Court Opinion

ID: 9647829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:52:06.430925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:54.045416
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
COLEMAN, Justice.
Upon the submission and oral argument of this cause, Chief Justice Spurgeon E. Bell announced that he was the owner of 100 shares of the common stock of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Associate Justice Ewing Werlein announced that he either owned, or had a beneficial interest in the income from, a comparable number of shares in the same company. Since it was common knowledge that all of the stock of Humble Oil & Refining Company, one of the relators herein, is owned by that company, the Chief Justice requested briefs from the parties as to whether such stock ownership disqualified them from sitting in this case. After studying the briefs and concluding that the stock ownership did not constitute such an interest in the case as was contemplated by Article 5, Sec. 11, Constitution of the State of Texas, Vernon’s Ann.St., the case was decided and an opinion handed down on November 9, 1967.
In the motion for rehearing filed by appellant, it was contended that the Court as then constituted was disqualified. The Court then set the case for oral argument. By reason of the retirement of Associate Justice Werlein, two members of the Court as constituted at the time of the second oral argument owned no stock in Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. However, since the original opinion in the case did not discuss the question of disqualification, it was thought proper that the matter be discussed in an opinion on the motion.
Article 5, Sec. 11, Constitution of the State of Texas, provides as follows: “Sec. 11. No judge shall sit in any case wherein he may be interested, or where either of the parties may be connected with him, either by affinity or consanguinity, within such a degree as may be prescribed by law, or when he shall have been counsel in the case.”
*401The disqualification of a judge under the Constitution renders him incompetent to act in the case and cannot be waived by the parties. Chambers v. Hodges, 23 Tex. 104 (1859); Postal Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Ellis, 140 Tex. 570, 169 S.W.2d 482 (1943).
The Texas case most nearly in point is Pahl v. Whitt, 304 S.W.2d 250 (Tex.Civ.App., El Paso 1957, no writ hist.). This was a case brought by certain men “individually, as members of the Central Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc., * * * as a class, against the Central Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc.,” and others seeking to enjoin the corporation from prosecuting certain libel suits and to recover certain funds expended in connection with the suits. The trial judge announced that he was a member of the “Central Texas Electric Co-op,” and received “public service from the Co-op in Kerr County.” The parties agreed to waive the disqualification of the judge if there was such disqualification. On appeal the question was raised, the contention being that the judgment was a nullity. The court sustained this contention, and in the opinion stated:
“In other words, if a Cooperative makes money, its members may receive dividends in the form of money or lowered rates for electricity, thus such members are in very much the same situation as stockholders in a corporation.
“It has long been held that a stockholder in a corporation is disqualified to sit as judge in a trial wherein the corporation is a party. 48 C.J.S. Judges § 80, p. 1051; Templeton v. Giddings, Tex., 12 S.W. 851; King v. Sapp., 66 Tex. 519, 2 S.W. 573; 25 T.J., pp. 272, 273. Also, as a rule, a judge is disqualified from sitting at the trial of an action against a mutual association of which he is a member. Sovereign Camp. Woodmen of the World v. Hale, 56 Tex.Civ.App. 447, 120 S.W. 539; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Sides, 46 Tex.Civ.App. 246, 101 S.W. 1163.
(C * * *
“There is one question in this case which does not arise in any of the other cases cited. It must be remembered that this case was brought by the appellants, not only for themselves as members of the Cooperative, but for every other member as a class, which included the judge himself. For this reason alone, we are compelled to hold that the trial judge was disqualified to try the case. If each of the named parties plaintiff that brought this suit has a justiciable interest in the suit, so does the Judge. Whatever benefits hoped to be obtained by the plaintiff members who brought this suit if successful, would inure to the benefit of the trial judge; as each is affected by the results of the suit, so would be the trial judge.”
Undoubtedly the decision of the court was correct under the reasoning last quoted. The statement that it has long been held that a stockholder in a corporation is disqualified to sit in a case wherein the corporation is a party is supported by the citations to Corpus Juris Secundum and Texas Jurisprudence, but the Texas cases cited are not precisely in point. Templeton v. Giddings, 12 S.W. 851 (Tex.Sup.1889), involved a promissory note assigned as collateral by a “firm” of which the trial judge was a member, the “firm” being the payee of the note.
The other Texas case cited, King v. Sapp, 66 Tex. 519, 2 S.W. 573 (1886), was a case wherein it was alleged that the trial judge was disqualified because he had been a counsel in causes between the defendant and other parties growing out of the same transaction as this suit and involving the same questions. The Supreme Court noted that the record did not disclose that the judge had any pecuniary interest in the outcome of the cases in which he had been employed, or that the decision in the present case would determine those cases and stated:
“The law enumerates the only instances in which an interest not neces*402sarily pecuniary will disqualify a district judge. These are where he has been of counsel in the cause, or where either of the parties may he connected with him by affinity or consanguinity within the third degree. Rev.St. art. 1090. By naming these special cases where the judge’s feelings may be interested, though he may not gain or lose by the event of the suit, the law doubtless intended to limit all other cases of interest to such as should be of a pecuniary nature. The judge must, by the judgment in the case, gain or lose something, the value of which may be estimated.”
This holding that before a judge will be disqualified, it must appear that a pecuniary gain or loss on the part of the judge will necessarily result from the outcome of the suit being tried before him, was reiterated by the Supreme Court of Texas in Hidalgo County Water Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. Blalock, 157 Tex. 206, 301 S.W.2d 593 (1957). In this case the Court stated:
“If his interest in the question is indirect, uncertain, or remote, and the result of the suit will not necessarily subject him to a personal gain or loss, he is not disqualified to sit in the case. Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S.W.2d 515, 70 A.L.R. 1484; City of Oak Cliff v. State ex rel. Gill, 97 Tex. 391, 79 S. W. 1068. Judge Blalock is not a party to the main suit, and any judgment which may be rendered therein for or against the District from which he purchases water would affect him only indirectly. * * *
“The most serious question for decision is raised by the fact that Judge Blalock’s home is located in an original porcion which abutted on the Rio Grande at the time the grant was made by the Crown of Spain. * * * Stated differently, it is suggested that it will be decided in this case whether Judge Blalock has an individual, personal right to set up a system of his own whereby he can pump water from the river three miles away for irrigation purposes * * * Our view is that the possibility of any direct injury tO' Judge Blalock on account of his being deprived of the right to set up an irrigation system of his own is too- highly remote and speculative to disqualify him to sit in the case.”
In Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S.W. 2d 515 (1930), the Court stated:
“Soon after the adoption of the present Constitution, the judge of the district court of Jefferson county announced that he was embarrassed to- proceed with a trial because ‘of his personal interest adverse to the appellants in the questions involved in this cause.’ The objection to the judge’s qualification to determine the cause was overruled by the Supreme Court in an opinion by Judge Bonner, stating:
“ ‘The constitution prohibits a judge from sitting in a case in which he may be interested. Const.1876, art. V, sec. 11.
“ ‘The statute is to the same effect. R.S., art. 1090.
“ ‘The interest of the learned judge presiding, however, was simply in the question involved, and not in the result of the suit. This was not such disqualifying interest as would prevent him from trying the cause, or would authorize the appointment of a special judge.
“ ‘The presiding judge not having been disqualified, it was his duty, however embarrassing, to have proceeded with the trial. Taylor v. Williams, 26 Tex. 583; Houston & T. C. Railway Co. v. Ryan, 44 Tex. 426; Davis v. State, 44 Tex. 523; 1 Greenl.Ev., § 389.’ McFaddin v. Preston, 54 Tex. 403, 406.
“ * ⅜ *
“In Judge Brown’s carefully considered opinion in the case of the City of Oak Cliff v. State, 97 Tex. 391, 79 S.W. 1068, it is said: ‘In his treatise on Courts, Mr. Work expresses the result of the *403authorities upon the question thus: “The interest which will disqualify a judge must be direct and immediate, and not contingent and remote.” Page 396, 79 S.W. 1068.’
“After reviewing the Texas cases relied upon as sustaining a contrary conclusion, Judge Brown’s opinion continues with the statement: ‘It is apparent from these authorities that in each case the interest of the presiding judge was directly and immediately affected by the judgment that he entered — it acted immediately upon the subject without the interposition of other authority — and each came strictly within the rule laid down by Mr. Work.’
“Finally, Judge Brown’s opinion definitely and positively approves the declaration in a cited New York case (In re Ryers, 72 N.Y. 1, 28 Am.Rep. 88) that the true rule is ‘that where a judicial officer has not so direct an interest in the cause or matter as that the result must ■necessarily affect him to his personal or pecuniary loss or gain, * * * then he may sit.’
“In accordance with the court’s decision that the Constitution, rightly construed, does not disqualify him, the Chief Justice has participated in the decision of all other questions in this case save that relating to his disqualification.”
A case directly in point was decided by the Supreme Court of California. In Central Pac. Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. 706, 296 P. 883 (1931), the court stated:
“This brings us naturally to the consideration of the second ground of disqualification which was urged before the trial court and is still insisted upon here. This other alleged disqualification was held to consist in the admitted fact that Judge Luttrell was at the time of the institution of the original action and continued to be thereafter a stockholder in a corporation known as Transamerica Corporation, which was asserted in the statement presented and filed before the trial court to be the owner of substantially all of the capital stock of the Bank of Italy National Trust & Savings Association. Had the Transamerica Corporation been made a party to said original action, the situation would doubtless have been one directly covered by the provisions of section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure as above amended. But the fact that, whatever the relationship thus alleged to exist between Transamerica Corporation and Bank of Italy National Trust & Savings Association might be, the former corporation was not a party to said action and hence does not come within the intendment of said action. Neither do we think that the situation as thus presented could in any event constitute a disqualification under the well-settled rule above stated that the alleged disqualifying interest must appear to be an immediate and direct interest in the outcome of the litigation. To be a stockholder in some corporation which is not and could not be made a party to the action cannot by any stretch of reasoning be held to amount to a disqualification, and we are cited to do no authority which so holds. On the contrary, the cases not only within our own but other jurisdictions have expressly held that in such cases no disqualification exists. Central Sav. Bank of Oakland v. Lake, 201 Cal. 438, 444, 257 P. 521; Favorite v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 181 Cal. 261, 184 P. 15, 8 A.L.R. 290; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362; Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Ass’n v. Williams, 117 Tex. 218, 300 S.W. 44; Webb v. Town of Eutaw, 9 Ala.App. 474, 63 So. 687; People v. Whitridge, 144 App.Div. 493, 129 N.Y.S. 300.”
Neither Standard Oil Company of New Jersey nor Humble Oil & Refining Company has an “interest” in this case in the sense that the word “interest” is used in the Constitutional provision under discus*404sion. The companies are interested in the question to he determined by this case, but neither company necessarily will be subject to a pecuniary loss or gain by the outcome of this suit. Neither company has an interest different from other members of the public in the subject matter of this suit, that is, whether the territory in question has been validily annexed by the City of Pasadena, or is subject to the exclusive annexation jurisdiction of the City of Houston and has been annexed in part by that City. In the petition on which this suit went to trial, no special relief was prayed for on behalf of Humble Oil & Refining Company, nor was it granted any special relief by the judgment entered by the trial court.
This suit was originally brought by the State of Texas on the relation of the City of Houston. In the First Amended Original Petition, Humble Oil & Refining Company appeared as an additional relator. This is a quo warranto proceeding. Such an action is one by which the State acts to protect itself and the good of the public generally, although the suit is, at times, brought at the instance of and for the benefit of a private individual who may have a special interest in the matter. Staples v. State, 112 Tex. 61, 245 S.W. 639 (1922).
Although a relator may be responsible for setting in motion a quo warranto proceeding by an information, the conduct and continued prosecution of the cause is under the exclusive control of the State, and such proceeding may be brought by the State without a relator. Denison v. State, 61 S.W.2d 1017 (Tex.Civ.App., Austin 1933, error ref.); State ex rel. Bennett v. Clarendon Ind. School Dist., 156 Tex. 542, 298 S.W.2d 111 (1957).
Where relators, joined by the District Attorney, instituted proceedings in the nature of a quo warranto, after securing the required permission of the District Judge, and proceeded to trial without the actual participation of the District Attorney, and attempted to appeal a judgment dismissing the cause without the District Attorney joining in the appeal, this Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction stating that it had no jurisdiction of an appeal by the private relators alone, and that, had the State participated actively in the trial, the judgment was final as to it since the State did not appeal. State ex rel. Steele v. Heath, 44 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Civ.App., Galv. 1931, error ref.). See also State ex rel. Cavanaugh v. Nelson, 170 S.W. 814 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo 1914).
It is equally true that had Humble Oil Company not joined in this suit as a relator, it would have been bound by the outcome of the suit, as is its parent company, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Williams v. White, 223 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio 1949, error ref.); City of Ft. Worth v. Taylor, 162 Tex. 341, 346 S.W.2d 792 (1961).
This being the state of the law, it appears that neither Humble Oil nor Standard Oil has any more interest in this law suit than any other member of the general public, and that each is equally bound by the decision with all other members of the general public. It follows that neither Chief Justice Bell nor Associate Justice Werlein had an interest in this law suit different from that of all members of the general public. In such a case, it is firmly established that neither a trial judge nor a member of an appellate bench is disqualified. City of Dallas v. Peacock, 89 Tex. 58, 33 S.W. 220 (1895); City of Oak Cliff v. State, 97 Tex. 391, 79 S.W. 1068 (1904); Hubbard v. Hamilton County, 113 Tex. 547, 261 S.W. 990 (1924); Elliott v. Scott, 119 Tex. 94, 25 S.W.2d 150 (1930).