Court Opinion

ID: 9943023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 17:00:43.319425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:53.955304
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-8083      Document: 010111003953          Date Filed: 02/22/2024         Page: 1
                                                                                        FILED
                                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                              Tenth Circuit

                                FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            February 22, 2024
                            _________________________________
                                                                               Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                   Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                              No. 23-8083
                                                      (D.C. Nos. 2:23-CV-000171-NDF &
  MICHAEL SHANE LOURCEY                                     1:22-CR-00045-NDF-1)
  CLEMENTS,                                                        (D. Wyo.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
                    _________________________________

 Before PHILLIPS, BRISCOE, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                     _________________________________

        Defendant Michael Clements, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a

 certificate of appealability (COA) in order to appeal the district court’s denial of his

 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We deny a COA

 and dismiss this matter.

                                               I

        In March 2022, a federal grand jury indicted Clements on two counts of

 distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1),

 and one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-8083      Document: 010111003953         Date Filed: 02/22/2024      Page: 2

 § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). On June 30, 2022, Clements pleaded guilty to the

 possession charge in exchange for the government’s agreement to dismiss the two

 distribution charges.

        On August 10, 2022, the probation office prepared and submitted to the district

 court and the parties a presentence investigation report (PSR). The PSR applied a base

 offense level of 18 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(1). The PSR then applied five

 enhancements based on specific offense characteristics: (1) a 2-level enhancement

 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2) because the material involved a prepubescent minor

 or a minor who had not yet attained the age of 12 years; (2) a 2-level enhancement

 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) because Clements distributed child pornography to

 others; (3) a 4-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)(A) and (B) because

 Clements possessed images portraying sadistic or masochistic conduct, as well as images

 of infants or toddlers; (4) a 2-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6)

 because Clements possessed the prohibited images on a cell phone; and (5) a 5-level

 enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D) because the offense involved 600 or

 more images. The PSR in turn applied a 2-point reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G.

 § 3E1.1(a) because Clements clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for the

 offense, and a 1-point reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) because Clements

 assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by timely

 notifying authorities of his intent to enter a plea of guilty. Ultimately, the PSR arrived at

 a total offense level of 30. As for Clements’s criminal history, the PSR assigned 3 points

 to a March 8, 2017 federal conviction for possession of child pornography. The PSR also

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Appellate Case: 23-8083     Document: 010111003953          Date Filed: 02/22/2024     Page: 3

 added 2 criminal points pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) because Clements committed

 the offense of conviction while still serving a term of supervised release for the 2017

 federal conviction. This resulted in a total criminal history score of 5 and a criminal

 history category of III. Together, the total offense level of 30 and the criminal history

 category of III resulted in a Guidelines imprisonment range of 121 to 151 months. The

 PSR also noted that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2), the statutory minimum term of

 imprisonment was 10 years.

        On September 6, 2022, the district court sentenced Clements to a term of

 imprisonment of 120 months, to be followed by a five year term of supervised release.

 Final judgment was entered in the case that same day. Clements did not file a direct

 appeal.

        On September 18, 2023, Clements filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or

 correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Clements alleged in his motion that his

 trial counsel “was ineffective . . . for failing to know and understand relevant sentencing

 factors that would have mitigated [his] sentence.” ROA, Vol. 2 at 5. Specifically,

 Clements alleged that his trial counsel should have asked the district court to apply the

 safety-valve provision set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and impose a sentence less than

 the otherwise applicable statutory minimum sentence of ten years. Clements argued that

 “[p]ost first step act the safety valve now reads in the conjunctive,” “mean[ing] that in

 order to be exempt from the safety valve a person would need to have more than 4

 [criminal history] points and a 3 point offense and a 2 point violent offense.” Id. at 11.

 Clements argued that he was thus eligible for safety-valve relief because, at the time of

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 the offense of conviction in this case, his criminal history included only a prior 3-point

 offense and a prior 2-point offense that was not violent.

        The government filed a brief in opposition to Clements’s § 2255 motion. The

 government noted that § 3553(f) “appl[ies] only to a very limited class of enumerated

 crimes primarily concerned with controlled substances” and excluding Clements’s

 offense of conviction. Id. at 18. Consequently, the government argued that Clements

 was ineligible “for a below mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to § 3553(f).” Id.

 The government in turn argued that “there [wa]s simply no reasonable probability

 [Clements] would have received a sentence under § 3553(f) even had his lawyer made the

 attempt.” Id. at 19.

        On November 9, 2023, the district court issued an order denying Clements’s

 § 2255 motion. In doing so, the district court “agree[d] with the Government” that

 § 3553(f) was “plainly inapplicable” because Clements’s offense of conviction “was

 excluded from th[e] list” of offenses eligible for safety-valve relief under § 3553(f). Id.

 at 25. The district court in turn concluded that Clements’s “ineffective assistance claim

 [wa]s predicated on an issue without merit[].” Id. at 26.

        Judgment was entered in the case on November 9, 2023. The judgment stated, in

 relevant part, that Clements was “not entitled to relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255” and

 that “no [COA] shall issue.” Id. at 27.

        Clements filed a notice of appeal on December 1, 2023. He has since filed an

 application for COA with this court.

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                                              II

        A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate review of the denial of a

 § 2255 motion. United States v. Parker, 720 F.3d 781, 785 (10th Cir. 2013). To obtain a

 COA, a defendant must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

 right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires a defendant to “demonstrate that

 reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims

 debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

        As we have noted, Clements argued in his § 2255 motion that his trial counsel was

 ineffective for failing to recognize and argue that Clements was eligible for safety-valve

 relief under § 3553(f). To prevail on this claim, Clements must first show that his trial

 counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning that it fell “below an objective standard of

 reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). If Clements can

 make this showing, he then must demonstrate that his trial counsel’s deficient

 performance prejudiced him, which requires him to show “a reasonable probability that,

 but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

 different.” Id. at 694.

        Clements cannot make the first of these showings because, as the district court

 correctly noted, Clements is ineligible for safety-valve relief under § 3553(f). Section

 3553(f), by its express terms, applies to a limited range of controlled substance offenses.

 It does not, as the district court noted, apply to child pornography offenses, such as

 Clements’s offense of conviction. Thus, we conclude that the district court correctly

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Appellate Case: 23-8083      Document: 010111003953          Date Filed: 02/22/2024     Page: 6

 rejected Clements’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and we in turn conclude that

 reasonable jurists could not disagree with the district court’s resolution of that claim.

                                              III

        For the reasons stated above, we DENY Clements’s application for COA and

 dismiss this matter.

                                                Entered for the Court

                                                Mary Beck Briscoe
                                                Circuit Judge

                                               6