Court Opinion

ID: 9416513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:48:13.432633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:29.015815
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY
delivered the opinion of the court.
■ This is' an- action of trespass brought by the defendant in error, against the plaintiff in error, to recover the value of certain property taken by him, in the province of Chihuahua during the late war with Mexico.
It appears that the plaintiff, who is a merchant of New York, and who was born in Spain, but is a naturalized citizen of- the United States, had planned a trading expedition to Santa Fé, New Mexico, and Chihuahua, in the Republic of Mexico, before hostilities commenced; and had set out from Fort Independence, in Missouri, before he had any knowledge of the declaration of war. As soon as the war commenced,"- an expedition was *129prepared under the command of General Kearney, to invade New Mexico; and a detachment'of troops was set forward to stop;the plaintiff and other traders until General Kearney came up, and to prevent them from proceeding in advance of the army.
The trading expedition in, which the plaintiff and the other tra.ders were éngaged, was, at the time they set-out, authorized by the laws of the United States. And when General Kearney, arrived they were permitted to follow, in the rear and to .tradé freely in all such places as might be subdued and occupied by the American arms. The plaintiff and other traders availed themselves of this permission and followed the army to Santa Fe.
Subsequently General Kearney proceeded to California; and the commánd in New Mexico devolved on Colonel Doniphan, who was joined by Colonel Mitchell, who served under him, and against whom tjiis action was brought.
It is unnecessary to follow the movements of the troops» or the traders particularly, because, up to the period at which the trespass is alleged to have been committed at San Elisario, in the province of Chihuahua, it is conceded that no control was exercised .over the property of the plaintiff, that was not perfectly justifiable in a state of war, and no act done by him that had subjected it to seizure or confiscation by the military authorities.
When Colonel Donip'han commenced his march for Chihuahua, the plaintiff and the other traders continued to follow in the rear and. trade' with the inhabitants, as opportunity offered. But after they had entered that province and were about to proceed in an expedition against the city -of that name, distant about 300 miles, the plaintiff determined to proceed no further, and to leave the army. And when this determination was made known to the commander at San Elisario he gave orders to Colonel. Mitchell, the defendant, to compel him to remain with and accompany the troops. Colonel Mitchell executed the order, and .the .plaintiff was forced, against his will, to accompany the American forces with his wagons, mules and goods, in that hazardous expedition.
Shortly before the battle of Sacramento, which was fought on the march to the town of Chihuahua,- Colonel Doniphan, at the request of the plaintiff, gave him permission to leave the army and go to the 'hacienda of a Mexican by the name of Pams, about eight miles distant, with his property. But the plaintiff did not avail himself of this permission ; and apprehended, upon more reflec,-tion, that his property would be in more danger there than with the army; arid that a voluntary acceptance on his part, and *130resuming the possession at his own risk, would deprive him of any remedy for its loss, if it should be taken by the Mexican authorities. , He remained therefore with the troops until they entered the town. His wagons and mules were used in the public service in the battle of Sacramento, and on the march afterwards. And while the town remained in possession of the American forces he endeavored, but without success, to dispose of his góods.When the place was evacuated they were therefore unavoidably left behind, as nearly all of his mules had been lost in the march and the battle. He himself accompanied the army, fearing that his person would not be safe if he remained behind, as he was particularly obnoxious, it seems, to the Mexicans,because he was a native of Spain, and came with a hostile invading army.
When the Mexican authorities regained possession of the place, the goods of-the plaintiff were seized and confiscated, and were totally lost to him. And this action was brcmght against Colonel Mitchell, the defendant, in the court below, to recover the .damages which the plaintiff alleged he had sustained by the arrest and seizure of his property at San Elisario, and taking it from his control and legal possession.
■ This brief - outline is sufficient to show how this case has arisen. The expedition of Colonel Doniphan, and all its incidents, are already historically known, and need not be repeated here.
At the trial in the Circuit Court the verdict and judgment were in favor of -the plaintiff'; and this writ of error has been brought upon, the ground that the instructions to the jury by thev Circuit Court, under which the verdict was found, were erroneous;
' Some of the objections taken in the argument here, on behalf of the defendant, have arisen from'a misconception of the instructions given to the jury. It is supposed that these directions embraced questions of fact as well as of law, and that the court took upon itself the decision of questions arising on the testimony, which it was the exclusive province of. the jury to deter;mine. But this is an erroneous construction of the exception taken at the trial. The passages in -elation to questions of fact are nothing more than the inferences .which in the opinion of the court were fairly deducible from the testimony; and were stated to the jury not to control their decision, but submitted for their consideration in order to aásist them in forming their .judgment. This mode of charging the jury has always prevailed in the State of New York, and has been followed in the Circuit Court ever since the adoption, of the Constitution.
The practice in this respect differs in different States. In some of them the court neither sums up the evidence in a charge to the jury nor expresses an opinion upon a question of fact. Its *131charge is strictly confined to questions of law, leaving the evidence to* be discussed by counsel, and the facts to be decided by the jury without commentary or opinion by the court.
But in most of the States the practice is otherwise; and they have adopted the usages of the English courts of justice, where the judge always sums up the evidence, and points out the conclusions which in his opinion ought to be drawn from it; submitting them, however, to the consideration and judgment of the jury.
It is not necessary to inquire which of these modes of proceeding most, conduces to the purposes of justice. It is suíficiént to say that either of them may be adopted under the laws of Congress. And as it is desirable that the practice in the courts of the United States should conform,' as nearly as practicable, to that of the State in which they are sitting, that mode of proceeding is perhaps to be preferred which, from long established usage and practice, has become the law of the courts of the State. The right of a court bf the United States to express its opinon upon the facts in a charge- to the jury was affirmed by this court in the case of M’Lanahan v. The Universal Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 182, and Games v. Stiles, 14 Pet. 322. Nor can it be objected to upon the ground that the reasoning and opinion of the court upon the evidence may have an undue and improper influence on the minds and judgment of the jury. For an objection of that kind questions their intelligence and independence, qualities which cannot be .brought into doubt without taking from that tribunal the confidence and respect which so -justly belong to it, in questions of fact.
It was in pursuance of this practice, that the proceedings set forth in the exceptions took place. "When the testimony was closed and the questions of law.had been raised and argued by counsel, "the court stated to them the view it proposed to take of the evidence in the charge about to be given. And it is evident, from the statement in the exception, that this was done for the purpose of giving the counsel for the respective parties an opportunity of going before the jury, to combat the inferences'drawn from the testimony by the court, if they, supposed them to be erroneous or open to doubt.
It appears tom the record that the counsel on both sides declined going before the jury, evidently acquiescing in the opinions expressed by the court, and believing that they could not be successfully disputed. And the judge thereupon charged the jury that if they agreed with him- in Ms view of the facts that they would find for the plaintiff, otherwise for the defendant; and Upon this charge the jury found for the plaintiff, and assessed the damages stated in the proceedings. It is mamfest, therefore, that *132the Circuit Court did not, in its instructions, trench upon the province of the jury, and that the jury could not have been misled as to the nature and extent of their own duties and- powers. The decision of the facts was fully and plainly submitted to them. . And their verdict for the plaintiff, upon the charge given to them, affirms the correctness of the views taken by the cour.t; and the opinions upon the evidence as therein stated must now be regarded as facts found by the jury j and as such are not open to controversy in this court.
This statement of the manner in which the case was disposed of in the Circuit Court was necessary to disengage it from objections which do not belong to it, and to show what questions were decided by the court below, and are brought up by this writ of error. We proceed to examine them.
It is admitted that the plaintiff, against his will, was compelled by the defendant to accompany the troops with the property in question when they marched from San Elisario to Chihuahua; and. that he was informed that force would be used if he refused. This was unquestionably a taking of the property, by force, from the possession and control of the plaintiff; and a trespass qn the part of the defendant, unless he can.show legal grounds pf justification.
He justified the seizure on several grounds.
1. That the plaintiff was engaged in trading with the enemy.
2. That he was compelled to remain with the American forces, and, to move with them, to prevent the property from falling into the hands of the enemy.
=3. That the property was taken for public use.
4. That if the defendant was liable for the original taking, he was released from damages for its subsequent loss, by the act of the plaintiff, who had resumed the possession and control of it before' the loss happened.
5. That the defendant acted in obedience to the order of his commanding officer, and therefore is not liable.
. The first objection was. overruled by the court, and we think correctly.
There is no dispute about the facts which relate to this part of the case, nor any contradiction in the testimony. The plaintiff entered the hostile country openly for the purpose of trading, in company with other traders, and under tjhe protection of the American flag. The inhabitants with whom he traded had submitted to the American arms, and the country was in possession of the military authorities of the United States. The trade in which he was engaged, was not only sanctioned by the commander of the American troops, but, as appears by the record, was permitted by the -Executive Department of the government, *133whose policy it was to conciliate, by kindness and commercial- intercourse, the Mexican provinces bordering on the United States, and by that means weaken the power of the hostile government of Mexico, with which we were at war. It was one of the means resorted to to bring the war to a successful conclusion.
It is certainly true, as a general rule, that no citizen can lawfully trade with a public enemy; and if found to be engaged in such illicit traffic his goods are liable to seizure and confiscation. But the rule has no application to a case of this kind; nor can an officer of the United States seize the property of an American citizen, for an act which the constituted authorities, acting within the scope of their lawful powers, have authorized to be done.
Indeed this ground of justification has not been pressed in the argument. The defence has been placed, rather dn rumors which reached the commanding' officer and suspicions which he appears to have entertained of a secret design in the plaintiff to leave the American forces and carry on an illicit trade with the enemy, injurious to the interests of the United States. And if such a design had been "shown, and that he was preparing ta leave the American troops for that purpose, the seizure and detention of his property, to prevent its execution, would have been fully justified. But tiñere is no evidence in the record tending to show that these rumors and suspicions had any foundation. And certainly mere suspicions of an illegal intention will not authorize a military officer to seize and detain the property of an American citizen. The fact that such an intention existed must be shown; and of that there is no evidence.
The 2d and 3d objections will be considered together, as they depend on the same principles., Upon these two grounds of defence the Circuit Court instructed the jury, that the defendant might lawfully take possession of the goods of the plaintiff, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the public enemy; but in order to justify the seizure the danger must be immediate and impending, and not remote or contingent. And that he might also take them for public use and impress them into the public service, in case of an immediate and pressing danger o» urgent necessity existing at the time, but not otherwise.
In the argument of these two points, the circumstances under which the goods of the plaintiff were taken have been much discussed, and the evidence examined for the purpose of showing the nature and character of the danger which actually existed at the' time or was apprehended by the commander of the American forces. But this question is not before us. It is a question of fact, upon which the jury have passed, and their verdict has decided that a danger or necessity, such as the court described, *134did not exist when the property of the plaintiff was taken by the defendant. And the only subject for inquiry in this court is, Whether the law was correctly stated in the instruction of the court; and whether any thing short of an immediate’and impending danger from the public enemy, or an urgent necessity for the public service, can justify the taking of private property by a military commander to prevent it from falling into the hands Of the enemy or for the purpose of converting it to the use of the public.
The instruction is objected to on the ground, that it restricts the power of the officer within narrower limits than the law will justify. And that when the troops' are employed in an expedition into the enemy’s country, where the dangers, that meet them cannot always be foreseen, and where they are cut off from aid from their own government, the commanding officer must necessarily, be intrusted with some discretionary power as to the measures he should adopt'; and if he acts honestly, and to t,ie best of his. judgment, the law will protect him. But it must be remembered that the question here, is not as to the discretion he may exercise in his military operations ór in relation to those who are under his command. His distance from Home, and the duties in which he is engaged, cannot enlarge his power over the property of a citizen, nor give to him, in that respect, any authority which he would not, under similar circumstances, possess at home. And where the owner has done nothing to forfeit his rights, every public officer is bound to respect them', whether he finds the property in a foreign or hostile country, or in his own.
There' are, without doubt, occasions in which private property may lawfully be taken possession of or destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the public enemy; and also where a military officer, charged with a particular duty, may impress private property into the public service or. take it for public use. Unquestionably, in such cases, the go mrnment is bound to make full compensation to the owner; but the officer is riot a trespasser.
But we are clearly of opinion, that in all of these cases the-danger must be immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent for the public service, such as will not admit of delay, and where the action of the civil authority would be too late in providing the means which the occasion calls for. It is impossible to define the particular circumstances of danger or necessity in which this power may be lawfully exercised. Every case must depend on -its own circumstances. It is the emergency that gives the right,, and the emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified.
*135In deciding upon this necessity, however, the state of the facts, as they appeared to the officer at the time he acted, must govern the decision; for he must necessarily act upon the information of others as well as his own observation. And if, with such information as he had .a right to rely upon, there is reasonable ground for believing that the peril is immediate and menacing, or the necessity urgent, he is justified in acting upon it; and the discovery afterwards that it was false or erroneous, will not malfe him a trespasser. But it is not sufficient to show that he exercised an honest judgment, and took the property to promote the public service; he must show by proof the nature and character of the emergency, such' ás he had reasonable grounds to ■ believe it to be, and it is then for a jury to say, whether it was so pressing as not to admit of delay; and the occasion such, according to the information upon which he acted, that private rights must for the time give way to the common arid public good.
But it is not alleged that Colonel Doniphan was deceived by false intelligence as to the movements or strength of the enemy at the time the property was taken. His camp at San Elisario was not threatened. He was well informed upon the state of affairs in his rear, as well as of the dangers before him. And the property was seized, not to defend his position, nor to place his troops in a safer one, nor to anticipate the attack of an approaching enemy, but to insure the success of a distant and ¡hazardous expedition, upon which he was about to march.
The movement upon Chihuahua was undoubtedly pndertaken from high and patriotic motives. It was boldly planned and gallantly executed, and contributed to the successful issue, of the war. But it is not for the court to say what protection or indemnity is due from the public to an officer who, in his zeal for the honor and interest of his country, and in the excitement of military operations, has trespassed on private rights. That question belongs to the political department of the government. Our duty is to determine under what circumstances private property may be taken from the owner by a military officer in a time of war. And the question here is, whether the law permits it to be taken to insure the success of any enterprise against a public enemy which the commanding officer may deém it advisable to undertake. And we think it very clear that the law does not permit it.
The case mentioned by Lord Mansfield, in delivering his opinion in Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 180, illustrates the principle of which we are speaking. Captain Gambier, of the British navy, by the order of Admiral Boscawen, pulled down the houses of some sutlers on the coast of Nova Scotia, who *136were supplying the sailors with spirituous liquors, the health of the sailors being injured by frequenting them. The motive was evidently a laudable one, and the act done for the public serviced Yet.it was an invasion of the rights of private' property, and without the authority of law, and the officer who executed the order was held liable to ah action, and the sutlers recovered damages against him to the value of the property destroyed.
This case shows' how carefully the rights of private property are guarded by the laws in England; and they are certainly, not less valued nor less securely guarded under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
We think, therefore, that the instructions of the Circuit Court on the 2d and 3d points were right.
The 4th ground of objection is equally untenable. The liability of-the defendant attached the moment the goods were seized, and the-jury have found that the plaintiff did not after-wards resume the ownership and possession.
Indeed, we do not see any evidence.in the record from which the jury could have found otherwise. From the moment they were taken possession of at San Elisario, they were under the control of Colonel Doniphan, and held subject to his order. They were no longer in the possession or control of the plaintiff, and the loss which happened was the immediate and necessary con-. sequence of the coercion which compelled him to accompany the troops.
It is true, the plaintiff remained with his goods and took care of.them, as far as he could, during the march. But whatever he did in that respect was by the orders' or permission of the military authorities. He had no independent control over them.
Neither can his efforts to save them from loss, .after they arrived at the town of Chihuahua, by sale or otherwise, be construed into a resumption of possession, so as to discharge the defendant from liability. He had been brought there with the property against his will; and his goods were subjected to the danger in which .they were placed by the act of the 'defendant. And the defendant cannot discharge himself from the immediate and necessary consequences of his wrongful act, by abandoning all care and control of the property after it reached Chihuahua, and leaving the plaintiff to his own efforts to save it. He could not discharge himself without restoring the possession in aplace of safety ; or in a place where the plaintiff was willing to accept it. And the plaintiff constantly refused to take the risk upon himself, after they arrived at Chihuahua, as well as on the march, and warned Colonel Doniphan that he would not.
Neither can the permission given to the plaintiff to leave the tioops and go to the • hacienda of Pams, affect his rights. He *137was then in the midst of the enemy’s country, and to leave the American forces at that point might have subjected his person and property to greater dangers than he incurred by remaining with them. The plaintiff was not bound to take upon himself any of the perils which were the immediate consequences of the original wrong committed by the defendant in seizing his property and compelling him to proceed with it and accompany the troops.
The 5th point may be disposed of in a few words. If the power exercised by Colonel Doniphan had been within the limits of a discretion confided to him by law, his order would have justified the defendant even if the commander had abused his power, or acted from improper motives. But we have already said that the law did not confide to him a discretionary power over private property. Urgent necessity would alone give him the right; and the verdict finds that this necessity did not exist. Consequently the order given , was an order to do an illegal act; to commit a trespass upon the property of another; and can afford no justification to the person by whom it was executed. The case of Captain Gambier, to which we have just referred, is directly in point upon this question. And upon principle, independent of the weight of judicial decision, it can never be maintained that a military officer can justify himself for doing an unlawful act, by producing the order of his superior. The order may palliate, but it cannot justify.
But in this case the defendant does not stand in the situation of an officer who merely obeys the command of his superior. For it appears .that he advised the order, and volunteered to execute it, when, according to military usage, that duty more properly belonged to an officer of inferior grade.
We do not understand that any objection'is taken to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court over the matters in controversy. The trespass, it is true, was committed out of the limits of the United States. But an action might have been maintained for it in the Circuit Court for any district in which the defendant might be found, upon procfess against him, where the citizenship of the respective parties, gave jurisdiction to a court of the United States. The subject was before this court in the case of, McKenna v. Fisk, reported in 1 How. 241, where the decisions upon the question are referred to, and the jurisdiction in cases of this description, maintained.
Upon the whole, therefore,, it is the opinion of this court, that there is no error in the instructions given by the Circuit Court, and that the judgment must be affirmed with costs.