Court Opinion

ID: 9768628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:12:48.676806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:42.649296
License: Public Domain

Carleton Harris, Chief Justice, dissenting. The basis for the majority holding appears to be that the Odglen complaint against Hodges does not explicitly allege that negligence caused the flooding. The majority opinion does not analyze this point, but merely states that “the damages alleged could not have taken place without foresight or expectation and did not involve any negligence on the part of appellees.” Yet nowhere in the Odglen complaint is it alleged that appellees acted willfully, i.e., that appellees knew that the drainage ditch was inadequate to remove the water without flooding adjacent land. Without such specific charges, it hardly seems reasonable to presume willfulness, as the majority does, since it is improbable appellees would, in my view, have deliberately inundated the adjoining fields. The record certainly contains no support for such a presumption. The great weight of opinion with respect to exclusions such as the one at issue is that the insurer is obligated under the policy unless it is shown that the insured party intended not merely his act, but the injurious consequences of that act. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarized this rule in Eisenman v. Hornberger, 438 Pa. 46, 264 A. 2d 673: . . . “[T]he vast majority of courts which have considered such a provision have reached the conclusion that before the insurer may validly disclaim liability, it must be shown that the insured intended by his act to produce the damage which did in fact occur. Annot. 2 A.L.R. 2d 1238 (1965). We subscribe to such a view. There is a very real distinction between intending an act and intending a result and the policy exclusion addresses itself quite clearly to the latter.” In Grand River Lime Company v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 32 Ohio App. 2d 178, 289 N.E. 2d 360, 200 residents had brought a class action against a nearby manufacturer, alleging damages from nuisance and trespass caused by emissions of industrial wastes and air pollution. The manufacturer then brought the Grand River suit against its insurer to compel the insurer to defend the class action. As in the instant case, the policy insured against damages caused by “occurrences,” the latter term defined elsewhere in the policy as an “accident.” The Ohio court held that the insurer was obligated to defend under the policy, stating: “We adopt the argument as propounded by the plaintiff that the word ‘occurrence’ is much broader than the term ‘accident.’ Such proposition is well stated in Aerial Agriculture Service v. Till (N.D. Miss. 1962), 20-7 F. Supp. 50, 57: ‘To begin with, the word “occurrence,” to the lay mind, as well as to the judicial mind, has a meaning much broader than the word “accident.” As these words are generally understood, accident means something that must have come about or happened in a certain way, while occurrence means something that happened or came about in any way. Thus accident is a special type of occurrence, but occurrence goes beyond such special confines and, while including accident, it encompasses many other situations as well.’ “We further adopt the plaintiff’s proposition to the effect that while the activity which produced the alleged damage may be fully intended, and the residual results fully known, the damage itself may be completely unexpected and unintended. “As an example, the plaintiff Grand River was certainly aware of its particular manufacturing activity, and was undoubtedly aware of the residual emission of smoke, dust, etc., but yet it is quite questionable whether Grand River expected or intended the damaging results to the property owners, at least in the sense that the policy uses such terms.” Actually, I consider that some of the cases cited by the majority support my view, but at any rate, it is apparent that I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.1    While it has no probative value in the question before us, it is interesting to note that the trial court found for defendants (including appellees) in this case and dismissed the complaint of Odglen.