Court Opinion

ID: 9746145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:02:46.36157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:41.472340
License: Public Domain

*1187FROEHLICH, J., Concurring.
I concur in the disposition made by the majority, and also in the majority’s recitation of the factual and procedural background of the case, as well as its analysis of the law. I write separately because I believe the majority has focused on the wrong issue in coming to its conclusion and has based its decision on an inappropriate ground.
Appellant and petitioner sought reversal of the trial court’s judgment on either or both of the alternative grounds (1) that false evidence had been introduced in the trial which was substantially material on the issue of guilt (see Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)); and (2) that the prosecution had suppressed or withheld exculpatory evidence (citing Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194]). The majority, at page 1174 of its opinion, concludes that Brady error was made by reason of the withholding of exculpatory evidence and determines “on that ground” to reverse the conviction.
As detailed in the majority opinion, all activity by the district attorney or Attorney General which might be characterized as withholding or suppressing evidence took place after the trial had been completed and the defendant sentenced. The only impact upon Garcia’s rights which might have been caused by the failure to advise of flaws in the expert testimony was (1) with respect to the stipulated dismissal of Garcia’s appeal (which at that time had been approved by our court) or (2) the creation of a ground for the appeal.
The stipulated dismissal was set aside and the appeal reinstated.1 Whatever potential existed for prejudice to Garcia because of entering into an imprudent agreement to dismiss his appeal was, therefore, remedied. As for the appeal, by the time it was ready for our review the information concerning the flawed expert testimony had been fully revealed. There was, therefore, no prejudice to Garcia in terms of his presentation of the appeal.
In other words, the temporary suppression or withholding of exculpatory evidence as a matter of fact has had no prejudicial effect whatever on Garcia’s case. I agree that it was necessary for us to review in some detail the facts of the suppression, since a particularly egregious violation of the defendant’s due process rights might have given rise to the sanction of complete dismissal. (Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742, 760 [157 Cal.Rptr. 658, 598 P.2d 818].) However, the majority accepts the referee’s finding that the failure to alert defense counsel to the expert’s *1188shortcomings was unintentional and therefore concludes that such failure would not justify complete dismissal of the case. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1182.) Since, therefore, no permanent harm was done to Garcia’s case by the temporary lapse of disclosure, and no punitive measures need be taken against the district attorney or the Attorney General, there is no practical effect resulting from our finding of withholding of evidence. It certainly should not be grounds for reversing the judgment.
As the majority points out, however, principally in the course of its discussion of the prejudicial effect of the flawed expert testimony, there are good grounds for reversal. Convincing evidence produced in connection with the habeas corpus petition established that the expert’s testimony of speed was inaccurate. His conclusion that Garcia’s speed was between 55 and 65 miles per hour cannot be supported. As the majority concludes, this was key testimony which we must assume influenced the jury in reaching its verdict. This was “newly discovered and credible evidence which undermine[d] the entire case of the prosecution” (In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 417 [179 Cal.Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690]) and hence warrants a reversal and new trial. I therefore agree that the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded on the ground of discovery of new evidence (the inaccuracy of the speed expert’s testimony) which casts grave doubt upon the verdict.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied August 31, 1993, and respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 24, 1993.

It is interesting to note that this action was taken by our court before receipt of the referee’s report, and was not based on any finding of withholding of evidence from the defense. Our ground for setting the dismissal aside was our discovery that the stipulation had not been executed by the defendant.