Court Opinion

ID: 9671594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:40:00.736969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:41.600073
License: Public Domain

McCALEB, Justice,
(concurring).
I fully subscribe to the majority holding that Mrs. Stevens’ title is suggestive of litigation and therefore not merchantable. Additionally, I am convinced that the title is not merchantable because the vendor cannot deliver title to the land she agreed to deliver, a single two-story house “on grounds measuring about 4CK x 120’ or as per title.” According to the vendor’s title, which clarifies any indefinite representation in the agreement as to the exact measurements of the land to be delivered, the lot actually measures 40 x 120 feet. However, Mrs. Stevens is unable to deliver this footage in accordance with her promise because of the encroachments resting upon the property.
Viewed in this light, the case is clearly distinguishable from that of Hunley v. Ascani, 174 La. 712, 141 So. 385, on which the majority opinion on first rehearing rested. In the Ascani case the vendor agreed to deliver certain premises situated on “ * * ground measuring approximately 30' x 120' or, as per title.” However, title examination revealed the width of the vendor’s lot to be only 26' 4", and the purchasers attempted to be released from the contract on the *99basis that the measurement of the frontage was less than represented. But the Court correctly held that they were still bound because the vendor was able to' deliver everything he promised, that is, exact land frontage “as per title”, even though the width of the lot was more than three feet shorter than the approximate width stated in the agreement.
In this case the vendor is unable to comply with her agreement, not because her title shows that she owns less frontage than that approximated in the agreement, but only because the frontage stated in the title cannot be delivered unencumbered due to the encroachments thereon. While it is true that the Court in Hunley v. Ascani resolved that the purchasers could not be relieved of their contract as they had inspected the premises and were satisifed with the frontage of the lot, these observations were unnecessary to the opinion in my view. The contract was clearly enforceable there, as the statement of approximate measurements of the lot was qualified (as here) by the words in the sales contract “or, as per title,” and, so long as the vendor was able to convey land measuring in frontage and depth “as per title,” he was able to comply with his promise.
Rehearing not considered. See Rule XI of this Court. Hamiter, J., is of the opinion the rehearing should be considered and granted. Alternatively, he entertains the view that since the opinion and decree on the first rehearing did not reserve to Young the right to apply for a second rehearing the application so filed by him, the second rehearing that was granted pursuant thereto, and the decision thereon, were all illegal, null, void, and of no effect (Section 3, Rule XI, Rules of this court) ; and that, consequently, the decision rendered on the first rehearing became and is the final judgment of this court.