Court Opinion

ID: 9669216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:44:01.142509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:54.000579
License: Public Domain

ELLIS, Judge,
concurring.
I concur only in the result reached by the majority. I disagree with the majority’s holding that Detective Gargotto’s testimony regarding Mr. Frazier’s request for an attorney “was not error, plain or otherwise ... as it was not presented in a manner to reflect upon appellant’s guilt.” Op. at 382. To the contrary, I believe it was error. I write separately to explain my reasoning. I concur in the result only because the issue comes to us for exercise of our discretion to review for plain error. While the error is egregious, I cannot say that it resulted in a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.
Mr. Frazier was charged with one count of tampering in the first degree, § 569.080.1(2).1 This section provides:
1. A person commits the crime of tampering in the first degree if:
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(2) He knowingly receives, possesses, sells, alters, defaces, destroys or unlawfully operates an automobile, airplane, motorcycle, *383motorboat or other motor-propelled vehicle without the consent of the owner thereof.
The State specifically charged Mr. Frazier with knowingly operating a motor vehicle ■without the consent of the owner. “The elements of this offense are (1) that the defendant knowingly receives, possesses, sells, alters, defaces, destroys or unlawfully operates (2) an automobile (3) without the consent of the owner.” State v. Kelley, 901 S.W.2d 193, 202 (Mo.App. W.D.1995).
The evidence at trial, leading up to the disputed testimony of Detective Gargotto, revealed that Tao Paletaoga owned a grey 1986 Chevy Silverado pickup track which, when he parked it outside his house on January 28, 1994, was in excellent condition. The next morning, he noticed the track was missing and called the police. Subsequently, Officer Francis noticed someone drive the track into an alley, and after about 30 seconds, observed someone hurriedly leave the alley on foot. He drove into the alley to investigate. He saw that the track had a broken left-wing window and broken steering column. He left the track when interrupted by a call from another officer but, about five minutes later, observed Mr. Frazier driving the same track. He followed it to a motel where Mr. Frazier parked the track, exited, and started walking away. Officer Francis then stopped Mr. Frazier to question him about the track. Mr. Frazier denied stealing the track.
Detective Gargotto testified that he questioned Mr. Frazier on January 31,1994. Detective Gargotto testified Mr. Frazier admitted he was driving the track and admitted that he saw the broken steering column and window. At this point, the following colloquy between the assistant prosecutor and Detective Gargotto occurred:
Q. Was the defendant able to offer any explanation for the damage to this pickup?
A: No, sir.
Q: What if anything did he say in response to that?
A: He didn’t say anything. Shortly into the interview, I believe seven minutes into the interview, he asked for an attorney, at which time the interview ceased.
Post-arrest silence or a defendant’s language representing silence cannot be used as evidence to incriminate him. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). “It cannot be remarked on, testified to nor implied in the prosecution’s presentation of its case.” State v. Tims, 865 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). Moreover, a defendant’s silence when confronted with a charge- of guilt made under circumstances calling imperatively for an admission or denial, or which could lead a jury to conclude that only a guilty person would have remained silent cannot be admitted. Id.
Nevertheless, testimony merely relating the conclusion of an interrogation after a defendant waived his right to silence is not prejudicial error. Id. at 886. However,
Any evidence describing these events must be carefully scrutinized. If the analysis of problematic testimony reveals that the defendant was failing to answer a direct charge of guilt, it should not be admitted. Or, if this was “a case where the defendant clammed up ... under circumstances calling imperatively for an admission or denial,” the evidence should likewise be refused.
Id. (citations omitted).
Detective Gargotto’s testimony raises two issues. The first is the admissibility of the fact that Mr. Frazier terminated the interrogation. The second is the admissibility of the fact that he requested an attorney. In my view, both were protected “silence” and should not have been admitted.
The State has the burden and must prove each and every element of a criminal offense, and if it fails to do so, any conviction obtained must be reversed. State v. Bromley, 840 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Mo.App. W.D.1992). In this case, it was incumbent on the State to prove that Mr. Frazier knew the track was stolen but drove it anyway. When Mr. Frazier was asked by Detective Gargotto to explain the damage to the truck, he requested an attorney, thereby ending the interrogation. Detective Gargotto’s testimony regarding Mr. Frazier’s request for an attorney went far beyond merely explaining the conclusion of an interrogation. It implied to the *384jury that Mr. Frazier “clammed up” when confronted with a question imputing to him knowledge that the truck was stolen. From the evidence of his silence, the jury could readily conclude that only a guilty person would refuse to answer or remain silent and therefore could just as readily conclude that Mr. Frazier knew the truck was stolen when he was driving it. Detective Gargotto’s testimony was not a mere explanation of why the interrogation concluded but rather was an attempt to prove Mr. Frazier’s guilt.
This conclusion is reenforced by the fact that Detective Gargotto subsequently made two unresponsive references to Mr. Frazier’s request for an attorney during cross-examination. During cross-examination, Detective Gargotto testified as follows:
Q: And you’ve indicated that you began questioning him at 1033 hours?
A: That is correct.
Q: And the questioning ended at 1043 hours?
A: When he asked for his attorney.
Q: Now, the statement that you are referring to is one that — this is a report that you wrote after you questioned Mr. Frazier?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: This is not a signed written statement in his own handwriting. This is just a paraphrase of what actually occurred; is that correct?
A: That is correct. When he asked for an attorney, ...
There can be no question that Mr. Frazier’s post-arrest termination of the interrogation by requesting an attorney was used as evidence to incriminate him.
The second issue arising from Detective Gargotto’s testimony makes it doubly prejudicial. “A request for an attorney may be perceived to be a remark which would be made by a guilty party. It is an effective reclamation of defendant’s right to silence and thus is not proper comment in testimony.” Tims, 865 S.W.2d at 886. Thus, in the case at bar, Detective Gargotto’s testimony allowed the jmy to infer Mr. Frazier’s guilt for two reasons. First, he terminated the interrogation in direct response to a question which imputed to him knowledge that the truck was stolen and he was driving it anyway. In other words, he failed to answer a direct charge of guilt. Second, his request for an attorney would be perceived by the jury as something only a guilty person would do. The testimony was inadmissible for both reasons, and likewise, its erroneous admission was doubly damning to Mr. Frazier.
While I conclude that Detective Gargotto’s testimony regarding Mr. Frazier’s termination of the interrogation and his request for an attorney was both inadmissable and prejudicial, I nevertheless concur in the majority’s affirmance of the judgment. Mr. Frazier’s attorney did not object to the testimony, seek a mistrial, or ask the court to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony. Thus, the issue comes to us on a request for plain error review pursuant to Rule 30.20. As such, the burden was on Mr. Frazier to establish manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice, not mere prejudice. State v. Cline, 808 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. banc 1991). In State v. Nolan, 872 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. banc 1994), our Supreme Court stated:
“Manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice” is not an easy phrase to define. “Indeed the cases give the distinct impression that ‘plain error’ is a concept appellate courts find impossible to define, save they know it when they see it.” 3A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 856 (1982). “[Wjhether an appellate court should take notice of an error not raised below must be made on the facts of the particular case, and there are no ‘hard and fast classifications in either the application of the principle or the use of a descriptive title.’ ” Id.; accord Cline, 808 S.W.2d at 824 (“The determination whether plain error exists must be based on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case.”).
Id. at 103.
“If the evidence presented in a criminal case is not sufficient to sustain a conviction, plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights is involved resulting in manifest injustice.” State v. Fosdick, 776 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Mo.App. S.D.1989). While I do not perceive this case as one in which the error was *385harmless because of overwhelming evidence supporting the conviction, see State v. Martin, 797 S.W.2d 758, 765 (Mo.App. E.D.1990), I conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction without consideration of Detective Gargotto’s inadmissible references to Mr. Frazier’s request for an attorney. As a result, it becomes a question of the degree of prejudice which occurred because of the inadmissible evidence. From my review of the facts and circumstances of this particular case, I cannot say that I have a firm conviction that a “manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted.” Rule 30.20.
For this reason, I concur in the result reached by the majority.

. All statutory references are to RSMo 1994 unless otherwise noted.