Court Opinion

ID: 9386281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 21:01:21.060518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:05.409634
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RICHARD CARL MUELLER, et al.,

              Plaintiffs,

      v.                                              Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-01229 (CJN)

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC,

              Defendant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Kayla Mueller, an American humanitarian aid worker, was kidnapped, tortured, and

executed by ISIS. Claiming that the Syrian Arab Republic was responsible for Kayla’s injuries

and death, Kayla’s mother, father, brother, and estate sued Syria under the state-sponsored

terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et

seq. Syria failed to appear and the Muellers moved for default judgment as to liability. See Pls.

Mot. for Def. J. as to Liability, ECF. No. 28.

       The Court previously concluded that the Muellers had demonstrated most of the elements

of their claims. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 32. But to finally decide the question of liability, the

Court required further briefing on the third and fourth elements of the private right of action under

the FSIA, which require plaintiffs to articulate a theory of recovery “through the lens of civil-tort

liability.” See id. at 26–28 (quoting Encinas v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 18-cv-02568, at 20

(D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2022)).

       The Muellers filed the requested supplemental briefing. See ECF No. 33. Kayla’s Estate

asserts five possible claims for relief: an action for wrongful death and four survival actions for

assault, battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 3–

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7. Kayla’s mother, father and brother each assert only one claim: intentional infliction of

emotional distress. See id. at 7–8.

        The Court now GRANTS the Mueller’s Motion for Default Judgment as to Liability in

part.

        1.     Wrongful Death

        Syria is liable for wrongful death if it caused Kayla’s death. See Braun v. Islamic Republic

of Iran, 228 F. Supp. 3d 64, 79 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 925).

Because the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Syria caused Kayla’s death, see Mem. Op.

at 22–24, Syria is also liable for the economic damages to her Estate caused by her premature

death. See Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 78 (D.D.C. 2010) (“A wrongful-

death action . . . may be brought through the estate of the decedent . . . for economic losses which

result from a decedent’s premature death.”).

        2.     Assault

        Syria is liable for assault if, when it provided material support for the hostage taking,

torture, and extrajudicial killing of Kayla Mueller, it acted “intending to cause a harmful or

offensive contact with . . . or an imminent apprehension of such a contact” by Kayla and she was

“thereby put in such imminent apprehension.” See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21. The

uncontroverted evidence establishes that Kayla received death threats and was subjected to routine

sexual abuse while in ISIS’s captivity, which is sufficient to establish that Kayla was put in

imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact. See, e.g., Ex. 24, ECF No. 28-28, at ¶¶ 10,

12. And by materially supporting ISIS with full knowledge that it was a terrorist organization, see

Mem. Op. at 8–13, Syria acted with intent to cause harmful contact and the immediate

apprehension thereof: “acts of terrorism are, by their very nature, intended to harm and to terrify

by instilling fear of further harm,” see Fain v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 856 F. Supp. 2d 109, 122–

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23 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Abedini v. Gov’t of Islamic Republic of Iran, 422 F. Supp. 3d 118, 132

(D.D.C. 2019) (“By their very nature, torture and hostage taking subject the victim to ‘imminent

apprehension of harmful or offensive contact’ at all times while in captivity.” (citation omitted)).

Syria is therefore liable to the Estate under this claim. See Est. of Parhamovich v. Syrian Arab

Republic, No. 17-CV-61, 2022 WL 18071921, at *12 (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2022) (“The estate of a

decedent may bring a wrongful death action, as well as ‘survival actions.’”); Valore, 700 F. Supp.

2d at 77 (“A survival action is one that accrued in a decedent’s favor before [her] death that may

be brought after [her] death by [her] estate; in other words, it is a claim that could have been

brought by the decedent, had [she] lived to bring it.”).

       3.      Battery

       Syria is liable for battery if, when it provided material support for the hostage taking,

torture, and extrajudicial killing of Kayla Mueller, it acted “intending to cause a harmful or

offensive contact with . . . or an imminent apprehension of such a contact” by Kayla and “a harmful

contact with” Kayla “directly or indirectly result[ed].” See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13.

Harmful contact is contact which results in “any physical impairment of the condition of another’s

body, or physical pain or illness.” Id. § 15. The evidence of death threats, routine sexual abuse,

and other forms of torture, see Mem. Op. at 14–16, “undeniably” establishes that Kayla suffered

harmful contact, see Abedini, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 133. And again, Syria acted with intent to cause

harmful contact by providing material support to ISIS, as acts of terrorism are, by their very nature,

intended to harm and to terrify by instilling fear of such harm. See Fain, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 123.

Syria is therefore liable to the Estate for battery. See Est. of Parhamovich, 2022 WL 18071921 at

*12; Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 77.

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       4.      False Imprisonment

       Syria is liable for false imprisonment if, when it provided material support for the hostage

taking of Kayla Mueller, it acted “intending to confine” Kayla “within boundaries fixed by the

actor,” its acts “directly or indirectly result[ed]” in her confinement, and Kayla “[was] conscious

of the confinement or [was] harmed by it.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35. The evidence

shows that, with Syria’s material support, ISIS kidnapped Kayla and moved her between several

ISIS prisons and other custodians for over a year until her death. Mem. Op. at 14–16. While

imprisoned by ISIS, Kayla faced death threats and routine sexual abuse. Id. And Syria intended

such acts of terrorism to occur as a result of its material support of ISIS. See id. at 24. Syria is

therefore liable to the Estate for false imprisonment from the time of her abduction in August 2013

until her death in February 2015. See Est. of Parhamovich, 2022 WL 18071921 at *12; Valore,

700 F. Supp. 2d at 77.

       5.      Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

       Syria is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress if, “by extreme and outrageous

conduct,” Syria “intentionally or recklessly cause[d] severe emotional distress to” Kayla. See

Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 46). Syria’s material support of the hostage taking, torture, and extrajudicial

killing was outrageous conduct that—at least recklessly—caused Kayla severe emotional distress.

See Mem. Op. at 20–24; Ex. D., ECF No. 33-1 (psychological autopsy). The Court easily

concludes that the Estate can recover under this claim. See Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 78 F.

Supp. 3d 379, 401 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Acts of terrorism are by their very definition extreme and

outrageous and intended to cause the highest degree of emotional distress.”).            See Est. of

Parhamovich, 2022 WL 18071921 at *12; Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 77.

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       Syria is also liable to Kayla’s immediate family members for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. See Est. of Parhamovich, 2022 WL 18071921 at *12 (“Immediate family

members of a victim—spouses, parents, siblings, and children—may bring claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress.” (citing Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 78–79)). The Muellers suffered

immensely as a result of Kayla’s treatment, both during Kayla’s captivity and after.            The

depositions of Marsha, Richard, and Eric reveal that they experienced nightmares, lack of sleep,

emotional distress, health problems, financial stress, and panic attacks. See Exs. A–C, ECF. No

33-1 (depositions). And although “[t]he scope of recovery under this theory” is usually limited to

immediate family members who were present at the time of the tortious conduct, see Encinas,

supra, at 23, presence is not required in emotional distress claims arising from terrorist attacks,

see Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 924 F.3d 1256, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Republic of Sudan

v. Owens, 194 A.3d 38, 39 (D.C. 2018)).

                                         CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Default Judgment as to Liability is GRANTED

in part. Syria is liable to the Estate of Kayla Mueller for wrongful death (Count I), battery (Count

II), assault (Count III), false imprisonment (Count IV), and intentional infliction of emotional

distress (Count V). See Compl. at ¶ 51–62, ECF No. 1. Syria is also liable to Richard, Marsha,

and Eric Mueller for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶ 60–62 (Count V). The Court

declines to address the claims for generic survival damages (Count VI), conspiracy (Count VII),

or aiding and abetting (Count VIII), see id. ¶ 63–70, because these claims are not addressed in any

of the briefing before the Court.

       Finally, the Muellers are directed to file either briefing as to damages or a motion for the

appointment of a special master to calculate damages.

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      An appropriate order will follow.

DATE: April 11, 2023
                                              CARL J. NICHOLS
                                              United States District Judge

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