Court Opinion

ID: 9665711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:55:28.860703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.151351
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.,
(concurring) I concur because I cannot, in the light of decisions of our Supreme Court,1 properly dissent. I write separately because, in my opinion, the rule of law established by those decisions should be reexamined and modified and, better yet, abrogated.
The issue tried to the jury in this civil case was whether the defendant, Samuel King, unjustifiably assaulted the plaintiff, Alfred Davis Powell, with a knife or whether, as claimed by King, he used the knife in self-defense. The jury’s verdict was for the plaintiff in the amount of $10,000.
After the assault, King was charged by the prosecutor with the offense of felonious assault,2 punishable by imprisonment for not more than four years.3 King pled guilty to the reduced charge of simple assault, a misdemeanor,4 was placed on probation and required to pay $100 costs.
Had King been convicted by a jury of either the charged offense, felonious assault, or the reduced offense, assault and battery, evidence of his convic*47tion probably would not have been admissible at the civil trial for the purpose of showing that substantially the same factual issues presented in the civil action were decided against him in the criminal proceeding. The general rule recognized by most jurisdictions,5 and by Michigan,6 is that a judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution is not admissible in a civil case arising out of the same occurrence. However, as my colleagues in this case rule (and I am obliged by controlling precedent to agree), a conviction on a plea of guilty is generally provable as an admission ;7 but not if the conviction is upon a plea of nolo contendere.8
These distinctions are all theoretically sound. Evidence of the commission of crime is generally not admissible.9 Admissions generally are, and a plea of nolo contendere is not an admission. But, although theoretically tenable, there is no sound reason why the defendant’s conviction for simple assault should be admissible because he did not take the precaution of offering a plea of nolo contendere and it makes no sense to treat a conviction following* a plea of guilty to a reduced charge as having greater evidentiary value than a conviction after a trial on the merits for the originally-charged offense.
The evidence of King’s conviction on a plea of guilty should have been excluded not only to protect him from deflection of the jury from the task before it, but also because in this case the evidence was *48without significant probative value. The fact that King, charged with felonious assault punishable by a sentence of four years in state prison, pled guilty to a misdemeanor shows merely that, faced with two unpleasant alternatives, he chose the less threatening. By pleading guilty he avoided the possibility of having a felony record and of being sentenced to serve a long term in prison. He made it more likely that he would be placed on probation, as he was. Additionally, by pleading guilty he saved the expense of defending himself against the criminal charge.
Introduction into evidence of the fact that King pled guilty, although without significant probative value, could well have influenced the jury and been responsible for the verdict against him. His plea of guilty to the assault charge was mentioned in the trial judge’s instructions and in oppossing counsel’s closing arguments. The jurors might well have reasoned that if the prosecutor charged King, he pled guilty, and the judge accepted the plea, he must have been the one at fault. The jurors should have been permitted to decide who was at fault uninfluenced by knowledge of the criminal prosecution.
The evidence was admitted as part of plaintiff’s case and, therefore, the question whether the conviction was admissible to impeach King’s credibility when he took the stand was not briefed by the parties and is not before us.10

 Nielsen v. Eiler (1929), 248 Mich 545 (civil action foi- assault; defendant’s plea to a reduced charge cognizable by a justice of the peace held to be admissible); Anders v. Clover (1917), 198 Mich 763, 765; Diamond v. Holstein (1964), 373 Mich 74, 77.
But a plea of guilty by a bus driver to a charge of failing to exercise due care is not admissible in a civil action against the bus driver’s employer arising out of the occurrence which gave rise to the traffic offense. Kloosterman v. Kalamazoo City Lines, Inc. (1970), 21 Mich App 513. In Kloosterman, in contrast with Diamond v. Holstein, the driver was not himself a defendant.

 MOLA § 750.82 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.277).

 MOLA § 750.503 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.771).

 MCLA § 750.81 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.276).

 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 334; McCormick, Evidence, § 295, pp 618, 619; 50 CJS, Judgments, § 754,.p 269 et seq.

 See Day v. Gold Star Dairy (1943), 307 Mich 383, 389; Smith v. Brown (1851), 2 Mich 161.

 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 701; McCormick, Evidence, § 242, fn 32, p 512, and authorities cited in fn 6, supra.

 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 702; McCormick, Evidence, § 242, fn 32, p 513.

 See authorities cited in fn 5, and 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 320, p 366 et seq.; McCormick, Evidence, § 157, p 327 et seq.

 See Sting v. Davis (1971), 384 Mich 608.