Court Opinion

ID: 9704444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:36:08.631025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:01.849235
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: The majority’s assertion that there is no ambiguity in section 11—501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 951/2, par. 11—501) is belied by the split of authority on the subject. If there were no disagreement among reasonable and experienced judges as to the statute’s meaning, our court would probably never have agreed to hear the case in the first place. The majority has now decreed the statute to be clear only because it must. Its analysis could not stand any other way. To admit any room for a difference of opinion would compel a contrary result. Settled principles of statutory construction provide that if a penal statute calling for the enhancement of a penalty can reasonably be construed in more than one way, we must apply a rule of lenity and construe the statute strictly in favor of the accused. (See Fitzsimmons v. Norgle (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 369, 374; People v. Carlock (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 1100, 1102.) Under that approach, a defendant could not be deemed to have "committed” a DUI offense within the meaning of section 11—501(d)(1) of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 951/2, par. 11—501(d)(1)) where, as here, the DUI offense resulted in a successfully completed term of supervision. The majority reaches a contrary conclusion based on dictionary definitions and inconsistency in the legislature’s choice of words. These considerations, however, must yield to the fundamental tenet of our system of jurisprudence which holds that we cannot know if an offense has been "committed,” as a matter of law, unless and until there has been a conviction. (See People v. Phillips (1978), 56 Ill. App. 3d 689, 695; Carlock, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 1102.) Because a discharge and dismissal upon the successful conclusion of supervision does not result in a conviction (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1005—6—3.1(f); Kirwan v. Welch (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 163, 166), a DUI offense resulting in a successfully completed term of supervision cannot be used for enhancement purposes under section 11—501 of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 951/2, par. 11—501). Although the legislative history is sketchy, remarks by one of the law’s sponsors directly support this interpretation of the statute. As the appellate court noted in this case, Representative Thomas J. McCracken, who had the final word on the legislation prior to the floor vote, specifically indicated that the enhancement provision would not become operative until a defendant had become a "fourth offender.” A first offense for which supervision was received would not count. The defendant would be subject to enhancement only where he had two additional convictions between completion of supervision and conviction of the offense for which enhancement was sought by the State. (People v. Sheehan (1994), 261 Ill. App. 3d 325, 330.) For all of these reasons, I would hold that the appellate court was correct in affirming the dismissal of the complaints charging defendants with felony DUI offenses. Accordingly, I dissent.