Court Opinion

ID: 9548377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:02:32.316727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:52.404406
License: Public Domain

JONES, J.,
concurring.
I write separately to respond to the colorful dissent written by Justice Lent and joined by Justice Linde.
The dissent argues that we have treated the defendant unfairly by deciding the case on a theory not advocated by either party. The key issue in this case in this court, the Court of Appeals and the trial court is whether the trial court must suppress evidence gained through warrantless searches of closed containers that were in the defendant’s automobile. We have answered that question unequivocally: no. The fact that the state asserted that the search was justified as “incident to arrest” rather than as a “mobile automobile exception” is irrelevant. The main issue whether the search violated our state constitution was asked and answered. The state and the defendant were entitled to argue any justification or lack of it for the search. We are not bound by their theories. We did not fetter the discussion and no one has been treated unfairly from a procedural standpoint.
The dissent then complains that even judges and lawyers might be subject to warrantless searches of their automobiles. That is certainly true, but only if the police have probable cause to believe that the lawyer or the judge was transporting contraband or crime evidence in the automobile. If police stop and search any citizen’s automobile, be it driven by judge or junkman, the police must have probable cause to do so. Although unrelated to the issue of the constitutionality *309of the search, if the search is not based on probable cause the police have invaded the privacy rights of the citizen and may be sued. This state provides a remedy for damages up to $150,000 under its Tort Claims Act for such unlawful acts. ORS 30.270. In addition, the federal government has provided a right to citizens to recover damages under 42 USC § 1983 if any police officer violates the federal constitutional rights of a citizen. Further, police who conduct unlawful searches and seizures are subject to administrative discipline, and in some cases to criminal prosecution. In short, police cannot conduct warrantless searches willy-nilly. If they do, they will be subject to severe sanctions.
The dissent continues its discussion by condemning the majority for not engaging in loose-lipped dicta when it asks how much ground this opinion is meant to cover. The dissent asks us to decide if the search would be lawful if the containers were not in the automobile. The opinion deals with containers in an automobile. The dissent then asks whether the opinion extends to crime evidence as well as contraband. The answer is found in State v. Brown, 301 Or 268, 721 P2d 1357 (1986): The search in Brown was for evidence of the crime — to wit, the gun, and in this case for contraband, to wit, the 10 pounds of marijuana.
The dissent’s incorporation of “The Incredible Hulk” article may be cute, but trite. Worse, the article is inapposite in that it refers to cars searched incident to arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 US 454, 101 S Ct 2860, 69 L Ed 2d 768 (1981), desk drawers in homes and cabin cruisers. I am amazed that the dissent finds this piece of whimsy persuasive.
The dissent concludes with a bit of legal chest-thumping and refers to the oft-quoted words of Justice Jackson with a snide side reference to even more oft-quoted words of Justice Frankfurter. These words from famous jurists can just as well be aligned with the majority opinion because the decision today does protect our citizens; it protects their rights as individuals, while allowing police to protect citizen rights to have our criminal laws enforced. A citizen’s rights of privacy are not protected by seizing him or his property and holding the person or property for hours pending the receipt of a warrant issued by a magistrate. Magistrates are judges. Judges are busy at work during the day and often difficult to reach at *310night. No one disputes that the containers could be seized and that the owner is deprived of that property until a warrant can be obtained. Also, no one disputes that it takes substantial time to obtain a warrant.
As the Chief Justice notes in his concurring opinion, our laws on the subject of search and seizure have been complex and confusing. It is no answer to say that all of these problems can be solved at the scene if the person involved gives consent. Anyone who has been involved in the practicalities of law enforcement knows that many of those on-scene consents become in-court denials. Further, the law of consent has not produced a legal bed of roses. Many thorny issues surround that procedure. See, e.g., State v. Douglas, 260 Or 60, 488 P2d 1366 (1971); see generally 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure 340-59, § 3.10 (1984). Police should not have to rely on a reversible consent to justify a car search. In fact, police can refuse consent and insist that the citizen wait for a warrant.
I envision a day when modern electronic techniques will provide the best of both worlds — warrants and immediate searches and seizures, but until then the decision in this case and in Brown will provide bright-line guidance for police and with less intrusion on the citizen privacy rights than our present outmoded, awkward warrant system provides.