Court Opinion

ID: 9919427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 15:14:23.498631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:27.664879
License: Public Domain

For Publication
                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

PEDRO DECOSTA and IVA DECOSTA                        ) S Ct Civ No 2019-0095
    Appellants/Plaintiffs                            )   Re Super Ct Civ No 383/2008 (STX)
                                                     )
v                                                    )
                                                     )
SAMUEL E EBBESSEN                                    )
  Appellee/Defendant                                 )
                                                     )
                                                     )
                                                     )

                     On Appeal from the Superior Court ofthe Virgin Islands
                                      Division of St Croix
                            Superior Court Judge Hon Jomo Meade

                                      Argued March 9 2021
                                      Filed January 18 2024

                                         Cite as 2024 VI 7

BEFORE         RHYS S HODGE, Chief Justice MARIA M CABRET, Associate Justice, and
               IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES
        Jeffrey B C Moorhead, Esq
        Jeffrey B C Moorhead P C
        St Croix, U S V I
                Attorneyfor Appellants

        Kevin A Rames, Esq
        Law Ofﬁces of K A Rames, P C
        St Croix, U S V I
               Attorneyfor Appellee

                                 OPINION OF THE COURT
CABRET, Associate Justice
Decosta v Ebbessen                         2024 VI 7
S Ct Civ No 2019 0095
Opinion of the Court
Page 2 of 17

{I      Iva and Pedro DeCosta (“DeCostas”) appeal the Superior Court 8 November 27, 2019

order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Samuel E Ebbessen (“Ebbessen”), in

their action seeking title to 14 King Cross Street, Christiansted through adverse possession As

the DeCostas are unable to satisfy the hostility requirement of their adverse possession claim,

this Court will afﬁrm

                     I   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

112    On November 5, 1962 Ebbessen took title and possession of 14 King Cross Street,

Christiansted, U S VI ( Property”) (JA 48, JA 270) As a member of the military services,

Ebbessen’s duties required him to be away from St Croix for extended periods of time IA 270

In his absence, Ebbessen employed several attorneys and property management agencies to

perform the day to day management responsibilities regarding the Property, one of them being

the Eileen Morris Reality Agency (JA 260 61) Ebbessen continued paying all required property

taxes despite his absence, and never transferred ownership of the Property (JA 48, IA 263-65)

1l3    On November 27, 1975 John and Iva DeCosta began occupying the Property with their

ﬁve children Pedro Cheryl, Tyrone John Jr and Troy (JA 35 36 168 69 205) Upon entering

the Property, John DeCosta paid $70 00 a month in rent to a man known to the family as “Mr

Gibbs ’ (1A 36 37, 86 97) After an unspeciﬁed period, Mr Gibbs informed John DeCosta that a

woman named Eileen Morris (“Morris”) would be collecting the rent for the Property from that

point on (IA 37 38, 208) Morris would either visit the Property to collect rent or John DeCosta

would visit Morris at her ofﬁce to provide payment (JA 37 38) During this time, the DeCostas

did not know Ebbessen owned the Property and they never signed a lease agreement (IA 208)
Decosta v Ebbessen                         2024 VI 7
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Opinion of the Com
Page 3 of 17

1|4    John DeCosta made timely rental payments until he died in 1987 (JA 38) Following

John’s death, Iva DeCosta continued paying rent until Hurricane Hugo hit St Croix in 1989 (JA

38) Ebbessen was on military assignment in Alaska at the time of Hurricane Hugo and was

informed that the Property suffered severe hurricane damage (JA 260 61) Ebbessen assumed

the Property was uninhabitable and abandoned after the hurricane (JA 261)

1[5    But Iva DeCosta and her children continued to live on the Property, and shortly after

Hurricane Hugo, Iva DeCosta unsuccessﬁJlly searched for Morris to continue paymg rent (JA

38 39) In her attempt to locate Morris, Iva visited Morris’s ofﬁce where she learned for the ﬁrst

time that Ebbessen was the owner of the Property (JA 39-40) Iva DeCosta then went to the “tax

oﬁice” to inquire about contacting Ebbessen to pay him rent directly (JA 39-40) There, a man

named Mr Magras informed her that Ebbessen “went away" and possibly died (JA 40) After

several failed attempts at paying rent the DeCostas remained on the Property rent free and made

no further attempts to contact Ebbessen until 2005 (JA 40 206)

16     In 2005, Pedro DeCosta obtained a St Thomas mailing address for Ebbessen from the

Recorder of Deeds in an attempt to contact him for a second time JA 206 Pedro DeCosta wrote

and mailed a letter to the St Thomas address, however, Ebbessen never received the letter nor

did he learn of Pedro DeCosta s attempted contact (IA 206 07 270 71)

17     After another failed attempt at contacting Ebbessen, the DeCostas, once again remained

on the Property rent free (IA 42) During their time on the Pr0perty, the DeCostas paid utility

bills and received mail in their name and did regular maintenance and repairs (JA 198, 217) The

DeCostas also made improvements to the Property, such as planting a garden, building a wooden
Decosta v Ebbessen                           2024 VI 7
S Ct Civ No 2019 0095
Opinion of the Court
Page 4 of 17

structure around the cistern, and mplacing the outer boards and windows of the house (JA 198,

274) The DeCostas did not seek a government issued building permit or inspection when

making or completing repairs (IA 50) Additionally, the DeCostas did not lease the Property to

third parties, nor did they ever use the Property as collateral for any loan (JA 50)

1|8    In 2008, an organization known as the Women’s Coalition of St Croix organized a

program that offered to paint buildings in disrepair in an effort beautify downtown Christiansted

(IA 52) To participate in the program, the Women’s Coalition required individuals to provide

documentation (e g , a deed) proving they were the owners of the property subject to potential

renovations (IA 243) When a volunteer for the program, Donette Audain, approached the

DeCostas with an offer to paint 14 King Cross Street, the DeCostas informed her that they could

not authorize participation in the program because they did not own the Property and did not

have the requisite documents demonstrating ownership (JA 52, 243 44) Pedro DeCosta

speciﬁcally informed Audain that “the home is not theirs’ and that “they rent it ” (JA 243-44)

19     After the Women’s Coalition learned that the DeCostas could not authorize participation,

an attorney with the program contacted Ebbessen seeking his permission to paint the Property

(JA 270 71) It was during this exchange in 2008 when Bbbessen ﬁrst learned that the Property

was occupied (JA 270 71) Before this Ebbessen believed the Property was “uninhabitable

because of its decrepit condition” following Hurricane Hugo JA 270 27] Ebbessen also stated

that he drove by the Property multiple times ﬁom 1998 2008 and continued Its deplorable

condition (1A 271) Ebbessen, in his afﬁdavit supporting his motion for summary judgment,

indicated that he had “no knowledge of [the DeCostas’] occupancy and had not granted anyone

permzssion to live there ” (IA 270 71) (emphasis added)
 Decosla v Ebbessen                                 2024 VI 7
 S Ct Civ No 2019 0095
 Opinion of the Court
 Page 5 of 17

1110      Ebbessen’s counsel served the DeCostas with a forcible entry and detainer summons as

well as an eviction summons shortly after discovering they were still on the Property (IA 53) In

reSponse to the eviction notice, the DeCostas ﬁled a veriﬁed complaint with the Superior Court

on July 25 2008 alleging title to the Pr0peny by adverse possession (JA 53 JA 11) After a

lengthy discovery process Ebbessen ﬁled a motion for summary judgment on December 12,

2012 (IA 138) In his motion, Ebbessen asserted that the DeCostas commenced possession of

the Property as permissive tenants because they were paying rent on a monthly basis upon

entering the premises (JA 133) Ebbessen ﬁmher argued that the DeCostas could not satisfy the

hostility requirement of their adverse possession claim because they did not give Ebbessen

actual notice of a superior claim to title following their permissive entry, nor did they effectively

repudiate their existing tenancy to graduate from permissive tenants to adverse possessors (IA

133 35)

1[11     On February 12 2013 the DeCostas filed a counterstatement of material facts and on

April 10, 2017 the DeCostas ﬁled a supplemental brief in reply to Ebbessen’s motion for

summary judgment ' (IA 55, 268) The DeCostas argued that they were never permissive tenants

as there was never a formal lease agreement executed between the parties and Ebbessen never

granted anyone permission to live there (JA 267) For this reason, the DeCostas maintained that

' The DeCostas claimed the following material facts were in dispute (1) Iva and Pedro DeCosta were never
tenants/lessees of Ebbessen nor were they ever given permission to reside on the Property (2) Iva and Pedro
DeCosta never paid monthly rent, only John DeCosta paid monthly rent, (3) The property was not nninhabitable
alter Hurricane Hugo; (4) The DeCostas did not attempt to pay anyone rent aﬁer Hurricane Hugo, (4) Pedro
DeCosta wrote to Ebbessen in 2005 to advise him of his claim of ownership and to inquire about purchasing the
adjacent property, not to inquire about purchasing No 14 King Cross Street, (5) The DeCostas declined
participation in the Paint and Scrape project because they could not provide the deed to the Property, not because
they were not “owners ” (M 56-62)
Decosta v Ebbessen                                2024 VI 7
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Opinion of the Court
Page 6 of 17

they were never required to give actual notice of repudiation and their possession of the Property

remained hostile for the required statutory period (JA 267)

112      The Superior Court entered summary judgment in favor of Ebbessen on November 27,

2019 (JA 273 8|) The Superior Court, relying on this Court’s decision in Peppertree Terrace v

Williams, 52 VI 225 (VI 2009), reasoned that the DeCostas were permissive tenants under

Title 28 V I C § 831 and that their deposition testimony about monthly rent paid from 1975 to

1989 was proof of a periodic, month to month, tenancy Peppertree, 52 VI at 232 (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY LANDLORD AND TBNANT § 1 5 cmt d (1977))2 The

Superior Court then concluded that as permissive tenants, the DeCostas were required to

expressly notify Ebbessen of any hostile intent to change their status from permissive tenants to

adverse possessors (JA 273 81) As there was no evidence in the record to establish that the

DeCostas gave Ebbessen actual notice of their hostile intent within the statutorily required time

period, the Superior Court granted Ebbessen’s motion for summary judgment (JA 271 81) The

DeCostas timely ﬁled this appeal on December 13 2019 (JA 1)

                         II JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

113     This Court “[has] jurisdiction over all appeals arising from ﬁnal judgments, ﬁnal decrees

or ﬁnal orders of the Superior Court, or as otherwise provided by law ’ V I CODE ANN tit 4, §

32(a) Because the Superior Court's November 27, 2019, memorandum opinion and order

granting summary judgment to Ebbessen was a ﬁnal order within the meaning of section 32(a),

1 Although Peppemee is a pte-Banks decision relying on the Restatement this Court adopted the same deﬁnition of
a periodic tenancy in Alvarez v Estate ofKeel 73 V l 538 545 (V l 2020)
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Opinion of the Court
Page 7 of 17

this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal Machado v Yacht Haven U S V! , LLC, 61 V I 373,

379 (V I 2014) (citing Perez v Ritz-Carlton (V I) Inc 59 V I 522 527 (V I 2013))

1|l4    This Court exercises plenary review of Superior Court decisions granting summary

judgment Kennedy Fundmg Inc v GB Props Ltd, 73 V1 425 431 (V I 2020) (citing Joseph

v Daily News Publzshmg Company Inc , 57 VI 566, 581 (VI 2012)) “[W]hen reviewing a

grant of summary judgment on appeal, this Court sits in the same position as the Superior Court

and applies the same summary judgment test that governs the Superior Court's decision ” Id

“Because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, it should be granted only when ‘the pleadings,

the discovery and disclosure materials on ﬁle, and any afﬁdavits show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ’”

Kennedy Funding, 73 VI at 431 (quoting VI R ClV P 56(0), Williams v United Corp , 50

VI 191 194 (V I 2008) (quoting former wording of FED R Cw P 56(C))                  Accordingly

when reviewing the record, thls Court must view the inferences to be drawn from the underlying

facts in the light most favorable to the non moving party, and we must take the non moving

party‘s conﬂicting allegations as true if ‘supported by proper proofs ’” Kennedy Fundmg, 73 V I

at 431 (citing thhams, 50 V I at 194) The movant may satisfy his burden simply by “pointing

out to the     court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case ”

Aubam v Kan Foods ofthe VJ Inc 70 V I 943, 948 (VI 2019) (citing Williams 50 VI at

194) Once the moving party meets his burden, the non moving party then has the burden of

“set[ting] out speciﬁc facts showing a genuine issue for trial ” Kennedy Fundmg, 73 V I at 431

(citing WtIIIams, 50 VI at 194)
Decosta v Ebbessen                          2024 V17
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Opinion of the Court
Page 8 of 17

1]15    1n proving a genuine issue for trial, the non moving party may not rest upon mere

allegations but must present actual evidence See Anderson v Ltberty Lobby Inc , 477 U S 242,

248 (1986) The evidence presented may be direct or circumstantial, but “the mere possibility

that something occurred in a particular way is not enough, as a matter of law, for a jury to ﬁnd it

probably happened that way     Kennedy Fundmg, 73 VI at 431 (citing Saldana v Kmart Corp ,

260 F 3d 228 232 (3d Cir 2001)) To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving partys

evidence must ‘ amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the evaluatlon of the

court) than a preponderance ” Id (citing Saldana, 260 F 3d at 232) (internal quotation marks

omitted) The trial court must not undertake the task of weighing the evidence or determining the

truth of the competing allegations, rather, it must “decide only whether there is a genuine issue

for trial such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non moving party ” Id (citing

Anderson 477 U S at 255)

                                         III DISCUSSION

1116   The Superior Court granted Ebbessen summary judgment because it found that the

factual record did not provide clear and convincing proof of the DeCostas’ hostile occupation of

the Property (JA 281 82) Pursuant to title 28 § 11 of the Virgin Islands Code adverse

possession is established by the “uninterrupted, exclusive, actual, physical adverse, continuous,

notorious possession of real property under claim or color of title for 15 years or more ” “The

party asserting adverse possession bears the burden of proving all the required elements by clear

and convincing evidence ” Mahablr v Hem of George, 63 VI 651, 659 (V I 2015) (citing

Szmpson v Golden Resorts LLLP 56 VI 597 606 (VI 2012))
Decosta v Ebbessen                         2024 VI 7
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Opinion of the Court
Page 9 of l7

       A Permissive Tenancy

117      The DeCostas present several interrelated issues for appeal, nearly all which concern

whether the Superior Court erred in ﬁnding them to be permissive tenants by virtue of paying

rent from 1975 to 1989 The DeCostas argue that they were never permissive tenants because

they never personally executed a formal written lease agreement with Ebbessen, nor did they

assent to the terms of John DeCosta’s agreement to pay rent The DeCostas also rely heavily on

Ebbessen’s statement in his afﬁdavit that he “had not granted anyone permission to live [on the

Property] See Ebbessen Aff 1| 9

1|18     Title 28 V I C § 831 deﬁnes the term “tenant” to include “a sub tenant, lessee, sub-

lessee, or other person entitled to the use or occupancy of any housing or business

accommodations, other than the owner ” The Virgin Islands recognizes several distinct

categories of landlord tenant relationships, one being a periodic tenancy See Alvarez v Estate of

Keel, 73 V I 538, 545 (V I 2020) A periodic tenancy is “[a] lease (written or oral) of no stated

duration, with rent to be paid monthly " Id at 545 (citing thltams, 52 VI at 232) Periodic

tenancies will continue indeﬁnitely until properly terminated by one of the parties 1d Under the

Code, proper termination of a periodic tenancy requires 30 days written notice or 14 days in the

event of nonpayment of rent 28 V I C § 752

1H9      Here, the DeCostas commenced possession of the Property as permissive tenants No one

disputes that John DeCosta paid a woman named Eileen Morris and a man named Mr Gibbs

$70 00 in monthly rent from the time he entered the Property in 1975, until his death in 1987

This is evidenced by both the deposition testimony of Iva and Pedro as well as rental catalogues
Decosta v Ebbessen                           2024 V17
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Opinion of the Court
Page 10 of [7

listing each month the DeCostas paid rent from 1975 to 1989 The record also reﬂects that

Ebbessen utilized Morris 3 real estate agency, The Eileen Mom's Reality Agency, to manage the

Property and collect rent in his absence These two pieces of evidence, when taken together,

demonstrate that Morris was collecting rent on Ebbessen’s behalf The undisputed monthly rental

payments are in and of themselves sufﬁcient to prove that a periodic tenancy existed when the

DeCostas entered the Property in 1975 See Williams 52 V I at 232 (holding that an undisputed

fee with rent to be paid monthly “created a month to month tenancy that continued until it was

properly tenninated by one ofthe parties’)

1|20   Despite the DeCostas’ contentions, it is immaterial that there was never a formal written

lease agreement executed between the parties because in the Virgin Islands a periodic tenancy

may be created orally Williams, 52 VI at 23! (holding that leases for an unspeciﬁed term or

leases not to exceed one year may be created orally) (citing 28 V I C §§ 241 242) In fact

periodic tenancies are typically informal arrangements Id [t is also immaterial that Iva and

Pedro were not parties to John DeCosta’s oral agreement and that they did not expressly agree to

the terms of John’s arrangement to pay rent The Virgin Islands Code deﬁnes the term “tenant

broadly to include “persons entitled to occupy the premises other than the owner ” 28 V I C §

831 Although Iva and Pedro did not meet Ebbessen nor expressly agree to the terms created by

John DeCosta, as wife and son of John DeCosta, they were nevertheless entitled to occupy the

premises when the DeCostas entered the Property That said, the DeCostas repeatedly point to

the statement in Bbbessen’s afﬁdavit that he had not granted anyone permission to live on the

preperty But the DeCostas have failed to provide any factual evidence to substantiate their

assertion that this statement should be applied retroactively to the period before Hurricane Hugo
Decosta v Ebbessen                                    2024 V17
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Opinion of the Court
Page 11 of l 7

The DeCostas cannot get around the fact that they entered the Property as permissive tenants,

and that the sole reason they ceased paying rent is because they could not ﬁnd Ebbessen to pay

him Ebbessen’s affidavit states that up until 1985 he had other pe0ple manage the property,

including collecting rent (JA 270) The DeCostas themselves admitted that the family paid rent

from 1975 to 1989 (JA 266) Consequently this statement the DeCostas point to simply

demonstrates that the DeCostas’ periodic tenancy likely transformed into a tenancy at sufferanee

following Hurricane Hugo 3 Nonetheless, there is no evidence in this record to dispute the fact

that the DeCostas were paying rent upon entering the Property in 1975 and therefore had

permission to reside on the Property until Hurricane Hugo

       B Hostile Intent

1121      The next issue on appeal is whether the DeCostas, who entered the property as

permissive tenants, can satisfy the hostility requirement of their adverse possession claim The

DeCostas' primary argument is that they were never permissive tenants On the other hand,

3 This Court has not expressly adopted a deﬁnition or rule regarding tenancies at sufferance, however, what
constitutes a tenancy at sufferance is widely accepted and a majority of U S jurisdictions have adopted a similar
deﬁnition H1!” Dobrowolskt, 484 A 2d ll23 “25 (N H 1984) ( A tenancy at sufferance has been described
generally as "an interest in land which exists when a person who had a possessory interest in land by virtue of an
effective conveyance, wrongﬁrlly continues in the possession of the land aﬁer the termination of such interest, but
without asserting a claim to a superior title (citing 2 R Powell, The Law of Real Property § 259, at 396 3 (Rohan
rev ed 1983) (quoting Restatement of Property § 22 (1936)») Commach Corp v AspenwoodApl Corp 417
S W 36 909, 915 (Tex 2013) (“[A] tenant at sufferance is ‘[a] tenant who has been m lawful possession of property
and wrongfully remains as a holdover aﬁer the tenant‘s interest has expired                   (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1605 (9th ed 2009)) Willis v Harrell, 45 S E. 794 795 (Ga l903)( A tenant at sufferance holds over
by wrong, and he is in possession, not by permission of the landlord but as a result of his laches or neglect ”), Bran);
v Scan 175 So 724, 724 (Fla 1937) (“[A] tenant at suﬁerance enters lawﬁrlly and holds over wrongfully without
the land owner's assent or dissent ”), Hamburg v Lobree 38 Cal 563, 563 (Cal I869) (“At the expiration of the
term for which the premises were leased, the defendant, by holding over. became a tenant at sufferance ”), Wolfe:- v
Hurst, 80 P 419, 42] (Ore 1905) (“At common law a tenancy at sufferance was created when a person came into
possession of land lawfully and held over wrongfully aﬁer his estate had ended ’) Sorensen v Hendry, 69 P 2d
llld, lll‘l (Kan 1937) ("A tenancy at sufferance arises only when a person comes into possession lawfully but
holds over wrongfully, aﬁer the termination of his interest ")
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Opinion of the Court
Page 12 of 17

Ebbessen reiterates on appeal that the DeCostas never expressly notiﬁed him of their hostile

intent and therefore never became adverse possessors following their permissive entry

1122    Hostility is one of six statutory requirements that must be satisﬁed to prevail on an

adverse possession claim 28 V I C § 11 As many courts applying Virgin Islands law have

previously stated, “there is no ﬁxed rule or mechanical formula [to] determine if possession is

hostile ” Mahabzr, 63 V l at 659, see also McNamara v Christian, 26 V I 109, 112 (Terr Ct

1991), Tutein v Daniels, 10 VI 255 263 (D VI 1973) “It is the intention of the adverse

claimant upon entering the property that ﬁxes the character of his possession ” McNamara, 26

V I at 112 When a claimant enters the property with the record title holder’s permission, “such

possession cannot acquire the character of adverse possession until the presumption of continued

subservience is rebutted ” Alvarez, 73 V I at 546 (quoting Andrews v Nathan1e1,42 V I 34, 39

(VI Super Ct 2000)) This is so because “[p]ossession cannot be adverse if the possessor

recognizes a superior ownership interest in the property, as possession, under those

circumstances, is not hostile to the owner's interest " Alvarez, 73 V I at 546

193    Generally, entry by virtue of a lease or the payment of rent bars adverse possession

claims as either or both actions implicitly recognize a superior claim of another to the property

and therefore, possession is not adverse or hostile See id at 545-46 “Although paying rent

defeats a claim of adverse possession, the failure to pay rent, standing alone, does not compel a

ﬁnding of adverse possession ” Id at 548 Thus, the true question of hostility following a

permissive entry is whether the claimant gave the record title holder proper notice of their

adverse or hostile intent See 1d at 546
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Opinion of the Court
Page 13 of 17

1124    When the Superior Court issued its November 27, 2019, memorandum opinion and order

this Court had not yet established whether notice of hostile intent following a permissive entry

must be communicated actually or constructively Consequently, the Superior Court engaged in a

Banks analysis and determined that a claimant must give actual notice of hostile intent to

transform a permissive entry into an adverse one Because the DeCostas could not provide

evidence of such actual notice, the Superior Court granted Ebbessen’s motion for summary

judgment However, in 2020, one year after the Superior Court made its determination, this

Court held that constructive notice that property is under a claim of ownership can transform a

permissive tenancy to a hostile claim Alvarez v Estate ofKeel, 73 V I 538 (V l 2020)

125    In Alvarez, the claimant rented a plot of land under an 18 month lease and used the

property as a barber shop 73 V I at 543-44 The claimant had originally occupied the property

with the owner's permission under a lease, and when the lease expired, the claimant continued

paying rent on a monthly basis Id Aﬁer some time, the owner passed away and the claimant

remained on the propeny without paying rent to the owner’s descendants Id The claimant

continued running his barber shop, paid property taxes on the land for over 20 years, made

signiﬁcant improvements and repairs, and requested a government issued loan to repair the

property 1d The claimant ﬁled an actuon to quiet title and was eventually awarded ownership of

the land through adverse possession Id This Court found that “[c]onstructive notice that

possession is under a claim of ownership is sufficient to transform a permissive entry to a hostile

claim ” Id at 551 In determining whether a claimant put the owner on sufﬁcient constructive

notice, the court will must look to actions taken on the land that are “unambiguous hallmarks of

ownership ” Id at 550 In Alvarez, this Court held that the claimant’s “actions were sufﬁcient,
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Opinion of the Court
Page 14 of 17

when taken together, to give the owner constructive notice that someone else was acting as

owner of the land ” Id at 549

1126    Unlike the claimant in Alvarez, however, the DeCostas failed to place Ebbessen on

sufficient constructive notice of their adverse or hostile intent Although Alvarez and the instant

case are similar in the sense that the claimants in both cases entered the respective properties as

permissive tenants, the cases are distinguishable in signiﬁcant ways First, the claimant in

Alvarez paid property taxes on the land for over 20 years while the DeCostas, in contrast, did not

pay any property taxes for over 20 years Payment of property taxes can be signiﬁcant evidence

in determining whether a landowner was placed on sufficient constructive notice Alvarez, 73

V I at 550 (ﬁnding that payment of property taxes is an unambiguous hallmark of ownership)

Their failure to do so weakens the DeCostas’ adverse possession claim, especially considering

that Ebbessen paid all required property taxes while the DeCostas remained in possession of the

Property Ebbessen’s payments illustrate his continued interest in maintaining ownership of the

Property See Edmond: v Thurman 808 S W2d 408 410 1] (Mo App Ct 1991) (ﬁnding the

landowner and their predecessors in title paid property taxes from 1962 onward and this weighed

against adverse possessor’s claim)

127    In addition to paying property taxes, the claimant in Alvarez took numerous other actions

on the land which “demonstrated to the landowners that Alvarez's interest was possessory and

therefore adverse ” Alvarez, 73 V I at 550 In Alvarez, this Court speciﬁcally noted that,

       Certainly a tenant cannot obtain a leased property by adverse possession simply
       by paying property taxes, but in addition to possessing the property exclusively
       for more than 50 years, [the claimant] also unilaterally took other actions that a
       landowner would normally undertake, including making numerous improvements
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Opinion of the Court
Page 15 of l 7

        and repairing the property aﬁer hurricane damage, without any prior agreement
        that he would do so, including undertaking an SBA loan to accomplish such
        improvements and repairs

Id Here, the DeCostas did not present similar proof of ‘ unambiguous hallmarks of ownership”

of the Property The DeCostas did not rent the Property out to third parties, they did not take out

liens or mortgages against the Property, nor did they use the Property as collateral for a loan, and

they never held themselves out as owners of the Property to third parties And while the

DeCostas point out that they paid all utility bills and received mail at the Property, these are

acnons commonly taken by both tenants and owners alike The DeCostas made some

improvements and repairs to the property, such as replacing some of the outer boards of the

house and replacing the ﬂooring in the kitchen (JA 198) However, these improvements and

repairs were neither extensive nor signiﬁcant, in the sense that they did not materially change the

character of the Property Indeed, the record shows that Ebbessen had passed by the Property

multiple times between 1998 and 2008, and that during these observations, the Propeny

remained largely unchanged in a dilapidated and unsafe condition This is distinguishable from

the actions of the claimant in Alvarez, whose repairs were so signiﬁcant he was able to maintain

a business on the premises The evidence the DeCostas point to is not enough to establish

constructive notice of the DeCostas’ adverse or hostile intent

128    The ﬁnal, and most Important, distinction from the circumstances reviewed in Alvarez is

that the DeCostas have consistently recognized Ebbessen’s superior claim of ownership to the

Property In Alvarez, the claimant ran a business on the premises and held himself out as the

landowner to customers and third parties In contrast, the DeCostas consistently asserted that
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Opinion of the Court
 Page 16 of 17

they were merely renting the property and did not hold themselves out as owners This is

evidenced by Iva DeCosta’s repeated attempts to pay rent following Hurricane Hugo as well as

Pedro DeCosta’s statement     that they “rent” the Property   to Audain when asked to participate

in the Women’s Coalition Program           The DeCostas’ attempts to pay rent and their

acknowledgment to a third patty that they did not own the property are actions which recognized

Ebbessen’s superior claim to title, even though they never actually paid tent after Hurricane

Hugo Additionally, while the claimant in Alvarez ﬁled a quiet title action to establish that he

was the owner of the land, here the DeCostas ﬁled an action for adverse possession only aﬂer

Ebbessen served them with an eviction notice This illustrates that the DeCostas only asserted a

claim to ownership when it became clear that Ebbessen would not allow them to remain on the

Property

1l29    The circumstances surrounding the Property show that Ebbessen was not alerted to the

DeCostas' intention to assert ownership at any point The ongoing state of disrepair of the

Property, and the DeCostas‘ failure to hold themselves out as owners, both indicate a lack of the

required hostility in the DeCostas’ actions As a result, their adverse possession claim catmot be

sustained, as they fail to meet the crucial requirement of "hostility" for establishing adverse

possession

                                       IV CONCLUSION

1130   The DeCostas have not demonstrated genuine issues of fact that warrant the reversal of

the summary judgment entered by the Superior Court The DeCostas began their use of the

property as permissive tenants, and their adverse possession claim lacks evidence to support the
Decosta v Ebbessen                     2024 V17
S Ct Civ No 2019 0095
Opinion ofthe Court
Page 17 of 17

required element of hostility As a result, we afﬁrm the Superior Court's grant of summary

judgment

Dated this 18th day of January 2024

                                                      BY THE COURT

                                                      L I"                     ‘
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ATTE8T

VERONICAJ HANDY ESQ
Cle of the Co rt

By
     eputy Clerk

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