Court Opinion

ID: 9947727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 16:02:38.814395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:29.444661
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 8, 2022               Decided March 5, 2024

                        No. 21-7135

  JOHN DOE 1, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF PROPOSED
                 CLASS MEMBERS, ET AL.,
                      APPELLANTS

                              v.

                     APPLE INC., ET AL.,
                        APPELLEES

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Columbia
                    (No. 1:19-cv-03737)

     Terrence P. Collingsworth argued the cause and filed the
briefs for appellants.

     William J. Aceves and Catherine Sweetser were on the
brief for amici curiae International Legal Scholars in support
of appellants.

    Martina E. Vandenberg and Agnieszka M. Fryszman were
on the brief for amici curiae Legal Scholars with Expertise in
Extraterritoriality and Transnational Litigation in support of
appellants.
                             2
    Paul Hoffman was on the brief for amicus curiae Human
Trafficking Institute in support of appellants.

    Eric A. Shumsky argued the cause for appellees. With him
on the brief were Beth S. Brinkmann, David M. Zionts, Henry
Ben-Heng Liu, John A. Boeglin, Emily Johnson Henn, Lauren
A. Weber, Craig A. Hoover, Neal Kumar Katyal, David M.
Foster, Danielle Desaulniers Stempel, Sean P. Gates, Andrew
C. Nichols, and Carolyn Frantz. Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. and
Jacob T. Spencer entered appearances.

     Paul Lettow, John B. Bellinger, III, John P. Elwood, and
Sean A. Mirski were on the brief for amici curiae The Chamber
of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. in support
of appellees.

    Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, PILLARD and RAO,
Circuit Judges.

    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.

     RAO, Circuit Judge: Cobalt is an essential metal for
producing the lithium-ion batteries that power modern
electronics. Nearly two-thirds of the world’s cobalt comes from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”), where some
of the metal can be traced to informal mining by Congolese
nationals digging with primitive tools in unsafe conditions.
Many of these informal miners are children, pressured into
work by extreme poverty.

     This lawsuit seeks to impose liability on five American
technology companies for “forced labor” used for informal
cobalt mining in the DRC. The plaintiffs, former cobalt miners
injured in mining accidents and their representatives, sued the
companies under the Trafficking Victims Protection
                               3
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”). That statute makes
it unlawful to “participat[e] in a venture” that engages in forced
labor. The plaintiffs allege the technology companies
participated in a venture with their cobalt suppliers by
purchasing the metal through the global supply chain. The
district court dismissed the suit for a variety of reasons,
including lack of Article III standing and failure to state a
claim.

     Although we conclude that the plaintiffs have standing to
pursue their damages claims, they have failed to state a claim
for relief. Purchasing an unspecified amount of cobalt through
the global supply chain is not “participation in a venture”
within the meaning of the TVPRA. We therefore affirm the
district court’s dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

                               I.

      The TVPRA creates a civil remedy against any person
who “knowingly benefits … from participation in a venture”
that violates federal slavery and human trafficking laws. Pub.
L. No. 110-457, § 221, 122 Stat. 5044, 5067 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1595(a)). Among other things, those laws make it
illegal to obtain the labor of a person by force or to engage in
the trafficking of any such person. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–90.

    This lawsuit alleges Apple, Alphabet, Dell Technologies,
Microsoft, and Tesla (the “Tech Companies”) violated the
TVPRA by participating in the global cobalt supply chain—a
“venture” that depends on forced labor.

                               A.

     To understand the alleged TVPRA “venture,” we first
trace the path of cobalt through the global supply chain. We
recount the facts as presented in the complaint, accepting them
                             4
as true for the purposes of the motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

     Cobalt is a metal used to make rechargeable lithium-ion
batteries, which are essential components of the smartphones,
laptops, electric cars, and other electronic devices
manufactured by the Tech Companies. According to the
plaintiffs, the Tech Companies purchase cobalt from large
international suppliers; those suppliers’ subsidiaries exploit
and perpetuate informal mining in the DRC; and informal
mining involves forced labor.

     The Tech Companies buy cobalt from at least three foreign
firms: Glencore, Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Company
(“Huayou”), and Eurasian Resources Group. Each of these
suppliers obtains cobalt from one or more subsidiaries in the
DRC. For example, Glencore controls the Kamoto Copper
Company (“KCC”). KCC provides cobalt to Glencore, which
sells it to Umicore, N.V. Umicore then refines the cobalt and
sells it to Apple, Alphabet, and Microsoft, as well as to
intermediaries that in turn sell to Dell and Tesla. Similarly,
Huayou runs Congo Dongfang Mining (“CDM”), which
supplies processed cobalt that Huayou sells to Apple, Dell, and
Microsoft. And Eurasian Resources owns a mine called
Metalkol SA, from which it sells cobalt to Tesla.

     The large cobalt suppliers and their subsidiaries have
mechanized and industrial operations in the DRC, but some
cobalt is still mined informally by Congolese nationals in open
pits and crude tunnels. The work is dangerous—mine collapses
are common, and miners are frequently maimed or killed.
Locals are allegedly “forced” into informal mining “by hunger
and desperation.”

     Informally mined cobalt enters the supply chain through
a variety of channels. The subsidiaries of Glencore, Huayou,
                               5
and Eurasian Resources mingle cobalt obtained by forced labor
with other sources of the metal. For instance, KCC allows
Congolese Presidential Guards to access one of its mining sites
and recruit children to dig up cobalt, which the Guards then sell
to buying houses; agents of CDM buy bags of “cobalt-rich
rocks” at the DRC-Zambian border to ship back to Huayou in
China; and at Eurasian Resources’s Metalkol mine, middlemen
force informal miners to work in the tunnels and gather bags of
cobalt.

     As alleged in the complaint, the participants in the cobalt
market intentionally use a murky supply chain to obscure the
extent to which they rely on forced labor. This allows the Tech
Companies and their suppliers to avoid formal association with
forced labor, yet everyone in the venture knows the global
supply chain includes cobalt procured by forced labor. And the
cobalt suppliers and their subsidiaries actively solicit and force
children to work in order to meet the Tech Companies’ growing
demand for cobalt.

                               B.

    The plaintiffs are four former miners, seven legal
representatives of former miners who are still children, and five
representatives of child miners who were killed in cobalt
mining operations.

     James Doe 1’s story is typical of the group. He dropped
out of school after the second grade and started working as a
surface digger, picking ore off the ground and selling what he
found. He later joined an informal group of miners and began
digging tunnels in an old copper-cobalt mine. He died at age
seventeen in a mining tunnel collapse. Another plaintiff, John
Doe 1, quit school at age nine to be a surface digger. At age
fifteen, he began work as a mule for KCC, carrying heavy bags
of rocks up and down a mountain for ten to fifteen cents per
                               6
trip. During one trip, he fell nearly twenty feet into a tunnel, an
accident that broke his back and left him paralyzed. The other
miners were similarly recruited as children to engage in
dangerous mining operations and suffered tunnel collapses,
falls, and other accidents that left them paralyzed, disfigured,
or worse. The stories of the sixteen miners paint a dismal
picture of exploitation and unsafe working conditions in the
DRC’s small-scale cobalt mines.

     The plaintiffs claim that a variety of factors forced the
children into these jobs. The children lacked the funds to afford
school, so they began mining at a young age to avoid starvation
and to support their families. Once they started, the miners felt
pressured into continuing the work. Several plaintiffs insist
they were trapped in a “debt bondage situation” where
“sponsors” gave out food and funds as an advance but deducted
the amount of the advance, along with other costs, from the
plaintiffs’ earnings when the cobalt was sold. Other miners
were told that if they did not continue working in the mines,
they would be blacklisted and barred from working at any other
mines in the region.

     The forced labor was organized or overseen by agents or
subsidiaries of the Tech Companies’ cobalt suppliers. Many of
the plaintiffs worked for a Lebanese labor broker named Ismail,
who recruited children into gangs of miners. Ismail was
authorized to organize these miners by a DRC-based company
controlled by Glencore. Similarly, another labor broker
arranged for children to work at mines owned by subsidiaries
of Huayou and to sell the cobalt to Chinese middlemen. Each
miner in the case was injured or killed at a mine operated by a
subsidiary of Glencore, Huayou, or Eurasian Resources.
Because these companies supply cobalt to the Tech
Companies, the plaintiffs claim their forced labor was
                                7
connected to and furthered by the Tech Companies’
participation in the global cobalt market.

                                 C.

     Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs sued the Tech
Companies, claiming the global cobalt supply chain was a
TVPRA “venture” and the Tech Companies participated in that
venture with the full knowledge that cobalt suppliers and their
subsidiary mining companies employed and trafficked in
forced labor. The plaintiffs also brought common law claims
for unjust enrichment, negligent supervision, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress based on the same supposed
“venture.” They sought to represent a class of similarly situated
child miners in the DRC, and they requested damages,
injunctive relief, and other equitable remedies.

    The Tech Companies moved to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district
court granted all motions in favor of the Tech Companies.1 It
held in the alternative that: (1) the plaintiffs lacked standing;
(2) the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged the Tech
Companies “participated in a venture”; (3) the plaintiffs had
not adequately alleged forced labor or trafficking in forced
labor under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1590; and (4) 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595 does not apply extraterritorially. The plaintiffs
appealed.

                                II.

     Article III vests the judiciary with the power “to resolve
not questions and issues but ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Ariz.

1
 The district court also granted Dell’s motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, which the plaintiffs do not appeal.
                               8
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). The constitutional
requirement “that a case embody a genuine, live dispute
between adverse parties … prevent[s] the federal courts from
issuing advisory opinions.” Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493,
498 (2020). To ensure we stay within the judicial power, we
ask at the threshold whether a plaintiff has standing to sue. Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1998).

     We assess standing with reference to three elements. First,
the plaintiffs “must have suffered an injury in fact.” Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (cleaned up).
Second, the injury must be “fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent
action of some third party not before the court.” Id. (cleaned
up). Third, the injury must be redressable by a favorable
decision of the court. Id. at 561. Where, as here, the plaintiffs
seek damages and equitable relief, they must separately
demonstrate standing “for each claim … and for each form of
relief that is sought.” Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017) (cleaned up).

     The plaintiffs have established injury and causation for
both their damages claims and claims for injunctive relief.
While damages will redress the plaintiffs’ injuries, it is purely
speculative whether an injunction against the Tech Companies
would provide any redress. We therefore find standing only for
the damages claims.

                               A.

     At the outset, the plaintiffs have alleged an injury in fact
resulting from the forced labor. The plaintiffs include miners
who suffered serious physical injuries, as well as the
representatives of those who were injured or killed while
mining in the DRC. Physical injuries are “tangible” harms that
                              9
are “concrete and particularized.” See TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203–04 (2021); Pub. Citizen, Inc.
v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1292
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[P]hysical injuries … are plainly concrete
harms under the Supreme Court’s precedents.”). The plaintiffs
have thus satisfied the first element of Article III standing for
both damages and injunctive relief.

                               B.

     The parties dispute whether the plaintiffs have
demonstrated their injuries are “fairly traceable” to the actions
of the Tech Companies. Traceability or “‘causation’ in [the
Article III] context is something of a term of art, taking into
account not merely an estimate of effects but also
considerations related to the constitutional separation of
powers” and “the proper role of courts in the American
governmental structure.” Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809
F.2d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “Article III grants federal
courts the power to redress harms that defendants cause
plaintiffs, not a freewheeling power to hold defendants
accountable for legal infractions.” TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at
2205 (cleaned up).

     To be fairly traceable, there must be a “causal connection
between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged
injury.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984). The
chain of causation may not be “attenuated,” id. at 752, nor can
it “result[] from the independent action of some third party not
before the court,” Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 42 (1976). The Supreme Court has recognized,
however, that “Congress has the power to … articulate chains
of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
                               10
1549 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).

     The plaintiffs allege the TVPRA establishes the necessary
causal link because Congress has imposed liability on anyone
who knowingly benefits from “participation in a venture” that
uses forced labor. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Because the Tech
Companies allegedly participate in a venture with the cobalt
suppliers whose subsidiaries are responsible for the forced
labor, the plaintiffs maintain the Tech Companies are within
the statutory causal chain for liability.

     The parties dispute what constitutes “participation in a
venture” within the meaning of the TVPRA. But whether the
Tech Companies were in fact participating in a venture is not
part of the threshold jurisdictional inquiry; it is a question for
the merits, which we address below. See infra Part III. “[T]he
absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does
not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.” Steel Co., 523 U.S.
at 89. When assessing standing at the pleading stage, we
assume that the plaintiffs’ view of the statute is correct and that
they will be successful on the merits of their claim. Attias v.
CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017). For the
following reasons, we conclude the plaintiffs’ allegations are
sufficient to establish traceability under the TVPRA.

                                1.

     The TVPRA explicitly establishes civil liability for
perpetrators of forced labor and indirect liability for other
knowing participants. The Act extends to a person who
“knowingly benefits … by receiving anything of value from
participation in a venture which that person knew or should
have known has engaged in an act in violation of [federal
slavery and trafficking laws],” including the prohibition on
forced labor. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); see also id. § 1589. In the
                                11
TVPRA, “Congress created … [a] private right of action,
allowing plaintiffs to sue defendants who are involved
indirectly with slavery.” Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct.
1931, 1939 (2021) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1940
(noting “distinctions … in the TVPRA … between direct and
indirect liability”). The plaintiffs rely on this statutory chain of
causation to support their standing.

    Even though Congress has spoken, we must consider
whether the TVPRA’s indirect liability for participation in a
venture establishes a causal chain that satisfies Article III.
“Congress’s creation of a statutory prohibition or obligation
and a cause of action does not relieve courts of their
responsibility to independently decide whether a plaintiff has”
Article III standing. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2205.

     With respect to the injury in fact and redressability
requirements, the Court has looked to “both history and the
judgment of Congress.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Because
the case or controversy requirement is “grounded in historical
practice, it is instructive to consider whether” a claimed injury
“has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or
American courts. In addition, … [Congress’s] judgment is also
instructive and important.” Id. (cleaned up). Following Spokeo,
the Court assessed whether a statutory injury satisfied Article
III by considering “whether plaintiffs have identified a close
historical or common-law analogue for their asserted injury.”
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204. Similarly, in Uzuegbunam v.
Preczewski, history and common law were central to assessing
whether nominal damages satisfied Article III redressability.
141 S. Ct. 792, 797–98 (2021); see also id. at 805 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (“We should of course consult founding-era
decisions when discerning the boundaries of our jurisdiction,
for the Framers sought to limit the judicial power to ‘Cases’
                               12
and ‘Controversies,’ as those terms were understood at the
time.”).

     The Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed whether
or how the reasoning of Spokeo and TransUnion applies to the
fair traceability analysis when Congress has established a
statutory chain of causation. These decisions, however, rest on
the longstanding principle that Article III provides a
constitutional minimum that cannot be lowered by Congress.
And the Court has recognized it is at least sufficient to establish
Article III standing if a statutory injury has a close common
law or historical analogue. In TransUnion, for instance, the
Court had “no trouble concluding” that the plaintiffs who
“suffered a harm with a ‘close relationship’ to the harm
associated with the tort of defamation … suffered a concrete
harm that qualifies as an injury in fact.” 141 S. Ct. at 2209; see
also Uzuegbunam, 141 S. Ct. at 798 (explaining that because
“nominal damages historically could provide prospective
relief,” they satisfy the Article III redressability requirement).

     Assuming without deciding that the inquiry set forth in
Spokeo and TransUnion applies to the fairly traceable
requirement of standing, the TVPRA’s indirect liability for
“participation in a venture” satisfies the constitutional
minimum because it mirrors the aiding and abetting liability
long established at common law. Traditional aiding and
abetting liability has three elements: “(1) the party whom the
defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an
injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as
part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he
provides the assistance; [and] (3) the defendant must
knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.”
Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The
third element emphasizes the “assistance” to the tortfeasor,
                              13
which may be as simple as “advice or encouragement.” Id. at
478 (cleaned up).

     The TVPRA is similar. It applies to anyone who
“knowingly benefits … from participation in a venture” that
involves, among other things, forced labor. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595(a). Like aiding and abetting liability, the TVPRA
requires (1) a wrongful act that causes an injury, specifically
forced labor; (2) knowledge, as the defendant must knowingly
benefit; and (3) substantial assistance, namely participation in
the “venture.” The language of venture mirrors the “assistance”
required for aiding and abetting liability. Indeed, under the
common law, such liability attaches to “a joint venturer.”
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 474. Thus, in the TVPRA, Congress
created a causal link for venture liability that is a
“close … analogue” to common law aiding and abetting.
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204.

     To the extent that liability under the TVPRA may range
somewhat beyond the contours of traditional aiding and
abetting, Congress maintains some leeway when creating
statutory causes of action. An “exact duplicate in American
history and tradition” is unnecessary, and courts “must afford
due respect to Congress’s decision to impose a statutory
prohibition or obligation on a defendant.” Id. The TVPRA’s
causal chain for a “venture” has a “close relationship” to
lawsuits that would be cognizable in the English and American
courts. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. Congress’s decision to
establish such liability in the TVPRA is therefore consistent
with Article III.

    We conclude the plaintiffs have demonstrated causation
because they have alleged the Tech Companies are in a
“venture”—as the plaintiffs understand the TVPRA—with
Glencore, Huayou, Eurasian Resources, and their DRC
                               14
subsidiaries who are responsible for the forced labor. This
analysis applies equally to the claim for damages and
injunctive relief because the statute identifies the necessary
causal link between the plaintiffs’ injuries and the Tech
Companies’ actions.

                               2.

    The Tech Companies’ arguments to the contrary are
unavailing. Relying on the district court’s traceability analysis,
the Tech Companies insist the plaintiffs’ causal chain is
speculative and “flows through the independent actions of
multiple third parties.” Because forced labor in the DRC
depends on a network of local actors, the Companies maintain
they are “disconnected from the wrongdoers” and, as “end-
purchasers of a fungible metal,” they cannot be held
“responsible for the conditions” at the bottom of the global
supply chain.

     These arguments, however, blur the line between standing
and the merits. When evaluating “causation” for the purposes
of standing, we are not determining whether the Tech
Companies are responsible for the forced labor and physical
injuries of the miners in the sense of ultimate liability. The law
knows many types of causation, and Congress has latitude to
establish liability based on different causation requirements.
Article III does not constitutionalize a particular theory of tort
causation. See, e.g., Maine Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 70 F.4th 582, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“Article
III standing does not follow the causation principles of tort
law.”); Tozzi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 271 F.3d
301, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[W]e have never applied a ‘tort’
standard of causation to the question of traceability.”). At the
standing threshold, an injury need only be “fairly traceable” to
the actions of a defendant. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (cleaned up).
                              15
And here, the plaintiffs plausibly allege they are victims of
forced labor in part because of the Tech Companies’ demand
for cobalt and their business relationship with the offending
cobalt suppliers, and we assume for standing purposes that this
suffices for venture liability under the TVPRA.

      The Tech Companies in essence respond that, even if
forced labor in the DRC is in some loose sense traceable to the
Companies’ involvement in the supply chain, the TVPRA’s
indirect liability for participation in a venture falls below the
“fair traceability” floor of Article III standing. But as already
explained, in the TVPRA Congress recognized a causal link
between the injury of forced labor and actors who indirectly
facilitate it. And that legislative judgment accords with
longstanding common law liability for aiders and abettors.
Indirect venture liability loosens the causal chain, but there is
still a “fairly traceable” link between miners and the Tech
Companies sufficient for Article III standing.

                               C.

    We next turn to redressability, which requires showing that
the “injury … caused by the defendant [is] redressable by a
court order.” United States v. Texas, 143 S. Ct. 1964, 1970
(2023). While the plaintiffs have established redressability for
monetary damages, they have not done so for injunctive relief.

                               1.

     Redressability is straightforward for the plaintiffs’
damages claims, and the Tech Companies do not contest it. The
Supreme Court has recognized that suffering can be relieved,
to some extent, by compensation. “Compensatory damages are
intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has
suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.” State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416
                               16
(2003) (cleaned up); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 901 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (explaining that
“when the plaintiff has been harmed in body or mind, money
damages are no equivalent but are given to compensate the
plaintiff for the pain or distress”). A damages award redresses
a past injury and can make an appreciable difference in the
plaintiff’s position. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109
(1983); Attias, 865 F.3d at 629 (holding plaintiffs who suffered
past financial injury “can satisfy the redressability
requirement” because they can be “made whole by monetary
damages”). Thus, the plaintiffs have established standing for
their damages claims.

                               2.

     We next consider whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated
redressability for injunctive relief. The complaint does not
specify what type of injunction the plaintiffs seek, but before
the district court they requested an order prohibiting “the cobalt
venture from using forced child labor.” The parties have not
addressed whether injunctions are available in private suits
under the TVPRA. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (authorizing
private plaintiffs to “recover damages” but not speaking to
injunctive relief), with id. § 1595A(a) (authorizing injunctive
relief in civil actions brought by the Attorney General). But
even assuming an injunction is available, the plaintiffs have
failed to establish standing to seek one because enjoining the
Tech Companies would not redress the miners’ injuries.

     To meet the Article III minimum, the miners must
demonstrate it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan,
504 U.S. at 561 (cleaned up). “[U]nadorned speculation will
not suffice to invoke the federal judicial power.” Simon, 426
U.S. at 44. Moreover, standing to seek an injunction is difficult
                                 17
to establish when the effectiveness of relief depends on the
compliance of third parties not before the court. See Haaland
v. Brackeen, 143 S. Ct. 1609, 1638–39 (2023).

     The plaintiffs insist they have standing to seek injunctive
relief because the Tech Companies are in a “venture” with the
cobalt suppliers, and therefore the Tech Companies have
sufficient influence “to stop the cobalt venture from using
forced child labor.” But the plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate that an injunction would redress their injuries.
First, while the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is
entirely forward looking, they do not explicitly allege that any
of them are still miners. In fact, the complaint refers to them as
“former” child cobalt miners. The mere existence of past
injury, however, does not justify forward looking equitable
relief. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105–07; see also Dearth v. Holder,
641 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]here the plaintiffs
seek … injunctive relief, past injuries alone are insufficient to
establish standing.”). Because there are no allegations the
plaintiffs are still victims of forced labor, an injunction seeking
to end forced labor in the DRC would not appreciably affect
these plaintiffs’ position.2

    For several of the plaintiffs, the complaint does not specify
whether they might be able to continue mining despite their

2
 The plaintiffs hope to represent a class of “current and former child
workers.” But at the pleading stage, “[t]hat a suit may be a class
action adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named
plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they
personally” have Article III standing. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 n.6
(cleaned up); see also J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 1324 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (“[A]n absent class member’s individual standing will not
suffice [to establish standing].”).
                                 18
injuries.3 But even assuming that one or more miners could
benefit from forward looking relief, it is “entirely speculative”
whether an injunction running against the Tech Companies
would thwart forced child mining in the DRC. Allen, 468 U.S.
at 758. The plaintiffs suggest that the Tech Companies have
substantial market power and could simply insist the cobalt
suppliers stop using forced labor. But the plaintiffs allege no
facts suggesting that the Tech Companies have control over
informal mining operations and forced labor violations far
down the supply chain. The Tech Companies are five end-
purchasers of cobalt and not the only ones. “[A]ll other tech
and electric car companies in the world” require cobalt,
according to the plaintiffs. Because the complaint lacks any
allegations about what percentage of cobalt the Tech
Companies purchase from Glencore, Huayou, and Eurasian
Resources, it is impossible to say whether the cobalt suppliers’
subsidiaries will change their labor practices at the behest of
five clients or whether they will continue operations and sell
their cobalt to other buyers.

     Furthermore, as the plaintiffs recognize, many actors in
addition to the cobalt suppliers perpetuate labor trafficking,
including labor brokers, other consumers of cobalt, and even
the DRC government. Issuing an injunction to the Tech
Companies to “stop the cobalt venture from using forced child
labor” would not bind the direct perpetrators of the unlawful
labor, who are not before this court. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571
(plurality opinion) (concluding there was no redressability
where the relevant harms were caused by independent third
parties and it was “entirely conjectural” whether an injunction
against the defendant would change their behavior); cf.

3
  Plaintiff John Doe 7, for example, was allegedly shot through the
armpit and “can no longer lift with his left arm,” but his capacity to
mine in the future is unclear.
                                 19
Brackeen, 143 S. Ct. at 1638–39 (holding that plaintiffs lacked
standing to seek an injunction when the entities responsible for
the alleged illegality were not parties to the lawsuit).

     It is therefore “entirely speculative” whether the insistence
of the five Tech Companies to stop using forced labor would
end the use of forced labor by the cobalt suppliers, their
subsidiaries, and affiliates. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 758. Because
the plaintiffs have failed to show that an injunction against the
Tech Companies would appreciably redress their injuries,
injunctive relief would be largely hortatory and outside the
proper role of Article III.

                                III.

     Because the plaintiffs have standing for their damages
claims, we proceed to the merits. We review de novo the
district court’s dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6),
accepting the pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. Ofisi v. BNP Paribas, S.A.,
77 F.4th 667, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2023). We affirm the district
court’s dismissal because the plaintiffs have failed to plausibly
allege “participation in a venture.”4

     The plaintiffs claim the Tech Companies violated the
TVPRA by “knowingly benefit[ting] … from participation in a
venture” involving forced labor. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The
plaintiffs do not allege the Tech Companies directly violated
federal forced labor prohibitions. Nor do the plaintiffs allege
the Tech Companies directly controlled the mines where the

4
 Because we affirm on this ground, we do not address the district
court’s alternative holdings—which the Tech Companies defend on
appeal—(1) that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead forced labor
or labor trafficking under sections 1589 and 1590, and (2) that the
TVPRA does not apply extraterritorially.
                                  20
plaintiffs’ injuries occurred. Instead, the plaintiffs contend the
Tech Companies conducted business with companies who
facilitated forced labor. The plaintiffs also maintain the Tech
Companies, as major purchasers of cobalt, had sufficient
market power to dictate the conditions at the mines.

     The TVPRA does not define the terms “participation” or
“venture” for purposes of section 1595(a). Therefore, we begin
with the ordinary meaning of both terms. Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995). A “venture” is an
“undertaking that is dangerous, daring, or of uncertain
outcome,” or a “business enterprise involving some risk in
expectation of gain.” Venture, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000); see
also Venture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (an
“undertaking that involves risk,” especially—but not
exclusively—“a speculative commercial enterprise”).
“Participation” means “taking part or sharing in something.”
Participation, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra.
Together these definitions suggest an ordinary meaning of
“participation in a venture”: taking part or sharing in an
enterprise or undertaking that involves danger, uncertainty, or
risk, and potential gain.5

   The plaintiffs have not adequately alleged the Tech
Companies participated in a venture because there is no shared

5
  Instead of dictionary definitions, the plaintiffs argue we should rely
on a different section of federal trafficking law, which defines
“venture” as “any group of two or more individuals associated in
fact.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(6). But that definition applies only to sex
trafficking. Id. § 1591(e) (stating the ensuing definitions apply “[i]n
this section”). “[A]lthough we usually presume that Congress intends
phrases in the same statute to mean the same thing, the text of this
statute overcomes that presumption.” Doe v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21
F.4th 714, 724 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
                                 21
enterprise between the Companies and the suppliers who
facilitate forced labor. The Tech Companies own no interest in
their suppliers. Nor do the Tech Companies share in the
suppliers’ profits and risks. Although a formal business
relationship is not necessary to be a participant in a venture,
something more than engaging in an ordinary buyer-seller
transaction is required to establish “participation” in an
unlawful venture. The two groups here, by contrast, are on
opposite sides of an arms-length transaction: Glencore,
Huayou, and Eurasian Resources sell cobalt, and the Tech
Companies buy cobalt.

     The allegations here differ markedly from other cases
finding participation in a venture under the TVPRA. For
example, in Ricchio v. McLean, the defendant motel operators
rented a room to a man who repeatedly physically and sexually
abused a young woman as he “groom[ed] her for service as a
prostitute subject to his control.” 853 F.3d 553, 555 (1st Cir.
2017). The motel operators took actions beyond an arms-length
exchange with the abuser. They had a history of working with
the trafficker and, even after the “coercive and abusive
treatment of [the woman] as a sex slave had become apparent,”
the motel operators facilitated the operation and even
“demand[ed] further payment.” Id. In other words, they
acknowledged the illegal purpose of the relationship, shared in
the benefits and the risk, and controlled the premises on which
the scheme took place.6

   The Seventh Circuit also recently found a plausible
TVPRA violation based on close cooperation between business

6
  By contrast, in Doe v. Red Roof Inns, the Eleventh Circuit held that
plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege hotel franchisors participated in
an unlawful venture with their franchisees’ employees because the
franchisors did not take part in the “common undertaking of sex
trafficking.” 21 F.4th at 727.
                              22
entities. See G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th 544, 560
(7th Cir. 2023). The court held a plaintiff may plausibly allege
participation in a venture by showing a “continuous business
relationship” and “a desire to promote the wrongful venture’s
success.” Id. at 559–60 (cleaned up). But the alleged “business
relationship” was more than just a purchasing agreement. The
defendant Salesforce provided direct support, specific business
advice, and productivity enhancing software to Backpage.com,
which hosted prostitution ads, thereby “facilitat[ing] the
growth of … a business … whose business model was built
upon systematic and widespread violations of [federal sex
trafficking law].” Id. at 560–61.

     By contrast, the plaintiffs here have not alleged a factual
basis to infer a common purpose, shared profits and risk, or
control as in Ricchio, nor do they allege the Tech Companies
and the cobalt suppliers had the type of direct and continuous
relationship that existed between the parties in Salesforce. The
plaintiffs repeatedly stress that the Tech Companies had a “tacit
agreement” to regularly “obtain [their] cobalt” from suppliers
whose subsidiary mining companies employed forced labor.
The purported agreement, however, was merely to buy and sell
cobalt. And purchasing a commodity, without more, is not
“participation in a venture” with the seller.

     The plaintiffs also maintain that the Tech Companies are
different from ordinary buyers because they “have a
contractual right to inspect and … control” the cobalt suppliers.
As evidence of a supposed right to inspect, the plaintiffs allege
Apple performed a “third party audit” of Huayou after public
pressure about the use of forced labor. But a third-party
investigation is not evidence of a contractual right to inspect,
let alone evidence of control. Additionally, the plaintiffs claim
the Tech Companies “required” Glencore and Huayou to join
the Fair Cobalt Alliance, an “industry-led program in which the
                               23
companies monitor themselves.” And several of the companies
collaborated to fund a “model mining project” to demonstrate
progress the mines were making to be child labor free. But
these programs do not establish a joint venture either. The Tech
Companies may exhort their cobalt suppliers to employ
humane practices, and companies can mutually pledge to
follow better labor standards, but neither circumstance gives
buyers control over their suppliers or results in the sharing of
risks and rewards.

     Finally, the plaintiffs suggest that the possibility of
commercial pressure is enough to establish a “venture”
between a buyer and seller. They contend that, because the
Tech Companies constitute the “essential market” for cobalt,
the Companies could force changes in mining practices. The
only control apparent in the complaint, however, is the Tech
Companies’ right to stop purchasing cobalt. Even if we assume
that allegations of market power could show participation in a
venture, the plaintiffs’ allegations do not suffice to support this
theory. The plaintiffs allege only that the Tech Companies “and
other members of the venture now control at least 80-85 percent
of the DRC cobalt supply chain.” The purported “venture” at
least includes the Tech Companies, Glencore, Umicore,
Huayou, and Eurasian Resources, but it might include more
firms, and the relative power of each participant is never
specified. Moreover, the plaintiffs offer no facts to suggest how
much of the suppliers’ cobalt was purchased by the Tech
Companies as opposed to other members of the venture or other
global buyers. Without more specific allegations, the question
is whether the Tech Companies’ purchasing an unspecified
amount of cobalt from a supply chain originating in DRC mines
plausibly demonstrates “participation in a venture” with
anyone engaged in forced labor in that supply chain. We hold
that it does not.
                              24
                             IV.

     With respect to their common law claims for unjust
enrichment, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the plaintiffs’ only merits argument on
appeal is that, because the Tech Companies were in a venture
with the cobalt suppliers, a co-venturer would be sufficiently
connected to the acts to be jointly and severally liable for the
common law tort claims. As we agree with the district court
that the Tech Companies failed to allege participation in a
venture, we affirm dismissal of the common law claims as well.

                             ***

     The plaintiffs have standing for their damages claims, but
not their claims for injunctive relief. Because the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim under the TVPRA or the common law,
however, we affirm the district court’s dismissal on these
grounds.

                                                    So ordered.