Court Opinion

ID: 9742173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:08:02.451143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:29.099534
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, also specially concurring: I agree with the plurality’s holding that the one-year statute of limitations in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8 — 101 (West 1996)), not the two-year statute of limitations in section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 — 212(a) (West 1996)), applies to medical malpractice actions against local governmental entities and their employees. I write separately, however, because I believe the plurality’s analysis is both an oversimplification and ultimately unpersuasive. The plurality employs the familiar rule of statutory construction which states that “ ‘[w]here there are two statutory provisions, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only one subject, the particular provision must prevail.’ ” Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 195 (1992), quoting Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 205 (1954). Focusing on “the nature of the defendants rather than on the type of the cause of action,” the plurality concludes that section 8 — 101 is the more specific statute. (Emphasis added.) 188 Ill. 2d at 194. The plurality’s analysis is an oversimplification because section 8 — 101 is both more specific and more general than the statute of limitations in section 13 — 212(a). It is more specific in the sense that it applies to a narrow class of defendants, local entities and their employees. On the other hand, it is more general than section 13 — 212(a) because it applies to any civil action, not just to medical malpractice actions. Plaintiffs make a plausible case that the focus should be on the type of the cause of action, not on the nature of the defendants. From plaintiffs’ point of view, the plurality’s exclusive focus on the nature of the defendants in both statutes is completely arbitrary. The plurality’s analysis is ultimately unpersuasive because, to the extent that section 8 — 101 is more general than section 13 — 212(a), this is one of those instances where “the legislature intended to make the general act controlling.” Stone v. Department of Employment Security Board, 151 Ill. 2d 257, 266 (1992), quoting 2B N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 51.05, at 174 (5th ed. 1992). As the plurality points out, the purpose of the one-year statute of limitations in section 8 — 101 is to encourage early investigation and settlement of meritorious claims so governmental entities can plan their budgets in light of potential liabilities. 188 Ill. 2d at 195. By its very nature then, section 8 — 101 was designed to apply broadly to any possible claim against a local governmental entity and its employees. This type of comprehensive protection necessarily controls over other statutes of limitations. Nothing suggests the legislature intended to abandon this scheme with respect to medical malpractice actions. Justice McMorrow’s argument in her dissent that the one-year statute of limitations in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to plaintiffs medical malpractice action because it does not explicitly say that it trumps the two-year statute of limitations in section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure is inane. The very reason this court analyzes which statute is more specific is because, arguably, either statute applies. There would be no reason to resort to this tool of statutory construction in the first place if one statute explicitly provides that it takes precedence over the other statute. Contrary to Justice McMorrow’s dissent, the fact that the legislature created an across-the-board rule limiting the time in which to file “any action” against a public entity or its employees to one year is powerful evidence that the legislature intended the more general statute to be controlling.