Court Opinion

ID: 9552540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:12:50.914064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:59.680897
License: Public Domain

J. LANSING,
CONCURRING IN THE RESULT.
I concur in the Court’s opinion with the exception of Section 11(B)(1). As to that section, I concur in the result.
I cannot agree that the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the description of “Unknown Fulton” as a ninety-four-year-old male in Gilpin’s medical records was a part of a pseudo-identity purposely assigned to Gilpin at the hospital. While it is clear from testimony of hospital personnel that the name “Unknown Fulton” was a fictitious name assigned in order to save time or because the hospital staff did not yet know the patient’s true name, the testimony provides no explanation as to whether the description of the patient as a ninety-four-year-old male was a part of this assigned pseudo-identity or was a mistake. In examining the witnesses, neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney *651elicited a direct explanation of how that patient description made its way into Gilpin’s records.
Although I view the trial court’s finding to be unsupported by the evidence in this regard, it does not follow that Gilpin’s motion in limine should have been granted. By filing a pretrial motion for an order excluding the blood test results on the ground of lack of foundation, Gilpin assumed the burden to show that the State could not possibly lay a. sufficient foundation for introduction of the tests at trial. To support her motion in limine, Gilpin relied solely upon the transcript of the preliminary hearing. This transcript did not meet her burden of proof, for although the State did not at the preliminary hearing give a satisfactory explanation for the misdescription of Gilpin as an elderly male, that does not establish that the State would have been unable to do so at trial. Moreover, even if the State were unable to explain the source or basis of the misdescription at trial, that would not necessarily preclude admission of the blood samples, for a trial court reasonably could conclude that a sufficient foundation showing that the blood samples were those of Gilpin was established from the testimony describing how the samples were handled and from the evidence that the sample labels bore the unique medical record number assigned to Gilpin upon her admission to the emergency room. In sum, Gilpin did not show that the misdescription was the result of such a mistake or mishandling of the blood samples that it would be impossible for the State to establish an adequate foundation for the evidence at trial. Therefore, I join in the majority’s ultimate determination affirming the denial of the motion in limine.