Court Opinion

ID: 9387563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 15:00:28.828095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.356111
License: Public Domain

20-1753
     Ramirez v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                                 Auh, IJ
                                                                           A044 128 896
                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                     SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 18th day of April, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
 9            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10            MYRNA PÉREZ,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   ROBINSON RAMIREZ,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                        v.                                     20-1753
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                      Rohmah A. Javed, Karen L.
25                                        Murtagh,
26                                        Prisoners’ Legal Services of New
27                                        York, Albany, NY.
28
29   FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
30                                        Attorney General; Kiley Kane,
31                                        Senior Litigation Counsel; Lindsay
32                                        Corliss, Trial Attorney, Office of
33                                        Immigration Litigation, United
 1                              States Department of Justice,
 2                              Washington, DC.
 3
 4       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 5   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 6   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 7   is DENIED.

 8       Robinson Ramirez, a native and citizen of the Dominican

 9   Republic, seeks review of a May 6, 2020 decision of the BIA

10   affirming a December 6, 2019 decision of an Immigration Judge

11   (“IJ”), which denied protection under the Convention Against

12   Torture (“CAT”).    In re Robinson Ramirez, No. A044 128 896

13   (B.I.A. May 6, 2020), aff’g No. A044 128 896 (Immig. Ct.

14   Fishkill Dec. 6, 2019).    We assume the parties’ familiarity

15   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

16       We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.

17   See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528

18   (2d Cir. 2006).    We review Ramirez’s factual challenges to

19   the denial of CAT relief under “the substantial-evidence

20   standard.”   Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020).

21   “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless

22   any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

23   the contrary.”    8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

                                    2
 1       With these standards in mind, we conclude that the agency

 2   did not err in finding that Ramirez failed to establish a

 3   likelihood of torture in the Dominican Republic.

 4       An     applicant   for   CAT   protection       has   the    burden    to

 5   establish that he would “more likely than not” be tortured by

 6   or with the acquiescence of government officials.                  8 C.F.R.

 7   §§ 1208.16(c)(2),      1208.17(a),       1208.18(a)(1);         Khouzam   v.

 8   Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2004).              In assessing

 9   whether an applicant has satisfied his burden of proof, the

10   agency     must   consider    “all       evidence    relevant      to     the

11   possibility of future torture,” including evidence of past

12   torture.    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).         “[A]n alien will never

13   be able to show that he faces a more likely than not chance

14   of torture if one link in the chain cannot be shown to be

15   more likely than not to occur.           It is the likelihood of all

16   necessary events coming together that must more likely than

17   not lead to torture, and a chain of events cannot be more

18   likely than its least likely link.”          Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518

19   F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re J-F-F-, 23 I. &

20   N. Dec. 912, 918 n.4 (A.G. 2006)).                  “A private actor’s

21   behavior can constitute torture under the CAT without a

22   government’s specific intent to inflict it if a government

                                          3
 1   official is aware of the persecutor’s conduct and intent and

 2   acquiesces in violation of the official’s duty to intervene.”

 3   Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2007); see

 4   also Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 759 (2d Cir.

 5   2022).

 6        We find no error in the agency’s determination that

 7   Ramirez did not suffer torture when he was abused by a private

 8   actor as a child.      The agency acknowledged that Ramirez was

 9   not required to report the abuse to police to establish

10   acquiescence.     But in determining that there was no evidence

11   of   government   acquiescence,          the   agency    was     entitled   to

12   consider the fact that Ramirez had not reported the abuse to

13   police.     See Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 593

14   (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that “failure to ask for police help

15   is   not    enough,   by   itself,       to    preclude      a   finding    of

16   acquiescence,” but that the agency was not compelled to find

17   acquiescence where petitioner gave police wrong information

18   and country conditions evidence showed efforts to combat gang

19   violence); see also Pierre, 502 F.3d at 118.

20        Further, the agency reasonably found that Ramirez failed

21   to   show   a   likelihood   of   torture        as     an   imprisoned     or

22   institutionalized mentally ill, criminal deportee in the

                                          4
 1   Dominican       Republic.       Ramirez     remained    employed       while

 2   unmedicated for decades in the United States and he does not

 3   have a history of violence, so we see no error in the agency’s

 4   conclusion that he failed to establish that he will likely

 5   come to the attention of police based on his mental health

 6   issues even if he cannot obtain medication.                See Savchuck,

 7   518 F.3d at 123.            The agency also reasonably found that

 8   limitations on mental health care in the Dominican Republic,

 9   as well as harsh conditions and lack of adequate medical care

10   in prisons, are due to a lack of resources rather than a

11   specific intent to torture those suffering from mental health

12   issues.     See id.; see also Pierre, 502 F.3d at 121 (“The

13   failure to maintain standards of diet, hygiene, and living

14   space in prison does not constitute torture under the CAT

15   unless    the    deficits     are   sufficiently       extreme   and    are

16   inflicted intentionally rather than as a result of poverty,

17   neglect, or incompetence.”).             We find no merit in Ramirez’s

18   argument that the IJ ignored his fear of torture based on the

19   nature of his past abuse or conviction, or that the BIA

20   improperly considered those bases in the first instance.                The

21   IJ found that Ramirez’s failure to establish a likelihood of

22   being imprisoned was dispositive of his fear of torture due

                                          5
 1   to the nature of his conviction and also found that he did

 2   not inform anyone in the Dominican Republic of the abuse he

 3   suffered.   See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129

 4   (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the record

 5   . . . [an applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”); see

 6   also INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general

 7   rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on

 8   issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results

 9   they reach.”).

10       Because Ramirez failed to establish that he was likely

11   to be singled out for detention or hospitalization or that

12   anyone would specifically intend to torture him, the agency

13   did not err in finding that he failed to satisfy his burden

14   of proof for CAT relief.     See Savchuck, 518 F.3d at 123;

15   Pierre, 502 F.3d at 121.

16       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

17   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

18   stays VACATED.

19                                FOR THE COURT:
20                                Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
21                                Clerk of Court

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