Court Opinion

ID: 9476666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:01:47.430027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:26.365603
License: Public Domain

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Leon County’s at-large election system violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 *1441U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). In their class action complaint plaintiffs asked the court to remedy this violation by ordering single-member districts. The county commission proposed as an appropriate remedy to be ordered by the court a “mixed” plan providing for five single-member districts and two commissioners elected at large. Plaintiffs conceded that the commissioners’ proposed plan complied with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. They contended, however, that the commissioners lacked authority under state law to change the election system without voter approval — approval which the commissioners did not secure— and therefore that the plan prepared by the commissioners was not a legislative plan within the meaning of the case law and thus not entitled to judicial deference. Rather, plaintiffs urged, the court was required to apply the principle that absent special circumstances a court-ordered plan must contain only single-member districts. The court found that the commissioners’ mixed plan was legislative and thus accorded it deference, and on that basis ordered it put into effect as a court-ordered plan.
This court now agrees with the conclusion that the plan was legislative and therefore affirms the district court. I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that the plan was legislative and would remand the case to the district court for further proceedings under correct standards.
I. The case law background
When a federal court declares an existing apportionment scheme unconstitutional it will, whenever practicable, afford the legislature a reasonable opportunity to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure before the court will devise and impose a remedial plan of its own plan. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 2497, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 95 S.Ct. 751, 766, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1833-34, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977). Such a new legislative plan is given deference by the court and may contain multimember districts. If a plan is devised and ordered by the court, however, absent special circumstances the court must give preference to single-member districts. Chapman, 420 U.S. at 18-19, 26-27, 95 S.Ct. at 761-62, 765-66; Wise, 437 U.S. at 540, 98 S.Ct. at 2497; Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 551, 92 S.Ct. 656, 658, 30 L.Ed.2d 704 (1972); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692, 91 S.Ct. 1760, 1762, 29 L.Ed.2d 268 (1971). This requirement recognizes that while multi-member districting is not per se unconstitutional, it does tend to have undesirable consequences.
A court-devised plan must meet more stringent standards than required of a legislature for several reasons. Redistricting, by its nature, is essentially a legislative task. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 at 138, 101 S.Ct. 2224, 2230, 68 L.Ed.2d 724 (1981); Wise, 437 U.S. at 539, 98 S.Ct. at 2496; Chapman, 420 U.S. at 17-18, 95 S.Ct. at 761-62. Because the court lacks the political authoritativeness that a legislature can bring to the task, it must act circumspectly and in a manner free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination. Wise, 437 U.S. at 541, 98 S.Ct. at 2498; Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1834, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977). Policies of federalism are implicated as well; absent constitutional infringement, state political policies as reflected through legislative action should be vindicated if possible by the federal court.
The act by a legislative body of submitting a proposed plan is not necessarily the equivalent of a legislative act of reapportionment. A legislative body whose statutory power to reapportion itself has been held unconstitutional may act under some circumstances to propose a plan. Indeed, a court may receive suggested plans from many groups and institutions within the community. But this does not answer the question of whether a public legislative body has proceeded in such a manner that its proposed plan is legislative as meant by *1442the law and therefore entitled to deference.1
In Wise the Supreme Court considered whether a reapportionment plan submitted to the court by the Dallas (Texas) City Council after the court declared the exist-' ing at-large system to be unconstitutional was a legislative plan or a court-imposed plan. Justice White, announcing the judgment of the Court and writing an opinion joined by Justice Stewart, concluded that a proposed reapportionment plan cannot be considered a legislative plan if the political body submitting it lacks the legal power to reapportion itself. He reasoned that the mere act by a legislative body of submitting a plan to the court is not the equivalent of a legislative act of reapportionment performed in accordance with the political processes of the community. Wise, 437 U.S. at 545, 98 S.Ct. at 2500.2 In Wise Justice White found that, after the existing system was declared unconstitutional, the Dallas City Council was free to exercise its residual or penumbral legislative power by adopting a mixed plan. Id. at 544, 98 S.Ct. at 2499. In short, Justice White found that the commission did not lack authority, but rather had authority to reapportion itself. This conclusion was reached in a context in which:
(1) The record suggested no statutory, state constitutional, or judicial prohibition upon the authority of the legislative body to enact an election plan under the circumstances. Wise at 544 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. at 2499 n. 8. Thus, the city council was free to, and did, “exercise its legislative powers.” Id. at 544, 98 S.Ct. at 2499 n. 8.
(2) Plaintiffs were unable to cite any authority supporting their contention that the Dallas City Commission exceeded its authority. Id.
(3) Since there was no provision for reapportionment for a home-rule city such as Dallas by some agency other than the city commission, the city would be permitted to reapportion itself where the time before the next election was too brief to permit approval of a new plan by referendum. Id.
(4) Dallas would be powerless to reapportion itself when the time before the next election was too short to approve a plan by referendum. Id.
(5) The district court held, and the court of appeals did not disagree, that in these circumstances the city commission did not exceed its legislative powers as governing body of Dallas. Id.
Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, concurred in the conclusion that the plan adopted by the city commission was a legislative plan for purposes of federal court review but dissented on the ground that it was unnecessary to find that the city commission was “imbued with [such] power [to reapportion itself]” after the apportionment provisions of the city charter were struck down. As they saw it, the essential point was that the legislative body “exercised a legislative judgment reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people.” Id. at 548, 98 S.Ct. at 2501.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented. Justice Mar*1443shall agreed with Justice White that only-election systems adopted by a governmental body pursuant to its valid legislative authority should be treated as legislative plans. Id. at 550, 98 S.Ct. at 2502 (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). He dissented, however, on the ground that a legislative plan could not be created by a legislature’s making a submission not in accord with valid state procedures governing legislative action. Id. at 553, 98 S.Ct. at 2504.
It seems to me that, applying the standards set out in Justice White’s opinion, the action by the Leon County commissioners was not legislative.
II. Florida law
To understand why the plan in this case is not legislative even under Justice White’s standards one must examine the Florida structure of county government.
The Florida constitution provides for “charter” counties, Article VIII, § 1(g) and “non-charter” counties, Article VIII, § 1(f). Florida counties have no inherent powers but derive their powers from the sovereign state and are not independent governmental entities. See, e.g., Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308, 321 (1930); Gessner v. Del-Air Corp., 154 Fla. 829, 17 So.2d 522 (1944) (“county commissioners have only such powers as are granted them by statute”). A “charter” county is established by the voters of the county adopting a charter. Id. § 1(c). A charter county government has broad general powers— “all powers of local government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors.” Id. § Kg):
This entirely new subsection [subsection (g) ] provides for the broadest extent of county self-government or “home rule” as it is commonly described.
D’Alemberte, Commentary on § 1(g), art. VIII, Fla. Const., 26A F.S.A. 270, 271.
A non-charter county is a government of limited granted powers. It has only “such powers of self-government as is provided by general law or special law.” Article VIII, § 1(f). The difference between county governments having only granted powers (non-charter counties) and county governments having all powers not inconsistent with general law (charter counties) is an advised one. Subsection (f) embodies new provisions enacted upon amendment of the state constitution in 1968. Commentary to § 1(f) at 270. The legislature created a Constitutional Revision Commission to conduct research, hold hearings and present a proposed constitution to the legislature. 1965 Laws of Florida Ch. 65-561. The draft was presented to the legislature. It contained a proposal for Article VIII, § 1(f) that “counties shall have the power of self-government except as otherwise provided by general or special law.” Commentary to § 1(f) at 270. After a parliamentary battle the House amended § 1(f) to its present form. See Journal of the House of Representatives, June 27, 1968. The Senate retained the Revision Commission’s recommendation. A conference committee submitted a proposed constitution containing § 1(f) as adopted by the House, and it was adopted by the legislature. See Journal of the House of Representatives, July 2, 1968. Summarizing, the Constitutional Revision Commission recommended general powers for non-charter counties, but the Florida legislature rejected the proposal and instead chose limited powers. This is summarized in the Commentary to § 1(f) at 270:
Subsection (f). This subsection embodies several new provisions which were proposed in a different manner by the Constitutional Revision Commission. That recommendation was that “counties shall have the power of self-government except as otherwise provided by general or special law.” The reverse is now the case under this subsection which provides that counties shall have such powers of self government as is provided by general or special law. Absent special or general legislation counties have no constitutional powers under this subsection.
*1444Until 1984 the at-large election system was the only method of election available to non-charter counties such as Leon. Fla. Const. Art. VIII, § 1(e). In that year the constitution was amended to permit commissioners to be elected “as provided by law.” In 1985, § 124.011(1), Fla.Stat.1985 was enacted, the effect of which was to give non-charter counties the option of adopting an alternate method for electing county commissioners: a five-person board with all elected from single-member districts or a seven-person board with five elected from single-member districts and two elected at-large. For either of these procedures to be utilized, however, the proposition must be submitted to approval by the voters. The Leon County commissioners have not submitted such a proposal to the voters, i.e., an alternate plan (single-member or five-two) for the non-charter government of their county.
The commissioners did resort to the voters in search of authorization for a four-three mixed plan, but without success. A four-three plan is not permitted for a non-charter county but only for a charter county. A charter county may choose a four-three plan by amending its charter by popular vote. Fla. Const, art. VIII, § 1(c), (e) and commentary to § 1 at 269. In October 1985, while this case was pending and three weeks before trial and some eight months after the effective date of § 124.011(1) authorizing the commissioners to seek voter approval for a five-two plan, the district court granted the commissioners a continuance to allow them to submit to the voters a change from non-charter to charter government with commissioners to be elected pursuant to a four-three mixed plan. The voters rejected the change.3 Trial was reset for February 1986. In mid-January 1986 the commissioners tried again to hold off remedial court action. They moved for a second continuance ostensibly based on citizens’ efforts to establish a consolidated government for Leon County. The request was denied.
III. Analysis of the present case under the principles of Wise.
An examination of this case in terms of the factors, enumerated above, on which Justice White appeared to rest his conclusion in Wise leads me to conclude that the plan proposed by the Leon County commissioners was not a legislative plan as it was not enacted pursuant to the commissioners’ authority but rather in derogation of their authority.
(1) and (2). This case does reveal state constitutional and statutory prohibitions upon the authority of a non-charter county to enact a plan in the manner followed by the Leon County commissioners. Leon County has no general or implied or “imbued” legislative powers. Florida has explicitly chosen to deny such powers to non-charter counties.
(3) and (4). There is no absence of means for the commissioners to pursue reapportionment under Florida law. In Wise the only legislative means of reapportionment was nullified when held unconstitutional. In this case only the old at-large system was struck down. The means to reapportion were in the hands of the commissioners beginning in January 1985, the effective date of § 124.011(1). Furthermore, there was no time crunch before the next election.
Rather than utilize the means available to them, however, the commissioners *1445sought and obtained a delay from the court and went to the voters with a plan that under Florida law was not available to non-charter counties, coupled with a vote on switching from non-charter status to charter status. The avenue of § 124.011(1) was available then, and was available when the commissioners sought a second continuance ostensibly to permit citizens to pursue efforts toward a consolidated government for the county. It was available when the district court decided this case, it has been available during this appeal, and it is available now.
(5). The district court in this case addressed only tangentially, if at all, the Florida constitutional and statutory history set out above and the question of the effect of a Florida non-charter county’s acting beyond its limited authority.
Moreover, it seems to me that even under Justice Powell’s opinion the plan in this case cannot be treated as legislative. In Wise the legislative body had no express power to reapportion itself, but, as Justice White had noted, no provision of Texas constitutional or statutory law appeared to deny it that power. In this vacuum where there was no specific authority and no specific denial or rejection of authority, Justice White found implied (“imbued” as Justice Powell described it) authority. Justice Powell considered this finding not essential; rather, he thought it enough that the city commission “exercised a legislative judgment, reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people.” Wise, 437 U.S. at 548, 98 S.Ct. at 2501. I believe that those following Justice Powell’s opinion would not extend their reasoning to the situation before us where there was no vacuum of power, the means to reapportion had been granted and were available but were not utilized, and the constitution and statutes of the state denied all legislative powers except those expressly granted.
Federal courts defer to the actions of state legislative bodies that act within their powers because we recognize that they can act with “political authoritativeness” as the expositors of “state political goals.” Id. at 541, 98 S.Ct. at 2498. But a legislative body does not act with “political authoritativeness” when it proceeds in derogation of the general political goals of the state as established for non-charter counties and eschews the specific and available political goals and procedures established for it. When a legislative body acts in this manner it is not free to make “policy choice[s] as elected representatives of the people” and it does not “perform[ ] in accordance with the political processes of the community.” Id. at 545, 98 S.Ct. at 2500. Instead it is acting in the teeth of the legislative and policy choices made by those who adopted the state constitution and the implementing statutes. To assign the dignity of legislative status to the actions of the commissioners in such a case is antithetical to the reasons for giving deference to such actions and it stands federalism on its head.
IV. The case law after Wise
The Fifth Circuit followed the analysis we have followed in a case involving a Florida non-charter county’s acting in the absence of statutory authority.4 McMillan v. Escambia County, 688 F.2d 960 (5th Cir.1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 466 U.S. 48, 104 S.Ct. 1577, 80 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984). The Fifth Circuit found the controlling analysis of Wise to be that in Justice White’s opinion, i.e., a plan cannot be legislative if the body proposing it lacks the authority under state law to apportion itself. It reached this conclusion on the basis that the three dissenters would take Justice White’s more restricted view of “legislative” rather than the more expansive view accepted by four justices in Justice Powell’s opinion. In McMillan, as in this case, the commissioners of a Florida *1446county submitted to the voters a proposal to change to a charter form of government and to adopt a 5-2 mixed plan. The voters turned it down. The district court then ordered single-member districts. The court of appeals held:
The Escambia County Commission is a non-charter government, and thus its legislative powers encompass only those specifically provided by state law. Defendants cite no state law empowering the Commission to reapportion itself, but contend that, under the analysis of Wise v. Lipscomb, supra, the Commission is implicitly vested with power to reapportion when the existing apportionment scheme has been held unconstitutional. We reject this argument because we are of the view that the district court correctly distinguished this case from Wise.
% >fc # # * #
The facts here are similar to those in Wise in that the only method authorized by state law for adopting a county election system that is not at-large is for the voters of the county to approve such a system by referendum. See text supra at 17. Unlike the Texas Constitution, however, the Florida Constitution expressly limits the legislative powers of the County Commission to those specifically authorized by state law. Hence, as the district court found, the Commission does not possess the legislative authority to reapportion itself even where the existing apportionment scheme has been held unconstitutional. On this ground, the district court correctly held that a judicially devised plan was necessary.
McMillan, 688 F.2d at 971-72. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. 466 U.S. 48, 104 S.Ct. 1577. I do not disagree with my brothers that the decision is not binding precedent. Considering McMillan as no more than, as Judge Hill puts it, “persuasive authority,” we should follow it for the reasons I have set out: it properly distinguishes Wise in the context of a Florida non-charter county; it recognizes political interests at the heart of deference to legislative actions taken by a governmental body acting as it is required to do in a democratic system; and it vindicates the principles of federalism.
Our present case is not controlled by McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 101 S.Ct. 2224, 68 L.Ed.2d 724 (1981), nor does Sanchez imply that the Court adopted Justice Powell’s Wise opinion. In Sanchez the Court addressed the question of what constitutes a legislative plan for purposes of preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court held that whenever a covered jurisdiction submits a proposal reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people, no matter how their power may be constrained by state law, such proposal is a legislative plan (Justice Powell's definition of a legislative plan) for purposes of the preclearance requirement of § 5. The Court explicitly distinguished the issue before it in Sanchez from the issue before the Court in Wise:
In this case, we are concerned only with the question whether the reapportionment plan submitted to the District Court should be considered a legislative plan for purposes of preclearance under § 5. We are not presented with any question concerning the substantive acceptability of that plan. Nevertheless, we draw significant guidance from prior cases in which the substantive acceptability of a reapportionment plan, rather than the applicability of § 5, was at issue.
Sanchez, 452 U.S. at 139, 101 S.Ct. at 2231.
Nor can Sanchez correctly be said to “stand in contrast” to McMillan. They concern different issues, Sanchez with § 5 and McMillan with the substantive acceptability of a plan presented to a court. In Sanchez the court rendered no opinion as to the proper definition of a legislative plan in a case such as Wise or McMillan or the case now before this court. McMillan addressed the precise issue facing this court *1447and with facts that are as congruent as possible for facts to be. Sanchez did not address the issue we must decide, which is whether the same definition of legislative plan should apply in both a § 2 and a § 5 preclearance case.
The issue involved in a § 5 proceeding is different from that before us. Under § 5 the legislative body must demonstrate that the proposed plan is constitutional, that it was not motivated by a discriminatory purpose, and that it will not have an adverse impact on minority voters. A § 5 inquiry asks whether a legislature can enact a proposed plan; if the plan gets § 5 preclearance it may become effective. Section 5 does not address in any fashion questions of whether the legislative body acted legally under state law in fashioning a plan.
While a legislatively enacted reapportionment plan is the preferred remedy after a judicial finding of unconstitutional apportionment, I believe that the Supreme Court cases articulating this preference do not contemplate that a legislature can satisfy this responsibility — and therefore avoid the more stringent requirements applicable to court-ordered plans — by submitting a plan that not only has not been enacted pursuant to valid state procedures governing reapportionment but also has in fact been fashioned in derogation of those procedures. Justice Powell’s opinion in Wise tells us, in effect, that a legislative body is free to act as representative of the people in a defacto fashion though it lacks specific authority to act. It is quite another thing to say that a legislative body acts as a representative of the people when it eschews the authority it possesses and proceeds on a course that state law has elected to deny to it.

. One can think of many examples demonstrating why a legislative body acting without state authority, and in derogation of state authority, is not entitled to the benefit of legislative deference. Surely we would not grant deference to a plan adopted by a rump session of a legislative body, consisting of less than a majority, meeting in secret and without notice to those members not present.

. The dissenters accept, as Justice White appears to do, that it is possible for a legislative body to act beyond "the usual course of its legislative responsibilities," Wise, 437 U.S. at 552, 98 S.Ct. at 2503 (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting), i.e., to merely submit a suggested plan as any other party (or other institution in a community) might respond to a court’s request for assistance. No one contends that this happened here. Rather Justice White concludes that the Council did have authority "to exercise its legislative powers.” Id. at 544, 98 S.Ct. at 2499. The dissenters contend the Council did not exercise its legislative responsibilities at all. It seems obvious that if the legislative body is acting as a mere source for a suggestion and is not even attempting to exercise its power to legislate, its suggestion is not entitled to deference as legislative action.

. Plaintiffs have contended that this is a rejection of a plan remarkably similar to that proposed to the court and must be rejected for that reason. As the district court noted, however, it is not clear what the voters were rejecting. They may have desired single-member districts. They may have rejected a change to charter status for their county, or any mixed system, or a four-three mix when the law permitted a five-two mix. Or they may have expressed a preference for the old at-large system even though it was unconstitutional.
But the district court’s analysis overlooks a point. What must be determined is whether, even though the vote was not an outright rejection, the commissioners possess authority to change the election system. Whatever motivated the voters, the election result certainly did not confer upon the commissioners the authority to act in derogation of Florida law.

. Section 124.011(1) had not been enacted at the time of McMillan so the Fifth Circuit did not consider its impact upon a non-charter county’s power to reapportion itself. The analysis regarding the lack of any inherent power to apportion itself, however, given a non-charter county's status as a governing body of limited powers, is the same.