Court Opinion

ID: 9586466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:11:33.863411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.142162
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.  This being an appeal from the trial court’s first grant of a new trial, this court should not reverse except upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Code Ann. § 6-1608.
Under the confused circumstances of this case, where the court sitting without a jury had entered judgment for the defendants, it did not abuse its discretion in the first grant of a new trial to the plaintiff.
As pointed out in Griffin v. Sellers, 170 Ga. 577 (153 SE 359), appellate courts “will not closely scrutinize the facts in evidence or endeavor to balance with great exactness the testimony of both sides with a view to detecting an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. The exercise of that discretion in favor of granting new trials should be encouraged.”
The majority opinion, in holding that the contractor was not a party to the proceedings, overlooks the amendment which *137made the W. J. Nixon Company a party without requiring new service. The amendment was allowed without- objection from the defendant, there was no attack on the service or lack of service in the trial court and the defendant W.- J. Nixon Company made an appearance by its attorneys on the trial of the case. See Cherry v. McCutchen, 68 Ga. App. 682, 689 (23 SE2d 587).
There was no dispute as to service on the corporation or in substituting it as a party in lieu of the individual. Yet the majority opinion hinges on this technicality which was not raised in the trial court and which cannot, therefore, be considered here. Knighton v. Alexander, 81 Ga. App. 565 (59 SE2d 409); Watson & Strickland v. Parian Paint Co., 138 Ga. 621 (75 SE 608).
The evidence is clear and uncontradicted that the debt is due and that the materials were furnished to the contractor for the Overmyer Warehouse job. The only conflict lies in whether the plaintiff’s proof shows they were furnished to W. J. Nixon individually or the W. J. Nixon Company. In this state of proof the trial judge first directed a verdict for the defendants, then granted plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. The only thing that concerns us at this stage is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in so doing. Since this is the first grant of a new trial, the trial court’s discretion should not be disturbed under the circumstances of this case.
As to Division 1 of the opinion, the invoices introduced into evidence show charges for such items as nuts and bolts, couplers, braces, corner posts, guardrails, lumber and boards, in addition to the charges for rental of the scaffolding. Such items would clearly be lienable materials furnished for the improvement of real estate. No attempt was made • in the trial of the case to separate the lienable items from the non-lienable items since the defendants made no objection on this ground and all parties during the trial and on this appeal apparently assumed that the materials furnished were lienable, including the scaffolding.
I am authorized to state that Judge Joslin concurs in this dissent.