Court Opinion

ID: 9556025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 21:03:41.493066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:54.981496
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/15/23 Whispering Oaks Residential Care Facility v. Killingsworth CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 WHISPERING OAKS RESIDENTIAL                                         H050479
 CARE FACILITY LLC et al.,                                          (Santa Clara County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. 18CV336673)
           Plaintiffs and Appellants,

           v.

 ROBERT KILLINGSWORTH,

           Defendant and Respondent.

         This case arises out of a property damage insurance claim for a 2010 Missouri
incident that has resulted in several lawsuits in Missouri and California. Defendant
Robert Killingsworth, the insurer’s Missouri claims adjuster, moved to quash service of
summons for lack of personal jurisdiction in this California action, and the trial court
granted the motion. Finding no error, we affirm.
                                            I.        BACKGROUND
         In August 2013, plaintiffs Whispering Oaks Residential Care Facility LLC,
Whispering Oaks RCF Management Co Inc., and Naren Chaganti filed a lawsuit in
Missouri against Cricket Communications, Inc. arising out of a 2010 incident in which
plaintiffs claim a frozen water pipe caused loss to their property and business. Cricket
had previously entered into a commercial lease agreement with Whispering Oaks Health
Care Center, Inc., a business in Wildwood, Missouri, which agreement provided for
Cricket to use in its telecommunication network a water tank on the premises.1
       Plaintiffs allege that, as required by the lease, Cricket obtained commercial
general liability insurance in an aggregate amount of $1 million from Travelers Insurance
Casualty Insurance Company of America (Travelers). Plaintiffs allege further that the
lease provides that it is to be interpreted under the laws of Missouri; the insurable interest
under both the lease and the insurance policy is in Missouri; and Missouri law applies to
the substantive aspects of plaintiffs’ lawsuit.
       Plaintiffs made a claim to Cricket based on the frozen water pipe incident and
were referred to Travelers. Plaintiffs allege that Travelers, Killingsworth, and Joseph
Tancredy, another claims adjuster who worked for Travelers in California, “failed to
follow one or more Missouri statutory and regulatory provisions regarding claims
processing practices.”
       The Missouri lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice in December 2014.
Plaintiffs filed another lawsuit against Cricket in California in November 2015 for the
alleged “failure to provide a [commercial general liability] policy as required under the
lease.” Judgment was issued against plaintiffs in that lawsuit in December 2018.
Plaintiffs filed the instant California lawsuit in 2018 against Travelers, Killingsworth, and
Tancredy.2 Here, they allege that in the 2015 California action, they discovered that

       1
        Whispering Oaks Residential Care Facility LLC and Whispering Oaks RCF
Management Co Inc. later became successors-in-interest to the lease by way of
assignment. Naren Chaganti is the sole owner, member, officer, and shareholder of those
two entities.
       2
         We observe that plaintiffs filed another separate lawsuit in Santa Clara County
Superior Court in 2020 against a different insurance company—Cincinnati Insurance
Company—for refusal to pay following the 2010 damage under a policy that covered
plaintiffs’ business property in Missouri. The trial court in that case granted the Ohio-
based insurance company’s motion to quash and a different panel of this Court affirmed
                                              2
Cricket had in fact obtained a policy that covered the claims in the original Missouri
lawsuit.
       Killingsworth, a resident of Missouri, was an insurance claims adjuster for
Travelers and worked on the claim related to the incident with the pipe. Plaintiffs allege
Travelers, Killingsworth, and Tancredy failed to follow Missouri law and made false
statements and/or concealed material facts regarding the existence of an insurance policy
and whether plaintiffs were insured under that policy or under Cricket’s coverage.
Plaintiffs relied on representations by Travelers and Killingsworth that plaintiffs were not
insured under any policy connected to the lease. Plaintiffs allege further that
Killingsworth conspired with Travelers, Tancredy, and Cricket managers to prevent
plaintiffs from obtaining the benefits of the policy.
       On November 14, 2019, Travelers removed the case to federal court. The federal
court granted a motion by plaintiffs to remand the case to the superior court on
May 14, 2020, but the remand order was not received by the trial court until
March 2, 2022.
       Plaintiffs served the original complaint on Killingsworth on December 30, 2020,
before the trial court received the remand order. Plaintiffs filed a first amended
complaint on November 15, 2021. The record does not reflect that plaintiffs ever served
the first amended complaint on Killingsworth.
       On December 23, 2021, Travelers demurred to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint.
Plaintiffs did not file an opposition. Instead, based on Travelers’ filing of its demurrer
prior to remand, as well as plaintiffs’ asserted non-receipt of “a working link to the
demurrer papers,” plaintiffs and Travelers entered into a stipulation withdrawing the
demurrer and allowing plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. The trial court

the order in Whispering Oaks RCF Management Co. Inc, et al. v. Cincinnati Insurance
Company (Mar. 13, 2023, H049906) [nonpub. opn.].

                                              3
entered an order in accordance with the stipulation but later rescinded the order after
granting a peremptory challenge by plaintiffs. Travelers therefore re-noticed its demurrer
to the first amended complaint.
       Killingsworth moved to quash service of summons. On September 9, 2022, the
trial court granted the motion.
       Plaintiffs timely appealed.
                                     II.   DISCUSSION
A.     Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       “California courts may exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis consistent with
the Constitutions of California and the United States.” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268 (Pavlovich); Code Civ. Proc.; § 410.10.3) “A state court’s
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has not been served
with process within the state comports with the requirements of the due process clause of
the federal Constitution if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that
the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” ’ [Citations.]” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996)
14 Cal.4th 434, 444 (Vons); Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District
Court (2021) __ U.S. __ [141 S.Ct. 1017, 1024].)
       “Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th
at p. 445.) Plaintiffs concede Killingsworth is not subject to general jurisdiction and we
agree that general jurisdiction does not apply. (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S.
117, 137 [“ ‘For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction
is the individual’s domicile’ ”].) We therefore consider only whether Killingsworth is
subject to this California lawsuit based on specific jurisdiction.

       3
           Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                               4
       There are three requirements for the exercise of specific jurisdiction: “(1) ‘the
defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation];
(2) ‘the “controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant’s contacts with the
forum” ’ [citation]; and (3) ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with
‘fair play and substantial justice’ ” ’ [citations].” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.)
Subjecting a defendant to specific jurisdiction is considered fair “because their forum
activities should put them on notice that they will be subject to litigation in the forum.”
(Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446.) Specific jurisdiction is based on the understanding
that a defendant who purposefully and voluntarily directs his or her activities toward a
forum receives a benefit and therefore should not be surprised that he or she can be sued
in that forum. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.)
       The California Supreme Court has described the standard of review for a motion
to quash as follows: “When a defendant moves to quash service of process on
jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying
the exercise of jurisdiction. [Citation.] Once facts showing minimum contacts with the
forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant’s burden to demonstrate
that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. [Citation.] When there is
conflicting evidence, the trial court’s factual determinations are not disturbed on appeal if
supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] When no conflict in the evidence exists,
however, the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court
engages in an independent review of the record. [Citation.]” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at
p. 449.)
B.     Procedural Issues
       1.     Timing of Motion to Quash
       Plaintiffs argue that Killingsworth filed his motion to quash too late and that he
waived any objection to personal jurisdiction by failing to schedule the hearing on the
motion within 30 days of the date on which the motion was filed.
                                              5
         As a general rule, a defendant may challenge a court’s personal jurisdiction by
serving and filing a motion to quash service of summons “on or before the last day of [the
defendant’s] time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause
allow . . . .” (§ 418.10, subd. (a)(1).) But “[w]here the defendant has removed a civil
action to federal court without filing a response in the original court and the case is later
remanded for improper removal, the time to respond shall be as follows: [¶] (1) If the
defendant has not generally appeared in either the original or federal court, then 30 days
from the day the original court receives the case on remand . . . to move to quash service
of summons . . . .” (§ 430.90, subd. (a)(1).)
         As stated in the trial court’s order and acknowledged by plaintiffs in their opening
brief on appeal, remand from the federal court was complete on March 2, 2022.
Killingsworth originally filed his motion to quash on June 14, 2022, more than 30 days
later.
         Killingsworth asserts that he was never served with the operative first amended
complaint and nothing in the record demonstrates this to be false.4 As the parties seeking
to establish jurisdiction, plaintiffs had the burden to show when they properly served
Killingsworth with the complaint, without which he would have no obligation to respond
within 30 days or any other time period. (See Kaiser Aetna v. Deal (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d
896, 904 [The burden of proof is on the plaintiffs “to establish the fact of jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence”]; see also American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 387 [“[T]he plaintiff has ‘the burden of proving the facts
that did give the court jurisdiction, that is the facts requisite to an effective service.’ ”].)
In other words, plaintiffs bore the burden of establishing the proper service of the first
amended complaint and, as a result, the untimeliness of the motion to quash in response.

         Proof of service of the complaint “must be filed with the court within 60 days
         4

after the filing of the complaint.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b).)

                                                6
       On this record, we find no fault with the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs
failed to establish a predicate fact essential to both personal jurisdiction and the asserted
untimeliness of the motion to quash—that plaintiffs had served Killingsworth with the
first amended complaint. (Hauser v. Ventura County Bd. of Supervisors (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 572, 576 [“The determination that a party has failed to carry her burden of
proof is, by its very nature, not required to be supported by substantial evidence, or any
evidence at all. It is the lack of evidence of sufficient weight and credibility to convince
the trier of fact that results in such a determination.”].) Further, even if Killingsworth had
filed the motion late, section 418.10 authorizes a trial court to allow a motion to quash to
be filed later for good cause. Under these circumstances, the trial court was within its
discretion in finding the existence of such good cause based on the court’s conclusion
that none of the delays in the case could be blamed on Killingsworth.
       We also reject plaintiffs’ argument that failure to schedule the hearing within 30
days results in waiver of an objection. “ ‘[S]cheduling a hearing date beyond 30 days
should not invalidate a motion to quash. Nothing in [section] 418.10 suggests the court
must overlook the lack of personal jurisdiction or proper service because of a defendant’s
failure to schedule a hearing date within 30 days.’ ” (Olinick v. BMG Entertainment
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1296; see also Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis
Corporation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964, 969, fn. 4 (Preciado) [rejecting contention that
motion to quash scheduled for hearing 99 days after filing of motion must be denied].)
       2.     Waiver of Jurisdiction Through General Appearance
       Plaintiffs contend Killingsworth made a general appearance by purportedly joining
in Travelers’ stipulation with plaintiffs and therefore waived any challenge to personal
jurisdiction.5 Whether a stipulation constitutes a general appearance depends on the

       5
         Plaintiffs also argue in their reply brief on appeal that seeking dismissal with
prejudice—as Killingsworth did in moving to quash—constitutes a general appearance.
For this proposition, plaintiffs rely on Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6
                                              7
nature of the stipulation and its surrounding circumstances. For example, “[a] written
stipulation between attorneys recognizing jurisdiction of the court over the parties
constitutes a general appearance by defendant.” (General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 449, 453, italics omitted.) But “[a] party who merely seeks an
extension of time to plead cannot reasonably be deemed to make a general appearance.
His purpose may be to obtain adequate time to determine whether or not to object to the
jurisdiction of the court.” (Busching v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 44, 51
(Busching); see also Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431, 435, fn. 9
[“[a] stipulation extending time in which to plead is not a general appearance.”]
       We independently review the trial court’s interpretation of a stipulation,
“including the resolution of any ambiguity, unless the interpretation depends on the trial
court's resolution of factual questions concerning the credibility of extrinsic evidence.”
(Dowling v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 685, 694.) Because the
court’s ruling “did not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence, . . . our review of the
court’s interpretation of the stipulation is de novo.” (Ibid.)
       The only reference to Killingsworth in the stipulation is as an employee of
Travelers. It is in a paragraph that states that “Travelers and Travelers’ employees
(defendants Joseph Tancredy and Robert Killingsworth) need not and shall not answer,
demur, or otherwise respond to the original Complaint or the First Amended Complaint,
but instead shall respond to the Second Amended Complaint within the normal timeframe
after being served.” Even if we assume for purposes of appeal that this language is

Cal.4th 1028, 1037, where the California Supreme Court stated that, “[n]otwithstanding a
‘special appearance’ designation on a motion to quash, if the movant seeks relief on any
basis other than lack of personal jurisdiction, he or she makes a general appearance.”
(Italics added.) Although Killingsworth stated in the conclusion of his motion to quash
that the court should dismiss him from the case with prejudice, he did so only on the
ground that “[t]he Court lacks personal jurisdiction over [him].” His statement regarding
dismissal does not transform his motion to quash into a general appearance.

                                               8
sufficient to make Killingsworth a party to the stipulation, the stipulation would not
constitute a general appearance.
       The stipulation for “Travelers and Travelers’ employees (defendants Joseph
Tancredy and Robert Killingsworth)” to “respond to the Second Amended Complaint” is
essentially an agreement for an extension of time, allowing Killingsworth to wait until
service of the second amended complaint before deciding how to respond. The
stipulation did not state that Killingsworth would “appear,” only that he would “respond.”
In this context, the word “respond” is similar in meaning to “plead.” (See Even Zohar
Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830,
834 [referring to a party’s failure to file a “responsive pleading” to the complaint].)
       In Owen v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 566, 569
(Owen), the court distinguished between language in a stipulation that “merely granted
time to ‘plead,’ not to ‘appear[,]’ ” stating that “[t]he difference is material.” Citing
Busching, supra, 12 Cal.3d 44, the court stated that “[w]hatever plaintiff’s counsel may
have thought that defendant’s counsel intended ultimately to do, he had no basis, on an
agreement merely to ‘plead’ to assume that defendant desired or intended anything more
than time to determine on a course of action.” (Owen, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 569-570, fn. omitted; see also Tires Unlimited v. Superior Court (1986) 180
Cal.App.3d 974, 982 [noting the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that “a
stipulation extending time to plead or otherwise respond to a complaint cannot be
considered a general appearance since defendant may be simply seeking time for
determining whether to object to the court’s jurisdiction”].) A stipulation to extend time
for Killingsworth to respond does not constitute a general appearance by Killingsworth.
(Busching, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 51.)
C.     Specific Jurisdiction
       To overcome the motion to quash, plaintiffs must first present evidence showing
minimum contacts with California. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449.) The evidence
                                               9
must demonstrate that Killingsworth “purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities within California, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.” (Floyd J. Harkness Co. v. Amezcua (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 687, 692 (Harkness).)
And, to be clear, “[i]n examining the quality and nature of the activities in this state, it is
settled that we are . . . concerned . . . exclusively with the nonresident defendant’s
activities in this state.” (Id. at p. 691.)
       The only evidence plaintiffs present is a declaration in which Chaganti avers:
(1)    On December 30, 2010, Killingsworth wrote a letter to Chaganti from “Travelers’
       Kansas office”;6
(2)    In December 2011, Chaganti had several e-mail communications with
       Killingsworth;
(3)    Killingsworth copied all his communications to two Cricket employees who
       Chaganti believes to be the security officer and in-house attorney for Cricket,
       working in Cricket’s corporate headquarters in San Diego;7
(4)    These Cricket employees, in collaboration with Killingsworth, terminated the
       Cricket lease at plaintiffs’ property;

       6
         It is not apparent from the declaration whether the reference to “Kansas” is to the
State of Kansas or to Kansas City, MO.
       7
         Following oral argument in this appeal, plaintiffs moved to augment the record
with a two-page privilege log from Travelers that purportedly confirms the contacts with
these employees. We deny the motion and plaintiffs’ alternative request for judicial
notice of the log, because the log was not before the trial court when it ruled on the
motion to quash. (In re Marriage of Forrest & Eaddy (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1202,
1209.) Moreover, even if we were to consider the privilege log, these contacts have no
impact on the outcome of this appeal, as we explain in our discussion of purposeful
availment, post.

                                                10
(5)    An employee at Travelers’ Walnut Creek office obtained all of Killingsworth’s
       notes and files and communicated with Killingsworth to get up to speed with the
       facts of the case.8
       Killingsworth filed his own declaration in which he stated that he resides and
works in Missouri and has never resided in or done business in California. He stated that
he was the claims adjuster that handled plaintiffs’ Missouri lawsuit pursuant to a
Travelers commercial general liability policy that insured Cricket but “was not the claims
adjuster for the California suit” filed in November 2015.9 He stated that all of his
contacts with plaintiffs were in his “capacity as a Missouri adjuster, responding to
plaintiffs’ first suit filed against a Travelers’ insured concerning an alleged frozen pipe on
the premises of plaintiffs’ Missouri businesses.”
       Killingsworth’s communications with Chaganti outside of California do not
constitute contacts with California. Likewise, communications from a Travelers
employee in California to Killingsworth do not demonstrate purposeful availment by
Killingsworth. (See Harkness, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 691.) The only possible
California contacts originating from Killingsworth are the communications on which
Killingsworth “copied” two employees of Cricket purportedly located in San Diego.10
There is no evidence in Chaganti’s declaration that the communications were directed to

       8
          Plaintiffs also attach as Exhibit A to the Chaganti Declaration the cover sheet for
an insurance policy issued by Travelers to Leap Wireless International. Chaganti states
that this was the cover page for the Cricket policy about which Killingsworth
communicated with plaintiffs and Cricket in California. The existence of the policy does
not show any contacts from Killingsworth to California related to the claims in plaintiffs’
lawsuit.
       9
        We understand Killingsworth’s statement to mean that he had no involvement
with the California case.
       10
        Plaintiffs state in their opening brief that the communications were e-mail
messages.

                                             11
those employees for any specific purpose other than to keep them informed of
Killingsworth’s conduct in Missouri as the claims adjuster for plaintiffs’ Missouri claim.
Even if Killingsworth contacted the California employees to talk to them directly about
the Missouri claim, the happenstance of those employees’ physical location would not
suffice as evidence that Killingsworth “purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities within California, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws[.]” (Harkness, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 692.) Potential defendants will be subject
to personal jurisdiction in a state only if they have clear notice that they will be subject to
suit there because their activities were purposefully directed at residents of the forum and
created a substantial connection with the forum. (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment,
Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1063.) A defendant “ ‘will not be haled into a jurisdiction
solely as a result of “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts . . . .’ ” (Ibid.)
“[T]he acts of making interstate telephone calls relative to the performance of a contract
executed outside the state and performed outside the state does not invoke the benefits
and protections of our laws.” (Harkness, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 692.) As plaintiffs
themselves allege, the lease at the center of the dispute provides that it is to be interpreted
under the laws of Missouri; the insurable interest under both the lease and the insurance
policy is in Missouri; and Missouri law applies to the substantive aspects of plaintiffs’
lawsuit.
       Even if we were to conclude that simply copying individuals in another state on
e-mail communications were sufficient to constitute “purposeful availment” in that state,
an individual is only subject to specific jurisdiction if “the ‘controversy is related to or
“arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’ ” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at
p. 446.) The controversy here arises out of property and business loss in Missouri and
plaintiffs’ insurance claim in Missouri. Killingsworth’s handling of the Missouri claim
does not subject him to suit in California. Likewise, to the extent plaintiffs rely on the
termination of the Cricket lease, plaintiffs’ allegations in the first amended complaint
                                              12
make clear their dispute arises out of the frozen pipe incident, not the termination of the
lease. Therefore, any contention of Killingsworth’s involvement in terminating the lease
is not relevant to a determination of whether he purposefully availed himself of the
benefits of California.
       As a final matter, we conclude that plaintiffs forfeited their theory that
Killingsworth caused an “effect” in California (i.e., a loss to plaintiffs) by not telling
plaintiffs that they were additional insureds under the Cricket policy, having failed to
raise it in the trial court. (See DiCola v. White Brothers Performance Products, Inc.
(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 676; see also Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 698.)
       Even if we considered plaintiffs’ “effects test” argument on the merits, we would
reject it. Although personal jurisdiction over defendants may arise from the effects of
their out-of-state conduct in the forum state (Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, 789
(Calder)), “virtually every jurisdiction has held that the Calder effects test requires
intentional conduct expressly aimed at or targeting the forum state in addition to the
defendant’s knowledge that his intentional conduct would cause harm in the forum.”
(Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 271, fn. omitted.) Beyond the absence of evidence
that Killingsworth intentionally directed any conduct towards California, the record
reflects no evidence that plaintiffs suffered any damage in California. Chaganti’s
declaration in fact focuses on the “terminat[ion of] the Cricket lease at our [Missouri]
property, causing damage in the form of lost rent.”
D.     Jurisdictional Discovery
       Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in denying their request to conduct
jurisdictional discovery. Generally, “[a] plaintiff attempting to assert jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant is entitled to an opportunity to conduct discovery of the
jurisdictional facts necessary to sustain its burden of proof.” (In re Automobile Antitrust
Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127.) But “[i]n order to prevail on a motion for
                                              13
a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery
is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)
We will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on such a motion absent “a manifest abuse of . . .
discretion.” (Ibid.)
       In their opposition to the motion to quash, plaintiffs requested the opportunity “to
conduct jurisdictional discovery limited to Killingsworth’s case-specific California
contacts,” based only on their stated belief that Killingsworth had “many phone
conversations with his customer Cricket in San Diego as to transfer of investigative
documents, instructions and strategy sessions on how to deny the claim.” Given that the
claims in the case arise out of the incident in Missouri, where Killingsworth lives and
works, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding no likelihood that “any
discovery would . . . lead to the production of evidence establishing personal jurisdiction
over . . . Killingsworth in California.” As we have discussed, even if Killingsworth spoke
to individuals in California about the Missouri claim, that would not establish that
plaintiffs’ claims against him arose out of his purposeful availment of California benefits.
(Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446.)
       Moreover, Killingsworth filed his amended notice for the motion to quash on
July 7, 2022. The motion was not heard until September 8. The record does not reflect
that plaintiffs sought jurisdictional discovery, even informally, during those two months
or during the life of the case. It would not have been an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to conclude that plaintiffs already had time to conduct discovery into
Killingsworth’s involvement in plaintiffs’ claims and that further discovery would
therefore not be likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing
jurisdiction. (See Preciado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 972-974 [trial court could
reasonably conclude that plaintiffs did not demonstrate discovery was likely to lead to
production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to
propound jurisdictional discovery when they had the opportunity to do so].)
                                              14
                                III.   DISPOSITION
      The superior court’s order granting the motion to quash is affirmed. Costs on
appeal are awarded to Killingsworth.

                                          15
                                              ____________________________
                                              LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
GREENWOOD, P.J.

_____________________________
GROVER, J.

Whispering Oaks Residential Care Facility LLC v. Killingsworth
H050479