Court Opinion

ID: 9846619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:44:21.526164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:40.473144
License: Public Domain

LEVINSON, Judge
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that defendant seeks affirmative relief in this Court rather than arguing an alternative basis in law for supporting the judgment, and that defendant is not entitled to cross-assign the error identified. I otherwise dissent from the majority opinion because it addresses issues not preserved for appeal. I write separately to address the error articulated by plaintiff.
Under N.C.R. App. R 28(a), “[t]he function of all briefs ... is to define clearly the questions presented to the reviewing court and to present the arguments and authorities upon which the parties rely in support of their respective positions thereon. Review is limited to questions so presented in the several briefs. Questions raised by assignments of error [not set out in the appellant’s brief] are deemed abandoned.” Rule 28 also requires that “[e]ach question shall be separately stated. Immediately following each question shall be a reference to the assignments of error pertinent to the question, identified by their numbers and .by the pages at which they appear in the printed record on appeal.” Rule 28(6).
In the instant case, plaintiff’s appellate argument references only assignment of error number one. Accordingly, assignment of error *59number two is deemed abandoned. Assignment of error number one states that:
The Full Commission made no findings of fact regarding whether or not the Plaintiffs permanent injury affected his wage earning capacity and consequently erred by concluding that Plaintiff was only entitled to compensation for a 5% disability to his back.
The word “only” within the phrase “only entitled to compensation for a 5% disability to his back” refers to the Commission’s determination that plaintiff had a five percent, rather than seven percent, impairment to his back. The word cannot refer generally to the Commission’s award because, inasmuch as the Commission awarded plaintiff temporary total disability for the period between 15 May 2000 and 30 November 2000, it clearly did not “only” award benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31 (2005). Accordingly, this assignment of error challenges the Commission’s award of compensation for a five percent permanent impairment to his back, pursuant to G.S. § 97-31.
Moreover, plaintiff did not assign error to the Commission’s determination that his period of temporary disability ended on 30 November 2000. Nor did plaintiff assign error to the Commission’s failure to make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that he was not entitled to temporary total disability after that date. I conclude that the issue preserved by the cited assignment of error is whether the Commission erred by failing to make findings of fact about plaintiff’s disability to support its determination that plaintiff had a five percent, rather than a seven percent, impairment. to his back. Regardless of whether other errors might have been assigned, this Court’s review is limited to those errors that are properly preserved:
The majority opinion then addressed [an] issue, not raised or argued by plaintiff, . . . [and] asserted that plaintiff’s Rules violations did not impede comprehension of the issues on appeal or frustrate the appellate process. It is not the role of the appellate courts, however, to create an appeal for an appellant. As this case illustrates, the Rules of Appellate Procedure must be consistently applied; otherwise, the Rules become meaningless, and an appellee is left without notice of the basis upon which an appellate court might rule.
Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (citing Viar v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 162 N.C. App. 362, 375, 590 *60S.E.2d 909, 919 (2004), and Bradshaw v. Stansberry, 164 N.C. 356, 79 S.E. 302 (1913)), reh’g denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005).
Plaintiff argues that the Commission’s finding, that plaintiff suffered a permanent impairment to his back, triggered a duty to make findings on the extent of disability or decreased wage earning potential caused bv the permanent impairment. Plaintiff contends that, because it failed to make such findings, the Commission erred by awarding benefits for only five percent “disability” to his back. I disagree, and conclude that plaintiff has' misstated the law in this regard.
Plaintiff essentially argues that awards under G.S. § 97-31 must be supported by findings on disability caused by the impairment. However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § “97-31 is a schedule of injuries that allows for compensation even if a claimant does not demonstrate loss of wage-earning capacity. ‘Losses included in the schedule are conclusively presumed to diminish wage-earning ability.’ Thus, the Industrial Commission may enter an award pursuant to section 97-31 without finding that the employee is disabled.” Childress v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 162 N.C. App. 524, 528, 590 S.E.2d 893, 897 (2004) (quoting Harrell v. Harriet & Henderson Yarns, 314 N.C. 566, 575, 336 S.E.2d 47, 52-53 (1985)) (citations omitted). I conclude that the Commission was not required, as a condition of awarding benefits under G.S. § 97-31, to make findings on disability caused by the five percent permanent impairment to his back.
Plaintiff also argues more generally that the Commission erred by failing to make certain findings of fact relevant to his claim for permanent disability. However, as discussed above, plaintiff failed to assign error to the Commission’s denial of his claim for permanent disability benefits, or to the Commission’s determination that his period of temporary disability ended on 30 November 2000. “Our scope of review is ‘confined to a consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record on appeal.’ N.C.R. App. P. 10(a). Since plaintiff failed to assign this as error in the record, this issue is not properly before us .’’Atlantic Coast Mech., Inc. v. Arcadis, Geraghty & Miller of N.C., Inc., 175 N.C. App. 339, 346, 623 S.E.2d 334, 340 (2006).
I conclude that the Commission’s Order and Award should be affirmed.