Court Opinion

ID: 9645680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:32:36.881457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:46.319856
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The ultimate question is whether in the factual premises of this cause the court of appeals erred in concluding that appellant did not suffer double jeopardy. See Ortiz v. State, 885 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994). Like that court, the plurality and the concurring and dissenting judges of this Court conjure up all sorts of notions and theories to explain why appellant was or was not subjected to loss of that constitutional protection. Because in my view those analy-ses are not just flawed but rife with propositions boding ill for existing easelaw, I write to suggest a more conventional answer to the question before us.

I.

To begin, I agree with Judge Meyers, and for essentially the reasons he gives, that when the trial court “accepted” appellant’s plea in this cause,1 he did not indicate an intention to follow the guilty plea agreement between the parties. Meyers, J., concurring (op. at 110-111). Thus I cannot agree with Judge Baird that this ease is controlled by Perkins v. Third Court of Appeals, 738 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Baird, J., dissenting (op. at 114). In Perkins the trial court had already manifested its intent to follow the plea agreement, then reneged. But I also disagree with the plurality’s conclusion that jeopardy does not attach in a plea-bargained guilty plea until the instant the trial court ratifies the plea agreement. Plurality op. at 106. There is good authority to the contrary.
In Thornton v. State, 601 S.W.2d 340, at 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Opinion on motions for rehearing), we observed that “while it is true that an accused is not entitled to have his [guilty] plea accepted, ... once he tenders it and the State proceeds to prosecute on that basis, clearly jeopardy has attached.” Although Thornton has been disavowed in other respects,2 we have never questioned this observation. Thus, it does not matter, for jeopardy purposes, when the trial court “accepted” the plea bargain agreement. Immediately after the trial court first announced it would “accept” appellant’s tendered plea in this cause, the State began to present evidence in support of the judgment, pursuant to Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P. See n. 1, *108ante. From that point on appellant was in jeopardy of conviction, for it was the trial court’s prerogative to follow the plea bargain agreement, and, should it find the evidence sufficient to support a judgment under Article 1.15, convict him. Had the trial court followed the plea bargain agreement in this cause, nothing appellant could have done would have prevented entry of a judgment on his plea.3 The plurality errs to hold that jeopardy does not attach in a bargained-for guilty plea until the trial court decides it will in fact abide by the terms of the plea agreement.4

II.

Of course, in any case in which a criminal prosecution does not proceed to final judgment, the question when jeopardy attaches is just the beginning of the double jeopardy analysis. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, at 467, 93 S.Ct. 1066, at 1072, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, at 433 (1973). Three questions remain: First, did appellant’s guilty plea proceeding in fact terminate prior to culmination in a judgment? Second, if so, did he consent, or at least not object to, the premature termination of his guilty plea proceeding? Finally, if he did not consent, can it nevertheless be said that his “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal” is, given the peculiar procedural posture of this case, “subordinate[ ] to the public’s interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments”? Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974, 978 (1949).
A
The first question is whether appellant’s withdrawal of his guilty plea when the trial court announced it would not follow the plea agreement amounted to a termination of the proceeding without final resolution of the charges against him. If it did not, and the subsequent entry of his plea of nolo conten-dere, with evidence introduced in support thereof, was just a continuation of the original plea proceeding, then obviously there is no double jeopardy problem. Cf. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (double jeopardy’s “successive prosecution” prohibition does not prevent state from prosecuting greater inclusive offense, even though defendant pled guilty to and was sentenced on lesser included offense, just as long as guilty plea to lesser included offense and continued prosecution for greater inclusive offense occurred within same continuous proceeding). I am inclined to view the withdrawal of a guilty plea as a termination of the proceeding without final disposition of the charges.
When appellant tendered his plea and the State began to put on its evidence, jeopardy attached. Nevertheless, the trial court was not yet required to say whether it would follow the plea agreement, having deferred “findings” on the plea to a later date. Article 26.13(a)(2). Thus, it is difficult to say exactly what jeopardy attached to. Judge Meyers apparently believes jeopardy at-*109taehed to the greater inclusive offense of aggravated robbery, since that is what was alleged in the indictment, and Article 26.11, V.A.C.C.P., “plainly contemplates” that an accused plead guilty to the indictment. Meyers, J., concurring (op. at 111). Just as plainly, however, the parties and the trial court were operating on the assumption appellant was pleading guilty only to the lesser included offense of robbery.5 But whatever jeopardy attached to, it terminated seros judgment with the withdrawal of the plea. For without a plea from the defendant, a criminal prosecution cannot proceed to judgment.6 Cf. Peltier v. State, 626 S.W.2d 30 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (conviction following jury trial reversed because defendant never pled to the indictment, and hence did not join issue before the jury). Appellant could not be convicted without a new plea and further presentation of evidence in support thereof. Thus I proceed to the second question, whether appellant consented to the premature termination of jeopardy.

B.

An accused cannot claim the protection of double jeopardy when the premature termination of the proceeding against him is brought about at his own request or with his apparent acquiescence. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976). It is true that, having announced it would not follow the plea agreement, the trial court in this cause essentially instructed counsel for appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.7 But just because the trial court instructed appellant to withdraw his plea does not necessarily mean appellant did not willingly assent. Far from objecting to the instruction, after a recess to consult with his client, counsel for appellant acceded readily enough, announcing to the trial court that “I would like to make a motion to withdraw my pleas as well.” This is understandable, since, absent a plea agreement whereby his exposure was limited to punishment for the lesser included offense of robbery, appellant had no particular incentive to plead guilty. There was a time when appellant would not even have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea under these circumstances. See n. 4, ante. It does not appear that appellant was effectively coerced into withdrawing it.8 Thus, the premature termination of jeopardy without a final resolution of the charges against him does not seem to have occurred against his will. The record supports the court of appeals’ alternative holding to the effect that appellant “consented to his ‘new trial.’ ” Ortiz v. State, supra, at 274. In the premises, he cannot now invoke the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.

C.

Because the record supports the court of appeals’ alternative holding in this cause, *110that appellant effectively consented to a second plea proceeding, I need not address the third question, viz: whether appellant’s right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must be, on the facts presented, subordinated to the public’s interest in obtaining a just and fair trial.
On these bases I concur in the judgment of the Court. I do not, however, join the Court’s opinion.
MALONEY and MANSFIELD, JJ., join.

. At the plea proceeding on July 28, 1989, the trial court admonished appellant and his code-fendants collectively as to range of punishment, and ascertained from each that his plea was freely and voluntarily made. Next the trial court instructed the group that they could only appeal with permission of the court. With this, the trial court announced:
"THE COURT: That being the case, the Court will accept your pleas of guilty at this time. Any evidence from the State?”
After the State tendered documentary evidence, including waivers of rights to jury trial, confrontation and the privilege against self-incrimination, the trial court proceeded to inquire whether it was the intention of the group to relinquish these rights. The trial court then ascertained the each codefendant was a Mexican resident, and admonished the group they could be deported as a consequence of their guilty plea. When each codefendant acknowledged he would persist in his plea, the trial court wrapped up the hearing:
“THE COURT: The Court is hereby going to accept it. Now, I'm not going to be making any decisions today. I'm going to be deferring findings and ordering a pre-sentence investigation report and schedule this matter for further hearing for August the 25th at 9:00 o’clock.”

. Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Bender v. State, 758 S.W.2d 278, 281, n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).

. Indeed, according to this Court's opinion in Perkins v. Third Court of Appeals, 738 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), once the trial court has determined it will follow a plea bargain agreement, entry of a judgment on a guilty plea (assuming it is supported by the State's evidence proffered in satisfaction of Article 1.15) is purely a ministerial act.

. Apparently the trial judge may delay his decision whether to follow a plea agreement right up until the moment he makes a "finding on the plea.” Article 26.13(a)(2), V.A.C.C.P. Because he cannot make a "finding on the plea" until after the plea has been tendered and evidence produced in satisfaction of Article 1.15, he may delay his decision whether to follow the plea agreement until well after the point at which we have said jeopardy "clearly ... has attached.” Thornton, supra.
Prior to amendment of Article 26.13(a)(2) in 1977, an accused who tendered a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement could be convicted on that plea whether or not the trial court decided to follow the plea bargain. He had no right to withdraw his guilty plea simply because the trial court refused to follow the plea agreement. See Shannon v. State, 708 S.W.2d 850, at 853-54, n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Clinton, J., dissenting). Such an accused was clearly placed in jeopardy the moment he tendered his plea and the State began to produce its evidence. That since the 1977 amendment an accused can withdraw his plea if the trial court refuses to follow the plea agreement does not alter the fact that, once his plea is tendered, if the trial court does follow the agreement, and the State’s evidence supports a judgment of conviction on the plea, he will surely be convicted. He is no less in "jeopardy" than before.

. At the plea proceeding on July 28, 1989, addressing appellant and his codefendants, the trial court had stated:
“THE COURT: ... Now, it is my understanding from the State that we’re going on the lesser included of robbery.
⅜ ⅜ ⅛ * ⅜ ¾:
“THE COURT: All right, Mr. Cortez, Mr. Alvarez and Mr. Ortiz, all lawyers have indicated to the Court that you each understand the charges which you are going to be pleaing to, which is the robbery and not the aggravated robbery, that you all intend to plea guilty to this.”
(Emphasis supplied.) The trial court then proceeded to admonish the group on range of punishment for the offense of robbery, not aggravated robbery.

. Of course, if the defendant refuses to plead, the trial court must enter a plea of not guilty for him. Article 26.12, V.A.C.C.P.

. After informing counsel he would not follow the plea agreement and render a judgment of conviction for the lesser included offense of robbery, the trial court said in open court:
“So I am hereby going to instruct the respective attorneys to withdraw the pleas of guilty in behalf of your clients and set this matter for trial. And if you don't, I will enter it in your behalf."

. In announcing he would not follow the plea agreement, the trial court stated:
"In reviewing all the facts, the pre-sentence investigation reports that were given to me on each respective defendant, I quite frankly, at this time am going to announce to all of you that I cannot in good conscience accept the recommendations that have been made.”
Appellant does not assail propriety of the trial court considering the PSI in its decision whether to follow the plea agreement. I therefore do not factor it into my analysis today.