Court Opinion

ID: 9948472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 15:01:15.402495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:53.433473
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11806    Document: 52-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2024   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11806
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JAMESETTA WHIPPLE-DUNCAN,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00040-LGW-CLR-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11806      Document: 52-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2024     Page: 2 of 12

        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11806

        Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Jamesetta Whipple-Duncan appeals her 60-month,
        within-Guidelines sentence for money laundering in violation of 18
        U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). The government argues that the appeal
        waiver provision of Whipple-Duncan’s plea agreement bars her
        three challenges on direct appeal. We agree with the government.
        Accordingly, we dismiss Whipple-Duncan’s appeal.
                                          I.
               Jamesetta Whipple-Duncan was indicted on several charges.
        Under a plea agreement, she ultimately pleaded guilty to one count
        of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
        Whipple-Duncan’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea
        agreement states that she “entirely waives her right to a direct ap-
        peal of her conviction and sentence on any ground (including any
        argument that the statute to which [she] is pleading guilty is un-
        constitutional or that the admitted conduct does not fall within the
        scope of the statute).” Dist. Ct. Doc. 79 at 9. It further states that
        “[t]he only exceptions are that . . . [Whipple-Duncan] may file a di-
        rect appeal of her sentence if (1) the court enters a sentence above
        the statutory maximum, (2) the court enters a sentence above the
        advisory Sentencing Guidelines range found to apply by the court
        at sentencing[,] or (3) the Government appeals the sentence.” Id. at
        9–10. She received a 60-month, within-Guidelines sentence and
        was ordered to pay restitution. She now brings three challenges on
USCA11 Case: 22-11806      Document: 52-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2024     Page: 3 of 12

        22-11806               Opinion of the Court                         3

        appeal: a challenge to the calculation of her Guidelines range at
        sentencing, a challenge to the restitution order, and ineffective as-
        sistance of counsel claims. The government seeks to enforce the
        appeal waiver.
                                         II.
                We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo. See
        United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). An ap-
        peal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly and volun-
        tarily. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir.
        1993). To establish that the waiver was made knowingly and vol-
        untarily, the government must show either that (1) the district
        court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver dur-
        ing the plea colloquy, or (2) the record makes clear that the defend-
        ant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. See id.
        The government cannot show that an appeal waiver was knowing
        and voluntary from an examination of the agreement’s text alone.
        See id. at 1352. There is a strong presumption that statements made
        during the Rule 11 colloquy are true. See United States v. Medlock, 12
        F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994). Moreover, an appeal waiver is en-
        forceable even when the district court does not completely discuss
        the exceptions to the waiver. See United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d
        1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020). The “touchstone” for determining a
        waiver’s enforceability “is whether it was clearly conveyed to the
        defendant that he was giving up his right to appeal under most cir-
        cumstances.” Id. (cleaned up).
USCA11 Case: 22-11806      Document: 52-1       Date Filed: 03/07/2024    Page: 4 of 12

        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11806

                A careful review of the record, including the waiver and
        Rule 11 colloquy, reveals that the appeal waiver is enforceable.
        During the Rule 11 colloquy, the court conveyed to Whipple-Dun-
        can that she was waiving her right to appeal her sentence in most
        circumstances when it explicitly recited the only three instances in
        which she might appeal her sentence and then questioned her to
        ensure she understood that, absent those exceptions, she was waiv-
        ing all other direct appeal rights. Further, the record makes mani-
        festly clear that she understood the full significance of the waiver,
        having signed the plea agreement containing the waiver and af-
        firmed that she understood to the district court during the plea col-
        loquy. The appeal waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily and
        is enforceable.
                                         III.
                Because the waiver is enforceable and because the govern-
        ment seeks to enforce it, Whipple-Duncan’s arguments are barred
        if they fall within the ambit of the appeal waiver’s text. After exam-
        ining the text of the appeal waiver and the law related to the argu-
        ments she seeks to raise, we conclude that Whipple-Duncan’s is-
        sues all fall within the ambit of her broad appeal waiver and that
        none of them falls within an exception. The government did not
        appeal the sentence, so that exception cannot apply to any of Whip-
        ple-Duncan’s issues. Therefore, we need only further examine the
        general applicability of the waiver and the other two exceptions.
USCA11 Case: 22-11806      Document: 52-1     Date Filed: 03/07/2024     Page: 5 of 12

        22-11806               Opinion of the Court                        5

                                         A.

               First, Whipple-Duncan argues that the district court plainly
        erred and imposed both a procedurally and substantively unreason-
        able sentence. She argues that the district court erred at sentencing
        when it (1) first adopted the presentence investigation report’s
        Guidelines range, which applied a two-level reduction for ac-
        ceptance of responsibility; (2) then orally referred to a three-level
        reduction for acceptance of responsibility; but (3) sentenced her
        based on the higher advisory Guidelines range that only reflected
        the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. However,
        attacking the sentence in this way is barred by her appeal waiver’s
        general prohibition and does not meet an exception to the appeal
        waiver.
               The exceeds-the-statutory-maximum exception does not ap-
        ply because Whipple-Duncan’s 60-month sentence clearly does not
        exceed the statutory maximum sentence of 240 months. See 18
        U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
               Additionally, Whipple-Duncan’s sentence does not exceed
        the advisory Guidelines range found by the district court. The up-
        per limit of her advisory Guidelines range was 63 months, which
        she agreed to in her plea agreement. The district court’s oral mis-
        step in stating that there was a three-level reduction for acceptance
        of responsibility does not change the fact that the actual Guidelines
        range calculated by the district court was based upon a two-level
        reduction.
USCA11 Case: 22-11806       Document: 52-1       Date Filed: 03/07/2024      Page: 6 of 12

        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11806

               When determining the terms of a sentence, the sentencing
        judge’s intent controls; and that intent is to be determined by ref-
        erence to the entire record. See United States v. Purcell, 715 F.2d 561,
        563 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Scott v. United States, 434 F.2d 11, 20 (5th
        Cir. 1970); United States v. Kindrick, 576 F.2d 675, 677 (5th Cir.
        1978)). An examination of the entire record leads to the inescapable
        conclusion that the sentencing judge intended that the two-level
        reduction would apply.
                The presentence investigation report’s Guidelines range was
        51 to 63 months and was based on a two-level reduction for ac-
        ceptance of responsibility for a total offense level of 24. Whipple-
        Duncan never objected to those findings. And the district court
        stated at the outset of the sentencing hearing that it was adopting
        the presentence investigation report as its findings. The district
        court also specifically found that Whipple-Duncan’s total offense
        level was 24 and found that the Guidelines range was 51 to
        63 months. The district court then mistakenly stated that Whipple-
        Duncan was entitled to a three-level reduction for acceptance of
        responsibility but then proceeded to again recognize that the cor-
        rect Guidelines range was 51 to 63 months, which was based on the
        two-level reduction. Then the court sentenced her to 60 months
        and noted that this was within the Guidelines range. In short, the
        district court orally corrected itself by calculating the Guidelines
        range with the two-level enhancement; and the record makes clear
        that the reference to a three-level reduction for acceptance of re-
        sponsibility was merely an oral misstep.
USCA11 Case: 22-11806      Document: 52-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2024      Page: 7 of 12

        22-11806               Opinion of the Court                          7

                Thus, the district court found at sentencing that a Guidelines
        range of 51 to 63 months applies; and Whipple-Duncan’s 60-month
        sentence does not exceed the 63-month upper limit of her advisory
        Guidelines range. Consequently, the district court did not “enter[]
        a sentence above the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range found
        to apply by the court at sentencing.” Dist. Ct. Doc. 79 at 10. There-
        fore, Whipple-Duncan’s sentence does not fall within this excep-
        tion to the appeal waiver either. As a result, Whipple-Duncan’s first
        issue is barred by her appeal waiver.
                                          B.

                Second, Whipple-Duncan argues that the court’s award of
        restitution lacked legal and factual justification. Generally, restitu-
        tion is considered a part of the defendant’s sentence, meaning a res-
        titution order at sentencing falls within the general sentence appeal
        waiver in a plea agreement. See Johnson, 541 F.3d at 1067–68. Based
        on the text of her plea agreement and our case law, Whipple-Dun-
        can argues that the restitution order here is not actually part of her
        sentence. This argument fails.
                Whipple-Duncan’s plea agreement provides for restitution
        by stating that “[t]he amount of restitution ordered by the Court
        shall include restitution for the full loss caused by Defendant’s total
        criminal conduct” and that “[r]estitution is not limited to the spe-
        cific counts to which Defendant is pleading guilty.” Dist. Ct.
        Doc. 79 at 7. And critically to her argument that the restitution or-
        der is not part of the “sentence,” Whipple-Duncan’s plea agree-
        ment also states that “[a]ny restitution judgment is intended to and
USCA11 Case: 22-11806      Document: 52-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2024      Page: 8 of 12

        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11806

        will survive Defendant, notwithstanding the abatement of any un-
        derlying criminal conviction.” Id. This provision, Whipple-Duncan
        argues, is out of step with our case law, which provides that when
        a defendant dies on appeal, his sentence—including a restitution
        order—disappears. The argument goes that because this restitution
        order claims to survive Whipple-Duncan, it must be something
        else that is not part of the sentence.
                Whipple-Duncan’s argument properly understands our case
        law but draws the wrong conclusion. It is true that when the de-
        fendant dies on direct appeal, our case law provides that the con-
        viction and sentence are void ab initio—which means we treat it as
        if the defendant had never been indicted and convicted. See United
        States v. Logal, 106 F.3d 1547, 1551–52 (11th Cir. 1997); United States
        v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 2007). The sentence,
        which includes any restitution order, disappears. See Logal, 106 F.3d
        at 1551–52; Koblan, 478 F.3d at 1325–26.
               Whipple-Duncan’s argument is that the fact that her plea
        agreement’s restitution provision states that it would survive her
        death means that it must not be part of the sentence—which would
        of course not survive her death under our case law. The logical
        conclusion of Whipple-Duncan’s argument would be that the res-
        titution order in this case could stand alone, even if the conviction
        and sentence were treated as void ab initio in the event of her
        death. Whipple-Duncan’s argument would mean that the “sur-
        vive” provision was effectively a type of poison pill in the plea
        agreement’s text that would allow a restitution order to exist
USCA11 Case: 22-11806      Document: 52-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2024     Page: 9 of 12

        22-11806               Opinion of the Court                         9

        separately from a sentence such that Whipple-Duncan can avoid
        her sentence appeal waiver.
               But Whipple-Duncan concedes that we have held that
        “based on statutory law, ‘before the court can impose a restitution
        order, a defendant must first be convicted of a crime.’” Aplt. Br. at
        55 (quoting Logal, 106 F.3d at 1552). It cannot stand alone. Moreo-
        ver, the plea agreement is just another branch that stemmed from
        that original indictment, so the whole plea agreement would be
        gone under our void ab initio case law. Thus, the “survive” provi-
        sion of the plea agreement would also disappear under that doc-
        trine along with the rest of the plea agreement and restitution or-
        der.
                Instead of concluding that the “survive” provision is a poison
        pill, the correct conclusion from our case law is that the “survive”
        provision is just an unenforceable provision of the plea agreement
        because that whole restitution order would disappear by operation
        of law upon Whipple-Duncan’s death under our void ab initio doc-
        trine. That “survive” provision is simply unenforceable, and we re-
        main firmly within our precedent that restitution is part of the sen-
        tence and can be waived by a sentence appeal waiver. Therefore,
        Whipple-Duncan cannot avoid the general application of the ap-
        peal waiver to the restitution issue.
              We must still determine if it meets an exception to the ap-
        peal waiver. A court may order restitution to the extent agreed to
        by the parties in a plea agreement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663; id.
        § 3663A(a)(1). This includes payment of “restitution to persons
USCA11 Case: 22-11806      Document: 52-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2024      Page: 10 of 12

        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11806

        other than the victim of the offense.” Id. § 3663(a)(1)(A); see also id.
        § 3663A(a)(3). The plea agreement here provided that “[t]he
        amount of restitution ordered by the Court shall include restitution
        for the full loss caused by Defendant’s total criminal conduct.” Dist.
        Ct. Doc. 79 at 7. And it also provided that “[r]estitution is not lim-
        ited to the specific counts to which Defendant is pleading guilty.”
        Id. This was an agreement expanding restitution beyond victims of
        the offense of conviction. Thus, contrary to Whipple-Duncan’s ar-
        gument, restitution to people other than victims of the offense does
        not exceed a statutory maximum. Additionally, when ordering res-
        titution, courts are not bound by any prescribed statutory maxi-
        mum. See Dohrmann v. United States, 442 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir.
        2006). Thus, Whipple-Duncan cannot successfully bring the resti-
        tution challenge into the exception to her appeal waiver about a
        sentence exceeding the statutory maximum. Moreover, the advi-
        sory Sentencing Guidelines range discussed by the other remaining
        exception does not speak to restitution; so that exception to her
        appeal waiver cannot be met here. Therefore, Whipple-Duncan’s
        appeal of the restitution issue is barred by the appeal waiver in her
        plea agreement.
                                          C.

               Third, Whipple-Duncan argues that her trial counsel pro-
        vided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to
        the district court’s computation of the Guidelines range and by fail-
        ing to object to the details of the restitution order. She asserts that
        no conceivable strategic justification existed for not objecting.
USCA11 Case: 22-11806      Document: 52-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2024     Page: 11 of 12

        22-11806               Opinion of the Court                         11

        However, the plain language of Whipple-Duncan’s appeal waiver
        applies here; and an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge does
        not meet an exception to her appeal waiver. Instead of arguing that
        it meets an exception to the appeal waiver, Whipple-Duncan ar-
        gues that we should not enforce the appeal waiver because of an
        alleged conflict of interest in having counsel negotiate a plea agree-
        ment that contains an appeal waiver that covers ineffective assis-
        tance of counsel claims.
                Our case law draws a line on this issue and places Whipple-
        Duncan’s claims firmly on the waived side. If an ineffective assis-
        tance of counsel claim challenges the validity of the plea or waiver,
        it could survive the appeal waiver. See United States v. Puentes-Hur-
        tado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2015); Williams v. United
        States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). But if an ineffective
        assistance of counsel claim challenges counsel’s conduct at sentenc-
        ing, it does not survive a sentence appeal waiver. See Williams, 396
        F.3d at 1342. Here, Whipple-Duncan challenges conduct at sen-
        tencing—namely, her counsel’s failure to object to her Guidelines
        range or the details of the restitution order. Therefore, Whipple-
        Duncan waived her ineffective assistance of counsel challenges on
        direct appeal.
                Even if this appeal were not waived, we would not address
        this issue here. Although a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
        may be raised on direct appeal, “[w]e will not generally consider [a]
        claim[] of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal
        where the district court did not entertain the claim nor develop a
USCA11 Case: 22-11806      Document: 52-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2024     Page: 12 of 12

        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11806

        factual record.” United States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th
        Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th
        Cir. 2002)). We only consider an ineffective assistance of counsel
        claim “on direct appeal ‘if the record is sufficiently developed.’” Id.
        (quoting Bender, 290 F.3d at 1284). Even when the record contains
        some indication of deficient performance, claims of ineffective as-
        sistance are generally more properly pursued through a collateral
        attack to a conviction and sentence. See id. That is the case here.
        Therefore, even if this issue were not waived, it would be more
        properly pursued through a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
        § 2255—which Whipple-Duncan’s plea agreement expressly per-
        mits through an exception to her separate collateral attack waiver.
                                         IV.
               Through the appeal waiver in Whipple-Duncan’s plea agree-
        ment, she has waived her ability to bring the challenges she seeks
        to bring on direct appeal. Accordingly, we DISMISS Whipple-Dun-
        can’s appeal.