Court Opinion

ID: 9680925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:41:16.190589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.422504
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
In determining the admissibility of testimony relating to the out-of-court identification by Rondel Little, Jr., the majority follows the teaching of Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), that reliability, rather than suggestiveness, “is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony . . . .” Finding this teaching unpersuasive, I must dissent.
The necessity for my dissent is well formulated by the words of Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for himself and Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Manson,
“Today’s decision can come as no surprise to those who have been watching the Court dismantle the protections against mistaken eyewitness testimony erected a decade ago in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967); and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). But it is still distressing to see the Court virtually ignore the teaching of experience embodied in those decisions and blindly uphold the conviction of a defendant who may well be innocent.
“The magnitude of the Court’s error can be seen by analyzing the cases in the Wade trilogy and the decisions following it. The foundation of the Wade trilogy was the Court’s recognition of the ‘high incidence of miscarriage of justice’ resulting from the admission of mistaken eyewitness identification evidence at criminal trials. United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S., at 228, 87 S.Ct., at 1933. Relying on numerous studies made over many years by such scholars as Professor Wigmore and Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Court concluded that ‘[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.’ Ibid. It is, of course, impossible to control one source of such errors — the faulty perceptions and unreliable memories of witnesses — except through vigorously contested trials conducted by diligent counsel and judges. The Court in the Wade cases acted, however, to minimize the more preventable threat posed to accurate identification by ‘the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification.’ Ibid.
* * * * * *
“ . . . The crux of the Wade decisions, however, was the unusual threat to the truth-seeking process posed by the frequent untrustworthiness of eyewitness identification testimony. This, combined with the fact that juries unfortunately are often unduly receptive to such evidence, is the fundamental fact of judicial experience ignored by the Court today.
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*438“ . . . The Court weighs three factors in deciding that the totality approach, which is essentially the test used in Biggers, should be applied. Ante, 432 U.S. at 111-113, 97 S.Ct. at 2251—2253. In my view, the Court wrongly evaluates the impact of these factors.
“First, the Court acknowledges that one of the factors, deterrence of police use of unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures, favors the per se rule. Indeed, it does so heavily, for such a rule would make it unquestionably clear to the police they must never use a suggestive procedure when a fairer alternative is available. I have no doubt that conduct would quickly conform to the rule.
“Second, the Court gives passing consideration to the dangers of eyewitness identification recognized in the Wade trilogy. It concludes, however, that the grave risk of error does not justify adoption of the per se approach because that would too often result in exclusion of relevant evidence. In my view, this conclusion totally ignores the lessons of Wade. The dangers of mistaken identification are, as Stovall held, simply too great to permit unnecessarily suggestive identifications. Neither Biggers nor the Court’s opinion today points to any contrary empirical evidence. Studies since Wade have only reinforced the validity of its assessment of the dangers of identification testimony. While the Court is ‘content to rely on the good sense and judgment of American juries,’ ante at 116, 97 S.Ct. at 2254, the impetus for Stovall and Wade was repeated miscarriages of justice resulting from juries’ willingness to credit inaccurate eyewitness testimony.
“Finally, the Court errs in its assessment of the relative impact of the two approaches on the administration of justice. The Court relies most heavily on this factor, finding that ‘reversal is a Draconian sanction’ in cases where the identification is reliable despite an unnecessarily suggestive procedure used to obtain it. Relying on little more than a strong distaste for ‘inflexible rules of exclusion,’ the Court rejects the per se test. Ante, at 113, 97 S.Ct. at 2252. In so doing, the Court disregards two significant distinctions between the per se rule advocated in this case and the exclusionary remedies for certain other constitutional violations.
“First, the per se rule here is not ‘inflexible.’ Where evidence is suppressed, for example, as the fruit of an unlawful search, it may well be forever lost to the prosecution. Identification evidence, however, can by its very nature be readily and effectively reproduced. The in-court identification, permitted under Wade and Simmons if it has a source independent of an uncounseled or suggestive procedure, is one example. Similarly, when a prosecuting attorney learns that there has been a suggestive confrontation, he can easily arrange another lineup conducted under scrupulously fair conditions. Since the same factors are evaluated in applying both the Court’s totality test and the Wade-Simmons independent-source inquiry, any identification which is ‘reliable’ under the Court’s test will support admission of evidence concerning such a fairly conducted lineup. The evidence of an additional, properly conducted confrontation will be more persuasive to a jury, thereby increasing the chance of a justified conviction where a reliable identification was tainted by a suggestive confrontation. At the same time, however, the effect of an unnecessarily suggestive identification— which has no value whatsoever in the law enforcement process — will be completely eliminated.
“Second, other exclusionary rules have been criticized for preventing jury consideration of relevant and usually reliable evidence in order to serve interests unrelated to guilt or innocence, such as discouraging illegal searches or denial of counsel. Suggestively obtained eyewitness testimony is excluded, in contrast, precisely because of its unreliability and concomitant irrelevance. Its exclusion both protects the integrity of the truth-seeking function of the trial and discourages police use of needlessly inaccurate and ineffective investigatory methods.
*439“Indeed, impermissibly suggestive identifications are not merely worthless law enforcement tools. They pose a grave threat to society at large in a more direct way than most governmental disobedience of the law, see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 570, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For if the police and the public erroneously conclude, on the basis of an unnecessarily suggestive confrontation, that the right man has been caught and convicted, the real outlaw must still remain at large. Law enforcement has failed in its primary function and has left society unprotected from the depredations of an active criminal.
“For these reasons, I conclude that adoption of the per se rule would enhance, rather than detract from, the effective administration of justice. In my view, the Court’s totality test will allow seriously unreliable and misleading evidence to be put before juries. Equally important, it will allow dangerous criminals to remain on the streets while citizens assume that police action has given them protection. According to my calculus, all three of the factors upon which the Court relies point to acceptance of the per se approach.
“Even more disturbing than the Court’s reliance on the totality test, however, is the analysis it uses, which suggests a reinterpretation of the concept of due process of law in criminal cases. The decision suggests that due process violations in identification procedures may not be measured by whether the government employed procedures violating standards of fundamental fairness. By relying on the probable accuracy of a challenged identification, instead of the necessity for its use, the Court seems to be ascertaining whether the defendant was probably guilty. Until today, I had thought that ‘Equal justice under law’ meant that the existence of constitutional violations did not depend on the race, sex, religion, nationality or likely guilt of the accused. The Due Process Clause requires adherence to the same high standard of fundamental fairness in dealing with every criminal defendant, whatever his personal characteristics and irrespective of the strength of the State’s case against him. Strong evidence that the defendant is guilty should be relevant only to the determination whether an error of constitutional magnitude was nevertheless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). By importing the question of guilt into the initial determination of whether there was a constitutional violation, the apparent effect of the Court’s decision is to undermine the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause. ‘It is therefore important to note that the state courts remain free, in interpreting state constitutions, to guard against the evil clearly identified by this case.’ Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 499, 97 S.Ct. 711, 716, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting.)”
The teachings of Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite have been widely criticized by commentators, see e. g., N. Sobel, Eye-Witness Identification: Legal and Practical Problems, §§ 37, 38 (Supp. 1977); Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against Convicting The Innocent? 72 Mich. L.Rev. 717 (1974); Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy’s Due Process Protection, 26 Stan.L. Rev. 1097 (1974); Recent Developments, Identification: Unnecessary Suggestiveness May Not Violate Due Process, 73 Colum.L. Rev. 1168 (1973); Note: Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan.L.Rev. 969 (1977).
Citizens of the State of Missouri have in their constitution a guarantee that they will not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Mo.Const. Art. I, § 10. This Court remains free to interpret the due process afforded Missouri citizens by this guarantee so as to protect against the well-documented dangers of mistaken eyewitness identification caused by unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures. I would, therefore, recognize that the due process clause of the Missouri Constitution prohibits the admission of tes*440timony as to identifications made by unnecessarily suggestive procedures.
To apply this requirement to the facts of this case it is necessary to look no further than the opinion in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1966). One of the procedures specifically identified as unduly suggestive is a lineup procedure in which only the suspect is required to wear distinctive clothing like that which the criminal allegedly wore, id. at 233, 87 S.Ct. 1926. In the instant case, at the lineup where he was identified by Ron-del Little, Jr., only the defendant was required to wear a shirt of the distinctive pattern which figured so prominently in the description of the criminal given police by Rondel Little, Jr. and others. No reason or justification is given to indicate this procedure was necessary. The suspect could easily have been given a shirt which did not obviously stick out like the proverbial sore thumb.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.