Court Opinion

ID: 9733828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:18:15.510483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:29.984679
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
dissenting in part.
I agree with the conclusion of the plurality that for purposes of determining admissibility for use as impeachment evidence all crimes may be divided into four categories:
I. Treason and all common } law felonies. }
II. The crimen falsi. }
III. Other crimes that reasonably bear upon the question of credibility.
IV. Other crimes that do not reasonably bear upon the question of credibility.
Infamous crimes.
In obedience to the doctrine of stare decisis, and in the absence of any objection grounded upon the constitutional right to due process, I agree that evidence of a final conviction of any crime falling within category I or category II is admissible without the necessity of weighing the *367probative value of such evidence against its potential for improper prejudice. I also agree that evidence of conviction of crimes falling within category III is admissible in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and that evidence of conviction of crimes falling within category IV is not admissible.
I cannot agree that the threshold determination of whether a crime falls within category III or category IV is a matter of discretion. Conviction of certain crimes, such as assault or battery, tells us little, if anything, about a person’s credibility, State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 503, 511-12, 510 A.2d 253 (1986), and these crimes should be placed in category IV. Other crimes, such as indecent exposure, may or may not involve conduct “damnable as an affront to decency and social norms,” and because we will not look beyond the fact of conviction to the underlying facts, must also be placed in category IV. Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981). Still other crimes, such as attempted rape, necessarily involve conduct that so reflects upon the moral character of the perpetrator as to be relevant to the question of credibility, and are placed in category III.
The decision of whether a particular crime belongs in category III or category IV is a matter of law. It is neither logical nor appropriate to permit one judge to find a crime to be within category III and another judge to find the same crime to be within category IV. Either the crime is such that in every case a conviction will sufficiently reflect on the moral character of the perpetrator to make that fact relevant on the issue of credibility, or it is not. That is not a matter of discretion.
Discretion comes into play when the trial judge is called upon to determine whether the fact of conviction of a category III crime should be admitted in a particular case. When the evidence is offered with respect to the credibility of a witness who is not a defendant, the inquiry is generally limited to matters of time and the age of the witness—how much time has intervened since the commission of that *368offense and how old was the witness at the time the offense was committed. Weighing these factors against the nature of the category III crime involved, the judge must determine whether the evidence has any probative value. If it does, it should be admitted, with the matter of weight being for the trier of fact. If the facial probative value of the conviction of a category III offense has been completely offset by either or both of the factors of time and age, evidence of the conviction should be excluded. When evidence of the prior conviction is offered concerning a witness who is a defendant, the trial judge also must consider the possibility of improper prejudice, and must weigh the probative value of the evidence against that potential of prejudice. These functions involve the exercise of discretion, and it is appropriate to afford considerable deference to the determination made by the trial judge after weighing and considering these relevant factors.
In the present case, the excluded convictions were for prostitution and solicitation for prostitution. The plurality concedes that the statutory definitions of these crimes are “sufficiently specific so that the trial judge did not have to speculate as to what conduct the law condemned.” Plurality opinion at [365, 535 A.2d at 453]. Notwithstanding that fact, and notwithstanding the fact that the trial judge did not purport to exercise any discretion but instead ruled as a matter of law that these crimes could never be in category III, the plurality affirms the ruling on the basis that the decision was within the discretion of the trial judge.
I am of the opinion that prostitution and solicitation for prostitution are category III crimes. A conviction of either of these crimes more probably than not reflects strongly enough on the moral character of the perpetrator to permit the trier of fact to consider the conviction along with all other relevant factors in assessing the credibility of the witness.
The State’s only complaining witness was Cynthia Stewart, who claimed Petitioner had robbed her as she stood with her girlfriend on a street corner in Baltimore City at *3691:30 a.m. on February 9, 1984. The girlfriend, who also was alleged to have been a victim, did not appear at trial. The State’s case rested on the credibility of Cynthia Stewart, and the convictions that Petitioner proffered to aid the jury in assessing credibility were:
July, 1980—Prostitution.
June, 1981—Solicitation for prostitution.
August, 1981—Solicitation for prostitution.
October, 1983—Solicitation for prostitution.
The witness was 26 years of age at the time of trial in September, 1984. Even if the trial judge had considered the age of the convictions and the age of the witness, there is nothing about those factors that would have militated against the introduction of the evidence. This is not a case where the passage of time deprived an earlier conviction of its probative value, or where an isolated conviction occurred while the witness was immature and sufficient time had passed so that the earlier conviction may well have had no probative value in assessing the current character of the witness. This witness was not a defendant, so there did not exist in this case any possibility of improper prejudicial use of the evidence by the jury.
The trial judge was wrong as a matter of law in his determination that prostitution and solicitation for prostitution are not category III crimes. Moreover, under the circumstances of this case there was no room for the exclusion of this evidence as an exercise of discretion. In assessing the credibility of the complaining witness, the jury was entitled to know that she had been convicted of prostitution in 1980 and of solicitation for prostitution on three separate occasions since that time. Because of the importance of this witness’s testimony, the error was not harmless.
I would remand the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for further proceedings.
MURPHY, C.J., joins in this opinion.