Court Opinion

ID: 9767483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:20:24.085469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:31.413885
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
While not crucial to the analysis of the case, the majority almost initially makes the following observation: “A startling episode took place in the trial. Apparently, the accused tried to influence or intimidate the accomplice witness Steve Thomas. The district judge and the jury observed this ‘theatre in the round’ or ‘theatre in the pit’ to use trial lawyer’s jargon.” This is the actual occurrence:
[THE COURT:] All right. Now, one point, Mr. Mumphrey, let this be on the record, you got a right to be here and watch this testimony. That’s perfectly appropriate. But at one point I saw you shaking your head no when the witness was testifying.
MR. MUMPHREY: I wasn’t shaking my head no.
THE COURT: I saw you shaking your head no. That may have meant that you personally disagreed with what he was saying. But I don’t want you making any motions while he’s testifying. I don’t want you speaking out while he’s testifying or making any kind of motions. In other words, I want you to be still while he’s testifying. I don’t want any distractions in the courtroom with regard to his testimony. You may not have been realized you were doing it. You’re not in trouble with the Court or anything like that. I’m just suggesting and telling you that I want you to try to avoid that.
THE WITNESS: [Sic] I wasn’t giving no head nods or nothing, because what he’s saying, it ain’t true, too much of nothing concerns me no way.
*83This melodramatic characterization epitomizes the way in which the majority analyzes this case. If the trial court thought appellant was trying to influence either the witness or the jury, why did the court state: “You’re not in trouble with the court ...” rather than issuing a stem admonishment appropriate for acts of intimidation or influence?
The majority states the complainant herself gave enough testimony to corroborate the accomplice witness. I respectfully disagree. The victim’s testimony corroborated that a senseless, degrading assault had been committed and the ancillary facts surrounding that assault. Her testimony does not, in any manner, tend to connect appellant with the offense committed. See Reed v. State, 744 S.W.2d 112 (Tex.Crim. App.1988).
The majority goes on to state: “Smith swore that Thomas proceeded to relate in detail, how he and the Appellant had had sex with the little girl. The appellant stood within four feet of the others and made no attempt to deny or refute that he had just engaged in committing the sexual assaults.” The record reflects:
On direct examination:
Q And when you met up with them, are you sure that it was the defendant Merle Mumphrey instead of his brother Charles?
A Yes, sir. It was him and Steve.
Q It was him and Steve?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did ya’ll talk about when you met up with them?
A He didn’t do no talking. But Steve was talking, and he told me that they had got this little White girl. And you know they — I could tell that they had had something. And he told me that they gave her some, and she gave them some.
Q Slow down just a moment. You said that you could tell that they had had something. Are you talking about Steve Thomas and the defendant?
A Yes, sir.
Q That they had had something. Are you saying that they had had something to drink or something to smoke?
A Yes, sir, drink. Something that would kind of put you kind of like intoxicated.
Q So in other words, in your opinion you thought that the defendant Merle Mumphrey and Steve Thomas were intoxicated at the time that they were talking to you?
A Yes, sir. But Steve seemed, you know, more.
Q Steve was saying most?
A Uh-huh.
Q When Steve was talking to you, how far was Merle from you?
A He was—
Q Let me ask you this. Let me just walk toward you. And when I get as close as Merle was to you, you stop me, okay?
A Okay. Stop.
Q Would you say that that's something like four feet or so?
A Yes, sir.
Q So that’s how close the defendant was to you — the defendant, Merle Mum-phrey was to you when Steve was talking to you about what they had done that night; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q What did he say that they had done? A He told me that they got this little White girl and they had given her some of the stuff and she just voluntarily gave them some.
Q Just voluntarily gave them some sex; is that correct? .
A Yes, sir.
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Q And while they were telling you this, was Merle looking at you?
A No, sir.
Q But was he within about four feet of you; is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Steve, was he whispering this stuff to you?
A No, sir.
*84Q Just talking in regular conversation like we’re talking now?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said you could tell that both of them were kind of messed up; is that right?
A He wasn’t as messed up as Steve was. Seemed like Steve had had more. You know, just took control of him more than it had him.-
Q You thought in your opinion Steve was more messed up than Merle was? A Yes, sir.
Q Did Merle ever say, “No, no. I never did have any sex with this White girl”? A No. He didn’t say nothing.
Q Didn’t say anything at all?
A No, sir.
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Q And, again, that Merle was standing about four feet away from Steve Thomas when Steve was telling you about getting some sex from this White girl; is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did they ask you if you wanted any? A Steve did. I told him no.
Q Why did you tell him that?
A Because I didn’t.
On cross-examination:
Q You didn’t talk to Merle that night, did you?
A No, sir.
Q How close were you to Merle?
A About four feet.
Q How far would you say four feet is, about like this?
A A step or two up.
Q So to you that’s about four feet?
A From here to the end of this thing right here.
Q To right here.
A Yes, sir. Oh, okay. If you want to put it like that then.
Q How far would you say it is, six or eight feet?
A From here to me, if you’re going to step that big with it.
Q Six or eight feet?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did Merle acknowledge that he heard any of the conversation that night?
A I’m quite sure he dfd. He was standing close enough to hear it.
Q That’s not answering my question. Did he acknowledge hearing any of that conversation that night?
A Tell me what you mean by that.
Q Well, all right. Did he say, “Yeah, we had a good time over there”? “Yeah, we didn’t do it”?
A He didn’t say nothing.
Q He didn’t say anything, did he?
A He didn’t say nothing.
The majority’s characterization of this testimony as “in detail” and their conclusion that the accomplice’s statements to the witness Smith equates to sexual assault is overreaching. According to the witness, the accomplice stated the sexual contact was voluntary. Admittedly the adjective “little” was used in describing the victim, but it can have a double meaning; small in stature or young. Consensual sexual contact with a small girl is not necessarily a penal offense. There is no evidence that the accomplice told the witness Smith anything about the victim’s age or even if he knew the age of the victim.
The majority cites Crestfield v. State,' 471 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.Crim.App.1971) for the general rule that when it is shown a defendant is not under arrest and a statement is made in his presence that he heard and understood and which called for a reply or a denial, then his silence may be shown as a confession. However, Gamboa v. State, 481 S.W.2d 423, 425-426 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972), discussed the rule and its application at some length. The court stated:
The State relies upon the rule that the silence of an accused to an accusation made in his presence is admissible against him provided he is not under arrest at the time.
In 1 Branch’s Ann.P.C.2d Ed. sec. 87, p. 91, it is written:
“Before silence can be construed as a confession of the truth of a statement made in defendant’s presence, it must be clearly shown that he heard *85and understood the statement, and that it called for a reply....”
2 McCormick & Ray Texas Law of Evidence sec. 1152 (Admissions of a Party), p. 44 briefly states the rule as it exists in this state, as follows:
“... Where a statement is made in the presence of a party under such circumstances that he heard and understood what was said, had an opportunity to reply and would naturally have replied unless he admitted the truth of the statement his silence may be received as a tacit admission of its truth. The Texas courts are strict in the enforcement of these limitations. The offering party must affirmatively show that each of the requisite conditions existed....”1
24 Tex.Jur.2d Evidence sec. 626, p. 192, discussed the rule as follows:
“In criminal cases, if the accused fails to deny an incriminating accusation made to him or in his presence, the fact that he was silent is properly admissible against him as an admission of guilt. For such evidence to be admissible as an admission of guilt, however, the statement made must have been an accusation of crime that called for a denial or a reply. Moreover, the accused must actually have heard the statement and had an opportunity to deny it. And it is essential that the accused should not have been under arrest or in confinement at the time the statement was made.” (Emphasis supplied.)
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The rule in question has no application where the statement made in his presence is ambiguous or has a double meaning, Welch v. State, 46 Tex.Cr.R. 528, 81 S.W. 50, 52 ([Tex.Cr.App.] 1904), or is not an accusation of a crime or does not show some criminality. See Crowell v. State, 56 Tex.Cr.R. 480, 120 S.W. 897 ([Tex.Cr.App.] 1909); Johnson v. State, 107 Tex.Cr.R. 312, 296 S.W. 887 (1927).
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Still further, if, from the circumstances, it appears that an accused is asleep, unconscious from intoxication, physically disabled from answering or physically suffering so as to probably be unable to understand any statement made, his silence signifies nothing and the statement is inadmissible. O’Quinn v. State, supra; State v. Epstein, 25 R.I. 131, 55 A. 204 (1903). In Bloomer v. State, 75 Ark. 297, 87 S.W. 438 (1905), the statement made in the accused’s presence was excluded where the accused was drunk.
The evidence is far from clear whether or not appellant heard the accomplice’s statements. The statements do not necessarily indicate any criminality, are ambiguous and could have a double meaning. Furthermore, the witness stated that appellant was intoxicated thus impairing his ability to understand or appreciate any inference of criminality. In this instance, his silence could not be used against him and thus cannot be corroboration of the accomplice testimony.
As a final piece of corroboration, the majority attempts to use the testimony of appellant’s brother. They describe the brother’s actions as,“[a]n early stratagem engaged in ...” but do not point (and cannot) to any place in the record where appellant devised or participated in the attempt by the brother to “take the rap.”
The focus of the appeal is not whether the jury had sufficient evidence before it to convict. They certainly did. Nor is this appeal concerned with the enhancement allegations or the punishment assessed. The question is whether the non-accomplice testimony is legal corroboration. Having addressed the majority’s “silent confession” finding, I find no arguable corroboration. Under TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 38.14 (Vernon 1979), the testimony alone of an accomplice witness cannot furnish the basis for a conviction, and a conviction so based must be reversed, Walker v. State, *8694 Tex.Crim. 567, 252 S.W. 554 (1923). This is true no matter how complete a case may have been made by the accomplice witness testimony and no matter how much credit the jury may have given such testimony. Paulus v. State, 633 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Therefore, under the decisions of our highest criminal court, this court has no choice but to reverse the conviction and reform the judgment to reflect an acquittal. Walker v. State, 615 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). Because the majority decides to the contrary, I respectfully dissent.

. In O’Quinn v. State, 55 Tex.Cr.R. 18, 115 S.W. 39 (1908), it was held that before the acquiescence of a defendant in the language or conduct of another can be assumed as the concession of the truth of any particular statement, the facts must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the language was heard or the conduct understood by the defendant at the time.