Court Opinion

ID: 9543401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:45:14.231923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:18.177817
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
specially concurring:
First, I wish to comment on the prosecutor’s failure to comply with 21 O.S. 1981, § 701.10, which provides in pertinent part: “Only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible.” When Section 701.10 is read together with Article II, Section 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution, it is clear that the State has an affirmative duty prior to trial to provide an accused in a capital case with (1) a concise summary of the “evidence” to be relied upon to support the aggravating circumstances alleged, and (2) a list of the witnesses to be called at trial. See Walker v. State, 723 P.2d 273, 285 (Okla.Crim.App.1986), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 600 (1986). Here, the Bill of Particulars filed by the State recited only the specific aggravating circumstances alleged to exist; no summary of the “evidence” to be used to support such aggravating circumstances was given as required by Section 701.10. The concise summary requirement cannot be met by simply *1249giving notice of which aggravating circumstances will be relied upon during the sentencing stage. Accordingly, the notice given in this case was woefully inadequate and requires this Court to vacate the appellant’s sentence of death.
The majority opinion states at page 8 that the notice problem “has arisen due to a lack of specificity in the statutes as to when and how a defendant should be advised of what evidence will be offered in support of the aggravating circumstances alleged” and that this Court “of necessity” must “fill in the vacuum left in the statutes in this area one case at a time....” It is true that Section 701.10 does not state any specific time period for complying with its notice provisions, except to require that such notice be given “prior to .. .trial-” Even so, the Court has previously recognized that the purpose of our constitutional and statutory notice provisions in the context of a capital case is “to afford a defendant the opportunity ‘to present a defense or an explanation for the alleged criminal conduct.’ ” Walker, supra, at 285 (Quoting Johnson v. State, 665 P.2d 815, 823 (Okla.Crim.App.1982)).
The majority opinion does not set a specific time limit on the notice requirement, nor do I believe that it is within the province of this Court to do so. We must recognize, however, that the notice requirement of Section 701.10 has constitutional implications insofar as a plurality of the United States Supreme Court has held that a capital defendant is denied due process “when the death sentence was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 363, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1207, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). “If a person is to be executed, it should be as a result of a decision based on reason and reliable evidence — not as a result of ambush.” Gholson v. Estelle, 675 F.2d 734, 738 (5th Cir.1982). In my view, in the case at bar, the reliability of the death sentence was impermissibly reduced below minimal standards of due process, because of the denial of a meaningful opportunity for the defendant or his counsel to deny, explain, argue, or in any way challenge, the accuracy or materiality of the State’s second stage evidence. Id. See also U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Gardner, supra; Okla. Const, art. II, § 7.
This Court cannot and will not tolerate capital trials based on principles of gamesmanship and “trial by ambush” tactics. Our system of justice has traditionally rested on the foundation that adversarial debate is an essential component of the truth-seeking process. It follows that an accused and his attorney must be given sufficient notice of the evidence to be used by the State to obtain a sentence of death, to allow the accused a reasonable and meaningful opportunity to deny or explain the evidence against him. Such determinations must be made by this Court on a case-by-case basis.
Second, with regard to the admissibility of first stage evidence to support the death penalty, contrary to the majority’s position, I believe that the prosecutor should be required to formally introduce first stage evidence for consideration during the second stage. See Stout v. State, 693 P.2d 617, 629 (Okla.Crim.App.1984) (Parks, J., Specially Concurring). Following discussion of this issue during oral argument, counsel for appellee conceded in a handwritten response that the “record does not reflect a formal motion to incorporate [first stage evidence] or an announcement of such to the jury by the trial court.” In any event, the trial judge’s giving of Instruction No. 11 during the second stage specifically precluded the jury from considering first stage evidence in assessing punishment:
IN ARRIVING AT YOUR DETERMINATION AS TO WHAT SENTENCE IS APPROPRIATE UNDER THE LAW, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO CONSIDER ONLY THE EVIDENCE RECEIVED HERE IN OPEN COURT PRESENTED BY THE STATE AND THE DEFENDANT DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE OF THIS PROCEEDING.
(O.R. 173) Accordingly, the first stage evidence cannot be used to support the aggravating circumstances. Because no valid *1250aggravating circumstances remain, it is not appropriate to independently reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Castro v. State, 749 P.2d 1146 (Okla.Crim.App.1987); Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562 (Okla.Crim.App.1987) (opinion on rehearing). Accordingly, I concur in the modification of the appellant’s sentence of death to life imprisonment.