Court Opinion

ID: 9451203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:09:52.972975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:36.793718
License: Public Domain

DUFFY, Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result).
Consistent with our decision in United States v. D’Antonio, 342 F.2d 666, we must hold that it was reversible error to permit the jury in this case, over the objections of the defendant, to separate during its deliberations.
The trial of the instant case was prior to our decision in D’Antonio. Upon inquiry, the District Judge who presided in this case, learned that several of the District Judges in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, had adopted the practice of permitting a jury in a criminal case to disband for the night, after the case had been submitted to them by the Court.
I do not agree with the statement in the majority opinion that the treatment of the jury in this case was violative of the rights of the jurors themselves; nor do I think the inference is warranted that the action of the trial judge in this case may have diminished or thwarted the jury from functioning properly by unnecessary exposure to discomfort.
Jury duty is an important duty of citizenship. The performance of such duty may often interfere with the juror’s comfort and convenience. Such duty may conflict with previously made plans for engagements.
Neither of the parties to this lawsuit has complained or made an issue of the treatment accorded to members of this *680jury. As far as the record shows, no member of the jury has complained. What is shown is that the jurors were willing to make great effort to reach their respective homes after the jury was permitted to separate.
At the late hour when it became apparent that a jury verdict would not be reached, it was in the discretion of the trial judge as to how best to handle a difficult situation. I am unable to say there was an abuse of discretion in this respect.