Court Opinion

ID: 9609174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:23:33.163215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:17.767427
License: Public Domain

STOWERS, Justice, dissenting.' Having considered the substituted opinion in this case I still dissent. The issue in this case is whether Article 16 of the Insurance Code, entitled “Trade Practices and Frauds,” NMSA 1978 §§ 59A-16-1 — 59A-16-30 (Orig.Pamp. and Cum.Supp.1987) can be grafted into the Workers’ Compensation Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 52-1-1 — 52-1-70 (Repl.Pamp.1987) as a new and additional cause of action. The answer is no. This concept of grafting a new cause of action into the workers’ compensation statute was dealt with in the case of Dickson v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co., 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1 (1982). In that case, this Court specifically stated that all statutory and common-law rights and remedies were abolished except as provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act. This concept has been further considered in the cases of Chavez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 547 F.2d 541 (10th Cir.1977) (New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy for denial of a claim for compensation, whether in good faith or bad faith) and Escobedo v. American Employers Insurance Co., 547 F.2d 544 (10th Cir.1977) (plaintiff’s theory that the alleged bad faith of defendant in terminating the installment payments of compensation created a cause of action separate and apart from workmen’s compensation action failed as the Workmen’s Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy). The exclusivity of the Workers’ Compensation Act was also addressed in Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Montoya, 91 N.M. 788, 581 P.2d 1283 (1978), wherein this Court stated: Once a workmen’s compensation act has become applicable either through compulsion or election, it affords the exclusive remedy for the injury by the employee or his dependents against the employer and insurance carrier. This is part of the quid pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are to some extent put in balance, for, while the employer assumes a new liability without fault, he is relieved of the prospect of large damage verdicts. Id. at 791, 581 P.2d at 1286 (quoting 2A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 65.10 (1976)). Even Section 52-1-6 of the Workers’ Compensation Act itself recognizes the exclusivity of compensation benefits. This is the law in the state of New Mexico and has been for some period of time. In looking at Article 16, specifically Section 59A-16-30 entitled “Private right of action,” it becomes readily apparent that this right of action is limited in two ways. First, the person has to be covered by Article 16 and must have suffered damages. Second, the damages suffered must be as a result of a violation of Article 16 of the Insurance Code. These then are the two basic requirements before you have a private right of action. A careful reading of the causes of action provided for under Article 16 makes it very clear that it was never intended to apply to the Workers’ Compensation Act. Nor, in any reasonable reading of the statute, can you conclude that it was intended to in any way overrule the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Nor can you find any reasonable implication that there was an intent to amend the Workers’ Compensation Act in any way. In view of the history of the Workers’ Compensation Act, it is readily apparent that if this kind of change is to occur, it should occur through appropriate legislative action. See Varos v. Union Oil Co., 101 N.M. 713, 688 P.2d 31 (1984). This kind of a change in the application of two statutes requires legislative enactments wherein the Legislature speaks clearly to the subject matter and provides the proper amendments to the statutes to reach the conclusions that the majority suggests are to be found now. I cannot find this. As we have stated many times, this Court will not interject itself into those areas which it deems appropriate for legislative action. Sanchez v. Bernalillo County, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d 909 (1953). I think that this is one of those areas and, for that reason, I dissent.