Court Opinion

ID: 9830237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:00:42.308385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:04.693750
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13348    Document: 23-1     Date Filed: 09/01/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13348
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MISAEL CEPEDA,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 8:16-cr-00146-JDW-TGW-1
                          ____________________
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       2                           Opinion of the Court                        22-13348

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Misael Cepeda, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 appeals
       the district court’s denial of his pro se motions for compassionate
       release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and for reconsideration of
       that denial. No reversible error has been shown; we aﬃrm.
              In 2016, Cepeda pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with
       intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in
       violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), and 846. Cepeda
       was sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment.
               In 2022, Cepeda moved pro se for compassionate release un-
       der section 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act.2 In his
       motion, Cepeda asserted two grounds for compassionate release.
       First, Cepeda said he suﬀers from hypertension: a condition he al-
       leged has caused loss of eyesight and “constant blackouts.” Cepeda
       also contended that his hypertension puts him at an increased risk
       of serious illness or death if he were to contract COVID-19. Sec-
       ond, Cepeda argued that compassionate release was warranted be-
       cause Cepeda’s terminally-ill father needed Cepeda to care for him.
       Cepeda also asserted that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors

       1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants.
                                                          See Timson v. Sampson, 518
       F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se pleadings. See
       Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
       2 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
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       22-13348                Opinion of the Court                           3

       and his post-conviction rehabilitation weighed in favor of compas-
       sionate release.
              The district court denied Cepeda’s motion. The district
       court ﬁrst determined that Cepeda had shown no extraordinary
       and compelling reason that would warrant compassionate release.
       The district court next determined that -- even if Cepeda could
       demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons -- the 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(a) factors did not support a reduced sentence. The district
       court later denied Cepeda’s motion for reconsideration.
              “We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen-
       tence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States v.
       Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). After eligibility is estab-
       lished, we review for abuse of discretion the district court’s deci-
       sion about whether to grant or to deny a defendant compassionate
       release. See id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an
       incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making its
       determination, or makes clearly erroneous factual ﬁndings.” Id.
               District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term
       of imprisonment but may do so to the extent permitted under sec-
       tion 3582(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); Giron, 15 F.4th at 1345-46. As
       amended by the First Step Act, section 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes a
       district court to modify a term of imprisonment under these cir-
       cumstances:
                      [T]he court . . . upon motion of the defendant
              after the defendant has fully exhausted all administra-
              tive rights . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13348

             . . . after considering the factors set forth in section
             3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it ﬁnds
             . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
             such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is con-
             sistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
             Sentencing Commission.

             18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
               We have said that a district court may reduce a defendant’s
       term of imprisonment under section 3582(c)(1)(A) only if each of
       these three conditions is met: “(1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors
       favor doing so, (2) there are ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’
       for doing so, and . . . (3) doing so wouldn’t endanger any person or
       the community within the meaning of § 1B1.13’s policy state-
       ment.” See United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir.
       2021). When the district court determines that a movant fails to
       satisfy one of these conditions, the district court may deny com-
       passionate release without addressing the remaining conditions. Id.
       at 1237-38, 1240.
               The policy statement applicable to section 3582(c)(1)(A) is
       found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; United States v.
       Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2021). The commentary to
       section 1B1.13 identiﬁes four categories that might constitute “ex-
       traordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a reduced sen-
       tence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1). Contrary to Cepeda’s
       assertion on appeal, section 1B1.13’s policy statement is binding on
       district courts. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1247.
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       22-13348               Opinion of the Court                         5

               Pertinent to this appeal, Application Note 1(A) of section
       1B1.13 provides that a prisoner’s medical condition may warrant a
       sentence reduction if the prisoner (1) has a terminal illness, or (2)
       suﬀers from “a serious physical or medical condition . . . that sub-
       stantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-
       care within” prison. Id. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(A)). Application
       Note 1(C) provides that a prisoner’s “family circumstances” might
       constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” in two situa-
       tions: (1) “[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the de-
       fendant’s minor child or minor children” and (2) “[t]he incapacita-
       tion of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner when the de-
       fendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or reg-
       istered partner.” Id. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(C)).
               The district court committed no error in determining that
       Cepeda failed to demonstrate an “extraordinary and compelling”
       reason within the meaning of section 1B1.13. Cepeda has not sat-
       isﬁed his burden of demonstrating that his hypertension currently
       constitutes a terminal illness. Cf. 18 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment.
       (n.1(A)(i)) (describing a terminal illness as “a serious and advanced
       illness with an end of life trajectory”). Nor has Cepeda oﬀered fac-
       tual allegations or documentation that would support a ﬁnding that
       his medical conditions have diminished substantially his ability to
       provide self-care while in prison. On top of this omission, Cepeda
       says he has completed a host of educational courses and has held a
       prison job in “maintenance and electrical” throughout his time in
       prison: activities that suggest Cepeda retains signiﬁcant physical ca-
       pabilities. Cepeda’s purported plans upon his requested release --
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       6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-13348

       acting as a primary caregiver for his father and starting a business
       as a tattoo artist -- also are inconsistent with a person unable to
       provide self-care.
              The district court also determined correctly that Cepeda has
       shown no family circumstances that would warrant a reduced sen-
       tence. Under Application Note 1(C), a prisoner’s family circum-
       stances may constitute “extraordinary and compelling circum-
       stances” only in two limited circumstances. Because Cepeda’s fa-
       ther is neither the caretaker of Cepeda’s minor children nor
       Cepeda’s spouse or partner, his incapacitation is no grounds for re-
       lief under Application Note 1(C). 3
               Cepeda also contends that the district court had discretion
       to consider whether -- alone or in combination -- Cepeda’s risk of
       serious illness from COVID-19, the harsh prison conditions created
       by COVID-19 lockdowns, his father’s illness, and Cepeda’s post-
       conviction rehabilitation constituted “other” extraordinary and
       compelling reasons under Application Note 1(D). 4 This argument
       is foreclosed by our binding precedent. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248

       3 Cepeda seems to assert for the first time on appeal that his mother’s medical

       condition supports his motion for compassionate release. Like Cepeda’s fa-
       ther, Cepeda’s mother is neither a caretaker to Cepeda’s minor children nor
       Cepeda’s spouse or partner. As a result, Cepeda’s mother’s health can be no
       “extraordinary and compelling reason” under Application Note 1(C).
       4 Application Note 1(D) reads this way: “As determined by the Director of the

       Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary and
       compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described
       in subdivisions (A) through (C).” 18 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment. (n.1(D)).
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       22-13348                   Opinion of the Court                                7

       (“Application Note 1(D) does not grant discretion to courts to de-
       velop ‘other reasons’ that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s
       sentence.”).
              Given the lack of an extraordinary and compelling reason
       that would warrant relief, we need not detail whether the section
       3553(a) factors would support a reduced sentence. See Tinker, 14
       F.4th at 1237-38, 1240. Nevertheless, we see no error in the district
       court’s determination that the section 3553(a) factors also weighed
       against granting Cepeda compassionate release. The district court
       noted that Cepeda had two convictions for drug-traﬃcking of-
       fenses (one of which involved nearly 2 kilograms of methamphet-
       amine and one of which involved over 220 kilograms of marijuana)
       and a conviction for illegal reentry after deportation. In the light
       of the seriousness of these oﬀenses, the district court concluded
       reasonably that a reduced sentence would not reﬂect the serious-
       ness of Cepeda’s oﬀense, promote respect for the law, provide just
       punishment, or provide adequate deterrence.
             Because Cepeda has failed to satisfy all three of the condi-
       tions necessary to justify a reduced sentence under section
       3582(c)(1)(A), the district court abused no discretion in denying
       Cepeda’s motion for compassionate release. 5

       5 We also reject Cepeda’s assertion that the district court violated his due pro-

       cess rights by not allowing him to file a reply to the government’s response to
       Cepeda’s compassionate-release motion. Cepeda alleges no facts showing --
       and nothing in the record demonstrates -- that Cepeda attempted to file a reply
       or that the district court otherwise prevented Cepeda from doing so.
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       8                  Opinion of the Court              22-13348

             AFFIRMED.