Court Opinion

ID: 9743794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:43:23.625742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:43.620228
License: Public Domain

Dissent
JACKSON, C. J.
I am in disagreement with the conclusions and result reached in the majority opinion and dissent, thereto.
Appellant in the argument section of its brief, paragraph VIII,.makes the following argument:
“In order to fully orient the Court on the background of the instant case, Appellant will first set forth a brief synopsis of the case history.
“On June 2, 1959, in the Allen County Circuit Court, the Appellee was convicted by a jury for the crime of embezzlement. The jury’s verdict merely found the Appellee guilty; it did not set out the punishment. (See Tr., p. 26)
*652“On June 2, 1959, the Allen Circuit Court sentenced the Appellee to fifteen (15) years in the Indiana State Prison. (See Tr., p. 26)
“On September 19, 1963, the Appellee filed his Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the LaPorte Circuit Court, and on October 4, 1963, Appellant filed his Motion to Quash Appellee’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The LaPorte Circuit Court, after argument, overruled the Motion to Quash, thus forming the issue for this appeal.
“In the habeas corpus proceedings below, Appellee principally based his argument upon the case of Palmer v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 73, 152 N. E. 607, and Shoemaker v. Dowd (1953), 232 Ind. 602, 115 N. E. (2d) 443, and also upon Burns’ Indiana Statutes (1956 Repl.), Section 9-1819.
“Succinctly stated, Appellee’s theory in the LaPorte Circuit Court was this:
“Since the duty to set the punishment devolved upon the jury under Burns’ Section 9-1819, supra, (the crime of embezzlement falling within the provisions of this statute), it was, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the trial court to set the punishment at fifteen (15) years. Appellee relied upon the case of Palmer v. State, supra, which states that when the jury fails to assess the punishment in those cases where it is required to do so by statute, such failure does not make the verdict void, but rather through a legal fiction, the guilty verdict is held to necessarily imply that the jury has assessed the punishment at the minimum number of years for which penalty clause of the statute calls. Hence, it is Appellee’s contention that the jury’s silient (sic) assessment of the punishment means that technically under the authority of the aforementioned Palmer case, supra, the jury assessed his punishment at two (2) years; and thus, the Court acted beyond its jurisdiction in sentencing him to a greater number of years — fifteen (15), in the instant case. In short, Appellee concedes that the portion of the sentence up to two (2) years was valid, but that the remainder of his sentence was excessive and void. Appellee used the case of Shoemaker v. State, supra, and its attendant dicta in the court *653below for his contention that that part of the sentence in excess of two (2) years was void.”
Appellant’s motion for new trial consists of two grounds, viz:
“1. The Court erred in overruling the Respondent’s Motion to Quash.
“2. The finding of the trial court is contrary to law.”
Appellant’s Assignment of Error is the single ground:
“1. The Court erred in overruling Appellant’s Motion For A New Trial.”
Appellant at paragraph VI, page 44 of its brief states:
“Since the judgment of the trial court is not assailed by Appellant as being contrary to law in the instant appeal, Appellant therefore waives this cause in his Motion for New Trial;....”
The statute under which appellee was charged, tried and convicted in pertinent part reads as follows:
“Every . . . employee ... of any . . . financial institution, . . . who, having access to, control or possession of any money ... to the possession of which his employer is entitled, shall, while in such employment, take, purloin, secrete or . . . appropriate to his own use . . . any money ... deposited with or held by such . . . financial institution . . . shall be deemed guilty of embezzlement, and, on' conviction, shall be imprisoned in the state prison for any determinate period of not less than two [2] years nor more than twenty [20] years and in addition to such imprisonment he shall be fined not less than one dollar [$1.00] nor more than one thousand dollars [$1,000.00], tf
Acts 1935, ch. 233, §1, p. 1229, §10-1704 Burns’ 1956 Replacement.
The determinate sentence statute in effect at the *654time of appellee’s conviction reads in pertinent part as follows:
“Verdict — Assessment of fine or punishment. —When the defendant is found guilty the jury, except in the cases provided for, in the next three [two] sections, must state, in the verdict, the amount of fine and the punishment to be inflicted; where the plea is guilty, or the trial is by the court, the court, subject to the same exception, shall assess the amount of fine and fix the punishment to be inflicted.”
Acts 1927, ch. 200, §1, p. 574, §9-1819, Burns’ 1956 Replacement.
The majority opinion is predicated on the theory that the remedy of habeas corpus is not available to the appellee in the instant case due to the intervention of Rule 2-40B and the case of Dowd, Warden v. Todd (1962), 243 Ind. 232, 184 N. E. 2d 4. A reading of the Rule (2-40B) and the Dowd case, supra, clearly indicates the procedure there outlined is applicable to the correction of an erroneous, not void, judgment.
In the case at bar the jury found the defendant guilty of the crime of embezzlement, the verdict did not fix the punishment as required by §9-1819, Burns’ 1956 Replacement, supra; hence the verdict could only be construed as giving the trial court, legal jurisdiction to impose on appellee only the minimum sentence of two years, plus $1.00 fine and the costs of the action. At the time this cause was tried the two statutes previously mentioned, §10-1704 and §9-1819 Burns’, supra, were in full force and effect and must be construed together. When the trial court imposed on appellee a sentence of fifteen [15] years and a fine of $1,000.00, the excess of thirteen [13] years imprisonment and the fine in the excess sum of $999.00, was beyond the jurisdiction of the court under the verdict to impose, and was in direct contraven*655tion of the statute. Thus, the judgment of the court did not conform to the verdict of the jury nor the statutes of the State of Indiana, and that portion of the trial court’s sentence which exceeds the minimum sentence of two years and the minimum fine of $1.00 is completely void. The validity of the judgment extends only to that portion of the sentence provided by law, i.e., two years and $1.00 fine plus costs, everything in excess thereof is illegal, absolutely void, beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and may be attacked and vacated by means and way of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a writ of habeas corpus. United States v. Lynch. (1947), 7 Cir. 159 F. 2d 198; Shoemaker v. Dowd, Warden (1953), 232 Ind. 602, 115 N. E. 2d 443; Hunnicutt v. Frauhiger (1927), 199 Ind. 501, 158 N. E. 572; 15 I.L.E., Habeas Corpus, §15, Excessive Sentence; 29 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, §26 (3).
The attempted application of the theory enunciated in Dowd, Warden v. Todd (1962), 243 Ind. 232, supra, to the case at bar is inappropriate, unlawful, inapplicable. and amounts to a prostitution of the principles of jurisprudence. I point out that I dissented in Dowd, Warden v. Todd, supra, and subsequent events have served only to confirm my belief that the majority opinion in the Dowd case was bad law, and that the judgment there appealed from should have been affirmed. In Dowd, Warden, v. Todd, supra, the central issue was the determination that a lesser crime was included in one of greater magnitude. That question is not involved in the case at bar, hence the Dowd case lends no support to the majority opinion. The finding and verdict of the jury could lead to only one judgment, in the instant case, under the indeterminate sentence statutes of Indiana. Assuming arguendo that at the time of the rendition of the judgment of conviction *656that the judgment could have been corrected by resort to Rule 2-40B, the corrected judgment would under the statute, have been limited to two years imprisonment, the imposition of a fine of $1.00 and costs, for the jury did not by its verdict specify the term of incarceration or the amount of the fine. That part of the judgment in excess of two years imprisonment and $1.00 fine and costs is invalid and void, and being so the remedy is by resort to the constitutionally guaranteed right to a writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant has waived the second specification or ground of his motion for new trial, namely that, “[t]he finding of the trial court is contrary to law.”, and has stated in its brief, “. . . the judgment of the trial court is not assailed as being contrary to law in the instant appeal, ... . .” The effect of such waiver and statement is tantamount to the appellant confessing that the findings of fact and judgment of the LaPorte Circuit Court is valid in every respect and is an admission of the accuracy and validity of the judgment of the. LaPorte Circuit Court in ordering the appellee released from custody. Further, by its waiver of such specification of its motion for a new trial appellant has removed all questions of law concerning the validity of the judgment of the LaPorte Circuit Court from consideration in this appeal and the cornerstone of the majority, opinion, that of the applicability of Dowd, Warden v. Todd (1962), 243 Ind. 232, 184 N. E. 2d 4, from consideration in this appeal. 2 I.L.E. Appeals, §423, Compliance or Acceptance of Benefits; Arnold v. Haberstock (1937), 213 Ind. 98, 10 N. E. 2d 591, 11 N. E. 2d 682.
I agree with the statements in Judge Achor’s separate opinion as contained in the first six paragraphs of such separate opinion. A defendant’s right *657to a writ of habeas corpus remains unimpaired under the circumstances present in the case at bar.
Notwithstanding erroneous dicta and ill considered opinions to the contrary, the statutes and the constitution of the State of Indiana require the State, to prove every element of crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant is not required at any time to take any affirmative action to protect and preserve his constitutional rights. There is no statutory or constitutional requirement that a defendant has a duty to object at the time of its rendition to a defective, prejudicial, erroneous or void judgment. He may with equanimity and safety stand mute and thereafter at such time as he chooses seek his proper remedy, and the denial or attempted denial of such right constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights under both the State and Federal Constitutions, and in addition thereto constitutes a violation of his civil rights under: Constitution of the United States, Amendments 5, 14; Constitution of Indiana, Art. 1, §21; Malloy v. Hogan (1964), 378 U. S. 1; Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U. S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229 (foot note 5).
The majority opinion in the concluding two or three pages leans heavily and relies greatly on the alleged agreement of the appellee and the prosecuting attorney to accept the judgment of the Allen Circuit Court as an estoppel of his right to the remedy of habeas corpus.
We point out that the so-called agreement on which the majority relies was not and is not a part of the record before us on appeal. Even if the so-called agreement were a part of the record, resort thereto shows appellee signed such agreement and “. . . said sentence of this court accepted as by law provided.” [Emphasis supplied.] The appellee, Arnold Hobbs, *658accepted the jurisdiction of the court to levy a sentence as provided by law. He has served that sentence and more and has fully complied with the agreement. All of the sentence greater than the minimum of two years and a fine greater than $1.00 and the costs of the action is void, and with it any extra legal provisions contained in the alleged or purported agreement. We further point out that reference to such agreement, much less reliance thereon by the majority of the court, is in derogation, denial and defiance of its own rule which does not permit questions to be raised for the first time on appeal, and the appellant raised the issue of the alleged agreement for the first time in oral argument before this court on the 6th day of May, 1965. Norton v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 201, 197 N. E. 2d 297; Tait v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 35, 188 N. E. 2d 537; McKay v. Carstens (1952), 231 Ind. 252, 108 N. E. 2d 249.
A habeas corpus proceeding being a civil action and this action being an appeal from a judgment of the LaPorte Circuit Court granting appellee a writ and his discharge the foot note one (being a reference to Acts 1947, ch. 189, §3, p. 625, §9-3303 Burns’ 1956 Replacement) of the majority opinion is not applicable to the case at bar as it applies to criminal actions and to specified special remedies not including habeas corpus.
The attempted casual dismissal of Witte v. Dowd, Warden (1952), 230 Ind. 485, 102 N. E. 2d 630, as dicta by the majority seeks to avoid the applicability of the well settled law so well set forth in that opinion. Although the restatement of the law on habeas corpus in . Witte v. Dowd, Warden, supra, did not force the release of Witte, it did once and for all state clearly that where the jurisdiction of the court is questioned and with it the capacity to render a valid judgment, *659this court on appeal can look behind the judgment to the record to determine the nub of the question, jurisdiction. Miller v. Snyder (1854), 6 Ind. 1; Smith v. Clausmeier (1893), 136 Ind. 105, 35 N. E. 904.
The attempt of this court to interpose a rule of court in a case where the question of a void judgment is raised merely by avoiding the use of the word “void” is in violation of Art. 1, §27, of the Indiana Constitution.
Ultimately, as in all endeavors, we come to the conclusion of the discussion of a case on the merits. That point has now been reached as we have herein heretofore point by point discussed and disposed of the points touched on in the majority opinion. I how point out that in actuality there is no appeal before this court in the case at bar. Why? The answer is simple, clear and concise. Appellant has waived specification two of his motion for new trial, in writing in its brief, and further therein makes this statement at page 44 of its brief, “VI . . . the judgment of the trial court is not assailed by the appellant as being contrary to law in the instant appeal . . .”, and again on page 44 of its brief it says, “VII. The sole error relied upon by Appellant in this appeal is that the trial court erred in overruling Appellant’s Motion to Quash the Appellee’s Writ of Habeas Corpus.” Appellant by its waiver and abandonment of its second specification of its motion for new trial recognized by its statement”. . . the judgment of the trial court is not assailed ...” and thereby acknowledges the validity and the correctness thereof. Hence, if the action of the trial court in overruling the motion to quash was erroneous, the judgment of the trial court would of necessity be “contrary to law.” Appellant cannot, after its waiver and its admission thereby that the judgment of the LaPorte Circuit Court is *660in all respects valid, proper and binding on all parties to that action, now sneak in the back door and collaterally attack such judgment by asserting one of the processes by which the judgment was reached was erroneous. The ruling on the motion was merged in the judgment as previously pointed out, consequently in fact as well as in law, the legal effect of appellant's admission as to validity of the judgment took out with such admission the first specification of the motion for new trial, “[t]he Court erred in overruling the Respondent’s Motion to Quash,” and its sole Assignment of Error that [t]he Court erred in overruling Appellant’s Motion For A New Trial”, consequently there is here no valid appeal and the judgment of the LaPorte Circuit Court must stand uncontroverted and unchallenged in complete validity, integrity and with full force and effect. Arnold v. Haberstock (1937), 213 Ind. 98, 10 N. E. 2d 591, Poffinbarger v. Sumner (1917), 186 Ind. 597, 117 N. E. 646.
The judgment of the LaPorte Circuit Court should be affirmed.
Note. — Reported in 206 N. E. 2d 182.