Court Opinion

ID: 9646622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:05:24.040794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:39.950814
License: Public Domain

Minor W. Millwee, Associate Justice, dissenting. Ark. Stats., § 2-208 implements Amendment No. 7 of the Arkansas Constitution and reads: “Before any initiative or referendum petition ordering a vote upon any amendment or act shall be circulated for obtaining signatures of petitioners, tbe sponsors shall submit the original draft thereof to the Attorney General, with a proposed legislative or ballot title and popular name. The Attorney General shall, within ten days, approve and certify or shall substitute and certify a more suitable and correct ballot title and popular name for each such amendment or act; the ballot title so submitted or supplied by the Attorney General shall briefly and concisely state the purpose of the proposed measure. If the Attorney General refused to act or if the sponsors feel aggrieved at his acts in such premises they may, by petition, apply to the Supreme Court for proper relief.” Now the clear purpose of the above section is to insure that an I & E petition bears a ballot title and popular name which shall “briefly and concisely state the purpose of the proposed measure.” It is equally clear that when a petition is submitted to the Attorney General under this section he shall either, ‘ ‘ approve and certify or shall substitute and certify a more suitable and correct ballot title and popular name . . . ” On April 1, 1955, plaintiffs submitted to the Attorney General prior to circulation a petition which was headed in large bold type as follows: PETITION FOR REFERENDUM SALES TAX EXEMPTION FOR LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY FEED Below this followed the petition proper asking that Act No. 94 of 1955, entitled “An Act to Exempt Feed-stuff s Used in Growing or Production of Livestock and/or Poultry in this State from the tax levied under the Gross Eeceipts Tax and that levied under the Compensating Tax Act, and for other purposes” be referred to a vote of the people at the 1956 General Election. In response to plaintiffs’ request for a ruling on the petition, the Attorney General, on April 4, 1955, replied: “I have examined your form for petition for referendum on Act 94 of 1955 and in accordance with Ark. Stats. (1947) § 2-208 the same as submitted is hereby approved.” In addition, the Attorney General furnished plaintiffs a set of “Instructions to Canvassers and Signers ’ ’ signed by him and to be placed at the head of the petition. In the present action the Attorney General takes the position that the words which plaintiffs say constituted the ballot title and popular name are “vague, indefinite, false and misleading.” Plaintiffs proceeded to procure more than 34,000 signers to the approved petition, which was filed with the Secretary of State on June 8, 1955. Immediately the Secretary of State was beseiged with numerous letters and telegrams from interested legislators and officers of various poultry associations requesting him to obtain a ruling from the Attorney General as to the “legality of the title” of the petition. As one writer put it: “Up in this neck of the woods we hope to find something wrong with the whole thing. Would you be so kind as to ask the attorney general to give us a public official ruling on the thing. Let’s hope it is unconstitutional or something.” Apparently even greater pressure was applied to the Attorney General. After considerable jockeying back and forth in which the Secretary of State repeatedly sought a definite ruling in the matter, the Attorney General wrote the letter on June 22, 1955, which concluded: “It is my opinion that, since the sponsor has not submitted a ballot title and popular name as required by § 2-208, and has not submitted a ballot title to the State Board of Election Commissioners as required by the 7th Amendment, as Secretary of State or as a member of the State Board of Election Commissioners you have no authority to certify, order or place this question on the ballot as the provisions of the Constitution and statutes which have not been complied with are mandatory.” The pertinent issue would seem to be whether the Attorney General was correct in the opinion initially given the plaintiffs or the one finally rendered to the Secretary of State. The majority say the latter. While logical arguments may be advanced in support of either view, the Attorney General was eminently correct in his first opinion, in my humble judgment. The rules governing the sufficiency of ballot titles have been repeated in many decisions. They are summarized in Bradley v. Hall, 220 Ark. 925, 251 S. W. 2d 470, as follows: “On the one hand, it is not required that the ballot title contain a synopsis of the amendment or statute. Sturdy v. Hall, 204 Ark. 785, 164 S. W. 2d 884. It is sufficient for the title to be complete enough to convey an intelligible idea of the scope and import of the proposed law. Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 43 S. W. 2d 356, 44 S. W. 2d 331. We have recognized the impossibility of preparing a ballot title that would suit every one. Hogan v. Hall, 198 Ark. 681, 130 S. W. 2d 716. Yet, on the other hand, the ballot title must be free from ‘any misleading tendency, whether of amplification, of omission, or of fallacy,’ and it must not be tinged with partisan coloring. Walton v. McDonald, 192 Ark. 1155, 97 S. W. 2d 81.” Another cardinal principle that runs through all our decisions is that the provisions reserving to the people the powers of initiative and referendum are to be given a liberal construction to effectuate the object and purpose thereby adopted. In Ferrell v. Keel, 105 Ark. 380, 151 S. W. 269, the court said such object and purpose, “was to increase the sense of responsibility that the lawmaking power should feel to the people by establishing a power to initiate proper, and to reject improper, legislation.” In Reeves v. Smith, 190 Ark. 213, 78 S. W. 2d 72, we said that since such residium of power rests in the electors, ‘ ‘ their acts should not be thwarted by strict or technical construction. ’ ’ The petition form which was circulated after its approval by the Attorney General clearly reveals that it bears a sufficient ballot title and popular name. The plain and easily understood words: “Sales Tax Exemption For Livestock And Poultry Feed,” briefly and concisely state the purpose of the proposed measure, as the law requires. A popular name is not required by the Constitution, and its requirement is merely a legislative device to make it easy for voters to discuss a measure. Pafford v. Hall, 217 Ark. 734, 233 S. W. 2d 72. The plain and simple words used by the sponsors here serve that exact purpose and could have no other function. I have challenged the majority, and I defy anyone to submit a ballot title or popular name that more clearly, concisely, definitely and accurately sets forth the purposes of the Act in question. I do not understand that the majority have found any fault with the substance of the words used by plaintiffs as a ballot title and popular name. What they do hold is that it is mandatory that the petition not only contain the tags or designations, “popular name” and “ballot title,” following the words used as such, but that such designation must be called to the Attorney Ceneral’s attention specifically; and that all this must be done on papers separate from the petition proper. This is a narrow, restricted and technical holding that overrules former cases and violates the whole spirit and intent of the I & ft Amendment. We have held very definitely that the legislative title incorporated in a petition to initiate or refer a measure, is and does become the ballot title when so used even though it was not so designated. The majority blandly ignore the holdings in the Coleman, Blocker and Hogan cases to this effect by stating that they were decided prior to the enactment of Sec. 2-208. While courts are not concerned with the wisdom or propriety of legislation, the people very definitely are. More than 34,000 Arkansas citizens felt that the Legislature acted wrongfully in exempting livestock and poultry feed from the sales tax while still exacting it on such vital necessities as medicine, milk and bread. In an earnest endeavor to make it possible for the people to determine for themselves whether this should be done, plaintiffs have become the unfortunate victims of a gross miscarriage of justice. Their valiant effort to exercise a precious constitutional right has now been completely thwarted by narrow, technical and illiberal judicial action that is without precedent to sustain it. I would permit the people to vote on Act 94 and, therefore, dissent from the conclusion of the majority. Justice McFaddin joins in this dissent.