Court Opinion

ID: 9697003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:03:24.725182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:45.231548
License: Public Domain

Brown, C. J.
(dissenting). On competent evidence the circuit court, trier of the fact, found that the dominant theme of the whole book, “Tropic of Cancer,” to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, appeals to prurient interests. This paraphrases the test approved by Roth v. United States (1957), 354 U. S. 476, 489, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. (2d) 1498, and which we adopted as the test by which to determine whether a publication is obscene in State v. Chobot (1960), 12 Wis. (2d) 110, 112, 106 N. W. (2d) 286, appeal dismissed, 368 U. S. 15, 82 Sup. Ct. 136, 7 L. Ed. (2d) 85, rehearing denied, *152368 U. S. 936, 82 Sup. Ct. 358, 7 L. Ed. (2d) 198. While contrary evidence was given, the finding is not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the finding should not be disturbed by the appellate court. If the finding is not disturbed the trial court’s conclusion must follow — that the book is obscene and not entitled to the protection of the First amendment of the federal constitution nor that of sec. 3, art. I of the Wisconsin constitution.
The Wisconsin legislature has enacted sec. 269.565, Stats. Its part, presently material, commands:
“(5) Findings and judgment. If, after such hearing, the court, or jury (unless its finding is contrary to law or to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence), determines that such matter is obscene, the court shall enter judgment that such matter is obscene.”
Having determined on competent evidence that Tropic of Cancer is obscene, the trial court correctly entered judgment embodying its conclusions relative to determination of obscenity and declaring that the protection of the free-press portions of the state and federal constitutions do not extend to Tropic of Cancer.
Whatever we may think, individually, of the public policy of suppressing any writing, as a court we may not declare our personal opposing preferences to be the law and thus subvert the public policy determined by the legislature. Thus it appears to me that the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed unless, of course, we can find that upon perusal of the book itself we find as a matter of law that Tropic of Cancer is not constitutionally obscene.
After judgment was entered in the circuit court but before the appeal was heard here, the case of Manual Enterprises, Inc., v. Day was determined by the United States supreme court ((1962), 370 U. S. 478, 486, 487, 82 Sup. *153Ct. 1432, 8 L. Ed. (2d) 639). There the postmaster general barred certain magazines from the mails because they were obscene and because they informed persons where obscene materials could be obtained. This administrative ruling was sustained by the federal district court and the court of appeals. The supreme court reversed. Mr. Justice Harlan wrote the principal opinion in which Mr. Justice Stewart joined. They held that the challenged material was not obscene under constitutional standards. Mr. Justice Black concurred in the result but gave no reasons. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice White did not participate. Mr. Justice Brennan, the chief justice, and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the result on the ground that the postmaster general lacked authority to make the ruling complained of. Mr. Justice Clark dissented. In his view the postmaster general does have the powers which he exercised and the record shows that the magazines inform the reader where obscene material can be found. That learned justice expressly refrained from considering the question of whether the magazines were themselves obscene. He would affirm the decision below.
It is apparent, therefore, that there was little agreement among the justices in the Day Case but in the principal opinion Messrs. Justices Harlan and Stewart announced a rule amending the Roth test of obscenity. They said that in addition to the appeal to prurient interest, as in Roth, in order to be held obscene the questioned material must present a “patently offensive portrayal.” Messrs. Justices Harlan and Stewart may have been speaking only for themselves but no other justice voiced disagreement with their addition to the test set forth in the Roth Case.
Tested by Roth alone, the trial court’s finding that Tropic of Cancer is obscene is conclusive, as I have said earlier. If we add to the test of obscenity the further requirement that there be present a patently offensive portrayal, which some *154of the justices in Day considered a prerequisite for a finding that the material is obscene, I have no difficulty in finding that this element also is present in Tropic of Cancer as a matter of law.
In the recent Massachusetts case of Attorney General v. Book Named “Tropic of Cancer” (Mass. 1962), 184 N. E. (2d) 328, referred to in appellants’ brief and in the majority opinion, the only evidence before the trial court and the appellate court was the book itself. It was proper there for the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts to act on the rule that where all the evidence is documentary the appellate court need not be influenced by the decision of the trial court but may reach its own conclusions from inspection of the documents. Appellants now urge us to pursue the same course. But the present case is different. This is not a case where we have documentary evidence alone. Now we have a great deal of expert testimony concerning contemporary community standards and the appeal to prurient interests in that area. We cannot ignore that testimony nor the findings based thereon.
If we care to consider that the test of the Roth Case has been amended by some of the justices who participated in the Day Case we might look at the book by itself to determine whether Tropic of Cancer is a patently offensive portrayal of the subject matter. If we do so it gives no aid and comfort to the appellants.
Far from being persuasive that the book is not obscene, a rereading of it only confirms the contrary conclusion. The book is a collection of anecdotes which, with few exceptions, describe in detail the sexual proclivities of a number of depraved men whose central character appears to be the author. His account of their practices and perversions in the erotic arena are described in the vilest terms known to the English language. The portrayal is patently offensive.
*155In Attorney General v. Book Named “Tropic of Cancer,” supra, a divided court, the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, adjudged the book not constitutionally obscene. In dissent the court’s learned chief justice and two of his colleagues aptly characterized the book thus (p. 336) :
“The book is pitched at the nadir of scatology. Indeed, its low level is relied upon as engulfing all obscene effect. We cannot bring ourselves to accept the thesis that the book, thus indicted, becomes endowed with constitutional protection. Its detailed and sordid sex episodes, persistently inserted at intervals in what passes for narrative, leave an outweighing staccato impression. In our opinion it should be classified as pornography.”
I agree emphatically with the Massachusetts dissenters. Tropic of Cancer is saturated with filth in its substance and in its expression. The judgment should be affirmed.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Currie and Mr, Justice Hallows join in this dissent.