Court Opinion

ID: 9367279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 15:02:14.93567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:58.823719
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                                IN RE: LACI C.

                            No. 1 CA-MH 22-0057
                              FILED 1-31-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
                       No. P1300MH202200022
               The Honorable Michael P. McGill, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Yavapai County Attorney’s Office, Prescott
By Benjamin D. Kreutzberg
Counsel for Appellee

The Law Office of David B. Loder, Wickenburg
By David B. Loder
Counsel for Appellant
                             IN RE: LACI C.
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Peter B. Swann1 joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1           L.C. appeals from the superior court’s order committing her
to involuntary treatment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            In May 2022, L.C.’s case manager applied for her to be
involuntarily evaluated at a psychiatric clinic. The case manager alleged
L.C. was “persistently or acutely disabled,” suffered from bipolar disorder,
and appeared to be “out of contact with reality.”

¶3            Drs. Collins and Kirkorsky both performed the court-ordered
evaluations and completed affidavits for the subsequent petition for court-
ordered treatment. In his affidavit, Dr. Collins avowed that L.C. was
“actively delusional[,]” “believes she owns the CIA and FBI[,]” and
“believes she has been brain transplanted.” Dr. Collins reported L.C. was
“threatening to harm [her]self and others” and refusing medications and
treatment. Dr. Collins concluded L.C. was “suffering from schizoaffective
bipolar [disorder]” and was “persistently or acutely disabled.”

¶4            Dr. Kirkorsky similarly reported that L.C. was “acutely
psychotic and manic.” He reported she was “unable to engage in a logical
discussion regarding her need for treatment” and was “adamant that she
needs to [be] discharge[d] to engage in experiments.” He diagnosed L.C.

1 Judge Peter B. Swann was a sitting member of this court when the matter
was assigned to this panel of the court. He retired effective November 28,
2022. In accordance with the authority granted by Article 6, Section 3, of
the Arizona Constitution and pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice
of the Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge Swann as a judge pro
tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the
resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for
the duration of Administrative Order 2022-162.

                                     2
                              IN RE: LACI C.
                            Decision of the Court

with bipolar 1 disorder and determined she was “persistently and acutely
disabled.” Both physicians agreed L.C. required court-ordered treatment.

¶5           The superior court ordered L.C. to undergo a combined
inpatient/outpatient treatment program, with inpatient treatment not to
exceed 180 days. L.C. timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 36-546.01 and 12-
2101(A)(10)(a).

¶6            To preserve an issue for appeal, appellants must present a
record demonstrating they first raised the issue before the superior court.
See In re MH2009-002120, 225 Ariz. 284, 287, ¶ 7 (App. 2010). When an
appellant fails to provide such a record, we presume the record supports
the superior court’s order. Johnson v. Elson, 192 Ariz. 486, 489, ¶ 11 (App.
1998) (“When no transcript is provided on appeal, the reviewing court
assumes that the record supports the trial court’s decision.”) L.C. has failed
to provide a transcript, or any record, that she raised the issues she now
challenges below. Waiver, however, is a discretionary doctrine, and in our
discretion, we address L.C.’s claims on their merits.

                                DISCUSSION

¶7            We review the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the superior court’s order and will not disturb an order that is
supported by substantial evidence. In re MH 2008-000438, 220 Ariz. 277,
278, ¶ 6 (App. 2009). As relevant here, Section 36-540(A) provides that the
superior court “shall order” a patient to undergo treatment if it finds by
“clear and convincing evidence that the proposed patient, as a result of
mental disorder, is a danger to self, is a danger to others or has a persistent
or acute disability . . . and is in need of treatment, and is either unwilling or
unable to accept voluntary treatment. . . .” See also A.R.S. § 36-501(33)
(defining persistent or acute disability).

¶8           L.C. argues that Drs. Collins and Kirkorsky violated Arizona
law requiring physicians to evaluate patients “in person” when they
conducted their evaluations of her through a telemedicine video
appointment. L.C. has failed to provide any evidence that Drs. Collins and
Kirkorsky conducted their evaluations via telemedicine, and in her brief,
she admits “[t]he record is not clear whether Doctor Kirkosky’s [sic]
examination was conducted in person.” But even assuming the physicians
evaluated L.C. through a telemedicine video appointment, her argument
nevertheless fails as a matter of law because Arizona law specifically
provides that court-ordered examinations “may include firsthand

                                       3
                               IN RE: LACI C.
                             Decision of the Court

observations or remote observations by interactive audiovisual media. . . .” A.R.S.
§ 36-501(13)(a) (emphasis added). Nothing in the record suggests the
physicians’ evaluation was deficient.

¶9            L.C. further argues the physicians’ evaluation was invalid
because she did not consent to it. But as the State correctly notes, Arizona
law does not require that a patient consent to an involuntary proceeding,
whether in person or by telemedicine. Under Section 36-3602(G)(2), the
consent requirement typically applicable to telemedicine appointments
“do[es] not apply . . . [i]n an emergency situation in which the patient or
patient’s health care decision maker is unable to give informed consent.”
L.C.’s emergency evaluation was such an “emergency situation.”
Moreover, the superior court may not order an evaluation unless the patient
“is unable or unwilling to undergo voluntary evaluation.” A.R.S. § 36-
524(C)(1). The record supports the superior court’s order.

                                CONCLUSION

¶10            We affirm.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

                                          4