Court Opinion

ID: 9843053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:25:24.524775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:27.043743
License: Public Domain

*849CLARK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
I concur in all of those parts of the majority opinion except the court’s holding that the district court had jurisdiction to revoke Taylor’s probation sentence and to re-sentence him to a term of thirty years. At the time of the revocation and re-sentencing, Taylor was in the custody of the Attorney General and under the supervision of the U.S. Parole Commission pursuant to the Commission’s revocation of Taylor’s special parole term. The revocation of the special parole term had as its basis the very same criminal act which was the basis of the district court’s revocation of the probation. The law is clear that the district court and the Parole Commission cannot have concurrent jurisdiction to punish an errant parolee. The reason is also clear — Congress has provided otherwise as discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Affronti v. United States.1
In November 1986 while serving a five-year special parole term which was to expire on June 5, 1989, Taylor was convicted of selling cocaine and sentenced by the district court to five years probation to commence on the expiration of the special parole term. The special parole term was revoked by the U.S. Parole Commission at the time of Taylor’s arrest in 1986. In May 1987 Taylor was released to serve the remainder of his special parole term outside of prison. Erring again in late 1988, Taylor’s special parole term was revoked on January 20, 1989 by the Parole Commission. On February 1, 1990, while Taylor was in prison serving the balance of his special term, the district court revoked the November 1986 probation sentence of five years and sentenced Taylor to a term of thirty years.
The majority maintains that the cases of United States v. Ross2 and United States v. James3 are applicable, reasoning that in those cases, the conduct leading to the revocation of probation occurred prior to the start of the sentence that included the imposition of probation. However, these cases do not provide any guidance on the issue before us. Neither Ross nor James dealt with circumstances involving the overlap of executive and judicial powers. In Ross, the defendant was arrested during the one-week grace period the district court had given him to put his affairs in order prior to being imprisoned.4 The defendant thus had not surrendered to the Attorney General, and the defendant had not previously been convicted of any other charges. Similarly, in James the defendant was released after conviction pending the completion of a presentencing report.5 The defendant was not then serving any other sentence. Both Ross and James granted district courts the power to revoke probation in the interstices between conviction and surrender to the Attorney General. Neither case stands for the proposition that federal courts have the power to intervene in the executive branch’s exercise of its parole powers.
The majority valiantly but ineffectually attempts to distinguish the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wright.6 Wright involved a defendant who had been sentenced on two counts. The first count was a term of imprisonment and the second count was a term of probation. The terms were to run consecutively. While on parole from the sentence of imprisonment, the defendant committed a state crime, and the district court revoked probation.7
The opinion in Wright carefully differentiated between probationary sentences and sentences of imprisonment that lead to parole. Probationers are supervised by judicially appointed probation officers, and the courts’ powers to impose probation arise solely from legislation. In contrast, parolees are supervised by the United States Parole Commission, an agency of the exec*850utive branch, which is empowered to grant or revoke parole to persons sentenced to prison. The opinion noted that Wright’s parole was clearly subject to revocation if he committed any crime during its term.8
Wright quoted from the probation statute, which then stated, “[t]he period of probation, together with any extension thereof, shall not exceed five years,”9 and showed that the exception to this language created by Ross is not unlimited. The Wright court stated, “It is true that Ross and its progeny have, despite the express wording of the probation statute upon which Wright relies, carved out an exception permitting the sentencing court to revoke the probation of a defendant, even though he has not yet begun to serve his probationary sentence, when he commits an illegal act. However, in all of these decisions, the illegal act committed occurred prior to the commencement of service by the defendant of any sentence imposed at the time the probationary sentence was imposed.”10 The opinion in Wright also stated, “No decision of this circuit has held that it is within the discretion of a sentencing court to revoke probation, for an act committed prior to the probationary period, for an act committed while a convicted person is on parole from another sentence before his consecutive probationary term commences. Such a holding, indeed, would be contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Affronti." 11
Wright then held that “overlap [between the executive and judicial branches] certainly occurs if the probation statute is interpreted so as to permit the same pre-probation violation to serve as cause both to revoke the parole on a prior sentence and also to revoke the uncommenced probation on a consecutive sentence.” 12 Here, we have exactly the case in Wright, as the same misdeed was used to permit revocation of Taylor’s parole and probation.
The language from Wright quoted by the majority is not to the contrary. This language states that probation “may be revoked because of an illegal act committed prior to its commencement only when the defendant has not commenced actual service of any sentence cumulatively imposed.” 13 The Wright court understood this exception as only applying “before the defendant commences service of any sentence imposed.” 14 Because Taylor’s probation was revoked after he had begun “service of any sentence imposed,” Wright, Affronti and the statute forbid district courts from revoking probation during the time when defendants are in the custody of the executive branch.
The relevant statutory language states unambiguously that probation may be revoked only “within the probation period.” 15 The Supreme Court in Affronti remarked, “Federal judicial power to permit probation springs solely from legislative action. The authority to put a convict on probation for an uncommenced term, after service of an earlier term has begun, has not been clearly given.” 16 The same reasoning applies in a situation where, as here, probation has been revoked before its term was commenced. The majority has failed to follow the usual requirement that criminal statutes be interpreted strictly.
The facts of this case provide an excellent example of the concrete harm that occurs from such overlap. Appellant's probation officer did not explain to appellant *851the terms of his probation when appellant was released on parole in May of 1987, because appellant was subject to the terms of parole, not probation, at that time. Thus, appellant had no warning that, should he misbehave, both his parole and probation would be revoked.
I would reverse.

. 350 U.S. 79, 76 S.Ct. 171, 100 L.Ed. 62 (1955).

. 503 F.2d 940 (5th Cir.1974).

. 848 F.2d 160 (11th Cir.1988).

. 503 F.2d at 942.

. 848 F.2d at 160-61.

. 744 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir.1984).

. Id. at 1128.

. Id. at 1128-29.

. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (repealed 1987).

. 744 F.2d at 1130 (footnote omitted).

. Id. (citation omitted).

. Id. at 1130-31; see also United States v. Fryar, 920 F.2d 252, 256 (5th Cir.1990) ("To prevent overlap between the judicial and executive spheres of power, Wright held that when a court has imposed a probationary sentence consecutive to another sentence, the court lacks power to revoke probation for a violation of a condition that occurred before the probationary term commenced but while the defendant was on parole from a prior sentence.”).

. 744 F.2d at 1131.

. Id. (emphasis in original).

. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (repealed 1987).

. 350 U.S. at 83, 76 S.Ct. at 174 (citation omitted).