Court Opinion

ID: 9534280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:38:16.638567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:09.162716
License: Public Domain

N. J. Kaufman, J.
While we concur in the results reached in Judge Brennan’s opinion on the propriety of the summary judgments granted to defendants Wyche and Wheels, we must respectfully dissent from his disposition regarding the defendant WFL. Our reasons for doing so will be outlined below.
Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint against the WFL asserted two separate theories of recovery. First, plaintiffs contended that the WFL was vicariously liable for Wyche’s battery under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The second theory of liability articulated by plaintiff was that the WFL was negligent, among other reasons, in keeping *458Wyche, a man purportedly of known violent propensities, within the WFL organization, provoking Wyche to violence by failing to act to satisfy his grievances and failing to act to prevent those grievances from arising.
As has been noted by Judge Brennan, both of these theories were disposed of by way of summary judgment. However, it is unclear from the record what was the exact basis of the trial judge’s reasoning. Since this is so, we will frame what we perceive to be the relevant inquiries on appeal: First, if there were undisputed facts below showing that Wyche did not act within any agency relationship with the WFL, summary judgment was warranted as to the first theory of recovery. Secondly, if the undisputed facts below show that Chester was an employee of the WFL, summary judgment was appropriate on both theories and the trial judge should be affirmed in toto. We will discuss each issue separately.
Plaintiffs rely on the fact that the Wheels had become insolvent and that the WFL had taken over the payroll to establish that Wyche acted as an agent for the WFL. In his brief, plaintiff asserts that the WFL had the right to hire or fire Wyche, "or as it ultimately did move him to another franchise”, purportedly relying on Wyche’s interrogatories. We have examined these interrogatories and we find no support for the statement regarding the WFL assigning his contract.
The proper test to determine an agency relationship, for purposes of respondeat superior liability, is the right to control. Arnett v Hayes Wheel Co, 201 Mich 67; 166 NW 957 (1918), Birou v Thompson-Brown Co, 67 Mich App 502, 507; 241 NW2d 265 (1976), lv den 397 Mich 808 (1976). Examining the facts under the right-to-control test, there is *459clearly no agency between Wyche and the WFL. Wyche was under contract with the Wheels, not the WFL. Wyche was sent to see plaintiff to collect his money with permission of the Wheels, not the WFL. On the record before us, there is nothing to indicate that the WFL had the right to control Wyche. The only evidence adduced below of any relevance is that the WFL had voluntarily undertaken to meet the Wheels’ payroll. In the instant case, this does not suffice to show that the WFL had the right to control Wyche; accordingly, summary judgment as to the first theory of liability was proper.
Plaintiffs’ second theory, however, does not stand in the same position. In defendant WFL’s brief, it is argued that Chester was an employee of the WFL. This view is premised upon the theory that if Wyche’s salary was undertaken by the WFL, then Chester’s salary was also taken over by the league. As we noted above, in the instant case the voluntary assumption of a salary obligation, by itself, does not meet the control test. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Chester’s salary was taken over by the league. In fact, it was never alleged below. We are now asked on appeal to infer this fact from the bankruptcy of the Wheels. We must decline this invitation.
As we previously noted, even were this true, the control test was not met. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the WFL had the right to control, hire or fire, or discipline Chester. Thus, there is nothing on the record to support the finding that Chester was an employee of the WFL. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligence theory.
R. M. Maher, P. J., concurred.