Court Opinion

ID: 9855463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:25:25.217193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:47.022168
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
As Brown turned to enter the soup aisle at the Piggly Wiggly store, she stepped into a puddle of water, slipped, and fell. In her deposition, Brown testified that she did not see the water before she stepped in it, but that it was clearly visible and that she would have seen it if she had looked. She stated that nothing would have prevented her from seeing the water if she had looked down.
“[I]n order to state a cause of action in a case where the plaintiff alleges that due to an act of negligence by the defendant he slipped and fell on a foreign substance on the defendant’s floor, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance and (2) that the plaintiff was without knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from discovering the foreign substance.” Al*619terman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623 (272 SE2d 327) (1980). There is no evidence the store had any actual knowledge of the water in which Brown slipped and fell. Even assuming the store had constructive knowledge of the water, Piggly Wiggly was still entitled to summary judgment under the second prong of Alterman Foods, supra.
Under the second prong of Alterman Foods, supra, the store was entitled to summary judgment if Brown knew about or should have discovered the puddle, unless the store somehow prevented her from discovering it. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 199 Ga. App. 808, 810 (406 SE2d 234) (1991). This part of the Alterman Foods test demands that a person must “exercise ordinary care for his own safety, and must by the same degree of care avoid the effect of the merchant’s negligence after it becomes apparent to him or in the exercise of ordinary care he should have learned of it. He must make use of all his senses in a reasonable measure amounting to ordinary care in discovering and avoiding those things that might cause hurt to him.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Alterman Foods, supra at 623. Even if the store is charged with constructive knowledge of the puddle, so long as Brown saw or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have seen the puddle, and the store did nothing to prevent her from seeing it, Brown is deemed to have knowledge of the hazard and is barred from recovery. Id. at 623.
Brown admitted in her deposition that although she did not see the puddle before she fell, it was clearly visible and she would have seen it if she had looked down. She admitted that nothing prevented her from seeing the puddle, and she made no claim that she was distracted by anything. These admissions are fatal to her claim. Although the exercise of ordinary care for one’s own safety does not require a continuous scanning of the floor for possible defects under all circumstances, ordinary care does require the use of one’s eyesight to discover and avoid hazards in plain view. Vermont American Corp. v. Day, 217 Ga. App. 65, 66 (456 SE2d 618) (1995); J. H. Harvey Co. v. Johnson, 211 Ga. App. 809, 811 (440 SE2d 548) (1994); Yeaple v. Grand Union Co., 207 Ga. App. 15, 16 (427 SE2d 13) (1992); Sinclair v. Orozco, 205 Ga. App. 498, 499 (423 SE2d 25) (1992). Thus, where, as here, an injury resulted from a plainly visible defect in the plaintiff’s path, that the plaintiff admits she would have seen if she had looked, we have repeatedly held that the plaintiff is barred from recovery for failing to exercise ordinary care for her own safety. Vermont American Corp., supra at 66-67; Edwards v. Wal-Mart Stores, 215 Ga. App. 336, 338 (449 SE2d 613) (1994); Bruno’s, Inc. v. Pendley, 215 Ga. App. 108 (449 SE2d 637) (1994); Colevins v. Federated Dept. Stores, 213 Ga. App. 49, 52 (443 SE2d 871) (1994); J. H. Harvey Co. v. Kinchen, 213 Ga. App. 868, 869 (446 SE2d 218) (1994); *620Johnson, supra at 811; Winn Dixie Stores v. Carroll, 212 Ga. App. 234 (441 SE2d 432) (1994); Foodmax v. Terry, 210 Ga. App. 511, 513 (436 SE2d 725) (1993); Sinclair, supra; Riggs v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 205 Ga. App. 608, 609 (423 SE2d 8) (1992).
In holding that Brown’s knowledge of the puddle in this case does not bar her recovery, the majority relies on Van Dyke v. Emro Mktg. Co., 211 Ga. App. 744 (440 SE2d 469) (1993) and Flood v. Camp Oil Co., 201 Ga. App. 451 (411 SE2d 348) (1991) in an attempt to distinguish this case from other cases in which recovery was barred because the hazard was plainly visible. In those cases, we held that a jury question remained even though the puddles in which the plaintiffs slipped and fell were visible. Both Van Dyke and Flood are clearly distinguishable from the present case. In Van Dyke, although the plaintiff saw the puddle of water with a substance floating on top, he did not know the substance was kerosene, and did not fully appreciate the extremely slippery hazard presented by the combination of water and kerosene. Because a store employee had actually seen the kerosene spill and recognized the true nature of the puddle, we found there was a jury question as to whether the store had superior knowledge of the hazard. Similarly, in Flood we found that, although the plaintiff could see the oily wet pavement on which she stepped and slipped, she did not know of the increased hazard presented by diesel fuel which had spilled and mixed with the water and oil. Since there was evidence the defendant knew of the diesel fuel spill, we found there was a jury question as to whether the defendant had superior knowledge of the hazard. Here, Brown was as qualified as any store employee to recognize the hazard presented by a puddle of water, so there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding Brown’s knowledge of the nature of the hazard.
The proximate cause of Brown’s injury was her failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety by discovering and avoiding the plainly visible puddle in her path. Accordingly, Piggly Wiggly was entitled to summary judgment.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong, Judge Johnson and Judge Smith join in this dissent.