Court Opinion

ID: 9517218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:09:46.041387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:39.043436
License: Public Domain

Concurring opinion by:
PHIL HARDBERGER, Chief Justice,
joined by ALMA L. LÓPEZ, Justice.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the admission of McDougall’s testimony was harmful for the reasons stated in my earlier dissenting opinion in Mata v. State, 75 S.W.3d 499 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. filed) (Hardberger, C.J., dissenting). In Mata, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court erred in admitting McDougall’s testimony and remanded the case to our court for a harm analysis. See Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). In conducting the harm analysis, my dissent asserts that we should use an analysis similar to that used by the Texas Supreme Court in Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex.2000). The reason is simple enough. If a jury is given both admissible and inadmissible testimony, which did they rely upon in reaching their verdict? “Because we cannot determine from our record which theory was the basis for the jury’s verdict, the error is harmful and reversal is required.” Mata, 75 S.W.3d 499, 503 (Hardberger, C.J., dissenting).
In this case, the majority undertakes the harm analysis because the State confessed error and stated that the facts in this case are no better than the facts in Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). The State did confess error during oral argument, but that cannot be the end of this court’s analysis.1 The State’s confession is a non-dispositive factor that we consider along with other relevant information. A well-principled attorney may confess error because he believes error exists and is honest enough to admit it. This is commendable behavior and assists both the court and the law. Ultimately, however, it is the court’s job to make the determination of whether error occurred after reflection on the position of both parties. Quoting the United States Supreme Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently stated in a similar situation:
The public trust reposed in the law enforcement officers of the Government requires that they be quick to confess error when, in them opinion, a miscarriage of justice may result from their remaining silent. But such a confession does not reheve this Court of the performance of the judicial function. The considered judgment of the law enforcement officers that reversible error has been committed is entitled to great weight, but our judicial obligations compel us to examine independently the errors confessed. The public interest that a result be reached which promotes a *662well-ordered society is foremost in every criminal proceeding. That interest is entrusted to our consideration and protection as well as that of the enforcing officers. Furthermore, our judgments are precedents, and the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties.
When presented with confessions of error, we have agreed frequently that the able prosecutors have correctly concluded that error was presented. But we have always done so after an independent examination of the merits of the claim.
Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 884 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (quoting Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258-59, 62 S.Ct. 510, 86 L.Ed. 832 (1942)).
In Mata, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals instructed us on how to evaluate the reliability of retrograde extrapolation testimony. See Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). After reviewing the scientific literature and the position taken by courts in other jurisdictions, the court concluded as follows:
We believe the science of retrograde extrapolation can be reliable in a given case. The expert’s ability to apply the science and explain it with clarity to the court is a paramount consideration. In addition, the expert must demonstrate some understanding of the difficulties associated with retrograde extrapolation. He must demonstrate an awareness of the subtleties of the science and the risks inherent in any extrapolation. Finally, he must be able to clearly and consistently apply the science.
The court evaluating the reliability of retrograde extrapolation should also consider (a) the length of time between the offense and the test(s) administered; (b) the number of tests given and the length of time between each test; and (c) whether, and if so, to what extent, any individual characteristics of the defendant were known to the expert in providing his extrapolation. These characteristics and behaviors might include, but are not limited to, the person’s weight and gender, the person’s typical drinking pattern and tolerance for alcohol, how much the person had to drink on the day or night in question, what the person drank, the duration of the drinking spree, the time of the last drink, and how much and what the person had to eat either before, during, or after the drinking.
Obviously, not every single personal fact about the defendant must be known to the expert in order to produce an extrapolation with the appropriate level of reliability. As the Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized, if this were the case, no valid extrapolation could ever occur without the defendant’s cooperation, since a number of facts known only to the defendant are essential to the process. If the State had more than one test, each test a reasonable length of time apart, and the first test were [sic] conducted within a reasonable time from the time of the offense, then an expert could potentially create a reliable estimate of the defendant’s BAC with limited knowledge of personal characteristics and behaviors. In contrast, a single test conducted some time after the offense could result in a reliable extrapolation only if the expert had knowledge of many personal characteristics and behaviors of the defendant. Somewhere in the middle might fall a case in which there was a single test a reasonable length of time from the driving, and two or three personal characteristics of the defendant were known to the expert. We cannot and should not determine today the exact blueprint for reliability *663in every case. Suffice it to say that the factors must be balanced.
46 S.W.3d at 916-17.
In this case, McDougaU’s testimony contained some inconsistencies which appear to be misstatements; however, McDougall was able to explain the science of extrapolation to the jury with some clarity. McDougall’s testimony was unlike his testimony in Mata in which the court cited numerous glaring inconsistencies, including numerous contradictions, math errors, and inconsistent statements. See Mata, 46 S.W.3d at 906 & n. 9-14, 914-15 & n. 81-86. In short, this is a much clearer case than Mata.
With regard to the three factors the Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed us to consider, one hour had elapsed between the offense and the test, as opposed to the two hour delay in Mata. Only one test was given, which is standard. Although McDougall did not know Bagheri’s individual characteristics, the assumptions used as the basis for his hypothetical were later proven to be true through Bagheri’s testimony, including (1) the time of Bagh-eri’s last meal; (2) the type of alcohol Bagheri consumed; (3) the duration of Bagheri’s drinking spree; and (4) the time of Bagheri’s last drink.
Given that the assumptions underlying McDougall’s extrapolation testimony were proven by Bagheri’s subsequent testimony, albeit with a few inconsistencies, this case falls “somewhere in the middle” because “there was a single test a reasonable length of time from the driving, and two or three personal characteristics of the defendant were known to the expert.” Mata, 46 S.W.3d at 916-17. Since this case falls “somewhere in the middle,” I believe it is proper to address the harm analysis given the “great weight” that we give to the State’s confession of error. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 884.

. Although the State confessed error during oral argument, the State’s brief contends, “The facts in the present case are somewhat different from those in Mata.”