Court Opinion

ID: 9376250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-02 16:00:38.915864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:05.531343
License: Public Domain

21-6526
     Campbell v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                           A215 929 051

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 2nd day of March, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            ROBERT D. SACK,
 9            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   RAYON UINARDO CAMPBELL,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                     v.                                        21-6526
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                   Rayon Uinardo Campbell, pro se,
25                                     Poughkeepsie, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian M. Boynton, Principal
28                                     Deputy Assistant Attorney General;
 1                              Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant
 2                              Director; Elizabeth M. Dewar,
 3                              Trial Attorney, Office of
 4                              Immigration Litigation, United
 5                              States Department of Justice,
 6                              Washington, DC.
 7
 8       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11   is DISMISSED.

12       Petitioner Rayon Uinardo Campbell, a native and citizen

13   of Jamaica, seeks review of a September 21, 2021, decision of

14   the BIA denying his motion to reopen.     In re Rayon Uinardo

15   Campbell, No. A 215 929 051 (B.I.A. Sept. 21, 2021).        We

16   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

17   procedural history.

18        We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for

19   abuse of discretion.   Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138,

20   168–69 (2d Cir. 2008).    The BIA abuses its discretion when

21   it “provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs

22   from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or

23   contains only summary or conclusory statements.”      Qin Wen

24   Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation

25   marks omitted).

                                   2
1          The BIA denied Campbell’s motion to reopen to apply for

2    voluntary departure because his evidence of reduced criminal

3    charges would not change the discretionary determination that

4    he did not merit voluntary departure.               See INS v. Abudu, 485

5    U.S. 94, 104–05 (1988) (“[I]n cases in which the ultimate

6    grant of relief is discretionary . . . , the BIA may leap

7    ahead . . . over the two threshold concerns (prima facie case

8    and   new    evidence/reasonable           explanation),       and     simply

9    determine that even if they were met, the movant would not be

10   entitled    to   the    discretionary          grant   of   relief.”).     Our

11   jurisdiction to consider a motion to reopen tied to the grant

12   of discretionary relief is limited to constitutional claims

13   and colorable questions of law.                Juras v. Garland, 21 F.4th

14   53, 61 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that jurisdiction to review

15   motions to reopen tied to discretionary relief is limited

16   because more expansive review would “provide an improper

17   backdoor” to challenging a removal order (quotation marks

18   omitted)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D).

19         Campbell   has    not     raised     a    constitutional    claim     or

20   colorable   question      of    law.       Campbell    does    not   have    a

21   colorable   claim      that    the   BIA   engaged     in   improper     fact-

                                            3
 1   finding, as the BIA was required to address the new evidence

 2   he presented and was allowed to determine whether it would

 3   change the exercise of discretion.          See Abudu, 485 U.S. at

 4   104–05.     In   addressing   whether   a   favorable   exercise   of

 5   discretion is warranted, the agency may consider a criminal

 6   complaint, and Campbell did not dispute the allegations that

 7   he was involved, only the level of responsibility he had for

 8   the victim’s injuries and that he had a gun.            See 8 U.S.C.

 9   § 1229a(c)(4) (placing burden on applicant to show favorable

10   exercise of discretion is warranted); Padmore v. Holder, 609

11   F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We do not challenge the Board’s

12   authority to review police reports and complaints, even if

13   containing hearsay and not a part of the formal record of

14   conviction because such documents are appropriately admitted

15   for   the   purposes    of    considering    an   application      for

16   discretionary relief.” (quotation marks omitted)).          “We lack

17   jurisdiction to review any claim that an IJ or the BIA erred

18   in weighing the factors relevant to the grant or denial of”

19   discretionary relief.        Guyadin v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 465,

20   468-69 (2d Cir. 2006).

21

22
                                       4
1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2   DISMISSED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED

3   and stays VACATED.

4                               FOR THE COURT:
5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                               Clerk of Court

                                  5