Court Opinion

ID: 9811870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:31:06.598057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:03.186424
License: Public Domain

SMITH, C. J.
Dissenting. "While concurring with the Court 'in the disposition made of the case, I cannot assent to the reasoning by which the result was reached.
L. B. Krimmenger as guardian to the plaintiff’s intestate who died before attaining twenty-one years of age, as part of his ward’s estate, received a sum of money arising from a sale of her land and paid to him by order of the Court directing the sale. This fund as well as the other personal estate of the ward was mismanaged and lost. The guardian died leaving a will, and the defendant, T. H. Robinson, was appointed administrator cum, testamento annexo of L. B. Krim-menger, and gave the bond on which the action is brought .against him and his sureties.
The defendant, Robinson, as such administrator took possession of the personal estate of the guardian and received assets sufficient to discharge his liabilities to the ward. The question* is, can the plaintiff recover in damages the value of the fund derived from the sale of the land, lost by mismanagement of the guardian, or must the suit to recover "^his part of the estate be brought on the relation of the heirs at law of the intestate infant ?
*230In my opinion the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages' for the entire estate lost, without discrimination as to the' sources from which any part of it was derived. It is not disputed upon repeated and uniform adjudications in this-State, and various statutory provisions, that money arising, from the sale of an infant’s land, until changed by some valid act of conversion after the infant attains majority, retains the qualities and properties of the land it represents, for the-purpose of ascertaining to whom under the law it rightfully belongs. But this doctrine applies only to claimants of the-fund. Its nature as personal property is not changed, nor is the'responsibility of the guardian for its care and management different from that which attaches to other personal property. Accordingly, iri two of the cases cited at the-bar, the fund treated as land, still in the view of a Court of Equity, had been recovered or reduced to possession by the.administrator, and was pursued in his hands by the heir, and; charged with a trust in his favor.
Although legal and equitable rights are under our present system administered by the same Court, yet the essential distinction in those rights and the remedies to enforce-them, cannot be lost sight of without introducing perplexity and uncertainty. This action is on the administration; bond to recover damages for a breach of trust, and should be controlled by those general rules that formerly governed a legal proceeding. No case has been called to my attention-ivhere an heir at law has prosecuted an action to recover the fund, or to secure his interest in it, until it has been reduced to possession or subjected to the control of the personal representative. The right to sue is essentially a personal-right vesting in the infant, and at her death transmitted to her administrator, who represents her as to all her rights of property, except her specific interest in land remaining" such until her death, and which thus descends to her heirs at law. The damages arising from the breach of trust and *231measuring the value of the property lost and the injury sustained, are personal, and the right to recover them vests only in the person who succeeds to all the choses in action that vested in the infant. To whom the fund shall be paid, and the respective claims of creditors, distributees and heirs thereto, are matters which must be afterwards ascertained and adjudged.
This view is in my opinion fully sustained by an express adjudication of this Court in Latta v. Russ, 8 Jones, 111.
The facts of that case are these : Richard Crabtree died, having made his will and devised certain of his lands to Thomas J. Latta and wife and others. The executors named in the will renounced, and his widow was appointed .admin-istratrix with the will annexed. She filed her petition in the proper Court, and obtained license to sell the devised lands for payment of debts. There was a surplus arising from the sale of the land in her hands when she died. The defendant, Russ, then became her administrator, and administration d. b. n. with the will annexed, was granted to the relator. The action was brought by the administrator d. b. n. upon the bond of the administratrix, against her administrator and sureties, to recover the fund derived from the sale of the land. This was resisted by the defendants upon the ground that the surplus arising from the sale of theland, made assets, belonged to the devisees, and that they alone as relators coulds ue. The Court declared that the objection that the action cannot be maintained by the administrator d. b. n. was not tenable, and Pearson, C. J., in delivering the opinion, says: “ Where an administrator dies before he has completed the settlement of the assets derived from real estate by paying debts and paying over the excess to the devisees or heirs at law, this unfinished duty cannot be performed by his administrator, for there is no privity between him and the devisees and heirs at law ; and it is consequently necessary that both of the deceased per*232sons should be represented, so that the representative of the administrator should pay over the fund to the representative of the first intestate, whose duty it is made to complete the administration by paying off all the debts, and paying over the excess to such persons as would be entitled to the land, had it not been sold. In other words, between the administrator d. b. n. of the first intestate, and his creditors and devisees or heirs, there is a privity; whereas there'is no privity between the latter and the administrator of the first administrator.”
This lucid statement of the true doctrine would seem to he decisive of our case, and to render further discussion needless. It may not however be inappropriate to notice some of the many' difficulties to be encountered in permitting the heir-at-law to sue and recover this money. If the specific fund is to be treated as land (except for the purpos-ses already stated) then its loss or destruction, like the destruction of houses on the infant’s [land, would obstruct or defeat the descent. The right to recover damages in the one case as in the other, is a personal right vesting in the infant and to which none but his representative succeeds at her death. Undoubtedly the heir has no claim for the destroyed houses, and why should she have to moneys lost, if they are to be treated as land merely ?
But in truth the fund is but a given sum of money which itself, or in case of its loss, the substituted damages which measure its value,'though its identity be lost, continues invested with the same attributes and goes to the same heir-at-law when reduced into possessson by the person, who under the law must pursue and recover it for the benefit of the party entitled thereto.
A further suggestion may be made in regard to the interest of creditors. For the space of two years after the grant of letters of administration or testamentary, the lands remain liable to debts and is inalienable by the heir or de-visee. If conveyed after-wards, the title passes but the heir *233or devisee is chargeable with the proceeds of sale. Daring the period mentioned, and after-wards before sale, the representative may by proper proceedings convert the land into assets to pay debts, and if necessary, it is his duty to do so. 'This duty is enforced and secured by his bond. But this protection would be lost if the heir or devisee can sue and .get possession of the fund into which the land has been •converted and apply it to his own use ; and in this respect his advantages are greater than if there had been no conversion, and to the same degree prejudicial to creditors.
The correct rule applicable to the case in my opinion is this; — The personal representative must reduce to possession the entire personal estate, and if necessary, sue for and recover debts and damages to which his testator or intestate may be entitled ; and in an action brought for this purpose, an inquiry into the source from which the funds sought to be recovered were derived, is wholly immaterial and irrelevant. The only issue between the parties is as to the defendant’s liability, and in what amount, to the deceased •or his representative to whom the right of actiop is transmitted. When the fund has been recovered, it then becomes important to ascertain whether any or what part arises from the sale of land, and who is the heir or devisee to whom, if not required for purposes of administration, it .should be paid.
This is a ‘ legal proceeding to recover damages for the Breach of a legal obligation and should be conducted substantially upon the principles which governed in an action at law, modified under the new practice so far only as is necessary to secure and protect those equitable- rights which formerly could only be asserted in a different tribunal. The judgment of the Court is entirely proper reversing the decision below and transmitting the cause in order to an amendment making the heir at law a co-plaintiff. So that if administration has been completed, the money recovered .which represents the land may pass at once into the hands *234of the heir at iaw who is -entitled to it. In this prompt and summary disposition of the whole matter in .a single proceeding, we have an illustration of the practical advantages, of the new system over the old, under which the heir would have been compelled to seek redress by instituting a new suit in another Court.
Per Curiam. Judgment vacated and cause remanded..