Court Opinion

ID: 9699234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:14:20.139329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:47.758329
License: Public Domain

Justice ALBIN,
dissenting.
Residents of South Brunswick Township petitioned their town council to amend the zoning ordinance for a portion of Route 27, to restrict plaintiff Riya Finnegan, LLC from building a twenty-four-hour drugstore and other commercial establishments that would exacerbate traffic, noise, safety, and other quality-of-life conditions for hundreds of residents within the immediate area. After conducting an extensive public hearing, the Township Council, in compliance with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a), rezoned plaintiffs proper*200ty from Neighborhood Commercial (C-l) to Office Professional (OP).
I cannot agree with the majority that the democratic exercise of the Township’s will through the legislative process, as authorized by N.J.S.A 40:55D-62(a), was arbitrary and capricious. In striking down the zoning amendment, the majority has substituted its own “equitable” judgment for a lawfully-enacted zoning ordinance addressing public safety and quality-of-life issues of concern to South Brunswick’s residents. I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division and uphold the zoning amendment. See Riya Finnegan, LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 394 N.J.Super. 303, 306-07, 318-19, 926 A.2d 402 (App.Div.2007).
I.
This case involves the zoning powers of a municipality under the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to — 163. A municipality’s “[pjower to zone” is specifically defined in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a). That statute provides:
The governing body may adopt or amend a zoning ordinance____Such ordinance shall be adopted after the planning board has adopted the land use plan element and the housing plan element of a master plan, and all of the provisions of such zoning ordinance or any amendment or revision thereto shall either be substantially consistent with the land use plan element and the housing plan element of the master plan or designed to effectuate such plan elements; provided that the governing body may adopt a zoning ordinance or amendment or revision thereto which in whole or part is inconsistent with or not designed to effectuate the land use plan element and the housing plan element, but only by affirmative vote of a majority of the full authorized membership of the governing body, unth the reasons of the governing body for so acting set forth in a resolution and recorded in its minutes when adopting such a zoning ordinance____
[N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) (emphasis added).]
The statute reflects the Legislature’s public policy to give municipalities the breathing space to adjust zoning and land use plans to reflect changing circumstances. See Willoughby v. Planning Bd. of Twp. of Deptford, 306 N.J.Super. 266, 279, 703 A.2d 668 (App.Div.1997) (noting that the effect of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62 is to “confer[] the responsibility for determining a municipality’s *201land use plan upon the governing body, composed of the people’s elected representatives”). A master plan is not a straitjaeket that forbids a municipality from improving its laws. By conferring authority on a municipality to amend zoning ordinances, even when inconsistent with the master plan, see N.J.S.A 40:55D-62(a), the Legislature simply recognized that laws originally enacted may be imperfect and must evolve to meet a community’s changing conditions and needs. The Legislature vested authority in the municipality’s democratically-elected governing body to make necessary amendments to its zoning ordinances, provided those amendments comply with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a).
Here, the Township complied with the statutory requirements of N.J.SA 40:55D-62(a). Plaintiff applied for site plan approval for a “14,690 square foot pharmacy with drive thru window, a 29,092 square foot retail building with [a] 6,800 square [foot] second story office and a 9,000 square foot office building” on 12.69 acres of property located on Route 27. Riya Finnegan, LLC, supra, 394 N.J.Super. at 307-08, 926 A.2d 402. That property, which represented the largest single undeveloped parcel in the C-l zone, abutted 300 single-family homes, a nearby elementary school, and a park. Residents appealed to the Township Council to amend the zoning of plaintiffs nearly thirteen-acre property from C-l to OP. They expressed fear that plaintiffs commercial shopping center would dramatically increase vehicular traffic and safety hazards, particularly to children, on already congested streets, and increase noise, lighting, and litter to unacceptable levels. One resident presented a land-use analysis of the more than three-mile stretch of highway in question, showing that the highway already was overdeveloped with more than one hundred commercial establishments.
In response, the,Township Council referred the issue to the Planning Board, as required by N.J.S.A 40:55D-64. After extensive public input, the Planning Board voted unanimously to recommend that the Township Council rezone plaintiffs property to OP. *202The Township Council then conducted a public hearing at which both residents and plaintiff’s attorney expressed their views. A resident, who had lived in the Township for twenty-one years, cited a traffic expert’s conclusion that there would be a voluminous increase in traffic at various hours on Saturday. Other residents, who presented accident data for the area, voiced their concern that the heightened traffic would lead ultimately to increased numbers of vehicular and pedestrian accidents.
After taking all of the residents and plaintiffs concerns into consideration, the Township Council voted unanimously to rezone plaintiffs approximately thirteen-acre parcel to OP. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) (stating that zoning amendment inconsistent with master plan requires “affirmative vote of a majority of the full authorized membership of the governing body”). The Council placed the reasons for its findings in a resolution. See ibid. (stating that “the reasons of the governing body for so acting [shall be] set forth in a resolution”).
Among the findings included in the resolution were that (1) rezoning the property would “significantly protect the health, safety and welfare of the residents and motorists in the area”; (2) “the development of a shopping center or other large commercial retail facility, as permitted in the C-l zone, would be too intense for this 12.69 acre parcel, which is not compatible to the residential properties immediately adjacent to it”; (3) “according to the accident data presented,” the site to be commercially developed “is already an area where accidents are prone to occur”; (4) “the property is more appropriately zoned OP ... [because] office use tends to generate less traffic than commercial since commercial can be open 24 hours a day while offices are generally closed nights and weekends”; (5) the “over development” of the “Route 27 corridor over the last seven years has made it ideal for application of the OP standards”; (6) the zoning amendment “is more in keeping with the general comprehensive plan of this area”; and (7) “rezoning will not prevent the owner from develop*203ing the property consistent with the OP zone standards.”1
Those findings articulated in the resolution were grounded on precise (not generic) information provided by local residents and on the commonsense inferences drawn by the council members who were familiar with the area to be developed. The Council did not need to hear from a civil engineer or a land-use planning expert to understand that plaintiffs intended commercial development would exacerbate safety and health concerns of the residents living within the immediate area of the Route 27 corridor. The Council enacted an amended zoning ordinance that conformed to the “general comprehensive plan of this area” and that promoted the general welfare of the community.
That the source of the zoning amendment was citizens petitioning their government should be of no concern. See Manalapan Realty v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378-79, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) (“That a municipality may change its zoning ordinance during the pendency of a site plan application is beyond question. This is so even if the ordinance is amended in direct response to a particular application.”). That one approximately thirteen-acre parcel of property rather than thirteen one-acre parcels of property is subject to the zoning amendment should not alter the analysis. See Kozesnik v. Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 172, 131 A.2d 1 (1957) (“Dissimilar treatment does not inevitably bespeak eapriciousness. If all property similarly situated had to be accorded identical treatment, the objective of a well-balanced community might be frustrated.”). The point is that the Council acted to further the general welfare of the community with a comprehensive plan in mind. Ibid. (“The final test must be whether the municipality is *204seeking to advance the community interest rather than some private or sectional advantage.” (citation omitted)).
The Council’s findings presented in its resolution are entitled to deference by this Court. Moreover, as with all duly-enacted laws, a zoning ordinance is presumed to be valid. See Riggs v. Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 610-11, 538 A.2d 808 (1988). That presumption of validity can be overcome only by a showing that “the ordinance is ‘clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or plainly contrary to fundamental principles of zoning or the [zoning] statute.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Bow & Arrow Manor v. Town of West Orange, 63 N.J. 335, 343, 307 A.2d 563 (1973)); see also id. at 611, 538 A.2d 808 (noting that “[t]he party attacking the ordinance bears the burden of overcoming the presumption” (citing Ward v. Montgomery Twp., 28 N.J. 529, 539, 147 A.2d 248 (1959))).
It is not the role of this Court to second-guess the policy choices made by the council members or judge the wisdom of the ordinance, but only to determine whether the law comports with the MLUL and the Constitution. See Bd. of Educ. v. Caffiero, 86 N.J. 308, 318, 431 A.2d 799 (1981). Here, the Township Council faithfully followed every dictate of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) in passing the zoning amendment and presented rationally-based findings in a resolution to support the amendment. Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that the Township acted in a “clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable” manner.
II.
Additionally, I do not agree with the majority that a rationally-based zoning amendment enacted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) — a statute that contemplates the enactment of zoning amendments inconsistent with the master plan-can be vitiated on the basis of the judicially — created equitable doctrine of “inverse spot zoning.” The majority characterizes the zoning amendment of the South Brunswick Township Council as inverse spot zoning, using as its template Petlin Associates, Inc. v. Township of Dover, 64 N.J. 327, 316 A.2d 1 (1974), this Court’s “most extended *205discussion” of inverse spot zoning. However, this case is distinguishable from Petlin in two significant ways.
First, the MLUL and, more particularly, the statutory grant of authority to municipalities under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) to pass zoning amendments inconsistent with the master plan did not exist at the time we decided Petlin, which preceded the effective date of the MLUL by nearly seventeen months. See L. 1975, c. 291, s. 82. At least textually, the land-use statutory law that predated the MLUL did not specifically authorize municipalities to adopt zoning ordinances inconsistent with a master plan. Because N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a) has granted zoning powers to municipalities that were not in our statutory law at the time of our holding in Petlin, that case may have limited value in resolving the present issue.
Second, Petlin’s facts are not in any way similar to those in the case before us. In Petlin, we found that inverse spot zoning existed because the municipality gave “no real consideration ... to how the property would fit into an integrated and comprehensive zone plan” and that “various enactments were designed to affect only the use of plaintiffs property.” Petlin, supra, 64 N.J. at 331, 316 A.2d 1. The Court found that the rezoning was “questionable on its face,” in part, because Dover Township’s own planning engineer had recommended against the zoning change and the Township’s governing body disregarded this recommendation. Ibid.
On the other hand, in this case South Brunswick Township considered the commercial overdevelopment of the Route 27 corridor and considered how rezoning plaintiffs property would improve the community’s overall comprehensive plan and the “health, safety and welfare” of its residents. Unlike in Petlin, here in the prerogative writ action before the trial court, South Brunswick’s director of planning and community development gave his opinion that the change in zoning would “clearly lead to enhanced protection of the health, safety and welfare of [area] residents” and that “[t]he Council’s decision to rezone clearly *206reflected a response to [ ] negative impacts to the existing residential development.”
Thus, Petlin does not support the majority’s nullification of South Brunswick’s zoning amendment, which was not only authorized by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a), but also grounded in rational findings made by the Township Council.
III.
Finally, a word must be said about the source of authority for the doctrine of “inverse spot zoning.” To the extent that authority is equitable in nature, that is, a judicially-created doctrine that finds its roots in notions of fairness, it must give way to statutory law. Oberhand v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 198 N.J. 558, 582, 940 A.2d 1202 (2008) (Long, J., dissenting) (finding that this Court cannot use its equitable “power to disregard clear legislative enactments because they are not in conformity with the court’s view of what is fair”). As the axiom goes, “ ‘equity follows the law.’” Dunkin’ Donuts of Am. v. Middletown Donut Corp., 100 N.J. 166, 183, 495 A.2d 66 (1985) (citation omitted). We cannot as a Court take away authority statutorily granted to municipalities based on our own concepts of fairness. So long as the zoning amendment was rationally based, even though inconsistent with the master plan, as permitted by N.J.S.A 40:55D-62(a), this Court has no power to remake the law in its own image. See Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 461, 908 A.2d 196 (2006) (“[A] court must discern not only the limits of its own authority, but also when to exercise forbearance____”); Oberhand, supra, 193 N.J. at 574, 940 A.2d 1202 (Albin, J., concurring) (“The source of a court’s powers to declare a law invalid rests on the higher law of our constitutions, not on judicially-crafted equitable principles.”).
IV.
For the reasons I have given, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division which upheld South Brunswick’s zoning amendment. I therefore respectfully dissent.
*207Justice LONG joins in this opinion.
For reversal and reinstatement — Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS — 5.
For affirmance — Justices LONG and ALBIN — 2.

 Indeed, within the OP zone, plaintiff can build professional and medical offices, banks, health clubs, fitness centers, dance studios, travel agencies, conference centers, nursing homes, extended-stay facilities, child care, assisted living and laboratory or research facilities. Because the property has not been stripped of its economic value by the zoning change, there is not a “taking" of land in any constitutional sense. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 136, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2665, 57 L.Ed.2d 631, 655 (1978).