Court Opinion

ID: 9796662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:02:05.300053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:53.739577
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
concurring in the judgment only:
I understand the majority to hold that if the admission of a statement in the case-in-chief against a defendant would violate the Miranda rule, that statement cannot be used even for impeachment purposes unless the defendant testifies at trial. Because it seems clear to me that the defendant's custodial statement in this case did not adequately contradict the testimony of any defense witness, I consider it unnecessary to reach the broader question addressed by the majority. Because I also have concerns about various aspects of the majority's discussion of im*327peachment, its failure to distinguish the bar of the Mirando rule from the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, and its understanding of James v. Illinois,1 generally, I concur only in the judgment of the court.
Initially, I take issue with the majority's distinction between "impeachment" and "rebuttal," and its contention that this case involves only the technique of impeachment by self-contradiction. See maj. op. at 319-821. I do not believe its rigid use of these terms comports with historical usage in this jurisl diction, and more importantly, it does not parallel United States Supreme Court usage in formulating the doctrines at issue here. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 623, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 LEd.2d 559 (1980)(referring to evidence impeaching defendant's credibility as "rebuttal evidence"); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 228, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting: characterizing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954), as holding that exclusionary rule would not bar the Government from "rebutting" defendant's testimony with tainted evidence). Because the distinction is unnecessary to make clear the difference between evidence that merely discredits a witness and substantive evidence of guilt, I would avoid its potential impact on matters not before us by omitting it altogether.2 Rather than involving only impeachment by self-contradiction, this case is before us precisely because it poses the question whether custodial statements of a defendant can be used to contradict other defense witnesses.
Impeachment is not generally understood as being limited to confronting a witness with his prior inconsistent statements but includes any challenge to credibility, including showing bias or interest, proving a lack of capacity to perceive or remember, demonstrating a reputation for untrustworthiness, or contradicting the substance of a witness' statements. See John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 33 (5th ed.1999)(relied on by the majority at 319). In James, the Supreme Court referred 'to "impeachment through contradictory evidence" rather than impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. James, 493 U.S. at 315, 110 S.Ct. 648. Although the contradictory evidence admitted to impeach in James was the defendant's own prior inconsistent statement, the cases upon which James relied that developed the impeachment doctrine approved of the contradiction of trial testimony by illegally obtained physical evidence. See Havens 446 U.S. at 626-27, 100 S.Ct. 1912 (admitting illegally obtained T-shirt to impeach defendant's denial of having connection to pieces of same shirt found in possession of co-conspirator); Walder, 347 U.S. at 65, 74 S.Ct. 354 (admitting evidence of unlawfully seized heroin to impeach defendant's testimony that he never possessed narcotics). Since the use of physical evidence to impeach involves neither "self-contradietion" nor prior statements of the defendant, the majority's restrictive definition of impeachment is clearly not that intended by the James court. I agree of course that if "impeachment" is defined to include only contradiction by a witness' own prior statements, by definition the defendant is the only person who can be impeached with his unwarned custodial statements. I do not, however, find the majority's postula*328tion of such a restrictive definition helpful in deciding the intent of the Supreme Court because it predetermines the result.
Unlike the majority, I do not believe the United States Supreme Court in James intended to define the limitations imposed by the Miranda rule on the use of a defendant's statements for impeachment. James forbade the impeachment of another witness with a statement of the defendant that had been illegally obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures. In doing so, it openly balanced the truth-seeking objective of our legal system against the privacy values protected by "the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment." James 493 U.S. at 311, 319, 110 S.Ct. 648. Despite the Court's reference to both Fourth and Fifth Amendment cases in recounting the development of the impeachment doctrine, I find nothing in James to suggest that the Miranda rule, which protects the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, necessarily bars the use of impeachment evidence to the same extent as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
The Supreme Court has distinguished the nature and purposes of the Miranda rule from those of the exclusionary rule on a number of occasions, both before and after James. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 LEd.2d 405 (2000)(referring to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 LEd.2d 222 (1985), as holding that they are different); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304-08, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (subsequent custodial statements not exelud-ed as fruit of earlier Miranda violation); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974)(testimony of witness discovered through Miranda violation not barred by Miranda rule)3; cf. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 686-89, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 LEd.2d 407 (1993)(distinguishing Miranda violation from Fourth Amendment violation for purposes of habeas corpus review based on its different purposes). While we, unlike many courts, have understood the Miranda rule to bar certain kinds of derivative evidence, much like the exclusionary rule, see People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879 (Colo.1994)(excluding marijuana plants as fruit of Miranda violation); 3 Wayne R. La-Fave, et. al., Criminal Procedure, § 9.5(b) (1999), we have also readily acknowledged their differences. See People v. T.C., 898 P.2d 20, 27 (Colo.1995)(adopting rule of Michigan v. Tucker), People v. Trujillo, 778 P.2d 1086 (Colo.1989)(adopting rule of Oregon v. Elstad ).
Unlike the exclusionary rule, which exists for the purpose of protecting privacy interests by deterring future police violations of the constitutional prohibition. against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Miranda rule protects the privilege against self-incrimination by barring the use of unwarned custodial statements to incriminate the defendant. Although clearly a constitutional rule that cannot be overruled by legislation, see Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431-32, 120 S.Ct. 2326, the Miranda rule's precise theoretical basis and scope remain somewhat unclear. LaFave § 6.5(e)(Supp.2002). With regard to admission solely for impeachment purposes rather than as substantive evidence of guilt, it is not difficult to envision the imposition of limitations on the use of voluntary statements acquired without the benefit of the prophylactic Miranda warnings that are different from the limitations imposed on the use of evidence obtained by unconstitutional searches and seizures. In the latter context, the extent to which impeachment is allowed depends largely upon its impact on the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. In the former context, it is not clear that impeachment use of a defendant's statements is incriminating at all. Particularly, with respect to prophylactic rules, the applicability of which is peculiarly within the power of the Supreme Court, I am reluctant to announce a rule excluding more evidence than has already been mandated by that Court.
In any event, I do not believe this case requires us to anticipate the Supreme Court. Impeachment by illegally obtained evidence, *329even of the defendant himself, is permissible only if it presents a direct conflict or contradiction with the witness' trial testimony. See LeMasters v. People, 678 P.2d 538, 543 (Colo.1984). In the case before us, the defendant's statement that he actually knew he was to appear in court on the day in question in no way conflicted with or made any less true or accurate his mother's testimony concerning his history of poor memory or his wife's testimony about her usual practice of recording his court dates, which was not done in this case. While the testimony of both witnesses would clearly have been less probative of the defendant's lack of knowledge in light of his admission, neither witness contradicted the defendant's statement or testified to a contradictory statement of the defendant.
To determine that the evidence in this case was erroneously admitted, it is therefore sufficient that the defendant's pre-trial statement, made inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief by the Miranda rule, could be admitted for impeachment purposes only to the extent that it was directly contradictory of trial testimony. Defined this narrowly, impeachment of another witness with the defendant's excluded custodial statements should rarely become an issue unless the testimony involves contradictory representations of the defendant himself. As to that eventuality, even the majority appears to have reserved judgment. Maj. op. at 825. Given the absence of any pressing need and the remaining uncertainty surrounding application of the Miranda rule, I see no merit in gratuitously venturing a prediction about the Supreme Court's ultimate resolution of this question.
Because I believe the defendant's pre-trial custodial statement was not directly contradictory of the testimony of any defense witness, I would affirm the court of appeals' order to remand for a new trial, Because I also consider various aspects of the majority's rationale both questionable and unnecessary, I concur in the judgment only.
Justice KOURLIS and Justice RICE join in the concurring opinion.

. 493 U.S. 307, 110 S.Ct. 648, 107 LEd.2d 676 (1990).

. Perhaps most prominently, these terms have been at the heart of a debate over the obligation to endorse witnesses, involving pronouncements that are arguably inconsistent. See People v. Cobb, 962 P.2d 944, 953 (Colo.1998) (Kourlis, J., dissenting: finding a distinction but characterizing it as "a slippery one," based in part on the collateral versus direct nature of the evidence); People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125, 132 (Colo.1986) (Vollack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: relying on People v. Vollentine, 643 P.2d 800 (Colo.App.1982), distinguishing "rebuttal testimony" that is introduced to "refute a defense," from "rebuttal testimony" that is "introduced solely to impeach"); People v. Muniz, 622 P.2d 100, 102-03 (Colo.App.1980) (distinguishing "rebuttal testimony which refutes alibi evidence and impeachment testimony which does not contradict alibi evidence but does attack the credibility of defense witnesses on collateral matters," in that case, by attacking their veracity concerning the activities of the defendant before the crime); see also Palmer v. People, 162 Colo. 92, 424 P.2d 766 (1967); Schreiner v. People, 95 Colo. 392, 36 P.2d 764 (1934); Ingles v. People, 90 Colo. 51, 6 P.2d 455 (1931); People v. Hamrick, 624 P.2d 1333 (Colo.App.1979), aff'd, 624 P.2d 1320 (Colo.1981).

. Unlike the majority, see maj. op. at 323 n. 7, I understand Tucker not as an impeachment case, but as holding that the Miranda rule does not extend to the testimony of witnesses discovered through voluntary but unwarned custodial interrogation. See People v. T.C., 898 P.2d 20, 27 (Colo.1995).