Court Opinion

ID: 9622922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:25:07.325916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:58.290299
License: Public Domain

Horowitz, J.
(dissenting) — The Secretary of State refused to certify Initiative 322 for the ballot, because the initiative lacked sufficient signatures (117,804) to comply with amendment 30 to the State Constitution as implemented by RCW 29.79 as amended, particularly RCW 29.79.200; RCW 29.07.090 and RCW 29.07.130.
The trial court, after taking evidence upholding the action of the Secretary of State, entered findings, conclusions, and judgment. Petitioner appealed the trial court's judgment to this court and this court by a vote of 5 to 4 reversed.
The majority opinion relies on three grounds for reversal, (1) RCW 29.79.200, which provides that multiple signatures by one person on initiative and referendum petitions are not to be counted, is void, (2) RCW 29.07.130 and RCW 29.07.090 do not confine the Secretary of State to checking the validity of signatures on petitions to signatures on voter registration cards in his office, and (3) if grounds one and two are valid, there is sufficient evidence to prove Initiative 322 contains the remaining ballot signatures needed to qualify the initiative for the ballot.
If any of the three arguments is not accepted, then there are insufficient signatures on the initiative for the ballot and the trial court's judgment must be affirmed.
It is our duty to give full effect to the will of the people as set forth in amendments 7 and 30 to the State Constitution. The people have imposed and also authorized the legislature to impose certain safeguards to protect the *257integrity and the workability of the operation of the initiative and referendum. We give effect to the will of the people both when we uphold the validity of the canvasing process upon a proper showing and when we uphold the action of the Secretary of State in refusing to certify an initiative for the ballot when the law and facts require such an action. We now consider the three arguments on which the majority relies to reverse the trial court's judgment.
Multiple Signatures — RCW 29.79.200
There was still a shortage in the required number of signatures for Initiative 322 even if multiple signatures by each person signing more than once on the initiative petitions are counted as one signature.
The seventh amendment to the State Constitution was approved November 1912. Article 2, section 1(d) of the amendment made express provision for implementing legislation as follows:
All such petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state, who shall be guided by the general laws in submitting the same to the people until additional legislation shall especially provide therefor. This section is self-executing, but legislation may be enacted especially to facilitate its operation.
The legislature in 1913 then enacted implementing legislation. Laws of 1913, ch. 138, p. 418. The legislation included provisions prohibiting and discouraging multiple signatures on initiative and referendum petitions presumably to "facilitate" the operation of the initiative referendum process. Laws of 1913, ch. 138, § 15, p. 426; § 16, p. 427; and § 31, p. 435. Section 15 reads in part:
If he [secretary of state] find the same name signed to more than one petition he shall reject both names from the count.
This language was retained when the statute was amended by Laws of 1933, ch. 144, § 1, p. 490. The substance of the language was again retained in Laws of 1965, ch. 9, § 29.79.200, p. 901 and Laws of 1969,1st Ex. Sess., ch. *258107, § 1, p. 815. The 1969 act contains the language now in RCW 29.79.200:
If the secretary of state finds the same name signed to more than one petition he shall reject the name as often as if appears.
The foregoing language has not been changed.
The legality of the 1913 provision dealing with multiple signatures has been assumed as a proper exercise of legislative power delegated to the legislature by the seventh amendment. This court so assumed in State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 143 P. 461 (1914). In describing the secretaries of state's duty and power to reject signatures for fraud under the 1913 statute as it then read, the court pointed out the only power the secretary of state had was to refuse to count multiple signatures as provided by the 1913 statute. Had the court believed the secretary of state had no such power, this reason would not have been available. Until the filing of the majority opinion in the instant case, successive secretaries of state, in obedience to the mandate of the 1913 act first reaffirmed by the 1933 amendment, have refused to count multiple signatures at all.
The majority argues the multiple signature statute is void because it does not "facilitate" the operation of the initiative process as required by Const, art. 2, § 1(a) (amendment 7). I do not agree.
When the legislature granted authority in amendment 7 to enact legislation to facilitate the operation of the initiative and referendum process, it necessarily vested in the legislature a discretion in its choice of means so to do. This is made clear by the rationale used in State ex rel. Kiehl v. Howell, 77 Wash. 651, 138 P. 286 (1914); State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Howell, 80 Wash. 692, 142 P. 1 (1914); and State v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., 82 Wn.2d 94, 508 P.2d 149 (1973). In Kiehl a statute required initiative petitions to be filed not less than 10 months before the election on the initiative. The statute was held valid notwithstanding the seventh amendment provided the initiative would be on *259the ballot "if filed at least 4 months before the election." The court said:
The legislature is expressly authorized to enact laws to facilitate the initiative and referendum. It seems clear to us that a limitation upon the time within which, prior to the election, a proposed measure may be filed and the procuring of signatures of voters to the petitions commenced, is a proper subject of legislation, looking to orderly procedure and fairness to the electors. While the constitutional amendment is declared to be self-executing, it is apparent that its execution would be almost, if not wholly, impracticable without legislation of some such nature as this. It, of course, is necessary that some practical test be provided for determining whether the signers of the petitions are legal voters. It is, of course, but fair that the petitions should, so far as practical, be signed only by those who would be voters at the election. This can be secured with greater certainty by having the petitions signed as near the time of the election as practical. . . . We are of the opinion that it is within the power of the legislature to fix a reasonable limit of time preceding the election within which an initiative measure may be filed with the secretary of state.
State ex rel. Kiehl v. Howell, supra at 654. In State ex rel. Chamberlain v. Howell, supra at 696-97, the court upheld the statute requiring those who filed arguments in support of an initiative for inclusion in the state pamphlet required to be published by statute to pay for the resulting increased cost of paper, printing, and binding of the state pamphlet. The court said:
But there is nothing in the constitution prohibiting the legislature from requiring a fee for filing, printing, or binding either the proposed measure, or the arguments. It is clear that, where the constitution does not prohibit the legislature from requiring a fee in such case, it is within the power of the legislature to require a fee . . . The constitution does not, in terms or inferentially, require the state to bear the expense of the publication of these arguments. It simply requires the legislature to provide methods of publicity, without limitation as to *260fees. The legislature, therefore, may require the proponents of any measure to pay the expense of the arguments or of the distribution or of the publicity. It has not, however, seen fit to do so. . . . This is not an unreasonable requirement, and no provision of the constitution is cited to us which proclaims such provisions invalid.
In State v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., supra at 97, the court upheld RCW 29.79.490(4), making it a crime to pay people to obtain signatures for an initiative petition. The court stated:
It is indisputable that there is a substantial state interest in the integrity of the whole scope of the elective processes, including those procedures involved in the direct legislative efforts of the people via the initiative.
In 1956 the people adopted amendment 30 to the State Constitution to change the minimum number of signatures required to qualify an initiative for submission to vote of the people. Const, art. 2, § 1A (amendment 30) provided:
Hereafter, the number of valid signatures of legal voters required upon a petition for an initiative measure shall be equal to eight percentum of the number of voters registered and voting for the office of governor at the last preceding regular gubernatorial election.
Clearly the people made it plain that in order to qualify for the ballot an initiative had to have the minimum number of signatures called for by that amendment. Amendment 30 made no change in the prohibition against counting multiple signatures originally contained in Laws of 1913, ch. 138, and continued in substance thereafter. The prohibition against counting any multiple signatures has continued to be honored by successive secretaries of state until the majority of this court in the instant case held the statutory prohibition to be void. Prior thereto, not only was the prohibition continuously enforced but the petitions including those used to obtain signatures for Initiative 322 warned against multiple signatures. Thus under the heading of "Instructions to Signers and Volunteer Solicitors," each initiative petition of Initiative 322 states:
*261Voters may sign Initiative No. 322 only once. If a voter signs more than once, that signature is lost completely and the voter is also subject to fine and imprisonment.
In addition, each petition contained a warning pursuant to RCW 29.79.100 that "every person . . . who knowingly signs more than one of these petitions . . . shall be punished by fine or imprisonment or both."
The legislature, in enacting the prohibition to count multiple signatures was exercising its discretion as to the best method of implementation it considered appropriate to protect the operation of the initiative and referendum process against error and even fraud. The legislature wished to provide some substantial measure of assurance that the signatures on the petition would be validly affixed by legal voters and that such signatures could be expeditiously counted with a minimum chance of error and expense.
It is true the legislature might have determined in the exercise of its discretion that it would be an adequate sanction if the multiple signatures were counted once for every person signing in that fashion or that an adequate sanction would be provided if the sanction were limited to criminal prosecution. However, the legislature had a right to believe the criminal sanction would be inadequate to prevent multiple signatures because of the requirement of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the signatory knowingly signed his name more than once. Laws of 1913, ch. 138, § 31, p. 435. Moreover, the possibility of prosecutions might well involve thousands of instances and these prosecutions would necessarily be slow, costly, and clog the courts with cases. The legislature therefore had a right to determine in the exercise of its judgment that a more effective remedy was not to count multiple signatures at all. As a matter of fafrness in administering the initiative, the petitions carried appropriate warning to signatories that multiple signatures would not be counted at all and could result in a criminal penalty.
We cannot fairly say the prohibition against the counting of multiple signatures does not "facilitate" the operation of *262the initiative and referendum process. The legislature had a right to provide a remedy for the evils resulting from multiple signatures. Nor can we say that no reasonably conceivable state of facts exists to justify the legislation. Moreover we are not a super legislature. We cannot substitute our notions of wisdom for that of the legislature. We cannot say as a matter of law, as does the majority, in effect, that the prohibition against counting of multiple signatures at all does not "facilitate" the operation of the initiative and referendum process. See Brewer v. Copeland, 86 Wn.2d 58, 542 P.2d 445 (1975); State v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., supra.
The fact that the 1913 act as amended has so long been observed (1913-1976) makes applicable the rule of statutory construction well stated in State ex rel. Pirak v. Schoettler, 45 Wn.2d 367, 371-72, 274 P.2d 852 (1954):
When a statute is ambiguous, the construction placed upon it by the officer or department charged with its administration, while not binding on the courts, is entitled to considerable weight in determining the intention of the legislature. Smith v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 7 Wn. (2d) 652, 110 P. (2d) 851.
The persuasive force of such an interpretation is strengthened when the legislature, by its failure to amend a statute, "silently acquiesces" in the administrative interpretation.
See also Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wn.2d 275, 279, 300 P.2d 569 (1956).
Furthermore the fact neither the people nor the legislature made change in the statutory prohibition against counting of multiple signatures is strong evidence that the people and the legislature saw no legal objection to the prohibition so long observed and assumed to be valid by this court as early as 1914 in State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, supra.
The majority relies upon Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211, 228, 125 P.2d 445 (1942) to support its argument that multiple signatures must be counted at least once per person. The majority, however, fails to note the sentence *263immediately preceding the language it quotes from. The Arizona court there stated:
It is true that a man declares he has not signed and will not sign any other petition for the same measure, but nothing in the law states that he shall be disqualified so far as one signature is concerned because he may have inadvertently affixed his signature to another petition for the same measure.
(Italics mine.) In Washington, however, unlike Arizona, RCW 29.79.200 — a valid statute — does disqualify the multiple initiative signatures entirely. Whitman v. Moore, supra, does not support the majority. The case, rather, supports the action of the Secretary of State in following the statutory prohibition against counting multiple signatures at all.
The Use of Registration Cards
The majority also argues the Secretary of State must go outside the registration cards in his office to check the validity of signatures on the initiative petitions. This argument is then followed by a discussion of the evidence to show that had the Secretary gone outside of the registration cards in his office, sufficient additional signatures would have been found to qualify the initiative for the ballot.
There is no claim that RCW 29.79 or any other statute expressly requires the Secretary of State to do this. The majority claims rather that notwithstanding RCW 29.07.090 and RCW 29.07.130, which direct the Secretary of State to check petition signatures by reference to the signatures on registration cards in his office, the Secretary of State is required to go outside those cards because it would improve the accuracy of his count. The majority seeks to justify this approach by claiming the statutes are ambiguous (without particular specification) and this claimed ambiguity should be resolved by requiring the Secretary of State to conduct his checking by recourse to registration cards in the 39 counties of thé state.
There are fat least two difficulties with this argument. First, it fails to heed what was said by this court in State *264ex rel. Evich v. Superior Court, 188 Wash. 19, 30-31, 61 P.2d 143 (1936), which had the effect of eliminating any ambiguity. In that case the court described the secretary of state's role in determining whether sufficient valid signatures are present. The court stated:
He is to ascertain the number of names of legal voters on the petition, and the standard manifestly is by comparison with the registration cards in his office certified to him by the local registration officers, in accordance with the provisions of § 13 of the permanent registration act, providing that these registration cards are deposited with him for the sole purpose of
"... checking initiative and referendum petitions, and mailing pamphlets containing constitutional amendments, initiative and referendum measures," etc.
That the secretary of state must compare the signatures on the petition, is further evidenced by Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 5412 [P.C. § 2765], quoted above, requiring him to keep a record of all names appearing on the petition of persons not registered voters and report them to the prosecuting attorneys.
(Italics mine.)
It is noted that this court did not say the secretary of state was required to check the signatures on the registration cards in the possession of county aiiditors of each of the 39 counties of the state.
Secondly, if the last cited statutes are ambiguous as claimed, the construction placed thereon by the uniform practice of the office of Secretary of State since 1913 (RCW 29.07.130), without legislative change, provides strong evidence the secretary of state has no duty to go outside the registration cards in his office for purposes of checking signatures. See Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. Washington Surveying & Rating Bureau, 87 Wn.2d 887, 558 P.2d 215 (1976); State ex rel. Pirak v. Schoettler, supra.
If a change is to be made in the duties of the secretary of state, it is for the legislature to do so. Again, it is to be noted this court is not a super legislature. A proper respect for the limitations on this court's powers, in light of the *265separation of powers doctrine, precludes our substituting our views as to desirable improvements in the applicable legislation for those of the legislature. King County v. Seattle, 70 Wn.2d 988, 425 P.2d 887 (1967); Department of Labor & Indus. v. Cook, 44 Wn.2d 671, 269 P.2d 962 (1954).
Evidence of Erroneous Count
The final argument of the majority is that if the Secretary of State was under a duty to count multiple signatures by the same person once instead of not at all and, if the Secretary of State was also under a duty to check signatures against voter registration cards in each of the counties of the state, instead of confining himself to voter registration cards in his office sent there pursuant to RCW 29.07-.090, then the record shows there were at least 264 signatures not counted — the number still needed to make up the minimum number of signatures required. Majority opinion page 253. The trial court did not so find. Instead, that court necessarily found otherwise by upholding the action of the Secretary of State. See finding of fact No. 1(3); conclusion of law No. 4.
The majority argues in somewhat general terms the evidence shows "a large number of registered voters" signatures were erroneously rejected. No analysis of the testimony actually given on which petitioner based her claim of erroneous count at trial is set forth. Possibly, however, the majority may have relied on the somewhat lengthy testimony of petitioner's principal supporter of the initiative who testified he was an expert and as such could testify as to the probability of error and the extent thereof. The testimony was necessary to show that there were at least 264 valid signatures not counted. The witness based his testimony concerning the extent of probable error on an alleged random sample of 21 signatures of registered voters from King County, 16 of which were claimed to have been erroneously rejected for want of voter registration cards in the Secretary of State's office. The expert explained his *266opinion was based on the random nature of the sample. He testified:
The only thing I can say is based on a random sample. I cannot vouch for whether the sample was chosen randomly or not; but I can give a projection based on the supposition that 16 signatures out of 21 were found to be incorrectly rejected and were chosen randomly. That would be the only basis of my opinion.
The assistant attorney general objected the sample was not a random sample. He stated:
[T]here is simply no evidence in the record that these names that were selected were selected at random. In fact, the testimony is directly contrary to the individuals in question. At least one of them said he picked people he knew or got signatures from and they were all selected from King County.
The witness was permitted to testify subject to the acceptance of the court of his testimony. At one point the court said concerning the believability of the testimony:
the Court has a right to accept or reject any evidence, no matter what the qualifications of the specialist might be.
His testimony included a cross-examination to test the credibility of the opinions of the witness based upon other hypotheticals and assumptions, including the assumption the sample was not a random sample. Petitioner's attorney at one point stated: "I'm ready to stipulate we don't have a perfectly random sample ..."
The trial court had a right to weigh the witness' testimony as it had indicated it would, and to accept it if convincing or to reject it if not. It apparently rejected it as speculative and unconvincing. See finding of fact No. 1(3); conclusion of law No. 4. This rejection was within its power under the familiar rule that the credibility of witnesses is for the trial court. Carson v. Mills, 49 Wn.2d 597, 304 P.2d 712 (1956); N. Fiorito Co. v. State, 69 Wn.2d 616, 618-19, 419 P.2d 586 (1966). I cannot find the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the testimony. This court lacks *267power to disregard the court's findings if supported by substantial evidence and then make findings of its own contrary to the trial court's findings. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959).
The trial court's judgment upholding the refusal of the Secretary of State to certify Initiative 322 for the ballot should have been affirmed.
Hamilton, Stafford, and Utter, JJ., concur with Horowitz, J.