Court Opinion

ID: 9583378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:38:04.858028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:59.352945
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. The case of Chastain Finance Co. v. Sherwood, 117 Ga. App. 556 (161 SE2d 401), authored by the writer for the court, followed Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ingalls Iron Works, 109 Ga. App. 574 (136 SE2d 505), also a summary judgment case. At the time of the decision in Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ingalls Iron Works, supra (April 15, 1964), this State had already adopted the summary judgment procedure patterned after *28the federal rules, the very same rules which were held in Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 342 (2a) (173 SE2d 723) to authorize the submission of evidence of an accord and satisfaction without previous pleadings, contrary to the above two cases. There is nothing in the summary judgment rules in existence on April 15, 1964, and those now in existence which would authorize a different interpretation. It seems that in Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra, we discovered some federal cases interpreting federal court rules differently from what we had interpreted similar rules adopted by statute in this State. When Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ingalls Iron Works, supra, was decided all defenses "in satisfaction or avoidance must be specially pleaded.” Code §81-307. In the Georgia Civil Practice Act (Ga. L. 1966, p. 609 et seq.), by which we adopted some additional rules with substantially the same language as the federal rules in great part, it was provided (Section 8 (c); Code Ann. § 81A-108 (c)): "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction.” There is nothing in the language of Paragraph 8 (c) which changes the law of Code § 81-307 insofar as pleading accord and satisfaction is concerned. Where then is the difference in the law that now calls for a different interpretation? The authority we cited in Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra, is quotations from Moore’s Federal Practice and federal cases. I do not deny that the federal courts have fairly consistently followed the ruling in Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra. But this court as early as April 15, 1964, followed as late as April 1, 1968, ruled differently, based upon what I consider a proper construction of our rules. I have no particular objection to following the federal cases as we did in Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra, but I see no need to change and disrupt what apparently has been the settled law of this State for six years under our summary judgment procedure. One rule should be followed.
In this connection, I think it might be advisable to call attention to some of the underlying differences between the federal rules and our rules which no doubt prompted the rulings by some of the federal courts. The first is that the federal rules are court-made rules, while our rules are rules that are made by legislative *29enactment. The second is that under the federal rules no amendment can be made as a matter of right after certain designated times have elapsed, whereas under our rules, we can now amend without the necessity of any order of the court. We might compare these two rules:
"(A) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as á matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 (a). Section 15 (a) of the Ga. Civil Practice Act (Code Ann. § 81A-115) provides: "(a) Amendments. Except as otherwise provided, a party may amend his pleading as a matter of course at any time, without leave of court.” With the freedom of amendment allowed in Georgia, there is no reason why parties should not comply with the rules. The lack of liberality in the filing of amendments under the federal rules no doubt had some bearing on the trend of the federal cases in the matter now under consideration. In view of the fact this court has been committed for six years to an interpretation of the rule as requiring such defense to be pleaded, and our liberality as to amendment, I believe the rule established first in Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ingalls Iron Works, supra, is the sounder rule, and until it is overruled, must be followed.