Court Opinion

ID: 9533673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:33:50.32615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:07.085912
License: Public Domain

WINDES, Justice
(dissenting).
I concur in the decision of the majority that the writ of certiorari must be quashed for the reason that the state had the right to appeal from the judgment setting aside the conviction but must disagree with the ruling that the respondent superior court had no jurisdiction to render such judgment. The basis of the majority opinion that the respondent had no power to entertain and rule upon the motion to set aside the conviction is that since the judgment of conviction appears regular on its face as a conviction of an adult, it carries with it a presumption of regularity as applied to the conviction of a juvenile and, to overcome the presumption, an affirmative showing must be made of an irregularity that would render the conviction void.
In my opinion this is legally unsound for two reasons. In the first place, if any presumption of regularity is to be used, it should be applied to the judgment of respondent setting aside the judgment of conviction and not applied to the judgment of conviction. Secondly, if it were the law that the record before Judge Patterson must affirmatively show an irregularity in the proceeding resulting in the judgment of conviction, the majority have unwittingly *242misinterpreted the record in holding there is nothing therein to show the proceedings leading to the conviction of the proven juvenile were irregular. As will hereinafter appear the record before us shows without possibility of contradiction that the prosecution of the juvenile was irregular and void.
The superior court when called upon to set aside a former void judgment is acting as a court of general jurisdiction. The power and jurisdiction to hear a motion to set aside a claimed void judgment is a common-law power and is not limited in any way by either statute or constitution. Under such conditions jurisdiction is presumed and one attacking the judgment must affirmatively show lack of jurisdiction. Applying this rule to Judge Patterson’s judgment setting aside the former conviction, we start with the presumption he had jurisdiction and when the state attacks that judgment, as it has by its petition for certiorari, it must show this court that the lower court had no power to rule upon the motion. This it has not and cannot do. The court had jurisdiction of the subject matter in an application to set aside; it had jurisdiction of the parties; and it had the power to make the kind of judgment rendered — a judgment setting aside a former judgment. Whether it was right or wrong in appraisal of the pleadings or evidence has no bearing on the question of jurisdiction. At most it could only be judicial error. If the majority’s decision be sound that the court has no jurisdiction nor power to enter upon an inquiry and make a ruling if the petition to set aside or the evidence in support thereof does not justify the conclusion, it means in effect that when a court of general jurisdiction is presented a complaint which does not state a cause of action or after trial it is presented with a situation where there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment, it has no power nor jurisdiction to rule thereon. This of course is not the law in any jurisdiction. Judge Patterson had the power and jurisdiction to make a ruling on the motion and if wrong, it must be corrected on appeal.
The majority erroneously applies the presumption of regularity to the judgment of conviction which was set aside. The superior court’s jurisdiction and power to prosecute a juvenile as an adult is not that of a court of general unlimited jurisdiction, but its jurisdiction under such circumstances is limited by both Article 6, section 6 of the Arizona constitution and A.R.S., section 8-202 and section 8-223 (formerly sections 46-101, 102, A.C.A.1939; 1928 Code, sections 1928, 1929). Under the constitutional provision, before a juvenile may be prosecuted criminally, the superior court “nmst” hold a hearing in chambers to determine whether he shall or shall not be prosecuted. This is a jurisdictional prerequisite to his prosecution as an adult. Wade v. Warden of State Prison, 14S Me. 120, 73 A. *2432d 128. Under the statute when a juvenile is charged in the justice court the justice’s power is limited. He cannot proceed with a preliminary hearing and bind the juvenile over to the superior court but can only certify him to the superior court in order that it may exercise its exclusive, original jurisdiction over the juvenile and decide whether he shall or shall not be prosecuted. If the superior court decides he shall be prosecuted, then and only then has the justice court power to proceed with a preliminary hearing and bind him over for prosecution. The certification to the superior court is a jurisdictional prerequisite for the magistrate to proceed. No such certificate appears in the record nor is there a record that an examination in chambers was had. To apply the presumption of regularity to the criminal prosecution when it is proven that a juvenile was prosecuted is error. When a court’s jurisdiction is limited by constitution or statute, the presumption of regularity cannot be invoked. 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, section 419, page 81. This text states:
“The general presumption in favor of such jurisdiction applies to judgments rendered by superior courts of general jurisdiction acting within the ordinary scope of that jurisdiction, and as to such courts it is commonly said that jurisdiction need not appear upon the record. As to courts of limited powers and special or inferior jurisdiction, a different rule prevails. There is no presumption that a judgment rendered by such a court is within its jurisdiction.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In fact when a court is sitting in a matter wherein its powers are limited, its jurisdiction must affirmatively be shown or affirmatively appear of record. State ex rel. Parsons v. Bushong, 92 Ohio App. 101, 109 N.E.2d 692; 31 Am.Jur., section 419, supra, and authorities cited therein.
Under the law as cited above, when it is proven that a juvenile has been prosecuted criminally, this court has no right to presume that the statutory proceedings of the justice court in binding the juvenile over for prosecution were regular or that the constitutionally required hearing in chambers was held. Actually, the state makes no contention that the justice’s certificate was issued or that such preliminary proceedings were had. The petition attacks the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the ground that the board of pardons and paroles, the state bureau of identification and thé state prison were never served with the motion to set aside the conviction. The basis of the state’s argument in its brief is that the juvenile failed to advise the court he was underage and for this reason cannot be heard to question the validity of his conviction. In effect the state in its brief admits no such juvenile hearing was had. Therein it says:
*244“Under the circumstances of this case, where the defendant Boh Crosby failed to advise the Court of his true age, if in fact he was under the age of 18, then the defendant could not later object to the jurisdiction of the Court.”
The state likewise says:
“It must be presumed from the record that the Court relied on the defendant’s representations or his appearance and determined him to be over 18 years of age.”
The respondent court found as facts that the defendant in the criminal prosecution was charged with the crime in the justice court, a preliminary hearing was had and he was bound over to the superior court without certifying the matter to the superior court as required by statute; and further found that the superior court held no hearing in chambers as required by the constitution to determine whether he should be prosecuted. The majority say these facts as found are not true because there is nothing in the record to support them. There is ample evidence to support such findings. The record shows a criminal complaint filed in the justice court at Seligman on September 9th and preliminary hearing and order binding him over to answer the charge on the same date complaint was filed. The record does not reflect the certificate referring the defendant to the superior court as required by the statute. The. majority say no irregularity affirmatively appearing, it will presume everything was regular and the defendant was certified to the superior court as a juvenile. This certificate for the purpose of a hearing by the superior court must of necessity precede the preliminary hearing and binding over for prosecution. We take judicial knowledge that the distance from Seligman to Prescott where the superior court sits is approximately 75 miles. Just how it was physically possible to file a complaint, certify to the superior court that the defendant was a juvenile, get back the result of the superior court hearing in chambers and the decision as to whether defendant should be prosecuted, and thereafter hold the preliminary hearing, all in one day is not explained by the majority opinion. The plain fact is it could not and did not happen. The presumption of regularity in the prosecution of the defendant as a juvenile creates a fact that the record demonstrates to be false. Even if this impossibility did not exist, the mere absence of any record of the justice’s certificate or the hearing in chambers is evidence that no such incidents occurred. The trial court on this record was not only justified but compelled to find that defendant was not certified to the superior court for preliminary hearing in chambers by the superior court judge.
STRUCKMEYER, J., concurs in the foregoing dissent.