Court Opinion

ID: 9782625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:00:23.84691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:06.685465
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON, specially concurring: I concur in the outcome but I must write separately. Like the majority, I find that reversal is not required on the particular facts of this case. Unlike the majority, I find that there was error. However, I affirm because I find that the error does not rise to the level of plain error. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007) (describing the plain error doctrine). In the case at bar, no one testified at trial that they saw defendant commit the shooting of the victim, and there was no physical evidence linking defendant to the crime. The State’s primary witnesses against defendant consisted of gang members or convicted felons who either implicated defendant in their earlier statements or who claimed at trial to have observed defendant with a gun. On this appeal, defendant claims that he was denied a fair trial because the State referred numerous times to the fact that his codefendants had already pled guilty for their involvement in the same crime, thereby suggesting to the jury that defendant was similarly guilty. There is a world of difference between impeaching witnesses with statements they made during their plea hearing and introducing the fact of their actual convictions, particularly when essentially the same statements were already admitted through videotaped police interviews. At trial, during the State’s direct examinations of two alleged accomplices, the State referred more than 15 times to the fact that both accomplices had already pled guilty to the same incident in which defendant stood accused. Then the jury received both the transcripts from the accomplices’ guilty plea hearings, as well as portions of their videotaped police interviews. In closing, the State argued that the codefendants’ guilty pleas and sentences were justified. I find this repetition unnecessary and prejudicial. The majority relies on Johnson and Maldonado. 409 Ill. App. 3d at 932. However, Johnson and Maldonado are distinguishable, because they involved prior multiple inconsistent statements by a victim or eyewitness, while the case at bar concerned prior multiple inconsistent statements of codefendants who pled guilty. The latter implicates the principles articulated by our supreme court in People v. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d 189 (1982), while the former does not. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 195-96. Simply put, guilty pleas create a risk of guilt by association, while statements of victims and eyewitnesses do not. See People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d 277, 289 (2010) (“a single evidentiary issue may be subject to more than one rule. Thus, while a positive rule may allow a certain type of evidence, a negative rule may prohibit its admission.”). The majority relies primarily on Sullivan. However, our supreme court subsequently distinguished and explained its Sullivan holding in People v. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d 189 (1982). The majority states that defendant failed to offer a persuasive reason to limit “the number of prior inconsistent statements that are offered to challenge the credibility of a witness.” 409 Ill. App. 3d at 932. That reason was offered by our supreme court in Stover — namely, the risk of guilt by association. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 195-96 (repeated references to a codefendant’s guilty plea were improper because “[t]he implication was that defendant’s guilt could be gauged accordingly”). In Stover, the State impeached defendant’s former codefendant, who was also defendant’s brother, with the codefendant’s guilty plea for the same incident that defendant was being tried for. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 192. Both defendants were charged with resisting arrest, during the same arrest. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 192. At trial, the codefendant testified that he was never informed, prior to being handcuffed, that he was under arrest. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 193. The State was then permitted to impeach him with his guilty plea to the charge of resisting arrest. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 193. The jury then found defendant guilty of the same offense. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 193. Our supreme court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the evidence of the codefendant’s conviction was improperly admitted. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 196. In Stover, our supreme court explained that the holding in Sullivan did nothing more than “articulate[ ] the holding in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971).” Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 195. In Montgomery, our supreme court adopted Federal Rules of Evidence 609, which permitted impeachment of the general credibility of a witness by evidence of felony convictions that are less than 10 years old. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516-17, 519. In Stover, the codefendant’s conviction was for a misdemeanor and therefore inadmissible under the Montgomery rule. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 195. In Stover, our supreme court held that the admission of prior inconsistent statements was not meant to be an end run around the purposes and limits of the Montgomery rule. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 195. In other words, even after Sullivan, prior felony convictions are generally admissible only for the purpose of impeaching general credibility and under the limits set out by our supreme court in Montgomery. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 195. In the case at bar, the codefendants’ convictions were not admitted for the purpose of impeaching their general credibility, and it was not necessary to admit their convictions in order to introduce the prior inconsistent statements from the plea hearings. Cf. Arroyo, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 151-52 (the State could not disclose to the jury that a witness had already been convicted for being the getaway driver for the same murder that defendant was standing trial for). In its brief to this court, the State conceded that “defendant is correct that the People did not use the witness’s convictions as impeachment evidence pursuant to People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971).” The appellate court has previously interpreted Stover exactly the same way we do now. In People v. Arroyo, 339 Ill. App. 3d 137, 151 (2003), the appellate court stated: “In clarifying the Sullivan ruling that an accomplice’s testimony can be impeached with that accomplice’s prior conviction of the same offense for which the defendant is on trial, our supreme court explained that Sullivan ‘merely articulates the holding in *** Montgomery’ and is ‘limited to the defined standards set forth in *** Federal Rule 609.’ [Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 195]. In other words, Sullivan does not provide a basis to admit a prior conviction to impeach a witness independent of the rule stated in Montgomery. See Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 195.” Arroyo, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 151. As a second and additional reason for reversing in Stover, our supreme court observed that “the prosecutor consistently emphasized, in his closing argument, that defendant’s brother pleaded guilty to the offense in question.” Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 195. Our supreme court found that this was improper because “[t]he implication was that defendant’s guilt could be gauged accordingly.” Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 195-96. Similarly, in the case at bar, the repetition implied defendant’s guilt. Under the particular facts and circumstances of Stover, our supreme court held that “evidence of the witness’ prior guilty plea constituted reversible error, entitling the defendant to a new trial.” Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 196. However, I do not find that the holding in Stover requires reversal in the case before us, because the facts and circumstances of this appeal differ in two significant respects from Stover. First, in the Stover appeal, our supreme court applied a harmless error analysis (Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 194), whereas in our case only a plain error analysis applies. Whether a reviewing court applies plain error or harmless error analysis “depends on whether defendant has forfeited review of the issue.” People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611 (2010). To preserve an alleged error for review, a “defendant must both specifically object at trial and raise the specific issue again in a posttrial motion.” People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005); People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564 (2007). Whether an error is forfeited or preserved is important because that fact determines which party in the appeal has the burden of persuasion. In a plain error analysis, “it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. By contrast, in a harmless error analysis, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no prejudice occurred. People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 495 (2009). In Stover, our supreme court found that the error was preserved for review and thus applied a harmless error analysis. Stover, 89 Ill. 2d at 193-94. By contrast, in the case before us, defendant concedes that plain error review applies, and thus he bears the burden of persuasion. Second, I do not find that defendant carried his burden of persuasion under either prong of the plain error doctrine. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. Under the plain error doctrine, a reviewing court may reverse only if: (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error; or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. The majority states that “defendant makes no claim that the evidence is closely balanced” under the first prong (409 Ill. App. 3d at 930), whereas the State argues that “defendant makes no argument that review is warranted under the second prong of plain error.” Obviously, both these statements cannot be correct, since both the majority and the State agree that defendant is arguing under at least one of the two prongs of plain error. In his opening appellate brief, defendant did argue that the State’s evidence was weak and not overwhelming, which I assume is an argument under the first or “closely balanced” prong of the plain error doctrine. Carrero, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 12 n.3 (analyzing defendant’s claim under the first or “closely balanced” prong although defendant had alleged only that the State’s evidence was “ ‘not overwhelming’ ”). Rather than repeating a previously given analysis, the brief then referred the reader back to a prior three-page discussion of why the State’s case was weak. Compare with Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d at 503 (review forfeited where “[defendant’s plain error argument consists of a single sentence”). In addition, in his reply brief, defendant stated unambiguously that “review of [defendant’s] claims is warranted under both prongs of the plain error rule.” The majority also states that “defendant cites a single case for his claim of plain error, People v. Johnson,” a “prong-two” plain error case. 409 Ill. App. 3d at 930 n.1. Actually, defendant’s main brief cited two cases in support of his plain error claim: Sullivan and Johnson. Also, the Johnson opinion discussed both “prong two” and prong one. First, the Johnson opinion “beg[a]n with a discussion of basic principles of plain-error analysis” covering both prongs, which defendant cited in his brief. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 63-64. Then the Johnson court affirmed the reversal of two defendants’ convictions under the second prong (Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 85, 87), and explained why the evidence concerning the third defendant was “not closely balanced” under the first prong. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 117. In addition, we should not ignore defendant’s reply brief, which cited People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (2005), where our supreme court reversed due to “error in a close case.” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 193. For all these reasons, it is clear that defendant was arguing both prongs on this appeal. However, I do not find that defendant carried his burden of persuading either (1) that the evidence was “closely balanced” or (2) that the error was “so serious” that it affected “the integrity of the judicial process.” Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565. The claimed error does not rise to the level of plain error. Thus, even though I find error, I concur with the holding of the majority and affirm.