Court Opinion

ID: 9741577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:58:29.643178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:57:18.843776
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE APPLETON, specially concurring: I concur with the result reached by the majority but write separately to identify concerns with the application of the nearly century-old definition of religious purpose enunciated by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People ex rel. McCullough v. Deutsche Evangelisch Lutherische Jehovah Gemeinde Ungeaenderter Augsburgischer Confession, 249 Ill. 132, 94 N.E. 162 (1911). This definition, relied upon by the Department to the exclusion of all other views, provided that religious purpose of property means use by a religious body as a stated place for public worship, Sunday schools, and religious instruction. That definition, enunciated at the dawn of the twentieth century, does not encompass all of the uses to which modern church buildings are put. How does one characterize the use of a church basement for a postfuneral luncheon? How does one accommodate the use of a parish hall for a wedding reception following the ceremony in the church? What is the effect of the inclusion of a “gymnasium” in many modern church buildings? I would argue that the Department cannot rest so heavily on the Deutsche formula without broadening its view as to what constitutes a religious purpose. Of even greater concern is the broadening definition of religion in the more evangelical of our churches where fellowship is as much a component of the religious experience afforded a church’s congregants as a formal service. Such experiences are not merely a by-product or benefit of church membership. They are, instead, central to the everyday expression of faith in the community. The Department is correct to be wary of many “nontraditional” uses of property in the guise of religion. However, it must be very careful in drawing lines at the appropriate places. The Supreme Court has said: “Governments have not always been tolerant of religious activity, and hostility, toward religion has taken many shapes and forms— economic, political, and sometimes harshly oppressive. Grants of exemption historically reflect the concern of authors of constitutions and statutes as to the latent dangers inherent in the imposition of property taxes; exemption constitutes a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard against those dangers.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673, 25 L. Ed. 2d 697, 704, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (1970). Our constitution provides that the General Assembly may exclude from real estate taxation property used for a religious purpose. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 6. It has done so by use of the language cited in the majority opinion. While I agree that the Deutsche tests are not exclusive, the Department, as an agency of the State of Illinois, cannot by its decision restrict religious expression by fiat.