Court Opinion

ID: 9954177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 19:03:16.847889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:52.428911
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 P. v. Avila-Guzman CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F086307
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 18CR-03529B)
                    v.

 ANGEL AVILA-GUZMAN,                                                                      OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Carol K.
Ash, Judge.
         Kyle Gee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Amanda D.
Cary, and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

         * Before Levy, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
       This appeal concerns only custody credits and fines following a resentencing
hearing after a prior appeal. Angel Avila-Guzman stands principally convicted of lying-
in-wait special circumstance murder and was sentenced to serve life without parole.
       On appeal, Avila-Guzman contends the abstract of judgment improperly reflects
custody credits, a $5,000 parole revocation fine is impermissible, and other fines and fees
are not supported by an ability to pay. The People concede both the credits and the
parole revocation fine are in error, but dispute the remaining fines and fees. We accept
the concessions but grant no relief from the other fines and fees.
                                    BACKGROUND1
       At the original sentencing hearing, Avila-Guzman was awarded 784 actual days of
custody credit. He was “also ordered to pay an $80 court security fee[ and] a $60
criminal conviction fee ….”2 When the issue of ability to pay arose, because Avila-
Guzman alleged an inability to pay and work due to his classification in prison, the court
reduced its “normal[]” $10,000 restitution fine to $5,000. The court noted it would
“reserve jurisdiction over the issue so [it could] revisit it to show that [Avila-Guzman]
doesn’t have financial ability” to pay.
       In the prior appeal, we directed the trial court to “conduct further proceedings,”
i.e., whether to retry a vacated gang-related crime enhancement and then resentence
Avila-Guzman. We specifically noted the “complaints as to certain [] fines and fees
imposed as part of the judgment [were] moot.” (People v. Avila-Guzman (Aug. 23, 2022,
F081473) [nonpub. opn.].)
       At the resentencing hearing now on appeal, the court awarded Avila-Guzman the
same 784 actual days of custody credits. As for fines and fees, Avila-Guzman’s counsel

       1 The facts underlying the crime are irrelevant to this appeal and we omit them
from our summary.
       2 See Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373.

                                             2.
“submit[ted] on the record” relative to “ability to pay ….” The court noted the previous
sentence was pronounced by a different judge, and it “appear[ed]” that judge “considered
the argument and did reduce the fine” from $10,000 to $5,000. Accordingly, the court
“le[ft] it as previously ordered,” including the $80 and $60 fees. The new abstract of
judgment also reflected a $5,000 parole revocation fine that was not otherwise ordered.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Avila-Guzman challenges the custody credits awarded at his resentencing hearing
and the imposed fines and fees. His challenges to the credits and parole revocation fine
are well taken; the challenge to the remaining fines and fees is not.
I. Trial Court Must Recalculate Actual Custody Credits At Resentencing Hearing
       The trial court in this case awarded the same actual custody credits at both
sentencing hearings. This was error.
       “ ‘[W]hen a prison term already in progress is modified as the result of an
appellate sentence remand, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the
modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or
prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed and delivered to prison
custody.’ ” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29.) The court must also
calculate conduct credits for the period before the original sentencing hearing. (Id. at
p. 30.) The agency to which the defendant is committed—in this case the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation—calculates and applies conduct credit for time following
the original sentencing hearing.” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673.)
       The court in this case failed to recalculate actual custody credits. We will direct it
to do so in the disposition.
II. $5,000 Parole Revocation Fine Is Unauthorized
       The $5,000 parole revocation fine was imposed pursuant to Penal Code section
1202.45, subdivision (a), which provides for a fine identical to an imposed restitution fine
if the “sentence includes a period of parole ….” (Emphasis added.) Because the

                                             3.
sentence in this case does not include parole, the fine is unauthorized. We will order it
stricken in the disposition.
III. Fines and Fees and Ability to Pay
       Avila-Guzman argues the $80 and $60 fees must be stricken and the $5,000
restitution fine must be stayed because he has no ability to pay. We disagree.
       “[U]pon proper objection, the court must hold a hearing at which [the] defendant
will have an opportunity to bear his burden of proof on the issue of ability to pay.”
(People v. Cowan (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 32, 49-50, review granted June 17, 2020,
S261952.) In assessing ability to pay, a trial court may appropriately consider future
income. (Id. at p. 48.) Future income includes wages earned in prison. (People v. Kopp
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 96, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)
       Although the trial court did not explicitly grapple with ability to pay,3 it was
Avila-Guzman’s burden to prove an inability to pay. Because future income includes
prison wages, it was incumbent upon him to demonstrate ineligibility to work. The
record is devoid of any proof, aside from his bare statement, he was ineligible to earn
wages in prison. Neither in the trial court nor on appeal does Avila-Guzman cite to any
regulation or documentation establishing an ineligibility to work in prison. We find he
has failed to discharge his burden to prove a present and future inability to pay.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The request for judicial notice filed on January 11, 2024, is denied.
       The Penal Code section 1202.45 fine is stricken. The trial court is directed to
recalculate actual custody credits and forward an amended abstract of judgment reflecting
these changes to the appropriate authority. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

       3 Indeed, it appears the trial court simply imposed the identical fines and fees
imposed by the prior judge.

                                             4.