Court Opinion

ID: 9901970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 19:02:21.550403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:42.386052
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/22/23 P. v. Lopez CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                B318535

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. KA060104)
         v.

VICENTE FRANCISCO
LOPEZ,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Bruce F. Marrs, Judge. Affirmed.

         Jonathan E. Demson for Plaintiff and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant and appellant Vicente Francisco Lopez
(defendant) appeals from the order denying his petition for
vacatur of his murder conviction and resentencing following an
evidentiary hearing held pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6,
subdivision (d).1 The trial court found the prosecution had met
its burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was
not entitled to resentencing. Defendant contends the order
should be reversed on the ground it is not supported by
substantial evidence. Defendant also contends the trial court
failed to consider his youth at the time of the crime, and thus the
matter should be remanded for that purpose. Finding no merit in
defendant’s contentions, we affirm the order.

                           BACKGROUND
      In 2003, defendant and codefendants Frank Eddie
Quintero, Raymond Salvador Ramirez, and Juan Lucas Soto,
were convicted of first degree murder, two counts of second
degree robbery, one count of assault with a deadly weapon and
conspiracy to commit robbery. The jury found true the robbery-
murder special circumstance alleged under section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(17). Defendant was sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole for the murder, with sentences stayed on the
remaining counts. This court affirmed the judgment on direct

1     Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the section by its new numbering
only.
      All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.

                                2
appeal. (See People v. Lopez (Oct. 6, 2004, B170919) [nonpub.
opn.].)
2003 trial evidence
       Bobby Bionghi testified he lived in the city of La Puente in
2002 and had been a member of the Barrio Puente gang for 13 or
14 years. He knew defendant, Soto, Quintero, and Ramirez, who
were members of various cliques of the La Puente gang, and he
identified them in court. On August 20, 2002, the four men
visited him unexpectedly while he was outside his house. A car
driven by Lorraine Calvillo pulled up next to Bionghi, who was
working on his car. First Soto approached Bionghi and then the
other three men got out while Calvillo remained in the car.
       Soto asked Bionghi whether he would be interested in
being the getaway driver in a robbery. Soto opened the hood of
the car in which he had just arrived, snapped open an air filter,
and pulled out a nickel-plated .357 revolver. Bionghi got a clear
view of two other weapons, which looked like a .32- or .25- and a
.380-millimeter semiautomatic, both black and smaller than the
revolver. Bionghi thought there might have been a third gun.
The other three men were about two to three feet away from him
and Soto as Soto spoke in a “common loud tone of voice.”
       After Soto had taken out the gun, Bionghi and defendant
had a brief conversation. Defendant mentioned a store in El
Monte on the corner of a busy street and another establishment
right around the corner from Bionghi’s residence, a tax business
with a fundraising box that would be easy to access. Defendant
said it would be a quick job because they knew where the money
was kept. Soto was still beside Bionghi during this conversation
and the other men were in the same place as before. Bionghi said
he was not interested, that he was on parole for robbery and
trying to discharge. Soto then put the revolver back in the air

                                3
filter compartment, closed the hood of the car and they left.
About an hour later, Bionghi heard sirens and a helicopter.
       Calvillo testified she remained in the car in Bionghi’s
driveway and was unable to hear the conversations. After
leaving Bionghi, Soto drove the car. Calvillo did not know where
he was going, nor did she ask. When Soto stopped the car he said
there was a tax place with a box of money and they were going to
check it out. Soto then parked in a residential area, and Calvillo
remained in the car.
       Camilo Castro, who operated an income tax business with
his sister, Carmen Castro, testified they kept a large collection
box in the office for donations to a charity he ran.2 The box was
located inside the front door in the lobby next to the door to
Carmen’s office, the first office to the right of the entrance to the
building.
       Camilo was in the back office with Maria Lagos and her
teenage brother Luis Lagos, when he heard two or more gunshots
in quick succession coming from the front of the business.
Carmen was in her office but Camilo did not hear her voice.
Almost immediately after the gunshots, Camilo saw a person
holding a gun at his office door. The gunman ordered them to go
under the desk, yanked the phone from Camilo’s desk, and then
took Camilo’s cell phone. He also took Maria’s keys, phone, and
wallet from her purse, and ordered them to stay there.
       The gunman left the back office, and Camilo heard a
commotion and banging noises coming from the lobby, including
the sound of the fax machine being dropped on top of the money

2     After first mention we use first names only for those who
share the surname of other witnesses or victims. We mean no
disrespect.

                                  4
box causing it to fall to the floor. After a few minutes of not
hearing voices, he said “hello” and received no reply. Camilo then
went to check on Carmen. He found her dead at her desk and the
robbers gone. Camilo went outside and saw his neighbor Charles
Visitor calling the police.
       Maria testified that she was in the back office when she
heard the front door open, a slam, and a noise like a surprised
sort of scream from Carmen. She moved her head to see three
men, one walking toward the back office, and two behind him.
The man coming toward the back office had a gun. Luis testified
he was focused on counting tickets when he heard gunshots, a
slight scream, and then another gunshot. He looked up and saw
someone coming into the back office and a man holding a chrome-
colored handgun pointed toward Carmen’s office. The man
coming to the back office pointed his gun at Maria.
       Visitor testified he ran a business adjacent to the tax office
and has been a business associate of Camilo’s for 19 years. At
approximately 3:30 p.m. the day of the robbery, while at his desk,
he heard four loud gunshots in rapid succession that sounded
close.
       Visitor walked into the lobby of the tax business where he
saw a man facing the door of Carmen’s office. Two other men
were squatting on the floor picking up money that was scattered
around. Visitor later identified the man facing Carmen’s door as
Quintero.
       A second man, who Visitor later identified as Soto, came
out of the building, hit Visitor in the head with something and
then ran in the same direction as Quintero. A third man then
came out of the building and ran past Visitor in the direction of
the first two. Visitor was unable to identify the third man.

                                 5
       Calvillo had turned the car around, and the men came
running and jumped in. Calvillo testified she saw they all had
money in their pockets. As she drove to her house the men all
talked about what they had just done. She said “they” were
asking Soto, “Why did you shoot her?” Soto said he had shot a
woman because she screamed and yelled for her brother. Soto
had told her to shut up, and he hit her, but “she still wouldn’t
shut up.” Calvillo saw Soto had a long silver gun, and defendant
had a black gun. They all said there would be no fingerprints
because they wore latex gloves, which they threw out the car
window onto the freeway. Defendant also threw Maria’s purse,
license, and credit cards out the window.
Section 1172.6 petition for resentencing
       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which amended the laws
pertaining to felony murder and murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, “to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Section 1172.6
provides a procedure for those convicted of murder or attempted
murder to seek retroactive relief if they could not now be
convicted under the amended laws. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
       In March 2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. After the prosecution stipulated
defendant had made a prima facie showing of eligibility under
the statute, the trial court received briefing, held an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) and denied
the petition on February 15, 2022.

                                 6
      At the hearing the trial court stated it had reviewed the
abstract of judgment, the charging documents, the preliminary
hearing transcript, trial transcript, jury instructions, Court of
Appeal decision, and the documents submitted by counsel.3 The
prosecutor submitted the matter on the trial transcript without
presenting additional evidence. The defense presented
defendant’s testimony.
Defendant’s hearing testimony
      On direct examination defendant testified that on
August 20, 2002, he was a member of the La Puente gang and
was at Bionghi’s house sometime in the midday or afternoon.
After fellow La Puente gang members Quintero, Ramirez, and
Soto joined them they were all “hanging out.” Defendant had
known Soto about a year and knew he was a little crazy, on edge,
and did not really care about anything. Defendant had known
the others for about two years. At that time Soto was 20 years
old, Ramirez was 17, Quintero was 18, and defendant was 19.
      Defendant claimed Soto pulled Bionghi aside to talk to him,
and defendant was not part of that conversation, did not know
then what it was about and only later learned it was about doing
a robbery. He denied being in earshot of Soto’s conversation with
Bionghi. He claimed Bionghi gave inaccurate trial and
preliminary hearing testimony and that Bionghi used a lot of
drugs. After the conversation with Bionghi, defendant spoke to
Ramirez and Quintero about doing a robbery. Defendant had
previously committed robberies with them and called them

3     Defendant objected to the admission of preliminary hearing
testimony without a foundational showing of unavailability of
each witness. The objection was overruled, and defendant does
not challenge that ruling.

                                7
“holdups” without guns. He claimed no one had any guns at the
time of his conversation with Ramirez and Quintero.
        With the plan to commit a robbery in El Monte, defendant,
Ramirez, Quintero, and Soto got into a car driven by Calvillo.
Soto sat in the front passenger seat. Defendant sat in the back
middle seat with Quintero and Ramirez. Defendant claimed he
was then unaware of any guns in the car. The plans changed on
the way when Soto said he knew of a charity money box in an
income tax business just around the block from Bionghi’s house.
Calvillo parked on a nearby street and remained in the car as the
others got out. Soto opened the hood of the car and from the air
filter they retrieved two guns defendant had not known were
there. Defendant was given a gun with an orange tip on the
barrel that he claimed was a BB gun and not a real gun.4 They
went into the tax office, which was about 50 or 60 feet around the
corner. Soto entered first, then defendant, then Quintero.
        Once inside Soto went to the first front office, and
defendant went to the back office, which was about 50 to 60 feet
from the front, because he saw people there. Defendant claimed
he went straight back and did not know what Soto was doing in
the front office. In the back office defendant told the three people
there to lie down, and then he robbed them. When he pointed his
gun at them he threatened to shoot them, but he never meant to
harm anyone. Defendant pulled the phone wires from the wall so
they could not make a call and then took the woman’s purse. He
then heard a loud bang and thought it might have been the
charity box falling.

4    No evidence was found in the record regarding whether an
orange tip on a gun means it is not a real gun.

                                 8
       Defendant saw Soto and Quintero run outside and followed
them out. As he ran he saw a person who had been shot slumped
over and was shocked because there was never an intent to harm
anyone. He continued running out and back to the car. When
everyone was back in the car, defendant, Ramirez and Quintero
were upset with Soto and asked why he had shot the woman.
Soto explained it was because she would not shut up. Defendant
denied ever having a discussion beforehand about harming
anyone, and he never thought that would happen. Defendant
never hit or touched anyone in the back office and claimed he did
not threaten them.
       Defendant said he never used a gun in the three or four
robberies he had previously committed and knew he was using a
toy weapon when he went into the tax office. He also claimed he
did not get a good look at Soto’s gun, had never seen it before,
and did not know whether it was loaded. Defendant had not
committed a prior robbery with Soto and denied knowing Soto
was the sort of person who would shoot someone for screaming or
crying. Defendant said he could not have prevented the shooting
because upon entering he had gone straight to the back, and
when he went past the woman as he left, he believed he could not
help her.
       On cross-examination defendant denied knowing they were
going to rob the tax business when they were at Bionghi’s house
or telling Bionghi it would be a quick job because he knew exactly
where the cash box was located. Defendant also denied he tried
to persuade Bionghi to be the driver, that Soto opened the hood in
his presence to show Bionghi the guns, or that he stood near
Bionghi and Soto when Soto was talking to him about driving.
Defendant claimed he did not see the guns before they parked at
the tax office, and there were only two guns. Defendant denied

                                9
hearing Carmen call out for her brother or the sounds of Soto
beating her when he entered the business, which happened after
he entered the back office. He said he did not try to help her
because he was not in the “vicinity” and because he was occupied
in the back office. Defendant admitted taking Maria’s wallet,
keys, cell phone, and other things, which he later threw out the
window, but denied threatening the people in the back office if
they had a cell phone.
      Later at Calvillo’s apartment the money was split four
ways, but defendant could not recall the size of his share.
Defendant claimed he used a BB gun that he kept, but admitted
it was not on him or in his house when he was arrested. He
claimed not to know Soto was the sort who could murder
someone, although he had known Soto for about a year and
thought he was a little crazy and “didn’t care about nothing.”
The trial court’s ruling
      The court denied the petition upon finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant had been a major participant in
the underlying robbery who acted with reckless indifference to
human life and was thus ineligible for relief.
      Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order of
denial.

                          DISCUSSION
I.    Eligibility for resentencing
      A defendant is eligible for resentencing under section
1172.6 if he or she could not have been convicted of murder under
the definition of murder as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957;
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843.) Prior to 2019, at
the time of defendant’s trial, when an accomplice killed another

                               10
during an inherently dangerous felony such as robbery, an aider
and abettor of the robbery could be convicted of murder without a
showing of intent to kill or implied malice. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 704, 707 (Strong).) Senate Bill No. 1437
amended section 189, subdivision (e) to limit felony murder
liability to actual killers, aiders and abettors with the intent to
kill, or major participants in the underlying felony who acted
with reckless indifference to human life as described in section
190.2, the statute defining the felony-murder special
circumstance. (Strong, at pp. 707-708.)
       Defendant concedes that substantial evidence supported
the trial court’s finding that he was a major participant in the
crime, however he contends the trial court’s finding that he
participated in the underlying robbery with reckless indifference
to human life was not supported by substantial evidence, and the
court thus erred in ruling he was ineligible for resentencing
under section 1172.6.
II.    Standard of review
       Once a defendant has made a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief, an evidentiary hearing is to be conducted
pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d). “[T]he burden of
proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, . . . that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see id., subd. (c).) The trial court sits as an
independent fact finder (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
943, 951) and must “‘review all the relevant evidence, evaluate
and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to
credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard . . .’” (People
v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480, quoting People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298). On appeal from the
denial of a petition after hearing, our task is to determine

                                  11
whether any rational trier of fact could have made the same
determination beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Vargas,
supra, at p. 951.) We defer to the trial court’s resolution of
conflicts and credibility determinations. (People v. Clements,
supra, at p. 298.)
        We apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (See
People v. Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 233-234.) Under
the usual substantial evidence standard, “we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v.
Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The same standard applies
when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.”
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court
must accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have
drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) “The standard is deferential, but the
evidence in support of the judgment must be reasonable, credible,
and of solid value; ‘a mere possibility’ or ‘[s]peculation is not
substantial evidence [citation].” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3
Cal.5th 1, 120.) “[B]ecause ‘we must begin with the presumption
that the evidence . . . was sufficient,’ it is defendant, as the
appellant, who ‘bears the burden of convincing us otherwise.’”
(People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1430.) Reversal
on a substantial evidence ground “is unwarranted unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the conclusion of the trier of
fact].’” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
III. Banks and Clark Factors
        In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), the California

                               12
Supreme Court “substantially clarified the law surrounding
major participant findings,” and “then substantially clarified the
relevant considerations for determining whether a defendant has
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at pp. 720-721.)
       The reckless indifference requirement was first articulated
in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 and Enmund v. Florida
(1982) 458 U.S. 782 in relation to the imposition of the death
penalty. In Banks and Clark, the California Supreme Court
clarified the definitions of major participant and reckless
indifference to human life and suggested relevant considerations
for the trier of fact in making that determination. “No one of
these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them
necessarily sufficient” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803); what
matters is the totality of the circumstances (In re Scoggins (2020)
9 Cal.5th 667, 677 (Scoggins)).
       The factors used to determine whether a defendant was a
major participant include the following considerations: the role
played by the defendant in planning the underlying crime; the
role the defendant had in supplying or using a lethal weapon; the
awareness of the defendant of the particular dangers posed by
the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or
conduct of the other participants; the defendant’s presence at the
scene of the killing; and the defendant’s action after lethal force
was used. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611; Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 803; see Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
       With regard to reckless indifference to human life, Banks
explained it as engaging in a felony known to carry a grave risk
of death while “‘“subjectively aware that his or her participation
in the felony involved a grave risk of death.”’” (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at pp. 801, 807.) Thus, “felony murderers . . . , who

                                13
simply had awareness their confederates were armed and armed
robberies carried a risk of death, lack the requisite reckless
indifference to human life” (id. at p. 809) because “only knowingly
creating a ‘grave risk of death’ satisfies the constitutional
minimum” (id. at p. 808) articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at page 158
and Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at page 798.
       In Scoggins, our Supreme Court gleaned factors from
Banks and Clark to guide the determination whether the
defendant was subjectively aware that his participation involved
a grave risk of death. As relevant here, factors to consider in
determining whether the defendant was subjectively aware that
his participation in the underlying felony involved a grave risk of
death are the defendant’s awareness that a gun would be used
during the robbery; the number of weapons ultimately used; the
defendant’s physical presence at the crime; the opportunity, if
any, to restrain the crime or aid the victim; the duration of the
interaction between the perpetrators and the victims; the
defendant’s knowledge of his confederate’s propensity for
violence; any efforts defendant made to minimize the risks of
violence during the robbery. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 677, citing Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623.)
       The major participant and reckless indifference factors
significantly overlap. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.) Thus,
although defendant has conceded that substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that he was a major participant
in the robbery, we consider all relevant factors from both
categories to determine whether substantial evidence support the
court’s finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human
life.

                                14
       Defendant, after summarizing the evidence in the light
most favorable to his claim that because the shooting was
spontaneous and unexpected and he was in the back office, the
facts as to him are comparable to getaway-driver cases such as In
re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 559. Defendant concludes
that the robbery was a “‘garden-variety armed robbery,’” an
expression quoted in Taylor, at page 559, and attributed to
Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at page 802. However, in Clark, the
California Supreme Court explained that “a robbery in which the
only factor supporting reckless indifference to human life is the
fact of the use of a gun is what we meant by ‘a garden-variety
armed robbery’ in Banks . . . .” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 617, fn. 74.) In Taylor, the target of the planned late-night
crime was a closed liquor store with just one employee present.
(Taylor, at p. 558.) There, the evidence was insufficient to show
that the defendant knew that his accomplice was armed or might
become violent; and the defendant was the getaway driver who
never got out of his car, could not see the shooting, did not supply
the gun, and left the scene only when he saw help was coming.
(Id. at pp. 557-560.) Moreover, that defendant thought he was
assisting in an “unarmed snatch-and-grab.” (Id. at p. 556.)
       Defendant here was not a getaway driver, the business was
not closed, defendant knew his accomplices were armed and he
knew the people inside would be robbed at gunpoint. We thus
reject the argument that this was a “garden-variety armed
robbery.”
       Moreover, considering the totality of the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, we find substantial
evidence that defendant acted with a reckless disregard for
human life. First, despite defendant’s denial at the evidentiary
hearing, the evidence at trial suggests defendant played a major

                                15
part in planning the robbery as he told Bionghi about the store in
El Monte, the tax business, and the charity box, explaining that
it would be a quick job because he knew where the money was. It
is thus reasonable to infer defendant was aware when the plan
was formed that firearms would be used, as he stood just two or
three feet from Soto and Bionghi when Soto opened the car’s air
filter and removed a .357 revolver, leaving in plain view two
semiautomatic firearms and possible a third firearm of some
kind. Although defendant denied knowing that Soto was the sort
to murder someone, he admitted he had known him for about a
year, knew Soto was armed before going into the tax office, and
knew Soto was a little crazy and “didn’t care about nothing.”
       Although he may not have been in the lobby when Soto shot
Carmen, defendant was present and participating at the scene of
the killing. The most reasonable inference from the evidence is
that defendant was close enough to hear what was happening in
the lobby. From the back office Maria was able to hear the front
door slam and Carmen’s surprised scream as Soto, defendant,
and Quintero entered through the front door. Luis testified he
saw a man pointing a gun toward Carmen’s office, heard
gunshots, a scream, and then another gunshot just before
defendant entered the back office. Calvillo testified when
defendant and the others asked Soto why he shot her, he
explained it was because she screamed and yelled for her brother,
and after he hit her and told to be quiet “she still wouldn’t shut
up.” The trial court could reasonably infer that defendant was
aware Soto had his gun drawn, Carmen was screaming, Soto had
told her to shut up, he hit her, and fired his gun at least once
before defendant reached the back office.
       Although defendant may not have had the opportunity to
prevent the killing when it took place, he certainly had the

                               16
opportunity to turn back and check on Carmen’s condition.
Instead, he continued to the back office where he robbed people at
gunpoint. Neither did defendant check on Carmen once he
robbed his victims. Visitor testified that sometime after hearing
gunshots and checking around the area of his office, he went into
the lobby of the tax office, where he saw Quintero holding a gun,
and Soto and another man squatting on the floor, picking up
money that was scattered all over the place. It is reasonable to
infer defendant was in the lobby picking up money while
Quintero was displaying a gun. Then, after Soto and Quintero
ran out of the business, defendant joined them in the car, again
without even checking on Carmen. Thus the trial court aptly
concluded the robbery happened over a substantial period of
time—a period in which defendant could have taken steps to
minimize the possibility of violence, intervene when Soto was
beating Carmen, or render or call for aid after the shooting,
instead of callously continuing to rob Camilo, Maria and Luis,
and then scooping up as much scattered money as possible.
       We conclude substantial evidence supports factors relating
to defendant’s significant role in planning the robbery,
defendant’s presence at the scene of the killing, his failure to
even attempt to minimize the violence, his awareness that a gun
would be used and Soto’s character, and his actions after lethal
force was used. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611; Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803; see Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 677.) We also conclude substantial evidence supports
defendant’s awareness of the weapons used during the robbery,
that at least two guns were used, defendant’s failure to restrain
the crime or give aid to the victim given the duration of the
interaction with the victims, and defendant’s lack of efforts to

                               17
minimize the risks of violence during the robbery. (Scoggins,
supra, at p. 677, citing Clark, supra, at pp. 618-623.)
IV. Youth as a factor
        Defendant argues the trial court was informed he was 19
years old at the time of the crime and the court failed to consider
his youth as a factor in determining his state of mind. For that
reason he claims this court should reverse the order and remand
with directions to consider his age, as the court did in People v.
Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1093 (Jones). While youth can
be a relevant factor in assessing whether a defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life (see In re Moore (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 434, 439 453-454), it is not by itself a dispositive
factor (In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 470).
       In Jones, the defense asked the trial court to consider that
the defendant was “‘barely 20 years old at the time of this crime,’
‘immature’ and ‘still developing.’” (Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1091.) Despite evidence in the record of childhood trauma
and mental illness, the trial court in that case did not consider
youth as a factor in its determination of reckless indifference.
(Ibid.) The appellate court presumed the trial court followed the
law at the time but noted the hearing took place prior to the
publication of appellate court decisions holding that youth must
be considered in “‘recognition of the science relating to adolescent
brain development . . . ,’” such as People v. Harris (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 939, 960 and In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at
page 454. (Jones, supra, at pp. 1091-1092, quoting People v.
Harris, at p. 960, and citing People v. Ramirez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 970, 990-991.)
       Though Jones was published after defendant’s evidentiary
hearing, the cases on which the Jones court relied were all
published prior to defendant’s evidentiary hearing, and

                                 18
defendant told the court he was 19 years old at the time of the
crime. We presume the trial court followed the law in making its
ruling and that it duly considered any evidence presented. (See
Jones, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.) Defendant did not
present evidence suggesting his immaturity or childhood
experiences caused him to act with “‘“impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences”’” (People v. Ramirez, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 990) or to be “impulsive rather than
criminally sophisticated” (Jones, supra, at p. 1091). As the
People point out, defendant had previously committed at least
three robberies. Given defendant’s role in planning the robbery
with Soto, whom defendant knew to be a little crazy, his
awareness of the weapons used, his failure to restrain the crime
or give aid to the victim and his lack of efforts to minimize the
risks of violence during the robbery, as we discussed above, we
agree with the People that the evidence showed him to be
sophisticated and experienced rather than immature and
inexperienced.
       Defendant’s actions after Soto shot Carmen are particularly
probative of defendant’s reckless indifference. The circumstances
were not ambiguous, and the evidence did not give rise to
different inferences that “may not be very probative of his mental
state,” such as immediate flight after the shooting. (Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 679-680.) The only reasonable inference
to be drawn from defendant’s actions is that he was concerned
only with money, not human life, to which he was recklessly
indifferent. “Youth can distort risk calculations. Yet every 18
year old understands bullet wounds require attention. The fact
of youth cannot overwhelm all other factors.” (People v. Mitchell
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 595, citing Tison v. Arizona, supra,
481 U.S. at pp. 142, 151-152, 158.) In sum, when youth is

                               19
overborne as here by the “Banks-Clark-Scoggins factors” to
support a finding of indifference to human life, being 19 years old
at the time of the crime is not a reason for the trial court to grant
the petition.
      Considering the totality of the circumstances we conclude
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant was a major participant in the robbery and acted with
reckless disregard for human life, such that a rational trier of fact
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant remains
guilty of felony murder under section 189 as amended effective
January 1, 2019.

                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying the section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

                                      ________________________
                                      CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

We concur:

________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.

________________________
KWAN, J.*

*     Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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