Court Opinion

ID: 9742074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:06:09.273623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:28.417375
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that reversible error occurred on the impeachment issue. In People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971), the Illinois Supreme Court explained that although evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible, a judge may allow such evidence pertaining to a witness other than the accused if (1) a conviction for the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult, and (2) the judge finds that admission is necessary to fairly determine the question of guilt or innocence. These observations implicate the constitutional right to confront witnesses. Regarding this right, the United States Supreme Court has explained that “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” (Emphasis in original.) Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 19, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294 (1985). Accordingly, when a judge improperly denies a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine a witness regarding bias, reversal is not automatic because such error may be harmless. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81 (1998). The instant ruling falls under the category of harmless error. People v. Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d 151 (1981), cited by defendant, is instructive by way of distinction. Wilkerson involved a witness, other than the accused, who had several charges pending against her when she testified for the State at the defendants’ trial. “The prosecutor in her case, who at one time was the prosecutor in the Wilkerson case, told [her] that after the Wilkerson case was completed, he ‘would be in touch with her. [He] would be in contact with her lawyer and try to work something out *** to see what could be worked out.’ ” Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d at 155. The defendants tried to impeach this witness with evidence of her pending charges, aiming “to convey to the jury that she might be trying to curry favor with the prosecutor of those charges by slanting her story in the Wilkerson case to suit the State.” Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d at 155. The trial judge disallowed the evidence, and the Illinois Supreme Court found reversible error. Unlike Wilkerson, the instant facts show that the jury heard evidence of Bobby King’s behind-the-scenes involvement with the State. On cross-examination, defense counsel attacked King’s credibility by eliciting testimony from King that the police interviewed him twice and warned, “It’s either you or Sherrick that did this. Tell us who did it.” King also acknowledged telling defendant, “It was either you or me.” Under the same cross-examination, King revealed that the State’s Attorney’s office told him that defendant would try to show that he (King) had committed the robbery. Thus, despite the ruling in question, defendant was allowed to present evidence supporting his claim that King had a motive to lie. Defense counsel reiterated this point during closing arguments, asserting that King implicated defendant through a deal with the State to save his own skin. Counsel urged the jury to disbelieve King, “who’s into it up to his neck, who’s somehow responsible for this, and is probably the person that had the gun.” Moreover, the jury was instructed that in judging the credibility of witnesses, it could consider any interest, bias, or prejudice a witness may have. Beyond evidence of motive to lie, defense counsel elicited further impeachment testimony from King. For instance, it was under counsel’s questioning that King admitted that his fingerprints may be on the gun used during the robbery. This point was also emphasized during closing arguments. Moreover, the court received a stipulation that police officers never recovered the gun from the Drummond residence. This stipulation impeached King’s testimony that he saw officers bring the gun out of the residence. Under these circumstances, I believe defendant received an effective opportunity to make his point about King’s credibility. The jury understood the point but still found King credible as to who pulled the gun on the victim. This finding was reasonable in light of its consistency with other evidence of record (including defendant’s own testimony that the victim identified him as the robber). Telling the jury about King’s juvenile adjudications would not have changed that evidence. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition.