Court Opinion

ID: 9729214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:29:22.653336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.974618
License: Public Domain

REYNOSO, J.
I dissent. Aside from other concerns1 I cite two grounds. First, the majority incorrectly interprets the phrase “applicant for or recipient of aid” (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25)) to include dependent children. I conclude that Congress meant the terms “applicant” and “recipient” to apply only to the caretaker relatives who apply for or receive benefits on behalf of dependent children. The terms may not be interpreted to include the children receiving benefits from AFDC programs. Second, petitioner’s religious belief which prohibits her from obtaining social security numbers for her children prevails over the state’s requirement that such numbers be furnished as a condition to the receipt of assistance.
I
As noted by the majority, the determination of whether the federal (45 C.F.R. § 232.10) and state (E.A.S. § 40-105.2) regulations which require social security numbers for the children are inconsistent with the grant of authority contained in 42 United States Code section 602(a)(25) depends upon the construction of the words “applicant for or recipient of aid” as used in the statute. A federal district court case has held that dependent children are not “applicants] for or recipients] of aid” as those terms are used in section 602(a)(25). (Green v. Philbrook, 427 F.Supp. 834.) I find the federal district court’s interpretation of the federal statute logical and reasonable.
The same subsection of the Social Services Amendment Act of 1974 which added United States Code section 602(a)(25) also added section *729602(a)(26). The text of section 602(a)(26) is spelled out in footnote 7 of the majority opinion. In interpreting the words “applicant” and “recipient” the following language in section 602(a)(26) is important: “[PJrovide that, as a condition of eligibility for aid, each applicant or recipient will be required—1Í] (A) to assign the State any rights to support from any other person such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, . . .” (Italics added.) Since Congress used the terms “applicant or recipient” in section 602(a)(26) in a manner which distinguishes the caretaker relative (the individual who applies for and receives aid in behalf of family members) from the dependent child (for whom application is made), it is illogical to conclude that Congress intended the identical words to have a different meaning when used in the sister statute (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25)) with which we deal. The accepted rule of statutory construction is that statutes on the same or related subject matter must be read and construed together in light of each other, so as to harmonize them if possible. (Ebert v. State of California (1949) 33 Cal.2d 502, 509 [202 P.2d 1022]; In re Marquez (1935) 3 Cal.2d 625, 628 [45 P.2d 342].) This rule is particularly applicable inasmuch as the identical words are used in two closely related subsections passed by the same legislature at the same time. Thus, “applicant and recipient” does not include the children.
Since the terms “applicant” and “recipient” as used in 42 United States Code section 602(a)(25) should not be interpreted to include children receiving AFDC benefits, the Health, Education and Welfare regulation (45 C.F.R. § 232.10) fails as inconsistent with the statute. The state regulation (E.A.S. 50-105.2) similarly fails.
II
The religious foundation of petitioner’s belief is not at issue in this case. Both the majority, albeit with apparent reluctance, and respondent agree that petitioner’s belief is entitled to First Amendment protection. It is therefore incumbent upon this court to approach the issue of whether the regulations in question impermissibly infringe upon petitioner’s constitutional right in the same manner it would if this particular belief were a cardinal principle of any of the major organized religions. On the record of this case, accordingly, petitioner is entitled to the same constitutional protection as would be accorded an individual holding beliefs consistent with the major Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or similar faiths.
*730Since it is established that petitioner’s First Amendment right is affected, the burden that must be shouldered by the state to defend a regulation which infringes on religious activity is a heavy one. Before an infringement can be countenanced, the state must show that its interest in the regulation outweighs petitioner’s interest in the free exercise of her religious belief. (Elrod v. Burns (1976) 427 U.S. 347 [49 L.Ed.2d 547, 96 S.Ct. 2673]; Sherbert v. Verner (1963) 374 U.S. 398 [10 L.Ed.2d 965, 83 S.Ct. 1790].) To meet its burden the state must demonstrate a compelling interest in the regulation. “The interest advanced must be paramount, one of vital importance, . . .” (Elrod v. Burns, supra, at p. 362 [49 L.Ed.2d at p. 559].) The state must further demonstrate that the regulation represents the least restrictive means of advancing its interests. (Sherbert v. Verner, supra, at pp. 406-407 [10 L.Ed.2d at p. 972].)
The state has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in requiring social security numbers for petitioner’s children. Respondent asserts that the regulation serves as an aid in the administration of the AFDC program and also that it serves as an aid in detecting welfare fraud. Analogous United States Supreme Court cases indicate that these interests are not sufficient. In Sherbert v. Verner, supra, the court held that the state’s purposes (preventing fraud against the unemployment benefit fund, and inconvenience to employers) were not compelling. The court more recently made clear that administrative convenience does not amount to a compelling state interest. (Reed v. Reed (1971) 404 U.S. 71 [30 L.Ed.2d 225, 92 S.Ct. 251].)
A federal district court, in a well-reasoned decision, has ruled on a case directly on point. Stevens v. Berger, (E.D.N.Y. 1977) 428 F.Supp. 896, concludes that the parents’ religious belief that social security numbers are a “devise of the Antichrist” or the “mark of the beast” precludes the state from requiring them to acquire social security numbers for their children as a precondition to receiving welfare benefits.
There is no suggestion that a threat exists sufficient in size to compromise the orderly administration of the AFDC program. (Sherbert v. Verner, supra, at pp. 408-409 [10 L.Ed.2d at p. 973].) We are not faced here with “an administrative problem of such magnitude, [as to] have rendered the entire statutory [and regulatory] scheme unworkable.” (Ibid.) The detrimental impact of petitioner’s action on the system, if any, is diminutive. If the state interest is so compelling, I wonder why Congress did not deal with it statutorily; in fact, we consider only a *731regulation.2 The state, I conclude, has not carried its heavy burden of demonstrating compelling interest. Nor has the state carried its burden of showing that the least restrictive means of attaining the state’s purpose has been adopted. (United States v. Robel (1967) 389 U.S. 258 [19 L.Ed.2d 508, 88 S.Ct. 419].) Petitioner has provided respondent with the birth certificates of her children as well as her own social security number (obtained for her when she was a minor). Identification of the family unit can be adequately achieved with petitioner’s number. Furthermore, the children can be identified by their names and birth certificates. Petitioner has also expressed her willingness to cooperate with the state in devising other alternatives of identifying her children. The feasibility of devising such alternatives is suggested by the model adopted by the Internal Revenue Service for identifying clergy who have opted out of the social security system. (Stevens v. Berger, supra, at p. 907.) The Constitution and First Amendment rights demand that an effort be made.
The sole burden of justifying its limitation on petitioner’s fundamental right rests with the state. The state has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest or that the regulations in question represent the least drastic intrusion upon petitioner’s constitutional right.
Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 27, 1979. Mosk, J., and Newman, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 I am unpersuaded by the privacy and equal protection conclusions of the majority.

 The Green court observed; “. . . Congress itself, by the enactment of § 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974, indicated that the disclosure of an SSN is not a trivial precondition to any benefit provided by law. Rather, § 7 makes it unlawful for any governmental agency to deny anyone such benefits on account of the failure to disclose his SSN unless the disclosure is required by federal law. We mention § 7 in this context merely to demonstrate Congress’ intention of avoiding unwarranted disclosure of SSN’s. Such an intent buttresses our conclusion that if Congress wished to require SSN’s from children benefitted by AFDC programs it would have done so explicitly. This inference is particularly strong in light of the fact that the same session of the same Congress enacted both the Social Services Amendments of 1974 and the Privacy Act of 1974.” (Green v. Philbrook, supra, at pp. 839-840.)