Court Opinion

ID: 9409719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 13:06:10.990032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:52.948541
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                      CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                             JULY 19, 2023
                                                                       STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                 IN THE SUPREME COURT
                 STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                               2023 ND 131

Fritz Opp,                                         Petitioner and Appellant
     v.
Office of the North Dakota
Attorney General - BCI CWL
Unit and Office of the North
Dakota Attorney General,                        Respondents and Appellees

                               No. 20220332

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial
District, the Honorable Bruce A. Romanick, Judge.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice, in which Chief Justice Jensen and
Justices Crothers and Tufte joined. Justice Bahr filed an opinion specially
concurring.

DeWayne A. Johnston, Grand Forks, ND, for petitioner and appellant.

Matthew A. Sagsveen, Assistant Attorney General, Bismarck, ND, for
respondents and appellees.
Opp v. Office of the North Dakota Attorney General - BCI CWL Unit,
                                et al.
                            No. 20220332

McEvers, Justice.

      Fritz Opp appeals from a dismissal judgment entered by the district
court after he attempted to appeal from a Bureau of Criminal Investigation
(“BCI”) decision denying his application for a concealed weapons license under
N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04. The court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because Opp had not complied with the requirements for perfecting an appeal
under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32 (“AAPA”).
We affirm as modified.

                                       I

       The jurisdictional facts are undisputed. BCI issued Opp a letter denying
his application for a concealed weapons license on grounds that he had been
convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude. Opp filed a “Petition of
Appeal to the District Court,” which included specifications of error, and noted
the appeal was taken “pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42.” Opp attempted to
serve the Attorney General with his petition via email but inadvertently
attached documents from an unrelated matter. Upon receipt of Opp’s email,
the Attorney General’s office advised Opp: “It is not clear why these records
were sent to this office. Accordingly, we cannot take any further action until
we receive clarification.” Opp’s counsel emailed the following response: “This
is a District Court Review of a CWL Application. Attached is the Notice of filing
and case assignment.” Opp’s petition and specifications of error were not
included with the response.

      The Attorney General moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction arguing Opp had not complied with the requirements for perfecting
an appeal under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42(4) of the AAPA by failing to serve a notice
of appeal and specifications of error on the Office of the Attorney General. Opp
responded arguing the AAPA did not apply because the law authorizing BCI to
grant or deny concealed weapons licenses, N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04, does not refer

                                       1
to the AAPA. Opp alternatively argued that any timing requirements should
be subject to equitable tolling.

      After a hearing, the district court granted the Attorney General’s motion
to dismiss. The court held the AAPA applies to N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04 by virtue
of language referencing the AAPA found in N.D. Admin. Code § 10-12-01-10.
The court concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Opp did not
serve a notice of appeal and specifications of error on the Attorney General
within 30 days as required by the AAPA. See N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42. Opp appeals
arguing the AAPA does not apply and consequently there are no time limits for
perfecting an appeal under N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04 or, alternatively, any
applicable deadlines should be extended under the doctrine of equitable tolling.

                                         II

      Article VI, § 8 of the North Dakota Constitution vests the district court
with “appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law or by rule of the supreme
court.” See also City of Casselton v. N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 307 N.W.2d 849,
851 (N.D. 1981) (“[T]he district court exercises appellate jurisdiction conferred
upon it by statute.”). The district courts of this state have: “Jurisdiction of
appeals from . . . the determinations of inferior officers, boards, or tribunals, in
the cases and pursuant to the regulations as may be prescribed by law.”
N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06(4). “[T]he judicial and legislative branches share authority
when establishing the procedure for the appellate jurisdiction of the district
court.” City of Williston v. Werkmeister, 2015 ND 172, ¶ 10, 865 N.W.2d 429
(quoting City of Fargo v. Komad, 2006 ND 177, ¶ 10, 720 N.W.2d 619). A party
invoking the district court’s appellate jurisdiction must satisfy the statutory
requirements for perfecting an appeal. Altru Specialty Servs., Inc. v. N.D. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 2017 ND 270, ¶ 8, 903 N.W.2d 721. “The statutory
requirements for filing and serving a notice of appeal from an agency order are
jurisdictional.” Id. If an appeal is not properly perfected, the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed. Benson v.
Workforce Safety & Ins., 2003 ND 193, ¶ 6, 672 N.W.2d 640.

      Under N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8), an applicant for a concealed weapons
license “may appeal a denial or revocation of this license to the district court of

                                         2
Burleigh County.” Chapter 62.1-04 does not specify a method for taking the
appeal. It states: “The attorney general may adopt any rules necessary to
implement this title.” N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(10). The Attorney General has
adopted regulations allowing an applicant who is denied a concealed weapons
license to petition for rehearing and reconsideration under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-
40 and to appeal to the district court of Burleigh County under N.D.C.C. § 28-
32-42. See N.D. Admin. Code § 10-12-01-10. Section 28-32-42, N.D.C.C.,
provides in pertinent part:

      1.    Any party to any proceeding heard by an administrative
            agency, except when the order of the administrative agency is
            declared final by any other statute, may appeal from the order
            within thirty days after notice of the order has been given as
            required by section 28-32-39. If a reconsideration has been
            requested as provided in section 28-32-40, the party may
            appeal within thirty days after notice of the final
            determination upon reconsideration has been given as
            required by sections 28-32-39 and 28-32-40. If an agency does
            not dispose of a petition for reconsideration within thirty days
            after the filing of the petition, the agency is deemed to have
            made a final determination upon which an appeal may be
            taken.

      ...

      3.    a.   The appeal of an order may be taken to the district court
                 designated by law, and if none is designated, then to the
                 district court of the county in which the hearing or a part
                 thereof was held. If the administrative proceeding was
                 disposed of informally, or for some other reason no hearing
                 was held, an appeal may be taken to the district court of
                 Burleigh County. Only final orders are appealable. A
                 procedural order made by an administrative agency while
                 a proceeding is pending before it is not a final order.

(Emphasis added.)

      As an initial matter, we note Opp has not argued the denial of his
application was not a final order, and there is no indication in the record that

                                         3
Opp sought a hearing, petitioned for reconsideration under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-
40, or requested any other relief from the Attorney General after receiving the
denial letter. Based on Opp’s petition of appeal, which expressly states it is
made “pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42,” it appears Opp attempted an
immediate appeal to the district court from the denial of his application. The
party appealing to district court has the burden to show the district court has
jurisdiction. See Boyko v. N.D.’s Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 409 N.W.2d 638,
640 (N.D. 1987) (discussing a claimant under workers’ compensation statute
had the burden to show the court has jurisdiction when appealing).

      Despite Opp’s reliance on N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42 in his petition, he now
claims it cannot apply to his appeal because the AAPA is not explicitly
referenced in N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04. Opp’s argument relies on statutory
provisions in various titles that allow for appeals to the district court and
explicitly refer to the AAPA or chapter 28-32. Opp’s reliance on statutory
references where the legislature has specifically referenced the AAPA when
discussing the right to appeal is misplaced. Such a reference is unnecessary
because the definition of an administrative agency does not require an express
statutory grant of a right to review. Hammond v. N.D. State Pers. Bd., 332
N.W.2d 244, 248 (N.D. 1983).

      Opp also argues section 62.1-04-03(8) allows for appeals to the district
court of Burleigh County without any time requirements or limitation. Because
chapter 62.1-04 expresses no limitations for appealing a decision denying a
concealed weapons permit, Opp contends the Office of the Attorney General
exceeded its rule-making authority by adopting N.D. Admin. Code § 10-12-01-
10, which adopts the timing requirements of N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42. As Opp
admits, his reading would allow appeals to be taken years after decisions were
made, after circumstances have changed, and after governing laws and rules
may have been revised or repealed. As we explain below, we reject Opp’s
reading of the laws at issue.

       We make every effort to “harmonize and give meaningful effect” to
statutes that relate to the same subject matter. State v. Marcum, 2020 ND 50,
¶ 21, 939 N.W.2d 840. We read words in a statute based on their plain, ordinary,

                                       4
and commonly understood meaning. Bell v. State, 2022 ND 222, ¶ 8, 982
N.W.2d 589; see also N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. “We interpret statutes in context to
give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence in a statute.”
Guthmiller v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2018 ND 9, ¶ 8, 906 N.W.2d 73 (quoting
Doyle v. Sprynczynatyk, 2001 ND 8, ¶ 10, 621 N.W.2d 353). We presume the
legislature intended a just and reasonable result when enacting a statute, see
N.D.C.C. § 1-02-38(3), and we avoid interpreting statutes in a manner that
would create an absurd or illogical result, State v. Stegall, 2013 ND 49, ¶ 16,
828 N.W.2d 526. It is not reasonable to expect an appeal may be taken at any
time without limitation.

       Opp argues N.D. Admin. Code § 10-12-01-10 is inconsistent with the
statutory framework for appeals under N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04. A regulation
which exceeds statutory authority or conflicts with the statute that it
implements is void. State ex rel. Clayburgh v. Am. W. Cmty. Promotions, Inc.,
2002 ND 98, ¶ 13, 645 N.W.2d 196. Section 10-12-01-10 requires an appeal
from the denial of a concealed weapons license to be taken to the district court
under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42. In promulgating section 10-12-01-10, the Attorney
General provided some guidance of the procedure for appealing BCI’s denial of
an application for a concealed weapons license. In doing so, the Attorney
General complied with the statutory mandate to adopt rules to implement title
62.1 on concealed weapons. See N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(10). The language of
N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42(3)(a) recognizes the legislature may designate a specific
district court has appellate jurisdiction to hear an appeal, and in this instance
N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8) requires an appeal be taken to the district court in
Burleigh County. See Boyko, 409 N.W.2d at 641 (discussing the statutory
designation conferred to district courts for filing a notice of appeal from an
administrative agency as being a matter of jurisdiction, not venue). The
Attorney General’s promulgation of section 10-12-01-10 does not conflict with
the statutory right to appeal to the district court in Burleigh County under
N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8); rather, the rule restates the jurisdictional limitation
designated in N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8) on where appellate review may occur as
may be provided by law under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42(3)(a).

                                       5
      Regardless of the regulations adopted by the Attorney General, the
AAPA applies to this appeal based on its plain language. BCI is organized
under the Attorney General, and the Attorney General acts as its
superintendent. See N.D.C.C. ch. 12-60. This Court has previously considered
the process for the denial of a renewal of a concealed weapons license under
N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04 to fall under the AAPA. See Kasprowicz v. Finck, 1998 ND
4, ¶¶ 14-15, 574 N.W.2d 564 (remanding for the BCI chief to exercise his
discretion under N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03 and N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32). Opp’s appeal
asks the district court to review a decision by BCI, which is organized under
the Office of the Attorney General, an “administrative unit of the executive
branch,” to deny a license to carry a concealed weapon, a “form of authorization
required by law.” See N.D.C.C. § 28-32-01(2), (7) (defining the terms
“administrative agency” and “license”). By its terms, the AAPA applies to Opp’s
appeal.

       We reject Opp’s invitation to read the reference to Burleigh County
district court in section 62.1-04-03(8) as permitting appeals without limitation.
Absent any apparent law to indicate otherwise, we hold Opp’s appeal is
governed by the AAPA. Although there was no hearing in this case as
ordinarily contemplated by the AAPA, N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42(3)(a) also
contemplates instances when, for some reason, no hearing is held. In addition,
the relief Opp requests on appeal is for reversal of the district court’s dismissal,
not a hearing under the AAPA. Opp has made no argument that he was denied
due process under the AAPA.

      An appeal under the AAPA may be taken by serving a notice of appeal
and specifications of error on the agency within 30 days after a party has
received notice of the agency’s decision. N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42. Opp undisputedly
did not do so, and therefore he did not satisfy the statutory requirements for
perfecting his appeal. Although the district court reached the same result
based on a different rationale (that the AAPA applies via N.D. Admin. Code §
10-12-01-10), we will not set aside its judgment merely because the court relied
on different reasoning. PHI Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Johnston Law Off., P.C., 2020
ND 22, ¶ 34, 937 N.W.2d 885. Based on this record, we agree with the district

                                         6
court that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Opp failed to perfect
his appeal under the AAPA.

                                      III

       Opp alternatively argues he is entitled to equitable tolling of “any
deadlines accompanying the appeal.” He relies on Boechler, P.C. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 142 S.Ct. 1493, 1501 (2022), where the
United States Supreme Court held a time limit to file a petition for review of
an IRS decision was a “nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling.”
However, unlike the timing requirement in Boechler, the provisions of the
AAPA are jurisdictional. See Altru Specialty Servs., 2017 ND 270, ¶ 8.
“Jurisdictional requirements . . . do not allow for equitable exceptions.”
Boechler, at 1497. The doctrine of equitable tolling, which this Court has not
adopted, is an exception to a statute of limitations. Grand Forks Homes, Inc. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 2011 ND 65, ¶ 22, 795 N.W.2d 335. Equitable tolling
cannot be used to extend a statutory deadline for perfecting an appeal. Id.
Rather, “[t]he terms of the statutes governing appeals control whether the time
for taking an appeal may be tolled.” Id.

       Opp also argues he is entitled to relief under N.D.R.Ct. 3.5(f), which
allows the district court to “grant appropriate relief if electronic filing or
electronic service was not completed due to technical problems.” See Inwards
v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2014 ND 163, ¶¶ 14-15, 851 N.W.2d 693
(affirming district court’s application of Rule 3.5(f) to allow agency additional
time to serve notice of appeal after attempted electronic service failed).
However, it appears Opp did not move for relief under Rule 3.5(f) in the district
court. See N.D.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1) (“A request for a court order must be made by
motion.”). Nor has Opp identified any place in the record where he claimed
Rule 3.5(f) applied. Opp cannot argue on appeal that the district court erred by
failing to issue relief he did not seek. See Schrodt v. Schrodt, 2022 ND 64, ¶ 7,
971 N.W.2d 861 (issues not presented to the district court will not be addressed
on appeal).

                                       7
                                       IV

      Opp did not satisfy the requirements to perfect an appeal under N.D.C.C.
§ 28-32-42, which apply to his appeal and are jurisdictional. Equitable tolling
cannot be applied as an exception to a statutory jurisdictional requirement.
The district court correctly held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. However,
the court dismissed the matter with prejudice. A dismissal with prejudice is
considered an adjudication on the merits. Trottier v. Bird, 2001 ND 177, ¶ 8,
635 N.W.2d 157. Absent jurisdiction, a court is powerless to do anything beyond
dismissing without prejudice. Riemers v. State, 2006 ND 162, ¶ 10, 718 N.W.2d
566. We affirm dismissal of the action but modify the judgment to dismiss
without prejudice.

      Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte

Bahr, Justice, specially concurring.

      I concur with the majority’s conclusion the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Opp’s appeal because Opp did not satisfy the
requirements to perfect an appeal under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42.

      Opp’s “Petition of Appeal” cites N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42, N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-
03, and N.D. Admin. Code § 10-12-01-10 as authority for his appeal. For that
reason, I write separately to address application of N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03 and
N.D. Admin. Code § 10-12-01-10. I also write separately to emphasize the
majority’s decision should not be read as holding an applicant for a concealed
weapons license is not entitled to a hearing prior to BCI issuing a final order
denying the application, and to suggest possible changes to N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-
03 and N.D. Admin. Code § 10-12-01-10.

                                        V

     Section 62.1-04-03(8), N.D.C.C., provides “[t]he applicant [for a concealed
weapons license] may appeal a denial or revocation of this license to the district

                                        8
court of Burleigh County.” Opp correctly notes N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04 does not
address an applicant’s right to an adjudicative proceeding under N.D.C.C. ch.
28-32, the Administrative Agencies Practice Act (AAPA), prior to the denial of
an application for a concealed weapons license. He therefore argues the AAPA
does not apply to his appeal. I agree with the majority that the AAPA applies
to Opp’s appeal.

      A statutory reference to the AAPA or to the right to a hearing in N.D.C.C.
ch. 62.1-04 is not required for the AAPA to apply to applications for a concealed
weapons license. Applicants for concealed weapons licenses are entitled to the
protections of the AAPA due to the definitions of “adjudicative proceeding,”
“administrative agency,” “license,” and “order” in N.D.C.C. § 28-32-01
irrespective of whether N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04 specifically references the AAPA.
Hammond v. N.D. State Pers. Bd., 332 N.W.2d 244, 248 (N.D. 1983) (“The
current definition of an administrative agency no longer requires that there be
an express statutory grant of a right of review under a statute located outside
the provisions of Chapter 28-32, N.D.C.C.”). A statute does not have to refer to
the AAPA or state an applicant has a right to a hearing for the AAPA to apply
to quasi-judicial decisions of administrative agencies. For that reason, I concur
with the majority that the AAPA governs Opp’s appeal. Majority, at ¶¶ 8, 12-
13.

       Opp further argues N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8) does not contain a time limit
for perfecting an appeal, which renders his appeal timely. Section 62.1-04-
03(8), without setting a time limit to perfect the appeal, designates the district
court with jurisdiction to hear an appeal; N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42(1) provides the
time limit to perfect an appeal from an order of an administrative agency.

      Under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42(1), “[a]ny party to any proceeding heard by
an administrative agency . . . may appeal from the order within thirty days
after notice of the order has been given as required by section 28-32-39.”
Section 28-32-42(3)(a), N.D.C.C., provides “[t]he appeal of an order may be
taken to the district court designated by law, and if none is designated, then to
the district court of the county in which the hearing or a part thereof was held.”
(Emphasis added.) Section 62.1-04-03(8), N.D.C.C., provides “[t]he applicant

                                        9
[for a concealed weapons license] may appeal a denial or revocation of this
license to the district court of Burleigh County.” Thus, N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8)
designates the district court where an appeal of a denial of an application for
a concealed weapons license may be taken under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42. The
limited language in N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8) cannot reasonably be read as an
exception to the AAPA, as argued by Opp.

       We avoid interpreting statues in a manner that would create an absurd
and illogical result. Henry Hill Oil Servs. LLC v. Tufto, 2023 ND 41, ¶ 10, 987
N.W.2d 314. Interpreting N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8) to grant a right to a direct
appeal to the district court of Burleigh County would create an absurd and
illogical result because a direct appeal to the district court would conflict with
the AAPA and deny applicants the established protections of the AAPA.
Moreover, interpreting N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8) to grant a right to a direct
appeal, as distinguished from an appeal under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42, would
create an absurd and illogical result because the statue does not provide a
process for the appeal, such as within what amount of time the appeal has to
be taken, the standard of review, and the record on appeal. See Majority, at ¶ 6
(“Chapter 62.1-04 does not specify a method for taking the appeal.”); Majority,
at ¶ 9 (section 62.1-04-03(8) has no time requirements or limitations and
“would allow appeals to be taken years after decisions were made, after
circumstances have changed, and after governing laws and rules may have
been revised or repealed”).

       Furthermore, “[s]tatutes relating to the same subject matter shall be
construed together and should be harmonized, if possible, to give meaningful
effect to each, without rendering either one useless.” Henry Hill Oil, 2023 ND
41, ¶ 10. To read the appeal language in N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8) to grant a
right to a direct appeal to the district court does not harmonize N.D.C.C. § 62.1-
04-03(8) with N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42 and would give no effect to the due process
requirements established in the AAPA. However, concluding N.D.C.C. § 62.1-
04-03(8) designates the district court where an appeal of a denial of an
application for a concealed weapons license may be taken under the AAPA
harmonizes N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8) with N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42 and the AAPA.

                                       10
      Under N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(4), BCI “is required to process the
application and make a determination within sixty days of receipt of the
properly completed application.” The sixty-day timeline does not conflict with
BCI providing an applicant the procedural protections of the AAPA. As we
stated in Singha v. N.D. State Board of Medical Examiners, 1998 ND 42, ¶ 27,
574 N.W.2d 838, the AAPA “is flexible enough to allow the [agency] to
informally deny license applications during its scheduled meetings as long as
applicants are afforded subsequent procedural safeguards required by the
A.A.P.A.” Thus, BCI can make its determination on an application within sixty
days based solely on the application as long as the applicant is subsequently
afforded the procedural safeguards required by the AAPA, including the right
to request a hearing.

       Section 10-12-01-10, N.D. Admin. Code, states an applicant may appeal
the denial of an application of a license to the district court of Burleigh County.
To read N.D. Admin. Code § 10-12-01-10 to provide an applicant a right to
appeal BCI’s decision without providing an applicant the opportunity for an
adjudicative proceeding would be inconsistent with the AAPA, making the rule
invalid. N.D.C.C. § 28-32-23 (providing “an administrative agency may adopt
specific agency rules of procedure not inconsistent with this chapter”); State ex
rel. Clayburgh v. Am. W. Cmty. Promotions, Inc., 2002 ND 98, ¶ 13, 645 N.W.2d
196 (“A regulation which exceeds the [agency’s] statutory authority or conflicts
with the statute that it implements is void.”); Steele v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp.
Bureau, 273 N.W.2d 692, 701 (N.D. 1978) (“A rule may not exceed statutory
authority or supersede a statute.”). Construing N.D. Admin. Code § 10-12-01-
10 to preserve its validity, N.D. Admin. Code § 10-12-01-10 must be
harmonized with N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32 by construing it to simply restate the
appeal rights and jurisdiction provided in N.D.C.C. §§ 28-32-42 and 62.1-04-
03(8). Steele, at 701 (construing administrative rule to preserve its validity by
interpreting it to require Workmen’s Compensation Bureau to conduct or hold
a formal hearing if requested by a party aggrieved by the result of an informal
hearing).

                                        11
                                       VI

      In enacting the AAPA, the North Dakota legislature “set out the due
process requirements for administrative agencies.” Steele, 273 N.W.2d at 700-
01. The AAPA generally governs due process requirements that must be
followed before an administrative agency issues an order as defined in the
AAPA. A significant procedural protection provided by the AAPA is the right to
an adjudicative proceeding. Under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-01(1), an “‘[a]djudicative
proceeding’ means an administrative matter resulting in an agency issuing an
order after an opportunity for hearing is provided or required.” (Emphasis
added.) “At any hearing in an adjudicative proceeding, the parties shall be
afforded opportunity to present evidence and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses as is permitted under sections 28-32-24 and 28-32-35.” N.D.C.C. §
28-32-21(2). Section 28-32-35, N.D.C.C., which addresses procedures at the
hearing, provides “the person presiding at the hearing shall afford to all parties
and other persons allowed to participate the opportunity to respond, present
evidence and argument, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal
evidence, except as restricted or conditioned by a grant of intervention or by a
prehearing order.” See also Singha, 1998 ND 42, ¶ 28 (“In administrative
contexts, we have held a hearing generally contemplates the presentation of
evidence and testimony.”). The right to a hearing is a significant procedural
protection in the AAPA. See Id. at ¶ 27 (“The statutory scheme of the A.A.P.A.
generally contemplates formal hearing procedures for deciding matters before
an agency.”); Steele, at 701 (explaining a formal evidentiary hearing is required
under the AAPA “unless the parties either agree otherwise or there is no
dispute of a material fact”).

       As noted by the majority, “there was no hearing in this case as ordinarily
contemplated by the AAPA.” Majority, at ¶ 13. Opp’s “Petition of Appeal” to the
district court states: “In a letter from Casey Miller, Chief Agent, North Dakota
Bureau of Criminal Investigation dated April 20, 2022, Fritz Opp was notified
that he was not going to be issued a Class 1 North Dakota Concealed Weapon
License.” Neither party filed a copy of the April 20, 2022 letter with the court.
Thus, the record does not show whether BCI provided Opp an opportunity for
a hearing as required by the AAPA. I agree with the majority’s decision not to

                                       12
address this issue because Opp did not raise this issue on appeal, and because
Opp’s notice of appeal and specifications of error were untimely. However, as
noted earlier, I write separately to emphasize the majority’s decision should
not be read as holding an applicant for a concealed weapons license is not
entitled to a hearing prior to BCI issuing a final order denying the application.

      Based on the limited record, it appears BCI issued an initial
determination based on Opp’s application. However, under the AAPA, BCI was
required to provide Opp an opportunity for a hearing prior to issuing a final
order denying his application. N.D.C.C. § 28-32-01(1) (“‘Adjudicative
proceeding’ means an administrative matter resulting in an agency issuing an
order after an opportunity for hearing is provided or required.” (emphasis
added)); Singha, 1998 ND 42, ¶¶ 30, 32 (remanding “the case to the Board for
proceedings consistent with the requirements of the A.A.P.A.” because the
Board denied Singha’s application “without complying with the procedural
formalities required by the A.A.P.A.”); Steele, 273 N.W.2d at 701 (“We are not
ruling out the use of an informal hearing (a non-evidentiary hearing) for
making an initial determination provided the Bureau will afford the claimant
a formal hearing (an evidentiary hearing) upon request if a dispute of a
material fact exists, as contemplated by the due process requirements set out
by the legislature in Ch. 28-32, NDCC.”).

      The majority correctly notes “there is no indication in the record that
Opp sought a hearing[.]” Majority, at ¶ 7. However, nothing in the record
indicates BCI notified Opp of his right to request a hearing. See Steele, 273
N.W.2d at 700 (distinguishing a case where claimant “was notified of his right
to seek reconsideration which would ultimately lead to an evidentiary hearing
but elected to treat the decision as final and appealed to the court”). Further,
neither N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04 nor N.D. Admin. Code ch. 10-12-01 informed Opp
he could request a hearing. Rather, N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03(8) and N.D. Admin.
Code § 10-12-01-10 only provide Opp could appeal to the district court of
Burleigh County. Therefore, arguably Opp justifiably believed his only remedy
was to appeal BCI’s letter to the district court of Burleigh County.

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       To avoid any possible confusion created by N.D. Admin. Code § 10-12-01-
10 as currently promulgated, the Attorney General may consider amending
N.D. Admin. Code ch. 10-12-01 to specifically identify applicants’ right to a
hearing under the AAPA and the process and timeline to request a hearing. If
it is not already doing so, BCI may consider specifically notifying applicants of
their right to request a hearing in its initial letter notifying applicants of the
denial of their application.

       The legislature may consider amending N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-03 to
specifically reference applicants’ right to a hearing under the AAPA. See, e.g.,
N.D.C.C. §§ 38-14.2-15, 43-02.2-10, 43-03-20, 43-10-23; 43-13-22; 43-23-11.1(2);
43-30-13; 43-31-11; 57-60-11. Alternatively, if the legislature intends N.D.C.C.
§ 62.1-04-03(8) to grant a right to a direct appeal to the district court of
Burleigh County, exempting applications for a concealed weapons license from
the procedural requirements of the AAPA, it may consider clearly and explicitly
doing so. It may also consider establishing the requirements and process for
the direct appeal, such as any timelines for the appeal to be taken, the standard
of review, and the record on appeal. See, e.g., N.D.C.C. § 2-04-11.

      Douglas A. Bahr

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