Court Opinion

ID: 9396805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 18:08:20.670855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.947200
License: Public Domain

J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 THEODORE ERVIN SHENK, SR.                 :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 1210 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 4, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-50-CR-0000116-2017

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 THEODORE ERVIN SHENK, SR.                 :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 1299 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 4, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-50-CR-0000024-2017,
                          CP-50-CR-0000116-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                  FILED: MAY 23, 2023

      Theodore Ervin Shenk, Sr. appeals from the aggregate judgment of

sentence of 142 months to 37 years of incarceration imposed in the above-

captioned cases after a jury convicted him of multiple counts of rape of a child,
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

indecent assault, and other crimes related to the sexual abuse of his

grandchildren, K.L.S. and A.L.S.1 We affirm.

             [Appellant] was charged with and convicted of the above-
       enumerated sex-related crimes after a two-day jury trial. The
       crimes were committed by [Appellant] against two of his
       granddaughters, A.L.S. and K.L.S., during two separate time
       periods.   From January 1, 2012 through August 31, 2016,
       [Appellant] committed crimes against A.L.S. when she was age
       five through age nine.      From December 22, 2003 through
       December 22, 2004, [Appellant] committed crimes against K.L.S.
       while she was five years of age.

             Prior to trial, on November 30, 2018, after review, Senior
       Judge Robert B. Sacavage granted the Commonwealth’s request
       for consolidation of the matters. Then, on November 15, 2019,
       after hearing, review, and meeting with the minor victims, then-
       President Judge Kathy A. Morrow directed that an alternative
       method of testimony for the minor victims was required.

             A[fter changes of judge and counsel and multiple
       continuances occasioned by, inter alia, the COVID-19 pandemic
       and Appellant’s requests for additional time to obtain an expert
       report, a] pre-trial conference was held by [the trial court] on
       November 10, 2021, to plan the logistics for carrying out Judge
       Morrow’s order for the contemporaneous alternative testimony of
       minor A.L.S. This pre-trial conference was attended by the
       Commonwealth and [Appellant]’s counsel (and, in fact, was re-
       scheduled once at the request of [Appellant]’s counsel).

             [Appellant] was found guilty of all charges against him
       following his two-day jury trial which concluded on November 16,
       2021. On May 4, 2022, he was sentenced to a combined total
       period of incarceration of 142 months to 37 years[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/22, at 2-3 (cleaned up).

____________________________________________

1We note that K.L.S. and A.L.S. are cousins, not sisters. While the trial court
and the parties do not utilize periods with their initials, we have added them
within quotations throughout this memorandum for the sake of consistency.

                                           -2-
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

      Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion in both cases which the

trial court denied by opinion and order of July 29, 2022, also captioned in both

cases. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on Monday, August 29, 2022,

captioned only at docket number 116-2017, but attaching the July 29, 2022

order captioned in both cases. On September 1, 2022, the trial court filed an

order at docket number 116-2017 directing Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal in accordance with Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b). The following day, Appellant filed a corrected notice of appeal in

each case that included both docket numbers at which Appellant was

sentenced. Appellant thereafter timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement in

both cases and the trial court entered an order in both cases indicating that it

relied upon its July 29, 2022 opinion to explain its rulings.

      In the appeal pertaining to docket number 24-2017, this Court issued a

rule to show cause why the September 2, 2022 appeal should not be quashed

as untimely. Appellant responded that the second notice of appeal was merely

filed to correct the record to reflect that the initial, timely appeal implicated

both of the consolidated cases. This Court discharged the rule and referred

the issue to the merits panel for resolution.

      Hence, before we consider the substance of these appeals, we

determine    whether    we   have    jurisdiction   to   entertain   them.    In

Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court

ruled that the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure “require that when a

                                      -3-
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court docket,

separate notices of appeal must be filed.” Walker, supra at 977. It further

instructed that “[t]he failure to do so will result in quashal of the appeal.” Id.

However, in Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462 (Pa. 2021), the Court

opted to “largely blunt the bright-line rule the Walker Court sought to

impose.” Young, supra at 477. Specifically, the Young Court held that,

when a timely notice of appeal is filed at only one docket number, Pa.R.A.P.

902 permits the correction of the error. Id. at 477-78. See also Pa.R.A.P.

902 (“Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a

notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but it is subject to

such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include, but

is not limited to, remand of the matter to the lower court so that the omitted

procedural step may be taken.”). This Court subsequently ruled that “[i]n the

absence of a showing of actual prejudice to an appellee resulting from the lack

of separate notices of appeal at each docket, bad faith by an appellant, or

other circumstances that render clemency inappropriate, a party filing an

appeal as of right will as a matter of course be permitted to correct a Walker

violation pursuant to Rule 902.” Commonwealth v. Young (“Young II”),

280 A.3d 1049, 1057 (Pa.Super. 2022).

      The Commonwealth argues that these appeals should be quashed

because Appellant had the opportunity to timely file the requisite number of

notices of appeal but did not, and that he failed to invoke Rule 902 in either

                                      -4-
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

his response to this Court’s rule to show cause or in his brief.               See

Commonwealth’s brief at 3-7. Consequently, the Commonwealth maintains

that Appellant waived his right to perfect this appeal pursuant to Young. We

disagree.

       The Commonwealth fails to account for our Young II holding that

correction of a Walker error will be permitted unless the appellee shows good

cause why it should not. It has not alleged that Appellant’s failure to file two

separate notices of appeal has prejudiced it or was done in bad faith. Further,

we are not convinced that counsel’s lack of understanding about how to appeal

a judgment of sentence imposed at two docket numbers constitutes a

circumstance that renders clemency inappropriate.2 See Young II, supra at

1057. Therefore, had counsel not filed the second notice of appeal, we would

have applied Young II and remanded for Appellant to correct the procedural

misstep, and then addressed Appellant’s issues.

       By filing the September 2, 2022 notice of appeal at docket number 24-

2017, counsel already did what we would have ordered. Consequently, we

need not remand and instead proceed to review Appellant’s claims of error,

which he states as follows:

____________________________________________

2 Indeed, were we to quash this appeal, we would merely delay the inevitable,
as Appellant would be entitled to reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc
pro tunc based upon counsel’s per se ineffectiveness.                   See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 993 n.2 (Pa. 2022) (“[I]t has
long been the law that counsel is ineffective per se if he fails to file a notice of
appeal that his client requested be filed.”).

                                           -5-
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

       A.    Whether the court erred in permitting the consolidation of
       the criminal actions for trial when the actions involved questions
       of law or fact not common to the other actions and did not all arise
       out of the same transaction or occurrence pursuant to
       Pa.R.Crim.P. 582.

       B.    Whether the court erred in permitting the minor victim
       A.L.S. to testify by alternative means when the victim was a
       teenager, not a child, whose ability to communicate would not
       have been substantially impaired pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. [§] 5885.

       C.     Whether the court erred in permitting the testimony of Trp.
       Mark Fisher when the testimony was based on an interview where
       [Appellant] was in custodial interrogation and was not Mirandized,
       in violation of [his] rights pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the
       United States Constitution and Article 1, [§] 9 of the Pennsylvania
       Constitution.

Appellant’s brief at 6 (cleaned up).

       Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in granting the

Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate the two cases.                  The following

principles govern our review:

       [T]he decision of whether to join or sever offenses for trial is within
       the discretion of the trial court, and such decision will not be
       reversed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of that discretion or
       a showing of prejudice and clear injustice to the defendant. The
       Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that distinct
       offenses which do not arise out of the same act or transaction may
       be tried together if the evidence of each of the offenses would be
       admissible in a separate trial for the other and is capable of
       separation by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion.

Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 975–76 (Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned

up).    See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1) (“Offenses charged in separate

indictments or informations may be tried together if: (a) the evidence of each

                                        -6-
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and is

capable of separation by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion[.]”).

      It is well settled that “evidence concerning distinct crimes is inadmissible

solely to demonstrate a defendant’s bad character or his propensity to commit

crimes[.]” Id. at 975-76. However, such evidence is properly admitted as

proof of the following:

      (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a
      common scheme, plan or design embracing commission of two or
      more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
      prove the others; or (5) to establish the identity of the person
      charged with the commission of the crime on trial, in other words,
      where there is such a logical connection between the crimes that
      proof of one will naturally tend to show that the accused is the
      person who committed the other.

Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 156 (Pa.Super. 2011) (cleaned up).

      Appellant acknowledges that “[t]he allegations in the case have certain

similarities.”   Appellant’s brief at 13.   Specifically, he concedes that “both

involve children of a similar age group and have a family link to defendant,”

and both concern “the same class of misconduct[.]”           Id.    However, he

maintains that, because the victims were different and “the two cases were

separated by a substantial period of time,” the separate cases “did not reach

the high degree of correlation in detail required to show a common scheme,

plan, or design.” Id. at 13-14. Appellant further argues that, even if the

similarities were sufficient to constitute a common scheme, the evidence still

                                       -7-
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

would not have been admissible because the prejudice outweighed the

probative value of the evidence. Id. at 14.

      The trial court addressed Appellant’s arguments as follows:

      At [Appellant]’s trial, [Appellant] presented as the grandfather of
      both minor victims, the age of both minors was similar, the
      specific nature of the assaults was similar and the [Appellant]’s
      conduct as to each victim as alleged prior to trial was similar.
      Upon review of the information provided and available to the trial
      court when consolidation was ordered, and the record at trial, this
      court considers the circumstances here indicated a classic
      common scheme, plan or design demonstrated in the commission
      of these two sets of offenses.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/22, at 4 (cleaned up).

      We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Appellant does not

dispute the similarities of his pattern of sexual abuse of his two grandchildren,

beginning when each was five years old, in his house while his wife was

otherwise occupied. We perceive that the indication of a common scheme is

strengthened, not weakened, by the lapse of time between the abuse of the

first five-year-old granddaughter, and the more than seven years it took for

the second granddaughter to be born and achieve the same age as the first.

Accord Commonwealth v. Aikens, 990 A.2d 1181, 1185-86 (Pa.Super.

2010) (holding lapse of more than a decade between instances of the

defendant’s abuse of his daughters did not defeat admissibility of evidence to

prove a common scheme where the abuse was similar enough, including that

the abuse for each began when the child reached the same age);

                                      -8-
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 680 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa.Super. 1996) (same

as to six-year gap between molestation of daughters).

      Nor does Appellant’s bald claim of prejudice convince us that the

evidence in one case was inadmissible in the other. Our Supreme Court has

acknowledged that, “[w]ithout a doubt, . . . other crimes evidence [is]

prejudicial to [the defendant].      That is what it is designed to be.”

Commonwealth v. Gordon, 673 A.2d 866, 870 (Pa. 1996). The issue is

whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the potential for

unfair prejudice. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) (providing that, in a criminal case,

other bad acts evidence may be admitted “if the probative value of the

evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice”).    “The admission of

evidence becomes problematic only when its prejudicial effect creates a

danger that it will stir such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a

rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial.”

Commonwealth v. Diehl, 140 A.3d 34, 41 (Pa.Super. 2016).                 Here,

Appellant offers no basis for us to conclude that the at-issue evidence was so

prejudicial that the jury was likely to abandon reason and convict him

regardless of the trial court’s instructions. Thus, we cannot conclude that the

trial court improperly concluded that the potential for unfair prejudice

outweighed the clear probative value of the evidence.

      As we perceive no manifest abuse of discretion nor showing of clear

injustice to Appellant, we conclude that the trial court did not commit

                                     -9-
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

reversible error in consolidating the two cases for trial. Thus, Appellant’s first

issue merits no relief.

      Appellant next challenges the trial court’s decision to allow A.L.S. to

testify outside of his presence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985. That statute

provides as follows, in pertinent part:

      (a) Contemporaneous alternative method.--Subject to
      subsection (a.1), in any prosecution or adjudication involving a
      child victim or a child material witness, the court may order that
      the testimony of the child victim or child material witness be taken
      under oath or affirmation in a room other than the courtroom and
      transmitted by a contemporaneous alternative method. . . . The
      court shall permit the defendant to observe and hear the
      testimony of the child victim or child material witness but shall
      ensure that the child cannot hear or see the defendant. The court
      shall make certain that the defendant and defense counsel have
      adequate opportunity to communicate for the purposes of
      providing an effective defense.           Examination and cross-
      examination of the child victim or child material witness shall
      proceed in the same manner as normally permitted.

      (a.1) Determination.--Before the court orders the child victim
      or the child material witness to testify by a contemporaneous
      alternative method, the court must determine, based on evidence
      presented to it, that testifying either in an open forum in the
      presence and full view of the finder of fact or in the defendant’s
      presence will result in the child victim or child material witness
      suffering serious emotional distress that would substantially
      impair the child victim’s or child material witness’s ability to
      reasonably communicate. In making this determination, the court
      may do all of the following:

            (1) Observe and question the child victim or child material
            witness, either inside or outside the courtroom.

            (2) Hear testimony of a parent or custodian or any other
            person, such as a person who has dealt with the child victim
            or child material witness in a medical or therapeutic setting.

                                     - 10 -
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.

      As recounted supra, after the Commonwealth moved to allow the child

victims to testify by alternate contemporaneous means, Judge Morrow held a

hearing and met with the children and granted the motion in November 2019.

However, due to the number of continuances requested by Appellant, the trial

did not occur until two years later. Appellant does not dispute the initial ruling

was made in compliance with § 5985(a.1), but rather suggests that it became

stale and a new hearing confirming the continued necessity of testimony by

an alternative method should have been undertaken. Specifically, Appellant

presents the following argument:

            In the present case victim A.L.S. alleges that she was
      sexually assaulted by the defendant when she was between the
      ages of 5 and 9. At the time of the Commonwealth’s motion to
      allow A.L.S. to testify by contemporaneous alternative method she
      was 11 years of age. At the time of the defendant’s trial, A.L.S.
      was 15 years of age. No evidence was presented to the court at
      the time of trial, when A.L.S. was 15 years of age, that testifying
      in an open forum in the presence and full view of the finder of fact
      or in the defendant’s presence would have resulted in A.L.S.
      suffering serious emotional distress that would substantially
      impair her ability to reasonably communicate.

Appellant’s brief at 15.

      As the trial court aptly notes, Appellant raised no challenge to the

continued validity of Judge Morrow’s ruling at the court’s November 2021

pretrial conference that was “set specifically for deciding the logistics of the

alternative method to facilitate the testimony of A.L.S. at trial.” Trial Court

Opinion, 7/29/22, at 5 (cleaned up). Indeed:

                                     - 11 -
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

     No objections or hesitations were raised by any party at any time
     prior to, during or after that conference. All present agreed to the
     alternate contemporaneous method selected and utilized at trial,
     which was comprised of a video conferencing tool that projected
     A.L.S.’[s] image and audio over a large screen/monitor directly in
     front of and in full view of [Appellant], the jury, and all others
     present in the courtroom during [the] two-day trial. Moreover, no
     objections were raised at trial—either before, during or after
     A.L.S.’s testimony was presented to the jury via the
     contemporaneous alternative method.

Id. (cleaned up).

     It is axiomatic that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”    Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).    As our

Supreme Court has explained:

     By requiring that an issue be considered waived if raised for the
     first time on appeal, our courts ensure that the trial court that
     initially hears a dispute has had an opportunity to consider the
     issue. This jurisprudential mandate is also grounded upon the
     principle that a trial court, like an administrative agency, must be
     given the opportunity to correct its errors as early as possible.
     Related thereto, we have explained in detail the importance of this
     preservation requirement as it advances the orderly and efficient
     use of our judicial resources. Finally, concepts of fairness and
     expense to the parties are implicated as well.

In re F.C. III, 2 A.3d 1201, 1212 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted).           Since

Appellant did not challenge the continued necessity of A.L.S.’s testimony by

alternative means given the passage of time, the Commonwealth had no cause

to present evidence that she would still suffer severe emotional distress

despite being two years older, and the trial court had no reason to consider

the issue. As it would be fundamentally unfair to allow Appellant to pursue

the claim on appeal, we deem the issue waived. Accord Commonwealth v.

                                    - 12 -
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

Torres-Kuilan, 156 A.3d 1229, 1231 (Pa.Super. 2017) (finding challenge to

trial court’s application of § 5985 waived because no timely objection was

made and the issue was raised for the first time on appeal).

       In his final issue, Appellant asserts that the testimony of Trooper Mark

Fisher about statements Appellant made at an interview was improperly

admitted.    Specifically, he contends that the statements were elicited at a

custodial interrogation without first issuing Miranda warnings,3 in violation of

the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 9 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution. See Appellant’s brief at 18-21.

       As the trial court noted in its opinion, Appellant raised this issue for the

first time at trial. In particular, since Appellant offered the defense that he

could not have committed the acts alleged because he was incapable of

obtaining an erection, the Commonwealth indicated an intention to present

testimony from Trooper Fisher about Appellant’s representation that he was

sexually active with his wife. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/22, at 9-10. The

Commonwealth argued at trial, and maintains on appeal, that by failing to

raise his contention that the evidence was inadmissible in a pre-trial

____________________________________________

3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any
questioning [in a custodial interrogation], [a] person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed.”).

                                          - 13 -
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

suppression motion, Appellant waived the claim. See N.T. Trial, 11/16/21, at

69; Commonwealth’s brief at 12-13. We agree.

      The suppression of evidence allegedly obtained in violation of a

defendant’s rights is governed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 581. Pursuant to that Rule, if

a timely suppression motion is not made, “the issue of suppression of such

evidence shall be deemed to be waived.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B). “Unless the

opportunity did not previously exist, or the interests of justice otherwise

require, such motion shall be made only after a case has been returned to

court and shall be contained in the omnibus pretrial motion set forth in Rule

578.” Id. “Whether the opportunity did not previously exist, or the interests

of justice otherwise require is a matter for the discretion of the trial judge.”

Commonwealth v. Sodomsky, 137 A.3d 620, 626 (Pa.Super. 2016)

(cleaned up). We have held that the interests of justice require consideration

of an untimely suppression motion “where the merits of counsel’s oral motion

were so apparent that justice required it be heard.”      Commonwealth v.

Long, 753 A.2d 272, 280 (Pa.Super. 2000) (cleaned up).

      Appellant did not file a suppression motion, but raised for the first time

on the second day of trial the claim that his statements should be suppressed

because they were made during a custodial interrogation.        See N.T. Trial,

                                     - 14 -
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

11/16/21, at 68.4 While trial counsel argued that “[c]onstitutional rights are

never waivable,” he acknowledged that “[t]here may be ineffective assistance

of counsel,” presumably referencing prior counsel’s failure to move for

suppression pretrial.5 Id.

       On appeal, Appellant does not assert that he did not have the

opportunity to move pretrial to suppress his statements. Nor did the interests

of justice require that the tardy oral motion be entertained. As the trial court

indicated, when Appellant voluntarily accompanied troopers to Pennsylvania

State Police barracks on the date in question, they advised Appellant that he

was not under arrest and that he was free to stop the interview and leave at

any time.     See Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/22, at 9.    Hence, it is not at all

apparent from the certified record before us that Appellant was so obviously

subjected to a custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings that the

belated motion should have been entertained. Id. at 9 n.1 (indicating “there

____________________________________________

4 The transcript from the second day of trial was not made part of the record
certified to this Court, but is included in Appellant’s reproduced record. As the
Commonwealth does not dispute its accuracy, we may consider it. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Holston, 211 A.3d 1264, 1276 (Pa.Super. 2019)
(“[W]here the accuracy of a document is undisputed and contained in the
reproduced record, we may consider it.”).

5 Trial counsel was incorrect about the ability to waive claims that implicate
the violation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cline,
177 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa.Super. 2017) (observing in the context of Rule 302(a),
that “issues, even those of constitutional dimension, are waived” if not timely
raised).

                                          - 15 -
J-S15005-23
J-S15006-23

is absolutely nothing in this record to support counsel’s conclusion” that the

statement was made in a custodial interrogation).

     Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in admitting

the apparently-voluntary statements rather than halting trial to hold an

impromptu hearing on Appellant’s claim, not even fleshed out until his post-

sentence motion, that he “was subject to a custodial interrogation because he

reasonably did not believe he had the right to leave.” Id. Given the absence

of a timely suppression motion, the suppression issue is waived and cannot

serve as a basis for appellate relief.   See Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B) (“If timely

motion is not made hereunder, the issue of suppression of such evidence shall

be deemed to be waived.”).

     For the above reasons, we hold that each of Appellant’s issues is either

meritless or waived. Therefore, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023

                                    - 16 -