Court Opinion

ID: 9366985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-30 16:00:58.039714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:56.555163
License: Public Domain

19-3636-cr
     United States v. Benjamin

                                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                           FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                                     SUMMARY ORDER

     RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
     CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
     PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
     PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
     SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
     CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH
     THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
     MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
 2   at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
 3   York, on the 30th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6                            JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
 7                            REENA RAGGI,
 8                            EUNICE C. LEE,
 9                                    Circuit Judges.
10   ------------------------------------------------------------------
11   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
12
13                                 Appellee,
14
15                          v.                                                            No. 19-3636-cr
16
17   NEAL BENJAMIN,
18
19                            Defendant-Appellant. *
20   ------------------------------------------------------------------
21
22   For Appellee:                                                               Katherine A. Gregory, Assistant
23                                                                               United States Attorney, for Trini
24                                                                               E. Ross, United States Attorney
25                                                                               for the Western District of New
26                                                                               York, Buffalo, NY.
27
28   For Defendant-Appellant:                                                    Jonathan I. Edelstein, Edelstein &
     *
         The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption as set forth above.

                                                                  1
 1                                                                Grossman, New York, NY.
 2                                                                Neal Benjamin, pro se, White
 3                                                                Deer, PA.
 4
 5
 6          Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New

 7   York (Richard J. Arcara, J.).

 8          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 9   DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

10          Defendant-Appellant Neal Benjamin appeals from the district court’s denial of his

11   resentencing motion brought pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391,

12   132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Following a jury trial, Benjamin was convicted in 1999 of one count of

13   conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of cocaine,

14   cocaine base, and marijuana (“Count 1”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 as it relates to 21 U.S.C.

15   § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and one count of distribution and possession with intent to distribute an

16   unspecified amount of cocaine base (“Count 3”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

17   (b)(1)(C). In 2008, the court sentenced Benjamin to a maximum 20 years on Count 1 and 10 years

18   on Count 3, to be served consecutively for a total of 30 years. The sentence was affirmed on

19   appeal. United States v. Benjamin, 391 Fed. App’x 942 (2d Cir. 2010).

20          In 2019, Benjamin filed a First Step Act motion to reduce his sentence. The First Step Act

21   made the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, retroactively

22   applicable. First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, Sec. 404. The Fair Sentencing Act narrowed the

23   sentencing disparity between cocaine and cocaine base (otherwise known as “crack”) offenses by

24   increasing the amount of crack required for conviction of certain offenses carrying mandatory

25   minimum and/or increased maximum sentences. Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, Sec.

26   2. To be eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, a defendant must have been

                                                      2
 1   convicted of a “covered offense,” i.e., an offense for which the Fair Sentencing Act changed the

 2   statutory penalty. First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, Sec. 404; see Terry v. United States, 141

 3   S. Ct. 1858, 1862 (2021). The district court denied Benjamin’s motion, finding him ineligible for

 4   relief because his convictions for drug crimes subject to § 841(b)(1)(C)’s penalties are not covered

 5   offenses under the First Step Act.

 6          On appeal, Benjamin, through counsel, urges the court to hold that crimes subject to

 7   § 841(b)(1)(C) penalties are covered offenses within the meaning of the First Step Act when the

 8   total sentence imposed exceeds § 841(b)(1)(C)’s 20-year maximum. Benjamin also argues, pro

 9   se, that (1) he was in fact sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (pondering, inter alia, a 10-

10   year-to-life sentencing range for crimes involving certain drug quantities), making his a conviction

11   for a covered offense; (2) the district court’s factfinding at sentencing violated his Sixth

12   Amendment rights; and (3) Congress’ failure to provide a First Step Act remedy to defendants

13   sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(C) violates the Equal Protection Clause.

14          We conclude that the district court properly denied Benjamin’s First Step Act motion and

15   reject Benjamin’s pro se arguments. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,

16   procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our

17   decision to affirm.

18          The denial of a motion for a discretionary sentence reduction is typically reviewed for

19   abuse of discretion. United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 2020). However, that

20   standard applies only where the district court exercised its discretion in the first instance. Id.

21   Where, as here, the district court determines that a defendant is ineligible for a discretionary

22   sentence reduction based entirely on statutory interpretation, we review that determination de

23   novo. Id.

                                                      3
 1       I.       Counseled Arguments

 2            The Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. United States, which held that crimes subject to

 3   § 841(b)(1)(C) penalties are not covered offenses within the meaning of the First Step Act, is

 4   dispositive of this appeal. 141 S. Ct. at 1864. Terry makes clear that because § 841(b)(1)(C) has

 5   no minimum crack quantity requirement, 1 the Fair Sentencing Act did not modify the statutory

 6   penalty for crimes subject to § 841(b)(1)(C) penalties. Id. at 1863. “Before [the Fair Sentencing

 7   Act of] 2010, the statutory penalties for [§ 841(b)(1)(C)] were 0-to-20 years, up to a $1 million

 8   fine, or both, and a period of supervised release. After 2010, these statutory penalties remain

 9   exactly the same.” Id. at 1862–63. As such, a crime subject to § 841(b)(1)(C) penalties is not a

10   “covered offense” for purposes of the First Step Act. Id.

11            Benjamin seeks to distinguish Terry on the basis that the petitioner in that case received a

12   15-and-a-half-year sentence, under the 20-year maximum of § 841(b)(1)(C). Id. at 1861. Because

13   Benjamin received two consecutive sentences under § 841(b)(1)(C), totaling 30 years, he

14   maintains that his sentence exceeds the statutory 20-year maximum penalty authorized by §

15   841(b)(1)(C). But Benjamin did not receive a sentence outside the 20-year statutory maximum

16   authorized by § 841(b)(1)(C); he received two sentences within the statute’s range. The district

17   court’s decision to run these two distinct sentences consecutively, for a total term exceeding that

18   statutorily-authorized sentence for a single conviction, is a perfectly permissible outcome that was

19   not modified by the Fair Sentencing Act. In short, both before and after 2010, the district court

20   was empowered to order two sentences under § 841(b)(1)(C) to run consecutively, even if they

21   exceeded 20 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (granting district courts discretion to run sentences

     1
      By contrast, § 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) have minimum crack quantities to trigger conviction. By increasing the quantity
     of crack necessary for conviction under each subsection, the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties
     under § 841(b)(1)(A) and (B), and thus drug crimes subject to such penalties are covered offenses under the First Step
     Act. Terry, 141 S. Ct. at 1863.

                                                               4
 1   consecutively). Thus, the fact that Benjamin, who was convicted of two counts carrying §

 2   841(b)(1)(C) penalties, received a longer total sentence than the petitioner in Terry, who was

 3   convicted only of one count, 141 S. Ct. at 1861, does not meaningfully distinguish Benjamin’s

 4   case. Terry simply does not leave room to argue that a crime carrying a § 841(b)(1)(C) penalty is

 5   a covered offense for purposes of the First Step Act.

 6            Benjamin’s second attempt to distinguish Terry on the basis that the Sentencing Guidelines,

 7   which incorporated the crack-cocaine disparity, played a role in his sentence is similarly

 8   unavailing. Terry makes clear that the only factor pertinent to identifying a covered offense for

 9   purposes of the First Step Act is whether the Fair Sentencing Act changed the statutory penalty.

10   Id. at 1863–64.

11      II.      Pro Se Arguments

12            Benjamin’s pro se arguments are equally unavailing. Benjamin argues that, because the

13   district court made a drug quantity determination at sentencing, which is not necessary under §

14   841(b)(1)(C), he was in fact sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(A)—making his crimes covered

15   offenses. He also claims that this judicial factfinding violated his Sixth Amendment right to have

16   facts found by a jury. These arguments confuse two distinct aspects of the criminal process:

17   making a finding regarding the elements necessary for conviction under a certain statute, and

18   thereby determining what statutory sentencing range applies, and engaging in factfinding to make

19   a Guidelines calculation. While the Sixth Amendment requires the former finding be made by a

20   jury, the latter remains within the discretion of the sentencing judge. See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S.

21   160, 163–64 (2009) (noting that while the Sixth Amendment requires that juries “determin[e]

22   whether the prosecution has proved each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt,” judges

23   may engage in judicial factfinding to select sentences within the statutory ranges). Here, a jury

                                                       5
 1   found Benjamin guilty of the elements necessary for conviction under § 841(a)(1) and § 846

 2   without regard to drug quantity such that § 841(b)(1)(C) provided the statutory sentencing range.

 3   The district court’s calculation of the drug quantity at sentencing was relevant only to its

 4   calculation of Benjamin’s Guidelines sentencing range, a factor properly considered in deciding

 5   Benjamin’s ultimate sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A). But the district court’s factfinding

 6   did not alter the statutory sentencing range so as to transform Benjamin’s counts of conviction

 7   from crimes subject to § 841(b)(1)(C) penalties to ones subject to § 841(b)(1)(A)’s higher

 8   penalties. Nor did it violate his Sixth Amendment right to have the elements of the offense

 9   determined by a jury.          Furthermore, the district judge’s decision to impose the sentences

10   consecutively, which took Benjamin’s total sentence outside the statutory maximum authorized by

11   § 841(b)(1)(C), was likewise within the district court’s discretion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584; Ice, 555

12   U.S. at 163 (noting judges’ typically “unfettered discretion” to determine “whether sentences for

13   discrete offenses shall be served consecutively or concurrently”); United States v. McLean, 287

14   F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that courts may impose consecutive sentences for multiple

15   crimes exceeding maximum penalty for one crime).

16            Lastly, Benjamin’s argument that the exclusion of defendants sentenced under §

17   841(b)(1)(C) from First Step Act relief violates the Equal Protection Clause fails because Benjamin

18   has not carried his burden of negating “every conceivable basis which might support” that

19   exclusion. 2 Winston v. City of Syracuse, 887 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Lehnhausen

20   v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).

21                                      *                           *                          *

     2
       Benjamin does not argue that there is a fundamental right to sentence reduction or that the distinction between crack
     and cocaine offenders convicted of different subsections of § 841 implicates a suspect class. Therefore, rational basis
     review applies. See Winston v. City of Syracuse, 887 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 2018).

                                                               6
1   For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

2                                       FOR THE COURT:
3                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
4

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