Court Opinion

ID: 9559341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:27:05.969829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:45.730760
License: Public Domain

*323WOLFE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I concur in the statement
“that matters of negligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause generally are jury questions”.
I also agree
“that where a verdict is directed, the evidence on appeal will be canvassed in a light most favorable to him against whom it is directed.”
But I think the latter rule has been pushed in some cases to unreasonable lengths. I do not think it was meant to cover cases where there is, on one pan of the scale, clear and unimpeáched eyewitness testimony of the .physical circumstances leading up to the event of the accident and of the accident itself by disinterested witnesses attended by no inherent inconsistencies and no reasonable showing of anything which would impede their observations but rather by circumstances which impressed their observations on their minds; whilst on the other pan are placed remote or barely possible conclusions based on attenuated or questionable testimony or on imagined or strained possibilities having no substantial basis.10
In this case, there was a legal duty on the deceased bicycler to have a light on his vehicle. It was negligence in law not to have one. He did not have one. It is admitted in the prevailing opinion that he was guilty of “some” negligence as a matter of law. But it is said that it is a jury question as to whether the failure to carry a light was a proximate cause of the accident; that the cab driver might not have seen it anyway. But this is not a case where an impervious substance or object was intruded between the point where the light should have been and the cab driver, *324such for instance as another car which would in any event have cut off a gleam from a light had there been one. In such a case, the jury could definitely find that the intruding object would, had there been a light on the bicycle, have nevertheless made it useless and hence the lack of a light could not have been the proximate cause of the collision. One of the reasons why a light is required is because it is known that on dark, misty or rainy nights or days the gleam from a light is one of the best means of warning drivers of the presence or approach of another, although it may be of little use in bettering the vision of the driver or rider. That is the very reason travelers turn their lights on in the daytime when they go through foggy or dusty areas. That the cab driver in this case might or could not have seen the light had it been there is pure conjecture and there is really no substantial basis even for the conjecture. Certainly he whose fault makes the conjecture necessary should not have it operate in his favor. Before we can take a case from the jury, must we allow it to conjecture that even had the traveler carried a light, it would have been ineffi-cacious where there is not even a substantial basis for such conjecture? If so, the obligation imposed by a positive duty of the law (statute or ordinance) and the purpose for which imposed will in many cases be negated. We cannot give the party, derelict in that duty, the benefit of such speculation. It must at least appear from the evidence that under the circumstances it could and would not have been effective and not that
“because of the weather and possible obscured vision the cab driver could not have seen the lamp in any event.”
The very “darkness, wetness, rain, mist” and likelihood of mistaking depth perception makes the lamp imperative and the lack of it all the more negligent. To say that under such circumstances the jury might find that the lack of a light was not a proximate cause would seem to place a premium on not carrying a light.
*325I doubt in this case whether the deceased could have
“acted as an ordinary prudent [lightless] person in failing to appraise accurately the proximity of the cab or its speed, so as reasonably to have misjudged his ability to clear the intersection in safety.”
But if he failed to carry the instrumentality which was designed to aid him better to judge of those factors or which would have warned or served to aid others in learning of his approach, how could he be the ordinary prudent man in his conduct on that occasion? The law requiring a light sets in part the standard of prudence required. Could such argument be made if an auto driver went out in any kind of weather without lights ? The duty of the cycler was no less.
How is it with a horn or a good brake, both required by the law? If there is no horn so no sound could be emitted, could the jury, unless the circumstances were such that as a matter of law it could be said that the sound of a horn could not in any event have been heard, be permitted to speculate that the horn would not have alerted an inattentive driver or pedestrian? Only in a case where the court can as a matter of law say that the sound of the horn, had there been one and had it been sounded, would nevertheless not have been heard, could it be said to have been in law non-contributing to the accident. Such ease would be analogous to the case where the court must say that an impervious object would have shut off the gleam from a light had there been a light. If there were no brake or only a totally inadequate brake, could the jury be alowed to speculate in a situation where brakes are intended to be used, that nevertheless had there been brakes the use of them could have had no effect in impeding the driver’s vehicle? Of course, if any possible braking could not sufficiently have reduced the speed and therefore the momentum, the accident might not have been avoided but even though the effects of a stronger impact might have been. Unless the situation is such that it is clear that had there been a light, or horn *326or brake, such devices would nevertheless have been utterly useless in the situation, we must presume, as against a driver who lacked any one of the required devices, that it might have aided in avoiding the accident or mitigated its severity and hence that its absence was contributory to the accident, or the damage flowing therefrom.
Outside of the factor that deceased had no lights, I think dubitatively here it may have been a jury question whether he proceded across the intersection as would have an ordinary prudent man. For purposes of the discussion here in progress, I assume so. But I think he was ngeligent in law in failing to carry a light and we cannot allow the jury to speculate under the facts of this case whether that the light might nevertheless not have served the purposes for which it was required so as to leave the question of proximate cause to the jury. I think the verdict pursuant to the instruction “no cause of action” should be affirmed.
In his opinion, Mr. Justice HENRIOD appears to play down the fact that the deceased did not have a light. He mentions it rather casually and then proceeds to discuss the case on the facts without including the salient fact of absence of a light seemingly on the theory that the trial court did not mention or attribute the absence of the light as a contributing cause as the basis for his directed verdict “no cause of action”. Regardless of whether the trial court assigned the correct basis for his ruling, in that he may not have mentioned every ingredient which made up the contributory negligence of the deceased or regardless even if he omitted the only element which would have required him in law to take the case from the jury, his ruling on the question presented by the motion for a directed verdict must stand or fall on whether the conduct of the deceased in proceeding without a light is in law such as to prevent his heirs from recovering.
The matter then comes down to this: The deceased was clearly negligent in law in failing to carry a light; that *327the absence of any warning gleam of light which was one of the very purposes for which the law required the light must necessarily be assumed to have contributed to the accident unless we shield the deceased from the consequences of his dereliction by a purely gratuitous assumption and conjecture that the mist and/or darkness would nevertheless have obscured the gleam had there been a light. Surely when the defendant goes to the extent of showing that a traveler was proceeding without a device required by the law which was designed to warn the defendant and others of the traveler’s approach, he, the defendant, does not need to go further and show that had the traveler been equipped with such device it would have been efficacious in warning him (the defendant). Certainly had there been a light gleam emanating from the decedent’s bicycle, it would have had some depth penetration into the gloom even though that penetration may have been somewhat in a direction away from the cab, in fact itself not certain from the evidence. The gleam might have been very faint and the jury could have concluded that the cab driver did or could not see it but when there was no light to send forth a gleam, the jury should not be permitted to speculate that even had there been one it would have done no good. Even the faintest gleam might, if traced through the chain of its effect in possibly or probably alerting a traveler in the darkness and his possible or probable response, mean the difference between life and death. Ships that pass in the night must avail themselves of every device to alert each other and avoid collision.
If a light is required by law and hence the failure of the requirement to have a light, the purpose of which is to counteract the effects of darkness or lack of visibility, is negligence in law, then implicit in the very failure to have that light (the negligence) is the fact that the failure caused or contributed to the accident since the accident grew out of the condition of darkness or impaired visibility due to *328darkness. Such conclusion would be logical and is simple common sense.
If this case were withdrawn from the jury for the reasons I state, it would not amount to requiring plaintiffs to prove freedom of deceased from contributory negligence. Would the defendant have been required to show what penetrating power of gleam would have been needed on that morning in view of the fact that the deceased carried no light whatsoever. I cannot agree that, in the face of admitted negligence — in the face of negligence in law- — a defendant must prove that had the deceased carried what the law required him to carry, it would have been adequate for the occasion. It seems but commonm sense that the defendant would not only have made out a case of negligence on the part of the deceased when it was disclosed that the latter had no light, but would have made, subject to rebuttal, at least a prima facie case of proximate and efficient contribution to the cause of the accident. To require the defendant to go further would be to make him carry the burden of anticipating matters introducible by the plaintiffs by way of rebuttal rather than visiting upon the plaintiffs a requirement
“to prove facts showing decedent’s freedom from contributory negligence proximately causing the accident.”
The sequence would be as follows: (1) Evidence by the heirs that the defendant was negligent or perhaps a reliance on the presumption that deceased was exercising due care for his own safety after introduction of matters of inducement.11 (2) Defendant’s evidence of his own conduct claimed to show due care and to negative the charge of his negligence and (3) in addition, evidence of the deceased’s failure to perform his legally required duty of *329carrying a light, which, failure would not only be negligence in law, but since one of the very purposes for which said light was required was to warn others of his approach, would intrinsically carry the deduction that the failure to carry it was a contributing cause of the accident. (4) Matters by the plaintiffs which would show that a gleam from a light could not (not that it might not) have alerted the defendant because the situation was such that such gleam, if there had been one, would have been totally invisible to the defendant. (5) In absence of such rebutting evidence, a ruling by the court, as in this case, directing a verdict “no cause of action”.
Outside of what I have said above, I shall not allude further to Mr. Justice Wade’s concurring opinion in this case except as referred to in footnotes 12 and 13 below. Mr. Justice Wade in footnote 7 to the first paragraph of his concurring opinion in this case12 has cited the Tuttle case *330as authority of this court for a proposition which I do not think is established in this state because I do not think that more than one Justice joined in that part of his opinion in the Tuttle case dealing with the efficacy and duration of the presumption of due care for his own safety which attends a decedent killed in an accident.13
*?I agree that it is
“not the inevitable conclusion that anyone killed or injured in an intersection [collision], or the other principal [party] in the event, of necessity must have been guilty of some carelessness contributing to the mishap”
but I am constrained to add to an observation to that statement.14
*333McDONOUGH, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of WOLFE, C. J.

An illustration of what I mean is contained in my dissenting opinion in the case of Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 121 Utah 420, 242 P. 2d 764.

 I should note here that Mr. Justice Wade does not think that presumption has any bearing in this case. Since I do not want to further complicate this case, already too far expanded, I shall make no issue of that matter.

 Whether the presumption serves until evidence is produced making a prima facie case overcoming it, or as I maintain, only until some evidence on how or why the accident happened is produced after the disfavored party has proceeded; whether the “required burden” used in Mr. Justice Wade’s opinion in the Tuttle case meant the burden of going so far as to make out a prima facie defense by persuasion, or as I then understood it and so stated, only the burden of proceeding after effect was given to the presumption; whether at bottom these are simply two ways of expressing the same idea; whether I am inconsistent with myself in my opinion in the Tuttle case and my opinion in this case; whether the opinion of Mr. Justice Crockett in the Tuttle case is consistent only with a holding that a prima facie case overcoming the presumption will nullify it; whether the “burden of going forward” now means the burden of persuading the fact trier that the presumption has been overcome in spite of my statement in the Tuttle case that I understood Mr. Justice Wade then to use it only in the sense of a duty to go forward and not a duty to persuade; whether this presumption of the use of due care for one’s safety is as temporary and ephemeral as the presumption of sanity as I rather think it is; * * * whether there is not a great different between a presumption which the law furnishes because of the experience of mankind and an inference which arises out of the evidence in the very case; and whether if the presumption *330disappears as I suggested, the inference may stay in as part of the evidence in the case; whether putting the duty on the judge to decide if the quantum of the evidence is sufficient or insufficient to make a prima facie case against the presumption so that it goes out or stays in; whether this does not introduce a rule which complicates the procedure applying to the presumption under discussion; whether, if the judge decides that the evidence is not sufficient to make a prima facie case against the presumption it stays in even though not mentioned as such, and whether anything is gained beyond what could be deduced or inferred by the jury if the presumption stays in unmentioned; and whether, if there is contrary evidence but not sufficient in the mind of the judge to overcome the presumption the judge should “direct the jury to assume the presumed fact” — these and other questions which occur to me prompted by footnote 7 of Mr. Justice Wade’s opinion, I cannot stay to discuss. They will surely press for answers at a later time when fact situations make more apposite their consideration.

I call attention to Mr. Justice Wade’s citation of Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., supra, in his footnote 7 as authority for the statements made in the first paragraph of his concurring opinion in this case. I express no opinion at this time as to the correctness or incorrectness of the principles stated by him in that paragraph. But I doubt if the case of Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., supra, can be cited as court authority for any of those statements. There was no majority opinion in that case on the question of the extent or efficacy of the presumption that one uses due care for his own safety. Mr. Justice Wade wrote the main opinion in that case. That opinion was concurred in by Mr. Justice McDonough. Mr Justice Henriod did not participate. Mr. Justice Crockett expressly avoided passing upon the office and extent of the presumption or on the question of when the presumption was nullified or at what point of the case it went out and the amount of evidence required to overcome it, and this on the theory that the jury had decided that the deceased had been going north and hence the conclusion was inevitable that the negligence of the P. I. E. had caused the death. But at all *?events that case could not have decided the question for which Mr. Justice Wade cites it as authority in this case. In that case I dissented stating so far as the matter of the principle was concerned, I could agree with Mr. Justice Wade that the deceased being clothed with the presumption, the defendant must meet the “required burden”, if by the required burden was meant “only, [the burden] of going forward * * * [with] some evidence of how the accident happened”. An examination of my dissenting opinion shows that I went no further. I expressly said “The ‘required burden’ as used in the quoted sentence, I assume, is not that of satisfying a particular quantum of proof or of introducing enough evidence to satisfy the jury that the presumption or presumptive fact is overcome. The burden is only that of going forward.” (Emphasis is part of the quotation.) At another point in my opinion I stated “Hence, where there is any evidence [emphasis is part of the quotation] which shows how or why the accident happened (circumstances of it) the presumption that the party who was clothed with it used due care, is sluffed off and the plaintiff is left with his proof, * * How the above can be construed to be in support by me of the statement seemingly included in footnote 7 of Mr. Justice Wade’s opinion, I am at a loss to understand.
There can be no stare decisis by a minority of the court. Where one judge does not participate and another dissents on the very question supposed to have been decided, and a third avoids deciding it by taking a view that supposedly does not require the question to be decided, no law in respect to that question is laid down by such decision of the court.

Judging from many cases which came before me while I was on the trial bench and from the records on appeals to this court and my experience in life, it is my opinion that most accidents are caused by the negligence of one or both or more parties and could with due care have been avoided; and this is especially true with intersection *332collisions. The accident that is a pure mishap or unavoidable accident is a rarity.
There are careful drivers and reckless and indifferent ones. The person who is careful and who suffers injury from the negligence of another should obtain redress. What should be guarded against is a policy which permits recovery in flimsy or manufactured or undeserved cases.
The fault lies largely with the courts and that applies also to the courts of review. The whole problem of fixing blame and assessing damages involves effects which transcend those that attend any individual case or cases. It involves the principle of distribution of risk by a pooling process. It involves a policy of encouraging automobile owners to carry liability insurance. This is a healthy practice which should be extended and encouraged. But the proper distribution of risk suffers if a premium is placed on permitting the unentitled to recover. The rates for this type of insurance are increasing apace. Under inflationary conditions, people, especially those with fixed or near fixed incomes, can hardly afford this type of insurance and on a tight budget tend to take a chance and dispense with it, at times with severe economic and health consequences to themselves, their families and/or those they may injure. So the effect of easy recoveries and large verdicts is transferred to the insurance companies and from them to the rate payers and finally to the public at large by increased rates. The problem is one of national importance. Juries, and at times, I think, judges forget that the barrel from which the money to pay damages comes from is not bottomless. Until some better method of handling claims for recovery for damages actually suffered from the fault of another is devised by society than the one which holds before plaintiff’s attorneys large prizes in the form of a contingent substantial portion of a collected verdict and before insurance attorneys’ motives to defeat such verdicts by every means legally available — and sometimes just available, — the temptations on both sides will be flagrantly present. Under such circumstances the battle for the mind of the judge and for the minds of the jurymen will be so intense as to not be conducive of the calm, judicial atmosphere and inquiry which produces the application of sound legal principles and dispassionate and objective fact finding. The immediate remedy lies partly in withdrawing from the jury by granting a motion to dismiss or motion for a directed verdict or motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict when, as in this case, it clearly appears that in law there was negligence on the part of complaining or deceased party and that such negligence proximately caused or substantially contributed to the injury to such party; in giving even *333handed treatment to both plaintiffs and defendants; in not straining to find prejudicial error in instructions because the verdict seems unsatisfactory to the reviewing judge; in not reversing judgments because of claimed prejudicial instructions when they are reasonably clear and adequate unless it is apparent that the claimed error in the law embraced in the instruction is of such a nature as could be reasonably expected to have had an efficient influence on the jury; in not concluding that a jury could “reasonably find” what no man of common sense and reason could find; in not stretching “reasonable” to include the preposterous nor the near impossible, nor what is not common sense; in cutting down verdicts clearly excessive compared to reasonable verdicts for comparable impairments or injuries.