Court Opinion

ID: 9513466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:36:04.778915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:52.260159
License: Public Domain

MARING, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 28] I concur in that part of the majority opinion holding Lemer’s failure to object to improper comments made during opening statement waived her claim of error. I write separately, however, to emphasize our opinion today should not suggest we condone the behavior of Campbell’s attorney in this case. During his opening statement, this attorney revisited the issue of Lemer’s drinking after the trial court expressly ruled the subject was not proper and admonished the jury to disregard it. Also during his opening statement, without any supporting evidence, Campbell’s attorney suggested Lemer intended to “strike it rich,” “win the lottery,” “pull the slot,” and “hope for *693the winning combination” through her suit for damages. He also commented that Lemer “never had too much money in her life” in a clear attempt to prejudice the jury against her based on her economic status. Characterizations like this of those who choose to use our courts destroy the very essence of the jury system. At trial, the opening statement should be used to explain “what evidence will be presented, to make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to follow, and to relate parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole”; it is not an occasion to influence the jury through improper argument. Testa v. Village of Mundelein, 89 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir.1996). Had Lemer objected to these statements and the trial court overruled the objections, I would consider such reversible error. In fact, I consider Campbell’s attorney’s statements as coming dangerously close to the line of depriving her of a fair trial.
[¶ 29] I also write to dissent from that part of the majority opinion upholding the jury verdict awarding Lemer past medical expenses and denying any recovery for pain and suffering. In Slaubaugh v. Slau-baugh, we reversed and remanded for a new trial where the jury verdict contained a substantial award for past medical expenses, but did not award damages for past pain, discomfort, and mental anguish. 466 N.W.2d 573, 577 (N.D.1991). I dissented in Nesseth v. Omlid, concluding the special verdict answers awarding $5,243.80 for past medical expenses and zero for past pain, discomfort, and mental anguish were inconsistent and irreconcilable. 1998 ND 51, ¶ 24, 574 N.W.2d 848. For the same reasons I dissented in Nesseth, I believe the jury award in this case was perverse, insufficient in light of the evidence, and irreconcilable.
[¶ 30] The jury found Campbell’s negligent operation of his vehicle was the proximate cause of Lemer’s injuries and awarded her $3,000 for past medical expenses. The medical records on which this award is based are replete with documentation of Lemer’s ongoing chronic pain, headaches, and sleep difficulties. Even the medical expert retained by the defense agreed Lemer actually suffers from this pain. On this evidence, it is simply inconsistent for the jury to award medical expenses for treatment associated with pain, thus confirming the treatment’s legitimacy, and then deny any recovery of damages for that very same pain and suffering.
[¶ 31] The damage award of zero for pain and suffering under these facts is so inadequate as to be without support of the evidence. This is not a case of meeting the statutory no-fault threshold by diagnostic testing or doctor shopping. The medical bills were for chiropractic treatments which were pain related. Had the jury awarded one dollar for pain and suffering, its verdict could not be questioned. But when it awards nothing it indicates a verdict based on prejudice and passion and not on the evidence.
[¶ 32] I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial on the issue of damages.
[¶ 33] Mary Muehlen Maring