Court Opinion

ID: 9916822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 18:05:38.15287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:01.431927
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 23-1701
                               Filed January 10, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF M.B., A.B., and N.B.,
Minor Children,

S.P., Father,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Kimberly Shepherd,

District Associate Judge.

       A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

       Jennifer Margret Triner Olsen, Davenport, for appellant father.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Dion D. Trowers, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Barbara Maness, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

children.

       Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

       The father of A.B. and N.B. appeals the order terminating his parental

rights.1 He challenges each of the three steps in the termination analysis under

Iowa Code chapter 232 (2023). See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010)

(“Termination of parental rights under chapter 232 follows a three-step analysis.”).

He also asks for more time. Because the evidence supports termination, we affirm.

       We begin our analysis by determining whether a ground for termination

exists under section 232.116(1). Id. The juvenile court terminated the father’s

parental rights under section 232.116(1)(d), (e), and (h), but the father only

challenges termination under section 232.116(1)(e). Because the father does not

dispute there is clear and convincing evidence showing the grounds for termination

under section 232.116(1)(d) and (h), we may affirm on those grounds without

further discussion. See id. at 707 (noting that “we may affirm the juvenile court’s

termination order on any ground that we find supported by clear and convincing

evidence”); In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (stating that “we do not have

to discuss [the first step]” when a parent fails to dispute the existence of all grounds

for termination under section 232.116(1)).

       Because the father does not challenge all grounds for termination relied on

by the juvenile court, we move to the second step of the termination analysis and

“apply the best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the

grounds for termination should result in a termination of parental rights.” D.W.,

791 N.W.2d at 706–07. We must “give primary consideration to ‘the child’s safety,

1 The mother of M.B., A.B., and N.B. also appealed the termination of her parental

rights, but the supreme court dismissed her appeal as untimely.
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. . . the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the

child, and . . . the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.”

Id. at 708 (alterations in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)).

       We agree with the juvenile court’s determination that termination is in the

children’s best interests.    The children came to the attention of the Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services after testing positive for

methamphetamine at birth in October 2021. Days later, the juvenile court removed

the children from the parents’ custody. The court returned the children home in

December 2022, but the parents’ ability to provide stability was short-lived; the

court removed the children less than one month later based in part on the father

relapsing in his methamphetamine use. By the August 2023 termination hearing,

almost two years after these proceedings began, the father was still unable to

resume care for the children. In the termination ruling, the court noted at length

the specific needs these children have and the upheaval they have endured. We

agree with the juvenile court that the children “cannot wait any longer for their

parents to fully address their mental health, substance abuse, and relationship

concerns, and to guarantee safety and stability for these children.” Clear and

convincing evidence shows termination is in the children’s best interests. See In

re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing that “at some

point, the rights and needs of the children rise above the rights and needs of the

parent”)

       Having determined that termination is in the children’s best interests, we

move to the third step of the termination analysis and “consider if any statutory

exceptions set out in section 232.116(3) should serve to preclude termination of
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parental rights.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. The father claims there is clear and

convincing evidence of the ground stated in section 232.116(3)(c): that termination

will hurt the children because of the closeness of the parent-child relationship. As

the parent resisting termination, the father bears the burden of proving

section 232.116(3)(c) applies. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018).

Even if the father meets this burden, we note that the decision to avoid termination

under section 232.116(3) is “permissive, not mandatory.”            Id. at 475.   But

considering that the father failed to attend visits with the children consistently and

provided, at most, one month of day-to-day care for these children in the two years

since they were born, we cannot find that termination will harm the children.

       The father wants more time. Under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b), the

court can continue a child’s placement for six months if doing so will eliminate the

need for the child’s removal. But before doing so, the court must “enumerate the

specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the

basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s

home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code

§ 232.104(2)(b). On the record before us, we cannot find that giving the father

more time will change the outcome. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa

2014) (“[W]e cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a

ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will

learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” (citation

omitted)). It will, however, delay the permanency these children require.

       We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

       AFFIRMED.