Court Opinion

ID: 9537531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:19:40.496383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:45.986717
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
I agree that we should utilize federal case law under Title VII to fashion the standards which, absent further governing legislation, will apply to actions brought in this state under I.C. § 67-5909. This serves to relieve our district courts of the burden of forging new law in this delicate area, and also appears to further the legislative intention as expressed in I.C. § 67-5901:
“The general purposes of this act are: (1) To provide for execution with the state of the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act of 1965 [sic] and to make uniform the laws of those states which enact this act. . . . ”
I also agree that we must remand this case for a new trial, for I am unable to completely agree with the analysis contained in the dissenting opinion. That analysis fails to reduce the procedure followed here by the trial court to the category of “harmless error.” As noted by the plurality, it is evident from the trial transcript and briefs that much confusion attended the trial — not an unexpected turn of events, given the lack of guidelines for the trial court to follow. If Mrs. Bowles had no opportunity to establish that the defendant employer’s articulated reasons for refusing to hire her were in fact pretextual, as appears to be the case, this alone presents sufficient reason to justify reversing for a second trial free of that infirmity. E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Moreover, there is reason to hold that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are sufficiently confusing to warrant reversal for clarification. A trial court’s findings ought to be such as to assist the appellate court in reaching a clear understanding of the basis for the decision. See Perry Plumbing Co. v. Schuler, 96 Idaho 494, 531 P.2d 584 (1975); Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331, 372 P.2d 414 (1962). The judge who tried this cause has since returned to private practice. It is appropriate in reversing, therefore, to remand the cause for an entirely new trial. See Walter v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 94 Idaho 738, 497 P.2d 1039 (1972).
If the plurality advocates adopting a standard of proof to require the employer to prove his “real” reason to the exclusion of all other reasons, as the dissent maintains, however, I must disagree with that standard. The plurality states that the “employer, in addition to presenting legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for an employment decision, must produce credible evidence to show that the reasons advanced were in fact the real reasons.” This statement is followed by a reference to five cases.
As the dissent points out, there are at least two ways to read that standard set forth by the plurality. The first way is to hold that the employer must do more than merely state a reason for his decision, where such reason has no support in the evidence. This apparently is the standard the dissent would adopt. * A second possible *817reading is to require that the employer prove his “real” reasons to the exclusion of all other possible reasons, including those of a discriminatory nature. After a close examination of the cases cited by the plurality, I cannot agree that this more stringent standard was utilized in those cases or that it should be adopted here. I also do not believe that this was the standard that the plurality intended to adopt.
In the first case cited by the plurality, Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corp., 531 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1976), the court merely held that there was substantial evidence to support the judge’s findings that plaintiff was discharged for the reasons stated by defendant and that those reasons were not pretext. That court stated that once a prima facie case is made out by the plaintiff, the “burden then shifts to defendant to show a valid reason for the action, and plaintiff is then afforded an opportunity to show that defendant’s asserted reason is a mere pretext.” Id. at 895. This statement that defendant must “show a valid reason” can in no way be read to require him to prove his “real” reason to the exclusion of all others.
The court in Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 348 (10th Cir. 1975), stated that “[djefendant may, of course, rebut this prima facie showing by producing evidence of objective business reasons or necessity for its failure to promote the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, in turn, are free to show that this was pretextual.” The only other relevant statement made by the court was “[a]s to the salaried positions and the use of the totem pole, it would appear that the defendant would have the burden of establishing the fundamental fairness of this approach since it is largely subjective.” Id. Again, these two statements do not place on the employer the burden of proving the real reason to the exclusion of all others.
In Peters v. Jefferson Chemical Co., 516 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1975), the court stated that “ ‘[o]nce the plaintiff has made out his prima facie case we look to the defendant for an explanation since he is in a position to know whether he failed to hire a person for reasons which would not exonerate him.’ ” Id. at 450, quoting Hodgson v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 455 F.2d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 1972). The court stated that defendant had established legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, that the plaintiff had not been transferred because she had a history of back problems and the job would have required heavy weight lifting. The court’s statement that it would “look to the defendant for an explanation” does not amount to a shift in the burden of proof, as opposed to the burden of going forward.
The defendant in Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975), failed to establish a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection,” but it was not because the court required him to prove his real reason. Rather he failed to show that the reason advanced was at all credible. Defendant’s only evidence consisted of self-serving statements that plaintiff’s work was piling up and that other employees couldn’t take care of it. Furthermore, it was shown that in the past defendant had used temporary help to fill in for absentees, but defendant refused to do so in this case.
The confusion surrounding the burden of proof here was perhaps best illustrated in the final case cited in the plurality opinion, Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 355 N.E.2d 309 (1976). That court stated that the employer’s burden in articulating “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” requires the employer to produce not only evidence of the reason for its action but also underlying facts in support of that reason. However, that court further stated that the employee then has the burden of persuasion on the issue of whether the articulated reason was in fact the real reason for the employer’s actions, or merely pretextual. Later in the opinion the court also stated that “an employer must not only give a lawful reason or reasons for its employment decision but also must produce credible evidence to show that the reason or *818reasons advanced were the real reasons.” Id. at 138, 355 N.E.2d at 314. The citations after this statement showed that the court was only putting the burden of going forward on the defendant, however, not the burden of proof. The only other statement made by the court on this issue was as follows:
“[I]f the employee has proved a prima facie case of sex discrimination and the employer gives an explanation for a hiring decision which has no reasonable support in the evidence or is wholly disbelieved (and hence is transparently pretextual), the employee should prevail. On the other hand, if the reason given by the employer is the real reason for its action and it is a nondiscriminatory one, even if the commission thinks the employer’s action was arbitrary or unwise, the employer has fulfilled its obligation of stating a reason and producing support for the stated reason, thus rebutting the prima facie case.” Id. at 138-39, 355 N.E.2d at 315.
As I read this case, the employer must produce evidence to show that his stated reasons are not transparently pretextual, i.e., he must set forth evidence which would reasonably justify the conclusion that the stated reasons were not merely convenient rationale. This is only a burden of going forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the prima facie case, for the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of discrimination remains with plaintiff. At no time does the burden of proof itself shift to the employer.
There appear to be two reasons why some courts, apparently aloof from the fact that the ultimate burden of proof remains at all times on the plaintiff, see King v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 523 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1975); Naraine v. Western Electric Co., 507 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1974), seemingly place the burden of proof on the employer at this second step. One reason is simply through a linguistic error and a misunderstanding of the distinction between going forward with the evidence and having the burden of proof. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S.Ct. 295, 296-98, 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The second reason is a feeling that only the employer knows the real reasons for his decision, and, if it is a subjective decision, it is very difficult for plaintiff to prove that it was a discriminatory reason; thus the employer should have the burden of proving that his decision was nondiscriminatory once a prima facie case is made out. This assumes, however, as the plurality here states, that “the practical effect [of defendants rebutting plaintiff’s prima facie case] . would be that there was no discrimination on the basis of sex as a matter of law.” I must disagree with this assumption that for all practical purposes the third step, where plaintiff can show pretext, is superfluous. There are ways that pretext can be shown. Plaintiff can show pretext by showing that the records relied on in support of the advanced reason “were fraudulent, inaccurate or otherwise unreliable ... if they were intended or known to be so . . . .” Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 468 (D.Col. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975). Plaintiff could also show sufficient pretext to take the issue to the trier of fact by showing that the reasons advanced had no bearing on plaintiff’s ability to perform on the job or by showing that the person actually hired was even less qualified in those areas relied on by the employer.
The plurality opinion acknowledges that the ultimate burden of proof remains with the plaintiff. It also states that a prima facie case shifts “the burden of producing evidence to the employer to give a lawful explanation for its treatment of complainant” (emphasis added). A better reading of the plurality opinion leads to the conclusion that the standard adopted is one of producing enough evidence to show that the advanced reasons were not purely pretextual, for the plurality held that defendants had not met their burden because “[t]hey failed to present credible evidence to suggest that those reasons were anything more than convenient reasons.” The plurality did not hold that defendants had not met their burden of proving that the reasons advanced were in fact the real reasons, but only that they had in effect- merely stated reasons *819without enough support in the evidence to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie case. The statement that defendant “must produce credible evidence to show that the reasons advanced were in fact the real reasons,” a statement taken from Wheelock College, supra, does not to my mind place the burden on defendant of proving that the reasons advanced were in fact the real reasons. It merely requires him to produce enough evidence to justify the conclusion that his reasons reasonably could have been the real reasons. That was the standard adopted by the court in Wheelock College, and I believe that is the standard which should be applied and that it is the standard which the plurality intended to adopt.
Although subjectiveness will always remain a part of the hiring process for many types of jobs, “[ajbsolute discretion over employment decisions where subjective race prejudice may control (perhaps even without the executive’s knowledge) is no longer consistent with our law.” Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1226, 1231 (6th Cir. 1976). Employers would be better off, both legally and probably job-wise, if they developed reasonably objective hiring procedures and records that they could then present to the court on being charged with job discrimination.
Even if I am incorrect in this reading of the plurality opinion, moreover, it appears from reading both opinions that a majority of this Court would agree with me that the quantum and standard of proof is as follows: (1) plaintiff carries the initial burden of making out a prima facie case from which it can be inferred, “if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were ‘based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.’ ” Furno Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978), quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); (2) defendant then must rebut that prima facie showing by producing enough evidence to show that his stated reasons are in fact credible, i.e., that his decision could reasonably have been based on the reasons set forth; and (3) plaintiff then can show that in fact the reasons stated are pretextual.