Court Opinion

ID: 9926623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 16:00:43.62399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:52.571559
License: Public Domain

21-2487-cr
U.S. v. Smith

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                                  SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 25th day of January, two thousand twenty-four.

        PRESENT:        Steven J. Menashi,
                        Sarah A. L. Merriam,
                                Circuit Judges,
                        Stephen A. Vaden,
                                Judge. *
____________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                 Appellee,

           v.                                                  No. 21-2487

FRANK SMITH, aka FRESH,

                 Defendant-Appellant. †
    ___________________________________________

*Judge Stephen A. Vaden of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
†   The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
For Appellee:                         JENNIFER SASSO (Jo Ann M. Navickas, on the
                                      brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for
                                      Breon Peace, United States Attorney for the
                                      Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

For Defendant-Appellant:              LAWRENCE D. GERZOG, New York, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Block, J.).

      Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

      Defendant-Appellant Frank Smith appeals from a judgment of conviction
and sentence entered on September 29, 2021, by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York. After a jury trial, Smith was found guilty of
one count of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1963(a), two
counts of murder in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), and
two counts of firearm-related murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). The
district court sentenced Smith to a total of life plus twenty years’ imprisonment
and a $500 special assessment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

                                         I

      First, Smith argues that the government presented insufficient evidence that
he committed any acts related to the racketeering enterprise, Rival Impact, during
the limitations period beginning June 22, 2011. He contends that although the jury
found that three racketeering acts within the limitations period had been proven—
racketeering acts one, four, and five—there was insufficient evidence that those
acts were related to Rival Impact.

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                                          A

         “We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, though a
defendant carries a heavy burden in making such a challenge.” United States v.
White, 7 F.4th 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
“conviction must be affirmed if any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Florez,
447 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In conducting
our review, we consider the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the
government’s favor, and deferring to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility
and its assessment of the weight of the evidence.” White, 7 F.4th at 98 (internal
quotation marks omitted).

         To establish racketeering, the “government must prove both that an
enterprise exists and that the conduct in furtherance of the enterprise comprises a
pattern.” United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204, 216 (2d Cir. 2010). To show a pattern,
the government must prove “[a]t least two predicate acts” that are “related and
amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). At least one predicate act must have been committed within the
five-year limitations period. See United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1367 (2d Cir.
1994).

         The predicate acts must be horizontally related and vertically related.
Burden, 600 F.3d at 216. “Horizontal relatedness requires that the racketeering
predicate acts be related to each other.” Id. Vertical relatedness requires “that the
acts [be] related to the enterprise” and is satisfied by showing “that the defendant
was enabled to commit the offense solely because of his position in the enterprise
or his involvement in or control over the enterprise’s affairs, or because the offense
related to the activities of the enterprise.” Id. “[B]oth the vertical and horizontal
relationships are generally satisfied by linking each predicate act to the enterprise”
because the “predicate crimes will share common goals … and common victims”

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and “will draw their participants from the same pool of associates.” United States
v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371, 376 (2d Cir. 2006).

                                          B

      The government presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury
could conclude that Smith committed acts related to Rival Impact during the
limitations period. These include racketeering act one, heroin distribution
conspiracy from January 2000 to January 2014; racketeering act four, possession of
cocaine base and heroin with intent to distribute on August 20, 2011; and
racketeering act five, possession of heroin with intent to distribute on September
5, 2011.

      As to racketeering act one, Smith argues that there was “not a shred of
evidence” connecting him to a Rival Impact-related drug conspiracy. Appellant’s
Br. 16. But the government did present such evidence. The government presented
testimony from cooperating witnesses Gerald Salley and Nabiu Mansaray—
longtime Rival Impact members—that Smith was involved in Rival Impact’s drug
distribution operations during the limitations period. For example, Salley testified
that Smith supplied him and other Rival Impact members with heroin to sell until
at least August 2011. Furthermore, Smith was arrested in August and September
2011 near the Mermaid Houses—Rival Impact’s turf where members had for years
cut, packaged, and sold drugs—in possession of distribution-quantity narcotics.
And a law enforcement officer testified that he observed Smith associating with
other Rival Impact members including Salley, Mansaray, and Michael Liburd
throughout the summer of 2011.

      Smith points to several pieces of evidence in the record that he contends
undermine the inference that he was involved with a Rival Impact-related drug
conspiracy. First, Mansaray denied that Smith was his “partner in crime” and
agreed, when asked, that Smith “worked alone.” App’x 98. But a reasonable
inference from the testimony is that Smith—and other Rival Impact members—
would sell drugs without other members present. Second, a police officer testified

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that he associated Smith with the “West 33rd Crew.” Id. at 131. But the Mermaid
Houses were on West 33rd Street, and the indictment explains that Rival Impact
was also known as the “33rd Street Crew.” Id. at 32.

      As to racketeering acts four and five, Smith argues that the government
presented no evidence that the acts were related to Rival Impact because the
arrests occurred at a distance from the Mermaid Houses. But the locations of the
arrests support the jury’s conclusion that the arrests were related to Rival Impact.
The August arrest took place “just north” of the Mermaid Houses, Gov’t App’x
121, and the September arrest was for a “hand-to-hand [drug] transaction” that
took place “[a]cross the street” from the Mermaid Houses, App’x 46. And the
government presented evidence that no one could sell drugs near the Mermaid
Houses without Rival Impact’s permission. So the jury could have concluded from
the locations of the arrests alone that the arrests were related to Rival Impact.

      Smith contends that the arresting officers “did not check the box to indicate
a gang affiliation” when completing the arrest report forms and that this omission
undercuts any connection between the arrests and Rival Impact. Appellant’s Br.
12. But the officers’ testimony indicates that they understood gangs, such as the
Bloods, to be different from crews, such as Rival Impact. And they testified that
they believed Smith was associated with a crew, which they explained to be a
“[g]roup of individuals who lived within that vicinity who sold narcotics.” App’x
131; see also id. at 50 (“I did not know [Smith] to be particularly associated with any
gangs. His particular crew, yes; gangs, no.”).

      We conclude that, taking “the totality of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government,” a rational jury could find that racketeering acts one,
four, and five, were vertically related to Rival Impact. White, 7 F.4th at 98 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The acts shared “common goals” and drew their
“participants from the same pool of associates[—]those who are members and
associates of” Rival Impact. Daidone, 471 F.3d at 376. And a jury could conclude
that Smith was able to commit these acts “solely because of his position … or his

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involvement in” Rival Impact. Burden, 600 F.3d at 216. Indeed, a jury could
rationally conclude that Smith could not have sold drugs around the Mermaid
Houses if he were not involved with Rival Impact.

                                         II

      Second, Smith argues that the government committed a Brady violation by
failing to disclose evidence that Michael Liburd—Smith’s cousin and fellow Rival
Impact member—participated in a different criminal enterprise during the
limitations period. Smith contends that such evidence was material to his defense
because the government presented evidence of Smith’s association with Liburd to
prove the existence of Rival Impact and Smith’s participation in it. Thus, he argues,
evidence of Liburd’s participation in a different enterprise could have weakened
the government’s case against Smith.

      “The basic rule of Brady is that the Government has a constitutional duty to
disclose favorable evidence to the accused where such evidence is ‘material’ either
to guilt or to punishment.” United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 2001).
“To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show (1) that the evidence at
issue is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either
willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued.” United States v.
Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 224 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]
Brady violation occurs only where the government suppresses evidence that could
reasonably have been taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict.” Coppa, 267 F.3d at 139 (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted).

      Smith has not shown that the government committed a Brady violation
because he does not identify any exculpatory evidence that was withheld or any
prejudice that resulted. At trial, the government stipulated that Liburd was a
member of the West End Enterprise between 2011 and 2017 and that Smith was
not a member of that other enterprise. This stipulation allowed the defense to

                                         6
advance any argument to the jury regarding the inference it should draw from
Liburd’s membership in a different enterprise—and Smith did advance such
arguments.

      In light of the government’s stipulation at trial and Smith’s failure to identify
any exculpatory evidence that the government withheld, we conclude that Smith
has not established a Brady violation.

                                          III

      Third, Smith argues that the district court provided supplemental jury
instructions that improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant as to the
fifth element of murder in aid of racketeering. He argues that the jury’s subsequent
inconsistent verdict—finding Smith guilty of murder in aid of racketeering but
making no finding as to racketeering acts seven and eight for the same murders—
establishes that the error was prejudicial.

      We review a challenge to a district court’s jury instruction de novo. United
States v. Shamsideen, 511 F.3d 340, 345 (2d Cir. 2008). “We will disturb a conviction
only when it appears reasonably likely that the jury understood the instructions to
allow it to convict on evidence insufficient to prove every element of the offense
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 227
(2d Cir. 1997); see Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22 (1994). The challenged portion
of the instruction cannot be considered in isolation, however, because “[t]he jury
charge taken as a whole might have explained the proper allocation of burdens
with sufficient clarity [such] that …the particular language challenged could not
have been understood by a reasonable juror as shifting the burden of persuasion.”
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1985).

      Smith’s argument fails because a reasonable jury would not have
understood the instructions, taken as a whole, “to permit a guilty verdict based on
less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Shamsideen, 511 F.3d at 345. Smith
argues that the district court’s instruction that “[i]f … you find that the defendant
was not motivated at all by a desire to maintain or increase his position in the
                                           7
enterprise, then you should find this element has not been proven,” App’x 160,
shifted the burden to the defendant to disprove that element. But taking the jury
charge as a whole, it is not “reasonably likely” that a jury would have understood
this sentence to shift the burden of proof. The district court stated three times
immediately prior to that sentence—and many times in the original jury charge—
that the government was required to establish each element beyond a reasonable
doubt, including specifically the fifth murder in-aid-of-racketeering element. “We
assume that a jury applies the instructions it is given.” Chalmers v. Mitchell, 73 F.3d
1262, 1267 (2d Cir. 1996). 1

      Smith contends that the verdict shows that the jury instruction was
prejudicial. We disagree. The district court instructed the jury that, in order to find
Smith guilty of racketeering, it was required to find at least two racketeering acts
proven but was not required to make a finding as to all eight racketeering acts
charged. The jury found acts one through six proven, but it made no finding as to
acts seven and eight—which were the same two murders as the murder in aid of
racketeering charges. Smith argues that this verdict is incongruous because in
order to find that the charges for murder in aid of racketeering had been proven,
the jury must have found that all the elements of racketeering acts seven and eight
had been proven plus the fifth “purpose” element. But there is no reason to think
that the challenged jury instruction had anything to do with this incongruity. The
instruction related only to the additional element, which was not required to be
proven for racketeering acts seven and eight. So any error in the challenged jury

1  Furthermore, the challenged instruction correctly articulated the legal standard. The
fifth element is proven when the desire to maintain or increase position in the enterprise
was “among” the motives of the defendant, even if it was not his “sole or principal
motive.” United States v. Farmer, 583 F.3d 131, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, as the district court explained, only if the jury finds that the
defendant “was not motivated at all by [this] desire” should it find the element not
proven. App’x 160.

                                            8
instruction would have no bearing on the jury’s consideration of the racketeering
acts.

        Accordingly, we see no error in the district court’s supplemental jury
instruction.

                                            IV

        Fourth, Smith argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable
because the district court erroneously believed that murder in aid of racketeering
carries a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment.

        Murder in-aid-of racketeering is punishable “by death or life imprisonment,
or a fine under this title, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1). Smith argues that the plain
text of the statute permits the district court to impose a fine instead of death or life
imprisonment. Yet the district court stated that it “do[es]n’t think [it] ha[s]
discretion” to depart from a minimum sentence of life imprisonment by imposing
only a fine. App’x 172.

        We have previously held that § 1959(a)(1) does “carr[y] a mandatory
minimum sentence of life in prison.” United States v. James, 239 F.3d 120, 127 (2d
Cir. 2000). In James, we recognized that the text of the statute presented some
“ambiguity.” Id. at 126. However, we saw “no basis for concluding that Congress
intended the unlikely result that … a judge was free to reject a death sentence or
life imprisonment for a defendant convicted [of murder in-aid-of racketeering],
but only by sentencing that defendant to a fine without prison time.” Id. at 127.
Our decision in James resolves Smith’s objection, and we therefore see no
procedural error.

                                        *        *    *

                                            9
         We have considered Smith’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are
without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.

                                      FOR THE COURT:
                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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