Court Opinion

ID: 9482054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:38:55.984875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:44.177825
License: Public Domain

ALARCON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the order granting a stay of the issuance of the mandate pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.
On July 5, 1978, Robert Alton Harris murdered two teenagers because he wanted to use their automobile to commit a bank robbery. Eight months later, on March 6, 1979, a California jury convicted Harris of two counts of murder and recommended the death penalty. The California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and upheld the sentence of death on February 11, 1981. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 5, 1981. Harris v. California, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 365, 70 L.Ed.2d 192 (1981).
On March 5, 1982, Harris filed his first federal petition for habeas corpus. The district court denied the first federal peti*972tion. While his first federal petition for habeas corpus was pending in this court, Harris filed a second federal petition for habeas corpus in the district court on August 13, 1982.
On September 16, 1982, this court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief on most of the issues raised by Harris. We reversed the denial of the first federal petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the California Supreme Court failed to undertake proportionality review of Harris’ sentence. Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1196-97 (9th Cir.1982). The Supreme Court reversed our decision in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984).
In his request for a stay, Harris asserts that the court’s opinion addressed at least three issues of first impression in its dictum. Harris asserts that “these important, unsettled questions of law make it appropriate for this court to stay the mandate pending the filing and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari.” Harris’ motion makes no reference to this court’s holding affirming the denial of his third federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, Harris apparently will ask the Supreme Court to review the clearly labeled dicta in the majority opinion, but not seek reversal of our holding that he has abused the writ under Rule 9(a) and 9(b).
Harris has not provided any basis for this court’s further acquiescence in his skillful manipulation of the federal habeas corpus laws to avoid the execution of the judgment of the California court issued more than 12 years ago. Harris argues that this court has routinely stayed the mandate in death penalty cases. None of the cases he has cited involve the denial of a third federal petition for habeas corpus.
If the Supreme Court believes that it should review Harris’ challenge to the dicta in this court’s opinion, it has the power to grant a request to stay any execution date.
I decline to participate further in the unconscionable delays that have occurred in reaching a final determination in this matter. It is no wonder that Congress is presently reexamining the rules that permit state prisoners to seek federal habeas corpus relief. The Harris case is a textbook example of how the Great Writ can be abused.
The district court denied Harris’ second federal petition for habeas corpus. On July 8, 1988, this court affirmed the denial of Harris’ second federal habeas corpus petition. 885 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.1989). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 16, 1990.
Harris filed a third petition for federal habeas corpus relief in the district court. The district court denied petition on March 28, 1990. A single judge of this court issued a stay and granted a certificate of probable cause. On August 29, 1990, this court affirmed the denial of Harris’ third federal petition for habeas corpus relief. 913 F.2d 606 (9th Cir.1990) (as amended). We held that review of the claims of Harris’ third petition is barred by Rules 9(a) and 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Id. at 617. We concluded that Harris had abused the writ of habeas corpus procedure by delaying nine years in raising new issues concerning the competency of the psychiatrists his attorney selected to assist in the preparation of the defense. We concluded that the State of California was prejudiced by this delay because one of the psychiatrists is dead and the other is now working outside the United States and may be unable to recall the materials he reviewed more than 11 years ago. Id. at 618.
In dictum, we addressed the merits of each of Harris’ claims “with the hope that all questions concerning the validity of the state court’s judgment will finally be resolved after eleven years of writs and appeals.” Id. at 618.