Court Opinion

ID: 9640597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:09:17.548541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:07.088988
License: Public Domain

Concurring by
Justice KELLER.
I concur in the majority opinion because I agree with its analysis of the issues presented in this case. I write separately, however, to reiterate that, in my view, McCullough should not have been permitted to recover any damages from the Kentucky Department of Corrections (“KDOC”). I joined Justice Cooper’s dissenting opinion in Department of Corrections v. Furr1 (“Furr") because I believed then — as I believe now — that the Commonwealth’s agencies cannot be sued for money damages under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”) because the General Assembly has not “specifically and expressly” waived their immunity from suit. In Jones v. Crittenden,2 I temporarily set aside my views regarding sovereign immunity and the KCRA and expressed my opinion on the merits of that case in light of the existing Furr precedent.3 I now realize, however, that, when the issue we addressed in Furr is again before this Court, I cannot fulfill my oath of office if I disregard my conclusion that a damage recovery is barred by sovereign immunity. I was mistaken to do so in Jones v. Crit-tenden. In this case, the KDOC argued before the Court of Appeals (and prior to Funds rendition) that McCullough could not recover damages against it under the KCRA. But, in its appeal to this Court, the KDOC has apparently abandoned this issue- — it raises no challenge to the holding in Furr, and no longer argues that it is immune from a damage award. Thus, although, I would vote, in accordance with my vote in Furr, to vacate McCullough’s compensatory damage award against the KDOC, I cannot do so. As to the issues that are properly before the Court, I agree *142with the analysis in the majority opinion, and thus I concur in the majority.

. Ky., 23 S.W.3d 615 (2000).

. Ky., 96 S.W.3d 13 (2003).

.Id. at 24 (Keller, J., dissenting).