Court Opinion

ID: 9944318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 16:39:15.871359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:54:16.360601
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION TO DOCKET AND DISMISS
This cause was filed in the Second Judicial District of Jones County, Mississippi, and demurrers were filed to the amended declaration. An order was entered sustaining the demurrers and the case was dismissed with prejudice on June 4, 1963. On the following June 14th (the last day of the May term) the plaintiff filed a motion asking leave of the court to amend her declaration, or, in the alternative, for an appeal. The court entered an order on that date taking the plaintiff's motion under advisement for decision in vacation. No action was taken on the motion during the following vacation or during the regular August term of the court, or during the vacation following the August term. At the November term (November 22, 1963) the court entered an order setting the case for hearing in vacation on December 16, 1963. On that date, the matter was heard and the judge entered an order overruling the motion of plaintiff to amend her declaration. Thereafter, on December 19, 1963, plaintiff gave notice to the court reporter, and on February 15, 1964, the plaintiff filed her appeal bond. The defendants have filed a motion in this Court to docket and dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal based upon the ground that the judgment entered in the circuit court on June 4, 1963, was a final judgment *Page 766 
and the ninety-day statute of limitation for an appeal (§ 753, Miss. Code 1942, Rec.) began to run on that date, so that when the appeal bond was filed, the plaintiffs' right to appeal was barred.
Movants have cited as authority for their motion, Jacobs v. New York Life Insurance Company, 71 Miss. 656, 15 So. 639, wherein this Court said: "It is not the duty of the court to offer the plaintiff leave to amend when a demurrer is sustained to the declaration. If desired, it must be asked for, and, if leave to amend is not obtained during the term, the judgment is final, and the case disposed of, so that costs may be taxed, and an appeal may be prosecuted from the judgment as final." (Emphasis supplied.) The expression of the Court, above-quoted, points up the fact that it is the duty of the parties to ask for leave to amend; this expression, however, would have been more in accord with the practice and more exact had it read "if leave to amend is not requested during the term, the judgment is final."
We held in Moore v. Montgomery Ward Co., 171 Miss. 420,156 So. 875 (1934), that "An appeal from a judgment in the circuit court is not allowed until that judgment is actually final (sections 13 and 3361, Code 1930); and since the judgment is under the control of the trial court until the motions mentioned are finally disposed of, it follows that not until that time does the judgment have that quality of finality which puts the statute of limitations in respect to appeals into operation. It would be an odd situation that an appeal should be allowable to this court, to set aside a judgment and grant a new trial, while a motion for a new trial remains pending before the trial court whereunder the trial court could, and perhaps would, do all that is sought by the appeal; and it would be an odd situation, too, if a case could remain pending in the trial court on an undecided motion for a new trial, and at the same time be pending *Page 767 
in this court on appeal; and it is a familiar principle that no statute of limitations runs against a party until he is allowed by law to do the thing as to which the statute is interposed."
We said in the case of Johnson v. Miss. Power Co., 189 Miss. 67,196 So. 642 (1940) "* * * if a motion for the setting aside of a judgment is filed before the end of the term of the court at which it was rendered, the finality of the judgment is thereby suspended and the limitation on the time for an appeal begins when, but not until, the motion is disposed of." See also Gulf, Mobile Ohio R. Company v. Forbes, 228 Miss. 134, 87 So.2d 488; Edwards v. Peresich, 221 Miss. 788, 74 So.2d 844 (1954); Armstrong v. Moore, 112 Miss. 511, 73 So. 567 (1917); DeWitt v. Thompson, 192 Miss. 615, 7 So.2d 529 (1942).
In the case of Mayflower Mills v. Breeland, 168 Miss. 207,149 So. 787, wherein an appeal was taken within six months after rendition of order overruling a new trial, this Court said "We have since held that, where a motion for a new trial is not disposed of at one term of court, it is continued until the next term and remains to be acted upon by the court at a subsequent term. * * * We therefore hold that the appeal was not barred at the time it was taken in this case, having been taken within six months after the rendition of the court's order overruling the motion for a new trial."
In the instant case, although it is true, that it is the duty of the court to hear and determine vacation matters and deliver opinions in writing at the next term of court (§ 1522, Miss. Code 1942, Rec.), the fact that the motion was not heard in vacation following the May term of court does not mean that the motion became moot, or that the former judgment became final; because all suits and proceedings remaining undecided at one term of court stand continued of course until the next term (§ 1649, Miss. Code 1942, Rec.), and this applies *Page 768 
to motions as well as to other proceedings (Willette v. State,219 Miss. 793, 69 So.2d 407).
Section 1519, Miss. Code 1942, Rec., was amended by the Laws of 1962, Chap. 297, so as to permit the court to determine all demurrers and motions in vacation, in the discretion of the court on ten days' written notice. In the case of Hyde Construction Co., Inc. v. Highway Materials Co., 248 Miss. 564, 159 So.2d 170, this Court held that the notice could be waived when all persons appeared at the hearing in vacation. Notice under this section is not required when the court sets a definite date in term time for a hearing in vacation.
(Hn 8) In accordance with the foregoing authorities, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the motion to docket and dismiss should be, and is, hereby overruled.
Motion to docket and dismiss overruled.
All Justices concur.