Court Opinion

ID: 9647820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:51:36.92774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:53.736649
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
MORRISON, Judge.
Appellant’s first and principal ground of error should be sustained. The officers had no arrest or search warrant. It is clear that appellant was under arrest. The following testimony by Officer Brown on cross examination was not set forth in the majority opinion:
“Q. I see, when you ascertained his name, was he free to leave?
A. No.
Q. So, all right, so during the time that you had this conversation with him pertaining to the gun, he was under arrest, is that correct?
A. Yes. After I found out his name.”
This search cannot be justified under the rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153, and Warden Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, supra. In the case at bar four hours had elapsed from the time the officer began his investigation to the time of the arrest. In McDonald, supra, the Court said, “This guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to the innocent and guilty alike.”
To hold as the majority does would authorize coercive type warrantless entry of any citizen’s bedroom at four o’clock in the morning by a number of armed police officers seeking information. This is and always has been prohibited by our Constitution.
This cannot be a case of invitation or consent because the identity of the lady who admitted the officers was not shown. The officer could not recall who lived at the address where the search was made. There was no testimony indicating that appellant himself invited the officers in or consented to the search. He was alone in bed when four officers came and began to ask him questions. Under such circum*675stances, consent to search cannot be inferred or presumed. It cannot be said that appellant volunteered the information about the whereabouts of the pistol, because the officer said that “he didn’t answer at first.” Then, “I asked him again.”
The proper rule, as I view it, has been enunciated by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Stockman, 63 Cal. 494, 47 Cal.Rptr. 365, 407 P.2d 277; People v. Charles, Cal., 57 Cal.Rptr. 745, 425 P.2d 545; and People v. Doherty, Cal., 59 Cal. Rptr. 857, 429 P.2d 177. It is that “the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the statement in question was not the fruit of a forbidden interrogation.” People v. Charles, supra. It is conceded that no warning was given in the case at bar, and therefore, the interrogation was forbidden because the Miranda warning was not given.
I respectfully dissent.