Court Opinion

ID: 9847198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:55:39.08071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:02.929060
License: Public Domain

Judge Parker
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the reason that in my opinion the order was not entered on 17 January 1989. The transcript reflects that at the hearing on that date, the trial judge made the following statement:
Well, I think the first thing the Court will do is give the Washington Order the full faith and credit it deserves and once doing that I see no change in circumstances to change the custody of the child. You may have some point that maybe the girl is spending too much time with her aunt. I don’t know but I’m going to let the mother keep custody of both the children. As to the visitation, do y’all need me to set something?
Then followed a discussion among the court and counsel about visitation rights which ultimately ended with counsel for defendant agreeing to draw the order when the parties had agreed on visitation. The written order that was entered on 6 April 1989 contained 29 numbered findings of fact and four conclusions of law. None of these findings or conclusions other than that there had been no change in circumstances and that the Washington order should be given full faith and credit were made at the 17 January 1989 hearing. Conclusions of law must be based on findings of fact supported by competent evidence. In this case no findings of fact to support the conclusions of law were made at the 17 January hearing. At most, all the trial judge did was to indicate how he would rule so that the attorney for the prevailing party could draw the order.
*671In my view, what occurred at the hearing on 17 January was not covered by either paragraph one or two of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 58. Paragraph one states:
[T]he clerk, in the absence of any contrary direction by the judge, shall make a notation in his minutes of such verdict or decision and such notation shall constitute the entry of judgment for the purposes of these rules. The clerk shall forthwith prepare, sign, and file the judgment without awaiting any direction by the judge.
In the present case, the judge made a contrary direction — he directed the lawyer for the prevailing party to draw the order. Furthermore, paragraph one clearly contemplates a situation where entry of a proper order or judgment by the clerk without further action by the judge can be accomplished. In this case since the trial judge gave no indication as to his findings of fact in open court, the clerk could not possibly have entered a proper order.
Similarly, paragraph two is inapplicable. Paragraph two of Rule 58 provides:
In other cases where judgment is rendered in open court, the clerk shall make a notation in his minutes as the judge may direct and such notation shall constitute the entry of judgment for the purposes of these rules.
In the present case, nothing in the record suggests that the judge directed the clerk to make a notation in the minutes.
As this Court noted in Barringer & Gaither, Inc. v. Whittenton, 22 N.C. App. 316, 206 S.E.2d 301 (1974):
Rule 58 is designed to achieve the objectives of (1) making the moment of the entry of judgment easily identifiable, and (2) furnishing fair notice to all parties of the entry of the judgment.
Id. at 317, 206 S.E.2d at 302. The case presently before the Court for review is just another of many illustrative of the fact that these worthy objectives are not being accomplished by the application of Rule 58.