Court Opinion

ID: 9710193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:04:08.727673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.019788
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The trial court in this case ordered Mayview and DPW to be joined as indispensable parties. Whenever a Commonwealth agency is joined as an indispensable party-defendant such joinder invokes this Court’s exclusive original subject matter jurisdiction and pro tanto divests the courts of common pleas of subject matter jurisdiction. See CRY, Inc. v. Mill Service Inc., 536 Pa. 462, 640 A.2d 372 (1994); Yezerski v. Fong, 58 Pa.Cmwlth. 566, 428 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa.Cmwlth.1981). Thus, because the trial court ordered DPW and Mayview to be joined as indispensable party-defendants, the trial court was divested of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to DPW and May-view. Hence, by the trial court’s own order, it divested itself of jurisdiction and thus should not have proceeded further with respect to the DPW and Mayview. Because the trial court did proceed further with respect to DPW and Mayview, it committed error and should be reversed. Because the majority affirms, I dissent.
By deciding that the trial court need not have joined DPW and Mayview as indispensable party-defendants, the majority attempts to avoid the clear rule of law that when Commonwealth parties are joined as indispensable party-defendants, the trial court is thereby divested pro tanto» of subject matter jurisdiction. However, even accepting the majority’s reasoning for the sake of argument, while the trial court may not have needed to join DPW and Mayview as indispensable parties, the trial court did in fact do so. Having joined DPW and Mayview as indispensable parties, the trial court was divested pro tanto of subject matter jurisdiction thereby. See CRY.
If the majority means to say that the trial court erred in joining DPW and Mayview as indispensable parties, then the majority ought to say so and ought to offer an analysis as to why they are not indispensable parties. If indeed that is what the majority intended to say, I respectfully disagree. I believe that the DPW and Mayview are indispensable parties to this action.
If a Commonwealth entity is an indispensable party, then this Court’s exclusive original subject matter jurisdiction is invoked thereby ousting the court of common pleas subject matter jurisdiction over the Commonwealth parties pro tanto. CRY. If however, a Commonwealth entity is merely a “necessary” party, as the County argues, then the common pleas court’s subject matter jurisdiction is not ousted and that court may proceed. In re Emery, 138 Pa.Cmwlth. 668, 589 A.2d 283 (Pa.Cmwlth.1991). In order to determine whether a party is indispensable or not, our Supreme Court set forth the following test in CRY:
1) Do the absent parties have a right or interest related to the claim?
2) If so, what is the nature of that right or interest?
3) Is that right or interest essential to the merits of the issue?
4) Can justice be afforded without violating the due process rights of absent parties?
In order to determine whether a Commonwealth entity is a necessary party, this Court has stated the test as a party “whose presence, while not indispensable, is essential if the Court is to completely resolve the controversy before it and render complete relief.” Emery, 589 A.2d at 285, quoting, York-Adams County Constables Assoc. v. Court of Common Pleas of York County, 81 Pa.Cmwlth. 566, 474 A.2d 79, 81 (Pa.Cmwlth.1984).
This action seeks to compel Mayview, a state hospital to admit and treat a patient. I believe that Mayview’s interests in such an action are manifest and weighty and that compelling it to admit and treat a patient over its objections without it being joined as a party to the involuntary commitment proceedings violates Mayview’s due process *1120rights. This action also seeks to compel DPW to cooperate in the admission and the treatment of Bobbie Jean Bishop at May-view. DPW is a Commonwealth entity charged with the statewide responsibility to assure the availability of appropriate mental health services to needy individuals, to operate state mental health facilities for the benefit of patients and to assign the functions of state mental health facilities, See The Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (MH/MR Act).1 Although perhaps not as clear as Mayview’s rights, nevertheless, I believe that DPW’s rights also would be violated without it being joined as a party to the involuntary commitment proceedings.
Instead of determining whether DPW and Mayview are indispensable parties, the majority reasons that because the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over involuntary commitments and because the trial court has inherent jurisdiction to enforce its orders, it thereby has subject matter jurisdiction to compel a Commonwealth entity, Mayview, to admit a patient on pain of contempt. There are several problems with the majority’s reasoning.
First, at the very least, the majority should conduct the CRY analysis to determine whether Mayview and the DPW are indispensable parties in order to determine whether this Court’s original exclusive subject matter jurisdiction is invoked, thereby ousting the common pleas court’s subject matter jurisdiction pro tanto. The majority cannot conclude that the court of common pleas has subject matter jurisdiction here without first determining that DPW and/or Mayview are not indispensable parties. That is to say, the majority cannot conclude that the court of common pleas has subject matter jurisdiction here without first analyzing whether this Court has exclusive original subject matter jurisdiction. If, in fact, DPW and/or Mayview are indispensable parties, then the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas is ousted to that extent, notwithstanding its general jurisdiction over civil commitments and its inherent power to enforce its own orders, and this Court’s exclusive original subject matter jurisdiction is invoked. Because the majority fails to perform this necessary analysis, I must dissent.2
Second, the legislature has seen fit to specifically provide that the Commonwealth Court shall have original exclusive jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings “[ajgainst the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity” except in enumerated circumstances not here relevant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 761. The majority is not able to point to any specific statutory grant of jurisdiction in either the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA)3 or the MH/MR Act which permits the courts of common pleas to exercise jurisdiction over a Commonwealth entity. The only provisions which the majority can muster is the general grant of jurisdiction to the courts of common pleas over civil commitments and a court’s inherent power to enforce its orders. Jurisdiction in this case is a matter of statute. Thus, at bottom, this matter comes down to an issue of what the legislature intended to be the respective jurisdiction of this Court and of the courts of common pleas in cases like this. Hence, as this is a matter of statute and there is some doubt as to the meaning of the competing statutory provisions, rules of statutory construction apply. And those rules instruct us that where there is a conflict between general provisions and specific provisions, the specific provisions are to control. 42 Pa.C.S. § 1933. Here, the specific provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 761 should control over the general provisions of the MHPA.4
Moreover, merely because a court of common pleas has subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of whether a particular indi*1121vidual should involuntarily submit to treatment, it does not necessarily follow as a matter or logic or of law that the court of common pleas has subject matter jurisdiction to order a Commonwealth entity to admit a particular individual as the majority seems to think. While it is true that courts have inherent power to enforce their orders, such inherent power is not unlimited and is bounded by limits on the court’s jurisdiction and by applicable law. In this case, the common pleas court’s inherent power to enforce its order requiring Bobbie Jean Bishop to undergo involuntary treatment is limited by the jurisdictional bar to such a court exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a Commonwealth entity.
Indeed, the heart of the majority’s reasoning in support of its disposition in this matter is that
[b]y virtue of this statutory jurisdiction over court-ordered commitments, the courts of common pleas also have jurisdiction to order commitment to any approved facility designated within a given service area; by its participation in the county mental health program, a mental health facility is subject to the terms of the MH/MR Act and MHPA for the purposes of receiving and treating court-committed patients. Under the terms of these statutes, when a court orders treatment at a designated state mental hospital, the designated facility must admit the patient for treatment; at that time, the facility is without recourse to deny admission.
Majority op. at p. 1117. Interestingly, the majority fails to point out which specific “terms of these statutes” provide that when a court of common pleas orders treatment at a state mental hospital, the designated facility must admit the patient for treatment. Perhaps, it is because there are no such terms in the statutes. At least my reading of the statutes fails to reveal such terms.
For the foregoing reasons, I must dissent.

. Act of October 20, 1966, Special Session, No. 3, P.L. 96, as amended, 50 P.S. §§ 4101-4704.

. The majority's result can only be justified if the majority opinion is read as a sub silentio determination that either Mayview or DPW or both are not indispensable parties. Such a determination should not be made without a careful and explicit analysis of the issue, especially in light of the fact that the trial court determined that May-view and DPW were indispensable parties.

. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, as amended. 50 P.S.§§ 7101-7503.

. Likewise, contrary to the concurring opinion, I fail to divine from the general provisions of the MHPA, either individually or collectively, a legislative intent to grant the courts of common pleas *1121jurisdiction over Commonwealth entities when the legislative intent could not be made clearer than its explicit specific words enacted at 42 Pa.C.S. § 761 granting to this Court exclusive original subject matter jurisdiction in civil actions against Commonwealth entities.