Court Opinion

ID: 9825701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 13:58:46.485629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:17.596815
License: Public Domain

Hart, J., (on rehearing). Counsel for appellants in their motion on rehearing insist that the provisions of-the decree of the chancery court for a penalty are clearly erroneous. The Tri-County Highway Improvement District was created by special act approved March 6, 1919. Road Acts of 1919, vol. 1, p. 510. Section 26 provides for the time of the payment of the taxes and how suits to collect the same shall be conducted. Upon the failure of the land-? owners to pay the special taxes to the collectors, as provided in the act, the commissioners are empowered to enforce the collection by chancery proceedings in the county in which the land is situated, and the penalty for the nonpayment óf the taxes is provided in the section. Thus it will be seen that the Legislature has deemed it expedient or advisable for the speedy and certain collection of the special assessments to enact a penalty to provide against protracted delays. The penalty became by operation of the statute a part and parcel of the taxes due.- We are not called upon to defend the terms of the statute, either in whole or in part. It .is sufficient to say that, in accord with the general rule on the subject, this court has held that the Legislature has the power to impose a penalty for the nonpayment of taxes and to authorize the penalty to be. enforced with the taxes. Scott v. Watkins, 22 Ark. 556; Craig v. Flanagin, 21 Ark. 319; Thompson v. Sherill, 51 Ark. 453; Brasch v. Mumey, 99 Ark. 324; and Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., vol. 2, pp. 900 and 1030. In this connection it . may be stated that in State v. Norton, 63 Minn. 497, it was held that penalties the, saíne as in the case of nonpayment of taxes levied for general purposes, may be added in case of nonpayment of taxes levied by a municipality for local improvements. . Such is the effect of our own decision in Dickinson v. Cypress Creek Drainage Dist., 139 Ark. 76. But it is claimed that the provisions of § 26 do not apply to winding up proceedings where the road contemplated is not improved or constructed. We can not agree with this contention. Section 30 provides that, if for any reason the improvement shall not be made, all expenses and costs accrued to that time shall be charged against the real property in the district, and the amount necessary to discharge all such indebtedness shall be assessed, apportioned and paid in the manner herein provided. So it will be seen that the same method of procedure is provided for the collection of assessments in a proceeding to wind up the district where the improvement is not made as in case where the improvement is made under the provisions of the act. Again it is insisted that such a holding is contrary to the rule laid down in Federal Union Surety Co. v. Flemister, 95 Ark. 389. The primary object of the suit in that case was to wind up the affairs of a fire insurance company on account of its insolvency, and a receiver was appointed to take charge of its assets. Certain policyholders were allowed to intervene arid to establish the amount of their fire losses. The policy-holders also sought to have taxed in their favor the attorneys ’ fees provided by the statute, and the court held that the policy-holders were not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees where the policy-holders filed their claim in the insolvency proceedings, and could only claim the penalty and attorneys’ fees provided by the statute where they brought suit directly against the company to establish their claims. In the case at bar, as we have already seen, the penalty was expressly provided by the statute and was enforced in a direct proceeding under the statute to collect the unpaid taxes. It will be noted that the penalty for the nonpayment of taxes was enforced in the chancery court in the eases cited above. It was expressly held that the power to provide for a collection of the penalty with the taxes was so essentially necessary to meet the wants of the government that it could not be regarded as unreasonable or oppressive to the taxpayers. It is next insisted that the court erred in holding that only the decree of the court could be looked to in determining whether the bill of review should be sustained. We did not mean that such a restricted meaning should he placed upon the language used on this phase of the case in our original opinion. Of course the pleadings as well as the decree itself may be looked to, and, when this was done in the present case, there was no error on the face of the record. It was pointed out in our original opinion that the decree expressly recites that it was heard on certain resolutions relating to the various claims of creditors, and the decree was within the issues presented by the pleadings and the evidence. For this reason we hold that there was no error apparent upon the face of the record upon which to base the bill of review. The same may be said of the decree of August 24, 1920, as the one of November 30, 1920. The result of our views is that the petition for a rehearing must be denied.