Court Opinion

ID: 9841855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 20:09:17.034002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:26.775281
License: Public Domain

Mb. Justice BbowN,-
dissenting.
The law of Texas for the creation of a live stock sanitary commission,, cited in the opinion of the court, provides that “ it *261shall be the duty of said commission, upon receipt by them of reliable information, ... of any malignant disease, to go , . . and make a careful examination of the animals believed to be affected, . . . and if said disease is found tó be of a malignant, contagious or infectious character, they shall direct and enforce such quarantine lines and sanitary regulations as are necessary to prevent the spread of any such disease. And no domestic animals affected with disease, or capable of communicating the same, shall be permitted to enter or leave the district, premises or grounds so quarantined, except by authority of the commissioners.”
I had supposed the authority of the commissioners to be fixed by this act, and their right to quarantinemr forbid the entry of animals was limited to such as were infected with disease or capable of communicating the same.
The proclamation of the Governor, based upon the report of the. sanitary commission, covers two separate classes of cases. It finds that cattle in the southern portion of Jefferson County, Texas, are affected with disease and liable- to impart such disease to cattle ranging in the upper portion of Jefferson and other counties, and therefore forbids such cattle from being transported north or west of certain bayous running across the southern portion of .Jefferson County. So far the order is within >the statute. '
But it also finds that the. commission “has reason to believe that charbon and anthrax has [broken out] or is liable to break out in the State of Louisiana,” and hence that no cattle are to be transported into Texas from Louisiana. This portion of the, order seems to me a plain departure from the terms of the statute. It does not find that there are cattle ' in Louisiana “ infected with disease or capable of communicating the same,” but simply that the disease is liable to break out in-that State. It does not. even find that it has broken out, or that there are any cattle in that State capable of communicating the disease. If the fact that a contagious disease is liable to break out in a certain locality be sufficient tó justify a quarantine against such locality, then it is possible that every port of the United' States may quarantine against Cuban or other West Indian ■■ ports, *262since it is a well-kno^n fact that yellow fever is liable to break out there at almost any time, and especially during the summer months.
The sweeping nature of this order is manifest by comparing it with the first order relating to the Jefferson County cattle. There is a finding there that the .cattle in the southern portion of a particular county'“are affected with disease, known as charbon or anthrax, and are liable to impart such disease to cattle” ranging in the upper portion of Jefferson County, and therefore no cattle 'shall be transported north or west of the infectéd district. In other words, it finds the actual existence of disease within'a definite-and circumscribed locality, and pro-' hibits the transportation of cattle from such locality to nófi-infected districts.
. On the other hand, the second order assumes to quarantine against, cattle'from the entire-State, of Louisiana, without any finding that the disease has broken out there, or that the cattle in such State are liable to communicaté such disease to other cattle. The order is not limited to cattle coming from any particular portion of the State, but applies to the-wfiole State, regardless of the actual existence of the-disease’ or the liability to communicate contagion...
It‘seems to me that the proclamation goes far beyond the authority of the statute, beyond the necessities of the case, and is a wholly unjustifiable interference with interstate commerce. The statute thué construed puts a power into the hands of a sanitary commission which is liable to be greatly abused and. to be put forward as ah excuse for keeping out of Texas perfectly healthy animals -from other States, and putting a complete stop to a large trade.
In the case of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, the statute of Kansas in.question applied only to “cattle capable of communicating,.or liable to impart what is known as Texas, splenetic or Spanish fever to. any domestic cattle ” of the State, and was a proper exercise of the power of quarantine, since healthy-cattle were not interfered with. These were substantially the terms of .the Texas statute, to which I see no objection ; but the action of the commission *263was a plain departure from the terms of the statute, and I think unauthorized by law. It was practically as sweeping as the statute of Missouri, condemned by this court in Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, which provided that “ no Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle shall be driven or otherwise conveyed into, or remain, in any county in this State, between the first day of March and the first day of November in each year, by any person or persons whatever,” regardless' of the fact whether these cattle were diseased or were capable of communicating disease. This was held to be in conflict with the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. As justly observed of . the opinion in that case by the court in its opinion in this case, “ a distinction was made between a proper and an improper exertion of the police power of the State. The former was confined to.the prohibition of 'actually infected or diseased cattle; and to régulations not transcending such prohibition. .The statute was held not to be so confined, and hence was declared invalid.” This is the precise objection I make to the finding of. the commission, and to thp proclamation of the Governor in this case.
It is sufficient to say of the finding of the Supreme Court of Texas that “ so far as the record shows, every animal of the kind prohibited in the State of Louisiana may have been actually affected with charbon or anthrax,” that there is no such finding in the report of the commission or in the Governor’s proclamation, and that, under the statute, there must be a finding either of disease, or of a liability to communicate disease, to justify the action of the' commission. It cannot of its own motion put in force the quarantine laws of the State without the finding of some facts that such enforcement is necessary to the protection of Texas cattle. I am therefore constrained to dissent from the opinion of the court.