Court Opinion

ID: 9957828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 14:13:49.915978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:54.408194
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Nancy Colbert,
                       Petitioner                 :
                                                  :
               v.                                 :    No. 241 M.D. 2023
                                                  :    Submitted: February 6, 2024
President Judge John Hall, Court of               :
Common Pleas,                                     :
                   Respondent                     :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM                                                             FILED: April 5, 2024

               President Judge John Hall of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester
County (Hall) filed preliminary objections to the amended petition for review filed
by Nancy Colbert (Colbert), pro se. Hall challenges this Court’s jurisdiction,
Colbert’s standing, and whether Colbert has stated her claims properly. We sustain
Hall’s preliminary objection contesting this Court’s jurisdiction and transfer the
matter to our Supreme Court.
                                      I. BACKGROUND1
               Colbert states that she was in a courtroom with two signs forbidding (1)
all cell phone use and (2) recording without court permission. Am. Pet. for Rev.,

       1
          “[W]e accept as true all well-pleaded material facts set forth in the petition for review and
all inferences fairly deducible from those facts.” Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901,
917 (Pa. 2013) (Robinson) (cleaned up). We may also consider documents or exhibits attached to
the petition for review. Diess v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 935 A.2d 895, 903 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). We
may reject “conclusions of law or argumentative allegations.” Small v. Horn, 722 A.2d 664, 668
(Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). We construe pro se pleadings liberally. Hill v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
271 A.3d 569, 578 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).
6/6/23, ¶ 6.2 She claims that on two occasions, a constable warned her not to record
but that the constable and presiding judge did not similarly warn the attorneys and
police officers also present in the courtroom. Id. ¶¶ 7-10.
              In response, Colbert filed a request with the court administrator under
the Right-to-Know Law, Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
Id. ¶ 13. Colbert requested, inter alia, records addressing a judge’s authority to
prohibit (1) cell phone use by the public but not lawyers and police officers and (2)
attendees from recording a public courtroom session.                  Id.   Per Colbert, the
administrator did not provide records but referred Colbert to Pa.R.Crim.P. 112,
Pa.R.J.A. 1910, and a 2016 administrative order. Id. ¶ 14. Colbert expresses her
confusion about why lawyers and police officers were permitted to use their cell
phones. See id. ¶¶ 15-19. She notes that she appealed the response to her records
request to Hall and labels Hall’s reply as unresponsive. Id. ¶¶ 23-27.
              Apparently dissatisfied with Hall’s response, Colbert sued Hall, raising
two claims, as best as we can discern. First, Colbert raises a First Amendment claim,
U.S. Const. amend I, reasoning that the signs and the 2016 administrative order are
unconstitutional. Id. ¶ 20 (citing Phila. Bail Fund v. Arraignment Ct. Magistrate
Judges, 440 F. Supp. 3d 415 (E.D. Pa. 2020)). Second, Colbert asserts some form of
equal protection or due process claim. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21-22. Colbert reasons that
“arbitrary behavior” occurred because the lawyers and police officers ignored the
two signs, whereas the public was “forced to obey . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 21-22, 28. Colbert
“demands access to public records without threat of arrest” and “equal protection

       2
         The docket reflects that Colbert has filed a single amended petition for review although
she has labeled it a second amended petition.

                                               2
under the law for all . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 33-34.3
               Colbert requests a declaratory judgment that she was denied “free
public access” to courtroom proceedings. Id. at 11-12 (prayers for relief). In
Colbert’s view, equal protection requires that any rules or restrictions on cell phone
use be applied equally to everyone in the courtroom. Id. Similarly, she states that
“all participants and witnesses of a public courtroom proceeding” have a “First
Amendment right to record a public event.” Id. Thus, Colbert requests that future
orders ensure “the First Amendment right to record a public event . . . .” Id.4
               In response, Hall filed preliminary objections, which summarily assert
that Colbert “lacks standing, the Petition for Review fails to state valid declaratory
judgment, First Amendment, or equal protection claims, the action is barred by
sovereign immunity, [and] this Court lacks jurisdiction to interfere with a Judicial
District’s administration and cell phone usage policies or declare a Supreme Court
rule invalid, among other issues that may be raised.” Prelim. Objs., 7/3/23, ¶ 11.
                                          II. ISSUES
               Hall raises four issues. First, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider
Colbert’s claims because only our Supreme Court exercises “supervisory authority”
over “the lower courts.” Hall’s Br. at 6. Second, Colbert has no standing because

       3
          Colbert also contends that she requested a copy of the court proceedings she attended and
paid $2 to receive a compact disc. Am. Pet. for Rev. ¶ 29. Colbert claims that she was “denied
access to the public record” because the compact disc required “special software in order to
function.” Id.
        4
          We quote the relevant portions of Colbert’s prayer for relief: “First, to avert vagueness
and uphold equal protection, cell phone use will be applicable to all participants and witnesses of
a public courtroom proceeding; if lawyers and police may use them, then the posted sign of
prohibition is unnecessary. Secondly, to properly limit government to due process in the interest
of justice and the professional rules of responsibility, executive orders will remain in conformance
with state and federal Supreme Court rulings that abide by the First Amendment right to record a
public event, applicable to all participants and witnesses of a public courtroom proceeding.” Am.
Pet. for Rev., at 11-12 (prayers for relief).

                                                 3
her petition for review failed to allege future visits such that she lacks “an immediate,
concrete interest” in Hall’s administration of cell phone use. Id. at 5. Third, Colbert
fails to state a claim for declaratory relief because there is “no uncertainty about any
legal obligations between the parties.” Id. at 6. Fourth, Colbert fails to state any
First Amendment, equal protection, and due process claims. Id.
                                      III. DISCUSSION5
               In support of its preliminary objection grounded in lack of jurisdiction,
Hall argues that Colbert’s requested relief falls within the purview of our Supreme
Court. Hall’s Br. at 9. Per Hall, only our “Supreme Court and President Judge have
supervisory and administrative authority” over cell phone usage within the
courtroom. Id. Hall asserts that this Court has no authority to “interfere with a
court’s operations or override a president judge’s administrative decisions . . . .” Id.
at 10. In Hall’s view, Colbert’s claims are similar to those raised in Guarrasi v. Scott,
25 A.3d 394 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). Id. Per Hall, the Guarrasi Court similarly held it
could not exercise jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims. Id.6

       5
           Generally, “a court must decide whether it is clear from the well-pleaded facts and
reasonable inferences from those facts that the claimant has not established a right to relief.”
Yocum v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 161 A.3d 228, 233-34 (Pa. 2017) (cleaned up). “A court
considering a preliminary objection may take evidence and create a factual record, but it need not
do so if it has sufficient information to rule on the objection.” Rehab & Cmty. Providers Ass’n v.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 283 A.3d 260, 271 (Pa. 2022); see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(2).
         Hall’s preliminary objections and supporting brief did not cite to the applicable Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 1517. We construe Hall’s preliminary objection based on lack of
jurisdiction as invoking Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(1). We accept Hall’s preliminary objection based on
a lack of capacity to sue as under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(5). C.G. v. J.H., 172 A.3d 43, 54 (Pa. Super.
2017). We interpret Hall’s remaining preliminary objections as a demurrer under Pa.R.Civ.P.
1028(a)(4). See Page Publ’g, Inc. v. Hemmerich, 287 A.3d 948, 952 (Pa. Super. 2022) (interpreting
failure to plead sufficient facts for declaratory relief as a demurrer under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4)).
         6
           Colbert concisely counters, in a single sentence, that Hall’s argument misses the point.
Colbert’s Br. at 13-14. Colbert reasons that our Supreme Court properly delegated jurisdiction to
this “Court for declaratory judgments involving state actions . . . .” Id. at 13. In her view, none of
Hall’s cited caselaw is on point. Id. at 14.

                                                  4
             In Guarrasi, the petitioner sued, among others, the president judge of
the court of common pleas in his official and individual capacity, as well as other
judges. Guarrasi, 25 A.3d at 395, 397. The petitioner claimed that permitting “non-
judicial personnel to sign judges’ names to orders” was unconstitutional and that all
such orders should be void. Id. at 399. The petitioner also requested declaratory
relief in his favor. Id. at 397. The respondents filed a preliminary objection that this
Court lacked jurisdiction to “regulate who signs [such] orders or to declare prior . . .
orders void.” Id. at 400.
             In resolving this preliminary objection, the Guarrasi Court noted that
our Supreme Court has original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all cases involving
mandamus or prohibition directed to courts of inferior jurisdiction. Id. at 407. In
contrast to our Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, the Guarrasi Court stated that
“in order for Commonwealth Court to have any jurisdiction over [the court of
common pleas] there must be an appeal from that court pending before this Court.”
Id. This Court thus held that it lacked original jurisdiction to resolve the petitioner’s
request for a declaratory judgment “regulating who signs” orders from that court of
common pleas and declaring such “orders void based on the lack of an authentic
signature.” Id. at 407-08. The Guarrasi Court also dismissed the petition with
prejudice, reasoning that the defects were “incurable.” Id. at 408.
             Instantly, analogous to Guarrasi, Colbert requests a declaration from
this Court directed to Hall, President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester
County. See Am. Pet. for Rev. at 11-12 (prayers for relief). Giving Colbert the benefit
of the doubt, see Hill, 271 A.3d at 578, Colbert raises two demands: first, this Court
order Hall to permit cell phone use by everyone in the courtroom; and second, this
Court order that future orders by Hall conform “to the First Amendment right to

                                           5
record a public event,” i.e., courtroom proceedings. See Am. Pet. for Rev. at 11-12
(prayers for relief).
                To paraphrase the Guarrasi Court, there is no appeal from the Court of
Common Pleas of Chester County. See Guarrasi, 25 A.3d at 407. As in Guarrasi,
we lack original jurisdiction to resolve Colbert’s request for a declaratory judgment
regulating cell phone usage within that court. See id. We similarly lack original
jurisdiction to grant Colbert’s request that Hall’s orders conform to the First
Amendment. See id. To quote Guarrasi, our “Supreme Court, not Commonwealth
Court, has general supervisory and administrative authority over” the Court of
Common Pleas of Chester County. See id. at 408. Accordingly, we sustain Hall’s
preliminary objection grounded in jurisdiction.
                Guarrasi, however, did not address a transfer to our Supreme Court.
See generally id. Because we lack original jurisdiction, we cannot resolve Hall’s
remaining preliminary objections but must transfer the matter to our Supreme Court.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103.7

        7
           Section 5103 of the Judicial Code requires this Court to transfer a matter to the proper
tribunal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103 (“If an . . . other matter is taken to or brought in a court . . . which does
not have jurisdiction of the . . . other matter, the court . . . shall not . . . dismiss the matter, but shall
transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth . . . .”). We recognize that
our Supreme Court chastised this Court for improperly transferring a matter. Gass v. 52nd Judicial
Dist., Lebanon Cnty. (Pa., No. 118 MM 2019, filed Oct. 30, 2019) (per curiam order) (holding
“transfer was improper” as this Court’s original jurisdiction extends to suits against the courts). In
Gass, the issue was a court of common pleas’ policy barring probationers from using medical
marijuana. Gass v. 52nd Judicial Dist., Lebanon Cnty., 232 A.3d 706, 708-09 (Pa. 2020). The
Gass petitioners sought “declaratory and injunctive relief” prohibiting the court of common pleas
from “penalizing medical marijuana patients . . . .” Id. at 709. In contrast to Gass, Colbert has
requested that this Court require Hall to permit cell phone use to record courtroom proceedings.
See Am. Pet. for Rev. at 11-12 (prayers for relief). Unlike Gass, we believe that Colbert’s requested
relief falls more squarely within our Supreme Court’s “general superintendence over the courts of
this Commonwealth . . . .” Mun. Publ’ns, Inc. v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Phila. Cnty., 489 A.2d
1286, 1288 (Pa. 1985) (vacating Superior Court order that essentially reassigned a court of common
pleas judge).

                                                      6
                               IV. CONCLUSION
             For these reasons, we sustain Hall’s preliminary objection grounded in
lack of jurisdiction and transfer the matter to our Supreme Court.

                                         7
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Nancy Colbert,
                   Petitioner            :
                                         :
            v.                           :   No. 241 M.D. 2023
                                         :
President Judge John Hall, Court of      :
Common Pleas,                            :
                   Respondent            :

PER CURIAM
                                      ORDER

            AND NOW, this 5th day of April, 2024, we sustain the preliminary
objection grounded in lack of jurisdiction filed by President Judge John Hall of the
Court of Common Pleas of Chester County and transfer the matter to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103.