Court Opinion

ID: 9609381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:26:42.010418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:25:00.186693
License: Public Domain

Stafford, J.
(concurring) — I concur with the result of the majority; however, I feel it is necessary to discuss more fully why Seattle's lewd conduct ordinance does not unconstitutionally infringe on First Amendment rights.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right of cities and states to regulate offensive conduct in public places even though it may involve expressive activity or speech. See Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wn.2d 584, 599-603, 584 P.2d 918 (1978), for a detailed discussion. As Justice Douglas stated in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512-13, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498, 77 S. Ct. 1304 (1957): "No one would suggest that the First Amendment permits nudity in public places, adultery, and other phases of sexual misconduct. . . . Government should be concerned with antisocial conduct, not with utterances." See also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 n.7, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125, 95 S. Ct. 2268 (1975). It is also clear that
when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968). Thus, even conceding appellant's activity might have been communicative (as indeed we must, given the motion in limine granted by the trial court), it is not thereby shielded from governmental regula*67tion if certain conditions are met.
The requisite conditions are set forth in United States v. O'Brien, supra at 377. First the governmental regulation must fall within the constitutional power of the government. Second, it must further an important or substantial governmental interest. Third, the governmental interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Fourth, the restriction must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The instant ordinance meets these tests.
Cities in our state have the power to regulate activity such as public nudity. Such regulations are justified by considerations of public morals and general welfare, both incident to the general "police power" of municipalities. See Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wn.2d 786, 797, 435 P.2d 692 (1967); Tacoma v. Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290 P. 1010 (1930); Const. art. 11, § 11. " [Regulation of indecent exposure and of conduct inducing to breaches of the peace are traditional and proper subjects of the police power ..." Kew v. Senter, 416 F. Supp. 1101, 1105 (N.D. Tex. 1976). By promoting public morals, the regulations also further an important or substantial public interest. Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 427, 509 P.2d 497, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1973); Kew v. Senter, supra. See generally Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973). The courts below determined as much, the municipal court stating that this ordinance concerned a "clear and important governmental interest in the welfare and morals of the public and in maintaining peace and good order in the city."
These regulations "reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830, 93 S. Ct. 2908 (1973). The conduct here is constitutionally unprotected; there is no right to appear nude in public. Rather, the constitution only requires that some nudity be tolerated as part of some larger form of expression meriting protection, when the *68communication of ideas is involved. State v. Baysinger, _ Ind. —, 397 N.E.2d 580 (1979), appeal dismissed sub nom. Clark v. Indiana, 446 U.S. 931, 64 L. Ed. 2d 783, 100 S. Ct. 2146 (1980).3 Seattle's ordinance makes ample allowance for artistic nudity by its exemption of artistic or dramatic performances.4
The third factor in O'Brien is also met. As stated in Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 427, 509 P.2d 497, 512, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1973):
The regulation is aimed at conduct, not speech; at "separately identifiable conduct" (Cohen v. California, supra, 403 U.S. 15, 18), not at an activity "entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct. ..." (Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., supra, 393 U.S. 503, 505.)
See also Kew v. Senter, supra at 1105: "it is difficult to conceive of ideas entitled to First Amendment protection which can be solely — or even best — expressed by baring the anus or genitals in the circumstances forbidden by the statutes."
As to the fourth element of O'Brien, if the ordinance does impose some incidental restriction on First Amendment freedom of speech and expression, it is certainly no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest involved. Quoting from Crownover, 9 Cal. 3d at *69428:
The ordinances do not prohibit speech or expression or entertainment; they merely direct that the entertainer cannot appear with genitals or breasts exposed. The ordinances proscribe no more than is necessary to ban the nudity which has been deemed harmful to public welfare or morals.
It is clear appellant's conduct has been constitutionally regulated.
Brachtenbach, C.J., concurs with Stafford, J.

Gabriele v. Old Orchard Beach, 420 A.2d 252, 256 (Me. 1980), noted that the appeal in State v. Baysinger, _Ind. _, 397 N.E.2d 580 (1979), was dismissed by the Supreme Court for want of a substantial federal question. It noted that pursuant to Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 45 L. Ed. 2d 223, 95 S. Ct. 2281 (1975), this disposition signifies that the Supreme Court sustained the decision on the merits, with precedential force as to all courts except the Supreme Court itself. Baysinger upheld a public indecency statute's application to topless dancing in any public place, providing that the dancing does not occur as part of an artistic production.

Appellants did not argue in the courts below that they were covered by the dramatic performance exception to the ordinance. Having failed to raise it below, such argument is deemed waived. See Bradbury v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 91 Wn.2d 504, 512, 589 P.2d 785 (1979). This court should not have allowed the issue on the merits. Thus, I do not agree with the majority's unnecessary discussion of the issue.