful in that case, the defendant township had not adopted the civil service system or the provisions of MCLA 38.514; MSA 5.3364. Thus, since there was no statutory provision for full back pay, it was unnecessary to determine the applicability of the doctrine of mitigation.
In another context, it has been held that a *440member of a police department is a public officer. Blynn v Pontiac, 185 Mich 35, 42-43; 151 NW 681 (1915). Blynn, however, involved an officer’s cláim for workmen’s compensation. The classification was relevant only for the purpose of determining the benefits of an "employee” as provided for in the city charter.
I conclude that the facts of the present case are considerably different than both Parker and Blynn. The general rule that a wrongfully discharged employee is entitled to damages equal to back pay less the amount of wages earned from other employment during the period of discharge is more properly applicable. See Edgecomb v Traverse City School District, 341 Mich 106, 116-117; 67 NW2d 87 (1954).