Court Opinion

ID: 9946139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 15:08:12.774099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:27.959672
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3397-21

ALEXANDER CARDILLO,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OPERATED SCHOOL
DISTRICT FOR THE
CITY OF PATERSON,
PATERSON BOARD OF
EDUCATION, EILEEN SHAFER,
M.ED, in her official capacity and
individually, MONICA FLOREZ,
in her official capacity and
individually,

     Defendants-Respondents.
_____________________________

                   Argued January 24, 2024 – Decided February 29, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-0820-20.

                   Juan Carlos Fernandez argued the cause for appellant
                   (Fernandez Garcia, LLC, attorneys; Michael Garcia and
                   Juan Carlos Fernandez, of counsel and on the briefs).
            Kyle J. Trent argued the cause for respondents
            (Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro & Murphy, PC,
            attorneys; Mark J. Blunda, of counsel and on the brief;
            Kyle J. Trent, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Alexander Cardillo appeals the April 8, 2022 order granting

summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Paterson Board of Education (the

Board) and the State Operated School District for the City of Paterson (the

District), as well as Monica Florez and Eileen Shafer, both in their official

capacities and individually, and dismissing his disability discrimination,

unlawful retaliation and wrongful termination claims under the New Jersey Law

Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, as well as the May 27,

2022 order denying his motion for reconsideration. Because the trial court did

not err in finding plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case or that the

District's reasons for terminating his employment by eliminating his position as

part of a reduction in force (RIF) were pretext, we affirm.

      In reviewing whether summary judgment was improvidently granted, we

view the facts set forth in the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the

non-moving party. Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake, 234 N.J. 317, 329 (2018).

In doing so, we give plaintiff "the benefit of the most favorable evi dence and

                                                                              A-3397-21
                                         2
most favorable inferences drawn from that evidence." Gormley v. Wood-El,

218 N.J. 72, 86 (2014); see also R. 4:46-2(c).

        Plaintiff worked for the District from 2015 until June 2019, when his

contract to work as a library media specialist (LMS) at the Martin Luther King,

Jr. School (the MLK School) was not renewed as part of a RIF. The MLK

School is one of more than fifty schools in the District. While plaintiff worked

at the MLK School, principal Monica Florez was his direct supervisor and Eileen

Shafer was the District superintendent, to whom Florez reported.            During

Florez's December 18, 2018 to March 1, 2019 leave of absence, vice principal

Ramona Serrano was the acting principal and plaintiff's supervisor.

        During the 2018-19 school year, plaintiff began mentoring Student E, 1 a

thirteen-year-old seventh-grade special education student at the MLK School

who had an individualized education program (IEP) as part of his curriculum.

Plaintiff asserts that at several points before and during Florez's leave of absence

he met with the MLK School's special education team and reported he did not

feel Student E's IEP was being adequately followed.

1
    We identify Student E only by his initial in accordance with the motion record
    and to preserve the confidentiality of the non-party minor.
                                                                              A-3397-21
                                         3
      While Florez was on leave, Serrano received several reports concerning

plaintiff's interaction with Student E, including teachers observing plaintiff

alone in the library with Student E in violation of school policy . Serrano

addressed these issues with plaintiff, as well as the concern plaintiff was taking

Student E away from assigned in-class instruction time on a "constant" basis. In

February or March 2019, Serrano instructed plaintiff to stop taking Student E

out of his assigned classes. However, MLK School teachers and administrators

continued to observe plaintiff disregarding Serrano's instructions and spending

time alone with Student E. When Florez returned to work in March 2019, she

spoke with plaintiff about the reports of his inappropriate conduct relating to

Student E during her absence.

      In early March 2019, a member of the MLK School staff also reported

directly to Florez that they had seen inappropriate interactions between plaintiff

and Student E. While in Florez's office, the staff member called the New Jersey

Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCP&P) to report the incident.

At DCP&P's request and with Serrano's knowledge, Florez took steps to ensure

plaintiff was not alone with Student E and advised other MLK School

administrators of the same instruction during the pendency of the DCP&P

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                                        4
investigation. A school administrator was directed to be present whenever

Student E was in the library with plaintiff.

      Despite these efforts, plaintiff's conduct toward Student E continued, and

Florez learned that while the DCP&P investigation was continuing, plaintiff

purchased a McDonald's lunch for Student E, gave the lunch to him in front of

other students, and continued to allow Student E into the library alone with him

in the mornings before school started. Plaintiff also allowed students in his book

club, including Student E, to go into the library during their scheduled lunch

time. Another teacher also complained that plaintiff entered and interrupted

their classroom to speak with Student E during class time. Florez again advised

plaintiff these situations were inappropriate and in violation of school policies.

      Plaintiff alleges that around March 2019, Florez began harassing him.

According to plaintiff, he believed the harassment was retaliation because he

informed school administrators he believed Student E's IEP was not being

followed. Specifically, plaintiff alleges Florez followed him around the school

and he was uncomfortable when Florez spoke to him about being alone with

Student E. Plaintiff said Florez intensified her harassment and attacks on him

each time he reported student mistreatment.

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                                        5
      During the same time period, the MLK School administrators learned that

new classes of Pre-K students were being added to the MLK School student

population. Some staff members' schedules had to be changed to accommodate

the additional classes, the teachers' preparation periods and lunch.       Since

plaintiff's classification as a LMS qualified him to cover the Pre-K classes,

plaintiff was assigned to assist another staff member in some of those classes.

Plaintiff contends this scheduling change was accomplished while the DCP&P

investigation was pending and that he was assigned to take on classes with non-

communicative students with autism as punishment for reporting the harassment

that Florez was subjecting him to. During this time, plaintiff informed his union

representative that some Pre-K students had removed their diapers and were

running around the classroom. Plaintiff told Florez the new assignment was

causing him anxiety and discomfort. Florez told him "[a]ll you need to do is go

in and read a book to the children."

      Plaintiff asserts he has a history of depression and anxiety, for which he

received treatment from medical professionals before, during, and after his

employment at the MLK School.            Although plaintiff contends he was

"forthcoming" by advising both Florez and the school nurse of his "well-known"

anxiety diagnosis, plaintiff only recounted two specific occasions during spring

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                                       6
2019 when he informed staff members at the MLK School of his mental health

conditions.

      Plaintiff contends Florez learned of plaintiff's anxiety after he experienced

an incident and went to see the school nurse. The only incident in the record

correlating to this description occurred in March 2019 when Florez scolded

plaintiff for allowing students in the library during lunch. Plaintiff says he

suffered a panic attack as a result of the scolding and had to be escorted to the

school nurse's office. Plaintiff took a sick day on March 15, 2019.

      Plaintiff contends that Florez would not allow plaintiff to meet privately

with Shafer on March 18, 2019. On the same date, Florez instructed plaintiff to

remove two students from the library, one of whom was Student E, which

plaintiff felt was inappropriate.

      At a meeting that same day, plaintiff told Florez that she was "the person

making [him] sick," he was anxious, and he felt targeted by her. Plaintiff

informed Shafer that Florez was following him around the school. Shafer

replied: "I don't want you to worry about what's going on over there, [Florez] is

retiring very soon and, you know, don't worry about what's happening."

      Plaintiff claims that on March 19, 2019, he attempted to give Florez a

"doctor's note" making it clear "he was under duress." However, Florez would

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                                        7
not accept the note. Plaintiff then provided the note to the school nurse and told

the nurse he had an anxiety disorder and the note was to go in his file at the

District's main office. Plaintiff asserts the nurse then gave the note to Florez.

Florez denies ever seeing a note and testified that if she had received a note

asserting an anxiety disorder, she would have given it to the District and a

determination would be made if she could meet the accommodation. Plaintiff's

District personnel file does not contain a document mentioning an anxiety

disorder.

      The note plaintiff references is a February 13, 2019 letter from social

worker, Carole M. Pasahow, DSW, LCSW, stating that "Mr. Alexander Cardillo

has been a patient of mine since January 2014 for treatment of anxiety and

depression." Plaintiff never provided any proof that he was diagnosed with

anxiety and depression by a qualified physician. Plaintiff testified he was not

seeking an accommodation when he gave the note to the nurse.

      On April 15, 2019, plaintiff went to the hospital for an anxiety attack.

When he returned to work, he contends that Florez was standing at the front door

and said: "I need your book club list." Plaintiff states that he walked around

Florez and handed a secretary a doctor's note regarding his absence.

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                                        8
       The DCP&P investigation concluded in April or May 2019. At Florez's

deposition, she testified DCP&P "called to tell [her] that the case was finalized

and there were no findings." Plaintiff's union representative learned of the

DCP&P investigation when DCP&P officials went to Student E's house to

conduct an interview. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he learned of the

then-closed DCP&P investigation on September 27, 2019.

       In May 2019, the Board "eliminated hundreds of positions in the District

through a [RIF] due to … [a] budgetary shortfall." The 2019 RIF was one of

several RIFs that occurred in the District almost annually due to financial issues.

The District's initial 2019 RIF plan called for the elimination of all nontenured

LMS positions, including plaintiff's. Only three of the fifty-two schools in the

District were able to keep a non-tenured LMS by substituting other positions,

increasing class sizes or not filling a vacancy which existed in that school.

Twelve LMS positions were among the hundreds of positions eliminated by the

RIF.

       The MLK School was required to eliminate three positions. Plaintiff's

position was one of those that Florez recommended be eliminated, as were the

positions of a second-grade teacher and a fourth-grade teacher. The District has

posited there are State requirements as to how many teachers and nurses must

                                                                             A-3397-21
                                        9
be kept on staff based on student population size, but no such requirement exists

for the LMS position. Additionally, "[p]laintiff's schedule had the most open

spaces and he covered significantly [fewer] classes than any other non-tenured

staff member."

      After Florez submitted a recommended plan for accomplishing the RIF at

the MLK School, the Board voted to accept the proposal and eliminate the LMS

position. Plaintiff was notified that his employment contract for the following

year was not being renewed and his employment officially ended in June 2019.

      Plaintiff argues that Florez unilaterally made the decision as to which

positions to eliminate and that the Board, in retaining three LMS positions in the

District with less seniority than him, improperly applied District Policy 3146,

which states, in part: "When two or more nontenured teaching staff members

are employed within the category affected by a [RIF], the nontenured teaching

staff member(s) shall be retained in that category who has demonstrated greater

competence."

      Neither plaintiff nor his union representative filed a grievance or petition

regarding his non-renewal and plaintiff did not request a hearing before the

Board. Plaintiff also did not file a grievance or complaint with the District's

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                                       10
Affirmative Action Office or human resources department claiming harassment

or discrimination while employed by the District.

      On March 11, 2020, plaintiff filed an eight-count complaint alleging the

following:   disability discrimination in violation of the LAD (count one);

negligent supervision and training (count two); respondeat superior (count

three); hostile work environment in violation of the LAD (count four); aiding

and abetting as to Florez (count five); retaliation (count six); wrongful

termination (count seven); and aiding and abetting as to Shafer (count eight).

After discovery concluded, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.

On April 8, 2022, the court granted defendants' motion and dismissed the

entirety of the complaint with prejudice for the reasons set forth in a written

decision.

      The trial court found plaintiff had failed to present an opinion from an

expert that he had a disability recognized under the LAD and, therefore, plaintiff

had not set forth a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Further, the

trial court rejected plaintiff's retaliation claims as unsubstantiated, unrelated to

any adverse employment actions, and without a causal link to any alleged

protected activities. The trial court also concluded plaintiff did not establish he

was engaged in LAD-protected activities, he lacked standing to bring a case on

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                                        11
behalf of a special-needs student, and he improperly failed to exhaust

administrative remedies as to his wrongful termination claim.

      On May 27, 2022, the court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration

finding that plaintiff had not met the standard set forth in D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242

N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990), to warrant reconsideration of a final order.

On reconsideration, the trial court found that plaintiff did not set forth a prima

facie claim for discriminatory discharge since he did not establish that his LMS

position was filled by someone else after the RIF.          Although in reply to

opposition to his motion for reconsideration, plaintiff did supply the court with

copies of an advertisement for a District job fair in which the LMS position was

listed as one of the positions being hired for, the court stated it did not consider

any additional evidence submitted on the reconsideration motion that could have

been provided in opposition to defendants' summary judgment motion.

      The trial court also found that plaintiff failed to establish causation since

plaintiff admitted it was his belief Florez took action against him for his

relationship with Student E, not as the result of disability discrimination. The

trial court found plaintiff only mentioned an allegation that he was retaliated

against for complaining that Pre-K students with autism were being treated

improperly in a conclusory fashion by way of counsel's argument in opposition

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                                        12
to summary judgment without making the allegation anywhere in his complaint.

Finally, the trial court found on reconsideration that plaintiff did not establish

any evidence of pretext under the McDonnell Douglas2 burden-shifting

framework. This appeal followed.

       On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in finding he had not

established he had a disability nor that he was advocating on behalf of those

with disabilities. Further, plaintiff alleges the trial court improperly relied on

evidence not established in the record to grant summary judgment and that he

has standing to bring each of the claims in his eight-count complaint. Plaintiff

additionally asserts that the trial court incorrectly found the elimination of his

position resulting from a District-wide RIF was not pretextual.

       We review a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment

de novo, applying the same standard applied by the trial court. Samolyk v.

Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). As a result, we are tasked with determining

"'"whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational

factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving

party."'" C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 255 N.J. 289, 305 (2023)

2
    McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
                                                                            A-3397-21
                                       13
(quoting Samolyk, 251 N.J. at 78) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins Co. of

Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).

      We broadly construe and apply the protections of the LAD to allow for

the greatest available antidiscrimination impact. Richter v. Oakland Bd. of

Educ., 246 N.J. 507, 537 (2021). "The LAD's worthy purpose is no less than

eradication of '"the cancer of discrimination" in our society.'" Ibid. (quoting

Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 390 (2016) (quoting Nini v.

Mercer Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98, 115 (2010))).

      In a discrimination claim under the LAD, it is the plaintiff who bears the

burden to establish a prima facie case. Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 408

(2010). To succeed in proving a prima facie case, the evidentiary burden is

"'rather modest.'" Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 447 (2005)

(quoting Marzano v. Comput. Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 508 (3d Cir. 1996)). It is

sufficient that the plaintiff is able "to demonstrate to the court that plaintiff's

factual scenario is compatible with discriminatory intent – i.e., that

discrimination could be a reason for the employer's action." Ibid. (emphasis

omitted) (quoting Marzano, 91 F.3d at 508).

      Given that claims under the LAD are to be interpreted broadly and the

standard for summary judgment requires facts to be viewed in the light most

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                                       14
favorable to the non-moving party, the trial court's task is not to determine the

strength of the case, but rather if plaintiff's "allegations, if true, can establish

that defendant[] violated the LAD." Beneduci v. Graham Curtin, P.A., 476 N.J.

Super. 73, 82 (App. Div. 2023). "Rather than considering each incident in

isolation, courts must consider the cumulative effect of the various incidents,

bearing in mind 'that each successive episode has its predecessors, that the

impact of the separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work environment

created may exceed the sum of the individual episodes.'" Lehmann v. Toys 'R'

Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 607 (1993) (quoting Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus. Inc.,

955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992)).

      For plaintiff to succeed in demonstrating that he was improperly

discharged because of his disability, he must establish the four factors set forth

in Viscik v. Fowler Equipment Co., 173 N.J. 1, 14 (2002):

            that he or she (1) belongs to a protected class; (2)
            applied for or held a position for which he or she was
            objectively qualified; (3) was not hired or was
            terminated from that position; and that (4) the employer
            sought to, or did fill the position with a similarly-
            qualified person.

      We turn first to the trial court's determination that plaintiff failed to

establish that he was disabled pursuant to the standards set forth by our LAD

decisional law. The trial court found plaintiff must establish a prima facie

                                                                              A-3397-21
                                        15
showing of a disability by way of expert opinion as a prerequisite to the viability

of counts one (disability discrimination in violation of the LAD), four (hostile

work environment in violation of the LAD), and five (aiding and abetting as to

Florez). We affirm the trial court and add that establishing a disability is also

dispositive as to count eight (aiding and abetting as to Shafer).

      Plaintiff argues that the trial court's determination that he failed to

establish a disability was predicated on the erroneous conclusion that he failed

to produce expert medical testimony. Plaintiff claims he did provide expert

testimony, but the court discredited it after improperly making credibility and

validity determinations in place of the trier of fact.

      Under the LAD, an employee who has a disability is a member of a

protected class. N.J.S.A. 10:5-12. Disability is defined in the LAD under

N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q). "Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q), there are two specific

categories of handicap: physical and non-physical. The physical and non-

physical clauses of the statute are distinct from each other and provide separate

ways of proving handicap." Viscik, 173 N.J. at 15. "To meet the physical

standard, a plaintiff must prove that he or she is (1) suffering from physical

disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement (2) which is caused by

bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy." Ibid.

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                                        16
                     To meet the non-physical standard, a plaintiff
              must prove that he or she is suffering (1) from any
              mental, psychological or developmental disability (2)
              resulting from an anatomical, psychological,
              physiological or neurological condition that either (a)
              prevents the normal exercise of any bodily or mental
              functions or (b) is demonstrable, medically or
              psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory
              diagnostic techniques.

              [Id. at 16.]

        "Where the existence of a handicap is not readily apparent, expert medical

evidence is required. Accordingly, courts place a high premium on the use and

strength of objective medical testimony in proving the specific elements of each

test contained in the statute." Ibid. (internal citations omitted).

        The trial court found that plaintiff alleged in response to the summary

judgment motion he had two disabilities: high blood pressure 3 and anxiety.

Under the standards set forth in Viscik, 173 N.J. at 15-16, the court determined

that high blood pressure and anxiety are not disabilities that are readily apparent

and, therefore, expert testimony was required.

        On appeal, plaintiff asserts there is "ample, competent evidence" of his

disability in the record based on the note, which lacks a diagnosis from a

qualified physician, and contains a conclusory sentence stating plaintiff "has

3
    Plaintiff does not argue on appeal that high blood pressure is a disability.
                                                                              A-3397-21
                                         17
been a patient of [hers] since 2014 for treatment of anxiety and depression." In

deciding the summary judgment motion, the trial court recognized the note was

the only "unverified" evidence in the record proffered on this issue.

      We conclude the trial court did not err in concluding the note was not

expert testimony sufficient to establish a disability under the LAD. Since

"psychiatric diagnoses are generally outside the competence of psychiatric

social workers, appellate courts have sustained the discretion of trial courts that

excluded such testimony." State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 422 (1988) (emphasis

omitted). Additionally, pursuant to Viscik, 173 N.J. at 16, the note fell short of

establishing plaintiff's anxiety "either (a) prevents the normal exercise of any

bodily or mental functions or (b) is demonstrable, medically or psychologically,

by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques."              The single

substantive sentence in the note fails to meet these standards and does not

address any function that plaintiff's anxiety prevents him from undertaking or

the demonstrability of plaintiff's anxiety. The note does not contain an actual

diagnosis from a qualified expert predicated on facts but rather merely sets forth

in generic terms that there was treatment.

      We find no error in the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff has not

established a prima facie showing that he has a disability under the LAD. This

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                                       18
is sufficient basis alone to affirm the trial court's order dismissing all claims

contingent on plaintiff establishing membership in a protected class under the

LAD – counts one, four, five, and eight.

      Next, we turn to plaintiff's argument that the trial court improperly

dismissed all claims for retaliation against plaintiff for LAD-protected activities

contained in counts two (negligent supervision and training), three (respondeat

superior), and six (retaliation).

      "[A] person engages in protected activity under the LAD when that person

opposes any practice rendered unlawful under the LAD." Young v. Hobart W.

Grp., 385 N.J. Super. 448, 466 (App. Div. 2005); see also Jamison v. Rockaway

Twp. Bd. of Educ., 242 N.J. Super. 436, 445 (App. Div. 1990).

             [T]he prima facie elements of a retaliation claim under
             the LAD requires plaintiff to demonstrate that: (1)
             plaintiff was in a protected class; (2) plaintiff engaged
             in protected activity known to the employer; (3)
             plaintiff was thereafter subjected to an adverse
             employment consequence; and (4) that there is a causal
             link between the protected activity and the adverse
             employment consequence.

             [Victor, 203 N.J. at 409.]

      Plaintiff asserts that his "advocacy for special needs students" constitutes

a protected activity under the LAD, and, therefore, any retaliation for those

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actions is unlawful. Even if plaintiff's conduct was a protected activity, we

nonetheless affirm the trial court's dismissal of counts two, three, and six since

plaintiff has failed to produce prima facie evidence of a causal nexus.

      As part of establishing a prima facie case, a LAD claimant must

demonstrate "there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse

employment consequence." Ibid. "[C]ausal connection may be demonstrated

by evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive."

Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 543, 550 (App.

Div. 1995). There is "no case that stands for the proposition that proximity is

the only circumstance that justifies an inference of causal connection." Ibid.

      The only proffered adverse employment action in the record is the

elimination of the LMS position that plaintiff held as a non-tenured District

employee through the mandatory RIF. On reconsideration, the trial court found

that "pretext cannot exist without causation" and there was "was no showing in

the [original] motion how the RIF's financial considerations were retaliatory."

We agree that plaintiff failed to establish prima facie evidence of a causal

relationship between any disability or LAD-protected activity and the

elimination of the LMS position.

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                                       20
      The only evidence in the record as to the reason for the elimination of the

LMS position that plaintiff held was the RIF. No intention to discriminate

against plaintiff through adverse employment action was proffered or

demonstrated. The undisputed evidence in the motion record established that

plaintiff's position was eliminated under the RIF, along with hundreds of other

District employee contracts that were not renewed as the result of budgetary

constraints. We agree that plaintiff failed to proffer prima facie evidence of

causation.

      While we conclude the trial court properly found that plaintiff did not

establish a prima facie LAD case and the analysis could end there, we also agree

with the trial court's determination that plaintiff failed to present evidence

defendants' proffered reasons for the employment action were pretext to obscure

true discriminatory intentions towards plaintiff. Under McDonnell Douglas,

after the defendant has shown "a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its

decision," "the plaintiff must then be given the opportunity to show that

defendant's stated reason was merely a pretext or discriminatory in its

application." Dixon v. Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 442

(1988).

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                                      21
      To guide the liberal application of the LAD, New Jersey has adopted the

"procedural burden-shifting methodology" set forth in McDonnell Douglas, 411

U.S. at 802-04. Under this burden-shifting analysis,

            (1) the plaintiff must come forward with sufficient
            evidence to constitute a prima facie case of
            discrimination; (2) the defendant must then show a
            legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision;
            and (3) the plaintiff must then be given the opportunity
            to show that defendant's stated reason was merely a
            pretext or discriminatory in its application.

            [Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 331
            (2010) (quoting Dixon, 110 N.J. at 442).]

      For the same reasons plaintiff did not establish causation, we find the

record lacking in evidence of pretext. The only evidence in the record as to the

elimination of the LMS position at the MLK School was that it was

accomplished under a mandatory RIF. The LMS position was one of three jobs

at the MLK School eliminated by the RIF, which included two elementary

school teachers. Plaintiff also does not refute defendants' submission that,

although the state requires a certain number of teachers and nurses at each

school, no such requirement exists for the LMS position. Also undisputed is

that the elimination of plaintiff's LMS position had the least disruptive impact

on the student population because he led fewer individual classes than other non-

tenured positions.

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                                      22
      Plaintiff's assertion that there were non-tenured employees holding LMS

positions in the District whose contracts were renewed despite having less

experience than him is not supported by any evidence in the record. Conversely,

defendants point to evidence in the record that twelve LMS positions in the

District were eliminated as part of the RIF, in addition to hundreds of other staff

positions. Plaintiff's assertion at oral argument before us that the District has

since rehired for his position is not substantiated by any proofs in the record

before the trial court. See Scott v. Salerno, 297 N.J. Super. 437, 447 (App. Div.

1997).

      We conclude the legitimate reason for the reassignment of plaintiff to

newly added Pre-K classrooms is not disputed by any competent evidence in

both motion records. We also reject plaintiff's argument that the non-party

DCP&P investigation was a fiction created by defendants to justify separating

plaintiff from Student E and changing his classroom assignment.

      Despite acknowledging that he learned of the DCP&P investigation in

September 2019 and his union representative learned of the investigation when

DCP&P visited Student E at home, plaintiff makes the unsupported argument

that Florez fabricated the existence of any investigation in order to generate a

pretextual reason for his termination. This unsupported belated assertion does

                                                                             A-3397-21
                                       23
not create a genuine question of material fact as to pretext.              DCP&P

investigations are confidential and plaintiff had no right to notification from

defendants and, in fact, advising plaintiff would be contrary to statute. N.J.S.A.

9:6-8.10a(a).

      Even under the liberal application of the LAD, "[t]o prove pretext . . . a

plaintiff must do more than simply show that the employer's reason was false;

he or she must also demonstrate that the employer was motivated by

discriminatory intent." Viscik, 173 N.J. at 14. Plaintiff did not present any facts

in the record evidencing a discriminatory intent by defendants or their

representatives. Accordingly, we see no error in the trial court's conclusions

that plaintiff has failed to produce evidence to raise a genuine issue of pretext.

We affirm the trial court in dismissing counts two, three, and six.

      Although we find plaintiff's remaining arguments lack merit, we will

nonetheless briefly address each one in turn. We substantially agree with the

trial court's determination that in order for Shafer or Florez to be liable

individually and in the official capacities, as alleged in counts five and eight the

District must first be found liable. See Cicchetti v. Morris Cnty. Sheriff's Off.,

194 N.J. 563, 594 (2008). Since the District is not liable under the LAD, we

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shall not disturb dismissal of the aiding and abetting claims against the

individual defendants.

      As to count seven, the trial court found plaintiff's claim for wrongful

termination pursuant to New Jersey's Education Law (NJEL), N.J.S.A. 18A:1-1

to 76-4, was not within the jurisdiction of the Law Division and could only be

adjudicated by the Commissioner of Education. See Campione v. Adamar, Inc.,

155 N.J. 245, 261 (1998). Plaintiff clarified on appeal that this litigation only

seeks relief for LAD-based claims that are not cognizable in a wrongful

termination action filed with the Commissioner. Thus, we affirm the dismissal

of plaintiff's wrongful termination claim pursuant to our LAD-based analysis.

      Affirmed.

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