Court Opinion

ID: 9754519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:02:58.943137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:54.352237
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
I disagree with the assertion that “[t]he language of the Act is straightforward, unambiguous and clear.” Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court. At 411. The substantial arguments made on both sides in this case alone belie this claim. Notwithstanding the need for ascertaining *421the statute’s meaning which thus arises, I am not persuaded of the necessity or usefulness of examining the comparative negligence statutes of numerous other jurisdictions. As has been noted, “no state has a comparative negligence statute identical to that of Pennsylvania.” Id., At 412-413, n. 11. Finally, I question the validity of many of the examples of what would follow if the appellant’s argument were accepted. I find them to be simply straw men whose confutation adds nothing to the strength of the rationale. For these reasons I join only in the interpretation of the Comparative Negligence Act, holding that a plaintiff is precluded from recovery only where his negligence exceeds the combined negligence of all defendants, and that each such defendant is liable for the plaintiff’s damages in proportion to his degree of negligence, even if his portion of the total negligence is less than that of the plaintiff.
I also join Mr. Justice Flaherty’s Concurring Opinion. The unfairness apparent in situations such as this derives from the rule of joint and several liability contained in the statute, placing the burden of rectifying the inequity on one defendant by seeking contribution from co-defendants. The legislature authorized this distribution of the inequities and may modify it if it so chooses.
FLAHERTY and HUTCHINSON, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.