Court Opinion

ID: 9704719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:44:05.304135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:04.630802
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Chief Justice.
The former wife appeals from an order modifying the former husband’s child support obligation and reducing his arrearages for child support. The original decree of divorce was entered in November 1982. After a modification and contempt hearing in 1985, the trial court entered conclusions stating that it was making an “equitable adjustment” of the husband’s child support arrearages of $6,085. The former wife was awarded a money judgment of $2,000 for such arrearages.
Over the years from 1982 to 1985 the former husband paid only $1,865 on a total support obligation of $7,950. The trial court found that the former husband had been employed during this period and that he had the ability to meet his support obligation. During this time the former husband’s gross income, not including his spouse’s income, increased from $472 in 1982 to approximately $9,000 in 1983 and $10,000 in 1984. The trial court, however, did not enter any findings or conclusions on any change in circumstances in the children’s needs or the abilities of either of the parents to support the children. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 366 N.W.2d 845 (S.D.1985); Johansen v. Johansen, 365 N.W.2d 859 (S.D.1985); Gross v. Gross, 355 N.W.2d 4 (S.D.1984).
The wife contends that the trial court erred in retroactively excusing a portion of the child support arrearages in the absence of a finding of changed circumstances.
A trial court’s authority to retroactively modify child support has been consistently reaffirmed. Stack v. Stack, 369 N.W.2d 132 (S.D.1985); Hood v. Hood, 335 N.W.2d 349 (S.D.1983); Larsgaard v. Larsgaard, 298 N.W.2d 381 (S.D.1980). This court has clearly stated, however, that absent any finding of a change in circumstances a trial court has no basis on which to conclude that child support should be retroactively modified or that arrearages should be excused. Stack, 369 N.W.2d at 136. We have also stated that in setting child support the children’s interest must be the primary consideration rather than *657an undefined notion of the “equitable” adjustment of rights between the parents. Johansen, supra. This is equally applicable to adjusting child support arrearages. Because the trial court did not find any change in circumstances, other than an increase in the husband’s income, the court could not adjust the arrearages.
Although the former wife has appealed from the order relieving the former husband of support arrearages, in his brief the husband attacks the original divorce decree. He seems to argue that he was entitled to relief from the decree under SDCL 15-6-60(b)(3) and (6) on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. No motion to vacate under this statute appears in the record, however. Where a party has failed to make a motion to correct or modify a judgment in the court below he may not attack the judgment for the first time on appeal. Lindskog v. Schouweiler, 12 S.D. 176, 80 N.W. 190 (1899). The former husband’s contention that the original decree of divorce should have been vacated is an attempt to raise issues on appeal that were not raised below. We will not consider such issues for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Mayrose v. Fendrich, 347 N.W.2d 585 (S.D.1984).
We reverse the trial court’s decision and remand with directions to enter judgment for the full amount of the arrearages.
MORGAN and SABERS, JJ., and POSHEIM, Retired Justice, concur.
HENDERSON, J., concurs specially.
MILLER, J., not having been a member of the court at the time this action was submitted to the court, did not participate.