Court Opinion

ID: 9939571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:11:08.995209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:26.448829
License: Public Domain

J-S27003-23

                                2024 PA Super 20

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 JUAN EVANGALIST PERALTA                   :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :     No. 291 MDA 2023

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 21, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-06-CR-0004236-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                     FILED: FEBRUARY 8, 2024

      Juan Evangalist Peralta, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of

sentence of 45 to 90 days of incarceration following his conviction for illegally

operating a vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock. Appellant argues

that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was required to only drive

vehicles that contained such equipment. After careful review, we determine

that the Commonwealth failed to prove Appellant had adequate notice of his

obligations, as the statute required the Department of Transportation

(“PennDOT”) to inform Appellant of his ongoing obligation to drive with an

interlock device unless and until he obtained an unrestricted license. We thus

reverse Appellant’s conviction and vacate his judgment of sentence for that

offense. We affirm his judgment of sentence in all other respects.

      On August 17, 2021, Sergeant Mark McCreary was monitoring traffic

when his license plate reader triggered an alert that a passing vehicle’s
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registration was expired.1       After confirming the result, Sergeant McCreary

stopped the vehicle, which was driven by Appellant. Appellant handed over

an expired registration, expired insurance cards, and his driver’s license,

which “indicated the ignition interlock requirement.” N.T., 11/16/22, at 22.

The Commonwealth introduced photographs and body camera footage

showing the interior of the vehicle, which did not contain an ignition interlock

device.

       The Commonwealth entered into evidence a copy of Appellant’s certified

driving history provided by PennDOT to the Commonwealth. That document

showed that Appellant refused breath testing on July 21, 2018, resulting in a

one-year suspension effective September 7, 2018. The history further states

that his operating privileges were restored on January 14, 2020. Additionally,

there is a section with a header line of “interlock limited license (II LL).” Below

this heading, the following fields are listed, each of which is blank: II LL

License Class; II LL License Issued; II LL License Expires; II LL License Status.

Id. at 62 (Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-2) (some capitalization omitted).

However, at a different part of the same page, below Appellant’s date of birth

and sex, the following text appears: “Record Type: Ignition Interlock License.”

Id.

       The trial court questioned Sergeant McCreary about these entries,

observing that the document “just says restoration of operating privileges

____________________________________________

1 The vehicle was not registered to Appellant.

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January 14, 2020. So that would indicate that … his operating privileges were

restored.   Now, that may mean that he still was under this additional

requirement of the interlock[,] but his operating privileges are restored. It

doesn’t say that.” Id. at 48. The officer replied, “I would agree with you.

That was how I interpreted it.” Id. The trial court additionally remarked,

“Okay. Explain to me why it would … appear that … according to the first

page[,] there’s no information about an interlock limited license. And then at

the bottom of the second page it says that he is restored in January of ‘20.”

Id. at 49. Sergeant McCreary pointed out that the first page of the document

indicated that Appellant had an ignition interlock license, and he reiterated

that Appellant was in possession of a driver’s license that had an interlock

designation.

      Appellant was convicted of one count of illegally operating a motor

vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3808, as well as the

summary offenses of unlawfully operating a vehicle without an emission

inspection sticker and unlawfully operating a vehicle without a certificate of

inspection. The trial court imposed the above-stated sentence on Appellant.

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied, and a timely

notice of appeal from that order. Appellant then filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a

Rule 1925(a) opinion, and we now review Appellant’s two appellate claims:

      1. Whether the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to
      support the verdict in that the Commonwealth failed to establish

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       beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of illegally operating a
       motor vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock?

       2. Whether the verdicts of guilty of illegally operating a motor
       vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock, unlawful operation of
       vehicle without emission inspection, and operation of vehicle
       without official certificate of inspection was contrary to the weight
       of the evidence presented at trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (footnotes omitted).2

       Appellant’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

convict him of the interlock offense. Our standard of review is well-settled:

       In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
       whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable
       inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to
       the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every
       element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As an
       appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute
       our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of doubt is
       for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
       that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from
       the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations

omitted).

       Before discussing the parties’ arguments, for ease of disposition, we first

set forth the relevant statutes and Appellant’s obligations under those

provisions. As a prefatory matter, the definition section of the Vehicle Code,

75 Pa.C.S. § 102, defines the term “ignition interlock limited license” (“IILL”)

as follows:

____________________________________________

2 Appellant stated in the accompanying footnotes that, upon further review,

his challenges to the weight and sufficiency of the summary offenses are
without merit. As such, he has abandoned those challenges on appeal, and
we do not address them.

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      A driver’s license issued to an individual whose operating privilege
      is suspended or revoked for one or more violations under section
      1547 (relating to chemical testing to determine amount of alcohol
      or controlled substance) or 3802 (relating to driving under
      influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or under former
      section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or
      controlled substance) or a violation substantially similar to a
      violation under section 3802 or former section 3731 in another
      jurisdiction, requiring the individual to operate only motor vehicles
      equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system.

75 Pa.C.S. § 102.

      Next, Section 3808(a) of the Vehicle Code codifies the criminal offense

at issue, as follows:

      (a) Offense defined.--

         (1) An individual required to only drive, operate or be in
         actual physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle
         equipped with an ignition interlock system under any of the
         following who drives, operates or is in actual physical control
         of the movement of a motor vehicle within this
         Commonwealth without such a system commits a
         misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to
         pay a fine of not less than $300 and not more than $1,000
         and to imprisonment for not more than 90 days:

            (i) Section 1556 (relating to ignition interlock limited
            license).

            (ii) Section 3805 (relating to ignition interlock).

            (iii) A requirement by another jurisdiction to operate
            only a vehicle with an ignition interlock system.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3808(a).

      Sections 3808(a)(1)(i) and (ii) govern when an individual must obtain

an IILL. For ease of discussion, we begin with the first four subsections of

Section 3805:

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       (a) General rule.--Except as provided under subsection (a.1), if
       a person violates section 3802 (relating to driving under influence
       of alcohol or controlled substance) or has had their operating
       privileges suspended pursuant to section 1547 (relating to
       chemical testing to determine amount of alcohol or controlled
       substance) or 3808(c) (relating to illegally operating a motor
       vehicle not equipped with ignition interlock) and the person seeks
       a restoration of operating privileges, the department shall require
       as a condition of issuing a restricted license pursuant to this
       section that the following occur:

          (1) Any motor vehicle to be operated by the individual has
          been equipped with an ignition interlock system and
          remains so for the duration of the restricted license period.

          (2) If there are no motor vehicles owned or to be operated
          by the person or registered to the person that the person so
          certify to the department in accordance with the
          department’s regulations.

       (a.1) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to an individual
       who meets all of the following:

          (1) Is subject to the penalties under section 3804(a)(1)
          (relating to penalties) or subject to mandatory suspension
          of operating privilege under section 3807(d) (relating to
          Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition).

          (2) Has not had a prior offense, as defined under section
          3806 (relating to prior offenses).

       (b) Application for a restricted license.--A person subject to
       this section shall apply to the department for an ignition interlock
       restricted license[3] under section 1951 (relating to driver’s license
       and learner’s permit), which shall be clearly marked to restrict the
       person to only driving, operating or being in actual physical control
       of the movement of motor vehicles equipped with an ignition
       interlock system. Upon issuance of an ignition interlock restricted
____________________________________________

3 The phrase “ignition interlock restricted license” is not defined. As noted
supra, the definitions section of the Vehicle Code defines the phrase “ignition
interlock limited license.” Moreover, Section 1951 of the Vehicle Code is the
general provision for issuing licenses and it does not contain any reference to
IILLs. In context, it appears the word “restricted” is used in the ordinary
sense.

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     license to any person, the department shall notify the person that
     until the person obtains an unrestricted license the person may
     not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement
     of any motor vehicle which is not equipped with an ignition
     interlock system.

     (c) Issuance of unrestricted license.--One year from the date
     of issuance of an ignition interlock restricted license under this
     section, if otherwise eligible, a person may be issued a
     replacement license under section 1951(d) that does not contain
     the ignition interlock system restriction. The department shall not
     issue an unrestricted license until a person has presented all of
     the following:

        (1) Proof that the person has completed the ignition
        interlock restricted license period under this section.

        (2) Certification by the vendor that provided the ignition
        interlock device that the person has complied with
        subsection (h.2).

     (d) Prohibition.--Except as set forth in subsections (e) and (f),
     until the person obtains an unrestricted license, the person may
     not own, register, drive, operate or be in actual physical control
     of the movement of any motor vehicle within this Commonwealth
     unless the motor vehicle is equipped with an ignition interlock
     system.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3805(a)-(d).

     According to the certified driving record, Appellant refused chemical

testing and received a 12-month license suspension, as set forth by Section

1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code:

     (b) Civil penalties for refusal.--

        (1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of
        section 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing and
        refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon
        notice by the police officer, the department shall suspend
        the operating privilege of the person as follows:

           (i) Except as set forth in subparagraph (ii), for a
           period of 12 months.

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75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(i).

      Due to this suspension, Appellant was required to obtain an IILL by

virtue of Section 3805(a) if he wished to have his operating privileges

restored.   According to the certified driving record, Appellant’s operating

privileges were restored on January 14, 2020. Because Appellant possessed

a driver’s license indicating that he was required to use an ignition interlock

device, it follows that he applied for the IILL.       Subsection (b) required

Appellant to “apply to the department for an ignition interlock restricted

license,” and once that license was issued, subsection (c) is triggered. That

subsection states that the person must use the ignition interlock system for a

period of one year. Afterwards, the person may apply for a regular driver’s

license without the restrictions.

      Subsection (d), which states that “until the person obtains an

unrestricted license, the person may not own, register, drive, operate or be in

actual physical control of the movement of any motor vehicle within this

Commonwealth unless the motor vehicle is equipped with an ignition interlock

system,” is relevant because the incident date in this case was more than one

year after Appellant was eligible to apply for a regular license. Accordingly,

the plain text of the statute means that Appellant was required to drive with

an ignition interlock system unless and until he satisfied statutory criteria for

obtaining an unrestricted license.

      To obtain that license, the statute requires the holder of an IILL to prove

their compliance with whatever ignition interlock device the operator selected.

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“An ignition interlock system required to be installed under this title must be

a system which has been approved by the department.          The department’s

approval of ignition interlock systems shall be published in the Pennsylvania

Bulletin.”   75 Pa.C.S. § 3805(h).   Subsection (h.2) requires the vendor to

certify compliance, and the IILL holder must provide that documentation to

PennDOT.      75 Pa.C.S. § 3805(c)(2).      Additionally, as cited within this

subsection, Section 1556 deals with IILLs.     Subsection (a) of that statute

addresses the general standards for issuing an IILL as follows:

      (a) Issuance.--

         (1) The department shall issue an ignition interlock limited
         license under this section to an individual whose operating
         privileges have been suspended or revoked for:

                                      ***

             (ii) a refusal to submit to chemical testing under
             section 1547 (relating to chemical testing to
             determine amount of alcohol or controlled substance).

         (2) The department shall issue an ignition interlock limited
         license under the provisions of this section only upon
         receiving proof that any motor vehicle to be operated by the
         individual has been equipped with an approved ignition
         interlock system as defined in section 3801 (relating to
         definitions) as a condition of issuing an ignition interlock
         limited license. Any vehicle to be operated by the individual,
         during any period in which the individual holds a valid
         ignition interlock limited license, must be equipped with an
         ignition interlock system.

         (3) An ignition interlock limited license issued under the
         provisions of this section permits an individual to operate
         motor vehicles equipped with a functioning ignition interlock
         system, as defined in section 3801.

         (4) Any period in which an individual holds a valid ignition
         interlock limited license under this section shall be counted

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          toward satisfaction of any mandatory period of ignition
          interlock use imposed under section 3805 (relating to
          ignition interlock) arising from the same incident.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1556(a).4

       With these provisions in mind, we now set forth the parties’ arguments.

Appellant cites the certified driving history, which established that his driving

privileges were restored on January 14, 2020, and emphasizes that the first

page of that document “fails to provide any information in the ‘Interlock

Limited License’ column but does note that his driver’s license issue date was

Jan. 14, 2020.” Appellant’s Brief at 28. Appellant argues that Section 3808

is not a strict liability offense, citing analogous cases holding that the

Commonwealth must establish notice that an offender was aware that their

license had been suspended. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed

to show that PennDOT complied with Section 3808(b), which states PennDOT
____________________________________________

4 The reference in paragraph (4) of time counting towards the mandatory
requirements of Section 3805 is because other portions of Section 1556 permit
individuals whose license is suspended due to certain DUI offenses to request
an IILL before their full period of suspension expires. In Appellant’s case, the
underlying basis for using an IILL was a suspension under 75 Pa.C.S. §
1547(b)(1)(i). He would have been eligible to request an IILL six months into
his suspension pursuant to Section 1556(f):

       (f) Suspension eligibility.--The following shall apply:

          (1) An individual whose license has been suspended under
          section 1547(b) shall be eligible to apply for and, if
          otherwise qualified, be issued an ignition interlock limited
          license under this section if the individual:

              (i) has served six months of the suspension imposed
              under section 1547(b)(1)(i)….

75 Pa.C.S. § 1556(f).

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“shall notify the person that until the person obtains an unrestricted license

the person may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the

movement of any motor vehicle which is not equipped with an ignition

interlock system.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3805(b). Appellant argues that he cannot be

expected to show that he did not receive this notice, as this would force him

to prove his own innocence.

      The Commonwealth, in contrast, does not view its failure to show that

the Section 3808(b) notice requirements were given as relevant because of

the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse.      The Commonwealth

argues that the statute put Appellant on notice of his obligations, as the

statute specified that an IILL holder must use an ignition interlock device until

a replacement license is issued and, to obtain that license, Appellant had to

prove to PennDOT that he complied with the ignition interlock requirements.

      Whether this statute requires notice and, if so, what type of notice,

appears to be an issue of first impression.     We agree with Appellant that

precedents involving 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543 are analogous. Section 1543(b) of

the Vehicle Code states that a person is guilty of that offense if he or she

“drives … at a time when the person’s operating privilege is suspended or

revoked” due to certain enumerated offenses related to DUIs. Case law holds

that the Commonwealth is required to show that the offender had notice of

the suspension.   Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Crockford, 660 A.2d

1326, 1327 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc), which aptly summarized the

applicable principles of law. “The seminal case in this area is Commonwealth

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v. Kane, … 333 A.2d 925 ([Pa.] 1975), which held that it is necessary for the

Commonwealth to prove that the accused had actual notice of suspension in

order to convict of driving while under suspension.” Id. at 1328. “Notice is,

therefore, a judicially created element, designed to protect a defendant’s due

process rights.” Id. at 1329.

       The Kane holding recognizes that there is often a lag between a

conviction and the collateral consequence of license suspension. We see that

gap here; the certified driving record shows that Appellant refused a breath

test on July 21, 2018, and the official notice of suspension was mailed August

3, 2018, and made effective September 7, 2018. Without notice, Appellant

would not know when his license became suspended. Thus, we agree that

notice of the ignition interlock restriction is necessary.

       Briefly, we note that Appellant describes this notice component as

implicating mens rea.      “The term mens rea is Latin for guilty mind and is

defined as ‘[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction,

must    prove   that   a   defendant    had     when   committing   a   crime[.]’”

Commonwealth v. Andre, 17 A.3d 951, 958 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation

omitted; bracketing in original). The General Assembly has enacted Section

302 of the Crimes Code, which supplies defaults in the absence of a statutory

mens rea requirement. Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136, 1149

(Pa. 2014) (stating that our Supreme Court has “repeatedly held § 302

provides the default level of culpability where a criminal statute does not

include an express mens rea”). Under the default provision of Section 302(c),

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“[w]hen the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense

is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”      18 Pa.C.S. §

302(c).

      Notwithstanding, the parties’ dispute is not about culpability but rather

whether the Commonwealth must show notice as contemplated by precedents

like Crockford. The rationale of those cases is not grounded in mens rea in

terms of conduct but rather notice as a component of procedural due process.

Indeed, both Section 1543(b) and Section 3808 of the Vehicle Code seem to

establish a strict liability scheme, as the decision to drive while knowing that

their license is suspended (Section 1543) or that their license is restricted by

an ignition interlock requirement (Section 3808) suffices to establish liability

if the individual chooses to drive while knowing of those restrictions. Thus,

the offense seems to establish strict liability, as it is awareness of the

restrictions that creates liability, not any “guilty mind” with respect to the

conduct itself. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Samuels, 778 A.2d 638, 643

(Pa. 2001) (Saylor, J., concurring) (“[I]t is widely accepted that the legislative

branch may impose absolute liability for ‘public welfare offenses’ to promote

the public welfare by enforcing compliance with regulatory schemes.”);

Commonwealth v. Collins, 810 A.2d 698, 703 (Pa. Super. 2002) (rejecting

a claim that the Commonwealth was required to prove that a DUI defendant

voluntary ingested the intoxicant as the statute lacked a culpability provision;

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“We interpret this omission to mean that the legislature intended Driving

Under the Influence to be a strict or absolute liability offense.”).

      We conclude that the Commonwealth was required to establish

Appellant had notice of that restriction. However, we note that there are two

separate types of notice at issue. The first is notice that Appellant was not

permitted to operate a motor vehicle unless it had an ignition interlock device

installed. While the Commonwealth did not show that PennDOT sent any type

of documentation beyond Appellant’s license suspension for refusing a breath

test, an obvious indicator that Appellant had notice is the fact that he

possessed an IILL. The statutory framework establishes that PennDOT does

not issue this license on its own initiative.     Instead, upon restoration of

operating privileges, the individual can request an IILL.         That Appellant

physically possessed his IILL card is sufficient proof that he had actual notice

that his license was restricted.

      The second type of notice is whether Appellant had notice that, by virtue

of having an IILL, he was not to operate a vehicle without an ignition interlock

device until he obtained a replacement license, even if the one-year time

period had elapsed. One answer to this question is the foregoing: by having

an IILL, Appellant knew he was limited to using vehicles with an ignition

interlock device.   The other answer is that having an IILL is not enough,

because that does not necessarily tell you how long you must comply with the

restriction. The Commonwealth urges the former, while Appellant asks this

Court to adopt the latter.

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      The Commonwealth’s position relies on the proposition that ignorance

of the law is no excuse. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199

(1991) (“The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no

defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal

system.”).   As set forth supra, the statute’s plain language supplies the

requisite notice.

      We are not persuaded that application of this maxim should prevail, as

this argument overlooks the General Assembly’s instruction within Section

3805(b) that PennDOT must inform an IILL holder of the ignition interlock

requirement. The Commonwealth’s reliance on the general rule writes out

this language.      We acknowledge that the textual command could be

interpreted as a courtesy: PennDOT was required to tell Appellant that, until

he obtained an unrestricted license, he was not permitted to drive unless the

vehicle had an ignition interlock device, but if PennDOT failed to do so, the

onus is still on the offender consistent with the general principle that ignorance

of the law is no excuse. However, we conclude that this interpretation is not

consistent with legislative intent.     “The object of all interpretation and

construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the

General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect

to all its provisions.”     1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).          The Commonwealth’s

interpretation makes the notice requirement entirely superfluous.        “We are

not permitted to ignore the language of a statute, nor may we deem any

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language to be superfluous.” Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160,

1168 (Pa. 2009).

      If the General Assembly intended that the notice provision was

irrelevant to the motorist’s duty to comply, it could have clearly stated that

point. In this regard, the General Assembly has stated in the Sexual Offender

and Registration Notification Act (“SORNA”) context that a failure to inform is

irrelevant to the registrant’s duties. That statute is analogous because, like

license suspensions, sexual offender obligations are collateral consequences

that flow from a criminal conviction. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 240

A.3d 654, 657–58 (Pa. Super. 2020) (noting that our Supreme Court has

deemed Subchapter       I of SORNA to         be   non-punitive; “Non-punitive,

administrative requirements are merely collateral consequences of a criminal

conviction.”); see also Commonwealth v. Duffey, 639 A.2d 1174, 1176

(Pa. 1974) (“Courts of this Commonwealth have consistently recognized that

a license suspension is a collateral civil consequence of a criminal

conviction.”). Collateral obligations, in turn, may impose further requirements

that, if not followed, subject the offender to criminal penalties. Again, SORNA

is readily comparable. A person who is required to register as a sex offender

is subject to criminal penalties if he or she fails to comply with those

requirements.     Similarly, a person who has an IILL is required to use an

ignition interlock device and is subject to criminal penalties if he or she fails

to comply with their requirement to use an ignition interlock device. Section

9799.20 states:

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      In order to implement the provisions of section 9799.19 (relating
      to initial registration), as appropriate, the Pennsylvania State
      Police, the court having jurisdiction over the sexual offender, the
      chief juvenile probation officer of the court and the appropriate
      official of the Department of Corrections, county office of
      probation and parole, the Department of Human Services or a
      State or county correctional institution shall:

         (1) Inform the individual required to register of the
         individual’s duties under this subchapter.

         (2) Require the individual to read and sign a form stating
         that the duty to register has been explained and that the
         individual understands the registration requirement.

         (3) Collect the information required under section
         9799.16(b) and (c) (relating to registry) and forward the
         information to the Pennsylvania State Police for inclusion in
         the registry as set forth in this subchapter.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.20.

      Section 9799.20 itself does not address any consequences of a failure

to inform. However, Section 9799.23 — which addresses a trial court’s duties

to inform certain individuals who are sentenced, adjudicated delinquent, or

committed for involuntary treatment of their registration obligations — states

that a “[f]ailure by the court to provide the information required in this section,

to correctly inform a sexual offender of the sexual offender’s obligations or to

require a sexual offender to register shall not relieve the sexual offender from

the requirements of this subchapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.23(b)(1). Similarly,

the statute addressing the periodic verification duties of a sexual offender

requires the Pennsylvania State Police to send notice by mail to “facilitate the

process of verification of information[.]”     42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.25(c).       That

statute likewise clarifies that any failure to do so does not relieve the offender

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of their obligations. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.25(d). Similar provisions appear in

Subchapter I of SORNA, which applies to offenders whose offenses predated

the enactment of SORNA in 2012.

      Our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Roberts, 293 A.3d 1221,

1226 (Pa. Super. 2023), appeal granted, 2023 WL 5923298 (Pa. Sept. 12,

2023), supports our conclusion that these statutes are relevant to our

analysis. In that case, Roberts was subject to lifetime registration due to a

conviction and required to report annually to the Pennsylvania State Police.

In 2020, he failed to appear for his annual appearance, and was charged.

Roberts argued that “there was insufficient proof of his mens rea under 18

Pa.C.S.[] § 4915.2(a)(1), (2),” which supplies a mens rea of “knowingly.” Id.

at 1225. We observed that “the statute does not require proof that Roberts

knew of his lifelong-registration requirement.” Id. We concluded that that

the General Assembly, “when enacting SORNA, codified the ancient maxim

that ignorance of the law is no excuse.           Roberts may not excuse

noncompliance with SORNA based on alleged ignorance of his lifetime-

registration obligation.” Id. at 1226 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Notably, citing the statutory provisions stating that the failure to inform is

irrelevant to the offender’s obligations, we stated “there is no notice

requirement in SORNA. The statute expressly negates and disclaims such a

requirement.” Id.

      While Roberts reaches the opposite conclusion in terms of result, we

deemed relevant the fact that the statute “negates and disclaims” any notice

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requirement. Section 3805(b), in contrast, requires notice but is silent as to

what happens if PennDOT fails to comply (or, by extension, if the

Commonwealth fails to prove that the notice was given). We therefore deem

the notice requirement to be a key part of legislative intent.

       We determine that the placement of this obligation is relevant as well.

If   this   obligation   were   merely     promulgated   as   a   regulation,   the

Commonwealth’s argument would be far more compelling. But Section 3808,

which sets forth the substantive elements of the crime, incorporates within its

definition Section 3805. By codifying the notice requirement within Section

3805(b), the General Assembly made notice an integral part of the statute.

While notice is not an element of the crime, we find that the General Assembly

intended for the notice function to protect due process rights.          Thus, the

Commonwealth was required to show notice.

       Finally, we conclude that the notice provision indeed protects a citizen’s

due process rights. The General Assembly’s intent in this regard is arguably

not controlling; as we stated in Crockford, supra at 1329, “[n]otice is … a

judicially created element, designed to protect a defendant’s due process

rights.”    But two points warrant paying particular attention to the General

Assembly’s intent. First, the statutory notice requirement reflects a legislative

intent to override the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Second,

the General Assembly may have required PennDOT to give notice because a

person may reasonably assume that once the one-year period has expired, as

it did in this case, that full restoration of driving privileges is automatic. While

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an offender is statutorily required to certify their compliance, it would not be

unreasonable for a person to think that the ignition interlock device

automatically reported its usage statistics.       Relatedly, an offender who is

aware of their duty to certify may think that their obligation ceases unless

their application for an unrestricted license is rejected.5 The complexity of the

statute justifies a conclusion that notice is needed to sustain a conviction.

Because the Commonwealth failed to show that PennDOT satisfied its Section

3805(b) obligation, we conclude that reversal of Appellant’s conviction for

illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock is

warranted.6

       Conviction for illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped with

ignition interlock is reversed.        Judgment of sentence for that conviction

vacated. Judgment of sentence at the remaining summary offenses affirmed.7

____________________________________________

5 The certified driving history is confusing in this regard, as the fields indicating

when Appellant’s IILL was issued and/or expired are blank.

       Additionally, as the trial judge’s questions at trial reflect, the fact that
Appellant’s operating privileges were restored is confusing. In truth, operating
privileges in this context are better described as conditionally restored. The
requirement that the driver use an ignition interlock device is an additional
condition that must be followed for one year before full operating privileges
are restored.

6 Due to our disposition, we need not address Appellant’s weight claim
pertaining to his conviction for illegally operating a motor vehicle not equipped
with ignition interlock.

7 Because Appellant has served the maximum period of incarceration and no

probationary sentence was imposed, there is no need to remand for
resentencing.

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     Judge Bowes joins this memorandum.

     Judge Sullivan concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/08/2024

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