Court Opinion

ID: 9628782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:31:54.67753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:11.238111
License: Public Domain

DENECKE, C. J.,
dissenting.
The majority states the issue to be whether the trial court’s instruction violates the defendant’s right against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution.
I am of the opinion that we should not decide this case on a constitutional issue. I conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the trial court’s instruction is not proper criminal trial practice and, therefore, the conviction should be reversed.
When the United States Supreme Court holds for the defendant in a criminal case, it frequently bases its decision on "the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts * * McNabb v. United States, 318 US 332, 341, 63 S Ct 608, 87 L Ed 819 (1943). United States v. Hale, 422 US 171, 95 S Ct 2133, 45 L Ed2d 99 (1975), applied the same principle. As the opinions in these two cases indicate, it follows this procedure although the defendant has argued solely on constitutional issues.
The Oregon Court of Appeals has used this practice; that is, deciding cases on nonconstitutional grounds although constitutional grounds were urged. Neuhaus v. Federico, 12 Or App 314, 317, 505 P2d 939 (1973).
In my opinion the reason for such a principle is the rigidity of constitutional rulings. If a court declares a practice contrary to the Federal or State Constitutions, the legislative branches cannot effect any change. Change by the people is difficult, particularly if it must be accomplished by amending the Federal Constitution. Courts should be sensitive to barring legisla*590tive action when non-constitutional alternative solutions are available.
If a court holds against a defendant in a criminal case who is claiming rights under the Federal or State Constitutions, the court must necessarily decide the constitutional issue.
This court has not yet expressly held that we have supervisory power over the administration of justice in the trial courts. The Court of Appeals has expressly recognized it has that power. State v. Gassner, 6 Or App 452, 459, 488 P2d 822 (1971). This court has repeatedly assumed we have that power. Two examples are State v. Shipley, 232 Or 354, 360-362, 375 P2d 237 (1962), cert den 374 US 811, 83 S Ct 1701, 10 L Ed2d 1034 (1963), and State v. Marsh, 260 Or 416, 435-444, 490 P2d 491 (1971).
In Shipley we considered whether to adopt the McNabb-Mallory rule. We recognized the rule as one based upon supervisory power over the practice of the trial courts. We refused to adopt the rule, not because of a lack of authority, but because we deemed the rule inadvisable. In Marsh we considered the "dynamite” instruction given to juries which appear to be having trouble in reaching a verdict in a criminal case. We held the dynamite instruction given was improper but not reversible error because no exception was taken. We also approved a modified instruction on that general subject. The only basis for our decision could be our supervisory power over the trial courts.
Turning to the merits of the present case, the defense attorney decided his client would be prejudiced if the court instructed that the jury could draw no inferences from the defendant’s failure to testify. He so informed the court. The question of whether the defendant was or would be prejudiced by such an instruction is debatable and probably unanswerable. I can think of no reason why the instruction should be given over defendant’s objection. I disagree with the trial court that over defendant’s objection it was *591necessary to give it to protect the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.
The decision by counsel not to have the instruction given was a decision based on trial strategy. Unless the trial court has substantial and justifiable doubt of the competency of counsel, the trial court should not interfere with that strategy. If counsel’s requests made pursuant to such strategy are otherwise not objectionable, the trial court should grant the requests.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.