Court Opinion

ID: 9475761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:37:08.949811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:54.615068
License: Public Domain

BORK, Circuit Judge:
Appellants, the Haitian Refugee Center (“HRC” or “Center”) and two of its members brought this action to challenge the United States’ program of interdicting on the high seas vessels carrying undocumented aliens attempting to enter the United States. Such aliens are returned to the country from which they came. Appellants seek declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm because we conclude that appellants lack standing to sue. Though the Center has alleged sufficient injury, neither the HRC nor its members have established the causation required by separation of powers principles for article III standing. In addition, we hold that the Supreme Court’s prudential rules preclude appellants’ attempts to assert the legal rights and interest of the interdicted Haitians.1
I.
On September 29, 1981, “having found that the entry of undocumented aliens, arriving at the borders of the United States from the high seas, is detrimental to the interests of the United States,” the President proclaimed that: “The entry of undocumented aliens from the high seas is hereby suspended and shall be prevented by the interdiction of certain vessels carrying such aliens.” Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 app. at 993 (1982).
On the same date, the President issued an executive order directing the Secretary of State to enter into “co-operative arrangements with appropriate foreign governments for the purpose of preventing illegal migration to the United States by sea.” Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed.Reg. 48,109 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 app. at 992-93 (1982). On September 23, 1981, the United States and Haiti entered into such an arrangement. See Interdiction Agreement, Sept. 23, 1981, United States-Haiti, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241. Under the agreement, Haiti authorized United States authorities to board Haitian flag vessels on the high seas and make certain inquiries regarding the condition and destination of such vessels and the status of those on board. If a violation of United States law or an appropriate Haitian law is discovered, the vessel and the persons aboard may be returned to Haiti. The *797United States agreed to the presence of a representative of the Haitian Navy aboard any United States vessel engaged in the interdiction program. The agreement also provides that it is “understood that the United States, having regard for its international obligations pertaining to refugees, does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants the United States determines qualify for refugee status.” Finally, the Government of Haiti agreed that all Haitians returned to the country who are not traffickers in illegal migration will not be subject to prosecution for illegal departure.
The Executive Order directed the Secretary of Transportation to order the Coast Guard to interdict “any defined vessel carrying [undocumented] aliens.” The de-' fined vessels include vessels from foreign nations with which the United States has arrangements authorizing it to board such vessels. The Secretary of Transportation was also ordered to direct the Coast Guard “[t]o return the vessel and its passengers to the country from which it came, when there is reason to believe that an offense is being committed against the United States immigration laws, or appropriate laws of a foreign country with which we have an arrangement to assist.” Though the Coast Guard was to carry on the interdiction program only outside the territorial waters of the United States, the Executive Order provides that “no person who is a refugee will be returned without his consent” and that the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Transportation, shall take appropriate steps "to ensure the fair enforcement of our laws relating to immigration ... and the strict observance of our international obligations concerning those who genuinely flee persecution in their homeland.”
To implement the arrangement with Haiti, INS officials were assigned to the Coast Guard vessels engaged in the interdiction program. The INS developed unpublished, informal guidelines setting forth the procedures to be followed during interdiction operations. See INS Role in and Guidelines for Interdiction at Sea, Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 55-57. The guidelines provide that if it is deemed safe and practicable by the commanding Coast Guard officer, each person aboard the interdicted vessel shall be interviewed to determine his or her name, nationality, documentation and reasons for leaving Haiti. The INS official is directed to be “watchful for any indication (including bare claims)” that a passenger may qualify for refugee status. If the official finds such an indication, an additional individual interview is held. If the interviewee indicates that he has a bona fide claim to refugee status, then the individual must be taken to the United States to present his claim.
The interdiction program began in October, 1981. Since then, over 78 vessels carrying more than 1800 Haitians have been interdicted. The government states that it has interviewed all interdicted Haitians and none has presented a bona fide claim to refugee status. Accordingly, to date all interdictees have been returned to Haiti.
II.
Appellants sought two forms of relief: (1) an injunction permanently enjoining the Coast Guard and the INS from continuing the interdiction program, and (2) a judgment declaring the interdiction program illegal. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Complaint”) at 20, J.A. at 23. The complaint contains four counts. Count I asserts that the interdiction program violates the rights of the interdicted Haitians under the Refugee Act of 1980 (“Refugee Act”), Pub.L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). Complaint at 13-15, J.A. at 16-18. Count II states that the actions of “interdicting, detaining, and forcibly returning” the interdictees to Haiti “were taken by the defendants in excess of their constitutional and statutory authority,” and that these actions were taken “in violation of standards of due process defined by Congress in the Refugee Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act and therefore without *798due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.” Complaint at 15-16, J.A. at 18-19. Count III alleges that the interdiction program violates the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Declaration”). See Complaint at 16-18, J.A. at 19-21. Count IV asserts that the interdiction program violates the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Haiti, 34 Stat. 2858, and the extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3181 et seq. (1982). See Complaint at 18-19, J.A. at 21-22.
The government defendants moved to dismiss “on the grounds that [the district court] lack[ed] jurisdiction over the subject matter, that the case is not justiciable under the ‘political question’ doctrine, that plaintiffs lack standing, and that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” J.A. at 26. The court granted the motion on the last ground, specifically rejecting the contention that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F.Supp. 1396, 1401-03 (D.D.C.1985).
On the merits, the district court determined at the outset that the President possesses statutory and constitutional authority to conduct the interdiction program, citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a)(1) (1982) and the President’s inherent constitutional power over immigration. 600 F.Supp. at 1399-1400. The court then held that the Refugee Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act provide no grounds for relief because “those acts only establish procedures guaranteed to aliens within the United States.” Id. at 1404. The court dismissed plaintiffs’ due process claim, concluding that “the interdicted Haitians have no Fifth Amendment rights.” Id. at 1405. Nor did the court find any grounds for relief in the Protocol or the Declaration since the former is not self-executing and the latter is merely a nonbinding resolution. Id. at 1405-06. Finally, the district court concluded that the extradition treaty and statute provide relief only to Haitians in the United States. Id. at 1406.
Appellants appeal the dismissal of their complaint, renewing the claims they put forward below. The government seeks affirmance on several alternate grounds: (1) that the appellants lack standing, (2) that the claims present nonjusticiable “political questions,” or (3) that the district court correctly determined that the President possesses sufficient statutory and constitutional authority to conduct the interdiction program and that the program violates none of the laws cited by the appellants.
III.
It should be said at the outset that the law of standing remains uncertain and unsettled in some of its major branches. This opinion attempts to discern and apply themes that underlie the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions in this field. It may be that the doctrine enunciated creates discontinuities with older precedent or with other aspects of standing law. The resolution of such discontinuities, if such there be, is not a task for this court, however. The Supreme Court appears to be in the process of reworking the concept of standing and what it has done so far requires, or at least counsels, the result here reached.
Whether appellants satisfy the constitutional requirements for standing to challenge the interdiction program is considered first. Appellants’ ability to meet the prudential standing requirements is considered separately below.
To satisfy article Ill’s “case” or “controversy” requirement, a litigant must “ ‘show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant’ and that the injury ‘fairly can be traced to the challenged action’ and ‘is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (footnote and citations omitted). There are, therefore, three ele*799mente to article III standing. The first is an injury of the sort which the law will recognize. The other two are stated as varieties of causation: that the injury was not only caused by the action challenged but can be alleviated by that action’s cessation.
A.
1. The HRC has alleged an injury of the sort that satisfies article III. Its complaint alleges that the HRC’s “purpose, as set forth in its by-laws, is to promote the well-being of Haitian refugees through appropriate programs and activities, including legal representation of Haitian refugees, education regarding legal and civil rights, orientation, acculturation, and social and referral services.” Complaint at 10, J.A. at 13. The complaint also alleges that “[t]he HRC has been directly injured by the interdiction program in that its organizational purpose has been thwarted.” Complaint at 15, J.A. at 18. In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982), the Supreme Court held such allegations sufficient to establish injury in fact. In Havens, Housing Opportunities Made Equal (“HOME”), an organization operating a housing counseling service, sued Havens Realty Corp. for allegedly engaging in racial steering practices in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982). HOME alleged that it " 'has been frustrated by defendants’ racial steering practices in its efforts to assist equal access to housing through counseling and other referral services’ ” and that it “ ‘has had to devote significant resources to identify and counteract the defendant’s [sic] racially discriminatory steering practices.’ ” 455 U.S. at 379, 102 S.Ct. at 1124. The Court considered such injury to the organization’s activities, along with “the consequent drain on the organization’s resources,” to be “concrete and demonstrable” and “far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.” Id. Havens thus indicates that the HRC has alleged article III injury.2
The same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to appellants Edouard Franck and Carlo Dorsainville, two individual members of the HRC. They challenge the interdiction program on the same grounds, and *800seek the same relief, as the HRC.3 The individual appellants allege that their “associational rights ... have been injured [by the interdiction program].” Complaint at 15, J.A. at 18. This allegation, in the absence of any substantive first amendment claim, is insufficient to establish the requisite injury.
In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972), the Supreme Court considered, and rejected, the claim that the government’s refusal to permit Ernest E. Mandel, a well-known advocate of economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world communism, to enter the United States was a violation of the first amendment rights of United States citizens who invited Mandel to speak at universities and other forums in the United States. Though the Court’s opinion does not discuss standing, and so does not constitute a precedent, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119, 104 S.Ct. 900, 918, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), it may be assumed that the plaintiffs’ allegation that the exclusion “prevented] [the Americans] from hearing and meeting with Mandel in person for discussions,” 408 U.S. at 760, 92 S.Ct. at 2580, satisfied the article III requirement of a distinct and palpable, not abstract or conjectural or hypothetical, injury, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3325, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984).
2. The individual appellants’ alleged injury in this case is of a far different character. Appellants do not assert that they have been deprived of an opportunity to meet with a particular alien concerning a particular subject, or, for that matter, that they know, or even know of, any of the interdicted Haitians with whom they wish to associate. Rather, their claim is merely that they have been deprived of an opportunity to associate with some number of a class of unidentified aliens seeking to enter the country. In this regard, appellants' alleged injury is no different from that of any American who would enjoy meeting unidentified aliens of a particular nationality denied entry to the United States. It is unclear whether an injury so generalized and unspecific is adequate for standing purposes. The point need not be decided, however, for the individual appellants' alleged injury is insufficient for another reason.
These appellants, rather curiously, do not make a substantive claim that the interdiction program violates their first amendment rights. Instead, the complaint recites interference with HRC members’ “associational rights” only to establish injury. Appellants’ counsel confirmed this at oral argument. When asked whether appellants’ complaint contains a first amendment claim, he first replied “no” and then explained: “We argue an associational right as part of the basis for answering the claim that we lack standing.” Standing “often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). This therefore is a complaint in which a right of association is recited as a basis for standing but no aspect of the interdiction program is alleged to violate the first amendment. A party cannot have standing on the basis of a legal right he does not claim is violated.
B.
Assuming therefore that the Center has established injury in fact, neither the HRC nor its members can establish the second and third article III requirements— that their alleged injuries fairly can be traced to the interdiction program and are likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
*801The “traceability” and “redressability” requirements are closely related. See Von Aulock v. Smith, 720 F.2d 176, 180 (D.C.Cir.1983). “To the extent that there is a difference, it is that the former examines the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury, whereas the latter examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 753 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. at 3326 n. 19. Though the concepts of traceability and redressability may differ in some respects, they are alike in focusing on the question of causation. As will be shown, “causation” in this context is something of a term of art, taking into account not merely an estimate of effects but also considerations related to the constitutional separation of powers as that concept defines the proper role of courts in the American governmental structure.
When the Supreme Court has granted standing to a litigant who claims injury to his ability to act together with a third party not before the court, the litigant typically has challenged a statute that produced injury by placing him under a legal prohibition against engaging in conduct together with the third party. This legal prohibition causes an injury to the litigant sufficient to confer standing apart from any prediction about the third party’s actions. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194-95, 97 S.Ct. 451, 455-56, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (vendor granted standing to challenge statute prohibiting sale of beer to minor male customers without requirement of showing that these customers would buy absent statute); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188, 93 S.Ct. 739, 745, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) (physicians granted standing to challenge abortion statute without requirement of showing that patients would request abortions absent statute). In this case, however, the interdiction program has not legally prohibited the HRC from contacting or counseling Haitian refugees.
In the absence of a legal prohibition on his relationship with a third party, the litigant may establish article III causation only if the governmental action he complains of has purposefully interfered with that relationship. Without a purposeful interference, by statute or by executive action, the litigant would lack article III standing no matter how copious a factual showing of causation he might make. With a purposeful interference, the litigant may obtain standing if he is able to meet the high standard of “substantial probability” that his injury from that interference be traceable and redressable by the court. In this case, the interdiction program is not aimed at preventing Haitian refugees from dealing with the HRC. The prevention of that relationship is merely an unintended side effect of the program. Accordingly, the HRC lacks article III standing to challenge the interdiction program.
This conclusion and the conceptual framework for article III causation follow directly from the separation of powers principle central to the analysis of article III in the Supreme Court’s cases. No decision of the Supreme Court has been found that goes so far as to find article III caustion for injury to a litigant's relationship to a third party in the absence of a statute or executive action aimed at deterring the litigant from participating in the relationship.4 *802Rather, when a litigant not under a legal prohibition complains even of a directly intended impact from governmental action, the Supreme Court’s decisions make it clear that a finding of causation is extremely unlikely if the causal chain involves a prediction about the independent actions of third parties.5 For instance, in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), petitioners — persons with low and moderate incomes unable to afford housing in the town of Penfield— sought to challenge a Penfield zoning ordinance allocating 98% of the town’s vacant land to single-family detached housing. Petitioners alleged that “enforcement of the ordinance against third parties — developers, builders, and the like — has had the consequence of precluding the construction of housing suitable to their needs at prices they might be able to afford.” Id. at 504, 95 S.Ct. at 2208. At the outset, the Court described petitioners’ obligation under article III: “to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants’ actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm.” Id. at 505, 95 S.Ct. at 2208.
The Court found the requisite causation lacking:
Here, by their own admission, realization of petitioners’ desire to live in Pen-field always has depended on the efforts and willingness of third parties to build low-and moderate-cost housing____ But the record is devoid of any indication that [the actual attempts by builders to construct moderate-cost housing in Pen-field], or other like projects, would have satisfied petitioners’ needs at prices they could afford, or that, were the court to remove the obstructions attributable to respondents, such relief would benefit petitioners.
422 U.S. at 505-06, 95 S.Ct. at 2208-09. It appears — at a minimum — that to establish causation petitioners would have had to point to record evidence indicating that builders had submitted proposals for planned housing that, if permitted to be built, “would be adequate, and of sufficiently low cost, to meet these petitioners’ needs.” Id. at 505 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. at 2208 n. 15. Absent such evidence, “the remote possibility ... that [petitioners’] situation might have been better had respondents acted otherwise, and might improve were the court to afford relief,” id. at 507, 95 S.Ct. at 2209, could not support petitioners’ standing.
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), provides an additional example. There, indigents who were denied admission to various hospitals were denied standing to challenge an IRS revenue ruling that replaced a previous ruling they claimed was required by the Internal Revenue Code. The rulings defined the circumstances under which a nonprofit hospital qualifies for favorable tax treatment as a “charitable” corporation. Under the old ruling, a hospital “ ‘must be operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for the services rendered’ ” and must not “ ‘refuse to accept patients in need of hospital care who cannot pay for such services.’ ” Id. at 30, 96 S.Ct. at 1920 (quoting Rev.Rul. 56-185). Under the new ruling, a hospital qualified as a charitable corporation if it “ ‘operates a full time emergency room and no one requiring emergency care is denied treatment,’ ” even though it “ ‘otherwise ordinarily limits admissions to those who can pay the cost of their hospitalization.’ ” Id. *803at 31, 96 S.Ct. at 1921 (quoting Rev.Rul. 69-545).
The indigents alleged that the new ruling “encouraged” hospitals to deny non-emergency room services to indigents, the “implicit corollary” of which was that a grant of the “requested relief, resulting in a requirement that all hospitals serve indigents as a condition to favorable tax treatment, would ‘discourage’ hospitals from denying their services to” indigents. 426 U.S. at 42, 96 S.Ct. at 1926. The Court found it “purely speculative” whether “the denial of access to hospital services in fact results from [the IRS’s] new Ruling, or [whether] a court-ordered return to their previous policy would result in these [indigents’] receiving the hospital services they desire,” id., since the alleged injury “results from the independent action of some third party not before the court,” id., and “it is just as plausible that the hospitals to which respondents may apply for service would elect to forgo favorable tax treatment to avoid the undetermined financial drain of an increase in the level of uncompensated services.” Id. at 43, 96 S.Ct. at 1926.6
It seems clear that the Supreme Court’s decisions about causation rest upon something more than mere estimates of probabilities. If Warth and Simon were viewed as pure analyses of causation, as that term is ordinarily used, those decisions would not be entirely persuasive. In Warth, the zoning ordinance challenged was designed precisely to prevent construction of the kind of housing petitioners wanted, which suggests rather strongly that, but for the ordinance, some would have been built. It seems highly probable, moreover, that builders will build what is demanded. In Simon, it seems implausible that the denial of favorable tax treatment would not have caused some hospitals to alter their practices in order to qualify. The entire theory of the IRS rulings is that they will modify behavior. Both cases, however, indicate that the causation analysis of challenges to governmental action was influenced by considerations related to the separation of powers. Thus, Warth begins by stating the principles of standing relevant to petitioners’ claims and notes “concern about the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a democratic society.” 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. at 2205. Simon refers to the “assigned role in our system” of the federal courts. 426 U.S. at 39, 96 S.Ct. at 1924. These observations would not be relevant if the inquiry was merely one as to statistical probability.
That the separation of powers heavily influences the causation component of standing doctrine is made even clearer by *804Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). In that case, the mother of an illegitimate child sued on behalf of herself, her child, and others similarly situated to enjoin the district attorney’s failure to prosecute the fathers of illegitimate children under a statute making criminal a parent’s failure to provide support for his or her minor children. Texas courts construed the statute to apply only to the parents of legitimate children, and Linda R.S., an unwed mother, claimed that failure to prosecute the father of her child was a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Though the Supreme Court found that the mother was injured by the father’s failure to provide support, it concluded that the necessary causal relationship was lacking. “The prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative.” Id. at 618, 93 S.Ct. at 1149. But, as the dissenting opinion emphasized, the mother had sued not only for herself and her minor daughter but on behalf of all other women and minor children who sought support. The dissent found the conclusion that the effect of coercive sanctions was “at best, ... only speculative,” a “very odd statement.”
I had always thought our civilization has assumed that the threat of penal sanctions had something more than a “speculative” effect on a person’s conduct. This Court has long acted on that assumption in demanding that criminal laws be plainly and explicitly worded so that people will know what they mean and be in a position to conform their conduct to the mandates of law. Certainly Texas does not share the Court’s surprisingly novel view. It assumes that criminal sanctions are useful in coercing fathers to fulfill their support obligations to their legitimate children.
Id. at 621, 93 S.Ct. at 1150 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent was surely right in its view of causation viewed as a matter of predicting human responses to law enforcement. If the statute was deemed effective to force the fathers of legitimate children to pay support, no reason appears why it would not also be effective with respect to the fathers of illegitimate children. The majority surely understood, moreover, that its “speculativeness” argument, if taken literally, would eliminate the idea of deterrence as a support for any criminal sanctions. But the majority’s rationale did not ultimately rest on causation taken as a mechanical question. The last paragraph of the majority opinion makes that clear:
The Court’s prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. Although these cases arose in a somewhat different context, they demonstrate that, in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another. Appellant does have an interest in the support of her child. But given the special status of criminal prosecutions in our system, we hold that appellant has made an insufficient showing of a direct nexus between the vindication of her interest and the enforcement of the State’s criminal laws.
Id. at 619, 93 S.Ct. at 1149 (citations omitted). The refusal of courts to interfere with prosecutorial discretion is, as many cases state or intimate, an aspect of the separation of powers. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3100, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480, 482 n. 9 (D.C.Cir.1967); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.1965) (en banc); see also Nathan v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1069, 1077-79 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (summarizing authorities). Causation analysis therefore must be informed by separation of powers concerns.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s more recent statement that the entire concept of article III standing rests on separation of powers, a statement made in the course of explaining the *805“traceability” and “redressability” requirements:
These terms cannot be defined so as to make application of the constitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise.
The absence of precise definitions, however, as this Court’s extensive body of case law on standing illustrates, hardly leaves courts at sea in applying the law of standing____ In many cases the standing question can be answered chiefly by comparing the allegations of the particular complaint to those made in prior standing cases. More important, the law of Art. Ill standing is built on a single basic idea — the idea of separation of powers. It is this fact which makes possible the gradual clarification of the law through judicial application.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751-52, 104 S.Ct. at 3325 (citations omitted). Standing doctrine, and in particular the causation aspect of that doctrine, is thus properly understood as designed to confine federal courts to their “properly limited” function.7 That is probably the reason for the heavy presumption that causation is too speculative if injury or redress depends upon the independent action of a third party not before the court, a presumption that in the absence of a legal prohibition can be overcome only by both a demonstration that the purpose of the law or governmental action was to prevent the relationship between the litigant and the third party and a convincing demonstration of “substantial probability that the third party would otherwise have entered into the alleged relationship with the litigant.8 This doctrine implements separation of powers because it is necessary to prevent the virtually limitless spread of judicial authority. “Given the complexity and interdependence of our society and governmental policies, it will often be possible to allege with some plausibility that a change in a governmental policy is likely to cause other persons or institutions to modify their behavior in ways beneficial to the plaintiff. If such allegations were routinely accepted as sufficient to confer standing, courts would be thrust into a far larger role of judging governmental policies than is presently the case, or than seems desirable.” Northwest Airlines v. FAA, 795 F.2d 195, 204 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1986); see also Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 881, 881 (1983) (standing doctrine “crucial and inseparable element” of separation of powers principle, whose disregard will inevitably produce “overjudicialization of the processes of self-governance”).
That this is in fact the Supreme Court’s ultimate rationale for the line it has drawn is apparent from the reasons given by Justice O’Connor for rejecting a conclusion of causation in Allen v. Wright:
That conclusion would pave the way generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal
*806obligations. Such suits, even when premised on allegations of several instances of violations of law, are rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication.
“Carried to its logical end, [respondents’] approach would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action; such a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its committees and the ‘power of the purse’; it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful governmental action.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. [1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 2326, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972)].
468 U.S. at 759-60, 104 S.Ct. at 3329. These concerns
counsel[ ] against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution, after all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3.
Id. at 761, 104 S.Ct. at 3330. It is for this reason that Allen v. Wright stressed that “the standing inquiry must be answered by reference to the Art. Ill notion that federal courts may exercise power only ‘in the last resort, and as a necessity, Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 [12 S.Ct. 400, 402, 36 L.Ed. 176] (1892), and only when adjudication is ‘consistent with a system of separated powers ...,’ Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 [88 S.Ct. 1942, 1951, 20 L.Ed.2d 947] (1968).” 468 U.S. at 752, 104 S.Ct. at 3325.
Conclusions about causation are thus at least as much a matter of constitutional principle as they are estimates of probabilities. With that in mind, as well as Allen v. Wright’s instruction to compare the allegations here with those made in prior standing cases, it is necessary next to consider whether appellants have established the requisite causation.
The injury claimed by the Center is its inability to counsel and represent the interdicted Haitians. The injury asserted by the individuals is denial of association. “[T]he question [is] whether [the injuries asserted by the HRC and its members] reasonably can be said to have resulted, in any concretely demonstrable way, from [appellees’] alleged constitutional and statutory infractions.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 504, 95 S.Ct. at 2208. The presumption is that they cannot since appellants complain of no legal disability imposed on them. Their injuries, and the capacity of an injunction to redress those injuries, instead depend upon a prediction about the independent action of a third party not before the court — i.e., whether, absent the interdiction program, at least one Haitian refugee would agree to be counseled or represented by the HRC and at least one would consent to associate with the individual appellants. If statistics were all, it would seem rather farfetched to deny the heavy probability that this would occur. That probability may be enhanced by the HRC’s allegation that it “has been recognized by the INS as a source of legal counsel for indigent Haitians,” Complaint at 10, J.A. at 13, and by an affidavit of the Center’s executive director stating that “[t]he programs and activities of the [HRC] include legal representation of Haitians (many times at the request of the immigration authorities).” Affidavit of Father Gerard Jean-Juste at H 2, Record Document No. 7, Attachment 1, at 2. Nonetheless, these factors appear not to be sufficient to confer standing. Even assuming, as we must, that INS officials previously have referred Haitians to the Center for counseling, there is no indication that such referrals will be made in the future or were made pursuant to an ongoing, official INS policy. The Supreme Court, albeit in a somewhat different context, has held that past official conduct, not taken pursuant to an official policy, provides no basis for standing to seek prospective injunctive re*807lief. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1666-67, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372, 96 S.Ct. 598, 604, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976).
Moreover, as has been noted, the Supreme Court’s cases demonstrate that statistical probabilities are neither the only nor the primary source of article III standing. Under these cases, appellants’ showing of causation fails. The allegations that, absent the interdiction program, some Haitian refugees would have dealt with appellants in the past or would do so in the future is just as “speculative” as was causation in Linda R.S., Warth, and Simon9 Even the existence of an official INS referral policy would not appear sufficient to establish the requisite causation because there remains the fact that the interdiction program was not designed to interfere with HRC’s counseling of Haitian refugees.10 Like the challenge to IRS policies in Allen v. Wright, the challenge here to the interdiction program is brought by persons who suffered no “direct harm,” 468 U.S. at 761, 104 S.Ct. at 3330, but were only adventitiously affected by the challenged action. Thus, as in Allen v. Wright, a court could not recognize appellants’ standing in this case, regardless of the factual showing they might have made, “without running afoul of [the] structural principle [of separation of powers].” Id. (footnote omitted).
Appellants therefore have failed to establish the requisite causation. But because the Supreme Court has never said explicitly that the separation of powers concept leads it to deny causation where it otherwise might be found if it were a purely factual question, it is appropriate also to examine the prudential principles that bear on appellants’ standing.
IV.
In addition to the article III minima, [standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. at 3324. These prudential requirements bear a “close relationship to the policies reflected in the Art. Ill requirement's],” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475, 102 S.Ct. at 760, and thus help “to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
Appellants’ failure to satisfy the first and third of these prudential requirements provides an additional reason why appellants lack standing to challenge the interdiction program. We first consider the HRC’s attempt to assert the legal rights and interests of third parties and then turn to the zone of interests requirement.
*808A.
With one arguable exception,11 appellants’ challenge relies exclusively on the alleged legal rights and interests of the interdicted Haitians under U.S. statutes, the U.S. Constitution and international agreements. See supra pp. 797-98. In the usual case, reliance on the rights of others contravenes the Supreme Court’s first prudential principle “that ‘the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’ ” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474, 102 S.Ct. at 760 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. at 2205). In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has concluded that, in certain circumstances, a litigant may be given standing to assert particular legal rights of third parties.
A litigant may be “allowed [third party] standing to litigate the rights of third parties when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation of third parties’ rights.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 510, 95 S.Ct. at 2211. If the government has directly interfered with the litigant’s ability to engage in conduct together with the third party, for example, by putting the litigant under a legal disability with criminal penalties, and if a statute or the Constitution grants the third party a right to engage in that conduct with the litigant, the litigant has standing to challenge the government’s interference by invoking the third party’s rights. See, e.g., Secretary of State of Maryland v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-58, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2846-48, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (fundraiser had standing to challenge statute imposing criminal penalty on charitable fundraisers for contracts granting them commissions greater than statutory cap by invoking client charities’ first amendment rights); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-97, 97 S.Ct. 451, 454-57, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (vendor had standing to challenge statute imposing criminal penalty on vendors for sale of beer to males under 21 or to females under 18 by invoking males’ equal protection rights); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89, 93 S.Ct. 739, 745-46, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) (physicians had standing to challenge statute imposing criminal penalty on physicians for performance of certain abortions by invoking patients’ privacy rights).
By granting a litigant standing to invoke a third party’s rights, “the Court has found, in effect, that the constitutional or statutory provision in question implies a right of action in the [litigant].” Warth, 422 U.S. at 500-01, 95 S.Ct. at 2206.12 J.H. Munson Co. further supports this explana*809tion. After identifying the reasons behind the prudential ban on third party standing, the Court stated: “Within the context of the First Amendment, the Court has enunciated ... concerns that justify a lessening of prudential limitations on standing.” 467 U.S. at 956, 104 S.Ct. at 2847 (emphasis added). The Court noted that “[t]he activity sought to be protected is at the heart of the business relationship between Munson and its clients, and Munson’s interests in challenging the statute are completely consistent with the First Amendment interests of the charities it represents.” Id. at 958, 104 S.Ct. at 2848. It was the danger that the restriction on fundraisers would chill the charities’ free speech that justified the fundraisers’ standing to assert the charities’ first amendment rights. Third party standing may be proper for first amendment claims, because at least some of the rights secured by the first amendment protect the ability of persons to engage in activity with one another.
Third party standing therefore is appropriate only when the third party's rights protect that party’s relationship with the litigant. Thus, a litigant may not be given third party standing to assert constitutional rights of third parties that do not protect a relationship, such as procedural due process rights. A litigant therefore could never have standing to challenge a statute solely on the ground that it failed to provide due process to third parties not before the court.
The Supreme Court’s rejection of litigants’ attempts to raise the fourth amendment rights of third parties further illustrates this limit. In United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980), evidence of a foreign bank account was obtained by the IRS through an illegal search of a briefcase owned by defendant’s banker. The Supreme Court held that the evidence could be used because the defendant “lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from [his banker].” Id. at 731-32, 100 S.Ct. at 2444. Since the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, devised as a deterrent for police misconduct, does not protect interaction between the litigant and a third party, see Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 277, 305 n. 149 (1984), a litigant may not base his standing on the third party’s fourth amendment right.
Similarly, in California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974), a bankers’ association, a bank, and bank depositors sought to challenge on fourth amendment grounds a regulation obligating financial institutions to report all currency transactions of their customers over $10,000. After denying first party standing to the litigants, the Court said, “[n]or do we think that the [bankers’ association] or the [bank] can vicariously assert such Fourth Amendment claims on behalf of bank customers in general.” Id. at 69, 94 S.Ct. at 1521. This is crucial because among the general customers were undoubtedly many that did engage in transactions required to be reported. That they would engage in such transactions with the banks was certainly as predictable as the interactions in Bolton, Craig, and J.H. Munson Co., cited above. The only explanation for California Bankers’ denial of third party standing, then, is that the fourth amendment provides no protection for the interaction between a depositor and his bank.
Applying the principles established by the Supreme Court’s cases to the case at bar, we find two reasons why appellants lack third party standing to assert the rights and interests of the interdicted Haitians. First, appellants have not made the independent showing required for recognition of third party standing to raise the non-constitutional rights of third parties, because none of the laws that the interdiction program is alleged to violate are substantive protections of a relationship between Haitian aliens and appellants (or anyone else). The program is alleged primarily to violate such Haitians’ procedural rights. Second, even if Haitians could claim a substantive right to consult with appellants, the interdiction program was *810not designed to interfere with that consultation. These reasons merit a further word.
It is significant that the typical Supreme Court case recognizing third party standing involves a challenge to a statute that interferes with the litigant’s protected relationship with third parties. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976), a case without a majority rationale, nevertheless does not break this pattern, nor does the plurality view support appellants’ standing here. In that case, physicians who regularly performed abortions for low-income women sued to enjoin the operation of a statute prohibiting the payment of Medicaid benefits to doctors for performing abortions that were not “medically indicated.” Justice Blackmun, joined by three other members of the Court, allowed the physicians to assert the rights of their patients because denial of payment would interfere with women’s abortion decisions. Justice Powell, also writing for three other Justices, thought the absence of a direct interference with the relationship of the physicians with their patients precluded third party standing. The decisive vote was cast by Justice Stevens, who found third party standing only because the physicians had first party standing. There was thus no majority rationale concerning the physicians’ ability to assert the rights of their patients. It is worth noting, moreover, that even Justice Blackmun’s Singleton approach provides no basis for finding third party standing on the part of either the HRC or its members. According to the plurality’s approach, the statute challenged in Singleton was specifically intended to burden the third-party patients’ relationship with their physicians. By contrast, the interdiction program was not intended to prevent the interdicted Haitians from dealing with appellants. The interference with that relationship is an unintended side effect of a program with other purposes. As shown above, allowing standing for unintended side effects of programs would involve the court in the continual supervision of more governmental activities than separation of powers concerns should permit. Should there be any doubt that this is a factor in article III analysis, it certainly appears relevant to the prudential limits to standing.
There is a second reason why appellants lack third party standing in this case: the statutes appellants seek to enforce were not intended to give them a right of action on behalf of the interdicted Haitians. As in the case of constitutional guarantees, a statute may grant the litigant a right of action amounting to third party standing. As the Supreme Court has explained:
Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules____ [S]o long as [the art. Ill requirement] is satisfied, persons to whom Congress has granted a right of action, either expressly or by clear implication, may have standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest in support of their claim.
Worth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206. Thus, whether a federal statute confers third party standing upon a particular litigant depends on the intent of Congress. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-56, 104 S.Ct. 831, 838-50, 78 L.Ed.2d 645 (1984) (“In evaluating [whether a federal statute implies a private right of action], our focus must be on the intent of Congress when it enacted the statute in question.”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1838, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982) (same); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 2066, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981) (same); accord Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2485, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979) (“The question of the existence of a statutory cause of action is, of course, one of statutory construction.”). In this case, appellants have pointed to no evidence that Congress, in adopting the Refugee Act, the IN A, and the other laws invoked by appellants, intended to grant appellants rights of action to seek relief on *811the basis of the interdicted Haitians’ legal rights and interests under these laws.
This court’s decision in FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C.Cir.1985), does not alter our conclusion that appellants lack third party standing. In FAIC Securities, deposit brokers sued to enjoin the implementation of regulations, promulgated pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and the National Housing Act, which would have changed existing federal insurance coverage of deposits in a way that effectively put deposit brokers out of business. The court found that the brokers had third party standing to assert the legal rights and interests of their depositors, that the depositors’ interests fell within the relevant zones of interests, and that, therefore, the brokers had standing to challenge the regulations. The opinion states: “we feel constrained to follow the holdings in Craig and Carey [v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977) ], which base standing upon the vendor-vendee relationship alone.” 768 F.2d at 360-61. The FAIC Securities court, however, did not cite or discuss the Supreme Court’s decisions in Payner and California Bankers Association. In those cases, analyzed above, the Court held that the same vendor-vendee relationship was insufficient to confer third party standing.13
B.
The zone of interests test requires “that the plaintiff’s complaint fall within ‘the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.’ ” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475, 102 S.Ct. at 760 (quoting Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)). This requirement applies whether the litigant is asserting his own legal rights and interests, those of third parties, or both. If the litigant asserts only his own legal rights, then he must establish that his interest falls within the relevant zones of interests.14 If the litigant asserts only the rights of third parties, then he may satisfy the zone of interests requirement by reference to the third parties’ interests if the *812court determines both that the litigant has third party standing and that the third parties’ interests fall within the relevant zone of interests. See FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C.Cir.1985). Thus, if appellants had established third party standing, and the interdicted Haitians’ interests fell within the relevant zones of interests (a question we do not consider), then the zone of interests requirement would present no barrier to appellants’ standing to assert the legal rights and interests of the interdicted Haitians.15 If the litigant asserts both his own rights and those of third parties, then he must satisfy the zone of interests test with respect to both his own interests and those of the third parties whose rights he has standing to assert.
Though we read appellants’ complaint to assert only the legal rights and interests of the interdicted Haitians under the Refugee Act, the INA, the Protocol, the Declaration, the due process clause, and the extradition treaty and statute, the point is not crucial. Even if appellants alleged that the interdiction program also violates their own legal rights under these laws, appellants would lack standing to assert such rights since we conclude that appellants’ interests do not fall within the zones of interests of these laws.
Despite some initial confusion, it is now the settled law of this circuit that “the ‘zone’ test is supposed to focus on ‘the interest asserted by a party in the particular instance.’ ” American Friends Service Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 52 (D.C.Cir.1983) (quoting Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283, 293-94 (D.C.Cir.1981)). Indeed, it has been almost ten years since this court originally identified, and dispelled, confusion on this topic:
We are aware of the confusion surrounding the meaning of which interests are relevant to the zone test. Essentially, the confusion surrounds what exactly has to fall within the relevant zone: 1) the parties themselves; 2) the interests of the parties in general; or 3) the particular interest the parties are asserting in the litigation. It seems clear to us that the particular interests are the relevant interests in the context of an application of the zone standard.
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 142 n. 76 (D.C.Cir.1977) (citation omitted).
Thus, to satisfy the zone of interests requirement, appellants must establish that their particular interests alleged to have been injured by the interdiction program fall within the respective zones of interests intended to be protected or regulated by the Refugee Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the fifth amendment, the Protocol, the Declaration, the extradition treaty, and the extradition statute.
The particular interest the HRC is asserting in this litigation is its interest in counseling and representing the interdicted Haitians; the members’ interest is in associating with the interdicted Haitians. It is these interests that appellants agree are injured by the interdiction program. See Complaint at 10, 15, J.A. at 13, 18.
Our cases establish “the appropriate test to be ... whether the complaining party has stated an interest which is arguable from the face of the statute.” Tax Analysts, 566 F.2d at 142. The one exception to this general approach is when “the legislative history contain[s] clear evidence of *813an intent either to allow the appellant’s interests as a basis for standing or to deny standing to a party in this position.” Id. at 143 n. 80. The provision of the Refugee Act that the interdiction program is said to violate provides:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien’s status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). It is not immediately apparent from this language that the zone of interests Congress intended the Refugee Act to protect or regulate includes an organization’s interest in representing, and its members’ interests in associating with, Haitian refugees. Rather, on its face, the statute appears to regulate or protect only the interest of aliens in applying for asylum.
Our recent decision in Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931 (D.C.Cir.1986), does not change this preliminary conclusion. There, “organizations that endeavor, through informational, counseling, referral, and other services, to improve the lives of elderly citizens,” id. at 935, challenged certain HHS regulations that made their endeavor more difficult. Though primarily focusing on injury in fact and causation, the court’s opinion contains a paragraph on zone of interests:
In addition, the interests at stake in this case satisfy the prudential standing requirement. The appellants claim that the challenged features of the HHS-specific regulations make it more difficult for the organizations to assist elderly persons to know, enjoy, and protect their rights under the [Age Discrimination Act]. Such interests as promotion of the knowledge, enjoyment, and protection of the rights created by a statute are securely within the “zone of interests” protected by that statute.
Id. at 939 (citations omitted). We have no reason to question the court’s conclusion that organizations’ interests in assisting the elderly to understand and assert their rights under the ADA fall within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the ADA. If, however, Action Alliance were read to mean that the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by every statute necessarily includes an organization’s (or, there being no reason to distinguish, an individual’s) interest in promoting the rights created by that statute, that dictum would not merely conflict with settled law but would render the entire concept of a zone of interest a nullity. If any person or organization interested in promoting knowledge, enjoyment, and protection of the rights created by a statute or by a constitutional provision has an interest that falls within the zone protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional provision, then the zone-of-interest test is not a test because it excludes nothing. Indeed, such a reading would mean that this court ignores the Supreme Court’s decisions that persons who have only a “generalized grievance” about the way in which government operates do not have standing. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm, to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974). That is why Action Alliance must be read to be compatible with the numerous decisions of this court making clear that, “in applying the zone test a court must discern whether the interest asserted by a party in the particular instance is one intended by Congress to be protected or regulated by the statute under which suit is brought.” Control Data Corp. v. Baldrige, 655 F.2d 283, 293-94 (D.C.Cir.1981) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See American Friends Service Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29, 50 (D.C.Cir.1983); Capital Legal Found, v. Com modity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 259 (D.C.Cir.1983) (Ginsburg, J.); see also Copper & Brass Fabricators Council v. De partment of the Treasury, 679 F.2d 951, 952-53 (D.C.Cir.1982); id. at 953 (Ginsburg, *814J., concurring in the result) (“our recent decision in Control Data Corp____ prescribes the manner in which the ‘zone of interests’ test is to be applied in this Circuit”). Thus, we must determine whether the HRC’s interest in counseling, and its members’ interests in associating with, the interdicted Haitians are interests intended to be protected or regulated by the Refugee Act and the other laws under which the interdiction program is challenged.
We have already concluded that nothing on the face of the Refugee Act indicates a congressional intent to protect or regulate the interests asserted by appellants. The legislative history of the Act, however, does contain evidence that some members of Congress were aware of the interests of “voluntary resettlement agencies” like the HRC and that Congress recognized that United States policy toward refugees has an impact on those interests. For example, the House Report states: “Refugee resettlement in this country has traditionally been carried out by private voluntary resettlement agencies____ The Committee recognizes that the efforts of these agencies are vital to successful refugee resettlement.” H.R.Rep. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1979). Senator Kennedy, speaking in favor of the Senate bill, observed that one consequence of the proposed legislation would be to save the volunteer agencies money since they would be “better able to plan and prepare for refugee arrivals. They are [now] plagued by the uncertain, ad hoc character of the current program.” 125 Cong.Rec. 23,233 (1979). Representative Holtzman, a House sponsor of the bill, also recognized that the legislation would have a beneficial impact on the interests of volunteer agencies: “If this legislation is enacted, for the first time there will be some predictability to our Government’s response to refugee problems that exist around the world. The Congress, the executive_ branch, and the voluntary agencies will, as a result, be able to engage in long-term planning____” Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).
These remarks make it arguable that the interests of volunteer organizations are within the zone of interests protected by the Refugee Act16 and that the interdiction program adversely affected HRC’s interest. The Act could hardly improve predictability if actions taken offshore prevented the Act from being applied as intended. There is, on the other hand, a counterargument described in Tax Analysts & Advocates:
Every [statute] generates consequences and various forms of impact on a wide range of valid interests held by a diverse range of parties____ But the concepts of consequence and impact are not the proper guideposts to define the relevant zone of interests
We cannot define the zone of interests as being the equivalent in every case of the “zone of impact” or the “zone of consequences.”
566 F.2d at 144 (emphasis in original).
The situation here is analogous to one in which members of Congress, during consideration of a bail reform statute, remark that clarification would enable lawyers to plan their courtroom strategies with more certainty. No one would suppose that such remarks brought lawyers within the zone of interests regulated or protected by the statute so that lawyers themselves would have standing. But we need not decide *815whether the HRC’s interest in providing volunteer services falls within the Act’s zone of interests or merely within the “zone of consequences” given our conclusion that the HRC has not established the requisite causation. It is clear, however, that nothing in the Act or its legislative history indicates that the individual appellants’ interests in association with aliens comes within the zones of interests to be protected or regulated.
We next consider whether appellants’ interests fall within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the INA and conclude that they do not. The deportation provision provides in pertinent part:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an alien described in section 1251(a)(19) of this Title) to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982). On its face, this language evinces no intent to protect or regulate the HRC’s interest in counseling, or its members’ interests in associating with, interdicted Haitians. Appellants also point to the provisions of the INA establishing procedures for the exclusion of aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1982). But again, those provisions cannot be read fairly to protect or regulate the interests asserted by appellants in this case.
The provision of the INA regarding the right to counsel is subject to the same analysis. The provision states:
In any exclusion or deportation proceedings before a special inquiry officer and in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such exclusion or deportation proceedings, the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.
8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982). The zone of interests of this provision, like the others, does not appear to protect or regulate the individual appellants’ interest in associating with Haitian refugees in general. While the provision creates a right of representation for aliens to be represented in exclusion or deportation proceedings, it seems impossible that the interest of the HRC in being the representative is also within the provision’s zone of interests. If that were so, any lawyer who wished to represent aliens, but who had no client, would, so far as the zone of interests test is concerned, have standing to enforce this provision. Neither party has pointed to anything in the legislative history of the INA to clarify these matters further.
We need spend little time examining whether appellants’ interests fall within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the fifth amendment. Since the complaint simply equates due process with the procedural protections of the Refugee Act and the INA, see Complaint at 16, J.A. at 19, our findings concerning the zones of interests protected or regulated by those statutes require the same conclusion concerning the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the fifth amendment, as invoked by appellants in this case.
Nor need we be detained by the Protocol, a treaty signed by the United States in 1968. Article 33 of that document provides:
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.
19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. The district court held that the Protocol was not self-executing, but had been partially executed through the Refugee Act. We need not decide the point, however, because the result is not relevant to appellants’ standing in this case. If the Protocol is self-executing, its language makes plain that it was not intended to regulate or protect the interests asserted by appellants. If, on the other hand, the Protocol is not self-execu*816ting and has been partially executed through the Refugee Act, we have already considered separately whether appellants’ interests fall within the zone of interests of that enactment.
The complaint alleges that the interdiction program also runs afoul of the United States’ Extradition Treaty with Haiti, 34 Stat. 2858, and the extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3181 et seq. (1982). We have examined both of these laws and think it sufficient to say that there is absolutely no indication that either was intended to protect or regulate the interests asserted by appellants in this case.17
It is plain that the interests asserted by the individual appellants in this case do not fall within the zones of interests to be protected or regulated by the laws under which they seek to challenge the interdiction program. Appellant HRC’s interests also do not fall within the zone of interest of any provision cited.
V.
Though the HRC alleged injury in fact, neither the Center nor its members established the requisite causation. Had the Center established causation, it might have had standing to challenge the interdiction program as ultra vires the President’s statutory and constitutional authority. In no case, however, could the Center be given standing to assert the legal rights and interests of the interdicted Haitians under the laws listed in the complaint since the due process clause does not protect Haitians’ interaction with appellants and the other laws fail to grant the Center private rights of action to assert such rights. Moreover, appellants lack standing to assert rights they themselves might claim under the laws listed in the complaint since their interests fall outside the zones of interests of those laws.
The district court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss is hereby

Affirmed.

. The judgment of this court is that the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Since the only rationale for reaching that result upon which two members of the court agree is that expressed in Part III A 2, concluding that the individual appellants lack article III standing, and Part IV of this opinion, concluding that all appellants lack prudential standing, these parts are the opinion of the court.

. At least one circuit has held that an organization must prove a drain on its resources in order to "come within the Havens formula.” See Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 203 (5th Cir.1984), aff’d, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Though the HRC did not allege a drain on its resources, our cases apparently have not required such allegations to find injury in fact. See, e.g., Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 937-38 (D.C.Cir.1986). But, contrary to the assertion in Judge Edwards’ concurrence, the HRC may not allege the drain on its resources from conducting this litigation as injury in fact. This position, which would enable every litigant automatically to create injury in fact by filing a lawsuit, has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court: Article III injury does not arise from "an injury that is only a by-product of the suit itself’ but “requires an injury with a nexus to the substantive character of the statute or regulation at issue.” Diamond v. Charles, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 1707-08, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (emphasis added) (litigant’s liability for attorney’s fees not article III injury).
Though the HRC's alleged injury thus appears to meet the article III requirement under Havens, the injury nonetheless may be a "generalized grievance” insufficient to support the Center’s standing under the "prudential principles that bear on the question of standing.” See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75, 102 S.Ct. at 759-60. The Court did not consider this question in Havens since it held that the statute under which suit was brought conferred standing to the full limits of article III and thus precluded application of the prudential barriers. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 372, 102 S.Ct. at 1120. It is well established that a bare assertion that the government is engaging in illegal or unconstitutional activity does not allege injury sufficient to confer standing. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 489 n. 26, 102 S.Ct. at 768 n. 26. In addition, it is doubtful that simply alleging an intention to engage in counseling that would be impaired by such activity could suffice to overcome an otherwise applicable generalized grievance objection since such an allegation could be made by virtually any litigant wishing to evade the generalized grievance limitation. Nevertheless, whether the HRC’s alleged injury is a mere generalized grievance need not be decided since the Court’s cases are less than entirely clear in this area and the discussion of the other standing requirements suffices to deny the Center's standing.

. Whether the HRC possesses standing as the representative of its members under Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) is not considered here, since two HRC members here assert standing in their own right. If they have standing, there is nothing gained by finding that the HRC also has representative standing. If the members do not have standing, then neither would the HRC in its representational capacity. See id. at 343, 97 S.Ct. at 2441.

. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976), is an unusual situation that proves this rule. In Singleton, the Court found that physicians had shown article III injury and causation from a statute that denied them Medicaid reimbursement for abortions they performed. The statute both aimed at preventing the physicians from performing abortions and operated immediately and automatically on the physicians by denying them reimbursement for abortions already performed at the time they sued, obviating any need to base causation on the likelihood of any third party action, such as the patients’ payment to their physicians. Compare Singleton with Diamond v. Charles, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986), where a pediatrician was denied standing to defend the constitutionality of an Illinois law obligating physicians performing abortions to attempt to save the lives of viable fetuses. The statute imposed no legal obligation or intended burden upon Diamond, the pediatrician. The Court, expressly distinguishing Singleton, found that Diamond’s alleged injury — loss of business resulting from contraction of the pool of potential fee-paying *802patients — was based on the speculative independent action of third parties, namely, the possibilities that such fetuses would survive and then find their way as patients to Diamond. Id. 106 S.Ct. at 1705.

. Accord Mideast Systems & China Civil Constr. Saipan Joint Venture v. Model, 792 F.2d 1172, 1178 (D.C.Cir.1986) ("the presence of an independent variable between either the harm and the relief or the harm and the conduct makes causation sufficiently tenuous that standing should be denied’’); Action Alliance, 789 F.2d at 938 (causation and redressability present where "the ultimate relief appellants seek cannot sensibly be viewed as dependent upon the actions of third parties").

. Accord Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). There, parents of black children who were attending public schools undergoing desegregation challenged as unlawful certain IRS guidelines and procedures designed to carry out the IRS policy of denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. The parents alleged that the guidelines and procedures were inadequate since many racially segregated private schools continued to receive tax exemptions. This diminished the plaintiffs’ children's ability to receive an education in racially integrated public schools. The injury was alleged to be traceable to the challenged guidelines, and could be redressed by court order, because the receipt of tax exemptions made contributions to the schools deductible from income, and deductibility " 'facilitate^] the raising of funds to organize new schools and expand existing schools in order to accommodate white students avoiding attendance in desegregating public school districts.’ ” Id. at 746, 104 S.Ct. at 3322.
The Court found the line of causation between the IRS guidelines and desegregation of the children’s schools to be "attenuated at best” since the alleged injury is "highly indirect and 'results from the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ ” 468 U.S. at 757, 104 S.Ct. at 3328 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 42, 96 S.Ct. at 1926). Specifically, the Court observed:
[I]t is entirely speculative ... whether withdrawal of a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to change its policies. It is just as speculative whether any given parent of a child attending such a private school would decide to transfer the child to public school as a result of any changes in educational or financial policy made by the private school once it was threatened with loss of tax-exempt status.
Id. 468 U.S. at 758, 104 S.Ct. at 3329 (citation omitted). It seems highly doubtful that any factual showing by plaintiffs would have sufficed to establish causation for such a "highly indirect” injury.

. The term "separation of powers," it must be understood, is used here as a shorthand for what Warth calls "the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a democratic society," 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. at 2205, a role that includes judicial respect not only for the coordinate branches of the national government but also for the other governmental members of the federal system. (Warth itself, after all, prevented unwarranted judicial interference with the decisions of a local zoning board.)

. Judge Edwards objects to this formulation because he believes it inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. He notes that in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976), a seller of beer did not have to establish that, absent the challenged statute, some males in the category prohibited from purchasing would have bought beer from her. This misunderstands the position taken in this opinion. A past course of conduct, of the sort one would naturally expect to continue but for the law’s intervention, will suffice to show the "substantial probability” article III requires as a factual matter. An established vendor-vendee relationship satisfies that aspect of the test. Many cases in addition to Craig illustrate this point. Indeed, in this case, I note that it is highly likely that Haitian refugees would continue to come to the HRC and I base that judgment of a "substantial probability” on the fact that they are alleged to have done so regularly in the past. See infra pp. 806-807.

. Nor can the redressability requirement be met because the relief sought, if granted, would at least remove an "absolute barrier" to the alleviation of appellants’ alleged injuries. We considered and rejected just this claim in Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Goldschmidt, 627 F.2d 258 (D.C.Cir.1980).

. The suggestion in Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206, that a current affidavit would have cured the causation problem in that case would not appear to apply to the present case. The zoning ordinance challenged in Warth was designed to prevent an economic transaction between builders and home buyers. That suggests that the affidavit requirement related to the high threshold of actual likelihood imposed by the separation of powers principle even in cases of legal disability or purposeful interference. When separation of powers indicate that courts ought not monitor an executive program merely to remedy an adventitious injury, it would be anomalous to permit that constitutional requirement to be overriden by an affidavit.

. Though it is not clear from their complaint, appellants’ claim, that the interdiction program exceeds the President’s statutory and constitutional authority, may assert an alleged legal right of their own — the right not to be injured by ultra vires executive action. See Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C.Cir.1969).

. Viewing third party standing as implied by specific constitutional guarantees readily explains Cheaney v. Indiana, 410 U.S. 991, 93 S.Ct. 1516, 36 L.Ed.2d 189 (1973), a case summarily denying a nonphysician, convicted of performing an abortion, standing to assert his patent's rights. Because the Roe right does not protect nonphysician-patient relationships, there was no basis for third party standing.
This view of third party standing also clarifies the duty of state courts when faced with claims of third party standing. Professor Monaghan rightly suggests that "[i]f no affirmative federal law drives the doctrine, [then] a state court’s refusal to permit such a third party standing challenge [would be] an adequate and independent state ground.” Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 277, 294 (1984) (footnote omitted). If, on the other hand, we are correct that third party standing is implied by substantive constitutional guarantees, then the supremacy clause obligates the state courts to recognize such standing. For example, if a case like Doe v. Bolton arose in state court, we feel confident that the Supreme Court would not readily accept a state court’s holding that, "whatever the rule in the federal courts, our established doctrine is that the physician may assert only his own rights and not the rights of his patients." Id. at 293. Conversely, the Supreme Court may review a case from a state court although standing would have been lacking under the Court’s prudential rules if the case had been brought in a federal district court. See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983); Monaghan, supra, 84 Colum.L.Rev. at 290-92.

. We do not mean to say that the result in FAIC Securities was incorrect. The court’s finding that the brokers satisfied article III standing requirements was sufficient to establish the broker’s standing. Since the brokers were challenging the regulations as ultra vires the FDIA and the NHA, they were not required to establish that the interest they asserted fell within the zones of interests of those statutes. The zone of interests requirement thus was either inapposite or satisfied. See infra note 14. Nor was there any independent need for the brokers to establish third party standing since the legal right they asserted — the right not to be injured by unauthorized agency action — was their own. See Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C.Cir.1969) (holding that helium producers had standing to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from enforcing regulation requiring government contractors to purchase their helium needs from the Secretary — a regulation claimed, and held, to be in excess of statutory authority); cf. Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C.Cir.1981) (litigant held not to have third party standing permitted to challenge as ultra vires copyright of government-commissioned television series).

. Appellants need not, however, show that their interests fall within the zones of interests of the constitutional and statutory powers invoked by the President in order to establish their standing to challenge the interdiction program as ultra vires. Otherwise, a meritorious litigant, injured by ultra vires action, would seldom have standing to sue since the litigant’s interest normally will not fall within the zone of interests of the very statutory or constitutional provision that he claims does not authorize action concerning that interest. For example, were a case like Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952), to arise today, the steel mill owners would not be required to show that their interests fell within the zone of interests of the President’s war powers in order to establish their standing to challenge the seizure of their mills as beyond the scope of those powers.
It may be that a particular constitutional or statutory provision was intended to protect persons like the litigant by limiting the authority conferred. If so, the litigant’s interest may be said to fall within the zone protected by the limitation. Alternatively, it may be that the zone of interests requirement is satisfied because the litigant’s challenge is best understood as a claim that ultra vires governmental action that injures him violates the due process clause.

. Though a litigant who possesses third party standing may be able to satisfy the zone of interests requirement by reference to the interests of third parties, there is no reason to suppose that a litigant who satisfies the zone of interest requirement by reference to his own interest also possesses third party standing. The latter is a separate inquiry. The only litigants who properly may assert the legal rights and interests of third parties are those who fall within one of the exceptions to the rule against third party standing, a subject taken up at Section IV.A., supra. That a litigant's interest falls within the relevant zone of interests is simply irrelevant to that inquiry. On the other hand, the reason that possession of third party standing may assist a litigant to satisfy the zone of interests requirement is because a litigant with such standing may assert the legal rights and interests of third parties and the third parties’ interests may fall within the relevant zones of interests.

. This is insufficient under the Supreme Court’s statement of the rule. Though the Court initially stated the test as whether the plaintiffs interest “arguably” falls within the relevant zone of interests, see Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., 397 U.S. at 153, 90 S.Ct. at 829, its most recent statements of the test consistently omit the term "arguably.” See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 2866 n. 4, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. at 3325; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475, 102 S.Ct. at 760. These omissions must be considered a conscious refinement of the test by the Court.

. We do not consider whether appellants' interests fall within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because it is merely a nonbinding resolution, not a treaty, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. See G.A.Res. 217, 3 U.N.GAOR, U.N.Doc. 1/777 (1948).