Court Opinion

ID: 9449113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:57:17.373814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:42.473489
License: Public Domain

*33BAZELON, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
My brethren recognize that under Cop-pedge an indigent petitioner is entitled to at least a partial transcript based upon conclusory claims of error in his pro se petition. This clearly appears from their statement that Coppedge requires that:
“when a pro se petition is filed, upon direct appeal from judgment of conviction, and the claims of error stated therein (e. g., ‘insufficiency of evidence/ ‘unlawful search and seizure,’) are so conclusory in nature that ‘their substance cannot adequately be ascertained,’ counsel will be appointed and, simultaneously, the portion of the transcript of proceedings which relate to the con-clusory allegations will be ordered * * [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus if the pro se petition in the present case had been filed after Coppedge, this court would have ordered the transcript simultaneously with the appointment of counsel. Hence appointed counsel would not be required to accept or reject petitioner’s pro se claims without the benefit of relevant portions of the transcript.
Here we appointed counsel and denied his request for a transcript before Cop-pedge. Our denial was based on our pre-Coppedge procedure of appointing counsel and then requiring him to establish the need for a transcript based upon claims of error. Our post-Coppedge procedure eliminated this requirement. As I read the court’s opinion today, it holds this requirement applicable simply because counsel’s appointment and request for a transcript occurred before Cop-pedge. I think it clear, however, that Cop-pedge governs since the matter is now before us on timely motion for reconsideration “in light of Coppedge.” I would therefore grant the motion for reconsideration and order the transcript.
Since the single issue on this motion is a very narrow one arising from the unique chronology of the case in relation to Coppedge, it is unnecessary for me to intimate any opinion regarding matters in the majority opinion which go beyond the unique and narrow circumstances of this ease.