Court Opinion

ID: 9965719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 14:02:23.861762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:35.284605
License: Public Domain

Rel: May 3, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

                   Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
                                _________________________

                                         CR-2022-0546
                                   _________________________

                                  Brandon Dewayne Sykes

                                                      v.

                                         State of Alabama.

                           Appeal from Lamar Circuit Court
                                     (CC-19-144)

PER CURIAM.

        Brandon Dewayne Sykes appeals his capital-murder convictions

and his sentence of death. Sykes was convicted of murder made capital

for intentionally killing Keshia Nicole Sykes during a first-degree

burglary, see §13A-5-40(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975, for intentionally killing
CR-2022-0546

Keshia Nicole Sykes during the commission of a first-degree kidnapping,

see § 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, and for intentionally killing Keshia

Nicole Sykes during the commission of a first-degree robbery, see § 13A-

5-40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975. The jury unanimously sentenced Sykes to

death.

                                  Facts

     Sykes and Keshia were married from May 2012 to May 2014, and

they had two children together during the marriage, a son named Bron

and a daughter named Brooklyn. The divorce had been contentious, with

Keshia being awarded custody of their children amidst allegations that

she had been abused by Sykes. Sykes was unhappy with the court's

custody determination, and he was particularly incensed by Keshia's

living with and becoming engaged to Drapher Bonman, who at the time

had a pending charge for a sex offense against a minor. Sykes had

already refused to return Bron to Keshia following a visitation period,

and he sought to obtain custody of Brooklyn, as well. On February 8,

2015, Sykes attempted to report to Lt. Steve Thompson of the Vernon

Police Department that Keshia had imperiled their daughter's safety by

living with Bonman.     Lt. Thompson encouraged Sykes to take the

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information to the attorney handling his domestic case. Sykes agreed but

stated to Lt. Thompson, " 'If the court won't help get my kids back, then

I'll do whatever I have to do to get them back.' " (R. 896.)

     On February 18, 2015, Keshia moved out of Bonman's house and

into a house next door to her parents. That night, though, Bonman spent

the night with Keshia in her new home. Around 7:20 a.m. the following

morning, Keshia's mother, Kathleen Nalls, called Keshia on her way to

work. Keshia told her mother that she and Brooklyn were watching

television at home. Nalls testified that when she arrived at work, she

noticed Sykes sitting in his truck in a parking lot across the street. Nalls

went inside and peered through a window. She saw Sykes leave the

parking lot in his truck.

     Nalls attempted to contact Keshia later that morning but was

unsuccessful, and Nalls learned that Keshia had failed to pick up Nalls's

sister as scheduled. Nalls telephoned a nephew who lived with her and

asked him to look for Keshia's vehicle, a silver Honda owned by Bonman

that Keshia was using at the time. Her nephew told Nalls that the

vehicle was not at Keshia's house.

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     After work Nalls went to Keshia's house. Upon entering, Nalls saw

that there was blood throughout the residence, that a bedroom window

had been shattered, and that several of Keshia's possessions, such as her

vehicle, wallet, and cell phone, were missing. Nalls also noticed that a

bedspread and several rugs had been removed from the house. Neither

Keshia nor Brooklyn were at the home.

     Chief Davy Eaves of the Vernon Police Department responded to

the emergency call about the state of Keshia's house. In the kitchen,

Chief Eaves saw bloodstains and smears throughout – on the back door,

on the floor, on the counter, and on the appliances. A rag covered in blood

sat on the kitchen table, and there was a mop in the corner that appeared

to have bloodstains. The mop was still damp, according to Chief Eaves.

Chief Eaves stated that he accidentally bumped a chair in the kitchen

while taking pictures of the scene; when the chair moved, one of the feet

left a streak of blood on the floor from blood that had pooled underneath

it. Chief Eaves testified that it "looked like something had happened that

somebody had tried to clean it up." (R. 743.) Chief Eaves noted a bloody

footprint in the living room along with substantial bloodstains on the

carpet in the house.      Chief Eaves stated that blood had "soaked

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completely through the carpet padding and had pooled on the cement

floor." (R. 757.) Outside the house, Chief Eaves photographed drops of

blood in the yard and recovered a small, frozen piece of flesh lying in the

grass. Subsequent genetic testing revealed that the piece of flesh and

much of the blood found inside of and outside the house were from

Keshia. Also, a mixture of genetic profiles was found on the handle of the

bloodstained mop, and Sykes could not be excluded as a potential

contributor to the minor component of this sample.

     Brooklyn was located at the home of Sykes's sister, Lekeshia Sykes.

Lekeshia told investigators that Sykes had dropped off his son at her

house around 6:15 a.m. that day and that Keshia had sent her a text

message around 11:15 a.m. asking her if she could babysit Brooklyn.

Lekeshia told investigators that Keshia had arrived with Brooklyn about

15 minutes after she sent the text message.

     Bonman arrived at Keshia's house while officers were assessing the

scene. According to Bonman, he had left Keshia's house around 5:00 a.m.

on February 19 and that, although he had attempted to call her during

the day, he had not spoken to her since he left the house.

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     Sykes agreed to be interviewed at the Vernon Police Department on

the night of Keshia's disappearance. Sykes told officers that he had not

been in contact with Keshia during the previous week. Sykes stated that

he had dropped off his son Bron with his sister Lekeshia around 6:30 a.m.

and then went to work at Wheeler Automotive body shop, where he

remained until 3:00 p.m. After work, he drove to Lekeshia's house and

stayed until 5:00 p.m. with Bron and Brooklyn. While Sykes was giving

his statement, Lt. Thompson conducted a consensual search of Sykes's

truck. Lt. Thompson scraped and collected what appeared to be two

droplets of dried blood in the back of Sykes's truck. Subsequent genetic

testing established that the blood was Keshia's.

     On February 23, Inv. Keith Cox with the Pickens County District

Attorney's Office was notified by law enforcement in Mississippi that

Keshia's vehicle may have been located. Inv. Cox went to an address in

Lowndes County, Mississippi; two mobile homes, which appeared to be

vacant, sat on the property.    Keshia's burned-out vehicle was found

behind the mobile home on the right. Inv. Cox found a flashlight about

10 yards from the vehicle and three red gas cans – one in front of the

mobile home to the right and two more inside the mobile home to the left.

                                   6
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        Officers collected several cell phones from Sykes.     The data

extracted from the cell phones, and the people to whom that data led,

challenged Sykes's assertion to investigators that he had been at Wheeler

Automotive all day on February 19. For instance, Sykes spoke on the

phone several times with Benjamin Scott, an acquaintance of Sykes,

between 6:59 a.m. and 9:38 a.m. on February 19. Scott testified that he

often performed odd jobs for Sykes in exchange for drugs. On February

19, Sykes asked Scott to photograph Bonman's house and to then come

to Wheeler Automotive. Scott arrived at the body shop and Sykes asked

for a ride. Sykes directed Scott on a circuitous route around town before

directing him to drive by the house of Keshia's parents. 1 Scott was

instructed to stop his vehicle approximately 100 yards beyond the house.

Sykes told Scott he would call him, and he then got out of the vehicle,

running to a wooded area next to Keshia's house.

        Scott drove to his girlfriend's house and waited. At some point,

Scott answered a telephone call from a number he did not recognize. It

was Sykes; Scott testified that Sykes sounded as though he were out of

        1 Scott was not aware that Keshia had moved into the house next

door.
                                    7
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breath and that he could hear a child crying in the background. Sykes

told Scott to meet him at Lekeshia's house; Scott drove to the house but

did not stop. Scott explained: "I [didn't] stop because I thought he's done

kidnapped his baby or something. And I didn't want to get in the middle

of [that]." (R. 1076-77.) Scott next heard from Sykes later that evening.

Scott went by Sykes's house and picked up methamphetamine as

payment for his assistance that day. Scott called him two days later to

ask for methamphetamine with a promise to pay Sykes later. Sykes

agreed, warning him, " 'You don't want to get on my bad side. That's the

first time I killed in a long time.' " (R. 1081.)

      Sykes's telephone records indicated he called his cousin Eric

Blevins at 10:31 a.m. on February 19. Sykes asked Blevins if he knew of

a good body of water in which to sink a vehicle. Sykes explained that he

wanted to dispose of a vehicle for insurance purposes. Blevins testified

that he told Sykes that he did not know where to sink a car.

      Luther Hackman, Sykes's cousin who lived in Columbus,

Mississippi, received a call from Sykes at 10:56 a.m. on February 19.

Sykes told him he "just needed to park a car." (R. 1134.) Sykes described

the vehicle as a "silver or gold Honda" that belonged to "his wife's

                                       8
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boyfriend." (R. 1135-36.) Sykes arrived around noon and parked the

Honda in Hackman's backyard, which was surrounded by a high fence.

Hackman then drove Sykes back to Wheeler Automotive.

     Hackman saw Sykes the following day when Sykes returned to

retrieve the Honda. Sykes told Hackman that "he wasn't going to let

them raise his kids 'cause whoever the guy was, he was a child molester

and [Keshia] was beating on his kids and … wasn't letting him see … the

kids." (R. 1140-41.) As Sykes walked to the Honda, Hackman noticed

that Sykes was carrying a lighter and a small gas can. Sykes asked

Hackman to follow him in his own vehicle and to pick him up after he

abandoned the Honda; Hackman agreed. Sykes left Hackman's property

and drove for a few minutes before turning down a gravel road. Hackman

drove beyond the gravel road for a few miles and then turned around. As

he came back, Sykes was walking down the road. Sykes got in Hackman's

vehicle, and Hackman drove Sykes back to Vernon. Geolocation tracking

of Sykes's cell phone supported Hackman's testimony regarding Sykes's

trips to Columbus.

                                  9
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     On March 29, 2015, Lekeshia sought out Lt. Thompson to amend

her prior statement that Keshia had brought Brooklyn to her house on

February 19:

     "What actually happened that day was that at around 9:00
     a.m., [Sykes] showed up with no prior notice with Brooklyn
     and gave me Brooklyn and told me, 'If anybody asks, Keshia
     brought her.' … At 11:15, I received a text message that
     asked, 'Can you keep Brooklyn?' I didn't recognize the
     number at first, and sent back a text asking, 'Who is this?',
     but then I remembered it was Keshia Sykes's old number ….
     Right after I sent the text, [Sykes] called me from his 2300
     phone number and said, 'Just play along.' … I then sent a
     text back to Keshia's phone that said, 'Yes, I'll keep her,' and
     a text came back, 'I'll bring her in a minute.' I don't know if
     [Sykes] was sending the text from Keshia's phone or if Keshia
     was with [Sykes] and using the phone herself at this time. …
     [A]round 5:00 p.m., [Sykes] told me to send Keshia a text and
     ask about bringing Brooklyn back to her."

(R. 1119.)   Keshia told Lt. Thompson that she realized lying in her

previous statement was "a very serious matter" but that she had been

afraid of the reaction from her family had she been truthful.

     Investigators were able to tie Sykes to Keshia's missing cell phone.

A month or so after Keshia's disappearance, Nalls noticed activity on her

cellular billing statement from Keshia's cell phone. Nalls reported the

activity, and this led investigators to Christy Sanderson, who

relinquished the cell phone to investigators and stated that she had

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bought the cell phone from Lois Gibson. Gibson testified that she had

acquired the cell phone on March 8 when she visited Sykes's house with

a mutual friend. Gibson saw several cell phones in the living room of

Sykes's house, and, as she was leaving, she stole one – a white, LG brand

cell phone. Gibson then sold the cell phone to Sanderson. Gibson later

received a telephone call from an unknown number; a female on the line

told Gibson that she was " 'the sister of the guy whose house you stole the

phone from. It's my phone, and I want it back.' " (R. 1269.) Gibson also

received text messages demanding that the cell phone be returned; these

text messages were sent from a cell phone law enforcement eventually

collected from Sykes. At trial, Gibson identified Keshia's cell phone as

the cell phone that she had stolen from Sykes.

     Sykes was arrested on April 9, 2015. The next day, Sykes gave a

statement to Agent Andy Jones with the Alabama Bureau of

Investigation.   Sykes told Agent Jones that investigators had a

misapprehension about Keshia's disappearance. Sykes explained that at

the time of his divorce from Keshia, he "was running money and drugs

for the cartel out of Memphis and sometimes he would loan the car to

them, sometimes he would drive it himself." (R. 1441.) Sykes stated

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Keshia was embittered about not being awarded Sykes's vehicle in the

divorce proceedings. On one occasion when Keshia was aware of cartel

members using Sykes's vehicle, Keshia spitefully contacted the Memphis

office of the Drug Enforcement Administration and provided federal

agents with the location of Sykes's vehicle. Sykes told Agent Jones that

Keshia's tip led to the arrest of 3 cartel members and the seizure of 40

pounds of marijuana, 2 bricks of cocaine, $280,000, and his vehicle. 2

     According to Sykes, he and Keshia soon afterwards resumed their

relationship. The rekindled romance ended in January 2015, though,

and Keshia began living with Bonman. Agent Jones continued:

     "[Sykes] said that Keshia had an addiction to
     [methamphetamine]; and before she left Sykes, she found a
     flip phone that he had that he used strictly for making deals
     with the cartel in Memphis.

          "He said he had it hid inside a stuffed animal in the kids'
     room and Keshia had found it and took it with her when she
     moved in with Bonman[. Keshia] used this flip phone to set
     up a purchase of [methamphetamine] with the cartel in
     Jasper and Bonman provided her with some currency and
     some – counterfeit currency to make the purchase.

          "And [Sykes] said that Keshia and Bonman put the
     actual real currency on top and the fake currency on the
     bottom, made the purchase of the drugs and by the time the

     2  The Drug Enforcement Administration had no record of this
alleged arrest and seizure.
                                    12
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     cartel found out that it was fake currency, that she'd already
     left with the drugs.

           "So [Sykes] said he got a call from a cartel member
     telling [Sykes] he owed [the cartel member] $20,000."

(R. 1442-43.) Sykes denied any responsibility for Keshia's actions, and,

according to Sykes, the cartel "wanted their money or her." (R. 1443.)

Sykes offered them Keshia. Sykes admitted to Agent Jones, " 'I led them

down [to Keshia's house] but I didn't do nothing to her." (R. 1443.) Sykes

stated that the cartel's plan was to "kidnap her, take her to Memphis and

use her in some kind of sex ring." Sykes told Agent Jones that he gave

cartel members the location of the abandoned mobile homes in

Mississippi as a place where Keshia's vehicle could be burned; Sykes

could not explain why geolocation tracking of his cell phone placed him

in the vicinity of the burned vehicle.

     Sykes initially denied to Agent Jones being taken anywhere by

Scott on the day Keshia disappeared but amended his statement once he

was presented with his cell-phone records. Sykes stated that Scott did

pick him up at work and drop him off near Keshia's house, but that

instead of going to her house, he ran to a nearby church to rendezvous

with cartel members. At that meeting, Sykes told them Keshia was at

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her house along with her daughter; Sykes instructed them to bring his

daughter Brooklyn to him at his house.

     Agent Jones confronted Sykes with the presence of blood in his

truck. Sykes speculated that the cartel had placed the blood in his truck

to incriminate him. Sykes also told Agent Jones that he had heard there

was a lot of blood inside Keshia's house. Sykes stated that "he would not

doubt that she actually cut herself to make it look like she'd got hurt and

that he wouldn't be surprised if she resurfaced in Vernon after she

sobered up." (R. 1449.)

     Agent Jones spoke to Sykes five days later, on April 15, at Sykes's

request. Sykes told Agent Jones that if the district attorney was "willing

to offer him a deal, that he would be willing to cooperate and give Keshia's

family some closure." (R. 1452.) Sykes added that if no offer were made,

the district attorney would "just have to do it the hard way." (R. 1452.)

     Jacob Wiley was incarcerated with Sykes at the Pickens County

Jail in May 2017. Wiley had known Sykes for approximately 12 years by

that point, having first met him at a hunting and fishing club. Wiley

testified that the two spoke every day while they were in jail and that the

conversations   eventually    turned     toward   the   reasons   for   their

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incarcerations. Sykes told Wiley that he was in jail on a capital-murder

charge. Sykes did not expressly identify his victim but did describe the

actions that gave his rise to his charge. Sykes explained to Wiley that he

had "beat her up and threw her in his truck" and that "he took her and

dumped her" "where we used to go fishing." (R. 1418.) Wiley testified

that the two used to fish the Sipsey River. Sykes told Wiley that he had

dumped the body "down past the boat launch" and that he had tied the

body with ratchet straps and weighted it down with cinder blocks.

Despite search efforts in the area described by Wiley, Keshia's body was

not recovered.

                           Standard of Review

     Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P., as amended effective January 12, 2023,

provides:

           "In all cases in which the death penalty has been
     imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals may, but shall not be
     obligated to, notice any plain error or defect in the proceedings
     under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the
     trial court, and take appropriate appellate action by reason
     thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely
     affected the substantial right of the appellant."

This Court will continue to review the entire record for plain error in all

cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, although our analysis

                                    15
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on issues reviewed for plain error may not be as extensive as has been

this Court's practice historically. Iervolino v. State, [Ms. CR-21-0283,

Aug. 18, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2023).

           " 'The standard of review in reviewing a claim under the
     plain-error doctrine is stricter than the standard used in
     reviewing an issue that was properly raised in the trial court
     or on appeal.' Hall v. State, 820 So. 2d 113, 121 (Ala. Crim.
     App. 1999), aff'd, 820 So. 2d 152 (Ala. 2001). Plain error is
     'error that is so obvious that the failure to notice it would
     seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial
     proceedings.' Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 167 (Ala.
     1997), modified on other grounds, Ex parte Wood, 715 So. 2d
     819 (Ala. 1998). 'To rise to the level of plain error, the claimed
     error must not only seriously affect a defendant's "substantial
     rights," but it must also have an unfair prejudicial impact on
     the jury's deliberations.' Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199, 209
     (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), aff'd, 778 So. 2d 237 (Ala. 2000). 'The
     plain error standard applies only where a particularly
     egregious error occurred at trial and that error has or
     probably has substantially prejudiced the defendant.' Ex
     parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d at 167. '[P]lain error must be
     obvious on the face of the record. A silent record, that is a
     record that on its face contains no evidence to support the
     alleged error, does not establish an obvious error.' Ex parte
     Walker, 972 So. 2d 737, 753 (Ala. 2007). Thus, '[u]nder the
     plain-error standard, the appellant must establish that an
     obvious, indisputable error occurred, and he must establish
     that the error adversely affected the outcome of the trial.'
     Wilson v. State, 142 So. 3d 732, 751 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
     '[T]he plain error exception to the contemporaneous-objection
     rule is to be "used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in
     which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result." '
     United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L.
     Ed. 2d 1 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
     163 n.14, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982))."

                                    16
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DeBlase v. State, 294 So. 3d 154, 182-83 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018).

                                Analysis

                                    I.

     During rebuttal closing arguments, the prosecutor stated the

following: "There's only two people in the world that know what

happened in that house. One of them's dead, and the other one is sitting

right over there at the end of that table. (Indicating)." (R. 1619.) Sykes

asserts that the argument was a direct comment on his decision not to

testify. Sykes did not object to the comment; he argues, though, that the

circuit court's failure to take prompt curative action constituted plain

error. This Court agrees.

     In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall not be compelled to

give evidence against himself. Alabama Constitution, Art. I, § 6. The

right against self-incrimination is likewise enshrined in the Alabama

Code:

           "On the trial of all indictments, complaints or other
     criminal proceedings, the person on trial shall, at his own
     request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness, and his
     failure to make such a request shall not create any
     presumption against him nor be the subject of comment by
     counsel.   If the district attorney makes any comment
     concerning the defendant's failure to testify, a new trial must

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     be granted on motion filed within 30 days from entry of the
     judgment."

§ 12-21-220, Ala. Code 1975. " '[O]nce a defendant chooses not to testify

at his trial the exercise of that choice is not subject to comment by the

prosecution.' " Ex parte Davis, 718 So. 2d 1166, 1173 (Ala. 1998) (quoting

Wherry v. State, 402 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981)).

             "Comments by a prosecutor on a defendant's failure to
     testify are highly prejudicial and harmful, and courts must
     carefully guard against a violation of a defendant's
     constitutional right not to testify. Whitt [v. State, 370 So. 2d
     736, 739 (Ala. 1979)]; Ex parte Williams, 461 So. 2d 852, 853
     (Ala. 1984); see Ex parte Purser, 607 So. 2d 301 (Ala. 1992).
     This Court has held that comments by a prosecutor that a jury
     may possibly take as a reference to the defendant's failure to
     testify violate Art. I, § 6, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901.
     Ex parte Land, 678 So. 2d 224 (Ala.), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
     933, 117 S. Ct. 308, 136 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1996); Ex parte
     McWilliams, 640 So. 2d 1015 (Ala. 1993); Ex parte Wilson,
     [571 So. 2d 1251, 1261 (Ala. 1990)]; Ex parte Tucker, 454 So.
     2d 552 (Ala. 1984); Beecher v. State, 294 Ala. 674, 320 So. 2d
     727 (1975).        Additionally, the Fifth and Fourteenth
     Amendments of the United States Constitution may be
     violated if the prosecutor comments upon the accused's
     silence. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14
     L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965); Ex parte Land, supra; Ex parte Wilson,
     supra. Under federal law, a comment is improper if it was
     ' " 'manifestly intended or was of such a character that a jury
     would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on
     the failure of the accused to testify' " ' United States v.
     Herring, 955 F.2d 703, 709 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
     927, 113 S. Ct. 353, 121 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1992) (citations
     omitted); Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir.),
     cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983, 109 S. Ct. 534, 102 L. Ed. 2d 566

                                    18
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      (1988); United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 758 (11th
      Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021, 105 S. Ct. 440, 83 L. Ed. 2d
      365 (1984). The federal courts characterize comments as
      either direct or indirect, and, in either case, hold that an
      improper comment may not always mandate reversal.

             "Consistent with this reasoning, Alabama law
      distinguishes direct comments from indirect comments and
      establishes that a direct comment on the defendant's failure
      to testify mandates the reversal of the defendant's conviction,
      if the trial court failed to promptly cure that comment. Whitt
      v. State, supra; Ex parte Yarber, [375 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Ala.
      1979)]; Ex parte Williams, supra; Ex parte Wilson, supra. On
      the other hand, 'covert,' or indirect, comments are construed
      against the defendant, based upon the literal construction of
      Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-220, which created the 'virtual
      identification doctrine.' Ex parte Yarber, 375 So. 2d at 1234.
      Thus, in a case in which there has been only an indirect
      reference to a defendant's failure to testify, in order for the
      comment to constitute reversible error, there must have been
      a virtual identification of the defendant as the person who did
      not become a witness. Ex parte Yarber, 375 So. 2d at 1234;
      Ex parte Williams, supra; Ex parte Wilson, supra; Ex parte
      Purser, supra."

Ex parte Brooks, 695 So. 2d 184, 188-89 (Ala. 1997) (footnote omitted).

      Our decision here is controlled by the opinions of the Alabama

Supreme Court in Whitt v. State, 370 So. 2d 736 (Ala. 1979), and Ex parte

Wilson, 571 So. 2d 1251 (Ala. 1990). In Whitt, the defendant had been

indicted for first-degree murder arising out of a fatality in an automobile

collision.   The defendant was ultimately convicted of second-degree

murder and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. This Court affirmed the

                                    19
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defendant's conviction and sentence.       The Alabama Supreme Court

granted the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider

whether the prosecutor had made an impermissible comment on the

defendant's failure to testify.

     The defendant in Whitt neither testified nor called any witnesses

on his behalf. During closing arguments, the prosecutor remarked: "The

only person alive today that knows what happened out there that night

is sitting right there." Defense counsel objected to the comment and

moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor had commented

on the defendant's failure to testify.

     The trial court denied the defendant's motion and instructed the

jury: "I am going to instruct the jury though to disregard the last remark

in regard to that. The statement made by the District Attorney in his

argument is only his inferences from the evidence, but I want you to

disregard the last remark, just what he said." Whitt, 370 So. 2d at 737.

     This Court held that the remark "was 'argument in kind' to rebut

remarks by petitioner's counsel, that it was only an 'indirect' reference to

petitioner's failure to testify, and, finally, that any possible reference to

                                     20
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petitioner was 'eradicated' by the court's instructions." Whitt, 370 So. 2d

at 738. The Supreme Court rejected each holding.

     "We must disagree and hold that the remark was not an
     'argument in kind,' was not an 'indirect' reference to the
     petitioner's failure to testify, and was not 'eradicated' by the
     court's instructions.

           "The comment 'The only person alive today that knows
     what happened out there that night is sitting right there' is
     almost identical to the comment ' "No one took the stand to
     deny it" ' held to be a direct comment on the defendant's
     failure to testify and held to be reversible error in Beecher [v.
     State], 294 Ala. 674, 320 So. 2d 727 (1975) (per Justice
     Embry). The comment is very close to the comment made in
     Warren v. State, 292 Ala. 71, 288 So. 2d 826 (1973). There,
     this Court held (per Justice McCall) that the argument ' "The
     only one that said he didn't sell it (marijuana) was the little
     brother' was also a direct comment on the failure of the
     defendant to testify and constituted reversible error. It is thus
     that we must conclude, based on the holding and rationale of
     those two cases, that the comment by the district attorney in
     this case was a direct comment on the failure of the defendant
     to testify and constituted error to reverse.

           "We cannot agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals
     that this comment was 'argument in kind' to rebut remarks
     made by petitioner's counsel. It seems self-evident that it
     cannot be 'argument in kind' when we do not have the defense
     counsel's argument to which this comment is said to reply.
     The record does not contain the closing arguments in this
     case.

           "….

          "This brings us to a consideration of the last ground
     given by the Court of Criminal Appeals for finding that the

                                    21
CR-2022-0546

    second comment did not constitute reversible error, namely,
    whether the trial court's instructions to the jury cured such
    impermissible comment.

          "We cannot agree that the trial court's instructions in
    this case were sufficient to cure the harmful effect of the
    district attorney's comment. The court stated:

         " 'I am going to instruct the jury though to
         disregard the last remark in regard to that. The
         statement made by the District Attorney in his
         argument is only his inferences from the evidence,
         but I want you to disregard the last remark, just
         what he said. I will deny your motion.'

          "In seeking to instruct the jury to disregard the remark,
    we think that the trial court's instructions fell short of what
    is required to effectively erase the highly prejudicial and
    harmful nature of such a comment.

         "….

          "We suggest that, at a minimum, the trial judge must
    sustain the objection, and should then promptly and
    vigorously give appropriate instructions to the jury. Such
    instructions should include that such remarks are improper
    and to disregard them; that statements of counsel are not
    evidence; that under the law the defendant has the privilege
    to testify in his own behalf or not; that he cannot be compelled
    to testify against himself; and, that no presumption of guilt or
    inference of any kind should be drawn from his failure to
    testify. With appropriate instructions, we hold that the error
    of the prosecutor's remarks will be sufficiently vitiated so that
    such error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. U. S. v.
    Brown, 546 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1977); Chapman v. California,
    386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967); Beecher v.
    State, supra."

                                   22
CR-2022-0546

370 So. 2d at 738 (emphasis in original.)

     The Alabama Supreme Court was confronted with a similar remark

by the prosecutor in Ex parte Wilson, supra. In Wilson, the defendant

had been convicted of three counts of capital murder and sentenced to

death. Following this Court's affirmance of the defendant's convictions

and sentence, the Alabama Supreme Court granted the defendant's

petition for a writ of certiorari to consider, among other things, the

propriety of the following argument made during the State's rebuttal in

closing arguments: " 'I can't tell you what that woman went through

during that night, because there is only one eyewitness, and he ain't

going to tell you. I wish I could tell you all of that. I can give you this

evidence that these officers have worked meticulously to gather up ....' "

Wilson, 571 So. 2d at 1259. The defendant moved for a mistrial, asserting

that the argument was " 'the equivalent of saying that this defendant has

not testified.' " Id. The State countered that the remark was a reasonable

inference from the evidence, specifically, a taped confession given by the

defendant. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for mistrial,

and the prosecutor resumed his rebuttal: "When I say that, I mean this

defendant didn't tell you on that tape recording that he gave Alvin Kidd

                                    23
CR-2022-0546

as to what she went through …." Id. The trial court gave a lengthy

instruction after closing arguments had concluded regarding a

defendant's right not to testify.

     The State argued before the Alabama Supreme Court that the

prosecutor's "comment was not on the defendant's failure to testify, …

that his explanatory sentence 'made it clear to the jury that he was

referring to the defendant's sketchy incriminating statements, which had

been admitted into evidence,' " and that the jury would not have

reasonably understood the remark to be a comment on the defendant's

failure to testify.   Wilson, 571 So. 2d at 1260.        The Court was

unpersuaded. Relying heavily on Whitt, the Alabama Supreme Court

held the remark combined with the trial court's failure to promptly cure

the remark to be reversible error:

           "The statements in this case do not fall within the
     bounds set forth in Ex parte Dobard, [435 So. 2d 1351 (Ala.
     1983)], or Beecher [v. State, 294 Ala. 674, 320 So. 2d 727
     (1975)].[3] The district attorney clearly did not comment
     generally on the State's evidence standing uncontradicted.
     His statement falls well outside the permitted range available
     to a district attorney in closing and is far more prejudicial

     3 In those cases, the Alabama Supreme Court held that, "[w]here

the State's evidence does stand uncontradicted, the prosecutor does have
the right to point this out to the jury." Beecher, 294 Ala. at 682, 320 So.
2d at 734.
                                     24
CR-2022-0546

     than those statements deemed to be indirect comments in Ex
     parte Williams, [461 So. 2d 852 (Ala. 1984)]. See also Stain v.
     State, 494 So. 2d 816 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (court unable to
     distinguish comment from that in Williams). …

           "….

           "We find here that the comment made by the district
     attorney was a direct comment on the defendant's failure to
     testify and violated the defendant's rights as found under the
     United States Constitution, the Constitution of Alabama of
     1901, and Ala. Code (1975), § 12-21-220. We cannot agree that
     the comment made by the district attorney could have been
     understood by the jury only as a reference to the defendant's
     'sketchy incriminating statement.' "

Wilson, 571 So. 2d at 1263-65.

     The remark in the instant case – "There's only two people in the

world that know what happened in that house. One of them's dead, and

the other one is sitting right over there at the end of that table.

(Indicating)." – closely parallels the remarks in Whitt and Wilson. The

State asserts that, when viewed in context, the challenged remark was

merely a response to the argument of defense counsel during his closing

argument that there were gaps in the State's evidence. This Court finds

the State's purported justification unavailing.    Here, the prosecutor

asserted to the jury that there were only two people who knew what had

happened to Keshia – Keshia, who was dead and unable to testify, and

                                   25
CR-2022-0546

Sykes. The prosecutor's remark "called the jury's attention to the fact

that [Sykes], the only eyewitness who could have taken the stand, did not

testify." Powell v. State, 631 So. 2d 289, 291-92 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)

(emphasis in original).

     In light of the holdings of the Alabama Supreme Court in Whitt and

Wilson, this Court holds that the remark was a direct comment on

Sykes's decision not to testify. Further, because the circuit court failed

to take prompt curative action, this Court must reverse Sykes's

convictions and sentence of death. See Ex parte Wilson, 571 So. 2d at

1261 ("In a case where there has been a direct reference to a defendant's

failure to testify and the trial court has not acted promptly to cure that

comment, the conviction must be reversed.").

                                   II.

     Although this Court is reversing Sykes's convictions and sentence

of death based on the prosecutor's direct comment on Sykes's decision not

to testify in conjunction with the circuit court's failure to take prompt

curative action, this Court must address an issue that may arise in a

possible retrial – the appropriate capital-sentencing scheme to be applied

should Sykes again be convicted of capital murder.

                                   26
CR-2022-0546

     Act No. 2017-131, Ala. Acts 2017, amended §§ 13A-5-45, 13A-5-46,

and 13A-5-47, Ala. Code 1975, to, among other things, remove the circuit

court's authority to override a jury's sentencing verdict, thereby making

the jury the final sentencing authority in capital cases. Section 13A-5-

47.1, Ala. Code 1975, states that this new capital-sentencing scheme

"shall apply to any defendant who is charged with capital murder after

April 11, 2017, and shall not apply retroactively to any defendant who

has previously been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death

prior to April 11, 2017."

     On April 9, 2015, Sykes was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping

Keshia. That charge was elevated in May 2015 when Sykes was indicted

in case no. CC-15-208 on two counts of murder made capital for

intentionally killing Keshia Nicole Sykes during the commission of a

first-degree burglary and for intentionally killing Keshia Nicole Sykes

during the commission of a first-degree kidnapping. However, in April

2019, Sykes was reindicted in case no. CC-19-144 on three counts of

murder made capital for intentionally killing Keshia Nicole Sykes during

the commission of a first-degree burglary, for intentionally killing Keshia

Nicole Sykes during the commission of a first-degree kidnapping, and for

                                    27
CR-2022-0546

intentionally killing Keshia Nicole Sykes during the commission of a

first-degree robbery. It was on this indictment that Sykes was tried and

convicted of three counts of capital murder.

     On February 22, 2021, Sykes moved the circuit court to declare

that, given the date of his reindictment, the new capital-sentencing

scheme should apply to him. (C. 67-68.) At a pretrial hearing, the State

agreed with Sykes's motion. The circuit court granted Sykes's motion on

March 5, 2021. (C. 69.)

     The new capital sentencing scheme is triggered by the date on

which a defendant is charged with capital murder.        Sykes was first

charged with capital murder in the death of Keshia in May 2015, well

before the effective date of the new capital-sentencing scheme – April 11,

2017. See Rule 1.4(b), Ala. R. Crim. P. ("'Charge' means a complaint,

indictment, or information."). Therefore, the prior capital-sentencing

scheme is applicable to Sykes, should he again be convicted of capital

murder.

                               Conclusion

     The prosecutor made a direct comment during guilt-phase closing

arguments on Sykes's decision not to testify and the circuit court failed

                                   28
CR-2022-0546

to take prompt curative action to correct the error. This constituted plain

error.     Therefore, this Court must reverse Sykes's convictions and

sentence of death and remand the case for a new trial.

     REVERSED AND REMANDED.

     Kellum and Cole, JJ., concur. Minor, J., concurs in the result, with

opinion. Windom, P.J., dissents, with opinion. McCool, J., recuses

himself.

                                    29
CR-2022-0546

MINOR, Judge, concurring in the result.

     I concur in the result. I write separately to explain why I think that

the capital-sentencing scheme enacted by Act No. 2017-131, Ala. Acts

2017, may not apply to Brandon Dewayne Sykes's charges.

     As the main opinion explains, law enforcement arrested Sykes in

April 2015 on suspicion of kidnapping Keshia Nicole Sykes. According to

a motion Sykes filed and the State's appellate brief, the grand jury

indicted Sykes in May 2015 in case no. CC-15-208 for two counts of

murder made capital for intentionally killing Keshia during the

commission of a first-degree burglary and a first-degree kidnapping. 4 (C.

67; State's brief, p. 1.) In April 2019, the grand jury indicted Sykes in

case no. CC-19-144 on three counts of capital murder: intentionally

killing Keshia during the commission of a first-degree burglary,

intentionally killing Keshia during the commission of a first-degree

kidnapping, and intentionally killing Keshia during the commission of a

first-degree robbery. (C. 24-26.)

     The main opinion also explains:

           "Act No. 2017-131, Ala. Acts 2017, amended §§ 13A-5-
     45, 13A-5-46, and 13A-5-47, Ala. Code 1975, to, among other

     4The record does not include the 2015 indictment.

                                    30
CR-2022-0546

     things, remove the circuit court's authority to override a jury's
     sentencing verdict, thereby making the jury the final
     sentencing authority in capital cases. Section 13A-5-47.1, Ala.
     Code 1975, states that this new capital-sentencing scheme
     'shall apply to any defendant who is charged with capital
     murder after April 11, 2017, and shall not apply retroactively
     to any defendant who has previously been convicted of capital
     murder and sentenced to death prior to April 11, 2017.' "

___ So. 3d at ___.

     In her dissenting opinion, Presiding Judge Windom describes the

2019 indictment as nullifying the original 2015 indictment, citing Hulsey

v. State, 196 So. 3d 342, 353 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015), and Ex parte Russell,

643 So. 2d 963, 965 (Ala. 1994).

     In Hulsey, the grand jury returned four indictments against

Hulsey. He was tried and convicted on the fourth indictment, which

charged him with reckless endangerment and first-degree unlawful

manufacturing of a controlled substance. Hulsey was not charged with

first-degree unlawful manufacturing of a controlled substance until the

fourth indictment, which was returned beyond the statute of limitations.

On appeal, this Court held that "[b]ecause the previous indictments did

not charge first-degree unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance,

none of them tolled the statute of limitations as to that offense." 196 So.

3d at 352-53.

                                    31
CR-2022-0546

     The State argued, in the alternative, that Hulsey should be

convicted of the lesser-included offense of second-degree unlawful

manufacture of a controlled substance. This Court noted that the second

indictment, which was returned within the statute of limitations,

charged Hulsey with that offense and thus tolled the statute of

limitations. But because the third indictment was defective in charging

Hulsey with that offense, the third indictment did not toll the statute of

limitations. Thus, this Court held that Hulsey could not be guilty of

second-degree unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance. 196 So.

3d at 355-56.

     Russell involved a different but also complicated procedure:

           "On October 3, 1991, an automobile driven by Willie
     Samuel Russell, Jr., collided in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, with an
     automobile owned and operated by the City of Tuscaloosa
     Police Department. Russell was promptly arrested, and
     prosecutions were initiated pursuant to (1) a Uniform Traffic
     Ticket and Complaint ('UTTC') charging him with the
     misdemeanor offense of driving while under the influence of
     alcohol ('DUI); (2) a UTTC charging him with the
     misdemeanor offense of driving a vehicle while his driver's
     license was revoked ('DRL'); and (3) a complaint signed by
     Officer S.L. Stimpson charging him with the felony offense of
     leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury, as
     prohibited by Ala. Code 1975, §§ 32-10-1(a) and -6.

          "On November 18, 1991, a Tuscaloosa County grand jury
     considered and rejected the felony count, indicting Russell,

                                   32
CR-2022-0546

    instead, on the charge of 'attempt[ing] to fail to ... stop at the
    scene of the ... accident'—a misdemeanor offense as defined by
    § 13A-4-2(d)(4). In February 1992, Russell was convicted on
    the charges of DUI and DRL. He appealed those convictions
    to the Tuscaloosa County Circuit Court.

          "By October 23, 1992, Russell had been tried in the
    Tuscaloosa County District Court and there acquitted of the
    misdemeanor offense charged in the indictment. On that date,
    he moved the circuit court to dismiss the cases involving the
    DUI and DRL charges, contending that the court lacked
    subject-matter jurisdiction of the appeals in those cases. The
    circuit court agreed with Russell, and, on March 9, 1993,
    dismissed those cases.

          "The City of Tuscaloosa ('the City') petitioned the Court
    of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the
    circuit court judge to vacate his judgment of dismissal and
    reinstate the cases. The Court of Criminal Appeals, with an
    opinion, granted the City's petition. Ex parte City of
    Tuscaloosa, 636 So. 2d 692 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).

          "In seeking from this Court a writ of mandamus
    directing the Court of Criminal Appeals to rescind its writ of
    mandamus, Russell contends that the circuit court's action
    was mandated by Ala. Code 1975, § 12-11-30(2), which, he
    insists, vested in the circuit court exclusive original
    jurisdiction of the DUI and DRL cases. Although the parties
    invite us to discuss a number of interesting questions
    tangentially related to this case, we confine our attention to
    the issue that, in our view, resolves this dispute, namely, the
    effect of the grand jury's indictment on the offense charged in
    Officer Stimpson's complaint, within the context of § 12-11-
    30(2).

          "Section 12-11-30(2) provides in pertinent part: 'The
    circuit court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all
    felony prosecutions and of misdemeanor or ordinance

                                   33
CR-2022-0546

    violations which are lesser included offenses within a felony
    charge or which arise from the same incident as a felony
    charge ....' (Emphasis added.) See also Ala. R. Crim. P. 2.2(a).
    Russell contends that the charge made in Officer Stimpson's
    complaint, and on which the arrest warrant was based,
    constituted a 'felony charge' within the meaning of this
    section. He insists that the DUI and DRL charges '[arose]
    from the same incident as [the] felony charge' and,
    consequently, that the circuit court, rather than the
    municipal court, had exclusive original jurisdiction of the DUI
    and DRL charges. He then reasons that because the circuit
    court had exclusive original jurisdiction, that court did not
    acquire jurisdiction on appeal after the cases had been,
    erroneously he contends, prosecuted in the municipal court.

          "Russell's reasoning is based on the proposition that the
    complaint charging the commission of a felony offense
    irrevocably invoked the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
    circuit court. In effect, he insists that the grand jury's action,
    which reduced the felony charged in the complaint to a
    misdemeanor, was inconsequential. For the following reasons,
    we disagree with this proposition.

          "A complaint instituting a criminal prosecution and
    authorizing an arrest is 'superseded' by the subsequent return
    of an indictment addressed to the same set of operative facts.
    See Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.6(a). In such cases, a party is 'tried on
    the charge in the indictment and not on the warrant of arrest
    or its supporting affidavit.' Henry v. State, 57 Ala. App. 383,
    388, 328 So. 2d 634, 638 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976) (emphasis
    added). Cf. Wilson v. State, 99 Ala. 194, 195, 13 So. 427, 427
    (1893) (an indictment returned in proper form cures defects
    in an antecedent charging instrument); Toney v. State, 15 Ala.
    App. 14, 16, 72 So. 508, 509 (1916) (same); cf. also Hansen v.
    State, 598 So. 2d 1, 2 n.1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (an
    indictment supersedes antecedent indictments); Broadnax v.
    State, 54 Ala. App. 546, 549, 310 So. 2d 265, 268 (Ala. Crim.
    App. 1975).

                                   34
CR-2022-0546

           "Under these rules, the complaint, the original
     instrument charging the felony of leaving the scene of an
     accident, was superseded by the subsequent indictment
     containing the misdemeanor charge of attempting to leave the
     scene of an accident. In other words, the original charging
     instrument was nullified by the indictment, which was
     returned on November 18, 1991. When Russell was tried in
     the municipal court in February 1992 for DUI and DRL, no
     felony charge was pending; therefore, the exclusivity
     provision in § 12-11-30(2) was not triggered. The circuit court
     clearly possessed jurisdiction over those two cases when
     Russell appealed for a trial de novo, and it erred in dismissing
     them."

643 So. 2d at 964-65.

     I am not persuaded that Hulsey or Russell are controlling. First,

there is no issue about the statute of limitations. Second, there is no issue

about which court had jurisdiction over the capital-murder charges.

Finally, there is no question that Sykes was charged with capital murder

when he was arrested and indicted in 2015, and it appears that the 2015

indictment included two of the three capital murder charges included in

the 2019 indictment.

     Act No. 2017-131, Ala. Acts 2017, applies to all defendants charged

after April 11, 2017. It does not expressly state that it applies to

defendants charged before April 11, 2017, but not convicted and

sentenced to death until after that date. This Court, however, has

                                     35
CR-2022-0546

affirmed the convictions and death sentences of defendants charged

before April 11, 2017, but convicted and sentenced after that date. See,

e.g., Dearman v. State, [Ms. CR-18-0060, Aug. 5, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___

(Ala. Crim. 2022); Young v. State, 375 So. 3d 813 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021),

cert. denied (No. 1210291, Oct. 21, 2022); and Belcher v. State, 341 So.

3d 237 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020), cert. denied (No. 1200374, May 21, 2021).

Those decisions, as well as the plain language of Act No. 2017-131, Ala.

Acts 2017, support the idea that Sykes is not subject to the new

sentencing scheme under that act. Based on the materials before this

Court, however, I believe it is premature to decide this question.

                                   36
CR-2022-0546

WINDOM, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

      The main opinion reverses Brandon Dewayne Sykes's capital-

murder convictions and his sentence of death because, it holds, the

prosecutor made a direct comment on Sykes's decision not to testify and

the circuit court failed to take prompt curative action. Because I do not

believe the prosecutor made a direct comment on Sykes's decision not to

testify, I respectfully dissent.

      During rebuttal closing arguments, the prosecutor stated: "There’s

only two people in the world that know what happened in that house.

One of them's dead, and the other one is sitting right over there at the

end of that table. (Indicating)." (R. 1619.) The main opinion, relying on

the opinions of the Alabama Supreme Court in Whitt v. State, 370 So. 2d

736 (Ala. 1979) and Ex parte Wilson, 571 So. 2d 1251 (Ala. 1990), holds

that the foregoing was a direct comment on Sykes's decision not to testify.

      The remark by the prosecutor was admittedly similar to the

remarks made by the prosecutors in Whitt and Wilson, as well as a

remark made by the prosecutor in Powell v. State, 631 So. 2d 289 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1993), which is also cited by the main opinion. In all three

cases, as in this case, the prosecutor referenced the defendant's being the

                                    37
CR-2022-0546

only remaining eyewitness to the crime. Even so, I do not believe a

reversal of Sykes's convictions and sentence is warranted under the

circumstances here.

     What distinguishes the remark at issue from the remarks made in

Whitt, Wilson, and Powell is the context in which it was made. The State

has assumed this position in its brief on appeal, asserting that, when

viewed in context, the argument of the State in rebuttal was merely a

reply in kind to the argument of defense counsel during his closing

argument that there were gaps in the State's evidence. Indeed, "[a]

challenged comment of a prosecutor made during closing arguments

must be viewed in the context of the evidence presented in the case and

the entire closing arguments made to the jury – both defense counsel's

and the prosecutor's." Ex parte Brooks, 695 So. 2d 184, 189 (Ala. 1997). 5

     5 The State relies in its brief on the reply-in-kind doctrine. Sykes
counters that the reply-in-kind doctrine is inapplicable here because he
made no illegal argument. On this point, I agree with Sykes. "The reply-
in-kind doctrine is designed to restore an equal playing field in the
courtroom when one party violates the rules." Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Ogletree, 331 So. 3d 1150, 1156 (Ala. 2021) (emphasis added); see Minor
v. State, 914 So. 2d 372, 430 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) ("It is a
misapplication of this rule, however, to uphold an illegal argument under
the guise of 'reply in kind,' where the initial argument, to which the
purported reply is addressed, is itself a legally permissible comment to
the jury."). Because Sykes's arguments in closing about the gaps in the
                                   38
CR-2022-0546

     I believe Ex parte Musgrove, 638 So. 2d 1360 (Ala. 1993), and Ex

parte Brooks, 695 So. 2d 184 (Ala. 1997), are instructive. In Musgrove,

the Alabama Supreme Court examined the following rhetorical questions

posed to the jury by the prosecutor during rebuttal closing arguments:

"What did you hear from the defense?" and "What did you hear from the

Defendant?" The appellants objected, asserting that the questions were

comments on their right not to testify. The appellants' objections to the

questions were overruled, and the circuit court gave no curative

instruction to the jury. Still, the Alabama Supreme Court found no error

that warranted reversal. After reviewing the entirety of the closing

arguments from both parties, specifically noting that defense counsel had

"made repeated attacks upon the prosecution's presentation of its case

and the prosecution's motivation for obtaining a conviction," Musgrove,

638 So. 2d at 1368, the Alabama Supreme Court endorsed this Court's

State's evidence were entirely appropriate, the State cannot now avail
itself of the reply-in-kind doctrine to excuse its remark on rebuttal.

      Nonetheless, the fact that the State's remark was made in response
to arguments raised by Sykes is relevant because it provides context for
the challenged remark.
                                   39
CR-2022-0546

holding with respect to the prosecutor's question, "What did you hear

from the Defendant?":

           " '[This comment,] when viewed in the context of
           the entire argument, did not refer to the
           appellants' failure to testify, but was rather the
           prosecutor's opening into a summary of the case
           presented by the defense. The comment was
           clearly not a direct reference to the appellants'
           failure to testify because it was not ' "manifestly
           intended to be, or was of such a character that the
           jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be,
           a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." '
           [Citations omitted.] Nor was this comment an
           indirect reference to the appellants' failure to
           testify and there was no "close identification" of
           the appellants as the exact people who did not
           become witnesses.      [Citation omitted.]     This
           statement by the prosecutor was merely a general
           opening statement to a recapitulation of the
           defense's case.'

     "Musgrove and Rogers v. State, 638 So. 2d 1347, 1359 (Ala.
     Crim. App. 1992).

           "We agree."

Ex parte Musgrove, 638 So. 2d at 1369 (emphasis added in Ex parte

Musgrove).

     Similarly, in Ex parte Brooks, supra, the Alabama Supreme Court

considered the following argument, which was allowed by the trial court

over defense counsel's objection:

                                    40
CR-2022-0546

                " 'In that connection I ask [defense counsel],
          the last thing I said before I sat down was to get
          up here and tell these people what's the reasonable
          hypothesis that's consistent with his innocence?
          That says anything other than he intentionally
          killed her while he raped and robbed her in her
          apartment. Have you heard it yet? Of course not.

                "….

               "Well, have you heard one word in this
          courtroom since Tuesday morning, one word in
          this courtroom since Tuesday morning, that
          causes you to believe there's a reasonable
          hypothesis of innocence, that is anything except
          compelling of his guilt from this evidence proposed
          to you by [defense counsel] in argument or
          otherwise?"

Ex parte Brooks, 695 So. 2d at 187. Again, the Alabama Supreme Court

reviewed the entirety of the parties' closing arguments and recognized

that defense counsel had

     "argued that the State's evidence, because of its
     circumstantial nature, was insufficient to prove beyond a
     reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the
     crimes. Defense counsel insisted that the evidence created a
     reasonable hypothesis of the defendant's innocence because
     there were unidentified fingerprints, unidentified pubic hair,
     and unidentified semen at the crime scene, which, defense
     counsel contended, suggested that another person had
     committed the crimes."

Id. at 189. The Alabama Supreme Court held that "in the context of the

evidence and the closing arguments of both the defense and the State,

                                  41
CR-2022-0546

the statements at issue were not a reference to the defendant's failure to

testify, but rather were a reply to the insufficiency argument made by

defense counsel that the evidence suggested a reasonable hypothesis of

the defendant's innocence and that the State had failed to eliminate that

hypothesis." Id.

     I believe the main opinion focuses too much on the remark itself

and ignored the context in which that remark was made. After all, in

isolation, it would be difficult to craft an argument that more directly

comments on a defendant's decision not to testify than the remark in Ex

parte Musgrove – "What did you hear from the Defendant?" But, as in

Ex parte Musgrove and Ex parte Brooks, this Court should not view the

remark in isolation but rather should look to the evidence offered at trial

and the entirety of the closing arguments to gather the context in which

the allegedly improper remark was made.

     In this case, a primary theory of Sykes's guilt-phase defense was

that law enforcement did not know what had happened to Keshia Sykes

and, in fact, could not even be certain that she was dead. Defense counsel

harped on this theory during his closing arguments:

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          "I asked [Agent] Andy Jones [of the Alabama Bureau of
    Investigation] right here, 'Is Keshia Sykes dead?' He says, 'I
    can't say for a fact.'

          "Do you know why there's a charge for Kidnapping, one
    for Robbery and one for Burglary? Because the State has no
    real theory of what this case is about. They figure, 'If we just
    throw enough stuff up against the wall, something will stick.'

         "So is it Burglary? Did he come through the window in
    the back? …

         "….

         "So what's the method of death? What did he do with
    the body? When did he move the body? …

         "….

          "… And you remember if anybody sat on this stand and
    said, 'You know what? With that amount of blood lost, you
    expect somebody to be dead.' This is the serious physical
    injury.

        "Did you hear him? No. And you know why? Nobody
    knows. Nobody knows.

         "….

         "And that's what this is about. Someone who is missing.
    Someone who told Clara Hollis, 'You think I'll get my' – 'my
    disability money? Because if not, I'm leaving in February
    anyway.'

          "What was the impetus for her to leave? Think about
    the testimony of all of the things. Think about the Burglary,
    the Robbery, the Kidnapping.

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           "You know, they are just saying it had to be one of those.
     It had to be one of those. Is there any evidence of that?

           "….

           "So we have no idea of a time of death. We think it's
     sometime allegedly between 8:00 and 8:58. Old Highway 18
     right in Vernon just right off the road.

           "You are going to tell me that Brandon Sykes went
     inside, whether Robbery, Burglary, Kidnapping, beat the hell
     out of her, cleaned up, did something with the body and was
     at his sister's house by 9:00 o'clock?

           "….

          "… Consider the fact they have no idea how anything
     happened; but yet, they are wanting you to find him guilty.

            "Consider the facts just like Andy Jones said, 'I can't say
     for a fact she's dead,' and find him not guilty.

           "Thank you."

(R. 1598-1607.) The prosecutor responded to defense counsel's argument

in his rebuttal:

          "One thing [defense counsel] brought up is what
     happened in the house. The State doesn't know it. The State
     doesn't know. I'll concede some of that. We don't know exactly
     what happened in the house.

           "There's only two people in the world that know what
     happened in that house. One of them's dead, and the other
     one is sitting right there at the end of that table. (Indicating.)
     Those are the only two people that know what happened in
     that house, but we can look at the facts in evidence."

                                    44
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(R. 1619) (emphasis added.) The prosecutor then addressed the evidence

that supported the State's theory of a brutal murder of Keshia. Viewed

in context, I do not believe the prosecutor's challenged remark, which is

emphasized above, was " 'manifestly intended or was of such a character

that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on

the failure of the accused to testify.' " Ex parte Brooks, 695 So. 2d at 188

(quoting United States v. Herring, 955 F.2d 703, 709 (11th Cir. 1992)).

     In Whitt, the Alabama Supreme Court was precluded from

considering the context of the challenged remark because the record did

not contain the closing arguments. Whitt, 370 So. 2d at 738. In Wilson,

the prosecutor referenced the defendant's being the only eyewitness and

added that " 'he ain't going to tell you' " what happened. Ex parte Wilson,

571 So. 2d at 1260. In Powell, the prosecutor specifically drew the jury's

attention to the fact that the deceased victim could not "come in and

testify," which left the defendant as the only eyewitness who could have

taken the stand. Powell, 631 So. 2d at 290. In contrast, in this case the

prosecutor's argument followed a lengthy challenge to the evidence, or

purported lack thereof, made by defense counsel, and the prosecutor even

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prefaced the challenged argument with a reference to the specific

argument of defense counsel that he intended to address.

     Additionally, I believe this Court must be mindful that the jury was

specifically instructed by the circuit court that the burden of proof rested

upon the State and that Sykes was not required to prove his innocence.

(R. 1654.) The circuit court also gave the following instruction:

     "The Court charges the jury that the fact that that the
     Defendant did not testify in this case cannot be considered in
     determining the Defendant's guilt or innocence.

           "No inference or conclusion should be drawn by the jury
     from the fact that the Defendant was not sworn and put on
     the witness stand as a witness in his own behalf, nor should
     this fact have any weight with the jury in reaching a verdict."

(R. 1657.)

     In sum, I believe that the jurors would have perceived the remark

not as a comment on Sykes's decision not to testify but rather for what it

was – a rebuttal to defense counsel's closing argument. See Thomas v.

State, 824 So. 2d 1, 26 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), overruled on other

grounds, Ex parte Carter, 889 So. 2d 528, 533 (Ala. 2004) ("We reiterate

that we look at the impact of an allegedly improper comment in the

context of the entire proceeding, and that we do not view the comment in

the abstract." (citing McWhorter v. State, 781 So. 2d 257 (Ala. Crim. App.

                                    46
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1999))). It would seem, given the lack of an objection or a curative

instruction, that defense counsel for Sykes and the circuit court perceived

the remark in the same way.

      I do not believe the challenged remark constituted a direct comment

on Sykes's decision not to testify; consequently, I do not believe the circuit

court committed plain error in failing to sua sponte provide a curative

instruction. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the

main opinion.

      I also disagree with the discussion in the main opinion about the

appropriate capital-sentencing scheme to be applied should Sykes again

be convicted of capital murder.

      Act No. 2017-131, Ala. Acts 2017, created a new capital-sentencing

scheme that placed the final sentencing authority in capital cases with

the jury. I believe that by the express wording of the applicability statute

– § 13A-5-47.1, Ala. Code 1975 – the new capital-sentencing scheme

applies to Sykes's charges for capital murder.

      Section 13A-5-47.1 contains two provisions – one that establishes

to whom the new capital-sentencing scheme applies and one that

establishes to whom the new capital-sentencing scheme does not. First,

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§ 13A-5-47.1 states that the new capital-sentencing scheme "shall apply

to any defendant who is charged with capital murder after April 11,

2017." As the main opinion points out, Sykes was first indicted in May

2015 in case no. CC-15-208 on two counts of murder made capital for

intentionally killing Keshia Nicole Sykes during the commission of a

first-degree burglary and for intentionally killing Keshia Nicole Sykes

during the commission of a first-degree kidnapping. However, he was

not tried on this indictment. In April 2019, Sykes was reindicted in CC-

case no. 19-144 on three counts of murder made capital for intentionally

killing Keshia Nicole Sykes during the commission of a first-degree

burglary, for intentionally killing Keshia Nicole Sykes during the

commission of a first-degree kidnapping, and for intentionally killing

Keshia Nicole Sykes during the commission of a first-degree robbery. It

was on this indictment that Sykes was tried and convicted. It seems

indisputable that Sykes was, in fact, "charged with capital murder after

April 11, 2017." § 13A-5-47.1. 6 Looking to the date on which Sykes was

     6 This Court has recognized that "an original charging instrument

is nullified by a subsequent indictment" and that "a subsequent
indictment that changes an offense of a previous indictment is not an
amendment to the previous indictment; it is a new indictment that
supersedes, nullifies, and replaces the previous indictment." Hulsey v.
                                  48
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first charged with capital murder appears to read into the statute a

qualifier that does not exist.

     Next, § 13A-5-47.1 states that the new capital-sentencing scheme

"shall not apply retroactively to any defendant who has previously been

convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death prior to April 11,

2017."   Sykes was sentenced to death on April 5, 2022; thus, this

provision of § 13A-5-47.1 clearly does not exclude Sykes from being

sentenced under the new capital-sentencing scheme.

     In light of the procedural history of Sykes's case, I believe the circuit

court properly determined that the new capital-sentencing scheme was

applicable to Sykes's charges for capital murder. Therefore, I respectfully

dissent from that portion of the main opinion as well.

State, 196 So. 3d 342, 353 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015); Ex parte Russell, 643
So. 2d 963, 965 (Ala. 1994).
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