Court Opinion

ID: 9718876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:36:59.51079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:08.659370
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 53. (concurring in part; dissenting in part). This case raises several procedural issues that require comment.
¶ 54. On December 12, 2002, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a 12-count, 48-page complaint against the respondent, Michael Trewin. The complaint asked that the respondent "be found in violation of the Supreme Court Rules as alleged," and "that the Court impose discipline commensurate with the severity of Trewin's misconduct, along with such other and further *143relief as may be just and equitable, including an award of costs." The costs to the respondent, not including his own legal fees, now exceed $25,000.
¶ 55. The 12 counts in the complaint alleged violation of the following rules:
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¶ 56. The referee concluded that the respondent had violated numerous rules, but the referee's report did not neatly track the 12 counts seriatim, so that a reader could keep score of the counts that OLR proved and the counts that it did not prove. An accurate "score" would help the court evaluate the appropriate costs.
¶ 57. What is evident from this case is the following: First, the complaint against Trewin at the outset was so open-ended that he had no idea what discipline OLR was seeking, or what the potential consequences would be if he simply conceded every count. This uncertainty about likely or potential consequences provided a strong incentive for the respondent to resist the discipline.
¶'58. Second, some of the counts charged contained multiple alleged violations against multiple clients. Consequently, unless the respondent was willing *144to acknowledge wrongdoing to every part of every count, he had no choice but to resist some of the counts, particularly when he did not know what the consequences would be if he did not resist.
¶ 59. Third, OLR contends that Trewin should pay the entire cost of the proceeding. This means he is asked to pay the costs to prosecute him on counts on which he successfully defended himself.
¶ 60. To illustrate, OLR charged Trewin in Counts 1, 6, 7, and 11 with alleged violations of Rule 20:1.8(a). Each count alleged that Trewin entered into a business transaction or business transactions (a) the terms of which were unfair and unreasonable to the client; and (b) without obtaining the client's written approval. On each such count, the referee dismissed the allegation that the terms of the allegation were unfair and unreasonable as to the client. In retrospect, these counts were overcharged by OLR but the cost of getting them partially dismissed is to be borne entirely by Attorney Trewin. Count 9 was not proven but the cost of prosecuting that failed count is to be borne by Attorney Trewin. Allegations involving transactions with two named individuals were dismissed. Attorney Trewin is to pay for those unsuccessful allegations.
¶ 61. In Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58, this court adopted the "lodestar" method for determining reasonable attorney fees under fee-shifting statutes. The court needs to ask itself whether the cost assessment in some disciplinary proceedings is consistent with the lodestar methodology, or whether it is driven by nothing more than OLR’s legitimate need for funding and our coldblooded political determination that additional costs should not be assessed to the members of the state bar. *145Both of these factors are reasonable, but not if they completely override the element of fair play to a respondent attorney.
¶ 62. I concur in the discipline imposed by the court but would adjust some of the costs to reflect the respondent's success in defending himself against some of OLR's charges.