Court Opinion

ID: 9365711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 19:02:46.020561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:47.255688
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/24/23 P. v. Cole CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C093908

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 01F06209)

           v.

    THEODORE COLE,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Theodore Cole appeals from the trial court’s February 10, 2021 order
denying his petition for resentencing brought pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6
(formerly § 1170.95).1 The court found defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of law
by virtue of the jury’s special circumstance finding and determined preclusive use of this

1        Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

       Effective June 30, 2022, long after defendant filed his petition, the Legislature
renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the section where possible by its new numbering.

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finding (which predated the California Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522) was permissible under
published authority.
       On appeal, the parties agree, as do we, that the trial court’s order cannot stand
under the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698. We accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
                                     BACKGROUND
       Defendant’s Convictions
       On October 24, 2002, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree felony murder
(§§ 187/189; count one) with an attempted robbery special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)) and attempted robbery (§§ 664/211; count two). We upheld these convictions in
an unpublished decision issued in 2004. (People v. Cole (Mar. 26, 2004; C042903)
[nonpub. opn.].) The California Supreme Court denied defendant’s petition for review.
(People v. Cole, supra, C042903, review den. June 9, 2004, S124337.)
       Legal Background
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which became
effective on January 1, 2019, was enacted “to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent
to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The legislation
accomplished this by amending sections 188 and 189 and adding former section 1170.95
to the Penal Code.
       Section 188, which defines malice, now provides in part: “Except as stated in
subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely

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on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Section 189, subdivision (e)
now limits the circumstances under which a person may be convicted of felony murder:
“A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in
subdivision (a) [defining first degree murder] in which a death occurs is liable for murder
only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶]
(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”
       Senate Bill 1437 also added former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, which
allows “those convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to seek relief . . . .” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830,
843.) Section 1172.6, subdivisions (b) and (c) create a two-step process for evaluating a
petitioner’s eligibility for relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960-962.) First,
the trial court determines whether the petition is facially sufficient under section 1172.6,
subdivision (b). (Lewis, at p. 960.) If the petition is facially sufficient, the trial court
moves on to subdivision (c), appointing counsel (if requested) and following the briefing
schedule set out in the statute. (Lewis, at p. 966.) Following the completion of this
briefing, the trial court then determines whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing they are entitled to relief. (Ibid.)
       As our Supreme Court explained, “[w]hile the trial court may look at the record of
conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has made a
prima facie case for section 117[2.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c)
is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the
court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations

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were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[A] court
should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.] ‘However, if the record, including the
court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,”
then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
       As relevant here, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which took effect
on January 1, 2022, amended section 1172.6 to codify the holdings of Lewis regarding
petitioners’ right to counsel and the standard for determining the existence of a prima
facie case and to clarify the burden of proof at the resentencing hearing as proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8; Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.)
       Defendant’s Petition for Resentencing
       On July 24, 2020, defendant’s attorney filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95, which acknowledged the jury’s special circumstance finding.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) Nonetheless, defendant declared he was not a major participant
and did not act with reckless indifference to human life, and his attorney argued the jury’s
enhancement finding that predated the holdings of Banks and Clark should not be given
preclusive effect.
       On February 10, 2021, the trial court issued an order denying defendant’s petition
for resentencing. The court reasoned that the jury instructions and jury findings from
defendant’s original trial established his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. This
was true even though this finding predated the California Supreme Court’s decisions in
People v. Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522.
       Defendant timely appealed. After multiple delays for counsel to submit their
briefing, the case was fully briefed on November 18, 2022, and assigned to this panel
shortly thereafter.

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                                      DISCUSSION
       During the pendency of this appeal, our Supreme Court decided People v. Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th 698, which held that: “Findings issued by a jury before Banks and
Clark do not preclude a defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under
Senate Bill 1437. This is true even if the trial evidence would have been sufficient to
support the findings under Banks and Clark.” (Id. at p. 710.) Here, the trial court
concluded that the jury’s pre-Banks and Clark findings precluded defendant from making
a prima facie case as a matter of law. Because these conclusions do not survive Strong,
we will reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.2
                                     DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                     /s/
                                                 EARL, J.

We concur:

    /s/
RENNER, Acting P. J.

    /s/
KRAUSE, J.

2  We decline defendant’s invitation to determine whether substantial evidence supports
the jury’s determination that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. Such
inquiry would be contrary to the guidance of Strong, which rejected that a trial court’s
substantial evidence review of a pre-Banks/Clark finding would eliminate the need for
remand for issuance of an order to show cause. (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 720.)

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