Court Opinion

ID: 9829978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:46:55.641618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:26.273894
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
While we have decided to overrule the motion for- rehearing, there are certain points of attack upon our opinion which we wish to briefly discuss.
We stated that there was no train between 12:40 a. m. and 2:40 a. m., and no train between 4:35 and 7:50 a. m. It is urged that this finding is in conflict with the undisputed evidence, especially with thei train sheet, which was introduced in evidence and not controverted. We have examined this document again, and do not agree that it shows the arrival of troop trains or government supply trains during the intervals mentioned. Furthermore, while there was testimony by the railway employes to the effect that their entire time was taken up with government business from the arrival of the cattle in question until the unloading of the same, there is ample ro.om in the evidence to raise an issue in this respect. Not only were the employes interested witnesses, and the jury privileged to disbelieve their testimony on this point, in the' light of the other evidence, but there were other facts upon which the jury were entitled to conclude that the cattle could have been unloaded many hours before they were placed at the unloading switch. As heretofore pointed out, the yardmaster testified that if he had known the cattle had been in the .cars almost 36 hours upon their arrival at Sander-son, he would have instructed the conductor to take them to the stockyards and unload them. This alone we think made the issue one for the jury. However,' that is not all. The agent at Sanderson testified that the cars containing the cattle could have been taken from the yards and placed at the unloading switch in about 15 or 20 minutes, and the stockyards were not more than about a half to three-fourths of a mile from the station. Furthermore, Emmit Buck testified that immediately upon arrival of the cattle at Sanderson he asked the yardmaster to place the cars for unloading immediately, and that the employé promised to do so in a few minutes; that throughout the night he several times made a similar request, and was promised that the cattle would be unloaded at a certain time ahead, but that this was not done. He also testified that the yardmaster did not appear to be busy. We have no doubt that these facts were sufficient to take the question to the jury.
It is also urged that our holding is in conflict with the case of Railway v. Daggett, 87 Tex. 322, 28 S. W. 525, a decision by the Supreme Court. The point here specifically made is that we erred in holding that the special issue, presenting the defense that the caretakers were negligent in not attending to and looking after the stock, was properly refused, because there was no pleading to support it. An examination of the case cited discloses that it is not in conflict with our ruling, for the reason that it was there specially pleaded by the railway company that the injuries to the cattle resulted from the negligence of the plaintiff in deserting the cattle and refusing to give them proper attention. This was, in effect, specifically pleading a breach of the contract. In the present case there was no such pleading.
We have carefully examined the answer of the railway company, and find that, while they specifically pleaded the stipulations of the contract, there was no allegation that plaintiff or his caretakers had failed to properly look after and attend to the stock. The only attempt to make this plea, suggested in the motion for rehearing, is in paragraph 7 of the answer. The default of negligence there complained of, however, was not the failure of plaintiff or his caretakers to look after the stock, or to give them attention while in the cars, but is restricted to alleged delay and negligence on their part in unloading the stock at Sanderson. It is clear from the undisputed evidence that the shipper could not possibly have been at fault in this respect, because he could not unload his stock until the cars were placed at the unloading switch. The averment is that if any delay occurred in unloading the stock at Sanderson, it was not due to any default or negligence of defendant, but resulted from the negligent failure of plaintiff to unload his stock with reasonable promptness and to properly comply with his contract and said rule of the Railroad Commission. The Commission rule referred to was one which made it the duty of the shipper to load and unload his live stock. As pleaded, it had no relation to the failure of plaintiff to look after his stock in any other respect. It is *896clear, we think, that even as against a general demurrer, the allegation cannot fairly he construed to be a claim that the plaintiff was in. default or was negligent in failing to look after or attend to his stock, except as to alleged delay in unloading his stock. The language, “the negligent failure of plaintiff to unload his stock with reasonable promptness, and to properly comply with his contract and said rule of the Railroad Commission,” is qualified by what precedes it, and cannot be said to be a pleading that the plaintiff had failed to comply with his contract in any other respect except as to delay in unloading. For these reasons, we adhere to the conclusion that plaintiff was not entitled to the special instruction requested upon this issue. ,
In the opinion we also stated that there was no evidence raising this issue. A more careful consideration of the statement of facts convinces us that in this we were in error. The evidence, while meager, embraces testimony which tended to show that plaintiff or his caretakers were negligent in not lessening the damages by giving proper attention to the cattle while in the cars at Sanderson. However, as we have held there was no pleading to support this defense, the evidence would be unavailing to plaintiff in error.
Since the submission of the motion for rehearing, counsel for appellant has called our attention to two cases, which it is claimed are in conflict with our conclusion: Railway v. Harrington, 209 S. W. 685, and Hines v. Wards, 228 S. W. 1117. We have read both of these cases carefully.
As to the first, the Court of Civil Appeals merely held, as had been previously decided by the Supreme Court in several cases, that where there is a general plea of contributory negligence it is sufficient, in the absence of general demurrer, to authorize testimony in support of the plea, and will entitle .the defendant to a specific submission of the defense. Our opinion does not militate in the least against this doctrine. The distinguishing feature is that in the Harrington Case there was expressly involved a general plea of contributory negligence, whereas in the present case no such plea is to be found. We have examined the answer again very carefully, and the only claim of negligence on the part of the plaintiff is his alleged delay in unloading the cattle from the cars.
With reference to the other case cited, it would appear to support the appellant’s contention that some of the questions and answers of some of the witnesses here were violative of the rule announced by the Supreme Court in the Roberts Case, 101 Tex. 420, 108 S. W. 808. However, in the absence of a more complete statement of the testimony of the witness in the case of Hines v. Wards, it is an unsafe conclusion to say that the decision is directly in point. We have given this question renewed consideration, and adhere to the conclusion that the testimony complained of in the present case is not in conflict with the rule announced in the Roberts Case. When the entire testimony of these witnesses is considered, it is clear to our minds that they did not testify to either legal conclusions or upon mixed questions of law and fact.
In addition to authorities cited in the original opinion, we refer to the following: Railway Co. v. West, 149 S. W. 207, a decision by this court; and to the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Conner, in Railway Co. v. McIntyre, 152 S. W. 1105; and Railway v. Gatewood, 185 S. W. 936.
It is not thought necessary to discuss any other questions. The motion has been given due consideration, but we believe it should be overruled, which is accordingly done.