Court Opinion

ID: 9890057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 07:10:50.466904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:50:02.233473
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                        EL PASO, TEXAS

 MOUNTAIN VIEW HEALTH &                            §               No. 08-23-00033-CV
 REHABILITATION CENTER, INC.,
                                                                      Appeal from the
 CREATIVE SOLUTIONS IN
 HEALTHCARE, INC., and LIDIA MOYA,                 §           210th Judicial District Court
                        Appellants,                              of El Paso County, Texas
 v.                                                §              (TC# 2022DCV1585 )
 MARY HORTON KEELE,
                        Appellee.                  §

                                      DISSENTING OPINION
       I disagree with the Court’s determination that Appellants met their evidentiary burden to

compel arbitration. Assuming authentication, the purported arbitration agreement merely requires

Keele to arbitrate with “the facility,” but it fails to define that generic term. Here, I view In re

Macy’s Texas, Inc., 291 S.W.3d 418, 419 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam), as factually distinguishable.

There, the signed arbitration acknowledgment identified “the Federated Department Stores, Inc.,”

as a party to the contract, and further defined “the Company,” as inclusive of “your particular

employer.” Id. Moreover, the contract further detailed that employees of three corporate entities

would be covered by its terms. Id. But here, Keele rightly points out that no legal entity has

actually agreed to be bound by the purported agreement. On the contract’s face, it’s impossible to
tell which entity has agreed to be bound by the agreement. Lastly, In re Macy’s provides no support

for considering Keele’s pleading to supply the missing term. Id. Even so, Keele provides the name

of several possible employers by her allegations. As instructed by In re Merrill Lynch Tr. Co. FSB,

235 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Tex. 2007), “a contract with one corporation—including a contract to

arbitrate disputes—is generally not a contract with any other corporate affiliates.” In sum, because

I disagree with the Court’s reasoning and disposition, I respectfully dissent.

                                              GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

October 6, 2023
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, Soto, JJ.