Court Opinion

ID: 9713505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:16:35.618094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.049773
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: As the majority properly notes, our court has consistently upheld the retroactive application of a shortened statute of limitations as long as potential litigants are allowed a “reasonable time” in which to bring an action following enactment of a statute. (Meegan v. Village of Tinley Park (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 354; Hupp v. Gray (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 78.) However, while acknowledging our court’s past position, this court today negates the right of the defendant to rely on it. The court’s reasoning is based on the tenuous proposition that the “culpable negligence” safety valve in the post-conviction statute is an adequate substitute for the “reasonable time” standard. Indeed, the majority contends that reliance on the culpable negligence standard “could conceivably provide a more expansive right to post-conviction relief than a ‘reasonable time’ rule might” (124 Ill. 2d at 88), although the majority offers no support for this belief. Review of the pertinent case law indicates the utter fallacy inherent in the majority’s reasoning. My research failed to find even one appellate or supreme court case in which a post-conviction petition was allowed based on a “showing that the delay was not due to *** culpable negligence.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 122 — 1. In People v. Reed (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 169, the allegation of “numerous errors” was not enough “to show that failure to file the petition was not the result of culpable negligence.” (42 Ill. 2d at 172.) People v. Diefenbaugh (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 73, held that the pro se defendant was not excused from culpability despite the fact that at the trial court level he specifically offered the following three reasons for delay in filing: (1) he had only a sixth-grade education and was not aware of the law regarding post-conviction proceedings; (2) he was in jail and had no available funds with which to retain an attorney; and (3) counsel was not appointed until after the statute of limitations had run. (40 Ill. 2d at 74.) Our court indicated that “[n]one of these reasons are sufficient to demonstrate a lack of culpable negligence” (40 Ill. 2d at 74), before it also went on to find that failure of the trial court to respond to documented repeated requests for transcripts of proceedings was not enough to show a lack of culpable negligence on the part of the defendant (40 Ill. 2d at 75). The question of what is sufficient proof to show a lack of culpable negligence was again before our court in People v. Montgomery (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 94. The defendant in Montgomery offered verification of his mental illness to support his contention that he was not culpably negligent and therefore should be allowed to file his petition for a post-conviction hearing. Despite our court’s review of several psychiatric reports which “indicate[d] a condition of mental disturbance” (45 Ill. 2d at 96), the dismissal of the defendant’s petition was affirmed because there was “not *** a sufficient showing that defendant’s delay was due to causes other than his culpable negligence” (45 Ill. 2d at 96). As these cases indicate, the criteria necessary to show a lack of “culpable negligence” have been construed quite narrowly. I see no reason to depart from our prior positions on both the “reasonable time” standard and the “culpable negligence” standard. To deny the defendant in the instant case his reliance on the “reasonable time” standard because “he need only have alleged facts justifying the delay in filing” (124 Ill. 2d at 88) is to patently misstate the scope of our prior holdings. The majority’s “culpable negligence” substitute is no substitute at all. Additionally, I note that the majority indicated this court’s adoption of the appellate court approach in People v. Robinson (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 29. (124 Ill. 2d at 84.) I find this puzzling because that decision, while it noted our court’s prior holdings upholding the retroactive application of a shortened statute of limitations, denied the defendant’s late post-conviction hearing petition only because it was not filed within a “reasonable time” after the statute was amended to shorten the statute of limitation. I find no justification for the majority’s departure from our well-accepted “reasonable time” standard. Because defendant’s petition was filed within five weeks of the effective date of the amended statute, I would remand to the circuit court for a post-conviction hearing. I therefore respectfully dissent and would affirm the unanimous holding of the appellate court. JUSTICE STAMOS joins in this dissent.