Court Opinion

ID: 9371128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 16:04:46.492365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.485639
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                            FOURTH DISTRICT

         CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
     a Florida not-for-profit corporation, and HERBERT SIMPSON,
                                Appellants,

                                   v.

    THE CITY OF DANIA BEACH, FLORIDA, BROWARD COUNTY,
      FLORIDA and DANIA ENTERTAINMENT CENTER, LLC,
               a Delaware limited liability company,
                            Appellees.

                            No. 4D21-1306

                          [February 15, 2023]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Keathan Frink, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE11-22597.

   Michael E. Dutko, Jr. and Janine R. McGuire of Conrad & Scherer LLP,
Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.

   Andrea G. Amigo, George P. Roberts, Jr., and Lyman H. Reynolds, Jr.
of Roberts Reynolds Bedard & Tuzzio, PLCC, West Palm Beach, for
appellee, The City of Dania Beach, Florida.

  Andrew J. Meyers, Joseph K. Jarone and Scott Andron, Broward
County Attorneys, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee, Broward County, Florida.

  John M. Mullin and Robert L. Scheppske III of Tripp Scott, P.A., Fort
Lauderdale, for appellee, Dania Entertainment Center, LLC.

                        On Motion for Rehearing

MAY, J.

   We grant the appellees’ motions for rehearing, withdraw our prior
opinion, and substitute the following.

   This dispute arose from development agreements between the City of
Dania Beach (“City”) and the Dania Entertainment Center (“DEC”) to
expand the Dania Jai Alai pari-mutuel facility.
   In 2006, the City entered into a development agreement with the pari-
mutuel facility owner Aragon Group, Inc. The agreement included the
building of a new gaming facility and Jai Alai fronton. In 2007, Broward
County (“County”) approved the plat for Dania Jai Alai for a 325,000
square foot gaming facility, which included 100,000 square feet of casino,
a 1,000-seat fronton, and 187,000 square feet of accessory commercial
use. The County also approved two other parcels on the plat for 54 single-
family detached units and 1.159 acres of active park.

   Subsequently, the DEC purchased the property from Aragon. In 2011,
the DEC sought to “amend and restate” the existing development
agreement between the City and Aragon. The new development agreement
incorporated plans from the original agreement and added a marina,
commercial retail, a new casino, and two hotel towers. The City’s attorney
and outside counsel advised the pari-mutuel facility it was exempt from
City regulations. In May 2013, the DEC finalized the gaming licenses and
permit rights transfers from Aragon.

   Mr. Sniezek of the Broward County Planning Council wrote a letter and
confirmed the City was not “required to allocate land use intensities under
the ‘Regional Activity Center’ (RAC) land use designation on the Broward
County Land Use Plan [] and located in the City” for the amended
development. His letter provided:

      Based on the information provided by you, it is Planning
      Council staff’s understanding that the proposed hotel and
      marina uses are located within lands designated as a pari-
      mutuel by the State of Florida. Based on that information and
      in such context of Florida Statute 550.155(2), it would appear
      that the proposed use would qualify as a “capital improvement
      proposed by a permitholder licensed under this chapter to a
      pari-mutuel facility existing on June 23, 1981.”

      In consultation with the Planning Council Attorney and
      County Attorney’s office, Planning Council staff has
      determined that the uses described in your correspondence
      are permitted without a need to allocate land use intensities
      under the permitted uses of the RAC.

      Please note that this finding is subject to review and agreement
      by the City of Dania Beach. In addition, the proposed uses
      must meet any other applicable requirements of Florida
      Statutes Chapter 550.

                                     2
(Emphasis added).

   The statute referenced in the letter, section 550.155(2), Florida Statutes
(2011), provides in pertinent part as follows:

      A capital improvement proposed by a permitholder licensed
      under this chapter to a pari-mutuel facility existing on June
      23, 1981, which capital improvement requires, pursuant to
      any municipal or county ordinance, resolution, or regulation,
      the qualification or approval of the municipality or county
      wherein the permitholder conducts its business operations,
      shall receive approval unless the municipality or county is able
      to show that the proposed improvement presents a justifiable
      and immediate hazard to the health and safety of municipal or
      county residents, provided the permitholder pays to the
      municipality or county the cost of a building permit and
      provided the capital improvement meets the following criteria:

      (a) The improvement does not qualify as a development of
      regional impact as defined in s. 380.06; and

      (b) The improvement is contiguous to or within the existing
      pari-mutuel facility site.

(Emphasis added).

   At the City Commission meeting in August 2011, City staff
recommended approving the 2011 amended development agreement with
the DEC, and the public had an opportunity to comment. After public
comment, the City Commission voted unanimously to approve the 2011
development agreement.

   The City and the DEC entered into the development agreement. That
agreement stated the City had determined the proposed improvements did
not present an immediate hazard to the City’s residents’ health and safety.
The County was not a party to the agreement.

   In 2011, Citizens for Responsible Development (“CFRD”) and Herbert
Simpson (“individual plaintiff”, collectively “plaintiffs”) sued the City for
declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged CFRD was a non-
profit public interest organization in Broward County. It alleged its
membership included Dania Beach residents, who are adversely affected
by the development agreement’s proposed expansion.

                                     3
    The complaint further alleged Simpson was a legally blind resident
living within one mile of Dania Jai Alai. The complaint sought a
declaration that the 2011 development agreement was void because the
City failed to comply with the Florida Local Government Development
Agreement Act, sections 163.3220–163.3243, Florida Statutes (2011). The
complaint sought to compel the City to comply with the Act. The DEC
intervened in the proceedings.

   In 2011 and 2012, the County approved two plat note amendments to
the Dania Jai-Alai Plat. 1 The planning council, in consultation with its
attorney and the County attorney, determined the pari-mutuel facility uses
were exempt from being allocated as part of the RAC, pursuant to section
550.155. The 2012 plat note effectuated changes to comply with the
Florida Department of Transportation’s conditions of approval of the 2011
plat note amendment.

   In 2014, the DEC sought a new development agreement, the “second
amended agreement,” which added a multi-story parking garage and a
banquet hall. A public hearing was held on August 26, 2014, with advance
notice published in the newspaper, posted at City Hall, and mailed to over
6,000 surrounding landowners. Members of the public were allowed to
speak, including Simpson, who expressed concern about the traffic and
being able to cross the street. After notice, a second public hearing was
held.

   At the third hearing, the CFRD’s counsel objected to the meeting as not
being noticed as a quasi-judicial hearing. Counsel offered documents and
testimony to prove the currently proposed development agreement
presented an immediate hazard to the health, safety, or welfare of the
City’s residents. The commission rejected the evidence. At the meeting’s
conclusion, the second amended agreement was approved and then
executed by the City and the DEC. The County was not a party to the
second amended agreement.

   After the City’s approval, CFRD and Simpson amended their complaint
to allege the City ignored three sets of development laws: (1) the
Development Agreement Act, sections 163.3220–163.3243, Florida

1
  The 2011 plat note amendment added several approved uses, including an
additional 15 acres of pari-mutuel facility which could include 500 hotel rooms,
60 marina slips, and 45,000 square feet of commercial use. The 54 dwelling
units and the park were to be deleted from the plat. According to the supporting
material, the plat was subject to the “Dania Beach Regional Activity Center”
(“RAC”).

                                       4
Statutes (2011); (2) the Dania Beach Unified Land Development Code; and
(3) the Broward County Development and Land Use Codes.

    The plaintiffs alleged the development agreements failed to comply with
Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (2011), and thereby denied the public the
ability to participate. They alleged the City failed to comply with the review
requirements of its own code and development review process to determine
the expansion’s impact on the City and its residents. And finally, they
alleged the City improperly gave “carte blanche” to the DEC based on
section 550.155(2), Florida Statutes (2011).

   The plaintiffs sought a declaration that section 550.155 did not apply
to the Dania Jai Alai expansion, and the 2011 amended agreement was
void as a result. Similarly, they sought a declaration that the 2014
development agreement was void. They also sought a declaration that
section 550.155 was void as an unconstitutional special law.

   The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in two other counts, pursuant to
section 163.3243. They requested the court declare the 2011 and 2014
approvals of the development agreements void because the City failed to
comply with the public notice and hearing requirements of section
163.3225. They sought to compel the City to comply with section
163.3225.

  The plaintiffs added the County as a defendant. They alleged the
County “dropped the ball too” because it misinterpreted that section
550.155 exempted existing pari-mutuels from County land use regulations
and review processes. The plaintiffs alleged the County did not investigate
whether the Dania Jai Alai facility complied with section 550.155.

    The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the County erroneously
relied on section 550.155 because that section did not apply.
Alternatively, the County failed to apply its land use code or engage in
developmental review in connection to the 2011 and 2014 development
agreements.

   All defendants answered, asserting multiple defenses, including the
plaintiffs lacked standing. Ultimately, the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. While the motions raised several grounds, the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the
standing issue alone.

   The court found the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to
show an “injury-in-fact.” Specifically, the court found the CFRD failed to

                                      5
demonstrate associational standing by showing a “substantial number of
[CFRD’s] members are substantially affected by the approval of the
redevelopment.” Citing to Renard v. Dade Cnty., 261 So. 2d 832 (Fla.
1972), the court found the plaintiffs failed to meet one of the specific
standing requirements of land use cases; i.e., to establish special damages.
The court found neither plaintiff met that requirement. From this order,
the CFRD and Simpson now appeal.

   We have de novo review. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach,
L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000).

    The only question raised in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs have
standing. “Any litigant must demonstrate that he or she has standing to
invoke the power of the court to determine the merits of an issue.” Giuffre
v. Edwards, 226 So. 3d 1034, 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting Vaughan
v. First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla., 740 So. 2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 2d DCA
1999)).

   “Standing depends on whether a party has a sufficient stake in a
justiciable controversy, with a legally cognizable interest which would
be affected by the outcome of the litigation.” Id. at 1038-39 (emphasis
added) (quoting Weiss v. Johansen, 898 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA
2005)).

   •   Does the Individual Plaintiff Have Standing?

   Our supreme court has articulated the three requirements for
standing.

       First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact, which is
       concrete, distinct and palpable, and actual or imminent.
       Second, a plaintiff must establish a causal connection
       between the injury and the conduct complained of. Third, a
       plaintiff must show a substantial likelihood that the requested
       relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.

State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1113 n.4 (Fla. 2004) (citations omitted). In
short, standing requires injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. Id.
As the trial court found, the individual plaintiff failed to make the
requisite showing.

                                     6
   Here, the trial court relied on Renard, where our supreme court
addressed three types of attacks on zoning ordinances. 2 The supreme
court articulated standing requirements for each case category.

        Part (1) deals with standing to enforce a valid zoning
        ordinance. The Boucher 3 rule requiring special damages still
        covers this type of suit. . . .

        Part (2) of the question certified to this Court deals with
        standing to attack a validly enacted zoning ordinance as being
        an unreasonable exercise of legislative power. . . . [P]ersons
        having a legally recognizable interest, which is adversely
        affected by the proposed zoning action, have standing to sue.

        Part (3) of the question certified deals with standing to attack
        a zoning ordinance which is void because not properly
        enacted, as where required notice was not given. Any affected
        resident, citizen or property owner of the governmental unit in
        question has standing to challenge such an ordinance.

Id. at 837–38.

    In its order, the trial court focused on Part 1 and held the plaintiffs
failed to establish a “special injury”. Because the individual plaintiff’s
alleged injury (increased traffic) did not relate to the property where the
individual plaintiff resided, the trial court found the individual plaintiff
did not suffer an “injury-in-fact.”

   The dissent, however, has chosen to focus on Part 3, which “deals with
standing to attack a zoning ordinance which is void because not properly
enacted.” Id. at 837-38. The dissent then conflates development
agreements with zoning ordinances and characterizes the plaintiffs’
complaint as an attack on the process used to approve the development

2   Renard did not involve or address development agreements.

3 Boucher v. Novotny, 102 So. 2d 132, 135 (Fla. 1958) (“[O]ne seeking redress,

either preventive or corrective, against an alleged violation of a municipal zoning
ordinance must allege and prove special damages peculiar to himself differing in
kind as distinguished from damages differing in degree suffered by the
community as a whole.”).

                                        7
agreements. 4 The dissent does so to avoid any requirement of special
damages under Renard.

    So, we must look at what the plaintiffs alleged.

    •   Since 2011, the City repeatedly has either intentionally or
        mistakenly ignored the actual requirements of State law as it
        applies to the Dania Jai Alai proposed mega-expansion.

    •   The uses contained within the mega-expansion are not
        permitted within the zoning districts applicable to the
        property.

    •   The City failed to apply the land development regulations for
        the applicable zoning districts, so as to ensure that the uses
        contained within the mega-expansion are consistent with the
        community's character.

   These are allegations the City failed to comply with its own ordinances,
which the plaintiffs now seek to enforce. That sounds suspiciously like
Renard Part 1, which addresses standing to enforce a valid zoning
ordinance. To have that standing, the individual plaintiff must show a
“special injury.” What the complaint does NOT allege is that the City’s
zoning ordinances are “void because not properly enacted, as where
required notice was not given.” See Renard, 261 So. 2d at 838.

   Under J.P.’s three-part standing test, the individual plaintiff failed to
establish an injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability. Under Renard,
Part 1 applies and the individual plaintiff failed to establish special
damages and therefore has no standing.

4
  Development agreements and zoning ordinances are not the same. “[A]
‘development agreement’ has been defined as ‘a contract between a [local
government] and a property owner/developer, which provides the developer with
vested rights by freezing the existing zoning regulations applicable to a property
in exchange for public benefits.’” Pres. Palm Beach Pol. Action Comm. v. Town of
Palm Beach, 50 So. 3d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Morgran Co. v. Orange County, 818 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2002)).

    A zoning ordinance is a local legislative enactment, not a contract. See Lee
County v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (explaining zoning is
a legislative function).

                                        8
   Plaintiffs claim because the individual plaintiff is legally blind,
increased traffic resulting from the DEC’s capital improvement creates the
required injury-in-fact. But it doesn’t. The injury alleged by the
individual plaintiff is purely conjectural — being hit by a car nearly a mile
from his home. It is not an injury-in-fact, “which is concrete, distinct and
palpable, and actual or imminent.” J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1113 n.4 (internal
quotation marks omitted). And it is certainly not a “special injury” under
Renard Part 1.

    Indeed, the Second District has held increased traffic is “only damage[]
differing in degree from [that] suffered by the community as a whole and
[is] not [a] special damage[] . . . differ[ent] in kind.” Skaggs-Alberton’s
Prop., Inc. v. Michels Belleair Bluffs Pharmacy, Inc., 332 So. 2d 113, 117
(Fla. 2d DCA 1976). To reach this conclusion, the Second District relied
on a Georgia decision, which explained:

       The mere increase in traffic congestion adjacent to one’s
       property as the result of improvements erected on nearby
       property and the attendant inconvenience resulting therefrom
       which are damages suffered alike by all property owners
       similarly situated, does not give to one individual such a
       substantial interest in the decision of the Board of Adjustment
       permitting the improvement as to authorize an appeal
       therefrom. Such increase in traffic congestion and attendant
       difficulties in finding parking places are matters which
       address themselves to the police authorities of the
       municipality rather than to the zoning authorities.
       ....

       Such an inconvenience is a condition incident to urban living.

Id. (quoting Victoria Corp. v. Atlanta Merch. Mart, Inc., 112 S.E.2d 793,
795 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960)). The individual plaintiff has no injury in fact, no
special injury under Renard, and no standing.

   •   Does CFRD Have Standing?

   For the CFRD to establish standing, it must prove:

       (1) A substantial number of the [a]ssociation’s members,
       although not necessarily a majority, are substantially affected
       by the challenged rule; (2) The subject matter of the rule is
       within the association’s general scope of interest and activity;

                                      9
       and (3) The relief requested is the type appropriate for a trade
       association to receive on behalf of its members.

Hillsborough Cnty. v. Fla. Rest. Ass’n, 603 So. 2d 587, 589 n.1 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1992) (quoting Fla. Home Builders Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor & Emp.
Sec., 412 So. 2d 351, 353-54 (Fla. 1982)).

    Here, the CFRD also failed to show standing. The trial court
determined: “[T]here is no record evidence that a substantial number of
its members are or will be substantially affected by the [d]efendants’
actions.” At the hearing on the summary judgment motions, the CFRD
relied on the individual plaintiff’s alleged injury, and suggested another
member lives within 300 feet of the facility. But as explained above, the
individual plaintiff lacks standing and so does the association.

   •   Broward County

    The County adopts the City’s and the DEC’s arguments but has its
own unique position concerning the litigation. It argues that it is a
stranger to the development agreements, took no part in them, and has
no control over the City’s decisions. It also argues regardless of the “injury
in fact” or “special injury” requirement, the plaintiffs cannot establish the
second and third requirements for standing: causal connection and
redressability. The County relies on DeSantis v. Fla. Educ. Ass’n, 306 So.
3d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

   In DeSantis, plaintiffs sued several state officials, including Governor
DeSantis, because they disagreed with the State’s plan for reopening
schools during the pandemic. Id. at 1208. The First District concluded
the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the causation and redressability
requirements of standing. Id. at 1214. Individual school districts, not
state officials, had the discretion to return to in-person learning and so
were the actual “cause” of the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. Id. The Governor
could not be the cause. Id.

   The plaintiffs also failed to satisfy the redressability requirement
because whatever the outcome of their lawsuit, “the choice of how to
deliver education to students remain[ed] with Florida’s school boards,”
not the Governor. Id.

   Here, the County did not cause the plaintiffs’ alleged injury. That
injury relates solely to the City’s alleged defective approval of the
development agreements. The DEC and the City are the parties to the

                                      10
development agreements and the cause, if any, of an alleged injury. The
County played no role in the development agreements.

   To the extent the plaintiffs rely on the 2011 Sniezek Opinion, they are
misguided. The 2011 Sniezek Opinion was issued by the Planning
Council—not the County. They are different governmental entities, and
the County had no control over, or responsibility for, the actions of either
the Planning Council or Mr. Sniezek.

   The plain language of both development agreements indicates the City
“confirm[ed]” an allocation of use from the RAC was not required and then
explained this conclusion was “consistent with” Mr. Sniezek’s opinion.
The development agreements themselves do not indicate the Sniezek
Opinion controlled the City’s actions. And an adverse decision against
the County would not redress the plaintiffs’ alleged injury because the
County has no control over the City, the DEC, or the development
agreements.

   For these reasons, the plaintiffs have no standing to sue the County.

   As the trial court concluded, neither the individual plaintiff nor the
CFRD had standing to bring this action against the City, the DEC, or the
County. The trial court correctly entered summary judgment for the
defendants. We affirm.

   Affirmed.

CIKLIN, J., concur.
WARNER, J., dissents with opinion.

WARNER, J., dissenting.

    I dissent, because I believe that the standing issue is governed by the
third category set forth in Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832, 838
(Fla. 1972). Any affected resident has “standing to attack a zoning
ordinance which is void because not properly enacted, as where required
notice was not given.” Id. Because appellants, affected residents, were
challenging the development agreements as void, due to both lack of notice
and the City’s failure to follow its own zoning code as to the process of
adopting a zoning ordinance, they had standing. I contend that the
development agreement in this case is the equivalent of a zoning ordinance
for purposes of standing.

                                     11
    Stripped to its essence, the City of Dania Beach entered into a contract
with DEC to develop a substantial portion of land around the Dania Beach
Jai Lai. It held a public meeting on the first iteration of the agreement,
and public hearing on the next, but the City did not follow either the
Florida Local Development Agreement Act, section 163.3221, et seq. or its
own land use code. 5 The commission voted to approve each agreement,
affirmatively refusing to apply its code, concluding that section
550.1555(2), Florida Statutes (2011) prohibited their application. That
section provides that a capital improvement to a pari-mutuel facility which
requires municipal, or county approval shall receive such approval under
certain circumstances.

   The development agreement in this case allowed for changes in the plat
and rezoning of property, if necessary, to accomplish the Capital
Improvement Plan for the properties surrounding the Jai Lai. It requires
vacation of a city street running through the property (which had been
dedicated to the City), and it provides for the issuance of building permits
in accordance with the agreement. In other words, it is the equivalent of
a zoning ordinance.

   Renard allows an affected person to challenge a void ordinance without
showing special damages. 6 261 So. 2d at 832. The Renard court cited
Rhodes v. City of Homestead, 248 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), in a
footnote as support for standing to attack a zoning ordinance as void
because it was not properly enacted. Renard, 261 So. 2d at 838 n.14.

    In Rhodes, the Third District said:

5 Dania Beach Unified Land Development Code and Broward County
Development and Land Use Codes.

6 City argues that plaintiffs’ reliance upon the distinctions in Renard as to
standing requirements that do not require proof of special damages were
disavowed in Herbits v. City of Miami, 207 So. 3d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), because
the Third District held those distinctions were impliedly overruled. Id. at 284. In
Herbits, the Third District cited to its own decision in Renard v. Dade County, 249
So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), rather than the supreme court decision. Herbits,
207 So. 3d at 283–84. We do not agree with Herbits, that the Renard distinctions
have been sub silentio overruled by the supreme court. First, the supreme court
does not intentionally overrule itself sub silentio. See Puryear v. State, 810 So.
2d 901, 905 (Fla. 2002). Second, Herbits relied on Solares v. City of Miami, 166
So. 3d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), but that case dealt with taxpayer standing to
challenge a lease negotiated by the city, not a zoning case. Herbits, 207 So. 3d
274.

                                        12
      The rule or ground [that the plaintiffs must show a special
      damage to attack a zoning decision] presented by defendants
      in moving to dismiss has no application where a person
      affected seeks to challenge such action of the city on the ground
      . . . that the proceedings of the city board or council which
      resulted in such action were conducted contrary to provisions
      of the charter, such as by failure to the city to give notice
      required by its charter, as alleged here.

Id. at 674–75 (emphasis supplied); see also Parsons v. City of Jacksonville,
295 So. 3d 892, 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“Under Florida law, no special
injury is required for actions attacking void ordinances; i.e., ordinances
adopted without proper notice or legislative authority, or in excess of police
powers.”). Similarly, in Upper Keys Citizens Ass’n, Inc. v. Wedel, 341 So.
2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), the court held no special injury requirement
for standing applied to an attack on a variance on the grounds that it was
illegally enacted and void because the county did not follow its zoning
regulations. Id. at 1064. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff,
a non-profit corporation whose members were citizens of the county, had
standing to sue to declare the variance illegal and void. Id.

    This is precisely what these appellants claim, i.e., that the city did not
follow the process of their land use code or the Florida Local Government
Development Agreement Act. They allege that there was inadequate notice
with respect to the approval of both the 2011 and 2014 development
agreements. The allegations are not challenges to the substantive zoning
decision, but challenges to the procedure for approving the development
agreements. Furthermore, appellants’ complaint alleged that the City
affirmatively failed to follow its code provisions by its application of section
550.155. Because it did not apply its own code, the commission’s approval
of the development agreement was invalid. The appellants, as affected
residents, had standing to assert the commission’s actions as void. No
showing of special damage was necessary.

   The majority disagrees that this development agreement could be
tantamount to a zoning ordinance for purposes of the application of
Renard. In a footnote, the majority cites to Morgran Co. v. Orange County,
818 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) for the proposition that a
development agreement is a “contract between a [local government] and a
property owner/developer, which provides the developer with vested rights
by freezing the existing zoning regulations applicable to a property in
exchange for public benefits.”

                                      13
   The Morgran court quoted from Brad K. Schwartz, Development
Agreements: Contracting for Vested Rights, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.Rev. 719
(Summer 2001). The article discusses development agreements and
explains that these agreements are contract zoning, which is illegal, if not
based upon enabling legislation:

      Contract zoning refers to an ad hoc agreement between a
      municipality and a developer regarding rezoning. In the
      traditional view, contract zoning is per se invalid, but courts
      are increasingly rejecting this approach and upholding certain
      forms of contract zoning. Specifically, courts distinguish
      between bilateral and unilateral contracts.         A bilateral
      contract in which a municipality promises to rezone property
      is illegal because the municipality bypasses the notice and
      hearing phases of the legislative process, thereby depriving
      interested parties of due process. On the other hand, a
      unilateral contract in which a developer makes a promise
      contingent on the municipality’s act of rezoning is legal.
      Because the municipality does not promise to take action
      prior to the zoning hearing, it does not circumvent the
      legislative process.    In short, contract zoning is illegal
      whenever it arises from a promise by a municipality to zone
      property in a certain manner, whether in a bilateral contract
      or unilateral contract initiated by the municipality.

      Development agreements take the form of bilateral contracts
      as the municipality and the developer exchange promises. As
      such, absent legislative authority, development agreements
      constitute illegal contract zoning.     It is of critical legal
      consequence, therefore, that development agreements are
      entered into pursuant to express enabling legislation. Thus
      recognizing the central importance of development agreement
      legislation, it is worth noting the basic provisions found in a
      typical development agreement statute.

Id. at 728–29 (emphasis supplied).

      Morgran also recognized that contract zoning is disapproved. 818
So. 2d at 642. The court cited to Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla.
1956) which explained:

      A municipality has no authority to enter into a private
      contract with a property owner for the amendment of a zoning
      ordinance subject to various covenants and restrictions in a

                                     14
      collateral deed or agreement to be executed between the city
      and the property owner. Such collateral agreements have
      been void in all of the cases to which we have been referred.
      Any contrary rule would condone a violation of the long
      established principle that a municipality cannot contract
      away the exercise of its police powers.

Id. at 89 (internal citations omitted). Hartnett explains the limit of
municipal power to enter into contract zoning:

      In exercising its zoning powers the municipality must deal
      with well-defined classes of uses. If each parcel of property
      were zoned on the basis of variables that could enter into
      private contracts then the whole scheme and objective of
      community planning and zoning would collapse.            The
      residential owner would never know when he was protected
      against commercial encroachment.           The commercial
      establishments on ‘Main Street’ would never know when they
      had protection against inroads by smoke and noise producing
      industries. This is so because all genuine standards would
      have been eliminated from the zoning ordinance. The zoning
      classifications of each parcel would then be bottomed on
      individual agreements and private arrangements that would
      totally destroy uniformity. Both the benefits of and reasons
      for a well-ordered comprehensive zoning scheme would be
      eliminated.

      The adoption of an ordinance is the exercise of municipal
      legislative power. In the exercise of this governmental function
      a city cannot legislate by contract. If it could, then each citizen
      would be governed by an individual rule based upon the best
      deal that he could make with the governing body. Such is
      certainly not consonant with our notion of government by rule
      of law that affects alike all similarly conditioned.

Id. (emphasis supplied).

   Thus, the adoption of a development agreement which provides for
contract zoning is void as beyond the power of the City unless there is
legislative authority for its enactment. Before the trial court, the City
claimed authority through its Home Rule power, but the foregoing shows
that it does not have the power to enter into contracts with private
developers outside of enabling legislation. It must comply with its own

                                      15
Land Development Code, which is the enabling legislation for zoning
matters.

    The complaint alleges that the approval of the development agreement
occurred without notice in accordance with the code, nor without
compliance with any of its procedures; in other words, without legislative
authority. Therefore, based upon these allegations, Renard allows an
affected resident to sue. I would reverse the court’s summary judgment
as to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.

   In Counts 6 and 7, appellants sought an injunction to prevent
enforcement of the development agreements for failure to comply with the
notice provisions of the Florida Local Government Development Agreement
Act. § 163.3225, Fla. Stat. The City maintains that the statute does not
apply. After carefully reviewing the record and the statute, I agree.

   Section 163.3220, Florida Statutes, provides in part:

      (3) . . . [I]t is the intent of the Legislature to encourage a
      stronger commitment to comprehensive and capital facilities
      planning, ensure the provision of adequate public facilities for
      development, encourage the efficient use of resources, and
      reduce the economic cost of development.

      (4) This intent is effected by authorizing local governments to
      enter into development agreements with developers, subject
      to the procedures and requirements of ss. 163.3220-
      163.3243.

      (5) Sections 163.3220-163.3243 shall be regarded as
      supplemental and additional to the powers conferred upon local
      governments by other laws and shall not be regarded as in
      derogation of any powers now existing.

(Emphasis supplied.). It appears that a local government does not have to
adopt the provisions of the act. Section 163.3223, Florida Statutes, states:

      Any local government may, by ordinance, establish
      procedures and requirements, as provided in ss. 163.3220-
      163.3243, to consider and enter into a development
      agreement with any person having a legal or equitable interest
      in real property located within its jurisdiction.

                                    16
(Emphasis supplied.). Thus, the notice provisions under the act in section
163.3225, which appellants contend the City violated, do not apply if the
City did not adopt the provisions and provide for developer agreements.

   There is nothing in the record to show that the City has adopted the
statute, making section 163.3220 et seq. inapplicable. Because it is
inapplicable, I would affirm the trial court’s summary judgment on these
counts based upon the tipsy coachman principle. 7

    Finally, the City and County both argue that the trial court should be
affirmed on the tipsy coachman principle, because even if appellants have
standing, the City’s actions in approving the development agreement were
required by section 550.155. While the majority has not addressed this
issue because they affirm on the standing issue, I must address why I
would still reverse. I disagree that tipsy coachman should apply, because
there remain material issues of fact as to how section 550.155 should be
applied.

    Appellants claim in the complaint that the City and County improperly
failed to apply their land use codes, because they erroneously found that
the pari-mutuel facility was exempt from their application pursuant to
section 550.155. There are several reasons to support their claim that the
governmental entities are not exempt from following their own ordinances
in development approval.

    Section 550.155 provides:

      A capital improvement proposed by a permitholder licensed
      under this chapter to a pari-mutuel facility existing on June
      23, 1981, which capital improvement requires, pursuant to
      any municipal or county ordinance, resolution, or regulation,
      the qualification or approval of the municipality or county
      wherein the permitholder conducts its business operations,
      shall receive approval unless the municipality or county is
      able to show that the proposed improvement presents a
      justifiable and immediate hazard to the health and safety of
      municipal or county residents, provided the permitholder
      pays to the municipality or county the cost of a building
      permit and provided the capital improvement meets the
      following criteria:

7 Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 644–45
(Fla.1999).

                                     17
      (a) The improvement does not qualify as a development of
          regional impact as defined in s. 380.06; and

      (b) The improvement is contiguous to or within the existing
          pari-mutuel facility site[.]

§ 550.155(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). Nothing in the statute states
that the capital improvement is “exempt” from the approval process. In
fact, it contemplates that an approval process is required. Had the
Legislature intended to exempt any capital improvement from proceeding
through rezoning, building permit approval, and the like, it would have
expressly stated as much. Thus, the County and the City wrongly
interpreted this as altogether exempting the facility from the approval
process. Instead, the statute requires the approval process, even though
in the end it may compel the outcome.

   There also remains a material issue of what constitutes the pari-
mutuel facility. A pari-mutuel facility is defined in the statute as: “the
grounds or property of a cardroom, racetrack, fronton, or other facility
used by a licensed permitholder.” § 550.002(22), Fla. Stat. (2011).
Fronton is defined as “a building or enclosure that contains a playing court
with three walls designed and constructed for playing the sport of jai alai
or pelota.” § 550.002(9), Fla. Stat. (2011).
   Under the statute, the “facility” does not appear to be anything more
than the building itself or the building with the parking lot. It does not
comport with the statutory definitions that property across the street from
the Fronton, or the docks in the water can constitute part of the pari-
mutuel facility. The only evidence in the record relied on by the City and
County is a letter from a Department of Business Regulation investigator
which states that the entire property was “authorized for pari-mutuel
activity.” But that is not a statement that the entire property is a pari-
mutuel facility.

   Moreover, the statute applies to a pari-mutuel facility existing on June
23, 1981. There is no information in the record regarding the facility in
existence on that date. If the land surrounding that 1981 facility was
acquired after 1981, or the facility itself was expanded after 1981, then
those additional land and improvements would not have been existing on
that date, and thus the statute would not apply to any improvement of the
expanded facility.

   Finally, there is a material issue of fact as to what property is
“contiguous to or within the existing pari-mutuel facility site.” See §

                                    18
550.155(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Given the definition of pari-mutuel facility in the
statute, property across a street that was dedicated to the City would not
qualify, even if the development agreement provided that the City was to
vacate the street.

   For those reasons, I do not think a tipsy coachman resolution is merited
based on section 550.155(2), Florida Statutes.

WARNER, J., dissenting.

    I dissent, because I believe that the standing issue is governed by the
third category set forth in Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832, 838
(Fla. 1972). Any affected resident has “standing to attack a zoning
ordinance which is void because not properly enacted, as where required
notice was not given.” Id. Because appellants, affected residents, were
challenging the development agreements as void, due to both lack of notice
and the City’s failure to follow its own zoning code as to the process of
adopting a zoning ordinance, they had standing. I contend that the
development agreement in this case is the equivalent of a zoning ordinance
for purposes of standing.

    Stripped to its essence, the City of Dania Beach entered into a contract
with DEC to develop a substantial portion of land around the Dania Beach
Jai Lai. It held a public meeting on the first iteration of the agreement,
and public hearing on the next, but the City did not follow either the
Florida Local Development Agreement Act, section 163.3221, et seq. or its
own land use code. 8 The commission voted to approve each agreement,
affirmatively refusing to apply its code, concluding that section
550.1555(2), Florida Statutes (2011) prohibited their application. That
section provides that a capital improvement to a pari-mutuel facility which
requires municipal, or county approval shall receive such approval under
certain circumstances.

   The development agreement in this case allowed for changes in the plat
and rezoning of property, if necessary, to accomplish the Capital
Improvement Plan for the properties surrounding the Jai Lai. It requires
vacation of a city street running through the property (which had been
dedicated to the City), and it provides for the issuance of building permits
in accordance with the agreement. In other words, it is the equivalent of
a zoning ordinance.

8 Dania Beach Unified Land Development Code and Broward County
Development and Land Use Codes.

                                     19
   Renard allows an affected person to challenge a void ordinance without
showing special damages. 9 261 So. 2d at 832. The Renard court cited
Rhodes v. City of Homestead, 248 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), in a
footnote as support for standing to attack a zoning ordinance as void
because it was not properly enacted. Renard, 261 So. 2d at 838 n.14.

    In Rhodes, the Third District said:

       The rule or ground [that the plaintiffs must show a special
       damage to attack a zoning decision] presented by defendants
       in moving to dismiss has no application where a person
       affected seeks to challenge such action of the city on the ground
       . . . that the proceedings of the city board or council which
       resulted in such action were conducted contrary to provisions
       of the charter, such as by failure to the city to give notice
       required by its charter, as alleged here.

Id. at 674–75 (emphasis supplied); see also Parsons v. City of Jacksonville,
295 So. 3d 892, 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“Under Florida law, no special
injury is required for actions attacking void ordinances; i.e., ordinances
adopted without proper notice or legislative authority, or in excess of police
powers.”). Similarly, in Upper Keys Citizens Ass’n, Inc. v. Wedel, 341 So.
2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), the court held no special injury requirement
for standing applied to an attack on a variance on the grounds that it was
illegally enacted and void because the county did not follow its zoning
regulations. Id. at 1064. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff,
a non-profit corporation whose members were citizens of the county, had
standing to sue to declare the variance illegal and void. Id.

9 City argues that plaintiffs’ reliance upon the distinctions in Renard as to
standing requirements that do not require proof of special damages were
disavowed in Herbits v. City of Miami, 207 So. 3d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), because
the Third District held those distinctions were impliedly overruled. Id. at 284. In
Herbits, the Third District cited to its own decision in Renard v. Dade County, 249
So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), rather than the supreme court decision. Herbits,
207 So. 3d at 283–84. We do not agree with Herbits, that the Renard distinctions
have been sub silentio overruled by the supreme court. First, the supreme court
does not intentionally overrule itself sub silentio. See Puryear v. State, 810 So.
2d 901, 905 (Fla. 2002). Second, Herbits relied on Solares v. City of Miami, 166
So. 3d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), but that case dealt with taxpayer standing to
challenge a lease negotiated by the city, not a zoning case. Herbits, 207 So. 3d
274.

                                        20
    This is precisely what these appellants claim, i.e., that the city did not
follow the process of their land use code or the Florida Local Government
Development Agreement Act. They allege that there was inadequate notice
with respect to the approval of both the 2011 and 2014 development
agreements. The allegations are not challenges to the substantive zoning
decision, but challenges to the procedure for approving the development
agreements. Furthermore, appellants’ complaint alleged that the City
affirmatively failed to follow its code provisions by its application of section
550.155. Because it did not apply its own code, the commission’s approval
of the development agreement was invalid. The appellants, as affected
residents, had standing to assert the commission’s actions as void. No
showing of special damage was necessary.

   The majority disagrees that this development agreement could be
tantamount to a zoning ordinance for purposes of the application of
Renard. In a footnote, the majority cites to Morgran Co. v. Orange County,
818 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) for the proposition that a
development agreement is a “contract between a [local government] and a
property owner/developer, which provides the developer with vested rights
by freezing the existing zoning regulations applicable to a property in
exchange for public benefits.”

   The Morgran court quoted from Brad K. Schwartz, Development
Agreements: Contracting for Vested Rights, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.Rev. 719
(Summer 2001). The article discusses development agreements and
explains that these agreements are contract zoning, which is illegal, if not
based upon enabling legislation:

      Contract zoning refers to an ad hoc agreement between a
      municipality and a developer regarding rezoning. In the
      traditional view, contract zoning is per se invalid, but courts
      are increasingly rejecting this approach and upholding certain
      forms of contract zoning. Specifically, courts distinguish
      between bilateral and unilateral contracts.         A bilateral
      contract in which a municipality promises to rezone property
      is illegal because the municipality bypasses the notice and
      hearing phases of the legislative process, thereby depriving
      interested parties of due process. On the other hand, a
      unilateral contract in which a developer makes a promise
      contingent on the municipality’s act of rezoning is legal.
      Because the municipality does not promise to take action
      prior to the zoning hearing, it does not circumvent the
      legislative process.    In short, contract zoning is illegal
      whenever it arises from a promise by a municipality to zone

                                      21
      property in a certain manner, whether in a bilateral contract
      or unilateral contract initiated by the municipality.

      Development agreements take the form of bilateral contracts
      as the municipality and the developer exchange promises. As
      such, absent legislative authority, development agreements
      constitute illegal contract zoning.     It is of critical legal
      consequence, therefore, that development agreements are
      entered into pursuant to express enabling legislation. Thus
      recognizing the central importance of development agreement
      legislation, it is worth noting the basic provisions found in a
      typical development agreement statute.

Id. at 728–29 (emphasis supplied).

      Morgran also recognized that contract zoning is disapproved. 818
So. 2d at 642. The court cited to Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla.
1956) which explained:

      A municipality has no authority to enter into a private
      contract with a property owner for the amendment of a zoning
      ordinance subject to various covenants and restrictions in a
      collateral deed or agreement to be executed between the city
      and the property owner. Such collateral agreements have
      been void in all of the cases to which we have been referred.
      Any contrary rule would condone a violation of the long
      established principle that a municipality cannot contract
      away the exercise of its police powers.

Id. at 89 (internal citations omitted). Hartnett explains the limit of
municipal power to enter into contract zoning:

      In exercising its zoning powers the municipality must deal
      with well-defined classes of uses. If each parcel of property
      were zoned on the basis of variables that could enter into
      private contracts then the whole scheme and objective of
      community planning and zoning would collapse.            The
      residential owner would never know when he was protected
      against commercial encroachment.           The commercial
      establishments on ‘Main Street’ would never know when they
      had protection against inroads by smoke and noise producing
      industries. This is so because all genuine standards would
      have been eliminated from the zoning ordinance. The zoning
      classifications of each parcel would then be bottomed on

                                     22
      individual agreements and private arrangements that would
      totally destroy uniformity. Both the benefits of and reasons
      for a well-ordered comprehensive zoning scheme would be
      eliminated.

      The adoption of an ordinance is the exercise of municipal
      legislative power. In the exercise of this governmental function
      a city cannot legislate by contract. If it could, then each citizen
      would be governed by an individual rule based upon the best
      deal that he could make with the governing body. Such is
      certainly not consonant with our notion of government by rule
      of law that affects alike all similarly conditioned.

Id. (emphasis supplied).

   Thus, the adoption of a development agreement which provides for
contract zoning is void as beyond the power of the City unless there is
legislative authority for its enactment. Before the trial court, the City
claimed authority through its Home Rule power, but the foregoing shows
that it does not have the power to enter into contracts with private
developers outside of enabling legislation. It must comply with its own
Land Development Code, which is the enabling legislation for zoning
matters.

    The complaint alleges that the approval of the development agreement
occurred without notice in accordance with the code, nor without
compliance with any of its procedures; in other words, without legislative
authority. Therefore, based upon these allegations, Renard allows an
affected resident to sue. I would reverse the court’s summary judgment
as to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.

   In Counts 6 and 7, appellants sought an injunction to prevent
enforcement of the development agreements for failure to comply with the
notice provisions of the Florida Local Government Development Agreement
Act. § 163.3225, Fla. Stat. The City maintains that the statute does not
apply. After carefully reviewing the record and the statute, I agree.

   Section 163.3220, Florida Statutes, provides in part:

      (3) . . . [I]t is the intent of the Legislature to encourage a
      stronger commitment to comprehensive and capital facilities
      planning, ensure the provision of adequate public facilities for
      development, encourage the efficient use of resources, and
      reduce the economic cost of development.

                                      23
      (4) This intent is effected by authorizing local governments to
      enter into development agreements with developers, subject
      to the procedures and requirements of ss. 163.3220-
      163.3243.

      (5) Sections 163.3220-163.3243 shall be regarded as
      supplemental and additional to the powers conferred upon local
      governments by other laws and shall not be regarded as in
      derogation of any powers now existing.

(Emphasis supplied.). It appears that a local government does not have to
adopt the provisions of the act. Section 163.3223, Florida Statutes, states:

      Any local government may, by ordinance, establish
      procedures and requirements, as provided in ss. 163.3220-
      163.3243, to consider and enter into a development
      agreement with any person having a legal or equitable interest
      in real property located within its jurisdiction.

(Emphasis supplied.). Thus, the notice provisions under the act in section
163.3225, which appellants contend the City violated, do not apply if the
City did not adopt the provisions and provide for developer agreements.

   There is nothing in the record to show that the City has adopted the
statute, making section 163.3220 et seq. inapplicable. Because it is
inapplicable, I would affirm the trial court’s summary judgment on these
counts based upon the tipsy coachman principle. 10

    Finally, the City and County both argue that the trial court should be
affirmed on the tipsy coachman principle, because even if appellants have
standing, the City’s actions in approving the development agreement were
required by section 550.155. While the majority has not addressed this
issue because they affirm on the standing issue, I must address why I
would still reverse. I disagree that tipsy coachman should apply, because
there remain material issues of fact as to how section 550.155 should be
applied.

    Appellants claim in the complaint that the City and County improperly
failed to apply their land use codes, because they erroneously found that
the pari-mutuel facility was exempt from their application pursuant to

10 Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d 638, 644–45
(Fla.1999).

                                     24
section 550.155. There are several reasons to support their claim that the
governmental entities are not exempt from following their own ordinances
in development approval.

   Section 550.155 provides:

      A capital improvement proposed by a permitholder licensed
      under this chapter to a pari-mutuel facility existing on June
      23, 1981, which capital improvement requires, pursuant to
      any municipal or county ordinance, resolution, or regulation,
      the qualification or approval of the municipality or county
      wherein the permitholder conducts its business operations,
      shall receive approval unless the municipality or county is
      able to show that the proposed improvement presents a
      justifiable and immediate hazard to the health and safety of
      municipal or county residents, provided the permitholder
      pays to the municipality or county the cost of a building
      permit and provided the capital improvement meets the
      following criteria:

      (c) The improvement does not qualify as a development of
          regional impact as defined in s. 380.06; and

      (d) The improvement is contiguous to or within the existing
          pari-mutuel facility site[.]

§ 550.155(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). Nothing in the statute states
that the capital improvement is “exempt” from the approval process. In
fact, it contemplates that an approval process is required. Had the
Legislature intended to exempt any capital improvement from proceeding
through rezoning, building permit approval, and the like, it would have
expressly stated as much. Thus, the County and the City wrongly
interpreted this as altogether exempting the facility from the approval
process. Instead, the statute requires the approval process, even though
in the end it may compel the outcome.

   There also remains a material issue of what constitutes the pari-
mutuel facility. A pari-mutuel facility is defined in the statute as: “the
grounds or property of a cardroom, racetrack, fronton, or other facility
used by a licensed permitholder.” § 550.002(22), Fla. Stat. (2011).
Fronton is defined as “a building or enclosure that contains a playing court
with three walls designed and constructed for playing the sport of jai alai
or pelota.” § 550.002(9), Fla. Stat. (2011).

                                    25
   Under the statute, the “facility” does not appear to be anything more
than the building itself or the building with the parking lot. It does not
comport with the statutory definitions that property across the street from
the Fronton, or the docks in the water can constitute part of the pari-
mutuel facility. The only evidence in the record relied on by the City and
County is a letter from a Department of Business Regulation investigator
which states that the entire property was “authorized for pari-mutuel
activity.” But that is not a statement that the entire property is a pari-
mutuel facility.

   Moreover, the statute applies to a pari-mutuel facility existing on June
23, 1981. There is no information in the record regarding the facility in
existence on that date. If the land surrounding that 1981 facility was
acquired after 1981, or the facility itself was expanded after 1981, then
those additional land and improvements would not have been existing on
that date, and thus the statute would not apply to any improvement of the
expanded facility.

   Finally, there is a material issue of fact as to what property is
“contiguous to or within the existing pari-mutuel facility site.” See §
550.155(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Given the definition of pari-mutuel facility in the
statute, property across a street that was dedicated to the City would not
qualify, even if the development agreement provided that the City was to
vacate the street.

   For those reasons, I do not think a tipsy coachman resolution is merited
based on section 550.155(2), Florida Statutes.

                           *         *         *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                                     26