Court Opinion

ID: 9615535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:38:02.588745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:39.320832
License: Public Domain

Garley, Justice,
dissenting.
Because Cain was convicted by a jury, he had an absolute right to file a timely direct appeal. Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687 (470 SE2d 436) (1996). Compare Wheeler v. State, 269 Ga. 547 (499 SE2d 629) (1998) (guilty plea); Syms v. State, 240 Ga. App. 440 (1) (523 SE2d 42) (1999) (guilty plea). However, he did not do so. Instead, he filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal which was untimely because it was premature. According to the majority, “Cain’s motion for out of time appeal should be deemed as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. . . .” Majority opinion, p. 786. In my opinion, this “functional *787equivalent” concept is a fiction which is fundamentally inconsistent with the mandate of Georgia law. “ ‘ “The proper and timely filing of the notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court.” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied in part and in original in part.) Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Appellant did not file a “proper and timely” notice of appeal, but, instead, he filed an untimely motion for an out-of-time appeal. Thus, he did not satisfy the “absolute requirement” for invoking a direct appellate review of his conviction. Under these circumstances, I believe that the dispositive issue is whether Appellant is entitled to a proper consideration of the motion for an out-of-time appeal even though it was filed too early.
Cain’s motion for an out-of-time appeal was untimely because it was premature and not because it was late. He filed it during the 30-day period within which he could have filed a notice of direct appeal. “[A]n out-of-time appeal is the remedy for a frustrated right of appeal . . . .” Rowland v. State, supra at 875 (2). However, the prematurity of the motion does not adversely affect its validity. See Gillen v. Bostick, 234 Ga. 308, 309 (1) (215 SE2d 676) (1975). “ ‘[P] remature filing is not a ground of dismissal in criminal cases, at least insofar as a criminal defendant is concerned. . . .’ [Cits.]” Betha v. State, 208 Ga. App. 802, 803 (432 SE2d 242) (1993). Thus, Appellant’s motion became viable 31 days after April 10, 2000, and a denial must be based upon its lack of merit, rather than its untimeliness.
It is clear that the denial of a motion for an out-of-time appeal “requires a determination of who bears the ultimate responsibility for the failure to file a timely appeal, the attorney or the client.” Cannon v. State, 175 Ga. App. 741, 742 (334 SE2d 342) (1985). Compare Johnson v. State, 182 Ga. App. 477 (1) (356 SE2d 101) (1987) (trial court authorized to grant motion even though counsel not responsible for loss of right to appeal). The majority concedes that the trial court did not explain why it denied Cain’s motion. Thus, here, as in Cannon v. State, supra at 743, “[t]he trial court’s order fails to reveal a specific determination as to whether the right to appeal was lost as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel or of [A]ppellant’s own conduct.”
Under these circumstances, the proper disposition of this case is not, as the majority holds, a reversal and remand with direction that Cain be allowed to proceed pursuant to the “functional equivalent” of a timely filed notice of appeal. Instead, the correct resolution is to vacate the trial court’s insufficient order and to remand the case with direction that a new hearing be conducted and a new order entered which addresses the merits of the motion for an out-of-time appeal. See Barnes v. State, 243 Ga. App. 703 (534 SE2d 440) (2000); Bisele v. State, 238 Ga. App. 289 (519 SE2d 9) (1999); Haynes v. State, 227 Ga. *788App. 64 (488 SE2d 119) (1997); Randolph v. State, 220 Ga. App. 769 (1) (470 SE2d 300) (1996); Hasty v. State, 213 Ga. App. 731 (445 SE2d 836) (1994); Evans v. State, 198 Ga. App. 537 (402 SE2d 131) (1991); Cannon v. State, supra at 473. The trial court must determine whether there are “proper reasons” to grant the motion. Johnson v. State, supra at 477. One such reason would be if the mistaken filing of an untimely motion for an out-of-time appeal, rather than a proper and timely notice of direct appeal, was attributable to the attorney. “A criminal defendant who has lost his right to appellate review of his conviction due to error of counsel is entitled to an out-of-time appeal. [Cits.]” Rowland v. State, supra at 875 (2). I dissent to allowing a direct appeal to proceed other than in accordance with the established procedure for obtaining an out-of-time appeal.
Decided November 25, 2002.
R. Gary Spencer, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Adam M. Hames, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson and Justice Hines join in this dissent.