Court Opinion

ID: 9960163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 16:11:24.108951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:14.817629
License: Public Domain

J-A01031-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  AKEEM HAYDEN                                 :   No. 431 EDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Dated January 30, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0005339-2022

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E, and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                               FILED APRIL 15, 2024

       The Commonwealth appeals from an order of the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing the charges of Driving Under the

Influence (“DUI”) and Driving While Operating Privileges Suspended (“DUS”)1

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 (“Rule 600”). After

careful review, we affirm.

       On December 17, 2021, at 10:22 p.m., Appellee, Akeem Hayden, was

in the driver’s seat of his Mitsubishi SUV stopped in a driving lane at the

intersection of 40th and Spring Garden Streets in Philadelphia. Officer Natalie

Biondo saw that the SUV was impeding traffic, as several cars had to go into

the opposite driving lane to get around it. Officer Biondo turned on her siren

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(A)(1) and 1543(A), respectively.
J-A01031-24

to get the driver to move the car. There was no response. She exited her

patrol car to check on the well-being of the driver. Appellee was passed out in

the car, with the engine running. Officer Biondo could not arouse him, either

by speaking to him or shaking him. There was an open can of beer in the

center console. EMTs arrived, who were successful in waking Appellee. The

odor of alcohol emanated from his breath when he spoke. When appellee

refused to go to the hospital, he was arrested and taken to the Police

Detention Unit. There, AID Officer Jamanda Beard-Smith attempted to test

Appellee, but he refused. Appellee’s certified driving history demonstrated

that at the time of his arrest, his license had been suspended due to prior DUI

convictions. N.T. 6/17/22 – Municipal Court Trial, 6-10, 13-17, 18, 21.

       On June 17, 2022, the Honorable Marvin L. Williams of the Municipal

Court of Philadelphia found Appellee guilty of DUI and DUS. He imposed a

term of six months’ reporting probation and fined Appellee. On July 19, 2022,

the same day that he was sentenced, Appellee filed a timely appeal for a trial

de novo in the Court of Common Pleas. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1006(A)(1).2

____________________________________________

2 A defendant convicted in Philadelphia’s Municipal Court has two options for

appeal to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas: trial de novo or
petition for a writ of certiorari. See Commonwealth v. Beaufort, 112 A.3d
1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2015). “A trial de novo gives the defendant a new trial
without reference to the Municipal Court record; a petition for writ of certiorari
asks the Common Pleas Court to review the record made in the Municipal
Court.” Id.

                                           -2-
J-A01031-24

      Following the appeal, court administration scheduled the following pre-

trial proceedings. Two weeks after the filing of the appeal, on August 2, 2022,

Appellee’s formal arraignment was scheduled and held.

      On October 3, 2022, the first and only status listing was scheduled and

held. At the status listing, the defense requested a Form 229 that had not

been produced in discovery. The form is usually prepared by an arresting

officer, and generally repeats the incident information from a different form –

which had been produced in this case – along with biographical information

for the arrestee and contact information for witnesses, if any. Appellee did not

know if a Form 229 had been prepared in this case. The Assistant District

Attorney who had handled the Municipal Court trial informed the trial court

that Officer Beard-Smith had said there was no Form 229, but that Officer

Biondo had “indicated there possibly may be,” and so she would investigate.

The trial court responded, “ok, just notify defense counsel.” N.T. 10/3/22 –

Status Listing, 3.

      On January 23, 2023, the first and only pretrial conference was held.

The defense attorney stated that the Form 229 requested at the last listing

had not been produced, and “otherwise” the defense was ready for trial. A

newly assigned Assistant District Attorney reported that the Commonwealth

was ready for trial. With respect to the Form 229, she stated much the same

information as had been forwarded at the October status listing, while claiming

the police department was still trying to locate the form. She also suggested

should the form not be located that it could be excluded from trial with a

                                     -3-
J-A01031-24

negative inference drawn. Defense counsel agreed. The trial court ruled that

the date for trial would remain, and if the Form 229 was not produced to the

defense at least three days prior to trial, it would be excluded. N.T. 1/23/23

– Pre-Trial Conference, 4-5.

      On January 30, 2023, the first trial date was reached. Defendant had

filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 1013(G). The defense still had not

been provided with the Form 229. The prosecutor reiterated the information

from a week before, which she stated she had confirmed with the Municipal

Court trial prosecutor. She then reiterated the prior agreement for the court

to draw a negative inference from the lack of a Form 229, noting that in this

instance it would only be duplicative of information produced to the defense.

When the trial court sought clarification, the prosecutor asserted that the Form

229 did not exist, rather than being an extant document that had not been

produced in discovery. N.T. 1/30/23, 4-6.

      Following this discussion, the trial court held the Rule 1013(G)

evidentiary hearing. Defense counsel acknowledged on the record that a Form

229 has “limited evidentiary value,” but argued that the Commonwealth still

had to produce it once it had been “ordered” to do so by the court. N.T.

1/30/23 – Motion, 9. Discovery sanctions such as drawing a negative inference

were not an appropriate substitute for due diligence. Id. Further, the defense

argued, the Commonwealth could not demonstrate due diligence because it

had only to produce the Form 229 over several months and had failed to do

so. Id., 10.

                                     -4-
J-A01031-24

      Believing that a Form 229 had been prepared in this case, the defense

called Officer Biondo to testify. She was the first officer to come in contact

with Appellee. N.T. 1/30/23 – Motion, 10. Officer Biondo, however, only stated

that a Form 229 “should exist” and that the District Attorney’s Office had not

reached out to her to acquire any document. Id., 11. Under cross-

examination, she admitted that she does not keep all of her paperwork, and

if she had prepared paperwork in connection with an arrest and was not the

officer who transported the arrestee, then the paperwork she created would

have been given to the officer transporting the arrestee. Id., 12-13. Officer

Biondo did not transport Appellee the night he was arrested. Id., 12. When

questioned by the court, Officer Biondo recalled creating some documents in

connection with Appellee’s arrest but did not have any specific recall on

whether that included a Form 229. Id., 13. It would not have been unusual

for the transport officer to prepare a Form 229. Id.

      After this testimony, the Commonwealth acknowledged that under

Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2021), it had to prove its due

diligence through the entirety of the case before any delay caused by judicial

scheduling could be considered. N.T. 1/30/23, 15. The trial court then walked

the prosecutor through what had been done since the court “ordered the

Commonwealth to produce [the Form 229] on a status date,” and again “on

the pretrial date.” Id., 20. The prosecutor explained that the trial court only

orders police documents to be produced if the “actual piece of paperwork does

exist,” and then explained that the previously-assigned Assistant District

                                     -5-
J-A01031-24

Attorney tried to determine whether the Form 229 existed, but could not do

so. Id., 21-22. The markings on the Commonwealth’s trial file were entered

into evidence to document that the court had been informed by each of the

assigned prosecutors of their belief the document did not exist. Id., 21. The

Commonwealth then argued that judicial delay, not the Commonwealth,

caused trial to be scheduled past the run date. Id., 25-26. There had been no

continuances, all of the “important” discovery had been produced and the 195-

day period since the de novo trial appeal had been taken up by necessary

proceedings – formal arraignment, status listing and pre-trial conference –

dictated by judicial administration scheduling. Id.

      Appellee’s counsel argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove its

due diligence, because it did not document any of the efforts made by the

previously assigned prosecutor to determine if the Form 229 existed and

Officer Biondi had testified that no one ever asked her about it. N.T. 1/30/23,

15, 26-27. In addition, Appellee’s counsel argued that the Form 229 had

become mandatory discovery once the trial court ordered it to be produced,

at a minimum, placing an obligation on the Commonwealth to obtain it (or

determine its non-existence) to demonstrate its due diligence. Id., 28-29.

Noting that the form might not be necessary, and while both the defense and

Commonwealth might be able to go to trial without it, the Commonwealth had

to prove its due diligence because the run period had expired. Id., 30.

      The trial court ruled that the Commonwealth had not demonstrated due

diligence in the pre-trial period with respect to obtaining the document, which

                                     -6-
J-A01031-24

the court had ordered to be produced if it existed. It noted that the

Commonwealth did not provide dates, much less documentation, of when

specific efforts were made by the assigned prosecutors. In particular, it stated

that it wanted to hear from the previously assigned prosecutor, whom the

present prosecutor alleged had made all of the efforts to locate the Form 229.

The trial court noted that the only evidence presented established that the

Commonwealth’s search for the document did not extend to asking Officer

Biondo about it, even though there was a court order for production of the

form. The Commonwealth had five months to produce the form or determine

it had never been created. It accomplished neither. The trial court granted

Appellee’s motion and dismissed the charges with prejudice. N.T. 1/30/23, 15,

27-31.

      The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal.

      The Statement of the Question Involved in the Commonwealth’s brief is

consistent with Rule 1925(b) Statement, and provides as follows:

      Did the lower court err in dismissing this case—in which the
      Commonwealth had been the verdict winner at defendant’s trial in
      the Philadelphia Municipal Court—on prompt trial grounds under
      Pa. R. Crim. P. 1013, when the only instance in which the lower
      court found the Commonwealth not to have been duly diligent was
      its inability to produce a putative two-page arrestee biographical
      information form that was not in the Commonwealth's possession,
      that the Commonwealth determined after a reasonable
      investigation did not actually exist, and that the defense
      acknowledged almost certainly would have been insignificant even
      if it had existed?

Appellant’s Brief, 4.

                                     -7-
J-A01031-24

      Our standard of review for a Rule 600 (prompt trial) claim is whether

the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion:

      … Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon
      facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing
      and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an
      error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
      overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly
      unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will,
      as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

      The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the record
      of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the trial
      court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light most
      favorable to the prevailing party.

Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743, 748 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned up),

appeal denied, 292 A.3d 839 (Pa. 2023).

      Additionally, when considering the trial court's ruling, this Court is
      not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600]. Rule
      [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection
      of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of
      society. In determining whether an accused's right to a speedy
      trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's
      right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain
      those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.
      However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not
      designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith
      prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 A.3d 810, 821 (Pa. Super. 2023). See also

Commonwealth         v.   Bradford,      46    A.3d    693,   702    (Pa.   2012);

Commonwealth         v.   Genovese,      425    A.2d   367,    371   (Pa.   1981);

Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc).

                                       -8-
J-A01031-24

      So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
      Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial
      rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a manner
      consistent with society's right to punish and deter crime. In
      considering [these] matters ... courts must carefully factor into
      the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual
      accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law
      enforcement as well.

Ramos, 936 A.2d at 1100 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted);

see also Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1238–1239 (Pa. Super.

2004) (en banc).

      The Rule of Criminal Procedure governing the timing of a Municipal Court

trial provides that the Commonwealth must commence the trial de novo within

120 days of the filing of the notice of appeal. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1013(G). “In all

other respects the provisions of Rule 600 shall apply to such trials in the Court

of Common Pleas.” Id.

      If a defendant is not brought to trial within the required time, he
      “may file a written motion requesting that the charges be
      dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been
      violated.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1). The trial court must then
      conduct a hearing on the motion. Id. Subsection (C) further
      provides that when computing time for Rule 600 purposes,
      “periods of delay at any stage of the proceeding caused by the
      Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise
      due diligence shall be included in the computation of time within
      which trial must commence[, but a]ny other periods of delay shall
      be excluded from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

Faison, 297 A.3d at 821–22. This Court has held that a Rule 600 analysis

entails the following three steps:

      First, Rule 600(A) provides the mechanical run date. Second, we
      determine whether any excludable time exists pursuant to Rule

                                      -9-
J-A01031-24

       600(C). We add the amount of excludable time, if any, to the
       mechanical run date to arrive at an adjusted run date.

       If the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we apply the
       due diligence analysis set forth in Rule 600([D]). As we have
       explained, Rule 600[] encompasses a wide variety of
       circumstances under which a period of delay was outside the
       control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the
       Commonwealth's lack of diligence. Any such period of delay
       results in an extension of the run date. Addition of any Rule 600[]
       extensions to the adjusted run date produces the final Rule 600
       run date. If the Commonwealth does not bring the defendant to
       trial on or before the final run date, the trial court must dismiss
       the charges.

Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 74 A.3d 228, 236 (Pa. Super. 2013), aff'd,

107 A.3d 735 (Pa. 2014). See also Carl, 276 A.3d at 749; Commonwealth

v. Wendel, 165 A.3d 952, 956–57 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).3

       Here, the notice of a trial de novo appeal was filed on July 19, 2022.

The mechanical run date – 120 days later – was November 16, 2022. By that

date, even though there had been no continuances, the Court of Common

Pleas had held only the formal arraignment and status listing. The first trial

____________________________________________

3 In 2013, former Rule 600 “was rescinded and new Rule 600 adopted to
reorganize and clarify the provisions of the rule in view of the long line of
cases that have construed the rule.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, comment. As such, the
three-step method to calculating the run period is correct, as it is based on
the method used in the long line of cases. A plain reading of the rule would
support calculating the run period by counting only includable days, those
“periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the
Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). Doing so would avoid the need for steps one and two
and having to convert the number of days into a date certain. A hearing would
be necessary only if the number of includable days exceeded the total
permitted in the rule. The result is the same using either method in this case.

                                          - 10 -
J-A01031-24

date had been scheduled by court administration to be held on January 30,

2023, 195 days after the start of the run period.

       As there was neither Commonwealth nor defense caused delay during

the run period, the trial court went directly to an evidentiary hearing on

whether the Commonwealth had been duly diligent throughout the entirety of

the case since the filing of the appeal for a trial de novo. Commonwealth v.

Harth, 252 A.3d 600, 617 (Pa. 2021) (“requiring the Commonwealth to

demonstrate that it acted with due diligence before a trial court excludes time

from its Rule 600 time computation on the basis of judicial delay”). 4 Due

diligence does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, only

reasonable effort by the Commonwealth to bring defendant to trial in timely

manner. Commonwealth v. Hill, 736 A.2d 578, 588 (Pa. 1999). It is fact-

specific   and    must     be   determined     on   a   case-by-case   basis.   Id.;

____________________________________________

4  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Harth that “requiring the
Commonwealth” to prove its due diligence “before a trial court excludes time
from its Rule 600 time computation on the basis of ‘judicial delay’ comports
with the language of Rule 600(C)(1) and its commentary, the purpose behind
the rule, and our prior jurisprudence[.]” Id. at 617. According to the
comments to the rule, however, the inquiry for a judge is “whether the delay
is caused solely by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to
exercise due diligence.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Cmt. The scheduling of necessary
procedural events by court administration, without any postponement, is not
delay caused solely by the Commonwealth. Nor would it be correct to say, as
the trial court did, that “the Commonwealth failed to bring Appellee to trial
before the adjusted run-date passed,” Second Supplemental Opinion, 5
(emphasis supplied), because there was no opportunity to commence trial
before the run date had passed, or even within thirty days of it. See
Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 14 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc).
Nevertheless, Harth controls our analysis.

                                          - 11 -
J-A01031-24

Commonwealth v. Aaron, 804 A.2d 39, 43 (Pa. 2002). The proper focus is

on what was done by the Commonwealth, not on what was not done.

Commonwealth v. Preston, 901 A.2d 1, 12 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc);

Commonwealth v. Jones, 886 A.2d 689, 701 (Pa. Super. 2005). The

Commonwealth        has    the   burden        of   proving   its   due   diligence   by   a

preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Kearse, 890 A.2d 388,

393 (Pa. Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 804 A.2d 671, 673 (Pa.

Super. 2002).

       Each of the assigned prosecutors assured the court on the record that

they, or the police, would investigate the existence or location of the Form

229. N.T. 10/3/22, 3; N.T. 1/23/23, 4. Yet, the Commonwealth presented no

evidence at the hearing that any additional investigation was conducted over

the   four   months     since    the   defense       requested      the   document.    See

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 804 A.2d 675, 679-680 (Pa. Super. 2002) (to

demonstrate due diligence with respect to a defense discovery request, the

Commonwealth must make “reasonable efforts” but need not do so “to the

defense’s complete satisfaction”).5 At the hearing, the trial court specifically

noted that the Commonwealth did not present the previously assigned

prosecutor, whom it was alleged had made the efforts to locate the document,

____________________________________________

5 Notably, the defense request for the single document was made four months

in advance of the trial date. This was not a situation where a late request by
the defense for additional discovery caused trial to be postponed, in which
case exclusion of the resulting delay would be proper. See Commonwealth
v. Andrews, 213 A.3d 1004, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2019).

                                          - 12 -
J-A01031-24

nor did it provide dates, much less documentation, of when those specific

efforts were made. It ruled that the Commonwealth had not demonstrated its

diligence with respect to discovery. In light of the burden of proof and standard

of review, we find the trial court’s conclusion was supported by the record and

sufficient to dismiss the charges.

       The only statement supporting that any investigation had been done

was the hearsay report by the assigned trial prosecutor about what the

previously assigned prosecutor had told her she had done, which amounted

to phone calls to the police department that were not returned. N.T. 1/30/23,

27-28. The lower court was entitled to reject that meager assertion.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 852 A.2d 315, 317-318 (Pa. 2004) (unsworn

statements by counsel are not enough to prove diligence). A fair reading of

the record, in the light most favorable to the Appellee as the motion winner,

supports the conclusion that the assigned prosecutors made little or no effort

from the status listing through the day of trial. At most, the originally assigned

prosecutor made one or two calls to the police but did not follow up. That was

not a reasonable effort to produce a document the trial court had ordered the

Commonwealth to either produce or determine did not exist.6
____________________________________________

6 We note that the trial court stated it had ordered the document be produced

in discovery if it existed and the Commonwealth did not object to that
representation. N.T. 1/30/23, 20, 30. See also Second Supplementary
Opinion, 2. Our review of the record discerns no clear order to that effect.
Rather, defense counsel noted that the Form 229 had not been produced but
might not exist, and the prosecutor, who handled the trial in Municipal Court
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 13 -
J-A01031-24

       The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred by ruling it lacked

diligence by failing to produce a two-page biographical information form that,

to the best of its ability to determine did not actually exist and the defense

acknowledged would almost surely lack significance if it did exist. Appellant’s

Brief, 14. In light of the standard of review, we are unpersuaded. We note

further that the Commonwealth is not being faulted for being unable to

produce the document, but for not coming forward with any first-hand account

or near contemporaneous documentation to support a finding that the

prosecutor had made reasonable efforts to find the document or determine

that it did not exist. See Wallace, 804 A.2d at 679-680. We doubt that the

lack of this document was material to the defense.7 However, we must rely on
____________________________________________

stated she did not believe the form existed but would investigate further. N.T.
10/3/22, 3. In response, the trial court said “Okay. Just notify defense
counsel.” Id. With a neutral standard of review, we would not find that the
trial court entered an order to produce the document, but rather only to tell
counsel the result of an investigation into its existence. The standard of
review, however, requires us to view the record in the light most favorable to
the Appellee. Carl, 276 A.3d at 748. It may well be that this is the trial court’s
usual practice though it be opaque to a reviewing court, and all parties
understood their obligations. The absence of an objection by the
Commonwealth, at the very least, deprived us of a clear explanation. See
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

7 Just as the Commonwealth failed to object to the existence of a discovery

order, it failed to object to the materiality of Appellee’s request, as the police
form was subject to disclosure only on an order discretionary with the court.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)(a)(i); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 72 A.3d 681, 684
(Pa. Super. 2013). In explaining why the Form 229 would be material, even
though it had “limited evidentiary value,” defense counsel stated “in a 229
they [a police officer] typically asks people what their jobs are, where they’re
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 14 -
J-A01031-24

trial courts to exercise their discretion in entering clear discovery orders to

avoid potential gamesmanship by the defense. The Commonwealth also

argues that this was a discovery trap that bootstrapped an insignificant

discovery issue into a discharge. Appellant’s Brief, 15-16. If this was a trap,

the Commonwealth walked into it unprepared. We can only suggest that it

keep better records of efforts made to produce ordered discovery, which it

may then proffer at a hearing to satisfy its burden of proof.

       Pursuant to Harth, neither we nor the trial court may attribute to judicial

delay the fact that court scheduling made it impossible to bring this matter to

trial in a timely fashion without proof that the Commonwealth had been duly

diligent. At the hearing, the Commonwealth offered no persuasive evidence

that its representatives had actively investigated whether a particular

document had been created in this case, even though agreeing it had been

ordered to do so months earlier. Because the Commonwealth failed to

demonstrate that it made reasonable efforts to produce the ordered

document, it did not prove its due diligence.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

living. If a person is so intoxicated they can’t even provide those answers,
that might be relevant evidence for the defense.” N.T. 1/30/23. We discern
no helpful evidence for the defense in this hypothetical, as Appellee was
charged with a crime where intoxication was an element.

                                          - 15 -
J-A01031-24

Date: 4/15/2024

                  - 16 -