Court Opinion

ID: 9755381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:36:18.890605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:06.611119
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge,
Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.
I concur that the trial court erred in admitting the Beretta gun brochure into evidence, but dissent from the conclusion that the evidentiary error, properly preserved for review, was not prejudicial.
When determining legal relevancy, the principal opinion finds that the prejudicial effect of admitting the gun brochure outweighs its probative value. I agree with the majority’s analysis up to this point. Because it does not matter whether the gun used was real, I also concur with the majority with respect to the first degree robbery conviction.
As to the armed criminal action, however, the principal opinion ignores a critical point. The error was preserved by proper objection and where error is preserved, the error is presumed to be prejudicial and the state bears the burden of showing the error to be harmless. State v. Taylor, 739 S.W.2d 220, 223-24 (Mo.App.1987); State v. Miller, 650 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Mo. banc 1983); State v. Rhodes, 988 S.W.2d 521, 529 (Mo. banc 1999); Burton v. State, 641 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Grant, 784 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Mo.App.1990). The standard for the state varies in the case law from showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless,1 to *279presuming prejudice unless the error is “harmless ... without question.”2
Regardless of how the standard is described, the primary method to show harmless error is to show that the result, without the erroneous evidence, would have been the same because evidence of guilt was overwhelming. State v. Ford, 639 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Sykes, 628 S.W.2d 653, 657 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Degraffenreid, 477 S.W.2d 57, 65 (Mo. banc 1972), State v. Rush, 949 S.W.2d 251, 256 (Mo.App.1997); State v. Davidson, 947 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Mo.App.1997). Or, as other cases hold, the presumption of prejudice is rebuttable by facts and circumstances of the particular case. Burton, 641 S.W.2d at 99; Grant, 784 S.W.2d at 834; State v. Walker, 484 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Mo. banc 1972); Ford, 639 S.W.2d. at 575.
Other than the improperly admitted gun brochure, the only evidence that a real gun was used in committing the crime was the testimony of the victim. The victim testified that the gun was of the type where the clip goes into the handle. No gun was ever recovered.
The evidence of the use of a gun was not strong and was far from overwhelming. State v. Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301, 311 (Mo. banc 1996). The admission of the gun brochure, while brief in duration, seems crucial to the state’s case. The state’s purpose was not, contrary to the principal opinion’s assumption, simply to show Anderson’s familiarity with this kind of gun.3 The gun brochure was offered and received in the state’s case, before Anderson testified, and thus was not offered to rebut testimony that he was unfamiliar with that type of gun.
Most tellingly, the state’s brief submitted in this case argues that the evidence helped to prove that Anderson was guilty of first degree robbery and armed criminal action because “the guns depicted in the brochure were similar to the guns the victim described at trial .... ” Moreover, the state argues here that the gun brochure “corroborated the victim’s testimony that both [Anderson] and his step-brother carried guns during the robbery and it impeached [Anderson’s] post-arrest statement that only his stepbrother had a gun
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According to the jury instructions, in order to find Anderson guilty of first degree robbery and armed criminal action, the jury did not need to find that Anderson himself possessed a weapon. The stepbrother’s possession would have been sufficient. The instruction for first degree robbery requires, at a minimum, that Anderson’s stepbrother “displayed or threatened the use of what appeared to be a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” To convict Anderson of robbery the jury did not have to find that the gun used was a real gun. By contrast, the instruction for armed criminal action requires the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.4 It is unclear whether *280the jury decided the issue by concluding that a BB gun is a dangerous instrument or by deciding that Anderson or his stepbrother used a gun of the kind pictured in the brochure.
The brochure is the only corroboration of the state’s understandably weak evidence. It is not at all cumulative and cannot be treated as harmless.5 Without the gun brochure, the evidence supporting armed criminal action is neither strong nor overwhelming.6
The record shows that the reason the state offered the gun brochure is to convict Anderson of armed criminal action and to help convict him of first degree robbery— as opposed to second-degree robbery. The state’s improper evidence appears to have had its intended effect. There is no way to discern the actual reasoning of the jury. In these circumstances, the doubt weighs against the state, which has the burden of overcoming the presumption of prejudice. Anderson’s admission that his stepbrother had a BB gun may eliminate the prejudice as to the armed robbery conviction, but not as to armed criminal action.
The state has not overcome the presumption of prejudice, and I therefore dissent. The trial court’s judgment as to armed criminal action should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

. State v. Taylor, 739 S.W.2d 220 (Mo.App.1987); State v. Miller, 650 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. *279banc 1983).

. State v. Degraffenreid, 477 S.W.2d 57, 64 (Mo. banc.1972).

. The majority opinion cites New Jersey v. Koskovich, a case where a state Supreme Court determined that gun magazines found in the defendants bedroom were admissible to show familiarity with guns. 168 N.J. 448, 776 A.2d 144, 162-63 (2001). In that case the defendant was not denying that he used a gun to commit the felony but was claiming that the gun fired accidentally. The evidence was relevant to show defendant’s shooting of the victim was purposeful and knowing because he was experienced and proficient with weapons. Id. at 163.

."Dangerous instrument means any instrument, article, or substance, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily *280capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.” Jury Instruction No. 10.

. State v. Hanway, 973 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Mo.App.1998).

. See State v. Ford, 639 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Sykes, 628 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Degraffenreid, 477 S.W.2d 57, 65 (Mo. banc 1972), State v. Rush, 949 S.W.2d 251 (Mo.App.1997); State v. Davidson, 947 S.W.2d 87 (Mo.App.1997).