Court Opinion

ID: 9551562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:55:25.963906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:10.701628
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent.
The facts as stated by Mr. Justice Crockett are accepted.
*483Our statute, 63-30-13, U.C.A.19S3, as amended, says two things :
A claim against a political subdivision shall . be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within ninety days after the cause of action arises; provided, however, that any claim filed against a city or incorporated town under section 63-30-8 shall be governed by the provisions of section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
First, it says that a claim against a political subdivision will be barred, unless notice of the claim is filed within ninety days after the cause of action arises. Second, it says that any claim filed against a city or incorporated town under this section, shall not be governed by the provisions of 63-30-13, but shall be governed by the provisions of 10-7-77. The first part of the statute says nothing about a written notice, nor to whom notice shall be delivered. The second part of the statute requires examination of 10-7-77, which specifies that the claim referred to there must be in writing. It further is very explicit about what the notice of the claim must contain, and to whom it must be presented. These two statutes are distinctly different. They are similar only in the fact that both require some notice.
The purpose of statutes requiring the presentation of claims to political subdivisions, prior to filing a suit, is in furtherance of public policy to prevent unnecessary litigation. The purpose of notice provisions is to afford the political subdivision an opportunity to investigate the claim while the matter is of recent memory, witnesses are yet available, conditions have not materially changed and to determine if there is liability, and if there is, the extent of it. These salutary provisions do serve to prevent needless litigation.1 The procedure set out in the main opinion is merely more mechanistic, but would not impart any more notice than defendant had.
The main opinion has engrafted on 63-30-13 all manner of requirements for the notice, which are not set forth in the statute, nor necessary. The subject statute says nothing about written notice, but the main opinion cites the case of Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v. Morse, 43 Utah 515, 136 P. 965, wherein, Mr. Justice Frick says:
We think the law is well settled that where a statute requires notice to be given but is silent with respect to the manner of notification, written notice is understood. ... A substantial compliance with the statute in that regard is, we think, all that is necessary.
In support of that proposition, Mr. Justice Fri.ck cites 29 Cyc. 1117:
The general rule in respect to notices is that mere informalities do not vitiate them so long as they do not mislead, and give the necessary information to the proper parties.
In view of the fact that our statutes are to be liberally construed to effect their objectives and to promote justice,2 I would not extend, by implication, the terms of 63-30-13, particularly where it is invoked by a political subdivision to avoid liability.3 And again, particularly where the object of. 63-30-13 is to give a right of action to the citizen where one did not previously exist. If our guide, for engrafting on 63-30-13 the notice requirements stated in the main opinion, is 10-7-77, then we should be further guided by the latter statute, as amended, with reference to claims for minors.4’ 5
*484Given the salutary public policy in 63-30-13, allowing one redress against a political subdivision, the lack of express requirements, and the substantial compliance doctrine set forth in the Tooele case; I would hold the following:
That defendant did have notice, that it had written notice (in the form of the school principal’s written report, filed with defendant), that it was not misled, and that it had all of the opportunities the statute means to provide it, viz., an opportunity to investigate, to secure its witnesses, to determine liability and the extent of it, all before a material change in conditions. If anyone were misled, plaintiff was.
That if the foregoing were not determinative of this matter (and I think it is), the conflict in the statements of plaintiff and the school principal necessarily needs to be determined at trial, and if determined in plaintiff’s favor, such would be sufficient to allow the action, because the detrimental effect of the misleading statement would thereby be cured.
That the holding of the district court be reversed and the matter remanded for trial.

. 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, etc., Sec. 686.

. See. 68-3-2, U.C.A.1953.

. 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, etc., Sec. 687.

. See the dissents in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972) ; Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973).

.The instant matter sparks recollection of the instructions given by the Khalif Omar, to his first Kadi c. 900 A.D.: “If thou seest fit to judge differently from yesterday, do not hesitate to follow the truth as thou seest it; for truth is eternal and it is better to return to the true than to persist in the false!”