Court Opinion

ID: 9897395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:02.431159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.725087
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      May 16 2023, 10:13 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Alexander E. Budzenski                                    Theodore E. Rokita
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana

                                                          Jesse R. Drum
                                                          Assistant Section Chief, Criminal
                                                          Appeals
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Porfirio Marin,                                           May 16, 2023
Appellant-Petitioner,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-PC-3006
        v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Matthew E.
Appellee-Respondent.                                      Symons, Magistrate
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D29-2001-PC-3926

                                 Opinion by Judge Bradford
                               Judges May and Mathias concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023                                 Page 1 of 20
      Case Summary
[1]   In October of 2004, Porfiro Marin pled guilty to Class D felony attempted

      sexual misconduct with a minor. Fifteen years later, Marin filed a petition for

      post-conviction relief (“PCR”), in which he alleged that the factual basis that

      had been entered in connection to his guilty plea was insufficient to support his

      conviction and that his trial counsel had provided him with ineffective

      assistance. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied Marin’s PCR

      petition. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Marin was born in Mexico on September 15, 1984. Marin has resided in the

      United States since he was four years old and has resided in Indianapolis since

      1999. Marin received his permanent-resident status on or about November 28,

      2003.

[3]   On April 7, 2004, the State charged Marin with one count of Class B felony

      child molestation, alleging that “on or about April 1, 2004, [Marin] did perform

      or submit to sexual intercourse with [S.D.], and [S.D.] was a child who was

      then under the age of fourteen (14) years, that is thirteen (13) years of age[.]”1

      Ex. Vol. p. 56. Six months later, on October 7, 2004, the State and Marin

      entered into a plea agreement, under the terms of which the State would dismiss

      1
          S.D. was born on August 17, 1990.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023           Page 2 of 20
      the Class B felony charge and Marin would plead guilty to Class D felony

      attempted sexual misconduct with a minor. The plea agreement left sentencing

      to the trial court but capped the executed portion of Marin’s sentence at 364

      days.

[4]   On November 5, 2004, the trial court conducted a guilty-plea hearing at which

      the following exchange occurred:

              THE COURT:           … Before I can consider accepting your plea,
              it’s real important that you understand everything that’s going
              on. If you don’t understand anything, please interrupt me
              through your attorney and through the interpreter, and we’ll take
              time to explain it to you.

              You are the defendant, Porfirio Marin?

              THE INTERPRETER:                   Yes.

                                                       ****

              THE COURT:           … I’m going to read this to you through the
              interpreter, what you’re offering to plead guilty to: On or about
              April l, 2004, in Marion County, [S]tate of Indiana, the following
              named defendant, Porfirio Marin, who was at the time over the
              age of 18 years, attempted to commit the crime of sexual
              misconduct with a minor with another person, to-wit: S.D., who
              legally to be between the ages of 14 and 16, by submitting her to
              touching and fondling with the intent of satisfying his own sexual
              desires.

              That, sir, is a Class D felony you’re offering to plead guilty to.
              Do you understand that?

              THE INTERPRETER:                   Yes.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023             Page 3 of 20
               THE COURT:          Do you understand in order for you to be
               guilty of what you’d like to plead guilty to, the facts I’ve read to
               you must be true? Do you understand?

               THE INTERPRETER:                     Yes.

               THE COURT:             And by pleading guilty, you’re admitting true
               the facts that I just read to you. Do you understand that?

               THE INTERPRETER:                     Yes.

      Ex. Vol. pp. 13–15.2 Marin indicated that he understood that although he had

      originally been charged with Class B felony child molestation, pursuant to the

      terms of his plea agreement, he had agreed to plead guilty to Class D felony

      attempted sexual misconduct with a minor. Marin further indicated that he

      was satisfied with the manner in which his attorney had represented him,

      understood the terms of his plea agreement, and wished to plead guilty.

[5]   The State then offered the following factual basis:

               Were the State to proceed to trial, it would prove beyond a
               reasonable doubt that on or about April 1, 2004, in Marion
               County, [S]tate of Indiana, at the Days Inn Motel on South
               Keystone, the defendant, Porfirio Marin, did engage in sexual
               contact with S.D., whom at the time he believed to have been
               between the ages of 14 and 16 years old, by engaging in sexual
               contact, which included touching and fondling, with the intent of

      2
        The trial court also confirmed that Marin understood that by pleading guilty, he would waive the following
      rights: the right to a public and speedy trial, the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
      him, the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, the right to require the State to
      prove his guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to remain silent, the right to present evidence on his
      behalf, and the right to appeal his conviction.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023                                    Page 4 of 20
        satisfying his own sexual desires.

        Further, Your Honor, the State would prove that Mr. Marin, the
        defendant, was over the age of 18 at the time of this offense.

        The State would also present testimony that Mr. Marin did
        confess to Detective John Arvin of the Indianapolis Police
        Department that he did engage in sexual contact with S.D.[,] all
        of which is contrary to the stated laws of Indiana.

Ex. Vol. pp. 21–22. The following exchange then took place between Marin

and the trial court:

        THE COURT:                Did you hear the factual basis as read by the
        prosecutor?

        THE INTERPRETER:                   Yes.

        THE COURT:                Are those facts correct?

        THE INTERPRETER:                   Yes.

        THE COURT:           Having heard the factual basis, do you still
        wish to enter into a guilty plea?

        THE INTERPRETER:                   Yes.

        THE COURT:          Do you have any questions regarding your
        rights or any other matters?

        THE DEFENDANT:                     No.

        THE COURT:           Well, I’m going to make a finding there is a
        factual basis to accept your guilty plea to the amended
        information, Attempted Sexual Misconduct with a Minor, Class

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023                  Page 5 of 20
              D felony, enter judgment of conviction, and accept the plea
              agreement made between Mr. Marin and [ ]the State.

      Ex. Vol. pp. 22–23.

[6]   After accepting Marin’s guilty plea, the trial court conducted a sentencing

      hearing, during which Marin apologized and indicated that he understood that

      he had “used poor judgment.” Ex. Vol. p. 25. Marin’s counsel argued that

      Marin was a good candidate for probation and requested that the trial court

      sentence him to 364 days of probation. Marin’s counsel further argued that

      “the lesson has been learned … has been captured pretty well by my client that

      this was a very stupid act, very young, foolish, immature and … just

      irresponsible poor judgment on his part that he will not repeat again[.]” Ex.

      Vol. pp. 28–29. In response, the State argued that

              [T]his is a situation where there … are two people. The victim in
              this case, S.D., is under the age of 14. It was defendant’s belief at
              the time, according to the plea, that she was between the ages of
              14 and 16.

              So at the very least what this Court is aware of is that the
              defendant did engage in a course of conduct that he sought with
              someone he thought was between the age of 16 and 14 at a time
              when he was … over 18. And it’s the State’s concern with this,
              Your Honor, that … this be very clearly shown to the defendant
              as being the wrong course of conduct.

              And the State does have concerns that the period of 364 days on
              sex offender probation, or on probation of any kind, will not be
              sufficient to clarify for the defendant how egregious his action
              was. We would ask that the maximum be imposed in this case

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023            Page 6 of 20
              and that 364 days be executed.

              … I don’t think the 364 days probation is going to give [Marin]
              sufficient time to change in accordance to what’s necessary for
              him not to commit this in the future.

              And I don’t think there is any … indication on his history that
              this is a pattern, this is recurring. But I don’t think that’s
              necessary to show at this point given the situation, Your Honor.

      Ex. Vol. pp. 34–36. The trial court sentenced Marin “to a year on Community

      Corrections.”3 Ex. Vol. p. 37.

[7]   More than a decade later, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Marin traveled to

      Mexico for his grandmother’s funeral. On his return to the United States,

      Marin was detained by federal immigration authorities. Marin claims that he

      was told “to clear [his] case” in order to “get [his] green card back.” PCR Tr. p.

      8.

[8]   Thereafter, on January 28, 2020, Marin filed a PCR petition, in which he

      alleged that the factual basis entered during the guilty-plea hearing had been

      insufficient to support his conviction and that his trial counsel had provided

      him with ineffective assistance. The post-conviction court conducted an

      evidentiary hearing on January 18, 2022, at which both Marin and his trial

      3
        The abstract of judgment was subsequently amended to reflect that the executed portion of Marin’s
      sentence was 364 days rather than a year.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023                               Page 7 of 20
       counsel testified. On November 17, 2022, the post-conviction court denied

       Marin’s PCR petition.

       Discussion and Decision
[9]    “Post-conviction procedures do not afford the petitioner with a super-appeal.”

       Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. 1999). “Instead, they create a

       narrow remedy for subsequent collateral challenges to convictions, challenges

       which must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules.” Id.

       A petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief appeals from a negative

       judgment and as a result, faces a rigorous standard of review on appeal. Dewitt

       v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. 2001); Collier v. State, 715 N.E.2d 940, 942

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[10]   Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739,

       745 (Ind. 2002). Therefore, in order to prevail, a petitioner must establish his

       claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5);

       Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745. When appealing from the denial of a PCR petition,

       a petitioner must convince this court that the evidence, taken as a whole, “leads

       unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-

       conviction court.” Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745. “In other words, the defendant

       must convince this Court that there is no way within the law that the court

       below could have reached the decision it did.” Id. (emphasis in original). “It is

       only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion,

       and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion, that its

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023         Page 8 of 20
       decision will be disturbed as contrary to law.” Godby v. State, 809 N.E.2d 480,

       482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. “The post-conviction court is the sole

       judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” Fisher

       v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004).

       I.      Sufficient Factual Basis
[11]   At all times relevant to the instant matter, Indiana Code section 35-35-1-3(b)

       has provided that an Indiana court cannot accept a guilty plea unless it is

       satisfied that there is an adequate factual basis for the plea.

               The purpose of the factual basis requirement is to ensure that a
               person who pleads guilty is truly guilty. Butler v. State, 658
               N.E.2d 72[, 76] (Ind. 1995). As the ABA standards put it, the
               court should satisfy itself that “the defendant could be convicted
               if he or she elected to stand trial.” ABA Standards for Criminal
               Justice Pleas of Guilty 65 (3d. ed. 1999). “[A] factual basis exists
               when there is evidence about the elements of the crime from
               which a court could conclude that the defendant is guilty.”
               Butler, 658 N.E.2d at 77. The presentation about facts need not
               prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The original trial
               court’s determination that the factual basis was adequate is
               clothed with the presumption of correctness. See id. We will
               only set aside the trial court’s acceptance of a guilty plea for an
               abuse of discretion. Id.

       State v. Cooper, 935 N.E.2d 146, 150 (Ind. 2010). “In light of those declared

       purposes for the factual basis requirements, claims about omissions in the

       factual basis have been unavailing when the omissions do not seem to

       demonstrate doubt about actual guilt.” Id. “[R]elatively minimal evidence has

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023           Page 9 of 20
       sometimes been held adequate” to establish a factual basis. Butler, 658 N.E.2d

       at 77. Moreover, “prejudice must be established before post-conviction relief

       can be granted on grounds of failure to establish a factual basis for a guilty

       plea.” State v. J.E., 723 N.E.2d 863, 864 (Ind. 2000).

[12]   Marin pled guilty to Class D felony attempted sexual misconduct with a minor.

       At the time of his guilty plea, the State was required to prove that Marin was at

       least eighteen years of age and that “with a child at least fourteen (14) years of

       age but less than sixteen (16) years of age,” he attempted4 to perform or submit

       to “any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent

       to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person.”

       Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(b) (2003).

[13]   Again, during the guilty-plea hearing, the State offered the following factual

       basis for Marin’s guilty plea:

               Were the State to proceed to trial, it would prove beyond a
               reasonable doubt that on or about April 1, 2004, in Marion
               County, [S]tate of Indiana, at the Days Inn Motel on South
               Keystone, the defendant, Porfirio Marin, did engage in sexual
               contact with S.D., whom at the time he believed to have been
               between the ages of 14 and 16 years old, by engaging in sexual
               contact, which included touching and fondling, with the intent of
               satisfying his own sexual desires.

       4
         “A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for commission of the
       crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” Ind. Code
       § 35-41-5-1(a) (2003). “An attempt to commit a crime is a felony … of the same class as the crime
       attempted.” Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1(a) (2003).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023                              Page 10 of 20
               Further, Your Honor, the State would prove that Mr. Marin, the
               defendant, was over the age of 18 at the time of this offense.

               The State would also present testimony that Mr. Marin did
               confess to Detective John Arvin of the Indianapolis Police
               Department that he did engage in sexual contact with S.D.[,] all
               of which is contrary to the stated laws of Indiana.

       Ex. Vol. pp. 21–22. Marin stated during the guilty-plea hearing that he agreed

       with the factual basis and wished to plead guilty. Marin also stated that he

       understood that in order to plead guilty, the facts contained in the factual basis

       must be true. Marin did not challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis at the

       time he entered his guilty plea.

[14]   Marin now contends that the factual basis was inadequate because its wording

       included both criminal and non-criminal behavior, i.e., attempted sexual

       intercourse with a child under the age of sixteen and attempted sexual

       intercourse with a sixteen-year-old. The State concedes that it was error to use

       language in establishing the factual basis that included the age of sixteen but

       asserts that Marin has “failed to prove that he was prejudiced by the error” as

       the record clearly established that he was alleged to have engaged in sexual

       conduct with a child under the age of sixteen. Appellee’s Br. p. 12. We agree

       with the State.

[15]   In an apparent effort to limit his potential criminal exposure, Marin agreed to

       plead guilty to Class D felony attempted sexual misconduct with a minor in

       exchange for dismissal of the Class B felony charge. In negotiating a guilty

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023         Page 11 of 20
       plea, “[e]ach party bargains to include or exclude certain terms and each party

       receives substantial benefits by arriving at an agreement.” Bethea v. State, 983

       N.E.2d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2013) (citing Wright v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1153, 1155

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)). “[A] plea agreement is a contract, ‘an explicit agreement

       between the State and defendant,’ which, if accepted by the trial court, is

       binding upon all parties.” Id. (quoting Griffin v. State, 756 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied). The parties negotiated the terms of their

       agreement, and each received substantial benefits. Through the parties’ plea

       negotiations, Marin lessened his criminal exposure from a Class B felony to a

       Class D felony and capped the executed portion of his sentence at 364 days.

       After the trial court accepted the plea agreement, it entered judgment of

       conviction against Marin for a Class D felony and sentenced him in accordance

       with the terms of the parties’ agreement. Marin, therefore, received the benefit

       of his bargain.

[16]   We note that Class D felony sexual misconduct with a minor involves victims

       of a different age range than Class B felony child molesting and is therefore not

       actually a lesser-included offense of Class B felony child molesting. However,

       the parties seem to have treated it as such, allowing Marin the opportunity to

       plead guilty to a lower-level offense. We thereby find this case to be

       comparable to State v. Sanders, 596 N.E.2d 225 (Ind. 1992), a case in which a

       defendant pled guilty to a lesser-included offense for which he was never

       actually charged in exchange for dismissal of a more serious criminal charge.

       In Sanders, the Indiana Supreme Court considered whether Sanders’s guilty plea

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023         Page 12 of 20
       to involuntary manslaughter was supported by the record. Sanders had been

       charged with murder after he had shot and killed Indianapolis police officer

       Matthew Faber. Sanders, 596 N.E.2d at 225. Prior to trial, “Sanders pled guilty

       to involuntary manslaughter in exchange for the State’s dismissal of all other

       charges.” Id. Sanders “was never formally charged with involuntary

       manslaughter, but pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-included

       offense of murder.” Id. at 225–26. The trial court accepted Sanders’s guilty

       plea and sentenced him “to a term of seven years imprisonment.” Id. at 226.

[17]   Sanders subsequently sought PCR, with his counsel arguing that his “guilty

       plea should be set aside because at the time of the guilty plea hearing there was

       no charging document (either information or indictment) that charged Sanders

       with involuntary manslaughter.” Id. “Sanders[’s] legal premise was that, as a

       matter of law, a defendant cannot knowingly enter into a guilty plea to the

       charge of involuntary manslaughter unless there is an information or indictment

       charging him with the crime of involuntary manslaughter.” Id. The post-

       conviction court granted Sanders relief and this court affirmed. On transfer,

       however, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that because Sanders was

       pleading guilty to a lesser-included offense of the crime of murder, “no separate

       information or indictment was necessary in order to put Sanders on notice of

       the charges.” Id. at 227. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that it

       was clear from the record that Sanders was aware of the elements of the offense

       to which he pled guilty. Id. at 228.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023        Page 13 of 20
[18]   Similarly, in this case, despite the error in the wording used by the State in

       establishing the factual basis, we believe that Marin had adequately been made

       aware of the elements of the offense to which he pled guilty. Marin indicated at

       the guilty-plea hearing that he understood that he had originally been charged

       with Class B felony child molestation under Indiana Code 35-42-4-3 which, at

       the time Marin was charged, provided that “[a] person who, with a child under

       fourteen (14) years of age, performs or submits to sexual intercourse or deviate

       sexual conduct commits child molesting, a Class B felony.” The probable cause

       affidavit that was filed in conjunction with the original charging information

       clearly stated that S.D., who was born on August 17, 1990, was thirteen years

       old on the date in question. Thus, before plea negotiations had even

       commenced, Marin had been put on notice that the State was alleging that he

       had committed sexual acts with a child who was under the age of sixteen. As

       such, even though the State erred by using language in establishing the factual

       basis that included the age of sixteen, we cannot say that Marin was prejudiced

       by this error because he knew, or at the very least should have known, that the

       State had alleged that his criminal acts involved a child under the age of sixteen.

[19]   Furthermore, while Marin correctly states that at the time he pled guilty to

       Class D felony attempted sexual misconduct with a minor, Indiana Code

       section 35-42-4-9(c) provided that “[i]t is a defense that the accused person

       reasonably believed that the child was at least sixteen (16) years of age at the

       time of the conduct,” we conclude that by pleading guilty, Marin waived his

       right to raise this affirmative defense. It is well-established that “[d]efendants

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023          Page 14 of 20
       who bargain to plead guilty in return for favorable outcomes give up a plethora

       of substantive claims and procedural rights.” Hawkins v. State, 990 N.E.2d 508,

       509 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. For instance, when a defendant pleads

       guilty, he waives the right to challenge his conviction on double jeopardy

       grounds. See Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind. 2002) (providing that a

       defendant “waived his right to challenge is convictions on double jeopardy

       grounds when he entered his plea agreement” and “there is no exception to this

       rule for ‘facially duplicative’ charges”); Games v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1132, 1135

       (Ind. 2001) (providing that a defendant “who enters a plea agreement to achieve

       an advantageous position must keep the bargain” and “[o]nce the defendant

       bargains for a reduced charge, he cannot then challenge the sentence on double

       jeopardy grounds”). Likewise, “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty and agrees to

       a specific sentence, he waives his right to challenge the propriety of his

       sentence.” Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 75 (Ind. 2008).

[20]   Again, the record indicates that from the beginning of the criminal proceedings,

       Marin knew or should have known that the State was alleging that S.D. was

       thirteen years old when he engaged in sexual acts with her. At no point prior to

       pleading guilty did Marin raise the affirmative defense that he believed that

       S.D. had been sixteen and, when questioned by the trial court, Marin indicated

       that he understood the charges against him and wished to plead guilty. By

       pleading guilty, Marin waived the right to challenge his conviction on the

       ground that he had reasonably believed that S.D. had been sixteen years old on

       the date in question.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023         Page 15 of 20
       II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
[21]   “The right to effective counsel is rooted in the Sixth Amendment to the United

       States Constitution.” Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ind. 2006). “‘The

       Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it

       envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial

       system to produce just results.’” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

       668, 685 (1984)). “‘The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness

       must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

       adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just

       result.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).

[22]   A successful claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy two

       components. Reed v. State, 866 N.E.2d 767, 769 (Ind. 2007). Under the first

       prong, the petitioner must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient by

       demonstrating that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of

       reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have

       the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation

       omitted). “We recognize that even the finest, most experienced criminal

       defense attorneys may not agree on the ideal strategy or most effective way to

       represent a client,” and therefore, under this prong, we will assume that counsel

       performed adequately and defer to counsel’s strategic and tactical decisions.

       Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 585 (Ind. 2002). “Isolated mistakes, poor

       strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render

       representation ineffective.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023            Page 16 of 20
[23]   Under the second prong, the petitioner must show that the deficient

       performance resulted in prejudice. Reed, 866 N.E.2d at 769. A petitioner may

       show prejudice by demonstrating that there is “a reasonable probability (i.e. a

       probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for

       counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

       (emphasis added, internal quotation omitted). A petitioner’s failure to satisfy

       either prong will cause the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to fail. See

       Williams, 706 N.E.2d at 154. Stated differently, “[a]lthough the two parts of the

       Strickland test are separate inquires, a claim may be disposed of on either

       prong.” Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. 2006) (citing Williams,

       706 N.E.2d at 154).

[24]   Marin contends that his trial counsel provided deficient performance and that

       he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. As it relates to allegedly

       deficient performance, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that “under [Padilla

       v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)], if counsel knows a client is a non-citizen,

       then counsel must inform the client whether the plea carries a risk of

       deportation.” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1282 (Ind. 2019) (cleaned

       up).

[25]   Marin was represented at trial by the Honorable Jose Salinas, when Judge

       Salinas was a practicing attorney specializing in immigration and criminal law,

       with over ninety percent of his clients being Hispanic. Marin testified during

       the post-conviction hearing that he had never been advised that his guilty plea

       could result in deportation and that he did not learn of the immigration

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-3006 | May 16, 2023         Page 17 of 20
       consequences until he had re-entered the United States after attending his

       grandmother’s funeral in Mexico. As it related to Marin, Judge Salinas stated

       that

               I do not recall independently giving any advisements to this
               particular client. But I will say that it was my practice, because I
               did immigration -- that it was my routine to always inquire (1) as
               to the immigration status of my clients, (2) as to whether or not
               they wanted -- what was their priority.… Was their … priority to
               stay out of jail, or you know, try to fight for whatever
               immigration benefits they may have at the time or may have in
               the future.

       PCR Tr. pp. 4–5. Judge Salinas further stated that it would have been his

       routine practice to advise non-citizen clients of potential immigration

       repercussions following a criminal conviction.

[26]   The post-conviction court found that Judge Salinas provided Marin with

       adequate performance, noting that Marin’s assertion “that he was not advised

       of the immigration consequences by Judge Salinas is admittedly self-serving”

       and “comes after immigration proceedings being initiated against [him] based

       solely on this conviction.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 141. The post-

       conviction court weighed the evidence and found Judge Salinas’s testimony

       regarding his routine with clients facing immigration issues to be more credible

       than Marin’s testimony. Again, when appealing from the denial of a PCR

       petition, a petitioner must convince us that the evidence, taken as a whole,

       “leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the

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       post-conviction court.” Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745. Marin has failed to meet

       this heavy burden.

[27]   Furthermore, even if Marin had established deficient performance, he has failed

       to convince us that he was prejudiced by Judge Salinas’s representation.

                 In the context of a guilty plea, the prejudice prong of the
                 Strickland test focuses on whether counsel’s deficient performance
                 affected the outcome of the plea process. To satisfy the prejudice
                 requirement, the petitioner therefore must show that there is a
                 reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not
                 have pled guilty. To prove they would have rejected the guilty
                 plea and insisted on trial, defendants must show some special
                 circumstances that would have supported that decision.
                 Defendants cannot simply say they would have gone to trial, they
                 must establish rational reasons supporting why they would have
                 made that decision.

       Jones v. State, 151 N.E.3d 790, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (cleaned up), trans.

       denied.

[28]   The record reveals that by pleading guilty to a Class D felony rather than

       having potentially been found guilty of a Class B felony, Marin received a

       substantial benefit, effectively reducing his potential period of incarceration

       from twenty years to 364 days. In attempting to show prejudice, Marin

       indicated that he did not “really know much of Mexico” and had never wanted

       to live in Mexico. PCR Tr. p. 18. When asked “why do you think we should

       believe you that you would’ve gone to trial with that risk … instead of taking

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       the agreement,” Marin responded “[b]ecause I got all my family here. I’ve …

       been here the rest of my life. So I … would’ve fought my case.” PCR Tr. p. 18.

[29]   Given the substantial benefit Marin received, coupled with the fact that he had

       made a recorded confession to investigating officers, the post-conviction court

       did not find Marin’s claim that he would not have pled guilty but rather would

       have fought the Class B felony charge to be credible. The post-conviction court

       found, and we agree, that Marin has failed to “show special circumstances”

       supporting his decision or “establish rational reasons supporting why [he]

       would have made that decision.” Jones, 151 N.E.3d at 797. Marin has

       therefore again failed to meet the heavy burden of convincing us that the

       evidence, taken as a whole, “leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision

       opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745.

[30]   The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

       May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

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