Court Opinion

ID: 9353357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 17:09:39.018025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:23.748406
License: Public Domain

J-A22034-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    GEORGE ALLEN JOHNSON III                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1282 WDA 2021

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 30, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-02-CR-0007141-2019

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                            FILED: JANUARY 11, 2023

        Appellant, George Allen Johnson, III, appeals from the July 30, 2021

Judgment of Sentence entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common

Pleas following his guilty plea to four firearms offenses, two driving under the

influence offenses, and seven drug and drug paraphernalia possession

offenses.    Appellant contends that the Commonwealth breached the plea

agreement. We agree and, thus, we vacate Appellant’ judgment of sentence

and remand for further proceedings.

        The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On May 11,

2019, police arrested Appellant for drunk driving after finding him unconscious

in the driver’s seat of a vehicle that had come to a stop in a residential front

yard.    Police searched the vehicle and discovered two firearms, cocaine,
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*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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heroin, marijuana, a digital scale, a plastic spoon covered in powder residue,

and plastic baggies. Police also found a large amount of cash on Appellant’s

person. The Commonwealth then charged Appellant with the above crimes.

          On April 13, 2021, Appellant entered a general guilty plea to all the

charged crimes. In explaining the terms of the plea agreement, Appellant’s

counsel informed the court there had been no agreement as to sentence and

that “it is my understanding that there would be no objection [or] commentary

at the time of sentencing to what the [d]efense requests.”1 Counsel further

clarified that the Commonwealth “indicated she would not object at the time

of sentencing to a sentencing request that we make at the time of the

hearing.”2      The Commonwealth did not object to Appellant’s counsel’s

characterization of the plea agreement or offer its own interpretation of the

agreement it had reached with Appellant. The plea court acknowledged the

agreement by stating “Okay. I mean, that’s fine. She cannot object.” 3 The

court then conducted a plea colloquy, after which it accepted Appellant’s guilty

plea. The court deferred sentencing pending preparation of a presentence

investigation report.

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1   N.T. Guilty Plea Hr’g, 4/13/21, at 5.

2   Id. at 6.

3   Id.

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        Appellant appeared for sentencing on July 30, 2021.         Prior to the

imposition of sentence, Appellant’s counsel recommended that Appellant

“qualifie[d] for a rehabilitative mitigation sentence[,]”4 and requested that the

court impose a Justice Related Services (“JRS”) plan that included a

structured, long-term, inpatient drug, alcohol, and mental health treatment

program.

        In response to Appellant’s request for a JRS plan, the Commonwealth

asserted that Appellant’s “presentence report is replete with facts that he

cannot be supervised in the community,” and then proceeded to enumerate

Appellant’s prior convictions and flight from drug treatment. 5              The

Commonwealth characterized Appellant’s past conduct as proof that Appellant

“cannot be trusted in the community,”6 made its own request that the court

impose a standard-range sentence, and offered commentary in support of the

recommendation.

        Appellant’s counsel responded by reiterating her understanding that

Appellant and the Commonwealth “had an agreement . . . that there would be

no recommendation on sentencing from the Commonwealth today.”7 The

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4   N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 7/30/21, at 27.

5   Id. at 28-29.

6   Id. at 29.

7   Id. at 30.

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Commonwealth then explained that when the parties “discussed the possibility

that there would be no recommendation, I certainly did not expect that you

would be asking for a JRS plan[,]” which the Commonwealth opined was

“completely inappropriate.”8

        Following the parties’ arguments, the court imposed an aggregate term

of six to twelve years’ incarceration followed by five years of probation.

        Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion for modification of

sentence, explaining the terms of the parties’ plea agreement and noting that,

contrary    to   the   agreement,      the     Commonwealth   made   a   sentencing

recommendation.9        At a hearing on the post-sentence motion, Appellant’s

counsel orally moved for leave to amend the motion to include a request to

withdraw the plea. The court denied the request as untimely. After arguments

from counsel, the court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion.

        Appellant pro se filed a timely notice of appeal10 and obtained new

counsel. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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8   Id. at 30.

9   Post-Sentence Motion, 8/6/21, §§ 2-7.

10 It is implicit in Pa.R.A.P. 904, the rule governing the content of notices of
appeals, that the correct date of the order appealed should be included in a
notice of appeal. Commonwealth v. Martin, 462 A.2d 859, 860 (Pa. Super.
1983), overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Graves, 508 A.2d
1198 (Pa. 1986). Although Appellant did not identify any date for an order on
appeal in his notice of appeal, we will entertain this timely appeal despite the
inadequacy of the notice. See In re McElhatton, 729 A.2d 163, 165 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1999) (“A failure to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 904 will not result in a

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       Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

       Is Appellant entitled to a re-sentencing hearing owing to the
       Commonwealth’s breach of the Guilty Plea Agreement (with that
       breach occurring when the Commonwealth, which had pledged not
       to object to Appellant’s sentencing request or to offer any
       comments regarding sentencing, responded to Appellant’s request
       for a “rehabilitative mitigated sentence” with a request that he
       instead be ordered to serve a term of 7-to-14 years of
       imprisonment)?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

       Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth violated the parties’ plea

agreement by objecting to the rehabilitative mitigated sentence proposed by

his counsel and, instead of staying silent, requesting a standard-range

sentence of incarceration. Id. at 29, 40-43, 52.

       “Although a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it remains

contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under contract-law standards.”

Commonwealth v. Kroh, 654 A.2d 1168, 1172 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation

omitted).    In assessing whether a plea agreement has been breached, we

consider what the parties to the agreement reasonably understood the terms

to be.   Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444, 447 (Pa. Super.

2013) (en banc). “Such a determination is made based on the totality of the

surrounding circumstances and any ambiguities in the terms of the plea

agreement will be construed against the Commonwealth.”          Id. (quotation

marks and citations omitted). Further, “[c]ontract interpretation is a question

____________________________________________

dismissal of the notice of appeal so long as the notice of appeal is timely
filed.”), citing Commonwealth v. Gumper, 512 A.2d 699 (Pa. Super. 1986).

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of law, so our standard of review . . . is de novo and to the extent necessary,

the scope of our review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Kerns, 220 A.3d

607, 612 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quotation marks and citations).

      Our Supreme Court has held:

      there is an affirmative duty on the part of the prosecutor to honor
      any and all promises made in exchange for a defendant’s plea.
      Our courts have demanded strict compliance with that duty in
      order to avoid any possible perversion of the plea bargaining
      system, evidencing the concern that a defendant might be coerced
      into a bargain or fraudulently induced to give up the very valued
      constitutional guarantees attendant the right to trial by jury.
      Therefore, in Pennsylvania, it is well settled that where a plea
      bargain has been entered [into] and is violated by the
      Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled, at least, to the benefit
      of the bargain.

Commonwealth v. Zuber, 353 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa. 1976) (quotations and

citations omitted).

      Here, the trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea.   As Appellant’s

counsel explained to the court, in exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea, the

Commonwealth agreed to forego objecting to or providing commentary on

Appellant’s sentence request.      The Commonwealth did not object to

Appellant’s counsel’s characterization of the parties’ agreement and did not

offer any explanation of its own understanding of this negotiated term in

response to Appellant’s counsel’s representations.

      Our review of the notes of testimony indicates that, notwithstanding the

Commonwealth’s manifested assent to the negotiated term of the agreement,

it violated the agreement by explicitly objected and offering comments in

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opposition to Appellant’s sentence request.    Specifically, in response to

Appellant’s request for a JRS plan, the Commonwealth objected, stating that

Appellant’s “presentence report is replete with facts that he cannot be

supervised in the community,” and then proceeded to enumerate Appellant’s

prior convictions and flight from drug treatment. N.T., 7/30/21, at 28-29.

The Commonwealth characterized Appellant’s past as proof that Appellant

“cannot be trusted in the community.” Id. at 29. When, in response to these

comments from the Commonwealth, Appellant’s counsel reiterated her

understanding that the Commonwealth had agreed not to make a sentencing

recommendation, the Commonwealth responded by opining that Appellant’s

request for a JRS plan was “completely inappropriate.”    Id. at 30.    The

Commonwealth then made its own sentencing request and offered argument

in support of its request. See id. at 29. In doing so, the Commonwealth

violated the terms of the negotiated plea agreement.

      In sum, following our de novo review, we conclude that the

Commonwealth violated its agreement with Appellant. Because Appellant is

entitled to the benefit of the bargain he struck with the Commonwealth, we

vacate his judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.

      Judgment of Sentence vacated.        Case remanded.       Jurisdiction

relinquished.

      Judge Olson joined the memorandum. Judge Colins filed a dissenting

memorandum.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/2023

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