Court Opinion

ID: 9952778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 19:01:08.103218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:19.494693
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11138    Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 03/20/2024   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11138
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       EDWIN GIOVANNY MENDOZA-VERDUGO,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00012-AW-GRJ-2
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11138       Document: 24-1      Date Filed: 03/20/2024      Page: 2 of 5

       2                       Opinion of the Court                   23-11138

       Before WILSON, JORDAN, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Edwin Giovanny Mendoza-Verdugo appeals his total sen-
       tence of 132 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute or
       possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation
       of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm in furtherance
       of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
       § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). He argues that the district court violated his Fifth
       and Sixth Amendment rights by considering (and making findings
       about) conduct for which he was acquitted (a drug amount) in cal-
       culating his guideline range. He does not, however, challenge as
       clearly erroneous the district court’s drug quantity finding.
                                           I
               We review constitutional challenges to a sentence de novo.
       See United States v. Hall, 965 F.3d 1281, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020). Issues
       not raised in the initial brief on appeal are deemed abandoned.
       United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
       See also United States v. Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032, 1043 (11th Cir. 2019)
       (stating that an appellant abandons an issue on appeal “when []he
       makes only passing references to it that are background to other
       arguments or [are] buried within other arguments, or both”) (quo-
       tation marks omitted). We are “bound to follow a prior panel’s
       holding unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point
       of abrogation by an opinion of the Supreme Court or of this Court
       sitting en banc.” United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir.
       2019).
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       23-11138               Opinion of the Court                          3

                                         II
               In calculating a defendant’s guideline range, a district court
       may consider acquitted conduct that is proven by a preponderance
       of the evidence. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155-57
       (1997); United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006). A
       district court’s consideration of acquitted conduct proven by a pre-
       ponderance of the evidence does not violate due process, so long
       as the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum
       for the crime of conviction. See Watts, 519 U.S. at 155-157.
              This principle applies where the district court calculates a
       defendant’s guideline range based on drug weight for which the
       defendant was acquitted by a jury but was proven by a preponder-
       ance of the evidence at sentencing. See United States v. Smith, 741
       F.3d 1211, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2013). And it applies where a district
       court considers factual allegations or evidence outside of the jury’s
       special verdict. See United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th
       Cir. 2005) (ruling that it was not plain error for the sentencing court
       to consider evidence of the defendant’s connection to an amount
       of cocaine beyond the ﬁve kilograms for which the jury found him
       responsible via special verdict). The reason is that a jury’s verdict
       and a district court’s factual determinations at sentencing employ
       diﬀerent standards of proof. See United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d
       1213, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011) (“There is nothing inconsistent with a
       jury verdict to the eﬀect that the Government had not proven cer-
       tain acts beyond a reasonable doubt and a judicial ﬁnding that the
       Government had proven those acts by a preponderance of the evi-
       dence.”).
              “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that in-
       creases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
       maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   23-11138

       reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
       See also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999) (ruling that
       each element of a crime must be “charged by indictment, proven
       beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict”).
       In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005), the Supreme
       Court reaﬃrmed its holding from Apprendi that “[a]ny fact (other
       than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence
       exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a
       plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant
       or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” In doing so, it de-
       termined that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was unconstitu-
       tional “insofar as the guidelines were mandatory and to the extent
       that they allowed the upper limits of the sentence to depend on
       facts that had not been established by a plea of guilty or proven to
       a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d
       1160, 1183 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 244).
              We have “repeatedly stated that sentencing courts may ﬁnd
       by a preponderance of the evidence all facts relevant to imposing a
       sentence below the statutory maximum.” Smith, 741 F.3d at 1227.
       Moreover, “Booker does not suggest that the consideration of ac-
       quitted conduct violates the Sixth Amendment as long as the judge
       does not impose a sentence that exceeds what is authorized by the
       jury verdict.” Duncan, 400 F.3d at 1304.
                                          III
               As a preliminary matter, Mr. Mendoza-Verdugo has aban-
       doned any issue other than his constitutional challenge to the dis-
       trict court’s consideration of acquitted drug weight in calculating
       his guideline range, which is reviewed de novo. Though his initial
       brief references substantive and procedural reasonableness claims,
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       23-11138               Opinion of the Court                         5

       this reference is minor and background to his constitutional chal-
       lenge, and it is thus abandoned.
              We are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court in
       Watts, which allows for the consideration of a defendant’s acquit-
       ted conduct at sentencing. We are also bound by our own prece-
       dent, which holds that a district court may ﬁnd that a particular fact
       was proven by a preponderance of the evidence despite a special
       verdict ﬁnding that the same fact was not proven beyond a reason-
       able doubt.
              Contrary to Mr. Mendoza-Verdugo’s contention, Apprendi
       and Jones do not abrogate Watts, because those cases allow a court
       to make factual ﬁndings relevant to sentencing by a preponderance
       of the evidence, so long as those ﬁndings do not result in a sentence
       beyond the statutory maximum set by the jury’s verdict. Indeed,
       we have applied Watts to judicial ﬁndings about drug weight after
       Apprendi and Jones. See Smith, 741 F.3d at 1226-27.
              Here the district court’s consideration (and ﬁnding) of ac-
       quitted drug weight aﬀected Mr. Mendoza-Verdugo’s guideline
       range, but not the statutory maximum ﬁxed by the counts of con-
       viction. Mr. Mendoza-Verdugo was ultimately sentenced to a term
       of 132 months, well below the statutory maximum of 40 years
       stemming from the jury’s guilty verdicts.
                                        IV
             We aﬃrm Mr. Mendoza-Verdugo’s sentence.

             AFFIRMED.