Court Opinion

ID: 9460670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:57:19.460561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:43.900949
License: Public Domain

PELL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
There can be no disagreement that the sad plight of the claimant in the present appeal is capable of arousing a high degree of sympathy. However, because I am unable to agree that the majority opinion correctly reflects the applicable law, I feel compelled to record this dissent.
The district court concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiff had the burden of showing that she was under disability on or before December 31, 1950. This was the crucial date and there appears to be no disagreement that the burden of proof was on the claimant.
The district court further concluded as a matter of law that there was substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the finding of the Appeals Council.
Here I would expect to find that I was verging from the result reached by the majority opinion. However, that opinion recognizes explicitly that “we may not substitute our judgment for [the Secretary’s] as long as the evidence supporting the denial is substantial and that, in this case, it is not unreasonable to characterize plaintiff’s post-1950 employment as substantial.” Nevertheless, the judgment of the district court is reversed with a direction to enter judgment for the plaintiff.
The result appears to have been reached on the basis of medical opinion in the administrative record as well as certain equitable considerations which I do not find to have been encompassed in the statutory scheme.1 As to the *1102medical opinion, aside from the question that the majority opinion appears to be weighing this evidence and finding it more persuasive than the admittedly substantial evidence on which the Secretary relied, I do not find support in the record for the crucially determinative question.
Dr. Rostenberg concluded that the scleroderma was present in and from the late 1930’s. This, however, is not the crucial question. The fact that a person was suffering from a diagnosed disease or ailment at a particular time is not sufficient in the absence of proof of its disabling severity to warrant the award of benefits. Henry v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 993, 88 S.Ct. 492, 19 L.Ed.2d 487. I find no medical opinion that the disease was of sufficient severity as to have rendered the claimant disabled on or before December 31, 1950.
The “substantial evidence” of employment adverted to in the majority opinion appears to me to be dispositive of the issue on this appeal. Just looking at the Western Electric employment alone, I note the following earnings: 1955, $2,556.26; 1956, $4,200.00; 1957, $4,114.93; and 1958, $484.85. The wages received during this period from March 8, 1955 to January 10, 19582 were the highest she had ever earned. I am unable to equate this earnings record and what it represents in terms of gainful employment on an assembly line with an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical . . . impairment,” which is the definition of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d).
The plaintiff attempts to explain her ability to continue working by stating that she was helped by her co-workers. She also indicated, however, that she worked as a part of a group and the pay depended upon group production. It is conceivable that sympathetic co-workers will help an ailing comrade, but when this lasts over a three-year period with the pay of those in the group, also presumably “bread-earners,” being constantly diminished, it is understandable if the Secretary, in evaluating the evidence, viewed with some skepticism a claim that during the period in question the claimant was unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.
The claim of help by the co-workers at Western Electric was supported by the affidavit of one fellow employee of that plant who told of the difficulties experienced by the claimant during her work at the plant. The affidavit states that the claimant had a heavy rate of absence. The claimant’s own affidavit states she “was absent usually at least two half days a week.” (Emphasis added.) The co-worker’s affidavit also states, “I believe that she said that she was getting some medical help. She was weak and co-workers had to help her with her work .... Her co-workers tried to help her.”
Ordinarily great deference should be given to the credibilty determinations made by the tribunal actually hearing the case. Here the administrative law judge found in favor of the claimant. However, substantially all of the evidence was in affidavit or similar form and the interpretation and inferences to be given to it and drawn from it were before the Appeals Council. The courts should not redetermine the facts de novo. Myers v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1972). Our only inquiry is to determine whether the Secretary’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Even if the court should be of the opinion that documenta*1103ry evidence can be reinterpreted by us, here the evidence fails to support a determination that the claimant met the disability requirement prior to 1951.
In sum, this court is presented with a pathetic story, one which has great appeal to compassionate understanding, and one which involves relatively insignificant sums of money in today’s inflationary context. But this court is also presented with a case which requires the application of established rules of law. While I do so less than happily, considering the circumstances of this hapless individual, I nevertheless feel compelled to come down on the side of the rule of law. At the very least, this court should do no less than remand for the receipt of expert testimony as to whether the plaintiff was disabled prior to 1951 which thus far has not been demonstrated in the record to the extent that it requires this court to reverse and direct the entry of judgment for the plaintiff.

. I do not disagree with the statement in the majority opinion that it is settled policy to construe the statute favorably to the claimant; however, such a policy does not to me mean that mere eligibility under the statute *1102should be transmuted into a prevailing claim. Likewise, the fact that the claim is relatively small compared to litigation costs, being a case that private litigants would probably settle, is no basis for making bad law.

. The plaintiff testified as to the Western Electric employment: “I have the exact dates here. I started March 8, 1955 and on January 10, 1958 they let me go.”
While $484.85 would ordinarily be more than she would have earned in the first ten calendar days of a year, the record is silent as to matters such as severance pay and accrued vacation compensation.