Court Opinion

ID: 9760300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:47:14.261652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:10.632289
License: Public Domain

Arthur H. Healey, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree with the majority’s opinion that the element of causation, which differentiates the greater offense of felony murder from the lesser offenses of first degree burglary and first degree robbery, was not “sufficiently in dispute” to permit the jury consistently to find the defendant innocent of felony murder but guilty of burglary or robbery. Although the majority acknowledges that “[t]he state’s evidence justified a conviction for first degree burglary, first degree robbery, or both,” it goes on to hold that the defendant was not entitled to instructions on those offenses on the basis of the last prong of the test in State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 427 A.2d 414 (1980). The majority’s statements that the evidence “supports the jury’s conclusion that the August 21, 1975 beating set in motion the force which killed Dominic Dipollina on December 24, 1975,” and that “the facts which the jury could have found from the state’s evidence were sufficient to prove each and every element of felony murder, including causation, and therefore sufficient to sustain the verdict,” serve to obscure the issue on this appeal. The question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict has not been raised by anyone. The only question is whether the evidence on the element of causation was “sufficiently in dispute to permit the jury consistently to find the *611defendant innocent of the greater offense bnt guilty of the lesser.” State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 588, 427 A.2d 414 (1980). I believe that this last condition of Whistnant means that where reasonable minds could differ upon the existence or nonexistence of the element(s) that distinguishes the greater from the lesser offense, the defendant or the state is entitled to an instruction upon it. Cf. State v. Gosselin, 169 Conn. 377, 379, 363 A.2d 100 (1975). This is so because the defendant is entitled to have the jury pass upon every factual issue fairly presented by the evidence. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S. Ct. 1993, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1973); State v. Rodriguez, 180 Conn. 382, 385, 429 A.2d 919 (1980).
This case presents a classic example of the last prong of Whistnant being satisfied, for not only could reasonable minds differ on the element of causation, but there was an actual dispute at the trial on this point. What I consider to be a strong attack made by the defendant on the state’s case on the element of causation is not entirely evident from the facts appearing in the majority opinion, which derive primarily from the evidence summarized in the state’s brief. I believe that this is a ease where it is necessary to deviate from our normal procedure of examining only the evidence in the briefs; see Practice Book, 1978, § 3060B; and, under § 3060R “consult the transcript of evidence on file to supplement or explain the evidence” in the briefs because “sufficient cause appears” to do so. When the defendant filed his brief, our decision in State v. Whistnant, supra, had not been published and he was, therefore, unaware of any need to satisfy the requirements set out in that ease. He relied upon the state of the law at the time his brief was filed, *612according to which, it may fairly be assumed, his claim that he was entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offenses involved would have had substantial merit. See State v. Vasquez, 176 Conn. 239, 241, 405 A.2d 662 (1978).1 Inasmuch as we now require the defendant to satisfy a requirement of the Whistnant test that he was unaware of at the time the appeal was heard, I believe that sufficient cause exists to examine the evidence presented notwithstanding the defendant’s failure to print a summary of that evidence in his brief. See Practice Book, 1978, § 3164.
In this case the state called five doctors to testify. The testimony of four of these doctors was directed to a single issue: the cause of the victim’s death.2 Each of these doctors was subjected to extensive cross-examination on that issue. Doctor Swan is a general practitioner in family practice. He testified that he saw the victim on July 10, 1975, just prior to the assault of August 21, 1975, for complaints which included a urinary problem and “poor appetite” and that at the time of a visit one week later he “was apparently healthy.” Swan also treated the victim after the assault. The state’s attorney *613asked Mm whether the injuries he received in the beating contributed to his death. He answered: “Well, I can say that this definitely had something to do with it. It explains why his condition become (sic) downhill. He was unable to eat. He had sustained multiple injuries, and he lapses (sic) into mental deterioration.” During cross-examination, Swan testified that there were occasions, after Dipollina returned to the hospital some time after the August 21 beating, that he tried to get out of bed without assistance, and that on one occasion he fell on the floor and “apparently nobody [saw] how he fell.” He also testified on cross-examination that the victim was nourished by the insertion into his stomach of a nasal gastric tube, that he would pull out this tube, and that the family decided not to have the tube reinserted because “their father [was] terminal [and] it was decided not to lengthen the suffering . . . .” Finally, defense counsel asked Swan: “Can you tell us what caused this man’s death?” His answer was “No.”
Doctor Basden, a general practitioner and assistant medical examiner, viewed the body of the victim and the results of the autopsy in order to fill out the death certificate. Basden concluded that the cause of death was “[b]ilateral organized subdural hematoma with bilateral lobular pneumonia,” and he classified this death, under the categories appearing in the certificate, as a “Homicide assault.” On cross-examination, Basden testified that he had seen the victim once after the August 21 injury; that the victim’s daughter is a neighbor of his; and that he paid the victim a courtesy visit and referred him to his original physician. He also testified that prior to making out the death certificate he had looked at the hospital chart which referred to the August 21 *614injuries, and spoke to the chief medical examiner. Basden was asked by defense counsel, “What was it about your examination of the body or anything that you observed directly that indicated the origin of this subdural hematoma?” He responded: “The information I had was the original assault,” which came from “the chart at the hospital.” He also acknowledged on cross-examination that there can be other factors, besides traumatic injury, that cause a subdural hematoma, and that a fatal subdural hematoma was not an injury commonly encountered by a general practitioner, like himself.
Doctor Rosenberg, the pathologist who performed the autopsy, testified that in the examination of the brain his principal finding from the autopsy was a chronic subdural hematoma. He also testified that chronic malnutrition was “an important contributing factor” in the cause of death. On cross-examination he testified that, according to the facts presented to him in a lengthy hypothetical question posed to him by the state on direct examination, the subdural hematoma “would appear to be the earliest insighting [sic] cause or contributing factor.” He then went on to say that there were other contributing factors in this death, and was asked the question, “You are not prepared to say that this man’s death was solely caused by the subdural hematoma?” He answered “No.” He was then asked the following questions and gave the following answers: “Can a subdural hematoma ever be the sole proximate cause of death? A: Yes. It can. Q: But it was not in this situation? A: Not in my opinion.”
Doctor Gross, the chief medical examiner for the state of Connecticut, also testified for the state. He *615stated on direct examination in response to a hypothetical question that injuries such as those sustained by Dipollina, would be “a contributory cause” of death. Cross, who did not perform the autopsy and never saw the body, consulted with Basden concerning the autopsy. He talked with Basden and “suggested as to how that death certificate should be worded after he [Basden] had outlined to me the circumstances of the death and the autopsy finding.” He did not see the autopsy report until after he had spoken to Basden. He testified, on cross-examination, that he was not prepared to say that the subdural hematoma was the sole and proximate cause of death. Nor could Cross state with “reasonable medical certainty” that the subdural hematoma occurred as a result of the injuries inflicted four months earlier. Instead, he testified: “It is possible that it may have, but I can’t with reasonable certainty say that.”
In the light of this evidence, coupled with the fact that the victim was eighty years of age at the time of the assault and that about four months elapsed between the assault and his death, it is eminently fair to say that a genuine factual dispute existed on the element of causation. Because the evidence showing that the defendant was guilty of burglary or robbery was overwhelming,3 the element of causation was, in effect, the sole issue in dispute at the trial. The state, as well as the defendant, acknowledged this dispute and the real possibility that the jury might not believe that the element of causation *616had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt when it requested an instruction on the lesser included offenses of burglary and robbery.4
The majority appears to suggest that an element differentiating a greater offense from a lesser offense can be “sufficiently in dispute to permit the jury consistently to find the defendant innocent of the greater offense but guilty of the lesser” only when the defendant presents evidence to rebut the state’s evidence on that element. That requirement is not part of the Whistnant rule. This is implicitly recognized by the third prong of the Whistnant rule, which requires that there be “some evidence, introduced by either the state or the defendant, or by a combination of their proofs, which justifies conviction of the lesser offense.” State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 588, 427 A.2d 414 (1980). The function of cross-examination is to put certain matters in dispute and, indeed, in this instance that function is well demonstrated. Nor does such a requirement square with the basic rule that it is the jury’s province to decide questions of fact fairly presented by the evidence. See Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 314, 16 S. Ct. 839, 40 L. Ed. 980 (1896); State v. Rodriguez, 180 Conn. 382, 405, 429 A.2d 919 (1980). Implicit in the right to trial by jury afforded criminal defendants under the sixth, amendment to the United States constitu*617tion is the right to have the jury decide all relevant issues of fact. United States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d 142, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1969). It is not enough to say the jury fulfills its function of deciding issues of fact simply because in a case such as this they can acquit where an element of the crime charged is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States Supreme Court has said in this regard: “Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.” Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S. Ct. 1993, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1973). In Keeble, as in the case before us, the jury had to choose between conviction of the offense charged and acquittal, as the trial court refused to charge on a lesser included offense supported by the evidence.5 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction in Keeble and, in doing so, said: “We cannot say that the availability of a third option — convicting the defendant of [the lesser offense] — could not have resulted in a different verdict.” Keeble v. United States, supra, 213. The same can be said here.
In State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 427 A.2d 414 (1980), the fourth prong of the test there announced was appropriately applied. Whistnant sought a charge on larceny in the fourth degree as a lesser offense of robbery in the first degree. Because larceny in the fourth degree does not involve use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument and the only evidence introduced was of a theft of money by the use of a firearm, we concluded *618that the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser offense. That is hardly the case here. While Whistnant never challenged the use of a gun in the robbery that he was charged with; id., 587; the defendant here strenuously challenged the state’s evidence on the element of causation.
In People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35 (1927), the New York Court of Appeals considered the propriety of a trial court’s refusal to charge on a lesser offense of felony murder, which was punishable by death. The Moran court concluded that submission of the case to the jury on felony murder alone “is proper only where there is ‘no possible view of the facts which would justify any other verdict except a conviction of the crime charged or an acquittal.’ ” Id., 105. The court went on to state that where evidence is uncertain in its implications the jury must not be forced into the dilemma of choosing between conviction of the crime charged and acquittal. Ibid.; accord, People v. Oddy, 16 App. Div. 2d 585, 229 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1962). That same reasoning applies here. I believe that under State v. Whistnant, the defendant was entitled to have the jury pass upon the lesser offenses of first degree robbery and first degree burglary. The element of causation presented a factual question that was not only “sufficiently” in dispute, but was hotly in dispute. Accordingly, I would set aside the judgment and order a new trial.

 In State v. Vasquez, 176 Conn. 239, 405 A.2d 662 (1978), we said: “ ‘The test for determining whether one violation is a lesser included offense in another violation is whether it is possible to commit the greater offense, in the manner described in the information or bill of particulars, without having first committed the lesser. If it is possible, then the lesser violation is not an included crime.’ ” State v. Vasquez, supra, 241. The test for determining whether a person is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense has been enlarged by our decision in State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 427 A.2d 414 (1980).

 Dr. Guy Berry, who examined and treated the victim at the hospital emergency room on the evening of August 21, 1975, and morning of August 22, 1975, had no further contact with him after 9 a.m. on August 22, 1975.

 The defendant’s brother, Ronald Morin, who was involved in the criminal activity in this case and who was present with the defendant in Dipollina’s home on August 21, 1975, testified for the state, under a grant of immunity, concerning the events of that day.

 While it is true that the appropriate inquiry for the jury is whether the injury inflicted was a “contributory cause” of death; State v. Tomassi, 137 Conn. 113, 119, 75 A.2d 67 (1950) ; State v. Leopold, 110 Conn. 55, 61-62, 147 A. 118 (1929); the question before us is not whether the jury, on the evidence presented, was entitled to conclude that the element of causation was proved. The question is whether under State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 427 A.2d 414 (1980), the defendant was entitled to have the jury consider the lesser offenses involved.

 As the majority points out, the state’s evidence in this case justified a conviction for first degree robbery, first degree burglary or both.