Court Opinion

ID: 9380623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 18:00:54.315536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.507875
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ESTATE OF D.C.,

               Plaintiff,

       v.                                            Civil Action No. 20-743 (TJK)

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA et al.,

               Defendants.

                                  MEMORANDUM ORDER

       Plaintiff is a guardianship estate created to hold funds for a minor. ECF No. 32 (Compl.)

¶¶ 1–2. It alleges that it was supposed to receive a check for $55,703.36 from a law firm, one of

the Defendants. Compl. ¶¶ 17–18. Plaintiff says the law firm sent the check, but it never arrived

because it was stolen and cashed by the thief. See Compl. ¶¶ 18–26. The remaining two Defend-

ants are banks involved in that transaction. See Compl. ¶¶ 9, 18, 26. Having never received the

funds to which it claims entitlement, Plaintiff sued the law firm and both banks, alleging breaches

of various common-law and state-statutory duties. See generally Compl. ¶¶ 27–78. Defendants

have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See ECF Nos. 33, 35.

       Although no party contests this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court must question

it sua sponte. Doe ex rel. Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Federal

courts have “limited jurisdiction.” Friends of Animals v. Pruitt, 258 F. Supp. 3d 91, 93 (D.D.C.

2017). They must presume “that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). And the party invoking its jurisdiction—

Plaintiff here—has the burden to show otherwise. Id.; see also Wendland v. Gutierrez, 580 F.

Supp. 2d 151, 152 n.1 (D.D.C. 2008).
         Plaintiff says the Court has diversity jurisdiction. Compl. ¶ 7. Federal diversity jurisdic-

tion has two elements. The first is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, as defined

by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4). The Court has already ordered Plaintiff to show cause why its case

should not be dismissed for failure to allege complete diversity, permitted an amended complaint

in response to that order, and ordered Defendants to describe their state citizenship in affidavits.

See Min. Order of June 8, 2022; Min. Order of July 8, 2022; ECF Nos. 29–32. The second element,

which has not been litigated so far, is that the amount “in controversy exceeds . . . $75,000, exclu-

sive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In this context, Plaintiff’s burden to establish

subject-matter jurisdiction includes the “burden to establish with evidence ‘that it does not appear

to a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount.’” Griffith v. EduCap,

Inc., No. 16-CV-1541 (DLF), 2019 WL 4737064, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2019) (quoting Payne v.

Gov’t of D.C., 559 F.2d 809, 820 & n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). And that burden may be triggered “by

the court sua sponte.” Id. (quoting Payne, 559 F.2d at 820).

         Plaintiff has not satisfied its burden concerning the amount-in-controversy requirement.

The amount of financial harm it claims to have suffered is both certain—$55,703.36—and well

short of $75,000. See Compl. ¶¶ 18, 27–28, 34, 36, 42, 47, 53, 66, 70, 73, 76–78. Its complaint

hints at three reasons why its total claim might exceed $75,000, but none of those reasons are

adequately pleaded.

         The first possible reason is that the operative complaint’s prayer for relief asks for “com-

pensatory damages in the amount of $150,00.00against [sic] Defendants jointly and severally.”

Compl. at 29. 1 But that figure is not explained. And “a bare-bones assertion of jurisdictional

sufficiency” is inadequate; Plaintiff must allege some facts supporting its damage calculation.

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    The Court assumes that Plaintiff intended to request $150,000.

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Bronner ex rel. Am. Studies Ass’n v. Duggan, 962 F.3d 596, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Moreover, if

the $150,000 figure reflects Plaintiff’s attempt to hold all three Defendants “jointly and severally”

liable by multiplying its damages by three, it is improper. See Compl. at 29. Joint and several

liability allows a wronged party to recover for the same harm against any of multiple wrongdoers.

See Hill v. McDonald, 442 A.2d 133, 137 & n.3 (D.C. 1982). Plaintiff may not recover more than

once for that same harm. See Saunders v. Hudgens, 184 A.3d 345, 350 (D.C. 2018). For those

reasons, the unexplained $150,000 claim does not establish this Court’s jurisdiction.

        The second possible reason is that Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees.            See Compl.

¶¶ 34, 47, 53, 66, 73, 78; id. at 29. But such fees “are generally not included in the amount in

controversy, unless provided for by statute or contract.” Wexler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 496 F.

Supp. 2d 150, 154 (D.D.C. 2007). Plaintiff alleges no contract and cites no statutory provision for

attorney’s fees. The only statute that the complaint mentions at all is the District of Columbia’s

adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, which contains no provision for attorney’s fees. See

generally D.C. Code § 28:3-101 et seq. Anyway, the mere availability of attorney’s fees would

not be enough. To include those in an amount-in-controversy calculation, a plaintiff must provide

something more than conjecture, speculation, or a bare assertion. See Inst. for Truth in Mktg. v.

Total Health Network Corp., 321 F. Supp. 3d 76, 90–91 (D.D.C. 2018). The Court has nearly a

$20,000 gap to fill before it can conclude that it has jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has not even asserted

that its attorney’s fees could fill that gap, let alone provided a basis for the Court to so conclude.

For those reasons, the requests for attorney’s fees do not establish this Court’s jurisdiction.

        The third possible reason is that one of Plaintiff’s claims—for negligent infliction of emo-

tional distress—seeks unquantified damages for “serious emotional distress to the Plaintiff.”

Compl. ¶ 62. But again, an unquantified, unexplained assertion will not do. A plaintiff hoping to

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use emotional harm as a ticket to federal court must “explain how [it] has suffered” that harm.

Symkowicz v. Frisch, No. 19-CV-3329 (BAH), 2020 WL 4432240, at *6 (D.D.C. July 31, 2020)

(quoting Bronner, 962 F.3d at 610) (alteration adopted). A statement that the plaintiff has suffered

emotional injury is a description only of the “type[ ] of harm,” and so does not meet the plaintiff’s

burden. Id. (quotation omitted). That is all Plaintiff says. See Compl. ¶¶ 61–63. And again, the

complaint fails even to assert that the claimed emotional damages could close the $20,000 gap.

Thus, the request for emotional damages does not establish this Court’s jurisdiction either.

       For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint does not meet its burden, so the Court lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction. See Rosenboro v. Kim, 994 F.2d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Thus, the

Court “must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514

(2006). Still, “the governing law mandates generosity in evaluating the eligibility of a claim for

federal jurisdiction.” See Rosenboro, 994 F.2d at 290. Because this issue has not previously been

raised during this litigation and it is conceivable that further allegations could remedy the present

jurisdictional defects, the Court will give Plaintiff a chance to file a complaint that cures them.

       For all the above reasons, it is hereby

       ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 32, is DISMISSED for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It is further

       ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint by April 19, 2023. It is further

       ORDERED that Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint,

ECF Nos. 33, 35, are DENIED AS MOOT. It is further

       ORDERED that the parties’ Joint Motion for a Status Conference, ECF No. 25, is DE-

NIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

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      SO ORDERED.

                           /s/ Timothy J. Kelly
                           TIMOTHY J. KELLY
                           United States District Judge
Date: March 20, 2023

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