Court Opinion

ID: 9772350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:15:08.332014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.462213
License: Public Domain

J-S27018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 DONNA H. ARTHUR                          :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 752 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 1, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-14-SA-0000039-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                  FILED: AUGUST 29, 2023

      Donna H. Arthur appeals from the judgment of sentence of a fine and

non-reporting probation imposed after she was convicted of animal neglect.

We vacate Appellant’s sentence and conviction and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

      The trial court offered the following summary of the case history upon

Appellant’s appeal from an adverse decision by the magisterial district court:

            This matter arises out of a citation for animal neglect that
      occurred on April 6, 2021, wherein [Appellant] was found to be
      keeping several cats and/or newborn kittens in a locked and filthy
      vehicle, with the windows rolled up, on an unseasonably warm
      spring day, and with an internal vehicle temperature of one-
      hundred twenty degrees Fahrenheit.

            ....

              On March 15, 2022, the first day of [Appellant]’s de novo
      trial, [Appellant] for the first time made an oral representation to
      th[e trial c]ourt that she wished for court appointed counsel, and
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     that she had purportedly emailed the undersigned judge’s
     chambers to notify them of such request. Th[e trial c]ourt denied
     [Appellant]’s  request,    erroneously     and    unintentionally
     misrepresenting to [Appellant] that it could not appoint counsel
     for a summary appeal, and then proceeded to conduct the de novo
     trial.

           The Commonwealth’s first witness, Lisa King (“Ms. King”),
     is the founder and president of Hope’s Dream Rescue and
     Sanctuary, a local nonprofit that provides assistance and free
     veterinary care to stray cats and to owners who lack the financial
     means to provide for their cats themselves. Ms. King testified that
     her organization had received a report of the cats in question
     being kept in a hot car and that, at the time of the incident, the
     external temperature was roughly seventy-six degrees
     Fahrenheit, while the internal temperature of the vehicle was
     measured at one-hundred twenty degrees Fahrenheit. Ms. King
     also testified that the vehicle was parked with the windows rolled
     up on an asphalt parking lot outside the establishment where
     [Appellant] worked, and that the conditions inside the vehicle
     were filthy. Ms. King further testified that four five-day old kittens
     were ultimately recovered from the vehicle, and that such young
     kittens cannot eat kibble and need to be either bottle-fed or
     nursed every two hours. Finally, Ms. King testified that one kitten
     of the litter had already died under [Appellant]’s watch, and that
     the mother of the kittens had previously escaped.

           During Ms. King’s testimony, the Commonwealth also
     produced photographic evidence of the state of [Appellant]’s
     vehicle, and of the temperature recorded at the time of the
     incident. . . .

            The court next heard testimony from humane society police
     officer Harold Walstrom (“Officer Walstrom”). Officer Walstrom
     testified that [Appellant]’s vehicle was “packed full of stuff,” that
     the temperature inside the vehicle had been measured with a laser
     thermometer, and that the thermometer indicated an internal
     temperature of roughly one-hundred twenty degrees Fahrenheit.
     There was some discrepancy in the testimonies regarding the
     number of cats in [Appellant]’s vehicle at the time of the citation,
     with Officer Walstrom testifying that there were a total of six cats
     inside the vehicle . . . . Officer Walstrom also testified that, after
     waiting for thirty minutes to see if [Appellant] would return, he
     placed a call for assistance and had a police officer escort

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     [Appellant] from her place of work back to her vehicle. The officer
     also credibly testified on rebuttal that, after opening the door of
     [Appellant]’s vehicle, he was able to feel a wave of heat release
     from said vehicle.

           ....

           The Commonwealth’s final witness was Cindy Viehdorfer
     (“Ms. Viehdorfer”), an associate of local nonprofit Happy Valley
     Animals in Need. Ms. Viehdorfer explained what the limits of her
     organization were, that they do not offer boarding services and
     can only provide care when cats are surrendered to them. Ms.
     Viehdorfer also testified that [Appellant] had refused to surrender
     her cats after being referred to her. Ms. Viehdorfer also testified
     that, after beginning to care for the newborn kittens that Happy
     Valley Animals in Need had received, the smallest of them was
     unable to be saved and ultimately passed away, likely from heat
     exhaustion.     Ms. Viehdorfer also testified as to the costs
     associated with caring for the kittens, estimating the cost to be
     “around $1,200, $1,500 just for basic KMR, bottles, food, anything
     else that they would need at that time.” Ms. Viehdorfer credibly
     explained that caring for newborn kittens is particularly
     challenging:

           I mean, like bottle babies, we’ll start with they need
           fed every two hours. They have to be maintained at
           a certain heat. They have to be expressed. Normally,
           a mom kitten [sic] does all that, like licks them and
           makes them go to the bathroom and makes them
           urinate after they eat. That’s the mom. But at this
           point, you’re the mom. So you’ve got to — like having
           a baby, you’ve got to be up every two hours. You’ve
           got to make sure all this is done. Plus, you have to
           keep them clean. Because if they go and they’re all
           — it’s a fulltime job for about three-and-a-half weeks,
           four weeks after a kitten is born.

     Finally, Ms. Viehdorfer testified that living conditions for kittens
     need to be between seventy-five and eighty degrees Fahrenheit,
     that too high of heat can kill kittens, and that kittens would not
     survive long durations of time in one-hundred twenty degrees
     Fahrenheit.

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            [Appellant] herself testified . . . [and] conceded to living in
      her car with the cats, and stated that she was spending over
      $400.00 a month on her cats . . . . [Appellant] further testified
      that her car was not hot, that she was being stalked, and that
      Officer Walstrom was uncivil and shouted at her, threatening to
      take her cats and ruin her reputation. However, in light of other
      credible evidence and testimony to the contrary, the court found
      [Appellant] to be not credible. . . .

             After closing arguments, th[e c]ourt ultimately found that
      the Commonwealth had met its burden of proving [Appellant]
      neglected her animals beyond a reasonable doubt, albeit just
      barely. . . . [T]he Court found Officer Walstrom to be credible as
      to his recounting of events, and concluded from his testimony
      regarding the sunny weather, the sealed car, the car being parked
      on an asphalt parking lot, and the wave of heat released from the
      car that the Commonwealth met its burden in proving [Appellant]
      failed to provide adequate shelter to protect her animals from the
      weather.

            Consequently, the court entered its verdict and sentenced
      [Appellant] to pay a fine of $100, and placed her on unsupervised
      probation, costs waived, for ninety days, during which time
      [Appellant] was prohibited only from possessing animals at any
      point in which she was forced to reside in her motor vehicle.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/22, at 2-10 (cleaned up).

      Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal to this Court.         When

Appellant asked for an extension of time to file her docketing statement, this

Court noted her lack of counsel despite the fact that she had faced a potential

sentence of imprisonment, and remanded to the trial court to determine her

eligibility for the appointment of counsel. See Order 7/7/22. The trial court

responded with an order indicating that, based upon Appellant’s admission

that she earned $21 per hour, she was not eligible for court-appointed

counsel. See Order, 7/27/22. When Appellant sought a second extension,

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this Court remanded for the trial court to “re-evaluate Appellant’s request for

the appointment of counsel in light of her current circumstances.”        Order,

10/17/22 (citing Commonwealth v. Carlson, 244 A.3d 18, 25 (Pa.Super.

2020)1). Shortly thereafter, the Center County Public Defender entered an

appearance on Appellant’s behalf and filed a verified statement of Appellant’s

indigent status, a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and ultimately a brief posing

the following questions, which we have re-ordered for ease of disposition:

       I.     Did the lower court abuse its discretion in concluding,
              without inquiry into [Appellant’s] financial circumstances,
              that it could not appoint counsel because the trial was for a
              summary offense?

       II.    Did the Commonwealth fail to prove that [Appellant]’s
              automobile provided insufficient shelter from the weather
              for her [five] kittens to support the guilty verdict to the
              criminal offense of animal neglect?

       III.   Did the lower court abuse its discretion in denying
              [A]ppellant the opportunity to impeach a witness with his
____________________________________________

1 In that case we observed:

       To the extent the trial court assessed Appellant’s right to
       appointed counsel based principally upon the singular
       representation that Appellant was earning a living wage, the trial
       court erred. The test under Rule 122(A)(2) is not whether a
       defendant earns a living wage, but rather, whether he or she is
       without financial resources or is otherwise unable to employ
       counsel. While certainly consideration of a person’s income is a
       weighty factor, the test under Rule 122(A)(2) is more
       encompassing than the single criteria of a person’s wages.
       Instantly, the trial court failed to conduct any hearings for
       purposes of creating a record on Appellant’s eligibility for
       appointed counsel under the criteria of Rule 122(A)(2).

Commonwealth v. Carlson, 244 A.3d 18, 25 (Pa.Super. 2020).

                                           -5-
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              prior recorded testimony on the basis that the instant
              proceeding was a trial de novo and what happened at the
              prior proceeding had no relevance?

Appellant’s brief at 6.2

        We begin with Appellant’s contention that the trial court abused its

discretion in declining to appoint counsel for her in accordance with

Pa.R.Crim.P. 122 and 454. The latter Rule provides as follows in relevant

part:

        (A) Immediately prior to trial in a summary case:

        (1) the defendant shall be advised of the charges in the citation
        or complaint;

        (2) if, in the event of a conviction, there is a reasonable likelihood
        of a sentence of imprisonment or probation, the defendant shall
        be advised of the right to counsel and

           (a) upon request, the defendant shall be given a reasonable
           opportunity to secure counsel, or

           (b) if the defendant is without financial resources or is
           otherwise unable to employ counsel, counsel shall be assigned
           as provided in Rule 122; and

        (3) the defendant shall enter a plea.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 454. Rule 122 in turn states as follows in pertinent part:

        Counsel shall be appointed:

        (1) in all summary cases, for all defendants who are without
        financial resources or who are otherwise unable to employ counsel
        when there is a likelihood that imprisonment will be imposed;

____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth advised this Court that it would not file a brief but rested

upon the analysis of the trial court’s opinion.

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      (2) in all court cases, prior to the preliminary hearing to all
      defendants who are without financial resources or who are
      otherwise unable to employ counsel;

      (3) in all cases, by the court, on its own motion, when the interests
      of justice require it.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 122(A).

      Where a court determines before trial that it is unlikely that a term of

supervision would result and no such term is imposed, the court has no

obligation to appoint counsel or advise the defendant of the right to counsel.

See Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa.Super. 2006).

However, “[n]o defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment or probation if

the right to counsel was not afforded at trial.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 122, Comment

(citing, inter alia, Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002)); Pa.R.Crim.P.

454, Comment (same). See also Commonwealth v. Soder, 905 A.2d 502,

504 (Pa.Super. 2006) (vacating and remanding for a new trial, “prior to which

appropriate action under Rule 454(A) may be undertaken,” because the

defendant received a sentence of imprisonment following a trial that took

place without the court first complying with Rule 454(A)).

      Here, after obtaining several continuances to attempt to secure private

representation, Appellant requested the appointment of counsel.         The trial

court denied the request without inquiring into Appellant’s ability to afford

counsel based upon what it has since candidly acknowledged was a

misinterpretation of Rule 122. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/22, at 15-16.

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Therefore, Appellant’s sentence and conviction cannot stand.       See Soder,

supra.

       Rather than ceasing our review there and remanding for a new trial

following the trial court’s full compliance with Rule 454A, we consider

Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her

conviction because if it is meritorious, it would entitle her to the more

favorable result of complete discharge. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Koch,

39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).

       The following standard of applies to appellate review of a sufficiency

claim:

       The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
       is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
       most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
       to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
       a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
       the evidence and substitute our judgment for a fact-finder. In
       addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
       the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
       innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
       resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
       inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
       drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
       may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
       beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
       evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
       must be evaluated and all evidence received must be considered.
       Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of
       witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
       believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Haahs, 289 A.3d 100, 104 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned

up).

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      The offense of neglect of animal is defined as follows, in relevant part:

      A person commits an offense if the person fails to provide for the
      basic needs of each animal to which the person has a duty of care,
      whether belonging to himself or otherwise, including any of the
      following:

         ....

         (2) Access to clean and sanitary shelter and protection from
         the weather. The shelter must be sufficient to permit the
         animal to retain body heat and keep the animal dry.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5532(a).

      Appellant’s attack on the evidentiary sufficiency of her conviction is two-

fold. First, she asserts that the subsection of the statute under which she was

convicted only “directs the pet owner to make available a shelter that keeps

the pet dry and warm when the weather is damp and cold.” Appellant’s brief

at 19.   She argues that the concern “that pets should not be locked into

unventilated vehicles in the baking sun for extended periods of time” is “a

condition not contemplated in this legislation.” Id.

      We disagree with Appellant’s statutory interpretation. We observe that

“the object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and

effectuate the intention of the legislature. When the words of a statute are

clear and free from all ambiguity, they are presumed to be the best indication

of legislative intent.” Commonwealth v. McCabe, 265 A.3d 1279, 1287 (Pa.

2021) (citation omitted). In this vein, words are to be given “their common

and approved usage.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a).

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      The plain language of subsection two of the animal neglect statute

requires those with a duty to care for animals to assure access to two things:

(1) “clean and sanitary shelter” and (2) “protection from the weather.” 18

Pa.C.S. § 5532(a)(2). In further describing the necessary shelter to which the

animal must have access, the legislature specified that it “must be sufficient

to permit the animal to retain body heat and keep the animal dry.”               Id.

However, there is no indication that the access to “protection from the

weather” concerns only cold and damp conditions.              Rather, the plain and

ordinary meaning of the word weather encompasses a broader array of

circumstances,    including   excess     heat.        See     https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/weather     (last    visited    July   24,   2023)   (defining

“weather” principally as “the state of the atmosphere with respect to heat or

cold, wetness or dryness, calm or storm, clearness or cloudiness”

(emphasis added).     See also https://www.dictionary.com/browse/weather

(last visited July 24, 2023) (“[T]he state of the atmosphere with respect to

wind, temperature, cloudiness, moisture, pressure, etc.”).

      Hence, we ascertain the meaning of the phrase “access to . . . protection

from the weather” to indicate that the animals in question must be able to go

to a place that protects them from heat, as well as cold, that threatens their

basic needs.     Accord Commonwealth v. Tomey, 884 A.2d 291, 295

(Pa.Super. 2005) (affirming conviction based upon deprivation of access to

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clean and sanitary shelter where the animals lacked “access to sufficient food,

water or ventilation” (emphasis added)).

      In her second sufficiency argument, Appellant contends that the

Commonwealth did not establish that her car did not provide the kittens access

to protection from the weather. Specifically, she argues as follows:

      The weather at 1 pm on April 6th was sunny with a temperature of
      76 degrees. The dashboard of Ms. Arthur’s car minutes after she
      was seen standing there with the door open changing her shirt for
      work was 120 degrees. An hour later, with the doors shut and the
      windows rolled up the temperature on the dashboard is still 120
      degrees. Knowing the first reading, animal control was content to
      wait a full hour with those windows rolled up to even check on the
      kittens. And when they finally did, they were fine. It defies logic
      and common sense to speculate that the temperature on the floor
      under the dashboard would have been the same or higher.

Appellant’s brief at 20.

      Appellant’s argument essentially asks this Court to make the opposite

credibility determinations from those of the fact-finder. Specifically, Appellant

would have us reject Officer Walstrom’s testimony that he felt a wave of heat

when he opened the door, and Ms. Viehdorfer’s testimony that one of the

kittens died from heat exhaustion, in favor of Appellant’s testimony about the

floor of the car not being hot when it read 120 degrees on the dashboard. As

this flies in the face of our standard of review, we reject Appellant’s second

sufficiency argument. See Haahs, supra at 104 n.2.

      Having determined that Appellant is not entitled to discharge, we order

the remedy applicable for the trial court’s error in failing to assess Appellant’s

right to counsel.     Specifically, pursuant to Soder, supra, we vacate

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Appellant’s sentence and conviction and remand for a new trial following full

compliance with Rule 454.3

       Judgment of sentence vacated. Conviction vacated. Case remanded for

further   proceedings      consistent    with      this   memorandum.   Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/2023

____________________________________________

3 Given our disposition, we need not consider Appellant’s evidentiary issue
concerning the trial court’s disallowance of impeachment evidence that was
not prepared for use at trial, but which Appellant asked to email to the court
and prosecution in the midst of the proceedings. See Trial Court Opinion,
11/23/22, at 14.

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