Court Opinion

ID: 9587085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:17:56.096256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:01.429568
License: Public Domain

CORCORAN, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from the relief granted on the petition for review. I do not agree that defendant has raised a color-able claim that would entitle him to an evidentiary hearing on the recantation issue. I agree with the majority on all other issues addressed on appeal.
The majority correctly points out the standard to determine if defendant has presented a “colorable claim”: the claim must have the appearance of validity; in other words, if taken as true, it would change the verdict. State v. Lemieux, 137 Ariz. 143, 147, 669 P.2d 121, 125 (App. 1983). Thus, in order to determine whether the claim is colorable, we must apply the applicable standard to determine the validity of the specific claim raised by petitioner.
Here, defendant has based his petition on the existence of “newly discovered evidence”—affidavits by two third parties that the victim had recanted his trial testimony that defendant molested him. As a matter of law, testimony by third parties about recantation is collateral impeachment evidence only, and cannot be used as substantive evidence of the truth of the facts stated that would entitle defendant to post-conviction relief. See State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 251, 686 P.2d 750, 774 (1984); United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763, 772 (9th Cir.1977); see generally M. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 63 at 92 (1960). One of the requirements for post-conviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence is that the evidence not be merely impeaching. State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 426, 661 P.2d 1105, 1127 (1983). Defendant has simply not produced any newly discovered evidence that is substantive—that is, if taken as true, would change the verdict. In my opinion, defendant would have had to produce an affidavit from the victim, not third parties, in order to present a colorable claim. Even if such testimony had been produced, however, the trial court *73would have discretion to find that such recanted testimony would not have changed the verdict. The unreliable and untrustworthy nature of recanting testimony has been consistently acknowledged in our courts. Fisher, 141 Ariz. at 251, 686 P.2d at 774; State v. Hickle, 133 Ariz. 234, 238, 650 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1982); State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 394, 646 P.2d 268, 279 (1982).
In the absence of any evidence that would change the verdict, I would uphold the trial court’s determination that defendant did not present a “colorable claim” that entitled him to an evidentiary hearing. I would have denied relief on that basis.