Court Opinion

ID: 9515097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:53:44.611939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:24.862990
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(concurring specially).
[¶ 70.] I concur on Issues 1 through 6 and concur specially on Issue 7.
[II71.] SDCL 19-16-3(2) (Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B)) provides in part:
A statement is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is ...
(2) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth; or
(4) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
[¶ 72.] The commentary to FRE 801(d)(2)(B) provides in part:
Under established principles an admission may be made by adopting or acquiescing in the statement of another ... [a]doption or acquiescence may be manifested in any appropriate manner. When silence is relied upon, the theory is that the person would, under the circumstances, protest the statement made in his presence, if untrue. The decision in each case calls for an evaluation in terms of probable human behavior.
(Emphasis supplied.) It is not necessary that the out-of-court statement be against the declarant’s interest at the time it is made. The statement must be adverse to the party’s case at the time of trial and be offered against the party at trial.
Any prior statement of a party is admissible if it is offered against the party at trial. The test is whether the statement is being offered at trial for a purpose that is relevant to the lawsuit. Personal knowledge of the matter admitted is not required, nor is mental capacity. The admission can be oral or written, or nonverbal conduct if intended as an assertion ... [admissions are substantive evidence, and no preliminary foundation by examining the declarant is necessary, the rule being specifically excepted from SDCL 19-14-25 (613(b)).
John W. Larson, South Dakota Evidence, 801.3 (2003 Supp).
[¶ 73.] If Russell Olson was being untruthful in telling his brother that Abbott *713said the franchise would bring in $40,000 in the first year, surely Abbot would have “protest[ed] the statement made in his presence.” There is nothing in the motion hearing transcript to indicate Abbott protested. However, in order to qualify as an admission, the person making the admission must be a party opponent. Abbott is not a party to this lawsuit and therefore his silence cannot amount to an admission under these facts.
[¶ 74.] Olson argues that Russell was on the board of directors for Krause Gentle and that he was acting as an agent for Krause Gentle when he made the statements regarding profitability. Olson asserts that Russell’s comments were not hearsay because they were an admission under FRE 801(d)(2)(D)(a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship). This argument also fails because Olson offered no proof to the jury that Russell was an agent of Krause Gentle. Olson points out that the attorney for Krause Gentle conceded at the hearing on Olson’s offer of proof that Russell was on the board of directors. Olson contends that this amounts to a judicial admission and as such should be deemed a settled fact.
[¶ 75.] In Tunender v. Minnaert, we defined judicial admissions as statements “made in court by a person’s attorney for the purpose of being used as a substitute for the regular legal evidence of the facts at the trial.” Tunender v. Minnaert, 1997 SD 62, ¶ 24, 563 N.W.2d 849, 854 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 48 (6th ed 1990) (emphasis in the original)). While the attorney certainly acknowledged that Russell was on the board of directors, he made it abundantly clear’ that he had no intention of allowing his acknowledgement to serve as a substitute for the plaintiffs burden of proving the fact.
[¶ 76.] Olson points to no attempt on the record to present evidence of his brothers directorship before the jury. Indeed, other than his initial offer of proof, the briefs point to no place in this voluminous record where any evidence regarding Olsons claim was presented to the jury. Having failed to establish Russell’s agency, Olson’s claim that Russell’s sales pitch was a statement by Krause Gentle’s agent or servant is insufficient. The Court need not determine whether Olson has shown prejudicial error because Olson failed to lay the proper foundation to bring this conversation before the jury as an admission by party opponent. However, we continue to disagree with the majority opinion’s claim that establishing prejudice is a precondition to establishing error.