Court Opinion

ID: 9746443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:16:23.648259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:13.249286
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
PAUL E. ALPERT, J.
(Retired, Specially Assigned).
I concur in the result but seriously question some of the reasoning and conclusions declared by the majority.
At part II of this opinion, the majority opines:
Based on our review of the court’s ruling, we cannot determine whether the court recognized the disjunctive nature of the standard applicable to a motion for modification of child support. Although the court found a material change of circumstances based on appellee’s income, it never articulated the elements of a material change in circumstance. Nor did it acknowledge that a substantial change in income, by itself, could support a modification. Instead, it appears that the court believed that the modification standard is a conjunctive one, which required appellant *37to demonstrate a change in financial circumstances and a change in the child’s needs.
Op. at 22.
Because the court did not fully consider the importance of the change in the father’s economic position as an alternative basis on which to modify support, we shall vacate the judgment....
Op. at-.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion above stated. Implicit in the trial judge’s reasoning (see pages 7-10 of the opinion) is the recognition that the court could award an increase in child support but, for the reasons stated, chose not to do so. A reasonable reading of the trial court’s analysis indicates that the judge believed that an increase in the wealth of a wealthy dad did not “automatically” entitle the child to an increase in support. A judge is presumed to know the law and “is presumed to have performed his duties properly.” Lapides v. Lapides, 50 Md.App. 248, 251, 437 A.2d 251 (1981).
To the extent that the majority suggests that a trial court must accept extravagance or over-indulgence where it believes that such conduct is not in the best interest of the child, I strongly disagree. See part III of the opinion.
I do, however, agree with the majority that it is not appropriate for a court to limit the amount of child support on the basis that the appellant has a limited career expectancy. While I disagree with this aspect of the trial judge’s decision, it does tend to indicate that the trial judge recognized that he had a choice, i.e., he could increase child support based on appellant’s substantiated increase in income but chose not to do so, theorizing that the increase would be short lived. In any event, if and when material circumstances change, appellant can then seek modification. While I do not suggest the trial court should increase the amount of child support because of the increased income, I would remand because the trial court should not have considered appellee’s limited career expectancy.