Court Opinion

ID: 9894779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 21:04:37.336693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:34.649522
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE                        :    ID No. 2102000900
                                         :
v.                                       :
                                         :
MURRAY A. HALL,                          :
                                         :
                    Defendant.           :

                            Submitted: August 30, 2023
                            Decided: November 2, 2023

                                        ORDER

      On this 2nd day of November 2023, upon consideration of Defendant Murray
A. Hall’s motion for postconviction relief, the Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, Mr. Hall’s appeal, the exceptions he raises in his appeal, and the
record in this case, it appears that:
      1.     On November 4, 2021, Mr. Hall pled guilty to two counts of Robbery
in the Second Degree, 11 Del. C. § 831, as lesser included offenses of Robbery in
the First Degree, and one count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission
of a Felony, 11 Del C. § 1447A. In Mr. Hall’s plea agreement with the State, the
parties jointly recommended that he serve an unsuspended five years of
incarceration, followed by decreasing levels of probation.          After the Court
conducted a full colloquy, it accepted the plea and sentenced Mr. Hall consistently
with the joint recommendation.
      2.     Mr. Hall filed no direct appeal after his guilty plea. Rather, he filed a
motion, pro se, seeking postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal
Rule 61. The Court then referred the matter to a Superior Court commissioner for
findings of fact and recommendations as permitted by 10 Del. C. § 512(b) and
Superior Court Criminal Rule 62 (a)(5).
          4.     After considering the parties’ positions, the Commissioner issued her
findings and recommendations in her Report attached as Exhibit A. In her Report,
she explained (1) why Mr. Hall failed to demonstrate that his counsel performed
ineffectively before or during his guilty plea, and sentencing, and (2) why his
remaining grounds for relief had no merit. The Commissioner conducted a complete
review of the record and found that Mr. Hall’s counsel provided competent
representation and that he entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Accordingly, she recommended that the Court deny Mr. Hall’s motion for
postconviction relief.
          5.     Mr. Hall then appealed the Commissioner’s Report, and           later
supplemented his exceptions with an “amended appeal.”          When considering Mr.
Hall’s exceptions to the Report, the Court conducts a de novo review to determine
whether the Commissioner erred in those portions of her Report to which he objects.1
In Mr. Hall’s combined submissions, he merely reiterates the arguments that he
presented to the Commissioner.
          6.     After thoroughly considering Mr. Hall’s exceptions to the Report and
after reviewing the record de novo, the Court finds that the Commissioner has
already correctly addressed his exceptions. She committed no error, and as a result,
the Court adopts her Report.
          NOW, THEREFORE, after a de novo review of the record in this matter,

1
    Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5)(iv).

                                             2
and for the reasons stated in the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation dated
July 27, 2023:
      IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court adopts the Commissioner’s
Report and Recommendation attached as Exhibit A.           Mr. Hall’s motion for
postconviction relief filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 is therefore
DENIED.

                                                   /s/Jeffrey J Clark
                                                     Resident Judge

JJC/klc
oc: Prothonotary
cc: The Honorable Andrea M. Freud
      Murray Hall, Pro Se
      Trial Counsel

                                         3
Exhibit A

    4
      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
 STATE OF DELAWARE                       :
                                         :            ID No. 2102000900
                                         :          In and for Kent County
 v.                                      :
                                         :   RK-21020160-01 ROBBERY 2ND
 MURRAY A. HALL,                         :   RK-21020161-01 ROBBERY 2ND
                                         :   RK-21020162-01 PFDCF
                 Defendant.              :

         COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
              Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief
                Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61

Stephen Welch, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, for the State of
Delaware.
Murray Hall, Pro se.
FREUD, Commissioner
July 27, 2023

      The defendant, Murray Hall (“Hall”), pled guilty on November 4, 2021, to
two counts of Robbery in the Second Degree 11 Del. C. § 831, as lesser included
offenses of Robbery in the First Degree; and one count of Possession of a Firearm
During the Commission of a Felony, 11 Del. C. §1447A; As part of the plea deal,
the State agreed to Nolle Prosequis on the remaining charges of one count of
Aggravated Menacing, two counts of Wearing a Disguise During the Commission
of a Crime, and one count of Conspiracy in the Second Degree. The State, along
with the Defense, recommended a sentence thirteen years incarceration, suspended
after serving five years, three of which were minimum mandatory, followed by
varying levels of probation. Had Hall gone to trial and been found guilty as charged,
he faced many years in jail, including many years of a minimum mandatory sentence.

                                         5
The Court agreed with the sentence recommendation of the parties and sentenced
Hall in accordance with the plea agreement recommendation.
      Hall did not appeal his conviction to the Delaware Supreme Court. Instead he
filed the pending Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 on July 20, 2022, in which he alleges, among other claims,
ineffective assistance of counsel. Following several continuances and a request by
the Court to trial counsel to supplement her response, the matter is now ready for my
review.
                                      FACTS
      According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause, on September 25, 2020, Dover
Police responded to Royal Farms convenience store at approximately 2248 hours,
located at 293 Saulsbury Road, Dover for a robbery incident. The witness described
the suspect as a black male, with a light-colored facemask with a venting device on
the front, waiting in line behind other customers. When it was the suspect’s turn in
line, he approached the counter and demanded money from the cash register and
presented a black handgun, which the suspect pulled from his waistband area. The
Royal Farms clerk complied with the demand, as she was afraid of being shot. The
clerk handed over approximately $132.00. After a review of the Royal Farms’
surveillance footage, the suspect could be seen fleeing the store on foot, eastbound
towards the Simon Circle development.
      On January 25, 2021, Dover Police responded to the same Royal Farms
convenience store at approximately 2328 hours for a report of another robbery
incident. A Royal Farms employee stated that a black male wearing a gray Nike zip
up hoodie with the hood over his head, blue faded jeans, and white sneakers with
red accents and a multi-colored facemask entered the convenience store and stood
in line. When the suspect approached the counter, when it was his turn in line, he

                                         6
asked for 2 packs of Newport 100s cigarettes. When then the employee placed the
cigarettes on the counter, the suspected demanded all of the money from the cash
register. The suspect said, “don’t make a scene” and said, “I’m not play.” The Royal
Farms employee said that the suspect kept his hands in the pocket of his hoodie and
observed a large bulge in the same pocket. The Royal Farms employee believed the
suspect was armed with a weapon. The employee placed the money into a bag and
handed it to the suspect, which was approximately $130.00. The suspect kept his
right hand in his hoodie pocket and took the bag of money with his left hand.
      A review of the Royal Farms’ video surveillance footage revealed the suspect
walked to the Royal Farms’ parking lot from the area of Simon Circle development.
After the robbery, the suspect fled on foot, eastbound towards Simon Circle
development.
      A review of the Simon Circle video surveillance footage from January 25,
2021, revealed what appears to be a light-colored Jeep Renegade occupied by at least
(2) people driving around the development just prior to the Royal Farms robbery.
The vehicle parked in Simon Circle development, the driver of the vehicle exited,
and walked towards Royal Farms. Just after the robbery, what appears to be the same
subject, walked eastbound from the area of Royal Farms and entered the driver’s
seat of the vehicle. The vehicle made a U-turn in the roadway and fled eastbound.
There were certain unique features of the vehicle, such as dark colored roof rails,
dark colored roof, the mirrors and door handles appeared to be the same color as the
main body of the vehicle, a dark colored front grill, and the lower half of the front
bumper is dark in color.
      On January 20, 2021, a stolen tan 2016 Jeep Renegade, registered to Murray
Hall, was recovered and returned to Hall. Photographs of Hall’s Jeep Renegade,
which matched the suspect vehicle observed in the January 25, 2021, Simon Circle

                                          7
video surveillance footage.
      After reviewing the Royal Farms video footage from the September 25, 2020,
and January 25, 2021, robberies, the suspect in both incidents is a black male with
similar skin tone and similar build. During both incidents, the suspect waited in line
behind other customers, which is unique about both of these incidents. The suspect
fled on foot towards Simon Circle development after both robbery incidents. One
robbery occurred at approximately 2248 hours and the other occurred at
approximately 2328 hours, which both robberies occurred within close proximity of
each other regarding time of day.
      Through investigation, it was discovered that Hall sold items to Capital Pawn
located at 324 Martin Street, Dover, Delaware on January 25, 2021, at approximately
1734 hours. On February 9, 2021, the Dover Police obtained video surveillance
from Capital Pawn from January 25, 2021, incident. Hall was observed arriving at
Capital Pawn in what appears to be his tan Jeep Renegade. Hall was wearing what
appeared to be the same gray Nike zip up hoodie, blue faded jeans, and multi-colored
facemask as in the January 25, 2021, Royal Farms robbery in Dover, DE. The tan
Jeep Renegade observed in the Capital Pawn video footage matches the suspect
vehicle observed in the Simon Circle video footage from January 25, 2021, Royal
Farms robbery incident.

                              HALL’S CONTENTIONS
      In Hall’s Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief, he raises the following
ground for relief:
    Ground One                         Mentally Incompetent.
                                       During the time upon taking the plea Murray
                                       Hall was on 30 mg of Zyprexa for

                                          8
                                                       schizophrenia. That powerful dose alone is
                                                       enough to distort and impair judgment.
         Ground Two                                    Lack of Physiological Evaluation
                                                       Despite the Courts knowledge of prior and
                                                       present mental history, the Court failed to
                                                       order a physiological evaluation to determine
                                                       if I was mentally able to take plea.
           Ground Three                                Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
                                                       The lawyer never raised anything about my
                                                       mental health, or about the fact that their was
                                                       proff (sp.) I was at work during the
                                                       robbies(sp.) I was not defended.
           Ground Four                                 Suppression of Favorable Evidence
                                                       The witness stated that she knows the person
                                                       who rob her stated his name and the
                                                       description given is far from mines. Also I’m
                                                       charged with “PFDCF” when I was never
                                                       found in possesion (sp.) of a firearm and they
                                                       can’t say nor prove that is was an actually
                                                       firearm

                                                 DISCUSSION

           Under Delaware Law, the Court must first determine whether Hall has met
the procedural requirements of the Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may
consider the merits of the postconviction relief claims.2                          Under Rule 61,
postconviction claims for relief must be brought within one year of the conviction
becoming final.3 Hall’s Motion was filed in a timely fashion, thus the bar of Rule

2
    Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991)
3
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).

                                                         9
61(i)(1) does not apply to this Motion.        As this is Hall’s initial Motion for
Postconviction Relief, the bar of Rule 61(i)(2), which prevents consideration of any
claim not previously asserted in a postconviction motion, does not apply either.
         None of Hall’s claims were raised previously at his plea, sentencing, or on
direct appeal. Consequently, they are barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i)(3) unless he demonstrates: (1) cause for relief from the procedural default; and
(2) prejudice from a violation of the movant’s rights.4 The bars to relief are
inapplicable to a jurisdictional challenge or to a claim that satisfies the pleading
requirements of subparagraph (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of Rule 61.5 To
meet the requirements of Rule 61(d)(2), a defendant must plead with particularity
that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually
innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted6 or that
he pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States or Delaware Supreme
Courts, applies to the defendant’s case rendering the conviction invalid.7 Hall’s
Motion pleads neither requirement of Rule 61(d)(2).
         Each of Hall’s ground for relief is premised on ineffective assistance of
counsel. Therefore, Hall has alleged sufficient cause for not having asserted this
ground for relief at trial and on direct appeal. Hall’s ineffective assistance of
counsel’s claim is not subject to the procedural default rule in part because the
Delaware Supreme Court will not generally hear such claims for the first time on
direct appeal. For this reason, many defendants, including Hall, allege ineffective
assistance of counsel in order to overcome the procedural default. “However, this

4
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
5
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
6
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i).
7
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii).

                                          10
path creates confusion if the defendant does not understand that the test for
ineffective assistance of counsel and the test for cause and prejudice are distinct,
albeit similar, standards.”8 The United States Supreme Court has held that:
                  [i]f the procedural default is the result of ineffective
                  assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires
                  that the responsibility for the default be imputed to the
                  State, which may not ‘conduc[t] trials at which persons
                  who face incarceration must defend themselves without
                  adequate legal assistance;’ [i]neffective assistance of
                  counsel then is cause for a procedural default.9

A movant who interprets the final sentence of the quoted passage to mean that he
can simply assert ineffectiveness and thereby meet the cause requirement will miss
the mark. Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
movant must engage in the two-part analysis enunciated in Strickland v.
Washington10 and adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State.11
         In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires a defendant show:
(1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard or reasonableness;
and (2) that counsel’s actions were prejudicial to him in that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s error, he would not have pled guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial and that the result of the trial would have been his
acquittal.12 The failure to establish that they defendant would not have pled guilty
and would have proceeded to trial is sufficient cause for denial of relief.13 In
addition, Delaware Courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of

8
  State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 (Del. Super.)
9
  Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
10
   466 U.S. 668 (1984).
11
   551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
12
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687
13
   Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1988) (Citing Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988)) (citations
omitted).

                                                         11
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of
actual prejudice and substantiate them of risk summary dismissal.14                                         When
examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong of the Strickland
test, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was professionally
reasonable.15 This standard is highly demanding.16 Strickland mandates that, when
viewing counsel’s representation, this Court must endeavor to “eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight.”17
        Following a complete review of the record in this matter, it is clear that Hall
has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claims that his attorney
was ineffective. I find Trial Counsel’s affidavits, in conjunction with the record,
more credible than Hall’s self-serving claims that his counsel’s representation was
ineffective. Hall’s counsel denies the allegations.
        Hall was facing the possibility of many years in jail, including minimum
mandatory time, had he been convicted on all counts. The sentence and plea were
very reasonable under all the circumstances, especially in light of the evidence
against him. Prior to the entry of the plea, Hall and his attorney discussed the case
ad the plea. The plea bargain was clearly advantageous to Hall. Counsel was
successful in negotiating a beneficial plea bargain with the State. Counsel’s
representation was certainly well within the rage of required by Strickland.
Additionally, when Hall entered his plea, he stated he was satisfied with Defense
Counsel’s performance. He is bound by his statements unless he presents clear and

14
   See e.g., Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998), citing Boughner v. State, 1995 WL 466465 at *1 (Del.
Supr.).
15
   Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (Citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
16
   Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 754 (Del. 1990) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986)).
17
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

                                                        12
convincing evidence to the contrary.18 Consequently, Hall has failed to establish that
his counsel’s representation was ineffective under the Strickland test.
           Even assuming, arguendo, that counsel’s representation of Hall was somehow
deficient, Hall must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice. In an
attempt to show prejudice, Hall simply asserts that his counsel was ineffective by
failing to adequately investigate the case and for allegedly allowing him to plead
guilty when he was mentally incompetent. Hall’s Trial Counsel states that Hall was
competent to plead guilty and that she was prepared for trial. My review of the facts
of the case leads me to conclude that Trial Counsel’s representation of Hall was well
within the requirements of the Sixth Amendment and no prejudice has been
demonstrated. His statements are insufficient to establish prejudice, particularly in
light of the evidence against him. Therefore, I find Hall’s grounds for relief are
meritless.
           I will briefly address Hall’s allegations for the benefit of the Court. Hall first
claims that due to his documented mental illness and the fact that he was taking a
prescribed mental health medication at the time of his plea, it was consequently
unkowing and involuntary. The record, however, belies Hall’s assertions. Both
Counsel and the Court determined Hall was competent to plead guilty on the day he
did. The fact that he was taking his prescribed medications bolsters the evidence that
he was competent since the mediation is designed to counteract the effects of a
mental illness. Hall’s claim is unsupported and meritless.
           Hall’s remaning claim revolves around his allegations that he could not have
committed the robberies because he was working at the time of the robberies. He
claims his attorney was ineffective for not delving into his alleged alibi. Trial

18
     Mapp v. State, 1994 WL 91264, at *2 (Del. Supr.) (Citing Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 937-938 (Del. 1994)).

                                                          13
Counsel provided the Court with a copy of a subpoena issued by the Court to Hall’s
alleged employer. Clearly, Trial Counsel took steps to investigate Hall’s alleged
alibi. While Trial Counsel has no record that the alleged employer ever responded
to the subpoena, that fact does not prove ineffective assistance on her part. Prior to
Hall’s trial he called Trial Counsel and indicated he wished to accept the State’s plea
offer. By this action and his plea, he admitted his guilt and waived any futher duty
on the part of his Counsel to delve further into his alleged alibi. Had Hall not on his
own, decided to plead guilty, presumably Trial Counsel would have followed up on
the subpeona. However, since Hall chose to plead guilty there was no longer any
need to follow up with that investigation since Hall admitted his guilt. Consequently,
this ground for relief is meritless, as well.
           To the extent that Hall alleges his plea was involuntary, the record contradicts
such an allegation. When addressing the question of whether a plea was
constitutionally knowing and voluntary, the Court looks to a plea colloquy to
determine if the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary. 19 At the
guilty-plea hearing, the Court asked Hall whether he understood the nature of the
charges. The consequences of his pleading, and whether he was voluntarily entering
the pleas. The Court asked Hall if he understood he would waive his constitutional
rights if he entered the plea including the right to suppress evidence; if he understood
each of the constitutional rights listed on the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form
(“Guilty Plea Form”); and whether he gave truthful answers to all the questions on
the form. The Court asked Hall if he had discussed his plea and its consequences
fully with his attorney. The Court also asked Hall if he was satisfied with this
counsel’s representation. Hall answered each of these questions affirmatively. 20 I

19
     Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993)
20
     State v. Hall, Del. Super., I.D. No.2102000900 (Nov. 4, 2021) Tr. at 6-13

                                                           14
find Trial Counsel’s representation far more credible than Hall’s self-serving, vague
allegations.
           Furthermore, prior to entering his plea, Hall signed a Guilty Plea Form and
Plea Agreement in his own handwriting. Hall’s signature on the forms indicated that
he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty and
that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in the Plea
Agreement. Hall is bound by the statements he made on the signed Guilty Plea Form,
unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. 21 I confidently find
that Hall entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that Hall’s grounds for relief
are completely meritless.

                                                CONCLUSION
           I find that Hall’s counsel represented him in a competent and effective
manner, as required by the standards set in Strickland and that Hall has failed to
demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the representation. I also find that Hall’s
guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. I recommend that the Court deny
Hall’s Motion for Postconviction Relief, as procedurally barred and meritless.

                                                                /s/Andrea M. Freud
                                                                  Commissioner

AMF/jan
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Resident Judge Jeffrey J Clark
    Stephen Welch, DAG
    J’Aime Walker, Esq.
    Murray Hall, SCI

21
     Sommerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997)

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