Court Opinion

ID: 9369270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 16:03:04.185995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:13.928985
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 50
                    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                        DIVISION IV
                                         No. E-22-390

 DANIEL CARMAN                                   Opinion Delivered February   8, 2023
                                 APPELLANT
                                                 APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
                                                 BOARD OF REVIEW
 V.                                              [NO. 2021-BR-05605]

 DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF
 WORKFORCE SERVICES; AND
 DEWAYNE HIGGINS TRUCKING CO.,
 INC.
                       APPELLEES AFFIRMED

                            WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

       Daniel Carman appeals the Arkansas Board of Review’s (the “Board’s”) decision

disqualifying him from unemployment benefits under Arkansas Code Annotated Section 11-10-

507(3)(A) (Supp. 2021) on the basis of its finding that he was not able and available to perform

suitable work. We affirm.

       Carman was seventy-two years old and an over-the-road truck driver for Dewayne Higgins

Trucking Company when the COVID-19 pandemic began. His last day working was March 28,

2020, and he applied for regular unemployment benefits on April 6, 2020. In his application,

he cited his separation from work as “Laid Off: Lack of Work.” He stated that he could begin

work immediately and that he had not refused any job since he became unemployed. His

employer responded to the claim, alleging that Carman did not want to work due to the
coronavirus. The Arkansas Division of Workforce Services (the “Division”) began paying

Carman weekly benefits for the week ending April 11.

       Over a year later on June 3, 2021, Carman completed an able-and-available statement

providing that he was not “able and available for work from April 20 through July 30, 2020”

due to his “COPD and heart trouble.” He stated that he would not have reported to work during

this period if work had been available. He explained that he was unable to work due to the

pandemic and the CDC’s warning that individuals with medical conditions should “self-

quarantine.”

       On October 19, 2021, the Division issued a notice of agency determination to the parties

disqualifying Carman from receiving unemployment benefits under section 11-10-507(3)(A) on

the ground that he was not available for suitable work for personal reasons. Carman filed a

timely appeal of the notice to the Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”), which conducted a hearing

on November 11.

       The hearing officer framed the issue to be decided as whether Carman was unemployed,

physically and mentally able to perform suitable work, available for such work, and doing those

things a reasonably prudent individual would be expected to do to secure work as required by

section 11-10-507(3)(A). The only testimony presented was from Carman, who admitted that he

was not available to work during the relevant time period “because of the pandemic, my health.”

He testified that his employer provided no masks, gloves, or hand sanitizer and that his wife,

who worked in a pharmacy at the time, was also unable to get supplies. He said that he did not

take medical leave but simply told his employer that it was not safe for him to work because of

his COPD and heart condition.

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       Following the hearing, the Tribunal affirmed the Division’s determination, specifically

finding that Carman was unavailable to work—and consequently ineligible for benefits—from

April 5 through August 1, 2020, “due to having personal health issues and could not be exposed

to COVID-19.” The Tribunal also found that Carman’s employer failed to accommodate him

with proper safety items for protection from COVID-19 to perform his job duties.

       Carman timely appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Board and included two

additional items with his petition for appeal. The first is a letter to Carman and “to whom it

may concern” from his nurse practitioner stating that Carman was off work during the relevant

time period because he has multiple medical conditions putting him at a high risk for

complications related to COVID-19. The second item is a letter to the Board from Carman

alleging that he was eligible for “PUA through the CARES Act.” 1 The Board issued a decision

on June 2, 2022, affirming and adopting the Tribunal’s decision as its own. The Board then

referenced Carman’s PUA argument in the following paragraph:

       The Board notes the claimant’s appeal to the Board in which he references the
       application of the CARES Act § 2102(a)(3)(A) to his claim for benefits. This matter
       involves a claim for regular unemployment insurance benefits, which is a separate
       process. As such, any claims relying on the CARES Act are not currently before the Board
       and cannot be considered in this decision. The claimant was unavailable for work during
       the period in question. Therefore, the claimant was not able and available to perform
       suitable work.

Carman filed a timely appeal of this decision.

       1
        PUA, Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, is one of several federal financial-assistance
programs created by the federal government during the COVID-19 pandemic. See Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 9021 to § 9034).

                                                 3
       We affirm the decision of the Board when it is supported by substantial evidence.

Hourston v. Dir., 2022 Ark. App. 142, at 4. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as

reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We view the evidence

and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Id. Even if the

evidence could support a different decision, our review asks whether the Board could have

reasonably reached its decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Cely v. Dir., 2022 Ark.

App. 384, at 3, 653 S.W.3d 394, 397. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded

their testimony are matters to be resolved by the Board. Higgins v. Dir., 2016 Ark. App. 449, at

6, 503 S.W.3d 833, 837.

       The primary issue before us is whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision

that Carman was ineligible for benefits from April 5 through August 1, 2020, because he was

unavailable for work. In order to be eligible to receive benefits, a worker must be unemployed,

physically and mentally able to perform suitable work, and “available for the work.” Ark. Code

Ann. § 11-10-507(3)(A). Here, Carman filed an able-and-available statement specifically stating

that he was unavailable to work during the relevant time period due to personal health issues

during the COVID-19 pandemic. His own testimony confirmed this at the hearing. And he does

not dispute on appeal that he was unavailable to work from April 5 through August 1, 2020.

This is substantial evidence that supports the Board’s decision.

       Carman notes in his brief that under section 11-10-507(3)(G), no individual shall be

considered “unavailable” if, during the entire week, he is “required to withdraw from the labor

market for less than four days of the week because of a compelling personal emergency.” To the

extent Carman is attempting to apply this exception as an argument for reversal, we decline to

                                                4
address it. Carman did not make this argument below, and we do not consider issues raised for

the first time on appeal. Rossini v. Dir., 81 Ark. App. 286, 288, 101 S.W.3d 266, 268 (2003).2

       Carman devotes considerable argument to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-513,

which governs disqualification for voluntarily leaving work. Because he was not found ineligible

for benefits under this section, it is not applicable to the issues on appeal.

       We turn now to Carman’s argument challenging the Board’s determination that the

CARES Act is inapplicable to his unemployment claim. He contends that the CARES Act

applies because he received Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) benefits

and because he is entitled to PUA benefits due to his underlying health conditions and the

increased risks he would face if infected by the coronavirus.

       Carman is correct that he received FPUC benefits under the CARES Act. FPUC benefits

were paid by the federal government to states that entered into an agreement with the Secretary

of Labor under the CARES Act, which Arkansas did. 15 U.S.C. § 9023(a), (b)(1). The states

then distributed the FPUC payments—$600 each week during the time relevant to this appeal—

to individuals “otherwise entitled under the State law to receive” regular unemployment

compensation. 15 U.S.C. § 9023(b)(1), (b)(3). The record reflects that Carman’s weekly benefits

included $306 in state unemployment benefits and $600 in FPUC benefits. However, as stated

earlier, the Board found, and we have affirmed herein, that Carman was unavailable for work

and thus ineligible for benefits under section 11-10-507(3)(A), which includes state

unemployment compensation benefits and FPUC benefits.

       2
       We note that Carman was not unavailable for only four days of any week but for sixteen
consecutive weeks.

                                                 5
       The Board’s finding that the CARES Act does not apply to Carman’s claim is not related

to his receipt of FPUC benefits. Rather, the Board’s finding relates to Carman’s claim below

and on appeal that he is entitled to PUA benefits under the CARES Act § 2102(a)(3)(A). The

Board found that Carman’s claim was for regular unemployment only and that his claim for

PUA benefits was not before the Board and could not be considered in this claim. Substantial

evidence supports these findings.

       Nothing in the record on appeal indicates that Carman filed a claim for PUA benefits,

which must be filed and processed separately from a claim for state unemployment benefits.

Wright v. Dir., 2022 Ark. App. 222, 646 S.W.3d 150. Indeed, one of the prerequisites for filing

a successful claim for PUA is that the individual is not eligible for regular unemployment

compensation. Soler v. Dir., 2022 Ark. App. 37, at 3 (discussing in detail the PUA program). This

appeal originates from Carman’s filing for regular state employment benefits only. 3

       For the reasons stated above, we affirm the Board’s decision.

       Affirmed.

       GRUBER and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

       DeeAnna Weimar, for appellant.

       Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee director, Division of

Workforce Services.

       3
     We express no opinion regarding Carman’s eligibility for PUA benefits under the
CARES Act.

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