Court Opinion

ID: 9808287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:33:01.628103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:47.615237
License: Public Domain

Clark, C. J.,
dissenting: The most diligent research shows no statute that forbids a married woman to make a contract “with the assent” of her husband. The statute which has been relied on is The Code, 1826, now Revisal, 2094, which forbids her to make any contract “without the assent” of her husband, except in three cases, named, i. e., for necessaries, for support of the family, and to pay antenuptial debts, for which she can contract without his assent. The prohibition to contract without the husband’s assent in the other cases than the three cases named is certainly not a prohibition of the power to contract with his assent, but a recognition that she can contract with the husband’s assent.
*785Tbe right to act as free trader (Revisal, 2112) is a dispensation witb tbe prohibition to contract without tbe husband’s assent in all cases. As this is conferred by tbe husband’s assent once for all, certainly be can give bis assent to each contract as it arises.
Tbe Constitution allows a woman to convey her land witb tbe written assent of her husband, and tbe Court has often held that, as tbe assent is only required as to land, she can draw checks and dispose of personal property without bis assent. It was so held in Vann v. Edwards, 135 N. C., 661. A. fortiori can she contract with bis assent.
A married woman can draw checks and drafts without her husband’s assent, and, of course, is liable on them if not paid. Revisal, 2095. She is liable upon her real estate for buildings or repairs put thereon by her verbal assent or acquiescence ivith-ou-t the assent of her husband... Revisal, 2016; Finger v. Hunter, 130 N. C., 529. Of course, she must be liable when tbe contract is made witb bis assent.
Ever since tbe Statute of Frauds (29 Chas. II.) it has been held that land can be conveyed only in writing. But it has never been held that in consequence one cannot make a contract verbally which could be enforced by a sale of land. But if such were tbe law, as a married woman can convey her land witb tbe assent of her husband, certainly she can contract with bis assent.
Tbe courts have no right to enact a statute forbidding married women to contract witb tbe assent of tbe husband. Tbe Legislature has not done so. Tbe Constitution has emancipated married women by giving them full control of their property and earnings, with tbe right to dispose of it by will or otherwise, save that as to conveyances of real estate there must be tbe written assent of tbe husband — in analogy to tbe joinder of tbe wife in the conveyance of tbe husband’s realty.
That there is no prohibition of tbe wife to contract freely with tbe husband’s .assent is held in Brinkley v. Ballance, 126 N. C., 396, and Bates v. Sultan, 117 N. C., 100. There is no statute requiring “charging,” and tbe Court has no power to enact it. It is against tbe spirit of tbe Constitution and in *786violation, of tlie enfranobised status of married women created by it. Every student of tbe bistory of tbe law knows that tbe doctrine of “charging” was created in England in an effort to confer upon married women of wealth tbe power to contract on tbe faith of their property, at a time when tbe law there did not, as now, give them unrestricted control of their property and freedom to contract even-without tbe assent of their husbands. See Century of Law Reform,, 354-358, 368-373, 376; Dicey-Law and Opinion in England, 369-393. Certainly, the doctrine is obsolete and an anachronism here, when the wife has contracted with the assent of her husband and she can convey her realty with his assent and all her other property without it.
If there are any decisions of this or preceding courts which forbid a married woman to contract with the assent of her husband, they should be modified or overruled. A court should overrule its own errors (as this Court has shown it is strong enough to do), as well as the errors of a court below. Indeed, errors of the'higher court more imperiously demand correction, for they are more injurious. Ten times zero is only zero, and an error ten times repeated acquires thereby no approximation to being correct. It is an error still, only more harmful by repetition. As we have as precedent Brinkley v. Ballance, supra, we can follow that, if ’a precedent is essential.
The feme defendant bought the plaintiff’s goods, at the price $163.20, with the' written assent of her husband and, indeed, through his agency. She has kept the goods and now refuses to pay for them, though the jury find that she is worth $13,000 in personal property, besides realty. It is but common honesty that she be adjudged to pay the $289.' There is no sign or shred of a statute that provides that she is not liable for such contract when made with the assent of her husband.
The decisions that a wife cannot contract with the assent of her husband, though she can convey realty with his assent, and can make many contracts and dispose of j>ersonalty without his assent, have not become a rule of property, and to correct the error cannot affect any title. As the husband’s assent is not required for her protection in disposing of her personalty, and such assent is sufficient protection in conveying her realty, there *787can be no reason why the husband's assent was not enough protection in purchasing these goods when there is no statute that requires more.
In Bank v. Howell, 118 N. C., 273, this Court, in effect, recommended a statute permitting a wife to contract as a feme sole, without the assent of her husband in all cases, as is the law in England, New York, and our adjoining States. But that would require amending Revisal, 2094, which forbids her to contract without her husband’s consent except in certain. cases. Here she contracted with the assent of her husband, and there is no statute making her incompetent to buy these articles. Her estate has benefited to the extent of the jewelry bought. ■