Court Opinion

ID: 2964501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:36.116654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:56.509785
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2178

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                    DWAYNE YOUNG,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Karl R.D.  Suchecki with  whom  Jennifer Petersen  and Petersen  &
            ___________________             _________________      ___________
        Suchecki were on brief for appellant.
        ________
            Andrea Nervi  Ward, Assistant  United States  Attorney, with  whom
            __________________
        Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
        _______________

                                 ____________________

                                   January 23, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL,  Circuit  Judge.     In  May  1995,  a  jury
                      STAHL,  Circuit  Judge.
                              ______________

            convicted  defendant  Dwayne  Young  on  a  single  count  of

            unlawful  possession of  a firearm  by a  felon, 18  U.S.C.  

            922(g)(1).  During trial, and after denying Young's motion to

            suppress,  the   district  court  admitted  the  firearm  and

            ammunition into evidence.  The district court also admitted a

            so-called "turret  tape," a recording of  radio transmissions

            between a police officer and his dispatcher,  made during the

            officer's  foot pursuit  of  Young.1   Finally, the  district

            court  allowed   the  jury  to   use  a   government-prepared

            transcript as  an aid in listening  to the tape while  it was

            being played during trial.  Finding no error, we affirm.

                                      Background
                                      Background
                                      __________

                      On  April 7,  1994, Officers  James Fee  and Robert

            Twitchell of the  Boston Police Department, while  patrolling

            the  Roxbury section  of Boston,  received a  radio broadcast

            describing  three  individuals  suspected  of  armed robbery.

            Several  blocks  from  the  last  reported  location  of  the

            suspects, the officers noticed a group  of three men standing

            together.    Upon  seeing  the unmarked  cruiser,  the  group

            dispersed.   One of the three, Young, walked in one direction

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The  term "turret  tape"  refers to  recordings of  radio
            broadcasts  between Boston  Police officers  and dispatchers.
            Specifically,  "turret"  derives  from   the  fact  that  the
            communications  facility  which  records  such  transmissions
            resides in aturret tower at the Boston Police headquarters.  

                                         -2-
                                          2

            by himself while the  other two departed together  in another

            direction.  

                      The officers, noting that Young's short height  and

            black clothing appeared  to match the  description of one  of

            the  robbery  suspects,  pulled  their cruiser  to  the  curb

            alongside Young.  From  the passenger seat, Officer Twitchell

            rolled down his  window and announced "Boston Police, you got

            a minute?"  to  which Young  responded  "Sure."   Young  then

            "angled" toward the rear of the cruiser.  As Young approached

            the  car,  the  officers  noticed  the handle  of  a  handgun

            protruding from  his waistband.  Officer  Twitchell lunged at

            Young  through  the  window  of the  cruiser,  made  fleeting

            contact  with his jacket or  belt, but failed  to either grab

            the  gun or  detain  him.   Young  turned  and  ran from  the

            cruiser, with Twitchell, now on foot, in pursuit.

                      During  the  pursuit, Officer  Twitchell  saw Young

            remove  the  gun from  his waistband  and  throw it  into the

            basement  stairwell of  a building  on Elm Street.   Although

            Young   successfully  eluded  Twitchell,  he  was  ultimately

            apprehended  by a back-up police officer who found him hiding

            in a nearby garage.   Officer Twitchell then returned  to the

            stairwell  and recovered  the gun.   While these  events were

            unfolding, Officer Twitchell and other  officers continuously

            transmitted  information  to  the  dispatcher  at  the Boston

                                         -3-
                                          3

            Police headquarters.  These transmissions comprise the turret

            tape.  

                      Prior to trial, Young moved to suppress the gun and

            the turret tape.   Young asserted  that the police  recovered

            the gun through  a violation of his  Fourth Amendment rights,

            and argued  that the  tape constituted  inadmissible hearsay.

            The district court denied Young's motion to suppress the gun,

            but  granted his motion with respect to the turret tape, with

            the caveat  that  defense counsel's  cross examination  might

            subsequently render  it admissible.   During trial  and after

            defense counsel's cross examination of Officer Twitchell, the

            district court admitted the turret tape as a prior consistent

            statement, and allowed the jury to use a transcript  prepared

            by the government, as an aid in listening to the turret tape.

            Young appeals  admission of the gun and  tape, as well as use

            of the transcript.

                                      Discussion
                                      Discussion
                                      __________

                      A.  Suppression of the Gun
                      __________________________

                      We employ  a dual standard in  reviewing motions to

            suppress.   We review  the district court's  findings of fact

            for clear error.  See United States v. Bartelho, 71 F.3d 436,
                              ___ _____________    ________

            441 (1st  Cir. 1995).  "A  clear error exists only  if, after

            considering  all of the evidence, we are left with a definite

            and  firm conviction that a  mistake has been  made."  United
                                                                   ______

            States v.  McCarthy,  77  F.3d 522,  529  (1st  Cir.),  cert.
            ______     ________                                     _____

                                         -4-
                                          4

            denied, 117 S.  Ct. 479  (1996).  Deference  to the  district
            ______

            court's  findings of  fact  reflects our  awareness that  the

            trial judge, who hears the testimony, observes the witnesses'

            demeanor and evaluates the facts first hand, sits in the best

            position  to determine  what actually  happened.   See United
                                                               ___ ______

            States  v.  Zapata, 18  F.3d 971,  975 (1st  Cir. 1994).   By
            ______      ______

            contrast, we review  conclusions of law  de novo and  subject
                                                     _______

            the  trial  court's  constitutional  conclusions  to  plenary

            review.  See id.; see  also Ornelas v. United States, 116  S.
                     ___ ___  ___  ____ ________________________

            Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996).  Determinations  of probable cause and

            reasonable  suspicion, relevant  to the  constitutionality of

            law  enforcement   seizures  and  arrests  under  the  Fourth

            Amendment, present  mixed questions of law and  fact which we

            review de novo.  See Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1663.  
                   __ ____   ___ _______

                      Young  argues  that  the  district court  erred  by

            concluding that recovery of the firearm did not occur through

            conduct   that   violated   his   Fourth   Amendment  rights.

            Specifically,  Young contends that Officers Twitchell and Fee

            lacked either the reasonable suspicion needed to stop him, or

            the probable cause required for an arrest.  We disagree.

                      Interaction between law  enforcement officials  and

            citizens  generally  falls  within  three   tiers  of  Fourth

            Amendment   analysis,  depending  on   the  level  of  police

            intrusion  into a person's privacy.  The first or lowest tier

            encompasses  interaction of  such minimally  intrusive nature

                                         -5-
                                          5

            that  it  does  not trigger  the  protections  of the  Fourth

            Amendment.  The Supreme  Court has repeatedly emphasized that

            not all personal intercourse  between the police and citizens

            rises  to the  level of a  stop or  seizure.   See Florida v.
                                                           ___ _______

            Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (citing cases).  Police may
            _______

            approach  citizens in  public spaces  and ask  them questions

            without triggering  the protections of the  Fourth Amendment.

            See  id.; United States v. Manchester, 711 F.2d 458, 460 (1st
            ___  ___  _____________    __________

            Cir. 1983).  Such police engagements need not find a basis in

            any  articulable suspicion.  See  Bostick, 501  U.S. at  435.
                                         ___  _______

            Police conduct  falls short  of  triggering Fourth  Amendment

            protections when, from the  totality of the circumstances, we

            determine that  the subject  of any police  interaction would

            have  felt free  to  terminate the  conversation and  proceed

            along his  way.  See Bostick, 501  U.S. at 439; United States
                             ___ _______                    _____________

            v. Sealey, 30 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1994).  The totality of the
               ______

            circumstances in  this case establishes  that any interaction

            between the  officers and Young prior  to Officer Twitchell's

            lunge  falls well  within  the first  tier of  police-citizen

            interaction, and therefore, fails  to trigger the protections

            of the Fourth Amendment.  As they pulled alongside Young, the

            officers identified themselves as Boston Police officers, and

            asked  "got a  minute" to  which Young  replied "sure."   The

            district  court  credited  the  officers'  testimony,  and we

            detect  no clear error.   We recently determined that conduct

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                                          6

            virtually identical to  what occurred  in this  case did  not

            trigger   the  protections  of   the  Fourth  Amendment,  and

            concluded that  in the  absence of  an officer's  exertion of

            physical  force or  an individual's submission  to a  show of

            authority,  no seizure  occurs.   See Sealey,  30 F.3d  at 10
                                              ___ ______

            (finding no Fourth Amendment seizure where police officers in

            a cruiser approached defendant and yelled "Hey Steven, what's

            up?") (citing California v. Hodari D., 499  U.S. 621 (1991)).
                          __________    _________

            We reiterate  that conclusion  with respect to  the officers'

            conduct toward Young prior to Officer Twitchell's lunge.

                      The   remaining  two  tiers   of  Fourth  Amendment

            analysis comprise  de facto arrests requiring probable cause,
                               __ _____

            and lesser seizures generally known as investigative or Terry
                                                                    _____

            stops,  which  require a  lesser  reasonable  suspicion.   An

            arrest occurs when an officer, acting on probable  cause that

            an individual has committed  a crime, detains that individual

            as  a suspect.   Probable cause exists  when police officers,

            relying  on reasonably  trustworthy facts  and circumstances,

            have information upon which a reasonably prudent person would

            believe  the suspect had committed or was committing a crime.

            See United States  v. Maguire,  918 F.2d 254,  258 (1st  Cir.
            ___ _____________     _______

            1990), cert. denied, Kavanagh v. United States, 501 U.S. 1234
                   _____ ______  ________    _____________

            (1991).  An investigative  stop, also known as a  Terry stop,
                                                              _____

            see Terry  v. Ohio, 392 U.S.  1 (1968), occurs  when a police
            ___ _____     ____

            officer,  acting on  reasonable and articulable  suspicion of

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                                          7

            criminal activity, briefly  detains an individual to  confirm

            or  dispel  his suspicion.   See  McCarthy,  77 F.3d  at 529;
                                         ___  ________

            United States v. Schiavo, 29 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1994).
            _____________    _______

                      The  government  concedes,  for  purposes  of  this

            appeal, that when Officer  Twitchell made contact with Young,

            he  seized him  for  Fourth Amendment  purposes.   See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

            Zapata, 18 F.3d at 977 (indicating that officer's touching of
            ______

            citizen  during ongoing  investigative stop  establishes that

            seizure  occurred).   In the  absence of further  argument on

            this point, we  proceed under the  assumption that a  seizure

            occurred  in this  case.   Young  contends that  the officers

            either seized him without the requisite reasonable suspicion,

            or  arrested him  without the requisite  probable cause.   We

            conclude that  to the  extent the officers,  through fleeting

            physical  contact, seized Young, they did  so well within the

            parameters of  an investigative stop, and  that the officers'

            actions  do  not rise  to the  level  of an  arrest requiring

            probable cause.

                      With respect to  investigative stops, the  relevant

            question "is  not whether  the police had  probable cause  to

            act, but  instead whether  the actions taken  were reasonable

            under  the circumstances."    McCarthy,  77  F.3d at  529.  A
                                          ________

            familiar two-  pronged test  guides this  inquiry.   We first

            must determine whether the  officer's action was justified at

            its  inception,  and, if  so,  whether the  action  taken was

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                                          8

            reasonably  related  in  scope  to  the  circumstances  which

            justified the interference.  See id. at 530; United States v.
                                         ___ ___         _____________

            Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 6 (1st  Cir. 1994).  To satisfy the first
            _______

            prong, "'the police officer must be able to point to specific

            and  articulable facts  which, taken  together  with rational

            inferences   from  those   facts,  reasonably   warrant  that

            intrusion.'"   Kimball, 25 F.3d at 6 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
                           _______                        _____

            at 21).  To satisfy the second prong, we examine the totality

            of the circumstances, see  United States v. Walker, 924  F.2d
                                  ___  _____________    ______

            1, 4 (1st Cir. 1991), bearing in mind that "an officer may []

            conduct  a patdown search  where the officer  is justified in

            believing  that the  person  is armed  and  dangerous to  the

            officer or others," Schiavo, 29 F.3d at 8. According  to  the
                                _______

            district court,  the following facts gave  rise to reasonable

            suspicion  necessary to  temporarily detain  Young:   (1) the

            officers saw three  individuals, one or more of whom appeared

            to  match the description of three armed robbers who had been

            spotted in the area; (2) as they approached, one of the three

            (Young)  walked  away from  the group;  (3) Officer  Fee told

            Officer Twitchell  that he  thought he recognized  the person

            walking away (Young) as a "bad guy;" (4) upon asking Young to

            answer some questions,  Young angled toward  the rear of  the

            car instead of directly toward  the passenger window; and (5)

            as  Young  approached,  both  officers  saw  a  gun   in  his

            waistband.    Careful review  of  the record  from  which the

                                         -9-
                                          9

            district court drew these  findings does not leave us  with a

            "definite  and firm conviction that a mistake has been made,"

            McCarthy,  77 F.3d at 529, and those findings are not clearly
            ________

            erroneous.   We are satisfied, moreover, that  these facts in

            their totality  could give  rise to the  officers' reasonable

            suspicion that Young had been involved in criminal activity.

                      We also conclude  that Officer Twitchell's  action,

            the  lunge at Young, was  reasonably related in  scope to the

            circumstances.  In agreeing  with the district court we  note

            that  sight of the gun gave rise to a significant concern for

            the officers' and public's safety.  See Walker, 924 F.2d at 4
                                                ___ ______

            (officer's   concern  for   own  safety   is   of  "paramount

            importance" in  assessing the  appropriateness of  the action

            taken).  To  open the door of the cruiser  and question Young

            would  have afforded Young an opportunity to use the gun, and

            could  have placed the officers  and any bystanders in harm's

            way. 

                      To be sure, the  officers did not determine whether

            Young  carried the  firearm  legally prior  to attempting  to

            remove  it or restrain him.   As we  have indicated, however,

            "'[c]onduct innocent in  the eyes of the  untrained may carry

            entirely different 'messages'  to the experienced or  trained

            observer.'"  United States  v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54,  56 (1st
                         _____________     _______

            Cir.  1990) (quoting United States v.  Bernard, 623 F.2d 551,
                                 _____________     _______

            560 (9th Cir.  1979)).  "Weighing  'the limited violation  of

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                                          10

            the individual's privacy  against the  opposing interests  in

            crime prevention  and detection  and in the  police officer's

            safety,'"  United  States v.  Quinn, 815 F.2d  153, 156  (1st
                       ______________     _____

            Cir.  1987), we  conclude that  Officer Twitchell's  lunge at

            Young, and the attendant physical contact, were reasonable in

            scope and the circumstances justified the intrusion.

                      Young,  however, argues  that the  physical contact

            resulting   from  Officer  Twitchell's   lunge  elevated  the

            encounter  to  a de  facto  arrest,  which required  probable
                             __  _____

            cause.  We have  recently rejected the contention  that every

            incidence  of physical  contact, even  de minimis,  between a
                                                   __ _______

            police officer and a citizen, constitutes an arrest requiring

            probable case.  See  Zapata, 18 F.3d at 977  (indicating that
                            ___  ______

            police touching of individual  does not necessarily elevate a

            seizure to  an arrest).   Parsing whether  any given  seizure

            constitutes an arrest  or a lesser seizure, however, proves a

            difficult  task.    See  id.  at  975   (explaining  that  no
                                ___  ___

            scientific    formula    exists   to    distinguish   between

            investigative stops  and arrests).  Police  conduct will rise

            to  the level of  an arrest  when "'a  reasonable man  in the

            suspect's position  would have understood his  situation,' in

            the circumstances  then obtaining, to be  tantamount to being

            under arrest."   See  id. (quoting  Berkemer v.  McCarty, 468
                             ___  ___           ________     _______

            U.S. 420, 442 (1984)).  

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                                          11

                      Factors that can elevate  a non-arrest seizure to a

            de facto arrest requiring probable cause include extending an
            __ _____

            investigative stop  beyond the  time necessary to  confirm or

            dispel  reasonable suspicion,  and  physically  blocking  the

            suspect's exit such  that a reasonable person  would not feel

            free to leave.   See Maguire,  918 F.2d at 259.   The use  of
                             ___ _______

            guns and  the  presence  of more  than  one  police  officer,

            however,  do  not necessarily  convert an  investigative stop

            into an  arrest.  See id.  Above all  else, our cases in this
                              ___ ___

            area  evince the fact specific  nature of the  inquiry.  See,
                                                                     ___

            e.g.,  Kimball, 25  F.3d at  6  ("Whether police  activity is
            ____   _______

            reasonable  in any  particular context  depends on  the facts

            which are unique to that incident.").  

                      By lunging at and  brushing his hand against Young,

            Officer Twitchell did  not impose "'restraints comparable  to

            those of a  formal arrest.'"  Quinn, 815 F.2d at 156 (quoting
                                          _____

            Berkemer,  468 U.S. at 441).   The officers  did not restrain
            ________

            Young's freedom  of movement or succeed in detaining him even

            briefly.  Nor did  the officers ever communicate  verbally to

            Young that he was under arrest or that  they wanted to arrest

            him.   Under  those  circumstances, no  reasonable person  in

            Young's position  could have understood his  situation "to be

            tantamount to being under  arrest."  Zapata, 18 F.3d  at 975.
                                                 ______

            In light of police  conduct we have determined to  fall short

            of de facto arrest, we affirm the district court's conclusion
               __ _____

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                                          12

            that  Officer  Twitchell's de  minimis physical  contact with
                                       __  _______

            Young did not effect an  arrest.  Cf. Zapata, 18 F.3d  at 977
                                              ___ ______

            (holding  that de  minimis physical  contact did  not convert
                           __  _______

            investigative stop  into arrest);  Quinn, 815 F.2d  at 156-57
                                               _____

            (holding that  presence of several officers  and the blocking

            of defendant's  car did  not convert investigative  stop into

            arrest);  United States  v. Trullo,  809 F.2d  108,  113 (1st
                      _____________     ______

            Cir.) (holding that police officer's use of drawn gun did not

            convert  investigative stop into  arrest); cert.  denied, 482
                                                       _____  ______

            U.S. 916 (1987).

                      B.  Admission of the Turret Tape
                      ________________________________

                      At trial,  the district  court admitted the  turret

            tape, a recording of  the radio transmissions between Officer

            Twitchell  and his  dispatcher during  his pursuit  of Young.

            The district court initially declined to allow the  tape, but

            warned defense counsel that questioning on  cross examination

            of  Officer Twitchell might  render the tape  admissible as a

            prior consistent  statement under  Rule  801(d)(1)(B) of  the

            Federal  Rules  of  Evidence.   On  appeal  Young renews  his

            hearsay objection to the tape.2  

                                
            ____________________

            2.  Young   also  asserts   that   the  tape   lacked  proper
            foundation,  and cannot  be characterized  as either  Officer
            Twitchell's  present sense impressions or excited utterances.
            See   Fed.  R.  Evid.  803(1)  and  (2).    With  respect  to
            ___
            foundation, we note that  Young failed to object to  the tape
            on foundation grounds at  trial.  We will  review, therefore,
            only for  plain error, and  conclude that the  district court
            admitted  the  tape  on  a  sufficient  foundation.    United
                                                                   ______
            States v.  Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 807 (1st Cir. 1996).  Prior
            ______     ________

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      We  review the district court's evidentiary rulings

            for  abuse of discretion.   See United States  v. Alzanki, 54
                                        ___ _____________     _______

            F.3d 994, 1008 (1st Cir. 1995),  cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 909
                                             _____ ______

            (1996).  Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides in relevant part:

                      (d)  Statements which are not hearsay.  A
                      (d)  Statements which are not hearsay.
                      statement is not hearsay if--

                           (1)  Prior     statement     by
                           (1)  Prior     statement     by
                           witness.        The   declarant
                           witness.
                           testifies   at  the   trial  or
                           hearing   and  is   subject  to
                           cross-examination    concerning
                           the    statement,    and    the
                           statement   is   .   .  .   (B)
                           consistent with the declarant's
                           testimony  and  is  offered  to
                           rebut  an  express  or  implied
                           charge against the declarant of
                           recent fabrication  or improper
                           influence or motive . . . 

            Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B).   For Rule 801(d)(1)(B) purposes,

            we  view the  lower  court's determination  that a  statement

            rebuts an express  or implied charge of recent fabrication as

            a  finding of  fact, subject  to reversal  only if  it proves

                                
            ____________________

            to  playing  the  tape,   the  government  elicited   Officer
            Twitchell's  testimony  that  he  recognized the  tape  as  a
            recording of the broadcast,  he had listened to the  tape, he
            recognized all of  the voices on it, and that  to the best of
            his knowledge,  the tape fairly and  accurately reflected the
            radio  transmissions  that occurred  that  evening.   In  the
            absence of any foundation-based objection by defense counsel,
            we cannot  conclude that  the district judge  committed plain
            error.   With  respect to  Young's alternative  arguments, we
            conclude  that the  tape  was properly  admitted  as a  prior
            consistent statement, and, therefore, we decline to  consider
            them.  

                                         -14-
                                          14

            clearly  erroneous.  United States v. Piva, 870 F.2d 753, 758
                                 _____________    ____

            (1st Cir. 1989).

                      During direct examination  of Officer Twitchell the

            government sought to introduce the turret tape.  The district

            judge  declined to allow the tape at that time, but indicated

            that cross examination of  Officer Twitchell could render the

            tape  admissible  as  a Rule  801(d)(1)(B)  prior  consistent

            statement. During cross examination, Young's counsel elicited

            testimony from Officer Twitchell  that, prior to his recovery

            of  the firearm,  he  had never  broadcast  (a) that  he  and

            Officer Fee saw  a gun in Young's waistband, and  (b) that he

            had seen Young throw the handgun during the pursuit.

                      The  government argued that through those questions

            defense counsel  implied  that Officer  Twitchell  fabricated

            seeing Young possess the  gun, and moved on redirect  to play

            the  turret tape  as a  prior statement  consistent  with his

            testimony.   Officer  Twitchell testified  that he  saw Young

            throw  the gun, and on the tape, states the same observation.

            The district court found  that defense counsel, regardless of

            her  intent, had elicited testimony from which the jury could

            infer that  Officer Twitchell fabricated his  testimony, and,

            accordingly, admitted  the tape under Rule  801(d)(1)(B).  We

            cannot conclude that the lower court abused its discretion.

                      Despite defense  counsel's insistence that  she did

            not intend to imply fabrication, the district judge correctly

                                         -15-
                                          15

            ruled  on the basis of the possible inferences the jury could

            make as a result of the question.   See Piva, 870 F.2d at 759
                                                ___ ____

            (evaluating charge of fabrication on basis of what jury could

            infer).  Moreover,  the district judge  did not commit  clear

            error in finding  that as  a result of  cross examination,  a

            jury could have concluded  that Officer Twitchell neither saw

            Young with a gun in his waistband, nor saw Young throw a gun.

            Defense   counsel's   questioning   implied  fabrication   by

            highlighting  that Officer Twitchell  never broadcast that he

            saw a gun in  Young's waistband, and that he  never broadcast

            that he saw Young throw the gun until after Officer Twitchell

            recovered  the gun.    In simple  terms,  a jury  could  have

            inferred that  if Officer Twitchell did not  broadcast it, it

            did not happen.   His  statement on the  tape was  consistent

            with his  testimony on direct  examination that  he had  seen

            Young  throw  the  gun,  and,  therefore,  was  appropriately

            admitted as a prior statement consistent with that testimony.

                      Young points  out that  nothing in the  turret tape

            directly  contradicts the  testimony  elicited  during  cross

            examination, that Officer Twitchell did not broadcast that he

            saw Young throw a gun until  after he recovered it.  While we

            do  not dispute  the truth  of Young's  assertion, we  do not

            ascribe  similar significance  to it.   Nothing  in the  rule

            requires  the prior  consistent  statement to  contradict any

            testimony; the  prior consistent  statement  must merely  "be

                                         -16-
                                          16

            offered to rebut a charge or  implied charge of fabrication."
                                      __________________

            Fed. R.  Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).   Having found,

            without  clearly erring,  that defense  counsel's questioning

            could  permit the  jury  to infer  fabrication, the  district

            judge did  not abuse his  discretion in admitting  the turret

            tape  as  a  Rule 801(d)(1)(B)  prior  consistent  statement,

            offered to rebut that implied charge.

                      The district judge  allowed the government to  play

            the  entire turret  tape, "in  order to  set the  context, in

            order  to understand the timing of what was going on."  Young

            contends that  even if one of  Officer Twitchell's statements

            constitutes a prior consistent  statement, the tape  contains

            additional statements of Officer Twitchell and others that do

            not  fall within  that category,  and, therefore,  constitute

            inadmissible hearsay.

                      At  sidebar  the  district  judge  invited  defense

            counsel to  offer redactions  for his consideration  prior to

            playing  the tape  to the  jury.   Defense counsel  failed to

            offer specific, cognizable redactions,  failed on the  record

            to  object specifically  to those  portions  of the  tape she

            found objectionable, and to explain to the district judge why

            they   did  not   constitute  prior   consistent  statements.

            Accordingly, Young may not now raise this argument on appeal.

            See Piva, 870  F.2d at  759 (lack of  specific objections  at
            ___ ____

                                         -17-
                                          17

            trial  precludes  party   from  raising  specific  issue   on

            appeal).3   In any event, having reviewed the contents of the

            tape, we cannot  conclude that the district  judge abused his

            discretion in admitting the entire tape and playing it to the

            jury.4

                      C.  Use of Transcripts of the Turret Tape
                      _________________________________________

                      The district  judge also allowed the  government to

            provide  a transcript  to aid  the jury  in listening  to the

            tape.   By way  of background, we digress  to explain how the

            government  prepared the  transcript.   The  government first

            sent the  tape to  a transcribing company,  which transcribed

            the  tape to the best of its ability, given its unfamiliarity

            with police  jargon, names  and  codes, and  the events  that

            transpired  that particular  evening.    The government  then

            allowed each participant to review the transcript independent

                                
            ____________________

            3.  In Piva,  the district  judge admitted a  prior statement
                   ____
            under  Rule  801(d)(1)(B)   over  counsel's  general  hearsay
            objection.  870 F.2d at 759.  Rather than point to a specific
            reason why  Rule 801(d)(1)(B)  did not apply,  counsel merely
            made   a  hearsay   objection   and   also  argued   improper
            rehabilitation.   See  id.   We held  that counsel's  lack of
                              ___  ___
            specificity precluded raising  a specific  challenge to  Rule
            801(d)(1)(B) applicability for the first time on appeal.  See
                                                                      ___
            id.  
            ___

            4.  With respect to the  Turret tape, Young did not  raise an
            argument  based  on Tome  v. United  States,  116 S.  Ct. 696
                                ____     ______________
            (1996)  either  at  trial  or now  on  appeal.    We are  not
            unmindful, however, of the Supreme  Court's recent admonition
            that to be admissible, a prior consistent statement must have
            been  made before the alleged motive to fabricate arose.  Id.
                                                                      ___
            at 700.  In  light of the nearly contemporaneous  recovery of
            the gun  and Officer Twitchell's broadcast,  we are satisfied
            that this case does not present us with a Tome issue.
                                                      ____

                                         -18-
                                          18

            of one another, in order to attempt to fill in those portions

            the transcribing company could not determine.  The government

            then  sent the  revised transcript  back to  the transcribing

            company, which then reviewed it while listening to the  tape,

            in order to validate the corrections.

                      The government informed the court of this procedure

            at  the  hearing on  Young's  motion  to  suppress,  when  it

            introduced  the  tape  at  trial,  and  before  the  jury  by

            specifically eliciting Officer  Twitchell's testimony that he

            assisted in the  preparation of  the final  transcript.   The

            district judge  offered defense  counsel  the opportunity  to

            replay the  tape with an alternative  transcript, and allowed

            significant time and latitude on cross examination of Officer

            Twitchell about  the government's transcript and  his role in

            its preparation.  Defense counsel, however, failed to utilize

            any alternative transcript, or even the original draft of the

            transcript,   to   point   out   potential   inaccuracies  or

            inconsistencies, or  simply to offer the  jury an alternative

            view of the contents of the tape.

                      In  this circuit we  have long approved  the use of

            properly authenticated transcripts of tape recordings for the

            purpose of  helping the  jury  listen to  and understand  the

            recordings themselves.   See  United States v.  Campbell, 874
                                     ___  _____________     ________

            F.2d  838, 849 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Rengifo, 789
                                            _____________    _______

            F.2d 975, 980 (1st  Cir. 1986) (citing cases).   The district

                                         -19-
                                          19

            judge  may even allow the jury to have the transcripts during

            deliberations provided "the court makes clear that the tapes,

            not  the   transcript  constitute  evidence   in  the  case."

            Rengifo, 789  F.2d at 980 (quoting United  States v. Richman,
            _______                            ______________    _______

            600  F.2d 286,  295 (1st  Cir. 1979)).   Prior to  trial, the

            district judge  should attempt to obtain  a single stipulated

            transcript;  failing that,  however, the  court should  allow

            each party to introduce its  own transcript of the  recording

            upon proper authentication.  See id. at 983.   
                                         ___ ___

                      In addition,  when "a defendant  has possession  of

            the transcript and tape prior to trial and raises no pretrial

            objection, the district court is not obliged to interrupt the

            trial  to screen the transcript for accuracy prior to its use

            by the jury."  United States v. Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 48
                           _____________    ____________

            (1st  Cir.  1991),  cert.   denied,  502  U.S.  1065  (1992).
                                _____   ______

            Instead,  the district court may simply listen to the tape as

            it is played for the jury, follow the transcript, and rule on

            specific  objections  as  they arise.    See  id.   Should  a
                                                     ___  ___

            defendant fail to offer  specific objections during  playback

            of the tape, or offer an alternative transcript, the district

            court does not abuse  its discretion by allowing the  jury to

            use the transcript.  See id.
                                 ___ ___

                      Our  review  of  the  record reveals  no  abuse  of

            discretion in the use of the government's transcript  in this

            case.   At the  outset we  note that  Young does  not dispute

                                         -20-
                                          20

            proper authentication.  Upon  determining that the jury could

            hear  the tape with the  aid of the  disputed transcript, the

            district judge  gave the requisite instruction  that the tape

            and  not the  transcripts constituted  the evidence  the jury

            should consider.  The  judge specifically instructed the jury

            to  disregard anything in the transcript  that they could not

            understand  from the  tape.   See Campbell,  874 F.2d  at 849
                                          ___ ________

            (once  judge instructs jury  that tape and  not transcript is

            evidence, we review for abuse of discretion).  The judge also

            instructed the jury  that he would  allow defense counsel  to

            play the tape again  with a different transcript, "to  see if

            you hear something different from what you might have thought

            you heard when it was played with the other transcript before

            you." The  judge reiterated this  instruction as part  of his

            final instructions while charging the jury.5      

                      In  addition to  the  events at  trial, the  record

            reflects  that  defense  counsel  possessed  copies  of   the

            government's transcripts before trial, but raised no pretrial

                                
            ____________________

            5.  Young also  asserts that by reviewing  the transcript and
            helping  to fill  in  some of  the portions  the transcribing
            company  found  unintelligible,  Officer  Twitchell  had  the
            opportunity  to create  his own  prior consistent  statements
            after  a motive  to  fabricate arose.    See Tome  v.  United
                                                     ___ ____      ______
            States,  115  S.  Ct.  696, 700  (1995)  (holding  that prior
            ______
            consistent  statement must  have been  made before  motive to
            fabricate arose in  order to  be admissible).   We note  only
            that, as  the district judge  twice instructed the  jury, the
            evidence  consisted of the tape  and not the  transcript.  As
            indicated, defense  counsel had ample opportunity  to present
            an  alternative  transcript,  or  to  impeach  the transcript
            through cross examination of Officer Twitchell.  

                                         -21-
                                          21

            objections specific to either of them.  While defense counsel

            objected to the revised  transcript at trial on the  basis of

            alleged  inaccuracies, she  neither made  specific objections

            during  playback   of  the  tape,  nor  chose   to  offer  an

            alternative  transcript,  even  though  the   district  judge

            clearly indicated he  would permit  her to  do so.   On  that

            basis  we cannot conclude that  the district court abused its

            discretion  in  allowing the  jury  to  use the  government's

            transcript.6   See Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d at 48 (holding that
                           ___ ____________

            district  court   does  not  abuse   discretion  by  allowing

            transcript in absence  of specific objections  or alternative

            transcript).  

                      Finally, Young argues that  the tape and transcript

            had a prejudicial effect  that far outweighed their probative

            value under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Young

            failed to  raise  this  objection at  trial;  we  review  the

                                
            ____________________

            6.  Young also  challenges the admissibility of  the tape and
            use  of  the transcript  on  the basis  of  the Confrontation
            Clause  of the Sixth Amendment.   See U.S.  Const. amend. VI,
                                              ___
            cl. 3.  Young argues  that the transcript contains statements
            by  the dispatcher, who did not appear at trial as a witness.
            The  Confrontation Clause  exists  to  "advance  a  practical
            concern for the accuracy  of 'the truth-determining process .
            . . by assuring  that the trier of fact [has]  a satisfactory
            basis  for evaluating  the  truth of  the prior  statement.'"
            United  States v.  Panzardi-Lespier, 918  F.2d 313,  319 (1st
            ______________     ________________
            Cir. 1990).  On that basis, we have held that when an out-of-
            court statement  "falls within  a firmly rooted  exception to
            the hearsay  principle," its  admission does not  violate the
            Confrontation Clause.   See id.   Having determined that  the
                                    ___ ___
            turret tape constitutes a prior consistent statement, and not
            hearsay,  we are satisfied that its admission did not violate
            the Confrontation Clause.  

                                         -22-
                                          22

            district court's decision,  therefore, only for plain  error.

            See  Jacques v. Clean-Up Group,  Inc., 96 F.3d  506, 516 (1st
            ___  _______    _____________________

            Cir.  1996).   We will  disturb a  district court's  Rule 403

            rulings,  moreover,  only  in   "'extraordinarily  compelling

            circumstances.'"   United States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7, 12 (1st
                               _____________    _____

            Cir. 1996), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 1997 WL 2646 (Jan. 6,
                        _____ ______

            1997) (quoting United States v. Montas, 41 F.3d 775, 783 (1st
                           _____________    ______

            Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1986 (1995)).  We see no
                        _____ ______

            such circumstances  in this  instance, and identify  no plain

            error in admission  of the  tape and use  of the  transcript.

            Young's Rule  403  argument, raised  for  the first  time  on

            appeal, thus fails.

                      Affirmed.
                      Affirmed
                      ________

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                                          23