Court Opinion

ID: 9521746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:11:02.954914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:34.419953
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE DOWNING, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I fully agree with parts I and II of the majority opinion, which affirm defendant’s conviction. For the following reasons, I must dissent from part III, which remands this cause for imposition of sentence on the armed violence conviction. Armed violence is the commission of any felony defined by Illinois law while armed with a dangerous weapon. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 33A — 2.) The statute first became effective in 1967. Certain amendments were added effective February 1, 1978. Since the amendments, many cases have dealt with the issue of when convictions and concurrent sentences are proper for both armed violence and the underlying felony offense upon which the armed violence conviction is predicated. Two considerations are involved in determining whether convictions are proper for both armed violence and the predicate felony: “one act, one crime” (see People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 363 N.E.2d 838, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 894, 54 L. Ed. 2d 181, 98 S. Ct. 273), and “double enhancement” (see People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 261, 422 N.E.2d 627). The doctrine of “one act, one crime” provides that a defendant may not be convicted of, or be given sentences for, more than one offense unless he commits more than one physical act. This doctrine was extensively discussed by the supreme court in People v. King, and recently applied in People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 281, 426 N.E.2d 535. The supreme court first addressed itself to the amended armed violence statute in People v. Haron. There it developed the doctrine of “double enhancement.” Harón was charged with aggravated battery, and armed violence predicated on the underlying felony of aggravated battery. Harón had committed an offense with a deadly weapon, which allowed the charge to be enhanced from battery to aggravated battery, and which also supported the charge of armed violence. The supreme court held this “double enhancement” to be contrary to the intent of the General Assembly, and thus affirmed the dismissal of the armed violence charge against Harón. See also People v. Van Winkle (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 220, 430 N.E.2d 987. On the same day the Harón opinion was filed, the supreme court handed down People v. Myers. Myers was convicted, relevantly, of attempted murder and armed violence based upon the underlying offense of aggravated battery. (Defendant was not convicted of aggravated battery.) The relevant act involved the use of a knife in slitting the victim’s throat. The evidence showed that the defendant moved the knife from the victim’s neck twice while threatening the victim’s companion and cutting the latter’s fingernail. The supreme court applied the King doctrine, found each act of placing the knife against the victim’s throat to be sufficient under King to support a conviction, and thus affirmed the concurrent sentences for attempted murder and armed violence. Since the effective date of the amended armed violence statute, the appellate court has considered a number of cases arising from the armed violence statute. In this district of the appellate court, a variety of results has been reached. The following summary illustrates the treatment of this matter by this district. In the 1st Division: People v. Jones (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 475, 417 N.E.2d 647. Defendant was convicted of unlawful restraint, armed violence, and two counts of unlawful use of weapons. Concurrent sentences were imposed for armed violence and unlawful use of weapons. Relying on King, the court vacated the unlawful restraint and one unlawful use of weapons convictions, and affirmed the armed violence and the other unlawful use of weapons charges. People v. Mormon (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 556, 422 N.E.2d 1065. Defendant was convicted of rape and armed violence. The court, relying on King, held the act of rape with the victim held at gunpoint is only one act. The armed violence conviction was vacated. The supreme court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 572. In the 2d Division: People v. Crawford (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 888, 414 N.E.2d 25. This consolidated case involved, in Crawford, convictions of armed robbery and armed violence, and in Miller, convictions of rape, armed robbery, and armed violence. Relying on King, the armed violence convictions were set aside. People v. Lynom (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 1113, 423 N.E.2d 1281. Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and armed violence. Relying on Harón and Myers, the court discussed the issue of double enhancement. The court found no improper double enhancement and affirmed the multiple convictions. Significantly, the “one-act, one-crime” issue was not discussed. People v. Best (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 424 N.E.2d 29. The multiple convictions of deviate sexual assault, rape, burglary, and armed violence were affirmed. Defendant used a knife and threatened to kill if the victim did not submit. The court relied on Lynom and did not discuss the “one-act, one-crime” question. People v. Feierabend (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 731, 424 N.E.2d 765. The multiple convictions of murder and armed violence based on a gunshot killing were affirmed. The court, relying on Lynom and Best, discussed the question of double enhancement. The issue of “one-act, one-crime” was not discussed. In the 3d Division: People v. Johnson (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 428 N.E.2d 1133. Defendant was convicted of murder by stabbing of the victim. He was further convicted and sentenced for armed violence. Disagreeing with the second division cases and relying on King, the court vacated the conviction and sentence for armed violence. In the 4th Division: People v. Burnette (1981), 97 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 423 N.E.2d 1193. Defendant was convicted and sentenced for murder and armed violence for a gunshot killing. Relying on King, the court held the victim’s shooting was one act and reversed the conviction and sentence for armed violence. In the 5th Division: People v. Jones (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 412 N.E.2d 683. The defendant was convicted of armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and armed violence. Based on King, the court reversed the conviction for armed violence on the theory of “pyramiding.” People v. Simmons (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 519, 425 N.E.2d 1168, appeal allowed (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 581. The court held the convictions and concurrent sentences for involuntary manslaughter and armed violence resulting from a shooting death violated the principle of one act, one crime, and vacated the involuntary manslaughter conviction. The Simmons court acknowledged Lynom, but declined to follow it. People v. Perez (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 64. Convictions an concurrent sentences for rape and armed violence were affirmed, relying on Best. The court dealt only with the issue of double enhancement and not with the issue of one act, one crime. People v. Petrovic (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 282, 430 N.E.2d 6. Defendant was convicted of aggravated battery and armed violence. Based on Harón, the court found double enhancement in battery to aggravated battery, then to armed violence. The latter conviction and sentence were vacated. It is obvious the amended armed violence statute has created problems. In this district a clear-cut policy has not developed. The problems of double enhancement and “one act, one crime” have led to inconsistent results. A proper analysis of whether convictions and concurrent sentences for armed violence and the predicate felony may be imposed requires a two-step analysis. First, the court should determine if multiple convictions and sentences violate the rule against double enhancement. (Harón.) Second, the court should determine if multiple convictions and sentences violate the principle of “one act, one crime.” King; Myers. Turning to the instant case, defendant was convicted of murder and armed violence predicated on the underlying felony of murder, along with other crimes. The doctrine of double enhancement poses no problem. Defendant, however, committed only one act upon which the charges of murder and armed violence were based, the shooting of Sammy Priest. A series of gunshots, fired in a single burst, constitutes only one act. (People v. Connor (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 652, 660-61, 402 N.E.2d 862, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 595.) Thus, multiple convictions and concurrent sentences in the instant case violate the principle of “one act, one crime.” The trial court held that a sentence on armed violence would be duplicitous and not appropriate. I agree. (See Simmons v. United States (1978), 435 U.S. 6, 55 L. Ed. 2d 70, 98 S. Ct. 909.) I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.