Court Opinion

ID: 9628937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:34:42.695751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:13.407070
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Justice,
dissenting in part.
I disagree with the court insofar as it concludes that there is no evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to Claudette McDonald’s negligent entrustment of the Nissan Pathfinder to her son, Bobbie McDonald, Jr.
There was sufficient evidence here to create a genuine issue of fact as to Claudette McDonald’s right to control the car: under AS 28.10.261(a), her name on the car’s registration and certificate of title are “prima facie evidence of [her] ownership or right to possession.” In granting summary judgment against Neary, the trial court concluded that the McDonalds’ unanswered affidavits professing their lack of actual ownership and right to possession rebutted this presumption and left no jury question. This conclusion is simply incorrect. Under Evidence Rule 301, evidence that rebuts a statutory presumption such as the one established in subsection 261(a) actually creates a jury issue as to the presumed fact — a fact that would otherwise be conclusively established by the presumption: “When the burden of producing evidence to meet a presumption is satisfied, the court must instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, infer the existence of the *1213presumed fact from the proved fact[.]” ARE. 301(a).
This court skirts the point by finding that there is “no evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact about whether [Claudette] had a superior right of control over the vehicle.” Op. at 1209 (emphasis added). The court reasons that, as a mere co-owner with her son, Claudette’s right of control was at most equal to Bobbie Jr.’s. Op. at 1211.
In my view, however, a genuine issue as to superior control arises here from undisputed record evidence that Bobbie Jr. is not and never has been a licensed driver. Because Bobbie Jr. had no license to drive, his right to possess and control his new ear was severely limited; Claudette admitted that she knew of his unlicensed status. Reading the record in the light most favorable to Neary, it supports a finding that Claudette was a licensed driver. As a licensed driver, Claudette was subject to no similar limitations. As between the two record owners, then, Claudette was the only one who was entitled to drive the ear; in her capacity as co-owner, she also had a clear legal right to prevent the car’s illegal use by her son and an obvious interest in doing so.
Given these circumstances, if the jury found Claudette to be a genuine co-owner — a question of fact placed in genuine dispute for summary judgment purposes by the statutory presumption stemming from Claudette’s name on the Pathfinder’s registration — it could also reasonably find that she had the right and the ability to control the car herself and to prevent Bobbie Jr. from using it. Thus, when viewed in the light most favorable to Neary, the record contains sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to Claudette’s superior right of control and to support a finding of liability against her.
I would accordingly reverse the summary judgment order as to Claudette McDonald.