Court Opinion

ID: 9732956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:46:13.826027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:59.362525
License: Public Domain

T. E. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree witb tbe opinion submitted for tbe Court.
Interspousal immunity is not merely a procedural bar; it is a substantive rule of tbe common law.
Tbe 1963 amendment to tbe married women’s acts, quoted in tbe Court’s opinion deals witb procedure.
To give tbe spouses a right to sue each other for personal tort, it is not enough that tbe statute merely give one a remedy against tbe other, but it is necessary that it expressly confer such a right of action, since tbe common-law disability goes not merely to tbe remedy but to tbe cause of action. 41 Am Jur 2d, Husband and Wife, §526, p 446.
“In many decisions tbe courts of many of tbe States, notwithstanding tbe statutes conferring rights upon a married woman over her separate property not possessed at tbe common law, have thus far, without exception, denied tbe right of a wife to sue her husband for personal wrongs committed during coverture. No such right is conferred by our statute unless it be by implication. Tbe legislature should speak in no uncertain manner when it seeks to abrogate tbe plain and long-established rules of tbe common law. Courts should not be left to construction to sustain such bold innovations. Tbe rule is thus stated in 9 Bac. Abr. tit. ‘Statute,’ I 4), 245:
“ ‘In all doubtful matters, and where tbe expression is in general terms, statutes are to recieve such *46a construction as may be agreeable to tbe rules of tbe common law in cases of that nature; for statutes are not presumed to make any alteration in the common law, farther or otherwise than the act expressly declares. Therefore, in all general matters the law presumes the act did not intend to make any alteration ; for, if the parliament had had that design, they would have expressed it in the act.’ ” Bandfield v. Bandfield (1898), 117 Mich 80.
The common-law rule of immunity from tort liability between husband and wife is based upon sound reasons of policy. Marriage is the foundation of family life. The family is the basic unit of society; the cornerstone of the community, the state and the nation. It is perceived that lawsuits between spouses, seeking money damages for real and fancied injuries, are incompatible with harmonious marriage.
Another reason persists. The unity of man and woman in the married state is still a reality. The marriage contract itself imposes legal duties and gives legal rights to both spouses. We have come to speak of “consortium” as the sum total of the status and rights of the parties resulting from the relationship.
The duties of husband and wife have never been the subject of common-law liability. Though the husband was entitled to the wife’s services, he could not bring assumpsit to recover their value from her. Though a wife was entitled to support from her husband, the common law gave no civil remedy. She could invoke criminal sanctions. She could petition the court of equity. She has no cause to sue him for money damages.
“Personal wrongs inflicted upon her give her the right to a decree of separation or divorce from her husband, and our statutes have given the court of *47chancery exclusive jurisdiction over that subject. This court, clothed with the broad powers of equity, can do justice to her for the wrongs of her husband, so far as courts can do justice, and, in providing for her, will give her such amount of her husband’s property as the circumstances of both will justify, and, in so doing, may take into account the cruel and outrageous conduct inflicted upon her by him, and its effect upon her health and ability to labor.” Bandfield v. Bandfield (1898), 117 Mich 80.
The wisdom of the common-law policy abides.
To what end would a wife hire a lawyer — on a one-third contingent fee basis — to bring an action for damages against her husband?
If the husband has no liability insurance, the procedure is an exercise in futility.
The conclusion is inescapable that the sine qua non of intraspousal civil damage litigation is liability insurance.
The economic interests of husband and wife are closely entwined. The husband usually pays his wife’s medical bills; joins as plaintiff to recover them from third party tortfeasors. Each spouse has a derivative action for loss of consortium.
Even without these patent interests, it is obvious that a plaintiff spouse’s success in litigation will have substantial effect on the family finances.
Intraspousal tort litigation can hardly be called adversary. It is more like a joint venture to collect from the insurance company.
The wrongdoer profits from his own wrongful act. That doesn’t seem like a very good way to reduce the toll of human injuries. True, nobody likes to get hurt. As a general rule, people don’t injure themselves or their loved ones on purpose. But accidents do happen, and frequently they reflect a *48cross-current of human emotions and urges too subtle for most of us to perceive.
Married tempers often fly. So do pots, pans, fists and worse. Apologies and caresses will no longer be the only available balm. In Michigan at least, we can well envision the family donnybrook ending with the husband calling his insurance agent, the wife calling her lawyer and both entertaining visions of better days ahead.