Court Opinion

ID: 9472344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:57:11.005824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:52.619676
License: Public Domain

JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the conviction of defendant Leslie William Hans must be reversed.
I agree with the majority that the most troublesome issue in this case is the district court’s decision to permit the jury to see the windbreakers during their deliberations, in spite of the fact that the windbreakers had not been moved into evidence. Even if this was error, as the majority concludes, I would hold that the error was harmless. Hans had the opportunity to challenge the admissibility of the windbreakers before trial; only through inadvertance were the windbreakers not actually introduced. At the very outset, the prosecutor informed the jury (in his opening remarks) that the windbreakers seized from Bauman were similar to the ones worn in the robbery, but that there was no evidence that they were the same windbreakers. There was testimony at trial about the windbreakers seized from Bauman. Thus, Hans had reason and opportunity to elicit testimony from Grzybowski that the seized windbreakers were not the garments used in the robbery.
Citing United States v. Ong, 541 F.2d 331 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075, 97 S.Ct. 814, 50 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977), the majority holds that the lower court committed reversible error because the admission of the windbreakers “affect[ed] substantial rights” of the defendant. Whether the court’s conduct “affects substantial rights” depends upon the effect of the challenged conduct on the jury’s verdict, an inquiry which requires a scrutiny of the particular facts of the case at issue and the procedural context of the asserted error. See Ong, 541 F.2d at 338. Under the circumstances described above, coupled with the fact that the windbreakers had actually been marked for identification, though not formally moved into evidence, I conclude, “beyond a reasonable doubt,” that the district court’s decision to show the jury the windbreakers “did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; see Ong, 541 F.2d at 338.
I can find no error in the district court’s treatment of McCarthy’s testimony. The judge called the attorneys to side-bar as soon as Hans’ attorney objected to McCarthy’s statements about the Detroit F.B.I. When the government explained the nature of the testimony that it planned to elicit, the judge sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard McCarthy’s “last statement.” The cautionary instruction was sufficient in this case to cure any prejudice.
Finally, I would hold that the district court’s treatment of Grzybowski’s state*97ments concerning the flak-jackets and bullet-proof vests was not reversible error. Grzybowski first mentioned the bulletproof vests during cross-examination. Her testimony was responsive to counsel’s question concerning the length of time that she, Bauman and Hans had been together in Bauman’s apartment. She repeated her reference to the vests when Hans’ attorney, rather than directing Grzybowski to limit her answer to a specific length of time, twice pressed her, “Can you answer my question?” Hans’ attorney first objected to Grzybowski’s references when the government attempted to elicit further testimony about the vests on re-direct. The court sustained that objection but let the cross-examination testimony stand. I would find that the district court ruled properly on this point as well.
Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction of Hans.