Court Opinion

ID: 9766337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:42:12.859771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:20.830604
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
Appellant challenges his conviction for violating § 6106 of the Uniform Firearms Act1 *on several grounds: that the evidence was insufficient to prove possession of the pistol; that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving absence of license; that the lower court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence, that the pistol should have been suppressed as the “fruit” of his illegal arrest; and that his trial counsel was ineffective.
Pursuant to a search warrant, Montgomery County and Upper Merion police conducted a search of Room 258 in Stouffer’s Motor Inn, King of Prussia, on July 14, 1974. The police believed that the occupant of the room, Rocco Auriemma, a known drug dealer, was in possession of narcotics. While the police were searching the room, the appellant, Joseph Dever, and Kenneth Tuzzi knocked on the door. The officers, all in plain clothes, *96went to the door; one officer, Officer Ferlick, opened it and stated “Police, come in.” Officer Ferlick testified that the appellant then “picked up his arms and shoved me slightly. And then he took several steps backwards. And it appeared to me as if he were trying to run or prepare to run to get away or flee.” The police immediately pursued and during the ensuing scuffle, a loaded .45 caliber automatic pistol dropped from the appellant’s waist area to the floor.
The appellant was indicted for a violation of § 6106 of the Uniform Firearms Act on October 29, 1974, and his trial was scheduled for January 22, 1975. On January 6, 1975, the Commonwealth filed a petition for extension of time for commencing trial pursuant to Rule 1100(c), Pa. R.Crim.P., alleging that it was unable to bring the appellant to trial within the 180 day period (before January 13, 1975) despite due diligence. A hearing on the petition was set for January 31, 1975. On January 13,1975, the appellant filed a motion to suppress, contending that the pistol was the “fruit” of an illegal arrest. On January 15, 1975, appellant’s motion was dismissed as untimely filed. Appellant’s case was called to trial on January 27, 1975. At that time, the appellant’s counsel waived all objections to the Commonwealth’s petition to extend in return for the Commonwealth’s waiver of its timeliness objection to appellant’s suppression motion. The lower court then heard and denied appellant’s suppression motion. Appellant was tried on January 28-29, 1975, and was found guilty by a jury. Post-trial motions were filed and denied on May 5, 1975. On May 16, 1975, appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one to five years. This appeal followed.
Appellant first contends that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the pistol. “In determining whether the evidence is sufficient in law to prove that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable *97doubt of the crime or crimes charged, we must, after a verdict of guilty, accept as true all of the evidence, direct or circumstantial, and all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence, upon which the trier of facts could properly have based the verdict. Commonwealth v. Malone, 444 Pa. 397, 281 A.2d 866 (1971); Commonwealth v. Petrisko, 442 Pa. 575, 275 A.2d 46 (1971).” Commonwealth v. Fortune, 456 Pa. 365, 367, 318 A.2d 327, 328 (1974). See also Commonwealth v. DiSilvio, 232 Pa.Super. 386, 335 A.2d 785 (1975); Commonwealth v. Carter, 230 Pa.Super. 236, 326 A.2d 480 (1974).
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence which established that the pistol was found on the floor of the area in which the officers and appellant scuffled. Each officer testified that the gun was not his and that the appellant was the only other person in the area of the scuffle. Furthermore, one of the officers, Detective Hill-born, testified that he saw “a 45 automatic pistol fall from the waist area of the defendant, Joseph Dever, and land on the floor.” This evidence, was believed by the jury and was, therefore, clearly sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
Relying on Commonwealth v. McNeil, 461 Pa. 709, 337 A.2d 840 (1975), appellant also contends that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving that he did not have a license for the pistol. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 461 Pa.Super. 327, 346 A.2d 308 (1975), (HOFFMAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SPAETH, J., joined), we held that McNeil will be given only prospective application. Because appellant was convicted prior to our Supreme Court’s decision in McNeil, his argument is without merit.2
Relying on Commonwealth v. Reece, 437 Pa. 422, 263 A.2d 463 (1970), the appellant next asserts that the police officers acted without probable cause when they ar*98rested him, and therefore, that the pistol should have been suppressed as the fruit of the illegal arrest.
In Reece, the police secured a warrant to search an apartment where a “pot party” was supposed to be held. A thorough search of the apartment revealed only a minute residue of amphetamine powder. During the course of the evening, all the people, including the appellant, who arrived at the apartment were immediately searched by the police. The search of the appellant produced a small quantity of marijuana, and the appellant was subsequently convicted of possession.
In reversing appellant’s conviction, our Supreme Court stated: “In our view the arresting officer lacked the required ‘probable cause’ to make the arrest in this case, and hence, the incidental search of Reece’s clothing and person was likewise unlawful.
“The arresting officer had no information whatsoever about Reece before he entered the apartment involved. There was nothing about his demeanor or conduct which would in any way suggest that he was ‘on drugs’, or that he had drugs in his possession; in reality, the only possible basis for the arrest was his appearance on the scene where a ‘pot party’ was expected to occur.” Commonwealth v. Reece, supra at 426, 427, 263 A.2d at 465. (Footnote omitted).
I believe that the instant case is controlled by Reece. Here, as in Reece, the only possible basis for the arrest was the appellant’s appearance at the motel room. The police had no information about him, nor did his demean- or or conduct in any way implicate him in any crime. “The inference that persons who talk to narcotic addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an intrusion by the police upon an individual’s personal security.” Commonwealth v. Reece, supra at 428, 263 A.2d at 466, quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, *9962, 63, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1902, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). (Emphasis omitted). Furthermore, what the lower court characterizes as appellant’s “apparent attempt to flee”, cannot supply probable cause to arrest. Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 454 Pa. 320, 311 A.2d 914 (1973). Finally, even the Majority admits that the appellant’s “slight shove” of Officer Ferlick under the circumstances of this case does not constitute probable cause to arrest.3 The Majority argues, however, that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), enabled the officers to adopt an intermediate response: “Under these circumstances, the police were justified in believing that criminal activity was afoot and their detention of appellant as well as the protective search of him was clearly reasonable.” I need not reach this issue, however, because the officers did not adopt this intermediate response. Rather, Officer Ferlick immediately grabbed the appellant in a bear hug and a struggle ensued. At this point, the appellant was clearly under arrest and whether the officers could have stopped and frisked the appellant need not be determined. Thus, the appellant’s arrest was illegal and the gun must be suppressed as the “fruit” of the illegal arrest.
Finally, the appellant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he waived all objections to the Commonwealth’s petition for extension of time for commencing trial.4 Specifically, the appellant argues that his counsel waived the objections to the Commonwealth’s petition only because of his prior negligence in failing to *100file timely suppression motions. Thus, appellant argues that counsel’s prior negligence deprived him of the opportunity to challenge the Commonwealth’s petition.
The standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel is well-established: “Our task in cases of this nature therefore encompasses both an independent review of the record, see Commonwealth ex rel. Sprangle v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 589, 225 A.2d 236 (1967), and an examination of counsel’s stewardship of the now challenged proceedings in light of the available alternatives. Perhaps Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 38 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978, 83 S.Ct. 1110, 10 L.Ed.2d 143 (1963), best describes this necessary process: 'Facts are alleged from which it would appear that these potential defenses would have suggested themselves to a reasonably diligent trial counsel. The defense actually tendered was so insubstantial in relation to those not offered as to cast doubt upon the hypothesis that trial counsel made a deliberate informed choice.’ We cannot emphasize strongly enough, however, that our inquiry ceases and counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. The test is not whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing a hindsight evaluation of the record. Although weigh the alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel’s decisions had any reasonable basis.” Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352 (1967). (Footnotes omitted).
Appellant’s contention is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because the Commonwealth’s petition to extend went unchallenged. It is clear that trial counsel waived his objections to the Commonwealth’s petition in order to preserve his right to make the suppression motion. But for counsel’s failure to file a timely, *101meritorious suppression motion, however, he would have been able to challenge the Commonwealth’s petition to extend. While there is a prima facie case of ineffectiveness in the record, “[cjounsel will not be declared ineffective for failure to file a motion that he could reasonably have regarded as pro forma.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 231 Pa.Super. 371, 376, 331 A.2d 777, 780 (1974). Cf. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 334 A.2d 610 (1975). (Counsel not held ineffective for failure to file a futile motion).
The record in the instant case does not contain the basis for the Commonwealth’s petition to extend. Because I cannot decide that issue, I would remand for an evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975).
I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CERCONE and SPAETH, JJ., join in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1; 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106.

. Commonwealth v. McNeil, supra, was filed on May 13, 1975.

. The recitation of facts in both the lower court’s opinion and the appellant’s brief omits any reference to the appellant’s “slight shove” of Officer Ferlick. Rather, both rely on the appellant’s presence at the scene and his attempted flight to justify the arrest.

. The issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is properly before this Court because appellate counsel did not represent appellant at trial, and the alleged ineffectiveness is apparent in the record. See Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975).