Court Opinion

ID: 9765613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:10:29.037047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:11.110857
License: Public Domain

*204NIGRO, Justice,
dissenting.
Since I believe that the Superior Court properly reviewed the merits of Appellee’s Persinger claim under the circumstances of this case, I respectfully dissent.1
Here, as noted by the Majority, Appellee entered a plea of nolo contendere to each of the charges in the three separate criminal informations filed against him. However, the trial court failed to inform Appellee during its colloquy that the sentences for each of the charges could be imposed consecutively, as this Court now explicitly requires under Commonwealth v. Persinger, 532 Pa. 317, 615 A.2d 1305 (1992) (plea is not tendered knowingly and intelligently if defendant is not informed that consecutive sentences could be imposed upon his multiple convictions). Following sentencing, Appellee was appointed new counsel, who, on appeal to the Superior Court, did not challenge the validity of Appellee’s plea based on an inadequate colloquy. Subsequently, Appellee filed a pro se petition under the PCRA and was appointed counsel. When counsel took no action in Appellee’s case in the two and one-half years after he had filed a notice of intention to file an amended petition, the PCRA court appointed new PCRA counsel, Ms. Beroes. Ms. Beroes filed an amended petition on Appellee’s behalf, which was subsequently dismissed by the PCRA court without a hearing.2 On appeal, the Superior Court found that the petition filed by Ms. Beroes was insufficient to facilitate review of the issues presented and thus, remanded the case to the PCRA court to determine how Appellee wished to proceed. On remand, the PCRA court appointed new counsel, Mr. Tabano, who filed a supplemental appellate brief on Appellee’s behalf. In this brief, Mr. Tabano raised the issue that both trial and appellate counsel were *205ineffective for failing, essentially, to challenge Appellee’s plea on the grounds that he had never been advised that his sentences could be imposed consecutively. The Superior Court found that the issue had not been waived and determined, after reviewing the claim on its merits, that counsels’ assistance had been ineffective under Persinger.
The Majority, however, finds that the Superior Court improperly reached the merits of the Persinger claim. Instead, the Majority concludes that this issue has been waived for purposes of the PCRA because Mr. Tabano did not raise a sufficiently serial ineffectiveness claim. In other words, Mr. Tabano failed to argue that Appellee’s prior PCRA counsel had also been ineffective for failing to raise the issue of trial and appellate counsels’ ineffectiveness with regard to their failure to raise a Persinger claim. Therefore, the Majority concludes that the Superior Court improperly reviewed the issue on its merits. I disagree.
Here, Appellee was appointed two PCRA counsel, who, from all indications, did not adequately represent the interests of their client.3 Given this ineffectiveness, Appellee was appointed yet another attorney, Mr. Tabano, to represent him on his appeal to the Superior Court. Under these circumstances, I cannot agree that simply because Mr. Tabano recognized a meritorious issue overlooked by prior counsel yet failed to use the operative words in his brief to overcome waiver of this issue by prior counsel, Appellee’s Persinger claim should, in effect, never be subject to review on its merits.
While Appellee still has the ability to file a second PCRA petition, and raise a serial ineffectiveness claim regarding the Persinger issue sufficient to overcome waiver, such a scenario essentially strips Appellee of his opportunity to have this claim addressed on its merits. It is well-settled that a second or subsequent post-conviction petition for relief will not be entertained “unless a strong prima facie showing is offered to *206demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 513, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (1988). To make such a prima facie showing of a miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must establish either that the proceedings were so unfair that no civilized society could tolerate the verdict or that he is actually innocent of the crimes charged. Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 534 Pa. 483, 487, 633 A.2d 1098, 1100 (1993). Since Appellee in the instant case pled nolo contendere and has alleged ineffectiveness of counsel based on Persinger, he would most likely not be able to satisfy the stringent threshold requirements of Lawson. See Commonwealth v. Allen, — Pa.—, 732 A.2d 582 (1999) (petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim based on Persinger, raised in context of second PCRA petition, did not meet Lawson’s ‘miscarriage of justice’ standard under totality of circumstances).4
In my view, the PCRA is designed to protect persons from such situations as the one presented by this appeal. Here, Appellee was represented by two court-appointed PCRA counsel who, quite simply, did not effectively perform their job. Although Appellee’s third appointed counsel recognized a meritorious issue overlooked by prior counsel, he failed to appreciate the need to raise a serial ineffectiveness claim with enough layers to avoid technical waiver of the issue. Under the Majority’s holding, because of his counsels’ shortcomings, Appellee will be forced to file a second PCRA petition in order to have the merits of his Persinger claim become eligible for review. In all probability, however, Appellee would be unable to meet the threshold standards required for relief at that stage under Lawson. See Commonwealth v. Allen, supra. Given the circumstances of this case, I cannot agree that this is the correct result and therefore, must dissent.

. For purposes of this dissent, “Persinger claim” refers to the claim that Appellee’s nolo contendere plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered since the trial court did not advise Appellee that his sentences could be imposed consecutively on multiple convictions.

. The amended petition did not raise a claim relating to the validity of Appellee's plea on the grounds that the trial court did not advise Appellee during its colloquy that consecutive sentences could be imposed upon multiple convictions.

. As the Superior Court noted, Appellee’s first PCRA counsel took no action on Appellee’s behalf for two and one-half years after filing a notice of intention to file an amended petition and Attorney Bereos filed a deficient brief on appeal to the Superior Court.

. In all likelihood, Petitioner would also not be able to demonstrate that his second petition has been timely filed under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (petition must be filed within one year of date judgment becomes final unless petition alleges one of enumerated exceptions to timeliness requirements).