Court Opinion

ID: 9774966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:39:38.866924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:18.377886
License: Public Domain

*121DAVIDSON, Judge
dissenting.
I cannot agree to the affirmance of this case. I respectfully enter my dissent.
I have reached the definite conclusion that the testimony showing the prior acts of misconduct and violations of the law on the part of the appellant was not admissible and that Dempsey v. State, 159 Texas Cr. R. 602, 266 S.W. 2d 875, is authority for that conclusion.
I am also convinced that the testimony of the witness Scarborough regarding his attempted arrest of the appellant, the difficulty that ensued, and the exchange of shots was not admissible. On the other hand, if Scarborough’s testimony was to be admitted and remain with the jury, then the charge upon murder without malice should have been given.
Scarborough’s testimony was sufficient to raise the issue of a killing without malice in that it showed the attempted arrest and the difficulty which ensued, including the exchange of shots in which appellant was wounded by a shot from Scarborough’s gun — all happening just prior to the meeting with the deceased, who was also a peace officer attempting to arrest the appellant.
The trial court should have responded to appellant’s request that such issue be submitted to the jury.
It must be remembered that there is no set formulae or state of facts by which it may be said that the issue of murder without malice is or is not presented. All that the statute (Art. 1257c, Vernon’s P.C.) requires is that there be enough facts to present the issue that the killing occurred under the immediate influence of a sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, by which is meant such cause as would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.
To sustain the action of the trial court in refusing to submit murder without malice, we must conclude that, as a matter of law, there are no facts in evidence which would authorize a jury to conclude that the mind of the appellant was incapable of cool reflection when he killed the deceased. Crabtree v. State, 187 *122Texas Cr. R. 63, 127 S.W. 2d 906; Stephens v. State, 145 Texas Cr. R. 100, 165 S.W. 2d 721.
I am of the opinion that the issue was raised by Scarborough’s testimony showing the attempted arrest, the difficulty which followed, and the ensuing shooting in which appellant, himself, was seriously wounded — all occurring just a short time before the killing.