Court Opinion

ID: 9431395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:32:12.985128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:28.294566
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
A defendant can be compelled to produce material evidence that is incriminating. Fingerprints, blood samples, voice exemplars, handwriting specimens, or other items of physical evidence may be extracted from a defendant against his will. But can he be compelled to use his mind to assist the prosecution in convicting him of a crime? I think not. He may in some cases be forced to surrender a key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents, but I do not believe he can be compelled to reveal the combination to his wall safe — by word or deed.
The document the Government seeks to extract from John Doe purports to order third parties to take action that will lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence. The directive itself may not betray any knowledge petitioner may have about the circumstances of the offenses being investigated by the grand jury, but it nevertheless purports to evidence a reasoned decision by Doe to authorize action by others. The forced execution of this document differs from the forced production of physical evidence just as human beings differ from other animals.1
*220If John Doe can be compelled to use his mind to assist the Government in developing its case, I think he will be forced “to be a witness against himself.” The fundamental purpose of the Fifth Amendment was to mark the line between the kind of inquisition conducted by the Star Chamber and what we proudly describe as our accusatorial system of justice. It *221reflects “our respect for the inviolability of the human personality,” Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U. S. 52, 55 (1964). “[I]t is an explicit right of a natural person, protecting the realm of human thought and expression.” Braswell v. United States, ante, at 119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In my opinion that protection gives John Doe the right to refuse to sign the directive authorizing access to the records of any bank account that he may control.2 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

The forced production of physical evidence, which we have condoned, see Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967) (voice exemplar!; Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966) (blood test): Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (1910) (lineup), involves no intrusion upon the' contents of the mind of the accused. See Schmerber, 384 U. S., at 765 (forced blood test permissible because it does not involve “even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused”). The forced *220execution of a document that purports to convey the signer’s authority, however, does invade the dignity of the human mind; it purports to communicate a deliberate command. The intrusion on the dignity, of the individual is not diminished by the fact that the document does not reflect the true state of the signer’s mind. Indeed, that the assertions petitioner is forced to utter by executing the document are false, causes an even greater violation of human dignity. For the same reason a person cannot be forced to sign a document purporting to authorize the entry of judgment against himself, cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748 (1970), I do not believe he can be forced to sign a document purporting to authorize the disclosure of incriminating evidence. In both cases the accused is being compelled “to be a witness against himself”; indeed, here he is being compelled to bear false witness against himself.
The expression of the contents of an individual’s mind falls squarely within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633-635 (1886); Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 420 (1976). Justice Holmes’ observation that “the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him,” Holt v. United States, 218 U. S., at 252-253, manifests a recognition that virtually any communication reveals the contents of the mind of the speaker. Thus the Fifth Amendment privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right “ ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.'” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 8 (1964)). The deviation from this principle can only lead to mischievous abuse of the dignity the Fifth Amendment commands the Government afford its citizens. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S., at 764. The instant case is illustrative. In allowing the Government to compel petitioner to execute the directive, the Court permits the Government to compel petitioner to speak against his will in answer to the question “Do you consent to the release of these documents?” Beyond this affront, however, the Government is being permitted also to demand that the answer be “yes.”

 The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a tvitness against himself.” A witness is one who “gives evidence in a cause.” T. Cunningham, 2 New and Complete Law Dictionary (2d ed. 1771). The Court carefully scrutinizes the particular directive at issue here to determine whether its “form” or “execution” “communicates any factual assertions, implicit or explicit, or conveys any information to the Government.” Ante, at 215. But the Court’s opinion errs in focusing only on whether the directive reveals historical facts, ignoring that the execution of the directive creates new facts and a new piece of evidence that may be used against petitioner. The Court determines that the document’s form has no testimonial significance because it does not reveal the identity of any particular banks or acknowledge the existence of any particular foreign accounts. This much is true. But the document does reveal exactly what it purports to reveal, which is that petitioner “directs,” see ante, at 204-205, n. 2, the release of any documents that conform to the description contained in the statement. Thus, by executing the document, petitioner admits a state of mind, a present-tense desire. That the directive asserts that it was executed “pursuant to” court order does not save petitioner from this compelled admission. Only the most sophisticated bank officer could be expected to understand the phrase “pursuant to that certain order,” ibid., to mean “executed involuntarily under pain of contempt.” But even if the directive expressly revealed its involuntary character, it would still communicate the direction that incriminating documents be produced.
By executing the document, petitioner creates evidence that has independent significance. The Court’s opinion does not foreclose the possibility that the Government will attempt to introduce the directive itself to create a link between petitioner and whatever documents the Government is able to secure through use of the directive. This danger was fully described in an example employed by the First Circuit in its analysis of a *222document, which, like the one at issue here, did not assert the existence of any particular bank records or accounts:
“Suppose that at trial the government were to introduce bank records produced in response to a subpoena that had been accompanied by the consent form and that it was not apparent from the face of the records or otherwise how [defendant] was linked to them. Suppose also that the government then introduced the subpoena and consent form, and a government witness testified that the bank records were received in response to the subpoena and consent form. . . . Would not the evidence linking [defendant] to the records be his own testimonial admission of consent?” In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F. 2d 791, 793 (1987).
The example reveals that the compelled execution causes the creation of evidence that did not exist before and which through the Government’s artifice may become part of the prosecution’s case against petitioner. The example also demonstrates that the “testimonial” significance of the directive can only be appreciated if the document is considered in its completed form from the perspective of an individual who knows no more about the circumstances of its creation than is revealed on its face. The fact that the document was produced under compulsion, which the Court relies on in asserting that the directive “sheds no light on [petitioner’s] actual intent or state of mind,” ante, at 216, is not relevant to consideration of the document’s testimonial significance.
A critical issue at any trial at which the Government seeks to introduce bank records produced by a compulsory directive would be proof that the documents pertain to accounts within the control of the defendant. The directive relates the testimonial fact that the defendant ordered the production of those documents which relate to any account he has at a bank or trust company or over which he has signatory authority. Perhaps this testimony alone does not prove the fact of control, but it is certainly probative of that fact. The defendant can no longer testify without contradiction from the face of the directive that he never authorized the production of records relating to his accounts. The directive that he was compelled to create testifies against him.