Court Opinion

ID: 9926275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 15:07:12.996317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:15.386899
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re L.E.S., 2024-Ohio-165.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 IN RE: L.E.S., E.S., N.S.                :        APPEAL NOS. C-220430
                                                              C-220436
                                          :        TRIAL NO. F12-728Z

                                          :            O P I N I O N.

Appeals From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 19, 2024

Durst Kerridge Khatskin LLP, Alexander J. Durst, Paul R. Kerridge, Link Nestheide
Family Law and Diana M. Link, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

Hilton Parker LLC, Jonathan L. Hilton, Geoffrey C. Parker, Essig & Evans LLP and
Danielle L. Levy, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Amy R. Gilbert and Freda J. Levenson, for Amici Curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation and National Association of Social
Workers,

Frost Brown Todd LLP, Ryan W. Goellner, Lewis Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith LLP
and Jason A. Paskan, for Amicus Curiae The Nathaniel R. Jones Center for Race,
Gender, and Social Justice.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

ZAYAS, Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}   The “right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the

person.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609

(2015); see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010

(1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-384, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618

(1978). In Obergefell, the United State Supreme Court held that states may not

constitutionally exclude same-sex couples from “marriage on the same terms and

conditions as opposite-sex couples.” Obergefell at 675-676. Consequently, states

cannot constitutionally deprive same-sex couples of the “constellation of benefits”

linked to marriage under state law. Id. at 646-647, 670; Pavan v. Smith, 582 U.S. 563,

564, 137 S.Ct. 2075, 198 L.Ed.2d 636 (2017).

       {¶2}   Under R.C. 3111.95(A), Ohio conclusively recognizes a consenting

different-sex spouse of a married woman as the natural parent of a child conceived as

a result of nonspousal artificial insemination during the marriage. Obergefell clearly

compels the result that such legal recognition must be equally extended to a

consenting same-sex spouse of a married woman under Ohio law as Ohio has linked

the establishment of a parent-and-child relationship to the marriage in such a

situation and therefore provides married couples with a form of legal recognition not

available to unmarried couples. See Pavan at 567; see also Harrison v. Harrison, 643

S.W.3d 376, 382-383 (Tenn.App.2021).

       {¶3}   The more difficult question presented to this court on appeal is whether

the same-sex consenting partner of a woman subject to nonspousal artificial

insemination can be recognized as the legal parent of the child(ren) conceived as a

result of the nonspousal artificial insemination where the parties were never married

but would have been at the time of the child(ren)’s conception had they legally been

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

able to do so and have the marriage recognized in their home state of Ohio. For the

reasons that follow, we hold that such a partner should be recognized as a legal parent

under Ohio law where it is affirmatively established that the parties would have been

married at the time of the child(ren)’s conception but for Ohio’s unconstitutional ban

on same-sex marriage. See In re Domestic Partnership of Madrone, 271 Or.App. 116,

128, 350 P.3d 495 (2015).

       {¶4}    In the instant case, the juvenile court determined that there was no

pathway under Ohio law for appellee/cross-appellant C.E. to be recognized as the legal

parent of the child(ren) consensually conceived by her same-sex partner,

appellant/cross-appellee P.S., as a result of nonspousal artificial insemination during

their relationship, despite C.E.’s assertion that the parties would have been married at

the time of conception had they legally been able to do so. Instead, based on a number

of other factors, the trial court found that P.S. relinquished sole custody of the children

in favor of shared custody with C.E. under In re Bonfield, 97 Ohio St.3d 387, 2002-

Ohio-6660, 780 N.E.2d 241, and In re Mullens, 129 Ohio St.3d 417, 2011-Ohio-3361,

953 N.E.2d 302. Because we hold that in this case the juvenile court should have first

determined whether the parties would have been married at the time of the

child(ren)’s conception—but for Ohio’s unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage—

before finding that C.E. could not be recognized as a legal parent of the child(ren)

under Ohio law, we reverse the juvenile court’s parentage determination and remand

the cause for further proceeding consistent with this opinion and the law. Since the

juvenile court’s judgment on remand could render P.S.’s assignments of error

pertaining to custody and visitation moot, determination of P.S.’s assignments of error

is premature, and we decline to address them.

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                         OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                            I. Factual and Procedural History

       {¶5}    On March 9, 2012, P.S. and C.E. jointly filed an R.C. 2151.23(A)(2)

nonparent petition for custody regarding L.E.S., born February 16, 2012. The petition

indicated that P.S. was contractually relinquishing custody of L.E.S. based on a

cocustody agreement (the “custody agreement”) between the parties. The custody

agreement provided that the parties lived together as a family with L.E.S. and L.E.S.

had no legal, presumed, or alleged father under R.C. 3111.95(B) as L.E.S. was

conceived using anonymous artificial insemination.        Under the agreement, P.S.

expressly relinquished any right she may have to exclusive or paramount care, custody,

and/or control of L.E.S.

       {¶6}    On October 11, 2018, P.S. filed a motion for contempt and to terminate

or modify the custody agreement based on a change in circumstances. The motion

argued that she was the birth mother of L.E.S., and that C.E. was not acting in the best

interest of the child.

       {¶7}    In response, C.E. filed a complaint for parentage and custody of L.E.S.,

plus E.S. and N.S., born April 11, 2014. The complaint maintained that the juvenile

court had jurisdiction to determine parentage and custody under R.C. 3111.01-3111.99

and 2151.23(A)(2), the update in law before and after Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644, 135

S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609, and In re Mullens, 129 Ohio St.3d 417, 2011-Ohio-3361,

953 N.E.2d 302. The complaint asserted that all three children were conceived using

artificial reproductive technology (“ART”) with the same anonymous sperm donor

matching the ethnicity of C.E. The complaint further asserted that P.S. gave birth to

the children with the active and consistent involvement of C.E.—both financially and

otherwise—and both parties’ written consent. C.E. averred in the complaint that,

although same-sex marriage was not legally recognized in Ohio during their 12-year

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

relationship, the parties held a “civil commitment ceremony” prior to the birth of the

children and presented as married to friends, family, and others.

       {¶8}   P.S. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss C.E.’s complaint, arguing,

among other things, that no established Ohio law allowed for any parental rights to be

bestowed upon C.E. for any of the children, and that the parties ended their

relationship shortly after E.S. and N.S. were born and never entered into a shared-

custody agreement for E.S. and N.S. After responsive briefing and oral argument, the

magistrate entered an order on April 19, 2019, denying P.S.’s motion to dismiss.

       {¶9}   Hearings were held on December 6 and December 13, 2019, and

January 31, September 11, and September 18, 2020. C.E. testified that the parties were

engaged and committed exclusively to each other. However, at the time of their

engagement, they were unable to legally marry. She further testified that they were

not married at the time the children were born because they were unable to legally

marry. She agreed in her testimony that the parties could have traveled to another

state to be married during their relationship and that the parties had the ability to

travel as they traveled often. She said they even traveled to Boston to be married.

However, they concluded that their marriage would not be acknowledged in Ohio, so

they ultimately did not marry.

       {¶10} In contrast, P.S.’s sister testified at the hearing that, when asked, P.S.

once said that the parties were not getting married.

       {¶11} On January 26, 2021, the magistrate entered a decision on the

parentage, custody, and visitation issues.      Relevant for our purposes here, the

magistrate denied C.E.’s request to be established as a legal parent, finding no basis in

Ohio law to do so.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶12} Both parties filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. Among other

things, C.E. argued that the magistrate erred in finding that Ohio law did not allow for

a determination that she was a legal parent of the children post-Obergefell. P.S.

asserted several objections pertaining to the custody and visitation issues, among

other things. On August 5, 2022, the juvenile court entered a decision generally

overruling all objections. Pertaining to parentage, the juvenile court found that the

magistrate correctly determined that Ohio law prevented C.E. from being established

as a legal parent of the children and that Obergefell did not change this result.

       {¶13} C.E. and P.S. now appeal the juvenile court’s decision.

                                 II. Law and Analysis

                                A. Standard of Review

       {¶14} When ruling on objections to a magistrate’s decision, Juv.R.

40(D)(4)(d) requires the juvenile court to “undertake an independent review as to the

objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual

issues and appropriately applied the law.” This court reviews a juvenile court’s

decision on objections to a magistrate’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,

In re E.N., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170272, 2018-Ohio-3919, ¶ 22. However, where

the appeal presents only questions of law, this court’s review is de novo. See, e.g., In

re J.P., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-61, 2016-Ohio-7574, ¶ 11.

                                     B. Parentage

       {¶15} “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that

includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and

express their identity.” Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 651-652, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d

609. “Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State shall

‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ ” Id. at

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

663. The liberties protected by the Due Process Clause “extend to certain personal

choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that

define personal identity and beliefs.” Id.

       {¶16} “The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring

part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.” Id. “[I]t requires courts to

exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that

the State must accord them its respect.” Id. at 644. This inquiry is not bound by

history and tradition. Id. Rather, the inquiry “respects our history and learns from it

without allowing the past alone to rule the present.” Id. “When new insight reveals

discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a

claim of liberty must be addressed.” Id.

       {¶17} The right to marry is a fundamental constitutional right that applies

with equal force to same-sex couples. Id. at 665. This right includes the “identified

essential attributes of that right based in history, tradition, and other constitutional

liberties inherent in this intimate bond.” Id. One of the bases for protecting the right

to marriage is that it safeguards children and families. Id. at 667. This includes not

only the protection that marriage provides to children and families under state law,

but also more profound benefits. Id. at 668. “By giving recognition and legal structure

to their parents’ relationship, marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity

and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in their

community and in their daily lives.’ ” Id. Marriage is the foundation of family and

society, and society supports married couples by “offering symbolic recognition and

material benefits to protect and nourish the union.” Id. at 669.

              Indeed, while the States are in general free to vary the benefits

       they confer on all married couples, they have throughout our history

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       made marriage the basis for an expanding list of governmental rights,

       benefits, and responsibilities. These aspects of marital status include:

       taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession;

       spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical

       decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of

       survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules;

       campaign finance restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health

       insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation rules.

       * * *. The States have contributed to the fundamental character of the

       marriage right by placing that institution at the center of so many facets

       of the legal and social order.

              There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples

       with respect to this principle. Yet by virtue of their exclusion from that

       institution, same sex-couples are denied the constellation of benefits

       that the States have linked to marriage. This harm results in more than

       just material burdens. Same-sex couples are consigned to an instability

       many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives.

(Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.) Id. at 669-670.

       {¶18} Under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, same-sex

couples must be permitted to marry “on the same terms and conditions as opposite-

sex couples.” Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675-676, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609; Pavan,

582 U.S. at 564, 137 S.Ct. 2075, 198 L.Ed.2d 636. The United States Supreme Court

has continued to invalidate state laws that do not provide same-sex couples with the

same “constellation of benefits” that are linked to marriage under state law. See Pavan

at 566-567 (reversing a decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court which did not require

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

same-sex spouses to receive the same recognition as different-sex spouses under an

Arkansas law that required a married woman’s husband to appear as the child’s father

on the child’s birth certificate when the child was conceived by means of artificial

insemination).

       {¶19} “When [the United States Supreme] Court applies a rule of federal law

to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and

must be given full retroactive effect * * * as to all events, regardless of whether such

events predate or postdate the announcement of the rule.” Harper v. Virginia Dept.

of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), syllabus.

       {¶20} Here, the juvenile court found that Obergefell did not create a pathway

under Ohio law for C.E. to be recognized as a legal parent of the children as the parties

were never married. Although recognizing that the parties ended their relationship

prior to Obergefell, the court failed to acknowledge the retroactive application of

Obergefell. Specifically, the juvenile court did not consider whether the parties would

have been married at the time the children were conceived but for Ohio’s

unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage or consider how Ohio law contravenes the

mandate of Obergefell that same-sex couples receive the same constellation of benefits

linked to marriage as different-sex couples. The narrow question now before this court

is whether the juvenile court should have considered whether the parties would have

been married at the time the children were conceived—absent Ohio’s unconstitutional

ban on same-sex marriage—before determining whether C.E. could be established as

a legal parent of the children under Ohio law.

       {¶21} Under Ohio law, “[i]f a married woman is the subject of non-spousal

artificial insemination and if her husband consented to the artificial insemination, the

husband shall be treated in law and regarded as the natural father of a child conceived

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

as a result of the artificial insemination and a child so conceived shall be treated in law

and regarded as the natural child of the husband.” R.C. 3111.95(A). Under this section,

the husband is conclusively considered to be the natural father of the child with respect

to the father-and-child relationship, and no action or proceedings under R.C. 3111.01

to 3111.18 or R.C. 3111.38 to 3111.54 can affect the relationship. Id.

       {¶22} Thus, under Ohio law, marriage provides the husband in such a

situation with the benefit of a conclusively established father-and-child relationship

with a child conceived by his wife as a result of the nonspousal artificial insemination.

Under Obergefell, this marital benefit cannot constitutionally be deprived from a

consenting same-sex spouse of a married woman as Ohio has linked the establishment

of a parent-and-child relationship to the marriage in such a situation and therefore

provides married couples with a form of legal recognition not available to unmarried

couples. See Pavan, 582 U.S. at 567, 137 S.Ct. 2075, 198 L.Ed.2d 636 (“Arkansas has

thus chosen to make its birth certificates more than a mere marker of biological

relationships: The state uses those certificates to give married parents a form of legal

recognition that is not available to unmarried parents. Having made that choice,

Arkansas may not, consistent with Obergefell, deny married same-sex couples that

recognition.”); see also Harrison, 643 S.W.3d at 382-383 (analyzing a similar

Tennessee statute and reaching the same result).

       {¶23} If we were to simply hold that such legal recognition is not available to

C.E. merely because the parties were not legally married at the time the children were

conceived, we would be failing to consider the retroactive effect of Obergefell for

parties that were not legally married due to Ohio’s unconstitutional same-sex marriage

ban, the fundamental harm caused by such unconstitutional ban, and the impacted

children who are left without a conclusive parent-and-child relationship because of a

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

state wrong. To do so continues the harm that Obergefell was meant to remedy and

does not provide due process or equal protection under the law. See generally Pueblo

v. Haas, 511 Mich. 345, 352, 367-374 (2023) (holding that the court could not

justifiably deny same-sex couples—who were never married but would have been

before the birth of a child born as a result of in vitro fertilization but for Michigan’s

unlawful prohibitions on same-sex marriage—the benefit of utilizing Michigan’s

equitable-parent doctrine as the underlying rationale of the equitable-parent doctrine

was served by the extension and the court’s duty was to ensure that constitutional

rights were safeguarded and further harms were not perpetrated).

       {¶24} Rather, the only remedy this court sees for the unconstitutional

deprivation of rights in this case, which safeguards not only the right to marry but the

children involved in the relationship, is to recognize—in the limited circumstances

where it is affirmatively established—marriages that would have existed at the time

the children were conceived, absent Ohio’s unconstitutional ban on same-sex

marriage. See Dick v. Reeves, 1967 OK 158, 434 P.2d 295 (Okla.1967) (validating a

ceremonial interracial marriage of a decedent performed prior to the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Loving, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010, and

recognizing   the   decedent’s   spouse—post-Loving—for        purposes    of   intestate

succession); see generally Brooks v. Fair, 40 Ohio App.3d 202, 532 N.E.2d 208 (3d

Dist.1988) (“It has never been the policy of this state to encourage the illegitimization

of children.”); R.C. 2151.01 (“The sections in Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code, with

the exception of those sections providing for the criminal prosecution of adults, shall

be liberally interpreted and construed so as to effectuate the following purposes: (A)

To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children

subject to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code, whenever possible, in a family

                                               11
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

environment, separating the child from the child’s parents only when necessary for the

child’s welfare or in the interests of public safety; (B) to provide judicial procedures

through which Chapters 2151. and 2152. of the Revised Code are executed and

enforced, and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing, and their constitutional

and other legal rights are recognized and enforced.”). We find this remedy to be within

the clear intent of R.C. 3111.95 of legitimizing any child(ren) conceived under the

circumstances of the statute by two consenting parents—who would have been

married absent the ban—and ensuring that both consenting parents are responsible

for the child(ren)’s welfare. See generally Treto v. Treto, 622 S.W.3d 397, 402

(Tex.App.2020) (reviewing and interpreting the Texas parentage code in a manner

consistent with the legislative intent of the statutes and the guarantees of equal

protection).

       {¶25} We note that, contrary to the juvenile court’s finding, the Ohio Supreme

Court’s decision in In re Mullens, 129 Ohio St.3d 417, 2011-Ohio-3361, 953 N.E.2d

302, does not prevent a determination of parentage in this case. The issue presented

to the court in Mullens was “whether a parent, by her conduct with a nonparent,

entered into an agreement through which the parent permanently relinquished sole

custody of the parent’s child in favor of shared custody with the nonparent.” Id. at ¶

1. Thus, the issue of who may be considered a parent under Ohio’s parentage statutes

was not directly before the court. Yet, citing to In re Bonfield, 97 Ohio St.3d 387, 2002-

Ohio-6660, 780 N.E.2d 241, the court did say that “Ohio does not recognize a parent’s

attempt to enter into a statutory ‘shared parenting’ arrangement with a nonparent,

same-sex partner because the nonparent does not fall within the definition of ‘parent’

under the current statutes.” Id. at ¶ 11. However, we must recognize that there was

no argument presented to the court in Mullens pertaining to who may be considered

                                               12
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

a parent under Ohio law, and the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Bonfield does not

govern this case.

        {¶26} In Bonfield, the Ohio Supreme Court—when addressing the parental

rights of a same-sex partner—looked to R.C. 3111.01 for the definition of a “parent,”

and recognized three ways a parent-and-child relationship could be established: (1) by

natural parenthood, (2) by adoption, or (3) “by other legal means in the Revised Code

that confer or impose rights, privileges, and duties upon certain individuals.” Id. at ¶

28. The parties—at a time prior to Obergefell when same-sex marriage was prohibited

in Ohio—argued that R.C. 3111.95(A) provided “other legal means” by which parental

rights could be recognized and advocated for a four-part test to be utilized when

determining whether a same-sex partner should be treated as a parent under R.C.

3111.95(A). Id. at ¶ 29-30, 55. The court ultimately rejected the asserted four-part test

proposed by the parties, but never rejected the general claim that R.C. 3111.95(A)

created other legal means by which parental rights may be conferred under Ohio law.

Id. at ¶ 34.

        {¶27} R.C. 3111.95(A) clearly creates “other legal means” by which parental

rights are conferred on certain individuals under Ohio law, and—as established

above—the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Obergefell, 576 U.S.

at 675-676, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609, clearly compels the result that such legal

recognition is equally extended to same-sex spouses. Therefore, neither Mullens nor

Bonfield is contrary to our holding in this case.

        {¶28} Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court

should have considered whether, but for Ohio’s unconstitutional ban on same-sex

marriage, the parties would have been married at the time the children were born

before determining that Obergefell did not create a pathway for C.E. to be recognized

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

as a legal parent of the children under Ohio law. See In re Domestic Partnership of

Madrone, 271 Or.App. 116, 128, 350 P.3d 495 (2015) (holding that choice—and not

merely intent to parent—was the key to the determination of whether a similar statute

should apply to a particular same-sex couple that was not permitted to marry in

Oregon and therefore the factual question to be answered was whether the parties

would have been married before the children were born had they been able to do so).

       {¶29} We emphasize that this opinion does not decide any question beyond

the narrow issue before this court or make any determination that this same question

can or should be utilized when deciding any other rights and liabilities relating to

marriage or children in Ohio. Rather, this opinion is meant to solely address the

narrow set of cases in which, absent the chance to prove the parties would have been

married at the time of the child(ren)’s conception had they been able to do so, the party

lacks any remedy to right the wrong created by the unconstitutional deprivation of her

rights, which in this case is the inability to establish parental rights, particularly under

R.C. 3111.95(A), based on a marriage in the same manner as a different-sex spouse

under Ohio law.

       {¶30} P.S. points to Candelaria v. Kelly, 535 P.3d 234 (Nev.2023), and argues

that the “would-have-married” standard usurps legislative authority in states—such as

Ohio—that do not recognize common-law marriage since common-law marriage is not

recognized even for different-sex couples. We disagree. In a common-law marriage,

the parties involved have to their avail the personal choice to be legally married but

choose not to do so. Here, the parties were unconstitutionally deprived of their

personal choice and ability to be lawfully married in their home state and of

recognition of a lawful marriage entered in another jurisdiction.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶31} In Candelaria, the Nevada Supreme Court hinged the retroactive effect

of Obergefell to the date of solemnization. Candelaria at 237-238. We find this to be

illogical in a situation where the exact issue is that the parties were unconstitutionally

deprived of their personal choice and freedom to lawfully marry in their home state or

have a lawful marriage recognized. In essence, the decision in Candelaria detriments

parties whose decision not to marry or solemnize their union was based on

circumstances beyond their control: their home state’s unconstitutional ban on same-

sex marriage. See generally, e.g., In re Harper, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-800045,

1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 4967 (Jan. 1, 1981) (holding that the paramount status of the

natural parent’s right to custody would be destroyed where the basis of an unsuitability

finding was circumstances beyond the parent’s control). Further, the sole question

before the court in Candelaria was the determination of a date of a marriage for

purposes of property division in a divorce. Candelaria at 235. As we have already

emphasized, this court is not reaching any conclusion on whether the same question

used here pertaining to parentage can or should be utilized when deciding any other

rights and liabilities relating to marriage or children in Ohio. Accordingly, we do not

find Candelaria to be persuasive here.

       {¶32} Nevertheless, we caution that the question to be answered is not

whether the parties held themselves out as married at the time. The necessary inquiry

should not be decided in favor of a marriage based solely on facts analogous to a

determination of common-law marriage as Ohio does not recognize common-law

marriage even for different-sex couples. This is not to say that some of the same

considerations inquired upon for common-law marriage may not be used to aid the

trier of fact in making a credibility determination as these factors most certainly may

be relevant when assessing the credibility of the parties at issue. In fact, any number

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

of factors may ultimately be relevant when assessing credibility and determining

whether the parties would have been married at the time of the child(ren)’s

conception, but for Ohio’s unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage.

       {¶33} We recognize that decisions about marriage “are among the most

intimate that an individual can make.” Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 646, 666, 135 S.Ct.

2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609. Accordingly, the trial court should proceed with caution in

ensuring that the effect of a marriage is not imposed on a party that would not have

mutually assented to the marriage, while also recognizing the restrictive situation the

parties were placed in due to the unconstitutional ban on their liberty.

       {¶34} If it is credibly established that the parties would have been married at

the time a child was conceived absent the ban, then this court is of the opinion that

marriage should be recognized for the purposes of determining parental rights,

particularly under R.C. 3111.95(A). In other words, this opinion has one specific

purpose: to allow for the recognition of marriages in limited situations where the

parties would have been married at the time that a child was conceived had they been

legally able to do so and have the marriage recognized in their home state. It is meant

to right a wrong for which this court sees no other remedy, and to safeguard the

children involved by preserving the irreplaceable bond that is the parent-and-child

relationship.

       {¶35} Accordingly, we sustain C.E.’s cross-assignment of error as we hold that

the trial court should have determined whether the parties would have been married

at the time of the child(ren)’s conception before deciding that Obergefell did not create

a pathway for C.E. to become a parent under Ohio law.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                  IV. Conclusion

       {¶36} Having sustained C.E.’s cross-assignment of error, we reverse the

judgment of the trial court pertaining to the determination of parentage and remand

the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the law. We note

that the juvenile court may hear additional evidence under Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d).

       {¶37} Because the trial court’s judgment on remand could render P.S.’s

assignments of error pertaining to custody and visitation moot, determination of the

assignments of error is premature and we decline to address them.

                                            Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

WINKLER and KINSLEY, JJ., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its own entry this date.

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