Court Opinion

ID: 9719015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:40:30.828324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.092657
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the judgment affirming the convictions for first and second-degree child molestation but I would vacate the conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon. I am not satisfied that the state presented evidence sufficient to survive a motion for a judgment of acquittal relative to whether the defendant possessed a firearm with a present ability to inflict harm. Indeed, I am of the opinion that the state presented no proof establishing this essential element of the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon. Accordingly, I would affirm in part and reverse in part.
General Laws 1956 § 11-5-2, entitled “Felony assault,” provides for a maximum penalty of twenty years imprisonment for anyone found in violation of its provisions. Prior to our holding in State v. Jackson, 752 A.2d 5 (R.I.2000), an essential element of the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon was an actual and present ability to inflict harm to the victim. In the case of a firearm, this means a weapon that is loaded and operable. The defendant’s actual ability to inflict harm is what distinguishes the crime of felony assault from that of misdemeanor assault. As the testimony in this case clearly demonstrates, there is no evidence that the defendant had a present ability to inflict harm to this victim, whatsoever. The victim’s direct examination testimony relative to the existence of a weapon consists of the following:
“Q At some point, did [the defendant] show a weapon to you?
“A At that point, I guess at that age, it appeared to be a gun.
“Q Okay. When you say you think it was a gun, would you tell me, if you can close your eyes, can you remember it, what it looked like?
“A I mean, it looked like a gun, I mean, looked like a gun.
“Q Okay. I guess it doesn’t — I guess there are lots of kinds of guns.
“A Yes, there is [sic].
“Q Okay. There’s rifles, there’s pistols.
“A It looked like a — not like a big rifle, you know, it looked like a handgun, something like that.
“Q A handgun?
“A Yeah, something like that.
“Q Okay. Do you know — do you know the difference between a revolver and an automatic?
“A At that point, no, I wouldn’t be able to tell you. I couldn’t tell you if it was — I know it was something that you handle, you know, what I mean? I mean, it’s not something I could tell you if it’s an automatic or revolver or anything like that, you know.
“Q But you do know the difference— now you know the difference?
“A Now I know the difference, but back then, I couldn’t.”
On cross-examination, he testified as follows:
“Q What did the gun look like?
* * *
“A I told you, it was small.
“Q What else?
“A I told you. It was — I know it was black.”
This testimony is markedly different from the facts in State v. Andrade, 657 A.2d 538, 539 (R.I.1995), wherein we upheld a felony assault conviction notwithstanding the inability of the state to produce a firearm. In Andrade, the weapon *890was specifically described as “a steel-gray firearm” that was “probably a 9-millimeter pistol because it did not have a revolver barrel.” Id. at 540. Moreover, Andrade not only aimed the firearm at both victims at close range, one victim was ordered to lie down on his bed while Andrade rifled through his possessions, and was informed that it was his lucky day and that Andrade would not shoot him but rather he would “shoot a hole in [his] mattress.” Id. This Court held, based upon the detailed description of the firearm and the nature of the threats made by the defendant, that a jury could reasonably have inferred that Andrade inflicted an assault with a dangerous weapon upon each victim. Again, we' emphasized the close proximity of the firearm to each victim and the oral threat made by the defendant that he was “going to shoot a hole in your mattress.” Id. at 543.
In State v. Jeremiah, 546 A.2d 183 (R.I. 1988), this Court declared the law of assault with a dangerous weapon as:
“[A]ny unlawful offer to do corporal injury to another under such circumstances as may create a reasonable apprehension of immediate injury unless the person so threatened takes action or inaction to avoid it, coupled with a present ability to carry the offer into effect.” Id. at 186-87.
I am not satisfied that the testimony in this case, consisting of “I guess it appeared to be a gun,” “it looked like a gun,” “it looked like a handgun, something like that” and “it’s not something I could tell you if it’s an automatic or revolver or anything like that,” (emphasis added), is sufficient to survive a motion for a judgment of acquittal. This evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, fails to establish that defendant was in possession of a loaded weapon with a present ability to inflict death or serious bodily injury upon anyone. Consequently, I dissent.