Court Opinion

ID: 9664173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:05:30.417058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:02.768601
License: Public Domain

Robert W- Hansen, J.
(dissenting). “Forum shopping” describes the effort to steer a lawsuit to a judge or jurisdiction where prospects for a favorable outcome are believed to be promising. Here the defendant, convicted and sentenced for the crimes of rape, robbery and aggravated battery, did, not shop around in seeking a reduction of the sentences imposed. Rather he waited until the trial judge who imposed the sentences retired from the bench. Then he sought a reduction of the sentences from the new judge who had taken the place of the retired sentencing judge. Did that new judge have authority or jurisdiction to modify those sentences —twelve years after they had been imposed by his predecessor on the bench?
*621By petition for writ of certiorari, the attorney general of the state of Wisconsin challenges the authority or jurisdiction of the new judge to amend or reduce the sentences imposed by his predecessor, twelve years earlier. The majority opinion denies such petition on a ground not raised or argued by either party on the petition for writ. That issue is the attorney general’s delay in seeking review of the sentence modification. The reference is not to the twelve years that the defendant waited before seeking modification of the sentences imposed. Rather it is to the less than one year that separates the attempted modification of the sentences and the petition for writ. There is no information as to when the attorney general’s office learned of the reduction of sentence, nor explanation, nor opportunity for explanation of the time lapse involved. There hardly could be when the issue, found controlling by the majority, was not considered relevant by anyone until after briefs were completed and oral arguments concluded.
The majority opinion states that, “. . . The resen-tencing order might have been appealed within the time allowed for such an appeal but was not,” adding that “Matters of this kind should be promptly reviewed if they are to be reviewed at all. . . .” That might appropriately be said of a defendant seeking modification of a sentence imposed, as well as of the state seeking appellate review of a modification granted. However, the suggestion that appeal, not certiorari, is the proper or even exclusive remedy for appellate review of the right of a trial court to modify a sentence in a criminal case runs into this holding by this court:
“Certiorari lies to review questions of the jurisdiction of a trial court to revise, modify, and correct its judgment or sentence. . . .” State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court (1960), 11 Wis. 2d 512, 515, 105 N. W. 2d 812, citing State ex rel. Zabel v. Municipal Court (1923), 179 Wis. 195, 190 N. W. 121, 191 N. W. 565.
*622In Reynolds, no suggestion is made that such resort to certiorari must be had within the time statutorily prescribed for appeal of judgment in a criminal proceeding. No specific time for seeking the writ is spelled out. The majority opinion here does not establish a time limit for seeking a writ of certiorari that was not met by the state, but rather finds inexcusable delay in seeking the writ. Inexcusable delay or laches would not necessarily apply even to a belated bringing of a petition for writ of certiorari because “In some cases it has been held or intimated that the doctrine of laches does not apply where the order complained of exceeds the jurisdiction of the tribunal rendering it.” 14 Am. Jur. 2d, Certiorari, p. 808, sec. 30. However, what is wrong with its application here is that it neglects the public interest. We are familiar, sadly enough on occasion, with court decisions holding that, where the constable has blundered, the criminal goes free. Now we see a corollary rule, where the state hesitates, the right to challenge jurisdiction is lost. What is wrong with both consequences, is that they derive from a flat, two-dimensional approach that sees a criminal trial as a “cops and robbers” proposition. There is a third dimension — the interest of the public in the administration of criminal justice — and it is hardly served by holding a nine-month delay to be laches — fatal to challenging a twelve-year delayed modification of sentence in a criminal case.
Laches aside, and the issue raised reached on its merits, it should be clear that the modifying or reducing of the sentences twelve years after they were imposed is a nullity — void as being beyond the authority and jurisdiction of the judge who sought to reduce the sentences imposed by his predecessor on the bench.
In the Reynolds Case (where the state was questioning the jurisdiction of a county court to reduce the sentence imposed in a criminal case), this court stated that, *623“. . . Wisconsin adheres to the common-law principle that a trial court has no power to revise its judgment and sentence in a criminal case after the expiration of the term or after the execution of the sentence has commenced. . . .” State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court, supra, at page 515, citing State ex rel. Traister v. Mahoney (1928), 196 Wis. 113, 122, 219 N. W. 380.
A modification of this adherence to the common-law rule came in the Hayes Case where this court held, “. . . Within reasonable limits we think an unjust sentence should be corrected by the trial court. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Hayes v. State (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 93, 105, 175 N. W. 2d 625. In that opinion this court asked itself “. . . what limitation should be placed upon such power [to change and modify its judgments] in the interest of promoting justice in the administration of criminal law. . . .” Id. at page 101. Answering that question, the Hayes decision made clear that “We adopt one year from the date of sentencing for the time being as a time limit within which a motion can be made to have the court exercise its inherent power to modify a criminal sentence. . . .” Id. at page 106. That made the time limit for seeking review of sentence, at least in most cases “. . . the same as the period now in effect for making a motion for a new trial and for a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty. . . .” Id. at page 106.
However, the court noted that, on July 1, 1970, “the new criminal code will become effective and the time within which a motion for a new trial can be made is reduced to ninety days after judgment of conviction,” and stated, “On and after July 1st we think the time within which to move for a modification of a sentence imposed on or after that date should by analogy be ninety days from the date of sentencing . . . .” Id. at page 106. (Emphasis supplied.)
*624Of this ninety-day limit upon the seeking to modify a criminal sentence, the majority opinion in this case states that it “. . . is not jurisdictional but regulatory . . . .” The writer would hold it to be jurisdictional in keeping with the generally accepted rule that “Perfection of the review proceeding within the time limited by statute or 'practice rule is jurisdictional . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 4 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error, p. 782, sec. 292. In the Reynolds Case this court held that expiration of the then-existing time limit for seeking modification of sentence deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to so review a sentence. The Hayes Case extended the time limit, but gave no indication it was altering the time limit’s jurisdictional impact and the majority opinion offers no explanation for its conclusion that Hayes did eliminate the time limit’s jurisdictional aspect.
Whether the time limit is termed jurisdictional or regulatory, it clearly limited the power of a trial court in this state to entertain motions for modification of sentence in criminal cases brought after the time limit set by this court had passed by. When a motion for modification of sentences was brought in this case twelve years after the sentences were imposed, the court to which the motion for modification was directed was without authority to entertain it, much less grant it.
The writer agrees with the majority holding that sec. 974.06, Stats., does not abrogate Hayes nor provide for review of sentence without time limit whenever it is claimed that the sentence violates constitutional guarantees. Where the imposition of the original sentences here occurred before sec. 974.06 was enacted, we see no basis for its being considered relevant to the case before us. However, even if it were applicable, where the original sentences were within the statutory limits for the crimes committed, and where no attack upon the con*625stitutional validity of such statutory upper limits accompanied the motion for modification, the writer would see no constitutional dimension involved in the defendant’s motion for modification of sentences. Where no constitutional challenge is made to the statutory limits established by the legislature and where the sentences imposed are within the statutory limits, the only issue involved is whether the trial court abused its discretion in fixing particular sentences within the statutory limits.
In Hayes, this court stated that “. . . the sentencing process must at some point come to an end. . .” Hayes v. State, supra, at page 105. In this case that point was reached one year after the sentences were imposed and judgment entered, these being pre-July 1,1970, sentences. And if defendant’s repeated parole violations have made another parole opportunity unlikely, his sole remaining recourse is to the governor of this state for pardon or commutation of sentence. Under our tripartite form of government, clemency is for the executive, not the judicial, branch of government to consider and, in deserved cases, to grant. So, on the merits, the writer would grant certiorari finding the court that modified the judgment to have been without jurisdiction or authority so to do and would set aside the 1970 order modifying the 1958 sentences imposed.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley and Mr. Justice Connor T. Hansen join in this dissent.