Court Opinion

ID: 9771579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:47:57.984087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:33.302951
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The Houston (14th) Court of Appeals found certain facts and circumstances attended officers’ taking a confession from appellant, viz:
“Detective Kroschel testified at trial that after appellant was given his Miranda warning but prior to making a statement, appellant inquired whether or when an attorney would be appointed. Appellant was not provided with counsel, nor did the interrogation cease. Instead, appellant was told by Detective Kroschel that he would have counsel when he went to court. Detective Muir testified that he remembered appellant asking if he could get an attorney when he came to Houston and that he told appellant he would be appointed counsel when he got to court.”
Collins v. State, 701 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 1985).1 On that factual premise the Houston Court concluded that “appellant’s question as to ‘whether’ or ‘when’ an attorney could be appointed to represent him, asked after he was given his rights, was sufficient to invoke his right to counsel.” Id., at 306. (Emphasis in original opinion).
Now the majority would have it factually that “appellant asked if he would get an appointed attorney when he went to Houston,” Maj. opinion, p. 567, and as a matter of law that the court of appeals held “appellant’s inquiry, made after he was informed of his Miranda rights, as to whether an attorney would be appointed when he went to Houston, constituted invocation of his rights to counsel.” Id., at p. 566.2
*571Thus the majority is deciding on a factual basis other than that found and premised below whether the Houston Court came to a correct conclusion of law. I dissent to that kind of “review” of a decision of a court of appeals.3
In ,the instant cause we did not grant review to decide if the court of appeals correctly concluded that an inquiry “as to whether an attorney would be appointed when [appellant] went to Houston constituted invocation of his right to counsel,” for the rather obvious reason that the court of appeals did not hold that. Rather, recognizing the several allusions to an appointed attorney by both appellant and detectives might have created a ambiguous situation, and because the court of appeals assumed he “did not fully understand his rights,” Collins v. State, supra, at 306, we granted review to determine whether the officers were obliged to ensure that appellant did understand his rights. Compare Massengale v. State, 710 S.W.2d 594, 598, n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
At the Jackson v. Denno hearing on direct examination by the prosecution Detective Kroschel testified that upon meeting with appellant in an interview room, “We took some [eight] pictures of him, advised him of his rights and talked to him.” 4 He answered negatively to a question whether at any time after being warned appellant “request[ed] to exercise any of his constitutional rights, specifically including the right to confer with counsel.” The next questions and his answers are:
“Q. Did he ever mention an attorney?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he say about a lawyer?
A. He asked if he would have one appointed to him and I said yes, when you went to Court.
Q. ... Did he ask to have one at that time?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did he ask to have one before he talked to you?
A. No, sir.”
When appellant indicated that he would talk to the detectives, they first interviewed him about “where he had been, what he had been doing, his full identification, name, address, date of birth and things like that, [and] then all the way down the line and then he asked, what kind of deal are your going to cut and we said none;” appellant said “okay, and then he went ahead and talked.” The detectives sought out Lt. Phillips, told him appellant wanted to give a statement, and asked for a typewriter. Lt. Phillips said he would provide one but wanted “to get our Judge to arraign him so there’s no problems and advise him of his rights so he understands what he’s doing.” After that was done, Lt. Phillips remained in the interview room while a statement was taken from appellant. In that statement appellants confesses to committing not only the instant armed robbery but also to four more in Houston and one each in Hurst and Carrollton.
On crossexamination Detective Kroschel retold of appellant’s mentioning an attorney, viz:
“Q. All right. Now, you’ve indicated that he talked to you about wanting a lawyer. Is that correct?
A. He asked if, when one would be appointed to him.
*572Q. And what was your response to that?
A. I said I'm sure they do. They always appoint one.
Q. But he didn’t indicate to you that he wanted to talk to him before he made the statement?
A. No, sir. He did not.
Q. He’s worried about making a statement and then wanting a lawyer later on down the road. Is that what you are saying.
A. It’s what he told us. It’s what he asked.”
At trial appellant again broached the subject with Detective Kroschel, by asking him “in relation to_the blue card Miranda warning [and] that contained on the top of the statement, was there ever any discussion with the defendant about his request to be given the opportunity to at least talk to an attorney at some point in time?” Now the witness somewhat modified his version, viz:
“A. The only thing he asked us, if he would have an attorney appointed to him.
Q. And what did you say in relation to that?
A. Yes, he would.
Q. Did you indicate that it could be done at that particular time or was this just a nebulous question and a nebulous response about whether that might be forthcoming as far as an attorney is concerned?
A. That’s all that was asked.
Q. He just asked if he could have one and you said, you bet, and it was dropped. Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right, sir. Was that before or after he made the statement?
A. Before.
Q. So he did at some point prior to making this statement at least mention wanting an attorney. Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.”
On redirect the prosecutor pursued the matter:
“Q. Did he ask for an attorney at that time, sir, or was the question in terms of would he have one in the future?
A. He did not ask for one at that time.
Q. Did you offer him one at that time when you read him his rights?
A. Yes, sir.”
At the conclusion of the hearing the trial judge pronounced the finding of the court “that the statement made by the defendant was freely and voluntarily made.” The judge did not make a finding on the matter of invocation of right to counsel. There are no written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Compare Curtis v. State, 640 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).5
The rationale of the Houston (14th) Court of Appeals is that “when the question as to counsel is raised after the accused is informed of his rights, it is equally logical to assume that the accused did not fully understand his rights.” Collins, supra, at 306. (Emphasis in original). The State asserts that the Houston Court has formulated a “bright line rule,” but, as the appellant characterizes it in his brief, that assertion is a “red herring.” Unfortunately the majority gets distracted by its smell from the real issue decided by the Houston Court: When an accused is about to be subjected to custodial interrogation, and after being warned under Miranda it appears from his questions that he does not fully understand his rights to counsel, the interrogator must clarify for him those rights to render a subsequent statement admissible. Manifestly the Houston Court was agreeing with a similar decision in Huff v. State, 678 S.W.2d 236, 242 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984), no PDR; see also Goodnough v. State, 627 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1982), PDR refused.
*573Again, we granted review in this cause to examine that theory, yet we do not.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
ONION, P.J., and WHITE, J., join.

. Emphasis added by court of appeals; all other emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise indicated.

. The majority gets its "Houston notion" from testimony of Detective Muir, the State’s last witness at the Jackson v. Denno hearing; asked on crossexamination whether he was saying "there was never any mention of a lawyer other than when [appellant was warned] that he had a right to a lawyer,” Muir responded:
"Yes, sir. He asked if he would get a lawyer when he come to Houston, if I remember right. And we told him that one would be appointed when he got here if he didn't have one.”
Muir added, "but I think that was at the end of it he was talking about coming to Houston, would he have an attorney."

. Constitutionally, courts of appeals determine "all questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error," Article V, § 6. Even while a majority of this Court resolutely disapproves their applying the traditional insufficient evidence standard, and will not regard as "conclusive” their determinations on factual matters, see, e.g., Hill v. State, 719 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.Cr. App.1986), the Court should at least give some deference to their factual findings, unless it can demonstrate they are inaccurate. In the latter event we have summarily vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of the true factual scenario. See, e.g., Szilvasy v. State, 678 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).

. Several of the photographs portray appellant stripped to the waist. Lt. Phillips explained:
"I was asked to come in, which is something unusual — I’m not, we’ve never had that problem, but Houston came in and asked if .... they could take pictures of him with his top down and I said, why is that, and they said, to prove that he’s not been physically abused.”

. In pattern form the court instructed the jury on the issue of voluntariness, warnings and waiver of rights by appellant.