Court Opinion

ID: 9725775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:09:47.432387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:19.633937
License: Public Domain

STATON, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Mere accident instructions are a plague upon the administration of justice when they are used to reach the issue of liability. The Majority disapproves of their use but refused to reverse. I would reverse. My dissent is for the following reasons:
(1) The Majority attempts to overrule the Supreme Court opinion in Miller v. Alvey (1965), 246 Ind. 560, 207 N.E.2d 633 and the Court of Appeals, Second District, opinion in Dunlap v. Goldwin (1981), Ind.App., 425 N.E.2d 724.
(2) The Majority's reliance upon Condor v. Hull Lift Truck, Inc., (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 10, is misplaced. The Majority should have followed Miller v. Alvey, supra, and Dunlap v. Goldwin, supra.
(3) The Majority erroneously assumes that the "pure-accident" instruction does not extend to the issue of lHability. It ignores the line of cases that distinguish between burden of proof and the issue of liability when a instruction is being properly analyzed.
(4) In Condor, the Court held that the "pure-accident" instruction, relating to proximate cause-not liability-was harmless error, since it was cured by other instructions. No other instructions were given in the Chaffee case to lessen the impact of mass confusion caused by the mere accident instruction on liability.
(5) The "pure-accident'" instruction has been disapproved by the Indiana Supreme Court, the Indiana Court of Appeals and by the Majority. Yet, the Majority insists that the giving of such an instruction should be tolerated and not looked upon as reversible error. The instruction is confusing and misleading. Its use presents an unsurmountable obstacle to the administration of justice, and it should be dealt with on appeal in a resolute manner which will leave no doubt at the trial level that its use will no longer be tolerated.
The "pure-accident" instruction was given upon the issue of liability. The theory was negligence. The Majority opinion states: "Moreover, we disagree with the dissent's perception that this language creates a 'pure-accident' instruction. It does not, and to the extent that Dunlap v. Goldwin (1981), Ind.App., 425 N.E.2d 724 supports the dissenting view, we believe Dunlap to be in error." Dunlap is predicated upon Miller v. Alvey (1965), 246 Ind. 560, 207 N.E.2d 633. In Miller, our Supreme Court explained that it was reversible error *242to give a "pure-accident" instruction and stated:
"that the word 'accident' does not necessarily preclude fault or negligence. The term is susceptible of different meanings and constructions and to tell a jury there is no liability in case of 'unavoidable accident' or 'pure accident' ie., an unintentional, careless, or unknown occurrence, is misleading and confusing to say the least, and is not compatible with the principles of tort law imposing liability on persons who fail to exercise ordinary or reasonable care."
Miller v. Alvey, 207 N.E.2d at 636.
Although the Majority begins its discussion of "pure-accident" instruction by saying: "We must commence by expressing disapproval of the instruction," it nevertheless condones the instrument of confusion which the Indiana Supreme Court has attempted to exorcise in Miller v. Alvey.
As Chief Judge Buchanan stated in Dunlap:
"The use of non-liability verbiage in the first sentence of the instruction before us, 'not an insurer' and 'accident proof,' so taint the instruction as to make it fatally defective as the instruction in Miller v. Alvey. The same potential for confusing the jury as to the true basis for liability exists in both instructions, even though the misleading language in Miller may be somewhat pronounced."
425 N.E.2d at 726.
The Majority has attempted to overrule the Indiana Supreme Court opinion in Miller v. Alvey and the Court of Appeals opinion in Dunlap by making a flippant reference to their existence and then pronouncing their demise.
The Majority's reliance upon Condor v. Hull Lift Truck, Inc. (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 10 is misplaced. Proximate cause was the issue in Condor, not liability. Too, the theory in Condor was strict liability rather than negligence. As Justice Pivarnik pointed out in Condor:
"The position of Allis-Chalmers is well taken that the same unforeseeable intervening cause of Condor's accident that insulated Hull from liability also insulated AllisChalmers. In fact, Allis-Chal-mers is even further removed from the point of cause since not only was there the intervening acts of Globemaster but there was evidence that Hull had committed acts that could be considered intervening since the equipment was put on the market by Allis Chalmers...."
435 N.E.2d at 15-16.
Hull had converted the carburetor system from gasoline to L.P. gas, installed conversion kit parts on the carburetor, and had substituted a spring provided by the LP. gas company. The "pure-accident" instruction related to the issue of proximate cause rather than the issue of liability.
In Condor, the opinion written for the Court by Justice Pivarnik, is in agreement with a long line of cases which hold that an accident instruction is not necessarily reversible when it deals with the burden of proof, e.g., proximate cause. Perry v. Goss (1970), 253 Ind. 603, 255 N.E.2d 923, 928; Ernst v. Sparacino (1978), 177 Ind.App. 610, 380 N.E.2d 1271, 1277; Anderson v. Baker (1975), 166 Ind.App. 324, 335 N.E.2d 831, 834; Adkins v. Elvard (1973), 155 Ind.App. 672, 294 N.E.2d 160, 163; Wilson Freight Co. v. Scheurich (1968), 143 Ind.App. 53, 238 N.E.2d 25, 30, or the issue of proximate causation, Chamberlain v. Deaconess Hospital, Inc., (1975), 163 Ind.App. 324, 324 N.E.2d 172, 174-175; Jessop v. Werner Transportation Co., (1970), 147 Ind.App. 408, 261 N.E.2d 598, 602. Additionally, Justice Pivarnik concluded in his opinion that the instruction was harmless error since the proper application of law was covered by other instructions. In Chaffee's case, there were no other instructions to clarify the standard of liability.
The "pure-accident" instruction has been disapproved time and time again by the Indiana Supreme Court, the Indiana Court of Appeals, and singularly disapproved by the Majority. The "pure-accident" instruction is confusing, misleading and a plague upon the administration of justice.
*243The only way to rid the courtroom of the scourge of "pure-accident" instructions is to reverse.