Court Opinion

ID: 9672451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:55:26.648668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:16.295728
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I cannot subscribe to the view of the majority that the dispositive statute — Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-1102 (Repl. 1992) — is ambiguous. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court. The pertinent sections of the statute are these: (B) Tangible personal property in transit through this state and tangible personal property manufactured, processed, or refined in this state and stored for shipment outside the state shall, for purposes of ad valorem taxation, acquire no situs in this state and shall not be assessed for taxation in this state. (2) “Tangible personal property in transit through this state” means, for the purpose of this section, tangible personal property: (C) Which is manufactured, processed, or refined within this state and which is in transit and consigned to, or stored in or on, a warehouse, dock, or wharf, public or private, within this state for shipment to a destination outside this state. Ark. Code Ann. § 26-26-1102 (b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(C) (Repl. 1992). (Emphasis added.) Only goods that are 1) manufactured for shipment in this state, and 2) stored for shipment out of state are exempt from assessment. Clearly, these criteria do not include raw material — coiled steel, in the case before us — which is shipped into this state for the purpose of eventual manufacture. ■ The reason raw material is not exempt is obvious. It may never find its way into goods that are manufactured. Or if it does, the goods may not be shipped out of state but instead may be sold in Arkansas. Also, the raw material could be sold off for some other business venture and avoid the manufacturing process altogether. That is why it makes eminent sense to exempt only raw material that has actually been manufactured and is actually stored, awaiting shipment out of state. That way Pulaski County is assured that the goods have not established a situs in Arkansas but are on their way out of state. Otherwise, the eventual fate of the steel coil in its unprocessed state is speculative at best. What also militates in favor of the statute’s clarity is the fact that Omega Tube followed it for two years — 1986 and 1987 — and did not contest assessment of its steel coil until 1988. Voluntary assessment is certainly some indication that the company did not believe its raw material was exempt. Yet in this appeal, Omega Tube contends that it came to Arkansas on assurances that its steel coil would be exempt from property taxes and was misled. If that is so, why did the company voluntarily pay the tax on raw material for two years after locating here? Omega Tube argues that the practices of county assessors vary with regard to assessing raw materials. No doubt. But that does not translate into ambiguity. Nor does the testimony of individuals involved in promoting business development in Arkansas who may have intended a different result from that actually memorialized by statute. I go back to the words of the statute itself, and the words could not be clearer. The General Assembly is presumed to have intended what it states, and here it did so with clarity and precision. See Roy v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 307 Ark. 213, 819 S.W.2d 2 (1991).There is nothing that remotely suggests that raw materials are exempt. Only after the material has been processed into product and awaits shipment out of state does it receive the favorable tax treatment. I would affirm the trial court. Hays, J., joins. MAY 17, 1993 No response. Larry Vaught, Pulaski County Att’y, for appellees.