Court Opinion

ID: 9427501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:20:59.597361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:07.543937
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The opinion of the Court addresses, and sustains, the policy of the Transit Authority under its Rule 11 (b) only insofar as it applies to employees and applicants for employment who “are receiving methadone treatment” (emphasis supplied) . Ante, at 572-573, n. 3, and ante, this page. I concur in the opinion of the Court holding that there is no violation of the Equal Protection Clause or Title VII when the Authority’s policy is applied to employees or applicants who are currently on methadone.
But in my view the question presented by the record and opinions of the courts below is not limited to the effect of the rule on present methadone users. Indeed, I had thought it conceded by all concerned that the Transit Authority’s policy of exclusion extended beyond the literal language of Rule 11 (b) to persons currently free of methadone use but who had been on the drug within the previous five years. The District Court was unsure whether all past users were excluded but indicated that the policy of exclusion covered at least persons who had been free of methadone use for less than five years. 399 F. Supp. 1032,1036 (SDNY 1975).1 The Court of *595Appeals for the Second Circuit was unequivocal. It understood that the rule constituted a “blanket exclusion from employment of all persons participating in or having successfully concluded methadone maintenance programs.” 558 F. 2d 97, 99 (1977).
Petitioners’ brief in this Court states, in effect, that the Authority will consider only applicants for employment who have been free of a drug problem for “at least five years”:
“[T]he Authority will give individual consideration to people with a past history of drug addiction including those who have completed either a drug free or a methadone maintenance program, and who have been completely drug free and have had a stable history for at least five years.” Brief for Petitioners 5.
There was a similar recognition of the Authority’s policy in the petition for a writ of certiorari.2
Despite this unanimity among the parties and courts below as to the question presented, the Court today simply chooses to limit its decision to the policy with respect to employees and applicants currently receiving methadone treatment. The explanation given is that “neither the findings of fact, nor the record evidence, squarely presents any issue with respect to former users that must be resolved in order to dispose of this litigation.” Ante, at 572-573, n. 3. But the only support the Court cites for this statement is a lack of proof as to the policy’s actual application. In light of the express admission *596of the Transit Authority to the District Court that the policy extended to at least some former users,3 evidence of the past application of the policy was irrelevant to the fashioning of prospective relief.4
I conclude that the Court has decided only a portion of the case presented, and has failed to address what it recognizes as the more difficult issue. Ante, at 572-573, n. 3, 591-592, and n. 37. We owe it to the parties to resolve all issues properly presented, rather than to afford no guidance whatever as to whether former drug and methadone users may be excluded from employment by the Authority. I agree with the courts below that there is no rational basis for an absolute bar against the employment of persons who have completed successfully a methadone maintenance program and who otherwise *597are qualified for employment. See Vance v. Bradley, ante, at 111; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 314 (1976); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 40 (1973). I therefore would affirm the judgment below with respect to the class of persons who are former methadone users.

 The District Court also noted that the Authority “contends that it cannot afford to take what it considers the risks of employing present or past methadone maintained persons, except possibly those who have been successfully withdrawn from methadone for several years.” 399 F. Supp., at 1052 (emphasis supplied).

 In petitioners’ statement of the ease the affected class was said to include former addicts “who are participants in or have completed a methadone maintenance program.” Pet. for Cert. 4 (emphasis supplied).
The brief for respondents similarly described the Transit Authority’s policy:
“The Transit Authority’s blanket denial of employment to fully rehabilitated heroin addicts who are being or ever have been treated in methadone maintenance programs violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Brief for Respondents 59.

 See, e. g., 3 Court of Appeals Joint App. in No. 76-7295, pp. 1106a-1112a.

 The Court seems to imply that because the Transit Authority’s policy with respect to former methadone users had not been invoked against any of the named plaintiffs, it was improper for the District Court to certify a class of former users who would be affected by the policy. Ante, at 572-573, n. 3, 576-577, n. 12. Even if one were to consider it proper for this Court to disregard the District Court’s explicit finding that plaintiff Frasier “was rejected because of his former methadone use,” 399 F. Supp., at 1034 (emphasis supplied), the Court overlooks the further finding:
“[I]t is unquestioned that there are many methadone maintenance patients who successfully withdraw from methadone and stay clear of drug abuse thereafter. Plaintiff Beazer is such a person, having ceased using methadone almost two years ago.
“There is no rational reason for maintaining an absolute bar against the employment of these persons regardless of their individual merits.” Id., at 1051.
It is clear that Beazer both was a proper representative of the class of former users and was interested in Transit Authority employment, inasmuch as reinstatement was part of the relief he sought. In light of the Transit Authority’s unequivocal policy of not employing persons in Beazer’s position, it was unnecessary for him to engage in the futile ritual of reapplying for employment after terminating his methadone use in order to have standing to attack the policy.