Court Opinion

ID: 9897265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:26.138547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:59.488514
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Oct 10 2023, 9:03 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Riley L. Parr                                              Theodore E. Rokita
Lebanon, Indiana                                           Attorney General of Indiana
                                                           J.T. Whitehead
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Anthony Cook,                                              October 10, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-CR-87
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Johnson Superior
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Peter D. Nugent,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           41D02-2007-F2-14

                                Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                              Judges Riley and Bradford concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-87 | October 10, 2023                            Page 1 of 8
      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   For twice selling methamphetamine to a confidential informant (CI), Anthony

      Cook was convicted of two counts of dealing. He appeals, arguing that his right

      to confront adverse witnesses was violated because the CI did not testify at his

      trial. Separately, Cook contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion

      for a continuance after he did not show up to his trial. Finding no error, we

      affirm.

      Facts
[2]   While working with the Franklin Police Department in November 2019, the CI

      tipped off Detective Richard Whitaker that Cook had offered to sell 3.5 grams

      of methamphetamine for $120. After Detective Whitaker determined the tip

      appeared credible, a controlled buy was quickly arranged.

[3]   On the day of the controlled buy, the CI met Cook at a fast-food restaurant with

      $120 provided by law enforcement. The CI wore an audio recording device,

      and Detective Whitaker and another detective, Zachary Russell, conducted

      surveillance using listening devices and a small camera. The controlled buy

      went off without a hitch, and the CI returned with 3.59 grams of

      methamphetamine.

[4]   The group then returned to the police station, where the officers reviewed the

      gathered evidence. While this was happening, Cook called the CI looking to

      make a second drug deal that same day, this time at a gas station car wash.

      Detectives Whitaker and Russell arranged another controlled buy between the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-87 | October 10, 2023       Page 2 of 8
      CI and Cook. And again, the deal went smoothly with the officers obtaining

      both audio and visual evidence of the controlled buy. When the CI returned to

      Detective Whitaker’s vehicle, she turned over the methamphetamine—nearly

      14 grams purchased this time for $350—and provided him with a summary of

      the transaction consistent with the surveillance recordings.

[5]   The State charged Cook with two counts of felony dealing in

      methamphetamine: one as a Level 2 and the other as a Level 4 felony. During

      Cook’s jury trial, the State moved to admit exhibits consisting of audio and

      video recordings of the controlled buys. The CI did not appear at Cook’s trial.

      Neither did Cook, although his counsel was present. The trial court admitted

      the recordings over Cook’s objection. After Cook was convicted as charged, the

      trial court sentenced him to 17½ years imprisonment.

      Discussion and Decision
[6]   Cook presents two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that admission of the

      video and audio evidence of the controlled buys violated his right to

      confrontation because the CI was not called as a witness at trial. Second, he

      alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a

      continuance the morning of his trial.

[7]   Generally, the admission of evidence and the decision to grant or deny a

      continuance are both placed within the discretion of the trial court. Jones v.

      State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (evidence); Flowers v. State,

      654 N.E.2d 1124, 1125 (Ind. 1995) (continuance). For a decision to be an abuse

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-87 | October 10, 2023         Page 3 of 8
      of discretion, it must be clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and

      circumstances before the trial court. Jones, 982 N.E.2d at 421. But we review

      alleged constitutional violations, like any pure issue of law, de novo. Id.

      I.       Admission of Evidence
[8]   Because the CI did not testify at his trial, Cook contends that the evidence of

      the controlled buys violated his confrontation rights under the Indiana

      Constitution. Article 1, § 13 guarantees criminal defendants the right to “meet .

      . . witnesses face to face.” Although this language is similar to the text of the

      Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “the rights guaranteed by

      Article 1, § 13 are not necessarily identical to those given by the Sixth

      Amendment.” State v. Owings, 622 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind. 1993).

[9]   But as Cook concedes, Indiana Courts have uniformly ruled that criminal

      defendants have no right to confront a confidential informant whose statements

      “were not admitted for the truth of the matters asserted.”1 Williams v. State, 669

      N.E.2d 956, 958 (Ind. 1996); see also Williams v. State, 930 N.E.2d 602, 609-10

      (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). This result tracks the Sixth Amendment. Crawford v.

      Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“[The Sixth Amendment] also does not

      1
        We acknowledge that the Supreme Court’s underlying legal analysis on this issue is brief. After determining
      that challenged evidence was not hearsay and therefore able to be admitted, our Supreme Court found no
      violation of the federal constitution and, in a single sentence without elaboration, “also” found no violation
      of Article 1, § 13. Williams, 669 N.E.2d at 958. Later cases have been similarly brief. Williams v. State, 930
      N.E.2d 602, 609-610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that the defendant’s argument under Article 1, § 13 to
      exclude confidential informant evidence failed under Williams). But Cook does not challenge the force of
      these precedents.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-87 | October 10, 2023                                 Page 4 of 8
       bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the

       truth of the matter asserted.”). In other words, when a confidential informant’s

       statement is not hearsay,2 Article 1, § 13 does not bar its admissibility at trial.

       Williams, 669 N.E.2d at 958.

[10]   The CI’s statements were not hearsay. As has been consistently determined by

       Indiana courts, “statements made by a [confidential informant] recorded in the

       course of a controlled drug buy [are] not offered by the State to prove the truth

       of the matter asserted and [are], therefore, not hearsay.” Vaughn v. State, 13

       N.E.3d 873, 879-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); Williams, 930 N.E.2d at 607-10;

       Lehman v. State, 926 N.E.2d 35, 37-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). This is so because

       such evidence is only “context evidence, not legally operative conduct.”

       Williams, 930 N.E.2d at 609.

[11]   Here, Cook approached the CI about selling methamphetamine not once, but

       twice. And the CI’s statements during the controlled buys largely amount to

       only those necessary to facilitate the controlled buy. Indeed, “[i]t was the

       statements made by the [defendant] that really constituted the evidentiary

       weight” of the controlled buy. Williams, 669 N.E.2d at 958. This being so, the

       2
           As explained by this Court in a similar case:

                ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
                hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Statements not admitted to
                prove the truth of the matter do not run afoul of the hearsay rule—they are not hearsay.
       Williams v. State, 930 N.E.2d 602, 608 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations
       omitted); see also Ind. Evidence Rule 801.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-87 | October 10, 2023                                    Page 5 of 8
       CI’s statements were not hearsay and the admission of the challenged exhibits

       containing those statements did not violate Article 1, § 13.

[12]   But Cook also urges us to use this case as an opportunity to endow Article 1, §

       13 with “greater protections and procedural safeguards than those provided for

       in the United States Constitution.” Appellant’s Br., p. 10 (citing Randall T.

       Shepherd, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 Ind. L. Rev. 575, 576

       (1989)). “Interpretation of the Indiana Constitution is controlled by the text

       itself, illuminated by history and by the purpose and structure of our

       constitution and the case law surrounding it.” State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 443

       (Ind. 2022) (quoting Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Ind. 1993)).

[13]   Yet Cook provides no specific argument on the meaning of Article 1, § 13. He

       provides merely an unsupported reference to what “‘populist, anti-government

       Jacksonian Democrats’ of the 1850s” may have thought about this case.

       Appellant’s Br., p. 12 (quoting Price, 622 N.E.2d at 962). And although Cook is

       correct to note that other rights in the Indiana Constitution have been

       interpreted more broadly than their federal counterpart—as Article 1, § 13 itself

       has been in other contexts—this fact alone does nothing to establish the scope

       of the right here. See Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 987 (Ind. 1991) (finding

       greater protections under Article 1, § 13 than the federal constitution); Hill v.

       State, 137 N.E.3d 926, 936-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (applying Article 1, § 13’s

       separate analysis). Because Cook has not explained the exact nature of the relief

       he seeks, we end our analysis here.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-87 | October 10, 2023          Page 6 of 8
       II.     Denial of Continuance
[14]   Cook also alleges that the trial court erred in denying his counsel’s motion for a

       continuance when Cook did not appear the morning of his trial. “When, as

       here, a defendant moves for a continuance not required by statute, we review

       the court’s decision to deny the request for an abuse of discretion.” Ramirez v.

       State, 186 N.E.3d 89, 96 (Ind. 2022).

[15]   Cook claims that the trial court erred when it failed to evaluate and compare

       the parties’ interests before denying his request for a continuance. But even if

       that were true, Cook must still establish prejudice from the continuance’s

       denial. Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 236 (Ind. 2015) (stating an abuse of

       discretion exists only “where a defendant was prejudiced as a result of not

       getting a continuance”). Cook’s only argument about prejudice is that a

       continuance may have allowed him to attend his trial and “vindicate” his

       rights. Appellant’s Br., p. 13. Yet Cook fails to explain his absence at trial. And

       as he concedes on appeal, the trial court informed Cook several times of his trial

       date.

[16]   In short, when a defendant “willfully” does not attend his trial after being fully

       informed of its date and location, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in

       denying a motion for a continuance. Fletcher v. State, 537 N.E.2d 1385, 1385-86

       (Ind. 1989).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-87 | October 10, 2023         Page 7 of 8
[17]   Finding no error in the trial court’s admission of the evidence from the

       controlled buys or its denial of Cook’s continuance motion, we affirm.

       Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-87 | October 10, 2023         Page 8 of 8