Court Opinion

ID: 9682737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:15:37.145763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:40.995900
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Norvell,
joined by Justices Garwood and Griffin, dissenting.
In my opinion the order of the Court of Civil Appeals dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction was not the proper order to enter in this case.
Even if we consider the “cause” in the county court which culminated in the rendition of a judgment upon the award of the commissioners as being a special statutory proceeding, yet nevertheless the Court of Civil Appeals would have jurisdiction to reverse the judgment if it were void because it did not conform to the award or for some other reason such as a failure to acquire jurisdiction of the subject matter and parties affected by the condemnation proceedings. Therefore the court should have considered the appeal to determine if such questions were efficiently raised by the appellant in that court. If they were not, then the proper order would have been one affirming the judgment of the county court rather than dismissing the appeal. I doubt if there is a matter other than voidness of judgment which could be effectively raised without filing objections to the award, but it is a rather common thing to encounter points in an appellate brief which cannot be sustained because the required record showing is not made. This circumstance does not however deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction of the cause.
Unless one is willing to draw a rather fine distinction between a “decision of the county court” and a “judgment of the [county] court,” it would seem that the Court of Civil Appeals had jurisdiction of this appeal. Article 3266, Sec. 7, Vernon’s Ann. Texas Civ. Stats., expressly provides for a judgment upon the decision of the commissioners and makes the same “the judgment of the court.” We should simply say that as the decision of the commissioners becomes the judgment of the court, such judgment is appealable under the provisions of Article 3268 which authorizes appeals from “the decision of the county court” in an eminent domain cause.
It may be that in so far as this particular case is concerned, it would make little difference to petitioner whether the judgment of the county court stands as a result of a dismissal of his appeal or a decision on the merits to the effect that the points *74which he urges are not efficiently raised, largely due to the circumstances that they are not supported by proper objections to the commissioners’ decision or award.
Be that as it may, the merits of the appeal are not before us. There is, however, an important point of appellate jurisdiction and practice to be decided which will necessarily control future cases of like nature. It is difficult for me to consider a judgment of a county court as a non-appealable judgment. Likewise, it seems undesirable to determine jurisdiction of courts upon the efficacy of the contentions raised in a brief when jurisdiction, as fixed by statute, seems to be based upon cases, causes and judgments.1
The constitutional provision setting forth the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil Appeals is as follows:
“* * * Said Courts of Civil Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of their respective districts which shall extend to all civil cases of which the District Courts or County Courts have original or appellate jurisdiction under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law. * * * Said courts shall have such other jurisdiction, original and appellate as may be presented by law. * * *” Article 5, Sec. 6, Texas Constitution.
*75The general statutory provision relating to such jurisdiction is as follows :
“The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals shall extend to all civil cases within the limits of their respective districts of which the District Courts and County Courts have or assume jurisdiction when the amount in controversy or the judgment rendered shall exceed One Hundred Dollars exclusive of interest and costs.” Article 1819, Vernon’s Ann. Texas Stats.
The particular statutory provision relating to appeals in eminent domain cases is as follows:
“* * * If the cause should be appealed from the decision of the county court, the appeal shall be governed by the law governing appeals in other cases; except the judgment of the county court shall not be suspended thereby.” Article 3268.
Sections 6 and 7 of Article 3266 read as follows:
6. “If either party be dissatisfied with the decision, such party may within ten days after the same has been filed with the county judge file his objection thereto in writing, setting forth the grounds of his objection, and thereupon the adverse party shall be cited and the cause shall be tried and determined as in other civil causes in the county court.
7. “If no objections to the decision are filed within ten (10) days, the County Judge shall cause said decision to be recorded in the minutes of the County Court, and shall make the same the judgment of the court and issue the necessary process to enforce the same.”
In Sinclair v. City of Dallas, 44 S.W. 2d 465, 466, wr. ref., Mr. Justice Alexander, afterwards Chief Justice of this Court, writing for the Waco Court of Civil Appeals, clearly indicated that an eminent domain proceeding, whether concluded under the procedure of Article 3266, Sec. 6, or that prescribed in Article 3266, Sec. 7, culminates in an action in the County Court, either as a judgment of the court based upon findings (by a judge or jury) or an award made by commissioners. Condemnation proceedings admittedly originate as administrative proceedings, “and do not become an action in the county court in the true sense until such objections are filed (Art. 3266, Sec. 6) or until the time for filing same has expired and the judge is *76required to enter judgment on the award.” (Art. 3266, Sec. 7). Sinclair v. City of Dallas, supra.
Similarly, the clear import of Fitzgerald v. City of Dallas, Texas Civ. App., 34 S.W. 2d 682, 683, wr. ref., is that there is no distinction between a judgment rendered under Art. 3266, Sec. 6, and one rendered under Art. 3266, Sec. 7. It was said:
“All proceedings from the date of the qualification of said appointees [commissioners] up to and including the filing of their decision with the county judge were had exclusively before, and determined by, them. The authority of said commissioners ceased on the filing of their decision, and the authority of the county judge was to be exercised under subdivision 7 of Articl 3266, R.S. 1925, viz.: if no objections to the decision had been filed as authorized by subdivision 6 of article 3266 within ten days after the filing of said decision, to ‘cause said decision to be recorded in the minutes * * * and * * * make the same the judgment of the [county] court,’ thus a final judgment would have been rendered disposing of said condemnation proceedings.”
In Milam v. Akers, Texas Civ. App., 181 S.W. 2d 719, 723, no writ history, the Court said:
“* * * The two sections, taken together, clearly provide for a judgment of the county court, upon trial, Sec. 6, or upon the award, Sec. 7. If neither party files objection within the time prescribed, then it becomes the mandatory duty of the county judge to render judgment thereon. If either party files objection within the stated time, the adverse party must be cited and the cause tried ‘as in other civil causes in the county court.’ This language clearly calls for an original or ‘de novo’ trial, and effectually does away with the award altogether.”
The only opinion prior to those rendered in the present case which says that a judgment rendered under Article 3266, Sec. 7, is not appealable is that of the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals in City of El Paso v. Ward, 213 S.W. 2d. 726, 729, no writ history. In this case, however, Mr. Justice Sutton filed a dissenting opinion on the point which seems to express the preferable view. He said:
“It seems to me equally clear we have the jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding. As said in the Big Spring case [Big Spring v. Garlington, Texas Civ. App., 88 S.W. 2d 1095] when *77Commissioners filed their report that is the end of their services. That is the end of the activities of the agency set up by the statute in condemnation proceedings. All acts after the filing of the report are judicial acts of the Court. There may be a maximum period of ten days of dormancy. If there be no objections filed within the ten day period then the Court acts, not the agency. The statute makes it the duty of the Judge to enter the decision of the Commissioners as the judgment of the Court and ‘issue the necessary process to enforce the same.’ ”
The contention that the action of the county judge in rendering judgment upon the commissioners’ award is not an action in “a civil case” seems to be without force in determining the jurisdictional point involved. In setting forth the general appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals, the term, “civil cases,” is used. This undoubtedly was intended to mean non-criminal cases as the Court of Criminal Appeals was created in the same year as the Courts of Civil Appeals and vested with appellate jurisdiction in all “criminal cases.” However that may be, the Constitution also contains a provision that, “Said courts shall have such other jurisdiction original and appellate as may be prescribed by law.” Under this provision and enabling legislation, the Courts of Civil Appeals exercise appellate jurisdiction over election contests which are legislative proceedings and not civil suits. Gonzales v. Laughlin, Texas Civ. App., 256 S.W. 2d 236. Similarly, here we have a special legislative provision relating to appeals in eminent domain causes.
I do not regard the case of Fortune v. Killebrew, 86 Texas 172, 23 S.W. 976, as being decisive of this appeal. That case involved an arbitration award which “was entered and recorded as the judgment of the Court.” This Court held that this proceeding was purely statutory and unknown to the common law and that the jurisdiction conferred upon the court should be considered as special rather than general and that accordingly an award not based upon a binding and legal agreement was void and subject to collateral attack. While this holding may be considered as doing some violence to the wording of the statutory provision that such “award shall be entered and recorded as the judgment of the court, with like effect as other judgments of the court," it is not a holding that such judgment is not appeal-able; for after all, an appeal lies from a judgment which is wholly void, Jones v. Bass, Texas Com. App., 49 S.W. 2d 723, holdings approved by the Supreme Court, 3-A Texas Jur. 89, Appeal and Error, Sec. 69, 16 Texas Jur., 788, Eminent Domain, Sec. 452, and the appellate court is authorized to set aside the *78judgment of a trial court on the ground that such court had acted beyond the scope of its legitimate powers. In Leslie v. Griffin, Texas Com. App., 25 S.W. 2d 820, 822, it was said:
“The trial court, in hearing the- complaint of the defendant in error, and in rendering judgment granting the relief it did, assumed powers which the court did not possess. The proceedings and the judgment rendered herein are void; and the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, on appeal, to declare them so, and to set them aside. Williams v. Steele, 101 Texas 382, 108 S.W. 155; Roy v. Whitaker (Texas Civ. App.) 50 S.W. 498; Gray v. Maddox, 5 Texas 528; 3 Texas Jur. p. 130.”
It seems much simpler to regard judgments rendered under both Sections 6 and 7 of Article 3266 as appealable judgments without reference to classification of acts in rendering judgment as judicial, administrative, or ministerial. It has been held that the rendition of a judgment upon a jury’s finding is a “ministerial act.” Fredericksburg Hospital & Clinic v. Spring-all, Texas Civ. App., 220 S.W. 2d 692, no writ history, Springall v. Fredericksburg Hospital & Clinic, Texas Civ. App., 225 S.W. 2d 232, no writ history, and from this premise, should the judicial-ministerial distinction be recognized, it could be argued that there is h distinction between a judgment rendered upon the findings of a judge and one rendered upon a jury verdict under Article 3266, Sec. 6, in so far as appealability is concerned.
I would reverse the order of dismissal entered by the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause to that court for a consideration of the appeal upon its merits. Accordingly I respectfully dissent from the order of affirmance.
Opinion delivered July 9, 1958.
Rehearing overruled October 1, 1958.

. — The distinction between the appellate jurisdictional statutes applying- to the Supreme Court and the Courts of Civil Appeals should be noted. Under Article 1728, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Ciurt extends to questions of law arising in certain species or types of cases which have been brought to the Courts of Civil Appeals from appealable judgments of trial courts. These species or types of cases are set forth in six numbered paragraphs. Obviously, one invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must show that his case comes within one or more of the classifications set forth in the statute, i.e., that the case involved the construction or validity of statutes necessary to a determination of. the case or that the Court of Civil Appeals has committed an error of substantive law which affects the jurgment in a case where the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals is not made final by statute. This jurisdictional statute is obviously of a different type from our eminent domain statutory provision relating to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil Appeals.
By way of example, in Burgess v. City and County of Dallas Levee Imp. District, Texas Civ. App., 155 S.W. 2d 402, wr. dism. w.o.m., the court held that the question of the extention to which property should be taken for public use was one resting within the discretion of the Legislature; yet the proposition asserting the contrary was simply overruled, although it perhaps could have been said that absent a showing that compensation had not been made, no judicial question was presented and the court was without authority or jurisdiction to decide the issue. This is a common occurrence in lawsuits. Issues are often determined by authorities other than judicial tribunals. These determinations the court must accept, but the fact that one or more of this type of issues occurs in a cause on trial in a court does not destroy the jurisdiction of the appellate court to review the cause.