Court Opinion

ID: 9588922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:39:41.7898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:26.430224
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
On November 3, 1972, F. L. Bray was leaving the premises of his employer, and it was necessary to cross a public highway in order to reach the parking lot of his employer where Bray’s car was parked. He was struck by a vehicle driven by a fellow employee; and suffered disabling injuries as a result of the impact.
Bray applied for workmen’s compensation against his employer and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.
The deputy director recognized the well established rule that an employee is allowed a reasonable time for ingress and egress from his place of work; and that his period of employment usually includes such reasonable time for ingress to and egress from the place of work while he is on the employer’s premises (Federal Ins. Co. v. Coram, 95 Ga. App. 622, 625 (98 SE2d 214); U. S. Cas. Co. v. Russell, 98 Ga. App. 181 (105 SE2d 378)), and that an accident of the nature here described is one which may arise out of and in the course of his employment.
Despite this, the deputy director held that the pedestrian violated Code Ann. § 68-1656 (a) which provides that every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk, or within an *593unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, shall yield the right of way to the vehicles on the roadway. He further held that claimant, in this instance, was in the performance of an unlawful act in failing to yield the right of way to a vehicle in that he violated Code Ann. § 68-1657 (a); and that the preponderance of the evidence here warranted a finding that the claimant’s injuries were proximately caused by his violation of Code Ann. § 68-1657 (a).
The deputy director denied workmen’s compensation. The full board affirmed.
The case was appealed to the superior court and that court took judicial notice that the geographical location of the place of the accident in this case was in a rural and unincorporated area of Stephens County, and that the board erroneously determined that the pedestrian claimant was violating Code Ann. § 68-1657 (a), because same did not apply at this location.
Claimant was outside the incorporated city and there was no evidence that he failed to use an available crosswalk at that point. The court also found the mere existence of a traffic control device at some distance down the road (300 feet, T. p. 50), would not bring this case within the purview of Code Ann. § 68-1657 (a); and that as the highway falls within the exception to the statute, the claimant did not violate a penal statute and had "equal rights” with any vehicle thereupon. The court reversed the board’s finding that the claimant was guilty of wilful misconduct and its denial of compensation. The insurer/employer appeal.
The majority hold the claimant was "jaywalking” on a roadway in violation of the law and therefore guilty of wilful misconduct so as to deny him workmen’s compensation. I dissent.
1. Wilful misconduct includes all conscious or intentional violations of definite laws or rules of conduct as distinguished from inadvertence, unconscious or involuntary violations. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 169 Ga. 333 (Id) (150 SE 208).
2. The insurer contends that where it is shown that the claimant was in violation of the law ("jaywalking”) in crossing a public road that he is guilty of wilful *594misconduct. Hall v. Kendall, 81 Ga. App. 592 (59 SE2d 421); Young v. American Ins. Co., 110 Ga. App. 269, 270 (5) (138 SE2d 385); Pacific Indem. Ins. Co. v. Eberhardt, 107 Ga. App. 391 (130 SE2d 136). I cannot agree that claimant was guilty of any crime (misdemeanor).
3. Our courts may take judicial notice of the state highways in this state, and their location, as well as locations of lands in the state surveys, city limits, and county lines. See Jordan v. State, 212 Ga. 337, 338 (92 SE2d 528), and citations at page 340; Moye v. State, 46 Ga. App. 727 (2) (169 SE 59); Guess v. Morgan, 196 Ga. 265, 266 (5) (26 SE2d 424); Williams v. State, 96 Ga. App. 833, 834 (101 SE2d 747). Clearly, the court could take judicial notice that the location of defendant’s manufacturing plant, shown to be 3 to 3 1/2 miles east of Toccoa in Stephens County on U. S. Highway 123, was in an unincorporated area of Stephens County.
There was no evidence offered to show that the State Highway Board or any local authority (Stephens County) had established by ordinance, or otherwise, that pedestrians could only cross this highway at the plant intersection light. See Code Ann. §§ 68-1610, 68-1611, 68-1613, 68-1614, 68-1655, 68-1656, 68-1657. And as to marked and unmarked crosswalk at the traffic controlled intersection to the plant, Code Ann. § 68-1657 (a) states: "Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway: Provided, however, that this section shall not apply to roadways in areas where there are no crosswalks nor intersections at which pedestrians may cross the roadway, but that on such roadways in such areas pedestrians crossing the roadway shall have equal rights with vehicles on the roadway.” Compare Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Almon, 120 Ga. App. 869 (172 SE2d 624).
4. It therefore is a gross injustice for the majority here to hold that the claimant was guilty of wilful misconduct (i.e., trying to commit suicide?), in stepping into the roadway to cross to the parking lot prior to departing his job site. I fully agree with the view of the trial judge, and I would affirm his judgment in reversing *595the Board of Workmen’s Compensation.
5. The majority at several places refers to a "pedestrian crossing,” but we feel it important to point out that the "pedestrian crossing” was not of the character usually known as a "pedestrian crossing.”
The only crossing in the vicinity was one where a pedestrian could punch a button and cause the light to change, at the entrance to the parking lot, and this pseudo-crossing was 300 feet (100 yards) from where the injured claimant undertook to cross. (T. pp. 34, 51). This was not in a municipality, and we do not know of any law which describes the foregoing as a "pedestrian crossing,” or one which a pedestrian is obligated to use while in the rural part of the county, and at a distance of 100 yards therefrom on penalty of being guilty of a violation of the law.
I am authorized to state that Judges Quillian, Clark and Webb concur in this dissent.