Court Opinion

ID: 9747734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:29:58.066359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:25.827374
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice
(concurring).
I agree with the conclusion of Mr. Chief Justice JONES, in his Opinion for the Court, that Judge Cercone’s term of office as Judge of the Superior Court has been extended by operation of Section 2 of the Schedule to Article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution,1 to the first Monday of January 1980. The Court therefore correctly holds that Judge Cercone need not run for retention election as Judge of the Superior Court until the 1979 municipal election. I do not accept the reasoning employed by Mr. Chief Justice JONES to reach this result, in that it fails to emphasize the limited scope of this Schedule provision and, implicitly suggests, albeit unintentionally, that this Court has the power, absent express constitutional authority, to extend a constitutionally mandated judicial term of office. I must reject any implication that this Court is clothed with such authority, and I am thus constrained to set forth my views on the subject.
The pertinent facts of this case may be summarized as follows. On November 5, 1968, William F. Cercone was duly elected by popular vote as Judge of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. He took his oath of office on January 6, 1969, the first Monday of the year, for a ten year term of office expiring on the first Monday of January 1979. At the time of Judge Cercone’s election to office, Judges of the Superior Court were elected in even-numbered years.2 However, by the time he took his oath of office in January 1969, the Judiciary Article to *471the Constitution had been extensively revised. In addition to establishing a retention procedure for the reelection of incumbent Judges,3 the new Article required all Judges, including those on the Superior Court to be elected at municipal elections held only on odd-numbered years.4 The framers of the Judiciary amendments recognized that the changes to Article V would cause a break in the succession provided for under the former constitutional provisions for the Judges of the Superior Court. In order to harmonize the transition, Section 2 was enacted. Section 2 of the Judiciary Schedule provides:
“The present terms of all judges of the Superior Court which would otherwise expire on the first Monday of January in an odd-numbered year shall be extended to expire in the even-numbered year next following.” Pa. Const, art. 5, Schedule, § 2.
The question now before this Court is whether Judge Cercone’s term is subject to extension under this Section. The controversy centers on the interpretation to be accorded the phrase, “the present terms of all judges of the Superior Court.”
According to Mr. Chief Justice JONES, “present terms” are all those in effect or arising after January 1, 1969, the effective date of the Judiciary amendments. Under this rationale, Judge Cercone is therefore included because his “term” commenced when he took his oath of office on January 6, 1969. On the other hand, the dissenting Justice concludes that “present terms” should be restricted to terms that commenced prior to the effective date of the amendments. Judge Cercone therefore would not be included because his oath was administered five days after the amendments became effective. I am unable to accept either of these interpretations.
In my view, it is clear that if we had not embraced within this jurisdiction the concept of the retention elec*472tion with the adoption of the new Judiciary Article, there would have been no pressing need for a provision such as Section 2. My rejection of the rationale espoused in the Opinion for the Court and the dissenting opinion is thus based upon their failure to recognize the interrelationship between Section 2 and the orderly transition of this Commonwealth to the process of judicial retention.
Prior to retention a judge who completed the term to which he or she was elected was required to participate in a partisan election if further judicial service was desired. The incumbent had no greater entitlement to the office than any other person interested in seeking it.5 The former judge and the aspirant to the office were on the same footing and neither could complain as to when the next opportunity for election to the office would be available. Thus, a hiatus between the expiration of the incumbent’s term and the next appropriate election, to allow for the change from the old to the new would be of no moment.6 Nor would such a situation create a significant burden upon the administration of justice since the vacancy could be filled through the appointment process. See Pa.Const. art. V, § 13(b) (1968). A comparable situation frequently occurs when a judge dies or resigns before the expiration of his term.7 It is often the case that a vacancy is not filled in the first general election following the creation of the vacancy. See Pa.Const. art. V, § 13(e) (1968); Simmons v. Tucker, 444 Pa. 160, 281 A.2d 902 (1971).
*473The retention concept intends to place the incumbent judge in a favored position when he or she seeks another term in office. The 1968 Judiciary Amendment was obviously intended to enhance the quality and the efficiency of the judiciary of this Commonwealth, and one of the cardinal tenets of this new philosophy was expressed in the concept of the retention election. Retention was seen as a vehicle which would insulate the jurist from political and other outside influences by eliminating the necessity of a partisan election if the judge decided to seek another term in office. A vacancy occurs at the end of the term only if the incumbent jurist elects not to seek the succeeding term or is rejected by the voters in the retention election. See Pa.Const. art. V, § 15(b) (1968). Thus, it was the incompatibility of the retention concept as applied to the terms of Judges of the Superior Court, who took office under the former constitutional provision, with the new requirement that judges be elected in odd-numbered years, which occasioned the necessity of Section 2 of the Schedule to Article V.8
Without Section 2 a Superior Court Judge who was elected to office in an even-numbered year would have his term expire on the first Monday of January of the odd-numbered year but could not seek reelection until November of that year.9 In this instance, the hiatus between the expiration of the term and the next appropriate election would be disastrous. Unlike the scheme of the prior constitution, where a partisan election could have been held to fill the office, the period between the *474expiration of the term and the next election would now present an insurmountable problem. In such a case, a vacancy would occur at the expiration of the stated term, which would be subject to appointment for the interim period until the next appropriate election.10 Such a result is obviously incompatible with the concept of retention, which presupposes the absence of a vacancy. Absent some authorization to extend the term, it would be impossible to preserve the right of the incumbent jurist to an uncontested, non-partisan retention election. Section 2 thus arose from the need to make the retention process applicable to Superior Court Judges who were formerly elected to office in an even-numbered year.11
It is therefore clear that the purpose of Section 2 in the. overall constitutional scheme was to extend by one year the term of office of any Superior Court Judge elected to a term established under the provisions of the prior constitution in order to render the judge’s term of office compatible with the new election provisions established by the amendments. Moreover, it is equally clear that this overall scheme could not be achieved if the Ian*475guage of Section 2 was interpreted to exclude from its operation any of the Judges of the Superior Court who took office under the prior constitution. This in itself is a compelling rationale for our determination today that Judge Cercone’s term must be extended by operation of Section 2. We have held many times that the constitution is not to be construed to lead to an impracticable or unreasonable result, but its construction is to be sensible and expedient, in light of the constitutional purpose. Commonwealth v. Novack, 395 Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102 (1959); Duane v. City of Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 33, 185 A. 401 (1936).
Unlike my brethren, I do not believe that a “sensible and expedient” construction of the language of Section 2 can be ascertained without a clear understanding of its intended effect, particularly in light of this Court’s longstanding adherence to the principle that the constitution is entitled to a construction, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the intent of its makers. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Beamish, 309 Pa. 510, 165 A. 615 (1932); Moers v. City of Reading, 21 Pa. 188 (1853). Reference to this principle in the instant case compels the view that the framers, in utilizing the phrase “present terms,” intended to include the terms of any Superior Court Judges which had become fixed under the provisions of the prior constitution. Even though Judge Cercone did not take his oath of office until January 6, 1969, his entitlement to the judgeship in question and his term of office became fixed, pursuant to the 1874 Constitution, on November 5, 1968, the day that he was elected. Accordingly, when the new Judiciary Article and its Schedule took effect on January 1, 1969, his was a present term within the meaning of Section 2 of the Schedule.
In my view, any other construction of this provision would severely distort its intended effect. I therefore cannot accept the view of the dissenting Justice, which *476he concedes is a “deviation from the constitutional scheme,” post at 731, since it would result in six of our Superior Court’s Judges being elected in odd-numbered years, and one being elected in an even-numbered year. Such a construction does not effectuate the constitutional scheme, but subverts it. If the view espoused by the dissenting Justice were adopted by this Court, we would be required to disregard the express mandate of Article V, Section 13(a) and Article VII, Section 3, that all judges be elected in an odd-numbered year.
My disagreement with the Opinion of the Court, although I reach the same result, stems from its emphasis upon the science of lexicography rather than a concentration upon the intent of the framers and the understanding of the people in adopting the Article and its Schedule. A literal reading of the language employed in the Court’s opinion would suggest that any term hereinafter commencing subsequent to the effective date of the amendments is subject to modification under Section 2. It is obvious that the framers of the Schedule did not intend for this provision to authorize such sweeping judicial interference with all future terms of the Judges of the Superior Court.12 This construction is not only patently unnecessary to effectuate the reorganization of the judiciary under the new Article V, but it is belied by the fact that Section 2 is merely part of the Schedule, attached to the Constitution to serve temporary purposes only, see Commonwealth ex rel. Barratt v. McAfee, 232 Pa. 36, 41, 81 A. 85, 86 (1911).
A constitutional provision establishing a fixed term of office, encompasses an implied prohibition against ex*477tending the term, and absent specific constitutional authority, no court has the power to increase a constitutionally mandated judicial term of office. Commonwealth ex rel. Barratt v. McAfee, supra; Commonwealth v. Sheatz, 228 Pa. 301, 77 A. 547 (1910). I for one cannot accept that Section 2 of the Schedule can be read as providing the specific constitutional authority to indefinitely suspend the operation of Article V, Section 15(a).13
In conclusion, I think it is clear that the Schedule provision in question was intended to be no more than a stop-gap measure. Its purpose was to bring the seven terms of the seven Judges on the Superior Court into alignment with the newly added constitutional requirement that they stand for election in an odd-numbered year and at the same time preserve the right of those judges to seek reelection by retention. Further, I understand that the one-year increase in Judge Cercone’s term sanctioned by our decision today completes this process. Accordingly, Section 2 of the Schedule has served its purpose, and it has no further applicability in the judicial reorganization process.

. The Schedule, by its own terms, has “the same force and effect” as the Constitution. See Pa.Const. art. V, Schedule (1968).

. Compare Act of June 24, 1895, P.L. 212, § 1, 17 P.S. § 113 (1962) with Pa.Const. art. VII, § 2 (1874).

. See Pa.Const. art. V, § 15(b) (1968).

. Id. §§ 13(a), 15(b).

. While many communities ascribed to various concepts of the sitting judge principle, it was not mandated by law and was solely dependent upon the will of the electorate.

. In the instant case although Judge Cercone’s term would expire on the first Monday of January 1979, a municipal election to fill that vacancy would not occur until November of 1979.

. If a jurist is defeated for retention, the vacancy is to be filled by appointment, Article V, § 15(b).

. Under the 1968 Constitutional Amendment, any “justice or judge elected under section thirteen (a) . .’’is entitled to a retention election. See Pa.Const. art. V, § 15(b) (1968).

. While another possibility would be to hold the retention election in the odd-numbered year occurring two years before the odd-numbered year in which the term would expire (i. e., in this instance, the retention election would be held in 1977 for a term to begin in January 1979), I agree with both the Opinion of the Court and the dissent that such an arrangement would be violative of the public policy of this Commonwealth.

. That the Governor might in his discretion appoint the incumbent for the interim period, Pa.Const. art. V, § 13(b) (1968), does not protect the incumbent’s right to seek retention. Under the constitutional scheme, the benefits of retention do not inure to judges who obtain their office by the process of appointment. See Pa.Const. art. V, § 13(c) (1968).

. To further support the view that the retention concept was the critical consideration necessitating Section 2 is the fact that Section 2 is limited to the Superior Court and does not purport to affect the terms of Justices of the Supreme Court. Although Justices of this Court under the former constitutional provisions may have had terms that would expire within an odd-numbered year the problem sought to be remedied by Section 2 was not presented because the Justices were not entitled to seek reelection for that office after the expiration of the 21 year term. Pa.Const. art. V, § 2 (1874).
Additionally, the Commonwealth Court was created under the new Judiciary Article and therefore their terms were made consistent with the new scheme. Pa.Const. art. V, §§ 4, 15(a) (1968). Further, the Common Pleas Judges were formerly required to be elected in odd-numbered years. See Pa.Const. art. VII, § 3 (1874).

. I am also troubled by the language in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice JONES, ante at 722-723 suggesting that the applicability of Section 2 extends to judges other than those on the Superior Court. While I have no doubt that any such ambiguity in the opinion was unintentional, I wish to clarify that the provision in question, by its express language, affects only the terms of the Judges of the Superior Court. See note 11 supra.

. Article V, Section 15(a) of the 1968 Constitution fixes the term of Judges of the Superior Court at ten years.