Court Opinion

ID: 9807709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:13:46.558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:16.053864
License: Public Domain

Adaks, J.,
concurring: The defendants are indicted for a malicious assault committed in a secret manner in breach of C. S., 4213, which reads as follows: “If any person shall in a secret manner maliciously commit an assault and battery with any deadly weapon upon another by waylaying or otherwise, with intent to kill such other person, notwithstanding the person so assaulted may have been conscious of the presence of his adversary, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in jail or in the penitentiary for not less than twelve months nor more than twenty years, or by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, or both, in the discretion of the court.” Section 4214 relates to an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill resulting in injury, the language being: “Any person who assaults another with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, and inflicts serious injury not resulting in death, shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison or be worked on the county roads for a period not less than four months nor more than ten years.” There are other statutes which provide that on a trial for rape, or for other felony, when the crime charged includes an assault against *228tbe person, it shall be lawful for tbe jury to acquit of tbe felony and to find a verdict of guilty of an assault against tbe person indicted if tbe evidence warrants sucb finding; and that upon tbe trial of any indictment tbe defendant may be convicted of tbe crime charged therein or of a less degree of tbe same crime, or of an attempt to commit tbe crime so charged, or of an attempt to commit a less degree of tbe same crime. C. S., 4639, 4640.
In tbe present case tbe trial judge instructed tbe jury that they might convict tbe defendants of tbe crime charged in tbe indictment (sec. 4213), or of an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, but not in a secret manner (sec. 4214), or of an assault with a deadly weapon. Tbe jury returned a general verdict of guilty and tbe defendants were sentenced to bard labor in tbe State prison for a term of not less than five and not more than ten years.
In S. v. Barnes, 122 N. C., 1031, tbe defendant was indicted for an assault with intent to commit rape, and on bis appeal tbe Court observed : “While tbe statute permits a verdict for an assault where it is embraced in tbe charge of a greater offense, as rape or other felony, a verdict simply of guilty and not specifying a lower offense is a verdict of guilty of tbe offense charged in tbe indictment.” In the' preceding paragraph of tbe opinion it is said: “There is only one count in tbe indictment, and it is unnecessary to notice tbe authorities cited as to general verdicts rendered on a bill charging offenses punishable differently.”
I do not think that section 4214 can properly be construed as a lesser degree of tbe offense denounced in section 4213, as an assault with a deadly weapon may be, because it is a separate and distinct statutory felony; but, there being only one count in tbe indictment, let me concede that tbe defendants could have been convicted under tbe former section for tbe reason that tbe language of tbe indictment is sufficient to embrace this offense. This granted, I am impressed with tbe expediency and wisdom, if not tbe necessity, of requiring juries in cases of this character to specify tbe particular charge on which tbe verdict is returned. It is tbe better practice, as it makes for certainty and gives assurance to tbe Court. Here tbe punishment prescribed is different in each of tbe three crimes of which tbe defendants may have been convicted: (1) imprisonment in jail or in tbe penitentiary for not less than twelve months nor more than , twenty years, or by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, or both, in tbe discretion of tbe court; (2) imprisonment in tbe State prison or to be worked on tbe county roads for a period not less than four months nor more than ten years; (3) fine or imprisonment or both in tbe discretion of tbe court. I do not say that tbe verdict is fatally defective, but I think that under tbe *229conditions disclosed the judge should have been definitely informed as to which of the three offenses the verdict was intended to apply. The motion in arrest of judgment was not made in'the trial court, and of course was not considered by the presiding judge; but the return of a general verdict caused the motion to be lodged in this Court.