Court Opinion

ID: 9868843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 19:01:04.135923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:56.139281
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING.
In his motion for rehearing petitioner insists that our orig*491inal opinion overrules Stone v. Sledge, 87 Texas 49, 26 S. W. 1068. It was not thought that it would be so construed. In our view the cases are clearly distinguishable. We expressly limited our holding to cases involving non-homestead community property. The property dealt with in the Stone-Sledge case was the separate property of the wife and her name did not appear in the body of the deed. The strict rules governing the conveyance of a- wife’s separate property are not applicable in the conveyance of community property.
He also insists that the proper construction to be given to the deed under review is that, “the parties intended that Mrs. Hoff should convey the property described in the deed and that Mr. Hoff should consent to the conveyance.” It may be that the deed is properly susceptible to that construction. We do not hold that it is not, but, if so, and if the deed was properly executed by her, then it was a valid conveyance of the legal as well as the equitable title to the property. It is a well established rule that a deed to non-homestead community property executed by the wife alone with the consent of the husband conveys title. Thomas v. Chance, 11 Texas 634; Hanks v. Leslie, 159 S. W. 1056, (error refused) ; Leyva v. Rodriquez, 195 S. W. (2d) 704, (error refused, no reversible error) and the authorities there reviewed. It was suggested from the bench during oral argument that this case might fall within- the rule of the cases just cited, and in our study of the case we gave consideration to that theory, but, since the case had not been briefed on that theory, and since we became convinced that the theory upon which the Court of Civil Appeals based its decision and which had been briefed by both parties was sound, we concluded not to write upon the question of whether legal title passed by the deed. Having concluded that the equitable title passed we did not feel, and do not now feel called upon to decide whether, upon another theory, the legal title also passed. As stated in Mondragon v. Mondragon, 113 Texas 401, 257 S. W. 215, where it was thought that the instrument under review might probably have been sufficient as a conveyance, “Since, however, the same result will be reached, we will treat the contract as one for the sale of land, rather than a conveyance.”
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion delivered January 15, 1947.
Second motion for rehearing overruled February 12, 1947.