Court Opinion

ID: 9566108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:34:03.921225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:10.559443
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority in reversal of the conviction based on the Amended Information. I cannot join, however, in the failure to give appellant’s offered theory of the defense instructions involving the felon in possession charge, and consequently dissent.
Possession was an intrinsic factor in the criminal complaint and denial to appellant of an appropriate instruction defining that term had the effect of essentially denying his right to any real defense. Appellant Edward Mclnturff was first charged with receiving, concealing or disposing of stolen property, unlawful entry which was later dropped, and then several months later, with the felon in possession of a firearm charge, which was added within the consolidated complaint. Involved in the later charge was a Ruger Mini-14 .223 semi-automatic rifle which had been taken by Melnturff’s two sons, Ricky and John, in an auto burglary.
- At trial, the two sons, as well as Nancy Reeves, Mclnturff’s girlfriend at the time of the burglaries, testified that Mclnturff took the rifle from his sons and placed it in his bedroom closet. However, another state witness, Tony Sanchez, testified that John Mclnturff had control over the rifle. Sanchez testified that John Mclnturff claimed that the rifle belonged to him, that John Mclnturff had shown him the rifle while.at the residence and then hid the rifle in Sanchez’s backyard. Sanchez further testified that John Mclnturff returned the next day and removed the rifle from its hiding place. John Mclnturff testified he gave the gun to a friend of Ricky Mcln-turff.
Mclnturff declined to present a testimonial defense in resting after the State presented its case. His defense, according to his counsel’s closing argument, was based on the credibility and believability of the witnesses, particularly Ricky and John Mclnturff and Nancy Reeves, and whether the State had met the requisite burden of proof.
The two instructions quoted in this majority were tendered by Mclnturff to address the realistic theory of defense that actual possession started with and remained in the hands of the thieves who were co-residents in the house, namely his sons. That issue differentiated, as the extreme, temporary custody by location in the house where he was compared to actual possession when another then claimed right to actual control and dominion. Mclnturff wanted to distinguish whatever temporary custody he may have achieved, if any, by the temporary handling from the actual possession contended to remain in others. In order to present his defense, Mclnturff requested theory of defense instructions accurately defining possession which was denied by the trial court.
As authority for his two refused instructions, Mclnturff relied on Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201 (Wyo.1980). In that case, this court said “[t]he mere giving of temporary custody for a limited purpose is not a surrender of dominion or control as to be a transfer of possession.” Id. at 204. Other cases in which we construe the meaning of possession are in accord with Wells. In Craig v. Gudim, 488 P.2d 316 (Wyo.1971), an action by a bankruptcy trustee against homeowners and a bank, this court stated that possession is inclusive of custody but custody is not tantamount to possession. Id. at 319. In State v. George, 32 Wyo. *199223, 231 P. 683 (1924), a larceny case in which the defendant was convicted of stealing sheep, this court said the defendant did not have possession of the sheep simply because they were on his land. Id. at 247, 231 P. 683. The defendant had to do some act to indicate his will to subject the sheep to his control before the owner of the sheep lost constructive control of them. Id.
In addressing the issue presented here, we apply the following standard:
In determining whether an instruction in favor of an accused should be given, the evidence must be viewed in a light as favorable to him as is justifiable.
Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579, 581 (Wyo.1986). The trial court has a duty to present an instruction supporting the defendant’s theory of defense, either one offered by the defendant or a similar one, if the instruction is supported by competent evidence. Smith v. State, 773 P.2d 139, 141 (Wyo.1989); Stapleman v. State, 680 P.2d 73, 75 (Wyo.1984). A jury must be instructed on all material essentials. Murdock v. State, 351 P.2d 674, 683 (Wyo.1960).
At the close of the State’s case, Mcln-turff chose to rest. This choice meant the verdict depended on whether the State had met its burden of proof. “One accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and this presumption applies to every element of the crime charged.” Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870, 879 (Wyo.1976) (citing Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 89, 69 S.Ct. 1447, 1450, 93 L.Ed. 1826 (1949)). Mclnturff raised questions in cross-examination and in closing as to the credibility of the three witnesses whose testimony indicated that Mclnturff had possession of the firearm. Mclnturff did not dispute the fact that the weapon was in the house where he resided, which was the same house where his sons, the actual thieves, also resided. No other instruction covers the definition of possession, which would have allowed the trial court to refuse his instructions. Prime v. State, 767 P.2d 149 (Wyo.1989). The definition of possession was central to Mclnturff's defense and the question of whether he was guilty of the felon in possession charge. Mcln-turff was entitled to his instructions defining possession as competent evidence tends to support these instructions.
In denial of instructions which correctly differentiated temporary custody from possession in accord with the established precedent of this court in Wells, Mclnturff was denied opportunity to seek consideration for his theory of defense. Comment by the majority that no evidence existed to support the custody concept elicited in Wells is simply not accurate in consideration of the established evidence in this case of who stole the gun, who kept the gun, and then who disposed of the gun — none of which conduct was that of Mclnturff.
I continue to reject the failure of trial courts to provide defendants with access to their theory of defense through either evidence or instruction. Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822 (Wyo.1991), Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting. See also Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544 (Wyo.1990); Thom v. State, 792 P.2d 192 (Wyo.1990) and Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S.Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896). The reasonableness of Mcln-turff’s defense and the appropriateness of application of the rule of Wells should have been vested in the fact finding jury and not escarped by the trial court and now buried by this court.
Consequently, I respectfully dissent.