Court Opinion

ID: 9824753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:17:45.652113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:01.981030
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
It is insisted upon petition for rehearing in this case that the proposition involved in the first paragraph of the syllabus of our decision in this case is “based wholly upon the theory of waiver,” which we held was not involved.in the case because not pleaded. Not so. Waiver is based upon the failure to exercise a known and existing right, or upon conduct reasonably leading to a belief that such right is not intended to be exercised. In this case we tried" to make it clear that, under the clauses of the Standard *282insurance policy considered, the right to appraisement and inspection only existed during a reasonable time “from such date as the circumstances of each case may show to be the period at which the desirability or necessity of appraisement or inspection of .the goods first arises.” The sale of the damaged goods by the defendants was no breach of the provisions of the policy above referred to, except as such ‘sale prevented an appraisement or inspection to which the insurer Was entitled. Now, if such right -on the part of the company no longer existed when the .goods were’sold, there was no breach, and the other essentials, such as proof of loss, etc., being proved, there was a “substantial compliance” with the terms of the policy and waiver is not involved. If the policy in express terms limited the right to inspection and appraisement to a period of 20 days after notice of the fire, and that time had expired without a demand for inspection and appraisement, and thereafter the damaged goods were sold, could it be contended that a plea of breach of the policy by reason of the sale of the damaged goods at such time must be met by an express plea of waiver? We think not. The right of the insurer had ceased to exist at the time of the sale. So in this case. The- right to an inspection and ap-praisement under the clauses considered ceased to exist at “the end of a reasonable time, and the sale of the damaged goods after that time w'as no breach of the policy, and it was not necessary to plead a waiver of an alleged breach which was not, in fact, any violation of the rights of the insurer. A party cannot be said to be required to plead waiver against an asserted right, which does not, in fact, exist at the time of the alleged breach of such right.
*283It is also insisted that we should say, as a matter of law, that a reasonable time to demand appraisement and inspection had not expired after the receipt of the proof of loss. This argument is based upon the assumption that, the time within which the appraisement and inspection under these clauses of the policy must be demanded begins to run from the date of the receipt of the proofs of. loss. We distinctly did not so hold. The language of the opinion is “from such date as the circumstances of each case-may show1 to be the period at which the desirability or necessity of appraisement or inspection of goods first arises.” This date may be that of the receipt of the proof of .loss if the disagreement over values or condition of the goods arises then for the first time. On the other hand, it may become apparent long before any proof of loss is-, filed that the parties cannot agree and that an appraisement will be necessary. The contention that the question of what constituted a reasonable time in this case should' be decided as a matter of law is without merit.
It is further insisted that the trial court did not properly instruct upon certain propositions involved in the decision. It is the settled rule of this court that a party cannot complain of failure, to instruct unless he has himself offered suitable instructions upon the omitted propositions..
' The petition for rehearing is denied.
By the Court: It is so ordered.