Court Opinion

ID: 9743929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:50:31.155405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:45.720828
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Hunter, J.
I must respectfully dissent in this cause for I cannot agree that the premature motion for discharge was *634a delay chargeable to the defendant. Although I do not feel the early trial rule is always a practical one for state-wide application, I do feel that as long as we have the rule we should follow both the spirit and the letter of the rule. The question one must ask is whether the premature motion for discharge is the type of delay which was contemplated as being chargeable to the defendant. In my opinion it is not. As relator points out, his petition served more to alert the court of the delay occurring in his case than to impose delay.
The reason delays are chargeable to defendant and extend the fifty days is to prevent a defendant from invoking the rule and then utilizing dilatory tactics to assure the lapse of fifty days. The idea is that if one really desires a speedy trial he would not and should not cause any delay in bringing his cause to trial on the merits. Can anyone seriously question that the defendant did indeed desire a speedy trial? His motion for discharge, filed in good faith, was certainly not intended as a delaying tactic and therefore should not be chargeable as such. The defendant’s action was not in contravention of the spirit of the rule but was actually a tool in its implementation for the court then has notice that the fifty days is about to toll. By charging this delay to the defendant we emasculate the rule by undermining its philosophical cornerstone and with this I cannot concur.
NOTE. — Reported in 277 N. E. 2d 370.