Court Opinion

ID: 9772095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:07:11.806754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.047293
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
This appeal is from a conviction for unauthorized use of a motor propelled vehicle, where the punishment was assessed at life imprisonment under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 12.42(d). The panel opinion on original submission held that the State had the burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged and the State failed to prove as it was required to do that the appellant knew the vehicle he was driving was stolen in order to show that he intentionally and knowingly operated the vehicle without the owner’s consent. There was a vigorous dissenting opinion by Judge Dally.
On rehearing, and after further consideration, we agree with the original dissenting opinion, grant the State’s motion for rehearing and affirm the judgment.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 31.07, provides:
“(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly operates another’s boat, airplane, or motor-propelled vehicle without the effective consent of the owner.
“(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.”
The elements of the offense under said § 31.07 are: (1) a person (2) intentionally or knowingly (3) operates an airplane, boat, or motor-propelled vehicle (4) without the effective consent of the owner. Neely v. State, 571 S.W.2d 926 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The offense under said § 31.07 has the same elements as theft under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 31.03(a), (b)(1), except that in such theft there is the additional element of an *190intent to deprive the owner of property. In Neely v. State, supra, it was held that the offense of unauthorized use of a motor-propelled vehicle could be proven by the same or less than all the facts necessary to prove theft; that it is a lesser included offense under the current 1974 Penal Code although it may not have been under the former Code. Further, in Neely it was held that since the facts would have sustained the defendant’s conviction for theft under the current Penal Code, such facts would have sustained his conviction for the lesser included offense of unauthorized use of a motor-propelled vehicle as alleged.
The Practice Commentary to said § 31.07 reads:
“Section 31.07 combines and restates prior Penal Code arts. 1333 (using a boat without consent), 1341 (driving vehicle without consent), and 1342 (unlawful use of state’s vehicle) and adds airplanes, which may soon become a problem. It proscribes the use of property without the owner’s consent when the actor has no intent to deprive and thus is not guilty of theft.
“Boats and airplanes are included, in addition to motor vehicles in general, to cover sailboats and gliders, for example, which do not depend upon a motor for propulsion.
“Curiously, the penalty has been increased to a felony regardless of the value of the ‘borrowed’ vehicle. A car thief, if he steals only automobiles with a value of less than $200, is better off if he is convicted of theft than if he is convicted of the ‘lesser’ offense of driving without consent. Under prior law, art. 1340, the comparable offense became a felony only when the value of the ‘borrowed’ car exceeded $200, and at that time $50 was the felony threshold for theft purposes.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, the State’s evidence showed that on July 25,1976, the appellant, a person, was stopped by the police while operating a motor-propelled vehicle, a 1966 Chevrolet, which had been stolen two days earlier. Paul Merritt, the lawful owner of the automobile, testified he had not given his consent to appellant to use his automobile. At the time of his arrest, appellant was in possession of five Chevrolet master ignition keys 1 and a switchblade knife and told the arresting officer, “There’s nothing you can do to help me, I’m going back to the penitentiary.” He told the officer he had obtained the car from a “Cliff,” but did not know or refused to give Cliff’s last name and refused to take the officer back to the apartment where Cliff supposedly was in the apartment complex the appellant had just left. He was described as being uncooperative.
The elements of the offense charged were adequately demonstrated by the State, including the element of culpable mental state of “intentionally.”
The appellant, who had been convicted of possession of marihuana in 1967 and of three felonies involving theft and burglary in 1974 and was on parole at the time of his arrest, testified that he had met “Cliff” or “Clifford” about two weeks before the incident in question and at the time did not know Cliff’s last name. He related Cliff had come by his apartment or room on July 25, 1976, and that he had gone with Cliff to Cliff’s apartment where there were other people, and when it was discovered they all were out of cigarettes he offered to walk to the store. Cliff told him to take his (Cliff’s) car and gave him the set of master ignition keys later found in his possession. He had only driven about two blocks before he was arrested. He testified he did not know the automobile involved was stolen. The appellant offered evidence, which if believed, would strongly indicate he could not have been the person who actually stole the 1966 Chevrolet on July 23rd. The trial court was the trier of the facts, the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. The trial *191court had the right to accept or reject any evidence offered by the State or the appellant. The defense offered by the appellant that someone else stole the automobile and he, not knowing such fact, used the automobile thinking he had consent of the one authorized to give such consent does not create an additional element to the offense of which the appellant was convicted.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. The original dissenting panel opinion is correct. The State’s motion for rehearing is granted and the judgment is affirmed.

. This fact was not mentioned in the panel opinion by the majority as the State’s motion for rehearing points out.