Court Opinion

ID: 9745206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:41:23.633068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:57.567116
License: Public Domain

MALLANO, P. J., Dissenting.
I believe that plaintiffs Showing Animals Respect and Kindness (SHARK) and Steve Hindi did not violate West Hollywood Municipal Code chapter 11.44, which prohibits “mobile billboard advertising,” because that chapter bans only commercial speech, and not the kind of noncommercial speech engaged in by plaintiffs, namely making a case against cruelty to animals. (All chapter and section references are to the city’s municipal code.) Section 11.44.020, subdivision A makes it unlawful “for any person to conduct, or cause to be conducted, any mobile billboard advertising upon any street, or other public place within the city in which the public has the right of travel.” (Italics added.) The ordinance then states, “Mobile billboard advertising includes any vehicle, or wheeled conveyance which carries, conveys, pulls, or transports any sign or billboard for the primary purpose of advertising.” (§ 11.44.020, subd. B, italics added.)
The issue presented is, “What is advertising?” I think of advertising as promoting a product or service—commercial speech—as opposed to promoting a political or social message, such as speaking against cruelty to animals—noncommercial speech. A look at a few dictionaries supports my view. Here are some examples.
The American Heritage Dictionary defines “advertising” as “[t]he activity of attracting public attention to a product or business, as by paid announcements in the print, broadcast, or electronic media.” (American Heritage Diet, of the English Language (4th ed. 2000) <http://www.bartleby.com/61/57/ A0105700.html> [as of Sept. 9, 2008].) According to Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1992), “advertising” means “to announce or praise (a product, service, etc.) in some public medium of communication in order to induce people to buy or use: to advertise a new brand of toothpaste” (Id. at p. 20.) The same dictionary indicates that the definition of “advertising” meaning “to inform or advise” is obsolete. (Ibid.)
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) defines “advertising” as “the action of calling something (as a commodity for sale, a service offered or desired) to the attention of the public esp. by means of printed or broadcast paid announcements.” {Id. at p. 31.) The Compact Oxford English Dictionary *827states that “advertising” is a derivative of “advertise,” which means “[to] present or describe (a product, service, or event) in a public medium so as to promote sales.” (Compact Oxford English Diet. (2005) <http://www. askoxford.com/concise_oed/advertise?view=uk> [as of Sept. 9, 2008].)
The likelihood that the ordinance governs only commercial speech is also suggested in that “advertising” is preceded by “billboard.” The ordinance does not regulate simply “advertising” but “billboard advertising.” A “billboard” is “a very large board on which advertisements are shown, esp. at the side of a road.” (Cambridge Diet, of American English (2d ed. 2007) <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/Default.asp?dict=A> [as of Sept. 9, 2008].) “Advertisement,” in turn, means “a paid notice that tells people about a product or service.” (Ibid., italics added.)
On the other hand, the Encarta Online Encyclopedia gives the following definition of “advertising”: “a form of commercial mass communication designed to promote the sale of a product or service, or a message on behalf of an institution, organization, or candidate for political office.” (Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia (2008) <http://encarta.msn.com/ encyclopedia_761564279/advertising.html> [as of Sept. 9, 2008], italics added.) And the Oxford English Dictionary provides this definition: “A bringing into notice; spec, by paid announcement in a printed journal, by prominent display of placards, etc.” (Oxford English Diet. (2d ed. 1989) <http://dictionary.oed.com> [as of Sept. 9, 2008].)
I could no doubt search other dictionaries from various times and come up with different definitions. But this case does not turn on which dictionary one uses. Rather, the foregoing definitions illustrate the point that “advertising,” as used in the ordinance, is ambiguous with respect to whether it is limited to commercial speech, as plaintiffs contend, or whether it covers both commercial and noncommercial speech, as the city contends. In light of this ambiguity, I look to the legislative history of chapter 11.44 for the answer to that question. (See Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1142, 1151 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 81, 179 P.3d 882].)
Chapter 11.44 is a part of West Hollywood Ordinance No. 03-669. The preamble states: “The City Council of the City of West Hollywood resolves, determines and orders as follows. Section 1. Findings. [][]... [][] C. The restrictions contained in the following Ordinance will not unduly burden commercial advertising within the City.” (Italics added.) This language convinces me that the city intended the ordinance to cover commercial speech only. Otherwise, it could be read as indicating a willingness to unduly burden noncommercial speech. In Supersign of Boca Raton v. City of Fort Lauderdale (11th Cir. 1985) 766 F.2d 1528, the district court interpreted a *828virtually identical ordinance as regulating only commercial speech. (Id. at pp. 1529-1530.) Because the court’s interpretation was plainly correct, neither side disputed it on appeal. (Id. at p. 1530, fn. 1.)
Consistent with the purpose of not unduly burdening commercial speech, the city’s ordinance contains an “[e]xemption[]” for “[a]ny vehicle which displays an advertisement or business identification of its owner, so long as such vehicle is engaged in the usual business or regular work of the owner, and not used merely, mainly or primarily to display advertisements.” (§ 11.44.030, italics added.) Buses and taxicabs are completely exempt from the ordinance. (Ibid.)
Finally, assuming for the sake of argument that the ordinance covers commercial and noncommercial speech to the same extent, it still raises serious First Amendment issues. “Merely treating noncommercial and commercial speech equally is not constitutionally sufficient. The first amendment affords greater protection to noncommercial than to commercial expression. . . . Regulations valid as to commercial speech may be unconstitutional as to noncommercial. ...[][] Thus, ‘[although the city may distinguish between the relative value of different categories of commercial speech, the city does not have the same range of choice in the area of noncommercial speech to evaluate the strength of, or distinguish between, various communicative interests.’ ” (National Advertising Co. v. City of Orange (9th Cir. 1988) 861 F.2d 246, 248, citations omitted.) “[T]he constitution . . . grants ‘less protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression’ ” (Sciarrino v. City of Key West, Fla. (11th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 364, 367; accord, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn. (1978) 436 U.S. 447, 455-456 [56 L.Ed.2d 444, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1918]), and political speech enjoys the highest level of protection (see FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (1986) 479 U.S. 238, 260 [93 L.Ed.2d 539, 107 S.Ct. 616, 629]; Coral Springs Street Systems v. City of Sunrise (11th Cir. 2004) 371 F.3d 1320, 1347, fn. 22). Yet, under the city’s interpretation, the ordinance prohibits a political organization from using its vehicle for the primary purpose of displaying a sign in support of a particular candidate.
The law is to the contrary. The First Amendment protects the right of a vehicle owner to drive on public streets for the primary purpose of conveying a noncommercial message that appears on the vehicle. (See Center for Bio-Ethical v. Los Angeles County (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3d 780, 783-793 [sheriff’s department violated drivers’ First Amendment rights by preventing vehicle, which bore enlarged photographs of aborted fetuses, from circling school during morning rush hour notwithstanding officers’ concerns about traffic congestion and safety of pedestrians]; Fogel v. Collins (9th Cir. 2008) *829531 F.3d 824, 827-828, 829-833 [police violated vehicle owner’s First Amendment rights by arresting him and impounding his vehicle just because it bore messages saying, “ T am a fucking suicide bomber communist terrorist,’ ” “ ‘Pull me over! Please, I dare ya,’ ” “ ‘Allah Praise the Patriot Act,’ ” and “ ‘W.O.M.D. on board’ ” (capitalization omitted)].) The right to display a sign on a vehicle, as exercised by plaintiffs here, rests largely on the principle that “ ‘[a]ll public streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora.’ ” (Center for Bio-Ethical, at p. 787, quoting Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 487 U.S. 474, 481 [101 L.Ed.2d 420, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2500].)
Given that we should accept an interpretation of the ordinance that avoids constitutional doubts regarding its validity, I interpret the ban on “advertising” to pertain to commercial advertising only. (See Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163, 177 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 777].) “A statute [that may] imping[e] on the right of free speech should be construed no more broadly than is absolutely necessary to accomplish its purposes.” (Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 446, 452, fn. 5 [39 Cal.Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428]; accord, Welton v. City of Los Angeles (1976) 18 Cal.3d 497, 505-506 [134 Cal.Rptr. 668, 556 P.2d 1119].)
I do not suggest that an appropriate ordinance cannot be drafted to remedy the distraction and other traffic problems that might be attributed to the video broadcasts and the sound emitted by plaintiffs’ vehicle in this case. (See Kovacs v. Cooper (1949) 336 U.S. 77, 86-88, 89, 96-97 [93 L.Ed. 513, 69 S.Ct. 448, 453-54, 455, 458-59] [city ordinance may, consistent with First Amendment, prohibit vehicles from using sound-amplifying devices]; Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City of Concord, N.H. (1st Cir. 2008) 513 F.3d 27 [rejecting First Amendment attack on city ordinance banning all electronic messaging signs, including signs that appear animated or projected]; Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie (8th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3d 793, 797-798 [upholding, against First Amendment challenge, ordinance prohibiting signs with movable displays]; La Tour v. City of Fayetteville, Ark. (8th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 1094, 1095-1100 [First Amendment notwithstanding, city may prohibit all signs that flash or blink]; State v. Dahl (Minn.Ct.App. 2004) 676 N.W.2d 305 [affirming defendant’s conviction under, and rejecting First Amendment challenge to, city ordinance banning “motion signs”—signs that revolve, rotate, have moving parts, or display motion].) But the First Amendment requires that such an ordinance be drawn with more precision than the one here. (See Welton v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 506.) The city’s ordinance, as construed by the city, is overbroad.
*830In sum, chapter 11.44 should be construed to avoid First Amendment concerns. It follows that because Hindi’s and SHARK’S anticruelty to animals message was noncommercial speech, it did not fall within the ban of chapter 11.44. Thus, I would reverse.
A petition for a rehearing was denied October 6, 2008, and appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 17, 2008, S167583.