Court Opinion

ID: 9540566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:17:47.929218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:01.204558
License: Public Domain

Almand, Justice,
dissenting. When the plaintiffs instituted this action they named Kathleen Logan Phillips, as executrix of the estate of Lula K. Logan, a party defendant. The primary purpose of this action was two fold: (1) to require the specific performance by the executrix of an oral contract by the testatrix as to the devising of certain real and personal property to the plaintiffs and (2) • the cancellation of a deed from the testatrix to one of the defendants. In both instances, the executrix of the estate was a necessary and indispensable party. Hazelrigs v. Butler, 204 Ga. 98 (48 SE2d 727); Reeves v. Tarnok, 161 Ga. 838 (131 SE 891). By their voluntary action and amendment to the petition, the plaintiffs dismissed their suit against the executrix and other heirs and devisees. A plaintiff in an equity suit may as a matter of right strike the name of a defendant, but he takes the risk of the consequences of such act. Coston v. Coston, 66 Ga. 382 (1); Pearson v. Courson, 129 Ga. 666 (5) (59 SE 907).
When a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his petition, whether for a good or a bad reason, the court has no authority, over the objection of the defendant, to re-instate the action. Simpson v. Brock, 114 Ga. 294 (40 SE 266). So in this case, where the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their action against a named defendant, they cannot subsequently bring such party back into the case over the objection of such former defendant.
The executrix of the estate of the testatrix being an essential and indispensable party, and she being absent as such party, the court did not err in sustaining the grounds of the appellees’ general demurrer pointing out such defect. Sowell v. Sowell, 212 Ga. 351 (92 SE2d 524); Wingo v. Manufacturer’s Nat. Bank, 219 Ga. 302 (133 SE2d 15).
Mr. Justice Quillian concurs in this dissent.