Court Opinion

ID: 9405514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 19:00:37.722606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.589178
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          JUN 28 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CLARISA MANLAPIG                                No. 22-1152
LICO; BUENAVENTURA LAGADAN                      Agency Nos.
LICO, Jr.,                                      A205-326-711
                                                A205-326-712
             Petitioners,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted June 5, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: MILLER and KOH, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY, District Judge.***

      Clarisa Manlapig Lico (“Ms. Lico”) and Buenaventura L. Lico, Jr. (“Mr.

Lico”), natives and citizens of the Philippines, petition for review of the Board

of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of their appeal of the Immigration

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
              The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for
the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying Ms. Lico’s application for withholding of removal

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Where, as here, the BIA summarily adopts the IJ’s

decision without opinion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), we review the IJ’s

decision as if it were the BIA’s decision.” Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067,

1072 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ren v. Holder,

648 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011)). We review questions of law de novo and

factual findings for substantial evidence. Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070,

1076 (9th Cir. 2020). “Under this standard, we must uphold the agency

determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Duran-

Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). We deny the petition.

      1. Because Mr. Lico did not file an independent application for either

statutory withholding of removal or CAT relief and no derivative status exists

for such relief, Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005), Mr. Lico

is not eligible for relief. Thus, our review is limited to Ms. Lico’s claims.

      2. Ms. Lico did not waive her claims. Although Ms. Lico’s briefing

could have been more thorough, she sufficiently identified the agency rulings at

issue and the facts from the record that she believes support her position.

Compare with Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992)

(“Because Acosta-Huerta made no argument with respect to the remaining

issues . . . they are deemed abandoned.”). Therefore, we review her petition on

the merits.

                                         2                                      22-1152
      3. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Ms. Lico

failed to establish a cognizable social group or a nexus to that group. Ms. Lico

insists that she was targeted because of her social status, i.e., the fact that her

husband worked abroad and she was considered wealthy in the Philippines. But

Ms. Lico’s social group is not cognizable because wealth is not an immutable

characteristic “because it is not fundamental to an individual’s identity” and can

change over time. Macedo Templos v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 877, 882–83 (9th

Cir. 2021). And, even recognizing that the association need only be “a reason”

for the harm, see Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017),

the two incidents were perpetrated by different individuals, who targeted

everyone.

      Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that while

Ms. Lico established a genuine subjective fear of future persecution, it is not

objectively reasonable. She makes no claim that a “pattern or practice” of such

persecution exists, see Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060–61 (9th Cir.

2009), and her generalized fear of violent crime and corruption is insufficient to

meet her burden of showing “credible, direct, and specific evidence” that she

will be persecuted upon her return to the Philippines, Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364

F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fisher v. I.N.S., 79 F.3d 955, 960 (9th

Cir. 1996)); see also Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft

or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”).

                                          3                                     22-1152
The incidents at issue occurred more than twenty years ago, Ms. Lico returned

to the Philippines in the interim without incident, and there is no indication

these men are still looking for her.

      Accordingly, Ms. Lico failed to show eligibility for withholding of

removal.

      4. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Ms. Lico

failed to establish that it is more likely than not that she would be tortured if

removed. The prior robbery incidents do not qualify as torture, see Lopez v.

Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Torture is defined as an

extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment that is specifically intended to

inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)), and the record shows that Ms. Lico and her husband returned to the

Philippines in 2001 without incident. While the 2018 Human Rights Report

indicates that torture occurs in the Philippines—for example, against suspected

drug traffickers—Ms. Lico has presented no evidence that she is more likely

than not to find herself in such a position. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600

F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (explaining that eligibility for

CAT relief requires more than “generalized evidence of violence and crime”

that was “not particular to [p]etitioners”). Thus, the record does not compel a

contrary finding to that made by the IJ.

                                           4                                   22-1152
      PETITION DENIED.1

1
 The temporary stay of removal remains in effect until the issuance of the
mandate. (See Dkt. 2.)

                                       5                                 22-1152