Court Opinion

ID: 9367275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 15:00:41.497894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:58.785461
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1018   Document: 51   Page: 1   Filed: 01/31/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                ______________________

    HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY,
               Plaintiff-Appellee

  KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN INC., KAI-
  SER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF GEORGIA,
   KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF THE
  MID-ATLANTIC STATES, INC., KAISER FOUNDA-
    TION HEALTH PLAN INC. OF COLO., KAISER
 FOUNDATION HEALTHPLAN OF THE NW, GROUP
   HEALTH COOPERATIVE, HARKEN HEALTH IN-
    SURANCE COMPANY, HEALTH PLAN OF NE-
  VADA, INC., OXFORD HEALTH PLANS (NJ), INC.,
 ROCKY MOUNTAIN HEALTH MAINTENANCE OR-
     GANIZATION, INCORPORATED, UNITEDH-
  EALTHCARE BENEFITS PLAN OF CALIFORNIA,
  UNITEDHEALTHCARE COMMUNITY PLAN, INC.,
   UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY,
   UNITEDHEALTHCARE LIFE INSURANCE COM-
 PANY, UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF ALABAMA, INC.,
    UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF COLORADO, INC.,
  UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF FLORIDA, INC., UNIT-
  EDHEALTHCARE OF GEORGIA, INC., UNITEDH-
         EALTHCARE OF KENTUCKY, LTD.,
    UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF LOUISIANA, INC.,
    UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF MISSISSIPPI, INC.,
  UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.,
     UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF NEW YORK, INC.,
   UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
    INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF OKLAHOMA,
 INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
 INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE MID-ATLAN-
      TIC, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE
Case: 22-1018     Document: 51           Page: 2       Filed: 01/31/2023

 2                 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY             v. US

 MIDLANDS, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE
 MIDWEST, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF UTAH,
  INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF WASHINGTON,
    INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF OHIO, INC.,
   ROCKY MOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE OPTIONS,
 INC., ALL SAVERS INSURANCE COMPANY, UNIT-
  EDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY INC.,
                Plaintiffs-Appellants

                                   v.

                     UNITED STATES,
                         Defendant
                   ______________________

                         2022-1018
                   ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:16-cv-00259-KCD, Judge Kathryn C. Davis.

            -------------------------------------------------

   COMMON GROUND HEALTHCARE COOPERA-
  TIVE, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS
             SIMILARLY SITUATED,
                Plaintiff-Appellee

  KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN INC., KAI-
  SER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF GEORGIA,
   KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF THE
  MID-ATLANTIC STATES, INC., KAISER FOUNDA-
    TION HEALTH PLAN INC. OF COLO., KAISER
 FOUNDATION HEALTHPLAN OF THE NW, GROUP
   HEALTH COOPERATIVE, HARKEN HEALTH IN-
    SURANCE COMPANY, HEALTH PLAN OF NE-
  VADA, INC., OXFORD HEALTH PLANS (NJ), INC.,
    ROCKY MOUNTAIN HEALTH MAINTENANCE
Case: 22-1018   Document: 51   Page: 3       Filed: 01/31/2023

 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY   v. US                 3

    ORGANIZATION, INCORPORATED, UNITEDH-
  EALTHCARE BENEFITS PLAN OF CALIFORNIA,
  UNITEDHEALTHCARE COMMUNITY PLAN, INC.,
  UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY,
  UNITEDHEALTHCARE LIFE INSURANCE COM-
 PANY, UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF ALABAMA, INC.,
    UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF COLORADO, INC.,
  UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF FLORIDA, INC., UNIT-
  EDHEALTHCARE OF GEORGIA, INC., UNITEDH-
         EALTHCARE OF KENTUCKY, LTD.,
     UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF LOUISIANA, INC.,
    UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF MISSISSIPPI, INC.,
  UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.,
     UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF NEW YORK, INC.,
   UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
    INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF OKLAHOMA,
 INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
 INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE MID-ATLAN-
   TIC, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE MID-
    LANDS, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF THE
 MIDWEST, INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF UTAH,
   INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF WASHINGTON,
     INC., UNITEDHEALTHCARE OF OHIO, INC.,
    ROCKY MOUNTAIN HEALTHCARE OPTIONS,
 INC., ALL SAVERS INSURANCE COMPANY, UNIT-
   EDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE COMPANY INC.,
                 Plaintiffs-Appellants

                          v.

                  UNITED STATES,
                      Defendant
                ______________________

                      2022-1019
                ______________________
Case: 22-1018     Document: 51     Page: 4    Filed: 01/31/2023

 4                 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY      v. US

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:17-cv-00877-KCD, Judge Kathryn C. Davis.
                  ______________________

                  Decided: January 31, 2023
                    ______________________

     DEREK L. SHAFFER, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sulli-
 van, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellees.
 Also represented by DAVID COOPER, New York, NY; J. D.
 HORTON, ADAM WOLFSON, Los Angeles, CA; STEPHEN A.
 SWEDLOW, Chicago, IL.

     MOHAMMAD KESHAVARZI, Sheppard Mullin Richter &
 Hampton LLP, Los Angeles, CA, argued for plaintiffs-ap-
 pellants. Also represented by JOHN BURNS, MATTHEW G.
 HALGREN, San Diego, CA.
                  ______________________

     Before MOORE, Chief Judge, TARANTO and CHEN, Circuit
                           Judges.
 TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
     These appeals present a challenge to awards of attor-
 ney’s fees to class counsel taken out of the classes’ recover-
 ies in successful class actions against the United States
 based on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), and the Health
 Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
 152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (collectively, the ACA). We va-
 cate and remand for reconsideration of the fee awards.
     In the ACA, Congress created a three-year Risk Corri-
 dors program to accompany the creation of new health-in-
 surance marketplaces, which presented uncertain risks for
 participating health-insurance companies. To encourage
 participation, Congress provided, among other things, that
 qualified health-plan issuers (QHP issuers) that offered
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 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY    v. US                 5

 their products in the new marketplaces would be entitled
 to payments from the Secretary of the Department of
 Health and Human Services (HHS) if they suffered suffi-
 cient losses. 42 U.S.C. § 18062(b). When the government
 failed to make the payments required by the statute, many
 QHP issuers sued the United States in the Court of Federal
 Claims (Claims Court) seeking damages under the Tucker
 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
     Among the suits were two class actions now before us,
 Health Republic Insurance Co. v. United States and Com-
 mon Ground Healthcare Cooperative v. United States, in
 which the law firm of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sulli-
 van, LLP (Quinn Emanuel) was appointed lead counsel for
 classes of QHP issuers seeking payment of the past-due
 amounts. Class Certification Order, Health Republic, No.
 16-cv-00259 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 3, 2017); Class Certification Or-
 der, Common Ground, No. 17-cv-00877 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 8,
 2018). In the opt-in notices sent to potential class members
 with court approval, Quinn Emanuel represented that it
 would seek attorney’s fees to come out of any recovery, that
 it would seek no more than 5% of any judgment or settle-
 ment obtained, and that the Claims Court would determine
 the exact amount based on, among other things, how many
 issuers participated, the amount at issue in the case, and a
 so-called “lodestar cross-check” (based on the hours actu-
 ally worked). The Health Republic and Common Ground
 cases were stayed on the merits pending the resolution of
 appeals in other cases involving materially identical
 claims. During the stay, the Supreme Court, in other
 cases, ruled against the government on the central issue in
 the various cases, holding that QHP issuers were entitled
 to collect ACA-promised Risk Corridors payments through
 Tucker Act actions. Maine Community Health Options v.
 United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1331 (2020).
     In light of Maine Community, the Claims Court en-
 tered money judgments in favor of the Health Republic and
 Common Ground classes, in amounts adding to about $3.7
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 6                HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY     v. US

 billion. See Health Republic Insurance Co. v. United States,
 156 Fed. Cl. 67, 71 (2021). The Claims Court then awarded
 Quinn Emanuel 5% of each of the common funds recovered
 in Health Republic and Common Ground, rejecting various
 objections of thirty-four class members (Objectors), the to-
 tal fee amounting to about $185 million, to be taken out of
 the class members’ recovery. Id. at 84. The Objectors now
 appeal, contending that the attorney’s fee award (the two
 awards considered as one) was unreasonable. Because the
 Claims Court’s analysis was inconsistent with the terms of
 the class opt-in notices and did not adequately justify the
 extraordinarily high award, we vacate the award and re-
 mand for a redetermination of what fees should be
 awarded.
                              I
                              A
      In the ACA, Congress provided for the creation of
 online marketplaces through which issuers of health-bene-
 fits plans could sell their plans. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1).
 As an incentive for issuers to participate in the market-
 places, whose novelty came with substantial uncertainty,
 the ACA established the Risk Corridors program, among
 other risk-mitigation measures, to “defray the carriers’
 costs and cabin their risks” during the first three years of
 operation of the marketplaces (2014, 2015, and 2016).
 Maine Community, 140 S. Ct. at 1315–16. Under the Risk
 Corridors program, QHP issuers participating in the online
 marketplaces “with profits above a certain threshold would
 pay” amounts to the HHS Secretary, while QHP issuers
 participating in the online marketplaces “with losses below
 that threshold would receive payments from” the Secre-
 tary. Id. at 1316; see 42 U.S.C. § 18062(b).
     During the Risk Corridors program’s three-year exist-
 ence, Congress passed appropriations bills that included
 riders barring use of the appropriated funds to make the
 Risk Corridors payments to the unprofitable QHP issuers.
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 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY     v. US                 7

 See Maine Community, 140 S. Ct. at 1317. Each year,
 moreover, the money collected from the profitable QHP is-
 suers was insufficient to cover the ACA-required payments
 to the loss-incurring QHP issuers. Id. Because of the ap-
 propriations riders, the government did not pay what the
 ACA required. Id.
      QHP issuers that were owed government payments
 filed several similar actions against the United States un-
 der the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a), seeking an award
 of the overdue amounts. The first of the actions was filed
 by Quinn Emanuel on February 24, 2016, on behalf of
 Health Republic Insurance Company (Health Republic)
 and a putative class of issuers. Health Republic, 156 Fed.
 Cl. at 71. The government moved to dismiss the Health
 Republic complaint on June 24, 2016, asserting lack of sub-
 ject-matter jurisdiction, but the Claims Court denied the
 motion on January 10, 2017. Id. at 72.
      One week earlier, on January 3, 2017, the Claims
 Court had certified the proposed opt-in class in Health Re-
 public and appointed Quinn Emanuel as lead class counsel
 and Health Republic as class representative, and on Feb-
 ruary 24, 2017, the Claims Court approved Quinn Eman-
 uel’s proposal for notice to the potential class members. Id.
 On March 15, 2017, Quinn Emanuel sent a notice stating
 that, if a recovery resulted, it would seek an attorney’s fee
 award that would be deducted from any recovery by the
 class, but it did not identify how much it would seek,
 whether by indicating a percentage of recovery or other-
 wise. Id.; J.A. 696; see J.A. 1389 (stating date of that no-
 tice). The opt-in deadline was May 12, 2017. J.A. 696.
 Almost immediately after the notice was sent, Quinn
 Emanuel, based on concerns that some potential class
 members misunderstood the possible amount of requested
 fees, sought and obtained the Claims Court’s permission to
 distribute, and it did distribute, a supplemental class no-
 tice, Health Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at 72, which added the
 following:
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 8                HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY      v. US

     Class Counsel [Quinn Emanuel] represents that it
     will request no more than 5% of any judgment or
     settlement obtained for the QHP Issuer Class. The
     fee may be substantially less than 5% depending
     upon the level of class participation represented by
     the final membership of the QHP Issuer Class. In
     any event, the exact percentage of Class Counsel’s
     fees will be determined by the Court subject to,
     among other things, the amount at issue in the case
     and what is called a “lodestar cross-check” (i.e., a
     limitation on class counsel fees based on the num-
     ber of hours actually worked on the case). See, e.g.,
     Geneva Rock Products, Inc. v. United States, 119
     Fed. Cl. 581, 595–96 (2015); Loving v. Sec’y of
     Health and Human Servs., 2016 WL 4098722, at *4
     (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 7, 2016).
 Unopposed Motion to Supplement the Class Notice, Health
 Republic, No. 16-cv-00259 (Mar. 24, 2017) (emphasis in
 original), as modified by Order Approving the Unopposed
 Motion to Supplement the Class Notice, Health Republic,
 No. 16-cv-00259 (Mar. 27, 2017). Overall, 153 QHP issuers
 opted into the Health Republic class. Health Republic, 156
 Fed. Cl. at 72.
     On March 3, 2017, Health Republic had moved for sum-
 mary judgment, and the government cross-moved for sum-
 mary judgment on April 12, 2017. Id. On July 11, 2017,
 the Claims Court stayed proceedings pending the resolu-
 tion of already-pending appeals in other Risk Corridors
 cases, in which Quinn Emanuel was not counsel, that
 raised identical legal issues.
                              B
     Quinn Emanuel filed a separate class action on behalf
 of Common Ground Healthcare Cooperative (Common
 Ground) and a putative class, raising the same claims, and
 that case proceeded on materially the same course as did
 the Health Republic case, with Quinn Emanuel as class
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 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY    v. US                 9

 counsel for a certified opt-in class. See id. at 72–73. The
 notice sent to potential members in the Common Ground
 class was identical in relevant part to the supplemental no-
 tice sent in Health Republic. Id. at 73. Overall, 130 QHP
 issuers opted into the Common Ground class. Id. at 73.
                              C
     Both the Health Republic and Common Ground actions
 remained stayed until the Supreme Court decided the con-
 solidated set of cases covered by the Maine Community
 opinion. In one of those cases, the Claims Court had ruled
 for the QHP issuer, but on appeal our court ruled for the
 government in all the cases, on a single ground: While
 agreeing that the ACA, considered on its own, created an
 obligation for which the Tucker Act remedy was available,
 we held that the appropriations riders overrode that rem-
 edy. See Maine Community, 140 S. Ct. at 1318. The Su-
 preme Court disagreed with us about the effect of the
 riders, id. at 1323–27, and held that the Tucker Act was
 available for the loss-incurring QHP issuers to obtain dam-
 ages reflecting the overdue ACA-required payments, id. at
 1319–23, 1327–31. The Court concluded that “the tempo-
 rary Risk Corridors program . . . created a rare money-
 mandating obligation” and that the qualifying unprofitable
 QHP issuers were entitled “to collect payment” of all re-
 quired but unpaid Risk Corridors amounts through dam-
 ages actions in the Claims Court. Id. at 1331.
      In light of Maine Community, the Claims Court en-
 tered Rule 54(b) judgments in favor of the Health Republic
 and Common Ground classes, awarding both classes the to-
 tality of their unpaid Risk Corridors payments. See Health
 Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at 73–74. The Health Republic class
 recovered approximately $1.9 billion, and the Common
 Ground class recovered approximately $1.8 billion. Id. at
 74.
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 10               HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY     v. US

                              D
     After the Claims Court entered judgments in favor of
 the Health Republic and Common Ground classes, Quinn
 Emanuel moved for attorney’s fees in both cases, request-
 ing 5%–that is, about $185 million—of the $3.7 billion com-
 mon-fund recovery. Health Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at 74.
 Quinn Emanuel stated in a declaration that its attorneys
 worked “almost 10,000 hours” on the two cases, “at a
 blended hourly rate of approximately $1033 across part-
 ners and associates,” with support staff adding more than
 400 hours “at an average rate of approximately $325 per
 hour.” J.A. 1792. The Objectors opposed the request for
 the $185 million award, arguing that the attorney’s fee
 award should be $8.828 million (0.22%) and certainly no
 more than $20 million (0.54%). The Objectors also con-
 tended that the number of hours Quinn Emanuel claimed
 to have worked on the case should be reduced, noting the
 stay of the litigation for years and asserting the insuffi-
 ciency of Quinn Emanuel’s supporting declaration. Health
 Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at 74.
      Rule 23 of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims
 (like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23) authorizes the
 court to “award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable
 costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agree-
 ment” in a certified class action. RCFC 23(h); see Fed. R.
 Civ. P. 23(h) (identical). Appropriately borrowing from
 case law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, see Progressive Indus-
 tries, Inc. v. United States, 888 F.3d 1248, 1253 n.4 (Fed.
 Cir. 2018) (“[T]he precedent interpreting the Federal Rules
 of Civil Procedure applies with equal force to the compara-
 ble Rules of the Court of Federal Claims.”), the parties be-
 fore us recognize the existence of two common methods for
 determining what fee to award, under the reasonableness
 standard, in a case like this, in which a common fund is
 recovered.     One is a percentage-of-the-fund method,
 through which “a reasonable fee is based on a percentage
 of the fund bestowed on the class.” Blum v. Stenson, 465
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 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY     v. US                 11

 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984). The second is the lodestar
 method (used generally outside the common-fund context),
 through which “the court calculates . . . the product of rea-
 sonable hours times a reasonable rate,” Haggart v. Wood-
 ley, 809 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal
 quotations omitted) (quoting City of Burlington v. Dague,
 505 U.S. 557, 559–60 (1992)), and then adjusts that “lode-
 star” result, if warranted, “on the basis of such factors as
 the risk involved and the length of the proceedings,” Staton
 v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 968 (9th Cir. 2003). We have
 recognized that the Claims Court has discretion to decide
 what method to use. Haggart, 809 F.3d at 1355.
     To determine the attorney’s fee to award in the Health
 Republic and Common Ground actions, the Claims Court
 elected to use the percentage-of-the-fund method. Health
 Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at 75. We have not enumerated
 what facts must be considered when this method is used,
 but several Claims Court decisions have used a multi-fac-
 tor test approach, under which the court considers
     (1) the quality of counsel; (2) the complexity and
     duration of the litigation; (3) the risk of nonrecov-
     ery; (4) the fee that likely would have been negoti-
     ated between private parties in similar cases; (5)
     any class members’ objections to the settlement
     terms or fees requested by class counsel; (6) the
     percentage applied in other class actions; and (7)
     the size of the award.
 Moore v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 781, 787 (2005) (citing
 Manual for Complex Litigation § 14.121 (4th ed. 2004)); see
 also Kane County v. United States, 145 Fed. Cl. 15, 18
 (2019); Mercier v. United States, 156 Fed. Cl. 580, 591
 (2021); Health Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at 74. Guided by the
 seven Moore factors, the Claims Court in the present cases
 rejected the Objectors’ challenges and approved the 5%
 award requested by Quinn Emanuel. Health Republic, 156
 Fed. Cl. at 77–83.
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 12               HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY      v. US

     The Objectors had argued for use of a “lodestar cross-
 check” as part of the percentage-of-the-fund approach,
 which, they urged, would show that a $185 million (5%) fee
 would be much too large. The name reflects an approach
 taken in many judicial decisions, under which the reason-
 ableness of a potential percentage-of-the-fund fee is
 checked by “dividing the proposed fee award by the lode-
 star calculation, resulting in a lodestar multiplier,” In re
 AT & T Corp., 455 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2006), and when
 this implicit multiplier “is too great, the court should re-
 consider its calculation under the percentage-of-recovery
 method, with an eye toward reducing the award,” In re Rite
 Aid Corp. Securities Litigation, 396 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir.
 2005). In this case, the $185 million fee would be 18 to 19
 times the product of Quinn Emanuel’s asserted hours and
 asserted rates. Health Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at 82. De-
 spite that very high implicit multiplier, the Claims Court
 stated that it need not perform a lodestar cross-check, then
 added: “[E]ven if the Court applied the lodestar cross-
 check, a multiplier of 18–19 would, at least, not be outside
 the realm of reasonableness.” Id.
     The Claims Court entered final judgment in both the
 Health Republic and Common Ground actions on Septem-
 ber 17, 2021, awarding 5% of the respective common funds
 as attorney’s fees. The Objectors timely appealed on Octo-
 ber 1, 2021. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1295(a)(3).
                              II
     We review an award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of
 discretion. Hall v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,
 640 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011). A court abuses its
 discretion when it makes “a clear error of judgment in
 weighing relevant factors or in basing its decision on an er-
 ror of law or on clearly erroneous factual findings.” Bayer
 CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 851 F.3d 1302,
 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Mentor Graphics Corp. v.
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 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY        v. US                13

 Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed.
 Cir. 1998)). We conclude that the Claims Court abused its
 discretion in its fee award for several reasons, mostly but
 not exclusively limited to the court’s discussion of a lode-
 star crosscheck.
                                A
     The Claims Court concluded that it was not necessary
 to perform a lodestar cross-check in this case. That conclu-
 sion, we hold, was legal error.
     It is a sufficient reason for us to so hold that in this case
 the court-approved notices sent to potential class members,
 for use by potential members in deciding to whether to opt
 into the classes, expressly guaranteed use of a lodestar
 cross-check by the Claims Court in determining an attor-
 ney’s fee award. See supra p. 8. Quinn Emanuel cites ju-
 dicial decisions from other circuits reciting that a trial
 court need not always subject a potential percentage-of-
 the-fund fee award to a lodestar cross-check. See, e.g., Keil
 v. Lopez, 862 F.3d 685, 701 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Although not
 required to do so, the court verified the reasonableness of
 its award by cross-checking it against the lodestar
 method.”); Appellees’ Br. at 36 n.6. But none of the cited
 decisions recite the existence of a class notice like the ones
 distributed here and nevertheless approve dispensing with
 a lodestar cross-check, much less when, as in this case, no
 change of circumstances or other basis has been advanced
 for disregarding the guarantee. We conclude that it is an
 abuse of discretion to dispense with a lodestar cross-check
 in these circumstances.
     As the Claims Court recognized, the court-approved
 guarantee of a judicial lodestar cross-check was part of the
 “deal” offered to potential class members and accepted by
 what we may assume to be all issuers that chose to join the
 classes. Health Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at 79; id. (endorsing
 characterization, in another case, that the act of “opting
 into the class . . . effectively accepted the offer of
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 14                HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY        v. US

 representation” by the named plaintiffs and class coun-
 sel). 1 That characterization properly reflects a well-recog-
 nized legal constraint applicable in a class action:
 Assurances about the future course of the litigation, when
 stated in a court-approved class notice like the ones here,
 must generally be respected. See In re Diet Drugs, 369 F.3d
 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that the trial court must
 manage the actions of class members in a manner “con-
 sistent with fair class notice” by abiding by “the terms of
 the . . . class notice”); id. at 318 (“But the Court’s power has
 to be exercised consistent with the terms of the notice . . .
 on which potential class members relied at the outset of the
 process.”); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448,
 472–74 (2d Cir. 1974) (concluding that the district court
 abused its discretion by acting “[c]ontrary to the terms” of
 the class notice’s assurances regarding the administration
 of a class action), abrogated in part on other grounds by
 Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d
 Cir. 2000); cf. In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 810 F.2d
 1017, 1019–20 (11th Cir. 1987) (recognizing principle but
 finding no violation of the notice).
    We see no basis for a departure from that principle
 here. The class notice in each case before us unequivocally

      1 All issuers that opted into the Common Ground class
 did so after the sole notice in that case. In the Health Re-
 public class, an initial notice was superseded, within ten
 days, by the notice quoted above (identical to the Common
 Ground notice), and the deadline for opting into the class
 was still at least six weeks away. No argument has been
 made to us to give distinctive treatment to class members
 that opted in between the two notices in Health Republic
 (as such members seemingly could have rescinded initial
 opt-ins, before the deadline, had there been no modifica-
 tion). We therefore treat the deal as applying to all persons
 that joined the class.
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 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY      v. US               15

 stated that a lodestar cross-check would be conducted by
 the Claims Court in its determination of a reasonable at-
 torney’s fee. In each case, developments in the litigation
 subsequent to the notice and the choices to join the class
 did not make the process of a cross-check no longer mate-
 rial to a proper adjudication of how much money would be
 subtracted from the class recovery to pay counsel. In these
 circumstances, the law required a lodestar cross-check,
 contrary to the Claims Court’s conclusion. And because
 each class-action notice referred simply to a “lodestar cross-
 check,” what was promised and therefore required was ap-
 plication of the scrutiny and accompanying standards gen-
 erally bearing that name in attorney’s-fee case law. 2

     2  Because of what the class notices promised, we need
 not decide whether a lodestar cross-check would be re-
 quired here had there been no class notices requiring it. It
 is evident, however, that the policies that govern a court’s
 determination of a “reasonable” percentage-of-the-fund at-
 torney’s fee under Rule 23(h), noted infra, might well call
 for a lodestar cross-check as part of the inquiry at least as
 a general matter. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d
 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Calculation of the lodestar,
 which measures the lawyers’ investment of time in the lit-
 igation, provides a check on the reasonableness of the per-
 centage award. Where such investment is minimal, as in
 the case of an early [resolution], the lodestar calculation
 may convince a court that a lower percentage is reasonable.
 Similarly, the lodestar calculation can be helpful in sug-
 gesting a higher percentage when litigation has been pro-
 tracted. Thus, while the primary basis of the fee award
 remains the percentage method, the lodestar may provide
 a useful perspective on the reasonableness of a given per-
 centage award.”); Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 50 (“[T]he lode-
 star remains useful as a baseline even if the percentage
 method is eventually chosen. Indeed, we encourage the
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 16               HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY       v. US

                               B
     The Claims Court in this case did not perform the re-
 quired lodestar cross-check. The court did note what the
 implicit multiplier would be for the $185 million award if
 the hours and rates asserted by Quinn Emanuel were ac-
 cepted, and it stated, citing three judicial decisions in sup-
 port, that “even if the Court applied the lodestar cross-
 check, a multiplier of 18–19 would, at least, not be outside
 the realm of reasonableness.” Health Republic, 156 Fed.
 Cl. at 82. That analysis does not suffice even apart from
 the lack of scrutiny of the lodestar figure itself.
                               1
     The Claims Court did not give required consideration
 or weight to pertinent principles and to consensus norms
 based on those principles. Two principles of central im-
 portance here were articulated and implicitly endorsed by
 the Supreme Court in a non-class-action case discussing
 fees to be paid from a recovery even when agreements be-
 tween counsel and plaintiffs set a presumptive fixed per-
 centage: “If the benefits are large in comparison to the
 amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward ad-
 justment is . . . in order”; and “[a] court should disallow
 windfalls for lawyers.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S.
 789, 808 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation
 omitted). Those principles are reflected in various circuit-
 court decisions in the class-action setting. See, e.g., In re
 Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation, 654 F.3d

 practice of requiring documentation of hours as a ‘cross
 check’ on the reasonableness of the requested percentage.”
 (quoting In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
 Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 820 (3d
 Cir. 1995))). No concrete, persuasive arguments to the con-
 trary have been presented to us. But we need not and do
 not decide the question.
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 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY      v. US                17

 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Thus, for example, where award-
 ing 25% of a ‘megafund’ would yield windfall profits for
 class counsel in light of the hours spent on the case, courts
 should adjust the benchmark percentage . . . .”); Walmart
 Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 122 (2d Cir.
 2005) (“Recognizing that economies of scale could cause
 windfalls in common fund cases, courts have traditionally
 awarded fees for common fund cases in the lower range of
 what is reasonable.”); In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litiga-
 tion, 243 F.3d 722, 736 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]bsent unusual
 circumstances, the percentage will decrease as the size of
 the fund increases.”); In re Prudential Insurance Co. Amer-
 ica Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283,
 339 (3d Cir. 1998)) (“[I]n many instances the increase in
 recovery is merely a factor of the size of the class and has
 no direct relationship to the efforts of counsel.” (cleaned up)
 (quoting In re First Fidelity Bancorporation Securities Lit-
 igation, 750 F. Supp. 160, 164 n.1 (D.N.J. 1990))); Gold-
 berger, 109 F.3d at 49 (noting that courts should “prevent
 unwarranted windfalls for attorneys”).
      Here, the Claims Court did not apply those principles.
 Indeed, it indicated a contrary view. The Claims Court
 noted that “[w]here a successful lawsuit results in a multi-
 billion-dollar award, even a minute fee percentage can re-
 sult in a sizeable award to counsel, the case at hand being
 such an example.” Health Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at 81. But
 it used that fact as a reason to approve, not reduce, Quinn
 Emanuel’s request. Id. at 79 (small percentage of recovery
 “weigh[ed] heavily” in favoring approval of requested fee).
      Those principles are reflected in judicial decisions that
 establish a relevant norm far below an implicit multiplier
 of 18 to 19. For a lodestar cross-check, “the resulting mul-
 tiplier need not fall within any pre-defined range,” In re
 Rite Aid, 396 F.3d at 307 & n.17, but “[e]ven when the lode-
 star method is used only as a cross-check, ‘courts must take
 care to explain how the application of a multiplier is justi-
 fied by the facts of a particular case,’” In re Cendant, 243
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 18               HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY       v. US

 F.3d at 742 (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Prudential,
 148 F.3d at 340–41). In particular, a court must provide
 sufficient analysis and “[c]onsideration of multipliers used
 in comparable cases” to justify the award made. In re Rite
 Aid, 396 F.3d at 307 & n.17. More particularly still, a court
 should “examine[] the reasoning behind . . . awards in cases
 of similar size.” In re Cendant, 243 F.3d at 737. “[C]ourts
 setting attorneys’ fees in cases involving large settlements
 must avoid basing their awards on percentages derived
 from cases where the settlement amounts were much
 smaller.” Id. at 736.
     That approach is consistent with the principles en-
 dorsed by the Supreme Court. And it does not exclude tak-
 ing full account of the relevant attorney-fees considerations
 as they apply to a particular case. For example, the parties
 before us do not dispute that such considerations may in-
 clude the risk of nonpayment in a contingency-fee common-
 fund arrangement, see, e.g., In re Synthroid Marketing Lit-
 igation, 325 F.3d 974, 978 (3d Cir. 2003), and the interest
 in “sustain[ing] the incentive for attorneys to continue to
 represent such clients,” Florin v. Nationsbank of Georgia,
 N.A., 60 F.3d 1245, 1247 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Fed. R.
 Civ. P. 23, 2003 Advisory Committee Note (“In determining
 a fee for class counsel, the court’s objective is to ensure an
 overall fee that is fair for counsel and equitable within the
 class.”).
     A number of courts have surveyed relevant fee awards
 and noted a norm of implicit multipliers in the range of 1
 to 4. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1051 n.6 (surveying percent-
 age-based attorney’s fee awards in common fund cases of
 $50–200 million from 1996 through 2001, “with most . . .
 from 1.0–4.0 and a bare majority . . . in the 1.5–3.0 range”);
 In re Cendant, 243 F.3d at 737–38, 742 (completing a sim-
 ilar survey and reaching a similar conclusion); In re Pru-
 dential, 148 F.3d at 341 (“[M]ultiples ranging from one to
 four are frequently awarded in common fund cases when
 the lodestar method is applied.” (quoting 3 Newberg on
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 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY     v. US               19

 Class Actions § 14.03 at 14–15)). Quinn Emanuel recog-
 nized the same at oral argument before us. Oral Arg. at
 30:43–31:12 (Q: “Do you agree that as a general matter the
 lodestar multiplier tends to be between the range of 1 and
 4?” A: “I think that is true in terms of the reported deci-
 sions . . . .”). A multiplier of 18 or 19 is far outside the
 evident relevant norm and so would require exceptional
 justification.
     The Claims Court cited three decisions as approving
 implicit multipliers of an order of magnitude akin to the
 18-to-19 implicit multiplier based on Quinn Emanuel’s fig-
 ures here. Health Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at 82 (citing Stop
 & Shop Supermarket Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
 2005 WL 1213926 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2005); In re Merry-Go-
 Round Enterprises, Inc., 244 B.R. 327 (Bankr. D. Md.
 2000); and Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d
 1213 (Del. 2012)). But the existence of outliers does not
 negate the existence of a norm. The Claims Court did not
 discuss the three decisions, aside from noting the multipli-
 ers in each case. And the cited decisions offer particularly
 weak support for the implicit multiplier here.
     The court that decided Americas Mining was not a fed-
 eral court, was not applying federal-law standards, and did
 not actually conduct a lodestar cross-check. 51 A.3d at
 1253–58. In Stop & Shop, the district court’s award corre-
 sponded to a 15.6 multiplier, but none of the class members
 objected to the award—rather, plaintiffs offered “extraor-
 dinary support . . . for counsel’s request for fees.” 2005 WL
 1213926 at *18. And Merry-Go-Round was a bankruptcy
 proceeding in which the bankruptcy court concluded that a
 court-approved fixed-percentage contingency agreement
 between counsel and the bankruptcy trustee was reasona-
 ble under 11 U.S.C. § 328(a), that enforcement of the agree-
 ment was not “unethical” under the rules of professional
 conduct despite a lodestar multiplier of 19.6, and that the
 matter was not subject to the standards for assessing fees
 in common-fund class actions. 244 B.R. at 337–38, 343–44.
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 20               HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY       v. US

 The three decisions cited by the Claims Court do not justify
 a conclusion that the award here is consistent with “re-
 sponsible discretionary parameters.” In re Cendant, 243
 F.3d at 742.
                               2
     The Claims Court erred in another way as well. In
 stating simply that an implicit multiplier of 18 to 19 was
 not outside “the realm of reasonableness,” Health Republic,
 156 Fed. Cl. at 82, the Claims Court misconceived its task
 as one in which the request for fees was presumptively to
 be granted, subject only to challengers’ demonstration that
 the request is outside the range of reasonableness and
 must be reduced. In fact, the Claims Court pervasively
 framed its inquiry that way once it decided to apply the
 percentage-of-the-fund method. See, e.g., id. at 77 (pro-
 ceeding “to evaluate the reasonableness of Class Counsel’s
 requested fee” (emphasis added)); id. (finding “nothing in
 this category [quality of counsel] that justifies a reduction
 in the requested fee” (emphasis added)); id. at 79 (applying
 risk factor to “support[] [counsel’s] fee request”); id. at 81
 (stating that task is “to evaluate the reasonableness of
 Class Counsel’s fee request,” and addressing “why a reduc-
 tion of fees is not justified” (emphases added)).
     That approach was improper. This is not a case in
 which a class notice stated that a fixed percentage of recov-
 ery would be awarded unless the court determines it to be
 unreasonable. Cf. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 (discussing a
 contingency-fee agreement reviewed only for reasonable-
 ness by a court). The class notice in each case before us
 stated a maximum possible request and that the court it-
 self would determine the proper fee. See supra p. 8. At
 least in such a case, although a range of reasonableness
 undisputedly exists, see Health Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at
 82; Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 524 F.3d 331, 340 (1st
 Cir. 2008), the court’s task is to make its own determina-
 tion of what fee to award, within the range of reasonable
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 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY        v. US                21

 possibilities, considering the relevant principles and prec-
 edents addressing comparable facts.
      The Claims Court did not identify, and Quinn Emanuel
 has not cited, any authority that defines the adjudicator’s
 task, in these circumstances, as determining the range of
 reasonableness and awarding the top end or whatever class
 counsel requests below that top end. And where there is
 no agreement by the class to a specified percentage subject
 only to an unreasonableness check, such an approach
 would be contrary to the widespread recognition that the
 trial court has a “fiduciary duty” to protect the interests of
 the class, given the general non-alignment of the interests
 of class counsel and the class when a common-fund fee is
 proposed. See In re Optical Disk Drive Products Antitrust
 Litigation, 959 F.3d 922, 930, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2020); In re
 Washington Public Power Supply Systems Securities Liti-
 gation, 19 F.3d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Because in com-
 mon fund cases the relationship between plaintiffs and
 their attorneys turns adversarial at the fee setting stage,
 courts have stressed that when awarding attorneys’ fees
 from a common fund, the [arbiter] must assume the role of
 fiduciary for the class plaintiffs.”); id. (“[A]t the fee-setting
 stage, plaintiffs’ counsel, otherwise a fiduciary for the class,
 has become a claimant against the fund created for the ben-
 efit of the class. It is obligatory, therefore, for the trial
 court judge to act with a jealous regard to the rights of
 those who are interested in the fund in determining what
 a proper fee award is.” (cleaned up)); Skelton v. General
 Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1988) (“The court
 becomes the fiduciary for the fund’s beneficiaries and must
 carefully monitor disbursement to the attorneys by scruti-
 nizing the fee applications.”); In re Fine Paper Antitrust
 Litigation, 751 F.2d 562, 583 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[F]ee requests
 from the resulting equitable fund in court must be sub-
 jected to heightened judicial scrutiny.”); Goldberger, 209
 F.3d at 52 (reaffirming the standard of fiduciary duty); Ge-
 neva Rock Products, Inc. v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 581,
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 22               HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY       v. US

 593 (2015) (“Under RCFC 23(h), the court has a fiduciary
 duty to independently review the reasonableness of class
 counsel’s proposed fee.”), rev’d in part on other grounds by
 Longnecker Property v. United States, 2016 WL 9445914
 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2016); see also In re Continental Illinois
 Securities Litigation, 962 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1992) (re-
 viewing and reversing a district court’s fee award on behalf
 of the class though no class member objected).
      The Claims Court stated that the “Objectors are seek-
 ing to pay an infinitesimal portion of their recovery to
 [Quinn Emanuel] in attorney’s fees.” Health Republic, 156
 Fed Cl. at 81. But the “portion” of the recovery is not all
 that matters: Quinn Emanuel, with court approval, ex-
 pressly promised a lodestar cross-check, whose focus is the
 actual dollar amount based on hours worked and hourly
 rates. Quinn Emanuel’s numbers for hours and rates, even
 if accepted, would produce a lodestar of approximately $10
 million, and Quinn Emanuel’s $185 million proposal is
 huge compared to that figure, whereas the Objectors’ dollar
 proposal of $8.828 million is pretty close to it. And to the
 extent that the Claims Court was suggesting that it could
 default to adopting the requester’s proposal just because it
 deemed the Objectors’ proposal too low, we see no basis for
 such a suggestion. One proposal may be too high and the
 other too low, with a third figure (proposed by no one) being
 best supported by the evidence. The Claims Court did not
 identify, and Quinn Emanuel has not cited, authority that
 requires or supports adoption of the position of the re-
 quester in that circumstance. Indeed, such an approach
 would run counter to a federal trial court’s responsibility to
 “ensure that the amount and mode of payment of attorney
 fees are fair and proper whether the fees come from a com-
 mon fund or are otherwise paid[, e]ven in the absence of
 objections,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h), 2003 Advisory Committee
 Note, and to the placement of the burden regarding fees on
 the fees claimant in other contexts where there is no ad-
 vance client agreement to a fixed amount, see Blum, 465
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 HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY     v. US               23

 U.S. at 895–96 n.11 (stating, in case involving lodestar
 method, that burden is on fee claimant to support a fee
 award); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 437 (1983)
 (same regarding lodestar components); Rumsey v. Depart-
 ment of Justice, 866 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
 (same).
                              C
      For the reasons discussed, we must vacate the award
 of fees and remand for reconsideration. That reconsidera-
 tion must include a lodestar cross-check in accordance with
 this opinion, including an assessment of whether there is
 sufficient justification for an award with an implicit multi-
 plier outside the mainstream of relevant multipliers. We
 do not see such justification in what Quinn Emanuel has
 presented to us.
      As part of the lodestar cross-check on remand, the
 Claims Court should also readdress the Objectors’ conten-
 tions that Quinn Emanuel has not done enough to justify
 the lodestar itself—the approximate number of hours and
 blended rates used to produce the 18-to-19 implicit multi-
 plier. More relaxed specificity and documentation stand-
 ards apply to examination of the lodestar in a percentage-
 of-the-fund case compared to the standards applied when
 the lodestar method is directly used to set the fee (espe-
 cially where paid by the adverse party). See In re Rite Aid,
 396 F.3d at 306 (“The lodestar cross-check calculation need
 entail neither mathematical precision nor bean-counting.”
 (footnote omitted)). But the Claims Court should provide
 more explanation than so far presented concerning the ad-
 equacy of Quinn Emanuel’s hours and rates in light of the
 Objectors’ criticisms. See Health Republic, 156 Fed. Cl. at
 81–82.
     One final point. We have concluded that the court
 must honor the class-notice commitments if, as here, they
 remain material to the court’s task and that the court in
 this case may not treat the request as presumptively the
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 24               HEALTH REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY     v. US

 proper award but must play a more neutral role, character-
 ized as a fiduciary one, in deciding what fee is warranted.
 The Objectors argue that those conclusions may have a
 bearing on aspects of the fee analysis beyond the lodestar
 cross-check. Opening Br. at 48–53. On remand, the Claims
 Court should reconsider any parts of its analysis affected
 by the conclusions we have reached above.
                             III
      For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the fee award and
 remand for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
 ion.
      Costs are awarded to the appellants.
                VACATED AND REMANDED