Court Opinion

ID: 9644263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:51:34.50836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:58.761900
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority that appellant “consented to” the delay before trial nor can I agree that appellant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. I must also dissent from the majority’s holding that appellant has not been denied the effectiveness of counsel.
I
Appellant was returned to Philadelphia from Georgia on February 6, 1971. Appellant was incarcerated for thirty-one months before his trial began on September 17, 1973.
Prior to his extradition from Georgia appellant retained Cecil B. Moore 1 as his counsel for this case. The *308case was not listed for trial. In March 1972, after thirteen months of detention awaiting trial, appellant sent a pro se petition to the court demanding a speedy trial. The petition was addressed to the court and it was apparent from the contents of the petition that appellant was voicing to the court his dissatisfaction with his counsel’s inaction. However, the petition was not acted upon by the court, but was diverted first to the District Attorney’s office and then to Mr. Moore.
Mr. Moore took no action, nor did the Commonwealth or the court. Neither the Commonwealth nor the trial court acted to list the case for trial. Appellant, who had not yet been found guilty, remained in jail. On April 1, 1973, two years and two months after appellant was returned to Pennsylvania to await trial, he sent a letter to the court asking that Mr. Moore be relieved of his duties as counsel. This communiqué did reach the trial judge and in May, 1973, Mr. Moore was allowed to withdraw. New counsel entered an appearance and trial began in September 1973, thirty-one months after appellant was returned to Pennsylvania.
The Commonwealth’s position, simply stated, is that there was no violation of appellant’s right to speedy trial because “the Commonwealth was at all times ready and willing to try appellant’s case whenever Mr. Moore would make himself available.” This position is without support in the record since the Commonwealth never scheduled the case for trial. Incredibly — even in view of appellant’s having petitioned the court demanding a speedy trial — the majority finds, “The delay in appellant’s trial occasioned by Mr. Moore was consented to by appellant, as indicated by his failure to evidence dissatisfaction with Mr. Moore until April of 1973.” I cannot join in such a fiction. Nor can I agree that the delay was occa*309sioned by Mr. Moore. The delay was occasioned by the Commonwealth’s and the trial court’s failure to schedule the case for trial.
The Commonwealth contends that it did all that was required by merely waiting until appellant’s counsel was ready to try the case. On this record its position is untenable. The Commonwealth fails to recognize that it has an affirmative duty to move cases to trial. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 38-39, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 1569, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970):
“Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial.”
This principle was repeated by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2190, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972):
“A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.”
Thus, the Commonwealth cannot answer a speedy trial claim by saying that a defendant failed to bring his action to trial. The Commonwealth has a duty to schedule the trial timely.2 A defendant may then seek to have the *310trial date postponed. This procedure insures that the record will reflect that any long delay in trial is actually attributable to the defendant who sought the postponement. The record here shows no action by appellant or his counsel to postpone the trial. It is not enough for the Commonwealth to point to a silent record and say that the silence constitutes the defendant’s waiver of his speedy trial right. “Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.” Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 526, 92 S.Ct. at 2190.
Moreover, in this case the Commonwealth was on notice as early as March 1972; that appellant wanted to be tried. In these circumstances the duty of the Commonwealth to schedule the case for trial is undeniable.
It is manifestly unjust to attribute the delay here to appellant through the use of a “consent” fiction. The incarcerated defendant wrote to the court asking to be tried immediately. His letter was ignored by both the court and the Commonwealth. Yet the majority finds he consented to the delay only because he did not phrase his speedy trial demand as a demand to have his counsel withdraw. It is unfair to penalize appellant who was in jail and without the resources or opportunity to bring his demand to the court in any better way than that which he employed. There was no consent to the delay; nor can the record be forced to even suggest a waiver of the right to speedy trial.
The majority purports to follow the four-prong test announced in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), which requires a balancing of (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) defendant’s assertion of the right to speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. In fact, the majority follows a three-prong test, for it assigns as the reason for the delay defense counsel’s failure to take affirmative action to bring the case to *311trial. Under the majority’s analysis, the reason for the delay is ignored and defense counsel’s failure to assert the right is counted twice.
The majority points to no continuances or other delays requested by appellant during the thirty-one months he awaited trial in Pennsylvania. The majority’s decision to attribute the delay to the failure of defense counsel to take affirmative action to bring the case to trial is not justified under the test announced in Barker v. Wingo. The prosecution, not defense counsel, has the affirmative duty to bring the case to trial. Id. at 527, 92 S.Ct. at 2190 (1972). To label defense counsel’s action as “dilatory,” when he has taken no action to delay trial, turns the analysis on its head.
The majority’s approach also gives undue weight to the third factor in the Barker v. Wingo test: the defendant’s assertion of his right. By attributing the delay to defense counsel’s failure to demand an immediate trial, the majority circumvents the holding in Barker v. Wingo that failure to demand a speedy trial does not preclude a finding that a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been denied. Id. at 528, 92 S.Ct. at 2191 (1972).
Thus, the reason for the delay must be attributed to the Commonwealth’s failure to bring the case to trial. This reason for the delay, and the length of the delay— thirty-one months weigh heavily in favor of a determination that appellant’s right to a speedy trial has been denied. When these factors are considered with appellant’s request for a speedy trial, over a year before he was tried, and the prejudice to appellant from being incarcerated over the entire period, there is no doubt that appellant has been denied his right to a speedy trial. The indictment should be quashed and appellant dismissed.3
*312II
Because I would grant relief for the violation of appellant’s right to speedy trial, it is unnecessary to reach the issue of counsel’s ineffectiveness. In view of the majority’s resolution of the ineffectiveness issue, however, I am compelled to express further dissent.
The majority finds that appellant cannot now challenge Mr. Moore’s effectiveness because he consented to Mr. Moore’s course of action through his failure to discharge Mr. Moore until April of 1973. This is an unacceptable standard. Obviously, a criminal defendant is in no position to evaluate his counsel’s conduct. Moreover, in this case appellant was in jail and had little communication with counsel. He, therefore, cannot be said to have consented to his counsel’s inaction or ineffectiveness.
The proper test for determining effectiveness of counsel was stated in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352 (1967) : “Counsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests.”
The majority does not apply this standard here. I am unable to determine, however, what “reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests” there was in Mr. Moore’s long months of inaction.
I dissent.

. The fact that Mr. Moore has difficulty disposing of his large number of cases, see Commonwealth v. Williams, 457 Pa. 502, 327 A.2d 15 (1974); Moore v. Jamieson, 451 Pa. 299, 306 A.2d 283 *308(1973), should not affect this Court’s analysis of appellant’s claim. Nor may the Commonwealth or the trial court conclude that because Mr. Moore is counsel that the prosecution is relieved of its duty to list cases for trial. See A.B.A. Standards, note 2, infra.

. See American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial § 1.2 (Approved Draft, 1968):
“Control over the trial calendar should be vested in the court. The prosecuting attorney should be required to file as a public record periodic reports with the court setting forth the reasons for delay as to each case for which he has not requested trial within a prescribed time following charging. The prosecuting attorney should also advise the court of facts relevant in determining the order of cases on the calendar.”
Id., The Functions of the Trial Judge § 3.8 (Approved Draft, 1972):
“The trial court has the ultimate responsibility for proper management of the criminal calendar and should take measures to insure that cases are listed on the calendar and disposed of as promptly as circumstances permit.”

. The remedy is analogous to the statute of limitations. If the charge is not brought within the statutory time limit there may be no prosecution. Likewise if trial is not “speedy” there may be no prosecution. See, e. g., Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100; see generally, A. *312G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 Stan.L.Rev. 525 (1975); Note, the Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 Colum.L.Rev. 864 (1957); Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973).