Court Opinion

ID: 9862934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:31:46.179638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:38.407575
License: Public Domain

*59Justice WALLACE,
concurring.
I concur with the Court’s analysis regarding our jurisprudence that inconsistent verdicts should stand when the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of the substantive offense. State v. Grey, 147 N.J. 4, 10, 11, 685 A.2d 923 (1996).
I write separately to discuss an issue that is not properly raised before us, but may have contributed to the inconsistent verdicts. The misgiving I have concerns the failure of the trial court to fully respond to the jury’s question concerning the unlawful possession count.
Preliminarily, I agree that the trial court properly charged the jury on the elements the State must prove for the jury to find defendant guilty on the count of possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose. The majority opinion sets forth the charge as related to that count. The trial court clearly explained the State’s claim that defendant’s unlawful purpose in possessing the firearm was to “unlawfully confine Carmen Miles with the purpose to commit the crime of aggravated sexual assault upon Carmen Miles.”
During deliberations, however, one of the notes the jury sent to the court stated:
It is our reading of the counts that if a guilty verdict is found in Count 4 [possession of the B.B. gun for an unlawful purpose] a guilty verdict must also be found on either aggravated sexual assault or kidnapping. We believe that specifically the fourth element states: In this case the State contends that the defendant’s unlawful purpose in possessing the firearms was to unlawfully confine Miles for the purpose to commit the crime of aggravated sexual assault on Miles.
After conferring with counsel, the trial court merely reminded the jury of its obligation to consider each offense separately and jto render a verdict as to each count. The foreperson indicated, however, that the court’s statements were not responsive to the jury’s concern, and the following colloquy ensued:
*60Court: Well, perhaps it may be helpful, you must render a verdict as to each count individually.
Foreman: Somewhat. I don’t know if we’re allowed to articulate our concern.
Court: Why don’t you do this? Keeping in mind each count is a separate offense and you have to render your verdict as to each charge. If you have a further question, let me know.
In my view, in response to the foreman’s comment about articulating the jury’s concern, the trial court should have instructed the foreman to present that concern in writing. It is evident that the foreman’s response, after the trial court attempted to answer the jury’s question without knowing what troubled the jury, demonstrated that the jury was still confused.
More importantly, because the jury’s note conveyed its belief that it must decide the counts consistent with one another, the trial court’s reply that the jury should consider each charge separately may have inappropriately led the jury to believe that it properly could reach inconsistent verdicts. Although after the jury has reached its verdicts, we will generally not disturb them even when they are inconsistent, during trial, the court should not inferentially or otherwise convey to the jury that it may apply lenity to reach inconsistent verdicts.
In the absence of the trial court requesting the foreperson to express his concern in writing, at the very least, the court should have informed the jury that in a criminal case, the jury cannot create its own unlawful purpose, but must decide whether the purpose alleged by the State has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In that vein, the court should have instructed the jury along the following lines:
It may be helpful to restate that as jurors, you may not rely on your own notions of the unlawful purpose of the defendant. Rather, you must consider whether the State has proven the unlawful purpose charged. The unlawful purpose alleged by the State was to confine Carmen Miles with the purpose to commit the crime of aggravated sexual assault upon her. I instruct you that unless you find the unlawful purpose, as the State contends, was to confine Ms. Miles for the purpose to commit the crime of aggravated sexual assault upon her, you must find defendant not guilty of that charge. If you find the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the unlawful purpose and each of the elements charged, you may find defendant guilty of that offense.
*61Chief Justice PORITZ and Justice LONG join in this concurrence.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO — 7.
For concurrence — Chief Justice PORTTZ and Justices LONG and WALLACE — 8.