Court Opinion

ID: 9917475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 15:10:31.287148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:07.281042
License: Public Domain

01/11/2024
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                               AT JACKSON
                    Assigned on Briefs December 19, 2023

              LEE ARDREY HARRIS V. ALENA MARIE ALLEN

                 Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County
                 No. CH-23-0389     JoeDae L. Jenkins, Chancellor

                           No. W2023-01794-COA-T10B-CV

The appellant is the Mayor of Shelby County. He filed a complaint for divorce, and the
Shelby County chancellor originally assigned to the case recused herself. The case was
reassigned to another Shelby County chancellor who accepted the case. Six months later,
the appellant filed a motion to recuse the chancellor based on the Mayor’s budgetary duties
regarding Shelby County government, including the chancery court and the chancery court
clerk. The chancellor denied the motion, finding that it was not filed promptly in
accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. We affirm.

      Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the
                             Chancery Court Affirmed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,
C.J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., joined.

Sarah Suzanne Brown, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Lee Ardrey Harris.

Vickie Hardy Jones, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Alena Marie Allen.

                                       OPINION

                       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       This is a Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B appeal seeking the recusal of
Chancellor Joedae Jenkins of Shelby County. The appellant is the Shelby County Mayor,
and the matter before the trial court is a divorce. The facts are largely uncontroverted.

       Mayor Lee Ardrey Harris (“Mayor Harris” or “Husband”) filed a complaint for
divorce from Alena Marie Allen (“Ms. Allen” or “Wife”) on March 20, 2023. Ms. Allen
filed an answer and counter-complaint on March 29, 2023. The next day, the first
chancellor assigned to the case recused herself sua sponte, finding that there was a conflict
of interest and stating, “In order to avoid even the appearance of impropriety with regards
to the parties in this case, the Court finds it should recuse itself from any further activity in
this case.” The case was randomly reassigned to Chancellor Jenkins, who entered an order
accepting the reassignment.

      According to Chancellor Jenkins’s order denying recusal, the case proceeded as
follows:

         (F) On April 5, 2023, Wife filed a Notice of Attorneys as Parties.

         (G) On April 6, 2023, Wife filed her Petition for Entry of Parenting Plan and
         to Permit Relocation of Mother with Minor Children, which included her
         proposed Permanent Parenting Plan.

         (H) On May 8, 2023, Husband filed Father’s Response to Mother’s Petition
         for Entry of Parenting Plan and to Permit Relocation of Mother with Minor
         Children. Although not titled as such, [this] pleading included Husband’s
         counter-petition and proposed Permanent Parenting Plan.

         (I) On June 10, 2023, Wife filed Mother’s Response to Father’s Counter-
         Petition to Set Parenting Time.

         (J) On June 20, 2023, Wife filed Motion to Consider Children’s Preference
         and to Allow Testimony of Children.

         (K) On June 22 and 28, 2023, this Court conducted a hearing on Mother’s
         April 6, 2023 Petition and Father’s May 8, 2023 Counter-Petition.

         (L) On June 28, 2023, this Court rendered its oral ruling.

         (M) On July 24, 2023, this Court entered its Order on Mother’s Petition for
         Entry of Parenting Plan and to Permit Relocation of Mother with Minor
         Children and Father’s Response to Mother’s Petition for Entry of Parenting
         Plan and to Permit Relocation of Mother with Minor Children/Father’s
         Counter-Petition to Set Parenting Time and Permanent Parenting Plan.

       On September 28, 2023, Mayor Harris filed a motion to recuse Chancellor Jenkins
based on the appearance of impropriety arising from the Mayor’s authority over the Shelby
County budget, which includes items regarding the Shelby County Chancery Court and
Shelby County Chancery Court Clerk.1 On November 14, 2023, the trial court held a

   1
       In no pleading in the trial court or on appeal does Mayor Harris cite to any state statutes or county
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hearing on the motion to recuse and entered its written order denying the motion on
November 27, 2023. In the order, the trial court held that Mayor Harris “waived the issue
by failing to raise it in a timely manner.” The court found that Mayor Harris did not raise
the concern of an appearance of impropriety until the September 28 filing of his motion to
recuse, while “[a]ll of the facts relied on by [Mayor Harris] for his request that this court
recuse itself were known to [Mayor Harris] at the time of the filing of his Complaint and
at all times relevant hereto.” Mayor Harris appealed.

                                       STANDARD OF REVIEW

      An appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling on a recusal motion under a de
novo standard of review. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10B, § 2.01.

                                               ANALYSIS

        Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 1.01 begins by declaring that a party
seeking recusal of a trial judge “shall do so by a written motion filed promptly after a party
learns or reasonably should have learned of the facts establishing the basis for recusal.”
Promptness is mandatory and its importance is declared at the very beginning of the rule.
“Courts frown upon the manipulation of the impartiality issue to gain procedural advantage
and will not permit litigants to refrain from asserting known grounds for disqualification
in order ‘to experiment with the court . . . and raise the objection later when the result of
the trial is unfavorable.’” Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting Holmes v. Eason, 76 Tenn. (8 Lea) 754, 757 (Tenn. 1882)). A delay in asserting
the right to an impartial judge will result “in a waiver of a party’s right to question a judge’s
impartiality.” Id.

        Chancellor Jenkins’s order at the end of March clearly accepted the case assignment.
Mayor Harris raised the appearance of impropriety issue at the end of September – six
months after the court accepted the case and two months after the trial court ruled on the
conflicting petitions. Ms. Allen’s response in this Court suggests that Mayor Harris’s
motion to recuse is a “strategic maneuver.” In his Rule 10B petition, Mayor Harris denies
that the issue of recusal is “strategic.” Rather, he maintains that he “did not see the need to
bring up the issue since he contemplated an out-of-court resolution of the parties’ divorce.”

regulations or rules regarding his budgetary oversight of the Shelby County Chancery Court or the Shelby
County Chancery Court Clerk. The Mayor attached an affidavit to his Rule 10B appellate petition, dated
December 18, 2023. An attachment to the Mayor’s affidavit entitled “FY24 Budget Highlights” includes
a citation to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-21-401, which is a schedule of fees. The Mayor’s affidavit indicates that
the proposed budget shows a decrease in funding and an additional employee for the Shelby County
Chancery Court. Because the affidavit is dated December 18, 2023, and the trial court’s order denying the
motion to recuse was entered November 27, 2023, we conclude that the affidavit was not presented to the
trial court for consideration.

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Strategic or not, Mayor Harris’s delay in raising the issue is fatal to his cause. Mayor Harris
knew of his budget duties at the time he filed for divorce. He states in his appellate petition
that he has denied funding requests from the Shelby County chancellors in the past. If he
felt the issue was or could be a problem, the time to raise it was at the beginning of the case
– not six months later and not after a full evidentiary hearing on competing petitions for
permanent parenting plans. Mayor Harris did not raise the issue promptly and therefore the
issue is waived. The Rule 10B petition is denied.

                                        CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the chancery court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed
against the appellant, Mayor Lee Ardrey Harris, for which execution may issue if
necessary.

                                                    _/s/ Andy D. Bennett_______________
                                                    ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

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