Court Opinion

ID: 9963989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 18:00:56.431562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.465416
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40729     Document: 123-1        Page: 1   Date Filed: 04/26/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                           ____________                                 FILED
                                                                    April 26, 2024
                            No. 22-40729
                                                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                           ____________
                                                                        Clerk

Allen Fitzgerald Calton,

                                                      Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                 versus

Pinkie Patel, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Health
Administrator, Stiles Unit; Dale Wainwright, Individually and in his
Official Capacity as Chairman, Texas Board of Criminal Justice; FNU
Eckersley, Individually and in his/her Official Capacity as Contract
Dentist with UTMB/TDCJ; FNU Tucker, Individually and in his/her
Official Capacity as Contract Dentist with UTMB/TDCJ; Owen
Murray, Individually and in his Official Capacity as UTMB Medical
Director; Linnette Linthicum, Individually and in her Official
Capacity as TDCJ Health Services Administrator; John Doe, I,
Individually and in his/her Capacity as Correctional Managed Health Case
Committee Chair; John Doe, II, Individually and in his/her Official
Capacity as TTU Health Care Systems Medical Director; Robert
Williams, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Health Services
Administrator; Manual Hirsch, D.D.S., Individually and in his Official
Capacity as TDCJ Director of Dental Services; Cheryl Andreu,
Individually and in her Official Capacity as Dental Assistant; Wanda
Daigle, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Dental Assistant;
Carla Deroven, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Dental
Hygienist; Texas Board of Criminal Justice, Sued in Their
Official Capacity as Policy Maker for TDCJ; Dr. Wong,

                                                    Defendants—Appellees.
Case: 22-40729             Document: 123-1          Page: 2       Date Filed: 04/26/2024

                    ______________________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 1:17-CV-239
                    ______________________________

Before Elrod and Graves, Circuit Judges, and Ashe, District Judge.*
Per Curiam:†
        Proceeding pro se, Allen Fitzgerald Calton, Texas prisoner # 1123880,
filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous prison officials
and prison dental providers. His claims had to do with his efforts to receive
treatment for his severe periodontal issues and the prison system’s policies
on such treatment. Because Calton sought to proceed in forma pauperis, the
district court ordered prison officials to provide a supplemental record,
known as a Martinez report, to flesh out the facts in the complaint. See Norton
v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997); Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d
317, 319 (10th Cir. 1978). The district court converted the Martinez report
into a motion for summary judgment and granted judgment as a matter of law
against Calton as to all the defendants. Calton timely appealed.
        On appeal, Calton only challenges the dismissal of his claim of
deliberate indifference against a single dentist, Dr. Jess Tucker. Calton has
abandoned, by failure to brief, any challenge to the district court’s dismissal
of his claims against all other defendants to his lawsuit. See Fed. R. App. P.
28(a)(8); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). We therefore
affirm the dismissal of Calton’s claims against all defendants other than Dr.
Tucker. Moreover, we decline to discuss Dr. Tucker’s argument, which was
not presented to or discussed by the district court, that he is entitled to
        _____________________
        *
          United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by
designation.
        †
            This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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Case: 22-40729       Document: 123-1        Page: 3    Date Filed: 04/26/2024

                                  No. 22-40729

qualified immunity from Calton’s deliberate-indifference claim. See Baker v.
Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 251 (5th Cir. 2023), as revised (May 19, 2023).
       Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). If a prison official “has subjective
knowledge” that a prisoner is at substantial risk of objectively and sufficiently
serious harm, that “official shows a deliberate indifference to that risk by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Sanchez v. Oliver, 995 F.3d
461, 473 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013).
       At the threshold, Calton argues that the district court applied an
improper legal standard to his claim of deliberate indifference by requiring
him to show that Dr. Tucker acted with an improper motive. We disagree.
Although the district court considered whether the record indicated that Dr.
Tucker acted with an improper motive, it did so only in considering whether
Dr. Tucker displayed the type of “egregious intentional conduct” that would
amount to deliberate indifference. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 351 (5th
Cir. 2006). The district court applied the correct standard.
       Moving on to the merits of Calton’s claim, the following facts are
undisputed. Dr. Tucker was aware that Calton had severe periodontal
disease, that scaling and root-planing of both his upper- and lower-arch teeth
had been ordered, and that, during the three-month period between the
scheduling of the procedure and the date of Calton’s appointment for the
procedure on April 9, 2018, five of Calton’s upper teeth had become non-
recoverable such that scaling and root-planing of the upper-arch teeth were
no longer indicated. Calton refused to have Dr. Tucker extract those teeth
on that date. Dr. Tucker also did not perform the scaling and root-planing of

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Case: 22-40729       Document: 123-1       Page: 4    Date Filed: 04/26/2024

                                  No. 22-40729

Calton’s lower-arch teeth, and he removed the scaling and root-planing from
Calton’s treatment plan. Dr. Tucker noted that Calton should return to the
dental clinic as needed for sick-call requests.
       Reviewing the district court’s judgment de novo, we conclude that the
district court erred in determining at this stage of the proceedings that, as a
matter of law, Dr. Tucker was entitled to summary judgment on Calton’s
claim of deliberate indifference. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Sanchez, 995 F.3d
at 466; Rogers, 709 F.3d at 407. Reviewing the summary judgment evidence
in the light most favorable to Calton, the non-moving party, Dr. Tucker’s
decision not to perform the planned scaling and root-planing on Calton’s
lower-arch teeth could amount to deliberate indifference to Calton’s serious
medical needs. As the district court noted, Calton’s medical records “could
be construed as supporting” the contention that this procedure was cancelled
simply because Calton refused to have his upper-arch teeth extracted. We
therefore reverse the dismissal of Calton’s claim against Dr. Tucker and
remand for further proceedings. In doing so, we express no view on the
parties’ respective chances of ultimate success in this case.
       Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED IN
PART and REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

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