Court Opinion

ID: 9896545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 17:11:44.28864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:07.675522
License: Public Domain

J-A22003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 ALBERT E. CUNEO, A/K/A ALBERT E.        :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 CUNEO II T/A/D/B/A ALBERT E.            :         PENNSYLVANIA
 CUNEO II FREELANCE APPRAISAL            :
 SERVICES                                :
                                         :
                    Appellant            :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
 RAYMOND L. BURGESS                      :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :    No. 14 WDA 2023
 YVETTE C. PETERSON                      :

             Appeal from the Order Entered December 1, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
                         No(s): GD 2007-011138

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY BOWES, J.:                  FILED: NOVEMBER 13, 2023

      Albert E. Cuneo, a/k/a Albert E. Cuneo II t/a/d/b/a Albert E. Cuneo II

Freelance Appraisal Services has appealed from the order that sustained the

preliminary objections of Yevette C. Peterson and overruled Mr. Cuneo’s

preliminary objections to her preliminary objections.

      Briefly, the underlying facts are as follows. Raymond Burgess executed

a mortgage on a property on Webster Avenue on Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in

2006. The mortgage holder foreclosed on the mortgage in 2007, purchased

the property at a sheriff’s sale in 2008, and sold the property to Ms. Peterson

in 2009. Mr. Cuneo, who had obtained a judgment against Mr. Burgess on an

unrelated breach of contract claim in 2007, after the mortgage had been
J-A22003-23

perfected. Mr. Cuneo filed a praecipe for a writ of revival against Mr. Burgess

in 2012 and 2017, in an effort to realize the outstanding judgment. In 2022,

he filed a praecipe for a writ of revival also naming Ms. Peterson as the

purported terre-tenant.1 Ms. Peterson filed preliminary objections asserting

that, as a result of the sheriff’s sale, Mr. Cuneo’s judgment no longer attached

to the Webster Avenue property. Mr. Cuneo filed a response and objections

to the objections.     On December 1, 2022, the trial court entered an order

ruling in Ms. Peterson’s favor on both sets of preliminary objections.

       This timely appeal followed, and both Mr. Cuneo and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Mr. Cuneo presents the following questions for

our review:

       1.     Whether the trial court erred when it found that [Mr. Cuneo]
       received service of notice of sheriff sale under Pa.R.C. 3129.2,
       that is a rule and not a statute, which was obscure, vague, had no
       handbill and was void of any affiant identification signature, and
       were there violations in the notice of U.S. Const. Art. 1 sec 10 cl.1
       and Amendments. 4, 5, 7 and 14; and the Pennsylvania
       Constitution of 1968 Article 1 sections 1, 8, and 17; because [Mr.]
       Cuneo was not joined in the foreclosure action or being directly
       named a party to it under any form of action, sounding in collateral
       claims for relief to vitiate [Mr.] Cuneo’s judgment lien?

       2.    Whether the trial court erred when it found that [Mr.]
       Cuneo’s writ of revival in no way could be indexed against Appellee
       or the real estate located at 2627 Webster Avenue. . . ?

       3.   Whether the trial court erred when it failed to consider [Mr.
       Cuneo’s] writ of revival in the context of a complaint in a civil
____________________________________________

1 “A terre-tenant, as used in our law, is one who became the owner of an
interest in the real estate after the lien of the judgment attached.” Adelson
v. Kocher, 36 A.2d 737, 738 (Pa.Super. 1944).

                                           -2-
J-A22003-23

      action, seeking a judgment or creating lien which was earned and
      attached May 29, 2007, in this action in violation of the strict text
      set forth by 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 8141(6), without requiring application
      of the exclusive process to raise affirmative defenses to a
      complaint?

Mr. Cuneo’s brief at 3-4 (cleaned up).

      Upon a thorough review of the certified record, the parties’ briefs, and

the applicable law, we affirm the order sustaining Ms. Peterson’s preliminary

objections, and overruling Mr. Cuneo’s preliminary objections to her

preliminary objections, based upon the opinion of the Honorable John T.

McVay, Jr. entered on February 21, 2023.             In particular, Judge McVay

explained that the mortgage on the property was perfected and recorded ten

months before Mr. Cuneo’s judgment, rendering the latter a junior lien.

Further, the sheriff’s sale of the subject property, held subsequent to issuance

of a proper affidavit of service upon all record junior lien holders, divested all

junior liens on the property.       See Trial Court Opinion, 2/21/23, at 4-5

(pagination supplied) (citing, inter alia, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8141(1) (providing the

priority of liens against real property), and Unity Sav. Ass’n v. Am. Urban

Scis. Found. Inc., 487 A.2d 356, 358 (Pa.Super. 1984) (“[T]he general rule

[is] that a sheriff’s sale of property divests all junior liens on that property.”)).

      While we understand Mr. Cuneo’s frustrations with being unable to

satisfy his judgment against Mr. Burgess, none of his underdeveloped

arguments concerning freedom of speech or other constitutional or statutory

provisions has convinced us that relief is warranted.

                                        -3-
J-A22003-23

     Order affirmed.

DATE: 11/13/2023

                       -4-
                                                                              Circulated 10/31/2023 11:47 AM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

 ALBERT E. CUNEO,                                CIVIL DIVISON
                Plaintiff,
 V.                                              Case No.: GD-07-011138
 RAYMOND L. BURGESS,
                                                 Date: February 21, 2023
                Defendant,
 V.

 YVETTE C. PETERSON,

                 Terre-Tenant.

                             Pa.R.C.P, 1925(b) OPINION

                                      Procedural History

       On 12/28/2022, Albert E. Cuneo ("Cuneo") filed this appeal of my 12/01/2022, order that

sustained Yvette C. Peterson's ("Peterson") Preliminary Objections Raising Questions of Fact to

strike Cuneo's Writ of Revival to Terre-Tenant, and the judgement entered in this action cannot

be indexed in any way against the property known as 2627 Webster Ave., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

("Webster Ave."). That order also overruled Cuneo's Preliminary Objections to Peterson's

Preliminary Objections.

        Raymond Burgess ("Burgess") had executed a mortgage with Wells Fargo on 6/30/2006,

which was recorded on 7/6/2006 and secured by the Webster Ave. property. Burgess subsequently

defaulted on the mortgage in November 2006 and was the Defendant in a 2007 foreclosure action

filed on 3/14/2007, for the Webster Ave. property.
        Separately, on 4/19/2007, a judgement was entered in favor of Albert E. Cuneo for a breach

of contract claim against Burgess in the Magisterial District Court and was entered and filed in the

Court of Common Pleas on 5/29/2007. Cuneo was a lienholder ofBurgess' Webster Ave. property

at the time when Wells Fargo filed its foreclosure action, and he was provided Notice of the

Sheriffs sale Pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 3129. The record is clear that the Wells Fargo mortgage and

foreclosure action was filed and of record before Cuneo' s judgement.

       As a result of the foreclosure action, U.S. Bank took title to the Webster Ave. property as

the successful bidder at the 2/4/2008 Sheriffs sale. The Sheriffs Deed is dated 2/26/2008, and

was recorded on 3/14/2008, as Instrument 2008- 7032. Peterson subsequently purchased the

Webster Ave. property from U.S. Bank, the foreclosing mortgage holder, for $5,600.00 and took

title by deed dated 12/31/2008, and recorded it on 3/3/2009, as Instrument Number 2009-4392.

       Approximately 14 years later, Cuneo filed a Praecipe for Writ of Revival against Yvette C.

Peterson, "Terre-Tenant" on or about 7/15/2022. On 8/22/2022 Peterson filed her Preliminary

Objections Raising Questions of Fact to strike Cuneo's Writ of Revival to Terre-Tenant. Cuneo

filed a response and his own Preliminary Objections to Peterson's Preliminary Objections on

9/9/2022. In response, Peterson filed ten (10) exhibits which are documents filed of record with

the Allegheny County Department of Court Records and the Allegheny County Department of

Real Estate, and I take judicial notice as fact pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence Pa.

R.E. 201. I heard argument on 12/1/2022 and sustained Peterson's Preliminary Objections and

overruled Cuneo's Preliminary Objections, finding that Peterson was not a Terre-Tenant.
                                        Standard of Review

       The Superior Court in Richmond v. McHale, 35 A.3d 779, 783 (2012) established the

standard of review in sustaining preliminary objections for trial courts:

               Preliminary objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action should
       be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader
       will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If any
       doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it should be resolved in
       favor of overruling the preliminary objections.

Id.
                A demurrer tests only whether, as a matter oflaw, the pleaded allegations
       may entitle the pleader to relief. To answer that question, the pleader's factual
       allegations are accepted as true; because there are no other "facts" before the court,
       the trial court has no basis to assume otherwise. And because neither party has had
       any opportunity to present evidence showing what the facts actually are, the law
       precludes dismissal unless it is 'clear and free from doubt' that no relief may be
       obtained under the pleader's allegations. (internal citations are omitted)

C.G. v. J.H., 172 A.3d 43, 54-55 (2017), affd, 648 Pa. 418, 193 A.3d 891 (2018).

                                             Discussion

       All eight (8) of Cuneo' s alleged errors are founded on his incorrect belief that his

judgement had priority over Wells Fargo mortgage and that Peterson had purchased the property

directly or indirectly from Burgess, making her a Terre- Tenant. Both of Cuneo' s legal averments

are erroneous upon review of the documents filed with the Allegheny County Department of Court

Records and the Allegheny County Department of Real Estate.

       Peterson filed Preliminary Objections Raising Questions of Fact to strike Cuneo's Writ of

Revival to Terre-Tenant, averring that pursuant to Pa. R.C. P. Rules 1028(a)(l) there is a lack of

jurisdiction over Peterson and a demurrer under 1028 (a)(4) averring that Cuneo's Writ of

Revival to Terre-Tenant was legally insufficient.
       Cuneo first incorrectly argues that his lien had priority over Wells Fargo's mortgage. The

record is clear that Wells Fargo's mortgage on the property was perfected and filed on 7/6/2006,

nearly ten (10) months before Cuneo's judgement was recorded in the Allegheny County's

Department of Court Records on 5/29/2007.

       Priority for the liens of purchase money mortgages is provided by statute at 42 Pa.C.S. $

8141(1), time from which liens have priority, is as follows:

       Liens against real property shall have priority over each other on the following
       basis:
       (1) Purchase money mortgages, from the time they are delivered to the
       mortgagee, if they are recorded within ten days after their date; otherwise,
       from the time they are left for record. A mortgage is a "purchase money
       mortgage" to the extent that it is:
               (i) taken by the seller of the mortgaged property to secure the payment of
               all or part of the purchase price; or
               (ii) taken by a mortgagee other than the seller to secure the repayment of
               money actually advanced by such person to or on behalf of the mortgagor
               at the time the mortgagor acquires title to the property and used by the
               mortgagor at that time to pay all or part of the purchase price, except that a
               mortgage other than to the seller of the property shall not be a purchase
               money mortgage within the meaning of this section unless expressly stated
               so to be.
       (2) Other mortgages and defeasible deeds in the nature of mortgages, from the time
       they are left for record.
       (3) Verdicts for a specific sum of money, from the time they are recorded by
       the court. ( emphasis added)

Id.

       There is no dispute that Wells Fargo's mortgage was recorded, and its foreclosure action

was prior to Cuneo' s verdict judgment. Based on the applicable law as set forth in $ 8141, time

from which liens have priority, and the record, Cuneo' s verdict for a specific sum of money was

a junior lien to Wells Fargo's mortgage.

       Further, Cuneo incorrectly avers that his judgement lien was not divested by the

2/4/2008, Sheriffs sale and is still viable against the Webster Ave. property. The general rule in
Pennsylvania is that a Sheriffs sale of property divests all junior liens on that property. Unity

Sav. Ass'n v. Am. Urb. Scis. Found. Inc., 487 A.2d 356, 358 (1984) citing Albert J. Grosser v.

Rosen, 259 A.2d 679 (1969). Since the record contains an Affidavit of Service Pursuant to Rule

3129, stating that all record lien holders, including Cuneo, were served notice of the 2/4/2008,

Sheriffs sale, all junior liens were divested after the Sheriffs sale. The law is clear that Cuneo' s

lien on the property was divested upon the sale of the property to the mortgage holder at the

Sheriffs sale. Applying the law as found in Unity. it is clear that Cuneo's lien on the property

was divested upon the sale of the property to the mortgage holder at the Sheriffs sale.

       Cuneo's filing a Writ of Revival to Terre-Tenant against Peterson was legally insufficient

since the record confirms that Peterson is not a Terre-Tenant. The law in Pennsylvania is clear

as to what establishes a Terre-Tenant and valid defenses to that claim. "A terre-tenant, as used in

our law, is one who became the owner of an interest in the real estate after the lien of the

judgment attaches" Adelson v. Kocher, 36 A.2d 737, 738 (1944). "A terre-tenant is one who has

purchased an estate mediately or immediately from the debtor while it was bound by a

judgment." Ellinger v. Krach, 28 A.2d 453 (1942),affd sub nom. Simmons v. Simmons, 29

A.2d 677 ( 1943 ). "The only defense in the trial of a scire facias on a judgment is a denial of the

existence of the judgment, or proof of a subsequent satisfaction or discharge thereof." Dowling

v. McGregor, 91 Pa. 410, 412 (1880)

       It is evident from the record that U.S. Bank took title to the Webster Ave. property as the

successful bidder at the Sheriffs Sale after a review of the dockets at GD-07-5528 and GD-07-

1113 8 in the Allegheny County Department of Court Records and the Allegheny County

Department of Real Estate. The Sheriffs Deed transferring the property to U.S. Bank is dated

2/26/2008, and was recorded on 3/14/2008, as Instrument 2008-7032, which divested Cuneo's
lien along with all other junior lien holders. Approximately ten (10) months later Peterson, a

bona fide purchaser, bought the Webster Ave. property from U.S. Bank on 12/31/2008, which

was recorded 3/3/2009. It is apparent from the record and the U.S. Bank to Peterson deed

transfer, that Burgess was not a grantor and the property at that time was owned by U. S Bank

and not Burgess. Therefore, Peterson did not purchase property mediately or immediately from

the debtor (Burgess) while it was bound by Cuneo' s judgment which was divested by the

2/4/2008 Sheriffs sale.

       Cuneo also filed Preliminary Objections to Peterson's Preliminary Objections in which

he attempted to raise procedural issues that allegedly occurred with the underlying Sheriffs sale

that took place more than fourteen (14) years ago. First and foremost, neither Peterson nor Cuneo

were parties or participants in the Sheriffs sale that occurred in 2008. Therefore, any alleged

procedural errors or allegations raised by Cuneo against Wells Fargo and the Allegheny Sheriffs

Department are not properly before me. Cuneo lacks standing to raise these issues at this time,

and I lack jurisdiction in this matter. I do note that Cuneo had revived his writ of judgement two

times before 2022, once in 2012 and again in 2017, and never raised the issue of Peterson being a

Terre-Tenant even though she has been the record owner since March of 2009.

       Even if I did find that Cuneo has standing, he may be barred by the doctrine of laches

since he sat on any rights he may have had for over fourteen ( 14) years while having at least

constructive notice that the property was sold to Peterson in 2009. These reasons are why I

overruled Cuneo's Preliminary Objections to Peterson's Preliminary Objections.

                                           Conclusion

          In conclusion, I did not commit any errors or abuse my discretion in sustaining
Peterson's Preliminary Objections and striking Cuneo's Praecipe for Writ of Revival against

Peterson as a Terre-Tenant with prejudice and overruling Cuneo's Preliminary Objections to

Preliminary Objections. Applying the law to the record, I found that Peterson was not a

Terre-Tenant and the Webster Ave. property could not be indexed by Cuneo'sjudgement

against Burgess. While my ruling does not invalidate Cuneo' s judgment against Burgess or

his estate, it does preclude him from indexing or executing against Peterson's property for all

the above reasons.

                                                   BY THE COURT: