Court Opinion

ID: 9669730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:08:07.061178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:43.191566
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and suggest that what other courts have decided under different statutory schemes does little to guide us in resolving the issue before us.
The evidence is such that a fact finder could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff-appellant, Genevieve Salazar, approached the intersection from the southbound lane of traffic at approximately the same time the defendant-appellee, Amy Nemec, approached the same intersection from the westbound lane of traffic. The evidence is also such that a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that each driver brought her vehicle to a halt in response to the signs commanding both the southbound and westbound traffic to stop and that each driver entered the intersection at approximately the same time.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,146 (Reissue 1993), noted by the majority, provides that unless modified by other rules of the *301road, when “two vehicles approach or enter an intersection from different roadways at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,148 (Reissue 1993) requires a driver approaching an intersection controlled by a stop sign to stop and, having stopped, to “yield the right-of-way to any vehicle which has entered the intersection from another highway or which is approaching so closely on such highway as to constitute an immediate hazard if such driver moved across or into such intersection.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,150 (Reissue 1993) requires one who has stopped to yield the right-of-way to others and not move until such can be done with reasonable safety.
Contrary to the majority’s proclamation, nothing in the language of § 60-6,146 suggests that the preference given the driver on the right does not apply to vehicles which have stopped in response to stop signs and then enter an intersection at approximately the same time. Neither does the language of § 60-6,146 declare that the same preference does not apply to vehicles traveling on different roadways which approach, at approximately the same time, an intersection controlled both ways by stop signs. Moreover, neither the language of § 60-6,148 nor the language of § 60-6,150 modifies the right-of-way granted by § 60-6,146.
• We must remember that statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be construed so as to maintain a sensible and consistent scheme, State ex rel. City of Elkhorn v. Haney, 252 Neb. 788, 566 N.W.2d 771 (1997), and so as to achieve the purpose of the statutes, Village of Winside v. Jackson, 250 Neb. 851, 553 N.W.2d 476 (1996). It seems to me the construction adopted by the majority is not sensible and does not achieve the purpose of the statutes which define the rules of the road, which is to provide for the orderly movement of traffic with the least possible risk; rather, it encourages those stopping at intersections controlled by multiple stop signs to race in order to become the first into the intersection. Section 60-6,146 provides a directional right-of-way in order to do away with any incentive to race into an intersection. The majority ill-advisedly reverses the statutory and widely recognized principle that as between two vehicles *302approaching or entering an intersection at approximately the same time, the vehicle on the right has the right-of-way.
Inasmuch as the point of the collision permits an inference that the Salazar and Nemec vehicles entered the intersection at approximately the same time, the failure of the district court to instruct on the right-of-way granted the vehicle on the right by § 60-6,146 prejudiced Salazar.
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.