Court Opinion

ID: 9819702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:32:01.792441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:21.441260
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COUSINS1, dissenting: While I concur in part with the majority’s answer regarding the ultimate issue in the case, I disagree with the majority’s view that the answer to the ultimate issue “may be ‘yes,’ but only if the record on appeal establishes that the trial conducted in the defendant’s absence violated principles of fundamental fairness and due process under the cause and prejudice test adopted by our supreme court.” 339 Ill. App. 3d at 514. The majority cites to People v. Simpson, 204 Ill. 2d 536 (2001), People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247 (2001), and People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 652 N.E.2d 278 (1995). However, these cases are inapposite. The majority’s rationale conflicts with the reasoning in analogous cases previously decided by this court. In People v. Williams, the court held that a defendant appealing from a denial of a section 115—4.1(e) motion to vacate the conviction and sentence was allowed to have a disposition on the merits of the conviction and sentence in the appeal under section 115 — 4.1(g) of the Code. Williams, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 795. The Williams court concluded that claims relative to the proceedings in absentia could be reviewed on the merits because section 115—4.1(e) makes the appeal on the merits part of the appeal on the ruling of the collateral attack. Williams, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 799. See also Par-tee, 125 Ill. 2d. at 33-34 (citing to People v. Stark, 121 Ill. App. 3d 787, 790, 460 N.E.2d 47 (1984), that section 115—4.1 merely provides defendant with additional means of securing a new trial). The review, however, must be brought within the time frame required by Supreme Court Rule 606(b) from the final order of the collateral proceeding. Williams, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 799. In Stark, this court recognized the possibility that, when properly requested, a defendant tried in absentia may receive review on the merits of the underlying judgment in a section 115—4.1 motion. The court stated: “While it may well be *** that a defendant is given a second bite of the apple when pursuing a motion under section 115—4.1 and, if successful, will undermine an otherwise valid conviction and sentence, this section is in harmony with article I, section 4 of our constitution which confers upon a defendant the right to appear and defend himself in person. Section 115—4.1 is a statutory mechanism to protect this constitutional right. By predicating the granting of a new trial or sentencing hearing exclusively upon defendant’s excusable absence from the jurisdiction, it is apparent that the legislature distinguishes between a direct criminal appeal on the merits and an appeal based upon an alleged violation of defendant’s right to be present at all criminal proceedings. This section was not intended to set forth the appropriate procedure for appealing from a conviction or sentence obtained in absentia-, rather, it merely provides an additional means of attacking the conviction or sentence.” Stark, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 792-93. In People v. Pontillo, 267 Ill. App. 3d 27, 640 N.E.2d 990 (1994), this court again concluded that the collateral remedy under section 115—4.1 of the Code will support an appeal separate from the direct appeal of the underlying judgment. Pontillo, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 33. In Pontillo, the defendant did not file an appeal from the judgment and sentence entered in absentia. Six years later defendant timely filed an appeal from an order denying his motion under section 115—4.1 of the Code. Pontillo, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 28. The Pontillo court noted the following: “Although defendant filed no notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of his 1986 motion for new trial, he filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s November 17, 1992, denial of his motion for new trial or new sentencing hearing under section 115—4.1(e), which allows for the consideration of a defendant’s claim that his absence from trial was both without his fault and due to circumstances beyond his control. Section 115—4.1(g) provides for an appeal from such denial: ‘A defendant whose motion under paragraph (e) for a new trial or new sentencing hearing has been denied may file a notice of appeal therefrom. Such notice may also include a request for review of the judgment and sentence not vacated by the trial court.’ (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115— 4.1(g) (now 725 ILCS 5/115—4.1(g) (West 1992)). Our supreme court has characterized section 115—4.1(e) as a collateral remedy which, under appropriate circumstances, may be utilized by a defendant who has been convicted in absentia as a method of securing review of his conviction. It is analogous to an action for post-judgment relief under section 2—401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2—401 (West 1992)) or an action for post-conviction relief under section 122—1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 122—1 (now codified, as amended, at 725 ILCS 5/122—1 (West 1992))) and will support an appeal separate from a direct appeal of the underlying judgment. People v. Partee (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 24, 31-38. Because a section 115—4.1(e) proceeding focuses solely upon issues relating to a defendant’s absence from trial at the time of his conviction, it is evident that an appeal from the court’s denial of a motion under that section would ordinarily be confined to the same issues. However, section 115—4.1(g) expressly provides a separate device enabling the defendant to obtain, in addition, a review of allegations of error relating to the underlying conviction. Specifically, he must include in his notice of appeal ‘a request for review of the judgment and sentence not vacated by the trial court.’ (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115—4.1(g) (now 725 ILCS 5/115—4.1(g) (West 1992)).) Without such a request, the notice of appeal would necessarily pertain only to issues relating to the order denying his section 115—4.1(e) motion for a new trial or new sentencing hearing, i.e., whether his absence from court was without his fault and due to circumstances beyond his control. An appellate court has jurisdiction of only those matters raised in the notice of appeal. [Citations.]” Pontillo, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 33-34. It appears that the rule proposed by the majority requires the same showing necessary for an evidentiary hearing under section 122—1(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/122—1(a) (West 2000)) be made before a review of merits of an underlying judgment and sentence in a section 115—4.1 motion. This court has drawn a distinction between the two sections of the Code when a postconviction motion was filed instead of a section 115—4.1 motion in People v. Manikowski, 288 Ill. App. 3d 157, 679 N.E.2d 840 (1997). In that case we stated: “The petition presents a serious question of timeliness. It is clearly filed beyond the time constraints imposed on postconviction relief under section 122—1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. 725 ILCS 5/122—1 (West 1992). The question is joined by the allegation that delay was not due to defendant’s culpable negligence. Such a question does not arise under section 115—4.1(e). The potential relief it provides is not limited by the passage of time. Moreover, section 115—4.1(e) requires the precise evidentiary hearing unsuccessfully pursued by the petition. These obvious advantages are overshadowed, however, by the fact that a section 115—4.1(e) motion clears a path to test error that occurred in the conduct of defendant’s trial. Postconviction petitions must demonstrate a process flawed by error of constitutional magnitude. Such petitions do not subject trial error to judicial review. A section 115—4.1(e) motion, however, opens the entire underlying judgment and sentence to further scrutiny. See 725 ILCS 5/115—4.1(g) (West 1992); People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 530 N.E.2d 460 (1988). Since defendant’s conviction and sentence have never been reviewed, even an unsuccessful effort pursued under section 115—4.1(e) harbors an advantage. It provides a direct appeal of the conviction and sentence.” (Emphasis in original.) Manikowski, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 160-61. To the extent that the majority’s opinion in the instant case purports to require defendant to make a showing in the record that the trial violated principles of fundamental fairness and due process under the cause and prejudice test, it is inconsistent with Williams, Manikowski, Stark and Pontillo. The majority cites to no authority that is apposite to support the holding that a defendant tried in absentia must first allege due process violations supported by the record before a review of the merits of the underlying judgment and sentence. Because of the analysis requiring that the trial conducted in a defendant’s absence violated principles of fundamental fairness and due process before a defendant tried in absentia may obtain a review of his conviction and sentence under section 115—4.1 of the Code, the majority declines to address the substantive issues raised in defendant’s brief. In my view, we should address the substantive issues raised in defendant’s brief. Perforce, I dissent.   Justice Cousins participated in the disposition of this case before his retirement.