Court Opinion

ID: 9615289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:33:39.166769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:44.484803
License: Public Domain

MOON, Chief Justice,
dissenting, in which HEEN, Justice, joins.
I agree with the majority’s preservation of our recognition in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Olson, 69 Haw. 559, 751 P.2d 666 (1988), that “insurance policies with uninsured motorist provisions which purport to restrict the applicability of uninsured motorist statutes are void.” Id. at 564, 751 P.2d at 669. I also agree that, pursuant to Olson, the provision of the policy at issue, which limits coverage to other non-named insured, non-family members who are “occupying” the insured vehicle, is void, and that the language of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 431:10-213 (1987 Spec. Pamphlet), applicable at the time of the accident, controls. However, I believe the majority’s analysis runs afoul of two fundamental tenets of statutory construction and imprudently adopts an overly broad rule that will lead to inequitable and undesirable results; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The insurance policy in issue affords UM coverage to “covered persons.” “Covered person” is defined in relevant part as either (1) the named insured or any family member, or (2) “[a]ny other person occupying [the] covered auto.”1 As she is neither the named insured nor a family member of the named insured, the decedent Bockhorn’s only possi*134ble entitlement to coverage under the policy is pursuant to the second category. However, at the time of the accident, the law required that
[n]o automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against ... death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered ... unless the policy provides coverage for the protection of the persons insured who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles ....
HRS § 431:10-213 (emphasis added). Because the policy at issue extends coverage only to those “occupying” the covered auto, it is more restrictive than, and therefore repugnant to, the scope of coverage required by HRS § 431:10-213; thus, the language of the statute must control. Olson, 69 Haw. at 564, 751 P.2d at 669. Consequently, the central inquiry governing Bockhom’s entitlement to coverage changes from whether Bockhorn 'was “occupying” the covered vehicle at the time of her death to whether her death arose out of the “ownership, maintenance or use” of the insured vehicle.
The majority contends that HRS § 431:10-213 does not require a claimant to be engaged in “ownership, maintenance or use” of the insured vehicle at the time of his or her accident to be covered and makes much of the presence of the terms “ownership, maintenance or use” in HRS § 431:10C-301(b)(l) and (2) (1987 Spec. Pamphlet), which addresses liability coverage, and the absence of said terms in subsection (3), which addresses UM coverage. The majority therefore suggests that the terms apply to the “ ‘owner[ ] or operator[ ] of [the] uninsured motor vehicle[]’ causing injury and not that of the insured or ‘covered’ person claiming entitlement to UM benefits.” Majority opinion" at 129 n. 8, 883 P.2d at 50 (emphasis in original).
In order to effectuate the legislative intent underlying UM coverage and to avoid contrary or inconsistent requirements, HRS §§ 431:10-213 and 431:10C-301(b)(3), both of which existed at the time of the accident in the present case, must be read in pari mate-ria with each other. See, e.g., HRS § 1-16 (“Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.”); State v. Kumukau, 71 Haw. 218, 224, 787 P.2d 682, 686 (1990) (recognizing same); Franks v. City & County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 335, 843 P.2d 668, 671 (1993) (court must read statutory provisions in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose).
As previously noted, HRS § 431:10-213 provides in relevant part:
[n]o automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against ... death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered ... unless the policy provides coverage for the protection of the persons insured who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles ....
Id. (emphasis added).
HRS § 431:10C-301(b)(3) provides:
With respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State, liability coverage provided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in section 287-7, under provisions filed with and approved by the commissioner, for the protection of person insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided, however, that the coverage required under this section shall not be applicable where any insured named in the policy shall reject the coverage in writing.
Id. (emphasis added).
As phrased in isolation, section 431:10-213 requires that every automobile liability or motor vehicle liability insurance policy include UM coverage. In other words, section 431:10-213, standing alone, mandates the inclusion of UM coverage in every motor vehicle insurance policy, much like liability and *135property damage insurance. Section 431:10C-301(b)(3), on the other hand, allows the insured to reject the coverage in writing. Thus, when read separately, the two provisions appear to compel different requirements. However, when we examine the original UM statute and its legislative history, it becomes patently clear that in order to effectuate the legislative purpose of the UM statute, both sections 431:10-213 and 431:100-301(b)(3) must be read together.
Both sections have their genesis in a common provision, the original UM statute, HRS § 431-448, which provided in relevant part:
Automobile liability; coverage for damage by uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle, (a) No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, shall be delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed in this State, with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State, unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in section 287-7, under provisions filed with and approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom, provided that the coverage required under this section shall not apply where any insured named in the policy shall reject the coverage in writing.
The following relevant legislative history of section 431-448 clearly indicates that the legislative intent was to create a statutory scheme premised on the insurer’s mandatory offer, and not mandatory inclusion, of UM coverage:
The purpose of this bill is to promote protection through voluntary insurance, for persons who are injured by uninsured motorists who cannot pay for personal injuries caused by motor vehicle accidents. The bill would require all companies writing policies insuring against liability for personal injuries and property damages to offer to their clients “uninsured motorist protection.”
Hse.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 194, in 1965 House Journal at 582 (emphasis added). Therefore, section 431:10-213 must be read together with section 431:10C-301(b)(3) so as to effectuate this intent. Any other interpretation unacceptably would render section 431:10-213 superfluous. See Franks, 74 Haw. at 339, 843 P.2d at 673 (Courts are bound, if rational and practicable, to give effect to all parts of a statute and no clause, sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all words of the statute.); see also Mollena v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 72 Haw. 314, 324, 816 P.2d 968, 973 (1991) (construing subsections (a) and (b) of HRS § 431—448 so as to prevent rendering section meaningless); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Robinol, 699 F.Supp. 819, 822 (D.Haw.1988) (requirement under HRS § 431-448(a) that offers for coverage must be made when policy “shall be delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed” applied to HRS § 431—448(b)).
Therefore, the “ownership, maintenance or use” clause clearly applies to HRS § 431:10C-301(b)(3), notwithstanding the absence of those terms in that subsection, and the scope of coverage mandated by the statute must be interpreted accordingly. The issue thus is: to whom do the terms apply, the uninsured motorist or the claimant?
Section 431:10-213, read in conjunction with section 431:10C-301(b)(3), requires the insurer to offer UM coverage in all motor vehicle or automobile liability policies which “insure against loss for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle,” and UM coverage must be provided “for the protection of the persons insured.” HRS § 431:10-213(a). In accordance with this statutory provision, “the persons who must be insured by the uninsured motorist insurance are those who comprise the class described by the phrase ‘for the protection of persons insured thereunder’ and therefore *136the terms of the liability coverage are to be employed to determine who is insured for purposes of the uninsured motorist coverage.” Widiss, supra, § 2.8 at 38 (emphasis added). Professor Widiss concludes:
[UM] [c]overage for persons who are involved with the “maintenance” or “use” of an insured vehicle arguably is required by the statutory mandates which have been adopted throughout the nation.... Therefore, if a coverage issue arises about the scope of protection when the insurance policy is subject to such a statutory mandate, there is an additional—and very compelling-justification for the view that coverage must be afforded for anyone who is engaged in the maintenance or use of an insured vehicle—that is, anyone who is engaged in the maintenance or use is an insured because such persons clearly are afforded liability coverage without regard to whether they are defined as “insureds” in the coverage terms for the uninsured motorist insurance.
Id. (emphasis added). “Operation, maintenance or use,” therefore, applies to the claimant.
As Professor Widiss also makes clear, the argument for imposition of the statutory scope of coverage in lieu of the scope of coverage as defined by the policy terms is that the terms utilized to define the scope of required coverage in the statute are broader than the terms used to define the scope of coverage within the policy. In other words, as noted above, “ownership, maintenance or use” sets out a broader scope of coverage than “occupying.” Bockhorn’s very argument for relief from the “occupancy” restriction of the policy thus necessarily rests on the fact that “operation, maintenance or use,” as set forth in the statute, both applies to her and is comparatively more expansive than “occupancy.” She is, however, also bound by its concomitant restrictions.
In our interpretation of “operation, maintenance or use,” we also read it in pari mate-ria with the current HRS § 481:100-103(13),2 which defines “operation, maintenance or use” as “occupying, entering into or alighting from” a motor vehicle. See Matter of Hawaiian Telephone Co., 61 Haw. 572, 579, 608 P.2d 383, 388 (1980) (“The legislature has a broad power to define terms for a particular legislative purpose, and the courts, as a general rule of construction, are bound to follow legislative definitions of terms rather than commonly accepted dictionary, judicial or scientific definitions.”).
Thus, the issue in this case is one of pure statutory construction. Specifically, the question in the present case is whether, at the time of the accident, Boekhorn was engaged in the “use” of the disabled vehicle as that term is utilized in HRS § 431:10-213 and defined in HRS § 431:100-103(13).
II.
This court has often noted that, when construing a statute, “our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.” Franks, 74 Haw. at 334, 843 P.2d at 671 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). The plain meaning of the terms utilized in the definition sets up a logical construct contemplating a zone of physical proximity to the insured vehicle. To constitute “operation, maintenance or use,” one must be, to quote the language of the majority, somehow “connected” to the vehicle. Majority opinion at 126-127, 883 P.2d at 47-48. This “connection,” as statutorily established by the words “occupying,” “entering into,” and “alighting from,” undeniably contains a physical proximity element.3 To adopt an interpretive test that ignores this *137characteristic, violates the first principle of statutory interpretation as noted in Franks, and moreover, simply offends common sense.
Review of the legislative history reveals that the legislative intent is in accord with the plain meaning of the terms utilized in the definition. The majority, I believe, unnecessarily parses the language of the applicable legislative history with surgical precision to conclude that the explicit “immediate proximity” limitation of HRS § 431:10C-103(13)(A)4 should be restricted to “conduct in the course of loading or unloading the vehicle.” By so concluding, the majority overrules Olson to the extent it holds otherwise and effectively disregards the fact that the legislature recognized that a claimant’s physical proximity to an insured vehicle is both a relevant and logical characteristic upon which to base the boundaries of coverage. In Olson, the court concluded that “the legislature intended the phrase ‘operation, maintenance or use’ in HRS Chapter 294 to be a term of art which when used throughout the chapter means accidents resulting from activities prescribed ‘in the immediate 'proximity of the vehicle.’ ” 69 Haw. at 563, 751 P.2d at 669 (emphasis added). Although the court may have taken the phrase “in the immediate proximity of the vehicle” out of the “loading or unloading” context, it correctly recognized the legislative intent to utilize a claimant’s physical proximity as a limiting principle to balance the competing concerns of coverage and cost containment, especially in light of the plain meaning of the terms in the definition.
The utility of the legislative history in our analysis of the definition of “use” lies not as much in the specifics of the language, but rather in what it reveals about the concerns that were before it when the statute was being worded, that is, the insurance industry’s uneasiness with the prospect of being statutorily required to cover vehicle-related injuries that occur physically distant from the vehicle itself. In earlier drafts of the statute, loading and unloading activities were included, without limitation, in the definition of “operation, maintenance or use.” Hse. Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 28, in 1974 House Journal at 866; see Majority opinion at 131-132, 883 P.2d at 52-53. Uneasy with the language, the insurance industry recommended the exclusion of all such losses, that is, while loading and unloading, “requiring instead that a victim must be ‘occupying, entering’, or ‘alighting from’ a vehicle at the time of loss [in order] to be covered.” Hse. Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 28, in 1974 House Journal at 866. Specifically, the industry voiced concern over the “costly danger of having claims made for injuries sustained during loading operations which, in fact, were far removed from the parked, hut insured, vehicle.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, insurers were concerned about injuries arising out of situations where a victim lacks a proximate physical relationship to the insured vehicle. The industry, however, was not similarly concerned with such a lack of physical proximity in the balance of the definition and was content to rely on a definition that confined “operation, maintenance or use” to “occupying, entering into or alighting from” a motor vehicle. Consistent with the relationship of physical proximity inherent in the plain meaning of the terms, the industry was not concerned with the inclusion of an explicit “immediate proximity” limitation in the definition of “operation, maintenance, or use,” because the definition, in and of itself, clearly encompassed that requirement.
Admittedly, the discussion memorialized in the committee report, see Majority opinion at 131-132, 883 P.2d at 52-53, arose out of a discussion of no-fault coverage and “loading *138and unloading”; however, the specific concern before the legislature clearly indicated an awareness regarding the effects of the absence of a physical proximity requirement and the costs of coverage.5 A fair reading of the legislative history supports the conclusion that, in light of the plain meaning of the terms, an immediate physical proximity requirement is implicit in HRS § 431:10C-103(13); the addition of an explicit limitation would have been superfluous and redundant.6 Thus, although its analysis may have been slightly flawed, I submit that the court in Olson, by adopting the phrase “in the immediate proximity of the vehicle” from the loading and unloading context, was nevertheless correct in interpreting the legislative intent and, accordingly, reached the correct result.
It is also important to note that, to the extent the majority overrules Olson, it also overrules Colonial Penn Insurance Co. v. First Insurance Co. of Hawai‘i, 71 Haw. 42, 780 P.2d 1112 (1989) to the same extent. In Colonial Penn, this court reaffirmed Olson ⅛ recognition that the “immediate proximity” limitation applied generally to the phrase “operation, maintenance, or use” wherever it was used in the insurance code, and further applied it to the insurance policy phrase “vehicle occupied by the injured person.” Id. at 44, 780 P.2d at 1114.
Moreover, to support its position in derogation of Olson, the majority states that “the purpose underlying the Hawaii UM statutes is not limited to the protection of ‘users of motor vehicles!,]’ ” Majority opinion at 131, 883 P.2d at 52 (emphasis in original), and cites to the language of the former HRS § 431^48 (1976) (now HRS § 431:10C-301(b)), asserting that it “mandated that auto policies extend UM coverage for the protection of all insured ‘persons ... who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners and operators of uninsured motor vehicles!.]’” Majority opinion at 131, 883 P.2d at 52 (emphasis in original). This argument obfuscates the issue because it simply restates the obvious, that is, that all insured persons are covered, and begs the very question at issue in this case. I submit that no one would disagree that if a person exercised his or her option to purchase UM. protection and an insured under the policy was subsequently injured by an uninsured motorist and was legally entitled to recover damages, that person should be covered. The issue here, however, is who is insured.
III.
We have often noted that “a departure from a literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd ... result and the literal construct in the particular action is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act.” Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 60, 868 P.2d 1193, 1207 (1994) (quoting Franks, 74 Haw. at 341, 843 P.2d at 674). The majority violates this principle, improperly departs from the plain meaning of the statute and the legislative history, and adopts a rule that will ironically produce the absurd results it allegedly attempts to avoid.
The “absurdity” ostensibly relied upon by the majority in justifying its departure from the physical or immediate proximity requirement of the statute is that, if Shimp, the driver of the insured vehicle, and Bockhorn, the passenger, were both struck by the uninsured motorist one mile down the road from the disabled vehicle, Shimp would be covered and Bockhorn would not, “although both had been occupants of the insured vehicle and both were identically situated with respect to *139the uninsured Honda Accord.” Majority opinion at 127, 883 P.2d at 48 (emphasis added). Such a result cannot be deemed an absurdity and, •with all due respect, the majority’s conclusion that the result is absurd is simply wrong.
Under the majority’s hypothetical, Shimp and Bockhorn were indeed both occupants of the vehicle at one time, and both were struck by the same vehicle. However, in the context of insurance coverage, the two are worlds apart. As Professor Widiss notes, “the conditions under which the coverage is provided for individuals in each of these three groups7 or classes of insureds [as set out by the policy] is distinctly different. Therefore, when confronted with disputes about whether a claimant is an insured, it is essential to begin the analysis upon which the claimant seeks to be covered as an insured.” Widiss, supra, § 4.1, at 59 (emphasis added). Shimp derives his entitlement to coverage based on his status as a family member of a named insured, who entered' into a contract of insurance with the insurer and paid premiums in exchange for coverage, not because he was an occupant of the vehicle. As a “family member,” Shimp’s coverage under the policy is relatively comprehensive. As Professor Widiss notes, ‘“Clause (a)’ insureds [i.e. named insureds and “family members”] are protected when they are operating or are passengers in a motor vehicle, as well as when they are engaged in any other activity such as walking, riding a bicycle, driving a hay wagon, or even sitting on a front porch.” Widiss, supra, § 4.2 at 60-61.8 Bockhorn’s entitlement to coverage, however, would arise only by virtue of her status as an occupant of the Shimp family’s insured vehicle. This distinction is supported by the relevant legislative history, which provides:
An insurance company offering uninsured motorist protection engages to pay to the insured, spouse or minor children or either, resident in the named insured’s household, sums not to exceed the stated limits, for any uncollectible valid claim or unsatisfied judgment for damages resulting from bodily injury or death, resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile.
Hse.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 194, in 1965 House Journal at 582 (emphasis added). In interpreting this legislative history, we have previously noted:
The avowed-purpose of the [UM] statute is to encourage self-protection against the financially irresponsible motorist through voluntary insurance. To make this realistically possible, it requires liability insurance companies to offer their clients this protection in at least the minimum amounts established by the financial responsibility law. The policy required under the financial responsibility law is for the protection of the public generally, while uninsured motorist insurance is for individuals who have the foresight to protect themselves against the financially irre*140sponsible motorist. The statute was clearly designed to enable the purchaser of the latter type of insurance to assure himself and the members of his household of not less than the minimum protection provided for the general public in the financial responsibility law. The uninsured motorist policy is personal to the insured. This is what he bargained for, and one which he was encouraged to purchase by the legislature.
Palisbo v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., Ltd., 57 Haw. 10, 15, 547 P.2d 1350, 1354 (1976) (underscoring added) (bold in original). The legislature made explicit its intent to accord full UM protection to a named insured and his or her family. Nowhere is there voiced a similar intent to accord coextensive coverage to passengers of insured vehicles, let alone former passengers, long since separated from the insured vehicle by time, space, and state of mind.
In other words, Shimp and his family are covered for bodily injury or death under their UM policy as pedestrians because they bargained and paid for the coverage. Here, the patent, sensible, and ultimately fair distinction as recognized by the legislature between Shimp and Bockhorn is that Bockhorn never paid a single premium to the insurer; accordingly she is not entitled to the same scope of coverage as Shimp. The supposed “absurdity” as set forth by the majority is unfounded and cannot form the basis in which to depart from the intent of the legislature.
The majority contends that if this court were to recognize a physical proximity limitation on “use,” “neither Shimp nor Bockhorn would be entitled to UM benefits.” Majority opinion at 127-128 n. 12, 883 P.2d at 48-49. First, as noted above, the only provision of the policy in contravention of the statute, and thus in issue in the present case, is the provision limiting coverage to other non-named insured, non-family members who “occupy” the vehicle; coverage as to “family members,” like Shimp, remains valid and is consistent with the legislative intent to offer coverage to those with the foresight to purchase insurance to protect both themselves and their families. Second, as Professor Widiss notes, although the uninsured motorist insurance must protect all classes of persons who are protected by the liability coverage, “the uninsured motorist insurance may define insureds so as to provide coverage for persons who would not be covered by the associated liability insurance coverage.” Widiss, supra, § 5.2 at 198.
IV.
Further, I believe the majority unwisely relies on the “chain of events” test utilized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Sanders, 803 P.2d 688 (Okla.1990), in fashioning its rule. Safe-co addresses a different outcome-dispositive issue. In Safeco, claimants Laura Lee Sanders and Michael Houghton were sitting-in Sanders’ father’s automobile when they were subdued by Scott Allen Hain and Robert Wayne Lambert. Id. at 689. After forcing Sanders to drive for a short distance, Hain and Lambert directed her to stop, forced Houghton out of the car, took his money and his keys, tied him up, and locked him in the trunk of the vehicle. Id. Either Hain or Lambert then drove the car for a short distance, stopped, and locked Sanders in the trunk with Houghton. Id. Hain or Lambert drove the vehicle back to the site of the abduction and then, with Hain driving Sanders’ vehicle and Lambert driving Houghton’s truck, drove to an isolated area. Id. With Sanders and Houghton locked in the trunk of Sanders’ car, Hain and Lambert cut the vehicle’s fuel line, set the fuel afire, and burned the car. Id. Hain and Lambert then left the scene in Houghton’s truck; Sanders and Houghton died as a result of thermal burns and smoke inhalation. Id.
The Sanders’ vehicle was insured under an automobile policy issued by Safeco, which included UM coverage. The personal representatives of the estates of Sanders and Houghton filed claims for UM benefits. Safeco denied the claims and commenced a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, which in turn, certified *141four questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.9
Unlike the present ease, where the outcome-dispositive issue is whether the claimant was engaged in “use” of a vehicle at the time of her injury, the outcome-dispositive issue in Safeco was whether Hain and Lambert, as uninsured motorists, were engaged in the use of an uninsured vehicle. The Safeco court explained:
The requirement in subsection B of § 363610 that the insured be legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle implies an intent that there be a connection between the motoring or transportation use (use related to the inherent nature of a motor vehicle) by an uninsured motorist and the injury to the insured. Therefore, a two-prong test is necessary to determine whether an injury is within the UM coverage contemplated by § 3636: 1) is a use of the vehicle connected to the injury; and 2) is that use related to the transportation nature of the vehicle. If the injury is within the mandate of § ‘3636, then it is causally connected to the use of a motor vehicle.
Id. at 692 (emphasis added). The Safeco court was thus primarily concerned with Oklahoma’s statutory language “legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle” and how that statutory requirement applied to the uninsured motorists, Hain and Lambert.11
Furthermore, in concluding that Sanders and Houghton were engaged in “use” at the time they were killed in the trunk of the insured vehicle, the Safeco court specifically held that “if the facts establish that a motor vehicle or any part of the motor vehicle is the dangerous instrumentality which starts the chain of events leading to the injury, the injury arises out of the use of the motor vehicle, as contemplated by 36 O.S.1981, § 3636.” Id. at 692 (emphasis added). Phrased in its entirety, it is clear that the test arises from a different context and addresses an entirely distinct problem. On its face, the rule simply does not apply to the present situation because neither the Shimp vehicle nor any part of it could be characterized as a “dangerous instrumentality which start[ed] the chain of events leading to [Bockhorn’s] injury.” Id.
In addition, consistent with the primary question in the case, the Safeco court ultimately ruled in favor of the insurer based on the third certified question, holding that *142“acts of an uninsured motorist which are not related to the transportation nature of a motor vehicle and which result in injury to the insured constitute acts of independent significance which sever the causal connection between the use of a motor vehicle and the injury.” Id. at 694. The court noted:
Under the facts certified to this Court, the acts of cutting the fuel line and igniting the fuel after the car was parked, which caused the car to burn, are so contrary to its [sic] transportation nature of the vehicle that, as a matter of law, these events are not related to its transportation nature and injury resulting therefrom is not within the UM coverage mandated by § 3636.
Id. at 695.
Because it turns on a completely different issue stemming from different statutory language, Safeco reasonably cannot be said to stand for the proposition that a claimant, one mile away from a disabled vehicle, is engaged in “use” of the disabled vehicle and, thus, forms an improper legal context from which to derive the rule in the present case.
Moreover, Safeco is factually distinguishable from the present case. Unlike the present ease, .the Safeco claimants were physically proximate to, and were clearly “occupying” the insured vehicle. As Sanders and Hough-ton were locked in the trunk of the insured vehicle, they were physically proximate to the vehicle.
Similarly, all of the cases relied upon by Safeco, which included Olson, also involve situations where the claimants were either in or within a reasonable physical proximity of the insured vehicles and are, thus, inapposite to the present case. In Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mouse, 268 P.2d 886 (Okla.1954), the case relied upon by the Safeco court for the “chain of events” rule, the claimant (Mouse) was injured when he fell from a combine he was transporting after the combine’s breather pipe became lodged in the top of a bridge, and he was directed to climb onto the combine to dislodge the pipe. Id. at 889. The court held that Mouse was engaged in “use” of the truck at the time of his injury and was thus entitled to liability insurance benefits, and also explicitly noted that, in considering whether the truck was the mechanism that caused Mouse’s injury, “in all reported cases where the cause of the injury was something physically attached to or immediately connected in some manner to the vehicle or its operation, the injury resulted from the use of the vehicle[.]” Id. at 889.
In Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Mitchell, 373 So.2d 1129 (Ala.Civ.App.1979), the decedent insured’s yard man beat and choked her, wrapped her in a blanket, placed her in the trunk of her insured vehicle, and ultimately abandoned the vehicle. She died from lack of food, water, and oxygen. The decedent’s family sought coverage under their UM policy and was denied coverage because, among other reasons, the decedent was not engaged in “use” of the vehicle at the time she died. On appeal, the Alabama Civil Court of Appeals remanded the case, noting that “[w]hether [the decedent’s] death resulted from the ‘use’ of the automobile is a factual matter to be decided by the trier of fact in the wrongful death action, not in [the] declaratory judgment action.” Id. at 1135.
In Gilbertson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 845 F.2d 245 (10th Cir.1988), two claimants were injured and one was killed when the tortfeasor dropped a fifty-one pound rock from a freeway overpass onto their car as it passed below. The claimants sought coverage under their UM policy. The Tenth Circuit of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the insurer, noting “the real question in [the] case is one of causation,” and held that “[the tortfeasor’s] exiting the car, removing the rock from the car, carrying the rock to the edge of the overpass, balancing it on the ledge and then allowing it to fall, taken together, constituted an act of independent significance which broke the causal link between the use of the [tortfeasor’s uninsured] car and the [claimants’] injuries.” Id. at 248.
Finally, in Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Waggoner Drilling Co., 340 P.2d 490 (Okla.1959), a case dealing with liability insurance, a drilling company contracted with a trucking company to dismantle, transport, and reassemble a drilling rig. The rig was *143damaged during reassembly, and the drilling company sued the trucking company for the damage. The trucking company’s liability insurer denied coverage, asserting, inter alia, that the accident did not result from an operation or use of the truck on the highway. Id. at 493. The court held that as the disas-sembly, loading, unloading, and reassembly of the oil rig constituted one continuous act of transportation, the operation or use of the vehicle had a “proximate and necessary connection with the operation and use of the vehicle upon the highway....” Id. at 495.
As demonstrated by the above discussion, Safeco addresses a very different coverage issue and arises from a very different factual context, and is not the case upon which to rely to craft a rule for the present case.
Finally, the majority gleans a “new” rule not only from a foreign legal context, but also imprudently excises the rule out of context from the case itself. By extracting only the expansive definition of “use” in Safeco and ignoring the accompanying analysis regarding the causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the murders, the majority adopts an excessively broad principle similar to a “but-for” test. The majority’s proffered rule also completely ignores a claimant’s status as a non-named, non-family member under the policy. Moreover, because “[tjhere is hardly any activity in our society which is not preceded by the use of an automobile!,]” Gilbertson, 845 F.2d at 248, the “new” rule affords virtually limitless coverage once a claimant has occupied an insured vehicle.
Under the test as adopted by the majority, the coverage question would amount to a simple inquiry into whether the claimant was injured in the broad and unqualified subsequent “chain of events.” In other words, if the injury was caused by an uninsured motorist after occupancy of an insured vehicle, the claimant is covered, regardless of time, physical distance, or, seemingly, even intervening events.
Most importantly, under the test as formulated by the majority, there apparently is no need to examine the cause of an otherwise uninsured passenger leaving the vehicle. Thus, whether the passenger leaves a vehicle because it breaks down or is simply parked, or because he or she was dropped off at some destination, according to the new rule, UM coverage continues to be extended to the former passenger for some undefined period of time or distance from the insured vehicle. Although the majority states that “the critical element [for UM coverage] with respect to [persons who have been passengers in an uninsured vehicle but are injured by uninsured motorists while pedestrians] is a sufficient ‘connection with the insured vehicle[,]’ ” Majority opinion at 132, 883 P.2d at 53, and concludes that “as a matter of law ... there was a ‘causal relation or connection between [Boekhorn’s death] and the use of the insured vehicle,’ ” Majority opinion at 127, 883 P.2d at 48 (emphasis added), the test completely disregards the critical element of a causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the injury.
The majority’s “new” rule will undoubtedly lead to absurd results. For example, assume the same facts as the present case, that is, a non-named insured, non-family member passenger is riding in an insured vehicle driven by a named insured or family member of a named insured and the vehicle breaks down. If the passenger then hitchhikes and receives a ride from a second insured vehicle and that vehicle is struck by an uninsured motorist which causes injury to the passenger, the passenger would potentially be covered under both vehicles’ insurance because, under the majority’s test, the incident would have occurred during the “chain of events” subsequent to the occupancy of the first insured vehicle. In the event the second vehicle was uninsured and was involved in a one-car accident, injury to the passenger would be covered by the first vehicle that was insured. The same result would achieve if the passenger hitchhikes and subsequently receives rides from multiple insured or uninsured vehicles which break down in turn before an accident with an uninsured vehicle. What if the disabled vehicle was a large van or bus? Under the majority’s test, if all passengers then go their separate ways and each receives injuries caused by an uninsured motorist, all passengers would be covered under the UM policy applicable to the van, bus, or *144its drivers, again regardless of time or physical distance. Taken further, in light of our decision in Ganiron v. Hawai‘i Insurance & Guaranty Association, 69 Haw. 432, 744 P.2d 1210 (1987), where we held that an insured can recover under a UM policy for injuries inflicted upon him or her by a gunshot from an unidentified individual in an unidentified vehicle, any of the van or bus passengers, who sustain injuries as a result of a drive-by shooting while walking miles away from the insured vehicle, would be covered by the insurance applicable to the van or bus and thus entitled to UM benefits.
The majority states that the above-noted hypothetieals “represent some interesting examples,” and that “[ijndeed, under some of them, a claimant may not be entitled to UM coverage as a matter of law.” Majority opinion at 132 n. 23, 883 P.2d at 53. The majority takes issue with the contention that their rule affords virtually limitless coverage once a claimant has occupied an insured vehicle, but is also suspiciously reluctant to explain which claimants in which hypothetieals would not be entitled to coverage and why. The majority’s response that a claimant may not be entitled to UM coverage as a matter of law in “some” situations implies that the amorphous “chain of events” may be broken, but the majority refuses to shed any light on what could serve to break it, or even what holds “the chain’s” links together. I would submit that as the test stands, unqualified and unchecked, the “chain” encompasses all accidents caused by an uninsured motorist after a claimant’s occupancy of an insured vehicle and seemingly cannot be broken.
Y.
I believe these results do not comport with the legislative intent and are not in accord with the statutory scheme of providing insurance to the consumer “at the most reasonable and lowest cost,” Sen.Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 689, in 1985 Senate Journal 1181, and surely could not have been anticipated, much less intended, by the legislature when it defined the scope of “use” in the UM statute.
Accordingly, because any test purporting to effectuate the legislative intent underlying the plain meaning and legislative history of HRS §§ 431:10-213 and 431:100-103(13) at the very least must incorporate a reasonable physical proximity limitation, and in light of the majority’s admission that Bockhorn, as a matter of law, was not in a reasonable physical proximity to the insured vehicle,121 would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of FICH.

. Most UM policies across the nation employ this categorical scheme to define coverage. See, e.g., 1 A. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance, § 4.1, at 59 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter, Widiss] (referencing 1966 Standard Form, Part II: Persons Insured).

. HRS § 431:10C-103(13) provides in pertinent . part:
Operation, maintenance or use with respect to a motor vehicle includes occupying, entering into and alighting from it, but does not include:
(A) Conduct in the course of loading or unloading the vehicle, unless the accidental harm occurs in the immediate proximity of the vehicle[.]
HRS § 431:10C-103(13) (1987 Spec. Pamphlet).

. Webster’s New International Dictionary (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter, Webster's] defines “occupy” in relevant part as “to fill up (a place or extent) ... to take up residence in ... to hold possession of.” Webster’s, supra, at 1560. "Occupy” also *137means "to take or fill up (time, space).” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 920 (Rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter, Random House ].
"Enter” is defined in relevant part as "to go or come into a material place; make a physical entrance or penetration.” Webster’s, supra, at 756; "to come or go into; to penetrate or pierce: the bullet entered the bone.; to put in or insert: to enter a wedge under a door.” Random House, supra, at 441.
"Alight” is defined in relevant part as “to spring down, get down, or descend (as from horseback or a vehicle); dismount.” Webster's, supra, at 53; “to dismount from a horse, descend from a vehicle, etc.” Random House, supra, at 34.

. See supra note 2.

. The insurers' concerns conveyed to the legislature were well-founded because the scope of coverage for a claimant, deriving entitlement to coverage by virtue of "operation, maintenance, or use” is obviously related to the claimant’s physical proximity to the insured vehicle. A potential claimant clearly encounters a greater number of risks of bodily injury the farther he or she ventures from the physical proximity of the insured vehicle. Failing to recognize a limitation, based on a claimant's physical proximity to the vehicle, would undoubtedly require an insurer to cover more risks and to spread the attendant costs of such coverage by increasing its premium schedules for all insureds accordingly.

. In light of the majority's conclusions, and for prospective purposes, an explicit pronouncement by the legislature regarding the physical proximity limitation inherent in HRS § 431:10C—103(13) would be prudent.

. According to Professor Widiss, uninsured motorist insurance generally provides coverage for three distinct groups or classes of persons:
(a) The named insureds identified in the Declarations and, while residents of the same household, the spouse and relatives of the named insureds;
(b) Any other person while occupying a covered or insured vehicle; and
(c) Any person with respect to damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in (a) or (b) above.
Widiss, supra, § 4.1 at 59.

. The majority's cite to Couch aptly sets forth the rationale in distinguishing between Shimp and Bockhorn:
[Ujninsured motorist coverage ... creates two classes of persons who can recover: on the one hand, the named insured, and while resident of the same household, the spouse of any such named insured, and relatives of either; and on the other, those who use, with the consent, express or implied of the named insured, the vehicle to which the policy applies and those who are guests in such vehicle.... [S]econd group persons are only covered when an accident takes place while they are occupying, operating or using the insured vehicle. This is to be contrasted with the fact that first group persons are not required to be associated with the insured auto in order for coverage to attach .... Coverage for the first of the classes listed above, but not for the second, extends to an injury suffered while a pedestrian.
Majority opinion at 124, 883 P.2d at 46 (quoting 12A J. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 45:635, at 130-32 (R. Anderson and M. Rhodes 2d ed. 1981) (footnotes omitted)).

. The four certified questions read as follows:
1. Does the murder of [the decedents] when they were murdered by being burned to death in the trunk of the automobile in question "arise out of the ... use of the motor vehicle” as contemplated by 36 O.S. § 3636?
2. If the deaths arose out of the use of a motor vehicle, was there a causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the murders?
3. If the causal connection existed, do the acts of [the murderers] after the car was parked, constitute acts of independent significance to sever any causal link?
4. Were [the murderers] "operators of (an) uninsured motor vehicle" when they set the vehicle on fire and murdered [the decedents]?
Safeco, 803 P.2d at 690.

. The Oklahoma statute relating to UM coverage, 36 Oklahoma Statutes 1981 § 3636 provides in pertinent part:
(A) No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be issued, delivered, renewed, or extended in this state with respect to a motor vehicle registered in this or principally garaged in this state unless the policy includes the coverage described in subsection (B) of this section.
(B) The policy referred to in subsection (A) of this section shall provide coverage therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles or hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death therefrom. Coverage shall not be less than the amounts or limits prescribed for bodily injury or death for a policy meeting the requirements of Section 7-204 of Title 47, Oklahoma Statutes, as the same may be hereafter amended....
36 O.S.1981 § 3636 (emphasis added).

.The Safeco court also held that because Oklahoma law holds that a motor vehicle is uninsured when it is driven by an uninsured motorist, the vehicle listed in the Safeco policy became uninsured when it was operated by Hain and/or Lambert, who were uninsured, just before setting fire to the vehicle. 803 P.2d at 695-96.

. The majority states, "we do not believe, on the record before us, that any reasonable trier of fact could find Bockhom was in a reasonably close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle at the time of the accident; accordingly, it is apparent as a matter of law that she was not." Majority opinion at 127, 883 P.2d at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).