Court Opinion

ID: 9908693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:09:42.244307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:27.004558
License: Public Domain

J-A23045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                 :           PENNSYLVANIA
                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
    GIL SCOTT GROVE                              :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :      No. 685 MDA 2023

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 3, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-CR-0000727-2022

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                       FILED: DECEMBER 11, 2023

       Gil Scott Grove, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered May 3, 2023, in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County following

his convictions for DUI-General Impairment; DUI-Highest Rate; Driving While

Operating Privilege is Suspended or Revoked; Carrying and Exhibiting Driver’s

License on Demand; Registration Card to be Signed and Exhibited on Demand;

Driving    on     Roadways       Laned     for       Traffic;   Prohibiting   Text-Based

Communications; and Careless Driving.1 Appellant contends that the

suppression court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress, which

challenged the basis of the traffic stop. We conclude that the stop was legal

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c); 75 Pa.C.S.§
1543(b)(1.1)(ii); 75 Pa.C.S. § 1511(a); 75 Pa.C.S. § 1311(b); 75 Pa.C.S. §
3309(1); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3316(a); and 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714(a).
J-A23045-23

because the troopers had reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant was

DUI. Accordingly, we affirm.

      The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On January 3,

2022, Pennsylvania State Troopers Vincent Morgan and Collin Reber initiated

a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle leading to his arrest. Prior to trial, Appellant

filed a motion to suppress claiming that the troopers did not possess the

requisite probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of

Appellant's vehicle. Pre-Trial Motion, 4/12/22, at 3. A hearing on the motion

was held on July 26, 2022 at which the Commonwealth played footage of the

traffic stop, and Trooper Morgan and Trooper Reber testified.

      Trooper Morgan testified that he has been employed with the

Pennsylvania State Police for six and a half years. Notes of Testimony of

Suppression Hearing, 7/26/23, (hereinafter “N.T.”), at 4. He testified that he

observed a GMC Yukon cross over the lanes of traffic multiple times traveling

southbound on U.S. 222 in Berks County. N.T. at 4. The vehicle then switched

lanes without timely activating its turn signal. N.T. at 5. The Trooper indicated

that these were violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, particularly section

3309(1), and that he activated his emergency lights after these observations.

N.T. at 6. He also testified that his vehicle was close enough to Appellant’s

vehicle that he could observe the violations with his natural vision, and that

he had to accelerate to close the distance between the two cars in initiating

the stop. He did not observe Appellant speeding. N.T. at 10. Trooper Morgan

testified that based on the totality of the circumstances at the time he

                                        -2-
J-A23045-23

conducted the traffic stop, he had suspicion that the vehicle was being

operated by a drunk driver. N.T. at 18. Trooper Morgan identified Appellant

as the driver of the vehicle stopped. N.T. at 5.

      Trooper   Reber    testified   that   he   has   been   employed   with   the

Pennsylvania State Police for about seven years and has handled multiple DUI

cases. N.T. at 19, 21. He stated that on the night of the traffic stop in question,

he observed Appellant’s vehicle cross over the center dash line, cross over it

again, and then “weave” back across the right side where it crossed over the

fog line. N.T. at 19. He observed the vehicle change lanes and not activate its

turn signal until it was in the middle of changing between lanes. N.T. at 20.

Trooper Reber indicated that these were violations of the Motor Vehicle Code,

particularly section 3309(1), and that the “very abrupt weave across the

center line” further raised his suspicions that the driver of the vehicle was DUI

of alcohol or narcotics. N.T. at 21; N.T. at 22, 24, 25. In his experience, drivers

swerve in that way when trying to overcompensate for a “lack of ability to

maintain their lane” when under the influence of a substance. N.T. at 21. On

cross-examination, Trooper Reber estimated that the distance between

Appellant’s vehicle and the Troopers’ vehicle was 300-500 feet upon observing

the first violation and 150-200 feet upon observing the second. The troopers

were traveling approximately fifty-five miles per hour and did not observe

Appellant speeding. N.T. at 22. After the hearing, the suppression court denied

Appellant's motion.

                                       -3-
J-A23045-23

      On February 16, 2023, a bench trial was held in which the parties

stipulated, inter alia, that Appellant’s BAC was 0.264% within two hours after

having operated his vehicle on January 3, 2022; that this was Appellant’s third

DUI within ten years; that Appellant was driving at a time where his operating

privilege was suspended; that Appellant did not possess a license or

registration; and that he was using his cell phone while driving to send text

messages. Stipulations of Fact, 2/16/23, at 1-2. Following the bench trial,

Appellant was convicted on all charges and sentenced to fifteen months to

seven years’ incarceration. Appellant then filed this appeal raising the

following questions for our review:

      (1) Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion
         to suppress physical evidence based upon the officer's lack of
         reasonable suspicion of suspected driving under the influence
         to base the traffic stop of the Appellant’s vehicle?
      (2) Whether the court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion
         to suppress physical evidence based upon the officer’s lack of
         probable cause that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code had
         occurred that justified the traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle?

Appellant’s Br. at 4.

      Our standard for reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress is

well established. In reviewing a suppression court's denial of a suppression

motion,

      we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so
      much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
      when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
      suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record,
      we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court's
      legal conclusions are erroneous. . . . Nonetheless, we exercise
      plenary review over the suppression court's conclusions of law.

                                      -4-
J-A23045-23

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 107 A.3d 52, 93 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

      Appellant's questions concern the quantum of cause required in order

for a law enforcement officer to stop a vehicle for an alleged violation of the

Vehicle Code. The relevant statutory authority is 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b), which

states:

      (b) Authority of police officer.--Whenever a police officer is
      engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers
      or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring
      or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal,
      for the purpose of checking the vehicle's registration, proof of
      financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
      number or the driver's license, or to secure such other information
      as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce
      the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (bold in original).

      This Court has stated,

      Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal
      activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the
      authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated investigatory
      purpose. . . . Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle
      stop when the driver's detention cannot serve an investigatory
      purpose relevant to the suspected violation.

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

omitted). Further, this Court has held that an officer must have probable cause

“for a stop based on an observed violation of the vehicle code or another non-

investigable offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1009 (Pa.

Super. 2017). “Thus, [section] 6308(b) requires only reasonable suspicion in

support of a stop for the purpose of gathering information necessary to

                                       -5-
J-A23045-23

enforce the Vehicle Code violation.” Commonwealth v. Venable, 200 A.3d

490, 498 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      [W]hen considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable
      cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the
      nature of the violation has to be considered. If it is not necessary
      to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle Code
      has occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to stop the
      vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a stop is necessary to
      further investigate whether a violation has occurred, an officer
      need only possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
      Illustrative of these two standards are stops for speeding and DUI.
      If a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the officer must possess
      probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is so because when a
      vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be determined as to the
      speed of the vehicle when it was observed while traveling upon a
      highway. On the other hand, if an officer possesses sufficient
      knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer
      may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code
      violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed
      opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under
      the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.

Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations

omitted).

      Thus, since different crimes under the vehicle code require different

levels of suspicion, in order to determine if reasonable suspicion or probable

cause was required to be possessed by the troopers, it is necessary to

determine what the suspected violation was, and if the stopping of the vehicle

and the detention of Appellant served a stated investigatory purpose to the

suspected violation.

      Our review reflects that the troopers stopped Appellant’s vehicle due to

their suspicion of DUI. While both troopers testified to having observed several

                                      -6-
J-A23045-23

Motor Vehicle Code violations of the nature that would not require further

investigation, those violations led to the suspicion that Appellant was DUI.

Trooper Morgan suspected at the time, “we may be dealing with a drunk

driver.” N.T. at 18. Trooper Reber stated that he activated his MVR because

“we were under suspicion that we may have a DUI in front of us, someone

who was possibly driving his vehicle under the influence of alcohol or

narcotics.” N.T. at 21. Trooper Reber also stated that in his training and

experience, abrupt swerving like he observed from Appellant’s vehicle

“indicates someone who's compensating because of lack of ability to maintain

their lane because of being under the influence of some substance.” N.T. at

21. Finally, Trooper Reber stated, “we felt that the operator of the vehicle may

have been under the influence of a substance, whether alcohol or narcotics or

drugs, that we wanted to make a stop to investigate to prevent him, if he was,

from possibly crashing his vehicle and harming someone else or himself.” N.T.

at 25. Therefore, the nature of the violation being investigated was a DUI.

      As discussed above, a vehicle stop for suspicion of DUI may generally

be based on reasonable suspicion, because such a stop may require further

investigation. See Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008)

(stating that “[e]xtensive case law supports the conclusion [that] a vehicle

stop for DUI may be based on reasonable suspicion, as a post-stop

investigation is normally feasible.”). There is a “distinction between the

investigative potential of a vehicle stop based on a reasonable suspicion of

DUI as compared to other suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.”

                                     -7-
J-A23045-23

Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 423 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

and quotation marks omitted).

      Since the troopers stopped Appellant’s vehicle due to a suspicion of DUI,

a violation which requires further investigation, they only needed to possess

reasonable suspicion that Appellant was DUI in order to initiate a legal stop.

See Chase, 960 A.2d at 116; Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1291. In determining

whether Trooper Morgan and Trooper Reber possessed reasonable suspicion,

“we must accord due weight to the specific reasonable inferences that [they

are] entitled to draw from the facts in light of [their] experience.”

Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 272 (Pa. Super. 2005). Reasonable

suspicion requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2011).

      This Court has held that reasonable suspicion of DUI is formed when a

qualified officer observes a vehicle weaving and drifting over the fog line. See

Commonwealth v. Walls, 206 A.3d 537, 543 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also

Sands, 887 A.2d at 272 (reasonable suspicion of DUI present where driver

drifted over fog line by three feet three times on straight section of highway);

Commonwealth v. Hughes, 908 A.2d 924, 927-28 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(reasonable suspicion of DUI where defendant's vehicle swerved outside of his

lane of travel twice in one mile); Commonwealth v. Masters, 737 A.2d

1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. 1999) (reasonable suspicion of DUI where defendant's

vehicle repeatedly changed lanes for no reason). Trooper Morgan and Trooper

                                     -8-
J-A23045-23

Reber were therefore justified in stopping Appellant’s vehicle to investigate

further to confirm or deny their suspicion.

      Here, in explaining its ruling that reasonable suspicion of DUI supported

the stop, the suppression court had the opportunity to view the testimonial

and video evidence. The court concluded that Appellant's vehicle drifted back

twice cross over the dash lines of the left and right lanes of travel and that it

changed lanes two times without timely signaling the change. Tr. Ct. Op.,

6/2/23, Exhibit A, at 2. The court also stated how the “very abrupt weave”

across the center line created suspicion of DUI justifying a traffic stop to

permit further investigation necessary to substantiate the suspicion. Id. at 2-

3. The court, therefore, properly denied Appellant's suppression motion.

Applying the applicable standard of review and considering comparable

decisional law, we conclude that the record supports the court's factual

findings and legal conclusion that reasonable suspicion of DUI supported

Trooper Morgan and Trooper Reber’s traffic stop of Appellant.

      Appellant argues that because he was not charged with a violation of 75

Pa.C.S. § 3334, Turning Movements and Required Signals, it must be assumed

that Appellant’s tardiness in using his turn signal did not rise to the level of a

chargeable offense, and thus, no probable cause existed for the vehicle stop.

Appellant’s Br. at 15. However, the fact of Appellant’s tardiness in using his

turn signal is relevant to the analysis for reasonable suspicion of DUI.

Appellant further argues that since 75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1), Roadways Laned for

Traffic, requires only that an individual drive “as nearly as practicable entirely

                                      -9-
J-A23045-23

within a single lane” and his crossing of the traffic lines was minor, no probable

cause existed for a stop of the vehicle. Appellant’s Br. at 18. Whether probable

cause existed sufficient to stop the vehicle for a violation of that section

becomes irrelevant because the nature of the violation being investigated was

a DUI, and Appellant’s movement between lanes of traffic is relevant to the

analysis for reasonable suspicion of DUI.

      Because we find that the troopers had sufficient reasonable suspicion of

DUI, and the stop of Appellant’s vehicle would have been legal if the troopers

had either reasonable suspicion of DUI or probable cause of another Motor

Vehicle Code violation, we will not address Appellant’s second issue. Because

the troopers’ reasonable suspicion of DUI was proved by the Commonwealth

at the suppression hearing, we will not reverse the trial court’s conclusion of

law that the stop of Appellant’s vehicle was legal. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/11/2023

                                     - 10 -
J-A23045-23

              - 11 -