Court Opinion

ID: 9403827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 19:05:24.526241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:36.481704
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/21/23 Capital Wholesale v. Buehring CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

    CAPITAL WHOLESALE LLC,                                                                     C095879

                    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                          (Super. Ct. No.
                                                                                34202100298533CUDFGDS)
           v.

    AARON BUEHRING,

                    Defendant and Respondent.

         Plaintiff Capital Wholesale LLC sued Aaron Buehring for libel, defamation per se,
and false light based on allegations that he posted negative reviews of Capital Wholesale
online. Buehring responded with a successful anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.1 Capital Wholesale appeals from a
subsequent judgment awarding $23,728 for attorneys’ fees and costs to Buehring.

1  The anti-SLAPP statute “provides for early dismissal of certain actions known as
‘strategic lawsuits against public participation.’ ” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th
82, 85.)

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Capital Wholesale argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to completely
analyze the reasonableness of these fees. We disagree and affirm the attorneys’ fee
award. While we reject Buehring’s request that we sanction Capital Wholesale for filing
a frivolous appeal, he is nonetheless entitled to costs and attorneys’ fees for this
successful appeal.
                                    I. BACKGROUND
       Buehring filed a motion seeking recovery of $37,400 in attorneys’ fees and $228
in costs as the prevailing party pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,
subdivision (c). In support of his motion, Buehring submitted a declaration from one of
his attorneys. In part, the declaration set forth the hours expended by two attorneys, as
well as their billable rates.
       The requested $228 in costs was undisputed. As to the attorneys’ fees, the trial
court found the declaration did “not suffice to establish the reasonableness of the 81.6
hours of attorney time for the anti-SLAPP motion. Indeed, the Court is familiar with
anti-SLAPP motions, and Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was not complex.” The court
further explained, “[t]he issues were straightforward and no hearing was required.” The
court found counsel’s hourly rates were reasonable, but found Buehring was only entitled
to an award for a total 50 hours of attorney time. After multiplying the number of hours
it determined were reasonable for each attorney by each attorney’s hourly rate, the trial
court awarded Buehring $23,500 in attorneys’ fees. The court entered judgment
accordingly, and Capital Wholesale filed a timely appeal from this judgment.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
A.     The Trial Court’s Fee Award
       The prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion “shall be entitled to recover
that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).)
This appeal challenges only the trial court’s determination of reasonable attorneys’ fees.
“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the

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number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM
Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The lodestar figure may then be
adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at
the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid., italics added.) As relevant
to this appeal, in Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122 (Ketchum), our Supreme
Court mentioned four such factors: “the lodestar . . . may be adjusted by the court based
on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of
the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of
the fee award. . . . In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation
involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of
the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.”
(Ketchum, supra, at p. 1132, italics added.)
       “We review a trial court’s fee award using an abuse of discretion standard.”
(Pasternack v. McCullough (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1055.) “The ‘ “experienced
trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and
while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the
appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” ’ ” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 1132.) “Unless an appellant demonstrates otherwise, we assume the trial court
followed the law and acted within its discretion.” (Sonoma Land Trust v. Thompson
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 978, 984.)
       As to the first factor mentioned in Ketchum, the trial court reduced the requested
fees based on its conclusion that Buehring’s anti-SLAPP motion was “not complex” and
“[t]he issues were straightforward.” Capital Wholesale argues the trial court’s analysis
was incomplete because the trial court “did not analyze the other Ketchum factors
including the skill displayed in presenting them, the extent to which the nature of the
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and the contingent nature of the

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fee award.” This assertion is unavailing. A trial court is not required to issue a statement
of decision with specific findings regarding a fee award, and the appellant must
affirmatively demonstrate the court erred. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1140-
1142.) Thus, “we cannot reverse an attorney fee award solely for lack of an explanation
by the trial court. We can reverse only if the record contains some indication that the trial
court considered improper factors or did, indeed, simply snatch its award ‘from thin
air.’ ” (Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino
(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1189-1190.) Here, nothing in the record indicates the trial
court abused its discretion. As to the second factor, the trial court implicitly concluded
the skill displayed in presenting the motion did not require a further adjustment. The trial
court noted it could consider the skill required and the skill employed in handling the
litigation but made no adjustments based on this factor. The record does not suggest any
adjustments were required. The remaining factors mentioned by Capital Wholesale did
not apply. As to the third factor, there was no evidence the nature of the litigation
precluded other employment. As to the fourth factor, the evidence showed Buehring paid
an hourly rate and his lawyers had taken no contingent risk. The record indicates the trial
court considered and properly applied the relevant factors. Therefore, Capital Wholesale
has not demonstrated the court abused its discretion in setting the amount of the award.
We will therefore affirm the award.
B.     Request for Sanctions
       Buehring asks that we impose sanctions on Capital Wholesale for filing a frivolous
appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 907; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276.) Although Capital
Wholesale’s claims lack merit, we decline to find that its appeal is so egregious as to
warrant the imposition of sanctions. (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637,
651 [“[T]he punishment should be used most sparingly to deter only the most egregious
conduct”].) Accordingly, we will not impose sanctions.

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C.     Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal
       Buehring argues he is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs related to this appeal.
We agree. “[A]n award of fees may include not only the fees incurred with respect to the
underlying claim, but also the fees incurred in enforcing the right to mandatory fees
under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1141.)
       “Accordingly, defendants are entitled to, and are awarded, their attorney fees [and
costs] on this appeal in an amount to be determined by the trial court on remand.”
(Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 287.)
                                   III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment granting attorneys’ fees is affirmed. Aaron Beuhring is awarded his
costs and attorneys’ fees on appeal. The matter is remanded to the trial court to
determine the amount thereof.

                                                         /S/

                                                  RENNER, J.

       We concur:

       /S/

       DUARTE, Acting P. J.

       /S/

       HORST, J.*

* Judge of the Placer County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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