Court Opinion

ID: 9424983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:13:21.730844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:52.958354
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
with whom The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Powell join, dissenting.
Disposition of these cases depends on the sorting out of admittedly conflicting implications from different sections of the principal statute involved. The Court’s conclusion, while supportable if regard be had only for the actual language of the sections, is by no means compelled by that language. Its conclusion is reached in utter disregard of the relevant legislative history, and quite without consideration of the sharp break that it represents with the historical modus operandi of the grand jury. It is, in my opinion, wrong.
The Court states the question to be whether witnesses threatened with contempt under 28 U. S. C. § 1826 (a) “are entitled to invoke this prohibition of § 2515 as a defense to contempt charges brought against them for refusing to testify.” Ante, at 43. The question as thus framed by the Court has been so abstracted and refined, and divorced from the particulars of these two cases, as to virtually invite the erroneous answer that the opinion of the Court gives.
Nor is it accurate to “assume,” as the Court does, that the Government’s overhearing of these witnesses was in violation of the applicable statute. Petitioner Gel-bard contended in the trial court that the United States planned to use his electronically overheard conversations as one basis for questioning him before the grand jury, and so stated in a presentation to that court. The Government in a reply affidavit stated that whatever information had been gathered as a result of electronic overhearing had been obtained from wiretaps conducted *72pursuant to court order as provided in 18 U. S. C. § 2518.1 Pamas, so far as this record shows, made no similar allegation in the trial court. The Court of Appeals in its opinion described the position taken by these witnesses in the following language:
“When cited for contempt in the district court, each attacked the constitutional validity of Section 2518, and additionally urged that he should not be required to testify until and unless first allowed to inspect all applications, orders, tapes and transcripts relating to such electronic surveillance and afforded an opportunity to suppress the use before the grand jury of any evidence so secured . . . 443 F. 2d 837, 838.
Thus what was presented to the trial court in this proceeding under 18 U. S. C. § 1826 (a) was not a neatly stipulated question of law, but a demand by the petitioners that they be permitted to roam at will among the prosecutor’s records in order to see whether they might be able to turn up any evidence indicating that the Government’s overhearing of their conversations had been unauthorized by statute. In order to determine whether this particular type of remedy is open to these petitioners at this particular stage of potential criminal proceedings it is not enough to recite, as the Court does, that 18 U. S. C. § 2515 prohibits the use of illegally overheard wire communications before grand juries as well as before other governmental bodies. This *73proposition is not disputed. The far more difficult inquiry posed by these facts is whether the granting to these petitioners, at this particular stage of these proceedings, of sweeping discovery as a prelude to a full hearing on the issue of alleged unlawful surveillance can fairly be inferred from the enactment by Congress of the two statutes relied on in the Court’s opinion.
I
It may be helpful at the outset to treat briefly the background of 28 U. S. C. § 1826 (a). As the Court notes, this provision was enacted as a part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, and the Senate Report states that it was intended to codify the “present practice” of the federal courts. S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 148 (1969). The existing practice of the federal courts prior to the enactment of this section was based on Red. Rule Crim. Proc. 42 and on 18 U. S. C. § 401, both of which dealt generally with the power of courts to punish for contempt. The enactment of § 1826 (a) appears to have resulted from a desire on the part of Congress to treat separately from the general contempt power of courts their authority to deal with recalcitrant witnesses in court or grand jury proceedings. Since, as the Senate Report states, the enactment of this provision was designed to “codify present practice” it is instructive to note the types of claims litigated in connection with grand jury matters under Rule 42 and 18 U. S. C. § 401 prior to the enactment of this new section. So far as the reported decisions of this Court and of the lower federal courts reveal, prior litigation with respect to grand juries has dealt almost exclusively with questions of privilege, and most of these cases have dealt with issues of the privilege against self-incrimination. While it is plain that the respondent in such proceedings was entitled to a hearing and to adduce evidence, it is equally plain that the *74typical hearing was short in duration and largely devoted to the arguments of counsel on an agreed statement of facts.2
Some of the flavor of the type of proceeding contemplated under the prior practice is gleaned from the following passage in the Court’s opinion in Shillitani v. United States, 384 U. S. 364, 370 (1966) (citations omitted):
“There can be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt .... And it is essential that courts be able to compel the appearance and testimony of witnesses .... A grand jury subpoena must command the same respect . . . . Where contempt consists of a refusal to obey a court order to testify at any stage in judicial proceedings, the witness may be confined until compliance . . . .”
These proceedings seem almost invariably to have been short and summary in nature, not because the defendant was to be denied a fair hearing, but because the type of issue that could, be raised at such a proceeding was one which did not generally permit extensive factual development. Even where a court of appeals reversed a contempt adjudication because of the district court’s failure to allow the defendant to testify on his own behalf with respect to material issues, there was no hint of either the right to, or the necessity for, any discovery proceedings against the Government. Hooley v. United States, 209 F. 2d 219 (CA1 1954).
Congress was, of course, free to expand the scope of inquiry in these proceedings, to enlarge the issues to *75be tried, and to alter past practice in any other way that it chose consistently with the Constitution. But in view of the stated congressional intent to “codify present practice” by the enactment of § 1826 (a), we should require rather strong evidence of congressional purpose to conclude that Congress intended to engraft on the traditional and rather summary contempt hearings a new type of hearing in which a grand jury witness is accorded carte blanche discovery of all of the Government’s “applications, orders, tapes, and transcripts relating to such electronic surveillance” before he may be required to testify. 443 F. 2d, at 838.
II
Just as Congress was not writing on a clean slate in the area of contempt hearings, it was not writing on a clean slate with respect to the nature of grand jury proceedings. These petitioners were called before a grand jury that had been convened to investigate violations of federal laws. We deal, therefore, not with the rights of a criminal defendant in the traditional adversary context of a trial, but with the status of witnesses summoned to testify before a body devoted to sifting evidence that could result in the presentment of criminal charges. Just as the cases arising under the antecedents of 28 U. S. C. § 1826 (a) suggest a limitation on the type of issue which may be litigated in such a proceeding, cases dealing with the role of the grand jury stress the unique breadth of its scope of inquiry. In Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 282 (1919), this Court defined the vital investigatory function of the grand jury:
“It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of *76the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime. As has been said before, the identity of the offender, and the precise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are developed at the conclusion of the grand jury’s labors, not at the beginning. . . .”
Another passage from Blair pointed out the citizen’s obligation to obey the process of the grand jury:
“[I]t is clearly recognized that the giving of testimony and the attendance upon court or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to perform upon being properly summoned.” Id., at 281.
In Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 362 (1956), the Court traced the development of the English grand jury and concluded that the probable intent of the Framers of our Constitution was to parallel that institution as it had existed in England where “[g]rand jurors were selected from the body of the people and their work was not hampered by rigid procedural or evidential rules.” 350 U. S., at 362. The Court in Costello was at pains to point out the necessity of limiting the nature of challenges to evidence adduced before a grand jury if that body were to retain its traditional comprehensive investigative authority:
“If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the merits a . defendant could always insist on the kind of preliminary trial to determine the competency and *77adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury.” 350 U. S., at 363.
While this general statement applied by its terms only to one who was ultimately indicted by the grand jury, its reasoning applies with like force to one who seeks to make an evidentiary challenge to grand jury proceedings on the basis of his status as a prospective witness. Indeed, time-consuming challenges by witnesses during the course of a grand jury investigation would be far more inimical to the function of that body than would a motion to dismiss an indictment after it had concluded its deliberations.
In Lawn v. United States, 355 U. S. 339 (1958), the Court refused, to accord to petitioners the hearing, prior to trial, on the issue of whether or not a grand jury which indicted them had made direct or derivative use of materials the use of which by an earlier grand jury had been held to violate the petitioners’ privilege against self-incrimination. In supporting its conclusion that the petitioners should not even be accorded a hearing to sustain these contentions, the Court quoted a passage from Costello describing the grand jury as
“ ‘[an] institution, in which laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by technical rules. Neither justice nor the concept of a fair trial requires such a change. In a trial on the merits, defendants are entitled to a strict observance of all the rules designed to bring about a fair verdict. Defendants are not entitled, however, to a rule which would result in interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial.’ ” 355 U. S., at 350.
It seems to me to be clear beyond cavil from these cases that prior to the enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, a hearing such as *78that which the Court awards these petitioners was not only unauthorized by law, but completely contrary to the ingrained principles which have long governed the functioning of the grand jury.
Ill
When Congress set out to enact the two statutes on which the Court relies, it was certainly not with any announced intent to change the nature of contempt hearings relating to grand jury proceedings, or to change the modus operandi of the grand jury. Instead, largely in response to the decisions of this Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), Congress undertook to draft comprehensive legislation both authorizing the use of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance on specified conditions, and prohibiting its use otherwise. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 66 (1968). The ultimate result was the 1968 Act. Critical to analysis of the issue involved here are §§ 2515 and 2518 (10) (a) of that Act, which provide in pertinent part as follows:
“Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.” § 2515.
“Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any *79intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that — ■
“(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted ;
“(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
“(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval. . . .” §2518 (10)(a).
Here is presented at the very least an implied conflict between two separate sections of the same Act. Section 2515 proscribes generally the use of unlawfully intercepted communications as evidence before a number of specified bodies, including a grand jury. Section 2518 (10) (a) provides for the type of hearing that petitioners sought and were denied by the District Court; it provides such hearings in connection with a number of specified legal proceedings, but it conspicuously omits proceedings before a grand jury. The method by which the Court solves this dilemma is to state that if petitioners succeed after their discovery in establishing their claim of unlawful electronic surveillance, their questioning before the grand jury on the basis of such electronic surveillance would violate § 2515 as, of course, it presumptively would. Therefore, says the Court, petitioners must be entitled to the discovery and factual hearing which they seek, even though §2518 (10) (a) rather clearly denies it to them by implication.
A construction which I believe at least equally plausible, based simply on the juxtaposition of the various sections of the statute, is that § 2515 contains a basic proscription of certain conduct, but does not attempt to specify remedies or rights arising from a breach of that proscription; the specification of remedies is left *80to other sections. Other sections provide several remedies; criminal and civil sanctions are imposed by §§ 2511 and 2520, whereas §2518 (10) (a) accords a right to a suppression hearing in specified cases. Thus the fact that one who may be the victim of alleged unlawful surveillance on the part of the Government is not accorded an Alderman-type suppression hearing (Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969)) under the provisions of §2518 (10) (a) is not left remediless to such a degree that it must be presumed to have been an oversight; he is remitted to the institution of civil proceedings, or the filing of a complaint leading to the institution of a criminal prosecution. While the latter two remedies may not be as efficacious in many situations as a suppression hearing, the remission of an aggrieved party to those remedies certainly does not render nugatory the general proscription contained in § 2515.
The omission of “grand jury” from the designated forums in § 2518 (10) (a) is not explainable on the basis that though the testimony is sought to be adduced before a grand jury, the motion to suppress would actually be made in a court, which is one of the forums designated in § 2518 (10) (a). The language “in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before” quite clearly refers to the forum in which the testimony is sought to be adduced. But even more significant is the inclusion among the designated forums of “department,” “officer,” “agency,” and “regulatory body.” Congress has almost without exception provided that issues as to the legality and propriety of subpoenas issued by either agencies or executive departments should be resolved by the courts. It has accomplished this result by requiring the agency to bring an independent judicial action to enforce obedience to its subpoena. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 79r, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935; 15 U. S. C. § 78u, Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 41 U. S. C. §§ 35-45, Walsh-*81Healey Act; 50 U. S. C. App. § 2155, Defense Production Act of 1950; 47 U. S. C. §§ 409 (f) and (g), Communications Act of 1934; 46 U. S. C. § 1124, Merchant Marine Act, 1936; 26 U. S. C. § 7604, Internal Revenue Code of 1954; 16 U. S. C. § 825f (c), Electric Utility Companies Act; 15 U. S. C. § 717m (d), Natural Gas Act; 7 U. S. C.
§ 51 In, Tobacco Inspection Act. This general mode of enforcement of agency investigative subpoenas was discussed in the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946).
Thus, if Congress in § 2518 had intended to focus on the forum in which the hearing as to the legality of the subpoena is to be determined, rather than the forum in which the testimony is sought to be adduced, it would have omitted not only grand juries, but departments, officers, agencies, and regulatory bodies as well from the coverage of § 2518 (10) (a). For questions as to the legality of subpoenas issued by all these bodies are resolved in the courts. By omitting only grand juries in § 2518, Congress indicated that it was dealing with the forum in which the testimony was sought to be adduced, and that the suppression hearing authorized by the section was not to be available to grand jury witnesses.
In the light of these conflicting implications from the statutory language itself, resort to the legislative history is appropriate. Passages from the legislative history cited by the Court in its opinion do not focus at all on the availability of a suppression hearing in grand jury proceedings; they simply speak in general terms of the congressional intent to prohibit and penalize unlawful electronic surveillance, of which intent there can, of course, be no doubt. But several parts of the legislative history address themselves, far more particularly than any relied upon by the Court in its opinion, to the actual issue before us. The Senate Report, for example, *82indicates as plainly as possible that the exclusion of grand juries from the language of §2518 (10) (a) was deliberate:
“This provision [§ 2518 (10)(a)] must be read in connection with sections 2515 and 2517, discussed above, which it limits. It provides the remedy for the right created by section 2515. Because no person is a party as such to a grand jury proceeding, the provision does not envision the making of a motion to suppress in the context of such a proceeding itself. Normally, there is no limitation on the character of evidence that may be presented to a grand jury, which is enforcible by an individual. [United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251 (1966).] There is no intent to change this general rule. It is the intent of the provision only that when a motion to suppress is granted in another context, its scope may include use in a future grand jury proceeding.” S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 (1968). (Emphasis added.)
There is an intimation in the opinion of the Court that the reason this language was used may have been that grand juries do not pass upon motions to suppress, while courts do. This intimation is not only inconsistent with the language of the section itself, as pointed out, supra, at 80, but it attributes to the drafters of the report a lower level of understanding of the subject matter with which they were dealing than I believe is justified. It is also rather squarely contradicted by the statement that there is no limitation on the character of evidence that may be presented to a grand jury “which is enforcible by an individual.” Had the report meant to stress the presumably well-known fact that grand juries do not themselves grant motions to suppress, it would not have *83used that language, nor would it have cited United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251 (1966).
The fact that the report states the reason for the policy adopted in terms of the rights of an “individual,” rather than in terms of the rights of a “defendant,” makes the Court’s discussion of the doctrine of various cases, ante, at 60, of doubtful help in construing the statute. Whatever United States v. Blue, supra, may be said to “hold” after careful analysis by this Court, the drafters of the Senate Report undoubtedly took it to stand for the proposition for which they cited it. As stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Green v. United States, 356 U. S. 165, 189:
“The fact that scholarship has shown that historical assumptions regarding the procedure for punishment of contempt of court were ill-founded, hardly wipes out a century and a half of the legislative and judicial history of federal law based on such assumptions.”
Not only does the report dealing with § 2518 (10) (a) make clear that it is to be construed in connection with § 2515, which it limits, but the section of the same report dealing with § 2515 re-emphasizes this conclusion. Speaking of the latter section, the report says:
“The provision must, of course, be read in light of section 2518 (10) (a) discussed below, which defines the class entitled to make a motion to suppress. It largely reflects existing law. . . . Nor generally [is there any intention] to press the scope of the suppression rule beyond present search and seizure law. See Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). . . . The provision thus forms an integral part of the system of limitations designed to protect privacy. Along with the criminal and *84civil remedies, it should serve to guarantee that the standards of the new chapter will sharply curtail the unlawful interception of wire and oral communications.” S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 96 (1968).
The conclusion that §2518 (10) (a) is the exclusive source of the right to move to suppress is further fortified by the Senate Report’s comment on § 2510 (11) of the Act, which defines an “aggrieved person” as one who is a party to an “intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed.” The Senate Report, p. 91, states:
“This definition defines the class of those who are entitled to invoke the suppression sanction of section 2515 discussed below, through the motion to suppress provided for by section 2518 (10) (a), also discussed below. It is intended to reflect existing law . . . .” (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
Finally, § 2518 (9) requires the Government to provide to each party to “any trial, hearing or other proceeding” a copy of the court order authorizing surveillance if the Government intends to use the fruits thereof. The Senate Report, p. 105, states:
“ 'Proceeding’ is intended to include all adversary type hearings. ... It would not include a grand jury hearing. Compare [United States v. Blue, supra].”
If § 2515 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 stood alone without any informative legislative history, the Court’s conclusion with respect to the rights of these petitioners would be plainly correct. If the conflicting implications from two sections of the same statute were present in a regulatory scheme which was to stand by itself, rather than to be superimposed on procedures such as contempt hearings and *85institutions such as the grand jury, the Court's conclusion would at least be tenable. But when the Court concludes that Congress, almost in a fit of absentmindedness, has drastically enlarged the right of potential grand jury witnesses to avoid testifying, and when such a conclusion is based upon one of two ambiguous implications from the language of the statute, and is contrary to virtually every whit of legislative history addressed to the point in issue, I think its conclusion is plainly wrong.
> 1 — 1
The Court seeks to bolster its reasoning by reliance upon 18 U. S. C. §3504 (a)(1), which was a part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. That section provides in pertinent part as follows:
“(a) In any . . . proceeding . . . before any . . . grand jury . . .
“(1) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible because it is the primary product of an unlawful act or because it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the opponent of the claim shall affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act.”
Assuming, arguendo, that this section does apply to petitioners in No. 71-110, the record in the District Court and the opinion of the Court of Appeals clearly show that only Gelbard made what might be called a “claim” within the language of the section, and that the Government in its response did “affirm or deny” the occurrence of the alleged unlawful act; in fact, the Government denied the occurrence of the unlawful act. This should be sufficient for disposition of the case as to these petitioners.
The Court, without giving much guidance to those who would seek to follow the path by which it reaches the conclusion, concludes that this section “confirms that *86Congress meant that grand jury witnesses might defend contempt charges by invoking the prohibition of § 2515 against the compelled disclosure of evidence obtained in violation of Title III.” If the Court means to say any more than that, under the circumstances specified in § 3504, the Government must affirm or deny, I am at a loss how it extracts additional requirements from the language used by Congress in that section.
But even if the Court were correct in deciding that § 3504 (a)(1) requires more than it says of the Government, I believe the Court errs in deciding that this section applies at all to these petitioners. Title VII as enacted actually consists of two parts, A and B. Part A is a series of findings by Congress, reading as follows:
“The Congress finds that claims that evidence offered in proceedings was obtained by the exploitation of unlawful acts, and is therefore inadmissible in evidence, (1) often cannot reliably be determined when such claims concern evidence of events occurring years after the allegedly unlawful act, and (2) when the allegedly unlawful act has occurred more than five years prior to the event in question, there is virtually no likelihood that the evidence offered to prove the event has been obtained by the exploitation of that allegedly unlawful act.” § 701, 84 Stat. 935.
The House Report (to accompany S. 30) contains this comment on Part A:
“This section contains a special finding relating, as do the following sections of the title, to certain evidentiary problems created by electronic surveillance conducted by the Government prior to the enactment of Public Law 90-351 on- June 19, 1968, which provided statutory authority for obtaining surveillance warrants in certain types of criminal *87investigations.” EL R. Rep. No. 91-1549, p. 50 (1970). (Emphasis supplied.)
The same report, in its introductory discussion of Title VII, contains the following statement:
“Title VII intends to limit disclosure of information illegally obtained by the Government to defendants who seek to challenge the admissibility of evidence because it is either the primary or indirect production [sic] of such an illegal act. The title also prohibits any challenge to the admissibility of evidence based on its being the fruit of an unlawful governmental act, if such act occurred 5 years or more before the event sought to be proved. As amended by the committee, the application of title VII is limited to Federal judicial and administrative proceedings, and to electronic or mechanical surveillance which occurred prior to June 19, 1968, the date of enactment of the Federal wiretapping and electronic surveillance law (chapter 119, title 18, United States Code).” Id., at 34. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Senate Report, too, casts §3504 (a)(1) in quite a different light from that in which the Court puts it:
“Lastly, it should be noted that nothing in section 3504 (a)(1) is intended to codify or change present law defining illegal conduct or prescribing requirements for standing to object to such conduct or to use of evidence given under an immunity grant. See, e. g., Giordano v. United States, 394 U. S. 310 (1969); Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969). Nevertheless, since it requires a pending claim as a predicate to disclosure, it sets aside the present wasteful practice of the Department of Justice in searching files without a motion from a de*88fendant. . . .” S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 154 (1969). (Emphasis supplied.)
These conclusions in the Senate Report are supported by statements of the bill's managers in the House during the time it was being debated. Congressman Poff explained Title VII as follows:
“Title YII of S. 30 . . . would, first, reverse the Supreme Court’s decision in Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969) requiring, under its supervisory power, the disclosure of Government files in criminal trials, and . . . would, second, set a 5-year ‘statute of limitations’ on inserting issues dealing with the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ in similar cases.” 116 Cong. Rec. 35192.
Congressman Celler explained the amendments incorporating the pre-June 19, 1968, time limitation into subsections (a) (2) and (a) (3) of § 3504 that had been made by a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee in these words:
“As amended by the committee, the application of title VII is limited to Federal judicial and administrative proceedings, and to electronic or mechanical surveillance which occurred prior to June 19, 1968, the date of enactment of the Federal wiretapping and electronic surveillance law — chapter 119, title XVIII, United States Code.” Id., at 35196.
Even more specific was the explanation of the amendment made by Congressman Poff on the floor of the House after the time provisions had been included:
“TITLE VII — LITIGATION CONCERNING SOURCES OF EVIDENCE
“Mr. Chairman, title VII of the Organized Crime Control Act is designed to regulate motions to suppress evidence in certain limited situations where *89the motion is based upon unlawful electronic eavesdropping or wiretapping which occurred prior to the enactment of the Federal electronic surveillance laws on June 19, 1968 ....
“Where there was in fact an unlawful overhearing prior to June 19, 1968, the title provides for an in camera examination of the Government’s transcripts and records to determine whether they may be relevant to the claim of inadmissibility. . . . To the extent that the court is permitted to determine relevancy in an ex parte proceeding, the title will modify the procedure established by the Supreme Court in Alderman v. United States [citation omitted]. . . .
“As I have indicated, the title applies only to disclosures where the electronic surveillance occurred prior to June 19, 1968. It is not necessary that it apply to disclosure where an electronic surveillance occurred after that date, because such disclosure will be mandated, not by Alderman, but by section 2518 of title 18, United States Code, added by title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Section 2518 (10) [(a)] provides a specific procedure for motions to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that the communication was unlawfully intercepted, that the authorization for the interception was insufficient, or that the interception was not made in conformity with the authorization obtained. It provides, insofar as the disclosure of intercepted communications is concerned, that upon the filing of a motion to suppress by an aggrieved person the trial judge may in his discretion make available to such person and his counsel for inspec*90tion such portions of an intercepted communication, or evidence derived therefrom, as the judge determines to be in the interest of justice — see Senate Report No. 1097, 90th Congress, 2d Session 106, 1968. The provisions of this title will, therefore control the disclosure of transcripts of electronic surveillances conducted prior to June 19, 1968. Thereafter, existing statutory law, not Alderman, will control. Consequently, in view of these amendments to title VII, its enactment, in conjunction with the provisions of title III of the 1968 act, provides the Federal Government with a comprehensive and integrated set of procedural rules governing suppression litigation concerning electronic surveillance.” Id., at 36293-35294. (Emphasis added.)
The weight of the findings actually enacted by Congress in Part A and the uniform tenor of the legislative history outweigh, in my opinion, the ambiguity arising from the failure to actually include a cutoff date in §3504 (a)(1).
Section 3504 (a)(1) by its terms, even if read totally out of its context and background, as the Court seeks to do, affords these petitioners no help because the Government has complied with its requirements in these cases. But more importantly, the entire thrust of the findings actually adopted by Congress, and of the reports of both Houses, makes it as plain as humanly possible that this section was intended as a limitation on existing rights of criminal defendants, not as an enlargement of them. Congress, displeased with the effect of this Court’s decision in Alderman, supra, desired to put a statute of limitations type cutoff beyond which the Government would not be required to go in time in order to disprove taint. Equally displeased with the policy adopted by the Government of searching its files for evidence of taint even when none had been alleged *91by the defendant, it sought to put a stop to that practice by requiring the Government to “affirm or deny” only where there is “a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible.” Understanding of this background not only affords a complete explanation of the language used by Congress in this section, but illustrates the palpable error into which the Court has fallen in construing it. The Court has at least figuratively stood on its head both the language and the legislative history of this section in order to conclude that it was intended to expand the rights of criminal defendants.
V
Neither the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 nor the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, when construed in accordance with the canons of statutory construction traditionally followed by this Court, supports the expansive and novel claims asserted by these petitioners. The Court having reached a contrary conclusion, I respectfully dissent.

 In the case of respondents Egan and Walsh, the Government in the District Court did not state whether it had engaged in electronic surveillance. In this Court, however, the Government represented that respondents Egan and Walsh had not been subjected to electronic surveillance. In light of this development, I would remand their ease to the District Court in order to give the respondents another opportunity to testify. For this reason, references to “petitioners” throughout this opinion are meant to be to only petitioners Gelbard and Parnas.

 See, e. g., Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 159 (1950); Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367 (1951); Curcio v. United States, 354 U. S. 118 (1957); United States v. George, 444 F. 2d 310 (CA6 1971); In re October 1969 Grand Jury, 435 F. 2d 350 (CA7 1970).