Court Opinion

ID: 9717476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:04:03.897095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:53.335800
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
WAS THE CONFESSION VOLUNTARY?
Time chronology:
11:30 a.m. Questioning began.
11:30 a.m. - 12:19 p.m. Damaging admissions (oral confession).
12:19 p.m. Written statement given.
1:54 p.m. Oral confession made.
1:57 p.m. Written confession given.
I am to apparently believe that when the questioning began — in a locked interrogation room within the detective bureau of a police station and the detective has the only key — this was not custodial interrogation. Further, I am to believe this, notwithstanding the fact that the detective testified the defendant could not leave the room without Smith using his key to unlock the doors. Detective Smith also testified he never told defendant that defendant was free to leave the locked room. On occasions when Detective Smith left the room, Smith had to use a key to let himself out, which was witnessed by the defendant.
Between 11:30 a.m. and 12:19 p.m., focus was upon defendant as the perpetrator of this assault. For, indeed, Detective Smith possessed knowledge of (a) the victim’s statements concerning the assault itself, and (b) the victim’s identification of the defendant by a photograph. Detective Smith knew defendant was a suspect and could have proceeded with an arrest. He had sufficient grounds to sign a complaint for a warrant of arrest. Rather, he sought a confession.
Between 11:30 a.m. and 12:19 p.m. defendant orally confessed. Conceded by all is this fact: Defendant was given no Miranda warning prior to this oral confession. “Fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine then attaches, in my opinion, and any oral or written statements in connection with this assault are inadmissible. The procedural safeguards affording protection against self-incrimination required by Miranda are lacking here. Mathiason is in-apposite. Mathiason was not locked in a room the size of a cell. There was no restriction on his freedom to depart in any way. The United States Supreme Court considered this an important factor in Mat-hiason. Here, McQuillen witnessed the detective leave the room and use a key each time to get out from the inside of the room. Each time, the doors were locked and McQuillen was locked in the room restricted from his personal freedom. McQuillen was in custody. In Mathiason, the United States Supreme Court said “Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on- a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’ ” Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714, “[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, — U.S. -, -, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279 (1983). Locked in a room so one cannot get out is certainly such a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree set out in Be-heler.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.