Court Opinion

ID: 9375015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 18:00:50.962231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:54.845892
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 24 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANTOS VILLATORO-MOLINA, AKA                    No.    18-72070
Santos Villa,
                                                Agency No. A205-576-490
                Petitioner,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                          Submitted February 21, 2023**

Before: OWENS, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

      Santos Villatoro-Molina, a citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order affirming the denial of his application

for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and

we dismiss in part and deny in part.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
       1. Villatoro argues that separation from his daughter would create an

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, and that this court should reverse the

Immigration Judge (IJ) and BIA’s judgments as a result. This court has held that

hardship determinations are discretionary. Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d

887, 891 (9th Cir. 2003). We are statutorily barred from reconsidering discretionary

decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), and so we lack jurisdiction to review

this issue. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 929–30 (9th Cir. 2005).

      2. Next, Villatoro asserts that the IJ failed to inform him of his apparent

eligibility for voluntary departure and did not allow him or his counsel to address

the issue, violating his due process rights. Reversal of the BIA’s decision is

appropriate only if the proceedings were so fundamentally unfair that Villatoro was

unable to present his case, and if Villatoro shows he was materially so prejudiced

that the violations affected the outcome. Benedicto v. Garland, 12 F.4th 1049, 1058

(9th Cir. 2021); Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2006); see

also Tovar-Landin v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is no

constitutionally protected liberty interest in the discretionary privilege of voluntary

departure.”). Neither of Villatoro’s claims meet this threshold.

      While the IJ has a duty to inform noncitizens of apparent eligibility for relief,

the “apparent eligibility” standard of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) is only triggered when

“the facts before the IJ raise a ‘reasonable possibility that the petitioner may be

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eligible for relief.’” C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting

Moran-Enriquez v. INS, 884 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1989)). Here, the IJ denied

voluntary departure “because no evidence was presented regarding this form of relief

from removal.” 1    The IJ has no duty to comb the record for evidence of

eligibility. See United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“Until the alien himself or some other person puts information before the judge that

makes such eligibility apparent, this duty does not come into play.”) (quoting

Moran-Enriquez, 884 F.2d at 422).

      Villatoro’s claim that the IJ did not allow him to address his eligibility for

voluntary departure also fails. There are no facts in the record to suggest Villatoro

was denied this opportunity, and when the IJ asked if the parties wished to make any

further arguments or submit further documents, Villatoro declined.

      The BIA held that Villatoro had not “demonstrated any harm that deprived

him of due process, including any prejudicial defects in the proceedings below.” See

Matter of Santos, 19 I&N Dec. 105, 112 (BIA 1984). Villatoro fails to show that his

proceedings were fundamentally unfair or that he suffered any prejudice, so there

are no grounds to reverse the BIA’s decision.

      DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.

1
  Villatoro argues the IJ erred in finding that he lacked a good moral character. As
the BIA explained, the IJ did not make an explicit finding regarding Villatoro’s
moral character.

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