Court Opinion

ID: 9661570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:43:14.592552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:30.661791
License: Public Domain

GILDEA, Justice
(dissenting).
In our constitution, the people of Minnesota restricted the ability of the state government to deficit spend. The political branches have agreed on a process in the unallotment statute for ensuring that the government meets this obligation. Whether that process is the wisest or most prudent way to avoid deficit spending is not an issue for judicial review. That question should be left to the people themselves to debate and resolve through the political process. The judiciary’s “duty” is simply “to apply the law as written by the legislature.” Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 292 v. City of St. Cloud, 765 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn.2009) (Magnuson, C.J., for a unanimous court). The majority is unable to do so because the language the Legislature used in the unallotment statute leaves the majority with uncertainty and ambiguity. The majority therefore rewrites the statute to insert additional conditions, and then finds that the Commissioner of Minnesota Management and Budget (Commissioner) violated the statute because he did not comply with the conditions the majority has added.
Unlike the majority, I do not find the language the Legislature used uncertain or ambiguous as applied to the unallotment at issue in this case. I would not rewrite the statute; I would apply the language as written. Because I would hold that the executive branch complied with the plain language of the statute, and that respondents have not met their burden to prove that the statute is unconstitutional, I respectfully dissent.
Respondents challenge the decision of the Commissioner to unallot funds for the Minnesota Supplemental Aid — Special Diet Program (Special Diet Program). The un-*371allotment was effective November 1, 2009. The Commissioner carried out the unallotment under Minn.Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 4 (2008). Respondents contend, and the district court held, that the Commissioner did not comply with the statute. Respondents also contend that the statute is unconstitutional. Because I conclude that the Commissioner properly carried out his duties under the statute and because I conclude that respondents have not met their burden to prove that the unallotment statute is unconstitutional, I would reverse.
I.
I turn first to the question of whether the Commissioner complied with the statute. The Minnesota Legislature has charged the Commissioner with “managing] the state’s financial affairs.” Minn. Stat. § 16A.055, subd. 1(a)(2) (2008). One of the ways in which the Commissioner performs this management function is to prepare “a forecast of state revenue and expenditures” in February and again in November of each year. Minn.Stat. § 16A.103, subd. 1 (2008). In November 2008, the Commissioner anticipated that the state would receive $31,866 billion in revenue for the 2010-2011 biennium. In February 2009, the Commissioner modified this revenue forecast, and anticipated that the state would receive $30.7 billion in revenue, and that the state would have $4.57 billion less than necessary to meet its obligations in the 2010-2011 biennium. During the 2009 legislative session, spending changes were enacted into law that reduced the state’s projected deficit. But, on June 4, 2009, after the legislative session ended, the Commissioner projected in a letter to the Governor that the state would still be short $2.7 billion for the 2010-2011 biennium. Because the Commissioner determined that probable receipts would be less than anticipated and revenues were less than needed to satisfy the state’s obligations for the 2010-2011 biennium, the Commissioner utilized the authority in section 16A.152, subdivision 4, to avoid deficit spending.
This statute provides:
(a) If the commissioner determines that probable receipts for the general fund will be less than anticipated, and that the amount available for the remainder of the biennium will be less than needed, the commissioner shall, with the approval of the governor, and after consulting the Legislative Advisory Commission, reduce the amount in the budget reserve account as needed to balance expenditures with revenue.
Minn.Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 4(a). There were no funds in the budget reserve account that could be used to balance the budget. Accordingly, the Commissioner unallotted under subdivision 4(b) of the statute, which provides:
(b) An additional deficit shall, with the approval of the governor, and after consulting the legislative advisory commission, be made up by reducing unex-pended allotments of any prior appropriation or transfer. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the commissioner is empowered to defer or suspend prior statutorily created obligations which would prevent effecting such reductions.
Minn.Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 4(b).
There is no dispute in this case that the Commissioner sought and received the approval of the Governor, as subdivision 4(b) of the statute required, before the unallot-ments were made. The parties also agree that the Commissioner consulted with the Legislative Advisory Commission before making any unallotments, as the statute also mandates. But the parties dispute whether the Commissioner complied with the statute in two respects. First, respon*372dents contend that the unallotments did not comply with the statute because, they argue, “probable receipts for the general fund” were not “less than anticipated.” Minn.Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 4(a). Second, respondents argue that the unallotments violated the statute because the Commissioner did not determine that the “amount available for the remainder of the biennium will be less than needed” when he unallotted.1 Id.
The parties each contend that the plain language of the statute supports their position, and, they argue in the alternative, that if we were to determine that the statute is ambiguous, principles of statutory construction counsel that we construe the statute in their favor. The majority concludes that the parties’ different readings of the statute are reasonable and that therefore the statute is ambiguous. The majority uses its determination of ambiguity as an invitation to rewrite the statute to include the condition precedent of a balanced budget. Specifically, the majority divines that what the Legislature meant to say was that once a balanced budget has been enacted into law and a deficit thereafter occurs, the Commissioner may unallot to make up that deficit. The obvious problem with this rewrite is that it is a rewrite. The Legislature chose not to include the condition precedent the majority finds necessary, and we cannot, under the guise of statutory construction, add it. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2008) (“When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”). Our task instead is to read the words and apply them as the Legislature wrote them. Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn.1995) (“Where the intention of the legislature is clearly manifested by plain unambiguous language ... no construction is necessary or permitted.”). I turn now to that task and consider the two specific provisions in the statute at issue.

A. Were Probable Receipts Less than Anticipated?

Respondents argue, and the district court held, that the Commissioner’s unal-lotments violated the statute because the budget deficit was not “previously unforeseen.” Respondents’ argument is based on the fact that the budget deficit was known in February when the Commissioner prepared the forecast. Moreover, respondents contend that when the Governor signed appropriation legislation and vetoed revenue legislation, the Governor (and therefore the Commissioner) knew that the state would not have funds sufficient to satisfy the financial obligations in the appropriation legislation. Therefore, respondents argue, the budget deficit was not unanticipated.
Even assuming the factual predicates for respondents’ arguments, I would hold that the Commissioner complied with the plain language of the unallotment statute. When we construe statutes, our obligation is to determine whether the statute is plain on its face. State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn.2009). If so, the role of the judiciary is to apply the language as it is written. See id. at 773 (“We have no opportunity to ignore part of the legislature’s definition.”); State v. Jesmer, 293 Minn. 442, 442, 196 N.W.2d 924, 924 (1972) *373(“In construing statutes, we have said that where language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent must be given effect and there is no room for construction.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The statute requires that the Commissioner determine that “probable receipts ... will be less than anticipated.” Minn. Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 4(a). Plainly, the Commissioner must make this determination before he unallots. But the statute does not provide any other deadline by which the Commissioner is to make this determination. See id. The Legislature could have imposed temporal restrictions on the Commissioner’s decision-making if that was its intention, but it chose not to do so in this statute. Specifically, the Legislature could have written into the statute the requirement that the Commissioner may unallot only where a budget deficit arises that was not projected in the most recent budget forecast. The Legislature also could have added a provision requiring the Commissioner to make the determination, within the biennium itself, that “probable receipts ... will be less than anticipated.” The Legislature did not do so, and as we have repeatedly recognized, it is not for the judiciary to insert such restrictions. See e.g., Reiter v. Kiffmeyer, 721 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn.2006) (expressly declining to read time requirements into a statute because “we will not read into - a statute a provision that the legislature has omitted, either purposefully or inadvertently”); Morrison v. Mendenhall, 18 Minn. 232 (Gil.212, 218-20) (1872) (declining to interpret a foreclosure statute as containing additional requirements because the Legislature rather than the courts must be the source of any modifications to the statute as written).2
There likewise is no. requirement in the statute that the Commissioner determine the cause of the budget deficit before he may unallot. Which of the two coordinate branches of government is responsible for the budget shortfall now facing Minnesota is the subject of many pages of debate in this litigation. The judiciary is not the venue to resolve this dispute. See In re McConaughy, 106 Minn. 392, 415, 119 N.W. 408, 417 (1909) (“Many questions arise which are clearly political, and not of judicial cognizance.”). Moreover, even if the judicial branch were inclined to wade into this dispute, it would be irrelevant in this case because there is nothing in section 16A.152 that limits the Commissioner’s authority to unallot depending upon what or who is most responsible for the budget shortfall. The judiciary cannot rewrite the statute to add such restrictions.
*374The unallotment statute simply requires that the Commissioner determine whether “probable receipts for the general fund will be less than anticipated.” Minn.Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 4(a). This phrase is not ambiguous in my view, and I would hold that the Commissioner made the necessary determination. Specifically, he concluded, in his June 4, 2009, letter, that “[y]ear to date receipts for FY 2009 are down $70.3 million compared to the February forecast. Nearly all major revenue categories have collected less than anticipated.” Respondents make no argument that these determinations were arbitrary or inaccurate in any way. See In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 277 (Minn.2001) (noting that an “agency’s conclusions .are not arbitrary and capricious so long as a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made has been articulated” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the Commissioner complied with the plain language of the statute and respondents have not demonstrated that his determination was arbitrary and capricious, I would uphold the Commissioner’s determination that “probable receipts for the general fund [were] less than anticipated.”
B. Was the Amount Available for the Remainder of the Biennium Less than Needed?
Respondents argue that the Commissioner’s unallotments violated the statute because the unallotments covered the entire biennium. Respondents contend that whether funds are available for the remainder of the biennium cannot be determined until some point after the biennium has begun. Accordingly, respondents argue, unallotments that cover the entire biennium and determinations that are made prior to the start of the biennium violate' the plain language of the statute. The Commissioner contends that the “remainder of the biennium,” referred to in Minn.Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 4(a), can include the entire biennium. In the alternative, the Commissioner argues that even under respondents’ interpretation of “remainder,” the unallotment at issue in this case — for the Special Diet Program- — was not effective until November 1, 2009, well into the biennium.
The parties’ disagreement as to the meaning of “remainder” in the statute appears to be the basis upon which the majority concludes that the statute is ambiguous. In my view, we need not reach the question of whether the word “remainder” can refer to the whole biennium or refers to a period that is less than the whole.
The only question presented in this case is whether the decision to unallot funds from the Special Diet Program complies with the statute. As to the Special Diet Program, the Commissioner determined that “the amount available'for the remainder of the biennium will be less than needed”; that is, the amount available, starting November 1, would be less than needed to fund the Special Diet Program for the remainder of the biennium. Further, there is no dispute that the Special Diet Program funds were not unalloted until November 1. The Commissioner’s determination that there would be insufficient funds for this program was, indisputably, only with respect to a portion of the biennium and not the entire biennium. We therefore have no occasion in this case to determine whether decisions to unallot that were effective on the first day of the biennium violate the statute. Because the unallotment decision at issue in this case concerned only part of the biennium and the unallotment was not effective until several months into the biennium, the Commissioner’s actions complied with the statute no matter how “remainder” is defined.
*375In sum, I would not reach out to decide more than the narrow question directly presented here. As applied to the unallotment at issue in this case — the unallotment from the Special Diet Program — the statute is not ambiguous, and the Commissioner complied with the plain language the Legislature wrote in the statute. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (directing that we are to look to see whether “the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity” (emphasis added)). I would so hold.
II.
Respondents argue that if the Commissioner’s unallotment from the Special Diet Program did not violate the unallotment statute, then the statute is unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Because I would conclude that the Commissioner complied with the statute, it is necessary for me to reach the constitutional issue respondents raise.
We are extremely reluctant to declare a statute unconstitutional and will do so “only when absolutely necessary.” In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1989). Our precedent requires “every presumption” to be “invoked in favor of upholding [a] statute” that is challenged on constitutional grounds. State v. Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d 134, 138 (Minn.2001). Because “Minnesota statutes are presumed constitutional,” those who challenge the constitutionality of a statute bear a heavy burden in making this challenge. In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d at 364. In order to succeed, respondents must demonstrate “beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional.” State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn.1990). I would hold that respondents have not met their heavy burden to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statute is unconstitutional.
Our constitution divides the “powers of government ... into three distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial.” Minn. Const, art. Ill, § 1. The constitution also prohibits any “person! ] belonging to or constituting one of these departments [from] exercising] any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly provided in this constitution.” Id. Respondents argue that the unallotment statute violates the separation of powers because in the statute, the Legislature delegated pure legislative authority to the Commissioner. I disagree.
Where one branch purports to perform completely a function assigned to one of the other branches, such encroachment violates the separation of powers principle. See Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 112-13, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538 (1949) (noting that “purely legislative power cannot be delegated” and that “[p]ure legislative power ... is the authority to make a complete law”). We have recognized that such encroachment into the judiciary’s sphere of constitutional responsibility is unconstitutional. For example, where the Legislature purports to remove from the judiciary a class of cases that the constitution vests in the judiciary, the Legislature has violated the separation of powers doctrine. Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn.1999) (holding that “[t]he administrative [child support] process violates separation of powers and is unconstitutional”); see also Quam v. State, 391 N.W.2d 803, 809 (Minn.1986) (holding that the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals “went beyond the quasi-judicial authority delegated to it to determine facts and answer questions of law as they arise under the Workers’ Compensation Act and sought to assume the power to determine the validity of a duly promulgated rule of another agency” and the court “thereby *376exceeded the scope of adjudicative power the legislature delegated to the agency-consistent with the constitutional doctrine .of separation of powers”).
Our separation of powers analysis therefore requires that we examine the function at issue and determine, as a threshold matter, whether the constitution assigns that function exclusively to one branch in our constitution. See Irwin v. Surdyk’s Liquor, 599 N.W.2d 132, 141-42 (Minn.1999) (“Legislation that prohibits this court from deviating from the precise statutory amount of awardable attorney fees impinges on the judiciary’s inherent power to oversee attorneys and attorney fees by depriving this court of a final, independent review of attorney fees. This legislative delegation- of attorney regulation exclusivély to the executive branch of government violates the doctrine of separation of powers.”). In the case before us, the function at issue is the spending of state revenue. More specifically, the function is ensuring that the state does not deficit spend because our constitution restricts deficit spending. See Minn. Const, art. XI, § 6 (“No certificates [of indebtedness] shall be issued in an amount which ... will exceed the then unexpended balance of all money which will be credited to that fund during the biennium under existing laws.”).
The constitution assigns the responsibility to ensure that the state does not deficit spend to both the legislative and executive branches. See New England Div. of the Am. Cancer Soc’y v. Comm’r of Admin., 437 Mass. 172, 769 N.E.2d 1248, 1256 (2002) (recognizing that passing laws authorizing spending is a legislative function and that spending state revenue is an executive function). The constitution assigns this function in part to the Legislature because “[n]o money shall be paid out of the treasury of this state except in pursuance of an appropriation by law.” Minn. Const. art. XI, § 1. And the constitution assigns this function in part to the executive branch because the executive branch “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Minn. Const, art. V, § 3. As part of the faithful execution of the law, the executive branch implements the appropriation laws through the spending of state revenue. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-33, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (describing “authority to determine the budget cuts to be made” to balance the federal budget “as plainly entailing execution of the law in constitutional terms”); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 375 Mass. 827, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1222 (1978) (noting that “the activity of spending money is essentially an executive task”). The executive branch must also faithfully execute the constitutional prohibition against deficit spending. See Minn. Const. art. XI, § 6. In ensuring that all laws, including appropriation laws and the constitution, are faithfully executed, the executive “is bound to apply his full energy and resources, in the exercise of his best judgment and ability, to ensure that the intended goals of legislation are effectuated.” Opinion of the Justices, 376 N.E.2d at 1221; see also Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733,106 S.Ct. 3181 (“Interpreting a law enacted by [the Legislature] to implement the legislative mandate is the very' essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”).3
*377Because the function is one that the constitution commits to both branches, the-unallotment statute — -which simply acknowledges this joint responsibility — does not delegate pure legislative authority to the executive branch and it does not violate separation of powers. There are many instances in the operation of government, such as the prohibition against deficit spending, where the function at issue requires responsible effort from both of the political branches. Such “cooperative ventures” do not violate the separation of powers. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (holding that congressional creation of United States Sentencing Guidelines Commission did not violate separation of powers).
Precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court and from our court recognizes that within areas of joint responsibility — like that at issue here — the branches may seek assistance from one another without running afoul of the separation of powers. The unallotment statute recognizes that the Legislature needs assistance from the executive branch in determining how best to execute spending priorities when, because of the constitutional restriction on deficit spending, an appropriation law cannot be fully executed. The statute does not give the executive branch the authority to make or unmake the law. Instead, the statute embodies an acknowledgement of the responsibility that the legislative and executive branches share for managing our state’s budget, and it provides an opportunity for the political branches to work cooperatively within the confines of our constitution.4
As former Chief Justice Taft explained, “[i]n determining what it may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental coordination.” J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, *37848 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928) (concluding that a statute that authorized the President to increase tariff rates on foreign products was not a delegation of legislative authority to the President in violation of separation of powers even though the Constitution vested in Congress the power to levy duties). Specifically with regard to the legislative branch seeking assistance from the executive branch, so long as “Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” Id. at 409, 48 S.Ct. 348.
We have likewise recognized that “some interference between the branches does not undermine the separation of powers; rather, it gives vitality to the concept of checks and balances critical to our notion of democracy.” Wulff v. Tax Court of Appeals, 288 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn.1979) (noting that a “strict interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine would make the existence and functioning of ... agencies nearly impossible”). And we have embraced the “intelligible principle” standard from Hampton in our own separation of powers jurisprudence. See Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 113 n. 10, 36 N.W.2d 530, 539 n. 10 (1949) (citing Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409, 48 S.Ct. 348).
Specifically, we have held that “the legislature may authorize others to do things (insofar as the doing involves powers which are not exclusively legislative) which it might properly, but cannot conveniently or advantageously, do itself.” Id. at 112-13, 36 N.W.2d at 538. Such legislative authorization does not offend the separation of powers as long as the Legislature provides a sufficient check in the form of a “reasonably clear policy or standard of action which controls and guides the administrative officers in ascertaining the operative facts to which the law applies.” Id. at 113, 36 N.W.2d at 538. The law must “take[ ] effect upon these facts by virtue of its own terms, and not according to the whim or caprice of the administrative officers.” Id. If this check exists on the executive branch’s exercise of authority, the “discretionary power delegated to the [executive branch] is not legislative,” and there is no separation of powers violation. Id. at 113, 36 N.W.2d at 538-39. We have also recognized “that what is a sufficiently definite declaration of policy and standard varies in degree according to the complexity of the subject to which the law is applicable.” Anderson v. Comm’r of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 309, 315, 126 N.W.2d 778, 779, 782-83 (1964) (holding that a statute that delegated authority to commissioner of highways to suspend driver’s license where driver “is an habitual violator” was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority). The unallotment statute satisfies the rule we applied in Lee and Anderson.
The statute sets forth the “controls” that guide the Commissioner. Lee, 228 Minn, at 113, 36 N.W.2d at 538. The Commissioner cannot unallot unless “probable receipts for the general fund will be less than anticipated” and “the amount available for the remainder of the biennium will be less than needed.” Minn.Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 4(a). Once these determinations are made, the Commissioner must first exhaust the budget reserve account before invoking the unallotment authority. Id.; see also Minn.Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 4(b), (c). All of the determinations necessary to trigger the statute are objectively verifiable and remove the unallotment authority from the mere “whim or caprice” of the Commissioner. *379Lee, 228 Minn, at 113, 36 N.W.2d at 538.5
But these triggers are not the only controls on the Commissioner’s discretion. To the contrary, the Legislature has restricted the scope of the Commissioner’s unallotment authority in several additional and clear ways. First, the Commissioner may only unallot to the extent necessary to prevent deficit spending. See Minn. Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 4(b) (“An additional deficit shall ... be made up by reducing unexpended allotments.... ”). The unal-lotment itself does not impact the appropriation legislation; it merely delays incurring the obligation until revenue is in place to pay for it.
Second, before the Commissioner may unallot, the Commissioner must “consult[ ] the legislative advisory commission.” Id. “Consult” means “to ask the advice or opinion of’ and “to deliberate together.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 248 (10th ed. 1993). Our precedent requires that “every presumption” be “invoked in favor of upholding the statute,” which necessarily means that we must give force to the Commissioner’s obligation to seek the advice of and to deliberate with the legislative branch. See State v. Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d 134, 138 (Minn.2001). Through the required consultation with the Legislative Advisory Commission, a group that includes the leaders from both houses of the Legislature,6 the executive branch receives the benefit of guidance as to legislative priorities and concerns. See R.E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn.1978) (“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, public officials, administrative officers, and public authorities, within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by law, will be presumed to have properly performed their duties in a regular and lawful manner and not to have acted illegally or unlawfully .... ” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). By requiring that the Commissioner ask the advice of and deliberate with the Legislative Advisory Commission before the Commissioner unallots, the Legislature has provided an important check on the Commissioner’s decision-making.
Third, the Legislature has prioritized the areas from which the Commissioner may unallot by specifically exempting several funds from the unallotment authority. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 16A.14, subd. 2a(l) (2008) (noting that the allotment system does not apply to appropriations for the judiciary or the Legislature); Minn.Stat. § 16A.14, subd. 2a(2) (2008) (providing exemption for unemployment benefits); Minn.Stat. § 16B.85, subd. 2(e) (2008) (providing that the risk management fund “is exempt from the provisions of section 16A.152, subdivision 4”); MinmStat. § 477A.011, subd. 36(y) (2009 Supp.) (providing that “[t]he payment under this paragraph is not subject to ... any future unallotment of the city aid under section 16A.152”).
Fourth, of those funds that the Legislature has directed are available for unal-lotment (in other words, those programs *380the Legislature has not exempted from unallotment), the Legislature has further constrained the executive branch. Specifically, the Legislature requires that the Commissioner “reduce allotments ... by the amount of any saving that can be made over previous spending plans through a reduction in prices or other cause,” and directs that the Commissioner “may consider other sources of revenue available to recipients of state appropriations and may apply allotment reductions based on all sources of revenue available.” Minn.Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 4(d), (e). Fifth, once an unallotment has been made, the Commissioner must, within 15 days, notify four different committees of the Legislature of the decision. Minn. Stat. § 16A.152, subd. 6 (2008).
Finally, the Legislature, of course, remains free in the next legislative session to undo the unallotments as it has done in the past. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 41A.09, subd. 3a(h) (2008) (requiring that the Commissioner “reimburse ethanol producers for any deficiency in payments ... because of unallotment”). The fact that the Legislature retains, and has exercised, the authority to undo the Commissioner’s unallot-ments provides an important check on the Commissioner’s exercise of discretion. This check is not unlike the check we have found relevant within our own sphere in the opportunity for our review of decisions from executive branch “courts.” See, e.g., Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744, 753 (Minn.1983) (finding that the “power” of the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals, an executive branch court, “to set attorney fees is constitutionally permissible, because these awards are reviewable by this court”). But cf. Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720, 725 n. 36 (Minn.1999) (“[T]he availability of judicial review alone will not provide adequate judicial supervision to protect a system against a separation of powers challenge.”). If the opportunity for judicial review in our court is a relevant check of executive branch “courts,” logic dictates that a similar check in the legislative branch is likewise relevant to a separation of powers challenge to the unallotment statute.
In sum, the unallotment statute provides objectively verifiable triggers for the Commissioner’s unallotment authority. It defines the scope of what the Commissioner may unallot — only funds sufficient to resolve the deficit. It prioritizes the funds from which the Commissioner may not unallot, and for those funds available, it provides further guidance as to how the Commissioner is to unallot from those funds. It requires that the Commissioner work with the Legislative Advisory Commission in exercising the unallotment function. Finally, the Legislature retains an important check through its ability to undo the unallotments. Our precedent compels the conclusion that there are sufficient standards in this statute. This is especially true if we recall that every presumption is to be invoked in favor of upholding the constitutionality of a statute. Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d at 138.7
The issues presented here are only whether the Commissioner complied with the statute, and whether the unallotment statute is constitutional. Because I would *381hold that the Commissioner complied with the plain language of the statute when he unallotted from the Special Diet Program, and that respondents have not met their heavy burden to prove that the unallotment statute is unconstitutional, I would reverse.

. Even though the unallotments were made under paragraph (b) of subdivision 4, the parties agree that the threshold determinations set forth in paragraph (a) ("that probable receipts for the general fund will be less than anticipated” and "that the amount available for the remainder of the biennium will be less than needed”) operate to constrain the Commissioner's decision-making.

. See also Greene v. Comm’r of Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 722 (Minn.2008) (noting that it is not the "proper function” of the judiciary to add “a right into the statute”); Beardsley v. Garcia, 753 N.W.2d 735, 740 (Minn.2008) (declining to interpret the statute so as to "effectively rewrite” it because that prerogative belongs to the Legislature rather than to the court); Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Minn.2008) ("The policy-based argument advanced by the dissent regarding when to measure the endangerment to the child is not without merit, but such a determination belongs to the legis- . lature, not to this court.”); State v. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d 672, 684 (Minn.2008) (explaining that it is the province of the Legislature, not the courts, to expand an accomplice corroboration statutory requirement to jury sentencing trials); Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 513, 524 (Minn.2005) (explaining that, while some of the original policy considerations supporting the corporate practice of medicine may need reexamination, the Legislature, not the courts, is the appropriate forum to enact such policy change); Haghighi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 577 N.W.2d 927, 930 (Minn.1998) ("If the literal language of this statute yields an unintended result, it is up to the legislature to correct it.”).

. In Bowsher, Congress passed a law that gave the Comptroller General the authority to mandate which budget cuts the President had to make in the event of a federal budget deficit. 478 U.S. at 717-18, 106 S.Ct. 3181. Because Congress had the authority to remove the Comptroller General, the Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 732-33, 106 S.Ct. 3181. Specifically, the statute was unconstitutional because it vested executive authority in the hands of an office within the legislative branch. Id. at 733-34, 106 S.Ct. 3181.

. This principle of cooperation is central to the budget-making and oversight process in Minnesota. Although the Legislature determines appropriations, it is the Commissioner that oversees the allotment process. An ”[a]l-lotment” is "a limit placed by the commissioner on the amount to be spent or encumbered during a period of time pursuant to an appropriation.” Minn.Stat. § 16A.011, subd. 3 (2008). The Legislature approves appropriations for agencies, but leaves the determination of the actual spending plans to the agencies. See Minn.Stat. § 16A.14, subd. 3 (2008). Agencies submit their spending plans to the Commissioner; those plans must certify that "the amount required for each activity is accurate and is consistent with legislative intent.” Id. The Commissioner, not the Legislature, then reviews the spending plans to determine whether they are "within the amount and purpose of the appropriation.” Minn.Stat. § 16A.14, subd. 4 (2008). The Legislature has very broadly charged the Commissioner with the task of determining whether these spending plans are within the purpose of the appropriation. The Commissioner may even, "modify the spending plan and the allotment to conform with the appropriation and the future needs of the agency.” Id. This authority to review spending plans, approve them, or modify them along with allotments, is different than unallotment, but reflects the Legislature’s recognition that the Commissioner’s exercise of the spending power requires the executive branch to discern and adhere to the legislative purpose in the appropriations. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733, 106 S.Ct. 3181. Stated another way, inherent in the Commissioner's authority to "allot” (i.e., place a limit on the amount of money to be spent pursuant to an appropriation) is the necessity that the Commissioner be guided by his determination of legislative priorities. The Legislature does not give the Commissioner a definitive set of guidelines in discerning legislative purpose and priorities embodied in the appropriations when the Commissioner is making allotments; rather, the Legislature gives the Commissioner broad, flexible authority in making allotments based on his identification of legislative priorities and purpose.

. These triggers also demonstrate that this statute is not in any way similar to the statute at issue in the case the concurrence cites, State v. Great Northern Railway Co., 100 Minn. 445, 479, 111 N.W. 289, 294 (1907) (suggesting that if statute charged commission with "supervision] [of] the issuance of only such stock as is authorized by law,” and with “the duty of ascertaining in each case whether the proposed increase is for an authorized purpose and in accordance with the requirements of the law,” the statute would have been constitutional).

. See Minn.Stat. § 3.30, subd. 2 (2008) (listing members of Legislative Advisory Commission).

. My conclusion that the statute is constitutional is in accord with the nearly unanimous result from jurisdictions around the country that have upheld the constitutionality of similar unallotment statutes. See Univ. of Conn. Chapter AAUP v. Governor, 200 Conn. 386, 512 A.2d 152, 156-59 (1986); Legislative Research Comm’n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 926-31 (Ky.1984); New England Div. of the Am. Cancer Soc’y v. Comm’r of Admin., 437 Mass. 172, 769 N.E.2d 1248, 1256-58 (2002); N.D. Council of Sch. Adm'rs v. Sinner, 458 N.W.2d 280, 285-86 (N.D.1990); Hunter v. State, 177 Vt. 339, 865 A.2d 381, 396 (2004).