Court Opinion

ID: 9462421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:40:42.927555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:35.032094
License: Public Domain

ROSS, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in all of Judge Webster’s opinion except his determination that the failure to give the proper instructions did not constitute plain error.
I agree that Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., supra, mandates the giving of instructions requiring the jury to find that the Maverick was defective and therefore dangerous when put to a use reasonably anticipated. As Judge Webster points out, the failure to give such an instruction was held to be preju-dicially erroneous in Keener.
In the original opinion Judge Webster filed a dissent in which he included the following paragraph:
Appellees contend that appellants failed to preserve this assignment of error, relying upon Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. I *272disagree. Defense counsel objected to giving any instruction on enhanced injury, contending this was not the law of Missouri. I think that objection was sufficient to preserve the point. In any event, while a trial court does not commit reversible error when it assumes as true the existence of an undisputed or uncontradicted fact and omits it from its instruction, Celatron, Inc. v. Cavic Engineering Co., 432 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Mo.App.1968), the evidence at trial made foreseeability a sharply disputed factual issue. By treating it as conceded, the trial court removed the issue from the jury’s consideration and thereby affected the substantial rights of the defendants in a manner inconsistent with substantial justice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 61; Edwards v. Mayes, 385 F.2d 369, 373 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1967) (failure to instruct that driving at excessive speed was negligence per se constituted plain error requiring reversal despite lack of adequate objection by appellants); Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1964) (erroneous instruction on vicarious liability was plain or fundamental error requiring new trial despite appellants’ failure to object thereto). See also 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practico and Procedure § 2558, at 672-74 n. 41 (1971). (Footnotes omitted.)
I consider that paragraph to be a proper statement of the law; that the failure to give the proper instruction was plain error; that the alternative instructions stressed by Judge Webster in this opinion do not cure that plain error in that they fail completely to refer to a “use reasonably anticipated” by the manufacturer.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial for the reasons stated in Judge Webster’s original dissent.