Court Opinion

ID: 9703519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:59:35.281389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:49.874031
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
“[A]nytime either a husband or wife contributes towards the purchase of entireties property their contribution is presumed to be a gift to the other.” Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 528, 347 A.2d 477, 480 (1975). Here, throughout their marriage the parties treated the husband’s pension plan as entireties property, and the wife by obtaining employment outside the home enabled the husband to increase his participation in the plan. The majority acknowledges these facts, and yet nevertheless holds that the husband made no gift of the plan to the entireties. In my opinion the law does not require so manifestly unfair a result.
I agree with the majority, and in any event it is established, that in order for there to be a valid gift there must be a donative intent and a delivery. See Ashley v. Ashley, 482 Pa. 228, 393 A.2d 637 (1978); In re Estate of Young, 480 Pa. 580, 391 A.2d 1037 (1978); Wagner v. Wagner, 466 Pa. 532, 353 A.2d 819 (1976). Here the question is not one of intent, for the husband admitted in open court under oath that he intended a gift. The question is only whether there was a delivery. I further agree with the majority that the pension plan may be described as a chose in action, and that as a general proposition of law, it may be said that in order for there to be a valid gift of a chose in action there must be actual or constructive delivery of a writing setting forth the nature and subject matter of the gift. Kreisl v. Kreisl, 415 Pa. 424, 204 A.2d 40 (1964); Russell Estate, 385 Pa. 557, 123 A.2d 708 (1956). Here it is undisputed that there was no delivery of such a writing. My difference with the majority is in concluding that on the facts here, that failure of *117delivery does not mean that there was no gift. General propositions solve most cases, but not every case. One must always ask whether, even though a general proposition has not been satisfied, the considerations that it is intended to serve have been satisfied.
The requirement that a gift be delivered is not based upon the medieval concept of seisin so much as upon considerations of psychology and evidence. This may be seen by hypothesizing a gift in which there has been no delivery. One commentator, Professor Mechem, has described the situation that would result:
If A has in his possession a chattel which is susceptible of ready manual tradition, and he desires to make an unconditional gift of that chattel to B, who is present and willing to accept it, A will normally express his donative intent in some form or other, and hand over the chattel. Conceivably, even, he may hand it to B without any other expression of donative intent. The need of such an act, i. e., the tradition, is instinctively felt by both parties. A pulls his watch from his pocket, says to B: “I hereby give you this watch” . . . and then returns the watch to his pocket. Is that transaction normal? The instincts of both parties will lead to a feeling that the transaction is not quite normal, not quite what it seems to be. Neither party, we will assume, has any idea of the legal principles involved, but neither’s sense of incompleteness is any the less for that. A may say to himself: “If I gave it to him, why did I put it back in my pocket?” B may say to himself: “I guess he was joking, since he didn’t in fact give it to me.” The point appears to be that the feeling that there has been no gift is not necessarily to be attributed to insophistication, or to mediaeval-mindedness. Any idea of a gift under normal circumstances (and we are assuming the circumstances to be such) does include the idea of transfer of possession. If the title has passed to B, the right to possession automatically and simultaneously passes with it. A in retaining the watch is committing an unexplained breach of B’s right to immedi*118ate and complete possession. Neither the law nor common sense readily places on events an interpretation necessarily involving an unlawful act on the part of one of the parties. B’s inference that title did not pass, that there was some mistake or some condition, is reasonable and proper.
Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 Ill.L.Rev. 341, 346-47 (1926) (footnotes omitted).
Professor Mechem identifies the considerations of psychology and evidence that are served by requiring the delivery of a gift, as follows:
In the first place, the delivery makes vivid and concrete to the donor the significance of the act he is doing. Any one can realize the psychological difference between a man’s saying he gives something, yet retaining it, and saying he gives it and seeing it pass irrevocably out of his control. The wrench of delivery, if the expression be understood and permissible, the little mental twinge at seeing his property pass from his hands into those of another, is an important element to the protection of the donor. If he is uncertain, if he hardly understands himself just what he means or (which is perhaps even more important) what he is understood to mean, he cannot fail to understand (and be understood) when he hands over the property. It gives him a locus penitentiae. It forces upon the most thoughtless and hasty at least a moment’s acute consideration of the effects of what he is proposing to do. Where valuable property is being passed without consideration, perhaps in the agony of a dying moment, it does not seem unwise to insist upon this simple and automatic safeguard.
Secondly, the act of manual tradition is as unequivocal to actual witnesses of the transaction as to the donor himself. Here normality is a big factor. What did the donor say? What did he mean? Perhaps he spoke under his breath, or was unable to speak clearly. Perhaps he hesitated and contradicted himself so that the outcome of *119his thought was not readily to be ascertained by witnesses in the flurry of the moment. If he hands over the property, he has done an act that will settle many doubts, an act perhaps capable of more than one interpretation, yet readily and naturally susceptible of but one.
Thirdly, and lastly, the fact of delivery gives the donee, subsequently to the act, at least prima facie evidence in favor of the alleged gift. The law does not presume unlawful acts. Possession is ordinarily rightful. The evidence is of course at best presumptive, yet better than none. If the donee comes out of the sick room and says the bonds have been given to him he will be more credited, and more reasonably, if he has them in his possession. It is easier to fabricate a story than to abstract the property. Id. at 348-49 (footnote omitted).
The importance of the delivery requirement thus is not the actual act of transfer itself but the effect the act of transfer has upon the donor, the donee, and third parties. Accordingly, if some act of the donor would have the same effects, and would thereby serve the same functions, as would an actual delivery of possession of the res, then it should be held that a valid gift has been made despite the fact that the res was not delivered. Thus the delivery of a sealed instrument to represent the res, or of a key to obtain a res locked in a trunk, has been held sufficient to effect a gift of the res, for the delivery of the key or instrument served the same functions as would have been served by an actual delivery of the res. See Mechem, supra (discussing symbolic delivery).
The first effect of delivery, as described by Professor Mechem, is the psychological impact of the act of delivery upon the donor. The act of transferring possession of the property signals to the donor that the time for joking is over and that the decision to make a gift entails the serious consequence of the loss of possession and control of the res. It is like the act of placing one’s seal upon a contract — a solemn act impressing upon the donor the importance of the transaction. In this case I should find that this psychologi*120cal consideration of the delivery requirement was fully satisfied by the husband’s act of testifying in court and under oath that he intended to make, and thought he had made, a gift of the pension plan to the entireties.
The second and third effects of delivery, as described by Professor Mechem, involve evidentiary considerations. They are directed to the problem of proving that a gift occurred and to the prevention of fraud against the alleged donor or third parties.
Evidence of delivery represents proof, frequently convincing, of the donor’s donative intent. Conversely, a failure to make delivery contradicts an intent to make a gift. Evidence of delivery also tends to prevent fraud against a third party who adopts a relationship to the res in accordance with the possession of the res. To consider Professor Mechem’s hypothetical donee of the undelivered watch: A pawnbroker will not allow the donee to pledge a watch he does not possess; but if the pawnbroker sees the donor give the watch to the donee and hears the donor say it is a gift, he may very likely rely on the donee’s pledge of the watch. Moreover, where the watch is undelivered a later purchaser from the donor may defend himself against the hypothetical donee’s claim of an earlier gift by arguing that there could have been no gift because the donor retained possession and he relied on that possession in making his purchase.
In this case none of the problems contemplated by these considerations of evidence is presented. The evidence of the husband’s retention of the pension plan in his name and of his failure to deliver a writing to the wife in no way contradicted, but rather was consistent with, the evidence of his repeated declarations that the property was that of the marriage — of the entireties. As the husband testified, he did not intend a complete transfer to the wife, in which case the retention of any interest by the husband would have been inconsistent with an intent to make a gift. In the case of a gift to the entireties estate — to the marriage — evidence of possession or custody by either the husband or by the wife or both is consistent with evidence of intent to make a gift. See Collins v. McCandless, 179 Tenn. 656, 169 S.W.2d 850 *121(1943) (valid gift of half interest in bonds from husband to wife although no actual delivery of bonds; retention in husband’s safe deposit box consistent with gift of half interest to wife). See also In re Estate of Young, supra, (delivery in joint tenancy' must only “invest in the donee so much dominion and control . . . as is consonant with” joint ownership). Nor does this case involve the relationship of any third party to the res, and no third party will be adversely affected by a decision that the pension plan was entireties property. Accordingly, the consideration that there should be proof of delivery in order to prevent fraud is not pertinent to a decision that here there was a gift of the plan to the entireties.
The delivery requirement also protects the donor from fraud. In this aspect it resembles the Statute of Frauds. Absent a writing representing an alleged contract within the Statute of Frauds, the contract will not be enforced, for enforcement might impose a fraud upon the party against whom the contract has been pleaded. See Simplex Precast Indus., Inc. v. Biehl, 395 Pa. 105, 149 A.2d 121 (1959); Gerlock v. Gabel, 380 Pa. 471, 112 A.2d 78 (1955). Where, however, the party admits to the contract or somehow waives the claim of the Statute of Frauds, the contract will be enforced. Indeed, to deny enforcement in such a case might impose a fraud upon the pleader of the contract and would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Statute of Frauds, which is to prevent fraud. See Simplex Precast Indus., Inc. v. Biehl, supra; Duffee v. Judson, 251 Pa.Super. 406, 380 A.2d 843 (1977). So too in a case where the alleged donor denies that any gift was intended, or is unavailable and so cannot defend himself against a claim of a gift. However, where, as here, the donor, in open court and under oath, admits that he intended to make a gift, there is no reason not to enforce the gift in accordance with his intent, for there can be no fraud against him, and, as discussed, no third party is involved.
I should therefore hold that on the facts of this case a valid gift was made, and should reverse the order of the lower court.