Court Opinion

ID: 9896944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:04:26.36305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:55.471676
License: Public Domain

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  STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CARLTON BUTLER
                (SC 20702)
      Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins and Moll, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, challenging the trial court’s
   decision to grant the state’s motion to open the judgment dismissing
   certain criminal charges, including risk of injury to a child, that had
   been filed against the defendant. The charges stemmed from an incident
   in which the defendant allegedly had inappropriate contact with a twelve
   year old child. After the charges were filed, the defendant applied for
   and was granted admission to a statutory (§ 54-56l) two year, supervised
   diversionary program for individuals with psychiatric disabilities, which
   would lead to dismissal of the charges following his successful comple-
   tion thereof. As a condition to being admitted to the program, the defen-
   dant agreed that he would have no contact with minors, including in a
   volunteer or work capacity, and that he would not be present at any
   locations frequented by minors. Thereafter, the trial court received a
   report noting that the defendant had successfully completed the pro-
   gram, and it held a hearing to address the possible dismissal of the
   charges under § 54-56l (i). At that hearing, the prosecutor argued that
   the court should not grant a dismissal in light of a final progress report,
   issued by the Court Support Services Division, that indicated that the
   defendant had not satisfactorily completed the program, and in light of
   a letter from the defendant’s probation officer that indicated that he
   received information from an anonymous source that the defendant had
   recently volunteered for an excursion sponsored by a local YMCA that
   involved minors. That letter also indicated that the defendant was not
   allowed to enter two local YMCAs due to certain undisclosed incidents
   and that he had unsuccessfully applied for employment positions as a
   camp counselor at a third local YMCA while he was participating in the
   program. That letter further indicated that the defendant had failed to
   report to his probation officer for a scheduled appointment. In response,
   defense counsel argued that, although the defendant did not appear for
   his most recent probation appointment, the allegations contained in the
   letter regarding volunteering at a YMCA and submitting YMCA employ-
   ment applications had not been substantiated. Defense counsel also
   represented to the court that the defendant’s father had informed him
   that the defendant, who did not have a license to operate a motor vehicle,
   relied on his father to drive him everywhere, that the defendant did not
   participate in a YMCA excursion as a volunteer, and that he had never
   driven the defendant to a YMCA to apply for employment. The trial
   court ultimately dismissed the charges against the defendant. The follow-
   ing day, the state filed its motion to open, claiming that it obtained new
   information and evidence demonstrating that the defendant had not
   successfully completed the diversionary program, including footage of
   the defendant working at a summer camp, and that the trial court, in
   dismissing the case, relied on representations made by defense counsel
   that had proven to be false. During the hearing on the motion, defense
   counsel stressed the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the case following
   a dismissal under § 54-56l (i). The trial court granted the state’s motion,
   concluding that it had erroneously dismissed the charges because its
   dismissal was based on false information. On appeal, the Appellate Court
   reversed the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to open, concluding
   that the trial court improperly had granted the motion insofar as the
   trial court lost jurisdiction when it rendered its judgment of dismissal.
   The Appellate Court also concluded that it did not need to decide
   whether the civil rule that a trial court has intrinsic power to open a
   judgment obtained by fraud applies in the criminal context because,
   even if it did, the record did not support a finding that fraud was
   perpetrated on the trial court. On the granting of certification, the state
   appealed to this court. Held:

1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had lost
    jurisdiction when it dismissed the defendant’s criminal charges and was
    therefore without jurisdiction to rule on the state’s motion to open the
    judgment of dismissal:

   This court determined, after reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs,
   and after considering oral argument, that the Appellate Court’s reasoning
   and analysis were sound, and agreed with the Appellate Court’s conclu-
   sion that the trial court was divested of jurisdiction when it rendered a
   final and unconditional judgment of dismissal.

   This court clarified that the statutory (§ 52-212a) ‘‘four month rule,’’
   which permits a trial court to retain jurisdiction over a civil judgment
   for a period of four months after the notice of judgment has been sent
   and to open that judgment during that four month period, is inapplicable
   in criminal cases.

   This clarification was based on this court’s consideration of legislation
   passed in 1977, which served to modify a trial court’s common-law
   authority to revise its judgments, the fact that § 52-212a pertains to ‘‘civil’’
   judgments and the fact that the legislature had not enacted any similar
   provision authorizing a trial court to retain jurisdiction over a criminal
   judgment for a designated period of time following its rendering, and
   on this court’s recognition that, in State v. McCoy (331 Conn. 561), it
   had determined that the common-law rule that a trial court’s jurisdiction
   is lost upon the execution of a defendant’s sentence remained viable law.

   Moreover, this court concluded that State v. Wilson (199 Conn. 417), in
   which the court held that the four month rule of § 52-212a applied to
   criminal judgments, was wrongly decided, and that particular holding
   in Wilson was overruled.

   In concluding that the trial court’s judgment dismissing the defendant’s
   criminal charges served to divest that court of jurisdiction to decide the
   state’s motion to open, this court reasoned that a trial court’s authority
   over a criminal case derives from the presentment of an information,
   that § 54-56l (i) ensures that a defendant’s pending criminal charges will
   be dismissed upon his or her successful completion of the diversionary
   program authorized by § 54-56l, and that, when an information, which
   contains the charges and establishes the trial court’s jurisdiction, is
   dismissed, the court’s jurisdiction is extinguished because there exists
   no valid charging document to confer jurisdiction.

   Furthermore, this court observed that other jurisdictions have similarly
   concluded that a trial court is divested of jurisdiction and authority upon
   the dismissal of all criminal charges.

2. This court did not need to decide whether the civil rule permitting a trial
    court to open a judgment obtained by fraud applies in the criminal
    context insofar as the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the
    record in the present case did not support a finding of fraud or intentional
    misrepresentation.
                    (One justice concurring separately)
       Argued February 23—officially released September 19, 2023

                              Procedural History

  Information charging the defendant with the crimes
of risk of injury to a child and breach of the peace in
the second degree, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, geographical
area number five, where the court, Brown, J., granted
the defendant’s application to participate in a statutorily
authorized diversionary program; thereafter, the court,
McShane, J., rendered judgment dismissing the infor-
mation; subsequently, the court, McShane, J., granted
the state’s motion to open the judgment of dismissal,
and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court,
Prescott and Alexander, Js., with Bishop, J., dissenting,
which reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded
the case with direction to dismiss the state’s motion to
open, and the state, on the granting of certification,
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
   Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Margaret E. Kelley, state’s
attorney, Rebecca A. Barry, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, and Mary A. SanAngelo, senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellant (state).
  Emily H. Wagner, assistant public defender, for the
appellee (defendant).
                         Opinion

   McDONALD, J. This certified appeal requires us to
decide, as a matter of first impression, whether a crimi-
nal court has inherent common-law jurisdiction to open
a judgment of dismissal following the defendant’s com-
pletion of a supervised diversionary program within
four months of the date it was rendered. We are also
asked to decide whether the trial court has the authority
to open the same judgment of dismissal if that judgment
was the result of purported misrepresentations to the
court. We conclude that criminal courts do not have
jurisdiction to open a judgment following a dismissal.
We also decline to reach the second certified question
because the trial court made no findings of misrepresen-
tations in the present case.
   The defendant, Carlton Butler, was arrested in 2017
on charges of risk of injury to a child and breach of
the peace in the second degree. The charges arose from
an incident at a McDonald’s restaurant in Derby involv-
ing inappropriate conduct between the defendant and
a twelve year old child. In August, 2017, the defendant
filed an application to participate in a supervised diver-
sionary program for individuals with psychiatric disabil-
ities. The trial court canvassed the defendant on the
conditions imposed on him while participating in the
diversionary program, which included that he have no
contact with minors, including in a volunteer or work
capacity, and that he not go to any areas frequented by
minors. The defendant indicated that he was willing to
abide by all of the conditions. The court subsequently
granted the application.
   In the early stages of the two year supervised diver-
sionary program, the defendant struggled with the pro-
gram’s mental health and counseling requirements,
which became the subject of several court hearings.
Due to the defendant’s failure to regularly attend the
court-mandated counseling sessions, the defendant was
enrolled in an alternative program with the Sterling
Center, which the trial court described as more rigorous
than the initially designated program. In June, 2019, the
court indicated that it received a report noting that the
defendant successfully completed his sessions at the
Sterling Center. The court congratulated the defendant
on his success and the ‘‘great letter’’ it received, and
continued the case to October 2, 2019, for possible
dismissal under General Statutes § 54-56l (i), which pro-
vides for the dismissal of pending charges following
the successful completion of a pretrial supervised diver-
sionary program.
   On September 25, 2019, the Judicial Branch Court
Support Services Division issued a final progress report,
which indicated that the defendant had not satisfactorily
completed the assigned diversionary program. Attached
to the report was a letter from the defendant’s probation
officer. The attached letter stated that the probation
officer received information from an anonymous source
that, in August, 2019, the defendant volunteered for a
YMCA trip involving minors. The letter indicated that
the Office of Adult Probation was unable to verify the
accuracy of the information provided by the anonymous
source. The letter further indicated that the probation
officer found that the defendant was not allowed to
enter the Waterbury and Torrington YMCAs due to ‘‘sep-
arate, undisclosed incidents’’ and that the Plainville
YMCA director informed the officer that the defendant
‘‘unsuccessfully applied for three separate employment
positions as a ‘camp counselor’ on [March 15, 2019].’’
Lastly, the letter noted that the defendant failed to
report to his probation officer on September 18, 2019.
There was nothing appended to the letter to substanti-
ate these allegations.
   From September 25, 2019, until the defendant’s Octo-
ber 2, 2019 hearing, the Office of Adult Probation did
not provide any further support or details regarding the
information in the letter. On October 2, 2019, the trial
court held a hearing to determine whether it would
dismiss the charges against the defendant. The prosecu-
tor argued that the court should not grant a dismissal
because of the statements and allegations contained in
the September 25 letter attached to the final progress
report. In response, defense counsel argued that the
allegations contained in the letter regarding volunteer-
ing at a local YMCA and submitting YMCA job applica-
tions had not been substantiated.
  Defense counsel also argued that ‘‘[the defendant]
does not [have] a driver’s license. He does not own a
car. His father drives him everywhere. His father is
present here in the courtroom and is willing to come
up and talk to Your Honor. Your Honor, I talked to [the
defendant’s] father, who stated that [the defendant] has
never gone on a YMCA trip as a volunteer. He’s also
indicated to me that he’s never—they live in Waterbury.
He’s also indicated to me that he’s never driven [the
defendant] to the Plainville YMCA to apply for a job.
  ‘‘Secondly, Your Honor, the reason why [the defen-
dant] is not allowed at the YMCAs is because, prior to
this case—prior to the supervised diversionary program
being granted, he was going to the YMCA. While the
case was pending, he was going to the YMCA. At that
point, someone notified the YMCA of his arrest. They
told him he was no longer allowed back. So, I found it
concerning . . . that some of this information [in the
September 25, 2019 letter] is very dated. Okay? And,
secondly, based on his father’s own representation to
me, false.
   ‘‘It’s true, [the defendant] will admit that he did not
go to his last probation meeting on September [18,
2019]. [The defendant] forgot about it. After two years,
it’s the one and only one he’s ever missed. [The defen-
dant] is attending Goodwin College; however, I know
[the defendant] likes to tell people he’s living in East
Hartford, but, after speaking with his father, he still
lives at home with his father. His father drives him to
Goodwin College. I know, in chambers, Your Honor, I
had indicated that [the defendant] did apply for an adult
counselor position, but that was through Easterseals;
that was not through the YMCA. So, we don’t even know
if this YMCA application is [the defendant] himself. [The
defendant’s] father would probably tell Your Honor,
because he’s told me, that he’s never driven [the defen-
dant] to the Plainville YMCA. To [the father’s] knowl-
edge, [the defendant] has never applied to . . . the
YMCA for anything. He’s never, to his knowledge, ever
went on a trip with minors. [The defendant’s] only mode
of transportation is through his father. He’s never taken
his father’s car without permission. [The defendant]
doesn’t own a car. He doesn’t have a driver’s license.
. . . Your Honor, so, essentially, the only thing that is
a fact and is true is that [the defendant] missed his last
probation meeting on [September 18, 2019]; however,
the probation officer left a card for [the defendant] to
go on [October 1, 2019]. . . .
   ‘‘I think, up to [this] point, Your Honor, [the defen-
dant] has fulfilled everything on the supervised diver-
sionary program. He paid for the Sterling Center out
of pocket. He’s on disability. It was a financial hardship
for him and his father. The allegations of [his] going to
the YMCA during the pendency of [his] being [in] the
supervised diversionary program is unfounded . . .
and refuted by the only person he can get a ride from.
For those reasons, Your Honor, I think [the defendant]
should have a successful dismissal on this program.’’
   After hearing arguments from both parties, the trial
court proceeded to articulate its ruling dismissing the
charges against the defendant: ‘‘[W]hat the court has
before it is an individual who missed his last appoint-
ment, and the fact that this case has been pending since
[June, 2017], with no arrests certainly speaks in the
defendant’s behalf. I certainly understand the state’s
concern with [regard] to the defendant working as a
camp counselor, but I am concerned [with] the fact that
this was an anonymous tip that was not looked into by
the Office of Adult Probation, other than just to receive
it without making phone calls. It doesn’t appear as
though any of it is, in fact, true. The defendant had
numerous appointments during the way, he had his
bumps along the way and ended up making those. You
know, it’s something that he applied for back on [Octo-
ber 2, 2017], with the understanding that, if he did what
he was supposed to do, [the case] would be dismissed.
He did what he was supposed to do. The case is there-
fore dismissed.’’
  The next day, the state filed a motion to open the
judgment of dismissal, claiming that information had
come to the state’s attention following the judgment of
dismissal that demonstrated that the defendant did not
successfully complete the supervised diversionary pro-
gram. It argued that the trial court relied on representa-
tions made by defense counsel that had proven to be
false. The state also asserted that there was footage of
the defendant working at a summer camp in Massachu-
setts that was taken during the summer of 2019. The
state indicated that the Office of Adult Probation would
provide a more detailed report as to the noncompliance.
As to the trial court’s authority to open the case, the
state argued that the court had jurisdiction under State
v. Johnson, 301 Conn. 630, 643, 26 A.3d 59 (2011), Tyson
v. Commissioner of Correction, 155 Conn. App. 96, 105,
109 A.3d 510, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 931, 110 A.3d 432
(2015), and State v. O’Bright, 13 Conn. App. 732, 733,
539 A.2d 161 (1988).1
   The defendant objected to the motion, arguing that
the cases relied on by the state were not pertinent to
the trial court’s consideration of whether it could open
the dismissal of the criminal charges. He also argued
that granting the motion to open would be against public
policy and would set a dangerous precedent that is
particularly troublesome under these circumstances
because a defendant who is enrolled in a diversionary
program must agree to the tolling of the statute of
limitations with respect to his underlying crimes in
order to participate. Therefore, the defendant argued,
granting the motion to open would endanger all current
and past defendants who used a diversionary program
and whose crimes are within the statute of limitations.
   The trial court held a hearing on the state’s motion
to open on October 15, 2019, at which the court entered
as court exhibits (1) an ‘‘addendum’’ to the September
25, 2019 letter,2 and (2) a five page report from the
defendant’s probation officer dated October 4, 2019,
which detailed the officer’s supervision of the defendant
during the diversionary program and noted the officer’s
concern that the defendant ‘‘continues to seek contact
with minors and actively engages in deceptive behavior
to conceal such contact.’’ The letter further stated that,
‘‘[u]nfortunately, this officer was unable to communi-
cate this information to the [c]ourt prior to the dismissal
of the [s]upervised [d]iversionary [p]rogram due to the
[time frame] of the information being confirmed.’’
   At the hearing, the trial court noted that it ‘‘based its
decision to dismiss this [case] on information that was
incorrect, was totally contradictory . . . and I would
assert . . . that I did it under false pretenses. I dis-
missed this under false pretenses that the defendant
was in compliance when . . . not only was he not in
compliance, he couldn’t have been any further away
from compliance.’’ It also indicated to defense counsel
that it was ‘‘a little angered’’ by the representations
made to the court but that it did not fault counsel
because counsel ‘‘went with the information [he] had
. . . at the time’’ and that the information later proved
to be inaccurate.
   Both parties then presented argument on the issue
of opening the judgment. The prosecutor focused her
argument on the ‘‘material misrepresentation[s]’’ made
to the trial court that concerned the specific conditions
of the defendant’s program compliance. Defense coun-
sel’s argument in objection stressed the lack of the
court’s jurisdiction over the case following a dismissal
under § 54-56l (i). Defense counsel also argued that he
represented to the court only the information he knew
and that the allegations he refuted were a YMCA trip
and applying to the Plainville YMCA and that those
allegations were never substantiated. Lastly, defense
counsel reiterated how harmful this precedent would
be to other defendants who engage in diversionary pro-
grams and that this situation is ‘‘bigger than [the defen-
dant]’’ and ‘‘endangers any and all participants in [a
diversionary program].’’
   The trial court proceeded to grant the state’s motion
to open the judgment of dismissal, noting that the dis-
missal was ‘‘erroneous’’ and stating on the record: ‘‘I
don’t know a lot about subject matter jurisdiction. I
know I looked at the cases that the state has provided
[the court] with, and none of them seem[s] to be quite
on point. But I also know what the right thing to do is.
And the right thing to do in this particular case is to
[open] this case and have the defendant . . . face the
charges. I say that because this dismissal was granted
[on] erroneous grounds. The dismissal was false, with
false information. And, counsel, nobody has put any
[aspersions on] you . . . and I’m not going to ask for—
elicit a response, but it is wrong. It is wrong [that] the
defendant received a dismissal. Just as if it was a clerical
error, I will say this was an error, in that I had none of
this information before me.’’ The court did not make
any express finding that the state had established, by
clear and convincing evidence, intentional misrepresen-
tations by defense counsel to the court.
  The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from
the trial court’s decision to open the judgment, claiming
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to open and set
aside the unconditional dismissal of his charges follow-
ing his completion of the supervised diversionary pro-
gram and that, in doing so, it deprived him of liberty
and finality of judgment interests. See State v. Butler,
209 Conn. App. 63, 79, 267 A.3d 256 (2021). The state
argued in response that the trial court possessed subject
matter jurisdiction to open a case following a dismissal.
Id. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant and
concluded that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the
matter when it rendered the judgment of dismissal. Id.,
79–80. Therefore, the Appellate Court concluded that
the trial court improperly granted the state’s motion to
open. Id., 80.
   The Appellate Court began its analysis by reviewing
the original common-law rules regarding jurisdiction,
under which ‘‘a trial court possesses the inherent power
to modify its own judgments during the term at which
they were rendered’’; (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) id., 81; and that ‘‘a trial court has the discretionary
power to modify or vacate a criminal judgment before
the sentence has been executed.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 83. Additionally,
it noted that ‘‘[n]o statutory provisions exist . . . that
expand the existing common-law jurisdiction of our
criminal courts or expressly permit a court to reinstate
criminal charges after it has dismissed them.’’ Id.
   The Appellate Court surveyed a line of cases from
this court dealing with the ‘‘four month rule’’ set forth
in General Statutes § 52-212a,3 which permits a trial
court to retain jurisdiction over a civil judgment for a
period of four months after the notice of the judgment
was sent. Id., 84–94. The Appellate Court acknowledged
this court’s decision in State v. Wilson, 199 Conn. 417,
513 A.2d 620 (1986), in which this court concluded that
the four month rule applied to criminal matters, as well
as civil. See State v. Butler, supra, 209 Conn. App. 89–90;
see also State v. Wilson, supra, 437. It also reviewed
our subsequent decision in State v. Myers, 242 Conn.
125, 698 A.2d 823 (1997), in which this court cited Wil-
son as support for its observation that a criminal trial
court retained jurisdiction to entertain a motion for a
new trial, even after sentencing. See State v. Butler,
supra, 90; see also State v. Myers, supra, 136 and n.16.
The Appellate Court then explained that a more recent
decision by this court, State v. McCoy, 331 Conn. 561,
206 A.3d 725 (2019), ‘‘fully abrogated in the context of
final criminal judgments any application of the four
month rule, which applies only in civil matters.’’ State
v. Butler, supra, 94; see State v. McCoy, supra, 586–87.
Thus, the Appellate Court concluded that, ‘‘once the
criminal court rendered a final judgment dismissing all
charges in the present case, it lost jurisdiction over the
matter and could not properly entertain, let alone grant,
a motion to open and restore the matter to the criminal
docket.’’ State v. Butler, supra, 103–104.
  The Appellate Court also considered whether a crimi-
nal court has inherent jurisdiction to modify a judgment
obtained by fraud. The court acknowledged the existing
civil rule that a trial court has intrinsic power to open
a judgment obtained by fraud. Id., 94; see also, e.g.,
Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212, 218, 595 A.2d
1377 (1991). It concluded, however, that ‘‘[i]t [was]
unnecessary to decide at this juncture . . . whether
this particular civil rule applies equally in the criminal
context because, even [if it assumed], without deciding,
that it does, [it was] unconvinced that the record in the
present case would support a finding that a fraud, as
opposed to a negligent misrepresentation, was perpe-
trated on the [trial] court.’’4 (Footnote omitted.) State
v. Butler, supra, 209 Conn. App. 94–95. The Appellate
Court noted that, although the trial court likened its
decision to dismiss the case to a ‘‘clerical error,’’ it
cannot be properly classified as one. Id., 104. ‘‘The [trial]
court made a reasoned determination on the facts pre-
sented that, contrary to the opinion of the Court Support
Services Division and the state, the defendant had com-
pleted satisfactorily the diversionary program. It did so
on the basis of the evidence before it and the arguments
presented by the parties, including the representations
made by defense counsel that went unchallenged
despite later proving to be, at least in part, untrue. . . .
The fact that the state later came into possession of
better or more convincing evidence that, if presented
to the [trial] court at the October 2, 2019 hearing, likely
would have changed the court’s calculus and, therefore,
its decision did not confer power on the court to enter-
tain a motion to open the judgment of dismissal.’’ Id.,
104–105.
   Lastly, the Appellate Court noted the policy consider-
ations served by its conclusion, including the ‘‘signifi-
cant liberty and finality of judgment interests’’ that
attach by virtue of the trial court’s granting of an uncon-
ditional judgment of dismissal and the fact that the
defendant, in agreeing to participate in the supervised
diversionary program, ‘‘gave up his right to defend
against the allegation leveled by the state and agreed
to be subject to numerous conditions in excess of those
imposed by the [trial] court as conditions of his release.’’
Id., 102. The Appellate Court acknowledged the state’s
‘‘valid and weighty interest in convicting the guilty’’;
(internal quotation marks omitted) id., 103; but also
emphasized that ‘‘the unique situation that the [trial]
court found itself in . . . was largely the result of the
state’s handling of the initial October 2, 2019 hearing.
. . . [T]he state, in opposing the dismissal of the defen-
dant’s charges, chose to rely solely on the negative final
report and the letter appended thereto, which contained
only unsubstantiated allegations of potential contacts
with minors and one admitted failure to report as the
sole basis to support the contention that the defendant
unsatisfactorily completed the diversionary program.
The state did not provide affidavits from the various
YMCA employees who had provided information to the
probation officer. It did not obtain or submit copies of
the employment applications allegedly executed by the
defendant or other corroborating evidence. It did not
request the opportunity to question under oath the wit-
ness . . . on [whom] defense counsel [relied] in his
argument and who was present in the courtroom during
the October 2, 2019 hearing. Moreover, the state has not
lost its ability to prosecute the defendant with respect
to any actions that he took while participating in the
program that may constitute violations of his terms of
release or new crimes.’’ Id.
   The dissenting Appellate Court judge disagreed with
the majority’s characterization of the state of the law
following McCoy and concluded that Wilson was, at
least in part, still applicable law. See id., 110–11 (Bishop,
J., dissenting). In concluding that, when ‘‘no sentence
has been imposed, a criminal court’s jurisdiction to
modify its judgment ends after a period of four months
following judgment,’’ the dissent implied that the trial
court retained jurisdiction to modify its judgment not-
withstanding the dismissal. Id., 110 (Bishop, J., dis-
senting). Furthermore, although it agreed with the
majority’s conclusion that the trial court made no
explicit findings of fraud, it characterized the court’s
comments as a reflection of the court’s belief that it
was ‘‘grossly misled’’; id., 114 (Bishop, J., dissenting);
and ‘‘induced into an erroneous decision . . . .’’ Id.,
115 (Bishop, J., dissenting).
   The state filed a petition for certification to appeal
to this court, which we granted, limited to the following
issues: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude
that the trial court lacked inherent common-law author-
ity to modify its judgment of dismissal within four
months of the date on which it was rendered?’’ And (2)
‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court properly reverse the trial
court’s decision to open its judgment despite the fact
that the judgment of dismissal was predicated on a
material misrepresentation made to the trial court?’’
State v. Butler, 343 Conn. 904, 272 A.3d 1126 (2022).
   After reviewing the parties’ briefs, the record, and the
oral argument, we conclude that the Appellate Court’s
reasoning and analysis were sound and its conclusion
was correct on both issues. Specifically, we conclude
that the trial court lost jurisdiction upon rendering a
final and unconditional judgment of dismissal; there-
fore, it lacked jurisdiction to entertain or grant the
state’s motion to open. Second, we agree that the record
does not support any finding by the trial court of inten-
tional or material misrepresentations; accordingly, we
need not address the question of whether intentional
misrepresentations provided the court with a basis to
claim jurisdiction to open its judgment of dismissal.
Nevertheless, we clarify two points in support of the
Appellate Court’s conclusion that the trial court lost
jurisdiction upon rendering its judgment of dismissal.
First, we make explicit what we implied in State v.
McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 561, that the four month rule
permitted by statute in the context of civil cases is
inapplicable to criminal cases. See id., 574–75, 580–87.
Second, we explain that the unconditional dismissal of
all charges is a final disposition of the case that deprives
the trial court of any further jurisdiction over the matter.
   We begin by addressing the ‘‘four month rule’’ and
its purported applicability to criminal cases. As the
Appellate Court extensively discussed, our trial courts
are courts of general jurisdiction. See State v. Butler,
supra, 209 Conn. App. 81; see also, e.g., State v. Ramos,
306 Conn. 125, 133, 49 A.3d 197 (2012). ‘‘In the absence
of statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of
[their] jurisdiction are delineated by the common law.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos,
supra, 133–34. At common law, the Superior Court sat
in sessions; see General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 51-181;
and possessed inherent power to modify its judgments
during the term during which they were rendered.5
‘‘During the continuance of a term of court the judge
holding it ha[d], in a sense, absolute control over judg-
ments rendered; that is, he [could] declare and subse-
quently modify or annul them.’’ Sturdevant v. Stanton,
47 Conn. 579, 580 (1880). The common law has long
recognized that, ‘‘during the term [in which] any judicial
act is done, the record remaineth in the breast of the
judges of the court, and in their remembrance, and
therefore the roll is alterable during that term . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commonwealth v.
Weymouth, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 144, 145 (1861). ‘‘The
authority thus exercised is probably founded on the
practice by which the record is not finally made up
until the end of the term or session of the court, when
‘the roll,’ as it is called, is signed and returned.6 Until
then, it remains in the control of the court, and no entry
therein is deemed to be final, or beyond the power of
the court to amend or alter it, either for error or other
sufficient cause.’’ (Footnote added.) Id. Additionally, in
the criminal context, a trial court was also divested of
jurisdiction upon any action in execution of a defen-
dant’s sentence. See, e.g., State v. Pallotti, 119 Conn.
70, 74, 174 A. 74 (1934). ‘‘This is so because the court
loses jurisdiction over the case when the defendant is
committed to the custody of the [C]ommissioner of
[C]orrection and begins serving the sentence.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. McCoy, supra, 331
Conn. 581–82.
   The legislature modified the structure of our court
system in 1977 when it revised General Statutes (Rev.
to 1977) § 51-181 to remove any reference to the ‘‘ses-
sions’’ of court and, rather, provided in relevant part
that the Superior Court ‘‘shall sit continuously through-
out the year, at such times and places and for such
duration of time as is fixed and determined by the chief
court administrator . . . .’’ Public Acts 1977, No. 77-
576, § 27. In amending the statute to remove any refer-
ence to sessions or terms of the court, the legislature
rendered the previous rule regarding continuing juris-
diction during the term inoperable. We recognized this
change in State v. Luzietti, 230 Conn. 427, 646 A.2d 85
(1994), in which we noted that the rule ‘‘no longer has
vitality in this state.’’ Id., 432 n.6. This modification did
not, however, impact the existing common-law rule that
‘‘a trial court has the discretionary power to modify or
vacate a criminal judgment before the sentence has
been executed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 581.
   Since the revision to General Statutes (Rev. to 1977)
§ 51-181, the legislature has granted continuing jurisdic-
tion to the Superior Court in particular circumstances.
For example, the legislature has authorized the court
to modify the terms of probation, even after a sentence
is imposed; see General Statutes §§ 53a-29 (c), 53a-30
(c) and 53a-32 (d); and to hear a petition for a new trial
filed following sentencing. See General Statutes § 52-
270 (a). Significantly, the legislature enacted § 52-212a,
which provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[u]nless otherwise
provided by law and except in such cases in which the
court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or
decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be
opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside
is filed within four months following the date on which
the notice of judgment or decree was sent. . . .’’7
(Emphasis added.) The legislature has not, however,
enacted any similar statutory provisions permitting a
trial court to retain general jurisdiction over criminal
judgments for a designated period of time following a
final disposition.
   We recognize that, notwithstanding the legislature’s
action in the civil context, this court, in State v. Wilson,
supra, 199 Conn. 417, concluded that the four month
rule in § 52-212a extended to criminal judgments. See
id., 437. Specifically, this court, without any analysis,
concluded: ‘‘We see no reason to distinguish between
civil and criminal judgments in this respect, and we
therefore hold that, for purposes of the [common-law]
rule, a criminal judgment may not be modified in mat-
ters of substance beyond a period of four months after
the judgment has become final.’’ Id. This court, how-
ever, did not ultimately utilize the four month rule to
confer jurisdiction on the Superior Court in that case.
See id., 438.
  Following Wilson, this court, in State v. McCoy, supra,
331 Conn. 561, clarified that Wilson cannot be read as
expanding the jurisdiction of the trial courts, and any
reliance on the decision for that purpose is misplaced.
See id., 581–82, 586–87. We explained that the common-
law rule that jurisdiction is lost upon execution of the
defendant’s sentence remains viable and controlling,
and we overruled Wilson8 to the extent that it reached a
conclusion that was inconsistent with that proposition.9
Id., 586–87.
   Although McCoy did not address the general applica-
bility of the four month rule in criminal cases prior to
the execution of a sentence, we take the opportunity
to do so now. Our review of the common law and
subsequent statutory provisions leads us to conclude
that Wilson was wrongly decided, and we overrule it
to the extent that it concluded that the four month rule
applies in the criminal context. The court in Wilson
failed to consider the differences between the civil and
criminal contexts. Moreover, its conclusion that there
was ‘‘no reason’’ not to apply the civil rule to the crimi-
nal context is analytically backward. State v. Wilson,
supra, 199 Conn. 437. The proper inquiry is whether
there was specific statutory authority to apply the civil
rule in the criminal context, not whether there was a
prohibition to extending it beyond what was legisla-
tively authorized. The conclusion in Wilson usurped the
proper role of the legislature and ignored the limitations
that it inserted in § 52-212a, which applied the four
month rule only in the civil context. We agree with the
Appellate Court in the present case that ‘‘the court in
Wilson provided absolutely no rationale for extending
the four month rule to criminal judgments . . . .’’ State
v. Butler, supra, 209 Conn. App. 94.
   As the Appellate Court stated, ‘‘the four month time
period is not itself a creature of the common law;
indeed, no such rule existed. Rather, it is the result of
legislation and court rule, both of which expressly limit
its application to a ‘civil judgment or decree . . . .’ ’’
Id., 93–94. Neither of those enactments contemplates
application in the criminal context. It is well established
that ‘‘[w]e are not permitted to supply statutory lan-
guage that the legislature may have chosen to omit.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public
Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations, 296 Conn.
594, 605, 996 A.2d 729 (2010). Therefore, it is not appro-
priately within our purview to infer jurisdiction when
no statutory provision exists to grant it.
  Having concluded that the four month rule does not
apply in the criminal context and that a trial court loses
jurisdiction over a criminal matter once a sentence has
been executed, the question that remains is whether
the dismissal of criminal charges also divests the trial
court of jurisdiction. We agree with the Appellate
Court’s conclusion that the dismissal in the present
case was a complete and final resolution of all pending
charges, and, therefore, the trial court lost jurisdiction
following that action. See State v. Butler, supra, 209
Conn. App. 80–81, 103–104. We find it useful, however,
to expand on the Appellate Court’s rationale.
   There is no case law or statutory authority directly
addressing the effect of a complete dismissal of criminal
charges on a trial court’s jurisdiction. Existing authority
in the criminal context generally, however, is instructive
on this question. It is well established that the authority
of the Superior Court over criminal cases derives from
the presentment of an information, which is ‘‘essential
to initiate a criminal proceeding.’’ Reed v. Reincke, 155
Conn. 591, 598, 236 A.2d 909 (1967). Here, to resolve
the charges against him, the defendant applied for and
was accepted into a pretrial supervised diversionary
program for persons with psychiatric disabilities. Upon
the successful completion of the program and applica-
tion for dismissal, § 54-56l (i) promises dismissal of
the charges. Furthermore, the statute also provides for
erasure of any record of the charges under General
Statutes § 54-142a upon successful completion of the
program. General Statutes § 54-56l (i). When the infor-
mation, which contains the charges and establishes the
jurisdiction of the trial court, is dismissed, the court’s
jurisdiction is extinguished because there is then no
valid charging document pending before the court to
confer jurisdiction on it.
    One example illustrating this principle is the trial
court’s loss of jurisdiction upon entry of a nolle prose-
qui. ‘‘The effect of a nolle is to terminate the particular
prosecution of the defendant without an acquittal and
without placing him in jeopardy. . . . Therefore, the
nolle places the criminal matter in the same position
it held prior to the filing of the information. Indeed,
no criminal matter exists until, and if, the prosecution
issues a new information against the defendant. As our
rules explain, [t]he entry of a nolle prosequi terminates
the prosecution and the defendant shall be released
from custody. If subsequently the prosecuting authority
decides to proceed against the defendant, a new prose-
cution must be initiated. . . . The defendant is accused
of no crime, is released from custody unconditionally
and is no longer under the authority of the [trial] court.
It follows that, generally, a court does not have jurisdic-
tion over the case after the entry of a nolle. . . .
Although this court has recognized a narrow exception
to this general rule, that exception is not applicable
in [this] case.’’10 (Citations omitted; emphasis added;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Richardson, 291 Conn. 426, 430, 969 A.2d 166
(2009). The dismissal following completion of a diver-
sionary program similarly places the case in a state in
which ‘‘no criminal matter exists . . . .’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Id. Therefore, without pending
charges, the trial court does not possess jurisdiction
over the case.
   Other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that a
trial court is divested of jurisdiction and authority upon
the dismissal of all criminal charges. For example, the
Appellate Court highlighted Smith v. Superior Court,
115 Cal. App. 3d 285, 171 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1981), in which
the California Court of Appeal concluded that, ‘‘at least
[when] no actual fraud has been perpetrated [on] the
court, a criminal court has no authority to vacate a
dismissal entered deliberately but [on] an erroneous
factual basis.’’ Id., 287; see also State v. Butler, supra,
209 Conn. App. 99. Similarly, the Washington Court
of Appeals has concluded that ‘‘[a] criminal action is
commenced by the filing of an indictment or informa-
tion. . . . Thus, a [trial] court acquires subject matter
jurisdiction over a criminal action only at such time as
an indictment or information is filed . . . [and] loses
subject matter jurisdiction when the indictment or infor-
mation is dismissed.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Cor-
rado, 78 Wn. App. 612, 615, 898 P.2d 860 (1995). The
Missouri Court of Appeals has also concluded that,
‘‘[o]nce a nolle prosequi has been entered, the trial court
loses jurisdiction to proceed with the case.’’ Kilgore v.
State, 70 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Mo. App. 2002). Lastly, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained: ‘‘It is
well settled that when a trial court empowered with
jurisdiction over a criminal case sustains a motion to
dismiss the indictment or information, the person
accused thereunder is, in law, discharged from the accu-
sation against him; there is, concomitant to such dis-
missal, no case pending against the accused and,
accordingly, no jurisdiction remaining in the dismissing
court.’’ State ex rel. Holmes v. Denson, 671 S.W.2d 896,
898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
                             CONCLUSION
   The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial
court lost jurisdiction when it dismissed the defendant’s
pending charges and, therefore, was without jurisdic-
tion to entertain the state’s motion to open the judgment
and reinstate the charges. We also agree with the Appel-
late Court’s conclusion that we need not decide whether
the civil rule permitting a trial court to open a judgment
obtained by fraud applies in the criminal context because
the record before us does not support a finding of fraud
or intentional misrepresentation.
      The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
 In this opinion ROBINSON, C. J., and MULLINS and
MOLL, Js., concurred.
  1
     Although the state cited these cases in its initial motion to open, it did
not reference these cases on appeal to this court. The trial court noted in
its oral ruling that none of the cases was on point. The Appellate Court further
concluded that ‘‘the record contains no argument by the state regarding
how these cases are instructive, and, without the benefit of such input, we
are left to agree with the assessment of the trial court and the defendant
that these cases are inapposite to the issue before us.’’ State v. Butler, 209
Conn. App. 63, 87, 267 A.3d 256 (2021). We agree that the cases are not
instructive, and they were not raised in this appeal, and, therefore, we do
not address them further.
   2
     The addendum confirmed the representations that defense counsel made
at the October 2, 2019 hearing regarding the defendant’s failure to appear
for his probation appointment. Specifically, the addendum provided that
the defendant met with the probation officer on October 1, explained that
he had forgotten about the last appointment, and reported that he was living
in East Hartford and was attending Goodwin College. The addendum also
indicated that the defendant had become ‘‘agitated and refused to have
a civil conversation about the negative report submitted to the [c]ourt.’’
Accordingly, the probation officer asked the defendant to leave the office.
   3
     Although § 52-212a has been amended since the events at issue in this
appeal; see Public Acts 2021, No. 21-104, § 44; those amendments have no
bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer
to the current revision of the statute.
   4
     The Appellate Court noted that, to open and vacate a civil judgment on
the basis of fraud, a party must show that he was ‘‘diligent during trial in
trying to discover and expose the fraud, and that there is clear proof of that
fraud.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Butler, supra, 209 Conn.
App. 95; see also, e.g., Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 107,
952 A.2d 1 (2008).
   5
     This court has interpreted the word ‘‘term,’’ as used in the common-law
rule, to refer to ‘‘sessions’’ of the Superior Court, as it was defined in early
enactments of General Statutes § 51-181. See, e.g., Snow v. Calise, 174 Conn.
567, 571–72, 392 A.2d 440 (1978).
   6
     It is notable that the rationale for permitting continuing jurisdiction until
the end of the term—that the ‘‘roll’’ remained in the hands of the judges
and was not signed until the end of the term—is no longer relevant in our
present court operations because orders become finalized at the time they
are issued. See Commonwealth v. Weymouth, supra, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 145.
   7
     Practice Book § 17-43 (a), which sets forth the procedures for civil
matters, contains similar language.
   8
     McCoy also overruled in part State v. Myers, supra, 242 Conn. 136. See
State v. McCoy, supra, 331 Conn. 586–87. Myers disregarded the established
principle that a trial court loses jurisdiction upon execution of the sentence
and instead cited to Wilson in concluding that the court retained jurisdiction
to entertain a motion for a new trial, even after execution of a sentence,
because it was within the four month period. See id., 583–87; see also State
v. Myers, supra, 136.
   9
     The Appellate Court’s opinion in the present case provides a thorough
overview of this lineage of cases. See State v. Butler, supra, 209 Conn.
App. 88–94.
   10
      The narrow exception mentioned in Richardson is from State v. Lloyd,
185 Conn. 199, 205–206, 440 A.2d 867 (1981), in which we concluded that
‘‘the trial court retains jurisdiction after the entry of a nolle prosequi over
the defendant’s objection when the defendant has a motion to dismiss on
other grounds pending before the court prior to the entry of the nolle.’’
State v. Richardson, 291 Conn. 426, 430 n.5, 969 A.2d 166 (2009). We need
not address the continued viability of this rule because it is not at issue in
this case.