Court Opinion

ID: 9735002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:56:14.255728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:53.670652
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. Although Edward Burchell, Jr., (Claimant) asserts that the University of Pittsburgh (Employer) discharged him for viewing “pornography” while at work, the majority does not address whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review’s (UCBR) contrary finding, i.e., that Employer discharged Claimant for violating a policy which prohibits employees from using Employer’s computers to display “obscene” material at any time. Even if Employer did discharge Claimant for violating the computer use policy, I disagree with the majority’s holding that Employer met its burden of proving a violation of that policy.
I. Reason for Discharge
As stated, the UCBR found that Employer discharged Claimant for violating Employer’s policy prohibiting the use of Employer’s computers to display “obscene” material at any time, not just while at work. Claimant challenges this finding, asserting that he was discharged for a different reason. Thus, I submit that this court must address whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the UCBR’s finding that Claimant was discharged for violating Employer’s computer use policy.
On this matter, I initially point out that Employer never mentioned the computer use policy in its filings with the Unemployment Compensation (UC) Service Center. On May 7, 2002, Employer certified as true and correct, on a form requesting separation information, that Claimant was separated from employment because “Claimant violated company sexual harassment policy.” (O.R., Item No. 4, ex. 8.) On August 23, 2002, on an “Employer Questionnaire” seeking the reason for Claimant’s separation from employment, Employer did not mark the box indicating a “Rule Violation.” Instead, Employer marked the box labeled “Other” and wrote, “sexual harassment as well as misusage [sic] of University own [sic] computer system.” (O.R., Item No. 4, ex. 6 at 1.) On September 6, 2002, in speaking to a representative from the UC Service Center, Employer stated that Claimant was discharged for: “excessive tardiness, poor work performance and the sexual harassment issue.” (O.R., Item No. 5, ex. 5.)
At the first hearing before the referee, to establish the reason for Claimant’s discharge, Employer presented the testimony of David Schatz, Manager of Consulting Services for Computer Services and System Development. (R.R. at 14a.) Schatz, who is identified as EW1 in the following testimony, stated that Claimant was discharged by letter for inappropriate use of his time at work.
*1087ET And how was [Claimant’s] dismissal communicated to [Claimant]?
EW1 In writing [through] a letter drafted by HR [Human Resources] that I signed.
ET And was that on April 25, 2002?
EW11 believe it was yes.
ET I’m going to show you a letter dated April 25, 2002[.] [I]s that the termination letter?
EW1 Yes....
ET And in that letter do you outline the reasons for [Claimant’s] termination?
EW1 Yes I do.
ET What — Why was [Claimant] terminated from his employment?
EW1 Essentially it’s for inappropriate use of his time. He was using his time to download material that was inappropriate under [Employer] guidelines.
ET Explain to me [Claimant’s job.] [H]ow did that work....
EW1 If I might go into a little bit more detail there, our departments] ... can receive computer support one of 3 different ways. They can hire their own person.... They can use our central services ... or the departments] can contract with my department.... We hire the people. We screen them. We train them and we’ve placed them in departments] based upon whether they had a 1 day a week contract, 2 day a week contract, 5 day a week contract, whatever.
ET And how was [Claimant] used....
EW1 He was working in a couple departments ....
ET And when he is contracted out to a particular department is he expected to work their work hours, their work days?
EW1 Yes he is and those days are specified ... by the department.
ET And if he’s contracted for 7.5 hours a day is he expected to work 7.5 hours a day?
EW1 Yes he is[.] 7% hour work day, 1 hour unpaid for lunch[,] is the University standard.
(R.R. at 14a-15a) (emphasis added). Thus, according to Schatz, Claimant was discharged for downloading inappropriate material during his 7.5-hour work day.
Schatz’ testimony was corroborated by Kathleen Travers, who represented Employer at the hearing. Travers stated, “I would indicate that the termination letter clearly outlines the reasons for [Claimant’s] termination and talks about using work time to gain access to obscene materials through the University computer system. ...” (R.R. at 21a) (emphasis added).
To prove that Claimant downloaded inappropriate material during his work day, Schatz offered as evidence a list of files found on the laptop computer assigned to Claimant. (R.R. at 17a.) Claimant questioned Schatz about the list of files, but Schatz stated that he did not create the list and that he did not view the files on the list.
C Are you going to testify to what the files contained ... ?
EW1 I can only testify to what the file names are and the size of them. I did not look at them myself.
C Did you create that document?
EW1 Mr. [William R.] Bergman created that document.
C Well then that would ... be hearsay.
(R.R. at 18a.) Employer then requested a postponement of the hearing so that Em*1088ployer could subpoena Bergman, and the referee granted the request. (R.R. at 18a.)
Bergman, who was Employer’s Data Security Manager, testified at a subsequent hearing about the list of files. According to that testimony, Employer had asked Bergman to do an inventory of the hard drive of the laptop computer assigned to Claimant to see whether it contained any pornography. (R.R. at 20a.) In his inventory, Bergman listed file names that appeared to be pornographic, and Bergman confirmed that they were pornographic by viewing them. (R.R. at 22a-23a.) The inventory also contained the dates and times that the files were downloaded to the computer. (R.R. at 26a.)
Employer offered the list of files as evidence, but Claimant requested and received a continuance so that he could verify the file download dates, the days of the week and the times. (R.R. at 24a-25a.) In other words, Claimant specifically sought time to better address Employer’s claim of willful misconduct by comparing the download dates and times with his work schedule and determining whether the list proved that he had downloaded the files during his work hours.
At the third hearing, Claimant presented evidence challenging the download dates and times shown on the list. In response, Schatz testified, for the first time, that Employer had a computer use policy prohibiting the display of “obscene” material on Employer’s computers at any time. (R.R. at 27a, 33a.) Notably, after presenting the policy, Schatz never testified that Claimant violated that policy or that Employer discharged Claimant for violating that policy. {See R.R. at 32a-34a.)
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the UCBR’s finding that Employer discharged Claimant for violating Employer’s computer use policy. The only evidence in the record about Claimant’s discharge is that Employer discharged Claimant for sexual harassment, for excessive tardiness, for poor work performance and for downloading inappropriate material during his 7.5-hour work day.1 However, the UCBR did not find that Employer discharged Claimant for any of these reasons.
II. “Obscene” Material
Even if the record contained substantial evidence to support the UCBR’s finding that Employer discharged Claimant for violating the computer use policy, Employer did not prove that Claimant violated that policy.
As indicated, Employer’s policy prohibits the use of Employer’s computers “for the creation, design, manufacture, preparation, display, or distribution of any written or graphic obscene material.” (O.R., Item No. 15, Employer’s ex. C at 2.) The UCBR found that Claimant violated this policy by “downloading pornographic material” from the internet and by “leaving” a CD containing “pornographic” movies in *1089a computer. (Findings of Fact, No. 6.) However, “downloading” material from the internet is not the same as creating, designing, manufacturing, preparing, displaying or distributing that material. Similarly, “leaving” a CD in a computer is not the same as creating, designing, manufacturing, preparing, displaying or distributing the CD.2
Moreover, the UCBR clearly erred as a matter of law in determining that Claimant violated Employer’s policy relating to “obscene” material based solely on Claimant’s possession of “pornographic” material. The U.S. Supreme Court’s case law indicates that “pornographic” material is not necessarily “obscene” material. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874, 117 S.Ct. 2829, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (stating that the First Amendment protects sexual expression that is indecent but not “obscene”); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 n. 2, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973) (distinguishing “pornographic” and “obscene” materials).
Accordingly, unlike the majority, I would reverse.

. I note: (1) Employer presented no evidence that Claimant violated a sexual harassment policy or engaged in sexual harassment; (2) Employer presented no evidence that Claimant was excessively tardy for work; (3) Employer presented no evidence that Claimant’s work performance was poor; and (4) although Employer presented evidence relating to Claimant’s download of inappropriate material to a laptop computer assigned to Claimant, Employer provided no evidence that Claimant downloaded inappropriate material during his 7.5-hour work day.

. The majority states that it is a "necessary inference” that Claimant also displayed the obscene material. (Majority op. at 1087.) However, with respect to findings of fact, our role as an appellate court is limited to determining whether they are supported by substantial evidence. It is not our role to make additional findings of fact by drawing necessary inferences from the UCBR’s findings of fact.