Court Opinion

ID: 9853803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:55:17.211434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:08.304226
License: Public Domain

Justice KOURLIS,
dissenting.
I do not find support either in the law as set forth in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) and Colorado Civil Rights Commission v. Big O Tires, Inc., 940 P.2d 397 (Colo.1997) or in the evidence presented to the Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ) for a conclusion that the Colorado Department of Natural Resources (the Department) intentionally discriminated against Ahmad Bodaghi. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I.
There is little doubt'that the Department of Natural Resources and Max Vezzani, Bo-daghi’s superior and the appointing authority, valued the contributions of Bodaghi during his tenure with the Department from 1984 until 1993.1 During that time, the Department promoted him four times and named him “State Land Board Employee of the Year” in 1991. One of the promotions involved a reallocation of Bodaghi’s position while Max Vezzani managed the Land Board.
Despite his upward movement, Bodaghi believed he deserved greater compensation for his efforts because he had taken on additional responsibilities since the previous audit. Thus, he sought another reallocation of his position. Inherent in any upward reallocation, however, is the risk that other qualified candidates may apply for the position. As a part of the reclassification process, Bo-daghi drafted a job description. In it, Boda-ghi indicated that the position required, among other things, knowledge of right-of-way laws, land economics, leases, titles, and real estate values, and the ability to plan, organize, and complete projects. Bodaghi convinced the authorities. With Vezzani’s support, Bodaghi successfully obtained the reallocation of his position to Program Administrator I, a dramatic increase. Unfortunately for Bodaghi, other candidates desired the position, and Vezzani selected another person.
There were two areas to which the ALJ looked for evidence of improper bias. The first was the hiring process, and the second was the hiring decision. In accordance with applicable personnel rules, Vezzani elected to adopt an objective, structured, selection process for two management level reallocated positions. He explained that he made the change because the reallocation of Bodaghi’s position was “high level” and there were few such positions within the Land Board; the commissioners requested that he fill any vacancies with the best candidates; and other employees wanted a more open hiring process. Vezzani also testified that he believed that the Land Board employed very few professional level employees. Because of the heightened level of the position, he planned to allocate more responsibility to the job and wanted to make sure he selected the best available candidate.
Having determined that he would use a new hiring process to fill Bodaghi’s reallocated position, Vezzani delivered a memorandum (the Bodaghi memo) to all staff members encouraging them to apply for the position. The letter explained, “[i]n order to better keep everyone informed of personnel actions I have decided to personally circulate notices of this nature as a matter of course. Therefore in the future whenever any of these land type actions come through I will circulate copies to the Land Board staff.” It also stated, “[hjowever, the immediate decision for you is whether or not you *305wish to apply for the position.” In addition to the memorandum, Vezzani verbally urged employees to apply for the job during a staff meeting.
Similarly, a few days later, Vezzani issued a memorandum (the Price memo) explaining that he would use the same new process to fill Mr. Price’s reallocated position.2 The Price memo mirrored the previous one except it did not include the above quoted language.3 Price, like Bodaghi, disliked the implementation of this new hiring scheme. To Price’s benefit, however, the only other applicant for that position withdrew from consideration, making a competitive hiring process unnecessary.
The new selection system consisted of several steps including briefing papers on two issues, a written exam, and an interview. All three parts were evaluated by several people.4 The panel chosen by Vezzani consisted of himself, the Surface Sections Manager, the Minerals Director, and a Land Board Commissioner. Vezzani had not used the system when filling three previously reallocated positions, but had used similar processes to fill position vacancies. Two of the reallocations related to secretarial type positions and the other to a high level position, a position Vezzani filled with the incumbent.5
Bodaghi, Robert Clift, District Manager at Pueblo, Dennis DeVore, Minerals Manager in Greeley, and William Killip, Special Projects Manager for the Land Board, initially applied for the reallocated position, but the Personnel Board did not allow Killip to participate in the selection process because he had submitted his application after the deadline. Witnesses indicated that they found the position attractive in large part because of its management status and substantial salary. In a memorandum to the candidates, Vezzani indicated:
You should know that my personal philosophy is that the incumbent has a slight edge in that he has been doing the job. What that means to me is that if it is a close call between [Bodaghi] and one or more of the candidates, I would be inclined to appoint the incumbent. However, the Commissioners and I want to assess each of your individual knowledge, skills and abilities. Our bottom line is quite simple — who can do the best job for the [Land Board].
With respect to the hiring decision, all four panel members ranked the successful applicant, Dennis DeVore, first among the' three candidates. At the time of selection, DeVore had worked for the Department for twelve years, had earned two of the highest designations in the appraisal profession, the MAI and the ARA, had more than two years of experience as a professional right-of-way agent for an engineering firm, had worked for six years as an independent appraiser which included significant right-of-way duties, and had surveyed right-of-ways for about a year. The panel noted DeVore’s fine performance during the interview portion of the process and favored his real estate appraisal skills, despite the fact that such experience was not a formal job requirement.6
Two of the panel members provided written evaluations to Vezzani, while the third offered his recommendation to Vezzani verbally. The panel articulated several specific reasons for the recommendation to hire De-Vore. “DeVore is clearly the leader in terms of organization of thoughts and clear communication and writing ability.” “DeVore had 6 good to excellent answers to the 10 questions ... [Bodaghi] had 3 to 2 good to excellent answers.” “[Bodaghi] had difficulty grasping what some answers [sic] the panel was looking for, has below average ability to commu*306nicate his thoughts orally, [and] had to be prompted several times to give the complete answer.” “[DeVore] gave concise answers directly addressing the questions posed, oral communication skills are very good, thinks quickly on his feet and uses analogies and examples very well.” “Without question Dennis far surpassed [Bodaghi] ... in the oral portion of this exam. His answers were thought out, concise and in my opinion correct.” Consistent with the recommendations of all members of the panel, Vezzani appointed DeVore to the position.7
Having been laid off by the Department, Bodaghi later exercised his bumping rights and transferred to the Colorado Division of Wildlife. Today, Bodaghi holds the same level of position that he held prior to the reallocation of his Department position.
II.
The law applicable to this case invites confusion because of the concepts of shifting burdens of proof and production. We attempted to clarify the applicable test in Colorado Civil Rights Commission v. Big O Tires, Inc., 940 P.2d 397 (Colo.1997). In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, the United States Supreme Court explained inconsistencies in previous opinions, and reiterated the test for proving a prima facie case of illegal discrimination outlined in McDonnell Douglas for proving intentional discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-20, 113 S.Ct. 2742. In Big O, we modified the Supreme Court test8 slightly to accommodate broader forms of illegal discrimination. Thus, when bringing an employment discrimination suit under Colorado law, a plaintiff must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of racial discrimination by showing: 1) that he belongs to a protected class; 2) that he was qualified for the position at issue; 3) that he suffered some type of adverse employment decision; and 4) that the circumstances gave rise to an inference of illegal discrimination. See Big O, 940 P.2d at 400.
Establishment of a prima facie case of intentional discrimination creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Big O, 940 P.2d at 400-01. This means the employer must provide a legitimate business reason for the employment decision, or it will lose the case. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Big O, 940 P.2d at 401. Although the burden of production then shifts to the employer, the burden of proving intentional discrimination remains with the plaintiff. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Big O, 940 P.2d at 401-02. When the employer carries this burden of production, the presumption in favor of the plaintiff disappears. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742.
The employer, having effectively negated the prima facie case, then forces the trier of fact to decide whether the legitimate business reason for the employment decision was merely a pretext for illegal, intentional discrimination. See id. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Big O, 940 P.2d at 401-02. The factfinder may proceed to make this determination based on the plaintiffs prima facie ease alone if the factfinder does not believe that the business reason proffered for the employment decision was legitimate; or the factfin-der may hear and consider additional evidence. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Big O, 940 P.2d at 402. Although no additional evidence is required, the plaintiff consistently maintains the burden of showing that the business reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason for the hiring decision. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Big O, 940 P.2d at 402. The plaintiff “ ‘must be given a full and fair opportunity, to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a *307racially discriminatory decision.’ ” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. 1817).
The underlying premise is that the plaintiff must prove discrimination, not that the employer must prove the absence of discrimination: “Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of ... race,” color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. at 523-24, 113 S.Ct. 2742. Thus, the plaintiff maintains the burden in an employment discrimination suit of proving that the employer’s business reason for its employment decision was a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
III.
Bodaghi established a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Had the Department not explained its reasons for its business decision, the ALJ would have been required to find in his favor. However, the Department satisfied its burden of production by articulating several reasons for implementing the new hiring process and supporting the choice of DeVore as the most qualified person for the job. It is at this juncture in the analysis that I differ from the majority.
A.
In my view, the court of appeals correctly applied the body of United States Supreme Court and Colorado case law. Because the presumption in favor of Bodaghi disappeared upon the Department’s showing of a legitimate business reason for its selection of De-Vore, the law then required Bodaghi to show that the adverse employment decision was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. It was then incumbent upon Bodaghi to demonstrate that the business reason was false, and that unlawful discrimination was the real reason. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Big O, 940 P.2d at 401. The court of appeals explicitly stated that “[i]n this respect, there is no requirement that the complainant produce further evidence, and if the factfinder determines that the reason given by the employer was not its true reason and that the given reason was simply a pretext for discrimination, a finding of discrimination will be sustained.” Bodaghi v. Department of Natural Resources, 969 P.2d 718, 720 (Colo.App.1998). Thus, contrary to the majority’s understanding, I do not read the court of appeals as adopting a requirement that a plaintiff must put forth additional evidence of illegal discrimination. , Succinctly stated, the question is whether the Department’s business reasons for hiring DeVore over Bodaghi were credible. Bodaghi bore the burden of showing that they were not and that unlawful discrimination was the real reason.
B.
I return then to the facts before the ALJ. A finding that the business reason was a pretext for discrimination must be supported by sufficient evidence and not based on mere speculation. A reviewing court may reverse the decision of an administrative agency if the court finds that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously, made a decision that is unsupported by the record, or exceeded its authority. See § 24-4-106(7), 7 C.R.S. (1999). Unlike the majority, I find that the record does not support the finding that the Department unlawfully discriminated against Bodaghi. Indeed, I find no evidence of such an inference and a substantial amount of evidence to the contrary, including the conclusions of the four panel members who independently determined that DeVore deserved the position over Bodaghi. I examine below each fact on which the ALJ and the majority rely.
The majority leans on the ALJ’s finding that DeVore did not administer rights-of-way while working as a District Manager for the Land Board. However, they fail to recognize that the reallocated position required “three years of professional right-of-way experience,” and the Human Resources Manager for the Department of Natural Resources reviewed DeVore’s application and concluded that he met the minimum requirements for the job before she submitted DeVore’s appli*308cation to Vezzani. DeVore testified before the ALJ that he engaged in right-of-way activities for more than the required three years prior to joining the Land Board.
The ALJ concluded that the Department illegally discriminated against Bodaghi when, contrary to past practices, it instituted a rigorous selection process for the reallocated position. This modification alone cannot demonstrate discriminatory intent. If it did, no employer would be able to modify hiring practices in any way where the employer, prior to making the process change, knows of a potential candidate from a protected class. As the ALJ aptly noted, there is nothing inherently wrong with an agency changing its selection procedures. However, the ALJ disapproved of making the process significantly more challenging than before, even though all candidates participated in the new process and no evidence indicated any inherent biases in the new procedures. Vezzani’s implementation of a new, neutral and comprehensive process does not support the decision that the Department discriminated against Bodaghi.
Next, the ALJ found fault with the memorandum sent by Vezzani that outlined his decision to change the process, and his encouragement of employees to apply. The ALJ criticized the Bodaghi memo because it differed from the Price memo. The ALJ erred in its analysis of this fact. Vezzani sent the Bodaghi memo to employees several days before sending the Price memo to the same employees. Because he had not sent memos in the past in such instances, Vezzani logically explained that he intended to modify the hiring system for reallocated positions. To avoid any confusion, the Bodaghi memo clearly explained that anyone could apply for the position. It would have been redundant to include the same messages on the Price memo delivered to the staff four days later. The employees, including Bodaghi, who testified at the hearing indicated that the memo-randa were identical. Thus, even those to whom Vezzani directed the memos found no fault with them. The mere existence of the memoranda and the language contained therein does not support the ALJ’s finding of improper discrimination.
The ALJ also concluded that the Department could not possibly have favored De-Vore’s appraisal skills because such skills were not included in the job requirements. This conclusion defies logic. Employers generally interview those applicants who possess the minimum skills for the job; employers often choose to hire the applicant who possesses more than the minimum skills and credentials. Undoubtedly, an inference of unlawful discrimination may arise when an employer places value on an unnecessary or inapplicable skill, but such a case is not present here. All members of the panel concluded that DeVore was the best candidate for the job, and the Department has since added appraisal responsibilities to the position, thereby demonstrating the relevance of those skills. Furthermore, the job description, drafted by Bodaghi, stated in several areas that the position required land valuation and appraisal report review. Thus, although the job requirements did not specifically list appraisal certification, it remained part of the duties of the job. Indeed, Bodaghi testified that in his prior job, he directed all appraisal reports to DeVore for his review. Thus, it would be logical to incorporate that skill into the new position and avoid one additional step.
Finally, the ALJ placed significant weight on the testimony of Vezzani that he expected more of a Program Administrator than of an Engineering Technician II, the classification of the position prior to the reallocation. Under the circumstances, the statement makes perfect sense. Increasing levels of responsibility often go hand in hand with increases in grade and pay. All of the panel members expected that DeVore would enhance the position. Although it appears Bo-daghi demonstrated that he may also have had the capacity to excel in the position, proven, past performance in one job does not compel promotion to a more complex or demanding job.
Although several witnesses suggested that Vezzani sought to create his own management team with hand-picked people, not a single witness, other than Bodaghi, testified that national origin had anything to do with DeVore’s selection. In fact Bodaghi merely *309testified “[a]nd also for some reason that I don’t know, maybe what I based my discrimination [sic], because of my nationality, that he just didn’t want me within the management level.” It appears Bodaghi did not know why Vezzani selected DeVore, and apparently, he was unwilling to accept the fact that another candidate may have been more highly qualified.
Accordingly, I do not view the record as supporting the ALJ’s finding that the Department’s choice of DeVore was a pretext for discrimination.
C.
Unlike the majority, I see little similarity between this case and Big 0. In Big O, Thurman, an African-American woman and inside-sales clerk, violated company policies resulting in the termination of her employment with Big O. See Big O, 940 P.2d at 398. Before an administrative law judge, Thurman established a prima facie case of illegal discrimination. See id. at 401. Big O rebutted the presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing Thurman: namely, that she had violated company policy after being warned in writing that such violation would result in her termination. See id. In response, Thurman demonstrated that during the same period, Big 0 did not discipline a Caucasian, female inside-sales clerk who violated the same rules.9 See id. at 401-02. We concluded that sufficient evidence existed to find that the asserted reason was a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 402. Specifically, we held “[w]here a prima facie case of discrimination is proven and the reasons given for discharge are found to be a pretext for discrimination, no additional evidence is required to infer intentional discrimination.” Id. (emphasis added).
This case is very different from Big O. In Big O, two employees of different races engaged in the same improper behavior. The employer terminated only the employee from a protected class. Under those circumstances, we concluded that the plaintiff proved that the business reason was a pretext for discrimination.
Bodaghi presented no such compelling evidence of unlawful discrimination. Rather, the evidence suggests that the Department planned to treat the two reallocated positions in exactly the same manner. Furthermore, unlike in Big O where the employer did not reasonably explain why it treated the employees differently, the Department provided reasonable explanations for its decision to prospectively modify the selection system for reallocated positions and its selection of De-Vore. The facts, even as determined by the ALJ, support the claim that the Department wanted to ensure that it placed the top candidate in high level reallocated positions, that the employees wanted a more open hiring process, and that the Department made a well-grounded decision when it selected De-Vore.
IV.
The majority notes that discrimination can be subtle and difficult to prove. I agree, and the courts have addressed that issue by the method of shifting burdens once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case. However, there must still be evidence from which the factfin-der can conclude that the reason the plaintiff was not hired was illegitimate and served to disguise invidious and illegal discrimination. Here, the evidence raises no such inference. It remains the plaintiffs burden to prove discrimination by some logical inference inherent in the evidence, and in this case, the plaintiff failed to meet that burden. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice RICE joins in this dissent.

. Because, as set forth below, I do not believe that the evidence supports the ALJ’s findings of fact, I do not limit my narrative to those findings, but rather discuss the evidence presented to the ALJ.

. Mr. Price was not a member of any. protected group.

. The Colorado Civil Rights Division concluded that the Price memorandum contained the language encouraging people to apply, but the version contained in the record does not contain such language.

. Although the Department’s Personnel Analyst informed Bodaghi that there would not be an examination process, that letter was based on the Department’s practices prior to Vezzani’s decision to change the hiring process.

. Vezzani had worked with the incumbent for several years both at the State Land Board and at the Division of Parks and Outdoor Recreation.

. Real estate appraisal responsibilities have since been assigned to this position.

. Vezzani had attempted previously to appoint DeVore to a position with the Department, but DeVore declined the invitation because he wanted to remain in Greeley, Colorado at the time.

. The United States Supreme Court test was established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and clarified in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Hides arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

. Big O terminated the Caucasian clerk shortly after receiving notification and a copy of Thurman's charge.