Court Opinion

ID: 9965364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 14:08:59.061246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:55.744038
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                                APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

                                                         SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                         APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                         DOCKET NO. A-2450-22

JOSEPH E. DEVANEY, JR., and
PAULA DEVANEY, husband and
wife,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE CHEMOURS COMPANY FC,
LLC, WJV GENERAL
CONTRACTORS, LLC, and
BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL
SERVICES, LLC,

     Defendants-Respondents.
______________________________

                   Argued April 16, 2024 – Decided May 2, 2024

                   Before Judges Mayer, Whipple and Augostini.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Law Division, Salem County, Docket No. L-0221-19.

                   Michael Charles Shapiro argued the cause for
                   appellants (Stark & Stark, PC, attorneys; Evan J. Lide
                   and Michael Charles Shapiro, of counsel and on the
                   briefs).
            Diane Fleming Averell argued the cause for
            respondents (Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, PC,
            attorneys for respondent The Chemours Company FC,
            LLC; Diane Fleming Averell and Jennifer Amanda
            Kelliher, of counsel and on the joint brief).

            Hill Wallack, LLP, attorneys for respondent WJV
            General Contractors, LLC (Andrew S. Riso, of
            counsel and on the joint brief).

            Donnelly, Petrycki & Sansone, attorneys for
            respondent Brown and Root Industrial Service, LLC
            (Robert J. Gillispie, Jr., of counsel and on the joint
            brief)

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Joseph Devaney 1 appeals the March 21, 2023 order granting

summary judgment to defendants Chemours Company FC, LLC (Chemours)

along with WJV General Contractors, LLC (WJV) and Brown & Root

Industrial Services, LLC (B&R) (collectively defendants). We agree with the

trial court's ruling that plaintiff cannot establish defendants owed him a duty of

care because the ongoing storm rule, announced by the Supreme Court in

Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, 246 N.J. 546 (2021), applies. We

affirm.

1
   Paula Devaney asserted a per quod claim based on Joseph's injury. For
simplicity's sake, we refer to Joseph as the sole plaintiff.

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      Plaintiff was a security guard for G4S, the contractor that provided

security services for Chemours. As a security guard, one of his responsibilities

was to inspect incoming and outgoing cars at Chemours' entrance and exit.

The area plaintiff was tasked with inspecting was known as the "100%

inspection area."   When walking from the inbound to the outbound area,

plaintiff would either walk around the area or go through a doorway. Plaintiff

would go through the doorway to the outbound lane that required inspection as

it was "[t]he best way to get there."

      On January 4, 2018, four days before plaintiff's slip and fall, there was a

winter storm that resulted in less than four inches of snow and .23-.35 inches

of precipitation. On January 8, 2018, a winter storm, with light snow, sleet,

and freezing rain, began at 2 p.m. and did not end until around 9:30 p.m. Once

Chemours became aware of icy conditions at the facility at 6:45 p.m., they

contacted WJV and B&R to respond to Chemours' facility. WJV and B&R

were contracted to provide snow and ice removal at Chemours' facility for the

season.   An email was also sent to employees, security guards, and snow

contractors to notify them of the conditions. The email advised the facility

was prepared with salt, and ice/snow removal crews would be mobilized if

needed.

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      Plaintiff began his shift at 6 p.m. Then, at around 8:30 p.m., while

plaintiff was walking his usual path, he slipped on asphalt into a doorway

between the inbound and outbound area of the inspection zone. 2 Plaintiff

sustained injuries, which resulted in multiple surgeries.

      On December 5, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging bodily injury

caused by a slip and fall on wintry conditions at Chemours' premises. In 2021,

while this litigation was still pending, our Supreme Court issued its decision in

Pareja, and adopted the ongoing storm rule. Under the ongoing storm rule,

commercial landowners do not have a duty to remove the accumulation of

snow and ice until the conclusion of the storm. WJV and B&R were also

named as defendants. On February 3, 2023, defendants filed a joint motion for

summary judgment arguing they were not liable due to the ongoing storm rule

adopted following Pareja.

      On March 21, 2023, the trial court granted defendants' motion for

summary judgment and dismissed all claims against Chemours, WJV, and

B&R with prejudice. This appeal followed.

2
  At 10:30 p.m., Chemours was notified another security officer had fallen at
7:15 p.m., in a different location from where plaintiff fell and before plaintiff's
fall.

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      We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and apply the

same standard as the trial court. Lee v. Brown, 232 N.J. 114, 126-27 (2018).

"[S]ummary judgment will be granted if there is no genuine issue of material

fact and 'the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of

law.'" Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017) (quoting Templo Fuente

De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199

(2016)). To determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we

consider "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a

rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-

moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540

(1995). "An issue of material fact is 'genuine only if, considering the burden

of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion,

together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving

party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.'" Grande v.

Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217

N.J. 22, 38 (2014)).

      Here, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to

defendants; thus, we find no reason to disturb the trial court's ruling. It is well

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                                       5
settled the plaintiff in a negligence action must prove: (1) defendant owed

plaintiff a duty of care; (2) defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach

actually and proximately caused the plaintiff's injury; and (4) damages.

Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex,

196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008)). A commercial landowner has a duty to maintain

safe premises, which extends to any area where invitees are expected to go and

requires them to protect an invitee from "known or reasonably discoverable

dangers." Moore v. Schering Plough, Inc., 328 N.J. Super. 300, 305-06 (App.

Div. 2000) (quoting Rigatti v. Reddy, 318 N.J. Super. 537, 541 (App. Div.

1991)). Specifically, a commercial landowner has a duty to dispose of snow

and ice in its parking lots and walkways. Moore, 328 N.J. Super. at 307.

      In Pareja, the plaintiff slipped, fell, and injured himself on a driveway

apron, which was       private property     owned by defendant, Princeton

International. 246 N.J. at 549. Hours prior to the incident, freezing rain, light

rain, and sleet had fallen.     Ibid.   At the time of the plaintiff's injury,

precipitation was ongoing. Id. The Court held "commercial landowners do

not have a duty to remove the accumulation of snow and ice until the

conclusion of the storm." Id. at 558. Adopting this rule, the Court relieved

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commercial landowners of the duty to continuously clear snow and ice from

their property throughout the duration of an inclement winter weather event.

            [S]uch a duty does not consider the size, resources,
            and ability of individual commercial landowners or
            recognize that what may be reasonable for larger
            commercial landowners may not be reasonable—or
            even possible—for smaller ones. While we trust juries
            to uphold their duties to evaluate reasonableness, we
            do not wish to submit every commercial landowner to
            litigation when it is not feasible to provide uniform,
            clear guidance as to what would be reasonable. We
            decline to impose a duty that cannot be adhered to by
            all commercial landowners.

            [Id. at 557 (footnote omitted).]

      Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff's slip-and-fall occurred during the

snowstorm. Thus, the ongoing storm rule applies, relieving defendants of any

duty of care they may have owed plaintiff.

      Plaintiff argues retrospective application of the ongoing storm rule

contradicts the negligence jurisprudence that provides individuals recourse if

they are seriously injured due to a defective sidewalk. However, the trial court

correctly rejected plaintiff's argument concerning retroactive application,

because nothing in Pareja required prospective application only. In Pareja

itself the Court applied the newly rendered ongoing storm doctrine, to a 2015

slip-and-fall that occurred during an ongoing storm. Id. at 549.

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                                       7
       We also reject plaintiff's additional arguments that we should not extend

the ongoing storm rule to include sidewalks of highly secure, restricted -access

industrial facilities such as Chemours. This argument overlooks Pareja's goal

of providing "uniform, clear guidance" for all commercial landowners. Pareja

rejects the distinction between public and private ownership, to ensure

uniformity. We decline to draw arbitrary lines for the type of property that

falls under Pareja. Therefore, there is no reason to limit Pareja's application to

exclude facilities such as Chemours.

       The standard under Pareja is that remediation is required within a

reasonable time after storm has ended.         246 N.J. at 558.      "Given the

unreasonableness of removing the accumulation of snow and ice while a storm

is ongoing" liability would only attach to WJV and B&R after the storm ended,

which in this case was about 9:00 p.m., well after the plaintiff's fall. Id. at

558.

       Based on our review of the summary judgment record in light of the

Court's opinion in Pareja, we are satisfied the trial court correctly considered

the entire record and determined the ongoing storm rule bars plaintiffs'

negligence claim against defendants as a matter of law.          We also reject

plaintiffs' claim there are genuine issues of material fact supporting a finding

                                                                           A-2450-22
                                       8
of liability under the exceptions to the ongoing storm rule recognized by the

Court in Pareja.

      Any remaining arguments raised by plaintiff are without sufficient merit

to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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