Court Opinion

ID: 9832971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:20:42.472449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:56.787280
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants contend that the trial court’s finding that appellants “knew that said ear was exhibited for sale from said time, September 12, 1929, to October 7, 1929, as ordinary' merchandise or automobile,” is ambiguous as to the time of appellants’ knowledge ; that the uncontradicted evidence shows that such knowledge was not acquired until the ear was sold; and that this ambiguity should be resolved in accordance with such evidence. The evidence leaves a great deal to inference and is almost exclusively from interested witnesses. While it is true that the finding is not expressly that appellants knew that the car was being offered for sale while it was being so offered, we think that is the natural import of the language used and is the only reasonable interpretation to be given to the finding. There 'would be no relevancy in a finding that appellants acquired such knowledge at some indefinite time after the sale of the car. Such finding could have no material bearing upon any issue in the case. Furthermore, it is a cardinal rule applied to findings of trial courts that they should be so construed as to support the trial court’s judgment. Elder, Dempster & Co. v. Weld-Neville Cotton Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 231 S. W. 102.
It is further contended that our holding that the consignment contract was in effect a conditional sale is in conflict with that in Milburn Mfg. Co. v. Peak, 89 Tex. 209, 34 S. W. 102.
We find it unnecessary to consider the question or to pass upon the proper, construction of the consignment contract. It was not our intention to rest our decision upon that issue. We sustain appellants’ contention that the trial court’s finding that appellants obtained the bailment contract after the consignment contract, and received thereunder the $500 deposit, was inconsistent with the further legal existence of the consignment contract, and was therefore tantamount to a finding that the bailment contract superseded *513tlie consignment contract under the doctrine stated in our original opinion. This holding renders a construction of the bailment contract unimportant, and that portion of our original opinion may be disregarded.
Other points raised in the motion have been fully covered in our original opinion.
The motion is overruled.
Overruled.