Court Opinion

ID: 9789889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:43:33.676297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:24.967493
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result which is reached by the majority in this case. I find, however, that my perception of the situation in the State of Wyoming with respect to review of sentencing is different from that set forth in the majority opinion. In my view we are confronted by a situation in which we are compelled to look more closely at what we have done than what we have said. Scrutinized from that perspective, it is quite clear to me that this court as a matter of practice follows the common-law rule with respect to sentence review. The practical effect of our decisions is that a sentence is not subject to appellate review if it is within the limits set by the legislature.
It cannot be denied that the court has articulated the clear abuse of discretion exception to the rule that this court will not interfere with the discretion of the trial court in sentencing. This court said in State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 11, 253 P. 14, 16 (1927), that:
“ * * * While this court may have the power to reduce the sentence — a point which we need not decide — we think that the district court was better qualified to judge of the proper punishment to be meted out. We ought not, except in a clear case, to interfere with the discretion of the trial court in that regard. But, lest the decision on this point might hereafter be misconstrued, we think we should add that we should not want it to be used in prejudice of the appellant, should he, at any time, deem fit to appeal to executive clemency, for, as stated before, the case is one peculiar in its facts, and we can readily see that different men might come to different conclusions as to what punishment should be meted out. We simply decide that, sitting as an appellate court, the discretion vested in the trial court has not been so clearly abused as to authorize us to interfere.”
This same proposition has been alluded to in a number of cases: Eaton v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 803 (1983); Taylor v. State, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1297 (1983); Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172 (1982); Gyrus v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 900 (1982); Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 (1981); Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378 (1979); Smith v. State, Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194 (1977); Daellenbach v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 679 (1977); Cavanagh v. State, Wyo., 505 P.2d 311 (1973); and Bird v. State, 36 Wyo. 532, 257 P. 2 (1927).
When we consider the definition of an abuse of discretion quoted in the majority *1098opinion from Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831 (1980), we must recognize that a sentence within the limits set by the legislature cannot be considered an “error of law committed by the court under the circumstances.” Consequently there could not be an abuse of discretion. The rule which this court has followed is perhaps more clearly enunciated in Apodaca v. State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 603, 605 (1977), in which the court said:
“The sentence imposed herein is clearly within the statutory limits as set by the legislature, 20 years being the minimum penalty therefor. It being within such limits, the determination of this penalty was exclusively with the trial judge. *
Similar holdings were encompassed in Hicklin v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 743, 79 A.L.R.3d 1050 (1975), and Bentley v. State, Wyo., 502 P.2d 203 (1972). This rule does seem to closely match that rule articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the following language:
“If there is one rule in federal criminal practice which is firmly established, it is that the appellate court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits allowed by a statute.” Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440-441, 94 S.Ct. 3042 [3051], 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974), quoting from Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-341 (8th Cir.1930).
Justice Rose, in his dissenting opinion in Scheikofsky v. State, supra, stated that in his view this court had adopted a policy of non-review with respect to sentencing. In substance this does amount to the common-law rule.
I concur in the result in this case because I am comfortable with the common-law rule. I am not comfortable with a rule which would make every sentence imposed by a trial court a matter subject to review by this court. In the absence of the experience with the accused which the trial court has, the only way the appellate court can achieve a meaningful adjustment of sentences is to do it on the basis of some sort of mathematical averaging. In my judgment, such a statistical approach to the concept of sentencing ultimately would rob the district court of any discretion whatsoever with respect to sentencing.
We would be adjusting sentences based upon a cold record without even knowing what the defendant looked like. I do not think that it is possible to experience another individual through a file of papers which is identified by his name, but which under the circumstances has no greater significance than the case number attached to the file. Consequently, if it is necessary for our society to impose sentences upon individuals it must be done by the trial judge who sees the person, comes to know him through his court appearances and participation in the trial, has an opportunity to assess his credibility, can appraise his degree of remorse, and deals with him on a personal basis as a representative of an unfortunate group in our society who must from time to time encounter the consequences of violating society’s rules. I would feel extremely uncomfortable trying to adjust that sentence, one of the more significant events in the life of a living and breathing individual, without ever having seen that person.
I have not, however, completed the statement of my position. We also must recognize some exceptional instances in which it would be appropriate for this court to examine the sentence imposed by a district judge in the exercise of our discretion. We recently have reviewed other cases pursuant to a petition for a writ of certiorari. The granting of the writ is entirely within the discretion of this court. If a petition for a writ of certiorari should be applied for in the interests of Grant Alan Wright I would vote to grant that petition. In my view this court in that context could perhaps identify standards pursuant to which an abuse of discretion might be found other than the definition set forth in the Martinez case. In 4 A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, 20-1.2 (1980), for example, the American Bar Association has suggested the following as objectives of appellate review of sentences:
“(a) To correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard for the *1099nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest;
“(b) To promote respect for law by correcting abuses of sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process;
“(c) To facilitate the possible rehabilitation of an offender by reducing manifest and unwarranted inequalities among sentences of comparable offenders; and “(d) To promote the development in application of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just.”
While undoubtedly other standards might well be suggested to the court, standards such as this would be appropriate in determining in the exceptional case whether an abuse of sentencing discretion had occurred.
It does appear that New Hampshire and Wisconsin have held that in those jurisdictions the appellate court has the power to review sentences under its supervisory jurisdiction with respect to trial courts. State v. Fortes, 114 R.I. 161, 330 A.2d 404 (1975); State v. Johnson, 67 N.J.Super. 414, 170 A.2d 830 (1961); and State v. Tuttle, 21 Wis.2d 147, 124 N.W.2d 9 (1963). This approach is at least analogous to that found in the language of Art. 5, § 2 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming which states:
“The supreme court shall have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the state, in both civil and criminal causes, and shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law.”
In summary, while I accept as workable and appropriate in the vast majority of criminal cases the common-law rule with respect to sentence review, I recognize the potential for an exceptional case in which the sentence imposed by the trial judge shocks the conscience of the appellate court. I am willing to consider those cases pursuant to a petition for a writ of certiorari, the granting of which is discretionary with this court. The invocation of the writ of certio-rari is appropriate in such an instance because as this court has developed its position with respect to sentence review the defendant clearly has no appeal from the sentence imposed by the trial court.