Court Opinion

ID: 9941200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 01:01:44.864361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:20.287223
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-11060      Document: 00517066021         Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/15/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                                    FILED
                                                                          February 15, 2024
                                   No. 21-11060
                                 ____________                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                 Clerk
   United States of America, ex rel; Dana Johnson, Relator,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Raytheon Company,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 3:17-CV-1098
                  ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge:
          Plaintiff-Appellant Dana Johnson sued his former employer
   Defendant-Appellee Raytheon Co. under the False Claims Act, claiming
   retaliation for reporting fraudulent misrepresentations that Raytheon
   allegedly made to the Navy. The district court held it lacked subject-matter
   jurisdiction over all but one of Johnson’s claims and granted summary
   judgment to Raytheon on the remaining claim. We conclude that the district
   court correctly held Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), bars
   review of Johnson’s claims implicating the merits of the decision to revoke
   his security clearance and that Johnson failed to present a prima facie case of
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   retaliation for the remaining claim we have jurisdiction to assess.
   Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
                                I. BACKGROUND
                                    A. Facts
          Defendant-Appellee Raytheon Co. is a government defense
   contractor. The U.S. Navy is one of Raytheon’s customers. One of
   Raytheon’s Navy projects is the Advanced Sensor Technology (AST)
   Program. The AST Program is a “Special Access Program,” meaning
   Raytheon employees must have top-secret security clearance and be deemed
   mission critical to work on the Program. The federal government has full
   discretion to grant Raytheon employees security clearances and access to the
   Program. Raytheon’s contract with the Navy includes security requirements,
   and Raytheon has security plans that are approved by the Navy. As part of its
   security plan, Raytheon monitors its employees’ activities, including their
   computer and network use. Raytheon is required to report security concerns
   to the Navy.
         Plaintiff-Appellant Dana Johnson worked for Raytheon for thirty
   years, most recently as a systems engineer on the AST Program. Johnson
   claims that he saw Raytheon make fraudulent misrepresentation to the Navy
   about the products and equipment that Raytheon was providing through the
   AST Program, and that he spoke up internally about the problems over a
   couple of years with a number of supervisors and managers, though he never
   utilized official channels either with Raytheon or the Navy to express his
   fraud concerns. Johnson claims he identified and spoke out about four
   different problems that arose during his employment.
         First, Johnson encountered a problem with a “radar mode” in the
   Navy’s planes, and Johnson informed manager Brian Cook. According to
   Johnson, he fixed the problem in the computer code, but Raytheon did not

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   follow through with the necessary recalibration of the radar because it would
   have been expensive and time-consuming. Cook told Johnson to sign off on
   the project anyway. Johnson refused because that would have meant making
   a false representation to the Navy. Raytheon nevertheless told the Navy that
   there was no issue.
          The second problem involved a faulty computer initialization or
   “booting” process caused by outdated software that would make radar
   programs crash. Johnson recommended using updated software to fix the
   problem, but no software upgrade occurred. Later, Johnson was told that
   Raytheon had informed the Navy that the problem was fixed, but Johnson
   knew this was false. He reported this issue to supervisors Mike Leddy and
   Steve Blazo, as well as to a test conductor named Rick Scoggins, among
   others. Sometime in 2013 or 2014, a member of the Raytheon security
   department, Mack Slater, twice told Johnson to stop talking to the Navy
   about problems.
          The third problem involved equipment called oscilloscopes.
   According to Johnson, he discovered that the equipment was damaged and
   that Raytheon was hiding it from the Navy. He reported the issue to a
   manager and his supervisor and told them that hiding the status of the
   equipment was a violation of Raytheon’s contract with the Navy.
          The fourth problem involved the creation of a configuration guide for
   laptops. Johnson and other software engineers wrote a guide for use by the
   Navy and submitted it to Raytheon for approval. The guide was approved,
   but the final version did not include items that the software engineers deemed
   essential. Johnson told supervisor Rocky Carpenter about this problem.
   Johnson said that omission of certain information would lead to testing
   problems, but Raytheon told the Navy that the guide was approved by the
   engineers anyway.

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          According to Johnson, after he reported these concerns to managers
   and supervisors, Raytheon began to subject him to increased monitoring and
   allegedly fabricated a record of misconduct against him. According to
   Raytheon, computer auditing that it conducts as part of its contract with the
   Navy showed Johnson was taking unauthorized actions. Eventually, in
   January 2015, Raytheon’s AST Program Security Officer, Lynne Sharp,
   reported Johnson to the Navy for suspected security violations. Raytheon
   claims the reporting was required by its Navy contract. Johnson claims this
   was an act of retaliation.
          The Navy and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) began
   an investigation. They conducted forensic audits and eventually interviewed
   Johnson. Johnson states he did not initially realize that he was the target of
   an investigation, but instead believed that the Navy was investigating his
   concerns about Raytheon. Partway through the investigation, the Navy
   suspended Johnson’s AST Program access on an interim basis after a co-
   worker told him he was the target. At the end of the investigation, in July
   2015, the Navy found that Johnson had committed security violations and
   subsequently permanently revoked his access to the AST Program.
   Specifically, the Navy found that Johnson (1) downloaded and used an
   unauthorized software program called Wireshark (referred to as a “sniffer”
   or “analysis software”) on a protected network and ran network scans more
   than 100 times, and (2) used a computer at Raytheon that was designated for
   Boeing work (not Navy work) without permission, and, in doing so, accessed
   information without authorization. The Navy instructed Sharp to inform the
   Department of Defense Central Adjudication Facility (DOD CAF)—the
   agency that manages security clearances relevant to this case—of the Navy’s
   finding that Johnson committed security violations, and she states she did so.
   According to the NCIS, in September 2015, the DOD CAF revoked
   Johnson’s top-secret security clearance.

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          After the Navy completed its investigation, Raytheon conducted its
   own disciplinary investigation based on the Navy’s findings and terminated
   Johnson’s employment. Sarah Humphrey, a member of Raytheon’s Human
   Resources (HR) department, conducted the investigation, interviewed other
   employees, and provided a report to HR and Security Vice President Gary
   LaMonte. LaMonte made the final decision to terminate Johnson in October
   2015. Johnson claims he was not provided with the findings of the
   investigations, told of the violations, or allowed to respond to the findings
   prior to being fired. While Johnson was interviewed as part of both
   investigations, he states that he was merely asked hypothetical questions and
   not given a chance to respond to anything specific. At the time of his
   termination, Johnson says he was qualified to work on other projects at
   Raytheon that did not require a security clearance but was fired after thirty
   years with the company instead of being transferred to another project.
                             B. Procedural History
          Johnson filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
   Northern District of Texas, which included both a qui tam action on behalf of
   the United States and a retaliation claim on his own behalf, both pursuant to
   the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33. The United States declined to
   intervene and moved to dismiss the qui tam claims. The district court granted
   the United States’ motion and granted Johnson leave to amend his complaint
   to replead his retaliation claim. In his second amended complaint, Johnson
   claimed that he engaged in protected activity when he identified and spoke
   out about concealing issues from the Navy, and Raytheon retaliated against
   him in four different ways: (1) Raytheon, through Slater, instructed him not
   to report problems to the Navy; (2) Raytheon monitored him; (3) Raytheon
   made false accusations about him to the Navy; and (4) Raytheon fired him.

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          During the discovery process, the parties had difficulty with requests
   for production that involved allegedly classified documents or documents
   stored in classified computer systems that required Navy review. Discovery
   issues eventually resulted in an agreed-to order that established a process for
   Raytheon to file a motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment:

      • Raytheon would first file a “summary of the basis” for its motion to
        enable the parties to narrow the scope of discovery to what was needed
        to support and oppose the motion.
      • Next, the parties would conduct discovery for approximately two
        months.
      • Two weeks after discovery was completed, Raytheon would file its
        motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment.
      • Then, Johnson would have the choice of either responding to the
        motion or filing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) declaration
        identifying what additional discovery was needed to respond.
      • Finally, after any Rule 56(d) issue was resolved, Johnson would
        respond to the motion and Raytheon would reply.
          Raytheon timely submitted its summary, and then, after conducting
   discovery, timely filed a combined motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
   Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and motion for summary judgment under Federal
   Rule of Civil Procedure 56, arguing, in relevant part, that the district court
   lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over most of Johnson’s claims pursuant to
   Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), and its progeny, and, on
   the merits, the only act of alleged retaliation that the district court had
   subject-matter jurisdiction to consider—instructing Johnson not to report
   problems to the Navy—was not a materially adverse employment action. In
   response, Johnson filed a Rule 56(d) declaration requesting additional
   discovery. The district court denied Johnson’s request for additional
   discovery and ordered Johnson to respond to Raytheon’s motion, but allowed
   Johnson to file a supplemental Rule 56(d) declaration with his summary

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   judgment opposition. Johnson filed an opposition, with exhibits. With his
   opposition brief, Johnson also renewed his initial Rule 56(d) declaration and
   made a supplemental declaration. Raytheon filed a reply. After oral
   argument, the district court granted Raytheon’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion and
   dismissed Johnson’s retaliation claim in part for lack of subject-matter
   jurisdiction and granted summary judgment in part on the merits in favor of
   Raytheon. The district court also denied Johnson’s renewed Rule 56(d)
   request for additional discovery. Johnson timely appealed.
                                II. LEGAL STANDARDS
          The district court’s grant of Raytheon’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
   dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and its Rule 56 motion for
   summary judgment are both reviewed de novo, applying the same standards
   as the district court. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.
   2001); Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017).
          Subject-matter jurisdiction may be assessed on: “(1) the complaint
   alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the
   record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the
   court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. “The
   burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting
   jurisdiction.” Id. Under the second basis, which is applicable here, “our
   review is limited to determining whether the district court’s application of
   the law is correct and, if the decision was based on undisputed facts, whether
   those facts are indeed undisputed.” Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74
   F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996) (first citing Ynclan v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 943
   F.2d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir.1991); and then citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d
   404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)).
          Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is
   no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

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   judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine
   if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
   nonmoving party.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing
   Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2018)). “On a motion for
   summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable
   to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.”
   Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th Cir. 2009).
          The denial of a Rule 56(d) request is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
   Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016). The standard
   for abuse of discretion is generally “whether the evidence requested would
   affect the outcome of a summary judgment motion.” Id. at 423. “This court
   has found an abuse of discretion where it can identify a specific piece of
   evidence that would likely create a material fact issue.” Id. “In contrast, this
   court has found no abuse of discretion where the party filing the Rule 56(d)
   motion has failed to identify sufficiently specific or material evidence to affect
   a summary judgment ruling.” Id.
                                    III. ANALYSIS
          The False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, is the
   government’s primary litigation tool for the recovery of losses sustained as
   the result of fraud against the government. United States ex rel. Steury v.
   Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing United States
   ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2008)); see also 5B
   John Bourdeau, et al., Federal Procedure, Lawyers
   Edition § 10:49, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2023). The FCA
   provides for civil penalties and multiple damages for knowingly presenting
   false or fraudulent claims to the government, and authorizes civil actions to
   remedy such fraud, which may be brought by the Attorney General or by
   private individuals in the government’s name. 5B Bourdeau, et al.,

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   supra § 10:49. To protect internal “whistleblowers,” the FCA also includes
   an anti-retaliation provision:
           Any employee, contractor, or agent shall be entitled to all relief
           necessary to make that employee, contractor, or agent whole,
           if that employee, contractor, or agent is discharged, demoted,
           suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner
           discriminated against in the terms and conditions of
           employment because of lawful acts done by the employee,
           contractor, agent or associated others in furtherance of an
           action under this section or other efforts to stop 1 or more
           violations of this subchapter.
   31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1). “The purpose of the False Claims Act, of course, is
   to discourage fraud against the government, and the whistleblower provision
   is intended to encourage those with knowledge of fraud to come forward.”
   Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994).
   Relief available to whistleblowers who incurred retaliation includes
   reinstatement, double back pay with interest, and special damages, including
   costs and attorneys’ fees. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2).
           FCA retaliation claims involving circumstantial evidence are analyzed
   using the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 1 See, e.g.,
   Musser v. Paul Quinn Coll., 944 F.3d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 2019); Diaz v. Kaplan
   Higher Educ., L.L.C., 820 F.3d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 2016); see also McDonnell
   Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973) (establishing this
           _____________________
           1
             Johnson also briefly argues that he presented direct evidence of retaliation, which
   is evaluated outside of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Cf. Septimus v. Univ. of Hous.,
   399 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating in the Title VII context that McDonnell Douglas
   does not apply to cases which there is direct evidence of retaliation). “Direct evidence is
   evidence which, if believed, proves the fact without inference or presumption.” Brown v.
   E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Burns v. Gadsden State
   Cmty. Coll., 908 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1990)). That is not the case with any of the evidence
   offered by Johnson. Accordingly, we apply the McDonnell Douglas framework.

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   framework). “Under this framework, the employee must first establish a
   prima facie case of retaliation by showing: (1) that he engaged in protected
   activity; (2) that the employer knew about the protected activity; and (3)
   retaliation because of the protected activity.” Musser, 944 F.3d at 561. “If the
   employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
   state a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its decision.” Musser, 944 F.3d
   at 561 (quoting Garcia v. Pro. Cont. Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir.
   2019)). “‘This burden is one of production, not persuasion,’ and it involves
   no credibility assessment.” Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
   Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)). “After the employer articulates a legitimate
   reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the
   employer’s reason is actually a pretext for retaliation.” Id. (quotation
   omitted). To prevail on an FCA retaliation claim, the plaintiff must
   ultimately prove at trial that the retaliatory motive was a but-for cause of the
   adverse employment action. Id.
          Johnson brings four claims of retaliation: (1) a retaliation claim based
   on Slater advising him not to report problems to the Navy; (2) a retaliation
   claim based on Raytheon monitoring him; (3) a retaliation claim based on
   Raytheon reporting false accusations of security violations to the Navy; and
   (4) a retaliation claim based on Raytheon firing him. However, before we
   examine the merits of these claims, we must first assure ourselves of our
   jurisdiction. See Cleartrac, L.L.C. v. Lanrick Contractors, L.L.C., 53 F.4th
   361, 364 (5th Cir. 2022).
                   A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Under Egan
          Jurisdiction over three of Johnson’s four FCA retaliation claims is
   complicated by the presence of sensitive national security issues. Raytheon’s
   proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for monitoring Johnson (claim
   two), reporting his conduct to the Navy (claim three), and ultimately firing

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   him (claim four)—the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework—is
   that the Navy found Johnson had committed several serious security
   violations, which caused the Navy to revoke his access to the AST Program
   and the DOD CAF to revoke his top-secret security clearance. Raytheon
   argues that, even assuming arguendo that Johnson has made out a prima facie
   case of retaliation as to these three claims, assessment of these claims is
   largely barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of the Navy v.
   Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), and its progeny because determining whether
   Raytheon’s proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reason is pretextual would
   necessarily require scrutinizing the DOD CAF’s decision to revoke
   Johnson’s security clearance, which credited the Navy’s finding that Johnson
   committed security violations. 2 The district court agreed with Raytheon,
   ruling that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under Egan to determine
   whether Raytheon’s proffered reasons for monitoring, reporting, and
   terminating Johnson were pretextual. We agree as well. 3
           In Egan, the Supreme Court held that the Merit System Protection
   Board (MSPB) lacked authority “to review the substance of an underlying
   decision to deny or revoke a security clearance in the course of reviewing an
   adverse action” taken against a federal employee. 484 U.S. at 520. The Court
           _____________________
           2
              Raytheon does not offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Johnson’s
   remaining claim of retaliation—that Raytheon retaliated against him when Slater advised
   him to not raise concerns with the Navy (claim one)—and accordingly does not argue that
   Egan bars review of this claim. Instead, Raytheon argues Johnson has not made out a prima
   facie case of retaliation on this claim, an argument we address below. As to Egan, though,
   we agree it is not implicated by this claim.
           3
              Raytheon also argues that, as a government contractor, it is absolutely immune
   from claims regarding its monitoring and reporting under a purported doctrine of immunity
   that protects government contractors from claims based on their reporting of security
   issues to their government clients. The district court did not address Raytheon’s “absolute
   immunity” claim, resolving the case in light of Egan instead. Because we do the same, we
   also decline to reach Raytheon’s claim of absolute immunity.

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   reasoned that the presumption in favor of review “runs aground when it
   encounters concerns of national security, as in this case, where the grant of
   security clearance to a particular employee, a sensitive and inherently
   discretionary judgment call, is committed by law to the appropriate agency of
   the Executive Branch.” Id. at 527. Egan did not ultimately ground its holding
   in the text of the civil service law or any other statute, but instead held that it
   “flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the
   President and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant.” Id.
   Egan also explained that security clearance decisions were not subject to
   review because of their unusually “predictive” nature in assessing a person’s
   potential to compromise sensitive information and the decisions’ grounding
   in specialized expertise that could not be reasonably reviewed by non-experts.
   Id. at 528–29. Courts, accordingly, should be “reluctant to intrude upon the
   authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.” Id. at 530.
          Courts have not narrowly read Egan as merely applying to MSPB
   agency review of a security clearance revocation decision, but instead as
   embodying a broader principle that judicial review is not permitted over
   decisions that implicate the Executive’s Article II powers “to classify and
   control access to information bearing on national security and to determine
   whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy.” Id. at 527. We first
   adopted this understanding of Egan in Perez v. F.B.I., 71 F.3d 513, 514–15 (5th
   Cir. 1995). Perez concerned a Title VII retaliation claim brought by a former
   FBI employee, who claimed that the FBI revoked his security clearance and
   fired him (as his job required a security clearance) because he had joined a
   class action lawsuit against the FBI alleging discrimination against Hispanic
   employees. Id. at 514. Under the applicable McDonnell Douglas framework,
   the FBI’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for revoking the employee’s
   security clearance and subsequently firing him were that he had “fabricated
   official reports” and “disclosed classified information to unauthorized

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   representatives of the Cuban Government.” Id. We held that we lacked
   subject-matter jurisdiction under Egan to question these proffered reasons:
   “Because the court would have to examine the legitimacy and the possibly
   pretextual nature of the FBI’s proffered reasons for revoking the employee’s
   security clearance [under the McDonnell Douglas framework], any Title VII
   challenge to the revocation would of necessity require some judicial scrutiny
   of the merits of the revocation decision.” Id. at 514. “As the Supreme Court
   and several circuit courts have held that such scrutiny is an impermissible
   intrusion by the Judicial Branch into the authority of the Executive Branch
   over matters of national security, neither we nor the district court have
   jurisdiction to consider those matters.” Id. at 514–15. Raytheon argues that,
   because the present FCA case also requires use of the McDonnell Douglas
   framework, the same jurisdictional concerns raised in Perez are implicated
   when considering whether Raytheon’s proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory
   reasons are pretextual.
           However, before we turn to Johnson’s pretext arguments, we must
   address two preliminary arguments he raises as to the applicability of Egan
   and Perez. The first argument is whether, as a factual matter, Johnson’s top-
   secret security clearance was revoked, which the parties have argued over in
   briefing. Egan was specially concerned with reviewing the merits of a security
   clearance decision. 484 U.S. at 527–29. If Johnson’s security clearance was
   not revoked, the question, then, is whether we may extend Egan to the
   revocation of Johnson’s AST Program access. 4 However, because the

           _____________________
           4
            Several circuits, including our own, have refused to extend Egan beyond security
   clearances to certain other government decisions. See, e.g., Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881, 885–
   86 (5th Cir. 2013); Hale v. Johnson, 845 F.3d 224, 229–31 (6th Cir. 2016); Kukinski v.
   Mnuchin, 829 F. App’x 78, 84–86 (6th Cir. 2020) (unpublished); Rattigan v. Holder, 689
   F.3d 764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2012). However, the D.C. and Federal Circuits have extended

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   undisputed facts show the DOD CAF revoked Johnson’s top-secret security
   clearance based on the Navy’s findings of security violations, we need not
   consider extending Egan. See Barrera-Montenegro, 74 F.3d at 659 (stating we
   must determine whether the undisputed facts forming the basis of a Rule
   12(b)(1) dismissal are indeed undisputed). Raytheon has provided a report by
   the NCIS as well as affidavits by Raytheon personnel Sharp and LaMonte
   stating that the DOD CAF revoked Johnson’s top-secret security clearance
   in September 2015 after Sharp informed the DOD CAF of the Navy’s
   findings. 5 In response, the only evidence Johnson points to is his affidavit
   stating he has obtained a security clearance at his new job, without stating
   whether it was top-secret or a lower level of clearance. The fact that Johnson
   has obtained a new unspecified security clearance does not dispute the fact
   that his top-secret security clearance was previously revoked. Johnson’s
   evidence fails to raise a dispute that his top-secret security clearance was
   revoked, and the mere statements to the contrary in his briefing, unsupported
   by the record, are insufficient to create a dispute of fact.
           The second preliminary argument is that Raytheon is a private
   contractor, not a government actor, which raises the legal question of the
   extent to which Egan may apply in the private-employment context. The
   typical case running afoul of Egan’s jurisdictional concern is one against the
   government agency that made the security clearance decision. 6 However, the
           _____________________
   Egan to certain decisions analogous to a security clearance. Foote v. Moniz, 751 F.3d 656,
   658 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1155–60 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
           5
              Johnson forfeited any argument as to the competency of this evidence by failing
   to brief it on appeal. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021);
   Jackson v. Gautreaux, 3 F.4th 182, 188 n.* (5th Cir. 2021) (stating we cannot consider
   arguments raised for the first time at oral argument).
           6
             Raytheon cites only one circuit case in which a suit against a private contractor
   was found to be barred by Egan, Beattie v. Boeing Co., 43 F.3d 559, 566 (10th Cir. 1994). In
   that case, the Air Force delegated its authority to make security clearance decisions to a

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   Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to consider Egan’s applicability to private
   government contractors in Zeinali v. Raytheon Co., 636 F.3d 544, 550-51 (9th
   Cir. 2011). The court held that, while “private employers can rarely avail
   themselves of Egan’s jurisdictional bar” because “[i]n employment
   discrimination suits against private employers, courts can generally avoid
   examining the merits of the government’s security clearance decision,” Egan
   nonetheless bars claims against private employers that “question the
   [government agency’s] motivation behind the decision to deny [the
   plaintiff’s] security clearance.” Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting
   Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2008)). We find this reasoning
   persuasive. If a plaintiff’s arguments question the merits of a government
   agency’s security clearance decision, Egan and Perez’s concern over a court
   second-guessing the Executive Branch’s exclusive discretion to control
   information bearing on national security is just as relevant in a case against a
   private employer as against the government itself. We conclude, therefore,
   that the mere fact Raytheon is a private contractor does not make Egan’s
   jurisdictional bar inapplicable; the key issue is whether the case requires the
   court to question the merits of, or motivation behind, the government’s
   security clearance decision or whether the court may avoid such an inquiry
   by deciding only questions that do not necessarily require consideration of
   the merits of the security clearance decision. See id.; Dubuque v. Boeing Co.,
   917 F.3d 666, 667 (8th Cir. 2019) (applying Zeinali in the private-employment
   context); cf. Egan, 484 U.S. at 526 (recognizing the MSPB could review
   certain related issues that did not implicate its concerns, such as “review of

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   private contractor, and the court found “no compelling reason to treat the security
   clearance decision by [the private contractor] differently than the similar decision made by
   the Air Force,” as “both decisions represent[ed] the exercise of authority delegated by the
   Executive Branch.” Id. The present case does not exactly fit that mold.

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   the fact of denial, of the position’s requirement of security clearance, and of
   the satisfactory provision of the requisite procedural protections”).
          Turning, then, to Johnson’s pretext arguments, under Perez, we are
   bound to conclude that any analysis of the “possibly pretextual nature of
   [Raytheon]’s proffered reasons” for monitoring, reporting, and ultimately
   firing Johnson under the McDonnell Douglas framework “would of necessity
   require some judicial scrutiny of the merits of the [DOD CAF’s security
   clearance] revocation decision.” See 71 F.3d at 514. Raytheon’s stated reason
   for firing Johnson is the Navy’s determination that Johnson committed
   several serious security violations. Johnson argues this reason is pretextual
   because he has evidence that he did not commit any security violations.
   There is no way to assess whether Raytheon’s reason was pretextual without
   treading on the DOD CAF’s security clearance decision, which credited the
   Navy’s investigation and finding that Johnson did commit security violations.
   The same is true for Raytheon’s decisions to monitor him and report his
   suspected security violations to the Navy, even though these actions
   occurred before the Navy’s investigation. “The reasons why a security
   investigation is initiated may very well be the same reasons why the final
   security clearance decision is made.” Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 148–49
   (4th Cir. 1996) (holding the instigation of an investigation of a security
   clearance was covered by Egan because the investigation was closely tied to
   the security clearance decision). Johnson’s claims regarding the monitoring
   and reporting by Raytheon are that they were based on false accusations of
   security violations. But the DOD CAF accepted the Navy’s finding that these
   violations actually occurred, and there is no way to assess Raytheon’s reason
   for monitoring and reporting Johnson without second-guessing that
   determination. See Wilson v. Dep’t of the Navy, 843 F.3d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir.
   2016) (declining to examine plaintiff’s argument that the “initiation of
   revocation” of a security clearance was “based on ‘false’ complaints and

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   accusations” because the security investigation—which could not be second-
   guessed under Egan—“specifically found them reliable”); Hill v. White, 321
   F.3d 1334, 1335–36 (11th Cir. 2003) (“To review the initial stages of a
   security clearance determination is to review the basis of the determination
   itself regardless of how the issue is characterized”).
          Johnson maintains that his pretext arguments do not require us to
   consider the merits of the DOD CAF’s security clearance decision, relying
   primarily on two cases, but each is distinguishable from his case. Johnson first
   relies on the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764 (D.C.
   Cir. 2012). In Rattigan, the plaintiff was an FBI employee who alleged he was
   retaliated against when other employees reported false security concerns
   about him that resulted in an investigation. Id. at 764. Eventually, the security
   investigation concluded that the allegations “lacked corroboration and were
   unfounded,” and the plaintiff retained his security clearance. Id. at 766. The
   plaintiff sued, arguing the decision to report false security concerns
   amounted to retaliation under Title VII. Id. at 766. The D.C. Circuit held that
   Egan did not apply because (1) the focus of the pretextual review under the
   McDonnell Douglas framework was on “decisions by other FBI employees
   who merely report security concerns,” not “security clearance-related
   decisions made by trained Security Division personnel,” and (2) the claim
   was “based on knowingly false reporting.” Id. at 768, 770.
          Urging us to adopt and apply the reasoning of Rattigan, Johnson
   argues Egan does not bar his claims because he is arguing that Raytheon
   monitored him under false pretenses; reported false security violations to the
   Navy; and after the Navy concluded its investigation, chose to fire Johnson,
   knowing the Navy’s findings were based on false information. However, we
   need not decide whether to adopt Rattigan’s reasoning because Johnson’s
   case falls outside of it. In Rattigan, judicial review was unlikely to interfere
   with national security because the security investigation concluded that the

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   allegations were unfounded. In Johnson’s case, of course, the Navy’s
   investigation, accepted by the DOD CAF, found that Johnson had committed
   the alleged security violations. Under the circumstances in this case, Egan
   precludes review of the false reporting claims because their resolution would
   necessarily implicate the merits of the DOD CAF’s security clearance
   revocation. See Bland v. Johnson, 637 F. App’x 2, 2–3 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
   (unpublished), aff’g for the reasons stated in 66 F. Supp. 3d 69, 74–75 (D.D.C.
   2014) (“In . . . contrast to Rattigan, in which the ultimate security decision
   was favorable to the plaintiff, see 689 F.3d at 766, here, DHS OSCO
   suspended Mr. Bland’s clearance.”).
          Johnson also cites to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Zeinali. In that
   case, the plaintiff, who was of Iranian descent, claimed that he was
   discriminated against when he was fired by his employer, a private
   contractor, after the government denied him a security clearance, while
   similarly situated non-Iranian employees were retained. 636 F.3d at 546–47.
   The Ninth Circuit held Egan did not deprive the court of jurisdiction because
   the plaintiff did not argue the government “improperly denied his
   application for a security clearance,” but instead “contend[ed] that [his
   employer’s] security clearance requirement was not a bona fide job
   requirement, and that [his employer] used the government’s security
   clearance decision as a pretext for terminating [him] in a discriminatory
   fashion.” Id. at 551–52. To support his claim, the plaintiff introduced
   evidence that other similarly situated employees who were not of Iranian
   descent had been retained even though they also lacked security clearances.
   Id. at 552–54.
          Relying on Zeinali, Johnson argues Egan does not bar this court from
   considering whether transfer to a non-sensitive position was feasible. Again,
   we need not decide whether to adopt the distinction made in Zeinali because
   Johnson’s case does not fit it. Unlike in Zeinali, Johnson vehemently disputes

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   the merits of the Navy’s findings, which the DOD CAF credited in revoking
   his security clearance. While he claims to only be challenging Raytheon’s
   actions, and not directly challenging the Navy’s actions, his position is
   nonetheless that the Navy, and in turn the DOD CAF, was wrong. Moreover,
   Johnson has introduced no evidence that similarly situated employees were
   treated differently, i.e., that another employee was found by the Navy to have
   committed security violations warranting a revocation of his security
   clearance but was retained by Raytheon.
          In sum, Johnson argues we should have jurisdiction to examine issues
   that do not call into question his security clearance decision, such as whether
   transfer to a non-sensitive position was feasible and whether a private party
   made false statements to the government. In a case that presented different
   facts, his position could have merit. But his is not that case. There is no
   dispute that Johnson’s top-secret security clearance was revoked; he
   introduced no evidence concerning whether transfer to a non-sensitive
   position was feasible; and, on these facts, there is no way to assess whether
   Raytheon’s statements were false without necessarily assessing whether the
   DOD CAF’s decision, which credited the Navy’s findings, was wrong.
   Johnson simply cannot get around the reality that to show that Raytheon fired
   him even though it knew the Navy’s findings were wrong would require
   assessing the validity of the DOD CAF’s decision, which Egan and Perez
   forbid. Accordingly, we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to consider
   Johnson’s claims that Raytheon retaliated against him by monitoring him,
   making false accusations about him to the Navy, and firing him.
                    B. Prima Facie Case of FCA Retaliation
          Johnson’s remaining FCA retaliation claim—that Raytheon retaliated
   against him when Slater told him to not share his concerns with the Navy—
   is not barred by Egan, and we therefore proceed to the merits of this claim.

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   Under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Johnson “must
   first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: (1) that he engaged
   in protected activity; (2) that the employer knew about the protected activity;
   and (3) retaliation because of the protected activity.” Musser, 944 F.3d at 561;
   see also Diaz, 820 F.3d at 176 (describing elements of the prima facie case
   somewhat differently). Raytheon did not dispute that Johnson engaged in
   protected activity; however, it argued that Johnson’s purported act of
   retaliation—Slater advising Johnson to not share his concerns with the
   Navy—is not a materially adverse employment action that amounts to
   retaliation. The district court agreed. 7 We agree as well.
           “[A] retaliatory act must be ‘materially adverse, which . . . means it
   well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from’ engaging in protected
   activity.” United States ex rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 816 F.3d 315,
   326 (5th Cir. 2016) (second alteration in original) (quoting Halliburton, Inc.
   v. Admin. Review Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir.2014)). The FCA includes a
   non-exhaustive list of examples of actionable retaliation, including
   “discharge[ ], demot[ion], suspen[sion], threat[s, and] harass[ment].” Id.
   (alterations in original) (quoting § 3130(h)(1)).
           Under certain circumstances, a request to cease protected conduct
   may be a materially adverse action. See, e.g., Fallon v. Potter, 277 F. App’x
   422, 428 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). For example, Johnson cites Fallon,
   277 F. App’x at 428, in which we held in the Title VII context that an issue
   of material fact precluded summary judgment as to whether multiple direct
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           7
             Although the district court held Johnson’s claims for Raytheon monitoring him,
   reporting his conduct to the Navy, and ultimately firing him were barred by Egan, it held in
   the alternative that Johnson had not presented a prima facie case of retaliation as to these
   three actions and that Johnson could not show Raytheon’s reasons for monitoring and
   reporting him were pretextual. Because we hold these claims are barred by Egan, we need
   not address these alternative holdings.

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   statements from a supervisor to an employee to not file a discrimination
   complaint could have dissuaded a reasonable employee from pursuing the
   claim, and would therefore have constituted retaliation. In that case, the
   employee’s direct supervisor told the employee: (1) “You just keep filing
   those EEO complaints and I promise you one thing—there won’t be a person
   in this post office to testify against me”; (2) “You need to call her [an EEOC
   officer] and talk to her so you can drop this EEO”; (3) “You need to tell her
   you don’t need redress . . . cause you’re canceling the EEO complaint;” and
   “(4) You’ll never have anyone in this post office stand up for you. If you
   continue to file these charges, I’ll show you what you’re up against.” Id. On
   the other hand, in Hernandez v. Johnson, 514 F. App’x 492, 498–99 (5th Cir.
   2013) (unpublished)—relied on by Raytheon—we distinguished Fallon,
   affirming the grant of summary judgment for an employer on a Title VII
   retaliation claim. There, the employee’s first-level supervisor called the
   employee at home and stated “she felt threatened by [the employee] telling
   her about his prior EEO activity.” Id. at 495. We concluded this “single
   statement that was not even a direct threat was not a materially adverse
   employment action.” Id. at 499. While these cases are unpublished and
   nonbinding, they are persuasive. See Light-Age, Inc. v. Ashcroft-Smith, 922
   F.3d 320, 322 n.1 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (noting our unpublished
   opinions issued after January 1, 1996, are “persuasive authority”).
          Here, Raytheon’s conduct is more similar to that in Hernandez.
   Johnson points to two instances of a single Raytheon employee advising him
   not to report his concerns to the Navy. These statements did not contain
   threats, and Slater—the one who made these statements—was not Johnson’s
   supervisor. Such conduct would not have “dissuaded a reasonable worker
   from” reporting to the Navy. See Bias, 816 F.3d at 326 (quoting Halliburton,
   771 F.3d at 259). Because Johnson failed to make out a prima facie case of
   retaliation as a matter of law, summary judgment was appropriate.

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                 C. Rule 56(d) Request for Additional Discovery
          Finally, Johnson argues that the district court abused its discretion in
   denying his Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery. Rule 56(d) provides:
          If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for
          specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its
          opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or
          deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to
          take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.
          According to Johnson’s Rule 56(d) declaration, his aim in seeking
   additional discovery was largely to gather evidence that Raytheon knew that
   he had not violated any security policies, both when it reported him to the
   Navy and when it terminated him, as well as to gather evidence to dispute
   that the Navy’s investigation was independent and to prove that its
   conclusions were wrong. As explained, Johnson’s arguments that Raytheon
   knew he had not violated security policies and that the Navy’s investigation
   was based on false reports is barred by Egan, and the district court did not
   abuse its discretion in denying related discovery because the evidence
   requested would not have affected the court’s ruling on the motion as a
   matter of law. See Smith, 827 F.3d at 423. As to Johnson’s sole claim that
   survives Egan—that Raytheon retaliated against him in advising him not to
   report his concerns to the Navy—Johnson has not cited to any specific facts
   that he needed and was prevented from discovering that would create a
   genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the action was materially
   adverse. See id. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
   Johnson’s Rule 56(d) request.
                                 IV. CONCLUSION
          The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          This case was argued in August of 2022. The parties will benefit
   greatly from closure. So, I confine my dissent to disagreement with the
   extension of Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) to bar
   Article III judicial review from this private-sector, whistleblower
   employment-termination dispute. See Zeinali v. Raytheon Co., 636 F.3d 544,
   549-52 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “no case . . . has ever adopted a
   bright-line rule as broad as the one suggested by Raytheon” because
   “Raytheon’s approach would essentially immunize government contractors
   from any liability in cases involving employees whose security clearances are
   revoked or denied”). In Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988), the
   Supreme Court clarified that Congress must speak clearly when it intends to
   bar judicial review altogether. Indeed, scholarship that is critical of courts’
   overexpansive interpretation of Egan points out that, “[a]s of 2019, a
   staggering 2.5% of the entire civilian labor force—well over 4 million
   people—have been adjudicated eligible to hold a clearance, of which over
   2.94 million had access to classified information.” Max Jesse Goldberg,
   Security-Clearance Decisions and Constitutional Rights, 132 Yale L.J.F. 55,
   70 (2022). Because I would not extend Egan’s narrow statutory bar to
   insulate from judicial review adverse actions taken by government
   contractors—here, an allegedly pretextual and retaliatory action against a
   whistleblower—I respectfully dissent.

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