Court Opinion

ID: 9520583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:44:24.118191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:28.687365
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TRAPP, concurring in part and dissenting in part: In Pioneering Processing, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 414, I dissented from the determination upon review of declaratory judgment that the village of Naplate was bound by a finding of the trial court that that village could not rescind a consent to the issue of a permit for a hazardous waste dump. There the village was not a party in declaratory judgment. In the light of the facts that the Environmental Protection Agency, an asserted representative of the village, had issued a permit, had taken no step to rescind or modify it, and had written that the Agency would express no view upon the issue of rescission, it did not seem fair or appropriate to hold that the Agency was a proper and qualified representative who could bind the village. In this case the village of Naplate joins in seeking administrative review of the order of the Pollution Control Board. In this record, that order discloses that there was no administrative decision upon the issue of rescission by the village of its prior consent. The relevant context of the order includes: “Section 21(g) of the Act prohibits a hazardous waste disposal site located within a mile and a half of a municipality in a county of 225,000 or more without a waiver from the governing body, or within a thousand feet of a private well or the existing source of a public water supply. The Village of Naplate, therefore, had to have waived the requirement for a permit to be granted, and it did in fact execute such waiver. There is no evidence in the record before the Board that it acted to rescind that waiver prior to the Agency’s decision to grant the permit (see R. 531 — 537). As noted above, the scope of the Board’s review of permit appeals is limited to the record before the Agency at the time of decision. Therefore, any later rescission is not presently before the Board and the Board need not reach the question as to what effect a rescission subsequent to the granting of developmental permit would have on the granting of an operating permit after a purported rescission.” (Emphasis added.) By reason of the absence of an administrative order I would dismiss the proceedings for administrative review by the village of Naplate. I concur with the opinion in its other aspects.