Court Opinion

ID: 9487348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:14:22.202164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:13.250816
License: Public Domain

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant, Jose Manuel Leon-Leon was convicted of being an alien who, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, reentered the United States without permission after having been deported.
Appellant’s 1988 deportation hearing was held by telephone. Appellant and his attorney were at the INS office in Tucson, Arizona and the Immigration Judge was presiding in Phoenix. There is no evidence in the record to show that Leon-Leon waived his right to be physically present at the hearing. See Purba v. Immigration & Naturalization Svc., 884 F.2d 516, 518 (9th Cir.1989) (parties must consent to telephonic hearings).
Since the appellant did not speak English, a court interpreter was present in Phoenix. The only questions translated into Spanish related to the appellant’s name, whether he spoke Spanish and whether Fernando Gaxio-la was his attorney. Leon-Leon responded affirmatively in Spanish to each of these questions.
After clarifying these preliminary matters, the court then asked Leon-Leon’s attorney, in a single, compound question, whether the appellant would waive the seven day rule with respect to the date of the telephonic hearing, admit service of the order to show cause on the appellant, waive the reading of appellant’s rights, waive the reading of the order to show cause, admit the factual allegations in the order to show cause, admit that appellant was deportable, and designate Mexico as the appellant’s country of origin. The attorney agreed.
This question was not addressed to the appellant or even translated into Spanish. Not only was the appellant unable to participate meaningfully, he could not even follow along as his attorney waived his rights. See Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization Svc., 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982) (this court has repeatedly recognized the importance of an interpreter to the fundamental fairness of a deportation hearing; it was improper for the Immigration Judge to deny simultaneous translation when the interpreter was present at the hearing).
Under these circumstances, the appellant’s due process rights were violated. There was insufficient evidence to show that he waived his right to be physically present at his deportation hearing. Moreover, no meaningful translation of the hearing was provided.
Despite these violations, the government, relying on United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc), argues that the 1988 deportation order may still be used to prove that the appellant violated § 1326 unless the appellant shows that he suffered prejudice from the due process violations. If the appellant cannot show prejudice, the government argues, the due process violations amount to harmless error. The government errs in its analysis. First, the government vastly overstates this court’s holding in Proa-Tovar. Second, a harmless error analysis cannot be applied in this case.
A. United States v. Proa-Tovar
In November 1989, Proa-Tovar was charged with violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. *1434At trial, he sought to exclude his prior deportation order arguing that his due process rights were violated in the deportation hearing since he was not properly advised of, and had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a direct appeal of those proceedings.. The government conceded that Proa-Tovar’s waiver of his right to a direct appeal was not knowing and intelligent. The government argued, however, that he was nonetheless deportable because he showed no prejudice resulting from the violation. The district court denied Proa-Tovar’s motion to dismiss and the jury found him guilty.
On appeal, this court held that when “an alien is deprived of the right to direct judicial review of a deportation order but the deprivation does not result in any prejudice,” evidence of that order need not be excluded in a later prosecution for illegal reentry. 975 F.2d at 594.
The court noted that it was well-established that an appellant must demonstrate prejudice when a collateral attack is made on an immigration order during § 1326 prosecutions. Relying on United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987), the court extended this rule to an attack made “on the ground that there has been a deprivation of the right to direct appeal of the administrative proceedings.” 975 F.2d at 595 (emphasis added).
The en banc court specifically noted that the issue before it was “narrow and straightforward.” 975 F.2d at 594. The court decided that prejudice must be shown when an alien attacks a deportation order on the ground that he was deprived of the right to a direct appeal of the deportation hearing. The court in Proa-Tovar did not hold, as the government implies, that whenever there is a due process violation in a deportation hearing, no matter how egregious, the alien must always prove prejudice in order to preclude subsequent use of the deportation order in a § 1326 case. Proa-Tovar addressed only the denial of the right to direct appeal.
B. Harmless Error
The government also argues that, if an alien is clearly deportable and cannot show prejudice, it was harmless error that his deportation hearing violated due process.
In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264-65, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), the Supreme Court held that structural defects in a trial are not subject to a harmless error standard.1 However, trial errors — those that occur “during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” — are subject to such an standard. 499 U.S. at 307-08, 111 S.Ct. at 1264.
In this case, the appellant’s deportation hearing was held by phone without any evidence that he consented to not being physically present. Other than the preliminary questions; the judge’s questions were not translated into Spanish, making it impossible for the appellant to participate or even understand what was happening. These were structural defects that affected the very framework within which the hearing proceeded.
In Fulminante, the Court listed other errors that are structural in nature and not subject to the harmless error standard. These include excluding members of the defendant’s own race from a grand jury, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986); denial of the right to represent one’s self at trial, McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984); and denial of the right to a public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). The Court noted that each of these affects the framework within which the trial proceeds. 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. at 1265. “Without these basic protections, a criminal *1435trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. at 1265. Structural errors defy analysis by the harmless error standard because they affect the very reliability of the proceedings.
In this case, the error at issue affected the “entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end.” 499 U.S. at 309, 111 S.Ct. at 1265. Leon-Leon was tried and deported without any translation of the proceedings. He was helpless to defend himself. Without being able to understand the proceedings and aid in his own defense, the hearing could not reliably determine Leon-Leoris deportability-
The error in Leon-Leon’s proceeding was not so discreet such that this court may set aside its effect and examine all other relevant evidence and determine whether the error was harmless. The error permeates the hearing itself. If this is set aside, the court has nothing left to examine. Such is the nature of a structural defect.
This court may not use a harmless error analysis to determine whether the appellant suffered prejudice as a result of the due process violation. Proa-Tovar does not require it and, indeed, Fulminante precludes such an analysis because appellant’s hearing was structurally defective. Thus, the deportation order should not have been used to prove an element of appellant’s § 1326 violation and the conviction should be reversed.

. Fulminante was a criminal case while deportation cases are civil. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 703, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 1018, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893) (deportation is not criminal punishment). However, in this case the govemment is seeking to use the deportation order to prove an element of a criminal offense against Leon-Leon, i.e. that he illegally reentered this country after being deported. Therefore, Fulmi-nante ’s safeguards are applicable to this case.