Court Opinion

ID: 9649836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:10:43.420041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:29.982207
License: Public Domain

FICKLING, Associate Judge,
with whom KELLY, Associate Judge, joins, dissenting:
The majority holds today that the trial judge properly instructed the jury that It must return a guilty verdict if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which constituted the essential elements of the crime charged.1 I must respectfully disagree. In my view, this peremptory command, equivalent to a directed verdict, seriously invaded the province and prerogatives of the jury, thereby undermining appellant’s constitutional right to a jury trial.
*713The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal defendant shall have the right to a trial by an impartial jury. A fundamental principle implicit in this guarantee is that a trial court may never instruct a jury to convict. United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947); Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138, 41 S.Ct. 53, 65 L.Ed. 185 (1920); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105, 106, 15 S.Ct. 273, 39 L.Ed. 343 (1895). A judge cannot direct a verdict of guilty through the use of the words “must” or “required,” even in the face of undisputed and uncontradicted facts, United States v. Gollin, 166 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875, 68 S.Ct. 905, 92 L. Ed. 1151 (1948); Dinger v. United States, 28 F.2d 548, 550 (8th Cir. 1928), and even though the evidence points conclusively towards guilt. Edwards v. United States, 286 F.2d 681, 683 (5th Cir. 1960); Loomis v. United States, 61 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1932); Cain v. United States, 19 F.2d 472, 475 (8th Cir. 1927). Moreover, a judge cannot partially direct a guilty verdict. Mims v. United States, 375 F.2d 135, 148 (5th Cir. 1967).
In the instant case, I can only conclude that the trial judge directed the verdict through his use of the word “must.” No particular incantation by a judge is necessary to conclude that a verdict has been directed. As Judge Tamm stated in United States v. Hayward, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 302, 420 F.2d 142, 144 (1969):
While the judge in this case did not direct a verdict of guilty in form, that is the substantive effect of the instruction given. The rule against directed verdicts of guilt includes perforce situations in which the judge’s instructions fall short of directing a guilty verdict but which nevertheless have the effect of so doing by eliminating other relevant considerations if the jury finds one fact to be true. .
It is clear that the use of the peremptory word “must” has a mandatory and coercive effect on a jury. The word itself constitutes a command which eliminates all options and discretion. I have no doubt that a reasonable juror would conclude that the court is directing a verdict of not guilty, when the trial judge tells that jury that it must acquit the defendant if the government has not proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the same reasonable juror would not conclude that the court is also directing a verdict of guilty, by its use of the same word “must,” if the government proves its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the compelling, coercive effect of the command is heightened by the fact that it is voiced by a judge. “[T]he influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and . . . his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling.” Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626, 14 S.Ct. 919, 38 L. Ed. 841 (1894). Stated another way, “[a] judge’s charge is reverentially received by the average jury, be it delivered extemporaneously or carefully scripted.” United States v. Driscoll, 454 F.2d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 1972). Accordingly, the use of this strong command in the context of jury instructions concerning an accused’s guilt has met with disapproval. Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 184 F.2d 394 (1950);2 accord, United States v. *714Cunningham, 423 F.2d 1269, 1277 (4th Cir. 1970); Cain v. United States, supra at 475.3
The trial judge’s highly objectionable peremptory instructions invaded the province of the jury in two separate but related ways. In so commanding the jury, the trial judge usurped two fundamental jury prerogatives, thereby upsetting the delicate balance 4 existing between the independent functions of the judge and jury.
I.
First, it is fundamental that in a criminal jury trial, it is the exclusive function of the jury to decide all questions of fact and the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. Cooper v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 345, 218 F.2d 39, 41 (1954); accord, United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685, 693-94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 949, 96 S.Ct. 368, 46 L.Ed.2d 284 (1975). The classical practice is that the judge delivers the applicable law of the case, defining and explaining the offense charged against the defendant, and the jury, thus being informed as to the exact law, places its determination of the facts alongside the law and reports in open court in a single verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty.” When fulfilling this vital function of rendering a verdict, “[t]he jury must not be reduced to the position of a mere ministerial agent by a direction on their very thought.” Morris v. United States, 156 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1946). In Morris, the court went on to state:
“The jury is in no sense the agent of the judge. They both derive their origin from the same high source, and the judge in laying down rules to guide the jury in their deliberations, merely acts as the mouthpiece of the law for the purpose of marking out a definite and clearly ascertained path by which the ends of justice are attained.” . . . [T]he composite decision of law and fact is thus rendered by the jury after they have been duly instructed. Their verdict is but a reflection of such action. [Id. at 531; citations omitted; emphasis in original.]
In the instant case, the trial judge usurped this traditional function of the jury by instructing that a guilty verdict must be rendered if certain facts were found beyond a reasonable doubt. By virtue of this peremptory command, the jury was relegated to the role of the judge’s agent. Likewise, the rendering of a guilty verdict became merely a ministerial act upon the finding of certain facts.
The courts have severely criticized this sort of direct control by the judge over the *715jury verdict in the closely analogous situation of special verdicts. In federal criminal practice, submission of a form calling for a special verdict or special interrogatories from the jury has been held to be error. See, e. g., United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 419 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Adcock, 447 F.2d 1337, 1339 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939, 92 S.Ct. 278, 30 L.Ed.2d 252 (1971); United States v. James, 432 F.2d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 906, 91 S. Ct. 2214, 29 L.Ed.2d 682 (1971); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-85 (1st Cir. 1969); Gray v. United States, 174 F. 2d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 848, 70 S.Ct. 90, 94 L.Ed. 519 (1949). In 2 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal, ch. 7, § 512 at 364, it is said:
In the Civil Rules provision is made for the use of special verdicts or of a general verdict accompanied by special interrogatories. There is no such provision in the Criminal Rules, and the submission of a form calling for a special verdict by a jury in a criminal case has been held to be error. “In such trials the practice has been settled time out of mind to charge but one crime in one count, to accept but one general plea to it and to call upon the jury to make but one general response, guilty or not guilty.” Special verdicts might be acceptable if the only duty of the jury were to find the facts, leaving it to the court to apply the law. In criminal cases, however, it has always been the function of the jury to apply the law, as given by the court in its charge, to the facts. . . . [Footnotes and citations omitted.]
In setting forth the reasons for his dislike of special verdicts, then-Chief Judge Aldrich stated in United States v. Spock, supra at 181-82:
In the exercise of its functions not only must the jury be free from direct control in its verdict, but it must be free from judicial pressure, both contemporaneous and subsequent. . . . Both have been said to result from the submission of special questions. . . .

We are less concerned by the jury’s possible fear of subsequent criticism with respect to special findings than we are with the subtle, and perhaps open, direct effect that answering special questions may have upon the jury’s ultimate conclusion. There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict of guilty than to approach it step by step. A juror, wishing to acquit, may be formally catechized. By a progression of questions each of which seems to require an answer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted. The result may be accomplished by a majority of the jury, but the course has been initiated by the judge, and directed by him through the frame of the questions. [Citations omitted.]
Moreover, in United States v. Noble, 155 F.2d 315, 317-18 (3d Cir. 1946), the court stated:
If the jury’s only duty was by a special verdict to answer interrogatories as to the existence of certain facts and to leave to the judge the application of the law to the facts thus found it might have been sufficient merely to give them a copy of the information for their guidance in performing this duty. But the jury in the present case had a much greater duty than this. They were called upon to determine by a general verdict not only whether the defendant did certain acts which he was alleged to have done but also whether the doing of those acts amounted to the commission of the crime against the United States with which he was charged. In making that determination it was necessary for them to apply the law to the facts as they found them to be. .. . [Emphasis added.]
*716The link between special verdicts and the type of instruction given in the instant case is clear. In both cases, the jury is called on to find facts, but the application of these facts to the law is reserved for the judge. The trial judge’s peremptory command to return a guilty verdict, if certain facts were found beyond a reasonable doubt, operated like a special verdict, thereby constituting an impermissible level of direct control over the jury verdict. Like a special verdict, the mandatory instruction to convict poses the additional dangers of excessive judicial pressure and jury catechizing.
The majority attempts to dispel any notion of jury coercion by arguing that the peremptory instructions cannot be viewed in isolation. Rather, the majority states that all the instructions must be analyzed in their totality. Specifically, the majority notes that “[t]he jury repeatedly was reminded that it had the sole power to determine the verdicts, and was told that it should disregard any intimated or expressed opinion of the trial judge.” The majority also points out that the jury received instructions regarding the presumption of innocence and the government’s duty to prove each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
My response is twofold. First, I agree that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). However, in utilizing this contextual approach, a conviction cannot stand if one part of the charge overwhelms the fairness and efficacy of the entire charge. United States v. Driscoll, supra at 796. In the instant case, the overwhelmingly coercive effect of the peremptory instructions was not neutralized by the remaining instructions. Second, the irreconcilable inconsistency between the two key instructions is fatal. On the one hand, the jury is told that it must find appellant guilty if certain facts are found beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, the jury was informed that the verdict was its “sole and exclusive duty and responsibility.” Certainly such a patent contradiction leads only to confusion in the jury’s deliberations.
II.
Aside from usurping the jury’s exclusive power to render its own verdict after applying the law to the facts, the trial judge’s peremptory instructions invaded another separate but related prerogative of the jury — that of jury nullification. Jury nullification is that unreviewable power of the jury to bring in a verdict of not guilty “in the teeth of both law and facts.” Horning v. District of Columbia, supra, 254 U.S. at 138, 41 S.Ct. at 54. This jury prerogative is embodied in the jury’s power to issue a general verdict of not guilty which is irreversible by the court and which does not reveal the jury’s rationale. United States v. Dougherty, 154 U.S.App. D.C. 76, 93, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (1972).
In the instant case, the trial judge’s peremptory command to return a guilty verdict if certain facts were found 'beyond a reasonable doubt, effectively foreclosed the exercise of the jury nullification prerogative. In effect, the trial judge affirmatively and authoritatively told the jury that such a power did not exist. As such, this was an erroneous statement of the law.
At the outset, it is important to recognize that the trial judge was not simply neutral on the question of nullification. By his emphatic command, the trial judge effectively negated the possibility in the jury’s mind. In its attempt to sugarcoat an otherwise unpalatable pill, the majority glibly concedes the existence of the jury nullification power, but states that “we do not feel its exercise should be encouraged.” The trial judge, of course, took a quantum leap beyond merely withholding encouragement. Rather, he affirmatively foreclosed any possibility of the exercise of the power in the minds of the jury.
*717I agree with the cases in this jurisdiction and across the country which have held that it is not error to refuse to instruct the jury that it, in fact, possesses such a power. Arshack v. United States, D.C.App., 321 A.2d 845, 849-52 (1974); accord, United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106-07 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dougherty, supra, 154 U.S.App.D.C. at 93-100, 473 F.2d at 1130-37; United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 1443, 35 L.Ed. 2d 706 (1973); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991, 90 S.Ct. 1124, 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1005-07 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910, 90 S.Ct. 908, 25 L.Ed.2d 91 (1970). A jury should exercise this power only on rare occasions, and, accordingly, I agree that the jury is sufficiently apprised of its option through the various formal and informal channels which have existed up to now. See United States v. Dougherty, supra, 154 U.S.App.D.C. at 98, 473 F.2d at 1135. Moreover, I agree that although the jury has the power to bring in a verdict “in the teeth of both law and facts,” it is surely not impermissible for the court to urge or encourage the jury not to do so provided the court does not coerce or command a guilty verdict. See United States v. Marchese, 438 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1971).
The majority holds today, however, that the trial judge can affirmatively inform the jury that no such power exists, that is, that it must return a guilty verdict if it finds certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt. I view such a holding as dangerous and unwarranted. It impinges on the very essence of the jury’s role as one of the spokesmen for the community conscience in determining whether blame can be imposed. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968).
For all of the foregoing reasons, I strongly dissent from the majority’s sanction of the instruction given in the case at bar. The use of the peremptory phrase “must find guilty” is equivalent to a directed verdict and seriously invades fundamental powers and prerogatives of the jury. Although this instruction may well increase the conviction rate in our trial courts, it can only do so at the expense of the constitutional right to a jury trial.
I would note finally that although the majority finds no error in the “must convict” instruction given below,5 it proceeds to endorse the following modification of Criminal Jury Instruction No. 2.08.
If you find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense with which the defendant is charged, it is your duty to find him guilty. On the other hand, if you find that the government has failed to prove any element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Without addressing the merits of this particular modification, I would note only that I see no need to change the existing instruction. New procedures and innovations in criminal procedures should be adopted only with great hesitation. See United States v. Spock, supra at 183. This is especially true where the innovation may well impinge on fundamental rights of the accused.

. The trial judge used the word “must” on three separate occasions in his instructions to the jury.
Instruction No. 2 charged the jury that “if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that on December the 24th, 1972, in the District of Columbia, the defendant, Stanley Watts, did enter the sleeping dwelling of Cynthia D. Celey, [that] said dwelling was occupied at the time, and that at the time of the entry the defendant possessed the specific intent to commit an assault upon Cynthia D. Celey, then you must find the defendant guilty of burglary in the first degree.” (Emphasis added.)
Instructions 5 and 6, which dealt with the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon against both Celey and Inabinet, also charged the jury that if it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts to be as charged, then it “must find the defendant guilty.” (Emphasis added.)

. In Billeci, supra at 279, 184 F.2d at 399, the trial judge gave the following instructions in an attempt to secure a unanimous verdict from a deadlocked jury:
If you believe from the testimony that the defendants have committed the crime of which they are charged, then you must find a verdict of guilty, irrespective of whether the witnesses appealed to you or not. On the other hand, if you do not believe that the defendants have committed the crime of which they are charged, then you must find a verdict of not guilty.
You must confine yourselves strictly to the question and ask yourself honestly, “Do I believe from the evidence I have heard at this trial that the defendants have committed this crime?” If you answer the *714question “Yes,” you must find the defendants guilty. If your answer is “No,” then you must find them not guilty. [Emphasis added.]
In holding that these instructions were erroneous, Judge Prettyman stated:
That statement is not the law. The law is that if the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the alleged offense it should find a verdict of guilty, but if there be a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors they must acquit. . ..[Emphasis added.]
Contrary to the majority’s view, the Billed court focused equally on the two erroneous aspects of the instruction: vie., the omission of the “reasonable doubt” standard and the use of the word “must.” The majority chooses to disregard the erroneous use of “must,” finding that there is only a subtle distinction between the words “should” and “must.” I must disagree with such a selective reading of the case. Moreover, I find the distinction between “should” and “must” obvious and vitally important.

. Contrary to the majority’s view, the giving of an instruction that amounts to a directed verdict is “plain error.” United States v. Musgrave, 444 F.2d 755, 762 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ragsdale, 438 F.2d 21, 27 (5th Cir. 1971); Mims v. United States, supra at 148.

. The majority speaks of the need for a “meaningful degree of instructional equipoise” to guide juries in arriving at their verdicts. In my view, however, this approach destroys the delicate balance (or equipoise, if you will) which has traditionally existed between the separate functions of the judge and jury.

. Since the majority finds that it was not error, much less plain error, to give this peremptory instruction, I assume that trial courts in the future may continue to use the “must convict” language.