Court Opinion

ID: 9766069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:31:10.214488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:19.240326
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice CAPPY,
Concurring.
Respectfully, I concur in the majority’s result. I write separately because I would find that the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies in this instance.
The majority correctly sets forth the standard regarding the doctrine: Generally, a party is estopped from assuming a position inconsistent with her assertion in a previous action if her contention was successfully maintained. Trowbridge v. Scranton Artificial Limb Co., 560 Pa. 640, 747 A.2d 862, 864 (2000). The purpose of judicial estoppel is to “protect the integrity of the courts by preventing litigants from ‘playing fast and loose’ with the judicial system” by switching positions as the moment requires. Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 566 Pa. 494, 781 A.2d 1189, 1192 (2001) (citation omitted).
Yet the majority opinion omits relevant factual history. On September 25, 1998, at Wife’s request, the trial court issued an order prohibiting bifurcation of the economic issues from the divorce action. Wife subsequently filed a “Petition to Enforce Settlement Agreement” in which she asserted that the parties had reached an agreement on the distribution of their property. As a result, on October 19, 1999, the trial court entered a consent order distributing the marital assets based on the parties’ agreement that Wife filed to enforce. Wife now argues that the October 19, 1999 order is a nullity and that she is entitled to the property.
Wife is estopped from challenging the October 19, 1999 consent order. Wife has taken inconsistent positions: she *594initially asserted that there was a valid settlement agreement, but now contends that the agreement is void. Wife also successfully maintained her prior position in that she sought enforcement of the settlement agreement and obtained a consent order from the trial court distributing the marital property on that basis.
Wife argues that in a non-bifurcated divorce proceeding, a marital settlement agreement is a form of executory contract, and when the non-performing spouse dies before performance of its terms and before the issuance of a divorce decree, the divorce action abates, the court loses subject matter jurisdiction, the agreement is a nullity and the survivor accedes to the property. But this matter was bifurcated — at Wife’s request. Wife does not suggest that when the trial court entered the consent order, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, only that jurisdiction in that forum is now lost. Even assuming arguendo that the family court division loses jurisdiction, the matter is now in Orphans’ Court. Wife cannot now “play fast and loose” with the courts and change her position to suit her own ends. Accordingly, I would affirm the Superior Court on this basis.
Justice CASTILLE and NIGRO join this concurring opinion.