Court Opinion

ID: 9520579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:44:22.167023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:27.894928
License: Public Domain

Hale, C.J., and Cutter, J.
(concurring in the result). We concur in the affirmance of the conviction. We feel, however, that this is an area in which the Supreme Judicial Court has been proceeding on a case by case basis to lay down standards for applying G. L. c. 234, § 28, second par., as amended through St. 1975, c. 335. This obviously does present special difficulty where it is contended that racial considerations “may cause a decision ... to be made in whole or in part upon issues extraneous to the case.” Since the Sanders case, 383 Mass. 641 (1981), and the Hobbs case, 385 Mass. 863 (1982), further guidance has not been given.1
The trial judge in the present case, of course, could have avoided some controversy by following the recommendation in the Lumley case, 367 Mass. 213, 216-217 (1975). He did not do so but gave no extended statement of the grounds of his action. He reasonably could have felt that this was a case (if facts supporting a conviction should be found by the *468jury2) where jurors, whatever their racial background, would be unsympathetic to the defendant because of the facts and that juror revulsion would not be increased by the races of the participants in the criminal events. The judge may have appraised the situation as one where separate inquiries of individual jurors might infect with bias a case where possible racial prejudice would not be significant. His general inquiry of the panel was plainly designed to raise the matter of racial bias for each juror’s conscientious consideration without laying such emphasis upon it as to produce any undesired and unfortunate reaction.3 To the extent that the trial judge still possesses discretion in these matters, the authors of this separate opinion think that he did not abuse it and probably acted sensibly. In any event (at least until further guidance from the Supreme Judicial Court), we think that this court should not prescribe for the future a mandatory course and practice which would diminish the traditional range of discretion of trial judges in the conduct of trials.

In the Sowers case, 388 Mass. 207, 210-213 (1983), involving interracial rape, the trial judge in fact did make individual inquiry of the members of the venire.

 Four black jurors were in fact seated, two of whom were removed by the Commonwealth by peremptory challenge. One of these was challenged by the Commonwealth because she seemed nervous and “uncomfortable in the role of being a juror.” The record does not show the reasons for the Commonwealth’s challenge of the other black juror. Two black jurors were not the subject of peremptory challenges by the Commonwealth, and participated.

 The transcript indicates to us that at trial racial issues in fact were not emphasized improperly before the jury. The prosecutor in her conduct of the case, and defense counsel in her defense of Stephens before the jury, were careful to avoid introduction of racial considerations. The judge made a diligent effort to confine the evidence to issues really presented. In her summation, however, defense counsel herself made reference to race by saying to the jury, “I know that you will decide this case fairly and impartially and on the evidence. I know that race will not be an issue in this case, and that there will not be any questions of bias or prejudice coming up among you.”