Court Opinion

ID: 9378780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 16:17:19.274827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:58.050563
License: Public Domain

J-A28027-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 MARLENE JONES                             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                     Appellant             :
                                           :
                                           :
                v.                         :
                                           :
                                           :
 VONSHELT R. NORTHERN                      :   No. 1046 EDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Dated March 17, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Domestic Relations at
                           No(s): 00591N2001,
                          PACSES NO. 015102785

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and McCaffery, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                            FILED MARCH 13, 2023

      Marlene Jones (Mother) appeals from the order, entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Chester County, granting Vonshelt R. Northern’s (Father)

petition to terminate child support for the parties’ adult autistic child (D.N.).

After our review, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining the

hearing officer did not abuse his discretion in (1) denying Mother’s request for

continuance, and (2) denying Mother’s request to reopen the record. We,

therefore, reverse the order terminating child support, and remand with

instructions.

      D.N. was born in June 2000. In early childhood, D.N. was diagnosed

with autism spectrum disorder and learning disabilities. On June 18, 2001,

the court entered an order requiring Father to pay child support to Mother,
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who was D.N.’s primary custodian and caretaker.       This order remained in

effect for 17 years.

      On June 11, 2018, after D.N. turned eighteen, a hearing was held before

Hearing Officer Richard Lombardi.      Both parties testified. Following the

hearing, Hearing Officer Lombardi determined D.N. was incapable of

supporting himself and, thus, was not emancipated. Hearing Office Lombardi

found Mother’s testimony “to be entirely credible,” concluding:

      It's clear to me from the evidence that was presented, the
      evidence was uncontradicted, . . . that, unfortunately, your son
      suffers from a number of significant mental and physical issues,
      not the least of which is autism and epilepsy. . . . Taken as a
      whole, I don’t believe for a moment that your son is capable of
      supporting himself. I don’t believe that there is an employer out
      there who would hire hm full time at a supporting wage given the
      multitude of his issues. Consequently, I find that your son is not
      emancipated for purposes of support.

N.T. Hearing, 6/11/18, at 28.

      Father did not appeal that determination and, instead, filed a pro se

petition to terminate support on October 18, 2018. Father subsequently

retained legal counsel, who filed a counseled petition to terminate support on

March 4, 2019.     A conference was scheduled, but later continued several

times.   Thereafter, a hearing was scheduled for January 9, 2020, which was

continued at Father’s request, delayed further due to the COVID-19 pandemic

shutdowns, and ultimately rescheduled for July 30, 2021.

      At the July 30, 2021 hearing, neither Mother nor D.N. appeared.

Mother’s counsel appeared. Prior to the start of the hearing, Mother’s counsel

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relayed to Hearing Office Lombardi that, despite several attempts, she had

been unable to contact Mother for the two weeks prior to the hearing.

Mother’s counsel expressed her concern that Mother was ill or hospitalized

because it was unusual for Mother not to respond and Mother had not missed

any previous court hearings. N.T. Hearing, 7/30/21, at 3-5, 40.      Mother’s

counsel sought a continuance, which Hearing Officer Lombardi denied. The

hearing proceeded solely on Father’s testimony.

      Thereafter, on September 16, 2021, Mother filed a petition to reopen

the record.     At a hearing on September 21, 2021, Mother testified to her

medical problems, including high blood pressure, chronic pain, asthma, panic

attacks, and anxiety, and that, in addition to her primary care physician, she

is under the care of a cardiologist, an orthopedist, a pulmonologist, and a

psychiatrist. N.T. Hearing, 9/21/21, at 6-10. With respect to the hearing at

which she did not appear, Mother testified that she missed that hearing due

to her medical conditions. She stated:

      I was told by my doctor, immediately I had to go over to
      orthopedics because I was having a lot of pain. They thought I
      was having a stroke, and I had to go right over the same day of
      court to the orthopedic doctor. . . . I was aware of [the hearing
      date], but like I mentioned, I had that doctor’s appointment as an
      emergency that day as well[.] . . . I knew [the hearing date] was
      coming, but I didn’t know it was that same day that I had to go to
      the doctor. It truly slipped my mind because I was under a lot of
      duress. I will be honest about that. I truly forgot about it[.]

Id. at 4, 12.

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      The court denied Mother’s petition to reopen the record. Thereafter, on

November     22,   2021,   Hearing   Officer   Lombardi   filed   a   report   and

recommendation terminating Father’s support obligation.               Mother filed

exceptions on December 13, 2021, which were denied by the Honorable Ann

Marie Wheatcraft. See Opinion and Order, 3/17/22. Mother filed a timely

notice of appeal, and she raises the following issues for our review:

         1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in terminating child
            support for the parties’ autistic, epileptic, disabled son, who
            the court previously found to be an unemancipated adult
            entitled to support?

         2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s
            counsel’s request for [a] continuance on July 30, 2021?

         3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Mother’s
            petition to reopen the record?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

      This Court has explained:

      In Pennsylvania, the duty to support a child generally ceases when
      the child reaches the age of majority, which is defined as either
      eighteen years of age or when the child graduates from high
      school, whichever comes later. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4321(3), however,
      provides that “parents may be liable for the support of their
      children who are 18 years of age or older.” In applying section
      4321(3), this Court has found that there is a presumption that the
      duty to support a child ends when the child reaches majority:

         Ordinarily a parent is not required to support his adult
         child[,] but there is a well-recognized exception supported
         by abundant authority that where such child is too feeble
         physically or mentally to support [himself or herself,] the
         duty on the parent continues after the child has attained [his
         or her] majority.

      When the disability resulting in the child’s inability to be
      self-sufficient already exists at the time the child reaches

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      the age of majority, however, the presumption is
      rebuttable by the adult child upon proof that there are
      conditions that make it impossible for her or him to be
      employed. . . . To rebut the presumption that a parent has
      no obligation to support an adult child, the test is whether
      the child is physically and mentally able to engage in
      profitable employment and whether employment is
      available to that child at a supporting wage. The adult child
      has the burden of proof on these issues. Our scope of
      review is limited to a determination of whether the trial
      court committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law
      when making a determination in this regard.

Style v. Shaub, 955 A.2d 403, 408-09 (Pa. Super. 2008) (some citations

omitted) (emphasis added) .

      At the hearing, Father testified that he is an independent truck driver

and that he offered D.N. employment helping with deliveries. N.T. Hearing,

7/30/21, at 8-9. Father also testified that D.N. graduated from Upper Merion

High School, id. at 7, and that D.N. worked as a dishwasher at a restaurant

while in high school. Id. at 9. Father stated that he had not lived with D.N.

since D.N. was seven years old, id. at 10, and Father acknowledged that

“technically I really don’t know as far as health-wise what’s really wrong with

[D.N.].” Id. at 11. We emphasize that the bulk of Father’s testimony was in

response to questioning regarding Father’s past employment, his independent

trucking business, his income and expenses, and his work schedule. See id.

at 15-35.

      Moreover, this Court has clarified that whether someone is “employable”

does not resolve the issue of whether that individual is entitled to continuing

support from parents. In Com. ex rel. Cann v. Cann, 418 A.2d 403, 405–

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406 (Pa. Super. 1980), the adult child, who had a learning disability, was

unable to earn a supporting wage because of her mental capacity, even though

she worked forty hours per week at a cleaning job and babysitting. Id. at

404–06. This was sufficient to require her father to continue paying support

when it was determined that her living expenses exceeded her income. Id.

at 405–06.    Thus, an adult child who is mentally or physically disabled is

entitled to support even if he or she is employable, but is incapable of

self-support. See id. at 405 (party seeking to vacate support order “must

demonstrate not just that the child is capable of earning some income, but

that the child is able to earn a sufficient living to be entirely self-

supporting[.]”); see also Kotzbauer v. Kotzbauer, 937 A.2d at 487, 490–

94 (Pa. Super. 2007) (despite working sixteen to twenty hours a week, adult

child was unable to support herself due to her disability, and her father was

responsible for providing continuing support); Hanson v. Hanson, 625 A.2d

1212 (Pa. Super. 1993) (where adult child working part-time jobs was unable

to support herself due to disability, father was responsible for providing

continuing support).

      Here, despite Hearing Officer Lombardi finding that D.N. was completely

disabled in 2018, in 2021, the same hearing officer, after hearing only Father’s

testimony, found D.N. fully capable of working full time and supporting

himself. Father has been supporting this child for over 17 years and there

was no evidence indicating that D.N.’s situation has substantially changed.

Because Mother’s request for continuance and to reopen the record were

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denied, there was no opportunity for either Mother or D.N. to rebut the

presumption that support should be terminated simply because D.N. reached

the age of majority. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer stated

that “[t]he case has been in the system a long time. I understand that, and

that’s part of the reason why I denied the request for a continuance.”

Id. at 38 (emphasis added).

       Both parties sought continuances in this matter. Mother sought a

continuance on January 31, 2019, while Father filed motions to continue on

May 15, 2019, October 24, 2019, January 8, 2020, and January 30, 2020.

Thereafter, the hearing was delayed due to COVID-19 pandemic shutdowns.1

Although it was Mother’s responsibility to appear at the July 30, 2021 hearing

or, at the very least, communicate with counsel, the court’s refusal to either

continue or reopen the matter in these circumstances may prematurely punish

D.N., and is, in our opinion, unacceptable.2

       We find that the order denying the continuance and refusing to reopen

the record was an abuse of discretion. See Colonna v. Colonna, 791 A.2d

353, 356-57 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“The general rule is that a court may, in its

____________________________________________

1 On February 10, 2021, the parties’ counsel jointly sought a continuance of a
discovery conference scheduled for March 19, 2021, averring discovery and
updated medical information was pending and the “current pandemic of
COVID-19 remans an issue for the litigants and their counsel due to
compromised health issues.” Motion for Continuance, 2/10/21.

2 It appears from the record that Mother may not be in the best physical
condition to advocate for D.N. If it sees fit, the court may wish to explore
appointment of a guardian ad litem for D.N.

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discretion, reopen the case after a party has closed for the taking of additional

testimony, but such matters are peculiarly within the sound discretion of the

trial court.”); Baysmore v. Brownstein, 771 A.2d 54, 57 (Pa. Super. 2001)

(standard of review of order denying motion for continuance is abuse of

discretion).   Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an assessment and

hearing. We direct the court address what changes, if any, occurred in the

years between the June 2018 hearing and the July 2021 hearing, which

resulted in termination of support, and that the court make specific findings

as to whether, even if employable, D.N. is capable of self-support. Cann,

supra.

      Reversed and remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/13/2023

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