Court Opinion

ID: 9828964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:53:26.719846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:55.734447
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[4] Appellee, in his motion for rehearing, lays considerable stress on the fact that the Liberty Bond had depreciated in value between the time of its delivery to the oil and gas company and its return to him, and argues that his ability to purchase the stock which the defendant had agreed to sell him was to that extent diminished, and that by these facts the case is brought within the reason of the rule announced in the case of Cavit v. McFadden, 13 Tex. 234. If the ap-pellee had made the contract, agreeing to deliver the bond at the time of the delivery of the stock, the bond would have depreciated in his hands prior to the breach just the same as it did in the hands of the defendant; and, as we said, before, when the contract was breached and the appellee accepted the return of the bond, he was in precisely the same condition he would have been in if he had never delivered the bond in the first place, and we see no reason for applying a different rule for the measure of damages in the two cases. If it be true that the value of the bond had depreciated (there was no proof of this fact except the plaintiffs’ evidence, to the effect that he sold it for something less than par), the appellee could, we think, on proper allegations, recover the difference between the value of the bond and the value of the stock at the time of the breach of the contract.
[5] We adhere to the opinion that the acceptance of the return of the Liberty Bond put an end to appellee’s right to sue for a specific performance of the contract or to treat the transaction as a conversion of the oil stock, appellee’s remedy being thereafter a suit for damages for breach of the contract. We think the authorities cited in the original opinion sustain this conclusion. The appellee cites the case of Mutual Loan & Investment Co. v. Matthews, 176 S. W. 924, as holding *499to the contrary. Appellee’s attorney is mistaken in his statement of the facts of this case. The facts are that Matthews and the Mutual Loan & Investment Company owned jointly certain notes, payable to and in the possession of the said investment company. The company converted to its own use these notes, by transferring them to a third party, in payment of its indebtedness. The notes were subsequently returned to the investment company, but after the maker had become insolvent and without the collateral security which had been given to secure their payment. It was held that the return of the notes to the investment company did not preclude Matthews from suing the company for a conversion of his interest in the notes. Appellee’s attorney evidently misread Sthe ease, for he states in his argument that the facts showed that the notes were returned to Matthews. We- think the attorney is also mistaken in his conclusion as to the facts in the case of Early-Foster Co. v. Mid-Tex Oil Mills, 208 S. W. 224.
We should call attention to the said case of Early-Eoster Co. v. Mid-Tex Oil Mills, however, as we did not have this case before us in our original consideration of the case and it should be considered in connection with what we said in the original opinion, in the discussion of the question of the measure of damages in a case of conversion. It was held in this case that where a conversion of property of fluctuating value is attended with fraud, willful wrong, or gross negligence, the measure of damages is “the highest market value of such property between the date of conversion and the filing of the suit.” On motion for rehearing the measure of damages adopted by the New York court and by the 'Supreme Court of the United States, discussed in our original opinion, is referred to, and it is said that under such rule the judgment of the lower court could be sustained, though we take it that the court adhered to its opinion as to the correct measure of damages originally announced. If this were a case of conversion, it may be that the rule there announced would be applicable; but, as we have held that the appellee cannot, treat the transaction as conversion, the authority is not applicable here.
The motion for rehearing will be overruled.-