Court Opinion

ID: 9453984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:31:27.274184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:54.964409
License: Public Domain

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I would affirm the judgment of the district court. In my opinion the decision *175of the majority is not supported by the facts of this case.
Defendant’s conviction was for the possession of mail matter which had been stolen, taken and abstracted from the United States mail. The conviction resulted from a search of defendant’s apartment for a stolen television set, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Hermes, an Illinois state court judge. The facts alleged in the complaint sworn to by police officer O’Keefe, on which the warrant issued were:
“This complainant received information from a person previously used and proved to be reliable, that the property stated above, which are the proceeds of a burglary as recorded under PD# F 066570 was bought by the above stated person and being concealed in his apartment located on the third floor front apartment, located at 7129 South Parnell, Chicago, Ill.”
Execution of the warrant did reveal .the stolen mail although the television set was not found.
Defendant is not entitled to relief here because he was convicted for possession of stolen mail and not for possession of a stolen television set. In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 1103, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947), the Supreme Court, affirming defendant’s conviction, stated:
“If entry upon the premises be authorized and the search which follows be valid, there is nothing in the Fourth Amendment which inhibits the seizure by law-enforcement agents of government property the possession of which is a crime, even though the officers are not aware that such property is on the premises when the search is initiated.”
While in that case, federal officers entered defendant’s apartment upon two arrest warrants charging crimes of fraud, defendant’s conviction was for the unlawful possession of certain Selective Service Notice of Classification Cards and Registration Certificates, found in the apartment. See also Seymour v. United States, 10 Cir., 369 F.2d 825 (1966), where in searching for marihuana, police officers discovered postal money orders, money order limitation stamps and a post office dating stamp, which led to defendant’s conviction for illegal possession of government property. Therefore, if, as in Harris, supra, execution of a warrant,1 issued upon probable cause, reveals possession of stolen mail matter, defendant’s conviction should be affirmed without reference to the purpose of the search in the case at bar, which was to seize a stolen television set. In short, failure of the search for its original purpose is not relevant to the question raised by a motion to suppress the evidence of the crime found. In my opinion the facts contained in officer O’Keefe’s affidavit hereinbefore set out were sufficient by standards established by the Supreme Court to constitute probable cause.
Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509,12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), relied on by the majority, clearly is distinguished because there no facts were provided by the affiant to support his “conclusion” or to permit the magistrate to perform his neutral and detached function. In the case at bar facts were set forth and corroborated. Further, nothing in Aguilar requires that the defendant be apprised of the source of the information used to obtain evidence of his criminal conduct. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) and Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887 (1964). In those cases, the court stated the conditions which require the government to disclose the identity of its informant. Those conditions do not exist in this case and defendant does not contend that they do.
By its present decision this court is now for the first time committing itself to the proposition that the police must reveal the source of their information in order to sustain a warrant to search be*176cause “such information is essential to sustain a proper search warrant.” The decisions cited in support of the majority’s decision are clearly inapposite. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Ventresca, (1965) 380 U.S. 102 at 108-109, 85 S.Ct. 741 at 746, 13 L.Ed. 2d 684:
“If the teachings of the Court’s cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. * * * Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.
* * * * * * * * * when a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnieal, rather than a commonsense, manner. Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.”
I am not persuaded that the failure to find the television set now vitiates defendant’s conviction for possession of stolen mail matter. In my judgment, no legitimate purpose is served by reversing convictions based upon constitutional abstractions or elaborate specificities which have no proper place in this area. See Ventresca, 380 U.S. 108, 85 S.Ct. 741. Cf. United States ex rel. Pugh v. Pate, Warden of the Illinois Penitentiary, 7 Cir., 401 F.2d 6, July 1, 1968, where we gave effect to the fourth amendment by requiring that someone take the responsibility for the facts alleged, giving rise to the probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, and that defendant be apprised of the name of that person. Those requirements were met in the case at bar.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of conviction.

. There, an arrest warrant.