Court Opinion

ID: 9676137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:15:48.286885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:44.402111
License: Public Domain

HEDGES, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion that renders judgment for Suzette Marshall on the Sacketts’ claim against her pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act for violation of their liberty interests by placing the Sacketts’ names in the HCCPS central registry.
Official immunity is the only ground on which we may reverse the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the Sacketts’ causes of action and render judgment that the Sacketts take nothing. See Tex.Civ. PRA.C. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(5) (Vernon Supp.1995). To support its assertion that Marshall was officially immune as to the Sacketts’ “liberty interest” cause of action, the majority points to the defendants’ summary judgment evidence that Marshall requested that the Sacketts’ names not be placed in the HCCPS central registry. Mar*937shall is not defending on the basis of official immunity; she is denying that she did the act in the first place. We cannot consider this issue because it is outside the permissible scope of this appeal. Boozier v. Hambrick, 846 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no wit).
I would affirm the summary judgment in favor of HCCPS, affirm the summary judgment in favor of Marshall as to all causes of action except the claim for violation of “liberty interest,” and reverse and remand as to that claim.