Court Opinion

ID: 9963752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 05:06:23.047828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:58.470952
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

DAVID J. SZYMANSKI,                                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       April 25, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                      No. 366882
                                                                       Wayne Circuit Court
COUNTY OF WAYNE and WARREN EVANS,                                      LC No. 21-017542-AW

               Defendants-Appellees.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and JANSEN and MALDONADO, JJ.

MALDONADO, J. (dissenting).

        I believe that the majority erred by treating its interpretation of the Amann Resolution as
dispositive concerning plaintiff’s claim for equitable relief. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

        As the majority aptly observed, the elements of promissory estoppel “are (1) a promise, (2)
that the promisor should reasonably have expected to induce action of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee, and (3) that in fact produced reliance or forbearance of that
nature in circumstances such that the promise must be enforced if injustice is to be avoided.” Cove
Creek Condo Ass’n v Vistal Land & Home Dev, LLC, 330 Mich App 679, 713; 950 NW2d 502
(2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). I believe the evidence is such that there is a genuine
issue of fact with respect to each of these elements. There was evidence that plaintiff was
repeatedly promised that he would qualify for Amann benefits, that the individuals making the
promises knew that plaintiff was using that information to make life and career decisions, and that
plaintiff did make career decisions in reliance on these promises.

        Instead of analyzing the elements of promissory estoppel, the majority summarily asserts
that plaintiff’s claim “depends on his eligibility for those benefits under the Amann Resolution.”
I disagree. Plaintiff is not seeking to directly recover Amann benefits, he is seeking equitable relief
premised on promises made regarding such benefits. The majority’s analysis of the text of the
resolution and its conclusion that plaintiff is not eligible for such benefits is certainly germane to
the reasonableness of plaintiff’s reliance on these promises, but it is not dispositive. As I see it,
promises were allegedly made to plaintiff by people who were positioned such that they should

                                                 -1-
have known if he was eligible for the benefits, and this is sufficient to create a genuine issue of
fact regarding the reasonableness of plaintiff’s reliance on defendants’ promises.

       Accordingly, I dissent.

                                                            /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

                                                -2-