Court Opinion

ID: 9374178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 17:00:25.158525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:45.358127
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-8079     Document: 010110816219       Date Filed: 02/22/2023   Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      February 22, 2023

                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 21-8079

  IAN ARBEE BATARA-MOLINA,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of Wyoming
                            (D.C. No. 1:20-CR-00179-ABJ)
                        _________________________________

 Josh Lee, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public
 Defender, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

 Jonathan C. Coppom, Assistant United States Attorney (L. Robert Murray, United States
 Attorney, with him on the briefs), Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
                         _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Circuit Judge, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

 EBEL, Circuit Judge.
                          _________________________________

       Defendant-Appellant Ian Batara-Molina appeals the denial of his motion to

 suppress methamphetamine found in a car he was driving. This methamphetamine

 was discovered after Mr. Molina was stopped for speeding on his way to Sioux Falls,

 South Dakota. During this traffic stop, two deputies deployed a drug-sniffing dog
Appellate Case: 21-8079    Document: 010110816219        Date Filed: 02/22/2023      Page: 2

 around the perimeter of the car and were alerted to the presence of contraband. The

 car was searched, and methamphetamine was found in the trunk. Mr. Molina moved

 to suppress this methamphetamine on the basis that his traffic stop was delayed for

 the dog sniff and that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for this delay. After

 the district court denied this motion, Mr. Molina pled guilty to one count of

 possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.

 § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).

       On appeal, Mr. Molina continues to argue that his traffic stop was delayed for

 the dog sniff and that the deputies lacked reasonable suspicion for this delay.

 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we find that the traffic stop was

 justified by reasonable suspicion, and so we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of

 Mr. Molina’s motion to suppress.

                                  I. BACKGROUND

 A. Factual Background

       While driving through Wyoming with a female passenger, Mr. Molina was

 pulled over by Deputy Eric Coxbill for going 49 mph in a 45-mph zone. Deputy

 Coxbill approached the car from the passenger-side of the vehicle and noticed a

 strong odor coming from the interior—which he would later describe as either fruity,

 perfumy, or like a new car smell. Speaking to Mr. Molina through the passenger

 window, Deputy Coxbill requested Mr. Molina’s license, registration, and insurance

 information. Mr. Molina provided his license, but explained that the car was a rental,

 and proceeded to look for the rental agreement on his phone.
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       While Mr. Molina was searching for the agreement, Deputy Coxbill asked

 where he and his female companion were headed. Mr. Molina said they were going

 to South Dakota for vacation but was unable to properly pronounce the name of their

 destination city. After hearing Mr. Molina say what sounded like “See Ox falls,”

 Deputy Coxbill asked Mr. Molina whether he meant to say “Sioux Falls.” ROA at

 58. Mr. Molina confirmed that this was indeed what he meant to say.

       Mr. Molina then found the rental agreement and passed his phone to Deputy

 Coxbill. After reviewing the agreement, Deputy Coxbill asked Mr. Molina how long

 he and his companion planned to stay in South Dakota, since he had noticed that the

 rental car was scheduled to be returned to California in two days (September 28).

 Mr. Molina said that they intended to head back on Tuesday (September 29) and

 would be extending the car rental accordingly.

       Deputy Coxbill then returned to his patrol car to write Mr. Molina a warning.

 On his way to the car, he passed Deputy Kyle Rhoades (who had arrived at the scene

 while Deputy Coxbill was talking to Mr. Molina). On his way by, Deputy Coxbill

 mentioned to Deputy Rhoades that he had smelled a cover odor in the car. Deputy

 Rhoades then followed Deputy Coxbill back to the patrol car and stood outside the

 car while Deputy Coxbill wrote the warning for Mr. Molina. While writing, Deputy

 Coxbill filled Deputy Rhoades in on some of his observations from the stop,

 including Mr. Molina’s fast travel plans and the fact that Deputy Coxbill had noticed

 a vape in the car. When he reached the address section of the warning, Deputy

 Coxbill passed the warning off to Deputy Rhoades and asked him to both verify Mr.

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 Molina’s address and have Mr. Molina roll up his car windows. Deputy Rhoades

 took the warning and walked to the car while Deputy Coxbill retrieved a drug-

 sniffing canine from the patrol car.

       Deputy Rhoades approached the driver-side of the rental car and asked

 Mr. Molina to exit the vehicle and roll up the windows. Mr. Molina rolled up the

 windows and followed Deputy Rhoades out onto the street and then along the

 shoulder of the road to Deputy Coxbill’s car. Once Mr. Molina and Deputy Rhoades

 were away from the rental car, Deputy Coxbill approached the car with the dog.

 While Deputy Coxbill and the dog circled the car, Deputy Rhoades confirmed

 Mr. Molina’s address. Just before Deputy Rhoades finished writing the warning, the

 dog alerted to contraband in the car. Deputy Coxbill then proceeded to search the

 car, where he found roughly fourteen pounds of methamphetamine in the trunk.

 B. Procedural Background

       Mr. Molina was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute

 methamphetamine. He subsequently moved to suppress the methamphetamine seized

 by Deputy Coxbill on the grounds that the deputies had prolonged the traffic stop in

 violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to Mr. Molina, the deputies were

 required to have reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for the dog sniff, which

 they lacked. Mr. Molina thus argued that the methamphetamine must be suppressed.

       The district court held a hearing on this motion, at which it heard testimony

 from three Government witnesses: (1) Deputy Coxbill, (2) Deputy Rhoades, and (3)

 Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation Special Agent Jason Ruby. Early in his
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 testimony, Deputy Coxbill walked through the reason that he had Deputy Rhoades

 confirm Mr. Molina’s address. He explained that warnings and citations for

 motorists are tracked in a database called “Spillman,” and that it is important to

 ensure that addresses are accurate (in case two people with the same name are pulled

 over). According to Deputy Coxbill, it is very common for a driver’s license to have

 an incorrect address on it, and so he confirms an address every time he issues a

 warning or citation.

       In addition, Deputy Coxbill testified that he always travels with the drug dog

 used here, and because of this, he never needs to wait for one to arrive at the scene.

 He also explained that the dog used here doubles as an apprehension dog that is

 trained to bite people, and so Deputy Coxbill always has people roll up their windows

 during the dog sniff to ensure passenger safety, since the dog is prone to sticking his

 head in open windows. And, because the canine also functions as an apprehension

 dog, Deputy Coxbill usually starts the sniff on the passenger side of the vehicle so

 that Deputy Rhoades and the driver can safely get out of the way of the dog.

       Deputy Coxbill then walked through his various observations during the stop

 that aroused his suspicions. When he first approached the car, he noticed an

 “overwhelming” cover odor coming from inside the vehicle (although he was unable

 to identify the exact nature of the odor). ROA at 42. He also found it odd that Mr.

 Molina pronounced “Sioux Falls” as “See Ox Falls.” Id. at 58. Moreover, he noticed

 that Mr. Molina’s car was rented by a third-party. Not only that, but the rental

 agreement stated that the car was due back in California in two days, making for a

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 very fast trip. Although Mr. Molina explained to Deputy Coxbill that he planned to

 extend the trip by one day, Deputy Coxbill was aware that this was a “long drive”

 and thus still believed this was a suspiciously quick trip. Id. at 46.

        Deputy Coxbill also testified that he took note of the fact that Mr. Molina was

 coming from California, which he believed to be a source for many narcotics. In

 addition, Deputy Coxbill noticed that Mr. Molina had a vape (although he did not

 smell any marijuana) and had limited luggage in his backseat. Finally, Deputy

 Coxbill thought it was unusual that Mr. Molina and his companion had spent the

 previous night sleeping at a gas station rest stop.

        After Deputy Coxbill’s testimony concluded, Deputy Rhoades then testified

 about his role in the traffic stop. He explained that, after Deputy Coxbill had passed

 him the warning, he walked to the driver’s side of the vehicle and asked Mr. Molina

 to roll up his windows and exit the vehicle so that they could confirm Mr. Molina’s

 address. Mr. Molina rolled up his window, and then the two men walked to the side

 of the road so that Deputy Rhoades could finish filling out Mr. Molina’s warning.

 Deputy Rhoades learned that he had in fact misunderstood Mr. Molina’s address from

 the license, and so Mr. Molina was able to clarify the correct address. Before he was

 finished writing the warning, however, Deputy Coxbill approached and told him that

 the dog had detected something in the vehicle.

        Special Agent Ruby was the last to testify. He explained that there are various

 indications of narcotics trafficking that were relevant here, like the use of a third-

 party rental, a short stay at a location, limited luggage in a vehicle, and the fact that

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 an individual is traveling from the West Coast. Special Agent Ruby also testified

 that Mr. Molina’s trip to South Dakota and back to California would take around fifty

 hours of driving.

       After holding this hearing, the district court denied Mr. Molina’s motion to

 suppress. The court reasoned that the deputies had not delayed the traffic stop in any

 way for the dog sniff, since the only delay involved Deputy Rhoades and Mr. Molina

 walking away from the vehicle to the side of the road. According to the court, this

 was only done so that Deputy Rhoades could avoid standing in traffic, and Deputy

 Rhoades immediately finished writing the warning once they were out of the road.

 Even if the stop had been delayed for the dog sniff, though, the court concluded that

 any delay would be supported by reasonable suspicion. To support this suspicion, the

 district court pointed to the cover odor, the incorrect pronunciation of Sioux Falls,

 the third-party rental agreement, the imminent expiration of the rental agreement, the

 night spent at the gas station, the fact that Mr. Molina was traveling from California,

 the vape pen, and the lack of luggage in the backseat.

                                   II. DISCUSSION

       “A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that

 violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). An officer’s

 authority to seize a vehicle’s occupants ends, however, when “tasks tied to the traffic

 infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. Even so, it is

 permissible for an officer to “conduct certain unrelated inquiries during the stop,” but

 these inquiries may not delay the traffic stop unless the officer has “reasonable

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 suspicion ordinarily required to detain an individual.” United States v. Frazier, 30

 F.4th 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).1 “Even de

 minimis delays caused by unrelated inquiries violate the Fourth Amendment in the

 absence of reasonable suspicion.” Id.

       Here we may assume, without deciding, that Mr. Molina’s traffic stop was

 unreasonably prolonged to assist the drug investigation because, even with that

 assumption, the delay was justified by the officers’ reasonable suspicion that they

 were confronting ongoing criminal drug activity. Whether a dog sniff is supported

 by reasonable suspicion is an objective question “based on the totality of

 circumstances,” which looks to whether the facts “available to the detaining officer,

 at the time, warranted an officer of reasonable caution in believing the action taken

 was appropriate.” United States v. Morales, 961 F.3d 1086, 1092 (10th Cir. 2020)

 (cleaned up) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)). This “is a mixed

 question of law and fact that we review de novo.” United States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d

 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 2010). Although this review is de novo, the findings of fact

 which the district court found to support reasonable suspicion are reviewed for clear

 error, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the determination of the

 district court.” United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005).

 Moreover, we must “defer to the ‘ability of a trained law enforcement officer to

       1
         This moment that the stop is prolonged such that reasonable suspicion was
 necessary is referred to as the “Rodriguez moment.”
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 distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.’” Id. (quoting United States v.

 McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir.1996)).

       The district court relied upon eight facts in determining that Deputy Coxbill

 had reasonable suspicion: (1) the cover odor, (2) the mispronunciation of Sioux Falls,

 (3) the third-party rental agreement, (4) the imminent expiration of the rental

 agreement, (5) the night spent at the gas station, (6) the vape pen, (7) the lack of

 luggage in the backseat, and (8) the fact that Mr. Molina was traveling from

 California. We analyze each fact below and ultimately hold that the district court

 properly credited the cover odor, the third-party rental agreement, and the imminent

 expiration of the rental agreement as supporting reasonable suspicion. However, it

 was error for the court to rely on the remaining factors to support reasonable

 suspicion of ongoing criminal activity. Taking only these permissible facts into

 account, this case falls very close to the line, but we nonetheless conclude that

 reasonable suspicion is narrowly supported by the totality of the circumstances.

              1.     The cover odor.

       The first fact was the cover odor, which was permissibly factored into the

 suspicion analysis. It is well-established that “a strong odor may give rise to

 reasonable suspicion on the part of law enforcement officials that the odor is being

 used to mask the smell of drugs.” United States v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107, 1114

 (10th Cir. 1998). Although it is common for an officer to identify the nature of the

 cover odor, see, e.g., United States v. Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011)

 (trooper identified the masking smell as cologne), it is unnecessary for the purposes
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  of reasonable suspicion for the officer to identify the precise nature of the smell. It is

  enough that Deputy Coxbill found the smell to be “overwhelming,” since a cover

  odor is often an overwhelming odor which masks the smell of narcotics. ROA at 42,

  47.2

                2.     Mr. Molina’s pronunciation of “Sioux Falls.”

         The second fact was Mr. Molina’s mispronunciation of Sioux Falls as “See Ox

  Falls.” We conclude that there is nothing suspicious about the mispronunciation of

  that French word by a person who didn’t purport to live there.

                3.     The third-party rental.

         The third fact was the use of a third-party rental, which was properly

  considered suspicious. Although the use of a rental car alone does not contribute to

  reasonable suspicion, Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1177, the fact that a rental was made by a

  third-party is consistent with the behavior of drug traffickers, see United States v.

  Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The officer knew from his training

  and experience that drug couriers often use third-party rental cars.”). For this reason,

  it was reasonable for an officer in Deputy Coxbill’s position to find the use of a third-

  party rental here suspicious.

         2
           It is not enough, though, for an officer merely to identify a strong smell (like an
  air freshener, for example). It is critical that the smell be sufficiently “overwhelming” as
  to resemble a cover odor.
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               4.     The imminent expiration of the rental agreement.

        The fourth fact was the imminent expiration of Mr. Molina’s rental agreement,

  which Deputy Coxbill permissibly found to be suspicious. To make such a long

  trip—only to stay at the destination for such a short amount of time—is also

  consistent with the behavior of a drug courier. See United States v. Sokolow, 490

  U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (“ . . . surely few residents of Honolulu travel from that city for 20

  hours to spend 48 hours in Miami during the month of July.”); see also United States

  v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1151 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding it suspicious that the

  defendant “chose to drive a long distance to spend a single night” at his destination).

        In arguing otherwise, Mr. Molina cites to United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d

  1120, 1129 (10th Cir. 2005). In Santos, the defendant was pulled over in Wyoming

  while traveling from California to New York in a car due back in California in four

  days. Id. We concluded that this was not suspicious because the “government

  presented no evidence that extending the car rental period would entail any financial

  penalty, or even any increase in the rate,” which is key because “it is not unusual for

  a driver to rent a car for a certain period, and then to extend the rental without

  incurring a penalty or paying a higher rate.” Id. As such, it was critical to our

  decision in Santos that the officer did not discuss the rental agreement with the

  defendant, and thus did not know whether the defendant planned to extend the

  agreement or whether the defendant was blasé about incurring a rental extension fee.

  See id. In contrast, Deputy Coxbill did discuss the rental agreement with Mr. Molina

  and learned that Mr. Molina planned to extend the agreement by just one day. This

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  was therefore not a case where an officer was unaware of the details of a possible

  rental extension, nor one where an officer did not see the defendant’s attitude about a

  rental extension. To the contrary, Deputy Coxbill was aware that, even with an

  extension, Mr. Molina would have at most two days in Sioux Falls (rather than one

  day before the extension). This does not undermine Deputy Coxbill’s belief that the

  trip would be suspiciously short for a supposed “vacation.” Id.; see also Sokolow,

  490 U.S. at 9.3 Thus, this factor also supports the district court’s conclusion that

  there was reasonable suspicion of an ongoing drug trafficking crime.

               5.     The night at the gas station.

        The fifth fact was Mr. Molina’s night at the gas station. It was erroneous for

  the district court to credit this as suspicious. Courts should not deem an action

  reasonably suspicious if it “describe[s] a very large category of presumably innocent

  travelers.” Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980). As the Fifth Circuit has

  recognized, persons of little means are often forced to engage in cost-cutting

  measures when they travel long distances, to “avoid the cost of overnight stays,”

  United States v. Madrigal, 626 F. App’x 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished)—and

        3
          Special Agent Ruby testified that the exact length of the round-trip drive is
  around fifty hours. Mr. Molina is correct, however, that we “consider only those facts
  known” to Deputies Coxbill and Rhoades at the point they diverted from the “traffic-
  based mission to arrange the dog sniff.” Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1174. Special Agent Ruby’s
  testimony is thus irrelevant to reasonable suspicion. Even so, it appears that Deputy
  Coxbill generally understood the length of the trip, even if he did not know the precise
  number of hours it would take. See ROA at 46 (Deputy Coxbill testifying that it was a
  “long drive” from California to Sioux Falls). Thus, the record indicates that Deputy
  Coxbill was aware that Mr. Molina would have around two days in Sioux Falls for this
  vacation, even with the rental extension.
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  this includes sleeping at gas stations or rest stops. As such, courts should not treat

  these cost-cutting measures as suspicious, lest they conflate poverty with crime. See

  Reid, 448 U.S. at 441. It was thus erroneous for the district court to credit this fact in

  the suspicion analysis.

                6.     Coming from California.

         The sixth fact was that Mr. Molina came from California. We have held that

  neither state citizenship nor the origination point of a trip can serve as “a permissible

  basis upon which to justify the detention and search of out-of-state motorists[.]”

  Vasquez v. Lewis, 834 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2016) (state citizenship); see also

  United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2007) (origination point). At

  the time that Vasquez was decided, we observed that twenty-five states had permitted

  marijuana use either medically or recreationally, and so the reference to a “drug

  source state” as a justification for a search would “justify the search and seizure of

  the citizens of more than half of the states in our country.” Id. at 1137–38. This

  rationale has only grown stronger, since even more states have legalized marijuana in

  some form since Vasquez was decided.4 It was thus impermissible for the district

         4
           See Ala. Code §§ 20-2A-1 et seq. (2022); Ark. Const. of 1874, Amend. 98, §§ 1
  et seq. (2016); Fla. Stat. §§ 381.986 et seq. (2016); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-12-200 et seq.
  (2021); La. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:1046 et seq. (2022); Mo. Const. Art. XIV, §§ 1 et seq.
  (2021); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 19-24.1-01 et seq. (2021); Okla. Stat. tit. 63, §§ 2-101 et seq.
  (2022); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 34-20G-1 et seq. (2021); Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-3.7 et
  seq. (2021); Va. Code Ann. §§ 4.1-1100 et seq. (2021); W. Va. Code §§ 16A-1-1 et seq.
  (2022).
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  court to credit Deputy Coxbill’s suspicion on this basis. Vasquez, 834 F.3d at 1137–

  38.

               7.     The vape pen.

        The seventh fact was the vape pen in Mr. Molina’s car. We have previously

  held that the presence of common items—like butane lighters or energy pills—“adds

  no weight to the reasonable suspicion analysis as it would be likely to find such items

  in the vehicle of any innocent traveler.” Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1152.     The

  government has described this vape pen as among the “least probative” facts and

  provides no evidence that this vape pen was being used for any illegal activity.

  Although we make no ruling about the possible evidential value of a vape pen under

  different circumstances, here it was erroneous to factor Mr. Molina’s vape into the

  suspicion analysis. See Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1152.

               8.     The lack of luggage in the backseat.

        The eighth fact was the lack of luggage in the backseat of Mr. Molina’s

  vehicle. We have previously held that this fact is worth “little or no weight” if the

  vehicle has a trunk because “many, if not most, travelers store luggage” in the trunk.

  United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1431 (10th Cir. 1997). To this end, it is

  critical that Deputy Coxbill admitted that he did not ask about luggage in the trunk

  before the dog sniff. Since there was no evidence that Mr. Molina did not have much

  luggage in his trunk as well, we do not afford the lack of luggage in Mr. Molina’s

  backseat any weight in the suspicion analysis. See Mendez, 118 F.3d at 1431.

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               9.     Totality of the circumstances.

        The final step of the inquiry is to look at the totality of the circumstances “to

  see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for

  suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Davis, 636 F.3d 1281, 1290–91 (10th

  Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). After

  eliminating the facts that should not have been considered in the analysis, we are left

  with just three facts on which Officer Coxbill permissibly relied: (1) the cover odor,

  (2) the third-party rental, and (3) the details of the rental agreement. The sufficiency

  of these facts to establish reasonable suspicion is right on the line, but because of the

  deference we give to an officer “to distinguish between innocent and suspicious

  actions,” Santos, 403 F.3d at 1124, we conclude that Deputy Coxbill’s suspicion to

  prolong Mr. Molina’s traffic stop for a dog sniff was just barely supported by the

  totality of the circumstances.

                                   III. CONCLUSION

        We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Mr. Molina’s motion to suppress.

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