Court Opinion

ID: 9529095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:47:28.244695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:40.096191
License: Public Domain

OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
Garrard, J.
IC 1971, 9-4-13-1 et seq. provides that driving privileges may be suspended for those found to be habitual traffic offenders. The scheme of IC 1971, 9-4-13-3 is to establish three categories based upon the gravity of the offense which may cause one to meet the definition of an habitual traffic offender. As the seriousness of the offense diminishes, more violations are required for one to be found an offender. Furthermore, a more serious offense may be counted with less serious offenses to constitute the required number of offenses. Yet nothing in the statute applicable to Marlett precluded the court from finding him guilty under subsection (a) (3) although he might also have been found guilty under subsection' (a) (2). Since the record does support a finding under' (a) (3), I concur with the majority that.the decision was not contrary to law in this respect.
*565However, I disagree with the majority conclusion that the court could use the provisions of the habitual offender statute to restore to Marlett a driving privilege already validly suspended.
The purpose of the statute is to promote the public welfare by suspending the driving privilege of certain recidivist offenders. IC 1971, 9-4-13-10 in the form applicable to Marlett did permit the imposition of a restricted privilege rather than total suspension for the third (least serious) category of offense.
However, IC 1971, 9-4-13-18 further provides:
“Nothing contained in this chapter [9-4-13-1 — 9-4-13-18] shall be so construed as to repeal, modify or amend any other laws or parts of laws . . . relating to the operation . . . of motor vehicles, the licensing of persons to operate motor vehicles or providing penalties for the violation thereof; nor shall anything in this chapter be construed so as to preclude the exercise of regulatory powers of any division, agency, department or political subdivision of this state having the statutory power to regulate the operation and licensing of motor vehicles and the licensing of motor vehicle operators . . . .” .
Accordingly, under IC 1971, 9-4-13-1 et seq: the court had power to impose an independent suspension.'of driving privileges based upon the recidivist status defined by the statute. It, also, had power to lessen the harshness of the penalty for those persons qualified under IC 1971, 9-4-13-10. It did not, however, under this statute, have the power to restore a driving privilege and nullify a prior sanction validly imposed under another act. It is undisputed that Marlett was the subject of a valid total suspension order at the time of these proceedings.
Note. — Reported at 358 N.E.2d 198.