Court Opinion

ID: 9710916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:20:31.936467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.062003
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE MILLS, concurring: No quarrel have I with the doctrine of legislative classification. But when a statute transcends the perimeters of that principle, and encroaches upon constitutional prohibitions, then its application must necessarily be circumscribed. And I believe that such is the case here. I concur with Mr. Justice Craven’s conclusion that the Skinner rationale applies to this case and that — on the narrow legal issue posed — the two appeals are indistinguishable. Both statutes of time limitations attempt to accomplish precisely the same end: To immunize or protect a limited class within a broad field, sheltering a favored part of the greater whole. What Skinner says about architects and contractors in the construction domain is what we must say here about physicians and hospitals in the health care arena. I am unable to discern any meaningful distinction in a logical comparison. Consequently, I am of the view that the unanimous opinion of our supreme court in Skinner mandates the declaration of unconstitutionality spelled out in the primary opinion here. As to Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association, the majority of the court in that case did hold that a medical malpractice monetary recoverable limitation of *500,000 was arbitrary and equated a special legislative treatment. I do not subscribe, however, to the reasoning of that portion of the opinion. The history and background of the avalanche of medical malpractice litigation and its disasterous effect upon health care costs, insurance, etc., afford a logical and reasonable basis for a differentiation between classes of litigants complaining of injuries. We do not live in a vacuum — our society is not a void — and the legislative attempt to cope with the particular type of case now in both the legal and societal spotlight was, in my view, a reasonable exercise of legislative discretion. But, although I personally disagree with such conclusion, I consider that we are bound by the supreme court holding in Wright. It is the law of Illinois — and it supports the application of Skinner. In short, I conclude that the appeal at bar must be reversed on the ground that the subject statute exceeds the four corners of constitutional prescription.