Court Opinion

ID: 9836746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:14:56.362325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.728665
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority’s decision regarding Issue I. I disagree with its decision on Issue II.
At the outset, I decline to join the majority’s advocacy of “free proof.” 53 MJ at 483. Our charter is to interpret and apply Rule 413, not to justify the wisdom of its promulgation.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this case “is the type of case in which this evidence was designed to be admitted.” 53 MJ at 483. I have grave doubts about the admissibility of the indecent assault on A1C P to prove the offenses against A1C D. The indecent assault on A1C P occurred on October 18, 1996, well after the offenses against A1C D. The offenses against A1C D were alleged to have occurred on April 26, 1996, 6 months before the indecent assault on A1C P, and during August 1996, 2 months before the indecent assault on A1C P.
While Rule 413 does not specifically set out a temporal requirement, legislative and scholarly commentators strongly suggest that an offense offered as evidence of propensity must precede the offense that the evidence is offered to prove. A week after the evidentiary changes Were adopted, Senator Robert Dole, a co-sponsor of the changes, described them on the Senate floor as “establishing a general presumption that evidence of past similar offenses in sexual assault and child molestation cases is admissible at trial.” 140 Cong. Rec. S.12990 (daily ed. September 20,1994) (emphasis added); see also S. Saltzburg, L. Schinasi, and D. Schlueter, Military Rules of Evidence Manual 616-18 (4th ed.1997), referring repeatedly to “history of similar misconduct,” “past similar transgressions,” “past sexual offense evidence,” and “past sexual offenses.” In the absence of persuasive federal authority to the contrary, I conclude that Rule 413 does riot authorize *487admission of evidence of sexual offenses committed after the charged offense. Accordingly, I would hold that the evidence was not admissible as propensity evidence under Rule 413.
Turning to the issue of prejudice, I am not convinced that the error was harmless. At trial the defense conceded that the evidence of appellant’s indecent assault on A1C P was admissible under Mil.R.Evid. 404(b), to prove his intent with respect to the alleged housebreaking. The defense, however, contested admission of the evidence as propensity evidence under Rule 413. After the military judge overruled the defense objections, he compounded the error by permitting trial counsel to argue propensity and instructing the members on the use of the evidence to show propensity.
The credibility of A1C D’s testimony was seriously undermined at trial. The court members did not believe her testimony entirely, as evidenced by their findings. They found appellant not guilty of raping A1C D (Charge I and its specification) but guilty only of indecent assault, and not guilty of an indecent assault (specification 1 of Charge III) on A1C D, but guilty only of an assault and battery. Under these circumstances, I have “grave doubt” whether the error was harmless. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). Accordingly, I would set aside the findings of guilty of indecent assault (Charge I and its specification) and assault and battery (specification 1 of Charge III), and authorize a rehearing on those offenses and the sentence.