Court Opinion

ID: 9916773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 17:08:31.59305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:58.996145
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard D. Navarro,                             :
                              Petitioner        :
                                                :
               v.                               :
                                                :
Pennsylvania State Police,                      :   No. 1510 C.D. 2022
                          Respondent            :   Submitted: December 4, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                                           FILED: January 10, 2024

               Richard D. Navarro (Petitioner) petitions pro se for review of the
October 3, 2022 adjudication and order (Adjudication) of an administrative law
judge of the Office of the Attorney General (ALJ)1 that denied his application for
return of a firearm (Application) based on a disqualifying criminal conviction. Upon
review, we affirm.
               This Court briefly outlined the underlying facts and procedural posture
of this matter in a previous memorandum opinion as follows:

       1
         We observe that the ALJ who filed the Adjudication at issue in the instant appeal differs
from the ALJ who filed the ALJ decision at issue in our previous memorandum opinion in this
matter. See Adjudication; Findings and Reasons for Denial of Requested Relief dated Jan. 25,
2018; see also Navarro v. Pa. State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1433 C.D. 2017, filed May 17, 2018),
aff’d, 212 A.3d 26 (Pa. 2019). However, because the fact that different ALJs presided over the
various stages of the proceedings has no bearing on this Court’s resolution of the matter herein,
we make no distinction between the two ALJs in this memorandum opinion.
                    On November 20, 2013, Petitioner pleaded guilty to
             two counts of forgery,[1] both graded as misdemeanors of
             the first degree.[2] The trial court sentenced Petitioner the
             same day to 24 months’ probation.
                 [1]
                       18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4101(a)(1) & (3).
                 [2]
                       18 Pa.C.S. § 4101(c).

                    On October 3, 2016, Petitioner submitted the
             Application, which was denied after a Pennsylvania
             Instant Check System (PICS) report indicated Petitioner
             had disqualifying criminal convictions. Petitioner timely
             challenged the denial. By letter dated December 23, 2016,
             [] Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) informed Petitioner
             that it had confirmed the denial of the Application
             pursuant to Section 922(g) of the Federal Gun Control Act
             (GCA)[3] based on his disqualifying 2013 first-degree
             misdemeanor forgery convictions.
                 [3]
                       18 U.S.C. §§ 921-931.

                   Petitioner timely appealed the PSP determination,
             and a hearing took place before an ALJ on July 7, 2017.
             On August 15, 2017, the ALJ denied the Application. On
             September 12, 2017, Petitioner appealed to this Court.

Navarro v. Pa. State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1433 C.D. 2017, filed May 17, 2018)
(Navarro I), slip op. at 1-2 (some footnotes omitted), aff’d, 212 A.3d 26 (Pa. 2019)
(Navarro II). However, because the ALJ made no findings regarding the interstate
or foreign commerce status of the firearm that Petitioner requested be returned, this
Court determined that it lacked necessary information to properly determine whether

                                               2
the firearm should not be returned pursuant to Section 922(g).2 See Navarro I, slip
op. at 5. Accordingly, the Court vacated the ALJ’s decision and remanded the matter
for further findings. See id.
               PSP appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which granted the
appeal and concluded as follows:

               [T]he Commonwealth Court did not err in determining the
               ALJ must make findings regarding the interstate or foreign
               commerce status of a firearm before affirming PSP’s
               decision to deny transfer to [Petitioner]. PSP clearly
               presented “accurate” record information to the extent it
               included a conviction for a crime punishable by up to five
               years’ imprisonment. However, the information was
               incomplete to the extent it failed to show the firearm in
               question moved in interstate or foreign commerce, a
               required element of the prohibition under federal law on
               which PSP relied. As the Commonwealth Court here
               properly found, the federal prohibition of Section 922(g)
               simply cannot apply absent some proof the firearm at issue
               moved in interstate or foreign commerce. We agree with
               the panel’s conclusion the evidence relating to such
               commerce need not be extensive and may be satisfied by
               showing the gun was manufactured outside Pennsylvania
               (or that the gun otherwise crossed state lines).

Navarro II, 212 A.3d at 54.

       2
          In the Adjudication, the ALJ states that in Navarro I, this Court found the ALJ had
correctly determined that Petitioner’s guilty pleas to forgery constituted disqualifying convictions
under the GCA. See Adjudication at 2-3. We observe that the Court did not so find in Navarro I,
but instead simply explained that such a finding, together with evidence that the firearm sought to
be purchased, possessed, or received, moved in interstate commerce, is necessary to trigger Section
922(g) of the GCA. See Navarro I, slip op. at 2-5. However, because the ALJ on remand made
the required findings of fact discussed in Navarro I, we will address the question of disqualifying
convictions now in this memorandum opinion.

                                                 3
               Following our Supreme Court’s decision in Navarro II, the ALJ
conducted an evidentiary hearing in compliance with this Court’s remand order. The
ALJ then issued the Adjudication, finding as a fact that Petitioner had pleaded guilty
to two counts of forgery graded as misdemeanors of the first degree, which offenses
were punishable by imprisonment of up to five years. See Adjudication at 5-6.
Further, based on PSP’s exhibits entered into evidence at the hearing,3 the ALJ also
found that “[t]he firearm that [Petitioner] sought to have returned to him was
manufactured by Bushmaster Firearms International in Windham, Maine[,]” and
that, “[i]n order to be in Pennsylvania, the firearm had to cross state lines and move
in interstate commerce given that it was manufactured in Maine.”                        Id. at 6.
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that PSP satisfied its burden to prove that Petitioner
is prohibited by law from receiving or possessing a firearm, that the firearm in
question moved in interstate commerce, and that PSP properly denied the
Application. See Adjudication at 8. Petitioner timely appealed the Adjudication to
this Court.4
               In the instant appeal, Petitioner alleges that Section 922(g) of the GCA
violates the United States Constitution’s Commerce Clause5 and is therefore

       3
        Petitioner stipulated at the hearing that PSP’s exhibits depicted his gun and that the gun
was stamped with an indication that it was manufactured by Bushmaster Firearms International,
Windham, Maine. See Notes of Testimony, August 30, 2021, at 7.

       4
          “On appellate review, we will affirm the decision of an administrative agency unless
constitutional rights were violated, an error of law was committed, the procedure before the agency
was contrary to statute, or any finding of fact made by the agency and necessary to support its
adjudication is unsupported by substantial evidence.” Pa. State Police v. Slaughter, 138 A.3d 65,
70 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016); see also 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.
       5
         See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (allowing Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).

                                                4
unconstitutional on its face. See Petitioner Br. at 6-10. Accordingly, Petitioner
argues that the ALJ erred in upholding the PSP’s determination that he is precluded
from possessing a firearm. We disagree.
                The Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 19956 requires PSP to
determine whether potential transferees of firearms are prohibited from receipt or
possession of a firearm under state or federal law.7 The GCA states in pertinent part:

                (g) It shall be unlawful for any person --

                     (1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime
                     punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
                     one year;[8]
       6
           18 Pa. C.S. §§ 6101-6187.

       7
           The Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

                (a) Administration.--The Pennsylvania State Police shall have the
                responsibility to administer the provisions of this chapter.

                (b) Duty of Pennsylvania State Police.--

                (1) Upon receipt of a request for a criminal history, juvenile
                delinquency history and mental health record check of the potential
                purchaser or transferee, the Pennsylvania State Police shall
                immediately during the licensee’s call or by return call forthwith:

                        (i) review the Pennsylvania State Police criminal
                        history and fingerprint records to determine if the
                        potential purchaser or transferee is prohibited from
                        receipt or possession of a firearm under Federal or
                        State law[.]

18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1.

       8
          The GCA expressly excludes “any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a
misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less” from the term “crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). We note
that this exclusion is inapplicable to this case, however, as Petitioner was convicted of forgery

                                                 5
               ....

               to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
               possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
               ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
               which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
               foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
               Petitioner’s facial challenge9 to the constitutionality of the GCA merits
no relief. Petitioner alleges that the GCA violates the Commerce Clause of the
Unites States Constitution.10 See Petitioner Br. at 9-15. We do not agree.

graded as a first-degree misdemeanor, which is punishable by up to five years of imprisonment.
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 1104, 4101(c).

       9
         Two kinds of constitutional statutory challenges exist: challenges that attack a statute on
its face and those that attack a statute as it is applied in a particular case. Lehman v. Pa.
State Police, 839 A.2d 265, 275 (Pa. 2003).

               A facial attack tests a law’s constitutionality based on its text alone
               and does not consider the facts or circumstances of a particular
               case. An as-applied attack, in contrast, does not contend that a law
               is unconstitutional as written but that its application to a particular
               person under particular circumstances deprived that person of a
               constitutional right. . . .

Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 493 (Pa. Super. 2011). For the purpose of issue
preservation, as-applied constitutional challenges must be raised before the ALJ. Lehman, 839
A.2d at 276. We observe that Petitioner claimed that he had raised such a challenge and PSP
argued against the same in the previous appeal of this matter. However, Petitioner neither raised
nor briefed an as-applied constitutional challenge in the instant appeal.

       10
          We observe that, prior to remand, Petitioner challenged Section 922(g)(1) of the GCA
based on alleged violations of the Second and Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
in addition to his claim based on the Commerce Clause. However, Petitioner did not raise or argue
these claims anew in his brief in the instant appeal following remand, and those arguments are
therefore now waived. See Boniella v. Commonwealth, 958 A.2d 1069, 1072 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth.

                                                 6
                 Initially, Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of GCA Section
922(g) as a perversion of the intent of the United States Constitution’s Commerce
Clause. Petitioner cites to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), to support his argument that Section 922(g)
violates the Commerce Clause. In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down Section
922(q) of the GCA, which prohibited firearms possession within 1,000 feet of school
grounds, as beyond the Commerce Clause because “[t]he [GCA] neither regulate[ed]
a commercial activity nor contain[ed] a requirement that the possession be connected
in any way to interstate commerce.” 514 U.S. at 551. However, unlike the GCA
section examined in Lopez, Section 922(g) of the GCA includes a commerce-related
jurisdictional element.11         Therefore, multiple federal courts have rejected the
argument that Section 922(g) violates the Commerce Clause. See United States v.
Gateward, 85 F.3d 670, 672 (3d Cir. 1996) (listing cases); see also United States v.

2008) (noting that a court will not consider arguments that are not properly raised and developed
in a brief).

       11
            Specifically, Section 922(g) provides:

                 (g) It shall be unlawful for any person--

                 (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
                 imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

                 ....

                 to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in
                 or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any
                 firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
                 interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added).

                                                     7
Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1996). Petitioner is incorrect in his argument that
Section 922(g) of the GCA violates the Commerce Clause.12
               Our determination that the GCA is constitutional renders this matter
relatively simple. The GCA precludes individuals convicted of crimes punishable
by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year from possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). The Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 requires adherence to
the GCA. Petitioner was convicted of two counts of forgery graded as first-degree
misdemeanors, each of which carries a maximum punishment of five years’
incarceration. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 1104, 4101(c). Accordingly, federal law prohibits
Petitioner from possessing a firearm, and PSP properly determined such. Further,
the evidence presented at the hearing following remand established that the firearm
in question moved in interstate commerce. Thus, the ALJ explained:

               [] PSP has presented compelling and undisputed evidence
               that in 2013, [Petitioner] entered guilty pleas to two counts
               of forgery graded as misdemeanors of the first[ ] degree in
               the Cumberland County trial court for which he received
               probation. Because the first-degree misdemeanors were
               (and are) punishable by a maximum term of incarceration
               of five years, he is prohibited from possessing or receiving
               any firearm that has been shipped or transported in
               interstate or foreign commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
               [] PSP has also presented compelling and undisputed
               evidence that the firearm which [Petitioner] sought to have
               returned to him and to possess was manufactured in the

       12
           We acknowledge that Petitioner’s brief quotes sections of the Federalist Papers,
specifically Federalist Paper 42, to support the argument that Section 922(g) of the GCA is
unconstitutional. See Petitioner Br. at 8-9. We acknowledge the historical value of the Federalist
Papers, that venerable collection of essays drafted by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay to convince the various states to accept the newly drafted federal Constitution. We
decline, however, to adopt Petitioner’s argument that Section 922(g) violates the Commerce
Clause, which argument has been rejected by multiple Federal courts as discussed supra, based on
Petitioner’s personal interpretation of the meaning of Federalist Paper 42.
                                                8
             state of Maine and moved in interstate commerce. In light
             of this, I find that Section 922(g)(1) applies to prohibit
             [Petitioner] from receiving or possessing a firearm.

Adjudication at 7-8.
             We find no error of law or violation of Petitioner’s constitutional or
procedural rights in the ALJ’s decision. The case is as straightforward as it appears:
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that (1) Petitioner is subject to the
prohibitions of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 and GCA Section
922(g)(1) by virtue of having been convicted of crimes punishable by up to five
years’ imprisonment, and (2) the firearm in question moved in interstate commerce.
Accordingly, the ALJ properly affirmed PSP’s determination.
             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Adjudication.

                                       ___________________________________
                                       CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                          9
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard D. Navarro,                      :
                         Petitioner      :
                                         :
            v.                           :
                                         :
Pennsylvania State Police,               :   No. 1510 C.D. 2022
                          Respondent     :

                                      ORDER

            AND NOW, this 10th day of January, 2024, the October 3, 2022
adjudication and order of the administrative law judge of the Office of the Attorney
General is AFFIRMED.

                                       ___________________________________
                                       CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge