Court Opinion

ID: 4063020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 20:42:48.820782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:32:13.548518
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                    14-15-00028-CV
                                                      FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                  HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                                4/7/2015 4:26:25 PM
                                                               CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                             CLERK

              NO. 14-15-00028-CV

                                                   FILED IN
                                            14th COURT OF APPEALS
  IN THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF           APPEALS,HOUSTON, TEXAS
             HOUSTON, TEXAS                  4/7/2015 4:26:25 PM
                                            CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                                                     Clerk

        MICHAEL JUSTIN JACOBS,
                                         Appellant
                        v.

                 ADANA ALT,
                                         Appellee

      On Appeal from the 395th District Court
            Williamson County, Texas
       Trial Court Cause No. 10-0968-F395

BRIEF OF APPELLANT MICHAEL JUSTIN JACOBS

                      Paige Frankenberry
                      State Bar No. 24074226
                      FRANKENBERRY LAW FIRM
                      4425 S. Mopac Expy, Suite 105
                      Austin, Texas 78735
                      (512) 252-9937 Telephone
                      (512) 852-5937 Facsimile
                      paige@frankenberrylaw.com

                      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
                      MICHAEL JUSTIN JACOBS

  APPELLANT REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENT
                 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
       The following information is provided pursuant to Rule 38.1(a) of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and for this Court to determine issues of
disqualification and recusal under Rule 16 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure:

APPELLANT                             COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Michael Justin Jacobs                 Paige Frankenberry
                                      FRANKENBERRY LAW FIRM
                                      4425 S. Mopac Expy, Suite 105
                                      Austin, Texas 78735
                                      (512) 252-9937 Telephone
                                      (512) 852-5937 Facsimile
                                      paige@frankenberrylaw.com
                                      Appellate and Trial Counsel

                                      Ryan S. Dougay
                                      1607 Nueces
                                      Austin, Texas 78701
                                      (512) 469-0092 Telephone
                                      Trial Counsel through September 2012

                                      James Winegardner
                                      1711 Grassy Creek Dr.
                                      Allen, Texas 75002
                                      (817) 253-0957 Telephone
                                      Trial Counsel through March 2011

APPELLEE                              COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Adana Alt                             Robert D. Ettinger
                                      P.O. Box 50323
                                      Austin, Texas, 78763
                                      robert@ettlaw.com
                                      (512) 478-4754 Telephone
                                      (512) 478-9542 Facsimile
                                      Appellate and Trial Counsel

                                     ii
                                        TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                                                                   Page
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................................... cover
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................................................. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................................iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... iv-vii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................... viii-x
ISSUES PRESENTED .............................................................................................. xi
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................... 1
 A. BACKGROUND AND DEFAULT HEARING .............................................................. 1
 B. SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION AND BILL OF REVIEW .................................................. 3
 C. REGISTERED PEDOPHILIA SEX-OFFENDER UNCLE GILBEY ENTERS THE PICTURE 4
 D. UNDOING THE DEFAULT HEARING, SORT OF ....................................................... 6
 E. THE GAME CHANGER: PLAYING PRINCESS TAG WITH UNCLE GILBEY ................ 9
 F. POST-TRIAL MOTIONS ....................................................................................... 20
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 21
STANDARDS OF REVIEW ................................................................................... 24
 A. ABUSE OF DISCRETION ...................................................................................... 24
 B. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY .......................................................................................... 25
 C. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY ...................................................................................... 26
 D. DE NOVO ........................................................................................................... 27
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ...................................................................... 28
 ISSUE I . VICARIOUS CONSENT ............................................................................... 28
 ISSUE II. PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION .............................................................. 36
 ISSUE III. CONSERVATORSHIP ................................................................................ 41
 ISSUE IV. NO ORIGINAL ORDER TO MODIFY .......................................................... 61
PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 62
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................. 63
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 64
APPENDIX .............................................................................................................. 65

                                                            iii
                                      INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
                                                                                                                      Page

CASES	
  
Alameda v. State, 181 S.W.3d 772 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2005) ........................31
Alameda v. State, 235 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ...................................31
Allen v. Mancini, 170 S.W.3d 167 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2005, pet. denied) ............30
Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.1986) (per curiam). ........................................26
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex.2005).............................................25
Collins v. Collins, 904 S.W.2d 792 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995)..............31
CTTI Priesmeyer, Inc. v. K & O Ltd. P'ship, 164 S.W.3d 675 (Tex.App.-Austin
  2005, no pet.) .......................................................................................................26
Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, no writ) .....................48
Dow Chemical Co. V. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2001). ..................................26
Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. 1999)
  (citations omitted) ................................................................................................40
Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1982)................................................24
Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2003) ...................27
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976) .................................................42, 58
In re A.A.M., No. 14-05-00740-CV, 2007 WL 1558701 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th
  Dist.] May 31, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) ............................................................45
In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) .......44
In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355 (Tex.2003) (citations omitted) .....................................43
In re C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.
  denied) ..................................................................................................................44
In re H.A.P., No. 11–05–00180–CV, 2006 WL 648312 (Tex.App. – Eastland

                                                             iv
  March 16, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) ...................................................................48
In re J.I.O., No. 11-05-00369-CV 2007 WL 1644579 (Tex.App.-Eastland June 7,
  2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) .....................................................................................48
In re J.K., No. 09-10-00226-CV, 2011 WL 2119770 (Tex.App.-Beaumont May 19,
  2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). ....................................................................................45
In re K.B., No. 03–09–00366–CV, 2010 WL 5019368 (Tex.App.-Austin Dec. 9,
  2010, no pet.) (mem.op.) ......................................................................................45
In re Kubankin, 257 S.W.3d 852 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, orig. proceeding) (per
  curiam) .................................................................................................................50
In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d 790 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.) ...........................47
In re L.C.L., 396 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.). .............................45
In re L.M.M., No. 03-04-00452-CV, 2005 WL 2094758 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no
  pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted) .....................................................................45
In re R.D., 955 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied)
  (citation omitted) ..................................................................................................46
In re S.E.K., 294 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied) ...............44
In re S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.) ....................................48
In re T.D.L., No. 02-05-00250-CV, 2006 WL 302126 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, Feb.
  9, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) .................................................................................48
In re T.N.C., No. 13-11-00305-CV, 2011 WL 5282679 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
  Nov. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) ........................................................................45
In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2000) ...........................................................42, 44
Isaacson v. Isaacson, No. CIV-10-678-M (W.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2011) ...................28
Jackson v. Axelrad, 221 S.W.3d 650, (Tex. 2007) ..................................................34
Johnson v. Johnson, 804 S.W.2d 296 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ)
  ..............................................................................................................................48

                                                               v
Kittman v. Miller, No. 12-13-00097-CV 2013 WL 4680575 (Tex. App. – Tyler
  Aug. 29, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ...............................................................36
K-Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357 (Tex. 2000) ........................................24
Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10 (Tex.2002) .............................................................42, 58
McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.1992). .....................................................41
McDonald v. Dankworth, 212 S.W.3d 336 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, no pet.)...........25
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Elchehimi, 249 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2008) ............................40
Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.1998) .....................................................29
Saavedra v. Schmidt, 96 S.W.3d 533 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.) ..................42
Shook v. Walden, 304 S.W.3d 910, 916-17 (Tex.App.-Austin 2010, no pet.)
  (citations omitted) ................................................................................................27
State v. Heal, 917 S.W.2d 6 (Tex.1996) ..................................................................27
Sylvia v. Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., No. 03-09-00427-CV 2010
WL 1507827 *13 (Tex. App.–Austin Apr. 15, 2010, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) .......44
Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535 (D.Utah 1993) .......................................28
Ussery v. State, 03-07-00116-CR, 2008 WL 269439 (Tex. App.–Austin, Jan. 30,
  2008, pet. ref’d) (mem.op., not designated for publication) ................................28
Van Heerden v. Van Heerden, 321 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
  2010, no pet.) .......................................................................................................41
Wagner v. Wagner, 64 F. Supp. 2d 895 (D.Minn.1999) ...........................................28
Weaver v. State, No. 10-06-00326-CR, 2007 WL 4157237 (Tex. App.–Waco Nov.
  21, 2007, pet. denied) (mem.op., not designated for publication) .......................28
Wichita County v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.1996) ...............................................34
Williams v. Willaims, 150 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied) ........47
Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) ..........24

                                                           vi
STATUTES	
  
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) ............................................................................................28
Tex. Fam. Code § 153.001(a) ............................................................................42, 43
Tex. Fam. Code § 153.004 ......................................................................................42
Tex. Fam. Code § 153.132 ......................................................................................50
Tex. Fam. Code § 161(D), (E) .................................................................................46
Tex. Fam. Code § 32.005 ........................................................................................39
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002 ..............................................................................58
Tex. Pen. Code §16.02(c)(4)(B) ..............................................................................28
Tex. Pract. & Civ. Rem Code § 123.001(2) ............................................................28
Tex. R. Civ. Pro § 329b(f) .......................................................................................61

OTHER AUTHORITIES

McAlinden, Anne-Marie. ‘Setting’Em Up’: Personal, Familial and
Institutional Grooming in the Sexual Abuse of Children.
Social & Legal Studies 15.3 (2006): 339-362. .................................................. Tab F

Samantha Craven , Sarah Brown & Elizabeth Gilchrist (2006) Sexual grooming of
children: Review of literature and theoretical considerations. Journal of Sexual
Aggression. 12:3, 287-299. ...............................................................................Tab G

Smith, Daniel W., et al. Delay in disclosure of childhood rape: Results from a
national survey. Child abuse & neglect 24.2 (2000): 273-287..........................Tab H

                                                         vii
                               NO. 14-15-00028-CV

               IN THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS,
                          HOUSTON, TEXAS

                        MICHAEL JUSTIN JACOBS,
                                                          Appellant
                                        v.

                                 ADANA ALT,
                                                          Appellee

           BRIEF OF APPELLANT MICHAEL JUSTIN JACOBS

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

      Michael Justin Jacobs, Appellant in this Court, respectfully submits his brief

in support of his appeal from an “Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child

Relationship” signed by the trial court on August 29, 2014, that was four and one-

half years in the making.

                            STATEMENT OF THE CASE

      This appeal arises from an April 2010 suit originally filed by Appellee

Adana Alt (“Adana”) requesting that the trial court adjudicate parentage and enter

an order that included parenting plan provisions. (CR 8-10). Appellant, Michael

                                        viii
“Justin” Jacobs, is the father of the parties’ five year-old daughter, the subject of

the suit, and Justin properly answered the suit. (CR 11-12). The parties agreed to

visitation and child support without formal temporary orders.

      In April 2011, a default judgment was entered against Justin that was

subsequently overturned by a Bill of Review in October of 2013 due to Justin’s

lack of notice of the final hearing. (CR 17-44, 224). Nonetheless, the trial court

proceeded on a motion to modify that Justin’s former attorney had filed after the

default judgment. (3RR 98:20-25).

      Following a contested injunction hearing in May 2013 (before the Bill of

Review was granted), the trial court granted Justin’s request to enjoin Adana from

allowing the parties’ then four-year-old child to be within 500 feet of Adana’s

brother, a registered sex offender and convicted pedophile who was on the verge of

being released from prison. (CR 159-160).

      After a bench trial on Temporary Orders in October 2013, the trial court

rendered a final order in a February 2014 letter to counsel without a final hearing

(CR 252-53). The parties were appointed Joint Managing Conservators with Adana

being granted all Texas Family Code § 153.132 rights, and the trial court ordered a

permanent injunction on the child being within 500 feet of Adana’s brother. (CR

252-53).

      Before the trial court’s final order was entered, the child made an outcry to

                                         ix
her father and Child Protective Services that she had been playing a “touch” game

with her registered sex offender and pedophile uncle in violation of the trial court’s

injunction. Justin filed requests to re-open evidence, for immediate possession of

the child, for the right to determine the primary residence of the child and other

Section 153.132 rights, and for supervised, or otherwise restricted, access for

Adana. (Suppl CR __). After three hearings and nearly four months in Justin’s

custody, the trial court returned the child to Adana as the primary custodian. (CR

291-322). This appeal follows.

                                          x
                    ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

                                    ISSUE I.

      Did the trial court err (or alternatively abuse its discretion) by
excluding a recorded telephone call obtained by vicarious consent due to
father’s good-faith, objectively reasonable belief that recording the call was in
the child’s best interest because the mother was continuing to violate
protective injunctions and coach the child to deny the mother’s violations?

                                   ISSUE II.

      Did the trail court err (or alternatively abuse its discretion) in excluding
expert testimony that the child was afraid of her uncle, a convicted pedophile,
when the evidence was permissibly obtained.

                                   ISSUE III.

      Did the trial court err (or alternatively abuse its discretion) by
designating the mother as the parent with the exclusive right to designate the
child’s residence, by granting the mother other exclusive rights, and by
allowing the mother to have unsupervised possession of the child where the
evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support that such findings
and orders were in the best interest of the child?

                                   ISSUE IV.

      Is a judgment on a modification void where the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to show that an original order existed to modify?

                                        xi
                            STATEMENT OF FACTS

      A. Background and Default Hearing

      Justin and Adana began dating when Justin was twenty-one and Adana was

in her early thirties after they met through Justin’s sister. After a couple of years of

dating, their daughter was born in March 2009. When their daughter was one

month old, the couple moved from Adana’s mother’s and step-father’s home in

Liberty Hill, Texas, to a home Justin’s mother helped Justin purchase in Granbury,

Texas. (3RR 68:17-23) Justin found employment as a commission-only life

insurance salesman after the move. (3RR 79:14-16).

      A week after the child’s first birthday in March 2010, Adna’s mother and

step-father, Nancy and Luis Buitron, arrived in Granbury for a visit. (4RR 32:10-

12). Within hours of the Buitrons’ arrival, Adana’s mother announced to Justin that

Adana needed a temporary hiatus from their relationship, so Adana and the child

would be accompanying the Buitrons’ back to their home in Liberty Hill that day.

(4RR 32:10-12). Less than two weeks later, Adana filed a “Petition to Adjudicate

Parentage” in Williamson County and included a request for the court to set out a

parenting plan. (CR 8-10). Justin hired a local Granbury attorney who responded to

the suit. (CR 11-12). Counsel for the parties negotiated a series of agreements

regarding Justin’s visitation and child support in lieu of adjudicating Temporary

                                           1
Orders. (3RR 63:6-9, 127:11-12, 145:15-19).

       Justin’s employment became untenable in late 2010 when the insurance

company he worked for charged back to him several thousand dollars in

commission many months after the original sale date, which meant Justin would

not be paid commission on future sales until the charge-back was satisfied. (3RR

80:1-25). Justin’s counsel filed a withdraw motion on January 18, 2011 after Justin

told him that he would not have the resources for afford further representation at

that time. (CR 13-14). On February 25, 2011, Adana’s counsel set the matter for a

final hearing on April 27, 2011, and notified Justin’s withdrawing counsel of same.

(Suppl 3RR 3). Justin’s attorney failed to notify Justin a final hearing had been set

before withdrawing in March 2011, and a default judgment was entered at the

April hearing in favor of Adana for all relief she requested. (CR 17, 224). The

parties were appointed Joint Managing Conservators of the child with Adana

named as the parent with the exclusive right to determine the child’s primary

residence and the exclusive right to determine all other Texas Family Code Section

153.132 rights. (CR 17). The trial court set Justin’s child support obligation based

on Adana’s testimony that Justin had earned $3,900 per month gross resources a

year earlier when the parties’ separated.1 (Suppl 2RR 11:1-3). On the date of the

       1
          Although, Justin’s tax returns through 2011 do not demonstrate an income for any year
greater than $2,280 per month. (3RR 76:16-77:2,79:8-10, 7RR 134-135).

                                               2
default hearing, Justin had just begun working a mile over the Texas border at a

nuclear power plant in New Mexico making $500 per week. (3RR 81:1-11).

      B. Subsequent Litigation and Bill of Review

      Within weeks of the default judgment, a steel beam fell on Justin while

working at the power plant. (3RR 81:12-15). He recuperated in Lubbock where his

extended family lives. (3RR 82:11-15). Within a few weeks of healing from the

injury, Justin suffered six ischemic strokes and more than one hundred transient

ischemic strokes. (3RR 82:11-20, 83:10-19). After discharge from nearly a month

in the hospital, the doctors ordered him to forgo physical exertion and driving for

several months due to the high risk of recurrence. (3RR 84:2-25, 85:1-7). Justin

remained in Lubbock and re-enrolled in college during this period of limbo to gain

credits toward a paramedic degree. (3RR 86:1-16).

      Also during this period of time, Justin contacted an attorney to learn what

remedies were available to overturn the default judgment or otherwise reduce child

support that he could not afford. Justin’s new attorney filed a suit for modification

in November 2011, which was followed by a child support enforcement action by

Adana. (CR 45, 82). Justin sought new counsel after he felt pressured by his

counsel to settle both the temporary orders on the modification and the

enforcement suit, both at the same child support obligation rate (save for three

                                         3
months) that was ordered in his absence at the default hearing.2 (CR 89, 56).

       In late summer of 2012, when the child was three years old, apparently

Adana began taking the child to a young, licensed clinical social worker named

Lauren Scott.3

       After a review of Justin’s files, current counsel filed a Bill of Review on

Justin’s behalf in March of 2013. (CR 94).

       C. Registered Pedophilia Sex-Offender Uncle Gilbey enters the picture

       While the Bill of Review was pending, Justin asked Adana to agree through

counsel that the parties’ daughter would not be in the presence of Adana’s brother

who was on the verge of being released from a nine-year prison sentence. (2RR

10:19-23). Adana’s brother, Gilberto Buitron, known to his nieces and nephews as

“Uncle Gilbey,” is a lifetime registered sex offender who was convicted of

aggravated sexual assault of a child on December 18, 1997.4 (4RR 14:7-8, 17:19-

21; 2RR 10:7-10). Seven years later and still on parole for his first offense, Mr.

       2
           Justin was told that by his former counsel that he would likely fare worse or be put in
jail if the parenting plan or child support matters were heard by the trial court, and that, therefore,
Justin just needed to agree to the orders being offered by opposing counsel even though Justin
felt the terms were as inequitable as the terms contain in the default hearing order. (3RR 103:13-
20).
       3
         It is unknown whether Ms. Scott was licensed at the time the child began seeing this
counselor or if she practiced under the supervision of another practitioner at the ministry where
she is employed. (4RR 53:4-5).
       4
           The offense date was March 10, 1997. (2RR 42:2-3).

                                                  4
Buitron was found to be in possession of one or more child pornography videos on

his personal laptop computer on January 13, 2005. (2RR 10:2-6, 29, 30:7-12). Both

offenses occurred while Mr. Buitron was living at home with his parents, Adana’s

mother and step-father, where he currently resides. (2RR 29:2-7, 11:7-8).

      Because Adana and the Buitron family have repeatedly denied that Mr.

Buitron is a pedophile, they believe he presents no risk of harm to children. (2RR

12:24-25, 21:1-3, 24-25, 34:4-12, 35:1-3; 4RR 83:7-12). Adana has described her

brother’s aggravated sexual assault of a child as a fun, innocuous, and victimless

“circle jerk” with youths in the community. (4RR 82:20 – 83:12). Thus, Adana

refused to agree to an order prohibiting the child to be in the presence of Uncle

Gilbey–even after the trial court telegraphed its intent by granting a Temporary

Restraining Order before Mr. Buitron’s release. (2RR 9:16-18). Instead, Adana

appeared with her mother at the injunction hearing to implore the trial court to

allow the parties’ then 4 year-old daughter to enjoy the company of Uncle Gilbey.

(2RR). Adana’s counsel even suggested that the child could not have a “happy

Christmas” without her and Uncle Gilbey being together. (2RR 7:19-25, 8:1).

      When Adana was asked during the May 2013 injunction hearing why she

beleived it was a good idea for the child to be around her brother, she replied,

“Because he’s my brother, regardless… I don’t see that there is going to be a risk

there.” (2RR 12:20-25). Adana also said, when asked on direct examination, that

                                         5
she would be perfectly willing to abdicate her responsibility to protect her child

from her pedophile-brother to her step-father, her sister, or the mother who

physically assaulted and battered Adana when Adana was herself a minor.5 (2RR

13:10-20, 14:3-12, 15:12-17; 6RR 59:5-10). Adana and her parents did not want to

be inconvenienced by excluding Uncle Gilbey, especially during birthdays,

holidays, and other family events, just because “the family” consists of both young

children and a convicted pedophile. (2RR 6:7-10, 16:15-17, 28:7-11, 39:13-14).

       The trial court granted Justin’s request for the injunction stating that the

court was there to protect the child from this “child molester,” not make sure that

he had “a happy family reunion” after release from prison. (2RR 41:7-8, 43:8-10,

25, 44:1-4).

       In June 2013, the counselor Adana had taken the child to wrote Adana’s

counsel a letter stating that the child was not attached to Justin because Justin was

“not present for the first few months of her life,” which are “critical” for

attachment development, but that the child was securely attached to her mother and

grandmother, to which the counselor could “testify.” (7RR 155).

       D. Undoing the Default Hearing, Sort Of

       The trial court granted Justin’s Bill of Review in a letter to counsel on

       5
        Adana wholly contradicted her willingness to rely on others to protect her child from a
pedophile when her own counsel subsequently prompted the opposite response on cross-
examination with a leading question. (2RR 17:5-7).

                                               6
October 15, 2013, owing to Justin’s lack of notice of the final hearing in 2011. (CR

224). Rather than wiping the slate clean, the trial court let stand the parties’

modification temporary orders and enforcement settlement, both of which were

agreed to after the default judgment but prior to the filing, or granting, of the Bill

of Review. (CR 224, 252-53).6 7

        In a bench trial the following week, the trial court considered testimony

regarding Justin’s historical earnings to redress some of Justin’s past, and future,

child support obligation as well as testimony regarding Justin’s visitation travel

costs and work schedule. (3RR). Justin also requested a geographic restriction on

the child’s residence. In the same hearing, the trial court considered Adana’s

motion for enforcement on the above-guideline child support obligation that Justin

had never been able to afford. (3RR).

        Adana testified that Justin was capable of earning more money during the

time the couple lived together in Granbury (from April 2009-April 2010), but that

his income was limited by his monthly (more or less) binge drinking. (3RR 134:4-

21). Despite this assertion, Adana had not requested that Justin’s visitation be

supervised or limited at the default hearing when this binge drinking would have

        6
         Despite the fact that, by virtue of the Bill of Review being granted, there was no
original order to modify or to enforce.
        7
            As a result, Justin’s above-guideline child support was not reduced through August 31,
2012.

                                                  7
been occurring.8 (2RR). Justin testified that he felt he was drinking more than he

should have been in 2011 after Adana left because he had been depressed over her

leaving and taking their child with her. (3RR 119:5-8). Justin went to alcohol

“rehab” voluntarily because he felt he needed to address, primarily, his depression.

(3RR 119:9-14). Justin testified that he received a charge for Driving While

Intoxicated four months after completing rehab in 2011 while in college, but that

he did not drink very often, and, in fact, had not had a drink in last three and a half

months, since June, before his daughter’s summer visitation.9 (3RR 160:15-23)

       Justin requested that the court modify Adana’s exclusive right to make

decisions regarding medical, psychological, and educational decisions because

Adana had taken the child to a counselor without telling him for a year. (3RR 61:

14-18). He further requested that Adana be prohibited from drinking while in

possession of the child because Adana had historically drank alcohol frequently

enough to cause him some concern. (3RR 61:19-20, 96:8-19). Adana testified that

she drinks one to two glasses of wine only one to two times per week (3RR

127:15-18). Adana testified that she drinks beer occasionally in addition to wine.

(3RR 127:20-24).

       8
         The pre-drafted orders presented to the trial court at the default hearing contained an
alcohol injunction, but Adana did not mention alcohol at the default hearing. (2RR).
       9
       Justin testified in August of 2014, that, in fact, he completely stopped drinking in the
summer of 2013. (6RR 38:10-11).

                                                 8
      At the end of the hearing, the court retroactively reduced Justin’s child

support back to May 2013 and took other issues under advisement while

acknowledging the hearing and ruling was for temporary orders only. (3RR 98:20-

99:6). Adana’s counsel prepared an order adjusting the current child support and

the court entered these temporary orders on October 30, 2014. (CR 229)

      The trial court issued a final ruling via letter to counsel in February 2014

without ever conducting a final hearing. (CR 6).

      E. The Game Changer: Playing Princess Tag With Uncle Gilbey

      On April 20, 2014, before the trial court’s final order was entered, the child

made an outcry to Justin and his wife that she had been playing “Princess Tag”

with her Uncle Gilbey, and that Adana told the child not to tell Justin that the child

had ever met or been around Uncle Gilbey; that it was their little “secret.” (4RR

13:17-14:19; Suppl CR ___). Justin immediately alerted his attorney, who made a

report to Child Protective Services (“CPS”).

      On April 24, 2014, Jaclyn Roberts with CPS conducted a surprise, recorded

interview with the child at the child’s daycare center. (4RR 28:18-22). While the

child readily told Ms. Roberts that Uncle Gilbey was among the persons living at

her maternal grandparent’s house, when the child was directly asked if she ever

sees Uncle Gilbey there, the child denied it in accordance with her mother’s

admonishments. (4RR 29:17-23). Being a seasoned CPS veteran and child

                                          9
interviewer, Mr. Roberts began asking the child what kind of games she likes to

play, where she plays them, and with whom she plays the games.10 (4RR 29:23-

24). The child said she plays “Princess Tag” with her Uncle Gilbey at her

grandparents’ home and that once, on a Friday after school, Uncle Gilbey was too

tired to play, so they watched television. (4RR 29:24-30:4, 42:2-13).

       Ms. Roberts informed both Adana and Justin’s counsel of the contents of the

child’s interview the same day. (5RR 9:6-17). Justin filed requests with the trial

court the next day for a writ of possession and/or a temporary restraining order, to

re-open evidence, for the right to determine the primary residence of the child and

other Section 153.132 rights, and for supervised access to the child for Adana.

(Suppl CR ___). That afternoon in chambers, the trial court ordered Adana to

relinquish possession of the child to Justin immediately and set a hearing for the

following week.

       April Hearing

       At the April hearing, Ms. Roberts testified as to what the child told her,

including that the game “Princess Tag” it is just like “regular tag,” except that the

child is the “princess” and whoever catches her is her “prince.” (4RR 42:11-13).

When asked if her recommendation was that the child remain at Justin’s house,

       10
         Ms. Roberts testified that she has worked for CPS for seven years and interviewed
“thousands” of children. (4RR 28:4-13).

                                              10
Ms. Roberts testified that she had “significant concerns” about the child being

around the maternal family because they do not believe that Uncle Gilbey is a

danger to the child, and that if the child remained in Lubbock, the child should see

a counselor in Lubbock. (4RR 39:12-18; 37:17-19).

      The child’s counselor testified that she was “very certain” that continued

removal from her mother would cause the child emotional harm. (4RR 49:19-23).

However, in forming that opinion, the counselor admitted that she relied on false

information provided to her by Adana that Justin was not present in the child’s life

during the child’s first year, which is “critical” for attachment, when, in fact,

Adana and Justin lived together during the child’s first year. (4RR 53:22-54:4,

56:3-14, 32:10-12). The counselor further testified that she counseled the child

under this presumption for a year without attempting to verify the information

through Justin or any disinterested collateral contacts. (4RR 61:23-62:10; 6RR

80:1-5). The trial court subsequently dismissed any notion that the child was not

bonded to Justin or would be emotionally harmed by separation from her mother

when, after remaining with Justin for several weeks, the counselor reported the

child was doing was doing well and was enjoying her time at Justin’s house. (5RR

37:1-7, 77:5-10).

      Justin testified that Adana and “her whole family believe that [Uncle Gilbey

is] innocent and that he was framed and that the State had planted evidence.” (4RR

                                        11
15:9-11).

       The trial court determined from the testimony that the child had, in fact,

been in the presence of, and had played games with, Uncle Gilbey in violation of

the injunction. (4RR 66:10-16, 111:7-10). And while Adana and her parents told

Ms. Roberts and testified that the child had never been in the presence of Uncle

Gilbey, the trial court found that their testimony lacked credibility; that “they’re

down here saying what’s necessary to get what they want.” (4RR 106:17-19). The

court stated it was “not going to wait until this little girl is fondled to do something

about it,” and ordered Justin to maintain custody. (4RR 107:7-8). The trial court

also ordered the child to have a forensic interview at the Child Advocacy Center

(“CAC”) and one session with the child’s therapist in an attempt to ascertain more

information about the child’s contact with Uncle Gilbey and who told the child

what before returning to update the court the following month. (4RR 110:5-

111:12). The trial court stated that it trusted the child’s counselor “is not going to

try to hide things from us.” (4RR 110:16-17).

       Justin took the child to the CAC interview directly after the April hearing,

and to the first ‘post-removal’ counseling session the following week. (5RR 17:11-

16).

       May Hearing

       At the May 2014 hearing, the CAC interviewer testified that the child denied

                                          12
having any uncles whatsoever, despite the fact that the child has a second uncle she

frequently visits. (5RR 6:11-22, 10:6-14). As a result, Ms. Roberts testified that she

was concerned that the child got in trouble with Adana for admitting to Ms.

Roberts that she played with her Uncle Gilbey. (5RR 10:6-23). At the April

hearing, Adana’s mother testified that “Princess Tag” was the game the child

played with the grandmother’s neighbor’s children. (4RR 88:10-24). Upon

interviewing the parents of the neighbor children in question, however, those

parents said they had never heard of the game “Princess Tag.” (5RR 11:11-22).

      Ms. Scott, the child’s counselor, reported that the child admitted that Adana

had told the child not to talk to anyone about her Uncle Gilbey, but that Dad had

not told the child to say, or not say, anything. (5RR 29:3-8, 19-21). Ms. Scott also

testified that the child told her that the child lied to CPS–because she was “shy and

nervous” and “her mind was out of it”–and that the child never told Justin that she

had seen Uncle Gilbey. (5RR 31:4-5; 35:9-18). Ms. Scott said she believed the

child’s new version because she and the child have a “rapport,” even though the

child told the counselor in the same breath that she had been coached by her

mother, and even though, the counselor admitted, there would be no reason for

Adana to coach the child about Uncle Gilbey if the child had never been in the

presence of Uncle Gilbey. (5RR 39:7-40:4, 32:11-14).

      Because 1) the CAC interview and counseling session were unproductive

                                         13
with respect to learning whether or not the child had been touched sexually, 2) the

child was now saying she had never seen Uncle Gilbey, and 3) the child’s current

therapist recommended the child see a psychologist, Justin took the child to a child

and family psychologist, Dr. Mark White, in Lubbock the following week. (5RR

18:1-21; 6RR 61:23-25).

      Justin also hired a psychologist local to the trial court, Dr. Kelley Baker,

after the child told Dr. White that she was afraid of Uncle Gilbey and witches,

which her grandfather told her “get little girls.” Although Dr. White shared with

Dr. Baker what the child expressed, the trial court refused to allow Dr. Baker to

testify to these facts because, the trial court stated, Justin was not authorized to

take the child to a psychologist. (5RR 51:1-11). Dr. Baker testified that young

children can easily be coached to tell “first order” lies, which are lies in response to

simple, direct “first order” questions. (5RR 46:19 - 48:12). Dr. Baker said that

typically children under the age of six have difficulty telling “second order” lies

when the question is presented in a way that the child is not able to understand that

they are essentially being asked for the same information. (5RR 46:19 - 48:12). For

example, a child might say, “No,” when asked if she has ever seen someone, but

then say that she plays games with that person, as the child did here during the CPS

interview. (4RR 29:17-30:4, 42:2-13).

      Adana testified that she had cut-off all contact with her parents since the

                                          14
April hearing. (5RR 60:1-6).

      At the conclusion of the May hearing, the trial court again ordered that

Justin was to maintain custody, ordered Adana to take a protective parenting class,

allowed Adana to have some visitation with the child, and imposed an injunction

on the child being in the presence of the child’s maternal grandparents. (5RR

83:11-21). Additionally, the court ordered a series of counseling sessions with the

child’s counselor along with what the content of the sessions should be. (5RR

80:2-14, 19-21; 82:2-5, 84 12-13). The court further ordered that the child was not

to see another counselor besides Ms. Scott. (5RR 77:19-20).

      In a session with the child’s counselor at the end of June, the child told the

counselor that there was something–a lie with respect to Uncle Gilbey–that she had

not told anyone about yet. (CR 284). Despite prodding by the counselor, the child

would not say what she had yet to reveal. (CR 284). The following month the child

told Justin, then the counselor during a session with the child, that Adana spanks

the child in the mouth when the child says something that she is not supposed to

say. (CR 284, 6RR 85:12-23). The child demonstrated to the counselor how Adana

hits her on the mouth using a doll. The child’s counselor reported Adana’s

behavior to CPS (6RR 85:12-23). In early August while the child was spending a

week of summer possession with Adana, the child told Justin in a telephone call

that she had finally gotten to fly her kite, but that her kite did not go as far up in the

                                           15
air as her grandfather’s kite. (CR 285; RR 45:7-8; Pet’r’s Ex 3, audio recording).11

Justin detailed these three concerns in an affidavit and filed a second temporary

restraining order requesting that Adana return the child to Lubbock early, that

further visitation be restricted to the Lubbock, and that a replacement counselor be

appointed since the child was withholding information about Uncle Gilbey.12                      13

(CR 281).

       Adana returned the child to Lubbock following the child’s one-week visit at

Adana’s house. (RR 45:4-13). Justin began recording the child’s telephone

conversations with Adana at that time, he said, due to his concerns that Adana was

continuing to violate the trial court’s injunctions. (6RR 45:4-25). In a telephone

call between the child and Adana the day after Adana returned the child to

Lubbock, Adana “remind[s]” the child that “we”…“you and me,” had flown kites

the week before. (6RR 44:2-13, 47:3-16).

       August Hearing

       At the April hearing At the status hearing on August 20, 2014, Justin

attempted to introduce the “you and me” recording between the child and Adana as
       11
         The trial court had enjoined the child from being in the presence of her grandparents
ten weeks earlier.
       12
          Adana told Justin in August that she was considering moving to the Lubbock area
since she was no longer associating with her family. (6RR 63:11-22).
       13
         The trial court denied the request over the phone as the judge (as well as opposing
counsel) were at a family law seminar in San Antonio.

                                               16
direct evidence of Adana’s coaching the child. (6RR 45:21-25). The trial court

refused to admit the recording opining that Justin did not meet the best interest of

the child threshold found in Alemeda v. State, and therefore, allowing the recording

to be heard or admitted would be tantamount to the trial court violating the “federal

wiretap laws.”14 (6RR 51:16-19, 52:7-16, 55:15-17). Justin also testified that the

child cried in her bedroom a lot after coming home from Adana’s two separate

one-week summer visits with the child. (6RR 39:1-3).

       Justin testified that he no longer drinks alcohol and had not had a drink in

over a year.15 (3RR 160:15-23; 6RR 38:10-11). Justin said that if the child stayed

in Lubbock, the child would not be subject to daycare or after-care once she started

school because his wife is a stay-at-home-mom with Justin’s younger daughter.

(6RR 62:19-23).

       Justin testified that he was concerned that Adana spanking the child in the

mouth was how Adana controlled what the child revealed, and that Adana’s actions

were the result of a cycle of abuse. (6RR 58:116-59:10). Adana had previously

admitted that she emancipated herself as a minor, which she told Justin was due to

her mother hitting her in the head and face with a hairbrush, but Adana claimed she

       14
          Alemeda v. State does not address federal wiretap laws, but rather state ‘wiretap’ law.
See infra, pg. 31.
       15
          Further, Justin’s wife provided in her affidavit supporting the April 2014 request for a
restraining order (in order to address any concerns about Justin’s drinking that Adana alleged at
the October 2013 hearing) that she and Justin live an alcohol-free lifestyle (Suppl CR ___).
                                                 17
emancipated herself because she wanted to live with her boyfriend. (2RR 14:17-

15:19). The child’s counselor admitted that it is possible that what Adana is doing

to the child is the result of a cycle of abuse. (6RR 89:2-8).

      The child’s counselor also testified that she still does not believe (as she did

not at the May hearing), that the child has ever been in the presence of Uncle

Gilbey. (6RR 84:19-24). Ms. Scott also testified that she “clarified” with the child,

during a session in which Adana was also present in the room, that the child had

flown kites with her grandfather a long time ago, but not so long ago with her

mom. (6RR 83:9-24).

      Adana testified that she drank the equivalent of one to two glasses of Franzia

wine three to four times per week. (6RR 9:23-10:10, 10:21-23). This amount

represents twice the amount Adana testified in October 2013 that she regularly

consumes, but she was aware at this point that the contents of her trash had just

been appropriated. (3RR 127:15-18; 6RR 15:16-19). Justin testified he requested

that a private investigator appropriate Adana’s curbside trash because he had noted

that Adana sometimes seemed intoxicated when he spoke to her while she was in

possession of the child. (6RR 38:12-20). The court had previously declined his

request to impose an alcohol injunction on Adana. (3RR 96:8-12; CR229).

      The trash collected from Adana’s home by the investigator one week before

the August hearing contained three large cans of beer and six empty 5-liter boxes

                                          18
of Franzia wine, which would equate to consumption of forty bottles of wine per

week. (CR 161-169 (investigator’s report); 6RR 28:5-30:13, 32:18-33:8). The

receipts also contained in the trash confirmed that Adana purchased three of the 5-

liter boxes (equating to twenty bottles) within a four-day period, one of which

Adana purchased while Adana was in possession of the child. (CR 165; 6RR

33:20-25, 38:17-20). Adana’s trash also contained an empty prescription bottle of

Fioricet, which contains a barbiturate, and an empty over-the-counter

analgesic/sleep-aid combination, as well as refill receipts for both of these central

nervous system depressants. (7RR 162). Packaging for both medications contain

warnings against mixing these drugs with alcohol. (7RR 162). Adana said she had

stored the empty wine boxes over a period of months and that she gave one of the

three boxes she purchased over a four-day period to a friend. (6RR 981-18).

      At the end of the hearing, after Justin had custody of the child in Lubbock

for four months, the trial court returned the child to Adana’s primary custody and

lifted the injunctions on the child being in the presence of, or in the home of, the

maternal grandparents, which is also Mr. Buitron’s home. (CR 291). The court

maintained the injunction on the child being in the presence of Mr. Buitron. (CR

317). That is, the trial court requested that Adana’s counsel provide it with the

same order rendered in February 2014 via letter before the child’s outcry, and the

trial court entered the same on August 29, 2014. (6RR 112:13-16).

                                         19
     F. Post-Trial Motions

      Justin requested Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law within twenty

days after the final order was entered, and timely filed notice of past due Findings

and Conclusions. (CR 323, 329). Justin filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion

to Modify, Correct, or Reform Judgment within thirty days after the final order

was entered. (CR 324, 327). After receiving Findings of Facts and Conclusions of

Law from the trial court, Justin timely requested Additional and Amended

Findings and Conclusions, to which the trial court did not respond. (CR 336).

                                        20
                       SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

                                       I. and II.

      The trial court erred, or abused its discretion, by excluding a telephone

recording between the child and mother and by excluding testimony from a

psychologist. The trial court believed that Justin did not have the authority to

obtain the evidence under federal wiretap laws, under the existing trial court

orders, or under Section 32.005 of the Texas Family Code.

      The vicarious consent doctrine provided the consent required under federal

wire tap statutes to record the call because Justin had a good-faith, objectively

reasonable belief that recording the call was in the best interest of the child.

      Justin took the child to a psychologist to have the child examined, as is his

right (and duty) as the child’s joint managing conservator. The trial court’s orders

only addressed psychological treatment, not examination. Even if Justin did not

have authority under the trial court’s order, Justin had authority under Section

32.005 that allows a psychologist with reasonable grounds to suspect a child has

been abused or neglected to examine a child.

      The excluded evidence was material to the issues of conservatorship, and

excluding the evidence was harmful to the outcome of the case.

                                           21
                                         III.

      Appellant argues that, despite the trial court stating that it was “not going to

wait until this little girl is fondled to do something about it,” that is, in effect,

exactly what the trial court did by failing to provide the child any greater protection

than the child all ready had when the child revealed that she was playing ‘touch’

games with her registered pedophilia sex offender uncle with the knowledge and

consent of the child’s mother. In fact, since the evidence in this case was re-opened

in the summer of 2014, Justin learned of other abuses Adana was imposing on the

child, but the trial court did not address them at all. The trial court’s interest

seemed to focus on returning to “status quo,” even if status quo meant the child

will continue to be endangered, coached, and abused.

      The orders are contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the

evidence. The orders are clearly unjust (especially to the child, who will ultimately

be the one to suffer the harmful consequences) and should shock the conscience of

this court. Justin has been left with no real way to protect his daughter from a

sexual predator of children, and the child has been left without any protections

from a mother who has shown she will physically and emotionally abuse and

endanger the child. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in rending such

an order.

                                          22
                                           IV.

      The modification judgment is void because there is no evidence to show that

an original order existed to modify. The original judgment was overturned by Bill

of Review, and, therefore, Justin is entitled to an original trial.

                                           23
                            STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. ABUSE OF DISCRETION

      A trial court’s decision in family law cases regarding conservatorship,

modification, and parental rights and duties is reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); See

also, Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet.

denied). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary,

unreasonable, or without regard to any guiding rules and principles. K-Mart Corp.

v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357, 360 (Tex. 2000). There is no abuse of discretion if

evidence of a substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court’s

decision. Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 587.

      Under the abuse of discretion standard of review in family law cases,

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error

but are relevant considerations in assessing whether the trial court abused its

discretion. Id. at 587. When assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion

in light of the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court employs a two-

pronged inquiry: (1) did the trial court have sufficient information upon which to

exercise its discretion, and (2) did the trial court err in its application of discretion.

Id. at 588. The trial court’s factual determinations are reviewed for sufficiency

                                           24
under the first prong, then the reviewing court determines whether, based on the

evidence, the trial court's decision was reasonable. Id.

B. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY

      The legal sufficiency of evidence to support a particular fact-finding is a

question of law. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex.2005). In a

legal sufficiency challenge, the reviewing court credits favorable evidence

supporting the finding if a reasonable fact-finder could, and disregards contrary

evidence unless a reasonable fact-finder could not. Id. at 827. If the evidence at

trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the same

conclusions, the evidence is legally sufficient. Id. at 827. When the evidence falls

within the zone of reasonable disagreement, a reviewing court may not substitute

the judgment of the trial court. McDonald v. Dankworth, 212 S.W.3d 336, 339

(Tex.App.-Austin 2006, no pet.) (citations omitted). A reviewing court cannot

disregard undisputed evidence that allows of only one logical inference. Keller,
168 S.W.3d at 814.

      A reviewing court sustains a legal sufficiency challenge if the record shows:

(1) the complete absence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law or

evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3)

the evidence offered o prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla, or (4) the

evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. Id. at 810 (citation

                                          25
omitted). In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a

fact-finder's determination, the reviewing court must determine whether the

evidence would allow reasonable and fair-minded people to find the facts at issue.

Id. at 827.

      Where a party bearing the burden of proof challenges a the legal sufficiency

of a finding, a reviewing court determines whether the evidence establishes, as a

matter of law, all of the facts in support of an issue. Dow Chemical Co. V. Francis,

46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001).

C. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY

      In reviewing a question of factual sufficiency, the reviewing court considers

all of the evidence in the record, both in favor of, and contrary to, a challenged

finding in a neutral light. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986) (per

curiam). Where a party bears the burden of proof, a factual sufficiency challenge is

sustained if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the

evidence that it is clearly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly demonstrates

bias. CTTI Priesmeyer, Inc. v. K & O Ltd. P'ship, 164 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex.App.-

Austin 2005, no pet.)

      A reviewing court must not merely substitute its judgment for that of the

trier of fact when conducting a factual sufficiency review. Golden Eagle Archery,

Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). However, the reviewing court

                                        26
may conclude that a finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the

evidence even if the record contains “some evidence of probative force” to support

the finding. Id.

D. DE NOVO

      In reviewing a question of law, the reviewing court engages in an analysis de

novo without deference to the lower court’s determination. State v. Heal, 917
S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex.1996). A "trial court has no `discretion' in determining what the

law is or applying the law to the facts,” and, therefore, abuses its discretion if it

misinterprets or misapplies the law. Shook v. Walden, 304 S.W.3d 910, 916-17

(Tex.App.-Austin 2010, no pet.) (citations omitted).

                                         27
                    ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES16

                                              ISSUE I.

      Did the trial court err (or alternatively abuse its discretion) by
excluding a recorded telephone call obtained by vicarious consent due to
father’s good-faith, objectively reasonable belief that recording the call was in
the child’s best interest because the mother was continuing to violate
protective injunctions and coach the child to deny the mother’s violations?

       Both federal and state “wiretap” statues prohibit intercepting or recording a

telephone conversation unless one of the parties to the conversation has consented

to the interception or recording.17 However, the federal and Texas courts

considering the doctrine of “vicarious consent” have all held that the necessary

consent may be vicariously provided by a parent (or guardian) on behalf of the

minor child when the consenting adult has a good-faith, objectively reasonable

belief that recording the communication is necessary and in the best interest of the

child.18

       16
            Citations to the record are included if not previously cited in the Statement of Facts.
       17
         18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d); Tex. Pen. Code §16.02(c)(4)(B); Tex. Pract. & Civ. Rem Code
§ 123.001(2)
       18
         Other than the federal and state cases cited herein, the other federal and state cases are,
Wagner v. Wagner, 64 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896 (D.Minn.1999); Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186
(E.D.Ark. 1998); Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D.Utah 1993); Isaacson v.
Isaacson, No. CIV-10-678-M (W.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2011); Weaver v. State, No. 10-06-00326-CR,
2007 WL 4157237, at *2 (Tex. App.–Waco Nov. 21, 2007, pet. denied) (mem.op., not
designated for publication); Ussery v. State, 03-07-00116-CR, 2008 WL 269439, at *1 (Tex.
App.–Austin, Jan. 30, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem.op., not designated for publication).
                                                 28
      The Texas opinions affirming the vicarious consent doctrine are the progeny

of Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.1998), which was the first, and is the

only, federal circuit court to address vicariously consented telephone recordings.

Id. at 606. In Pollock, a mother recorded telephone calls between her daughter and

her ex-husband and his new wife after the mother became concerned that her

daughter was being “emotionally abused” by the father. Id. at 603. Specifically, the

mother believed that her daughter’s father and step-mother were subjecting the

fourteen-year-old child to mounting “psychological and emotional pressure” to do

whatever necessary for the daughter to convince her mother that the father should

have custody of the daughter. Id. at 604.

      The mother had noted a gradual change whereby her daughter demonstrated

an “excessive or compulsive desire to be with her father” and a “deteriorating

relationship” with her mother. Id. The mother said she began recording calls

because of her “concern for her child’s well being.” Id. The court noted that it was

important to the determination to consider that the recordings were made in the

context of a bitter and protracted custody dispute. Id. at 603.

      In one recorded call between the child and her step-mother, the child

expressed wanting to kill the mother’s two attorneys. In turn, the step-mother

added the trial court judge to the “hit list.” Id. The father and step-mother filed suit

against the mother for violating federal wiretap statutes prohibiting interception

                                            29
and disclosure of telephone conversations without consent of one of the parties. Id.

at 605.

      The Pollock court found that the mother’s concerns about her daughter’s

welfare provided vicarious consent to record and disclose the content of the

telephone calls, and thus, the recordings did not violate federal wiretap laws. Id. at

610. Specifically, after surveying each state and federal district court opinion on

the issue at that time, the Pollock Court held that:

             [A]s long as the guardian has a good faith, objectively

             reasonable basis for believing that it is necessary and in

             the best interest of the child to consent on behalf of his or

             her minor child to the taping of telephone conversations,

             the guardian may vicariously consent on behalf of the

             child to the recording.

Id.

      In Allen v. Mancini, 170 S.W.3d 167 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2005, pet. denied),

a father recorded telephone conversations between his minor child and the child’s

mother during the child’s summer vacation with father. Id. at 170, 172. The father

became aware during the visitation that the mother was attempting to interfere in

the child’s relationship with the father by telling the child that her father did not

love the child, the father stole money and was going to jail, the father had

                                          30
“kidnapped” the child, and instructed the child not to call the father “Dad.” Id. at

170. The recordings were admitted into evidence during a subsequent custody

modification proceeding. Id. at 172. The mother objected to the admissibility under

both state and federal wiretap statutes.19 Id. at 172-73. The appellate court held that

the father had provided vicarious consent “under the criteria set forth in Pollock,”

and, therefore, neither Texas nor federal wiretap laws were violated. Id. at 173.

       The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has likewise ruled on vicarious

consent. Alameda v. State, 235 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In Alameda, a

mother suspected that her thirteen-year-old daughter was having an inappropriate,

but not sexual, relationship with a former male tenant who had roomed at mother’s

home for a year. Id. at 220. The mother believed that the former tenant and her

daughter were continuing to have contact without the mother’s knowledge or

permission because the man’s relatives would tell the mother things about herself

that they would not otherwise know if her daughter and the man were not still in

contact. Id. at n.1 (majority opinion); Alameda v. State, 181 S.W.3d 772, 780

(Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2005). Continued contact concerned the child’s mother

because the man had allowed the child to do things the mother did not approve of

       19
         The Allen opinion infers that, since the mother cited Collins v. Collins, 904 S.W.2d 792
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), writ den'd, 923 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.1996), and Collins
addressed only Section 123 of the Texas Practice and Civil Remedies Code, the mother in Allen
was not implicating the Texas Penal Code. 170 S.W.3d at 172.

                                               31
during his tenancy, such as drive a car. Alemeda, 235 S.W.3d. at n.1 (majority

opinion). The mother recorded all incoming and outgoing telephone calls and

discovered the man and her daughter were engaging in a sexual relationship. Id. at

220. The recordings were turned over to the police, and the man was charged

accordingly. Id. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the recordings as

inadmissible under Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

(exclusionary rule) claiming the recordings were illegally obtained per § 16.02 of

the Texas Penal Code. 235 S.W.3d at 220. The trial court held that vicarious

consent was provided due to the mother’s concerns. Id. Both the intermediate

appellate court and the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the standard set out in

Pollock and affirmed on that basis.20 Alameda, 181 S.W.3d at 778; Alameda, 235
S.W.3d at 223.

       In the instant case, Justin’s good-faith, objectively reasonable concerns were

a matter of record long before he began recording calls between the child and

Adana. The child made an outcry to Justin and to CPS that the child had been

around her pedophilia uncle in violation of an injunction. In fact, the uncle had

       20
           The verbiage of the Forth Worth Court of Appeals’ holding differed slightly from
Pollock, stating that: "[A]s long as a parent has a good faith, objectively reasonable basis for
believing that the taping of telephone conversations is in the best interest of the parent's minor
child, the parent may vicariously consent to the recording on behalf of the child.” Alameda v.
State, 181 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2005) (emphasis added). The Court of
Criminal Appeals used both the Pollock language and the Fort-Worth appellate court’s language
in their opinion. 235 S.W.3d at 223.

                                                32
been touching the child via a uniquely created version of tag that made the child a

“princess” and whoever caught her, her “prince.” It is well established that early

physical pedophilia grooming often includes body-contact games or play-acting,

and early psychological grooming often includes making the child feel “special.”21

Even the trial court voiced concern over the dynamic of the princess/prince role

playing, and Ms. Roberts agreed the dynamic was worrisome. (4RR 42:17-24).

       Then, after Adana received a call from CPS letting Adana know what the

child told her, the child recanted her story, denying that she even had any uncles at

all. CPS joined Justin in his concern that Adana had punished the child for her

outcry. A few months later, the child revealed Adana’s mode of punishment when

the child says things the child is not supposed to say: spanking the child in the

mouth.

       In the few days before Justin began recording telephone calls between his

daughter and Adana, it became apparent to Justin that Adana had again violated a

court injunction when the child told Justin in a phone call that she had flown kites

with her paternal grandfather that day (Justin is unaware if the child’s grandmother

or Uncle Gilbey, who both reside with the grandfather, was also present). The

court had specifically enjoined Adana just ten weeks earlier from having the child

       21
         Anne-Marie McAlinden, ‘Setting’Em Up’: Personal, Familial and Institutional
Grooming in the Sexual Abuse of Children, 2006, at 347; Samantha Craven, Sexual Grooming of
Children: Review of Literature and Theoretical Considerations, 2006, at 295.
                                              33
in her parents’ presence during Adana’s limited summer possession. (5RR 83:11-

21). Justin felt it was in the child’s best interest for him to be able to document the

continued violations so that the trial court would have sufficient information to put

safeguards in place.

      In both Pollock and Alemeda, the parents only suspected inappropriate

conduct by the other parent or third party at the time the courts deemed their

suspicions were enough to provide vicarious consent. Justin already knew Adana

had engaged in inappropriate conduct with the child, and had good reason to

believe she was still violating injunctions, which necessarily meant she was still

coaching the child. Exacting secrecy also has the effect of interfering in the child’s

relationship with the other parent, as was the case in Pollock and Allen.

      The trial court and CPS shared Justin’s concerns about Adana’s conduct and

about whether the child had been, or would be, harmed, which is why the trial

court removed the child from Adana’s possession and awarded Justin temporary

custody. The fact that others would, and did, have the same concerns is a likely

gauge for “good-faith, objectively reasonable basis.” See Wichita County v. Hart,

917 S.W.2d 779, 784-85 (Tex.1996) (reviewing “good faith” definitions in various

contexts and holding that “good faith” is “honesty in fact” in the Whistleblower

context); see also, Jackson v. Axelrad, 221 S.W.3d 650, 655-56 (Tex. 2007) (the

traditional reasonable-person standard takes into account both the knowledge and

                                          34
skill of an ordinary person). Given that others did have serious concerns about

Adana’s conduct, Justin’s vicarious consent to record telephone calls between the

child and Adana meets the standard articulated in Pollock, Alemeda, and Mancini.

      As the cases on vicarious consent demonstrate, recording a child’s telephone

conversations often produces the only direct and irrefutable evidence that the other

parent or a third-party is engaging in behavior harmful to the child. In this case,

while there was evidence that Adana had coached the child and that she spanks the

child in the mouth to control what the child says, the recording was the only

evidence that Adana was continuing to coach the child after undertaking a

protective parenting class that the court seemed confident would reform Adana.

Thus, contrary to the trial court’s finding that Adana was “successfully progressing

in protective parenting classes,” the excluded recording would have demonstrated

to the trial court that, despite embarking on a protective parenting class, Adana was

continuing to ignore injunctions and then continuing to mentally and emotionally

abuse the child in an attempt to exonerate herself. (CR 334:27)

      Moreover, the trial court specifically told Adana at the April hearing after

the child was removed from her possession that she was not to coach the child, and

stated, “If you think it’s bad now, get caught doing that,” referring to coaching the

child. (4RR 114:20-115:2). Because at the same hearing the trial court refused to

order any specific visitation for Adana with the child, the statement “if you think

                                         35
it’s bad now,” clearly implied the trial court would continue to severely limit

Adana’s access to the child if she were “caught” coaching the child. (4RR 114:16-

19, 115:3-13, 116:4-9).

      But without the irrefutable evidence “catching” Adana continuing to coach

the child even as late as August, instead of limited access, the trial court returned

the child to Adana’s possession at the conclusion of the August hearing. That is, by

the trial court’s own sentiments, the exclusion of the “you and me” recording

evidencing Adana’s continued coaching likely caused a rendition that the court

would not have otherwise made. Kittman v. Miller, No. 12-13-00097-CV 2013 WL
4680575 at *8-9 (Tex. App. – Tyler Aug. 29, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(excluded testimony that showed a parent behaved inappropriately on more than

one occasion probably caused an improper rendition). Therefore, the trial court

erred, or alternatively, abused its discretion, and a new trial should be granted.

                                      ISSUE II.

      Did the trail court err (or alternatively abuse its discretion) in excluding
expert testimony that the child was afraid of her uncle, a convicted pedophile,
when the evidence was permissibly obtained.

      At the initial hearing after the child made an outcry (April hearing), the trial

court ordered that the child have a CAC interview and a session with the child’s

counselor. Justin took the child to a psychologist, Dr. White, for an examination

shortly before the May hearing as well. During basic get-to-know you questions,

                                          36
such as what do you like/dislike, what are you afraid of, the child spontaneously

said that she was afraid of witches and Uncle Gilbey. (5RR 51:1-11). Justin did not

expect the child to mention Uncle Gilbey since the child had denied having uncles

or ever seeing Uncle Gilbey to CAC and her regular counselor, respectively, in the

weeks before owing do Adana’s coaching. The fact that she did mention Uncle

Gilbey demonstrated to Justin that the child does not feel free, or safe, to talk to the

counselor Adana and her mother take the child to see–the one who reached out to

Adana’s counsel offering her ‘testimony.’ After this disclosure to Dr. White, Justin

hired a psychologist, Dr. Kelley Baker, local to the trial court, to consult with Dr.

White so that Dr. Baker could testify as to her and Dr. White’s impressions, the

fears the child expressed (statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis),

and offer therapy suggestions the following week at the May hearing.

      During the May hearing, and in the trial court’s findings of fact and

conclusions of law, the trial court found that Justin was not authorized to have the

child examined by a psychologist because Adana was the parent with “the

exclusive right…to consent to psychiatric and psychological treatment,” and the

trial court had neither provided authorization. (5RR 19:1-20:25, 53:15-54:24; CR

232, 333:24, 335:3) (emphasis added). However, Justin testified, and Justin’s

counsel made it clear, that Justin took the child for an examination or assessment

only, not for treatment. (5RR 19:14-20:25). The parties’ orders did not address a

                                          37
parent taking a child to a psychologist, or any other health care provider, for an

examination. The only limitation was regarding treatment of the child, and Dr.

White did not provide treatment.

      Under the parties’ order Justin had, and has, a duty of care and protection of

the child during his periods of possession. At the time the child was examined by

Dr. White, Adana had no right to any possession of the child whatsoever. In fact,

the trail court expressly refused to order any visitation between the April and May

hearings. (4RR 116:4-9). The right to have the child examined, therefore, arises

under Justin’s duty to protect the child if he is not otherwise prohibited, otherwise

Justin would merely be warehousing his daughter without any ability to determine

what specialized care he may need to provide for her. And Justin was not

prohibited from having his child independently examined under the parties’ or the

trial court’s orders at that time. (4RR, CR 229, 252).

      Should this court interpret Justin’s authority to consent to an examination

under the parties’ orders differently, Section 32.005 of the Texas Family Code

expressly entitles, inter alia, a psychologist to examine a child “without the consent

of the child, the child’s parents or other person authorized to consent to treatment

under this subchapter” if the psychologist has “reasonable grounds to believe the

child’s physical or mental condition has been adversely affected by abuse or

neglect,” unless consent is prohibited by a court order. Tex. Fam. Code §

                                         38
32.005(a), (c). In the instant case, no injunction existed that prohibited Justin from

taking the child to a psychologist.

      It appears that § 32.005 (or its sister statute 32.004) have never been

considered by Texas appellate courts. However, sections in Subchapter A

(“Consent to Medical Dental, Psychological, and Surgical Treatment”) allow

minors to consent for themselves to various treatments, including surgery, under

certain conditions and allow various providers to treat or examine minors without

any consent whatsoever, provided they have reasonable grounds to do so. Tex.

Fam. Code §§ 32.001-32.005. The “subchapter” provides a laundry list of “other

persons” from whom a psychologist does not need consent in order to examine a

child (besides the child and the child’s parents), including various family members,

various institutions, a court having jurisdiction over a suit affecting the parent-

child relationship of which the child is a subject, managing conservators, and

guardians. Tex. Fam. Code §§ 32.001(a), 32.004(b).

      In its conclusions of the law, the trial court seems to interpret § 32.005 to

mean that a psychologist may only examine a child when a psychologist discovers

facts warranting reasonable grounds on their own. (CR 335). Appellant is unclear

how a psychologist might independently discover such facts without someone

close to the child–who will transport the child to the psychologist, such as a parent

or guardian–relating facts to the psychologist. The trial court further opines that a

                                         39
parent should not be allowed “to create” reasonable grounds to believe that his

child’s physical or mental condition had been adversely affected by abuse or

neglect. (CR 335). Appellant agrees with this statement. However, here, Justin did

not create the reasonable grounds, but rather the reasonable grounds were all ready

created by Adana (as evidenced by the trial court removing the child from her

possession, of which Dr. White was aware since he knew Justin prior to the child’s

removal). Justin merely related the removal facts to the psychologist who then

formed his own beliefs as to whether he had reasonable grounds.

      Indeed, it would seem impermissible under the first rule of statutory

construction to insert qualifiers after “reasonable grounds” such as “which he or

she independently discovers” or “the facts of which were not communicated by a

parent” into the text of a statute. Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc.,

996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999) (citations omitted) (“[F]irst…look[] to the plain

and common meaning of the statute's words"); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Elchehimi,

249 S.W.3d 430, 434 (Tex. 2008) (declining to adopt an “integral part test”

because the test was “not present in the text of the statute…”)

      Due to the trial court’s erroneous interpretation of Justin’s authority (or the

psychologist’s under § 32.005), the court was offended that Justin took the child to

a psychologist even though Justin only sought to have the child examined for clues

of molestation since the CAC forensic interview ordered was ineffectual likely due

                                         40
to Adana punishing the child for the outcry. Instead of allowing Dr. Baker (or Ms.

Scott) to offer suggestions on how to proceed with therapy considering the child

was saying she was scared of a ‘non-existent’ uncle, the trial court ordered the

content of the child’s therapy.

       Dr. Baker’s excluded testimony was evidence material to the issue of

conservatorship, including present and future emotional needs of, and danger to,

the child. See Van Heerden v. Van Heerden, 321 S.W.3d 869, 877 (Tex. App.-

Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Dr. Baker’s testimony would provide the only

evidence that the child was scared of Uncle Gilbey for some reason. The trial court

exclusion’s of this evidence, therefore, was an error, or alternatively, an abuse of

discretion and probably caused an improper rendition of the case. McCraw v.

Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex.1992). It is unlikely that the trial court would

have returned the child to Adana if the trial court had considered the testimony,

which tended to show that the yet-to-be revealed secret about the registered

pedophilia sex offender uncle that the child had been playing “touch” games with

is something that makes the child as scared of him as she is of witches, who “get

little girls.”

                                    ISSUE III.

      Did the trial court err (or alternatively abuse its discretion) by
designating the mother as the parent with the exclusive right to designate the
child’s residence, by granting the mother other exclusive rights, and by

                                        41
allowing the mother to have unsupervised possession of the child where the
evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support that such findings
and orders were in the best interest of the child?

      A. Conservatorship

      The determination of conservatorship issues is "intensely fact driven.” Lenz

v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex.2002). The burden of proof in conservatorship

cases is a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; § 105.005; In re W.M., 172 S.W.3d
718, 724 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). The Texas Supreme Court has

developed best interest factors to guide the courts in making such determinations in

conservatorship and modification of conservatorship cases. Holley v. Adams, 544
S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex. 2000).

The Texas legislature has provided the courts with public policy imperatives for

the courts to observe in applying the best interest factors to the facts in each

conservatorship case. Id. at 14; Tex. Fam. Code § 153.001(a). Many statues in the

Texas Family Code reveal how seriously the legislature takes its public policy

imperatives and parens patriae role in the protection of children within its borders

from abuse and neglect at the hands of a child’s own parent. See, e.g., Tex. Fam.

Code §§ 153.004, 153.131, 156.104, 156.1045, 161.001; Saavedra v. Schmidt, 96
S.W.3d 533, 544 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).

      B. Safety of the Child Controls

      Collectively, the guidance provided by the Texas Supreme Court and

                                        42
legislature mandate that the safety of the child controls. Also collectively, the

guidance as applied to the facts in this case dictate that Adana should not be

appointed the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the child’s

residence or to consent to the child’s psychological treatment, and that her periods

of possession should provide for monitoring or other protective safeguards for both

the physical and emotional safety of the child.

      Section 153.001(a) sets out the state’s public policy imperatives:

      (a) The public policy of this state is to:

      (1) assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with

           parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the

           child;

      (2) provide a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child; and

      (3) encourage parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their child

           after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.

Tex. Fam. Code § 153.001(a) (emphasis added).

      At the outset of the conservatorship statutes, the legislature qualifies which

parents may be assured of frequent and continuing contact with their children when

a court decides conservatorship and possession issues. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355,

361 (Tex.2003) (citations omitted) (“The rights of parenthood are accorded only to

those fit to accept the accompanying responsibilities."). The statute further

                                         43
provides that courts will first and foremost seek to provide a safe, stable, and

nonviolent environment. Without a safe environment, which necessarily includes

nonviolence, stability is of little import. Id. (“[P]rotection of the child is

paramount…”). A court that effectively makes the same assurance to a parent who

has not shown that he or she would keep their child safe, renders the policy

nonexistent and leaves the child at risk of harm. See generally, Sylvia v. Tex. Dep’t

of Family and Protective Servs., No. 03-09-00427-CV 2010 WL 1507827 at *13

(Tex. App.–Austin Apr. 15, 2010, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted)

(mother’s parental rights terminated for failure to protect children from sexual

abuse because she disbelieved her husband was intentionally exposing himself to

her children); In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 431-32 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th

Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (mother’s possession was supervised unless she provided

father with negative drug and alcohol test results prior to each possession period).

       The Texas Supreme Court and many courts of appeals have held that the

presumptions in Chapter 153 of the Texas Family Code do not apply to Chapter

156 conservatorship modifications. In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex.2000);

In re S.E.K., 294 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied); In re

C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet.

denied). And while this interpretation means that the ‘safety of the child’

presumptions contained in Chapter 153 where there has been a showing of abuse

                                         44
and neglect are not statutorily available to the child in a modification proceeding,

certainly evidence of abuse and neglect must still be considered. See, S.E.K., 294
S.W.3d at 929. The ‘safety presumptions’ available to protect the child in an

original proceeding provide that a parent who has a history or pattern of, inter alia,

child neglect or abuse may not be appointed joint managing conservator and

should have supervised visitation with the child. Tex. Fam. Code § 153.004(b), (e);

In re L.M.M., No. 03-04-00452-CV, 2005 WL 2094758, *7 (Tex.App.-Austin

2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted); Contra In re L.C.L., 396 S.W.3d 712,

719 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.).

      Spanking a child in the mouth, for any reason, much less to silence a child,

is physical and emotional abuse. Cases where testimony reveals that a parent hit a

child in the mouth are noted in appellate opinions, likely owing to the fact that

such behavior is universally recognized as physical and emotional abuse. In re

A.A.M., No. 14-05-00740-CV, 2007 WL 1558701, at *2 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th

Dist.] May 31, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re T.N.C., No. 13-11-00305-CV, 2011
WL 5282679, at *3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Nov. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.);

In re K.B., No. 03–09–00366–CV, 2010 WL 5019368, at *2, 6 (Tex.App.-Austin

Dec. 9, 2010, no pet.) (mem.op.); In re J.K., No. 09-10-00226-CV, 2011 WL
2119770 at *3, 13 (Tex.App.-Beaumont May 19, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      While terminating Adana’s parental rights was never a question or request in

                                         45
the case at bar, the statutes and case law on termination are instructive since

termination was ordered in cases similar to this case. That is, in cases where a

parent knowingly placed a child in an environment at high risk for sexual abuse, or

neglect due to alcohol abuse, and then refused to change their behavior, or were

too slow to change their behavior. Section 161.001 provides that if a trial court

finds that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the

child and that, by clear and convincing evidence, inter alia, any one of the

following has occurred, the parent-child relationship may be terminated:

      (D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions

          or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of

          the child, or

      (E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who

          engaged in conduct with endangers the physical or emotional well-being

          of the child.

Tex. Fam. Code § 161(D), (E).

      Subsection D permits termination for a single act of endangerment, whereas

Subsection E requires a course of conduct. In re R.D., 955 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex.

App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied) (citation omitted). Subsection D speaks to the

parent’s act or omission causing a child to be placed or remain in an endangering

environment, whereas Subsection E speaks to a parent’s conduct that itself causes

                                         46
endangerment. Id.

      In the instant case, the trial court found that the child had been in the

presence of a registered pedophilia sex offender due to Adana’s conduct. (CR

332:21, CR 317). Regardless of whether Adana wants to believe that her brother is

guilty of the pedophilia offenses for which he was convicted, she is aware of the

convictions, thus, her acts, omissions, and conduct meet, not just one, but all ‘four’

of the alternative conditions in Subsections D and E. In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d 790,

796 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (mother’s parent-child relationships

terminated where mother, “at a minimum, knew of the potential for danger of

sexual abuse” and “failed to adequately protect the children from that risk.”). There

is no a requirement that exposing the child to endangerment resulted in harm in

order to terminate a parent’s legal relationship to their child. Williams v. Willaims,

150 S.W.3d 436, 450 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied) (“conduct need not

have caused an actual injury…to constitute conduct that endangers the child's

physical or emotional well-being”).

      Surely, then, based on Adana exposing the child to a high risk of sexual

abuse because she refuses to “see that there’s going to be a risk,” reasonable minds

could only come to one conclusion: that the trial court abused its discretion by

allowing Adana to have primary custody of the child and not safeguarding the

child. In re J.I.O., No. 11-05-00369-CV 2007 WL 1644579, at *3 (Tex.App.-

                                         47
Eastland June 7, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (father awarded custody where mother

did not “see a problem” with her sex offender boyfriend being around the child as

there was no evidence the child was yet harmed); Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d
921, 928 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, no writ) (“It is foreseeable that a child will be

victimized if left alone or brought into close proximity with a pedophile. A

reasonable parent will protect a child… from [that] predatory behavior…”).

      Adana is, of course, also aware of her excessive alcohol intake, (along with

prescription barbiturates), which alone will support a finding that termination is in

the child’s best interest. In re S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45, 52 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no

pet.) ("Evidence of illegal drug use or alcohol abuse…is often cited as conduct

which will support an affirmative finding that the parent has engaged in a course of

conduct which has the effect of endangering the child.") (emphasis added); In re

T.D.L., No. 02-05-00250-CV, 2006 WL 302126, at *7-8 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth,

Feb. 9, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering mother's continuous abuse of

prescription drugs in analyzing trial court's subsection (E) finding); Johnson v.

Johnson, 804 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ)

(mother awarded sole custody while father’s visitation was supervised due to the

fact that father was abusing alcohol); In re H.A.P., No. 11–05–00180–CV, 2006
WL 648312, at *2 (Tex.App. – Eastland March 16, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(upholding supervised-visitation only for father due to his alcohol abuse).

                                         48
      The trial court implied during the May hearing and in its findings of fact that

returning to the prior orders or “status quo” was the goal and in the best interest of

the child. (5RR 82:23-25; CR 28). But as the cases above all demonstrate, when

“status quo” is endangering, abusing, and neglecting the child, all of which

demonstrate an improper bond between the parent and child, status quo is anything

but in the best interest of the child. Safety controls.

      C. The Evidence, the Findings, and Best Interest of the Child

      The trial court found that the child had been in the presence of Uncle Gilbey

during the first hearing after the CPS child interviewer testified that the child

reluctantly revealed to her that the child had played the “touch” game of Princess

Tag with her Uncle Gilbey. This finding is also reflected in the trial court’s

findings of fact. (CR 332:21). Even the evidence submitted by Adana’s counsel

showed that every day in 2014 that Uncle Gilbey was not at work or he left work

early, Adana’s mother, with whom Uncle Gilbey lives, picked the child up from

daycare as if the family is going out of their way to foster a relationship between

the child and her registered pedophilia sex offender uncle. (7RR 159, 160).

      While Justin did not seek custody of the child when he filed a modification,

he did once the child told him that she had been playing Princess Tag with Uncle

Gilbey. Learning that his child was being touched by a pedophile, along with the

evidence of Adana coaching the child, spanking her in the mouth, and abusing

                                           49
alcohol, was, as Justin put it, “definitely a game changer.” (6RR 64:18-24). It

would be a game changer for any reasonable trier-of-fact. Nonetheless, and while

there were no concerns about Justin’s parenting or the environment the child lives

in with Justin, the trial court found it not only to be in the best interest of the child

for Adana to have primary custody, but in the child’s best interest for Adana to

have all of the exclusive rights contained in Section 153.132, which is tantamount

to giving Adana sole managing conservatorship of the child. Tex. Fam. Code §

153.132; In re Kubankin, 257 S.W.3d 852, 860 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, orig.

proceeding) (per curiam) (order providing a joint managing conservator with seven

exclusive rights corresponds to a sole managing conservatorship).

Undisputed, Relevant Substantive Conservatorship Evidence

      • Justin will go to great lengths to protect his child from a pedophilia sex

         offender.

      • Adana fought to have the child establish a personal relationship with her

         pedophilia sex offender brother as he was being released from a nine-year

         prison sentence, saying that she just does not “see that there is going to be

         a risk there.” (2RR 12:20-25).

      • Adana exacted secrecy from the child by coaching her not to talk about

         Uncle Gilbey to anyone.

      • Adana has spanked the child in the mouth.

                                           50
        • Child’s counselor reported Adana to CPS.

        • Adana drinks alcohol every week.

        • Adana had six empty 5-Liter boxes of wine (equating to forty empty

          bottles) in her weekly curbside trash.

        • Adana purchased three 5-Liter boxes of wine (equating to twenty bottles)

          in a four-day period.

        • Adana regularly takes a prescription containing barbiturates.

Credibility Issues

        The trial court, the sole judge of credibility, stated at the April hearing that

the testimony of Adana and her family lacked any credibility. “So their testimony

of their belief [that Mr. Buitron is a pedophile] to me is disingenuous. I don’t

believe–I think they’re down here saying what’s necessary to get what they want.”

(4RR 106:17-19). Thus, it would be unreasonable for a trier-of-fact to give any of

Adana’s sworn testimony credibility.

        Indeed, subsequent testimony by Adana was just as incredible since Adana’s

testimony varied substantially between hearings and her versions of events were, at

times, the exact opposite of credible evidence. For example, the amount of alcohol

to which Adana testified she drank every week doubled from one hearing to the

next.

        Adana maintained at the August hearing that the child never met Uncle

                                           51
Gilbey (even after the trial court stated months earlier that it disbelieved her when

she said there had been no contact between the two). However, she also testified at

the August hearing that, “…if I had been told–if that restraining order (sic)

said…‘Do not go to anybody’s house that has, you know, [Uncle Gilbey] in their

house,’ if that’s what it said, I would have done that.” By this ambiguous

statement, Adana appeared to be blaming the injunction (or the court) for the

contact between the child and Uncle Gilbey because the injunction did not list all

the places the child might run into her uncle, such as the home he lives in. (5RR

60: 1-6).

      Adana testified at the August hearing that the reason she purchased three 5-

Liter wine boxes on August 6th and 10th–just ten and fourteen days prior to her

testimony–was because she “thinks” her best friend was in town, or that she was

going to her best friend’s house, “or something.” (6RR 98:12-15). It would not be

very difficult for most people to recall whether or not they have seen their out-of-

town best friend during the last two weeks.

      At the original injunction hearing regarding Uncle Gilbey, Adana’s counsel

stated that if the trial court would see fit to deny Justin’s request for the injunction

against Uncle Gilbey, Adana would ensure that when the child and Uncle Gilbey

were together, “[Uncle Gilbey] will have, absolutely, no physical contact with the

child, not a handshake, not a hug, not a pat on the back.” (2RR 6: 4-6).

                                          52
      Regarding the child saying in a recorded phone call that she “finally” got to

fly her kite, but that it did not go as high as her grandfather’s (indicating Adana had

again violated an injunction imposed to safeguard the child), Adana’s counsel

elicited the following testimony:

      Q. Did you and Sierra go fly kites, recently?
      A. Yes, we did in our backyard.
      …
      Q. The first week of August?
      A. Yes.
      Q. Did Sierra make some comment about how high her kite
        flew?
      A. Yes, we got -- we had some really good wind, and it went
        really high.
      Q. When is the last time she flew a kite with her step-
        grandfather?
      A. I think it was my birthday last year, but I'm not positive.
      Q. When was that?
      A. October. But, I mean, he may have -- they may have done it,
        or tried to. That was the whole thing, they tried to fly a kite,
        and it didn't work out.
      …
      Q. Ha[ve] [the grandparents] had any contact with Sierra since
        May 21, 2013?
      A. No.
      Q. Does Sierra say when she was flying a kite that it went
        higher than the last time she flew one with grandpa?
      A. Yes, she said it flew higher than her grand-dad's dragon
        kite.
      Q. Okay. And we're now facing an allegation that because she
        said that, somehow grandpa had to be there that day?
      A. Well -- and I can see why [Justin] thought that, but, no, [the
        child’s grandfather] wasn't there. She was just saying that our
        kite, because she was holding it, she let the string go, go, go,
        and it went really high. [The child’s grandfather] had -- he
        didn't get his up.

                                          53
(6RR 22:1-25, 23:1-13) (emphasis added).

      But if the child had flown the kite with Adana rather than with grandfather

on August 4, 2014, as the child reported, then Adana would have known that her

child’s kite did not go “really high” at all, much less fly away, according to the

child. In fact, the exact opposite thing happened: the child’s kite did not go “so

way up in the air,” but her “granddad’s kite did” go way up in the air. (Pet’r’s Ex

3, audio recording).

      The testimony from Adana’s parents was equally as incredible. Adana’s

mother testified that Princess Tag was the game that the child played with the three

boys next door to their home (the home where Uncle Gilbey lives). (4RR 88:10-

24). Yet in a subsequent interview by CPS with the parents of the neighbor

children in question, those parents stated they had never heard of Princess Tag.

(5RR 11:11-22)

      On the other hand, the trial court never questioned Justin’s credibility, nor

was his testimony ever impeached by Adana’s counsel, nor did his testimony vary

over the five hearings. Additionally, there were no concerns voiced about Justin’s

parenting skills, parenting ability, or his protectiveness, as evidenced by: 1) the

lack of concerns listed in the findings, 2) the trial court giving the child to Justin

for four months, 3) the child’s counselor and CPS testifying that they had no

concerns about Justin’s parenting or his home.

                                         54
Incompetent Evidence

      Testimony from Ms. Scott about there being emotional harm to the child if

she stayed too long with Justin or if Justin maintained custody is wholly

incompetent. Ms. Scott provided no basis specific to this child to opine that the

child would be harmed. Ms. Scott’s information has largely been fed to her from

Adana directly or from Adana through the child, since the evidence shows that

Adana has told the child to deny to Ms. Scott that she has been in contact with

Uncle Gilbey. The trial court largely recognized Ms. Scott’s testimony about harm

to the child was unsupported by fact when Ms. Scott testified that the child was

enjoying being at Justin’s Lubbock home.

Trial Court Findings

      Finding 13: Justin testified that he worked in Eunice, New Mexico, which is

only a few miles over the Texas border. Justin never resided there.

      Finding 16: The last sentence in this finding is not supported by the record.

In the April hearing there was considerable discussion with Ms. Scott, Ms. Robert

(CPS), and the court about transitioning to a Lubbock counselor so that Justin

would not have to drive twelve hours round trip for one fifty-minute session with

Ms. Scott. (4RR 37:17-19, 97:8-98:3). The discussion included Ms. Scott Skyping

with the child’s new counselor. (4RR 97:24-98:3). At the conclusion of the April

hearing, alternatives regarding transitioning to a Lubbock counselor were still up in

                                         55
the air as evidenced by the trial court stating that it would like “Ms. Scott to have,

at least, one face-to-face with the child.” (4RR 99:4-6, 110-13-15). As to whether

Ms. Scott is a neutral counselor, it is very unusual for a therapist to counsel a child

for a year without verifying facts about the child from both parents or collateral

contacts. It is also very unusual for a counselor to write a letter to an attorney with

an opinion about visitation based on one-sided contact and offer-up “testimony”

should it be needed. And, still, Ms. Scott does still not believe the child had contact

with Uncle Gilbey despite the court finding that the child did have contact.

      Finding 17: The inference that Justin did not participate in the child’s

counseling is not supported by the record. Justin testified that he not know that the

child was seeing Ms. Scott until a year after the child began seeing Ms. Scott

(another secret, perhaps). Ms. Scott testified that after she called Justin (a year into

counseling), he called her back within a week, and he was receptive to what she

had to say. (4RR 60:11-61:7). Ms. Scott had not heard from Justin for a few days

after she called Justin, she wrote a letter to Adana’s counsel saying that he “never”

called her back, apparently not realizing that Justin is a truck driver so that

returning calls during business hours is not always feasible. Adana also testified

that he called the counselor. (3RR 125:2-4).

      Finding 18: This finding is not supported by the record. Instead, Adana

testified that she advised Justin she would be taking the child to counseling before

                                          56
she took the child (which Justin disputes), and that Justin supposedly said that he

did not want to talk about it, and he did not say anything else. (3RR 124:3-6,

156:4-8).

      Finding 23: This finding is a mischaracterization of the CAC interview, on

two levels. First, the child could not make an outcry about abuse at the hands of an

uncle that she refused to acknowledge even existed. Second, an “outcry of abuse”

was made if one considers, as did CPS, that, all of a sudden, denying the existence

of uncles (the child has two) is an implied outcry that the child was punished by

Adana (or possibly even by Uncle Gilbey) for revealing the secret. (5RR 10:6-23).

      Finding 24: The absence of evidence is not itself evidence. The original

concern is still outstanding: no one knows whether the child has been sexually

abused. The new concern that arose during the CAC interview–that the child has

been utterly silenced–has not been addressed, and will not be addressed by Ms.

Scott since she does not believe the child has had contact with the uncle about

which silencing would be necessary. Ms. Scott maintains her belief even though

the child told her that there is something she has not revealed about Uncle Gilbey,

and then the child told Dr. White that she is afraid of Uncle Gilbey, but would not

say why.

      Finding 27: Again, the absence of evidence is not itself evidence.

Best Interest of the Child

                                        57
      In suits regarding conservatorship and possession of, and access to, children,

the best interest of the children "shall always be the primary consideration of the

court" in suits regarding conservatorship. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002; Lenz,
79 S.W.3d at 14. The eleven best interest of the child factors identified by the

Texas Supreme Court for guidance in modification of conservatorship cases are:

      1. the desires of the child;
      2. the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;
      3. the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
      4. the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
      5. the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best
         interest of the child;
      6. the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking
         custody;
      7. the stability of the home or proposed placement;
      8. the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing
         parent-child relationship is not a proper one;
      9. any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent;
      10. the child’s need for stability; and
      11. the need to prevent constant litigation in child custody cases.

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72; V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d at 343.

      The evidence shows that Justin has a close relationship with his daughter

and that she feels safe with him. The fact that she disclosed to Justin the secret

Adana told her not to tell anyone demonstrates that she is aware that Justin is a

protective parent and trustworthy parent. The evidence shows that Justin has gone

to great lengths to protect his daughter’s physical and emotional health, even if that

means multiple hearings and an appeal that he can ill-afford as a short-haul truck

                                         58
driver. (6RR 72:7-9) The evidence shows that Justin is concerned about his

daughter’s mental health (and did drive twelve hours round-trip for fifty-minute

counseling sessions with Ms. Scott), and he wants her to continue in counseling,

although he would like the child to see a psychologist with training and experience

in trauma. (4RR 18:21-23, 5RR 44:8-22).

      Justin testified that if his daughter stayed in Lubbock she would go to a five-

star elementary school five blocks from his home, and that his two daughters were

inseparable when they are together with him and his wife. (4RR 10:23-11:1). The

testimony also showed that Justin is a willing co-parent in spite of Adana’s

endangerment to the child, as evidenced by Adana speaking with Justin for forty-

five minutes about him helping Adana move to Lubbock. (6RR 12:10-17).

      The remaining concerns about Adana are serious, including: 1) her

continuing to violate protective injunctions even after the child was removed, 2)

her and her family’s disbelief that Uncle Gilbey is a risk to the child, 3) her

exacting secrecy from the child, 4) her spanking the child in the mouth, 5) her

alcohol abuse, 6) her prescription narcotic use, and 7) her mixing alcohol and

narcotics.

      In exacting secrecy, through punishment or otherwise, Adana is using the

child to exonerate herself for violating the injunctions. This is s serious concern all

of its own since the effect that exacting secrecy has all ready had on the child is

                                          59
that the child is too scared to disclose something she has not told anyone yet.

Young children who are sexually abused by family members commonly delay

disclosures longer than older children or children sexually abused by non-family

members even where they were not sworn to secrecy or threatened.22

       D. Abuse of Discretion

       Despite the fact that the trial court stated on April 30, 2014 that it was “not

going to wait until this little girl is fondled to do something about it,” that is, in

effect, exactly what the trial court did by not providing the child any greater

protection than the child all ready had when the court discovered that the child was

playing ‘touch’ games with a registered pedophilia sex offender with the mother’s

consent and knowledge. (4RR 107:7-8). Therefore, the trial court abused its

discretion.

       There is no evidence, or alternatively, insufficient evidence, to support the

trial court’s finding that it is in the best interest of the child to return the child to

Adana along with all Section 153.132 rights and no safeguards for the child. Even

the trial court’s findings do not support Adana having primary custody. Such a best

interest finding is contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

The orders are clearly unjust (especially to the child, who will ultimately be the

one to suffer the harmful consequences), are likely the result of bias toward
       22
         Daniel W. Smith, Delay in disclosure of childhood rape: Results from a national
survey. Child abuse & neglect 24.2, 2000, at 283-84.
                                               60
returning to “status quo,” and should shock the conscience of this court. Justin has

been left with no real way to protect his daughter from a sexual predator of

children, and the child has been left without protections from a mother who has

demonstrated that she will violate any injunction and abuse the child. Therefore,

the trial court abused its discretion in rending such an order, and this case should

be reversed or remanded for a new trial.

                                    ISSUE IV.

      Is a judgment on a modification void where the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to show that an original order existed to modify?

      After the default judgment, Justin’s second attorney filed a suit to modify the

original judgment, and the parties agreed to temporary orders as well as agreeing to

an enforcement action brought by Adana on the original default judgment.

Subsequently, the trail court set aside the parties’ original judgment by granting

Justin’s Bill of Review. Tex. R. Civ. Pro § 329b(f). Nonetheless, the trial court

proceeded on the parties’ agreed temporary orders on the modification suit and on

the parties’ agreed resolution to the enforcement on the original default judgment.

(CR 224).

      However, one cannot modify, or agree to an enforcement of, an original

order, where an original order does not exist. Therefore, the parties’ “Order in Suit

to Modify Parent-Child Relationship” is void. (CR 291). Appellant could not locate

                                           61
authority for finding a modification order void where no original suit exits.

However, the proposition is one of logic.

      The harm Appellant suffered is the presumptions relating to a history or

pattern of past or present child neglect or physical abuse that a trial court is bound

to under an original proceeding, but not under a modification proceeding. It is

unlikely that Adana could have, or would, overcome these statutory presumptions

in an original proceeding given that there is credible evidence that Adana allowed

the child to have contact with her brother in violation of injunctions and that Adana

coaches the child and spanks her in the mouth to exonerate Adana and keep secret

Adana’s endangerment of the child.

PRAYER
             WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, MICHAEL JUSTIN

JACOBS respectfully requests this Court reverse and render judgment removing

Adana as the parent with the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of

the child and granting Justin all other Section 153.132 rights. Alternatively,

MICHAEL JUSTIN JACOBS respectfully requests that the case be remanded to

re-try all conservatorship issues while finding that the important excluded evidence

should be admitted at the new trial. Because Justin has never been afforded a

hearing on the original suit, MICHAEL JUSTIN JACOBS respectfully requests

                                         62
that the case be remanded for an original suit affecting the parent-child

relationship. MICHAEL JUSTIN JACOBS respectfully requests that this Court

grant him such other and further relief as to which he may show himself to be

justly entitled.

                                            Respectfully submitted,

                                            FRANKENBERRY LAW FIRM
                                            4425 S. Mopac Expy, Suite 105
                                            Austin, Texas 78735
                                            (512) 252-9937 Telephone
                                            (512) 852-5937 Facsimile

                                            ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
                                            MICHAEL JUSTIN JACOBS

                                            By: _____________________
                                                Paige Frankenberry
                                                State Bar No. 24074226
                                                paige@frankenberrylaw.com

                                            ATTORNEY FOR
                                            MICHAEL JUSTIN JACOBS

                           CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

        I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Appellant Brief and Appendix has been served upon opposing counsel, Mr. Robert
Ettinger, Law Office of Robert D. Ettinger, P.O. Box 50323, Austin, Texas, 78763,
via electronic mail to robert@ettlaw.com, on the 7th day of April 2015.

                                            ______________________________
                                            Paige Frankenberry

                                       63
                         CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

       I hereby certify that this Appellant’s Brief contains 14,844 words excluding
the caption, identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument,
table of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues
presented, statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature,
proof of service, certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix.

                                             ______________________________
                                             Paige Frankenberry

                                        64
                             NO. 14-15-00028-CV

               IN THE FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS,
                          HOUSTON, TEXAS

                       MICHAEL JUSTIN JACOBS,
                                                         Appellant
                                      v.

                               ADANA ALT,
                                                         Appellee

                         Appendix to Appellant’s Brief

List of Documents:

Tab A –   [Final] Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship
Tab B -   Docket Sheet, page 1
Tab C –   Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
Tab D –   Exhibit: Wine boxes photo
Tab E –   Exhibit: Trash Pull Report from Investigator
Tab F –   Article: ‘Setting ‘Em Up’
Tab G –   Article: Sexual grooming of children
Tab H –   Article: Delay in disclosure of childhood rape
Tab I –   Texas Family Code Section 32.005
Tab J –   Days Maternal Grandmother picked up child from Daycare and Days
          Uncle Gilbey off work or left work early
Tab A
                                                                                a·" ,.FILED
                                                                                      t
                                                                               a ~o'clock t-r M
                                                                                                 1\ _

                                                                                     SEP02201~~
                                           NO. 10-0968-F39S             ·
                                                                                   >/.A A ~
                                                                                          0

IN TilE INTEREST OF .                               § IN TJIEUISTRIQJi&Q~wllliamson Co., TX.
                                                    §
SIERRA JACOBS                                       §   395 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
                                                    §
A CHILD                                             §   "WaLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS

              ORDERIN SUIT TO MODIFY PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP

        On October 23, 2013 the Court beard this case. On April 30, 2014 the Court heard the

motion to re-open evidence and the Court re-opened the evidence; On April 30~ 2014, May 21,

2014 and August 201 2014 additional evidence was submitted to the court during evidentiary

hearings.

Appearances

        Petitioner, Justin Jacobs, appeared in person and through attorney . of record, Paige

Frankenberry, and announced ready for trial and post trial hearings.

        Respondent, Adana D. Alt, appeared in person and through attorney of record, Robert D.

Ettinger, and annoUJ,lced ready for trial and post trial hearings.

Jurisdicfi()n
        The Court, after examining the record and the evidence and argument         of counsel, finds
that it has jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties 8.nd that no other court bas continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction ofthis case. All persons entitled to -citation were properly cited.

Jury

        A jury was waived, and all questions of fact and of law were submitted to the Court.

Record

        The     re~ord   of testimony was. duly reported by the court reporter. fox the 395 Judicial

District Coll{L
Child

        The Court finds that the folloWing child is the subject <>fthis suit:

Namt:: Sierra Jacobs
        Sex:   female
        Birth date:    Match ZO, 2009
        Home state: Texas
        Social Security number:       withheld
        Driver's license number and issuing state:      N/A

Findings

        The Court finds that thjs order is in the best intetest of the child.

Parenting Plan

        The Court finds that the provisions in these orders relating to the rights and duties of the
                                                               '                    .

                                                                                .
parties with relation to the child, possession of and access to the child, child support,
                                                                                   .
                                                                                          and

optimizing the development of a close and continuing relationship between each party and the

child constitute the parenting plan. established by the Court.

Consetvatorship

        The Court finds that the following orders are in the.best interest of the child.

        IT IS ORDERED that Justin Jacobs and , Adana D.. Alt are removed as managing

conservators and that Justin Jacobs and Adana D. Alt are appointed Joint Managing Conservators

ofthe following child: Sierra Jacobs.

        IT rs ORDERED that,-at all times, Adana D; Al~ as a parent joint managing conservator,

shall have the followfug rights:

       1.     the right to receive · information from w:zy other conserva.tor of the child
concerning the health, education, and welfare of the c¥J.d;

       2.      the .right to confer with the other parent to the extent possible before n:mking a
decision conce.rning the health, education, and welfare of the child;

        3.      the right of access·to medical, dental, psychological, and educational records of

                                                                                                  2
the child;

          4.     the right to consult with a physician, dentist, or psychologist of the child;

          5.    the right to consult with school officials concerning the child;s welfare and
~ducatj,onal status, ind1;1ding school activities;

          6.     the right to attend school activities;

       7.     the right.to be desjgnated on the child's records as a petson to be notified in case
of an emergency;

      8.     the right to consent to medical, dental, and surgical treatment during an
emergency involving an immediate danger to the health and safety of tb:e child; .and

        9.     the right to manage the estate of the child to the extent t}le estate bas l>een created
by the patent or the parent's family.

          IT XS ORDERED that, at all times, Justin Jacobs and Adana D. Alt. as parent joint

managing conservators, shall each have:the following duties:

        1.      the duty to infonn the other conservator of the child in a. timely manner of
significant infonna.tion concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child; and

        2.      the duty to infotro the other conservator of the child if the conservator resides
with for at least thirty days, marries, or intends to marry a person who the conservator knows is
registered as a sex offender under chapter 62 of the Code of.Criminal Procedure or is currently
charged with an offense for which on ~onviction the person would be required to register under
that chapter. IT IS ORDERED that tliis information shall .be tendered in the fonn of a notice
made as soon as p.(a.Cticable, but not biter than the fortieth day after thC'l date the conserv~tor of
the child begips to reside with the person or on the tenth day after the date the m.ani.age occurs,
as appropriate~ IT IS ORDERED that 1he notice must 1nclude a description of the offense that is
the basis of the person's requirement to register as a sex offender or of the offense with which the
person is charged.         WARJ.'UNG:        A CONSERVATOR COMMITS AN . OFFENSE
PUNISHABLE AS A CLASS C .MISDEMEANOR IF THE CONSERVATOR FAILS TO
PROVIDE THIS NOTICE.

          IT IS ORDERED that, during her periods of possession, Adana D. Alt, as parent joint

managing conservator. shall have the following rights and duties:

          1.     the duty of care, control, protection, and reasQnahle discipline of the child;

          2.    1he duty to support the child, including providing the child with clothing, food,
shelte~   and medical and dental care not involvit:lg an invasive procedure;

                                                                                                    3
       3.     the right to consent for the child to medical and dental care not involving an
invasive procedure; and

       4.     the right to direct the moral and religious ~g of the.child.

       IT IS ORDERED that, during his periods of possession, Justin Jacobs, as parent joint

ma:Qaging conservator, shall have the following rights and duties:

       1.     the duty of care, control, protection) and reasonable discipline of the child;

        2.     the duty to support the child, incl\lding providin,g the child with clotlli.n& food,
shelter) and me(ijcal and dental care not involvhig an invasive procedure;

       3.     the right to consent for the child to medical and dental care not involving an
invasive procedure; and

       4.     the right to direct the moral and religious ~ of the child.

       IT IS ORDERED tb,at Adana D. Alt, as a parent joint managing conservator, shall have

the following rights and duty:

       1.      1he exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child within the State
of Texas' west ofthe Interstate 35 corridor;               ·

       2.     the exclusive right to ~nsent to medical; dental, and surgical treatment involving
invasive procedures;

        3.      the exclusive right, after written consultation with Justin Jacobs, to CQnsent to
psychiatric and psychological treatment of the child. It is ORDERED that the child Temain in
thera,PY with the current therapist until discharged by that therapist;

       4.      the exclusive right to receive and give receipt .for periodic payments for the
support of the child and to. hold or disburse these funds for the benefit of the .child;

       5.      the exclusive right to represent the child in legal · action and to make othe;r:
decisions of substantial legal significance concerning the child;

       6.      the exclusive right to consent to marriage and to enlistment in the armed forces of
the United States;

       7.      the exclusive right to make d~isions concerning the child's education;

       8.      except as provided by section 264.0111 ofthe TeJCas Family Code, the exclusive

                                                                                                 4
right to the services and earnings of the child;

        9_.    except when a guardian of the child's estate <;~r a guardian or attorney ad litem has
been appointed for the child, the exclusive right to act as an agent of the child in relation to the
child's estate if the child's action is required by a state, the. Unit~ States, or a foreign
government; and

       10.    the exclusive duty to manage the estate of the· child to the extent the estate has
been created by community property or the joint property of the parent.

       The Court finds that; in accoxdance with section 153.001 of the Texas Family Code, it is

the public policy of Texas 1o assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with

parents who have    ~hown   the ability to act in the best interest of the child, to   ~ovide   a safe,

stable, and nonviolent environment for the child, and to encourage parents to share in.the rights

and duties of raising their child after the parents have.separated or dissolved their marriage. IT

IS ORDERED that the prlmary residence of the child shall be the State oi Texas west of the

Interstate 35 corridor, and the parties shall not remove the child from the State of Texas west 0f

the Interstate 35 corridor for the purpose of changjng the primary residence of the child until.

modified by further order of the court of continuing jurisdiction or b~ written agreement signed

by the parties and filed with the court.
       IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Adana D. Alt shall have the exclusive right to

designate the chiJd•s ,Primary .residence witbjn the·.State of Texas west of the Interstate 35

cottidor.

       IT IS FURTilER ORDERED that tlris geogt~phic restriction on the residence of the child

shall be lifted if, at the time Adana D. Alt wishes to·remove th~ child from the State.of Texas

west of the .Interstate 35 copidor for the·purpose of changing the primary residence of the child,

Justin Jacobs has moved at least 75 miles further from the WilliiUIJ.Son County line than h9lived

on October 23, 2013.

                                                                                                     5
Possession and Access
       1.    Srandurd Possession Order

             IT IS ORDERED that each conservator shall ~mply with all terms and
      conditions of thls Standard Possession Order. IT IS ORD~RED that this Standard
      Possession Order is effective immediately and applies to all periodS of possession
      occurring on and after the date the Court signs this Standard Possession Order. JT IS,
      THEREFORE, ORDERED;

             (a)    Definitions

                    1.      In this Standard Possession Order ''school" means the primary or
             secondary school .in which the child is enrolled or, if the child is not enrolled in a
             primary or seeondazy school, the public schoQl district in which the child
             primarily resides.

                    2.      In this Standard Possession Order ''child'' includes each cbil~·
             whether one or more, who is a subject of this suit while that child is under the age
             of eighteen years and not otherwise emancipated.

             (b)    Mutual Agreeme.nt or Specified Tenns fur Possession

                     IT IS ORDERED that the conservatorS sb.a)) have possession of the child
             at times mutua1ly agreed to in advance by the parties, and, in the absence of
             mutual agreement, it is ORDERED that the conserva~ors shal~ have possession of
             the child under the specified terms set out in this Stanchu:d Possession Order.

             (c)     Parents Who Reside 100 Miles qr.LessApart

                     Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Standard Possession Order,
             when Justin Jacobs resides 100 miles or less from tb,e primary residence of the
             child, Justin Jacobs shall have the right to possession of the child as follows:

                     1.     Weekends-

                     On weekends that.occtu' during the regular schooltel'IIl, beginning at 6:00
             p.m., on the fir~ thlrd, and fifth Friday of each month and ending at 6:00 p.m. on
             the following S\mday.

                    ·On weekends that do not occur during the regular school term, begin.ning
             at 6:00p.m., on the first, third, cmd fifth Friday .of each month and ending at 6:00
             p.m. on the following Sunday.

                                                                                                 6
       2.      Weekend Possession Extended by a Holiday-

       Except as otherw~se expressly provided·in this S1andard Po$Session Ord~,;,
if a weekend period ofpossessi<;>n by Justin Jacobs begins on a .studcnt holiday or
a teacher in-servi<::e day that falls on a Friday during the .regular schoc;>l tenn, as
determined by the school in which the child is enrolled, or a federal, state, or local
holiday that falls on, a Friday during the summer months when school is not in
session, that weekend period of possession shall begin at 6:00 p.m. on the
immedi~tely preceding Thursday.

        Ex~pt as otherwise exp~ssly provided in this Standard Possession Order,
if a weekend period of possession by Justin Jacobs ends on or is immediately
followed by a student holiday or a teacheJ,' in-service day that falls on a Monday
during the regular school term, as determined by the school in which the child is
enrolled, or a federal, state, or local holiday that falls on a Monday during the
summer months when school is not in session, ·that weekend }leriod of possession
shall end at 6:00p.m. on that Monday.
       3.     Thursdays- On Thursday of each week during the regular school
term, beginning at 6:00 p~m. ·and endmg at 8:00p.m.

        4.      Spring V-acation in Even-Numbered .Years - In even-numbered
years, begiml.ing at.6:00 p.m. on the day the child is dismissed from school for the
school's spring vacation and ending at 6:00 p.~. on the day before school resumes
after that vacation.

       5.      Extended Summer Possession by Justin Jacobs-

        With Written Notice by April 1 • If Justin Jacobs gives· Adana D. Alt
written notice by April 1 of a year specifying an extended period or periods of
summer possession for that year, Justin Jacobs shall have possession of the child
for thirty days beginning no earlier than the day· after the child's school is
dismissed for the summer vacation and ending rio later thatr seven days before
school resumes at the end of the summer va·cation in that year, to be exercised in
no more than two separa.te periods of at least seven consecutave days each, with
each period of possession beginning and ending at 6:00 p.m on each applicable
day, as specified in the written notice. These periods of possession shall begin
and end at 6:00 p.m. on each applicable day.

        Without Written Notice by April 1 • If Ju.stin Jacob$ does not give Adana
D. Alt written notice by April t of a year specifying an extended period or periods
of sum.mex- possession for that year, Justin Jacobs shall have possession of the
child for thirty consecutive days 41 that ye~ be~nning at 6:00 p.m. on July l and
ending at 6:00p.m. on July 31.             ·

       Notwithstanding the Thursssession - Each conservator is ORDERED
       to give notice to the person in possession of' the child on each occasion that the
       conservator will be unable to exercise' that conservator's right of possession for
       any specified period.                      ·

                8.     Written Notice - Written notice. inc]ucling notice provided by
       electronic mail or facsimile, shall be deemed to have been timely made ii received
       or, if applicable, po~ked bef<:>re or at the time that notice is due.
             9.      Changing weekend visitation-If Justin Jackson gives Adarl.a Alt 90
       dayS Written notice 'he may substitute a znd or 4th Weekend for a 15\ 3rd OX' 5th
       weekend in any given .month.

This concludes the Standard Possession Order.

2.     Duration

       The periods- of possession ordered above apply to the child the subje~t of this suit

while that child is under the age of eighteen years and not otherwise emancipated.

3.     Noninterference with Possession

       Except aS expressly provided herein, IT IS ORPERED tllat neither conservator

                                                                                          12
shall take possession of the child during the. other conservatoris period of possession

unless there is a prior written agreem.~nt signed by both conservators or in_case of an

emergency.

4.     Termination ofOrders

       The provisions of this or.der relating to conserva~orship, possession, or access

terminate on.the maniage of Justin Jacobs to Adana D. Alt unless a nonparent or agency

has been appointed conservator of the child under.chapter 153 of the Texas Family Code.

5.     Long-Distance Access a1ui Visitation

       IT IS ORDERED that, until a child reaches the age of five years, the following

arrangements for the travel of that chlld shall control:

       Adult to Accompany Child- IT IS ORDERED that Justin Jacobs shall trave1 with

the child between the residence of Adana D. Alt and that of Justin Jacobs at the beginning

and end of each period of possession. In place of this requirem~nt~ Justin Jacobs is

authoriT.ed to designate a responsible adult known to the child and to the mother to travel

with the child betWeen the residence of A that employer shall

constitute a credit' against the child support obligation. Payment of the full amount of child

support ordered paid by this order through the means of withholding from earnings shall

dischafge the ·child support obligation. If the amount withheld from eamings and credited

against the child support obligation is less than 100 percent" of the amount ordered to be paid by

this order, the balance due remains an obligation of Justin Ja~obs, and it is ·hereby ORDERED

that Justin Jacobs pay the balance due directly to the state disbmsement unit specified below.

          On this date the Court signed an Income Withholding for Support.

          Payment

          IT IS ORDERED that all payments shall be made· through the state. disbursement unit at

Texas Child Support Disburiement Unit, P.O. Box 659791, San Antonio, Texas 78265-9791, and

thereafter promptly remitted to Adana D. Alt for the support ofthe child. IT IS ORDERED that

each party shall pay, when due, all fees· charged to that pw-ty by the state disbursement unit and

any other agency statutorily authorized to charge a fee.

          Change of Employment

          IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that.Justin Jacobs shall notify this Court and Adana D. Alt

                                                                                                 18
by U.S. certified mail, retum receipt requeste4, of any change of address and of any tennin.ation

of employment. 1bis notice shall be given no later than seven days after the change of address

or the tennination of employment. This notice or a subsequent noti~e shall also provide the

current address of Justin Jacobs and the name and address of his current employer, whenever that

infoi'II).ation becomes available.

       Clerk's Duties

        IT IS ORDEREP that, on the reguest of a prosecuting attomey1 the title IV-D agency, the

friend of the Court, a domestic relations office, Adana D. Alt, Justin Jacobs, or an attomey

representing Adana D. Alt or Justin Jacobs, the clerk of this C::ourt shall cau.se a certified copy of

the Incoroe W ithholding for Support to be' delivered to any employer.

Health Care

        1.      IT IS ORDERED that Justin Jacobs and Adana D. Alt shall' each provide medical

support for the child as set oui in this order as additional child support for as long .as the Court

may order Justin Jacobs and Adana D. Alt to provide $Upport for the child under sections

154.001 and 154.002 of the Texas Family Code. Beginning on the day Justin Jacobs and Adana .

D. Alt's actual or potential obligation to support th~ child u.o,der sections 154.001 and 154.002 of

the Family Code terminates, IT. IS ORDERED that Justin Jacobs and Adana D. Alt are

discharged from the obligations set forth in this medical support order, except for any failure by

a parent to fully comply with those obligations before that 'date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

that lhe cash medical support payments ordered below are payable · through the state.

disbursement unit and subject to the provisions for withholding from earnings provided above

for other child support payments.

       2.       Definitions -

                                                                                                   \9
       "Health Insurance" means insuran,ce coverage ~at provides basic health-care services,

including usual physician services, office visits1 hospitali~on, and J~boratory, .X-ray, and

emergency services, that may be provided through a health maintena.nce organization or other.

private or public organizatio~ other than medical assistance under chapter 32 of the Texas

Human Resources Code.

       ".Reasonable cost" means the cost of health in~wance coverage for a child that doe& not

exceed 9 percent of Justin Ja.oobs •s annual resouroes, as described by section 154.06i(b) of1he

Texas Family Code.

       "Reasonable and necessary he.cUth-care expenses not paid by ~ur!:'U),ce and incurred by or

on behalf of a child" include, without limitation, any copayments for office visits or prescription

drugs~ the yearly deductible,   if any, a:o,d medical, surgical, prescription drug, mental bealth-care

services, dental, eye care,. ophthalmological, atld orthodontic charges. These reasonable and

necessary health-(::are expenses do not includ;e   e~penses   for travel to and from the b;calth-care

provider o.r for nonprescription medication.

       "Furnish'' means:

               a.     to hand deliver the docwnent by a person eighteen years of age or older

                      either to th~ reojpient ~r to a person who is eighteen years of age or older

                      and permanently res~ des with the recipient;·

              b.      to deliver the document to the recipient by certified mail, return receipt

                      requested, to the recipient's last known·mailing or residence address; or

               c.     to deliver the document to the recipient at the recipient's last known

                      mailing or residence address using any person or ent.\ty whose principal

                      business is that of a courier or deliverer of papers or documents either

                                                                                                   20
                        within or outside the United States.
        3.      Findings on Health Insurance         Avail~ility-     Having considered the cost,

accessibility, and quality ofhealth insurance coverage available to thC? parties, the Court finds:

      · Health insurance is available or is in effect for the · child       thro~    Adana D. Alt's

employment or membership in a union, trade       asso~ation,   or oth~r organization at a reasonable

cost of$100.00.

       1T IS FURTHER FOUND that the following orders rei8J'ding h~th-care coverage are in

the best interest of the child.
                                                 .
        4,      Provision of Health-Cate Coverage -

        As child support, Adana D. Alt is O:RDERED to continue to maintain health insurance

for the child who is the subject of this suit that covers basic health-care services, including usual

physician services, office visits, hospitaliz~tion, laboratory, X-ray, and emergency services.

        Adana D. Alt is ORDERED to maintain such health insurance in full force and effect on

the child who is the subject of this suit as long as child support is payable for that child. Adana

D. Alt is ORDERED to convert any group insurance to individual coverage or obtain other

health insurance for the child     within fifteen days of termination of her employment or other
disq_uali.fication from the group insurance.      Adana D. Alt is ORDERED to exercise · any

conve,;sion options or a.c;qllisition o£ new health insurance·in ·such a manner that the resulting

insurance equals or exceeds that jn effect immediately before the change.

        Adana D. Alt is ORDERED to furnish Justin Jacobs a true· and correct copy of the health

insurance policy or certification and a schedule of benefits within 30 days of the sjgn.in~ of this

order. Adana D. Alt is ORDERED to fwnish JustiiJ. Jacobs- the insurance cards anl;i any other

forms necessary for   us~ of the   W$UI'ance within 30 days of the signing ofthis otder. Adana D.

                                                                                                     21
Alt is ORDERED to provide, within three days of receipt by ner, to Justin Jacobs any insurance

checks, other payments, or explanations ofbenefits relating.to any medical expenses for lhe child

that Jus~ Jacobs paid or incurred.

       Pursuant to section 1504.051 of the Texas lnsurance Code, it is ORDERED that if Adana

D. Alt .is eligible for dependent health C{)verage but' fails to apply to obtain covexage fo:r
                                                                                            . the
chH~ the insut~r shalJ ~ttroU tb.e child   on appli~tion of J~ti.n. Jacobs or others as authorized by
law.

       fursuant to section 154.182 of the Texas Family Code, Justin Jacobs is ORDERED to

pay Adana D. Alt cash medical support for .reimbursement ..of health insurance premiums, as

additional child support, of one hundred dollars ($100.00) per month, 'with the first installment

being due arid payabl¢ on March 1, 2014 and a like installment being due and payable on or

before the flrst day of each month 'until the tenni.uation of c~t cblld support for the child

under this order.

       IT IS ORDERED that the cash· medical support provisions of this o;rder shall be an

obligation ofthe estate of Justin Jacobs and shall not terminate on his death.

       Pursuant to section 154.183(c) of the Texas Family Code, the reasonable and necessary

health-care expenses of the obild that are not reimbursed by·health insurance are allocated as

follows: Adana D. Alt is OWERED to pay 50 percent.and Justin J~CQbs is ORDERED to pay

50 percent of the unreimbursed health-care expenses if, at the time the expenses are incurred,

Adana D. Alt is providing health insurance as ordered.

       The party who incurs a health..care expense on behalf of the child is ORDERED to

submit ~ the other party all forms, teceipts,       bills.   statements, and explanations of benefits

reflecting the uni.nsul-ed portion of the health-care expenses within thirty days afte.r he or she

                                                                                                  22
receives them.     The xtonincurring party is ORDERED to pay his or her percentage of the

v,ninsur!!d portion of the heal1h·care   ~penses   either by paying the health-care: provider directly

or by reimbursing the incurring party for any advance payment exce~g the incurring party's

percentage of the uninsured portion of the health-care expenses within tlrirty days aftet t,he

nonincurring party receives the forms, receipts, bills, statements,·and explanations of benefits.

       These provisions apply to all unreimbursed hc:alth-care expenses of the child who is the

subject of this suit that are incurred while chUd support is payable for the child.

       5.        Secondary Coverage- IT IS ORDERED that if a party provides secondary health

insurance coverage for the child, both parties shall cooperate fully with regard to the handling

an,d Jiling of claims with the insurance canier pro'Yi:ding the coverage in order to ,maximize the

benefits available to the child and to ensure that the _party who pays for health-care expenses fo.r

the child is reimbutsed for the payment from both cani;ers to the fullest extent possible.

       6.        Compliance with Insurance Company Requ.iJ:ements ·- Each party is ORDERED to

conform to all requi'I.'Cments imposed by     t4e   terms and conditions of the policy of health

insurance covering the child in order to assure the maximwn reimbursement or direct payment

by the insurance company of the incurred health-care .expense, incl1;.1ding but not limited to

rcqul,tements for advance :notice to any carrier, second opinions, and the like. Each party is

ORDERED to use "preferred providers," or services within the health maintenance. organization,

if applicable. Disallowance of the bill by a health insurer shall not exewe the obligation of either

party lo make payment. Excepting emergency health-care expenses incurred on behalf of the

child, if a party incurs health-care expenses for the child using "out-of-network" health-care

providers or services, or fails to follow the health insurance company procedures or .

requiremen~, that party shall pay· all such health-care expenses incurred 'absent (l) written

                                                                                                    23
agreement ofthe parties allocating such health-care expenses or (2) further order of the Court.

       7.       Claims • Except as provided in this paragra.ph, the p~ whci is not           carry~g the

health insurance policy ·covering the child is ORDERED to furnish to the part}' carrying the

policy: within fifteen days of receiving them,· any and all forms, receipts, bills, and statements

reflecting the health-care expenses the party not carrying the policr incurs on behalf ofthe chijd.

In accordance with section     ~204.251   and 1504.055(a) of the Texas Insurance Code, IT IS

ORDERED that the party who is not carrying the health insurance policy covering the child, at

that. party's option • m,ay file any claims for health-care Q:j>enses directly with the insurance

canier with and from whom ·coverage is provided for .the benefit of the child ~d receive

payments    direct~y   from the insurance company.       Further, for the sole. purpose of section

1204.251 of the Texas Insurance Code, Justin Jacobs is designated the managing conservator or

possessory conservator of the child.

       The parry who is caxrying the health insurance policy covering the child is ORDERED to

submit all forms required by the inswance company for payment or reimbursement of health-

care expenses incurred by either party on behalf of the child to the .insurance carrier within

fifteen days of that party's receiving any fonn.   receip~   bill, or st.atemeut reflecting the expenses.

       8.       Constructive Trust for Payments Received ~ IT IS ORDERED that any insurance

payments receiv~ by a party fi;Qm the health insurance carrier as reimbursement for health-care

expenses incurred by or o.n behalf ofthe child shall belong to th,e party.who paid those expenses.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the party. receiving ·the               insur~ce   payments .is designated a

constructive trustee to receive any insurance checks or payments for health-care expenses paid

by the other party, and the: party canying the pollcy shall endorse and forward. the checks or

payments, along with zmy explanation of benefits received. to·the other party within three days of

                                                                                                       24
.receiving them.
       9.          WARNING· A PARENT ORDERED TO PROVIDE HEALTH INSURANCE

OR TO PAY THE OTHER PARENT ADDITIONAL CHILD SUPPORT FOR TilE COST OF

HEALTH INSURANCE WliO FAILS TO DO SO IS LIABLE FOR NECESSARY MEDICAL
                   '
EXPENSES OF Tiffi CHILD, WITHOUT REGARD TO WHETIIER THE EXPENSES

WOULD HAVE BEEN PAJD IF HEALTI-I INSURANCE~ BEEN PROVIDED, AND FOR

THE COST OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS OR CONTRIBUTIONS, IF ANY, PAID
ON BEHALF OF TI-l£ CHILD.
Miscellaneous Child Support Provisions ,

       No Credit for Infonnal Pa.ymems

       IT IS ORDERED that the child support as         pres~bed    in this order shall be exclusively

discharged in the manner ordered and that any direct paymel;l.f.s made by Justin Jacobs to Adana.

D. Alt or any expenditures incurred by Justin Jacobs during Justin Jacobs's periods of possession

of or access to the child, as prescribed in this order, for food, clothing, gifts, ttavel, shelte:r, or

entertainment are deemed in addition to and not in lieu of the support ordered in this order.

       SUpport as Obligation of Estate

        IT IS ORDERED that the, provisions for child support in this oxder shall be an obligation

of the estate 'Of Justin Jacobs and shall not tetminate on the death of Justin Jacobs. PaymentS

received for the benefit of the child, including payments               fr~m   the Social Security

Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs or other governmental agency or life insurance

proceeds, annuity payments, trust distributions, or retirement survivor benefits, shall be a credit

against this obligation. Any remaining balance of the child suppOrt is an obligation of Justin

Jacobs's estate.

                                                                                                    25
         Termination of Orde.cs on Marriage of Paxties but Not on Death of Obligee

         The provisions of this order relating to current child supporllerm.inate on the m.aniagc of

Justin Jacobs to Adana D. Alt l,l.Q.},ess a nonparent or agency has qeeu :appointed   co~ervator   of

the child \lnder chapter 153 of the Texas Family Code. An obligation t9 pay child support under

this   ~rder   does not terminate on the death of Adana D. Alt but continues as an oblisatl:on to

Sierra Jacobs.

Medical Notification

         Each party is ORDERED to infonn the other party within 24 hours of any meoical

condition of the child requiring surgical intervention, hospitalization, or both.

         Within 30 days after the Court signs this order~ each party is ORDERED to execute -

         1.       all necessary releases pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act (HJPAA) and 45 C.F.R. ·section 164.508 to pennlt·the other conservator to

obtain h,ealth-c,:are information regarding the child; and

         2.        for all health-care providers of the child, an authorization for disclosure of

protected health infonnation to the of:b.er consefVator pursuant to the HIPAA and 45 C.F.R.

section 164.508.

         Each pa,rty is further ORDERED to designate the other conservator as a person to whom

protected health infonna~ion regarding the child may be disclosed whenever the party executes

an authorization for disclosure <>f protected health information pursuant to the HIPM and 45

C.F,R. section )64.508.

Injunctive Relief

         The Court finds that. because of tb.e condu,ct of Justin Jacobs, a. pennan~nt injunction

against him should be granted as appropriate relief because there is no adequate remedy at law..

                                                                                                   26
       The.~ permanent injunction granted. below shiLl!    be effective immediately       and shall be
binding .on Justin .Jacobs; on his agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and on those persons

in active concert or participation with them who    re~ve   actual   notic~   of this order by pexsona1

service or otherwise.

        IT IS ORDERED that Justin Jacobs is permanently enj~il}ed from:

               1.      ingesting any alcohol 24 hours prior to and .during any period of
possession of the child.

       The Court finds that, because of the conduct. of Adana D. Alt, a permanent injunction

against her should be granted as appropriate reli,ef because there is no adequate remedy at 1.8.w.

       The permanent injun.ction granted below shall be effective ixqmediately and shall be

binding on Adana D. Alt; on her agents, servants. employees> and attorneys; and on those

persons in active concert or participation with them who receive acroal notice of this order by

personal service or otherwise.

       IT IS ORDERED that:

                  1.    Adana Alt or her agen,ts or persons in active concert or participation with
                              1h.em wb.o receive actual notice of this order by personal service or
                              otherwise, w:e enjoitied from permitting the child, Sieua Daoielle
                              Jacobs. from being in the presence of, or within 500 feet of,
                              Oilbcrto Eustaquio Buitron at any time.

Service of Writ

        Peti.tioner and Respondent waive issuance and service of the writ of injunction, by

stipulation.. IT IS ORDERED that P~titioner and Respondent shall be deemed io be duly served

with the writ of injunction.

Required lriformation

       The informatio~ req~ed for each party by ~on 105.006(a) of the Texas Family Code

is as follows:

                                                                                                     27
Name:          Justin Jacobs

        Social Security number:       withheld]

        Driver's license number:                                               lssuing state: Texas

        Cunent residence address:

        Mailing address:

        Home telep)lone number:

        Name of employer:

        Address of employment:

        Work telephone number.

Name:          Adana D. Alt

        Social Security number:       withheld

        Driver's license number:      0899342          Issuing state: Tex.as

        Current resi.dence address:   300 Carl Shlpp, Liberty Hill, Texas 78()42

        Mailing address:              3oo Car1 Shipp, Liberty Hill, Texas 78642
        Home telephone number:        51.2 -538-8138

        Name of employer:             Work Po:rc~ Solutions

        Address of employment:        6505 Airport Blvd., Suite 101-c, Austin, T~ 78752

        Work telephone number:        512-597-7191

Required Notices

        EACH PERSON WHO lS A PARTY TO                nus ORDER TS ORDERED TO NOTIFY
EACH 01HER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY OF ANY

CHANGE IN tHE PARTY'S CURRENT RESIDENCE ADDRESS, MAILING ADDRESS,

HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER. NAME OF EMPLOYER, ADDRESS OF                                EMPLOYMENT~

                                                                                                  28
DRIVER'S LICENSE       NUMBE~        AND WORK       TEL~PHONE       NUMBER. . THE PARTY IS

ORDERED TO GIVE NOTICE OF AN INTENDED CHAN<;:JE IN ANY OF TifE REQUIRED

INFORMATION TO EACH OTHER PARTY,
                            .                . THE STATE CASE
                                 THE COURT, AND

REGISTRY ON OR BEFORE THE 60TII DAY BEFORE THE -INTENDED CHANGE. IF

THE PARTY DOES NOT KNOW OR COULD NOT HAVE KNOWN OF TiiE CHANGE IN

SUFFICIENT TIME TO PROVIDE 60-DAYNOTICE, TilE PARTY IS ORDERED TO GIVE

NOTICE OF THE CHANGE ON OR RBFORE TIIE FIFTH DAY AFTER TilE DATE THAT

THE PARTY KNOWS OF THE CHANGE.

       THE DUTY TO FURNISH THIS INFORMATION TO EACH Ol1IER PARTY, THE

COURT, AND UIE STATE CASE REGISTRY CONTINUES AS LONG AS ANY PERSON,

RY VIRTUE OF THIS ORDER, IS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT

OR ENTffiED TO POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD.

       'FAILURE BY A PARTY TO _OBEY THE ORDER OF THIS COURT TO PROVIDE

EACH OTHER PARTY, THE COURT, AND THE STATE CASE REGISTRY WITH THE

CHANGE IN THE REQUIRED INFORMATION MAY RESULT IN .PURmER LITIGATION

TO ENf'ORCE 1HE ORDER, INCLUDING CONTEMPT OF COURT. A FINDING OF

CONTE?vfPT MAY BE PUNISHED BY CONFINEMENT IN JAIL FOR UP TO SIX

MONTHS, A FINE OF UP TO $500 FOR EACH VIOLATION, ANP A MONEY JUDGMENT

FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COURT COSTS.

       Notice shall be given to the other party by delivering a copy of the notice to the party by

regi~ered   or certified mail, return receipt requested. Notice shall be ·gjven to the Court by

delivering a copy of the notice either in per5on to the clc;rk of this Court or by registered ~r

certi1,led mail addressed to the clerk. Notice shall be'given to the state case registry by mailing a

                                                                                                  29
copy of the notice to State Case Registry, Contract Services Section, MC046S, P.O. Box 12017,

Austin, Texas 78711-2017.

       NOTICE TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF mE STATE OF TEXAS: .YOl). MAY USE

REASONABLE EFFORTS TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF CIDLD CUSTODY SPECIFIED

IN TillS ORDER. A PEACE·OFFICER WHO RELIES ON THE TERMS O.F A COURT

ORDER AND 'fHE OFFICER'S AGENCY ARE ENTITLED TO TilE APPLICABLE

lMMUNITY AGAINST ANY CLAIM1 CIVU, .OR OTHERWISE; REGARDING THE
                                                                .
OFFICER'S GOOD FAITH ACTS PERFORMED IN THE SCOPE QF THE OFFICER'S

DtmES IN ENFORCING THE TERMS OF THE ORDER THAT RELATE TO ClflLD

CUSTODY. ANY PERSON WI:iO KNOWINGLY PRESENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT AN

ORDER THAT IS INVALID OR NO LONGER IN EFFECT COMMITS AN OFFENSE TIJAT

MAY BE PUNISHABLE BY CONFINEMENT                m JAIL .FOR AS LONG AS TWO YEARS
AND A fiNE OF AS MUCH AS $10t000.

Warning.s

       WARNINGS TO PARTIES: FAILURE TQ OBEY A COURT ORDER FOR CHILD

SUPPORT OR FOR POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A CHILD MAY RBSULT IN

FURTHER Ln10ATION TO ENFORCE Uffi ORDER, INCLUDING CONTEMPT OF

COURT. A FINDING OF CONTEMPT MAY BE PUNISHED BY c ·ONFINEMENT IN JAIL

FOR UP !0 SIX MONTHS, A FJNJ:!, OF UP TO $500 FOR BACH VIOLATION, AND A

MONEY JUDGMENT FOR PAYMENT OFATTORNBY'S.FEES ANP COURT COSTS.

       FAILURE OF A PARTY TO MAKE A CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT TO THE

PLACE AND IN THE MANNER REQtJlREP BY A COURf ORDER MAY RESULT IN THE

PARTY'S NOT RECEIVING CREDIT FOR MAKING THE PAYMENT.

                                                                                          30
        FAlLURE OF A PARTY TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT DOES NOT nJSTIFY

DENYING THAT PARTY COURT-ORDERED POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A

CHILD. REFUSAL BY A PARTY TO ALLOW POSSESSION OF OR ACCESS TO A

CHILD DOES NOT JUSTIFY FAlLURE TO PAY COuRT.:.ORDERED CHILD SUPPORT TO

THAT PARTY.

Attor11ey's Fees

        IT IS ORDERED that attorney's fees are to be borne by the.party who incurred them.

Costs

        IT IS ORDERED that costs of court are to be borne by the party who incurred them:·

Di$Charge from Discovery Retention Requirement

        IT IS ORDERED that the parties and theiP respective attorneys are discharged from the

requirement of keeping and storing the documents produced in this case in accordance with rule:

191.4(d) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Additional Orders

        It is Ordered that Adana Alt complete the parenting class which she began in July 2014.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael Justin Jacobs begin a parenting              cl~s   in Lubbock,

Texas during September 2014 and co:mplete the class as it is scheduled.

ReliefNot Granted

        IT IS ORDERED that all relief requested in this case and not eX.p:ressly granted is denied.

All other terms of the prior orders not specifically modified in this order shall remain in full

force and effect. All child support obligations of Justin Jacobs contained in the Temporary

Orders rendered by this court remain in full force and effect to the extent they have not been

paid.

                                                                                                31
It is so ordered.

                                '-"
SIGNED and ENTERED this the ¢~ '- day of August, 2014.

                                                         32
Tab B
    Judge's Family Law Docket, Williamson County, Texas
                                                                                                                                                                   10-0968-F395                 April 07, 20 I 0
       DATE                                                       ORDERS
                                                                                                                                                                   IN THE I~'TEREST OF
      5 ..I "'I- £5   TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER GRANTED: hearing set for                                                                                         SIERRA DANIELLE JACOBS
                      _ _M on                                         , 20_ _.                                                                                     A CHILD
                      HEARING FOR TEMPORARY ORDERS set for _ _M. on - - - - - - - - f - f
                      TEMPORARY ORDERS:
                       emporary rnJunction granted. The Petjtjoner/Respondent is appointed Temporary Managing
                      Conservator of minor children and Petitioner/Respondent is appointed Temporary Possessory
                                                                                                                                                                   395TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
                      Conservator. Temporary child support (and alimony) is set in the $                     er
                                                                                                                                                                   PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
                      (week), (each two weeks), (month) commencing on              day of               , 20_.
                      Inventory ordered filed on or before _ _day of                            , 20_. Temporary use of ll======t============;
                                                                                                                               DATE
                                                                                                                          !-/~lit

                      awarded to Petitioner/Responc1ent.                                                                  ·!~.,,,

                                                                     JUDGE PRESIDING

                      TEMPORARY ORDERS APPROVED AND SIGNED.
                      FINAL DECREE:
                      Evidence heard, divorce granted. Number of children involved under the age of eighteen._ __
6

                      The Petitioner/Respondent is appointed Managing Conservator of the minor children and Petitioner/
                      Responc1ent is appointed Possessory Conservator. Child support set in the amount of$_ _ __
                      per (week), (each two weeks), (month) commencing on              day of                , 20__.
                      through District Clerk's Office. Wife's former name restored to her_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
                      _ _ _ _ _ . Attorney's fees in the amount of$._ _ _ _ awarded to _ _ _ _ _ _ __
                      - - - - - - - - - - - · Wages withholding ordered. Property settlement approved/or
                      property divided as follows - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

                                                                                                                          'i   f!i ,,1.- ~~-yL-:.;..::,.;_:;___:_______;.+-~;,...--=--~,...---r--r"'-!----:--~-----"1
                      FINAL DECREE:APPROVED AND SIGNED.
                                                                     JUDGE PRESIDING

    ~----~W~A~G~E~W~I~T~H~HO~L~D~I~NG~A~P~P~RO~V~E~D~A~N~D~SI~G~N~EftD.----------------~I1/A~;.3
                                                                                                                          tt:l:
                      ~----------------------------------------~ 1 hj;rp3
Tab C
Nov 14 2014 12:30 395th District Court 512 943-1187               page 1

                 MICHAEL JERGINS
                     District Judge
                 395th Judicial District
                  Williamson County

                                                  November 14, 2014

           Ms. Paige Franken berry                              Mr. Robert D. Ettinger
           Attorney at Law                                      Attorney at Law
           4425 South Mopac, Ste I 05                           P.O.Box 50323
           Austin, Texas 78735                                  Austin, Texas 78763
           Fax: 512-852-5937                                    Fax: 512- 478-9542

           Re:     RE: ITIO Jacobs, 10-0968-F395

           Dear Madam & Sir:

                   Enclosed are Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed this date.

                                                        Respectfully,

                                                                  erg ins
                                                               ,3951h Judicial District Court

                                            405 Martin Luther King St., No. 15
                                                Georgetown, Texas 78626
                                                     (512) 943-1395
                                                   Fax (512) 943-1187
Nov 14 2014 12:30 395th District Court 512 943-1187             page 2
                                                                                        . . "FILED •L\.
                                                                                   at   II,:;> Do• clock I \ M~   .
                                                                                                          11tiplor, Lk. WA~497l

         Asslrn ment was to d rive to 300 Carl Shipp Dr. Ub@rty Hill, TX and coll@ct contents of trash prior to
         the weekly trash pickup at 6:00 AM for that location

lnvest~UQ!l..:. Orlve to Subject's re>idence after Subject leaves In the morning, collect all trash, and ta ke the
trash Ill a ~par at@ location to analyze the contents -look for anvthi~ related to Subject's family, alcohol,
cigarettes, drugs - l~gal o.r oth~rwlse, etc.

8/ 15/1014 4:40 AM                     Started drive to Subject's resldl!nc~

              ~: lSAM                  Arrived at Subject's residence. The Subject was home, putting items in her car. l
                                       c;ontinued down the street and par1c.ed at a separate loution in order to wait until
                                       Subjett left.

              5:19AM                   Noticed Subject d rive down the street. I drove bae:k to tile Subject's resldencl!.

              ~:20AM                   Arrived at the Subject's residence and collected 2 white plastic trash bags and 3
                                       brown paper Dollar General bags. The only oth"r contents In the trash bins were
                                       2 piua boxes. I noticed a ca r driving down the street towa rds my location, I got
                                       back In to mv veh~le ;md iiS I drove away, noticed the S1.1bject returning to the
                                       residence.

              5:55AM                   Remov"d collected trash fro m vehidc and put ln a safl! location to a nalyte at a
                                       Later time in the eve ning.

              lO:OOPM - 11:00 PM       Sorted trash from S1.1bject's residence. The 3 Oollar Ge neral bags contained 6
                                       empty boxes of franlia wine, whlli! the 2 white plastic trash bags conta ined coke
                                       cans, 3 cans o f Miller Lite filled with cigarettes, a water bottle lllletin, Texas 78704             Office: (512) 653-lOH
,.

                                                                         JG
                                                  'k    ............ -     ........ Uic. . AU971
            Adana AJt                                                                                      August 17, 2014

     S/19/2014   U:OO PM -12 :00 AM          Final repOtl ge!lentted

            The Qrirette butu lound Wfft the opetted tmnd of the Subject (t.Urtboto IOCM). P~ ~the-r
            rNfl was not releYantto the investigation (credit appllc.Jtioru).

            The prescrrption ~ckeu found ~howed tnl! Sub)t!Cl uslns her parent'saddreu listed (140 Round Up
            Dr. Uberty Hill, TJ() for her pre.scription orders from HEB

            During a compn!henslve bad&ground check, the- Subject's brother, who has 1 criminal record showtna
            he was convicted of aura >lOlled sexual 01.1sault and poues~oon of child porn