Court Opinion

ID: 9367665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 16:03:17.012539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:01.991038
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                            APRIL L. YOUNG,
                               Appellant,

                                     v.

       NEW RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION f/k/a
         DITECH FINANCIAL LLC, and NEWREZ, LLC d/b/a
            SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING, LLC,
                          Appellees.

                              No. 4D21-2579

                            [February 1, 2023]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Barry J. Stone, Senior Judge, Judge; L.T. Case No.
CACE19006695.

   Jeffrey M. Liggio of Liggio & Cornell, West Palm Beach, Geoffrey Stahl
of Gordon & Partners, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, and Philip M. Burlington
and Adam Richardson of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm
Beach, for appellant.

   Nancy M. Wallace of Akerman LLP, Tallahassee, and William P. Heller
of Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

   In this appeal, April L. Young (Young) challenges the trial court’s March
2021 and August 2021 orders dismissing her causes of action against New
Residential Investment Corporation (New Residential) and New Rez LLC
d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, LLC (Shellpoint) in the foreclosure
proceedings initiated by Ditech Financial LLC (Ditech). New Residential is
the current holder of the note and mortgage. During the pendency of the
foreclosure proceedings, New Residential purchased Ditech’s entire
mortgage business, including the promissory note and mortgage executed
by Young in favor of Ditech’s predecessor-in-interest. After Ditech sold the
note and mortgage to New Residential, Shellpoint began servicing the note
on behalf of New Residential pursuant to a servicing contract. We
conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of certain issues
raised by Young in this appeal, and that those issues over which we do
have jurisdiction lack merit.

    Young argues in this appeal that the trial court committed reversible
error by dismissing her: (1) Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act
(FCCPA) cause of action against Shellpoint; (2) equitable accounting cause
of action against both New Residential and Shellpoint; and (3) contractual
causes of action against both New Residential and Shellpoint. The trial
court’s March 2021 order dismissed Young’s FCCPA cause of action
against Shellpoint, and the equitable accounting cause of action against
both New Residential and Shellpoint. The August 2021 order dismissed
the contractual causes of action against both New Residential and
Shellpoint.

    We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Young’s causes of action against
Shellpoint without further comment. However, we lack jurisdiction to
review the trial court’s dismissal of Young’s equitable accounting and
contractual counterclaims against New Residential because those causes
of action are compulsory to the main foreclosure claim which remains
pending in the trial court. Neither the March 2021 nor August 2021 orders
can be considered partially final either with respect to the “entire case” as
to New Residential as a party, or with respect to the causes of action
asserted against New Residential, because those causes of action are
“interdependent with” and not “separate and distinct” from “other pleaded
claims” not yet adjudicated—namely, the main foreclosure claim. See Fla.
R. App. P. 9.110(k) (only partial judgments that dispose of “an entire case
as to any party,” or “a separate and distinct cause of action that is not
interdependent with other pleaded claims,” are immediately appealable
prior to entry of “the final judgment in the entire case”); see also 4040 Ibis
Circle, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 193 So. 3d 957, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA
2016) (borrowers’ counterclaims against holder of note and mortgage for
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing were compulsory in nature to main foreclosure action such
that order dismissing counterclaims, without any accompanying final
adjudication of main foreclosure claim, was not immediately appealable as
partial final judgment).

   We therefore dismiss this appeal to the extent Young seeks review of
the March 2021 and August 2021 orders dismissing her equitable
accounting and contractual causes of action against New Residential,
without prejudice to Young’s ability to challenge these orders in any
plenary appeal from the trial court’s final judgment on the main
foreclosure claim. In all other respects, we affirm the orders on review.

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  Dismissed in part, affirmed in part.

WARNER, CIKLIN and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

                           *        *      *

    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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