Court Opinion

ID: 9770931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:25:42.994902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:22.670013
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
Mr. Justice Calvert
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In its motion for rehearing the City of Galveston expresses the fear that our holding on original submission threatens the validity of our Workmens Compensation Act. Vernon’s Texas Civ. Stat. Art. 8306 et seq. Obviously what we said in our opinion has been misunderstood. We chose our words with care so that they would not be misunderstood, but misunderstanding by respondent City forecasts possible misunderstanding by others and prompts us to enlarge upon the main thesis of that opinion.
We said that Section 13 of Article I of our Constitution denies “to legislative bodies the right to arbitrarily abolish causes of action against municipalities where such causes of action are well established and well defined in the common law.” Perhaps it would have been more in keeping with the language of the constitutional provision had we said that it prohibited legislative bodies from arbitrarily withdrawing all legal remedies from one having a cause of action well established and well defined in the common law, but the practical result would have been the same, the only distinction being in unimportant phrasing. In either case proper respect must be accorded the emphasis we intended to give the word “arbitrarily”.
The validity of our Workmens Compensation Act was long since sustained by this Court in Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Texas 96, 185 S.W. 556, and by the Supreme Court of the United States in the same case. See 249 U.S. 152, *19863 L. Ed. 527, 39 Sup. Ct. 227. It may be voted that the Legislature did not by the Workmens Compensation Act arbitrarily abolish the employee’s common law cause of action for negligence against the employer, or arbitrarily withdraw from him all legal remedy therefor; it simply substituted a different but certain and adequate legal remedy for the one that existed at common law. Respondent can find no comfort in the Middleton case. In writing on the question the Supreme Court of the United States said that the citizen had no vested right to have the rules of law remain unchanged for his benefit, and said: “The definition of negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk, the effect to be given to them, the rule of respondent superior, the imposition of liability without fault, and the exemption of liability in spite of fault — all these, as rules of conduct, are subject to legislative modification.” The court went on to hold that a plan imposing liability on the employer irrespective of fault, “and requiring the employee to assume all risk and damages over and above the statutory schedule, when established as a reasonable substitute for the legal measure of duty and responsibility previously existing, may be made compulsory upon employees as well as employers.” (Emphasis ours throughout). See also N.Y. Central Ry. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 61 L. Ed. 667, 674, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, where while not deciding the question, the court expressed doubt that a state might “suddenly set aside all common-law rules respecting liability as between employer and employee, without providing a reasonably just substitute.”
Another class of cases involving a kindred question are those passing on the validity of so-called “Guest Statutes.” A Connecticut Statute Pub. Acts 1927, Ch. 308, limiting liability of an owner or operator of an automobile to a gratuitious passenger to those situations where injury to the guest grew out of intentional or heedless and reckless conduct on the part of the host was sustained by the Connecticut Court on the ground that it only revised or redefined the common-law duty of care of the host to the guest. Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 Atl. 240, 65 A.L.R. 943. The Supreme Court of the United States in the same case, upheld the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that it represented a reasonable and permissible exercise by the Legislature of the state’s police power to correct abuses and evils arising out of a growing multiplicity of suits by gratuitous passengers contrary to the public welfare, 280 U.S. 117, 74 L. Ed. 221, 50 Sup. Ct. 57, 65 A.L.R. 943. In sustaining the validity of a similar statute in this state (Article 6701b, V.A.C.S.) this Court cited the decision of the United States Supreme Court in *199the Silver case, without comment. Campbell v. Paschall, Texas Com. App., 121 S.W. 2d 593 (opinion approved). On the other hand, where the Legislature did not undertake to redefine the duty of care but sought to withdraw the remedy of the guest altogether, irrespective of the nature or quality of the host’s conduct, the Supreme Court of Oregon struck down the statute as violative of a constitutional provision identical with Section 13 of Article I of our Constitution. Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 Pac. 998, 272 Pac. 893, 61 A.L.R. 1236.
Under authority of a constitutional provision similar to Section 13 of Article I of our Constitution the Supreme Court of Illinois struck down a statute abolishing all causes of action for alienation of affection upon a conclusion that the statute did not subserve the public welfare but was contrary to the public policy of that state. Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E. 2d 464, 167 A.L.R. 232. For approving comment, see 42 Ill. L. Rev. 233.
Cases reaching an opposite result in dealing with the same problem went off largely on the theory that rights growing out of the marital- relationship were not “property rights” entitled to protection under a Constitutional provision for a remedy for injury to one’s “person, property or reputation,” and that the marital relationship and rights flowing therefrom were peculiarly within the field of permissible legislative regulation. See Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8 N.E. 2d 47; Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 10 N.E. 2d 619.
Thus it may be seen that legislative action withdrawing common-law remedies for well established common-law causes of action for injuries to one’s “lands, goods, person or reputation” is sustained only when it is reasonable in substituting other remedies, or when it is a reasonable exercise of the police power in the interest of the general welfare. Legislative action of this type is not sustained when it is arbitrary or unreasonable.
Now to a brief re-examination of the charter provision. It does not modify the remedy for causes of action against the City, nor does it redefine the duty of care the City owes to those using its streets. It purports to withdraw all remedy from one injured by the City’s conduct, whether the injury' arises out of negligence, simple or gross, or from willful acts and omissions. No broad public policy or general welfare considerations are advanced to justify the charter provision as a reasonable exercise of the police power. We can think of none that could be advanced inasmuch as the operational effect of the provision *200extends only to the city limits of the City of Galveston. In this connection, we are not to be understood as holding that the Legislature could not by general law abolish all causes of actions against cities for injuries growing out of simple negligence in the maintenance of streets; we have no occasion to do so. A decision of that question can come in due time if such a statute is ever enacted.
What is here said on motion for rehearing in reality adds nothing to the language of the original opinion; nor does it detract from our holding that the charter provision represents an attempted exercise of legislative power which is prohibited by Section 13 of Article I of the Constitution.
Our holding is, of course, limited to those situations in which the legislative action seeks to relieve a municipality of liability for injuries caused by its negligence in the performance of a proprietary function. When a municipality performs a governmental function it needs no legislative action to relieve it of the consequences of its negligence. We adhere to our holding that the maintenance of the street in question was a proprietary function. We are not confronted with a case in which injury occurred on a state-designated highway through a city.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion on rehearing delivered March 2, 1955.