Court Opinion

ID: 9847512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:01:12.203692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:18.698890
License: Public Domain

STANFORD, Justice.
This is an appeal by certiorari by Ernest Jeune, hereinafter called petitioner, from an award of The Industrial Commission of Arizona and B. F. Hill, F. O. Nathan, and J. J. O’Neill, members of said Commission, hereinafter called respondents, made on February 9, 1954, denying him any benefits.
The facts in the case are not in dispute. Petitioner was injured by accident on June 20, 1952, while working at Tucson for Del E. Webb Construction Company. The employer carried compensation for its employees with the respondent Commission. On August 15, 1952, petitioner filed a negligence action against his employer for his personal injuries, on the theory that the employer had failed to post the notices *412required by Section 56-944, A.C.A.1939. This action was tried in November, 1952, and the Superior Court of Pima County directed a verdict against petitioner on the sole ground that his evidence, viewed most favorably to him, failed to show that his employer had not fully complied with Section 56-944, supra. On January 25, 1954, this court, in Jeune v. Del E. Webb Const. Co., 76 Ariz. 418, 265 P.2d 1076, affirmed the superior court.
Thereafter, petitioner applied to the respondent Commission for workmen’s compensation. On February 9, 1954, the Commission entered an “award” denying petitioner any and all compensation or accident benefits, on the theory that by undertaking his unsuccessful civil action against his employer he had waived any right to compensation.
Petitioner filed but one assignment of error:
“The Respondent Commission erred and acted without jurisdiction in its order of February 9, 1954, denying petitioner any benefits or compensation, for the reason that the civil action previously filed against the employer was dismissed and was a nullity, and for the further reason that said order completely misinterprets and misconstrues the intent and language of Sections 56-950 and 56-944.”
The question before us is one of law only and involves an interpretation of Sections 56-944 and 56-950, A.C.A.1939;
Section 56-944, supra, in so far as is relevant here, provides:
“ * * * it shall be optional with employees to accept compensation as provided herein or to reject the provisions hereof and retain the right to sue said employer as provided by law. Such election to reject the terms of this article shall be made by a notice [to that effect] in writing, signed and dated, given by an employee to his employer * * *. Such notice must be filed with the employer prior to injuries sustained by such employee * * *. All employees shall be conclusively presumed to have elected to take compensation in accordance with the terms, conditions and provisions hereof, unless said notice in writing has been served by the said employee upon his employer prior to injury.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 56-944, supra, then directs that every employer “ * * * shall post and keep posted' in a conspicuous place upon his premises * * * ” a notice informing the employee as to his rights which are as set forth in the statute above quoted.
Section 56-944, supra, concludes by providing :
“If an employer fails to post and keep posted said notice as required ’* * *, no employee who shall thereafter engage in employment for such employer; during the time that such notices shall not be posted * * *, *413shall be deemed to have accepted the provisions of this article and it shall be optional for such employee, if injured during said period * * *, to accept compensation hereunder or maintain other action against the employer.”
Section 56-950, supra, in so far as is relevant here, provides:
“ * * * Every employee * * * who exercises any option to institute proceedings in court waives any right to any award * * *
The question before us is whether an injured employee, who institutes a civil suit for damages against his employer on a theory of negligence but who then has a verdict directed against him on the grounds that he had failed to prove that the statutory notices had not been posted, may thereafter be denied workmen’s compensation on a theory of election of remedies.
Respondents argue:
“Petitioner has misconstrued the nature of the option given to him under the Arizona statutes. He would reason that he is entitled to file suit for the purpose of determining whether or not an option really exists. This of course cannot be true under the Arizona statute which makes the election complete upon the instituting of suit. The Arizona statute has in effect said: ‘If you feel that you can prove that the employer did not post notices as required by law, go ahead and file suit and attempt to prove it, but when you file the suit you will have preconcluded yourself from any right to an award from the Commission.’ ”
The language of Section 56-944 is unambiguous. It provides, with one exception to be noted presently, that any injured employee who has not notified his employer in writing of his intention to reject workmen’s compensation in favor of suing his employer prior to his injury “ * * * shall be conclusively presumed to have elected to take compensation”. The one exception arises when the employer fails to post the notices as required by Section 56-944, supra, in which event the employee retains an option even after injury either to accept workmen’s compensation or to sue the employer.
The exception just referred to has no applicability in the present case since the notices were posted by the employer as required. This was conclusively decided, so far as these parties are concerned, in the case of Jeune v. Del E. Webb Construction Company, 76 Ariz. 418, 265 P.2d 1076. See Lauderdale v. Industrial Commission, 60 Ariz. 443, 446-447, 139 P.2d 449; Jones v. Morrison, 24 Ariz. 367, 373-374, 210 P. 472. It follows, therefore, that petitioner “ * * * shall be conclusively presumed to have elected to take compensation * * * ” as provided by Section 56-944. The language of the statute is subject to no other interpretation.
*414We agree with respondents that once an injured employee has elected either of the two remedies theoretically open to him, he forever precludes himself from pursuing the other remedy. Likewise, we agree with respondents that the petitioner Jeune has made a conclusive election, but his election was to accept workmen’s compensation (by fiat of Section 56-944), and was not, as contended by respondents, an election to reject compensation and sue his employer.
The question thus remaining is whether petitioner, having conclusively elected to take compensation, has somehow waived or forfeited that remedy by having subsequently instituted a civil suit against his employer to recover damages for the injury. The case of Gordon v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 83 N.H. 221, 140 A. 704, 706, is in point. Plaintiff there, following his injury, accepted workmen’s compensation payments for two months. Thereafter he brought a civil action against his employer to recover for the same injury. The action was dismissed because the plaintiff had already accepted workmen’s compensation. Plaintiff then applied for further workmen’s compensation payments. The Commission refused to pay. The court held that he was entitled to compensation notwithstanding his intervening suit against his employer. The court declared:
“When once a valid election has been made, there is no further right of election. ‘The assertion of one remedy involves a negation of the other.’ Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 286, 212 N.W. 461, 464. Consequently a judicial determination that the plaintiff has elected to accept compensation under the act is at the same time a determination that he has not elected to retain his common-law rights. His attempt to exercise those rights is therefore nugatory; the abortive action is dismissed, and he is left to his original choice.”
The Workmen’s Compensation Act, A.C.A.1939, § 56-901 et seq., was enacted primarily for the benefit of the injured employee to the end that employees might be assured of compensation for their injuries. The Act, therefore, should be, so far as possible, liberally construed to accomplish that purpose. Pressley v. Industrial Commission, 72 Ariz. 299, 233 P.2d 1082, 1085; Goodyear Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 62 Ariz. 398, 158 P.2d 511, 513.
It would hardly be consistent with the spirit and purpose of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, as set forth above, to declare it the intention of the legislature in providing that, in instances where an employer fails to post the statutory notices, an employee should have the option (not otherwise available to him) of maintaining a civil action against his employer and then, having so provided, deny the employee not only recovery against his employer but *415also the benefits of workmen’s compensation (otherwise available to him) where the employee exercises the regularly constituted procedure of our judicial system in an unsuccessful attempt to establish that his employer had failed to comply with his statutory duty.
“Surely the Legislature could not have intended that a right made exclusive through election should, in all cases and under all circumstances, be irretrievably lost by a subsequent endeavor to assert a nonexistent right.
* * * * * *
“The imposition of so drastic a penalty will not be inferred except from clear and unequivocal language.” Gordon v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 83 N.H. 221, 140 A. 704, 706.
To adopt the construction urged by the respondents would be to deny the employee a reasonable opportunity to contest the disputed question of whether his employer had posted the notices required by Section 56-944, supra.
The obvious purpose of the legislature in adopting the last paragraph of Section 56-944, supra, creating an exception to what would otherwise be the employee’s exclusive remedy, was to subject the employer to suit at common law for failure to post notices as required by. the statute, Sec. 56-944, supra, rather than to create a trap for the employee by which he might-be denied the right to seek workmen’s compensation, a right otherwise unquestionably his.
It is asserted, however, that one of the purposes of the statute is to protect the employer from vexatious litigation and that that purpose would be defeated by a holding here that this petitioner is entitled to workmen’s compensation. But as we have already declared herein, an employee is compelled to abide by his election, and' if that election be, as here, to accept workmen’s compensation, he may not thereafter sue his employer at common law on the merits of the case except upon a showing, as the statute specifically provides, that the statutory notices were not posted by the employer as required. If the employee brings such a civil suit against his employer in good faith he ought not to be penalized therefor. Gordon v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 83 N.H. 221, 140 A. 704.
Respondents insist that this court is bound by the law of Ohio, especially as stated in State ex rel. Wolf Run Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 1924, 110 Ohio St. 487, 144 N.E. 272, and in The Carnegie Steel Co. v. Zebich, 1923, 108 Ohio St. 449, 141 N.E. 367, and that, applying these cases, we could find only for respondents. Respondents support their contention by quoting from Elias v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 1, 3, 76 P. 605,
“The adoption of a statute from another state adopts with it the construction placed upon it by the supreme court of that state at the time of such adoption.”
*416Notwithstanding this statement, we aie not hound to adopt automatically and without modification the foreign construction of a statute if to do so would be inconsistent with principles of equity and justice and with our general conditions as we view them.
“It is true that we have usually followed the doctrine that when we take a statute from another state we take - it with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that state. (Citations omitted.)
“This rule, however, is not one which is mandatory and absolutely binding on us, and we have the right, if we consider another construction more in accord with the fundamental principles of logic, common sense and justice, and of our public policy to adopt it. (Citations omitted.)” Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Old Dominion Co., 31 Ariz. 324, 334, 253 P. 435, 438, 59 A.L.R. 625.
Therefore, if it be true that the statute applicable to the facts in this case were adopted from the statutes of Ohio as they appeared in 1925 when our present Workmen’s Compensation Act became law, we also adopt the constructions that had been placed upon that statute up to that time by the highest court of Ohio, unless such constructions are contrary to our conception of justice and public policy. If it be true that the courts of Ohio, in construing statutes similar to Sections 56-944 and 56-950, supra, would deny recovery to an employee in the position of petitioner, Jeune, here, we decline to follow that view, since it does not comport with our conception of justice and common sense as expressed in a policy, to which this state has long been committed, of liberal construction of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, favoring the granting of compensation to injured employees. See San Francisco Stevedoring Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 321, 149 P. 586.
Respondents also contend that Arizona law on the matter before us was settled in their favor by the early cases of Twohy Bros. v. Rogers, 9 Cir., 293 F. 566, and Consolidated Arizona Smelting Co. v. Ujack, 15 Ariz. 382, 139 P. 465. Both these cases were decided, however, before we adopted our present Workmen’s Compensation Act and before our code contained any provision at all similar to our present Section 56-944, supra. Clearly, then, these cases cannot be controlling here.
Therefore, the Commission’s “award” of February 9, 1954, denying petitioner compensation and accident benefits, was beyond its jurisdiction and is hereby set aside.
LA PRADE and WINDES, JJ., and LOCKWOOD, Superior Court Judge, concur.
Justice UDALL, having disqualified himself, the Honorable LORNA E. LOCKWOOD, Judge of the Superior Court of *417Maricopa County, was called to sit in his stead on the determination of this appeal,