Court Opinion

ID: 9957721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 00:00:57.874624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:34.778328
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60405           Document: 62-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                  ____________                                     Fifth Circuit

                                                                                  FILED
                                   No. 23-60405                               April 4, 2024
                                 Summary Calendar                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                    Clerk

Jacob Blair Scott,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

Jackson County, Mississippi; Mark Maples; Matthew
Lott; Lott Law Firm, L.L.C.; Amanda Capers; Jamie
Marie Rouse,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Mississippi
                            USDC No. 1:21-CV-318
                  ______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit
Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Jacob Blair Scott filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil complaint against
Jackson County, Mississippi; Chancellor Mark Maples; and private actors
Matthew Lott, Amanda Capers, Jamie Rouse, and Lott Law Firm, L.L.C.

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-60405        Document: 62-1       Page: 2     Date Filed: 04/04/2024

Scott appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his pro se civil action
against Chancellor Maples for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. He also challenges
the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the other
defendants.
       We review de novo dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Smith v. Hood, 900 F.3d 180,
184 (5th Cir. 2018). Under the Eleventh Amendment, citizens may not sue
their own state or another state in federal court unless the state has waived
its sovereign immunity or the immunity has been expressly abrogated by
Congress.     Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2013).
Mississippi has not waived its immunity nor has Congress taken it away. See
ROA.380; Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-5 (West 2024); Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 340 (1979). Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the
claims brought against Chancellor Maples in his official capacity. See Smith,
900 F.3d at 184.
       We review de novo dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ramirez
v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021). Judicial immunity provides
absolute immunity from suits for damages. Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565
F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2009). There are two circumstances, however, that
prevent application of judicial immunity: (1) “a judge is not immune from
liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial
capacity” and (2) “a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in
nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The acts taken by Chancellor Maples
satisfy all four of the relevant factors and were judicial in nature. See id. at
222. Insofar as Scott argues Chancellor Maples acted in the absence of all
jurisdiction, “[w]here a court has some subject-matter jurisdiction, there is
Case: 23-60405        Document: 62-1       Page: 3     Date Filed: 04/04/2024

sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.” Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d
1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993). Under Mississippi state law, a chancery court has
subject matter jurisdiction over divorce proceedings where one spouse is
domiciled in Mississippi and chancellors have broad discretion to award
alimony and divide marital assets. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-5-5, 93-5-23
(West 2024). Thus, Chancellor Maples had subject matter jurisdiction over
the proceedings. Chancellors may also grant an ex parte motion for a
temporary restraining order under Rule 65(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil
Procedure, which permits emergency requests to be heard without notice if
“it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit . . . that immediate
and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before the
adverse party or his attorney can be heard in opposition.” Miss. R. Civ.
P. 65(b); see Roberts v. Conner, 332 So.3d 272, 283-84 (Miss. Ct. App. 2021).
Thus, Chancellor Maples’s judicial acts were not taken in absence of all
jurisdiction. See Davis, 565 F.3d at 221. As for Scott’s conclusory allegations
that Chancellor Maples conspired with the private defendants and acted
corruptly or in bad faith, such allegations are insufficient to overcome judicial
immunity. See Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1023-24 (5th Cir. 1982).
       Scott also has not shown that the district court erred by dismissing
Chancellor Maples from the suit prior to any discovery. See Freeman v.
United States, 556 F.3d 326, 342 (5th Cir. 2009); Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484
F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2007). Scott has not demonstrated the district court
committed other procedural errors in its dismissal of Chancellor Maples from
the suit.
       We review “a summary judgment de novo, using the same standard
as that employed by the district court.” McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564,
571 (5th Cir. 2012). Scott argues that Jackson County can be held liable for
violations of constitutional rights committed by their officers and, as an
employer of Chancellor Maples, it is liable for acts committed by him. A
Case: 23-60405        Document: 62-1       Page: 4     Date Filed: 04/04/2024

governmental entity or municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only if
an official policy or custom caused a deprivation of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978). The actions taken by Chancellor Maples for which Scott complains
were taken in his judicial capacity, and thus he was not a policymaker for
Jackson County. See Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992).
Moreover, Scott has pointed to no official policy or custom of Jackson
County that deprived him of any constitutional right. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
       Next, private individuals typically are not considered state actors for
purposes of § 1983; however, “a private individual may act under color of
law in certain circumstances, such as when a private person is involved in a
conspiracy or participates in joint activity with state actors.” Ballard, 413
F.3d at 518. Scott’s disagreement with the final divorce decree does not show
that there was any agreement between the private defendants and Chancellor
Maples to act in concert with the specific intent to violate his constitutional
rights. See Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1023-24 (5th Cir. 1982).
Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that Scott failed to
allege sufficient facts to state a conspiracy claim under § 1983. See Bevill v.
Fletcher, 26 F.4th 270, 274-75 (5th Cir. 2022). Scott has alleged numerous
criminal violations against the private defendants, including fraud and theft;
however, private citizens like Scott do not have a constitutional right to have
an individual criminally prosecuted. See Oliver v. Collins, 914 F.2d 56, 60 (5th
Cir. 1990).
       Finally, the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in declining
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims once all of Scott’s
federal claims were dismissed. See Heggemeier v. Caldwell Cnty., 826 F.3d
861, 872 (5th Cir. 2016).
       AFFIRMED.