Court Opinion

ID: 9699649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:43:51.227424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:15.931294
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by HARRELL, J. Which BATTAGLIA and WILNER, JJ. join.
Although I agree with the Majority opinion Parts I and II, I disagree with the sanctions analysis and result in Part III. The Majority opinion concludes that the time periods involved in the present case and Respondent’s prior disciplinary action, Atty. Griev. Comm’n v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 919 A.2d 669 (2007) (“Mba-Jonas I”), overlap “to a certain extent.” Maj. op. at 346, 936 A.2d at 846. It reaches this conclusion on the basis that the Court filed its opinion in Mba-Jonas I on 20 March 2007 and the proceedings in the present case were initiated on 19 December 2005. Id. On the basis of this *349observation in gross, the Majority opinion penultimately expresses the view that it is “appropriate to consider [Respondent’s] present violations as a continuation of his previous improper [and substantially similar] misconduct.” Id. Therefore, for sanctions purposes, the Majority opinion considers the misconduct in both cases as constituting a “whole.” The focus of the Majority opinion is wrong.
The actual misconduct in Mba-Jonas I occurred over the period June 2003—June 2004. Mba-Jonas I, 397 Md. at 695-97, 919 A.2d at 672-74. The misconduct upon which the present case relies occurred during December 2004—October 2005. Respondent had been given the benefit of advice from Petitioner’s investigator, Mr. Fiedler, as early as 23 January 2004, about the specific record-keeping requirements of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as having a monitor of his bookkeeping practices from March 2004 to at least June 2004 (Mba-Jonas I, 397 Md. at 695, 919 A.2d at 672) under a failed conditional Diversion Agreement. Notwithstanding these affirmative efforts by others to get him to straighten out his record-keeping, Respondent persisted in the present case to ignore what was expected of him, after he no longer could claim ignorance of the requirements, over a substantially longer period of time than was embraced by them is conduct in Mba-Jonas I.
To my thinking, it is not the overlap of the prosecution and pendency of these cases that should be the focus of the sanctions analysis, but rather the actual dates of the misconduct. There was a clear separation of the misconduct of MbarJonas I, and that in the present case. The separation becomes even more meaningful in light of the external efforts made to get Respondent to conform to the ethical norms and his continued refusal and failure to do so. Simply put, there is no “whole” or single unit of prosecution (to borrow a phrase from another legal context) here.
Moreover, I am troubled by Respondent’s effort, clumsy though it was, to explain away his misconduct through the disingenuous solicitation and tender of Mr. Okechukwu’s let*350ter. Respondent was found by the hearing judge to have “deliberately tried to conceal his connection to [Mr. Okechukwu],” a former client of Respondent.
This record convinces me that Respondent remains resolutely oblivious to the ethical expectations and requirements for the safekeeping and accounting of trust monies and seems prepared to be devious and unforthcoming when sought to be held accountable for his actions. In order to protect the public from the probable continuing perpetration of Respondent’s misconduct and to set a proper example for the Bar as to the tolerance limits for this sort of ongoing pattern of misconduct, I would disbar Respondent.
Judge BATTAGLIA and Judge WILNER authorized me to state that they join the views expressed in this dissent.