Court Opinion

ID: 9445747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:37:27.689752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:23.776367
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
DUFFY, Chief Judge.
The petition for rehearing embraces in fact, if not in language, the charge of Judge Schnackenberg, in his dissenting opinion, that some of the language of the majority opinion, written by Judge Grubb, constituted “judicial heresy.” I do not think the charge is warranted. I think Judge Grubb, in his opinion, was only facing realities.
The point is made that in this record there was no direct affirmative proof of the existence of cinders, grease or other foreign matter on the floor under or in front of plaintiff’s desk. But the Supreme Court tells us that such degree of proof is not required in Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases. That Court, in a recent case, said: “The burden of the employee is met, and the obligation of the employer to pay damages arises, when there is proof, even though entirely circumstantial, from which the jury may with reason make that inference.” Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508, 77 S.Ct. 443, 449, 1 L.Ed. 493.
It is our duty, as I see it, to follow the law as laid down by the Supreme Court, even if the interpretation given does violence to our preconceived ideas of what the law is. If we follow the interpretations of the law as pointed out by our highest court, we should not be accused of judicial heresy. An appraisal, by high authority, of what the majority of the Supreme Court holds to be the rule in Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases, is shown by the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 77 S.Ct. 457, 1 L.Ed.2d 511. The *841Justice stated, 352 U.S. at page 563, 77 S.Ct. at page 480:
“ * # * jt has, however, been common ground that a verdict must be based on evidence—not on a scintilla of evidence but evidence sufficient to enable a reasoning man to infer both negligence and causation by reasoning from the evidence. Moore v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 340 U.S. 573, 71 S.Ct. 428, 95 L.Ed. 547. And it has always been the function of the court to see to it that jury verdicts stay within that boundary, that they be arrived at by reason and not by will or sheer speculation. Neither the Seventh Amendment nor the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. lifted that duty from the courts. However, in judging these cases, the Court appears to me to have departed from these long-established standards, for, as I read these opinions, the implication seems to be that the question, at least as to the element of causation, is not whether the evidence is sufficient to convince a reasoning man, but whether there is any scintilla of evidence at all to justify the jury verdicts. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied by Justice Harlan)
There can be no doubt that a majority of the Supreme Court, as presently constituted, regards F.E.L.A. cases as something apart and different from other negligence cases, and that a different rule or test applies. In fact, Mr. Justice Brennan, writing the majority opinion in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, at page 509, 77 S.Ct. 443, at page 450, stated: “The kind of misconception evidenced in the opinion below, which fails to take into account the special features of this statutory negligence action that make it significantly different from the ordinary common-law negligence action has required this Court to review a number of cases.”
The Supreme Court has decided two cases since the opinion herein was written, which strongly indicate there has been no change in the attitude of the majority as shown by the excerpts herein-before quoted.
In Ringheiser v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 354 U.S. 901, 77 S.Ct. 1093, 1095, 1 L.Ed.2d 1268, the plaintiff had an urgent call of nature, and entered a gondola car loaded with freight to relieve himself. The switching crew, not knowing of plaintiff’s presence, bumped the car and some of the freight fell upon plaintiff’s leg. The trial judge set aside a jury verdict for the plaintiff. A majority of the Supreme Court found no difficulty in reversing. Mr. Justice Clark in dissenting, said: “Of course, if the majority is saying that the railroad must inspect every loaded car awaiting switching, lest an employee be using it as a toilet, then I could easily understand the action here. * * * ”
The other case is McBride v. Toledo Terminal R. Co., 354 U.S. 517, 77 S.Ct. 1398, 1 L.Ed.2d 1534. The facts are not set forth in the per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court, but the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court, 166 Ohio St. 129, 140 N.E.2d 319, indicates that a trainman v/as climbing down the ladder on a car and slipped. He testified that he didn’t know whether he looked at the rungs of the ladder or not. It was night but he could see the last car, three ear lengths away. He carried an electric switching lantern, which was hooked over his left arm. He was an experienced trainman. When asked whether he was looking at the rungs of the ladder, he stated: “You can’t look down.” He admitted that the rungs on all cars are the same distance apart. He stated that he did not miss a rung, he slipped. “He imagined there was snow upon the soles. He had observed snow on the rungs of the ladders.”
The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the trial judge in granting judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, pointing out that the plaintiff testified he couldn’t see the rungs below and that, therefore, any lack of lighting could not conceivably have been a factor in causing the foot to slip. In that case Mr. *842Justice Frankfurter filed a dissent, in which he again criticizes the court for granting certiorari in F.E.L.A. cases to review facts. He points out that the Ohio Trial Court, the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court had passed on the case, the latter unanimously; that the only issue was sufficiency of the evidence on causation. He adds:
“In agreeing to take the case, the Court merely accedes to the natural desire of an unsuccessful plaintiff to have one more court guess whether there were enough facts on which the jury should be allowed to do its guessing.”
He further adds:
“There is no appeal from such abuse of judicial discretion by this Court.”
Mr. Justice Burton filed a dissent, agreeing with the Ohio Supreme Court and stating:
" * * * I believe that petitioner’s injuries were not caused, ‘in whole or in part,’ by the possible inadequacy of the lighting.”
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Whittaker dissented for the reason given by Mr. Justice Harlan in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493.
Judge Schnackenberg emphasized in the instant case that plaintiff testified “My one foot must have slipped.” In McBride, the plaintiff testified he imagined there was snow upon the soles of his shoes.
Bowing to the extreme position taken by a majority of the Supreme Court, I am convinced the decision reached by the majority of the panel in this case is correct, and I am, therefore, voting to deny the petition for rehearing.
SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge.
Judge Duffy relies on Mr. Justice Harlan’s dissenting language in Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 563, 77 S.Ct. 457, 480, 1 L.Ed.2d 511, where the justice refers to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases and says that that Court seems to imply “that the question, at least as to the element of causation, is not whether the evidence is sufficient to convince a reasoning man, but whether there is any scintilla of evidence at all to justify the jury verdicts.” There is no difficulty when that test is applied to the case at bar, because the record before us reveals that there is not a scintilla- of evidence of employer’s negligence as an element of causation for plaintiff’s injury. Hence there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached by the majority opinion in this case.
I favor the granting of a rehearing.
GRUBB, District Judge, votes to deny the petition for rehearing.