Court Opinion

ID: 9739959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:24:34.735878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.997329
License: Public Domain

ENGLISH, PJ, specially concurring: I agree that there should be a new trial, but cannot concur in all that is said by the majority. I do not believe that “the nature of the testimony (to the effect that the plug was seen to be broken after plaintiff’s injury) permits a reasonable inference that the defective condition of the plug pre-existed plaintiff’s contact with it.” In this regard it should be borne in mind that the only proof as to prior condition was that the ping was whole a few hours before the accident. Furthermore, proof of prior defective condition without proof that it was caused by defendant, or without proof of notice to defendant, actual or constructive, would be insufficient to establish negligence on the part of defendant, the sine qua non of the action. The conclusion of the majority on this point is contrary to the consistent holdings of a great volume of cases involving premises rendered dangerous by the existence of defective conditions or by the presence of foreign substances. While the case of Donoho v. O’Connell’s, Inc., 13 Ill2d 113, 148 NE2d 434, involved a foreign substance, the opinion’s statement of the general rule is, I believe, appropriate here. The court said at page 118: The parties do not question or quarrel with the rules of law appertaining herein: That a proprietor owes a business invitee the duty of exercising ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition (Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lanes, Inc., 5 Ill2d 153); and that liability will be imposed where a business invitee is injured by slipping on a foreign substance on the premises if it was placed there by the negligence of the proprietor or his servants, or, if there is no showing how the substance got on the premises, if it appears that the proprietor or his servant knew of its presence, or that the substance was there a sufficient length of time so that in the exercise of ordinary care its presence should have been discovered. (Davis v. South Side Elevated Railroad Co., 292 Ill 378.) Thus, where the foreign substance is on the premises due to the negligence of the proprietor or his servants, it is not necessary to establish their knowledge, actual or constructive (Pabst v. Hillmans, 293 Ill App 547); whereas, if the substance is on the premises through acts of third persons, the time element to establish knowledge or notice to the proprietor is a material factor. Schmelzel v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., 342 Ill App 501. See also Semmler v. Accettura, 31 Ill App2d 249, 253, 175 NE2d 297; Jones v. Kroger Grocery and Baking Co., 273 Ill App 183; Ritgers v. City of Gillespie, 350 Ill App 485, 492, 113 NE2d 215; Jochens v. City of Chicago, 6 Ill App2d 144, 150, 127 NE2d 142. The presumption of continuance of a condition runs forward, but does not reach backward. Cantwell Eagle Brewing Co. v. Horst, 61 Ill App 330, 331; City of Chicago v. Early, 104 Ill App 398, 400. The facts in the case at bar do not lend themselves to the inference that the plug was more likely to have been broken by defendant than by others including plaintiff. We are, therefore, not faced with a case to which the decision in Donoho v. O’Connell’s, Inc., 13 Ill2d 113, 148 NE2d 434, would be applicable. Nor are the facts here parallel to those in Swanson v. S. S. Kresge Co., 302 Ill App 455, 24 NE2d 62. I do agree with the majority, however, that there was sufficient evidence to raise a jury question under the rule of Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill2d 614, 126 NE2d 836. Upon a new trial, therefore, it could be argued by plaintiff that the manner of installation of the drinking fountain; its location with reference to the wall and the electric plug; the lack of a step to permit use by small children; etc.; constituted negligence on defendant’s part. And under that circumstance it would also be proper for defendant to argue the inference that the plug had been broken by plaintiff, as this would bear on the question of foreseeability in its relation to negligence, as set forth in the Kahn case.