Court Opinion

ID: 9772186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:09:43.834194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.488082
License: Public Domain

BURKE, Special Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I join Justice Leibson in that part of his dissenting opinion which deals with the failure to instruct on statutory mitigating circumstances (EED, mental disease or defect, and intoxication) in the penalty phase. I concur with that dissent in that the statutory law plainly states that the penalty phase instruction requires a lesser degree of Extreme Emotional Distress then is required for the guilt phase. I adopt Justice Leib-son’s dissent on this issue in regard to the penalty phase.
I also dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion in regard to the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. The remarks made by the prosecutor in this case are in substance the same as those criticized in Clark v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 793 (1991). If the arguments of the prosecutor were improper in Clark, they are improper here. The same reasoning set forth in Clark, is appropriate in this case.
Therefore, I would reverse this case and remand it to the Fayette Circuit Court for a retrial.