Court Opinion

ID: 9559577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:31:43.042048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:37.984296
License: Public Domain

Justice HOBBS
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. B & B’s form of release did not unambiguously notify Riehl that she was waiving any and all rights of action against the business in the event it breached its duty to her of exercising reasonable care.
Agreements that attempt to insulate a party from liability from his or her own negligence have long been disfavored, see Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo.1989), and must be closely scrutinized. See Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo.1981). B & B’s release referred in clear terms to the inherent risks of equine activity but not to the risk that this business might fail to adhere to the usual and customary safety procedures of the industry, such as (1) selecting a horse suitable to the rider’s level of experience and skill, (2) utilizing equipment and tack in good condition, (3) cinching and fitting the saddle, stirrups, and bridle correctly, and' (4) giving appropriate passenger safety instructions for handling the horse and one’s self.
Section 13-21-119(5), 5 C.R.S. (1997), requires equine professionals to provide warnings to prospective riders that they undertake, without recourse, the inherent risks of equine activity. Under section 13-21-119(2)(f), 5 C.R.S. (1997), these risks include, but are not limited to, the horse’s reaction to sound, sudden movement, and unfamiliar objects, persons, or other animals; surface and subsurface terrain hazards; and collisions with other animals or objects. On the other hand, the equine professional is responsible under section 13-21-119(4)(b), 5 C.R.S. (1997), for providing the rider with proper equipment and tack, and for selecting a horse which is suitable to the rider’s ability. The equine professional may not expose the rider to dangerous latent conditions without warning, and may not commit acts or omissions that, constitute a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant. Id. The provider may rely on the participant’s representation of his or her ability. Id.
Falling from a horse in Colorado’s challenging terrain can cause serious injury or death. Though riders can be expected to absorb the inherent risks of this potentially dangerous activity, they cannot reasonably expect, in the absence of notice and informed consent, to fall victim to the equine professional’s negligence. We must therefore closely scrutinize the release language used by B & B to ascertain, as a matter of law, whether Riehl’s waiver of rights constituted informed consent under the circumstances and can be given effect.
B & B seeks to immunize itself from its liability for breach of its statutory duty and its common law duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. In this regard, it relies on our decision in Heil Valley, 784 P.2d at 781. There we set forth four factors for determining whether an exculpatory release is valid:
(1) the existence of a duty to the public;
(2) the nature of the service performed;
(3) whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.
Id. at 784 (quoting Jones, 623 P.2d at 376). At issue here is the fourth factor, and under Heil Valley we must determine “whether the intent of the parties was to extinguish liability [for negligence] and whether this intent was clearly and unambiguously expressed.” Heil Valley, 784 P.2d at 785.
An agreement is ambiguous when it is fairly susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Browder v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 893 P.2d 132, 133 (Colo.1995). If two or more interpretations can reasonably result from a reading of B & B’s language, the reading most favorable to Riehl must be chosen because exculpatory agreements are strictly construed against the drafter. See Heil Valley, 784 P.2d at 784.
The majority opinion sets forth thé operable language of the release. Maj. op. at 135. The opening sentence .of the release states *140that the participant understands “the potential dangers that [the rider] could incur in mounting a horse and in riding said horse.” The next sentence again refers to the “potential dangers” of horseback riding, stating that “Understanding those risks,” the reader agrees to waive liability for “any injury or damage of any nature” arising from the activity. These references to the potential dangers of horseback riding could reasonably be read as relating to the inherent risks of equine activity that must be waived by statute.
The majority holds that the second sentence, waiving liability for “any injury or damage of any nature,” operates as a comprehensive waiver of liability for injuries arising from the rental of a horse from B & B, including injuries arising from B & B’s negligence. Maj. op. at 135. However, nowhere does the form refer to releasing B & B from its own negligence, and the release recites that the signer has executed the agreement “willingly and after having read or been advised of’ the warning required to be given under section 13-21-119. This language carries that logical inference that, in signing the form, the • participant acknowledges that she has been informed of the statutory limitation regarding the inherent risks of equine activity and is waiving liability for injuries arising only from those risks.
Because B & B’s agreement can logically be read in a manner that differs from the majority’s reading, it cannot be said that “the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language.” Heil Valley, 784 P.2d at 784. The agreement must therefore be strictly construed against its drafter, B & B, so as not to immunize B & B from its own negligence.
In Heil Valley, we held that an exculpatory agreement “purporting to waive ‘any claim [plaintiff] might state against the [defendant] as a result of physical injury incurred’ while horseback riding” covered claims based on negligence. Id. at 781. In enforcing the agreement, we noted that it was written in simple and clear terms that were free from legal jargon, and was not complicated. Id. at 785. The plaintiff had acknowledged that she understood the agreement. Id. The agreement’s first sentence specifically addressed the circumstances of the plaintiffs injury. Id. The rider was experienced and knew of the equine professional’s safety duties, yet waived them. As an experienced rider, she could have foreseen the risk that the horse might rear, causing the resultant injury. Id.
By contrast, the ambiguity in B & B’s release illustrates that it was not simple, clear, and uncomplicated. While the plaintiff in Heil Valley stated that she understood the agreement, Riehl stated here that she relied on the operative phrase in the release, “inherent risk.” None of Riehl’s claims based upon negligence or gross negligence are among the inherent risks of equine activity set forth in section 13-21-119. The agreement in this ease makes no reference to the risk that an operator might commit acts of negligence by providing faulty equipment or a horse that was unsuited to the rider’s abilities. Therefore the release did not address a risk that described the circumstances of the plaintiffs injury. -Finally, in contrast to the rider in Heil Valley, Riehl was a novice rider. She had ridden a horse only once before — on a beginner’s trail.6
A novice like Riehl who is presented with a pre-printed form, is eager to commence the ride, and is relying on the good faith of the person to whom she has paid the price of service, should expect that a business like B & B is not departing from customary safety practices of the industry. She, and other visitors and residents of Colorado like her, should, not be required to scrutinize such an instrument for its intent before mounting the horse.
*141Accordingly, I would uphold the judgment of the court of appeals.
MULLARKEY and MARTINEZ, JJ., join in this dissent.

. The majority cites two federal district court cases, applying Colorado law, that granted’summary judgment motions in negligence actions based on exculpatory agreements that the court found to be unambiguous. Maj. op. at 136. In each of those cases, however, one of the releases Signed by the plaintiffs explicitly waived claims for actions based upon negligence. See Potter v. National Handicapped Sports, 849 F.Supp. 1407, 1410-11 (D.Colo.1994); Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc., 941 F.Supp. 959, 960-61 (D.Colo. 1996).