Court Opinion

ID: 9594339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:29:16.812817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:03.688615
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I really do long for the result achieved by the majority but not the damage it does to established legal principles. I therefore respectfully dissent.
The Borsheims first sought to enforce the guarantees given by the defendants. When they failed in that effort, they appealed from the decision denying the validity of the defendants’ waiver of the protection of the anti-deficiency judgment statutes. We affirmed. Then, having at first not succeeded, they tried again. This time, the Borsheims sought rescission of their agreement and reinstatement of the judgment which they had released. Success was theirs! The district court granted summary judgment and rescission of the agreement and reinstated the prior judgment. The majority avoids the conclusion that the district court erred in granting rescission and decides this matter on what it says are different grounds. But the inevitable conclusion is that the summary judgment is sustainable under no ground whatsoever.
Lawyers operate in a milieu filled with contingencies and uncertainties. Because of that occupational hazard, it is ordinary practice to seek alternate and often inconsistent remedies in litigation in order to cover all bases and achieve the best possible result for clients. It is prudent and primary that lawyers take little for granted. While I agree that it may be unreason*599able for the law to expect or require a lawyer to guard against the reversal of established precedent, the same is not true with respect to an open question. The validity of a waiver of the anti-deficiency judgment statute’s protection may have been undecided, as are many issues lawyers deal with, but the liveliness of the question could not have been ignored or underestimated nor the prospect of an answer unfavorable to the Borsheims unanticipated or unguarded against. See First State Bank v. Anderson, 452 N.W.2d 90 (N.D.1990) [deficiency judgments are one of the least favored creatures of law and there is public policy against them]; accord Gust v. Peoples & Enderlin State Bank, 447 N.W.2d 914 (N.D.1989); Dakota Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. Funfar, 443 N.W.2d 289 (N.D.1989).
It seems clear to me that the Borsheims should have requested not only that the trial court enforce the guarantees but also that, if not, it permit rescission for failure of consideration, or, as the majority now holds, to prevent unjust enrichment, assuming that the Borsheims had complied with all of the requirements of rescission, including the offer to restore consideration received. E.g., Alton’s, Inc. v. Long, 352 N.W.2d 198 (N.D.1984); Blair v. Boulger, 358 N.W.2d 522 (N.D.1984). That simple and elementary measure of seeking alternate remedies would have avoided the ensuing morass of splitting claims for relief, creating multiplicity of trial court actions and appeals and perpetuating the agony of endless litigation. See Wolf v. Anderson, 422 N.W.2d 400 (N.D.1988). It also would have obviated the rationalization of the majority to achieve a result that does not easily flow from the application of recognized legal principles.
I would reverse. I, therefore, dissent.