Court Opinion

ID: 9833894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:07:38.087026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:08.711028
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[7] Upon a reconsideration of this case, on appellant’s motion for a rehearing, we conclude that the court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court in awarding appellee, Mims, a recovery for' the amount of the payments made upon the certificates or contracts of insurance issued to him in 1879, but which were surrendered for the new certificate or contract issued in 1885. An ingenious argument is made by counsel for appellee in support of their theory that it was not the intention of appellee and the old corporation that the rights of the parties under the certificates of 1879 should be surrendered upon the acceptance by app.ellee of the certificate issued in 1885, and that such surrender could not take place and a new contract be created, unless there was an actual performance, and not merely the promise to perform the agreement contained in the new certificate, but it is not believed the contention is sound, at least not so under the facts of this c&se. The application of appellee to enter the fourth class and to receive the certificate issued to him in that class in 1885 in lieu of certificates issued in 1879 in the first class contained the following:
“The undersigned, bom on the 6th day of June, 1837, a member in good standing of Sec. No. 278, Endowment Rank K. of P. and holding certificate No. 5383 in first class which is hereto attached, hereby makes application to enter the fourth class, in which I desire to hold an endowment of one thousand dollars, and I hereby surrender all- my right, title, and interest in and to the within certificate, the benefit upon my death to be paid as follows: To my wife, Mary J. Mims.”
A like application was made when appel-lee surrendered his certificate for $2,000 in the second class. The certificate appellee received in 1885, in lieu of the certificates mentioned above, and which is sued on in this case, contains, among others, the following stipulation:
“In consideration of the absolute surrender of the certificates heretofore held by him in first and secopd classes, for cancellation as requested in his application for transfer to the fourth class bearing date of May 7, 1885, and in consideration of the payment hereafter to said Endowment Rank of all monthly payments as required, and the full compliance with all the laws governing this rank, now in force, or that *843.may hereafter be enacted, and shall be in good standing under said laws, the sum of three thousand dollars will be paid by the Supreme Lodge of Knights of Pythias of the World to Mary J. Mims, as directed by said brother in his application.”
These stipulations show, we think, that ap-pellee agreed to surrender and to have canceled his certificates in the first and second classes in consideration of the issuance to him of the certificate in the fourth class, the acceptance of which operated, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, as a discharge and satisfaction of the former certificates of 1879, and an adjustment of all rights thereunder. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Neeley, 135 S. W. 1046. It follows that appellee was not entitled to recover the premiums or assessments paid on the certificates issued to him in 1879, and the judgment rendered in his favor for the amount of said assessments and the interest thereon is erroneous, and must be set aside.
We believe the other questions arising on the appeal have been correctly decided. The recent case of Provident Savings Life Assurance Society v. Ellinger, reported in 164 S. W. 1024, is not, under the facts of this case, authority for appellant’s contention that the amount of the premiums or ¿ssessments paid by appellee, with interest thereon, is not ap-pellee’s measure of damages. The record, without contradiction, in the case before us shows that appellee was not reinsurable at the time of the breach of the contract sued on, while in the Ellinger Case it showed that he was. ^This is an important distinction, differentiating the cases with respect to the. rule of damages. Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Lovejoy, 149 S. W. 398. This distinction seems to be recognized in both the Ellinger Case and the Neeley Case, supra. That ap-pellee, Mims, was 74 years of age and unin-surable at the time of the breach of his contract was pleaded and proved, and the fact stands unchallenged by anything appearing in the record sent to this court. Appellee is therefore entitled to recover only the amount of premiums paid since the issuance to him of the certificate in 1885, with interest, and the judgment of the trial eourt and thfe judgment of this court heretofore rendered, affirming the judgment of the trial eourt, will be reformed so as to deduct therefrom the amount of premiums and - interest paid on the insurance contracts of 1879. The principal amount of the premiums paid on these contracts, as appears without dispute from the - record, is $201, and, while these payments were in all probability made monthly, yet the record does not affirmatively show that fact. The certificates of 1879 were issued on the 30th day of April of that year, and the date of the'judgment of the district court is March 14, 1913, a period of little less than 34 years. The rate of interest recoverable and allowed appellee is 6 per cent, per annum, and he agrees in writing in this court that, in the event we hold he is not entitled to recover the premiums paid on the 1879 contracts, to remit all interest recovered by him in the lower court on said premiums, which amounts to $410, and which, added to the $201, principal, makes $611.
It is therefore ordered that the judgment of the district court and the judgment of this court heretofore rendered at this term, affirming said judgment of the district court, be reformed so as to deduct from said judgments the sum of $611, and that the judgment of the district court, as reformed, stand affirmed; that appellant’s motion for a rehearing in all other respects be overruled; and that the costs, of this appeal be taxed against appellee.