Court Opinion

ID: 9574271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:03:46.723959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:17.946745
License: Public Domain

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the compensation award at issue was supported by substantial evidence, and thus I have no quarrel with its resolution of the merits of this petition. I disagree, however, with its conclusion that initial judicial review of petitions under the Defense Base Act (“DBA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1651 et seq., lies with the courts of appeals. Because that disagreement goes to the question of our jurisdiction over this petition, I write separately.
As the majority recognizes, the question of whether initial judicial review of compensation decisions under the DBA lies with the courts of appeals or the district courts has divided our sister circuits. The Ninth Circuit has held that jurisdiction in the courts of appeals is appropriate, Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. *457Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir.1979) (finding jurisdiction in the courts of appeals but transferring the case to the Seventh Circuit),1 whereas the Sixth Circuit, along with every circuit to have considered the question since Pearce, has held that initial review lies in the district courts, see Home Indem. Co. v. Stillwell, 597 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir.1979); ITT Base Servs. v. Hickson, 155 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir.1998); Lee v. Boeing Co., 123 F.3d 801, 806 (4th Cir.1997); AFIA/CIGNA Worldwide v. Felkner, 930 F.2d 1111, 1116 (5th Cir.1991); see also Hice v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 156 F.3d 214, 218 (D.C.Cir.1998) (dictum) (“[While we are] inclined to agree with the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, we need not decide that issue for ourselves.”); Dyncorp Int’l v. Mechler, No. 08 Civ. 8309, 2009 WL 303329, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009) (agreeing “with those courts that have held that judicial review under the DBA is by the district court”). Today, the majority joins with the Ninth Circuit in holding that initial review under the DBA lies with the courts of appeals. In my view it does so in error. The DBA is unambiguous and clearly requires initial review of compensation decisions in the district courts.
The Supreme Court has “stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon [of statutory construction] is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord United States v. Salim, 549 F.3d 67, 78 (2d Cir.2008). Here, the relevant language of the DBA provides in part that “[j]udicial proceedings provided under sections 18 and 21 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act in respect to a compensation order made pursuant to this chapter shall be instituted in the United States district court.”2 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (emphasis added). Because there is no ambiguity in that language, our inquiry should be complete, and I believe the majority errs in proceeding further to consider the statute’s primary purpose.
The majority concludes that the DBA’s judicial review provision is ambiguous because the DBA, which was enacted in 1941, incorporates the provisions of the Long-shore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“Longshore Act”), and the Longshore Act was amended in 1972 to provide for initial judicial review in the courts of ap*458peals. See 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). According to the majority, the DBA, “[r]ead literally,” now states: “Judicial proceedings provided under section! ] ... of the Long-shore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act [which now provides for initial review in the courts of appeals] shall be instituted in the United States [District [C]ourt.” Maj. Op. at 453 (brackets in original). Because “[i]nitial review obviously cannot lie in both courts,” the majority concludes that the DBA is ambiguous. Id.
I agree, of course, that “[i]nitial review ... cannot lie in both courts.” Id. My disagreement with the majority is that, as I read it, the DBA does not, in fact, provide for review in both courts; it unambiguously provides for review only in the district courts. Although the DBA incorporates the provisions of the Longshore Act, it does so only insofar as those provisions are consistent with the DBA. The DBA states explicitly that “[ejxcept as herein modified, the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act ..., as amended, shall apply.” 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (emphasis added). In other words, to the extent that the language of the DBA and the Longshore Act are in conflict, the language of the DBA controls. See Felkner, 930 F.2d at 1113 (“If the DBA provides a specific modification then the provisions of the DBA control.”). There is, therefore, no genuine ambiguity in the terms of the DBA, and, in my view, the majority errs in looking beyond the plain language of the statute.
I recognize that the divergence in the judicial review procedures of the DBA and the Longshore Act may be the product of Congressional mistake or oversight. See Lee, 123 F.3d at 805 (noting that “Congress may have simply made an oversight in failing to amend ... the DBA” along with the Longshore Act). As other courts addressing this question have explained, however, “we cannot speculate about what Congress’ intent might have been when faced with the unambiguous language of a statute.” Hickson, 155 F.3d at 1275. Nor is it “our function to correct Congressional oversight, particularly when such oversight does not lead to impossible or absurd results.” Felkner, 930 F.2d at 1116-17; cf. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 142, 115 S.Ct. 1278, 131 L.Ed.2d 160 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that amendments to the Longshore Act unintentionally “put the administration of the [Black Lung Benefits Act] and the [Longshore Act] out of sync” but recognizing that while “[correcting a scrivener’s error is within this Court’s competence, ... only Congress can correct larger oversights of the kind presented” (citation omitted)). Requiring that DBA claims proceed in the district courts — as they did for over thirty years prior to the 1972 amendment to the Longshore Act— can hardly be considered an absurd result. Accordingly, we are required to adhere to the plain language of the statute.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. As the majority notes, the Seventh Circuit, upon accepting transfer of the Pearce case, appears to have agreed with the Ninth Circuit's holding. It did so, however, without any analysis and by stating simply: "We approve the holding of the Ninth Circuit that jurisdiction lies in the Seventh. In any event, both that holding and the decision that transfer was appropriate in lieu of dismissal and filing anew are now res judicata." Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 647 F.2d 716, 721 (7th Cir.1981). In light of the fact that the Seventh Circuit deemed the Ninth Circuit’s holding to be res judicata, its approval of that holding was mere dicta. It is therefore questionable whether the Seventh Circuit would consider the rule set forth in Pearce to be the law of the Circuit.

. The full provision reads as follows:
Judicial proceedings provided under sections 18 and 21 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in respect to a compensation order made pursuant to this Act shall be instituted in the United States district court of the judicial district wherein is located the office of the deputy commissioner whose compensation order is involved if his office is located in a judicial district, and if not so located, such judicial proceedings shall be instituted in the judicial district nearest the base at which the injury or death occurs.
42 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (emphasis added).