Court Opinion

ID: 9673455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:12:05.791514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:22.355084
License: Public Domain

*306Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). The question presented is whether the performance evaluations, disciplinary records, and complaints filed against public school teachers and administrators are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the performance evaluations, disciplinary actions, and complaints in issue are subject to mandatory disclosure under the foia. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the requested documents are not personal in nature. In my judgment, performance evaluations, disciplinary actions, and complaints are “[i]nformation of a personal nature.” MCL 15.243(l)(a); MSA 4.1801(13)(l)(a). Inasmuch as I believe disclosure of the records in this case would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, I agree that the requested records are not exempt from disclosure under the personal privacy exemption of subsection 13(l)(a). I also agree that the documents are not exempt under subsections 13(l)(m) or (n) of the foia. I write separately only to express my disagreement with the majority’s analysis under subsection 13(l)(a).
i
The first step in analyzing the applicability of the subsection 13(l)(a) privacy exemption is to determine if the requested documents are “[i]nformation of a personal nature.” Information is of a “personal nature” if it is “personal, intimate, or embarrassing.”1 Similarly, “personal” has been defined as “[o]f or pertaining to a particular person; private; one’s own *307. . . . Concerning a particular individual and his intimate affairs, interests, or activities; intimate . . . .”2 Rather than rely on these definitions, the majority adopts its own definition, concluding that information is personal only if it reveals “intimate or embarrassing details of an individual’s private life.”3 Labeled as a more “succinct test,” the majority’s characterization of the term “personal nature” significantly narrows the definition of the term and, hence, the scope of the exception. The statute provides that certain privacy interests are weighty enough to warrant an exemption from disclosure under the foia. Because even personal information will be disclosed when disclosure is not a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, it is not necessary to restrict the scope of the exemption by narrowly defining the term “personal.” Clearly, information in public records may be “personal, intimate, or embarrassing” even if not related to an individual’s private life. Indeed, because problems typically surface in the work environment in changes in performance, the line between personal and professional cannot be neatly bifurcated. The definitions adopted in Kestenbaum v Michigan State Univ, 414 Mich 510; 327 NW2d 783 (1982), and Swickard v Wayne Co Medical Examiner, 438 Mich 536; 475 NW2d 304 (1991), are an accurate characterization of the term “personal nature,” and I prefer those definitions over the one advocated by the majority.4
*308n
Without question, performance evaluations, disciplinary actions, and complaints about public employees are personal in nature. To say they are not would be to ignore the “customs, mores, or ordinaiy views of the community . . . .” Swickard, supra at 547; Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 232-233; 507 NW2d 422 (1993). By definition, performance evaluations call for evaluation of both positive and negative attributes of individual employees. To serve their pmpose of improving performance, personal shortcomings, flaws, and overall inabilities must be documented and detailed alongside character strengths. Meaningful evaluations contemplate candid and detailed exploration of such sensitive issues as promotional opportunities, pay or merit increases, personality defects, superior or inferior work performance, and counseling needs. Estimation of an individual’s professional aptitude can so clearly cause humiliation or embarrassment to an individual, and damage an individual’s reputation or career, that compelling public disclosure without considering the personal nature of the documents will inevitably result in sanitizing the evaluation. More importantly to the statutory inteipretation before us, we doubt that the Legislature would have adopted a definition of the term personal that would discourage the creation of important information.
The personal nature of performance evaluations has been well described. In Brown v Seattle Public *309Schools, 71 Wash App 613; 860 P2d 1059 (1993), the court stated:
The sensitivity of any human being to disclosure of information that may be taken to bear on his or her basic competence is sufficiently well known to be an appropriate subject of judicial notice. . . . This sensitivity goes beyond mere embarrassment, which alone is insufficient grounds for nondisclosure .... Employee evaluations qualify as personal information that bears on the competence of the subject employees[5]
In Federal Labor Relations Authority v United States Dep’t of Commerce, 295 US App DC 263, 268; 962 F2d 1055 (1992), mandatory personnel evaluations were described as “intensely personal” documents. Likewise, in Connolly v Bromery, 15 Mass App 661, 664; 447 NE2d 1265 (1983), the court noted that “[r]aw data appraising the job performance of individuals ... is particularly personal and volatile.” Similarly, the court in Trahan v Larivee, 365 So 2d 294, 300 (La App, 1978), maintained:
[T]he evaluation report is very personal and directly affects the employee. To publish or disclose such personal opinions may embarrass or humiliate the employee among his fellow employees, friends or family. It may affect his future employment. Humiliation or embarrassment could flow even though the rating would be “outstanding” as this rating may create envy or jealousy in other employees[6]
*310Despite ample justification for concluding that the requested documents are information of a personal nature, the majority holds today that the requested documents do not disclose intimate or embarrassing details and thus are not personal in nature.7 Because I believe that these documents clearly contain information of a personal nature to these plaintiffs, I disagree.
m
Having concluded that the requested information is personal, the next step is to determine whether disclosure of the material would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the plaintiffs’ privacy. Some invasion of privacy will inevitably occur upon disclosure of personal information. Only when that invasion rises to the level of being clearly unwarranted does the privacy exemption apply.
After reviewing redacted and unredacted versions of the requested records, I am persuaded that disclo*311sure would not constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. The Legislature was undoubtedly aware of the obvious invasion of privacy that would occur with disclosure of personnel records, yet chose to favor disclosure. To qualify for exemption under the personal privacy exception, disclosure must not only be unwarranted, but clearly unwarranted. The plaintiffs were unable to meet such a high burden in the instant case. Because I am unpersuaded that disclosure of the records in issue would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of plaintiffs’ privacy, I agree with the majority that the FOlA’s privacy exemption does not apply.
iv
Although I concur in the majority’s result, I believe the majority’s reliance on Univ of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 493 US 182; 110 S Ct 577; 107 L Ed 2d 571 (1990), to support the position that disclosure of performance evaluations to the public at large would not chill candid evaluations is misplaced. Ante, p 300. In Univ of Pennsylvania v EEOC, the petitioner sought recognition by the Supreme Court of a common law privilege precluding disclosure absent a judicial finding of particularized necessity of access, despite the fact that title VII authorized the EEOC to subpoena any evidence “relevant” to a charge under investigation. Unlike the present cases, Univ of Pennsylvania v EEOC did not involve disclosure of information to the general public, but instead was limited to the issue of disclosure of information to the EEOC for purposes of title VII enforcement. I disagree that the rationale of Univ of Pennsylvania v EEOC can be extended so far as to say that disclosure of intensely personal *312information to the public at large would not chill candid evaluations.
In Univ of Pennsylvania v EEOC, the commission exercised its subpoena powers under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to gain access to information including confidential letters, written letters of evaluation, and documents reflecting internal deliberations relating to teacher tenure proceedings at the University of Pennsylvania. Access was necessary to enable the commission to investigate allegations of racial or sexual discrimination in the university’s tenure process. Without access to these documents the EEOC would be unable to determine whether the allegations had merit. Id. at 186. By failing to comply with the commission’s request, the university essentially thwarted the EEOC’s investigation.
As part of its argument, the University of Pennsylvania claimed that “[a]s more and more peer evaluations are disclosed to the eeoc and become public, a ‘chilling effect’ on candid evaluations and discussions of candidates will result.” Id. at 197. Before concluding that disclosure would not have a chilling effect on candid evaluations, the Supreme Court noted that it is unlawful under title VII for “any officer or employee of the Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under [§ 2000e-8]” of the act. Id. at 192. Violations of § 2000e-8 carry with it criminal penalties. Id. In other words, pursuant to title VII, disclosure to the EEOC does not equal disclosure to the general public, and serious sanctions await any EEOC officer or employee who publicly discloses accessed information. In this context the Supreme Court declined to recognize a special privi*313lege that would conflict with the value that the public has a right to each man’s evidence. True, the Supreme Court was not prepared to “assume the worst about those in the [academic community],” ante, p 300, however this assumption simply expressed the view of the Court that disclosure to the EEOC of materials relevant to charges of racial or sexual discrimination would not be so harmful to academic interests as to warrant recognition of an evidentiary privilege.
v
For the reasons stated above, I hold that plaintiffs’ performance evaluations, disciplinary actions, and complaints are not exempt from disclosure under subsection 13(l)(a) of the foia. Accordingly, I concur with the majority to remand this case to the trial court with orders to release the records, subject to the redactions discussed by the majority.
Cavanagh and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.

 Kestenbaum v Michigan State Univ, 414 Mich 510, 549; 327 NW2d 783 (1982).

 Swickard v Wayne Co Medical Examiner, 438 Mich 536, 547; 475 NW2d 304 (1991).

 Ante, p 294.

 In Swickard, the word “private” was used to help define the meaning of “personal.” In that definition, “private” was used in the same manner as the word “intimate.” It does not follow that the word “private” in the Swickard definition requires that information relate to an individual's pri*308vate life, as opposed to an individual's professional life, in order to be considered personal.

 Id. at 617-618, citing Detroit Edison Co v NLRB, 440 US 301, 318; 99 S Ct 1123; 59 L Ed 2d 333 (1979).

 For additional cases that recognize the personal nature of performance evaluations, see Dawson v Daly, 120 Wash 2d 782, 797; 845 P2d 995 (1993) (employee evaluations qualify as personal information that bear on the competence of employees); Chairman, Criminal Justice Comm v Freedom of Information Comm, 217 Conn 193, 199-200; 585 A2d 96 (1991) (disclosure of performance evaluations would carry significant potential *310for embarrassment); Pawtucket Teachers Alliance v Brady, 556 A2d 556, 559 (RI, 1989) (performance evaluations are highly personal in nature); Ripskis v Dep’t of Housing & Urban Development, 241 US App DC 8; 746 F2d 1 (1984) (even outstanding performance evaluations may contain derogatory information and embarrass an employee if disclosed); Missoulian v Bd of Regents of Higher Ed, 207 Mont 513; 675 P2d 962 (1984) (evaluations contain information of a sensitive nature); Metropolitan Life Ins Co v Usery, 426 F Supp 150, 168 (D DC, 1976), aff’d sub nom Nat’l Organization of Women v Social Security Administration, 237 US App DC 118; 736 F2d 727 (1984) (job evaluations reflect highly personal details about company employees and if disclosed could be embarrassing and painful to the employee); Trenton Times Corp v Trenton Bd of Ed, 138 NJ Super 357, 363; 351 A2d 30 (1976) (performance evaluations are only subjective opinions of the performance of the employee, vary with the person giving the rating, and should remain confidential); Vaughn v Rosen, 383 F Supp 1049, 1055 (D DC, 1974), aff'd 173 US App DC 187; 523 F2d 1136 (1975) (disclosure of evaluations could expose employees to loss of future employment or friends and acute embarrassment).

 Ante, p 295.