Court Opinion

ID: 9768479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:05:30.887854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:41.266806
License: Public Domain

*725SIMS,,, Judge,
(dissenting).
.To- my mind the majority opinion is unsound and the. question is of sufficient importance .to justify a dissenting opinion.
The sole question involved is whether or not appellant’s injuries resulted from an accident which arose out of or was connected with his employment: The majority correctly say that for an injury to arise' out of the employment there must be a causal connection between the injury and the employment. This is but another way of saying the-injury must .have been connected with the-employment-and have flowed from that source and not.have been independent thereof. This is a :corr'ect statement of the-law.
Here, appellant’s unfortunate epileptoid ■condition was not brought on by his employment and had no causal connection therewith. Had it been brought on by any condition connected with his emplpyment, I would say the injury received from the' fall induced by his epileptoid condition was compensable. His case is not like that of a workman with a weak heart who falls and injures himself on- account of a heart attack brought on by over exertion, excessive heat, lack of air, undue excitement or any other condition which might cause him to collapse and injure himself in a fall. In such a case the workman would be entitled to compensation as his injury would have a causal connection with his work or employment. Appellant’s case is. more like that of a man with a known bad heart who when he reports,for work, and before hitting a lick, falls from a heart attack and injures himself by striking his head against a concrete floor. Such injury is not '‘work-connected” nor, can it fairly be traced to his work as a contributing proximate cause, coming .from a hazard to which his employment exposed him. Therefore the injury is not compensable.
In our recent case of Salmon v. Armco Steel Corp., Ky., 275 S.W.2d 590, a workman had a heart attack while climbing a pole and we held his death did not arise out of his employment and was not compen-sable. But if I understand the majority opinion in the instant case, had Salmon not died from his heart condition and his heart attack had caused him to fall from the pole and be killed 'by striking the ground, it would have been compensable. My mind fails to grasp this thin-spun distinction, since in either case the heart condition independent of all other conditions caused the injury or the death.
I find a clear and succinct statement of my view expressed'in Henderson v. Celanese Corp. 27 N.J.Super. 219, 98 A.2d 715, 716.
“ -Here the fall resulting -in the injury is not disputed. The difference of opinion- centers in -the cause.
“ ‘If it was occasioned by or was the result of a disease or physical seizure and was not contributed tp by “what the workman had to do,” it is not compensable. On the other hand, if the fall “would not have occurred but for the services rendered” in the employment, it is covered by the statute.’ ”
As Stasel’s seizure and fall had no connection with his employment, the accident did not arise out of his employment and is not compensable. I agree with what was written in Andrews v. L. & S. Amusement Corp., 253 N.Y. 97, 170 N.E. 506, his fall was caused by his seizure and the injury resulted from no added risk because of his employment.
I realize the majority opinion is supported by the authorities cited therein, but in my judgment these authorities are unsound and the view expressed in the Henderson and Andrews cases is more logical.
For the reasons given I most respectfully dissent and am authorized to say that Judge MONTGOMERY joins with me.