Court Opinion

ID: 9844093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:57:33.957472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:27.696805
License: Public Domain

ME. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
(specially concurring).
I concur in the result reached in the foregoing opinion but for a different reason.
In my opinion the New York cases referred to in the majority opinion differ from this. In New York the statute specifically defined “physiotherapy,” and provided for the issuance of a license to practice it. Our statute does neither. Likewise the New York statute made it plain that the practice of physiotherapy was the practice of medicine in a limited sense.
The statute also provided that, “A license to practice physio*101therapy shall not permit the holder thereof to administer drugs or to practice medicine as defined in section 1250 [6501] of this article, except to treat diseases under the supervision of a duly licensed physician.” Education Law, section 6512, subd. 4, McK. Consol. Laws, c. 16.
In the case of People v. Mari, 260 N.Y. 383, 183 N.E. 858, relied on in the majority opinion, the defendant was properly held guilty of practicing medicine without a license because he did not comply with the statutory law providing that he should operate in concert with a duly licensed physician. The court properly held that he did not comply with the New York statute because he failed to obtain a prescription from a physician in advance of the treatment.
The case of O’Neill v. Board of Regents, 272 App. Div. 1086, 74 N.Y.S. (2d) 762, relied on in the majority opinion, simply held that under the New York statutes the practice of physiotherapy is the practice of medicine in a limited field.
In People v. Dennis, 271 App. Div. 526, 66 N.Y.S. (2d) 912, also relied on in the majority opinion, the defendant was a licensed massage operator working with a physiotherapist and it was held that he was properly convicted of practicing medicine because what he did constituted the practice of physiotherapy under the New York statute. As above noted, Montana has no statute defining physiotherapy as does New York. The New York statute defines it as the practice of medicine in a limited way.
I concur in the result reached in the foregoing opinion because I think when defendant advertised that he was a heart specialist and a general practitioner and used the word “doctor” or prefixed the title “Dr.” before his name, he was using the term “Dr.” or “doctor” in a medical sense within the meaning of the statute.
Such advertising would imply that defendant was authorized by schooling and training to engage in the general practice of the healing science as usually practiced by a doctor and in *102addition that he was a heart specialist which some doctors are not.
While the term “in a medical sense” as used in the statute comes close to being so indefinite and uncertain as to be open to the objection to a criminal statute pointed out in H. Earl Clack Co. v. Public Service Comm., 94 Mont. 488, 22 Pac. (2d) 1056, yet I think, so far as this ease is concerned, the evidence shows that the terms were used in a medical sense.
I do not agree that this case is affected by that part of our statute defining the practice of medicine relied on in the foregoing opinion which makes it practicing medicine.for one who “recommends, prescribes, or directs” the use of any “drug, medicine, appliance, apparatus, or other agency.” Here there is no proof that defendant recommended, prescribed or directed the use of any agency. He himself directly applied whatever agency was used, viz.: massaging. He did not prescribe or direct the use of any agency.
I also disagree with my associates as to the necessity for offers of proof under the circumstances disclosed here. I agree that the result is unaffected by the evidence which was excluded but my reason for this conclusion is that defendant was not prejudiced by the rulings of the court excluding the evidence designed to show the type of treatment administered by defendant to his patients.
One witness, Mr. Cecil Johnson, testified without objection that defendant prescribed no drugs and used no instruments. “Q. He just worked on your body? A. Right. Q. Did he help you? A. Yes.” An objection was then made and sustained but no motion was made to strike the answer. Mrs. Prosper Martin also testified without objection that defendant did not prescribe any drugs or use any instruments, and that he helped her baby. Mrs. Robert Stead testified, without objection, that defendant did not prescribe drugs or use any instrument on her husband; that “He used his hands on my husband. Q. Did he help your husband? A. Yes, sir.” Mr. Emil Jackson was asked how defendant treated him, and an objec*103tion was sustained. However the witness went on to state, without objection, that defendant used no drugs or surgery or anything like that. He was asked, “Q. Did he ever give you a massage? A. Yes. Q. Did it help you? A. Yes.” Iva Rudd testified that he used no drugs. He testified without objection: “Q. Did he use any instruments? A. Just a vibrator on his hand. Q. Did he help you? A. Yes, sir.” Mrs. Thomas Pester testified without objection that she took massages and steam baths. Mrs. Zella Guigie testified without objection that defendant used no drugs or instruments.
I think the character of treatments offered by defendant was sufficiently brought out by his witnesses even though some objections were sustained. I fail to see where he was in any wise prejudiced by the rulings of the court in this respect. I do not believe the case would be different had offers of proof been made.