Court Opinion

ID: 9521205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:00:31.027875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:26.578318
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: I dissent for two reasons. The source of the harm to the plaintiff clearly falls outside the scope of the exculpatory clause, and, for a further reason, even if the exculpatory clause is shown to have the sweeping scope that the majority gives it, the plaintiff should be entitled to show that the clause is void as an “adhesion” contract. This case differs from Morrow in that here, the injury to the plaintiff was from a condition of the track and unrelated to any risks that are ordinarily attendant on auto racing. Thus, the source of the harm here falls outside the scope of the exculpatory clause. I would not permit the defendant to rely on the clause to shield himself from liability. The intent of these clauses is obvious: to protect track owners from claims based on the conduct of other drivers. The clause should not also bar claims based on the owner’s own negligence in constructing or maintaining the track. Defendants should not be allowed to foist on the unsuspecting the burden of testing recreational facilities for dangerous defects. The majority characterizes the “essence of the instant situation” as a trivial hobby. Presumably, if racing was the plaintiff’s occupation, or (and?) if racing deserved support as necessary to the Republic, the majority would be less likely to give effect to the exculpatory clause. Distinguishing the trivial from the important and hobbies from jobs implies that the validity of an exculpatory clause should depend on the significance of the interests and actions involved; I fail to find any legal or logical basis for this assumption. The majority would have the defendant’s liability turn on the plaintiff’s occupation; paradoxically, weekend enthusiasts would receive less protection than professionals, who would be able to demand more from the track owners through greater organization and self-interest. The effect of the majority decision is to permit owners of race tracks to charge drivers for the privilege of testing the surfaces of new tracks. The accident involved here occurred during the second lap of the first race on the defendant’s track. No races had ever been run before on this surface. Even if the sort of harm involved here fell within the scope of the exculpatory clause, I would permit the plaintiff to present evidence showing the adhesive nature of the agreement. The majority misunderstands the meaning of “adhesion contract.” It is not necessarily a contract “whereby defendant received all of the benefits”; more precisely, an adhesive contract concerns a product or service that cannot be obtained except by acquiescing to terms and conditions over which the weaker party has little or no bargaining power. (See Black’s Law Dictionary, “Adhesion contract,” at 38 (5th ed. 1979).) The weaker party generally receives one benefit — the benefit he could not obtain so easily without agreeing to the unfair terms of the contract. If most or all race tracks required racers to sign agreements absolving the track owner of all liability for personal harm and the owners invariably refused to vary the terms of the exculpatory clauses, the contracts would be adhesive. Before a defendant is permitted to use an exculpatory clause to escape tort liability, the plaintiff should be allowed to present evidence regarding the adhesive nature of the agreement. Proving that an agreement is adhesive deprives it of legal effect. Strauch v. Charles Apartments Co. (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 57, 273 N.E.2d 19.