Court Opinion

ID: 9852729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:35:38.255099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:33.471265
License: Public Domain

Birdsong, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in Divisions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and in the result reached by my colleagues as to Division 4. However, for the following independent reasons, I conclude that error was not committed when the trial court allowed the cross-examination of appellant’s expert neurologist, regarding a medical article found in the Neurosurgery medical journal.
1. As a general rule, “[u]nder Georgia law, an expert witness can be cross-examined by reference to a standard treatise in the field of the expert’s special knowledge, if the treatise has been proven to be a standard treatise on the subject, as was held in Mize v. State[, 240 Ga. 197, 198 (4) (240 SE2d 11)]. Also, the cross-examiner can establish the authoritative status of material used on cross-examination through the cross-examination of the witness, as was the case in Pound v. Medneyl 176 Ga. App. 756, 762 (4) (337 SE2d 772)]. [And w]hen establishing the authoritativeness of a text through the witness being cross-examined, the witness does not have to use the words ‘standard’ or ‘authoritative.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) (Agnor’s Ga. Evidence, Opinion Evidence and Experts, § 9-6 (1991 Supp.)); otherwise the adverse expert witness could frequently thwart the use of the document in his cross-examination merely by refusing to so label it.
The foundation requirement for the use of a treatise in cross-examination is to establish the value of the particular document as a source of professional authority and, of course, a “standard” treatise is presumed to be authoritative or it could not achieve recognition as a “standard” source within its field. Moreover, notwithstanding Pound v. Medney, 176 Ga. App. 756 (337 SE2d 772), I believe that every article or theory contained within a recognized “standard” or “authoritative” treatise need not be individually authenticated, whether the expert limits his assessment to the selective scope of the one article or not, it being sufficient that the particular article or theory has been accepted for publication and professional dissemination under the imprimatur of the “standard” or “authoritative” treatise in which it appears.
It is well-recognized that the admission of evidence is a matter which rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial court. See generally Gully v. Glover, 190 Ga. App. 238 (4) (378 SE2d 411); Gene Thompson Lumber Co. v. Davis Parmer Lumber Co., 189 Ga. App. 573, 575 (2) (377 SE2d 15). Of necessity, a trial court must be vested *873with discretion to determine whether a particular treatise has adequately been established as “authoritative,” to enable its use for purposes of cross-examination of the opposing party’s expert witness. Therefore, the correct standard of review in this case is whether the trial court abused his discretion in allowing the cross-examination of appellant’s expert regarding the article found in the medical publication concerned. See Ruffin v. State, 243 Ga. 95, 104 (16) (252 SE2d 472), cert. den. 444 U. S. 995 (100 SC 530, 62 LE2d 425). In my view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
I agree with my colleagues that “ ‘[a] party can prove by cross-examination of an opposing party’s expert that a treatise is standard [or authoritative] on the subject.’ ” Pound v. Medney, supra; Agnor, supra. Appellant’s expert is a board certified neurologist who testified in “layman’s terms” that neurology “is the diagnosis and treatment of diseases of the nervous system meaning the brain, the nerves coming from the brain, the spinal cord, nerves coming from the spinal cord, the muscles and associated trauma to the area,” and that the only “difference between a neurologist and a neurosurgeon is that a neurosurgeon operates while a neurologist doesn’t.” Thereafter, the expert admitted in cross-examination that he was familiar with the journal called Neurosurgery, that it was commonly read and referred to by members of the neurosurgical profession or the medical profession with interest in the area, as a useful reference and text, that he was not a stranger to this periodical himself, although he was not familiar with the particular article in question; and that before being published, articles which appear in the journal are submitted to peer review before one or two reviewers “who will look at it on its own merit as to whether it was done as a qualified or well-done study” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is the duty of an appellaté court to construe the evidence in support of the verdict and judgment (Department of Transp. v. Hillside Motors, 192 Ga. App. 637, 639 (2) (385 SE2d 746)), and this includes our obligation to draw those reasonable inferences from the competent testimony of record that either directly or indirectly supports the verdict and judgment rendered. When the testimony of the expert is viewed in this light, it is beyond cavil that, although the words “standard” or “authoritative” do not appear in the expert’s description of the journal, his testimony unequivocally establishes the journal as an “authoritative” medical source. In this regard, it may reasonably be inferred that the journal is both an “authoritative” and “standard” medical treatise because it is “commonly read and referred to” by members of the neurosurgical profession or the medical profession with interest in this area,” and these professionals consider it “a useful reference and text.” Clearly, it would not be commonly read and certainly it would not be commonly referred to by such ex*874perts unless it was authoritative. Further, unless it was considered authoritative, it could not be deemed “a useful reference” and certainly not a useful “text” by such professionals and the expert witness himself. “Text” as the word is commonly used by the expert in his testimony unequivocally means a “textbook.” See definition of “text” in Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1989 ed.). And, a “textbook” in its common meaning is “a book used by students as a standard work for a particular branch of study.” (Emphasis supplied.) Webster’s, supra; compare Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.) definition of “textbook.” The primary common definition of “treatise” is “a book or writing that treats some particular subject.” Webster’s, supra. Also, a “treatise” is defined as “a formal and systematic exposition in writing of the principles of a subject, generally longer and more detailed than an essay.” Id. When the expert’s words are attributed their normal and common meaning, his testimony not only establishes this medical journal was authoritative, but that it was a standard medical treatise as well, being a useful “text.”
Moreover, the use of the information contained in the article for purpose of cross-examination was not improper or prejudicial per se. Appellees were entitled to subject appellant’s expert witness to a thorough and sifting cross-examination. OCGA § 24-9-64. And the detailed cross-examination of appellant’s expert over the theory contained within this article served the legitimate purpose of testing the scope of the expert’s knowledge in his field, particular in regard to the administration of Heparin to aneurysm patients after ruptures to enhance patient recovery. “It is a cardinal rule of evidence that if evidence is duly admissible under any legitimate theory, it should be admitted even though it does not qualify for admission under one or more other evidentiary theories.” Boatright v. State, 192 Ga. App. 112, 116 (6) (385 SE2d 298) and cases cited therein. That is, “[e]vidence admissible in one capacity is not inadmissible because it does not satisfy the rules for admissibility in another capacity.” Stuckey Diamonds v. Jones, 195 Ga. App. 351, 352 (393 SE2d 706). Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the cross-examination of the expert regarding the article found in this medical journal.
2. Secondly, “[t]he object of all legal investigation is the discovery of truth. The rules of evidence are framed with a view to this prominent end, seeking always for pure sources and the highest evidence.” OCGA § 24-1-2. In the case at bar, the expert witness admitted in open court that he was personally familiar with the medical journal in question and, in addition, that it was commonly read and referred to by professionals, as above discussed.
The existing law, regarding the cross-examination of expert wit*875nesses concerning professional writings, should be expanded in the interests of fundamental fairness. In my view, the rules should be immediately modified to authorize expressly the cross-examination of an expert regarding any relevant article found within a particular medical journal or writing with which the expert claims to be or is otherwise shown to be personally familiar. Such cross-examination is a probative means of testing the scope of the expert’s medical knowledge and expertise in the professional area at issue to aifect the expert’s credibility and the weight to be given his testimony by the factfinder; however, under this proposed rule, the contents of the article would not be admissible as substantive proof of the facts therein contained.
The personal familiarity referred to in the proposed rule need not be a familiarity with the particular article, but only with the journal or writing in which the relevant article appears. This is because the mere fact that an expert is unfamiliar with a relevant medical article published in a professional journal or writing with which he is shown or professes to be familiar is of unquestionable relevance in testing the scope of the expert’s professional knowledge and expertise concerning the particular professional matter then at issue. The scope of such examination should remain subject to the usual and legitimate discretionary control of the trial court. But in such instances, cross-examination should be permitted whether it is first established that the journal is an “authoritative” or “standard” treatise. OCGA §§ 24-2-1; 24-9-64.
This expansion of the use of medical writings in cross-examination is not unfair, as an expert certainly should be expected to exhibit some knowledge or opinion as to relevant information contained within medical journals, texts, or other writings with which he professes to be personally familiar, particularly as by merely professing familiarity with various professional writings an expert may enhance his credibility with the jury. Further, while the trial court has a duty “to protect a witness from being unfairly dealt with” on cross-examination, it also has a duty “to allow a searching and skillful test of his intelligence, memory, accuracy, and veracity” and qualifications where relevant. Harris v. The Central R., 78 Ga. 525, 534 (3) (3 SE 355). “As a general rule, it is better that cross-examination should be too free than too much restricted.” Id. However, any form of cross-examination should not be without necessary limits. Thus, the trial court should be able to limit the scope of cross-examination, regarding exploration of the expert’s actual knowledge of the subject matter and degree of professional expertise, to relevant matters elicited by proper questioning. Prince v. Kujawa, 178 Ga. App. 828, 830 (2) (344 SE2d 680). This proposal is not novel, as Georgia has long favored the admission of any relevant evidence no matter how slight its probative *876value. Whisnant v. State, 178 Ga. App. 742 (1) (344 SE2d 536). Further, this procedure presents no fair risk of fundamental unfairness, as the scope and tone of the examination remains under the discretionary control of the trial court, the opposing party may timely request limiting instructions, and the expert remains free to express his views, as was done in this case, regarding the basic reliability of the articles appearing in such publications. Of course, it should not be allowed to cross-examine an expert over professional writings which are not “authoritative” or “standard” when his personal familiarity therewith has not been established, as in such instances his credibility has not been tacitly enhanced by his response, and the fair risk of prejudice would appear to exceed substantially the probative value to be gained by such cross-examination.
Decided April 8, 1992
Reconsideration denied July 10, 1992.
Thomas L. Murphy, for appellant.
Alston & Bird, Judson Graves, Kenneth B. Pollock, for appellees.
Accordingly, I would both affirm the judgment and expand the existing rule regarding cross-examination of experts over the contents of medical writings, as above outlined.