Court Opinion

ID: 9700603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:37:16.519398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:12.288735
License: Public Domain

JON P. WILCOX, J.
(dissenting). I dissent because I conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in modifying its initial legal custody and physical placement award under sec. 767.325(l)(a). The record reflects that the trial court applied the proper "necessary to modify" legal standard in sec. 767.325(l)(a), and using a rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion that the current custodial conditions provided by the mother were physically and emotionally harmful to the best interests of the child.
The majority opinion states that "this court will not reverse unless there is no reasonable basis for the trial *775court's exercise of discretion." Majority op. at 766. However, the majority takes a narrow view of the record to arrive at their conclusion that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and that the facts applied to the proper legal standard do not support the trial court's conclusion.
I agree with much of the legal analysis pertaining to sec. 767.325(1)(a) set forth in the majority opinion on pages 760 through 766. However, I believe the majority erroneously concludes that the trial court misapplied the law in this case and that the facts do not support the trial court's conclusion.
The trial court's written conclusions of law that were issued with its order transferring custody of the child to the father stated:
Pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes sec. 767.324(1) [sic], the Court concludes that the Guardian ad Litem and [Father] have shown by substantial evidence that modification of the Court's December 6, 1988 order granting custody to [the mother] must be modified because custody with [the mother] is emotionally harmful to the best interest of [the child]. (Emphasis added.)
This statement indicates that the trial court was aware of and applied the proper legal standard. The trial court concluded that it was necessary to modify its initial custody order because custody with the mother was emotionally harmful to the child. This was a reasonable conclusion based upon the record and the trial court's stated findings.
The' mother, after repeated court orders, refused to allow the father visitation with the child. Finally, the trial court found it necessary to temporarily transfer custody to the father to allow the child to see her father. *776The majority opinion concludes that the mother's denial of visitation with the father was not relevant because the guardian ad litem did not show that the denial was physically or emotionally harmful to the child. Majority op. at 768. Apparently the majority would require expert testimony that denying a child the right to see one of her parents is emotionally harmful to the child. I believe it is a matter of common knowledge that denying a child the right to visit one of her parents could be emotionally harmful to the child. A prefatory note to 1987 Act 355, sec. 46 which enacted sec. 767.325, Stats., states:
In its study, the special committee on custody arrangements concluded that the current laws and practices relating to child custody determinations in divorce and other actions affecting the family:
1. Do not adequately stress the importance of the best interest of the child and the significance to the child, in most cases, of a continuing, meaningful relationship with both parents. (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion thwarts Wisconsin's policy of encouraging a relationship with both parents by encouraging custodial parents to deny court ordered visitation to non-custodial parents.
In this case, the trial court found the mother in contempt. The trial court ordered the mother to jail, but later withdrew the sentence. Of course had the trial court enforced the jail sentence, it would have been necessary to temporarily transfer custody of the child to the father while the mother served her jail time. Jail is a poor remedy in these situations because it does more harm than good. Enforcing a jail sentence against a custodial parent creates the risk that the parent will lose his or her job and causes a loss of income during the time the jail *777sentence is served. More importantly, sentencing a parent to jail might cause emotional harm to the child.
The majority opinion at page 764 quotes the court of appeals which stated, "[I]n [this] two-year period of finality and stability, the courts are not to be battlefields where wounded parents turn their children as weapons against one another." However, this is exactly what the mother did in this case. The mother used the child as a weapon against the father by refusing to allow the father visitation with his daughter. The majority opinion leaves the trial court without a reasonable remedy in these type of contempt situations.
While I believe the mother's repeated refusal to comply with the trial court's visitation order was enough to meet the requirements of sec. 767.25(l)(a), there was additional evidence of physical and emotional harm upon which the trial court could have rationally relied to reach its conclusion. The trial court found that there was substantial evidence in the record that the mother did not appropriately interact with the child, causing emotional harm to the child. While under the mother's care, the child was developmentally behind with respect to her verbal skills, social emotional development, gross motor skills, and fine motor skills. The child became unruly after visits with her mother. The mother's refusal to comply with the trial court's order for a psychiatric evaluation together with her contemptuous actions in and out of court led the trial court to conclude that the mother's mental condition was emotionally harmful to the child.
The court appointed Anita Kropf as an expert in this case. Kropf has a masters in social work and is the director of the Community Counseling Center in Janes-ville, Wisconsin. Kropf testified that living with the mother would be emotionally harmful to the best inter*778ests of the child. Kropf recommended that the father retain custody of the child. Kropf based her opinion and recommendation on the psychological examinations performed by Dr. Richard Schlaefer on the mother, father, and father's fiance. Kropf also utilized the psychiatric evaluations of the father and father's fiance performed by Dr. Marek Hann.
Dr. Schlaefer is a psychologist who works for Anita Kropf at the Community Counseling Center. Dr. Schalefer is also an associate professor in the Psychology Department at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. Dr. Schlaefer diagnosed the mother as having an adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features. Dr. Schlaefer testified that the mother would keep the child isolated from the mainstream of social life.
The guardian ad litem spent a weekend with the child in the mother's home. The guardian ad litem stated at oral argument that the child was barricaded in the home and was not allowed contact with other children or adults. The guardian ad litem is the party who brought the motion to transfer custody because after visiting the mother's home and witnessing the child's living conditions, he felt an emergency situation existed which was physically and emotionally harmful to the child.
The child is now five years old and has been in the father's custody for over four years. The reality of this case is that after the majority opinion is issued the child will be returned to the custody of her mother. The father then may file a new motion with the court seeking custody of the child under the "best interests" standard of sec. 767.325(l)(b), because the initial custody order is now more than two years old. The most unfortunate consequence of this case is that the emotional well-being of an innocent child has been irreparably harmed.
*779I conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in modifying its initial custody and physical placement award because there was substantial evidence in the record that the custodial conditions provided by the mother were physically and emotionally harmful to the best interests of the child.
I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
I am authorized to state that Justices Ceci and Bab-LITCH join in this dissent.