Court Opinion

ID: 9917377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 06:05:07.593363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:35.377107
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

KYLE MICHAEL KELLEY,                                                  UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      January 11, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                     No. 364517
                                                                      Antrim Circuit Court
ELIZABETH ANN KELLEY,                                                 LC No. 20-8488-DM

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Plaintiff appeals by right the portion of the trial court’s January 5, 2023 judgment of divorce
granting defendant sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the parties’ three minor
children—AK, LK, and BK. We affirm.

                   I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         The procedural history of this case is extremely lengthy, spanning nearly three years from
the filing of the complaint for divorce until the entry of judgment. Each party was represented by
two attorneys, the children were appointed a lawyer-guardian ad litem, and even several of the
educational providers subpoenaed as witnesses were forced to seek the advice of counsel. The
record contains well over a thousand pages of transcripts and many hundreds more pages of
motions, briefs, records, and exhibits. Nine evidentiary hearings were held in front of the referee,
followed by a four-day de novo review hearing and several additional hearings before the trial
court, before the judgment of divorce was finally entered. Rather than provide an excessively long
chronological narrative of the underlying facts, this Court will endeavor to provide an overview of
the events below that support our ultimate conclusion.

                 A. BACKGROUND AND EVENTS OF FEBRUARY 7, 2020

       The parties were married in 2011 in Erie County, New York. They moved to Michigan in
2017. The parties have three minor children. Before their separation, plaintiff primarily worked
as a heating and ventilation, air conditioning, and refrigeration technician to support the family
while defendant stayed at home with the children. This arrangement was a source of conflict

                                                 -1-
between the parties, as plaintiff believed that defendant needed to also work to support the family,
while defendant believed that any earnings she made would essentially be offset by the cost of
childcare.

         On February 7, 2020, the parties argued over defendant’s decision to pay for a babysitter
for their then-two children (defendant being pregnant with BK at the time) and having her hair
done at a salon. That evening, plaintiff’s employer sent plaintiff to Crossroads, a strip club, to
repair a beverage cooler. After completing the job, plaintiff decided to stay and have food and
drinks. Defendant became upset when plaintiff was gone longer than he had said he would be, and
she became further upset when she checked their bank account to discover that defendant had spent
money at Crossroads. When plaintiff arrived home, the parties continued to argue. Defendant
testified that she believed plaintiff was intoxicated, while plaintiff testified to having had three
beers and not being impaired. At some point, defendant went to the garage and obtained one of
plaintiff’s handguns. Defendant testified that she was holding the gun and considering suicide
when plaintiff found her, at which point she tossed or dropped the gun on the ground. Plaintiff
testified that defendant put the gun in her mouth and also aimed the gun at him with her finger on
the trigger. Both parties called 911. A police officer who arrived on the scene, Officer Robert
Oliverius, testified that he observed plaintiff and believed he had been drinking. Officer Oliverius
also noted that plaintiff was highly animated, disheveled, and upset, and that plaintiff told him
several different versions of how he obtained the gun from defendant; these explanations included
that he took it from her, that she “tossed” the gun to him, and that he ordered her to drop the gun
and she threw it on the couch. Plaintiff never told Officer Oliverius that defendant pointed the gun
at him or had her finger on the trigger, but he did make one statement about defendant having the
gun in her mouth.

                 B. COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE, PPO, AND VISITATION

        Defendant agreed to a voluntary admission to Munson Hospital for in-patient psychiatric
treatment. While defendant was in the hospital, plaintiff obtained an ex parte personal protection
order (PPO). Plaintiff served defendant with both the PPO and his complaint for divorce on
February 13, 2020. AK and LK initially stayed with plaintiff in the marital home, while defendant
moved into a hotel room with her mother. Plaintiff attended a few supervised visits with defendant
in February and March 2020; the visitation procedure was complicated by the start of the COVID-
19 pandemic. On March 23, 2020, the trial court entered a temporary order for custody, parenting
time, and child support, granting the parties joint legal and physical custody of AK and LK and
granting defendant the use of the marital home. Plaintiff moved in with his parents. The PPO was
eventually dismissed in March 2020 and replaced with a mutual restraining order prohibiting the
parties from contacting the other except concerning the children.

        The parties’ relationship throughout the next nearly two years can best be described as
antagonistic. Initially, the parties exchanged the children at Safe Haven, a facility designed to
provide a safe and secure environment for such exchanges. However, plaintiff and his mother had
numerous verbal altercations with staff over a variety of minor delays or changes to the routine,
many of them caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. This ultimately led Safe Haven staff to ban
plaintiff from exchanges at Safe Haven. Safe Haven staff also noted numerous derogatory
statements made by plaintiff and his mother about staff in the presence of the children. During
times when Safe Haven was closed for COVID-related reasons, and after plaintiff was banned, the

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parties conducted parenting-time exchanges at a gas station. Defendant’s neighbor, Julie Greene,
who accompanied defendant to these exchanges, noted several times that plaintiff insulted
defendant in front of the children, including calling her lazy, a “bitch,” a “squatter” in plaintiff’s
house, and calling her “Miss Piggy” and making “oinking” sounds. Greene also observed plaintiff
tell his children that “the nightmare’s almost over” when they returned from a visit with defendant.
Green testified that plaintiff mocked defendant’s suicide threat at least once. Plaintiff and his
mother also formed a belief, and testified to it, that other patrons of the gas station had been enlisted
by defendant to watch the exchanges. Plaintiff’s mother filmed several other patrons whom she
believed were in league with defendant, and got into a verbal altercation with at least one of them.

                                 C. AK AND LK’S EDUCATION

         The parties also had significant conflicts over AK and LK’s participation in educational
programs, most notably the “Early On” program for children with developmental delays. Both
parties canceled Early On appointments without providing notice to the other. Plaintiff had
significant conflicts with Joanna Brown, an Early On service provider, and her supervisor.
Plaintiff stated several times that he believed Brown was biased in favor of defendant. Brown
testified that she had never dealt with a parent as consistently agitated as plaintiff. Plaintiff
ultimately requested that all Early On services be canceled. Brown and another Early On service
provider, Anne White, testified that plaintiff had spoken negatively about defendant in front of the
children more than once, including calling her a drug addict and inquiring as to whether defendant
was at fault for their children’s developmental delays. The parties also had significant
disagreements over whether AK should attend preschool, ultimately resulting in AK attending
preschool during defendant’s parenting time but not during plaintiff’s. The parties also disagreed
about whether LK should attend a special school for children with autism.

                               D. AK AND LK’S MEDICAL CARE

        The parties were extremely at odds concerning AK and LK’s medical care. Before the
divorce, the children received medical treatment from Dr. Jennifer Shockley, a family practitioner
who is not a pediatrician but who has pediatric patients and had done pediatric rotations as part of
her medical training. While defendant was in the hospital, plaintiff took AK and LK to see Dr.
Maureen Street, also a family practitioner. Dr. Street testified that she referred both girls to Pine
Rest for assessment of speech and developmental issues. Plaintiff repeatedly canceled
appointments defendant had made with Dr. Shockley, including the “well child” examinations
required for preschool, and even had his attorneys send Dr. Shockley a letter stating that her
treatment of AK and LK had not been approved by the court (although the trial court had not
ordered that the children see a particular physician) and demanding that she cancel an upcoming
appointment. Dr Street testified that plaintiff’s mother informed her that she had been court-
ordered to treat AK and LK, which was untrue. Dr. Street ultimately refused to continue treating
the children after being repeatedly involved in the parties’ litigation, including receiving numerous
requests for medical records and letters and calls from the parties’ attorneys. Dr. Street testified
that the parties attempted to attend one of the children’s medical appointments together in October
2020, but that the office staff had to stop the parties from fighting. Defendant testified that, at this
appointment, plaintiff called her a “psycho” and told her to kill herself; these statements were made
in front of AK and LK.

                                                  -3-
                                              E. BK

         BK was born in August 2020. Plaintiff was not present for the birth; defendant testified
that the COVID-19 restrictions in place at the time permitted only one additional person to be in
the delivery room, and she had chosen her mother. Before BK’s birth, plaintiff told defendant that
he thought BK was not his child. Plaintiff requested a paternity test at one point, although he
testified that none was ever performed. Rather, plaintiff became convinced that BK was his son
when he saw him after his birth and observed the physical resemblance.

        Plaintiff had wanted to give BK a different name; defendant chose BK’s name unilaterally
after she gave birth. Plaintiff refused to use BK’s name, testifying that he only referred to him as
“my son.” Plaintiff filed a motion with the trial court requesting that the court order that BK be
renamed; that motion was denied. At the hearing on plaintiff’s motion to enter a judgment of
divorce in December 2022 (the last hearing before the entry of the judgment of divorce), defendant
informed the trial court that plaintiff had recently shaved BK’s head down to the bare skin, and
had repeatedly cut the children’s hair extremely short as retaliation for perceived unfairness in the
divorce proceedings; plaintiff’s counsel alleged that this was merely a “summer shave.” The trial
court noted that it had “never seen a case like this, where one parent shaves the head of” a two year
old, noted that BK looked like “he has cancer and he’s undergoing chemo,” and stated that “this
establishes why I ordered that before I ever review a determination as to legal custody [plaintiff]
needed to have a psychological evaluation.”

                     F. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS OF DRUG ABUSE

        Plaintiff subpoenaed numerous medical professionals who had treated defendant over the
years, and presented evidence concerning medications that defendant had been prescribed during
those years. Plaintiff particularly focused on defendant’s prescribed use of Tramadol for pain
management, noting that it was considered an opioid. Dr. Shockley testified to prescribing
defendant Tramadol and stated that she had no concerns regarding potential substance abuse by
defendant, noting that Tramadol was “a very mild member” of the opioid class of drugs. Dr.
Shockley also testified to having prescribed cough syrup containing codeine to defendant in May
2018. Defendant testified to having been prescribed a limited amount of opiate-based painkillers
after LK’s birth by C-section. During a hearing in January 2021, plaintiff interrupted his own
counsel to say, “we want to talk to these doctors about [defendant] popping pills,” causing the trial
court to reprimand him. Plaintiff also testified that defendant had told him she had attempted to
overdose on sleeping pills in 2009. Plaintiff testified that defendant abused opiates while they
were dating, but he admitted that defendant did not abuse opiates after the parties were married.

                              G. REFEREE RECOMMENDATION

        Following nine days of hearings in this case, the referee issued a recommendation and
proposed custody and support order. The referee recommended a continuation of the existing joint
legal custody and current physical custody and parenting time order. The referee noted that “[t]his
case has been extremely and unnecessarily contentious. The actual facts are not particularly
complicated; the parties and their attorneys have engaged in every effort to obfuscate the issues
with incessant filings and demonstrated rancor.”

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                   H. DE NOVO REVIEW AND TRIAL COURT HOLDING

         Both parties objected to the referee’s proposed order. As stated, the trial court held an
extensive de novo review hearing over several days. At the de novo hearing, plaintiff presented
the testimony of several of plaintiff’s medical providers concerning the nature and reason for every
medication plaintiff had been prescribed over the past several years. Following the de novo review
hearing, the trial court granted the parties a divorce and held that defendant would have sole legal
custody and primary physical custody of the children. Finally, on January 5, 2023, nearly three
years after the filing of a complaint for divorce on February 13, 2020, the trial court entered a
judgment of divorce.

       This appeal followed.1

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        “To expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and final adjudication, all
orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made
findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion
or a clear legal error on a major issue.” MCL 722.28; see also Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81,
85; 782 NW2d 480 (2010).

        A trial court’s finding is against the great weight of the evidence when it is so contrary to
the weight of the evidence that it is unwarranted or is so plainly a miscarriage of justice that it
would warrant a new trial. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 877-878; 526 NW2d 889 (1994).
This standard applies to all findings of fact, see Hunter v Hunter, 484 Mich 247, 257; 771 NW2d
694 (2009), which includes findings regarding the existence of an established custodial
environment, see Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich App 599, 605; 766 NW2d 903 (2009), and the
findings concerning each custody factor, see Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d
336 (2008). The trial court’s findings of fact must be affirmed unless the evidence clearly
preponderates in the other direction. Mitchell v Mitchell, 296 Mich App 513, 519; 823 NW2d 153
(2012). In reviewing factual findings, this Court defers to the trial court’s determinations of
credibility. Shann v Shann, 293 Mich App 302, 305; 809 NW2d 435 (2011).

        This Court reviews a trial court’s discretionary rulings in a custody dispute for a palpable
abuse of discretion. See MCL 722.28; Shulick v Richards, 273 Mich App 320, 324-325; 729
NW2d 533 (2006). “An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court’s decision is so palpably
and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment,
or the exercise of passion or bias.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 705.

1
  We stress again that even this rather-detailed recitation of the facts and proceedings below is far
from comprehensive. The parties can be assured that this Court, in making its decision, reviewed
and considered all of the materials they filed on appeal.

                                                 -5-
          This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the facts, to determine
if the trial court committed clear legal error. See Kaeb v Kaeb, 309 Mich App 556, 564; 873 NW2d
319 (2015).

                                           III. ANALYSIS

       Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by awarding defendant sole legal and primary
physical custody of the children, because many of the court’s findings were against the great
weight of the evidence. We disagree.

                               A. GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES

       The Child Custody Act of 1970, MCL 722.21 et seq., governs the resolution of most
custody disputes in Michigan. See Mauro v Mauro, 196 Mich App 1, 4; 492 NW2d 758 (1992).
The purpose of the Act is to promote the best interests and welfare of children and courts must
construe it liberally to serve that purpose. See MCL 722.26(1); Frame v Nehls, 452 Mich 171,
176; 550 NW2d 739 (1996).

        In all custody disputes, “the best interests of the child control” the trial court’s decisions.
MCL 722.25(1). Therefore, trial court must resolve custody disputes by determining what is in
the child’s best interest. Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150; 631 NW2d 748 (2001).

       As the first step to resolving a custody dispute, a trial court must generally determine
whether the child had an established custodial environment with either or both parents. Jack v
Jack, 239 Mich App 668, 670; 610 NW2d 231 (2000). A child has an established custodial
environment “if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that
environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.”
MCL 722.27(1)(c). A child may have more than one custodian and more than one custodial
environment. See Berger, 277 Mich App at 707.

       If either parent requests joint custody, the trial court must consider it. See
MCL 722.26a(1); see also Wright v Wright, 279 Mich App 291, 299; 761 NW2d 443 (2008),
Shulick, 273 Mich App at 326. The court must determine whether joint custody is in the child’s
best interests by examining the best interest factors set forth in MCL 722.23, see
MCL 722.26a(1)(a), and by determining whether the “parents will be able to cooperate and
generally agree concerning important decisions affecting the welfare of the child,”
MCL 722.26a(1)(b). See also Dailey v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, 667; 811 NW2d 501
(2011). However, when parents have a “deep-seated animosity” between them that causes them
to have an “irreconcilable divergence in their opinions about how to foster [the] child’s well-
being,” joint custody ceases to be an option. Wright, 279 Mich App at 299-300, citing
MCL 722.26a(1)(b). In such cases, the trial court should order that one parent have sole custody.

       The trial court must explicitly consider the factors set forth in MCL 722.23 when
determining if a change in custody is in the child’s best interests. The factors that must be
considered are:
               (a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the
       parties involved and the child.

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               (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child
       love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child
       in his or her religion or creed, if any.

              (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child
       with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted
       under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.

              (d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
       environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.

             (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
       home or homes.

               (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.

               (g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.

               (h) The home, school, and community record of the child.

               (i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child
       to be of sufficient age to express preference.

               (j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and
       encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and
       the other parent or the child and the parents. A court may not consider negatively
       for the purposes of this factor any reasonable action taken by a parent to protect a
       child or that parent from sexual assault or domestic violence by the child's other
       parent.

               (k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed
       against or witnessed by the child.

               (l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular
       child custody dispute. [MCL 722.23.]

        When resolving a custody dispute, the trial court must consider and explicitly state its
findings and conclusions regarding each factor. See Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462,
475; 730 NW2d 262 (2007). However, the court need not comment on every matter in evidence
or declare whether it accepted or rejected every proposition argued. See Baker v Baker, 411 Mich
567, 583; 309 NW2d 532 (1981). The record need only be sufficient for an appellate court to
determine whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial court’s findings. See
MacIntyre v MacIntyre (On Remand), 267 Mich App 449, 452; 705 NW2d 144 (2005). A trial
court is also not required to give equal weight to all the factors; it may consider the relative weight
of the factors as appropriate to the circumstances. See Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149,
184; 729 NW2d 256 (2006).

                                 B. BEST-INTEREST FACTORS

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         In this case, the trial court found that factors (a), (h) and (j) favored defendant, factor (g)
favored plaintiff, and all other factors favored both parties (or neither party). Plaintiff argues that
the trial court’s findings under factors (a), (b), (c), (f), (h), and (j)2 were against the great weight
of the evidence. We disagree.

                                          1. FACTOR (A)

        Factor (a) concerns “[t]he love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the
parties involved and the child.” MCL 722.23(a). The trial court, while acknowledging that both
parties appeared to love their children, found that this factor favored defendant, primarily because
of plaintiff’s conduct toward BK. Despite plaintiff’s claim to the contrary, the trial court’s finding
was not solely based on plaintiff’s questioning of BK’s paternity prior to his birth. Rather, the
record shows that the trial court based its determination on plaintiff’s refusal to use BK’s name,
and on plaintiff questioning his paternity while simultaneously seeking sole legal and primary
physical custody of BK. The trial court also noted plaintiff’s insinuations that he might not be
AK’s or LK’s father. The trial court’s finding was not against the great weight of the evidence.
Fletcher, 447 Mich at 877-878. In fact, although the trial court discussed plaintiff’s animosity
toward defendant in addressing other factors, the record is replete with instances in which plaintiff
was willing to make his children unhappy, or even delay medical treatment or educational
programs, in order to inconvenience or somehow score a “win” over defendant. This conduct
supports the inference that plaintiff’s emotional ties to his children are weaker than his anger
towards his ex-wife, among other things. See Fletcher (After Remand), 229 Mich App at 25
(noting that “some factors have natural overlap”).

                                          2. FACTOR (B)

        Factor (b) concerns “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child
love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his or her
religion or creed, if any.” MCL 722.23(b). The trial court noted that both parties had the capacity
to provide love and affection for the children. However, it also noted the great deal of evidence
that plaintiff frequently became angry and could not control his behavior, as the trial court itself
observed at court hearings. The trial court noted that plaintiff’s anger resulted in his being banned
from Safe Haven, limiting his ability to participate in parenting-time exchanges. For many of the
same reasons as stated in our discussion of factor (a), the trial court’s finding was not against the
great weight of the evidence. Fletcher, 447 Mich at 877-878. Further, although plaintiff attempts
to explain his behavior as simple frustration and “having human emotions,” and argues that the
trial court merely allowed its “personal opinion” to influence its findings, the record shows clearly

2
 Although plaintiff asserts in his brief on appeal that the trial court’s findings under factor (l) were
against the great weight of the evidence, he provides no argument or citation to authority in support
of that assertion. “It is not sufficient for a party ‘simply to announce a position or assert an error
and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel
and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his
position.’ ” Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998) (citation omitted).

                                                  -8-
that plaintiff had aggressive or angry confrontations with nearly everyone involved in caring for
his children during the pendency of this case, often in front of AK and LK.

                                          3. FACTOR (C)

        Factor (c) concerns “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the
laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.” MCL 722.23(c). The trial
court found that this factor favored both parties equally, as both of the parties had the capacity and
disposition to provide the children with their basic material needs and medical care. We agree.
The record shows extensive and contentious disagreement between the parties over the children’s
medical treatment, with both parties at times conducting themselves poorly, such as when they
argued in Dr. Street’s office, or when they canceled appointments the other had made. But
plaintiff’s argument is essentially that his opinion concerning which medical providers should treat
the children is correct, and that defendant’s opinion is incorrect, and that the trial court therefore
should have found that this factor favored him. The type of medical care a child should receive is
a complex and difficult question at times, and the record shows that both parents, despite their
disagreements, were extremely invested in making sure their children received what they viewed
as proper care. Further, although plaintiff argues that the trial court erred because defendant has
“mismanaged her own health,” the evidence plaintiff cites in support of this argument is either
decades old (such as plaintiff’s claim that defendant did not always properly take medication she
was prescribed while living in New York), or irrelevant (such as plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s
prescribed use of Tramadol, a mild painkiller, for carpal tunnel syndrome and menstrual cramps
was the behavior of a “drug addict” seeking “round after round of painkillers”). The trial court’s
finding on this factor was not against the great weight of the evidence. Fletcher, 447 Mich at 877-
878.

                                          4. FACTOR (F)

         Factor (f) concerns “[t]he moral fitness of the parties involved.” MCL 722.23(f). The trial
court found that this factor favored both parties (or, perhaps more accurately, neither party), noting
that there was evidence that defendant had abused opiates in the past and there was also evidence
that plaintiff had abused alcohol in the past, but that the evidence was “a considerable period of
time ago.” This finding was not against the great weight of the evidence. Defendant’s treatment
for opiate addiction, and plaintiff’s conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence of
alcohol, both occurred before the birth of their children. None of defendant’s medical providers
testified to any current concerns with defendant regarding controlled substance abuse and, despite
plaintiff’s efforts to raise concerns about defendant’s use of Tramadol, no evidence was presented
that defendant’s ability to care for her children was ever impaired. Similarly, although the
evidence showed that plaintiff was at least somewhat intoxicated on the night of February 7, 2020,
and defendant testified to having been concerned about plaintiff’s drinking in the past, there was
no evidence presented that plaintiff had a current problem with alcohol or that alcohol use would
impair his ability to parent his children. The trial court’s finding was not against the great weight
of the evidence. Fletcher, 447 Mich at 877-878.

                                          5. FACTOR (H)

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        Factor (h) concerns “[t]he home, school, and community record of the child.”
MCL 722.23(h). The trial court found that this factor favored defendant, noting plaintiff’s repeated
conflicts with educational providers, especially employees of Early On. The trial court noted that
plaintiff had directed his attorneys to send numerous “threatening letters” to many service
providers. The record shows that plaintiff was frequently angry and adversarial toward female
service providers whom he believed were “biased” against him, including Joanna Brown, her
supervisor, and the staff of Safe Haven. The trial court noted that plaintiff’s actions were primarily
responsible for AK and LK not participating in Early On as much as they could have before they
“aged out” of the program. While plaintiff argues that this actions simply show his zealous
advocacy for the best possible education for his children, the record shows that his actions
frequently hampered and delayed AK and LK’s access to programs and services that could have
benefitted them significantly. The trial court finding was not against the great weight of the
evidence. Fletcher, 447 Mich at 877-878.

                                          6. FACTOR (J)

        Factor (j) concerns “[t]he willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent
or the child and the parents.” MCL 722.23(j). The trial court found that this factor did not favor
either party, or “maybe slightly” favored defendant. This finding was not against the great weight
of the evidence. The record shows that the communication between the parties was abysmal.
While both parties shared some of that blame, the record shows that plaintiff insulted defendant
frequently, publicly, and often in front of the children. Further, plaintiff was unwilling to use the
My Family Wizard tool for communication, even after being court-ordered to do so, until shortly
before the divorce was finalized. Plaintiff expressed no compelling reason for this refusal, stating
only that it was “ridiculous” and claiming that the parties should be able to communicate via text
message or phone. However, the record also shows that plaintiff would not respond to defendant’s
text communication, and even accused her of violating the mutual restraining order, forcing all
communication to go through the parties’ attorneys. If anything, the trial court’s finding
concerning this factor was rather generous to plaintiff; the evidence certainly did not preponderate
against it. Fletcher, 447 Mich at 877-878.

                                        C. CONCLUSION

        Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any of the trial court’s findings regarding the challenged
best-interest factors were against the great weight of the evidence. Moreover, the record clearly
shows that the parties possess “deep-seated animosity” between them that causes them to have an
“irreconcilable divergence in their opinions about how to foster” their children’s wellbeing.
Wright, 279 Mich App at 299-300, citing MCL 722.26a(1)(b). The record is replete with instances
in which the referee and the trial court urged the parties to attempt to find some means of working
together for the good of the children, rather than dragging them, and each other, through years of
exhausting (and expensive) litigation. Those urgings fell on deaf ears. It would have been
decidedly against the children’s best interests to allow the parties to share in the decisions
concerning their upbringing, with one party setting appointments only to have the other cancel
them, and every decision turned into a battle, a battle that would likely lead the parties back before
the trial court on a regular basis. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that sole legal custody and primary physical custody with one parent was in the

                                                -10-
children’s best interests. Id. And it did not abuse that discretion by determining that defendant
was the better choice in that regard.

       Affirmed.

                                                           /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                           /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                           /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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