Court Opinion

ID: 6963537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-24 01:49:45.509134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:08:04.293865
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Scott delivered the opinion of the Court: Under the facts as they must have been found, from the evidence, by the trial and Appellate courts, it is a question of law what duty defendant owed to plaintiff and other passengers on the train at the time the injury was inflicted upon plaintiff, and whether any liability rested upon defendant. Upon these questions the trial court instructed the jury, it was the duty of defendant, as a common carrier of passengers, “to exercise the utmost care, skill and vigilance to carry plaintiff safely, and to protect him against any and all danger, from whatever source arising, so far as the same could, by the exercise of such a degree of care and vigilance, have been reasonably foreseen and prevented.” It is said this instruction does not announce the law with entire accuracy,—that it required a higher degree of care to be observed by defendant for the safe carrying of a passenger than the law imposes,—and in that respect was misleading. It is freely conceded there is a marked distinction between the liability of a common carrier as to freights and passengers. As to freights, the carrier is an insurer, and is obligated to carry and deliver safely, at whatever hazard, and from that" obligation it can only be relieved by “the act of God” or the public enemy. But the carrier is not an insurer of the absolute safety of the passenger to be carried. Its liability in that respect is limited by care and diligence. What degree of care the common carrier must observe for the safety of a passenger on its train, to exonerate it from liability for injury, is a question of law. The rule of law is quite well understood, that as to the selection of suitable machinery and cars, the fitness of the road, both as to manner of construction and materials used, and in the use of all appliances adopted for the government or moving of trains, and as to the selection and retention of competent and faithful servants, the carrier of passengers is obligated to use the highest reasonable and practicable skill, care rind pligence. This principle of law is not called in question, but the argument is made, that in guarding passengers from dangers and perils not incident to ordinary railway travel, the carrier is only to be held to the use of ordinary and reasonable care and diligence. The distinction taken is not without support, both in reason and authority. So far as the machinery and cars furnished for the carriage of passengers, the fitness of the road-bed, and the competency and faithfulness of the servants employed, and in the use of the best known mechanical appliances to insure safety, are concerned, the passenger must rely solely on the carrier, and can do nothing to insure his personal safety. It is for that reason the carrier, in this respect, is obligated to the highest reasonable and practicable skill and diligence. The safety of passengers requires the strict and rigid observance of this rule against all carriers, by rail or otherwise; but as to dangers and perils not incident to ordinary perils by any mode of travel, the rule of liability imposed upon the carrier of passengers by law is less stringent. The carrier, however, must omit no care to discover and prevent danger to a passenger or passengers that is reasonable and practicable. The public exigency and security demand this much of the carrier at all times and under all circumistanees. It is the duty of carriers by rail to preserve order in their carriages, and to protect passengers from all dangers, from whatever source, arising on their trains, whether from the dangerous and violent conduct of other passengers or otherwise. To this end all conductors in this State, while on duty on their respective trains, are invested by statute with police power. With regard to danger and hazard to travel arising otherwise than on the train, and not incidents of such travel, the degree of care to be observed to discover and prevent all danger to and consequent injuries to passengers, must depend in a large measure on the attendant circumstances. No doubt in many cases, if the carrier observes ordinary care and diligence to discover and prevent injury to passengers, such as any prudent person would do for his own personal safety, it will be exonerated from liability. In other cases and under other circumstances it will, no doubt, be the duty of the carrier to exercise the utmost care, skill and diligence to protect the passengers from danger and injury, so far as the same, by the exercise of such care and skill and diligence, could have been reasonably and practicably foreseen and anticipated in time to prevent injury. In no case must the carrier expose the passenger to extra-hazardous dangers, that might readily be discovered or anticipated by all reasonable, practicable care and diligence. It is upon this latter principle, if at all, that defendant can be held liable for the personal injuries received by plaintiff. So far as any question of fact is involved, it will be presumed it was found against defendant by the trial court. There is some evidence that would warrant the jury in finding defendant’s servants were fully advised it was a dangerous service to take off and put on the non-union workmen at the dock gate. It must have been found they knew a desperate ■and wicked mob, consisting of great numbers, was organized there, to prevent, at all hazard, whatever the consequences might be, the taking on of these men, and that it could only be done by the aid of a powerful and efficient police force. Prior to the time the plaintiff was injured, the box cars containing these laborers had been assailed, and it might reasonably have been inferred the danger to passenger cars on the same account was imminent, and common prudence should have induced the taking of extraordinary precautionary measures. It could have been readily ascertained, upon the slightest inquiry, the fury of the mob had in no degree abated. Seasonably it might have been inferred it would be dangerous to continue to take on and put off the laborers in the midst of that lawless assembly of rioters. Even ordinary care would have discerned the danger. "Under the circumstances, the law would charge defendant with negligence in stopping a train filled with passengers, in the midst of a howling, revengeful, lawless mob, to take on persons whom the mob were seeking an opportunity to maltreat. The defendant was under no legal obligation to stop its train at the point in question, as it was not a station designated for that purpose. To do so was a needless and unwarrantable exposure of the lives and persons, of passengers to imminent peril. This train, filled as it was with men, women and children, as it may be presumed it was, stopped at a point not a station, in the midst of a fierce mob,, and the objects of its vengeance taken into the same car with passengers. This was unwise and hazardous in the extreme, to say the least of it. At all events, the offensive persons should have been placed in a car to themselves, where they could have been protected, or could have protected themselves, without danger to regular passengers who had not previously been advised as to the danger to be encountered. Some of the passengers, it seems, were advised by the conductor it-would be dangerous to remain in the smoking car, where the-laborers were to be received, but plaintiff was not so advised. It is said none of the officers had any knowledge the rioters-intended to or had any purpose to attack defendant’s passenger train at Brighton Park, or elsewhere, at that or at any other time. That is no doubt true. Had the officers of the road been informed the rioters purposed an attack on the passenger train of defendant, at Brighton Park or elsewhere, it. would have been criminal negligence to have exposed the passengers to such peril, without a sufficient police protection, and which would have been inexcusable for any reason or upon any ground. No such negligence can be imputed to defendant under the facts of this case. But defendant ought reasonably to have anticipated the mob might attack its train to reach the-object of their vengeance, so soon as it had passed from the protection of the police, and precautionary measures should have been taken. Such a thing was likely to occur at any near-distance from the eentr.al point of the disturbance. A like-attack had been made prior to that time, two miles distant, upon the laborers that had been carried in the box car. On this occasion the mob seems to have been more violent than usual, and the utmost care and vigilance should have been taken to prevent the .injury to passengers. The verdict is a sufficient warrant for the conclusion, reasonable precautions were not observed. Some criticism is made on the instruction given, in the use of the word “such,”- and in the use of the words “care, skill and diligence,” but the distinction taken in this respect is too subtle to be warranted by any fair reading o’f the instruction. After a most careful consideration it is thought the first instruction given for the plaintiff, of which complaint is made, states the law applicable to the facts of this case with sufficient accuracy, and there is no just ground for complaint on that score. It might be that in another case, where the facts are materially different, the instruction would not be applicable, and might be held to impose a degree of care and skill not enjoined by the law. What is said of the first instruction is sufficient to dispose of the objections to the other instructions, and they need not be further discussed. It may be conceded the fifth instruction of the series given for plaintiff, is in some respects slightly inaccurate, but not seriously so. The injury suffered by plaintiff is so serious in its consequences, the judgment in his favor ought not to he reversed for any mere subtle objection to an instruction, not warranted by the substantial justice of the case. Objections are also taken to the refusal of the court to give a number of instructions asked by defendant, and to the modification of others by the court. It is seen the instructions for defendant are quite numerous, and state the law very favorably to the defence sought to be made. It may be conceded, as is done, that some of the instructions refused might have been, with propriety, given, had not others been given containing substantially the same proposition. The court was under no duty to repeat the same thing, although expressed in different language and differently formulated. It would have aided, in no proper way, the defence defendant was endeavoring to make. It is assigned for error the court permitted counsel, in his closing argument, to make statements of facts not in evidence, to the prejudice of defendant, and to address the jurors by name, and to propound questions to them, and receive answers to such questions, against the objection of defendant. It may be, counsel indulged in intemperate language not justified by anything in the case; but the manner of conducting the oral argument before the jury is so much within the discretion of the trial court that this court will hesitate to interfere, unless it should appear manifest injustice was done. It is the duty of the trial court to require counsel to keep always within the bounds of propriety, and to be mindful of the rights of others who are not permitted in that presence to make reply. The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.