Court Opinion

ID: 9777262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:04:44.30977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:51.124713
License: Public Domain

*115ARMSTRONG, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent in this case because I believe the majority opinion contains three errors that build on each other to reach an incorrect outcome.
The majority mistakenly concludes that ORS 432.142 establishes a statutory proceeding in the circuit court for the issuance of a delayed certificate of birth that is separate from and in addition to the judicial review mentioned in ORS 432.140 and ORS 432.142(2)(e). The texts of the statutes and the legislative history show that ORS 432.142 describes a judicial review proceeding, not a separate statutory proceeding.
A person who wishes to obtain a delayed certificate of birth must first present information to the state registrar, pursuant to ORS 432.140(1). If the state registrar rejects the application, ORS 432.140(4)(a) requires the state registrar to “advise the applicant of the right to appeal under ORS 183.480 to 183.484.” ORS 432.142 then describes an appeal process and expressly requires that the petition include allegations “as may be required under ORS 183.480 and ORS 183.484.” ORS 432.142(2)(e). There could be no clearer textual indication that the process described in ORS 432.142 is Administrative Procedures Act (APA) review as specified in ORS 432.140 — that is, other-than-contested-case review.
The history of ORS 432.142 also supports my conclusion that what is currently in place is intended to be a judicial review of the state registrar’s determination and not a separate statutory proceeding in addition to any judicial review. The complete history is set out in the Appendix to this opinion. Suffice it to say that, as the majority’s tortured analysis demonstrates, the statute has undergone many modifications over the years. The current version appears to describe somewhat of a hybrid other-than-contested-case review in which the trial court reviews the documentation provided at the agency level, takes new evidence, and makes findings de novo. However, whatever the nature of the review process, it is clear that it is a review and not a separate process in addition to the judicial review of which the registrar is *116required to give notice under ORS 432.140. Neither the legislative history nor the text of the statute bears out the majority’s conclusion that the statute provides an alternative to judicial review.
The state registrar shares my understanding about the operation of the relevant statutes. ORS 432.142(2) directs the state registrar to prescribe and to furnish or approve the form of the petition that is to be filed under ORS 432.142(1). The form that the state registrar has prepared for that purpose identifies the form as a petition for judicial review. The parties in this case shared that understanding, too. They filed a stipulated motion to transfer the case from the Washington County Circuit Court to the Marion County Circuit Court on the basis of ORS 183.484(1), which confers “tflurisdiction for judicial review for orders other than contested cases” on the Marion County Circuit Court and “the circuit court for the county in which the petitioner resides or has a principal business office.” Because petitioner in this case resides in the State of Washington, the parties understood that the “court of competent jurisdiction” in which petitioner could file her petition under ORS 432.142(1) was the Marion County Circuit Court, based on the jurisdiction conferred on it by ORS 183.484(1).
In summary, the majority errs in concluding that there are two routes for review of the state registrar’s order to deny the issuance of a delayed birth certificate: a judicial review proceeding under the Oregon APA and a separate circuit court proceeding under ORS 432.142.
The second way in which the majority errs is in concluding that our review of the circuit court’s decision is de novo, based on the reasoning that the relief provided by the statute — the issuance of a delayed certificate of birth — is equitable. Although it is possible that that would have been a correct conclusion in 1981, when the circuit court was the initiating forum for the issuance of a delayed birth certificate,1 under the current procedure described in ORS 432.142, it is *117unlikely that the legislature would have contemplated that this court would review de novo the circuit court’s findings. Rather, our review of a circuit court’s judgment in other than a contested case is for legal error. See, e.g., Norden v. Water Resources Dept., 329 Or 641, 645-49, 996 P2d 958 (2000).
I note, further, that the parties have assumed that review in this case is for any evidence, that is, for legal error. They did not request de novo review of the trial court’s findings. Thus, even assuming that the opinion is correct that, as a general matter, we would review these types of decisions de novo, it is highly unusual for us to engage in de novo review sua sponte. See Harnisch v. College of Legal Arts, Inc., 243 Or App 16, 25, 259 P3d 67 (2011) (“Because we do not make or develop a party’s argument when that party has not endeavored to do so itself* * * we constrain our review in this case to the arguments that defendant actually made.”).
The only assignment of error raised by petitioner is that the trial court committed legal error in requiring petitioner to submit “documentary evidence” of the birth of the child in Oregon. It is clear from the record, however, that the trial court correctly understood that it could decide the case based solely on testimonial evidence and that the court did not require petitioner to submit documentary evidence in order to establish the child’s birth. What the court said was that it was not persuaded because the record lacked evidence to corroborate petitioner’s testimony — an implicit determination that the court did not find petitioner’s and her cousin’s testimony credible. Whether or not our review of this type of case is de novo, it is clear that the court did not err as asserted in the assignment of error. We should limit our review to the asserted error and not take on a de novo review of the record when it is not requested.
Ultimately, however, even if the majority were correct that review is de novo, we are not permitted to disregard the implicit credibility determinations of the trial court, which had the opportunity to view the witnesses’ demeanor. See, e.g.,Pinkham v. Brubaker, 178 Or App 360, 362, 37 P3d 186 (2001). In its de novo review of the circuit court’s findings, the majority disregards what must necessarily have been a credibility-based determination by the trial court that the *118petitioner simply had not put on persuasive evidence that the child was born in Oregon. The record is clear that the trial court understood that it was not bound by agency rules regarding the documentation required to determine birth. At the hearing, the court asked counsel:
“I’ve only had one other case like this * * *. Does the law allow me, if I find that the testimony is determinative of that fact, to grant what’s being requested?”
The state’s lawyer replied:
‘Yes, it does, Your Honor. We believe it’s a totality of the evidence standard. And I can point you to a statute talking about that. I don’t think it’s completely — you’re not going by the agency rules, regulations now. It’s your judgment.”
Thus, the trial court was well aware that it could make a determination based on the record before it and that it was not bound by the agency’s rules regarding proof of birth. The court heard the testimony of petitioner and her cousin, both of whom were involved with the birth of the child and stated that it took place in Oregon. The child was born in January 2005, and the mother testified that she had moved to Washington in February 2005. She had no documentation of her presence in Oregon. The court explained that it was troubled by the lack of documentation corroborating the presence of petitioner or the child in Oregon. The trial court said:
“This is an unfortunate case where there is simply no evidence in the record to corroborate the testimony of Mother who has not lived in Oregon for more than 3 years. * * * [A]bsent corroborating evidence, I do not find that Petitioner has met [her] burden of proof. * * * If there is additional evidence that can be presented, I would be pleased to review that.”
(Emphasis added.) The court found that petitioner had not met her burden of proof. Assuming, as we must, that the trial court correctly understood that it was required to make its determination based on the record before it, the trial court’s statement that petitioner had not met her burden of proof can represent only a determination that, in the absence of corroborating evidence and in light of mother’s absence from *119the state for three years since the child’s birth, petitioner’s and her cousin’s testimony simply was not persuasive, that is, it was not credible. That is a determination to which we must defer, even on de novo review.2
The majority rejects the need to do that, concluding that the trial court more likely than not denied the petition on the basis of a misunderstanding of petitioner’s burden of proof, rather than on the basis of a credibility determination. Tellingly, the majority does not identify the legal source for the trial court’s ostensible misunderstanding, and I cannot identify one. Where, as here, the state confirmed at the hearing the trial court’s assumption that the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses alone would be legally sufficient to satisfy petitioner’s burden, the majority’s conclusion that the court acted contrary to that understanding is remarkable.
Furthermore, because we lack the ability to make demeanor-based credibility determinations, de novo review on this record is a hollow exercise. With no evidence in the record other than evidence submitted by petitioner, including her testimony and that of her cousin, we would have no alternative but to find in favor of petitioner. There are aspects of petitioner’s and her cousin’s testimony that could — and, presumably for the trial court, did — raise doubts about the veracity of their testimony, but those doubts are not of the type that could be resolved without having seen the witnesses testify.
For all of the above reasons, I would affirm the judgment, and I therefore dissent.
*120APPENDIX
Before 1983, a person seeking a delayed birth certificate had to file a petition in circuit court. Former ORS 432.255 (1981), repealed by Or Laws 1983, ch 709, § 45. The petition was to be on a form prepared by the state registrar, former ORS 432.260 (1981), repealed by Or Laws 1983, ch 709, § 45, and was to be served on the district attorney, former ORS 432.265 (1981), repealed by Or Laws 1983, ch 709, § 45. The petitioner was entitled to appear at a hearing and “present to the court such evidence as is available in support of the statements of the petition.” Former ORS 432.270 (1981), repealed by Or Laws 1983, ch 709, § 45. The court, “if satisfied that the facts therein stated are supported by substantial evidence, shall make findings with respect to the time and place of the birth of the petitioner and his parents and shall order that such birth be registered * * *[.]” Former ORS 432.275 (1981), repealed by Or Laws 1983, ch 709, § 45.
In 1983, the legislature adopted what is, essentially, the current process. A review of the history of the bill that the legislature adopted to create the current process, Senate Bill (SB) 30 (1983), provides insight into its intended operation.
SB 30 originated as an effort by the Health Division of the Oregon Department of Human Resources to modernize Oregon’s vital records system by making it roughly congruent with the 1977 Model State Vital Statistics Act (Model Act). See Testimony, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 30, Feb 22, 1983, Ex B (statement of Kristine Gebbie); compare SB 30 §§ 8, 9 (1983), with Model State Vital Statistics Act §§ 9,10 (1977). As initially proposed, the relevant provisions of SB 30 provided:
“SECTION 8. (1) When a certificate of birth of a person born in this state has not been filed within the time period provided in [former ORS 432.205 (1983), repealed by Or Laws 1997, ch 783, § 22], a certificate of birth may be filed in accordance with rules of the division. The certificate shall be registered subject to evidentiary requirements as the division shall by rule prescribe to substantiate the alleged facts of birth.
*121“(2) A certificate of birth registered one year or more after the date of birth shall be made on forms prescribed and furnished by the State Registrar, marked ‘Delayed,’ and shall show on its face the date of the delayed registration.
“(3) A summary statement of the evidence submitted in support of the delayed registration shall be indorsed on the certificate.
“(4)(a) When an applicant does not submit the minimum documentation required by rule of the division for delayed registration or when the State Registrar has reasonable cause to question the validity or adequacy of the applicant’s sworn statement or the documentary evidence, and if the deficiencies are not corrected, the State Registrar shall not register the delayed certificate of birth and shall advise the applicant of the reasons for this action and of the right of the applicant to appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction.
“(b) The division by rule may provide for the dismissal of an application which is not actively prosecuted.
“SECTION 9. (1) If a delayed certificate of birth is rejected under section 8 of this 1983 Act, a petition signed and sworn to by the petitioner may be filed with a court of competent jurisdiction for an order establishing a record of the date and place of the birth and the parentage of the person whose birth is to be registered.
“(2) The petition shall be made on a form prescribed and furnished by the State Registrar and shall allege:
“(a) That the person for whom a delayed certificate of birth is sought was born in this state;
“(b) That no certificate of birth of the person can be found in the Vital Statistics Unit or the office of any local custodian of birth certificates;
“(c) That diligent efforts by the petitioner have failed to obtain the evidence required in accordance with section 8 of this 1983 Act and rules adopted pursuant thereto;
“(d) That the State Registrar has refused to register a delayed certificate of birth; and
“(e) Such other allegations as may be required.
*122“(3) The petition shall be accompanied by a statement of the State Registrar made in accordance with section 8 of this 1983 Act and all documentary evidence which was submitted to the State Registrar in support of the registration.
“(4) The court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition and shall give the State Registrar 30 days’ notice of the hearing. The State Registrar or an authorized representative * * * may appear and testify in the proceeding.
“(5) If the court finds, from the evidence presented, that the person for whom a delayed certificate of birth is sought was born in this state, it shall make findings as to the place and date of birth, parentage and such other findings as may be required and shall issue an order, on a form prescribed and furnished by the State Registrar, to establish a certificate of birth. This order shall include the birth data to be registered, a description of the evidence presented and the date of the court’s action.
“(6) The clerk of the court shall forward each order to the State Registrar not later than the 10th day of the calendar month following the month in which it was entered. The order shall be registered by the State Registrar and shall constitute the certificate of birth.”
SB 30 §§ 8, 9 (1983) (boldface and uppercase in original; emphasis added).
The Senate Judiciary Committee staff had a number of problems with the original draft of SB 30, including the provisions on the registration of delayed birth certificates. One of the committee’s counsel, Kathi Bogan, described the problems in a memorandum to the committee chair, Senator Jan Wyers:
“This is a Health Division bill based on the Model State Vital Statistics Act pu[b]lished by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1977. The bill is designed to conform Oregon’s vital statistics law to a nationwide system so that ‘each event is recorded once.’ The bill was drafted by the state registrar of vital statistics, Joe Carney, reviewed by Len Perlman of the AG’s office, and handled in Legislative Counsel by Kathleen Beaufait. It has an impact on paternity, adoption, abortion and marriage laws as well as ORS ch. 432, the existing vital statistics provisions. There are numerous problems in drafting language: the *123model act language has not been adapted to fit in with existing Oregon law. In addition, the bill is opposed by many county health officials because of its central reporting concept. Following is a brief outline of problems:
:¡; ij: ij;
“Section 8
“* * * The review provision, at subsection (4) is not defined, but includes the ‘court of competent jurisdiction’ language. I am not clear if this will be a writ of review or mandamus proceeding or if it is an agency review to the Court of Appeals.
“Section 9
“This section covers the review procedure, replacing ORS 432.255 and the original $1 circuit court procedure now at ORS 432.260-280. It doesn’t require a hearing within any definite timeframe.”
Hearing, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 30, Feb 22, 1983, Ex A (underlining in original; emphasis added).
As the discussion indicates, the staff was uncertain what to make of the judicial review provisions in the Model Act because it was unclear which court was the intended “court of competent jurisdiction” and the procedure by which that court would conduct its review. Those questions led the committee to amend SB 30 to bring the judicial review provisions into line with Oregon’s framework for judicial review of state agency actions, where, in circumstances in which an agency such as the state registrar makes a decision of the type at issue here, review is in the circuit court of an order in other than a contested case. As amended, the changes that were made to the bill to establish APA review of the state registrar’s decisions were ultimately codified at ORS 432.140(4)(a) and ORS 432.142 and are italicized below:
“(4)(a) When an applicant does not submit the minimum documentation required by rule of the state registrar for delayed registration or when the state registrar has reasonable cause to question the validity or adequacy of the applicant’s sworn statement or the documentary evidence, and if the deficiencies are not corrected, the state registrar shall not register the delayed certificate of birth and shall enter an order to that effect stating the reasons for the action. *124The state registrar shall advise the applicant of the right to appeal under ORS 183.480 and 183.484.”
ORS 432.140(4)(a) (1983), amended by Or Laws 1997, ch 783, § 19. The changes to ORS 432.142 were, in turn:
“(1) If application for a delayed certificate of birth is ordered rejected under ORS 432.140, the applicant may appeal the order under ORS 183.480 and 183.484.
“(2) On appeal, the applicant shall allege:
“(a) That the person for whom a delayed certificate of birth is sought was born in this state:
“(b) That no certificate of birth of the person can be found in the Vital Statistics Unit or the office of any local custodian of birth certificates;
“(c) That diligent efforts by the petitioner have failed to obtain the evidence required in accordance with ORS 432.140 and rules adopted pursuant thereto;
“(d) That the state registrar has refused to register a delayed birth certificate; and
“(e) Such other allegations as may be required under ORS 183.480 and 183.484.
“(3) The petition shall be accompanied by a statement of the state registrar accompanying the order made in accordance with ORS 432.140 and all documentary evidence which was submitted to the state registrar in support of the registration.
“[Deletion of paragraph requiring court to fix a time for hearing the petition.]
“(4) If the court finds, from the evidence presented, that the person for whom a delayed certificate of birth is sought was born in this state, it shall make findings as to the place and date of birth, parentage and such other findings as may be required and shall issue an order, on a form prescribed and furnished by the state registrar, to establish a certificate of birth. This order shall include the birth data to be registered, a description of the evidence presented and the date of the court’s action.
“(5) The clerk of the court shall forward each such order to the state registrar not later than the 10th day of the calendar month following the month in which it was *125entered. The order shall be registered by the state registrar and shall constitute the certificate of birth.”
ORS 432.142 (1983), amended by Or Laws 1997, ch 783, § 20 (emphasis added).
As the emphasized changes indicate, the modifications that the legislature made to the Model Act made review of the registrar’s decision to deny the registration of a delayed birth certificate judicial review under the Oregon APA of an order in other than a contested case, but the legislature retained the Model Act language that specified that the court should order the entry of a delayed birth certificate “[i]f the court finds, from the evidence presented, that the person for whom a delayed certificate is sought was born in this state[.]” ORS 432.142(4) (1983). That combination of features leads me to conclude that the legislature intended the reviewing court to follow the procedures for APA review in other than a contested case, including conducting a hearing to make a record for that review, see, e.g., Norden v. Water Resources Dept., 329 Or 641, 645-49, 996 P2d 958 (2000), but intended the court to make its own decision about whether the child was born in Oregon rather than to determine whether the state registrar had erred in making that decision. It takes some effort to discern that intention, but I believe that it is implicit in the decision to retain the language from the Model Act directing the circuit court to make its own finding on whether the child was born in Oregon, rather than to review the finding of the state registrar on that issue for legal error, which is the review that a court would conduct in other than a contested case. See ORS 183.484(5), (6). In particular, the direction to the court in ORS 432.142(4) (1983), to “issue an order * * * to establish a certificate of birth” that “shall include the birth data to be registered, a description of the evidence presented and the date of the court’s action” is an action by the reviewing circuit court that is different from any action that a reviewing court can take under the APA on review of an order in other than a contested case. See ORS 183.484(5), (6).
That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that normal APA review of the state registrar’s decision in other than a contested case would rarely, if ever, provide a basis to reverse the state registrar’s decision. That is because, given the *126expected record that would be created in such a case, it is difficult to imagine how the state registrar’s decision to deny registration could ever be said to lack substantial evidence to support it.
The manner in which the legislature modified the Model Act to combine APA review with the Model Act’s independent determination by the reviewing court on whether a child for whom a birth certificate is sought was born in Oregon was less than elegant, but I am convinced that it was intended to work in the manner that I have described. I also believe, however, that the less than elegant solution had the potential to create problems, particularly because of the provision in ORS 432.142(1) (1983) that states that “the applicant may appeal the order under ORS 183.480 and 183.484.” (Emphasis added.) I can well imagine that parties and courts could be confused by the juxtaposition of the direction that the appeal is under ORS 183.484, which specifies in subsections (5) and (6) that the review is for legal error, with the direction in ORS 432.142(4) (1983) that the circuit court is to make its own finding, “from the evidence presented,” on whether the person for whom the certificate is sought was born in Oregon and to enter its own order to that effect.
The legislature took the opportunity in 1997 to attempt to improve the less than elegant adaptation of the Model Act to APA review when it undertook to make housekeeping changes and to delete obsolete provisions in the course of bringing Oregon law into line with the latest Model Act and with federal law. In doing that, it managed to achieve an even less elegant solution to the problem. It made no substantive change to ORS 432.140(4), which continues to require the state registrar to advise unsuccessful applicants that they have “the right to appeal under ORS 183.480 to 183.484,” that is, under the APA. It made changes to ORS 432.142 to add more language from the Model Act to it, but it retained the provision in ORS 432.142(2)(e) that the petition that a person files to seek a judicial determination that a child was born in Oregon shall contain “[s]uch other allegations as may be required under ORS 183.480 and 183.484.”
The three changes that it did make were to replace subsection (1) of ORS 432.142 with the original language *127from the Model Act on the initiation of the appeal of the state registrar’s decision:
“(1) If the State Registrar of the Center for Health Statistics refuses to file a delayed certificate of birth under the provisions of ORS 432.140, the applicant may file a signed and sworn petition with a court of competent jurisdiction seeking an order establishing a record of the date and place of birth and the parentage of the person whose birth is to be registered.”
Or Laws 1997, ch 783, § 20; compare id. with Model State Vital Statistics Act § 10 (1992). It made an equivalent change to ORS 432.142(2) by replacing language that refers to the allegations that must be made on appeal with the language from the Model Act that specifies that the “petition shall be made on a form prescribed and furnished or approved by the state registrar * * *[.]” Or Laws 1997, ch 783, § 20. The facts that must be alleged in the petition are the same facts that had to be alleged on appeal. Finally, the legislature put back language from the Model Act that the legislature had removed in its 1983 adaptation that refers to the hearing that the court must conduct:
“(4) The court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition and shall give the state registrar notice of the hearing. The state registrar or an authorized representative may appear and testify in the proceeding.”
Or Laws 1997, ch 783, § 20. The legislature made no other substantive changes to ORS 432.142.
I understand those “housekeeping” changes to reflect an effort by the legislature to clear up the conflict that the reference in ORS 432.142(1) (1983) to conducting an appeal “under ORS 183.480 and 183.484” created as a result of its juxtaposition with the direction in ORS 432.142(4) (1983) for the court to make an independent factual determination on whether the child was born in Oregon. Its deletion in 1997 of the reference in subsection (1) to appealing under the APA and replacement of it with language from the Model Act directing an applicant to file a petition in “a court of competent jurisdiction” ameliorated the conflict, but it did so in an awkward and confusing way. As noted, the changes left *128intact the direction in ORS 432.140(4)(a) that the state registrar is to advise unsuccessful applicants of their “right to appeal under ORS 183.480 to 183.484” and the direction in ORS 432.142(2)(e) that the petition that applicants must file to appeal the state registrar’s decision shall contain “[s]uch other allegations as may be required under ORS 183.480 and 183.484.” The sense that I make of all of that is that the legislature intended the form of the appeal that applicants take to challenge an adverse decision by the state registrar to follow that of an APA review proceeding of an order in other than a contested case, but the decision that the court makes on appeal is a decision that is not tied to the APA review standards in such a proceeding. What is certain to me is that the legislature did not intend to create two avenues by which an unsuccessful applicant can seek to overturn an adverse decision by the state registrar on the registration of a delayed birth certificate: one under the APA and one through an independent court proceeding. That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, as discussed earlier, see 243 Or App at 125 (Armstrong, J., dissenting), traditional APA review will almost certainly be unavailing, yet that is the appellate avenue about which ORS 432.140(4)(a) directs the state registrar to advise unsuccessful applicants. No statute directs the registrar to advise applicants of review under ORS 432.142, the procedure that the majority believes is the independent procedure that the 1997 legislature created and that, as noted above, is the only efficacious appeal procedure available to an applicant.

 1 note that, since it was enacted in 1967, ORS 3.260 has listed “issuance of delayed birth certificate” (along with adoption, change of name, filiation, commitment, and custody) as a proceeding in which “the circuit court shall exercise exclusive and original jurisdictionf.]”

 If there were any doubt about whether the trial court correctly apprehended its task, the legally appropriate thing for us to do would be to remand the case to the trial court for it to reconsider its decision under the proper standard. That disposition would be consistent with petitioner’s assignment of error, which asks us to correct the trial court’s alleged error in applying an incorrect legal standard to its decision.
In that regard, the trial court emphasized in its letter opinion its willingness to consider additional evidence. In a footnote in petitioner’s brief, she indicates that she did not respond to that invitation because she understood the court to be willing to consider only documentary evidence and not to conduct a further hearing to receive additional testimony. Petitioner appears to have misapprehended the import of the trial court’s invitation to submit evidence. If it were appropriate to remand the case to the trial court, the court and the parties would be free to consider whether an additional evidentiary hearing would be appropriate.