Court Opinion

ID: 9906016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 19:02:32.953122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.181788
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 P. v. Ernst CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Sutter)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096254

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                             (Super. Ct. No.
                                                                                          CRF060001103)
           v.

 SCOTT KEITH ERNST,                                                                ORDER MODIFYING
                                                                                  OPINION AND DENYING
                    Defendant and Appellant.                                           REHEARING

                                                                                        [NO CHANGE IN
                                                                                          JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

         It is ordered that the opinion filed in this case on October 31, 2023, be modified
as follows:

                                                             1
On page 4, delete the third full paragraph beginning with “We have no difficulty
concluding” and replace with the following:

       We have no difficulty concluding that an individual who tortured a victim is not
similarly situated to an individual who did not kill, did not intend to kill, or was not a
major participant in a crime, and the Legislature could rationally determine that someone
who imposed torture should be punished differently. Defendant seeks to avoid this
distinction by contending that his specific conviction for torture, with malice imputed
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, makes him similarly situated to
individuals convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under a theory of
imputed malice, who are potentially eligible for resentencing. (See CALCRIM No. 402;
People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 260-263.) Even if we were to accept that
premise, we would still conclude the Legislature could rationally “ ‘ “take one step at a
time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind.” ’ ” (Kasler v. Lockyer, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 482.) And even if
defendant’s conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter places him in a group
similarly situated to individuals convicted of attempted murder or voluntary
manslaughter, the Legislature could have reasonably determined there was no need to
permit resentencing for attempted voluntary manslaughter because that crime is generally
subject to a lesser punishment. Attempted voluntary manslaughter is subject to 18
months, three years, or five years six months in state prison (§§ 193, subd. (a), 664,
subd. (a)), whereas voluntary manslaughter is subject to three, six, or 11 years in state
prison (§ 193) and attempted murder is subject to five, seven, or nine years (§ 664,
subd. (a)). To the extent part of the Legislature’s focus was on reducing the duration of
incarceration, it was rationale to address crimes with generally higher sentences.

       This modification does not change the judgment.

                                              2
       The petition for rehearing is denied.

FOR THE COURT:

    /S/
HULL, Acting P. J.

   /S/
MAURO, J.

    /S/
KEITHLEY, J.*

* Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                               3
Filed 10/31/23 P. v. Ernst CA3 (unmodified opinion)
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Sutter)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                                  C096254

           v.                                                                             (Super. Ct. No.
                                                                                          CRF060001103)
 SCOTT KEITH ERNST,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Scott Keith Ernst appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition
seeking relief under Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30, 2022,
former section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6 without change to the text.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the current statute.

                                                             1
Defendant contends the trial court (1) should have applied section 1172.6 to his
convictions for torture and attempted voluntary manslaughter, and (2) should have
appointed counsel for him. Finding no merit in the contentions, we will affirm the trial
court’s order.
                                     BACKGROUND
       In 2008, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter,
torture, first degree robbery, conspiracy to commit first degree robbery, assault with
a deadly weapon, criminal threats, malicious disfigurement, second degree robbery,
and carjacking. The trial court sentenced defendant to life in state prison for torture, plus
12 years four months in state prison for the remaining offenses.
       In 2022, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition. As relevant here, the petition
alleged he could not presently be convicted of torture or attempted voluntary
manslaughter2 due to changes in the law. Defendant requested the appointment of
counsel and a hearing.
       The trial court determined the petition was facially deficient because
neither of defendant’s convictions are eligible for relief under section 1172.6.
The trial court summarily denied the petition without appointing counsel or holding a
hearing.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
       Defendant contends the trial court should have applied section 1172.6 to his
convictions for torture and attempted voluntary manslaughter. He argues there is an
overriding legislative purpose that permits courts to look beyond the language of the

2 Defendant’s petition incorrectly referenced attempted “involuntary” manslaughter
rather than attempted voluntary manslaughter. We assume this was a mistake and we
refer to his correct conviction in this opinion.

                                              2
statute and resentence a defendant convicted of a crime having a mental state equivalent
to malice and who was sentenced to an indeterminate life term. In addition, he claims it
would violate equal protection to exclude torture and attempted voluntary manslaughter
from resentencing eligibility.
       In interpreting a statute, we begin by considering the statute’s words, giving
them a plain and commonsense meaning. (People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1421.)
If the words are clear, we need go no further. (Ibid.)
       Here, the statute allows petitions from defendants convicted of murder, attempted
murder, and manslaughter. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1), (2).) The statute does not mention
attempted manslaughter or torture, nor does it mention any test for including other
offenses, whether based on the required mental state or the potential punishment. We
presume the Legislature meant what it said and, had it wanted courts to reach other
crimes, it would have said so. In fact, in 2021 it amended the statute to include attempted
murder and manslaughter but did not add attempted manslaughter or torture and did not
authorize courts to apply the statute to unspecified offenses. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2;
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3.)
       Defendant argues in the alternative that section 1172.6 denies equal protection to
people convicted of attempted manslaughter and torture by excluding them from its
resentencing scheme while including those convicted of murder, attempted murder, and
manslaughter. Both the state and federal Constitutions extend to persons the equal
protection of law, entitling persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate
purpose of the law to receive like treatment. (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277,
287 (Chatman); see U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)
California Supreme Court precedent does not differentiate between the state and federal
guarantees of equal protection for claims arising from allegedly unequal consequences
associated with different types of criminal offenses. (Chatman, at 287.)

                                              3
       “In order to decide whether a statutory distinction is so devoid of even minimal
rationality that it is unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection, we typically ask two
questions.” (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 289.) First, whether “ ‘ “the state has
adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal
manner.” [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for
all purposes, but “whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law
challenged.” ’ ” (People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1202, italics omitted.)
“Normally ‘offenders who commit different crimes are not similarly situated’ for equal
protection purposes.” (People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 888; accord
People v. Barrera (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1565.)
       The second question is “whether the challenged classification ultimately bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” (Chatman, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 289.)
“A classification in a statute is presumed rational until the challenger shows that no
rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable.” (Ibid.) “[T]he
Legislature is afforded considerable latitude in defining and setting the consequences of
criminal offenses.” (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 887; see
also Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472, 482 [“the state may recognize that different
categories or classes of persons within a larger classification may pose varying degrees of
risk of harm, and properly may limit a regulation to those classes of persons as to whom
the need for regulation is thought to be more crucial or imperative”].)
       We have no difficulty concluding that an individual who tortured a victim is not
similarly situated to an individual who did not kill, did not intend to kill, or was not a
major participant in a crime, and the Legislature could rationally determine that someone
who imposed torture should be punished differently. And even if defendant’s conviction
for attempted voluntary manslaughter places him in a group similarly situated to
individuals convicted of attempted murder or voluntary manslaughter, the Legislature
could have reasonably determined there was no need to permit resentencing for attempted

                                              4
voluntary manslaughter because that crime is generally subject to a lesser punishment.
Attempted voluntary manslaughter is subject to 18 months, three years, or five years six
months in state prison (§§ 193, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)), whereas voluntary manslaughter
is subject to three, six, or 11 years in state prison (§ 193) and attempted murder is subject
to five, seven, or nine years (§ 664, subd. (a)). To the extent part of the Legislature’s
focus was on reducing the duration of incarceration, it was rationale to address crimes
with generally higher sentences.
         Section 1172.6 does not violate defendant’s right to equal protection of the laws.
                                               II
         Defendant further contends the trial court should have appointed counsel for him.
He focuses on the portion of People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 discussing
appointment of counsel and an opportunity for briefing, but Lewis explains that a
petitioner is entitled to appointment of counsel only upon the filing of a facially sufficient
petition. (Lewis, at p. 957; see also § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).)
         To be sufficient under section 1172.6, a petition must facially establish
that the requirements for eligibility are satisfied. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708; § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A)-(C).) As relevant here, it must declare that
defendant was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(2).) Defendant’s petition declared he was convicted of torture and attempted
voluntary manslaughter. As we have explained, those convictions are not referenced
in the statute. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the petition without
appointing counsel.
         Defendant also contends the trial court should have informed him of the defects
in the petition and given him an opportunity to amend. But the statute makes no
mention of amending a facially insufficient petition. Rather, it requires denial
without prejudice. (§ 11726, subd. (b)(2).) Defendant has not established trial court
error.

                                               5
                                       DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for relief pursuant
to section 1172.6 is affirmed.

                                                      /S/
                                                   MAURO, J.

We concur:

    /S/
HULL, Acting P. J.

    /S/
KEITHLEY, J.*

* Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                              6