Court Opinion

ID: 9884686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:08:33.498733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:40.411898
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 50. (concurring). I join the majority opinion but write separately to emphasize that the sole reason for hearing this matter was to address the unresolved question of jurisdiction.
¶ 51. In response to Parker's petition for review, Beverly Enterprises contended that the court lacked jurisdiction to review a circuit court order compelling arbitration. Making an argument that this court lacks jurisdiction to review a circuit court order is roughly equivalent to a minnow taunting a muskellunge. Neither the argument nor the minnow is likely to survive.
¶ 52. Nonetheless, no reader should view this opinion as an invitation for parties to appeal circuit court orders compelling arbitration, or file petitions for review from orders like the order issued by the court of appeals. See Majority op., ¶ 40.
¶ 53. Under Wis. Stat. § 788.01, arbitration agreements are enforceable "except upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." In this case, the circuit court admirably performed its duty to determine whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable before ordering the parties to proceed to arbitration. It analyzed in detail the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, including an assessment of both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Beginning with procedural unconscionability, the court considered, among other factors, that the plaintiffs had other options for nursing homes, the defendant's attorney drafted the agreement, the *440agreement was conspicuously written and was not in fine print, the terms of the agreement were not contradictory, and the agreement was not a "take it or leave it proposition." Addressing the issue of substantive unconscionability, the court considered that the agreement was a bilateral one, arbitration was to be done by a professional arbitrator, and the limitation of claims in the agreement affected both parties equally.
¶ 54. In short, the circuit court meticulously considered the factors set out in Wisconsin law for determining both substantive and procedural unconscionability. See Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 2006 WI 53, ¶¶ 34-36, 290 Wis. 2d 514, 714 N.W.2d 155.
¶ 55. In a very rare case in which this court reviewed a court of appeals decision on appeal from an order compelling arbitration we "recognize[d] that the courts of this state must act with extreme care when they become involved in an arbitration proceeding. After all, a fundamental tenet of arbitration is that of avoiding the court system." See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Jackson, 190 Wis. 2d 597, 613, 527 N.W.2d 681 (1995). This consideration is particularly strong when appellate review could delay proceedings for several years before arbitration could begin.
¶ 56. Appellate courts have jurisdiction to review orders compelling arbitration, but that does not mean they should exercise that jurisdiction. When, as in this case, a circuit court performs the proper legal analysis and orders the parties to proceed to arbitration based upon a written arbitration agreement, appellate courts should review such an order only in the most extraordinary of circumstances.
¶ 57. For the foregoing reasons, I write separately.
¶ 58. I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN joins this concurrence.