Court Opinion

ID: 3203752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-05-16 19:31:52.411205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:28.165056
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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ANNE L. BAILEY,                                NO. 73365-6-1                     as.
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KENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,                          UNPUBLISHED OPINION                     _ii

                                                                                       181 Wash. 2d 439, 444, 334 P.3d 541 (2014). Summary

       3 The court indicated that it did not address Bailey's claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress because the District did not challenge that claim on summary
judgment. In a filing with this court, Bailey voluntarily dismissed that claim without
prejudice under CR 41(a)(1)(B).
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No. 73365-6-1/13

judgment is only warranted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Scrivener. 181

Wash. 2d at 444. This court views all facts and makes all reasonable factual inferences in

the light most favorable to Bailey, the nonmoving party. Scrivener. 181 Wash. 2d at 444.

       Hostile Work Environment

       Bailey argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her hostile work

environment claim because she failed to show membership in a protected class.

       Bailey's hostile work environment claim falls under the Washington Law Against

Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW. The Supreme Court has explained that

summary judgment "is seldom appropriate in the WLAD cases because of the difficulty

of proving discriminatory motivation." Scrivener. 181 Wash. 2d at 445. "To overcome

summary judgment, a plaintiff needs only to show that a reasonable jury could find that

the plaintiff's protected trait was a substantial factor motivating the employer's adverse

actions." Scrivener. 181 Wash. 2d at 445. The plaintiff's burden is one of production, not

persuasion, and may be proved through direct and circumstantial evidence. Scrivener.

181 Wn.2dat445.

       To establish a prima facie case for discrimination based on a hostile work

environment, Bailey must show the harassment (1) was unwelcome, (2) occurred due to

membership in a protected class, (3) affected the terms and conditions of employment,

and (4) is imputable to the employer. Antonius v. King County. 153 Wash. 2d 256, 261,

103 P.3d 729 (2004).

       The trial court dismissed this claim because Bailey failed to show membership in

a protected class:

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No. 73365-6-1/14

       Plaintiff's claim that she was subject to a "hostile work environment" stems
      from her treatment by a co-worker who plaintiff says bullied, maligned and
       harassed her over a period of years. Plaintiff voiced complaints to her
       principal about her co-worker's alleged treatment. She does not claim to
       be a member of a protected class under RCW 49.60.180 nor under any
       other section of the WLAD (except that pertaining to retaliation which is
       addressed below.) Therefore, her hostile work environment claim fails
       and summary judgment is warranted insofar as this claim is not
       synonymous to her retaliation claim.

CP at 467 (emphasis added).

       Membership in a Protected Class

       Bailey claims the trial court erred in concluding she was not a member of a

protected class. She argues the hostile work environment she experienced "arises out

of her actions to protect the disabled students of color." Br. of Appellant at 28.

       The WLAD creates several protected classes. It prohibits an employer from

discriminating against an employee on the basis of "age, sex, marital status, sexual

orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, honorably discharged veteran or military

status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability. .." RCW

49.60.180(2).

       Bailey argues that reporting discrimination is a protected activity. She cites Ray

v. Henderson. 217 F.3d 1234, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000). Ray is not helpful. That case

addressed whether a male worker's sexual harassment report of female colleagues was

a protected activity under Title VII. The case did not address the question here—

whether a plaintiff who reports alleged discrimination is a protected class member for

purposes of a free standing hostile work environment claim.

       Bailey also cites Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System. LP. 534 F.3d 1116,

1123 (9th Cir. 2008), where the court noted that discriminatory conduct directed at an

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No. 73365-6-1/15

individual other than the plaintiff "may be relevant to a hostile work environment claim."

As in Ray. Johnson does not address the relevant question presented here.

         Bailey also claims she is a member of a protected class because she reasonably

believed she was opposing discriminatory practices. She relies on the WLAD's

retaliation statute, RCW 49.60.210(1 ).4 Actions taken in response to an employee's

opposition to discrimination constitute retaliation, not a claim for hostile work

environment. See Currier v. Northland Servs.. Inc.. 182 Wash. App. 733, 742, 332 P.3d

1006(2014).

         Bailey's claim also fails because she produced no evidence that Browning's

alleged harassment was motivated by plaintiff's race, gender, sexual orientation, or

another protected class.

         Bailey also argues that her protected class status arises from her actions to

protect disabled students. She relies on Johnson. But that case did not address

"associational discrimination." Associational discrimination occurs when a nonminority

is discriminated against for "siding with" a minority. See Barret v. Whirlpool Corp.. 556

F.3d 502, 515 (2nd Cir. 2009); Reply Br. of Appellant at 7.

         Even if associational discrimination applied here, Bailey's claim fails because she

did not show she suffered adverse actions because of her advocacy for, or association

with, students of color. Barrett. 556 F.3d at 515. The record contains overwhelming

evidence that Bailey's advocacy focused on herself not for members of any protected

class.

         4 That statute makes it unfair for an employer to "discharge, expel, or otherwise
discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices
forbidden by this chapter." RCW 49.60.210(1).
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No. 73365-6-1/16

      Retaliation

      Bailey also claims the District retaliated against her for "seeking

accommodation," "filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission when [the District] refused her accommodation ... demoted

her after she made her request and forced her out of the workplace with intimidation by

[the District's] General Counsel."5 Br. of Appellant at 30. An employer may not retaliate

against an employee for opposing the employer's discriminatory practices or for filing a

discrimination claim against the employer. RCW 49.60.210(1 ).6

      To establish a prima facie case of retaliation Bailey must show (1) she engaged

in a statutorily protected activity, (2) the District took some adverse employment action

against her, and (3) a causal link between her protected activity and the District's action.

Estevez v. Faculty Club of Univ. of Wash.. 129 Wash. App. 774, 797, 120 P.3d 570

(2005). Bare assertions at summary judgment that a genuine material issue exists will

not defeat a summary judgment motion in the absence of actual evidence. Trimble v.

Wash. State Univ.. 140 Wash. 2d 88, 93, 993 P.2d 259 (2000).

       5 Bailey's briefing alleges a confusing array of District actions she claims are
retaliation. But most of her arguments lack meaningful analysis, citation to authority,
and consist of conclusory statements. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Boslev. 118
Wash. 2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (appellate courts do not consider claims not
supported by references to the record or citation to authority); McKee v. Am. Home
Products. Corp., 113 Wash. 2d 701, 705, 782 P.2d 1045 (1989) ("We will not consider
issues on appeal that are not raised by an assignment of error or are not supported by
argument and citation to authority.").
        6 Under RCW 49.60.210(1), an employer may not retaliate against an employee
for opposing a prohibited practice:
        (1) It is an unfair practice for any employer, employment agency, labor
            union, or other person to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate
            against any person because he or she has opposed any practices
            forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge,
            testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter.

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No. 73365-6-1/17

       The plaintiff need not show the adverse employment action was a "but for" cause

of the protected activity.   Allison v. Housing Auth. of City of Seattle. 118 Wash. 2d 70, 95-

96, 821 P.2d 34 (1991). The plaintiff instead must show that it was a "substantial factor"

in the employer's decision to retaliate. Allison. 118 Wash. 2d at 95-96.

       Where a WLAD plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discrimination, we employ a

three-part burden shifting framework. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S.

792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); Texas Dep't of Cmtv. Affairs v. Burdine.

450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L Ed. 2d 207 (1981). Under this burden shifting

framework, Bailey bears the initial burden to demonstrate a prima facie case. If she

succeeds, the burden shifts to the District to present evidence of a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. The burden then shifts back to Bailey to

produce evidence that the District's stated reason for the adverse employment action is

mere pretext. Anica v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc.. 120 Wash. App. 481, 488, 84 P.2d 1231

(2004). Bailey bears the ultimate burden of establishing her claims at trial. To survive

summary judgment, she need only show that a reasonable jury could find that her

retaliation claims, noted above, were substantial motivating factors for an adverse

employment action. Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I. 144 Wash. 2d 172, 185-87, 23 P.3d 440

(2001); Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chem. Corp. 118 Wash. 2d 46, 71 -72, 821 P.2d 18

(1991).

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No. 73365-6-1/18

       Protected Activity

       Bailey claims her request for an accommodation and filing an EEOC claim are

protected activities.7 Hansen v. Boeing Co.. 903 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (W.D. Wash.

2012); RCW 49.60.210. The District does not dispute that these actions constitute

protected activity for a retaliation claim.

       Bailey also argues that her complaints about Browning constitute protected

activity. Bailey claims the District retaliated against her based on repeated complaints

about Browning. But the record contains overwhelming evidence that Bailey's

complaints about Browning were all about disagreements over student assignments and

communication styles. Nothing about her complaints are based on WLAD.

       We are not persuaded by Bailey's present claims that Browning

disproportionately rejected students of color and Bailey was a "whistle-blower" on

Browning's race discrimination. The record provides no support for these claims. For

example, Bailey points to no racial remarks or faculty, parent, or student complaints

about Browning discriminating against students of color. Bailey presented no relevant

evidence that Browning discriminated against students of color. The undisputed

evidence shows Browning's preference for teaching only "case load" students. This is a

nondiscriminatory explanation and Bailey makes no attempt to show it is a pretext for

discrimination.

        7 These "protected activities" are also based on Bailey's allegation that the
District refused to place her in the non-teaching position she repeatedly requested.
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No. 73365-6-1/19

      Adverse Employment Action

      Bailey claims she suffered an adverse employment action when she requested

an accommodation and exercised her right to medical leave.

      An adverse employment action "involves a change in employment conditions that

is more than an inconvenience or alteration of one's job responsibilities, such as

reducing an employee's workload and pay." Alonso v. Qwest Communications. Co..

178 Wash. App. 734, 746, 315 P.3d 610 (2013). Whether an action "is materially adverse

depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and 'should be judged from the

perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position.'" Tvner v. State. 137 Wn.

App. 545, 565,154 P.3d 920 (2007) (quoting Burlington North. & Santa Fe Rv. Co. v.

White. 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2417, 165 L Ed. 2d 345 (2006)).

       The trial court dismissed this claim because Bailey suffered no adverse

employment action:

       When [Bailey] appeared ready to return to her former position as a teacher
       on January 3, 2013, her employer, after claiming to be caught by surprise,
       agreed to start her back in that position within two weeks of her return to
       work and offered to employ her as a substitute teacher in the interim. The
       evidence does not support an adverse employment action under RCW
       49.60.180.

CP at 460.

       Bailey claims she suffered three adverse actions: (1) the District demoted her

when Barringer told her she had to teach a full class load or resign while she was on

leave; (2) the District treated her less favorably from other return to work employees

who were immediately allowed to resume their original preleave duties; (3) the District's

attorney yelled at her on January 3.

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No. 73365-6-1/20

       Judged by a reasonable person in Bailey's position, the undisputed facts do not

show any material adverse actions by the District. The District was prepared to restore

Bailey to her former position soon after her January 3 return to work. The record shows

that Bailey's unilateral decision to return to work on very short notice surprised the

District. The District offered short-term alternatives at her normal salary and offered to

reinstate her to her original duties.

       Bailey also argues she suffered an adverse employment action based on her

interaction with Lind on January 3. She claims Lind knew she suffered from anxiety and

depression and yelled at her anyway. The problem with this contention is Bailey argues

Lind's behavior "lead to [Bailey's] constructive discharge." Br. of Appellant at 3-4. We

decline to address her constructive discharge claim. She failed to analyze this claim

and provided no case authority. This argument is waived. We do not consider

arguments unsupported by argument or citation to legal authority. RAP 10.3(a)(6);

Cowiche Canvon Conservancy v. Boslev. 118 Wash. 2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

Bailey also fails to establish a nexus between the alleged adverse action and protected

activities.

        Even if we assume Bailey suffered an adverse action based on protected activity,

she fails to show the District's nondiscriminatory explanation was a pretext for

discrimination.

        Pretext

        The trial court ruled that even if Bailey proved a nexus between a protected

activity and an adverse employment action, she failed to show the District's

nondiscriminatory explanations were pretext:

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No. 73365-6-1/21

      Furthermore, even if the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the
      plaintiff established a nexus between the protected activity and an adverse
      employment action, the defendant has established legitimate non
      discriminatory bases for not creating a non-teaching position for Ms.
      Bailey when she was requesting it and for not returning her to a classroom
      on January 3, 2013. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the reasons
       stated 1) that no non-teaching positions were funded or available and 2)
       that putting her in a classroom within a month of the end of the semester
      would disrupt and adversely affect students have been rebutted by any
       showing of pretext.

CP at 460.

       Under the burden shifting framework discussed above, Bailey does not show the

District's nondiscriminatory explanations constitute pretext for discrimination. "An

employee may satisfy the pretext prong by offering sufficient evidence to create a

genuine issue of material fact either (1) that the defendant's reason is pretextual or (2)

that although the employer's stated reason is legitimate, discrimination was

nevertheless a substantial factor motivating the employer." Scrivener. 181 Wash. 2d at

446-47. The plaintiff may show this by demonstrating the explanation (1) has no basis

in fact, (2) were not really factors for its decision, (3) were not temporally connected to

the adverse action, or (4) were not motivating factors in employment decisions for other

employees in the same circumstances. Scrivener. 181 Wash. 2d at 447.

       The District presented nondiscriminatory explanations for each of Bailey's

claimed adverse actions. The District did not put Bailey back to work on January 3

because her first request to return to teaching before the beginning of the second

semester was at 3:00 pm on January 2. By January 6, the District offered her interim

employment. The District reasoned that to reassemble Bailey's students and classes

weeks before the end of the semester would cause substantial disruption. The District's

actions were the product of "the lateness of plaintiff's change-of-heart, and good

                                            -21-
No. 73365-6-1/22

educational policy." Br. of Resp't at 44. Bailey readily conceded at oral argument that

the District was unable to reconstitute her classrooms on short notice without causing

significant disruption for her students.

         The record also shows the District tried to honor Bailey's request to return on

January 3. It offered temporary work as a substitute teacher with the same salary, the

same benefits, and the same hours as her original position. The District also offered to

let her start work on January 14 doing catch up work on lEPs and other necessary

tasks.

         Bailey's retaliation claim fails.

         FMLA Violations

         Bailey argues the District interfered with her right to FMLA protected leave when

it (1) required her to exhaust paid leave before FMLA protected leave, (2) declined to

return her to her original job after medical clearance, and (3) offered her a non-

equivalent job upon her return.

         Even if we assume without deciding that the District interfered with Bailey's

FMLA right by insisting she exhaust paid leave before FMLA protected leave, Bailey

shows no adverse consequence from the District's policy. We need not address

Bailey's remaining claims given our resolution here.

         Attorney Fees

         Bailey requests fees under RAP 18.1 and WLAD, RCW 49.60.030. "RCW

49.60.030(2) does not expressly authorize for attorney fees on review, but it has been

interpreted as authorizing such an award." Xieng v. People's Nat. Bank of Washington.

120 Wash. 2d 512, 533, 844 P.2d 389 (1993). RCW 49.60.030(2) allows plaintiffs to sue

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No. 73365-6-1/23

under the WLAD and "recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both,

together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys' fees ..." Given our

resolution of the issues here, we deny Bailey's request for attorney fees.

                                     CONCLUSION

       For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing

Bailey's claims.

WE CONCUR:

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