Court Opinion

ID: 9393421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 06:08:39.275946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.133262
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSE and RENDER in part and Opinion Filed
May 2, 2023

                                          S   In The
                                Court of Appeals
                         Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                     No. 05-21-00362-CV

  DYNARESOURCE DE MÉXICO S.A. DE C.V. AND DYNARESOURCE
                    INC., Appellants
                           V.
           GOLDGROUP RESOURCES INC., Appellee

                  On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court
                               Dallas County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-17887

                                       OPINION
                    Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove1
                              Opinion by Justice Goldstein
       Dynaresource de Mexico S.A. de C.V. (DynaMexico) and Dynaresource Inc.

appeal the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss, motion for non-

recognition of a foreign judgment, and special appearance filed by Goldgroup

Resources, Inc. The trial court’s judgment also denied Dynaresource’s2 motion for

   1
     The Honorable Justice Lana Myers was originally a member of this panel. The Honorable Justice
Breedlove succeeded Justice Myers on this panel when her term expired on December 31, 2022. Justice
Breedlove has reviewed the briefs and the record.
   2
      Except where necessary to distinguish separate Dynaresource entities, appellants are referred to
collectively as “Dynaresource.”
recognition of a foreign judgment. In five issues, Dynaresource argues the trial court

erred in (1) granting Goldgroup’s special appearance, (2) reaching the merits of the

recognition action after granting the special appearance, (3) preventing an

evidentiary hearing from being held on the merits of the recognition action by ruling

simultaneously on the special appearance and on the merits, (4) granting

Goldgroup’s motion for non-recognition of a foreign judgment, and (5) granting

Goldgroup’s motion to dismiss. In this case of first impression, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment granting Goldgroup’s special appearance; in all other respects, we

reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment dismissing for lack of

jurisdiction Dynaresource’s motion for recognition of a foreign judgment and

Goldgroup’s motion to dismiss and motion for non-recognition.

                                 BACKGROUND

      On September 1, 2006, DynaMexico, a Mexican corporation, Dynaresource,

a Delaware corporation, and Goldgroup, a British Columbia corporation, entered

into an Earn In/Option Agreement whereby DynaMexico granted Goldgroup an

option to earn up to a fifty-percent equity interest in DynaMexico, which owned gold

mining operations and assets comprising the San Jose de Gracia property located in

Mexico. Under the heading “Governing Law/Jurisdiction,” the agreement provided

that, “[s]ubject to the applicability of Mexican law in respect to the shares of

DynaMexico and the acquisition thereof, the venue and jurisdiction for any dispute

                                         –2–
related to this Agreement shall be in Denver, Colorado.” The agreement specifically

provided for dispute resolution:

      8.16 Dispute Resolution.

      All questions or matters in dispute under this Agreement shall be
      submitted first to mediation and then if no resolution to binding
      arbitration pursuant to the terms hereof.

      (a) Any dispute shall first be submitted to a mediator, selected by the
      Parties, by agreement at a neutral location, agreed to by all parties. All
      costs of the mediation shall be borne equally by the parties to the
      dispute.

      (a) It shall be a condition precedent to the right of any party to submit
      any matter to arbitration pursuant to the provisions hereof, that any
      party intending to refer any matter to arbitration shall have given not
      less than 10 days’ prior notice of its intention to do so to the other party,
      together with particulars of the matter in dispute. On the expiration of
      such 10 days, the party who gave such notice may proceed to refer the
      dispute to arbitration as provided in paragraph (b).

      (b) The party desiring arbitration shall refer the dispute to binding
      arbitration in Denver, Colorado under the Rules of American
      Arbitration Association (“AAA”) by a single arbitrator selected by the
      parties. If the parties cannot agree, an arbitrator from the Denver area
      shall be selected by the AAA office in Denver. The arbitrator’s decision
      shall be final, binding and non-appealable and may be enforced in any
      court. The parties shall each pay a pro rata share of the arbitrator’s and
      AAA’s charges for the arbitration. The arbitrator may, in his or her sole
      discretion, award attorney fees and out-of-pocket expenses to that party
      which the arbitrator, in its sole discretion, determines is the prevailing
      party.

Finally, the agreement constituted “the entire agreement and understanding of the

Parties in respect of the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior

understandings, agreements or representations.”

                                          –3–
        As set out in the pleadings and court orders in the record, the history of

disputes between Goldgroup and Dynaresource dates back to December 2012, when

Dynaresource sued Goldgroup in Texas. Goldgroup defended by arguing, among

other things, that Dynaresource’s claims were subject to arbitration. Dynaresource

dismissed the lawsuit in March 2014 and refiled it in Mexico (the Mexico lawsuit).3

Also in March 2014, Goldgroup made a demand against Dynaresource in Denver,

Colorado before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution of the American

Arbitration Association (AAA), and an arbitrator was appointed. On May 30, 2014,

Dynaresource filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against

Goldgroup in Federal District Court in Colorado.                        Dynaresource also raised

arguments that the Colorado arbitration should be stayed pending a determination of

arbitrability by courts in Mexico.

        In September 2014, the arbitrator determined that he had authority to

determine jurisdiction under AAA rules because the rules were incorporated into the

arbitration agreement, and the arbitrator deferred ruling on all objections to

arbitrability until the merits. Between December 2014 and September 2015, the

Colorado arbitration, the Colorado Federal lawsuit, and the Mexico lawsuit were all

pending. In September 2015, the judge issued an order in DynaResource’s Colorado

Federal lawsuit, finding that the parties’ arbitration agreement remained operative,

    3
     As part of the Mexico lawsuit, Dynaresource also sought declaratory relief as to the invalidity of the
agreement’s arbitration provision.
                                                   –4–
at least some of Goldgroup’s claims were subject to arbitration, and nearly all

Dynaresource’s arguments against arbitrability were to be addressed by the

arbitrator.

       In October 2015, the Mexico City Court issued an order declaring the

arbitration agreement “ineffective and impossible [of] enforcement,” providing that

Dynaresource recover from Goldgroup $28,280,808.34 in damages for Goldgroup’s

“breach of its obligation to refrain from doing something, when boasting as the

owner of the San Jose de Gracia project” and as “damages and lost profits resulting

from the breach of its corporate obligation to refrain from doing something, with

respect to the San Jose de Gracia mining project, as a result of lawful profits that

[Dynaresource] should have received . . . from the sale of gold that should have

occurred.”

       In November 2015, the arbitrator, after being advised of the Mexican order,

issued a procedural order denying Dynaresource’s application to suspend

proceedings based on the Mexico City Court order and re-affirmed that a hearing on

the merits was set for November 16, 2015. Dynaresource contended that the order

from the court in Mexico City litigation was “way more mandatory than your

resolutions and even the Denver judge [sic] resolution” and ceased to participate in

any further arbitration proceedings.

       In April 2016, Dynaresource dismissed the Colorado Federal lawsuit. In

August 2016, the arbitrator issued a Final Award in favor of Goldgroup, awarding

                                        –5–
damages and attorney’s fees. Among other things, the arbitrator found insufficient

cause to excuse Dynaresource’s failure to participate in the arbitration, and

Dynaresource had no right to pursue arbitrability challenges in the Mexico City

lawsuit.

      Goldgroup sought confirmation of the arbitration award in Colorado federal

court. In May 2019, the Colorado federal court granted Goldgroup’s motion to

confirm the arbitration award, denied Dynaresource’s motion to vacate the

arbitration award, and directed the clerk to close the case. The order began by noting

that “a reader may pause and wonder why this case [was] before the District of

Colorado when none of the parties are citizens of the state of Colorado and the

underlying events which gave rise to the parties’ dispute did not occur here.” The

order explained that the parties’ agreement expressly provided that “the party

desiring arbitration shall refer the dispute to binding arbitration in Denver,

Colorado,” including that venue and jurisdiction for any dispute related to the

agreement was to be in Denver. In April 2021, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the arbitration award.

      In the interim, commencing in November 2015, Goldgroup began a series of

challenges to the Mexican court order in Mexico, culminating in the Mexican

Supreme Court’s dismissal of Goldgroup’s appeal in July 2019. In December 2019,

the Mexican Federal Appeal Court issued a “Final Ruling” affirming the Mexican

court order. In February 2020, the Mexican trial court issued a final judgment

                                         –6–
foreclosing on all solely-held Goldgroup shares of DynaMexico in partial execution

of the Mexican monetary award.

      In August 2020, Dynaresource again filed suit in Dallas County, this time

seeking to domesticate, through recognition, the Mexican court’s judgment.

Goldgroup filed a motion to vacate asserting seven grounds including a special

appearance averring it is a Canadian corporation with its principal place of business

in Vancouver, British Columbia, with no Texas contacts and improper service.

       The Dallas County district court, following a hearing, issued an order of

dismissal for want of jurisdiction on November 30, 2020. In its order, the trial court

made the following findings:

      1. DynaResource filed this action, pursuant to Chapter 36A of the
         Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

      2. There has been no service of process, pursuant to Texas Rules of
         Civil Procedure upon Goldgroup by DynaResource.

      3. Goldgroup has not waived service of process in this action.

      4. Goldgroup has not made a general appearance in this action.

      5. Goldgroup has specifically objected to the Court’s jurisdiction based
         upon DynaResource’s total failure to serve Goldgroup pursuant to
         the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

      On December 4, 2020, Dynaresource filed an Original Petition for

Recognition of Foreign Judgment in Dallas County district court. The petition

alleged personal jurisdiction was “not required in this recognition lawsuit” pursuant

to section 36A.005 of the Uniform Foreign Currency Money Judgments Recognition

Act (UFCMJRA). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36A.005. Specifically,
                                   –7–
Dynaresource argued Goldgroup was properly personally served with process in the

Mexico lawsuit, was domiciled in Mexico, had a business office in Mexico and the

cause of action arose out of business done by Goldgroup through that office and a

foreign-country judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of personal

jurisdiction if these criteria are met. See id. § 36A.005(a).

      On December 31, 2020, Goldgroup filed a special appearance asserting it was

a nonresident of Texas, had no assets in Texas, and had no purposeful contacts with

Texas. On January 4, 2021, Goldgroup filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that

the parties’ express agreement designated Denver as the forum for any dispute. The

motion asserted that “the dispute that gave rise to the Mexico Judgment was directly

related to Goldgroup’s ownership interest and obligations in Dynaresource and the

San Jose de Gracia project, both of which the Agreement governed.” Goldgroup

argued the trial court was not required to recognize a foreign-country judgment if

“the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the

parties under which the dispute in question was to be determined otherwise than by

proceedings in the foreign court.” See id. § 36A.004(c)(5). Because the case was

governed by a forum-selection clause that designated Denver as the forum for any

dispute, Goldgroup argued, Texas’ venue statutes did not apply.

      On January 7, 2021, Goldgroup filed a motion for non-recognition. As it had

in the previous Texas suit, Goldgroup argued that the Mexico Judgment violated the

parties’ express agreement that venue and jurisdiction for any dispute between the

                                         –8–
parties would be in Denver; the Mexico Judgment conflicted with a final and

conclusive judgment from the United States District Court for the District of

Colorado; and the UFCMJRA did not apply to the Mexico Judgment because (1) the

Mexico Judgment was not “final, conclusive, and enforceable” and (2) the Mexico

City court neither had personal jurisdiction over Goldgroup nor jurisdiction over the

subject matter.

       On February 8, 2021, the trial court conducted a hearing on Goldgroup’s

special appearance and motion to dismiss. On May 12, 2021, the trial court entered

a final judgment granting Goldgroup’s special appearance, motion to dismiss, and

motion for non-recognition and denying Dynaresource’s motion for recognition of a

foreign judgment. This appeal followed.

       To provide the appropriate context to the legal issues before us, we start with

an abbreviated primer of the UFCMJRA.

                            THE UFCMJRA FRAMEWORK4

       Section 36A.006 of the UFCMJRA provides that, if recognition of a foreign-

country judgment is sought as an original matter, the issue of recognition may be

raised by filing an action seeking recognition of the foreign-country judgment. Id.

   4
       The UFCMJRA is a limited recognition statute fundamentally distinct from the recognition given to
a sister court judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA). See generally
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) comment 1 accompanying
section 36A.006.
                                                 –9–
§ 36A.006.5 The issue of recognition always must be raised in a court proceeding.

Id. cmt. 1. The parties to an action in which recognition of a foreign-country

judgment is sought must comply with all state procedural rules with regard to that

type of action. Id. cmt. 4. Thus, by filing an action under section 36A.006, a party

is required to comply with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

2 (“These rules shall govern the procedure in the justice, county, and district courts

of the State of Texas in all actions of a civil nature.”).

        The UFCMJRA provides the standards for recognition of foreign-country

judgments:

        (a) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (b) and (c), a court of
        this state shall recognize a foreign-country judgment to which this
        chapter applies.

        (b) A court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country judgment
        if:

                (1) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does
                not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
                requirements of due process of law;

                (2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the
                defendant; or

                (3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
                matter.

        (c) A court of this state is not required to recognize a foreign-country
        judgment if:

    5
       Until the foreign judgment is recognized, there is no domesticated judgment for purposes of all
applicable challenges to a judgment afforded full faith and credit. Unlike a party in possession of a
registered judgment from a sister state, Dynaresource, as a judgment creditor has no right of enforcement
until the judgment is recognized. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 35.008 and 36A.006, cmt. 1.
                                                 –10–
           (1) the defendant in the proceeding in the foreign court did not
           receive notice of the proceeding in sufficient time to enable the
           defendant to defend;

           (2) the judgment was obtained by fraud that deprived the losing
           party of an adequate opportunity to present the party’s case;

           (3) the judgment or the cause of action on which the judgment is
           based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or the United
           States;

           (4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive
           judgment;

           (5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an
           agreement between the parties under which the dispute in
           question was to be determined otherwise than by proceedings in
           the foreign court;

           (6) jurisdiction was based only on personal service and the
           foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of
           the action;

           (7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise
           substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with
           respect to the judgment;

           (8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the
           judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due
           process of law; or

           (9) it is established that the foreign country in which the
           judgment was rendered does not recognize judgments rendered
           in this state that, but for the fact that they are rendered in this
           state, would constitute foreign-country judgments to which this
           chapter would apply under Section 36A.003.

     (d) A party resisting recognition of a foreign-country judgment has the
     burden of establishing that a ground for nonrecognition stated in
     Subsection (b) or (c) exists.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36A.004. According to the NCCUSL

comments accompanying section 36A.004:
                                      –11–
      Recognition of a judgment means that the forum court accepts the
      determination of legal rights and obligations made by the rendering
      court in the foreign country. See, e.g. Restatement (Second) of
      Conflicts of Laws, Ch. 5, Topic 3, Introductory Note (recognition of
      foreign judgment occurs to the extent the forum court gives the
      judgment “the same effect with respect to the parties, the subject matter
      of the action and the issues involved that it has in the state where it was
      rendered.”). Recognition of a foreign-country judgment must be
      distinguished from enforcement of that judgment. Enforcement of the
      foreign-country judgment involves the application of the legal
      procedures of the state to ensure that the judgment debtor obeys the
      foreign-country judgment. Recognition of a foreign-country money
      judgment often is associated with enforcement of the judgment, as the
      judgment creditor usually seeks recognition of the foreign-country
      judgment primarily for the purpose of invoking the enforcement
      procedures of the forum state to assist the judgment creditor’s
      collection of the judgment from the judgment debtor. Because the
      forum court cannot enforce the foreign-country judgment until it has
      determined that the judgment will be given effect, recognition is a
      prerequisite to enforcement of the foreign-country judgment.
      Recognition, however, also has significance outside the enforcement
      context because a foreign-country judgment also must be recognized
      before it can be given preclusive effect under res judicata and collateral
      estoppel principles. The issue of whether a foreign-country judgment
      will be recognized is distinct from both the issue of whether the
      judgment will be enforced, and the issue of the extent to which it will
      be given preclusive effect.

Id. cmt. 2. The interplay between sections 36A.004 and 36A.005 is clarified by

NCCUSL comment 6 to section 36A.004:

      Under § 36A.004(b)(2), the forum court must deny recognition to the
      foreign-country judgment if the foreign court did not have personal
      jurisdiction over the defendant. Section 36A.005(a) lists six bases for
      personal jurisdiction that are adequate as a matter of law to establish
      that the foreign court had personal jurisdiction. Section 36A.005(b)
      makes clear that other grounds for personal jurisdiction may be found
      sufficient.

Id. cmt. 6.

                                        –12–
        The purpose of recognition is two-fold—to domesticate a judgment for

purposes of enforcement and attain preclusive effect of that judgment.                                 The

UFCMJRA does not address seeking recognition in a forum court when the

purported judgment debtor has no ties, no presence, and no assets in the forum state.

This appeal directly implicates this issue.

                                              ANALYSIS

        As a threshold matter, it is antithetical to our system of justice to be able to

file a suit for recognition of a judgment when the purported judgment debtor has no

ties to the state in which recognition is sought, either through assets to attach or seize

by enforcement or personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor.6 Dynaresource

does not dispute the lack of nexus to Texas, rather it contends the trial court had

subject matter jurisdiction “because section 36A.006(a) of the Uniform Act specifies

that recognition of a foreign Judgment may be accomplished via an original action

in this Court.” Other than the venue provision,7 Dynaresource provides no facts in

support of filing for recognition in Texas.

        The NCCUSL comment to Section 36A.006 is clear that:

        While this Section sets out the ways in which the issue of recognition
        of a foreign-country judgment may be raised, it is not intended to create
        any new procedure not currently existing in the state or to otherwise

    6
     The Due Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment . . . against
an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.” International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
    7
      We note without additional comment or analysis that Dynaresource relies on section 15.002(a)(4) of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to assert venue is proper in Dallas County as both its non-
party parent company DynaUSA as well as DynaMexico have principal places of business here.
                                                   –13–
        effect existing state procedural requirements. The parties to an action
        in which recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought under
        §36A.006 must comply with all state procedural rules with regard to
        that type of action. Nor does this Act address the question of what
        constitutes a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to adjudicate with regard
        to an action under §36A.006.

Id. cmt. 4. Further, the NCCUSL notes the courts are split on the issue of whether

the presence of debtor assets is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction and that the Act

takes no position on that issue. Id.8

        We take the position and expressly conclude that the Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure apply to a UFCMJRA recognition suit, including Rule 120a, with

attendant application of Texas jurisprudence to those rules. As set forth below,

consistent with constitutional due process considerations, the Texas rules and

jurisprudence require some articulated semblance of a Texas tie to the debtor; thus,

Dynaresource’s venue pleadings alone are insufficient to maintain the recognition

suit in Dallas, Texas.

        Special Appearance

        In its first issue, Dynaresource argues the trial court erred in granting

Goldgroup’s special appearance. Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over

    8
      In so noting, the NCCUSL references Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1977) (“Once it has
been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there
would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant
has property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an
original matter.”). We find the Shaffer opinion, its historical analysis of International Shoe, and its progeny
instructive in concluding that a nexus to Texas, either in rem or in personam, is required to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant/judgement debtor. Id. at 213 (“We therefore conclude that all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny”) (footnote omitted).
                                                    –14–
a nonresident defendant is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo.

See Steward Health Care Sys. LLC v. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2021, no pet.) (en banc) (citing Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. Bell, 549

S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. 2018)). When a trial court does not issue findings of fact and

conclusions of law with its special appearance ruling, all facts necessary to support

the judgment and supported by the evidence are implied. Id. When the appellate

record includes the reporter’s and clerk’s records, these implied findings are not

conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency in the appropriate

appellate court. Id. at 125–26 (citing BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83

S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)). When the relevant facts in a case are undisputed, an

appellate court need not consider any implied findings of fact and considers only the

legal question of whether the undisputed facts establish Texas jurisdiction. See id.

at 126 (citing Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 558).

      Courts have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: “general”

jurisdiction and “specific” jurisdiction. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior

Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017). For an individual, the paradigm forum for the

exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is

an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home. See

id. A court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim against that defendant, even

if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different State. See id. But

                                        –15–
“only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to”

general jurisdiction in that State. See id.

      Specific jurisdiction exists when (1) the defendant has “made minimum

contacts with Texas by purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting

activities [in the state],” and (2) the defendant’s potential liability arose from or is

related to those contacts. In re Christianson Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC,

639 S.W.3d 671, 679 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Moki Mac River

Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. 2007)). To show purposeful

availment, a plaintiff must prove that a nonresident defendant seeks a benefit,

advantage, or profit from the forum market. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v.

Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005). Only the defendant’s contacts are

relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or third person. See id. And

those contacts “must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated.”

Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2013) (quoting

Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 338–39 (Tex.

2009)).

      The plaintiff bears the initial burden of pleading sufficient allegations to bring

a nonresident defendant within the provisions of the Texas long-arm statute.

Saidara, 633 S.W.3d at 126 (citing Old Republic, 549 S.W.3d at 559); Moncrief Oil,

414 S.W.3d at 149. In order to meet its burden, a plaintiff must show the act on

which jurisdiction is predicated, not a prima facie demonstration of the existence of

                                         –16–
a cause of action. Bruno’s Inc. v. Arty Imports, Inc., 119 S.W.3d 893, 896–97 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Clark v. Noyes, 871 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1994, no pet.).    This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an

allegation that the nonresident defendant is doing business in Texas or committed

tortious acts in Texas. Saidara, 633 S.W.3d at 126. If the plaintiff does not meet

this burden, the defendant need only prove that it does not reside in Texas to negate

jurisdiction. See Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex.

1982).

      Here, Dynaresource argues the trial court erred in granting Goldgroup’s

special appearance “where the UFCMJRA clearly and unequivocally provides that

a Court may not deny Recognition of a Foreign Judgment for lack of personal

jurisdiction over the Judgment Debtor.” In making this argument, Dynaresource

relies on two Texas cases: Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd., 260

S.W.3d 476 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) and Beluga

Chartering B.V. v. Timber S.A., 294 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2009, no pet.). These cases stand for the proposition that, under the version

of the UFCMJRA in effect at the time, a challenge to a Texas court’s personal

jurisdiction was not available under the UFCMJRA. Beluga, 294 S.W.3d at 305

(citing Haaksman, 260 S.W.3d at 480–81). These cases hold that the language of

the UFCMJRA did not require personal jurisdiction over a judgment debtor in Texas

as a prerequisite for enforcing a foreign country judgment in Texas. Id. (citing

                                       –17–
Haaksman, 260 S.W.3d at 479–80).9 The court in Beluga determined that, based on

Haaksman, the trial court properly denied the special appearance of Beluga, the

debtor on a Uruguayan judgment. Id. at 305. However, these cases relied on a

chapter of the civil practice and remedies code that was entirely repealed in 2017.

See Acts 2017, 85th Leg, ch. 390 (S.B. 944), § 2, effective June l, 2017 (repealing

sections 36.001 to 36.008).

         In conjunction with the cited cases, Dynaresource relies on section

36A.005(a)(1) of the current UFCMJRA, which provides that a foreign-country

judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if the

defendant was served with process personally in the foreign country. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 36A.005(a)(1).10 Dynaresource conflates the former

repealed and current versions of section 36A.005(a)(1) and pre-2017 authorities to

support its contention that a judgment debtor is not entitled to make a special

appearance in Texas court challenging personal jurisdiction in an action brought

under the UFCMJRA. We decline to follow Dynaresource’s line of reasoning.

         The rationale in Beluga and Haaksman, on which Dynasource relies in

arguing that a special appearance is not available in a proceeding under the

    9
     By our analysis we are strictly separating proceedings seeking recognition of a foreign judgment under
the UFCMJRA from proceedings to enforce a foreign judgment once recognized, which the UFCMJRA
does not address.
    10
      The current version of section 36A.005 provides a non-exclusive list of bases upon which a foreign
judgment may not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction, all dependent upon the
defendant’s relationship to the foreign country.
                                                  –18–
UFCMJRA, premised as it is upon a repealed version of the UFCMJRA, is not

determinative here. See Beluga, 294 S.W.3d at 305; Haaksman, 260 S.W.3d at 480–

81.   NCCUSL comment 6 to section 36A.004 makes clear that, contrary to

Dynaresource’s contention, the reference to “lack of personal jurisdiction” in section

36A.005(a)(1) refers to the lack of personal jurisdiction in a foreign court, which

may preclude a court of this state from recognizing a foreign-country judgment

under section 36A.004(b)(2). See id.

      The procedural mechanism of a special appearance is solely “for the purpose

of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the

defendant on the ground that such party or property is not amenable to process issued

by the courts of this State.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a. While the UFCMJRA specifically

addresses service of process as it relates to the underlying foreign court, it provides

no guidance as to the formalities of recognition proceedings, requisites of filing, or

specified notice of the proceeding to the judgment debtor. We therefore look to the

laws and rules of procedure of this state for guidance. TEX. R. CIV. P. 1, 2. Basic

state and federal constitutional constructs of due process require notice and an

opportunity to be heard. See Roper v. Jolliffe, 493 S.W.3d 624, 636 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)

(“Due process at a minimum requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”)).

                                        –19–
         Texas rules provide for a special appearance in response to an original court

proceeding to telegraph to the court the lack of personal jurisdiction or nexus to

Texas. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a. Goldgroup, as the party resisting recognition of a

foreign-country judgment, has the statutory burden of establishing that a ground for

nonrecognition exists,11 while simultaneously avoiding the adverse consequence of

subjecting itself to this state’s jurisdiction for all purposes. The trial court clearly

granted Goldgroup’s special appearance while simultaneously ruling on motions to

dismiss, for recognition and for non-recognition.

          Because Dynaresource does not challenge the granting of Goldgroup’s

special appearance on any other grounds than those raised and rejected above, we

conclude the trial court did not err in granting Goldgroup’s special appearance. See

Siskind, 642 S.W.2d at 438. We overrule Dynaresource’s first issue.

         Once it granted Goldgroup’s special appearance, the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to proceed further with the underlying recognition proceeding. See TEX.

R. CIV. P. 120a (special appearance made for purpose of objecting to jurisdiction of

the court); see generally Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216–17 (assertion of jurisdiction

inconsistent with constitutional limitation on state power.); see also Int’l Shoe, 326

U.S. at 319. We therefore conclude the trial court erred in proceeding to rule on the

   11
        TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36A.004 (d).
                                               –20–
merits of Dynaresource’s claims. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a. Accordingly, we need

not further address Dynaresource’s remaining issues.

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment granting Goldgroup’s special

appearance; in all other respects, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render

judgment dismissing for lack of jurisdiction Dynaresource’s motion for recognition

of a foreign judgment and Goldgroup’s motion to dismiss and motion for non-

recognition.

                                          /Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
                                          BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
                                          JUSTICE

210362F.P05

                                       –21–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

DYNARESOURCE DE MÉXICO                         On Appeal from the 134th Judicial
S.A. DE C.V. AND                               District Court, Dallas County, Texas
DYNARESOURCES INC.,                            Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-17887.
Appellants                                     Opinion delivered by Justice
                                               Goldstein. Justices Carlyle and
No. 05-21-00362-CV           V.                Breedlove participating.

GOLDGROUP RESOURCES INC.,
Appellee

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court granting Goldgroup Resources Inc.’s special appearance is AFFIRMED. In
all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is REVERSED, and judgment is
RENDERED that Dynaresource’s motion for recognition of a foreign judgment
and Goldgroup’s motion to dismiss and motion for non-recognition are
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

       It is ORDERED that appellee GOLDGROUP RESOURCES INC. recover
its costs of this appeal from appellants DYNARESOURCE DE MÉXICO S.A. DE
C.V. AND DYNARESOURCES INC..

Judgment entered May 2, 2023.

                                        –22–