Court Opinion

ID: 9837047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:16:06.723802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:20.036266
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Judge
(concurring in the result):
I agree with the result reached in the majority opinion, but I write separately to set out my rationale for affirming the decision of the court below.
The term “military property” under Article 121 was not defined in paragraph 46e(l),* Part TV, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.), which was in effect at the time of appellant’s offenses. The term was defined, however, in the discussion section of Article 108 in paragraph 32(c)(1).* I agree with the majority that the definition under Article 108 is applicable to Article 121.
Although appellant admitted during the plea inquiry that the property was “military property,” his agreement with a legal conclusion is not necessarily sufficient to establish a factual predicate for his pleas. See United States v. Outhier, 45 MJ 326, 331 (1996) (“Mere conclusions of law recited by an accused are insufficient to provide a factual basis for a guilty plea.”). However, he also admitted that he was an authorized purchasing agent for the Air Force, and that he used a government credit card, thereby obligating the Air Force to pay for the property. He admitted that the items purchased were items that could be used by the Air Force to operate its refrigeration systems. He admitted that the Air Force had actual possession of those items that he took to his place of duty. The Government asserts, and I agree, that the Air Force had constructive possession of those items that appellant took to his home. See United States v. Simonds, 20 MJ 279, 280 (CMA 1985) (“In a general sense, all property purchased with federal funds and owned or held by a service is military property.”).
In my view, the foregoing facts are a sufficient factual predicate for the pleas of guilty. See RCM 910(e), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1998 ed.), and United States v. Davenport, 9 MJ 364, 367 (CMA 1980) (factual basis for plea required). Appellant made no statements inconsistent with his pleas of guilty. See RCM 910(h)(2) and United States v. Penister, 25 MJ 148 (CMA 1987) (statements inconsistent with plea must be resolved or plea set aside.). Accordingly, I join the majority in concluding that there is no “substantial basis” for setting aside the guilty pleas. See United States v. Prater, 32 MJ 433, 436 (CMA 1991).

 These paragraphs remain the same in the 1998 edition.