Court Opinion

ID: 9727482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:39:21.437497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:38.716200
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: Because the majority agrees with defendant’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, it reverses his conviction and remands for a new trial. In my judgment, the majority’s determination on the record before us is erroneous. Although defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may have merit, he should be required to establish that merit at a hearing on a post-conviction petition, at which time an appropriate record could be made. The entire premise underlying defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that "Dave Starr” told the State’s investigator over the phone that "defendant may have been working” out of town on the date in question, thus providing an alibi. Starr himself never testified or provided an affidavit, nor has he ever provided anyone with the records upon which he claimed to be able to tell after the fact (some eight or nine months later) that defendant was engaged in an out-of-town detasseling operation. If in fact Starr is mistaken or if his records are not as good as he claimed, then this court has reversed the defendant’s conviction based on nothing more than unfounded speculation. The majority might think that defense counsel should have made greater efforts to establish defendant’s detasseling employment and might also speculate that corn companies maintain pay records (supposedly a necessity for Internal Revenue Service (IRS) purposes). If defense counsel’s greater efforts would have or could have resulted in obtaining such records (assuming they exist), then I would likely agree with the majority that those efforts should have been expended. However, what if, despite the IRS requirements, such records do not in fact exist? In People v. Kunze (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 708, 725-26, 550 N.E.2d 284, 296, this court addressed defendant’s claim that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel as follows: "Where, as here, consideration of matters outside of the record is required in order to adjudicate the issues presented for review, the defendant’s contentions are more appropriately addressed in proceedings on a petition for post-conviction relief. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 122 — 1 through 122 — 8.) We therefore decline to adjudicate in this direct appeal [defendant’s] contentions concerning the alleged incompetence of [defendant’s] trial counsel. An adjudication of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is better made in proceedings on a petition for post-conviction relief, when a complete record can be made and the attorney-client privilege no longer applies.” (Emphasis added.) In the present case, as in Kunze, the record is insufficient to permit adjudication of defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The majority erred by not following this court’s own advice in Kunze of waiting for this matter to be adjudicated through defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief. I add that I agree with the majority that evidence of defendant’s prior convictions was mishandled. Absolutely no reason existed to allow the State to bring out that defendant was on intensive probation. This information served only to "dirty up” defendant in the eyes of the jury. Assuming that the State needed the probation officer’s testimony that he saw defendant in his apartment on the night in question, all the State legitimately needed to obtain was information that this witness (the probation officer) had reason to go to defendant’s apartment and see him there. The jury did not need to be told why he went there, who the witness was, or what the connection was between the two. Interestingly, in Kunze I wrote a specially concurring opinion suggesting procedures trial courts should use to avoid the problems shown by this case regarding impeachment of defendants by prior convictions. (Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 728-36, 550 N.E.2d at 297-303 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring).) Unfortunately, the trial court in the present case did not follow those suggestions. Had the court done so, no issues regarding the handling of defendant’s impeachment by his prior convictions would now be on appeal before us. I view the mishandling of this impeachment evidence so seriously that on this ground alone I might be inclined to reverse and remand for a new trial. However, the majority, although citing this matter as error, never says that it constitutes the basis for the majority’s reversal of defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, because the only ground cited by the majority for reversing and remanding is that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, I respectfully dissent.