Court Opinion

ID: 9560731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:54:35.742908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:08.924593
License: Public Domain

Barrow, X,
dissenting.
The rule established in Winfield v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 1049, 421 S.E.2d 468 (1992) (en banc), does not address the issue raised in this case. Winfield, focusing on a trial court’s credibility evaluation, held only that “ ‘where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them’ ” must be “ ‘accorded great deference on appeal.’ ” Id. at 1049-50, 421 S.E.2d at 468 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 369 (1991)).
“[T]wo permissible views of the evidence” do not exist in this case. The prosecutor struck a black woman because, the prosecutor said, he wanted to remove young people without children from the jury and the woman he struck was “only 28 . . . [and] had no children.” He did not, however, strike another woman, of a different race, who was twenty-three years old and had no children. These facts are not in dispute.
*555Only one permissible view of this evidence exists. The prosecutor, while saying one thing, did another. Assuming the truth of the prosecutor’s explanation, we must decide whether, as a matter of law, his explanation, contradicted by his actions, rebuts the prima facie showing of discriminatory intent. See United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir. 1992).
This question is not addressed by Winfield. A careful reading of the majority opinions in both the en banc and the panel decisions reveals absolutely no reference to this issue; only the dissents address it. See Winfield, 14 Va. App. at 1049, 421 S.E.2d at 468; Winfield v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 446, 404 S.E.2d 398 (1991).
A dissent, in disagreeing with the majority, cannot define the rule of a majority decision. However tempting it may be to infer from a dissent that which is not expressed in a majority opinion, such inferential reasoning cannot be precedentially binding.
Stare decisis does not foreclose review of an issue not addressed on its merits in a prior decision. Virginia Department of Corrections v. Crowley, 227 Va. 254, 262, 316 S.E.2d 439, 443 (1984). In order to provide stability, uniformity, and predictability in the legal system, stare decisis assures the application of “ ‘principles . . . founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.’ ” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 853 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)). Only a majority decision elevates a legal rule beyond the mere proclivities of an individual. See Ken Kimura, Note, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1593, 1596 n.15 (1992). A dissent represents only the dissenter’s view of a majority decision.
Consideration of this issue by the dissenting opinions in Winfield permits, at best, only the reasonable inference that the majority deliberately chose not to address the issue. A later decision of this court supports this conclusion. See Broady v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 281, 429 S.E.2d 468 (1993). This issue has, however, been addressed by panels of our court and federal courts. Facially non-racial reasons do not overcome the prima facie showing of discriminatory intent when applied to members of one race and not to another. Id. at 285, 429 S.E.2d at 471. See Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506, 512 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1204 (1991); Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352, 1361-62 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991). See *556also United States v. Johnson, 873 F.2d 1137, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1989); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 176, 186-87, 380 S.E.2d 1, 6-7, aff'd en banc, 9 Va. App. 169, 384 S.E.2d 343 (1989). A prosecutor’s disclaimer of racial discrimination is not dispositive of whether the prima facie showing of discrimination has been overcome. If it were, a prosecutor’s denial of a discriminatory purpose would suffice. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)). Even if a prosecutor’s explanation is truthful, if the criterion used by the prosecutor eliminates members of the defendant’s race from the jury, but not members of another race who meet the same criterion, the explanation fails to rebut the presumption of discrimination. Consequently, in this case, the prosecutor’s explanation, contradicted by his actions, does not, as a matter of law, overcome the showing of discriminatory intent.
For this reason, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand the matter for a new trial;2 therefore, I dissent.

 Having so concluded, I need not address the consequences of the prosecutor’s other peremptory strikes.