Court Opinion

ID: 9720405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:29:22.812249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:17.481003
License: Public Domain

Kendall, P. J.
This is an appeal from an award of the Industrial Board in favor of appellee awarding compensation for an accidental injury.
The appellant contended before the Board that appellee’s impairment was not the result of any accidental injury received while in the course of his employment.
Hearing Member made an award that appellee had a twenty-five (25%) permanent partial impairment to the man as a whole and awarded compensation at the rate of Thirty ($30.00) Dollars per week for one hundred and twenty-five (125) weeks, with attorney fees and costs. The Full Board affirmed the award of the Hearing Member, with the exception of one member.
Appellant’s assignment of error is that the award of the Full Board is contrary to law and in support thereof charges that the award is not sustained by sufficient evidence. Since it is only in the event that there is no substantial evidence to sustain some necessary fact upon which the ward is based, that the award will be set *50aside for the reason here assigned, it is necessary for us to review the evidence briefly.
It was stipulated that appellee was in the employ of appellant on February 6, 1954, on which date he received an injury as a result of the accident arising out of and in the course of his employment when a steel angle iron fell and hit him on the head causing lacerations.
After the accident, appellee walked to the first-aid room where the cut was cleaned and sutured and then returned to the plant. The evidence further reveals that he did not show evidence of unconsciousness or unsteadiness and worked the remainder of that working day, which was Saturday. On the following Monday, appellee returned to the shop and worked until Friday afternoon when he acted “like he was going to faint”. On that evening he left for Kentucky for a visit, returning to Indianapolis the following Sunday; that on the trip to and from Kentucky appellee had “passing-out episodes”, and, upon his return to Indianapolis, his family doctor was called who ordered him sent to the hospital where he remained until March 12, 1954. While in the hospital, he evidenced symptoms of nervous and mental troubles of various types. The family physician, Doctor Worley, testified that appellee was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of subdural hematoma; that the patient spoke slowly and with jerks, while before the accident complained of, he spoke rapidly and coherently; however, this was contradicted by certain members of the family. The doctor testified, in response to appellee’s impairment, that, “At the present time, unless hi's brain improves, which I am almost sure it will not, he has about an 85% permanent disability”. It was Dr. Worley’s opinion that appellee had a cyst condition prevailing at the time but had he not sus*51tained the blow on the head, this cyst would have never broken and the brain surrounding .the cyst would never have been permanently damaged as a result- of the injury. There was evidence that the appellee had suffered polio during youth.
Dr. E. Rogers Smith testified in behalf of appellant that appellee’s ex-rays showed a dilation of the ventricle and atrophy over the surface of the brain; -that there was .no displacement of the ventricle surroundings which indicated there was no hematoma present on one side or the other; that a hematoma is a blood clot nearly always- caused by an -accident and that neither - the pneumoencephalogram nor the pressure reading of the spinal puncture or' spinal fluid showed evidence of a hematoma; that the patient’s mental condition fluctuated from day to day; that the appellee complained of headaches although a neural examination was negative and the cranial nerves indicated no imbalance and the same was true for the deep reflexes, motor power, sensation, coordination of the extremities; that there was no. evidence that the blow on the head had-broken a cyst, if there was one and caused -a hemorrhage; that in his opinion, the appellee had no disability resulting from the injury when last seen, except there was a temporary concussion and that it was highly impossible that it injured the brain.
The testimony of appellee’s physician relates' to an eighty-five (85%) percent permanent disability of appellee, while the award of the Industrial Board is for a twenty-five (25%) percent permanent partial impairment. The testimony of appellant’s doctor was to the effect that appellee had no permanent partial imoairment as a result of the injury. It is upon this type of evidence, in view of the finding of the Board, that appellant argues that there is no evidence of probative value *52of permanent partial impairment of appellee as a result of the injury received on February 6, 1954.
It is contended by appellant that there is a real distinction between the term, disability, and the term, impairment, and that such distinction must be kept in mind at all times in proceedings before the Industrial Board and strongly relies on the recent case of Kenwood Erec. Co v. Cowsert (1953), 124 Ind. App. 165, 115 N. E. 2d 507; Northern Ind. Power Co. v. Hawkins (1925), 82 Ind. App. 552, 146 N. E. 879. Considering the Kenwood case, supra, as a whole, we believe it is authority actually to sustain the award of the Board in this case. It is not so much a question whether appellee’s physician used the word, disability, in his testifying, as it is whether or not the Industrial Board improperly construed the evidence in making their award that the appellee had a twenty-five (25%) percent permanent partial impairment. After Dr. Worley gave his testimony as to appellee’s disability in response to a question regarding impairment, there was no motion to strike the answer from the record. At page 170 of 124 Ind. App. in the Kenwood case, supra, the court said:
“However, on objection to the admission of the statement, the hearing member stated: Tt is quite apparent that the doctor meant impairment instead of disability.’ We are, therefore, required to examine the complete statement of Dr. Vietzke to determine whether the Board improperly construed the above statement.”
Doctor Worley had known the appellee for some two or three years. He had operated on him for appendicitis a short time before the accident complained of here. He considered appellee to be normal physically and mentally prior to the accident and when the doctor observed appellee after the accident on February 12, *53appellee was incoherent in speech, reflexes were abnormal and he did not remember things that occurred two weeks prior thereto. Appellee had fainting spells, and, after being admitted to the hospital, did not regain consciousness for several days, whereupon he asked Doctor Fausset, a neuro-surgeon, to see the patient, who in turn asked Doctor Hetherington. At the time patient was admitted to the hospital he did not recognize members of his family, was in a stupor, which was typical of acute edema of the brain, which is a swelling of the brain. Dr. Worley was asked the following question: “. . . What, in your opinion, would be the percentage, if any, of permanent partial impairment to him as a whole man ?” In answering the question, the doctor used the term, “disability”, instead of “impairment”. In view of the Board’s finding of the impairment of a man as a whole and the testimony given by Dr. Worley, appellant now contends that there is no evidence to sustain the finding of the Board. Considering the history of the case as given to Dr. Worley, his knowledge of the appellee prior to the accident, the fact that he was interrogated as to the impairment of the appellee, it seems reasonable for the Board to have construed his testimony in rendering their award as relating to impairment and that Dr. Worley used the word, “disability”, in its more common and generic usage with the intention that it relate only to the functional loss of appellee’s body as described by the act as “impairment”. Kenwood v. Cowsert, supra. In so construing, doubtless the Board believed the testimony of Dr. Worley wherein he stated that appellee’s condition was that of a “post-concussion syndrome with post hemorrhage, atrophy of the brain, . . . damage to the point where his brain will not return to normal and this means the brain is permanently damaged.” Neither can it be overlooked that in *54testifying that the appellee’s disability was eighty-five (85%) percent'; that the doctor testified that the disability “will never change, so far as that is concerned or will change very little. ...”
In the Kenwood case, supra, relied upon by appellant, the- Hearing Member stated, “It is quite apparent that the' doctor meant impairment instead of disability”, while in the-instant case, at the close of the evidence, the Hearing Member stated, “The Doctors we have medical testimony of eighty-five percent permanent partial impairment and nothing. . . .”
We recognize full well the distinction of the two ' words, impairment and disability. Disability as generally used means inability to work, while im- ’ -pairrnent refers to the loss of a function.
Evidence of appellee’s condition before and after the accident was -given by members of his family to the effect that before the accident in February, 1954, he was a normal person, excepting a speech defect; that he acted' like anyone else; that after the accident he acted like he was in a fog, answered questions slowly, had headaches, would lie around, would forget what happened and had to be watched, all of the time. Certainly the manner and extent to which a man can think, speak, remember and act clearly is material, and the Board had a right to consider the same in view of the medical testimony in determining the amount of impairment to the man as a whole.
From the testimony as related in this case, this--court cannot say that Dr. Worley did not use the term, “disability,” in its more common usage intending that it relate only to the functional loss of the appellee’s body as described by the act of impairment. In fact, this case is stronger than that of the Kenwood case, supra.
*55We have examined the authorities cited by appellant and find that they are not comparable to the facts of this case. ■ .
It is well settled that the. findings of a Reviewing Board are to be sustained whenever possible and they are not to be reversed unless they are lacking in evidential support or are tainted by an error of law. Our courts have held that evidence, of disability may be properly admitted as tending to proye or disprove impairment of body function. Miers v. Standard Forgings (1946), 117 Ind. App. 89, 69 N. E. 2d 180.
We, therefore, conclude that the evidence before the Board and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom are sufficient to support the award.
Award affirmed with statutory penalty of five (5%) percent. .
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING '