Court Opinion

ID: 9363793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 18:01:34.358235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:34.270703
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-14698    Document: 52-1     Date Filed: 01/17/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 20-14698
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       MICHAEL GORDON WATSON,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket Nos. 6:19-cv-01112-WWB-DCI,
                          6:17-cr-00283-RBD-DCI-1
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14698

                            ____________________

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Michael Watson appeals the district court’s denial of his 28
       U.S.C. section 2255 motion which had collaterally attacked his
       criminal sentence. Watson claimed that his trial counsel was inef-
       fective because counsel didn’t raise a viable suppression issue re-
       lated to the traffic stop that led to Watson’s arrest. We affirm.
                                        I.

              Watson pleaded guilty to possessing meth and marijuana
       with the intent to distribute them and possessing a firearm in fur-
       therance of the drug trafficking crime. He now contends his plea
       was involuntary and unknowing because counsel failed to raise
       with him or the district court that evidence from his traffic stop
       may have been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Wat-
       son asserts there was no reasonable suspicion drugs were in his car,
       and it was therefore unconstitutional for law enforcement to pro-
       long his traffic stop for driving with a suspended license to wait for
       a canine unit. The district court rejected these arguments and de-
       nied the section 2255 motion without holding a hearing. It found
       Watson’s ineffective assistance claim was barred by his guilty plea,
       and, even if it hadn’t been barred, it failed on the merits.
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       20-14698               Opinion of the Court                        3

                                       II.

              When reviewing a district court’s order denying a section
       2255 motion, we review legal conclusions de novo and factual find-
       ings for clear error. Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1137
       (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Whether counsel was ineffective pre-
       sents a mixed question of fact and law that is reviewed de novo.
       Payne v. United States, 566 F.3d 1276, 1277 (11th Cir. 2009).
                                       III.

              We agree with the district court that Watson’s motion fails.
       “A defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdic-
       tional challenges to the constitutionality of the conviction, and
       only an attack on the voluntary and knowing nature of the plea can
       be sustained.” Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir.
       1992). But a defendant doesn’t voluntarily and knowingly plead
       guilty when his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. See Hill v.
       Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56–60 (1985). “[W]here a petitioner faults
       his lawyer for failing to pursue a motion to suppress prior to enter-
       ing a plea, both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of
       Strickland turn on the viability of the motion to suppress.” Arvelo
       v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 788 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2015);
       see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (“Where
       defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim
       competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the de-
       fendant must . . . prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meri-
       torious . . . .”).
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                      20-14698

               The district court correctly concluded Watson’s Fourth
       Amendment claim was not viable. Even accepting Watson’s fac-
       tual description of the incident as true, the officer had reasonable
       suspicion there were drugs in the car, justifying a prolonged stop.
       First, after approaching Watson’s vehicle, the officer confirmed he
       was driving with a suspended license. See United States v. Pruitt,
       174 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A variety of factors may con-
       tribute to the formation of an objectively reasonable suspicion of
       illegal activity. . . . [A]mong those are driving with a suspended li-
       cense.” (quotation omitted)). Second, the officer noticed Watson
       appeared nervous. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)
       (“[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining
       reasonable suspicion.”). Third, when asked if had past arrests, 1
       Watson admitted he had previously been arrested for trafficking
       methamphetamine. See United States v. Bishop, 940 F.3d 1242,
       1249 n.4 (11th Cir. 2019) (although it carries less weight, “when
       viewed in totality with the other relevant factors, knowledge of a
       defendant’s criminal history” may contribute to reasonable suspi-
       cion). Fourth, the officer noticed boxes of sandwich bags on the

       1
         In United States v. Campbell, we held that questions asked during a traffic
       stop may be unlawful if they (1) are unrelated inquires aimed at investigating
       other crimes, (2) add time to the stop , and (3) lack reasonable suspicion. 26
       F.4th 860, 885 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, No. 21-1468, 2022 WL
       4651666 (Oct. 3, 2022). Here, Watson’s arrest history was related to the traffic
       stop’s purpose. It could shed insight on whether he had knowledge of his sus-
       pended license. See Fla. Stat. § 322.34(3). And, if he drove with a suspended
       license “knowingly,” greater penalties applied. Id. § 322.34 (1)–(2).
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       20-14698                Opinion of the Court                         5

       car floorboard. See United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1076
       n.10 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that an officer “testified that, based on
       his experience, a large number of smaller baggies ‘usually means
       that somebody is fixing to distribute [drugs] into smaller baggies to
       make purchase of it, to make sales’”) (alteration in original));
       United States v. Perry, 14 F.4th 1253, 1261, 1275 (11th Cir. 2021)
       (characterizing “numerous boxes of sandwich baggies” as “drug
       paraphernalia”).
              Any of these four facts alone may not have amounted to rea-
       sonable suspicion. See, e.g., Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294, 1302
       (11th Cir. 2001) (“[N]ervousness, standing alone, cannot provide
       ‘reasonable suspicion’ . . . .”). But that is not our analysis. “We may
       not consider each fact only in isolation, and reasonable suspicion
       may exist even if each fact ‘alone is susceptible of innocent expla-
       nation.’” United States v. Bautista-Silva, 567 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th
       Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277
       (2002)). From the collective facts, “a trained officer draws infer-
       ences and makes deductions—inferences and deductions that
       might well elude an untrained person.” United States v. Cortez,
       449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
              The totality of the circumstances gave the officer “a minimal
       level of objective justification”—in other words, reasonable suspi-
       cion—to believe contraband was in the car and to prolong the stop
       to await the arrival of a canine unit to investigate further. United
       States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 970 (11th Cir. 2003). That the officer
       may have finished issuing Watson’s ticket for driving with a
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                20-14698

       suspended license before calling for the canine unit doesn’t render
       the detention unconstitutional. See United States v. Hernandez,
       418 F.3d 1206, 1212 n.7 (11th Cir. 2005) (underlining “that police
       are not constitutionally required to move at top speed or as fast as
       possible,” and ruling fifty-minute detention permissible where of-
       ficer had to call for a canine unit). Nor does the fact that Watson
       was placed in the back of the police car for forty-five minutes while
       awaiting the unit’s arrival. See United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347,
       1350–51 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding under Terry a seventy-five-mi-
       nute, handcuffed detention in the back of a police car); United
       States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (permitting
       sixty-minute detention under Terry).
               Even if the detention as a whole lasted longer than reasona-
       ble for a suspended license traffic stop, the facts that arose during
       the suspended license portion of the stop—confirmation of sus-
       pended license driving, nervousness, a prior drug arrest, and boxes
       of plastic baggies—established reasonable suspicion that an addi-
       tional crime was being committed and justified prolonging the de-
       tention to investigate. See Hernandez, 418 F.3d at 1206 (holding
       that when officer conducting a traffic stop developed “reason to
       suspect that he was not dealing with just a speeding case” he then
       had “reason to detain [d]efendant longer than perhaps a traffic stop,
       in itself, would allow”); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 575
       U.S. 348, 355 (2015) (explaining that officers may prolong traffic
       stops when they have reasonable suspicion).
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       20-14698                   Opinion of the Court                               7

                                            IV.

              Because Watson’s Fourth Amendment claim was not viable,
       his counsel’s failure to raise it with him and the district court didn’t
       constitute ineffective assistance of counsel nor render his guilty
       plea involuntary or unknowing. The district court properly denied
       his section 2255 motion. 2
               AFFIRMED.

       2 Our  certificate of appealability encompassed whether Watson was entitled
       to an evidentiary hearing on his motion. He was not because his alleged facts,
       even if true, conclusively showed he was not entitled to relief. See Aron v.
       United States, 291 F.3d 708, 714–15 (11th Cir. 2002); Rosin v. United States,
       786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The district court is not required to grant
       a petitioner an evidentiary hearing if the [section] 2255 motion and the files
       and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
       relief.” (quotation omitted)).