Court Opinion

ID: 9749232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:28:46.869283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:45.352141
License: Public Domain

*92Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy :
The majority opinion, while correctly stating what has been the law in cases of this sort, reaches what I consider a wrong result on the facts, and I must accordingly dissent. As the Court reaffirms, “[rjecanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the [trial] court' to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such [recanting] testimony is true.” Commonwealth v. Coleman, 438 Pa. 373, 376-77, 264 A. 2d 649, 651 (1970). See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 312, 313, 234 A. 2d 552 (1967); Commonwealth v. Palarino, 168 Pa. Superior Ct. 152, 155, 77 A. 2d 665 (1951). For this reason, “[t]he well established rule is that an appellate court may not interfere with the denial or granting of a new trial where the sole ground is the alleged recantation of state witnesses unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Coleman, supra.
In the case at bar the trial judge was not satisfied that the recanting statement was true. He reached this conclusion after a careful analysis of the recanting testimony and the evidence which tended to corroborate it, viewed against the background of the trial evidence and Ms own observation of the demeanor of the prosecutrix on the witness stand at trial. The reasons leading him to the belief that Frieda Hosteller was telling the truth at the trial and not in her recanting deposition are set forth in Judge Palmer’s opinion for the court en banc, from wMch I quote:
“Upon a close examination of the record, we are not persuaded Frieda perjured herself at the trial. In tMs regard we recognize that in this, as in most cases of sexual assault, there were, or are, no witnesses. Of necessity, therefore, the law has always permitted convictions of such crimes based on the uncorroborated testimony of the victims. Where, as here, the victim *93subsequently recants, and it was her testimony, and hers alone, which served to convict the defendant, the difficulties in determining where the truth lies are manifest. There are, however, certain factors which shed some light and which must be considered.
“Thus it is to be noted that fifteen minutes after the assault Frieda told her sister, the first person to come into the home, what had occurred. Within a matter of minutes thereafter she told her mother. The next day she told the same story to her stepbrother and his wife, and then to the police. Subsequently, before trial, she affirmed this story before the Juvenile Court, as a result of which protective custody was awarded to the Northampton County Children’s Bureau. Thereafter she recounted the same facts to a judge and jury. Thus, from January 23, 1988, until she gave her recanting statement on June 28, 1968, she never waivered in the account which she gave at the trial of the incidents which occurred between her and her father on January 23. It must also be noted she did not change this story until two days after she elected to leave her grandmother’s home and return to live with her mother and father and the rest of her family.
“On the other hand, we recognize Frieda’s story was not corroborated by any other testimony in the case; both the examination by her mother and that of the doctor disclosed no physical evidence which would support her story.
“'The author of this Opinion was the trial judge. He clearly recalls Frieda’s demeanor on the witness stand. While she wept at times during the course of her examination, her testimony was given in a forthright and convincing manner. She was an intelligent and candid witness. There was no indication her testimony was inspired by malice, spite, or a feeling of hatred for her father. Nor did the testimony of any of the other wit*94nesses suggest any reason why Frieda would testify falsely.
“On the other hand, the record before us does not ‘incontrovertibly’ demonstrate Frieda told the truth in her recanting statement of June 28,1968. In this statement she does not state why, if her testimony at the trial was false, she ever made up the story in the first place. All she does state is that she testified as she did because, having told her grandmother and her uncle the same story previously, she thought if she testified to the contrary they would not believe her and also ‘because my grandmother and them was in court, and if I turned around and told the other story that he didn’t touch me, then I didn’t know what they would think.’
“Similarly, while the testimony at trial disclosed no motive for Frieda to tell an untrue story, the motive for her recanting testimony is apparent. Thus, the record discloses she first indicated she wished to change her story sometime between June 25 and June 27, 1968, immediately upon her voluntary return to her parents’ home from the home of her grandmother where she admittedly was unhappy. Obviously this young girl must have felt her parents—with whom she wanted to live—resented her part in convicting her father. While there was no evidence this resentment was expressed, it must have been apparent to her, her only hope of being accepted back into the family was to recant the testimony she had given at the trial.
“It also must be remembered Frieda was not physically injured by her father and while she testified she told him she was ‘scared’, when she realized what he proposed to do, there was no indication in her testimony that what occurred permanently estranged her from him. The fact she voluntarily returned home from her grandmother’s while her father was still there *95and while she could have remained away from home, demonstrates this to be true. Thus, while what he did was a crime under the law and ‘scared’ this fifteen year old girl at the time it was done, there was no evidence it was such an enormity in her view as, when weighed with the alternative of being able to return to her home and live with her parents, would have caused her not to choose the latter course.”
On the basis of this record, I do not see how it can be said that the lower court committed a clear abuse of discretion.
It may be that the majority opinion, while paying lip service to the prior law on this subject, in effect limits its application to the retraction of a previously convicted co-conspirator or co-felon, and enunciates a new rule as to the recantation of one who is the victim of and sole witness to a sex crime; the new rule would in effect require a new trial in the latter type of case. If that is the intention of the majority, I am not persuaded that such a modification is called for or is wise.
We are dealing here not with a tort claim between private parties,1 but with a crime against the state. It seems to me eminently sound that the quality of the so-called “after-discovered evidence” should be scrutinized with the greatest care by the trial judge before awarding a new trial. I think his duty still should be to refuse a new trial if not satisfied that the recanting statement is true.
The majority argue that a witness-victim has “more to lose” by admitting to trial perjury in retraction *96than does a co-conspirator, already in prison. Assuming, arguendo, that this is so, it is only one element going to tbe believability of the retraction; it should certainly not by itself carry sufficient credence to warrant a new trial. I am aware that in rape cases false accusations are not infrequent; the same factors that are responsible for this phenomenon can operate to produce false recantations.
Mr. Chief Justice Held joins in this dissent.

 In civil cases the rule seems to be that it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to refuse to grant a new trial where it appears, by “incontrovertible” evidence obtained after trial, that the verdict was rendered, or materially enhanced in amount, by reason of the perjury of the litigant in whose favor it was entered. Candelore v. Glauser, 291 Pa. 582, 140 Atl. 525 (1928) ; see also Blake v. Marinelli, 357 Pa. 314, 53 A. 2d 550 (1947).