Court Opinion

ID: 9748467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:02:31.122716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:35.589177
License: Public Domain

Justice McCAFFERY,
dissenting.
I must dissent from this Court’s per curiam order denying relief. In my view, relief pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1732(a) is appropriate even though Appellant has failed first to seek relief by applying for a stay in the Commonwealth Court.
Rule 1732(a) provides
(a) Application to lower court. Application for a stay of an order of a lower court pending appeal, or for approval of or modification of the terms of any supersedeas, or for an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal, or for relief in the nature of peremptory mandamus, must ordinarily be made in the first instance to the lower court, except where a prior order under this chapter has been entered in the matter by the appellate court or a judge thereof.
Pa.R.A.P. 1732(a) (emphasis added).
Here, this Court, in its discretion, has accepted for appeal the very case underlying the instant application for extraordinary relief and has, moreover, entered two orders placing this appeal on an accelerated schedule. As a result, the merits of the case will be argued before this Court during our March 2009 Session. Thus, by order, this Court has established its stewardship over the case and has affirmatively determined that the case is of such significance that it is to be disposed of in an unusually expeditious manner. The requirement of Rule 1732(a) that a stay application must first be made to the lower court applies only in the ordinary case. This is no ordinary *624case, and our orders entered in this case reflect that fact. Rather than preclude our review, Rule 1782(a) supports it.
Having determined that Rule 1732(a) supports this Court’s accepting for review the instant application for extraordinary relief, I would briefly note that I am in favor of granting it. Although the requirements for granting a stay are not insignificant, I believe that, on balance, they support this Court’s precluding the City from closing any fire facilities pending the outcome of the determination of the merits of this case.
On one side of the ledger is the City’s interest in closing the facilities to save money, which in these current times is certainly an important goal. However, as Justice Baer sagely observes in his Concurring Statement, it is possible that the City’s immediate closure of the fire facilities may actually engender greater costs should the City not prevail on the appeal. Further, should the City prevail on appeal, the delay (and the consequent costs) suffered by the City would not be extensive, as this case has been placed on an accelerated schedule.
On the other side of the ledger is the very real possibility that closure of the facilities will endanger the lives and safety of both first responders (firefighters, police, and EMT personnel) and the public. While the Court of Common Pleas was not convinced that the safety of first responders and the public would be jeopardized by the closure of the fire facilities, I would take judicial notice of the fact that the potential delay of response time created by these closures could endanger both first responders and the public. Any delay could create a risk of a fire spreading or of an emergency being exacerbated. In either case, the public and first responders face greater, indeed possibly fatal, threats to their safety.
Therefore, I believe that on balance, there is no question as to which direction this Court should take in this matter. I believe this Court is obliged to defer to the reality of increased risk of endangerment of the safety of the public and of the first responders caused by the closure of the fire facilities. *625Accordingly, I would grant the instant application for extraordinary relief.