Court Opinion

ID: 9698427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:50:08.662752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:40.904150
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge:
On June 14, 1977, appellant pleaded guilty to four counts of burglary,1 and one count each of attempted burglary, criminal attempt,2 escape,3 and theft of movable property.4 His plea was accepted, and he then was ordered to pay the costs of prosecution and make restitution to the victims; he was also sentenced to a term of imprisonment of from ten to twenty years on each of the four burglary counts and on the attempted burglary count, and from three and one-half to seven years each on the counts of criminal attempt, escape, and theft of movable property. The sentences were to run concurrently. No post-trial motions were filed, nor was any direct appeal taken from the judgment of sentence. Appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act5 (PCHA), alleging ineffectiveness of counsel with regard to his guilty plea. Counsel for appellant was appointed,6 and a hearing date was set. During the hearing on the petition, appellant raised the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel due to a conflict of interest, to-wit, the law partner of appellant’s counsel represented *510appellant’s co-defendant.7 This petition was denied per order dated April 3, 1978. It is from this order that appellant appeals.
On appeal, appellant again contends that a conflict of interest was created by the dual representation of appellant and his co-defendant by the same law firm, and that this conflict resulted in harm to appellant, thus denying him effective representation by competent counsel. Additionally, appellant contends that the sentence imposed on the charge of attempted burglary was illegal. We agree with appellant’s latter contention, and therefore vacate the sentence imposed on the attempted burglary charge and remand to the court below for resentencing on that charge.
Initially, we note that representation of co-defendants by different attorneys of the same law firm constitutes dual or joint representation. Accordingly, if it would have constituted a conflict of interest for one attorney to represent both co-defendants, it is equally improper if one law firm represents both co-defendants. In the case of Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 258 Pa.Super. 183, 185, 392 A.2d 745, 746 (1978), this court held:
“As to the claim of conflict of interest, we note that we agree with appellant that if it was improper for one public defender to represent more than one co-defendant, it was equally improper for two or more to do so. Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Tf a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with *511him or his firm may accept or continue such employment.’
This language clearly includes members of the same defender office; compare Commonwealth v. Via, 455 Pa. 373, 316 A.2d 895 (1974).”
However, the mere fact of dual representation is insufficient to support a finding of conflict of interest, and is not a per se violation of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 318 A.2d 354 (1974). To make the dual representation rise to a true conflict, appellant need not show that actual harm resulted, but must at least show the possibility of harm. Commonwealth v. Westbrook, 484 Pa. 534, 400 A.2d 160 (1979); Commonwealth v. Breaker, supra. Our supreme court has held that:
“ ‘appellant will satisfy the requirement of demonstrating possible harm, if he can show, inter alia, “that he had a defense inconsistent with that advanced by the other client, or that counsel neglected his case in order to give the other client a more spirited defense.” ’ (citations and footnote omitted).” Commonwealth v. Westbrook, supra, 484 Pa. at 538, 400 A.2d at 162, citing Commonwealth v. Breaker, supra 456 Pa. at 345, 318 A.2d at 356.
If a conflict of interest is found to have arisen from the dual representation, the mere existence of such conflict vitiates the lower court proceedings. Commonwealth v. Westbrook, supra; Commonwealth v. Breaker, supra.
Appellant cites two bases upon which, he contends, a finding of harm is supported: (1) appellant claims he had a good defense for his escape charge, but was forced to abandon it as part of his guilty plea strategy; and (2) appellant claims that the statements made by his co-defendant which implicated appellant in one of the burglaries would have necessitated counsel’s attacking at trial, his co-defendant’s credibility during cross-examination.
The vague references in the record to appellant’s “good defense” do not support a finding that there was a *512“substantial defense not raised that was inconsistent with that of [appellant’s] co-defendant.” See Commonwealth v. Cox, 441 Pa. 64, 270 A.2d 207 (1970); Commonwealth v. Pettiford, 253 Pa.Super. 503, 385 A.2d 452 (1978). First, the nature of the alleged defense is nowhere expounded upon in the record. The record does reveal, however, that appellant helped to make a rope, attempted to throw it over a prison wall (this goal was ultimately accomplished by co-defendant DeFrain), and intended to obtain a gun in order to effectuate the escape. (N.T. 17-20). How these facts support a finding that a substantial defense existed is beyond our comprehension. Second, even assuming that a substantial defense did exist, we would be unable to discern how that defense was inconsistent with the defense presented by co-defendant DeFrain, particularly in light of the fact that DeFrain offered no defense to the escape charge, but instead plead guilty.
Nor do we conclude that appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel. Initially, we recognize that a presumption exists that counsel is competent and that a claim of ineffectiveness will not be successful unless it is sustained by the record or other credible evidence. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 371 A.2d 468 (1977). In passing upon the claim of ineffective assistance, the single question is whether counsel’s choice of strategy had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. “Although weigh the alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel’s decisions had any reasonable basis.” (footnote omitted). Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 353 (1967). Thus, counsel is deemed constitutionally effective once we conclude that the particular course chosen was in the interest of the client, and we will not substitute hindsight evaluation of the record to determine retrospectively whether counsel’s decision was reasonable.
In the instant case, the evidence firmly indicated appellant’s guilt with respect to the attempted escape *513charge. When laced with the alternatives of recommending that appellant plead not guilty to the charge and risk the possibility of receiving a consecutive sentence if convicted after trial, or recommending that appellant plead guilty and accept the Commonwealth’s offer to recommend to the lower court that appellant receive concurrent sentences on all charges, counsel chose to recommend the latter. Indeed, appellant did receive concurrent sentences. In light of the above facts, we conclude that counsel’s strategy did have a reasonable basis designed to effectuate appellant’s interests, and as such, we deem counsel’s assistance to be constitutionally effective.
Appellant also claims that the implicating statements of his co-defendant necessitate a finding of conflict of interest. The statements appellant alludes to were purportedly made by co-defendant DeFrain to a Pennsylvania official while DeFrain was being transported from North Carolina to Pennsylvania, and they insinuated that appellant was involved in one of the burglaries committed after the prison break. In order to have zealous representation, appellant contends, his counsel would have had to attack DeFrain’s credibility, thus sacrificing the interests of one co-defendant for the other. We find this argument to be waived.
Appellant’s claims of ineffectiveness due to conflict of interest must be evaluated in the context of his guilty plea. In the case of Commonwealth v. Chumley, 482 Pa. 626, 640-641, 394 A.2d 497, 504-505 (1978), our supreme court stated:
“Upon entry of a plea of guilty, all grounds of appeal are waived other than challenges to the voluntariness of the plea and the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. Commonwealth v. Greer, 457 Pa. 646, 326 A.2d 338 (1974). Thus allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with entry of the guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused appellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Pa. 266, 383 A.2d 926 (1978); Commonwealth v. Bunch, 466 Pa. 22, 351 A.2d 284 (1976).”
*514In the instant case, appellant does not allege that his plea was rendered involuntary and unknowing by any possible conflict that may have arisen from the fact of his co-defendant’s implicating statements, nor does he challenge the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. Under these circumstances, we find that the issue appellant seeks to raise is not properly before this court.
The final argument which appellant puts forth is that the sentence imposed on the attempted burglary charge was illegal. We agree, and therefore remand the case to the court below for resentencing on the charge of attempted burglary. Burglary is a felony of the first degree (18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(e)), but attempted burglary is only a felony of the second degree. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 905(a). Second degree felonies are punishable by imposition of a prison sentence not to exceed ten years. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(2). Additionally, the court shall impose a minimum sentence of confinement which shall not exceed one-half of the maximum sentence imposed. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1356(b). As applied to the instant case, the greatest term of imprisonment that could have been imposed on the attempted burglary charge is one of from five to ten years. The court below sentenced appellant to a term of imprisonment of from ten to twenty years on that charge. The sentence clearly exceeds statutory limits as to both maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment and, as such, is patently illegal and cannot be allowed to stand. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Young, 256 Pa.Super. 392, 389 A.2d 1180 (1978).
Accordingly, we vacate the sentence on the attempted burglary charge and remand to the court below for resentencing on that charge in accordance with this opinion.
SPAETH, J., files a dissenting opinion.

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502.

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 901.

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5121.

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).

. Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580 § 1 et seq. (19 P.S. § 1180-1 et seq.) (Supp. 1978-79).

. Appellant’s trial counsel was Cleveland C. Hummel and his co-defendant’s counsel was Thomas A. James. Both attorneys were law partners in the firm of Hummel, James and Mihalik, a firm which does the bulk of the public defender work in Columbia County. Counsel for appellant during his PCHA proceeding and on appeal to this court has been Robert L. Marks, Public Defender for Montour County. Although trial counsel and appellate counsel are both public defenders, appellate counsel is not from the same office as trial counsel, and thus there is no need to remand this case for appointment of counsel outside the public defender’s office. See Commonwealth v. Glasco, 481 Pa. 490, 393 A.2d 11 (1978).

. The court below, in its opinion supporting the April 3 order, noted that this was the sole issue which appellant raised during the PCHA hearing. Our independent review of the record of that proceeding discloses that appellant also raised the issue of the illegality of the sentence imposed on the attempted burglary charge. In any event, this issue is properly before this court because claims of illegality of sentence cannot be waived. Commonwealth v. Walker, 468 Pa. 323, 362 A.2d 227 (1976); Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 258 Pa.Super. 40, 391 A.2d 662 (1978).