Court Opinion

ID: 9750142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:23:11.953481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:03.340175
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen,
Robert A. Murray was convicted by a jury in Cumberland County on two indictments charging him with involuntary manslaughter. A motion for a new trial Avas denied, and a prison sentence was imposed. An appeal filed in the Superior Court resulted in a per curiam affirmance without opinion. We granted allocatur and now reverse because we conclude the use of certain evidence at trial violated constitutional due process.
The basic facts are undisputed.
About 5:30 p.m. on March 21, 1968, an automobile operated by Murray, while traveling on a two lane highway, left its lane of traffic, crossed over to the other side of the highway, and crashed into an automobile coming from the opposite direction. Injuries suffered in the collision caused the death of two occupants of the second vehicle. Murray himself was seriously injured and removed to a hospital.
About 7:10 p.m. of the same evening, a test of Murray’s blood was made by technicians in the hospital at the instance of an investigating police officer. This occurred without Murray’s consent or the prior issuance of a search warrant. An analysis of the blood sample indicated an alcoholic content of 2.06 milligrams per c.c. The folloAving day, a complaint was filed and arrest warrants issued. Because of Murray’s condition and hospitalization, execution of the warrants was delayed until April 3rd, or until the time Murray was being discharged from the hospital.
Based on the information gained from the analysis of the sample of Murray’s blood, under the circumstances before related, a competent medical pathologist *25testified at trial, “I think there was a 95% chance that he (Murray) was intoxicated.”
A timely filed pretrial motion .to suppress evidence of the blood test wa's denied and an objection to its use at trial was overruled.
The person of an individual may be lawfully searched, even without a search warrant, if the search is conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969), and Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 421 Pa. 169, 218 A. 2d 249 (1966).1 And, under certain circumstances, this includes intrusion into a person’s body for blood to be analyzed for alcoholic content. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966). Cf. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 431 Pa. 512, 246 A. 2d 325 (1968). However, for such a search to be valid, it must be substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and confined to the immediate vicinity thereof. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S. Ct. 889 (1964); Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 239 A. 2d 290 (1968). While the exigencies of the existing circumstances may render the search valid, even if not strictly contemporaneous with the arrest,2 the present situation is not such a case. Although the altruistic motives of the arresting officer in delaying the arrest are to be admired, this, in itself, Cannot warrant the conclusion that the search of Murray’s person thirteen days before his arrest was an “incident” thereto.
*26The order of the Superior Court and the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction are reversed, and a new trial is ordered.

A warrantless search may also be valid if conducted as a protective measure where the circumstances Justify a reasonably prudent man in the belief that the person searched is armed and there is danger to the safety of the searcher or others in the area. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), and Commonwealth v. Reece, 437 Pa. 422, 263 A. 2d 463 (1970). Admittedly, this situation is not presented in this case.

See Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967).