Court Opinion

ID: 9949699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 14:08:35.090586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:47.626917
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                                APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

                                                         SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                         APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                         DOCKET NO. A-0393-22

LEWTON BILLS and JENELE
JONES, his spouse,

          Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

MOHAMAD HANAFY,

          Defendant-Respondent,

and

HEBATALLA HANAFY,

          Defendant,

and

AHMED ELGOHARY,

     Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________

                   Argued February 6, 2024 – Decided March 12, 2024

                   Before Judges Whipple, Enright and Paganelli.
             On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
             Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-7635-19.

             John J. Clark, IV, argued the cause for appellant
             (Schumann Hanlon Margulies, LLC, attorneys; John J.
             Clark, IV, on the briefs).

             Grace Elizabeth Robol argued the cause for
             respondent Lewton Bills (Davis, Saperstein &
             Salomon, PC, attorneys; Grace Elizabeth Robol, on
             the brief).

PER CURIAM

      This is an appeal from an order of judgment after a three-day jury trial

resulting from injuries plaintiff Lewton Bills sustained from a dog bite. We

affirm.

      On October 27, 2018, plaintiff, a Verizon service technician, made a

service call to a home where defendants Mohamad and Hebatalla Hanafy lived.

Defendant Ahmed Elgohary and his two German Shepherds also lived in the

residence. Plaintiff asked whether the dogs were secured, entering only after

he was assured they were. He then entered and left the house at least twice,

before leaving to carry his tools to his vehicle. Upon re-entering the property

to test the connection, plaintiff was bitten by one of the dogs that was

previously secured and suffered significant injuries requiring medical

attention.

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       Plaintiff and his wife, Jenele Jones, 1 sued the Hanafys and Elgohary.

Plaintiffs served discovery demands on the Hanafys and Elgohary. Elgohary

did not respond, asserting he never received the demand. On November 3,

2021, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and defendants cross-moved.

The trial court granted summary judgment only in favor of Mohamad Hanafy.

A three-day trial followed in August 2022.

       During trial, plaintiff Bills and all three defendants testified. Plaintiff

testified he was moving a modem from one part of the house to another, which

required conducting a wire run. He knew there were dogs in the house. At

one point, plaintiff left the house to put his tools back into his truck and was

returning to test the internet connection when he was bitten.

       Mohamad Hanafy testified that, when plaintiff completed the job and the

internet was working, he walked plaintiff out of the house. He also testified

the dogs had been released after plaintiff told him the job was complete.

Afterwards, plaintiff came back into the home by himself without ringing the

bell. Mr. Hanafy testified there was no paperwork for him to sign, and he was

never asked to sign anything with relation to the job.

1
    Ms. Jones pleaded a loss of consortium claim.
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      On the second day of trial, before the close of plaintiffs' case in chief,

defendant Hebatalla Hanafy produced an automated email sent from

"pldonotreply@verizon.com," dated October 27, 2018, at 3:26:31 p.m., Eastern

time. The email contained the statement, "Your Verizon repair request, ticket

#NJDQ0BQPP8 has been resolved."           The email had been in defendant

Hebatalla Hanafy's possession for almost four years and had not been produced

during discovery. The first mention of the email was after plaintiffs presented

their case at trial. The trial judge barred the documentation as prejudicial

because it was only supplied during the trial. Defense counsel subsequently

requested the judge rule on whether he would be allowed to question a defense

witness regarding receipt of any notification from Verizon indicating the

service job was complete. The trial judge barred that line of questioning,

finding defendants were trying to circumvent unmet obligations in discovery

by introducing the document through testimony, while not producing the

document itself.

      Elgohary testified he checked the internet, and—after plaintiff grabbed

his tools and left the house—he released the dogs from the room where they

had been kept.

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      At the conclusion of testimony, plaintiffs moved for a limited directed

verdict to find Elgohary was the owner of the dog that attacked him. The trial

judge granted the motion. As no evidence of the animal's vicious propensity

had been adduced at trial, a directed verdict was also entered in favor of

Hebatalla, and she was effectively dismissed from the case. The jury then

returned a verdict finding for plaintiff and against Elgohary.      This appeal

followed.

      On appeal, Elgohary asserts a new trial is required. He argues he was

unfairly prejudiced when the court barred presentation of the Verizon email,

and he characterizes this ruling as an unwarranted discovery sanction.

Elgohary also argues the trial court erred by entering a directed verdict on the

issue of liability and by failing to charge the jury on the issue of contributory

negligence, averring plaintiff was a trespasser when the harm occurred.

      "[W]e apply an abuse of discretion standard to decisions made by our

trial courts relating to matters of discovery." Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New

Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011). We defer to "a trial court's disposition

of discovery matters unless the court has abused its discretion[,] or its

determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law."

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Rivers v. LSC P'ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 80 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Payton

v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J. 524, 559 (1997)).

      Rule 4:17-7 governs answer to interrogatories, and it provides:

            [I]f a party who has furnished answers to
            interrogatories thereafter obtains information that
            renders such answers incomplete or inaccurate,
            amended answers shall be served not later than
            [twenty] days prior to the end of the discovery period
            . . . . Amendments may be allowed thereafter only if
            the party seeking to amend certifies therein that the
            information requiring the amendment was not
            reasonably available or discoverable by the exercise of
            due diligence prior to the discovery date.

            [R. 4:17-7.]

      Trial courts have broad discretion with regard to discovery issues and

can suspend discovery sanctions when: (1) there exists no "design to mislead

or conceal"; (2) there is an "absence of the element of surprise"; and (3) no

prejudice would result "from the admission of the evidence." Branch v. Emery

Transp. Co., 53 N.J. Super. 367, 376 (App. Div. 1958). Whether a trial court

resolves the issue by adjourning or declaring a mistrial is also up to their

discretion and, unless the court's decision to exclude would create "a manifest

denial of justice, the decision on exclusion must stand." Thomas v. Toys R

Us, Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 569, 582 (App. Div. 1995).

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      Elgohary contends he was never served with any demand for production

of documents and, when the Hanafys were served and answers were provided,

Elgohary was not a party to the lawsuit. He also argues, because the Hanafys

were not instructed via the interrogatories to perform a search for email

communications, they cannot be charged with the obligation to produce said

document.

      Plaintiffs' interrogatories instructed the Hanafys to "identify all

documents that may relate to this action and attach copies of each such

document." The email that stated the repair request ticket had been resolved —

the timing of which was at the heart of this appeal—showed it was received by

Hebatalla Hanafy on October 27, 2018, at 3:26:31 p.m., Eastern time. The

email was always accessible and available to defendants, and they failed to

produce it as a related document during the discovery process. Its absence in

no way renders it "not reasonably available or discoverable by the exercise of

due diligence prior to the discovery end date," as outlined in Rule 4:17-7.

Thus, this email does not now fall under the described amendment exception

and "shall be disregarded by the court and adverse parties." R. 4:17-7.

      Moreover, Elgohary was sent interrogatories and document production

requests in April 2021.    He failed to respond to the discovery demands.

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Elgohary asserts he was never served with such demand for production, and

plaintiff never provided a signed acknowledgement of service. Elgohary did

not raise lack of service during the trial, however, instead argued the demand

was not specific enough.

      Additionally, Elgohary contends, even if the Hanafys committed a

discovery violation for failing to produce the email during discovery, it was

not in his possession, custody, or control. Therefore, according to Elgohary,

he had no obligation to produce said email, and he should not have been barred

from using it at trial to show Bills was no longer a business invitee when he

was injured. Elgohary asserts the trial court suppressed the "smoking gun"

that would have afforded him his only opportunity to effectively rebut Bills's

strict liability claim and, therefore, produced manifest injustice.

      We reject the assertion that these arguments require us to reverse the

trial court and permit the use of the email. First, the email was presented

during trial and would have prejudiced plaintiffs. See Branch, 53 N.J. Super.

at 376. Additionally, the email is also not as central as Elgohary argues. It

was time stamped an hour after Bills arrived at the hospital and only

referenced the closure of the service ticket. Nothing in the record shows when

such emails were generated—whether it was when the job was done, when the

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internet was back up, or at some other time after the computer system

processed the job. Moreover, during testimony, Mohamad testified the dogs

were released because he believed the job was finished. Bills testified that, at

the time of the attack, he had not finished the job. Whether or not he was

trespassing was, therefore, a question for the jury. The jury returned a verdict

for Bills, which "should not be overthrown except upon the basis of a carefully

reasoned and factually supported (and articulated) determination . . . that the

continued viability of the judgment would constitute a manifest denial of

justice." Baxter v. Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 597-98 (1977).

      Any remaining arguments raised by the parties are without sufficient

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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