Court Opinion

ID: 9392079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 07:00:10.650482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:15.795082
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                       2023 MSPB 17
                             Docket No. AT-0752-20-0508-I-1

                                Jeremiah Timothy White,
                                         Appellant,
                                              v.
                                Department of the Army,
                                          Agency.
                                        May 3, 2023

           Jeremiah Timothy White, Jacksonville, Florida, pro se.

           Guy E. Reinecke, Saint Augustine, Florida, for the agency.

                                          BEFORE

                              Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                               Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                 OPINION AND ORDER

¶1        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his alleged involuntary demotion appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons set forth below, we DENY the petition for review, MODIFY the
     administrative judge’s analysis as to why section 512(a) of the National Defense
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (2017 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 114-328,
     130 Stat. 2000, 211-13 (2016) (codified, as relevant here, at 32 U.S.C.
     § 709(f)(4)-(5), (g)(1)), does not apply retroactively to this appeal, but otherwise
     AFFIRM the initial decision.
                                                                                           2

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The Department of the Air Force employed the appellant as an Aircraft
     Pneudraulic Systems Mechanic. 1 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, 6. The
     agency appointed the appellant to his position as a “dual status” technician under
     32 U.S.C. § 709. IAF, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 5 at 8. In late 2014, due to what the
     agency described as the appellant’s “inability to perform [his] duties,” it issued
     him an “Employee Decision Form” which provided him with three employment
     options. IAF, Tab 5 at 10-12. The options were as follows: (1) a change to a
     lower grade; (2) extended leave without pay; or (3) a resignation.         Id. At the
     appellant’s election, on December 14, 2014, he was demoted to the position of
     Tools and Parts Attendant, which reduced his grade and salary. 2 IAF, Tab 1 at 6,
     Tab 5 at 13.
¶3         The appellant subsequently appealed his demotion to the Board, alleging
     that the agency violated Technician Personnel Regulation (TPR) 715, subjected
     him to “unfair work practices,” and discriminated against him. IAF, Tab 1 at 3.
     The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack
     of jurisdiction.   IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 4.             Therein, the

     1
       A dual status technician, like the appellant, “is an employee of the Department of the
     Army or the Department of the Air Force, as the case may be, and an employee of the
     United States.” 32 U.S.C. § 709(e); Fitzgerald v. Department of the Air Force,
     108 M.S.P.R. 620, ¶ 14 (2008). Thus, although the appellant identified himself as an
     employee of the Florida Air National Guard, for purposes of this appeal he is an Air
     Force employee. IAF, Tab 1 at 1, 6. Accordingly, it appear s that this case was
     incorrectly docketed against the Department of the Army. However, given the Florida
     National Guard’s participation in the case and our disposition affirming the initial
     decision, we find no prejudice in this error. IAF, Tab 5 at 7; Petition for Review File,
     Tab 3 at 8; see Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124, 127 (1981)
     (finding an administrative judge’s procedural error is of no legal consequence unless it
     is shown to have adversely affected a party’s substantive rights).
     2
      The agency subsequently terminated the appellant from his dual status position due to
     his loss of compatible military membership. IAF, Tab 5 at 8. However, the appellant
     does not challenge his separation from Federal service in the instant appeal .
                                                                                           3

     administrative judge found that, at the time of the appellant’s demotion, the
     Board lacked jurisdiction to review adverse action and involuntary adverse action
     appeals from dual status technicians appointed under 32 U.S.C. § 709. ID at 2-3.
     In addition, the administrative judge determined that the amendments to
     section 709 set forth in the 2017 NDAA, which extended Board adverse action
     appeal rights under chapter 75 to dual status technicians under certain
     circumstances, did not apply retroactively, and thus did not provide for Board
     jurisdiction in this matter. ID at 3 n.3. Finally, the administrative judge found
     that, because the Board lacks jurisdiction over the underlying demotion, it does
     not have authority to adjudicate the appellant’s disability discrimination claim.
     ID at 3-4.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review, alleging that he was coerced
     into electing a demotion, rendering it involuntary. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1 at 4-6. He further reiterates that the agency discriminated against him
     and asserts that the agency violated various TPRs, Florida state law, and criminal
     statutes. Id. at 4-8. The agency has responded to his petition for review, and the
     appellant has replied to its response. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

                                          ANALYSIS
     The administrative judge correctly determined that the amendments to
     section 709 of the NDAA do not apply retroactively.
¶5         As discussed above, the administrative judge found that the amendments to
     section 709 of the 2017 NDAA, which extend Board appeal rights to dual status
     technicians under certain circumstances, do not apply retroactively. 3 ID at 3 n.3.

     3
      The 2017 NDAA limits dual status National Guard Technician appeals of most agency
     actions to the adjutant general of the relevant jurisdiction “when the appeal concerns
     activity occurring while the member is in a military pay status, or concerns fitness for
     duty in the reserve components.” 32 U.S.C. § 709(f)(4). The law affords appeal rights
     pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7513 concerning any activity not covered by
     subsection (f)(4). 32 U.S.C. § 709(f)(5). Office of Personnel Management regulations
                                                                                         4

     The appellant does not challenge this finding on review. Although we agree with
     the administrative judge’s conclusion, we modify the initial decision to
     supplement the analysis on retroactivity.
¶6        Prior to the 2017 NDAA, the statutory scheme covering dual status
     technicians did not allow for Board appeals challenging adverse actions such as
     reductions in grade or pay, or removals.      McVay v. Arkansas National Guard,
     80 M.S.P.R. 120, 123 (1998).       Section 512(a) of the 2017 NDAA amended
     32 U.S.C. § 709 to provide that, when a dual status technician is in a non-military
     pay status, he is entitled to appeal adverse actions to the Board in certain limited
     circumstances. 32 U.S.C. § 709(f)(4)-(5); (g)(1); Dyer v. Department of the Air
     Force, 971 F.3d 1377, 1382-84 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
¶7        Here, as noted above, the appellant was demoted in December 2014, prior to
     the 2017 NDAA’s enactment on December 23, 2016.              IAF, Tab 1 at 6.      As
     discussed below, the amended statutory provision of section 709 is not retroactive
     and thus does not apply to this appeal.
¶8        The proper analytical framework for determining whether a new statute
     should be given retroactive effect was set forth by the Supreme Court in Landgraf
     v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994):
           When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in
           suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has
           expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done
           so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules.
           When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the
           court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive
           effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he
           acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new

     implementing the 2017 NDAA, which became effective on December 12, 2022, state
     that adverse actions and performance-based removals or reductions in grade of dual
     status National Guard Technicians are not appealable to the Board except as provided
     by 32 U.S.C. § 709(f)(5). 5 C.F.R. §§ 432.102(b)(16), 752.401(b)(17); see Probation on
     Initial Appointment to a Competitive Position, 87 Fed. Reg. 67,765, 67,782-83
     (Nov. 10, 2022).
                                                                                              5

            duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute
            would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that
            it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a
            result.
¶9          When Congress intends for statutory language to apply retroactively, it is
      capable of doing so very clearly.          King v. Department of the Air Force,
      119 M.S.P.R. 663, ¶ 9 (2013) (citing Presidio Components, Inc. v. American
      Technical Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (giving
      retroactive effect to amendments enacted in 2011 in light of express statutory
      language that the amendments applied to “all cases, without exception, that are
      pending on, or commenced on or after, the date of the enactment of this Act”)).
      Here, the 2017 NDAA, as enacted, is silent regarding the retroactivity of this
      amendment to section 709. Thus, applying the first part of the Landgraf test, we
      find that Congress has not expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.
¶10         Turning to the second part of the Landgraf test, we find that the
      2017 NDAA would increase the agency’s liability for past conduct. As noted
      above, prior to the 2017 NDAA, the Board lacked jurisdiction ove r dual status
      technicians’ appeals involving adverse actions such as reductions in grade or pay.
      McVay, 80 M.S.P.R. at 123. Thus, to hold now that the agency’s act of demoting
      the appellant is subject to Board review, and potential reversal, would increa se
      the agency’s liability. 4 See Rebstock Consolidation v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 7 (2015) (declining to give retroactive effect to the
      Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA) provision expanding
      jurisdiction over certain protected activity because doing so would increase a
      party’s liability for past conduct as compared to pre -WPEA liability).

      4
        Nothing in the 2017 NDAA or elsewhere suggests that it clarified an existing law. Cf.
      Day v. Department of Homeland Security, 119 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶¶ 10-26 (2013)
      (observing that when legislation clarifies existing law, its application to pre -enactment
      conduct does not raise concerns of retroactivity).
                                                                                      6

      Accordingly, considering the test set forth in Landgraf, we find no basis for
      finding that the 2017 NDAA amendments to 32 U.S.C. § 709 are retroactive.

      The administrative judge correctly found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over
      the appellant’s demotion.
¶11         The appellant argues on review that he is a Federal employee and thus the
      Board has jurisdiction over his appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The administrative
      judge held that the Board lacked jurisdiction over appeals brought by Federal
      employees appointed under 32 U.S.C. § 709.       ID at 2-3.   We agree with the
      administrative judge.
¶12         Applying the language of section 709 prior to the enactment of the
      2017 NDAA, the Board has consistently held that it lacked chapter 75 jurisdiction
      over adverse actions brought by dual status technicians appointed under
      section 709, like the appellant. McVay, 80 M.S.P.R. at 123; see Ockerhausen v.
      State of New Jersey Department of Military and Veterans Affairs, 52 M.S.P.R.
      484, 489 (1992) (finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction over adverse actions
      brought by National Guard technicians because they are expressly excluded under
      the applicable statutes). As such, although the appellant is correct that he is a
      Federal employee, he nonetheless has failed to meet his burden of establishing
      jurisdiction over this appeal.
¶13         Moreover, because we lack jurisdiction over the appeal, we likewise lack
      jurisdiction over the appellant’s discrimination claim. ID at 3-4; see Wren v.
      Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980) (finding prohibited personnel
      practices and affirmative defenses are not independent sources of Board
      jurisdiction), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Similarly, we lack
      jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s claims that the agency violated various
      state and Federal laws. See Wren, 2 M.S.P.R. at 2. Accordingly, we affirm the
      initial decision as modified to supplement the administrative judge’s analysis on
      the retroactivity of the amendments to section 709 of the 2017 NDAA .
                                                                                            7

                                             ORDER
¶14         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).

                                NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choice s of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

            (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
      judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
      Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

      5
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                          8

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decisi on before
                                                                                  9

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disab ling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                          Office of Federal Operations
                   Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                P.O. Box 77960
                           Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                          Office of Federal Operations
                   Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               131 M Street, N.E.
                                 Suite 5SW12G
                           Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                     10

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             11

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.