Court Opinion

ID: 9406089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 19:03:52.370334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.605012
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/29/23 P. v. Coughlin CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B315841
                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 20CR06975)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Santa Barbara County)

v.

ZACHARY BARKER
COUGHLIN,

     Defendant and Appellant.

       Zachary Barker Coughlin appeals from the judgment
entered after a jury had found him guilty of committing multiple
sex offenses against four women – Jane Does 1 through 4. With
the exception of Jane Doe 2, appellant videotaped the commission
of the offenses. Appellant notes, “Most of the sexual activity that
formed the basis for the charges took place in [his] bus that was
filled with mirrors and contained video equipment.”
        Appellant contends: (1) a search warrant authorizing the
search of his cell phone, laptops, and hard drives violated the
Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement; (2) he was
denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
because his trial counsel failed to properly challenge the search
warrant; (3) the trial court erroneously ordered his legs shackled
during the trial; (4) the court erroneously precluded him from
arguing that a woman may consent in advance to the commission
of sex acts upon her while she is unconscious; and (5) the court
abused its discretion in allowing the jury to watch videos of his
commission of charged and uncharged sex offenses. We affirm.
              Guilty Verdicts and Appellant’s Sentence1
       The jury convicted appellant of sexual penetration by a
foreign object upon an unconscious person (Pen. Code, § 289,
subd. (d));2 sexual penetration by a foreign object upon an
intoxicated person (§ 289, subd. (e)); forcible sexual penetration
by a foreign object with true findings on kidnapping allegations
(§§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A), 667.61, subds. (a)(d)(2), (b)(e)(1)); rape of
an intoxicated person (§ 261, subd. (a)(3)); two counts of rape of
an unconscious or asleep person (§ 261, subd. (a)(4)(A)); three
counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); forcible rape with true
findings on kidnapping allegations (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 667.61,
subds. (a)(d)(2), (b)(e)(1)); kidnapping to commit rape (§ 209,
subd. (b)(1)); two counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd.
(c)(2)(A)); and forcible oral copulation of an unconscious person
(§ 287, subd. (f)(1)). The jury found true an allegation that in the
present case appellant had been convicted of committing sex

      1 We omit a summary of the evidence presented at trial.
The facts underlying appellant’s convictions are immaterial to
the issues on appeal.

      2Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to
the Penal Code.

                                   2
offenses against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c),
(e)(4)).
       The trial court sentenced appellant to prison for an
aggregate determinate term of 20 years plus an aggregate
consecutive indeterminate term of 125 years to life.
          Sealed Search Warrants and Supporting Affidavits
       This case involves two search warrants and supporting
affidavits. The trial court ordered the documents sealed. On
June 13, 2022, appellant’s counsel filed in this court an
application to unseal the documents. The application stated:
“The trial court originally ordered the [documents] sealed
because the [affidavits] referred to the [confidential citizen-
informants] by name . . . . [¶] However, appellant presently
challenges the denial of the motion to suppress evidence gained
as a result of the search warrants. . . . [S]ome information
needed to rule on the motion is contained in the sealed
documents.” (See People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 971 [“all
or any part of a search warrant affidavit may be sealed if
necessary to . . . protect the identity of a confidential
informant”].)
       We denied the application to unseal the documents. We
granted counsel’s request for a copy of the sealed record on
appeal, which includes the documents in question. We ordered
counsel to “not make copies of these documents or reveal the
contents of these documents to his client.”
       Appellant’s counsel subsequently filed a publicly-available
opening brief citing extensively to the sealed documents.
“Nothing filed publicly in the reviewing court – including any . . .
brief . . . – may disclose material contained in a record that is
sealed . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46(g)(1).) Pursuant to

                                 3
Rule 8.46(g)(2)(A) and (B), counsel should have filed a “public
redacted version” and a confidential “unredacted version” of the
opening brief.
       In this opinion we refer to facts in the sealed documents
that counsel disclosed in his opening brief. These facts were
earlier disclosed in appellant’s publicly-filed motion to suppress
evidence. The trial court did not order the motion sealed. It is
included in the publicly-available clerk’s transcript. The motion
identified the confidential informants by their initials and
contained no contact information for the informants. The sealed
documents, in contrast, disclosed the informants’ full names. We
set forth only those facts necessary to adequately consider the
issues on appeal. In Sager v. County of Yuba (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 1049, 1051, the record was sealed, but the court
concluded it “must discuss some facts in order to provide an
opinion ‘in writing with reasons stated’ as required by the
California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14.)”
           First Search Warrant and Supporting Affidavit
       Appellant does not contest the validity of the first search
warrant and supporting affidavit. In the affidavit, the affiant set
forth facts supporting his belief that appellant was stalking two
women in violation of section 646.9. The affiant declared: “Based
on my training and experience, I know that those involved in the
crime of stalking will oftentimes use cell phones, laptops, . . . and
other devices . . . for . . . communication with their victims. I also
know that [they] . . . will also keep photos of victims/ residences/
workplaces . . . on cell phones, laptops[,] . . . and portable digital
storage devices that may be found in the possession of the
suspect. I therefore request that a search warrant be authorized
to search [appellant’s] residence, a red and black converted school

                                  4
bus . . . so that these items may be found and seized.” Based on
the affidavit, a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the
search of appellant’s bus for “[a]ll cell phones” and electronic
storage devices.
          Second Search Warrant and Supporting Affidavit
       Appellant contests the validity of the second search
warrant. In the supporting affidavit, the affiant declared that on
May 18, 2020, deputy sheriffs had made a traffic stop of
appellant’s bus. During a search of the bus pursuant to the first
search warrant, they seized five cell phones, three laptop
computers, and a black bag containing several hard drives. The
affiant believed that these items may contain evidence relevant
to the stalking investigation. He requested that the items be
searched for the period “between [January 1, 2019] and [May 19,
2020], the period of time that will include events leading up to
the day of the first meeting between Victim #1 and [appellant]
and [appellant’s] arrest the night on [May 18, 2020].”
       The second search warrant authorized a search of the
seized items for “all data that constitutes evidence and
instrumentalities of violations of . . . [section] 646.9 PC [stalking]
by [appellant], including communications referring to or relating
to this investigation involving any or all of the following
people . . . : [warrant stated names of the two confidential
informants whom appellant had allegedly stalked].”
                  Evidence Discovered During Search
                  Pursuant to Second Search Warrant
       During the search pursuant to the second search warrant,
law enforcement officials discovered approximately 7,000 videos
and 158,000 photographs. “[A] lot of [the videos] were duplicates
of basically the same event.” Some of the videos and photographs

                                  5
depicted appellant’s commission of sex acts upon women. The sex
acts did not involve the stalking victims identified in the search
warrants and supporting affidavits.
      The jury watched videos depicting the charged sex offenses
committed by appellant against Jane Does 1, 3, and 4. It also
watched videos depicting uncharged sex offenses committed by
appellant against Jane Does 5 and 6. The People graphically
describe the videos at pages 11-20 of respondent’s brief.
          The Second Search Warrant Did Not Violate the
          Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement
      Appellant contends the second search warrant “lacked any
meaningful limits [on the search] and therefore violated the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”3 (Bold
omitted.) “The Fourth Amendment requires that a search
warrant describe with particularity ‘the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.’ (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)”
(People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205-206.) “The
purpose of the ‘particularity’ requirement of the Fourth
Amendment is to avoid general and exploratory searches by
requiring a particular description of the items to be seized.”
(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1296.)
      “‘[I]ndiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under
the authority of “general warrants” were the immediate evils that
motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.’
[Citation.] The particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment helps to ensure that a search or seizure ‘will not

      3 Appellant does not contend the search warrant affidavit
failed to establish probable cause for the search. Appellant
alleges, “There may have been probable cause to search [his]
devices for evidence of stalking . . . .”

                                6
take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches
. . . the Framers intended to prohibit.’” (People v. Robinson (2010)
47 Cal.4th 1104, 1132 (Robinson).)
        “However, a warrant ‘need only be reasonably specific’
[citation], and ‘the specificity required “varies depending on the
circumstances of the case and the type of items involved.”’
[Citations.] The constitutional and statutory requirements of
particularity are satisfied if the warrant ‘imposes a meaningful
restriction upon the objects to be seized.’ [Citation.] The
requirement of reasonable particularity ‘is a flexible concept,
reflecting the degree of detail available from the facts known to
the affiant and presented to the issuing magistrate.’” (Robinson,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)
        “Whether a warrant’s description of property to be seized is
sufficiently particular is a question of law subject to independent
review by an appellate court. [Citation.] In considering whether
a warrant is sufficiently particular, courts consider the purpose of
the warrant, the nature of the items sought, and ‘the total
circumstances surrounding the case.’ [Citation.] A warrant that
permits a search broad in scope may be appropriate under some
circumstances, and the warrant’s language must be read in
context and with common sense.” (People v. Eubanks (2011) 53
Cal.4th 110, 133-134.)
        Appellant argues: “The [second search] warrant allowed the
police to search every application, file, and piece of data on the
phones and hard drives. The searches could have been limited to
the individuals identified in the stalking cases, and could have
used specific key words . . . or derogatory comments consistent
with cyber stalking. But there were no limits (other than the
dates mentioned [the period between January 1, 2019 and May

                                 7
19, 2020]) and police were permitted to rummage through
appellant’s entire life, all of the privacies of life one keeps on his
cell phones and computers, and discover evidence it would argue
to be rape — which was unrelated to the stalking case they were
investigating. . . . [A]n investigation into potential stalking did
not permit a fishing expedition into appellant’s life that revealed
potential sex offenses involving . . . other . . . women.”
       The second search warrant’s description of the scope of the
search complied with the Fourth Amendment’s particularity
requirement. The warrant did not authorize an exploratory
search. It limited the search to evidence concerning the criminal
offense of stalking. The warrant authorized a search for
“evidence . . . of violations of . . . [section] 646.9 PC [stalking] by
[appellant], including communications referring to or relating to
this investigation involving . . . the [two stalking victims
identified in the search warrants and supporting affidavits].”
       “‘[A] warrant may satisfy the particularity requirement
either by [(1)] identifying the items to be seized by reference to a
suspected criminal offense or by [(2)] describing them in a
manner that allows an executing officer to know precisely what
he has been authorized to search for and seize.’” (United States v.
Cobb (4th Cir. 2020) 970 F.3d 319, 329 (Cobb).) Here, the second
search warrant clearly satisfied the first criterion. It
“‘identif[ied] the items to be seized by reference to a suspected
criminal offense’” – the stalking of two women named in the
warrant. (Ibid.; see United States v. Palms (10th Cir. 2021) 21
F.4th 689, 700 [as to search of defendant’s cell phone, “the
warrant’s limitation to evidence of the crime of human trafficking
satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement”];
United States v. Hall (7th Cir. 1998) 142 F.3d 988, 996-997 [“we

                                  8
hold that the search warrants were written with sufficient
particularity because the items listed on the warrants were
qualified by phrases that emphasized that the items sought were
those related to child pornography”]; United States v. Castro (6th
Cir. 2018) 881 F.3d 961, 965 [“A warrant that empowers police to
search for something satisfies the particularity requirement if its
text constrains the search to evidence of a specific crime”]; United
States v. Bishop (7th Cir. 2018) 910 F.3d 335, 337 [“It is
enough . . . if the warrant cabins the things being looked for by
stating what crime is under investigation”].)
       Appellant does not claim, and could not validly claim, that
the seizure of the videos of his sex crimes with other women was
unlawful because the second search warrant did not authorize
their seizure. The police lawfully seized these videos under the
plain view doctrine. (See Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403
U.S. 443, 465 [“An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’
doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to
search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the
search come across some other article of incriminating
character”]; United States v. Williams (4th Cir. 2010) 592 F.3d
511, 522 [plain view doctrine applied to discovery of child
pornography while conducting computer search under warrant
authorizing search for evidence of crimes involving threats of
bodily harm and harassment by computer].)
       “‘[T]he requirement that a search warrant describe its
objects with particularity is a standard of “practical accuracy”
rather than a hypertechnical one.’ [Citations.] The rule against
excessive parsing of the language used in a warrant . . . militates
in favor of truthfinding in criminal investigations, a value of
significant importance to the public safety and societal order.”

                                 9
(People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85,
96.) “So long as the warrant describes the items to be seized with
enough specificity that ‘the executing officer is able to distinguish
between those items which are to be seized and those that are
not,’ [citation], the particularity standard is met.” (United States
v. Blakeney (4th Cir. 2020) 949 F.3d 851, 862.) The particularity
standard was met here.
             Appellant Was Not Denied His Constitutional
                Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
         Appellant maintains he was denied his constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed
to challenge the second search warrant under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA, § 1546 et al.). “‘[T]o
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
first show counsel’s performance was “deficient” because his
“representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.”
[Citations.] Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from
counsel’s performance or lack thereof. [Citations.] Prejudice is
shown when there is a “reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
. . .’” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721.) The defendant
“must carry his burden of proving prejudice as a ‘demonstrable
reality,’ not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or
omissions of counsel.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883,
937.)
         Appellant asserts, “The warrant here failed because it did
not specify any apps or files where there might be evidence of

                                 10
cyberstalking.” Thus, the warrant “violated the heightened
particularity requirements described in section 1546.1(d)(1)” of
the CalECPA. Section 1546.1, subdivision (d)(1) provides, “The
warrant shall describe with particularity the information to be
seized by specifying, as appropriate and reasonable, the time
periods covered, the target individuals or accounts, the
applications or services covered, and the types of information
sought . . . .” (Italics added.)
       Appellant has not carried his burden of showing that
counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial because
counsel failed to argue that, in violation of section 1546.1(d)(1),
the second search warrant “did not specify any apps or files
where there might be evidence of cyberstalking.” Appellant does
not refer us to any evidence in the record showing that law
enforcement personnel knew or reasonably should have known
which apps or files might contain evidence of stalking. “[I]t is
impossible to tell what a computer storage medium contains just
by looking at it.” (United States v. Hill (9th Cir. 2006) 459 F.3d
966, 973; see also Cobb, supra, 970 F.3d at 329-330 [court
rejected defendant’s argument that “the police could not search
the computer because the police could not foretell the murder
evidence that was located on the computer or the location of that
evidence within the contents of the computer”].)
             Appellant Was Not Prejudiced by the Court’s
             Order that He Be Shackled during the Trial
       The trial court found that appellant “poses a significant
security risk.” It ordered that he be restrained with leg shackles.
The chains would be covered with tape so they would not make a
clanking noise. The court observed: “We . . . have a black table
skirt around both Counsel tables which blocks the view from

                                11
the . . . jurors of any of those shackles. [¶] The Sheriff’s
Department does a very good job of ensuring that the jurors and
prospective jurors never see or know that the defendant is being
moved . . . .” The court said it would take additional measures to
assure that the jury was not aware of the shackling.
        Appellant maintains the trial court erred in ordering the
restraint. “‘[A] criminal defendant may be subjected to physical
restraints in the jury’s presence upon “a showing of a manifest
need for such restraints.” [Citations.] . . .’ . . . The trial court’s
determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1259 (Williams).)
        We need not consider whether the trial court abused its
discretion. If it had abused its discretion, “[appellant] cannot
demonstrate prejudice. ‘“[W]e have consistently held that
courtroom shackling, even if error, [is] harmless if there is no
evidence that the jury saw the restraints, or that the shackles
impaired or prejudiced the defendant’s right to testify or
participate in his defense.”’” (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th
905, 935.) There is no such evidence here. Appellant testified at
trial. “No evidence suggests the restraint . . . affected his
[testimony or] demeanor or impaired his ability to communicate
with defense counsel.” (Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1259.)
               Advance Consent Is Not a Defense to Sex
             Acts Committed upon an Unconscious Woman
        The People made a pretrial motion “to preclude the defense
from arguing that prior consent by any victim for [appellant] to
engage in sexual activity with her while she is asleep or
unconscious is a valid defense.” Relying on People v. Dancy
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 21 (Dancy), the trial court granted the
motion. Appellant asserts, “The holding in Dancy is fatally

                                  12
flawed and deprived [him] of his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to present a defense.”
       In Dancy the appellate court rejected the defendant’s
argument “that a man who intentionally engages in sexual
intercourse with an unconscious woman, knowing that she is
unconscious, does not harbor general criminal intent . . . if he
reasonably believes that the woman has consented in advance or
would have consented if she had been conscious.” (Dancy, supra,
102 Cal.App.4th at p. 36, fn. omitted.) The court explained: “The
concept of an ‘advance consent’ to unconscious sexual intercourse
is based on a fallacy. A decision to engage in sexual intercourse
is necessarily an ad hoc decision made at a particular time with
respect to a particular act. While a woman may expressly or
impliedly consent to conscious sexual intercourse in advance, she
remains free to withdraw that consent, and ordinarily has the
ability to do so since she is conscious. Even if a woman expressly
or impliedly indicates in advance that she is willing to engage in
unconscious sexual intercourse, a man who thereafter has sexual
intercourse with her while she is unconscious necessarily
deprives her of the opportunity to indicate her lack of consent.
The inherent risk that a man may misinterpret a woman's prior
statements or conduct weighs strongly against recognizing
‘advance consent’ as a defense to rape of an unconscious person
since the woman's lack of consciousness absolutely precludes her
from making her lack of consent known at the time of the act. It
follows that a man who intentionally engages in sexual
intercourse with a woman he knows to be unconscious harbors a
‘wrongful’ intent regardless of whether he believes that she has
(or she actually has) consented in advance to the act.” (Id. at p.
37.)

                                13
       We find the reasoning of Dancy persuasive and follow it
here. The trial court did not err in precluding appellant from
arguing that advance consent is a defense to the commission of
sex acts upon an unconscious person.
          The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
   Allowing the Jury to Watch Videos of Appellant’s Sex Offenses
       Appellant claims that, in violation of Evidence Code section
352 (section 352) and his right to due process, the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the jury to watch
“inflammatory” videos of his commission of sex offenses against
Janes Does 1 and 3 through 6. Appellant protests that he “was
convicted in a ‘trial by video’” that “increased the chance that the
jurors would vote to convict [him] because they hated him rather
than because he had actually raped the women who entered his
bus.”
       Section 352 provides, “The court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.”
       “Trial courts enjoy ‘“broad discretion”’ in deciding whether
the probability of a substantial danger of prejudice substantially
outweighs probative value. [Citations.] A trial court’s exercise of
discretion ‘will not be disturbed except on a showing the trial
court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage
of justice.’” (People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 167-
168 (Holford).)

                                14
        “The prejudice which exclusion of evidence under
. . . section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage
to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative
evidence. ‘[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial
or damaging to the defendant's case. The stronger the evidence,
the more it is “prejudicial.” The “prejudice” referred to in . . .
section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an
emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which
has very little effect on the issues. In applying section 352,
“prejudicial” is not synonymous with “damaging.”’” (People v.
Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638, italics added.)
        “‘“On appeals challenging discretionary trial court rulings,
it is appellant’s burden to establish an abuse of discretion. . . .”’”
(Geffcken v. D’Andrea (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1307.)
Appellant has failed to carry his burden of showing that the trial
court abused its discretion. The videos of Jane Does 1, 3, and 4
depicted appellant’s commission of charged sex offenses.
Therefore, the videos were extremely probative. They were the
only evidence available where the victim was unconscious during
the commission of the sex offenses.
        The videos of Jane Does 5 and 6 depicted appellant’s
commission of uncharged sex offenses. The videos were
admissible under Evidence Code section 1108. “When a
defendant is accused of a sex offense, Evidence Code section 1108
permits the court to admit evidence of the defendant’s
commission of other sex offenses, thus allowing the jury to learn
of the defendant’s possible disposition to commit sex crimes.
[Citation.] The court has discretion under Evidence Code section
352 to exclude the evidence if it is unduly prejudicial. [Citation.]
The evidence is presumed admissible and is to be excluded only if

                                 15
its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value
in showing the defendant’s disposition to commit the charged sex
offense or other relevant matters.” (People v. Cordova (2015) 62
Cal.4th 104, 132.)
       The circumstances of the uncharged sex offenses against
Jane Does 5 and 6 are similar to the circumstances of the charged
offenses. Thus, the videos of Jane Does 5 and 6 were highly
probative as to appellant’s commission of the charged offenses.
(People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917 [“the probative
value of ‘other crimes’ evidence is increased by the relative
similarity between the charged and uncharged offenses”].) But
“[a]dmissibility under Evidence Code section 1108 does not
require that the sex offenses be similar; it is enough the charged
offense and the prior crimes are sex offenses as defined by the
statute. [Citation.] That criterion is clearly met here.” (People v.
Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 50.)
       The videos of the uncharged offenses were “no more
inflammatory than [the videos of] the charged offenses, so [the]
additional prejudicial effect [of the uncharged-offense videos] was
minimal. For the same reason, it was unlikely the jury would
return a guilty verdict based upon the uncharged misconduct
rather than the charged offenses.” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7
Cal.4th 380, 408.)
       Accordingly, the trial court acted well within its discretion
in permitting the jury to watch the videos. “Having concluded
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under section 352,
we must also reject [appellant’s] argument that he was deprived
of his constitutional [due process] right to a fair trial.” (Holford,
supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.)

                                 16
                          Disposition
     The judgment is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        YEGAN, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             CODY, J.

                              17
                     Von Deroian, Judge

           Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

               ______________________________

     Patrick Morgan Ford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.