Court Opinion

ID: 9439155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:23:45.072582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:11.844123
License: Public Domain

KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s holding that the gratuity verdict is not supported by the evidence but I disagree with its rever*854sal of the district court’s judgment of acquittal on the Meat Inspection Act count. I believe, like the district court, that the government failed to adduce evidence to support a finding of intent to influence discharge' of a specific duty under the Meat Inspection Act, as required by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Calif., — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 1402, 143 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999). Therefore, I would uphold the district court’s judgment of acquittal on each count of conviction.
Writing on a clean slate, I would propose for both section 22 of the Meat Inspection Act (which criminalizes the giving a thing of value to a government official “with intent to influence said [official] in the discharge of any duty provided for in [the Meat Inspection Act],” 21 U.S.C. § 622) and for the gratuity provision of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (which criminalizes giving or receiving a thing of value to or by a public official “for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official,” 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)) a much less rigorous showing of intent than the Supreme Court imposed on the gratuity provision in Sum-Diamond. Nevertheless, given the Court’s strict construction of the gratuity provision there, I do not see how we can interpret section 22 more leniently here.
In Sun-Diamond, the Supreme Court concluded the phrase “for or because of any official act” in the gratuity provision “means ‘for or because of some particular official act of whatever identity’ — just as the question ‘Do you like any composer?’ normally means ‘Do you like some particular composer?’ ” — U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 1407. The Court acknowledged that “[i]t is linguistically possible, of course, for the phrase to mean ‘for or because of official acts in general, without specification as to which one’ — just as the question ‘Do you like any composer?’ could mean ‘Do you like all composers, no matter what their names or music?’ ” Id. The court stated, however, that “the former seems to us the more natural meaning.” Id. Applying the same approach to section 22 of the Meat Inspection Act, I believe the “more natural meaning” of “in the discharge of any duty” must be similarly construed to be “in the discharge of some particular duty of whatever identity.” Although, as the majority observes, the Meat Inspection Act contains no definition of “duty” comparable to section 201’s definition of “official act,” on which the Sum-Diamond Court relied to buttress its interpretation of the gratuity provision, we must still, I believe, adhere to what the Supreme Court has indicated the “natural meaning” of “any duty” is. That this meaning is the required one under Sum-Diamond is reinforced by the Court’s treatment there of the bribery provision in 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)-(2), which — in language similar to that of section 22 of the Meat Inspection Act — proscribes the giving (§ 201(b)(1)) and receiving (§ 201(b)(2)) of a thing of value “with intent, inter alia, ‘to influence any official act’ (giver) or in return for ‘being influenced in the performance of any official act’ (recipient).” — U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 1406 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1), (2)).
In Sun-Diamond, the Supreme Court compared section 201(b)’s bribery provision with section 201(c)’s gratuity provision and concluded that “[t]he distinguishing feature of each crime is its intent element.” — U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 1406. The Court noted that for a violation of the bribery provision, “there must be a quid pro quo — a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act,” — U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 1406 (emphasis original), while the gratuity provision “requires only that the gratuity be given or accepted ‘for or because of an official act.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court took for granted that the more stringent quid pro quo intent requirement for bribery required a connection between the thing given and a specific act or omission by the public official. The only disputed question in the Court’s eyes was whether the same connection was required to satisfy the more lenient intent standard *855of the gratuity proscription in section 201(c). The Court determined that it was, admonishing that “a statute in this field that can linguistically be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken to be the latter.” — U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 1410. We must likewise, therefore, treat section 22 as a scalpel which can excise only the most precisely delineated bribes. If the gratuity provision requires proof of a “link” between a bribe and a particular act, as Sun-Diamond held, the intent language in section 22 must also be construed to mandate a link between the thing given and discharge of a specific duty the giver has attempted to influence. Applying the Sun-Diamond standard, I cannot find evidence to support the required link between the May 1993 feting of Agriculture Secretary Espy in Russellville, Arkansas and an intent on appellee Schaffer’s part to influence either the “zero tolerance” policy or the safe handling labeling policy for meat.
First, there is nothing in the record to connect the Russellville festivities to the government’s “zero tolerance” policy — except for the bare facts that Tyson Foods was a business that might be affected by such a policy and that the policy (or its revision) may have been actively under consideration by the Department of Agriculture at the time.* This coincidence does not, as Sun-Diamond requires, “prove a link” between the policy and the party. See Maj. Op. at 844 (concluding that “an awareness by a regulated entity that the USDA had been developing a new pathogen control policy” is not “definitive link” under gratuity provision). There is nothing to suggest that at the time of the Russellville weekend Tyson Foods was concerned about the policy in any specific way, much less that it invited Secretary Espy with the intent to influence the policy — whether intending to “induce” or “discourage” action on it or to “encourse [him] adhere to the status quo.” See Maj. Op. at 849. As for the safe handling labeling, the evidence the majority cites to show Tyson Foods was concerned about the policy relates to the August 1993 promulgation of emergency labeling regulations, to take effect 60 days later, and Tyson Foods’ opposition to their expedited implementation. See Government Exhibits 124, 130, 131, 131A, 136, 138; Trial Tr. at 625-36, 848-52, 1095, 1273-75. There is nothing to suggest that Tyson Foods was aware of the expedition — or that it was even planned — at the time of the Russellville festivities in May 1993.

 As the majority notes, a zero tolerance policy for meat had already been adopted in February 1993. See Maj. Op. at 837, 844. To the extent the evidence shows an intent to influence a zero tolerance policy for poultry, it cannot support a violation of section 22 of the Meat Inspection Act which criminalizes only gifts to influence the discharge of a duty under the Meat Inspection Act. Poultry labeling is not a duty under the Meat Inspection Act, which governs only "meat and meat food products,” see 21 U.S.C. §§ 602, 603, defined as "any product capable of use as human food which is made wholly or in part from any meat or other portion of the carcass of any cattle, sheep, swine, or goats,” id. § 60l(j) does not govern poultry.