Court Opinion

ID: 9880818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 18:03:43.495076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:01:08.927268
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/28/23 P. v. Alvez CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115 .

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                                  2d Crim. No. B325218
                                                                           (Super. Ct. No. CR38932)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                                 (Ventura County)

v.

JOHN CHARLES ALVEZ,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      John Charles Alvez appeals an order entered after the trial
court denied his motion to initiate a proceeding pursuant to
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) to preserve
youth-related mitigation evidence to use at a future youth
offender parole hearing. (Pen. Code, § 3051.)1 We conclude that
the court properly rejected Alvez’s constitutional arguments that
he has been denied equal protection of the law and freedom from
cruel and unusual punishment and affirm. (People v. Jackson
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 199-200; People v. Acosta (2021) 60

         1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Cal.App.5th 769, 774-782; In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
427, 433-439.)
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       This appeal involves the underlying murder and robbery of
21-year-old Marco Rodriguez, a clerk in a Moorpark grocery store.
Alvez delivered spices to the grocery store and was friendly with
Rodriguez. On May 5, 1996, Alvez, then 22 years old, shot
Rodriguez twice in the back of the head during a robbery. Alvez
took cash from the cash register and fled the store.
       In 1996, a jury convicted Alvez of first degree murder and
found that he committed the murder while engaged in a robbery
and while lying in wait. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)(A) & (15).) The jury also convicted him of second degree
robbery and found that he personally used a firearm. (§§ 211,
12022.5, subd. (a).) For this special circumstances murder, the
trial court sentenced Alvez to the mandated life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP) plus 10 years consecutive for the
firearm enhancement. The court also imposed but stayed
sentence on the robbery and related firearm enhancement
pursuant to section 654. We affirmed the conviction in People v.
Alvez (Nov. 19, 1997, B109325) [nonpub. opn.].
       On November 9, 2022, Alvez filed a motion in propria
persona requesting a Franklin hearing and appointment of
counsel pursuant to section 1203.01. The trial court denied the
motion deciding that Alvez was statutorily ineligible because he
was 22 years old when he committed the Rodriguez murder and
received a LWOP sentence for the crime. (§ 3051, subd. (h).) The
court also rejected Alvez’s constitutional challenges.

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                            DISCUSSION
      Alvez appeals and contends that section 3051, subdivision
(h), which makes young adults sentenced to LWOP ineligible for
youth offender parole hearings, violates equal protection of the
law. He also claims his sentence violates the constitutional
proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment. In part,
Alvez relies upon People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273,
review granted January 11, 2023, S277487 (Hardin) and
sympathetic statements by reviewing courts inviting the
Legislature to reconsider the parole hearing exclusion of section
3051, subdivision (h). (People v. Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th
189, 201-202 (conc. opn. of Dato, J.); id. at p. 202 (conc. statement
of Liu, J.); People v. Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 780-781.)
He also contends that his sentence violates the California Racial
Justice Act of 2020 (Racial Justice Act) because the LWOP
sentence is imposed more often on young adults of color.
                                   I.
      Alvez argues that section 3051, subdivision (h), denying
him a youth offender parole hearing, violates his state and
federal constitutional rights affording equal protection of the law
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 7 of
the California Constitution. He asserts that the equal protection
analysis must consider the purposes of section 3051 – to account
for the continuing brain and personality development of juvenile
and young adult offenders.
      Section 3051 provides a parole eligibility mechanism for
juvenile offenders. When first enacted in 2013, section 3051
applied only to juvenile offenders sentenced to indeterminate life
terms with the possibility of parole and not juvenile offenders
sentenced to LWOP or those over 18 years at the time of the

                                  3
offense. (Former § 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b); Stats. 2013, ch. 312,
§ 4.) The Legislature later amended section 3051 to extend
eligibility to youthful offenders under the age of 23, then later to
age 25. (Former § 3051, subds. (a)(1), (b); Stats. 2015, ch. 471,
§ 1; Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1.) Our Supreme Court in People v.
Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, 269, established a procedure by
which an inmate may be entitled to a hearing to preserve
evidence for a future parole hearing regarding the impact of the
inmate’s youth in the commission of the crime.
       Section 3051, subdivision (h), however, provides: “This
section shall not apply to cases . . . in which an individual is
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a
controlling offense that was committed after the person had
attained 18 years of age.” “Controlling offense” refers to “the
offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed
the longest term of imprisonment.” (Id., subd. (a)(2)(B).) Alvez’s
argument is one that many reviewing courts have considered and
rejected. We join those decisions.
       The state and federal Constitutions extend to persons the
equal protection of the law. (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th
277, 287.) An equal protection challenge requires a showing that
the government has adopted a classification affecting two or more
similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. (People v.
Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836.) Here the classification is
subject to the minimum equal protection standard: rational basis
review. (People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74 [statutes not
involving suspect classes like race or national origin or impinging
on fundamental rights subject to minimum equal protection
standard of rational basis review].)

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       Pursuant to the rational basis review, equal protection of
the law is denied only where there is no rational relationship
between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
governmental purpose. (People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th 62,
74.) “To successfully challenge a law on equal protection
grounds, the defendant must negate ‘ “ ‘every conceivable basis’ ” ’
on which ‘the disputed statutory disparity’ might be supported.
[Citation.] ‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, “[e]qual
protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess
the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the law.”’” (People v. Acosta,
supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 769. 778.)
       Rational basis review requires courts to ask whether the
state adopted a classification affecting two or more groups that
are similarly situated in an unequal manner, and whether the
challenged classification ultimately bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate state purpose. (People v. Chatman, supra, 4
Cal.5th 277, 289.) A classification in a statute is presumed
rational until the challenger shows that no rational basis for the
unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable. (Ibid.)
       We reject Alvez’s contention that those who are 18 to 25
years old when sentenced to LWOP are similarly situated to
those who are 18 to 25 years old when sentenced to life with the
possibility of parole, for purposes of a Franklin hearing. Alvez’s
claim fails because there is a rational basis for different
treatment of the two groups. The distinction between these two
groups is rational given the level of culpability necessary to
convict a defendant of a first degree murder with special
circumstances. It is the prerogative and duty of the Legislature
to recognize degrees of culpability when drafting punishment for
crime. (People v. Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th 821, 840.)

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       We disagree with People v. Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th
273, that the different treatment here violates equal protection.
We agree with the majority of courts that decided that a rational
basis exists to distinguish between young offenders who are
sentenced to life with the possibility of parole and those who are
not, for purposes of a Franklin hearing.
                                   II.
       Alvez contends that section 3051, subdivision (h), renders
his sentence unconstitutionally cruel and/or unusual pursuant to
article I, section 17 of the California Constitution and the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. He points out
that young adults with lengthy non-LWOP sentences are eligible
for youth offender parole hearings. (§ 3051, subds. (a), (b)(1)-(3).)
Alvez asserts that a mandatory LWOP sentence is grossly
disproportionate to his crimes and ignores the hallmark features
of his youth and potential for rehabilitation, as well as his
individual circumstances. He adds that other jurisdictions have
held mandatory LWOP sentences for young adults
unconstitutional as failing to recognize the mitigating qualities of
youth and potential for maturity and growth.
       The trial court imposed sentence on Alvez in 1996. That
sentence rendered him ineligible for release on parole; his
sentence remains the same today. Recent legislation, including
section 3051 and judicial decisions, does not change this fact.
Although Alvez sought a judicial determination that he is
entitled to a Franklin hearing, in practical effect he is seeking a
determination that he is “eligible for release on parole.” (§ 3051,
subd. (b)(4).) This is so notwithstanding that he is a young adult
offender, not a juvenile LWOP offender within the meaning of
section 3051, subdivision (b)(4). Moreover, subdivision (h)

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unambiguously states that young adult LWOP offenders (like
Alvez) are ineligible for release on parole.
       Our Supreme Court has foreclosed similar arguments in
the context of the death penalty. In re Williams, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th 427, 439, concluded when considering an Eighth
Amendment challenge by a young adult LWOP offender who
committed his controlling offense at age 21: “To the extent
petitioner contends an LWOP sentence is an unconstitutional
cruel and unusual punishment when imposed on any 21-year-old
defendant, we observe our Supreme Court has essentially
rejected that very argument in the context of the death penalty.
In People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429, the court
acknowledged research that youths ages 18 to 21 share many of
the same cognitive and developmental deficiencies as adolescents
under age 18. But the court nonetheless held that 18 is “ ‘ “the
age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.” ” ’ If the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a sentence of death for 21
year olds, then most assuredly, it does not prohibit the lesser
LWOP sentence.
       The judicial decisions upon which Alvez relies involve
minors under the age of 18 years. Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567
U.S. 460, 465, held that mandatory life without parole sentences
for those under the age of 18 years at the time of their crimes
violates the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
prohibition. Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 held that the
Eighth Amendment barred capital punishment for children.
Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 barred LWOP sentences
for children committing nonhomicide offenses. These decisions
considered the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment in the context of minors under the age

                                  7
of 18. Roper concluded: “[A] line must be drawn” and “[t]he age
of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many purposes
between childhood and adulthood.” (Roper, at p. 574.) Thus, 18
years is “the age at which the line for death eligibility ought to
rest.” (Ibid.)
       Our Supreme Court has also held that adults between 18
and 25 years old can constitutionally receive the death penalty.
(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1234-1235; People v.
Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th 371, 429-430; People v. Powell (2018) 6
Cal.5th 136, 191.) Intermediate appellate courts have also
rejected the claims Alvez makes here. (People v. Acosta, supra,
60 Cal.App.5th 769, 781-782; People v. Windfield (2021) 59
Cal.App.5th 496, 525-527; People v. Montelongo (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1016, 1030-1032; id. at p. 1032 [“Unless and until
the United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court,
the Legislature, or the voters by initiative change the law, we are
bound to apply it”].) We agree with those decisions and reject
Alvez’s contentions.
                                  III.
       For the first time on appeal, Alvez claims that mandatory
LWOP is cruel or unusual punishment pursuant to the Racial
Justice Act. (§ 745.) He asserts that the mandatory LWOP is
imposed more often on young adults of color.
       Section 745, subdivision (b), provides three avenues for
bringing a claim pursuant to the Racial Justice Act: motion in
the trial court, petition for writ of habeas corpus, or a motion
pursuant to section 1473.7 for those persons no longer in custody.
A defendant must establish a prima facie showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is a substantial

                                 8
likelihood that a violation of the law has occurred. (§ 745, subds.
(c), (h)(2).)
       Here Alvez is precluded from raising this claim for the first
time on appeal and we do not consider it.
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment (order) is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

             YEGAN, J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                                 9
                   Gilbert A. Romero, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, David E. Madeo, Blythe J. Leszkay, and Yun
K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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