Court Opinion

ID: 9463944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:21:00.272547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:22.651411
License: Public Domain

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the district court decision. First, although I agree with the majority’s finding of negligence per se based on the shipowner’s failure to provide line throwing devices, the majority incorrectly builds on this conclusion with a further finding that the shipowner’s negligence, as a matter of law, was a legal cause of the decedent’s death. Second, the majority incorrectly finds that the defendant’s sale of beer on board its ship made the ship unseaworthy or, alternatively, was clear negligence on the defendant’s part.
In stating the appropriate standard of causation in maritime tort cases, this court indicated its preference for the “legal cause” doctrine rather than for the doctrine of proximate cause. This court stated in Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975), that “[a]n employer’s negligence need not be the sole proximate cause of an injury to result in his liability, but may merely be a contributing cause of the accident.” 507 F.2d at 221. The court described the “legal cause” standard as follows:1
The elements of legal cause are negligence, a causal connection between the negligence and the injury, the invasion of a legally protected interest, and lack of a countervailing legally protected interest as a defense to liability. Restatement 2d Torts § 9. The defendant’s negligence must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, with no rule of law relieving the actor of fault. “Substantial” means more than “but for” the negligence, the harm would not have resulted, . . . and more than merely negligible negligence. . . . The gist of it is that some responsibility for the effect must accompany the cause. Id. at 223 (citations omitted), (emphasis supplied).
*246The court in Spinks also observed that the Jones Act is remedial legislation which extends to seamen the rights accorded railway workers under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970), and that it should be liberally construed in favor of injured seamen. Although I agree that all of the refinements of proximate cause are inappropriate to maritime tort law, I apprehend that a causal relationship between the negligence and the injury must be established before liability can attach. I believe that the particular facts of this case require the court to establish one of the outer limits of liability under the legal cause standard. Given the factual distinctions between Spinks and the instant case, the line-drawing process herein required can be accomplished without vitiating the remedial purposes so well articulated in Spinks.
The plaintiff in Spinks lived and worked as a maintenance employee aboard a jack-up drilling barge. His injury occurred when he slipped on a walkway adjacent to an area covered with detergent which he and a co-worker had applied and were supposed to clean up. In Spinks, there was, really, no issue raised as to the existence of a causal relationship, in fact, between the condition of the deck (soapy and slippery) and the injury to Spinks who slipped and fell on that deck. The issue addressed was that of responsibility in law for the condition of the deck at the time of the casualty. The trial court had concluded that Spinks’ negligence was the “sole proximate cause” of his injury even though the co-worker and a supervisor shared responsibility for cleaning up the slippery surface. 507 F.2d at 220-21.2 On appeal, this court reversed the district court’s conclusion that Spinks, “the lowest member of the hierarchy” of workers, was solely responsible for correcting the dangerous condition which resulted in his injury. Further, we rejected the contention that Spinks, alone, was negligent when, in the course of his duties, he walked across the slippery floor, carrying a bucket in each hand instead of reserving one hand and arm to steady himself by use of hand rails, observing that “[h]is duty is to do the work assigned, not to find the safest method of work.” 507 F.2d at 223. Having found that the employer was chargeable with acts of negligence contributing to the dangerously slippery condition, and having disposed of the contention that Spinks’ actions vis-a-vis the danger were the sole cause of the injury, liability naturally followed.
In the case before us today, there is no such easy path to liability. The deceased, Reyes, was not merely “doing the work assigned.” He willfully donned his swimming attire and deliberately flung himself into the ocean for a swim.3 Once into the water, Reyes exhibited no desire to leave it. He pulled steadily away from the vessel towards a buoy. Nothing indicates that an available life ring would have interested him as an alternative to his sport. He had left the deck for his own purposes and he gave no sign of seeking safe return to it. Under the evidence, scores of lines might have been thrown by Coast Guard approved devices, improvised catapults, or whatever without having had the slightest deterrent effect upon Reyes.
Under these facts, the district court determined that Reyes, alone, authored his own casualty. The judge characterized that finding as the “sole proximate cause” of the event. Instructed by the teachings of Spinks, we know that the appropriate standard for determining actionable causation is legal cause rather than what is seen as the more stringent standard of proximate cause.
*247Nevertheless, I apprehend that this review illuminates the critical distinction between this case and Spinks.
In the instant case, the conclusion that the crew members could have discharged a line throwing device, if one had been available, is the only hint of causation upon which the majority was able to hinge its determination of liability. The majority, therefore, assumes cause in fact from the existence of negligence.4 But a mere possibility of causation is not enough for this court to hold, as a matter of law, that the defendant’s negligence was a contributing cause in fact of the injury. In reaching its finding of liability, the majority blurs the distinction between the fact of negligence and the fact of causation. The former is, by definition, established when the defendant is guilty of negligence per se, but the latter is not likewise automatically established.5
In Spinks the negligent acts of the plaintiff and the defendants were inextricably woven together to create the dangerous condition, i.e., the soapy floor.6 Here, the *248negligent act of the plaintiff is easily separable from the negligence per se of the defendant. The defendant failed to comply with a safety regulation. The plaintiff jumped overboard and swam away from his ship. Thus, although the absence of safety equipment was not established as a cause in fact of Reyes’ death, separate and express determinations of causation with respect to both negligent acts are not only possible on remand, they are required for a proper resolution of this case.
As a result, I conclude that the question whether Reyes’ death was caused in fact by only one, or both, of these acts of negligence must be resolved by the district court on remand. Although the finder of fact might conclude that the defendant’s failure to provide safety equipment was a cause in fact of Reyes’ death, it might just as easily find to the contrary. After cause in fact is established, and only at that point, can the questions of legal cause and the extent of liability, if any, be determined by the court.
In addition to finding that the defendant was negligent for failing to provide the necessary line throwing devices, the majority also finds that the defendant was either negligent or caused its ship to become unseaworthy by authorizing the sale of beer on board. The majority’s finding of unseaworthiness or negligence was necessary to establish liability because the rule is well-established that a seaman cannot recover for injuries caused by his willful intoxication if his injury was not caused in any way by the vessel’s unseaworthiness or by the defendant’s negligence. Little v. Green, 428 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964, 91 S.Ct. 366, 27 L.Ed.2d 384 (1970); Barlow v. Pan Atlantic S. S. Corp., 101 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1939); The S. S. Berwindglen, 88 F.2d 125 (1st Cir. 1937); Lortie v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 78 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1935); Weissbach v. Matson Navigation Co., 345 F.Supp. 1176 (N.D.Cal.1972). I believe that the ship was not unseaworthy and that the defendant was not negligent for authorizing the sale of beer on board.
The rationale behind the doctrine of unseaworthiness is to protect seamen from dangerous conditions beyond their control. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724, 87 S.Ct. 1410, 18. L.Ed.2d 482 (1967); Little v. Green, 428 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964, 91 S.Ct. 366, 27 L.Ed.2d 384 (1970). The mere presence of liquor aboard a vessel, therefore, does not automatically render it unseaworthy. Kontos v. S.S. Sophie C., 236 F.Supp. 664 (E.D.Pa.1964). The vessel would be unseaworthy only if, for example, liquor consumption caused the crew to become undisciplined, thereby endangering the crew, the cargo, or the ship. Boudoin v. Lykes Brothers Steamship Co., Inc., 348 U.S. 336, 75 S.Ct. 382, 99 L.Ed. 354 (1955); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., Inc., 325 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1963). This is not the case before us.
The defendant in this case authorized the sale of beer as a goodwill gesture toward the crew. As the district court found, the crew was disciplined in its beer consumption. The Master sold only beer to the crew, and he limited the amount of beer that each crewman could buy. Although occasionally a crewman was intoxicated while on board ship, no crewman was permitted to work while intoxicated. If a crewman misbehaved while on board due to intoxication, the Master would not permit that crewman to buy any more beer. On at least one occasion, the Captain confiscated alcoholic beverages from a crewman. Finally, the plaintiff presented no evidence of serious disorders created by intoxicated crewmen. Thus, the sale of beer to the crew did not endanger the crew, the cargo, or the vessel, and the vessel was not rendered unseaworthy by the sale of beer on board.
*249The defendant also was not negligent for authorizing the sale of beer. Although the warranty of seaworthiness imposes an absolute duty on shipowners, the standard for negligence is only due care. Cox v. Esso Shipping Co., 247 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1957). Therefore, when a plaintiff alleges that the defendant created a defective condition on the vessel, which is the test for unseaworthiness, the defendant cannot be found negligent if the defendant is not also held liable for violating the warranty of seaworthiness. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 91 S.Ct. 514, 27 L.Ed.2d 562 (1971); 1B Benedict, Admiralty 3-58 (7th ed. 1976). Because I believe that the defendant’s ship was not unseaworthy, I also believe that the defendant was not negligent in authorizing the sale of beer on board. As outlined above, the Master exercised due care in the sale and consumption of beer on board.
The majority, however, states that if the decedent had not been drunk, “he would never have gone swimming in the ocean initially.” No basis in the record exists for this statement. Even if the evidence did support this statement, however, it is insufficient to hold the defendant liable. The plaintiff had the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent and that the defendant’s negligence contributed to the plaintiff’s death. Traupman v. American Dredging Co., 470 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Atlass’ Petition, 350 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 988, 86 S.Ct. 551, 15 L.Ed.2d 476 (1966). The plaintiff did not carry this burden. Every witness who testified that he had talked with or observed Reyes the day of his death stated that Reyes did not act peculiarly that day, that he did not smell of alcohol, and that his appearance did not indicate that he had consumed any alcohol that day. The only indication that Reyes had been drinking was the autopsy finding of .185% ethanol in his heart blood.
If Reyes was drunk at the time of his death, the defendant is not liable because that fact would indicate intentional misconduct on Reyes’ part; the crew was not allowed to work when drunk, and Reyes worked until shortly before his death. Little v. Green, 428 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964, 91 S.Ct. 366, 27 L.Ed.2d 384 (1970); Barlow v. Pan Atlantic S.S. Corp., 101 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1939). If Reyes was not drinking before he jumped over the side of the ship, a causal connection does not exist between the defendant’s sale of beer and Reyes’ death.
Finally, the sale of beer did not constitute negligence per se because it did not violate any statute or regulation. Phipps v. S.S. Santa Maria, 418 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1969); Marshall v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 334 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1964). In fact, as the district court found, the practice is recognized in 46 U.S.C. § 91, which exempts “spirits, wines, or other alcoholic liquors” in sea stores from disclosure in the ship’s manifest.
For these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s holding that the defendant’s failure to provide line throwing devices was, as a matter of law, a legal cause of the decedent’s death and that the defendant was negligent or its ship unseaworthy because beer was sold to crewmen on board. The majority’s opinion unreasonably expands the bounds of causes of action for unseaworthiness and for negligence under the Jones Act.

. In addition, the court made the following statements which are particularly relevant to the case at bar:
Under the Jones Act, even the slightest negligence suffices for a finding of liability, (footnote omitted).
The duty owed by an employer to a seaman is so broad that it encompasses the duty to provide a safe place to work. ... By comparison, the seaman’s duty to protect himself (the ground for any countervailing legal interest serving to exculpate the employer) is slight. His duty is to do the work assigned, not to find the safest method of work. 507 F.2d at 223. (citations omitted).

. The trial court also found that the defendants were negligent in permitting use of a faulty soap machine and that its use might be “deemed to constitute an unseaworthy condition.” The court held, however, that their negligence and the “deemed” unseaworthiness were not the proximate causes of Spinks’ injury. 507 F.2d at 221.

. In Spinks, had the seaman, with full knowledge of a soapy area of the deck, and with no duty to perform at or near it, decided for sport to run full pace upon it and slide across it, the case would be more nearly controlling.

. Cause in fact must be established whether liability is determined under a legal cause, or a proximate cause, standard. Although the existence of either legal or proximate cause is a question of law, cause in fact is a predicate for liability under either concept. The court in Spinks, supra, stated this principle as follows:
The concept of proximate cause often obscures the true analysis of a tort. A court makes a policy judgment on the limits of liability when causation in fact has been established. Prosser, Torts § 42 (4th ed. 1971). 507 F.2d at 222.
This case, therefore, is distinguishable from Manning v. M/V Sea Road, 417 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1969), cited by the majority. In Manning the cause in fact of the plaintiffs injury — a faulty manhole cover located on the deck of his ship — had been unexceptionably established in the district court. This court was called upon only to decide “cause in law” or legal liability for the injury. 417 F.2d at 605.

. The majority holds that “[ojnce it is established that there has been an inexcusable violation of the statute causation adds no problem.” (emphasis added). I must disagree. Causation is always a problem, in the sense that cause in fact must always be proved to establish liability. Even where negligence per se has been established, “[tjhere will still remain open such questions as the causal relationship between the violation [of a statute or regulation] and the harm to the plaintiff . . . .” Prosser, Torts § 36 (4th ed. 1971). See e.g., Heath v. Matson Navigation Co., 333 F.Supp. 131, 135 (D.Haw. 1971).

. The court in Spinks placed great emphasis on its inability to say that the plaintiffs negligence could have been the only cause in fact of his injury. That this fact, not present here, was crucial in the court’s analysis is evident from the following statement:
As between Spinks, a nineteen year old seaman, and his supervisor, it cannot be said that Spinks alone had the duty to realize that carrying two buckets was dangerous, or to apply the anti-skid material, or to see that the deck was washed down. As between Spinks and his co-worker, Walker was older, had worked on the barge two and a half years, and handled the nozzle applying the soap and steam in washing down the soapy deck. We state no opinion on the relative responsibility of these individuals. We do hold, however, that in the circumstances this case presents, the entire burden cannot be placed on the lowest member of the hierarchy. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 507 F.2d at 223.
In this case, on the other hand, the district court on remand might very well conclude that Reyes alone was responsible for his death. Such a finding would exonerate the defendant from liability entirely. Kelloch v. S & H Subwater Salvage, Inc., 473 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1973) (recognizing the proposition cited, but finding the district court’s conclusion that plaintiff’s negligence was only 30 percent not clearly erroneous); Kell v. Greenville Mid-Stream Service Inc., 321 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1963); Moore v. United States, 347 F.Supp. 38, 41 (N.D.Cal. 1972) (finding no nexus between the plaintiffs injury and the alleged negligence of the defendant and concluding that plaintiffs own negligence was the cause of his injury).
I am mindful of the Jones Act provisions concerning contributory negligence. 45 U.S.C. § 53 provides in pertinent part as follows:
the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee: Provided, that no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee.
Before this section is applicable, however, there must first be a finding that the defendant’s negligence caused “in whole or in part” the injury to the plaintiff. 45 U.S.C. § 52. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 394, 2 L.Ed.2d 382 (1957), there*248fore, does not require a finding of liability on remand. In Kernan, the Supreme Court held that, even in the absence of negligence, the Jones Act permits recovery for the death of a seaman resulting from a violation of a statutory duty. Since cause in fact had been clearly established, however, Kernan did not eliminate the requirement of causation even though as in the instant case, the defendant had violated a Coast Guard regulation and was guilty of negligence per se.