Court Opinion

ID: 9572627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:43:21.227215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:41.231288
License: Public Domain

M. F. Cavanagh, J.
We are called upon to determine the rights and priorities of parties to a garnishment proceeding; we must consider novel issues of Federal and state law that are not easily resolved.
On April 21, 1971, plaintiff-appellee (garnishor) was awarded a judgment of $275.89 against principal defendant Phillips (debtor). A writ of garnishment issued and was served on garnishee-defendant-appellant (garnishee), the employer of debtor Phillips. Garnishee filed a disclosure pursuant to District Court Rule 738.6, indicating that debtor’s gross earnings were $189.88, and his mandatory deductions $26.30, leaving a disposable income of $163.58. Of this, garnishee claimed a deduction of $40.89 as a weekly installment payment of prior loans of $5,957.32 by garnishee to debtor. Garnishee contended that this $40.89 deduction, being 25% of the debtor’s disposable income of $163.58, *362barred any payment to garnishor because of a Federal law limiting garnishments to 25% of disposable income. Consequently, garnishee refused to tender any money to garnishor and paid debtor $122.69.
Garnishor, displeased with garnishee’s action, sued in district court. There followed a district court ruling, an appeal of that ruling by the garnishee in the Wayne County Circuit Court, an order of the circuit court, and garnishee’s appeal of that order to this Court. To comprehend the district court ruling, the circuit court ruling, and our opinion today, we must state the Federal and state laws that have engendered this controversy.
In 1968 Congress enacted the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat 146; 15 USC 1601, et seq., effective July 1, 1970. Subchapter II, 82 Stat 163; 15 USC 1671-1677, is concerned with restrictions on garnishment. Section 1673 sets out a formula for determination of the maximum allowable garnishment:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in section 1675 of this title, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed
"(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or
"(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by section 206(a)(1) of Title 29 in effect at the time the earnings are payable, whichever is less. In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the Secretary of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in paragraph (2).”
*363"(c) No court of the United States or any State may make, execute, or enforce any order or process in violation of this section.”
To apply the formula, one must look to the definitions of disposable earnings provided for in the act, § 1672(b):
"The term 'disposable earnings’ means that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld.”
The limitations apply only to garnishment proceedings, also defined in the act, § 1672(c):
"The term 'garnishment’ means any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt.”
It is clear that, in the present case, there was a "garnishment proceeding” that brings into consideration the congressional restrictions; it is equally clear that the disposable income subject to the garnishment formula is $163.58. The loan payment deduction by the garnishee cannot serve to reduce disposable income for purpose of the act, for the loan payment is not a deduction "required by law to be withheld”.
Were it not for the loan payment deduction by the garnishee, there is no doubt that the garnishor could, under the act, garnish 25% of $163.58, or $40.89. No one disputes that this is the maximum claim that the garnishor can make. The question to be resolved is whether the garnishor can claim any or all of that 25% of disposable income when the garnishee has a valid deduction. The presence *364of the loan agreement requires us to turn to the state law for a determination of priorities in payments. 0
Under state law, DCR 738.6, a garnishee is required to file a disclosure statement.1 This court rule does more than merely require disclosure: the rule establishes a priority2 in favor of the garnishee:
"Disclosure. The garnishee shall file with the clerk of court a disclosure under oath within 6 days after the date of the service of the writ upon him. The disclosure shall reveal any liability to the principal defendant as specified in DCR 738.5, and, except as to claims for unliquidated damages for wrongs or injuries, may claim any setoff of which the garnishee could have availed himself against the principal defendant if he had not been garnisheed. Unless the plaintiff takes further steps as authorized by these rules within 6 days after the receipt of notice of the filing of the garnishee’s disclosure, the disclosure shall be held to be sufficient.” (Emphasis added.)
The issue in the present , case is how the setoff *365rights given to the garnishee by DCR 738.6 affect the garnishor’s claim to 25% of the debtor’s disposable income. We must determine if either the Federal act or the state court rule requires a particular order of preference.
In so doing, it is helpful to realize that the respective Federal and state enactments here involved do not conflict with each other. In this regard, the case of Hodgson v Hamilton Municipal Court, 349 F Supp 1125, (SD Ohio, 1972), appositely stated at 1132-1133:
"Congress clearly indicated on the face of its legislation on garnishment that it did not intend to preempt the entire field of garnishment law from the States, but limited its exercise of supremacy to two areas only: one being the maximum amount which may be garnished from the earnings of an individual from any week or other pay period which has been subjected to garnishment, as provided in §§ 303 and 302 of the Act; and the second being a prohibition against discharge of an employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness, as Congress provided in § 304 of the Act. Beyond these two areas, Congress expressly stated in § 307 (15 USC § 1677) that Title III:
" ' * * * does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person from complying with, the laws of any State
" '(1) prohibiting garnishments or providing for more limited garnishments than are allowed under this sub-chapter, or
" '(2) prohibiting the discharge of any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for more than one indebtedness.’
"It was the intention of Congress that any section or provision of a state law that requires a larger amount to be garnished than the federal law permits in § 303 of the Act be considered preempted by the federal law. On the other hand, a state law provision is to be applied *366and will not be considered preempted, if it results in a smaller garnishment amount. ” (Emphasis added.)
As indicated from the foregoing, no state is mandated in any way to enact garnishment legislation. Many states prohibit garnishments.3 If Michigan can prohibit garnishments completely, it certainly may impose whatever restrictions upon garnishment procedures it deems proper.
The number of possible interpretations of how the Federal statute and the court rule interact, in this particular case is considerable. The two courts below, the parties, and even the judges of this panel are divided in construction.
The district court ruled that Federal law was inapplicable to the garnishee’s claim, as the loan payment deduction was not itself a garnishment. The court further determined that the priority given in DCR 738.6 allowed the garnishee to deduct from disposable income whatever sum the debtor had consented to be deducted. The garni-shor was then entitled to 25% of the balance, if any, that remained after deduction of the loan payment from disposable income. In this case, the garnishee, by agreement with the debtor, could take $40.89 of the $163.58 disposable income; the garnishor could take 25% of the $122.69 balance, or $30.67.
The Wayne County Circuit Court determined that the court rule did not establish any priority in favor of the garnishee, because the garnishee, unlike the garnishor, was not a judgment creditor. Therefore, the garnishor could take its 25% claim *367from the disposable income. Once the garnishor had taken its full 25% claim, the garnishee could take nothing. The circuit court held that, while the deduction of the loan payment was not technically a garnishment, the deduction had become part of a garnishment proceeding. As the Federal act prohibits a state court from enforcing any order contrary to the act, the circuit court could not issue an order resulting in the loss to the debtor of over 25% of his income. In this case, the garnishor could take $40.89, the garnishee nothing.
The dissent of Judge Bashara would allow the garnishee to deduct whatever sum agreed to by the debtor, with no limitations, and then allow the garnishor to take 25% of the original disposable income out of the balance, if any, remaining after garnishee’s deduction. In this case, the garnishee would take $40.89 and the garnishor would take $40.89.
Our conclusion draws upon all of the above interpretations and yet differs from them all. We hold that a garnishee is entitled to deduct from disposable income whatever sum was agreed upon by the debtor, with no limitation. The garnishor can then claim the difference, if any, between 25% of disposable income and the garnishee deduction. If the garnishee deduction is more than 25% of disposable income, the garnishor will recover nothing. In this case, the garnishee is entitled to $40.89, the garnishor nothing.
Our primary support for this conclusion is the interpretation we give to DCR 738.6. At first glance, the clause "may claim any setoff of which the garnishee could have availed himself against the principal defendant if he had not been garnisheed” would appear to require that the garnish*368ee’s claim against the debtor be set off against the garnishee’s liability to the debtor, leaving the balance subject to the garnishor’s claim. This interpretation is made by the dissent and admittedly finds support in other jurisdictions with similar rules.4
We think that the better interpretation of the court rule is that the garnishee’s claim against the debtor be set off against the claim made by the garnishor.5 This interpretation is by no means a new or novel one and is supported by the observation that garnishment proceedings pit the garnishor as plaintiff against the garnishee as defendant. See DCR 738.5 and 738.1(1). Cf. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co v Bushman, 262 Mich 304; 247 NW 190 (1933). A setoff is traditionally a balancing of claims between the parties to the immediate action. Ward v Fellers, 3 Mich 281 (1854), Merchants Bank of Canada v Schulenberg, 54 Mich 49; 19 NW 741 (1884). Hence, the garnishee’s setoff will be against the garnishor s claim.
This interpretation of the court rule is additionally buttressed by doctrines of construction that serve to protect the principal debtor. Because gar*369nishment is a harsh remedy, its application will be limited whenever possible by reasonable construction of court rules and statutes. Ford v Detroit Dry Dock Co, 50 Mich 358; 15 NW 509 (1883), People’s Wayne County Bank v Stott, 246 Mich 540; 224 NW 352 (1929).
Because this case concerns a statutory provision creating an exemption of wages from garnishment, we construe a rule that affects the exemption in a way that will benefit the debtor. Hutchinson v Whitmore, 90 Mich 255, 263; 51 NW 451 (1892). Cf. Riggs v Sterling, 60 Mich 643, 649; 27 NW 705 (1886).
In garnishment proceedings where an exemption is involved, we will construe rules and statutes to maximize protection of the principal debtor. Rik-erd Lumber Co v Chrouch, 135 Mich 703; 98 NW 739 (1904).
The discussion above employs state law to resolve the controversy. Federal law merely narrows the battle over debtor’s paycheck to 25% of disposable income; state law determines that, as to this 25%, the garnishee has priority over garnishor by way of setoff.
It is possible to use Federal law to reach the same result. The purpose of the Consumer Credit Protection Act has been well stated:
"The intent of the Consumer Act was to make sure that wage earners were able to receive at least 75% of their take home pay in any one pay period so that they would have enough cash to meet basic needs.” In re Kokoszka, 479 F2d 990, 996-997 (CA 2, 1973); aff'd 417 US 642; 94 S Ct 2431; 41 L Ed 2d 374 (1974), reh den 419 US 886; 95 S Ct 160; 42 L Ed 2d 131 (1974).
Admittedly, the act does not go so far as to . prohibit all creditor arrangements with debtors *370that result in the receipt by the debtor of less than 75% of disposable income. Western v Hodgson, 494 F2d 379 (CA 4, 1974) (wage assignment is not garnishment as defined by act).
Admittedly, our recognition that the garnishee, by agreement with the debtor, can deduct as much as 100% of disposable income undercuts the purposes of the act without running afoul of its explicit prohibitions. The Federal law is clearly not all-inclusive.
However, we feel that where a state court has the opportunity to reasonably interpret a state court rule in a manner that serves the admirable Federal purpose of maximizing the debtor’s share of his own earnings, the court should do so. Were we to do otherwise — were we to interpret the court rule by allowing both the garnishee deduction and the garnishor claim — we would contribute to the shrinking of the debtor’s paycheck. We believe that Federal law prohibits a state court from using garnishment proceedings to exacerbate the debt- or’s financial situation when the state court can, by construction of a court rule, maximize the debtor’s share. State laws should be interpreted in a manner that best serves the purposes of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act. Hodgson v Christopher, 365 F Supp 583 (D ND, 1973).
The rule that we announce is not without its costs. It may make credit more difficult and expensive to obtain; it may encourage more secured transactions. It may encourage excessive dependence on employers for loans. It may be unfair to favor garnishee creditors over judgment creditors.6 *371However, these are matters to which the Legislature may properly address itself by enacting legislative standards to guide both the creditor and debtor.
Reversed. No costs, a public question being involved.
J. H. Gillis, J., concurred.

 While the garnishment herein was filed in district court and thus involved DCR 738.6, effective January 1, 1969, the Michigan General Court Rules, GCR 1963, 738.6, contains identical language.

 The parties have not argued that the Supreme Court is without authority to establish priorities between parties in garnishment proceedings. We make no comment on that issue. See MCLA 600.4011(2); MSA 27A.401(2) (formerly MCLA 600.4011(l)(b); MSA 27A.4011(l)(b), as amended 1974 PA 371, eff. April 1, 1975), which gives the Supreme Court authority to adopt rules for garnishment proceedings in circuit court "to protect the parties”. The same conditions will apply in district courts. MCLA 600.8306(1), (2); MSA 27A.8306G), (2), (as amended by 1974 PA 371, eff. April 1,1975).
We do note that the doctrine of setoff by a garnishee is well established in Michigan jurisprudence; DCR 738.6 and its counterpart GCR 1963, 738.6 are not novel doctrines created by the Court. See Cummings v Fearey, 44 Mich 39; 6 NW 98 (1880). See also MCLA 600.7579; MSA 27A.7579 (allowing setoff in justice court and limiting garnishee liability "for the balance after adjustment of mutual demands”) repealed by 1974 PA 297, § 2. MCLA 408.521; MSA 17.271 is arguably statutory authority for an employer-garnishee setoff, although it says nothing about priorities.

 The Hodgson v Hamilton Municipal Court decision, supra, interestingly points out the concern of' Congress over the tremendous increase in number of personal bankruptcies and the resultant effect upon interstate commerce and notes the striking drop in bankruptcy filings in those states which prohibit garnishments.

 E.g., Davison-Paxon Co v Mutual Empire Clothing Co, 52 Ga App 686; 184 SE 409 (1936), Southeast National Bank of Chicago v Ravin, 35 Ill App 2d 366; 182 NE2d 925 (1962), Henderson v Northwest Airlines, 231 Minn 503; 43 NW2d 786 (1950), North Chicago Rolling Mill Co v St. Louis Ore & Steel Co, 152 US 596; 14 S Ct 710; 38 L Ed 565 (1894).
This interpretation is based on the theory that the setoff provisions in garnishment statutes are to protect the garnishee, not the principal debtor. North Chicago Rolling Mill Co, supra, 152 US at 619.

 This interpretation was apparently opted for in Sun Sales Co v Hodges, 256 La 687; 237 So 2d 684 (1970), where the court did not allow payment to the garnishor until the debtor’s obligation to the garnishee was liquidated. The court’s opinion, however, was based on a statute with much more specific directions than DCR 738.6.
Mary v Lewis, 57 Mich App 14, 19; 225 NW2d 206 (1974), rev’d 394 Mich 443; 231 NW2d 648 (1975), does not compel either interpretation.

 We do caution garnishees that our rule is not without some limits. Garnishees should not join with debtors in raising garnishee deductions solely to thwart garnishing creditors. Such deductions may be fraudulent. Cf., Nordstrom v Corona City Water Co, 155 Cal 206; 100 P 242 (1909). See Musser v Ricks, 271 Mich 174, 176; 259 NW 882 (1985).