Court Opinion

ID: 9384667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 17:07:30.507128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.352046
License: Public Domain

J-A01028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    DEBBIE MULLEN, ADMINISTRATRIX    :          IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES MYERS     :               PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
                    Appellant        :
                                     :
                                     :
              v.                     :
                                     :
                                     :          No. 2268 EDA 2021
    AMERICAN CIRCUIT BREAKER         :
    CORPORATION, BALDOR ELECTRIC     :
    COMPANY, CHAMPLAIN CABLE         :
    CORPORATION, COOPER              :
    INDUSTRIES, CROUSE-HINDS, FIVES :
    NORTH AMERICAN COMBUSTION,       :
    INC., GENERAL CABLE              :
    TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION,        :
    INTRICON CORPORATION, JOHNSON :
    CONTROLS, INC., KERITE COMPANY, :
    KILLARK, SELAS HEAT TECHNOLOGY, :
    SIEMENS INDUSTRY, INC., THE HITE :
    COMPANY                          :

                Appeal from the Order Entered October 14, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                       Civil Division at No(s): 191001898

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                              FILED APRIL 4, 2023

       Appellant Debbie Mullen, administratrix of the estate of James Myers,

appeals from the order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee

IntriCon Corporation.1       Appellant argues that there are genuine issues of

____________________________________________

1Appellee IntriCon Corporation was formerly known as Selas Corporation of
America. See Compl., 10/18/19, at ¶H; see also Appellee’s Mot. for Summ.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A01028-23

material fact concerning James Myers’ (Decedent) exposure to asbestos and

subsequent development of mesothelioma.          After careful review, we agree

with Appellant and reverse and remand for further proceedings.

       The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

       [Decedent] James Myers died on March 23, 2018. This suit
       followed on October 18, 2019. The complaint alleges [Decedent]
       contracted mesothelioma during his time working at Sunbeam
       Equipment Corporation (Sunbeam) from 1967 to 2017.[2]
       [Decedent] was not deposed before his death. In opposition to
       summary judgment, [Appellant] offered deposition testimony
       from numerous co-workers of [Decedent] in an attempt to
       establish that he was regularly exposed to asbestos from valves
       and burners manufactured by [Appellee].

       Sunbeam manufactured heat-treating furnaces and incinerators.
       [Appellee] was identified as the manufacturer of “Firecheck”
       safety valves that were installed in the furnaces at Sunbeam.
       Shipments of [Appellee’s] Firecheck valves came in “every other
       week.”

       The Firecheck valves contained a “rope gasket” inside. The rope
       gasket came already installed in the device but sometimes it
       would be “bad” and had to be replaced. Workers would remove
       the old gasket and replace it with a new one from Sunbeam’s
       storeroom. Removing the old gasket would create “a little bit of
       dust.” George Carl, a trades helper who worked at Sunbeam at
       the same time as [Decedent], testified that the rope he removed
       from the Firecheck valves “looked like our standard asbestos rope”
       and that is what would be used to replace the rope in the Firecheck
       valves. Mr. Carl never saw documentation that the rope contained
       asbestos.     Mr. Carl believed the replacement rope was
       manufactured by Johns Manville. Mr. Carl also testified that based
____________________________________________

J., 9/10/20, at 2, 5. For clarity, we refer to both Selas Corporation of America
and IntriCon Corporation as Appellee.

2It is undisputed that Sunbeam was subsequently known as SECO/Warwick.
See, e.g., N.T. George Carl Dep., 7/1/20, at 16, 181; Order, 1/28/21; Order,
4/7/21.

                                           -2-
J-A01028-23

      on his personal experience the gaskets used in the Firecheck
      valves looked like asbestos.

      Mr. Carl testified that [Decedent] would be in the “vicinity” or
      “right next to” Mr. Carl while he worked with the gaskets and rope
      on the Firecheck valve. Mr. Carl testified that different electricians
      would be nearby while he performed the removal and estimated
      about a quarter of the time it would be [Decedent].

      [Decedent] worked in the electrical shop at Sunbeam. Electricians
      would wire equipment in the electrical shop and when any
      component of the furnaces needed to be electrified, the
      electricians, including [Decedent], would come out of the electric
      shop and into the assembly bays. The furnaces manufactured by
      Sunbeam had an electrical component and at some point during
      the building of a furnace[,] the electricians at Sunbeam would run
      conduit, pipe, and wire into the furnace. Sunbeam could
      manufacture approximately 150 furnaces a year and all of these
      would require electrical components.

      Gary Praisner, another of [Decedent’s] coworkers, testified that
      asbestos rope and cloth would be cut in the general assembly bay
      of the facility and this would create dust that would go into the
      air. Asked “would [Decedent] have breathed in dust from this
      asbestos rope that was used throughout the years that you were
      there at the Sunbeam plant?” Mr. Praisner answered in the
      affirmative.

      In her response to the summary judgment motion, [Appellant]
      attached as an exhibit what are purportedly purchase orders of
      [Appellee’s] burners and Firecheck valves to Sunbeam dated from
      September 19, 1964, to March 11, 1974. The purchase orders did
      not reference asbestos.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/27/22, at 2-3 (citations and footnote omitted, formatting

altered).

      Appellant initiated the underlying action against Appellee and thirteen

other defendants on October 18, 2019. Compl., 10/18/19. On September

10, 2020, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellee’s Sum.

Jud. Mot., 9/10/20. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary

                                      -3-
J-A01028-23

judgment on March 26, 2021. Order, 3/26/21. Appellant filed a motion for

reconsideration on April 16,2021, which the trial court denied on April 22,

2021. Excluding Appellee, the case ultimately settled as to all remaining non-

bankrupt parties, with the exception of the dismissal of one defendant without

prejudice to be reopened as an arbitration matter.        See Order, 10/14/21.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on November 2, 2021. Both the trial court

and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

        We note that an order “declaring a case settled as to all remaining

parties renders prior grants of summary judgment final for [Pa.R.A.P.] 341

purposes,[3] even if the prior orders entered disposed of fewer than all claims

against all parties.” Harahan v. AC & S, Inc., 816 A.2d 296, 297 (Pa. Super.

2003) (citation omitted); see also Shellenberger v. Kreider Farms, 288

A.3d 898, 905 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2023) (addressing timeliness of an appeal and

finality of a nearly identical order in a similar procedural posture). Moreover,

we conclude Appellant’s November 2, 2021 notice of appeal was timely as it

was filed within thirty days4 from the entry of the October 14, 2021 order.5
____________________________________________

3   See Pa.R.A.P. 341 (addressing finality of orders, generally).

4See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing that an appeal “shall be filed within 30 days
after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken”).

5 On January 28, 2022, this Court issued an order to show cause why the
appeal should not be quashed. Order, 1/28/22. The show cause order noted
that the trial court’s October 14, 2021 order reflected that the case was
“settled as to all non-bankrupt parties except the Manville Fund without
prejudice. Case dismissed against Manville Fund without prejudice to be
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -4-
J-A01028-23

See Quinn v. Bupp, 955 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that

“[i]nterlocutory orders that are not subject to immediate appeal as of right

may be reviewed in a subsequent timely appeal of a final appealable order or

judgment” (citations omitted)); see also Shellenberger, 288 A.3d at 905

n.6. Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal is properly before this Court.

       On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:

       Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law
       in ruling that [Appellee] was entitled to summary judgment based
____________________________________________

reopened as an arbitration matter.” Id. Further, the show cause order
correctly stated that an order directing a matter to arbitration is not a final,
appealable order. See id. (citing Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Mumma, 921 A.2d
1184, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2007)). Appellant filed a timely response explaining
that the October 14, 2021 order did not “direct” the case to arbitration, but
rather the October 14, 2021 order “merely noted that its dismissal order will
not be an absolute bar to one of the settled defendants litigating its
contribution claim against [the Manville Fund].” Appellant’s Resp., 2/7/22.
On February 22, 2022, this Court discharged the show cause order. However,
we may address the issue of appealability sua sponte because it affects our
jurisdiction. See Jahanshahi v. Centura Dev. Co., Inc., 816 A.2d 1179,
1183 (Pa. Super. 2003); Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). Nevertheless, upon review, we
conclude that the October 14, 2021 order is final for purposes of appellate
jurisdiction. We agree with Appellant that the October 14, 2021 order did not
order arbitration, but rather, it provided the possibility for pursuit of
arbitration and stated that the case was concluded as to the other defendants.
See Appellant’s Brief at 10; Order, 10/14/21. Additionally, the October 14,
2021 order utilized language that this Court has previously deemed final for
purposes of perfecting appellate jurisdiction. See Shellenberger, 288 A.3d
at 905 n.6; see also Weible v. Allied Signal, Inc., 963 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super.
2008). Indeed, the Weible Court stated: “In this case all parties are now
settled, bankrupt, or dismissed by grant of summary judgment or otherwise.
Consequently, the grants of summary judgment for [the appellees] are final
orders for appeal purposes and the present appeal is properly within our
jurisdiction.” Weible, 963 A.2d at 525 (citing, inter alia, Harahan, 816 A.2d
at 297). Accordingly, we discern no impediment to our appellate jurisdiction
in the instant matter. See Shellenberger, 288 A.3d at 905 n.6; Weible,
963 A.2d at 525; Harahan, 816 A.2d at 297.

                                           -5-
J-A01028-23

      on [Appellant’s] alleged failure to show [D]ecedent’s exposure to
      [Appellee’s] asbestos-containing products?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      Appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that she failed

to meet the product identification and exposure requirements to survive a

motion for summary judgment.          See id. at 15.     Specifically, Appellant

contends that the trial court erred when it found that Appellant could not

satisfy the frequency, regularity, and proximity test for asbestos liability

cases.   Id. at 15-16.     Appellant contends that a witness, Mr. George Carl

identified Appellee’s asbestos-containing product and satisfied the frequency,

regularity, and proximity test. See id. at 17-21.

      Appellee responds that summary judgment was proper because

Appellant failed to establish that Decedent was exposed to asbestos fibers

from Appellee’s product, the firecheck valves. Appellee’s Brief at 12. Further,

Appellee argues that Appellant did not establish that Appellee’s product

contained asbestos.       See id. at 12-14.   Accordingly, Appellee asserts that

Appellant cannot satisfy the frequency, regularity, and proximity test, and

Appellant’s claim is based on speculation. See id. at 18-21.

      This Court’s scope and standard of review are well settled:

      Our scope of review of an order granting summary judgment is
      plenary. We apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing
      all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists a
      genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the light
      most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the
      existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
      against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue
      as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is

                                       -6-
J-A01028-23

      entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment
      be entered.

      Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly implicate
      the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [her] cause of action.
      Summary judgment is proper if, after the completion of discovery
      relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports,
      an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has
      failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action
      or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be
      submitted to a jury. Thus, a record that supports summary
      judgment will either (1) show the material facts are undisputed or
      (2) contain insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie
      cause of action or defense and, therefore, there is no issue to be
      submitted to the jury. Upon appellate review, we are not bound
      by the trial court’s conclusions of law, but may reach our own
      conclusions. The appellate Court may disturb the trial court’s
      order only upon an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

      Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on facts
      and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and
      consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its discretion if, in
      resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises
      its discretion in a manner lacking reason. Similarly, the trial court
      abuses its discretion if it does not follow legal procedure.

      Where the discretion exercised by the trial court is challenged on
      appeal, the party bringing the challenge bears a heavy burden.

      It is not sufficient to persuade the appellate court that it might
      have reached a different conclusion if . . . charged with the duty
      imposed on the court below; it is necessary to go further and show
      an abuse of the discretionary power. An abuse of discretion is not
      merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the
      law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
      manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias
      or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is
      abused.

National Cas. Co. v. Kinney, 90 A.3d 747, 752-53 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

                                      -7-
J-A01028-23

     To survive a motion for summary judgment in asbestos litigation, it is

well settled that the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence establishing

product identification. Eckenrod v. GAF Corp., 544 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. Super.

1988). Additionally:

     the plaintiff must establish that the injuries were caused by a
     product of a particular manufacturer or supplier. Vanaman v.
     DAP, Inc., 966 A.2d 603, 607 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc). In
     other words, the plaintiff must present some evidence that he
     inhaled asbestos fibers shed by the specific manufacturer’s
     product. Gutteridge v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 804 A.2d
     643, 652 (Pa. Super. 2002). As a result, the plaintiff must do
     more than just show the mere presence of asbestos in the
     workplace. Instead, the plaintiff must prove he worked in the
     vicinity of a specific manufacturer’s product.

     When evaluating the plaintiff’s evidence in asbestos cases at the
     summary judgment stage, Pennsylvania courts use the frequency,
     regularity, and proximity test established in Eckenrod. Gregg v.
     V-J Auto Parts, Co., 943 A.2d 216, 227 (Pa. 2007). In Gregg,
     our Supreme Court adopted the Eckenrod standard and held that
     courts should make a reasoned assessment of whether, in light of
     the evidence on the frequency, regularity, and proximity of a
     plaintiff’s alleged exposure, a jury could draw a sufficient causal
     connection between the defendant’s product and the asserted
     injury. Id. at 227. Therefore, the relevant inquiry under a
     manufacturer’s motion for summary judgment is whether a
     plaintiff has pointed to sufficient material facts in the record to
     indicate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the
     causation of decedent’s disease by the product of each particular
     defendant. Vanaman, [966 A.2d] at 607. See also Rost v. Ford
     Company, 151 A.3d 1032 (Pa. 2016) (emphasizing that
     “frequent, regular, and proximate” test in this context requires
     evidence of exposure sufficient to allow jury to infer causal
     connection between exposure to asbestos-containing products
     and development of mesothelioma).

     Eckenrod, however, is not a rigid test that sets an absolute
     threshold required to support liability. Gregg, 943 A.2d at 225.
     Rather, courts should apply Eckenrod in an evaluative fashion, in
     a way tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case. Linster

                                    -8-
J-A01028-23

        v. Allied Signal, Inc., 21 A.3d 220, 224 (Pa. Super. 2011).
        Application of the test becomes less stringent where the plaintiff
        produces specific evidence of exposure to a defendant’s product.
        Id. Similarly, in cases involving mesothelioma, the frequency and
        regularity requirements should become “less cumbersome.” Id.
        A plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment, however, if a jury
        would need to speculate to find in plaintiff’s favor. Krauss v.
        Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556, 568 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Kardos v. Armstrong Pumps, Inc., 222 A.3d 393, 399-400 (Pa. Super.

2019) (some citations omitted and formatting altered).

        Here, the trial court concluded that Appellant failed to present evidence

that Appellee’s product contained asbestos or that Decedent was exposed to

dust from Appellee’s product on a regular, frequent, and proximate basis.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/27/22, at 5. The trial court found that none of Appellant’s

witnesses testified that Appellee’s firecheck valves contained asbestos and

that Appellant’s witness, Mr. George Carl, stated only that the material he

removed from the firecheck valves “looked like” asbestos. Id. (citing R.R.

240a-241a).6 The trial court concluded that this testimony was insufficient to

establish that Appellee’s firecheck valve contained asbestos because it would

require the finder of fact to speculate. See id. Additionally, the trial court

held that Appellant’s witnesses offered only conjecture concerning whether

Decedent inhaled any dust produced by Appellee’s product, and “even if”

Appellant proffered evidence to show Appellee was responsible for providing

asbestos-containing products to Sunbeam, there is insufficient evidence from

which a jury could conclude that Decedent was regularly, frequently, and
____________________________________________

6   We may refer to the reproduced record for the parties’ convenience.

                                           -9-
J-A01028-23

proximately exposed to asbestos.       Id. at 6.    After careful review, we are

constrained to disagree.

        As stated previously, Appellant must show that that Decedent was

frequently, regularly, and proximately exposed to asbestos fibers from

Appellee’s product to permit a jury to infer causal connection between

Decedent’s    exposure     to   asbestos   and     Decedent’s   development    of

mesothelioma.      See Kardos, 222 A.3d at 399.             In cases involving

mesothelioma,     the   frequency    and   regularity   requirements   are    less

cumbersome. See id. at 400.

        Here, it is undisputed that Decedent worked at Sunbeam and that

Sunbeam manufactured heat-treating furnaces. Trial Ct. Op., 5/27/22, at 2.

While employed at Sunbeam, Decedent developed mesothelioma.             See id.

Decedent worked as an electrician and built electrical panels for the furnaces

at Sunbeam.      See R.R. 257a-264a.       During the manufacturing process,

electricians would leave the electrical shop and come to the assembly floor

where the furnaces built.       Electricians would then wire the furnaces and

connect the electrical panels to the furnaces for testing. See id. at 260a-

264a.

        Mr. Gary Praisner, who worked at Sunbeam during the time Decedent

worked there, testified that asbestos was used at Sunbeam. See id. at 108a-

111a.    Mr. Praisner testified that scrap material, including asbestos, was

swept-up and the dust was scattered all over the assembly floor. See id. at

111a-119a. Mr. Praisner stated that Sunbeam made approximately 150-200

                                      - 10 -
J-A01028-23

furnaces per year, and some of the furnaces had as many as fifty burners.

See id. at 125a. He explained that each furnace required asbestos gaskets

and the use of asbestos caused dust. See id. at 125a-126a. Mr. Praisner

stated that Decedent breathed in this dust. See id. at 127a.

      Mr. Peter Fizer, who was also employed at Sunbeam when Decedent

worked there, testified that although Decedent worked in the electrical shop,

Decedent also came to the assembly floor. See id. at 134a. Mr. Fizer testified

that there was dust all over the assembly floor. See id. at 140a.

      Mr. George Carl was employed at Sunbeam at the same time Decedent.

See R.R. 223a. Mr. Carl and Mr. Edward Burdick, another Sunbeam employee

who worked at Sunbeam when Decedent worked there, testified that

Appellee’s predecessor in interest, Selas Corporation, manufactured firecheck

valves that were used in the production of furnaces at Sunbeam. See id. at

225a, 235a, 284a.

      Moreover, Mr. Carl testified further that he routinely worked with

asbestos rope and asbestos gaskets while employed at Sunbeam. See id. at

218a-219a.    With respect to asbestos, Mr. Carl said that he worked with

“miles” of it. See id. at 218a. Further, Mr. Carl explained that Sunbeam built

furnaces containing burners, and each burner had a firecheck valve. See id.

at 226a.

      Mr. Carl identified Appellee’s firecheck valve and confirmed working with

Appellee’s firecheck valve during the assembly process.      See id. at 231a-

232a. Mr. Carl stated that the firecheck valve was installed close to the burner

                                     - 11 -
J-A01028-23

in the furnaces Sunbeam built. See id. at 220a, 226a. The firecheck valves

arrived at Sunbeam containing rope packing. See id. at 232a, 238a, 241a.

Mr. Carl stated that the rope “looked like our standard asbestos rope.” See

id. at 240a. Mr. Carl further testified that in some instances, this packing

inside Appellee’s firecheck valve had to be replaced, and this required Mr. Carl

to remove the packing that came from Appellee’s product and was inside

Appellee’s firecheck valve.    See id. at 226a-228a.       Mr. Carl said that

approximately ten to fifteen percent of the time, the rope packing in the

firecheck had to be removed and replaced. See id. at 233a, 234a. Mr. Carl

testified that when he had to scrape out and remove the old packing it would

shred and come out in pieces.     See id. at 233a.     The removal of the old

packing created dust. See id. at 238a. Mr. Carl noted that although he was

“not a chemist,” he stated that the material looked like asbestos, and it would

shred like asbestos. Id. at 232a, 246a. Mr. Carl also explained that when the

gaskets shredded and had to be replaced, they were replaced with more

asbestos. See id. at 221a, 241a, 243a.

      Mr. Carl also testified that Sunbeam employees were “all over the plant,”

and they would breathe in each other’s dust. Id. at 162a. Mr. Carl noted that

when Decedent was in the electrical shop, he was removed from the dust on

the manufacturing floor. See id. at 224a. However, Mr. Carl explained that

in order to install the electrical wiring, Decedent had to come out onto the

manufacturing floor, and he stood right beside Mr. Carl. See id. Mr. Carl said

that he did not work with Decedent all the time, but when he did, Decedent

                                     - 12 -
J-A01028-23

worked right next to him. See id. at 247a, 248a. Mr. Carl noted that there

were other electricians, but Decedent was with him twenty-five percent of the

time. See id. at 248a. As noted, Mr. Carl unequivocally testified that when

he had to remove the packing from Appellee’s firecheck, this removal process

created dust. See id. at 223a, 247a. Mr. Carl testified that he had to scrape

out the old gaskets approximately ten to fifteen percent of the time, and he

said that Decedent was working “right next to me” and “in the vicinity” when

Mr. Carl tore apart or scraped out the old gasket in the firecheck and replaced

it. See id. at 223a-224a, 233a, 234a, 247a. When Mr. Carl was asked if he

knew what the material inside the firecheck valve was, he responded: “It

looked like our standard asbestos rope. That’s what we would put in. It was

a white rope. It looked just like the asbestos rope.” See id. at 240a-241a.

Mr. Carl also testified that he regularly observed asbestos, and these

observations caused him to be able to recognize asbestos-containing rope and

gaskets and conclude that the firecheck valves contained asbestos. See id.

at 249a-250a.

      This Court has previously stated:

      We conclude that on the record evidence before us concerning the
      frequency, regularity, and proximity of [the decedent’s] asserted
      exposure to the [manufacturer’s] product[,] a jury would be
      entitled to make the necessary inference of a sufficient causal
      connection between the [manufacturer’s] product and [the
      decedent’s] mesothelioma. This is not to say that a jury must
      make this inference. Contrary inferences are possible; even
      plausible. However, the parsing of possible or plausible contrary
      inferences that might be drawn from the evidence is not the

                                    - 13 -
J-A01028-23

       quintessence of summary judgment; it is the embodiment of a
       trial.

Wright v. Allied Signal, Inc., 963 A.2d 511, 521 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Moreover, in Weible, this Court reversed the trial court’s order granting

summary judgment in favor of defendants where the decedent’s co-workers

testified that, “in the presence of” the decedent, they worked on and replaced

clutches, brakes, and gaskets, and this process of removing and replacing

brakes, clutches, and gaskets produced asbestos dust. Weible, 963 A.2d at

528-32. We conclude that the same rationale applies here.

       After review, we do not agree with the trial court that this case is so

clear and free from doubt that Appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. See Kinney, 90 A.3d at 752. Rather, we conclude that Appellant

presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as

to Decedent’s contact with Appellee’s product, and we conclude that the trial

court erred in granting summary judgment where the facts sufficiently

identified Appellee’s product and the frequency, regularity, and proximity of

Decedent’s exposure to it. See Korol v. Aurora Pump Co., 1373 EDA 2022,

2023 WL 1980858, at *7 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 14, 2023) (unpublished

mem.);7 see also Kardos, 222 A.3d at 400 (noting that in cases where the

complainant      developed     mesothelioma,       “the   frequency   and   regularity

requirements should become ‘less cumbersome’” (citation omitted)).              After

____________________________________________

7We may cite to unpublished memorandum decisions of this Court filed after
May 1, 2019, for their persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).

                                          - 14 -
J-A01028-23

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellant, we conclude

that Appellant is entitled to present, to a jury, the issue of whether there is a

sufficient causal connection between the Appellee’s products and Decedent’s

mesothelioma. See Korol, 2023 WL 1980858, at *7 (citing Linster, 21 A.3d

at 229).

      On this record, we reverse the order granting summary judgment and

remand for further proceedings. See Korol, 2023 WL 1980858, at *7 (citing

Harahan, 816 A.2d at 297-98 (providing that deposition testimony from

decedent’s co-workers provided circumstantial and direct evidence to show

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant’s asbestos-

containing product caused decedent’s disease)); see also Wright, 963 A.2d

at 520-21.

      Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2023

                                     - 15 -