Court Opinion

ID: 9478781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:57:54.437871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:36.890950
License: Public Domain

STATEMENT SUR DENIAL OF REHEARING IN BANC
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
I joined in the panel opinion, because I felt bound by our decision in Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363 (3d Cir.1976), even though that opinion seems inconsistent at least with the spirit of our later jurisprudence. See United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.1988); AJA Associates v. Army Corps of Engineers, 817 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir.1987); Horizons International, Inc. v. Baldrige, 811 F.2d 154 (3d Cir.1987). I would hear this case in banc and hold that we have appellate jurisdiction, following the rule adopted by the D.C. Circuit in the case of Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 873 F.2d 325, 328-32 (D.C.Cir.1989) (D. Ginsburg, J.).
In that case, Judge Ginsburg, speaking for the court, expressed the view that Congress did not intend that the final order rule place an agency in a position of dependence upon the self-interest of others in order to get review of a legal decision that dictates the standards and procedures to be applied by the agency in making its decisions. Here, as in Occidental, the Secretary is between the proverbial rock and a hard place. If the Secretary, bound by the district court’s opinion, grants benefits on remand to Mrs. Finkelstein, he cannot appeal. If the Secretary does not grant benefits on remand, whether or not the legal issue will be reviewed depends on whether Mrs. Finkelstein decides to press an appeal. *221The legal issue presented is one of great importance in the administration of the Social Security disability statute and, in practical terms, I do not believe that the government will get this issue decided, at least in the foreseeable future, in the absence of an interlocutory appeal.
I believe that the D.C. Circuit rule is a sensible application of our existing jurisprudence, which provides a narrow exception to the normal rule of non-appealability in cases in which an important legal issue is finally resolved and review of that issue would be foreclosed “as a practical matter” if an immediate appeal were unavailable. See AJA, 817 F.2d at 1073. Unfortunately, I read Bachowski as foreclosing our applying that rule to this fact pattern, hence my vote for rehearing.
Judge SLOVITER and Judge STAPLE-' TON agree with this statement.