Court Opinion

ID: 9489246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:10:02.714377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:25.046467
License: Public Domain

ORDER:
In October of 1995, appellant Fabio Aberto Torres was indicted by a grand jury in the Southern District of Texas and charged with two drug trafficking offenses. An arrest warrant was issued by that court, and in May of 1996, Torres was arrested in southern Florida, taken into custody, and brought before a United States magistrate judge of the Southern District of Florida. The magistrate judge ordered Torres’ removal by the U.S. Marshal to the Southern District of Texas, ordered the Marshal’s execution of that order stayed until June 14, 1996, and ordered Torres released from custody on the condition that he post a $50,000 corporate surety bond.
The Government appealed the magistrate judge’s release order to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145, which provides that:
If a person is ordered released by a magistrate, or by a person other than a judge having original jurisdiction over the offense and other than a Federal appellate court — (1) the attorney for the Government may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation of the order or amendment of the conditions of release.
18 U.S.C. § 3145 (emphasis added). On May 30, that court, exercising its authority under section 3145, stayed the magistrate judge’s order.
In addition to appealing to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, the Government appealed the magistrate judge’s release order to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. That court dismissed the Government’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, relying on the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3145.1
*1031Although Torres prevailed in the district court — albeit not in a decision on the merits — he now appeals that district court’s decision. Contending that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain the Government’s appeal, Torres asks that we summarily reverse its order of dismissal and remand the case with the instruction that the district court decide the Government’s appeal on the merits. In addition, Torres asks us to stay the magistrate judge’s removal order pending the district court’s disposition of that appeal.
The Government, responding to Torres’ application for relief, contends that because the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain its appeal, we likewise lack jurisdiction. The Government’s position is correct; in fact, the notion that the district court, and in turn this court, has the authority to entertain the Government’s appeal of the magistrate judge’s release order is without merit. The plain language of section 3145 dictates that the district court with original jurisdiction over the offense, ie., the prosecuting district, here the Southern District of Texas, is the only proper one to review the order in question. In so concluding, we agree with the only other court of appeals to have addressed the issue. See United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir.1995) (authority to review magistrate judge’s detention order resides with the district court where the prosecution is pending).
Accordingly, appellant’s application for the relief described above is
DENIED.

. Once the Government appealed to the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, appellant was held in custody pursuant to an "automatic stay" provision in that court's local rules which provides for an automatic stay pending the government's appeal of a magistrate judge's release order. S.D.Fla.Mag.R. 4(a)(2). We note in passing that this local rule is of dubious applicability in this case, given the fact that the district court had no jurisdiction over the Government's appeal. In any event, the U.S. Marshal for the Southern District of Florida now holds Torres pursuant to the Southern District of Texas order of May 30 staying the release.