Court Opinion

ID: 9681485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:51:22.962587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.194498
License: Public Domain

CARVER, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority on the merits of this appeal, but dissent to the majority’s *614decision to remand this case, since remand rewards the contractor for failing to meet its burden of proof and subjects the owner, who conscientiously followed long-established precedent, to the expense, time and risk of a second trial. This record presents no equitable reason for such “double jeopardy”, and without reason of any kind, affords contractor “an opportunity for another ‘bite at the apple,’” as forbidden by Owen v. Brown, 447 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex.1969). I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment for Owner.
The majority finds that remand “will subserve better the interests of justice” because “the jury was supportive of Contractor’s case.” The majority therefore concludes that “to render judgment would be to frustrate] the clear intent of the jury that Contractor recover a sum of money from Owner and would be exacting a forfeiture of Contractor’s cause of action.” In reaching this conclusion, the majority neglects crucial facts which demonstrate that the “interests of justice” would only be served by rendering judgment.
First, there is no basis for remand where trial of a case is “based upon well-established law.” University of Texas System v. Sckieffer, 588 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The Texas Supreme Court has remanded cases in the interest of justice when the law on which a case had been tried had been changed between the time of trial and appeal. Jackson v. Ewton, 411 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex.1967). Thus, remand was proper in the Atkinson case itself, where the court established a new rule. The Atkinson parties were given the opportunity to reformulate their case in obedience to a principle which did not exist at the time of their original trial. The equitable reason for initially granting a remand, however, does not extend to cases tried under Atkinson sixty years later, when the relevant principles have become well-settled law.
Second, it was Contractor who failed to meet his burden of proof and Owner who tried to correct the error. Owner recognized that an issue on the cost of repair, an essential element of contractor's recovery under Atkinson, was missing and brought the omission to both Contractor’s and the trial court’s attention twice by its objection to the charge and by its motion to correct judgment. Owner thus tried to act in accordance with clear and well-settled law. The trial court responded by erroneously overruling Owner’s objection and motion. It is clearly inequitable to punish Owner for errors induced by Contractor’s own failure to obey Supreme Court precedent.
Third, Owner’s objection to the improper submission distinguishes this case from each case cited by the majority as authority for remand. None of the cases cited by the majority reflect that a similar objection was made, e.g., Williams v. Meyer, 629 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1982, writ dism’d) (owner waived objection to improper submission), and each case had additional equitable factors supporting remand, e.g. Turner, Collie & Braden v. Brookhollow, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 160 (Tex.1982) (issue had been submitted on cost of repair, but incorrect formula was used). Thus, none of the eases cited by the majority are directly controlling in determining “equity” under the present record.
Finally, Contractor’s only argument on appeal regarding his failure to properly submit his case is that Atkinson places an unfair burden on conractors. This argument was squarely rejected in Vance v. My Apartment Steakhouse of San Antonio, 677 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.1984), as noted by the majority. Contractor makes no argument that the case was not fully developed or that the case was tried on the wrong theo*615ry, the traditional instances where remand is permitted. See National Life and Accident Insurance v. Blagg, 438 S.W.2d 905, 911 (Tex.1969).
I would hold, therefore, that Contractor should not be rewarded for failure to try his lawsuit correctly at the expense of Owner, who did. I would follow the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Jackson, Blagg and Owen, and of this Court in Dawson v. Garcia, 666 S.W.2d 254, 261 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, no writ). Dawson holds:
[Appellees] did not join [appellant] in the objection to the combined improper submission. We conclude that justice does not require a remand. [Appellees] had the opportunity through objection to do it right the first time. They declined that opportunity. A remand under these circumstances would merely afford [appellees] an opportunity for another “bite at the apple.” See Owen v. Brown, 447 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex.1969). We conclude, therefore, that judgment for [ap-pellees] on these issues should be reversed and rendered.
Consequently, I would join in the reversal of the judgment of the trial court but would render judgment here for Owner.