Court Opinion

ID: 9763690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:52:25.570811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:48.350446
License: Public Domain

BLEIL, Justice,
dissenting.
No evidence supports our holding that substantial evidence exists to support a finding that Charles Gulden’s actions did not constitute misconduct. No precedent supports our holding that the supervisory directive was unreasonable. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Section 7.4(d) of the City's Personnel Rules provides that refusal to comply with instructions or orders from a supervisor is grounds for discharge. Gulden refused to assist in the investigation of the bomb threat by not taking a polygraph examination as directed.
The record reveals that the appeals referee found the following:
“The claimant in the instant case was discharged because he refused to submit to a polygraph examination when requested to do so by the employer. The examination was to be administered to all employees in the claimant’s department in an investigation of a bomb threat made to the City of Dallas Credit Union. The employer’s request was not unreasonable, and the claimant’s refusal to cooperate in the investigation constituted insubordination. The claimant was discharged for misconduct connected with his work, and a disqualification under § 5(b) of the Act is in order....”
On the same record before the referee, a majority of the Texas Employment Commission determined that a claimant would not be considered guilty of misconduct connected with the work for refusing to take a polygraph examination, because he had not agreed to take the examination when he was hired. The opinion of the dissenting member of the Texas Employment Commission was that a claimant such as Gulden, who refuses a reasonable request to take a polygraph examination should be considered guilty of misconduct connected with the work and should be disqualified under the terms of § 5(b) of the Act.
The Commission, the trial court, and the majority of this Court, attach undue significance to the fact that Gulden was not advised, at the time of his employment, that there was a possibility of his being subjected to a polygraph examination. There are innumerable unimaginable acts of misconduct which might disqualify one from unemployment compensation benefits. It would be impossible for an employer to envision every possible circumstance constituting misconduct in order to relate them to an employee before employment. The majority would have all employers be prophets. The foundation of the majority’s opinion is the fact that Gulden was not told before he was hired that there was a possibility of being subjected to a polygraph test. This foundation is built on shifting sand.
The test adopted, for whether or not a rule or directive is a reasonable one, is also suspect. The majority seems to hold that courts should follow a completely subjective standard, applied from the point of view of the employee. I disagree. Rule 7.4(d) is not attacked as unreasonable. Whether the supervisor’s directive that he take a polygraph test was reasonable in light of the prior pranks within Gulden’s department, the serious bomb threat and the City’s need to eliminate that sort of incident, is the issue. The issue is not whether the employee’s insubordination was unreasonable, viewed through his eyes and in light of the circumstances facing him.
Under the circumstances of the employer his directive to the prank-prone members of the right-of-way section was reasonable. The circumstances were that a bomb threat *553was being investigated by the City. Gulden’s employer needed him to assist in the investigation. He knew his employer needed his help in this serious matter. His refusal to follow the directive given him was insubordination under the personnel rules and misconduct under the unemployment statute.
This Court in Texas Employment Commission v. Ryan, 481 S.W.2d 172, 177 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1972, no writ), indicated that the statute comprehends more than misconduct in the performance of the work; it requires abstinence from conduct that would justify an employer in discharging an employee. Gulden certainly did not abstain from conduct that would justify his employer in discharging him, but rather he engaged in precisely the type of misconduct contemplated by the statute. It was further an act of willful disregard of the employer’s interest, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, and a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect. This conduct is proscribed by similar legislation in other states. Hickenbottom v. District of Columbia, 273 A.2d 475, 477 (D.C.App.1970).
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.