Court Opinion

ID: 9840184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 15:11:54.013109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:41.644542
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              September 15, 2023
                                                                                 EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                 STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                          SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

                                SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                      OF WEST VIRGINIA

State of West Virginia,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent

vs.) No. 22-0363 (Summers County 21-F-61)

Christopher James Cody,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Christopher J. Cody (“Petitioner”) appeals from the Circuit Court of Summers County’s
final judgment of April 14, 2022, sentencing him for his jury convictions on three counts of
possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute and one count of possessing a controlled
substance. The State filed a response. 1 On appeal, petitioner alleges that the circuit court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his home
because the search was allegedly unlawful. Upon our review, finding no substantial question of
law and no prejudicial error, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a
memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P.
21(c).

         On September 8, 2021, West Virginia State Police Trooper First Class Jack C. Woods went
to petitioner’s home in response to a report of a stolen cell phone. He was informed that petitioner’s
phone had been taken by petitioner’s ex-wife, Angel Cody. When the trooper retrieved the phone,
Ms. Cody told him that petitioner was involved in dealing drugs. After some additional
investigation of possible drug trafficking by petitioner, the trooper returned the phone to petitioner
at his residence. The ensuing discussion and search were captured on the trooper’s body cam.

        During a discussion in his cruiser, the trooper told petitioner that he had been informed of
alleged drug dealing and wanted petitioner’s consent to search his residence. Petitioner was
repeatedly advised that he did not have to consent, but if the trooper obtained a warrant, the search
would be conducted by several officers instead of just the trooper, that there would probably be
some publicity on Facebook, and that it might be embarrassing to petitioner’s family (petitioner’s
parents lived nearby on the same road). In addition, if the trooper had to call the sheriff and ask
him to obtain a warrant, the house would have to be locked down and no one would be allowed to
leave until deputies arrived with the warrant. Petitioner was also told that he was free to leave and
free to call his attorney.

       1
          Petitioner is represented by attorney Joshua D. Brown. Respondent State of West Virginia
is represented by Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General Andrea Nease
Proper.
                                                  1
         Petitioner said, “F*** it. Come on,” or similar words, 2 and started walking toward his
home. The Trooper took this as consent to search, and followed him, at one time asking petitioner
to slow down so that he could catch up, which petitioner did. At the suppression hearing, petitioner
testified that he meant that the trooper should call the sheriff and ask him to get a search warrant,
not that the trooper could come in the house and search without a warrant. He also testified at the
suppression hearing that he thought the trooper wanted to “look” instead of “search” and that
looking, and searching, were “two different things.”

         In any event, the trooper entered the house and conducted a search during which he found
two boxes: a gray box containing baggies, weights for a scale, a grinder, and a small black box
containing controlled substances. He also found $1,024.00 worth of five-, ten- and twenty-dollar
bills in petitioner’s wallet, which the Trooper later testified were commonly used denominations
in drug deals. During the search, petitioner produced a bag of marijuana, placed it on the table in
front of him, and said it was his. After the black box was located, petitioner said that he did not
realize it was in the house when he authorized the search, thinking that it was under his vehicle.
At no time during the search did petitioner clearly tell the trooper to stop searching, or that he
withdrew his consent.

        At one point during the search, petitioner did say “I change” but this portion of the body
cam video is hard to hear, and the parties disagree as to whether these words were followed by
“my mind.” After the incriminating evidence had been located, petitioner asked “didn’t I need to
sign consent papers?” Trooper Woods responded that he had petitioner’s verbal consent on his
body cam video, so he did not need a written consent. When the trooper said this, petitioner did
not dispute having given verbal consent.

        Following the search, petitioner was taken to the Hinton Detachment of the State Police
where he was given a Miranda 3 warning, questioned by Trooper Woods and Summers County
Sheriff Faris, and gave a statement. The audio recording of his statement contains a confession of
drug dealing and a confirmation that the search of petitioner’s home had been consensual.
Petitioner admits that some of this recording is in his voice but alleges that the tape has been altered
and that the statement saying that he had consented to the search was not uttered by him.

        A suppression hearing was held on February 16, 2022, and petitioner’s motion to suppress
evidence was denied because the circuit court found that the search had been consensual, declaring
that “[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that
[petitioner] had consented” to a search of the residence. A one-day trial was held on February 28,
2022, and petitioner was found guilty on three counts of possession of controlled substances with
intent to deliver (one count apiece for methamphetamine, fentanyl, and suboxone) and one count
of possession related to marijuana.

        2
         In his closing argument at trial, petitioner’s counsel stated that petitioner said, “F*** it.
Let’s go.” During the suppression hearing, petitioner claimed to have said “F*** it. Let’s do this,”
and then “F*** it. Let’s do this. Call the sheriff.” The briefs filed by both parties on appeal,
however, both state that petitioner said: “F*** it. Come on.”
        3
            See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                                   2
      We have previously established the following standard of review when considering
motions to suppress evidence:

                      When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an
               appellate court should construe all facts in the light most favorable
               to the State, as it was the prevailing party below. Because of the
               highly fact-specific nature of a motion to suppress, particular
               deference is given to the findings of the circuit court because it had
               the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to hear testimony on
               the issues. Therefore, the circuit court's factual findings are
               reviewed for clear error.

Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Lacy, 196 W. Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996).

       Furthermore:

                       In contrast to a review of the circuit court’s factual findings,
               the ultimate determination as to whether a search or seizure was
               reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
               Constitution and Section 6 of Article III of the West Virginia
               Constitution is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Similarly,
               an appellate court reviews de novo whether a search warrant was too
               broad. Thus, a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence
               will be affirmed unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence,
               based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or, based on the
               entire record, it is clear that a mistake has been made.

Lacy, 196 W. Va. at 107, 468 S.E.2d 719, 722, Syl. Pt. 2. Having determined the applicable
standard of review, we proceed to a consideration of the merits.

        As the Court has observed, “[t]he Fourth Amendment, as well as article III, section 6 of
the West Virginia Constitution, protects individuals in their homes against unreasonable search
and seizure. As a general rule, warrantless searches of a person’s home are forbidden.” State v.
Buzzard, 194 W. Va. 544, 549, 461 S.E.2d 50, 55, (1995) (citations omitted). This general rule is
subject to certain exceptions, such as where “authorities have obtained the voluntary consent of a
person authorized to grant such consent.” Id. In the present case, the State contends that the
warrantless search of petitioner’s residence was authorized by the petitioner. Petitioner asserts that
he did not authorize the search, but should his language and acts be construed as expressing
consent, that such consent was coerced, and was therefore invalid. He also asserts that he withdrew
his consent during the search.

        Initially, we must consider whether petitioner consented to a warrantless search of his
dwelling through his words and actions. After some discussion of his choice to voluntarily agree
to a search or wait until a search warrant was obtained, petitioner left the trooper’s vehicle, saying
words to the effect of “F*** it. Come on.” He walked toward his house with the trooper following

                                                  3
behind him. When the trooper asked him to slow down so that he could catch up, petitioner
complied. The trooper then followed him inside through the open door, with petitioner making no
attempt to prevent him from entering. Thus, “the facts available to the officer at the moment of
entry [were sufficient to] ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the party had
voluntarily authorized the officer’s entry onto the premises.” Id. at 550, 461 S.E.2d at 56; accord
State v. Jarvis, No. 14-1154, 2015 WL 7628838, at *2 (W. Va. Nov. 23, 2015) (memorandum
decision). As the court observed in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Flippo, 212 W. Va. 560, 575 S.E.2d
170 (2002), “a search may be lawful even if the person giving consent does not recite the talismanic
phrase: ‘You have my permission to search.’”

        Having found that the lower court did not err in finding that petitioner verbally consented
to a search, we now consider whether that consent was freely given without duress or coercion. In
Buzzard, we set out several relevant criteria to consider in determining whether consent to search
was voluntarily given:

                       The circuit court, and this Court on review, should consider
               the following six criteria when evaluating the voluntariness of a
               defendant’s consent: 1) the defendant’s custodial status; 2) the use
               of duress or coercive tactics by law enforcement personnel; 3) the
               defendant’s knowledge of his right to refuse to consent; 4) the
               defendant’s education and intelligence; 5) the defendant’s belief that
               no incriminating evidence will be found; and 6) the extent and level
               of the defendant’s cooperation with the law enforcement personnel.
               While each of these criteria is generally relevant in analyzing
               whether consent is given voluntarily, no one factor is dispositive or
               controlling in determining the voluntariness of consent since such
               determinations continue to be based on the totality of the
               circumstances.

194 W. Va. at 545-46, 461 S.E.2d at 51-52, Syl. Pt. 3. Applying these factors to the facts of this
case, we conclude that petitioner’s Motion to Suppress was properly denied by the lower court.

        First, we note that petitioner was not in custody when he gave consent to search his house.
He was sitting in Trooper Woods’s cruiser but had not been arrested or restrained in any way. In
fact, he was told that he was free to leave.

        Turning to the second factor, petitioner’s consent was not obtained through duress or
coercion. He was repeatedly told that he did not have to consent to a search and that he was free
to call his attorney. In fact, petitioner testified that the trooper was “awful nice” to him. Trooper
Woods’s statements that a formal search with a warrant might be embarrassing to petitioner and
his family, or that the house would have to be locked down and no one would be allowed to leave
until the warrant arrived, seem more like statements of fact than threats given the circumstances
of this case. See Jarvis, 2015 WL 7628838, at *3 (telling a defendant that he could either consent
to a search or wait outside in a law enforcement vehicle until a warrant was obtained was not a
threat that vitiated consent).

                                                 4
        As for the third factor, knowledge of the right to refuse consent, petitioner was frequently
told prior to the search that he did not have to consent, and that Trooper Woods would not be
“mad” if he refused to do so. Moreover, petitioner was familiar with law enforcement officers
obtaining written consents prior to searches, which indicates that he had some awareness of the
need to obtain consent in some form.

        The fourth factor relates to a defendant’s education and intelligence. According to the
Presentence Investigation Report, petitioner dropped out of the eighth grade at the age of sixteen.
Although petitioner’s formal education may have been somewhat limited, the record indicates that
he was familiar with the criminal justice system through his many prior brushes with the law and
was knowledgeable enough to ask the trooper about whether he should have been asked to sign a
written consent.

        As for the fifth factor, petitioner’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found
during a search, petitioner remarked that he thought a small black box was supposed to be under
his vehicle, instead of in his house. During the search, that box was found to contain substances
later identified as methamphetamine, fentanyl, and suboxone. Apparently, when he was asked
whether he consented to a warrantless search of his house, he did not realize that this box would
be inside where it could be found during a search.

        The sixth and final Buzzard factor is “the extent and level of the defendant’s cooperation
with law enforcement personnel.” See 194 W. Va. at 545-46, 461 S.E.2d at 51-52, Syl. Pt. 3. In
this case, the evidence indicates that petitioner had a lengthy discussion with the trooper before
verbally agreeing to a warrantless search. The evidence also shows that petitioner discussed his
drug usage with the trooper, attempted to discount his ex-wife’s allegations that he was dealing,
slowed down when he walked toward his house so the trooper could catch up with him, opened
the door, and allowed the trooper to enter his residence without objection. Once the trooper was
inside, petitioner did not expressly withdraw his consent or ask the trooper to stop searching. 4 In
fact, he produced a bag of marijuana, placed it on the table in front of him, and said it was his
marijuana.

        After considering the totality of the circumstances, construing all facts in the light most
favorable to the state, and giving particular deference to the findings of the circuit court, we
conclude that the lower court did not err in denying petitioner’s motion to exclude evidence and
in allowing this case to proceed to verdict.

       For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s order of April 14, 2022, is hereby affirmed.

       4
         Petitioner alleges that he told the trooper that he had changed his mind during the search,
but that statement is hard to hear, and reasonable people could disagree over whether the words
“my mind” were uttered after “I changed.” Moreover, it is not clear whether this statement was
directed toward the trooper or toward a woman who was in the house during the search. It is
possible that this remark was related to petitioner’s attempt to leave a room that was being searched
when the trooper wanted him to remain.

                                                 5
                                        Affirmed.

ISSUED: September 15, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:
Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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