Court Opinion

ID: 9568718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:06:54.961345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:01:42.583700
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
(dissenting).
In my opinion neither the district court nor this court has the right to settle the controversy between plaintiff and the board of county commissioners.
Article IV, sec. 1, of the Montana Constitution divides the powers of government into executive, legislative and judicial departments, and provides that “no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.” The exception clause has no application here because there is no other constitutional provision bearing upon the question here presented.
R. C. M. 1947, see. 16-1006, confers jurisdiction and power upon the board of county commissioners to provide suitable rooms for county purposes when there are no necessary county *113buildings. It has authority to erect and furnish a court house and such other public buildings as may be necessary. R. C. M. 1947, sec. 16-1008.
Likewise the law fixes the number and compenastion of deputy county officers (R. C. M. 1947, secs. 25-602, 25-603, 16-3706), but authorizes the county commissioners “to fix and determine the number of deputy county officers and allow to the several county officers a greater or less number of deputies or assistants than the maximum number allowed by law, when in the judgment of the board of county commissioners such greater or less number of deputies is or is not needed for the faithful and prompt discharge of the duties of any county office”. R. C. M. 1947, sec. 25-604.
Courts have no right to substitute their discretion for the discretion reposed in officers or boards by legislative acts. State ex rel. Highway Commission v. District Court, 107 Mont. 126, 81 Pac. (2d) 347; State ex rel. Bowler v. Board of County Com’rs, 106 Mont. 251, 76 Pac. (2d) 648; State ex rel. North American Life Ins. Co. v. District Court, 97 Mont. 523, 37 Pac. (2d) 329, and cases therein cited.
The rule applicable was appropriately stated in Carbon County v. Draper, 84 Mont. 413, 276 Pac. 667, 669, as follows: “Having power to act (section 4465 [Rev. Codes of 1921 R. C. M. 1947, sec. 16-1001], supra,) the hoard had jurisdiction to decide, and, if it decided wrongly and error was committed in so doing, it did not usurp an unconferred jurisdiction. In other words, the authority to examine, settle, and allow in no manner depends on the nature of the decision to be rendered. The power to hear and determine necessarily carries with it the power which makes the determination binding, without reference to the question of whether it be right or wrong. If this were not so, the findings and conclusions of the board on matters which it has authority to decide would be of no value. There must be a time when controversies end, and, when the authority is expressly conferred upon the board, as here, the determination, even though erroneous, ought not to be assailed. ’ ’
*114Since we have no statute prescribing what space a county officer must have, that question, like that of the number of deputies, rests in the discretion of the board of county commissioners.
If the majority opinion in this case is right, then it opens a Pandora’s box of litigation that heretofore has been locked by the Constitution. If that opinion is right, then when the governor acts upon an application for a pardon under R. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-9801, his action is subject to review by this court; and if this court thinks the board of prison commissioners has abused its discretion in ruling upon an application for pardon, the court may substitute its judgment for that of the board. Yet this is clearly contrary to the general rule. 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, sec. 157, p. 497.
Under R. C. M. 1947, sec. 82-1127, it is the duty of the board of examiners as the board of supplies and furnishing board ‘ ‘ To hire all offices for the state officers, and to furnish the same”. If the majority opinion in this case is correct, then any state officer who is dissatisfied with the office and furnishings provided for him by the board may come to us in quest of a better office and furnishings.
Under R. C. M. 1947, sec. 82-1145, the board of examiners may employ clerical help for any state officer or board when necessary. If the majority opinion is correct, then any state officer or board, dissatisfied with the amount of clerical help provided, may rush to the courts for relief. These and countless other illustrations might be given where we will be asked to substitute our discretion for that of the particular officer or board vested with jurisdiction and power over a certain subject matter on the charge that there has been an abuse of discretion.
The general rule which I think has application to the question here presented is stated in 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, sec. 145, p. 484, as follows: “Questions which the legislature under its constitutional power has submitted for decision to administrative officers in the performance of purely administrative functions have been held not to be matters for judicial considera*115tion. ’ ’ The same rule applies to functions intrusted to the executive department generally. 16 C. J. S., p. 432. And see to the same effect Shelley v. Normile, 109 Mont. 117, 94 Pac. (2d) 206.
Mandamus will lie to compel a board to perform a ministerial act about which it has no discretion; but it does not lie unless there is a clear duty not involving discretion. McCarten v. Sanderson, 111 Mont. 407, 109 Pac. (2d) 1108, 132 A. L. R. 1229; State ex rel. State Pub. Co. v. Smith, 23 Mont. 44, 57 Pac. 449. It takes more than difference of opinion to make for an abuse of discretion. Fulmer v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 96 Mont. 22, 28 Pac. (2d) 849; Grant v. Michaels, 94 Mont. 452, 23 Pac. (2d) 266.
Eelatrix under the law is not without a remedy. She in legal effect asserts that the county commissioners refuse to perform the official duties pertaining to their office. R. C. M. 1947, see. 94-5516, makes any officer subject to removal from office who “has wilfully refused or neglected to perform the official duties pertaining to his office”. This is also provided for in E. C. M. 1947, sec. 94-4708.
If the board has been guilty of an abuse of discretion not amounting to a neglect to perform its official duties, then the remedy of relatrix is to be attained at the polls. In other words they are accountable under their oaths to the people only, just as are the individual members of this court. As was said in State ex rel. State Publishing Co. v. Smith, supra [23 Mont. 44, 57 Pac. 451] : “If they have acted arbitrarily, if they have chosen to pervert the functions of their high offices to vile, partisan uses, or to the purposes of favoritism, as is suggested by the allegations in the affidavit [complaint in the instant case], we have no power to restore their consciences, and bring them to a sense of their duty. The forum in which they are to be judged is the minds and consciences of the people, whose servants they are, and who alone can hold them responsible for the manner in which they perform their duties.”
It may well be that the right of the courts to step in when executive and legislative officers abuse their discretion or act *116arbitrarily or capriciously would promote good government. But if so, the Constitution should be amended so as to permit the judicial department to take over in such a case. It might also promote better government if a tribunal were provided to which resort might be had in those rare cases where it is claimed that this court has abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously, but this too would require a constitutional amendment.
I think the judgment should be reversed and the proceeding dismissed.
MR. JUSTICE ANDERSON, concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Angstman.