Court Opinion

ID: 9893139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 21:04:05.07796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:41.963034
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/25/23 P. v. Sandoval CA1/5

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
          Plaintiff and Respondent,                               A165364
 v.
 MELECIO SANDOVAL,                                                (Humboldt County
          Defendant and Appellant.                                Super. Ct. Nos. CR1805473,
                                                                  CR2101609)

       Melecio Sandoval, convicted by a jury of attempted robbery,
contends the prosecutor peremptorily challenged an African
American venireperson for racially discriminatory reasons; the
trial court improperly limited voir dire and failed to instruct the
jury on lesser included offenses; and the evidence was insufficient
to prove attempt. We affirm.

                                    BACKGROUND

      Kayla S. was walking home with her phone in her hand
when she heard someone running and talking loudly behind her.
She turned around and saw Sandoval approaching from about 20
feet away. He ran about five feet beyond her, turned to face her,
and said “ ‘[g]ive me your money, bitch.’ ” His tone was angry
and demanding and he leaned toward her in an aggressive stance
with his arms held out, his fists clenched, and his feet apart.

                                                1
Kayla said she had no money. Sandoval responded, “ ‘Yes, you
do, bitch.’ ”

      Kayla held her ground, telling Sandoval she would “go on
[her] way and he was gonna go on his way.” Sandoval turned and
resumed walking in the direction Kayla had been heading. Kayla
also resumed her walk home, but Sandoval turned, lunged at her,
and said “ ‘Don’t follow me, bitch.’ ” Kayla responded that she
was just trying to go home, reiterating that they would each go
their own ways and not have any trouble.

       Seeing Kayla’s phone, Sandoval said “ ‘Don’t call 911,
bitch.’ ” She put the phone in her pocket, held her hands up,
assured him she wouldn’t, and crossed to the opposite side of the
street. As she walked, Sandoval yelled at her “ ‘You’re ugly,
bitch. You’re such an ugly bitch’ ” and “ ‘You fuck,’ ” over and
over.

      Kayla kept an eye on Sandoval until he was out of sight,
then ran home and called 911. Sandoval was arrested about a
block from her house and charged with attempted robbery.

                         DISCUSSION

                                A.

       Sandoval contends the court erred when it rejected his
Batson-Wheeler1 challenge to the prosecutor’s peremptory
challenge of an African American venireperson. He asserts that
(1) the sole African American’s removal from the venire
established a prima facie case of a discriminatory purpose; and
(2) the prosecutor’s explanation for the challenge was
unsupported by the record.

      1 Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89 and People v.

Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277

                                2
                                   1.

      The trial court analyzes a Batson-Wheeler motion using a
three-part test. First, the defendant must make out a prima facie
case with facts sufficient to support an inference of
discriminatory purpose. Second, if the defendant succeeds in
making that showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
provide a race-neutral reason for the strike. Third, the court
evaluates the prosecutor's proffered reason and determines
whether it is legitimate or pretextual. (People v. Baker (2021) 10
Cal.5th 1044, 1071; accord, Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S.
162, 168, 170-171.) The court may consider the prosecutor’s
demeanor, the reasonability (or lack of it) of the proffered reason,
and whether it has some basis in accepted trial strategy.
(Johnson v. California, supra, at pp. 170-171.)2

       We review the court’s determination with great restraint,
presuming the strike is constitutional and deferring to the court
if it made a “ ‘ “ ‘sincere and reasoned effort’ ” ’ ” to evaluate the
nondiscriminatory justifications. (People v. Ervin (2000) 22
Cal.4th 49, 75.)

      2 In 2020, the Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure

section 231.7 (Assem. Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), Stats.
2020, ch. 318, §§ 1-3), codifying the Batson/Wheeler principle
that peremptory challenges may not be based on a prospective
juror's race. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subd. (a).) Pursuant to the
new statute, the court need not find purposeful discrimination to
sustain the objection but, rather, that “there is a substantial
likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race .
. . as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Id., §
231.7, subd. (d)(1).) Sandoval’s jury was selected before the law’s
January 1, 2022, operative date (Id., § 231.7, subd. (i)), so it does
not apply to this case.

                                   3
                                   2.

       M.U. was the sole African American in the jury venire. She
testified in response to the court’s questions that she had been
charged with petty theft in 2009 or 2010. The charges were
resolved to her satisfaction with “no court or anything.” The
prosecutor did not question M.U. and, over a defense objection,
used a peremptory challenge to excuse her.

     Out of the potential jurors’ presence, Sandoval’s counsel
argued M.U.’s removal from the jury violated Batson-Wheeler
because she was the only African American in the venire.
Counsel emphasized that the prosecutor had not questioned M.U.
and had not struck any other juror who had a criminal conviction.
The prosecutor responded that, while M.U. was the only African
American juror to be seated, until that point he had exercised
peremptory challenges only against White jurors.

       Turning to his reasoning, the prosecutor said he excused
M.U. “because she had been accused of a petty theft. It was not
exactly clear from her answers how that [was] resolved, but my
perception of it was that she had accepted responsibility for that
in some fashion.” It was not that anyone with some sort of
criminal history would be inappropriate to sit on the jury, “[b]ut
someone who’s been accused of a theft offense or committed theft
activity in the past, that’s just simply too close to the charges . . .
. And, frankly, I think it would be malpractice for the People to
keep a juror with something like that in their background that is
so close to the facts of this case.”

      Without indicating whether it found Sandoval had made a
prima facie case of a discriminatory purpose, the court ruled the
prosecutor had excluded M.U. for a nondiscriminatory reason. It
also commented that “most of the county is Caucasian. However,
we do have still left on this jury some diversity and individuals
from different ethnic backgrounds, and the Court will note that

                                   4
the defense also excused at least one Hispanic prospective juror .
. . [¶] . . . [¶] and that there are others.”

                                 3.

       We cannot tell from this record whether the court denied
Sandoval’s Batson-Wheeler challenge on the first prong—because
he failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination—or the
second—because it accepted the prosecutor’s non-racial reason for
the strike. (See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 612-613
[trial court’s request that prosecutor give reason for peremptory
challenge is not an implicit finding that defendant established
prima facie case]; cf. People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 391
[where trial court finds no prima facie case of discrimination but
allows the prosecutor to state reasons and rejects challenge,
reviewing court should begin analysis by reviewing prima facie
ruling].) The ambiguity, however, does not matter here.
Assuming without deciding that the court found a prima facie
case of discrimination, it reasonably determined the prosecutor
provided a legitimate reason for dismissing M.U.

      To satisfy its burden of showing a race-neutral reason, the
opponent of a Batson-Wheeler motion must provide a clear and
reasonably specific explanation for the challenge. (People v.
Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1158.) The prosecutor did so
here; M.U. had been charged with a theft offense some dozen
years earlier and was therefore “too close” to Sandoval’s charged
offense to serve as a juror. Although M.U. said she was satisfied
with the resolution of her case, the prosecutor could reasonably
be concerned that a person who had been charged with a theft
offense would be sympathetic to the defense.

      Sandoval’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. First,
that M.U.’s case had been resolved without a trial did not make
the prosecutor’s explanation unreasonable. Second, Sandoval’s
claim that the “facts in the record are objectively contrary to the

                                 5
prosecutor’s statements” is contradicted by M.U.’s testimony that
she had been charged with a theft offense. Third, a comparative
juror analysis does not, as he asserts, reveal purposeful
discrimination. Five prospective jurors reported having been in
traffic court, and one had received a DUI. None of them,
however, had been charged with a theft-related offense. As the
prosecutor explained, he struck M.U. not because she had “some
type of criminal history,” but because she had been charged with
a crime similar to Sandoval’s. The trial court reasonably
accepted this explanation. (See People v. Ledesma (2006) 39
Cal.4th 641, 679 [comparative analysis did not show
discriminatory purpose where prosecutor struck prospective juror
with prior weapons and DUI convictions but not others with
speeding tickets]; cf. Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 241
[proffering reason for striking African American panelist that
applied equally to otherwise similar non-African American
venirepersons selected for jury tended to prove purposeful
discrimination].)

                                 B.

                                 1.

      Sandoval raises two further challenges to the jury selection
procedures. He contends the court violated his right to an
impartial jury by: (1) allowing counsel only 10 minutes to
question the first panel of 18 prospective jurors; and (2)
altogether prohibiting counsel from directly questioning the
second panel of seven prospective jurors.

       At the outset of jury selection, the court advised the parties
that it would question all prospective jurors and select an initial
group of 18 for further individual questioning. The parties would
then have 10 minutes each to question this group, and the court
would follow up with any additional questions counsel requested:
“If there are any areas that you want me to question further,
                                  6
general areas that you want me to question or specific questions
that you have for jurors that you haven’t been able to ask, then
just let me know and I’ll ask more questions.” When defense
counsel objected to the time limit, the court responded that 10
minutes was not arbitrary and was twice the amount of time it
usually allowed.

       The court described the questions it would ask the
prospective jurors and asked counsel to identify any other areas
of questioning they wished it to pursue. It agreed to ask two
questions requested by the prosecutor and five of six questions
from the defense, including whether the jurors had any general
racial bias or specific animus against Hispanic people. The court
then asked whether the parties had additional questions they
wanted it to ask. Defense counsel said no.

     The court questioned the first 18 prospective jurors as a
group and individually. When it finished, it stated, “Counsel, if
you need more, I can inquire on those.”

      Defense counsel questioned the prospective jurors about
the reasonable doubt standard, their views on homelessness and
the homeless, and their past experiences as crime victims. None
of counsel’s questions concerned potential racial bias. The
prosecutor’s questions, in turn, focused on the standard of proof
and the jurors’ duty not to be influenced by bias, sympathy,
prejudice, or potential penalty.

      The parties exercised peremptory challenges and the court
excused potential jurors for cause. It then called and questioned
seven additional prospective jurors, two of whom were eventually
seated as jurors 4 and 10. After questioning this second group,
the court asked counsel whether they wanted to approach the
bench or to exercise peremptory challenges. Defense counsel
asked, “Do we get to question the panel?” The court said they did

                                 7
not. After an unreported bench conference, both sides exercised
peremptory challenges.

       Sandoval moved for a mistrial, challenging the time limit
for voir dire and the court’s refusal to allow counsel to question
the second juror panel, particularly as to racial bias. The court
denied the motion.

       The court next called and questioned another seven jurors,
this time allowing counsel to question them directly. It excused
one juror for cause and each side exercised their final peremptory
challenges. The court then called and questioned another five
prospective jurors, including the person eventually seated as
juror 9.

      Defense counsel objected that the court had not allowed her
to question three of the seated jurors. The court responded:
“Well, as far as defense being permitted to ask questions, you
were given the chance to ask questions of anyone else, and I did
specifically ask that.” It then questioned a potential alternate
juror and swore the jury in.

       After the verdict, Sandoval unsuccessfully moved for a new
trial on the ground, in part, that the court arbitrarily limited the
time for voir dire and failed to ask all but one of the jurors about
potential bias against Hispanic people.

                                  2.

       Code of Civil Procedure section 223, subdivision (b)(2)
provides that trial courts in criminal cases “shall not impose
specific unreasonable or arbitrary time limits or establish an
inflexible time limit policy for voir dire.” Sandoval contends the
trial court prejudicially violated this provision by limiting his voir
dire of the first 18 jurors to 10 minutes. We are unpersuaded.

                                  8
       Trial courts have both the duty to reasonably restrict voir
dire to expedite the trial (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210,
1246) and considerable discretion in limiting the time for parties
to directly question prospective jurors. (People v. Debose (2014)
59 Cal.4th 177, 194.) Reviewing the record for abuse of that
discretion (see People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714),
we find nothing warranting reversal. To be sure, the time was
short. But the trial was neither factually nor legally complex. It
involved only three witnesses and two hours of testimony. And it
lasted less than two days, including deliberations. The court
advised counsel that it would ask additional questions they could
propose after exhausting their time. Counsel made no such
request. While we question the wisdom of the 10-minute limit,
which may well be inadequate in other trials, here we would find
it harmless even assuming it exceeded the court’s discretion.
(See People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 661 [error in manner of
conducting voir dire reversible if fundamentally unfair trial
results].)

      Precluding any direct questioning of the second panel (and
possibly a subsequent group), however, was definitely error.3 As
Sandoval observes, this prohibition violated the legislative
directive that, subject to reasonable limits, “counsel for each
party shall have the right to examine, by oral and direct
questioning, any of the prospective jurors” after the court’s initial
examination (Code Civ. Proc., § 223, subds. (a), (b)(1), italics
added.) Sandoval’s counsel was denied that right.

      3 In addition to the second panel, Sandoval asserts he was

not allowed to question a prospective juror (later seated as juror
9) whom the court questioned later in the proceedings, after it
had allowed counsel to personally question a third panel of
venirepersons. We will assume for purposes of discussion that
counsel was not allowed to question juror 9, although the record
does not show defense counsel either asked to or was prohibited
from doing so.
                                  9
       The question, then, is whether the error warrants reversal.
“Unless the voir dire by a court is so inadequate that the
reviewing court can say that the resulting trial was
fundamentally unfair, the manner in which voir dire is conducted
is not a basis for reversal.” (People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p.
661, citing Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 425-426;
People v. Asbury (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1230.) Here, again,
we cannot say the record demonstrates a fundamentally unfair
trial. Sandoval identifies nothing in the court’s examination—
which did include questions about bias—that indicates jurors
from the second group were racially biased or otherwise
suggested a need for follow-up questions. Moreover, had counsel
perceived such a need, she could have accepted the court’s offer to
ask further questions—including questions aimed at discerning
implicit bias, the primary focus of Sandoval’s argument in this
court. No fundamental unfairness appearing, the record presents
no basis for reversal.

                                 C.

      Sandoval contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he
attempted to rob Kayla because he was unarmed and did not
touch or threaten her with violence. The contention is meritless.

       Penal Code section 211 defines robbery as “the felonious
taking of personal property in the possession of another, from
[their] person or immediate presence, and against [their] will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.” For attempted robbery,
the prosecutor must prove two elements: the specific intent to
commit robbery, and a direct but ineffective act toward
committing the crime beyond planning or preparation. (People v.
Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1021; People v. Vizcarra (1980)
110 Cal.App.3d 858, 861.)

       Sandoval’s argument concerns the second element. An act
is sufficient for an attempted offense if it is directed toward
                                 10
carrying out the would-be perpetrator’s plan or, in other words,
represents “ ‘ “some appreciable fragment of the crime.” ’ ”
(People v. Watkins, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1021.) When intent to
rob is clearly shown, any slight act in furtherance of it suffices to
complete the crime. (People v. Foster (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 331,
336; People v. Bonner (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 759, 764.) We review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment below,
presuming in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the jury could reasonably have deduced from it, and reverse only
if there is no substantial evidence to support the judgment under
any possible hypothesis. (People v. Sanford (2017) 11
Cal.App.5th 84, 91.)

       Here there was undisputed evidence that Sandoval ran
toward Kayla from behind, turned to confront her with clenched
fists, and aggressively demanded she give him her money. When
she said she had none he insisted, “ ‘Yes, you do, bitch.’ ” This
was sufficient to establish a direct step toward committing
robbery through fear. (See People v. Davison (1995) 32
Cal.App.4th 206, 216 [enough that defendant and companion
approached victim at night at ATM, stared at her, and told her to
stand back]; People v. Ramos (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 591, 601-602
[fear need not be extreme], disapproved on another point in
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353, fn. 16.)

      Sandoval disagrees. He contends we must put aside the
customary substantial evidence standard of review and instead
review the evidence de novo because, in his view, he was merely
exercising his First Amendment rights when he “ask[ed] for
money” on a public street. (See In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th
620, 632 [independent review standard applies when defendant
raises plausible First Amendment defense to criminal threat
offense].) But Sandoval apparently did not raise a First
Amendment defense at trial, and appropriately so: speech uttered
by a robber while ordering the victim to hand over money is not

                                 11
constitutionally protected. (United States v. Quinn (1975) 514
F.2d 1250, 1268; see also Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299,
328 [extortion]; Ulmer v. Municipal Court (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d
263, 266 [panhandling]; People v. Fisher (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th
1556, 1559-1560 [threats].) In any event it does not matter, as
the evidence in this case was sufficient under either standard of
review.

                                 D.

       Finally, Sandoval argues the court erred prejudicially by
failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on attempted theft, assault
with intent to commit robbery, and simple assault. Applying
independent review and considering the evidence in the light
most favorable to Sandoval (People v. Woods (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 461, 475), we disagree.

       A trial court has the duty to sua sponte instruct the jury on
any uncharged lesser offense that is necessarily included in a
charged offense if there is substantial evidence from which the
jury could reasonably conclude the defendant committed the
lesser, but not the greater, offense. (People v. Lopez (2020) 9
Cal.5th 254, 269.) Attempted theft is a lesser included offense of
attempted robbery, since robbery includes all of the elements of
theft (including the taking of property without the owner’s
consent) plus the additional element of force or fear. (People v.
Burns (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256.) Here, however, there
was no evidence from which the jury could have convicted
Sandoval of attempted theft but acquitted him of robbery or its
attempt. The force or fear requirement for the robbery charge
was satisfied by Sandoval’s belligerent demand that Kayla give
him her money. If he did not use force or fear, then he did
nothing more than ask Kayla to give him money—albeit rudely—
which is neither attempted robbery nor attempted theft.

                                 12
       Sandoval’s claim that the court was required to instruct on
simple assault or assault with the intent to commit robbery fails
for a different reason: robbery does not include assault as a lesser
offense. (People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 100.) Sandoval
mistakenly relies on cases expressly or implicitly overruled by
Wolcott. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57
Cal.2d 450, 455-456.)

                               DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                        BURNS, J.

WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
CHOU, J.

People v. Sandoval (A165364)

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