Court Opinion

ID: 9918417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 21:02:31.068315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:00.380790
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/12/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                          DIVISION FIVE

 In re P.H., JR., A Person Coming         B321592
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                          (Los Angeles County
                                          Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP00872A)
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 P.H.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
      Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      P.H. (Father) appeals from juvenile dependency jurisdiction
and disposition orders concerning his son, P.H., Jr., (Minor),
which were made after the juvenile court found there was no
reason to know Minor was an Indian child under the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We consider whether ICWA and
related state law obligated the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (the Department) and the
juvenile court to ensure certain tribes were formally notified of
the proceedings.

                         I. BACKGROUND
       The sole issue raised in Father’s appeal is ICWA
compliance, and we accordingly focus on the facts bearing on that
issue.
       Minor, born in 2011, lived with Father and his mother, A.R.
(Mother). In March of 2022, the Department filed a juvenile
dependency petition alleging Minor was at substantial risk of
serious physical harm based on physical abuse by Mother,
Father’s failure to protect Minor from Mother, and unsanitary
conditions in their home. The Department later filed a first
amended petition adding allegations that Minor was at
substantial risk of serious physical harm based on Mother’s
alcohol abuse and Father’s history of methamphetamine and
alcohol abuse.
       In connection with the initial detention hearing, both
parents filed ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status
forms indicating they may be members of, or eligible for
membership in, federally recognized Indian tribes. Father
indicated possible affiliation with “Yucca Indian or Navajo” tribes
in New Mexico and informed the court at the detention hearing

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that his mother might have more information. Mother indicated
Minor’s maternal great-great-grandmother Lilia A. was “possible
Apache” and maternal great-aunt Christina W. (Christina) may
know more. Mother further indicated Minor’s great-grandmother
“on [Mother’s] father’s side,” Susie R. (Susie), was “possible Yuki”
and maternal great-aunt Maria S. (Maria) may know more about
that. The juvenile court ordered the Department to investigate
Minor’s possible connection to the Apache, Yuki, Yucca Indian,
and Navajo tribes.
       When speaking with a Department social worker, Mother
said the only relatives she could think of who might have ICWA-
related information were Christina and Maria. The Department
was unsuccessful in multiple attempts to contact Christina. It
was, however, able to reach Maria. Maria told the Department
“she had no way of proving that her family had any Yaki
heritage.” She said her mother, Susie (Minor’s great-
grandmother), never claimed Indian ancestry. Maria was not
close to the family of her father, Inez R.R. (Minor’s great-
grandfather), but someone at Inez R.R.’s funeral told her that a
photo on display showed Inez R.R.’s mother (Minor’s great-great-
grandmother) “dressed in a Yaki Indian outfit.”
       The Department investigated Father’s claimed Yucca and
Navajo ancestry by speaking with Father and Minor’s paternal
grandmother, Gloria H. (Gloria). Gloria denied Father had any
Indian ancestry, explaining that her parents “never mentioned
anything” and Minor’s paternal grandfather’s family was Irish.
Father conceded he did not know why he believed he had Indian
ancestry, explaining that he “remember[ed] as a kid watching
western movies with [his] grandparents[,] [and] maybe it was all
the folklore.”

                                 3
       In April 2022, the Department mailed ICWA-030 Notice of
Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child forms to the Secretary
of the Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and several Apache
and Navajo tribes. The notice informed the recipients of an
adjudication hearing set for May 2022. The Department received
return receipts from all the tribes except the Navajo Nation.1
       At the April 2022 detention hearing, the juvenile court
found it “[did] not have a reason to know that [Minor] is an
Indian Child, as defined under ICWA, and [did] not order notice
to any tribe or the BIA.” The court did, however, order the
Department to make further efforts to contact Christina.
       The juvenile court assumed dependency jurisdiction over
Minor in May 2022, sustaining the amended petition’s allegations
relating to unsanitary conditions in the home and Mother’s
alcohol abuse.
       At the June 2022 disposition hearing, the juvenile court
found the Department’s ICWA “investigation is complete, and
there is no reason to know that the child is subject to the ICWA
statute.” The juvenile court ordered Minor removed from the
parents. Mother and Father were granted monitored visitation
and ordered to participate in individual counseling and other
programs.

                        II. DISCUSSION
      Father challenges only the Department’s failure to provide
tribes with formal notice of the juvenile court proceedings

1
      The Bureau of Indian Affairs sent a letter listing an
address for the Navajo Nation’s ICWA Program that differed
from that to which the Department sent notice.

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pursuant to ICWA and related California law.2 As we shall
explain, no formal notice was statutorily required because none of
the statements by Minor’s parents or other family members
provide reason to know he is an Indian child for purposes of the
relevant statutes.3

       A.    Legal Framework
       ICWA and related California law define an “Indian child” to
include a child who is either a member of an Indian tribe or is
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf.
& Inst. Code,4 § 224.1, subds. (a) & (b).) In addition to imposing
substantive requirements concerning the placement of and
termination of parental rights to an Indian child, ICWA gives

2
      Perhaps in view of the fact that ICWA duties are
continuing duties that exist throughout a dependency proceeding,
appeals raising ICWA issues are most frequently taken from
orders terminating parental rights, not disposition orders. In
this appeal, we have not been asked to decide (and do not decide)
whether there is any jurisprudential reason not to entertain an
ICWA-related challenge from an appeal taken from a disposition
order and associated jurisdiction finding.
3
       The Department and the juvenile court may at times decide
it is advisable to provide notice to tribes as a prudential matter
even when such notice is not statutorily required. That is to be
encouraged, and a rule mandating reversal any time such
voluntarily provided notice is imperfect would not encourage the
practice.
4
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                5
Indian tribes the right to intervene in state court proceedings
contemplating such actions. (25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(c), 1912, 1915.)
       Relatedly, ICWA and related California statutes impose an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child who is
the subject of a dependency proceeding is or may be an Indian
child. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7-8.) Section 224.2,
subdivision (b) states a “county welfare department . . . has a
duty to inquire whether [a] child is an Indian child” and
“[i]nquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child . . . .” So-called “further inquiry” is required if
there is “reason to believe” the child is an Indian child (§ 224.2,
subd. (e)), and formal notice to the relevant tribes is required if
there is “reason to know” the child is an Indian child (§ 224.3,
subd. (a)). Here, there is no need to attempt to distinguish
between these standards because Father challenges only
compliance with the notice requirement that is triggered by a
reason to know a child is an Indian child.
       Such reason to know exists “under any of the following
circumstances: [¶] (1) A person having an interest in the child,
including the child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an Indian
organization, a public or private agency, or a member of the
child’s extended family informs the court that the child is an
Indian child. [¶] (2) The residence or domicile of the child, the
child’s parents, or Indian custodian is on a reservation or in an
Alaska Native village. [¶] (3) Any participant in the proceeding,
officer of the court, Indian tribe, Indian organization, or agency
informs the court that it has discovered information indicating

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that the child is an Indian child. [¶] (4) The child who is the
subject of the proceeding gives the court reason to know that the
child is an Indian child. [¶] (5) The court is informed that the
child is or has been a ward of a tribal court. [¶] (6) The court is
informed that either parent or the child possess an identification
card indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (d).)
       We review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings for
substantial evidence. (See, e.g., In re N.F. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
170, 178; In re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 719.)

      B.      Formal Notice to Tribes Was Not Required Under
              ICWA or Related California Law
       Father contends the Department failed to satisfy section
224.3, subdivision (a)’s requirements for formal notice. He argues
the Department should have sent notice to the Pascua Yaqui
Tribe of Arizona,5 the notices sent to Navajo and Apache tribes
should have named Lilia and Susie and included additional
information concerning various relatives’ possible tribal
affiliations, and the Department should have ensured the Navajo
Nation received notice. Father’s arguments fail for the simple
reason that formal notice is only required where there is reason

5
      Mother and Father mentioned possible Yuki, Yaki, and
Yucca heritage, but Father suggests “Yaki” is a misspelling of
“Yaqui.” The Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona is the only Yaqui
tribe with an ICWA representative listed on the Bureau of Indian
Affairs’ website. (Bur. Indian Affairs, ICWA Designated Agents
Listing <https://www.bia.gov/bia/ois/dhs/icwa/agents-listing> [as
of Dec. 12, 2023].)

                                 7
to know an Indian child is involved (§ 224.3, subd. (a))—and here,
there was no such reason.
       Nothing in the record establishes reason to know Minor is
an Indian child based on the six circumstances set forth in
section 224.2, subdivision (d). At most, the statements by Father,
Mother, Maria, and Gloria suggest Minor might have some
Indian ancestry. But “tribal ancestry is not among the criteria
for having a reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (In re
Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885; accord In re Dominic F.
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 571 [“A suggestion of Indian ancestry
is not sufficient under ICWA or related California law to trigger
the notice requirement”].)
       Father nonetheless suggests formal notice was required,
even in the absence of reason to know Minor is an Indian child,
because the Department did contact the Navajo and Apache
tribes. Father is concerned that the juvenile court’s ICWA
finding was “based on highly defective notices” and might
“potentially prejudice future courts in juvenile dependency
matters regarding this family.” But Father is mistaken that the
juvenile court’s ICWA finding was based on the Department’s
compliance with formal notice requirements. As we have already
explained, the juvenile court never found formal notice was
required—and, under the circumstances, it was not.

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                         DISPOSITION
     The jurisdiction finding and disposition order are affirmed.

             CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                          BAKER, J.

We concur:

     RUBIN, P. J.

     MOOR, J.

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