Court Opinion

ID: 9661139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:30:11.090083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:25.652347
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that the majority has correctly decided this circumstantial evidence case. The appellant is connected with the crime by two tenuous threads, neither of which is sufficient by itself, together, or with all the other facts of the case.
First, the recovery of the appellant’s wallet on January 6 from the kitchen floor of 800 Hollybrook is deemed probative by the majority. There was no showing that it was put or otherwise left there during the commission of the burglary. In an analogous case, we held that fingerprints found at the scene of a burglary, without a showing that they must necessarily have been made at the time of the burglary, were insufficient to sustain the conviction. Bowen v. State, 460 S.W.2d 421 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). Cf. Stone v. State, 396 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.Cr.App.1965). The mere presence of the appellant’s wallet is not sufficient to sustain the verdict.
Second, the majority relies upon hearsay evidence to establish that the appellant had been riding in the car “. . . which, from the evidence presented was shown to have been involved in the burglaries.”1 Hearsay, of course, has no probative value. Mendoza v. State, 522 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). Moreover, hearsay coupled with the evidence presented to show that the car the appellant, a day after the burglary, had been riding in might have been used in the offense is insufficient to sustain the verdict.
In Culmore v. State, 447 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), the Court stated:
“In ascertaining whether the guilt of the accused has been established to a moral certainty, the appellate court will review the evidence in light of the presumption that the accused is innocent. The court will not assume any acts against the accused that are not shown to have been committed by him. Furthermore, a conviction will not be sustained on appeal if the evidence does not sufficiently establish all material elements of the offense charged.”
In Jackson v. State, 536 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), we stated that “[tjhe jury is not allowed to reach a verdict based upon speculation.” The two factors upon which the majority relies are totally inadequate to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but guilt.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

. The majority opinion states that “[T]he record is not clear as to how Metcalf determined appellant had arrived at Petty’s house in the Cadillac.” The majority opinion concedes that neither Petty nor Metcalf could have had personal knowledge that the appellant arrived in the Cadillac. The majority, however, fails to recognize that Metcalf testified that his conversation with the appellant during the time Met-calf was at Petty’s house was limited to the ownership of the car. Thus, Jones was the only person present who could have informed Metcalf that the appellant arrived in the Cadillac. The record, however, shows that Met-calf’s conversation with Jones during the time Metcalf was at Petty’s house was limited to the ownership of the car. Since it is clear that Metcalf did not have personal knowledge of the appellant’s arrival in the Cadillac, cf. Bright v. State, 556 S.W.2d 317 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), and that Metcalf, the appellant and Jones discussed only the ownership of the Cadillac, Metcalf’s testimony that the appellant arrived at Petty’s house in the Cadillac must necessarily be based on hearsay evidence. The appellant has discharged his burden of showing that the evidence was hearsay. Beal v. State, 520 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). Thus, the majority’s reliance on Durham v. State, supra, is misplaced.