Court Opinion

ID: 9588464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:41.10722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:30.887120
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
With extreme reluctance I concur in the judgment. In my opinion, contrary to that of the majority, the People’s theory for sustaining the taking of the blood sample would have been valid had it been timely presented and the trial court determined the circumstances to be those asserted by the People.
The People’s theory is that in the absence of a warrant, consent, or an arrest the taking of Allen Hawkins’ blood sample did not violate his right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. The police officers had witnessed a clear indication of his intoxication at the scene of the accident, and there was probable cause for Hawkins’ arrest. Time had already elapsed in taking him to the hospital and there was ample justification for the police to have a blood sample taken by a doctor in a hospital.
The majority, in rejecting the theory, fail to give adequate recognition to the fact that an emergency was presented in that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatened the destruction of evidence since alcohol soon disappears from the blood. The theory, however, unfortunately was not presented in the municipal or superior court and for the reasons hereinafter stated may not be presented for the first time here. The record contains evidence that would have supported determinations that the recited circumstances existed,1 and had the theory been urged below and the trial court made such determinations the taking of the blood sample *767was permissible under California and other state court decisions and clear implications in United States Supreme Court decisions since the evidence was in the process of destruction.2
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 [16 L.Ed.2d 908, 86 S.Ct. 1826], wherein the question whether the analysis of a blood test was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure arose in the context of a warrantless arrest, the Supreme Court, after noting that “such testing procedures . . . constitute searches of ‘persons,’ and depend antecedently upon seizures of ‘persons,’ within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment,” stated that the considerations justifying searches incident to an arrest had little applicability with respect to searches involving intrusions beyond the body’s surface and that before a blood test can be made there must be “a clear indication” of intoxication. In concluding that the officer was not required to obtain a search warrant before the test was made, the court stated, “The officer in the present case . . . might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances threatened ‘the destruction of evidence.’ Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367. We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.” (Italics added.) Schmerber further declared that the test chosen was reasonable—that blood tests are today “commonplace” and for most involve “virtually no risk, trauma, or pain”3—and that the test was performed in a reasonable manner—namely by a physician in a *768hospital. (See also People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal.2d 766, 771-772 [312 P.2d 690].)
Schmerber did not explicitly state whether the emergency doctrine could be used to justify blood tests independent of an arrest, but courts in this state and others have expressly or implicitly employed that doctrine to justify such tests where the defendant was not arrested and neither a warrant nor consent was obtained. (People v. Glass, 266 Cal.App.2d 222, 228-229 [71 Cal.Rptr. 858]; McDonald v. Justice Court, 249 Cal.App.2d 960, 963-964 [58 Cal.Rptr. 29]; People v. Huber, 232 Cal.App.2d 663, 666 et seq. [43 Cal.Rptr. 65]; People v. Pack, 199 Cal.App.2d 857, 864-865 [19 Cal.Rptr. 186]; State v. Mitchell (Fla.) 245 So.2d 618, 621-623; State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733 [145 N.W.2d 650, 654-656]; see also People v. Bustos, 247 Cal.App.2d 422, 424-426 [55 Cal.Rptr. 603] [wherein court assumed that the custody necessary to the taking of blood amounts to an arrest].) In some of the cited cases the defendant was semiconscious or unconscious, but no less an emergency exists in a case such as this where the defendant has regained consciousness.
Support for upholding the taking of a blood sample under the circumstances heretofore recited is found by analogy to cases involving searches of movable vehicles stopped on the highway where there is probable cause to believe that they contain contraband. The rationale for sustaining such searches is that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality in which the warrant must be sought. (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459-460 [29 L.Ed.2d 564, 579, 91 S.Ct. 2022]; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 [26 L.Ed.2d 419, 426-428, 90 S.Ct. 1975]; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-154 [69 L.Ed. 543, 551-552, 45 S.Ct. 280].) A similar rationale applies to blood samples under the recited circumstances for alcohol soon disappears from the blood (see, e.g., Schmerber v. California, supra, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771 [16 L.Ed.2d 908, 919-920]; In re Martin, 58 Cal.2d 509, 512 [24 Cal.Rptr. 833, 374 P.2d 801]; People v. Huber, supra, 232 Cal.App.2d 663, 670). Indeed, blood sampling under such circumstances may present a stronger case for dispensing with a warrant, since movable vehicles are at most only very likely to be unavailable for inspection at a later date, while the. alcohol in a suspect’s blood is certain to disappear. (See 79 Harv. L. Rev. 677, 678.)
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that where evidence is in the process of destruction a warrantless search in the absence of an arrest may be justified. (See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 [26 L.Ed.2d 409, 413-414, 90 S.Ct. 1969]; Chapman *769v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 [5 L.Ed.2d 828, 832, 81 S.Ct. 776]; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 [93 L.Ed. 153, 158, 69 S.Ct. 191]; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 [92 L.Ed. 436, 441, 68 S.Ct. 367].)
The implied consent law (Veh. Code, § 13353) by its terms is inapplicable in the absence of an arrest. However, in enacting this law the Legislature did not intend to preempt the field of chemical sobriety tests by complete statutory regulation, and the admissibility of blood alcohol tests under established case law is not affected by the cited section. (See People v. Wren, 271 Cal.App.2d 788, 791-792 [76 Cal.Rptr. 673]; People v. Fite, 267 Cal.App.2d 685, 687-691 [73 Cal.Rptr. 666].)
Regrettably, however, the People failed in the lower courts to present the theory now urged. In the superior court the People conceded that the only ground upon which they sought to justify the search and seizure was consent. (See fn. 3 in majority opinion.) In the municipal court the People likewise relied upon such consent and also on other grounds not asserted here presumably because of their patent lack of merit.4
The People cannot for the first time assert their present theory in the instant mandamus proceeding since Hawkins, being entitled to assume that the theories advanced by the prosecutor constituted the only purported justification for the search and seizure had no reason to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and adduce evidence of his own to rebut the theory now advanced by the People. (See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 488 [2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 1510-1511, 78 S.Ct. 1245]; Reinert v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.App.3d 36, 42 [82 Cal.Rptr. 263]; People v. Adam, 1 Cal.App.3d 486, 489 [81 Cal.Rptr. 738].)
Gross miscarriages of justice may occur in cases such as the instant one where a motion to suppress evidence is granted at a special hearing in the superior court and the theory upon which the search and seizure might be upheld is not presented until the People seek mandamus.5 In such cases *770under Penal Code section 1538.5, as it now reads, the People do not have an opportunity to have the legality of the search, and seizure relitigated in the light of their new theory. The section currently reads, “. . . If defendant’s motion is granted at a special hearing in the superior court, the people, if they have additional evidence relating to the motion, and not presented at the special hearing, shall have the right to show good cause at the trial why such evidence was not presented at the special hearing and why the prior ruling at the special hearing should not be binding, or the people may seek appellate review. ... If the people prosecute review by appeal or writ to decision, or any review thereof, in a felony or misdemeanor case, it shall be binding upon them.” (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (j).)6 (Italics added.)
It is for these reasons that I join in the judgment.
McComb, J., concurred.

Probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary care and prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person *767is guilty of a crime. (People v. Terry, 2 Cal.3d 362, 393 [85 Cal.Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961]; People v. Cockrell, 63 Cal.2d 659, 665 [47 Cal.Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116].) Here it appears or may be inferred that before the blood sample was taken, the officers were aware of facts indicating that Hawkins drove the pickup truck onto the highway without stopping or even slowing at the stop sign, a collision ensued resulting in death and injuries to others, Hawkins’ breath smelled of alcoholic beverages, his eyes were bloodshot, his speech a little slow, he appeared dazed, and two full beer cans and one empty were in the pickup. The foregoing evidence would be sufficient to show both probable cause for Hawkins’ arrest for felony drunk driving (Veh. Code, § 23101) and a clear indication he was intoxicated.

The People rely in part upon the destruction of evidence exception to the rule that searches without a warrant are per se unreasonable subject to established exceptions. The majority thus err in stating that the People rely solely on the incident to an arrest exception.

Schmerber stated (at p. 771 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 920]) that the petitioner there was not “one of the few who on grounds of fear, concern for health, or religious scruple might prefer some other means of testing” and that the court therefore need not *768decide whether such wishes would have to be respected. Here Hawkins makes no claim that he is among that few.

In the municipal court at the hearing on the motion to suppress the prosecutor (who was not the same prosecutor who appeared at the preliminary hearing) asserted that under Schmerber “whether the blood-alcohol test is admissible . . . depends on . . . one thing, only: ... if it’s done in a medically approved manner, it is admissible. . . . [I]n this case we have consent, that’s even better. ... I don’t know the facts of this case, because I wasn’t here to handle it—but if there is any suspicion that a man is intoxicated and they have reasonable cause to think possibly there will be an arrest coming forth in a few days . . . they have the right to gather that evidence. They did everything correct under the law. They asked him if he consented. He did. They took it in a medically-approved manner. ... It is admissible evidence regardless of the implied consent requirement.”

Here if the facts are those indicated by the present record the suppression of the blood-alcohol test manifestly frustrates the imperative public interest in combatting the excessive loss of lives and irreparable injuries caused by intoxicated drivers.
*770A gross miscarriage of justice also could occur, for example, in a first degree murder case where evidence vital to conviction is suppressed at a special hearing in the superior court but was lawfully obtained under a theory presented for the first time by the People in a mandamus proceeding.

It should be noted that under Penal Code section 1538.5 and decisions of this court a defendant’s interests are protected to a greater extent than are those of the People. Under section 1538.5 if pretrial motions to suppress are denied by the municipal and superior court, a defendant may seek appellate review before trial by filing a petition for mandamus or prohibition, and if he is unsuccessful he is not bound by the appellate decision and may seek to relitigate the issue on appeal from the judgment of conviction. (People v. Medina, 6 Cal.3d 484 [99 Cal.Rptr. 630, 492 P.2d 686].) Also subdivision (h) of the section specifically provides that “If, prior to the trial of a felony or misdemeanor, opportunity for this motion did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, the defendant shall have the right to make this motion during the course of trial in the municipal, justice or superior court.” People v. O’Brien, 71 Cal.2d 394, 403 [78 Cal.Rptr. 202, 79 Cal.Rptr. 313, 455 P.2d 138, 456 P.2d 969], stated that “By omitting the word ‘renew’ from subdivision (h), the Legislature must have intended to limit the operation of that provision to instances in which the motion is ‘made’ or ‘entertained’ for the first time at trial.” Subsequently in People v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 605, 611 [94 Cal.Rptr. 250, 483 P.2d 1202], we declared that “It should be emphasized that the O’Brien rule is limited to preventing the renewal of a prior motion to suppress, rather than the making of a new motion based upon grounds either unavailable or unknown to defendant at the time his prior motion was denied. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (h).) Thus, for example, if there occurred an intervening change in the applicable law or the discovery of new evidence in support of suppression, the trial court could entertain a new motion based upon such grounds.” Also in. an appropriate case relief can be afforded to a defendant on the basis of ineffective counsel. (See, e.g., People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460, 463-466 [34 Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487].)