Court Opinion

ID: 9631725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:47:37.73891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:41.595312
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in that part of the Court’s opinion affirming the trial court’s determination that there was no prevailing party for purposes of awarding costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1).
I respectfully dissent from that part of the Court’s opinion in which the Court holds that it is not necessary for the lessor to be a prevailing party in order to obtain attorney fees and costs because of a clause in the lease.
First, not even FCB and the Ketterlings assert the view adopted by the Court on this issue. On appeal, FCB and the Ketterlings do not contend that they were entitled to attorney fees and costs under the terms of the lease if they were not the prevailing parties. In their brief, FCB and the Ketterlings contend:
The written lease upon which plaintiffs obtained an order for possession contains the following term:
In the event that the lessor does find it necessary to bring suit or action under the terms of this lease, then the lessee hereby agrees to pay the lessor’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of suit incurred in said suit or action. (R., p. 20).
When an award of attorneys fees is sought based on the terms of a contract, *570it is unnecessary for the prevailing party to meet the restrictive criteria for an award of attorneys fees contained in Rule 54(e)(1). See Bank of Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 336, 647 P.2d 776 (App.1982). Based upon the clear contractual term of this farm lease and FCB’s status as a prevailing party, FCB was entitled to costs and attorney’s fees.
Appellants’ Brief 12 (emphasis added).
FCB and the Ketterlings argue only that they were entitled to costs and attorney fees because they were prevailing parties. It is inappropriate for the Court to address whether they are entitled to costs and attorney fees even if they are not prevailing parties. The issue was not presented by FCB and the Ketterlings.
In addition, even if the issue were properly before the Court, under the long-standing rules that this Court has followed, the lessor is not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs unless the lessor is the prevailing party.
This is not a case in which FCB and the Ketterlings sought damages from the Wissels equal to their attorney fees and costs based on a breach of the clause in the lease providing for the payment of these amounts. This is a case in which FCB and the Ketterlings sought to have the trial court award costs and attorney fees to them under the statutes and rules of civil procedure of this state.
Blackstone gives the history of the award of costs at common law:
Thus much for judgments; to which costs are a necessary appendage; it being now as well the maxim of ours as of the civil law, that “victus victori in ex-pensis condemnandus est ” (he who loses the suit pays costs to his adversary): though the common law did not professedly allow any, the amercement of the vanquished party being his only punishment. The first statute which gave costs, eo nomine (by that name), to the defendant in a real action was the statute of Glouscester, 6 Edw. I, c. 1, as did the statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. Ill, c. 6, to the defendant in one particular case, relative to wardship in chivalry: though in reality costs were considered and included in the quantum of damages, in such actions where damages are given: and, even now, costs for the plaintiff are always entered on the roll as increase of damages by the court. But, because those damages were frequently inadequate to the plaintiff’s expenses, the statute of Gloucester orders costs to be also added: and farther directs, that the same rule shall hold place in all cases where the party is to recover damages. And, therefore, in such actions where no damages were then recoverable (as in quare impedit, in which damages were not given till the statute of Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I), no costs are now allowed; unless they have been expressly given by some subsequent statute. The statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 10, was the first which allowed any costs on a writ of error. But no costs were allowed the defendant in any shape, till the statutes 23 Hen. VIII, c. 15, 4 Jac. 1, c. 3, 8 and 9 Wm. Ill, c. 11, 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, which very equitably gave the defendant, if he prevailed, the same costs as the plaintiff would have had, in case he had recovered. These costs on both sides are taxed and moderated by the prothonotary, or other proper officer of the court.
2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *399.
This history of the status of costs at the common law was summarized by the United States Supreme Court in 1851:
At first, by the common law, no costs were awarded to either party, eo nomine [by that name]. If the plaintiff failed to recover he was amerced pro falso clam-ore [a nominal emercement of a plaintiff for making a false claim]. If he recovered judgment, the defendant was in misericordia [quit of all amercements] for his unjust detention of the plaintiff’s debt, and was not therefore punished with the expensa litis [costs or expenses of the suit] under that title. But this being considered a great hardship, the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Ed. I. c. 1, was passed, which gave costs in all cases when the plaintiff recovered damages. *571This was the origin of costs de incremento [costs in addition to damages and nominal costs found by the jury]; for when the damages were found by the jury, the judges held themselves obliged to tax the moderate fees of counsel and attorneys that attended the cause. See Bac. Abr. tit. Costs.
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How) 363, 370, 14 L.Ed. 181, 185 (1851).
I.C. § 73-116 provides:
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided for in these complied laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state.
This Court has regularly applied this statute. E.g., Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 215, 796 P.2d 87, 93 (1990); State v. Iverson, 79 Idaho 25, 28, 310 P.2d 803, 804 (1967).
In applying the common law to the subject of costs, this Court has said:
At common law costs were not recoverable eo nomine. Costs can therefore be recovered only in cases where there is statutory authority therefor. The power to impose costs must then be found in some statute or some rule of court in which the legislature had given the power in general terms to the court to make rules and orders in regard thereto. (11 Cyc. 24.)
Cronan v. District Court, 15 Idaho 462, 465, 98 P. 614, 615 (1908).
Before they were repealed in 1975 (1975 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 242, § 1, p. 652), the statutes in this state provided:
12-101. Parties entitled to costs. — Parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to costs and disbursements, as hereinafter provided.
12-102. Allowance to plaintiff. — Costs are allowed of course to plaintiff upon a judgment in his favor in the following cases:
1. In an action for the recovery of real property.
2. In an action to recover the possession of personal property where the value of the property amounts to $100 or over; such value shall be determined by the jury, court or referee by whom the action is tried.
3. In an action for the recovery of money or damages when the plaintiff recovers $100 or over.
4. In a special proceeding.
5. In an action which involves the title or possession of real estate, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll or municipal fine.
12-104. Allowance to defendant.— Costs must be allowed, of course, to the defendant upon a judgment in his favor in the actions mentioned in section 12-102, and in special proceedings.
Under these statutes, the court could award costs only to a party who received a favorable judgment.
In 1977, the present version of I.C. § 12-101 was enacted:
12-101. Costs. — Costs shall be awarded by the court in a civil trial or proceeding to the parties in the manner and in the amount provided for by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
1977 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 4, § 1, p. 9.
As the Court’s opinion in this case notes, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A) provides:
Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
This history of costs at the common law, and the current status of I.C. § 12-101 and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A), cause me to conclude that there is no authority for this Court to allow costs to a party who is not a prevailing party, as determined by the trial court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). A contractual provision obligating a party to pay costs of suit may provide the basis for an action to enforce the contract, but it does not authorize a trial court to award costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-101 and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(A) where there is no prevailing party. In this case, FCB and the Ketterlings sought an award by the trial court pursu*572ant to the statute and the rule, not an enforcement of the clause of the lease.
Attorney fees are only a special species of costs and, pursuant to the statutes and rules of civil procedure, may be awarded to a prevailing party. The only significance of a contractual provision for the award of attorney fees is to allow a court to award attorney fees pursuant to the rules of civil procedure even though there is no statute authorizing the award.
In 1911, this Court said: “It is the general rule that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered in an action unless authorized by statute or by express agreement of the parties.” Jenkins v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 19 Idaho 290, 297, 113 P. 463, 465 (1911).
The Court has made similar statements in many other cases. E.g., Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 578, 682 P.2d 524, 531 (1984) (“We continue to adhere to the so-called ‘American rule’ to the effect that attorney fees are to be awarded only where they are authorized by statute or contract.”); Kidwell & Heiser v. Fenley, 96 Idaho 534, 531 P.2d 1179 (1975); Mecham v. Nelson, 92 Idaho 783, 789, 451 P.2d 529, 535 (1969).
In Kidwell & Heiser v. Fenley, 96 Idaho 534, 531 P.2d 1179 (1975), the Court stated the rule more fully:
[T]his Court has adhered to the rule that a successful litigant is not entitled to recover attorney fees for the cost of bringing an action unless such recovery is provided by statute or contract between the parties.
Id. (emphasis added).
This statement is consistent with the statutes and rules of civil procedure of this state:
12-121. Attorney’s fees. — In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees____
I.C. § 12-121 (emphasis added).
Rule 54(e)(1). Attorney fees. — In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract:...
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) (emphasis added).
In light of these authorities, I am unable to agree that attorney fees and other costs may be awarded to a non-prevailing party who makes a claim for them pursuant to the statutes and rules of civil procedure. If FCB and the Ketterlings had sought damages for breach of the clause in the lease, that would have been a different matter. Instead, they sought an award by the trial court under the statutes and rules of procedure that restrict awards to prevailing parties.
More fundamentally, this issue is not raised on appeal by FCB and the Ketterlings. In my view, the Court should not address it.