Court Opinion

ID: 9399315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 16:10:07.189034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:01.188853
License: Public Domain

June 2, 2023
                                              Supreme Court

                                              No. 2021-336-Appeal.
                                              (P 19-3074)

      In re R.M.               :

   NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
   before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
   are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
   Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
   Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
   Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
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   made before the opinion is published.
                                                             Supreme Court

                                                             No. 2021-336-Appeal.
                                                             (P 19-3074)

                In re R.M.                   :

       Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

                                    OPINION

      Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The respondent father, Luis M., appeals

from a Family Court decree terminating his parental rights to his daughter, R.M.,

born on March 25, 2018, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) and (a)(3). The

decree also terminated the parental rights of the child’s mother, Esmeralda M.1 She

has a separate appeal from the decree pending before this Court.

      This appeal came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the

parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be

summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and

reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this appeal

may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in

this opinion, we affirm the decree of the Family Court.

1
  To protect the identity of any children, in this opinion, we will use the children’s
initials and the biological parents’ first names and last initials only. No disrespect is
intended.

                                          -1-
                                          I

                                 Facts and Travel

      When R.M. was born in 2018, respondent and Esmeralda were already

involved with the Department of Children, Youth, and Families. Esmeralda had four

other children who were the subjects of existing petitions for termination of parental

rights. See In re Manuel P., 252 A.3d 1211 (R.I. 2021). The respondent is the father

of one of those children, V.M.2 When DCYF was notified that Esmeralda was seen

with an infant on May 11, 2018, it filed an ex parte neglect petition and was granted

temporary custody of R.M. DCYF developed two case plans for respondent with a

goal of reunification. On February 5, 2019, however, respondent was arrested for

substance-related crimes and was incarcerated until February 17, 2021. During

some of that time period, Esmeralda was committed to Eleanor Slater Hospital for

mental health issues.

      On June 10, 2019, DCYF filed a petition to terminate the parental rights (the

TPR petition) of respondent and Esmeralda pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i)

and (a)(3). The TPR petition against respondent was based on his incarceration and

the child’s placement in the care of DCYF for more than twelve months. DCYF

alleged that there was not a substantial probability that the child could be returned

2
  The respondent consented to an open adoption for V.M. on September 11, 2018.
In re Manuel P., 252 A.3d 1211, 1214 n.5 (R.I. 2021).

                                        -2-
to respondent’s care within a reasonable period of time. Thereafter, on July 9, 2019,

the Family Court suspended visitation of both respondent and Esmeralda.

      A trial on the TPR petition was held on April 5, 6, and 7, 2021.3 DCYF

presented testimony from Kimberly Marino, a social caseworker for DCYF;

Esmeralda; Jonny Lubo, a child protective investigator; Amanda Grandchamp, a

clinician for the Families Together program; and Jane Ahles, a casework supervisor

for DCYF. The respondent was called as a witness by DCYF, and he also testified

on his own behalf. In addition, the trial justice considered the two case plans

prepared for respondent, the Family Court Order regarding suspension of visitation,

judgments of conviction against respondent, a protective order granted in favor of

respondent against Esmeralda, and an affidavit supporting respondent’s request for

the protective order. We summarize the pertinent testimony of the various witnesses

as follows.

                                Kimberly Marino

      DCYF first presented testimony from Kimberly Marino, a social caseworker

for DCYF. She stated that she first became involved with Esmeralda and her

children around April 2015. Marino testified that she was alerted that Esmeralda

was seen with an infant on May 11, 2018. Because a TPR petition had already been

3
 In his written decision, the trial justice noted that this case was merged with the
original neglect petition.

                                        -3-
filed concerning Esmeralda’s four other children, Marino indicated that a neglect

petition was filed immediately, and R.M. was placed into DCYF custody.

      Marino testified that she immediately began to develop a case plan for R.M.

as it related to Esmeralda and respondent.       Marino identified case plans for

respondent dated June 14, 2018, and December 26, 2018. Marino stated that her

case-planning concerns for respondent included his “history of criminal, violent

behavior, substance use, and parenting.” She indicated that the objectives for the

case plans relating to R.M. were developed from respondent’s case plan for V.M.

She stated that she went over the June case plan with respondent and provided him

with a copy. She testified that he never signed that plan because “he wanted to go

over it with his attorney first.” She could not recall meeting with respondent to go

over the second case plan, but she testified that the concerns remained the same.

      The respondent’s case plans state that, based on his self-report and statements

made regarding selling drugs in September 2018, “[respondent] will accept services

to address documented history of substance use and will live a life free of drugs,

alcohol and other illegal substances.” The plans also required respondent to engage

in substance-abuse evaluation openly and honestly and engage in toxicology screens

at Family Court or with an outside provider.

      Regarding substance abuse, Marino testified that previous documentation

from the Adult Correctional Institutions “had very specific recommendations” about

                                        -4-
respondent’s substance abuse.        Further, Marino claimed that respondent,

respondent’s mother, and Esmeralda had also indicated that he abused substances.

Despite this, according to Marino, respondent stated that “he was clean” at the time.

      Marino provided conflicting testimony regarding referrals and court orders to

address respondent’s suspected substance abuse. On direct examination, Marino

testified that there was an order for respondent to obtain random substance-abuse

screens. However, in response to the court’s inquiry, Marino testified that no orders

or referrals to substance-abuse screenings ever occurred with respect to R.M.’s case.

Instead, she indicated that DCYF was monitoring prior referrals for respondent and

Esmeralda.

      Marino testified that respondent never provided any documentation of

substance-abuse treatment. She stated that respondent did provide a drug screen to

Roger Williams Hospital, but that DCYF never received the results. She recalled a

letter sent from a clinician at Roger Williams Hospital on July 3, 2018, that stated

respondent did not qualify for an evaluation for substance use.

      To address parenting issues, Marino testified that respondent and Esmeralda

were referred to supervised visitations with the Families Together program.

Initially, she said, respondent and Esmeralda were referred together, but eventually,

respondent was re-referred individually. Marino stated that she was present for the

first visitation with respondent and Esmeralda. She recalled that respondent did a

                                        -5-
good job taking the baby when Esmeralda needed a break. She was not present for

other visitations, but she testified that the Families Together program had informed

her that respondent was not “parenting properly.”

      Marino also testified about other interactions she had with Esmeralda and

respondent.   Marino testified that DCYF was primarily “concerned” about

Esmeralda’s “mental health.” In particular, she testified regarding Esmeralda’s

mercurial conduct at the DCYF office.        She also recalled Esmeralda missing

visitations because of hospitalizations and criminal charges. According to Marino,

because of Esmeralda’s ongoing mental health issues and “erratic behavior,” DCYF

pressed respondent to obtain a protective order against her. As for respondent,

Marino acknowledged that respondent’s visitations were “consistent.”        Marino

confirmed that respondent had made positive progress with overcoming parenting

barriers. Still, Marino denied that respondent ever successfully completed the case

plan goals.

      Marino indicated that she learned that respondent had been arrested in

February 2019. She also stated that she had no contact with respondent from January

2019 until June 2019, when the petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights

was filed. Marino testified that she filed a motion to suspend visitations in April

2019, which was granted on July 9, 2019.

                                       -6-
      Marino testified about R.M.’s placement as well. When R.M. was first

removed from the parents’ custody, she was placed in a foster home with her

siblings. Marino stated that she visited the foster home and observed R.M. with her

foster family at least once a month until 2019, when Marino was taken off the case.

She observed that, at the time, R.M. was bonded to the home and that she “fit right

in” with her siblings. At trial, she also indicated that R.M.’s foster home is a

pre-adoptive home.

                                     Esmeralda

      DCYF also presented testimony from Esmeralda. Esmeralda testified that she

gave birth to R.M. on March 25, 2018, in the Dominican Republic. She admitted

that she did not inform DCYF that she was pregnant or that she gave birth.

Esmeralda also conceded that she kept the pregnancy a secret because she “didn’t

want [DCYF] removing [her] child.” Esmeralda further testified that respondent

was present for all the visitations she attended until October 2018, when respondent

filed a restraining order against her. She denied arguing with respondent during their

visitations with R.M.

                                    Respondent

      The respondent testified extensively, first in DCYF’s case-in-chief and then

on his own behalf. He testified that he was present on March 25, 2018, when R.M.

                                        -7-
was born in the Dominican Republic. He confirmed that he and Esmeralda traveled

to the Dominican Republic to circumvent DCYF.

      Regarding the case plans, respondent acknowledged receiving a copy of the

first case plan. The respondent maintained that he tried to cooperate with DCYF’s

services and recommendations. He denied that DCYF ever asked him to do random

drug screenings. Nevertheless, he testified that he attempted to obtain screenings

from two different providers. The respondent claimed that he attempted to obtain a

screening from CODAC Behavioral Healthcare, assuming it was affiliated with

DCYF, but CODAC personnel told him that they could not perform the screening

because he was not a client. After notifying Ahles and Marino, respondent said that

he went to Roger Williams Hospital for an assessment on his own accord. He

testified that Roger Williams Hospital deemed it unnecessary to continue treatment

and that the hospital sent a letter to DCYF relaying the same. The respondent stated

that he tried to communicate with DCYF after visiting Roger Williams Hospital, but

that he never heard anything back. He stated that he left voicemails for both Ahles

and Marino. He also testified that, around the same time, he had provided a sample

to Job Corps for a new job he was starting; however, he stated that Job Corps does

not keep such records.

      The respondent maintained that he does not have a drug problem. He testified

that he had only smoked marijuana a few times when he was seventeen and that “it

                                       -8-
wasn’t for [him].” He also denied having any mental health problems. Contrary to

his case plan and testimony from Grandchamp, he denied ever telling Grandchamp

that he sold drugs.

      The respondent also testified that he engaged with the Families Together

program and recalled the staff praising his work. He testified that he attended

approximately six meetings with the Families Together program and that he was on

time for those meetings. He also stated that, when he held R.M. during the

visitations, she behaved as a normal six- to eight-month-old would. He said that

during the visitations he was either holding R.M., watching her play, or otherwise

engaging with her. He testified that R.M. appeared happy and that he was able to

soothe her with a teething device when she was fussy.             He also described

Grandchamp’s demeanor as “positive” after she observed him change R.M.’s diaper.

The respondent also testified that he expressed to Grandchamp that he “would love

to learn as much as [he] can to be the best father [he] could be” and to develop more

patience.

      The respondent testified that, at the time of the visitations, he and Esmeralda

had not been in a relationship for “[a]bout a year.” He also indicated that during one

of the visitations, he became frustrated with Esmeralda trying to provoke him. He

testified that DCYF told him that it was in his and R.M.’s best interests for him to

obtain a restraining order against Esmeralda. The respondent also stated that there

                                        -9-
were additional issues with Esmeralda that prompted him to request a restraining

order. After the restraining order was entered, respondent testified, he did not have

contact with Esmeralda.

      The respondent acknowledged that he was arrested for possession and

distribution of a controlled substance on or about February 5, 2019, and that it was

“pretty close” to a visitation with R.M. He confirmed that he ultimately pled guilty

to possession of and conspiracy to distribute heroin and to violating the terms of his

probation stemming from a prior conviction for second-degree robbery.

      The respondent claimed to have continued his efforts to reunify once he was

incarcerated. He said that he attempted to participate in a parenting program while

he was incarcerated but he was not able to obtain visitations. The respondent also

stated that he attended the Providence Center’s four-month substance-abuse

program, but he did not present any documentation to support this testimony. The

respondent asserted that, in late 2019 and early 2020, he took five parenting classes

at the ACI before the classes were canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The

record, however, does not contain any documentation to support this claim.

      The respondent also denied ever telling DCYF that he did not want R.M. to

be brought to the ACI for visitations. He maintained that there should have been no

issue with V.M. or R.M. visiting at the ACI. In terms of contracting or spreading

                                        - 10 -
disease, he stated that the facilities were kept very clean and that his daughters would

have been at no greater risk than they would have been at a daycare or DCYF.

      At the time of trial, respondent testified that he had a full-time job with Cardi’s

Furniture, where he earned between $700 and $800 per week. He also testified that,

at the time, he was living in a four-bedroom home with his mother and grandmother.

The respondent also testified about his probation terms, which required him to

provide “[c]lean urine,” maintain employment, and maintain lawful behavior. He

further testified that he does not spend time in “bad company” anymore, hoped that

he can be a productive member of society, and “God willing, be able to raise [his]

daughter.”

                               Amanda Grandchamp

      DCYF also presented testimony from Amanda Grandchamp, a family

clinician with the Families Together program. Grandchamp testified that, from

August to October 2018, respondent and Esmeralda were referred to the Families

Together program for visitation, as provided in the case plan, “to gain knowledge of

different levels of child development, appropriate discipline, and boundary setting.”

Grandchamp also testified that, for “safety concerns,” the first few visitations were

held at the Providence DCYF office.

      She stated that an initial intake with respondent and Esmeralda took place on

August 14, 2018. Grandchamp testified that, when she inquired of the parents’

                                         - 11 -
respective goals for the Families Together program, respondent said that he wanted

to work on patience.      When asked about their relationship, respondent told

Grandchamp that he and Esmeralda had been in a relationship for six years, but at

that point, had been separated for a few months. Grandchamp also testified that

Esmeralda said that respondent’s family sold drugs. According to Grandchamp,

respondent replied to this by saying, “[w]e all sell drugs.”

      Grandchamp testified that, after the initial intake, she supervised six

visitations with R.M. between August and October 2018. She stated that respondent

attended two visitations by himself in September and October 2018. Grandchamp

testified that Esmeralda had missed these two appointments because she was

“psychiatrically hospitalized.” During these visitations, Grandchamp confirmed that

respondent appeared to be sober, although, she felt, it was not clear whether

respondent was “of sound mind,” and so she recommended a psychological

evaluation.

      According to Grandchamp, Esmeralda’s behavior was erratic and provocative

during the visitations.    Except when Esmeralda was attempting to provoke

respondent, Grandchamp testified, there was minimal communication between the

two. Grandchamp stated that respondent was frequently frustrated with Esmeralda

and expressed that he thought it was a waste of time to meet with her. Both parents,

according to Grandchamp, would blame each other for their situation. In particular,

                                        - 12 -
respondent blamed Esmeralda’s involvement with the other children that opened

R.M.’s case to DCYF.

      Grandchamp testified that Esmeralda’s behavior was “never consistent” and

that “[h]er mood changed frequently.” Grandchamp also recalled several instances

where Esmeralda behaved inappropriately with R.M. Because of her observations,

Grandchamp testified, she had concerns about respondent’s ability to protect the

baby. In particular, she testified that, when Esmeralda’s behavior appeared unstable,

she would sometimes “just take the baby from [respondent, and] he didn’t object.”

      Grandchamp also testified that she was concerned with respondent’s ability to

parent. She noted that respondent struggled to change R.M.’s diaper and clean the

child properly. She also expressed concern about respondent’s knowledge of the

baby’s developmental stages because he would bring toys that were designed for

older children and hold the baby incorrectly. Further, Grandchamp testified that she

did not observe any bonding between respondent and the child.

      Grandchamp testified that she could not recall discussing substance-abuse

screenings or evaluations with respondent. In Grandchamp’s final evaluation with

respondent, she recommended that he engage in another parenting program without

Esmeralda.

                                       - 13 -
                                     Jane Ahles

         DCYF also called Jane Ahles, the casework supervisor DCYF assigned to

R.M.’s case. Ahles testified that she became involved with Esmeralda’s children for

a period in 2014 and then again in August 2015 until October 2019. She became

involved in R.M.’s case on May 11, 2018, when R.M. was placed into DCYF

custody. Like Marino and Grandchamp, Ahles also testified about Esmeralda’s

erratic and inappropriate behavior at visitations.

         Ahles testified that on September 5, 2018, respondent approached her and

discussed obtaining a restraining order against Esmeralda.     She stated that he

vaguely referenced his relationship with Esmeralda and indicated that things were

not going well. She denied that DCYF had encouraged him to get the restraining

order.

         Ahles verified that she spoke with respondent about his case plan and his

needs for services related to substance abuse and random screens on a number of

occasions. She testified that respondent produced a letter from Roger Williams

Hospital stating that, because he had self-reported as not having a problem with

substances and tested negative, they did not feel that he needed a substance-abuse

evaluation. Ahles also indicated that she continued to recommend that respondent

be referred for both mental health and substance-abuse counseling. She stated that

when she encouraged respondent to comply with the case plan, he denied having a

                                        - 14 -
substance-abuse problem, claimed that he did not need counseling, and consistently

blamed Esmeralda for the problems. She stated that he would sign releases but

would not follow through with any type of referrals “because he said he didn’t need

them.” She could not recall any formal referrals for mental health counseling. Ahles

stated that DCYF provided respondent with “a referral for substance abuse” and “a

couple of choices” of providers and that respondent ultimately “chose Roger

Williams.”

      Ahles testified that respondent was eventually referred to an individual

visitation program. According to her testimony, Ahles later learned that, after an

individual visitation on February 4, 2019, respondent was arrested, along with family

members, for charges related to substance distribution and possession. Ahles was

additionally informed about respondent’s incarceration at the ACI in connection

with the arrest.

      Ahles testified that DCYF is required to continue to attempt to provide

visitation when an individual is incarcerated. She indicated that she did not discuss

the prospect of respondent continuing to have visits with R.M. once respondent was

incarcerated. She did, however, indicate that she had a discussion with respondent

at an unspecified hearing. She stated that she offered to arrange visitation but “he

declined * * * and said he would be getting out soon and he would prefer to visit

[R.M.] with DCYF in the community, rather than have her come to the ACI.” She

                                       - 15 -
testified that, after respondent had not been released for several months, DCYF filed

a motion to suspend visitations, which was subsequently granted in July 2019.

                             The Family Court Decision

         On October 14, 2021, the trial justice issued a decision.4 The trial justice

determined that DCYF had met its burden of proof for the TPR petition by presenting

“clear and compelling evidence.” He found by clear and convincing evidence that

R.M. “remained in foster care for more than twelve months; that the parent was

offered or received services to correct the situation which led to the child being

placed; and that there is not a substantial probability that the child will be able to

return safely to the parents’ care within a reasonable period of time, considering the

child’s age and need for a permanent home.” He further found that “both parents

are unfit by reason of conduct and conditions seriously detrimental to the child, such

as institutionalization of the parents, including imprisonment of such duration to

render it improbable for the parents to care for the child for any extended period of

time.”     In particular, he found that respondent’s “suspected substance abuse,

4
 The trial justice issued an amended decision on November 23, 2021, where he
corrected the spelling of names. There were no substantive changes.

                                         - 16 -
domestic violence, criminal behavior and subsequent incarceration” prevented

reunification with R.M.

      The trial justice found that respondent was unfit because of his “actions and

inactions.” In particular, the trial justice found that respondent did not make efforts

to take the steps needed to reunify with his daughter. This determination was based

on the trial justice’s finding that respondent “spurned” DCYF’s referrals to

substance-abuse and batterers’ intervention programs. The trial justice also focused

on the fact that respondent’s criminal behavior led to his incarceration and loss of

contact with R.M. He found that, based on the child’s age and her need for a

permanent home, there was no likelihood of change in a reasonable time. He also

found that there was no parental bond between respondent and R.M. The trial justice

found, therefore, by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was an unfit

parent.

      Next, the trial justice addressed whether DCYF made reasonable efforts to

reunify respondent and the child. He reiterated that the major impediments to

reunification were respondent’s “criminal behavior, domestic violence, * * *

suspected substance abuse, and his lack of protective capacity.” The trial justice

found that DCYF made referrals for a supervised visitation and parenting program

for respondent. The trial justice also noted that respondent was referred to a second

visitation program, but shortly thereafter he was arrested and incarcerated for the

                                        - 17 -
next two years. The trial justice highlighted the fact that respondent failed to accept

responsibility for R.M. being placed into DCYF custody and consistently blamed

the mother. He also noted that respondent never obtained random toxicology

screens.   While the trial justice acknowledged respondent’s progress with the

Families Together program, he also recognized that it was respondent’s arrest and

incarceration that led to the suspension of visitations with R.M. The trial justice also

discussed respondent’s failure to submit documentation to the court concerning his

participation in a parenting program while he was incarcerated.

       Finally, based on R.M.’s placement with loving foster parents who intend to

adopt her as well as her bond with her foster parents, sister, and half-brother, the trial

justice ultimately found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the

best interests of the child.

       A decree terminating respondent’s parental rights to R.M. was entered on

November 24, 2021. The respondent filed a timely notice of appeal.5

5
  The respondent originally appeared pro se, but then moved to have counsel
appointed on May 5, 2022, and the public defender entered an appearance on May
17, 2022. On June 10, 2022, respondent filed an emergency motion to remand this
case so that he could move to reinstate visitations. This Court denied the motion on
June 17, 2022.

                                          - 18 -
                                           II

                                 Standard of Review

      “Natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and

management of their children.” In re Jae’La G., 276 A.3d 378, 389 (R.I. 2022)

(quoting In re Manuel P., 252 A.3d at 1218). “That interest ‘does not evaporate

simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of

their child to the state.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting In re Manuel P., 252 A.3d

at 1218). “The fundamental right of parents, however, is ‘not absolute.’” Id.

(brackets omitted) (quoting In re Manuel P., 252 A.3d at 1218). Before terminating

a parent’s rights, the Family Court must find that the parent is unfit. Id. “Given the

drastic and irreversible nature of a termination of parental rights decree, ‘the right to

due process requires that the state support its allegations by clear and convincing

evidence.’” In re Rylee A., 233 A.3d 1040, 1051 (R.I. 2020) (quoting In re Violet G.,

212 A.3d 160, 166 (R.I. 2019)).

      “On appeal, this Court reviews termination of parental rights rulings by

examining the record to establish whether the Family Court justice’s findings are

supported by legal and competent evidence.” In re Violet G., 212 A.3d at 166

(quoting In re Amiah P., 54 A.3d 446, 451 (R.I. 2012)). Those findings “are entitled

to great weight, and this Court will not disturb them unless they are clearly wrong

                                         - 19 -
or the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence.” Id. (quoting In re

Amiah P., 54 A.3d at 451).

                                         III

                                     Discussion

      On appeal, respondent argues that the trial justice erred in finding that (1) he

is unfit to parent R.M.; (2) DCYF’s efforts at reunification were reasonable; and (3)

termination of respondent’s parental rights is in R.M.’s best interests. We address

each of these arguments in turn.

                                   Parental Fitness

      The respondent first argues that the trial justice erred in finding he was unfit.

In particular, respondent avers that he demonstrated that he had “made significant

efforts to reunify with [R.M.], often without the assistance that DCYF was required

to provide.” The respondent emphasizes that DCYF referred him to only one

service, the Families Together program, for supervised visitations with R.M. He

also emphasizes Marino’s and Grandchamp’s testimonies regarding his positive

progress and engagement with the program. Further, he claims that Marino’s and

Ahles’s “waffling, speculative testimony” did not specify any referrals for other

services.

      The respondent also argues that the trial justice’s finding that there was not a

substantial probability of a safe return in a reasonable time was clearly wrong

                                        - 20 -
because the trial justice misconceived and overlooked evidence. He claims that the

trial justice overlooked his testimony that he attended classes while he was

incarcerated. Furthermore, respondent underscores that he obtained a restraining

order against Esmeralda, creating a safer and more stable environment for R.M. He

also highlights that he was released from prison before the trial which, according to

respondent, is a crucial fact that has been considered by this Court in other cases

involving unfitness of an incarcerated parent. Thus, respondent argues that the trial

justice’s finding that he is unfit due to a refusal to engage with his case plan or

incarceration is clearly wrong.

      Before terminating a respondent’s parental rights pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i)

and (a)(3), the trial justice must find by clear and convincing evidence that:

             “(2) The parent is unfit by reason of conduct or conditions
             seriously detrimental to the child; such as, but not limited
             to, the following:

             “(i) Institutionalization of the parent, including
             imprisonment, for a duration as to render it improbable for
             the parent to care for the child for an extended period of
             time;

             “* * *

             “(3) The child has been placed in the legal custody or care
             of [DCYF] for at least twelve (12) months, and the parents
             were offered or received services to correct the situation
             that led to the child being placed; provided, that there is
             not a substantial probability that the child will be able to
             return safely to the parents’ care within a reasonable

                                        - 21 -
                period of time considering the child’s age and the need for
                a permanent home[.]” Sections 15-7-7(a)(2)(i), (a)(3).

      This Court has stated that “refusal to cooperate with the objectives of the case

plans constitutes clear and convincing evidence of a lack of interest in the child and,

as such, could properly serve as a basis for a finding of parental unfitness.” In re

Elana W., 249 A.3d 287, 294 (R.I. 2021) (quoting In re James H., 181 A.3d 19, 27

(R.I. 2018)).

      In finding respondent unfit, the trial justice found by clear and convincing

evidence that R.M. had been in the care of DCYF for a period in excess of twelve

months—since May 2018. Moreover, R.M. had been in DCYF custody for eight

months before respondent was incarcerated for substance-related offenses. The trial

justice also found that, while DCYF offered services to respondent, he refused to

meaningfully engage with DCYF and most of the services offered to him,

particularly those related to mental health, suspected substance abuse, and criminal

behavior. The trial justice found that respondent denied any issues that DCYF

identified as barriers to reunification, and therefore he could not avail himself of the

services needed to achieve his case plan objectives. The trial justice also explicitly

stated that it was respondent’s substance-related criminal behavior that led to his

incarceration and his loss of contact with R.M. for most of her life.

      Although respondent’s progress with supervised visitations at the Families

Together program is noted, we are also of the opinion that his steadfast refusal to

                                          - 22 -
accept responsibility for his role in R.M.’s removal to DCYF custody supports the

trial justice’s finding that respondent is unfit and that there is “no likelihood of a

successful reunification with [respondent] within a reasonable time * * *.”

      The circumstances of R.M.’s clandestine birth, respondent’s complicity with

Esmeralda to conceal R.M. from DCYF, respondent’s criminal conduct and

incarceration, and his lack of bonding with the child are indicative of conditions in

respondent’s life that are seriously detrimental to a child. Yet, respondent refused

to acknowledge a need for services. See In re Elana W., 249 A.3d at 294. At this

time, R.M. is about five years old and has spent all but one and a half months in

DCYF custody. Therefore, considering R.M.’s age and her need for a permanent

home, our review of the record convinces us that legally competent evidence exists

to support the trial justice’s finding as to parental unfitness.

                           Reasonable Efforts to Reunify

      The respondent further argues that the trial justice erred in finding that DCYF

made reasonable efforts to “encourage and strengthen the parental relationship.”

Section 15-7-7(b)(1). The respondent submits that DCYF most keenly failed to

undertake reasonable efforts by failing to provide him with referrals to appropriate

services. He claims that DCYF ignored his self-assessments and that the case plans

required him to dishonestly report that he was suffering from substance abuse.

Further, respondent argues that DCYF failed to communicate or make suitable

                                          - 23 -
visitation arrangements with R.M. during his incarceration. He asserts that Ahles’s

testimony that respondent refused visitations at an unspecified hearing was not

credible, especially in light of her statement that she did not discuss the prospect of

continuing visitations after he was incarcerated.

      Before    terminating    a   respondent’s     parental   rights   in   accordance

with § 15-7-7(a)(3), DCYF must establish “by clear and convincing evidence that it

offered services that amount to a reasonable effort to correct the situation that led to

the children’s removal from the parent’s care.” In re Jae’La G., 276 A.3d at 391

(brackets omitted) (quoting In re Gelvin B., 251 A.3d 503, 510 (R.I. 2021)). DCYF

need not “‘demonstrate that it took extraordinary efforts’; rather, DCYF must

‘employ reasonable efforts, and the reasonableness of such efforts must be

determined from the particular facts and circumstances of each case.’” Id. (quoting

In re Gelvin B., 251 A.3d at 510). Whether DCYF’s efforts were reasonable should

be analyzed subjectively, “taking into account, among other things, the conduct and

cooperation of the parents.” Id. (quoting In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d 875, 882

(R.I. 2009)); In re Raymond C., 864 A.2d 629, 633-34 (R.I. 2005).

      The trial justice found that “[t]he major impediments to reunification with

[respondent] were his criminal behavior, domestic violence, his suspected substance

abuse and his lack of protective capacity.” To address these issues, the trial justice

found, DCYF developed two case plans in June and December 2018. The trial

                                         - 24 -
justice found that these case plans required respondent to “attend random toxicology

screens at Family Court or another agency, if necessary; engage openly and honestly

in a substance abuse evaluation and participate in batterers’ intervention and anger

management programs and mental health counseling.” Despite the case plan goals

and DCYF’s attempts to engage respondent, the trial justice found that respondent

“spurned their referrals” by refusing services and denying responsibility for DCYF

involvement. Further, the trial justice found, even though respondent was referred

to and participated in six visitations with the Families Together program and an

additional visitation program, respondent was arrested and incarcerated for the next

two years for substance-related charges.

      At the outset, we note that, notwithstanding Marino’s testimony that there was

an order for respondent to obtain random substance-abuse screens, no such order

existed in R.M.’s case. In fact, the case plans with respect to R.M’s case did not

specify random screens. Instead, the plans provided, following an open and honest

evaluation, “father to engage in toxicology screens at Family Court or other agency

if necessary.”

      Based upon our review of the record, however, we are satisfied that the

findings of the trial justice are supported by legal and competent evidence and are

thus entitled to great weight. We decline to disrupt them.

                                       - 25 -
      The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that DCYF referred respondent

to a supervised visitation and parenting program. Although respondent arrived at

these visitations on time and sober, staff observed his failure to interfere when

Esmeralda’s erratic behavior endangered R.M. Additionally, despite being on

probation for second-degree robbery, the circumstances of respondent’s arrest and

subsequent conviction evince a continuation of his criminal behavior. Even so,

respondent denied any responsibility and consistently asserted that Esmeralda was

the sole impetus for DCYF’s involvement with R.M. His minimal cooperation with

DCYF is an indication of his inability to put R.M.’s interests before his own and his

lack of protective capacity.

      We have previously stated that the “state does not guarantee success and will

not be burdened with ‘holding the hand of a recalcitrant parent.’” In re Raymond C.,

864 A.2d at 634 (quoting In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 204 (R.I. 1989)). Thus,

taking into account that it was ultimately respondent’s own criminal conduct that

interrupted his visitations with R.M. and his refusal to meaningfully cooperate with

DCYF, we decline to disrupt the trial justice’s finding that DCYF’s efforts were

reasonable under the circumstances. See In re Jae’La G., 276 A.3d at 391. “Such a

finding is entitled to ‘a substantial amount of deference due to the fact that the trial

justice has had an opportunity to appraise witness demeanor and to take into account

other realities that cannot be grasped from a reading of a cold record.’” In re Gelvin

                                         - 26 -
B., 251 A.3d at 510 (deletions omitted) (quoting Tsonos v. Tsonos, 222 A.3d 927,

934 (R.I. 2019)).

                                Child’s Best Interests

      Finally, respondent argues that the trial justice erred when he determined that

it was in R.M.’s best interests for respondent’s parental rights to be terminated. In

particular, respondent claims that the trial justice overlooked several matters,

including his progress with the Families Together program, his stable employment

and living situation, his successful parole, and his love for and desire to raise R.M.

      “Once DCYF has demonstrated parental unfitness and has shown that it made

reasonable efforts at reunification, the analysis then shifts to the overarching issue

of the best interests of the child, a determination that outweighs all others.” In re

Violet G., 212 A.3d at 167. Severing the bond between the parent and child is a

substantial disruption. See In re Alexis L., 972 A.2d 159, 170 (R.I. 2009). But it is

in “the best interests of children to have a safe and nurturing environment in which

to live, learn and grow.” Id.

      The trial justice is permitted to consider relationships and bonds that have

formed in a foster home. See In re Alexis L., 972 A.2d at 170. The trial justice found

that R.M. is happy and thriving in her pre-adoptive foster home. He further found

that R.M. is bonded to her foster parents, as well as with her biological sister and

half-brother. Additionally, R.M. is roughly five years old, and the respondent has

                                        - 27 -
had no contact with her for over four years. As such, we are satisfied that the

evidence presented in this case clearly supports the trial justice’s determination that

it is in R.M.’s best interests to terminate the respondent’s parental rights so that she

may be adopted by the foster parents who have raised her.

                                          IV

                                     Conclusion

      For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decree of the Family Court

terminating the respondent’s parental rights. The papers may be remanded to the

Family Court.

                                         - 28 -
                                             STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                                         SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
                                               Licht Judicial Complex
                                                 250 Benefit Street
                                               Providence, RI 02903

                                     OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case                            In re R.M.

                                         No. 2021-336-Appeal.
Case Number
                                         (P 19-3074)

Date Opinion Filed                       June 2, 2023

                                         Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
                                         Long, JJ.

Written By                               Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal                         Providence County Family Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court        Chief Judge Michael B. Forte

                                         For Petitioner:

                                         Benjamin Copple
                                         Department of Children, Youth and Families

Attorney(s) on Appeal                    Andrew J. Johnson
                                         Court Appointed Special Advocate
                                         For Respondent:

                                         Camille A. McKenna
                                         Rhode Island Public Defender

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)