Court Opinion

ID: 9574803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:08:28.729558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:14.595714
License: Public Domain

Mobley, Justice,
dissenting. I can not agree with the majority *266opinion that the Superior Court of Chatham County was without jurisdiction in this case. The court based its conclusion upon the decisions in Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 339 U. S. 239 (1) (70 Sup. Ct. 577, 94 L. ed. 795); Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561 (66 Sup. Ct. 322, 90 L. ed. 318); and Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Southern Railway Co., 339 U. S. 255 (70 Sup. Ct. 585, 94 L. ed. 811), all of which hold that the courts are without power to interpret the terms of collective-bargaining agreements between railroads and unions, or employees, where the interpretation will govern future relations between the parties.
In the Slocum case the railroad had collective-bargaining agreements with two labor unions, and a dispute ai’ose between the unions as to the scope of their respective agreements, each claiming certain jobs for its members. The Pitney case also involved a jurisdictional dispute between the railroad and two unions with which the railroad had separate agreements, each union claiming that its members should, under the agreements, man certain trains. In each of these cases the dispute “concerned interpretation of an existing bargaining agreement. Its settlement would have prospective as well as retrospective importance to both the railroad and its employees, since the interpretation accepted would govern future relations of those parties.” Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 339 U. S. 239 (1), 242. Likewise, Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Southern Ry. Co., 339 U. S. 255 (70 Sup. Ct. 585, 94 L. ed. 811), involved a dispute “between a railroad and a labor union as to the railroad’s obligation under their collective-bargaining agreement to give conductors extra pay for certain services," and the interpretation of the existing collective-bargaining agreement would govern future relations between the parties.
These cases are not authority for holding that the State court does not have jurisdiction of this case, for the reason that in each of them there was no dispute about the existence of a collective-bargaining agreement between the parties, an interpretation of which would decide the question at issue, and in each instance such interpretation would govern the future relations between the contesting parties. There the question was simply what the *267agreement meant. That is not the situation at all in this case, for here the question is not the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement between the parties, but the question raised by the pleadings is, was the decision and award of Referee Cheney a common-law or general-law arbitration award, as contended by the railroad, or did it, when made, become a provision in -the collective-bargaining agreement between the parties, which both admitted existed. There is a big difference in interpreting a collective-bargaining agreement, which admittedly exists, and in deciding whether an award made by an arbitrator, to whom the parties had submitted the question for arbitration, was an arbitration made under the general law, or under a collective-bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court of the United States in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768 (2a) (72 Sup. Ct. 1022, 96 L. ed. 1283), held that, where a “dispute involves the validity of a contract, not its meaning, it cannot be resolved by interpretation of a bargaining agreement so as to give exclusive jurisdiction to the Railway Adjustment Board under Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239.” The situation here is analogous, for the question is, whether a collective-bargaining agreement as to the hose-coupler phase of operation, exists, or whether this was a legal arbitration as the railroad contends. Not just the validity, but the very existence of an agreement, is the question. If there is none,' then there is no agreement for the Railway Adjustment Board to consider. This court in my opinion has jurisdiction and should determine whether the arbitration award was a common-law or legal arbitration as contended by the railroad, or whether when made it became a provision of the collective-bargaining agreement between the parties, as contended by the union.
The majority opinion distinguishes this case from Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Culpepper, 209 Ga. 844 (76 S. E. 2d 482), on the ground that the court there said that its decision would not govern future relations between the carrier and its employees, and that here the railroad is seeking a declaratory judgment to guide it in its future negotiations with the union. I do not agree that the interpretation asked by the railroad would govern future relations between the parties. There is a basic distinction between “future relations” and “future negotiations.” In the *268Slocum and Pitney cases, supra, the interpretation of the agreement would govern future relations between the parties, because the decision would settle whether the members of one union or of the other would man certain trains or perform certain work in the future. A decision of this court on whether this was an arbitration award independent of the collective-bargaining agreement, or whether it, when made, became a provision of the collective-bargaining agreement, decides whether the question of air-hose coupling has been settled once and for all time, or whether as a provision of the collective-bargaining agreement it was open for further negotiation after the expiration of the 3-year moratorium. It simply says whether the question was settled by arbitration, and is not the subject of further negotiation between the parties, or whether, as a provision in the collective-bargaining agreement, it is open to further negotiation. It does not settle any question that governs future relations between the parties. The decision of the court is therefore in conflict with the Culpepper case, supra.