Court Opinion

ID: 9497337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:49:02.402216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:08.391428
License: Public Domain

GREGORY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with my colleagues’ conclusion that the witnesses at issue in this appeal could provide material, favorable testimony on Moussaoui’s behalf. I further concur with their conclusion that the witnesses’ overseas location does not preclude a finding that they are within the reach of the Compulsory Process Clause because they are, for purposes of this litigation, deemed to be [Redacted] of the United States. I wholeheartedly agree with my colleagues that the Government has an absolute right to refuse access to the witnesses on national security grounds; we shall not, indeed we must not, question the Government’s determination that permitting the witnesses to be deposed would put our nation’s security at risk. See United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 154 (4th Cir.1990) (“We are not asked, and we have no authority, to consider judgments made by the Attorney General concerning the extent to which the information in issue here implicates national security.”). Further, as noted in the majority opinion, the district court correctly found that the proposed substitutions offered by the Government are not adequate to protect Moussaoui’s right to a fair trial. However, as both the district court and the majority have recognized, the Govern*484ment’s refusal to comply with the district court’s orders necessarily brings with it some consequences.1 See generally Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C.A. app. 3, § 6(a)(2) (West 2000 & Supp.2003) (providing for dismissal of indictment or other sanction upon Government’s refusal to disclose classified information when ordered to do so by the district court);2 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 670-71, 77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed.2d 1103 (1957) (holding that the Government may “invoke its evidentiary privileges [to avoid public disclosure of highly sensitive material] only at the price of letting the defendant go free.... [S]ince the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense.”) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12, 73 S.Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953)); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 162-64 (affirming dismissal of indictment when Government elected not to disclose classified evidence that was material to the defense). The remedy proposed by the majority does not begin to vindicate Moussaoui’s rights. Thus, it is in formulating the remedy for the Government’s refusal to comply with the district court’s order that I must part ways with the majority.3
The majority directs that the district court itself compile substitutions for the witnesses’ potential testimony, using portions of the [Redacted] summaries designated by Moussaoui, subject to objection by the Government. The majority further instructs that only Moussaoui may admit into evidence, or elect not to admit, the substitutions, subject, of course, to the district court’s ruling on admissibility. While I appreciate that the majority’s solution to *485the difficult problem of ensuring Mous-saoui’s rights is an effort to put him as nearly as possible in the place where he would be if he were able to examine the witnesses, I respectfully suggest that this solution places the district court in a thoroughly untenable position. Moreover, this solution is contrary to CIPA’s expectation that the Government shall provide proposed substitutions for classified information, and it essentially places the district court in the position of being an advocate in the proceedings.
Additionally, as the majority recognizes, because “many rulings on admissibility— particularly those relating to relevance— can only be decided in the context of a trial, most of the witnesses’ statements cannot meaningfully be assessed for admissibility at this time.” (Maj. op. at 472). Asking the district court to pick and choose from among the summaries to compile substitutions for Moussaoui’s use before the Government’s evidence is forecast is a risky proposition at best. The [Redacted] summaries paint a complete, if disjointed, picture of the statements made by the witnesses to date; if the summaries are to be used as a substitution for the witnesses’ testimony, they should be used in their entirety, subject to the district court’s trial rulings on admissibility of any given passage to which either party objects, whether on hearsay grounds, as cumulative, as unduly prejudicial, or upon any other evidentiary basis.4
Additionally, I disagree with the majority’s decision to vacate the district court’s order striking the Government’s death notice at this juncture.5
In a prosecution under the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3591-3598 (West 2000 & Supp.2003), the factfin-der is required to consider whether any mitigating factors weigh against imposing a sentence of death. One potential mitigating factor specifically identified in the Act is the defendant’s role in the offense:
(a) Mitigating factors. — In determining whether a sentence of death is to be imposed on a defendant, the finder of fact shall consider any mitigating factor, including the following:
(3) Minor participation. — The defendant is punishable as a principal in the *486offense, which was committed by another, but the defendant’s participation was relatively minor, regardless of whether the participation was so minor as to constitute a defense to the charge.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(a)(3). In other words, if a defendant is guilty of an offense, but played a small part in it, the jury (or, in a bench trial, the judge) could find that he was not sufficiently culpable to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
Moussaoui argues that the witnesses could offer testimony that would show he did not participate in an act that directly resulted in death: they would testify, he contends, that he did not have an active role in the planned September 11 attack, nor did he know of the plan and fail to disclose that knowledge to investigators, who might have been able to use that knowledge to prevent the attack, when he was taken into custody and questioned pri- or to the attack. Moussaoui’s theory of the case, as we understand it, is that even though he is a member of al Qaeda who has pledged his allegiance to Osama bin Laden, and even though he was willing to engage in terrorist acts, and was indeed training to participate in terrorist acts, he was not involved in the terrorist acts that occurred on September 11, 2001, nor did he know of the plans before the attack took place. Instead, his participation was to involve later attacks, attacks that may or may not have been planned to occur in the United States or against this country’s interests abroad. We cannot know to any degree of certainty whether the witnesses at issue would absolve Moussaoui of any responsibility for any part of the September 11 operation, or knowledge of the planned attack, nor do we know if a jury would find credible any such testimony. However, because the Government has exercised its right to preclude Moussaoui from examining the witnesses, and based on the [Redacted] summaries in the present record, we must assume for present purposes that they would so testify.
Even if Moussaoui is permitted to admit substitutions derived from the [Redacted] summaries, those substitutions cannot be considered a functional equivalent of live (or deposition) testimony, nor are they adequate or sufficient to substitute for testimony. Cf. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187-89, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (recognizing that stipulation “may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove” the stipulated fact). Because the summaries are not responses to the questions that Moussaoui would ask if given the opportunity to depose the witnesses, and because the jury will not be able to see the witnesses and judge their credibility, use of the summaries will necessarily place severe limits on the evidence Moussaoui can present in his defense, particularly during the penalty phase of a capital proceeding. The ultimate question that must be resolved to determine whether Moussaoui is eligible for the death penalty is this: Did he participate in the September 11 attack, or know of the attack in advance? If Moussaoui cannot ask this question of the witnesses who have direct knowledge, he is undeniably and irretrievably handicapped in his ability to defend himself from a sentence of death. The Government may argue that no one, other than Moussaoui himself, has stated he was not involved. Moussaoui has no access to those who could exonerate him from death eligibility, and the jury will not have any evidence upon which to base a finding in this regard except, possibly, for Moussaoui’s own testimony, which he is not obligated to provide. Moussaoui will not be able to offer the most relevant evidence with which he might be able to avoid the death penalty.
*487After we issued our opinion, the Government filed a letter dated May 12, 2004, purporting to “clarify certain factual matters.” In that letter, the Government stated that this court’s opinion erroneously relied on a presumption that the Government’s attorneys had not been privy to, nor had any input into, the [Redacted] witnesses at issue. The Government had argued, in both the district court and this court, that Moussaoui could not question the witnesses because any interference in the [Redacted] process would be devastating to national security. [Redacted] (United States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4162, Gov’t Supp. Ex Parte Appx., at 8). The Government now concedes in the May 12 letter that members of the prosecution team have in fact [Redacted] pertaining to the prosecution of Moussaoui. [Redacted] (Gov’t Ex Parte Appx. on Rehearing, at 63). While the May 12 letter does not necessarily contradict the Government’s previous pleadings and statements during oral argument, it is easy to see why the court concluded, based on the Government’s prior representations, [Redacted] information with actionable foreign intelligence value, [Redacted] that information is passed to the prosecutors, who in turn will pass the information to Moussaoui’s defense team in accordance with their obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Until now, no parallel access to the [Redacted] process has been available to Moussaoui.
The Government’s May 12 letter, and its positions taken during the hearing before the panel on June 3, 2004, only serve to reinforce my conclusion that the district court was correct in holding that the death penalty should not be within the range of sentencing options available when, as here, the Defendant’s ability to mount a defense is severely impaired. As the Government has made clear, the summaries of witness statements provided to the defense are not a complete account of the witnesses’ responses [Redacted] the only [Redacted] responses passed to the prosecution, and subsequently provided to the defense, are those responses deemed [Redacted] to have actionable foreign intelligence value. Thus, as the majority acknowledges, it is certainly possible that the witnesses, [Redacted] may have provided information that, although exculpatory as to Mous-saoui, was not passed on to the prosecution, and in turn to the defense team, because [Redacted] the information had no actionable foreign intelligence value.6 As the majority further recognizes, if [Redacted] have exculpatory evidence that they have not passed on to the prosecution, Moussaoui’s due process rights may be implicated. See United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 971 (3d Cir.1991) (stating that the prosecution is obligated under Brady to disclose all exculpatory evidence “in the possession of some arm of the state”); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 427-38, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (noting the prosecutor’s duty to learn of, and disclose, exculpatory evidence “known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police”). The majority downplays this possibility, calling it unlikely, and states that it need not be further explored because “there is no evidence before us that the Government possesses exculpatory materi*488al that has not been disclosed to the defense.” (Maj. op. at 462, n.14). ■ This conclusion is, at best, misguided. Because of the highly classified nature of the evidence at issue in this case, there is no way this court or Moussaoui could know whether an arm of the Government possesses exculpatory evidence that does not have foreign intelligence value; indeed, even the prosecution would not have access to any such evidence, [Redacted] distribute only those witness summaries that have foreign intelligence value. How there could ever be any evidence before us from which we could conduct a Brady analysis under these circumstances is a mystery.
Further, the reliability (or lack thereof) of the witnesses’ statements poses real stumbling blocks to the admission of those statements. The Government admits that the summaries are simply accurate reflections of the witnesses’ responses [Redacted] ■ However, we do not have all of the witnesses’ statements;. instead, we are privy only to those portions of their statements that are deemed to have actionable foreign intelligence value. We do not have [Redacted] we do not have [Redacted] we do not know [Redacted] Although the Government assures us that the statements have some indicia of reliability [Redacted] Without this context, however, we have only the bare statement, which the jury may consider "to be true [Redacted] This is a slim reed indeed upon which to base a jury verdict, especially where a man’s life hangs in the balance.
I cannot disagree with the majority’s statement .that “[b]ecause the Government will not allow Moussaoui to have contact with the witnesses, this court must provide a remedy adequate to protect Moussaoui’s constitutional rights.” (Maj. op. at 482). However, the majority’s effort to craft such a remedy rings hollow. The majority boldly states that “input by the prosecution team into the [Redacted] process has worked no unfairness on Moussaoui,” but directs that, “to provide Moussaoui with the fullest possible range of information from the witnesses,” the district court must permit Moussaoui to [Redacted] (Maj. op. at 479). To say this is a “remedy” must be of cold comfort to Moussaoui. Although he may propose [Redacted] The entire process is cloaked in secrecy, making it difficult, if not impossible, for the courts to - ensure the provision of Mous-saoui’s rights. Although the prosecution is laboring under the same constraints [Redacted]8 Moussaoui -has constitutional rights, not extended to the prosecution, that are implicated by this procedure. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (“Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.”); Washington v. Texas, 388. U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d. 1019 (1967) (“The right to offer testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense .... This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.”). Because the majority decrees that this so-called “remedy” will fulfill this court’s obligation to protect Moussaoui’s constitutional rights, today justice has taken a long stride backward.
To leave open the possibility of a sentence of death given these constraints on Moussaoui’s ability to defend himself would, in my view, subvert the well-established rule that a defendant cannot be sentenced to death if the jury is precluded *489from considering mitigating evidence pertaining to the defendant’s role in the offense. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 608, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 299 (4th Cir.2003) (“During sentencing in a capital case, the factfinder may ‘not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.’ ”) (quoting Lock-ett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954). A sentence of death requires “a greater degree of reliability” than any lesser sentence. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)).
Here, the reliability of a death sentence would be significantly impaired by the limitations on the evidence available for Moussaoui’s use in proving mitigating factors (if he is found guilty). Although it has been repeated often enough to have the ring of cliche, death is different. It is the ultimate penalty, and once carried out, it is irrevocable. A sentence of death cannot be imposed unless the defendant has been accorded the opportunity to defend himself fully; it cannot be imposed without the utmost certainty, the fundamental belief in the fairness of the result. Because Moussaoui will not have access to the witnesses who could answer the question of his involvement, he should not face the ultimate penalty of death. Accordingly, I would uphold the district court’s sanction to the extent that it struck the Government’s death notice. On this basis, I must dissent.

. To be clear: The consequences resulting from the Government’s noncompliance are not intended as a penalty upon the Government. Rather, they are a means of protecting the rights of the Defendant, and of protecting the integrity of these judicial proceedings.

. I am troubled by the majority's conclusion that no CIPA-type review applies to the substitutions for the witnesses' testimony. The majority holds that the substitutions are not to be prepared by the Government, as is the practice anticipated by CIPA, but instead are to be compiled by the district court based on portions of the still-classified summaries designated by Moussaoui, to which the Government may object, but over which the Government has little control. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d at 315-16. Because the Government is not itself compiling the substitutions, it has no ability to ensure that the substitutions will not compromise national security. It may well be that Moussaoui will elect to include in the substitutions information that the Government deems highly classified. However, the majority has left the Government with no clear mechanism for mitigating the potential national security consequences of admission of Moussaoui’s chosen portions of the summaries, other than the possibility of non-substantive changes to names, places, and the like. Although we cannot know at this juncture what materials might be included in the substitutions, or whether Moussaoui will in fact seek to admit the substitutions, it is foreseeable that the substantive information Moussaoui may seek to admit will include events that cannot be conveyed to the jury without jeopardizing national security, even if names or places are altered. This is just one of a series of instances of this court interceding in evidentiary matters that are properly the purview of the district court, a procedure that is sure to erode the district court's ability to carry out its constitutional mandate to ensure a fair trial.

.The usual remedy for the Government's failure to comply with a district court’s disclosure order is dismissal of the indictment. See, e.g., CIPA § 6(e)(2). However, like the majority and the district court, I believe that the ends of justice are best served by a circumspect exercise of discretion in creating an appropriate remedy.

. I expect that we are setting ourselves out as super-arbiters of the admission of evidence in this case. If the district court overruled an objection by the Government to Moussaoui's proffered materials for inclusion in the substitutions, for example, it is fair to assume that the Government might seek to appeal the district court’s ruling. Conversely, if Mous-saoui seeks inclusion of material but the district court sustains the Government's objection to the evidence, Moussaoui may seek to appeal. The construct proposed by the majority will, I fear, lead to unnecessary piecemeal review of the district court's rulings with regard to the substitutions it has been tasked to prepare. Indeed, as if to underscore my concern, after we issued our first opinion in this appeal, the majority decided to implement a new evidentiary remedy for the denial of Moussaoui's Sixth Amendment rights before the ink was even dry on the court’s previous opinion. This intrusion into the function of the district court belies our proper role as an appellate court.

. The majority leaves open the possibility that if the substitutions compiled by the district court are inadequate, or if the jury is not properly instructed as to the circumstances of the substitutions and their reliability, the death notice could be stricken and other sanctions could be imposed. In my view, however, Moussaoui’s inability to question the witnesses critically impairs his ability to prepare a defense, particularly (though not solely) as to a potential death sentence. Accordingly, as explained more fully below, if Moussaoui must proceed to trial on the basis of substitutions rather than the witnesses' testimony, as we all agree he must, the death penalty should be removed from the range of possible sentences Moussaoui may face.

. Although the prosecutorial function is to achieve justice, and as such prosecutors must seek out both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, the Government makes clear that [Redacted] (May 12 letter, at 3). [Redacted] have no duty [Redacted] exculpatory evidence unless that evidence would have actionable foreign intelligence value. Accordingly, even though [Redacted] "have a profound interest in obtaining truthful information,” (Slip op. at 478, n.31), they do not have an interest in ensuring that justice is achieved in this case.

. The prosecution has had one distinct advantage not afforded to Moussaoui: it has been able to [Redacted] over the course of many months, [Redacted] which may have aided the shaping of its trial strategy. This fact alone belies the majority's assertion that no unfairness has befallen Moussaoui.