Court Opinion

ID: 2964512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:44.980779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:57.101496
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1548

                            COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                        FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 

                                         and

                        FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

                    as Receiver for Bank Five for Savings, et al.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The  opinion of this Court  issued on December  19, 1996, is
          amended as follows:

               On  page  2, third  line from  the  bottom, the  citation to
            1821(a)(2)(B)(5), (6) should read   1821(a)(5), (6).

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1548
                            COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                        FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION 

                                         and

                        FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

                    as Receiver for Bank Five for Savings, et al.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                         Selya, Cyr and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                               ______________
                                    ______________

               Thomas O. Bean, Assistant  Attorney General, with whom Scott
               ______________  ___________________________            _____
          Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was on brief, for
          ___________  _________________________________
          appellant.
               Mitchell  E.F.  Plave, Counsel,  with  whom  Ann S.  DuRoss,
               _____________________  _______               ______________
          Assistant General  Counsel,  and Colleen  B.  Bombardier,  Senior
          __________________________       _______________________   ______
          Counsel, were  on  brief  for appellee  FDIC,  in  its  corporate
          _______
          capacity.
               Leslie Randolph, Counsel, with whom Ann S. DuRoss, Assistant
               _______________  _______            _____________  _________
          General Counsel, and Robert D. McGillicuddy, Senior Counsel, were
          _______________      ______________________  ______________
          on  brief  for  appellee FDIC,  as  Receiver  for  Bank Five  for
          Savings, et al.
                                 ____________________
                                  December 19, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      LYNCH, Circuit  Judge.   Against the backdrop  of a
                      LYNCH, Circuit  Judge.
                             ______________

            general  economic   decline   and  tightened   federal   bank

            regulations, Massachusetts suffered forty-eight bank failures

            between 1987 and 1994.  This case is part of the aftermath of

            that financial crisis.  At  issue is whether the Commonwealth

            of  Massachusetts,   acting  under  its   abandoned  property

            statute,  may obtain  either  the  federal deposit  insurance

            proceeds  or  the  pro  rata   distributions  from  abandoned

            accounts  in failed Massachusetts  banks.   Considerable sums

            are at stake.

                                          I.

                      The  Federal  Deposit  Insurance   Corporation  was

            created  by the Banking Act of 1933,  Pub. L. No. 73-66,   8,

            48 Stat. 162, to alleviate hardships caused by bank failures.

            See S.  Rep. No. 584, 72d  Cong., 1st Sess. 10  (1932).1  The
            ___

            agency  in its  corporate capacity  ("FDIC-Corporate") offers

            insurance  on depositors' accounts  for up  to $100,000.   12

            U.S.C.   1821(a)(1)(B).   Participating banks and thrifts pay

            premiums  to the FDIC.   Those premiums are  used to maintain

            two  insurance funds, the Bank Insurance Fund and the Savings

            Association Insurance Fund.   Id.   1821(a)(5), (6).   When a
                                          ___

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The Banking  Act of 1933 amended the Federal Reserve Act,
            Pub. L. No. 63-43,  38 Stat. 251 (1913).   Congress revisited
            the deposit insurance provisions in 1935,  and again in 1950,
            when  these provisions  were  amended and  made  part of  the
            Federal  Deposit Insurance Act ("FDIA"), Pub. L. No. 81-97,  
            2(1), 64 Stat. 873.

                                         -2-
                                          2

            bank  fails, FDIC-Corporate  draws  money from  one of  these

            funds  and either  pays  the insurance  proceeds directly  to

            depositors  as an insured deposit or transfers the money to a

            new bank as a transferred deposit, using whichever method  is

            more cost effective.   Id.    1821(f).  Upon  payment to  the
                                   ___

            depositors,   FDIC-Corporate   becomes   subrogated  to   the

            depositors'  rights   against  the  failed  banks.     Id.   
                                                                   ___

            1821(g)(1).

                      The  FDIC acting  as  a receiver  ("FDIC-Receiver")

            winds  up  the affairs  of failed  banks and  distributes any

            remaining  assets pro rata to  the bank's creditors.   Id.   
                                                                   ___

            1821(c)(2)(A)(ii); 1821(d)(11)(A).   FDIC-Corporate may bring

            a claim against FDIC-Receiver for the insured depositors' pro

            rata shares  of any distributed  liquidated assets.   See id.
                                                                  ___ ___

              1821(g)(1).

                      Before 1988, FDIC-Corporate  had generally  honored

            claims by states, pursuant  to their abandoned property acts,

            for the insured value of abandoned deposits at failed banks.2

            Treatment  of  Abandoned  Deposits  and  Property  in  Failed
            _____________________________________________________________

            Depository  Institutions:  Hearing  Before  the  Subcomm.  on
            _____________________________________________________________

            Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation  and Insurance
            _____________________________________________________________

            of  the House  Comm. on Banking,  Finance and  Urban Affairs,
            ____________________________________________________________

                                
            ____________________

            2.  "States as sovereigns may take custody of or assume title
            to abandoned  personal property  as bona vacantia,  a process
            commonly  (though  somewhat  erroneously)   called  escheat."
            Delaware v.  New York,  507 U.S.  490,  497 (1993).   All  50
            ________     ________
            states have statutes providing for such "escheat."

                                         -3-
                                          3

            102d  Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1992) (Letter of Alice C. Goodman,

            Acting Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, FDIC).  FDIC-

            Receiver continues  to permit  states that file timely claims

            pursuant to the provisions governing general creditors of the

            receivership estate to act on behalf of absent depositors and

            to claim those depositors' pro rata shares of any distributed

            liquidated  assets.   Id.  at  95 (Testimony  of  Alfred J.T.
                                  ___

            Byrne, General  Counsel, FDIC).   However, after  1988, FDIC-

            Corporate began  declining to pay states the insured value of

            abandoned accounts.   Id. at 97-98.   FDIC-Corporate asserted
                                  ___

            that  its original  policy  was inconsistent  with the  plain

            language  of the  pre-1993 version  of 12  U.S.C.    1822(e),

            which  provided  that  insurance   funds  not  claimed  by  a

            depositor  within eighteen  months  of the  appointment of  a

            receiver reverted back to the FDIC.  Id; see also 12 U.S.C.  
                                                 __  ___ ____

            1822(e) (1989) (current version enacted 1993).

                      The states,  with  Massachusetts in  the  vanguard,

            fought back.  They lobbied Congress, leading to the enactment

            of  compromise legislation, the Unclaimed Deposits Amendments

            Act  of  1993 ("UDAA"),  Pub. L.  No.  103-44, 107  Stat. 220

            (1993), under which  the states receive the  insured value of

            abandoned deposits  for a  10-year  period.   If a  depositor

            fails  to  make  a  claim during  this  time,  the  insurance

            proceeds on  the abandoned account  must be  returned to  the

                                         -4-
                                          4

            FDIC  and all rights of  the depositor are  extinguished.  12

            U.S.C.   1822(e)(5); see infra note 7.
                                 ___ _____

                      However, the UDAA expressly made the former version

            of     1822(e) applicable  to  banks  placed in  receivership

            between  January  1,  1989  and   June  28,  1993,  with  one

            additional  proviso.   Claims by  insured depositors  at such

            banks  made  prior to  the  termination  of the  receivership

            estate  are  not time-barred.   Pub.  L.  No. 103-44,    2(b)

            (1993).   Thus,  depositors at  banks placed  in receivership

            between  January 1, 1989 and June 28, 1993 have the longer of

            eighteen months or until  the termination of the receivership

            estate  to file  claims with  FDIC-Corporate for  the insured

            value of their accounts.  Id.
                                      ___

                      Massachusetts  also turned to  the federal judicial

            system for redress, claiming it is entitled to  the insurance

            proceeds  and  the  pro  rata  distributions  from  abandoned

            deposits   in  thirty-three  failed Massachusetts  banks  for

            which the  FDIC was appointed  receiver between May  1990 and

            December 1992.3

                                         II.

                      The  Commonwealth has  its own  comprehensive legal

            framework,   the     Massachusetts  Abandoned   Property  Act

            ("MAPA"), Mass. Gen. L. ch.  200A, for dealing with abandoned

                                
            ____________________

            3.  At  least one  similar  suit, Resolution  Trust Corp.  v.
                                              _______________________
            California, 851 F. Supp. 1453 (C.D. Cal. 1994), has also been
            __________
            brought in federal court.

                                         -5-
                                          5

            property.   The federal government has  a similarly intricate

            statutory  and regulatory scheme  relating to  bank failures.

            The dispute  between the  Commonwealth and the  FDIC involves

            the intersection of these two bodies of law.

                      The MAPA was enacted both  to protect the rights of

            true owners when and  if they appear and to  bring additional

            revenues  to  the  Commonwealth's   treasury.    Treasurer  &
                                                             ____________

            Receiver  Gen. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 446 N.E.2d
            ______________    _______________________________

            1376,  1383 (Mass.  1983).   It  creates  a presumption  that

            deposits are abandoned unless the owner  has, during the past

            three  years,  either communicated with the deposit holder or

            engaged in certain other activities.  Mass. Gen. L. ch. 200A,

               3.   Deposit  holders,  including banks,  are  required to

            submit  annual reports  to  the State  Treasurer listing  the

            names and  addresses of  depositors deemed to  have abandoned

            accounts valued at more  than $100.  Id.   7.  The banks must
                                                 ___

            send  letters to the owners  of such accounts  at least sixty

            days  before  filing  the  report,  giving  notice  that  the

            deposits  are about to be  surrendered to the  custody of the

            Commonwealth.  Id.   7(A).
                           ___

                      Unless a depositor claims an abandoned account, the

            bank must deliver  the funds  into the custody  of the  State

            Treasurer,  who  publishes a  notice  that  the accounts  are

            deemed abandoned.  Id.    8A, 8.  The money is then placed in
                               ___

            an  Abandoned Property Fund and  used for the  benefit of the

                                         -6-
                                          6

            Commonwealth.  Id.   9(e).  The owner of an abandoned account
                           ___

            has an unlimited period to submit a claim for the funds.  Id.
                                                                      ___

              10(a).  If the State Treasurer determines that the claim is

            valid, the owner  receives the  value of the  account plus  a

            small  amount of monthly interest.4   Id.    10(e).  However,
                                                  ___

            only about  25% of abandoned  accounts are ever  claimed; the

            rest are retained by the Commonwealth.

                      The dispute over deposits  held in failed banks and

            deemed  abandoned  under  the  MAPA  arose  in  early  1992.5

            Following  unsuccessful attempts  to  achieve  a  settlement,

            Massachusetts  filed  a  complaint  against  FDIC-Receiver in

            federal district court  in January 1994 seeking  the pro rata

            value  of  the  deposits  from the  failed  banks'  remaining

            assets.     In  March  1994,  Massachusetts   also  filed  an

            administrative  claim  with  FDIC-Corporate for  the  insured

            value of the unclaimed deposits, arguing that it was entitled

            to these funds under the MAPA.6

                                
            ____________________

            4.  This interest cannot exceed  five-twelfths of one percent
            per month.  Id.
                        ___

            5.  This   dispute   initially   involved  both   pre-closing
            deposits, deposits  abandoned before the banks  were put into
            receivership, and post-closing  deposits, deposits  abandoned
            after  the  banks  were  put  into  receivership.    However,
            Massachusetts has since conceded that  it is not entitled  to
            the  post-closing  deposits, Massachusetts  v.  FDIC, 916  F.
                                         _____________      ____
            Supp. 54, 57 (D. Mass. 1996), and so the term "deposits" here
            refers to pre-closing deposits only.

            6.  The Commonwealth  is not  attempting to recover  the same
            money  twice: it only seeks  the uninsured value  of the pre-
            closing  deposits from  FDIC-Receiver to  the extent  that it

                                         -7-
                                          7

                      FDIC-Corporate rejected the claim, stating that the

            MAPA  was pre-empted by  12 U.S.C.    1822(e) (1989) (current

            version enacted 1993).7  Massachusetts petitioned this  court

            directly for review of the administrative claim.  This  court

                                
            ____________________

            does not recover  the insured  value of  these deposits  from
            FDIC-Corporate.

            7.  The  pre-amendment  version,  the  operative  text  here,
            stated:

                           (e) Unclaimed deposits.   If,  after
                               __________________
                      the Corporation shall have given at least
                      three months' notice to the  depositor by
                      mailing  a copy thereof to his last-known
                      address appearing  on the records  of the
                      depository  institution  in default,  any
                      depositor  in the  depository institution
                      in  default  shall   fail  to  claim  his
                      insured  deposit   from  the  Corporation
                      within   eighteen    months   after   the
                      appointment  of  the  receiver   for  the
                      depository  institution  in  default,  or
                      shall fail within such period to claim or
                      arrange   to  continue   the  transferred
                      deposit  with  the new  bank or  with the
                      other   insured   depository  institution
                      which  assumes  liability  therefor,  all
                      rights  of  the  depositor   against  the
                      Corporation with respect  to the  insured
                      deposit,  and against  the  new bank  and
                      such other insured depository institution
                      with respect to the  transferred deposit,
                      shall be  barred, and  all rights of  the
                      depositor    against    the    depository
                      institution    in    default   and    its
                      shareholders, or  the receivership estate
                      to which the Corporation may  have become
                      subrogated, shall thereupon revert to the
                      depositor.  The amount of any transferred
                      deposits not claimed within such eighteen
                      months'  period, shall be refunded to the
                      Corporation.

            12 U.S.C.   1822(e) (1989) (amended 1993).

                                         -8-
                                          8

            held that it lacked jurisdiction and  transferred the case to

            the district court for a ruling on the merits.  Massachusetts
                                                            _____________

            v.  FDIC,  47   F.3d  456,  457  (1st   Cir.  1995)  (initial
                ____

            jurisdiction to  hear appeals from the  FDIC's disposition of

            claims  for  insurance benefits  lies  not  in the  court  of

            appeals, but in the district court).  The cases against FDIC-

            Corporate and FDIC-Receiver were consolidated in October 1995

            by agreement of the parties.

                      FDIC-Corporate moved to  dismiss, reasserting  that

            the MAPA  is pre-empted  by federal statute.   FDIC-Corporate

            moved in  the alternative for summary  judgment, arguing that

            its  decision  to  deny  Massachusetts' claim  was  a  proper

            exercise  of discretion.    At the  same time,  FDIC-Receiver

            moved to dismiss on the  ground that Massachusetts' claim for

            deposit  funds was time-barred because it  had not been filed

            within  the 90-day period for  general creditors set forth in

            12  U.S.C.    1821(d)(5).    Massachusetts  responded with  a

            motion   for   summary   judgment   against   FDIC-Corporate.

            Massachusetts v. FDIC, 916 F. Supp. at 57.
            _____________    ____

                      The   district  court,  in   a  carefully  reasoned

            opinion, dismissed the insurance claim against FDIC-Corporate

            and  entered  summary  judgment  for   FDIC-Receiver  on  the

            creditor  claim.  Id. at 61.8   The allowance of both motions
                              ___

                                
            ____________________

            8.  FDIC-Receiver's motion to dismiss was treated as a motion
            for  summary   judgment,  because  the   parties  asked  that
            materials outside  the pleadings  be considered.   Id. at  60
                                                               ___

                                         -9-
                                          9

            is reviewed de novo.   Villafane-Neriz v. FDIC, 75  F.3d 727,
                        __ ____    _______________    ____

            730 (1st  Cir. 1996); Heno v.  FDIC, 20 F.3d  1204, 1205 (1st
                                  ____     ____

            Cir. 1994).  We affirm.

                                         III.

                      The  Commonwealth argues  two bases  for  its claim

            against  FDIC-Corporate for  the  insured  value of  deposits

            abandoned   in  failed  Massachusetts  banks:  its  abandoned

            property  statute and  FDIC  regulations.   The claim  raises

            certain issues.  The  first is how properly to  interpret the

            relevant  version  of 12  U.S.C.    1822(e).   The  second is

            whether this federal statute pre-empts the MAPA.  If it does,

            the question  becomes whether the Commonwealth is nonetheless

            entitled to the insurance  proceeds under any other provision

            of federal law.

                      A. Statutory Construction
                      _________________________

                      The Supreme  Court  has instructed  that the  first

            task in  statutory construction is to  separate "the question

            of the substantive (as  opposed to pre-emptive) meaning of  a

            statute  [from]  the question  of whether  a statute  is pre-

            emptive."   Smiley v. Citibank, 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (1996).
                        ______    ________

            FDIC-Corporate's  primary  argument  is that  the  applicable

            version of    1822(e)  reflects a clear  congressional intent

            that insurance proceeds for  abandoned accounts revert to one

            of  the FDIC  insurance funds.   FDIC-Corporate  also asserts

                                
            ____________________

            (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)).

                                         -10-
                                          10

            that  its  interpretation  of  the  statute  is  entitled  to

            deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
                            _______    __________________________________

            Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
            ____

                      The Commonwealth counters that   1822(e) can hardly

            be read  as demonstrating  a clear congressional  intent that

            the  insurance  recoveries  referable to  abandoned  accounts

            revert  to the FDIC when the agency itself applied a contrary

            interpretation between 1950 and 1988.   Massachusetts further

            argues that,  in this context, the new FDIC interpretation is

            not  entitled  to  full  Chevron  deference.   FDIC-Corporate
                                     _______

            concedes  that before  1988 it  did not  consistently require

            deposit insurance on abandoned accounts to be returned to the

            federal government  rather than  turned over to  the states.9

            It asserts, however, that, when the inconsistency was brought

            to its attention in  late 1988, it determined that    1822(e)

            required  these funds to revert to the FDIC.  Hearing, supra,
                                                          _______  _____

            at 97-98  (Testimony of  Alfred J.T. Byrne,  General Counsel,

            FDIC).

                                
            ____________________

            9.  This inconsistency may have  resulted from the FDIC's use
            of three different  responses to bank failures,  one of which
            was  known as a  purchase and assumption  transaction and did
            not  involve either insured deposits or transferred deposits,
            and  thus did not implicate   1822(e).  In mid-1989, the FDIC
            modified  the   structure  of  its  purchase  and  assumption
            transactions so  that they made use  of transferred deposits,
            thus eliminating  this source of confusion.   Hearing, supra,
                                                          _______  _____
            at 97-98  (Testimony of  Alfred J.T. Byrne,  General Counsel,
            FDIC).

                                         -11-
                                          11

                      When  determining  the  substantive  meaning  of  a

            statute,  "[f]irst,  always,  is  the  question   of  whether

            Congress  has  directly spoken  to  the  precise question  at

            issue."   Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.   Here, the parties frame
                      _______

            the issue as   whether  a state, acting  under its  abandoned

            property statute, may "claim"  the insured value of abandoned

            deposits  held  in failed  banks.   The  crux of  the matter,

            however,  is  whether  a  state acting  on  behalf  of absent

            depositors may itself qualify as a depositor under   1822(e).

            We do not  believe the  plain language of    1822(e)  answers

            this question.  That the FDIC apparently viewed the matter in

            inconsistent ways  reinforces this conclusion.  Other indicia

            of   the  statute's  meaning,  particularly  the  legislative

            history,  thus come into play.   Wilson v.  Bradlees, 96 F.3d
                                             ______     ________

            552, 555 (1st Cir. 1996).

                      The Commonwealth's claim arises not under   1822(e)

            as  it was originally enacted  in the 1935  amendments to the

            Banking Act of 1933, but under the "reenactment" of   1822(e)

            in  1993  as  part of  the  UDAA.10    Consequently, we  must

                                
            ____________________

            10.  We use the term "reenactment" as a convenient shorthand.
            Section 2(b) of the UDAA states:

                      Special   rule   for   receiverships   in
                      _________________________________________
                      progress.--Section  12(e) of  the Federal
                      ________
                      Deposit  Insurance  Act  [subsec. (e)  of
                      this  section] as  in effect  on  the day
                      before the date of enactment of  this Act
                      [June 28, 1993]  shall apply with respect
                      to   insured   deposits   in   depository
                      institutions  for  which the  Corporation

                                         -12-
                                          12

            consider two different bodies of legislative history, that of

            the original version of    1822(e) from 1935 and that  of the

            UDAA.

                      The 1935 legislative  history provides no  guidance

            on  this issue.    However, the  proceedings  leading to  the

            enactment of the  UDAA do shed some light on  the matter.  At

            the  congressional hearings  on the  UDAA, two  senior agency

            officials   testified   as   to   the    agency's   post-1988

            interpretation of    1822(e).   Congress  did  not,  however,

            cause the new version  of   1822(e) to apply  to banks placed

            in  receivership between January  1, 1989 and  June 28, 1993,

            despite lobbying by the states.

                      Congress  is  often  deemed   to  have  adopted  an

            agency's  interpretation of  a statute  when, knowing  of the

            agency  interpretation,  it   reenacts  the  statute  without

            significant  change.   FDIC v.  Philadelphia Gear  Corp., 476
                                   ____     ________________________

            U.S. 426, 437 (1986).  The legislative  history thus suggests
                                                                 ________

                                
            ____________________

                      was first appointed  receiver during  the
                      period  between January  1, 1989  and the
                      date of enactment  of this Act [June  28,
                      1993],  except  that  such section  12(e)
                      [subsec.  (e) of this  section] shall not
                      bar   any   claim   made    against   the
                      Corporation by an  insured depositor  for
                      an  insured  or  transferred deposit,  so
                      long as  such claim is made  prior to the
                      termination of the receivership.

            Technically, then,  Congress  did not  reenact  the  pre-1993
            version of   1822(e), but rather caused it to apply  to banks
            placed into receivership between January 1, 1989 and June 28,
            1993.

                                         -13-
                                          13

            that Congress wanted unclaimed  deposits in banks placed into

            receivership  during the  relevant  period to  revert to  the

            FDIC.  But FDIC-Corporate's  argument that "[b]y enacting the

            UDAA,  Congress  has  erased  any  question  that     1822(e)

            requires unclaimed  insurance benefits to be  returned to the

            FDIC"  overstates the case.  Congress  may simply have chosen

            not to enter the fray as to the past.   While the legislative

            history  of the UDAA  is instructive, it  is not dispositive.

            Congress'  intent   remains  ambiguous.     Accordingly,  the

            question of  how much deference to  accord the interpretation

            advanced by FDIC-Corporate must be considered.

                      An  agency's  formal   interpretation,  through   a

            rulemaking or  an adjudication, of a  statute it administers,

            is accorded what has  come to be known as  Chevron deference.
                                                       _______

            Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise   3.5, at 119 (3d
                            ___________________________

            ed.  1994);  see also  Chevron, 467  U.S.  at 842-43.   Under
                         ___ ____  _______

            Chevron,  if  a  statute  is ambiguous  with  respect  to the
            _______

            contested issue, "the question  for the court is whether  the

            agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the

            statute."    Chevron,  467 U.S.  at  843.    Contrary to  the
                         _______

            Commonwealth's argument,  an agency  certainly does  not lose

            its entitlement to  deference by changing  its position on  a

            matter  entrusted to it by  Congress.  Rust  v. Sullivan, 500
                                                   ____     ________

            U.S. 173, 186 (1991).  Indeed, Chevron itself involved a case
                                           _______

            where the agency changed its position in a formal rulemaking.

                                         -14-
                                          14

            467 U.S.  at 863-64.   "[T]he whole  point of  Chevron is  to
                                                           _______

            leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute

            with the implementing agency."  Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1734.
                                            ______

                      Less formal interpretations  -- policy  statements,

            guidelines,  staff instructions, and  litigation positions --

            are not  accorded full Chevron  deference.   Davis &  Pierce,
                                   _______

            supra,   3.5, at 119-20; see also Massachusetts v. Blackstone
            _____                    ___ ____ _____________    __________

            Valley  Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 991 (1st Cir. 1995) (agency's
            _________________

            litigation  position not  entitled  to Chevron  deference).11
                                                   _______

            Here, the  change in policy regarding  treatment of abandoned

            deposits could not have  been more informal.  The  new policy

            was merely announced  in a  1988 presentation by  one of  the

            FDIC's  staff  attorneys  at  a conference  of  the  National

            Association  of  Unclaimed  Property  Administrators.   FDIC-

                                
            ____________________

            11.  Chevron involves a  recognition that  courts are  poorly
                 _______
            situated to make policy choices concerning the interpretation
            of statutes whose enforcement is entrusted  to administrative
            agencies.  Judges are  not experts in the field, nor are they
            part  of either of the  political branches.   Davis & Pierce,
            supra,   3.3, at 113-15.    But commentators have also  noted
            _____
            the   possible  anti-democratic  implications   of  too  much
            deference to the administrative agencies.  See, e.g., Farina,
                                                       ___  ____
            Statutory  Interpretation and  the  Balance of  Power in  the
            _____________________________________________________________
            Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 510-11 (1989).
            ____________________
                 According  full  Chevron  deference to  FDIC-Corporate's
                                  _______
            position  raises a  similar concern.   This  case in  the end
            involves  a dispute  between  a state  and an  administrative
            agency  of the  federal  government and,  as well,  questions
            about  the  role Congress  intended state  law  to play  in a
            federal scheme.   Congress should  not be lightly  thought to
            have wished  such sensitive  questions to be  handled through
            informal and  unexplained "policies"  of an  executive branch
            agency.   The  FDIC  may, of  course,  choose to  solve  this
            difficulty by engaging in more formal processes.

                                         -15-
                                          15

            Corporate  then proceeded  to deny  states' proofs  of claim.

            The  agency  did not  even issue  a  formal statement  of its

            reasons for the change.

                      This is not  to say that  FDIC-Corporate's position

            would  be   entitled  to   no  deference.     An  established
                                       __

            administrative  practice   interpreting  a  statute   may  be

            entitled to  deference even  if not  yet reduced to  specific

            regulation.      Philadelphia   Gear,   476  U.S.   at   439.
                             ___________________

            Additionally,  less  formal   agency  determinations  may  be

            accorded something less than full   Chevron deference.  Davis
                                                _______

            & Pierce, supra,   3.5, at 122.
                      _____

                      In  the  end,  however,   we  need  not   precisely

            ascertain  the  amount  of   deference  to  give  the  FDIC's

            interpretation of     1822(e),  because the outcome  would be

            unaffected.    FDIC-Corporate's   reading  of  the  provision

            comports  with  the  intent,  suggested  by  the  legislative

            history of  the  UDAA, that  the insured  value of  abandoned

            accounts  revert to  the  FDIC insurance  funds, where  these

            resources  can be  used to  defray the  costs of  future bank

            failures.  The states themselves pay nothing into the fund to

            secure  insurance for their citizens.  Any payment to a state

            is thus  a windfall, a result  at least in part  at odds with

            the purpose of  the insurance system.12   The FDIC's position

                                
            ____________________

            12.  Massachusetts responds  that allowing it to  receive the
            insurance proceeds would advance the interests of depositors,
            whose  claims would  never  be extinguished  under the  MAPA.

                                         -16-
                                          16

            is, in context, an eminently reasonable interpretation of the

            statute.

                      B. Pre-emption
                      ______________

                      The  district court  held that    1822(e) pre-empts

            the  MAPA with  respect  to the  insured  value of  abandoned

            deposits in failed  banks.   Our review of  this decision  is

            plenary.   New  Hampshire  Motor Transp.  Ass'n  v.  Town  of
                       ____________________________________      ________

            Plaistow, 67 F.3d 326, 329 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
            ________                                    ____________

            S. Ct. 1352 (1996).

                      As a  general matter, the  standards articulated in

            Louisiana  Public Service  Commission  v. FCC,  476 U.S.  355
            _____________________________________     ___

            (1986), guide  the inquiry  into whether a  federal provision

            pre-empts state law:

                      Pre-emption  occurs   when  Congress,  in
                      enacting a federal  statute, expresses  a
                      clear intent to  pre-empt state law, when
                      there  is  outright  or  actual  conflict
                      between  federal  and  state  law,  where
                      compliance  with  both federal  and state
                      law is in  effect physically  impossible,
                      where there is implicit  in federal law a
                      barrier   to   state  regulation,   where
                      Congress has  legislated comprehensively,
                      thus   occupying   an  entire   field  of
                      regulation  and leaving  no room  for the
                      States  to  supplement  federal  law,  or
                      where the state law stands as an obstacle
                      to  the  accomplishment and  execution of

                                
            ____________________

            Under federal law, the  claim is extinguished eighteen months
            after  the appointment of a receiver or at the termination of
            the receivership estate, whichever occurs later.  Pub. L. No.
            103-44,    2(b) (1993).   While the  Commonwealth's statement
            may  be theoretically  true, experience  shows that  the vast
            majority  of the  funds are  never claimed and  so it  is the
            state that usually benefits.

                                         -17-
                                          17

                      the  full objectives  of Congress.   Pre-
                      emption may  result not only  from action
                      taken  by  Congress  itself;   a  federal
                      agency  acting  within the  scope  of its
                      congressionally  delegated authority  may
                      pre-empt state regulation.

            Louisiana  Pub. Serv.  Comm'n, 476  U.S. at  368-69 (internal
            _____________________________

            citations omitted).

                      The  inquiry  here  has  an  additional  layer   of

            complexity due to Massachusetts' assertion, based on Delaware
                                                                 ________

            v.  New  York,  507  U.S.  490  (1993),  that  regulating the
                _________

            disposition of  abandoned property is a  traditional exercise

            of  state  authority.    See  id.  at  502.    When  Congress
                                     ___  ___

            legislates in an area traditionally within the purview of the

            states,  "we  start with  the  assumption  that the  historic

            police powers of the  States were not to be superseded by the

            Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of

            Congress."   Rice v. Santa  Fe Elevator Corp.,  331 U.S. 218,
                         ____    ________________________

            230  (1947).  Congress may  signal such intent  by an express

            statement of  pre-emption or  by pervasive regulation  of the

            area.    The  presumption  against pre-emption  may  also  be

            rebutted when  there is a  dominant federal interest  or when

            state  law produces  a result  inconsistent with  the federal

            statute.  Id.
                      ___

                      There  is no  express  pre-emption  clause  in  the

            legislation at issue here, such as there was in the statutory

            scheme implicated in the recently decided Medtronics, Inc. v.
                                                      ________________

            Lohr,  116  S.  Ct.  2240,  2250  (1996).    Nor  is  federal
            ____

                                         -18-
                                          18

            regulation of bank failures so pervasive that it indicates an

            intent  to  preclude  any  supplementation  by  state  law.13

            However,  as  the district  court  aptly  noted, the  federal

            government has  a strong interest in  regulating responses to

            bank failures,   particularly  when the guarantee  of federal

            insurance  is involved.  Massachusetts v.  FDIC, 916 F. Supp.
                                     _____________     ____

            at 59.

                      There also are  actual conflicts  between the  FDIA

            and the MAPA, and  so compliance with both federal  and state

            law is not possible.   In light of the  reasonableness of the

            determination that  states  acting under  abandoned  property

            statutes do  not qualify  as depositors under    1822(e), any

            state law conferring on  Massachusetts the right to act  as a

            depositor necessarily conflicts directly with federal law.

                      Another  fundamental inconsistency  between federal

            and state law concerns  the ultimate disposition of insurance

            proceeds  for abandoned  accounts.   While the  MAPA requires

            that FDIC-Corporate  turn  over  insured  deposits  and  that

                                
            ____________________

            13.  In other areas, where  Congress has intended to pre-empt
            state abandoned property statutes, it has done so explicitly.
            Cf.  31 U.S.C.     1322(c)(1) (certain  sums  to be  held  in
            ___
            Treasury  account  notwithstanding  state abandoned  property
            laws).   Accordingly, any congressional intent  to occupy the
            field here  could  be expected  to  be more  clearly  stated.
            E.g., Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 377 (declining
            ____  ___________________________
            to  find  field  pre-emption  where federal  statute  neither
            expressly  refers  to  state  law nor  uses  the  word  "pre-
            emption"); Grenier v. Vermont Log Bldgs.,  Inc., 96 F.3d 559,
                       _______    _________________________
            563 (1st  Cir. 1996)  (even with express  pre-emption clause,
            Congress did not intend to occupy the field totally).

                                         -19-
                                          19

            transferee  banks  turn  over  transferred  deposits  to  the

            Commonwealth, under the relevant  version of   1822(e), these

            funds  revert  to  one  of  FDIC-Corporate's  insurance funds

            either  after eighteen  months or at  the termination  of the

            receivership  estate, whichever  occurs later.   Pub.  L. No.

            103-44,   2(b) (1993).

                      And  there is   conflict,  not congruence,  between

            other  portions  of  the  statutory  schemes  as well.    For

            example, state and federal  law conflict over the time  frame

            in which a  depositor may  claim an abandoned  deposit.   The

            relevant   version  of   the  federal   provision  eventually

            extinguished  a depositor's  right to  an  unclaimed deposit,

            while  the MAPA  extends the right  of a depositor  to make a

            claim in  perpetuity.14  Mass. Gen. L. ch. 200A,   10(a).  We

            conclude that    1822(e) pre-empts  the MAPA with  respect to

            the  federal  scheme  for  deposits that  are  abandoned  and

            therefore  that  the  Commonwealth  is not  entitled  to  the

            claimed insurance proceeds.

                                
            ____________________

            14.  There  are other differences as well.   Section  1822(e)
            requires FDIC-Corporate  to  mail two  notices regarding  any
            unclaimed deposit, whatever its amount, the first thirty days
            after  insurance  payments  are  inititated  and  the  second
            fifteen  months   later,  to the  last  known address  of the
            depositor.  The MAPA would require FDIC-Corporate to send out
            additional  information:  a  report  to the  State  Treasurer
            describing  any  property abandoned  under  the  MAPA, and  a
            notice to the owner of any account containing more than $100.
            Mass.  Gen.  L.  ch.  200A,      7,  7(A).    However,  while
            different, these notice requirements do not actually conflict
            with each other.

                                         -20-
                                          20

                      Massachusetts  makes  a final  argument that  it is

            entitled  to the insurance  proceeds because, as  a matter of

            federal  law, it  is  a fiduciary  for  depositors.   Federal

            regulations  acknowledge that  there may be  "fiduciaries" or

            "custodians"  whose status  is  apparent from  the books  and

            records of the  failed bank and who,  as a matter of  federal

            law,  are permitted to stand  in the shoes  of the depositors

            for some purposes.   12 C.F.R.    330.4,  330.6 (1996).   The

            Commonwealth argues  that it  qualifies as a  fiduciary whose

            status is  apparent from  the banks' deposit  account records

            and  that   it  therefore  is  entitled   under  the  federal

            regulations to the insured value of abandoned deposits.  This

            argument fails because the Commonwealth locates the source of

            its fiduciary  status in state  law provisions that  are pre-

            empted by the applicable version of   1822(e).15

                                         IV.

                                
            ____________________

            15.  Additionally,  the district  court correctly  ruled that
            the Commonwealth's  claimed fiduciary status  is not  readily
            apparent from  the face of the banks' deposit account records
            as required by  the regulations.  Massachusetts  v. FDIC, 916
                                              _____________     ____
            F.Supp.  at  60.    Massachusetts argues  that  the  district
            court's cramped interpretation of  the term "deposit  account
            records"  is at odds with the more expansive approach of FDIC
                                                                     ____
            v.  Fedders  Air Conditioning,  35  F.3d 18  (1st  Cir. 1994)
                _________________________
            (noting that  "deposit account records" include  a variety of
            items).   But  unlike the  interpretation urged  here by  the
            Commonwealth,  Fedders involved  discrete items  contained in
                           _______
            the  bank  files  and did  not  require  the  FDIC to  cross-
            reference deposit  account  records with  abandoned  property
            reports that  might  not even  be kept  at the  banks.   This
            process would  "corrode the  FDIC's core mission"  of quickly
            determining insurance liability.  Massachusetts v. FDIC,  916
                                              _____________    ____
            F. Supp. at 60.

                                         -21-
                                          21

                      The  Commonwealth also  argues  that  the  district

            court erred in dismissing as time-barred Massachusetts' claim

            as a  creditor of  the receivership estate,  Massachusetts v.
                                                         _____________

            FDIC, 916 F. Supp. at 61.  The FDIA sets  statutory bar dates
            ____

            for claims  against FDIC-Receiver.  The  district court lacks

            subject  matter  jurisdiction over  any  claim  not filed  in

            accordance   with   these   requirements.     12   U.S.C.    

            1821(d)(13)(D).   Accordingly,  the district  court dismissed

            the action.  That dismissal was correct.

                      Creditors must file their claims with FDIC-Receiver

            by the date  specified in  a published notice.16   This  date

            must be at  least ninety  days after the  publication of  the

            notice.  12 U.S.C.    1821(d)(3)(B)(i).  Claims not  filed by

            the specified date are time-barred.   Id. (5)(C)(i); Simon v.
                                                  ___            _____

            FDIC, 48 F.3d  53, 56 (1st  Cir. 1995); Marquis v.  FDIC, 965
            ____                                    _______     ____

            F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1992).  The one statutory exception

            to the claims bar is for creditors who did not receive notice

            of the appointment of the receiver in time to comply with the

            filing date, but  who did  file the claim  in time to  permit

            payment.  12 U.S.C.   1821(d)(5)(C)(ii).

                      Massachusetts did not meet  the filing deadline for

            creditors.   Nor did  its  claims fall  within the  statutory

            exception:   the  Commonwealth  had   prompt  notice  of  the

                                
            ____________________

            16.  This notice is also mailed to all creditors shown on the
            institution's books.  Id.   1821(d)(3)(C).
                                  ___

                                         -22-
                                          22

            appointment of receivers for  the failed bank.  Massachusetts

            presents two  basic arguments  why it should  receive a  more

            generous  filing period: that it  is not just  a creditor but

            stands  in  the  shoes  of  depositors  as  a  fiduciary   or

            conservator, and that the  FDIC in the past had  permitted it

            to  do  so  and   is  now  bound  by  that   prior  position.

            Massachusetts' theory appears  to be that  as a fiduciary  of

            the depositors, it had no claim against FDIC-Receiver for the

            pro rata value of the abandoned deposits until the expiration

            of depositors' rights  to claim  the insured  value of  their

            accounts.   According to the Commonwealth,  its 90-day filing

            period17  for  claims  against the  receivership  estate only

            began  to  run eighteen  months  after the  appointment  of a

            receiver for  the failed  banks, effectively creating  a time

            limit of eighteen months plus ninety days.18

                      FDIC-Receiver's  position  is that  states  are not

            entitled  to  the  more  lenient time  limits  applicable  to

            depositors filing as creditors.  This position has the virtue

            of  being  largely consistent  with the  view taken  by FDIC-

                                
            ____________________

            17.  The statute  says that the  FDIC may specify  any period
            ninety days  or longer.   In this  case, as  in most  others,
            FDIC-Receiver set a 90-day filing period.

            18.  The  premise   on  which  this  argument   is  based  is
            incorrect:  since the enactment of the UDAA, depositors  have
            the longer of 18 months or until the end of  the receivership
            estate  to file insurance claims.  Pub. L. No. 103-44,   2(b)
            (1993).

                                         -23-
                                          23

            Corporate.19    Further, this  decision  is  not economically

            irrational.   It protects  the federal insurance  funds to  a

            certain  extent,  thereby reducing  the  cost  of the  thrift

            clean-up  to the  taxpayer.  FDIC-Receiver  pays out  what is

            left of  deposits pro rata  to creditors.   FDIC-Corporate is

            itself a  creditor of the  receivership estate to  the extent

            that  it   has  paid  insurance  and   became  subrogated  to

            depositors' rights.   12  U.S.C.   1821(g).   FDIC-Receiver's

            policy gives creditors a small window to assert their claims,

            which benefits all timely claimants, including FDIC-Corporate

            as subrogee.

                      The  Commonwealth's  claim  that it  stands  in the

            shoes of depositors fails.  The claim is based on the premise

            that Massachusetts  can be  a depositor  under    1822(e) and

            also requires that   1822(e) be read together with   1821(d),

            the   statutory  provision  setting   forth  the  bar  dates.

            However, nothing in the language of these provisions suggests

            that they should be read together.  Moreover, for the reasons

            outlined  earlier,  FDIC-Corporate's  determination that  the

            Commonwealth does not stand  in the shoes of depositors  is a

            reasonable one.  Because the Commonwealth cannot stand in the

                                
            ____________________

            19.  FDIC-Receiver  has   apparently  chosen  to   treat  the
            Commonwealth acting under the MAPA  as a general creditor for
            the purposes  of the claims bar  statute, notwithstanding the
            FDIC's  determination  that  the  MAPA does  not  render  the
            Commonwealth  a depositor  for purposes  of    1822(e).   The
            basis for this choice is not before us.

                                         -24-
                                          24

            shoes  of  depositors, its  argument that  its claim  did not

            arise until  the  end  of  the  18-month  period  for  filing

            insurance claims with FDIC-Corporate is unavailing.20

                      The argument that  Massachusetts should be  allowed

            the more generous  filing period because it  had been allowed

            that time period  in the past also fails.   The language of  

            1821(d) itself is clear.  The receiver must "promptly publish

            a notice to the depository institution's creditors to present

            their  claims, together with proof, to the receiver by a date

            specified  in the notice which shall not be less than 90 days

            after  the   publication  of   such  notice,"  12   U.S.C.   

            1821(d)(3)(B)(i), and  "claims filed after the date specified

            in the  notice published  under paragraph (3)(B)(i)  shall be

            disallowed  and  such disallowance  shall  be  final," id.   
                                                                   ___

            1821(d)(5)(C)(i).    FDIC-Receiver's  interpretation  of  the

            statute,  that  a state  must  file  its  claim  against  the

            receivership within ninety days  of receiving notice from the

            FDIC  or be barred  from doing so  in the future,  tracks the

            plain statutory  language.   The statutory language  does not

            admit  the distinction  the  Commonwealth  urges between  so-

            called "deposit" creditors and  "trade" creditors.  Even were

            there some  ambiguity about whether   1821(d)  should be read

            in light of   1822(e), reading the two sections together does

                                
            ____________________

            20.  While it is true that a claimant may not file  until his
            claim  comes  into being,  Heno, 20  F.3d  at 1209,  here the
                                       ____
            claims arose, if at all, before the banks failed.

                                         -25-
                                          25

            not  extend  the  claims  bar  date   for  creditors  of  the

            receivership estate.

                      Further, it is  far from clear that  there has been

            any reversal  of "policy" by the agency  on this point.  Even

            viewing  the evidence  in  the light  most  favorable to  the

            Commonwealth, as  required in reviewing the  district court's

            grant of summary  judgment, Hodgkins v. New England Tel. Co.,
                                        ________    ____________________

            82  F.3d 1226, 1229 (1st Cir. 1996),  there is no support for

            the argument  that FDIC-Receiver  had a consistent  policy of

            honoring  states' claims  filed  within eighteen  months plus

            ninety days  of receiving  notice of the  receivership.   The

            Commonwealth's case rests on two  pieces of evidence.  First,

            FDIC-Receiver sent  a letter to the  Commonwealth, dated July

            1993,   containing  language  that   Massachusetts  views  as

            confirming the  alleged policy.   This interpretation  is not

            supported  by  the language  of  the letter.    Second, FDIC-

            Receiver  honored  an  untimely  claim  by  Massachusetts for

            abandoned  deposits held  in  one of  the  banks that  failed

            around  the same  time as  the other  banks involved  in this

            litigation.  An isolated  settlement decision is not evidence

            of a prior policy.

                                          V.

                      The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  No
                                                            ________

            costs are awarded.

                                         -26-
                                          26