Court Opinion

ID: 9955543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 18:03:01.928099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:04.671746
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Alvarez CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B322652

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BA277752)
           v.

 JUAN MANUAL ALVAREZ,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Reversed and remanded
with directions.
      Tracy J. Dressner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer and Noah P. Hill, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
               __________________________________
       Juan Manual Alvarez, who was convicted of 11 counts of
first degree murder in 2008, appeals from the trial court’s order
denying a petition for resentencing under Penal Code former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6)1 that he brought in October
2021.2 He contends the trial court erred in denying the petition
at the prima facie stage because the record of his convictions does
not demonstrate he is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as
a matter of law. He asserts that his murder convictions were
based on an arson felony murder theory, and the trial court
engaged in impermissible factfinding when it found he was the
actual killer and therefore ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law. We agree with Alvarez that the record

      1 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was

renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10).
      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
      2 This is Alvarez’s second petition under former section

1170.95. He brought the first petition on July 16, 2019, and the
trial court summarily denied it on August 9, 2019, without
appointing counsel, allowing briefing, or holding a hearing.
Alvarez appealed that order, his counsel did not raise an issue in
the opening brief, and we dismissed the appeal as abandoned
because Alvarez did not file a supplemental brief (see People v.
Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496; People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216). (People v. Alvarez (July 27, 2020, B301306)
[nonpub. opn.].) The trial court did not find the present second
petition to be an impermissible successive petition (and the
People have not argued that it is) because of developments in the
law after the first petition was denied, namely the requirement
that the court appoint counsel for a petitioner who files a facially
sufficient petition under former section 1170.95, now section
1172.6. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis).)

                                 2
of his convictions does not establish as a matter of law that he
was the “actual killer” within the meaning of the current felony
murder statute (§ 189), or otherwise ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the
petition and remand the matter for further proceedings under
section 1172.6.
                          BACKGROUND
I.     Brief Overview of the Circumstances of the Offenses
       As context for the parties’ arguments in this appeal, we
provide the following brief account of the circumstances of the
offenses, taken from this court’s opinion in Alvarez’s direct appeal
of his convictions. (People v. Alvarez (Jan. 24, 2012, B210418)
[nonpub. opn.].) Our resolution of the present appeal is not
dependent upon this factual account, but rather upon the
theories presented, jury instructions given, and verdicts returned
at Alvarez’s trial, which we summarize below.
       On January 26, 2005, Alvarez poured gasoline over the
hood, roof, and sides of his Jeep Cherokee Sport, drove the Jeep
onto railroad tracks in Glendale, later exited the vehicle, and ran
away from the tracks. A southbound Metrolink train struck
Alvarez’s Jeep, the cab car of the train derailed, and the Jeep
became embedded underneath the derailed cab car. Sparks and
frictional heat ignited vapors from the gasoline Alvarez poured
onto the Jeep, and the resulting fire burned the Jeep and part of
the cab car as they continued to move along the tracks. The
wheels of the derailed cab car caught a switch, and the cab car
rolled onto a siding where it crashed into a parked freight
locomotive. The cab car and the next passenger car of the
southbound Metrolink train jackknifed and smashed into
passenger cars of a northbound Metrolink train, which also

                                 3
derailed. Eleven passengers from the two Metrolink trains died
from blunt force trauma (and 185 other passengers were injured).
(People v. Alvarez, supra, B210418, pp. 2-3.)
II.    Trial and Direct Appeal
       A.    Charges
       An amended information charged Alvarez with 11 counts of
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), one count of arson (§ 451, subd. (d)),
and one count of train wrecking (§ 219). As to each murder
count, the amended information alleged the special circumstance
that Alvarez committed the murders while engaged in the crime
of train wrecking within the meaning of section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(17). The amended information also alleged a
multiple murder special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).)
       The prosecution presented three theories of first degree
murder to the jury: (1) a willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing with express malice aforethought; (2) an unlawful killing
during the commission or attempted commission of arson (arson
felony murder); and (3) an unlawful killing during the
commission or attempted commission of train wrecking (train
wrecking felony murder). Alvarez (in his trial testimony) and his
counsel (during argument) told the jury that Alvarez’s intent
when he parked his vehicle on the train tracks was to commit
suicide, but he changed his mind and was unable to remove his
car from the tracks before he ran away from the vehicle to avoid
the oncoming train.
       B.    Argument to the Jury
       The prosecutor argued to the jury that under the evidence
presented, it could find Alvarez guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of first degree murder under any of the three theories specified
above.

                                4
        At the outset of the opening argument, the prosecutor
informed the jury, “you do not need to find an intent to kill in this
case to convict Mr. Alvarez of first degree murder.” The
prosecutor repeated that point throughout the argument. The
prosecutor told the jury it could find Alvarez guilty of first degree
felony murder if the victims died during the commission or
attempted commission of arson or train wrecking, “whether [the
victims] died intentionally, unintentionally or accidentally;” and
“it does not matter what the actual cause of death is.”
        Defense counsel argued to the jury that Alvarez was not
guilty of first degree murder because the evidence did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to kill anyone, or
intended to commit arson or train wrecking. Counsel further
asserted, “This case has almost been exclusively from the
Government’s perspective about the arson, because the other two
theories of first degree murder are just not viable” based on the
evidence presented.
        In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor again reviewed the
three theories of first degree murder. Regarding the two theories
of felony murder, the prosecutor told the jury, “This is obviously a
much easier way to get to first degree murder. You don’t have to
sit there and say, you know, is there enough for first degree
premeditated murder.”
        The prosecutor explained arson felony murder liability to
the jury, using the following example: “[I]f I decide to burn my
car . . . and in doing so I parked in the garage of a high-rise
building, and in doing so I cause a fire, and the fire is coming up
the building, and there’s people that are working up there and
they can’t get out, and the only way out, because they don’t want
to burn to death because they know that’s going to be a really bad

                                  5
death, they choose to jump out that window and they fall to their
death. [¶] I’m still responsible for that, even though they didn’t
burn. That’s how this works. I can’t say, well, I didn’t know they
were going to jump out of the building. I didn’t know they were
going to get hurt. [¶] You are responsible if you decide to set fire
as in this case and other people die.”
       C.    Jury Instructions
       The trial court instructed the jury on the three theories of
first degree murder that the prosecution presented.3 Using
CALJIC No. 8.10, the court informed the jury:
       “Defendant is accused in Counts 1 through 11 of having
committed the crime of Murder, a violation of section 187 of the
Penal Code.
       “Every person who unlawfully kills a human being with
malice aforethought or during the commission or attempted
commission of Arson or Train Wrecking, is guilty of the crime of
Murder in violation of section 187.
       “In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements
must be proved:
       “1. A human being was killed;
       “2. The killing was unlawful; and
       “3. The killing was done with malice aforethought or
occurred during the commission or attempted commission of
Arson or Train Wrecking.” The trial court next instructed the
jury on the definition of malice (CALJIC No. 8.11) and willful,
deliberate, and premedicated first degree murder (CALJIC No.
8.20).

      3 The trial court also instructed the jury on second degree

murder. Alvarez was not convicted of that crime, and those
instructions are not germane to his petition or this appeal.

                                 6
       Using CALJIC No. 8.21, the trial court instructed the jury
as follows regarding felony murder:
       “The unlawful killing of a human being, whether
intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the
commission or attempted commission of the crime of Arson or
Train Wrecking is Murder of the First Degree when the
perpetrator had the specific intent to commit that crime.
       “The specific intent to commit Arson or Train Wrecking and
the commission or attempted commission of either crime must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. There must also be a logical
connection between the act causing the death and the Arson or
Train Wrecking. This connection must involve more than just
their occurrence at the same time and place.”
       The trial court also instructed the jury on the elements of
arson with CALJIC No. 14.83: “1. The defendant set fire to or
burned or caused to be burned his own personal property; [¶] 2.
The fire was set or the burning was done willfully and
maliciously; and [¶] 3. The fire or burning resulted in injury to
another person’s property.”
       Using CALJIC No. 9.97, the trial court set forth the
elements of train wrecking as follows: “1. A person threw out a
switch, removed a rail, or placed any obstruction on any railroad;
[¶] 2. The person had the specific intent to derail any passenger,
freight or other train, car or engine; and [¶] 3. Caused derailment
of the passenger, freight, or other train, car or engine.”
       Regarding the train wrecking special circumstance
allegation, the trial court instructed the jury as follows with
CALJIC No. 8.81.17:

                                7
       “To find that the special circumstance referred to in these
instructions as murder in the commission of Train Wrecking is
true, it must be proved:
       “1. The murder was committed while the defendant was
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a Train
Wrecking; and
       “2. Any person suffered death as a result, meaning that an
illegal act was a cause of the death. A legal cause of the death is
an act that sets in motion a chain of events that produces the
death as a direct, natural and probable consequence of the act
and without which the death would not occur.”
       D.    Verdicts and Sentence
       The jury found Alvarez guilty of 11 counts of first degree
murder and one count of arson, and not guilty of train wrecking.
As to each of the murder counts, the jury found not true the
special circumstance allegation that Alvarez committed the
murders while engaged in the crime of train wrecking. The jury
found the multiple murder special circumstance to be true.
       After a penalty phase trial, the trial court sentenced
Alvarez to 11 consecutive terms of life in prison without the
possibility of parole (in accordance with the jury’s verdicts), and
imposed and stayed a two-year middle term for the arson.
       E.    Direct Appeal
       Alvarez appealed from the judgment of his convictions, and
we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Alvarez, supra, B210418, pp.
2, 21.) We noted in the opinion, Alvarez “concedes that ‘the
record supports that the jury convicted [him] of first degree
murder based on arson felony murder,’ aptly given the jury
convicted him of arson.” (Id. at p. 15.) We rejected his claims of
instructional and evidentiary error, including his contentions (1)

                                8
that the trial court erred in refusing his request to instruct the
jury on causation and (2) that “the evidence was insufficient to
support his murder convictions because there was no logical
connection between the arson and the deaths and because he
lacked the specific intent to commit arson.” (Id. at pp. 10, 14.)
We stated in the opinion, “Because [Alvarez] was the actual
killer, no logical nexus [between the felony and the deaths] is
required. Instead, the killings and arson just need to be parts of
one continuous transaction.” (Id. at p. 12.) Our passing reference
to Alvarez as the “actual killer” in our opinion in his direct appeal
predates the inclusion of this term in the felony murder statute
(§ 189) and, accordingly, predates case law defining that term for
purposes of section 189, subdivision (e)(1).
III. The Present Petition for Resentencing
       In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 “to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Sen. Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f), p. 6674; §§ 188, subd. (a)(3) &
189, subd. (e).) Senate Bill No. 1437 amended sections 188
(defining malice) and 189 (felony murder) and added section
1170.95, now renumbered section 1172.6, which established a
procedure for vacating murder convictions and resentencing
defendants who could no longer be convicted of murder in light of
the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 4, pp. 6675–6677.)

                                  9
       Section 189, subdivision (e), added by Senate Bill No. 1437,
states: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) [including
robbery and burglary] in which a death occurs is liable for
murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person
was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The
person was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”
       On October 12, 2021, Alvarez, as a self-represented litigant,
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.4
He used a preprinted form for a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. He alleged in the petition that he was convicted of first
degree murder under a theory of felony murder (or the natural
and probable consequences doctrine), and he could not now be
convicted of that crime because of changes to sections 188 and
189, effective January 1, 2019. He argued the evidence presented
at trial was insufficient to show he acted with reckless
indifference to human life within the meaning of People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522,
and the court should conduct an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d). He requested appointment of
counsel.

      4 For the remainder of this opinion, we refer to the statute

by its current designation, section 1172.6.

                                10
       On October 25, 2021, the trial court issued a minute order,
summarily denying Alvarez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus,
concluding Banks and Clark are inapplicable because “the jury
found, as did the Court of Appeal in affirming petitioner’s
convictions on January 24, 2012 (case B210418), that petitioner
was the actual and sole killer in these multiple murders.”
Regarding the section 1172.6 petition for resentencing, the court
appointed counsel for Alvarez and ordered the district attorney to
file a response to the petition.
       In its response, the district attorney argued Alvarez is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law
because he “was the sole participant in the crime and the actual
killer.” The district attorney added, “As such, Petitioner ‘could’
and would be found guilty of murder under the law made
effective January 1, 2019.” The district attorney attached to the
response this court’s opinion in Alvarez’s direct appeal of his
convictions and noted that “on more than one occasion” that
opinion refers to Alvarez as the “actual killer.”
       Alvarez, through appointed counsel, filed a reply brief. He
argued he is not ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a
matter of law because the record of his convictions does not
demonstrate as a matter of law that he was the actual killer. The
jury did not make an express finding that he was the actual
killer, and he asserted that such a finding was not required for a
guilty verdict under the arson felony murder theory. Applying
the jury instructions on felony murder, “The jury merely found
that there was a logical connection between the deaths and the
arson.” Alvarez pointed out that the cause of the victims’ deaths
was blunt force trauma from the train wreck, but the jury found
him not guilty of train wrecking and found the train wrecking

                               11
special circumstance allegation to be not true. He maintained
that he does not qualify as an “actual killer” within the meaning
of section 189, subdivision (e)(1), added by Senate Bill No. 1437;
and the references to him as the “actual killer” in this court’s
opinion in his direct appeal were made before the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 and case law defined the term
“actual killer” for purposes of section 189, subdivision (e)(1). He
argued that any finding at the prima facie stage of the
proceedings that he was the actual killer would constitute
impermissible fact finding, and the trial court was required to
issue an order to show cause on the petition.
       Alvarez attached to the reply brief the jury instructions and
verdicts from his trial. He also attached then-recent case law,
People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 4 (Lopez), which defines
the term “actual killer” for purposes of section 189, subdivision
(e)(1) as “someone who personally killed the victim and is not
necessarily the same as a person who ‘caused’ the victim’s death.”
       On July 14, 2022, the trial court held a prima facie hearing
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). Consistent with the written
response to the petition, the deputy district attorney argued that
Alvarez was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter
of law because he was “the only one involved in this case. He was
the actual killer.” Defense counsel argued that the issue of
whether Alvarez was the actual killer cannot be resolved at the
prima facie stage because it requires fact finding on issues of
causation.
       The trial court disagreed with defense counsel and
concluded that the record of convictions establishes Alvarez is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
Citing People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45 (Harden),

                                12
which we discuss below, the trial court concluded the jury
instructions given at Alvarez’s trial demonstrate the jury
necessarily found that Alvarez was the actual killer. Specifically,
the court referenced CALJIC No. 8.10, which, as quoted above,
begins with the language, “Every person who unlawfully kills a
human being with malice aforethought or during the commission
or attempted commission of Arson or Train Wrecking, is guilty of
the crime of Murder in violation of section 187.” (Emphasis
added.) The court quoted a passage from Harden, stating, “ ‘This
language on its face tells the jury that “the person who
unlawfully kills” is guilty of murder. In common understanding,
this would refer to the person who inflicted the fatal injury.’ ”
(Harden, at p. 55.) The court noted that in Lopez, supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at page 17, the case relied upon by Alvarez, the trial
court gave the jury CALCRIM instructions, which did not include
the “every person who kills” language in the murder instruction,
but rather stated the defendant “committed an act that caused
the death of another person” (CALCRIM No. 520). The court also
noted that at Alvarez’s trial, the felony murder instruction
(CALJIC No. 8.21) began with the language, “The unlawful
killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or
accidental, which occurs during the commission or attempted
commission of the crime of Arson or Train Wrecking is Murder of
the First Degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to
commit that crime.” (Emphasis added.) But in Lopez, the felony
murder instruction (CALCRIM No. 540A) stated, “While
committing [the felony] the defendant caused the death of
another person.” (Lopez, at p. 16.) In denying Alvarez’s section
1172.6 petition, the trial court concluded that under the CALJIC
instructions, the jury necessarily found Alvarez was the actual

                                13
killer in finding him guilty of first degree murder. As explained
below, we disagree with this conclusion.
                             DISCUSSION
I.     Legal Principles Regarding Petitions for
       Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
       When a defendant files a facially sufficient petition under
section 1172.6, the trial court must appoint counsel to represent
the petitioner, allow briefing from both sides, and hold a hearing
to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)-(c).) As our Supreme
Court explained: “While the trial court may look at the record of
conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether
a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section [1172.6]
relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited.
Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus
proceedings, ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as
true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual
allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the
petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without
first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if
the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts
refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is
justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
       If the trial court issues an order to show cause, the final
step in the process (unless the parties stipulate to resentencing)
is a hearing to determine if the petitioner is entitled to relief,
where the trial court must vacate the petitioner’s murder

                                14
convictions and resentence him or her on any remaining counts
unless the prosecution can “prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as
amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       “Whether the court conducted a proper inquiry under
section [1172.6], subdivision (c)” at the prima facie stage—the
issue before us—“is a question of statutory interpretation, which
we review de novo.” (People v. Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
429, 437; Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52 [“We
independently review a trial court’s determination on whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie showing”].)
II.    The Record of Alvarez’s Convictions Does Not
       Establish as a Matter of Law That He Was the
       “Actual Killer” Within the Meaning of Section 189,
       Subdivision (e)
       It is undisputed here that Alvarez filed a facially sufficient
petition under section 1172.6, subdivision (b). The question is
whether he made a prima facie showing he is entitled to relief
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c).
       After the enactment of the amendments in Senate Bill No.
1437, to be liable for felony murder, “one of the following [must
be] proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The
person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill,
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).) The parties agree, as do we,

                                 15
that Alvarez made a prima facie showing on his section 1172.6
petition unless the record of his convictions establishes as a
matter of law that he was the actual killer. Section 189,
subdivision (e)(2) does not apply in this case because Alvarez was
not prosecuted as an aider and abettor; rather he was the sole
participant in the charged offenses. And a finding that he acted
with reckless indifference to human life within the meaning of
subdivision (e)(3) cannot be resolved at the prima facie stage on
the record before us without resort to impermissible factfinding.
Finally, the record of Alvarez’s convictions does not establish as a
matter of law that he was convicted of the first degree murders
based on a theory that he acted with malice aforethought. (§ 188,
subd. (a)(3).)
        For purposes of section 189, subdivision (e)(1), “actual
killer” means “someone who personally killed the victim and is
not necessarily the same as a person who ‘caused’ the victim’s
death.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 4.) Personally
inflicting harm and proximately causing harm “ ‘are two different
things.’ ” (Id. at p. 17.) “The Legislature was aware of that
difference when it chose to use the term actual killer in enacting
Senate Bill No. 1437 to add section 189[, subdivision ](e).” (Id. at
p. 18.)
        In the context of accomplice liability, a person who hands
the murder weapon to another is not the actual killer. (Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 18.) “ ‘The actual killer is the person
who personally kills the victim, whether by shooting, stabbing, or
. . . taping his mouth closed, resulting in death by asphyxiation.’ ”
(Ibid., quoting People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 152.)
It does not follow that a defendant is necessarily the actual killer
simply because he or she was the sole participant in a felony that

                                 16
resulted in death. “If mere participation in a qualifying felony
that results in death were sufficient to qualify one as the ‘actual
killer,’ the language in section 189, subdivision (e)(1) would be
superfluous.” (People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 88, fn.
omitted, (Vang).) Thus, the term “actual killer” as used in section
189, subdivision (e)(1) does not apply only in cases involving
accomplice liability, as the Attorney General suggests. (Id. at pp.
84, 87 [rejecting the Attorney General’s argument “that Senate
Bill [No.] 1437 was focused solely on accomplice liability for
felony murder and that the Legislature used the term ‘actual
killer’ merely to distinguish between a perpetrator and an
ordinary aider and abettor in cases involving multiple actors”].)
       For example, in Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at page 70,
the Court of Appeal reversed the defendant’s conviction for first
degree felony murder and vacated the felony murder special
circumstance finding in the defendant’s direct appeal, concluding
the conviction and true finding “rest[ed] on an invalid legal
theory.” The appellate court briefly summarized the facts of the
case as follows: “In short, defendant, who has a long history of
domestic violence, had an argument with his wife. After she fled
in her car, defendant followed, eventually forced her to stop, and
coerced her (through force or fear) into his vehicle. As defendant
was driving away, his wife opened the door and jumped from the
moving vehicle, resulting in her death.” (Id. at p. 69.) The Court
of Appeal affirmed the defendant’s conviction for kidnapping but
agreed with the defendant that the prosecution had “proceed[ed]
on a legally inadequate theory” of felony murder—that the
defendant was the actual killer—because “the evidence showed
that [the victim] jumped from the truck on her own volition, and
there was no evidence that defendant directly caused [the

                                17
victim’s] death.” (Id. at p. 80.) We note that in the present case,
the prosecutor presented a similar example to Alvarez’s jury to
illustrate felony murder liability (as quoted in full above)—people
jumping out of a building to their deaths on their own volition to
avoid a car fire set in a parking garage below.
       In defining the term “actual killer,” as used in section 189,
subdivision (e)(1), the Vang court explained: “In light of Senate
Bill No. 1437’s intent to impose punishment commensurate with
the person’s culpability, we conclude that the term ‘actual killer’
was intended to limit liability for felony murder—in cases where
section 189, subdivision (e)(2) or (e)(3) do not apply—to the actual
perpetrator of the killing, i.e., the person (or persons) who
personally committed the homicidal act. In other words, the
intent was to conform California law to the ‘agency theory’ of
felony murder liability, under which criminal culpability is
restricted to deaths directly caused by the defendant or an
accomplice, as distinguished from the ‘proximate cause’ theory of
felony murder, under which a defendant is responsible for any
death that proximately results from the unlawful activity.”
(Vang, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 88.)
       As the Attorney General acknowledges, the “key question
in determining whether the trial court properly denied [the
section 1172.6] petition is whether it was possible for a juror” to
have found Alvarez guilty of felony murder “without also finding
[he] personally killed the victim.” (Harden, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 54.) We conclude the answer to that query is
yes, and any conclusion here that Alvarez was the actual killer
would rest on impermissible fact finding at the prima facie stage.
       The jury made no express finding that Alvarez was the
actual killer—that he personally killed the victims. Under the

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jury instructions given at Alvarez’s trial, to find Alvarez guilty of
felony murder, the jury had to find, in pertinent part: (1) a
human being was killed (CALJIC No. 8.10); (2) the killing was
unlawful, whether intentional, unintentional, or accidental
(CALJIC Nos. 8.10 & 8.21); (3) the killing was done during the
commission or attempted commission of arson (CALJIC No. 8.10);
(4) Alvarez had the requisite intent to commit arson (CALJIC No.
8.21); and (5) there was a logical connection between the act
causing death and the arson (CALJIC No. 8.21). Under these
instructions, the jury was not required to find Alvarez personally
killed the victims before the jury could find him guilty of felony
murder. Rather, the jury had to find Alvarez committed arson (or
attempted arson) and there was a logical connection between the
arson and the deaths. It is undisputed that the victims died as a
result of blunt force trauma from the train collisions and not as a
result of injuries from the fire. The jury found Alvarez not guilty
of train wrecking, a crime that would have required the jury to
find (1) Alvarez placed an obstruction on the railroad; (2) Alvarez
“had the specific intent to derail any passenger, freight or other
train, car or engine”; and (3) he “[c]aused derailment of the
passenger, freight, or other train, car or engine.”
       We disagree with the Attorney General’s position and the
trial court’s conclusion that there is language in CALJIC Nos.
8.10 and 8.21 indicating the jury had to find Alvarez personally
killed the victims in order to find him guilty of felony murder.
Before setting forth the elements of murder, which we outlined
immediately above, CALJIC No. 8.10, as given to Alvarez’s jury,
includes the following introductory sentence: “Every person who
unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought or
during the commission or attempted commission of Arson or

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Train Wrecking, is guilty of the crime of Murder in violation of
Penal Code section 187.” (See also CALJIC No. 8.21 [“The
unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional,
unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the commission
or attempted commission of the crime of Arson or Train Wrecking
is Murder of the First Degree when the perpetrator had the
specific intent to commit that crime”].) We do not read
“unlawfully kills” to necessarily mean “personally kills.” Under
the elements of felony murder at the time of Alvarez’s trial, he
unlawfully killed the victims, i.e., he committed felony murder.
It was not material then whether he personally killed the victims
or set in motion a chain of events that resulted in the victims’
deaths.
       We recognize that in Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
pages 54-55, the case relied upon by the trial court, the Court of
Appeal concluded that the “ ‘every person who unlawfully kills’ ”
language in CALJIC No. 8.10 “ ‘on its face tells the jury that “the
person who unlawfully kills” is guilty of murder. In common
understanding, this would refer to the person who inflicted the
fatal injury.’ [Citation.] The jury was instructed on no
alternative definition of murder. Thus, Harden’s murder
conviction necessarily means the jury determined she actually
killed [the victim].” Harden is distinguishable because, there, in
denying the defendant’s petition for resentencing at the prima
facie stage, the appellate court also relied on other factors not
present here: (1) that the jury made an express finding that the
defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim,
who died by strangulation during the course of a robbery
committed solely by the defendant; and (2) that the jury found a
felony murder special circumstance to be true, after being

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instructed with CALJIC No. 8.80.1, which stated in pertinent
part: “ ‘If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant actually killed a human being, you need not find that
the defendant intended to kill in order to find the special
circumstance to be true.’ ” (Id. at pp. 48, 54, 59.)
       The other cases the Attorney General relies on are
similarly distinguishable in that it was undisputed there that the
defendants personally and directly applied force to the victims.
In People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 959, the Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order denying a petition for
resentencing after an evidentiary hearing, where the defendant
was convicted of robbery and first degree murder after he
“physically assaulted and stole money from an 82-year-old man,
who died about an hour later from lethal cardiac arrhythmia.”
The appellate court concluded “the defendant personally
committed the act(s) that directly resulted in the victim’s death.”
(Id. at p. 971.) In People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193,
1196, a defendant who was fleeing after a robbery hit a man with
his car after the man tried to stop him, knocking the man onto
the hood of the car. The man fell off the car, hit his head on the
pavement, and died. The jury convicted the defendant of
burglary, robbery, and first degree murder, and found true the
special allegation that the defendant personally used a deadly
and dangerous weapon (a car) in the commission of the murder.
(Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order
denying the petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage,
concluding the defendant was the actual killer in that he directly
hit the victim with the car. (Id. at pp. 1198, 1202.)
       On the record before us, to determine Alvarez was the
actual killer, we would have to examine the evidence and make

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factual findings regarding causation. In other words, “to
conclude [he] is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, we would
have to weigh the evidence and find [him] to have been the actual
killer, which would be impermissible at this stage.” (Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 20.) Alvarez filed a facially sufficient
petition, setting forth a prima facie showing that he entitled to
relief. There is nothing in the record of convictions establishing
as a matter of law that he is ineligible for resentencing.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the
petition and remand the matter for further proceedings under
section 1172.6, including the issuance of an order to show cause
under subdivision (c). We conclude here only that the petition
may not be resolved at the prima facie stage based on the record
of Alvarez’s convictions.
                           DISPOSITION
       The July 14, 2022 order denying the petition for
resentencing is reversed and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings under Penal Code section 1172.6, including the
issuance of an order to show cause under subdivision (c).
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                                 CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.                   BENDIX, J.

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