Court Opinion

ID: 9931042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 15:01:00.861181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:08.627623
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13380   Document: 73-1       Date Filed: 02/08/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                  In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-13380
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       ANGELA W. DEBOSE,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
       THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
       RONALD FICARROTTA,
       Chief Judge, in oﬃcial capacity,
       ELIZABETH GADDY RICE,
       GREGORY P. HOLDER, et al.,
       Individually and Oﬃcial Capacities,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                         22-13380

                                ____________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02127-SDM-AAS
                             ____________________

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Angela Debose, a licensed attorney proceeding pro se, 1 ap-
       peals the district court’s dismissal of her second amended com-
       plaint. Debose asserts the court abused its discretion when it im-
       posed a limited injunction enjoining her from filing further lawsuits
       about her employment at the University of South Florida (USF)
       without the signature of an attorney barred in Florida or the Mid-
       dle District of Florida. Debose also contends the court erred in
       granting the Appellees’ motion to dismiss based on res judicata. Af-
       ter review, 2 we affirm the district court.

       1 Although pro se pleadings are normally liberally construed, Tannenbaum v.

       United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), that rule does not apply to
       a licensed attorney, see Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1194 n.1 (5th Cir.
       1977).
       2 We review an injunction against litigants who abuse the court system for an

       abuse of discretion. Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980).
       “The exercise of the court’s inherent powers is reviewed for abuse of discre-
       tion.” Pedraza v. United Guar. Corp., 313 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2002). “Be-
       cause res judicata determinations are pure questions of law, we review them de
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       22-13380                  Opinion of the Court                                3

                                    I. DISCUSSION
       A. Limited Injunction
              Federal courts have the power to manage their own dockets.
       Smith v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir.
       2014). That power “includes broad discretion in deciding how best
       to manage the cases before them.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
       The Supreme Court has stated a litigant’s constitutional right of
       access may be counterbalanced by the traditional right of courts to
       manage their dockets and limit abusive ﬁlings. In re McDonald, 489
       U.S. 180, 184 (1989). District courts possess the power to issue pre-
       ﬁling injunctions “to protect against abusive and vexatious litiga-
       tion.” Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993).
       We have explained a court has “a responsibility to prevent single
       litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery
       needed by others” and a litigant “can be severely restricted as to
       what he may ﬁle and how he must behave in his applications for
       judicial relief ” as long as he is not “completely foreclosed from any
       access to the court.” Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th
       Cir. 1986) (en banc) (emphasis in original).
              The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting a
       limited injunction against Debose from filing further lawsuits
       about her employment at USF without the signature of a lawyer
       barred in Florida or the Middle District of Florida. The court found

       novo.” Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir.
       2004).
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13380

       Debose had brought a multitude of prior claims in both federal and
       state court regarding the same issues and same Appellees. See Mar-
       tin-Trigona, 986 F.2d at 1387. While Debose argues the injunction
       violated her rights, the injunction did not completely foreclose her
       from filing any new claims because it allows her to file claims re-
       garding her employment at USF as long as an attorney signs off on
       the filing. See Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074. The court also did not abuse
       its discretion by using its inherent authority to issue this injunction
       as it is allowed to control its own dockets. See Smith, 750 F.3d at
       1262.
       B. Res Judicata
               Res judicata bars the parties to a prior action from relitigating
       the same causes of action that were, or could have been, raised in
       that prior action, if that action resulted in a ﬁnal judgment on the
       merits. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.
       2001). Res judicata “generally applies not only to issues that were
       litigated, but also to those that should have been but were not.”
       Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McCoy Restaurants, Inc., 708 F.2d 582, 586 (11th
       Cir. 1983). The bar applies where four factors are shown: (1) the
       prior decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction,
       (2) there was a ﬁnal judgment on the merits, (3) both cases involve
       the same parties or their privies, and (4) both cases involve the same
       causes of action. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1296.
              As to the third factor, we have explained “privity” comprises
       several diﬀerent types of relationships and generally applies “when
       a person, although not a party, has his interests adequately
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       22-13380                Opinion of the Court                          5

       represented by someone with the same interests who is a party.”
       E.E.O.C. v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004).
       As to the fourth factor, “[i]n general, cases involve the same cause
       of action for purposes of res judicata if the present case arises out
       of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same
       factual predicate, as a former action.” Israel Disc. Bank Ltd. v. Entin,
       951 F.2d 311, 315 (11th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted). “In
       determining whether the causes of action are the same, a court
       must compare the substance of the actions, not their form.” In re
       Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1297 (quotation marks omitted).
       “The test for a common nucleus of operative fact is whether the
       same facts are involved in both cases, so that the present claim
       could have been eﬀectively litigated with the prior one.” Lobo v.
       Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 704 F.3d 882, 893 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation
       marks omitted).
              The court did not err when it granted the USF Board of
       Trustees and its members, Greenberg Traurig, P.A., and Richard
       McCrea’s motion to dismiss based on res judicata. Debose’s prior
       state and federal cases had final judgments on the merits. See In re
       Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d at 1296. The previous state court and
       federal court cases involved the same parties or their privies. See
       Penco Aeroplex, 383 F.3d at 1286. In Debose’s previous complaints,
       she sued the USF Board of Trustees and its members, Greenberg
       Traurig, and McCrea. All of Debose’s cases arose out of the same
       nucleus of operative facts as the current case because all of
       Debose’s claims concern or stem from her employment and firing
       from USF. See Israel Disc. Bank Ltd., 951 F.2d at 315. Therefore, the
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       6                          Opinion of the Court                       22-13380

       district court did not err when it found res judicata barred all of
       Debose’s claims against the USF Board of Trustees and its mem-
       bers, Greenberg Traurig, and McCrea.
                                   II. CONCLUSION
              The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
       granted a limited injunction against Debose from filing further law-
       suits about her employment at USF without the signature of a law-
       yer barred in Florida or the Middle District of Florida. The district
       court also did not err when it granted the USF Board of Trustees
       and its members, Greenberg Traurig, and McCrea’s motion to dis-
       miss based on res judicata. Accordingly, we affirm. 3
               AFFIRMED.

       3 Debose did not raise the issue of whether the court erred in granting the

       United States and Thirteenth Circuit’s motion to dismiss for absolute immun-
       ity on appeal and thus abandoned that argument. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Flo-
       ridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating “[w]hen an appellant
       fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district
       court based its judgment, [s]he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of
       that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed”). Debose
       did not discuss the court’s ruling granting judicial and sovereign immunity in
       her initial brief, only discussing it in her reply brief, and has also abandoned
       that argument. See id. at 682-83 (explaining an appellant also abandons a claim
       when, among other things, she raises it for the first time in her reply brief).