Court Opinion

ID: 9663732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:49:27.270966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:55.723042
License: Public Domain

*596McCown, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion is entirely correct in stating that there is no justification for the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney. The court holds that such conduct was not prejudicial because other evidence of guilt was “conclusive,” resting that opinion upon Bruntz v. State, 137 Neb. 565, 290 N. W. 420. That case reversed a conviction because the county attorney, in argument to the jury, said: “The defendant does not get on the stand to tell you about this case.” While this court recognized the rule that reversal was not required where the evidence of guilt was conclusive, it limited its acceptance of the rule to the situation “where the evidence of guilt is so conclusive that all will agree that no other factor could possibly have influenced the result, and not otherwise.” This court reversed the conviction in Bruntz on the sole ground of the comment upon the defendant’s refusal to testify. It said: “It is not our purpose, however, to encourage violations of the statute, nor have we the right to speculate in any case on whether prejudice has resulted from the comment. The only possible aim of such a remark is to thwart the statute.”
The Bruntz case was some 25 years before Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106. In 1965, Griffin held: “(T)hat the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the federal government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” Since Griffin, comments by the prosecution upon the defendant’s failure to testify have been a violation of constitutional rights as well as a violation of the Nebraska statutes.
Section 29-2011, R. R. S. 1943, prohibiting “any comment made upon” the neglect or refusal of an accused to testify has been in effect at least since 1913. Even if *597the violation here were limited solely to the comment on the failure to testify, that violation should not be treated indulgently upon the theory that it may have been inadvertent rather than deliberately planned. The effect on the defendant’s rights is exactly the same whether the violation occurs deliberately or inadvertently. It is hard to believe that a statute which has been in effect in Nebraska for so long was inadvertently violated by any prosecuting attorney.
In addition to commenting upon the defendant’s failure to testify, the prosecuting attorney, in closing argument, also made a statement that he was personally convinced of the defendant’s guilt. A portion of Canon 15 of the former Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association provided: “It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his client’s innocence or in the justice of his cause.” Disciplinary Rule 7-106 (C) (4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by this court April 10, 1970, provides in part that: “In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not: Assert his personal opinion * * * as to the guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein.”
This court for many, many years has held that the expression of the personal opinion of the prosecutor in a criminal prosecution, not based on the evidence, in arguing the case to the jury is improper and should be condemned. See Wamsley v. State, 171 Neb. 197, 106 N. W. 2d 22. That case also held that even though an improper expression of personal opinion standing alone might not constitute prejudicial error sufficient to require a new trial, the cumulative effect of more than one irregularity might be sufficient to deprive the defendant of the constitutional right to a public trial by an impartial jury. This court quoted the following language with approval: “The doctrine of harmless error *598does not apply where accused has been deprived of a substantial right, and it will not be extended to such an extent as to deprive accused of a fair trial, or a trial on the merits.”
The majority opinion here, in referring to the statement of personal belief of the prosecutor in the guilt of the defendant, states: “The record does not show that the belief expressed was not a deduction from the evidence * * *.” We might add, the record does not show that the belief expressed was a deduction from the evidence. The language of Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C) (4) does not permit an expression of personal opinion as to guilt or innocence of an accused under any circumstances, but only permits an argument on an analysis of the evidence for a position or conclusion of guilt or innocence.
There should be no compromise with ethical standards of proper trial conduct, much less the tacit acceptance of even an unintentional violation of the statutory and constitutional rights of a defendant accused of crime. In the words of this court in Bruntz v. State, supra, “If we treat violation indulgently, we shall soon —in the words of Pope — ‘first endure, then pity, then embrace.’ ”