Court Opinion

ID: 9959668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:08:01.961038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:43.793564
License: Public Domain

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SJC-09903

                COMMONWEALTH   vs.   LEON ROBINSON.

         Suffolk.     January 5, 2024. - April 12, 2024.

     Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ.

Homicide. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Warrant,
     Affidavit, Disclosure of evidence, Argument by prosecutor,
     Assistance of counsel, Instructions to jury, Discovery,
     Capital case. Search and Seizure, Probable cause, Warrant,
     Affidavit. Probable Cause. Constitutional Law, Right of
     defendant in criminal case to act pro se. Evidence,
     Disclosure of evidence, Argument by prosecutor, Expert
     opinion, Firearm. Firearms.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on April 30, 2001.

     A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Joseph
M. Walker, III; the cases were tried before Elizabeth B.
Donovan, J.; a motion for a new trial, filed on April 30, 2019,
was heard by Debra A. Squires-Lee, J.; and a motion for
postconviction discovery, filed on December 14, 2022, was
considered by this court.

     Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant.
     Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney (Mark T. Lee,
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.
                                                                    2

     KAFKER, J.   Defendant Leon Robinson was convicted of murder

in the first degree for the 2001 shooting death of Recardo

Robinson1 (victim).   On the afternoon of February 21, 2001, the

defendant and the victim got into an argument at the victim's

barbershop, which culminated in the defendant shooting the

victim four times in front of several witnesses.   The defendant

was arrested that night, and in 2005 was convicted of murder in

the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and of

unlawful possession of a firearm.

     Appealing from his convictions and from the denial of his

motion for a new trial, the defendant advances a number of

arguments regarding errors committed before and during his

trial.   He argues that his motion to suppress evidence obtained

from the search of his apartment was erroneously denied.     He

also asserts that his right to represent himself at trial was

violated, and that the trial prosecutor acted improperly by

delaying disclosure of a change in a witness's testimony and by

ascribing a motive not supported by the evidence to the

defendant during closing arguments.   The defendant next contends

that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his

trial counsel did not introduce in evidence a swatch of fabric

with a spot of the victim's blood, and because his trial counsel

     1 Although the defendant and the victim share a surname,
they are not related.
                                                                       3

did not retain an expert on eyewitness identification or blood

spatter analysis to testify.   Finally, he asserts that the trial

judge abused her discretion in choosing not to give the jury

instruction requested by defense counsel on the possibility of

an honest but mistaken identification by witnesses.      He further

argues that the cumulative effect of all the alleged errors

requires that we grant him a new trial.     He also requests that

we reduce his conviction of murder in the first degree to

manslaughter as more consonant with justice.       Separately, he

also appeals from the denial of his motion for postconviction

discovery, and from his conviction of unlawful possession of a

firearm.

     Having considered all the arguments advanced by the

defendant and having reviewed the entirety of the record

pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we affirm the

conviction of murder in the first degree.       However, we vacate

his conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm and remand

for a new trial on that charge.

     1.    Factual and procedural background.    We recite the facts

as the jury reasonably could have found them, reserving certain

facts for our discussion of the legal issues.

     The victim was the owner of Hair Textures, a barbershop

located in the Brighton section of Boston.      On the afternoon of

February 21, 2001, the shop saw many visitors, as the victim was
                                                                      4

closing down the shop before moving to North Carolina.      Among

the visitors that afternoon were Maurice McIntosh, a friend of

the victim who had previously worked at Hair Textures, and James

Rainey, who was a regular at the shop.     The defendant, who was

not a regular at the barbershop but was a family friend of the

victim, was also present, having received a haircut at the shop

earlier in the afternoon.     By around 4:20 P.M., only four men

remained in the barbershop:    the defendant, the victim,

McIntosh, and Rainey.

     The victim began lecturing the defendant about how the

defendant needed to "straighten up" and change the way he was

living his life in order to take better care of his children.

The lecture upset the defendant, and the defendant showed the

men in the barbershop that he was carrying a black revolver.

The victim looked at his cell phone, and the defendant asked the

victim who he was calling.     The victim told the defendant he was

not calling anyone, and again began lecturing the defendant on

how to live his life.   The entire conversation between the

victim and the defendant lasted about five minutes, at the end

of which the defendant pulled out his gun and shot the victim

once in the chest.   The victim fell, and the defendant shot the

victim twice in the back and once in the back of the head.

Rainey ran to the back of the barbershop and descended a

staircase to the basement, where he hid until he was found by
                                                                      5

police.     McIntosh fled out the front door and ran to a nearby

pizza shop, where he called 911.

     Dorinda Carter was parking her car on Commonwealth Avenue

outside Hair Textures at the time of the shooting.     She saw the

defendant pull a gun from his waist area and shoot at the

victim.     The victim fell, and the defendant shot twice more.

The defendant left the barbershop.     Carter drove away, but

returned to the area and spoke to police when they arrived at

the scene.

     Police arrived at the barbershop a few minutes after the

shooting.    They secured the scene, discovered Rainey during a

protective sweep of the barbershop basement, and identified

McIntosh, Rainey, and Carter as witnesses.     Police brought the

three witnesses to a police station in Brighton, where officers

took statements from each of the witnesses regarding their

recollection of what had happened.     McIntosh described the

shooter as a Black man with a dark complexion, about five feet,

eight inches tall with a "low haircut" and goatee.     He stated

that the shooter had worn a black and white Polo brand shirt, a

black leather jacket, and a silver chain with a cross.     Rainey

told police the shooter was a Black male, five feet, four inches

tall, wearing blue jeans and a black leather jacket.     He stated

that the shooter was about thirty-nine years old, had short

hair, and walked with a limp.     Carter described the shooter as a
                                                                         6

darker skinned man of average height with a short, cropped

haircut, wearing a brown leather jacket and dark pants.      She

described the gun as a black revolver.

     Based on the witness descriptions of the shooter, police

created a set of 106 images of possible suspects.    Rainey and

McIntosh separately viewed the photographs, and both identified

the defendant as the shooter.    The defendant's photograph was

added to a photographic array with nine other photographs.         This

array was printed out, and paper versions were shown to Rainey,

McIntosh, and Carter.    Rainey and McIntosh both identified the

defendant as the shooter.    Carter circled two pictures to

indicate the men who most closely resembled the shooter.      One of

the pictures Carter circled depicted the defendant.

     On the night of the murder, the defendant was arrested at a

convenience store near his apartment in the West Roxbury section

of Boston.   When he was arrested, the defendant was wearing a

black leather jacket and dark pants.     Later that night, police

obtained a search warrant for the defendant's apartment, where

they found a black and white Polo brand shirt and a silver chain

necklace with a cross.

     The defendant's jacket and other evidence was submitted to

the Boston police crime laboratory (crime lab).     There,

criminalists discovered a small stain, roughly two millimeters

in diameter, on the right sleeve of the defendant's jacket.        The
                                                                    7

stained fabric was cut out of the jacket and submitted for

testing.   The swatch of fabric with the stain tested positive

for the presence of blood, and subsequent deoxyribonucleic acid

(DNA) testing showed that the bloodstain matched the DNA of the

victim.

     At trial, the prosecution called McIntosh, Rainey, and

Carter, all of whom testified regarding their recollection of

the murder.   McIntosh and Rainey both identified the defendant

as the shooter.   Two other witnesses who had been at the

barbershop during the afternoon of the murder testified and

stated they had seen the defendant there.   Criminalists from the

crime lab testified that the small stain found on the right

sleeve of the defendant's jacket had tested positive for the

presence of blood, and that the blood was a DNA match for the

victim.

     The defendant called Christopher Driscoll, another

percipient witness to the murder, who testified that he believed

the shooter had been a Black teenager wearing a blue jacket or

sweatshirt.   Driscoll acknowledged that he only saw the shooter

through the window of the barbershop for four or five seconds,

and he admitted that his recollection of the shooter's

appearance was "pretty foggy."
                                                                     8

     The defendant also presented evidence that suggested his

brother, Michael Robinson,2 had a motive to kill the victim

because of an altercation the night before the murder between

the victim and Bobby Stevens, a cousin of the defendant and

Michael.   The defense suggested that the eyewitnesses had

mistakenly identified the defendant as the shooter instead of

Michael because the defendant had been in the barbershop the day

of the murder.   Michael testified that he saw the defendant

during the afternoon of the murder, and that the two men could

have shaken hands when they met.    The defendant posited the

theory that when Michael and the defendant shook hands, the

victim's blood transferred from Michael onto the sleeve of the

defendant's jacket.

     The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree

on the theory of deliberate premeditation and was also convicted

of unlawful possession of a firearm.    He thereafter filed an

appeal.    In the interceding years, the defendant was represented

at various times by eight different appellate attorneys.     In

2019, the defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial.3       This

     2 As he shares a surname with both the defendant and the
victim, we refer to Michael Robinson by his first name.

     3 The pro se motion for a new trial was apparently prepared
and served on the Commonwealth in 2016. However, there is no
record of the motion having been received by this court until a
copy was submitted in 2019.
                                                                         9

motion was supplemented by a brief filed by his eighth and

current appellate counsel.         We remanded the motion to the

Superior Court where, following a nonevidentiary hearing, it was

denied.4     The defendant appealed, and that appeal has been

consolidated with the defendant's direct appeal from his

convictions.

        2.   Discussion.   On appeal, the defendant advances a number

of arguments regarding errors made by the trial judge,

prosecutors, and his trial counsel that he contends weigh in

favor of granting him postconviction relief.        We address each in

turn.

        a.   Motion to suppress.    The defendant presents several

arguments as to why the evidence seized from his apartment

pursuant to a search warrant should have been suppressed.          "In

reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the

motion judge's subsidiary findings absent clear error but

conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate findings and

conclusions of law" (citation and quotation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694, 699 (2019).

        i.   Probable cause.   The defendant first argues that

probable cause for the seizure of clothing, shoes, and personal

       The judge who heard the motion for a new trial was not the
        4

trial judge, as the trial judge had retired by the time the
defendant's motion was heard.
                                                                   10

effects from his apartment was lacking because the nexus between

the items sought and place searched was insufficient.   The

existence of probable cause to issue a search warrant is a

conclusion of law we review de novo.   See Commonwealth v. Tapia,

463 Mass. 721, 725 (2012).   To establish probable cause, the

facts of the warrant affidavit and the reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from them must contain enough information for

an issuing judge to determine that "the police seek items

related to criminal activity and that the items described

reasonably may be expected to be located in the place to be

searched at the time the warrant issues" (citation and quotation

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017).

       The affidavit in support of the warrant to search the

defendant's apartment provided that officers responded to a

shooting incident after an argument at the barbershop and named

McIntosh and Lamar Shanks as witnesses.    The affidavit further

stated that Shanks witnessed an argument in the barbershop

between the defendant and victim during the afternoon of the

murder but was not present for the shooting.    McIntosh witnessed

the argument between the defendant and victim as well as the

shooting and identified the defendant as the shooter later that

day.   The warrant listed as items to be seized a black revolver

and ammunition, black slacks, a black and white Polo brand

shirt, and papers to show proof of residency.
                                                                   11

     The affidavit stated that witnesses described the defendant

as wearing black pants, a black and white long-sleeve Polo brand

shirt, and a dark leather jacket.   The defendant was arrested

the night of the murder near his home wearing a black leather

jacket but not the other clothing described, leading to the

reasonable inference that he went to his apartment and changed

some of his clothes between the time of the murder and the time

of his arrest.   Accordingly, it was reasonable for the judge to

conclude that the clothes might be found at the defendant's

residence, particularly because the items sought were "durable,

of continuing utility to the defendant[], and it was reasonable

to expect that they would be kept at home, particularly as they

were not inherently incriminating to possess."   Commonwealth v.

Alexis, 481 Mass. 91, 103 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. James,

424 Mass. 770, 778 (1997).   See Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460

Mass. 617, 627 (2011) (reasonable to infer that defendant's

clothing "could provide trace evidence linking the defendant" to

violent crime he was purported to have committed).

     The defendant contends that a search for the "black

revolver and ammunition" suspected to be used in the commission

of the crime was not supported by probable cause because a

discharged gun is inherently incriminating, and it is

unreasonable to believe that an assailant would store such

evidence in his home.   Although we have previously suggested
                                                                  12

"that a defendant who has fired a handgun in the commission of a

murder 'would not keep at home an incriminating handgun which

could be readily identified as the murder weapon through

ballistics tests,'" we need not resolve this issue in the

instant case.   Alexis, 481 Mass. at 103, quoting James, 424

Mass. at 778 n.15.   But see Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass.

336, 343-344 (1998) (probable cause existed to search

defendant's home for ammunition and his mother's home for

ammunition and weapons where he was arrested in his mother's

home on day following murder); Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 373

Mass. 478, 488 (1977) ("police had probable cause to believe

that the gun [used to commit murder] would be concealed in the

defendant's home, and the search warrant was thus properly

issued").   Where only part of a search warrant is valid, the

remedy is to sever the part of the warrant that is overbroad or

not supported by probable cause.   Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 486

Mass. 159, 168 (2020).   See Commonwealth v. Lett, 393 Mass. 141,

145 (1984) ("The partial suppression remedy for a partially

invalid warrant, we believe, effects a pragmatic balance between

the deterrent effect of suppression and the cost to society of

excluding probative evidence").    Because neither a gun nor

ammunition was discovered during the search of the residence,

and consequently no gun was introduced at trial, the defendant

suffered no harm as a result of the warrant's inclusion of these
                                                                   13

items.   See Commonwealth v. Snow, 486 Mass. 582, 591 (2021)

("The defendant is not prejudiced by an overbroad warrant if the

Commonwealth does not seek to exploit the lack of particularity

in the warrant").

     ii.   Unnamed witnesses.   The defendant next contends that

the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because

the final paragraph of the search warrant affidavit attributes

the description of the defendant's clothing to "witnesses"

without naming the particular witnesses who made such

descriptions.   The defendant's argument essentially asks us to

submit the affidavit to the type of "hypercritical analysis" we

have explicitly disclaimed when reviewing a search warrant

affidavit on appeal.   See Perkins, 478 Mass. at 102 (reviewing

court reads search warrant affidavit "in a commonsense and

realistic manner . . . without overly parsing or severing it").

Although whether witnesses are named is "one factor which may be

weighed in determining the sufficiency of an affidavit"

(citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Atchue, 393 Mass. 343, 347

(1984), the search warrant affidavit names two witnesses, Shanks

and McIntosh, who both saw the defendant on the day of the

murder and spoke with police.     The judge was entitled to make

the reasonable assumption that one or both of the witnesses

named in the affidavit were the witnesses who described the

clothing worn by the defendant.     That the affidavit did not
                                                                    14

explicitly name the witnesses in the paragraph describing the

clothing thus does not render the affidavit as a whole

defective.    See id. (sufficiency of affidavit is determined by

"a consideration of all its allegations as a whole" [citation

omitted]).

     iii.     Signature.   Finally, the defendant claims that the

search warrant was defective because it was not signed by the

issuing judge.    This argument fails because when "there is no

dispute that the judge intended to issue the warrant, and the

judge signed the officer's affidavit, the failure to sign the

warrant is no more than a clerical error" (citation and

quotation omitted).     Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 405 Mass. 86,

89, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975 (1989).      Although the judge

failed to sign the search warrant itself, she signed the search

warrant affidavit, and submitted a sworn affidavit stating that

she reviewed the search warrant application, concluded probable

cause existed to search the apartment, and had the "unequivocal

intention to sign the Search Warrant."     The judge's clerical

error thus does not provide reason to invalidate the search

warrant.     Having considered the defendant's arguments, we

conclude that the defendant's motion to suppress was properly

denied.

     b.    Right to proceed pro se.    In both his direct appeal and

his appeal from the denial of his new trial motion, the
                                                                    15

defendant contends that he was denied his constitutional right

to proceed to trial pro se.   Claiming he unambiguously invoked

his right to represent himself at trial, the defendant argues

that the denial of this right was structural error and entitles

him to a new trial.

     The right to conduct one's own defense in a criminal case

is guaranteed by both the Massachusetts Constitution and the

United States Constitution.   Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 410 Mass.

1, 10-11 (1991), S.C., 420 Mass. 508 (1995).     Assertion of the

right to proceed pro se, however, "must be predicated upon an

unequivocal waiver of one's right to counsel."    Commonwealth v.

Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 807 (1985).     See Conefrey, supra at 11

(defendant can proceed pro se if "the election to proceed

without counsel is unequivocal; voluntarily and knowingly made;

asserted in a timely manner; and not sought for an improper

purpose" [citations omitted]).   Accord United States v.

Francois, 715 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 992

(2013) (judges "must keep in mind the strong presumption against

waiver" of the right to counsel and ensure decision to proceed

pro se is knowing and intelligent).

     In May 2005, shortly before the defendant's trial was

scheduled to begin, two ex parte hearings were held on May 3 and

May 10 regarding whether defendant's trial counsel would

withdraw from representing the defendant.    Counsel sought to
                                                                   16

withdraw following a disagreement between the defendant and his

attorneys regarding trial strategy.     The defendant wanted to

argue at trial that the blood found on his jacket was planted by

police, a theory his attorneys had informed him lacked any

supporting evidence.     By contrast, the defendant's attorneys

advocated for presenting the mistaken identification defense

that was ultimately pursued at trial.     The defendant disliked

this strategy because it involved arguing that his brother

Michael had killed the victim in retaliation for a fight between

the victim and the defendant's cousin, Stevens, the night before

the murder.

      Throughout both hearings, the defendant was clear that he

wanted his attorneys to question witnesses regarding the

possibility that the Boston police department had planted blood

on his jacket, and that he disagreed with his attorneys' refusal

to do so.     Despite their disagreement, however, the defendant

did not unequivocally express his desire to proceed to trial pro

se.   Indeed, when asked directly by the trial judge whether he

wished to represent himself at trial, the defendant responded,

"Your Honor, I understand that it will be a tremendous task, and

I'm not as good with the law as it might seems, I'm not.     I'm

willing to go along with counsel with their theory and not to go

pro se on this . . . ."     The defendant reiterated that he wanted

trial counsel to elicit testimony that the bloodstain found on
                                                                      17

his jacket could not have come from blood spatter.      In other

words, although the defendant had disagreements with his trial

counsel that led them to move to withdraw, at no point in either

hearing did the defendant affirmatively state that he wished to

proceed to trial pro se.    Furthermore, the trial judge told the

defendant that during trial, if the defendant felt it was

necessary to again discuss his trial counsel or trial strategy,

the judge would allow the defendant to be heard without the jury

or the prosecution present.     During the trial, however, the

defendant did not avail himself of this opportunity, providing

further support for the conclusion that he did not unambiguously

request to represent himself.     See Commonwealth v. Means, 454

Mass. 81, 90 (2009), citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,

516 (1962) ("Waiver of counsel may not be presumed from a silent

record").    We therefore conclude, as the motion judge did, that

because the defendant never unequivocally waived his right to be

represented by counsel, his right to represent himself was not

violated.    See Conefrey, 410 Mass. at 10-11; Tuitt, 393 Mass. at

807.

       c.   Alleged prosecutorial misconduct.   i.   Brady claim.   At

trial, the prosecution called McIntosh as a witness.      On direct

examination, McIntosh stated that while the victim was lecturing

the defendant on the afternoon of the murder, the defendant

stepped outside of the barbershop "for a minute," at which time
                                                                  18

McIntosh told the victim to "let it go" and stop arguing with

the defendant.   McIntosh's previous testimony before the grand

jury and his recorded statements had not mentioned the defendant

leaving the barbershop and returning.5   When the defense objected

and explained at a sidebar that the change in McIntosh's

testimony had not previously been disclosed to the defendant,

the prosecutor stated that McIntosh had not provided this

information until trial preparation, and that the prosecution

had inadvertently failed to provide notice of this new testimony

to the defense prior to trial.

     The defendant contends that the Commonwealth's failure to

disclose the change in McIntosh's testimony prior to trial

represents a breach of the prosecution team's duty to disclose

exculpatory evidence.   See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (C), 378

Mass. 874 (1979) (prosecutors must disclose "any facts of an

exculpatory nature" within their "possession, custody, or

control").6   See also Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), as appearing in

473 Mass. 1301 (2016) (prosecutors are required to "make timely

disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known

     5 On cross-examination, McIntosh stated that the defendant
did not leave the barbershop but did go to the sidewalk outside
the barbershop briefly.

     6 We cite to the version of the rule in effect at the time
of the defendant's prosecution. The current version of the rule
contains the same language.
                                                                   19

to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused

or mitigates the offense").   The defendant argues that the

delayed disclosure of this information prejudiced his defense

because if the Commonwealth had disclosed the new testimony

prior to trial, defense counsel would have incorporated the

evidence that the defendant left the barbershop into his opening

argument to bolster his claim of mistaken identification.

     The Commonwealth has a constitutional duty "to disclose in

a timely manner material, exculpatory evidence over which it has

possession, custody, or control."    Commonwealth v. Rodriguez-

Nieves, 487 Mass. 171, 177 (2021).    See Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment").

The changed statements came to the attention of the prosecution

sometime before trial but were not disclosed to the defense.

The new testimony was exculpatory because it differed in one

respect from both McIntosh's testimony before the grand jury and

his recorded statement describing the afternoon of the murder,

and therefore provided a basis to impeach his testimony.    See

Rodriguez-Nieves, supra (evidence is exculpatory where it may

impeach prosecution's witness).     The statements thus had the

potential to undercut the reliability of McIntosh, a prosecution

witness whose identification of the defendant as the shooter was
                                                                   20

important to the prosecution's case.   See Commonwealth v.

Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 22 (1978) ("The Brady obligation

comprehends evidence which . . . calls into question a material,

although not indispensable, element of the prosecution's version

of the events, or challenges the credibility of a key

prosecution witness").   The prosecution therefore had a duty to

disclose the change in McIntosh's anticipated trial testimony

and violated this duty by failing to disclose the new statement

prior to trial.   See Rodriguez-Nievez, supra at 177-178

(prosecutors violated their duty to defendant when they failed

to disclose change in witness's statement before trial).

     Having concluded that the prosecution violated its duty of

disclosure regarding McIntosh's changed statement, we must

consider whether the failure to disclose the statement

prejudiced the defendant.   "In measuring prejudice, it is the

consequences of the delay that matter, not the likely impact of

the nondisclosed evidence, and we ask whether the prosecution's

disclosure was sufficiently timely to allow the defendant to

make effective use of the evidence in preparing and presenting

his case" (quotations omitted).   Rodriguez-Nieves, 487 Mass. at

179, quoting Commonwealth v. Almeida, 452 Mass. 601, 609-610

(2008).   Because defense counsel had sufficient opportunity to

cross-examine McIntosh regarding his newly found recollection of

the defendant briefly exiting the barbershop, we conclude that
                                                                 21

the defendant suffered no prejudice from the delayed disclosure.

We emphasize that the missing information required no special

preparation to understand and digest.    It also differed from the

information disclosed in only one respect, and not one of

particular importance.   Although defense counsel was not able to

highlight the possibility that the defendant stepped outside

before the shooting during opening statements, he emphasized the

idea that the defendant left the barbershop in his closing

argument, and the defendant raises no other argument regarding

how he was prejudiced by the delay in disclosure.   See

Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 293-294 (2013) (no

prejudice to defendant from delayed disclosure of exculpatory

evidence relating to identification where defense counsel was

able to cross-examine witness and highlight exculpatory evidence

during closing argument and "the other identification evidence

against the defendant was extensive").    Cf. Commonwealth v.

Correia, 492 Mass. 220, 226 (2023) (defendant was not prejudiced

by late disclosure of prosecution's use of defendant's rap

lyrics found on Internet where defense counsel was able to

elicit testimony from defendant explaining lyrics).   Contrast

Rodriguez-Nieves, supra at 179-180 (defendant was prejudiced

when change in prosecution witness testimony was not disclosed

before trial and expert testimony impeaching credibility of

changed testimony would likely have mattered to jury).
                                                                     22

     ii.   Closing arguments.   The defendant also argues that the

prosecutor improperly made reference to facts not in evidence

during his closing argument to the jury.    In his closing

argument, defense counsel argued that the defendant's brother

Michael had murdered the victim.   The defense reasoned that the

victim had gotten into a physical altercation with Stevens the

day before the murder.    The victim had choked Stevens.

Following the altercation, Stevens left the barbershop but

warned the victim that he was "going to get [his] cousin."

Stevens testified that by his cousin, he meant Michael, whom he

saw a few minutes after the altercation.   Michael told Stevens

to stay away from the barbershop, and that he (Michael) would

take care of it.   Stevens went to a friend's apartment, where he

told his friend that he had been in a fight with the victim, and

that the next day, he or one of his family members would kill

the victim.    Stevens's friend felt that the threat was serious

enough that he went to the barbershop the day of the murder and

warned the victim about what Stevens had said.    There was no

evidence introduced at trial showing that Stevens or Michael

communicated with the defendant prior to the murder.       Defense

counsel argued that it was Michael, not the defendant, who had a

motive to kill the victim and suggested that Michael was the

real killer.
                                                                       23

     During the prosecution's closing argument, the prosecutor

argued that because both the defendant and Michael were cousins

of Stevens, they both would be similarly motivated to kill the

victim because of the fight between Stevens and the victim.           The

defendant objected, but the objection was overruled.   When the

defendant renewed his objection after the prosecutor's closing

argument, the judge said that she would instruct the jury not to

speculate on any of the evidence.   During her instructions to

the jury, the judge emphasized to the jury that closing

arguments were not evidence, and twice told the jury not to

decide the facts of the case on the basis of speculation.        On

appeal, the defendant argues that the statements suggesting he

had a motive to kill the victim were improper because there was

no evidence introduced showing that he had communicated with

Stevens or Michael between the altercation involving Stevens and

the time of the murder.   Because the defendant objected to the

statements, we review for prejudicial error.   See Commonwealth

v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 141 (2007), S.C., 477 Mass. 582

(2017).

     "Remarks made during closing argument are considered in the

context of the entire argument, together with the evidence

presented at trial and the judge's instructions to the jury."

Commonwealth v. Da Lin Huang, 489 Mass. 162, 180 (2022).     A

prosecutor may not misstate evidence or refer to facts not in
                                                                   24

evidence during closing argument.    Commonwealth v. Goddard, 476

Mass. 443, 449 (2017), citing Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass.

680, 703 (2015).   A prosecutor's closing argument may, however,

"analyze the evidence and suggest what reasonable inferences the

jury should draw from that evidence," Goddard, supra, quoting

Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 412 Mass. 505, 509 (1992).    Inferences

"need not be necessary and inescapable, only reasonable and

possible."    Goddard, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 432

Mass. 623, 628 (2000).

     Because the prosecutor's statement regarding the

possibility of the defendant sharing a motive with Michael was,

in the context of the entire argument and the evidence presented

at trial, a reasonable inference, we conclude that there was no

error.    See Da Lin Huang, 489 Mass. at 180; Goddard, 476 Mass.

at 449.   The jury heard testimony that around the time of the

murder, Michael and the defendant saw each other every day, even

though the defendant did not live in the Brighton area.

Furthermore, Stevens's statement to the victim that he was

"going to get [his] cousin" and his statement to his friend that

he or one of his family members was going to kill the victim

could logically refer to either Michael or the defendant, as

both were his cousins.   These facts in evidence, in conjunction,

allow the inference that Michael or Stevens communicated with

the defendant regarding Stevens's altercation with the victim,
                                                                   25

providing the defendant with the same motive as Michael to kill

the victim.7   Accordingly, we reject the defendant's contention

that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper.

     d.   Ineffective assistance of counsel.   The defendant

advances three theories as to why his trial counsel was

ineffective, thus depriving him of a fair trial.   First, he

proposes that his trial attorneys were ineffective because they

did not enter the bloodstained leather swatch in evidence for

the jury to consider, even though the admitted evidence included

expert testimony regarding the bloodstain, the leather jacket

from which the bloodstained swatch was cut, and a ruler to help

the jury understand the size of the two-millimeter bloodstain.

Next, he suggests that his trial counsel was ineffective for not

calling an expert witness on eyewitness identification.

Finally, the defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective

     7 We also note that a "prosecutor is entitled to make a fair
reply to the defendant's closing argument," Da Lin Huang, 489
Mass. at 180, quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 404 Mass. 1, 7
(1989). The defendant argued that because the defendant's
cousin had been in a fight with the victim, the defendant's
brother but not the defendant himself had a motive to kill the
victim in retaliation. The prosecutor's statement that
Michael's familial motive could easily also provide a motive to
the defendant was responsive to this argument by defense
counsel. See Da Lin Huang, supra, quoting Commonwealth v.
Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 130 (2013) ("A prosecutor may address a
particular point in defense counsel's closing argument as a
sham, but he may not characterize the entire defense as such").
                                                                     26

in choosing not to call a blood spatter expert to testify

regarding the bloodstain found on his jacket.

        Because the defendant was convicted of murder in the first

degree, we review his claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel under the G. L. c. 278, § 33E, standard to determine

whether there was a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of

justice.    Commonwealth v. Henderson, 486 Mass. 296, 301-302

(2020), citing Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 358

(2016).     Under this standard, we first determine whether

defense counsel committed an error in the course of trial, and

then determine whether that error was likely to have influenced

the jury's conclusion.    Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 46, 62

(2018), citing Commonwealth v. Holland, 476 Mass. 801, 812

(2017).

        Where a claim of error is based on a tactical or strategic

decision by trial counsel, rather than an omission or mistake,

an attorney's decision is only ineffective if it was "manifestly

unreasonable."    Henderson, 486 Mass. at 302.   Manifestly

unreasonable decisions are those "which lawyers of ordinary

training and skill in criminal law would not consider

competent."    Ayala, 481 Mass. at 62, quoting Holland, 476 Mass.

at 812.    We consider each of the defendant's claims of error in

turn.
                                                                  27

     i.   Leather swatch introduction.   The defendant was

arrested wearing a black leather jacket.   Criminalists at the

crime lab inspected the jacket and found a small stain, about

two millimeters in diameter, on the right sleeve of the jacket.

They cut a swatch of fabric containing the stain from the jacket

to perform testing on the stain.   The stain was determined to be

human blood, and DNA testing determined that the blood belonged

to the victim.   At trial, two criminalists testified regarding

the testing done on the stain and the test results.   However,

the swatch of fabric with the stain was not entered in evidence,

although a ruler was entered in evidence to help the jury

understand the size of the two-millimeter stain.   During jury

deliberations, the jury asked the judge whether the leather

swatch was in evidence, and the judge instructed the jury that

the leather swatch was not marked as an exhibit.

     In his motion for a new trial and again on direct appeal,

the defendant suggests that his trial counsel was ineffective

because when they received the question from the jury about the

swatch, they did not move to reopen the evidence to enter the

swatch as an exhibit.   The defendant contends that he was

prejudiced by this failure because if the jury had been able to

see the leather swatch firsthand, they would have concluded that

the stain was too small to have been the result of blood

spatter, which would have bolstered his argument that the
                                                                   28

bloodstain was transferred to the defendant's jacket from

contact with his brother on the night of the murder.

     The parties disagree as to whether the decision not to move

to submit the swatch to the jury as an exhibit was a strategic

decision by defense counsel at trial or an inadvertent error.8

We need not reach the issue whether the omission was a tactical

decision, however, because even assuming the failure to submit

the swatch to the jury as an exhibit was inadvertent, any error

was not likely to have influenced the jury's decision.    See

Ayala, 481 Mass. at 62.   Although the bloodstain itself was not

introduced in evidence, the jury heard testimony regarding the

discovery of the stain, the testing done by the Commonwealth and

the results of that testing, and the size of the stain.

Moreover, the jacket itself, as well as a ruler, was introduced

in evidence, allowing the jury to visualize the size of the two-

millimeter stain.   Because the bloodstained swatch itself would

not have provided the jury with any new information, it is

unlikely that the introduction of the swatch as an exhibit would

have influenced the jury's decision.9   See Commonwealth v.

     8 Trial counsel stated in an affidavit that he did not ask
that the swatch be submitted as an exhibit because he could not
"imagine that [he] would put in the government's evidence."

     9 We note that the defendant cites to no authority
suggesting that failing to admit evidence that is cumulative of
other evidence in the record rendered trial counsel ineffective,
and we further note that the defendant provides only conclusory
                                                                     29

Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 602 (2001) ("no error" by defense counsel

in choosing not to call additional witnesses whose testimony

would be "merely cumulative of other testimony").

     ii.   Expert testimony.   "The decision to call, or not to

call, an expert witness fits squarely within the realm of

strategic or tactical decisions."    Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 491

Mass. 339, 349 (2023), quoting Ayala, 481 Mass. at 63.     Indeed,

the defendant's trial counsel submitted an affidavit averring

that the choice not to call an expert witness on eyewitness

identification was a strategic choice, reasoning that "calling

an expert witness can cut both ways."   Accordingly, we evaluate

whether trial counsel's decision not to call an expert witness

on eyewitness identification was manifestly unreasonable at the

time it was made.   See Ayala, supra, citing Holland, 476 Mass.

at 812.

     The defendant argues that the decision not to call an

expert on eyewitness identification was manifestly unreasonable

because such an expert could have educated the jury regarding

bystander misidentification, which might have undercut the

testimony of McIntosh and Rainey by suggesting that they

mistakenly identified the defendant as the shooter because they

had seen him in the barbershop earlier in the day.   An expert

allegations regarding the prejudice suffered from the swatch not
being presented to the jury.
                                                                   30

also could have testified that when a witness is in a highly

stressful situation or in a situation involving a weapon, their

memories of the situation can be distorted.   See Commonwealth v.

Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 372-373 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 1025

(2018) (scientific research shows that high levels of stress

reduce eyewitness's ability to accurately remember events and

make identifications).

     Having reviewed the entire record, we cannot conclude that

the decision not to call an eyewitness identification expert was

manifestly unreasonable in this case.   See Kirkland, 491 Mass.

at 356-357 (trial counsel not ineffective in choosing not call

expert witness where "testimony had the potential to be a

double-edged sword for the defense, potentially helping the

defendant's case on the one hand but hurting it on the other,"

and where physical evidence unrelated to expert's testimony

identified defendant as shooter).   As defendant's trial counsel

stated in his affidavit, expert witnesses can cut both ways.     If

called at trial, an eyewitness identification expert likely

would have been forced to admit that because Rainey and McIntosh

spent thirty minutes and two hours, respectively, in the

barbershop with the defendant prior to the shooting, they likely

had ample opportunity to observe the defendant in a

nonstressful, well-lit environment, bolstering the credibility

of their identifications of the defendant.    See Commonwealth v.
                                                                   31

Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 910 n.24 (2013) ("Whether the witness

had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender at the time

of the offense will be affected by such matters as how long or

short a time was available, how far or close the witness was,

[and] how good were lighting conditions . . ." [citation

omitted]).

       Furthermore, an eyewitness identification expert likely

would have suggested that the description of the shooter by

defense witness Christopher Driscoll was likely to be unreliable

because Driscoll only observed the shooter for four to five

seconds in a stressful situation immediately after the shooting.

See Gomes, 470 Mass. at 372-373 (discussing negative effects of

stress on memory formation).     Driscoll testified for the defense

at trial and described the shooter as a Black teenager wearing a

blue jacket or sweatshirt, although he acknowledged that his

recollection of the shooting was "pretty foggy."    Driscoll was

the percipient witness whose description of the shooter least

resembled the defendant, who was in his late thirties at the

time of the murder.   The defendant's trial counsel could

reasonably have concluded that calling an expert who might

bolster the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses while

undercutting the reliability of Driscoll's testimony would harm

the defendant's case at trial.    See Kirkland, 491 Mass. at 356-

357.   The decision not to call an expert in this case was
                                                                    32

therefore not one "which lawyers of ordinary training and skill

in criminal law would not consider competent."    See Ayala, 481

Mass. at 62.   The defendant was therefore not denied effective

assistance of counsel by trial counsel's decision not to call an

expert witness on eyewitness identification.     See id.

     Similarly, the defendant argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective for choosing not to call a blood spatter expert at

trial.    In support of his motion for a new trial, the defendant

submitted an affidavit from a blood spatter expert who opined

that "while it is possible, it is unlikely that the blood stain

on the sleeve of the jacket" was the result of blood spatter

from a gunshot.   Trial counsel stated at an ex parte hearing

before trial that a blood spatter expert had been retained and

could testify that the spot of blood on the jacket was unlikely

to have come from blood spatter.   Trial counsel did not,

however, believe calling the expert was necessary, given the

limited testimony the Commonwealth provided regarding blood

spatter,10 and because an expert would not be able to provide an

alternate theory for the origin of the bloodstain.     Defense

     10At trial, the prosecution did not provide any evidence
suggesting that the bloodstain found on the defendant's jacket
was the result of blood spatter. Instead, the prosecution's
witnesses discussed the chain of custody of the jacket and
discussed the scientific testing that showed the stain was the
victim's blood, but they did not offer theories as to how the
blood had come to be on the defendant's jacket.
                                                                  33

counsel was also able to elicit testimony from a Commonwealth

expert regarding the fact that small droplets of blood do not

spatter as far as larger droplets, and during closing arguments

he emphasized that the two-millimeter stain was unlikely to have

resulted from blood spatter because of its small size.   The

strategic decision by trial counsel not to call a blood spatter

expert was therefore not manifestly unreasonable because, as the

motion judge observed, a blood spatter expert would likely have

been forced to admit on cross-examination that it was possible,

if unlikely, for the bloodstain to have resulted from blood

spatter during the shooting, and thus could potentially damage

the defendant's case.   See Kirkland, 491 Mass. at 356-357

(decision not to call expert witness not manifestly unreasonable

where expert had potential to harm defendant's case).

     e.   Jury instructions.   At trial, defense counsel requested

a jury instruction stating that, in addition to considering

whether a witness identifying a perpetrator testified honestly,

the jury should also consider "whether the witness's

identification is accurate or instead is an honest mistake."

The trial judge did not so instruct the jury.   Rather, the judge

gave the then-current model jury instruction on identification

(Rodriguez instruction).   See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378

Mass. 296, 310-311 (1979) (Appendix), S.C., 419 Mass. 1006

(1995) (providing jury instruction on identification testimony
                                                                    34

that was basis for model instruction used at defendant's

trial).11    Near the end of the model jury instruction, the judge

added, "In analyzing identification testimony you may consider

whether or not the witness might simply be mistaken."    On

appeal, the defendant contends that the judge's decision to

instruct the jury to consider that "a witness might simply be

mistaken" rather than instructing the jury as to an "honest but

mistaken" identification was an abuse of discretion.

     "Fairness to a defendant compels the trial judge to give an

instruction on the possibility of an honest but mistaken

identification when the facts permit it and when the defendant

requests it."    Commonwealth v. Pressley, 390 Mass. 617, 620

(1983).     Providing such an instruction "help[s] to ensure that

the jury understand 'the thrust' of the Rodriguez instruction --

i.e., that a witness might simply be mistaken."     Commonwealth v.

Pires, 453 Mass. 66, 72 (2009).

     In Pires, 453 Mass. at 68-72, we considered jury

instructions essentially identical to the jury instructions

provided in the present case.    See id. at 69 n.2 (setting out

     11We have since updated the model jury instruction on
identification to reflect more recent science on factors that
affect the reliability of eyewitness identification. Gomes, 470
Mass. at 376. See Model Jury Instructions on Eyewitness
Identification, 473 Mass. 1051 (2015). We explicitly
"intend[ed] the new instruction to have no retroactive
application." Gomes, supra at 376. As such, the Rodriguez
instruction was proper at the time of trial.
                                                                      35

full jury instruction provided on identification).      Like the

trial judge in this case, the judge in Pires gave the Rodriguez

instruction on identification and instructed the jury that "[i]n

analyzing identification testimony, you may consider whether or

not the witness might simply be mistaken."    Id. at 71.    We held

that "[a]lthough this was not the specific language the

defendant had requested, it was sufficient, in the context of

the over-all instruction, to apprise the jury on the possibility

of an 'honest but mistaken' identification."      Id.   As in Pires,

the instruction here conveyed to the jury the possibility of an

honest but mistaken identification, and we therefore discern no

error in the jury instructions offered by the trial judge.         See

id.   See also Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 597 (2005),

quoting Commonwealth v. Daye, 411 Mass. 719, 739 (1992) ("The

judge is not required to grant a particular instruction so long

as the charge, as a whole, adequately covers the issue").

      f.   Motion for postconviction discovery.   In December of

2022, the defendant filed a motion before this court to view the

district attorney for the Suffolk district's trial file.      The

defendant argued that because allegations had been made that the

trial prosecutor in this case withheld exculpatory evidence in

an unrelated proceeding,12 and because other Brady violations

       Following an independent investigation undertaken on
      12

behalf of the district attorney for the Suffolk district, the
                                                                   36

have been discovered in unrelated cases, he should be allowed to

review the district attorney's trial file to uncover any

potentially exculpatory evidence.   Because the motion was not

related to a motion for a new trial or a previously filed motion

for postconviction discovery, we denied the motion.   See Mass.

R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (4), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001)

("Where affidavits filed by the moving party . . . establish a

prima facie case for relief, the judge on motion of any party

. . . may authorize such discovery as is deemed appropriate

. . .").   We also noted that the defendant had failed to

establish a prima facie case for relief, as he made no attempt

to explain what evidence he was seeking.   See Commonwealth v.

Ware, 471 Mass. 85, 94 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Daniels,

445 Mass. 392, 407 (2005) (when requesting postconviction

discovery, defendant "must make a sufficient showing that the

discovery is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might

warrant granting a new trial").

     Here, the defendant contends that we erred and should allow

his discovery motion.   We decline to do so.   We emphasize that

the defendant continues to engage in a "fishing expedition"

prosecutor was cleared of any wrongdoing with regard to the
other case. Prosecutor Cleared of Withholding Evidence, Will
Rejoin Suffolk DA's Office, Boston Globe, July 6, 2023.
                                                                   37

untethered to any specific claims.   See Ware, 471 Mass. at 94;

Daniels, 445 Mass. at 405-407.

     g.   Cumulative error.   The defendant also argues that the

cumulative effect of the alleged errors discussed supra require

that he be granted a new trial.   As we have reviewed each of

these alleged errors and have found no prejudice to the

defendant, even when viewed as a whole, there are no grounds on

which to provide the defendant a new trial.   See Commonwealth v.

Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 596 (2019) (for defendant to be entitled

to new trial, errors must be such that "we cannot be certain

that the jury would have been able to look at the evidence

clearly and reach a decision based only on proof beyond a

reasonable doubt").

     We also reject the defendant's argument that we should

exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce his

conviction of murder in the first degree to manslaughter.      "[W]e

do not sit as a second jury to pass anew on the question of the

defendant's guilt."   Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 470 Mass. 163, 167

(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Carlino, 449 Mass. 71, 80

(2007).   Moreover, "[r]egard for the public interest impels us

to use with restraint our power under § 33E to modify the jury's

verdict," Ortiz, supra at 166-167, quoting Commonwealth v.

Colleran, 452 Mass. 417, 431 (2008).   Here, the defendant's

argument that the verdict is not consonant with justice is
                                                                     38

unsupported.     We therefore decline the defendant's invitation to

reduce his conviction to manslaughter.

     h.     Firearm charge.   The defendant also appeals from his

conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm.       At the time the

defendant was convicted, licensure was considered an affirmative

defense to a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm.      See

Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 689 (Guardado I), S.C.,

493 Mass. 1 (2023) (Guardado II).      Following the United States

Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n

v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), however, we held "that absence of

licensure is an essential element" of firearm possession

offenses.    Guardado I, supra at 690.    "Because Bruen was decided

after the defendant's trial but while the case was pending on

appeal, he is entitled to the benefit of the new rule; that is,

the right to have the Commonwealth prove that he lacked a

license."    Guardado II, supra at 12.    We therefore vacate the

defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm and

remand for a new trial on that charge.      See id.

     i.     Moffett briefing.   The defendant filed a 248-page pro

se brief along with the brief written by his appellate counsel.

The defendant's pro se brief advances thirty-three different

arguments, some duplicative of arguments included in the brief

filed by counsel and discussed supra.      The Commonwealth urges

that we should strike the defendant's pro se brief and disregard
                                                                   39

the arguments contained therein because the defendant's pro se

arguments were not included in defense counsel's appellate

brief, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201, 208

(1981).

     As we are required to conduct a plenary review of the

record to determine whether a meritorious claim existed,

pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we have reviewed

the defendant's pro se brief despite its numerous

nonconformities, which we will not belabor here.     Having

reviewed the entirety of the record, including all the

additional issues raised by the defendant in his pro se brief,

we conclude that nothing contained therein warrants an award of

extraordinary relief.     We also conclude that none of these

issues merits further discussion.

     3.   Conclusion.   For the reasons discussed, the defendant's

conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of

deliberate premeditation is affirmed, as is the denial of his

motion for a new trial.    Additionally, we affirm the denial of

the defendant's motion for postconviction discovery.     We vacate

the defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm

and remand for a new trial on that indictment.

                                      So ordered.