Court Opinion

ID: 9690502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:16:52.773561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:58.082182
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s thorough and detailed opinion because there is no evidence that Appellant was intoxicated by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, or a combination of any two or more of these substances.1 The jury heard evidence that Appellant’s speech was slurred, his pupils were constricted, and he could not or would not perform the field sobriety tests. His driving indicated a lack of the normal use of his mental or physical faculties. The testing officer said the horizontal gaze nystag-mus (HGN) test revealed four clues of intoxication or brain stem injury, but there was no odor of alcohol. The police did not seek to administer a breathalyzer test because there was no odor of alcohol.
The police concluded that Appellant did not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties, but the cause was “something other than alcohol.”
Intoxication is a term that is defined in the penal code.2 Intoxication by the introduction of alcohol and/or certain drugs is an essential element of the offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI).3 Intoxication, then, must be proved. It is not sufficient to prove just that a person “wasn’t acting right.” It is not enough to conclude that he must have taken something, but we know it was not alcohol.
Here, Appellant did not consent to a blood test. The officers could have sought a warrant to allow them to draw blood. They did not. They found no drugs on Appellant or in his vehicle. He did not admit to taking any drug or medication, nor did anyone testify that he had taken drugs, prescribed or otherwise. His jail medical records showed prescriptions for certain drugs, but the jury heard no evidence that he had taken them the day he was arrested.
The majority relies on cases holding that the officer’s opinion of intoxication is sufficient. In those cases; however, there was evidence that the defendant had ingested alcohol, drugs, or both. In Compton v. State, the defendant “smelled of alcohol; *180had slurred speech; admitted drinking two beers; [and] had a cold, open bottle of beer in his truck.4
The other cases the majority relies on are
• Rumage v. State, an unpublished case in which “[t]he officer testified he initially smelled alcohol on [Rumage’s] breath and noticed his speech was slurred. The driver of the other vehicle told the officer that she had seen [Rumage] at the restaurant where she worked drinking an alcoholic beverage shortly before the wreck”;5
• Payne v. State, an unpublished case in which Payne admitted drinking a 16-oz. beer around 7:00 a.m., about five hours before the accident, taking Lortab and Soma the morning of the accident, and taking another Lortab before lunch.6 She ate a sandwich at 11:00 and then left work. The accident occurred on her way home from work. She was incoherent and did not know where she was when the police interviewed her at the accident scene;7
• Guyett v. State, an unpublished case in which Guyette admitted that she was taking prescription medication as prescribed by her doctor, acknowledged that some of her medication was accompanied by a warning that it might cause drowsiness and affect the ability to drive, and stated that she had taken the drugs for years and was “acclimated” to them and that neither her doctors nor DPS had told her that she could not drive;8 and
• Gray v. State, an unpublished case in which Gray admitted that she had taken hydrocodone the night before, and the officer testified that hydroco-done is a controlled substance and that he found an empty prescription bottle for it in the car and as well as loose pills, an indication that she had taken the drug more recently than the night before.9
In all the cases relied on by the majority, there was evidence that the defendant drank alcohol and/or took the drugs near the time of the arrest, or, as in Gray, evidence of the presence of drugs or alcohol in the vehicle driven by the defendant. In the case now before this court, Appellant admitted to one or two drinks at 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. the morning of his arrest; he was not pulled over until around 6:30 or 6:45 p.m., more than eleven hours later, and the police officers were convinced that he had not been drinking, so convinced that they did not offer him a breath test. He did not testify that he had taken any drugs, no drugs were found in his vehicle, and no blood test was performed.
The majority holds that the pharmacist’s testimony regarding the effect of drugs Appellant listed on his jail intake form as drugs he was taking, combined with the arresting officer’s description of Appellant’s swaying, slurred speech, and con*181stricted pupils, as well as the absence of the odor of alcohol, was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Respectfully, I cannot agree.
There is no presumption of intoxication. Slurred speech, constricted pupils, and swaying may indicate intoxication, but such evidence only goes to the element of lack of normal use. It is not, in and of itself, proof of introduction into the body of a drug or controlled substance or alcohol, a necessary element of intoxication that the State must prove.10 If, rather than having the actual drug, having a prescription for a drug which, if used or abused, deprives a person of the normal use of his mental or physical faculties is sufficient to prove intoxication, no one who has been prescribed a sleeping pill, a muscle relaxant, cough medicine, or pain medication could ever drive without violating the DWI statute. The State must prove more than the mere opportunity to ingest the medication.
The legislature has balanced the interests of society and law enforcement against the due process rights of a defendant by providing the State the ability to draw and test a defendant’s blood. The police, although candid in admitting that there was no odor of alcohol despite Appellant’s history of alcohol abuse and thorough in searching out Appellant’s medical records to trace his medical history, provided the State with no more than a guess as to the reason for Appellant’s lack of coordination and slurred speech. I would hold that a guess is not sufficient evidence to support a felony conviction.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion upholding the trial court’s judgment.

. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.01(2)(A) (Vernon 2003).

. See id.

. See id. §§ 49.01 (2)(A), 49.04(a).

. Compton v. State, 120 S.W.3d 375, 379 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd).

. Rumage v. State, No. 12-02-00190-CR, 2003 WL 21999347, at *2 (Tex.App.-Tyler Aug.20, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

. Payne v. State, No. 12-02-00312-CR, 2003 WL 22047776, at *5-6 (Tex.App.-Tyler Aug. 29, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

. Id.

. Guyett v. State, No. 11-08-00003-CR, 2008 WL 3846221, at *2 (Tex.App.-Eastland Aug. 14, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

. Gray v. State, No. 05-04-01269-CR, 2005 WL 1670715, at ⅜6 (Tex.App.-Dallas July 19, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 49.01(2)(A), 49.04(a).