Court Opinion

ID: 9810817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:00:36.891122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:14.950680
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-1425
ANTHONY LEROY PATRICK,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
                                               Defendants-Appellees.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
          No. 1:14-cv-05414 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.
                     ____________________

     ARGUED MAY 18, 2023 — DECIDED AUGUST 31, 2023
                ____________________

   Before WOOD, LEE, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PRYOR, Circuit Judge. Anthony Patrick was arrested in June
2013 for various weapons-related charges and later charged
with numerous counts of attempted murder. After pleading
guilty to one count of aggravated discharge of a weapon and
receiving a sentence of time served, Patrick brought this civil
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that the City
of Chicago and twenty-three Chicago police oﬃcers violated
his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
2                                                               No. 22-1425

Amendments by conspiring to conduct an unlawful arrest, ex-
ecute a warrantless search of his home, and detain him un-
lawfully. Patrick also asserted various state law claims includ-
ing conspiracy, respondeat superior liability, and indemniﬁ-
cation. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. The district court granted the motion, dismissing all of
Patrick’s federal claims and ﬁnding the state law claims either
time-barred or blocked as derivative actions of Patrick’s un-
successful constitutional claims. Patrick appeals. 1 We aﬃrm
in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

                                       I

                                      A

    In reviewing the dismissal of Patrick’s complaints, we
must accept his allegations as true and view them in the light
most favorable to him. See Milchtein v. Milwaukee Cnty., 42
F.4th 814, 819 (7th Cir. 2022). On June 15, 2013, Patrick was
finishing up some work on a house near the home of an on-
and-off girlfriend, when gang affiliates of the girlfriend’s cur-
rent boyfriend—Armond Freeman—began shooting at him.
Patrick was able to escape in his truck and drive to his
mother’s house, where he lived. Also at the home at the time
were Patrick’s current girlfriend and his children.

    1 Patrick also brought Section 1983 claims for excessive force and vio-

lations of due process, various Monell claims, and state law claims for ma-
licious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He
does not pursue these claims on appeal, meaning any arguments relating
to them are waived. O'Neal v. City of Chicago, 588 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir.
2009); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
No. 22-1425                                                    3

    After realizing that he had left his truck unlocked with his
work equipment, Patrick went outside to secure it. Upon leav-
ing the residence, Patrick observed Freeman throw a brick
through the truck’s windshield. Immediately, Freeman and
another Gangster Disciple opened fire on Patrick. Patrick ran
back inside, grabbed a gun loaded with pellet bullets, and
fired two shots from the front door of his home. The bullets
struck Freeman in the buttocks and behind the ear. Freeman
and the other gang member stopped advancing toward the
house and ran away.
    Later that afternoon, Chicago police officers arrived at Pat-
rick’s home. Upon hearing banging on the front door, Patrick
looked outside and saw three Chicago police officers standing
on the front porch and other officers forming a perimeter
around the front of the house. Officers instructed Patrick to
open the door, explaining that they simply wanted to talk.
Patrick complied with the officers’ request, but, upon entering
the home, law enforcement immediately shoved Patrick to the
ground inside the entryway and handcuffed him. While pin-
ning Patrick to the ground, the defendants demanded that
Patrick tell them where the gun was or they were going to tear
Patrick’s mother’s home apart. At the time of the officers’ en-
try into the home, they had not obtained either a search war-
rant or an arrest warrant.
    Fearing for his and his family’s safety, and also feeling as
if he had no other choice but to do as the officers demanded,
Patrick informed the officers that there was a gun in a safe in
the basement of the home. In response, two officers pulled
Patrick, still handcuffed, off the ground, and told him to take
them to the safe. Once downstairs, the officers told the chil-
dren to go upstairs; the officers then shut the door to the
4                                                             No. 22-1425

basement, leaving them and a still-handcuffed Patrick inside
the basement alone. Patrick was instructed to open the safe.
After he did so, the officers seized ammunition and a number
of guns. Patrick was arrested, and his mother was instructed
by one of the officers to sign a written consent form so that
she could have the seized property returned to her. Patrick’s
mother complied.
    While awaiting a probable cause hearing, Patrick was
charged with various weapons-related charges. It is unclear
from the complaint when the probable cause hearing oc-
curred, but it appears from the state court docket that follow-
ing this hearing, Patrick was eventually charged with addi-
tional crimes, including attempted murder.2 Patrick was de-
tained for over five years awaiting trial. On the eve of trial,
Patrick was presented with a plea deal in which he could
plead guilty to one count of aggravated discharge of a
weapon and all other charges would be dismissed in ex-
change. Patrick would also receive a sentence of time served.
Wanting to ensure his freedom, Patrick accepted the deal.
                                     B
    Following his release, Patrick sued the City of Chicago and
the officers involved alleging both constitutional and state
law violations related to his arrest, the search of his home, and
his detention. Dismissing the Second Amended Complaint,
the district court found Patrick’s § 1983 unlawful search and
seizure claim collaterally estopped by the court’s previous
judgment in Patrick v. Cook County Department of Corrections,

    2 We take judicial notice of the state court records. Ewell v. Toney, 853

F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2017) (state court proceedings are a proper subject
of judicial notice).
No. 22-1425                                                                     5

et al., No. 13-cv-08352 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2014) (“CCDC Litiga-
tion”). The court also dismissed the remaining federal claims,
finding them to be either time-barred or barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Because none of Patrick’s con-
stitutional claims survived under § 1983, the district court also
dismissed Patrick’s Monell 3 claims against the City of Chicago
without prejudice. In exercising supplemental jurisdiction
over Patrick’s derivative state law claims of malicious prose-
cution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy,
respondeat superior liability, and indemnification, the district
court determined that these claims also must fail because the
underlying substantive causes of action were Heck-barred.
The court gave Patrick leave to file an amended complaint.

                                       C

    In the Third Amended Complaint, Patrick raised similar
claims to the Second Amended Complaint including § 1983
claims of warrantless search and seizure, unlawful pretrial
detention, conspiracy, supervisor liability, 4 and other federal

    3 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

The critical question under Monell is whether a municipal (or corporate)
policy or custom gave rise to the plaintiff’s harm, or if instead the harm
was the result of acts of the entity’s agents. Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 849
F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017). A municipality may be liable under § 1983 if
the plaintiff can prove that the alleged unconstitutional action is caused
by: (1) an express policy of the municipality, (2) “a widespread practice
that is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or prac-
tice,” or (3) a person with final policymaking authority. Bohanon v. City of
Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 675 (7th Cir. 2022); Glisson, 849 F.3d at 379.
    4 In this claim, found in Count Six of the Third Amended Complaint,

Patrick alleged that supervisors in the police department directly violated
6                                                             No. 22-1425

and state law claims. The district court again dismissed Pat-
rick’s complaint, finding him collaterally estopped from rais-
ing the § 1983 unlawful search and seizure claim and Heck-
barred from raising the § 1983 unlawful pretrial detention
claim and due process claim. Because Patrick’s federal deriv-
ative claims of conspiracy, failure to intervene, and supervi-
sor liability did not form independent causes of action, the
court also dismissed these claims. Patrick’s Monell claims
were not adequately pled, and thus were dismissed.
    Exercising jurisdiction over Patrick’s state law claims, the
district court found the malicious prosecution, conspiracy, re-
spondeat superior liability, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claims all Heck-barred. In addition, Heck not-
withstanding, the court also found these claims barred by the
statute of limitations. Without an underlying constitutional
violation, the court also dismissed Patrick’s derivative state
law claim of indemnification. Having disposed of all claims,
the district court entered final judgment in favor of the de-
fendants. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of
Patrick’s complaints. Proft v. Raoul, 944 F.3d 686, 690 (7th Cir.
2019).
                                     II

   Patrick raises three arguments challenging the dismissal
of his Second and Third Amended Complaints. First,

his constitutional rights by turning a blind eye to misconduct. It is distinct
from Patrick’s state law claim of respondeat superior liability, found in
Count Nine of the Third Amended Complaint, in which he alleged that
the City of Chicago was responsible for the torts of its agents. As we dis-
cuss in more detail next, the district court dismissed these claims for dif-
ferent reasons.
No. 22-1425                                                       7

regarding the Second Amended Complaint, Patrick contends
that the district court incorrectly determined that his unlaw-
ful search and seizure claim was collaterally estopped. Sec-
ond, Patrick argues that the district court erred in finding that
his unlawful pretrial detention claim in his Third Amended
Complaint, which included allegations of an untimely proba-
ble cause hearing and being detained for over five years un-
lawfully, was Heck-barred. Third, Patrick contends that be-
cause the district court prematurely dismissed his cognizable
§ 1983 claims, the district court also erred in dismissing his
derivative federal and state law claims of conspiracy, failure
to intervene, supervisor liability, and Illinois indemnification.
    In response, the defendants concede the district court
erred in dismissing Patrick’s search and seizure claim. Rely-
ing on Ramos v. City of Chicago, however, the defendants main-
tain that Patrick’s unlawful pretrial detention claim is fore-
closed by Patrick’s state court guilty plea and time-served
sentence. 716 F.3d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 2013) (concluding that
a plaintiff is unable to receive damages for time spent in cus-
tody on a valid sentence). Because the § 1983 unlawful pretrial
detention claim was properly dismissed, the defendants also
argue that the district court properly dismissed Patrick’s de-
rivative federal and state law claims.
                                 A
    We first turn to Patrick’s unlawful search and seizure
claim, which the district court dismissed on the basis that it
was collaterally estopped by the ruling in the CCDC Litiga-
tion. In that litigation, Patrick alleged that the State of Illinois
and the Cook County Department of Corrections were hold-
ing him under false pretenses on a charge of attempted mur-
der when he had acted in self-defense. Patrick v. Cook Cnty.
8                                                   No. 22-1425

Dep’t of Corr., No. 13-cv-08352 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2014). In
screening his complaint, the court read it as alleging false ar-
rest but reasoned that he had pleaded himself out of court by
acknowledging facts that would constitute probable cause.
Thus, the court dismissed Patrick’s complaint.
    In the present case, however, Patrick focuses on the offic-
ers’ warrantless search of his home and seizure of his prop-
erty, not the alleged false arrest. Thus, Patrick contends that
he is not collaterally estopped from pursuing his § 1983 un-
lawful search and seizure claim. We agree.
    Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as
issue preclusion, an issue cannot be litigated a second time
between the same parties when it has already “been deter-
mined by a valid and final judgment.” Riley v. Calloway, 882
F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436, 443 (1970)). Generally, four conditions must be met for
collateral estoppel to apply:

       (1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the
       same as that involved in the prior action, (2) the
       issue must have been actually litigated, (3) the
       determination of the issue must have been es-
       sential to the final judgment, and (4) the party
       against whom estoppel is invoked must be fully
       represented in the prior action.

Waagner v. United States, 971 F.3d 647, 657 (7th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1295 (7th Cir.
1987)). As collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense, the de-
fendant bears the burden of raising it in the district court and
No. 22-1425                                                    9

showing that its application is clear on the face of the com-
plaint. McDonald v. Adamson, 840 F.3d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 2016).
    As the parties acknowledge, the defendants cannot
demonstrate collateral estoppel because the CCDC Litigation
did not resolve whether the warrantless search of Patrick’s
home and seizure of his property were justified. The Fourth
Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment, protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Seizure of a person is distinct from seizure of property. See
Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552–54 (1980). And even where a
warrantless arrest may be proper, officers may not search and
seize property inside a home without consent or exigent cir-
cumstances. See United States v. Haldorson, 941 F.3d 284, 290,
294 (7th Cir. 2019) (concluding that officers may make a war-
rantless arrest consistent with the Fourth Amendment if there
is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed,
but “[w]arrantless searches and seizures within a home are
considered presumptively unreasonable and a violation of the
Fourth Amendment” absent “certain narrowly proscribed ex-
ceptions,” such as the exigent circumstances exception);
United States v. de Soto, 885 F.2d 354, 367–68 (7th Cir. 1989)
(same); United States v. Altman, 797 F.2d 514, 516 (7th Cir.
1986) (noting that the justification for a warrantless arrest is
distinct from whether a subsequent search of the home is per-
missible). None of those circumstances existed here.
   Thus, even if the court in the CCDC Litigation determined
there was probable cause for the alleged false arrest of Patrick,
there were no facts to support the warrantless search of
10                                                 No. 22-1425

Patrick’s home and the seizure of his property. The district
court erred by finding that Patrick’s unlawful search and sei-
zure claim was collaterally estopped. Accordingly, we con-
clude that Patrick’s § 1983 claims premised on the lack of a
search warrant were prematurely dismissed.
                               B
   Next, Patrick maintains that the district court erred in dis-
missing his § 1983 unlawful pretrial detention claim, which
involved allegations of an untimely probable cause hearing
and a conspiracy by law enforcement of misleading and mis-
directing the criminal prosecution to bolster charges against
Patrick. We are unable to reach the merits of this claim.
    As Patrick’s counsel stated during oral argument, the five
years Patrick spent in pretrial detention—the same time dur-
ing which he now contends that he was unlawfully de-
tained—was ultimately credited toward his sentence for ag-
gravated discharge of a weapon. “[A] section 1983 plaintiff
may not receive damages for time spent in custody, if that
time was credited to a valid and lawful sentence.” Ewell v.
Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Bridewell v.
Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2013); Ramos, 716 F.3d at
1020).
    In reviewing the state court criminal proceedings, we
agree with Patrick’s counsel that the five years Patrick spent
in custody following his arrest was credited to his valid and
lawful sentence of aggravated discharge of a weapon. Be-
cause this time was allotted to a lawful sentence, Patrick can-
not “seek damages related to [his] detention and therefore to
this extent has no injury that a favorable decision by a federal
court may redress.” Ewell, 853 F.3d at 917. And without a
No. 22-1425                                                          11

redressable injury, Patrick does not have Article III standing
to pursue this claim. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560–61 (1992) (noting that to establish standing a plaintiff
must demonstrate: an injury in fact, a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the conduct complained of, and that re-
dressability of the injury by a favorable decision is likely).
    Turning to his second allegation under the § 1983 unlaw-
ful detention claim, Patrick seems to be alleging that police
officers engaged in a conspiracy to hold him without probable
cause in order to give law enforcement time to build a
stronger case against him. In the Third Amended Complaint,
Patrick maintains that he was acting in self-defense when he
shot at Freeman. This evidence, including the overwhelming
evidence that Freeman instigated the shoot-out, was allegedly
ignored by the prosecution. According to Patrick, he dis-
charged his weapon to scare Freeman away.
    Under Illinois law, self-defense is an affirmative defense
to aggravated discharge of a firearm. 5 See, e.g., People v.
O’Neal, 66 N.E.3d 390, 408 (Ill. Ct. App. 2016) (citation omit-
ted). Because Patrick's self-defense allegations, if accepted as
true, would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction,
we must conclude that this claim is Heck-barred. Heck, 512
U.S. at 487 (holding that a court must dismiss a § 1983 suit if
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence). Accordingly, for
these reasons, Patrick’s § 1983 unlawful pretrial detention
claim cannot proceed.

    5 A person commits aggravated discharge of a firearm when he

“knowingly or intentionally discharges a firearm in the direction of an-
other person.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.2(a)(2).
12                                                   No. 22-1425

                                C
    Lastly, Patrick contends that because he has cognizable
§ 1983 claims, the dismissal of his six derivative claims, in-
cluding § 1983 conspiracy, § 1983 failure to intervene, § 1983
supervisor liability, and Illinois state law conspiracy, re-
spondeat superior liability, and indemnification, should be
reversed.
     Because the district court did not err in dismissing Pat-
rick’s § 1983 unlawful pretrial detention claim, we conclude
that any derivatives of that claim were properly dismissed.
On the other hand, the derivative claims relying on Patrick’s
§ 1983 warrantless search and seizure allegations—including
his § 1983 conspiracy and failure to intervene claims and the
Illinois indemnification state law claim—were prematurely
dismissed.
    The district court dismissed Patrick’s state law Illinois con-
spiracy and Illinois respondeat superior liability claims as
time-barred, and his remaining Monell claims were dismissed
for failure to state a claim. Patrick has not challenged these
rulings on appeal and, thus, has waived consideration of
them. O'Neal v. City of Chicago, 588 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2009)
(arguments not raised on appeal are waived).
    On remand, Patrick should be given leave to amend his
complaint regarding his § 1983 warrantless search and seizure
allegations and the derivative claims of conspiracy, failure to
intervene, and state law indemnification.
                               III
   For these reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part,
and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.