Court Opinion

ID: 9947427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 20:03:28.986638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:25.787294
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/4/24 P. v. Banks CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Yuba)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097446

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Super. Ct. No. CRF21-890)

           v.

 RORY MICHAEL BANKS,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Rory Michael Banks was charged with murder and burglary, and he
pled both not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury found him guilty on
both counts and legally sane. The trial court sentenced him to a total term of 60 years to
life and imposed $10,180 in fines and fees. Defendant argues the prosecutor committed
error during closing argument in the sanity phase of the trial when he stated defendant “is
now a convicted murderer and is presumed to have been sane at the time.” He also

                                                             1
argues his sentence violates Penal Code sections 654 and 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B).1
Finally, he argues the fines and fees violate due process because they were imposed
without determining his ability to pay. We disagree with all of defendant’s arguments
and thus affirm the judgment in full.
                                      BACKGROUND
       Given the arguments defendant makes on appeal, the underlying facts of the
crimes are largely irrelevant. It is sufficient simply to note the following: “[Defendant],
who suffers from delusional personality disorder, became influenced by conspiracy
theories from the ‘alt-right’ QAnon group. Believing the need to rid his community of
child molesters, [he] broke into the home of a convicted child molester [Ralph Mendez]
and killed him. A jury found [him] guilty of premeditated murder and burglary, and then
found him legally sane.”
                                        DISCUSSION
A.     Prosecutorial Error During Closing Argument
       During closing argument in the sanity phase of the trial, the prosecutor stated,
“Defendant is now a convicted murderer and is presumed to have been sane at the time.”
Defendant argues this misstates the law and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct or
error.2 Even if we assume it misstates the law, we find no error.
       “Where, as here, the prosecutor is alleged to have misstated the law to the jury,
this constitutes error only if (1) the prosecutor misstated the law, and (2) there is ‘ “a
reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the [prosecutor’s remarks] in an

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2      Our Supreme Court has explained “the term prosecutorial ‘misconduct’ is
somewhat of a misnomer to the extent that it suggests a prosecutor must act with a
culpable state of mind. A more apt description of the transgression is prosecutorial
error.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1, italics added.)

                                               2
improper or erroneous manner.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] Although we generally review
claims of prosecutorial error for an abuse of discretion [citation], we independently
examine what the law is [citation] and ‘objective[ly]’ examine how a ‘reasonable juror’
would likely interpret the prosecutor’s remarks [citations], bearing in mind that ‘ “we ‘do
not lightly infer’ that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging
meaning from the prosecutor’s statements. [Citation.]” ’ ” (People v. Collins (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 333, 340.) “To find prosecutorial error, we must view the challenged
statement in the context of the entire argument and the jury instructions to determine
whether there was a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the comments in
an improper or erroneous manner.” (People v. Meneses (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 63, 74.)
       Here, in context, is what the prosecutor said, along with defendant’s objection and
the court’s response:

                     PROSECUTOR: “Some key difference[s] from the
              guilt phase, some of what [defense counsel] touched on,
              Defendant is now a convicted murderer and is presumed to
              have been sane at the time. The burden of proof is on the
              Defendant. This is a weird place. Defense attorneys don’t
              usually have the burden of proof and prosecutors don’t
              usually argue second.

              “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m going to just make an
              objection, a legal objection, as — as the presumption that he
              is sane at this time, that that is the presumption, like a
              presumption of innocence, I don’t believe is a proper
              statement of the law. And I object as a mischaracterization.

              “THE COURT: The burden is on the Defendant to prove his
              sanity. To the extent that either counsel make statements
              about the law that conflict with this Court’s instructions, the
              jury is to follow my instructions.” (Italics added.)

       As defendant notes, he was not (yet) a convicted murderer. He had been found
guilty of murder in the first phase of the trial, but if the jury found him not guilty by
reason of insanity in the second phrase, he would not be a convicted murderer. (See

                                               3
People v. Morrison (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 995, 998 [finding of “not guilty by reason of
insanity . . . is not a conviction”].) As this court stated almost a century ago, “It would
require a peculiar process of reasoning to reach the conclusion that a defendant who was
finally found not guilty by reason of insanity of a kind which rendered him incapable of
committing the crime with which he was charged was nevertheless convicted of that
crime.” (In re Application of Merwin (1930) 108 Cal.App. 31, 32.) Saying defendant is
“now a convicted murderer” thus misstates the law.
       We are not convinced, however, that the prosecutor misstated the law when he
said defendant “is presumed to have been sane at the time” of the murder. Where a
defendant pleads both not guilty of the charged crimes, and not guilty by reason of
insanity, “the court conducts a bifurcated trial and the issues of guilt and sanity are
separately tried. [Citations.] In the first phase of trial, the defendant is tried on his or her
factual guilt without reference to the insanity plea. If the defendant is found guilty, he or
she receives a second jury trial in which his or her legal sanity is determined.” (People v.
Dobson (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431.) This court has previously held that, during
the sanity phase of a bifurcated trial, “even if the jury was directed to ‘assume’ the
defendant was sane, this assumption is subject to defendant presenting evidence to prove
otherwise. An assumption of sanity, like an assumption of innocence, is just another way
of saying the burden is on the party claiming otherwise to prove it.” (People v. Thomas
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 304, 310-311, italics added.) As defendant acknowledges, a
criminal defendant “bears the burden of proving insanity during the sanity phase” of a
bifurcated trial. (§ 25, subd. (b) [the defendant has burden of proving insanity].)
Defendant thus fails to convince us that the prosecutor misstated the law when he said
defendant is presumed sane, because that is just another way of saying defendant has the
burden of proving otherwise. Moreover, defendant fails to explain how the prosecutor’s
statement somehow “elevated [defendant’s] burden of proof in a way that made it more
difficult for [him] to prove insanity.”

                                               4
       Having determined the prosecutor misstated the law, at least in the first instance,
does not end the inquiry, because, as noted above, the prosecutor’s misstatement only
constitutes error if “there is ‘ “a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the
[prosecutor’s remarks] in an improper or erroneous manner.” ’ ” (People v. Collins,
supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 340.) In determining whether there is a reasonable likelihood
the jury applied the statement in an improper manner, the trial court’s “comments and
instruction to the jury” may “sufficiently dissipate[]” any “possible prejudicial
implication drawn from” the misstatements. (People v. Hughey (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d
1383, 1396.) “We presume the jury followed the court’s instructions, rather than any
conflicting comment by counsel, in reaching a verdict. [Citations.] ‘ “[J]uries generally
understand that counsel’s assertions are the ‘statements of advocates.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Meneses, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 75.)
       Here, as soon as defendant objected that the prosecutor misstated the law, the trial
court admonished the jury, “To the extent that either counsel make statements about the
law that conflict with this Court’s instructions, the jury is to follow my instructions.”
Moreover, prior to closing arguments, the trial court verbally instructed the jury, “If you
believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflicts with my instructions, you must
follow my instructions.” Finally, the jury was given a written copy of all instructions,
including CALCRIM No. 200, which states, “If you believe that the attorneys’ comments
on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.” The jury was
thus told three times that if there was a conflict between the attorneys’ statements about
the law and the jury instructions, it had to follow the instructions.
       The jury was also given CALCRIM No. 3450, which instructs on insanity. In
particular, it instructs “defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that he was
legally insane when he committed the crime,” and, “If, after considering all the evidence,
all twelve of you conclude the defendant has proved that it is more likely than not that he
was legally insane when he committed the crime, you must return a verdict of not guilty

                                              5
by reason of insanity.” (See § 25, subd. (b) [the defendant has burden of proving insanity
by a preponderance of the evidence]; People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1305, fn. 28 [preponderance of the evidence means “ ‘more likely
than not’ ”].) Defendant does not suggest CALCRIM No. 3450 is incorrect in any way,
and “[w]e presume the jury followed” it. (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266,
1299.)
         Thus, when we view the prosecutor’s statement alongside the court’s comments
and the jury instructions, we find it is not reasonably likely the jury understood or applied
the statement in an improper or erroneous manner. We therefore conclude there was no
error. (People v. Meneses, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 73.)
B.       Section 654
         The jury found defendant guilty of the murder of Ralph Mendez and of burglary,
with Mendez’s mother, Victoria M., named as the burglary victim. The jury also found
true the allegation that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of each
offense. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life on the murder count, with a
consecutive 25 years for the firearm enhancement; and to six years on the burglary count,
with an additional four years for the firearm enhancement. Defendant argues consecutive
sentences on both the murder and the burglary counts violates section 654’s prohibition
against multiple punishments for a single act. The trial court found the “multiple victim”
exception to section 654 applies, and we agree with the trial court.
         Section 654 provides, “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no
case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd.
(a).) This provision “bars the imposition of multiple sentences for a single act or
omission, even though the act or omission may violate more than one provision of the
Penal Code.” (People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1413.) “Section 654 has
long been interpreted to preclude multiple punishments not only for a single act that

                                              6
violates more than one statute, but for an indivisible course of conduct.
[Citation.] . . . [Citation.] ‘[I]f all of the offenses were merely incident to, or were the
means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have
harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once.’ ” (People v. Mejia
(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1042-1043.) “On appeal, we review factual determinations
under the deferential substantial evidence test, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People. [Citation.] We review de novo the legal question of whether
section 654 applies.” (People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786, 794.)
       Defendant argues the murder and the burglary were part of an indivisible course of
conduct because “the burglary was part and parcel of the murder, and the only purpose of
the burglary was to facilitate the murder of Mendez.” “Burglary consists of entry into a
house . . . with the intent to commit a felony. [Citation.] Thus, ordinarily, if the
defendant commits both burglary and the underlying intended felony, Penal Code section
654 will permit punishment for one or the other but not for both.” (People v. Centers
(1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 84, 98; see also People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 130
[“When a defendant is convicted of burglary and the intended felony underlying the
burglary, section 654 prohibits punishment for both crimes”].) Defendant argues the only
felony he intended to commit when he entered the house was murder, and section 654
thus prohibits punishment for both burglary and murder.
       The trial court found the “multiple victim” exception to section 654 applies, and
the People argue that finding is both supported by the evidence and legally sound. We
agree. Under the multiple victim exception, “ ‘ “even though a defendant entertains but a
single principal objective during an indivisible course of conduct, he may be convicted
and punished for each crime of violence committed against a different victim.” ’ ”
(People v. Centers, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 99, italics added.) Murder obviously
qualifies as a crime of violence, and Mendez was the only victim of that crime.
“Burglary, standing alone, is not a violent crime for purposes of the multiple victim

                                               7
exception.” (Ibid.) However, it “may be treated as such when there is a finding that the
defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the burglary.” (Ibid.) Here, the
jury found defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the burglary, thus
making it a violent crime for purposes of the multiple victim exception.
       Defendant argues Mendez was the only victim of the burglary. The trial court
found otherwise. In particular, it found Victoria M., Mendez’s mother, was a “separate
victim” of the burglary. We agree. Victoria was present in the home when her son was
shot, and she testified that, after shooting Mendez, defendant put his gun to her back and
asked her where the phone was. In the information, it was alleged in support of the
burglary count that defendant “did enter an inhabited dwelling house occupied by
Victoria M., with the intent to commit any felony.” It was further alleged the burglary
was “a violent felony within the meaning of Penal Code section
667.5[, subdivision ](c)(21) in that . . . Victoria M. . . . was present in the residence
during [its] commission.”3 The jury found defendant guilty of burglary, and also found
true the allegation that Victoria M. was present in the residence during the commission of
the burglary. The information also alleged numerous aggravating factors, including “as
to count 2 that the victim (Victoria M.) was particularly vulnerable, within the meaning
of California Rules of Court Rule 4.421(a)(3),” and defendant admitted all aggravating
factors. The evidence at trial, along with the allegations in the burglary count and the
aggravating factors, all support the trial court’s finding that Victoria was also a victim of
the burglary. And because there were different victims of each violent crime, section 654
does not preclude multiple sentences.

3      Section 667.5 provides “ ‘violent felony’ ” includes “[a]ny burglary of the first
degree . . . wherein it is charged and proved that another person, other than an
accomplice, was present in the residence during the commission of the burglary.”
(§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21).)

                                               8
       Defendant disagrees. He notes the jury was instructed that, to find him guilty of
burglary, the People had to prove (1) he entered a building, (2) when he entered the
building, he intended to commit murder, and (3) the building he entered was
noncommercial. Because Mendez was the only person he intended to murder, he argues
Mendez is also the only victim of the burglary. We disagree. Although it may be true
that defendant entered the house intending to murder Mendez, it is also true that he used a
firearm on Victoria in the commission of the burglary, and, as found by the jury, it was
Victoria’s presence in the house that made the burglary a violent felony.
       People v. Centers, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 84 is instructive in this regard. There,
the defendant was found guilty of burglary and kidnapping, and was also found to have
used a firearm during the commission of both crimes, which made them violent for
purposes of the multiple victim exception. (Id. at pp. 90, 98, 100.) The evidence showed
Daniel Raines owed the defendant $200. On the day of the crimes, Raines was staying at
a friend’s house; Jennifer Grundman, who lived there, and a man named Rick were also
present. (Id. at pp. 88-89.) The defendant entered the house holding a gun, pointed it at
Raines and said, “ ‘You’re coming with me. You’re going to pay your debt.’ ” (Id. at
p. 89.) Rick tried to intervene, and the defendant pointed the gun at him and asked if he
was willing to “ ‘take a bullet’ ” for Raines. (Ibid.) The defendant took Raines by the
arm, led him to a waiting car, and proceeded to drive him around and try to get his money
until the police intervened. (Id. at pp. 89-90.) The defendant argued the trial court
violated section 654 by imposing separate and unstayed sentences for both crimes, citing
the general rule that “if the defendant commits both burglary and the underlying intended
felony, Penal Code section 654 will permit punishment for one or the other but not for
both.” (Id. at p. 98.) The appellate court disagreed, finding the multiple victim exception
applied. It first noted “Raines was indubitably the victim of the kidnapping.” (Id. at
p. 101.) It then found Grundman was a victim of the burglary (even though she was not
the only victim), because (1) she lived in the house and the burglary statute protects a

                                             9
person’s possessory right in property, and (2) she was a victim of the defendant’s
“menacing display of a firearm during the burglary.” (Id. at p. 102; see id. at pp. 101-
102.) The court noted the information did not allege, and the jury thus did not find, that
any particular person was the victim of either the burglary or the related personal firearm
use enhancement (id. at p. 101), and there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s implied finding that “there was at least one victim of the burglary and the
personal firearm use who was not also a victim of the kidnapping” (id. at p. 102).
       So, too, in this case. There is at least one victim of the burglary and the related
personal firearm use enhancement (i.e., Victoria) who was not also a victim of the
murder. And we note that (unlike in Centers) the information in this case does identify
Victoria as a potential victim of the burglary because it alleges (1) defendant “did enter
an inhabited dwelling house occupied by Victoria M,” (2) “the [burglary] is a violent
felony within the meaning of Penal Code 667.5[, subdivision ](c)(21) in that another
person (Victoria M.) . . . was present in the residence during the commission of the above
offense,” and (3) “as to count 2 [i.e., the burglary count] . . . the victim (Victoria M.) was
particularly vulnerable.” All these allegations were either found true by the jury or
admitted by defendant. As in Centers, there was at least one victim of the burglary who
was not also a victim of the murder, and the trial court thus did not err in imposing
consecutive sentences for both counts.
C.     Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(2)(B)
       The murder count and the burglary count both alleged an enhancement for
personal use of a firearm, the jury found both enhancements true, and the trial court
imposed a separate sentence for each enhancement. Defendant argues the plain language
of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) required the court to dismiss all enhancements
beyond a single enhancement. We disagree.
       Defendant’s argument raises a pure issue of statutory construction, which we
review de novo. (John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 95.) Section 1385,

                                              10
subdivision (a), provides, “The judge . . . may . . . in furtherance of justice, order an
action to be dismissed,” and it has long been held that “the power to dismiss an ‘action’
under section 1385 includes the power to dismiss or strike an enhancement.” (People v.
Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 209.) In 2021, the Legislature “amended section 1385 to
specify factors that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to [dismiss or]
strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice.” (People v.
Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.) As amended, subdivision (c)(1) of section 1385
provides in relevant part, “Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” And subdivision (c)(2)
provides in relevant part: “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court
shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that
any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.” (Italics added.) The mitigating circumstance at issue in this case is
contained in subparagraph (B): “Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In
this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B), italics added.) Defendant interprets the italicized language to
mean that, in any case where multiple enhancements are alleged, the court is required to
dismiss all enhancements beyond a single enhancement. Again, we disagree.
       Subdivision (c)(1) and (2) of section 1385 both refer to the sentencing court’s
discretion in determining whether to dismiss an enhancement. Subdivision (c)(1)
provides the sentencing court must dismiss an enhancement “if it is in the furtherance of
justice to do so,” which accords the court general discretion to determine whether
dismissal is in the furtherance of justice. Subdivision (c)(2) then expressly states, “In
exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence” (italics added), showing “any of the mitigating circumstances in

                                              11
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present,” and it adds, “[p]roof of the presence of one or more
of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the
court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” One of
those mitigating circumstances—i.e., that “[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a
single case”—is at issue here. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).) Read together, this language
directs the trial court to “afford great weight” to the fact that multiple enhancements are
alleged in a single case when “exercising its discretion” in deciding whether to dismiss an
enhancement, but it does not require the court to dismiss all enhancements beyond a
single enhancement in any case in which multiple enhancements are alleged.
       We thus interpret section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) the same way that every case
that has considered the issue has interpreted it, and we hold the trial court retains
discretion not to dismiss all enhancements beyond a single enhancement in a case where
multiple enhancements are alleged if it determines dismissing the enhancements is not in
furtherance of justice or would endanger public safety. (See People v. Ortiz (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1093 [“the specification of mandatory factors did not displace the
trial court’s obligation to exercise discretion in assessing whether dismissal is ‘in
furtherance of justice’ ”], review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278894; People v. Anderson
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 239 [“This language, taken together, explicitly and
unambiguously establishes: the trial court has discretion to dismiss sentencing
enhancements; certain circumstances weigh greatly in favor of dismissal; and a finding of
danger to public safety can overcome the circumstances in favor of dismissal”], review
granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786; People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 18 [under
§ 1385 as amended, “the trial court retains discretion to impose the enhancement where
failing to do so would endanger public safety”]; People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
386, 391 [“[D]oes the mitigating circumstance that exists when there are ‘[m]ultiple
enhancements . . . in a single case’ and specifies that ‘all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed’ require the court to dismiss all but one of those

                                              12
enhancements in every case with multiple enhancements? We concluded that answer is
‘no’ ”], review granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309; People v. Mendoza (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296 [“dismissal is not always required when a mitigating factor that
contains ‘shall be dismissed’ language applies”].)
D.     Fines and Fees
       At sentencing, the court imposed the following fines and fees: $10,000 restitution
fine; $80 court operations fee; $60 conviction assessment fee; and $40 crime prevention
fee.4 In People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the court held it violated due
process to impose court fees without a determination of the defendant’s ability to pay,
and execution of a restitution fine must be stayed until the trial court holds a hearing and
concludes the defendant has the present ability to pay the fine. (Id. at pp. 1164, 1168.)
Citing Dueñas, defendant argues the trial court violated his due process rights by
imposing fines and fees without first determining his ability to pay. He notes “[t]he
record does not indicate that [he] has a present ability to pay.” He also notes he qualified
for appointed counsel, and he argues qualifying for appointed counsel suggests he does
not have the ability to pay.
       Defendant did not object to the fines or fees in the trial court on the ground he now
urges on appeal, and he did not present any evidence in the trial court on his ability to
pay. The People argue he has thus forfeited the issue. We agree.
       “Ordinarily, a criminal defendant who does not challenge an assertedly erroneous
ruling of the trial court in that court has forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on
appeal.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880.) This rule applies to alleged
sentencing errors, including the imposition of fees and fines. (People v. Trujillo (2015)

4      It also imposed $3,588.38 in victim restitution pursuant to section 1202.4,
subdivision (f). Defendant does not mention victim restitution, and we thus do not
discuss it.

                                               13
60 Cal.4th 850, 856-861 [the defendant forfeited challenge to booking fee by failing to
object in trial court]; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 409 [the defendant
forfeited challenge to restitution fine by failing to object in trial court].) This rule has
been applied to the failure to raise a Dueñas argument in the trial court. (See People v.
Lowery (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1046, 1052-1053 [Dueñas arguments forfeited by failure
to raise in trial court]; People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-1155
[same].) By failing to raise a Dueñas argument at his sentencing hearing, defendant
forfeited the right to raise the issue on appeal.
       Defendant notes his counsel did object to fines and fees, and he argues the
objection is sufficient to preserve his current argument on appeal. We disagree. The
probation department had recommended the restitution fine be set at $18,300, and
defense counsel stated, “We would object to that.” The court then asked, “What amount
would you suggest?” and defense counsel replied, “Well, restitution amount has been set.
I think that just doing a mathematical calculation by years is not appropriate. So I would
leave it to the Court’s discretion as to the amount of restitution, but certainly [it] should
not be based upon how long a man is imprisoned.” This is the only thing defense counsel
said about the imposition of fines or fees. Although “no particular form of objection is
required,” the objection “must be made in such a way as to alert the trial court” that
defendant claimed fines and fees could not be imposed without first determining his
ability to pay. (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 906.) Defense counsel’s
objection did not do that.
       Moreover, as to the $10,000 restitution fine in particular, section 1202.4 expressly
allows the trial court to consider the defendant’s ability to pay when imposing a fine
above the $300 statutory minimum. (§ 1202.4, subd. (c).) Here, the trial court imposed a
restitution fine above the statutory minimum, and defendant thus could have objected to
that fine based on an inability to pay, but he failed to do so.

                                               14
       Finally, we note that even People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, a case
that defendant cites several times in his briefs, held, “Consistent with Dueñas, a
defendant must in the first instance contest in the trial court his or her ability to pay the
fines, fees and assessments to be imposed.” (Id. at p. 490.) “Given that the defendant is
in the best position to know whether he has the ability to pay, it is incumbent on him to
object to the fine and demonstrate why it should not be imposed.” (People v. Frandsen,
supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154.) By failing to contest his ability to pay the fines and
fees imposed, defendant has forfeited the right to raise the issue on appeal.
       Defendant argues in the alternative that if we find his Dueñas claim was forfeited,
then the failure to object in the trial court constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
We disagree. As this court has previously stated, “we join those authorities that have
concluded the principles of due process do not require determination of a defendant’s
present ability to pay before imposing the fines and assessments discussed in Dueñas.”5
(People v. Pack-Ramirez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 851, 860 [citing cases].) This
conclusion invalidates defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim as well. (See
People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 377 [“attorney’s failure to assert a meritless
defense does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel”]; People v. Ochoa (1998)
19 Cal.4th 353, 463 [“Representation does not become deficient for failing to make
meritless objections”].)

5      Our Supreme Court is poised to resolve the issue, having granted review in People
v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted November 13, 2019, S257844, to
decide the following questions: “Must a court consider a defendant’s ability to pay
before imposing or executing fines, fees, and assessments? If so, which party bears the
burden of proof regarding defendant’s inability to pay?”

                                              15
                                    DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                    /s/
                                                EARL, P. J.

We concur:

    /s/
KRAUSE, J.

    /s/
KEITHLEY, J.*

*       Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                           16