Court Opinion

ID: 9390653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 05:07:47.877137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.992340
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

FUAD NASSER ALMASWARI,                                                UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      April 27, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                     No. 360612
                                                                      Wayne Circuit Court
GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY                                      LC No. 20-014676-NF
and BOLT EXPRESS, LLC,

               Defendants,

and

MARY KATHERINE LYCHUK,

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and SWARTZLE and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff was driving his vehicle on the highway when he rear-ended Mary Lychuk’s
vehicle. Lychuk argued that plaintiff was negligent in rear-ending her vehicle and that she was
entitled to summary disposition. The trial court denied Lychuk’s motion for summary disposition
because it was too soon to decide whether plaintiff was comparatively at fault. We reverse.

         On December 5, 2019, a semitruck unexpectedly swerved in front of defendant and came
to a complete halt on the highway. Lychuk was able to stop and did not hit the semitruck. Plaintiff
testified during his deposition that he saw the semitruck cross into his lane, in front of Lychuk, but
it was too late for him to stop before colliding with Lychuk. Plaintiff suffered injuries to his knee
from the collision, and he sued Lychuk for negligently operating her vehicle. Further, plaintiff
argued that Lychuk created a sudden emergency by completely stopping her vehicle. Lychuk
argued that no reasonable juror could conclude that plaintiff was not comparatively at fault for the
collision, and she moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court denied
Lychuk’s motion, and it held that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether
plaintiff was faced with a sudden emergency.

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       Lychuk now appeals with leave granted. Almaswari v Great American Ins Co, unpublished
order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 14, 2022 (Docket No. 360612).

        “We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition.” Sherman v City of St Joseph, 332 Mich App 626, 632; 957 NW2d 838 (2020)
(cleaned up). This Court reviews a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “by considering the
pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Patrick v Turkelson, 322 Mich App 595, 605; 913 NW2d 369 (2018).
“Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sherman, 332 Mich App at 632.

        The No-Fault Act, MCL 500.3101 et seq, was amended on June 1, 2019, and the collision
occurred after the amendment. The No-Fault Act states, in relevant part, that “[d]amages must be
assessed on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a
party who is more than 50% at fault.” MCL 500.3135(2)(b). A defendant is entitled to summary
disposition where no reasonable juror could find that the plaintiff was more at fault than the
defendant. See Huggins v Scripter, 469 Mich 898, 898; 669 NW2d 813 (2003).

        MCL 257.402(a) creates a rebuttable presumption that a driver who rear-ends another
driver, who was lawfully on a highway, is prima facie negligent. This presumption may be
rebutted “by showing the existence of a sudden emergency.” White v Taylor Distrib Co, 482 Mich
136, 139; 753 NW2d 591 (2008). “The sudden-emergency doctrine applies when a collision is
shown to have occurred as the result of a sudden emergency not of the [party’s] own making.” Id.
at 139-140 (cleaned up). “[A] sudden emergency sufficient to remove the statutory presumption
must be totally unexpected.” Id. at 140 (cleaned up).

        In this case, plaintiff testified that he saw the semitruck swerve into the parties’ lane and
come to a complete stop. Lychuk was able to stop before colliding with the semitruck, while
plaintiff was not able to stop before colliding with Lychuk. Under MCL 257.402(a), plaintiff is
presumptively negligent for the collision. Further, given that plaintiff testified that he saw the
semitruck swerve into the lane, it is not unexpected that Lychuk would have to stop her vehicle to
prevent herself from colliding with the semitruck. Thus, there was not a sudden emergency
because Lychuk’s stopping was expected. Given these facts, there is no genuine issue of material
fact that plaintiff was more than 50% at fault in causing the collision. Under MCL 500.3135(2)(b),
plaintiff cannot prevail against Lychuk, and the trial court erred by not granting Lychuk summary
disposition.

       Reversed. We do not retain jurisdiction. Lychuk, as the prevailing party, may tax costs
under MCR 7.219.

                                                              /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                              /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                              /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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