Court Opinion

ID: 9529572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:52:06.929855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:50.878883
License: Public Domain

Durham, J.
(dissenting)—By holding that the public disclosure act (PDA) does not apply to superior court case files, the majority rejects the clear language of the act and ignores prior case law of this court. Thus, I dissent.
As a starting point, the PDA itself establishes that the act is to be construed liberally, especially given the strength of its language. Some of this court's earlier statements in this regard bear repeating:
The Washington public disclosure act is a strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records. It states that, "mindful of the right of individuals to privacy and of the desirability of the efficient administration of government, full access to information concerning the conduct of government on every level must be *310assured as a fundamental and necessary precondition to the sound governance of a free society." RCW 42.17-.010(11). It further declares that "[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to promote . . . full access to public records so as to assure continuing public confidence [in] . . . governmental processes, and so as to assure that the public interest will be fully protected." Declarations of policy in an act, although without operative force in and of themselves, serve as an important guide in determining the intended effect of the operative sections. Hartman v. State Game Comm'n, 85 Wn.2d 176, 179, 532 P.2d 614 (1975). Declarations of policy requiring liberal construction are a command that the coverage of an act's provisions be liberally construed and that its exceptions be narrowly confined. Mead School Dist. 354 v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 85 Wn.2d 140, 145, 530 P.2d 302 (1975).
Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 127-28, 580 P.2d 246 (1978).
A liberal construction in this case is made even more compelling because of the voters' intent in passing this initiative. The citizens of this state directly enacted the PDA by adopting Initiative 276 in a 1972 election. Initiative 276 had an "extraordinarily broad range of citizen support". In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 618-19, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) (Andersen, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). The intent of the voters can be determined by examining the information they read in the voters pamphlet. Estate of Turner v. Department of Rev., 106 Wn.2d 649, 654, 724 P.2d 1013 (1986); Hi-Starr, Inc. v. Liquor Control Bd., 106 Wn.2d 455, 460, 722 P.2d 808 (1986). As we stated in Hearst:
The expansive disclosure requirement as established by the language of the act is further solidified by reference to the statement in the voters pamphlet explaining the act when it was Initiative 276: "The initiative would require all . . . 'public record' of both state and local agencies to be made available for public inspection and copying by any person asking to see or copy a particular record ..." Further, the statement expressly provided that the law "makes all public records and documents in *311state and local agencies available for public inspection and copying" except those exempted to protect individual privacy and to safeguard essential governmental functions. Official Voters Pamphlet, 1972 General Election, November 7, 1972, at pages 10, 108.
Hearst, at 128.
With these general considerations in mind, I turn to the application of the PDA to the facts of this case. The PDA requires that "[e]ach agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying all public records." RCW 42.17.260(1). Both the terms "agency" and "public records" are defined in the act. RCW 42.17.020(1), (26). If these definitions are satisfied, then the act applies absent a specific exemption under the PDA, RCW 42.17.310, and absent an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy. In re Rosier, supra. Here, no argument has been made that same-day access to court case files represented an invasion of privacy, nor that same-day access of those files triggers any of the specific exemptions. Therefore, if the definitions of "agency" and "public records" are met, the PDA applies. I conclude that such is the case.
Under the PDA, "agencies" include county departments. RCW 42.17.020(1). The King County Department of Judicial Administration is a county executive department. King County Charter 350.20. Hence, it qualifies as an "agency". The majority holds, however, that the Department of Judicial Administration is not covered by the PDA because the PDA does not cover courts. We need not decide, however, whether the PDA applies to courts, an issue about which the PDA is far from clear. Here, the Department of Judicial Administration is an executive, rather than a judicial, department. King County Charter 350.20. Applying the PDA to the Department of Judicial Administration does not apply it to the courts. New York courts recognize this distinction and apply their public disclosure statute to court administration offices, even though the judiciary is specifically excluded from that statute's coverage. Babigian *312v. Evans, 104 Misc. 2d 140, 427 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Quirk v. Evans, 116 Misc. 2d 554, 455 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 1982). Therefore, whether or not Washington's public disclosure act covers courts is irrelevant to its application to the Department of Judicial Administration.
It is even easier to demonstrate that court case files are "public records". "Public records" are defined to include "any writing containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency ..." RCW 42.17.020(26). The majority concedes that court case files are generally considered to be public records. The files also qualify under the above definition because the files are written, they relate to performance of a government function (adjudication of disputes), and they are retained by a county agency (the Department of Judicial Administration).
Therefore, I conclude that the public disclosure act applies to King County court case files. Further arguments presented by the majority, however, merit some additional attention.
The majority bases its holding on three arguments: The PDA does not apply to give access to court case files because (1) the common law provides that access, (2) the PDA does not specifically include courts or their case files in its definitions, and (3) any other holding would undo developed law protecting privacy and governmental interests. Each of these arguments conflicts with established legal principles.
The majority first argues that a statute is inoperative to the extent that a common law rule already exists. This argument runs afoul of the principle that unambiguous statutes are to be read in conformity with their obvious meaning, without regard to previous common law. State v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1, 15, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985); Teeter v. Lawson, 25 Wn. App. 560, 564, 610 P.2d 925 (1980). The common law simply does not preclude legislative action. There is no reason that the common law and statute cannot *313coexist. New legislation is presumed to be consistent , with prior decisions, absent legislative intent to the contrary. State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 493, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983); State v. Bushnell, 38 Wn. App. 809, 810-11, 690 P.2d 601 (1984). The government's refusal to disclose a document should be actionable if the refusal violated either the common law or the PDA. Whether the common law provides access is irrelevant to the issue of whether the PDA also provides access.
Second, the majority holds that the PDA does not apply because the statutory definitions do not specifically apply to courts and court case files. As discussed above, however, the definitions set out broad categories which are more than sufficient to include case files and the Department of Judicial Administration within the scope of the PDA. That the definitions do not contain the words "court case files" is, of course, irrelevant if these files fall within the categories of items set out by the definition.
Finally, the majority holds that the PDA is inapplicable because it fails to specifically exempt certain statutory provisions which keep private juvenile court files, artificial insemination records, paternity action files, adoption records, and mental commitment files. The majority cites no authority to support its assertion that developed case law regarding the confidentiality of these case files would be nullified if the PDA applies. In fact, case law indicates the contrary. Each of the protections mentioned by the majority has been adopted into statute. The PDA would not override those statutes, which are far more specific than the broad provisions of the PDA. Conflicting statutes are construed so that the more specific statute controls. See, e.g., In re Estate of Little, 106 Wn.2d 269, 283-84, 721 P.2d 950 (1986); Miller v. Sybouts, 97 Wn.2d 445, 448, 645 P.2d 1082 (1982); Johnson v. Central Vly. Sch. Dist. 356, 97 Wn.2d 419, 428-29, 645 P.2d 1088, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1982). The more specific statute applies even if it was enacted prior to the general statute. Christianson v. Spalding, 593 F. Supp. 500, 504 n.7 (E.D. Wash. 1983) (citing *314Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15, 55 L. Ed. 2d 70, 98 S. Ct. 909 (1978)). Statutes authorizing the sealing of otherwise public records are clear pronouncements of public policy which override a public disclosure statute. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bilder v. Delavan, 112 Wis. 2d 539, 554, 334 N.W.2d 252 (1983). At least one Washington court has recognized these principles by holding that the disclosure provisions of the PDA have no effect on the confidentiality of adoption records under RCW 26.32.150. In re Sage, 21 Wn. App. 803, 811-12, 586 P.2d 1201 (1978), review denied, 92 Wn.2d 1002 (1979).
Simply put, none of the majority's numerous arguments justify its position. The PDA applies to this case, the Department of Judicial Administration is an executive, not judicial, agency, and all the developed law protecting privacy and government interests remains fully functional. The majority opinion has needlessly restricted the scope of the PDA, a statute of great societal importance which is to be liberally construed.
Andersen, J., concurs with Durham, J.
Reconsideration denied February 12, 1987.