Court Opinion

ID: 9588686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:54.209357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:12.579547
License: Public Domain

Smith, Justice,
dissenting.
I do not think, under the unique facts and procedural posture of this case, that the majority is correct in finding that the city may not be estopped. Summary judgment was granted below; however, there are unresolved facts which require this case to be submitted to a jury for disposition based upon facts in the record which indicate that the act may not have been ultra vires. The new agreement may have been made with the implied consent of the members of the city council.
When viewed in favor of the appellees, the parties who opposed summary judgment, the facts show that appellee Rushing contacted four members of the city council of Warner Robins to voice objection to the huge increase in her water and sewer service bill. Each of the council members told her to contact the mayor about the problem. The owner of appellee Star Laundry also contacted members of the city council. He too was referred to the mayor. The mayor agreed to help and
As a result of the mayor’s intervention, the city subsequently began billing the appellants pursuant to a “phase-in” arrangement, under which their old rates were to be increased to those called for under the new ordinance on a more gradual basis.
Star Laundry v. City of Warner Robins, 189 Ga. App. 839, 840 (377 SE2d 709) (1989). Appellee Star Laundry continued to seek relief and
[Mr. Carter, the owner of Star Laundry,] delivered to city hall seven copies of a letter addressed to the “Mayor and Council” in which he petitioned the city to enact “a 44% decrease in the recently implemented rate structure,” so as to bring its water and sewer rates in line with those existing in several other Georgia cities whose rates he had surveyed. [3]
*351Decided July 13, 1989.
James E. Elliott, Jr., Moore & Moore, Bradley W. Bledsoe, for appellant.
Pamela M. Richards, for appellees.
The mayor was receptive to Carter’s request; and at a subsequent meeting attended by the mayor, Carter, the utility supervisor, and the city clerk, a rate structure was agreed upon . . . which was substantially lower than the ordinance rate.
Id.
The appellees depended, as does the public generally, on the members of the city council and the mayor to attend to their problems. The members of the council referred the appellees to the mayor for help with the huge increases in their bills. The mayor had several meetings with the appellees. The letter with seven copies addressed to the “Mayor and Council” was delivered to city hall. The mayor met with the appellees and the city utility department manager and city clerk and agreed upon a rate structure designed to give the appellees relief.
It is certainly within the realm of reason that appellees thought, as would any citizen, that their problems had been attended to in a lawful manner by their duly elected representatives. The appellees relied upon the new rate structure and made no attempts to implement changes in their business practices to offset the higher rates.4 These facts plus the fact that the appellees continued to be billed under the new agreement for approximately a year certainly shows that the agreement could have very well been ratified by implication by the city council members.
It really stretches the imagination to presume that after all of the above occurred, and with the number of city hall people involved, that the members of the city council did not at least know about and, by inaction, ratify and consent to the agreement giving the appellees relief from the oppressive rate increase.
All of the facts should be presented to a jury for determination of whether or not, under the unique facts of this case, the members of the counsel gave their implied consent to the agreement by their actions, inaction, and silence for almost a year.
*352Walter E. Sumner, amicus curiae.

3 The original change in the water rates increased Star Laundry’s water and sewer bill from $38.50 to over $4,000 per month. Star Laundry v. City of Warner Robins, supra.

 The difference between the amounts paid by the appellees and the amount called for in the ordinance was $75,000 for Star Laundry and $7,000 for Mrs. Rushing’s laundry.