Court Opinion

ID: 9907379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 15:02:17.531224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:51.780972
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 573
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION II
                                       No. CV-22-710

 JORDAN JOSLIN                                 Opinion Delivered December 6, 2023
                               APPELLANT
                                               APPEAL FROM THE WHITE
                                               COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
 V.                                            [NO. 73DR-19-607]

 MADISON OSBORN                           HONORABLE CRAIG HANNAH,
                                 APPELLEE JUDGE

                                               AFFIRMED

                            WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

       Appellant Jordan Joslin appeals the July 11, 2022 order of the White County Circuit

Court denying his motion to dismiss an agreed child-support order between the parties.

Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion because he was never

served with a copy of appellee’s petition for child support and that the circuit court never

obtained personal jurisdiction over him. We affirm.

       The facts are not in dispute. Appellee filed a petition for child support on September

23, 2019, contending that appellant is the father of Minor Child (MC) born on March 28,

2019. She indicated that the parties were never married, and she sought a “reasonable

amount of child support” and asked that a hearing be held immediately. Based on the

record, a summons was issued to appellant that same day, but it was never returned served.
The parties executed an agreed order on September 25, which was filed of record on

September 26.1 In the order, appellant agreed to pay weekly support in the amount of $187.

He was granted supervised visitation with MC; his name was to be placed on all documents

for access to MC’s records; he was directed to notify his employers of the income-withholding

provisions of the order; the parties were to keep each other informed of MC’s health,

education, and activities and consult with one another on those issues; he was to be

responsible for MC’s insurance if ARKids coverage terminated; the parties were granted the

right to all information concerning MC regardless of any state, federal, or business privacy

policy; and the parties were prohibited from residing with MC outside the jurisdiction of the

circuit court unless by agreement or court order. At the time appellant signed the agreed

order, only appellee was represented by counsel.

       Appellant subsequently obtained counsel and moved to dismiss the child-support

proceeding against him on May 9, 2022. He contended that the agreed order was void ab

initio because he was never lawfully served with appellee’s petition for child support, and the

circuit court never gained personal jurisdiction over him. He asked that the proceedings be

dismissed and that the agreed order be set aside as void. Appellee was served with appellant’s

motion on May 11. The circuit court emailed the parties’ attorneys on June 17 asking them

to set a hearing on a Tuesday as soon as possible or to allow the circuit court to rule on the

pleadings. The circuit court entered an order on July 11 denying appellant’s motion. The

       1
           An order of wage assignment was entered the same day.

                                              2
order stated that paragraph 1 of the agreed order waived the service requirements.2

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

       Appellant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his motion to

dismiss. He contends that he was never served with appellee’s petition and that he did not

execute a waiver of service prior to the entry of the agreed order. Service of valid process is

necessary to give a court jurisdiction over a defendant.3 Our service rules place an extremely

heavy burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that compliance with our rules has been had.4

The guiding principle of Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and the purpose of a summons

is to ensure due process by giving the defendant adequate notice of the suit and an

opportunity to respond before a judgment is entered. 5 Actual knowledge of a proceeding

does not validate defective process.6 The defense of personal jurisdiction may be waived by

the appearance of the defendant without raising the objection.7 This court has long

recognized that any action on the part of a defendant, except to object to jurisdiction, which

       2
       Paragraph 1 states, “This Court has continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties herein.”

       3
           Patsy Simmons Ltd. P’ship v. Finch, 2010 Ark. 451, 370 S.W.3d 257.

       4
           Wine v. Chandler, 2020 Ark. App. 412, 607 S.W.3d 522.

       5
           Ligon v. Bloodman, 2021 Ark. 124.

       6
           Trusclair v. McGowan Working Partners, 2009 Ark. 203, 306 S.W.3d 428.

       7
           Goodson v. Bennett, 2018 Ark. App. 444, 562 S.W.3d 847.

                                                3
recognizes the case in court, will amount to an appearance.8 In deciding whether a defendant

has waived his rights and entered an appearance, a determining factor is whether the

defendant seeks affirmative relief.9

       Appellant cites Raymond v. Raymond,10 and Criswell v. Office of Child Support

Enforcement,11 to support his contention that this case should be reversed and dismissed. In

Raymond, Daniel filed for divorce on December 30, 1996, but Diane was never served.

Ninety-three days later, on April 2, 1997, the parties’ signed conditional-reconciliation

agreement was filed. It stated that it would “shortly be filed as an attachment to the divorce

complaint.” The reconciliation efforts failed, and the parties subsequently executed a

property settlement agreement wherein Diane acknowledged receipt of the agreement and

waived her right to appear without further notice. The papers were filed along with the

divorce decree on May 12, 1997, 133 days after the complaint for divorce had been filed.

Diane obtained counsel, and on March 5, 1999, she asked the court to set aside the divorce

decree because the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her due to Daniel’s failure to

perfect service of process over her. The court denied Diane’s request, finding that her

signature on the conditional-reconciliation agreement constituted an entry of appearance.

Our supreme court subsequently reversed the court, holding that Diane’s signing of the

       8
           Id.
       9
           Id.
       10
            343 Ark. 480, 36 S.W.3d 733 (2001).
       11
            2014 Ark. App. 309, 436 S.W.3d 152.

                                              4
conditional agreement did not amount to an entry of appearance or a waiver of the court’s

jurisdiction as a defense. The supreme court reasoned that the agreement was not a

responsive pleading, and it did not request any relief from the court.

       In Criswell, the parties entered into a child-custody agreement in anticipation of

divorce on April 14, 2008. The agreement provided that Jeffery would pay $250 a week in

child support. On April 17, Ashley filed a complaint for divorce. The child-custody

agreement was also filed on the same day. No summons was ever issued by the court clerk

and the complaint for divorce was never served on Jeffery. The divorce decree was filed on

March 18, 2010. Ashely subsequently assigned her rights to the Office of Child Support

Enforcement (OCSE). In May 2013, Jeffery was found in contempt for nonpayment of child

support and found to be delinquent to the tune of $53,160. The court entered the $53,160

judgment against Jeffery. Jeffery retained counsel, and on June 7, 2012, his counsel moved

to dismiss the divorce decree and all subsequent orders because Jeffery was never served with

the complaint or a summons. The court denied Jeffery’s motion, finding that he subjected

himself to the jurisdiction of the court by signing and filing the child-custody agreement.

Jeffery appealed, and this court reversed, holding that the agreement signed three days before

the complaint for divorce was filed was not an appearance because there was not yet any

action to appear in.

                                              5
       This case is distinguishable from the cases relied on by appellant and is more in line

with Trelfa v. Simmons First Bank of Jonesboro.12 In Trelfa, Simmons First Bank filed a

foreclosure complaint on December 27, 2002, against property pledged as collateral by the

Trelfas for a loan. The complaint also sought the appointment of a receiver to collect the

rents from the commercial property on which Simmons held a first mortgage. Summonses

were issued but never served on the Trelfas. An amended complaint adding State Street as

a defendant was filed on January 10, 2003; however, no summonses were issued to the

Trelfas after the amended complaint had been filed. A private process server served the

Trelfas with the amended complaint on January 20, 2003. The process server delivered the

original summonses issued on December 27, 2002, prior to the date of filing the amended

complaint. The original summonses had been altered and failed to identify State Street as a

party. The Trelfas never filed an answer or other pleading. They did, however, agree, through

counsel, to the appointment of a receiver. The agreed order was entered on February 3,

2003, and an amended order was entered on February 18. A decree of foreclosure was

entered on May 5, finding the Trelfas to be in default. The Trelfas filed a motion on

February 23, 2005, asking that the decree be set aside because it was void. The court denied

the motion, finding, among other things, that the Trelfas entered their appearance when

they signed the agreed order appointing the receiver. The Trelfas and State Street appealed,

contending that the foreclosure decree was void because the process upon the Trelfas was

       12
            98 Ark. App. 287, 254 S.W.3d 775 (2007).

                                             6
void and asserting that the Trelfas had not waived that defect.13 This court disagreed,

holding that the Trelfas recognized the case as being in court and entered their appearance

by agreeing to the entry of an order appointing a receiver. We reasoned that such an agreed

order is, in effect, a stipulation and recognizes the case as being in court because it is a step

in the process of resolving the case and one of the remedies sought by Simmons.

       Here, a petition for child support was filed, and two days later, appellant signed an

agreed order for child support. Although he had not been served with the summons or the

petition for support, his actions amounted to an appearance because, by entering into the

agreed order, as in Trelfa, this was a step in the process of resolving the case, and it gave

appellee the remedy she sought (child support for MC). Appellant also received benefits in

the form of supervised visitation with MC; having the right to be informed about MC’s

health, education, and activities; having his name placed on all documents for access to MC’s

records; being granted the right to all information concerning MC regardless of any state,

federal, or business privacy policy; and the ability to have a say in whether MC can reside

outside the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of

appellant’s motion to dismiss for the reasons set forth in this opinion.14

       Affirmed.

       VIRDEN and GRUBER, JJ., agree.

       13
            State Street also contended that its lien still had first priority.
       14
         We can affirm the decision of the circuit court if the right result was reached, albeit
for the wrong reason. See Brumley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. 356.

                                                    7
James & Streit, by: Jonathan R. Streit and Elizabeth James, for appellant.

Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson, for appellant.

                                         8