Court Opinion

ID: 9910014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 18:02:40.734486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:26.603591
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/13/23 Dancel v. Farzam CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 CHRISTOPHER DANCEL,                                              B320810

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. 20STCV05270)
          v.

 STEVE FARZAM,

          Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lia Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
     Okorocha Law Firm and Okorie Okorocha for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
     Andrade Gonzalez, Sean A. Andrade, and Eric D. Mason for
Defendant and Respondent.
       Plaintiff Christopher Dancel (plaintiff) sued defendant
Steve Farzam (defendant) for creating a website using plaintiff’s
name as the domain name and posting defamatory and private
information on the website. The trial court dismissed the action
without prejudice when plaintiff’s attorney failed to appear for
trial. We are asked to decide whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying plaintiff’s requests to continue the trial date
before the court later dismissed the case. Plaintiff also
challenges the trial court’s earlier rulings granting defendant’s
motions to quash plaintiff’s subpoenas to law enforcement
agencies and imposing monetary sanctions in connection with the
motions to quash.

                           I. BACKGROUND
       Plaintiff filed a complaint in February 2020 alleging that,
after he served as an informant in an investigation that led to
defendant being convicted of various felonies, defendant
registered a website at http://www.christopherdancel.com and
posted defamatory and private information regarding plaintiff.
Plaintiff asserted causes of action for libel per se, violation of the
common law right of publicity and against misappropriation, and
violation of Business and Professions Code section 17525,
subdivision (a).1

1
       Business and Professions Code section 17525, subdivision
(a) provides that “[i]t is unlawful for a person, with a bad faith
intent, to register, traffic in, or use a domain or subdomain name
that is identical or confusingly similar to . . . [¶] (1) The personal
name of another living person or deceased personality, without
regard to the goods or services of the parties.”

                                  2
       A.     Subpoenas and Motions to Quash
       Plaintiff issued subpoenas to the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) and California Department of Justice (DOJ)
seeking, among other things, “Any and ALL RECORDS
pertaining to [defendant], including but not limited to documents
generated during any investigation or prosecution over the last
10 years to present only.”
       Defendant moved to quash the subpoenas and requested
sanctions totaling $9,690. On December 16, 2021, the trial court
granted defendant’s motions, giving two reasons for doing so.
First, the court determined plaintiff did not comply with Code of
Civil Procedure section 1985.3’s requirement that consumers be
notified before a subpoena is issued for certain records.2
Alternatively, the trial court reasoned that, in balancing
defendant’s right of privacy against plaintiff’s claimed need “to
establish [defendant’s] motivation in posting the defamatory
information,” 10 years of criminal records were not necessary. In
the trial court’s view, there “appear[ed] to be no dispute that
[plaintiff] participated in the investigations which led to
[defendant’s] convictions” because defendant acknowledged as
much in his cross complaint.3 Moreover, plaintiff did “not
explain[ ] what specific information is required from the records,”
relying instead on “a general assertion that the records are

2
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
3
      Defendant’s cross-complaint, dismissed before trial, is not
included in the appellate record.

                                 3
required.” The trial court ordered plaintiff and his attorney,
jointly and severally, to pay $3,017.50 in sanctions.4

       B.     Requests for Continuance and Order of Dismissal
       Plaintiff filed a series of ex parte applications to continue
the trial for 60 days in early 2022. First, plaintiff filed two
identical applications on March 24, 2022, asking the trial court to
continue the trial—then set to begin on March 28, 2022—because
his attorney was “a material expert witness” subpoenaed to
appear at several hearings, including two criminal matters,
around the same time. Plaintiff argued there was good cause to
continue the trial because his attorney would be unable to give
this case “his full attention” and because the criminal matters
“must take priority.” The trial court took the ex parte
applications off calendar because plaintiff’s attorney did not
appear at a hearing, but it continued the trial to April 5, 2022, on
its own motion.
       Plaintiff filed another ex parte application to continue the
trial on March 30, 2022. This application was substantially
similar to the prior applications but also mentioned an additional
criminal matter in which plaintiff’s attorney was serving as an
expert witness. Plaintiff subsequently requested judicial notice
of subpoenas for his attorney to appear in two other criminal
matters in which he was serving as an expert witness. The trial
court denied this application to continue the trial because it did

4
      This court summarily denied plaintiff’s writ petition
challenging the trial court’s ruling on the motions to quash and
sanctions. (Dancel v. Superior Court (Mar. 4, 2022, B318126)
[nonpub. opn.].)

                                 4
not comply with various court rules.5 At a hearing on motions in
limine held the same day, the trial court stated that jury
selection would commence on April 11, 2022. When plaintiff’s
attorney indicated he was subject to subpoenas in criminal
matters, the trial court responded that, “[i]f something actually
does come up for you on April 11, I’m sure you have a way of
putting that properly before the court . . . .”
       Plaintiff filed one more ex parte application to continue the
trial for 60 days on April 7, 2022. This too was substantially
similar to plaintiff’s prior applications, although it listed different
criminal matters in which his attorney was engaged as an expert
witness. The trial court denied the application on April 11, 2022.
The court emphasized the application “[did] not address the
disclosures or previous applications, as required by California
Rules of Court[,] rule 3.1202(b).”6 Additionally, “[t]here [was] no

5
       Specifically, the trial court cited California Rules of Court,
rules 3.1201(3), 3.1202(a), and 3.1204. Rule 3.1204 provides,
among other things, that a party seeking ex parte relief must
provide notice to the opposing party and attempt to determine
whether that party will appear to oppose the application, detail
efforts made to provide notice, or explain why notice should not
be required. Rule 3.1201(3) requires that a request for ex parte
relief be accompanied by “[a] declaration based on personal
knowledge of the notice given under rule 3.1204.” Rule 3.1202(a)
requires the applicant to provide contact information for the
opposing party’s attorney “or, if no such attorney is known, the
name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number of the
party if known to the applicant.”
6
       California Rules of Court, rule 3.1202(b) provides that “[i]f
an ex parte application has been refused in whole or in part, any
subsequent application of the same character or for the same
relief, although made upon an alleged different state of facts,

                                  5
attempt to determine whether the opposing party [would] appear
to oppose the application, as required by [California Rules of
Court,] rule 3.1204(a)(2).” On the merits, the trial court found
there “[was] no affirmative factual showing of irreparable harm,
etc. . . . in a declaration containing competent testimony based on
personal knowledge.” Plaintiff’s attorney did not “show[ ] that he
[was] attorney of record for a criminal matter that [was]
proceeding to trial.” Rather, he had only “shown some subpoenas
requiring his appearance (or placing him on call) as a witness,
and ha[d] expressed that he anticipate[d] he [would] receive
additional subpoenas in the future.”
        When the trial court called the case on April 11, 2022, to
rule on motions in limine and begin jury selection, an attorney
standing in for plaintiff’s attorney of record indicated the
attorney of record was “actually engaged in a criminal matter in
Placer [County]. He’s actually on his way this morning to Placer
as the defense’s expert witness in the criminal matter, so he’s not
available at all . . . .” The trial court asked who would be
representing plaintiff, and the attorney responded, “[t]here is no
one who is prepared to go forward with the plaintiff’s matter
today. No one else is prepared. This is a notification to the court
that [plaintiff’s attorney of record] would otherwise be prepared
had he not had the priority criminal matters before him. But
there’s no one today to appear, so in the interest of justice, and if
it’s the court’s desire, the court could dismiss the case today since
there’s no one prepared to go forward with [plaintiff’s] matter.”
Defendant’s attorney said “[i]t sounds to me like the plaintiff is

must include a full disclosure of all previous applications and of
the court’s actions.”

                                  6
requesting that the case be dismissed based on failure to appear
for trial, and that works for us.” The trial court ordered the case
dismissed without prejudice “based on defendant’s request that
the court dismiss the case, and also at the suggestion of plaintiff.”

                          II. DISCUSSION
       There was no error in denying the ex parte applications to
continue the trial because the applications did not comply with
the pertinent rules of court.
       Plaintiff’s challenge to the trial court’s orders granting
defendant’s motions to quash the DOJ and LAPD subpoenas and
imposing sanctions also lacks merit. Plaintiff does not contest
the trial court’s finding that he did not comply with consumer
notice requirements before serving the subpoenas and, in any
event, the trial court appropriately balanced defendant’s privacy
interest against plaintiff’s right to discover relevant facts in
quashing the subpoenas. The trial court’s associated sanctions
order was also appropriate.

      A.    The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
            Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Applications to Continue the Trial
      Plaintiff’s appellate briefing challenges the trial court’s
orders denying his ex parte applications to continue the trial
dated March 28, 2022, and April 5, 2022. Even assuming the
March ruling is within the scope of this appeal,7 the challenge

7
      In addition to the December 2021 orders granting
defendant’s motions to quash the law enforcement subpoenas
(and “[a]n order after judgment” mentioned nowhere in plaintiff’s
opening brief), plaintiff’s notice of appeal only identifies trial
court orders dated April 5, 2022, and April 11, 2022. These dates

                                  7
fails because plaintiff’s attorney failed to appear at the hearing
set to consider the March ex parte application in violation of
court rules requiring such an appearance. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1207.)
       As to the order dated April 5, 2022, plaintiff is incorrect
that the trial court “gave absolutely no statement of [its]
reasoning . . . .” Although we are concerned with the trial court’s
ultimate ruling and not its reasoning (Loy v. Kenney (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 403, 406), the trial court’s ruling is supported by
plaintiff’s failure to comply with several court rules cited in the
order. (Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d
869, 884 [“‘The Rules of Court promulgated by the Judicial
Council have the force of positive law and must be complied with
provided they do not conflict with any act of the Legislature’”].)
Indeed, the trial court expressly indicated it would consider an
application that was “properly before the court.” Plaintiff,
however, never subsequently filed an application that conformed
to the California Rules of Court.
       Because plaintiff’s briefing on appeal does not address the
trial court’s April 11, 2022, order denying the ex parte application
filed on April 7, 2022, any claim of error with respect to this
ruling is forfeited. (Foxen v. Carpenter (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 284,
295.) The same holds true concerning the appearance attorney’s
“notification to the court” that the attorney of record was
unavailable on April 11, 2022.

correspond to the judgment of dismissal and orders denying two
of plaintiff’s ex parte applications to continue the trial. Plaintiff’s
appellate briefs only discuss trial court continuance denial orders
dated March 28, 2022, and April 5, 2022.

                                   8
      B.     The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting
             Defendant’s Motions to Quash Plaintiff’s DOJ and
             LAPD Subpoenas
       Section 1985.3 sets forth procedural requirements
governing subpoenas for personal records of a consumer. Among
other things, the subpoenaing party must provide notice to the
consumer “[a]t least five days prior to service upon the custodian
of the records . . . .” (§ 1985.3, subd. (b)(3).) By its own terms,
section 1985.3 does not include subpoenas directed to law
enforcement agencies (§ 1985.3, subd. (a)(1)). But section 1985.4
makes its procedural requirements applicable to plaintiff’s
subpoenas to DOJ and LAPD.8

8
       Section 1985.4 provides that “[t]he procedures set forth in
Section 1985.3 are applicable to a subpoena duces tecum for
records containing ‘personal information,’ as defined in Section
1798.3 of the Civil Code that are otherwise exempt from public
disclosure under a provision listed in Section 7920.505 of the
Government Code that are maintained by a state or local agency
as defined in Section 7920.510 or 7920.540 of the Government
Code. For the purposes of this section, . . . ‘consumer’
means . . . any . . . natural person. . . .” Here, the records in
question are maintained by state and local agencies covered by
the statute. (Gov. Code §§ 7920.510, subd. (h) [“[a]ny . . . agency”
of a city], 7920.540, subd. (a) [“every state . . . department”
outside of the Legislature and the Judiciary].) And plaintiff’s
subpoenas seeking “[a]ny and ALL RECORDS pertaining to
[defendant]” inarguably target “personal information” as broadly
defined in Civil Code section 1798.3. (Civ. Code, § 1798.3, subd.
(a) [“The term ‘personal information’ means any
information . . . that identifies or describes an individual,
including, but not limited to, the individual’s name, social
security number, physical description, home address, home
telephone number, education, financial matters, and medical or

                                 9
       Plaintiff acknowledged in the trial court that he did not
provide consumer notice sufficiently in advance of serving the
DOJ and LAPD subpoenas. This alone justifies the trial court’s
decision to grant defendant’s motions to quash. (Bd. of Registered
Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1037
[“Where, as here, a state agency is served with a subpoena
seeking personal information that does not comply with the
consumer notice provisions, disclosure of the personal
information would violate the law”]; Sasson v. Katash (1983) 146
Cal.App.3d 119, 125 [holding that a party’s “admitted failure to
follow the notice and time procedures set forth in [section 1985.3]
justified the exclusion of the requested documents” when the
party asked a witness to produce them at trial]; see also § 1985.3,
subd. (k) [“Failure to comply with this section shall be sufficient
basis for the witness to refuse to produce the personal records
sought by a subpoena duces tecum”].)
       In addition, the trial court’s balancing of defendant’s
privacy interest against plaintiff’s competing interests was not an
abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., Denari v. Superior Court (1989)
215 Cal.App.3d 1488, 1498 [“The courts have repeatedly
recognized that release of arrest records or dissemination of
information about arrests implicated the right to privacy of the
arrestees”].) Plaintiff has never sufficiently explained how 10

employment history”].) At least some of the information may be
exempt from public disclosure under Government Code 7920.505.
(Gov. Code, § 7920.505, subd. (a)(2) [incorporating Government
Code section 7923.600]; Gov. Code, § 7923.600 [exempting from
disclosure “records of complaints to, or investigations conducted
by, or records of intelligence information or security procedures
of” DOJ and local police agencies].)

                                10
years of criminal records are relevant to the subject matter of this
litigation. His assertion that such records shed light on
defendant’s “motivation” in creating the website does not suffice
because there is no proffered link between the requested
information and the conduct alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff’s
contention that defendant waived any privacy interest relating to
law enforcement records because defendant noticed the
deposition of an LAPD detective lacks merit because, with only
the notice of deposition included in the appellate record, we have
no ability to assess the scope of the testimony and any potential
waiver.

      C.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
             Ordering Sanctions Against Plaintiff and His
             Attorney
       Subject to exceptions not applicable here, section 1987.2,
subdivision (a) provides that the trial court has discretion to
“award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in
making or opposing [a motion to quash], including reasonable
attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed
in bad faith or without substantial justification . . . .” Similarly,
section 2023.030, subdivision (a) provides that “[t]he court may
impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the
misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that
conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.”
Indeed, the court “shall impose that sanction unless it finds that
the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial
justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of
the sanction unjust.” (§ 2023.030, subd. (a).) Misuse of the

                                 11
discovery process includes “[p]ersisting, over objection and
without substantial justification, in an attempt to obtain
information or materials that are outside the scope of permissible
discovery.” (§ 2023.010, subd. (a).)
       The trial court ordered sanctions after finding that plaintiff
failed to comply with consumer notice requirements and failed to
provide a non-conclusory argument that defendant’s criminal
records were relevant to the subject matter of the litigation. As
we have discussed, the trial court was correct in both respects. In
opposing the motions to quash, plaintiff failed to address the
consumer notice issue and did not adequately explain why the
requested records were relevant to his case. Because the
opposition was not “‘well grounded in both law and fact’”
(Evilsizor v. Sweeney (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1312), it
lacked substantial justification and sanctions were warranted.
Plaintiff’s challenge to the sanctions order, predicated on a
contention that “there was no improper conduct or a showing of
bad faith,” does not apply the correct legal standard.

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                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Defendant shall recover his
costs on appeal.

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                          BAKER, J.

We concur:

     RUBIN, P. J.

     MOOR, J.

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