Court Opinion

ID: 9592885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:17:41.585543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:43.843420
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that, given the broad language of OCGA § 9-11-41 (a), appellant’s voluntary dismissal was authorized. I conclude, however, that the trial court was empowered to impose sanctions under OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (2) (other than dismissal) for appellant’s prior failure to comply with an order granting a motion to compel.
OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (2) provides in pertinent part that “[i]n lieu of any [orders awarding other sanctions], or in addition thereto, the I court shall require the party failing to obey the order [compelling dis-, covery] ... to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure.” (Emphasis supplied.) In American Express Co. v. Baker, 192 Ga. App. 21-23 (1) (383 SE2d 576) (1989), this court! addressed the question whether a motion for OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (2) [ sanctions survived a voluntary dismissal in an action in which the de-! fendant had filed a counterclaim for abusive litigation. Applying the! Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Memorial Med. Center, 258 Ga. 696 (373 SE2d 204) (1988), we concluded that because the abusivel litigation counterclaim remained pending after the voluntary dismis-| sal, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter discovery sanctions. [
The analysis in Moore is equally applicable to the circumstances! in the instant case. The Supreme Court reasoned in Moore that al-l lowing both a voluntary dismissal and the continuation of an abusive| litigation counterclaim “preserves the right of a plaintiff to dismiss and the right of a defendant to recover for abuse of litigation.” (Foot-| note omitted.) Id. at 696-697. Moore recognized that even though the action was dismissed, the defendant nonetheless was entitled to re-| cover for abuses that occurred prior to dismissal. Id. at 697. Since the expenses and attorney fees sanctions of OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (2) are¡ *199mandatory (absent certain limited exceptions) and are intended to compensate the moving party for expenses previously incurred in obtaining compliance with a court order compelling discovery, allowing a plaintiff to avoid such sanctions by voluntarily dismissing the complaint would thwart the purpose of OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (2). Accord Bryant v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 183 Ga. App. 577, 578 (359 SE2d 441) (1987) (once a motion for sanctions has been filed their imposition cannot be precluded by a belated response to the discovery request). Nothing in OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) compels such a result. See generally Moore, supra at 696. Thus, I conclude the right of a defendant to recover expenses and attorney fees for a plaintiff’s violation of a discovery order entered prior to a voluntary dismissal survives the dismissal, and accordingly, I would affirm the award of attorney fees in this case.
Decided March 15, 1991.
C. B. King & Associates, Chevene B. King, Jr., for appellant.
Watson, Spence, Lowe & Chambless, John M. Stephenson, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.