Court Opinion

ID: 9735704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:28:14.425573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:00.994332
License: Public Domain

FILES, J., Dissenting.
—With some regret I must dissent because I cannot find in the record the evidence which would support the judgment. Although there is more than one ground for reversal, these remarks are directed to the single issue of whether defendant had any duty to provide for the safety of the decedent. This turns on the question of agency to contract. The individuals whose alleged deliction caused the death were not sued, and hence the agency question could dispose of the entire case.
There can be no doubt that the deceased was, as to the defendant, an independent contractor. He agreed to supply a picture for a price. Were there no other relationship, defendant would have had no duty to train and equip the deceased, and therefore could not be charged with negligence for any alleged failure in this respect. However, plaintiffs contend that defendant, acting through its agents and employees, agreed to equip and train the deceased for underwater photography, and to select a safe place in which to dive, and that defendant was negligent in the performance of these extra duties which it had voluntarily assumed.
If defendant did not make any contract to train the deceased and provide for his safety, then defendant could not be liable for not having done so. This is not a ease in which *707defendant’s employees inflicted physical harm upon the deceased. The alleged tort is the failure to perform adequately certain alleged duties which would not have existed unless the defendant and its employees had agreed to assume such duties. The basic question then is whether there is any evidence that defendant authorized that contract to be made on its behalf. The burden of proof was on plaintiffs to prove that defendant authorized such an agreement, and unless some such evidence is produced defendant is entitled to a directed verdict. (Perkins v. Pacific Fruit Exchange, 132 Cal.App. 278 [22 P.2d 535]; Peterkin v. Randolph Marketing Co., 48 Cal.App. 300 [191 P. 947].) Agency to bind the principal to a contract must rest upon what the principal actually intends or appears to intend. (Civ. Code, §§ 2299, 2315, 2316, 2319; Rest. 2d Agency, §§ 32, 33.)
In arguing that Miss Curtiss was acting within the scope of her authority, the majority opinion has cited Vind v. Asamblea Apostolica etc. Christo Jesus, 148 Cal.App.2d 597 [307 P.2d 85]; Tarasco v. Moyers, 81 Cal.App.2d 804 [185 P.2d 86]; De Rosier v. Crow, 184 Cal.App.2d 476; Leming v. Oilfields Trucking Co., 44 Cal.2d 343 [282 P.2d 23, 51 A.L.R. 2d 107]; Boynton v. McKales, 139 Cal.App.2d 777 [294 P.2d 733]; and Restatement Second of Agency, section 228, comment d, and section 229, comment b. These authorities all deal with the question of when a servant is within the scope of his employment so that Ms torts are chargeable against the master. Scope of employment, creating tort liability in a master, should not be confused with scope of authority to make a contract binding on a principal. A truck driver may be within the scope of his employment under the eases above cited but still have no authority to agree that his employer will train and equip an underwater photographer.
In this case there is evidence that the two office boys, Ward and Bakken, and the staff writer, Miss Curtiss, were at all times employees of defendant and were doing some acts within the scope of their employment. Thus, it may be assumed, if Miss Curtiss or one of the boys had driven Ms automobile negligently en route to Point Dume, defendant might have been held liable for any resulting injury to a third person. (Boynton v. McKales, 139 Cal.App.2d 777 [294 P.2d 733].) It may further be assumed that if one of the boys, while posing for a photograph, had negligently struck the photographer with a fish spear, defendant, as employer of the boy, *708might have been liable for that injury. But this sheds no light on the question which is at the heart of plaintiffs’ ease —that is, whether any of these individuals had authority to agree that Prudential Insurance Company would equip and train Mr. Garber for underwater photography and select a safe place in which to work.
Workmen’s compensation cases dealing with “scope of employment” are likewise of no assistance here, because the scope of compensation coverage is determined by standards entirely different from the standards which measure the scope of authority to contract. We may assume that Miss Curtiss was at all times physically within the scope of her employment, so that she would have been compensated for any injury to herself, but this does not help to decide whether she was empowered to put her employer into the business of training underwater photographers.
It is clear enough that no individual here involved had unlimited powers, or even general powers of management, over any aspect of defendant’s business. There is evidence that Miss Curtiss had some authority to engage a photographer at rates which had been previously established, and presumably the company was bound to pay for the pictures she ordered. There is no suggestion that defendant held out any individual as having more authority than he actually had, and thus the problem of ostensible agency does not arise. The question then comes down to whether there is evidence that one of these individuals was authorized to make the kind of contract with the photographer which plaintiffs claim was made.
An agent has authority “To do everything necessary or proper and usual, in the ordinary course of business, for effecting the purpose of his agency.” (Civ. Code, § 2319.) To some extent the question of what is “in the ordinary course of business” is one for the jury to decide by drawing inferences from the facts in evidence, but the jury is not entitled to find authority when there is no evidence that the principal either intended the act to be done or manifested any such intent. Thus, for example, an agent authorized to accept fruit on consignment for sale was not authorized to guarantee that the consignor will receive a certain price (Perkins v. Pacific Fruit Exchange, 132 Cal.App.278 [22 P.2d 535]); an agent authorized to draw checks was held not authorized to create an overdraft (Torrance Nat. Bank v. Enesco Fed. Credit Union, 134 Cal.App.2d 316 [285 P.2d 737]); a baggage *709man employed by a railroad was held not to have authority to invite a motorist to cross the tracks at the company’s risk (Reger v. Southern Pac. Co., 59 Cal.App. 313 [210 P. 971]); an agent authorized to collect money had no authority to accept the debtor’s property in payment (Taylor v. Robinson, 14 Cal. 396). For further discussion of the limitations upon what is “necessary or proper and usual, in the ordinary course of business, for effecting the purpose of his agency,” see Howard v. Winton Co., 199 Cal. 374 [249 P. 511, 47 A.L.R. 1012]; Acme Gravel Co. v. Bryant, 111 Cal.App. 411 [295 P. 209]; Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Virden Packing Co., 10 Cal.App.2d 635, 642 [53 P.2d 163, 54 P.2d 18] ; Gallagher v. California etc. Co., 13 Cal.App.2d 482, 489-492 [57 P.2d 195].
It should be noted that an intention to benefit the principal is not enough to establish agency to make a contract. In many of the cited cases the agent apparently intended to further his principal’s business, and under some circumstances the transaction might have been beneficial.
The evidence relating to the relationship between defendant and its employees and the deceased contains no material conflicts. Miss Curtiss was a staff writer for the house magazine. Bakken and Ward were 17-year-old high-school students who worked four hours each afternoon in the machine accounting department. The boys did not receive pay either for the Friday night coaching session or the Saturday trip.
The deceased was an independent businessman who made his living as a commercial photographer, serving many clients. He was one of several photographers with whom defendant dealt from time to time. Photographers understood that defendant paid certain rates for photographs, per shot and per print, plus mileage. These prices were subject to negotiation in particular situations. The photographer ordinarily furnished his own equipment.
Miss Curtiss and her editors wanted an underwater photograph for the cover, and preferred that it be a picture of an employee rather than a stock shot, if practicable. She called Mr. Garber, with whom she had worked in the past, and inquired if he was interested. In a second conversation he said he was interested. Garber said he had never done this kind of diving and had no equipment. He came to Miss Curtiss’ office and met Ward and discussed the assignment. One purpose of the meeting was to talk to the boys about equipment. Mr. GarBer asked where he could get it or rent *710it, and Ward offered to obtain some by borrowing from friends who were members of a skin-diving club to which Ward and Bakken belonged. Later in the week Garber telephoned Ward directly to make arrangements for borrowing the equipment. Garber asked Ward if he could teach him what he needed to know. The boys suggested that they go to the swimming pool at the Chase Hotel in Santa Monica on Friday evening for practice.
On Friday, Ward and Bakken drove to work in Bakken’s car. They carried the borrowed diving equipment in the car. After work Garber met them and the equipment was transferred to his car. The three of them then drove to a shop where Garber obtained the underwater camera case (for which defendant had agreed to reimburse him in the amount of 15 dollars). They went to dinner and afterwards to the Chase Hotel, arriving about 8 p.m., where Garber practiced swimming underwater with the equipment. About 9:30 the pool closed and Garber drove the boys back to their car near the Prudential office.
Garber, Ward, Bakken and Miss Curtiss all came to Point Dume on Saturday morning. Miss Curtiss’ function was to work with the photographer and tell him what pictures were wanted. There is no evidence as to what she told him about this, other than the initial suggestion that an underwater photograph was desired.
The argument is made that Miss Curtiss had “implied authority” to agree to equip and train Garber for diving and select a safe place for him because this was necessary to the employer’s business. The “implied authority” of an agent is no more than what the principal himself actually intended the agent to do under the circumstances. The implied authority of an agent, as defined in Civil Code, section 2319, is limited to what is necessary, or proper and usual in the ordinary course of business. None of these elements appears in the evidence. The evidence does not show that it was necessary to deal with Garber in order to obtain a satisfactory picture, or even that it was important to have an underwater picture. No one has had the temerity to suggest that it is “usual” to agree to equip and train a wholly inexperienced person in order to buy an underwater picture. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that under any circumstances the management of the Prudential Insurance Company ever would have voluntarily assumed the grave responsibility for equipping *711and training an underwater photographer and providing for his safety.
There is not the slightest suggestion that it was necessary to deal with Garber at all, except for his desire to gain experience and Miss Curtiss’ personal willingness to accommodate him. The evidence shows that before Miss Curtiss interviewed Garber, the defendant had not definitely decided to use an underwater photograph, or if it used one, whether it would be a specially posed picture or a stock shot which could be purchased elsewhere. The article on skin diving was not even necessary to carry out the defendant’s business purpose, for the evidence shows that the staff had an alternate story ready for use in the event that the diving article was not completed. Even if the particular photograph be regarded as “necessary,” there is no evidence that it was necessary, or even advantageous, to select a wholly inexperienced man and then make a contract to train and equip him for the job. Garber was only one of many photographers who did business with defendant, but Miss Curtiss did not call upon any other because Garber said he wanted the experience. The evidence does not show how many qualified underwater photographers are available in the Los Angeles area. All of the evidence compels the conclusion that Garber wanted to try something new, and that Miss Curtiss and the two office boys agreed to help him, not for Prudential, but for Garber.
The evidence in the record contains nothing from which could be drawn a reasonable inference that defendant authorized any of its personnel to undertake an obligation on its behalf to furnish proper equipment, to train Mr. Garber to a reasonable degree of proficiency in underwater photography, or to take any responsibility for his personal safety. To say that the jury might infer such authority from the circumstances would be only to say that a jury of twelve laymen may apply its own standards as to the legal effect of the facts in evidence.
The judgment should be reversed.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 13, 1962. Piles, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 11, 1962.