Court Opinion

ID: 9679511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:54:31.446023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:14.073014
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. I conclude that the defendants’ convictions of violations of sec. 100.26(3), Stats. 1977, cannot be sustained because an element of the crime, namely the defendants’ state of mind whether called mens rea, criminal intent, guilty knowledge or scienter, was not proved.
The defendants were charged under sec. 100.26(3), Stats. 1977, with failing to obey regulations promulgated *280by the Department of Agriculture, Trade & Consumer Protection.1 Sec. 100.26(3) specifies that “[a]ny person . . . who intentionally refuses, neglects or fails to obey any regulation made under . . . s. 100.20, shall, for each offense ... be fined not less than $25 nor more than $5,000 or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one year or both.” (Emphasis added.) In contrast with the majority, I conclude that the word “intentionally” in sec. 100.26(3), Stats. 1977, modifies not only the verb “refuses,” but also the verbs “neglects” and “fails.”
The state asserts that the elements which it had to prove to sustain the convictions are:
(1) Defendants entered into a home improvement contract with a consumer.2
*281(2) Defendants received money prior to the completion of their obligations under the contract3 and a written contract executed by the defendants failed to set forth the dates or time period on or within which the work was to begin and be completed.4
(3) Defendants failed to begin or complete work on the dates or within the period specified in the home improvement contract.5
*282The state need not prove that the work contracted for was not completed; that the work completed was unsatisfactory ; that the consumer paid the defendants any sum in addition to the down payment; that the defendants failed to return the down payment to the consumer; or that the defendants’ contract was deleterious to competition. Further the state asserts that it need not prove scienter. Thus apparently the state’s position is that a home improvement contractor is guilty of a crime if the home improvement contractor — without intending to harm the consumer or to violate the law and without actually harming the consumer — fails to specify in a written contract the time period for doing the work or begins and completes the work after the dates specified in the contract without justification (as defined in the regulations).
The principal issue in this case is one of statutory construction; Does sec. 100.26(3) always require proof of scienter, i.e., proof that the defendant acted “intentionally.” The second issue of the case, depending on resolution of the first issue, is what does “strict liability” mean or what does “intentionally” mean. The final issue is whether the statute violates due process if scienter is not required as an element of the offense.
I.
This court has repeatedly stated that “the aim of all statutory construction is to discern the intent of the *283legislature,” Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. ILHR Dept., 72 Wis. 2d 26, 35, 240 N.W.2d 422 (1976), and that a “cardinal rule in interpreting statutes” is to favor a construction which will fulfill the purpose of the statute over a construction which defeats the manifest object of the act. Student Asso., U. of Wis.-Milw. v. Baum, 74 Wis. 2d 283, 294-95, 246 N.W.2d 622 (1976). Where one of several interpretations of a statute is possible, the court must ascertain the legislative intention from the language of the statute in relation to its context, scope, history, and object intended to be accomplished. State ex rel. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Racine v. Skow, 91 Wis. 2d 773, 779, 284 N.W.2d 74 (1979).
The instant case differs from the usual case raising the issue of whether the legislature intended scienter to be an element of a crime, in that in the usual case, the statutory definition of the crime is silent as to the element of scienter.6 In the case at bar, as the state and the majority acknowledge, the legislature specifically includes scienter in the definition of the offense; scienter is required for at least one type of violation of sec. 100.-26(3), namely the state must prove that a defendant intentionally refuses to obey the regulation. While in the usual case the state urges this court not to read the element of scienter into a statute which is silent as to mens rea, in this case the state urges us to read the statute to create three ways of committing a crime, only one of which requires proof of scienter. The state is in effect asking the court to read scienter out of a portion of the statute.
The cases and commentators suggest that courts consider the following factors in deciding whether a statute should be interpreted as requiring scienter as an element of the crime or as imposing liability without fault:
*2841. The language of the statute.
2. The legislative history of the statute.
3. The seriousness of the penalty.
4. The purpose of the statute.
5. The practical requirements of effective law enforcement.7
*285These factors were recently summarized by this court in State v. Collova, supra, 79 Wis. 2d at 482, 485, as follows:
“The problem is determining where the legislature intended to draw the line between offenses which do and do not require scienter. Liability without fault has been applied in Wisconsin, as the above cited cases demonstrate, in ‘regulatory criminal statutes.’ The complex industrial state of the 20th century has generated increased social regulation and has adapted the criminal law, originally designed to punish the culpable individual, to enforce obedience to regulatory statutes. These regulatory statutes are concerned primarily with the protection of social and public interests, with the prevention of direct and widespread social injury. They are more concerned with the injurious conduct than with the question of individual guilt or moral culpability. The penalties imposed are generally light. The usual rationale for strict liability statutes is that the public interest is so great as to warrant the imposition of an absolute standard of care —the defendant can have no excuse for disobeying the law. Because of the multitude of cases arising under these regulatory statutes, there is a need for quick, simple trials unhindered by examinations of the subjective intent of each defendant.
“[W]here the statute is not explicit, one of the principle [sic] indexes courts consider on the question whether some element of knowledge is required is the severity of the penalty involved.”
In determining legislative intent and in analyzing the five factors outlined above, a key principle is that “the element of scienter is the rule rather than the exception *286in our criminal jurisprudence.”8 This court has frequently recognized that a primary ethical foundation of the criminal justice system is that criminal liability is premised on individual blameworthiness. Reviewing these factors in the context of the case at bar, I conclude that they weigh heavily in favor of holding that the legislature intended scienter to be a necessary element of sec. 100.26 (3) .9
Language of the Statute. As the majority concede”., the statute can reasonably be read so that intentionally modifies all three verbs. The majority then labors mightily to limit “intentionally” to modifying the verb “refuses” and to define “refuses,” “neglects” and “fails” as three totally separate and distinct ways of committing a single offense. Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 428, 284 N.W.2d 703 (1981). There are several flaws in the majority’s analysis. First, the majority defines “refuses” as meaning intentional conduct, and the majority’s conclusion that the word “intentionally” modifies only the verb “refuses” renders the word “intentionally” redundant. Second, the majority’s dictionary definitions of the *287three verbs — and especially the definitions of neglect and fail — demonstrate that the meanings of the three verbs are not totally different and in fact overlap. Third, the majority intimates that the legislature intended to set forth a full range of degrees of scienter and a wide range of penalties. Supra, p. 268. Thus the-mriental element which may be proved ranges from intentional conduct (“intentionally refuses”), to negligent conduct (“neglects” which the majority intimates is the equivalent of negligence)10 to conduct without fault (“fails” which the majority in some parts of its opinion appears to say requires no proof of any mental element.) The majority seems to conclude that the legislature intended the trial court to select from the wide range of penalties on the basis of the degree of scienter, or lack thereof, charged or proven in each case. Supra, p. 277. Although the legislature failed to express this concept in the language of the statute, the court reads the statute as creating three separate ways (of varying degrees of scienter) of committing a single crime.11
Legislative History. Although the legislative history does not provide a definitive answer to the proper construction of the statute, it does point toward the legislature intending scienter to be an element of the crime. As the majority points out, the original 1921 version of sec. 100.26(3) does not include any words indicating that scienter is an element of the crime. In 1923 the legislature revised sec. 100.26(3), specifically adding the ele*288ment of scienter. The 1928 statute reads “wilfully violates or refuses, neglects or fails to obey any order or regulation.” The 1923 statute raises the same question raised in this case, namely whether the word signifying state of mind, i.e. “wilfully,” which is used only once, modifies each of the verbs. The 1923 statute can be read to penalize:
(A) One who wilfully violates any order, one who refuses to obey any order, one who neglects to obey any order, and one who fails to obey any order; or
(B) One who wilfully violates any order, one who wil-fully refuses to obey any order, one who wilfully neglects to obey any order, or one who wilfully fails to obey any order.
Although the state’s brief suggests that the statute can be read to punish
(C) One who wilfully violates any order or one who wilfully refuses to obey any order or one who neglects to obey any order or one who fails to obey any order,
the state at oral argument properly acknowledged that this reading is not plausible.
In 1935, sec. 100.26(3) was amended, but the legislative history shows that the revision was not intended to change the meaning of the statute.12 The phrase “wil-fully violates or refuses, neglects or fails to obey any order or regulation” was eliminated and replaced by the *289phrase used in the present statute, namely “intentionally refuses, neglects or fails to obey any regulation.” Since the 1935 revision did not change the meaning of the 1923 statute, both statutes must be construed in such a way that the words “wilfully” and “intentionally” modify the verb “refuses.” Thus the construction of the 1923 statute set forth in (A) above cannot be correct. It is conceded that the word “wilfully” in the 1923 statute cannot be construed to modify only the verbs “violates” and “refuses,” and thus the construction set forth in (C) above is not correct. The only other possible construction of the 1923 statute is that set forth in (B) above. Therefore, the 1923 and 1935 statutes can be interpreted in the same way only if the word “wilfully” in the 1923 statute is construed as modifying “violates,” “refuses,” “neglects” and “fails” (seethe construction in (B) above) and the word “intentionally” in the 1935 and present statute is construed as modifying the three verbs “refuses,” “neglects” and “fails.”
The legislative history demonstrates that in 1923 the legislature deliberately moved away from the 1921 statute which was silent as to scienter to a statute requiring scienter. This express addition of the element of scienter in 1923 is easily understood when we remember that administrative regulations were not published in one convenient, accessible book and thus were “not sufficiently known” and were “not sufficiently available.” 1940 Wis. Admin. Code (Red Book), Introduction. Under these circumstances it is likely the legislature intended that only wilful violations of the regulations be crimes.
Severity of the Penalty. One of the principal indices courts consider to determine whether the legislature intended to require scienter is the severity of the penalty involved. State v. Collova, 79 Wis. 2d 473, 485, 255 N.W. 2d 581 (1977). Penalties imposed on the basis of strict liability “commonly are relatively small and conviction *290does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1922). See also United States v. Brown, 578 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1978).
In the instant case the potential maximum penalty is relatively severe in the context of criminal sanctions. The penalty under sec. 100.26(3) — up to one-year imprisonment in the county jail or a fine from $25 to $5,000, or both — is more severe — at least as to the term of imprisonment — than the penalty for the highest classification of misdemeanors in the criminal code. The penalty for a Class A misdemeanor under the criminal code is a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed nine months or both.13
The state and the majority would have us look not at the maximum penalty possible but at the minimum penalty allowable, and the majority apparently reasons that the range of penalties illustrates that the legislature meant the statute to include various degrees of scienter. One way the majority opinion can be read is that it concludes that any problem caused by the severity of the sentence is cured by the prosecutors exercising discretion in selecting persons for prosecution and in charging the appropriate degree of scienter, and by the trial courts exercising discretion in imposing- the severest penalties only on those who acted most culpably. This solution is not satisfactory; the solution merely dispenses with the safeguards of a trial on the critical issue of blameworthiness. The defendants in this case were charged with and convicted of “failing” to obey the regulations, the least culpable behavior under the reasoning of the majority. Yet the defendants were sentenced to one-year terms of imprisonment on each charge, several to be served con*291secutively. I recognize that the defendants had been previously charged with crimes involving property improvements and that execution of the present sentences was stayed pending probation. Nevertheless, if either defendant violates one of the numerous terms of probation, he will be subject to a lengthy period of imprisonment on conviction of “strict liability” offenses.
In my view, a determinative factor in the case at bar is the severity of the penalty. I do not believe the legislature intended a person who is blameless to be subjected to the harsh consequences sec. 100.26(3) imposes. It is one thing to accept the idea that a blameless person might occasionally be required to pay a fine and quite another to speak of a blameless person spending a year in county jail.
The Model Penal Code takes the position that whenever conduct is punishable by imprisonment, the statute should require scienter to be proved. The Model Penal Code announces “a frontal attack on absolute or strict liability in penal law, whenever the offense carries a possibility of sentence of imprisonment.” Model Penal Code sec. 2.05, Comment, pp. 140-146 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Under the Code a conviction resting on strict liability may result only in a civil penalty of monetary forfeiture. The rationale for the position taken in the Model Penal Code is explained as follows:
“This section makes a frontal attack on absolute or strict liability in penal law, whenever the offense carries a possibility of sentence of imprisonment. The method used is not to abrogate such liability but to provide that when conviction rests upon that basis the grade of the offense is reduced to a violation, which is not a “crime” and under Sections 1.04(5) and 6.02 may result in no other sentence than a fine or fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty. If, on the other hand, the culpable commission of the offense has been established, the reduction in grade does not occur. Negligence is, however, treated as sufficient culpability in cases of this kind.
*292“This position is affirmed not only with respect to offenses defined by the Penal Code; it is superimposed on the entire corpus of the law, so far as penal sanctions are involved. Since most strict liability offenses are involved in special, regulatory legislation, this superimposition is essential if the problem is to be attacked. We have no doubt that the attempt is one that should bé made. The liabilities involved are indefensible in principle, unless reduced to terms that insulate conviction from the type of moral condemnation that is and ought to be implicit when a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed. In the absence of minimal culpability, the law has neither a deterrent nor corrective nor an incapacita-tive function to perform.
“It has been argued, and the argument undoubtedly will be repeated, that absolute liability is necessary for enforcement in a number of the areas where it obtains. But if practical enforcement can not undertake to litigate the culpability of alleged deviation from legal requirements, we do not see how the enforcers rightly can demand the use of penal sanctions for the purpose. Crime does and should mean condemnation and no court should have to pass that judgment unless it can declare that the defendant’s act was wrong. This is too fundamental to be compromised. The law g’oes far enough if it permits the imposition of a monetary penalty in cases where strict liability has been imposed. . . .” Model Penal Code sec. 2.05, Comment, p. 140 (Tent. Draft No. 4,1955).14
*293The severity of the penalty lends support to the view that the legislature did not intend sec. 100.26(3) to be used as the basis for prosecuting every unintended violation of a regulation regardless of fault. An “unintentional” violation works no major public injury. Of course persistent violations of the regulations must be stopped, and the penal sanctions imposed by sec. 100.26(3) are appropriate for deliberate (or even negligent) defiance or evasion of the regulations. Where there are persistent violations it is quite feasible to prove, whether directly or circumstantially, some level of culpability.
Purpose of the Statute. In State v. Collova, supra, 79 Wis. 2d at 486, we said that the inquiry as to the legislative intent of whether scienter is required, “reduced to its simplest terms, may be stated to be whether the statute appears on balance to be designed to punish wrongdoers or to implement a high standard of care on the part of the public.” When the legislature’s goal is primarily to regulate, to accomplish a social good, to obtain a high standard of care, proof of a criminal state of mind is eliminated to achieve the desired result.
The development of regulatory criminal statutes which do not require scienter, creating what has become known as public welfare offenses, has been described in numerous prior cases. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 US 246, 259-260 (1952); State v. Hartfiel, 24 Wis 60 (1869); State v. Dried Milk Products Co-Operative, 16 Wis. 2d 357, 362, 114 N.W.2d 412 (1962); State v. Collova, supra 79 Wis. 2d at 479-486. I recognize that no precise definition of public welfare offenses can be stated and that no precise line can be drawn between *294public welfare offenses and other crimes.15 Nevertheless if we are to retain the concept that certain offenses are punishable as crimes without proof of scienter, we should apply the indices which we have set forth in previous cases to distinguish public welfare offenses from other crimes. One index is the purpose of the statute. The purpose of enacting public welfare offenses is to protect the public safety, health, morals and general welfare. “ ‘In the interest of the larger good, [such legislation] puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.’ ” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 259-260 (1952). See also City of West Allis v. Megna, 26 Wis. 2d 545, 548, 133 N.W.2d 252 (1963); State v. Dried Milk Products Co-op., 16 Wis. 2d 357, 362, 114 N.W.2d 412 (1962); State v. Hartfiel, 24 Wis. 60 (1869).
Although one purpose of sec. 100.20, pursuant to which the regulations in the case at bar were issued, is to implement a high standard of care in the public’s interest of protecting competition, I conclude that an additional purpose of sec. 100.20, and the primary purpose of the regulations in the case at bar and of sec. 100.26(3), is to punish wrongdoers. If the primary purpose of sec. 100.26(3) is to punish wrong*295doers, the legislature must have intended that scienter be an element of the criminal offense set forth in sec. 100.26(3). I reach these conclusions for several reasons.
First, strict liability has generally been imposed on people who engage in acts which in and of themselves are not innocent or on people who engage in unusual or highly regulated activities and who may reasonably be held to know of and conform to government regulations. Such is not the case here.
Unlike the usual strict liability statutes which affect special, highly regulated businesses or activities such as drugs, intoxicating liquors, or firearms, sec. 100.20 and the regulations adopted under sec. 100.20, the violation of which are penalized under sec. 100.26(3), Stats., affect potentially all business people in the state. There appear to be 16 chapters and 79 pages of regulations in the administrative code, violations of which constitute crimes under sec. 100.26(3). These provisions cover a multitude of businesses and products. The comments of Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General James D. Jeffries, in an article entitled Protection for Consumers Against Unfair and Deceptive Business, 57 Marq. L. Rev. 559, 586 (1974), illustrate this point. Jeffries noted that Ag ch. 124, Wis. Adm. Code, entitled “Price Comparison Advertising”, “is one of the . . . most complex rules of the Department of Agriculture. . . . [and] may also prove to be the most far-reaching since virtually every seller engages in some form of price comparison advertising.”
Thus when the majority decides that the legislature did not intend that scienter be proved for violations of home improvement regulations, it ignores the fact that its decision governs violations not only of the regulations of home improvement contracts but also of regulations which potentially govern every person engaged in almost any trade or business in this state. I find it hard to believe that the legislature intended criminal sanctions *296ranging up to a $5,000 fine and one year imprisonment to be imposed on each business person in the state who without fault fails to comply with one of the multitude of administrative regulations adopted under sec. 100.20, Stats.
Second, most of the home improvement regulations deal with false statements and misrepresentations and thus prescribe offenses which are supplementary to and extensions of the common law crimes of larceny, false pretences and cheat. The purpose of these regulations is to prevent unscrupulous, fraudulent business practices which harm individual consumers. Many other regulations adopted pursuant to sec. 100.20 have a similar purpose. It is apparent that the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection has interpreted sec. 100.20 to authorize regulations to protect the pocket book of the individual consumer. These regulations primarily expand common-law and statutory property offenses; they do not primarily protect the public safety or the physical welfare or economic order of the community. 16 Because the regulations of Ag ch. 110 (as well as other regulations) proscribe in large part variants of the classic larceny offense, a traditional property offense protecting individual private property, and because ordinarily scienter is an element of such an offense at common law, Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-256 (1952), I conclude that the legislature intended scienter to be an element of sec. 100.26(3).17
*297Third, as is explained more fully below, the legislature provided a multitude of civil remedies for violation of a regulation issued under sec. 100.20 in lieu of or in addition to criminal prosecution under sec. 100.26(3). The multitude of civil remedies indicates that the legislature intended criminal prosecution to be used to punish only “intentional” offenses.
Because the primary goal of see. 100.26(3) is to punish the offender, I conclude that the legislature intended scienter to be an element of the crime.
Effective enforcement of the law. The larger the number of prosecutions expected or required to enforce the law, the more likely the legislature meant to impose liability without fault; the fewer the expected or required prosecutions, the more likely the legislature meant the prosecutor to prove scienter. LeFave & Scott, Criminal Law sec. 31, p. 220 (1972).
The legislature did not envisage a large number of criminal prosecutions under sec. 100.26(3) which had to be quickly processed. Quick criminal trials unhindered by proof of scienter are not needed for effective enforcement of sec. 100.20 or the regulations. The Wisconsin legislature has enacted a multitude of civil administrative and judicial remedies to enable the department of agriculture, trade and consumer protection, the department of justice, the district attorneys and the in*298jured parties to stop the prohibited practices and to afford relief to the injured parties.
The following provisions are remedies for violations of the regulations in lieu of or in addition to criminal prosecution under sec. 100.26(3) :
(1) Sec. 100.20(3), Stats., enables the department of agriculture, trade and consumer protection, after public hearing, to issue a special order, enjoining a person from employing unfair methods of competition or trade practices, or requiring the person to employ fair methods and practices.
(2) Under sec. 100.20(4), Stats., the department of justice may file a written complaint with the department of agriculture, trade and consumer protection, alleging that unfair trade practices or unfair methods of competition have been employed by certain named persons. The department of agriculture, trade and consumer protection is required to hold an administrative hearing to adjudicate the matters alleged in the complaint.
(3) Sec. 100.24, Stats, provides that, upon proof of a substantial and willful violation of any special or general order issued, the attorney general may bring an action to enjoin any corporation, foreign or domestic, from doing business in the state or to cancel or revoke its certificate of authority, or incorporation.
(4) Any district attorney or the department of justice may, pursuant to sec. 100.26(6), Stats., commence an action in the name of the state to recover a civil forfeiture of not less than $100 nor more than $10,000 for the violation of an order issued under sec. 100.20.
(5) The department of agriculture, trade and consumer protection may request the circuit court to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the violation of any special or general order issued under sec. 100.20, and prior to entry of final judgment the court may in its discretion restore to any person any pécuni-*299ary loss suffered because of the acts or practices of the contractor. See sec. 100.20 (6), Stats.
(6) Sec. 100.20(5), Stats., provides a private legal remedy to the injured person of twice the pecuniary loss, together with costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, for violations of special or general orders.
With this arsenal of weapons available to the state and the injured party against the violator, the argument that requiring proof of scienter in criminal prosecutions imposes severe difficulties in enforcement of the statute and regulations is not persuasive in the instant case. Further, administrative agencies ordinarily give warning to violators before criminal prosecution is instituted, and criminal prosecution is generally not undertaken by an administrative agency to catch those who are faultless but to penalize those who wilfully violate the law. Remington & Zick, Liability Without Fault Criminal Statutes, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 625, 653. Therefore the violators normally chosen to be prosecuted are specifically those where some level of scienter could be proven relatively easily because of repeated violations. The violator in this case appears to fall within this category. Consequently, I conclude that the legislature intended to impose the severe criminal penalty possible under sec. 100.26(3) only on those who “intentionally” violate a regulation.
For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the legislature intended that the word intentionally in sec. 100.-26(3) modify the verbs refuses, neglects and fails.
h-i y — i
The second question — and one not discussed by the parties or the majority — is what is meant by saying sec. 100.26(3) provides for “strict liability,” that is, that the defendant can be convicted even in the absence of fault. As one commentator notes, each criminal regulation *300“must be examined to determine in what respects it is ‘strict.’ ” Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 731, 742 (1960). Some of the regulations do seem to include an element of scienter, and some of the regulations do provide for defenses. See State v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982) (filed Jan. 1982).
The majority opinion waffles on what it means when it apparently holds that sec. 100.26(3) encompasses an “intentional” crime as well as a “strict liability” crime. After carefully concluding that “intentionally cannot modify fails” (swpra, p. 269), the majority opinion goes on to suggest that nevertheless scienter is always an element of the offense, saying “the wrongdoing punished is either an ‘intentional refusal’ or ‘neglect’ or ‘failure,’ all of which suggest in varying degrees, direct or implied knowledge of a wrongdoing.” Swpra, p. 277.
If the word “intentionally” modifies “fails,” as I have concluded, the issue is what does “intentionally” mean. As the United States Supreme Court observed recently in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403, 100 S. Ct. 624, 630 (1980), “few areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition of the mens rea required for any particular crime.” Just as “strict liability” may have different meanings, especially when the regulations cover a multitude of acts and actors, the word “intentionally” may have different meanings. I suggest that the word “intentionally” in the present statute is used much as the word “wilfully” was used in the 1923 version of sec. 100.26 (3).
One commentator pointed out recently that there are at least seven variations in the meaning and scope of the term wilful in the federal regulatory and corporate areas:
“(1) knowledge of illegality, or an intent to further an objective known to be illegal;
*301“ (2) recklessness as to legality;
“ (3) negligence as to legality;
“ (4) immoral objective, or knowledge of immorality— such as ‘bad purpose,’ ‘evil intent,’ and ‘conscious wrongdoing’ ;
“ (5) intent to defraud or injure;
“(6) intent or knowledge with respect to ordinary elements of the offense; and
“(7) recklessness with respect to ordinary elements of the offense.” Feinberg, Toward a New Approach to Proving Culpability: Mens Rea and The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 18 Am. Cr. L. Rev. 123, 127 (1980).
As to the two regulations in issue in the case at bar, the word “intentionally” might be interpreted to mean knowledge of illegality or recklessness as to illegality or negligence as to legality.
III.
The defendant argues that if the statute does not require scienter the statute violates due process. The majority apparently rejects this argument quoting at length various cases that have upheld strict liability statutes. I recognize that this court has, as have many federal and state courts, upheld the constitutionality of legislative acts creating crimes without a requirement of intent. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559, 578 (1911); State v. Dried Milk Products Co-op., 16 Wis. 2d 357, 359, 114 N.W.2d 413 (1962); State v. Collova, 79 Wis. 2d 473, 480, 255 N.W.2d 581 (1977); LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law sec. 32, pp. 221-222 (1972). Nevertheless the majority errs in intentionally neglecting to acknowledge that many courts and commentators have expressed misgivings about the constitutionality of strict liability statutes and that courts have recognized that due process may be violated when *302imprisonment and the stigma of a conviction are imposed on acts done innocently.18
In United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-565 (1971), which involved regulation of shipment of dangerous acids, the United States Supreme Court recognized that imposing criminal sanctions for regulating violations concerning non-dangerous products without requiring mens rea might raise due process problems. The Court said:
“Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may also be regulated. But they may be the type of products which might raise substantial due process questions if Congress did not require, as in Murdock, ‘mens-rea’ as to each ingredient of the offense.”
The rule to be derived from the decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with scienter and due process can be stated as follows: “Mens rea is an important requirement, but it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes.” Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 The Supreme Court Review 107.19
*303While statutes creating strict liability crimes have been upheld on numerous occasions there appear to be limits, constitutional limits beyond which the legislature cannot go. Courts have struck down statutes creating strict liability crimes as violating due process, reasoning that these statutes are vague and lack notice, State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 15, 189 P.2d 993 (1948); that these statutes create an unreasonable and arbitrary conclusive presumption of scienter and arbitarily attach criminal responsibility, People v. Nangapareet, 210 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. 1960); that these statutes are an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the police power, People v. Estreich, 75 N.Y.S.2d 267, 272 App. Div. 698 (1947). Admittedly the exact constitutional limits on the legislature’s defining the elements of a crime are not clear. But the majority errs by not directly confronting the issue of whether it recognizes any constitutional limitations on the legislature creating strict liability crimes.
Professor Packer concludes that one of the major flaws in the jurisprudence concerning mens rea is that courts have consistently avoided trying to define the constitutional limits of the problem by employing the conclusory label, “public welfare offense.” Packer, Mens Rea and The Supreme Court, 1962 The Supreme Court Review 149-52. The majority by not tackling the constitutional issue raised by its holding that scienter is not an element of the offense does nothing to provide future guidance for the legislature, litigants or the courts. For even if it is difficult to analyze the inter*304relation of scienter and due process, this court should try to begin to define the limits, if any, on the legislature’s power to define a crime.
In summary, the public policy of this state is that mens rea is the rule in criminal statutes, strict liability is the exception. Sec. 100.26(3) imposes a heavy penalty and a serious stigma on a violator. The rules of the department of agriculture, trade and consumer protection under sec. 100.20 have expanded from six special and general orders covering three and one-half printed pages in 1940 (the first time the orders of the state administrative agencies were printed in one volume) to several chapters of rules covering many printed pages in the present state administrative code. I can find no countervailing factors to move me to limit the word intentionally to modify only “refuses” and to construe the statute as one of strict liability. I conclude that the legislature intended in sec. 100.26 (3) to subject to criminal penalty only those who “intentionally” violate the department’s numerous rules issued pursuant to sec. 100.20.
Despite this court’s recognition that “the element of scienter is the rule rather than the exception in our criminal jurisprudence,” despite the legislature’s express incorporation of the element of scienter in sec. 100.26(3), despite the majority’s concession that the statute may reasonably be interpreted to require scienter, despite the severity of the penalty and despite the fact that speedy enforcement of the regulations which are extensions of common law criminal fraud are not necessary to protect the public welfare, the majority concludes that the word “intentionally” modifies only the verb “refuses” and that the statute does not require scienter to be proved in every prosecution. Further, without analysis of the due process issue, the majority holds the “strict liability” statute constitutional. I dissent.

 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to sec. 100.20, Stats. 1977, the relevant subsections providing as follows:
“(1) Methods of competition in business and trade practices in business shall be fair. Unfair methods of competition in business and unfair trade practices in business are hereby prohibited.
“(2) The department, after public hearing, may issue general orders forbidding methods of competition in business or trade practices in business which are determined by the department to be unfair. The department, after public hearing, may issue general orders prescribing methods of competition in business or trade practices in business which are determined by the department to be fair.”

 Ag 110.01(1), Wis. Adm. Code, defines home improvement and Ag 110.01(3), Wis. Adm. Code, defines home improvement contract as follows:
“Ag 110.01 Definitions. (1) ‘Home improvement’ means the remodeling, altering, repairing, painting, or modernizing of residential or non-commercial property, or the making of additions thereto, and includes, but is not limited to, the construction, installation, replacement, improvement or repair of driveways, 'sidewalks, swimming pools, terraces, patios, landscaping, fences, porches, garages, basements and basement waterproofing, fire protection devices, heating and air-conditioning equipment, water softeners, heaters and purifiers, wall-to-wall carpeting or attached or inlaid floor coverings, and other changes, repairs or improvements made *281in or on, attached to or forming a part of the residential or noncommercial property, but does not include the construction of a new residence. The term extends to the conversion of existing commercial structures into residential or non-commercial property.”
“(3) ‘Home improvement contract' means an oral or written agreement between a seller and an owner or a seller and a tenant or lessee of residential or non-commercial property, or á seller and a tenant or lessee if the tenant or lessee is to be obligated for the payment of home improvements made in, to, or upon such property, and includes all agreements under which the seller is to perform labor or render services for home improvements, or furnish materials in connection therewith.”

 Ag 110.05(1) (a) provides as follows:
“Ag 110.05 Home improvement contract requirements. (1) The following home improvements contracts and all changes in the terms and conditions thereof, shall be in writing:
“(a) Contracts requiring any payment of money or other consideration by the buyer prior to completion of the seller’s obligation under the contract.”

 Ag 110.05(2) (d) provides as follows:
“(2) Home improvement contracts and all changes in the terms and conditions thereof, required under this section to be in writing, shall he signed by all parties thereto, and shall clearly and accurately set forth in legible form all terms and conditions of the contract, and particularly the following:
“(d) The dates or time period on or within which the work is to begin and be completed by the seller.”

 Ag 110.02(7) (h), Wis. Admin. Code, provides:
“Ag 110.02 Prohibited trade practices. No seller shall engage in the following unfair methods of competition or unfair trade practices:
*282“(7) PERFORMANCE.. . .
“ (b) Fail to begin or complete work on the dates or within the time period specified in the home improvement contract, or as otherwise represented, unless the delay is for reason of labor stoppage, unavailability of supplies or materials, unavoidable casualties, or any other cause beyond the seller’s control. Any changes in the dates or time periods stated in a written contract shall be agreed to in writing.”

 See, e.g., State v. Collova, 79 Wis. 2d 473, 480, 255 N.W.2d 581 (1977).

 For a discussion of liability without fault and mens rea, see, e.g., LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law secs. 26, 27, 31, 47 (1972); Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law Ch. X (2d ed. 1960); Perkins on Criminal Law, 799-809 (2d ed. 1969) ; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933); Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 35 (1939); Remington & Halstead, The Mental Element in Crime — A Legislative Problem, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 644; Remington, Liability Without Fault Criminal Statutes — Their Relation to Major Developments in Contemporary Economic and Social Policy: The Situation in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 625; Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 Ind. L. J. 1 (1957); Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 1043 (1958); Wasserstrom, Criminal Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 731 (1960); Packer, Mens Rea and The Supreme Court, 1962 The Supreme Court Review 107; Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423 (1963); Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 322 (1966); Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 671 (1976); O’Connor, Mistake and Ignorance in Criminal Cases, 39 Modern L. Rev. 644 (1976); Dutile & Moore, Mistake and Impossibility: Arranging a Marriage Between Two Difficult Partners, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 166 (1979); Feinberg, Toward a New Approach to Proving Culpability: Mens Rea and The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 18 Am. Cr. L. Rev. 123 (1980) ; Case Notes, Criminal Lem — Mistake of Law — A Valid Defense, 11 DePaul L. Rev. 329 (1962); Note, Liability Without Fault: Logic and Potential of a Developing Concept, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 1201; United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971); United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971); United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. *2851976); United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (concurring opinion); Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960); State v. Alfonsi, 33 Wis. 2d 469, 476, 147 N,W.2d 550 (1960); Welch v. State, 145 Wis. 86, 129 N.W. 656 (1911); State v. Hartfiel, 24 Wis. 60 (1869).

 State v. Alfonsi, 33 Wis. 2d 469, 476, 147 N.W.2d 556 (1960). See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
“In construing a statute the court should not hold that it dispenses with the necessity for a criminal intent unless such an intent on the part of the legislature is clear beyond any reasonable doubt.” Clark & Marshall, Crimes, secs. 5, 20, p. 309 (9th ed. 1967).

 The majority’s discussion of legislative intent raises numerous problems and difficulties not specifically dealt with in the text of this dissent. For example, the majority gratuitously interprets sec. 52.05(1), Stats. 1979-80, and among other interpretations, appears to equate the adverbs “wilfully” and “intentionally.” It gratuitously interprets sec. 947.15, Stats. 1979-80, and equates the verb “neglect” with the noun “negleet.” It also sua sponte raises and answers questions about charges in future prosecutions and the need for jury unanimity under Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 304 N.W.2d 729 (1981).

 See State v. Balestrieri, 87 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 274 N.W.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1978), aff’d by divided court, 96 Wis. 2d 361, 291 N.W.2d 579 (1980).

 Compare sec. 100.26(3) with statutes in which the legislature does expressly provide different penalties for different degrees of scienter. See, e.g., sec. 948.18(2), Stats. 1979: “Any person violating s. 948.04, 948.10 or 948.11 is subject to a Class D forfeiture. Any person who intentionally or negligently violates the aforementioned section is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.”

 The Drafting Note to the 1935 amendment states that no change of meaning was intended when sec. 100.26(3) was revised as part of the 1935 revision and codification of the statutes administered by the department of agriculture. Senate Bill No. 454, 1935 Sess., states: “This bill is a revision and codification of the statutes administered by the department of agriculture and markets. . . . The bill is a rewriting of the present law with almost no changes in substance. The changes in language are for simplification and clarification. A note is appended wherever the change of language may have changed the meaning.” No such note is appended to sec. 100.26(3), Stats. Thus the 1935 statute should be read as was the 1923 statute. Guse v. A.O. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 406, 51 N.W.2d 24 (1952).

 Class A misdemeanors include crimes of damage to property and person, and most Class A misdemeanors appear to require scienter as an element of the crime. See, e.g., secs. 943.395, 943.41, 943.50, 943.61, 940.19, 941.01, 941.10, 941.13, 941.22, and 941.20, Stats. 1979-80.

 The Model Penal Code further concludes that sanctions for violations of administrative regulations, in contrast to sanctions for violations of statutes, should be primarily administrative in character, e.g. suspension of license, financial penalties or short terms of imprisonment in case of knowing or repeated violations. See Model Penal Code sec. 206.04 (Tent. Draft No. 2, p. 121 (1954)).
Professor Packer commented on the inappropriateness of the criminal sanction in the absence of scienter as follows:
“[To] punish conduct without reference to the actor’s state of mind is both inefficacious and unjust. It is inefficacious because conduct unaccompanied by an awareness of the factors making it criminal does not mark the actor as one who needs to be subjected to punishment in order to deter him or others from behaving similarly in the future, nor does it single him out as a socially dan*293gerous individual who needs to be incapacitated or reformed. It is unjust because the actor is subjected to the stigma of a criminal conviction without being morally blameworthy. Consequently, on either a preventive or retributive theory of criminal punishment, the criminal sanction is inappropriate in the absence of mens rea.” Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Supreme Court Review 107,109.

 “All criminal enactments in a sense serve the double purpose of singling out wrongdoers for the purpose- of punishment or correction and of regulating the social order. But often the importance of the one far outweighs the other. Crimes created primarily for the purpose of singling out individual wrongdoers for punishment or correction are the ones commonly requiring mens rea; police offenses of a merely regulatory nature are frequently enforceable irrespective of any guilty intent.” Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 72 (1933).
Professor Kadish commented that “the distinction between offenses that regulate and those that penalize in the traditional sense proves inadequate to divide the waters.” Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 423, 443 (1963).

 The two particular regulations in issue here, one requiring performance according to the contract and the second requiring the written contract to contain certain provisions, may be viewed as “regulatory” — “housekeeping”—in nature, rather than definitions of substant5”e criminal fraud in business transactions. These two regulation jwever aid in the enforcement of the “business fraud regulations.”

 The majority’s conclusion that if the consumer is to be protected the legislature must have intended sec. 100.26(3) to be in*297terpreted as not requiring proof of scienter is not supported by the legislative intent expressly stated in other consumer statutes. The Wisconsin consumer act (chs. 421-427, Stats. 1979-80) is designed “to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, false, misleading and unconscionable practices by merchants.” A criminal sanction is provided for violation of chs. 421-427. The sanction is limited to a fine (not more than $2,000); no imprisonment may be imposed. And the fine may be imposed only on proof that the actor “wilfully and knowingly engages in any conduct or practice in violation of chs. 421 to 427 .. . .” Sec. 425.401, Stats. 1979-80.

 Cf. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), where the United States Supreme Court struck down a strict-liability criminal statute on due process grounds. Fair play requires that before a person be subject to imprisonment, the person receive notice of the fact that the conduct is malum prohibitum. In Lambert the defendant had violated the statute merely by being a convicted felon and not registering with the police. She had lived in Los Angeles for years. Under the statute her passive status resulted in a violation if she did not register. Therefore there was nothing to put the defendant on notice that she was violating a statute. See also United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir. 1970).

 Professor Perkins has written that “the time has come to recognize that there has been a violation of due process whenever there has been any deprivation of liberty or property resulting from a conviction based upon liability without fault.” Perkins, Criminal Law 811 (2d ed. 1969).
For an interesting analysis of recent United States Supreme Court cases in regard to the question whether due process re*303quires mens rea to be an element of a crime, see Tushnet, Constitutional Limitations of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. Rev. 775 (1975). See also Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitution: Substantive Criminal Law Due Process, 24 Wayne L. Rev. 271 (1978).