Court Opinion

ID: 9906314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 17:10:16.475859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:14.442007
License: Public Domain

J-A20006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  BERATI TRANSPORTER, LLC                      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CO LP                   :   No. 1722 MDA 2022
  D/B/A PENSKE TRANSPORTATION                  :
  SOLUTIONS                                    :

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 23, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
                        Civil Division at No(s): 20-16089

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                        FILED DECEMBER 01, 2023

       Berati Transporter, LLC appeals from the order granting the motion for

summary judgment filed by Penske Truck Leasing Co LP d/b/a Penske

Transportation Solutions (“Penske”). Berati argues that it presented a genuine

issue of material fact pursuant to its claim that Penske committed fraud in

selling it used trucks and therefore the trial court erred in granting the

summary judgment motion. We affirm.

       In context of this appeal, the facts of this case are largely undisputed.

Berati, a limited liability corporation with its primary office in Philadelphia,

transports products in box trucks. In March 2018, Berati, through an agent,

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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contacted Penske to purchase used commercial trucks for its business. Penske

maintained a “premium list” of commercial trucks for sale.

      On April 13, 2018, pursuant to bills of sales, Berati purchased four

commercial trucks from the list. The trucks were heavily used and had been

driven between 182,323 and 272,088 miles. Under the bills of sale, Penske

sold the trucks on an “as-is” basis, and expressly made no further warranty

of any kind, express or implied, merchantability, or fitness for any particular

purpose. The bills of sale also provided Berati 15 days to inspect the vehicles

and inform Penske in writing if any of the vehicles did not meet delivery

conditions. The bills of sale further stated that a failure to notify Penske during

this period constituted an agreement that the trucks met the delivery

conditions. The bills of sale additionally indicated that Penske did not

guarantee or warrant any condition of the trucks after delivery, except for the

title, and that Penske had no obligation to conduct any maintenance, work, or

repairs on the trucks other than meeting the delivery conditions following

notice from Berati. Significantly, the bills of sale included a clause that there

were no representations or promises made by the parties other than what was

set forth in the agreement.

      Following delivery, Berati informed Penske that two trucks had issues.

As a result, Penske repaired the trucks in question and returned them to

Berati. Berati did not communicate any other issues within 15 days of the bills

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of sale. During the next year, Berati discovered several major issues with each

of the four trucks, requiring repairs at a significant expense.

      Berati filed a complaint, and subsequently amended complaints,

asserting breach of contract and fraud causes of action against Penske with

respect to the sale of the trucks. Notably, as part of its fraud claim, Berati

averred that Penske fraudulently misrepresented that the trucks were

roadworthy. Penske filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to both

causes of action. Thereafter, Berati voluntarily withdrew its breach of contract

claim. The trial court then granted summary judgment on the fraud claim in

favor of Penske. Berati timely appealed.

      On appeal, Berati raises the following questions for our review:

      1. Should the Trial Court grant a Motion for Summary Judgment
         to dismiss a fraud claim on the basis that an as-is provision in
         a contract disclaims warranties, when the fraud claim was
         based not on a breach of contract theory but rather arose from
         pre-contractual misrepresentations made to induce entry into
         the contract?

      2. Should the Trial Court grant a Motion for Summary Judgment
         and dismiss a fraud claim when the non-moving party
         misrepresented, as a matter of law, that vehicles were
         roadworthy?

      3. Should the Trial Court grant a Motion for Summary Judgment
         when expert reports demonstrate a genuine issue of material
         fact that the non-moving party misrepresented that vehicles
         were roadworthy at the time of sale?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, our standard of

review is as follows:

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      We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
      party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
      material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only
      where there is no material fact and it is clear that the moving party
      is entitled to judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment
      be entered. Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting or
      denying summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review
      is clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is
      established that the court committed an error of law or abused its
      discretion.

      Moreover, we recognize that … [w]here the non-moving party
      bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on
      his pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment.
      Further, failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient
      evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears
      the burden of proof establishes the entitlement of the moving
      party to judgment as a matter of law.

      Thus, our responsibility as an appellate court is to determine
      whether the record either establishes that the material facts are
      undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out
      a prima facie cause of action, such that there is no issue to be
      decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence that would allow a
      fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party,
      then summary judgment should be denied.

Shellenberger v. Kreider Farms, 288 A.3d 898, 905-06 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(citations, quotation marks, and paragraph break omitted).

      We will address Berati’s claims together. Berati contends that the trial

court erred in concluding that it failed to produce evidence supporting its fraud

claim. See Appellant’s Brief at 11, 15. Berati notes that contractual terms do

not foreclose a tort claim which is based on misrepresentations made prior to

the entry of a contract. See id. at 12. Berati argues that Penske made pre-

contractual misrepresentations that the trucks were “roadworthy,” which were

not subject to the “as-is” condition in the bills of sale. See id. at 11-12; see

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also id. at 12 (highlighting that the contract fails to specify that the trucks

were not roadworthy). Berati, citing to the Automotive Industry Trade

Practices (“AITP”) Regulations, asserts that Penske affirmed that the trucks

were roadworthy by holding them out for public sale. See id. at 12-13 (citing

37 Pa. Code § 301.2(5) (“For the purposes of this chapter, a motor vehicle

which is offered for sale is represented to be roadworthy ….”)).

      Furthermore, while Penske claims that the AITP Regulations are not

applicable to commercial transactions, Berati asserts that the regulation does

not provide any such limitation. See id. at 13-14. Berati maintains that his

expert reports opining that the trucks were not roadworthy at the time of the

sale established a genuine issue of material fact regarding Penske fraudulent

misrepresentation. See id. at 14, 15.

      Preliminarily, the Attorney General adopted the AITP Regulations for the

enforcement and administration of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices

and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”). See 73 P.S. § 201-3.1 (“The

Attorney General may adopt, after public hearing, such rules and regulations

as may be necessary for the enforcement and administration of this act.”);

see also Beckman v. Vassall-Dillworth Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 468 A.2d

784, 789 (Pa. Super. 1983) (noting that the AITP Regulations were enacted

pursuant to Section 201-3.1 of the UTPCPL). The AITP Regulations establish

acts and practices related to the sale of motor vehicles that are unfair or

deceptive. See 37 Pa. Code §§ 301.1-301.6. Importantly, a violation of the

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AITP Regulations may support an action under the UTPCPL; however, the

UTPCPL limits private actions under that act to persons who purchase or lease

“goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes.” 73

P.S. § 201-9.2.

      Here, Berati failed to raise any UTPCPL claim either in his amended

complaint or on appeal. Moreover, Berati purchased the trucks for business

purposes; therefore, it could not assert a private cause of action under Section

201–9.2(a). Accordingly, Berati’s claim premised on the AITP Regulations

cannot grant him relief.

      Likewise, Berati has not established, through any citation to relevant

authority, that noncompliance with Section 301.2(5) renders the “as-is”

provision in the bills of sale unenforceable. To that end, Berati fails to produce

evidence of any representation by Penske which turned out to be knowingly

false. Notably, the bills of sale explicitly stated that the trucks were sold “as

is” and disclaimed any warranties, express or implied, merchantability, or

fitness for any particular purpose. See Bills of Sale (3 trucks), 4/13/18, at 1;

Bills of Sale (1 truck), 4/13/18, at 1; see also 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2316(c)(1)

(stating that “[u]nless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied

warranties are excluded by expressions like ‘as is,’ … calls the attention of the

buyer to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied

warranty.”). In fact, Berati cannot rely on its assertion that Penske should

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have known any more than it should have known. As the trial court correctly

points out:

      [Berati] alleges that [Penske] knew or should have known that the
      vehicles were delivered with bent, cracked[,] or twisted frames;
      cracked engine block; unable to pass state inspection; damaged
      transmission; and flood damage. However, [Berati] fails to explain
      how these substantial defects could have existed upon delivery
      and not have been discovered by [Berati] and written notification
      provided to [Penske] within the fifteen days allowed under the
      terms of the contract. [Berati] further fails to explain how
      [Penske] could have intentionally misrepresented the condition of
      the heavily used vehicles sold “as is,” knowing the [Berati] would
      have opportunity to inspect the vehicles upon delivery and would
      have recourse if defects were discovered.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/22, at 2 (unnumbered).

      In light of the foregoing, Berati does not establish an issue of material

fact, and we conclude that the trial court properly entered summary judgment

in favor of Penske.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/01/2023

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