Court Opinion

ID: 9448342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:32:43.227869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:23.679303
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Both parties agree that the 1942 amendment defines “drilling for oil” in terms of prospecting for oil with a suitable drilling rig in a bona fide effort to *911discover oil. With that definition in mind, it seems to me that the undisputed evidence established that drilling for oil was started. Texaco contends that no oil or gas in paying quantities was discovered and I would agree with the finding of the district court to that effect. Nonetheless, when Texaco permitted more than 30 days to elapse between the abandonment of one well and the commencement of operations for the drilling of another well, Mound Company had an option to terminate the lease as to oil and gas. If the option existed, it was unquestionably exercised. The clear duty of the Court is to hold the parties to the terms of the agreement which they executed. With deference to the district court and to my brothers, the case appears that simple to me.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
Rehearing denied; RIVES, Circuit Judge, dissenting.