Court Opinion

ID: 9852217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:26:42.553446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.313753
License: Public Domain

GREENE, Judge,
concurring in the result.
I believe: (I) Christopher’s records from the Emerson Waldorf School (School) were inadmissible hearsay, and (II) plaintiffs’ post-judgment settlements with the Lowmans and West were not sanctioned by Chapter IB of our General Statutes. Nonetheless, as plaintiffs have not been prejudiced by these errors, I concur in the result.
I
“ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the de-clarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1999).
*185In this case, one of the defendants, while cross-examining Cathy Sterling (Sterling) about her testimony regarding Christopher’s post-accident behavior, read from Christopher’s School records. The information contained in these records tended to contradict Sterling’s testimony given on direct. Plaintiffs argue on appeal that these School records constitute inadmissible hearsay, even if used for impeachment purposes during the cross-examination of a witness. I agree. Defendants were challenging the veracity of Sterling’s testimony using the School records. Defendants, therefore, were offering the School records as the truth of the matter and, thus, these records were properly used for impeachment purposes only if admissible under some exception to the hearsay rule. Defendants, however, made no effort to qualify the records under any recognized hearsay exception, and plaintiffs failed to object at trial to the use of these records on the grounds they were inadmissible hearsay.3 Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot now do so on appeal. See State v. Campbell, 296 N.C. 394, 399, 250 S.E.2d 228, 231 (1979) (“the admission of evidence without objection waives prior or subsequent objection to the admission of evidence of a similar character”).
II
Defendants Soucy Trucking and Caron’s appeal raises an issue not yet determined by our appellate courts: whether a plaintiff may settle with fewer than all of the defendants after the liability of multiple defendants has been established by the trial court as joint and several. Section lB-4(2) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that if the plaintiff gives, in “good faith,” a release to one of two or more joint tort-feasors, this release “discharges the tort-feasor . . . from all liability for contribution to any other tort-feasor.” N.C.G.S. § 1B-4(2) (1999). On the other hand, section lB-3(f) provides that once a judgment is entered establishing the joint and several liability *186of multiple defendants, that judgment “shall be binding as among such defendants in determining their right to contribution.” N.C.G.S. § 1B-3(f) (1999). If section lB-4(2) is read to include post-judgment releases, the release of one of the joint tort-feasors in exchange for his pro rata share of the initial judgment could result in the remaining joint tort-feasors being liable for a larger contribution in the event of a new trial. For example: a judgment is entered against three defendants for $100,000.00 based on a joint and several liability jury verdict. The plaintiff appeals the case and on appeal, settles with defendant A for its pro rata share of the $100,000.00 verdict and provides defendant A with a release. Subsequently, the appellate court orders a new trial on the issue of damages and on retrial, the jury awards plaintiff $300,000.00 against defendants B and C. Are defendants B and C entitled to seek contribution from defendant A for $100,000.00, a pro rata share of the new verdict, on the grounds their joint and several liability was established in the first judgment? One reading of section lB-4(2) would suggest defendants B and C are not entitled to any contribution because the release of defendant A discharges his liability for any contribution to defendants B and C. Such a reading, however, directly conflicts with section lB-3(f), which sets contribution rights once joint and several liability is established. Accordingly, section lB-4(2) must be read to apply to only pre-judgment settlements, see Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 170-71, 175 S.E.2d 769, 771-72 (1970) (setting out contribution rights of joint and several defendants where plaintiff settled with one defendant prior to trial), as the entry of a judgment against two or more joint tort-feasors necessarily fixes a defendant’s right to contribution for any amount paid in excess of his pro rata share, see N.C.G.S. § 1B-1(b) (1999). To hold otherwise would permit the injured plaintiff party to “apportion the loss among joint tort[-]feasors as he sees fit,” an option inconsistent with Chapter 1B. See Bishop v. Klein, 402 N.E.2d 1365, 1372 (Mass. 1980).
In this case, plaintiffs were not authorized to settle post judgment with defendants West and Lowmans and the trial court therefore erred in approving the settlements. Because, however, we have not ordered a new trial in this case, defendants Soucy Trucking and Caron have not been prejudiced by the settlements as they cannot be required to pay an amount in excess of their pro rata share of the judgment.4

. When defendants first attempted to cross-examine Sterling about the School records, plaintiffs objected on the grounds they were “not part of discovery and... not on the pretrial order.” After some extensive examination of Sterling about the School records by defendants, plaintiffs did object to the use of “an unwritten report [contained in the School records] that we’ve never seen.” This objection was overruled and defendants were allowed to read the unwritten report to Sterling. This “unwritten report,” however, did not contain any information that had not already been admitted into evidence. I note plaintiffs did, at the beginning of defendants’ examination about the School records, object to defendants distributing copies of the School records to the jury, although the objection was sustained by the trial court. Later, defendants again requested permission to pass to the jury the School records and plaintiffs did not object at that time. Thus, plaintiffs cannot, on this record, complain about the use of the School records to cross-examine Sterling or their distribution to the jury.

. Had we ordered a new trial on damages, because of the likelihood of a new judgment in excess of the $62,600.00 judgment, the settlement would have been null and void and all defendants would have been a party of that new trial.