Court Opinion

ID: 9726038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:28:44.695489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:59.210802
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BUCKLEY, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority decision, as I believe that plaintiff’s section 2 — 622 reviewing health care professional’s report satisfied the statutory requirements, and second, that if it did not, the trial court should have allowed plaintiff’s second-amended complaint. A complaint may be dismissed where the section 2 — 622 written report does not comply with the statutory standards, but leave to amend should then be granted. Steinberg v. Dunseth, 276 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1042, 658 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (1995). Section 2 — 622 simply requires that plaintiff’s complaint contain (1) an affidavit stating that a qualified health professional has determined that plaintiff’s cause of action is meritorious, and (2) a written report indicating the basis for this determination. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 622 (West 1994). As long as minimal compliance is made, the case should move on to summary judgment or trial. Steinberg, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 1049, 658 N.E.2d at 1248. A single report is adequate if it is sufficiently broad to cover all defendants. Relaford v. Kyaw, 173 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1040, 527 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (1988). Most importantly, the purpose of section 2 — 622 is to deter frivolous suits rather than to deprive a plaintiff of a trial on the merits of his claim. See Steinberg, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 1042, 658 N.E.2d at 1244. Plaintiff’s section 2 — 622 report clearly met the statutory requirements where it set forth six distinct reasons in support of the health professional’s determination that plaintiff’s claim was reasonable and meritorious as against specific physicians as well as Rush and Northwestern hospitals. As to the doctors, the report stated the failure to timely and accurately diagnose plaintiff’s illness, failure to assess the possibility of a surgical procedure in a timely manner, and failure to take the appropriate measures to ascertain the reasons for plaintiff’s symptoms. Regarding the fault of the hospitals, the report stated a significant delay in transferring plaintiff to a care center where a corrective procedure and/or liver transplant could occur, failure to screen the physicians to whom the hospitals granted privileges in order to establish the doctors’ competency to deal with such situations, and failure to properly and adequately train and supervise physicians, residents and interns. Given these clear assertions of liability on the part of both individual physicians and the hospitals at which they work, I find that plaintiff’s reviewing health care professional’s report met the requirements of section 2 — 622 as to defendants Rush and Northwestern. The second basis for my dissent is that I believe the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint to add agency allegations. A trial court has discretion in determining whether an amendment should be allowed, but the court’s determination should be reversed where it has abused that discretion. In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 416, 615 N.E.2d 736, 742 (1993). In assessing whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, four factors are considered: (1) whether the amendment cures the defects in the pleadings; (2) whether the amendment is timely; (3) whether the movant had previous opportunities to amend; and (4) whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by the amendment. Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 274-76, 586 N.E.2d 1211, 1216-17 (1992). Moreover, in medical malpractice actions, leave to amend may be granted more freely since "the plaintiff should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to establish his case.” Peterson v. Hinsdale Hospital, 233 Ill. App. 3d 327, 332, 599 N.E.2d 84, 89 (1992). See also Leask v. Hinrichs, 232 Ill. App. 3d 332, 339, 595 N.E.2d 1343, 1347 (1992) ("[ajmendments to medical malpractice pleadings should be liberally allowed so that the case may be decided on its merits”). Plaintiff’s second-amended complaint, adding agency allegations, certainly cures any of the defects that the trial court found in dismissing the complaint. The amendment was timely in that the request was made a little over nine months after the complaint had been refiled and before any defendants had filed an answer to the pending first-amended complaint. Moreover, plaintiff’s request to amend was only his second request to amend in this multicount, multiparty, complex medical malpractice action. Finally, neither Rush nor Northwestern could claim prejudice or surprise at plaintiffs request to amend or by the allegations contained therein. The amendment did not contain new causes of action so much as it stated more clearly the cause of action (agency) which had been suggested by the allegations in the earlier complaint. Furthermore, this request was necessitated only by the trial court’s improper dismissal of plaintiffs first complaint on the grounds that plaintiffs section 2 — 622 report was insufficient. Finding that all four factors are satisfied, I believe the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff s second request to amend. For the reasons stated herein, I would reverse the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of defendants Rush and Northwestern from plaintiffs lawsuit and remand for further proceedings.