Court Opinion

ID: 9576666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:26:57.618893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:05.079732
License: Public Domain

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part,
with whom Chief Judge KOZINSKI joins in Parts III and IV, with the exception of the first and last paragraphs of Part IV:
Because our precedent forces me to treat the Seattle Center as a traditional public forum, I agree that the City of Seattle’s permitting requirements and ban on active solicitation for street performers at the Seattle Center are facially unconstitutional. I also agree with the majority’s invalidation of the City’s captive audience rule. However, the City’s performance location rule is constitutionally valid. Therefore, I join Parts I, II, III, V, and VI of the majority opinion.
I write separately, because (1) the characterization of the Seattle Center as a public forum is essential to this decision; (2) although the permitting scheme is not narrowly tailored, it relates to and meaningfully promotes the City’s legitimate interests; (3) the City has met its burden to show that the performance location rule is a constitutionally reasonable time, place, and manner restriction; and (4) while the City’s active solicitation rule is not content-neutral, the majority’s analysis seems to hold that any restriction on solicitation is necessarily content-based.
I
We are constrained to view the City’s rules regulating speech in the Seattle Center through the lens of the Supreme Court’s forum analysis. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976) (adopting a forum analysis as a means of determining whether the government’s interest in limiting use of its property outweighs the interest of others wishing to use the property for other purposes). Our conclusion as to the nature of the forum in which the regulations apply not only informs our analysis but largely shapes the outcome, “because the extent to which the Government may limit [speech] depends on whether the forum is public or nonpublic.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985). Therefore, the disposition of this case hinges almost entirely on whether we characterize the Seattle Center as a traditional public forum.
The majority states, without much analysis, that the record supports characteriz*1083ing the Seattle Center as a traditional public forum. I agree. However, given the significance of the majority’s holding and the fact that the majority strikes down most of the City’s challenged rules as facially unconstitutional, we should not fail to fully consider the nature of the forum at the Seattle Center.
There is no contention that the Seattle Center is a nonpublic forum.1 The record plainly shows that the Center is publicly owned, free and open to the public, and available as a forum for public communication. Yet a determination of the precise type of public forum is still necessary to guide our analysis.
If, as the City argued before the district court, the Seattle Center is a “limited public forum,” our review is somewhat lenient. A limited public forum is considered “a type of nonpublic forum that the government has intentionally opened to certain groups or to certain topics.” Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir.2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Under this analysis, the City’s regulations would be upheld “as long as (1) the restriction does not discriminate according to the viewpoint of the speaker, and (2) the restriction is reasonable.” Id. at 814 (citations omitted). Nothing in the record indicates that the City has limited the use of the Seattle Center to certain groups or dedicated it solely to the discussion of certain subjects. Further, the record suggests that the Seattle Center has historically been a public forum. Therefore, the Center is not a limited public forum.
If the Seattle Center is a traditional public forum, “the government may not prohibit all communicative activity” and, to enforce any content-based exclusion, the state “must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980)). Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions can be imposed if they are “content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” Id. (citations omitted).2 Quintessential public fora include “streets and parks which ‘have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.’ ” Id. (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939)).
To determine whether a venue is a traditional public forum, courts have considered a number of factors, including (1) the com*1084patibility of the dedicated uses of the forum with expressive activity; (2) whether a speaker has a reasonable expectation that their speech will be protected in the forum; (3) the historic use of the forum; (4) the current use of the forum; (5) whether the public has had free access to the forum; (6) whether the forum is a public thoroughfare; (7) the value of the area as an expressive locale; (8) the government’s interest in commercial revenues; (9) any purpose for which the land may have been dedicated and the consistency of that use with free speech. See ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas CACLU I), 333 F.3d 1092, 1100 & n. 7 (9th Cir.2003) (citations omitted) (collecting cases describing factors that courts have applied to determine the nature of the forum).
Our case law emphasizes three factors in determining the nature of the forum: “1) the actual use and purposes of the property, particularly status as a public thoroughfare and availability of free public access to the area ...; 2) the area’s physical characteristics, including its location and the existence of clear boundaries delimiting the area ...; and 3) traditional or historic use of both the property in question and other similar properties.... ” Id. at 1100-01 (citations omitted).
A reasonable application of these factors to the facts in this record confirms the majority’s characterization of the Seattle Center as a traditional public forum. The record shows that the Center is free and open to the public. It is a gathering place for cultural and political rallies. It hosts formal events, including concerts, plays, ballets, athletic events, and other cultural activities. It is a forum for countless informal gatherings every day as thousands of people frequent the Center to “congregate on the sidewalks and parks that are open to the public.” With more than ten million visitors a year, the current use and purpose of the facility is unavoidably public. The Center’s own literature characterize the Seattle Center as “one of the nation’s most extraordinary urban parks and entertainment centers .... a social and cultural gathering place for people around the world .... [a] host to remarkable arts, cultural, educational and community programs and international festivals .... [and] a gathering place and public space open to everyone [and] reflective of the Northwest’s diversity and alive with innovation.... ”
The Center’s physical characteristics and location also support the conclusion that the Center is a traditional public forum. It is publicly owned and centrally located in the heart of Seattle. Of the eighty-seven acres, twenty-three are open spaces and plazas with numerous walkways and access points to the downtown area and surrounding neighborhoods.
Further, the traditional and historic uses of the land also supports its designation as a traditional public forum. When the land was dedicated to the City over one hundred years ago, it was dedicated for “the use of the public forever.” Nearly fifty years ago, the Seattle Center was home to the 1962 World’s Fair, and it has continued to welcome the public ever since.
I also note that, given the express purpose of the Seattle Center, the forum is also clearly compatible with expressive activity. Based on the Center’s mission and history as a gathering place for cultural, social, political, and artistic expression, patrons of the Center could reasonably expect that their speech would be protected. The Center is also clearly a pedestrian thoroughfare for the ten million people who visit the center each year, and the Center has obvious value as an expressive locale. While the City no doubt has an interest in commercial revenues, the City’s interests and the stated purposes of the *1085Center are not inconsistent with free speech.
I acknowledge that the Seattle Center is not the average public park. It is a dynamic and complex evolution of public space, ripe with modern innovation and offering the public a wealth of educational, social, cultural, and commercial opportunity. The City’s challenge is to balance the competing uses and manage the Center in a way that fosters mutual enjoyment of these multiple uses. This is no small task. Yet, regardless of the novel attributes of Seattle’s “most extraordinary urban park,” the Seattle Center remains a traditional public forum and the City’s regulation of speech “is subject to the highest scrutiny.” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (Lee), 505 U.S. 672, 678, 112 S.Ct. 2701 (1992).
II
The City’s permitting scheme is not a valid time, place, or manner regulation, because it “burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). The City’s goal is to promote the safety and convenience of the public by regulating the conduct and location of those who (1) regularly attract crowds when performing in the Seattle Center and (2) who are overly aggressive, abusive, or harassing when soliciting donations from those who pass by. The City’s interest is both significant and legitimate. Yet, the broad brush of the permit requirement, on its face, sweeps within its prohibition not only the problematic aggressive behavior of regular street performers, but also any spontaneous or informal artistic expression by anyone. “Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.” Id. at 799-800, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988)). For those wishing to comply with the law, the prior restraint of the permit requirement would inevitably result in delays, deterring and effectively banning a significant amount of protected expression. See Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir.1994) (the delay caused by complying with a permitting procedure prevents immediate response to immediate issues and can deter or even preclude immediate responses to late-breaking events) (citations omitted). Because the rule would burden all artistic expression and reach substantially more individuals than the few problem street performers, it is not narrowly tailored. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495.
Additionally, while a permitting scheme might be justified for large groups, there is nothing to suggest that the City’s interest is sufficient to justify the prior restraint of a single-performer in this public forum. See Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1206 (permit requirement was unconstitutional where it could apply to “the actions of single protestors”); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1247-48 (9th Cir.1981) (same). Because (1) prior restraints are disfavored and (2) this prior restraint is targeted at individual speakers, the permit requirement must be found unconstitutional, if the state could achieve its purported goals in a less restrictive manner. Even if the permit requirement were more efficient in preventing the evils associated with the street performers, punishment of actual wrongdoers could achieve the City’s interests without burdening all forms of artistic expression with the prior restraint. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (enforcement of antifraud laws sufficient to protect citizens from possible fraud resulting from fundraising solicitations). As the majority illustrates, there are also alternative *1086means of coordinating multiple uses of the Seattle Center, such as reasonable time and place restrictions, without requiring permits for all artistic expression.
With regard to the permitting scheme, I disagree with the majority’s characterization that the permitting requirements do not promote the government’s interests “in any meaningful way.” The majority states that “[tjhere is ... no reason two street performers with permits would be less likely to engage in a territorial dispute than two street performers without permits.” The majority also states that the permit requirement “bears no apparent connection to the City’s stated interest in reducing hostile performer behavior .... [because] there is no reason why a performer with a permit is likely to be less hostile than one without a permit.” This analysis fails to view the permit requirement in the context of the entire permitting scheme. Contrary to the majority’s reasoning, the permitting system advances the City’s interest, because performers (who violate the Seattle Center rules) risk temporarily losing their permit and, thus, their ability to perform. If a performer engages in a territorial dispute (ostensibly because he does not abide by the first come, first serve rules regarding the designated performance locations), he might also lose his permit. Likewise, a performer who engages in hostile behavior towards other performers or patrons likewise risks losing his permit. The potential to lose the right to perform is a substantial, common sense deterrence to the undesirable conduct the City seeks to regulate.
Further, I disagree with the majority that the permitting requirements do not aid in coordinating multiple uses of the Seattle Center. While the permit system does not limit the total number of permits, nor assign particular performers to specific locations at specific times, it does provide an orderly means for allocating and prioritizing the use of performance locations among competing uses. That is, permitted performers have priority to use the performance locations over non-permitted performers. Further, the permitting scheme allocates the use of particular spaces among permittees on a first come, first served basis. A permitted street performer is protected if he abides by the rules, and he stands to temporarily lose his permit (and right to perform) if he does not. While there may be other schemes that might better clarify or coordinate the use of the Seattle Center for street performances, the majority’s conclusion that the permit rule does not promote or have any connection to the City’s interest ignores the punitive and deterrent elements of the permitting scheme. Although I agree that the permitting scheme is not narrowly tailored nor is the City’s interest significant enough to justify such a prior restraint on individual speakers, the scheme otherwise relates to and would meaningfully advance the City’s interest.
Ill
I dissent with regard to the City’s performance location rule. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the City, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, I agree that the City has met its burden with unrebutted evidence that demonstrates a significant, legitimate interest, which “would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (citation omitted). With regard to whether the rule allows for ample alternative channels for communication, I disagree with the majority, which concludes that Berger’s declaration presents “conflicting evidence concerning whether the sixteen dedicated locations provide adequate access to the intended audience.” Majority Op. at 1050.
In imposing time, place and manner restrictions, the government must only “re*1087frain from denying a ‘ reasonable opportunity’ for communication.” Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1141 (9th Cir.2005) (emphasis added) (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986)). The Supreme Court has instructed that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions need not preserve the most effective means of communication; rather, such restrictions must only guarantee that individuals retain the “ability to communicate effectively.” Id. at 1138 n. 48 (citing City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597, (2000) (upholding a law that prohibited individuals from having a position that maximized accessibility to the target of their speech)).
In Menotti, we held that a city order prohibiting protest demonstrations in certain areas during a World Trade Organization (‘WTO”) meeting left open ample alternative channels of communication. See id. at 1138-43. The city order effectively prevented protestors from delivering their message directly to WTO delegates in the facilities where the WTO meetings were held. Id. at 1138. Instead, protestors were relegated to areas directly across the street from the meeting location, as well as throughout the rest of downtown Seattle. Id. In concluding that the city order provided ample alternative means of communication, we noted that “[t]he Supreme Court generally will not strike down a governmental action for failure to leave open ample alternative channels of communication unless the government enactment will foreclose an entire medium of public expression across the landscape of a particular community or setting.” Id. at 1138 (citations omitted). “A time, place, and manner restriction does not violate the First Amendment ‘simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.’ ” Id. (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985)). Further, we recognized that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.” Id. (citations omitted). “The ‘ample alternatives’ cannot be taken to mean that each protestor has the right to convey his or her message in the manner preferred by that protestor.” Id. at 1140. The order afforded protestors a reasonable opportunity to communicate, because “[t]he protestors could reasonably expect their protest to be visible and audible to delegates, even if not as proximate as the protestors might have liked.” Id. at 1138.
Berger’s declaration asserts only that “many[of the locations] are far off the walkways where it is very difficult to notice the performer.”3 Giving Berger’s assertion the benefit of very generous inferences, we might conclude that some of the City’s designated performance locations are less favorable to Berger, because he would not be as close to his audience as he would like. However, the First Amendment does not guarantee Berger the right to convey his message in the most effective manner, in the manner he prefers, or as close to his audience as he might like. See id. at 1138-40.
Further, Berger’s conclusory expression of opinion does not create any material *1088dispute of fact that would foreclose summary judgment in favor of the City. For instance, Burger’s declaration does not dispute the location of the designated performance areas as portrayed by the City’s evidence. Berger’s declaration also does nothing to negate the other facts evident from the record. For instance, the record confirms that the location rule does not exclude performers from the Seattle Center, but limits access to sixteen locations within the forum. The record also shows that some ten million people visit the Space Needle, Key Arena, Pacific Science Center, and the Experience Music Project each year. The map showing the performance locations places the street performers in areas that are plainly accessible to the corridors of traffic and very near places where the public would naturally congregate as they visit the City’s famous attractions. The record shows that the performance locations were selected as a result of a public process in which the street performers themselves provided significant input. These sixteen locations provide more than reasonable opportunity to communicate to the five to eight performers who typically perform on the Seattle Center grounds at peak times. Further, if the performance locations prove inadequate for a particular performance, a performer can request special approval for an alternate performance location.
Based on Berger’s assertion that “many” of the locations are “far off the walkways,” the majority concludes, that “there are conflicting inferences to be drawn regarding material facts pertinent to the dispositive consideration, adequacy of access to the intended audience.” Majority Op. 1050. By inference, the majority suggests that the location rule must guarantee a level of access that meets the speaker’s subjective expectation, something that our cases have not previously required. In answering whether Berger and other street performers have an objectively reasonable opportunity to communicate, the record shows that the performance locations are all (1) within the Seattle Center, (2) adjacent to pedestrian walkways, and (3) near the Center’s most popular attractions. On this basis, the street performers can reasonably expect that their performances will be “visible and audible to [their intended audiences], even if not as proximate as [they] might have liked.” See Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1138. Berger’s assertion is, at most, an expression of his subjective view that the designated locations prevent the most effective form of communication. It does not create conflicting evidence as to whether the performance locations objectively provide “reasonable opportunity for communication.” Id. at 1141. Therefore, I would hold that the record is sufficiently developed, and the City has met its burden to show that street performers have ample, reasonable alternatives for communication.
IV
I join in the majority’s conclusion that the active solicitation ban is unconstitutional as presently written. Yet, I am concerned that the majority opinion could be read to hold that any restriction on solicitation is necessarily content-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
I agree that solicitation falls within the protection of the First Amendment. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 628-32, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980).4 Contrary to *1089the majority’s assertion, however, First Amendment jurisprudence generally treats regulation of solicitation as content-neutral. The Supreme Court has characterized “the inherent nature of solicitation itself, a content-neutral ground.” United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990). Likewise, in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648-49, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981), the Court found a regulation limiting solicitation in a public fairground to certain locations to be content-neutral, because it applied to all who sought to solicit funds.
Our own case law confirms that solicitation regulations can be content-neutral. See ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir.1986). In ACORN, the solicitation ordinance in question prohibited solicitation of vehicles while they were stopped in traffic. Id. at 1267-68. The ordinance provided: “No person shall stand on a street or highway and solicit, or attempt to solicit, employment, business or contributions from the occupants of any vehicle.” Id. at 1262 (quoting Phoenix City Ordinance § 36-101.01). The ordinance did not ban solicitation of contributions altogether, but only regulated the location and permissible targets for such activity. Id. at 1267. The ordinance also permitted other forms of communication (e.g. oral advocacy and distribution of literature). Id. We concluded that the ordinance was content-neutral, because it did “not single out any group or the content of any speech.” Id. We further explained that the ordinance was not passed to suppress any particular viewpoint but “was adopted to promote the city’s interest in ‘public peace, health and safety.’ ” Id. at 1267-68.
The majority relies on our decision in ACLU of Nevada v. City of Las Vegas (ACLU II), 466 F.3d 784 (9th Cir.2006), for the proposition that a regulation banning conduct associated with solicitation is content-neutral, while a regulation regulating the speech associated with solicitation is not. In ACLU II, we considered whether an ordinance banning solicitation at certain Las Vegas locations was content-neutral. The ordinance prohibited any solicitation, defined as “ ‘to ask, beg, solicit or plead, whether orally, or in a written or printed manner, for the purpose of obtaining money, charity, business or patronage, or gifts or items of value for oneself or another person or organization.’ ” ACLU II, 466 F.3d at 788 (quoting Las Vegas Municipal Code § 10.44.010(A)). The ordinance was interpreted to prohibit the distribution of handbills or leaflets that solicit money or donations, regardless of whether they involved a request for immediate or future donations. Id.
The three-judge panel concluded that the ordinance was not content-neutral because, “in order to enforce the regulation, *1090an official ‘must necessarily examine the content of the message that is conveyed.’ ” Id. at 794 (quoting Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992)). In other words, because law enforcement would have to read the content of the message conveyed to determine whether it fell within the ban, the ordinance was content-based. See id. at 794 & 796. The three-judge panel distinguished ACORN and prior Supreme Court cases, which had previously held solicitation regulations to be content-neutral, by characterizing those cases as involving regulations of the “act of solicitation” and not “words of solicitation.” Id. In essence, the panel held that solicitation regulations can be content-neutral only if they regulate “an element of conduct interwoven with otherwise expressive solicitation.” Id. at 795 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 705, 112 S.Ct. 2701 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). But, if the regulation restricts only the speech associated with the solicitation, it is content-based and therefore violates the First Amendment unless it survives strict scrutiny. See id.
The distinction, made in ACLU II between an “act of solicitation” and “words of solicitation,” would not make any difference under the majority’s content-neutrality analysis. Based on ACLU II, the majority distinguishes the outcome in ACORN, reasoning that the regulation there prohibited only an act of solicitation: the immediate physical exchange of money.5 Therefore, under the majority’s reasoning, a ban on in-hand solicitation involving the physical exchange of money would be content-neutral. But applying the logic of ACLU II to the facts of ACORN, the distinction fails to reconcile the different outcomes.
As a practical matter, there can be no act of solicitation without words of solicitation. That is, all solicitation involves expressive speech or conduct. A solicitation is nothing more than a request in which the solicitor communicates, in some fashion, his desire that the person solicited do something, such as give money, join an organization, transact business, etc.6 If there is no such expression, it cannot be said that any act of solicitation has occurred. Therefore, whether the regulation restricts conduct or speech, the applicability of the regulation depends on an evaluation of the content of the speech associated with the conduct.
For example, to determine whether an exchange of money is the result of a solicitation or a voluntary gesture of gratitude between old friends, there must necessarily be an evaluation of both conduct (the in-hand exchange of money) and the expressive communication associated with it. What did the recipient of the money communicate that led to the exchange? If he asked for money, then the regulation applies. If he merely expressed gratitude for his old friend and the donor volunteered the money, the regulation does not apply. Under the majority’s reasoning, no regulation that applies to an “act of solicitation” can ever be content-neutral, because conduct only becomes an act of solicitation when it is associated with words of solicitation. And to find words of solicitation, there must necessarily be some evalu*1091ation of the content of the communication associated with the conduct.
Under the majority’s reasoning, the ordinance in ACORN should have been held to be content-based, because to determine its applicability, law enforcement was required to evaluate the content of communications to determine whether individuals standing alongside stopped vehicles were asking the occupants for money, as opposed to simply communicating their views on political issues. Therefore, either ACORN or ACLU II was wrongly decided. Given the broad treatment of general solicitation regulations as content-neutral, I suggest the latter. In my view, ACLU II took the term “content-based” to its literal extreme and employed a hyper-technical analysis that effectively precludes any reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on solicitation. Consequently, I find the majority’s reliance on ACLU II to be misplaced.
The mere fact that a regulation requires an evaluation of the content of a communication is not determinative as to whether the regulation, on its face, is an impermissible content-based regulation. See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780, 789 n. 5 (9th Cir.2008). Any regulation of solicitation necessarily requires an evaluation of the communication to determine whether it falls within the regulation. But such an evaluation is not necessarily dependent on the substantive content of the message. It turns, instead, on the general character or form of the communication or the type or class of speech involved.
In Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 722, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000), the Supreme Court upheld a Colorado statute banning any leafletting, displaying of signs, engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling within eight feet of any person within a radius of one-hundred feet of a health care facility.7 The Court considered whether such a proscription was content-neutral, because enforcement of the statute required an examination of the oral statements made by a person suspected of violating the statute. Id. at 720, 120 S.Ct. 2480. In holding the statute to be content-neutral, the Court noted:
It is common in the law to examine the content of a communication to determine the speaker’s purpose. Whether a particular statement constitutes a threat, blackmail, an agreement to fix prices, a copyright violation, a public offering of securities, or an offer to sell goods often depends on the precise content of the statement. We have never held, or suggested, that it is improper to look at the content of an oral or written statement in order to determine whether a rule of law applies to a course of conduct.
Hill, 530 U.S. at 721, 120 S.Ct. 2480. The Court reasoned that even if a “cursory examination” were required to determine whether the statute applied, such an examination would not be problematic. See id. at 721-22,120 S.Ct. 2480.
First Amendment case law demonstrates that we afford varying degrees of protection to different types of speech. Political speech, for example, is at the core of First Amendment protection and any restrictions placed upon it must weather an exacting, strict scrutiny. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d *1092426 (1995) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)); ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2004). In contrast, purely commercial speech has been afforded a more “limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456, 98 S.Ct. 1912 (1978). Presumably, a regulation that applies only to commercial speech requires an evaluation of the content of the speech to determine the character or type of speech (whether it is commercial). Yet, this type of evaluation has not generally been held to be content-based and does not trigger strict scrutiny review. In the same way, an evaluation of a particular communication to determine whether it is a solicitation is not based on the substantive content of the message or the viewpoint of the speaker. It is, instead, a cursory evaluation to determine the general character or form of the speech itself. This evaluation of form does not make the regulation content-based.
Further, in the abstract, a simple solicitation of funds does not necessarily involve the exposition of any ideas. As the Supreme Court has stated, charitable solicitation falls within the greater protection of the First Amendment, because it “is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues.” Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632, 100 S.Ct. 826. “[Cjharitable appeals for funds ... involve a variety of speech interests— communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes — that are within the protection of the First Amendment.” Id. Consequently, the substantive content of a solicitation triggering constitutional protection is not the mere request for funds, but the viewpoints, ideas and persuasive speech that are intertwined and communicated with the solicitation. A regulation that asks only whether the communication is a solicitation of any kind does not require an evaluation of any substantive content. Therefore, the type of evaluation required by a typical solicitation regulation (i.e. whether the communication is a solicitation) is not the type of content-based evaluation that the First Amendment disfavors.
In my view, a solicitation regulation is content-neutral if (1) the underlying purpose of the regulation is not to suppress a particular viewpoint or any substantive idea;8 (2) the regulation, on its face, does not single out particular substantive content for differential treatment;9 and (3) the regulation does not single out a particular group.10 In other words, if a solicitation rule applies even-handedly to anyone who solicits, it is content-neutral. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648-49, 101 S.Ct. 2559.
However, I join the majority in invalidating the City’s active solicitation ban, because this particular regulation does more than generally ban solicitation or regulate only the manner of solicitation. It singles out a particular group that is defined, in part, by the medium through which they express themselves and the substantive message they convey. It also requires more than a technical evaluation *1093of the general character of the communication. To enforce the ban, an official must first determine whether the communication was a solicitation (which would be a permissible content-neutral evaluation). The official must then determine whether the solicitation was active or passive (also a content-neutral evaluation). If the speech is an active solicitation, then the rule requires the official to (1) determine who made the solicitation and whether that person is a street performer, and (2) evaluate whether the active solicitation was made in connection with the street performer’s artistic expression or performance (as opposed to soliciting funds for some other cause). As written, the rule targets only those involved in artistic expression. In my view, it improperly focuses on who is doing the soliciting and for what purpose they are soliciting, converting the rule into an impermissible content-based regulation.

. A nonpublic forum is a place that does not, by tradition or designation, serve as a forum for public communication; thus, content-based restrictions in nonpublic fora need only be "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983).

. If the Seattle Center were a “designated public forum,” our analysis would be the same, because the Center continues to be open to the public. Public property, that is not traditionally a public forum, may nonetheless be "opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity." Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948. In such a "designated public forum,” while the state is "not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the [forum], as long as it does, it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.” Id. at 46, 103 S.Ct. 948. A designated public forum includes "a place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects.” Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439).

. The majority also cites Berger's assertion that construction equipment at the Seattle Center temporarily blocked access to certain of the designated performance locations. This assertion is inapposite to the facial validity of the performance location rule. Further, even if construction impeded the use some performance locations for "weeks on end,” such a temporary condition cannot be relevant to determining whether the rule provides reasonable opportunity to communicate.

. I note that charitable solicitation has been held to receive the full protections of the First Amendment. "[C]haritable solicitations 'involve a variety of speech interests ... that are within the protection of the First Amendment,’ and therefore have not been dealt with as 'purely commercial speech.' ” Riley, 487 U.S. at 788, 108 S.Ct. 2667 (quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632, 100 S.Ct. 826). *1089Non-charitable solicitation may not be entitled to the same measure of protection as charitable solicitation. See id. at 796, 108 S.Ct. 2667. If such solicitation is motivated purely by profit and follows a provision of goods or services, it may be more akin to commercial speech, and not fully protected expression. There has been no argument that the solicitation rule in this case regulates only commercial speech. And it is clear that the regulation applies to both charitable and non-charitable solicitation by street performers. Therefore, the majority correctly applies the test for fully protected expression. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the street performers targeted by the City’s regulations perform with an expectation of receiving remuneration. Although the record is not clear, I suspect that most of the street performers are in the business of entertainment and provide entertainment services and accept “contributions” and “donations” as a source of personal income. For them, their craft is their ware and their solicitation is inevitably commercial in nature.

. While the majority interprets the ordinance at issue in ACORN as prohibiting “only the immediate physical exchange of money,” I disagree. I read the ordinance as clearly applying to any solicitation of or "attempt to solicit employment, business or contributions” regardless of whether money was physically exchanged. See ACORN, 798 F.2d at 1262.

. A common dictionary defines “solicit” as "to approach with a request or a plea (as in selling or begging) ... to endeavor to obtain by asking or pleading....” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2169 (1993).

. In Hitt, the challenged statute provided, "No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person in the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care facility....” Hill, 530 U.S. at 708, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (citing Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-9-122).

. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct 2746 (stating that the government’s purpose in adopting the regulation is the primary consideration).

. See Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 636 n. 7 (9th Cir.1998).

. See ACORN, 798 F.2d at 1267 (a restriction on solicitation that “does not single out any group or the content of any speech” is content-neutral).