Court Opinion

ID: 9664986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:35:55.122565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:11.893419
License: Public Domain

Shepherd, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree that defendant’s conviction for delivery of LSD should be affirmed (Docket No. 78383). However, I believe the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of that conviction to impeach defendant in the subsequent trial on the marijuana charge (Docket No. 78382) and that the error is serious enough to warrant reversal.
Delivery of LSD is not "an offense which directly bears on credibility”. People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35, 39; 268 NW2d 275 (1978). The prior conviction was for conduct virtually identical to the charged offense. Id. Although defendant testified despite the trial court’s ruling, it seems to me that *519unfair prejudice may have resulted. The jury may well have convicted defendant based on an inference "that because he was previously convicted he likely committed this crime”. Id.
In People v Hughes, 411 Mich 517, 520-521; 309 NW2d 525 (1981), the Supreme Court stated the purposes of the requirement that the trial court recognize and exercise discretion with respect to the admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions:
"The purpose of this inquiry is two-fold:
"D To put before the jury only those prior convictions indicative of the defendant’s disposition toward truthfulness and veracity; and
"2) To keep from the jury those convictions which, although they may be indicative of defendant’s disposition toward truthfulness, may interfere with the jury’s ability to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence on the basis of the evidence. Such interference is what is meant by 'prejudice’.”
The trial court’s ruling in this case advances neither of these purposes. This Court should not refrain from meaningful review simply because the trial court recognized its discretion and referred to the appropriate factors. Crawford, supra. We must consider the merits of the ruling in light of those factors. I do not believe that the trial court’s ruling represents an appropriate balance of the probative worth of the conviction and its prejudicial eífect. I would reverse the conviction in case No. 78382.