Court Opinion

ID: 9638293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:39:52.371557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:05.331003
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear.
Counsel for Louis E. Guidi has petitioned the Court for a rehearing on the ground that, the city warrant, which was the basis of his arrest for violating the traffic ordinances of Memphis, charges no offense. This was the sole issue upon the original hearing and ruled adversely to the contention of the petitioner. But counsel insists upon a rehearing by citing additional authorities from foreign jurisdictions, and also upon what is claimed to be a new argument to the effect that the warrant failed to charge the petitioner with “exceeding the speed limit upon a public street in the City of Memphis.”
The argument is made that the warrant should have given the name of the street, or street corners, by proper designation, or a “turn in the street” where the rate of speed “shall not exceed ten miles per hour”, all of which was necessary for petitioner to know the nature of the offense charged against him, otherwise the warrant charges no offense.
The numerous eases cited on the supporting brief are criminal cases and involve the sufficiency of criminal warrants, or “informations”. The principal case relied on is Wagner v. State, 114 Neb. 171, 206 N. W. 732, 733, where the “information” charged that the accused “ ‘did then .and there unlawfully and feloniously drive and operate a motor vehicle to wit a Studebaker automobile *20at a greater speed than thirty-five (35) miles per hour, to wit more than fifty (50) miles per hour within the city of Falls City’ ” etc., resulting’ in the serious injury to one Otto Gfurschke. The case seems to have been reversed because the “information” failed to charge a criminal offense as defined by the statute. “The statute is plain,” says the Court, “and its words defining the essential elements of the crime, or the equivalent thereof, must be contained in the information.” (Emphasis ours.) The Court further found “that the verdict of the jury is without evidence to support it. ’ ’ Other cases cited by counsel appear to express the same general view, the “information” or indictment in each case being strictly construed.
But these cases cannot be considered as controlling authority in this State. They are not in line with our rules of practice and procedure and are contrary to our own decisions relating to alleged insufficiency of indictments.
“Constitutional and statutory provisions requiring all prosecutions to be in the name of the state, or people, are generally construed as relating alone to criminal proceedings for violations of state laws, and not to the recovery of penalties under municipal ordinances. The prevailing judicial view is that cases of violation of ordinances are not criminal prosecutions, but are merely penal actions on the part of the local corporation .and have for their object the vindication of their own domestic regulations”. McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Vol. 9, Sec. 27.07, p. 565.
The foregoing text is with very few exceptions the law everywhere. It was decided by this Court well nigh a hundred years ago that a proceeding for the violation of a municipal ordinance is not a criminal prosecution but a civil action. Meaher v. Mayor of City of Chattanooga, *2138 Tenn. 74; City of Sparta v. Lewis, 91 Tenn. 370, 23 S. W. 182; City of Memphis v. Smythe, 104 Tenn. 702, 58 S. W. 215; State v. Mason, 71 Tenn. 649; J. W. Kelly & Co. v. Conner, 122 Tenn. 339, 123 S. W. 622, 25 L. R. A., N. S., 201; City of Nashville v. Baker, 167 Tenn. 661, 73 S. W. (2d) 169. In some cases the action is spolcen of as a “quasi-criminal proceeding,” the ofíense charged in the warrant being .against both the municipality and a state law. O’Haver v. Montgomery, 120 Tenn. 448, 456, 111 S. W. 449.
In the case at bar the offense charged in the warrant, if any, is denounced only by an ordinance of the city. It results that we must consider the assailed warrant only as a civil process.
The warrant was not questioned by the petitioner upon any ground until after judgment was pronounced and entered upon the minutes of the circuit court, to which it had been appealed from the city court. The law which supports the trial court’s action in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment is clearly stated in the History of a Lawsuit (Gilreath’s Revisión, 7th Ed.), Section 426, p. 463, as follows :
“An entire omission to state facts showing a cause of action is not cured by the verdict, for in such case there would be no ground or foundation on which to render judgment, but a defective or imperfect statement of such facts not objected to before verdict is cured by it. It is alone for material defects that the judgment may be arrested. It will not be done for matters of form, for these may be cured by amendments in favor of the judgment by the court rendering it, or by the court to which it may be removed if substantia] justice requires it. ’ ’
*22A warrant will not be lield insufficient because not setting out an ordinance 'claimed to have been violated where no objection was made to it in any particular in the trial court until after judgment is rendered on the merits. Aizenshtatt v. Mayor and Aldermen of City of Jackson, 1 Tenn. Civ. Aipp. 805. Moreover our own cases as well as many from foreign jurisdictions, support the proposition that technical nicety of pleading is not required in a warrant charging the violation of a municipal ordinance. History of a Lawsuit, supra; City of Sheridan v. Litman, 32 Wyo. 14, 228 P. 628; Ex parte McElroy, 241 Ala. 554, 4 So. (2d) 437; Grissett v. City of Birmingham, 236 Ala. 110, 181 So. 302. The only requirement is that the accused be given reasonable notice of the nature of the ordinance alleged to have been violated. Whether the warrant in this case be considered as a civil or criminal process it meets the requirements of the law in that the petitioner was given due notice of the cause of his arrest and what he had to defend.
The petition to rehear is denied.