Court Opinion

ID: 9662391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:08:00.348355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:39.170010
License: Public Domain

NORTHCUTT, Justice.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion herein. This is an action brought by Pat Milim joined by her husband, Tommy Milim, against G. Mayfield seeking modification of a prior judgment. Pat Milim and G. Mayfield were formerly man and wife and to this marriage was born one child by the name of Mona Kay May-field, the child here in question. Tommy Milim had been working for Mr. and Mrs. Mayfield for about nine months when, on Monday August 10, 1953, Mr. Mayfield discharged Milim and paid him what he owed him. There is some dispute as to the actions of Mrs. Mayfield at the time Milim was discharged but, on the following Wednesday, G. Mayfield filed-a suit for divorce in Cause No. 1445 in the District Court of Briscoe County, Texas. ■ A divorce judgment was entered on September 21, 1953 and Pat Mayfield and Tommy Milim were married on October 10, 1953. According to the undisputed record in this case, at *856the time Mr. and Mrs. Milim were married, he was thirty years of age and she was forty-three although she gave her age, when securing the' marriage license, as thirty-five years of age. When the original divorce • was granted, this appellant was granted custody of Mona Kay. Appellee testified he was to have the right to visit Mona Kay and she was to visit him at reasonable times and we think, under this record, it is shown that he has tried to let each parent visit the child as parents should. Thereafter, trouble arose between Pat Milim and G. Mayfield over the visitation as to Mona Kay, and G. Mayfield filed suit in Cause No. 2773 in the District Court of Swisher County,-Texas as to the custody of Mona Kay. On May 20, 1954, an agreed judgment was entered changing the custody of said child and giving G. Mayfield custody during June, July and August of each year and Pat Milim the other nine months of tiie year and allowing each of them cértain visitation rights during the period of time the child was in the custody of the other. This last mentioned judgment became final and no appeal was taken therefrom.
On October 14, 1954, appellant brought this action in Cause No. 2826 in the District Court of Swisher County, Texas to modify the judgment, entered on May 20, 1954 in Cause No. 2773 asking that she be granted- the full care, custody and control of Mona Kay. Appellee answered seeking .full care, custody and control of Mona Kay. Appellant contended that conditions had changed and that Mona Kay was unhappy and dissatisfied while in the custody of appellee; that appellee had committed and allowed to be committed acts of mental cruelty and acts detrimental to the happiness and welfare of the child; that appel-lee neglected the personal hygiene -and health of the child; and that appellee neglected the parental care, love and affection needed by ■ a child during- the time and periods when the child was with the appellee. The main contentions urged- by -appellee, are that appellant ■ ref uses to let-him-.visit with said child as provided fo’rin the judgment dated May 20, 1954 and that appellant continues to poison the mind of Mona Kay and creates in her mind an aversion and a dislike for appellee. The case was tried to a jury in- an advisory capacity. Two, questions were asked the jury. The first question was:
“Which one of the parents do you recommend should be awarded the custody of the child, Mona Kay May-field, subject to right of reasonable visitation to be fixied by the Court?”
The jury answered “Mrs. Pat Milim.” The second question asked the jury was:
“Do you find and recommend that the Court should permit G. Mayfield to have his daughter in his home for visitation purposes during the three summer months of June, July and August each year with periodic visitation during that time with her mother, all as provided in the agreed judgment of May 20, 1954?”
The jury answered “Yes” and the jury added:
“We suggest visitation once each month only by either side.”
The court entered judgment as found and recommended by the jury and appellant has perfected this appeal from said judgment. Appellant presented her appeal upon two points of error as follows:
“Point One
“The court, - having found that appellant, Pat Milim, is a fit and proper person to have the care, custody and control of the minor child, and having granted custody of the child to appellant, erred in ordering that the child visit in the home of appellee over the week end each month and for. three months each year, such action being in effect the granting of divided ■ custody of said minor child.
“Pqint Two
“The court, having found that appellant Milim is a fit and proper person to have the care, custody and con- - trol of the ’ minor child, and having *857■granted custody of said child to appellant erred in not permitting said ■ child to reside in the home of appellant for all of each year, with right of reasonable visitation by appellee.”
It will be noticed that not a single question was asked the jury as to the truthfulness of the changed conditions pleaded by the parties as to why.the judgment dated May 20, 1954 should be modified. No--objections were made to the charge of the court and neither were there any special issues requested by either of the parties. Under the findings of the jury and the judgment entered by the court, it was found that appellant should have Mona Kay for the three summer months as provided for in the former judgment and, in effect, was the same as finding the things as alleged as to the changed conditions were not true. We are familiar with the fact that split custody is not generally approved by the courts and we are also familiar with the rule that the welfare of the child is the, ■ paramount consideration in any case and agree with the authorities cited in the majority opinion but do not think they are in point here. The purpose of a final judgment in custody cases would be of no effect if it could be changed at the whim of one of the parents without showing a changed condition. On questions of fact, where the jury and the trial court have found certain things to be true, and that finding .is based upon sufficient -evidence, the appellate court cannot substitute its opinion and findings ■ contrary thereto. It is to be regretted that the welfare of the child was not., considered as much prior to August 10, 1953 ais it would seem to .be, at this time. From the undisputed - record in this case, it would seem that the, allegations of appellee to the effect that appellant is poisoning the mind of the child in question against the appel-lee might be correct; but since the jury and the trial court have found and held in effect that there have been no change of conditions since the judgment entered on May 20, 1954, and that based upon sufficient evidence, we think it is binding óñ this Court. Appellant’s attitude is clearly shown when she was asked the question:
“And ■ you don’t propose* for .'the child , to share in’contact-arid relationship and affection and- assocate with ■ her father, do you, you just dori’t propose for that to happen*, do you?”
Her answer was:
“No, I don’t think I will. I don’t think I will.”
Meaning she will not even, in the future let the father associate with his own child —we cannot help but to condemn- such an attitude. It is just not in the.heart of a child, who has always loved its father and whose father has always been good to, it, to say she never wants to .see ,or talk to her father again and that she loves a man thirteen years younger than her own mother, whom her mother married, unless there is some pressure brought,upon that child. The, judgment dated May 20, . 1954 was a final judgment and, was res adjudi-cata as ■ to the best interests of the child and should not be .modified except upon a showing of changed conditions since the judgment requiring, in the best' interests of such child, that the custody be changed. We think there is ample proof to substantiate, the findings of the jury and the trial court in- holding, as it did hold, there was no change of conditions requiring the 'change -of custody. The jury and the trial judge saw the'parties personally and heard them testify, they were better able to know and understand than we can from a printed record. Under this record, we cannot say the .-trial court abused its discretion in holding that conditions had not changed -so as to justify the court in ordering change of -custody from the father to the mother. Bryant v. Birdsong, Tex.Civ.App., 277 S.W.2d 922.
In the case of Pearson v. Pearson, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 188, 193, writ refused, N.R.E., it is said':
“In the case at bar the trial judge. • undertook to’ modify-the judgment o,f , 1942 as to the custody of .the .children. This action -could be based’ only on changed conditions' arising since February, 1944, because on that date the *858custody of these children had again been adjudicated. The trial judge did not find any changed conditions and when the matter was called to his attention in a specially requested finding he persisted in not so finding. Apparently the trial judge was of the opinion that he had to determine but one issue, that of the best interests of the minor children. It is true that in modifying a custody judgment the trial court should be governed by what will be to the best interest and welfare of the minor children, but it is equally true that such modification must be based upon changed conditions. Wilson v. Elliott, 96 Tex. 472, 73 S.W. 946, 75 S.W. 368, 97 Am.St. Rep. 928; Greenlaw v. Dilworth, Tex.Com.App., 299 S.W. 875; Keith v. Keith, Tex.Civ.App., 286 S.W. 534; Oldham v. Oldham, Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 564; Kesler v. McGuire, Tex.Civ.App., 109 S.W.2d 1115; Futch v. Futch, Tex.Civ.App., 299 S.W. 289.
“Frequent hearings as to the custody of minor children of divorced parents should be frowned upon by courts and are not to be encouraged. A judgment as to such custody is res judicata as to the best interests of the children and such judgment should not be modified except upon a showing of changed conditions since the judgment, requiring, in the best interests of such children, that the custody be changed. The burden of proof is upon the party seeking such change to allege, offer proof and secure an affirmative finding from the trier of facts that conditions have so changed since the prior adjudication as to require a change of custody.”
Although we think, from this record, the whole trouble as to custody and visitation as to this child is brought about because of the attitude of appellant, we are not in position to disturb the judgment of the trial court. The burden was upon the appellant to prove such changed conditions requiring the change of custody, and also secure an affirmative finding from the trier of facts that conditions have so changed since the prior adjudication ■ as to require a change of custody. This the appellant did not do but the trier of facts here in effect held directly to the contrary and such findings are binding upon this Court.
We are of the opinion this case should be affirmed.