Court Opinion

ID: 9654806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:51:45.74072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:13.670952
License: Public Domain

LARSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The majority has reached out to decide this case on a theory that the appellant has not raised at any point in the history of the case — from her resistance to the motion to dismiss, through her petition for judicial review, and up to this court.
On appeal to this court, Zieckler complains that
[t]he Commissioner’s actions in dismissing Zieckler’s appeal were unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and deprived Zieckler of the opportunity to have her appeal decided on the merits. Moreover, rule 876-I.A.C. 4.30, if interpreted to require dismissal in this case is an unreasonable exercise of the agency’s rule-making authority. The Commissioner’s actions violated Iowa Code § 17A.19, and the dismissal should be reversed and the appeal reinstated.
Zieckler’s complaint that the commissioner’s action “violated Iowa Code § 17A.19” is so general that it gives virtually no guidance to a court. Perhaps Zieckler. intends to argue that the commissioner violated some provision of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10), which lists fourteen grounds for reversing agency action. Her brief does not specify on which of these grounds she relies. The majority, however, fills in the gap by expressly basing its holding on section 17A.19(10)(&), a statute that was not even cited by Zieck-ler. Despite the fact Zieckler does not even mention this section, the majority holds that its application mandates reversal. Under that section, if the action of the agency is “[n]ot required by law and the negative impact ... is ... grossly disproportionate to the benefits accruing to the public,” the action lacks a rational basis. This section helps give meaning to one of the legislature’s stated purposes for the administrative procedure act, which “is to increase the fairness of agencies in their conduct of contested case proceedings.” Iowa Code § 17A.23.
However, this court’s concern for reaching what it perceives to be a fair result in a particular case cannot trump well-established principles of appellate procedure. One of these principles is that we will not “assume a partisan role and undertake the appellant’s research and advocacy.” See Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974); accord In re Det. of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 285 (Iowa *5352000); State v. Stoen, 596 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Iowa 1999). The rationale for such a self-imposed rule is obvious. If a court fills in the gaps in an appellant’s argument, it skews the judicial review process because it deprives opposing parties, and the district court, of an opportunity to meet the argument. Here, Zieckler does not argue that her right to appeal is grossly disproportionate to the public’s benefit. She does not hint at such a theory. In fact, as already noted, she does not even cite Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(/c), the section on which the majority relies.
If we allow dissatisfied parties such as Zieckler to take a shotgun approach by claiming simply, as Zieckler does, that the agency’s action was “unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious” and leave it to a court to fill in the gaps, we will open the floodgates to judicial review proceedings.
I would hold Zieckler to the arguments she actually made in her appeal to this court, not her arguments as supplemented and embellished by the majority. I would, therefore, defer to the commissioner’s rule-making authority and affirm the judgment of the district court.