Court Opinion

ID: 9454993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:05:59.184642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:24.574115
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
On May 31, 1968, the Local Board mailed to appellant an Order to Report for Induction effective June 20, 1968. On June 13, 1968, appellant for the first time requested a Special Form for Conscientious Objectors (Selective Service Form 150), which he completed and returned to the Board on June 17, 1968. The record contains much to support the merits of his claim. The issue as to that, however, is not now before us, for the Local Board never considered appellant’s claim on its merits. Instead it determined that his classification should not be reopened, noting in its minutes that there was,
no change in status resulting from circumstances over which registrant had no control, therefore Local Board is without authority to re-open classification or cancel induction order.
The Board apparently concluded that a conscientious objector exemption does *956not fall within the provisions of Regulation 32 C.F.R. 1625.2 which permits the Local Board to reopen a registrant’s classification even after it has mailed him an Order to Report for Induction where “there has been a change in the registrant’s status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control.”
In so concluding the Local Board misapplied the Regulation. Although there is a division of authority among the circuits on this point,1 conscientious objection has been held by this court, as the present opinion- of the court states, to be a circumstance over which the registrant has no control.2 Keene also interpreted Regulation 32 C.F.R. 1625.2 together with Regulation 32 C.F.R. 1625.1 (b), which requires a registrant to report information affecting his status within ten days, to mean that the registrant must demonstrate that his conscientious objection conviction matured after the Order of Induction to warrant reconsideration of his classification by the Board.
There is evidence in the record, as the court points out, that appellant’s convictions of conscientious objection crystallized prior to the date of his induction order,3 and that he failed to press his claim because of a misunderstanding about his physical eligibility for military service. On the basis of this evidence, the court holds that the Local Board’s refusal to reopen the appellant’s classification was justified, though the Board misconceived its authority under the Regulations.
There is support in Keene for this court’s decision finally to dispose of the case despite the Local Board’s misunderstanding of Regulation 1625.2. In Keene, however, “it [was] unmistakably plain that the registrant’s change in status due to a change in conscience did not occur after the induction notice was mailed.” No other conclusion was possible in Keene because the registrant there expressed his convictions to the Local Board in a letter dated on the very day his induction order was mailed. The evidence seems to me not so compelling in our case. Appellant did not indicate by any communication to his Local Board when his convictions matured, nor was there any independent, objective evidence on the subject. It was not until after he had received his induction notice, on June 16, 1968, that he publicly declared to the congregation of his church that he had formed such a belief. Moreover, appellant’s pastor informed the Board that appellant had struggled with his decision for a couple of years and only recently had come to a definite decision.
As the Local Board gave no consideration to the time when the appellant’s conscientious objector convictions matured, and because it is possible that had they done so they might have been persuaded that his claims were in fact timely, I do not find the Keene case controlling. I would apply to our case the rationale of United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 1966);
The realization that induction is pending, and that he may soon be asked to *957take another’s life, may cause a young man finally to crystallize and articulate his once vague sentiments. The long history of exempting conscientious objectors * * * indicate [s] to us a strong Congressional policy to afford meticulous procedural protections to applicants who claim to be conscientious objectors, * * *. Implementation of that policy requires that any individual who raises his conscientious objector claim promptly after it matures — even if this occurs after an induction notice is sent but before actual induction — be entitled to have his application considered by the Local Board. In light of this, the Local Board must first determine when an appellant’s beliefs matured.4
For our court to make an independent judgment on the record before us seems to me not to give weight to the narrow scope of judicial review over Local Board decisions of the character here involved.5 Indeed, in a case decided after Keene we held that,
If the Board states reasons for its action * * * and these reasons are found to be legally insufficient to support the Board’s classification, the classification should be found to be without a basis in fact. This is true even if an independent search of the record discloses an adequate basis in fact to support the action of the Board, * * *
Owens v. United States, 396 F.2d 540, 542-543 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 934, 89 S.Ct. 294, 21 L.Ed.2d 270.6
In concluding that this case should be remanded, I do not mean to say that appellant is in any way relieved of his burden on demonstrating when his convictions matured. However, as the Board did not consider his claim of exemption on its merits, I think appellant should be afforded the benefit of any doubts arising from the present state of the record. A remand is all the more appropriate when it is realized that the state of a person’s mind is rarely susceptible to objective proof. The standard to be applied is a difficult one to meet. I think appellant should have the opportunity to do this at the Board level instead of our determining his claim on this appeal from his criminal conviction.
I would reverse the conviction and remand the case to the Local Board for reconsideration in a manner not inconsistent with the views above expressed.7

. Compare, United States v. Stoppelman, 406 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1969), citing with approval, United States v. Blaisdell, 294 F.Supp. 1303 (D.Me.1968), also citing Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1959); United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966), aff’d on remand, 266 F.Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y.1967), aff’d, 379 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959, 88 S.Ct. 335, 19 L.Ed.2d 368; Ehlert v. United States, Crim. No. 21,930 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 1968), with United States v. Al-Majied Muhammad, 364 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1966); Davis v. United States, 374 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Jennis on, 402 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 912, 89 S.Ct. 1024, 22 L.Ed.2d 225 (1969); United States v. Schoebel, 201 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1953). Cf. United States v. Kroll, 400 F.2d 923 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1069, 89 S.Ct. 728, 21 L.Ed.2d 713 (1969).

. Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1959); Martinez v. United States, 384 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1967).

. See footnote 2 of the majority opinion.

. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine whether the Local Board might have rejected the registrant’s claim on the merits. The District Court ruled, after a hearing, that the Board had declined to reopen only because they did not believe the registrant to be sincere, 266 F.Supp. 161, and its ruling was affirmed on appeal, 379 F.2d 915. See, United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), where the court remanded as in Gearey but held that if it were determined that the Local Board rejected the registrant’s claim as untimely, the indictment must be dismissed until the Local Board makes a decision on legally sufficient grounds. See, also, United States v. Blaisdell, 294 F.Supp. 1303 (D.Me.1968); United States v. Hinch, 292 F.Supp. 696 (W.D.Mo.1968); dissenting opinion, United States v. Jennison, 402 F.2d 51, 54 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 912, 89 S.Ct. 1024, 22 L.Ed.2d 225 (1969); cf. Boswell v. United States, 390 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1968).

. “It is well to remember that it is not for the courts to sit as super draft boards, substituting their judgments on the weight of the evidence for those of the designated agencies.” Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 380-381, 75 S.Ct. 392, 395, 99 L.Ed. 428 (1955).

. See, also, Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 392, 75 S.Ct. 403, 99 L.Ed. 436 (1955), where the Supreme Court held that a legally insufficient basis for classification “must vitiate the entire proceedings.” To the extent that these cases are inconsistent with Keene they would seem to be controlling.

. I find it unnecessary to decide whether the State Director complied with Paragraph 9 of Memorandum No. 14. However, I think there is a serious question whether the State Director fulfilled his function of conducting a “review and determination” by merely looking through the file for procedural irregularities.