Court Opinion

ID: 9906653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 19:24:18.231877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:21.602156
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued November 28, 2023

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00409-CV
                           ———————————
          IN THE INTEREST OF A.I.M. AND A.I.M., CHILDREN

                   On Appeal from the 246th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 2015-52596

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This appeal stems from competing Petitions to Modify the Parent Child-

Relationship.   Following a jury trial, the trial court entered a final judgment

designating Appellee Isaac Menendez as the parent with the right to designate the

primary residence of two minor children, awarding Appellant Claudia Arellano a

standard possession order, and ordering Appellant to pay child support. The trial

court later reformed its final judgment to vacate the prior designation of Appellee
as the primary conservator. All other terms of the initial judgment remained the

same.

        Appellant raises two issues on appeal.         In her first issue, Appellant

challenges the trial court’s initial judgment designating Appellee as the parent with

the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children. Premised on

her argument that the trial court’s subsequent reformed order is void, Appellant

argues (1) we should reverse the initial order and vacate the designation of

Appellee as the parent with the right to determine the primary residence of the

children, consistent with the trial court’s reformed order, and thereafter “consider

the balance of this appeal,” or (2) in the alternative, hold that the jury’s verdict was

incomplete and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. In her

second issue, Appellant argues the trial court impermissibly contravened the jury

verdict and abused its discretion by awarding her a standard possession order over

the children and ordering her to pay child support.

        We hold the Reformed Order is not void, and affirm the Reformed Order.

                                      Background

        In 2016, the trial court entered an Agreed Final Decree of Divorce (“Agreed

Decree”) with respect to the marriage of Appellant Claudia Menendez1 and

Appellee Isaac Menendez.         Among the terms of the Agreed Decree, which

1
        Claudia’s last name is now Arellano.

                                               2
appointed Claudia and Isaac joint managing conservators of their two minor sons,2

the Agreed Decree provided that (1) neither parent would have the right to

designate the primary residence of the children, (2) the primary residence of the

children would remain within eight miles of the Galena Park Independent School

District, (3) the parental rights and duties of the parties would be shared equally,

(4) the parties would have equal possession of the children, and (5) Isaac would

pay child support to Claudia.

      Three years later, in 2019, Claudia filed a Petition to Modify the Parent-

Child Relationship, requesting she be appointed sole managing conservator and

that Isaac be denied access to the children or, in the alternative, that his visitation

with the children be supervised. Claudia alleged Isaac had “engaged in a history or

pattern of child abuse and neglect” and she requested the trial court to consider

such conduct in appointing her “sole managing conservator or the parties as joint

managing conservators.” Claudia requested the trial court to enter temporary

orders appointing her and Isaac temporary joint managing conservators and

designating Claudia as the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the

primary residence of the children. After a contested hearing, the trial court granted

temporary orders, appointing Claudia as temporary sole managing conservator

2
      Claudia and Isaac have three sons. This appeal concerns their two younger sons,
      who were minors during trial.

                                          3
over the children, awarding Isaac supervised possession of the children, and

ordering Isaac to pay child support.

      Isaac filed a Counter-Petition to Modify the Parent-Child Relationship. He

sought the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children and

requested that the children be required to reside within Harris County, Texas and

all contiguous counties.     Isaac further requested that he be appointed as the

conservator with “the exclusive right to make medical decisions, psychiatric and

psychological decisions[,] and educational decisions,” that Claudia be given a

standard possession order to provide “a more stable environment for the children,”

and that Claudia be ordered to pay child support. Isaac demanded a jury trial

pursuant to Section 105.002 of the Texas Family Code.3

      A jury trial commenced on July 26, 2021, and continued for several days

over the course of four months.4 While twelve jurors and two alternates were

seated originally, three of those jurors were dismissed by agreement during trial.

The parties agreed that nine of the eleven remaining jurors could return a verdict.

The jury charge, to which no one objected, asked the jury to answer the following

four questions:

3
      An amicus attorney was also appointed.
4
      Because the facts elicited during the trial have no bearing on this appeal, we do not
      discuss them.

                                            4
Question 1

Should the joint managing conservatorship be replaced by a sole
managing conservatorship of the children?

Answer “Yes” or “No.” Answer: ______

If you answered “Yes” to Question 1, then answer Question 2.
Otherwise, do not answer Question 2.

If you answered “No” to Question 1, then answer Question 3.
Otherwise, do not answer Question 3.

Question 2

Who should be appointed sole managing conservator of the children?
Answer by writing the full name of the person who should be
appointed.

Answer “Isaac Menendez” or “Claudia Arellanos.” Answer: ______

Question 3

Should the order that does not designate a conservator to have the
exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children be
modified to designate either parent as the conservator who has the
exclusive right?

Answer “Yes” or “No.” Answer: ______

If you answered “Yes” to Question 3, then answer Question 4.
Otherwise, do not answer Question 4.

Question 4

State the name of the parent who is awarded the exclusive right to
designate the primary residence of the children within Harris County,
Texas and contiguous counties.

Answer “Isaac Menendez” or “Claudia Arellanos.” Answer: ______
                                 5
The jury answered “No” to Jury Questions 1 and 3, and left the answers to Jury

Questions 2 and 4 blank. The trial court accepted the verdict without objection and

released the jurors.

      Sometime after the verdict was rendered, but before rendering final

judgment, the trial court interviewed the minor children over Claudia’s objection.5

The docket sheet reflects that on January 14, 2022, the trial court rendered

judgment “in the best interest of the children,” ordering, among other things, that

(1) both parents remain joint managing conservators of the children, but that Isaac

be granted the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children

within Harris County and contiguous counties, (2) Claudia be granted a standard

possession order, (3) Claudia and Isaac have the joint right to make medical,

psychological, and psychiatric decisions for the children, (4) Isaac be granted the

right to make education decisions for the children after consultation with Claudia,

and (5) Claudia pay Isaac child support. The trial court signed its Final Order in

Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship (“Initial Order”) on February 27, 2022.

The Initial Order recites that the “Jury rendered a verdict and the Court rendered a

5
      Isaac filed a Motion for the Court to Confer with Children on June 29, 2020.
      According to the docket sheet, the trial court granted the motion after a hearing on
      November 30, 2021. It is unclear when the children were interviewed. There is
      no reporter’s record of the hearing or the interview in the appellate record.

                                           6
rendition on January 14, 2022 relative to [the parties’] rights and duties, possession

and access, support, and various issues.”

      Claudia filed a Motion to Modify, Correct, or Reform the Judgment or, in

the Alternative, for New Trial. She argued that by awarding Isaac the exclusive

right to designate the primary residence of the children, the trial court’s Initial

Order contravened the jury’s verdict in violation of Section 105.002(c)(1)(D) of

the Texas Family Code. She also argued that the trial court’s order awarding her a

standard possession order “operated as a de facto contravention of the verdict”

because the possession schedule “effectively award[ed] the residence right” to

Isaac “in contravention of the jury’s verdict.”6

      In response, Isaac argued the Initial Order did not contravene the jury’s

verdict because the jury had not determined “which parent should have [the

primary] residence right.” He argued that Section 153.134(b)(1) of the Texas

Family Code requires a trial court to designate the parent with the exclusive right

to designate the primary residence of the children. Because “the jury did not

choose which parent should have” that right and the law is conclusive that a parent

6
      Claudia also argued the trial court erred by accepting a verdict from fewer than ten
      jurors and by interviewing the children in chambers. In response, Isaac argued
      Claudia had waived her right to complain about the number of jurors and that the
      court was within its rights to interview the children about possession and access,
      which are not jury issues. During the hearing on her Motion to Modify, Claudia
      withdrew the complaint about the number of jurors. And Claudia does not
      complain about the trial court’s interview of the children on appeal.

                                            7
must be chosen, he argued the trial court did not contravene the jury’s verdict, but

instead followed the law. Isaac also responded that the trial court’s judgment

awarding Claudia a standard possession order and ordering her to pay child support

did not contravene the jury’s verdict because pursuant to Section 105.002(c)(2)(B)

of the Family Code, the trial court “has the sole authority in rendering possession

of or access to the child.”

      Isaac also filed a Motion to Disregard Jury Finding No. 3,7 arguing the jury’s

answer to Jury Question 3 was immaterial.8 Isaac argued that because both parents

had filed competing pleadings requesting the right to determine the primary

residence of the children, they had in effect “judicially admitted there had been a

substantial and material change of circumstances” and thus a modification of the

Agreed Decree was necessary. Isaac argued the law “is conclusive that a parent

ha[s] to be given the residency right,” and the evidence at trial was “conclusive”

7
      In Jury Question 3, the jury was asked to determine whether the parties’ Agreed
      Decree which did “not designate a conservator to have the exclusive right to
      designate the primary residence of the children [should] be modified to designate
      either parent as the conservator who has the exclusive right.” The jury answered,
      “No.”
8
      A question is immaterial “(1) if the question should not have been submitted; (2) if
      the question was rendered immaterial by other findings, or (3) if the question
      called for a finding not within the jury’s province, such as presenting a question of
      law for the court.” Desai v. Good Hope Missionary Baptist Church of Houston,
      No. 01-19-00420-CV, 2021 WL 1414282, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
      Apr. 15, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Vecellio Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
      Vanguard Underwriters Ins. Co., 127 S.W.3d 134, 140 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
      Dist.] 2003, no pet.)).

                                            8
that he should be awarded the right to determine the children’s primary residency.

Isaac asked the trial court to disregard the jury’s verdict as to Jury Question 3 and

enter judgment appointing him as the conservator with the exclusive right to

designate the children’s primary residence.

      On May 4, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on Claudia’s Motion to

Modify and Isaac’s Motion to Disregard. The trial court denied Isaac’s motion and

granted Claudia’s motion in part, vacating the designation in the Initial Order of

Isaac as the parent with the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary

residence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made the following

rendition from the bench:

      The Court finds that it erred in contravening the jury’s verdict
      regarding the granting of exclusive right to designate the primary
      residence of the children and sets aside the designation of the right to
      determine the primary residence of the children. However, the Court,
      in crafting possession and access orders, took into consideration
      several considerations, including the fact that the mother in this case
      moved over an hour away from the father rendering a standard
      possession order, including overnights during the schooltime, virtually
      impossible. So, the Court finds that the following orders are in the
      best interest of the children: Neither parent is granted the exclusive
      right to determine the residence of the children, which complies with
      the verdict of the jury. Mom is granted a standard possession order
      that is not expanded. The Court finds that it is not in the best interest
      of the children for Mom to be granted an expanded standard
      possession order. All of the other portions of the rendition will
      remain the same . . . .

The trial court’s docket sheet entry for May 4, 2022, states in pertinent part:

                                          9
      RENDITION–The Court erred in contravening the jury’s verdict
      regarding the granting of the exclusive right to designate the primary
      residence of the children and sets aside the designation of the right to
      determine the primary residence of the children.

      The Court finds that the following orders are in the best interest of the
      children. Neither parent is granted the exclusive right to determine
      the residence of the children. Mom is granted an SPO, not expanded.
      Court finds that it is not in the best interest of children to grant
      expanded SPO. Parents are granted joint right to make psychological
      and psychiatric decisions for children, with treating physician to serve
      as tie-breaker. Dad is granted exclusive right to make education
      decisions for children, after consultation with mom . . . .

      On June 14, 2022, the trial court signed a Reformed Final Order in Suit to

Modify the Parent-Child Relationship (“Reformed Order”) reflecting the court’s

May 4, 2022 oral rendition.

      This appeal ensued.

                    Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      Pursuant to Section 105.002 of the Texas Family Code, a party may demand

a jury trial over certain matters involving conservatorship.       TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 105.002(a). A court may not submit questions to the jury concerning support or

“a specific term or condition of possession of or access to [a] child.”           Id.

§ 105.002(c)(2)(B). A party, however, is entitled to have a jury determine the

appointment of conservators, the parent with the right to designate the primary

residence of the child, and the need for any geographic restrictions for the primary

residence of the children. Id. § 105.002(c)(1). Section 105.002(c) states that in a

                                         10
jury trial, a party is entitled to a verdict by the jury and the court may not

contravene a jury verdict on the issues of:

      (A)    the appointment of a sole managing conservator;

      (B)    the appointment of a joint managing conservator;

      (C)    the appointment of a possessory conservator;

      (D)    the determination of which joint managing conservator has the
             exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child;

      (E)    the determination of whether to impose a restriction on the
             geographic area in which a sole managing conservator or joint
             managing conservator may designate the child’s primary
             residence; and

      (F)    if a restriction described by Paragraph (E) is imposed, the
             determination of the geographic area within which the sole
             managing conservator or joint managing conservator must
             designate the child’s primary residence[.]

Id. § 105.002(c).

      A trial court is not permitted to contravene a jury verdict on the issues of

conservatorship or residence unless the jury’s findings are not supported by the

evidence. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 20 (Tex. 2002). The jury’s verdict on

determination of residence is reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency. Epps v.

Deboise, 537 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see

also Ellason v. Ellason, 162 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.)

                                         11
(holding complaints regarding trial court’s disregard of evidence are properly

brought as challenges to legal or factual sufficiency of evidence).9

      A trial court has broad discretion in determining family law matters

involving custody, visitation, and possession. In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 427

(Tex. App.—Houston [l4th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). A party who seeks to modify an

existing possession has the burden of proving the “circumstances of the child, a

conservator, or other party affected by the order have materially and substantially

changed” since the date of its rendition. TEX. FAM. CODE § 156.101(a); see also id.

§ 156.401(a)(1).     The trial court’s primary consideration in determining such

matters is the best interest of the child. In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d at 427; Hammond

v. Hammond, 898 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no writ). The

trial court has substantial latitude to determine such matters.          Escalante v.

Escalante, 632 S.W.3d 573, 581 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.); In re A.L.E.,

279 S.W.3d at 427.

9
      Claudia states on appeal that “nobody has challenged the sufficiency of the
      evidence to support the verdict . . . . Thus, the sufficiency of the evidence to
      support the verdict is not in dispute.” See Garcia v. Harding, No. 01-07-01049-
      CV, 2008 WL 4965358, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 20, 2008, no
      pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A] jury’s findings underlying a conservatorship decision are
      subject to ordinary legal and factual sufficiency review.”) (citing Alexander v.
      Rogers, 247 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.)). Later in her
      brief, Claudia identifies without analysis eleven record excerpts that she argues
      contain “at least some” evidence supporting her request to be designated as
      primary conservator. Because neither party raised a sufficiency challenge on
      appeal, we do not review the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the jury’s
      verdict or the trial court’s standard possession order.

                                         12
      We review the modification of a possession order or child support

obligations for abuse of discretion. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109

(Tex. 1990); Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); In re T.W.E., 217

S.W.3d 557, 559 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.); In re Moore, 511

S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.). The test for an abuse of

discretion “is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or

principles; in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable.”

Worford, 801 S.W.2d at 109. If the trial court fails to analyze or apply the law

correctly, it abuses its discretion. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011).

                                           Analysis

A.    The Reformed Order is Not Void

      Claudia argues that “despite being rendered before the trial court lost plenary

power,” the Reformed Order was “entered shortly after the court lost plenary

power” and thus, “the Reformed [Order] is likely void.” Premised on her argument

that the Reformed Order is void, Claudia argues in her first issue that she is entitled

to final judgment based on the jury’s verdict, and thus, the trial court’s award in the

Initial Order appointing Isaac as the primary conservator with the exclusive right to

determine residency should be reversed. Alternatively, Claudia argues the jury’s

verdict that neither party should be given the exclusive right to determine the

                                           13
primary residence of the children is incomplete, and we should thus vacate the

Initial Order and remand for further proceedings.

      Isaac responds that the Reformed Order vacating his designation as primary

conservator with the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the

children is not void because oral rendition of the Reformed Order was made on

May 4, 2022, within the trial court’s plenary power, and the trial court’s act of

committing it to writing on June 14, 2022 was “purely a ministerial act.” Because

the Reformed Order is not void and supersedes the Initial Order, Isaac argues

Claudia’s first issue, which challenges the Initial Order, is moot. In the alternative,

he argues the Initial Order does not contravene the jury’s verdict, because the jury

did not determine which parent would have the exclusive right to designate the

primary residence of the children, and under applicable law, the trial court was

required to make that designation.

      Generally, a judgment is “rendered” when the trial court’s decision upon a

matter “is officially announced either orally in open court or by memorandum filed

with the clerk.” Pletcher v. Hansen, No. 01-09-00516-CV, 2011 WL 1631811, at

*5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 28, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re

Bill Heard Chevrolet, Ltd., 209 S.W.3d 311, 315 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Naylor, 466

S.W.3d 783, 788 (Tex. 2015) (“A court’s judgment is its announcement of the

                                          14
resolution of the issues in a lawsuit and is rendered ‘when the trial court officially

announces its decision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the

clerk.’”) (quoting S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1995)); In

re K.N.M., No. 2-08-308-CV, 2009 WL 2196125, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

July 23, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Judgment is ‘rendered’ when the trial court

officially announces its decision on the matter submitted to it in open court or by

written memorandum filed with the clerk.”).

      The Texas Family Code defines “render” in a suit affecting the parent-child

relationship as “the pronouncement by a judge of the court’s ruling on a matter.

The pronouncement may be made orally in the presence of the court reporter or in

writing, including on the court’s docket sheet or by a separate written instrument.”

TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.026. To be an official judgment, “the trial court’s oral

pronouncement must indicate intent to render a full, final, and complete judgment

at that point in time.” In re Marriage of Joyner, 196 S.W.3d 883, 886 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (citing S & A Rest. Corp., 892 S.W.2d at

858); McShane v. McShane, 556 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2018, pet. denied) (same) (citing Gamboa v. Gamboa, 383 S.W.3d 263, 270 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.). The words of the trial court, regardless of

whether they are spoken or written, “must evince a present, as opposed to future,

act that effectively decides the issues before the court.” In re Marriage of Joyner,

                                         15
196 S.W.3d at 886 (citing Woods v. Woods, 167 S.W.3d 932, 933 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2005, no pet.)); see also In re M.G.F., No. 2-07-241-CV, 2008 WL

4052992, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 28, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The

words used by the trial court must clearly indicate the intent to render judgment at

the time the words are expressed.”) (citing S & A Rest Corp., 892 S.W.2d at 858).10

      In suits affecting the parent-child relationship, docket sheet entries may

establish that a trial court orally rendered judgment on a certain date. TEX. FAM.

CODE § 101.026; see also Interest of P.Z.F., 651 S.W.3d 147, 152 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2021, pet. denied) (“Generally docket sheet entries are insufficient to

constitute a decree of the court; however, the [F]amily [C]ode alters this general

rule in suits affecting the parent-child relationship[.]”);11 Interest of G.X.H., 627

S.W.3d 288, 298 (Tex. 2021) (“Family Code section 101.026 expressly provides

that a court may pronounce or render an order on its docket sheet.”); In re C.V.G.,

10
      For example, when a trial court stated in rendering judgment that the court “will
      approve the agreement” and “will sign a written order to that effect,” the Fort
      Worth Court of Appeals held the trial court’s “oral pronouncement of its intention
      to render judgment in the future could not be a present rendition of judgment.” In
      re M.G.F., No. 2-07-241-CV, 2008 WL 4052992, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
      Aug. 28, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
11
      Section 101.032 of the Family Code defines “suit affecting the parent-child
      relationship” in pertinent part as “a suit filed . . . in which the appointment of a
      managing conservator or a possessory conservator, access to or support of a child,
      or establishment or termination of the parent-child relationship is requested.”
      TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.032(a). “A motion to modify the parent-child relationship
      is a suit affecting the parent-child relationship[.]” Chalu v. Shamala, 125 S.W.3d
      737, 738 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

                                           16
112 S.W.3d 180, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (Mirabal, J.,

concurring) (“Thus, contrary to the general rule in civil cases, a docket notation

standing alone constitutes rendition of judgment in suits affecting the parent-child

relationship”).

      During the May 4, 2022 hearing, the trial court made the following rendition

from the bench:

      The Court finds that it erred in contravening the jury’s verdict
      regarding the granting of exclusive right to designate the primary
      residence of the children and sets aside the designation of the right to
      determine the primary residence of the children. However, the Court,
      in crafting possession and access orders, took into consideration
      several considerations, including the fact that the mother in this case
      moved over an hour away from the father rendering a standard
      possession order, including overnights during the schooltime, virtually
      impossible. So, the Court finds that the following orders are in the
      best interest of the children: Neither parent is granted the exclusive
      right to determine the residence of the children, which complies with
      the verdict of the jury. Mom is granted a standard possession order
      that is not expanded. The Court finds that it is not in the best interest
      of the children for Mom to be granted an expanded standard
      possession order. All of the other portions of the rendition will
      remain the same . . . .

The trial court’s docket sheet for May 4, 2022 also states in pertinent part:

      RENDITION–The Court erred in contravening the jury’s verdict
      regarding the granting of the exclusive right to designate the primary
      residence of the children and sets aside the designation of the right to
      determine the primary residence of the children.

      The Court finds that the following orders are in the best interest of the
      children. Neither parent is granted the exclusive right to determine
      the residence of the children. Mom is granted an SPO, not expanded.
      Court finds that it is not in the best interest of children to grant
                                          17
      expanded SPO. Parents are granted joint right to make psychological
      and psychiatric decisions for children, with treating physician to serve
      as tie-breaker. Dad is granted exclusive right to make education
      decisions for children, after consultation with mom. Parents ordered
      to subscribe to Talking Parents app and communicate regarding the
      children through the app. Mom ordered to pay child support of
      $823.64/month beginning 3/1/22, with step down. Dad ordered to
      carry medical and mom ordered to reimburse dad $200/month
      beginning 3/1/22, with step down. Order entry 5/20/21, by
      submission.

      Both the trial court’s May 4, 2022 oral rendition and the corresponding

docket sheet evince an intent for the judgment to be a full, final and complete

judgment at that point in time.      The trial court’s rendition on May 4, 2022

effectively decided the issues before the court, and left nothing to be decided at a

future date. We thus conclude that the trial court’s May 4, 2022 rendition, made

within the court’s plenary power, was a final judgment, and the act of committing

it to writing on June 14, 2022 was merely a ministerial act. See In re E.G., No. 14-

14-00967-CV, 2016 WL 1128137, at *2 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 22,

2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A trial court’s oral pronouncement of its decision

terminating a parent-child relationship constitutes the rendition of a final judgment.

In the case of an oral rendition, the judgment is effective immediately, and the

signing and entry of the judgment are only ministerial acts.”) (internal citations

omitted); P.R.M. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-16-00065-

CV, 2016 WL 4506301, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (“When a trial court announces in open court that a parent’s rights are
                                         18
terminated, the termination is effective immediately, and the written order signed

later by the trial court merely memorializes the termination.”) (citing TEX. FAM.

CODE § 101.026).

      Because we conclude the Reformed Order is not void, and the Reformed

Order vacates the portion of the Initial order Claudia challenges in her first issue,

we overrule Claudia’s first issue.

B.    The Right to Designate Primary Residence

      In the trial court, Claudia moved to modify the Initial Order to request that

neither party be awarded the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of

the children. She argued that the designation in the Initial Order awarding Isaac

that exclusive right contravened the jury’s verdict.

      Section 153.134(b) of the Family Code, entitled Court-Ordered Joint

Conservatorship, provides that “[i]n rendering an order appointing joint managing

conservators, the court shall . . . designate the conservator who has the exclusive

right to determine the primary residence of the child . . . .” TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 153.134(b); see also Billisits v. Billisits, No. 03-21-00358-CV, 2023 WL

2191330, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 24, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“When a

trial court appoints the parents joint managing conservators, it must designate the

parent with the exclusive right to determine the child’s primary residence and

specify either the geographic area for the child’s primary residence or that the

                                          19
child’s primary residence may be without regard to geographic location.”). “That

the order must include a residence provision . . . does not affect a party’s right to

have the primary residence issue determined by a jury.” See Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 21

(citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 105.002); Garcia v. Harding, No. 01-07-01049-CV,

2008 WL 4965358, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 20, 2008, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (“The fact-finder designates which managing conservator will have the

exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence.”) (citing TEX. FAM.

CODE § 153.134(b)(1)).

      In her Motion to Modify the Initial Order, Claudia rejected the application of

Section 153.134, arguing instead that Section 153.133 is the relevant provision.

Under Section 153.133 of the Texas Family Code, a trial court need not appoint a

parent with the right to determine a child’s primary residence if the parents have

adopted an agreed parenting plan that, among other things,12 provides that “the

child’s primary residence shall be within a specified geographical area.” See TEX.

FAM. CODE §§ 153.133(c), 153.601(4) (defining parenting plan). Claudia argued

that because the parties’ 2016 Agreed Decree was agreed and identified a

12
      See TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.601(4) (defining “parenting plan” as “the provisions of
      a final court order that (A) set out rights and duties of a parent or a person acting
      as a parent in relation to the child; (B) provide for periods of possession of and
      access to the child, which may be the terms set out in the standard possession
      order under Subchapter F and any amendments to the standard possession order
      agreed to by the parties or found by the court to be in the best interest of the child;
      (C) provide for child support; and (D) optimize the development of a close and
      continuing relationship between each parent and the child.”).

                                            20
geographic area for the children’s residence and the trial court did not “render an

order appointing joint managing conservators,” Section 153.133, and not 153.134

applied. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.133(c). She argued then, and argues now, that

the Initial Order’s designation of Isaac as the primary conservator with the

exclusive residence right should be vacated.

      Isaac resisted Claudia’s Motion to Modify in the trial court, arguing the trial

court’s designation of Isaac as the primary conservator with the exclusive right to

designate the primary residence of the children in the Initial Order was not

erroneous because Section 153.134(b) of the Texas Family Code requires a trial

court to designate a joint conservator with that exclusive right. He made the same

argument in his Motion to Disregard Jury Question 3, asking the trial court to grant

him the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children.

      The trial court denied Isaac’s Motion to Disregard, granted Claudia’s Motion

to Modify in part, and issued the Reformed Order vacating the prior designation of

Isaac as the primary conservator with the right to designate the primary residence

of the children.13 While both parties presented arguments for and against the

13
      Like the Initial Order, the Reformed Order provides that Claudia and Isaac are to
      “remain Joint Managing Conservators” of the children. And it further provides
      that “the primary residence of the children shall be within Harris County, Texas
      and contiguous counties, and the parties shall not remove the children” from the
      designated geographic area “for the purpose of changing the primary residence of
      the children until this geographic restriction is modified by further order of the
      court . . . .”
                                          21
designation of Isaac as the parent with the right to designate the primary residence

of the children in the trial court’s Initial Order, neither Claudia nor Isaac challenge

the Reformed Order’s removal of that designation on appeal.             Indeed, in its

Reformed Order, the trial court awarded Claudia the relief she requested as to the

residence right, and she does not appeal that portion of the Reformed Order on

appeal. Isaac likewise did not cross-appeal the denial of his Motion to Disregard

nor does he complain on appeal about the Reformed Order. To the contrary, he

argues the Reformed Order is not void and should be affirmed in all respects.

      Because we have concluded the Reformed Order is not void, and neither

party challenges the Reformed Order on appeal as it concerns the removal of Isaac

as the parent with the residency right, we do not address the parties’ arguments

concerning the application of Section 153.134(b) or 154.133. Those arguments

were made solely in connection with the Initial Order, and no party has raised that

issue on appeal as to the Reformed Order. See Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d

56, 58 (Tex. 1993) (“[T]he courts of appeals may not reverse the judgment of a

trial court for a reason not raised in a point of error.”); see also London v. London,

94 S.W.3d 139, 150–51 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.)

(overruling appellant’s argument trial court violated Section 153.134(b) of Family

Code in its final judgment because appellant did not preserve that issue for appeal);

                                          22
One Call Sys., Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power, 936 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (holding adverse ruling is required

to preserve issue on appeal).

      We overrule Claudia’s first issue.

C.    The Standard Possession Order

      In the Reformed Order, the trial court awarded Claudia a standard

possession order and it ordered her to pay child support to Isaac. In her second

issue, Claudia argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a standard

possession order that “effectively awarded to Isaac the right to determine the

children’s primary residence, in contravention of the jury’s verdict, by giving him

significantly more time with the children.”14      Claudia does not challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s possession order. She

merely argues the Reformed Order is erroneous because it contravenes the jury’s

verdict as to primary residence. Isaac responds that the standard possession order

does not contravene the jury’s verdict because the Reformed Order does not award

either party the right to designate the children’s primary residence.

14
      Claudia does not analyze any child support issues in her brief. She merely states
      that “the possession order likely impacted the trial court’s determination of the
      remaining issues, including allocation of rights and duties and child support.
      Accordingly, Claudia requests the Court remand the case on the remaining issues
      in the order as well.”

                                           23
      “[A] trial court’s possession order may not stand when it effectively

contravenes a jury’s finding regarding a parent’s right to establish a child’s

primary residence.” In re Z.K.S., No. 13-19-00011-CV, 2020 WL 103864, at *4

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing

TEX. FAM. CODE § 105.002(c)(1)); Albrecht v. Albrecht, 974 S.W.2d 262, 265

(Tex. App.— San Antonio 1998, no pet.)). “Once a jury decides the foundational

issues such as conservatorship and the right to establish primary residence, the trial

court determines the attendant terms and conditions.” In re Z.K.S., 2020 WL

103864 at *3. Claudia relies on Albrecht v. Albrecht, In re Z.K.S., and Lenz v. Lenz

in arguing the standard possession order contravenes the jury’s verdict regarding

primary residence. We find all three cases inapposite.

      In Albrecht, a jury determined the father should have the right to designate

his child’s primary residence. 974 S.W.2d at 265. Notwithstanding, the trial court

awarded the father possession of the child from June 1 through December 1 each

year, and the mother possession of the child the remaining six months. Id. at 264.

The father argued that even though the jury had awarded him the right “to serve as

the joint managing conservator with primary care for his son, the trial court

effectively stripped away his rights by giving possession of his son” to the mother

for six months each year. Id. The court of appeals agreed, holding the trial court’s

possession order contravened the jury’s determination that the father had the right

                                         24
to establish the child’s primary residence because the father could not “effectively

serve as joint managing conservator under these conditions.” Id. at 265. Thus, the

appellate court held the trial court abused its discretion in “setting the terms and

conditions for possession of the child.” Id.

      In In re Z.K.S, a jury awarded the mother the exclusive right to designate the

child’s primary residence within the State of Texas. 2020 WL 103864 at *1. After

a bench trial, the trial court issued a possession order providing the father, who

lived 240 miles from the mother, with a “week on/week off” possession until the

child turned five and started kindergarten, at which time the father’s possession

would be governed by a standard possession order. Id. at *1, 3. The mother

appealed, contending the trial court’s “week on/week off” order contravened the

jury’s determination that she would have the exclusive right to designate the

child’s primary residence. Id. at *3. The appellate court concluded that the “week-

on/week-off” order contravened the jury’s finding “because it effectively

establishe[d] two primary residences for Z.K.S., separated by 240 miles.” Id. at

*5.    Thus, the court of appeals held the trial court’s possession order

“impermissibly contravene[d] the jury’s verdict” and could not stand. Id.

      Finally, in Lenz the Supreme Court considered whether the trial court’s

imposition of a geographic restriction on the children’s primary residence

contravened the jury’s verdict on residency. 79 S.W.3d at 11. The mother in Lenz

                                         25
sought modification of her divorce decree to remove a Texas residency restriction

so that she could move with the children to Germany. Id. at 12. The jury

determined the mother should have the exclusive right to determine the children’s

primary residence. Id. In its final order, however, the trial court allowed the

mother to establish the children’s primary residence provided the children lived in

Bexar County, Texas. Id. at *13. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s

order.     Id.   But the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that by

imposing its own primary residence restriction, “the trial court rejected the jury’s

verdict giving [the mother] the exclusive right to decide her sons’ primary

residence and granted the alternative remedy [the father] sought in his motion,

which was to restrict the children’s primary residence to Bexar County.”15 Id. The

Supreme Court stated that, pursuant to Section 153.134 of the Family Code, the

trial court was required “to include certain provisions in its order appointing joint

managing conservators.” Id. at *21. The requirement that “the order must include

a residence provision . . . does not affect a party’s right to have the primary

residence issue determined by a jury.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 105.002).

Although Section 153.134 required the trial court to include a residence provision

15
         In Lenz, the Supreme Court conducted a legal sufficiency review to determine
         whether the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, which allowed the mother the
         right to determine the children’s residence. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.10, 17 (Tex.
         2002). As noted, neither party in the present case questions the sufficiency of the
         evidence that led to the jury’s verdict or the trial court’s possession order.

                                             26
in its order, “the provision had to be in accord with the jury’s verdict giving [the

mother] the exclusive right to determine her children’s primary residence.” Id.

      Albrecht, In re Z.K.S., and Lenz do not support Claudia’s position. In each

of those cases, the jury determined which parent should have the right to determine

the children’s primary residence and awarded that exclusive right to either the

father or the mother. Contrary to the jury’s specific award, in each of the cited

cases the trial court issued orders contravening the jury’s residency finding.

Unlike in Albrecht, In re Z.K.S., and Lenz, the jury in this case did not award any

parent the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the children. There

was thus no jury finding on residency for the court to contravene. Claudia has not

directed us to, and we have not located, any case in which the jury opted not to

designate a parent to determine a child’s primary residence and the trial court

issued a possession order found to contravene the jury’s determination.16

      Claudia’s argument suggests she considers the jury’s verdict that the Agreed

Decree should not be modified to designate either parent as the conservator with

the right to designate the children’s primary residence to be an order for shared

possession of the children. But as Isaac correctly argues, only the trial court may
16
      The jury, given the option to determine which parent should have the ability to
      determine the children’s primary residence, chose not to answer that question
      (under Jury Question 4). No one objected to the jury charge as submitted. And the
      parties do not assert jury charge error on appeal. Indeed, in her reply brief,
      Claudia argues that “[c]ontrary to [Isaac’s] assertions, [Claudia] has not raised an
      argument regarding charge error.”

                                           27
consider issues of access and possession. Such matters are outside the province of

the jury. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 105.002(c)(2)(B) (“[T]he court may not submit to

the jury questions on the issue[] of . . . a specific term or condition of possession of

or access to the child[.]”).17    And the trial court is afforded wide latitude in

determining issues of access and possession. See Escalante, 632 S.W.3d at 580–

81.

      In the Reformed Order, the trial court held that

      in crafting possession and access orders, [it] took into consideration
      several considerations, including the fact that [Claudia] moved over
      an hour away from [Isaac] rendering a standard possession order,
      including overnights during the schooltime, virtually impossible. So,
      the Court finds that the following orders are in the best interest of the
      children: Neither parent is granted the exclusive right to determine
      the residence of the children, which complies with the verdict of the
      jury. [Claudia] is granted a standard possession order that is not
      expanded. The Court finds that it is not in the best interest of the
      children for Mom to be granted an expanded standard possession
      order. All of the other portions of the rendition will remain the same
      ....

17
      See In re S.H., 590 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied)
      (observing that “the specific terms and conditions of possession of or access to a
      child are distinct from the determination of which parent has the exclusive right to
      designate the child’s primary residence. In fact, while the latter issue may be
      submitted to a jury, a trial court is statutorily prohibited from submitting the
      former issue. . . . Thus, the specific terms and conditions of possession and access
      are for the court alone.”) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.002(c)(1)(D), (2)(B)).
      There is a rebuttable presumption that a standard possession order “(1) provides
      reasonable minimum possession of a child for a parent named as a possessory
      conservator or joint managing conservator and is (2) in the best interest of the
      child.” In re Collier, 419 S.W.3d 390, 398 (Tex.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (citing
      TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.252).

                                           28
Claudia does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial

court’s possession and access order. Her challenge is limited to her argument that

the trial court’s possession order is an abuse of discretion because the order

contravenes the jury’s verdict.

      Because the jury did not award any parent the exclusive right to designate

the primary residence of the children, there was no finding on residency to

contravene. See TEX. FAM. CODE §105.002(c) (enumerating issues that, if decided

by jury, may not be contravened by trial judge). We hold the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in awarding Claudia a standard possession order and ordering

her to pay child support.

      We overrule Claudia’s second issue.

                                   Conclusion

      We hold the Reformed Order is not void, and affirm the Reformed Order.

                                            Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                            Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Rivas-Molloy.

                                       29