Court Opinion

ID: 9603006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:02:28.100642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:07.772391
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
(dissenting): I dissent. In the first place, I do not think the appeal should be entertained. It is actually an appeal *665from an order refusing to strike matter from the petition. We have always up to now held such orders are not appealable. (See Hendricks v. Wichita Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 157 Kan. 651, 143 P. 2d 780, and many authorities there cited.) The rule is so well settled and so universally recognized as to require no further citations. In fact, no rule is cited much more often than the converse of the above, that an order sustaining a motion to strike is appeal- ■ able when it is tantamount to a demurrer. Every time such a rule is cited it accentuates the fact that an order overruling a motion to strike is not final and is not appealable. We said in Hendricks v. Wichita Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, supra:
“But the converse of such ruling has no such consequence. The overruling of a motion to strike may leave some surplus, immaterial or redundant matter in the pleading, but it does not strip the pleader of his cause of action or defense.”
Counsel for defendant in order to even make a show of being here used a devise of inserting a hitherto unknown ground in his demurrer. First, he demurred on the ground—
“1. The Amended Petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of said plaintiff and against said defendant.
“2. The Amended Petition does not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action for punitive damages in favor of said plaintiff and against said defendant.
“3. The Amended Petition shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive damages from the defendant.”
It is practically conceded that the first ground of the demurrer is not good. That is to say no one argues that the amended petition did not state a cause of action. The statement of appellant in his brief is:
“Appellant claims that the amended petitions of the appellees do not state causes of action in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant for the following reasons: The amended petitions did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for punitive damages in favor of said plaintiffs and against said defendant in any of the above entitled actions and the amended petitions of the plaintiffs showed that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover punitive damages from the defendant.”
A demurrer is a creature of the statute. (See G. S. 1949, 60-705.) That statute provides as follows:
“The defendant may demur to the petition only when it appears on the face either: First, that the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, or the subject of the action. Second, that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue. Third, that there is another action pending between the same *666parties for the same cause. Fourth, that several causes of action are improperly joined. Fifth, that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”
With the first four grounds we have no concern here. The fifth is—
“That the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”
That is all the grounds there are for a demurrer to a petition. There are no others. There is no provision in the statute for basing a demurrer on the ground that the petition does not state a cause of action for punititve or any other element of damages. The petition either states a cause of action or it does not. The defendant by this subterfuge of putting such a ground in his demurrer has secured an adjudication of this court on an order of a trial court overruling a motion to strike.
If this is to be the policy of this court our docket will be loaded with appeals from such orders. I do not think the appeal should have been entertained.
In the second place, I think the motion to strike was correctly overruled. No motion to make definite and certain was directed at this amended petition. Under such circumstances it should be liberally construed in favor of the pleader. I think a reasonable interpretation of the allegations of the amended petition is that the defendant was driving while intoxicated and on account of being in such a condition wrongfully, wantonly and recklessly drove his automobile on the wrong side of the highway. I cannot imagine any more wrongful or reckless course of conduct than to be driving an automobile on the highway while intoxicated. I actually feel that this decision will have the effect of condoning drunken driving on the highway. I know my brothers do not intend such a construction. I am thinking, however, of what the practical result will be.
The appeal should not have been entertained. Since it was entertained, the judgment should have been affirmed.