Court Opinion

ID: 9752672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:28:09.017336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:20.811711
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent from the majority’s determination that this case is controlled by Commonwealth ex rel. Shoemaker v. Coulson, 335 Pa.Super. 626, 485 A.2d 70 (1984). Sharon Shirley raised the applicability of this case in her previous appeal to this court. Shirley v. Javan, 442 Pa.Super. 649.659 A.2d 10 (1995). We there determined that Shoemaker was not applicable and could not provide authority for allowing Shirley to reinstate the child support action.
In Shoemaker, the parties had negotiated a lump-sum settlement and agreed to a directed verdict. The issue of paternity was resolved in the mother’s favor. This court permitted the mother to proceed with a subsequent action to *137obtain additional support on the principle that a parent cannot contract away the child’s right to support.
Paternity must be established before any right to support exists. In Shoemaker, paternity was established by the settlement and directed verdict so the only issue was whether requesting additional support was precluded by the payment of the lump sum. In the case presently before us, the original support action was also settled by a directed verdict and lump sum payment. However, the directed verdict was in favor of Javan. The entry of this verdict thus established that Javan is not Michel’s father.
This difference is crucial. In Shoemaker, the directed verdict in favor of the mother was a finding of paternity. This established a duty to support and the only issue then was the amount of support. In this case the directed verdict in favor of Javan is a finding of no paternity. Because there is a finding of no paternity, there cannot be a duty to support. Those cases which hold that a parent cannot contract away the child’s right to support are inapposite because the child has no right to support from someone who is not his father.
Shirley is not requesting a redetermination of the amount of support but is seeking to overturn the verdict of no paternity. The directed verdict entered by consent has the same force and effect as if it were a jury verdict entered after a full hearing. Keystone Bldg. Corp. v. Lincoln Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 468 Pa. 85, 360 A.2d 191 (1976). Shoemaker does not give the trial court the authority to disregard such a verdict and require Javan to be subjected to another trial on the same issue.
On the issue of whether Michel and his mother are in privity with one another, I agree with the trial court’s analysis.
‘Privity’ for these purposes has been defined as ‘such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights; and the term “privy” when applied to a judgment or decree refers to one whose interest has been legally represented at the trial.’ 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 788 (1947). Children, in particular, are bound by prior judgments against their parents when the children *138were properly represented in the litigation,’ or when they were ‘represented in the litigation by their parents or other persons.’ Id., § 804.
In the prior litigation, Michel was legally and properly represented by his mother, who sued under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.3(2). Rule 1910.3(2) permits an action for support to be brought ‘on behalf of a minor child by a person having custody of the minor, without appointment as guardian ad litem.’ (Emphasis added.) As explained above, this was the only way to obtain child support for Michel. Accordingly, the rule defines mother and child as privies. When Ms. Shirley sued, she sued on behalf of Michel, to protect his interests, not hers.
Nowhere is this more clear than in the parties’ agreement, in settlement of the initial action. The agreement states that the lump sum payment was ‘to be held in trust for the maintenance, care and support of the child Michael [sic] Shirley.’. The fact that the present action purportedly is brought in Michel’s own name makes no difference; all of the actions have been brought and have proceeded on his behalf.
Trial court opinion at pp. 10-11.
I would affirm the order of the trial court dismissing this action.