Court Opinion

ID: 9457990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:40:10.946954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:35.780697
License: Public Domain

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
It is one of the most uniquely difficult tasks for an appellate court to approach with calm judicial detachment the need to reverse on a “technicality” a conviction, and possibly end the prosecution, of a person now shown, by the record before the court, to be guilty of a serious crime. I use the term “technicality,” of course, in its much too simplistic meaning — that is, to comprehend errors of procedure as distinguished from errors of substance. It is no easier for the court, even though the procedural errors complained of relate to rights that are guaranteed by the literal command of the United States Constitution.1
It becomes somewhat less difficult for the court as we realize that it is almost always a convicted criminal whose case can present an important constitutional question — a question of the kind which has been one of the very main concerns of the Supreme Court of the United States over the years, for, it is apparent that unless there has been a conviction in a case in which the accused has been unsuccessful in urging the constitutional deprivation of his rights, there could be no vehicle before the Supreme Court which could present the question for decision.
Thus it is that, while frequently not understood by the public generally, the “technicalities” of the Fourth Amendment are for the protection of the guilty as much as for the innocent. I feel it appropriate to make these comments because of the fact, as indicated by the majority opinion, that when the trial court overruled Wysocki’s motion to suppress, counsel for Wysocki, although expressly reserving his right to appeal from that ruling, stipulated to the truth of the allegations in one count of the indictment.
Thus, although I am no happier than are my colleagues over the prospect of frustrating the proceedings of the trial court, I must, with all respect and deference to their views, dissent.
There is no disagreement between us as to the issues: (1) Was there probable cause for Wysocki’s arrest; and, if so, (2) Was the search that turned up the money orders a legal search. Of course, both the arrest and search were without a warrant.
With respect to the first issue I do not agree that the cumulation of cireum-*1163stances here amounts to probable cause. It appears to me that appellant Wy-socki’s arrest was predicated largely on the fortuitous circumstance that he was lodged with Lou Allen in the same motel room — in other words, guilt by association. The majority rationalizes its result by noting that persons engaged in the business of disposing of robber’s loot are “known to be rather agile and stealthy. They are usually not novices, and they change locations quickly,” and that the FBI agents were impelled to take swift action in arresting Wysocki lest he flee in the night. Aside from the fact that these are pure speculations by this court, not supported by anything in the record, this consideration is relevant only as to the issue whether the FBI agents had sufficient time to procure an arrest warrant and has no bearing whatsoever on the issues before us, i. e., whether there was probable cause to arrest Wysocki in the first place.
Significantly there was no effort to show why at approximately 4:30 o’clock on an April afternoon (there thus being some two to three hours remaining of daylight), the man seen in Allen’s room who had readily given his correct name could not have been kept under surveillance long enough to permit one of the agents to seek a warrant for his arrest. It seems clear to me that the reason they did not do so was that they fully realized they did not have sufficient evidence upon which a magistrate could issue such a warrant.
Prior to encountering appellant in Lou Allen’s motel room, agent McNamara knew only that appellant had previously been convicted of armed bank robbery, that he was “made out” as “principal” in the Detroit robbery, and that his brother Barney Wysocki had been arrested in Las Vegas in possession of nearly half the stolen money orders. Of these facts the last is plainly irrelevant to the question whether there was probable cause to arrest Chester Wysocki. The maxim “blood is thicker than water” cannot be translated into a constitutional doctrine that the crimes of one man, in vacuo, can be imputed to his siblings. Barney Wy-socki’s involvement in the Detroit robbery would be relevant to the inquiry here only if a connection, other than familial, had been established directly linking appellant to his brother and to the bank robbery in Detroit. Since the government adduced no evidence of such an extra-familial connection, the arrest of Barney Wysocki in Las Vegas has no more significance to the questions presented by this case than if the man arrested in Las Vegas had been named Barney Google.
Further, if agents Flynn and McNamara, armed with the information supplied by the Detroit FBI office, had encountered appellant on the streets rather than in Lou Allen’s motel room, they most certainly would have lacked probable cause to arrest him. The circumstance that appellant had previously been convicted of armed bank robbery clearly does not amount to probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). And, since a warrant for appellant’s arrest had not been sworn out in Detroit, the fact that appellant was “made out” as “principal” in the robbery must mean only that he was, in the opinion of the Detroit FBI office, the prime suspect. Mere suspicion, of course, does not measure up to the requirements of probable cause. Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959). The fact that the agents’ superiors in Detroit had “made” Wysocki “out” as “principal” in the robbery was no more significant than for the chief of police of a city to tell his patrolman to pick up a suspect because “I think he is the man we want.” This adds not a feather’s weight to the sum of circumstances upon which the court bases its finding of probable cause.
There remains to consider, then, the legal significance of appellant’s presence in Lou Allen’s motel room. Unquestionably there was probable cause to arrest Allen, but up until then, insufficient cause to arrest appellant. Thus, the pivotal issue here is whether probable *1164cause can be “caught” from those with whom one associates. The Supreme Court has held otherwise. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1967); United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948). Doubtless there was good reason to suspect appellant, but that is not enough. Appellant was simply one suspect found in the room of another suspect whom there was probable cause to arrest. On this record there is not one fact which pointed plainly, unequivocally, and directly to appellant, prior to his arrest, as a participant in the bank robbery.
Moving next to the question raised by the search of the Sears-Roebuck “gun box” that was half enclosed in a Sears-Roebuck bag out of reach of Wysocki — • an ordinary box that, by the testimony of the agents, could have contained anything small enough to fit in it, and which did not contain a gun or any special fitting for a gun, I think the decision of the majority cannot conceivably be squared with Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1968). In that case the Supreme Court said:
“(I)t is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
“There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs — or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself. Such searches . . may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.” (Emphasis supplied) at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040.
The facts in the case before us indicate that the box in the closet was not within the immediate control of appellant. By holding to the contrary the majority, in my view, erodes the prophylactic purpose of the Chimel rule.
I note that following his arrest appellant was told to sit in a chair placed in the middle of the room. Agents Flynn and McNamara then made a thorough preliminary search of the area immediately surrounding appellant, but not including the closet. Indeed on cross-examination agent Flynn admitted that had appellant been fully dressed when he was arrested there would “probably not” have been any reason for the officers to enter the closet. Moreover, the agents neither drew their guns nor attempted to shackle appellant or render him immobile. Plainly the agents themselves must have believed that appellant was not in a position to grab a weapon or seize destructible evidence. As a precautionary measure one agent positioned himself behind appellant, who was sitting, and the other in front of him. When agent McNamara went to the closet to get appellant’s clothes, agent Flynn continued to stand behind appellant in order to restrain him, if necessary. Moreover, at the closet door agent McNamara must have been an effective guard against the possibility that appellant might attempt to leave his chair, jump to the closet, take the box out of the Sears-Roebuck bag, open the box and then seize a weapon from within the box in the closet. It seems to me little short of fantastic to think that if he really were concerned about a gun in the closet, in such a situation the agent would not have taken the simplest step to prevent any such untoward event by merely slamming the door shut. I am unshakably of the opinion that the box was outside that limited *1165area which Chimel permits to be searched pursuant to an arrest.2
The majority notes that the search might have been validated under the “plain view” rule. I would point out, however, that whereas the box was in plain view, after the agents went to the closet, its contents were not. A closed and innocuous appearing box is not unlike a closed dresser drawer, the war-rantless search of which Chimel plainly forecloses unless it is within the immediate reach of the arrestee. Moreover, it is unavailing to assert that the agent’s expert testimony could be used to establish the contents of the box, for since the box was beyond the immediate control of the appellant, the agents were without authority to open it, just as they would be without authority to open closets and drawers which are beyond the immediate control of any arrestee.
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse appellant’s conviction.

. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution says : “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

. If it were not for the fact that my brethren sincerely believe that somehow the characterization of the box in the Sears paper bag as a “gun box” by the agent made it in effect a gun lying in plain view (laying aside for the moment that it was not within the area to pose a threat as limited by Chimel), I must say that I would think this characterization too flimsy to have our serious attention. The box was not introduced in evidence but it is patently clear from the record that it was an ordinary box, having neither any special shape nor configuration ; cf. United States of America v. Drew, 5 Cir., 1971, 451 F.2d 230. Moreover the identification of the box as a gun box was not made by the kind of expert testimony from which a witness is sometimes permitted to use his experience in detecting equipment used for a still or the identity of counterfeit money or the like. He merely stated that he “believed it to be,” or that he “thought it to be” a gun box. Strangely enough he arrived at this conclusion only by saying that this ordinary box could be fitted with a liner in which a gun could be set. The quotation in the majority opinion does not include the following:
“Q. You could not see into the box, is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you could not see through that bag?
A. I could see the end of the box.
Q. You could see into the box?
A. The end of the box.
Q. You could see the end of the box, I see, that is e-n-d ?
A. Yes, right.
Q. And you went over and took that, is that correct?
A. Yes, I thought it was a gun box.
Q. You thought it was a gun box?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that box have the configuration of a gun?
A. No, but you can put a cardboard inner in it and set a gun in there very easy.
Q. You could put gum bands in there, couldn’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. Toothpaste, shaving cream?
A. Yes.
Q. A swimsuit?
A. Right.
Q. Anything at all, right?
A. Correct.
Q. But you thought it was a gun box?
A. Right, I thought it was a gun box.
Q. And you thought it was a gun box because you wanted to justify the search, didn’t you?
A. I did not do a search.
Q. Well you did seize, did you not?
A. I seized that because I saw it.”