Court Opinion

ID: 9943777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 14:33:23.972569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:26.292336
License: Public Domain

I would reverse the order of dismissal. The prosecution was under no duty to divulge the name of the informant. (Theodor v.Superior Court, 8 Cal.3d 77, 88 [104 Cal.Rptr. 226,501 P.2d 234]; People v. Garcia, 67 Cal.2d 830, 836-837 [64 Cal.Rptr. 110,434 P.2d 366].) Here, the informant could not have testified in such manner as to infer that defendant merely possessed the narcotic but did not possess it for sale. The fact that another person who was not on the premises at the time of defendant's arrest had sold narcotics to the informant at the premises where defendant was arrested gives rise to no exculpatory inference as it relates to defendant. The majority argue that an inference might be drawn that defendant *Page 759 
possessed the narcotic not for sale but for personal use or only to destroy if the informer testified he had purchased contraband from a person other than defendant. I cannot follow this gossamer logic, whether it finds support in the decision of People v.Lamb, 24 Cal.App.3d 378 [101 Cal.Rptr. 25] or not. *Page 760