Court Opinion

ID: 9727749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:49:34.547338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:37.559612
License: Public Domain

REYNOSO, J.
I concur. The concurrence, as I explain below, is a limited one.
The trial court dealt with a constitutional and statutory broadside attack on the existence and effort of the California Commission on the Status of Women. The complaint prayed, in part, “That the Court declare the Commission dissolved, its acts . . . and the law establishing it null and void.” None of the theories advanced by plaintiffs, with the exception I discuss below, merit more than a polite nod.1
The legislative purpose of the Commission was articulated by the trial court with a sensitivity toward history:
“Study, research, the gathering and dissemination of relevant information was determined to be the best initial approach. These functions have been and are being served by the Commission herein. Anyone who cannot comprehend the compelling interest involved herein is either unaware of, oblivious to or totally insensitive to the history of the treatment of women. The Legislative purpose of the statutes creating the Commission was to study and provide information on what further could be done by the Legislature to bring women to the level of enjoying equal protection under our laws. (In 1837 the desire of women for equal *774protection under the law was succinctly stated by an early American feminist, Sarah Grimke who said: T ask no favor for my sex. All I ask of our brethren is that they take their feet off our necks.’)
“At the Women’s Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848, a Declaration of Principles was adopted paraphrasing the Declaration of Independence, it held ‘these truths to be self-evident; that all men and.women are created equal.’
“The Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, enacted in 1869, guaranteed universal suffrage for men. It was not until 1920 that women gained the right to vote by the enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment. While this was a giant step forward, compared to the status of women under the Code of Hammurabi, wherein women were legally chattels of men, it did not abate any of the discrimination practiced against women in employment, pay, jury service, right to a separate domicile, capacity to enter into binding agreements, capacity to sue and be sued, change in citizenship upon marriage to an alien, change of name upon marriage and many other areas wherein a person’s sex made the sole difference in the treatment he or she would receive under the law of the United States and of California. Legislatively and judicially many of these discriminations have been and are being abolished.” Under the California Constitution, a legislative classification based on sex is suspect. (Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 20 [95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 46 A.L.R.3d 351].) The creation of the Commission on the Status of Women was a legislative recognition that a compelling interest existed in improving the legal, social, political and economic status of women.
There is only one issue which, in my view, presents a triable issue of fact on the present state of the record. That issue is whether the Commission has been involved in (1) lobbying (which is permitted), (2) “promotion” in a political campaign absent express legislative authorization (which is proscribed under Stanson), or (3) activity which may be described as somewhere between lobbying and direct political activity during a campaign. The stipulation of facts entered into by the parties is vague regarding the issue we consider. Accordingly, as is explained below, the moving party, defendant Commission, has failed to make the type of showing required. (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Proceedings Without Trial, § 181, p. 2833.) The stipulation inferentialiy raises an issue of fact as to the precise nature of the activity conducted by the Commission and whether that activity is proper or proscribed. It may *775be that when all the facts and evidence are before the trial court, the facts will fit neatly within that activity which is not prohibited or that which is.
I do not share my brethrens’ apparent suggestion that conducting grass roots lobbying campaigns in support of Equal Rights Amendment is per se proscribed. Lobbying activity invariably means that the lobbyist (here the Commission) will be in contact with constituents to know their views as well with legislators. One of the legislative purposes of the Commission is to “encourage women’s organizations ... to institute local self-help activities designed to meet women’s educational, employment, and related needs . . .” (Gov. Code, § 8225, subd. (d).) Thus, the Commission is mandated to be in helpful communication with the grass roots organizations. If, however, the facts as they are developed in the trial show that the Commission was involved in “election campaigning” with respect to candidates which support Equal Rights Amendment, or otherwise directly involved in such campaigns, then we do have activity which is proscribed by Stanson v. Mott. It must be apparent that I take strong exception to my colleagues’ apparent conclusion that plaintiffs have already made an adequate showing on a summaiy judgment that the Commission’s activities involve election campaigning.
With respect to promotional activity, I agree that the real issue is not the objective but the audience to which it is directed. At times, however, the distinction may be more apparent than real. Thus, for example, the Commission is certainly authorized to take a stand in favor of Equal Rights Amendment and to issue a press release to that effect. The principal audience presumably is the legislators; surely a secondary audience must be the media and through the media the electorate. I cite this example as one which in my view is not proscribed. Further, whether the activity is “promotional” in an electioneering sense or promotional in terms of fulfilling a legislative mandate is not self-evident. Each challenged activity must be scrutinized.
On the one hand, the law seeks to protect the public from a “big brother” approach by government which seeks to propagandize on public issues. On the other hand, we must provide the governmental entities the freedoms to carry out their legislative missions. In the case of the Commission on the Status of Women the mission may be controversial and not pleasing to the plaintiffs. We, as a court, must nonetheless not interfere with that legislative mandate.
*776Because of the drastic nature of a summary judgment and the importance of safeguarding the adverse party’s right to a trial, the moving party must make a strong showing. The courts will construe the moving party’s affidavits strictly and the counteraffidavits liberally. (See 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, § 181, p. 2833.) Conflict of facts (and presumably factual inferences to be drawn from a stipulation) must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. (See Chesney v. Gresham (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 120, 125 [134 Cal.Rptr. 238].) Since all inferences are against the moving party, I conclude that the stipulation does raise a sufficient factual issue to go to trial only on this narrow issue: Is any of the Commission activity proscribed as being improper electioneering? The remedy, of course, may be no more than a declaratory judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 18, 1979. Reynoso, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 22, 1979. Bird, C. J., Tobriner, J., and Newman, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 regret the majority's failure to dispose of the other issues on appeal: (1) Does the establishment of the Commission (a) violate the separation of powers doctrine, or (b) deprive appellants of equal protection of the law, and their First Amendment rights; (2) Is the Commission’s promotion of the Equal Rights Amendment authorized by Government Code section 8220 et seq.? (3) If authorized are those sections void for vagueness? In my view, these contentions have no merit and would properly be the subject of a partial summary judgment. Judicial economy requires that we dispose of those issues or give guidance to the trial court.