Court Opinion

ID: 9529829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:54:35.340859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:55.739821
License: Public Domain

Springer, J.,
dissenting:
I dissent and would uphold the legislature’s action and uphold the statute’s constitutionality.
Appellant insurance companies, representing interests of insured property owners, have challenged the constitutionality of NRS 11.2051 on several grounds, but primarily on the grounds that the statute violates due process and equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions. Appellants are joined by several amici curiae.
*230I conclude that the statute is constitutionally valid.
NRS 11.205 frees certain design professionals and contractors engaged in the building construction industry from civil liability relating to real property improvements six years following substantial completion of the project. NRS 11.205 is a statute of repose. See Nevada Lakeshore Co. v. Diamond Elec., Inc., 89 Nev. 293, 511 P.2d 113 (1973). The statute functions to abolish certain claims for relief rather than to cut off a remedy as is the case with a limitation statute. It immunizes those engaged in the design, planning, supervision or construction of real property improvements six, and in certain instances seven, years from completion regardless of the date of discovery of any defect and regardless of the nature of the claim.

DUE PROCESS

Because of the repose granted by the statute, injured parties may be deprived of certain claims for damages arising out of negligent design or construction, and defendant landowners may find themselves unable to obtain indemnity or contribution from other tortfeasors because the six-year statutory period has elapsed.
In this case there can be no doubt that the statute has eradicated valuable substantive rights, but this does not require an invalidation of the statute on constitutional grounds. The legislature is free to create rights and is equally free to abrogate *231rights which have not yet vested. O’Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 299 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1980); Howell v. Burk, 568 P.2d 214 (N.M.App. 1977), cert. denied, 569 P.2d 413 (N.M. 1977). Examples of this proper exercise of legislative power are found in the legislative elimination of claims for criminal conversation and alienation of affection. With reference to the statute in question the legislature has in similar fashion eliminated the right to sue the enumerated building professionals after the passage of the statutory six-year period. This the legislature clearly has the power to do, and requirements of due process of law are met if the statute bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1982). The subject statute’s placing of a time limitation on the potential liability of designers and contractors is clearly carrying out a proper and legitimate legislative purpose, namely, keeping such persons from remaining potentially liable for the lifetime of a building or for their own lifetimes. This kind of enduring liability could severely hamper the ability of those engaged in building construction to defend against lawsuits and could thwart creative developments in construction and design. The statute is not violative of constitutional due process rights, state or federal.2

EQUAL PROTECTION

The foundation of appellants’ case is their contention that the statute violates state and federal guarantees of equal protection of the laws. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution forbids enactments that “deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” Article 4, section 21, of the Nevada Constitution requires that all laws be “general and of uniform operation throughout the State.” In my opinion the statute is in harmony with both federal and state constitutions.
This court has previously viewed the foregoing federal and state constitutional provisions as being synonymous. See Laakonen v. District Court, 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d 574 (1975). There being no reason to depart from that view in the immediate case, I believe that identical analysis may be applied to the *232state and federal equal protection challenges. A statute which is not based upon a suspect classification and which does not impinge on a fundamental right satisfies the equal protection clause if the classification is rationally related to legitimate government interest. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Laakonen v. District Court, supra.
The parties apparently agree that the statute has a legitimate purpose: providing repose for otherwise indefinite potential liability. The capacity of the statute to achieve that objective is not challenged. The gist of appellants’ objection to the statute is that it unfairly discriminates against others similarly situated, most notably landowners and occupiers and suppliers of materials.
A legitimate distinction exists between those engaged in the design, supervision and construction of real property improvements and those who own or occupy land. A primary factor in the distinction is control over the property. A tenant or landowner may allow the property to fall into disrepair or may improperly modify existing improvements. Since an architect or contractor generally has no control over a project once it is completed, there is no opportunity to prevent abuse of property. I believe that “[pjart of acceptance [of completed construction] is to accept some future responsibility for the condition of the premises. ... To say that there can be no limitation in perpetuity against a designer or erector of a structure would be in effect to discriminate against professional builders and designers.” Carter v. Hartenstein, 455 S.W. 2d 918, 920 (Ar. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971).
I also believe that a valid distinction exists between suppliers of materials and other members of the construction industry.3
The distinction lies in the quality control attainable in the mass production of materials. Each construction project is in a certain sense unique because of environmental differences and variations in design, while manufactured materials are ordinarily the product of standardized processes. The advantage of standardization is that it gives materialmen greater control over their products; the great degree of control justifies a longer time period for potential liability.
*233Since a legitimate distinction exists between the class of person protected by the statute and those excluded from its protection, I conclude that the statute offends neither the state nor the federal equal protection clauses.4

CONCLUSION

If this court were to uphold the validity of NRS 11.205 it would join a substantial majority of those jurisdictions with similar statutes which have also concluded that this form of legislation is constitutional. In doing so I recognize the hardship that some injured parties may suffer; still, the legislature has apparently weighed these factors against those favoring the granting of a time-limited immunity to designers and builders. The Nevada Supreme Court should not interfere with legislative determinations that are made within constitutional bounds.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

NRS 11.205 provides as follows:
11.205 Actions for damages for injury to person or property or wrongful death caused by deficiency in design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of improvements to real property.
1. No action in tort, contract or otherwise shall be commenced against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, *230supervision or observation of construction, or the construction, of an improvement to real property more than 6 years after the substantial completion of such an improvement, for the recovery of damages for:
(a) Any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction or construction of such an improvement; or
(b) Injury to real or personal property caused by any such deficiency; or
(c) Injury to or wrongful death of a person caused by any such deficiency.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of NRS 11.190 and subsection 1 of this section, where injury occurs in the sixth year after substantial completion of such an improvement, an action for damages for injury to property or person, damages for wrongful death resulting from such injury or damages for breach of contract may be commenced within 1 year after the date of such injury, irrespective of the date of death, but in no event may an action be commenced more than 7 years after the substantial completion of the improvement.
3. Where an action for damages for wrongful death or injury to person or property caused by any deficiency in an improvement to real property is brought against a person in actual possession or control as owner, tenant or otherwise of such improvement, the limitation prescribed by this section shall not be a defense for such person.

 Appellants also have argued that wholly blameless landowners may be required to bear liability for the negligence of architects or contractors. 1 disagree. A plaintiff may not recover against a landowner without first proving the negligence of the landowner. See Horvath v. Burt, 98 Nev. 186, 643 P.2d 1229 (1982) (Mowbray, J., dissenting). And though a negligent landowner may be unable to obtain contribution from construction industry tortfeasors of equal or greater culpability, this possibility is not unique to the immediate situation.

In Jasinski v. Showboat Operating Co., 459 F.Supp. 309 (D.Nev. 1978), the court interpreted NRS 11.205 to mean that suppliers of materials were included within the protection of the statute. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon our decision in Nevada Lakeshore, supra. I would reject this interpretation. The holding in Nevada Lake-shore concerned only a statutory interpretation of the running of the time periods and should not be construed as an interpretation of the application of the statute to specific parties.

As an independent basis for upholding the statute against a federal equal protection challenge, I am persuaded that the decision in Carter v. Hartenstein, supra, is dispositive of the issue. The statute under attack in Carter was nearly identical to that in issue in the immediate case, and the equal protection challenge was virtually the same as well. Following the Arkansas Supreme Court decision upholding the validity of the statute, appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court. There the appeal was dismissed for lack of substantial federal question. Although such a dismissal has limited precedential value, affirming only the judgment without accepting the reasoning of the lower court, the dismissal is nonetheless a binding adjudication of the merits. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). Because of the virtual identity of the statutes, both of which exclude possessors of land and suppliers of materials, I believe that Carter controls in the present case.