Court Opinion

ID: 9728500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:09:37.769141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:49.168482
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting: Illinois courts have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the GBMI statute while rejecting the present defendant’s same arguments. People v. Seaman, 203 Ill. App. 3d 871, 884-88 (1990) (rejected argument that statute was unconstitutional because it leads to compromise verdicts and jury confusion); People v. Smith, 124 Ill. App. 3d 805, 807-12 (1984) (rejected arguments that danger of compromise verdict and stigma associated with verdict of GBMI rendered statute unconstitutional); People v. DeWit, 123 Ill. App. 3d 723, 735-36 (1984) (rejected argument that GBMI verdict promotes jury confusion and leads to a compromise verdict); People v. Fields, 170 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6-7 (1988) (declined to reexamine decisions upholding the constitutionality of the GBMI statute); see also People v. Martin, 166 Ill. App. 3d 428, 435 (1988); People v. Boatright, 137 Ill. App. 3d 888, 890-91 (1985); People v. Carter, 135 Ill. App. 3d 403 (1985). Numerous states in addition to Illinois have also enacted legislation providing for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. Annotation, "Guilty But Mentally III” Statutes: Validity & Construction, 71 A.L.R.4th 702 (1989) (hereinafter 71 A.L.R.4th 702). Despite being faced with basically the same challenges raised by the defendant in the present case, all of the various state statutes have been upheld. See State v. Neely, 112 N.M. 702, 704, 819 P.2d 249, 251 (1991); 71 A.L.R.4th 702. Since the majority intends to ignore well-established precedent, I will reiterate some of the principles upon which the above-cited decisions rest and which are by now axiomatic. A statute carries a strong presumption of constitutionality, and the burden of showing its invalidity is on the person challenging the enactment. People v. Grano, 286 Ill. App. 3d 278, 295 (1996). When determining whether a statute violates due process, the court must determine whether the statute is designed to remedy the evils the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety, and general welfare. Seaman, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 885. Due process requires only that the statute be reasonably designed to accomplish its purposes, not that it be the best means of accomplishing them. Seaman, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 885. It has been repeatedly held that, because the GBMI statute is clearly rationally designed to accomplish the legislative goal of reducing the number of persons erroneously found not guilty by reason of insanity and to identify such defendants as in need of treatment, the statute does not violate due process. Seaman, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 885; Smith, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 811. The statute is reasonably designed to accomplish a legitimate purpose of the state. The verdict clarifies for the jury the distinction between a person who is not guilty by reason of insanity and one who is mentally ill yet not insane and, therefore, is criminally liable. By focusing the jury’s attention on the question of legal culpability, the statute increases the likelihood that the jury will return a verdict in accord with the appropriate legal standard, and it is a legitimate state interest to have juries returning verdicts that accord with the law. The legislature could have believed that some defendants were being found not guilty by reason of insanity even though they did not satisfy the legal standard for the defense. That the majority cites a report critical of the legislature’s remedy is irrelevant since the remedy need not be the best means to accomplish the statute’s purpose but only reasonably designed to accomplish its purpose to withstand constitutional attack. The majority erroneously concludes that the GBMI verdict is without legal consequence. This court has recognized that, upon a finding of guilty but mentally ill, the Department of Corrections must " 'cause periodic inquiry and examination to be made concerning the nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the defendant’s mental illness’ and to provide 'such psychiatric, psychological, or other counseling and treatment for the defendant as it determines necessary.’ ” People v. Morris, 237 Ill. App. 3d 140, 145 (1992), quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 2—6(b). Moreover, this court in Morris recognized that a GBMI verdict could work to the defendant’s advantage in sentencing and remanded the cause to make sure the trial judge considered the defendant’s mental illness in imposing sentence. Morris, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 145. Given that the verdict serves to identify mentally ill defendants in need of treatment and facilitates just the sentencing of mentally ill defendants, it is not without legal consequence as the majority argues. The majority’s discussion about the lack of treatment provided by the Department of Corrections to mentally ill inmates is a red herring. The Department of Corrections’ noncompliance with the statutory mandate for evaluation and treatment does not render an otherwise constitutional statute unconstitutional. If the defendant is in need of treatment but is not receiving it, then the appropriate remedy is a suit to compel the State to provide treatment. United States ex rel. Weismiller v. Lane, 815 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1987). At any rate, this is not the appropriate forum to determine whether the sentencing and treatment provisions of the guilty but mentally ill statute are being complied with. I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the statute places a conflicting burden of proof on the defendant. By raising the insanity defense, the defendant has already assumed the burden of proving that he is so mentally ill that he is legally insane. I do not view the GBMI statute as requiring the defendant to prove he is not insane. Rather, the current statute simply recognizes that the defendant will be the party presenting evidence of insanity, not the State, and that in the course of doing so the defendant may have failed to prove legal insanity but may have proved that he was mentally ill. In such a case, the defendant can avail himself of the GBMI verdict. The majority’s reliance on Reddick is misplaced because in the present case defendant must first be found guilty of the essential elements of the crime and then found legally sane before the GBMI verdict may be properly considered by the jury. See Seaman, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 886; Smith, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 811. Since the defendant has already been proved guilty with the requisite mental state before the jury considers the GBMI verdict, Reddick has no application here. Because I would follow the long line of cases upholding the constitutionality of the GBMI statute, I respectfully dissent.