Court Opinion

ID: 9680347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:30:21.50418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:28.168967
License: Public Domain

JAMES K. PREWITT, Special Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the principal opinion with one exception. In the discussion of appellant’s contention that the shotgun should not have been admitted in evidence because it was taken by an illegal search and seizure, the opinion suggests that probable cause existed that an offense was being committed. I do not agree. The officer testified that appellant bent over and appeared to place the gun either under the seat or in the floorboard. Presumably in the latter situation it would not have been concealed. I think this indicates no more than a 50 percent possibility that a crime was committed and probability would require more than that. I believe that a reasonable man would not believe that it was probable that a crime was being committed but only that it was a possibility.
I concur in the result because I believe that lack of probable cause does not always make a search and seizure “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Probable cause is not expressly required by the Fourth Amendment and the cases do not seem to require it in a situation such as this. Reasonableness of the action seems to be the criteria. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640-41, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-882, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579-81, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-94, 100 S.Ct. 338, 343-44, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). A “reasonable suspicion” of criminal conduct is sufficient for this type of search and seizure. Brown v. Texas, supra; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1922-23, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See also Annot., Law Enforcement Officer’s Authority, Under Federal Constitution, to “Stop and Frisk” Person—Supreme Court Cases, 32 L.Ed.2d 942, 946 (1973).
Justice Harlan concurring in Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 31-32, 88 S.Ct. at 1885, stated:
“If the State of Ohio were to provide that police officers could, on articulable suspicion less than probable cause, forcibly frisk and disarm persons thought to be carrying concealed weapons, I would *16have little doubt that action taken pursuant to such authority could be constitutionally reasonable. Concealed weapons create an immediate and severe danger to the public, and though that danger might not warrant routine general weapons checks, it could well warrant action on less than a ‘probability.’ ”
Although I think that less than probable cause was present here, I believe that the officer’s actions were properly based on a reasonable suspicion that a criminal violation was occurring.