Court Opinion

ID: 9624336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:58:41.263306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:44.051401
License: Public Domain

Justice MOORE:
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s ruling that petitioner failed to meet her burden of showing that trial counsel’s reason for striking the juror was pretextual.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the striking of a venire person on the basis of race or gender. State v. Evins, 373 S.C. 404, 645 S.E.2d 904 (2007), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 662, 169 L.Ed.2d 521 (2007). The proper procedure for a Batson hearing is set forth in Evins, at 415, 645 S.E.2d at 909. After a party objects to a jury strike, the proponent of the strike must offer a facially race-neutral explanation. Id. Once the proponent states a reason that is race-neutral, the burden is on the party challenging the strike to show the explanation is mere pretext, either by showing similarly situated members of another race were seated on the jury or that the reason given for the strike is so fundamentally implausible as to constitute mere pretext despite a lack of disparate treatment. Id. The burden of persuading the court that a Batson violation has occurred remains at all times on the opponent of the strike. Id.
*189Whether a Batson violation has occurred must be determined by examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record. State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 615, 545 S.E.2d 805, 810 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 977, 122 S.Ct. 404, 151 L.Ed.2d 306 (2001). Typically, the decisive question is whether the attorney’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. Evins, at 415-416, 645 S.E.2d at 909. There is seldom much evidence in the record bearing on the issue, and the trial court’s findings regarding purposeful discrimination necessai'ily will rest largely on the evaluation of demeanor and credibility of counsel. Id. Often the demeanor of the challenged attorney will be the best and only evidence of discrimination, and evaluation of the attorney’s mind lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province. Shuler, at 615, 545 S.E.2d at 810 (citing Hernandez v. Neiv York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). Therefore, those findings are given great deference and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Evins, at 416, 645 S.E.2d at 910.
In my opinion, the court of appeals correctly found that respondent’s reason for striking the juror was race-neutral pursuant to Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). In Purkett, the United States Supreme Court found that a prosecutor’s explanation for striking an African-American juror was race-neutral where the prosecutor explained that he struck the juror because he had “long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard.” The prosecutor had further explained that he did not “like the way [the juror] looked,” and that the mustache and beard looked suspicious to him. Thus, the United States Supreme Court approved the challenge of a prospective African-American juror solely on the basis of his appearance. The United States Supreme Court noted that the growing of long, unkempt hair is not peculiar to any race. Id. at 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769.
Furthermore, I believe that the court of appeals properly noted that the decision to wear an alternative hairstyle is not specific to any race. See Hastings v. Cambra, 2000 WL 307473 (N.D.Cal.2000) (finding that striking a proposed African-American juror because he had dreadlocks is a reasonable and race-neutral reason for the strike); State v. Bolton, 274 Kan. 1, 49 P.3d 468 (2002) (upholding the trial court’s decision *190finding no purposeful discrimination for striking a prospective African-American juror who wore hair braids). Just as the United States Supreme Court similarly noted in Purkett, the decision to wear one’s hair in the dreadlocks hairstyle is not peculiar to any race. In other cultures and more often in the past, the hairstyle has been worn as a religious choice by, for example, Hindus and Rastafarians, and is unrelated to race. In recent years, the wearing of the dreadlocks hairstyle has been practiced by both African-Americans and Caucasians, but more often by African-Americans. I would find that the choice to wear dreadlocks is a choice to wear an alternative hairstyle and is not limited to one particular race and that the trial judge therefore appropriately determined respondent’s reason for striking the juror was race-neutral. See Purkett at 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (a legitimate reason for exercising a challenge is not a reason that makes sense but a reason that does not deny equal protection).
In the instant case, after finding the reason for the strike was race-neutral, the trial judge then properly proceeded to determine whether petitioner could meet the burden of showing the explanation was actually mere pretext. Petitioner argued that having dreadlocks and making respondent’s attorney uneasy was not a sufficient basis for a discretionary strike. The judge found that, based on his evaluation of respondent’s attorney’s reputation and credibility, petitioner had not met her burden of showing pretext. In my view, petitioner’s cursory argument, without more, does not meet her burden of showing that the reason given for the strike was so fundamentally implausible as to constitute mere pretext, and thus, because the trial court’s finding is not clearly erroneous, it may not be set aside. See Evins, at 416, 645 S.E.2d at 909 (demeanor of the challenged attorney will be the best and only evidence of discrimination, and the evaluation of the attorney’s mind lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s provide; therefore, this finding is given great deference and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous); Shuler, at 615, 545 S.E.2d at 810 (same).
For these reasons, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the trial court’s ruling.
PLEICONES, J., concurs.