Court Opinion

ID: 9571181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:40.89002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:15.774507
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
dissenting.
There were two critical issues in the trial of this case. First, was the defendant negligent and, if so, to what extent? Second, was the plaintiff contributorily negligent in stopping on the road?
The court instructed on the range-of-vision rule as follows: “A motorist ordinarily has a duty to drive an automobile on a public street or highway in such a manner that he can stop in time to avoid a collision with an object within the range of his vision, and he is negligent if he fails to do so.
“A motorist is not, however, negligent where the object cannot be observed by the exercise of ordinary care in time to avoid a collision.” (Emphasis supplied.)
On the basis of this instruction, the jury may well have concluded that the existence of a dust cloud excused a violation of the rule. The rule, NJI No. 7.03 B, to the effect that the existence of dust required a reduction of speed and a commensurate degree of care on the part of defendant was directly in issue but not given.
The court instructed on the statute forbidding stopping on a highway but failed to instruct on the qualifying rule that the statute does not prohibit a momentary stoppage on the traveled portion of the highway under proper circumstances for a normal and reasonable purpose. See Greyhound Corp. v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 161 Neb. 152, 72 N. W. 2d 669. Under *227the instruction given, a school bus driver stopping to drop or pick up a school child on a narrow 18-foot country road would be guilty of negligence. A similar finding necessarily followed in the present case.
The failure to give these two qualifying instructions was tantamount to directing a verdict for the defendant and was extremely prejudicial. In my judgment, this judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Spencer and McCown, JJ., join in this dissent.
McCown, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion construes section 39-757, R. R. S. 1943, as applying to stopping on a highway to pick up passengers. In this case there is simply no dispute that the stopping was for the purpose of picking up a passenger who was in the process of coming across the road at the moment of impact. The language of this court in Greyhound Corp. v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 161 Neb. 152, 72 N. W. 2d 669, is entirely appropriate. In speaking of the identical statute, this court said: “We think this statute was not intended to prohibit a momentary stoppage on the paved portion of the highway under proper circumstances for a normal and reasonable purpose. A like statute was fully, and we think correctly, analyzed in Peoples v. Fulk, 220 N. C. 635, 18 S. E. 2d 147. Therein the court said: ‘The temporary stop of the bus on the hard surface portion of the highway to take on a passenger did not constitute a violation of sec. 123(a), ch. 407, Public Laws 1937, which provides that “no person shall park' or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or improved or main traveled portion of any highway, outside of a business or residence district, when it is practicable to park or leave such vehicle standing off of the paved or improved or main traveled portion of such highway.”
“ ‘The clause “whether attended or unattended” limits the meaning of the word “park” as well as of “leave *228standing.” The two'terms, as thus limited are synonymous. A vehicle which is left standing is parked and a vehicle which is parked is left standing. Neither term includes a mere temporary stop for a necessary purpose when there is no intent to break the continuity of the “travel.”
“ ‘ “Park” or “leave standing” means something more than a mere temporary or momentary stop on the road for a necessary purpose. * * * Starting and stopping are as much an essential part of travel in a motor vehicle as is “motion.” Stopping for different causes, and according to the exigencies of the occasion, is a natural part of the “travel.” The right to stop when the occasion demands is incident to the right to travel.’ ”
The majority opinion holds in effect that stopping on the right half of a level stretch of graveled country road to pick up a passenger on a clear, dry, winter day, with no traffic, ahead and only the defendant some distance behind, .'is. a violation of section 39-757, R. R. S. 1943, and is negligence more than slight in comparison with the negligence of a defendant who fails to see the stopped vehicle in time and strikes it from the rear. There should have been a- directed verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of liability with special instructions! on the comparative negligence rule if the statute was to be applied at all.
Spencer, J., joins in this dissent. ■