Court Opinion

ID: 9390697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 14:04:53.52795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.301729
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                               NO. 2022-CA-0232-MR

TIMOTHY NOLAN                                                         APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE KATHLEEN S. LAPE, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 17-CR-00487

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                    ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, ECKERLE, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Timothy Nolan (“Nolan”) appeals from the Campbell

Circuit Court’s order denying the relief he requested in a motion filed pursuant to

Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42. Having reviewed the record

and the briefs of the parties, we affirm.
                                        FACTS

               In 2017, Nolan was indicted on a multitude of felony counts, most of

which involved allegations of a sexual nature. The victims of some of the counts

were minors. Following negotiations with the prosecution, Nolan entered guilty

pleas to twenty-one counts, reserving the right to challenge the constitutionality of

Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 529.100, the human trafficking statute, which

was the basis for some of the counts.

               One of the counts had been amended to the charge of unlawful

transaction with a minor under the age of sixteen (16) with a controlled substance.

During his colloquy, the trial court read the factual basis for the amended charge to

Nolan. Nolan entered a guilty plea to that count and many others. Nolan clearly

understood not only the factual basis for the counts, but their consequences. Nolan

was an attorney and had been a district court judge in Campbell County for

decades, though he had not served as a judge for some time prior to his arrest and

prosecution.

               When Nolan appeared before the court again for sentencing, he

informed the court that he had changed his mind and wished to withdraw his plea.

Nolan specifically argued that the one count of unlawful transaction with a minor

under sixteen (16) with a controlled substance was factually incorrect. He argued

                                          -2-
that he did not realize his plea would require him to complete the Sex Offender

Treatment Program in prison before he would be eligible for parole consideration.

                 At the sentencing, Nolan’s privately retained counsel moved to

withdraw, and Nolan was appointed a public defender. He requested to be allowed

to act as his own co-counsel and the court held a hearing pursuant to Faretta v.

California.1 The court determined Nolan capable of acting as co-counsel and the

matter was set for a hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea. That motion was

ultimately denied, and Nolan was sentenced in accord with the plea deal.

                 Nolan filed a motion for shock probation soon thereafter and, during

the litigation of the motion, it was discovered that the judgment erroneously left

out the phrase “commercial sexual activity” in relation to each of the human

trafficking counts to which Nolan had pleaded guilty. However, during

sentencing, the fact that he had paid minors for sexual conduct had been read into

the record during the entry of the plea and he had specifically pleaded guilty to

each count. The trial court entered an amended judgment with the language

included and Nolan appealed from the amended judgment.

                 On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial

court, holding that the failure to include the phrase “commercial sexual activity”

had been an error of a clerical nature. On appeal, Nolan also raised the

1
    422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975).

                                                -3-
constitutionality of the human trafficking statute and alleged that the trial court had

interfered with his right to counsel. The Supreme Court was unpersuaded by either

of those arguments and affirmed the convictions and sentence.

             Nolan then filed the RCr 11.42 motion now before us. We affirm.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             The denial of an RCr 11.42 motion is reviewed on appeal for an abuse

of the trial court’s discretion. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 548

(Ky. 1998). Abuse of discretion has been defined as being arbitrary, unreasonable,

unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993

S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).

                                     ANALYSIS

             1. Amendment of Judgment

             Nolan alleges that the trial court erred in not allowing him the

opportunity to withdraw his plea pursuant to RCr 8.10 when it amended the

judgment to add the phrase “commercial sexual activity.” Nolan alleges that the

change resulted in him having to serve 85% of his sentence before he would be

eligible for parole, rather than 20% as was acknowledged by the trial court at the

time of his sentencing. He insists that the amendment amounted to the trial court

“rejecting” the plea agreement, implicating RCr 8.10, which reads, in part:

             If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on
             the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the

                                          -4-
                 defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of
                 good cause, in camera, that the court is not bound by the
                 plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to
                 then withdraw the plea, and advise the defendant that if
                 the defendant persists in that guilty plea the disposition of
                 the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that
                 contemplated by the plea agreement.

                 Even if we were persuaded that the amendment amounted to a

“rejection” of the plea agreement, which we are not, we are bound to follow the

decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court in the direct appeal. The Supreme Court

has already determined that the amendment corrected a “clerical error.” The

Supreme Court clearly already considered and passed judgment on this question,

and we do not have the authority to rule differently:2

                        A trial court generally loses power to amend its
                 judgment ten days after its entry. Winstead v.
                 Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 479, 485-86 (Ky. 2010).
                 However, the court may amend a clerical error as
                 opposed to judicial errors. RCr 10.10 provides that
                 “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments . . . arising from
                 oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at
                 any time on its own initiative or on the motion of any
                 party. . . .” Machniak v. Commonwealth provides
                 guidance for determining whether an error is clerical or
                 judicial:

                              [A] discrepancy between a trial
                        court’s intended sentence and the final
                        judgment is a clerical error where the

2
    “The Court of Appeals is bound by and shall follow applicable precedents established in the
opinions of the Supreme Court and its predecessor court.” Kentucky Supreme Court Rule
1.030(8)(a).

                                                -5-
      intended sentence was explicitly expressed
      by the trial court and fully made known to
      the parties, and such is readily apparent from
      the record of the sentencing hearing, with no
      credible evidence to the contrary.

351 S.W.3d 648, 654 (Ky. 2011).

       As described supra, a human trafficking
conviction involves either “forced labor or services” or
“commercial sexual activity.” KRS 529.010(5). Nolan’s
September 14, 2017 indictment included, among other
things, nineteen counts of human trafficking, human
trafficking of a minor, and criminal attempt human
trafficking of a minor. All of those counts included the
language “commercial sexual activity.” The written plea
agreement, signed by Nolan, failed to include the words
“commercial sexual activity” in referencing the amended
charges, but the facts for the human trafficking-related
convictions involved sexual activity in exchange for
payment of money or drugs, which constitutes
“commercial sexual activity.” During the plea colloquy,
the trial court read the facts of each count summarized in
the plea agreement and Nolan either admitted he engaged
in the conduct for each count or admitted there was
evidence sufficient to convict him of each count.

       The written plea agreement also expressly required
Nolan to register as a lifetime sex offender (consistent
with the requirement for the amended offenses of
Promoting Human Trafficking of Minor (Counts 1-4) and
the amended offense of Criminal Attempt Human
Trafficking of Minor (Count 25)), and “cooperate with
the Commonwealth in the investigation and prosecution
of other perpetrators of Human Trafficking, or any
crimes consisting of sex offenses, pornography, or other
offense related thereto. . . .” The trial court orally noted
Nolan’s requirement to register as a sex offender in its
plea colloquy with Nolan. The Judgment and Sentence
on Plea of Guilty included, as conditions of the sentence

                            -6-
             imposed, the usual requirements that accompany sex
             crimes, i.e., completion of sex offender treatment,
             submitting a blood sample for DNA identification, HIV
             testing, sex offender registration notification, residency
             restrictions, and a five-year additional conditional
             discharge period post-incarceration.

                    The Commonwealth also points out that Nolan
             acknowledged in his written motion to withdraw his plea
             that he was aware he would have to register as a sex
             offender but complained about having to admit to the
             facts of one of the counts before he could complete the
             Sex Offender Treatment Program. When rejecting the
             plea withdrawal motion, the trial court found Nolan was
             aware of the program before entering the plea, that it was
             part of the plea negotiations, and that the Commonwealth
             had agreed to expedite transfer to the correctional
             institution so he could get started in the program
             promptly.

                    We agree with the trial court that it is impossible to
             conclude anything other than that Nolan knowingly pled
             guilty to and was found guilty of crimes involving
             commercial sexual activity and that the court sentenced
             him for those commercial sexual activity crimes. A
             clerical error occurred when the language “commercial
             sexual activity” was omitted from the order when
             referencing the human trafficking offenses but the trial
             court properly corrected that clerical error by amending
             the judgment. We reject Nolan’s argument to the
             contrary.

Nolan v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-SC-000321-MR, 2020 WL 4047517, at 9-10

(Ky. Jul. 9, 2020).

             Further, there is no evidence to support Nolan’s contention to this

Court that the addition of the phrase “commercial sexual activity” in the amended

                                          -7-
judgment caused his parole eligibility to be increased to 85% from 20%. In fact,

he appeared before the Parole Board on March 9, 2021, well before the brief in this

matter was submitted to the Court – a fact which we take notice of pursuant to

Kentucky Rule of Evidence (“KRE”) 201.3 As he was sentenced to a total term of

twenty (20) years’ imprisonment, if his parole eligibility was to be 85%, he would

not have been eligible to see the Parole Board until he served seventeen (17) years.

As his term of imprisonment began in 2018, he clearly did not serve 85% of his

sentence before being seen by the Parole Board in 2021.4

                2. Factual Basis of Charge

                Nolan alleges that there was an insufficient factual basis for the

charge of unlawful transaction with a minor under the age of 16 involving a

controlled substance. However, Nolan had already entered the plea by the time he

alleges that counsel was ineffective for not providing proof of the victim’s age at

the time Nolan first met her, which he alleges was over 18. He had that knowledge

at the time he entered the plea and remained silent, so he cannot now complain that

his attorney was ineffective for not presenting information of which he was aware.

3
    http://kool.corrections.ky.gov/KOOL/Details/479751.
4
  We note that Nolan has appended documents to the Reply Brief concerning his classification
and whether the Department of Corrections has considered him a sex offender such that he
should be enrolled in the Sex Offender Treatment Program. None of these documents are
included in the record and we will not give them any consideration. See Rules of Appellate
Court (“RAP”) 25(B).

                                               -8-
             “[T]he effect of a valid plea of guilty is to waive all defenses other

than that the indictment charges no offense.” Commonwealth v. Elza, 284 S.W.3d

118, 121 (Ky. 2009). In Russell v. Commonwealth, the defendant sought relief

from his guilty plea to rape by alleging that the victim was already dead by his

hand at the time of the sexual assault and that rape requires a living victim. He

insisted that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by advising him to enter

the plea as it was a legal impossibility. His counsel testified at the RCr 11.42

hearing that he so advised his client because he believed a jury would not be

receptive to the argument that rape had not occurred because his client had already

killed the victim by a gunshot to the head prior to the sexual assault. He also noted

he feared that his client could well receive the death penalty from a jury. This

Court noted that “[a]dvising a defendant to plead guilty does not, in and of itself,

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” 992 S.W.2d 871, 874-75 (Ky. App.

1999).

             We hold that any advice to Nolan which resulted in a sentence of less

than the maximum sentence he faced was not ineffective. Given Nolan’s crimes

and his position, it was quite possible that a jury would have recommended a much

longer sentence than that for which he bargained. He has already had one hearing

                                         -9-
before the Kentucky Parole Board, and even if he was not granted parole on that

occasion, he clearly received a sentence with 20% parole eligibility.5

                                      CONCLUSION

              We find that Nolan’s contentions alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel are without merit and affirm the trial court’s denial of relief.

              ALL CONCUR.

    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

    Gregory A. Ousley                           Daniel Cameron
    Somerset, Kentucky                          Attorney General of Kentucky

                                                Brett R. Nolan
                                                Assistant Attorney General
                                                Frankfort, Kentucky

5
 It is not clear from the record before us whether Nolan has completed the Sexual Offender
Treatment Program, but it matters not to our determination.

                                             -10-