Court Opinion

ID: 9631947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:56:42.080335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:04.540104
License: Public Domain

BROOKS, Judge,
dissenting.
The result reached by the majority represents a classic triumph of form over substance. No matter how ingenious the procedural strategy, Grim simply cannot overcome the effect of our supreme court’s holding in Stephens v. Textron, Inc., 127 Ariz. 227, 619 P.2d 736 (1980).
The majority finds that Grim was aggrieved by the trial court’s denial of her motion to substitute the Industrial Commission as the real party in interest and stresses that Grim sought to substitute or join the commission. Whether that motion sought joinder or only substitution is of no moment. Absent a timely reassignment from the commission, Grim herself had no claim to pursue. Although the commission, if joined or substituted, might have recovered the amount of worker’s compensation benefits that it had paid to Grim, it could not have recovered for any additional losses that Grim herself might have suffered. See Henshaw v. Mays, 20 Ariz.App. 300, 305-07, 512 P.2d 604, 609-11 (1973). Grim’s argument to the contrary is unsupported by relevant authority.
The Industrial Commission has never reassigned the claim to Grim pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1023(B). Even if the commission had been joined or substituted as the real party in interest, once the two year statute of limitations for a personal injury action had passed without a reassignment, the commission simply had nothing to assign to Grim except her time-barred claim. As our supreme court held in Stephens, such an assignment cannot be given retroactive effect. To suggest that the statute of limitations may not be raised in the future is unrealistic. It has been repeatedly raised and argued by these parties during their three year journey through the courts.
In summary, the only way that Grim could have recovered in this case would be to have secured a reassignment of her cause of action from the Industrial Commission prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The procedure suggested by the majority would not accomplish this fact. At best, it would only resurrect *75the Industrial Commission’s claim for recovery of the compensation benefits that it has paid to Grim. It is for these reasons that I would hold that Grim was not aggrieved by the trial court’s order denying substitution of the Industrial Commission as the real party in interest.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.