Court Opinion

ID: 9940400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 15:06:09.419717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:50.067592
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 91
                      ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                         DIVISION IV
                                         No. CR-23-201

 JERMAINE LAWSON                                 Opinion Delivered February 14, 2024
                                  APPELLANT
                                                 APPEAL FROM THE CLARK
                                                 COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
 V.                                              [NO. 10CR-21-15]

 STATE OF ARKANSAS                           HONORABLE BLAKE BATSON,
                                    APPELLEE JUDGE

                                                 REVERSED AND REMANDED

                             RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

       Jermaine Lawson appeals from his convictions for possession of a firearm by certain

persons, simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, possession of a controlled substance

(methamphetamine), possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), fleeing, and possession

of a controlled substance (marijuana).1 On appeal, Lawson argues that the circuit court

abused its discretion by admitting certified copies of his prior convictions. We agree, and we

reverse and remand.

       On January 27, 2021, the State charged Lawson. The charges arose from a January

12, 2021 traffic stop. On August 23, 2022, the court held a jury trial. During opening

statements, the State informed the jury that

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           Lawson was also sentenced as a habitual offender.
       Lawson is a convicted a felon. He was in possession of a firearm. And what the State
       intends to do at the beginning of this trial is submit six prior felonies that Mr. Lawson
       was convicted of, showing you that he was in fact a felon at the time he was pulled
       over on January 21st, 2021[2] and taken into custody.

              Now the Judge is going to read you a jury instruction, it’s called a cautionary
       instruction, that you are not to consider Mr. Lawson’s previous felony convictions for
       anything other than his being a felon in possession of a firearm.

       ....

             Again, his multiple, prior convictions are not to be used in the finding of guilt
       on those. But, again, the State will submit more than sufficient evidence of that.

Thereafter, the court directed the State to present its case.

       Lawson immediately requested a bench conference, and he objected to the State’s

introducing certified copies of his prior felony convictions. He asserted that his prior

convictions are very similar to the current charges and thus highly prejudicial. He offered to

stipulate to his status as a felon without introducing the nature of those charges. The State

refused to stipulate, and the court overruled Lawson’s objection. The bench conference

concluded.

       The State then introduced certified copies of Lawson’s prior convictions, and the

prosecutor read the convictions to the jury. Specifically, the State introduced Lawson’s

convictions in CR-2002-0025 for two counts of delivery of a controlled substance (marijuana)

and unauthorized use of property to facilitate a crime. The State also introduced Lawson’s

convictions in CR-2002-0030 for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to

       2
           The prosecutor misstated the date of the traffic stop.

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deliver (marijuana), possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver (crack

cocaine), and possession of drug paraphernalia. When the State introduced the certified

copies, Lawson objected on the basis of foundation. The court overruled that objection as

well.

        The State then presented evidence that an officer initiated a traffic stop on Lawson

for driving 85 miles an hour in a 25-mile-an-hour zone. The officer testified that after he

activated his lights, Lawson escalated to speeds of 110 to 115 miles an hour. Lawson drove

for three miles before stopping, and the officer arrested Lawson. During a search, the officer

located a loaded handgun in Lawson’s waistband, and he found a bag of cocaine, a bag of

methamphetamine, and a bag of marijuana in his pants. Another officer interviewed Lawson

following his arrest, and the officer testified that Lawson admitted he should not have had a

firearm. A chemist with the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory testified that the bags found

on Lawson contained 6.0433 grams of cocaine with caffeine, lidocaine, and tetramisole;

3.5782 grams of methamphetamine and dimethyl sulfone,3 and 6.106 grams of marijuana.

        During jury instructions, the court instructed the jury that it should not take the

proof of Lawson’s prior felony convictions as proof of guilt. The jury later convicted Lawson,

and he was sentenced to sixty-six years’ imprisonment.

        3
       The chemist explained that dimethyl sulfone is a nutritional supplement that “makes
the amount of methamphetamine appear to be more.”

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       Lawson timely appealed his convictions to this court. The sole issue on appeal is

whether the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting certified copies of Lawson’s prior

convictions.

       The State initially asserts that Lawson’s argument on appeal is not preserved for our

review because Lawson did not object at the first opportunity. The State points out that

Lawson objected after opening statements, but it does not explain at what earlier point

Lawson should have objected. The State alternatively claims that Lawson’s argument is not

preserved because he failed to renew his argument when the court admitted his prior

convictions.

       To preserve an issue on appeal, a defendant must object at the first opportunity. Duck

v. State, 2018 Ark. 267, 555 S.W.3d 872. He also must renew his objection each time the

issue is raised. Id. Otherwise, he has waived his argument regarding that issue on appeal. Id.

       We hold that Lawson preserved his argument for appeal. During opening statements,

the prosecutor stated that Lawson is a convicted felon and that the State intended to

introduce copies of his prior convictions at the beginning of the trial. The prosecutor did

not discuss the nature of the prior convictions. After opening statements and before the

State presented its case, Lawson requested a bench conference in which he asserted his

objection and offered to stipulate to his status as a felon. The court overruled Lawson’s

objection during the bench conference, and immediately following the conference, the State

introduced the copies and read the convictions to the jury. Therefore, Lawson preserved his

argument.

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       The State additionally claims that Lawson’s failure to proffer his testimony stipulating

to his status as a felon precludes us from addressing the merits of his argument. We again

disagree. When evidence is excluded by the circuit court, the party challenging that decision

must make a proffer of the excluded evidence at trial so that the reviewing court can review

the decision unless the substance of the evidence is apparent from the context. Payne v. State,

2017 Ark. App. 572, at 3, 534 S.W.3d 723, 726; Griffin v. State, 2015 Ark. 340, 470 S.W.3d

676.

       Here, Lawson informed the court that he would “stipulate that he is in fact a

convicted felon without introducing the nature of those charges.” Accordingly, we find that

the substance of Lawson’s testimony is apparent from the context, and we are thus not

precluded from addressing Lawson’s argument.

       We now turn to the merits of the issue. Lawson argues that the circuit court abused

its discretion by admitting the certified copies of his prior convictions during the guilt phase

of his trial. He claims that the certified copies of his prior convictions were highly prejudicial

and improper propensity evidence, and he points out that he offered to stipulate to his status

as a felon. Lawson thus argues that his convictions must be reversed, and he cites Old Chief

v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), Ferguson v. State, 362 Ark. 547, 210 S.W.3d 53 (2003),

and Austin v. State, 98 Ark. App. 380, 255 S.W.3d 888 (2007).

       In Old Chief, the United States Supreme Court reversed a defendant’s felon-in-

possession-of-a-firearm conviction and held that the trial court abused its discretion by

refusing the defendant’s offer to stipulate to the convicted-felon element of the charge. Old

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Chief, 519 U.S. 172. The trial court instead admitted the full record of the prior judgment

and conviction for the sole purpose of proving the prior-felony element. Id. The Court noted

that, in cases where the defendant’s status as a convicted felon is at issue, evidence

concerning the nature or name of the previous conviction is most certainly relevant evidence,

but such evidence is also highly likely to induce unfair prejudice. Id. The Court explained

that in the unique situation in which the prosecution seeks to introduce evidence of a prior

conviction to prove the element of a felony conviction in a felon-in-possession-of-firearms

case, and a defendant offers to stipulate or admit the previous conviction,

       there is no cognizable difference between the evidentiary significance of an admission
       and of the legitimately probative component of the official record the prosecution
       would prefer to place in evidence. For purposes of the Rule 403 weighing of the
       probative against the prejudicial, the functions of the competing evidence are
       distinguishable only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the other.

Id. at 191.

       In Ferguson, the Arkansas Supreme Court applied Old Chief and reversed a defendant’s

convictions and remanded when the circuit court refused the defendant’s offer to stipulate

that he had a prior felony. Ferguson, 362 Ark. 547, 210 S.W.3d 53. The defendant had been

charged with felon in possession of a firearm and of two counts of aggravated assault. Id. The

Ferguson court held that, when a defendant in a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm case offers to

stipulate to or admit to the convicted-felon element of that charge, the circuit court is

required to accept the stipulation or admission, conditioned by an on-the-record colloquy in

which the defendant acknowledges the underlying prior felony conviction and accedes to

the stipulation or admission. Id.

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       In Austin, this court applied Ferguson and Old Chief, and we reversed and remanded

the defendant’s conviction for felon in possession of firearm when the circuit court rejected

his offer to stipulate that he had a prior felony conviction for second-degree battery. Austin,

98 Ark. App. 38, 255 S.W.3d 888.

       We find that these cases apply here, and we hold that the circuit court abused its

discretion by admitting the certified copies of his prior convictions when Lawson offered to

stipulate to his status as a felon. The State does not contest the issue on the merits.

       The State instead claims that any error by the circuit court was harmless because the

evidence of Lawson’s guilt was overwhelming. It also argues that Lawson cannot show

prejudice because the court gave a limiting instruction, and it further points out that Lawson

did not receive the maximum sentence.4

       We find the State’s arguments concerning the harmless-error analysis meritless. In

Ferguson and Austin, both felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm cases, the courts did not apply the

harmless-error analysis. See Ferguson, 362 Ark. 547, 210 S.W.3d 53; Austin, 98 Ark. App. 38,

255 S.W.3d 888. In Ferguson, the supreme court explained that “[i]n the narrow sphere of

felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm cases, the prejudicial impact of evidence on the nature of the

prior crime offered merely to prove the convicted-felon-status element cannot be

controverted.” Ferguson, 362 Ark. at 555, 210 S.W.3d at 57. Accordingly, in this case, we

       4
        Lawson acknowledges that his prior felony convictions were admissible during the
penalty phase of his trial. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-103(2) (Repl. 2016).

                                               7
decline to engage in the harmless-error analysis. Therefore, in accordance with the holdings

in Old Chief, Ferguson, and Austin, we reverse and remand this case.

       Reversed and remanded.

       HARRISON, C.J., and HIXSON, J., agree.

       Debra Reece Johnson, for appellant.

       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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