Court Opinion

ID: 9635199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:41:24.779963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:30.753733
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.
I must respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which determines that KRS 67.077(2) is a directory provision which may be satisfied by substantial compliance, and that the publication and advertising of the ordinance was also substantial compliance. This matter should be remanded to the circuit court to declare that the occupational tax ordinance is invalid because it was passed at a meeting which violated KRS 67.077(2).
In this situation, publication is mandatory because the statute uses the word “shall.” Accordingly, compliance with the conditions set forth in the statute must be strictly followed and enforced. Although the statute allows publication by summary, it is necessary that the publication of such a summary must also be in strict compliance. KRS 67.075(2) defines “summary” to mean a concise, written narrative covering the main points of any official statement which is certified as to its accuracy by the fiscal court, and written in such a way as to inform the public clearly of its contents. Here, the fiscal court did not certify the accuracy of the occupational tax ordinance. This fact was admitted by the judge/executive several times in his deposition. Thus, the fiscal court failed to fully comply with the strict compliance and mandatory requirements of the statute.
*846As noted by Justice Gus Thomas in Ar-nett v. Sullivan, 279 Ky. 720, 132 S.W.2d 76 (1939), there is “a vast difference between ‘substantial’ compliance and no compliance at all.” The question of whether a statute is directory or mandatory has been litigated a number of times. Arnett, supra, states that the term “directory” means that the statute gives directions which ought to be followed, but the power given is not so limited by the directions that it cannot be exercised without following the directions. The statute is regarded as directory if the directions given accomplish an end without affecting the real merits of the case. Arnett concluded that constitutional provisions are never directory and always mandatory. There is no reason for not applying the same standard to the statutory requirements in this case because the requirements go to the very heart of representative government in this Commonwealth. This case involves the imposition of a tax and the opportunity of members of the public including taxpayers to discuss or protest or support. Proper compliance is essential to the validity of the notice to the public. Cf. Skaggs v. Fyffe, 266 Ky. 337, 98 S.W.2d 884 (1936).
KRS 446.080(4) states in part that “all words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of language ...” Certainly, “shall” means shall. Bowen v. Commonwealth, ex rel. Stidham, Ky., 887 S.W.2d 350 (1994), states in part that we have a duty to accord to words of a statute their literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd result. See also Bailey v. Reeves, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 832 (1984).
Any summary as contemplated by this case must be certified as to its accuracy by the fiscal court and is a mandatory requirement because of the mandatory nature of the word “shall.” Much of the jurisprudence and legal authorities cited by the fiscal court involve cases where there was at least some effort made to comply with the statutes. Here, the evidence is abundantly clear that no effort whatsoever was made to comply with the certification language contained in the statute. Clearly, the fiscal court has the legal authority to pass a valid occupational tax. However, in this case, the ordinance was evidently hastily enacted in such a way as to deprive the citizens and taxpayers and others affected to have an adequate and accurate notice as to the contents of the proposed ordinance.