Court Opinion

ID: 9556660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 05:09:40.527327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:29.552151
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                   revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                       UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       August 17, 2023
                Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                      No. 351911
                                                                       Oakland Circuit Court
ADONTE MARQUIS BOUIE,                                                  LC No. 2018-267977-FC

                Defendant-Appellant.

                                           ON REMAND

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        This case returns to this Court after the Michigan Supreme Court vacated our judgment
and remanded the matter for reconsideration in light of its order in People v Welsh, ___ Mich ___;
980 NW2d 682 (2022) (Welsh III).1 The broad language of the remand order suggests that this
Court’s entire opinion was vacated—even those provisions that did not pertain to the issue
addressed in the Welsh order, i.e., the transferred-intent doctrine. We, therefore, reiterate extensive
portions of our previous opinion. As explained in this Court’s prior opinion, defendant filed an
appeal of right, raising several issues challenging his jury trial conviction of conspiracy to commit
first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.316(1)(a), for which he was
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant’s appellate arguments
were ultimately rejected and his conviction affirmed. People v Bouie, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 23, 2021 (Docket No. 351911) (Bouie I),
vacated & remanded 984 NW2d 203 (Mich, 2023). After reconsideration on remand, as directed
by the Supreme Court, we continue to affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.

1
    People v Bouie, 984 NW2d 203, 203-204 (Mich, 2023) (Bouie II).

                                                 -1-
                                   I. BACKGROUND FACTS

       The underlying facts were succinctly stated in our prior opinion. As explained in Bouie I:
              Defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit first-degree
       premeditated murder; the charging document indicated that he committed the
       offense in Oakland County during the period from July 2016 to December 2016.
       In the same charging document, defendant was also charged with first-degree
       premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), and three counts of assault with intent
       to commit murder, MCL 750.83, all pertaining to a shooting incident that occurred
       on August 5, 2016. There were also five charges of possession of a firearm during
       the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, i.e., one charge of
       felony-firearm associated with each of the other charges described earlier in this
       paragraph. The charging document indicated that the murder victim was Aniya
       Edwards (Aniya) and that the victims of the three assaults with intent to commit
       murder were, respectively, Tyrell Rush, Jameel Tanzil, and Ki-Jana Morgan. In the
       same charging document, codefendant, Ashton Kevon Greenhouse, was charged
       with the same offenses as defendant.

              At defendant’s trial, Greenhouse testified that he had entered into a plea
       agreement with the prosecutor; as part of the plea agreement, Greenhouse was
       required to testify truthfully at defendant’s trial. In particular, on April 11, 2018,
       Greenhouse pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, three counts
       of assault with intent to commit murder, and three counts of felony-firearm. The
       plea agreement called for Greenhouse to receive a minimum sentence of 25 years’
       imprisonment. Among other evidence presented at defendant’s trial, Greenhouse
       provided testimony implicating defendant in the charged crimes.

             The jury found defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit first-degree
       premeditated murder but not guilty of the other charges. [Bouie I, unpub op at 1-
       2.]

                 II. DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGES TO HIS CONVICTION

                                    A. ORIGINAL APPEAL

       The issues on appeal related to defendant’s conviction were addressed in our prior opinion,
Bouie I, in pertinent part, as follows:
              Defendant first argues on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to
       support his conviction. We disagree.

               A defendant’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is
       reviewed de novo. People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 618; 751 NW2d 57
       (2008). “When reviewing a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
       evidence, [this Court] review[s] the evidence in a light most favorable to the
       prosecutor to determine whether any trier of fact could find the essential elements
       of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Williams, 294 Mich

                                                -2-
App 461, 471; 811 NW2d 88 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Direct
evidence of guilt is not required. Id. “Rather, circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof
of the elements of a crime.” Id. (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
“This Court will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining the weight
of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” Kanaan, 278 Mich App at 619.
“All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution.” Id.

        MCL 750.157a provides, “Any person who conspires together with 1 or
more persons to commit an offense prohibited by law, or to commit a legal act in
an illegal manner is guilty of the crime of conspiracy . . . .” “A criminal conspiracy
is a partnership in criminal purposes, under which two or more individuals
voluntarily agree to effectuate the commission of a criminal offense.” People v
Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 588; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). “Conspiracy is a
specific-intent crime, because it requires both the intent to combine with others and
the intent to accomplish the illegal objective.” People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 629;
628 NW2d 540 (2001). “The gist of conspiracy lies in the illegal agreement; once
the agreement is formed, the crime is complete.” People v Seewald, 499 Mich 111,
117; 879 NW2d 237 (2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Direct proof
of a conspiracy is not required; rather, proof may be derived from the
circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties.” Jackson, 292 Mich App at 588
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

        The illegal objective of the conspiracy in this case was first-degree
premeditated murder. “The elements of first-degree murder are (1) the intentional
killing of a human (2) with premeditation and deliberation.” People v Bennett, 290
Mich App 465, 472; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). “Premeditation and deliberation, for
purposes of a first-degree murder conviction, require sufficient time to allow the
defendant to take a second look.” People v Orr, 275 Mich App 587, 591; 739
NW2d 385 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). For there to be a
conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder, each conspirator must have
the intent required for that offense. People v Hammond, 187 Mich App 105, 108;
466 NW2d 335 (1991). An intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a
dangerous weapon. People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 672; 509 NW2d 885
(1993).

         Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder because there
was no conspiracy to kill Aniya, i.e., the person who was actually killed during the
August 5, 2016 shooting incident. But there is no requirement to prove a conspiracy
to kill a person who was actually killed. Rather, “[t]he gist of conspiracy lies in the
illegal agreement; once the agreement is formed, the crime is complete.” Seewald,
499 Mich at 117. And contrary to defendant’s assertion, the identity of the person
who was the intended target of the conspiracy is not an element of conspiracy to
commit first-degree murder.1

                                         -3-
_________________________________________________________________
1
  Under defendant’s theory, an agreement to plant a bomb, fly an airplane into a
building, or fire an assault weapon into a crowd would not constitute a conspiracy
to commit first-degree premeditated murder merely because the conspirators never
identified a particular person who was the intended target of the conspiracy.
Defendant cites no authority to support his untenable position.
_________________________________________________________________

         Greenhouse’s testimony indicated that he and defendant were the persons
who fired shots at a group of people on Thorpe Street in Pontiac on August 5, 2016,
in retaliation for an earlier attempt to rob Greenhouse. There was ample testimony
that defendant and Greenhouse were close associates and were angry about the
attempted robbery of Greenhouse. Defendant and Greenhouse obtained assault
rifles and drove to the Thorpe area, where Tanzil, Rush, and Morgan, who were
members of a rival gang allegedly involved in the effort to rob Greenhouse, were
among a group of people at a social gathering. Greenhouse and defendant fired
their assault weapons at the group of people. Aniya, Tanzil, Rush, and Morgan
were struck by bullets; Aniya died, and the other three were injured. Greenhouse
further testified that, after he and defendant fired their assault rifles, they fled the
scene and hid their weapons, which indicates their consciousness of guilt. See
People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490, 510; 909 NW2d 458 (2017) (efforts to
hide evidence may indicate consciousness of guilt); People v Coleman, 210 Mich
App 1, 4; 532 NW2d 885 (1995) (fleeing may indicate consciousness of guilt).
Later in 2016, defendant, Edward Thompson, and Greenhouse armed themselves
with firearms, discussed using their weapons, and tried unsuccessfully to locate the
men allegedly involved in the attempted robbery of Greenhouse. Other witnesses
testified regarding incriminating statements defendant made about his involvement
in the shooting on Thorpe. There was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact
to find that defendant intended to combine with Greenhouse to accomplish first-
degree premeditated murder.
       Defendant next argues that he was denied his constitutional right to due
process because he was not given notice of whom he allegedly conspired to murder.
Defendant’s argument is unavailing.

        To preserve a due-process argument for appellate review, a defendant must
raise an objection on that ground in the trial court. People v Hanks, 276 Mich App
91, 92; 740 NW2d 530 (2007). As defendant concedes on appeal, he did not
preserve his due-process argument by raising an objection on that ground below.
Therefore, the due-process issue is not preserved.

        A preserved due-process claim is reviewed de novo, Jackson, 292 Mich App
at 590, but unpreserved constitutional issues are reviewed for plain error affecting
substantial rights, People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). Under the plain-error test, a defendant must show that (1) an error occurred,
(2) the error was clear or obvious, and (3) the error prejudiced the defendant, i.e., it

                                          -4-
affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id. at 763. If a defendant satisfies those
requirements, reversal is warranted only if the error resulted in the conviction of an
innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of the proceedings. Id. at 763-764.

       “No person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.” People v McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 699; 672 NW2d 191 (2003), citing
US Const, Am V, and Const 1963, art 1, § 17. “In a criminal case, due process
generally requires reasonable notice of the charge and an opportunity to be heard.”
McGee, 258 Mich App at 699. “[T]o establish a due process violation, a defendant
must prove prejudice to his defense.” Id. at 700. “Whether an accused is accorded
due process depends on the facts of each case.” Id.

        Defendant asserts that the felony information failed to afford notice of the
person(s) whom defendant allegedly conspired to murder. It is true that the count
charging defendant and Greenhouse with conspiracy to commit first-degree
premeditated murder did not identify a specific person who was the target of the
conspiracy. But as explained earlier, the identity of the person who was the target
of the conspiracy is not an element of conspiracy to commit first-degree
premeditated murder. In any event, the felony information also charged defendant
and Greenhouse each with three counts of assault with intent to commit murder;
Tanzil, Rush, and Morgan were identified in the felony information as the
respective victims of the three assaults with intent to commit murder. Defendant
was thus provided notice that he was being charged in connection with efforts to
kill Tanzil, Rush, and Morgan. Further, defendant has not demonstrated prejudice
arising from any deficiency in the felony information. He has not explained what
different defense would have been presented if Tanzil, Rush, and Morgan had been
specifically named in the conspiracy count in addition to the counts in which they
were already named. See McGee, 258 Mich App at 702 (the defendant did not
establish actual prejudice because she did not explain “what different defense
would have been presented[]”). Overall, defendant’s due-process claim fails
because he has not established that he was denied adequate notice and thus deprived
of an adequate opportunity to prepare his defense.

        Defendant further contends that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel because defense counsel did not request a bill of particulars. This argument
is likewise unsuccessful.

        To preserve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
raise the issue in a motion for a new trial or a Ginther hearing filed below, People
v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012), or in a motion to remand for
a Ginther hearing filed in this Court, People v Abcumby-Blair, ___ Mich App ___,
___: ___ NW2d ___ (2020) (Docket No. 347369); slip op at 8, lv pending.
Defendant did not raise this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel below by
filing a motion for a new trial or a Ginther hearing, or in this Court by filing a
motion to remand for a Ginther hearing. Hence, the issue is unpreserved. Because

                                         -5-
no Ginther hearing was held, this Court’s review is limited to the existing record.
Id.

       Whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel presents
a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. Heft, 299 Mich App at 80.
Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and questions of law are reviewed de
novo. Id.

        “To prove that his defense counsel was not effective, the defendant must
show that (1) defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that counsel’s deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant.” People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 68; 862
NW2d 446 (2014). “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant
bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Head, 323 Mich App 526,
539; 917 NW2d 752 (2018) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). “In
examining whether defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that
counsel’s performance was born from a sound trial strategy.” People v
Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). To establish prejudice, a
defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 9; 917 NW2d 249 (2018) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). A “defendant has the burden of establishing the factual
predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Hoag, 460
Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).

        MCR 6.112(E) provides, “The court, on motion, may order the prosecutor
to provide the defendant a bill of particulars describing the essential facts of the
alleged offense.” A preliminary examination obviates the need for a bill of
particulars by informing the defendant of the nature of the charges against him.
People v Harbour, 76 Mich App 552, 557; 257 NW2d 165 (1977); People v Jones,
75 Mich App 261, 270; 254 NW2d 863 (1977). A preliminary examination was
held in this case on August 17, 2018. Defendant fails to address this point or to
explain why the preliminary examination would not have provided adequate notice
of the nature of the charges against him. Therefore, defendant has not established
that a bill of particulars was needed or that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to request one. “Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile
objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Ericksen,
288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).

        Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder because the jury was never
instructed that the identity of the person who was the intended target of the
conspiracy was an element of the offense. This issue is waived because defendant
affirmatively approved the instruction below. Before the final instructions were
read to the jury, defense counsel approved of the instructions during exchanges with

                                        -6-
the trial court outside the presence of the jury. Also, after the trial court provided
its final instructions to the jury, including the instruction challenged on appeal, the
trial court asked, “Any objection to the instructions as read?” Defense counsel
responded, “None.” By expressly approving the jury instructions, defendant
waived review of the alleged instructional error. See People v Kowalski, 489 Mich
488, 503-505; 803 NW2d 200 (2011). Waiver extinguishes any error, meaning that
there is no error to review. Id.

        Defendant further argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the instruction and for waiving the alleged instructional error. Defendant’s
argument on this point is unavailing.

        Defendant did not raise this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel below
by filing a motion for a new trial or a Ginther hearing, or in this Court by filing a
motion to remand for a Ginther hearing. Hence, the issue is unpreserved. Because
no Ginther hearing was held, this Court’s review is limited to the existing record.
Abcumby-Blair, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 8.

        Jury instructions are considered “as a whole, rather than piecemeal, to
determine whether any error occurred.” Kowalski, 489 Mich at 501. “A criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to have a jury determine his or her guilt from
its consideration of every essential element of the charged offense. A defendant is
thus entitled to have all the elements of the crime submitted to the jury in a charge
which is neither erroneous nor misleading.” Id. (quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis,
and citations omitted). “Instructional errors that omit an element of an offense, or
otherwise misinform the jury of an offense’s elements, do ‘not necessarily render a
criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or
innocence.’ ” Id., quoting Neder v United States, 527 US 1, 9; 119 S Ct 1827; 144
L Ed 2d 35 (1999). Hence, “an imperfect instruction is not grounds for setting aside
a conviction if the instruction fairly presented the issues to be tried and adequately
protected the defendant’s rights.” Kowalski, 489 Mich at 501-502.

       The trial court instructed the jury as follows regarding the elements of
conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder:

              The Defendant is charged with the crime of conspiracy to
       commit first[-]degree, premeditated murder.      Anyone who
       knowingly agrees with someone else to commit murder is guilty of
       conspiracy.

              To prove the Defendant’s guilt, the Prosecutor must prove
       each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

             First, that the Defendant and someone else knowingly agreed
       to commit first[-]degree, premeditated murder.

               Second, that the Defendant specifically intended to commit
       or help commit that crime.

                                         -7-
                Third, that this agreement took place or continued during the
        period from July 2016 through December 2016.

The trial court also instructed the jury regarding the elements of first-degree
premeditated murder, including regarding the meaning of both premeditation and
deliberation, when instructing the jury on the separate charge of first-degree
premeditated murder. The trial court further instructed the jury on the concept of
transferred intent as follows: “If the Defendant or anyone he aided and abetted
intended to kill one person but by mistake or accident killed another person, the
crime is the same as if the first person had actually been killed.”

        The trial court’s instructions, when read as a whole, fairly presented the
issues to be tried and adequately protected defendant’s rights. The instruction on
conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder conformed with applicable
legal principles set forth earlier in this opinion. That is, the court correctly informed
the jury that defendant and someone else must have knowingly agreed to commit
first-degree premeditated murder and that defendant must have specifically
intended to commit or help commit that crime. See Jackson, 292 Mich App at 588
(“A criminal conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes, under which two or
more individuals voluntarily agree to effectuate the commission of a criminal
offense.”). Again, “[t]he gist of conspiracy lies in the illegal agreement; once the
agreement is formed, the crime is complete.” Seewald, 499 Mich at 117 (quotation
marks and citations omitted). The instructions, when read as a whole, also informed
the jury regarding the elements of first-degree premeditated murder, including
regarding the mental state required for that crime. Contrary to defendant’s
assertion, the identity of the person who was the intended target of the conspiracy
is not an element of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and the court did
not err in failing to include such an element in its instructions. Defense counsel
was not ineffective for failing to make a meritless argument or raise a futile
objection to the jury instructions. Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201.

       Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
request a specific unanimity instruction. We disagree.

        Defendant did not raise this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel below
by filing a motion for a new trial or a Ginther hearing, or in this Court by filing a
motion to remand for a Ginther hearing. Hence, the issue is unpreserved. Because
no Ginther hearing was held, this Court’s review is limited to the existing record.
Abcumby-Blair, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 8.

        The trial court provided a general instruction on unanimity to the jury. The
trial court instructed: “A verdict in a criminal case must be unanimous. In order to
return a verdict, it is necessary that each of you agrees on that verdict.” Defendant
nonetheless argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
specific unanimity instruction regarding the identity of the person who was the
intended target of the conspiracy. Defendant’s argument is unavailing.

                                          -8-
               Criminal defendants are entitled to a unanimous jury verdict. People v
       Chelmicki, 305 Mich App 58, 67; 850 NW2d 612 (2014), citing MCR 6.410(B).
       The trial court must properly instruct the jury regarding the unanimity requirement.
       Chelmicki, 305 Mich App at 67-68. A general instruction on unanimity is ordinarily
       sufficient, but “a specific unanimity instruction may be required in cases in which
       more than one act is presented as evidence of the actus reus of a single criminal
       offense and each act is established through materially distinguishable evidence that
       would lead to juror confusion.” Id. at 68 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
       In the present case, there was no risk of juror confusion. This case does not involve
       multiple acts presented as evidence of the actus reus of a single offense with each
       act established through materially distinguishable evidence. The prosecution
       theory was not that complicated: defendant agreed with Greenhouse to commit
       premeditated murder. The illegal agreement is the gist of the conspiracy, Seewald,
       499 Mich at 117, and the illegal agreement comprised a single criminal act.
       Defendant suggests that there could have been juror confusion or disagreement
       regarding who was the intended victim or target of the conspiracy, but again, this
       is not an element of the offense. A specific unanimity instruction was not required,
       and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile request.
       Chelmicki, 305 Mich App at 69. [Bouie I, unpub op at 2-7.]

Accordingly, this Court concluded that defendant’s challenges on appeal to his conviction of
conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder were without merit.

                    B. DEFENDANT’S LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED

       Thereafter, defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in our Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court held the application in abeyance for Welsh III. People v Bouie, 978 NW2d 825,
825-826 (Mich, 2022). While defendant’s application was pending, our Supreme Court entered
an order in Welsh III stating:
               On October 13, 2022, this Court heard oral argument on the application for
       leave to appeal the June 18, 2019 and February 18, 2021 judgments of the Court of
       Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR
       7.305(H)(1). We REVERSE in part the June 18, 2019 judgment of the Court of
       Appeals and REMAND this case to the Saginaw Circuit Court for a new trial before
       a properly instructed jury. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court
       erred when it instructed the jury that the defendant’s conspiracy with regard to an
       intent to murder one individual could be transferred to charges of conspiracy with
       intent to murder others. The panel erred, however, in finding no cause to reverse.
       The trial court’s erroneous instruction that the transferred-intent doctrine applied to
       the defendant’s conspiracy charges permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty
       of conspiracy against the identified victims (Berrian and Jones) on the basis of a
       different, uncharged conspiracy against one individual (DT). The jury’s note
       during deliberations suggests that the jury did so, and at a minimum, even assuming
       that the error was nonconstitutional, the defendant is entitled to a new trial because
       the error “undermined reliability in the verdict.” People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335,
       364; 646 NW2d 127 (2002). In all other respects, the application for leave to appeal

                                                -9-
       is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented
       should be reviewed by this Court. [Welsh III, 980 NW2d at 682.]

Our Supreme Court later entered an order in the present case stating: “[I]n lieu of granting leave
to appeal, we VACATE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and we REMAND this case to the
Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Welsh.” Bouie II, 984 NW2d at 203-204.

                          C. REMAND PROCEEDINGS & ANALYSIS

       On remand, the parties jointly moved to file supplemental briefs, and the motion was
granted. People v Bouie, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 9, 2023
(Docket No. 351911). The parties have filed supplemental briefs.

        In his supplemental brief, defendant argues that Welsh III should alter the way this Court
analyzes his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the fairness of his trial. According
to defendant, Welsh III indicates that the target of a conspiracy must be identified and that the
transferred-intent theory does not apply to a conspiracy charge. Thus, the evidence was
insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction because the evidence failed to establish the identity
of a person whom defendant conspired to kill. Also, defendant argues, he did not receive fair
notice of the identity of person who was the target of the conspiracy, and defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to insist on such notice. Further, the jury was not instructed that the identity
of the intended victim of the conspiracy was an element of the conspiracy charge. And a specific
unanimity instruction was required. Moreover, the jury should have been instructed that the
transferred-intent theory did not apply to the conspiracy charge.

       In its supplemental brief, the prosecution argues that Welsh III is of no consequence to this
Court’s opinion in Bouie I, our prior opinion. Nothing in Welsh III undermines this Court’s
conclusion that the identity of the person who was the intended target of the conspiracy is not an
element of the offense. Welsh III merely holds that the transferred-intent doctrine does not apply
to conspiracy charges. Unlike in Welsh III, the present case contains no indication that defendant
engaged in a different conspiracy than the one charged. Defendant was not denied due process.
The target of the conspiracy is not an element of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder;
moreover, Tanzil, Rush, and Morgan were identified in the felony information as the respective
victims of the counts of assault with intent to commit murder. Unlike in Welsh III, the jury here
expressed no confusion regarding the conspiracy or transferred-intent instructions, defense counsel
did not object to the instructions, and the jury was not told that the transferred-intent instruction
applied to the conspiracy charge. Even if defense counsel should have asked that the jury be told
the transferred-intent doctrine did not apply to the conspiracy charge, defendant cannot
demonstrate prejudice. The conspiracy count was not based on a theory of transferred intent. Also,
the conspiracy here lasted for several months and did not end on the day of the Thorpe Street
shooting.

        After reconsideration on remand, we conclude that our prior opinion, Bouie I, correctly
rejected defendant’s appellate arguments, and our Supreme Court’s order in Welsh III does not
alter the proper analysis of the issues raised on appeal.

                                                 -10-
       As explained above, our Supreme Court has vacated this Court’s judgment in Bouie I and
remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of the order entered in Welsh III.
Orders of our Supreme Court constitute binding precedent when the rationale can be understood,
even if doing so requires examination of other opinions in the case, including unpublished
opinions. Woodring v Phoenix Ins Co, 325 Mich App 108, 115; 923 NW2d 607 (2018); Evans &
Luptak, PLC v Lizza, 251 Mich App 187, 195-196; 650 NW2d 364 (2002). An unpublished
opinion of this Court is required to understand the Supreme Court’s rationale in Welsh III.

                                     1. THE WELSH CASE

        In People v Welsh, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June
18, 2019 (Docket No. 341519), p 1 (Welsh I), rev’d in part & remanded, lv den in part 980 NW2d
682 (2022), this Court explained that the “[d]efendant was convicted by jury of two counts of
conspiracy to commit assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83, MCL 750.157a, and three counts
of” felony-firearm. The defendant “was acquitted of two counts of assault with intent to murder,
one count of discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and one count of discharge of a firearm at a
building.” Id. This Court summarized the underlying facts:
                Defendant, Brandon Grace and Hannah Grace, their mother, Megan
       Gloude, Carl Wardell, Jr., and Destinie Wardell agreed to drive by a home where
       they thought that an individual named “DT” lived to kill him in retaliation for the
       death of their acquaintance. The group drove by the home twice. On at least the
       last of the two drive-bys, there were a number of people socializing on the porch,
       including the owner of the home, Sonnet Berrian, three other adults, and two
       children. Brandon Jones, Berrian’s fiancé, was inside the residence. Defendant
       discharged her weapon, but it did not fire. The group drove by a third time, and at
       least five shots were fired, including shots fired by defendant. No one was injured.
       [Id.]

        On appeal, the defendant argued “that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that
defendant’s conspiracy with regard to an intent to murder one individual could be transferred to a
charge of conspiracy with intent to murder others.” Id. at 4. This Court agreed but found no cause
to reverse. Id. This Court noted that the “[d]efendant was not charged with conspiracy to commit
assault with intent to murder DT” but rather “was charged with conspiracy to commit assault with
intent to murder Berrian and Jones, and assault with intent to murder Berrian and Jones.” Id.
       When instructing the jury on the assault charges, the trial court stated that “[i]f the
       defendant intended to assault or kill one person, but by mistake or accident killed
       or assaulted another person, the crime is the same as if the first person had actually
       been killed or assaulted.” The court did not discuss intended targets while
       instructing the jury on the conspiracy charges. During deliberations, the jury asked
       whether the “transfer effect” could apply to a thought, and asked for instructions
       regarding the conspiracy charges, stating: “We understand what it is, but I’m
       personally having trouble convicting someone of two counts, two counts of
       conspiracy with assault with intent to murder [Jones] and [Berrian], when, if they
       did conspire, it was about one person, DT.” The trial court stated to trial counsel
       that a conspiracy involved an intent to combine with others and an intent to
       accomplish the crime, here murder, and the object of the conspiracy can be

                                                -11-
       transferred to the people who were targeted by it. The trial court then informed the
       jury that “transferred intent can apply to a conspiracy charge. It’s up to all of you
       to decide if it applies to conspiracy charges in this case.” [Id.]

“[T]he charged crime that led to defendant’s conviction was the agreement to assault Berrian and
Jones,” but “the express agreement between defendant and her cohorts initially was to kill DT.”
Id. This Court stated that “the intent to assault Berrian and Jones with the intent to kill could be
inferred by transferring the intent of defendant and the group to kill DT, but the agreement to
assault them should not have been inferred from the intent to kill DT.” Id. at 5. “[B]ecause the
conspiracy crime is separate from the assault crime, and focuses on the agreement, the conspiracy
crime should be limited to the scope of the agreement, and the trial court erred by informing the
jury that transferred intent could apply to a conspiracy charge.” Id.

       Nonetheless, this Court determined that the error was harmless, explaining:
       Here, one juror questioned whether transferred intent could be utilized to
       demonstrate the conspiracy to assault Jones and Berrian. However, the evidence
       was sufficient to establish that defendant participated in a conspiracy to assault
       Jones and Berrian, without transferred intent. While denying defendant’s motion
       for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court stated that the conspiracy
       began with an intent to murder DT and that intent may have been transferred to
       Berrian and Jones, but there was also evidence of an agreement to murder Berrian
       and Jones because the assailants had driven by them once, and returned to shoot at
       them. As the trial court noted, the verdict was established by the evidence, despite
       the erroneous instruction. Thus, the instructional error did not undermine the
       reliability of the verdict. [Id.]

This Court also observed:
       Again, however, where there was evidence that defendant and the group would
       have known that there were other occupants in the house given that they would
       have seen them on the porch, and the implicit agreement was to go through with
       shooting at the house knowing various individuals were there, the jury would not
       have had to reach the issue of transferred intent to convict defendant. The problem
       arises simply because the jury raised the question regarding transferred intent. [Id.
       at 5 n 1 (emphasis added).]

This Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions but remanded for resentencing on grounds that
are not relevant here. Id. at 1, 10-13.

        After the defendant in Welsh was resentenced, she filed another appeal of right, arguing
that she was again entitled to resentencing; this Court rejected the defendant’s argument and
affirmed. People v Welsh, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
February 18, 2021 (Docket No. 352517) (Welsh II). The defendant then applied for leave to appeal
in our Supreme Court, which heard oral argument on the application and then entered an order
stating, in relevant part:

                                               -12-
       We REVERSE in part the June 18, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals and
       REMAND this case to the Saginaw Circuit Court for a new trial before a properly
       instructed jury. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court erred when
       it instructed the jury that the defendant’s conspiracy with regard to an intent to
       murder one individual could be transferred to charges of conspiracy with intent to
       murder others. The panel erred, however, in finding no cause to reverse. The trial
       court’s erroneous instruction that the transferred-intent doctrine applied to the
       defendant’s conspiracy charges permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty of
       conspiracy against the identified victims (Berrian and Jones) on the basis of a
       different, uncharged conspiracy against one individual (DT). The jury’s note
       during deliberations suggests that the jury did so, and at a minimum, even assuming
       that the error was nonconstitutional, the defendant is entitled to a new trial because
       the error “undermined reliability in the verdict.” People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335,
       364; 646 NW2d 127 (2002). In all other respects, the application for leave to appeal
       is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented
       should be reviewed by this Court. [Welsh III, 980 NW2d at 682.]

                                 2. WELSH NOT APPLICABLE

        We conclude that our Supreme Court’s order in Welsh III has no applicability here. In his
supplemental brief, defendant asserts that “Welsh confirms the necessity of identifying the target
of an alleged assault conspiracy.” But our Supreme Court in Welsh III did not hold that the identity
of the intended target(s) of the conspiracy is an element of conspiracy to commit first-degree
murder. Although the conspiracy charges in Welsh III had identified Berrian and Jones as the
victims or targets of the conspiracy, neither this Court nor our Supreme Court held that this was
legally required, i.e., that the identity of the target(s) of the conspiracy was an element of the
offense. And the ramification of inferring the existence of such an unstated holding in the order
would mean—as we stated in our prior opinion—that “an agreement to plant a bomb, fly an
airplane into a building, or fire an assault weapon into a crowd would not constitute a conspiracy
to commit first-degree premeditated murder merely because the conspirators never identified a
particular person who was the intended target of the conspiracy.” Bouie I, unpub op at 3 n 1.

        Our Supreme Court’s order in Welsh III should be understood to mean what it actually
says. The Court upheld this Court’s determination that the transferred-intent doctrine did not apply
in the context of the conspiracy charges in that case, but rejected this Court’s determination that
the error was harmless. Welsh III, 980 NW2d at 682. In particular, our Supreme Court agreed
with this Court “that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that the defendant’s conspiracy
with regard to an intent to murder one individual could be transferred to charges of conspiracy
with intent to murder others.” Id. The Court reasoned that reversal was required because the
erroneous instruction “permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty of conspiracy against the
identified victims (Berrian and Jones) on the basis of a different, uncharged conspiracy against one
individual (DT).” Id. A jury note from deliberations suggested that the jury did exactly that. Id.

        The present case differs from Welsh III. Unlike in Welsh III, the jury was never instructed
that the transferred-intent doctrine applied to the conspiracy charge, and the jury never expressed
confusion regarding the relevant instructions or provided a note suggesting that it was finding
defendant guilty of the charged conspiracy on the basis of a different, uncharged conspiracy.

                                                 -13-
         It is true that the trial court provided a transferred-intent instruction, but this was after the
court had instructed on all of the charged offenses, including first-degree premeditated murder,
which came after the conspiracy instruction. The language of the transferred-intent instruction
indicated that it applied to a killing, thus reflecting that the instruction pertained to the murder
charge, which required a killing, rather than the conspiracy charge, which did not require an actual
killing.2 Unlike in Welsh III, the jury never expressed confusion regarding the relevant
instructions, and the trial court never told the jury that the transferred-intent instruction applied to
the conspiracy charge. Moreover, the trial court informed the jury that the conspiracy was alleged
to have occurred from July 2016 to December 2016, i.e., it continued after the August 5, 2016
shooting incident. The jury was thus apprised that the conspiracy was alleged to have continued
after the shooting incident that resulted in an actual killing. Evidence supported the prosecution
theory of a continuing conspiracy. See Bouie I, unpub op at 3. This timeline further undercuts
any contention that the jury would have misunderstood the transferred-intent instruction, which
referred to a killing, as applicable to the conspiracy charge. And the trial court instructed the jury
that, “[i]f the defendant agreed to commit a completely different crime, then he is not guilty of
conspiracy to commit murder.”

        Considering the jury instructions as a whole, the jury was not given any reason to believe
that the transferred-intent instruction applied to the conspiracy charge. The jury was not provided
any instruction suggesting that it could find defendant guilty of the charged conspiracy on the basis
of a different, uncharged conspiracy, and there is no indication that the jury did so. Nor did the
prosecution present any theory that would have led the jury to find defendant guilty on the basis
of an uncharged conspiracy. Overall, this case differs from Welsh III, and no error occurred.

         We next consider, and reject, defendant’s arguments on remand. First, nothing in Welsh
III alters our holding that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction. We
identified the elements of the offense and explained at length why the evidence was sufficient to
satisfy those elements. Bouie I, unpub op at 2-3. We adopt that analysis and continue to conclude
that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction.

        In his supplemental brief, defendant again asserts that he was denied fair notice of the
target(s) of the conspiracy because the felony information did not identify the intended target(s).
But as we previously explained in Bouie I, “the identity of the person who was the target of the
conspiracy is not an element of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder.” Bouie I,
unpub op at 4. Here, the felony information identified Tanzil, Rush, and Morgan “as the respective
victims of the three assaults with intent to commit murder” and that “[d]efendant was thus provided
notice that he was being charged in connection with efforts to kill Tanzil, Rush, and Morgan.” Id.
By contrast, there is no indication that DT, the intended target of the drive-by shooting in Welsh
III, was ever identified in the charging document as a victim of the charged crimes. In short, there
is nothing in Welsh III that alters our previous conclusion, which we adopt here, that “defendant’s

2
  In particular, the transferred-intent instruction provided, “If the Defendant or anyone he aided
and abetted intended to kill one person but by mistake or accident killed another person, the crime
is the same as if the first person had actually been killed.” The instruction by its very terms thus
applied to a killing, but the conspiracy charge did not require an actual killing.

                                                  -14-
due-process claim fails because he has not established that he was denied adequate notice and thus
deprived of an adequate opportunity to prepare his defense.” Id.

        Next, defendant’s contention that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
bill of particulars remains unavailing. As we previously explained, a preliminary examination
obviates the need for a bill of particulars, a preliminary examination was held in this case, and
defendant has failed to explain why the preliminary examination would not have provided
adequate notice of the nature of the charges. Id. at 5. Thus, we adopt our previous conclusion that
“defendant has not established that a bill of particulars was needed or that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to request one.” Id.

         As for defendant’s claim of instructional error, there is nothing in Welsh III to alter our
previous conclusion that defendant waived any instructional error by expressly approving the jury
instructions. Id. And defendant remains unable to establish that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to object or for waiving the alleged instructional error. As we explained, the conspiracy
instruction “conformed with applicable legal principles” by “inform[ing] the jury that defendant
and someone else must have knowingly agreed to commit first-degree premeditated murder and
that defendant must have specifically intended to commit or help commit that crime.” Id. at 6-7.
“[T]he identity of the person who was the intended target of the conspiracy is not an element of
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and the court did not err in failing to include such an
element in its instructions.” Id. at 7. “Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a
meritless argument or raise a futile objection to the jury instructions.” Id. We also explained why
defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a specific unanimity instruction, id., and
nothing in Welsh III affects the proper analysis of that issue which we adopt here.

        Finally, in his supplemental brief on remand, defendant argues that the jury should have
been informed that the transferred-intent instruction did not apply to the conspiracy charge. He
asserts that the trial court plainly erred or that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request
such a clarification in the instructions. As for the allegation of instructional error, defendant
remains unable to overcome the fact that his trial counsel waived any alleged error by approving
the instructions that were given. Moreover, defendant cannot establish ineffective assistance of
his trial counsel on this issue. As already explained, this case differs from Welsh III. The
conspiracy instruction indicated that the agreement to commit first-degree premeditated murder
was alleged to have occurred from July 2016 through December 2016, i.e., it continued after the
August 5, 2016 shooting incident that resulted in a killing. The conspiracy instruction was given
first, followed by the instructions on the other charged offenses, including first-degree
premeditated murder, and only after all of those instructions was the transferred-intent instruction
given. Unlike in Welsh III, the jury did not express confusion about the transferred-intent
instruction, the jury was not told that the transferred-intent instruction could apply to the
conspiracy charge, and the jury did not provide a note indicating that it was finding defendant
guilty of the charged conspiracy on the basis of a different, uncharged conspiracy. Given the
circumstances of the instant case, we adopt our previous holding that defendant has not
demonstrated that his trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient or that defendant
was prejudiced by such performance.

       Accordingly, after reconsideration in light of Welsh III, we continue to affirm defendant’s
conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder.

                                                  -15-
                  III. DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGES TO HIS SENTENCE

       Again, because of the broad language of the Supreme Court’s remand order suggesting that
this Court’s entire opinion was vacated, i.e., Bouie I, we reiterate—and reaffirm—the resolution
of defendant’s issues on appeal related to his sentence, in pertinent part, as follows:
                Defendant next argues that the trial court lacked authority to sentence him
       to life imprisonment without parole for his conviction of conspiracy to commit first-
       degree premeditated murder. Defendant’s argument fails.

               “To preserve a sentencing issue for appeal, a defendant must raise the issue
       at sentencing, in a proper motion for resentencing, or in a proper motion to remand
       filed in the court of appeals.” People v Anderson, 322 Mich App 622, 634; 912
       NW2d 607 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Defendant did not raise
       this issue at sentencing, in a proper motion or resentencing, or in a proper motion
       to remand filed in this Court. Therefore, the issue is unpreserved.

              “[T]his Court’s review is limited to plain error affecting substantial rights
       because the issue was not preserved.” People v Clark, 315 Mich App 219, 224;
       888 NW2d 309 (2016).

              Relief is available only when (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was
              plain, meaning clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected
              substantial rights, meaning it affected the outcome of the
              proceedings. Additionally, reversal is warranted only when the
              plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually
              innocent defendant or when the error seriously affected the fairness,
              integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. [Id.
              (citation omitted).]

              The conspiracy statute, MCL 750.157a(a), provides that a person convicted
       of conspiracy to commit an offense punishable by imprisonment for one year or
       more “shall be punished by a penalty equal to that which could be imposed if he
       had been convicted of committing the crime he conspired to commit . . . .”
       Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated
       murder. The first-degree murder statute provides that a person convicted of that
       offense “shall be punished by imprisonment for life without eligibility for parole.”
       MCL 750.316. The trial court was thus bound to sentence defendant to life
       imprisonment without parole for his conviction of conspiracy to commit first-
       degree premeditated murder.

               In People v Jahner, 433 Mich 490, 504; 446 NW2d 151 (1989), our
       Supreme Court held that “a person sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy
       to commit first-degree murder is eligible for parole consideration . . . .” But Jahner
       was decided before MCL 750.316 was amended in 2014 to add language requiring
       that persons convicted of first-degree murder be sentenced to life imprisonment
       without parole. See 2014 PA 23. Jahner thus did not address the language in the

                                               -16-
current version of MCL 750.316. The trial court did not plainly err in imposing a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole.

       Defendant next argues that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for a conviction of conspiracy to commit first-
degree premediated murder constitutes cruel or unusual punishment in violation of
the Michigan Constitution. We disagree.

        “To preserve a claim that the defendant’s sentence[] [was]
unconstitutionally cruel or unusual, the defendant must raise the claim in the trial
court.” People v Burkett, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2021) (Docket
No. 351882); slip op at 2. Defendant did not raise this issue below. Therefore, the
issue is unpreserved.

       This Court has explained:

               This Court generally reviews constitutional questions de
       novo. However, we review unpreserved constitutional issues for
       plain error affecting substantial rights. To establish entitlement to
       relief under plain-error review, the defendant must establish that an
       error occurred, that the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and
       that the plain error affected substantial rights. An error affects
       substantial rights when it impacts the outcome of the lower court
       proceedings. Reversal is warranted only when the error resulted in
       the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously
       affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
       proceedings independently of the defendant’s innocence. [Burkett,
       ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2 (quotation marks and citations
       omitted).]

       Const 1963, art 1, § 16 prohibits cruel or unusual punishment. Burkett, ___
Mich App at ___; slip op at 3. This constitutional proscription includes a
prohibition of grossly disproportionate sentences. Id.

               This Court employs the following three-part test in
       determining whether a punishment is cruel or unusual: (1) the
       severity of the sentence imposed and the gravity of the offense, (2)
       a comparison of the penalty to penalties for other crimes under
       Michigan law, and (3) a comparison between Michigan’s penalty
       and penalties imposed for the same offense in other states.
       Legislatively mandated sentences are presumptively proportional
       and presumptively valid. In order to overcome the presumption that
       the sentence is proportionate, a defendant must present unusual
       circumstances that would render the presumptively proportionate
       sentence disproportionate.       Statutes are presumed to be
       constitutional, and the courts have a duty to construe a statute as

                                       -17-
       constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent. [Id.
       (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

        In People v Fernandez, 427 Mich 321, 335; 398 NW2d 311 (1986), our
Supreme Court held that “a mandatory life sentence, even if nonparolable, imposed
for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is not so excessive as to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.” The Court noted that “[c]onspiracy to commit first-
degree murder is an extremely serious offense, perhaps exceeded only by first-
degree murder itself.” Id. at 336. “Conspiracy can be as dangerous as a completed
offense because it may give rise to a cooperation among criminals that is a special
hazard.” Id. The Court further observed that, “[i]n enacting MCL 750.157a, the
Legislature decided that conspiracy to commit a given offense was as serious as the
actual commission, or that the conspiracy was sufficiently serious to merit the same
punishment.” Fernandez, 427 Mich at 337. Further, when comparing the offense
to other crimes in Michigan that carry a mandatory life sentence, our Supreme
Court could not “say that a conspiracy to commit first-degree murder such as
occurred in this case is so much less culpable than these offenses as to
constitutionally invalidate a mandatory life sentence.” Id. Nor did a consideration
of the sentences imposed by other states for the same offense require a finding of
disproportionality. Id. at 337-338. Lastly, although a nonparolable life sentence
does not advance a goal of rehabilitation,

       [o]ther policies, such as deterrence of others, deterrence of the
       offender, or punishment of the offender, may suffice to deflect a
       cruel and unusual punishment challenge. In the instant case, the fact
       that a conspiracy conviction requires the same punishment as the
       substantive target offense carries the message to potential
       wrongdoers that conspiratorial agreements involve substantial risks
       and dangers. This is a rational deterrence effort. Where a crime
       involves advance planning, such as premeditated murder and
       conspiracy, the possibility of deterring the potential wrongdoer from
       engaging in the illicit activity by a stringent penalty is more realistic
       than in crimes committed on impulse. Furthermore, a life sentence
       certainly protects society at large from an offender during the time
       of imprisonment. Finally, the retributive punishment factor is a
       valid consideration in cases such as this, where the potential harm
       to society is great. [Id. at 339.]

Accordingly, our Supreme Court in Fernandez held that

       the punishment of life imprisonment, even if nonparolable, is not
       cruel and unusual punishment under the federal or Michigan
       Constitutions.      The punishment, while strong, is not
       disproportionate to the crime when viewed in light of the gravity of
       the offense, sentences for other crimes in Michigan, sentences for
       the same crime in other states, and policies behind punishment. [Id.]

                                         -18-
               In light of our Supreme Court’s holding in Fernandez, defendant’s
       argument fails. He has not established that a mandatory sentence of life
       imprisonment without parole for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is cruel
       or unusual punishment. Nor has defendant “presented this Court with any unusual
       circumstances that would render the presumptively proportionate legislatively
       mandated sentence disproportionate.” Burkett, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6.4
       The trial court did not plainly err in imposing the sentence of life imprisonment
       without parole. [Bouie I, unpub op at 8-10.]
       __________________________________________________________________
       4
        Defendant notes that he “was just 20 years old in August 2016” when the shooting
       on Thorpe occurred, but he provides no elaboration or argument explaining whether
       or how he thinks his age at that time would constitute an unusual circumstance that
       renders his presumptively proportionate legislatively mandated sentence
       disproportionate.
       __________________________________________________________________

        Accordingly, we again affirm defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for his conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                            /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                            /s/ James Robert Redford

                                              -19-