Court Opinion

ID: 9880710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 15:07:03.17401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:54:22.081335
License: Public Domain

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                                             RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
                                                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                  2022-SC-0104-MR

ROBERT STONE                                                          APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
                          NO. 20-CR-0967-002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                    AFFIRMING

      A Kenton County Circuit Court jury found Robert Stone guilty of robbery

in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, and assault in the second

degree. The jury recommended a sentence of thirty years, which the trial court

then imposed. Stone appeals to this Court as a matter of right. 1 Stone raises

several claims of error: the trial court allowed a witness to testify about the

contents of a letter from the codefendant; the trial court allowed testimony that

Stone was identified through a database available to law enforcement; the trial

court should have granted a directed verdict on burglary and robbery in the

first degree; and the Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct

      1 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
during closing arguments. Upon review, this Court finds no error and thereby

affirms the judgment of the Kenton County Circuit Court.

              I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      James Thompson lived in the Golden Tower on the eleventh floor. On

June 5, 2020, surveillance footage showed Anthony Cornist, together with an

unidentified woman, and a man later identified as Robert Stone get off the

elevator together and approach Thompson’s apartment door. The unidentified

female knocked on Thompson’s door while Stone and Cornist hid from the view

of the peephole by standing flat against the wall beside the door. When

Thompson opened the door Cornist and Stone pushed Thompson inside his

apartment and Stone began striking him. Soon after, the camera footage

shows Stone punching Thompson outside of his apartment where he fell. Stone

kicks Thompson as he lay on the floor. Stone appears to remove something

around Thompson’s neck and goes through his pockets while either Cornist or

Stone shouted, “Get the T.V”! Cornist picks an item off the floor that had

dropped during the assault. Stone and Cornist head to the elevator where the

unidentified female waits with the door held open. Thompson suffered a broken

arm and orbital bone, required stitches above his eye, and had pins

permanently placed in his arm.

      Shannon Wilson was the property manager at the Golden Tower where

Thompson and Cornist lived. Thompson reported the assault to Wilson. When

she confronted Cornist about it, Cornist handed her a letter. Wilson testified at

trial from the contents of the letter wherein Cornist acknowledged it was him in

                                        2
the surveillance video but disavowed any knowledge of the identities of his two

companions.

      Detective Gregory Andrews from the Covington Police Department

testified. He initially could not identify Stone from the surveillance footage, but

he did take note of the distinctive tattoo on Stone’s neck. Detective Andrews

testified that he later was able to identify Stone from a “database available to

Kentucky law enforcement.” Detective Andrews was able to locate a photograph

of Stone, with the identical tattoo, labeled “Cornist family reunion, Cincinnati,

OH, 2012,” from a social media account.

      Stone testified that he went with Cornist, his uncle, to talk to Thompson

in order to clear up a dispute between the two men. He claimed, in the course

of this conversation, that Thompson invited them inside and then assaulted

him first and that he merely defended himself. He denied knowing the identity

of the unknown female and yet called her a friend. He acknowledged the

surveillance footage showed him leaning flat against the wall while his

unknown friend knocked on the door but claimed he only did so in order to

rest. And when the video showed him going through Thompson’s pockets as he

lay helpless on the ground after the assault, Stone claimed he was only trying

to help him.

      On October 1, 2020, Stone was indicted by a Kenton County grand jury

for complicity to robbery in the first degree, complicity to burglary in the first

degree, and complicity to assault in the second degree. Stone was tried together

with Cornist after which the jury found Stone guilty on all three counts and

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sentenced him to thirty years in prison. Further facts will be adduced as

necessary, so we now address the merits of his appeal.

                                  II.    ANALYSIS

      Stone argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right of

confrontation by allowing testimony prohibited by Bruton v. United States, 391

U.S. 123 (1968). Stone also contends testimony regarding his identification

from a database should have been excluded under KRE 2 404(b). Stone argues

further that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict on the

Robbery and Burglary charges. Additionally, Stone asserts the Commonwealth

committed misconduct during its closing arguments.

      A. The trial court did not err when it allowed into evidence a portion
      of the codefendant’s letter.

      Cornist wrote a letter to Wilson describing his involvement in the assault

and robbery. The trial court permitted Wilson to testify to a portion of its

contents wherein Cornist admitted his involvement but denied knowing the

other people with him. Stone contends this statement violates his right of

confrontation as protected by Bruton v. United States. This issue is preserved.

      Bruton stands for the proposition that when two or more codefendants

are tried jointly, the trial court must exclude any out-of-court statements that

incriminate, even implicitly, any non-declarant defendant even if the trial court

could issue a limiting instruction to the jury. 3 Bruton applies where “the

      2 Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
      3 The trial court did not give a limiting instruction in this case. Stone concedes

that none was requested. As we held in Quisenberry v. Commonwealth, a trial court

                                           4
powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands

accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury

in a joint trial.” Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36.

      The statement at issue in this case comes from a letter written by Cornist

and hand delivered to Wilson wherein Cornist admits he was the individual on

the video but states he does not know the others who were present with him.

Stone’s assertion that it should be excluded under Bruton is perplexing

because, in the language of Bruton, it is not an incriminating statement. It is a

statement that disavows any knowledge of Stone or his identity and cannot be

said to be incriminating. Stone claims that because there is a reference to his

existence it should have been excluded under Gray v. Maryland. 523 U.S. 185

(1998). Gray was an extension of Bruton where the U.S Supreme Court held

that a non-testifying co-defendant’s statement, as redacted by the trial court,

should have been excluded because it remained directly inculpatory as to the

defendant. Id. at 194. Stone’s reliance on Gray is likewise misplaced. In Gray,

the confession at issue was a statement that directly implicated somebody in

the crime―only the identity was omitted. It was as follows:

      Question: Who was in the group that beat Stacey?

      Answer:      Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys.

Id. at 196. In Gray, after the detective testified to the above, the prosecutor

asked, “after he gave you that information, you subsequently were able to

need not instruct the jury unless it is requested by the objecting co-defendant. 336
S.W.3d 19 (Ky. 2011).

                                           5
arrest Mr. Kevin Gray; is that correct?” The officer responded, “That's correct.”

Id. at 188-89. In the present case there is no statement implicating Stone in

the crime, either explicitly or implicitly, only that Cornist did not know either of

the people with him. It might even be argued that this particular statement is

exculpatory of Stone. As such, Bruton and its offspring do not apply. 4

      Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cornist’s statement did

violate the Bruton line of cases―when viewed in the context of the remaining

evidence―any error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to

determine whether this error is harmless, this Court must decide “whether

there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have

contributed to the conviction . . . or, put otherwise, whether the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d

76, 84 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 24 (1967)).

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that:

      An assessment of harmlessness cannot include consideration of
      whether the witness' testimony would have been unchanged, or
      the jury's assessment unaltered, had there been confrontation;
      such an inquiry would obviously involve pure speculation, and
      harmlessness must therefore be determined on the basis of the
      remaining evidence.

Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021-22 (1988). The basis of the remaining

evidence includes the surveillance footage of Stone, Detective Andrews’

identification of Stone by his tattoo in the photograph from the Cornist family

      4 Stone also alleges this statement violates Crawford v. Washington since it

clearly is testimonial. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). However, Stone ignores this statement is
admissible under KRE 801A(b)(1) as an admission against party opponent for Cornist.

                                          6
reunion and the testimony of Thompson. Furthermore, Detective Andrews

testified he listened to Stone’s recorded jail phone calls wherein Stone admitted

being the other male on the surveillance video and having entered Thompson’s

residence and “grabbed him out the house.” Additionally, Stone conceded on

the phone calls that Cornist was his uncle. Stone’s own testimony admitted

that he was on the elevator with Cornist and the unknown woman. The

admission of Cornist’s statement did not violate the principles espoused by

Bruton, but even if it did, we hold it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

      B. The trial court did not err by permitting Detective Andrews to
      identify Stone from a database available to law-enforcement.

      Stone claims that Detective Andrews identified him through a “law

enforcement database.” This, Stone claims, is a violation of KRE 404(b), as the

jury could infer this identification was because Stone had a prior criminal

history. This issue is preserved. KRE 404(b) states that:

      Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
      acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
      show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
      admissible:

      (1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,
      opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
      absence of mistake or accident; or

      (2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to
      the case that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished
      without serious adverse effect on the offering party.

In asserting this claim, Stone insists that the Commonwealth characterized

the database as a “law enforcement database” when that is a complete

mischaracterization of the evidence. The Commonwealth elicited from

                                        7
Detective Andrews how he was able to ascertain the identity of Stone through a

“database available to Kentucky law enforcement.” In fact, the testimony from

Detective Andrew was that he was able to find a photograph from a social

media platform of the “Cornist Family Reunion” where there was a photograph

of Stone with the identical tattoo as seen on the surveillance footage from the

incident at Golden Tower. There was no reference to any mugshots or criminal

background and the database from which the identification was made came

from an innocuous source. Therefore, Stone’s claim is wholly without merit. 5

      C. The trial court did not err when it declined to grant a directed
      verdict on the burglary and robbery in the first-degree charge.

      Stone claims the trial court should have granted a directed verdict on the

burglary-in-the-first-degree charge and robbery in the first degree. 6 These

issues are preserved. This Court has previously stated that:

      On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair
      and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
      Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
      juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
      guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of
      ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the
      evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
      questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such
      testimony.

      5 Stone also claims the Commonwealth failed to provide written notice as

required by KRE 404(c). But as we held there is no merit to Stone’s claim under KRE
404(b), we decline to address this issue.
       6 Although originally indicted on complicity on both these charges, the trial

court’s instructions gave the jury an option to convict on either complicity to these
charges or to convict on the underlying charges. The jury unanimously decided to
convict on burglary and robbery in the first-degree.

                                          8
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). The standard of

review for an appellate court on reviewing a lower court’s decision regarding a

directed verdict is, “if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly

unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a

directed verdict of acquittal.” Id.

      The Commonwealth, in order to convict a person of burglary in the first

degree, under KRS 7 511.020(1)(b) must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

            A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when, with
      the intent to commit a crime, he or she knowingly enters or
      remains unlawfully in a building, and when in effecting entry or
      while in the building or in the immediate flight therefrom, he or
      she or another participant in the crime: . . . (b) Causes physical
      injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime[.]

Stone claims the trial court should have granted a directed verdict on the

burglary-in-the-first-degree charge because there was no evidence that Stone

entered or remained in Thompson’s apartment unlawfully with the intent to

commit a crime therein. This court has long held that “[i]ntent can be inferred

from the actions of an accused and the surrounding circumstances. The jury

has wide latitude in inferring intent from the evidence.” Anastasi v.

Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Ky. 1988).

      In making this argument, Stone relies almost exclusively on Stone’s

version of events. Stone testified his intentions that day were wholly irenic and

that he was simply there to defuse tensions amongst old friends when

Thompson and Cornist began fighting. According to Stone, it was only after

      7 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                         9
Thompson began striking him that he was obliged to defend himself. But

Stone’s testimony is not the only evidence the jury heard during the trial. The

jury viewed the video in which all three appeared to act in a coordinated

attempt to entice Thompson to open his door so that they could enter his

dwelling and assault and rob him of any valuables. They heard Thompson

testify that he opened the door when an unknown woman knocked on his door.

After Thompson opened the door, Stone and Cornist immediately entered his

apartment, and Stone began assaulting him. Thompson heard one of them tell

the other to get the T.V. and heard Stone ask Cornist “where’s the money at,

man?” The jury heard Stone’s testimony but chose to reject his version of

events and since there was more than enough evidence for the jury to convict

on the charge of burglary in the first degree, it was not clearly unreasonable to

do so. As such, the trial court did not err by refusing to grant a directed verdict

on the charge of burglary in the first degree.

      Stone also contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant a

directed verdict on the robbery-in-the-first-degree charge because he claims the

Commonwealth did not prove Stone had the requisite intent to commit a

robbery. As noted above, the jury has wide latitude to infer intent from the

evidence. Id.

      The Commonwealth, in order to convict a person of robbery in the first

degree under KRS 515.020(1)(a), must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

            A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the
      course of committing theft, he or she uses or threatens the
      immediate use of physical force upon another person with intent to

                                        10
      accomplish the theft and when he or she: (a) Causes physical
      injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime[.]

This Court has held, and Stone concedes in his brief, that the element “in the

course of committing theft” can be proven by evidence of a completed theft or

an attempted theft. Sasser v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 290, 293 (Ky. 2016).

      Stone, is seen on surveillance footage rummaging through the pockets of

Thompson looking for something of value to steal, and Thompson heard Stone

ask, “where’s the money at, man?” While Stone testified that he put his hands

in Thompson’s pocket to help him, the jury clearly thought otherwise. The jury

concluded that Stone’s intent was to attempt to steal something of value and

he used physical force in order to accomplish the attempted theft. As this

Court cannot say it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to reach that

conclusion, we hold the trial court did not err by refusing to grant a directed

verdict for Stone.

      D. The Commonwealth’s comments during closing arguments were
      not improper.

      Lastly, Stone argues that the Commonwealth’s comments made during

closing arguments were improper. Stone argues the prosecutor unjustly

impugned Stone’s defense counsel’s closing argument as rooted in racial bias

and urges this Court to apply the Dickerson v. Commonwealth four-factor

analysis to find a violation of Stone’s right to a fair trial. 485 S.W.3d 310, 329

(Ky. 2016).

                                        11
      Stone concedes this issue is unpreserved, and as such we will review his

claim under our palpable error standard under RCr 8 10.26. Early v.

Commonwealth, 470 S.W.3d 729, 737 (Ky. 2015). For an error to be palpable it

must be “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.” Brewer v.

Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Burns v. Level, 957

S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1997)). An unpreserved error may be corrected on appeal

if failure to do so would cause a manifest injustice. Commonwealth v. Goss, 428

S.W.3d 619, 626-27 (Ky. 2014). This is an error that if it remained

uncorrected, there would be a likelihood of a different result, or it would call

into question the defendant’s right to due process. Id. at 627.

      Stone’s defense counsel argued during closing statements that these

events were just a “stupid street fight that got out of hand.” The

Commonwealth in response told the jury,

            Folks, the defense wants you to believe that this is overblown
      and overreacted and overcharged. In fact, they refer to this as a
      stupid street fight. And that is what—this why I had voir dire on it
      because that really offends me. This isn’t a stupid street fight.

             First of all, it’s not a fight. It’s a beating. It didn’t take place
      on the street. It started in James’s castle, his residence, where he
      is supposed to be safe. The only reason they are saying this, that
      this was a stupid street fight, is because it is a poor black man
      living in government subsidized housing in downtown Covington.

            Pretend this hallway is a porch of a nice big house in
      Independence or Edgewood or Villa Hills, Fort Mitchell, Lakeside
      Park, and these two men bull rush into the front door in that nice
      big house. And the next thing we see on the security video is these
      two men beating the man that lives there as he falls out of his own
      house. Beat him to the ground. Kick him in the face. Fracture his
      arm. Break his skull.

      8 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                           12
             Would we be calling this a stupid street fight? Would we be
      calling this case overcharged if this happened in Independence,
      Villa Hills, Edgewood, or Fort Mitchell? No, we wouldn’t. It’s
      prejudice. They want you to believe this poor black man is not
      entitled to the same protection under the law as every other
      resident of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and every other
      neighborhood in Kenton County.

           Let your verdict tell Mr. Stone and Mr. Cornist that yes,
      James is protected, just like every other resident of the
      Commonwealth of Kentucky and every other community in Kenton
      County. The law applies the same.

Stone claims that the Commonwealth’s comments were improper because it

implied that Stone’s defense counsel was making appeals to racial bias by

calling what happened to Thompson the product of a “stupid street fight.” He

argues that in doing so the Commonwealth impugned the integrity of defense

counsel. This unwarranted injection of allegations of racial bias, Stone claims,

is sufficient grounds for this Court to overturn the verdict and remand for a

new trial under the Dickerson four factors test. In Dickerson we held:

      We use the following four-factor test to determine whether a
      prosecutor's improper comments constitute reversible flagrant
      misconduct: “(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or
      to prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or
      extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed
      before the jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the
      accused.”

Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 310, 329 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Mayo v.

Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 41, 56 (Ky. 2010)).

      The Commonwealth’s remarks can be characterized by an appeal to the

jury to treat everyone the same, no matter where they live or how they look. We

do take note here that the Commonwealth made its comments to directly rebut

                                       13
Stone’s defense counsel’s contention that what happened to Thompson was a

stupid street fight. The Commonwealth was not entirely off base to suggest

this characterization had implicit racial undertones with a concomitant appeal

not to take this incident too seriously. As such, it is not entirely clear that

Dickerson should even apply in a situation where the Commonwealth makes

comments to directly rebut an implication made by the defendant in closing

remarks. But for the sake of argument, we now undertake the analysis.

      Under the first part of the test as expounded by Dickerson, we must

determine whether the Commonwealth’s remarks tended to mislead the jury or

caused prejudice to the defendant. Here we cannot find the Commonwealth’s

appeal to treat everyone equally, and its objection to Stone’s characterization

as rooted in racial bias, as having done so. As for the second part of the test,

this Court must determine whether the comments were isolated or extensive.

The Commonwealth’s portion of its closing that Stone now finds objectionable

is not more extensive than necessary in order to counter the defense’s own ill-

considered remark. Likewise, the third factor of the Dickerson test is whether

the Commonwealth injected its remarks intentionally. It is clear, in this case,

the Commonwealth intentionally made these remarks. That, however, should

carry little weight when the Commonwealth was merely responding to the

intentional injection of material by Stone’s own counsel. Finally, the last factor

is the strength of the evidence against the accused. Here, the evidence was

overwhelming as to the guilt of Stone, so this Court cannot find, after the

                                         14
weighing of these factors, sufficient grounds in order to find palpable error, and

thus, we decline to overturn the conviction.

                                 III.   CONCLUSION

      Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court committed no error that

could form the basis for overturning the judgement of the Kenton County

Circuit Court. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Julia K. Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Robert Baldridge
Assistant Attorney General

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