Court Opinion

ID: 9461280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:10:24.6198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:58.799220
License: Public Domain

CURTIS, District Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
I concur with Judge Choy’s holding that the trial court’s dismissal of count 3 should be affirmed, but I dissent from his holding that the trial court’s dismissal of counts 5 and 7 be reversed and remanded.
The appellant, who at the time of filing the complaint was a state prisoner, seeks damages by way of this civil rights action, brought pursuant to the provisions of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged wrongs done to him during his incarceration.
His complaint is quite typical of pro se pleadings. It is a lengthy and disorganized narrative of alleged injustices which he claims have been perpetrated upon him by prison officials. The complaint is replete with irrelevancies and inconsistencies, and the precise nature of his claims often appear vague and obscure. On the whole it appears to be a challenge to the prison officials’ authority to enact and enforce disciplinary rules, a contention which is without substantial merit.
The trial court, after patiently sifting through the pleadings and considering each of appellant’s claims, decided all eleven counts against him. McKinney v. DeBord, 324 F.Supp. 928 (E.D.Cal.1970). We are in agreement that the decision of the trial judge should be affirmed as to all counts, except 3, 5 and 7. As to the latter we have differing views.
In order to understand the true nature of appellant’s complaint in these counts, they must be read in the light of the complaint when read as a whole. Putting the events which appellant alleges in some chronological order, the following appear to be the facts:
Beginning at least as early as January 1969, the appellant undertook to provide legal services for fellow inmates, as well as for himself. In April of that year he began to collect law books, stationery, and other office supplies in his cell for use in connection with the performance of this service.
Prior to June 1, 1969, he alleges that there was in effect a prison rule prohibiting an inmate from having more than eight law books in his cell at any one time. At about that time, the rule was *507changed to allow not more than sixteen law books in an inmate’s cell. The principal thrust of appellant’s complaint is his contention that any such rule limiting the books which an inmate may have in his cell is unconstitutional. On this ground he directly attacked the validity of the rule in count 8, which was dismissed by the trial court as being without merit. We agree that such dismissal was proper.
Most of the other counts relate to the occasions upon which appellant’s attempt to obtain these books were frustrated.
In April and May of 1969, he attempted to contact various publishing companies including Bancroft-Whitney in San Francisco, but the prison authorities intercepted his letters. He also complains that he was prevented from showing his mother certain catalogues and brochures of law books which he wished to purchase.
Notwithstanding these allegations, he admits that during the year he was able to accumulate, by way of loan and purchase, sixty-four books which were confiscated from his cell in November and December of 1969. He further admits that from May to November he corresponded with law book publishing companies, apparently obtaining brochures and catalogues. With the knowledge and consent of prison authorities he arranged, presumably through his mother, to purchase forty-two of these books. When delivery was attempted at the prison, officials refused to accept them and ordered them delivered to the appellant’s mother. On several occasions she attempted to deliver them to the appellant, but each time she was refused by prison officials and the books were ultimately returned to the publishers.
In count 3, the appellant claims damages because of prison officials’ refusal to let him show his mother the law book brochures and catalogues. Judge Wallace holds that a dismissal of this count was improper because the trial judge assumed that the books, which were the subject matter of the purchase, were to be kept in the appellant’s cell which, of course, was in violation of the rule. Since the count contains no explicit allegation to this effect, it does not rule out the possible inference that the appellant intended to put the books to some legitimate use. In the face of such a factual dispute, Judge Wallace feels that the trial court should not have dismissed the count without at least giving the appellant an opportunity to respond. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
I concur completely with Judge Choy’s holding that in light of the allegations in the complaint, taken as a whole, the trial court was well within its discretion in construing count 3 to refer to the purchase of law books for use in appellant’s cell. Furthermore, appellant’s response to the motions for dismissal and motions for summary judgment was the filing of an affidavit stating:
“Your affiant is willing to stand on his well-pleaded complaint and is further willing to take the matter, as it now stands prepared, to [sic] Court of Appeals, therefore, no additional pleading will be filed. Plaintiffs stand or fall on their well-pleaded drafted Civil Right [sic] Act complaint. . . .”
In counts 5 and 7, appellant alleges that certain letters addressed to law book publishers were intercepted and suppressed. I agree with Judge Choy that for the reasons set forth in his opinion the interception and suppression of these letters was permissible unless the officers were acting in bad faith. Whereas, Judge Choy would remand for a clarification of the issue of good faith, I would affirm in reliance upon the presumption “that official duty has been regularly performed.” Cal.Evid.Code § 664 (West 1966).
It has long been the law of the State of California that a complaint seeking to charge official misconduct must negative the presumption of regularity of official action as declared by the Code. Los An-geles Athletic Club v. City of Long Beach, 128 Cal.App. 427, 17 P.2d 1061 (1st Dist. 1932). Cf. In re Sichofsky, 201 Cal. 360, 368, 257 P. 439 (1927).
*508The same presumption exists for Civil Rights Act cases of this sort, Urbano v. McCorkle, 346 F.Supp. 51, 54 (D.N.J. 1973), aff’d 481 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1973).
The nearest the plaintiff comes to alleging anything in the way of bad faith first occurs in the fifth claim where he alleges “Letters to the Bureau of N. Affairs was [sic] removed from the mails by Sergeant K. W. Miranda. Letters to M. Neil Smith, Bancroft-Whitney local representative, was [sic] also removed. Letters to Bancroft-Whitney were stolen from the mails. Letters to p 'stal authorities were stolen from the ils in an attempt to thwart a postal investigation of the charges that plaintiff had lodged against Miranda and others.”
Although plaintiff had a clear opportunity to allege bad faith, he carefully avoided doing so, alleging only that the defendants removed the letters and that certain letters were stolen by unnamed persons. Again in the seventh claim he alleges that certain letters “have not been allowed to leave the institution.” He again alleges that he “sought to send other letters to Bancroft-Whitney through the regular mail channels and these were summarily returned and rejected . . . ” by prison officials. In my view these allegations fall far short of charging bad faith or misconduct sufficient to negative the presumption of regularity of official action.
Furthermore, trial judges should have broad discretion in interpreting the pro se pleadings of prisoners, especially in civil rights actions. As Judge Duniway said in his concurring opinion in Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601-602 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845, 84 S.Ct. 97, 11 L.Ed.2d 72 (1963):
“I also think that the district judge should have a broader discretion in civil actions brought by prisoners against their jailers than in other civil actions. We know from sad experience with habeas corpus and 2255 cases that imprisoned felons are seldom, if ever, deterred by the. penalties of perjury. They do not hesitate to allege whatever they think is required in order to get themselves even the temporary relief of a proceeding in court. The prospect of amercing their jailers in damages must be a most tempting one, even if it will not get them their freedom. The disruption of prison discipline that the maintenance of such suits, at government expense, can bring about is not difficult to imagine.”
I can only conclude that the dismissal of counts 3, 5 and 7 was proper and, at least, the trial court, in doing so, was not clearly in error.
I would affirm.