Court Opinion

ID: 9912433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 15:01:56.699075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:29.797149
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 22, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2023-0210
                                _________________________

Ex parte Hankook Tire America Corporation and Hankook Tire
  & Technology Co., Ltd., f/k/a Hankook Tire Manufacturing
                           Company

                    PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Le'Asia Ann Crum, the dependent daughter and next kin
   of Robert Crum, Jr., deceased; and J.C., the minor child of
 Robert Crum, Jr., deceased, by and through his mother, legal
       representative, and next friend, Jacqueline Malone

                                                  v.

                  Hankook Tire America Corporation et al.)
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

                      _________________________

                            SC-2023-0312
                      _________________________

Ex parte Hankook Tire America Corporation and Hankook Tire
  & Technology Co., Ltd., f/k/a Hankook Tire Manufacturing
                           Company

              PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Le'Asia Ann Crum, the dependent daughter and next kin
   of Robert Crum, Jr., deceased; and J.C., the minor child of
 Robert Crum, Jr., deceased, by and through his mother, legal
       representative, and next friend, Jacqueline Malone

                                   v.

            Hankook Tire America Corporation et al.)

                (Dallas Circuit Court: CV-19-900292)

MITCHELL, Justice.

     Robert Crum, Jr., died when a concrete truck he was driving

overturned in Dallas County. Claiming that the accident was caused by

a defective tire on the truck, Crum's daughter, Le'Asia Ann Crum, and

Crum's minor son, J.C., acting by and through his mother Jacqueline

Malone ("the plaintiffs"), sued multiple parties, including the companies

that allegedly designed, manufactured, and distributed the tire in
                                   2
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

question, Hankook Tire America Corporation and Hankook Tire &

Technology Co., Ltd. ("Hankook").1

     When the plaintiffs deposed Hankook's designated corporate

representative, Won Yong Choi, they say that he provided evasive

answers to their questions or did not provide any answer at all. They

further state that Hankook's attorney compounded the problem by

repeatedly interrupting, objecting, and instructing Choi not to answer.

After the deposition, the plaintiffs moved the Dallas Circuit Court to

impose sanctions against Hankook based on the conduct of Choi and

Hankook's attorney. The trial court granted that motion and entered an

order (1) prohibiting Hankook from having any corporate representative

give testimony at trial that expounded on or went beyond Choi's

deposition testimony; (2) barring Hankook from disputing at trial that

     1There is some confusion about       whether the orders that are the
subject of these mandamus proceedings applied to only Hankook Tire &
Technology or to Hankook Tire America as well. The plaintiffs state that
Hankook Tire & Technology "is the only entity at issue for this
mandamus." Answer in case no. SC-2023-0210 at 2 n.8. But, out of an
abundance of caution, both Hankook Tire & Technology and Hankook
Tire America have petitioned for relief. For convenience, we follow the
parties' leads and simply refer in this opinion to "Hankook," whether that
encompasses one or both of the petitioners.

                                     3
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

the failed tire was defective; and (3) striking 10 of Hankook's affirmative

defenses concerning contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and

misuse. In case no. SC-2023-0210, Hankook petitions this Court for a

writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate that sanctions order.

We grant that petition.

     The trial court additionally directed the plaintiffs to submit

evidence of the attorneys' fees and costs they had incurred in preparing

for and taking Choi's deposition. After they did so, the trial court entered

an order awarding the plaintiffs $66,550 in attorneys' fees. In case no.

SC-2023-0312, Hankook petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus

directing the trial court to vacate that fee order. We grant that petition

as well.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     On July 26, 2019, Crum was driving a concrete truck for his

employer, Cosby-Carmichael, Inc., when the tire on the front passenger

side of the truck failed, causing him to lose control of the truck and the

truck to overturn. Crum died as a result of the injuries he sustained in

the accident.

                                     4
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

     The tire that failed was a 10-year-old Hankook AH10 tire. The

plaintiffs allege that the tire had plenty of tread life left when it

detreaded without warning, causing Crum's accident. Believing that the

tire was defective, the plaintiffs sued Hankook, asserting negligence,

wantonness, breach-of-warranty, and product-liability claims.2 Hankook

denied that its tire was defective and asserted a number of affirmative

defenses, including contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and

misuse.

     After Hankook unsuccessfully attempted to remove the action to

federal court, the parties proceeded with discovery, and the plaintiffs

served a deposition notice under Rule 30(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., which

authorizes the requesting party to name "as the deponent a public or

private corporation … and [to] describe with reasonable particularity the

matters on which examination is requested." A corporation receiving a

Rule 30(b)(6) notice is obligated to "designate one or more officers,

directors or managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on

     2The plaintiffs also sued Cosby-Carmichael and two companies that

allegedly sold, installed, and performed maintenance on the tire in
question, Jones Tire, LLC, and Jones Interstate Tire Company, Inc.
Those defendants are not parties to these mandamus proceedings.
                                   5
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

its behalf," and "[t]he persons so designated shall testify as to matters

known or reasonably available to the organization."           Id.   In their

deposition notice, the plaintiffs identified 35 matters on which

examination was requested; those matters broadly fell within the

following categories: (1) tire aging; (2) the design, testing, manufacturing,

marketing, and performance of Hankook AH10 tires; (3) other instances

when Hankook tires had similarly failed; (4) Hankook's record-retention

policies; (5) Hankook's research about tire failures; and (6) Crum's

accident.

     Hankook designated Choi as its corporate representative for the

Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. Choi began his employment with Hankook in

2004 after graduating with a degree in mechanical engineering. He

initially worked in research and development in Korea, becoming an

assistant manager after four years; then, in 2012, he moved to the United

States, where he provided technical services to Hankook's North America

customers. After five years in the United States, Choi returned to Korea,

where he worked on Hankook's product-development team for North

America, ultimately rising to his current position as head of Hankook's

development team for trucks and buses. Because Choi was located in

                                     6
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

Korea, the parties agreed that he would be deposed over two days via

video link. They also agreed to use interpreters because Choi was more

comfortable testifying in his native Korean.

     The first day of Choi's deposition lasted 7 hours and 43 minutes;

the second day lasted 7 hours and 28 minutes. The deposition was at

times contentious.   At several points over the course of the two-day

deposition, plaintiffs' counsel threatened to involve the trial court, and,

true to his word, the plaintiffs moved the trial court for sanctions three

months later.    The plaintiffs argued that Choi had been unable or

unwilling to answer even simple questions during the deposition and that

Hankook's counsel had "bombard[ed] the deposition with argumentative

interruptions, speaking objections, and instructions not to answer." The

plaintiffs specifically asked the trial court to sanction Hankook by (1)

prohibiting Hankook from having any corporate representative give

testimony at trial that expounded on or went beyond Choi's deposition

testimony, such as by suggesting that the tire detreaded due to

maintenance issues, improper inflation, or misuse; (2) establishing as a

fact that the subject tire detreaded due to a manufacturing defect; (3)

striking Hankook's contributory-negligence, assumption-of-risk, and

                                    7
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

misuse affirmative defenses; and (4) awarding the plaintiffs reasonable

attorneys' fees and expenses.

     Hankook opposed the plaintiffs' motion on both procedural and

substantive grounds. It first argued that the plaintiffs had failed to

comply with Rule 37(a)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., which provides that a motion

for discovery sanctions "shall be accompanied by a statement of the

attorney for the moving party stating that the attorney, before filing the

motion, has endeavored to resolve the subject of the discovery motion

through correspondence or discussions with opposing counsel" (emphasis

added). Hankook stated that the plaintiffs had not submitted the

mandatory statement and that they could not do so because, in the three

months since the deposition, they had not made any attempt to discuss

or resolve any outstanding grievances related to it. Hankook further

argued that Choi had been prepared for the deposition and had answered

the plaintiffs' questions to the best of his ability and that nothing in his

or Hankook's counsel's conduct during the deposition was improper or

warranted sanctions.

     The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion for sanctions at

which it reviewed excerpts from the videotaped deposition and heard

                                     8
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

from counsel on both sides, including the attorneys who had participated

in the deposition. The trial court then entered an order granting the

plaintiffs' motion, observing that "one of four things occurred almost

every time [Choi] was asked a substantive question. He either was not

prepared to answer the question; answered the question in an evasive

manner; was instructed not to answer by Hankook's counsel; or was

unnecessarily interrupted by Hankook's counsel's speaking objections."

The trial court thus concluded that Hankook had violated its duty under

Rule 30(b)(6) to produce a knowledgeable corporate representative and

ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to the sanctions they had

requested. In addition, the trial court gave the plaintiffs 15 days to

submit evidence of the attorneys' fees and costs they had incurred in

preparing for and taking Choi's deposition and in pursuing sanctions.

After the plaintiffs submitted evidence of attorneys' fees totaling $66,550,

Hankook countered by arguing that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any

award   because,    Hankook    said,       the   underlying   sanctions   were

unwarranted.

     To ensure it did not waive its right to seek appellate review of the

sanctions order, Hankook petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus

                                       9
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

before the trial court finalized the amount of the monetary sanction. See

Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P. We docketed that petition as case no. SC-

2023-0210. After the trial court entered an order awarding the plaintiffs

$66,550 in attorneys' fees, Hankook filed another petition seeking

mandamus review of that order as well. We docketed that petition as

case no. SC-2023-0312 and consolidated it with the prior petition for

review.

                           Standard of Review

     Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will be granted only

when the petitioner establishes (1) a clear legal right to the order sought;

(2) an imperative duty upon the trial court to perform, accompanied by a

refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the

properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex parte Gulf Health Hosps.,

Inc., 321 So. 3d 629, 632 (Ala. 2020). The petitioner bears the burden of

establishing all four of these elements before a writ of mandamus will

issue. Id. Additionally, we note that a trial court's order imposing

discovery sanctions will be disturbed only if it is shown that the court

went beyond its discretion in entering that order. Daily v. Esser, [Ms.

SC-2022-0672, Sept. 29, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2023).

                                    10
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

                         Case No. SC-2023-0210

     The parties' arguments to this Court focus on the first and third

elements of the mandamus test -- whether Hankook has a clear legal

right to the relief it seeks and whether it has an adequate remedy by way

of appeal. We analyze those elements in reverse order -- because if

Hankook has not established a cognizable basis for mandamus review, it

is not necessary to determine whether it has a clear legal right to relief.

     A. Adequate Remedy

     In Ex parte State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 320 So. 3d 550, 553

(Ala. 2020), this Court explained that a party seeking mandamus relief

can meet its burden of showing that it has no other adequate remedy by

citing "caselaw establishing that its petition falls within one of the

recognized exceptions to the general rule prohibiting interlocutory

appellate review, or otherwise explain[ing] why its case is extraordinary

and merits a new exception to that general rule." (Footnote omitted.)

Here, Hankook cites two cases as justifying its mandamus petitions: Ex

parte Gadsden Country Club, 14 So. 3d 830, 833 (Ala. 2009) (" 'A trial

court's disallowance of a party's affirmative defense is reviewable by a

petition for a writ of mandamus.' ") (citation omitted), and Ex parte

                                    11
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 3d 810, 813-14 (Ala. 2003)

(explaining that "review by appeal of a discovery order may be

inadequate … when the trial court … imposes sanctions effectively

precluding a decision on the merits … so that … the outcome has been all

but determined, and the petitioner would be merely going through the

motions of a trial to obtain an appeal").    Satisfying either Gadsden

Country Club or Ocwen would entitle Hankook to mandamus review.

     Hankook has demonstrated that it fits under Gadsden Country

Club -- a case the plaintiffs do not address. Gadsden Country Club

provides that " '[a] trial court's disallowance of a party's affirmative

defense is reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus.' " 14 So. 3d

at 833. We have affirmed that principle as recently as last week. See Ex

parte BTC Wholesale Distribs., Inc., [Ms. SC-2022-0881, Dec. 15, 2023]

___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2023). The trial court's sanctions order struck

Hankook's contributory-negligence, assumption-of-risk, and misuse

affirmative defenses; therefore, under Gadsden Country Club and BTC

                                   12
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

Wholesale Distributors, Hankook is permitted to seek appellate review

of that order without waiting until a final judgment is entered.3

     B. Clear Legal Right

     We turn to whether Hankook has a clear legal right to the relief it

seeks. At the outset, we note that the plaintiffs have acknowledged that

the trial court did not enter the sanctions in this case under Rule 37(a)(2).

That rule provides that when "a deponent fails to answer a question"

during a deposition,4 "the discovering party may move for an order

compelling an answer." Id. 5 If the trial court grants the motion and

enters an order compelling a response, and the deponent refuses to

comply with that order, the court may then enter sanctions against that

party under Rule 37(b)(2). Here, it is undisputed that no motion to

compel was ever made or granted, nor was there ever a refusal by Choi

     3Because  Gadsden Country Club provides a sufficient basis for
Hankook to obtain mandamus review, it is unnecessary for us to consider
an alternate basis under Ocwen.

     4Under   Rule 37(a)(3), "an evasive or incomplete answer is to be
treated as a failure to answer."

     5But the discovering party should refrain from filing such a motion

until after it has "endeavored to resolve" the dispute with opposing
counsel. Rule 37(a)(2).
                                 13
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

or Hankook to comply with a discovery order.         Thus, the sanctions

entered by the trial court cannot be justified by Rule 37(a)(2).

     The plaintiffs correctly note, however, that "no court order is

required to bring Rule 37(d) into play." Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553

So. 2d 82, 88 (Ala. 1989).     Rule 37(d) provides that if a corporate

representative designated under Rule 30(b)(6) fails "to appear" for a

properly noticed deposition, the trial court may sanction the party in the

same manner as if a discovery order entered in response to a Rule 37(a)(2)

motion was violated. See Rule 37(d) (explaining that, when there has

been a failure to appear, "the court in which the action is pending on

motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and

among others it may take any action authorized under paragraphs (A),

(B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule"). Hankook does not contest

a trial court's authority to sanction a party under Rule 37(d) when there

has been a failure to appear -- it simply argues that there was no failure

to appear here, where it is undisputed that Choi showed up at the

appointed time and was questioned by the plaintiffs for over 15 hours.

The plaintiffs nonetheless maintain that Choi's behavior during his

deposition was tantamount to a failure to appear such that the trial court

                                    14
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

was permitted to impose sanctions under Rule 37(d). This issue therefore

hinges on what constitutes a failure "to appear" as that term is used in

Rule 37.

      To begin, we note that the heading of Rule 37(d) indicates that it

applies to the "Failure of Party to Attend at Own Deposition" (emphasis

added), while the text of the rule addresses a party that "fails … to appear

before the officer who is to take the deposition" (emphasis added). Citing

the definitions for "appear" and "attend" in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate

Dictionary 60, 79 (11th ed. 2020), Hankook argues that those words

"unambiguously refer only to situations in which a party is not actually

'present at' the deposition or does not 'come formally' to it." Hankook's

reply brief at 4-5.

      The plaintiffs do not address with specificity the meaning of the

terms used in the Rule but, instead, argue that a deponent's inability or

unwillingness to answer questions is equivalent to a failure to attend or

to appear. In doing so, they cite several federal cases in which courts

have interpreted the similarly worded Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d). See, e.g.,

Kartagener v. Carnival Corp., 380 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

("Defendant's failure to present a witness prepared to testify about the

                                    15
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

topics on which she was designated was, under the circumstances,

tantamount to a failure to appear at all."); Black Horse Lane Assocs., L.P.

v. Dow Chem. Corp., 228 F.3d 275, 304 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[I]f a Rule 30(b)(6)

witness is unable to give useful information he is no more present for the

deposition than would be a deponent who physically appears for the

deposition but sleeps through it."); Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Southern

Union Co., 985 F.2d 196, 197 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that designation of

two corporate representatives without relevant knowledge "was

tantamount to a complete failure of the corporation to appear").

     In response, Hankook notes that none of the cases cited by the

plaintiffs constitute binding authority, and it urges us to reject their

"atextual" interpretation of Rule 37. Hankook's reply brief at 5. See also

Spinks v. Automation Pers. Servs., Inc., 49 So. 3d 186, 191 n.4 (Ala. 2010)

(recognizing that authority interpreting a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

that is similarly worded to an Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure may be

"persuasive," but it is "not binding on this Court").        Additionally,

Hankook cites an Alabama Law Review article in which the authors

criticized decisions in which sanctions were entered after a corporate

representative's appearance was deemed to be insufficient, stating that

                                    16
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

such decisions "are neither warranted under the Rule nor sustainable in

logic and common sense."          Kent Sinclair & Roger P. Fendrich,

Discovering Corporate Knowledge and Contentions: Rethinking Rule

30(b)(6) and Alternative Mechanisms, 50 Ala. L. Rev. 651, 672-73 (1999).

     Having considered all of these arguments, we conclude that

Hankook's position is in step with both the text of Rule 37(d) and the

structure of Rule 37 as a whole. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 24, at 167

(Thomson/West 2012) (explaining that the whole-text canon requires "the

judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and

of the physical and logical relation of its many parts"). Rule 37(d) applies

when a person "fails … to appear before the officer who is to take the

deposition." That subsection deals with a person who fails to submit

himself to the officer taking the deposition, but it does not address what

happens once a person has submitted himself to the officer and declines

to answer questions. If, over the course of a deposition, a deponent is

consistently unable or unwilling to answer questions that are asked, Rule

37(a) -- not Rule 37(d) -- provides the mechanism by which an aggrieved

party can obtain relief.

                                     17
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

     Under Rule 37(a), if the aggrieved party is unable to resolve the

dispute with counsel from the other side after the deposition, that party

can move the trial court to compel responses. If the motion is granted

and the deponent refuses to comply with the resulting order, the trial

court is then authorized to impose sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2). But the

aggrieved party cannot short-circuit the Rule 37(a) process by claiming

that a deponent's incomplete testimony is effectively a failure to appear,

especially where, as here, it is undisputed that Choi did testify regarding

a variety of topics over the course of 15 hours of questioning. In sum,

while the plaintiffs may have a legitimate grievance with some of Choi's

answers or nonanswers, his performance was a far cry from the

hypothetical sleeping deponent discussed in Black Horse Lane

Associates, 228 F.3d at 305, and any redress must come through Rule

37(a), not Rule 37(d).

     This interpretation of Rule 37 is reflected in the Committee

Comments to the Rule. Rule 37(d) addresses not only the failure to

appear for a deposition, but also the failure "to serve answers or

objections to interrogatories" and the failure "to serve a written response

to a request for production or inspection." The Committee Comments on

                                    18
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

the 1973 Adoption of the Rule explain that "Rule 37(d) provides remedies

for complete failures to respond or object to discovery" (emphasis added),

thus suggesting that it should not be invoked when there has been only

a partial failure to respond. See also Sinclair & Fendrich, supra, at 739

("[I]n the normal case, if a witness of any sort is produced in response to

a notice under the Rule, and the witness answers at least some questions,

no dispositive sanctions have ever been awarded by a federal court.").

     Finally, we note that Rule 37(d) provides no basis for sanctioning

Hankook based on the conduct of its counsel during Choi's deposition. If

Hankook's counsel instructed Choi not to answer questions or otherwise

interfered with his ability to provide answers during the deposition, the

plaintiffs could file a motion to compel under Rule 37(a). If the trial court

granted that motion, Rule 37(a) provides for the recovery of some

expenses, see Rule 37(a)(4), but it does not authorize the sanctions listed

in Rule 37(b), which the trial court imposed in this case. Rule 37(b)

sanctions become available only after there has been a failure to comply

with a motion to compel (Rule 37(a)) or a failure to appear or a complete

failure to respond (Rule 37(d)). Because there were no such failures in

                                     19
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

this case, the trial court exceeded its discretion by imposing sanctions on

Hankook under Rule 37(d).

                         Case No. SC-2023-0312

     Because the order imposing Rule 37 sanctions on Hankook is due

to be vacated, the trial court's follow-up order setting the amount of the

monetary sanction imposed in that initial order must also be vacated.

     The plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that all awards of attorneys'

fees are interlocutory orders not subject to mandamus review. They cite

Ex parte Gallant, 261 So. 3d 350 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017), to support their

argument, but that case is distinguishable. There, the Court of Civil

Appeals held that the petitioner was not entitled to mandamus relief

because his substantive arguments had not been timely asserted or

because he had an adequate remedy on appeal. 261 So. 3d at 354-55.

Here, by contrast, we have already explained that a party may properly

seek mandamus relief of a trial court's order striking its affirmative

defenses. See Gadsden Country Club, 14 So. 3d at 833; BTC Wholesale

Distributors, ___ So. 3d at ___.

     And, as we have explained above, the trial court exceeded its

discretion by sanctioning Hankook under Rule 37(d) even though Choi

                                    20
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

did not fail to appear for his deposition. Because the order imposing Rule

37 sanctions on Hankook is due to be vacated, the trial court's award of

attorneys' fees -- based on the same conduct as the other sanctions -- is

also due to be vacated. If Hankook was challenging only an award of

attorneys' fees, our conclusion about whether that challenge was

appropriate for mandamus review might be different. But it would be

contrary to principles of judicial economy for us to ignore that award now

when we have already held that the sanctions order was unwarranted.

                               Conclusion

     Because Choi did not fail to appear for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition,

the sanctions entered by the trial court were not authorized by Rule

37(d). Hankook's petitions are therefore granted, and the trial court is

directed to vacate both its initial order sanctioning Hankook and its later

order imposing a monetary sanction.

     SC-2023-0210 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

     SC-2023-0312 -- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

     Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ.,

concur.

     Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

                                    21
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

COOK, Justice (concurring specially).

     I concur fully with the main opinion's thorough analysis and

resolution of the issues presented by these consolidated petitions for

writs of mandamus. I write specially, however, for two reasons.

     First, I note that the plaintiffs in this case could have used the

procedures under Rule 37, Ala. R. Civ. P., to request an order from the

trial court to compel cooperation from Hankook's designated corporate

representative, Won Yong Choi. Doing so would have provided several

options to them. For example, after Choi refused to answer a question,

the plaintiffs could have "complete[d] or adjourn[ed]" the deposition and

then moved for an order compelling Choi to answer under Rule 37(a)(2).

If Choi continued to refuse to respond even after the plaintiffs moved for

and were granted an order compelling his response, the trial court would

have had a number of powerful sanctions at its disposal under Rule

37(b)(2). Those sanctions include:

           "(A) An order that the matters regarding which the
     order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken
     to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance
     with the claim of the party obtaining the order;

          "(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to
     support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or
     prohibiting that party from introducing designated matters in
                                     22
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

     evidence;

           "(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or
     staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or
     dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or
     rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
     party;

          "(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition
     thereto, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to
     obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or
     mental examination;

          "(E) Where a party has failed to comply with an order
     under Rule 35(a)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] requiring that party to
     produce another for examination, such orders as are listed in
     paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the
     party failing to comply shows that that party is unable to
     produce such person for examination."

Rule 37(b)(2).

     In addition to any of the foregoing options under Rule 37(b)(2), the

trial court would have also had the authority to order Hankook or Choi

to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the

plaintiffs in obtaining an order compelling Choi's response pursuant to

Rule 37(a)(4). That rule states:

     "If the motion is granted, the court shall, after opportunity for
     hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct
     necessitated the motion or the party advising such conduct or
     both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable
     expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney
     fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion
                                    23
SC-2023-0210; SC-2023-0312

       was substantially justified or that other circumstances make
       an award of expenses unjust."

Rule 37(a)(4). I offer no opinion as to which of the above-suggested

options constitutes the most appropriate course of action; rather, I note

these options for the benefit of the bench and the Bar.

       Despite the options that Rule 37 currently provides to litigants and

their attorneys when confronted with misconduct during discovery, I note

the possibility that the above-listed options may not be sufficient in all

circumstances. I thus write specially to also suggest that we consider

modifying our Rules of Civil Procedure to address future occurrences of

party or attorney misconduct during discovery in a more comprehensive

way.

       In the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 30(d), Fed. R. Civ. P.,

provides parameters to help ensure that depositions are conducted in

both a professional and timely manner. For example, Rule 30(d)(2) gives

trial judges authority to issue sanctions against deponents and their

attorneys for a broad range of misconduct that occurs during a deposition:

       "The court may impose an appropriate sanction -- including
       the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred by any
       party -- on a person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair
       examination of the deponent."

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(Emphasis added.)

      Given that the trial court may sanction a party for impeding a

deposition, Rule 30(d)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., requires that a deposition

should, normally, be completed in a timely manner and allows additional

time for doing so with permission from the trial court. Specifically, that

rule provides:

      "(1) Duration. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the
      court, a deposition is limited to one day of 7 hours. The court
      must allow additional time consistent with Rule 26(b)(1)[,
      Fed. R. Civ. P.,] and (2) if needed to fairly examine the
      deponent or if the deponent, another person, or any other
      circumstance impedes or delays the examination."

      Rule 30(d)(1). A substantial portion of the Advisory Committee

Notes for Rule 30, Fed. R. Civ. P., explain how to apply these provisions

in practice.6

      In addition to the parameters provided in Rule 30(d), Fed. R. Civ.

P., I note that Rule 30(c)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides the following

      6Other   aspects of Rule 30(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., are already
contemplated in the current version of Rule 30, Ala. R. Civ. P. Compare
Rule 30(d)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. (providing for a motion to limit or terminate
a deposition on the ground that it is being conducted in bad faith or in a
manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the
deponent or party), with Rule 30(d), Ala. R. Civ. P. (providing for the
same remedy).
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parameters for speaking objections:

     "An objection at the time of the examination -- whether to
     evidence, to a party's conduct, to the officer's qualifications, to
     the manner of taking the deposition, or to any other aspect of
     the deposition -- must be noted on the record, but the
     examination still proceeds; the testimony is taken subject to
     any objection. An objection must be stated concisely in a
     nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner. A person may
     instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to
     preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the
     court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3)."

(Emphasis added.)

     When I was practicing in federal court, I found that both of these

rules not only helped to ensure that most depositions were completed in

a timely manner, but also helped maintain a level of professionalism and

decorum throughout those proceedings. I offer no opinion as to whether

Rules 30(d) or 30(c)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., or some variation of those rules,

should be adopted in Alabama. Rather, I make these observations only to

suggest that the Standing Committee on the Alabama Rules of Civil

Procedure consider a change in our rules to address future occurrences of

misconduct in a similar, more comprehensive way.

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