Court Opinion

ID: 9480227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:41:35.438586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:33.177236
License: Public Domain

BRORBY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The standards that govern our review of a jury verdict are strict. We “may not weigh the evidence, pass upon the credibility of witnesses, or substitute [our] judgment for that of the jury,” Brown v. McGraw-Edison Co., 736 F.2d 609, 612-13 (10th Cir.1984). We may not reverse the denial of a directed verdict or JNOV motion unless the evidence “is susceptible to no reasonable inferences which may sustain the position of the party” opposing the *1484motion. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir.1988). Nor may we reverse a trial court’s denial of a new trial unless the verdict is “clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence.” Brown, 736 F.2d at 616. Judged by these tests, I cannot say the jury’s verdict on either of Sandlin’s claims is erroneous. Thus, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.
The effect of the majority’s opinion — of its recapitulation of the evidence and its formulation of the issues and the law to be applied — is to place a disproportionate evi-dentiary burden on the appellee Bill Sand-lin. For example, the majority state that the “first question presented is whether the totality of the evidence supports the verdict.” Opinion at 1481 (emphasis added). I view this as an over-generalization of the applicable standards of review, which I have laid out above. It is reminiscent of a “totality of the circumstances” test, which is inappropriate here, and it suggests the majority are reweighing the evidence — a job reserved to the jury.
The majority’s formulation of the federal statutory requirements also serves to place an unintended hurdle in the path of a plaintiff franchisee. As the majority correctly point out, “Congress [in the PMPA] did not intend to intrude courts into the marketplace.” Opinion at 1481. In fact, Congress considered “reasonable business judgments” as a ground for nonrenewal of a franchise, but rejected it in favor of the good faith and normal course of business tests, which would “avoid judicial scrutiny of the business judgment itself.” S.Rep. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 37, reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 873, 895-96. In spite of this history, the majority interpret the two statutory inquiries as “testpng] the honest commercial judgment of the franchisor.” Opinion at 1481. I cannot distinguish between the majority's “honest commercial judgment” standard and the “reasonable business judgment” test clearly rejected by Congress. Thus, in my view the majority have burdened franchisees — and the courts— with an inquiry Congress meant to avoid.
The majority also disregard certain evidence offered by Sandlin and characterize other evidence in such a way as to reduce its weight in his favor. Two examples suffice to demonstrate this problem. First, I do not view Mr. Sandlin’s expectation of staying in business for ten years as simply “hope or speculation,” Opinion at 1482, if viewed in light of other evidence — evidence of Sandlin’s increasingly profitable business, TRMI’s satisfaction with him as a franchisee, and commitments and assurances made to him by agents of TRMI. From this and other evidence, the jury could have concluded Sandlin’s expectation of remaining in business for several years was reasonable and thus protected by the PMPA. See S.Rep. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 18, 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News at 877 (“essential” that federal legislation not “prevent fulfillment of the reasonable renewal expectations of franchisees”). Second, the majority label as “self-serving speculation” Sandlin’s testimony that TRMI’s retail price at the Getty station was occasionally less than TRMI’s wholesale price to Sandlin. Opinion at 1483. TRMI did not specifically refute or deny this testimony. I do not view this testimony as “speculation” when Sandlin certainly possessed personal knowledge of both the price he paid TRMI for gas and the posted price at the station across the street. Belittling the significance of this testimony has a dual impact on Sandlin’s case, because it is relevant to both his federal and state law claims.
Moreover, although the majority seem willing to disparage Sandlin’s evidence, they offer no comment on certain evidence offered by TRMI that could, as easily, be disparaged. For instance, in attempting to establish the date by which rebranding was required, a TRMI witness testified that his only knowledge of the pertinent FTC order came from reading about it in the Wall Street Journal and being advised about it by unnamed "members of management.” Tr. at 185-86. Premature rebranding of the Getty station during the term of Sand-lin’s franchise could have been decisive on the issue of TRMI’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, yet *1485TRMI was unable to offer any more authoritative evidence of the FTC’s order. The majority acknowledge “the testimony of one witness who stated the rebranding of the Getty station took place earlier than necessary,” but discard it as “self-serving speculation.” Opinion at 1483. They similarly reject other testimony by Sandlin. In my opinion, this characterization of the evidence amounts to reweighing testimony and judging its credibility — exercises that lie within the exclusive province of the jury.
Because I am convinced there was evidence, albeit very thin, upon which a jury could reasonably have based verdicts for Sandlin on both of his claims, and that we may not upset those verdicts without reweighing the evidence or speculating as to the jury’s deliberations, I would affirm.