Court Opinion

ID: 9773252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:40:45.138208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:51.319289
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice. The appellant, Abram Isaac Peebles, was convicted of rape of his three-year-old nephew (the boy) and sentenced to 40 years confinement. He raises these points on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the court erred in allowing Peebles’ sister, who is the mother (the mother) of the boy to give hearsay testimony pursuant to A.R.E. 803(25); (3) the court erred in admitting as expert testimony the statement of a physician who examined the boy; and (4) the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to question Peebles’ mother (the grandmother) about irrelevant pornographic materials found in his home. We find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction. We decline to reverse the trial court’s determination, made in consideration of the factors stated in Rule 803(25), that the boy’s statement to the mother was sufficiently reliable to allow the mother’s testimony. We hold that the physician was qualified as an expert and that, to the extent the prosecutor was erroneously allowed to question the grandmother about the pornographic matter it was not sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. The Circuit Court held a hearing to determine whether to admit the mother’s testimony as to what the boy had told her with respect to the alleged rape. The boy was brought before the Court, and after stating his name and that he was four years old, he became completely inarticulate. He answered questions about his family in an obviously incorrect manner and was unable even to identify Peebles. He denied that he had told his mother about anything that Peebles had done to him. The mother testified that she, the grandmother, an aunt of the boy, and Peebles lived in separate trailer homes in the same trailer park. The mother testified she took the boy to Peebles’ home to watch television. She testified that when she returned for her child she struck a glass window on Peebles’ trailer with her arm. Peebles said, “Wait a minute. I’m fixing to take a bath.” The boy drew back a sheet covering the glass door, and she could see Peebles, naked with an erection, pulling up the boy’s pants. When she entered the trailer, Peebles told her he had done nothing wrong. She took the boy by the hand and left. She felt something “slimy” in the boy’s left hand, so she took his other hand. The mother testified that when she got him home, she put the boy on the bed and asked him what had happened. He said “No mommy, you’ll whip me.” She assured him she would not and asked “What did Uncle Abram do to you?” He replied, “He bite my dingdong.” In response to further questions, the boy told the mother that Peebles began bouncing on the bed and “we fight dingdongs.” He also told her “I had some milk from his dingdong.” She called the police. She testified that when her husband arrived at home, the boy ran up to him and said, “Daddy, Uncle Abram bite my dingdong.” On cross-examination, the mother testified that she had been in counseling, had been taking antidepressants, and that she sometimes did and sometimes did not get along with Peebles. The grandmother testified at the hearing that she came to the trailer park sometime after the event but while the police cruiser was there. She found the mother standing by the police car laughing. She stopped laughing as the grandmother approached. The boy was brought to the grandmother, and she asked him if Peebles bit him. He replied “Uh huh, Meemaw.” She then asked him to show her where, and he pointed to a spot on his penis where, she said, he had been bitten by a tick four days earlier. He again responded affirmatively when she asked if he were sure that was where Peebles had bitten him. The grandmother testified that Peebles and the mother often fought and that the mother had previously suffered brain damage from a coma and would have to be in counseling for the rest of her life. She also related that the mother had made false sexual accusations against her father and grandfather, and that the allegations had caused such a stir in the trailer park that the grandmother, who was in charge of the park, had had to ask the mother to move away. The aunt testified that on the day of the incident she heard the mother banging on Peebles’ door and asking to be let in. She shut her window because, “they’re constantly fighting.” Fifteen minutes later, the mother came to her and told her what had happened. The aunt went to the boy and asked him what had happened at Peebles’ trailer, and he said “We hit wingdings together” and “I wanted some milk. Uncle Abram got me some milk.” The mother testified that, at the request of the police, the boy was taken to Arkansas Children’s Hospital. He was examined there by Dr. Jim Mark Ingram. Dr. Ingram testified at the hearing that he had found a film around the boy’s mouth, down his chin, down his abdomen and on his left hand. He used an ultraviolet Wood’s lamp which causes sperm to floresce with positive result. On cross-examination he admitted that lots of substances would floresce under the lamp. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court stated that the stories of the mother, the grandmother, and the aunt were consistent, and there was sufficient evidence for the doctor to give his opinion. The Court ruled the testimony admissible. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence Peebles was charged with rape in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103 (1987) which provides, in relevant part, “(a) A person commits rape if he engages in . . . deviate sexual activity with another person:. . . (3) Who is less than fourteen (14) years of age. . . .” “Deviate sexual activity” is defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101 (1987), in relevant part, as “any act of sexual gratification involving: (A) The penetration, however slight, of the. . . mouth of one person by the penis of another person.. . .” At the trial, the State’s evidence consisted of the mother’s testimony and that of Dr. Ingram. They each testified in virtually the same language used at the pre-trial hearing and to the same facts. The defense presented the testimony of a serologist from the State Crime Laboratory who testified that he examined the “rape kit” consisting of samples of body fluids, hair, etc., taken from the boy at the hospital and was unable to detect any semen. The defense also presented testimony of the aunt who said that when she had asked the boy what had happened the boy told her he had been at Peebles’ trailer, had wanted some milk, and that Peebles brought it to him. She testified that Peebles had stopped by her place on the way to the store and asked if she needed anything. When he came back, he had the soft drink she had requested, and when asked, told her the contents of the sack he was carrying were vanilla wafers and milk for the boy and a candy bar. The grandmother testified for the defense that when she saw the boy after the incident he had no signs of having been molested but did have a tick bite on his penis.  In response to Peebles’ motion for a directed verdict at the end of the State’s evidence, the Court stated that the boy’s statement that he got some milk from Peebles’ dingdong was sufficient to indicate penetration. Apparently referring to the term “dingdong,” the Court recognized that the terminology being used was “imprecise.” No challenge to the testimony on that basis was made at the trial, and none is made on appeal. In response to Peebles’ contention that the hearsay statement was not corroborated, the Court found corroboration in the testimony of Dr. Ingram. The directed verdict motion was renewed at the conclusion of all the evidence. In making that determination whether there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury, the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it are viewed most favorably to the State, Blaney v. State, 280 Ark. 253, 657 S.W.2d 531 (1983), disregarding any other possible trial errors, Harris v. State, 284 Ark. 247, 681 S.W.2d 334 (1984).  Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to take the question to the jury. Still v. State, 294 Ark. 117, 740 S.W.2d 926 (1987). In a case similar to this one, Bryan v. State, 288 Ark. 125, 702 S.W.2d 785 (1986), we found substantial evidence of rape by deviate sexual activity even though there was only a hearsay statement of the child victim, admitted through the testimony of the child’s father who, like the mother in this case, was the witness who related the circumstantial evidence we held sufficient. We hold the evidence was sufficient in this case to take the case to the jury. 2. The physician’s statement Peebles contends Dr. Ingram’s testimony should not have been admitted because he had not previously been qualified to testify as an expert, had never before used a Wood’s lamp in a sexual abuse investigation, and ultimately conceded that the lamp could show up substances other than semen.  The issue of whether to permit one to be qualified as an expert and to give opinion evidence as an expert falls within the discretion of the trial court. Dumond v. State, 290 Ark. 595, 721 S.W.2d 663 (1986). Dr. Ingram testified with respect to his training as a physician, including study of investigation in child abuse cases. We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion. 3. Hearsay The most difficult aspect of this case is the Court’s ruling that Rule 803(25) permitted the mother to testify as to what the boy said. It should be noted at the outset that Peebles does not challenge the constitutionality of the Rule or complain that he was not afforded the opportunity to confront his accuser. His sole challenge is to the trial Court’s determination, made pursuant to Rule 803(25), that the boy’s statement possesses a reasonable likelihood of trustworthiness. He argues that one of the criteria for making the determination is the Court’s observations of the child as a witness. In this case, as noted above, the child told the Court nothing. If the issue here were the credibility of the mother, there would be real doubts, given the evidence of her history and mental condition. Her credibility, however, was an issue for the jury to determine. The question before us, assuming the mother’s testimony was true, is in the words of Rule 803(25), the “reliability-credibility” of the boy’s statements. In Hughes v. State, 292 Ark. 619, 732 S.W.2d 829 (1987), we in an obiter dictum sustained an appellant’s argument that Rule 803(25) requires that the child declarant appear before the trial judge “to establish the reliability-credibility of his statements if they are to be introduced at trial.” We held that there was substantial compliance with the requirement by the fact that the child testified at the trial in that case.  Here, the boy did appear before the judge, but nothing the child did or said can be held by us to have sustained the court’s ruling admitting the hearsay version of his testimony. The judge was obviously aware of the Rule, as he read parts of it to counsel at the hearing. His decision must have been based upon one of the other criteria stated in the Rule. They are: a. the age of the child b. the maturity of the child c. the time of the statement d. the content of the statement e. the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement f. the nature of the offense involved g. the duration of the offense involved h. the relationship of the child to the offender i. the reliability of the assertion j. the reliability-credibility of the child witness before the Judge k. the relationship or status of the child to the one offering the statement l. any other corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement m. any other factor which the Court at the time and under the circumstances deems relevant and appropriate.  Many of these criteria do not seem to be useful in the context of this case. We believe, however, the Court could have based the decision to admit the testimony on the fact that it was the boy’s mother to whom the statement was allegedly made and which he was unable to repeat in court. In addition, the assertion that the boy had made the statement was corroborated by the pretrial testimony of the grandmother and the aunt. It was also corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Ingram expressing the opinion that there was semen around the boy’s mouth and elsewhere on his body soon after the alleged event. We find no error in the admission of the statement. 4. The photographs Prior to the beginning of the trial, the prosecutor announced that she had some pornographic photographs and magazines she wished to introduce into evidence but was not sure if she could do so. Defense counsel said he “obviously” would object to questions about them. The prosecutor warned that if any witness testified that Peebles was just a “straight” person, she was armed with these materials and would use them for impeachment. When the prosecutor was questioning the grandmother, she asked the grandmother if she was aware that Peebles had some “sexual perversions.” The grandmother answered “No ma’am. I knew he had the magazines.” Defense counsel objected and complained that the prosecutor was trying to “bootstrap” herself into a position to introduce the items or questions about them when he had not opened the door by any such inquiry. The Court allowed the inquiry to go “a little further.” The prosecutor then asked what kind of magazines, and the response was “girly magazines.” She then asked if the grandmother knew Peebles kept some photographs. The grandmother said she had seen them “that night.” At that point the court interrupted the examination. The photographs to which the prosecutor referred were pictures of Peebles, taken by him, of himself in various stages of erection. Neither the photographs nor any magazines were introduced into evidence. The jury was not informed as to the nature of the photographs. The most they heard was that Peebles had possessed magazines “like Hustler.” While the questions asked were probably irrelevant, the testimony of the grandmother was ultimately not unfavorable to Peebles. She concluded by saying that she had no problem with him possessing such materials, as it was “his property, his life.” Peebles cites cases, such as Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986), in which photographs which were shown to the jury or admitted in evidence at trial were held to be inadmissible on appeal. While we are not persuaded by those cases because the facts are different here, we are concerned about his argument that counsel questioned the grandmother further about the magazines and photographs after the Court had told her she could go no further on the matter. After the Court had ruled she could go no further on the issue, the prosecutor asked: “It’s your testimony that the photographs that you viewed that were taken from Abram’s trailer that night, you don’t have any problem with those materials?” The grandmother responded: “It bothers me a little bit, yes, ma’am, but I consider that is his property, his life.”  We agree with Peebles’ argument, supported by his citation of Walker v. State, 138 Ark. 517, 212 S.W. 319 (1919), that it is a trial court’s duty to maintain control of the trial and to prohibit counsel from making improper argument or engaging in improper questioning. We also agree that counsel should not have asked the question after being limited by the Court. There was, however, nothing new in the question, and we do not find the sort of prejudice in it, and certainly not in the grandmother’s answer, which requires reversal. Cherry v. State, 302 Ark. 462, 791 S.W.2d 354 (1990); Taylor v. State, 299 Ark. 123, 771 S.W.2d 283 (1989). Affirmed. Brown, J., concurs. Dudley, J., dissents.