Court Opinion

ID: 9809223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:04:37.125954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:31.637403
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/31/23 P. v. Ventura CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                         G062186

           v.                                                           (Super. Ct. No. 05NF2778)

 JUVENAL RIOS VENTURA,                                                  OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Elizabeth G. Macias, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
                   No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                      *      *      *
              In 2018, the California Legislature undertook a major change to
California’s laws pertaining to murder. Effective January 1, 2019, it eviscerated the
“felony murder” and “natural and probable consequences” theories of culpability in an
attempt to ensure that punishment for murder was aligned with culpability.
              First, the Legislature eliminated the natural and probable consequences
theory for that crime by providing that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (Pen. Code1, § 188, subd. (a)(3).) Second,
it reined in the felony murder rule so that it can only be applied to nonkillers if they aided
and abetted the killer in committing first degree murder, or they were a major participant
in the underlying felony and acted recklessly indifferent to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e).)
              To obtain relief under the new section, the defendant must show 1) he was
prosecuted for murder under the felony murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, 2) he was ultimately convicted of first or second degree murder,
and 3) and he would not be liable for murder today because of how the Legislature has
redefined that offense.
              That statute, originally numbered section 1170.95 was subsequently
renumbered as section 1172.6. It sets out the new rules for proving murder, establishes
the retroactivity of the new statute, and provides a procedural vehicle for those convicted
under the discredited theories to challenge their convictions.
              We deal here with another of the burgeoning number of cases filed by
inmates seeking to take advantage of the changes in the law. Those changes are, not
surprisingly, confusing to people who have not received a legal education. And the
attorneys appointed to represent these people are often finding themselves forced to admit
to the court that their client’s misunderstanding of the law means there is no argument
that can be made on appeal with a reasonable chance of success. This is such a case.

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              All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                      2
              In 2007, appellant was sentenced to 15 years to life for an attempted murder
and 14 years was added to that sentence, reflecting enhancements for gang involvement,
great bodily injury, and use of a weapon, a total of 29 years. We affirmed his conviction
the following year but found sentencing error which caused a reduction of his sentence to
19 years.
              The facts, as we summarized them in that affirmance, were that, “After
work during the summer of 2005, David Montero went home, took a shower, and then
rode his bike to cash his paycheck. As Montero rode his bike, a car traveling behind him
eventually caught up to him. Montero noticed there were four or five Hispanic males
inside the car and they repeatedly asked for his name as they drove along side of him.
Montero surmised the occupants of the car, who were strangers, ‘weren’t looking for me
to be my friend . . .’ and so he tried to lose them by cutting across several apartments.
However, as Montero attempted to go through the apartments, the car was already there
and cut him off.
              “Montero testified that as he tried to escape, he went the wrong way, hit
some bushes, and had to leave his bike behind as he ran for help back at a school where
he had seen two or three people playing soccer. According to Montero, as he ran, two or
three occupants in the car got out and chased him. Montero testified that initially he was
able to fight off his attackers, but he was eventually overwhelmed by at least four as they
hit and kicked him. According to Montero, at first they were ‘viciously attacking’ him
with their fists and feet, and then he saw the knife and he was stabbed [by appellant].”
(People v. Ventura (Oct. 24, 2008, G039544) [nonpub. opn.], p. 2.)
              In 2022, appellant filed this action, seeking relief pursuant to section
1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel for appellant, heard appellant’s motion under
this section and denied it. He appealed and we appointed counsel to represent him on
appeal. Counsel reviewed the record in the case and concluded there was no issue he
could argue that had a reasonable chance of success. He did not argue against his client

                                              3
but requested – as the law provides – that we review the case, acknowledging the
applicability of People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Appellant was
notified he had the opportunity to write to us and tell us what issues he thought might be
found in the record but did not respond.
              Delgadillo relieves us of the responsibility of reviewing this record. It is no
longer required. But our court, as a general rule, follows People v. Flores (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 266 and People v. Griffin (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 329. We have decided,
because of the high stakes involved, to exercise the discretion Delgadillo gives us (14
Cal.5th at p. 232) in favor of Wende review (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436;
Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738).
              It should be emphasized that a Wende review is not limited to arguments
that would necessarily be successful, but merely arguments that could be made,
arguments whose proposal would not violate ethical prohibitions about frivolous appeals.
Our review of this case was aimed at merely finding something an attorney could
ethically argue in favor of reversal. We have made such a review and found nothing.
              We have found nothing because appellant does not fall within the terms of
the statute he is seeking to apply to his case. There was no application of the felony
murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine in his case. The jury was
not instructed on those doctrines, and they were not argued by counsel. That removes him
from the ambit of section 1172.6. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.)

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             Appellant’s counsel was right. There is no arguable issue here. The
judgment is affirmed.

                                              BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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