Court Opinion

ID: 9954602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 17:03:56.443891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:07.637363
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 P. v. Woods CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B327938

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BA454486)
         v.

ROBERT CLAY WOODS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Karla D. Kerlin, Judge. Affirmed.
      Nancy Gaynor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Robert Clay Woods appeals from an order denying his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His
appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and appellant filed a supplemental
brief. We review the contentions appellant raises in his
supplemental brief and affirm the order.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On October 10, 2017, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney filed an information charging appellant with attempted
willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a),
664) and felony vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)). The
information further alleged that appellant personally inflicted
great bodily injury upon the attempted murder victim
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and personally and intentionally
discharged a handgun during that crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)),
causing great bodily injury to the victim (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
       At trial, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
pattern jury instructions, including those on attempted murder
(CALCRIM No. 600), deliberation and premeditation (CALCRIM
No. 601), and the firearm and great bodily injury enhancements
(CALCRIM Nos. 3148, 3149, 3160). The court did not instruct
the jury on aiding and abetting (CALCRIM Nos. 400, 401) or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine (CALCRIM Nos. 402,
403). The jury found appellant guilty of attempted murder and
misdemeanor vandalism, and found the firearm and great bodily
injury enhancements true. However, the jury found not true the
allegation that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated. The trial court declined to strike the firearm

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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enhancements and sentenced appellant to the midterm of seven
years on the attempted murder conviction, plus three years for
the great bodily injury enhancement and 25 years to life for the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement. It
imposed and stayed sentence of 20 years on the section 12022.53,
subdivision (c) firearm allegation and imposed a concurrent
sentence of two years for the vandalism conviction.
       Appellant challenged his sentence on direct appeal. In an
unpublished opinion filed on March 26, 2019, a different panel of
this court rejected appellant’s argument that the trial court
abused its discretion by declining to strike the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) enhancement. (See People v. Woods (Mar. 26,
2019, B289477) [nonpub. opn.].) It agreed with appellant,
however, that the trial court erred by failing to stay the three-
year term for the great bodily injury enhancement and by
sentencing appellant to a term of two years for misdemeanor
vandalism. The appellate court modified judgment to stay
execution of the three-year term for the great bodily injury
enhancement, vacated the sentence on the vandalism conviction,
and remanded the matter for the trial court to resentence
appellant for misdemeanor vandalism. It affirmed the judgment
in all other respects.
       On October 18, 2021, appellant filed a form petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.2
A few days later, he also filed a petition for resentencing under
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721,

2     Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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§ 1) (SB 81). The trial court summarily denied the SB 81 petition
on October 27, 2021, holding that appellant was ineligible for
relief because SB 81 by its terms applies only prospectively. The
trial court appointed counsel to represent appellant in connection
with his section 1172.6 petition. The trial court subsequently
continued the matter several times at appellant’s request.
       On October 17, 2022, the trial court ordered the prosecution
to respond to appellant’s section 1172.6 petition. In its response,
filed December 1, 2022, the prosecution argued that appellant
was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because his jury was
not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine
or aiding and abetting principles. The prosecution attached the
jury instructions, verdict forms, and the previous appellate
opinion to its filing. Appellant filed a reply the same day. He
argued that his petition “alleged all the elements of a prima facie
case” and he was therefore entitled to an order to show cause and
evidentiary hearing.
       The court heard the petition on December 19, 2022.
Appellant submitted on the briefing, and the prosecution argued
that appellant was ineligible for relief. The court agreed with the
prosecution that appellant was ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. It filed a written ruling stating that its review of “the
Information [sic], the minute orders, the verdict forms, and the
jury instructions” led it to conclude that appellant “was not
convicted on a theory of natural and probably [sic] consequences,
felony murder, or even under an aider and abettor theory of
liability.” The court stated, “the record shows that Petitioner is
not eligible for relief as a matter of law. The jury instructions
given to the jury confirm that Petitioner was not convicted of
murder based on the natural and probable consequence [sic]

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doctrine, felony murder, or any other theory whereby malice
could be imputed to him based solely on his participation in a
crime.” The court further stated that it had “not engaged in any
factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion to reach the conclusion that Petitioner has failed to
state a prima facie case,” and “did not decide unresolved factual
issues that involve credibility determinations or weighing of
evidence.”
       Appellant timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
       Appellant’s appointed attorney filed a brief raising no
issues and requesting that this court proceed pursuant to
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. This court advised appellant of
his right to file a supplemental brief (see Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 231-232), and appellant did so. We evaluate the
arguments set forth in that supplemental brief. (See id. at p. 232
[“If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or
letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific
arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written
opinion”].)
       In his supplemental brief, appellant requests “a full
resentencing hearing.” He contends that the jury’s verdict on the
attempted murder count and its true findings on the
enhancement allegations were not supported by sufficient
evidence. Regarding the enhancements, he contends, as he did
on direct appeal, that he “was entitled to relief under Senate Bill
620,” which gave trial courts discretion to strike firearm
enhancements. He further contends that he “is now entitled to
relief under Senate Bill 81” as well as section 1473 (habeas

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corpus) and Senate Bill 97, which amended section 1473 effective
January 1, 2024.
       Appellant also argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to “object to a[n unspecified]
Fourth Amendment violation,” “investigate the victim when he
showed up a day before trial,” “file a motion for a ‘gatekeeper
hearing’ to be able to cross-exam [sic] the qualifications and
credentials of the prosecutor [sic] expert witness Justin Benson,”
file a motion to strike Benson’s testimony, retain “a medical
examiner to evaluate” unspecified evidence, file a motion to
dismiss the case, and “object to the disproportionality of the
sentence base [sic] on erroneous enhancement evidence.”
Appellant additionally asserts that the prosecution impermissibly
relied on case-specific hearsay, committed unspecified
misconduct, and possibly failed to comply with its obligations
under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. He also asserts
that the trial court “created a jurisdiction misconduct” by failing
to dismiss the case in the interests of justice during trial.
       None of these arguments relates to the section 1172.6
proceedings before the trial court below or at issue in this appeal.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order denying appellant’s
petition for section 1172.6 relief based on its conclusion that the
record demonstrates appellant’s ineligibility as a matter of law.
Our review of the record reveals that the trial correctly denied
the petition.
        Section 1172.6 provides that a person convicted of
“attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine” may be eligible for resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
The record of conviction demonstrates that the jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

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Appellant therefore could not have been convicted of attempted
murder under that theory and is ineligible for relief under section
1172.6. (See People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.)
Moreover, there is no indication that appellant’s jury was
instructed on the felony murder theory or any other theory of
imputed-malice liability. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a).) Appellant’s
arguments collaterally attacking his conviction and sentence seek
relief under other provisions and do not refute this conclusion or
otherwise demonstrate that he is entitled to an order to show
cause, an evidentiary hearing, or resentencing under section
1172.6.
                          DISPOSITION
       The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                           COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

MORI, J.

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