Court Opinion

ID: 9400594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 16:10:05.810754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:46.511033
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-1905.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                    RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO                                     JUDGES:
                                                  Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
        Plaintiff-Appellee                        Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                                  Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs-
                                                  Case No. 2023 CA 0001
CHARLES JOHNSON

        Defendant-Appellant                       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                       Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
                                               Pleas, Case No. 2015 CR 0432

JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        June 7, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant

GARY BISHOP                                    CHARLES JOHNSON
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY                           PRO SE
ASHLEY HAWKINS                                 P. O. Box 1812
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR                           Marion, Ohio 43302
38 South Park Street, Second Floor
Mansfield, Ohio 44902
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0001                                                   2

Wise, J.

         {¶1}   Appellant Charles Johnson appeals his conviction and sentence on one

count of felonious assault and one count of aggravated burglary entered in the Richland

County Common Pleas Court September 16, 2015, following a jury trial.

         {¶2}   Appellee is the state of Ohio.

         {¶3}   This case is before this Court on the accelerated calendar which is

governed by App.R. 11.1. Subsection (E), Determination and Judgment on Appeal,

provides in pertinent part: “The appeal will be determined as provided by App.R. 11.1. It

shall be sufficient compliance with App.R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason for the

court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary form.”

         {¶4}   One of the most important purposes of the accelerated calendar is to enable

an appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision more quickly than in a case

on the regular calendar where the briefs, facts, and legal issues are more complicated.

Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn., 11 Ohio App.3d 158, 463 N.E.2d 655 (10th

Dist.1983).

         {¶5}   This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned

rules.

                            STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

         {¶6}   For purposes of this Opinion, the relevant facts and procedural history are

as follows:

         {¶7}   Appellant Charles Johnson was married to Amanda Hatfield. In November

of 2014, Hatfield moved out of the home she shared with Appellant because Appellant

was romantically involved with Stephanie Carter. Hatfield alternated between staying with
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0001                                                    3

her mother and staying with Russell Breinich, II. Breinich lived in a home Hatfield had

purchased several years earlier, when she was previously dating Breinich.

       {¶8}   In March of 2015, Carter moved in with Appellant.

       {¶9}   During the afternoon of April 24, 2015, Appellant and Carter went to visit

Breinich, who was also a friend of Appellant. Hatfield was there, and the group hung out

at the home until about 6:00 p.m. Appellant and Carter then went to the home of another

friend, while Hatfield and Breinich went to a local bar. Appellant and Carter arrived at the

same bar at about 8:00 p.m. Breinich and Hatfield finished their beers and went home.

Before going to bed, Breinich wedged a wooden board against the front door, as the door

did not lock from the inside.

       {¶10} Appellant and Carter returned to a friend's house at about 10:00 p.m. They

left less than thirty minutes later, and Carter believed they were returning home. However,

Appellant stopped at Breinich's house to see if he wanted to have a few drinks. As Carter

sat inside the truck, she saw Appellant knock at both the front door and a side door that

led to a carport. Hatfield, hearing the pounding at the door, woke up Breinich. Appellant

kicked open the front door, punched Breinich in the face, and knocked Breinich

unconscious. Appellant straddled Breinich and continued punching him in the head while

yelling, “Do you like fucking my wife?” (T. at 146, 171). Hatfield jumped on Appellant's

back and attempted to pull him off Breinich. Carter ran from Appellant's truck, screaming

at Appellant to stop.

       {¶11} Appellant climbed off Breinich and drove back to his friend Chris Smith's

house. Carter chose to walk, rather than ride in the truck with Appellant. At Smith's house,

Appellant washed his hands and face, took off his blood-stained sweatshirt, and asked
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0001                                                  4

one of the people at the house to get rid of his sweatshirt. He and Carter then drove to

their home.

         {¶12} Meanwhile, Hatfield called Chris Smith for help because Breinich did not

want her to call an ambulance. Upon arriving at the scene, Smith called 9-1-1. Breinich

was taken to the local hospital, where he was intubated because he was choking on his

own blood. He was then life-flighted to Grant Medical Center in Columbus. His injuries

included multiple facial fractures, brain damage, and damage to his left eye, left ear,

trachea, and teeth. He spent five days in the intensive care unit and another twenty-three

days in the trauma unit at Grant Medical Center. He was then transferred to the Dodd

Rehabilitation Center where he spent fourteen days. He had five surgeries prior to trial

and needed additional dental, eye and ear surgery. He continued to suffer memory loss,

and required round-the-clock supervision from his parents.

         {¶13} Appellant was indicted by the Richland County Grand Jury on felonious

assault, in violation of R.C. §2903.11(A)(1) and aggravated burglary, in violation of R.C.

§2911.11(A)(1).

         {¶14} The case proceeded to jury trial in the Richland County Common Pleas

Court.

         {¶15} On September 11, 2015, the jury returned verdicts finding Appellant guilty

as charged.

         {¶16} On September 16, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to eight (8)

years incarceration for felonious assault and six (6) years incarceration for aggravated

burglary, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of fourteen (14) years.

The trial court also ordered Appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $6,140.00.
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0001                                                    5

       {¶17} On October 14, 2015, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal arguing ineffective

assistance of counsel.

       {¶18} On November 15, 2015, the trial court amended its sentence ordering

Appellant to pay restitution totaling $15, 287.74.

       {¶19} On May 13, 2016, this Court overruled Appellant's sole assignment of error

of ineffective assistance of counsel.

       {¶20} On March 16, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se motion to correct the November

15, 2015 sentencing entry.

       {¶21} On March 24, 2020, Appellee filed a response conceding that Appellant only

owed $6,140 of restitution.

       {¶22} On January 28, 2021, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. At the

hearing, the trial court continued Appellant's prison sentence, but amended the restitution

order to $6,140.00.

       {¶23} On February 22, 2021, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the

Resentencing Hearing raising four assignments of error, arguing he was deprived of the

right to counsel, denied notice and the right to be heard, abuse of discretion, and that the

sentence was contrary to law and not supported by the record.

       {¶24} By Opinion and Entry filed January 25, 2022, this Court held that Appellant's

Appeal was Moot.

       {¶25} On November 16, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to vacate restitution, which

was denied Appellant by the trial court on December 6, 2022.

       {¶26} On January 5, 2023, Appellant now appeals, raising the following error for

review:
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0001                                                     6

                                    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

       {¶27} “I. THE DECEMBER 6th, 2022 JUDGMENT ENTRY IS CONTRARY TO

LAW AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.”

                                                 I.

       {¶28} In his sole assignment of error Appellant claims that his sentence is contrary

to law. We disagree.

       {¶29} Upon review, we find that Appellant’s motion to vacate restitution is a

petition for post-conviction relief under R.C. § 2953.21. Where a criminal defendant,

subsequent to direct appeal, files a motion seeking to vacate or correct his sentence on

the basis that his constitutional rights were violated, such a motion is a petition for post-

conviction relief under R.C. § 2953.21. State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160, 679

N.E.2d 1131, 1997-Ohio-304.

       {¶30} R.C. § 2953.21 provides a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed no

later than 365 days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the Court of

Appeals in the direct appeal, or if no appeal is taken, no later than 365 days after the

expiration of the time for filing the appeal.

       {¶31} Here, Appellant pursued his direct appeal in October, 2015. This motion to

vacate restitution (petition) was filed more than seven years later. Appellant’s petition is

therefore untimely. A trial court has no jurisdiction to hear an untimely petition for post-

conviction relief unless the movant meets requirements set out in R.C. § 2953.23(A).

State v. Walker, 5th Dist. No. 12–CAA–020010, 2012-Ohio-3095, citing State v.

Demastry, 5th Dist. No. 05CA–14, 2005-Ohio-4962 ¶ 15.
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0001                                                   7

       {¶32} The doctrine of res judicata is also applicable to post-conviction relief

proceedings. State v. Nichols, 11 Ohio St.3d 40, 463 N.E.2d 375 (1984), paragraph two

of the syllabus. (Citation omitted). Moreover, res judicata has been utilized to justify

dismissal of post-conviction relief proceedings where the issue in question was never

raised on direct appeal from the original judgment and sentence. Id. at *42. (Citation

omitted).

       {¶33} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars the

defendant from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that

judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that the defendant raised or

could have raised at the trial which resulted in that judgment of conviction or on appeal

from that judgment.” State v. Snyder, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2015AP070043, 2016–

Ohio–832, ¶ 26 quoting State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967).

Further, “[i]t is well-settled that, ‘pursuant to res judicata, a defendant cannot raise an

issue in a [petition] for postconviction relief if he or she could have raised the issue on

direct appeal.’ ” State v. Elmore, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2005–CA–32, 2005–Ohio–5940, ¶

21 quoting State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997).

       {¶34} Upon review, we find that the issues raised by Appellant in his motion to

vacate and in the instant appeal are issues which were cognizable on direct appeal from

his judgment of conviction and sentence, and Appellant's collateral attack on the judgment

on these grounds is barred by res judicata. State v. Perry (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226

N.E.2d 104, paragraph nine of the syllabus.
Richland County, Case No. 2023 CA 0001                                                   8

       {¶35} Appellant could have raised the claimed error as to restitution in his direct

appeal but failed to do so. Because Appellant could have, but did not, raise his claimed

sentencing error on direct appeal, the error is now barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

       {¶36} Appellant’s assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶37} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of

Richland County, Ohio, is affirmed.

By: Wise, J.

Hoffman, P. J., and

Delaney, J., concur.

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