Court Opinion

ID: 9770039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:22:09.404482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:09.211599
License: Public Domain

HOLLAR, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s introductory premise that “an order remanding a case to an administrative agency [generally] is not a final order subject to an appeal.”1 I am constrained, however, to depart from the majority’s conclusion that an exception to the general rule exists which warrants the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over these purely interlocutory orders.
Contrary to the majority’s holding, I find there exists no jurisdiction to entertain these appeals because: (1) the Territorial Court cannot exercise jurisdiction not provided to it by the local legislature; (2) Ruiz and Todman were not required to raise the issue of the Territorial Court’s obligation to hear their initial appeal “de novo”; (3) the Territorial Court’s order remanding the cases to the administrative agency is not a final order; (4) the order remanding the cases to the administrative agency is an interlocutory order that does not fall within any exception to the final judgment rule; and (5) the 1998 amendment to section 354(b), eliminating the “de *688novo” provision, cannot be applied retroactively to this case.
A. The Territorial Court Cannot Exercise Jurisdiction Not Provided to It by the Local Legislature.
The Revised Organic Act of 1954, as amended, is the basic charter or constitution of the Territory of the United States Virgin Islands. The Act vests legislative power in the legislature, executive power in the Governor and judicial powers in the District Court. The Act, however, does not vest any particular jurisdiction in the Territorial Court. Instead, the Act confers powers in the local legislature to vest such jurisdiction in the Territorial Court as it deems fit, except for jurisdiction exclusively vested in the District Court. 48 U.S.C. § 1611(b) (1987).
As a direct result of this power conferred on it by the Revised Organic Act of 1954, as amended, the local legislature, via statute, vested certain powers in the Territorial Court, 'which included inter alia “de novo” original jurisdiction regarding administrative appeals of support orders. The applicable provision as set forth at V.I.Code Ann. tit. 16, 354(b), prior to the 1998 amendment, provided:
“Orders entered by a hearing officer shall be in writing, shall contain specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall be served on all parties, and shall have the same force and effect as orders entered by judges of the Territorial Court, except that an appeal from an Order of a hearing officer may be taken to a Family Division Judge of the Territorial Court within twenty (20) days of the entry of the order. The court shall hear the appeal de novo and unless otherwise ordered by the court, the support order entered by the hearing officer shall continue in force while the matter is on appeal.” (emphasis added).
The term “de novo” as contained in the statute means “a new hearing or hearing for the second time, contemplating an entire trial in the same manner in which the matter was originally heard and a review of previous hearing.” Black’s Law DictionaRY 435 (6th ed.1990). On a hearing “de novo” the court hears the matter as a court of original and not appellate jurisdiction.
While Ruiz and Todman filed timely appeals from the administrative support orders, the Territorial Court failed to conduct a hearing “de novo” as required by statute and failed to invoke original jurisdiction over the controversy, as evidenced by the remand order, which is inconsistent with a final order or judgment from a court which exercised original jurisdiction. Accordingly, these appeals should be remanded to the Territorial Court for a hearing “de novo” requiring a final decision on the merits at the conclusion of the hearing.
B. Ruiz And Todman Were Not Required To Raise the Issue of the Court’s Obligation To Hear Their Appeal “de novo.”
In invoking jurisdiction to decide these appeals on the merits, the majority asserts that appellees Ruiz and Todman did not raise the issue of the Territorial Court’s obligation to hear their appeal “de novo.”2 Additionally, the majority further contends that the type of jurisdiction exercised by the Territorial Court was wholly dependent upon whether the appellants in the lower court affirmatively asserted the court’s obligation to conduct a “de novo” *689review and if no affirmative assertion was made, then the Territorial Court judge was free to exercise some other type of review.3
Preliminarily, Ruiz and Todman did raise the issue of this court’s lack of jurisdiction, but on grounds other than those that are the subject of this dissent.
Secondly, I fail to find, within the plain meaning of 16 V.I.C. § 354(b), any remote suggestion that a Territorial Court family judge can elect not to exercise original “de novo” jurisdiction on appeals from an administrative hearing officer’s support order whenever a party to the appeal neglects to affirmatively assert the Court’s obligation to conduct a “de novo” appeal.
In arriving at its conclusion, the majority fails to recognize that subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental and nonwaivable requirement which must be fully considered by a court whenever a lack thereof is brought to its attention, even if raised for the first time on appeal. Godfrey v. International Moving Consultants, 18 V.I. 60 (Terr.Ct.1980). Moreover, this Court, in its appellate capacity, is obligated to make a threshold examination to determine if [it] has jurisdiction to hear the matter before it. Archer v. Aero Virgin Islands Corp. D.C. Civil Appellate No. 92-18 (D.V.LApp.Div. Sept. 28, 1992). Even if none of the parties raise the issue of jurisdiction, this Court, as a court of limited jurisdiction, must sua sponte raise the issue of appellate jurisdiction. NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, 176 F.3d 151 (3d Cir.1999). Thus, appellees were not required to raise the issue of the Territorial Court’s obligation to hear their appeal “de novo” since the court’s authority is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.
C. The Territorial Court’s Order Remanding the Case to the Administrative Agency Is Not a Final Order.
The majority opinion recognizes that section 23A of the Revised Organic Act of 1954 established the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and limited it to “the extent now or hereinafter prescribed by local law.” See also 48 U.S.C. § 1613(a). The Virgin Islands Code vests this Court with the power to review only “judgments and orders of the Territorial Court in all civil cases.” See 4 V.I.C. § 33. “Judgments and orders” within the meaning of section 33 have been judicially interpreted to mean “final” judgments and orders, Archer v. Aero Virgin Islands Corps., D.C. Civil Appellate No. 92-18 (D.V.LApp.Div. Sept. 28, 1992), so that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division would mirror that of the federal Courts of Appeal. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. deJongh, 28 V.I. 153, 158-59 (D.V.I.App.Div.1993). A “final” order or judgment ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute judgment. Ortiz v. Dodge, 126 F.3d 545 (3d Cir.1997).
Applying the judicial interpretation of this Court’s jurisdiction over judgments and orders, together with the meaning of a final order or judgment, it is clear that the Territorial Courts Order remanding these cases to the administrative agency is not a final order.
D. The Territorial Court’s Order Remanding the Case to the Administrative Agency is an Interlocutory Order That Does Not Fall within Any Exception to the Final Judgment Rule.
Although it has been established that the Territorial Court’s order remanding these eases to the administrative agency is *690not a final order, the majority nevertheless contends that: (1) a remand order to an administrative agency based on a legal ruling adverse to the agency can be treated as a final order, if the order will not be reviewable after remand, due to mootness; (2) the remand order may be immediately appealable when a trial court finally resolves an important legal issue in reviewing administrative agency action and a denial of appellate review before remand to the agency would foreclose appellate review as a practical matter; and (3) under a Gillespie4 analysis whenever an appeal from a Territorial Court order bears directly on the non-custodian parent’s obligation to pay support, a final judgment is not required for immediate review.
I find that the majority’s reliance on the recited exceptions to the final judgment rule is misplaced.
First of all, nothing within this record, regarding the cases under consideration, supports the contention that the Territorial Court’s remand order to the administrative agency, based on a ruling adverse to the agency, would be rendered unreviewable after remand due to mootness.
Secondly, nothing under the facts before this Court suggests that a denial of appellate review before remand to the agency would foreclose appellate review as a practical matter.
Thirdly, in Gillespie, supra, unlike the case at bar, the Court of Appeals exercised jurisdiction over the interlocutory orders without ruling on a persuasive pending petition, filed by the appellants, for mandamus and alternatively an application for exception to the “final” judgment rule under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b).5 In the case at bar, not only have the appellants failed to pursue any of the traditional procedural vehicles, such as Rule 54(b)6 certification, the “collateral order” doctrine or an application under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b), but it appears that the appellants are totally oblivious to the fact that the remand order they seek to appeal is interlocutory and not subject to appeal. See In the Matter of Sylvie Alison, 837 F.2d 619 (3d Cir.1988).
Another significant distinction between this appeal and the Gillespie case is the fact that the issue concerning payment -of child support by a non-custodial parent is not the type of fundamental issue, impacting upon general federal law, which warrants a deviation from the general final order rule. Hence, I find that the Territorial Court’s Order, remanding the case to the administrative agency, does not fall within any recognized exception to the final judgment rule.
E. The 1998 Amendment to Section 354(b) Eliminating the “de novo” Provision Cannot Be Retroactively Applied to This Case.
On May 5, 1998, an amendment to V.I.Code Ann. tit. 16, § 354(b) was enacted into law by the local legislature. The new provision provides as follows:
Orders entered by hearing officer shall be in writing, shall contain specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall be served on all parties, and shall have the same force and effect as orders entered by judges of the Territorial Court, except that an appeal from an order of a hearing officer may be taken to the Family Division judge of the Territorial Court within (20) days of the entry of *691the order. Such appeal shall only be made upon a showing of material mistake of fact or conclusion of law, with the burden of proof upon the challenger, and, unless the court finds good cause, the paternity or support order entered by the hearing officer shall continue in force while the matter is on appeal.
Notwithstanding the fact that the administrative hearing took place in 1993, that the Territorial Court remand order was entered in 1994 and this Court considered the briefs filed in this appeal on February 22,1995, the majority, quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 275, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) contends that the 1998 amendment may very well be applied to this case because changes in procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns about retroactivity.7
While I agree with the majority that the holding in Landgraf, supra, is controlling in this matter, I do not agree that the 1998 amendment to section 354(b) is subject to retroactive application. Furthermore, I do not agree that the amendment to section 354(b) is confined to merely procedural changes.
A comparison of the amended statute with the one it replaced, readily discloses jurisdictional changes, as a result of the total elimination of the “de novo” hearing; procedural changes with the introduction of a new standard for the allowance of an appeal; and substantive changes, as a result of the change in the quantum of proof required to stay the enforceability of the support order entered by the hearing officer.
Assuming arguendo, that the majority is correct in characterizing the changes in the amendment as being only procedural in nature, the Court in Landgraf, supra, at 275, footnote 29, 114 S.Ct. 1483 said:
Of course, the mere fact that a new rule is procedural does not mean that it applies to every case. A new rule concerning the filing of complaints would not govern an action in which the complaint had already been properly filed under the old regime, and the promulgation of a new rule of evidence would not require an appellate remand for a new trial. Our orders approving amendments to federal procedural rules reflect the common sense notion that the applicability of such provisions ordinarily depends of the posture of the particular case .... Contrary to Justice Scalia’s suggestion, 511 U.S. at 290, 114 S.Ct. at 1524, we do not restrict the presumption against statutory retroactivity to cases involving “vested rights”. Nor do we suggest that concerns about retroactivity have no application to procedural rules.
With respect to jurisdictional changes, which obviously occurred as a result of the elimination of the “de novo” hearing, the Court in Landgraf at 274, 114 S.Ct. 1522 held that [it] regularly applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed. However, in referring to its Bruner8 decision, the Court noted: “This jurisdictional rule does not affect the general principle that a statute is not to be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication.” Substantive changes, like jurisdictional changes, also require specific statutory intent before a retroactive construction can be applied. Conspicuously absent from the 1998 amendment to section 354(b) is any explicit *692language that would substantiate legislative intent to give the statute any retroactive construction.
In view of the posture of this appeal at the time of the 1998 amendment and the absence of any explicit language or legislative intent giving the amendment any retroactive application, none should be given.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. •
ORDER OF THE COURT
AND NOW, this 8th day of December, 2000, having considered the parties’ submissions and arguments, and for the reasons set forth in the Court’s accompanying Opinion of even date, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Territorial Court’s Order of termination of automatic payroll withholding is hereby VACATED, and it is further
ORDERED that the Territorial Court’s Order remanding the case to the Division of Parental and Child Services is hereby AFFIRMED for further proceedings consistent with the accompanying Opinion.

. Infra at page-4.

. See infra at page •7.

. See infra at page ■8.

.Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 85 S.Ct. 308, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964).

. Gillespie at 151, 85 S.Ct. 308.

. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).

. See infra at page-8 and footnote 7.

. Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 72 S.Ct. 581, 96 L.Ed. 786 (1952).