Court Opinion

ID: 9948435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 00:01:58.754737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:41.078273
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/6/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                          DIVISION EIGHT

 VFLA EVENTCO, LLC,                B323977

     Plaintiff and Appellant,      (Los Angeles County
                                   Super. Ct. No. 20SMCV00933)
         v.

 WILLIAM MORRIS
 ENDEAVOR
 ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, et al.,

     Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Mark H. Epstein, Judge. Affirmed.
      Carlton Fields, Harvey W. Geller, and Steven B. Weisburd for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Susan K. Leader, Conor D.
Tucker, and Stephanie V. Balitzer for Defendant and Respondent
William Morris Endeavor Entertainment, LLC.
      Shapiro Arato Bach, Cynthia S. Arato, Julian S. Brod, and
Avery D. Medjuck for Defendant and Respondent Big Grrrl Big
Touring, Inc.
      Law Offices of Max J. Sprecher, Max J. Sprecher; Meloni &
McCaffrey, and Robert S. Meloni for Defendants and Respondents
Starry US Touring Inc. and Kali Uchis Touring, Inc.
               ___________________________________

      Plaintiff and appellant VFLA Eventco, LLC (VFLA) sued
defendants and respondents Starry US Touring, Inc. (Starry US),
Kali Uchis Touring, Inc. (Kali Uchis Touring), Big Grrrl Big
Touring, Inc. (Big Grrrl), and William Morris Endeavor
Entertainment, LLC (WME) for various causes of action related to
$6 million in deposits paid to secure the performances of Ellie
Goulding, Kali Uchis, and Lizzo at VFLA’s music festival scheduled
for June 2020.1
      As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and in compliance with
the government restrictions meant to mitigate the pandemic, VFLA
cancelled the festival and demanded the return of the deposits from
WME, who negotiated the performance contracts and held the
deposits as the artists’ agent. VFLA claimed its right to the
deposits under the force majeure provision in the parties’
performance contracts, which determined the parties’ rights to the
deposits in the event of a force majeure cancellation. The artists
refused VFLA’s demand, claiming VFLA bore the risk of a
cancellation due to the pandemic.
      VFLA sued the artists for breach of contract and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. VFLA also sued
WME for conversion, money had and received, unfair business

1     We refer to the producers Starry US, Kali Uchis Touring, Big
Grrrl, and their respective performers collectively as “the artists”
unless otherwise necessary.

                                 2
practices, and declaratory relief. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the artists and WME, finding VFLA bore the
risk of the festival’s cancellation, and that WME could not be held
liable as an agent for the actions of its principals.
       For the reasons stated below, we hold the trial court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of the artists and WME.
The force majeure provision is not reasonably susceptible to VFLA’s
interpretation, and, in any event, the parol evidence favors the
artists. Further, we also hold the artists’ interpretation does not
work an invalid forfeiture or make the performance contracts
unlawful. Since VFLA conceded that, if the artists prevailed, WME
should prevail as well, we affirm the judgment in its entirety.
                         BACKGROUND
I.   Virgin Fest and the performance contracts
     In December 2019, VFLA publicly announced Virgin Fest
Los Angeles (Virgin Fest), a two-day music festival, scheduled for
June 2020 in Los Angeles.2 In February and March 2020, VFLA
entered into performance contracts with Starry US, Kali Uchis
Touring, and Big Grrrl to secure the performances of Ellie
Goulding, Kali Uchis, and Lizzo respectively.
      As the artists’ agent, WME negotiated the performance
contracts with VFLA. The performance contracts contained a “Role
of Agent” provision, providing: “[WME] acts only as agent for
Producer and assumes no liability hereunder and in furtherance
thereof and for the benefit of [WME], it is agreed that neither
Purchaser nor Producer/Artist will name or join [WME] . . . as a

2     The facts are taken from VFLA’s opposing separate
statements to Big Grrrl’s, Kali Uchis Touring’s, Starry US’s, and
WME’s motions for summary judgment.

                                  3
party in any civil action or suit anywhere in the world, arising out
of, in connection with, or related to any acts of commission or
omission pursuant to or in connection with this Agreement by
either Purchaser or Producer/Artist.”3
        Each performance contract also included an identical
addendum titled the “Virgin Fest Los Angeles—Festival Rider” (the
Virgin Fest riders). The Virgin Fest riders contained a force
majeure provision, providing: “A ‘Force Majeure Event’ means any
act beyond the reasonable control of Producer, Artist, or Purchaser
which makes any performance by Artist impossible, infeasible, or
unsafe (including, but not limited to, acts of God, terrorism, failure
or delay of transportation, death, illness, or injury of Artist or
Artist’s immediate family (e.g., spouses, siblings, children, parents),
and civil disorder). In the event of cancelation due to Force Majeure
then all parties will be fully excused and there shall be no claim for
damages, and subject to the terms set forth herein, Producer shall
return any deposit amount(s) (i.e., any amount paid to Producer
pursuant to the Performance Contract prior to payment of the
Balance) previously received (unless otherwise agreed). However, if
the Artist is otherwise ready, willing, and able to perform
Purchaser will pay Producer the full Guarantee unless such
cancellation is the result of Artist’s death, illness, or injury, or that
of its immediate family, in which case Producer shall return such

3      “Purchaser” refers to VFLA. “Producer” refers to either
Starry US, Kali Uchis Touring, or Big Grrrl, and “Artist” refers to
either Ellie Goulding, Kali Uchis, or Lizzo. “Guarantee” does not
mean “non-refundable,” rather, it is a term of art meaning the
deposits are a flat amount and not tied to a percentage of the ticket
sales.

                                   4
applicable pro-rata portion of the Guarantee previously received
unless otherwise agreed.”
      WME’s representative, Steve Gaches, and VFLA’s
representative, Tim Epstein, negotiated the Virgin Fest riders.
Gaches and Epstein had negotiated festival riders in the past,
including a recent festival rider for the Baja Beach festival in
Mexico (the Baja Beach rider). Gaches and Epstein used the Baja
Beach rider as a starting point for the Virgin Fest rider.
      The original draft of the Baja Beach rider’s force majeure
provision read: “A ‘Force Majeure Event’ means any act beyond the
reasonable control of Producer, Artist, or Purchaser which makes
any performance by Artist impossible, infeasible, or unsafe
(including, but not limited to, acts of God, terrorism, failure or delay
of transportation, death, illness, or injury of Artist or Artist’s
immediate family and civil disorder[)]. In the event of cancellation
due to Force Majeure then all parties will be fully excused and there
shall be no claims for damages. However, if the Artist has
commenced performance prior to such cancellation, Purchaser will
pay Producer the full Guarantee.”
      Gaches invited Epstein to make edits to the draft Baja Beach
rider. Epstein sent back a redline version of the draft, which
contained the following italicized changes to the force majeure
provision. “In the event of cancel[l]ation due to Force Majeure then
all parties will be fully excused and there shall be no claim for
damages, and subject to the terms set forth herein, Producer shall
return any deposit amount(s) (i.e., any amount paid to Producer
pursuant to the Performance Agreement prior to payment of the
Balance) previously received (unless otherwise agreed). However if
the Artist has commenced performance (i.e., performance at the
venue) prior to such cancellation, Purchaser will pay Producer the

                                   5
full Guarantee unless such cancellation is the result of Artist’s
death, illness, or injury, or that of its immediate family, in which
case Producer shall return such applicable pro-rata portion of the
Guarantee previously received unless otherwise agreed.” Gaches
accepted these changes, but proposed replacing the provision that
the artists would get paid in full only if they had “commenced
performance” before the force majeure cancellation with a clause
allowing the artists to keep the deposit if they were “otherwise
ready, willing and able to perform.” Gaches told Epstein the
revision was “the best we can do for this one,” indicating WME had
a “new directive” with respect to international travel shows.
Epstein agreed to Gaches’s revision. Gaches and Epstein then used
the Baja Beach rider’s force majeure provision for the Virgin Fest
riders.
      Under the terms of the performance contracts, VFLA
transferred to WME’s trust account the sums of $400,000 for Kali
Uchis, $600,000 for Goulding, and $5 million for Lizzo. The
performance contracts provided the deposits were nonrefundable
unless otherwise agreed. The deposits were consideration for the
artists’ performance at Virgin Fest, as well as for exclusivity and
advertising rights. The exclusivity rights prohibited the artists
from publicly performing or announcing any public performance
within a certain geographic area and within a certain period with
respect to Virgin Fest. Each artist also granted VFLA the right to
use her image, name, and likeness for Virgin Fest’s marketing and
advertising materials.
II.   Virgin Fest’s cancellation and VFLA’s demand for the
      deposits
      In March 2020, the State of California and the County and
the City of Los Angeles issued a series of orders to limit the spread

                                  6
of COVID-19, including the City of Los Angeles’s various “Safer at
Home” orders. The orders prohibited “all indoor and outdoor public
and private gatherings and events.” On May 8, 2020, the City of
Los Angeles informed VFLA that it would be extending an existing
Safer at Home order “to a future date to be determined” and that
Virgin Fest would “not be allowed as originally planned” for June
2020. The next day, VFLA publicly announced that “[a]s a result of
the governmental restrictions and mandates resulting from the
[COVID-19] pandemic, [Virgin Fest] in Los Angeles is prevented
from proceeding as scheduled next month.”
      Thereafter, VFLA demanded the return of deposits from
WME, taking the position that the government’s orders and
underlying COVID-19 pandemic conditions qualified as a force
majeure event, making the artists’ performances impossible, and
that, accordingly, the deposits should be returned. VFLA also
informed all performers, who were represented by WME and who
were contracted to perform at Virgin Fest, that it would take legal
action if the deposits were not returned. Each WME client returned
the deposits to VFLA except for Ellie Goulding, Kali Uchis, and
Lizzo, who disputed VFLA’s interpretation of the force majeure
provision.
III.    Procedural history
        In response, VFLA sued the artists for breach of contract and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. VFLA
also sued WME for conversion, money had and received, violating
Business and Professions Code section 17200, and declaratory
relief.
        After extensive discovery, the artists and WME moved for
summary judgment. VFLA also moved for summary adjudication
on its breach of contract cause of action against the artists. The

                                  7
artists argued the proper inquiry under the force majeure provision
in determining whether they were entitled to keep the deposits was
whether they were ready, willing, and able to perform but for the
force majeure event. They claimed, among other things, the term
“otherwise” meant “apart from” and was not susceptible to any
other interpretation in light of the force majeure provision’s “death,
illness, or injury” exception.
       VFLA claimed the force majeure provision’s “otherwise ready,
willing, and able” condition meant the artists were ready, willing,
and able to perform “in spite of” the force majeure event. Therefore,
because the government orders and underlying COVID-19
pandemic prevented the artists’ performances, the artists could not
satisfy the condition they were “ready, willing, and able to perform.”
VFLA also claimed the artists’ “but for” interpretation resulted in
an unlawful forfeiture and made the performance contracts
unlawful.
       WME filed its own motion for summary judgment, arguing,
among other things, it was not liable as the artists’ agent for what
was essentially a contract dispute between VFLA and the artists.
WME further argued it could not be held liable for its principals’
decisions to not return the deposits because WME’s conduct was not
independently wrongful or tortious.
       The trial court granted the artists’ and WME’s motions for
summary judgment and denied VFLA’s motion for summary
adjudication. It held the artists’ interpretation did not result in an
invalid forfeiture, nor did it make the agreements unlawful. In
interpreting the force majeure provision, the trial court found the
language was susceptible to either VFLA’s or the artists’
interpretation, and turned to parol evidence. The trial court
explained and the parties agreed, since the parol evidence was

                                  8
undisputed and the parties had waived their right to a jury, the
trial court could choose from conflicting inferences and interpret the
performance contracts as a matter of law.
       The trial court found the original draft of the force majeure
provision favored the festival organizer, but was revised to become
more artist-friendly, noting the artists could only keep the deposit
under the original force majeure provision if they “commenced
performance” while under the revised version, they could keep the
deposit if they established they were “otherwise ready, willing, and
able to perform.” The trial court considered other parol evidence,
but found it unpersuasive as it could support inferences in favor of
either side’s interpretation.
       The trial court also decided WME’s motion on the merits even
though VFLA conceded WME should prevail if the artists prevailed
on their motion. Although WME raised numerous arguments, the
trial court found one determinative—WME could not be held liable
as an agent for the actions of its principals under the performance
contracts’ role of agent provision. Further, WME had not engaged
in any independently wrongful or tortious conduct.
       VFLA appealed.

                           DISCUSSION
I.    Standard of review
      Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A party seeking summary
judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable
issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th

                                  9
826, 850.) A defendant meets this burden by showing that plaintiff
“has not established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish” an
essential element of his claim. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.)
      We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, which
means we “decide independently whether the facts not subject to
triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter
of law.” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.)
In deciding whether a material issue of fact exists for trial, we
“consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the
evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the
court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
II.   The artists’ “but for” interpretation of the force
      majeure provision is the only reading that avoids
      surplusage and gives meaning to every clause
      When interpreting a contract, we try “to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of
contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.”
(Civ. Code, § 1636.) If the contract language “is clear and explicit,
and does not involve an absurdity,” the language governs the
interpretation. (Civ. Code, § 1638.) And, if possible, “[w]hen a
contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be
ascertained from the writing alone.” (Civ. Code, § 1639.) We
interpret the contract as a whole “so as to give effect to every part, if
reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.”
(Civ. Code, § 1641.) We will avoid an interpretation “that leaves
part of a contract as surplusage.” (Rice v. Downs (2016) 248
Cal.App.4th 175, 186.) We also interpret a contract to “make it
lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried

                                   10
into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the
parties.” (Civ. Code, § 1643.) We will also avoid interpretations
that render the contract “unusual, extraordinary, harsh, unjust or
inequitable [citations], or which would result in an absurdity.”
(Harris v. Klure (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 574, 578.)
       Here, the force majeure provision is three sentences. The
first sentence defines a force majeure event as “any act beyond the
reasonable control of Producer, Artist, or Purchaser which makes
any performance by Artist impossible, infeasible, or unsafe.” The
first sentence then provides examples of a force majeure, including,
“acts of God, terrorism, failure or delay of transportation, death,
illness, or injury of Artist or Artist’s immediate family, . . . and civil
disorder.” Here, the parties do not dispute that the COVID-19
pandemic and government orders meet the definition of a force
majeure.
       The second sentence states the artists shall return the
deposits to VFLA in the event of a force majeure cancellation,
providing: “In the event of cancel[l]ation due to Force Majeure then
all parties will be fully excused and there shall be no claim for
damages, and subject to the terms set forth herein, Producer shall
return any deposit amount(s) (i.e., any amount paid to Producer
pursuant to the Performance Contract . . .) previously received . . .
unless otherwise agreed.” Like the first sentence, the parties do not
dispute the meaning of the second sentence, that is, VFLA is
entitled to the deposits in the event of a force majeure cancellation
unless another term of the performance contract applies.
       The third sentence, which is at the heart of the parties’
dispute, reads: “However, if the Artist is otherwise ready, willing,
and able to perform[,] Purchaser will pay Producer the full
Guarantee unless such cancellation is the result of Artist’s death,

                                   11
illness, or injury, or that of its immediate family, in which case
Producer shall return such applicable pro-rata portion of the
Guarantee previously received unless otherwise agreed.” The first
part of the third sentence thus creates an exception to when the
artist must return the deposit to VFLA in the event of a force
majeure, that is, when the artist can show he or she was “otherwise
ready, willing, and able to perform.” The second part of the third
sentence creates an exception to that exception, providing that the
artist must return the deposit to VFLA when the force majeure
cancellation is a result of the artist’s “death, illness, or injury, or
that of its immediate family.”
       The parties’ disagreement over the force majeure provision
and the determination of which party keeps the deposit in the event
of a force majeure cancellation can be summarized as follows.
       The artists claim their right to the deposits is conditioned on
them demonstrating they were “ready, willing, and able to perform”
but for the occurrence of the force majeure event. According to the
artists, the word “otherwise” modifies the adjectives “ready, willing,
and able,” and when “otherwise” modifies an adjective it means “in
all ways except the one mentioned.” In other words, the controlling
question is, had the force majeure event not occurred, would the
artists have been ready, willing, and able to perform.
       On the other hand, VFLA claims the artists’ right to retain
the deposits is conditioned on a showing that the artists were
“otherwise ready, willing, and able to perform” in spite of the
occurrence of the force majeure. In other words, VFLA asserts the
use of the word “however” at the beginning of the third sentence
connects the “ready, willing, and able” condition to the force
majeure event in the prior two sentences, meaning the artists must

                                  12
show they are “otherwise ready, willing, and able to perform”
notwithstanding or regardless of the force majeure.
       We hold the artists have the better interpretation. The
artists’ interpretation is the only reading of the force majeure
provision that gives effect to all three sentences, including the
exception to the exception, i.e., a cancellation that is the result of
a force majeure that is the artist’s death, illness, or injury, or that
of the artist’s immediate family. Further we hold the artists’
interpretation is the only interpretation that makes the force
majeure provision capable of being carried into effect while
remaining true to the parties’ intent to allow the artists to retain
the deposits at least in some circumstances in the event of a force
majeure cancellation.
       While VFLA’s reading appears reasonable at first glance, it
suffers from two fundamental problems. It makes the force majeure
provision indefinite and incapable of being carried into effect (Civ.
Code, § 1643) and deprives the third sentence of any meaning thus
rendering it surplusage (Rice v. Downs, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at
p. 186). Under VFLA’s interpretation, we are unsure, and VFLA
has not explained, how the artists could ever establish their right to
the deposits by showing they were “ready, willing, and able to
perform” in spite of a force majeure event when a force majeure
event is defined as any act making the artists’ performance
“impossible, infeasible, or unsafe.” This begs the question, in the
event of a force majeure that results in cancellation of the festival
or the individual artists’ performances, how could the artists ever
show they were able to perform notwithstanding the occurrence of
an event that made their performances impossible, infeasible, or
unsafe?

                                  13
       None of VFLA’s arguments or hypotheticals answer this
question. Nor has VFLA identified any scenarios where the artists
would definitively have the right to retain the deposits in the event
of a force majeure cancellation. For example, VFLA claims the
artists “might still be able to establish they were ‘ready, willing,
and able’ to perform” in the face of force majeure events such as
“terrorism,” a “failure or delay of transportation,” or “civil disorder”
which “might result in the cancellation of Virgin Fest.” Each of
these examples hypothesizes a force majeure event smaller in scope
than the COVID-19 pandemic, impacting Virgin Fest only
indirectly. The problem with these examples, however, is either
VFLA decides not to cancel Virgin Fest because the venue or area
where Virgin Fest was set to take place is not impacted, in which
case the force majeure provision does not apply, or, if Virgin Fest or
the artists’ performances are cancelled, VFLA never explains how
the artists could show they were otherwise able to perform
notwithstanding a force majeure event that rendered the artists’
performances or the festival itself infeasible or unsafe.
       VFLA asserts what distinguishes its hypotheticals from what
occurred here is that the COVID-19 related orders had the unique
effect of rendering the artists’ performances “ ‘illegal’ ” and
“ ‘unlawful’ ” at the times and places set forth in the performance
contracts. According to VFLA, when the force majeure event makes
the underlying performance illegal, the artists can never be “ready,
willing, and able to perform.” However, the definition of a force
majeure event does not distinguish between something that makes
the performances illegal versus something that makes the
performances impossible, unsafe, or infeasible. We find VFLA’s
distinction is without a difference and leads us back to the same
fundamental problem with VFLA’s reading—if a force majeure

                                  14
event makes the artists’ performances “impossible, infeasible, or
unsafe,” the artist can never show how they are otherwise able to
perform in the face of a force majeure.
       As such, VFLA’s interpretation of the force majeure provision
is neither definite nor capable of being carried into effect without
violating the intention of the parties, which was to allow the artists
to keep the deposits in at least some circumstances. (See Civ. Code,
§ 1643.)
       The problem with VFLA’s “in spite of” interpretation becomes
clearer when we consider a force majeure event that is the artists’
death, illness, or injury. VFLA’s reading is untenable considering
the artists could never be “otherwise ready, willing, and able to
perform” in spite of a force majeure event that was their own death,
illness, or injury, which are expressly defined as force majeures in
the provision’s first sentence. But, putting that logical fallacy aside,
VFLA’s right to the return of deposit in the event of a cancellation
due to the artists’ or artists’ immediate family members’ death,
illness, or injury is already provided for in the first two sentences of
the provision. Thus, under VFLA’s reading, the second part of the
third sentence, i.e., the exception to the exception, adds nothing to
the meaning of the force majeure provision despite Epstein and
Gaches specifically negotiating that term. Accordingly, VFLA’s
interpretation makes the third sentence of the force majeure
provision surplusage. (Rice v. Downs, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at
p. 186.)
       VFLA also raises its own surplusage argument, contending if
the parties intended to create a “but for” test, they would have done
so in one sentence reading: “VFLA bears all risk of a force majeure
cancellation except one based on the Artist’s death, illness, or
injury, or that of its immediate family.” This is not a surplusage

                                  15
argument, but a claim the parties could have drafted the force
majeure provision more clearly and concisely. While that is
undoubtedly true, the issue is not which party could have drafted a
shorter more comprehensible force majeure provision. Indeed,
VFLA’s interpretation could also have been one sentence that read:
“[I]n the event of cancellation due to force majeure, producer shall
not be paid and shall return any deposit amounts unless the artist
is ready, willing, and able to perform in the face of the force
majeure event.” The issue is which party’s interpretation gives
effect to each part of the force majeure provision and the contract as
a whole, which VFLA’s interpretation cannot do. (Civ. Code, § 1641;
Rice v. Downs, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.)
       Accordingly, we hold the artists’ “but for” interpretation of the
force majeure provision is the only correct reading that gives
meaning to each part of the provision and makes it definite and
capable of being carried into effect while reflecting the intention of
the parties.
III.   The parol evidence favors the artists’ “but for”
       interpretation
       Even assuming the force majeure provision is reasonably
susceptible to VFLA’s interpretation, that is, the word “otherwise”
only modifies the condition that the artists are “ready, willing, and
able to perform,” and the word “however” relates back to the force
majeure, providing the artists must show they are “ready, willing,
and able” notwithstanding the force majeure, we would still affirm
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as the parol evidence,
to the extent it favors either side, tends to favor the artists’
interpretation.
       When the language in a contract is reasonably susceptible to
either parties’ interpretation, the court may look to parol evidence,

                                  16
including the surrounding circumstances of the negotiations; the
contract’s object, nature, and subject matter; and the parties’
subsequent conduct. (Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shewry
(2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 964, 979–980.)
          A.  VFLA has not identified material conflicts in the
              parol evidence
       In looking at the parol evidence, we must address a threshold
issue identified by VFLA, which is whether the trial court resolved
conflicts in the parol evidence that should have been reserved for
trial.4
      In evaluating the extrinsic evidence, the court engages in a
three-step process. (Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1126–1127 (Wolf).) “First, it
provisionally receives any proffered extrinsic evidence that is
relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the
instrument is reasonably susceptible. [Citations.] If, in light of the
extrinsic evidence, the language is reasonably susceptible to the
interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is then admitted to aid
the court in its role in interpreting the contract. [Citations.] When
there is no material conflict in the extrinsic evidence, the trial court

4      In its summary judgment order, the trial court noted it had
extensive discussion with the parties during oral argument
concerning its authority to decide between conflicting inferences,
stating “[t]he bottom line is that because contract interpretation is
for the [c]ourt (and doubly so here where the parties have waived a
jury), the [c]ourt can choose from conflicting inferences even on
summary judgment. However, if the inference to be used depends
on the resolution of factual disputes concerning the parol evidence,
then resolution must await trial.”

                                   17
interprets the contract as a matter of law. [Citations.] This is true
even when conflicting inferences may be drawn from the
undisputed extrinsic evidence [citations] or that extrinsic evidence
renders the contract terms susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation.” (Ibid.)
       VFLA cites several examples in the record where it claims the
trial court erroneously resolved conflicts in the parol evidence.
VFLA’s citations do not support its claim of error.
       VFLA first cites to the declarations of Epstein and Jason
Felts, VFLA’s chief executive officer, which according to VFLA, the
trial court ignored even though they gave accounts of “what was
said and not said” between VFLA and WME during negotiations.
Specifically, Epstein stated he never discussed the meaning of the
phrase “otherwise ready, willing, and able” with Gaches or anyone
else at WME, and he never agreed to and was unaware of the
artists’ interpretation that “otherwise ready, willing, and able”
meant ready, willing, and able but for the occurrence of the force
majeure. Similarly, Felts stated he never agreed VFLA would bear
the risk of cancellation due to a force majeure.
       The record shows the trial court reviewed the Epstein and
Felts declarations, but excluded them to the extent they were the
declarants’ undisclosed understanding of the parties’ agreements,
stripped of any supporting evidence that those understandings were
disclosed during negotiations. The trial court’s exclusion of this
evidence was not error. “California recognizes the objective theory
of contracts [citation], under which ‘[i]t is the objective intent, as
evidenced by the words of the contract, rather than the subjective
intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation’ [citation].
The parties’ undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to
contract interpretation.” (Founding Members of the Newport Beach

                                  18
Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003)
109 Cal.App.4th 944, 956 (Newport Beach Country Club).) As the
trial court properly excluded Epstein’s and Felts’s undisclosed
understandings of the force majeure provision, they are insufficient
to raise a conflict in the parol evidence or a triable issue of fact.
(See id. at p. 960.)
       VFLA responds by directing us to the artists’ argument that,
if we agree with VFLA on appeal and reverse the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment, we must remand the matter for a bench trial
because the artists successfully defeated VFLA’s motion for
summary adjudication with a material disputed fact. VFLA
reasons, because the artists’ motion is “the mirror image of VFLA’s
motion and both motions are based on the same evidence, the same
triable issue of fact that the [a]rtists claim prevents summary
judgment for VFLA must also preclude summary judgment for the
[a]rtists.” Specifically, the artists rely on Gaches’s testimony that
he told Epstein, and Epstein agreed, the artists must be paid in the
event of a force majeure cancellation with only narrow exceptions.
Meanwhile, as described above, Epstein denies Gaches ever
disclosed this understanding.
       While we agree with VFLA that this testimony is conflicting
and related to the parties’ negotiations, it is not grounds for
reversal.
       As an initial matter, we note VFLA never raised this issue in
the trial court. In its opposition to the artists’ motion for summary
judgment, VFLA did not point to any disputes in material fact.
“ ‘Though this court is bound to determine whether defendants met
their threshold summary judgment burden independently from the
moving and opposing papers, we are not obliged to consider
arguments or theories, including assertions as to deficiencies in

                                 19
defendants’ evidence, that were not advanced by plaintiffs in the
trial court.’ [Citation.] ‘Ordinarily the failure to preserve a point
below constitutes a [forfeiture] of the point.’ ” (Meridian Financial
Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 698.) Because
VFLA never directed the trial court to this apparent disparity in
Epstein’s and Gaches’s accounts, its contention on appeal that this
conflict created a triable issue of material fact is forfeited. (See
ibid.)
       However, even if VFLA had preserved this argument, we
would not remand for a bench trial. This is because, even if we
drew an inference in favor of VFLA and assumed the truth of
Epstein’s version of events, i.e., that Gaches never disclosed his
understanding of the force majeure provision and Epstein never
agreed to the artists’ interpretation, the purported conflict is
immaterial to VFLA’s argument. (See Villalobos v. City of Santa
Maria (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 383, 390.) Even if Gaches never
disclosed his understanding of the agreement, this fact is
immaterial to the court’s interpretation. (Newport Beach Country
Club, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 960.) Conversely, when
considering the artists’ opposition to VFLA’s motion for summary
adjudication, we would have to draw an inference in the artists’
favor as the nonmoving party. (See Miller v. Department of
Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 470.) And by drawing an
inference that Gaches informed Epstein of his understanding the
artists had to be paid in the event of a force majeure, we would have
to find the artists carried their burden in opposing VFLA’s motion.
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 846.)
Thus, contrary to VFLA’s suggestion, this apparent conflict in
Gaches’s and Epstein’s testimony is not a two-way street resulting
in a triable issue of fact in VFLA’s favor.

                                 20
      VFLA’s remaining examples of purported conflicts in the
parol evidence are not persuasive. Our review of the evidence
shows the evidence was undisputed and therefore the trial court
could choose between conflicting inferences and interpret the
contract as a matter of law. (Wolf, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1126–1127.)
      For example, VFLA cites to evidence that Kali Uchis chose to
return a deposit to another festival organizer even though the
agreement for that festival contained the same force majeure
language as the Virgin Fest rider. This evidence, however, was
undisputed and considered by the trial court, who found it did not
necessarily require an inference in favor of either side given the
additional reasons Kali Uchis returned that deposit, making those
circumstances materially different than the facts here.
      VFLA also claims there was conflicting parol evidence
regarding an e-mail from Ellie Goulding’s agent, stating: “With [the
City of Los Angeles] extending [the] stay at home order through
July, Virgin Fest has been forced to cancel due to [force majeure].
With no current plans to reschedule, we need to proceed with the
process of returning the deposit currently held by WME.” Like
VFLA’s Kali Uchis example, this parol evidence was undisputed.
      VFLA also points to an e-mail exchange between Lizzo’s agent
and Felts, regarding Lizzo’s intent to publicly perform in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic. In the exchange, Felts asked the agent about
Lizzo’s public statement that “it’s time to stop performing due to
[COVID-19].” The agent responded that Lizzo intended to move
forward with her confirmed engagements, and she was “ready,
willing, and able to play . . . as soon as the [government] says we
can.” Again, this evidence was undisputed.

                                  21
      We are also not persuaded by VFLA’s argument that
summary judgment should be reversed because the trial court
“ignored” evidence submitted by VFLA. While the trial court’s
order does not refer to every piece of evidence submitted by VFLA,
any purported error is harmless where, as here, our independent
review establishes the validity of the judgment. (Goldrich v.
Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 772,
782.)
      In sum, VFLA has not identified any material conflicts in the
parol evidence. Therefore, the trial court was authorized to choose
between conflicting inferences and interpret the contract as a
matter of law. (See Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of
Rancho Cucamonga (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1341–1342.)
      B.      The parol evidence supports the artists’
              interpretation
       Having found the parol evidence was undisputed, we also
conclude, to the extent the evidence supported either side’s
interpretation, it tended to favor the artists’ reading.
       Most notably, we find Gaches’s revision of the force majeure
provision during the parties’ negotiations particularly persuasive to
the artists’ position. Gaches revised the condition that the artists
had to be paid in the event of a force majeure cancellation only if
they “commenced performance” to the condition that they needed to
be “otherwise ready, willing, and able to perform.” Gaches
explained the revision was “the best we can do for this one,” based
on a “new directive” from the head of WME’s music department in
light of the fact that Baja Fest was an international, i.e., higher risk

                                  22
festival.5 Although the extent of this change is contested, it
certainly shifted some risk from the artists to the festival organizer.
To accept VFLA’s interpretation, we would have to conclude
Gaches’s revision made it less likely, indeed, potentially impossible,
for the artists to demonstrate they were “otherwise ready, willing,
and able to perform” in the face of a force majeure, which was
clearly not the intention of the parties. Thus, the issues with
VFLA’s interpretation of the force majeure provision
notwithstanding, there is simply no inferences to be drawn in
VFLA’s favor on this evidence.
       With respect to the remaining parol evidence identified by
VFLA, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that it is not
particularly persuasive to either side’s position.
       For example, VFLA argues the parol evidence shows that
“prior to the instant litigation, WME and the [a]rtists interpreted
the [f]orce [m]ajeure [p]rovision the same way as VFLA; namely,
without a ‘but for’ exception.” VFLA directs us to the parol evidence
that other WME clients chose to return the deposits to VFLA.
VFLA also again cites to Kali Uchis’s decision to return the deposit
to the other festival organizer even though that performance
contract contained the same force majeure provision at issue here.
       The record shows VFLA has taken this evidence out of its
broader context. For example, it was undisputed that the deposits
paid to the other performers were far less than what was paid to
Ellie Goulding, Kali Uchis, and Lizzo. Thus, while it is possible to
interpret the performers’ decisions to return the deposits as

5     Although the term “higher risk” was not contained in the
draft comments, Epstein testified that it was communicated to him
that international also implied higher risk in this context.

                                  23
supporting an inference that WME and its performers initially
agreed with VFLA’s interpretation of the force majeure provision,
it is also equally reasonable to assume these other performers
returned the deposits to avoid a costly litigation after VFLA
threatened legal action. Moreover, it was undisputed WME advised
its clients that they had the option of returning the deposits to
avoid a public dispute that would result in litigation. As for Kali
Uchis’s decision to return the deposit to the other festival organizer,
the record shows Kali Uchis’s return of the deposit was contingent
on the other festival organizer working with her in good faith to
reschedule the performance. Given this additional context, these
performers’ decisions to return the deposits under materially
different circumstances are not particularly helpful to VFLA’s
position.
        VFLA also relies on an e-mail exchange between Ellie
Goulding’s representative and her agent in which they discuss
returning the deposit in light of the COVD-19 pandemic. VFLA
argues this is strong evidence in support of its interpretation.
However, in doing so, VFLA ignores other evidence from the artists
that the agent had limited knowledge of the force majeure
provision, and then in subsequent e-mails he advised the
representative that Ellie Goulding could retain the deposit, and
that other WME clients would be doing so under the disputed terms
of the force majeure provision.
        VFLA also cites to Lizzo’s statement that she would be
“ready, willing, and able” to perform as soon as the government said
she could. Again, we do not find this evidence particularly
persuasive to either side’s reading. Indeed, the statement is
consistent with the artists’ “but for” interpretation—that COVID-19
and the government shutdowns were the only thing impeding

                                  24
Lizzo’s performance but that she was otherwise ready, willing, and
able to perform.
      VFLA also cites evidence that WME negotiated other
contracts containing force majeure provisions, which contained the
“but for” language that the artists urge us to adopt here. However,
there was no evidence that either Gaches or Epstein had access to
or compared these other contracts with the Baja Fest or Virgin Fest
riders. Further, Gaches explained he used the term “otherwise” as
a plain language synonym for “but for.” Thus, without some
connection between the other contracts using the “but for” language
and the agreements here, such evidence is of little value.
      Accordingly, the parol evidence VFLA asserts supports its
interpretation of the force majeure provision is more or less equally
supportive of the artists’ reading. However, the only parol evidence
that unambiguously supports either side’s position is Gaches’s
revision making the force majeure provision more artist-friendly
and, to at least some extent, shifting the risk of a force majeure
cancellation from the artist to the festival organizer. When
combined with the actual language of the force majeure provision,
Gaches’s revision tips the parol evidence in favor of the artists.
IV.    The artists’ factual showing was sufficient
       VFLA argues that, even if we accept the artists’
interpretation of the force majeure provision, we should still vacate
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment because the artists
failed to make a sufficient factual showing that they were ready,
willing, and able to perform but for the force majeure event. This
argument is without merit.
       First, VFLA never argued this below. Throughout its
briefing, VFLA consistently argued the artists could not show they
were “ready, willing, and able” because the COVID-19 pandemic

                                 25
and resulting government orders prevented them from doing so as
a matter of law. In other words, VFLA argued its interpretation of
the force majeure was the correct one and, under that
interpretation, the artists could never show they were otherwise
ready, willing and able to perform under the circumstances.
Accordingly, we find VFLA’s argument forfeited. (Meridian
Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 698.)
       However, even if VFLA preserved this argument, it is not
grounds to remand the matter for a bench trial because VFLA never
alleged this alternative theory in its pleadings.
       “The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment
motion. ‘ “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary
judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues . . . ” ’ and to frame
‘the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment
proceeding.’ [Citation.] As our Supreme Court has explained it:
‘The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings
[citations], which “set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at
summary judgment.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Accordingly, the
burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires
that he or she negate plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the
complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some
theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Hutton v.
Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493.)
       Like its briefing in the underlying cross-motions, VFLA’s
operative complaint only claims the artists could not satisfy the
condition that they were ready, willing, and able to perform in the
face of the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, VFLA demanded the
deposits based on its unilateral interpretation of the force majeure
provision and never inquired whether the artists were otherwise
ready, willing, and able to perform. Then, neither VFLA’s operative

                                   26
pleading nor its subsequent briefing asserted that the artists were
not ready, willing, and able to perform due to some other
impediment unrelated to the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, whether
the artists made such a factual showing under their own
interpretation of the force majeure provision is irrelevant.6 (Hutton
v. Fidelity National Title Co., supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 493.)
V.     The artists’ interpretation does not result in a
       forfeiture or penalty
       VFLA also argues we must adopt its interpretation of the
force majeure provision because the artists’ interpretation would
work an invalid forfeiture or penalty. We disagree.
       “ ‘A forfeiture is “[t]he divestiture of property without
compensation” or “[t]he loss of a right, privilege, or property
because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty.” ’ ”
(Brandenburg v. Eureka Redevelopment Agency (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 1350, 1364.) “ ‘Forfeitures are not favored by the
courts, and, if an agreement can be reasonably interpreted so as to
avoid a forfeiture, it is the duty of the court to avoid it. The burden
is upon the party claiming a forfeiture to show that such was the
unmistakable intention of the instrument. [Citations.] “A contract
is not to be construed to provide a forfeiture unless no other
interpretation is reasonably possible.” ’ ” (Universal Sales Corp. v.
California Press Mfg. Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 751, 771.)
       The artists’ interpretation does not work a forfeiture here.
In at least one respect, VFLA’s argument is missing a hallmark of

6     Because we find that VFLA forfeited this argument and the
issue is otherwise irrelevant based on the pleadings, we do not
address VFLA’s evidentiary objections to Lizzo’s testimony under
Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.260, subdivision (c).

                                  27
forfeiture, which is a breach by the forfeiting party, i.e., VFLA. (See
Nelson v. Schoettgen (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d 418, 423; Smith v. Baker
(1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 877, 884.) Here, VFLA merely disagrees with
the artists’ interpretation of the force majeure provision and how it
allocated risk between the parties. And, while VFLA and the
artists disagree as to when they were to bear the risk of a force
majeure cancellation, it was the “unmistakable intent” of the
parties that the risk of a force majeure cancellation should be
reflected in the determination of who was ultimately entitled to the
deposits. (See Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co.,
supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 771.) Because there has been no breach and
the parties clearly intended to allocate risk with respect to a force
majeure cancellation, VFLA’s forfeiture argument is unconvincing.
        Moreover, while we acknowledge a breach is not a necessary
element of a forfeiture, we note the circumstances here also lack a
second indicator of a forfeiture or penalty, which is an unfair
divestiture of property that bears no relationship to the actual
damages anticipated by the parties when they negotiated the
contracts. (Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress for Less,
Inc. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1337–1338.) For example,
although not constituting a breach, a failure to satisfy a condition
may constitute a forfeiture when the value of the property forfeited
bears no reasonable relationship to the range of anticipated harm
when that condition is not satisfied. (Ibid.) We must prioritize the
substance of the parties’ agreement over its form, and compare the
value of the forfeited property with the range of harm anticipated
by the parties at the time of contracting. (Ibid.)
        Here, when we compare the value of the property forfeited,
i.e., the deposits, with the range of harm anticipated by the parties
at the time of contracting, for example, the artists’ lost opportunity

                                  28
to publicly perform in the Los Angeles area around the time of
Virgin Fest, the two amounts bear a reasonable relationship to each
other. The amount of the deposits, which represented the artists’
fee for their Virgin Fest performances, is what these artists could
command from VFLA because they also gave up their right to put
on competing public performances in and around Los Angeles in the
summer of 2020. Thus, the amount of the deposits bore a
reasonable relationship to the anticipated range of harm caused by
Virgin Fest’s cancellation. (See Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v.
Ross Dress for Less, Inc., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1337–1338.)
       VFLA claims that it received nothing for the deposits.
However, this claim is belied by the record, which demonstrates
VFLA bargained for more than the artists’ performances at Virgin
Fest. Rather, the performance contracts also granted VFLA
valuable exclusivity rights that prohibited the artists from publicly
performing or even publicly announcing any other competing
performances within a certain time and within a certain
geographical area of Virgin Fest.
       We are also not persuaded by VFLA’s argument that the
condition that the artists be “otherwise ready, willing, and able”
must be strictly interpreted against the artists under Civil Code
section 1442, which provides: “A condition involving a forfeiture
must be strictly interpreted against the party for whose benefit it is
created.”
       As we have concluded above, the artists’ interpretation of the
force majeure provision does not work a forfeiture, therefore, Civil
Code section 1442 does not apply.
       However, even assuming Civil Code section 1442 applies, it
does not support VFLA’s argument. This is because the condition
was created for VFLA’s benefit, not the artists. It is the artists who

                                 29
must satisfy the condition they are “otherwise ready, willing, and
able to perform” so as not to receive a windfall if they cancelled
their performance for reasons independent of the force majeure.
Thus, Civil Code section 1442 requires us to construe the condition
that the artists be “otherwise ready, willing, and able to perform”
against VFLA because it is the artists who must satisfy that
condition. (See Conolley v. Power (1924) 70 Cal.App. 70, 75–76.)
To hold otherwise would allow a party to use Civil Code section
1442 to obscure a contractual condition, making it more difficult for
the other party, who must satisfy the contractual condition, from
having a clear understanding of how that condition can be satisfied.
VI.    The artists’ interpretation does not make the
       performance contracts unlawful
       VFLA argues the artists’ interpretation of the force majeure
provision is also untenable because it requires this court to endorse
an illegal act or enforce a contract with an unlawful object,
specifically, allowing the artists to say they were “ready, willing,
and able” to perform despite the COVID-19-related restrictions
prohibiting their performances. Again, we are not persuaded.
       Every contract must have a lawful object. (Civ. Code, § 1550.)
“The object of a contract is the thing which it is agreed, on the part
of the party receiving the consideration, to do or not to do.” (Civ.
Code, § 1595.) “Where a contract has but a single object, and such
object is unlawful, whether in whole or in part, or wholly impossible
of performance, or so vaguely expressed as to be wholly
unascertainable, the entire contract is void.” (Civ. Code, § 1598.)
“Where an agreement is capable of being interpreted in two ways,”
we should construe it in order to make the agreement lawful and
capable of being carried into effect. (Segal v. Silberstein (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.) In determining whether the subject of a

                                 30
given contract is lawful, we rely on the state of the law as it existed
at the time of contracting. (Moran v. Harris (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d
913, 918.)
       VFLA argues the performance contracts had a single object—
the artists’ performances at Virgin Fest—which became unlawful as
a result of the government’s COVID-19 orders. Therefore, according
to the VFLA, the contracts are void, or, alternatively, we must
reject the artists’ interpretation because it would allow the artists
to assert they were “ready” and “able” to perform an illegal act.
Neither argument has merit.
       First, as discussed above, we disagree with VFLA’s
characterization that the artists’ performance at Virgin Fest was
the performance contracts’ only object, as VFLA also bargained for
valuable exclusivity rights, which the artists granted.
       Second, nothing in the force majeure provision requires the
artists to actually perform and violate COVID-19 restrictions, thus,
the artists are not asking us to help them carry out an illegal object.
By adopting the artists’ interpretation, we are not endorsing or
requiring the artists to perform an illegal act. Rather, our
interpretation of the force majeure provision merely requires us to
decide who is entitled to the deposits in the event of a force majeure
cancellation.
       Third, the record is clear that the performance contracts did
not have an unlawful object at the time of contracting. It was only
after the government issued its COVID-19 restrictions that the
artists’ performances at Virgin Fest became unlawful. “[I]f the
contract was valid when made, no subsequent act of the legislature
can render it invalid.” (Stephens v. Southern Pac. Co. (1895)
109 Cal. 86, 95.)

                                  31
       VFLA asserts that Indus. Devl. & Land Co. v. Goldschmidt
(1922) 56 Cal.App. 507 (Goldschmidt) forecloses the artists’ position
that they were “ready, willing, and able to perform” at Virgin Fest
after the government orders prohibited their performances. We find
Goldschmidt distinguishable.
       In Goldschmidt, a landlord sued his commercial tenants who
stopped paying rent after prohibition made illegal their winery and
liquor business operation on the property. (Id. at pp. 134–135.)
The Goldschmidt court held that the tenants were excused from
performance, i.e., paying rent for the remainder of the lease term,
when prohibition came into effect and made operating their
business unlawful. (Id. at pp. 508–509.) A critical factor in
Goldschmidt was the lease’s restrictive terms, which provided the
property could not be used for any other purpose other than a
winery and liquor business. (Id. at p. 135.) “The restrictive clauses
make it appear definitely enough that the lessees were bound to use
the premises for the purpose of conducting a winery or wholesale or
retail liquor business, or for all of such purposes, and that such uses
could not be varied at their option.” (Id. at p. 511.) Because the
lease’s terms were restrictive, the Goldschmidt court concluded the
lease became inoperative upon the enactment of prohibition. (Id. at
pp. 510–511.)
       Unlike the restrictive lease in Goldschmidt, the performance
contracts here anticipated the possibility of a force majeure
cancellation, and allocated the financial risk between the parties
accordingly. It is not illegal for parties to negotiate what happens
when a condition under a contract becomes impossible. (Mathes v.
Long Beach (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 473, 477.)
       VFLA also argues the “ready, willing, and able” condition is
void under Civil Code section 1441, which provides that “[a]

                                  32
condition in a contract, the fulfillment of which is . . . unlawful,” is
“void.” We disagree. As discussed above, the relevant inquiry is
whether the artists were “otherwise ready, willing, and able” absent
the force majeure, not whether they could perform in violation of
the COVID-19 restrictions. As such, nothing in the performance
contract requires the artists to satisfy an unlawful condition.
VII. Because VFLA’s contract claim fails, its breach of the
       implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim
       fails as well
       Given our finding that the artists’ interpretation of the force
majeure provision is the correct one, we conclude the artists also
prevail on VFLA’s cause of action for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.
       “ ‘ “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” ’ ”
(Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California,
Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 371.) A party need not show a specific
breach of the contract to prove a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Ibid.) “Were it otherwise,
the covenant would have no practical meaning, for any breach
thereof would necessarily involve breach of some other term of the
contract.” (Id. at p. 373.) Nonetheless, “the scope of conduct
prohibited by the covenant of good faith is circumscribed by the
purposes and express terms of the contract.” (Ibid.) “[T]he implied
covenant of good faith is read into contracts ‘in order to protect the
express covenants or promises of the contract, not to protect some
general public policy interest not directly tied to the contract’s
purpose.’ ” (Ibid.) The implied covenant will not “be read to
prohibit a party from doing that which is expressly permitted by an
agreement.” (Id. at p. 374.) Thus, “ ‘the parties may, by express

                                  33
provisions of the contract, grant the right to engage in the very acts
and conduct which would otherwise have been forbidden by an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.’ ” (Ibid.) In other
words, no covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be implied
which forbids acts and conduct expressly authorized by the
contract. (Ibid.)
      The plaintiff “must show that the conduct of the defendant,
whether or not it also constitutes a breach of a consensual contract
term, demonstrates a failure or refusal to discharge contractual
responsibilities, prompted not by an honest mistake, bad judgment
or negligence but rather by a conscious and deliberate act, which
unfairly frustrates the agreed common purposes and disappoints
the reasonable expectations of the other party thereby depriving
that party of the benefits of the agreement.” (Careau & Co. v.
Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371,
1395.)
      Here, VFLA points to various instances of bad faith conduct
by the artists. These include a statement from a WME
representative that it was treating Virgin Fest as a “money grab,”
Lizzo’s endorsement of an open letter calling for the music industry
to pause in order to curb the spread of COVID-19, WME’s statement
to Felts that the performance contracts were “pay or play”
agreements negotiated “under the strictest terms” because Virgin
Fest’s potential success was doubtful, Kali Uchis’s decision to
return the deposit to the other festival organizer, and a statement
from Ellie Goulding’s management expressing doubt she “would be
able to pull [her] show together in time for [Virgin Fest].”
      None of these examples, if proven, are sufficient to show the
artists breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
They do not demonstrate the artists’ failure or refusal to discharge

                                 34
contractual responsibilities which frustrated the reasonable
expectations of VFLA under the performance contracts. (Careau &
Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1395.) Instead, what occurred here is both sides took a
hardline but good faith position with respect to the force majeure
provision, which they were entitled to do. Moreover, it was the
COVID-19 pandemic, not any actions by the artists, that interfered
with VFLA’s expectations under the performance contracts. As far
as Lizzo’s call for the music industry to shut down during the
pandemic and Ellie Goulding’s management’s statement that she
may not be able to pull together her performance in time, those
statements had no bearing on Virgin Fest’s cancellation, which is
what ultimately caused the harm to VFLA. (See Floystrup v. City of
Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1318.)
VIII. WME’s motion for summary judgment
      Because VFLA conceded if the artists prevailed, WME should
prevail as well, we also affirm the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of WME.

                                35
                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs on appeal.

                                    VIRAMONTES, J.

     WE CONCUR:

                 STRATTON, P. J.

                 WILEY, J.

                               36