Court Opinion

ID: 9633134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:34:56.483353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:29.743400
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.
I dissent.
The language of the exclusion clause of the homeowner’s policy, “arising out of the ... use ... of a motor vehicle,” is clear and unambiguous when applied to the facts of this case. Neither, statute nor public policy precludes giving effect to the exclusion clause before us, and it should be enforced in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the parties.
Insurance policies are contracts to be construed according to traditional contract principles requiring’ courts to take cognizance of the intent of the parties. While it is true exclusion clauses must be interpreted narrowly, with ambiguity being construed against the insurer, language considered ambiguous when applied to some circumstances is not ambiguous per se, but must be judged by the facts of each case. (Herzog v. National American Ins. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 192 [84 Cal.Rptr. 705, 465 P.2d 841].)1
Because the negligent driving of an automobile was found to have been a direct and proximate cause of the accident, this occurrence comes within the express language of the exclusion clause, which negates coverage. In no way does the contract indicate the exclusion clause will be rendered inapplicable by the circumstance that there were other nonexcluded causes of the accident. The clause manifests the intent of the parties to exclude *108coverage by the homeowner’s policy for accidents caused by high-risk, auto-related activity, and the rates were no doubt fixed and paid accordingly. (See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Edgerly (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 334, 340 [107 Cal. Rptr. 246].) Foreseeing the possibility of car-related negligence actions, the prudent person seeks the coverage of an automobile liability policy— this the insured did. This court should not now add to the homeowner’s policy, in the guise of construction, a provision nullifying the exclusion clause in cases of concurrent proximate causation. Such provision would be consistent neither with the contract as written nor with the reasonable expectations of the parties.
Although section 530 of the Insurance Code mandates coverage when the insured peril is the proximate cause of the accident and the excluded peril is a remote cause, neither statute nor public policy precludes .giving effect to an exclusion clause when the causes are independent, concurrent and proximate. To the contrary, section 532 of that code reflects a policy of effectuating exclusion clauses in cases similar to this. Within the limits of Sabella v. Wisler (1963) 59 Cal.2d 21 [27 Cal.Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889]2 (see ante, p. 105, fn. 11), the section requires that, in cases of concurrent causation when the expected peril is a “but for” cause and the immediate cause of the loss was a nonexcepted peril, the exclusion clause will be controlling.3
Two cases in particular are relied on by the majority as factually and legally similar to this one. In Brooks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 305 [163 P.2d 689], in which a cancer patient succumbed to accidental injuries in part because of his existing condition, the court found the excluded cause was remote, stating: “[Recovery may be had even though a diseased or infirm condition [the excluded risk] appears to actually contribute to cause the death if the accident [the insured risk] sets in progress the chain of events leading directly to death, or if it is the prime or moving cause.” (Id. at pp. 309-310.) In Sabella v. Wisler, supra, the insured risk (rupture of a sewer line) was the efficient proximate cause, the one setting the excluded cause (subsidence) in motion.
*109In both cases coverage was properly allowed, for certainly an insured may reasonably expect that remote, incidental, or dependent causes will be disregarded in determining his coverage. However, in the instant case, the excluded cause was not remote, incidental, or dependent, but rather was direct, proximate, and independent; and, as the majority appears to concede (ante, p. 104), it can hardly be said the risk insured against by the homeowner’s policy was the “prime,” “moving,” or “efficient” cause.
Under the circumstances, we should give effect to the exclusion clause in accordance with the obvious expectations of the parties.
I would reverse the judgment.
McComb, J., concurred.

The majority cites numerous cases allowing coverage when, unlike the instant case, there was obvious ambiguity in application of the exclusion clause to the facts. For instance, in Great American Indem. Co. of New York v. Saltzman (8th Cir. 1954) 213 F.2d 743, the policy excluded use of aircraft. The insured entered an airplane without permission to examine the instruments, accidentally causing it to move. In Assurance Company of America v. Bell (1963) 108 Ga.App. 766 [134 S.E.2d 540], the act of insured’s child entering a car and accidentally releasing the brakes was held not to be “use” of the car. In these cases, it was reasonable to conclude the activity failed to constitute “use” of the vehicles and coverage was granted.
In other cases relied on by the majority, use of the vehicle was tenuously related to the chain of events causing the accident, automobile and homeowners’ policies therefore both providing coverage. (E.g., Brenner v. Aetna Insurance Company (1968) 8 Ariz.App. 272 [445 P.2d 474, 479]; Richland Knox Mutual Insurance Company v. Kallen (6th Cir. 1967) 376 F.2d 360, 364.) Each involved a close question whether the accident arose out of “use” of a vehicle. It was therefore proper to construe the coverage clause liberally and on the same facts construe the identical wording of the exclusion clause of the homeowner’s policy narrowly, resulting in overlapping coverage. Such results comport with the reasonable expectations of the parties but are inapplicable here.

Sabella says, in effect, that because of a conflict with section 530, section 532 is inoperative where a “but for” cause is too remote to be regarded as proximate. Sabella does not say that section 532 conflicts with section 530 when it is applied to exclude coverage of an occurrence concurrently and proximately caused by an excluded peril.

The broad language, “ ‘It has been held that when two causes join in causing an injury, one of which is insured against, the insured is covered by the policy ....’” (Hughes v. Potomac Ins. Co. (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 239, 244 [18 Cal.Rptr. 650]; Zimmerman v. Continental Life Ins. Co. (1929) 99 Cal.App. 723, 726 [279 P. 464]), is contrary to section 532 (even as construed in Sabella v. Wisler, supra) and should not be relied on in this case.