Court Opinion

ID: 9549089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:13:06.644403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:49.318972
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
We have previously stated that where, as in this case, an automobile is lawfully impounded, the impounding officer may enter the vehicle and conduct an inventory of personal property. See State v. Weeks, 29 Or App 351, 355, 563 P2d 760 (1977). Whatever this officer’s subjective intent, there is no dispute that defendant’s automobile was lawfully impounded and that the inventory was conducted pursuant to the standing policy of the sheriffs department. The issue is whether the inspection of the unlocked glove compartment of defendant’s car exceeded the scope of inventory searches permitted by the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 9. In my opinion, it did not, and I must respectfully dissent.
*525A constitutionally permissible search must pass muster under both the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, which occasionally affords a defendant even greater protection than its federal counterpart. See State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337, 667 P2d 996 (1983). In the case under discussion, the inventory search of defendant’s car was allowable under either standard.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364, 96 S Ct 3092, 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976), supports the entry of the glove compartment here insofar as the Fourth Amendment is concerned, notwithstanding the majority’s extended discussion of the factual distinctions between that decision and our case. We so held in State v. Crosby, 35 Or App 617, 582 P2d 40 (1978), rev den 285 Or 319, cert den 444 US 851 (1979), which the majority has conveniently decided to overrule.1
*526With respect to the Oregon Constitution, the majority’s major premise is incorrect. It seems clear that the court in State v. Keller, 265 Or 622, 510 P2d 568 (1973), did not decide the precise issue now before us. In Keller, the entry of a “tackle box” during an automobile inventory search was held to violate both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 9, because the discovery of the drug found inside followed intrusion into a closed container and, therefore, was not subject to “plain view” seizure. The cases primarily relied on by the court in Keller to support that holding, as well as State v. Childers, 13 Or App 622, 511 P2d 447, rev den (1973), which followed, each involved a similar closed container, i.e., a container that was one of the separate contents of the automobile rather than a part of the automobile itself.2
The distinction is significant, and we recognized it in State v. Crosby, supra. In that case, we held that an inventory search of an automobile’s trunk was lawful and distinguished Keller:
“State v. Keller, 265 Or 622, 510 P2d 568 (1973), is not contra. It involved a separate, smaller, closed container within a vehicle, as opposed to the vehicle itself. The inventorying of the trunk in this case is, in our view, analogous to the inventory of the interior of the defendant’s car in Keller. ” 35 Or App at 622 n 2. (Emphasis in original.)
Although our decision in Crosby rested on South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, I believe that the distinction is appropriate under the Oregon Constitution and would so hold. In my opinion, that result would preserve the protections established in State v. Keller, supra, and serve the legitimate purposes of the inventory.3
In addition to the above, I am very much concerned about the practical effect of the majority’s decision. Oregon recognizes the authority of law enforcement officers to inventory the contents of lawfully impounded vehicles. Under *527the rule espoused by the majority, their ability to carry out that legitimate task is seriously impaired, because they are denied access to an area of the vehicle that is, perhaps, more likely than any other to contain the very things they are authorized to inventory. That is like telling someone, “You can swim here, but don’t get wet.” It may very well be that, as a result of this opinion, an inventory sheet will contain a listing of only the automobile’s component parts, e.g., “one glove compartment, one trunk, etc.” That result is neither constitutionally required nor supported by common sense.4
Richardson, J., joins this dissent.

The majority’s “investigatory motive” analysis was expressly rejected in State v. Crosby, 35 Or App 617, 582 P2d 40 (1978), rev den 285 Or 319, cert den 444 US 951 (1979). Furthermore, the majority’s implicit assertion that the absence of a necessity for the inventory under the circumstances is somehow dispositive of the question at issue is less than convincing in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Illinois v. Lafayette, _ US _, 103 S Ct 2605, 77 L Ed 2d 65 (1983) (inventory search of a shoulder bag). There the Court explained:
“* * * In South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, * * * [w]e held that the search was reasonable because it served legitimate governmental interests that outweighed the individual’s privacy interests in the contents of his car. Those measures protected the owner’s property while it was in the custody of the police and protected police against possible false claims of theft. We found no need to consider the existence of less intrusive means of protecting the police and the property in their custody — such as locking the car and impounding it in safe storage under guard. Similarly, standardized inventory procedures are appropriate to serve legitimate governmental interests at stake here.
“The Illinois court held that the search of respondent’s shoulder bag was unreasonable because ‘preservation of the defendant’s property and protection of police from claims of lost or stolen property, “could have been achieved in a less intrusive manner.” For example, . . . the defendant’s shoulder bag could easily have been secured by sealing it within a plastic bag or box and placing it in a secured locker.’ 99 Ill App 3d, at 835, 425 NE2d, at 1386 (citation omitted). Perhaps so, but the real question is not what ‘could have been achieved,’ but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps; it is not our function to write a manual on administering routine, neutral procedures of the stationhouse. Our role is to assure against violations of the Constitution.
“* * * We are hardly in a position to second-guess police departments as to what practical administrative method will best deter theft by and false claims against its employees and preserve the security of the stationhouse. It is evident that a stationhouse search of every item carried on or by a person who has lawfully been taken into custody by the police will amply serve the important and legitimate governmental interests involved.” (Emphasis supplied.) 77 L Ed 2d at 71-72.

See, e.g., Mozzetti v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 4 Cal 3d 699, 94 Cal Rptr 412, 484 P2d 84 (1971) (closed suitcase); State v. Gwinn, 301 A2d 291 (Del 1973) (closed satchel); State v. Childers, 13 Or App 622, 511 P2d 447, rev den (1973) (sleeping bag classified as a “container”).

The language from State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 623 P2d 630 (1981), quoted by the majority 64 Or App at 523 is not applicable to this case. Quinn did not involve an inventory search and does not purport to define the proper scope of an inventory.

I am also concerned by the great weight accorded State v. Lowry, supra, by the concurrence. I see nothing in Lowry, which involved a search incident to arrest, to support the decision reached above and I find the deference given that opinion ironic. Perhaps we should wait to see where the Supreme Court’s “unwise course” is taking us instead of trying to get there first, because at this rate, I fear the long-established practice of inventory searches may not survive the voyage.