Court Opinion

ID: 9649885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:12:31.99384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:15.738689
License: Public Domain

JONES, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The majority contends that the order suspending appellants must be reversed because the utilization over objection, of appellants’ prior assertions of the privilege against self-incrimination violated their rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Without adverting to the merits of this position, my reading of the record clearly indicates that the initial cross-examination of both appellant Oxman- and appellant Levitan in regard to their prior exercises of the Fifth Amendment privilege were not objected to and that when inquiries were later made into the reasons for the prior exercises, appellants’ objections were sustained.1
*123Two other witnesses who had previously been called before the Special Disciplinary Court were also cross-examined with regard to prior assertions of the privilege against self-incrimination. When the first of these witnesses, J. P. McGraw, was so questioned, counsel for appellants objected on the grounds that this was not a proper question since it was not impeaching.2 Appellants did not and had no standing to object to this questioning on a constitutional basis since the privilege against self-incrimination inured to the witness and not appellants.3 Thus, even if we are to treat appellants’ objection to the questioning of McGraw as representing a continuing objection to this line of questioning of subsequent witnesses, appellants can still not be said to have objected on the basis that the reference to the prior assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination raises an impermissible inference of guilt, thereby violating their rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Nevertheless, this is the sole basis of the reversal by the majority.
*124I am thoroughly convinced that the majority mistakenly found reversible error to have occurred during the proceedings below. However, this determination is not really pertinent to the appropriate disposition of the case by the Court. The Act of May 19, 1879, P.L. 66, § 1, 17 P.S. § 1663 (now suspended by Supreme Court Rule 17-24(a)(4)), provides in pertinent part that “it shall be the duty of said supreme court to review the [proceedings] de novo. . . . ” (Emphasis added) The legislative mandate and the consistent holdings of this Court are that such review is mandatory. Krehel Appeal, 419 Pa. 86, 213 A.2d 375 (1965); Schlesinger Appeal, 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961); Moyerman’s Case, 312 Pa. 555, 167 A. 579 (1933).
The nature of our de novo review pursuant to the Act of May 19, 1879, requires in every case that we review a cold record. This record may be modified on appeal to this Court where errors of law have been committed by the court below. If the court below committed error in receiving certain evidence, then that evidence can be expunged from the record by this Court. If the court below erred in excluding evidence, then this evidence and any other new testimony may be offered by the complainant as specifically provided for by the Act of May 19, 1879.4
The instant case was presented to this Court solely on the testimony introduced during the disciplinary proceedings below. Since our review is de novo we are not •bound by the findings' of fact and conclusions of the court below, but are free to make our own determination as to the weight and credibility of the evidence. Krehel Appeal, 419 Pa. 86, 213 A.2d 375 (1965). It is also to be noted that generally conclusions of the hearing court in disciplinary proceedings are very persuasive on this *125Court, since the court of first instance better knows the lawyer, his standing, character, credibility, and fidelity to trust. Kraus’s Case, 322 Pa. 362, 185 A. 737 (1936). To the extent the opinion of the court below as to the credibility of Oxman and Levitan was tainted by the reference to their prior assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination, this resulted from their failure to object.5 However, granting that such references were improper because they were not impeaching, and granting that appellants can raise on de novo appeal to this Court alleged errors not raised below, the appropriate and equitable remedy to be applied here is the expunction of these references from the record before this Court, not at a new disciplinary^ hearing.6
That this Court is not able to judge the demeanor of the witnesses who appeared before the disciplinary court is inherent in the review provided for by the Act of May 19, 1879. To the extent that this review is not totally satisfactory, we can be comforted in knowing that this *126Act has now been suspended. Nevertheless, there is no authority by which this Court can evade its statutorily-mandated de novo review in the present case. In reviewing this case in adherence to the legislative mandate and the dictates of our prior case, law, it is clear beyond any question that the suspension orders should be affirmed.
POMEROY, J., joins in this dissent.

. Hie pertinent portions of the transcript appear as follows:
Cross-examination of appellant Oxman:
“Q. Mr. Oxman, you appeared before Judge Shoyer on August 10th, 1972?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And at that time you were represented by counsel?
A. Yes, Mr. Rutter.
*121Q. You pleaded the fifth amendment to our questions dealing with all of the cases that are the subject of this petition as well as a number of other cases?
A. That’s correct.
Q. By that I mean, you claimed your privilege under the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution against self-incrimination; is that right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Yet today, with respect to the cases—
JUDGE BARBIERI: He said he pleaded the fifth amendment before Judge Shoyer. I heard that part. What was the next question?
MR. RUTTER: So the record may be clear, the exact language of the claim as asserted at that hearing was as follows: T respectfully decline to answer on the ground of any privilege accorded me under the order of this Court dated October 28th, 1971, including, without limiting the foregoing, my rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and under Section 9 of Article 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and, in particular, on the ground that such answer might tend to incriminate me.’
BY MR. STEWART:
Q. You claim presently with respect to the cases which are the subject of our petition which are on trial here that you know of no impropriety by you or your partners in the handling of these cases, is that so?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Did you know of any impropriety back in August, on August 10th, 1972, when you testified before Judge Shoyer?
A. I did not.
Q. Then can you explain the reason for your claim of privilege against self-incrimination? Was it a frivolous plea if you had no reason to be concerned about improprieties?
A. Mr. Stewart, when I was asked to appear—
MR. RUTTER: Mr. Oxman, please answer the question directly.
THE WITNESS: It was not a frivolous plea. I did so on the advice of counsel.
BY MR. STEWART:
Q. On the advice of counsel?
A. Yes, after a great deal of deliberation and consideration.
Q. You, yourself, with counsel know you don’t enter a frivolous plea if there is no basis for it?
MR. RUTTER: I object.
THE WITNESS: I also know that he who represents himself is a fool for a client.
MR. RUTTER: I rise to protect my own reputation.
JUDGE BARBIERI: All right.
Q. Let me ask one more question on this. Was it your understanding then when you pleaded your privilege against self-incrimination that that privilege applied only to possibly immunization for criminal conduct which is really what we are talking about in the fifth amendment? Was that your understanding of the law on self-incrimination?
*122MR. RUTTER: I would object to the question because Mr. Stewart has stated the right to claim the privilege of the fifth amendment incorrectly.
MR. STEWART: No I haven’t, Mr. Rutter.
JUDGE BARBIERI: Just a minute, Mr. Stewart. State your objection.
MR. RUTTER: The objection is that Mr. Stewart has stated the right to claim the protection of the fifth amendment incorrectly.
JUDGE KLEIN: My understanding of the law is that you cannot ask a citizen why he took the fifth amendment. If he took it, that’s it.
JUDGE BARBIERI: I’m not sure. Judge Klein, that at a criminal matter you cannot ask him — if you were questioning his professional integrity that may not be the rule. I don’t know. But I don’t see what difference it makes.
MR. RUTTER: My only point is I refer to the Schlesinger Appeal.
JUDGE BARBIERI: Is that a disciplinary case?
MR. RUTTER: Yes, it is. The Schlesinger Appeal is a disciplinary case, a decision in 1961, in which the Court said that a witness may have a reasonable fear of prosecution yet be innocent of any wrongdoing and yet be entitled to assert the privilege.
JUDGE KLEIN: It would seem to me that in any kind of a case, if you engage a lawyer and the lawyer advises you to do it, that that is this situation then.
MR. RUTTER: Well, I take the responsibility for the plea, Your Honor. No doubt that.
MR. STEWART: The only point I want to make, Your Honor, is that—
JUDGE KLEIN: You have made your point before Judge Shoyer, Mr. Oxman, and you took the.fifth amendment. And now here he is testifying.
JUDGE BARBIERI: All right. I will sustain the objection. I don’t think he has to give his reasons.” (Emphasis added)
Record, vol. 6, at 139-142.
Cross examination of appellant Levitan:
“Q. Why, then, did you plead the fifth amendment before Judge Shoyer when questioned about these very cases and the testimony that you gave on the stand here today?
A. At that time, sir, I and my partners had retained Mr. Rutter to represent us. We discussed this at length and it is Mr. Rutter’s advice to us that that was the course that we should follow.
Q. Were you aware of the paragraph in Judge Jamieson’s order of October 28, 1971 requiring every member of the bar to cooperate with the investigation?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you think it was cooperation to plead the fifth amendment in view of your knowledge that there was no impropriety when the Court is calling upon you to explain your practice and conduct before its bar?
MR. RUTTER: Objected to.
JUDGE BARBIERI: I think that objection has to be sustained. Do you agree?
*123JUDGE KLEIN: Yes.
JUDGE MONTEMURO: Yes.
JUDGE BARBIERI: Objection is sustained. I don’t think you can ask why he pleaded that unless I don’t understand.” (Emphasis added)
Record, vol. 7, at 129-130.

. I agree with appellants that McGraw’s testimony at the proceeding before the Special Disciplinary Court and the earlier claim of privilege were not inconsistent and therefore not impeaching. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957). However, even if we assume, arguendo, that the court below completely discredited the testimony of McGraw on the basis of this evidence, that would not require reversal of the suspension orders since McGraw’s testimony was only pertinent, even tangentially, to four of the sixty-nine charges against appellants. There is substantial evidence on the record to support the sanctions imposed based solely on the remaining charges.

. When the second witness, William Jordan, was called, there was no objection to the initial inquiry into the fact that be had previously claimed his privilege against self-incrimination and, when further inquiry was made into the witness’ reasons for invoking the privilege, objection thereto was sustained.

. The Act of May 19, 1879, does not provide for the submission of additional testimony by the disciplinary counsel. Accordingly, when the majority refers to objections to new testimony, they necessarily refer to objections by disciplinary counsel.

. See prior discussion of this point.

. Despite the majority’s traversal, the following language from the majority opinion makes it abundantly clear that the majority has applied principles of traditional appellate review rather than of de novo review where this Court is the ultimate finder of fact:
“On this record we cannot say with assurance that the untainted evidence alone, however, persuasive, was sufficient to convince the trier of fact of appellants’ guilt. The testimony of various witnesses was directly contrary to that of appellants. Credibility was crucial in the factfinder’s determination. The court explicitly stated that it chose to disbelieve appellants’ testimony.
Even though we may assume that the court attached no inference of guilt to the prior plea of privilege, we must conclude that use of the prior plea even to impeach was prejudicial to the defense. Therefore appellants are entitled to a new disciplinary hearing at which no use of their prior claim of the privilege against self-incrimination should be permitted.”
The majority properly recognizes that our traditional waiver rule is not apposite when our review is de novo. However, since the majority has not treated this appeal as a de novo review, the policies enunciated in Commonwealth v. Agie, 449 Pa. 187, 189, 296 A.2d 741 (1972) and Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974) should be applied.