Court Opinion

ID: 9754475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:02:27.598626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:54.005843
License: Public Domain

PRYOR, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
The circumstances of this case present a new question of statutory interpretation arising under the District of Columbia indecent exposure statute, D.C.Code § 22-1112(a) (1981). By its holding, the court employs a narrow anatomical definition of the behavior in question. Because I adopt a broader standard, I dissent.
Appellant, Ms. Duvallon, in broad daylight, approached the plaza of the Supreme Court, fully clothed, with a sign hanging around her neck. She undressed completely, and then walked back and forth, in front of the Supreme Court, nude except for a sign which prevented a frontal view of her breasts and her genital area. The sides of her breasts, as well as her entire buttocks were at all times clearly visible to the police officers and other persons in the immediate vicinity.
Appellant asserts that she cannot be prosecuted' for this conduct because the District’s indecent exposure statute is merely a codification of the common law, and under the latter, the prohibition against indecent exposure purportedly does not preclude a person from intentionally exposing his or her buttocks to public view. More, specifically, it is urged that the scope of our indecent exposure statute is inextricably intertwined with the most common definition of “private parts,” such that “private parts” is deemed synonymous with genitals.
At common law the crime of indecent exposure is defined to include any “exposure of the entire person, or parts that should not be exhibited.” Messina v. State, 212 Md. 602, 605, 130 A.2d 578, 580 *729(1957); 1 see State v. Borchard, 24 Ohio App.2d 95, 99, 264 N.E.2d 646, 650 (1970); 67 C.J.S. § 10, at 49 (“indecent exposure is the exhibition of those private parts of the person which instinctive modesty, human decency, or self-respect requires shall be customarily kept covered in the presence of others”). The underlying purpose of the prohibition against indecent exposure is straightforward: to protect the public from being confronted in public places by annoying, shocking, or embarrassing displays of nudity or sexual activity. See Hearn v. District of Columbia, 178 A.2d 434, 438 (D.C.1962); 67 C.J.S. § 10, at 49; II J. Bishop, New CRIMINAL Law § 1125, at 671 (8th ed. 1892).
Many of the decisions in this area have resolved related but different questions: whether the exposure of genitals, specifically, was a violation of law, see Davenport v. United States, 56 A.2d 851 (D.C.1948); Truet v. State, 3 Ala.App. 114, 57 So. 512 (1912); whether the offensive conduct was sufficiently open to public view, Messina v. State, supra; Gilmore v. State, 118 Ga. 299, 45 S.E. 226 (1903); and lastly whether the conduct involved the requisite intent, Davenport v. United States, supra, 56 A.2d at 852; Case v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 374, 231 S.W.2d 86 (1950).
Further, it should be noted that in contrast to the statutes interpreted in most of these cases, D.C.Code § 22-1112(a) does not speak of “private parts” at all, but by its language prohibits an individual’s making of “any obscene or indecent exposure of his or her person” (emphasis added).
Thus, this case presents, for the first time in the District of Columbia, the question whether the naked exhibition of parts of the body, other than genitalia, constitutes unlawful exposure within the meaning of our statute.
As the opinions in this instance reflect, reasonable minds may differ as to how our statute should be interpreted. Given the common law origin of the exposure prohibitions and the general purposes of such statutes, I find nothing in the long line of cited decisions which requires us to equate the exposure of one’s “person” as meaning only the exposure of genitalia. Indeed, the latter behavior represents the most extreme form of violation.
In my view the broader interpretation of the statute is consistent with the common law, preserves the legislative intent, and gives adequate notice of the behavior which is proscribed.
Under the circumstances of this case, I would affirm.

. The common law of the District of Columbia consists of the common law of Maryland and the British statutes in force in Maryland in 1801, unless inconsistent with provisions of our code. Perkins v. United States, 446 A.2d 19, 23 (D.C.1982); see also D.C.Code § 49-301 (1981).