Court Opinion

ID: 9793854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:54:26.849552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:43.067572
License: Public Domain

Justice MULLARKEY,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that “the information contained in [Detective Richter’s] affidavit was not sufficient to establish that probable cause existed to search Titus’ residence.” Maj. op. at 151. I disagree. In my view, under the totality of the circumstances, the county court had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed in this case. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s ruling suppressing evidence seized during the search of the defendant’s home.
Detective Richter’s affidavit contains several important facts supporting the issuance *155of a search warrant.1 First, the affidavit states that a citizen informant, Crime Stopper # 1789E, named the defendant as a suspected dealer in “large amounts of marijuana” from his residence at 716 Arcadia Place. To support this allegation, Crime Stopper # 1789E reported that a high volume of traffic visited the defendant’s residence for short periods of time, usually in the evening and on the weekends.2 In connection with this allegation, Crime Stopper # 1789E provided Detective Richter with the license plate numbers and vehicle descriptions of 47 vehicles which had visited the defendant’s residence during a one month period.
Second, the affidavit states that Crime Stopper # 1789E reported having “smelled the odor of burned marijuana” coming from the defendant’s house “on several occasions.” Crime Stopper # 1789E also told Detective Richter that she3 was “familiar with the smell of burning marijuana, as [she] had been exposed to marijuana in the past, through acquaintances.”
Third, the affidavit describes a conversation between a confidential police informant (the Cl) and the defendant on August 22, 1993, during which the Cl asked the defendant whether he could purchase from him “a quarter” or “an eighth.”4 After the Cl asked, “Can I get some later, if I bring Mimi?” the defendant responded, “We’ll see, if you bring Mimi.” When the Cl again asked for a quarter ounce of marijuana, the defendant stated, “That’s something I won’t do ... I’ve got hard and pat rules about that.” The Cl then told the defendant that “I want to get high, man,” to which the defendant responded, “I can’t do it ... bring Mimi.” Eventually, after the Cl continued to discuss the purchase of marijuana, the defendant stated that “to this date in my life I’ve dealt with a very select group of people ... I don’t need new customers ... so, bring Mimi.”
Finally, the affidavit describes the efforts made by Detective Richter to corroborate some of the information reported by Crime Stopper # 1789E. Detective Richter cheeked the license plate numbers provided by Crime Stopper # 1789E and found that they matched the descriptions of the vehicles given by Crime Stopper # 1789E. He also conducted surveillance on the defendant’s residence on three separate occasions, “each time for approximately 30 minutes to one hour, in the early evening,” but did not observe any possible marijuana purchasers entering or leaving the premises. Finally, Richter inspected the reports given by Crime Stopper # 1789E and found that many of the vehicles which she identified had gone to the defendant’s residence “on an every other day basis.”
In my view, the above information adequately supports the county court’s decision to issue a search warrant in this case. In arriving at the opposite conclusion, the majority attempts to discredit the information provided in Detective Richter’s affidavit. For example, in section III A of its opinion, the majority holds that the conversation between the Cl and the defendant regarding the proposed purchase of “a quarter” or “an *156eighth” from the defendant “does not — either by itself or when considered with the other evidence — establish probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant for Titus’ residence.” Maj. op. at 151. This is so, according to the majority, because “[n]o sale ever took place, and Titus made no agreement to sell marijuana to the police informant passing as a buyer.” Id. at 151.
The majority fails to recognize, however, that the conversation between the Cl and the defendant provides information highly relevant to the probable cause calculus despite the fact that an actual purchase of marijuana did not occur. The statements made by the defendant to the Cl, when read in context, support a reasonable inference that marijuana may be located in the defendant’s home. For example, the Cl’s references to “a quarter,” “an eighth” and his statement that he wanted to “get high” clearly indicate that the conversation with the defendant concerned the proposed purchase of marijuana. The only reasonable interpretation of the defendant’s remarks is that, should the Cl return later with “Mimi,” the defendant would then sell him the marijuana he requested. Even the majority concedes that the defendant’s statements to the Cl “create an inference that Titus was engaged in criminal activi-ty_” Id. at 151. Accordingly, such statements by the defendant provide strong support for the issuance of the search warrant.5
The majority also attempts to downplay, in part III B of its opinion, Crime Stopper # 1789E’s report of a high volume of vehicle traffic for short periods of time at the defendant’s residence. See maj. op. at 151. In dismissing this information as effectively irrelevant to the probable cause determination, the majority states that “[t]he fact that a large number of people visit a residence in a one-month period does not establish that illegal activity is taking place.” Id. It further notes that “there must be something more than the mere fact that people are coming and going in order to support the belief that criminal activity is occurring.” Id. Although I agree that a high volume of vehicle traffic at a residence for short periods of time does not establish, by itself, probable cause to search the residence, such an observation is a relevant factor in support of a finding of probable cause. See, e.g., People v. Abeyta, 795 P.2d 1324, 1328-29 (Colo.1990) (noting that numerous vehicles were observed making brief stops to enter residence where marijuana dealing was suspected); People v. Delgado, 832 P.2d 971, 974 (Colo. App.1991) (observation of “a high volume of short term visitors” at a residence where cocaine dealing was suspected supported probable cause); see also United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir.1992) (citing as a relevant factor for purposes of probable cause the “unusually high volume of visitors briefly entering and leaving [the defendant’s] residence, consistent with drug trafficking”). The majority seems satisfied that the high volume of short-term traffic at the defendant’s residence is entirely innocuous simply because the defendant operated a telephone repair business out of his home. Maj. op. at 151. What the majority fails to mention, however, is that the affidavit clearly indicates that this traffic was observed in the evening hours and on weekends. Although it is possible that some of this evening and weekend traffic was related to the defendant’s legitimate business activities, it is equally, if not more, reasonable to infer from the information in the affidavit that such traffic was the product of marijuana trafficking occurring at that residence.
*157The majority also questions the relevance of Detective Richter’s corroboration of the license plate numbers and vehicle descriptions provided by Crime Stopper #1789E. See id. at 151-52. Once again, although I agree with the majority that the “matching of vehicle license plate numbers with vehicle descriptions [is] not the kind of ‘police corroboration’ that would serve to establish probable cause in this ease,” id. at 152 (emphasis added), I disagree with the majority’s wholesale dismissal of such efforts by Detective Richter. Independent police corroboration of the existence of the vehicles described by Crime Stopper # 1789E certainly strengthens the veracity of that informant’s tip, and, as such, constitutes additional support for the issuance of a search warrant in this case. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244-45, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2335-36, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (“It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that ‘corroboration through other sources of information reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale’....”).
I also question the reasons provided by the majority to support its conclusion, in part III C of its opinion, that Crime Stopper # 1789E’s statement that she smelled burning marijuana coming from the defendant’s residence “on several occasions” adds little to the probable cause calculus. Id. at 152. For example, the majority cites the defendant’s briefs for the proposition that “there is no evidence that [Crime Stopper # 1789E] is knowledgeable about the identification of smells.” Id. As a factual matter, this statement is misleading because Crime Stopper # 1789E did tell Detective Richter that she was specifically familiar with the odor of burning marijuana based on past exposure. More problematic, however, is the implication here that a citizen informant’s first-hand sensory observations add little, if anything, to the probable cause equation unless it has been established that the informant has some formal expertise in the particular area (e.g., in the “identification of smells”). Id. Where, as in this case, the odor alleged to have been detected is the distinctive smell of burning marijuana, considerable weight should be given to an informant’s statement that he or she recognizes such an odor from personal experience. See, e.g., United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir.1993) (“The smell of burnt marijuana would lead a person of ordinary caution to believe the passenger compartment might contain marijuana.”); United States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d 761, 764-65 (9th Cir.1992) (distinguishing between the distinctive odor of burned marijuana and the less pungent odor of planted marijuana, which requires a trained or experienced person to detect); United States v. Pond, 523 F.2d 210, 213 (2d Cir.1975) (“It cannot be disputed that marijuana has a distinctive pungent odor....”), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1058, 96 S.Ct. 794, 46 L.Ed.2d 649 (1976); United States v. Barron, 472 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir.1973) (holding that where an agent “familiar with the odor of marijuana” smells such an odor emanating from an automobile, that fact alone is sufficient to establish probable cause to search for marijuana), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920, 93 S.Ct. 3063, 37 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1973); People v. Baker, 813 P.2d 331, 333 (Colo.1991) (“In this case, the officers had probable cause to believe a crime was being committed when they smelled burned marijuana.”). Although a more detailed explanation of Crime Stopper # 1789E’s experience with the odor of burnt marijuana would have made the tip even stronger, a showing of specific olfactory expertise is not required under the “totality of the circumstances” test. Accordingly, Crime Stopper # 1789E’s statements as to the odor of marijuana emanating from the defendant’s residence constitute additional support for the issuance of the search warrant.
I am further troubled by the implication in the majority opinion that Crime Stopper # 1789E’s claim to have smelled burning marijuana coming from the defendant’s residence is somehow less relevant to the probable cause determination simply because it does not “support the conclusion that Titus was selling marijuana out of his home.” Maj. op. at 152 (emphasis in original). The question presented before the issuing judge in this case was whether the affidavit in support of the warrant alleged “sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that contraband or other evidence of criminal activity is located at the *158place to be searched.” Pate, 878 P.2d at 689 (emphasis added); People v. Arellano, 791 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Colo.1990). Thus, an informant’s claim that a suspect is using marijuana in his residence or is merely storing it there for someone else supports the issuance of a warrant to search the premises, even if such statements do not compel the conclusion that the suspect is actually selling marijuana from his home. See Pate, 878 P.2d at 692 n. 15.
Finally, although the majority acknowledges that the information in the affidavit must be evaluated under the “totality of the circumstances,” maj. op. at 150, it appears to have considered the weight of each relevant fact individually, without considering the impact of the affidavit as a whole. The opinion divides analysis of the affidavit into three separate subsections, with no discussion of whether a judge presented with all of the information in the affidavit would have a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to search the defendant’s home. The Gates Court specifically discouraged such “excessively technical dissection 'of tips, with undue attention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate.” 462 U.S. at 234-35, 103 S.Ct. at 2330. Although I agree with the majority that none of the individual facts presented in the affidavit, by itself, establishes a substantial basis for the issuance of the warrant, the affidavit viewed as a whole does support the county court’s decision.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
ROVIRA, C.J., and LOHR, J., join in this dissent.

. Our analysis is limited to the information contained within the four comers of the affidavit. People v. Pate, 878 P.2d 685, 690 (Colo.1994). Thus, the majority's reference to a statement made by counsel for the defendant at the suppression hearing (that the citizen informant allegedly had a “ 'long-standing feud’ with Titus") is misplaced. Maj. op. at 150. The question before us is whether the issuing judge, and not the trial judge reviewing the motion to suppress, had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.

. According to the affidavit, Crime Stopper # 1789E described this heavy vehicular traffic as "very inconvenient to those living in the immediate area, as 716 Arcadia Place does rest in a cul-de-sac.”

. The majority uses the pronoun “she” to refer to Crime Stopper # 1789E. The only indication in the record as to the gender of Crime Stopper # 1789E are references, made by counsel for the defendant at the suppression hearing, to “this lady" and "her" statements to the police about the defendant. Although counsel for the defendant characterized Crime Stopper # 1789E as female, the informant's identity has not been disclosed in these proceedings (the affidavit uses the plural "they” to refer to the informant). For purposes of consistency, I will also refer to Crime Stopper # 1789E as "she” or “her.”

. The affidavit explains that the terms “a quarter" and "an eighth” refer to a quarter ounce and an eighth ounce of marijuana.

. I also question the meaning of footnote three of the majority opinion. In that footnote, the majority states that although the tape recording of the conversation between the Cl and the defendant "is not a part of this appeal,” it nevertheless "recognize[s] that the defendant's brief to this court asserts that the affidavit does not accurately relate the conversation that took place between Titus and the informant.” Maj. op. at 149 n. 3 (emphasis added). It is unclear to me how the majority's legal analysis of this case is affected by its decision to "recognize” the defendant’s argument. The question presented in this interlocutory appeal is whether the issuing judge, based, on the information contained in the affidavit, had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed to search the defendant's home. Furthermore, the defendant does not claim that any of the information contained in the affidavit is false; rather, he simply claims that Detective Richter should not have explained in the affidavit that “a quarter” and "an eighth” are common references to quantities of marijuana.