Court Opinion

ID: 9462395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:40:17.582409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:34.555018
License: Public Domain

WATKINS, Senior District Judge
(dissenting):
Appellant, during the course of a felonious escape, shot and killed a guard, and kidnapped another guard. In November, 1969 he was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, felonious escape and kidnapping. The jury imposed sentences of life imprisonment, two years and ten to fifteen years, respectively, to be served consecutively.
A few days later Appellant wrote to one of his attorneys, thanking him for all he had done, and stating:
I have decided not to appeal my case. The only satisfaction I received from the verdict is the fact that we beat the Solicitor. If the Solicitor had stuck to the bare facts they could have gotten the death penalty ....
About a month later he wrote to his other attorney, and among other things said:
I don’t want to appeal, but I might try a post-conviction if I see fit at a later date.
Appellant did file a first and second “Appeal for Writ of Review in Forma Pauperis” in the State courts, on the second of which a plenary hearing was held. Relief was denied, largely on the ground that Appellant had knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal.
In the habeas corpus case below, Judge Butler held that this “finding is amply supported by the record.” He also made his own finding that Appellant “ ‘deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies.’ Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438, 83 S.Ct. 822, 849, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963).”
The majority opinion in this case relies upon Fay v. Noia, but does not mention the qualification therein:
This is not to say that in every case where a heavier penalty, even the death penalty, is a risk incurred by taking an appeal or otherwise foregoing a procedural right, waiver as we have defined it cannot be found.
372 U.S. 391, 440, 83 S.Ct. 822, 849.
The majority opinion does not discuss or even mention, Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973).1 There the Court said:
Petitioner’s final argument is that harsher sentences on retrial are impermissible because, irrespective of their causes and even conceding that vindictiveness plays no discernible role, they have a “chilling effect” on the convicted defendant’s exercise of his right to challenge his first conviction either by direct appeal or collateral attack. What we have said as to Pearce demonstrates that it provides no foundation for this claim. To the contrary, the Court there intimated no doubt about the constitutional validity of higher sentences in the absence of vindictiveness despite whatever incidental deterrent effect they might have on the right to appeal. . . .
412 U.S. at 29, 93 S.Ct. at 1984 (footnote omitted).
Chaffin also expressly holds that:
The choice occasioned by the possibility of a harsher sentence, even in the case in which the choice may in fact be ‘difficult,’ does not place an impermissible burden on the right of a criminal defendant to appeal or attack collaterally his conviction.
412 U.S. 17, 35, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 1987.
As examples of difficult choices, the Court referred to the problem confronting a defendant, in a case in which the jury determines guilt and penalty in a single non-bifurcated trial, as to whether he should forego his right to remain si*1313lent on the issue of guilt, in order to be able to argue his case for mitigation of punishment 412 U.S. at 31 — 33, 93 S.Ct. 1977; and the choice of accepting a “plea bargain” or of going to trial. 412 U.S. 30-31, 93 S.Ct. 1977.
That the choice may be difficult does not prevent it from being a knowing, understanding and voluntary choice. Here the choice was to by-pass his unchilled right to appeal.
Moreover, it is not clear to the writer that the decision of the majority will be to Appellant’s benefit. In Fay v. Noia, the Supreme Court majority did not remand for a new trial, but ordered the release of the Appellant. Here the case is remanded for a hearing on the merits. If as a result of that hearing it should be determined that Appellant is entitled to the issuance of the writ, the State of North Carolina almost certainly would be allowed a reasonable time to grant a belated appeal, or to retry the Appellant. On such retrial a jury might assess the death penalty, a result that Appellant studiously sought to avoid.

. The writer of this opinion did refer to Chaffin during oral argument, Chaffin is not cited in the briefs on either side.