Court Opinion

ID: 9420720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:55:47.568772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:26.771306
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting.
The only thing certain about § 20 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, is that violation of its terms is a felony punishable by ten years’ imprisonment. An alien ordered deported by the Bureau of Immigration is subject to this ten-year penalty if he “willfully fail or refuse to make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to his departure.” To avoid punishment an alien must guess with unerring accuracy what answers a judge or jury1 might someday give to the following questions: (1) When is an application “timely”? (2) What constitutes a “good faith” application? (3) What kind of “documents” are “necessary to his departure”? (4) To whom must he apply for these documents?
Aliens living in this country are not necessarily sophisticated world travelers familiar with the present-day red *174tape that must be unwound to get from one country to another. Congress should at least indicate when, to whom, and for what the alien should apply. If, for example, the statute merely required an alien to report at a certain time and place to sign “documents” collected by the American Department of State, the affirmative conduct demanded would at least be clear and specific. But the present statute, in my judgment, entangles aliens in a snare of vagueness from which few can escape. I think the Constitution requires more than a “bad” guess to make a criminal.2.

 “In earlier times, some Rulers placed their criminal laws where the common man could not see them, in order that he might be entrapped into their violation. Others imposed standards of conduct impossible of achievement to the end that those obnoxious to the ruling powers might be convicted under the forms of law. No one of them ever provided a more certain entrapment, than a statute which prescribes a penitentiary punishment for nothing more than a layman's failure to prophesy what a judge or jury will do. . . .” Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 278 (dissenting opinion). Cf. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 89.

 My belief that the statute is void for vagueness makes it unnecessary for me to reach the constitutional question discussed by Mr. Justice Jackson, although I have not yet seen a satisfactory reason for rejecting his view. See my opinion in Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U. S. 56, 78-81.