Court Opinion

ID: 9472151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:51:25.868013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:46.568408
License: Public Domain

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before LAY, Chief Judge, and HEA-NEY, BRIGHT, ROSS, McMILLIAN, ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, FAGG and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.
HEANEY, Circuit Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on a petition for rehearing en banc. Attorney Snyder, now represented by counsel, raises several points in his petition: (1) that Chief Judge Lay should recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) because of his personal knowledge of facts gained under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA); (2) that Snyder was not given proper notice that his allegedly disrespectful letter could be a basis for discipline; (3) that Snyder’s letter of complaint was an exercise of free speech protected by the First Amendment; (4) that his letter was not disrespectful; and (5) that the district court and the court secretary encouraged Mr. Snyder in directing that the letter of complaint be sent.
Before dealing with these arguments, we think it wise to state the facts more precisely. Robert Snyder was appointed by the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota to represent 12 defendants in a period from January 1, 1979 to early 1984. It appears from the record that eight of these cases were disposed of without trial and four involved at least some court appearances. According to the records that have been furnished to this Court, Mr. Snyder devoted approximately 270 hours to these cases over a four and one-half year period.
On August 9, 1983, Mr. Snyder completed work on a case in which he had been appointed to represent an indigent, and submitted a voucher in the sum of $1,898.55 to the district court for payment. Judge Bruce Van Sickle reduced the claim by $102.50 and forwarded this voucher to this Court on August 17. On September 6, this Court returned the voucher to Mr. Snyder requesting him to submit a detailed memorandum pursuant to 22.2 B of the guidelines, and to support his claim for long distance calls by attaching an itemized statement. The voucher was returned to us on September 26, but because he did not have both the number of hours expended as well as the dollar amounts, requested by the guidelines, it was returned by this Court to Mr. Snyder on the same date. On October 20, the completed voucher was returned to this Court. Included in the return was Mr. Snyder's letter of October 6; this letter is attached hereto as Addendum No. 1. The letter stated in part:
*342We have sent you everything we have concerning our representation, and I am not sending you anything else. You can take it or leave it.
Further, I am extremely disgusted by the treatment of us by the Eighth Circuit in this case, and you are instructed to remove my name from the list of attorneys who will accept criminal indigent defense work. I have simply had it.
On November 3, 1983, Chief Judge Lay wrote to Judge Van Sickle the letter which is attached hereto as Addendum No. 2. A copy of this letter was sent to Mr. Snyder. In that letter Chief Judge Lay stated in part:
I consider Mr. Snyder’s letter to your secretary as being totally disrespectful to the federal courts and to the judicial system. It demonstrates a total lack of respect for the legal process and the courts.
Mr. Snyder indicates that he would like to have his name removed from the list of attorneys who will be appointed to represent indigent criminal defendants. As far as the court is concerned, I will honor that request and I instruct you to remove his name from the list of attorneys who will be appointed in criminal cases. However, in view of the letter that Mr. Snyder forwarded, I question whether he is worthy of practicing law in the federal courts on any matter. It is my intention to issue an order to show cause as to why he should not be suspended from practicing in any federal court in this circuit for a period of one year. This suspension, of course, will apply to his appearance in federal court in North Dakota. We will, of course, give Mr. Snyder an opportunity to respond before any final determination is made.
On December 20, 1983, Chief Judge Lay caused to be issued the order to show cause which forms the basis of the present proceedings. A hearing on the order to show cause was held on February 15, 1983. At the hearing to show cause, Judge Richard Arnold read excerpts of Snyder’s letter of October 6 to Mr. Snyder and asked Mr. Snyder the following question: “I am asking you sir if you are prepared to apologize to the Court for the tone of your letter.” Mr. Snyder responded as follows: “That is not the basis that I am being brought forth before the Court today. It is not an apology and I could have apologized when an apology was demanded from Judge Lay and I declined * * * but I did not apologize then and I am not apologizing now.” Judge Arnold stated to Mr. Snyder: “I just want to get this clear that you are declining to aplogize for the letter of October 6.” Snyder said: “I am.” At the close of the hearing the Court gave Mr. Snyder an additional ten days in which to state that he was willing and ready to represent indigent defendants, that he would comply with the guidelines, and that he would apologize to the Court for his letter of October 6.
On February 22, Snyder wrote to this Court stating:
If and when a new Plan for the implementation of the Criminal Justice Act in the State of North Dakota is enacted, the undersigned will enthusiastically obey its mandates, just as he has obeyed the mandates, or lack thereof, in the existing Plan.
Further, the undersigned states that he will make every good faith effort possible to comply with the Court’s guidelines regarding the payment of attorney’s fees and expenses. [See Addendum No. 3.]
No apology for the October 6 letter was made. Thereafter, on February 24, 1984, Chief Judge Lay wrote to Mr. Snyder giving him another opportunity to apologize. He stated: “I am confident that if such a letter is forthcoming that the Court will dissolve the order.” See Addendum No. 4. Mr. Snyder responded as follows:
I am in receipt of your letter dated February 24, 1984. Please be advised that my letter of February 22, 1984 entirely states my position concerning this matter.
I cannot, and will never, in justice to my conscience, apologize for what I con*343sider to be telling the truth, albeit in harsh terms. You must therefore search your conscience and determine what course of action will best serve the interest of justice and the administration of the Eighth Circuit.
It is unfortunate that the respective positions in the proceeding have so hardened. However, I consider this to be a matter of principle, and if one stands on principle, one must be willing to accept the consequences.
Thank you for your time and attention.
We turn now to the arguments raised by Snyder on his petition for rehearing en banc. We deal with them seriatim.
First, it is clear that a judicial officer is not disqualified under 28 U.S.C. § 455 because of personal knowledge of facts unless the knowledge arises out of extra-judicial observation or misconduct. See United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916, 102 S.Ct. 1771, 72 L.Ed.2d 176 (1982). Chief Judge Lay, in processing Snyder’s claim and in seeking information to process the claim, was carrying out his judicial responsibilities. Any factual information gained in doing so or any judicial action taken by him as chief judge did not in any way arise in an extra-judicial capacity. Chief Judge Lay possesses no personal bias against Snyder and properly served on the panel to hear Mr. Snyder’s response to the Court’s show cause order.
Second, it is abundantly clear from the record that Snyder had notice that his disrespectful letter could be a basis for discipline. Snyder was given at least three opportunities to apologize for the letter and declined to do so.
Third, Snyder’s counsel states that Mr. Snyder’s letter was an exercise of free speech. Snyder urges that he should not be disciplined for exercising his First Amendment rights to criticize, and express frustration toward, the Court. The gravamen of the situation is that Snyder in his letter became harsh and disrespectful to the Court. It is one thing for a lawyer to complain factually to the Court, it is another for counsel to be disrespectful in doing so.
It is well settled that disrespectful remarks by an officer of the court do not fall within the ambit of protected speech. As Justice Stewart stated: “Obedience to official precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech.” In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-647, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 1388, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring).1
Fourth, Snyder states that his letter is not disrespectful. We disagree. In our view, the letter speaks for itself.
Snyder seeks to mitigate his conduct by stating that the district court and the district court’s secretary directed that the letter be sent. It appears from the affidavit of Judge Bruce Van Sickle that he was aware of Mr. Snyder’s letter to his secretary and viewed it as that of a frustrated lawyer hoping that his comments with respect to the fee schedule and the paperwork would serve as a basis for some change in the process. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Judge Van Sickle instructed Mr. Snyder to be disrespectful to this Court. Snyder wrote the letter, he is intelligent and capable of independently evaluating the ramifications of his conduct, and he must take responsibility for his own actions.
We have difficulty with the proposition that we should condone, or that anyone should approve, a lawyer’s exercise of open disrespect for the court before which the lawyer practices. To repeat what we have earlier observed, “a display of insolence and disrespect to [the Court] is an insult to the majesty of the law itself.” In the *344Matter of: Attorney Robert J. Snyder, 734 F.2d 334, 337 n. 6 (8th Cir. April 13, 1984). However, because of Snyder’s past cooperation with the district court in serving on pro bono matters, because of his now professed willingness to continue to do so and to comply with the CJA guidelines, and because of the alleged misunderstanding as to the reasons for his suspension— we conditionally vacate the panel’s order of suspension and provide an additional 10 days from the date of this order for Attorney Snyder to provide a sincere letter of apology to this Court for the disrespectful comments directed to the Court in his letter of October 6, 1983, sent to Judge Van Sickle’s secretary. The clerk is directed that if Snyder fails to comply with this request, our original order of suspension will be reinstated with the six month suspension to run from the date of the original order. The Clerk is further directed to send a copy of this order to each of the lawyers who signed the petition for rehearing en banc and to the president and secretary of the Burleigh County Bar Association.
The petition for rehearing en banc is denied on the ground that the majority of judges in regular active service did not vote to grant the petition as required by Fed.R. App.P. 35.
BRIGHT and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges, would grant the petition for rehearing en banc.
ADDENDUM NO. 1
Bickle, Coles and Snyder, Chartered
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
219V2 EAST BROADWAY
THE LITTLE BUILDING
P.O. BOX 2071
BISMARCK, NORTH DAKOTA 58502-2071
October 6, 1983
Helen Monteith
Federal Building
3rd Street & Rosser Avenue
Bismarck, ND 58501
Re: United States of America vs. Dennis Warren
Dear Helen:
I am in receipt of the letter of September 26, 1983, from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in which our latest attempt to justify our time and expenses for Dennis Warren has again been set back. This letter is for the purpose of responding to that letter.
In the first place, I am appalled by the amount of money which the federal court pays for indigent criminal defense work. The reason that so few attorneys in Bismarck accept this work is for that exact reason. We have, up to this point, still accepted the indigent appointments, because of a duty to our profession, and the fact that nobody else will do it.
Now, however, not only are we paid an amount of money which does not even cover our overhead, but we have to go through extreme gymnastics even to receive the puny amounts which the federal courts authorize for this work. We have sent you everything we have concerning our representation, and I am not sending you anything else. You can take it or leave it. Further, I am extremely disgusted by the treatment of us by the Eighth Circuit in this case, and you are instructed to remove my name from the list of attorneys who will accept criminal indigent defense work. I have simply had it.
Thank you for your time and attention.
Very truly yours,
BICKLE, COLES AND SNYDER, CHARTERED
/s/ Robert J. Snyder
Robert J. Snyder
Attorney at Law
ADDENDUM NO. 2
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
DONALD P. LAY
CHIEF JUDGE
November 3, 1983
The Hon. Bruce M. Van Sickle
United States District Judge
P.O. Box 670
Bismarck, North Dakota 58501
*345Re: Cl-83-4-01. U.S.A. v. Dennis Warren.
Dear Judge Van Sickle:
I am enclosing copies of recent correspondence of attorney Robert J. Snyder to your secretary, Helen Montieth, and from your secretary to my administrative assistant, June Boadwine. It is unfortunate that this matter now requires additional time, but because of the responses made by your secretary and Mr. Snyder, it is necessary for me to intervene.
I consider Mr. Snyder’s letter to your secretary as being totally disrespectful to the federal courts and to the judicial system. It demonstrates a total lack of respect for the legal process and the courts.
The Criminal Justice Act was passed as a response to the inadequacy of a prior system which did not award any type of reimbursement of expenses or time spent by a lawyer. I’m confident it was true when you were in practice as it was when I represented indigents that the bar performed without any reimbursement of either expenses or attorneys’ fees. This pro bono work was considered to be a part of our professional responsibility. The CJA was never intended to provide a reasonable attorney fee, only to provide funds to cover overhead and expenses.
Regardless of an attorney’s view as to whether he feels obligated to provide pro bono work, my concern now is related to the apparent refusal of the attorney involved in this case to comply with the Criminal Justice Act and the guidelines promulgated under it. In the original instance, Mr. Snyder failed to forward any time itemization, contrary to the statutory guidelines, and on that basis and based upon my direction to my administrative assistant, the claim for services was returned to you with the request that compliance be obtained. Mr. Snyder then itemized the amounts in dollars, but failed, as requested by the Administrative Office, to set forth the number of hours or portions of hours in each instance on his itemized schedule.
We are unable to ascertain whether he was charging time under his own fee schedule or that of the statute. In addition, he failed to itemize his out-of-pocket expenses on a separate sheet. Although these requirements may seem technical, under the Criminal Justice Act the federal government is dealing in millions of dollars and Congress requires proper itemization so that budgetary limitations may be accounted for in a proper manner.
As you know, processing these vouchers takes a good deal of time on my part, as well as on the part of every district judge who must approve them. If a district judge’s staff is to assist, it is essential they understand the guidelines and require attorneys to comply with them. If a voucher is not properly submitted and checked by the district court, it requires a great deal of time on my part in getting ultimate approval of it by the Administrative Office. Volume VII of the Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures contains the guidelines. However, when a lawyer becomes disrespectful and refuses to follow the guidelines and refuses to cooperate with the court, then it is a more significant problem.
Mr. Snyder indicates that he would like to have his name removed from the list of attorneys who will be appointed to represent indigent criminal defendants. As far as the court is concerned, I will honor that request and I instruct you to remove his name from the list of attorneys who will be appointed in criminal cases. However, in view of the letter that Mr. Snyder forwarded, I question whether he is worthy of practicing law in the federal courts on any matter. It is my intention to issue an order to show cause as to why he should not be suspended from practicing in any federal court in this circuit for a period of one year. This suspension, of course, will apply to his appearance in federal court in North Dakota. We will, of course, give Mr. Snyder an opportunity to respond before any final determination is made.
In view of Mr. Snyder’s attitude and refusal to assist the court in processing this voucher under the guidelines, I am approving a fee for him only to the statutory limit and properly itemized expenses.
*346Before taking the steps noted above, I would appreciate your views on the matter.
Sincerely,
/s/ Donald P. Lay
Donald P. Lay
/j
Ends.
cc: Mr. Robert Snyder
Ends.
ADDENDUM NO. 3
Bickle, Coles and Snyder, Chartered
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
219V2 EAST BROADWAY
THE LITTLE BUILDING
P.O. BOX 2071
BISMARCK, NORTH DAKOTA 58502-2071
February 22, 1984
Clerk
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
525 Federal Courts Building
316 North Robert Street
St. Paul, MN 55101
Re: Robert J. Snyder — Misc. 84-8017
Dear Sir:
In response to the oral demands made by the Court to the undersigned at the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, held in St. Paul on February 16,1984, the undersigned responds as follows:
If and when a new Plan for the implementation of the Criminal Justice Act in the State of North Dakota is enacted, the undersigned will enthusiastically obey its mandates, just as he has obeyed the mandates, or lack thereof, in the existing Plan.
Further, the undersigned states that he will make every good faith effort possible to comply with the Court’s guidelines regarding the payment of attorney’s fees and expenses.
Thank you for your time and attention.
Very truly yours,
BICKLE, COLES AND SNYDER, CHARTERED
/s/ Robert J. Snyder
Robert J. Snyder
Attorney at Law
RJS/cjm
cc: Judge Van Sickle
Judge Benson
Dewey Kautzmann
ADDENDUM NO. 4
united States court of appeals
EIGHTH CIRCUIT
DONALD P. LAY
CHIEF JUDGE
February 24, 1984
Mr. Robert J. Snyder
Bickle, Coles and Snyder
Attorneys at Law
P.O. Box 2071
Bismarck, North Dakota 58502-2071
Re: Order to Show Cause. Misc. No. 84-8017.
Dear Mr. Snyder:
The clerk has forwarded to me a copy of your letter you have written to the court indicating that you will continue to offer your services for pro bono representation under the Criminal Justice Plan.
The court expressed its opinion at the time of the oral hearing that interrelated with our concern and the issuance of the order to show cause was the disrespect that you displayed to the court by way of your letter addressed to Helen Montieth, Judge Van Sickle’s secretary, of October 6, 1983. The court expressly asked if you would be willing to apologize for the tone of the letter and the disrespect displayed. You serve as an officer of the court and, as such, the Canons of Ethics require every lawyer to maintain a respect for the court as an institution.
Before circulating your letter of February 23, I would appreciate your response to Judge Arnold’s specific request, and the court’s request, for you to apologize for the letter that you wrote.
*347Please let me hear from you by return mail. I am confident that if such a letter is forthcoming that the court will dissolve the order.
Sincerely,
/s/ Donald P. Lay
Donald P. Lay
cc: Chief Judge Benson
Judge Van Sickle
Mr. Maland, Clerk’s Office

. See also State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d 211, 214 (1972), which states:
Concerning respondent’s argument that DR 1-102(A)(5) creates an impermissible and chilling effect on "First Amendment freedoms,” an examination of decisions on the point (12 A.L.R.3d, Anno., p. 1408) reveals the consensus to be that an attorney’s right to free speech is tempered by his obligation to both the courts and the bar, an obligation to which ordinary citizens are not held.