Court Opinion

ID: 9522329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:22:51.379908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:33.848150
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MORAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Due process and our Supreme Court Rule 402 require an affirmative showing, in the trial court record, that a guilty plea has been entered knowingly and voluntarily. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 244, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 280, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1713; 87 Ill. 2d R. 402.) Recognizing the constitutional requirement that a plea of guilty must be “intelligent and voluntary,” the court in People v. Reeves (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 28, 29, stated that “Boykin adds the requirement that if the guilty plea is to withstand appellate or post-conviction review ‘the record must affirmatively disclose that the defendant who pleads guilty enters his plea understanding^ and voluntarily.’ (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 footnote (4), 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756, 90 S. Ct. 1463,1468.)” As the majority points out, Rule 402 was adopted in response to the requirements of Boykin. (101 Ill. 2d at 484.) The trial court is always under a duty to substantially comply with the requirements of Rule 402 before accepting a guilty plea. (People v. Krantz (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 187, 192.) I cannot agree with the majority that the record shows substantial compliance with the requirements of due process or Rule 402. In particular, I find that the trial court completely abrogated its duty to the defendant to determine if his plea was voluntary. 87 Ill. 2d R. 402(b). In conformity with the mandates of Boykin, our Rule 402(b) specifically addresses the determination of whether a guilty plea is voluntary and requires that the trial court “by questioning the defendant personally in open court *** determine whether any force or threats or any promises, apart from a plea agreement, were used to obtain the plea.” (87 Ill. 2d R. 402(b).) A careful reading of the record in the instant case reveals a complete absence of dialogue between the court and the defendant regarding the voluntariness of the plea. The court in Boykin expressly stated that presuming voluntariness from a silent record is impermissible. The court reasoned that “a plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction. Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality.” Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 279, 89 S. Ct. 1709,1712. The majority, in the case at bar, states that “[tjhere is no evidence in the record that [defendant] was pressured or forced to enter a guilty plea.” (101 Ill. 2d at 487.) This implies that the burden is on the defendant to prove that his plea was coerced or induced when, in fact, the burden is on the State to prove that it was voluntary. On the basis of a silent record, this burden cannot be met. While the court is required to inquire as to the voluntariness of the guilty plea, the State, in the absence of such an inquiry, could have aided in the establishment of an adequate record by suggesting this omission to the court. In so doing, the State would have been assured that it could meet the burden of proving voluntariness, if the validity of the guilty plea was challenged on review. As the court stated in McCarthy v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 459, 465, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 424-25, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1170, the dual purpose of Rule 11 (the Federal counterpart to our Rule 402) is to (1) assist the judge in determining that a guilty plea is voluntary, and (2) create a complete record which will reflect the factors necessary to make this voluntariness determination. “By personally interrogating the defendant, not only will the judge be better able to ascertain the plea’s voluntariness, but he also will develop a more complete record to support his determination in a subsequent post-conviction attack.” 394 U.S. 459, 466, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 425, 89 S. Ct. 1166,1170-71. I have scrupulously reviewed the record trying to discern any discourse that would indicate that the court ascertained that the defendant was voluntarily entering his guilty plea. This search proved fruitless, revealing neither explicit dialogue concerning the voluntariness of the plea nor inferences that the plea was, indeed, being entered voluntarily. As a result, it is impossible to conclude that the defendant received the admonishments required by our Rule 402 and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty Therefore, I would vacate the defendant’s guilty plea and sentence and remand the cause in order that defendant be allowed to plea anew. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH joins in this dissent.