Court Opinion

ID: 9905571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 18:05:15.953931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:43.958847
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                  STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2022-1751
                  _____________________________

MIKA KUSCHNITZKY,

    Appellant,

    v.

MARY KATHERINE MARASCO,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Dawn Caloca-Johnson, Judge.

                        November 29, 2023

LONG, J.

     Mika Kuschnitzky appeals a final judgment of injunction for
protection against sexual violence entered against him pursuant
to section 784.046(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Because the statutory
conditions for a sexual violence injunction were not met, we
reverse.

                                  I

     Section 784.046(2), Florida Statutes, creates a “cause of action
for an injunction for protection in cases of sexual violence.” It also
sets out the procedure and criteria for such injunctions:

    (c) A person who is the victim of sexual violence or the
    parent or legal guardian of a minor child who is living at
    home who is the victim of sexual violence has standing in
    the circuit court to file a sworn petition for an injunction
    for protection against sexual violence on his or her own
    behalf or on behalf of the minor child if:

    1. The person has reported the sexual violence to a law
    enforcement agency and is cooperating in any criminal
    proceeding against the respondent, regardless of whether
    criminal charges based on the sexual violence have been
    filed, reduced, or dismissed by the state attorney . . .

§ 784.046(2)(c), Fla. Stat. The statute’s plain language, therefore,
requires petitioners to do three things. First, they must establish
they were a victim of sexual violence. Second, they must have
reported the sexual violence to a law enforcement agency. Finally,
they must cooperate in any subsequent criminal proceeding that
may result from their report.

                                 II

     The issue here turns on the second requirement—whether the
petitioner, Mary Katherine Marasco, reported the sexual violence
to a law enforcement agency. Marasco did make a phone call to
the Tallahassee Police Department. Marasco called seeking
information about the options available to her. She provided her
name and details about the incident, but she requested to remain
anonymous and declined to make “a full disclosure” to the police
department. Marasco told the police officer that she would decide
later if she wanted to fully report the incident. But Marasco never
called back and never followed up with the police department to
report the incident. The officer Marasco spoke with testified that,
in compliance with Marasco’s wishes, she treated the call as an
anonymous matter, that nothing was written down, and that no
names were recorded. Kuschnitzky argues that this anonymous
phone call was not enough to constitute a report as required by
section 784.046(2)(c), Florida Statutes. We agree.

                                III

     This is a question of statutory interpretation. We begin our
analysis with the words of the text. A petitioner has standing if
“[t]he person has reported the sexual violence to a law enforcement

                                 2
agency and is cooperating in any criminal proceeding against the
respondent.” Fla. Stat. 784.046(2)(c)1. “The words of a governing
text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their
context, is what the text means.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 2 at 56
(2012). Our interpretation of this text should be guided by the
ordinary-meaning canon, “the most fundamental semantic rule of
interpretation.” Id. § 6, 69. “Words are to be understood in their
ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that
they bear a technical sense.” Id.

      Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term report as “[a] formal
oral or written presentation of facts.” Report, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). To “report” something, according to
Merriam–Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, is “to give an account
of,” “to serve as a carrier of (a message),” or “to give a formal or
official statement of.” Report, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1997). These definitions indicate that to
“report” something requires a formal action.

     Next, we consider the context of the term “report” within the
statute and conclude that it also suggests a formal action must be
taken to trigger the relief it offers. The legislature required a
petitioner to have “reported the sexual violence to a law
enforcement agency.” §784.046(2)(c), Fla. Stat. This phrase
anticipates that the person reporting the violence would have
initiated a full, official report with law enforcement. The phrase is
followed by, “and is cooperating in any criminal proceeding against
the respondent.” Id. This demonstrates that the kind of report
contemplated is one that operates in furtherance of a criminal
proceeding.       An anonymous phone call cannot meet this
requirement. If an anonymous call were sufficient, it would render
the statute’s cooperation requirement meaningless. *

    * The dissent concludes that “[t]he statute’s focus is not on

what happens after the victim reports the assault.” But as we have
seen, one of the statute’s three requirements is focused exclusively
on what happens after the victim reports the assault—that she
cooperate with any subsequent prosecution. That focus is in the
very same sentence as the reporting requirement.               This
                                 3
     We pause briefly to address the dissent’s alternative
construction. The dissent relies on a 2004 family law form which
includes a blank space for a petitioner to list the law enforcement
incident report number. Leaning on the form, the dissent
concludes that “[t]he statute does not require anything more about
a report except the fact of a report sufficient to generate an
incident report number, and the petitioner’s provision of that
report number in the petition.” First, we reject the premise that a
family law form is relevant to our interpretation of the controlling
law. Second, even if it were relevant, the inclusion of a place to list
an incident number on a form does not suggest to us that the
statute’s reporting requirement is thereby limited to obtaining
that number. Finally, and most importantly, the statute says
nothing about incident numbers. This interpretation effectively
rewrites the statute to say a petitioner has only to have called and
gotten an incident number, instead of what it actually says, that
the petitioner report the incident to law enforcement. And here, as
we have already discussed, the text and its context demonstrate
that report means to make a full report and cooperate with law
enforcement.

     Florida law hinges access to the vast injunctive power of the
state on a petitioner having first reported the incident to law
enforcement and then cooperating with any criminal proceeding
that follows. Marasco’s anonymous phone call does not meet the
reporting requirement of section 784.046(2)(c). She therefore lacks
standing to petition for a sexual violence injunction.

     REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to vacate the
final judgment of injunction for protection against sexual violence.

NORDBY, J., concurs; KELSEY, J., dissents with opinion.

requirement makes no sense if the petitioner need only make an
anonymous call to obtain an incident number.

                                  4
                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

KELSEY, J., dissenting.

     Florida adopted the law at issue in this case, “The Victim’s
Freedom Act,” in 2003. Ch. 2003-117, § 2, Laws of Fla. (HB 561).
This Act was codified at section 784.046 of the Florida Statutes,
and created a cause of action for “an injunction for protection in
cases of sexual violence.” § 784.046(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). The
operative language creating standing to petition for an injunction
against sexual violence has not changed since then, giving victims
standing to petition for a protective injunction in circuit court. See
§ 784.046(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2023). In relevant part, the statute
conditions such standing on whether “[t]he person has reported the
sexual violence to a law enforcement agency and is cooperating in
any criminal proceeding against the respondent, regardless of
whether criminal charges based on the sexual violence have been
filed, reduced, or dismissed by the state attorney.” § 784.046(2)(c)1.

     The statute as enacted in 2003 included a form petition,
requiring among other things that the petitioner swear that
“Petitioner has suffered sexual violence as demonstrated by the
fact that the respondent has: (enumerate incident of violence and
attach incident report by law enforcement agency or notice of
inmate release.).” § 784.046(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis
added) (setting forth form for petition). The next year, the
Legislature amended the Act, making it necessary for the supreme
court to modify the petition form. The supreme court rendered an
opinion stating that it was modifying the form “to allow a
petitioner for an injunction for protection against sexual violence
to furnish an address to the court in a separate confidential filing
pursuant to section 119.07(3)(s), Florida Statutes (2003), and to
allow a petitioner to include a law enforcement agency incident
report number in the petition as opposed to attaching the report to
the petition.” Amends. To Fla. Sup. Ct. Approved Fam. Law

                                  5
Forms—Sexual Violence Forms, 880 So. 2d 579, 579 (Fla. 2004)
(citing Ch. 2004, § 1, Laws of Fla.). The court appended the
approved form to its 2004 opinion, and explained the basic
prerequisites for obtaining an injunction as follows:

    In order to get an injunction you must have reported the
    sexual violence to a law enforcement agency and be
    cooperating in the criminal proceeding if there is one. It
    does not matter whether criminal charges based on the
    sexual violence have been filed, reduced, or dismissed by
    the state attorney’s office.

Id. at 590–91.

    The current form is the same as that revised and approved in
2004, and it includes the following relevant fill-in section:

    ____ a. Petitioner reported the sexual violence to law
    enforcement and is cooperating in any criminal
    proceeding. The incident report number by law
    enforcement is: __________. {If there is a criminal case,
    include case number, if known}. __________.

Id. at 592.

     The issue before us is what level of detail and formality is
required for the “report” under section 784.046, which is a question
of law we address de novo. See Brungart v. Pullen, 296 So. 3d 973,
976 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (noting that appellate court examines the
record for competent, substantial evidence supporting the trial
court’s entry of an injunction, but reviews de novo the legal
sufficiency of the evidence).

    Research has not revealed any cases on point. In one appeal
involving this statute and form, the court pointed out in a footnote
that the petitioner had not presented evidence satisfying the
reporting requirement: “[T]he petition alleged that she [petitioner]
had reported the sexual violence to a law enforcement agency, but
no evidence was presented at the final hearing establishing this
requirement.” Morrell v. Chadick, 965 So. 2d 1277, 1279 n.1 (Fla.
2d DCA 2007).

                                 6
     The record here, unlike that in Morrell, establishes that
Petitioner met her burden of demonstrating that she satisfied the
reporting requirement. She made a report to law enforcement,
then obtained an incident report number from law enforcement,
and put it on the petition form. The only reason an incident report
number existed is because she made a report.

     At the evidentiary hearing below, Petitioner testified under
oath at some length to the facts of the sexual assault, identifying
pictures of her torn jeans and the bruises on her thigh. She was
cross-examined vigorously. She testified that she called the police
special victims unit and reported the assault. She got the name
and contact number for the detective who took her call. She gave
the detective her name and phone number, and her assailant’s
name. She described the assault and the circumstances leading up
to it and following it. She provided the names and contact
information of people to whom she had already disclosed the
assault.

     Petitioner also testified that she discussed with the detective
what options she had, which included not proceeding with a
criminal case against her attacker at that time. Ultimately, she
asked to remain anonymous. There is no evidence that Petitioner
told the detective what to record, or that she controlled the content
of the detective’s records in any way.

     The detective also testified under oath. She recalled talking
with a female about a sexual battery, and that the caller was upset.
The caller had gotten the detective’s number from an FSU
advocate. The detective acknowledged that Petitioner was that
caller. The detective further testified that there was no pertinent
information that Petitioner failed to provide. She and Petitioner
discussed potentially pursuing a Title IX complaint against the
assailant, and that the detective would keep Petitioner’s
information anonymous. After speaking with Petitioner, the
detective called the victim advocate at FSU, expressing concern
about Petitioner and indicating that Petitioner would be calling
the advocate.

                                 7
     The detective created a very brief report that included
Petitioner’s name, phone number, and the date and time of the call,
also indicating that the caller wished to remain anonymous. When
Petitioner decided to seek an injunction, she contacted the
detective to get the incident report number, and the detective used
the contact information from Petitioner’s initial report to provide
that incident report number. The detective assured Petitioner in a
text message that “[a]s we discussed, you will be listed as
anonymous for now.” The detective testified that Petitioner still
could “make a full disclosure” and proceed on her complaint if
within the statute of limitations.

     Respondent’s counsel obtained this report through a public
records request. Petitioner had not previously seen the report. The
report was categorized as “open/inactive,” and indicated that the
reporter wished to remain anonymous. Respondent’s counsel
argued that the lack of substantive information made this, as a
matter of law, not a “report” sufficient to satisfy the statute. The
trial court rejected that argument and found that Petitioner
“meets the requirements for an injunction established by law.”

     We should affirm. The statute does not require anything more
about a report except the fact of a report sufficient to generate an
incident report number, and the petitioner’s provision of that
report number in the petition. Petitioner did that. The statute does
not list required contents for law enforcement’s written record, and
we have no authority to create any. If there were any doubt about
whether a report were made, Petitioner’s testimony, plus that of
the detective, eliminated that doubt.

     Respondent does not attack Petitioner for failing to tell law
enforcement about her assault, but rather attacks the detective’s
written record of Petitioner’s initial phone call—which Petitioner
did not write, review, edit, or even see until Respondent produced
it before the hearing. Respondent’s argument improperly shifts the
inquiry from the fact of a petitioner’s report to the receiving
person’s unilateral choice of what to record from the report. Those
are, or can be, two different things, as the evidence here
demonstrates. The statute asks only whether the petitioner
reported. Neither the statute nor the supreme-court-approved
petition form asks what the recipient records—in fact, neither asks

                                 8
about the content of a report at all. They only require that a report
was made. It was.

    Further cementing this result, section 784.046(2)(c)1.
expressly acknowledges that there might not be a criminal
proceeding after an assault is reported. The statute requires that
the victim “is cooperating in any criminal proceeding” regardless
of whether any charges are “filed, reduced, or dismissed by the
State Attorney.” Id. (emphasis added). The statute’s focus is not on
what happens after the victim reports the assault. There does not
have to be an active criminal proceeding. To the extent that the
statute requires any cooperation, this record shows that Petitioner
provided all pertinent information to law enforcement, then
obtained and provided the one thing the statutory form requires: a
law enforcement incident report number. We should affirm.

                  _____________________________

Luke Newman of Luke Newman, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A.,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.

                                 9