Court Opinion

ID: 9657856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:39:29.75837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:48.868962
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). I agree with the mandate in this case.
I.
As the circuit court stated, it’s a close call. I conclude that there was a sufficient showing in this case of specific and articulable facts known to the officers at the time of entry that led the officers, and would lead a reasonable person, to believe that compliance with the knock-and-announce requirement would endanger the safety of the officers or others. Thus the officers were excused from the knock-and-announce requirement.1
In this case the officers who executed the warrant (which was silent about no-knock entry)2 had reasonable grounds to believe at the time the warrant was executed that the defendant sold controlled substances out of his apartment, that he had a history of narcotics and burglary violations, that he had been convicted of a felony battery, and that he possessed a handgun to protect him*992self from another drug dealer. The officers had no information that the defendant ever threatened to use the gun or that the possession of the gun had anything to do with the police, but they knew of the defendant's conviction of a violent crime.
I do not think mere possession of or access to a firearm is always a sufficient ground to jettison the knock-and-announce rule.3 People with no intention of attacking police possess firearms in their homes. The federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms estimates that there are approximately 200 million firearms in the nation, about one per person. The Wisconsin court of appeals' certification recounts that between 41 and 53 percent of respondents living in the Midwest reported a firearm in their home in the years 1973-1989.4
On the one hand, the suspect's access to a firearm means that the firearm may be used against law enforcement officers. On the other hand, a suspect may be less likely to shoot at police officers who identify themselves as such and more likely to shoot at what the suspect may view as unidentified intruders breaking into a residence. Indeed one of the reasons for the knock-and-announce *993requirement is stated in terms of protecting the officers. See State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 623, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984).
Danger to the officers and the public from a knock- and-announce entry may be sufficiently established from the fact that the warrant relates to a particular type of serious criminal conduct, that the suspect has a firearm, and that there is reasonable suspicion of the suspect's violent nature. The suspect's known threats, as in Singer, or record of violent conduct, as in this case, and the suspect's possession of large quantities of drugs and a firearm are specific facts upon which officers might reasonably base their conclusion that the firearm will be used against them if they proceed with the ordinary announcements.5
Unannounced forcible entry is a serious disturbance of the security of people in their homes and cannot be justified on a per se, blanket basis. Each situation merits individual analysis. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d at 628-29.
II.
The expert witness, Raemisch, could testify about the characteristics of a drug dealer. This information is *994within his field of expertise and may be beyond the knowledge of many people; it would educate the factfinders and assist them in understanding the evidence in the case. Section 907.02, Stats. 1989-90.
Raemisch's testimony, however, went beyond imparting information about typical drug dealers. It was tantamount to a statement that the witness believed that the defendant committed the crime.6 This testimony is not permitted because the witness is testifying beyond his field of expertise; he is giving an opinion as an expert about a conclusion which the jurors could draw from the evidence themselves. The jury can determine whether the state has proved the elements of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt without any expert opinion. Cf. State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987) (ordinarily juror can knowledgeably determine credibility of the witness without help of expert witness); State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984) (expert witness may not opine that there was no doubt whatsoever that the complainant was an incest victim); State v. Robinson, 146 Wis. 2d 315, 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988) and State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988) (jury, not expert witness, draws inferences of guilt and credibility without assistance of expert witness). See also McCormick on Evidence sec. 12, at 147 (4th ed. 1992).
For the reasons set forth, I concur.

 State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 630, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984).

 In any event, whether the manner of entry is reasonable is to be determined at the time of entry. State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 630, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984).

 We rejected in Cleveland the state's argument that because drug dealers are armed, the officers could reasonably believe that their safety would be endangered if they announced their presence. We concluded that the fact that a person is a member of a class of persons more likely to resist search is not sufficient to justify unannounced entry. The officer must have knowledge of specific facts that indicate that this particular person will conduct himself or herself in a dangerous manner when confronted by law enforcement officers. 118 Wis. 2d at 631, n.16.
In United States v. Singer, 943 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 1991), the suspect had a handgun and had made threats.

 Citing Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics — 1989, Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center, Table 2.49.

 See, e.g., United States v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351 (6th Cir. 1990); Williams v. United States, 576 A.2d 700 (D.C. App. 1990); State v. Ford, 310 Ore. 623, 801 P.2d 754 (1990); People v. Marinez, 513 N.E.2d 607, 610 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), cert. denied 488 U.S. 868 (1988). See also 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure sec. 4.8(e) (2d ed. 1987).
For a decision concluding that a suspected drug dealer possessing a gun was not sufficient exigent circumstances to excuse the law enforcement officers from knocking and announcing their purpose before entering, see People v. Condon, 50 Crim. L. Rptr. 1555 (Ill. S. Ct. March 25, 1992). In that case the officers had no knowledge of any violent conduct by the suspect.

 The majority opinion 990 states that
"Raemisch testified that the evidence seized from the apartment tended to indicate that the residents of the apartment were involved in the sale of illegal drugs-[His] expert opinion testimony... was not merely a lay opinion on the determination of whether Williams actually intended to deliver the drugs."