Court Opinion

ID: 9404452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 05:06:55.944476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:13.881758
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     June 22, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 360425
                                                                     Kent Circuit Court
JORDAN SCOTT LOOMIS,                                                 LC No. 20-000322-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MURRAY and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant, Jordan Scott Loomis, appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of first-degree
felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve life in prison,
without the possibility of parole. We affirm.

       This case arises out of the fatal stabbing of James Robertson. Defendant contacted
Robertson to buy crack cocaine. Robertson drove defendant to an ATM to withdraw money for
the drugs, but defendant’s card was declined due to insufficient funds. Robertson then drove
defendant to a second ATM to try a different debit card. When they arrived in the parking lot,
defendant reached over and stabbed Robertson multiple times in the chest and neck. Robertson
offered defendant $50 to “just let him go,” but defendant declined. Defendant then drove
Robertson’s car around the area until Robertson died from his injuries. Defendant then purchased
drugs from another individual with Robertson’s money. The victim’s body was found partially
submerged along the Grand River in Ottawa County with eight sharp-force injuries, including both
stab wounds and incised wounds. At trial, defendant claimed self-defense.

       Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, defendant argues that the trial court erred by
admitting evidence from the search of the victim’s car and the search of defendant’s cell phone.
Second, defendant claims he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

                              I. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

        We first address defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in admitting evidence from
the victim’s car and defendant’s cell phone. We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s

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decision to admit or exclude evidence. People v Houston, 261 Mich App 463, 465; 683 NW2d
192 (2004). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to select a principled outcome from a
range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Kahley, 277 Mich App 182, 184; 744
NW2d 194 (2007).

        To preserve an evidentiary issue for review, a defendant must object to the admission of
the evidence at trial and specify the same ground for objection that it asserts on appeal. People v
Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019). If the defendant fails to object, the issue is
unpreserved. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 420; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). This Court
reviews unpreserved claims of error for plain error that affected substantial rights. Id. To establish
that the plain error affected his substantial rights, the defendant must show that the error “affected
the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d
130 (1999). “The reviewing court should reverse only when the defendant is actually innocent or
the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Thorpe, 504 Mich at 252-253.

                                        A. VICTIM’S CAR

        Defendant preserved his evidentiary claim relating to the search of the victim’s car by
raising a chain-of-custody argument in the trial court. See Thorpe, 504 Mich at 252. Defendant
asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence uncovered in the
victim’s car because the police failed to immediately seize the vehicle and preserve evidence
before it was tampered with by a third party, thereby breaking the chain of custody. Defendant
also asserts that exculpatory evidence could have been removed the car. We disagree with
defendant’s claims of error.

         “In order to obtain the admission of real evidence, a prosecutor must lay a foundation
identifying the items as what they are purported to be and displaying that the items are connected
with the accused or the crime.” People v Jennings, 118 Mich App 318, 322; 324 NW2d 625
(1982). See also MRE 901(a). When determining if an object should be admitted, the trial court
should consider the nature of the article, the circumstances surrounding the preservation and
custody of it, and the possibility of intermeddlers tampering with it. People v Muhammad, 326
Mich App 40, 59; 931 NW2d 20 (2018). Admission of evidence “does not require a perfect chain
of custody,” and “any deficiency in the chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence rather
than its admissibility once the proffered evidence is shown to a reasonable degree of certainty to
be what its proponent claims.” People v White, 208 Mich App 126, 130-131; 527 NW2d 34 (1994).

        Police officers located the victim’s car in Huff Park on November 27, 2019, amidst a
missing person investigation. Officers noticed the car was unlocked so they opened the door and
found the keys on the driver’s seat. They opened the trunk and saw it was full of miscellaneous
items. They closed the trunk and began searching for Robertson. The officers performed an
extensive search of Huff Park, but they did not find anything or anyone suspicious. The officers
reported there was no crime involved that they were aware of, and they were advised to leave the
car at the park. Sometime soon after the vehicle was located, representatives from Express Auto
repossessed the vehicle and moved it to Express Auto’s location in Wyoming, Michigan.

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         On November 29, 2019, the victim’s friend, Carolyn Stewart, who had been looking for
the victim, went to Express Auto to take the victim’s belongings out of the car. In doing so Stewart
testified that she tried to be as careful as she could and even put on gloves when she was allowed
in the car so as not to disturb potential evidence of a crime. Ms. Stewart also took photos before
she touched anything. Ms. Stewart then took the victim’s belongings out of the car, including
some clothes and an old cell phone. Later that afternoon the police took possession of the car and
asked Ms. Stewart to come to the police station with the items she had retrieved from the car. Ms.
Stewart gave everything she took to the police.

       That same day, a crime scene technician with the Grand Rapids Police Department
examined the car once it was taken into police custody. The technician found blood stains on the
backseat and the front passenger interior door. The stained areas as well as the steering wheel
were preserved and swabbed for DNA analysis. On December 4, 2019, police discovered the
victim’s body partially submerged in the Grand River. DNA was collected from the victim and
analysis revealed that the victim’s DNA matched that of the blood stains found in the car.

        There is a possibility that the victim’s friend could have, either inadvertently or
purposefully, tampered with the car and evidence within it before the police seized it. It is
undisputed that she took items from the car. However, it is also undisputed that the car the police
seized was in fact the victim’s car that was involved in his murder. Therefore, the evidence from
the victim’s car, which was limited to the DNA evidence derived from the blood stains on the
vehicle’s interior along with defendant’s own DNA from the steering wheel, is admissible. Any
deficiency in the chain of custody went to the weight of this evidence, and defendant was able to
argue its weight at trial. See White, 208 Mich App at 130-131. Accordingly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the
victim’s car.1

                               B. DEFENDANT’S CELL PHONE

        Turning to defendant’s arguments related to the cell phone, although defendant initially
moved to suppress the cell-phone evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, he withdrew his
motion before the trial court held an evidentiary hearing or ruled on the motion. This issue is, at
best, unpreserved. See Snider, 239 Mich App at 406. This Court reviews unpreserved claims of
error for plain error that affected substantial rights. Id. at 420. Indeed, given that defendant
withdrew his motion to suppress we could consider the issue waived. See People v Adams, 245
Mich App 226, 239-240; 627 NW2d 623 (2001).

        Police officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting a search of a cell phone.
Riley v California, 573 US 373, 386; 134 S Ct 2473; 189 L Ed 2d 430 (2014); People v Hughes,

1
  Defendant also makes the cursory assertion that the police violated due process by failing to
preserve exculpatory evidence that might have been found in the car. This argument is unpreserved
and without merit. Defendant admitted that he stabbed the victim, and he has not even attempted
to demonstrate that the police failed to preserve anything potentially exculpatory from the car. See
People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 79; 829 NW2d 266 (2012).

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506 Mich 512, 527; 958 NW2d 98 (2020). A search and seizure conducted without a warrant is
unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. People v
Rodriquez, 327 Mich App 573, 583; 935 NW2d 51 (2019). Voluntary consent is one such
exception. Id. “Consent permits a warrantless search so long as it is unequivocal, specific, and
freely and intelligently given.” Id. at 584. Whether consent is voluntary depends on the totality
of the circumstances. Id. Consent to search must come from someone who has authority to give
it, meaning either the property’s owner or someone “who shares common authority over the
property.” People v Mead, 503 Mich 205, 217; 931 NW2d 557 (2019).

        Defendant argues that the record is unclear as to whether the police officers obtained his
phone from the mother of his child, Emma Fox, before they obtained it during his interview with
police on December 1, 2019. Defendant also argues that he did not “voluntarily consent” because
he was led to believe that the police had already looked through his phone in some way, and he
“likely thought that he had no choice except to consent to a search of his phone.” Defendant further
argues that Fox would not have had authority to consent to a search of defendant’s phone as there
is no record evidence that Fox had common authority over the phone. These assertions are not,
however, supported by the record in this case.

        At trial, Grand Rapids Police Detective Tim DeVries testified that defendant turned over
his phone to police during his interview. In defendant’s motion to suppress the cell-phone
evidence, defendant conceded that he “was asked for and gave consent to search his cell phone.”
He maintained, however, that before he gave his consent police officers went to the apartment that
defendant and Fox shared, and Fox gave the officers defendant’s phone. He further asserted that
at his December 1, 2019 police interview, despite being told that he was not under arrest, he “had
no other choice than to allow officers to search his phone.” Because defense counsel withdrew
the cell-phone portion of the motion to suppress before the trial court issued a decision, a record
was never developed to support defendant’s assertions that Fox gave the phone to police or that he
had “no other choice” than to give his phone to police during his interview. As the appellant, it is
defendant’s burden to furnish this Court “with a record to verify the factual basis of any
argument….” People v Elston, 462 Mich 751, 762; 614 NW2d 595 (2000). Defendant has failed
to provide this Court with a record to support his claims that the police illegally searched his phone
at any point, and he has not shown error on this basis.

        Moreover, in his closing argument, defense counsel used the cell-phone data from the
victim’s and defendant’s phones to support defendant’s testimony about the timeline of his self-
defense claim. Having withdrawn his motion to suppress this evidence, and having endeavored to
use it for his benefit during trial, defendant should not be heard to complain on appeal that the
admission of this evidence constituted plain error. See People v Witherspoon, 257 Mich App 329,
333; 670 NW2d 434 (2003) (“[A]n appellant may not benefit from an alleged error that the
appellant contributed to by plan or negligence.”). Defendant has not shown that an error, let alone
a plain error, has occurred from the admission of defendant’s cell-phone evidence.

        Furthermore, even if defendant had shown that an error occurred, defendant’s substantial
rights were not affected by the admission of the cell-phone evidence because the outcome of the
trial would have been the same regardless of whether the cell-phone evidence was admitted. The
cell-phone evidence was not the only substantial evidence admitted at trial. There was evidence
of defendant’s DNA on the steering wheel of the victim’s car; the victim’s blood in the backseat

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of the car; the testimony of two separate jail inmates detailing defendant’s admissions to the
murder; defendant’s letters to one of the inmates; and the discovery of the murder weapon, a knife
buried at defendant’s home, that was consistent with the victim’s wounds. There was more than
sufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt even if the cell-phone evidence was excluded from the
trial. Therefore, defendant’s substantial rights were not affected by the admission of the cell-phone
evidence.

                                        II. SPEEDY TRIAL

       Defendant further argues that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We
disagree.

        The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to criminal defendants by the United States
Constitution and the Michigan Constitution, as well as by statute and court rule. US Const, Am VI;
Const 1963, art 1, § 20; MCL 768.1; MCR 6.004(A); People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 261; 716
NW2d 208 (2006). We review de novo whether defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial,
and this Court reviews the trial court’s factual findings for clear error. Williams, 475 Mich at 250.
Additionally, “this Court must determine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 664; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). “Violation of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial requires dismissal of the charge with prejudice.” Id. at 664-
665; MCR 6.004(A).

        When determining whether a defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial, the
length of delay is not solely determinative. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 112-113; 605 NW2d
28 (1999). The court applies a four-part balancing test that includes: “(1) the length of delay, (2)
the reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to the
defendant.” Williams, 475 Mich at 261-262. The delay period commences at defendant’s arrest.
Id. at 261. If the total delay from arrest to trial is under 18 months, then the burden is on the
defendant to show that he suffered prejudice. Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 665. But if the delay
is over 18 months, prejudice is presumed and the burden is on the prosecution to rebut the
presumption. Id. Scheduling delays and delays caused by the court are attributed to the prosecutor
but should be “given a neutral tint and are assigned only minimal weight in determining whether
a defendant was denied a speedy trial.” Id. at 666. A defendant can experience two types of
prejudice while awaiting trial—prejudice to his person and prejudice to the defense. Id. at 668.
Prejudice to the defense is the more serious prejudice to consider because a defendant’s inability
to adequately prepare his defense “skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id.

        As to the first factor in this case, the length of the delay—defendant was incarcerated on
December 1, 2019, and the trial began on December 13, 2021. Defendant had to wait 24 months
from the time of his incarceration to the time of his trial. Because this wait was longer than 18
months, prejudice is presumed, and the burden shifts to the prosecution to show that there was no
injury.

       As to the second factor in this case, reason for the delay—this case was first set for trial on
May 4, 2020; however, it was “adjourned due to other reasons.” Defendant’s next trial date was
scheduled for August 17, 2020, and it was also “adjourned due to other reasons.” The delay in this
case was due to the Covid-19 pandemic shutting down the jury trial system in March 2020. This

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Court has concluded that delay primarily resulting from the Supreme Court’s decision to suspend
jury trials in response to the Covid-19 pandemic is not attributable to either party. In re Sanborn,
337 Mich App 252, 270; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).

       As to the third factor in this case, defendant’s assertion of the right—defendant twice
moved to dismiss for failure to receive a speedy trial. Defendant first moved to dismiss on
January 19, 2021, and the trial court denied the motion on January 29, 2021. Later, defendant filed
a second motion to dismiss on August 17, 2021, and the trial court denied the motion on August 27,
2021. Therefore, defendant clearly asserted the right to a speedy trial.

        As to the fourth factor in this case, prejudice to defendant is presumed because the delay
was longer than 18 months; however, there is no indication of actual prejudice to the defense.
Defendant has not asserted that he was unable to secure witnesses or evidence for trial due to the
delay, and the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. We conclude that defendant has
failed to demonstrate prejudice to his defense as a result of the delay.

       Accordingly, defendant’s speedy trial claim lacks merit, and we deny relief on this issue.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
                                                             /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                             /s/ Michael F. Gadola

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