Court Opinion

ID: 9897218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:47.88698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:55.305249
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                  Jun 21 2023, 9:35 am

                                                       CLERK
                                                   Indiana Supreme Court
                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                        and Tax Court

                      IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court
         Supreme Court Case No. 22S-CT-318

               Kathryn Davidson,
                        Appellant,

                           –v–

             State of Indiana, et al.,
                        Appellees.

   Argued: November 15, 2022 | Decided: June 21, 2023

          Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court
                 No. 53C01-2003-CT-621
     The Honorable AmyMarie Travis, Special Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                    No. 21A-CT-1516

              Opinion by Justice Slaughter
 Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa and Molter concur.
Justice Goff concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.
Slaughter, Justice.

   The Indiana Comparative Fault Act does not apply to “tort claims”
against government defendants. But it does require the factfinder to
consider the fault of “all persons who caused or contributed to cause” the
plaintiff’s alleged injury. Here, after obtaining a judgment in Lake County
against a non-government defendant for injuries sustained in a highway
collision, the plaintiff sued again in Monroe County, seeking relief against
other defendants (both government and non-government) for injuries
arising out of the same accident. We hold that the claims asserted in
Monroe County are barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. To avoid
this result, a plaintiff seeking tort damages from both government and
non-government defendants must sue all such tortfeasors in one lawsuit.

                                              I

                                              A

  In April 2018, Kathryn Davidson was a passenger in a semi-truck
driven by her boyfriend, Brandon Nicholson, who at the time was acting
within the scope of his employment with J Trucking, LLC. While driving
northbound on State Road 37 in Monroe County, Nicholson fell asleep,
lost control, and collided with an overpass-bridge pier. As a result of the
collision, Davidson was ejected from the semi-truck, sustained serious and
permanent injuries, and is now quadriplegic.

   Davidson sent a timely tort-claim notice to the State. Her notice alleged
(1) the collision occurred in a construction zone within the Interstate 69
construction project, and (2) the Indiana Department of Transportation’s
negligence caused her injuries. Specifically, she claimed the department
was at fault in planning and setting up the construction zone and for
failing to place a barrier before the bridge pier to prevent or lessen any
impact. Davidson also sought various public records from the department
concerning traffic control, the construction project, her own accident, and
any other accidents at the site. The State denied her tort claim in
November 2018.

  The next month, Davidson, who lives in Lake County, filed a
negligence action against J Trucking in the Lake Superior Court.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023        Page 2 of 15
According to Davidson, the sole purpose of the Lake County lawsuit was
to obtain a final judgment against J Trucking to satisfy the requirements
for obtaining insurance coverage from J Trucking’s insurer, Progressive
Southeastern Insurance Company. After a bench trial, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of Davidson and against J Trucking for more
than $3.2 million. The court found that “Nicholson’s negligence was a
proximate cause of the motor vehicle collision . . . [and] of [Davidson’s]
claimed injuries, medical treatment, and medical expenses.” The court
further found that “[a]ll of [Davidson’s] past treatment and medical
charges were reasonable, necessary, and caused by the negligence of
Nicholson in the collision at issue.” And it found J Trucking vicariously
liable for Nicholson’s negligence.

   In January 2020, Davidson and Progressive settled her insurance claim
for $725,000, which was $25,000 short of policy limits. The settlement
discharged all liability, liens, damages, and costs against J Trucking. The
parties voluntarily dismissed the Lake County action in February 2020.

                                              B

   In March 2020, Davidson again sued for the same injuries she sustained
in the same I-69 construction zone. This time she sued in the Monroe
Circuit Court against six other defendants: State of Indiana; Indiana
Department of Transportation; I-69 Development Partners, LLC; DLZ
Indiana, LLC; Aztec Engineering Group, Inc.; and Walsh Construction
Company II, LLC. Davidson alleged these defendants were responsible for
designing, planning, building, and operating section 5 of the I-69 project,
as well as maintaining traffic and planning and placing barriers in front of
the bridge pier at the accident scene.

   The defendants moved to dismiss Davidson’s action for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. One of the defendants, Aztec,
also moved for judgment on the pleadings. These Rule 12 motions argued
the Lake County judgment for Davidson barred her Monroe County
claims under the doctrines of claim splitting, collateral estoppel, and
judicial estoppel. The defendants attached materials in support of their
motions, and Davidson attached materials to her response. Davidson

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023        Page 3 of 15
moved to strike the defendants’ attached materials or, alternatively, to
consider the Rule 12 motions as motions for summary judgment.

   The trial court granted the defendants’ Rule 12 motions and dismissed
Davidson’s action with prejudice, holding that collateral estoppel and
claim splitting barred her claims but judicial estoppel did not apply. The
court refused to treat the Rule 12 motions as motions under Rule 56. The
court took judicial notice of most of the attached materials the defendants
submitted, including the complaint, ruling, and stipulation for dismissal
in the Lake County action; the complaint in the present action; and the
public-records request. The court also took judicial notice of the tort-claim
notice, which Davidson attached in support of her response. But the court
did not take judicial notice of most of the evidence Davidson introduced,
including affidavits explaining why she did not sue the Monroe County
defendants in Lake County, evidence the department failed to respond to
requests for information, and her settlement agreement with Progressive.
The court denied her post-judgment motions to correct error and to
amend her complaint.

  Davidson appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that
neither collateral estoppel nor claim splitting barred her claims. Davidson
v. State, 187 N.E.3d 283, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The defendants then
sought transfer, which we granted, 194 N.E.3d 602 (Ind. 2022), thus
vacating the appellate opinion, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

                                              II

   Davidson raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues the trial court
erred in dismissing her action under doctrines of claim splitting (also
known as claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (also known as issue
preclusion). We hold that claim preclusion does not apply here, but issue
preclusion does, and the trial court was correct in dismissing her action on
the latter ground. Second, she argues the court erred in refusing to treat
the Rule 12 motions as motions for summary judgment, in dismissing her
action with prejudice, and in violating her due-process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. We hold there was no error. The court was not
obliged to review the Rule 12 motions as motions under Rule 56. And it

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023         Page 4 of 15
was entitled to dismiss the action with prejudice, so it did not violate her
due-process rights.

                                              A

   We begin with Davidson’s argument that the trial court wrongfully
dismissed her action under the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion.
We agree the court should not have dismissed her action based on claim
preclusion. But dismissal was warranted under issue preclusion.

                                              1

   The trial court erred in dismissing the Monroe County action based on
claim preclusion—a preclusive doctrine requiring four elements to be
satisfied: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) the
matter at issue in the present action was or might have been determined
in the prior action; and (4) the prior action was between the same parties
in the present action or their privies. Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1209
(Ind. 2019). Here, the fourth element was not met because none of these
defendants or their privies were parties in Lake County.

                                              2

   The trial court, though, was correct in dismissing the Monroe County
action based on issue preclusion. Issue preclusion bars relitigating the
same fact or issue when that fact or issue was necessarily decided in a
prior lawsuit by a court of competent jurisdiction. Nat’l Wine & Spirits, Inc.
v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 976 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 2012) (holding defensive
collateral estoppel barred plaintiff’s claim). The party to be estopped must
also have been a party (or its privy) in the prior suit. Ibid. Here, the
defendants argue that Davidson is barred from litigating the negligent
cause of her injuries and damages in Monroe County because this issue
was necessarily adjudicated in Lake County. We agree. Under our
comparative fault act, Ind. Code ch. 34-51-2, the Lake County court
determined, conclusively, that only J Trucking was at fault for Davidson’s
injuries.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023          Page 5 of 15
                                              a

   When applying issue preclusion to actions under the Act, we embrace
the approach of our court of appeals in Bornstein v. Watson’s of Indianapolis,
Inc., 771 N.E.2d 663, 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Bornstein held that because
the Act requires the trial court to apportion 100 percent of the fault for
both parties and nonparties, a judgment under the Act necessarily
adjudicates the negligent cause or causes of a plaintiff’s alleged injuries in
their entirety. Ibid. Under the Act, plaintiffs can recover damages only
from named defendants. Defendants, in turn, can limit their own liability
to plaintiffs by naming nonparties that contributed to plaintiffs’ loss. The
jury must determine “the percentage of fault of the claimant, of the
defendants, and of any person who is a nonparty.” Ind. Code § 34-51-2-8
(applies to two or more defendants); id. § 34-51-2-7 (single-party
defendant). The jury then multiplies the percentage of fault by the
claimant’s total damages regardless of fault and enters a verdict against
each defendant for its share of the damages. Ibid. When the action is tried
without a jury, the court sitting as factfinder must award damages
according to the same principles specified for juries. Id. § 34-51-2-9. The
result is that a single action under the Act necessarily adjudicates all the
liability and damages for the plaintiff’s alleged injury. Bornstein, 771
N.E.2d at 666.

   By establishing a system that apportions all liability and damages in the
same lawsuit, the Act functionally requires plaintiffs to name all
defendants in a single suit. Otherwise, serial suits against different
tortfeasors in connection with the same injury could lead to inconsistent
judgments. Id. at 667. For example, a Monroe County judgment
apportioning any fault to Davidson or the six defendants here would be at
odds with Lake County’s assignment of all fault to J Trucking. The Act
does not countenance such inconsistencies. Tort claimants in a later
lawsuit are thus foreclosed from recovering from tortfeasors omitted from
the first lawsuit. Ibid.

  At the same time, defendants bear the burden of naming nonparties
against which the jury can apportion fault. “The burden of proof of a
nonparty defense is upon the defendant, who must affirmatively plead the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023          Page 6 of 15
defense.” I.C. § 34-51-2-15. A nonparty defense limits the defendant’s
liability to the plaintiff to the proportion of the defendant’s own fault.
Witte v. Mundy ex rel. Mundy, 820 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. 2005). To assert a
nonparty defense, the defendant must name the nonparty when filing its
answer, or with reasonable promptness if the defendant discovers the
nonparty after filing its answer, to give the plaintiff the opportunity to
add the nonparty as a defendant. I.C. § 34-51-2-16; Owens Corning
Fiberglass Corp. v. Cobb, 754 N.E.2d 905, 913 (Ind. 2001) (interpreting
similar provision in Products Liability Act). While the defendant must
name all nonparties to limit its liability to the plaintiff, the plaintiff must
still sue all responsible persons to maximize her own recovery from
tortfeasors. A nonparty has no liability to the plaintiff.

   Here, both the Lake County and Monroe County lawsuits are subject to
the Act because in both suits Davidson has sought damages for injuries to
her person resulting from the collision. The Act “governs any action based
on fault that is brought to recover damages for injury or death to a person
or harm to property”. I.C. § 34-51-2-1(a). In the Lake County action, after a
bench trial, the trial court found Nicholson’s negligence, which it imputed
to his principal, J Trucking, was a proximate cause of Davidson’s claimed
injuries. The court apportioned all fault to J Trucking. The court found
only Nicholson a proximate cause of Davidson’s injuries, attributed all of
Davidson’s damages to Nicholson’s negligence, and entered a verdict
against J Trucking for the full judgment amount. The Lake County court
could not apportion fault to any Monroe County defendant named below
because none was a party or named nonparty in Lake County. In effect,
then, Davidson seeks to relitigate in Monroe County the apportionment of
fault already adjudicated in Lake County.

   Davidson counters that defensive issue preclusion does not apply here
because she did not “lose” her suit in Lake County. We disagree.
Defensive issue preclusion, to be sure, applies when the plaintiff
previously litigated the issue and lost. Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, Inc., 669
N.E.2d 165, 167 n.3 (Ind. 1996). But relevant here, when a plaintiff fails to
name a potential defendant in an action under the Act, as Davidson failed
to do in Lake County, the plaintiff “loses” against the unnamed defendant
by failing to obtain an allocation of fault against that defendant. For

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023            Page 7 of 15
example, in Bornstein, defensive issue preclusion barred the plaintiff’s
wrongful-death claim against the later-sued defendant because 100
percent of the fault had been apportioned in a prior suit the plaintiff
brought for the same underlying incident, leaving no fault to apportion to
the subsequent defendant. 771 N.E.2d at 666. In suits brought under the
Act, “a plaintiff is obliged to name all alleged joint tortfeasors as
defendants in one suit or face the possibility of being estopped from
pursuing a remedy against the unnamed tortfeasor in a subsequent
lawsuit.” Id. at 667. Thus, Davidson really did “lose” on the issue of
whether to apportion any fault to persons omitted as defendants or
nonparties in Lake County.

                                              b

   Next, Davidson argues that even if the Lake County suit necessarily
adjudicated who caused the injuries of which she complains, that suit
could not adjudicate any such cause vis-à-vis the State and the department
because government tort claims are excluded from the Act. Again, we
disagree.

   The Act’s plain language shows it applies here to the Monroe County
suit and to all its defendants, including the government defendants. By its
terms, the Act has far-reaching scope. It “governs any action based on
fault that is brought to recover damages for injury or death to a person or
harm to property, except as provided in subsection (b).” I.C. § 34-51-2-1(a).
As subsection 1(a) explains, the Act presumptively applies to any
negligence action to “recover damages for injury”. Davidson’s Monroe
County action is clearly subject to the Act under this definition. And
nothing in subsection 1(b) exempts the Monroe County action from its
coverage. The only actions the Act does not govern are those it expressly
exempts. Subsection 1(b) lists only two categories of exempt actions: (1)
those “brought against a qualified health care provider . . . for medical
malpractice” and (2) those accruing before 1985. Id. § 34-51-2-1(b). Stated
differently, the Act specifies which “actions” it excludes from coverage
and, notably, does not exclude actions against government defendants.

   While the Act thus applies to “actions” against government defendants,
it does not apply to “tort claims” asserted within such actions against

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023         Page 8 of 15
government defendants. “This chapter [the comparative fault act] does not
apply in any manner to tort claims against governmental entities or public
employees under IC 34-13-3[.]” Id. § 34-51-2-2 (emphasis added). But the
jury must nevertheless consider the fault of “all persons who caused or
contributed to cause the alleged injury” regardless of whether they could
be named as parties. Id. §§ 34-51-2-7(b)(1), 34-51-2-8(b)(1). Thus, if one
claim is subject to the Act, the method of apportioning fault requires
joinder of all claims against persons “who caused or contributed to cause
the alleged injury” for full apportionment of fault. Ibid.

   In practice, when a plaintiff brings a mixed-theory case that alleges both
government and non-government defendants are at fault for the plaintiff’s
injuries, the Act applies to require the jury to apportion a percentage of
fault and damages to all defendants and nonparties. But this
apportionment of damages has no effect on the underlying government
tort claims, which are still governed by common-law principles such as
contributory negligence.

   We disagree with Davidson that applying issue preclusion to the claims
against the government defendants here would contradict our holding in
State v. Snyder, 594 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. 1992). Snyder is inapposite for two
reasons. First, Snyder did not address issue preclusion but whether a new
trial was required because of inconsistent verdicts. Id. at 785–87. Second,
although the majority in Snyder declined to review the verdicts’
inconsistency, the concurrence noted the verdicts were not inconsistent
because the jury could have found the plaintiff incurred a risk against the
non-government defendant without also finding the plaintiff incurred a
risk against the State. Id. at 788–89 (Dickson, J., concurring).

   Government defendants are not excluded from actions (as opposed to
claims) governed by the Act. Relevant here, that means the Lake County
court needed to consider the fault of both the State and the department of
transportation if Davidson wanted to recover from them. Thus, the
apportionment of fault solely to J Trucking in Lake County necessarily
determined that these government defendants had no fault—and thus no
liability—to Davidson for purposes of issue preclusion.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023        Page 9 of 15
                                              c

   A court applying issue preclusion must also consider (1) whether the
party against whom the prior judgment is being asserted—here
Davidson—had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first
suit; and (2) whether it would be unfair under the circumstances for the
Monroe County defendants to use issue preclusion against her in the
second suit. Sullivan v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 605 N.E.2d 134, 138
(Ind. 1992). Davidson argues a question of fact remains on whether issue
preclusion should apply under these two factors. We disagree.

   First, because Davidson was able to discover the defendants through
reasonable, diligent investigation before obtaining a judgment in Lake
County, she had a full and fair opportunity to litigate against the
defendants there. Typically, even a meritorious defense is not a basis for
dismissal under Rule 12(B)(6) unless a plaintiff has pleaded herself out of
court by alleging, and thus admitting, the essential elements of the
defense. Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 464
(Ind. 2017). Davidson relies on the Rule 12(B)(6) standard in only one
portion of her brief where she argues the tort-claim notice was not
conclusive evidence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims
against Walsh, DLZ, Aztec, and I-69 Development. But Davidson
conceded in both the trial and appellate courts that she discovered the
defendants in this case by meeting with a construction-zone expert and an
accident reconstructionist. And she offers no reason why she could not
have consulted these experts in the initial investigation of her claims
before she sued and obtained a judgment in Lake County.

  Second, it is not unfair on this record to find Davidson’s Monroe
County claims barred by issue preclusion. She argues the fairness factors
weigh in her favor, and the government defendants concealed evidence
thereby preventing Davidson from suing them in the Lake County suit. In
fact, Davidson named the State and the department in the tort-claim
notice months before she sued in Lake County. Davidson argues she could
not raise her claims against the defendants in Lake County without being
subject to sanctions under Trial Rule 11. But what she alleged in Monroe
County is no more detailed than what she alleged in the tort-claim notice,

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023         Page 10 of 15
which she filed before suing in Lake County. Both the tort-claim notice
and the Monroe County complaint allege the department was at fault in
planning and maintaining the construction area and in failing to place a
barrier before the bridge pier. Thus, when Davidson served her tort-claim
notice, she had “reasonable cause to believe the existence” of the State’s
and the department’s negligent acts she alleged in her complaint. Ind.
Trial Rule 11. The trial court below did not consider Davidson’s
designated evidence concerning the State’s eventual denial of her tort
claim and its failure to respond to her public-record requests, so we
likewise decline to consider them here.

   Davidson also argues that financial and health considerations make it
unfair to apply issue preclusion here. But materials supporting these
considerations were not before the trial court, and we decline to consider
them here in the first instance. The trial court considered only the
pleadings, certain filings in the Lake County action, the tort-claim notice,
and the public-records request. None of these documents concern her
financial and health considerations when she sued only J Trucking in the
first suit.

                                              B

  Finally, we consider whether the trial court erred by refusing to treat
the Rule 12 motions as motions for summary judgment and by dismissing
Davidson’s action with prejudice. We hold it did not. And because there
was no error, there was no violation of Davidson’s Fourteenth
Amendment due-process rights.

                                              1

  Davidson argues the trial court erred when it judicially noticed some
materials without taking judicial notice of Davidson’s opposing evidence
or converting the Rule 12 motions to motions for summary judgment.
Under Trial Rule 12, if “matters outside the pleading[s] are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56”. T.R. 12(B),
12(C). A trial court converts a Rule 12 motion to a motion for summary
judgment “by its consideration of extraneous matters” regardless of

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023        Page 11 of 15
whether the court converts the motion to one for summary judgment
expressly. Milestone Contractors, L.P. v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 739 N.E.2d 174,
176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

   Here, the trial court correctly declined to consider the Rule 12 motions
as summary-judgment motions because it considered only the pleadings
and materials of which it took judicial notice and no outside materials.
When deciding the Rule 12 motions, the trial court took judicial notice of
certain materials, including the filings in the Lake County action, the
public-records request, and the tort-claim notice. The trial court did not
consider any other outside materials. In the context of Rule 12 motions,
“materials of which a trial court may take judicial notice . . . are not
considered ‘matters outside the pleading.’” Moss v. Horizon Bank, N.A., 120
N.E.3d 560, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, the trial court did not consider
any extraneous materials that would require converting the Rule 12
motions to motions under Rule 56.

  Davidson waived any argument that the court should not have
judicially noticed these materials by failing to raise the argument in her
opening appellate brief. See Monroe Guar. Ins. v. Magwerks Corp., 829
N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind. 2005) (finding waiver of issues not raised in
appellant’s initial brief). Davidson also waived her argument that the trial
court should have taken judicial notice of her opposing evidence because
she insufficiently developed the argument and cited no authority that her
evidence fell within the judicial-notice rule. “A litigant who fails to
support his arguments with appropriate citations to legal authority and
record evidence waives those arguments for our review.” Pierce v. State, 29
N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015); see also App. R. 46(A)(8) (providing that
appellant’s brief must support each contention with cogent reasoning and
citations to authorities, statutes, and the record).

                                              2

   Davidson also argues the trial court erred by dismissing her action with
prejudice. We disagree. A plaintiff has the right to amend her pleading as
of right within ten days after a trial court grants a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(B)(6). Rule 12(C) does not provide the same automatic right to
amend. Thus, unlike under Rule 12(B)(6), a first-time dismissal with

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023           Page 12 of 15
prejudice under Rule 12(C) is not improper. Davis ex rel. Davis v. Ford
Motor Co., 747 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

  In the Monroe County case, defendant Walsh filed a motion to dismiss,
which defendants DLZ, the State, the department, and Aztec joined.
Defendant I-69 Development filed a separate motion to dismiss. And
Aztec filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Although no other
defendant filed a formal written notice joining Aztec’s 12(C) motion, the
court below found that all defendants were “considered to have joined in
and supported” both the Rule 12(B)(6) and 12(C) motions. No party,
including Davidson, objected to the trial court’s procedural treatment of
these motions, and so we likewise treat all defendants as having joined
Aztec’s 12(C) motion.

   Davidson argues the Rule 12(C) motion should have been considered as
a Rule 12(B)(6) motion because it argued that she failed to state a claim for
relief. A 12(C) motion that argues the plaintiff’s allegations did not state a
claim for relief must be treated as a 12(B)(6) motion, but a 12(C) motion
that does not object to the legal sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations
need not be treated as a 12(B)(6) motion. Gregory & Appel, Inc. v. Duck, 459
N.E.2d 46, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). Aztec’s 12(C) motion argued that
Davidson’s claims are barred under the affirmative defense of collateral
estoppel, not that Davidson’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief.
And Aztec’s answer specifically asserted the affirmative defense of
collateral estoppel. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Davidson
leave to amend her complaint after it granted the defendants’ 12(C)
motion.

                                              3

   Davidson last argues the trial court violated her due-process rights by
committing cumulative procedural errors when it declined to treat the
Rule 12 motions as Rule 56 motions. These errors, according to Davidson,
deprived her of the right to introduce her evidence in opposition to the
defendants’ judicially noticed materials and led the court erroneously to
dismiss her action with prejudice. Davidson’s argument fails because the
court did not err in declining to treat the Rule 12 motions as motions for
summary judgment, for the reasons discussed above in Section II.B.1,

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023        Page 13 of 15
supra, at 11–12. Thus, the court did not err in dismissing her action with
prejudice.

                                      *       *        *

  For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the
Monroe County action with prejudice and denying Davidson’s motions to
correct error and to amend her complaint.

Rush, C.J., and Massa and Molter, JJ., concur.
Goff, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT KATHRYN DAVIDSON
Roberto Alejandro Mendoza
Alex Mendoza Law, LLC
Hammond, Indiana

William D. Beyers
Buchanan & Bruggenschmidt, P.C.
Zionsville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES STATE OF INDIANA AND INDIANA
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Benjamin M. L. Jones
Assistant Section Chief, Civil Appeals
Indianapolis, Indiana

Joshua T. Martin
Lewis and Wilkins LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023        Page 14 of 15
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE I-69 DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS, LLC
Anne K. Ricchiuto
Matthew C. Olsen
Jane Dall Wilson
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE DLZ INDIANA, LLC
Richard R. Skiles
Carlo T. Girolamo
Skiles DeTrude
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE AZTEC ENGINEERING GROUP, INC.
William E. Kelley, Jr.
Alexander C. Trueblood
Drewry Simmons Vornehm, LLP
Carmel, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE WALSH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
II, LLC
James P. Scheidler
Nicholas G. Brunette
Katherine M. Haire
Reminger Co., LPA
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL OF
INDIANA
Lucy R. Dollens
Quarles & Brady, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Crystal G. Rowe
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
New Albany, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-318 | June 21, 2023   Page 15 of 15
Goff, J., concurring in the judgment.

   I agree with the Court that Kathryn Davidson is precluded from
relitigating the allocation of fault in this case. However, in the course of
ruling for the State, I believe the Court is making new law in a vexingly
complicated area: the interplay between Indiana’s common-law and
comparative-fault negligence schemes. Our predecessors recognized the
dangers lurking here. I would not lay down a hard and fast rule of
procedure in mixed-theory cases involving both private and
governmental defendants. Rather, I would encourage all parties to make
use of the flexibility provided by the Comparative Fault Act and to
consider how the difficulty of litigating cases like this may be eased.

    I. All the fault for Davidson’s injuries has already
       been adjudicated.
   As the majority opinion relates, Davidson was seriously injured as a
passenger in a motor accident. She first brought suit against the driver’s
employer, J Trucking. This claim went to trial and resulted in a judgment
that held J Trucking at fault for Davidson’s injuries and liable for her
damages. Because J Trucking was an ordinary private defendant, the
action was subject to Indiana’s Comparative Fault Act, Indiana Code
chapter 34-51-2. Pursuant to statute, the verdict in that first suit
adjudicated “the fault of all persons who caused or contributed to cause
the alleged injury” and implicitly allocated “one hundred percent” of that
fault. Ind. Code § 34-51-2-7(b)(1); see also Mendenhall v. Skinner and
Broadbent Co., Inc., 728 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 2000) (a comparative fault
judgment allocates shares of the “total fault contributing to the injury”).
The Act requires that any nonparty who might share fault be named if
they are to be considered by the factfinder. I.C. § 34-51-2-15. No nonparty
was named or allocated fault in Davidson’s suit. Therefore, the verdict
held J Trucking at sole fault for Davidson’s injuries.

  This judgment has preclusive consequences in Davidson’s present,
successive action against new private defendants and the State. The
Restatement (Second) of Judgments indicates that relitigation is precluded

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when an issue was “actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment.” Am. Law
Inst., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). Looking to the
Restatement for guidance on the law of preclusion, as this Court does,
NIPSCO Indus. Grp. v. N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 100 N.E.3d 234, 244 (Ind.
2018), it is notable that Section 27 says nothing about whether the party to
be precluded must have been a loser in the previous suit. Granted, this
Court has phrased the test as requiring the party to have “lost” on the
issue concerned. Tofany v. NBS Imaging Sys., Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1037
(Ind. 1993). The opinion of the Court reasons that Davidson “really did
‘lose’” when she failed to pin any fault on persons not named as
defendants in her first suit. Ante, at 8. In the comparative-fault context,
however, I find it immaterial that Davidson previously won on the issue.
A plaintiff cannot reasonably expect to pin the same fault on multiple
defendants in series. There cannot be more than one hundred percent of
the fault to allocate. Here, the allocation of all the fault for Davidson’s
injuries was litigated, determined, and essential to the judgment against J
Trucking, meaning it cannot be relitigated.

   Of course, issue preclusion (previously called “collateral estoppel”) will
not apply in a subsequent action against new defendants when the party
to be precluded “lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
first action or other circumstances justify” permitting relitigation.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29. But I agree with the Court that
Davidson had a fair opportunity to sue all of the defendants involved in
this suit at the time of her suit against J Trucking. Ante, at 10–11. Her
present claims against both the private defendants and the State are
therefore precluded.

   I am concerned, however, that the Court’s explanation of how the
Comparative Fault Act applies to the State will cause difficulties.

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    II. The Court should not lay down a hard and fast
       rule for handling mixed-theory cases.
   Indiana’s Comparative Fault Act went into effect in 1985. Penn Harris
Madison School Corp. v. Howard, 861 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2007). Its
provisions differed in numerous ways from the common law of
negligence that had developed up to that time. For example, the doctrine
of contributory negligence, which “barred recovery on a plaintiff’s
negligence claim if the plaintiff was even slightly at fault,” was
substantially revised, so that a plaintiff would be barred recovery only if
their “own fault was greater than fifty percent.” Id. Joint and several
liability for damages was abolished in favor of liability in proportion to
fault. Indiana Dep’t. of Ins. v. Everhart, 960 N.E.2d 129, 138 (Ind. 2012).
However, the common law of negligence was retained for governmental
defendants. Howard, 861 N.E.2d at 1193. The Act “does not apply in any
manner to tort claims against governmental entities or public employees.”
I.C. § 34-51-2-2. Sharp legal minds foresaw that complications would arise
in Indiana’s “dual system of liability.” Lawrence P. Wilkins, The Indiana
Comparative Fault Act at First (Lingering) Glance, 17 Ind. L. Rev. 687, 729
(1984). Defendants subject to different legal regimes might be involved in
the same case, leading to “uncertainty and confusion.” Id. at 732.

   This problem came to a head in State Highway Department. v. Snyder, 594
N.E.2d 783 (Ind. 1992). In that case, the plaintiff sued both a private driver
and the State after a motor accident. Id. at 784–85. The jury found in the
driver’s favor, indicating that the plaintiff was more than fifty percent at
fault. Id. at 785. However, the same jury found against the State, which
then appealed on the grounds of verdict inconsistency. Id. If the plaintiff
was more than fifty percent at fault, the State argued, then he was
necessarily contributorily negligent. Id. This Court refused to entertain the
State’s claim, stating that “[b]ecause the legal theories under which the
two claims were prosecuted are not consistent, we will not reverse the
judgments entered pursuant to these legal theories merely because such
verdicts may appear to be inconsistent.” Id. at 786. Noting the “confusion
created by this predicament” of dual negligence rules, the Court refrained
from trying to “reconcile inconsistencies which are not necessarily

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reconcilable.” Id. at 786–87. The Court would “not review the consistency
of verdicts rendered under the Comparative Fault Act and verdicts
rendered under common law principles in cases such as this.” Id. at 787.
Additionally, the Court advised “[p]arties who find themselves faced with
prosecuting or defending mixed-theory cases such as this” on how to
proceed. Id. They could “file separate law suits or request separate trials.”
Id. Snyder predated this Court’s adoption of non-mutual issue preclusion
in Sullivan v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa., 605 N.E.2d 134 (Ind.
1992). And that explains why the Snyder Court considered it obvious that
the verdicts rendered in separate suits or trials need not “be consistent.”
594 N.E.2d at 787. But nor would the Court so require when two verdicts
were rendered in the same trial. Id.

   I agree with the Court that today’s case differs from Snyder. Ante, at 9. It
involves a successive suit, rather than parallel trials. And issue preclusion
is now established law. As discussed above, this doctrine generally bars
relitigation of any fault that has already been allocated by a judgment.
Here, the allocation of all the fault to J Trucking precludes attribution of
any fault to the State. I am also persuaded that Davidson did not rely on
Snyder in choosing not to sue the State in her first suit. Rather, she made
this decision believing she lacked sufficient information to initiate a claim.

   There was wisdom, however, in the Snyder Court’s reluctance to try to
bring order out of confusion. The dual-system conundrum has not been
resolved to this day. The majority attempts a solution, directing that
“when a plaintiff brings a mixed-theory case that alleges both government
and non-government defendants are at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, the
Act applies to require the jury to apportion a percentage of fault and
damages to all defendants and nonparties.” Id. at 9. But this procedure
would break down in practice because it conflicts with the comparative-
fault scheme itself.

   As Snyder suggested, the trial court in a mixed-theory case may
minimize the jury’s perplexity by conducting separate trials, one for
common-law defendants, such as the State, and one for comparative-fault
private defendants. 594 N.E.2d at 787. See also Ind. Trial Rule 42(B). But
then, how could the State’s fault be determined in the comparative-fault

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trial? The State would not be a nonparty whom the defendants might
name, for a nonparty must be a person “who has not been joined in the
action as a defendant.” I.C. § 34-6-2-88. Nor could the State be a defendant
in the comparative-fault trial, for the Act does not apply “in any manner”
to a tort claim against a governmental defendant. I.C. § 34-51-2-2. And the
State would defend itself only in the common-law trial. Professor Wilkins
foresaw the two sides of this paradox. See Wilkins, supra, at 730.

   In light of this problem, and the risk of confusing the jury by asking it
to apply two bodies of law to the same defendant, I would not lay down a
single mode of proceeding in mixed-theory cases. Instead, I would point
to Indiana Code subsections 34-51-2-7(b) and 34-51-2-8(b), which allow the
parties to vary the usual rules for comparative-fault adjudications and
thus devise procedures that make sense in a given case.

   Because Davidson is precluded from relitigating the fault for her
injuries, I concur in the Court’s judgment. However, I would encourage
the bench and bar, and my colleagues in the General Assembly, to
consider how the confusing predicament of litigating mixed-theory cases
may be eased.

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