Court Opinion

ID: 9411854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 07:00:24.193451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:15.606066
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SCOTT MCCRAY,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          CH-1221-16-0553-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: July 27, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

               THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Scott McCray, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, pro se.

           Erin Buck Kaiser, Esquire, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied his request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA)
     appeal.   Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneo us findings of material fact;

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s du e
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was a GS-11 Social Science Program Specialist for the
     agency.   Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 46.      The appellant filed an IRA
     appeal, arguing that the agency took the following actions against him in
     retaliation for protected disclosures:   (1) his supervisor ordered him to attend
     weekly staff meetings run by the Mental Health Intensive Care Management
     (MHICM) Program Director, even though the appellant had previously been
     excused from attending those meetings due to an equal employment opportunity
     (EEO) complaint that he had filed against the Program Director; (2) during a
     meeting, the Medical Center Director verbally threatened, humiliated, and
     belittled the appellant; and (3) after the appellant filed an internal whistleblower
     complaint, the Medical Center Director told the Administrative Investigation
     Board (AIB) investigating that complaint that the appellant was a chronic
     complainer, a disgruntled employee, and a liar. IAF, Tab 1 at 11-12, Tab 21 at 3.
     The administrative judge thus found that the appellant established jurisdiction
     over his appeal. IAF, Tab 11 at 4-6.
                                                                                         3

¶3        After a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision denying
     the appellant’s request for corrective action. IAF, Tab 28, Initial Decision (ID).
     The administrative judge found that none of the three actions listed above, either
     alone or together, constituted personnel actions within the meaning of 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(a)(2)(A). ID at 9-16.
¶4        The appellant has filed a petition for review, contesting the administrative
     judge’s analysis and arguing that the administrative judge was biased. Petition
     for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.       The agency has responded to the petition for
     review, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. PFR File,
     Tabs 5-6.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5        When reviewing the merits of an IRA appeal, 2 the Board must determine
     whether the appellant has established by preponderant evidence that he made a
     protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take
     or fail to take a personnel action.     E.g., Aquino v. Department of Homeland
     Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 35, ¶ 10 (2014). A preponderance of the evidence is the
     degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a
     whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely to be
     true than untrue. Id. If the appellant meets that burden, the Board must order
     corrective action unless the agency can establish by clear and convincing
     evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the
     disclosure. Id.

     The appellant established that he made a protected disclosure.
¶6        The administrative      judge found that the        appellant   established   by
     preponderant evidence that he made a protected disclosure evidencing several

     2
       The administrative judge found that the appellant established jurisdiction over this
     IRA appeal. IAF, Tab 11 at 4-6. Neither party challenges this finding on review, and
     we discern no basis to disturb it.
                                                                                         4

     categories of misconduct. ID at 9. Specifically, the administrative judge found
     that a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and
     readily ascertainable by that individual could reasonably conclude that the
     agency’s actions evidenced at least one of the categories of misconduct under
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(ii).    Id.   Neither party challenges this determination on
     review, and we discern no reason to upset this finding.

     The appellant is not entitled to corrective action because he failed to establish by
     preponderant evidence that he suffered a covered personnel action.
¶7         In his petition for review, the appellant challenges the administrative
     judge’s finding that he failed to establish that the agency subjected him to a
     personnel action. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-7. He asserts that the administrative judge
     overlooked and misinterpreted a number of unspecified factors and recounts the
     three incidents he claims are personnel actions, arguing that the incidents
     demonstrate that the agency subjected him to a hostile work environment in
     reprisal for his protected disclosures. Id.
¶8         Under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), 3 a “personnel action” is
     defined to include, among other enumerated actions, “any other significant
     change   in   duties,   responsibilities,   or   working   conditions.”    5   U.S.C.
     § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). The legislative history of the 1994 amendment to the WPA
     indicates that “any other significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working
     conditions” should be interpreted broadly, to include “any harassment o r
     discrimination that could have a chilling effect on whistleblowing or otherwise
     undermine the merit system and should be determined on a case -by-case basis.”
     130 Cong. Rec. H11,419, H11,421 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of

     3
       The WPA has been amended several times, including by the Whistleblower Protection
     Enhancement Act. The references herein to the WPA include those amendments. As to
     the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal, we have concluded
     that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
                                                                                          5

      Rep. McCloskey); see Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB
      17, ¶ 14.
¶9          However, notwithstanding the broad interpretation accorded to the term
      “significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions,” not every
      agency action is a “personnel action” under the WPA. Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17,
      ¶ 15 (citing King v. Department of Health and Human Services, 133 F.3d 1450,
      1452-53 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).       Rather, an agency action must have practical
      consequences for the employee to constitute a personnel action.              Id.   In
      determining whether an appellant has suffered a “significant change” in his
      duties, responsibilities, or working conditions, the Board must consider the
      alleged agency actions both collectively and individually.         Id., ¶ 16 (citing
      Holderfield v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 326 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir.
      2003)); see Sistek v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 955 F.3d 948, 955-56 (Fed.
      Cir. 2020). In sum, only agency actions that, individually or collectively, have
      practical and significant effects on the overall nature an d quality of an
      employee’s working conditions, duties, or responsibilities will be found to
      constitute a personnel action covered by section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).        Skarada,
      2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16.       As such, a number of agency actions may be covered
      thereunder collectively, even if they are not covered personnel actions
      individually, if, together, those actions are sufficiently severe or pervasive to
      significantly impact the appellant’s working conditions. Id., ¶¶ 16, 18, 29.
¶10         The appellant alleged that, as a result of his protected disclosures, his ch ain
      of command subjected him to a hostile work environment, i.e., subjected him to
      harassment that constituted a significant change in his working conditions. IAF,
      Tab 1 at 11-12, Tab 21 at 3. The administrative judge analyzed three specific
      incidents that the appellant alleged were personnel actions that demonstrate a
      hostile work environment, none of which she found sufficient to carry the
      appellant’s burden. ID at 9-16. Specifically, the administrative judge found that
      the 30-minute long June 30, 2015 meeting, in which the former Medical Center
                                                                                         6

      Director discussed the results of an investigation into the appellant’s allegations
      with him, was not a personnel action. ID at 10-12. The administrative judge
      further found that the presence of a third-party observer at those meetings as a
      note taker was not only common practice, but also was a reasonable measure
      under the circumstances, considering that the results of the investigation were
      inconsistent with the appellant’s allegations. ID at 11. Based on the testimony of
      all three participants as to what transpired in the meeting, the administrative
      judge found that the meeting itself, as well as the conduct of the appellant’s
      supervisor therein, fell short of being a personnel action. ID at 11 -12. We agree.
¶11         Concerning the appellant’s contention that the former Medical Center
      Director called him a chronic complainer, a disgruntled employee, and a liar in
      his testimony before the AIB, the administrative judge noted the former
      Director’s admission that he had described the appellant in that way. ID at 12.
      However, the administrative judge also found that the former Director credibly
      testified that he had not intended to belittle or insult the appellant, but rather to
      testify truthfully before the AIB, and that such testimony is not a personnel
      action. Id. Regarding the appellant’s attendance at the weekly MHICM Program
      staff meeting, the administrative judge found, based on the testimony before her,
      that all MHICM Program employees were expected to attend the 1-hour weekly
      staff meeting, that excusing the appellant from attending them was intended as a
      temporary accommodation while the agency investigated his December 2013 EEO
      complaint, and that, after the agency issued its final decision on that complaint,
      the appellant’s former supervisor began to ask when he would resume attending
      the weekly staff meeting. ID at 12-13. The administrative judge found that doing
      so did not constitute a personnel action, nor did it demonstrate a hostile work
      environment, because the appellant did not present evidence of any behavior
      therein so pervasive that it objectively could be considered a change in working
      conditions. ID at 12-14. While the administrative judge generally credited the
      appellant’s testimony that the meetings were stressful, in large part due to the
                                                                                            7

      presence of his former supervisor, the administrative judge found no evidence in
      the record to indicate that the former supervisor, who participated in the meetings
      by telephone, had engaged in conduct that would give rise to a hostile work
      environment. ID at 15. Instead, she found that the appellant generally tended “to
      exaggerate and to interpret routine events negatively” and commented that his
      “heightened sensitivity” did not convert an otherwise ordinary work environment
      into a hostile one. 4 Id.
¶12         We agree with the administrative judge that these three incidents
      individually do not comprise a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).
      ID at 9-16. Nor do we find that these incidents collectively had such a practical
      and significant effect on the overall nature and quality of the appellant’s working
      conditions, duties, or responsibilities as to constitute a personnel action covered
      by section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). See Sistek, 955 F.3d at 955-56 (finding that the
      agency’s investigation of the appellant was routine and did not , either on its own
      or as part of a broader set of circumstances, ri se to the level of a significant
      change in working conditions); Holderfield, 326 F.3d at 1209 (suggesting that a
      number of minor agency actions relating to an appellant’s working conditions
      may amount to a covered personnel action under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii)
      collectively, even if they are not covered personnel actions individually) . Based

      4
       The appellant argued, in part based on these statements, that the administrati ve judge
      was biased against him, contending that her statements to him were “harsh, arbitrary,
      untrue, and not supported by evidence.” PFR File, Tab 1. In making a claim of bias or
      prejudice against an administrative judge, a party must overcome the presumption of
      honesty and integrity that accompanies administrative adjudicators .         Oliver v.
      Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980).                Moreover, an
      administrative judge’s conduct during the course of a Board proceeding warrants a new
      adjudication only if the administrative judge’s comments or actions evidence “a
      deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impos sible.”
      Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting
      Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). Our review of the hearing transcript
      does not reveal any such conduct on the administrative judge’s part, and on that basis,
      we find that the appellant’s allegations fail to overcome the presumption and do not
      meet the high standard required to demonstrate bias .
                                                                                           8

      on the consistent testimony of the participants as to what transpired in the
      30-minute meeting that the former Medical Center Director called to review the
      results of the agency’s investigation into the appellant’s allegations, the
      administrative judge found that, despite the appellant’s frustration with the results
      of the investigation, it fell far short of evincing a personnel action. ID at 11-12.
      The administrative judge determined that the former Medical Director’s testimony
      before the AIB, however frank, was what the Director believed to be the truth,
      and thus was not a personnel action. 5 ID at 12. Similarly, the administrative
      judge found that requiring the appellant to attend the 1-hour weekly MHICM
      Program staff meeting, despite the stress and anxiety it caused him, did not
      evidence the kind of pervasive and severe behavior that could objectively be
      considered a change in working conditions sufficient to constitute a hostile work
      environment. ID at 14.
¶13         The Board will not overturn an administrative judge’s demeanor-based
      credibility findings merely on the basis of a disagreement with those findings.
      Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
      The issue of credibility is necessarily intertwined with the administrative judge’s
      findings concerning the seriousness of the incidents involved here, and, as such,
      those findings deserve deference.      Id. at 1372-73.    Because the appellant has
      identified no sufficiently sound reason to overturn the administrative judge’ s
      findings, we deny his petition for review.             The appellant’s allegations,
      collectively and individually, although indicative of an unpleasant and
      contentious work environment, do not establish that he suffered a significant
      change in his working conditions under the WPA. See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17,
      ¶ 29 (finding that the appellant’s allegations, collectively and individually,

      5
        Regardless of whether such statements could constitute evidence of retaliatory animus
      for the appellant’s whistleblowing activity, in the absence of a personnel action under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A), no prohibited personnel practice occurred. See Shivley v.
      Department of the Army, 59 M.S.P.R. 531, 536 (1993).
                                                                                      9

although indicative of an unpleasant and unsupportive work environment, did not
establish that he suffered a significant change in his working conditions under the
WPA).

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.            5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.              5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

6
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       10

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
                                                                                11

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you ma y be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, the n you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     12

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 7   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           13

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.