Court Opinion

ID: 9586190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:08:08.338701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:14.614220
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring specially.
In City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26 (426 SE2d 861) (1993), this Court adopted the majority view on the duty owed by governmental units to provide police protection to individual citizens:
[L]iability does not attach where the duty owed by the governmental unit runs to the public in general and not to any particular member of the public, except where there is a special relationship between the governmental unit and the individual giving rise to a particular duty owed to that individual.
Id. at 27, quoting 38 ALR4th 1194, § l[a] (1985). To establish the scope of the “special relationship” required to establish a particularized duty to protect, we adopted in City of Rome three requirements:
(1) an explicit assurance by the municipality, through promises or actions, that it would act on behalf of the injured party; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality that inaction could lead to harm; and, (3) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured party on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking.
Id. at 29. Applying the doctrine in that case, we held that the City of Rome owed no duty to the plaintiff on which tort liability could be based because there was no special relationship between the City of Rome and the plaintiff giving rise to a particular duty owed to that individual. Subsequently, in Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6 (471 SE2d 849) (1996), we held that the public duty doctrine did not apply to the Department of Transportation in a suit based on negligent design of an intersection because “our decision in [City of Rome v. Jordan] was directed squarely and only at the duty owed by a governmental entity to provide police protection to individual citizens.” 267 Ga. at 8. One year later, in response to questions certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, we relied on our holding in Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, supra, to conclude that the public duty doctrine did not apply to a situation in which a deputy sheriff answering an emergency summons to a swimming pool where a patron had collapsed interfered with ongoing efforts at resuscitation. Hamilton v. Cannon, 267 Ga. 655 (482 SE2d 370) (1997). Specifically, we held that the decision in City of Rome applied only to police protection and was limited to the situation involved in that case.
The Court of Appeals has had several opportunities since we *718issued City of Rome to consider and apply the public duty doctrine. See Dybas v. Town of Chester, 234 Ga. App. 113 (1) (505 SE2d 274) (1998) (absent special relationship, no liability for failure to keep underage drivers off road); Diaz v. Gwinnett County, 225 Ga. App. 807, 808 (485 SE2d 42) (1997) (absent special relationship, public safety officials not liable to employee for failure to prevent hepatitis infection); Booth v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 223 Ga. App. 243 (2) (477 SE2d 376) (1996) (absent special relationship, no liability for conduct allegedly breaching deputy’s bond); Washington v. Jefferson County, 221 Ga. App. 81, 82 (470 SE2d 714) (1996) (absent special relationship, no liability for not preventing fight); Finley v. Lehman, 218 Ga. App. 789 (1) (463 SE2d 709) (1995) (absent special relationship, no liability for allegedly negligent inspection of ditch); Tilley v. City of Hapeville, 218 Ga. App. 39 (1) (459 SE2d 567) (1995) (absent special relationship, no liability for not preventing collision with car stopped in roadway); Landis v. Rockdale County, 212 Ga. App. 700 (445 SE2d 264) (1994) (absent special relationship with person subsequently injured by intoxicated driver, no liability for not arresting intoxicated driver in earlier encounter); City of Lawrenceville v. Macko, 211 Ga. App. 312 (2) (439 SE2d 95) (1993) (absent special relationship, no liability for allegedly negligent inspection of house under construction); Smail v. Douglas County, 210 Ga. App. 830, 831 (437 SE2d 824) (1993) (absent special relationship, no liability for failure to provide police protection to woman killed by rock thrown from overpass); and Feise v. Cherokee County, 209 Ga. App. 733 (434 SE2d 551) (1993) (absent special relationship, no liability for failing to prevent attack by stalker). In addition to the present case, the Court of Appeals has found the doctrine to be inapplicable in Dollar v. Dalton Public Schools, 233 Ga. App. 827 (1) (c) (505 SE2d 789) (1998) (child injured falling from playground equipment at school); Queen v. City of Douglasville, 232 Ga. App. 68 (2) (500 SE2d 918) (1998) (negligence in planning parade alleged to cause child to be hit by train); Vance v. T.R. a, 229 Ga. App. 608 (1) (a) (494 SE2d 714) (1997) (physician’s failure to report child abuse); and Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178 (3) (460 SE2d 812) (1995) (doctrine not applicable “where the legislature, by statute, creates exposure of the state to potential liability for losses, as it did in OCGA § 50-21-24 (10)”).
As correctly noted by the majority, opinions issued since this Court’s decision in City of Rome demonstrate that our pronouncements regarding the doctrine have engendered uncertainty in its application. See, e.g., Coffey v. Brooks County, 231 Ga. App. 886 (500 SE2d 341) (1998). I believe, therefore, that this appeal presents a ripe opportunity to clarify the doctrine’s applicability and scope.
First, it must be noted that the doctrine operates only when there is an alleged failure to comply with a duty to protect. City of *719Rome, supra, fix. 2. More specifically, we have limited the application of the doctrine to the public safety context, referring in City of Rome and Hamilton to “police protection,” and in Dept. of Transp. v. Brown to “police services.” With the benefit of the cases considering application of the doctrine, it becomes clear that Presiding Justice Fletcher best expressed the scope of the doctrine in his dissent in Hamilton:
the public duty doctrine applies to police and other public employees who provide police services. These services include preserving public order; promoting public health, safety, and morals; and preventing, detecting and punishing crime.
Id. at 659.
Noting that the situation did not exist in City of Rome, we declined in that case to “determine whether a special duty may exist even in the absence of a special relationship where a police officer is present at the scene of a crime, has the knowledge and the resources to act to the benefit of the injured party, yet does not act.” Id. at 29, n. 4. After considering the doctrine’s development in this State, I believe that the doctrine should be expanded to include a provision for a particularized duty to an individual to arise separately from the formation of a “special relationship” as contemplated in City of Rome. I would hold, therefore, that a particularized duty on which liability may be based can arise when one with a duty to provide police services is present at the scene of a crime or emergency, has knowledge of the danger and resources to aid an injured or imperilled party, yet fails to act.
With those considerations in mind, I would restate the public duty doctrine as follows: Liability of a governmental unit and its agents for failure to provide police services to an individual does not attach where the duty owed by the governmental unit runs to the public in general and not to any particular member of the public, but liability does attach when (a) one with a duty to provide police services is present at the scene of a crime or emergency with knowledge of the danger and resources to aid an injured or imperilled party, yet fails to act; or (b) a special relationship between the governmental unit and the individual giving rise to a particular duty owed to that individual is created by (1) an explicit assurance by the municipality, through promises or actions, that it would act on behalf of the injured party; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality that inaction could lead to harm; and, (3) justifiable and detrimental reliance by the injured party on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking. For the purposes of the public duty doctrine, “police services” should include preserving public order; promoting public health, safety, and morals; and preventing, detecting and punishing crime.
*720Applying this restated doctrine to the relevant case law discussed above only raises concerns about one of our earlier decisions. This Court’s decision in City of Rome would have been the same under the restated doctrine because the case involved a claim of liability for failure to provide police services to an individual without a special relationship between the individual and the governmental unit. Likewise, the result would have been the same in Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, because that case did not involve a claim of liability for failure to provide police services, but rather a claim of liability based on faulty design of an intersection, an activity clearly not involving police services. However, under the public duty doctrine as restated in this concurrence, the answer to the first certified question in Hamilton would have been different. The Eleventh Circuit asked, “(1) Does the ‘public duty doctrine’ established in City of Rome apply outside the police protection context and in the circumstances of this case?” Under the restated doctrine, the actions of the deputy in that case were clearly within the meaning of “police services,” and a particularized duty to the imperilled individual would arise when the deputy arrived at the scene with knowledge of the danger and resources to aid the individual.
Regarding application of the doctrine by the Court of Appeals, the result of the cases cited above, other than the present case, would be the same under the restatement of the doctrine. In its opinion in the present case, the Court of Appeals specifically noted that it was this Court’s decisions in Hamilton and Dept. of Transp. v. Brown which prevented it from applying the doctrine to Rowe.
Viewing our precedent by looking at its effect on the decisions of the Court of Appeals, as noted by the majority, it is apparent that the means used to distinguish Dept. of Transp. v. Brown from City of Rome were inappropriate. I agree with the majority that Dept. of Transp. v. Brown could better have been distinguished simply by holding that highway design does not come within the meaning of police services, and I believe that decision should be allowed to stand. However, I also believe that the holding in Hamilton that the doctrine did not apply would be incorrect under the doctrine as restated in this concurrence. The situation in Hamilton would be within the public duty doctrine as restated herein because it involved a law enforcement officer providing police services and arriving at the scene of an emergency with knowledge of the danger and resources to aid the individual, and I believe that Hamilton should be overruled to the extent it is inconsistent with the restatement of the public duty doctrine in this opinion.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher joins in this special concurrence.