Court Opinion

ID: 9955713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 05:07:30.721716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:16.919576
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

DERRICK LASHON BRADDOCK,                                               FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                       March 28, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,                                    9:05 a.m.

v                                                                      No. 365095
                                                                       Court of Claims
PAROLE BOARD,                                                          LC No. 22-000134-MB

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RICK, P.J., and JANSEN and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

         This case presents interesting questions regarding the parole of prisoners serving a
parolable life sentence. Specifically, whether the Parole Board member who conducts the public
hearing must participate in the vote to determine whether the prisoner is granted parole and what
happens if that vote ends in a tie. The Court of Claims determined that the Board member, having
left the Board before the vote was taken, was not required to participate in the vote and that a tie
vote had the result of denying parole. For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that the Parole
Board member does not need to participate in the vote, at least under circumstances where that
person is no longer a member of the Board, and that the vote cannot end in a tie. According, we
affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand regarding the Court of Claims’ decision denying
plaintiff mandamus relief.

       The trial court summarized the facts in this case as follows:

               Plaintiff Derrick Braddock, a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the
       Michigan Department of Corrections (DOC), seeks a writ of mandamus
       compelling defendant Michigan Parole Board to "hold a lifer law public hearing
       conducted by one of its members who will be involved in the formal
       recommendation to grant or deny parole to Mr. Braddock in compliance with
       MCL 791.234(8)(c), MCL 791.244(2)(f) and (h), and Mich Admin Code, R
       791.7760(4)." Braddock also seeks to compel through a writ of mandamus a
       final parole decision made "by a concurrence of a majority vote of” the Parole
       Board's "participating members," which Braddock contends is commanded by

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MCL 791.246 and Mich Admin Code, R 791.7765(2), along with an order that the
"Director of the MDOC ... cast ... a tie-breaking vote if the vote of [the] Parole
Board ends in a tie[.]"

        In 2004, Braddock was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of
parole after a jury convicted him of assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83,
and several other offenses carrying lesser penalties. He became subject to the
Parole Board's jurisdiction regarding his life sentence in July 2021. See MCL
791.234(7)(a). Consistent with the parole consideration procedure described in
MCL 791.234(8), Braddock was interviewed by Parole Board member Rev.
Jerome L. Warfield, Sr., in June 2021. A majority of the Parole Board later
voted, in August 2021, to convene a public hearing.

      A public hearing was held on October 19, 2021. Parole Board member
Sonia Warchock presided at the hearing. Approximately six weeks later, on
November 28, 2021, Warchock resigned from the Parole Board and accepted other
employment.

        On December 10, 2021, the Parole Board issued a decision regarding
Braddock's parole, announcing: "The Parole Board has decided to withdraw
interest in your case and will not proceed toward release on parole at this time.
Your case will be reviewed, as required by law, on or about the date indicated
below." The date indicated is July 1, 2026. The decision included an
"explanation" and "recommendations for corrective action which may facilitate
release."

       Although the full Parole Board consists of 10 members, two Parole
Board positions were vacant on the date Braddock's parole decision was issued.
Eight members of the Board—its full complement at the time—participated in
the public hearing, and eight voted on whether to grant Braddock parole. The
eight Parole Board members split evenly, with four voting that they had
"interest" in granting parole, and four voting that they had "no interest" in
granting parole.

        Braddock then filed a three-count complaint seeking a writ of
mandamus. He sought to compel this Court to order that: (1) "all ten" members
of the Parole Board must consider whether to grant or deny parole; (2) the
Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections must cast a final vote in
the event that the Parole Board is unable to comply with its legal duty to render
a final parole decision to either grant or deny parole by a concurrence of the
majority of members; and that Sonia Warchock must be involved in the formal
recommendation to grant or deny parole.

       The Parole Board moved for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (C)(l 0), submitting affidavits attesting that Warchock was not
a Parole Board member at the time the Board convened in executive session to
consider Braddock's parole, and that there were only eight Parole Board

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       members when the vote to withdraw interest in Braddock's parole was
       conducted. The Board argued that because MCL 791.246 provides that parole
       decisions are to be made by a majority vote of the Board and "the eight-member
       decision was made by the entire Board," no legal violation occurred. Further,
       the Board contended, no statute authorizes the Director of the Department of
       Corrections to break a tie when the Board is evenly split regarding a parole
       decision, and no statute required that Warchock participate in the hearing after
       her resignation. Braddock had not identified the breach of any clear legal right
       or clear legal duty, the Board concluded, foreclosing the issuance of a writ of
       mandamus.

               Braddock responded with a proposed amended complaint withdrawing
       his contention that "all 10" Board members should be compelled to vote on his
       parole, conceding that the Parole Board "has authority under the common law of
       this State to render parole decisions with a quorum of less than all ten of its
       members." Nevertheless, Braddock urged, "all 'decisions' of the Parole Board
       must be made by a 'majority vote'—regardless of the number of Parole Board
       members participating," which requires either a re-vote until a majority is
       reached, or the participation of the Director of the MDOC as a tie-breaker. Under
       MCL 791.244(2)(f) and (2)(h), Braddock insisted, a public hearing "shall" be
       conducted by " 'at least 1 member of the parole board who will be involved in
       the formal recommendation' " to grant or deny parole, which means that
       Warchock, who conducted the meeting, must be compelled to vote on his
       parole.

         Thus, the essential facts that are relevant to resolving this appeal are fairly simple: (1) the
Parole Board member who conducted the public hearing was no longer a member of the Parole
Board when it took its vote and, therefore, did not participate in the vote and (2) the vote ended in
a tie that the Board interpreted to mean that parole was denied. For the reasons expressed below,
we conclude that it was not necessary for the Parole Board member who conducted the public
hearing to participate in the vote, but that it was necessary for the Parole Board to revote until the
result is no longer a tie.

       This Court reviews issues of statutory construction, as well as the trial court’s decision
granting defendant summary disposition, de novo. Dextrom v Wexford County, 287 Mich App
406, 416; 789 NW2d 211 (2010).

        We turn first to the question whether the Parole Member who conducted the public hearing
was required to participate in the vote on whether to grant plaintiff parole. Plaintiff argues that a
new public hearing is required, one conducted by a Parole Board member who will participate in
the ultimate vote. We disagree.

       Plaintiff relies on the provisions of MCL 791.244(2)(f), which provides:

              (2) Except in cases in which a commutation is requested based in part on a
       prisoner's medical condition and in which the governor has requested that the parole
       board expedite its review and hearing process under section 44a, upon its own

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       initiation of, or upon receipt of an application for, a reprieve, commutation, or
       pardon, the parole board shall do all of the following, as applicable:

                                                    ***

              (f) Conduct a public hearing not later than 90 days after making a decision
       to proceed with consideration of a recommendation for the granting of a reprieve,
       commutation, or pardon. The public hearing must be held before a formal
       recommendation is transmitted to the governor. One member of the parole board
       who will be involved in the formal recommendation may conduct the hearing, and
       the public must be represented by the attorney general or a member of the attorney
       general's staff.

We conclude that this statute is inapplicable to the present case. The plain text of the statute
provides that it applies to a hearing for a “consideration of a recommendation for the granting of a
reprieve, commutation, or pardon.” A parole is not a reprieve, commutation, or pardon. Black’s
Law Dictionary (10th ed) defines “parole” as “The conditional release of a prisoner from
imprisonment before the full sentence has been served.” It is also “a conditional release of a
prisoner serving an indeterminate or unexpired sentence.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary (11th ed.). People v Clark, 315 Mich App 219, 230; 888 NW2d 309 (2016).

        Plaintiff does raise the argument that MCL 791.234(8(c), which applies to parole of
prisoners serving life sentences, provides that the “decision to grant or deny parole to the prisoner
must not be made until after a public hearing held in the manner prescribed for pardons and
commutations in” MCL 791.244 and MCL 791.245. While the phrase “in the manner prescribed”
directs a general framework for the hearing, it does not necessarily include the requirement that a
Board Member who preside over the hearing participate in the decision or vote. This is particularly
true given that MCL 791.244(2)(f) says that that hearing may be conducted by a Board member
who will be involved in making the recommendation to the governor regarding a reprieve,
commutation, or pardon. While it is the governor who grants a reprieve, commutation, or pardon
and the parole board can only recommend, it is the parole board that grants a parole to a prisoner
serving a life sentence.

      Moreover, the statute says that a parole board member who will be involved in making the
recommendation “may conduct the hearing.” “May” is not “shall.” “May” is permissive, not
mandatory. See Woodman v Dep’t of Corrections, 511 Mich 427, 443; 999 NW2d 463 (2023).

        But, even if the Court were to agree that the statute requires that the public hearing on lifer
paroles be presided over by a Board member who will be participating in the decision, there was
no violation of the statute. Clearly, the member who conducted the hearing could not vote at the
December 10, 2021, meeting as she was no longer a member of the Parole Board. But there is no
indication that when she conducted the hearing it was anticipated that she would be unavailable to
vote when the time came. It places form over substance to say that whenever a Board member
leaves between the time of the hearing and the Board vote that the process must be redone with a
new public hearing.

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        Plaintiff responds to this argument by pointing out that the administrative code, R
791.7760(4), uses the word “shall” rather than “may.” But plaintiff does not provide authority for
the proposition that an agency may make mandatory that which the Legislature makes
discretionary, even where the statute directs the agency to establish rules of procedure.

        Defendant’s response is essentially that the vote to withdraw interest was not a vote to grant
parole and, therefore, is not subject to the requirements of MCL 791.234(8). Defendant’s response
reinforces the argument that the requirement for a Board member who will participate in the
recommendation to conduct the hearing does apply here because that requirement is limited to
recommendations for reprieves, commutations, and pardons. In particular, defendant points out
that the administrative rule plaintiff relied upon for making the requirement mandatory only refers
to reprieves, commutations, and pardons. Rule 791.7760 very explicitly, both in its heading and
numerous times in its text, refers to “reprieves, commutations, and pardons,” but not to “lifer
paroles.”

        For these reasons, we reject plaintiff’s argument. The Board member requirement only
applies to public hearings held for the consideration of reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
not for lifer paroles.

        We next turn to the question whether the Parole Board’s decision may end in a tie, thus
resulting in the denial of parole.1 We conclude that it cannot.

        To begin, there is certainly a compelling logic to the defendant’s position that a tie-vote
has the effect of denial. As defendant points out in its brief, basic parliamentary procedure dictates
that a motion fails when the vote ends in a tie. As defendant further argues, legislation can only
pass on a majority vote. See Const 1963, art 4, § 26. And a tie vote in an appellate court merely
leaves the lower court’s decision in place, without precedential effect. See, e.g., Adair v State of
Michigan, 474 Mich 1027, 1040; 709 NW2d 567 (2006) (“an even division . . . effectively
rendering null and void the work of the Court and leaving intact lower court decisions . . . .”)
(statement of Taylor, C.J., and Markman, J.); see also MCR 7.315(A) (“Except for affirmance of
action by a lower court or tribunal by even division of the justices, a decision of the Court must be
made by concurrence of a majority of the justices voting.”)

        But this case is not controlled by Robert’s Rules of Order. It is controlled by statute. And
the statutes involved are clear in their directives. MCL 791.246 provides:

                  All decisions and recommendations of the parole board required by this act
          must be by a majority vote of the parole board or, except as otherwise prohibited
          by this act, a parole board panel created pursuant to section 6(2).

Additionally, MCL 791.234(8) concerns the grant of parole to a prisoner serving a life sentence,
and subsection (8)(c) provides in part as follows: “A decision to grant or deny parole to the
prisoner . . . .” This indicates that the Parole Board does not just determine whether to grant parole,
but that it must also determine whether to deny parole. Or, to put it another way, if the statute

1
    Or, as the Parole Board phrased it, a “withdrawal of interest” in paroling plaintiff.

                                                   -5-
merely referenced a “decision to grant parole,” that would support a conclusion that a tie vote
results in the prisoner not being granted parole because a majority of the Board did not vote to
grant. It is inescapable that (1) the statute considers the denial of parole to be a decision and (2)
all decisions of the parole board must be made by majority vote. Defendant’s best argument would
be that the vote here that ended in a tie was a vote on whether there was “interest” in proceeding
towards parole. That is, it was essentially a vote on whether to take a vote to grant or deny parole.
And, defendant further posits, that this “withdrawal of interest” result is not a decision “required
by this act,” MCL 791.246; rather, it is not subject to the majority-vote requirement of that section.

         Defendant appears correct in arguing that this preliminary “interest” vote is not provided
for in the statute. It would seem to be an internal procedure, although defendant does not point to
an administrative rule that establishes this procedure. While there is a certain appeal to this
argument, we reject it. It merely serves to avoid the statutory requirements. To take an extreme
hypothetical, let us say that the Parole Board adopted an internal procedure that a parole petition
would not proceed to a “final vote” unless the Board members unanimously expressed an interest
in advancing the parole request to a vote. That would essentially give every member of the Board
a veto over the grant of a parole despite the clear statutory directive that parole decisions, to grant
or deny, are to be made by majority vote.

       But, even if this “vote to take a vote” process is a rule or policy of the Parole Board, by its
own rules a majority vote is required. Mich Adm Code, R 791.7765(2) provides:

               (2) A parole release, revocation, or rescission decision for a prisoner
       considered for parole pursuant to section 34(4) of Act No. 232 of the Public Acts
       of 1953, as amended, being S791.234(4) of the Michigan Compiled Laws, and all
       other parole board decisions required by statute, rule, or policy, including, but not
       limited to, commutation requests and special paroles, shall be made by the parole
       board. The decisions specified in this subrule shall be made by a concurrence of
       the majority of the parole board members. [Emphasis added.]

Therefore, even a preliminary decision of a “withdrawal of interest” is subject to the ‘majority
vote” requirement.

        Having concluded that a majority vote was required that was either favorable or
unfavorable to granting parole, and that a tie-vote is not permitted, there remains the question of
the remedy. The trial court’s grant or denial of a writ of mandamus is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. White-Bey v Dep’t of Corrections, 239 Mich App 221, 223; 608 NW2d 833 (1999).

        We reject plaintiff’s suggestion that this Court order the Director to cast the tie-breaking
vote. Admittedly, this is a rather workable solution. Indeed, it is a solution that the Legislature
should perhaps seriously consider to in order to avoid the problem of a tie-vote in the future. But
it is not a solution that is consistent with the statutory duties entrusted to the Director. The
Legislature has granted broad supervisory powers to the Director, MCL 791.203, including the
power to appoint the Parole Board, MCL 791.231a. But the Legislature has not given the Director
a seat on the Parole Board or the power to cast a tie-breaking vote. For this Court to direct the
Director to do so would, as defendant argues, constitute legislating from the bench. But we agree
with plaintiff’s argument that the Parole Board must re-vote until it reaches a majority decision.

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        The Legislature could have simply provided that parole may only be granted by a majority
vote of the Board, thus establishing that a tie-vote results in parole being denied. The Legislature
did not make that choice, instead requiring that both the decision to grant parole and to deny parole
must be by majority vote. Therefore, once the process has commenced, it must terminate with a
majority vote of the Board, be it favorable or unfavorable.

       The standard for granting mandamus was summarized in White-Bey, 239 Mich App at 223-
224:

               The burden of showing entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of
       mandamus is on the plaintiff. Herp v Lansing City Clerk, 164 Mich App. 150, 161;
       416 NW2d 367 (1987). To obtain a writ of mandamus, the plaintiff must show that
       (1) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the performance of the duty sought to be
       compelled, (2) the defendant has a clear legal duty to perform, (3) the act is
       ministerial in nature, and (4) the plaintiff has no other adequate legal or equitable
       remedy. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 443; 596
       NW2d 164 (1999); McKeighan v. Grass Lake Twp. Supervisor, 234 Mich App.
       194, 211–212; 593 N.W.2d 605 (1999).

We conclude that plaintiff has met this burden with respect to requiring a revote. As discussed
above, plaintiff has a right and defendant has a duty to provide a majority vote on whether to grant
or deny plaintiff parole. While the decision whether to grant parole is clearly discretionary, the
act of voting is itself ministerial. And defendant has not shown what other remedy could be
provided.

        Moreover, plaintiff is not entitled to a new public hearing, nor can this Court order the
Director to cast a tie-breaking vote, but plaintiff is entitled to have a parole decision made based
upon a majority vote by the Parole Board. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying a writ of
mandamus. On remand the trial court shall enter a writ of mandamus directing defendant to revote
and to do so until it reaches a majority decision whether to grant or deny parole.

       Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded to the Court of Claims for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. No costs, neither party
having prevailed in full.

                                                              /s/ Michelle M. Rick
                                                              /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                              /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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