Court Opinion

ID: 9689721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:44:18.590685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:51.386160
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 56. (dissenting). I agree with the circuit court and court of appeals, both of which held that the evidence in this case should be suppressed. The majority opinion, on the other hand, criticizes the court of appeals, contending that it "draws inferences and reaches conclusions that the facts do not support. ..." Majority op. at ¶ 37. I believe this very same criticism can be leveled at the majority opinion.
¶ 57. A "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."1 A warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable. Majority op. at ¶ 28. Therefore the burden is on the State to prove the existence of circumstances permitting entry into a home without a warrant. Majority op. at ¶ 29. The State clearly has not met its burden in this case.
¶ 58. The majority opinion infers that the intruder's entry into trailer #439 was by forced entry through a window. According to the complaint, however, Brian Champion said that when the intruder left the Champion trailer (#438) the intruder "went in the *553front door [of trailer #439]." According to the officer's testimony at the suppression hearing, witnesses reported only that the intruder entered trailer #439. The officer inferred that the intruder entered trailer #439 through an open window. The officer shone his flashlight through the open window, exposing four adults asleep in the room in which the intruder was supposed to have entered. The officer had no reports of physical violence, threats or weapons. These facts are insufficient to support an officer's reasonable belief "that delay in procuring a warrant would gravely endanger life or risk destruction of evidence or greatly enhance the likelihood of the suspect's escape."2
¶ 59. I agree with the court of appeals that the officer was not in hot pursuit of a suspect because "[t]he record does not demonstrate there was immediate or continuous pursuit of the suspect from the scene of the unlawful entry." State v. Richter, 224 Wis. 2d 814, 821-22, 592 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1999). In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), in which the police entered the defendant's home only minutes after a witness observed the defendant fleeing from his car, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "the claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing because there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the [defendant] from the scene of a crime."3 Furthermore, a number of courts have concluded that hot pursuit must be accompanied by a credible threat of violence in order to justify a warrant-less entry.4
*554¶ 60. I agree with the circuit court and court of appeals that no exigent circumstances justify this war-rantless search. The circuit court stated:
I really don't think that constitutes exigent circumstances. I really don't. The officer could have stood outside and knocked on the door. He's searching for someone that a citizen says ran that way.. . .
Clearly the officer is there illegally because he doesn't have permission. I don't think there are exigent circumstances. I don't think there is hot pursuit. As I indicated, the officer could have very well knocked on the door and — on the outside, explained why he was there, instead of gaining access without permission.
¶ 61. I agree with the circuit court and court of appeals that the warrantless search was unconstitutional.
¶ 62. But after deciding the entry was constitutional, the majority opinion unnecessarily concludes that even if the officer's warrantless entry into the defendant'sTiome was not constitutional, the suppres*555sion motion must nevertheless be denied because the defendant's consent to search the trailer was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry to remove the "taint" of the illegality.
¶ 63. I disagree. I conclude that the officer's war-rantless, middle-of-the-night entry, awakening of the defendant and failure to conduct an adequate investigation all weigh against a finding of attenuation.5 The officer entered the defendant's trailer, shook the defendant awake, told him that a burglar had been seen entering his trailer and asked for consent to search the trailer. In the officer's own words at the suppression hearing, "He [the defendant] was sleeping. . . .1 had to shake him and woke him up...."
¶ 64. The majority relies on this "brief conversation" to support a finding of attenuation. The majority opinion's finding of.attenuation in this case is inconsis*556tent with other cases and risks making a mockery of the attenuation doctrine.6
¶ 65. This case is, unfortunately, just one more in a line of recent cases in which the court has not been sufficiently protective of the privacy of the home.7 For the reasons set forth above, I dissent.
¶ 66. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.

 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984), quoting United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).

 State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 230, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986).

 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984).

 See, e.g., State v. Bolte, 560 A.2d 644, 654 (N.J. 1989) (hot pursuit alone is an insufficient justification for a warrantless entry into home); Butler v. State, 829 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Ark. *5541992) (hot pursuit alone is an insufficient justification for war-rantless entry into home; exigent circumstances required for disorderly conduct); City of Seattle v. Altschuler, 766 P.2d 518, 520-21 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (hot pursuit alone is an insufficient justification for warrantless entry into home; exigent circumstances required unless fleeing felon); State v. Bowe, 557 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (hot pursuit is an insufficient justification for warrantless entry into home unless violent crime involved; burglary without violence not sufficient); People v. Sanders, 374 N.E. 2d 1315 (Ill. App. 1978) (exigent circumstances required for warrantless entry in home; burglary without weapons not grave enough offense to justify warrantless entry; cited in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 749, 752 (1984)).

 Contrary to the majority's suggestion, our prior cases hold that a warning to the defendant that the officer does not have a warrant, while perhaps not necessary, contributes to a finding of attenuation. See State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 208-09, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) (explaining to defendant that the police lacked a warrant supports finding of attenuation); State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991) (reading Miranda warnings to defendant and signed waiver support finding of attenuation for statement and search); State v. Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d 338, 358, 585 N.W.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1998) (failing to inform defendant of no warrant and no need to consent weighs against finding of attenuation); United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1458-59 (10th Cir. 1985) (reading Miranda warnings and advising defendant of right to refuse consent are factors that may satisfy "the requirement of intervening circumstances").

 See, e.g., United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 695 (7th Cir. 1997) (no attenuation where consent to search "followed almost immediately after the illegal seizure" and "no intervening event of any significance occurred between the illegal seizure and the consent to break the causal chain"); United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 980 (10th Cir. 1996) (for attenuation a discontinuity between the illegal stop and the consent must occur).

 See, e.g., State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 321 N.W.2d 245 (1982), rev'd Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (U.S. Supreme Court reversed our court decision that held law-enforcement officer may enter home to arrest driver suspected of driving under the influence of intoxicants, a noncriminal offense); State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994), State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996), and Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (U.S. Supreme Court concluded that our court erred in adopting a categorical rule holding that a no-knock entry is permissible when officers have a warrant to search the home of a suspected felony drug dealer); State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517 (our court held a search warrant valid despite failure to link illegal drugs to accused's residence); State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552 (our court curtailed curtilage); State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621 (our court held that odor of marijuana justified warrantless entry).