Court Opinion

ID: 9883626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:01:49.124882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:27.596574
License: Public Domain

Iíeiíer, J.
(dissenting). There can be no doubt that the former Court of Chancery had jurisdiction of the care and custody of illegitimates, and that this jurisdiction now rests in the Superior Court under the Constitution of 1941. This has been a function of Chancery from the earliest time. The general jurisdiction of Chancery over the persons and estates of infants, for the protection of both, “is supposed to have originated in the prerogative of the Crown, arising from its general duty as parens patriae to protect persons who have no other rightful protector. But partaking, says Story, as the prerogative does, more of the nature of a judicial administration of rights and duties in foro conscientiae than of a strict executive authority, it was very naturally exercised by the court of chancery as a branch of its original general jurisdiction. ‘Accordingly/ he adds, ‘the doctrine, now commonly maintained is, that the general superintendence and protective jurisdiction of the court of chancery over the persons and property of infants is a delegation of the rights and duty of the Crown; that it belonged to that court and was exercised by it from its first establishment; and that this general jurisdiction was not even suspended by the Statute *411of Henry VIII, erecting the court of wards and liveries.’ The jurisdiction possessed by the English courts of chancery from this supposed delegation of the authority of the Crown as parens patriae is more frequently exercised in this country by the courts of the States than by the courts of the United States. It is the state and not the Federal Government, except in the territories and the District of Columbia, which stands, with reference to the persons and property of infants, in the situation of parens patriae. Accordingly provision is made by law in all the States for the appointment of such guardians, whose duties and powers are carefully defined.” New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 435, 26 L. Ed. 580 (1880). See, also, Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9, 21 L. Ed. 73 (1873).
This conception of equity’s inherent original jurisdiction, as a part of its general jurisprudence, over the persons and estates of infants has general acceptance. While this jurisdiction may, “in its very inception, have belonged to the king as a part of his executive power as parens patriae to protect his subjects, and may by him have been transferred to the court of chancery,” it is “firmly established as a judicial function of the court; it does not belong to the chancellor alone as the personal delegate and representative of the crown; it is exercised by all the judges composing the court of chancery, in the same manner, and governed by the same regulations, as all other confessedly judicial functions.” Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (5ih ed.), section 1304. It has been suggested that by the ordinance of March 28, 1770, the governor of the Provihce of Hew Jersey “was left with all the jurisdiction held by the English Chancellor as a judicial officer as distinguished from his power as a minister of the king, or representing the king as parens patriae,” and that the original jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery did not include “the care of property of infants,” ' a subject which “belonged to .the Chancellor in England as parens patriae rather than as a court, and was conferred upon the Chancellor of Hew Jersey by statute.” Keasbey’s Courts <& *412Lawyers of New Jersey, vol. 2, pp. 505, 508. But be that as it may, it was long recognized that the old Court of Chancery had general jurisdiction over the care and custody of infants domiciled or actually resident in New Jersey. Chancery had the beneficent prerogative of the care and protection of infants because of their incapacity for self-protection, due to their tender years. The State, Baird, pros. v. Baird & Torrey, 19 N. J. Eq. 481 (E. & A. 1868); Richards v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 283 (E. & A. 1889); Ex parte Hoines (N. J. Ch.) 112 A. 613 (1920); In re Williams, 77 N. J. Eq. 478 (Ch. 1910). In the Hoines case, Yice-Ohancellor Stevenson found that the control of infants was a part of the original general jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, and that “while of course laws in regard to infants may be made and changed from time to time, the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to enforce those laws cannot be impaired by legislative enactment.” The jurisdiction of the state “to regulate the custody of infants found within its territory does not depend upon the domicile of the parents. It has its origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless. * * * Eor this, the residence of the child suffices, though the domicile be elsewhere.” Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624 (1925).
At common law, an illegitimate is deemed nullus filius with few civil rights or privileges. He has no inheritable blood; but he has the right of property. He can have no-heirs except of his own body; and if he left no lineal descendants, his property is escheated. Gaines v. Hennen, 24 How. 553, 16 L. Ed. 770 (1860); Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pel. 178, 10 L. Ed. 408 (1840); Hardesty v. Mitchell, 302 Ill. 369, 134 N. E. 745, 24 A. L. R. 565 (1922); Wilkinson v. Adam, 1 Ves. & B. 422, 35 Eng. Rul. Cas. 506, affirmed, 12 Price, 470, 147 Eng. Reprint 780; 1 Blackstone’s Com. 459; 2 Id. 247. The acquired rights of an illegitimate have-the protection of the common law; and Chancery has the same inherent jurisdiction over dependent illegitimates within the State, for their care and custody and general pro*413teetion, as it has of legitimate children. B. 8. 9:16-1 had its origin in c. 331 of the Session Laws of 1913 (Pamph. L. p. 733), which recognized the preexisting jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery over the care and custody of illegitimates. This act was a supplement to the act relating to “minors, their adoption, custody and maintenance”; and it was stated to be “declaratory of the existing law upon this subject.”
There is an obvious interdependency between the care and custody and the support and education of infants. In most cases, the exercise of the judicial function in respect of care and custody necessarily involves the provision of support and education. The authors of the statutory revision of 1937 were indubitably guided by this consideration. B. S. 9:16-1, -2, -3 and -4 were grouped as chapter 16 of Title 9 relating to children, under the heading “Custody and Support.” Whatever the jurisdictional shortcomings prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1947, Article VI, section 3, paragraph 2 of that instrument vested in the Superior Court “original general jurisdiction throughout the State in all causes,” and thereby in explicit terms conferred upon the Superior Court jurisdiction of the entire subject here involved. B. 8. 9:16-4 provides that the remedy given by sections 9 :16-2 and 9:16-3 “shall be deemed cumulative as to remedies contained” in B. 8. 9 :17—1, el seq., commonly known as the Bastardy Act.
I would suggest that the limitations put upon this jurisdictional grant by my brethren are at variance with the constitutional design to lodge complete general jurisdiction in the Superior Court, and thus to avoid the jurisdictional limitations and conflicts of the old constitutional system that made for inefficiency and delay in the administration of justice. The history of the cited constitutional provision reveals a final draft intentionally free of all exceptions. The conceded inclusion of criminal jurisdiction in the Superior Court is an even more radical innovation. Yet there has been no suggestion that the whole of this jurisdiction be exercised by the Superior Court. The regulation of the exercise of *414concurrent jurisdiction is largely a matter of practical administration.
It is to be borne in mind that the petition here invoked the unquestionable general jurisdiction of the Superior Court over the custody of illegitimates. While the petition alleges that the child was born in Baltimore, Maryland, it was asserted on the oral argument that the mother and child are domiciled in New Jersey. The application of the statute to the particular circumstances is not an appropriate subject of inquiry at this stage of the proceedings. The decision turns upon a question of basic jurisdiction under the Constitution.
I would reverse the judgment.
Mr. Justice Burling joins in this opinion.
For affirmance—-Chief Justice Vanderbilt and Justices Case, Olirhant, Wacheneeld and Ackerson—5.
For reversal—Justices Heher and Burling—2.