Court Opinion

ID: 9954205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 20:03:20.666687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:53.201509
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 Matter of Talassazan Children’s Trust CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In the Matter of the Talassazan                              B323669
 Children’s Trust.
                                                              (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. 19STPB11199)

 MICHAEL R. AUGUSTINE,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 ABRAHAM TALASSAZAN,

           Defendant and
           Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Deborah L. Christian, Judge. Affirmed.
     Vivoli Saccuzzo and Michael W. Vivoli for Defendant and
Appellant.
      Gutman Law, Alan S. Gutman, and Matthew E. Hess for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
               __________________________________

       Non-parties Albert Talassazan and Mojgan Larian were
married from 1992 to 2010. They have five children. After a
plethora of litigation between, on the one hand, Mojgan and her
brother Isaac Larian and, on the other hand, Albert, his brother
appellant Abraham Talassazan, and others, the parties decided
to settle all disputes through the creation of a trust that would
benefit Mojgan and Albert’s five children.1 The parties entered
into a written settlement agreement providing for the creation of
the Talassazan Children’s Trust, which would be funded with
initial payments of $500,000 each from Isaac and Abraham. Both
the Settlement Agreement and the Trust Agreement creating the
Trust also provided that Abraham was required to make 82
monthly payments of $5,000. Attached to the Settlement
Agreement was a stipulated judgment against Abraham for
$910,000, less any amounts paid into the Trust. The parties
agreed that Mojgan could apply for entry of this Stipulated
Judgment should Abraham breach any of the payment
obligations contained in the Settlement Agreement.
       Abraham made 22 monthly payments before refusing to
make any more, claiming that the distributions made by the
Trustee violated the terms set forth in the Trust Agreement.
After Mojgan unsuccessfully attempted to have the Stipulated
Judgment entered, the Trustee filed a petition for instructions,
construction and modification of the trust instrument, transfer of

      1 We refer to certain individuals by their first name because

they share a surname with other individuals discussed herein.

                                2
right to payments to the trust, and for entry of judgment
pursuant to stipulation for civil judgment. The probate court
entered an order granting the petition, finding that Abraham was
not permitted to suspend his payments. The order also stated
that judgment was entered against Abraham for $300,000.
       On appeal, Abraham contends the probate court erred in
entering this order because: (a) the court’s order was barred by
the doctrine of issue preclusion; (b) the Stipulated Judgment
could be entered only in the case that produced the Settlement
Agreement; (c) the court erred in determining Abraham lacked
the right to suspend payments; and (d) there is no evidence to
support the court’s conclusion that Abraham breached the Trust
Agreement.2 We discern no error and therefore affirm.

     2 In his opening brief, Abraham contends he is appealing

from “the probate court’s entry of a stipulated judgment executed
as part of a settlement of a prior superior[] court action.”
However, because Abraham’s Notice of Appeal states he is
appealing “The Probate Court’s August 1, 2022, Ruling on
Submitted Matter, in which the Probate Court GRANTED
Petitioner’s petition, reserving for future decision the Court’s
award of attorney fees and costs to Petitioner,” and because, as
discussed below, nothing in the record shows that the Stipulated
Judgment was actually entered, we deem the appeal to be from
the August 2022 order.

                                3
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

      A.     The Settlement Agreement
       In January 2016, Isaac and Mojgan, on the one hand, and
Albert, Abraham, and others, on the other hand, entered into a
settlement agreement. As relevant to this appeal, the Settlement
Agreement provided that, as a resolution to multiple lawsuits the
parties had filed against each other, the “Talassazan Children’s
Trust” would be created for the benefit of Albert and Mojgan’s
children. Both Abraham and Isaac would settle the Trust with
initial payments of $500,000 each, with Abraham additionally
paying $5,000 a month until November 2022, the month the
youngest of the children turned 18. The parties to the Settlement
Agreement agreed and acknowledged that the Trust was a third-
party beneficiary to the Settlement Agreement. A copy of the
Trust Agreement was attached as an exhibit to the Settlement
Agreement, but the terms of the Trust Agreement were not
incorporated into the Settlement Agreement.
       Also attached to the Settlement Agreement was a
stipulated judgment against Abraham, in the amount of $910,000
less any amounts Abraham paid into the Trust. The parties
agreed that “Mojgan Larian may file the Stipulated Judgment on
behalf of the Children if . . . [¶] . . . Abraham Talassazan breaches
any of his payment obligations hereunder and after being
provided notice to cure for a period of five (5) business days
followed by Ex Parte notice of an application to enter the
stipulated judgment.” The parties also agreed that “pursuant to
C.C.P. § 664.6 and applicable law, Judge Helen I. Bendix and/or

      3 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history

relevant to the issues appellant raises on appeal.

                                 4
the court in the Madison Action[4] (i.e., Judge Gail Ruderman
Feuer or any subsequent judge assigned of [sic] the Superior
Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles) shall
retain jurisdiction over each and every Party to enforce the
settlement until performance in full of the terms of the
settlement. Each Party agrees that they are subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court for these purposes and this Agreement
is enforceable under C.C.P. § 664.6. The Court, upon motion of
any Party, may enter judgment pursuant to its terms.” Nothing
in the Settlement Agreement precluded other means of
enforcement.

      B.     The Trust
       In July 2016, Abraham and Isaac created the Trust by
signing the Trust Agreement and each transferring $500,000 to
Augustine, the Trustee, to be held as part of the “trust estate” on
the terms and conditions set forth in the Trust Agreement. As
relevant to this appeal:
       In Article 1, Augustine acknowledged that he held the
Trust estate for the benefit of Albert and Mojgan’s five children.
Article I also recited that the Trust was created pursuant to the
January 2016 Settlement Agreement entered into by Isaac on the
one hand, and Albert, Abraham, and others on the other hand.
       Article 3 provided that Abraham would make monthly
payments of $5,000 to the trust until November 2022, when the
last of Albert and Mojgan’s children would turn 18. The
payments were “to be used by the Trustee for the Children’s

      4 The settlement agreement defined the “Madison Action”

as an August 2013 case brought by Mojgan against Abraham and
others, with case number BC518866.

                                 5
proper health, education, support, maintenance, food, clothing,
entertainment, after school activities, summer camp and other
items for the Children’s welfare and well-being as the Trustee, in
the Trustee’s sole discretion, deems necessary.”
        Article 5.1.1 provided that the “Trustee shall pay to or
apply for the exclusive benefit of the Children, or any one of
them, as much of the net income and principal of the trust estate
as is necessary in the Trustee’s sole discretion to pay for the
essential living expenses of the Children (‘Essential Living
Expenses’ as defined by the categories set forth in Attachment
A).”5 It also provided that “[i]n order to expedite such payments
the Children’s mother shall provide to the Trustee, within the
first five (5) days of each calendar year, a proposed budget of the
Essential Living Expenses for that year, limited to the categories
set forth in Attachment A (unless otherwise directed by the
Trustee). The Trustee shall have the sole power and authority to
modify the proposed budget as he deems appropriate, after
discussing same with the Children’s mother. Once the annual
budgetary process is completed, the Trustee shall make the
payment directly to the provider of the goods or services where
feasible. If a direct payment to the provider is not feasible or

      5 Attachment A contained an “enumerated and exclusive

list of categories of expenses that comprise the Essential Living
Expenses of the Children for which the trustee is authorized to
disburse funds pursuant to Section 5.1.1 of the Children’s Trust,”
and listed 22 categories. For the categories of “Car Insurance for
the Children and Children’s Mother,” “Car Repairs,” and “Vehicle
Gas,” Attachment A stated that “to the extent that they cover the
Children’s mother, they shall be limited to two-thirds of her car
insurance, two-thirds of her vehicle gas, and two-thirds of car
repair expense.”

                                 6
deemed by the Trustee to be too burdensome, the Trustee shall
distribute an appropriate amount to a separate bank account,
which shall be used by the Children’s mother via bank debit card
solely for the Children in such amounts and for such purposes as
have been approved by the Trustee. The Children’s mother shall
retain, and provide to the Trustee upon request, any receipts
associated with such use. In making his determination, the
Trustee may approve payments that are greater for some
beneficiaries than others, even to the exclusion of one or more
beneficiaries if the Trustee deems this appropriate in light of the
size of the trust estate and the probable present and future needs
of the beneficiaries. Distributions under this Paragraph 5.1.1
shall be charged against the Trust as a whole and not against the
ultimate distributive share of any Child.”
       Article 5.1.2 provided that the “Trustee may, to the extent
the Trustee, in the Trustee’s sole discretion, deems appropriate,
make discretionary payments of principal to or for the benefit of
any Child, in order to remedy any hardship or special need
arising from illness, disability or other necessity in addition to
the authorized categories of disbursement contained on [sic]
Attachment A.”
       Article 8 provided that the “Trustee shall report to the
Grantors when, how and as requested by the Grantors.”6

      C.    Abraham Suspends Monthly Payments
      In December 2017, a domestic violence restraining order
was issued against Albert, protecting Mojgan and their minor
children. Albert was granted weekly visitation for three hours, in

      6 The Trust Agreement referred to Abraham and Isaac as

the “Grantors.”

                                 7
a therapeutic setting. According to a statement of facts in an
appeal Albert filed, Albert subsequently tried to modify the
visitation order after the parties could not agree on a schedule or
therapeutic setting for the visits. On May 25, 2018, the court
ordered that Albert would have “professionally monitored
visitation with the minor children for 2 hours each Sunday at the
N.E.S.S. Center.”
       In June 2018, Abraham’s attorney sent a letter to
Augustine, claiming that: (1) Mojgan had breached the
Settlement Agreement and the Trust Agreement because she
“recently initiated certain legal proceedings against Albert
Talassazan, and also filed documents with the bankruptcy court
despite the parties’ agreement to resolve all claims against Albert
Talassazan’s bankruptcy estate”; and (2) Mojgan had been
receiving from the Trust $15,000 a month, “plus thousands of
dollars of other unexplained distributions directly to Mojgan
Larian, with no indication these payments have inured to the
benefit of the children for whom the Trust was formed.”
Abraham’s attorney informed Augustine that, based on these
purported breaches, Abraham was suspending his $5,000
monthly payments “unless and until Mojgan Larian cures her
breaches of the Settlement Agreement and her violation of the
express purpose of the Trust through the referenced, unexplained
distributions to Mojgan Larian.” The attorney also requested any
documentation the Trustee had “substantiating” the $15,000
monthly payments to Mojgan.

      D.   Mojgan Unsuccessfully Attempts to Enter the
           Stipulated Judgment
     In January 2019, Mojgan moved to enforce the Settlement
Agreement, contending that Abraham had stopped making the

                                8
monthly payments required thereunder. Abraham opposed the
motion, claiming he ceased payments because Mojgan herself had
not complied with the terms of the agreement—specifically, she
failed to provide the Trustee with receipts for the children’s living
expenses. Abraham also accused the Trustee of failing to provide
him with the reports provided for in the Trust Agreement. In her
reply, Mojgan argued that Abraham’s payments were not
conditioned on her compliance with the Trust rules, and she
included a declaration from the Trustee, who claimed to have
provided Abraham with an accounting in 2016 and 2017.7
       In February 2019, the superior court (Judge Robert S.
Draper) denied Mojgan’s motion to enforce the Settlement
Agreement “without prejudice to [Mojgan] Larian’s right to renew
the motion if payments are not received after Larian has fulfilled
her obligations under the contract.” The court found Mojgan was
“incorrect to argue that her alleged failure to comply with the
trust’s accounting requirements do not matter to this motion”
because a “ ‘party complaining of the breach of a contract is not
entitled to recover therefor unless he has fulfilled his obligations.
He who seeks to enforce a contract must show that he has
complied with the conditions and agreements of the contract on
his part to be performed. In promises for an agreed exchange,
any material failure of performance by one party not justified by
the conduct of the other discharges the latter’s duty to give the
agreed exchange even though his promise is not in terms
conditional.’ ”

      7 The record contains neither the motion nor reply filed by

Mojgan. Our description of her arguments comes from the
superior court’s description of them in its order denying the
motion.

                                 9
      E.     Augustine Provides Receipts; Abraham Fails to
             Resume Payments
      In July 2019, Augustine’s attorney sent Abraham’s
attorney a letter stating that, while Augustine disagreed with
Abraham’s “assessment of breaches,” “in an effort to resolve the
dispute concerning” Abraham’s refusal to pay, he was providing
receipts covering January through June of 2019. The letter also
included a table dividing the expenses into eight broad categories
(“Food,” “Clothing,” “Medical/pharmacy/personal care,” “Car/car
insurance/car repairs/gas/uber,” “Gardener/cleaning lady,”
“Education and supplies,” “Travel/phone/entertainment,” and
“Miscellaneous sundries”) and listed the amount of money spent
for each category. The letter stated that, unless Abraham was
prepared to become current on his monthly payments to the
Trust, Augustine intended to “file a petition for probate court
supervision of the Trust which shall also seek, amongst other
things, to enforce your client’s obligation to pay what he is
obligated to pay pursuant to the trust instrument and the
Settlement Agreement.”
      In August 2019, Abraham’s attorney responded to the July
2019 letter, pointing out that: (1) many of the expenses paid for
by the Trust were impermissible under the express terms of the
Trust Agreement; and (2) the receipts provided did not match up
with the amounts listed in the table. The letter continued that
because the funds of the Trust were being expended for
impermissible uses, it was “not likely” Abraham would be
resuming his monthly payments.

      F.    Augustine Petitions the Probate Court
      In November 2019, Augustine filed a verified petition for
“instructions, construction and modification of the trust

                                10
instrument, for transfer of right to payments to the trust, and for
entry of judgment pursuant to stipulation for civil judgment.”
The petition recited the background of the creation of the Trust,
Abraham’s obligations to make 82 monthly payments of $5,000 to
the Trust, and his refusal to make further payments after his
twenty-second such payment. The petition attached the June
2018 letter from Abraham’s attorney but claimed that the
“purported basis for ‘suspending any further monthly payments
to the Trust’ appears to be pretextual, in retaliation for Mojgan
seeking and obtaining a restraining order against Albert, and the
court’s imposition of conditions on Albert’s visitation rights with
the children/beneficiaries.” The petition went on to argue that
Abraham lacked the right to suspend payments based on
distributions to Mojgan because the Trustee had the “sole
discretion” to determine necessary payments. The petition also
pointed out that the Settlement Agreement permitted only
Mojgan to request the entry of the Stipulated Judgment. It
explained that when Mojgan attempted to do so by moving for
entry of the Stipulated Judgment in case number BC518866, her
attempt was “ineffective.”
      Therefore, the petition asked the court to: (a) “Modify the
Trust to enable the Trustee to enforce the provision of the
Settlement Agreement which requires the monthly payment of
$5,000 by Abraham;” (b) “Order the transfer of the outstanding
and future payments from Abraham to the Trust;” (c) “Instruct
the Trustee to prosecute Abraham for his breach of the
Settlement Agreement and obligation to the Trust (i.e., to have
the Stipulated Judgment entered against Abraham);” (d) “Enter
judgment against Abraham in the amount of $300,000 plus
prejudgment interest;” and (e) “interpret, construe and declare

                                11
that the last sentence of Article 8 of the Trust instrument, which
states, ‘[i]n addition to the foregoing, the Trustee shall report to
the Grantors when, how and as requested by the Grantors,’ does
not provide Abraham with the right to dictate how the Trustee
administers the Trust, nor provide Abraham with the right to
suspend payments.”
       In February 2020, Abraham objected and responded to the
petition.

      G.    The Court Grants the Petition

            1.      Pre-Trial Stipulation
       In November 2020, Augustine and Abraham entered into a
stipulation, providing that Augustine and Abraham “stipulate
and agree to have this case determined by the Court, as follows.”
       Section I of the stipulation set forth the factual background
regarding the formation of the Trust, Abraham’s obligations to
make 82 monthly $5,000 payments, and the fact that he had
made only 22 such payments.
       Section II of the stipulation listed six issues to be
determined by the court: (1) “Whether the Petitioner is entitled to
an order modifying the Trust to enable the Trustee, as opposed to
Mojgan, to enforce the provision of the Settlement Agreement
which requires the monthly payment of $5,000 by Abraham;” (2)
“Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an order that outstanding
and future payments from Abraham be transferred to the Trust;”
(3) “Whether the Petitioner is entitled to enforce the Stipulated
Judgment against Abraham;” (4) “Whether the Petitioner is
entitled to judgment against Abraham in the amount of $300,000
plus prejudgment interest;” (5) “Whether the Petitioner is
entitled to a declaration that the last sentence of Article 8 of the

                                 12
Trust instrument, which states, ‘[i]n addition to the foregoing, the
Trustee shall report to the Grantors when, how and as requested
by the Grantors,’ does not provide Abraham with the right to
dictate how the Trustee administers the Trust, nor provide
Abraham with the right to suspend payments;” and/or (6)
“Whether Abraham was excused from making the $300,000 in
monthly installment payments, or legally justified in not making
the payments.”
      Under a section entitled “Standing, Jurisdiction and
Venue,” the parties also stipulated that Augustine “has standing
under Probate Code § 17200(a), this Court has jurisdiction and is
the proper venue under Probate Code § 17005(a).”

            2.    Trial

                  (a)     Preliminary Remarks
       A one-day trial took place in March 2022. During opening
statements, when Abraham’s lawyer accused Augustine of failing
to follow the dictates of Article 5.1.1, the court responded that
“whether or not there was a proper use of the [Trust] funds,
whether there was a breach of a fiduciary duty [from the Trustee]
based upon what’s written in [Article] 5.1.1, that’s really not
before me.” The court also noted that the Settlement Agreement
and the Trust Agreement “are two stand alone [sic] documents”
and that, while the Settlement Agreement attached a blank copy
of the Trust Agreement, it was “a stand alone [sic] Settlement
Agreement, which does not carry-over to the Trust.” When
Abraham’s counsel argued that the Settlement Agreement
obligated Abraham to make $5,000 monthly payments and that
the remedy for nonpayment was entry of the Stipulated
Judgment, the court stated such a remedy did not “preclude

                                13
remedy of that breach in the Trust [Agreement]. That’s a
separate instrument.”

                  (b)      Augustine’s Testimony
       Augustine called no witnesses; Abraham called Augustine
to testify. Augustine testified that he had spoken with Abraham
several times before he ceased making payments and when he
discussed the payments the Trust was making to Mojgan,
Abraham “did not indicate any disapproval.” Augustine did not
recall Abraham asking for expense receipts before he retained
counsel. Augustine also testified that he had “one conversation”
with Abraham about the termination of payments, and Abraham
“complained about a couple of things”:
       Abraham’s first complaint was that “there was an ongoing
family law dispute between Mojgan Larian and his brother. That
was the subject of a fair piece of family law litigation, eventually
a restraining order, eventually an unsuccessful appeal. None of
which I was involved in, but which was going on in the
background. [¶] . . . [¶] The implication was from Mr. Talassazan
that because his brother was not visiting the children, you know,
that was a factor in the termination of the payments.”
       Abraham’s second complaint was that “he was unhappy
with the receipts provided in the same vain [sic] as [his counsel]
Mr. Vivoli’s letter. In other words, he didn’t deviate much from
your letter, counsel. He was complaining about the gardener. He
was complaining about certain other things saying, ‘These were
Mojgan’s expenses and were not essential living expenses.’ ”
Abraham complained Mojgan “live[d] extravagantly” and had a
“history [of] being a spend thrift [sic].”
       On the subject of Mojgan’s efforts to have the stipulated
judgment entered, Augustine professed awareness of the attempt,

                                14
and acknowledged providing a declaration at the request of
Mojgan’s counsel “relating to the facts as to when the payments
started, when they stopped, that sort of thing.” As Trustee, he
believed he had a duty to cooperate with Mojgan in attempting to
collect monies he believed were owed to the Trust.
       When the court asked Augustine whether Abraham had
another motive to cease his monthly payments besides the lack of
expense receipts, Augustine responded, “That could very well be,
but I don’t know -- I have to concur with [my counsel] Mr.
Gutman. I don’t know if that’s really before you today, Mr.
Talassazan’s motivation. Obviously, I’m going to answer your
questions. But it’s only a few conversations, and I am not an
authority on it.” When the court followed up by stating that “if
the motivation was receipts, it sounded like there was [sic] other
motivations that preceded it,” Augustine responded, “There may
very well have been. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Just like the existence of
Mojgan Larian’s attempt to collect this judgment was known to
me[,] [t]he existence of the other family law motivations,
arguments, litigation, appeal, et cetera, that was known to me, as
well.”

                           (c)
                          Abraham’s Testimony
       Abraham’s testimony was received via declaration.8 He
testified that it was his idea to create the Trust as a means to

         8 Though the parties had stipulated to permit testimony via

videoconference, nothing in the record indicates the court ever
agreed to receive testimony in that manner. At trial, Abraham’s
attorney acknowledged that the court had entered an order in
September 2021 “saying live testimony or by declaration.” The
court agreed, and added that at the trial setting conference, “[i]t
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

                                       15
settle the ongoing litigation, that he “wanted to ensure that the
Trust could not be used as a vehicle for Mojgan to use Trust
assets to pay for her own lavish lifestyle, rather than the
essential living needs of the Children,” and that it was very
important to him that the Trustee “be required to account to
[Abraham] and Isaac Larian to ensure that the assets of the
Trust were properly used.” He further proclaimed that there was
“one and only one reason I ceased making $5,000 monthly
payments to the Trust”: because, after reviewing some of the
receipts provided by the trustee, it was “clear the funds were not
being used on ‘Essential Living Expenses’ of the Children, but
were in fact again being used by Mojgan for her own personal
expenses.” He reiterated that “the only reason [he] stopped
making monthly payments to the Trust [was] because Mojgan
failed and refused to account to the Trustee, and the Trustee
failed and refused to account to [him] as required by the
Settlement Agreement and Trust that [he] signed.”

            3.     Ruling
       In August 2022, the court granted the petition. In its
ruling, it noted that “[a]t trial[,] Trustee Augustine testified that
the reason given for the halt in monthly payments was pretextual
and was more than likely an effort to retaliate for the actions
taken in court in seeking restraining orders and the court
imposing limitations on Albert’s visitation with the children.
Regardless of the motive, the argument that Mojgan was
violating the express purpose of the trust (in her spending habits)
has little or no merit in light of the language of the Trust

was restated that [testimony would be permitted only] in-person
or by way of signed declaration.”

                                 16
instrument.” The court proceeded to cite the language within
Article 5.1.1 granting the Trustee sole discretion to pay for the
essential living expenses of the children, and sole power to modify
the proposed annual budget.
       The court also held that “Article 8 of the Trust instrument
[requiring the Trustee to account to Isaac and Abraham] does not
empower the Grantors to dictate how the Trust is administered
nor the right to suspend payments [sic].” The court found that
“the right to compel a report or an accounting is simply that.
There is no language in the Trust instrument authorizing the
suspension of monthly payments. The plain language of the
Trust is controlling and the court shall not expand, insert, imply
or interpret anything to the contrary.” The court therefore
modified the Trust Agreement to “enable the Trustee to enforce
the provisions of the global settlement agreement that pertain to
the Trust and require monthly payments of $5,000 to the Trust
from Abraham Talassazan” and held that the “Trustee is entitled
to enforce the stipulated judgment against Abraham Talassazan
and order that outstanding and future payments from Abraham
be transferred to the Trust.” The court then ordered that
“Judgment is entered in the amount of $300,000 in favor of
Michael R. Augustine, Trustee of the Talassazan Children’s Trust
as against Abraham Talassazan.” Abraham timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

      A.     Issue Preclusion is Inapplicable
      Issue preclusion “prevents relitigation of previously decided
issues.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813,
825.) “[I]ssue preclusion applies (1) after final adjudication (2) of
an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in

                                 17
the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the
first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Ibid.) Abraham
argues that issue preclusion from Mojgan’s failed attempt to have
the stipulated judgment entered barred the probate court’s order.
We disagree.
       Setting aside whether a denial of a motion without
prejudice can be considered a “final adjudication,” issue
preclusion requires an identical issue to be actually litigated and
necessarily decided. However, the issue before the court deciding
Mojgan’s motion was whether, under the Settlement Agreement,
Mojgan was entitled to have the Stipulated Judgment entered
when she had not provided expense receipts. On the other hand,
the issue before the probate court was whether Mojgan’s and/or
the Trustee’s alleged failures to provide receipts and reports
permitted Abraham to cease making monthly payments under
the Trust Agreement. The superior court that denied Mojgan’s
motion did not consider this issue. As the probate court noted,
the Settlement Agreement and the Trust Agreement are
standalone documents, and Mojgan’s failure to obtain the remedy
provided for in the Settlement Agreement did not preclude the
Trustee from seeking a remedy under the Trust Agreement.
       For the same reason, we hold that the Trustee was not in
privity with Mojgan on her motion to enforce the Settlement
Agreement because they were attempting to enforce different
legal rights. (See Zaragosa v. Craven (1949) 33 Cal.2d 315, 318
[“ ‘Who are privies requires careful examination into the
circumstances of each case as it arises. In general, it may be said
that such privity involves a person so identified in interest with

                                18
another that he represents the same legal right’ ”].) Issue
preclusion therefore does not apply.9

      B.     The Court Was Not Barred from Entering
             Judgment
       Abraham contends the court was precluded from entering
judgment against him because, pursuant to Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v.
Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, “a motion to enforce a
settlement agreement may not be made in an action other than
the action in which the settlement was made.” Viejo Bancorp is
inapposite. There, the appellate court considered “whether a
motion to enforce a settlement agreement under Code of Civil
Procedure section 664.6 may be considered in an action other
than the action in which the settlement was made,” and held that
it could not. (Id. at p. 203.)
       But here, the Trustee made no motion under Code of Civil
Procedure section 664.6. Section 664.6 is not the exclusive means
by which a settlement agreement may be enforced. (See MSY
Trading Inc. v. Saleen Automotive, Inc. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th
395, 404–405, fn. omitted [court “retain[ing] jurisdiction over [a]
settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 664.6 . . . only means the [court] could exercise
jurisdiction without requiring a separate action on the settlement
agreement. It does not mean it is the only court with jurisdiction

      9 Abraham also argues that even if issue preclusion does

not apply, the Trustee’s petition amounted to an untimely motion
for reconsideration. The petition was not a motion for
reconsideration because, as discussed at length above, the
probate court was not being asked to consider the same issue as
the superior court who had denied Mojgan’s motion.

                                19
to adjudicate the settlement agreement”]; Gauss v. GAF Corp.
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1122 [“ ‘[t]he statutory procedure
for enforcing settlement agreements under section 664.6 is not
exclusive. It is merely an expeditious, valid alternative
statutorily created’ ”].) Therefore, Viejo Bancorp presents no bar
to the Trustee’s petition.10

      C.     The Court Did Not Err in Finding That
             Abraham Lacked the Right to Suspend
             Payments
      Abraham argues that the court erred in finding he lacked
the right to suspend payments because Article 5.1.1 restricts all
payments from the Trust to the “essential living expenses of the
Children,” and memorializes Mojgan’s obligation to “retain” and
“provide to the Trustee upon request, any receipts associated
with” use of money that the Trustee distributed directly to
Mojgan for use for the children.
      But nowhere in Article 5.1.1—or anywhere else in the
Trust Agreement—is there a provision stating that if the Trustee
does not restrict payments to the essential living expenses of the
children, or Mojgan does not retain or provide the requisite
receipts, Abraham is then permitted to suspend the required
monthly payments. While Article 8 requires the Trustee to
“report to the Grantors when, how and as requested by the

      10 Moreover, nothing in the record indicates the court

entered the Stipulated Judgment in case number BC518866.
Instead, in case number 19STPB11199 (i.e., this case), the court
stated that “Judgment is entered in the amount of $300,000 in
favor of Michael R. Augustine, Trustee of the Talassazan
Children’s Trust as against Abraham Talassazan.”

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Granters,” the court found—and we agree—that “the right to
compel a report or an accounting is simply that. There is no
language in the Trust instrument authorizing the suspension of
monthly payments. The plain language of the Trust is
controlling and the court shall not expand, insert, imply or
interpret anything to the contrary.” As the court stated
repeatedly during the trial, “Whether or not there was a proper
use of the funds, whether there was a breach of a fiduciary duty
based upon what’s written in [Article] 5.1.1, that’s really not
before me.”11

      D.       Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s
               Finding That Abraham Breached the Trust
               Agreement
        Abraham contends the court’s conclusion that he breached
the Settlement Agreement was based on the Trustee’s testimony
that he halted payments for pretextual reasons. Abraham argues
the court erred in this conclusion because the Trustee disavowed
any expertise regarding Abraham’s motivations. This argument
is misguided.
        First, while the court did not explicitly state that Abraham
had breached either the Settlement Agreement or the Trust
Agreement, the court’s findings make clear that the court found
Abraham breached the Trust Agreement, without opining on
whether he also breached the Settlement Agreement. During
trial, the court expressed its view that the two agreements were
separate documents and stated that the superior court’s denial of

      11 We express no opinion on whether the Trustee’s actions

in making distributions or reporting to Abraham conformed with
the Trust Agreement’s requirements.

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Mojgan’s motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement did not
preclude the Trustee from seeking to enforce the Trust
Agreement. In the court’s order, the court analyzed provisions of
the Trust Agreement, not the Settlement Agreement, and found
that “Article 8 of the Trust instrument does not empower the
Grantors to dictate how the Trust is administered nor the right to
suspend payments [sic].”
      Even had the court incorrectly found that Abraham’s stated
reason was pretextual, it would be irrelevant. As discussed
above, the court expressly found that “[t]here is no language in
the Trust instrument authorizing the suspension of monthly
payments.” Therefore, even if Abraham’s sole reason for
terminating payments was because he believed that both the
Trustee and Mojgan were violating the terms of the Trust
Agreement, there would still be no grounds permitting his
cessation of payments.

                          DISPOSITION
      The court’s order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                                CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.                  WEINGART, J.

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