Court Opinion

ID: 9959767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:03:21.940427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:52.767052
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-2203
                    LT Case No. 2020-CA-0406
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ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

    Petitioner,

    v.

BRENT M. HUBER, INC.,
MCDONALD and COMPANY
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., KEVIN
MCDONALD, and KLLJMAC,
LLC,

    Respondents.
               _____________________________

Petition for Certiorari Review of Order from the Circuit Court for
Marion County.
Gary L. Sanders, Judge.

Kristen M. Fiore, of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, and Michael C.
Marsh, Sowmya Bharathi, Eric D. Coleman, and Donnie M. King,
of Akerman, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, and Robert W. Batsel, of
Gooding & Batsel, PLLC, Ocala, and Gordon J. Glover, of Glover
Law Firm, Ocala, for Petitioner.

Stephanie M. Marchman, and Julie Zolty, of GrayRobinson, P.A.,
Gainesville, and Gregory A. Hearing, and Benjamin W. Bard, of
GrayRobinson, P.A., Tampa, and Kristie L. Hatcher-Bolin, of
GrayRobinson, P.A., Lakeland, for Brent M. Huber, Inc.,
Respondent.
No Appearance for Remaining Respondents.

                           April 12, 2024

HARRIS, J.

     Petitioner, Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”), seeks
certiorari review of an order denying its emergency motion for
protective order as to Respondent, Brent M. Huber’s, attempt to
depose Allstate’s Corporate Litigation Counsel. Huber argues that
Allstate failed to establish a departure from the essential
requirements of the law because the order under review simply
permitted the deposition to occur, but did not rule on any attorney-
client privilege objections. We agree.

     The rules of civil procedure do not prohibit the deposition of
an attorney simply because he or she is an attorney, and protective
orders totally prohibiting a deposition should rarely be granted
absent extraordinary circumstances. See Bush v. Schiavo, 866 So.
2d 136, 138 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (“Florida courts have disapproved
the entry of protective orders prohibiting the taking of depositions
generally.”). In City of Oldsmar v. Kimmins Contracting Corp., 805
So. 2d 1091, 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), the court noted that “Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310(a) permits the taking of a deposition
of ‘any person.’” Courts must “exercise great care before permitting
the deposition of an attorney.” Stull v. Suntrust Bank, Case No.
09-82302-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/SELTZER, 2011 WL 13224911,
at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2011) (quoting W. Peninsular Title Co. v.
Palm Beach Cnty., 132 F.R.D. 301, 302 (S.D. Fla. 1990)). The mere
request for the deposition of a party’s attorney can create good
cause for the party opposing the deposition to seek a protective
order pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(c).
However, when seeking relief, a party cannot make a general,
blanket claim of privilege. Payne v. Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc., Case
No. 3:19-cv-1173-TJC-MCR, 2021 WL 3017392, at *9 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 2, 2021). That is all Allstate has done here.

    Accordingly, we deny Allstate’s request that we quash the
order denying its motion for protective order. During the
deposition, Allstate should be permitted to make objections to

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specific questions, if necessary, and when the trial court reviews
those questions and objections, it should make specific findings to
allow for meaningful appellate review. See State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co. v. Knapp, 234 So. 3d 843, 849–50 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018).

    PETITION DENIED.

EDWARDS, C.J., and SOUD, J., concur.

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    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
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