Court Opinion

ID: 6739744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 23:21:01.114398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:01:55.368955
License: Public Domain

Grace, C. J.
(specially concurring). As we view § 9645, C. L. of 1913, it merely provides for the issuing of a temporary restraining order to prevent the continuance of an alleged nuisance during the pendency of the action, which w&s commenced to abate it or to restrain a course of unlawful conduct. The restraining order remains in force only until final judgment.
We see no reason why the above section is not a valid one, and we think it is. It is different, however, with § 9646, which, when a tem*633porary injunction is issued, as provided in § 9645, authorizes the court or judge, at the time he issues the temporary injunction restraining the alleged nuisance, also to issue his warrant to the officer serving the writ of injunction to take possession of the room, building, or place into his custody, and to securely lock and hold the same to abide the final judgment in the action, and likewise to take and hold possession of any personal property found on the premises.
It is thus clear from the latter section that the possession of the property, either real or personal, mentioned in the section, may be taken from one against whom the proceeding is brought before there is any opportunity for a hearing, and before final judgment. This clearly would be taking property without due process of law. I am therefore of the opinion that § 9646 is clearly unconstitutional.
In the case of State v. Bennett, 37 N. D. 465, 163 N. W. 1063, L. R. A. 1917B, 1076, it was held that the section last mentioned did not authorize the destruction of useful personal property found on the premises. The writ of seizure should be discharged, and the order appealed from modified accordingly.