Court Opinion

ID: 9853563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:50:22.486755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:51.130931
License: Public Domain

McHUGH and McGRAW, Justices,
dissenting:
We believe that the majority opinion places too much emphasis on the technicalities of the hearsay rule and too little on the rationale behind it.
[“] The hearsay rule, which has long been recognized and respected by virtually every State, is based on experience and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant’s word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is not available in order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the jury.[”] Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 at 298, 93 S.Ct. 1038 at 1047, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973).
State v. Williams, 162 W.Va. 348, 353, 249 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1978). We do not believe that the rationale for excluding out-of-court statements was present in this case. In each instance cited by the majority opinion, the declarant was available and did, in fact, testify at trial. The appellant was afforded an opportunity to confront and examine the witness, and the jury was able to judge his or her demeanor.
Moreover, we do not believe that the out-of-court statements testified to by the prosecution on witnesses were inherently prejudicial. The defense made the credibility of these witnesses a principal issue at trial, and the State was entitled to offer corroborating evidence. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the matter was properly submitted to the jury, and we would not reverse the appellant’s conviction on the grounds relied upon by the majority.