Court Opinion

ID: 9852104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:24:35.65118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:22.521976
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result:
I agree that this appeal should be dismissed, but for a different reason. Our precedents dictate that the plaintiffs’ vol*757untary dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) cannot constitute an appealable final judgment because the dismissal was without prejudice. The majority, however, holds that the dismissal order can in fact constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal under a “pragmatic evaluation of finality.” Although this court has sanctioned a pragmatic approach to determining finality in certain limited circumstances, the majority’s ruling impermissibly expands this doctrine beyond its narrow confines. In so doing, the majority adds uncertainty to the final judgment rule of appellate jurisdiction, and undermines important values of judicial economy. In my view, the better course is to follow our clearly established rules of federal jurisdiction, and dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, I would not reach the issue of the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction as discussed in Part III of the majority opinion.
I.
Except in limited circumstances not relevant here, the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review only “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2008). A “final decision” under section 1291 is “a decision by the District Court that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (internal quotation marks, citation and footnote omitted). The final judgment rule is essential to the proper functioning of the federal courts, as it promotes judicial efficiency, prevents multiplicity of litigation, and minimizes delay “by forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy.” Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940).
In Concha v. London, we held that a plaintiffs “voluntary dismissal without prejudice is ordinarily not a final judgment from which the plaintiff may appeal.” 62 F.3d 1493,1507 (9th Cir.1995) (emphasis in original), citing Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 764 F.2d 1329, 1342, corrected, 773 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir.1985). We reasoned that, “[t]he policy against piecemeal appellate litigation is [] at its height in such cases” where a party appeals a voluntary dismissal without prejudice because if that party loses on appeal, he “is in no way precluded from proceeding with the litigation following the adverse decision.” Id. at 1508 n. 8.
Here, the district court approved the plaintiffs’ unopposed Rule 41(a)(2) motion for voluntary dismissal of their claims against the air district. The parties agree that because this order did not specify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, the dismissal is deemed to be without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). Therefore, under Concha, the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal cannot constitute a final judgment for purposes of exercising appellate jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs argue that the voluntary dismissal nonetheless falls within the narrow exception to Concha articulated in James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.2002). In that case, we permitted the plaintiff to appeal an adverse partial summary judgment order after she obtained a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of her remaining claims. Id. at 1068-70. We held that the voluntary dismissal without prejudice created sufficient finality for the purposes of appeal because it was made “with the approval of the district court, and the record reveals no evidence of intent to manipulate our appellate jurisdiction.” Id. at 1070.
*758The James exception is not applicable here. As the majority correctly concludes, our case “is distinguishable [from James] in several important respects,” including the fact that the plaintiffs seek to appeal issues never litigated before the district court, and the fact that there is a greater threat of piecemeal appellate review in this case given the “closely intertwined nature” of the claims dismissed with prejudice and those dismissed without prejudice. (Maj. Op. 749-50.)
In addition, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the record reveals at least some evidence that the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal without prejudice was done with an intent to manipulate our appellate jurisdiction. In particular, when counsel for the air district notified plaintiffs’ counsel about its concerns that the “without prejudice” dismissal could render the decision non-final, plaintiffs’ counsel adamantly refused to make the dismissal “with prejudice.” Although this is not direct evidence of an intent to manipulate the appellate process, the James exception does not require a lack of substantial evidence or even significant evidence. So long as there is any evidence of an intent to manipulate, the exception does not apply. James, 283 F.3d at 1068-69 (finding “no evidence” that the plaintiff deliberately attempted to manipulate the court’s appellate jurisdiction).
The default jurisdictional rule in Concha therefore applies to this case. Under this well-established precedent, voluntary dismissals without prejudice, like the dismissal at issue here, are not appealable final judgments, and this court lacks jurisdiction to review such judgments on appeal.
II.
The majority acknowledges that Concha precludes voluntary dismissals without prejudice from being appealable final judgments. (Majority Op. 748.) The majority also concedes that the James exception does not apply to the facts of this case. (Majority Op. 749-50.) Nonetheless, the majority holds that appellate jurisdiction exists here because the plaintiffs’ dismissal without prejudice can be construed as being one with prejudice under a “pragmatic evaluation of finality.” (Maj. Op. 750.) Unfortunately, this ruling cannot be squared with our precedent.
In construing the plaintiffs’ dismissal as one with prejudice, the majority principally relies on the fact-specific inquiry undertaken in Concha. (Maj. Op. 750-52.) In that case, although we held that voluntary dismissals without prejudice ordinarily do not constitute appealable final judgments, we ultimately concluded that “[i]n this unusual case,” the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal without prejudice would be treated as one with prejudice for the purposes of appeal. Concha, 62 F.3d at 1508-09. We justified this decision on the grounds that there was “no question” that the plaintiffs “intended” their dismissal to be with prejudice, and further that the plaintiffs had “absolutely nothing to gain by filing a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.” Id. at 1508.
This court’s determination of finality in Concha represents a fact-specific exception to the general rule that voluntary dismissals without prejudice do not constitute final judgments for the purposes of appeal. As we have held, any exceptions to our established bright-line jurisdictional rules should be construed narrowly. Cf. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881, 888-89 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that the James exception must be narrowly construed because “[a]ny other interpretation ... would undermine [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 54(b) and add uncertainty to the final judgment rule”). Thus, in accordance with the specific facts addressed in Concha, I conclude that a court *759may construe a party’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice to be one with prejudice only where (1) there is “no question” that the party “intended” the dismissal to be with prejudice, and (2) that party has “absolutely nothing to gain” from filing a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Concha, 62 F.3d at 1508-09.
The plaintiffs in this case cannot make these required showings. First, as described above, the record demonstrates that the plaintiffs in fact had no intention of entering a dismissal with prejudice. When asked by opposing counsel to change their without-prejudice dismissal to one with prejudice, plaintiffs’ counsel flatly refused.
Second, it is not at all clear that the plaintiffs had “absolutely nothing to gain” from filing a without-prejudice dismissal. In fact, the logical inference from their refusal to enter such a dismissal is that they perceived some advantage to obtaining a dismissal without prejudice. Moreover, although the plaintiffs argue that an adverse decision on this appeal would preclude their dismissed claims against the air district, nothing would prevent them from refiling their air district claims and seeking a different result. The majority cites the plaintiffs’ representations at oral argument that they do not seek to relitigate these claims as evidence that there is little possibility of such piecemeal litigation. (Maj. Op. 751.) However, the whole point of having bright-line jurisdictional rules is to avoid the expense and effort of appeal in the first place. We cannot have a rule where parties are unable to determine appellate jurisdiction based on a facial examination of the record, but must instead go through the trouble of writing briefs and preparing for oral argument to guard against the possibility of a last-minute determination of jurisdiction. Cheng v. Comm’r Internal Revenue Serv., 878 F.2d 306, 310 (9th Cir.1989) (“[O]ne of the primary purposes underlying the final judgment rule [is] the efficient use of judicial resources”).
For these reasons, I would not follow the majority’s approach in construing the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal to be one with prejudice. To expand the exception recognized in Concha beyond the specific facts of that case, as the majority does here, risks the adoption of an all-too flexible test for federal jurisdiction, one that would mimic former Justice Potter Stewart’s definition of pornography: I know it when I see it. This approach is diametrically opposed to our federal jurisprudence, which requires finality to be clear and identifiable on the record. 15A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3913, at 462 (1992) (“Although well-established rules of appealability might at times cause an action to be determined unjustly, slowly, and expensively, they have nonetheless the great virtue of forestalling the delay, harassment, expense, and duplication that could result from multiple or ill-timed appeals”).
Moreover, the plaintiffs had multiple avenues through which they could have appealed the non-final orders entered by the district court. Most obviously, they could have simply specified that their dismissal was with prejudice, thereby adhering to this court’s established rules of federal jurisdiction. Or, if a dismissal with prejudice was unpalatable, they could have moved for a Rule 54(b) severance, which permits a party to appeal otherwise non-final orders after the district court has made the required determination that there is no just reason for delay. Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(b) (2008).
I suggest we take an unfortunate and counter-productive turn when we fail to accept the dismissal with prejudice as necessary for appellate jurisdiction. We do *760not need to remind good lawyers to meet this standard, and we do not improve the appellate process by crafting rules to make up for those who are incompetent. Federal appellate jurisdiction is based on statutory requirements; and it is, in my view, misguided for us to stray from specific, easily discoverable requirements (dismissal with prejudice) to those so indefinite that guesswork is required (dismissal without prejudice- — -but I did not mean it).
Therefore, I concur in the result of the majority, but for the reason that our court’s jurisdiction has not been demonstrated.