Court Opinion

ID: 9946041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 22:02:46.940372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:21.959103
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24

                              CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION THREE

 RHONDA PERSIANI,

      Petitioner,

          v.                                            G062648

 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE                           (Super. Ct. Nos. 30-2022-01278408,
 COUNTY,                                                21HM06672, 20HM02654,
                                                        19HM02553, 19HM11594)
      Respondent,
                                                        OPINION
 THE PEOPLE,

      Real Party in Interest.

                  Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition to
challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Julian W. Bailey, Judge.
Petition denied and matter remanded with directions.
                  Martin F. Schwarz, Public Defender, Laura Jose, Chief Deputy Public
Defender, and Adam Vining, Assistant Public Defender, for Petitioner.
                  No appearance for Respondent.
                  Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Austin Deuel, Deputy District
Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.
                We hold a trial court has authority under Penal Code section 1370.01,
subdivision (b)(1)(A) to order treatment through mental health diversion for a mentally
                                                                                    1
incompetent misdemeanor defendant charged with driving under the influence. Here,
petitioner Rhonda Persiani was charged in four misdemeanor cases with driving under the
influence (Veh. Code § 23152, subd. (a)). While the charges were pending, a doubt arose
as to Persiani’s mental competence, criminal proceedings were suspended, and Persiani
was found incompetent to stand trial.
                Pursuant to section 1370.01, Persiani was evaluated and found suitable for
outpatient treatment through mental health diversion. However, the court and the parties
ultimately concluded Persiani was ineligible for such treatment because Vehicle Code
section 23640 prohibits diversion in cases where a defendant is charged with driving
under the influence. She sought dismissal of her four cases, arguing dismissal was
required under section 1370.01, subdivision (b)(2), because she was ineligible for any of
the treatment options in subdivision (b)(1)(D) of the statute. The court denied Persiani’s
motion to dismiss. Instead, to provide Persiani with needed mental health treatment, the
court imposed as conditions of Persiani’s release certain provisions of a treatment plan
the Orange County Health Care Agency recommended for Persiani.
                In the instant writ petition, Persiani argues the respondent court erred in its
application of section 1370.01. She asserts the court exceeded its authority by imposing
mental health treatment provisions as conditions of her release. She requests we issue a
writ directing the respondent court to dismiss her four cases or, alternatively, to relieve
her of any conditions of release and not set further court dates in those cases. At oral
argument before this court, she urged dismissal of her cases due to the length of time she
has been subject to the treatment plan as conditions of her release.

1
    All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

                                                2
              Because the record shows the court misunderstood its authority under
section 1370.01 and does not show the length of time Persiani was required to comply
with the court-ordered treatment plan, we deny the petition and remand the matter for
further proceedings. The respondent court is directed to hold a hearing to determine
whether to order Persiani be provided mental health diversion treatment under section
1370.01, subdivision (b)(1)(A), and if so, the length of such treatment.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
              Between February 2019 and July 2021, Persiani was charged with driving
under the influence in four different misdemeanor cases. In case No. 19HM02553, she
was charged with committing the following offenses on February 12, 2019: driving
under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 1), driving with a blood alcohol
level of 0.08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b); count 2), and resisting a
peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3). In case No. 19HM11594, the
prosecution alleged Persiani drove on September 5, 2019, while under the influence of
alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 1) and with a blood alcohol content of .08
percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b); count 2). In case No. 20HM02654, the
prosecution alleged Persiani drove on March 10, 2020, while under the influence of
alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 1) and drove with a suspended or revoked
license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a); count 2). In case No. 21HM06672, Persiani
was charged with committing the following offenses on July 26, 2021: driving under the
influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 1), resisting a peace officer
(Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and driving on a suspended or revoked license
(Veh. Code, § 14601.5, subd. (a); count 3). In each case, Persiani was released after
posting a bond.
              In August 2021, Persiani’s trial counsel expressed a doubt as to her mental
competence. The court suspended criminal proceedings (§ 1368) and appointed two

                                             3
psychologists to evaluate Persiani and assess her competence to stand trial (§ 1369,
subd. (a)(1)). Both psychologists concluded Persiani was not competent to stand trial. At
Persiani’s competency hearing in February 2022, the parties submitted on the
psychologists’ reports. The court found Persiani was mentally incompetent under
section 1367, subdivision (a) and referred the matter to the Orange County Mental Health
Department to conduct “a placement report.”
              Dr. Nicole Caceres from the Orange County Health Care Agency
Conditional Release Program (CONREP) evaluated Persiani. In a report filed with the
court on April 6, 2022, Caceres found Persiani was an appropriate candidate for
outpatient treatment through mental health diversion.
              At a hearing about a week later, Persiani’s counsel moved for dismissal of
all four of Persiani’s cases. Her counsel stated it had been “brought to [their] attention
that mental health diversion is generally not considered applicable to driving under the
influence cases.” Persiani’s counsel asserted dismissal was the only option under section
1370.01 because Persiani was ineligible for mental health diversion given her charges of
driving under the influence and she did not meet the criteria for the other options of
assisted outpatient treatment and conservatorship. The court expressed uncertainty as to
whether individuals like Persiani, who had been charged with driving under the influence
and found mentally incompetent, could be excluded from mental health diversion, given
the dictates of section 1370.01. Over the defense’s objection, the court reappointed one
of the psychologists who originally concluded Persiani was incompetent and the court
ordered Persiani be evaluated for borderline personality disorder, so the court could

                                              4
consider whether to grant or deny mental health diversion as directed by section
           2
1370.01.
               The court also exonerated the bonds in Persiani’s cases and released her on
her own recognizance (OR release) on the conditions she only drive with a valid driver’s
license, she not consume alcohol, and she be fitted with a Secure Continuous Remote
Alcohol Monitor (SCRAM) device. Persiani’s counsel objected to the court requiring a
SCRAM device as a condition of release. About two weeks later, the court removed the
SCRAM requirement.
               At a hearing on May 4, 2022, Persiani’s counsel requested the court dismiss
Persiani’s four cases. At the prosecution’s request, the court referred the matter to the
collaborative court so Persiani could be evaluated for assisted outpatient treatment. After
the evaluation was performed, the collaborative court concluded Persiani’s cases were not
suitable for the collaborative court.
               Her cases were sent back to the referring court, where a hearing was held
on June 1, 2022. Her counsel reiterated the argument her cases must be dismissed
because she did not qualify for mental health diversion based on her charges and she did
not qualify for assisted outpatient treatment or a conservatorship. At the prosecution’s
request and over the defense’s objection, the court continued the matter for a hearing at
which the prosecution could present evidence concerning a modified treatment plan for
Persiani. Persiani remained on OR release on the condition she “not drive.”
               About a week after the hearing, Persiani’s counsel filed a motion to
dismiss, asserting the court was required under section 1370.01 to dismiss Persiani’s four

2
  In evaluating Persiani’s mental competence, one of the court-appointed psychologists
noted the possibility Persiani had borderline personality disorder, a mental health
condition specifically excluded from mental health diversion at the time under former
section 1001.36. Effective January 1, 2024, borderline personality disorder was removed
as an excludable mental health condition under section 1001.36. (Stats. 2023, ch. 687,
§ 1.1.)

                                             5
cases. The prosecution filed a written opposition, in which it argued Persiani could
pursue treatment under section 1370.01 through mental health diversion, with
modifications to address her mental health and addiction issues. The prosecution asserted
Persiani should be treated through mental health diversion because it was consistent with
the intent of section 1370.01 and because dismissal of her cases would be a danger to
society, a disservice to Persiani’s need for treatment, and would lead to an absurd result.
              At the prosecution’s request, Caceres submitted a letter to the court, which
proposed “a modified treatment plan” for Persiani. The letter noted Caceres previously
opined Persiani was an appropriate candidate for mental health diversion, but she was
deemed ineligible because of her charges. Caceres therefore recommended Persiani’s
treatment plan be modified. Caceres opined Persiani’s mental health had deteriorated
since her arrest and recommended, “[g]iven the severity of her mental health symptoms at
this time,” Persiani “be seen by a psychiatric provider as soon as possible in order to
prevent further decompensation.” The letter contained specific recommendations
regarding Persiani’s treatment plan.
              At a hearing on June 29, 2022, the court denied the defense motion to
dismiss. The court stated it did not believe the Legislature in enacting section 1370.01,
“would have considered it appropriate to take a set of persons who had committed
seriously dangerous misdemeanors, and in this case four of them, and simply because of
their incompetence preclude the court from fashioning a treatment plan that could
hopefully address the issues that brought the person before the court.” The court decided
it had the inherent authority to make orders concerning the conditions of Persiani’s OR
release to protect public safety and to provide mental health treatment to Persiani. Using
Caceres’s recommended modified treatment plan, the court imposed on Persiani’s OR
release several conditions concerning mental health and substance abuse treatment.

                                             6
              In August 2022, the appellate division denied Persiani’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. In April 2023, the appellate division denied her petition for a writ of
mandate.
              Persiani filed a petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition in this court,
which we summarily denied. Persiani petitioned for review in the California Supreme
      3
Court. The Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to us with
directions to vacate our order denying mandate and to instead issue an order directing the
superior court to show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) We issued an order to show cause, the People filed a
return, and Persiani filed a reply.

                                       DISCUSSION
              A significant juncture in the proceedings below was when the court and the
parties concluded mental health diversion treatment as provided for in section 1370.01,
subdivision (b)(1)(A) was unavailable to Persiani because she was charged with driving
under the influence. Based on this conclusion, the court took the path of determining
what other mental health treatment options were appropriate for Persiani, ultimately
imposing mental health treatment conditions as terms of her OR release. We conclude
the court veered unnecessarily because a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant,
like Persiani, may be granted mental health diversion treatment as provided by section
1370.01, notwithstanding the charge of driving under the influence. We reach this
conclusion after examining the statutory framework concerning mentally incompetent
misdemeanor defendants, including section 1370.01’s language and legislative intent.
We conclude Vehicle Code section 23640 does not interfere with a court’s ability to order

3
  Persiani’s briefing in the Supreme Court suggests her compliance with the treatment
plan was paused pending review in the appellate courts.

                                              7
mental health diversion treatment after a court has found a misdemeanor defendant
mentally incompetent to stand trial and suspended criminal proceedings.

A. Principles of Statutory Construction
              “‘“‘“When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to
determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine
the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine
that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in
order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the
enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless
a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.
If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may
consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’
[Citation.] ‘Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire
statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word,
phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’”’”
[Citation.] The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that this court
reviews de novo.’” (People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 804.)

B. Statutory Framework Concerning Defendants Who Are Mentally Incompetent to
   Stand Trial
              The federal and state guarantees of due process forbid a court from trying,
convicting, or punishing a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent to stand trial.
(U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15; People v. Rodas (2018)
6 Cal.5th 219, 230.) This principle is codified in section 1367. (People v. Rodas, supra,
6 Cal.5th at p. 230.) Section 1367 qualifies a person as mentally incompetent to stand
trial “if, as a result of a mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is

                                              8
unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the
conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367, subd. (a); accord, Cooper v.
Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 354 [federal test for incompetence].)
              During the criminal proceedings, if “a doubt arises in the mind of the judge
as to the mental competence of the defendant” (§ 1368, subd. (a)) and defense counsel
concurs (id., subd. (b)), the court must order a hearing to determine the defendant’s
present mental competence (id., subds. (b), (c)). When the court commences competency
proceedings, criminal proceedings must be suspended until there is a formal
determination of the defendant’s mental competence. (Id., subd. (c); People v. Rodas,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 231.) The procedures for the competency hearing are set forth in
section 1369. If the defendant is found mentally competent, criminal proceedings
resume. (§§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(A), 1370.01, subd. (a).)
              However, if the defendant is found mentally incompetent, the severity of
the defendant’s charges — whether the defendant is charged with a felony or
misdemeanor — determines whether section 1370 or section 1370.01 applies. (§ 1367,
subd. (b).) If the defendant is charged with a felony or alleged to have violated the terms
of felony probation or mandatory supervision, section 1370 applies. (§ 1367, subd. (b).)
Under section 1370, a felony defendant found mentally incompetent to stand trial is
committed to the State Department of State Hospitals or other treatment facility or placed
on outpatient status for treatment to regain competency. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(i).)
This provides a path to mental competence through treatment, and once the court finds
the defendant’s competence has been restored, criminal proceedings resume. (§§ 1370,
subd. (a)(1)(C), 1372.) Instead of committing a felony defendant to a public or private
treatment facility, the court may grant the defendant treatment through mental health
diversion if the court finds the defendant is an appropriate candidate and the defendant is
found eligible for diversion under section 1001.36. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(v).)

                                             9
               Section 1370.01 applies when the defendant has been charged with one or
more misdemeanors or a violation of misdemeanor probation and the court finds the
defendant may be incompetent to stand trial because of a mental health disorder.
(§ 1367, subd. (b); Fresno County Public Guardian v. Superior Court (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 5.) We focus on section 1370.01 because Persiani was charged
with misdemeanor offenses before she was found mentally incompetent to stand trial.
               Senate Bill No. 317 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 317) repealed
former section 1370.01 effective December 31, 2021 and enacted its replacement
effective January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 599, §§ 1, 2.) When a defendant was found
mentally incompetent, the former statute required the court to suspend criminal
proceedings until the defendant became mentally competent. (Former § 1370.01,
subd. (a)(1).) Like section 1370, former section 1370.01 provided a path to restore the
defendant’s mental competence through treatment at a public or private facility or on
outpatient status. (Former § 1370.01, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Once competence was restored,
criminal proceedings resumed. (Id., subd. (a)(1)(B); § 1372.)

               Under the former statute, if the court found the defendant was an
appropriate candidate for mental health diversion and the defendant was eligible under
section 1001.36, the court could grant mental health diversion for a period not to exceed
one year. At the end of the period of diversion, the defendant was no longer deemed
incompetent to stand trial and the charges were dismissed. (Former § 1370.01,
subd. (a)(2).) If the court did not grant mental health diversion, the court could, after an
evaluation was conducted, order the defendant be confined in a treatment facility or
placed on outpatient status (id, subd. (a)(3)(A)) and order the involuntary administration
of antipsychotic medication to the defendant as prescribed by the defendant’s treating
psychiatrist (id., subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii)-(iii)).
               A “‘treatment facility’” included a county jail and the jail could be
“designated to provide medically approved medication to defendants found to be

                                                 10
mentally incompetent and unable to provide informed consent due to a mental disorder.”
(Former § 1369.1, subd. (a).) Thus, under former section 1370.01, a misdemeanor
defendant found mentally incompetent to stand trial could be committed to county jail for
up to one year for treatment and involuntarily medicated during this commitment.
               When a defendant was placed in a treatment facility or on outpatient status,
regular reports were required to be filed with the court concerning the defendant’s
progress toward resumption of mental competence. (Former § 1370.01, subd. (b).) If it
was reported “there was no substantial likelihood” the defendant would “regain mental
competence in the foreseeable future,” the court was required to order the defendant
returned to court and to determine whether to initiate conservatorship proceedings.
(Ibid.; id., subd. (c).)
               Senate Bill 317 replaced former section 1370.01 with a new statute,
effective January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 599, §§ 1, 2.) The bill’s author explained the
need for the legislation: “‘Existing law does not provide incompetent defendants
adequate mental health treatment when the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor.
These defendants often spend most, if not all, of their pre-trial detention waiting for a
treatment bed. [¶] . . . [¶] SB 317 provides pathways to appropriate mental health
treatment for defendants charged with misdemeanors.’” (Assem. Floor Analyses, 3d
reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 317 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 1, 2021,
pp. 1–2.) The new legislation did “not contemplate restoration of competency or a
resumption of criminal proceedings.” (Assem. Com. on Pub. Saf., Rep. on Sen. Bill
No. 317 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23, 2021, p. 8.) The objective, instead,
was mental health treatment. (Ibid.) Thus, Senate Bill 317 repealed the provisions
regarding resumption of criminal proceedings upon restoration of mental competence for
a person charged with a misdemeanor or a violation of misdemeanor probation. It also
eliminated referrals to custodial treatment for incompetent misdemeanor defendants,
including provisions concerning the administration of antipsychotic medication. (Legis.

                                             11
Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 317 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) 2021 Stats., ch. 599; Fresno
County Public Guardian v. Superior Court, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th Supp. at p. 5.)

C. Section 1370.01
              As enacted by Senate Bill 317, section 1370.01 provided in relevant part:
“(b) If the defendant is found mentally incompetent, the trial, judgment, or hearing on the
alleged violation shall be suspended and the court may do either of the following:
              “(1) [¶] (A) Conduct a hearing, pursuant to Chapter 2.8A (commencing
with Section 1001.35) of Title 6, and, if the court deems the defendant eligible, grant
diversion pursuant to Section 1001.36 for a period not to exceed one year from the date
the individual is accepted into diversion or the maximum term of imprisonment provided
by law for the most serious offense charged in the misdemeanor complaint, whichever is
shorter.
              “(B) If the court opts to conduct a hearing pursuant to this paragraph, the
hearing shall be held no later than 30 days after the finding of incompetence. If the
hearing is delayed beyond 30 days, the court shall order the defendant to be released on
their own recognizance pending the hearing.
              “(C) If the defendant performs satisfactorily on diversion pursuant to this
section, at the end of the period of diversion, the court shall dismiss the criminal charges
that were the subject of the criminal proceedings at the time of the initial diversion.
              “(D) If the court finds the defendant ineligible for diversion based on the
circumstances set forth in subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 1001.36, the court may, after
notice to the defendant, defense counsel, and the prosecution, hold a hearing to determine
whether to do any of the following:
                            “(i) Order modification of the treatment plan in accordance
              with a recommendation from the treatment provider.

                                             12
                              “(ii) Refer the defendant to assisted outpatient treatment
              pursuant to Section 5346 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. . . . If the
              defendant is accepted into assisted outpatient treatment, the charges shall be
              dismissed pursuant to Section 1385.
                              “(iii) Refer the defendant to the county conservatorship
              investigator in the county of commitment for possible conservatorship
              proceedings for the defendant pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with
              Section 5350) of Part 1 of Division 5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
              . . . If the outcome of the conservatorship proceedings results in the
              establishment of conservatorship, the charges shall be dismissed pursuant to
              Section 1385.
              “(2) Dismiss the charges pursuant to Section 1385. If the criminal action is
dismissed, the court shall transmit a copy of the order of dismissal to the county mental
health director or the director’s designee.
              “(c) If the defendant is found mentally incompetent and is on a grant of
probation for a misdemeanor offense, the court shall dismiss the pending revocation
matter and may return the defendant to supervision. If the revocation matter is dismissed
pursuant to this subdivision, the court may modify the terms and conditions of
supervision to include appropriate mental health treatment.
              “(d) It is the intent of the Legislature that a defendant subject to the terms
of this section receive mental health treatment in a treatment facility and not a jail. . . . A
defendant not in actual custody shall otherwise receive day for day credit against the term
of diversion from the date the defendant is accepted into diversion. . . .” (Stats. 2021, ch.
599, § 2.)
              This version of section 1370.01 was in effect when Persiani was found
incompetent to stand trial. Section 1370.01 has been amended twice since Senate

                                              13
Bill 317’s enactment but these amendments do not impact our interpretation of the statute
                                                                       4
as it existed when Persiani was declared incompetent to stand trial.
               Under the plain language of section 1370.01, subdivision (b)(1)(A), a court
has the discretion to order mental health diversion treatment pursuant to section 1001.36
for a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant if the court deems the defendant
eligible. The language of section 1370.01 does not exclude a mentally incompetent
defendant charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence from receiving
treatment through mental health diversion under section 1001.36. While defendants
charged with certain offenses may not be placed into mental health diversion (id.,
subd. (d)), driving under the influence is not listed as an excludable offense. Thus,
nothing in the language of either section 1370.01 or section 1001.36 bars a court from
exercising its discretion to provide treatment through mental health division to a mentally
incompetent defendant charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence.

D. Vehicle Code Section 23640
               Vehicle Code section 23640 was the perceived roadblock to ordering
mental health diversion treatment for Persiani pursuant to section 1370.01. Thus, we
examine the language of Vehicle Code section 23640 and case law addressing its
application.

4
  First, effective January 1, 2023, section 1370.01 was amended to add a fourth option if
the court found the defendant ineligible for mental health diversion; a court now has the
option of referring a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant to a Community
Assistance, Recovery, and Empowerment (CARE) program. If the defendant is accepted
into the CARE program, the court must dismiss the charges under section 1385.
(§ 1370.01, subd. (b)(1)(D)(iv) as added by Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 3.5.) Changes were
also made to section 1370.01, subdivision (b)(1)(D) to make it consistent with the
eligibility criteria in section 1001.36, subdivisions (b) – (d) and (g). (Stats. 2022, ch. 735,
§ 3.5.) Second, the provision concerning referral to the CARE program (§ 1370.01, subd.
(b)(1)(D)(iv)) was amended to clarify the time requirements for an eligibility hearing.
(Stats. 2023, ch. 283, § 1, eff. Sept. 30, 2023.)

                                              14
              Vehicle Code section 23640, subdivision (a), provides: “In any case in
which a person is charged with a violation of Section 23152 or 23153, prior to acquittal
or conviction, the court shall neither suspend nor stay the proceedings for the purpose of
allowing the accused person to attend or participate, nor shall the court consider
dismissal of or entertain a motion to dismiss the proceedings because the accused person
attends or participates during that suspension, in any one or more education, training, or
treatment programs, including, but not limited to, a driver improvement program, a
treatment program for persons who are habitual users of alcohol or other alcoholism
program, a program designed to offer alcohol services to problem drinkers, an alcohol or
drug education program, or a treatment program for persons who are habitual users of
drugs or other drug-related program.” (Italics added.)
              Recent cases have concluded Vehicle Code section 23640 bars pretrial
diversion for defendants charged with driving under the influence. (Tan v. Appellate
Division of Superior Court (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 130 [Veh. Code, § 23640 prohibits
granting misdemeanor diversion under Pen. Code, § 1001.95 to petitioner charged with
misdemeanor driving under the influence]; Grassi v. Superior Court (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 283 [same]; Moore v. Superior Court (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 561 [defendant
charged with driving under the influence ineligible for pretrial mental health diversion
under Pen. Code, § 1001.36 because of Veh. Code, § 23640]; Tellez v. Superior Court
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 439 [same].) These cases, however, addressed the availability of
pretrial diversion to competent defendants charged with driving under the influence. We
are tasked with considering application of Vehicle Code section 23640 to an incompetent
misdemeanor defendant charged with driving under the influence.
              A careful reading of Vehicle Code section 23640 reveals the statute does
not prohibit a court from exercising its discretion under Penal Code section 1370.01 to
order treatment through mental health diversion for a mentally incompetent defendant
charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence. Vehicle Code section 23640

                                            15
prohibits a court from suspending the proceedings for the purpose of allowing a
defendant to attend or participate in a treatment program. (Id., subd. (a).) However, a
court acting under Penal Code section 1370.01 suspends the criminal proceedings
because the defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial (id., subd. (b)), not for the
purpose of allowing the defendant to attend or participate in a pretrial diversion or
treatment program. Thus, the prohibition in Vehicle Code section 23640 does not apply
when a misdemeanor defendant charged with driving under the influence is found to be
incompetent to stand trial.
              Consideration of the legislative intent behind Vehicle Code section 23640
does not lead us to a different conclusion. Vehicle Code section 23640 and its
predecessor statute have been the law in California for over 40 years. (Moore v. Superior
Court, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 570.) “Courts have consistently observed that the
Legislature’s ‘“unambiguous intent”’ in enacting Vehicle Code sections 23640 and
23600, and their predecessor statutes, was ‘“to prohibit pre- or postconviction stays or
suspensions of proceedings to allow [driving under the influence defendants] to be
diverted into a treatment program and avoid spending the statutorily mandated minimum
time in confinement or paying the statutorily imposed minimum fine.”’” (Ibid.) The
legislative intent behind the restraint on pretrial diversion for defendants charged with
driving under the influence was to ensure all such defendants, “without exception, shall
have their guilt or innocence determined without delay or diversion.” (People v.
Weatherill (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1569, 1577.)
              But the determination of the guilt or innocence and imposition of
punishment on a mentally incompetent defendant charged with any crime is
constitutionally prohibited. (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378 [“conviction of
an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process”].) Vehicle Code
section 23640 and the legislative intent behind it must be considered with this
constitutional due process guarantee in mind.

                                             16
               Under section 1370.01, treatment may be ordered through mental health
diversion for a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant charged with driving under
the influence, like any other misdemeanor defendant. The Legislature intended section
1370.01 and section 1001.36 to work in concert, and in section 1370.01, treatment
pursuant to section 1001.36 is the preferred treatment option. “Section 1001.36
specifically excepts incompetent persons from the statutory requirements that they
consent to diversion, waive speedy trial rights, and agree to comply with treatment.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2), (3).)” (People v. Braden, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 815.) “The
provisions of sections 1370 and 1370.01 authorize a court to grant mental health
diversion to [incompetent] defendants without restoration of competency and
reinstatement of criminal proceedings. Without this express authorization, mental health
diversion would be unavailable to [incompetent] defendants due to the suspended nature
of criminal cases while competency proceedings occur.” (Id. at p. 833 (dis. opn. of
Evans, J.).)

E. The Court Misunderstood its Authority to Order Mental Health Diversion Treatment
   for Persiani Under Section 1370.01
               After Persiani was found incompetent to stand trial, she was evaluated by
Caceres and found to be an appropriate candidate for treatment through mental health
diversion. The court and the parties subsequently concluded Persiani was ineligible for
treatment through mental health diversion because she was charged with driving under
the influence, and the court did not order such treatment.
               By the time of oral argument before this court, the prosecution’s position
had evolved. The prosecution now acknowledges Vehicle Code section 23640 does not
bar a court from ordering a mentally incompetent misdemeanor defendant receive
treatment through mental health diversion. As we have discussed ante, Vehicle Code
section 23640 does not prevent a court from ordering a mentally incompetent

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misdemeanor defendant charged with driving under the influence to receive treatment
through mental health diversion, as authorized in Penal Code section 1370.01,
subdivision (b)(1)(A), after criminal proceedings have been suspended.
              Thus, we conclude the court had the authority under section 1370.01,
subdivision (b)(1)(A) to order Persiani receive treatment through the structure of mental
health diversion in section 1001.36. We therefore reject Persiani’s contention the court
was required to dismiss her charges because she was ineligible for the treatment options
                                          5
in section 1370.01, subdivision (b)(1).
              The matter is remanded and returned to the superior court so the court may
determine whether to order Persiani receive mental health diversion treatment pursuant to
section 1370.01, subdivision (b)(1)(A) and the length of such treatment.

5
  Because we conclude the court had the authority to order treatment through mental
health diversion, we do not address Persiani’s contention the court lacked the authority to
implement “its own form of informal diversion as terms and conditions of [her] release.”

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                                     DISPOSITION
             Persiani’s petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition is denied. The matter
is remanded with directions to the respondent superior court to hold a hearing to
determine whether to grant mental health diversion treatment to Persiani pursuant to
section 1370.01, subdivision (b)(1)(A).

                                                 MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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