Court Opinion

ID: 9831231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:56:25.674241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:32.845597
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In addition to the testimony of plaintiff set out in the main opinion to which defendants’ objections were, as held in that opinion, improperly overruled, the plaintiff testified:
“I wrote to Guy Swan or Milton J. Swan asking them for an accounting of how much money was due me. Neither of them ever made an accounting to me of money they received of mine. I never received any money from either Guy G. Swan or Milton 3. Swan after this letter was written. Guy G. Swan and Milton J. Swan were in the grocery business in Frankfort, Ind., under the firm name of Swan & Son. After the Swans came to Texas, I did not authorize them to use my money in buying personal property to farm on said land. I was not a partner with Guy G. Swan or Milton J. Swan; there was no partnership interest as to the farming of said land. There was no partnership interest in the personal property that was bought with my consent or knowledge; I was never consulted about buying personal property for improving said farm.
“I never received any money from them after they came to Texas. I did receive some money from them before they came to Texas; I received about $500; I can’t tell you whether I received that money by check or money; I could not tell you in what sums I received that money, it was in small amounts.”
All of this testimony was objected to by the defendants on the ground that it was testimony as to transactions with the deceased, and, plaintiff not having been called to testify thereto by the defendants, such testimony was inadmissible under article 2302, Sayles’ Civil Statutes. It seems to be well settled by the decisions of our appellate courts that plaintiff in this suit could not testify over defendants’ objection that the deceased, Milton J. Swan, had not paid her the moneys received by him as her agent. The statute prohibits testimony “as to” any transaction with the deceased, and this includes a denial that the deceased did or said certain things as well as an affirmative statement that such transactions or conversations occurred. Edelstein v. Brown, 100 Tex. 403, 100 S. W. 129, 123 Am. St. Rep. 816.
In the case of Johnson v. Lockhart, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 32, 40 S. W. 640, it is held that in a suit by an administrator to cancel a note executed by his decedent and held by the defendant the statute above cited prohibited the defendant from testifying that the note had not been paid. This is also held in the case of Abbott v. Stiff, 81 S. W. 562, in which case a writ of error was refused by the Supreme Court.
We think it necessarily follows from these decisions that the plaintiff in this case cannot, over the objection of defendants, testify that Milton J. Swan did not pay her the money collected by him as her agent.
In an able motion for rehearing, counsel for appellee has shown that there is other’ evidence in the record from which the court’s finding as to the amount collected by Milton J. Swan for plaintiff can be sustained. This being so, the case having been tried before the court without a jury, the error in admitting the testimony set out in our main opinion would not require a reversal of the judgment. Young v. Robinson, 135 S. W. 717; Mullaly v. Noyes, 26 S. W. 146. The finding that the moneys collected *999by the deceased had not been paid to the plaintiff does not appear to have been established by any testimony other than that of the plaintiff, and the admission of this testimony cannot be considered harmless.
There is no presumption that an agent duly authorized to collect money for his principal did not turn it over to the principal. On the contrary, the rule stated in 31 Cyc. page 1640, that: “The presumption of law is that an agent has done his duty until the contrary appears; misconduct and negligence will not in the absence of proof be presumed. Thus the legal presumption in the absence of proof is that the agent has performed his duty and paid over and accounted to his principal for moneys received by him in his capacity of agent” — is supported by the weight of authority. In addition to the cases cited in Cyc. in support of this rule, it is sustained by the following cases: Turner v. Kouwenhoven, 100 N. Y. 115, 2 N. E. 637; Knapp v. Griffin, 140 Pa. 604, 21 Atl. 449. It seems to us that this rule is sound in principle and is especially applicable when the agent is dead, and the principal seeks to hold his estate liable for his alleged nonperformance of duty. The money was rightfully received by the agent, and plaintiff’s cause of action is based upon the alleged failure' of the agent to do his duty and turn it over to her. In such case the burden is upon plaintiff, in order to establish liability on the part of the agent, to show that the money had not been paid over. The mouth of the agent being closed by death, the statute, in order that the parties may be placed on an equal footing in the matter of showing what the transactions were, closes the mouth of the principal.
We adhere to our former opinion reversing the judgment of the court below and remanding the cause for a new trial, and the motion for rehearing is overruled.