Court Opinion

ID: 9584363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:47:22.725986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:38.864732
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
concurring specially. At common law a *117corporation could not be punished for contempt. 12 Am. Jur., “Contempt” § 8. While it is contrary to the so-called “modem view,” -this common-law rule has been both recognized and applied by the courts of this State. Simmons v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 117 Ga. 305, 319 (43 S. E. 780, 61 L. R. A. 739); Auto Highball Co. v. Sibbett, 11 Ga. App. 618, 620 ( 75 S. E. 914). It is well settled that the “common law of force prior to May 14, 1776, was adopted as the law of this State by the act of February 25, 1784, except where modified by statute or not adjusted to the conditions or system of government existing here” and the decisions of the English courts prior to that date are recognized as controlling authority by our courts. Alexander v. Dean, 157 Ga. 280, 283 (121 S. E. 238), and cases cited; Davis v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 82 Ga. App. 460, 463 (61 S. E. 2d 510); Brooks v. Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 94 Ga. App. 791, 793 (96 S. E. 2d 213). Under these authorities, it is my opinion that the common-law rale still prevails here and that a corporation cannot be punished for contempt. It is significant to me that Code § 39-123 provides that certain officers of a corporation should be considered in contempt of court and punished accordingly for refusal to disclose to a levying officer the number of shares and the par value thereof owned by the defendant in the execution about to be levied, the significance, of course, being that there is no provision whatever making the corporation itself guilty of contempt of court.