Court Opinion

ID: 9382208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-25 00:00:23.434236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:37.784545
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50170     Document: 00516688530         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/24/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                                                       March 24, 2023
                                  No. 22-50170
                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk

   Samuel Cunningham,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                      versus

   Circle 8 Crane Services, L.L.C.,

                                                           Defendant—Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 7:20-CV-106

   Before Elrod, Haynes, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Haynes, Circuit Judge:
         Samuel Cunningham was employed as a crane mechanic by Circle 8
   Crane Services, LLC—a business that owns and leases self-propelled,
   hydraulic cranes to customers in several southwestern states. After Circle 8
   terminated him, Cunningham sued claiming that Circle 8 failed to pay him
   overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
   (“FLSA”) 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Circle 8 moved for summary judgment,
   arguing that Cunningham was exempt from the overtime compensation
   requirements as a “mechanic” under the Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”). The
   district court agreed, concluding that Cunningham was a “mechanic”
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                                     No. 22-50170

   because he engaged in activities of a character that directly affected the safety
   of operation of the mobile cranes in interstate commerce and therefore
   granted the motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below,
   we AFFIRM.
                                      I.       Facts
           Circle 8 owns and leases self-propelled, hydraulic cranes to companies
   for projects in oilfields. The cranes—which are permanently affixed to a
   truck chassis and can legally travel on highways—are transported to
   customer jobsites throughout the southern and southwestern United States,
   including Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and New Mexico.                As a crane
   mechanic, Cunningham traveled to these sites and other Circle 8 office
   locations where the cranes were stored to perform repairs and maintenance
   on the hydraulic, electrical, and pneumatic systems in the cranes. For
   instance, he repaired the cranes’ brakes, lights, horns, windshield wipers,
   transmissions, wheels, axles, tires, starters, and ignitions. On average,
   Cunningham serviced approximately five to twenty cranes a week and would
   travel out of state to service these cranes several times a month, if not several
   times a week. He estimated that he worked, on average, eighty hours per
   week.
           Cunningham was employed in this position for approximately three
   years—from April 2017 until March 2020. Initially, he was paid hourly and
   received overtime compensation, but in March 2018, despite no change in
   job responsibilities, Circle 8 converted him to a salaried position. In March
   2020, Cunningham gave his two-week notice to Circle 8 that he would be
   resigning. Three days later, Circle 8 terminated him.
           Cunningham sued Circle 8 claiming that it failed to pay him overtime
   compensation in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Circle 8 moved
   for summary judgment, arguing that Cunningham was exempt from the

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   overtime compensation requirements under the MCA exemption as a
   “mechanic.” The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
   (“R&R”) finding there was a genuine dispute of material fact of whether
   Cunningham performed work that directly affected the safe operation of
   motor vehicles and recommended denying the motion. Circle 8 objected to
   the magistrate judge’s R&R on the MCA exemption, and the district judge
   sustained the objection, concluding that Cunningham’s work involved
   “inspections that directly affected the mobile cranes’ safe operation” as well
   as “repairs . . . [that] maintain[ed] physical conditions essential to the safety
   of operation of the mobile cranes on highways.” As a result, the district court
   granted Circle 8’s motion for summary judgment on the MCA exemption.
   Cunningham timely appealed.
                    II.   Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
          We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s final judgment
   under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s “grant of summary
   judgment de novo, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the
   nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s
   favor.” Kariuki v. Tarango, 709 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation
   omitted). Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the movant shows
   that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
   entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
          “When the movant also carries the burden of proof at trial,” such as
   here where Circle 8 asserts an affirmative defense, the “burden is even
   higher; [it] must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements
   of the claim or defense.” Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 160
   (5th Cir. 2021) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in
   original). “Only if the movant succeeds must the nonmovant designate

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   specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (internal
   citation and quotation marks omitted).
                                      III.      Discussion
           Cunningham challenges the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment under the MCA exemption on two grounds: (1) the Secretary of
   Transportation did not have the power to establish the minimum
   qualifications and maximum hours of service for him; and (2) he did not
   engage in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of operation of
   motor vehicles. 1 Although Cunningham alludes to fact issues, the reality is
   that this case involves a dispute about the legal conclusion to be drawn from
   the facts of his employment, which is a question of law, rather than a dispute
   about what Cunningham did as an employee. We begin with an overview of
   the statutory and regulatory framework that guides this ruling, then we turn
   to the merits.
       A. MCA Exemption
           Generally, the FLSA requires an employer to pay overtime
   compensation to any employee working more than forty hours in a workweek.
   See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). “The overtime-pay rule is subject to several
   enumerated exemptions, however.” White v. U.S. Corr., L.L.C., 996 F.3d
   302, 307 (5th Cir. 2021); see 29 U.S.C. § 213. “[T]he employer bears the
   burden” to establish a claimed exemption applies to the claimant, Dalheim v.

           1
             Cunningham argues that Circle 8 has the burden of showing he engaged in safety-
   affecting work for each individual workweek that it claims the exemption applies. This is
   not entirely accurate. Under 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(3), “if the bona fide duties of the job
   performed by the employee are in fact such that he is . . . called upon in the ordinary course
   of his work to perform, either regularly or from time to time, safety-affecting activities,”
   the employee falls “within the exemption in all workweeks when he is employed” in that
   job. As set forth below in III.C., Cunningham was called upon in the ordinary course of his
   job to perform, from time to time, safety-affecting activities.

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   KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1224 (5th Cir. 1990), and we give a “fair reading”
   to the exemptions, Carley v. Crest Pumping Techs., L.L.C., 890 F.3d 575, 579
   (5th Cir. 2018).
           Under the MCA exemption, the overtime compensation requirement
   does not apply if “the Secretary of Transportation has [the] power to
   establish qualifications and maximum hours of service” for the employee. 29
   U.S.C. § 213(b)(1); see also White, 996 F.3d at 307. The Secretary of
   Transportation has this power for employees who are employed by either
   “motor carrier[s]” or “motor private carrier[s].” 49 U.S.C. § 31502(b)(1),
   (b)(2). 2 Importantly, though, “[t]he Secretary of Transportation need only
   possess the power to regulate the employees at issue; it need not actually
   exercise that power for the [MCA] exemption to apply.” White, 996 F.3d at
   307–08 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal citation and
   quotation marks omitted).
           “The Department of Transportation has promulgated regulations
   that interpret the statutory requirements of the MCA exemption.” Id. at 308
   (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 782.0–782.8). There are two regulations relevant to the
   disposition of this case—29 C.F.R. §§ 782.2 and 782.6. The former, which
   sets forth the general requirements for the MCA exemption, “states that the
   applicability of the MCA exemption to a particular employee ‘depends both
   on the class to which his employer belongs and on the class of work involved
   in the employee’s job.’”            White, 996 F.3d at 308 (quoting 29 C.F.R.
   § 782.2(a)).       Thus, the Secretary of Transportation may establish

           2
              A “motor carrier” is defined as “a person providing motor vehicle transportation
   for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). By contrast, a “motor private carrier” is
   defined as an individual who “transports property by motor vehicle” if “(A) the
   transportation is as provided in section 13501 of this title; (B) the person is the owner,
   lessee, or bailee of the property being transported; and (C) the property is being transported
   for sale, lease, rent, or bailment or to further a commercial enterprise.” Id. § 13102(15).

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   qualifications and maximum hours of service for employees of “motor
   carrier[s]” and “motor private carrier[s]” who:
          (1) [a]re employed by carriers whose transportation of
          passengers or property by motor vehicle is subject to [the
          Secretary of Transportation’s] jurisdiction under section 204
          of the [MCA], [and]
          (2) engage in activities of a character directly affecting the
          safety of operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on
          the public highways of passengers or property in interstate or
          foreign commerce within the meaning of the [MCA].
   Id. In short, for the MCA exemption to apply, the employer must prove that
   the employee “meet[s] both of these requirements.” Id. at 308 (internal
   citation and quotation marks omitted).
          The latter regulation—§ 782.6(a), which is one of several that
   delineate the specific classes of work involving “activities of a character
   directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles,” see
   § 782.2(b)(1)—sets forth the requirements for an employee to qualify as a
   “mechanic” and therefore satisfy the second requirement of the MCA
   exemption. See 29 C.F.R. § 782.6(a). To determine whether an employee
   qualifies as a “mechanic,” “neither the name given to his position nor that
   given to the work . . . he does is controlling. [W]hat is controlling is the
   character of the activities involved in the performance of his job.” 29 C.F.R.
   § 782.2(b)(2).
      B. Secretary of Transportation’s Authority
          Against this backdrop, we address Cunningham’s first argument. He
   contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment because
   there is no dispute that Cunningham’s qualifications and hours of service
   were not actually regulated by the Secretary of Transportation, nor did Circle
   8 maintain any records vis-à-vis Cunningham establishing compliance with

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   the Motor Carrier Act. According to Cunningham, this shows that the
   Secretary of Transportation did not have the power to establish his minimum
   qualifications and maximum hours of service.               This argument both
   misunderstands the law and misses the point.
          As noted above, the Secretary of Transportation “need not actually
   exercise [its] power for the [MCA] exemption to apply.” Id. at 307–08
   (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Thus, the fact that Circle
   8 has no records vis-à-vis Cunningham establishing compliance with the
   MCA or that Cunningham’s qualifications and hours of service were not
   actually regulated by the Secretary of Transportation is of no moment. The
   Secretary need only have the power to regulate, which, in turn, depends on
   whether the two MCA exemption requirements set forth above are satisfied.
   We conclude that the Secretary clearly has the power to regulate, as relevant
   here, “mechanics”—see 29 C.F.R. §§ 782.2(b)(1), 782.6(a)—so we reject his
   first challenge. The question, then, is whether Cunningham’s employment
   met the two MCA exemption requirements (or whether there is a genuine
   dispute of material fact about either or both requirements). We will discuss
   this next.
      C. Cunningham’s Employment
          As discussed above, there are two requirements for the MCA
   exemption to apply. As to the first requirement, “employment by a carrier
   subject to the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction,” Cunningham
   waived this issue by failing to raise it on appeal and argue it below, United
   States v. Griffith, 522 F.3d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that failure to
   raise an issue on appeal constitutes waiver of that argument), United States v.

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   Bigler, 817 F.2d 1139, 1140 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining the court will not
   consider issues that were not raised before the trial court). 3
           Turning to Cunningham’s second argument, he contends the district
   court erred when it concluded that he qualified as a “mechanic” within the
   meaning of § 782.2(a) and therefore satisfied the second requirement of the
   MCA exemption—“engage[ment] in activities of a character directly
   affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles.” 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a).
   More precisely, Cunningham argues he is not a “mechanic” because the bulk
   of the work he performed on the self-propelled cranes was to the crane itself,
   not the truck chassis, and his work on the crane did not directly affect how
   safely the vehicle could operate on highways. Staying with Cunningham’s
   logic, which refuses to treat the self-propelled crane as an undifferentiated
   whole, we agree with the district court that he qualified as a “mechanic”
   because his repairs to the truck chassis directly affected the safety of
   operation of the motor vehicle.
           A “mechanic” is an employee “whose duty it is to keep motor
   vehicles operated in interstate [] commerce by his employer in a good and
   safe working condition.”           29 C.F.R. § 782.6(a).          Mechanics engage in
   activities of a character that directly affects the safety of operation of motor
   vehicles when they “prevent the vehicles from becoming potential hazards
   to highway safety and thus aid in the prevention of accidents.” Id. For
   instance, mechanics perform work of this character when “they actually do
   [the] inspection, adjustment, repair or maintenance work on the motor
   vehicles themselves,” and the work “correct[s] or prevent[s] . . . defects

           3
             Even if Cunningham did not waive this issue on appeal, there is little question that
   Circle 8 engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the MCA exemption as it
   leased self-propelled cranes throughout the southern and southwestern United States,
   including Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and New Mexico.

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   which have a direct causal connection with the safe operation of the unit as a
   whole.” Id. Thus, activities like “[t]he inspection, repair, adjustment, and
   maintenance . . . of steering apparatus, lights, brakes, horns, windshield
   wipers, wheels and axles, . . . transmissions, . . . [and] starters and ignition”
   are of a character that directly affects the safety of operation of motor
   vehicles. Id.
          There is little dispute over the work Cunningham performed. He
   performed precisely the type of activities that § 782.6(a) contemplates as
   directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles on the truck
   chassis itself. For instance, he admitted that he performed repairs to the
   brakes, lights, horns, windshield wipers, transmissions, wheels and axles, and
   starters and ignitions in the self-propelled cranes. Even drawing every
   reasonable inference in his favor, the record demonstrates that at least some
   of these components—such as the wheels and axles, transmissions, and
   starter and ignition—were affixed to or part of the truck chassis. As such,
   the district court correctly concluded that Cunningham qualified as a
   “mechanic” under § 782.6(a) and engaged in activities of a character that
   directly affected the safety of operation of the self-propelled cranes.
                                 IV.      Conclusion
          In sum, the district court correctly concluded Cunningham was
   exempt from the FLSA overtime compensation requirements under the
   MCA exemption. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

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