Court Opinion

ID: 9579373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:54:34.686626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:28.831851
License: Public Domain

HEARN, Chief Judge:
Joseph Wilson brought this action against Charles Rivers for injuries he allegedly sustained in a car accident. The jury returned a verdict for Wilson. Rivers appeals, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to admit the deposition of his expert witness in biomechanics. We affirm.
FACTS
Wilson was a passenger in a vehicle driven by a co-worker, Deborah Ryan, which was stopped at a red light when Rivers’ car struck them from behind. At the time of the impact, Wilson was wearing a seatbelt and was leaning forward to retrieve his keys from the car’s floorboard.
Wilson brought this personal injury action. In his amended answer, Rivers admitted simple negligence “in allowing the front of his vehicle to bump the rear of the vehicle in which [Wilson] was a passenger” but asserted Wilson’s claims of *538back pain and surgery were unrelated to the low-speed collision.
At trial, Wilson testified he did not call EMS or go to the hospital immediately following the accident. The next Monday, he went to a doctor, had x-rays made, and was diagnosed with “some soft-tissue damage.” When Wilson failed to improve after several months, he was given an MRI and referred to an orthopedist who diagnosed him with a ruptured disk. The orthopedist recommended surgery after an epidural failed to provide Wilson relief. Wilson underwent a spinal fusion in December 1997. At the time of trial, Wilson’s medical bills totaled $54,324.88, and he claimed lost wages of $8,872.47.
Wilson introduced the depositions of two of his treating physicians. The first testified that Wilson had a disk rupture with an annular tear and a herniated disk at L4-5 and “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the accident most probably did cause the injury that subsequently led to [Wilson’s] necessity for surgery.” However, he did note that Wilson had degenerative arthritis in his lower back that probably predated the accident. Wilson’s orthopedic surgeon testified to the same injuries and stated they were consistent with being in a bent over position during an impact. Wilson testified he had no back pain prior to the accident.
In support of his contention that the accident did not cause Wilson’s injuries, Rivers sought to introduce the depositions of a radiologist and Dr. Richard Harding, a purported expert in the field of biomechanics. The radiologist’s testimony was admitted, and he testified that it is unusual for trauma of an acute nature to involve just one disk if there has been no fracture. He believed this accident did not cause or aggravate Wilson’s injuries. The thrust of Dr. Harding’s testimony was that Wilson’s injuries were not likely caused by the accident in question. After reading the deposition and conducting a lengthy colloquy on the matter, the trial judge refused to admit the deposition because he was concerned it would confuse the jury.1
*539The jury returned a verdict for Wilson for $103,500. The trial judge granted Rivers a setoff for the amount previously tendered to Wilson by the primary insurance carrier but denied his post-trial motions for a new trial absolute or new trial nisi remittitur. Rivers appeals.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Rivers contends the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding Dr. Harding’s videotaped deposition regarding the injuries reportedly sustained by Wilson. We disagree.
Rivers’ argument focuses on Dr. Harding’s qualification as an expert in the field of biomechanics. However, based on our review of the record, the trial judge did not specifically refuse to qualify Dr. Harding as an expert, but instead excluded the deposition under Rule 403, SCRE. Although he expressed concerns about Dr. Harding’s qualifications, he ultimately found that the deposition was more prejudicial than probative and that the testimony would be confusing to the jury.
In evaluating proposed expert testimony, trial judges consider Rules 702 and 403, SCRE. See State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 20, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (1999). Rule 403 provides for the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,. or misleading the jury....” This analysis is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hamilton, 344 S.C. 344, 358, 543 S.E.2d 586, 593 (Ct.App.2001). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law. Ledford v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 267 S.C. 671, 675, 230 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1976). Moreover, “[a] trial judge’s decision regarding the comparative probative value and prejudicial effect of evidence should be reversed only in ‘exceptional circumstances.’ ” Hamilton, 344 S.C. at 357-58, 543 S.E.2d at 593 (Ct.App.2001).
The trial judge found Harding seemed confused about the subject of his testimony and gave contradictory answers about the basis of his opinion. Based on our review of the deposition, we find there is evidence supporting the trial *540judge’s decision to exclude Dr. Harding’s deposition. For example, Harding testified that he made his determination about Wilson’s injuries caused by the accident based on his determination of the change in velocity at impact which he reached by looking at the damage to the vehicles, but he then testified that the amount of property damage does not determine the extent of injury. Harding also testified that he did not know either the speed of Rivers’ vehicle or Wilson’s precise position at impact. From this evidence, we find the trial judge properly concluded that the jury would be unduly confused by the testimony. Although this is a close case, it is not an exceptional circumstance warranting reversal. Because we do not believe the trial judge exceeded his discretion in excluding the evidence under Rule 403, SCRE, we affirm his decision.
AFFIRMED.
CONNOR, J., concurs.
SHULER, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

. In excluding the deposition, the trial judge said, "I don't think I don’t believe it will assist this Jury to understand the evidence in this case. I believe it would be more confusing than anything else and I would exclude it on that basis.”