Court Opinion

ID: 9623818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:44:06.65968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:35.131265
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
Plaintiff Edward Martin sought recovery for injuries he sustained from alleged medical malpractice by defendants Michael Reed, M.D., and Cartersville Radiology Group, P.C.
Martin alleged that Dr. Reed misread Martin’s x-rays and missed the fact that Martin had seriously injured his neck when he had a seizure while driving his car and crashed, with the result that Martin’s neck was not immobilized and in less than three days he was partially paralyzed.
I respectfully dissent because of the rulings in Divisions 4 and 5.
1. As to Division 4, objection was made to the testimony of Dr. Howell, an internal medicine specialist, whose opinion was that Dr. Reed exercised that degree of care exercised generally by physicians under like conditions and circumstances. The ground of objection was that the doctor admitted earlier that he was not competent to read cervical spine x-rays. The argument is that, because the central issue involved whether Dr. Reed negligently read the x-rays, Dr. Howell was disqualified from testifying whether Dr. Reed exercised the proper degree of care.
Dr. Howell was making an overall assessment which he stated was predicated on deposition testimony of Dr. Murphy and Dr. Harbin, whose deposition was not introduced at trial. He was evaluating Dr. Reed from the standpoint that both the other doctors had difficulty in diagnosing Martin’s condition.
Where an expert’s testimony is based on hearsay, lack of personal knowledge does not mandate exclusion of his opinion but presents a jury question as to the weight which should be assigned to that opinion. King v. Browning, 246 Ga. 46, 47 (268 SE2d 653) (1980). Also, a witness’ expression of doubt about his own competency does not disqualify him from testifying as an expert witness. Askew v. State, 185 *778Ga. App. 282 (1) (363 SE2d 844) (1987); Reeves v. Morgan, 121 Ga. App. 481, 483 (2) (174 SE2d 460) (1970) (reversed on other grounds 226 Ga. 697 (177 SE2d 68) (1970)).
Decided July 16, 1991
Reconsideration denied July 31, 1991
D. Lake Rumsey, Jr., Tom W. Brown, for appellant.
Brinson, Askew & Berry, Robert M. Brinson, Joseph B. Atkins, for appellees.
2. As to Division 5, the requested instruction amounted to a directed verdict insofar as whether there was any connection between the automobile wreck and the damages for which plaintiff sought recovery. Although Martin introduced testimony that immobilization of his neck would have prevented his paralysis, he failed to demonstrate that the evidence demanded a finding that Dr. Reed’s negligent reading of the x-rays was the sole cause of his final, resulting injuries. “ ‘Negligence alone is insufficient to sustain recovery. It must be proven that the injury complained of proximately resulted from such want of care or skill.’ ” Hawkins v. Greenberg, 166 Ga. App. 574, 575 (304 SE2d 922) (1983). See Parrott v. Chatham County Hosp. Auth., 145 Ga. App. 113, 115 (243 SE2d 269) (1978). Unless the evidence requires a particular finding, “it is the province of the jury to say whether the result was caused by the negligence.” Pilgrim v. Landham, 63 Ga. App. 451 (3) (11 SE2d 420) (1940). That being true, the written request to charge was not applicable to the evidence, and the refusal to charge it was correct. Seaboard C. L. R. Co. v. Thomas, 229 Ga. 301, 302 (190 SE2d 898) (1972).
The judgment of the trial court, which was in accord with the verdict of the jury, should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Sognier, Presiding Judge Banke, and Judge Andrews join in this dissent.