Court Opinion

ID: 9688204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:38:31.17448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:36.100292
License: Public Domain

CARTER, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur only in result because the facts reveal that the duplex was leased by Sue. Consequently, she could control the occu*673pancy thereof by excluding Donald s right of entry, notwithstanding the fact that it had at one time been his marital domicile. As a result, the jury could have found his entry was without right, license, or privilege, as must be the case for a burglary offense. But, it certainly would be otherwise if he was an owner or lessee of the property.
As stated in 73 C.J.S. Property section 27, at 209-10 (1983),
[t]he chief incidents of the ownership of property are the right to its possession, the right to its use, and the right to its enjoyment, according to the owner’s taste and wishes ....
(Footnotes omitted.) We recognized this attribute of property ownership in Iowa State Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 871, 82 N.W.2d 755, 758 (1957). The right of possession of jointly owned property is in common, and each has a right to the enjoyment of the whole thereof. In re Estate of Winkler, 232 Iowa 930, 933, 5 N.W.2d 153, 155 (1942). The same would be true as to a cotenant’s right of occupancy of leased premises.
As written, the majority opinion is much too broad and implies a right to throw an estranged spouse out of the family home or to preclude him from reentering based on some claim of right that is superior to his property interest. That right does not exist in the absence of a court order.
LAVORATO, C.J., joins this special concurrence.