Court Opinion

ID: 9405445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 16:13:06.82464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.087068
License: Public Domain

J-S15001-23
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS :         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 TO: K.I.P., A MINOR             :             PENNSYLVANIA
                                 :
                                 :
 APPEAL OF: L.G.A. A/K/A L.G.G., :
 MOTHER                          :
                                 :
                                 :
                                 :        No. 1544 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the Decree Entered October 18, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                              2022-0120a

 TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS :         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 TO: R.P.P., A MINOR            :              PENNSYLVANIA
                                :
                                :
 APPEAL OF: L.G.A A/K/A L.G.G., :
 MOTHER                         :
                                :
                                :
                                :         No. 1545 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the Decree Entered October 18, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                              2022-0121a

 IN THE INTEREST OF: R.P.P., A        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
                                      :
 APPEAL OF: C.P., FATHER              :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :   No. 1589 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the Decree Entered October 18, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                              2022-0121a
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    IN THE INTEREST OF: K.I.P., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: C.P., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1590 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Entered October 18, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                                 2022-0120a

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                  FILED JUNE 28, 2023

       L.G.A. a/k/a L.G.G. (“Mother”) and C.P. (“Father”) (collectively,

“Parents”) appeal from the October 18, 2022 decrees involuntarily terminating

their parental rights to K.I.P., born in January 2020, and R.P.P., born in March

2021.1 After careful review, we affirm.

       We glean the factual and procedural history of this matter from the

certified record. The York County Office of Children, Youth & Families (“CYF”

or “the agency”) first became involved with this family in May 2021, after the

agency received multiple reports of domestic disputes from both General

Protective Services (“GPS”) and Child Protective Services (“CPS”) over several

____________________________________________

1 Parents, who are not married, filed separate appeals in the above-captioned
matters. On November 23, 2022, this Court consolidated Mother’s appeals at
1544 and 1545 MDA 2022. On December 15, 2022, we similarly consolidated
Father’s appeals at 1589 and 1590 MDA 2022. These consolidated appeals
are inextricably interrelated in that they both implicate Parents’ respective
parental rights to K.I.P. and R.P.P. Thus, we will address the issues raised by
Parents collectively in this writing, where it is appropriate.

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months. These concerns culminated in an incident on May 1, 2021, when

officers of the York Area Regional Police responded to the family’s residence

and found Mother, Father, and K.I.P. suffering from injuries. Mother and K.I.P.

suffered minor facial injuries and Father received serious cuts to his fingers

after Mother attacked him with a knife.         See Amended Status Review

Recommendation, 1/21/22, at 2-3. The juvenile court awarded emergency

custody of both children to CYF, and one week later, it determined that legal

and physical custody should remain with CYF. On May 18, 2021, the juvenile

court adjudicated K.I.P. and R.P.P. dependent, and eventually placed the

children in their current foster home, which is a pre-adoptive resource. See

N.T., 10/17/22, at 157.

      The family’s service plan (“FSP”) issued the same month as the

dependency    adjudication   established   an   initial   permanency   goal   of

reunification. Parents were permitted joint, supervised visitations with K.I.P.

and R.P.P. twice every week.      These joint visitations eventually became

separate in March 2022 at the request of both parties. During the course of

this case, neither Mother nor Father ever progressed to unsupervised

visitations with K.I.P. or R.P.P. Id. at 22, 56. Furthermore, the frequency of

visits progressively decreased for Parents between May 2021 and July 2022.

By the time CYS filed the underlying termination petitions in this matter,

Father’s visits were occurring only once every two weeks due to substance

abuse concerns. Id. at 82-83; see also Revised Permanency Plan, 7/8/22,

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at 9. Similarly, Mother’s visits had declined to just once every week. See

Revised Permanency Plan, 7/8/22, at 9.

      Parents were assigned several goals under the permanency plan,

including, inter alia, addressing their domestic violence issues, completing

mental health, parenting, drug and alcohol, and anger management

assessments, and following through on the resulting recommendations.

Following her disclosure that she was suffering from anxiety and postpartum

depression, Mother was also individually directed to attend appropriate mental

health therapy and participate in medication management.

      Between June 2021 and July 2022, Parents were also enrolled in several

support and educational programs, including PA Child Trauma Intensive

Family Support Services (“TIFSS”), Pressley Ridge Intensive Family Services

(“Pressley Ridge”), Catholic Charities Intensive Family Services (“Catholic

Charities”), and the Commonwealth Clinical Group (“CCG”).         Father also

received services and counseling from TRIAD for Domestic Violence (“TRIAD”).

In June 2021, Parents began TIFSS, which is an intensive program focused

upon parental reunification and included therapy, parenting education, and

supervised visitations. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 22-24. However, Parents were

unsuccessfully discharged from this program in December 2021 due to their

intractable conflicts with, and threats against, the staff.   See Permanency

Review Order, 1/19/22, at 2-3; N.T., 10/17/22, at 20-24.

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      Thereafter, Parents began parental education and supervised visitations

through Pressley Ridge beginning in January 2022. Id. at 50-51. Ultimately,

Mother was discharged unsuccessfully from this program in April 2022 due to

her “hostile” behavior towards the staff.    Id. at 52-56.    Indeed, Mother’s

conduct became sufficiently problematic that Pressley Ridge issued a “no

trespassing” letter to her. Id. at 53. Father also did not successfully complete

the program before the filing of the termination petitions. Id. at 54. Mother

then began receiving advocacy services from Catholic Charities in April 2022.

However, she was ultimately also discharged unsuccessfully from that

program in July 2022. Id. at 97-98. Parents were also enrolled in services

provided by CCG beginning in March 2022, which were focused upon

stabilizing Mother’s emotions and addressing Father’s domestic violence

issues. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 130-31, 215-16. Mother was still in therapy

and counseling through CCG as of October 2022. Id. at 130-31. By contrast,

Father successfully completed domestic violence counseling with TRIAD in

February 2022 and CCG in June 2022. Id. at 215-16.

      Nonetheless, the physical conflicts between Mother and Father persisted

throughout this period. On November 4, 2021, Father called and reported to

the agency that Mother had attacked him with “two knives.” Status Review

Recommendation, 1/21/22, at 2. Similarly, in February 2022, CYF learned

there was another physical altercation between Parents, wherein Father struck

Mother following a verbal altercation initiated by Mother.            See CYF

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Permanency Report, 3/2/22, at 3; see also N.T., 10/17/22, at 54-55.

Accordingly, both Mother and Father were perpetrators of violence within their

relationship. Due to this ongoing turmoil, Parents were purported to have

separated sometime in March 2022.              Id. at 171, 193.   In approximately

August of 2022, Father relocated to live with family in New Jersey. Id. at 146.

       On July 5, 2022, CYF filed separate petitions to involuntarily terminate

Parents’ rights to K.I.P. and R.P.P. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2),

(5), (8), and (b).2 A joint termination hearing was held on October 17, 2022,

at which CYF presented testimony from its caseworker Elyse Nangle and TIFSS

therapist Mariela Acre. There was extensive testimony from Pressley Ridge

personnel, including family therapist Susan Brodbeck and family advocate

Julia Harrison.      Representatives from Catholic Charities also appeared,

including family advocate Brittany Sunday.           Mother testified and adduced

testimony from, inter alia, CCG outpatient therapist Clarissa Richardson.

Father testified on his own behalf and presented no additional evidence.

Finally, we note that the records and orders from the underlying dependency

proceedings were admitted into the record without objection.            See N.T.,

10/17/22, at 5-6.

____________________________________________

2  On July 12, 2022, the orphans’ court filed orders pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2313(a) that appointed Douglas J. Kozak, Esquire, to serve as legal counsel
for then-two-and-one-half-year-old K.I.P. and appointed Christopher Moore,
Esquire, as legal counsel for sixteen-month-old R.P.P.

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      On October 18, 2022, the orphans’ court granted the petitions and

involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father as to K.I.P.

and R.P.P. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On

November 8, 2022, Mother filed timely notices of appeal at both above-

captioned cases and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(i) and (b). On November 16, 2022, Father also

filed timely notices of appeal at both cases along with concise statements of

errors. Thereafter, the orphans’ court issued responsive opinions pursuant to

Rule 1925(a) addressing the claims of Mother and Father separately.

      In her brief to this Court, Mother broadly asserts that there were

insufficient grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2),

(5), (8), and (b).   See Mother’s brief at 6-7.     The claims enumerated in

Father’s appellate brief mirror these arguments. See Father’s brief at 5-6. As

discussed further infra, our analysis will focus exclusively on § 2511(a)(8) and

(b). In pertinent part, both Mother and Father assert that the orphans’ court

erred as a matter of law and/or abused its discretion by: (1) holding that the

conditions which led to the removal of K.I.P. and R.P.P. continued to exist and

that termination will best serve their needs and welfare pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(8); and (2) finding that termination was appropriate with respect

to the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of K.I.P. and

R.P.P. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). See Mother’s brief at 6-7; Father’s

brief at 6. We will address Mother’s and Father’s respective claims in turn.

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      The following basic legal principles will guide our review:

      In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
      appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
      decree of the termination court is supported by competent
      evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
      accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
      determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
      trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
      appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
      has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

      An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
      reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
      facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
      may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
      of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
      will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
      courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
      hearings.

      In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court
      must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions
      concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with
      the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and
      support.    Termination of parental rights has significant and
      permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such,
      the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to
      establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence,
      which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
      as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
      hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa.Super. 2022) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed at statute by

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 of the Adoption Act, which necessitates a bifurcated analysis

that focuses first upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct

that may warrant termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(1)-(11). M.E., supra at

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830.    If the orphans’ court determines that a petitioner has established

grounds for termination under at least one of these subsections by “clear and

convincing evidence,” the court then assesses the petition under § 2511(b),

which focuses primarily upon the child’s developmental, physical and

emotional needs and welfare. Id. at 830 (citing In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251,

267 (Pa. 2013)); see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). This Court “need only agree

with any one subsection of § 2511(a), in addition to § 2511(b), in order to

affirm the termination of parental rights.” T.S.M., supra at 267 (citing In re

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc)).

       In the instant case, the orphans’ court found that termination was

appropriate pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). However, we need

only agree with one such subsection, in addition to § 2511(b), in order to

affirm involuntary termination.     Thus, our analysis in this proceeding

implicates § 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

       (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
       may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
       grounds:

            ....

         (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
         agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
         removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
         removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
         termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
         and welfare of the child.

            ....

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      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

      In order to satisfy § 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that: (1) the

child has been removed from the parent’s care for at least 12 months; (2) the

conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3)

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa.Super. 2018).

Furthermore, termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) does not require an

evaluation of a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led

to the removal or placement of the child. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434,

446 (Pa.Super. 2017). Rather, our inquiry is focused upon whether the at-

issue conditions have been remedied such that “reunification of parent and

child is imminent at the time of the hearing.”     In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11

(Pa.Super. 2009). This Court has acknowledged:

      [T]he application of Section (a)(8) may seem harsh when the
      parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems
      that had led to removal of her children.           By allowing for
      termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to
      exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child's
      life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable to
      perform     the   actions   necessary     to   assume     parenting

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      responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate
      indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a
      parent's claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we
      work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a short
      period of time, to wit eighteen months, in which to complete the
      process of either reunification or adoption for a child who has been
      placed in foster care.

Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).

      Finally, this Court has explained that,

      while both [§] 2511(a)(8) and [§] 2511(b) direct us to evaluate
      the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve
      the analysis relative to [§] 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the
      “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by [§] 2511(b);
      as such, they are distinct in that we must address [§] 2511(a)
      before reaching [§] 2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).

      With respect to § 2511(b), we are required to “give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). It is well-established that this query

“requires the trial court to consider the nature and status of bond between a

parent and child.” M.E., supra at 837 (citing In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 484-

85 (Pa. 1993). Furthermore, “[w]hen examining the effect upon a child of

severing a bond, courts must examine whether termination of parental rights

will destroy a ‘necessary and beneficial relationship,’ thereby causing a child

to suffer ‘extreme emotional consequences.’” In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177

A.3d 937, 944 (Pa.Super. 2017) (quoting E.M., supra, at 484-485).

However, the “bond examination” is only one amongst many factors to be

considered in assessing the soundness of termination:

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      In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
      emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
      the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
      the child might have with the foster parent. In determining needs
      and welfare, the court may properly consider the effect of the
      parent's conduct upon the child and consider whether a parent is
      capable of providing for a child's safety and security or whether
      such needs can be better met by terminating a parent's parental
      rights.

M.E., supra at 837 (internal citations omitted).     Finally, “common sense

dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the

children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their

foster parents.” T.S.M., supra at 268. Accordingly, we emphasize that “the

strength of emotional bond between a child and a potential adoptive parent is

[also] an important consideration” in a “best interests” assessment pursuant

to § 2511(b). I.J., supra at 13.

      We will begin by addressing the orphans’ court’s findings as to Mother

pursuant to § 2511(a). With respect to § 2511(a)(8), she asserts that the

orphans’ court findings were not supported by competent evidence: “Since

the basis for the removal of the children was domestic violence issues, and

there was no evidence established at the hearing that there had been any

domestic violence issues for over six months before the hearing, the [a]gency

failed to meet its burden under . . . [§ 2511](a)(8).” Mother’s brief at 30-31.

      As a threshold matter, we note that Mother is mistaken to the extent

that she suggests that domestic violence was the only issue that precipitated

the removal of K.I.P. and R.P.P. from her care.      Rather, the agency also

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became concerned regarding Mother’s mental health. Indeed, the stipulation

of facts signed by Mother’s counsel indicates that, upon first making contact

with CYF in May 2021, Mother averred that she needed help with, inter alia,

her “mental health.”      Stipulation of Facts, 9/26/22, at ¶ 6.   The record

indicates Mother suffers from anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and

postpartum depression. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 112, 168.

      Thus, rather than a narrow conclusion predicated solely upon the mere

frequency of confirmed domestic violence between Parents, the orphans’ court

framed its findings under § 2511(a)(8) as a broad conclusion that Mother’s

“self-regulation issues” had not improved by the time of the termination

hearing. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 20. Specifically, the orphans’

court found that, “though Mother engaged in therapy to treat her various

issues throughout the tenure of these cases, the multiple teams of service

providers never saw enough improvement to increase the frequency of

Mother’s visitation or downgrade the levels of supervision necessary for those

visitations.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 21. As expounded upon infra,

with respect to the needs and welfare of K.I.P. and R.P.P. under § 2511(a)(8),

the orphans’ court noted that “termination best serves the needs and welfare

of the children in that all service providers queried on the topic, as well as

Father, found that the foster situation was good for the children.”       Id.

(emphasis in original).

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      Preliminarily, with respect to the first prong of § 2511(a)(8), there is no

dispute that both K.I.P. and R.P.P. have been removed from Mother’s care for

the requisite twelve months. Turning to the second prong, we note that there

is also ample evidence demonstrating that Mother’s mental health and

domestic violence issues continue unabated.        On two separate occasions

during the course of this case, Mother assaulted Father with a knife. See

Amended Status Review Recommendation, 1/21/22, at 2-3.                  Mother’s

argument that there have been no subsequent incidents fails to acknowledge

the seriousness of these events. TIFSS therapist Mariela Arce also reported

that Mother was “hearing voices from a ghost” during a hospital visit in

November 2021. Permanency Review Order, 1/19/22, at 3.

      Concomitantly, the record also reflects that Mother has been largely

unsuccessful in addressing these issues.         She has been involuntarily

discharged from three different service providers during the lifetime of this

case: (1) TIFSS in December 2021 for behavioral issues and threats made

against the staff; (2) Pressley Ridge in April 2022 due to “hostile” behavior;

and (3) Catholic Charities in July 2022 due to the court’s entry of the goal

change order precluding reunification. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 20-24, 52-56,

97-98. The respective testimonies of Ms. Acre, Ms. Brodbeck, and Ms. Sunday

confirm these discharges were unsuccessful, i.e., services concluded before

Mother addressed her underlying issues. Id.

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     Moreover,    while   Mother   has   been   successfully   participating   in

therapeutic services provided by CCG since March 2022, these efforts have

not yielded any salient improvement in her condition. Ms. Richardson testified

that Mother still suffered from significant, unresolved emotional turmoil and

that she had not yet begun to process her domestic violence issues:

           Q.    All right. So you’re saying that the eight sessions that
     you’ve had with [M]other have focused on entirely the emotional
     distress or whatever is bothering her in that moment when she
     comes in.

           A.    Correct.

           Q.     So you haven’t had a chance to address domestic
     violence and anger management with [M]other because of that.
     Is that right?

          A.    Anger management and domestic violence was [sic]
     brought up because it was part of her distress, but the main focus
     was on stabilizing her motions as opposed to processing the
     domestic violence.

           Q.   Okay. So would you say that you have a lot more
     work to accomplish with [M]other yet?

           A.    Yes, we have work that needs to be done.

          Q.     All right. And there is no estimated discharge or time
     frame for discharge. Is that right?

           A.    Not at this time, no.

N.T., 10/17/22, at 130-31. Ms. Nangle testified similarly that Mother had not

yet achieved resolution of either her mental health or her domestic violence

issues. Id. at 176-77. Based upon the foregoing, we find ample evidence

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supporting the orphans’ court’s finding that the conditions that led to the

removal of K.I.P. and R.P.P. continue to exist as to Mother.

      Turning to the third and final prong of § 2511(a)(8), the orphans’ court

concluded that termination would best serve the needs and welfare of K.I.P.

and R.P.P., who were approximately two and one-half and one and one-half

years old, respectively, at the time of termination.         Specifically, the court

based this determination largely upon the unanimous opinions of the service

providers who had the opportunity to observe K.I.P. and R.P.P. in foster care

and testified at the termination hearing. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at

21 (“[T]he termination best serves the needs and welfare of the children in

that all service providers queried on the topic . . . found that the foster

situation was good for the children.”). There is more-than-adequate support

in the certified record for the orphans’ court’s findings.

      From the outset, we note that Mother and Father’s fraught relationship

led to a suspected physical injury to K.I.P. at the onset of CYF’s involvement

with this family. See Amended Status Review Recommendation, 1/21/22, at

2-3. By contrast, after observing both K.I.P. and R.P.P. in the pre-adoptive

foster home, Ms. Brodbeck reported that “there was definitely a positive

relationship between foster parents and the children. [The children] definitely

felt comfortable and safe with them as well.” N.T., 10/17/22, at 62. She

described both K.I.P. and R.P.P. receiving appropriate direction, discipline, and

freedom to play in their foster home.      Id.   Ms. Nangle relayed the same

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observations in her testimony, wherein she averred that “these boys are very

well taken care of” in their foster home. Id. at 151. Ms. Harrison also reported

that the children were happy and comfortable.           Indeed, as previously

indicated, even Father was supportive of the children’s foster placement. Id.

at 218 (“I am happy. I love [foster parents]. They are good people. They

are good parents.”). In comparison to the uncertainty and risk of physical

harm that existed in the children’s familial home, there seems to be little

dispute in the record that termination of parental rights in anticipation of

adoption will serve the needs and welfare of both K.I.P. and R.P.P.

      Based upon the foregoing analysis, we find that the orphans’ court

properly found sufficient evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to § 2511(a)(8), in that: (1) more than twelve months had elapsed

from the time of removal when the agency sought termination; (2) the

conditions that precipitated removal continue to persist, i.e., Mother’s mental

health and domestic violence issues are unresolved; and (3) termination in

favor of adoption by foster parents will serve the needs and welfare of K.I.P.

and R.P.P.

      Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to at least one

subsection of § 2511(a), we now turn to consider the propriety of terminating

Mother’s parental rights in light of the provisions of § 2511(b), which, as we

previously highlighted, afford primary consideration to “the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

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Mother asserts the orphans’ court failed to “give significant weight to the bond

between [M]other and the children” or to “consider whether termination would

destroy the existing beneficial relationship between [M]other and the

children.” Mother’s brief at 34. For its part, the orphans’ court’s rationale did

“not deny that there are bonds of sorts between Mother and the children,” but

concluded any bond with Mother was unhealthy and that the children “were

primarily bonded, and healthily so,” with foster parents. Trial Court Opinion,

12/5/22, at 22-23 (emphasis in original). Thus, it found termination to be the

“demanded” course of action to serve K.I.P.’s and R.P.P.’s “best interests.”

Id. at 23.

      Instantly, Mother’s arguments are focused upon the bond examination

mandated by Pennsylvania law. See E.M., supra, at 484-485. In addition to

the forgoing discussion addressing the children’s needs and welfare pursuant

to § 2511(a)(8), we observe that the certified record belies Mother’s

contention that she has a well-established bond with R.P.P. To the contrary,

Ms. Brodbeck described multiple occasions during which Mother asserted that

she was unable to feel a bond with R.P.P.         See N.T., 10/17/22, at 57.

Furthermore, Ms. Brodbeck also reported that Mother used domestic chores

to essentially avoid interacting with both children during supervised

visitations. Id. at 59. While Ms. Sunday testified that she believed that there

was a bond between the children and Mother, assuming, arguendo, that some

manner of bond exists between Mother and the children, the evidence of

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record establishes that the stronger, healthier bond in this matter exists

amongst K.I.P., R.P.P., and foster parents.

     For this point, the orphans’ court largely relied upon the testimony of

Ms. Nangle, who averred as follows with respect to the bond analysis:

     Q.    Now both of the children were fairly young when they came
     into care into their current home. Correct?

     A.      Yes.

     Q.   So in the last year and a half or so the day-to-day needs
     have been met by the resource family?

     A.      Yes.

     Q.    When we weigh the bond that the children have with the
     resource family versus [M]other, where does the stronger parental
     bond lie?

     A.      The foster [parents].

     Q.    And when we weigh the bond that the children have with
     the resource family versus [F]ather, where does the stronger bond
     lie?

     A.      Foster [parents].

     Q.   And why do you believe that the stronger bond lies with the
     resource parents rather than [M]other and [F]ather?

     A.   The day-to-day care. The children are always with foster
     parents, and [Mother and Father] only see the children once a
     week or once every other week.

Id. at 153-54.

     This testimony underscores the undisputed fact that Mother never

progressed    to    unsupervised     visitations   with   either   K.I.P.   or   R.P.P.

Furthermore, as detailed above, her efforts to ameliorate the issues that

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caused the children’s removal have been unsuccessful.         Ms. Richardson

confirmed that there is no knowable time frame for Mother to achieve her

emotional and mental self-regulation goals. In this particular legal context,

the permanency needs of the children must receive greater and more

immediate consideration than the aspirations of even well-meaning parents.

See I.J., supra at 11-12 (emphasizing that this Court “cannot and will not

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future”).

       Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the

orphans’ court finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights will best

serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of K.I.P.

and R.P.P. pursuant to § 2511(b). Thus, we will affirm the decrees entered

by the orphans’ court terminating Mother’s parental rights.

       We now turn to Father’s appellate issues. With respect to § 2511(a)(8),

Father asserts that the domestic violence issues that caused the removal of

the children no longer exist.3 See Father’s brief at 17-18. However, Father’s

arguments also concede that “[t]he domestic violence in this family was

clearly exacerbated by the toxic relationship between Mother and Father.” Id.

at 18.    Father alleges that his relationship with Mother has since ended,

asserting, like Mother, that there have been no incidents of domestic violence

____________________________________________

3 During the lifetime of this case, Father has presented with a number of
substance abuse issues.

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since the couple allegedly separated in March 2022. Id. The orphans’ court

found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8), based on

its conclusion that Father’s domestic violence issues remained unresolved.

See Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 18-20. We agree.

      Initially, there is no dispute that CYF has fulfilled the first prong of

§ 2511(a)(8) in that the children have been removed from Father’s care for

the requisite twelve months.     As above, we find that Father’s arguments

concerning the second prong gravely minimize the cascading incidents of

violence committed by the parties in this case. For his part, Father admitted

to beating Mother and having an ongoing problem with anger management.

See N.T., 10/17/22, at 217 (“You know, I caused a lot of the issues or anger

issues are because of me. . . . I have a problem with my hands. I used to

beat her[.]”).   Father likewise presented with a spotty record of service

compliance. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 20-24, 154. Although Father completed

some of the educational programs, the orphans’ court noted that such

completion is not an automatic indicator of beneficial progress. Specifically,

the incident in February 2022 wherein Father struck Mother took place mere

days after he “successfully” graduated from TRIAD’s domestic violence

diversion program. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/5/22, at 18-19 (“Father was

successfully discharged from programming for domestic violence within days

of his assaulting Mother, which militates against a finding that Father has truly

addressed this concern[.]”); see also N.T., 10/17/22, at 55, 61, 65. Like the

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orphans’ court, we find this juxtaposition clearly bespeaks unresolved

domestic violence issues for Father.         Mere completion of mandated

programming means little if it does not result in behavioral correction.

      Moreover, although Father claims that the end of the parties’

relationship has ended all domestic violence concerns, there is conflicting

evidence in the record indicating that Mother and Father continued their

relationship and mischaracterized the nature of their alleged separation to the

court as reported by Ms. Brodbeck and Ms. Nangle.         Id. at 62-63, 156.

Overall, the record supports the orphans’ court finding that Parents’ continued

relationship remained a cause of concern at the time of termination. Id. at

123. Based on the foregoing, we find the second prong of § 2511(a)(8) is

also satisfied with respect to Father, in that his domestic violence issues

continued to exist at the time CYF petitioned for termination.

      As Father has confined his discussion of § 2511(a)(8) to the first and

second prong of this statute, we address the third prong of section (a)(8) in

disposing of Father’s overlapping challenge to the orphans’ courts needs and

welfare analysis pursuant to § 2511(b). Instantly, Father asserts that he has

a “healthy parental bond” with the children, which will result in negative

“emotional consequences” if severed.         Father’s brief at 22.         While

acknowledging that Father has an undeniable bond with both K.I.P. and R.P.P.,

the orphans’ court found that the children’s exposure to the negative aspects

of Parents’ relationship coupled with the strength of the children’s bond with

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foster parents augured in favor of termination.       See Trial Court Opinion,

12/5/22, at 20-21. For the reasons discussed above, we find no fault in the

orphans’ court’s finding.

      Like the orphans’ court, we credit the existence of the bond that exists

amongst Father, K.I.P., and R.P.P., which is undisputed in the record.

However, contrary to Father’s averments, that bond is not entirely positive.

As noted by the orphans’ court, Father’s involvement in the children’s lives

has exposed K.I.P. to physical harm and both minors to emotional chaos in

the form of Parents’ fraught and violent relationship.          See id. at 21

(“[C]onsidering the children were exposed to at least some of Father’s faults,

in toto, the [c]ourt found that Father’s relationship with the children was a

toxic soup.”). We also emphasize that Father’s still-supervised visits with the

children have decreased to just one visit every two weeks. Contrary to the

averments in his brief, Father testified that he was pleased with the children’s

foster placement. See N.T., 10/17/22, at 218. As with Mother, the stronger,

healthier bond in the lives of both K.I.P. and R.P.P. clearly resides with foster

parents. Id. at 153-54.

      Based on the above analysis, we find that termination of Father’s

parental rights will best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional

needs and welfare of K.I.P. and R.P.P. pursuant to § 2511(b). Accordingly,

we affirm the decrees terminating Parents’ respective parental rights.

      Decrees affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 06/28/2023

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