Court Opinion

ID: 9583590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:40:15.831027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:41.638593
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that defendant, as a private publisher, has an unqualified right to reject plaintiffs advertisement. I respectfully disagree. As noted by the trial court, both Southern Bell and defendant are wholly owned subsidiaries of BellSouth Corporation, one of the regional telephone operating companies formed as the result of the breakup of American Telephone & Telegraph Company. Southern Bell is a public utility; defendant is not a public utility. Prior to the breakup of AT & T, Southern Bell itself undertook the publication of the white and yellow pages directories. Since the breakup this function has been performed by defendant pursuant to a written agreement with Southern Bell. Defendant does not contend that this agreement has removed the white pages (alphabetical) directory from the realm of Southern Bell’s responsibilities as a public utility (and consequently from regulation by the PSC, see Rule 515-12-1-.10, Rules of the Georgia Public Service Commission), yet it argues that said agreement effectively removes the yellow pages (classified) directory therefrom. This argument misses the point. If publication of the yellow pages directory is a service provided by Southern Bell which touches upon its responsibilities and obligations as a public utility, it may not avoid same merely by contracting with another not a public utility to provide the service. It follows that defendant, by contractually assuming Southern Bell’s responsibilities and obligations in this regard, may not pursue same in a manner different from that required of Southern Bell. See generally Ga. Power Co. v. Ga. Public Svc. Comm., 211 Ga. 223, 228 (85 SE2d 14) (1954), the court holding that it “seems to be a well-settled rule that public utilities have the right to enter into contracts between themselves, or with others, free from control or supervision of the State, so long as such contracts are not unconscionable or oppressive and do not impair the obligation of the utility to discharge its public duties.” What, if any, responsibilities and obligations does defendant have in regard to the publication of advertisements in the yellow pages?
“The weight of authority seems to treat the publication — in-*315eluding advertising — of a classified telephone directory [yellow pages] as being more nearly a private matter than one of public interest so as to make it subject to regulation by a Public Service Commission.
“However, a telephone company enjoys the advantage of being a monopoly for its area in the field of telephonic communication. As a subscriber for a private telephone I am entitled to have my name and telephone number listed in the regular directory. It is part of the service furnished in return for my payment. Without such a current alphabetical directory, the utility value of my telephone would be infinitely less. Apparently all the court and commission authorities agree that this regular directory is subject to the jurisdiction of and regulation by the Public Service regulatory bodies. A greater charge is paid for a business telephone than for a private telephone and in partial return therefor the customer is entitled to be listed under the proper business or professional grouping in the Classified Directory. Such subscriber also has what might be termed an option to buy advertising therein subject to the reasonable rules and regulations of the. Telephone Company . . . The Classified Directory, like the regular directory ... is provided by a company which enjoys an absolute monopoly. A business dependent even partially upon the telephone — and many businesses are to a great extent so dependent — is at a tremendous disadvantage with no telephone. It is prejudiced if not listed in the Classified Directory and the business is damaged if it is denied the right to advertise in the Classified Section, especially if competitors do advertise there. There is no comparable advertising media.” Videon Corp. v. Burton, 369 SW2d 264, 269 (Mo. App. 1963). “The yellow pages are a very useful and beneficial component in providing telephone service to the public . . . Indeed, the yellow pages are more than a convenience to newcomers in town who need a doctor, lawyer, plumber, electrician or any number of services. Newcomers could not be expected to begin in the front of the alphabetical listings and search until they find the desired service.” State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co., 299 SE2d 763, 765-66 (N.C. 1983), overruling Gas House, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co., 221 SE2d 499 (N. C. 1976). “Although there are ‘ydd°w pages’ published by independent publishers, the telephone company’s yellow pages is the only one distributed to everyone with a telephone.” Discount Fabric House v. Wis. Tel. Co., 345 NW2d 417, 419 (Wis. 1984).
Yellow pages advertising “arises out of a private business transaction of the telephone company which in all other respects has been recognized as a monopoly and has been regulated by the Public Service Commission in performing its services. Certainly, the telephone company would not argue that it is engaged in a business other than one which performs a service of great importance to the public when *316it distributes a yellow pages book without cost to every telephone customer. The telephone company without question holds itself out as willing to give reasonable public service to all who apply for an advertisement in the yellow pages . . . The telephone company has wisely and responsibly taken advantage of an energy conserving society, both as to time and natural resources, by advertising that persons should determine the availability of products before traveling to shopping areas by letting their fingers do the walking through the yellow pages. The telephone company has an exclusive private advertising business which, if not legally monopolistic, is tied to its public utility service of providing telephone service. Without additional or identifiable charges, every telephone customer receives the yellow pages free with the telephone service. There is nothing in this record to show that there is any other mode of advertising available to [plaintiff] which reaches as many customers, is of a similar nature as the yellow pages, and is inexorably tied to the telephone service.” Discount Fabric House v. Wis. Tel. Co., supra at 420-21. “The company derives revenue from this source which should be and is considered in fixing the over-all rates . . . We believe that the publication of the Classified Directory and the advertising thereunder is a method, procedure and operation which is designed for and actually does facilitate the business of affording telephonic communication, is truly a monopoly in that advertising field and is public business insofar as its business subscribers are concerned. Such a publication sui generis ought to be subject to reasonable rules and regulations.” Videon Corp. v. Burton, supra at 269-70. See also Allen v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 171 NW2d 689 (Mich. App. 1969). See generally OCGA § 46-2-20 (a) and (c).
The yellow pages have never been and are not now regulated by the PSC. However, as noted above, yellow pages advertising is not an enterprise entirely separate from the telephone company’s responsibilities and obligations as a public utility. The language cited by the majority from the opinion in Southern Bell v. C & S Realty Co., 141 Ga. App. 216, 221 (233 SE2d 9) (1977), and repeated in Southern Bell v. Coastal Transmission Svc., 167 Ga. App. 611 (1b) (307 SE2d 83) (1983), is indeed obiter dicta and, in my view, should be disapproved. “In the absence of regulation by the State, the whole subject of the making of rules and regulations is left to the [public utility], subject only to control by the courts of their reasonableness or discriminatory character.” Railroad Comm. of Ga. v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 140 Ga. 817, 826 (80 SE 327) (1913). A public utility may not enforce arbitrary requirements, but “should be given great leniency in restricting the contents of advertising, not only for the protection and preservation of its own good name but also to shield the public from pillage and misunderstandings.” Videon Corp. v. Burton, supra at 270. See, *317e.g., Dollar A Day Rent A Car v. Mountain States Tel. &c. Co., 526 P2d 1068 (Ariz. App. 1974); Boyer v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 252 FSupp. 1 (D. Kan. 1966); AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 373 P2d 31 (Okla. 1962); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Tex. State Optical, 253 SW2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). See also Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Ga. Power Co., 225 Ga. 851 (171 SE2d 615) (1969); Ga. Public Service Comm. v. Ga. Power Co., 182 Ga. 706, 715 (186 SE 839) (1936); and Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Beach, 8 Ga. App. 720 (1) (70 SE 137) (1911), to the effect that a public utility, having a monopoly in the section where it operates, has no authority to select customers or discriminate against the members of a class it has elected to serve.
It follows from the foregoing that defendant has considerable discretion regarding the contents of yellow pages advertising. The exercise of that discretion should be controlled by the courts, in the absence of regulation by the PSC, only to the extent that it is unreasonable or discriminatory. That is, defendant may not regulate the contents of yellow pages advertising in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Was defendant’s refusal of plaintiff’s advertisement in this case arbitrary and capricious?
The trial court concluded that the business judgment of defendant to exclude the words “gay” and “lesbian” was based on a valid and rational business determination that some segment of the readers of the yellow pages “could perhaps” be offended by such words in the context used. This finding is apparently premised upon defendant’s “ethics” policy (advertisement with respect to homosexuals “may at this time be offensive” to users of the yellow pages) and defendant’s testimony that plaintiff’s advertisement “may be considered controversial by, or may offend, a certain segment of its customers” and that defendant also seeks to uphold the “prestige” of the yellow pages directory. Defendant’s “evidence” in this regard can only be fairly described as mere opinion or belief, affording no hint as to the factual basis for its conclusion. There are no facts in this case which support defendant’s conclusion that the subject advertisement “may be” offensive to users of the yellow pages, only patent speculation. Indeed, the positive evidence of record compels a finding contrary to defendant’s conclusion — during the three years in which the subject advertisement appeared in the yellow pages, not one complaint was received from the public or a customer. Cf. Boyer v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra (10 complaints received over a year’s time by master plumbers concerning classification of sewer and drain cleaners under the general heading “plumbing” in yellow pages were de minimis and did not establish that the public was confused or misled to its detriment). Compare Videon Corp. v. Burton, supra (177 complaints received by the Better Business Bureau considered as part of the sub*318stantial evidence supporting PSC’s finding of no unlawful discrimination and no unreasonableness in telephone company’s refusing to accept Videon’s advertising in the yellow pages as submitted because of the implication that Videon was rendering free service).
Decided December 5, 1985
Rehearing denied December 19, 1985
Ralph S. Goldberg, for appellant.
R. Phillip Shinall III, for appellee.
A “rational” business decision is necessarily one “of, relating to, or based upon reason.” Webster’s Third New Inti. Dictionary at 1885. “Conclusions of witnesses are of no probative value unless the facts on which the opinions are based sustain the opinions rendered.” Gordy Tire Co. v. Bulman, 98 Ga. App. 563, 564 (106 SE2d 332) (1958). See generally QCGA § 24-9-65. “Findings of fact of a court sitting without a jury are not to be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). The ‘clearly erroneous’ standard requires reversal of a trial court’s findings of fact if there is no evidence to support them. [Cit.]” Richmond County Hosp. Auth. v. Richmond County, 255 Ga. 183, 191 (336 SE2d 562) (1985). “ ‘If the court’s judgment is based upon a stated fact for which there is no evidence, it should be reversed.’ [Cit.]” Lamas v. Baldwin, 140 Ga. App. 37, 39 (230 SE2d 13) (1976). There being no probative evidence to support the trial court’s finding that defendant’s refusal of the subject advertising was based on a valid and rational business determination (i.e., that such refusal was not arbitrary and capricious), the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. See generally Big Canoe Corp. v. Williamson, 168 Ga. App. 179 (308 SE2d 440) (1983).
In light of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit in defendant’s assertion that compelling it to accept the subject advertisement violates its rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (98 SC 1912, 56 LE2d 444) (1978); Pines v. Tomson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (4) (Cal. App. 1984). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (96 SC 1817, 48 LE2d 346) (1976); Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P2d 951 (Alaska 1978).