Court Opinion

ID: 9493100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:58:11.668678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:39.166544
License: Public Domain

MESKILL, C. J.,
dissenting:
I believe that the plain language of the “crime of violence” definition in the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4), compels a different result than that reached by the majority. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
A “crime of violence” is defined as one “that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force ... may be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B). The critical limitation in this definition is the requirement that the risk of physical force must arise “in the course of committing the offense.” (emphasis added). This phrase, taken as a whole, plainly refers only to the actions or conditions necessary to satisfy each element of “the offense.” Here, the offense is the possession of a weapon by a felon. A felon is “in the course of committing the offense” only when he obtains the weapon. No element other than the possession of a weapon by a felon is needed for conviction. What a felon does or does not do with the *105weapon neither adds to, nor subtracts from, that offense. As explained in United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7 (D.C.Cir.1999), “some aspect of the charged offense must create the risk of violence in order to itself qualify as a crime of violence.” Id. at 14. The act necessary to commit the felon-in-possession offense — obtaining or possessing a weapon while a felon — does not itself involve “a substantial risk” of physical force.
The majority parses the statutory language into several elements to avoid giving the definition its natural meaning and to create an ambiguity where none exists. It does so to justify its policy discussion and its perusal of uncertain legislative history. The majority argues that a felon in possession of a weapon poses a substantial risk of physical force and that, ipso facto, that risk occurs “in the course of’ committing the offense. This strikes me as pure sophistry. If the statute only defined a “crime of violence” as one “that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk of physical force,” the majority’s reading would be plausible. However, the statute includes the limiting language “in the course of committing the offense.”
The majority attempts to avoid the limiting language by interpreting “in the course of committing the offense” as “during” the possession. The majority then posits a “substantial risk” that a felon in possession will, at some future point “during” his or her continued possession, engage in physical force against person or property. Although this interpretation may have some superficial appeal — after all, the use of a weapon must occur during its possession— it ignores the import of the limitation. “[I]n the course of’ must be read in conjunction with “committing the offense” such that the continuing conduct of possessing a weapon cannot be the time frame used to consider whether a “substantial risk” of physical force derives from the commission of the felon-in-possession offense. Whether the weapon is used in the future is irrelevant. Our concern is the felon-in-possession offense and that offense is committed the instant of possession. A felon who subsequently uses the weapon against another person is “in the course of committing” another offense, not “in the course of committing the [felon-in-possession] offense.” The appropriate time frame encompasses only the conduct necessary to commit the felon-in-possession offense. When considering the felon-in-possession offense and the “in the course of committing” requirement, the course is a very short course.1 Because the statute requires us to look to the charged offense to determine whether the risk of physical force derives from the commission of that offense, it is inappropriate to speculate as to whether a felon-in-possession defendant may commit a “crime of violence” in the future.
Otherwise, I admit that holding the felon-in-possession offense not to fit within the statutory definition of a “crime of violence” for purposes of the Bail Reform Act may result in the release of some potentially dangerous individuals. There are valid policy arguments for affirming and, were I still a Member of Congress, I could act on them. As a court, however, our role is limited to interpretation of the language Congress used in drafting the statute. We should not misread the statutory language in order to carry out what Congress may have intended but failed to accomplish by the language it chose. The majority states that “had Congress explicitly focused on the issue it would have by far preferred [the majority construction].” That may be so, but it does not justify misinterpreting the language used. Because the language of the statute is clear, much of the majority’s discussion and much of its criticism of Singleton is misplaced. Even if some of *106Singleton s supporting arguments are flawed, Singleton reached the-correct result.
In short, the majority attempts to carry out what it believes Congress intended to do. Certainly, we should try to carry out Congress’ intent. However, we should do so limiting ourselves to the plain language used. We should not forget that a person arrested for violating the felon-in-possession statute is, at this stage of the criminal proceeding, presumed to be innocent. We should not lightly deprive a presumably innocent person of bail. Nor should we subject such an individual to the risk of detention at a stage when few facts are known other than that the individual previously has been convicted of a felony and is now charged with, but not convicted of, possession of a weapon. The language of the statute is clear to me and I would vacate and remand with instructions to set bail.

. A felon in possession of a weapon may be in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for the duration of the possession, thus alleviating the majority's statute of limitations concerns in footnote 5. However, the felon in possession is only briefly "in the course of committing” that offense.