Court Opinion

ID: 9811340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:17:49.336486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:41.318570
License: Public Domain

SUE WALKER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Affording almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts that are supported by the record and to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Officer Galloway did not possess reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying his investigatory stop of Lopez. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s order granting Lopez’s motion to suppress.
The law is well-settled that an officer’s investigative detention of a suspect based on reasonable, articulable facts that an offense has been or is being committed does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as: (1) the officer’s action was justified at its inception; and (2) the officer’s action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Under the first prong, “the police *591officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 242 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880). The facts must be viewed together, and those facts that do not show reasonable suspicion in isolation may do so when combined with other facts. Jones v. State, 926 S.W.2d 386, 388-89 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd) (op. on reh’g). Additionally, an officer’s experience may be considered when determining if the officer had a basis for reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative detention. Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).
A trial court’s granting of a motion to suppress is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). Under this standard of review, we afford almost total deference to a trial court’s determination of the historical facts that the record supports, especially when the trial court’s fact findings are based upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
Officer Galloway responded to a burglary call relating to painting equipment taken from the back of a vehicle parked on the street in front of complainants’ residence. Officer Galloway explained that the street running by the front of complainants’ home was a narrow asphalt road. He explained, “It’s considered two lanes, but it’s a very small roadway. And just directly in front of the residence is — is a turn, a bend in the road.” He admitted that it would not be unusual for drivers to slow in front of complainants’ residence as they approached the curve. As Officer Galloway stood in front of complainants’ residence speaking with them about the burglary, the trio observed Lopez drive slowly down the street in front of complainants’ home. The complainants told Officer Galloway that they had observed that same truck drive by several times earlier in the evening.1 The complainants did not see who had burglarized their property, did not identify Lopez as the burglar, and did not identify Lopez’s truck as the automobile used in the burglary. Nonetheless, Officer Galloway decided to stop Lopez’s vehicle by running into the street and flagging him over. When asked to explain why he detained Lopez, Officer Galloway responded,
More or less it was an investigatory detention. We — I was stopping them to ask them questions, where they had been that evening, pertaining to the theft to see if — maybe if they had been involved with that. I was trying to investigate the theft based on the complainants’ suspicions that maybe they were involved.
When we saw them, they were also driving very slowly through the neighborhood. Of course, at that time I didn’t know that they lived there or anywhere close. And it was just suspicious activity, I felt like, with thefts — or a recent burglary in the area. [Emphasis added].
On redirect examination Officer Galloway testified:
Q. Do you have any experience in your — in your training with the police academy, or whatever, whereever [sic] it may come from, with defendants re*592turning to — suspects, that is — returning to the scene of a crime?
A. Well with the unit that I’m currently assigned to, a burglary unit, we find that that happens, yes, the scene of an area. .If they find particular equipment or anything that they’ve stolen, they’ll return and try to—
Q. So you’ve found that to be common in your training?
A. Some — yeah. Yes, ma’am. Some criminals have that M.O., yes, ma’am.
At the time of Lopez’s stop, Officer Galloway had been employed as a police officer by the city of Fort Worth for fifteen months. He was “vaguely familiar” with the area and had been working in that district for approximately two months.
The majority holds that Officer Galloway’s two months’ experience in the area and fifteen months’ experience as a police officer, the fact that complainants reported that Lopez had driven by several times earlier in the evening, and Officer Galloway’s training that “some” burglars drive by a successful burglary crime scene constitute reasonable articulable facts so compelling that the trial court abused its discretion and misapplied the law by holding to the contrary. I cannot agree. Applying the required deferential standard of review to the record before us, the trial court could reasonably have determined that Officer Galloway stopped Lopez’s vehicle as he testified, simply to investigate complainants’ suspicions, not because he possessed reasonable articulable suspicion that Lopez had committed the burglary. Additionally, the trial court could reasonably have determined that Officer Galloway’s testimony that “some” criminals return to the crime scene was global and did not support any reasonable inference of criminal activity by Lopez. The trial court could reasonably have determined that driving slowly down a poorly lit street while approaching a curve did not constitute activity out of the ordinary related to a crime. In short, I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in holding that Officer Galloway failed to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted his stop of Lopez. See, e.g., Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 242-43. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s order granting Lopez’s motion to suppress.

. Officer Galloway subsequently learned that Lopez lived in the neighborhood on a nearby street.