Court Opinion

ID: 9654733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:49:01.380031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:12.976127
License: Public Domain

W. O. MURRY, Chief Justice ing).
(dissent-
I do not concur in the opinion of the majority.
There can be no doubt but that the allegations of plaintiffs’ petition presented a real emergency existing in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas, due to the drought and the scant flow of water in the Rio Grande River, upon which so many people are dependent for water, not only for irrigation but also for domestic, municipal, industrial and other purposes.
The trial court first met this emergency by the granting of a temporary restraining order under the provisions of Rule 680, T.R.C.P., which could continue in force for a period of only ten days, unless renewed for a like period or extended by agreement of the parties, as is provided in said Rule 680. The court proceeded with a hearing upon the application for a temporary injunction, as is contemplated by the provisions of said Rule 680, but after hearing testimony for several days granted the temporary injunction herein appealed from by appellants.
The trial court by his findings shows that he did not determine the correlative rights of the various parties to this suit to divert water from the Rio Grande, but stated that this could only be done upon a hearing of the merits of the case. The court seems to base his temporary injunction upon a voluntary proration agreement entered into by some of the parties to this suit, which the court found was not binding upon the parties and was never intended to have any effect upon their various rights to divert water from the Rio Grande.
The record shows that many of the parties to the suit have been engaged in diverting water from the Rio Grande for many years and have valuable property rights in the beneficial use of the waters of the Rio Grande. Some of these rights are riparian rights, and some are non-ripariari rights, based upon prescription arising from a long-time use of such waters. All of these rights are valuable property rights and some are undoubtedly prior to others, but the trial court did not take sufficient time to determine these property rights and their priorities before issuing a temporary injunction.
The trial court, by the provisions of its order, first seizes all water of Texas flowing in the Rio Grande below Rio Grande City, pendente lite, to be administered in trust for all riparian owners and other water users entitled to share in the reasonable use of such waters, under orders of the court, with due respect to priorities as prescribed by lam. In order to administer such trust, O. E. Van Berg was appointed Master in Chancery, pendente lite, charged with the duty, among other things, of enforcing all rules and regulations as prescribed by the court. The court further provided that both plaintiffs and defendants shall be permitted to use and are limited to the use, except as otherwise set out, of waters of the normal flow of the Rio Grande in the proportion which the acreages for which they customarily divert water from the normal flow of the Rio Grande shall bear to 'the whole number of acres in the Counties of Cameron and Hidalgo for which such waters are customarily diverted. The Master is charged with the duty of seeing that each smaller user is accorded reasonable use of the waters of the Rio Grande, with priorities established by law.
The court then ordered the issuance of a temporary injunction directing all plaintiffs and defendants to cease and desist from diverting said waters, otherwise than in compliance with and according to the rules and regulations which are hereby, or which hereafter shall be prescribed by this court.
This injunction greatly disturbed, rather than preserved, the status quo. In the first place, it undertakes to appoint a river *302master to control the use of the Texas share of the water flowing in the Rio Grande. This is unquestionably a delegation of judicial power. There is no legislation in this State authorizing such a procedure. Many of the states have such provisions, but in the absence of legislation authorizing such action a court has no authority to appoint such an administrator with judicial powers. Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641; Seagraves v. Green, 116 Tex. 220, 288 S.W. 417; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Wilson, 56 S.W. 429; Board of Water Engineers v. McKnight, 111 Tex. 82, 229 S.W. 301.
Next the order places all diverters of water from the Rio Grande on an equal footing and allows them a reasonable use of the water, subject to priorities prescribed by law, whether they be riparian, users, appropriators, or whether they assert a prescriptive right to such use. It does not attempt to state what are the priorities prescribed by law, nor what is a reasonable use. The reasonable use of water does not apply between riparian users and appropriators. Miller & Lux v. Madera, 155 Cal. 59, 99 P. 502, 22 L.R.A.,N.S., 391. The record is also clear that it permits riparian water to be taken away from riparian users and turned over to non-riparian users. A prescriptive user of water never has priority over a riparian user, especially where the prescriptive user is down stream from the riparian user. Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W. 458; Mud Creek Irrigation Agr. & Mfg. Co. v. Vivian, 74 Tex. 170, 11 S.W. 1078; Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733, 70 L.R.A. 964; Miller v. Madera, 155 Cal. 59, 99 P. 502.
I am further of the opinion that this order is void for uncertainty. It is clear that the proportion of the water of the Rio Grande belonging to Texas cannot be accurately determined. It is only guessed at by the court and the amount changes from time to time and day to day. The parties are allowed to make a reasonable use of the water, without any definition of what is a reasonable use. It is undetermined who has the prior right to the water, but the parties are required to respect priorities. As above indicated, the only practical way such an order could possibly be enforced would be for the Master, Van Berg, to become a virtual dictator and arbitrarily permit each party to use a certain amount of water and for the court to punish every one who violates s.ucli orders, irrespective of what his legal rights might be. No court, in the absence of statutory authority, has a right to appoint such an administrator with such arbitrary authority. If the court could not determine the rights of the parties as to the use of the riparian water flowing in the Rio Grande, then how is the Master going to determine such right, except in an arbitrary manner, and how else is he going to determine priorities? Board of Water Engineers v. McKnight, 111 Tex. 82, 229 S.W. 301.
An injunction must be sufficiently certain and definite in its provisions so that a party may know, from the injunction itself, exactly what he is prohibited from doing, and so that a court can determine when such injunction has been violated. Rule 683, T.R.C.P. This must be determined from a reading of the injunction itself, and not by referring to other instruments such as rules and regulations prescribed and to be prescribed. Rule 683, supra. ■
It occurs to me that it is impossible to determine the correlative rights of riparian users from a common stream without having before the court all of such users. I doubt the right of the court to determine the correlative rights of riparian users of water of only a certain arbitrary section of a stream, such as from the western boundary of Hidalgo County to the mouth of the Rio Grande, when there are other riparian users on other sections of the same stream. Such relative rights can only be determined when all such users of the entire stream on the Texas side are made parties to the suit. But, aside from this, the amount of available water, according to the court’s order, is to be determined by the Government gauge near Rio Grande City, but no attempt is made to bring into the suit riparian users down stream from this gauge who operate in Starr County. *303The users in Hidalgo and Cameron Counties were ordered to cease and desist from using such water other than as they were permitted to do so under rules and regulations prescribed and to be prescribed by the court, while the users in Starr County were left free to divert water from such common stream, after it had been measured at Rio Grande City, without any restraint whatever.
The temporary injunction in this case being one which is mandatory in its nature and one which disturbs the status quo, could properly be issued only after a hearing at which the correlative rights of the parties, together with their priorities, had been determined. Ward County Water Imp. Dist. 2 v. Ward County, etc., Tex. Civ.App., 214 S.W. 490; James v. E. Weinstein & Sons, Tex.Com.App., 12 S. W.2d 959; Marrs v. R. R. Commission, 142 Tex. 293, 177 S.W.2d 941; 24 Tex. Jur. 121, §§ 86 and 88.
Further, I have serious doubt that this suit can be maintained as a class action. Plaintiffs below attempted to bring this suit as a class action and they attempted to represent many necessary parties who were users of water from the Rio Grande, based upon what must necessarily be different claims — some as riparian users and some as non-riparian users. Plaintiffs were water districts not shown to have any riparian right to use water from the Rio Grande. It would seem that under such circumstances there would necessarily have to be a conflict of interest between plaintiffs and the other parties they undertook to represent as a class. Under such circumstances a class suit cannot be maintained. McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 5 S.Ct. 652, 28 L.Ed. 1015; Knioum v. Slattery, Tex.Civ.App., 239 S.W.2d 865; Rule 42, T.R.C.P.; Giordano v. Radio Corp. of America, 3 Cir., 183 F.2d 558; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 8 Cir., 168 F.2d 182; Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Emp. and Moving Picture Mach. Operators of U. S. and Canada, 9 Cir., 183 F.2d 685.
I think the temporary injunction in this case might well have been refused, because its enforcement will - require continuous judicial supervision and a hearing on each violation thereof. 24 Tex.Jur. 127, § 89.
For the above reasons and others which I shall not attempt to set forth here, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.