Court Opinion

ID: 9700919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:53:17.620196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:12.449561
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, J.,

dissenting:

In State v. Hepple, 279 Md. 265, 368 A. 2d 445 (1977), this Court flatly held that when a trial court erroneously admits testimony as rebuttal evidence, the error is not cured because the court might have properly allowed the testimony in the exercise of its discretion to vary the normal order of proof. The Court there stated (279 Md. at 273-274):
“We further point out that it is of no consequence that the trial judges might have allowed the testimony pursuant to their discretion to deviate from the conventional order of producing evidence, because we are convinced that in both cases this discretion was not exercised____[Bjecause there is no indication here ... that either court was exercising its discretion to vary the normal mode of presentation of evidence, we cannot uphold the admission of the disputed testimony, even if we were convinced, looking at the record in retrospect, that the trial court could have properly allowed that testimony pursuant to . this discretionary authority____This is so because if testimony is admitted at the rebuttal stage, but only pursuant to the trial court's discretion to vary the order of proof, the defense must be afforded the same opportunity to investigate and attempt to impeach or otherwise respond to the State’s witness as it would have had had the evidence been offered in chief----Our decision today in no way restricts the exercise of the trial court’s discretion to allow non-rebuttal evidence at the rebuttal stage of a trial — it merely requires *557that a change in the normal order of presentation of evidence be in fact an exercise of the court’s discretion.”
In my view, the above-quoted holding is fully applicable to the instant case. Here also, it does not matter whether the trial court might have allowed the testimony pursuant to its discretion to deviate from the conventional order of proof. I am convinced that the court in the present case, like the trial courts inHepple, admitted the challenged testimony solely on the ground that it was rebuttal evidence.
The majority, in asserting that the court in this case did in fact exercise its discretion to vary the order of proof, relies on the trial judge’s comment that the jury’s inquiries “seem to be relevant questions, and either side, I presume, will pursue them.” Even taking this comment by the trial judge in isolation, it indicates only a “presumption” or expectation on the part of the judge that certain matters will be pursued. It was in no way a ruling on a disputed evidentiary issue. No question on the subject had yet been asked of any witness, and no issue had been raised by counsel. Moreover, the comment itself does not suggest the basis for the trial court’s belief that the jury’s questions could properly be pursued.
Later, however, the trial judge did, for the first time, make a ruling on the matter. After defense counsel objected to a specific question, the court overruled the objection on the ground that “I think it is proper rebuttal to Mr. Mays’ testimony ....” The trial court would not have overruled the objection solely on the ground that the evidence was “proper rebuttal” if the court really believed that it had previously ruled the evidence admissible in the exercise of its discretion to vary the order of proof. To state, as does the majority, that the trial court was “simply offering an alternate basis for the admissibility of the testimony,” is to indulge in a fiction. Nothing in this record remotely suggests that the trial court believed that it was admitting the testimony on alternate grounds. I agree fully with the observations of Judge Melvin, in his dissenting opinion in the Court of Special Appeals, that:
“The actual ruling made by the court with respect to the disputed testimony ... is the court’s action in *558overruling the objection to the question that elicited the disputed testimony. The trial court clearly based its ruling on its belief that the testimony [of Detective Bucheit] was 'proper rebuttal to Mr. Mays’ testimony that this holdup took place.’ ”
Under our holding in State v. Hepple, supra, the convictions ought to be reversed and a new trial awarded.
Judge Levine has authorized me to state that he concurs with the views expressed herein.