Court Opinion

ID: 9395154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 13:11:28.88091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:05.918781
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 40

                  SUPREME COURT            OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2021AP1054

COMPLETE TITLE:        Femala Fleming,
                                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                             v.
                       Amateur Athletic Union of the United States,
                       Inc.,
                                 Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.

                         REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                         Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 377, 979 N.W.2d 614
                             PDC No: 2022 WI App 46 - Published

OPINION FILED:         May 17, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         February 23, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Dane
   JUDGE:              Rhonda L. Lanford

JUSTICES:
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ.,
joined. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN
WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by John J. Reid and Cassiday Schade LLP, Milwaukee. There
was an oral argument by John J. Reid.

       For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by
James P. Scoptur, Jeffrey M. Herman, Jason S. Sandler, and Aiken
& Scoptur, Brookfield, and Herman Law, Boca Raton. There was an
oral argument by Jeffrey M. Herman.
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy W. Burns, Jesse
J. Bair, Nathan M. Kuenzi, and Burns Bair LLP, Madison, for
CHILD USA.

                              2
                                                                   2023 WI 40
                                                           NOTICE
                                             This opinion is subject to further
                                             editing and modification.   The final
                                             version will appear in the bound
                                             volume of the official reports.
No.       2021AP1054
(L.C. No.    2020CV1789)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                       :            IN SUPREME COURT

Femala Fleming,

             Plaintiff-Appellant,                               FILED
      v.                                                   MAY 17, 2023
Amateur Athletic Union of the United States,                  Sheila T. Reiff
Inc.,                                                      Clerk of Supreme Court

             Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.

ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, and HAGEDORN, JJ.,
joined. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN
WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.           Reversed.

      ¶1     ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.        This is a review of

a published decision of the court of appeals, Fleming v. Amateur

Athletic Union of the United States, Inc., 2022 WI App 46, 404

Wis. 2d 377, 979 N.W.2d 614, reversing the Dane County circuit

court's1 order dismissing Femala Fleming's action against Amateur

      1   The Honorable Rhonda L. Lanford presided.
                                                                               No.   2021AP1054

Athletic Union of the United States, Inc. ("AAU") as untimely

under Wis. Stat. § 893.54 (2021-22).2                      We reverse.

       ¶2      Fleming argues that she timely filed her negligence

claim against AAU because the governing statute of limitations

is Wis. Stat. § 893.587, which requires that "[a]n action to

recover       damages          for   injury      caused     by    an     act     that      would

constitute          a    violation     of"       certain    ch.    948    sexual        assault

offenses against children "shall be commenced before the injured

party reaches the age of 35 years or be barred."                                According to

Fleming,       § 893.587         governs     her      negligence    claim       because     she

alleged AAU negligently hired, retained, and supervised Shelton

Kingcade, who sexually assaulted Fleming between 1997 and 2000,

making her "injury caused by an act that would constitute a

violation of" an enumerated ch. 948 offense.                             She also argues

that Wis. Stat. § 893.13 tolls this deadline for "30 days from

the date of final disposition" of Fleming's "action to enforce

[her] cause of action."                    Because Fleming originally filed her

action against AAU in federal court, turned 35 years old while
that       action       was    pending,    and    filed    this    action       in   the   Dane

County circuit court within 30 days after her federal action was

dismissed, Fleming argues that her action was timely filed.

       ¶3      At issue is not whether Fleming could sue Kingcade.

Our analysis concerns only the claim against AAU.                                We conclude

that       Fleming's          negligence    claim      against    AAU    was     not    timely

       All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-
       2

22 version unless otherwise noted.

                                                  2
                                                                        No.   2021AP1054

filed.      Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 does not provide the governing

statute of limitations for Fleming's negligence claim against

AAU because her claim is not "[a]n action to recover damages for

injury caused by an act that would constitute a violation of" an

enumerated        ch.   948    offense.          Instead,   Fleming's     "action    to

recover     damages"      is    "for"     "injury        caused    by   an"   entirely

different act——AAU's act of negligently hiring, retaining, and

supervising Kingcade.            Because Fleming does not allege that AAU

committed an enumerated injury-causing act, her claim is not

"[a]n action to recover damages" to which § 893.587 applies.

The governing time limit is instead the three-year statute of

limitations under Wis. Stat. § 893.54 as extended by Wis. Stat.

§ 893.16, which the parties agree would bar Fleming's negligence

claim against AAU if applicable.                   Accordingly, Fleming's claim

is time-barred, and the circuit court was correct to grant AAU's

motion to dismiss.             We therefore do not reach the issue of

whether the tolling period under Wis. Stat. § 893.13 applies to

§ 893.587.
             I.     FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

      ¶4     The following facts are taken from Fleming's complaint

as   well    as    federal     and   state       court   case     records,    including

                                             3
                                                                           No.    2021AP1054

documents AAU attached as exhibits to its motion to dismiss.3                               We

accept these facts as true for purposes of our review.                             Data Key

Partners     v.     Permira     Advisers           LLC,     2014     WI   86,     ¶18,     356

Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693.

     ¶5      Between 1997 and 2000, Fleming was a member of the

Madison Spartans Youth Basketball Club, an AAU-affiliated youth

basketball        program.           AAU    is        a      non-profit      "multi-sport

organization       dedicated        to   the       promotion       and    development       of

amateur     sports        and   physical           fitness     programs,"        and     which

"sponsors and sanctions athletic events, including basketball

tournaments in Wisconsin and Minnesota."                           Fleming's coach was

Shelton Kingcade, an adult male who coached both the Madison

Spartans     and        Fleming's    school         basketball       team.        "Kingcade

applied    for     and    became    a    member       and/or       volunteer     affiliated

with" AAU, and he maintained this affiliation at all relevant

times.     "In order for a coach to participate in AAU tournaments,

he must be a member of the AAU.                     Furthermore, athletes can only

participate        in     AAU   tournaments          with     coaches      who     are     AAU
members."

     3 AAU argued to the circuit court that the court could
accept the facts in these exhibits as "incorporated into the
pleadings   by  reference."     "The   incorporation-by-reference
doctrine     'prevents     a    plaintiff     from     "evad[ing]
dismissal . . . simply by failing to attach to his complaint a
document that prove[s] his claim has no merit."'" Soderlund v.
Zibolski, 2016 WI App 6, ¶38, 366 Wis. 2d 579, 874 N.W.2d 561
(quoting Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687,
690 (7th Cir. 2012)) (alterations in original).      The circuit
court and court of appeals considered the contents of these
exhibits in ruling on AAU's motion, and Fleming does not object
to our doing the same here.

                                               4
                                                                            No.     2021AP1054

    ¶6         Kingcade     sexually      assaulted           Fleming        on      multiple

occasions during the relevant period, for which he was later

convicted of repeated sexual assault of a child contrary to Wis.

Stat. § 948.025(1) and second-degree sexual assault of a child

contrary       to    Wis.   Stat.      § 948.02(2).                State     v.     Kingcade,

No. 2015CF1094        (Dane    Cnty.    Cir.      Ct.       June    27,    2016).        These

assaults "occurred in Kingcade's home and in hotels rented by

Kingcade," and while Fleming and Kingcade attended tournaments

"sanctioned and organized" by AAU.                     Fleming was a minor, between

the ages of 13 and 16, during this entire period.                                She alleges

that Kingcade was previously arrested and convicted of second-

degree sexual assault of a minor in 1990, again arrested but not

convicted       of    the     same    offense          in    1992,       that      Kingcade's

supervisor was aware of the conviction, and that "AAU was aware

or should have been aware that Kingcade was convicted of Second-

Degree Sexual Assault of a Minor in 1990."

    ¶7         On November 1, 2019, Fleming filed a complaint in the

United     States     District       Court       for    the    Western           District   of
Wisconsin alleging various causes of action against AAU, Dane

County, the Madison Metropolitan School District, and Kingcade's

supervisor Stephen Blue.              Doe v. Amateur Athletic Union of the

U.S., Inc., No. 19-cv-901-jdp (W.D. Wis.).                           Fleming turned 35

years    old    on   November    4,    2019,      while       that    action       was   still

pending,       and   the    district     court         dismissed          that    action    on

August 11, 2020, on jurisdictional grounds.                        Id.

    ¶8         On August 31, 2020, Fleming filed this action against
AAU in the Dane County circuit court alleging AAU was negligent
                                             5
                                                                              No.    2021AP1054

in   hiring,       retaining,       and   supervising          Kingcade,      and     "[a]s    a

direct and proximate result of [AAU's] negligence" Fleming "was

sexually abuse[d] by Kingcade" and suffered damages.                                AAU filed

a    motion     to       dismiss    based    on     the        three-year       statute       of

limitations        under     Wis.    Stat.       § 893.54(1m)(a)         for        negligence

claims.         Fleming       argued      this     statute        of     limitations          is

inapplicable and that the appropriate statute of limitations is

instead    Wis.      Stat.    § 893.587,      which       states,       "[a]n       action    to

recover       damages      for     injury    caused       by     an     act     that      would

constitute a violation of [certain enumerated criminal sexual

assault offenses against minors] . . . shall be commenced before

the injured party reaches the age of 35 years or be barred."

Fleming further argued that, though she already reached the age

of 35, Wis. Stat. § 893.13 tolled the limitations period during

the duration of her federal action, making this claim timely.

AAU responded in supplemental briefing that § 893.13 did not

toll the limitations period because "§ 893.587 functions as a

statute of repose, not limitations and as such, it is explicitly
not subject to tolling."

      ¶9      In     a    written    decision      dated        April    30,        2021,    the

circuit    court         granted    AAU's    motion       to    dismiss.            The   court

concluded,

           Due to the nature of the statutes listed in [Wis.
      Stat.] § 893.587, and the legislature choosing to hold
      religious    organizations   accountable    until   an
      individual reaches the age of 35 and not extending
      that accountability to other similar groups this Court
      finds that [§ ]893.587 was not intended to provide an
      extended statute of limitations for the claims

                                             6
                                                                            No.   2021AP1054

    Plaintiff sets forth in her Complaint.     The Court
    finds   that   Wis.  Stat.   [§ ]893.54 applies  and
    Plaintiff's lawsuit is time-barred.
Because    the       circuit    court      concluded       § 893.54(1m)(a)         was    the

applicable statute of limitations, the court did not reach the

issue   of      whether      Wis.    Stat.    § 893.13       applied        to    toll    the

limitations period.

    ¶10      Fleming appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.

The court of appeals first concluded that Wis. Stat. § 893.587

applies    to    Fleming's       negligence        claim     because    the       statute's
language     "expressly        expands      the    injury-causing       act       that    may

underlie the action for damages to any act that would violate

any of the enumerated statutes" and "defines only the universe

of injury-causing acts, not actors or theories of liability."

Fleming, 404 Wis. 2d 377, ¶20.                    The court also held that Wis.

Stat.     § 893.13        tolled      that        limitations        period       because,

"regardless of whether Wis. Stat.                     § 893.587 is a statute of

repose or a statute of limitation, the distinction asserted by

AAU is irrelevant" as the tolling statute applies to both.                               Id.,

¶¶44-48.        As    a   result,    the     court    of    appeals    concluded         that
Fleming timely filed her action in state court.                       Id., ¶49.

    ¶11      AAU petitioned this court for review on the questions

of whether Wis. Stat. § 893.587 provides the applicable time

limitation for Fleming's negligence action and, if so, whether

Wis. Stat. § 893.13 tolls that limit.                  We granted review.

                               II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

    ¶12      "In      this   case,    we     review    a    motion     to    dismiss      for
failure to state a claim.               'Whether a complaint states a claim

                                             7
                                                                          No.    2021AP1054

upon which relief can be granted is a question of law for our

independent review; however, we benefit from discussions of the

court of appeals and circuit court.'"                  Saint John's Communities,

Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2022 WI 69, ¶13, 404 Wis. 2d 605, 982

N.W.2d 78 (quoting Data Key Partners, 356 Wis. 2d 665, ¶17).

      ¶13      "The motion to dismiss here is based on whether the

complaint       was   timely    filed    under       the    applicable         statute   of

limitations . . . ."           Doe 56 v. Mayo Clinic Health Sys., 2016 WI

48, ¶14, 369 Wis. 2d 351, 880 N.W.2d 681.                         "This involves the

interpretation and application of a statute to an undisputed set

of facts, which also presents a question of law we review de

novo.     If a complaint is not timely filed, the claim is time-

barred and dismissal will be upheld."                 Id. (citation omitted).

      ¶14      "Judicial deference to the policy choices enacted into

law by the legislature requires that statutory interpretation

focus primarily on the language of the statute.                          We assume that

the     legislature's      intent        is       expressed       in     the    statutory

language."       State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004
WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.                             "Thus, we have

repeatedly held that statutory interpretation 'begins with the

language of the statute.                If the meaning of the statute is

plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"                              Id., ¶45 (quoting

Seider    v.    O'Connell,      2000    WI    76,    ¶43,       236    Wis. 2d 211,      612

N.W.2d 659).          "[S]tatutory       language          is    interpreted      in     the

context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a

whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related        statutes;     and       reasonably,         to     avoid        absurd     or
                                              8
                                                                            No.     2021AP1054

unreasonable results."                Id., ¶46.         Additionally, "[s]tatutory

language is read where possible to give reasonable effect to

every   word,      in     order     to      avoid    surplusage."           Id.          "Where

statutory language is unambiguous, there is no need to consult

extrinsic     sources          of     interpretation,          such    as     legislative

history."         Id.        "However, even where the statutory language

bears a plain meaning, 'we nevertheless may consult extrinsic

sources "to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."'"

Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., Inc., 2018 WI 12, ¶20, 379

Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68 (quoting State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82,

¶22, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769).

                                      III.     ANALYSIS

     ¶15     AAU        raised      three      issues     in     its       petition         for

review:     (1)    whether       an      injured     party     bringing      "claims       for

negligent hiring and negligent supervision of the sexual abuser

of a child . . . may file such claims against a non-abuser at

any time before reaching the age of 35 years under Wis. Stat.

§ 893.587"; (2) "[a]re claims for negligent hiring and negligent
supervision        of    a    sexual        abuser   subject     to    the        three-year

limitations period in Wis. Stat. § 893.54"; and (3) "[i]f Wis.

Stat.   § 893.587         applies      to    Fleming's       claims    against       a    non-

abuser, does § 893.587 operate as a statute of repose to which

no   tolling        provision         applies . . . or          as     a     statute         of

limitations,       such      that     the    tolling    provisions      in        Wis.   Stat.

§ 893.13 apply to extend the time within which Fleming may file

her action under § 893.587."

                                               9
                                                                             No.    2021AP1054

      ¶16     We begin by reviewing Wis. Stat. §§ 893.54(1m)(a) and

893.587, and we explain that Fleming's claim may proceed only if

the governing statute of                  limitations is § 893.587.                  We then

interpret      § 893.587,           and    we     conclude     it     does     not       govern

Fleming's negligence claim against AAU.                       Instead, the applicable

statute     of        limitations4         is     the     three-year       period         under

§ 893.54(1m)(a)            as   extended        by   Wis.     Stat.    § 893.16,          which

renders Fleming's claim time-barred.                      We therefore do not reach

the   issue      of    whether       the    tolling       period      under       Wis.    Stat.

§ 893.13 applies to § 893.587.

                      A.   The Competing Limitations Periods

      ¶17     The     primary       dispute     in    this    case    is   which         of   two

statutes      of      limitations         governs       Fleming's     negligence          claim

against AAU:          Wis. Stat. §§ 893.587 or 893.54(1m)(a).

      ¶18     Fleming argues the governing statute of limitations is

Wis. Stat. § 893.587.            Under this statute,

      An action to recover damages for injury caused by an
      act that would constitute a violation of s. 948.02,
      948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or 948.095 or would create a
      cause of action under s. 895.442 shall be commenced
      before the injured party reaches the age of 35 years
      or be barred.
§ 893.587.            Fleming    filed      her      action    in     federal       court     on

November 1, 2019, and she turned 35 years old three days later

on    November        4,    2019.         The    Western      District       of     Wisconsin

      4One issue raised in the briefing is whether Wis. Stat.
§ 893.587 is a statute of limitations or a statute of repose.
We do not reach this issue.          However, for the sake of
simplicity, we refer to § 893.587 as a statute of limitations.

                                                10
                                                                       No.     2021AP1054

dismissed her federal action on August 11, 2022.                             Under Wis.

Stat. § 893.13,

           (2) A law limiting the time for commencement of
      an action is tolled by the commencement of the action
      to enforce the cause of action to which the period of
      limitation applies.    The law limiting the time for
      commencement of the action is tolled for the period
      from the commencement of the action until the final
      disposition of the action.

           (3) If a period of limitation is tolled under
      sub. (2) by the commencement of an action and the time
      remaining after final disposition in which an action
      may be commenced is less than 30 days, the period
      within which the action may be commenced is extended
      to 30 days from the date of final disposition.
According to Fleming, this statute tolls the limitations period

by the length of her federal action plus an additional 30 days.5

Because she filed this action in the circuit court on August 31,

2020,     only   20   days     after   her     federal      action   was     dismissed,

Fleming concludes her action is timely.

      ¶19     AAU argues the governing statute of limitations is not

Wis. Stat. § 893.587 but is instead Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1m)(a).

Under     § 893.54(1m)(a),       "[a]n       action    to    recover    damages      for
injuries to the person" "shall be commenced within 3 years or be

barred."      "The three year period begins on the same date that

the   cause      of   action    accrued      against     [AAU]."       Pritzlaff      v.

Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 312, 533 N.W.2d 780

(1995).     For "a person entitled to bring an action [who] is, at

      5Fleming argues in the alternative that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)
applies and accomplishes the same result.     We likewise do not
reach this argument.

                                          11
                                                          No.     2021AP1054

the time the cause of action accrues, . . . under the age of 18

years," Wis. Stat. § 893.16 extends this limitations period to

the age of 20.6

     6   Wisconsin Stat. § 893.16 provides in full:

          (1) If a person entitled to bring an action is,
     at the time the cause of action accrues, either under
     the age of 18 years, except for actions against health
     care providers; or mentally ill, the action may be
     commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases,
     except that where the disability is due to mental
     illness, the period of limitation prescribed in this
     chapter may not be extended for more than 5 years.

          (2) Subsection (1) does not shorten a period of
     limitation otherwise prescribed.

          (3) A disability does not exist, for the
     purposes of this section, unless it existed when the
     cause of action accrues.

          (4) When 2 or more disabilities coexist at the
     time the cause of action accrues, the 2-year period
     specified in sub. (1) does not begin until they all
     are removed.

          (5) This section applies only to statutes in
     this chapter limiting the time for commencement of an
     action or assertion of a defense or counterclaim
     except it does not apply to:

          (a) Actions for the recovery of a penalty or
    forfeiture or against a sheriff or other officer for
    escape;

          (b) Extend the time limited by s. 893.33,
     893.41, 893.59, 893.62, 893.73 to 893.76, 893.77(3),
     893.86 or 893.91 or subch. VIII for commencement of an
     action or assertion of a defense or counterclaim; or

          (c) A cause     of   action   which   accrues   prior    to
     July 1, 1980.

                                  12
                                                                No.    2021AP1054

    ¶20     Both   AAU    and   Fleming     agree   that   if     Wis.     Stat.

§ 893.587 does not provide the governing statute of limitations

for Fleming's claim, then the governing statute of limitations

is instead Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1m)(a) as extended by Wis. Stat.

§ 893.16.     They   also   agree   that,    even   with   this       extension,

Fleming's claim would be time-barred if § 893.54(1m)(a) is the

governing statute of limitations.           Accordingly, Fleming's claim

may proceed only if § 893.587 governs her claim and Wis. Stat.

§ 893.13 tolls the limitations period.

                     B.   Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587

    ¶21     As always, we begin with the text of the statute.                 To

repeat, Wis. Stat. § 893.587, titled "Sexual assault of a child;

limitation," reads as follows:

    An action to recover damages for injury caused by an
    act that would constitute a violation of s. 948.02,
    948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or 948.095 or would create a
    cause of action under s. 895.442 shall be commenced
    before the injured party reaches the age of 35 years
    or be barred.
The statute applies to two types of actions.           The first is "[a]n

action to recover damages for injury caused by an act that would

constitute a violation of" certain enumerated statutes.                      Id.

Each of these enumerated statutes is a criminal offense relating

to sexual assault of children.7           The second type of action is

    7  The enumerated offenses include sexual assault of a child
(Wis. Stat. § 948.02), engaging in repeated acts of sexual
assault of the same child (Wis. Stat. § 948.025), incest with a
child (Wis. Stat. § 948.06), sexual assault of a child placed in
substitute care (Wis. Stat. § 948.085), and sexual assault of a
child by a school staff person or a person who works or
volunteers with children (Wis. Stat. § 948.095).

                                    13
                                                                            No.    2021AP1054

"[a]n action to recover damages for injury caused by an act

that . . . would create a cause of action under s. 895.442."

Id.     Wisconsin Stat. § 895.442 provides a cause of action for

"[a]ny    person       who    suffers    an    injury    as   a    result         of   sexual

contact with a member of the clergy that occurs while the person

is under the age of 18."                § 895.442(2)(a).          It also provides a

cause of action against a religious organization:

      Any person who may bring an action under par. (a) may
      bring an action against the religious organization
      that employed the member of the clergy for all damages
      caused by that sexual contact if, at the time that the
      sexual contact occurred, another employee of that
      religious    organization   whose    duties   included
      supervising that member of the clergy knew or should
      have known that the member of the clergy previously
      had sexual contact with a person under the age of 18
      and failed to do all of the following:

               1. Report that sexual contact under s. 48.981(3).

           2. Exercise ordinary                care     to    prevent        similar
      incidents from occurring.
§ 895.442(2)(b).

      ¶22      Fleming       argues   that     Wis.     Stat.      § 893.587           applies
because her action against AAU for negligence is "[a]n action to

recover     damages       for    injury       caused    by    an      act     that      would

constitute a violation of" an enumerated ch. 948 offense.                                 All

agree    the    alleged      negligent     acts    of   AAU——negligently               hiring,

retaining,       and     supervising       Kingcade——do         not     "constitute         a

violation of" an enumerated ch. 948 offense or "create a cause

of action under s. 895.442."                   However, according to Fleming,

§ 893.587 nonetheless applies because her injury was ultimately
caused by Kingcade sexually assaulting her, making her injury

                                              14
                                                                  No.    2021AP1054

"caused    by   an   [enumerated]       act."      In   other   words,    Fleming

furthers the court of appeals' argument that § 893.587's "first

clause does not impose any restriction based on whom the action

is against or the theory of liability."

    ¶23     We disagree.       Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 does not apply

to Fleming's negligence claim against AAU because her claim is

not "[a]n action to recover damages for injury caused by an act

that would constitute a violation of" an enumerated ch. 948

offense.    Rather, Fleming's claim is an entirely different kind

of "action to recover damages" because it is "for" injury caused

by AAU's negligence, not "injury caused by an [enumerated] act."

    ¶24     Wisconsin        Stat.     § 893.587    defines     the     particular

"action to recover damages" to which the extended limitations

period applies.            The statute defines the "action to recover

damages" using two criteria:            the presence of an injury, and the

type of injury-causing act.             First, there must be "an injury."

Second, the injury-causing act must be one of the enumerated

acts.     A qualifying "action to recover damages" must therefore
allege both an injury and an enumerated injury-causing act.

    ¶25     Additionally, and most important to this case, it is

not enough that the "action to recover damages" is "for injury"

and that this injury be "caused by an [enumerated] act."                      This

reading isolates portions of the statute, failing to give the

whole   statute      its    "common,    ordinary,    and   accepted      meaning."

Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.              Rather, the "action to recover

                                         15
                                                                        No.    2021AP1054

damages"        must    be    "for"8   the   particular     "injury     caused    by   an

[enumerated] act."             Section 893.587 defines a qualifying "action

to recover damages."               If the alleged injury-causing "act" is not

one of the enumerated acts, then this changes the nature of the

"action to recover damages."                  It is no longer "[a]n action to

recover damages" "for" "injury caused by an [enumerated] act";

it is instead "[a]n action to recover damages" "for" "injury

caused by" an entirely different act.                      When the injury-causing

"act" changes, so too does the nature of the "action to recover

damages."

         ¶26       In other words, the question is not whether the injury

was "caused by an act that would constitute a violation of" an

enumerated ch. 948 offense.                  That interpretation reads out the

first part of the clause and disregards the fact that Wis. Stat.

§ 893.587          defines    a    qualifying     "action    to    recover    damages."

Rather, the question is whether the plaintiff's action is "[a]n

action        to    recover    damages    for"    the    injury    as   caused    by   an

enumerated          act.      If    the   alleged       injury    was   caused   by    an
enumerated act, but the "action to recover damages" is not "for"

injury as caused by that same act, then it is a different kind

of "action to recover damages," and § 893.587 does not apply.

As   a       result,    for   § 893.587's       extended    limitations       period   to

apply, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must have

       See For, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
         8

Language 709 (3d ed. 1992) ("[u]sed to indicated the object,
aim, or purpose of an action or activity"; "[u]sed to indicate
equivalence or equality").

                                             16
                                                                           No.   2021AP1054

alleged       in    the   complaint       that       the     defendant       caused     the

plaintiff's injury by committing an enumerated act.

      ¶27     A review of Wis. Stat. § 893.587's statutory history

supports this plain meaning.              "A review of statutory history is

part of a plain meaning analysis.                   Statutory history encompasses

the previously enacted and repealed provisions of a statute."

Richards      v.     Badger    Mut.     Ins.       Co.,    2008     WI    52,    ¶22,   309

Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (citation omitted).

      ¶28     Wisconsin       Stat.    § 893.587's         original       form   contained

the same operative language we interpret here, but the only

enumerated act was incest:

      An action to recover damages for injury caused by
      incest shall be commenced within 2 years after the
      plaintiff discovers the fact and the probable cause,
      or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should
      have discovered the fact and the probable cause, of
      the injury, whichever occurs first.
Wis. Stat. § 893.587 (1987-88) (emphasis added).                            The crime of

incest could only be committed by "persons related by blood or

adoption."          Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312,

351, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997) (citing Wis. Stat. § 948.06 (1993-

94)).       In cases of incest, the perpetrator's access to the child

is    due     to    a   familial      relationship,          not    the    perpetrator's

affiliation with any third person or organization.

      ¶29     The legislature amended this statute in 2001 to expand

the   list     of    enumerated       acts.        Whereas    the    previous      version

applied to "[a]n action to recover damages for injury caused by

incest," the amended version applied to "[a]n action to recover
damages for injury caused by an act that would constitute a

                                              17
                                                                             No.     2021AP1054

violation of s. 948.02, 948.025, 948.06, or 948.095."                               2001 Wis.

Act 16, § 3862x.           Importantly, this amendment only expanded the

list of enumerated acts beyond incest.                         The legislature's intent

as evident from the text was to eliminate the requirement that

the perpetrator have a familial or adoptive relationship with

the   child.       It   retained           the    same     operative       language——"[a]n

action to recover damages for injury caused by"——and did not

extend the limitations period in any way other than by expanding

this list of enumerated acts.

      ¶30   The legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 893.587 in 2003

again to expand the list of enumerated acts.                           It added to this

list "an act that . . . would create a cause of action under

s. 895.[442]."9         2003         Wis.    Act       279,    § 6.        Wisconsin    Stat.

§ 895.442       provides    a    cause      of        action   for    "[a]ny       person    who

suffers an injury as a result of sexual contact with a member of

the clergy that occurs while the person is under the age of 18"

"against the member of the clergy" and "against the religious

organization       that       employed           the     member       of     the     clergy."
§ 895.442(2)(a)         and     (b).             This     amendment         continued        the

legislature's       pattern      of     defining         the    specific      conduct       that

exposed     a     person        to     claims          under     § 893.587's         extended

limitations period.

      ¶31   Under Fleming's interpretation, several parts of Wis.

Stat.     § 893.587        would      be     meaningless.              "Where       possible,

      9The amendment cited Wis. Stat. § 895.71, which has since
been renumbered to Wis. Stat. § 895.442.

                                                 18
                                                                           No.    2021AP1054

statutory provisions dealing with the same subject matter should

be interpreted 'in a manner that harmonizes them in order to

give each full force and effect.'                      Further, '[a] construction of

a   statute       rendering       a        portion     of   it   meaningless      must   be

avoided.'"              Belding       v.     Demoulin,      2014     WI   8,     ¶33,    352

Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373 (first quoting Madison Metro. Sch.

Dist.       v.   Cir.    Ct.   for         Dane   Cnty.,     2011    WI   72,    ¶101,   336

Wis. 2d 95, 800 N.W.2d 442; and then quoting State v. Kruse, 101

Wis. 2d 387, 395, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981)).                           If § 893.587's first

clause applied to claims against persons or organizations that

did not themselves commit an enumerated "act," there would be no

need    for      the    statute       to    reference       claims   against     religious

organizations under § 895.442.10                       The same is true for another

        Fleming argues our interpretation cannot be correct
       10

because    it   "would   create   a   constitutional    problem   by
discriminating against religious organizations."      However, "the
purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the
statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and
intended effect."     State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. It is
true that "[a] court should avoid interpreting a statute in such
a way that would render it unconstitutional."        Am. Fam. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. DOR, 222 Wis. 2d 650, 667, 586 N.W.2d 872 (1998).
But the constitutional-doubt canon does not trump a plain
meaning.    "[T]he canon rests instead upon a judicial policy of
not    interpreting     ambiguous   statutes    to     flirt    with
constitutionality, thereby minimizing judicial conflicts with
the legislature."     Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 249 (2012).         The canon
thus "has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity."
United    States   v.   Palomar-Santiago,   593   U.S.    ___,   141
S. Ct. 1615, 1622 (2021) (quoting United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001)).        Therefore,
"[w]e will not rewrite a law to conform it to constitutional
requirements."     United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481
(2010). We likewise will not decide whether any portion of Wis.
                                                  19
                                                             No.   2021AP1054

statute enumerated as a qualifying "act"——Wis. Stat. § 948.06,

the incest statute.       That statute defines the crime of incest,

but it also imposes criminal liability on a person responsible

for a child's welfare whose inaction exposes the child to the

risk of incest:

         (2) Is      a   person    responsible   for   the    child's
    welfare and:

         (a) Has knowledge that another person who is
    related to the child by blood or adoption in a degree
    of kinship closer than 2nd cousin or who is a child's
    stepparent   has  had   or  intends   to  have sexual
    intercourse or sexual contact with the child;

         (b) Is physically and emotionally capable                  of
    taking action that will prevent the intercourse                 or
    contact from occurring or being repeated;

         (c)   Fails to take that action; and

         (d) The failure to act exposes the child to an
    unreasonable risk that intercourse or contact may
    occur between the child and the other person or
    facilitates the intercourse or contact that does occur
    between the child and the other person.
§ 948.06(2).      The extended limitations period under § 893.587
therefore applies to claims against persons who did not commit

incest but did commit an offense in violation of § 948.06(2).

If all that mattered was the injury-causing act, § 893.587 would

not need to reference this offense.        These examples demonstrate

that the statutes enumerated as qualifying acts under § 893.587

specifically   identify     when   the   extended   limitations      period

Stat. § 893.587 is unconstitutional as a consequence of our
interpretation, as that is a question for another day, and we
must not prejudge the issue.

                                    20
                                                             No.    2021AP1054

applies against persons or organizations that did not directly

commit an act of sexual abuse.       Where the limitations period has

broader application, the enumerated statutes say so.               Fleming's

interpretation     would   render   reference    to      these     provisions

meaningless.

     ¶32    Indeed, our prior application of Wis. Stat. § 893.587

is consistent with this plain meaning.          In Doe 1 v. Archdiocese

of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827, we

determined the proper limitations periods for claims brought by

three plaintiffs who alleged, "when they were children, a now-

deceased Roman Catholic priest . . . abused them sexually after

he had been criminally convicted of sexually molesting another

child and the Archdiocese knew of his conviction."                  Id., ¶3.

The plaintiffs brought claims of negligent supervision and fraud

against    the   Archdiocese.   Id.,     ¶5.    Though    the    plaintiffs'

injuries were all ultimately caused by acts of sexual abuse, we

concluded that the limitations period in Wis. Stat. § 893.587

did not apply to their fraud claims against the Archdiocese11:

          The statutes listed in Wis. Stat. 893.587 refer
     to   acts   of   sexual  assault,   incest, or   sexual
     exploitation.     The act that the complaints allege
     caused    injury   is   the   Archdiocese's  fraudulent
     misrepresentation, i.e., the representation that the

     11We did not address Wis. Stat. § 893.587 with regard to
the negligent supervision claims because "those claims accrued
at the time of abuse in the mid–1970s or 1982 and were barred by
the statute of limitations then in effect.       Wisconsin Stat.
§ 893.587 was not created until 2003 and did not take effect
until May 2004." Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95,
¶59 n.18, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827 (citing 2003 Wis. Act
279, § 6).

                                    21
                                                                                  No.    2021AP1054

       Archdiocese did not know the priests had histories of
       sexually abusing children and did not know the priests
       were dangerous to children.      None of the statutes
       listed    in    § 893.587    refers   to    fraudulent
       misrepresentations.   Therefore, the statute does not
       apply to these claims of fraud.
Id.,    ¶60.            It   is    therefore          consistent       for   us   to    hold    that

§ 893.587          only           applies        to        claims      against     persons        or

organizations that directly committed an enumerated act.

       ¶33        Consulting         extrinsic         sources       further      confirms      this

plain meaning.               Even though Wis. Stat. § 893.587 is unambiguous,
we     may        nonetheless            consult           extrinsic     sources,        such     as

legislative history, but only "to confirm the plain meaning."

Anderson          v.     Aul,      2015     WI        19,    ¶112,     361   Wis. 2d 63,         862

N.W.2d 304 (Ziegler, J., concurring).

       ¶34        The        legislature          originally           enacted     Wis.        Stat.

§ 893.587 to provide an extended limitations period for actions

against abusers, codifying the court of appeals' decision in

Hammer       v.    Hammer,         142    Wis. 2d 257,           418    N.W.2d 23       (Ct.    App.

1987).       Hammer involved a suit against the plaintiff's "father

for    incestuous             abuse,      intentional            infliction       of    emotional

distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress."                                       Id.

at 259.       The issue was "whether the discovery rule . . . applies

to cases of incestuous abuse."                             Id.   We held, "as a matter of

law, that a cause of action for incestuous abuse will not accrue

until the victim discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable

diligence should have discovered, the fact and cause of the

                                                      22
                                                                   No.    2021AP1054

injury."12       Id. at 264.         "The legislature later codified the

Hammer decision by enacting Wis. Stat. § 893.587 as the statute

of limitations for claims of incest."                 Doe, 211 Wis. 2d at 336;

accord 1987 Wis. Act 332, § 22m.               The fact that the legislature

enacted § 893.587 in response to Hammer, where the only claim

was against the individual who committed the incest, supports

our interpretation of § 893.587.

       ¶35     The legislature has        also considered, but repeatedly

rejected,      an   amendment    that    would   achieve   Fleming's      proposed

interpretation.        The first instance of this was in 2007, where

the legislature rejected an amendment that would have extended

Wis. Stat. § 893.587 to claims "against any person"13:

       An action to recover damages against any person for
       injury caused by an act that would constitute a
       violation of s. 948.02, 948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or
       948.095 an adult's sexual contact with anyone under
       the age of 18 or by an act committed by an adult that
       would create a cause of action under s. 895.442 shall
       may be commenced before the injured party reaches the
       age of 35 years or be barred at any time.
2007    S.B.    356;   2007     A.B.    651.     In    fact,     the   legislature

considered      the    very   same      amendment     numerous    times     in   the

following years.        See 2009 S.B. 319; 2009 A.B. 839; 2009 A.B.

       The discovery rule no longer applies, as Wis. Stat.
       12

§ 893.587 was later amended to remove language that incorporated
the rule: "within 5 years after the plaintiff discovers the
fact and the probable cause, or with the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have discovered the fact and the probable
cause, of the injury, whichever occurs first."    2003 Wis. Act
279, § 6.

       Underlines
       13             indicate     proposed                    additions,        and
strikethroughs indicate proposed deletions.

                                          23
                                                                       No.     2021AP1054

453; 2011 S.B. 345; 2011 A.B. 461; 2013 S.B. 225; 2013 A.B. 265;

2015 S.B. 262; 2015 A.B. 348; 2019 S.B. 381; 2019 A.B. 424.                             It

rejected the amendment each time, indicating that § 893.587 does

not apply to claims "against any person."

       ¶36    We therefore conclude the limitations period in Wis.

Stat.     § 893.587        applies      only    to   claims   alleging       that      the

defendant         caused      the     plaintiff's    injury       by   committing       an

enumerated act.            The question is not whether the injury was

"caused      by    an   act    that    would    constitute    a    violation     of"    an

enumerated ch. 948 offense.               Rather, the question is whether the

plaintiff's action is "[a]n action to recover damages for" the

injury as caused by an enumerated act.                    If the alleged injury

was caused by an enumerated act, but the "action to recover

damages" is not "for" the injury as caused by that same act,

then the "action to recover damages" is not "for" "injury caused

by an [enumerated] act," and § 893.587 does not apply.

                        C.     Fleming's Claim Against AAU

       ¶37    We conclude that Fleming's claim against AAU does not
qualify as "[a]n action to recover damages for injury caused by

an [enumerated] act" under Wis. Stat. § 893.587.                        The governing

statute of limitations is instead the three-year period under

Wis.    Stat.      § 893.54(1m)(a).            Accordingly,   Fleming's      claim      is

time-barred.

       ¶38    Fleming's claim against AAU is "for negligence in its

hiring,      retention        and     supervision    of   Kingcade      as   a   coach-

                                               24
                                                             No.       2021AP1054

member."14    In her complaint, Fleming alleged, "As a direct and

proximate result of Defendant AAU's negligence, [Fleming] has

suffered severe psychological, emotional and physical injuries,

and emotional distress."

      ¶39    We first recognized a cause of action for negligent

supervision in Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250,

580   N.W.2d 233   (1998),   which   involved    a   claim   by    a    shopper

alleging     "Wal-Mart   employees    unlawfully     stopped,       detained,

searched, and interrogated him."          Id. at 258.   Relevant to this

case, we explained the causation element for such claims as

requiring two wrongful acts——one by the employer, and one by the

employee:

           With respect to a cause of action for negligent
      hiring, training or supervision, we determine that the
      causal question is whether the failure of the employer
      to exercise due care was a cause-in-fact of the
      wrongful act of the employee that in turn caused the
      plaintiff's injury.    In other words, there must be a
      nexus between the negligent hiring, training, or
      supervision and the act of the employee.           This
      requires two questions with respect to causation. The
      first is whether the wrongful act of the employee was
      a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury. The second
      question is whether the negligence of the employer was
      a   cause-in-fact   of    the  wrongful   act   of  the
      employee. . . . The act of the employee, whether
      intentional or unintentional, must be causal to the
      injury   sustained.      But  equally   important,  the
      negligence of the employer must be connected to the
      act of the employee.

       We refer to
      14                 such   claims     in   shorthand    as    "negligent
supervision" claims.

                                     25
                                                                     No.       2021AP1054

Id. at 262.       Fleming argues this is significant because it means

a     negligent     supervision       claim      "inherently    includ[es]              the

intentional tort committed by the perpetrator."

       ¶40     We do not place the same significance on the fact that

negligent supervision claims require two causal acts.                          Fleming's

claim is not "[a]n action to recover damages" to which Wis.

Stat.       § 893.587   applies.        "While    negligent    supervision             does

require an underlying wrong to be committed by the employee as

an element, the tort actually focuses on the tortious, i.e.

negligent, conduct of the employer."                    Doyle v. Engelke, 219

Wis. 2d 277, 291 n.6, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998), overruled on other

grounds by Talley v. Mustafa, 2018 WI 47, 381 Wis. 2d 393, 911

N.W.2d 55.         To   argue    that    an    employer's     act    of        negligent

supervision       "inherently    includ[es]"       an   employee's        intentional

tort conflates the two separate acts, and it morphs liability

for     negligence      into    vicarious      liability.15         See        Lewis    v.

Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 60, ¶11, 243 Wis. 2d 648,

627     N.W.2d 484      (quoting      Vicarious      Liability,       Black's           Law
Dictionary        927   (7th    ed.     1999))     ("[T]he     law     in        certain

circumstances       will    impose      'vicarious      liability'        on     a     non-

negligent party.           Vicarious liability is '[l]iability that a

supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable

conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee)

       We leave for another day, however, the issue of whether
       15

Wis. Stat. § 893.587 applies to claims that a defendant is
vicariously liable for injury caused by the enumerated act of
another.

                                          26
                                                                                No.    2021AP1054

because      of     the   relationship         between         the    two        parties.'").

Fleming's claim against                AAU is "for injury caused by" AAU's

negligence, not Kingcade's intentional tort.16                         For this reason,

§ 893.587 does not apply.

       ¶41    Though Fleming did suffer an injury, and that injury

was    in    part    caused       by   an   act    enumerated        under           Wis.   Stat.

§ 893.587, her claim against AAU is not based on that act.                                   For

§ 893.587      to    apply,       Fleming's    claim     would       have       to     be   "for"

injury as caused by an enumerated act——Kingcade's act of sexual

assault.       However, her claim is for injury as caused by an

entirely separate act——AAU's negligence, an act that all agree

is    not    enumerated      in    § 893.587       and   would       not    constitute         an

enumerated        offense.         This     changes      the    nature          of    Fleming's

"action to recover damages" such that it is not "for" "injury

caused by an [enumerated] act," and § 893.587 therefore does not

apply.17

       ¶42    Both    AAU     and      Fleming      agree      that        if     Wis.      Stat.

§ 893.587 does not provide the governing statute of limitations

       We emphasize that this distinction is based on the
       16

alleged act, not the theory of liability applied to that act.

       We have previously held that a negligent supervision
       17

claim is a "derivative cause[] of action" which "accrue[s] at
the same time that the underlying intentional tort claims
accrue[]."   Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 312,
366, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997). However, this conclusion is based on
application of the discovery rule to determine when a
limitations period commences for a derivative claim.        See
Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 311-15,
533 N.W.2d 780 (1995).     That rationale does not inform our
decision here because the discovery rule does not apply under
the current version of Wis. Stat. § 893.587.

                                              27
                                                                          No.    2021AP1054

for Fleming's claim, then the governing statute of limitations

is instead Wis. Stat. § 893.54(1m)(a) as extended by Wis. Stat.

§ 893.16.       They      also   agree      that,    even    with   this        extension,

Fleming's claim would be time-barred if § 893.54(1m)(a) is the

governing statute of limitations.                   Therefore, because § 893.587

does not provide the governing statute of limitations, Fleming's

claim against AAU is time-barred, and the circuit court was

correct to grant AAU's motion to dismiss.

                                  IV.     CONCLUSION

       ¶43   Fleming argues that she timely filed her negligence

claim against AAU because the governing statute of limitations

is Wis. Stat. § 893.587, which requires that "[a]n action to

recover      damages      for    injury     caused     by    an     act     that       would

constitute      a    violation     of"      certain    ch.    948    sexual        assault

offenses against children "shall be commenced before the injured

party reaches the age of 35 years or be barred."                           According to

Fleming,     § 893.587      governs      her     negligence    claim       because       she

alleged      AAU     negligently        hired,       retained,      and         supervised
Kingcade, who sexually assaulted Fleming between 1997 and 2000,

making her "injury caused by an act that would constitute a

violation of" an enumerated ch. 948 offense.                        She also argues

that Wis. Stat. § 893.13 tolls this deadline for "30 days from

the date of final disposition" of Fleming's "action to enforce

[her] cause of action."              Because Fleming originally filed her

action against AAU in federal court, turned 35 years old while

that   action       was   pending,    and    filed    this    action       in    the    Dane

                                            28
                                                                         No.     2021AP1054

County circuit court within 30 days after her federal action was

dismissed, Fleming argues that her action was timely filed.

       ¶44    At issue is not whether Fleming could sue Kingcade.

Our analysis concerns only the claim against AAU.                            We conclude

that   Fleming's         negligence      claim   against     AAU    was      not   timely

filed.       Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 does not provide the governing

statute of limitations for Fleming's negligence claim against

AAU because her claim is not "[a]n action to recover damages for

injury caused by an act that would constitute a violation of" an

enumerated         ch.   948    offense.      Instead,      Fleming's        "action     to

recover      damages"      is    "for"     "injury    caused       by    an"     entirely

different act——AAU's act of negligently hiring, retaining, and

supervising Kingcade.             Because Fleming does not allege that AAU

committed an enumerated injury-causing act, her claim is not

"[a]n action to recover damages" to which § 893.587 applies.

The governing time limit is instead the three-year statute of

limitations under Wis. Stat. § 893.54 as extended by Wis. Stat.

§ 893.16, which the parties agree would bar Fleming's negligence
claim against AAU if applicable.                  Accordingly, Fleming's claim

is time-barred, and the circuit court was correct to grant AAU's

motion to dismiss.              We therefore do not reach the issue of

whether the tolling period under Wis. Stat. § 893.13 applies to

§ 893.587.

       By    the    Court.—The     decision      of   the   court       of     appeals   is

reversed.

                                            29
                                                                  No.   2021AP1054.jjk

    ¶45        JILL   J.     KAROFSKY,      J.     (dissenting).         This     case

demands that we answer a straightforward question: Under Wis.

Stat. § 893.587, is Femala Fleming's1 action against the Amateur

Athletic Union (AAU) an "action to recover damages for injury

caused    by    an    act    that   would    constitute      a   violation   of"    an

enumerated child sexual assault statute?                     I would answer this

question with a resounding "yes."                 Fleming's action requires her

to prove that the following two acts caused her injury: (1) the

AAU negligently hired and supervised Kingcade; and (2) Kingcade

sexually       assaulted     her    when    she    was   a   child.      Therefore,

Fleming's action is "an action to recover damages for injury

caused by an act that" undisputedly constitutes a violation of

§§ 948.025(1) & 948.02(2).2              The majority atextually reads Wis.

Stat.    § 893.587      to    require      that   "the   defendant      cause[]    the

plaintiff's injury by committing an enumerated act"3 and thus

improperly excludes actions to recover damages for injury caused

by more than one act.          Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

    ¶46        Having decided that Wis. Stat. § 893.587 operates to
allow Fleming to file her action against the AAU until she turns

35, I would also hold that such limitation is tolled under Wis.

Stat. § 893.13.         This section applies in general terms to any

    1  This court generally refers to victims using pseudonyms.
However, on appeal Fleming referred to herself by name.      We
therefore follow her lead and refer to her by name.
    2  Fleming's coach, Shelton Kingcade, has already been
convicted of repeated sexual assault of the same child under
Wis. Stat. § 948.025(1) and second degree sexual assault of a
child under § 948.02(2) for the conduct alleged in this action.
    3    See Majority op., ¶26 (emphasis added).

                                            1
                                                                               No.   2021AP1054.jjk

"law limiting the time for commencement of an action," and thus

applies in this case whether § 893.587 is considered a statute

of    limitations          or        a     statute       of        repose.           Wis.        Stat.

§ 893.13(2).        As such, Fleming's filing was timely and should

not be dismissed on those grounds.                        I would affirm the court of

appeals decision and remand the cause for further proceedings.

                                          I.    BACKGROUND

      ¶47    The majority provides an accurate description of the

facts of this case which I briefly reiterate here.                                           Fleming

brought an action against the AAU alleging that a supervising

member of the AAU was aware that Kingcade had been convicted of

second-degree       sexual           assault      of     a    minor       in    1990       and     was

arrested,     but    not    convicted,            for    the       same   offense          in    1992.

Despite     knowledge           of        the    these       convictions,            the     AAU——an

organization        that        promotes         and     organizes        youth        and       adult

athletic events——granted Kingcade membership and allowed him to

coach   Fleming's      youth             basketball      team      between      1997       and    2000

without adequate supervision.                      During the time Kingcade was a
member and coach with the AAU, he assaulted Fleming on multiple

occasions.     Fleming was between 13 and 16 years old at the time

of the assaults.

      ¶48    Fleming       filed           a    complaint          in   the     United          States

District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin when she

was   34    years    old,       and       she    turned       35    while      the    action      was

pending.        That        federal             action        was       then     dismissed          on

jurisdictional grounds, and Fleming filed this action in the

                                                  2
                                                                 No.   2021AP1054.jjk

Dane County Circuit Court within 30 days of the federal action's

dismissal.

                                   II.     ANALYSIS

       ¶49   We must determine whether Fleming's claim was timely

filed.       The facts regarding when Fleming filed her claim are

undisputed.          The      parties    dispute:     (1)    whether   Wis.       Stat.

§ 893.587 extends the time period in which Fleming may bring her

claims against the AAU until she is 35 years old; and if so, (2)

whether Wis. Stat. §            893.13 tolls said limitation for 30 days

from   the    time      her    federal   action     was   dismissed.        Both    are

matters       of     statutory          interpretation       which     we         decide

independently.          Duncan v. Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc., 2022

WI 1, ¶9, 400 Wis. 2d 1, 968 N.W.2d 661.                    I begin by addressing

Wis. Stat. § 893.587 and then will turn to the tolling statute,

Wis. Stat. § 893.13.

                         A.    Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587

       ¶50   Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 reads in full:

       An action to recover damages for injury caused by an
       act that would constitute a violation of s. 948.02,
       948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or 948.095 or would create a
       cause of action under s. 895.442 shall be commenced
       before the injured party reaches the age of 35 years
       or be barred.
The language of this statute is not, on its face, difficult to

understand.        The phrase "caused by an act that would constitute

a   violation      of    [an    enumerated      statute]"     modifies      the    word

"injury."      The relevant action brought by the injured party must

therefore be to recover damages for injury caused by such an
act.

                                            3
                                                                     No.    2021AP1054.jjk

       ¶51     In   this     case      Fleming    alleges      that     the     AAU   was

negligent in hiring, retaining, and supervising Kingcade.4                            The

elements       of    a     negligent      supervision       claim     are:      (1)   the

organization had a duty of care owed to the plaintiff; (2) the

organization breached its duty; (3) a wrongful act or omission

of an organization member was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's

injury; and (4) an act or omission of the organization was a

cause-in-fact of the wrongful act of the member.                       See John Doe 1

v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶16, 303 Wis. 2d 34,

734 N.W.2d 827.            Specifically, the cause of action in this case

is   to      recover      damages   for    injury    caused     by    two     acts:   (1)

Kingcade's assault of Fleming; and (2) the AAU's negligent act

of allowing Kingcade to become a member of the AAU and coach

youth       basketball      without       adequate       supervision       despite    his

history of child sexual assault.                  Fleming must prove that both

acts       caused   her    injury   in    order     to    establish    causation      and

recover damages.

       ¶52     If   the    AAU   had    allowed     Kingcade    to     become    an   AAU
member and coach despite his history of child sexual assault but

Kingcade had not then assaulted Fleming, then Fleming would not

be able to support this specific cause of action against the

AAU.       Fleming's injury, as alleged in this particular cause of

       The elements of these negligence claims are generally
       4

expressed in terms of an employer/employee relationship.
Fleming's claim characterizes Kingcade as a "servant" of the
AAU. Neither the relationship between the AAU and Kingcade nor
the applicability of such negligence claims to these facts are
at issue in this appeal. As such, I present the elements as an
organization/member relationship, and, for simplicity, focus on
the negligent supervision claim.

                                             4
                                                                    No.   2021AP1054.jjk

action,      would   not   have   existed      but   for     Kingcade's        assaults.

Those assaults are acts that would constitute (and in fact did

constitute)      a   violation    of    Wis.    Stat.      §§    948.02    &    948.025.

Therefore, Flemings's specific cause of action is to recover

damages for injury caused by acts that constitute a violation of

an    enumerated     child   sexual     assault      statute.        Section 893.587

squarely governs and extends the time to file a claim until

Fleming turns 35.

       ¶53     The majority opinion confuses this plain reading in a

number of ways.         First, it tortures the language of the statute

to create an atextual requirement that the defendant in the

action be the same person who committed the act of child sexual

assault enumerated in the statute.               Second, the majority focuses

on the statutory and legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 893.587

but    fails    to   acknowledge       that    the   statutory       language     never

excluded actions against third parties.                         Third, the majority

mistakenly asserts that Fleming's reading of the statute renders

operative portions of the statutes meaningless.                           Fourth, the
majority's approach raises constitutional issues that are easily

avoided by a straightforward reading of the statute.                             I will

address each of the majority's missteps in turn.

                             1.   Textual Analysis

       ¶54     The   majority's   first       misstep   is      a   tortured     textual

analysis that contradicts itself in its quest to add additional

requirements not present in the statute.                     The majority opinion

begins by rightly acknowledging that "the statute defines the
'action to recover damages' using two criteria: the presence of

                                          5
                                                                  No.    2021AP1054.jjk

an injury, and the type of injury-causing act."                         Majority op.,

¶24.      But the majority quickly contradicts itself, insisting

that "it is not enough that the 'action to recover damages' is

'for injury' and that this injury be 'caused by an [enumerated]

act.'"       Id., ¶25.      If the statute provides only two criteria to

define the "action to recover damages," then how could those

criteria not be enough?

       ¶55    The majority then asserts that "the question is not

whether the injury was 'caused by an act that would constitute a

violation of' an enumerated ch. 948 offense" because such a

reading      does    not    account   for   the   part    of    the     statute    that

requires "an action to recover damages."                      Id., ¶26.         That is

nonsense.       The words of the statute clearly indicate that this

is precisely the question to answer, and the "action to recover

damages" language remains fully operative.                     There clearly must

be an action to recover damages, and the statute sets out two

criteria for what that action must be: it must be for injury and

the injury must be caused by an act that would constitute a
violation of an enumerated statute.               As set out above, Fleming's

action against the AAU satisfies both criteria.

       ¶56    All of the majority's attempts to reorder the words of

the statute lead to the same result.               The reordering only serves

to   confuse        the    analysis   and   provide      an    opening     to    create

atextual requirements.           For example, the majority opinion states

that "if the alleged injury was caused by an enumerated act, but

the 'action to recover damages' is not 'for' injury as caused by
that same act, then it is a different kind of 'action to recover

                                            6
                                                                      No.    2021AP1054.jjk

damages'      and   § 893.587        does    not    apply."         Id.       As    already

explained, Fleming's action against the AAU is an "action to

recover damages" "for" injury caused by an enumerated act and an

additional act of negligence by the AAU.                           Fleming's cause of

action      requires   her     to    establish      that     both    acts       caused    her

injury.        Thus,    Fleming's           cause   of     action        satisfies       this

formulation of the majority's reading of the statute as well.

       ¶57    The majority then maintains that "[a]s a result, for

§ 893.587's         extended        limitations       period        to      apply . . . a

plaintiff must have alleged in the complaint that the defendant

caused the plaintiff's injury by committing an enumerated act."

Id.    (emphasis     added).         This     requirement         that    the    defendant

themselves must have committed an enumerated act comes out of

thin air and not from the words of the statute——no matter how

the majority reorders or emphasizes certain words.

       ¶58    Wisconsin      Stat.    § 893.587      does     not    specify       who    the

action to recover damages must be against.                        The statute does not

qualify the nature of the action other than that it must be for
a    qualifying     injury.         Fleming's       injury    qualifies         under    the

criteria of the statute.

       ¶59    The majority supports its reading, in part, by looking

to    Doe    1's    analysis,       which     declined       to     apply    Wis.    Stat.

§ 893.587 to a fraudulent representation claim.                           Majority op.,

¶32; Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, 303 Wis. 2d

34, 734 N.W.2d 827.            Doe 1 explicitly left open the question

                                              7
                                                                              No.    2021AP1054.jjk

presented     to      us     in    this   case.5              However,     its      holding       that

negligent supervision claims are derivative of the employee's

wrongful    acts       while       fraudulent           representation        claims        are    not

weighs heavily in Fleming's favor, rather than the AAU's.                                          See

Doe 1, 303 Wis. 2d 34, ¶50.                    The Doe 1 court distinguished the

two   types      of    claims       based      on       the    cause     of   the    plaintiffs'

injuries, which goes to the very heart of the question presented

to us today.

      ¶60     Doe 1 concerned claims of both negligent supervision

and   fraudulent           representation           by        multiple     plaintiffs.             The

negligent     supervision           claims      were          based   on   the      Archdiocese's

unsupervised placement of a priest who had previously molested

children      and      the        priest's      subsequent            molestation        of       more

children.        Id., ¶5.          The fraudulent representation claims were

based on the Archdiocese's affirmative representation that the

priest did not have a history of molesting children.                                  Id.

      ¶61     On the negligent supervision claim, Doe 1 held that

"the claims of negligent supervision made here are derivative of
the underlying sexual molestations."                             Id., ¶36.          As the court

explained, "a derivative claim is one 'that derives from, grows

out   of,   or     results        from    an    earlier          or    fundamental      state       or

condition.'"          Id.,    ¶24     fn.      11       (citing        Webster's      Third        New

International Dictionary Unabridged 608 (1961 ed.)).                                         In the

      5Wisconsin Stat. § 893.587 did not apply to the negligent
supervision claims in Doe 1 because the assaults occurred on or
before 1982, prior to the relevant amendments to § 893.587. Doe
1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶59 n. 18, 303
Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827.

                                                    8
                                                                    No.    2021AP1054.jjk

case of negligent supervision, the claim derives, or results

from, the employee's wrongful act.                     Id.     In contrast, "claims

for     fraud        based     on        intentional      misrepresentations           are

distinguishable         from       negligent       supervision      claims"     because

"fraud claims are not derivative . . . ."                       Id., ¶50.       A fraud

claim is not derivative, the court reasoned, because it "does

not require proof of a wrong by an employee that causes injury

to another."          Id., ¶24 fn. 11.             Instead, "the wrongful act is

the . . . fraudulent           representation"         and     "[f]raud    claims,      if

proven, provide a separate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries."

Id., ¶50.

       ¶62     The Doe 1 court's assertion that Wis. Stat. § 893.587

did not apply to fraudulent representation claims is consistent

with its holding regarding derivative claims.                        It makes sense

that    if     an    action    for       fraudulent    representation        "does     not

require proof of a wrong by an employee that causes injury to

another,"      then    it     is   not    an   "action    to    recover    damages     for

injury caused by an act that would constitute a violation" of
the    child    sexual       assault      statutes.       See    id.,     ¶24   fn.    11;

§ 893.587.          The same logic does not apply to a negligent hiring

action, which is "derivative of an employee's wrongful act that

causes    injury       to    another"       and    does   require    proof      that    an

employee's wrongful acts caused the plaintiff's injury.                         See Doe

1 303 Wis. 2d 34, ¶16; ¶24 fn. 11.

       ¶63     Even without the "derivative" versus "not derivative"

labels, all we need to do is look to the elements of a negligent
supervision claim and an intentional misrepresentation claim to

                                               9
                                                                No.   2021AP1054.jjk

distinguish them.     The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation,

as discussed in Doe 1, are:

      (1) the defendant made a factual representation; (2)
      which was untrue; (3) the defendant either made the
      representation knowing it was untrue or made it
      recklessly without caring whether it was true or
      false; (4) the defendant made the representation with
      intent to defraud and to induce another to act upon
      it; and (5) the plaintiff believed the statement to be
      true and relied on it to his/her detriment.
Id., ¶38 (quoting Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co.,

2005 WI 111, ¶12, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205).                        Each of
these elements is focused exclusively on the acts of the person

making the representation and the response of the plaintiff.                     In

contrast, the elements of a negligent supervision claim require

both that "a wrongful act or omission of an employee was a

cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury" and that "an act or

omission of the employer was a cause-in-fact of the wrongful act

of the employee."        Id., ¶16.    The elements require two acts by

different actors.     In Fleming's case, she must establish one act

by Kingcade, and one act by the AAU.                  Thus, based on these

elements,      § 893.587    should    apply     to        Fleming's      negligent

supervision cause of action even though it was not applied to

the fraudulent representation claims in Doe 1.

      ¶64   In sum, neither the language of the statute nor Doe 1

supports the majority's assertion that § 893.587 applies only to

actions where the defendant is the same person who committed the

act of child sexual assault.         Instead, both the language of the

statute and Doe 1 indicate that Fleming's action is "[a]n action
to   recover   damages     for   injury    caused    by    an   act    that   would

                                      10
                                                        No.   2021AP1054.jjk

constitute a violation of" an enumerated child sexual assault

statute, and thus can be brought until Fleming turns 35.

               2.   Statutory and Legislative History

    ¶65   The majority recounts the legislative history of Wis.

Stat. § 893.587 without ever acknowledging that the statute was

always written to apply to actions against third parties.6              The

relevant portion of the statute originally read: "An action to

recover damages for injury caused by incest shall be commenced

within 2 years after the plaintiff discovers the fact and the

probable cause . . . ."      Wis. Stat. § 893.587 (1987-88).            The

operative language has not changed.             It emphasizes that the

action to recover damages be for injury, and that the injury be

caused by incest.     This does not mean that the only action to

recover damages could be against the person committing incest.

    ¶66   The legislature's subsequent amendments did not change

this operative language.        The legislature never introduced a

requirement   regarding   the   identity   of    the   defendant   in   the

action to recover damages.      See 2001 Wis. Act 16, 2003 Wis. Act
279, 2005 Wis. Act 277.

    6  The majority goes so far as to state that "the fact that
the legislature enacted § 893.587 in response to Hammer, where
the only claim was against the individual who committed the
incest, supports our interpretation of § 893.587."   ¶34.   The
language of a statute cannot be limited by the specific fact
pattern presented in a case that inspired the drafting of that
statute. This court should not imply that statutes can be thus
limited.

                                  11
                                                               No.   2021AP1054.jjk

     ¶67    The     majority    also    finds    it    significant      that   the

legislature has, on multiple occasions, rejected the following

proposed amendment:7

     An action to recover damages against any person for
     injury caused by an act that would constitute a
     violation of s. 948.02, 948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or
     048.095 an adult's sexual contact with anyone under
     the age of 18 or by an act committed by an adult that
     would create a cause of action under s. 895.442 shall
     may be commenced before the injured party reaches the
     age of 45 or be barred at any time.
This amendment includes the addition of the words "against any
person"     to      qualify     the     action        to     recover     damages.

But that is not the only change it would make.                       The proposed

amendment would also remove any limitation on the time period in

which a child victim must bring an action to recover damages.

It would also add a requirement that the injury-causing act be

committed by an adult and would remove the enumerated child

sexual    assault    statutes    in    favor    of    more    general    language

encompassing any sexual contact with a child.                  The legislature

may have rejected this amendment because it disagreed with any

number of these significant proposed changes.                   This rejection

does not reliably indicate that the legislature was concerned

about the addition of the phrase "against any person."

     ¶68    But even if the only proposed change in this amendment

were the addition of "against any person," we could just as

easily assume the legislature rejected such a proposal because

the change is unnecessary.             The statute currently contains no

     7 Underlines indicate proposed additions, and strikethroughs
indicate proposed deletions.

                                        12
                                                                        No.   2021AP1054.jjk

parameters regarding the identity of the defendant.                             Why would

the   legislature      need    to    further          specify    that    the    action    to

recover damages could be against any person?                             In short, the

legislature wrote and amended the statute so that it has always

applied to actions against third-parties.

                                    3.    Surplusage

      ¶69   The majority mistakenly states that reading Wis. Stat.

§ 893.587    as   I     do——providing            no    limitations        regarding      the

identity of the defendant——would render several parts of Wis.

Stat. § 893.587 meaningless.                See majority op., ¶31.              The parts

the   majority    reference         as     meaningless          actually      functionally

expand § 893.587 under any reading of the statute.                            Furthermore,

the   majority    appears      to    forget       that    the     enumerated      statutes

serve   a   purpose     beyond      their    connection          to   § 893.587,      which

renders the referenced language far from meaningless.

      ¶70    In 2001, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 893.587

to apply to acts other than incest and to include enumerated

statutory references rather than referencing only the general
act of incest.         2001 Wis. Act 16.              Now, instead of an undefined

reference    to   an    "act   of        incest,"      § 893.587      lists     enumerated

statutes that clearly define the possible injury-causing acts.

This clarifying change could not be rendered "meaningless" by

any reading of the statute.

      ¶71   In 2003, the legislature again amended § 893.587 to

extend the limitation period to when the victim turns 35 and to

include an "act that would create a cause of action under s.
895.71" to the enumerated injury-causing acts.                             2003 Wis. Act

                                            13
                                                                                No.    2021AP1054.jjk

279.       Section 895.71 was later renumbered to § 895.442.                                Section

895.442 creates a cause of action against clergy who have sexual

contact      with    a   minor     as    well    as        a    cause      of    action     against

religious      organizations            who   knowingly            hire     clergy        who     have

previously had sexual contact with a minor.

       ¶72    The majority asserts that Fleming's interpretation of

§ 893.587 would render this amendment meaningless because if the

statute already included claims against third parties, "there

would be no need for the statute to reference claims against

religious      organizations."                Majority           op.,      ¶31.          Not      so——

referencing         § 895.442      increased          the       scope       of        § 893.587     to

include causes of action that were not covered by any of the

other enumerated statutes.                First, adding § 895.442 expanded the

limitation      period       for     victims     to        bring      an   action        against     a

clergy member if they were abused by the clergy member when they

were 16 or 17 years old.                  Likewise, adding § 895.442 expanded

the limitation period for 16- or 17-year-old victims to bring a

claim      against       a   third      party        (in       this    case       the     religious
organization).           This is true even though the statute already

applied to actions against third parties for injuries caused by

violations of the other enumerated statutes.8                               The reference to

       The references to Wis. Stat. § 948.02 and § 948.025 would
       8

not allow for such claims because they both require the victim
to be under 16 years old, § 948.06 and § 948.085 may not apply
because they require a familial or care-taking relationship
between perpetrator and victim, and § 948.095 may not apply
because it requires the perpetrator to be a school staff member
or in a position that requires the perpetrator to work directly
with children.   Each of these are additional requirements that
§ 895.442 does not include.

                                                14
                                                           No.    2021AP1054.jjk

§ 895.442     was   therefore       not     meaningless,         but   instead

functionally expanded the scope of the statute.                 To the extent

that causes of action brought under § 895.442 might overlap with

those brought for violations of the other enumerated statutes,

the same can be said for the other enumerated statutes under any

reading of § 893.587.9

     ¶73    Furthermore, the majority ignores the fact that the

enumerated   statutes    serve   an   independent    purpose       outside    of

their use in § 893.587.     The majority claims that the enumerated

statutes "specifically identify when the extended limitations

period applies against persons or organizations that did not

directly commit an act of sexual abuse."            Id.     But that is not

true.    The enumerated statutes create some offenses or causes of

action against persons or organizations that did not directly

commit an act of sexual abuse, but the statutes do not do so for

the purpose of identifying an extended limitation period.                    The

enumerated   statutes'    purpose     is   to   create    and    define   those

offenses or causes of action.         In contrast, § 893.587 addresses

     9 For instance, § 948.025 requires three or more violations
of certain subsections of § 948.02.      The fact that § 893.587
lists both statutes even though § 948.02 covers acts that
violate § 948.025 suggests that the legislature may have
prioritized   covering  its   bases   over   maximum  efficiency.
Although we avoid reading a statute to create surplusage, the
legislature is not restricted to writing statutes in the most
efficient manner possible.    See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v.
Milwaukee Cnty., 2019 WI 24, ¶24, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d
153   (discussing the "reality that '[s]ometimes drafters do
repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing of
substance.'" (quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: the
Interpretation of Legal Texts 176 (2012)).

                                      15
                                                                            No.      2021AP1054.jjk

only the timing limitation of actions and does not create any

action in and of itself.

       ¶74    The      fact        that      Wis.        Stat.        § 893.587             already

contemplates the timing limitation of a                             common law             cause of

action       for     negligent       supervision             does    not         influence         the

legislature's decision to implement a statutory cause of action

for    negligent        supervision             by     religious       organizations                in

§ 895.442(2)(b).            Likewise, it is not meaningless to include a

reference to that statutory cause of action in § 895.587.                                           As

such, Fleming's reading of the statue, which I would adopt, does

not render any portion of the statutes meaningless.

                            4.     Constitutional Avoidance

       ¶75    Finally, the majority's reading of the statute likely

renders      the     statute       unconstitutional.                This    issue          could   be

easily avoided by adopting Fleming's straightforward reading of

the statute.

       ¶76    I      agree       with     the         majority       that        a      canon      of

interpretation cannot trump a plain meaning interpretation of an
unambiguous statute.                See majority op., ¶31 n.10.                            But as I

explain above, the majority does not offer a convincing reading

of    the    plain    meaning       of    Wis.       Stat.    § 893.587,          let      alone    an

unambiguous         reading.            Here,     I     maintain       that          the    statute

unambiguously applies to third-party claims.                           However, if I were

to accept the majority's alternative reading as reasonable, and

thus    agreed       that    the    statue       is    ambiguous,          the    principle        of

constitutional         avoidance         supports        Fleming's         position.            When
faced with an ambiguous statute where one reading of the statute

                                                 16
                                                                  No.    2021AP1054.jjk

raises     serious     constitutional     questions,      this    court       has    long

favored the reading of the statute that avoids constitutional

issues.      See Baird v. La Follette, 72 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 239 N.W.2d

536 (1976) ("Where there is serious doubt of constitutionality,

we must look to see whether there is a construction of the

statute      which    is    reasonably    possible      which    will     avoid      the

constitutional question.").

      ¶77     The majority's reading both twists the language of the

statute       and     gives     rise     to     a     possible        constitutional

issue.       Under    the   majority's    reading,       §§ 893.587       and 895.442

work together to allow an extended period of time for a victim

to   bring    a     negligent   supervision     cause     of    action,       but    only

against a religious organization.               An action against any other

secular organization for acts of its employees or members would

have a much shorter statute of limitations.                      This arbitrarily

favors     secular     organizations      and       clearly    runs     the   risk    of

violating both the Federal and Wisconsin Constitutions.10                       Such a

risk can be easily avoided by interpreting the statute as I
have, which would provide a consistent limitations period in

which to bring negligent supervision claims based on a violation

of an enumerated statute.

      10   U.S. Const. amend. I; Wis. Const. art. I, § 8.

                                         17
                                                                   No.   2021AP1054.jjk

                                     B.   Tolling

      ¶78   Wisconsin    Stat.       § 893.1311     operates       to    toll a     "law

limiting    the   time   for    commencement        of    an   action"     while    the

action is pending and for up to "30 days from the date of final

disposition" of that action.              Wis. Stat. § 893.13(2), (3).              The

AAU argues that Wis. Stat. § 893.587 is a statute of repose

rather than a statute of limitations.                    As such, it argues that

§ 893.13 does not operate to toll the limitation in § 893.587.

      ¶79   There is no functional difference between a statute of

limitations and a statute of repose in Wisconsin law, at least

for   the   purposes     of    determining        whether      a   tolling      statute

applies.    See Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 86,

¶¶51-61,    245   Wis.   2d     1,    628    N.W.2d      893   (holding      that   the

statutory    phrase      "any     applicable        statute        of    limitations"

includes    statutes     of     repose,      in   part     because       "the    phrase

'statute of repose' is judicial terminology and is not featured

in legislative lingo.").              Whether § 893.587 is a statute of

limitations or a statute of repose, it is a "law limiting the
time for commencement of an action."                  Wis. Stat. § 893.13.           As

such, § 893.13 tolls the time limit set in § 893.587.

      ¶80   Fleming filed her action in federal court before she

turned 35 years old——before the limitation period under Wis.

Stat. § 893.587 ran.           She then filed her action in Wisconsin

       The briefing in this case focuses on Wis. Stat. § 893.13
      11

as the operative statute to toll Fleming's statute of limitation
while her federal case was pending.        It appears that both
§ 893.13 and 893.15 are required to toll a limitation during the
pendency of a federal case, but this does not change the
relevant analysis, so I will also focus on § 893.13.

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                                                                    No.   2021AP1054.jjk

court within 30 days of the final disposition of the federal

case.    Her action was timely filed.

                               III.    CONCLUSION

     ¶81    Fleming's      cause      of    action        against     the      AAU     for

negligent   supervision        is    "an    action       to    recover    damages     for

injury   caused      by   an   act   that       would    constitute       a   violation

of . . . s. 948.02 [and] 948.025" under Wis. Stat. § 893.587.

As such, Fleming had until she was 35 years old to bring her

action against the AAU, and the time limit was further tolled by

§ 893.13.       Because the majority ignores the plain meaning of

§ 893.587's text and holds that Fleming's action is untimely, I

respectfully dissent.

     ¶82    I   am   authorized       to    state       that   Justices       ANN    WALSH

BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent.



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