Court Opinion

ID: 9627100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:34:19.285576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:03.199969
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice QUINN
dissenting in part.
The majority reasons that “[njothing in the statute prohibits the prosecution from introducing evidence of the non-existence of a statutory mitigator” in its case-in-chief during the penalty phase of a capital case, and that unless the prosecution is permitted to do so, “there is the risk that the jury might conclude, incorrectly, that the defendant had no significant criminal history.” Op. at 806-807. The majority’s decision, in my view, lacks support in either the structure or text of the capital sentencing *808statute and, more importantly, jeopardizes the basic fairness of a capital sentencing hearing. I therefore dissent from Part II of the court’s opinion.
I.
Under Colorado’s capital sentencing statutory scheme, once a defendant is found guilty of a capital offense, a separate trial is conducted to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death. A review of the statutory scheme for the capital sentencing hearing shows that the General Assembly intended the penalty phase of a capital case to be conducted in a sequential fashion similar to a trial on the issue of guilt, with the prosecution first presenting evidence of statutory aggravating factors and then the defendant being provided the opportunity to present evidence of mitigating factors.
The statute imposes upon the prosecution the burden of proving at least one statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. § 16-ll-103(l)(d), 8A C.R.S. (1986). Included in the list of statutory aggravators are the following factors dealing with prior convictions: (1) a class 1 felony committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment for a class 1, 2, or 3 felony; or (2) a prior conviction in Colorado, or in another jurisdiction, of a class 1 or class 2 felony which constituted or would qualify as crime of violence defined by section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986). Both the prosecution and the defense conclude that these statutory aggravators are not involved in this case.
The statutory scheme also contains a list of mitigating factors and states in section 16-ll-103(l)(d) that “[tjhere shall be no burden of proof as to proving or disproving mitigating factors.” The list of mitigating factors, as set forth in section 16 — 11— 103(5), is as follows:
(a) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime; or
(b) His capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution; or
(c) He was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution; or
(d) He was a principal in the offense which was committed by another, but his participation was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution; or
(e) He could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in the course of the commission of the offense for which he was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person; or
(f) The emotional state of the defendant at the time the crime was committed; or
(g) The absence of any significant prior conviction; or
(h) The extent of the defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement officers or agencies and with the office of the prosecuting district attorney; or
(i) The influence of drugs or alcohol; or (j) The good faith, although mistaken, belief by the defendant that circumstances existed which constituted a moral justification for the defendant’s conduct; or
(k) The defendant is not a continuing threat to society; or
(l) Any other evidence which in the court’s opinion bears on the question of mitigation.
The jury is required to return a verdict of either death or life imprisonment based upon a consideration of the respective aggravating factors and mitigating factors that have been placed in evidence. Section 16-11-103(2) states, in this respect, as follows:
(a) After hearing all the evidence and arguments of the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, the jury shall deliberate and render a verdict based upon the following considerations:
(I) Whether at least one aggravating factor has been proved as enumerated in subsection (6) of this section;
(II) Whether sufficient mitigating factors exist which outweigh any ag*809gravating factor or factors found to exist; and
(III) Based on the considerations in subparagraphs (I) and (II) of this paragraph (a), whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
(b) (I) In the event that no aggravating factors are found to exist as enumerated in subsection (6) of this section, the jury shall render a verdict of life imprisonment, and the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.
(II) The jury shall not render a verdict of death unless it finds and specifies in writing that (A) at least one aggravating factor has been proven; (B) there are insufficient mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factor or factors that were proved.1
The structure and text of the capital sentencing scheme clearly demonstrate that the prosecution has the initial burden of going forward and proving the existence of a statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt; that the defendant may then present evidence of a statutory mitigating factor or, pursuant to subsection 16 — 11—103(5)(Z), may present “[a]ny other evidence which in the court’s opinion bears on the question of mitigation”; and that only those statutory aggravating factors which the prosecution has proven and only those mitigating factors which have been placed in evidence shall be submitted to the jury for its consideration in determining the appropriate penalty. Thus, as pertinent to the issue raised here, the statutory penalty scheme contemplates that the defendant must present affirmative evidence of “[the] absence of any significant prior conviction” before such factor will be placed in issue. Without such affirmative evidence there would be no basis either in fact or in law to submit this statutory mitigating factor to the jury for its consideration.
II.
I acknowledge that section 16-11-103(l)(b) vests the trial court with considerable discretion in determining the relevancy of the evidence submitted by either the prosecution or the defense on the issue of penalty. That section states as follows:
All admissible evidence presented by either the prosecuting attorney or the defendant that the court deems relevant to the nature of the crime, and the character, background, and history of the defendant, including any evidence presented in the guilt phase of the trial, and any matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating factors enumerated in subsections (5) and (6) of this section may be presented. Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, as long as each party is given an opportunity to rebut such evidence.
Section 16 — 11—103(l)(b) should be construed in a manner that harmonizes it with the entire statutory scheme and effectuates a just and reasonable result. § 2-4-201, IB C.R.S. (1980). I would thus construe section 16 — 11—103(l)(b) to authorize the trial court to admit evidence concerning “the character, background, and history of the defendant” but only insofar as such evidence is relevant to any of the statutory aggravating factors presented by the prosecution or to any of the mitigating factors placed in evidence by the defendant.
A construction of section 16 — 11—103(l)(b) that permits the prosecution to establish in the initial phase of the penalty trial that the defendant sustained prior felony convictions in order to thereby controvert a mitigating factor that has not yet been placed in issue, and may never be placed in issue, skews the entire statutory scheme. Such construction results in exposing the jury to evidence which, in the final analysis, may be totally irrelevant to any of the aggravating or mitigating factors submitted to the jury for consideration on the *810issue of penalty.2 Of course, if a defendant presents affirmative evidence that he has no significant prior conviction, the court may permit the prosecution to present evidence in contravention of such mitigating factor either in the course of cross-examination of the defendant or during the rebuttal phase of the penalty trial.
III.
In this case, the majority holds that the trial court erred in prohibiting the prosecution from presenting evidence of the defendant’s prior felony convictions in the initial phase of the penalty trial for the purpose of disproving “[t]he absence of any significant prior conviction.” The majority’s holding thus allows the prosecution to expose to the jury the defendant’s prior felony convictions, with all their attendant prejudice, e.g., People v. Lucero, 200 Colo. 335, 342-45, 615 P.2d 660, 665-66 (1980); Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 284, 344 P.2d 455, 458 (1959), even though the defendant has not yet placed in issue any mitigating factor to which the defendant’s prior criminal record might relate. To construe Colorado’s capital sentencing scheme in this manner creates the risk that the jury will sentence the defendant to death, not because it is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a statutory aggravating factor exists or that the mitigating factors do not outweigh the proven statutory aggravating factors, but because it believes that the defendant’s prior criminal record, even though not constituting a statutory aggravating factor, would render any sentence less than death a moral injustice. Such a construction, in my view, will inevitably result in a trial that is the antithesis of a fundamentally fair proceeding on the issue of life imprisonment or death.
I would approve the ruling of the trial court prohibiting the prosecution from offering evidence of the defendant’s prior felony convictions, none of which constituted a statutory aggravating factor, in the prosecution’s case-in-chief during the penalty trial.
I am authorized to say that Justice LOHR and Justice KIRSHBAUM join in this dissent.

. We recently held in People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d 786 (Colo.1990), that before a defendant may be sentenced to death the prosecution must satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating factors do not outweigh the proven statutory aggravating factors.

. To the extent that section 16 — 11—103(l)(b) might be viewed as ambiguous with respect to the scope of the court’s discretion in admitting evidence concerning the "character, background, and history of the defendant” during the prosecution’s case in chief, the rule of lenity requires a construction in favor of the defendant. E.g., S.G.W. v. People, 752 P.2d 86, 88 (1988); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955); People v. Chavis, 659 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Colo.1983).