Court Opinion

ID: 9732360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:17:58.50615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:26.470831
License: Public Domain

Holbrook, J.
{dissenting). Being unable to join with my brother judges in their determination of this case, I must respectfully dissent for the reasons herein stated. I am convinced that it is imperative, if we are to experience a fair and impartial administration of government in this free society, that the fundamental law recognize and declare that the officers of the legislative, judicial and executive divisions of government that have the duty of making, interpreting, and enforcing the laws, may not strike and also may not join with others in any union organization that could give special favor to the members of that organization or interfering with such officers’ undivided loyalty to their oaths of office and to their duties. In this statement of declared truth, I would include police officers of a city, who are required by their oaths to enforce the laws in their city. I believe the public policy of our state is that just stated.
The facts as stated in the majority opinion are as I would have stated them, as is the definition of the term “public policy” taken from 50 CJ, Public Policy, § 62, pp 857-859. I also reiterate what I believe *284to be the claims of the city of Escanaba on this appeal — (1) under the public policy of the State of Michigan and the city of Escanaba, police officers are limited in selecting a labor union as their representative for collective bargaining purposes to a labor organization composed of law enforcement officers and (2) police officers and sergeants of the police department of the city of Escanaba are officers within the meaning of the public policy of the state.
In the case of Fraternal Order of Police v. Lansing Board of Police & Fire Com’rs (1943), 306 Mich 68, 71, 77-80, the board of police and fire commissioners of the city of Lansing passed a resolution:
“ ‘The men and discipline committee to whom was referred the matter of investigation of the Fraternal Order of Police wish to make the following report, after interviewing the president of the organization :
“ ‘That no superior officer of the Lansing police department be allowed to become a member of the Fraternal Order of Police; that the membership be confined to members of the Lansing police department with the exceptions of the superior officers; and that inasmuch as the Fraternal Order of Police is an organization of policemen, that they refrain from taking into the order, so-called associate or honorary members.
“ ‘The committee makes these recommendations having in mind the welfare of both the organization and the police department, and with the convictions that this is departmental business.’ ”
The Fraternal Order of Police, a Michigan nonprofit organization, brought the suit for the purpose of enjoining and restraining the members of the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners of the city of Lansing from enforcing the above resolution. In *285the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bushnell it is stated as follows:
“In Coane v. Geary (1939), 298 Ill App 199 (18 NE 2d 719), the court quoted with approval a statement from the opinion rendered in O’Regan v. City of Chicago, reported in 37 Chicago Legal News, p 150, December 24, 1904. That statement is applicable to the instant case. It reads in part as follows:
“ ‘ “A police force is peculiar, sui generis, you may say, in its formation and in its relation to the city government. It is practically an organized force resembling in many respects a military force, organized under the laws of the United States and equally as important as to the functions it is required to perform.
“ ‘ “It is not an ordinary branch of the executive government like the mayor’s office even, your water department, the comptroller’s department, the health department, even; but, as I say, it is peculiar to itself, and to look at it in the same light that other branches of the executive department are regarded would be a mistake in a judicial decision. It is a department which requires that the members of it shall surrender their individual opinion and power to act, and submit to that of a controlling head just as much as the common soldier must surrender his own opinion and power of action to that of his commanding officer. And there is the same necessity of discipline — of regulation existing in the police department that exists in regard to the military department. Strict discipline must be enforced, and it must be enforced in a manner that is effective, and without the supervision or regulation of any other-department of the State, and, particularly, without any attempt on the part of the judicial department (which is a branch of the government entirely distinct and separate from the executive department), to regulate it in any way, and particularly, to regulate its discipline.” ’ * * *
*286“When the Fraternal Order of Police confined its activities to ‘police officers engaged in regular police duties,’ its members were not acting as private individuals. Defendant board is not necessarily concerned with the private activities of police officers, but it is and should be greatly concerned with their activities as members of the law enforcement branch of the government. Those who serve the public, either as the makers of the law, the interpreters of the law, or those who enforce the law, must necessarily surrender, while acting in such capacity, some of their presumed private rights. As stated by Mr. Justice Sharpe :
“ ‘Nor can it be denied that when a person is appointed and becomes a member of the police department, he subjects himself to the reasonable rules and regulations adopted by the board.’ * * *
“The constitution and bylaws of plaintiff’s national, state and local organizations which were received in evidence provide in effect that citizens may become associate members upon payment of dues of not less than $5 per year, and such associate members will he furnished ‘a membership card’ and car ‘emblem.’ One would be naive, indeed, to assume that such automobile emblem did not carry with it the intimation of special privileges to associate members. This of itself is enough to require the determination that the existence of plaintiff organization within the law-enforcement body of a municipality is contrary to public policy.
“Defendant board is necessarily vested with a large measure of discretion and the burden of showing arbitrary action is upon those who charge it. Carter v. Thompson [(1935), 164 Ya 312 (180 SE 410)].
“We agree with the trial judge that the resolution adopted by the board was reasonable and that:
“ ‘It cannot he said that such action is not within the scope of the authority granted by the charter of the city of Lansing, nor that it is arbitrary or un*287reasonable. Neither the plaintiffs nor the individuals concerned are deprived of any constitutional right.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.)
Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the Teamsters Local No. 328 admits other members than police officers or other law enforcement officers. The privileges and responsibilities of such membership are not in evidence although proffered by the city of Escanaba before the MLMB. The question of conflict of interests was not considered by the MLMB for the reason that it determined that § 9 of the PERA was conclusive and that the terms thereof included as employees the police force of the city.
In the case of Blynn v. City of Pontiac (1915), 185 Mich 35, the question was whether a policeman of the city of Pontiac was an employee or an officer. The determination therein that the police officer under the facts in that case was an officer and not an employee was based on the provisions of the charter (and ordinances) of the city. This conclusion is proper, for Mr. Justice Kuhn stated on p 46 as follows :
“Being satisfied that a policeman is an appointive officer under the provisions of the charter of this city, required to take an official oath, of office, which it appears was done in this case, it follows that he came within the exception in subdivision 1, § 7, pt 1, act No 10, Public Acts 1912 (extra session), (2 How Stat [2d ed] § 3945), and is not an employee, as defined by said act, and therefore does not come within its provisions. Any effort to enlarge the scope of this act should be addressed to the legislature.”
In 16 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 45.11, pp 661-665, it is stated:
“It has been said that policemen may be either officers or employees, as the local legislative depart*288ment may determine. A majority of the cases announce that members of a police department, including commissioners, superintendents, the chief of police, police sergeants, watchmen, constables, special policemen, and patrolmen, are public officers. Thus, policemen have been held to be officers, and not employees, with respect to qualifications, compensation, tenure, dismissal, and within the meaning of a workmen’s compensation act. They are sometimes held to be state officers, it being said that they hold office not under contract between themselves and the municipality, but as a trust from the state. Other courts, however, hold them to be municipal officers, and, in fact, their chief function is to aid in enforcing the local police regulations, mainly of municipal origin, and they are paid for such service not by the state, but out of the city treasury, from the contributions of the local taxpayers, for strictly ‘municipal purposes.’ Under some laws, they are held to be both state and municipal officers.”
Also, in 43 CJ, Policemen, § 1315, pp 761, 762, we find further light wherein it is stated:
“The office of policeman or police patrolman was unknown to the common law, and wherever it exists it is a creation of statute or municipal ordinance. In its generic sense it includes every member of the police force, whatever may be his grade or rank. A policeman has been variously defined to be an ‘officer,’ or a ‘peace officer,’ or a ‘civil officer.’ Under some provisions creating the office a policeman is considered a public officer holding his office as a trust •from the state and not as a matter of contract between himself and the city, although for some purposes he may be regarded also as a city officer. But, in construing particular provisions creating the office, it has been variously held that a policeman is a city officer in a proper sense and not a state officer ; that he is not a ‘public officer’ that he is neither a state officer nor an officer acting in a purely local *289capacity, but is an officer sui generis; that he is. only a ministerial officer. Police officers can in'n'o sense be regarded as agents or employees of the city.” (Emphasis supplied.)
A determination must be made in this case in the first instance as to whether under the charter and ordinances of the city of Escanaba police officers of that city are officers or employees. This was not done by the MLMB.
The public policy of the state has been clearly defined in the cases of Fraternal Order of Police v. Lansing Board of Police & Fire Com’rs, supra; State Lodge of Michigan, Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Detroit (1947), 318 Mich 182. A recent case that fortifies these principles and sanctions the right of the city to forbid its police officers from joining a union that admits employees of private industry and other personnel is Local No. 201 (AFL-CIO) v. City of Muskegon (1963), 369 Mich 384.
The public policy of our state as declared by the Supreme Court permits a home rule city to control the members of its police force so that police officers may not become members of a union that admits to membership others than law enforcement officers which may result in privileges being extended to such other members, or whereby police officers may be prevented from carrying out their duties impartially and fairly. Inasmuch as members of a police force may be officers of a city and not employees under Blynn v. Pontiac, supra, and because the legislature in enacting MCLA § 423.209 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.455 [9]) did not specifically name police officers as public employees, it is apparent that the public policy of our state as declared by the Supreme Court has not been changed by the PERA. Police officers may be likened to a city attorney and his assistants— they are both appointed and they both take oaths of *290office. Both are responsible for the proper enforcement of the law. It is reasonable to assume that the city attorney and his assistants are officers and not employees of the city within the terms of the PERA. The declared public policy of the state is available to the city of Escanaba in this case.
I conclude that there were issues before the MLMB that were not determined; that proper evidence was proffered bearing upon those issues that were not admitted, and I would therefore remand to the MLMB for a further hearing or hearings to determine the status of the police officers of the city of Escanaba, i.e., whether the police officers are employees or officers under the charter, ordinances and resolutions of the city; whether the adoption of the resolution by the city council of Escanaba was a proper exercise of its power; and to determine possible conflicts of interest resulting from the proposed joining by the police officers of the city of Escanaba of Teamsters Local No 328, which admits others than law enforcement officers to its membership. This should be determined under the laws of this state and the charter, ordinances and resolution of the city of Escanaba. All proper exhibits and evidence pertaining to these issues should be admitted by the MLMB on remand. Redetermination should be made in both matters by the MLMB and certified back to this Court for further review.
No costs, a public question being involved.