Court Opinion

ID: 9959014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:05:52.46959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:23.014255
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                      No. 22-0908
                                  Filed April 10, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ARNOLD RAY TOOMER,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Kevin McKeever,

Judge.

      A defendant appeals the sentence imposed following his conviction for

failure to register as a sex offender, second or subsequent offense. AFFIRMED.

      Kent A. Simmons, Bettendorf, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., Greer, J., and Vogel, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024).
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GREER, Judge.

        Arnold Toomer was convicted of and sentenced for failure to register as a

sex offender, second or subsequent offense, a class “D” felony, in violation of Iowa

Code sections 692A.103, 692A.104, and 692A.11 (2021). Toomer now appeals

his sentence alleging the district court failed to properly exercise its discretion

when sentencing him. We affirm.

   I.      Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

        Toomer was convicted of lascivious acts with a child in 1993 and has

subsequently been convicted multiple times for sex offender registry violations. In

2021, he again failed to comply with registration requirements by not providing the

local sheriff with his current address in a timely manner and, instead, providing an

address where he was not residing. While Toomer was charged as a habitual

offender pursuant to Iowa Code section 902.8, the enhancement was dropped by

the State as part of an agreement that the parties would jointly recommend that

Toomer be incarcerated for a term not to exceed five years if he was found guilty

by the court. The State recorded this agreement in an uncontested motion to

amend the trial information, writing “[t]he plea agreement is that in exchange for

the State’s agreement to allow [Toomer] to proceed charged without the habitual

designation, [he] agrees he will be sentenced to prison for an indeterminate term

not to exceed five years upon conviction at the trial on the minutes of testimony.”

        Following a bench trial on the minutes of testimony, the district court found

Toomer guilty of the offense.       At Toomer’s request, the court immediately

proceeded to sentencing.      The parties informed the court of their sentencing

agreement, and Toomer stated “the agreement with the State [is] that the parties
                                             3

would agree to a five-year prison sentence” and “this is an agreed-upon sentence.”

The State agreed and asked “that the court follow the plea agreement.” The court

elected to follow the parties’ agreement, sentencing Toomer to an indeterminate

term of incarceration not to exceed five years while also suspending the minimum

fine. Toomer appeals.

    II.       Standard of Review.

           “We will reverse a decision of the district court when an abuse of discretion

occurs or there is some defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Thompson,

856 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa 2014).

    III.      Analysis.

           Toomer challenges the sentence imposed, arguing the district court failed

to properly exercise its discretion when sentencing him to a term of incarceration

for a period not to exceed five years. See State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 67

(Iowa 2022) (recognizing that sentences that fall within the statutory limits are

“cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor” but “when the sentencing court fails

to exercise discretion because ‘it was unaware that it had discretion,’ we typically

vacate and remand for resentencing (citations omitted)); Iowa Code § 902.9(1)(e)

(“A class ‘D’ felon, not an habitual offender, shall be confined for no more than five

years . . . .”).

           The crux of Toomer’s claim is this statement by the district court:

           All right. I find that I should follow the recommendation being made by the
           attorneys. So, Mr. Toomer, I am going to sentence you to a period of
           incarceration of not more than five years in the Iowa Department of
           Corrections, and I am going to suspend the minimum fine in this case.
                                          4

From this statement Toomer contends the district court abused its discretion by

failing to consider more than a single factor when fashioning his sentence. In

Wilbourn, the Iowa Supreme Court held: “It is not an abuse of discretion for the

court to impose a sentence consistent with the parties’ plea agreement without

giving additional reasons for rejecting other sentencing options.” 974 N.W.2d at

67. Toomer claims this does not apply to his situation because there was no plea

agreement between the parties.        He further argues even if the sentencing

agreement is equated with a plea agreement for the purposes of the Wilbourn rule,

then it should be expanded to require consideration of more than a single factor.

       We find that the rule in Wilbourn applies to the sentencing agreement

between the parties here, as Wilbourn discussed a “joint sentencing

recommendation on the record.” Id. at 68. And again, our supreme court has held

that “a sentencing court does not abuse its discretion for failing to state sufficient

reasons for imposing a sentence if it was merely giving effect to the parties’

agreement.” State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756–57 (Iowa 1995). This is so

because when imposing an agreed-upon sentence, it is “not the product of the

exercise of trial court discretion but of the process of giving effect to the parties’

agreement.” State v. Snyder, 336 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Iowa 1983). Toomer was

successful in obtaining the sentencing agreement he sought and proceeded

accordingly. Pursuant to that agreement, the district court sentenced Toomer to

exactly what he had requested of the court. A district court need not consider any

other factor when giving effect to a sentencing agreement. As we discern no abuse

of discretion in the sentencing procedure, we affirm.

       AFFIRMED.