Court Opinion

ID: 9484446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:53:58.156928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:15.273010
License: Public Domain

KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the remand to reconsider whether Candisha Robinson (Robinson) acted as a “supervisor” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c) and to reduce the special assessment from $300 to $200 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A). I dissent because in my view this case is distinguishable from United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053 (D.C.Cir.1991), and United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330 (D.C.Cir.1993), the cases upon which the majority primarily relies. Moreover, in concluding that Robinson did not “use” a firearm “in relation to” a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), the majority opinion perpetuates this court’s misuse of two factors — the number and the firepower of the firearm(s) used. Neither of these factors is mentioned in the statutory language nor does either affect the “use” of a firearm.
As the majority notes, Officer Hale made two purchases from Robinson’s apartment. On July 15, 1991, Veloria Robinson, Robinson’s sister, took Hale to the apartment. After her sister knocked on the front door, Robinson answered and asked what Hale wanted. He asked for a “twenty” and stood in the entrance of the apartment as the two sisters went into the apartment’s only bedroom. Hale observed Robinson hand her sister, Veloria, a rock of crack cocaine. Veloria Robinson came out of the bedroom and gave Hale the crack; he paid her with marked money. The next evening Hale returned to make another purchase. This time Kwarme Parker, Robinson’s tenant, approached him outside the apartment. Parker indicated that Veloria Robinson was inside the apartment and that he could serve him. Parker went inside while Hale waited outside. Parker returned and exchanged a rock of crack for marked money. Hale did not see Robinson during this sale.
Thirty minutes later, the police executed a search warrant for the apartment. Robinson was then present. Inside a locked trunk in the bedroom closet, the police found 10.88 grams of crack cocaine with an estimated street value of $1,440, the marked money from the Parker drug sale, another $42.80, various personal papers containing Robinson’s name and a holstered .22 caliber derringer. In the bedroom, the police also found a plastic case for a cassette tape that contained numerous ziplock bags.
At trial, Robinson took the stand in her defense. She claimed that on July 15 she was out of town during the day and stayed overnight in a local motel. She admitted that she owned the trunk and used it to store many of her belongings. She testified that she looked inside the trunk each day1 and that the last time she examined it before her arrest was the night of July 14. According to her testimony, she frisked Parker, who also lived in the apartment, each time he entered the apartment because she suspected that he was selling drugs. Finally, Robinson maintained that she had never seen the gun or any drugs in her apartment.
Robinson was convicted on all six counts of the indictment: one count of possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of *892cocaine base in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), one count of possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 860(a), one count of distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), one count of distribution of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), one count of maintenance of a premises to manufacture, distribute, store or use a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) and one count of using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The district court denied her motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Robinson, 779 F.Supp. 606 (D.D.C.1991). She appeals only the section 924(c)(1) conviction. The majority reverses her firearm conviction because “the possession of this single, unloaded .22-caliber derringer found in a locked trunk in a bedroom closet falls significantly short of the type of evidence we have held to establish actual use under the statute.” Majority Opinion at 888. The majority concludes that “[t]he only reasonable view of the evidence in this case is that the gun was intended for use at some future date.” Id. at 890.
To reach its conclusion, the majority relies on Bruce and Derr. In Bruce, the police seized a trench coat in the front closet of the apartment where the defendant lived. In the pockets of the coat, the police found ziplock bags of crack cocaine, cocaine powder and marijuana; a brown bag containing empty ziplock bags; and “a brown bag containing a belt buckle which held a fully loaded .22 caliber four-shot derringer, as well as eight rounds of .22 ammunition.” Bruce, 939 F.2d at 1054. The defendant was convicted of possession of more than five grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute and use of a firearm in violation of section 924(c)(1).
We reversed the firearm conviction because “the evidence established only that the gun was intended to be used for defendant’s protection at the time and place of subsequent distribution.” Id. at 1056 (emphasis original). We reached this conclusion because
the gun — a small derringer hidden in a belt buckle stored in a paper bag alongside drugs in the pocket of a raincoat hanging in a closet — would clearly appear to be intended for use only at the time of distribution. It is hardly the sort of weapon a drug dealer would employ for protection against an effort to penetrate a crack house.
Id. at 1055. We were able to distinguish between present use and intended use because “there was no evidence presented that any distribution of drugs took place at the apartment.” Id. at 1056. In other words, because the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute and not distribution, we concluded that, while the gun might be used to protect Bruce during future distribution, it was not being used at the time of discovery to protect the drugs. “We do not see how it can be said that under such circumstances the gun is used in relation to the possession of the drugs, regardless of the defendant’s intention to distribute the drugs subsequently.” Id (emphasis original).
In Derr, while executing a search warrant for the apartment of the defendant’s friend, the police came upon a locked closet. After opening the door to the closet, the police found an unloaded, holstered .357 Magnum revolver and nine rounds of ammunition on top of a pile of miscellaneous items. Directly under the gun, the police located a plastic bag containing a padlocked wooden box. Inside the box, they found 18.4 grams of crack cocaine as well as drug paraphernalia. In other parts of the apartment, they found more drug paraphernalia. Derr, who sometimes stayed in the apartment, was charged with possession with intent to distribute and using a gun “during and in relation to his possession of the drugs.” Derr, 990 F.2d at 1333 (emphasis added). The jury convicted Derr on both counts. We emphasized that a conviction under section 924(c)(1) requires “evidence showing that the firearm actually facilitated the possession of the drugs.” Id. at 1337 (emphasis original). We added: “When the predicate offense is possession, it is also insufficient for the evidence to indicate *893that the gun would be used at a later time in distributing the drugs.” Id at 1337 (emphasis added); see Bruce, 939 F.2d at 1056.
The majority’s reliance on Bruce and Derr stems from its totally inexplicable statement that “the primary drug offense underlying the conviction is possession with the intent to distribute.” Majority Opinion at 887 (emphasis added). Nothing could be further from the truth. Robinson was convicted not only of possession with intent to distribute; she was also convicted of distribution and maintenance of a premises for the purpose of distributing drugs, neither of which convictions she contests. Contrary to the majority’s view, Bruce, Derr and every other case it cites is inapposite because not one of those cases involved distribution or maintenance convictions.2 Robinson’s uncontested convictions on the distribution and maintenance counts put her in a category wholly separate from Bruce, Derr and the other defendants whose mere possession convictions have led this court to distinguish between present and future intentions, an “exceedingly slippery slope” according to one of my colleagues. United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C.Cir.1992) (Silberman, J., concurring). Whether or not she “used” the gun in relation to her possession of crack with intent to distribute may be, if anything, irrelevant. The real question is whether she used the firearm “during and in relation to” her distribution and maintenance offenses.
Among the several inaccuracies contained in the majority opinion is the statement that “[t]he government, for its part, does not argue that Ms. Robinson carried, brandished or otherwise used the derringer during or in relation to the distribution of the drugs to Officer Hale.” Majority Opinion at 886-87. If the majority means by this statement that Officer Hale did not in fact see Robinson display the firearm, then I do not disagree. If, however, the majority means, as I think it does, that the government admits that there is no evidence to suggest that Robinson used, within the meaning of section 924(c)(1), the firearm when she distributed the crack to Officer Hale, I do not agree.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, we must defer to the jury’s determination and affirm if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948, 111 S.Ct. 365, 112 L.Ed.2d 328 (1990). We must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, allowing the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, and permitting the jury to determine the weight and the credibility of the evidence.” United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1358 (D.C.Cir.1986); United States v. Butler, 924 F.2d 1124, 1126 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 205, 116 L.Ed.2d 164 (1991). Supporting evidence can be either direct or circumstantial. United States v. Kegler, 724 F.2d 190, 196 (D.C.Cir.1983); United States v. Carter, 522 F.2d 666, 681-82 (D.C.Cir.1975). The evidence supporting Robinson’s section 924(c)(1) conviction is circumstantial which means that inferences are to be drawn from the relevant circumstances. The most significant circumstance is that the firearm was found together with the crack in Robinson’s trunk in her bedroom the night after she had distributed crack from that location. Robinson denied she had been in the apartment the night before and the jury disbelieved her. If the jury rejected her *894testimony regarding her whereabouts on July 15, that rejection can, and does, inform its interpretations and conclusions with respect to the rest of her testimony. A defendant disbelieved as to one count does not suddenly become a model of credibility with respect to the remaining counts. The jury could have reasonably inferred that Robinson had obtained the crack from her trunk when Officer Hale saw her hand her sister the crack in her bedroom; indeed, according to the evidence, the only crack found in the apartment was in the trunk. The jury could have just as reasonably concluded that the .22 caliber derringer, found with the crack and seized from the locked trunk the next night, was in the same location a short time earlier.3
Once the jury concluded that Robinson opened the trunk on July 15, there are only two possible conclusions: either the gun was in the trunk then or it was placed in the trunk between the evening of the 15th and the time of the search on the evening of the 16th. The jury disbelieved her testimony that she never saw drugs in the apartment; it was also free to disbelieve her testimony that she never saw the gun. Moreover, the government is “not required to disprove every conceivable scenario in which appellant would be innocent”; instead, a defendant “is entitled to a judgment of acquittal ‘only when there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Whetzel, 589 F.2d 707, 711-12 (D.C.Cir.1978) (quoting United States v. Davis, 562 F.2d 681, 683 (D.C.Cir.1977)). Once the jury concluded that the gun was in the trunk with the crack at the time Robinson distributed the crack, it then had to determine whether the gun was “use[d] or carrie[d]”4 during and in relation to the distribution.
We have held that “[m]ere possession of a gun even by a drug trafficker does not violate the statute.” United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C.Cir.1992). Nonetheless, “we have construed the term as broad enough to encompass any ease in which the gun facilitated or had a role in the trafficking offense.” Id. (emphasis added). A defendant need not brandish or fire the gun in order to use it. Id.; see United States v. Jefferson, 974 F.2d 201, 205 (D.C.Cir.1992); United States v. Evans, 888 F.2d 891, 896 (D.C.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019, 110 S.Ct. 1325, 108 L.Ed.2d 500 (1990); United States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 1128, 1141 (D.C.Cir.1989).
We have further held that the only limitation on the language in section 924(c)(1) “is that the guns be used ‘in relation’ to the drug trafficking crime involved, which we think requires no more than that the guns facilitate the predicate offense in some way.” United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 261 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam) (emphasis added), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 362,121 L.Ed.2d 275 (1992). The relationship between the firearm and the predicate offense is satisfied
“[i]f the firearm is within the possession or control of a person who commits an underlying crime as defined by the statute, and the circumstances of the case show that the firearm facilitated or had a role in the crime, such as emboldening an actor who had the opportunity or ability to display or discharge the weapon to protect himself or intimidate others, whether or not such display or discharge in fact occurred.”
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir.1985) (Kennedy, J.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 867, 108 S.Ct. 192, 98 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)); see also Morris, 977 F.2d at 623 (same); United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 231 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc) (same); United States v. *895Vasquez, 909 F.2d 235, 239 (7th Cir.1990) (same), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2826, 115 L.Ed.2d 996 (1991).5
Robinson’s circumstances easily satisfy the possession or control prong of the test. The jury could have reasonably concluded that she had possession or control of the gun. The police found the gun in her trunk, which she checked every day. The locker was in the closet in her bedroom in her apartment. See Anderson, 881 F.2d at 1141.
The gun also facilitated the distribution. The majority observes that because the gun was inside the locked trunk, it “certainly was not easily accessible” or “within ‘easy reach,’” Majority Opinion at 888 (quoting Morris, 977 F.2d at 623), and therefore could not be used to protect Robinson or her drug stash. From its location in the trunk next to the drugs, however, the derringer served two purposes. First, it protected Robinson.> during distribution. While reaching to get the drugs, Robinson could easily grab the small gun without being noticed, providing her with personal protection or allowing her to intimidate others. Using the derringer in this way corresponds with its original use. See infra at n. 12. In United States v. Wilson, 938 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 946, 117 L.Ed.2d 115 (1992), the Seventh Circuit concluded “that a defendant intended to use 'the firearm in facilitation of a drug related crime ‘if it [is] strategically located so as to be quickly and easily available for use during a drug transaction. ’ ” Id. at 791 (quoting United States v. Whitley, 905 F.2d 163, 166 (7th Cir.1990) (quotation omitted)) (emphasis in Wilson). In Wilson, the police, after stopping the defendant, found the gun in the locked trunk of his car. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit upheld his conviction under section 924(c)(1) because the gun “was strategically located directly on top of the bag containing the cocaine and the defendant knew where the gun was and it was loaded and readily accessible for use if necessary should any problems arise during the drug transaction.” Id,; see also Jefferson, 974 F.2d at 207 (finding gun was accessible in case of emergency where gun was located in grass-catcher bag next to drugs).6
Second, the derringer protected the drugs during distribution. Again, the gun’s location made it easily accessible during distribution, thus providing protection at that time. If Robinson had “ ‘the opportunity or ability to display or discharge,’ ” Harris, 959 F.-2d at 261 (quoting Stewart, 779 F.2d at 540), the gun at the time of distribution, which the jury could have reasonably concluded based on its proximity to the drugs, the jury could have likewise reasonably concluded that the gun “ ‘facilitated ... the crime’ ” by protecting her or the drugs, thereby “ ‘emboldening’ ” her to commit the crime. Id. (quoting Stewart, 779 F.2d at 540).7
Moreover, even if her distribution conviction did not support Robinson’s section 924(c)(1) conviction, her conviction based on 21 U.S.G. § 856(a)(1) does. The jury found, and Robinson does not contest, that she violated 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) by maintaining a premises to manufacture, distribute, store or use a controlled substance. Although the *896majority, goes to great lengths in its attempt to show that Robinson’s apartment was not really a “crack house,” its discussion is irrelevant. Whether or not Robinson’s apartment fits the usual description of a crack house, the jury found that she maintained her apartment in violation of section 856(a)(1) and she does not' challenge that finding.
Maintenance of a premises for the purpose of distributing drugs is not a “passive,” Bruce, 939 F.2d at 1055, crime like possession. We noted in United States v. Lancaster, 968 F.2d 1250, 1253 (D.C.Cir.1992), that
[sjection 856(a)(1) makes it unlawful only to “open or maintain any place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance.” The “casual” drug user does not run afoul of this prohibition because he does not maintain his house for the purpose of using drugs but rather for the purpose of residence, the consumption of drugs therein being merely incidental to that purpose,
(emphasis added in Lancaster). Because it is an ongoing offense,8 the jury could permissibly conclude that a gun found on the premises was being used “during and in relation to” that offense. And the majority’s chief authority, Bruce, expressly recognizes this difference:
If guns are strewn around a “crack house” in which drugs are stored, it might be inferred that the guns are there to protect the occupant’s “possession.” In such a case, the guns are “used” in relation to the drug trafficking crime of possession with intent to distribute because they are intended to protect the stash of drugs that will subsequently be distributed. And although the actual distribution is a separate crime, courts have treated evidence of use of guns in such a house for protection of the distribution function as equivalent to protection of possession. Since in the typical crack house possession and distribution are intertwined, that seems to us to be a logical interpretation of the statute.
Bruce, 939 F.2d at 1055 (citations omitted).9 In other words, Robinson used the gun to facilitate ongoing drug trafficking crimes (actual distribution on the premises and maintenance of a premises for the purpose of distributing drugs) and therefore violated section 924(c)(1).10
The majority attaches significance to the presence of only one gun to conclude that Robinson did not use the derringer to protect herself or the drugs. We have considered the number of guns present to be a factor in determining usage, see Morris, 977 F.2d at 622, and have distinguished between an “arsenal” of guns to protect distribution sites and a single gun. See United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 418, 421 (D.C.Cir.1991). Compare United States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 1128 (D.C.Cir.1989) with United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053 (D.C.Cir.1991). At the same time; however, we have made clear that the use of only one gun violates section 924(c)(1). See Morris, 977 F.2d at 622. Sec*897tion 924(c)(1) requires the use of “a” firearm, not multiple firearms. See United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir.1991) (“A statute which prefaces the object of the offense with the word ‘a’ unambiguously authorizes singular units of prosecution.”).
On the rare occasion that we have found the use of one gun violative of the statute, the firearm was large and powerful. See Jefferson, 974 F.2d at 208 (“a 12-gauge shotgun is a formidable firearm”). But section 924(c)(1) does not require that a gun be of a certain caliber or size to come within the statute.11 Nor does the use of the firearm have to be successful. A drug defendant’s choice of a less effective firearm does not affect his use of it. The reason any firearm no matter its size or firepower violates section 924(c)(1) when used during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime is obvious: Any gun can kill or wound. See Blank Pistol Kills Actor, The Son of Bruce Lee, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1993, at A14.
By creating a hierarchy of guns, we encourage a defendant to argue about the characteristics of his firearm in order to establish that it does not come within section 924(c)(l)’s proscription. Indeed, Robinson’s counsel asserted at oral argument:
COUNSEL: [The derringer] is basically a joke of a weapon....
THE COURT: Well, now wait a minute. It’s not a joke of a weapon, it can kill people—
COUNSEL: Well, it can, if you get lucky—
Disparagement of the derringer ignores reality.12 Some of my colleagues have referred to the gun as “lowly,” Jefferson, 974 F.2d at 209, and “ornamental,” Morris, 977 F.2d at 622. Perhaps they have forgotten it was a derringer that took the life of Abraham Lincoln. See George C. Nonte, Jr., Pistol & Revolver Guide 16 (1975).
I have no difficulty concluding that Robinson used the derringer in violation of section 924(c)(1). Accordingly, I dissent.
Before: MIKVA, Chief Judge; WALD, HARRY T. EDWARDS, SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, STEPHEN F. -WILLIAMS, D.H. GINSBURG, SENTELLE, KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
Oct. 8, 1993.
Appellee’s Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc and the response thereto’' have been circulated to the full Court. The taking of a vote was requested. Thereafter, a majority of the judges of the court in regular active service voted in favor of the suggestion. Upon consideration of the foregoing it is
*898ORDERED, by the Court en banc, that the suggestion is granted and this case will be reheard by the Court sitting en banc.
. It is FURTHER ORDERED, by the Court en banc, that the judgment of the court .filed herein on June 18, 1993, is hereby vacated.

. Robinson’s testimony thus is at odds with the majority’s assertion that "it is unclear whether Ms. Robinson had the key to the lock on the trunk.” Majority Opinion at 888.

. United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330 (D.C.Cir.1993) (possession with intent to distribute); United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617 (D.C.Cir.1992) (same); United States v. Jefferson, 974 F.2d 201 (D.C.Cir.1992) (same); United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 418 (D.C.Cir.1991) (same), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 148, 121 L.Ed.2d 99 (1992); United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053 (D.C.Cir.1991) (possession with intent to distribute and possession); United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572 (D.C.Cir.) (possession with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948, 111 S.Ct. 365, 112 L.Ed.2d 328 (1990); United States v. Evans, 888 F.2d 891 (D.C.Cir.1989) (same), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019, 110 S.Ct. 1325, 108 L.Ed.2d 500 (1990); United States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 1128 (D.C.Cir.1989) (same). The majority parenthetically cites United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam) (distribution and conspiracy to distribute), cert denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 362, 121 L.Ed.2d 275 (1992), which upheld the section 924(c)(1) convictions.

. Robinson testified that she had not looked inside the locker since the evening of July 14. But that assertion flowed from her testimony that she did not go home the night of July 15, testimony the jury did not believe.

. Although the government does not argue on appeal that Robinson "carried” the gun during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, the evidence indicates that during the July 15th distribution she carried the gun as well. We have held that "carry” as used in section 924(c)(1) "need not be read in a 'hypertechnical or narrow’ way.” United States v. Evans, 888 F.2d 891, 894 (D.C.Cir.1989) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019, 110 S.Ct. 1325, 108 L.Ed.2d 500 (1990). A weapon need not be on a defendant's person to convict him of "carrying” a firearm. Id. at 895. "[A] jury could properly infer that ... [the defendant] ‘carried’ the gun in the sense that it was within reach and available to protect him during his ongoing [drug trafficking offense].” Id.

. A charge under section 924(c)(1) can be made without separately charging the underlying drug offense. See United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461, 1463-64 (10th Cir.1992) (en banc); United States v. Munoz-Fabela, 896 F.2d 908, 910-11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 824, 111 S.Ct. 76, 112 L.Ed.2d 49 (1990); United States v. Hunter, 887 F.2d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1159, 107 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1990). In fact, a conviction under section 924(c)(1) can stand notwithstanding acquittal on the predicate drug offense. United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 288-89 (D.C.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1069, 110 S.Ct. 1790, 108 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990); cf. United States v. Gibbs, 904 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C.Cir.1990).

. That the gun here may have been unloaded (there was no affirmative evidence one way or the other) and that no ammunition was present are matters of little importance. Many courts have found that an unloaded gun can violate section 924(c). See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Silva, 983 F.2d 123, 125 (8th Cir.1993) (quickly accessible firearm in close proximity to drugs violated section 924(c) even though gun was unloaded and no ammunition was found); United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902, 905-07 (3d Cir.1992) (easily accessible rifle located next to drugs violated section 924(c) even though gun was unloaded, no ammunition was present and rifle stock was separated from barrel).

.In United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250, 254 (2d Cir.1988), a case cited with approval in Bruce, 939 F.2d at 1055, and in Long, 905 F.2d at 1578, the Second Circuit stated that "use” in relation to distribution is satisfied by:
i) Proof of a transaction in which the circumstances surrounding the presence of a firearm suggest that the possessor of the firearm in*896tended to have it available for possible use during the transaction; or ii) The circumstances surrounding the presence of a firearm in a place where drug transactions take place suggest that it was strategically located so as to be quickly and easily available for use during such a transaction.
Robinson’s circumstances satisfy both tests delineated in Veliz-Cordero, that is, her distribution conviction fits the first circumstance and her section 856(a)(1) conviction fits the second.

. Indeed, we know that at least two instances of crack distribution occurred in Robinson's apartment within a twenty-four hour period.

. The only difference between the premises described in Bruce and Robinson’s apartment is the absence in the latter of "guns strewn around.” Bruce, 939 F.2d at 1055. The danger, if not error, in distinguishing between one gun and more than one gun in an analysis of section 924(c)(1) is discussed infra.

. The Supreme Court’s most recent decision interpreting section 924(c)(1) supports affirming Robinson's conviction. In Smith v. United States, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993), the Court, citing, inter alia, United States v. Harris, supra, declared:
The phrase "in relation to” is expansive, as the courts of appeals construing § 924(c)(1) have recognized. Nonetheless, the phrase does illuminate § 924(c)(l)'s boundaries. According to Webster's, "in relation to” means "with reference to” or "as regards.” The phrase "in relation to” thus, at a minimum, clarifies that the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence. As one court has observed; the "in relation to" language "allays explicitly the concern that a person could be” punished under § 924(c)(1) for committing a drug trafficking offense "while in possession of a firearm” even though the firearm’s presence is coincidental or entirely "unrelated” to the crime. Instead, the gun at least must “facilitate, or have the potential of facilitating,” the drug trafficking offense.
Id.,-U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2058-59 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

. Section "924(c)(1) does differentiate among firearms in providing for punishment. For example, use of a short-barreled rifle or shotgun increases the punishment from five years’ to ten years' imprisonment. If the firearm is "a machine gun, or destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler,” the punishment is thirty years. If the conviction is the defendant’s second or subsequent conviction under section 924(c)(1), the punishment increases to twenty years for a firearm other than a machine gun or a firearm that is a destructive device or equipped with a silencer or muffler. For the latter category, a second conviction results in life imprisonment without release.

. The history of the derringer began in the mid 1800s, the age of the riverboat gambler. As one author noted, "[t]he Derringer in the late 19th century was known as the ‘gambler’s gun,' because it could be hidden up a man’s sleeve and flipped into his hand in an instant.” Robert Hertzberg, The Modern Handgun 68 (1965). It became popular because it was easy to conceal and was effective in emergency situations. One author described it as
truly the gun for the ladies' hand bag. It is very small, as was the original Remington from which it was redesigned. It is also an excellent under cover gun for the peace officer or soldier for emergency use, or for anyone for a close range defense gun. The small cartridge is not the best for serious work but is far better than no gun at all and is quite effective at close -range where such a gun would be used.
Elmer Keith, Sixguns by Keith 83-84 (1955).
The modern derringer is likewise an effective weapon. The government’s expert witness testified that ”[t]he first weapon of choice among dealers is a .357 or .44 magnum, or something more powerful than this, but it’s still as effective as that .357 or .44 magnum.”