Court Opinion

ID: 9570264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:21:48.490557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:18.646454
License: Public Domain

Justice Whichard
concurring in the result.
I concur in the holding that defendant must have a new capital sentencing proceeding because he was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the mitigating circumstance that he suffered a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder. I also agree that the trial court should have submitted the mitigating circumstance of defendant’s age at the time of the crime. I write separately because I disagree with the conclusion that attempted second-degree rape is an inherently violent crime by definition and that therefore evidence of defendant’s prior conviction for attempted second-degree rape consisting solely of the judgment entered thereon satisfies the State’s burden of proving the aggravating circumstance of the previous conviction of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
The opinion for the Court correctly states that in State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 321, 384 S.E.2d 470, 494 (1989), this Court concluded that rape has as an element the use or threat of violence to the person; however, the opinion fails to note that in Artis the Court was considering N.C.G.S. § 14-27.2, which defines the offense of first-degree rape. From this Court’s determination that first-degree rape necessarily involves the use or threat of violence, the opinion concludes that second-degree rape also always involves violence and that therefore attempted second-degree rape involves at least the threat of violence. In light of the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 14-27.3(a)(1) & (2) and the generally accepted meaning of the word “violent,” I am unable to make this leap in logic.
The State may proceed on one of two theories in proving second-degree rape as defined in N.C.G.S. § 14-27.3(a)(1) & (2). It may show that the defendant had vaginal intercourse “[b]y force and against the will” of the victim, or it may show that the intercourse was committed against a victim who is “mentally defective, mentally incapacitat*409ed, or physically helpless” and that the defendant knew or should have known of the victim’s condition. N.C.G.S. § 14-27.3(a)(1) & (2) (1993). A mentally defective victim may be one “who suffers from mental retardation, or . . . who suffers from a mental disorder, either of which temporarily or permanently renders the victim substantially incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct . ...” Id. § 14-27.1(1). A mentally defective person who is substantially incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct nonetheless could be willing to participate in sexual intercourse and able to communicate a willingness to do so. Sexual intercourse with such a person could be entirely non-violent, though deemed criminal by the legislature. A physically helpless victim may be one “who is physically unable to resist an act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual act. . . .” Id. § 14-27.1(3). A physically helpless person who is physically unable to resist a sexual act nonetheless may be willing to participate in such an act and capable of verbally communicating his or her willingness to do so. Sexual intercourse with a physically helpless person thus could be non-violent, though deemed criminal by the legislature.
The opinion for the Court accepts the possibility that the legislature could deem consensual sexual intercourse with a physically helpless person criminal but concludes that the legislature did not intend that result here. I cannot join in this conclusion. “[P]enal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the private citizen with all conflicts and inconsistencies resolved in his favor.” State v. Pinyatello, 272 N.C. 312, 314, 158 S.E.2d 596, 596 (1968). We thus must construe the statute liberally in defendant’s favor. Whether constitutionally allowed or not, the legislature has shown itself capable of deeming consensual sexual intercourse criminal in another context: when it occurs between individuals who are not married to each other. See N.C.G.S. § 14-184 (1993) (“If any man and woman, not being married to each other, shall lewdly and lasciviously associate, bed and cohabit together, they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor____”). Like N.C.G.S. § 14-184, N.C.G.S. § 14-27.3(a)(2) makes no mention of violence. Given the lack of express language denoting violence, it is similarly possible that the legislature intended second-degree rape to encompass non-violent acts of sexual intercourse with mentally defective or physically helpless persons.
To support the “prior violent felony” aggravating circumstance, the State introduced only the judgment, which stated only that defendant had been convicted of attempted second-degree rape. Without more, there was no proof that the offense in fact involved the *410use or threat of violence because the State does not need to prove violence to satisfy the essential elements of second-degree rape involving a physically helpless or mentally defective victim. Defendant’s conviction could have been for attempted second-degree rape against a victim who was mentally defective by virtue of his or her inability to appraise the nature of his or her conduct or against one who was physically helpless and unable physically to resist a sexual act. Neither act necessarily involves the use of violence. Rape is generally an abhorrent and serious crime, but the language of the statute allows for the possibility that the crime of attempted second-degree rape may be non-violent — indeed, thoroughly consensual.
The opinion for the Court opines that the legislature only intended to prohibit having or attempting to have nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a physically helpless person, and it questions whether any other view would pass constitutional muster. The problem, however, is that with only the judgment before us, we cannot know whether the intercourse involved in the prior felony was consensual or nonconsensual. I do not believe a death sentence based in part on the “prior violent felony” aggravating circumstance can stand without proof in the record that the felony was in fact violent.
I therefore would hold that the trial court erred in submitting this aggravating circumstance without further proof of a factual basis for the conviction showing that the offense in fact involved the use or threat of violence. If the prosecution has such proof, it should offer it at defendant’s new capital sentencing proceeding.