Court Opinion

ID: 9513551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:37:38.527156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:54.308995
License: Public Domain

NEUMANN, Justice,
concurring specially.
[¶ 30] While Justice Maring makes a strong argument that a workers compensation system should never be permitted to find a permanently and totally disabled worker has voluntarily withdrawn from the labor market, I cannot find such a policy reflected in the statutes that apply in this case. I agree with much of what Justice Kapsner has written about the meaning and interpretation of the applicable statutes, but I cannot agree with her final conclusion regarding the Bureau’s findings of fact. I therefore write separately.
*503[¶ 31] Section 65-05-09.3, N.D.C.C. (1991) says, “An employee who has retired or voluntarily withdrawn from the labor force is presumed retired from the labor market ....’’ (Emphasis added.) Obviously, those two terms, “labor force” and “labor market,” must mean two different things as the legislature has used them in this statute, even though they might appear to be synonymous. Section 65-05-09.3 goes on to say this presumption can be overcome if the worker shows four things which, taken together, are evidence the worker really is trying to find another job. From all this, I understand “withdrawn from the labor force” to mean “not presently working,” and I understand “retired from the labor market” to mean “not interested in working in the future.” Boiled down to its essence, 65-05-09.3 says a claimant who is voluntarily not presently working is presumed to be not interested in working in the future, and therefore is ineligible for disability benefits unless he shows he really is trying to find another job.
[¶ 32] Section 65-05-09.3 then goes on to say, “The presumption does not apply to any employee who is permanently and totally disabled as defined under this title.” The Bureau has now found that Shiek is permanently and totally disabled. The presumption, therefore, does not apply to him. In Shiek v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 139, ¶21, 582 N.W.2d 639 (“Shiek I ”), we stated, “once the claimant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is totally and permanently disabled, the Bureau must prove, without the aid of a presumption, the claimant is retired from the labor market.”
[¶ 33] According to Justice Maring, this statement is incorrect. Justice Maring argues once the claimant has established total and permanent disability, the Bureau doesn’t get a chance to prove anything more. According to Justice Kapsner, not only is the statement correct, but the Bureau in this case has met its burden of proof. With the greatest respect, I must disagree with both of my colleagues.
[¶ 34] Justice Maring, as I have said, finds an admirable policy reflected in the statutes. Unfortunately, I am not convinced, and therefore cannot agree, that the statutes declare the policy she finds articulated there. Justice Kapsner quite correctly, I believe, states at ¶ 47 that “Retirement from a specific job is insufficient to show removal from the labor market because the presumption does not apply.” Without the presumption, retirement or voluntary withdrawal from the labor force does not, standing alone, prove retirement from the labor market. But Justice Kapsner then refers to and relies on the Bureau’s conclusion that Shiek had retired from the labor market, a conclusion the Bureau has based on Shiek’s long-standing plans to retire from this particular job. That, I would argue, is exactly the presumption the legislature has said the Bureau may not use in this case. The Bureau has concluded Shiek has retired from the labor market because the Bureau has found he had withdrawn from the labor force-retired from a specific job. The Bureau has applied the presumption to reach its conclusion. Reviewing the Bureau’s findings I note many references to Shiek’s plans to retire from this specific job. I find none saying Shiek expressed an intent to quit working entirely.
[¶ 35] Perhaps some confusion was caused by paragraph 22 in Shiek I. The first sentence states, “The Bureau’s finding that Shiek voluntarily retired on September 25, 1992, in accordance with his long-standing plan to retire is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” *504Shiek I, 1998 ND 139, ¶ 22, 582 N.W.2d 639. As the author of that opinion, I admit that sentence may be somewhat unclear and possibly misleading. It was intended as a reference to Shiek’s retirement from his particular job, the fact that he had “retired or voluntarily withdrawn from the labor force.” It was not a reference to retirement from the labor market, a very important distinction under 65-05-09.3. The first sentence of paragraph 23 should have made the distinction clear by saying, “That finding, however, does not give rise to a presumption of retirement from the labor market under N.D.C.C. 65-05-09.3 (1993) if Shiek is permanently and totally disabled.” Shiek I at ¶ 23. Unfortunately, because of the issue presented in Shiek I, that distinction was obscured when the opinion immediately went on to discuss the lack of a clear finding that Shiek was permanently and totally disabled.
[¶ 36] However, despite any short-lived confusion that may have been caused by paragraph 22, a careful reading of section 65-05-09.3 and of the rest of Shiek I should have made clear that in the case of a permanently and totally disabled worker something more than a long-standing plan to retire from a particular job was necessary to prove the claimant had retired from the labor market. The Bureau’s findings in this case fail to include that something more. I therefore concur in the result reached by Justice Maring.
[¶ 37] William A. Neumann