Court Opinion

ID: 9830842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:33:28.348675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:26.854890
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants contend that they requested no charge on the issue of discovered peril.
The following charge was requested: “In this case the law imposed no greater duty upon Mrs. Vesper at the time and place of the accident to look out for the safety of Mrs. Lavender than it was imposed upon-Mrs. Lavender to look out for her own safety. No duty rested upon the said Mrs. Vesper until it became apparent to her that there was danger of collision to the plaintiff. After it became apparent to the said Mrs. Vesper that there was danger of collision with the plaintiff, the duty was imposed upon her of exercising such care as an ordinarily prudent person would have made under the same circumstances to stop the car in the shortest time and space possible, and, if you find that she did so, you will find for the defendants.” If this did not recognize the existence of the issue of discovered peril,, we are at a loss to understand its effect. However, as stated in the opinion, the testimony presented the issue.
In view of the following testimony of the-witness Eelton, it is contended that the main opinion is inaccurate, in stating that all the testimony showed that plaintiff was not struck as she stepped from the sidewalk. Eelton did testify: “The automobile was-crossing a little north of the north track on Commerce street, I suppose 10 or 15 .feet from Mrs. Lavender as she stepped from the sidewalk. * * * The situation, as I saw it, was just as Mrs. Lavender stepped off the sidewalk, the automobile was some 10 feet from her, and in no time almost the collision occurred. * * * Mrs. Lavender was crossing diagonally like she was trying to make a short cut. * * * There was-nothing to obstruct her view of the automobile.” This would make it appear that as-she stepped from the sidewalk she stepped directly into a place of obvious danger. On the other hand, this situation is negatived by the testimony of several witnesses. Mrs. Vesper herself testified: “I first saw Mrs. Lavender in the street looking as if she had just taken a step or two from the curb, she was going diagonally across Ervay street, and, when I saw Mrs. Lavender in the street I blew a horn, and she looked up. When I gave the signal, she glanced up, and continued very rapidly until she seemed to be in the middle of the street. She was on the ear track, and she suddenly stopped and wheeled right round and came back just as rapidly as she had gone forward. Wheeled right round and seemed to face me, faced my car, toward the car, and came directly to the car. I should say she took at least three or four steps after she retraced her-movements. She just seemed to jump right over and back again three or four times rapidly, etc. * * * I did not use thé emergency brake on this occasion. The automobile was a Buick, Model 10.” The witness Eowler testified: “The car was probably 10 or 15 feét from the lady that was in the street, and she seemed to be undecided. *381as to whether to go on, or across or go back, but she turned, and had no more than turned before the automobile hit her. I judge the auto was making from seven to eight miles an hour. * * * Supposing I was driving up Ervay street between the car tracks and the curb, going along on low gear, the best mode to make the quickest stop, using such appliances as I have for stopping, the first thing to do is to put your foot on the brake, use the emergency brake, and the foot brake, too. Moving at a speed of six or seven miles an hour, I could stop in five feet by the use of the emergency and the foot brake — that grade at that place.” The witness Bailey testified: ‘‘Mrs. Lavender started west across Ervay street and stopped as the automobile approached her, seemingly to let it pass, and at that time the automobile was turned or swung to the right, and then the automobile was swung to the left, and Mrs. Lavender stepped back, or backed up, and the automobile was then turned to the' right and struck her with the left front wheel. * * * Assuming that it was a Buick machine operated by Mrs. Vesper and the machine running from six to ten miles an hour, I think it could easily be stopped in a distance of six feet. * * * The lady seemed to be confused and turned the machine right and left, and just before the collision the man appeared to make an attempt to assist her to handle • the ear. The lady had the wheel. From what I saw I think the cause of the collision was a failure to ■apply the brakes. I think what the man did probably steered the machine away from Mrs. Lavender, and made it strike her with ■one wheel, instead of the end of the machine. If he had not grabbed the wheel, I think the machine would have struck her squarely and run over her.” The witness ■Gastéis testified: “As we came across Commerce street on Ervay, Mrs. Lavender stepped into the street in front of us. We blew the horn and slowed up going slow, and Mrs. Lavender walked into Ervay street onto the •car tracks. We started to go around her to our right, to pass around between her and the curb, when she suddenly turned around •and saw us, and apparently became frighten■ed, and started back to the curb. When she got right in front of us, she seemed to lose ■control of herself, and couldn't go to the right or left, and then we collided with her.”
The above is sufficient of the testimony to show that there was a phase of the case presented of Mrs. Lavender being run into by this automobile while in the act of crossing the street, and not immediately as she stepped from the sidewalk. The testimony develops also a case of discovered peril. The requested charge, if given, would have had the effect of declaring that, if before leaving the sidewalk she had failed to look and listen for the approach or presence of this automobile or other vehicles, it was negligence per se, and she could not recover if that fact contributed to her injury.
We understand from the cases referred to in the main opinion that a pedestrian has a right to use a street for the purpose of crossing it, provided in so using it he observes ordinary care for his safety, and that the mere fact of going into a street without first looking or listening, where there are vehicles and necessarily dangers, does not necessarily preclude him from a recovery of damages for injuries sustained while crossing. There was testimony in the case that plaintiff was some distance in the street when the conditions arose which led to her inju”y. Upon that testimony she did not receive her injury by stepping into danger as she left the curb, and was not in danger of injury from this automobile when she did so. To have told the jury that because she did not look and listen, or in other words, take precautions, before leaving the sidewalk, by observing movements of this automobile, which she could not have anticipated according to the testimony cited, she could not recover for her injury, would have been to ignore and prejudice other material issues.
The motion is overruled.