Court Opinion

ID: 989709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:10:58.894232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:48:03.951821
License: Public Domain

cle . . . on the highways of the Commonwealth while
the revocation of the person's driving privilege remains in
effect." Va.
Code S 46.2-357(A). This language shows that the legislature
contem-
plated and provided for the continued regulation of individuals
who

                                3
had received habitual offender status before implementation of
the
Act.

Perhaps most significant for purposes of this appeal is the fact
that
the penalty provision for an adjudicated habitual offender's
second
offense (driving on a suspended or revoked license, see Va. Code
S 46.2-357(B)(2)) has not been altered in the least. It states
that such
an offender shall be "guilty of a felony punishable by
confinement in
a state correctional facility for not less than one year nor more
than
five years." Va. Code S 46.2-357(B)(2)&(3). Dawson was sentenced
within those parameters; his presentencing report set the
statutory
minimum and maximum sentences as one and five years respectively.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the Virginia General Assem-
bly evinced its intent to enact a new, stiffer law dealing with
those
who commit serious traffic violations, and that it drafted the
legisla-
tion in such a way as to provide saving provisions for the
penalties
to be imposed on those it previously chose to designate habitual
offenders for having accumulated such violations. Because the
legis-
lature continues to recognize a class of persons who have already
been designated habitual offenders, Dawson's contention that his
con-
viction has been deprived of its "statutory underpinnings" is
without
merit.

We likewise find Dawson's equal protection argument to be
unavailing. Dawson argues that the Act creates a class of
habitual
offenders who are treated differently under the traffic laws than
are
those who now commit the same types of infractions. While this is
undoubtedly correct, we find the Act's classification scheme to
be
rationally related to a legislative goal. See FCC v. Beach
Communica-
tions, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (stating that statutory
classifi-
cations that neither affect members of a suspect class nor
infringe
upon fundamental constitutional rights are subject to a rational
basis
standard of review). There can be no doubt that retaining the
classifi-
cation of habitual offender that existed prior to July 1, 1999 is
ratio-
nally related to the Virginia General Assembly's goal of
regulating
traffic safety. Furthermore, the legislature could hardly be
expected
to reclassify past offenders under the new scheme, as ex post
facto
problems would then arise.

AFFIRMED

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