Court Opinion

ID: 9468587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:18:34.785492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:56.566590
License: Public Domain

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:
Asserting the attorney-client privilege, Andrew C. Pavlick, an attorney at law, refused to tell a federal grand jury the name of the person who paid his fee for representing three defendants in a drug conspiracy case. The district court denied the government’s motion to compel disclosure. We affirm.

Background Facts

In June 1979, the United States Coast Guard boarded a vessel, found a cargo of 18 tons of marijuana, and arrested the three members of the crew. Shortly after their arrest, Pavlick appeared as counsel for the three men who were subsequently tried, convicted and sentenced for conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Thereafter the three were granted immunity, brought *1059before a federal grand jury, and questioned about the drug transaction, including questions about the identity of other co-conspirators.
Prior to the grand jury session, the three defendants waived the attorney-client privileges arising out of their relationship with Pavlick. One testified that neither he nor his two associates had met or directly sought Pavlick’s services prior to his appearance as their counsel. This defendant further testified that when he became involved in the conspiracy, he was assured he would be taken care of in the event of an arrest. All three defendants said Pavlick had informed them that another person had furnished the money for their legal fees and bonds. Pavlick did not reveal to them the identity of their benefactor.1
When he appeared before the grand jury, Pavlick invoked the attorney-client privilege and refused to identify the person who provided the money for the legal fees and bail bond costs for the three defendants. He again refused to identify this person at the hearing to compel disclosure.2
The district court noted that normally the attorney-client privilege does not prevent disclosure of the identity of a client. However, the court accepted Pavlick’s contention that the facts of the instant case brought it within the exception to the rule set forth in In re Grand Jury Proceedings v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
On appeal the government contends that (1) Pavlick failed to establish the existence of the attorney-client relationship between himself and the anonymous benefactor, and, alternatively, (2) the disclosure of the client’s identity falls outside the scope of the privilege in this instance.

Attorney-Client Relationship

Our analysis commences with the threshold inquiry: At what point, for purposes of the attorney-client privilege, does the attorney-client relationship begin? We addressed this question in Jones and listed the basic elements which are necessary to establish the privilege:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is [the] member of a bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
517 F.2d at 670. See also United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 123 (1978).
The government contends that the attorney-client relationship was not established, there being no proof offered of advice requested or legal services performed. The government views Pavlick’s testimony as mere conclusions, and cautions that to consider these sufficient would invite spurious claims and indicate an indifference as to whether the purpose of the privilege is being served.
We decline to accept the government’s argument. Pavlick testified that the unidentified person contacted him to *1060secure legal services for the three defendants and to discuss his own criminal liability. Whether Pavlick actually undertook performance of the requested services is not dispositive. Once the individual told Pavlick about his legal problem, which involved potential criminal exposure, the attorney-client relationship, for the purposes of establishing the privilege, came into being. We note that the information of record, which Pavlick provided the district judge, only marginally suffices to support the finding that the client was concerned about his own culpability. In the future, we would prefer that the trial judge inquire further into the facts upon which the claim of privilege is based. This would involve additional inquiry into the nature of the client’s potential criminal liability, an inquiry which may be made in open court or in chambers, but on the record.
We are cognizant that the “purpose of the privilege — to suppress truth — runs counter to the dominant aims of the law.” 517 F.2d at 672. We must, however, balance the countervailing value — the encouraging of people to seek legal advice freely, and to speak truthfully and candidly to the attorney without fear that the communication will be disclosed. It is imperative that the privilege attach soon after the prospective client has contacted an attorney, and certainly not later than the point at which the person reveals facts tending to establish a criminal exposure. The existence of the privilege cannot be limited to instances in which the attorney-client relationship comes to full fruition by the payment of legal fees and the performance of legal services. If that were required, a person would be compelled to retain the first attorney consulted in order to preserve the privilege. Such a requirement would ignore the reality that during early consultations the lawyer, the client or both may choose not to formalize or continue the relationship. The client may not be able to pay the fee; the attorney may discover some fact which either obliges or persuades him not to accept employment; there may be a personality conflict, or either, for no articulable reason, may decide against formalizing the relationship. As one commentator noted:
At the inception of the contacts between the layman and the lawyer it is essential that the layman feel free of danger in stating the facts of the case to the lawyer whom he consults. Even though the lawyer rejects the case and the relation of attorney and client never arose, the usual duties as to privileged communications and conflicting interests should apply. The general principle of law should be, each duty incident to the attorney-client relationship begins as early as is helpful to the effective working of the relationship.
See L. Patterson & E. Cheatham, The Profession of Law at 246 (citing Taylor v. Sheldon, 172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961)). See generally, American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 4, EC 4-1, DR 4-101.
We conclude that the benefits of the attorney-client privilege are available to the prospective client at least from that point in the consultation at which vulnerability to criminal prosecution is indicated. Viewed against that standard, we find that the privilege between Pavlick and the unknown party came into being during their early consultations.

The Jones Exception

That the attorney-client privilege exists and extends to Pavlick’s unidentified client does not end our inquiry. Usually the privilege does not protect the name of the client, for the “identity of a client is a matter not normally within the [attorney-client] privilege.” Jones, 517 F.2d at 670-71 (citing Frank v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028, 86 S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966)). In Jones, we recognized an exception to this general rule based on the holding in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960): “Under certain circumstances, an attorney must conceal even the identity of a client, not merely his communications, from inquiry.” 517 F.2d at 671. We further concluded that the identity of a client is privi*1061leged “when so much of the substance of the communications is already in the government’s possession that additional disclosures would yield substantially probative links in an existing chain of inculpatory events or transactions.” 517 F.2d at 674. This exception results from the concern that in certain instances, the attorney’s disclosure of the client’s identity would, in itself, tend to incriminate the client. In the instant case, the government has acknowledged that the determination of the undisclosed individual’s name may lead to that person’s indictment. The district judge was justified in sustaining the attorney’s claim of the privilege.

The Crime/Fraud Release

If an attorney’s advice is sought to advance the commission of a crime or a fraudulent act or scheme, the attorney-client privilege may not be successfully asserted. The government maintains, in the alternative, that because the benefactor’s payment of Pavlick’s fees constituted an overt act in the conspiracy, his identity should not be protected. This argument is based on the defendants’ testimony about the assurances of aid in the event of arrest. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of Fine, 641 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981), we held that the attorney-client privilege is vitiated if an attorney is retained “to further present or intended illegal activity, regardless of whether the attorney knows his client’s true motivations,” (citing United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977)). See also United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975) (attorney-client privilege does not extend to conversations concerning plans to commit perjury). Nothing in this record indicates that when Pavlick was first approached the purpose was “to further present . . . illegal activity,” or “to further . . . intended illegal activity.” When Pavlick was consulted the boatload of marijuana had been seized and the three defendants had been arrested. Although there may have been a prior agreement that legal fees would be paid if arrests occurred, there is nothing to show that Pavlick was involved in that agreement. The record reflects that Pavjick was retained to represent the three defendants and the unidentified client for past criminal acts. We noted the effect of this distinction in Fine:
The Baird exception to the general rule is designed to protect the identity of clients who seek legal advice as to past activities that may result in criminal prosecution. If a legitimate legal relationship is an evidentiary lead to subsequent, unrelated criminal activity, no substantial interest of society is served by protecting the name of the client and fee arrangement involved in the legitimate activity.
641 F.2d at 204 n.5. Nothing in the record evidences any on-going activity when Pavlick was hired, other than attempts to avoid detection for past offenses. There being no proof, nor even an assertion, that the undisclosed client’s name is wanted in connection with any illegal activity occurring after Pavlick was hired, we must conclude that Pavlick was engaged to represent his clients for past, completed criminal acts. The attorney-client privilege covers that representation, and the shield is not forfeited by the operation of the crime/fraud release.
We today address the situation in which a person consults an attorney, asks the attorney to represent others with whom the person is criminally culpable, and pays the attorney’s fees. In that situation, involving only past, consummated criminal acts, where the mere disclosure of the identity of the person may measurably increase the risk of criminal charges, the attorney may and should assert the attorney-client privilege. Absent waiver by the client, that assertion should be honored unless an essential element as outlined in Jones is found wanting, or a limitation or exception as noted in Fine is found to apply. Capsulating, the identity of a person who seeks the advice of a qualified attorney, on a matter which includes that person’s potential criminal exposure, where the mere disclosure of the person’s identity would tend to incriminate for past criminal acts, is protected by the attorney-client privilege. Unless the client waives the privilege, the assertion by the attorney should be sustained.
The district court is AFFIRMED.

. We note the inconsistency of the withholding of this information with the aspirational statement contained in Canon 2, EC 2-21 of the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility: “A lawyer shall not accept compensation or any thing of value incident to his employment or services from one other than his client without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure.” See also ABA Opinion 320 (1968).
The record reveals that Pavlick received approximately $40,000 in legal fees, $25,000 to pay the bonding company and $125,000 to be held in trust as collateral for the bonds.

. The court inquired: “You were retained by somebody who told you to represent these people?” Pavlick responded: “And him and someone who was also worried about his own culpability.”