Court Opinion

ID: 9410874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-24 20:01:05.832715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:00.927568
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 24 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WAYNE JOHNSON, Esquire,                         No. 22-16290

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:21-cv-07579-JSC

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CLERK
RECORDER; DEBORAH COOPER;
PATRICIA D. MALONE, Court Reporter;
ESA EHMEN KRAUSE, Chief Probation
Officer; COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of California
                 Jacqueline Scott Corley, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted July 18, 2023**

Before:      SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

      Wayne Johnson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Fourteenth Amendments. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo. Glazer Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Forescout Techs., Inc., 63 F.4th 747,

763 (9th Cir. 2023) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6));

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s claims against the Court

Clerk and Court Reporter because both defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial

immunity. See Acres Bonusing, Inc v. Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 916 (9th Cir. 2021)

(“Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights

violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.”

(citation omitted)); Wright v. Beck, 981 F.3d 719, 738 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining

that “immunity applies when a non-judicial officer performs a non-discretionary or

administrative function at the explicit direction of a judicial officer” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted and alteration adopted)).

      The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s claim against defendants

Ehmen-Krause and Contra Costa County because Johnson failed to allege facts

sufficient to state a plausible claim and defendant Ehmen-Krause is entitled to

absolute judicial immunity. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (a

court is not required to accept conclusions and speculation in adjudicating a motion

to dismiss); Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020)

                                           2                                     22-16290
(explaining that Monell claims are contingent on a violation of constitutional

rights); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157 (9th Cir. 1986) (absolute judicial

immunity extends to probation officers preparing reports for the use of state

courts).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Johnson’s

second amended complaint without further leave to amend because amendment

would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034,

1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal

without leave to amend is proper if amendment would be futile); Fid. Fin. Corp. v.

Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F., 792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The district

court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the court has

already given the plaintiff an opportunity to amend [the] complaint.”).

      AFFIRMED.

                                         3                                      22-16290