Court Opinion

ID: 9684405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:55:58.312715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:55.577810
License: Public Domain

DON WITTIG,
Senior Justice, dissenting, (Assigned).
Because I would hold that the relator, Tenet Hospitals, has an adequate remedy at law, I respectfully dissent. Mandamus will not issue where there is “a clear and adequate remedy at law, such as a normal appeal.” State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.1984).
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. Republican Party of Texas v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex.1997); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-44 (Tex.1992). We do not have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to supervise or correct incidental rulings of a trial judge where there is an adequate remedy by appeal. Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex.1989). Without this prerequisite *828limitation, appellate courts would “embroil themselves unnecessarily in incidental pretrial rulings of the trial courts” and mandamus “would soon cease to be an extraordinary writ.” Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1991).
Before mandamus may issue, relator must show the requirement of an inadequate remedy by appeal; this is a “fundamental tenet of writ practice.” Holloway, 767 S.W.2d at 684; Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985). Two areas that allow for mandamus are representative. One circumstance allowing extraordinary interference with a trial court occurs where there is unique and compelling circumstances to summon the exercise of mandamus jurisdiction. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d at 93-94 (trial court ruling affecting state wide elections). Another justification for interference with a trial court would exist where some substantial right or manifest and urgent necessity. Holloway, 767 S.W.2d 680, 684; Hey v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (1958). The relator has the burden of proof to show the inadequacy of the appellate remedy. In re Abraham, 22 S.W.3d 512, 515 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, orig. proceeding). And this burden is a heavy one. Lutheran Social Service, Inc., v. Meyers, 460 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex.1970). I would hold that relator has not met this heavy burden.
Tenet argues in its original brief that its “unique due process right” was denied, citing only Collom and In re Morris. Collom, 62 S.W.3d at 929-30; In re Morris, 93 S.W.3d 388, 390 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002)(orig. proceeding). The majority opinion also cites a subsequent Amarillo case, In re Rodriguez, 99 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003)(orig. proceeding). However, in both Amarillo cases mandamus was denied and those cases rely solely upon Collom,1 I would also note all three of these cases address an entirely different section of Article 4590i, and simply do not address either our situation or relator’s due process argument.
Collom specifically stated: “The issue in this case is whether the trial court, having found that the expert report filed by the plaintiff was not in compliance with the statutory requirements, and having further found that such lack of compliance was not due to accident or mistake, had a ministerial duty to dismiss the plaintiff’s case with prejudice.” Collom 62 S.W.3d at 927. It should be noted that the statutory requirement at issue was a time requirement. The trial court made two critical statutory findings: First, the export report was not in statutory compliance (it was over two years late); and second, the lack of compliance was not due to accident or mistake which could have allowed an extension for statutory compliance.2 See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(d) & (g)(Vernon 2003). The Collom court stated: “We therefore hold that the trial court in this case, having made findings of noncompliance, and having made no finding consistent with the granting of the thirty-day statutory grace period, had a ministerial duty to dismiss the case with prejudice.” Id. at 928. Collom expressly noted that mandamus would only lie to direct the performance of a ministerial act or duty, or to correct a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court. Id. at 927. Once the trial *829court found a clear statutory non-compliance (a more than two year delay) and no grounds for extension, it had a ministerial duty to dismiss the case. Id. at 928. Justice Grant correctly pointed out that the court was not reviewing the merits of the trial court’s finding on the failure of the required expert report to comply with the statute or the finding in the order that the failure to comply was not the result of an accident or mistake. Id. at 930. I cannot over emphasize another insightful comment by Justice Grant: “Because this was not an appeal and because the real party in interest could not appeal because that party had received a favorable ruling and also because the order was interlocutory, the issue of the merits of the trial court’s findings could not be reviewed by this court.” Id. [Emphasis added]. Yet today, this is precisely what Tenet has asked us to do. Review the judicial reasoning of the trial court, on the merits of the reports, and rendered a final judgment. Simultaneously, we summarily cut off the claimants ability to appeal the trial court’s denial of their request to amend their reports.3
In Collom, the trial court expressed its order in sufficiently precise statutory terms that precluded its granting of the thirty-day grace period provided in Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(g). Collom, 62 S.W.3d at 927. Even though that court ruled the report was not timely, and there was no entitlement to a grace period, that court without statutory authority, rather in direct contradiction to the statute, granted a 15 day extension. We must contrast both the facts and differing statutory requirements. Collom is principally based on Section 13.01(g) and Section 13.01(d). The latter provides:
(d) Not later than the later of the 180th day after the date on which a health care liability claim is filed or the last day of any extended period established under Subsection (f) or (h) of this section, the claimant shall, for each physician or health care provider against whom a claim is asserted:
(1) furnish to counsel for each physician or health care provider one or more expert reports, with a curriculum vitae of each expert listed in the report; or
(2) voluntarily nonsuit the action against the physician or health care provider.
Tex.Rev.Civ.StatAnn. art. 4590i, § 13.01(d)(Vemon 2003).
The defendants’ motion in Collom was based on Section 13.01(d) not (Z). Collom, 62 S.W.3d at 927. The Collom case was filed March 5, 1998. Id. at 926. The report was filed more than two years later on May 2, 2000. Id. at 927. Accordingly, under Section 13.01(e), the legislature mandated dismissal with prejudice, absent the granting of a grace period, which the trial court denied.4 Id.
This case sub judice, involves Section 13.01(Z). That section provides: (Z) A *830court shall grant a motion challenging the adequacy of an expert report only if it appears to the court, after hearing, that the report does not represent a good faith effort to comply with the definition of an expert report in Subsection 13.01(r)(6) of this section.
As duly noted by the majority, art. 4590i allows a challenge to the adequacy of the report. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(7). The trial court must grant a motion to dismiss “only if it appears to the (trial) court, after hearing, that the report does not represent a good faith effort to comply with the definition of an expert report in Subsection 13.01(r)(6) of this section.” Id. Here, quite obviously, it did not appear to the trial court that the report did not represent a good faith effort to comply with the definition of an expert report. Logically then, there was not and could not be a ministerial duty of the trial court to dismiss as delineated in Collom.
It seems to me, that the legislature invested with the trial court in the first instance, not the appellate courts, the authority to determine, in its judicial discretion, the adequacy of a report. The language of Section 13.01(Z) is totally de-pendant “only” on the trial court’s discretion vis a vis the language of Section 13.01(e), which mandates dismissal when the claimant totally fails to timely file a report. While the majority opinion goes to great length to analyze the merits of the reports, that is not our function, either under the statute or in the exercise of our extraordinary writ powers.
Tenet’s “due process” arguments facially fails, because the legislature left the decision of a report’s adequacy with the trial court, and provided no interlocutory appeal. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014 (Vernon 1997). In its reply brief Tenet admits: “Because the trial itself is the harm, the harm cannot be remedied by a post trial appeal.”5 The law is clear that the “cost or delay of having to go through trial and the appellate process does not make the remedy at law inadequate.” Hooks v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 808 S.W.2d 56, 59-60 (Tex.1991); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 841-42.
Unlike Collom, the record before us does not reflect that the trial court expressly disregarded a mandatory statutory deadline requirement to dismiss the claims against relators where no report was filed for over two years. Here, the trial court found the report was a good faith effort under Article 4590L Thus, the record does not support the conclusion that the trial judge violated a ministerial duty to dismiss the suit against relators. Under his finding, the trial court could not dismiss the case. Nor is there evidence that the remedy of ordinary appeal, given the state of the record, is inadequate to meet the legislative intent of reducing so called frivolous lawsuits. There is not a scintilla of proof that this death claim is frivolous. I would hold that under relator’s motion, it is not the prerogative of appellant courts to issue writs of mandamus to control or revise the exercise of discretion by trial courts in the performance of purely judicial as distinguished from ministerial acts. Iley, 311 S.W.2d at 651-52. Accordingly, I would conclude that relators have not shown they are entitled to the extraordinary relief requested.

. Collom in turn, generally relies on mandatory deadlines found in family law, specifically parental rights, which are of constitutional dimension. I would note that enforcement of these type of statutory deadlines are ministerial acts.

. The tóal judge specifically found that: plaintiff's expert report failed to comply with Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(d)(180 day deadline requirements).

. This issue is neither raised nor briefed. At a minimum, the case should be remanded to inform the trial court it was in error about the report. Obviously claimants’ counsel and the trial court both thought the reports were adequate. If they were not adequate, is that not exactly the type of mistake contemplated that would allow claimants to amend and address any deficiencies?

. Section 13.01(e) provides: "If a claimant has failed, for any defendant physician or health care provider, to comply with Subsection (d) of this section within the time required, the court shall, on the motion of the affected physician or health care provider, enter an order awarding as sanctions against the claimant or the claimant’s attorney:
(1) the reasonable attorney's fees and costs of court incurred by that defendant;
(2) the forfeiture of any cost bond respecting the claimant's claim against that defendant to the extent necessary to pay the award; and
*830is) the dismissal of the action of the claimant against that defendant with prejudice to the claim’s refiling.” [Emphasis added].

. I would also note relator’s unfettered ability to file a no-evidence or traditional motion for summary judgment, should either or both be appropriate. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c) & (i).