Court Opinion

ID: 9781251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:26:05.343963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:22.613932
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment of affirmance, but write separately because the analysis in Division 2 of the majority opinion is incomplete. Determination of whether the 1980 will was “mutual” such that an enforceable contract not to revoke the will existed must begin with former OCGA § 53-2-51 (b),
which was effective until January 1, 1998, and read: “(e)xcept for mutual wills based on express contract, no wills shall be or shall be construed to be mutual wills unless there is contained in both wills an express statement that the wills are mutual wills.”
Bandy v. Henderson, 284 Ga. 692, 695 (4) (670 SE2d 792) (2008). “The purpose of this provision (Ga. L. 1967, p. 719) was to eliminate the uncertainty that had crept into the law through the practice of courts, on an ad hoc basis, of finding wills to be ‘mutual’ by implication.” (Emphasis in original.) Coker v. Mosley, 259 Ga. 781 (1) *206(a) (387 SE2d 135) (1990). Thus, the earlier version of the Probate Code required either an express contract or an express statement that the joint or separate wills are mutual. Hodges v. Callaway, 279 Ga. 789, 791 (1) (621 SE2d 428) (2005). Although there is no evidence of an express contract to refrain from revoking the 1980 will, the body of that will does contain an express statement that the joint will is mutual. Compare Hodges v. Callaway, supra at 792 (1) (references to mutuality in the will which were in the title of the instrument and the attestation clause were insufficient to constitute the express statement contemplated by OCGA § 53-2-51 (b) that the will was mutual).
Decided May 16, 2011.
Charles A. Tingle, for appellant.
Caldwell & Watson, Harry W. MacDougald, Floyd E. Propst III, Tracy S. Drake, for appellees.
The majority’s extensive reliance upon Johnson v. Harper, 246 Ga. 124, 125 (1) (269 SE2d 16) (1980) is problematic because, although the will at issue in that case contained an express statement that it was a mutual will, the opinion in Harper fails to recognize the importance of that statement and instead relies heavily on Simmons v. Davis, 240 Ga. 282, 283 (1) (240 SE2d 33) (1977). Although Simmons was decided ten years after the effective date of the 1967 amendment, it makes no mention of the amendment. To the extent that Simmons and the majority opinion in this case omit the requisite application of former OCGA § 53-2-51 (b), their holdings are “contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.” Coker v. Mosley, supra at 781 (1) (a), fn. 1.
Nevertheless, because the body of the 1980 joint will does contain an express statement that it is mutual, because the devises therein are wholly reciprocal, and because the surviving testator benefitted therefrom, I agree with the majority that, under applicable law preceding the effective date of the Revised Probate Code of 1998, a contract not to revoke the will existed and was specifically enforceable. I also note that the analysis under the Revised Probate Code would be entirely different. See Hodges v. Callaway, supra at 791-792 (1). Accordingly, I respectfully concur specially in the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.