Court Opinion

ID: 9630228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:05:53.77346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:34.531965
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge:
In this Opinion, we are called upon to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to submit to the jury the appellant’s, Charles D. Hahn’s, requested instruction that a manufacturer of prescription drugs may be held strictly liable under the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 402A for an allegedly deficient warning contained in a prescription drug package insert. The trial court ruled that such an instruction was precluded under Comment K of Restatement of Torts (Second) § 402A. We agree. Thus, we affirm the judgment entered in favor of the appellee, the Upjohn Company.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On December 29,1976, the appellant sustained an injury to his back during the course of his employment as a warehouseman at Acme Markets. Performance of this job required the appellant to do a large amount of heavy lifting. As a result of his back injury, the appellant came under the care of Dr. Howard A. Richter. Dr. Richter diagnosed the appellant’s injury as a herniated disc and recommended that appellant undergo surgery to repair the disc. The appellant agreed and the surgery was performed by Dr. Richter at Lankenau Hospital on January 27, 1977. On February 22, 1977, the appellant was discharged from the hospital. In March, 1977, *133the appellant received Dr. Richter’s written permission to return to his job as a warehouseman.
Shortly after returning to work, the appellant suffered a recurrence of extreme pain in his back. The appellant returned to Dr. Richter who advised him to stay home from work and rest. When the appellant’s pain did not subside, he was readmitted to Lankenau Hospital from May 18, 1977 to May 28,1977. During this hospitalization, Dr. Richter noticed that the appellant was developing arachnoiditis, which is a scarring of the arachnoid nerves in the lower back. (N.T. 6/8/89 at 28-29). After the arachnoiditis was discovered, the appellant received his first intrathecal injection1 of Depo-Medrol, a drug manufactured by the appellee, the Upjohn Company (Upjohn), even though intrathecal injection was not a Federal Drug Administration (F.D.A.) approved usage for the drug.2 Upon receiving the first intrathecal injection of Depo-Medrol, the appellant’s back pain subsided and he received Dr. Richter’s permission to return to work on July 18, 1977.
On September 26, 1977, the appellant suffered a relapse of back pain while at work and returned to the hospital until October 15, 1977. During this hospital stay, the appellant had three epidural blocks administered to him. After being released from the hospital, the appellant returned home until extreme pain in his back and left leg forced his re-hospitalization on October 19, 1977. While in the hospital, the appellant consulted with Dr. Richter and Dr. James Meadowcroft, both of whom advised the appellant that a spinal fusion would be necessary. The appellant agreed to have the spinal fusion performed by Dr. Meadowcroft. At this time, the appellant also gave his permission to Dr. Richter to remove the previously discovered scar tissue while Dr. Meadowcroft was performing the spinal fusion. During this operation, Dr. Richter administered the second intrathecal injection of Depo-Medrol to the appellant.
*134Following the appellant’s second operation, he continued to experience worsening pain in his left leg. The appellant was readmitted to Lankenau Hospital on January 14, 1978 and a third intrathecal injection of Depo-Medrol was administered by Dr. Richter. The third intrathecal administration of Depo-Medrol alleviated the appellant’s symptoms significantly, and Dr. Richter and Dr. Meadowcroft advised him that he could return to work if he were assigned to light duty. However, a light duty assignment was unavailable at the Acme Markets warehouse, so appellant did not return to work at that time.
In May, 1978, the appellant’s pain in his back and left leg returned and Dr. Richter administered a fourth intrathecal injection of Depo-Medrol. The cycle of relief through the intrathecal administration of Depo-Medrol and relapse continued throughout the remainder of 1978, 1979, and early 1980, with the appellant receiving four additional intrathecal administrations of Depo-Medrol from Dr. Richter. During this time period, the appellant, with Dr. Richter’s permission, sporadically returned to work. The last day the appellant worked was December 30, 1979. Shortly thereafter, on February 4, 1980, the appellant received his eighth and final intrathecal injection of Depo-Medrol; however, the pain in his back and left leg did not diminish at all. The appellant was admitted to the hospital in early March, 1980 and given a myelogram. The result of the myelogram revealed that the appellant had extensive arachnoiditis. Dr. Richter recommended additional surgery to remove the extensive scar tissue which resulted from the arachnodities. The appellant consented. During the course of the surgery, a nerve root was severed, which caused the appellant to suffer a host of serious permanent injuries.
On February 23,1982, the appellant filed a writ of summons naming Dr. Richter, Dr. Meadowcroft, and Dr. Qualls, together with Upjohn as defendants. A two count complaint was subsequently filed on July 1, 1982. In Count I, the appellant alleged that the defendant physicians were negligent in their treatment of him and failed to exercise the requisite standard of care required of physicians with their respective specialities. Specifically, in Count I, the appellant alleged that the *135defendant physicians breached the standard of care by: (1) recommending repeated surgery without adequate indication that the benefits outweighed the risks; (2) recommending that the appellant prematurely return to his warehouseman job before he had properly healed; (3) repeatedly intrathecally injecting him with Depo-Medrol despite known dangers of which the defendant doctors were or should have been aware existed. In Count II, the appellant sued Upjohn alleging that Upjohn was aware, or should have been aware, that the intrathecal injection of Depo-Medrol caused arachnoditis and the formation of scar tissue within the spinal canal, and that despite this knowledge, Upjohn failed to adequately and fully warn physicians of the serious risks attendant to the intrathecal use of Depo-Medrol.
During the next seven years, all parties conducted extensive discovery. On May 24, 1985, the appellant discontinued all of his claims against Dr. Meadowcroft and Dr. Qualls. On the same day, the appellant also executed a joint tortfeasor’s release in favor of Dr. Richter in exchange for valuable consideration. However, Dr. Richter remained a party defendant to the litigation as to the questions of liability and the possible apportionment of damages.
At the jury trial, both the appellant and Upjohn presented extensive evidence regarding the drug, Depo-Medrol, and its intrathecal use. The appellant’s evidence showed that although intrathecal use of Depo-Medrol was not an approved application of the drug at the time of its market approval by the F.D.A. in 1959, Upjohn was fully aware that it was being used in this manner by some physicians. The appellant also presented evidence that revealed that Upjohn had filed a supplemental New Drug Application (N.D.A.) with the F.D.A. in 1963, seeking to add intrathecal administration as an approved use of Depo-Medrol. In furtherance of its supplemental New Drug Application, Upjohn conducted various clinical investigations regarding the intrathecal use of Depo-Medrol until terminating its supplemental N.D.A. application on April 3, 1969. The appellant maintained that before terminating its campaign for F.D.A. approval of the intrathecal use of Depo-*136Medrol, Upjohn received various reports from physicians conducting the clinical investigations as early as 1965, establishing a connection between the intrathecal use of Depo-Medrol and the development of arachnoiditis. The appellant asserted that after receiving these negative reports, Upjohn merely dropped its campaign to get Depo-Medrol approved for intrathecal use without attempting to alert any physicians already using Depo-Medrol intrathecally on their patients that the drug may cause arachnoiditis. The appellant presented evidence which showed that Upjohn did not place a warning on the package insert that arachnoiditis had been reported when Depo-Medrol was used intrathecally until it was directed to do so by the F.D.A. in early 1977. The appellant also presented evidence that Upjohn did not place a warning on the package insert that Depo-Medrol was not recommended for intrathecal use until it was required to do so by the F.D.A. in May of 1980.
In its defense, Upjohn explained that it had ceased trying to get F.D.A. approval for the intrathecal use of Depo-Medrol for economic reasons. Upjohn also presented evidence which showed that the early reports it received concerning a connection between the intrathecal administration of Depo-Medrol and the development of arachnoiditis occurred in clinical investigations involving patients with multiple sclerosis and that arachnoditis is symptomatic of that disease. Upjohn elicited further evidence which established that Dr. Richter had diagnosed that the appellant had arachnoiditis before Depo-Medrol was ever intrathecally administered to him. Dr. Richter also testified that he had not consulted the Physician’s Desk Top Reference Book, a reference book which contains all of the package inserts for the various F.D.A. approved prescription drugs, regarding Depo-Medrol since 1973. Dr. Richter further testified that he was not aware at any time during his treatment of the appellant that a connection had been established between the intrathecal administration of Depo-Medrol and arachnoiditis. Additionally, Dr. Richter stated that until he was served with the appellant’s complaint in this lawsuit and consulted the Physician’s Desk Top Reference Book, he *137was unaware that the package inserts contained a warning against using Depo-Medrol intrathecally.
Upjohn also presented expert testimony from the former head of the F.D.A., Dr. Herbert Ley, who testified that Upjohn’s warnings contained in the Depo-Medrol package were adequate. Dr. Ley also testified that the F.D.A. would not have allowed Upjohn to contact physicians or send a “Dear Doctor” letter regarding the intrathecal use of Depo-Medrol because it was not an approved use for the drug.
Finally, Upjohn presented evidence regarding several factors which are known causes of arachnoiditis which were present in the appellant’s patient history before Depo-Medrol was ever intrathecally administered to him, such as the initial injury suffered by him, the two prior operations and the pantopaque dye used in the first myelogram performed on him in January, 1977.
At the close of the evidence, the appellant requested in his points for charge that the jury be instructed as to both strict liability and negligence regarding the warning placed on the Depo-Medrol package inserts. The trial court refused to give the jury a strict liability instruction, ruling that Comment K of the Restatement of Torts § 402(A) provides an exception precluding a strict liability instruction in cases involving prescription drugs. The trial court grounded its jury instruction solely upon the issue of negligence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Upjohn. Post-verdict motions were denied. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, the appellant raises the following issue for our review:
IN A PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTION BROUGHT AGAINST THE MANUFACTURER OF A PRESCRIPTION DRUG, WHERE THE PLAINTIFF’S THEORY OF LIABILITY IS THAT THE PRODUCT WAS DEFECTIVE WHEN SOLD WITHOUT SUPPLYING ADEQUATE WARNING TO THE PRESCRIBING PHYSICIAN ABOUT SERIOUS MEDICAL RISKS KNOWN TO THE DRUG COMPANY, DOES COMMENT K OF THE *138RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, PROVIDE THE DEFENDANT WITH AN EXCEPTION TO STRICT LIABILITY IN PENNSYLVANIA?
(The Appellant’s Brief at 3).
The appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on strict liability in accordance with section 402(A), Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)).3 The appellant argues that Comment K to section 402(A),4 Unavoidably unsafe products, does not provide *139Upjohn with an exception to strict liability when the appellant’s theory of liability is that the product was defective when sold due to the manufacturer’s failure to warn the prescribing physician about medical risks involved with the use of a drug which were known to the manufacturer. The appellant asserts that by refusing to give the jury a strict liability charge, the trial court failed in its obligation to instruct the jury on all theories of liability which would be fairly inferred from the evidence; thus, the appellant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial.
At the outset, we note that in determining whether to reverse a jury verdict due to an erroneous jury charge, an appellate court must look at the jury charge as a whole; if the charge inaccurately describes the law, there is error. Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985); Summit Fasteners Inc. v. Harleysville Nat. Bank, 410 Pa.Super. 56, 599 A.2d 203 (1991), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 633, 606 A.2d 902 (1991). Alleged errors in the jury instructions must be considered in relation to the entire charge and in light of the evidence presented. Clayton v. Sabeh, 406 Pa.Super. 335, 594 A.2d 365 (1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 639, 600 A.2d 1257 (1991). In order to constitute reversible error, a jury instruction must not only be erroneous, but must also be harmful to the complaining party. Summit Fasteners Inc. v. Harleysville Nat. Bank, supra at 62, 599 A.2d at 206; Jistarri v. Nappi, 378 Pa.Super. 583, 588, 549 A.2d 210, 213 (1988).
We begin our analysis of the question of the applicability of strict liability under the Restatement of Torts (Second) 402A in cases involving prescription drugs with the cogent remarks of our Supreme Court in the seminal case, Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
There is no question that manufacturers of potentially dangerous drugs are held to a high degree of care. As this Court said in Henderson v. National Drug Company, 343 *140Pa. 601, 610, 23 A.2d 743, 748 (1942), “* * * the public interest requires the holding of companies which make and sell drugs and medicine for use in the human body to a high degree of responsibility under both the criminal and civil law for any failure to exercise vigilance commensurate with the harm which would be likely to result from relaxing it.” The Court went on to say, however, that this consideration did not justify the courts in lowering the standards of proof in cases of this kind. “If we did so, the public interest would be ill served.” Thus, neither the law of Pennsylvania, nor, so far as we are aware, the law of other states has imposed strict liability upon a drug manufacturer merely because of dangerous propensities of the product.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes strict liability on the seller of any product “in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the .user or consumer.” This section has been adopted as the law of Pennsylvania. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). Comment h to the section makes it clear that a product, as to which adequate warning of danger involved in its use is required, sold without such warning is in a “defective condition.” Comment j states that “in order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use.” The comment continues: “Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and the product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition nor is it unreasonably dangerous.”
Incollingo v. Ewing, supra at 286-88, 282 A.2d at 219-20 (emphasis added).
Our Supreme Court further stated in Incollingo v. Ewing, supra, relying on Comment K of Section 402(A), that there are some products which are:
[ijncapable of being made safe for its intended use, such as new or experimental drugs, as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience there can be no assurance of safety, but such experience as there *141is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.
“The seller of such products,” concludes this comment, “again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.”
Id. at 287-88, 282 A.2d at 219-20.
In Incollingo v. Ewing, our Supreme Court categorized Chloromycetin, a prescription drug which had been on the market for more than thirty years at time of its decision as a product which was unavoidably unsafe but justifiably marketed and used notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The court further stated that the strict liability rule of Restatement 402(A) is not applicable in a case involving a prescription drug and that the standard of care required for a manufacturer of prescription drugs is set forth in § 388 of the Restatement (Second) which concerns the liability of a supplier of a chattel known to be dangerous for its intended use.5 Id. at 288 n. 9, 282 A.2d at 220 n. 8. See also Baldino v. Castagna 505 Pa. 239, 244, 478 A.2d 807, 810 (1984); Mazur v. Merck & Co. Inc., 964 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (1992).
Our Supreme Court has reiterated its position regarding the unavoidably unsafe nature of prescription drugs and the inap*142plicability of the strict liability provisions of Section 402A in Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 526 Pa. 208, 212-13, 584 A.2d 1383, 1386-87 (1991) and Baldino v. Castagna, supra. In these two cases, the Supreme Court discussed the applicability of Comment K of Restatement 402A to the Bendectin and Butozoiden-Alka, the two prescription drugs which were involved in those cases.6
Due to the inherently dangerous nature of prescription drugs, such drugs are not available to the general public but may be obtained only upon prescription by a licensed physician. Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 361 Pa.Super. 589, 594, 523 A.2d 374, 376 (1987). Thus, the warnings required of a manufacturer of prescription drugs must be directed towards the physician and not the patient-consumer. Baldino v. Castagna, supra 505 Pa. at 244-45, 478 A.2d at 812; Incollingo v. Ewing, supra 444 Pa. at 286-87, 282 A.2d at 220; McDaniel v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 367 Pa.Super. 600, 619, 533 A.2d 436, 446 (1987).
This is so because it is the duty of the prescribing physician to be fully aware of (1) the characteristics of the drug he is prescribing, (2) the amount of the drug which can be safely administered, and (3) the different medications the patient is taking. It is also the duty of the prescribing physician to advise the patient of any dangers or side effects associated with the use of the drug as well as how and when to take *143the drug. The warnings which must accompany such drugs are directed to the physician rather than to the patient-consumer as “[i]t is for the prescribing physician to use his independent medical judgment, taking into account the data supplied to him from the manufacturer, other medical literature, and any other source available to him, and weighing that knowledge against the personal medical history of his patient, whether to prescribe a given drug.”
Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra at 596-97, 523 A.2d at 378, citing Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation, 224 Pa.Super. 418, 431, 307 A.2d 449, 457 (1973).
Accordingly, because of the inherently dangerous nature of all prescription drugs and their limited legal accessibility through a prescription issued by a duly licensed physician, and assuming that there was proper preparation and warning, a manufacturer of prescription drugs is not strictly liable under Section 402A for unfortunate consequences which occur through the use of the otherwise useful and desirable products. See Baldino v. Castagna, supra 505 Pa. at 244, 478 A.2d at 810 citing Incollingo v. Ewing, supra 444 Pa. at 288, 282 A.2d at 221. Rather, a manufacturer of prescription drugs is liable only if it fails to exercise reasonable care to inform physicians, for whose use the prescription drug is supplied, of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous for its intended use. See Incollingo v. Ewing, supra at 288 n. 9, 282 A.2d at 220 n. 8.
Instantly, the appellant has not based his entitlement to a strict liability instruction under Section 402A upon allegations that the Depo-Medrol supplied to Dr. Richter was improperly and defectively prepared by Upjohn in the actual manufacturing process of the drug, thus causing him to develop arachnoditis as a result of its administration. Rather, the appellant asserts that the alleged defect in the drug was that Uphohn was aware and failed to include a warning in the package insert, that the unapproved intrathecal administration of this drug was known to cause arachnoditis. Thus, appellant has based his entitlement to the strict liability instruction upon *144Upjohn’s failure to adequately warn physicians of the dangers of intrathecal administration of Depo-Medrol rather than a defect in the design or manufacture of the prescription drug.
In Harford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moorhead, 396 Pa.Super. 234, 578 A.2d 492 (1990), we explained the difficulty in distinguishing within the “failure to warn” context between the theories of strict liability (in proving the product defective) and negligence (in proving the seller acted unreasonably) as the two principles appear to overlap.
Although there is contrary language in some decisions, most authorities have been forced to concede that in practice a determination of the adequacy of warnings can be made only by borrowing from negligence concepts. Thus, Dean Keeton has written:
[A] product may be defective as marketed because of a failure to adequately warn, or a failure to use proper means to warn about a risk or hazard related to the way the product was designed---- [Liability is imposed on the ground that the seller or manufacturer failed adequately to warn about some risk or hazard, or failed adequately to instruct about how to avoid the risk or harm. Under this approach, the product is allegedly defective as marketed because of the failure to properly present it to purchasers and users.
Notwithstanding what some courts have said, in establishing this ground of recovery, the plaintiff in most states must prove negligence in the failure to warn properly. There will be no liability in these cases without a showing that the defendant knew or should have known of the risk or hazard about which he failed to warn. Moreover, there will be no liability unless the seller or manufacturer failed to take the precautions that a reasonable person would take in presenting the product to the public.
Although this ground of recovery is sometimes referred to as strict liability, it is really nothing more than a ground of negligence liability better described as the sale of a product in a defective condition.
*145Hanford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moorhead, supra at 248-49, 578 A.2d at 499-500 citing Remy v. Michael D’s Carpet Outlets, 391 Pa.Super. 436, 445-446, 571 A.2d 446, 551 (1990) (quoting W. Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law — A Review of Basis Principles, 45 Mo.L.Rev. 579, 586-87 (1980)). However, the product at issue in Hanford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moorhead, supra, was not a prescription drug. Rather it was sulphur strips used for making wine, a product, which unlike prescription drugs, does not fall under the category of “unavoidably unsafe products” set forth in Comment K to section 402A of the Restatement of Torts. Mazur v. Merck & Co. Inc., supra at 1355 n. 8. Therefore, we were not compelled in Hanford, supra, to invoke the section 388 “reasonableness” standard applied by. our Supreme Court in Baldino v. Castagna, supra and Incollingo v. Ewing, supra, in cases involving the warning labels on prescription drugs.
Therefore, as was aptly set forth by the California Supreme Court in Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories), 44 Cal.3d 1049, 1059 n. 4, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412, 417 n. 4, 751 P.2d 470, 476 n. 4 (1988).
The test stated in comment k is to be distinguished from strict liability for failure to warn. Although both concepts identify failure to warn as the basis of liability, comment k imposes liability only if the manufacturer knew or should have known of the defect at the time the product was sold or distributed. Under strict liability, the reason why the warning was not issued is irrelevant, and the manufacturer is liable even if it neither knew nor could have known of the defect about which the warning was required. Thus, comment k, by focussing on the blameworthiness of the manufacturer, sets forth a test which sounds in negligence, while imposition of liability for failure to warn without regard to the reason for such failure is consistent with strict liability since it asks only whether the product that caused injury contained a defect.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly refused to give the jury a strict liability failure to warn instruction under Section 402A as such an instruction has been *146precluded by our Supreme Court’s application of Comment K to all prescription drugs. Thus, the trial court properly instructed the jury to examine Upjohn’s conduct regarding the dangers of the intrathecal administration of Depo-Medrol in light of the “reasonableness” standard set forth in Section 388.
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment entered in favor of Upjohn is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ROWLEY, President Judge, joined both Majority Opinion and CAVANAUGH’S, J., Concurring Opinion.
CAVANAUGH, J., filed a Concurring Opinion and joined Majority Opinion.
McEWEN, J., joined DEL SOLE’S, J., Dissenting Opinion.
DEL SOLE, J., filed a Dissenting Opinion.
BECK, J., joined both Majority Opinion and CAVANAUGH’S, J., Concurring Opinion.
TAMILIA, J., joined Majority Opinion.
POPOVICH, J., joined Majority Opinion.
FORD ELLIOTT, J., joined DEL SOLE’S, J., Dissenting Opinion.

. An intrathecal injection is administered directly into the spine.

. Depo-Medrol is approved by the F.D.A. only for intramuscular, intraarticular or soft tissue administration.

. § 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.

. Comment K: Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. [T]he same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the *139public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.

. § 388 Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. (Emphasis added).

. Comment K has been adopted in an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have considered the matter. See, Brown v. Superior Court (Abbot Laboratories), 44 Cal.3d 1049, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470 (1988). DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, etc. (8th Cir.1983) 697 F.2d 222, 228-29; Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc. (2nd Cir.1969) 416 F.2d 417, 425-426; Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Lab. (Ala. 1984) 447 So.2d 1301, 1303-1304; Gaston v. Hunter (App.1978) 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326, 338-341; Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co. (D.Md.1975) 441 F.Supp. 377, 380-381; Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co. (1986) 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318, 1323. But see Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.1981) (applying strict liability to prescription drugs); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984) (whether drug is unavoidably unsafe must be determined on a case by case basis). Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984) (Comment K is only applicable if drug in question was placed on the market without adequate testing because of exigent circumstances).