Court Opinion

ID: 9961659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 14:13:24.058726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:16.309002
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard G. Mroz,                            :
                    Petitioner              :
                                            :
             v.                             :
                                            :
Unemployment Compensation                   :
Board of Review,                            :   No. 1028 C.D. 2020
                 Respondent                 :   Submitted: March 8, 2024

BEFORE:      HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                              FILED: April 19, 2024

             Richard G. Mroz (Claimant) petitions this Court pro se for review of
the Unemployment Compensation (UC) Board of Review’s (UCBR) September 2,
2020 order affirming the Referee’s decision that denied Claimant UC benefits under
Section 402(b) of the UC Law (Law).1 Claimant presents one issue for this Court’s
review: whether the UCBR erred by affirming the Referee’s conclusion that
Claimant failed to satisfy his burden of proving a necessitous and compelling reason
for failing to return to his job as a delivery driver. After review, this Court affirms.
             Smart Lab, Incorporated (Employer), a dental laboratory, employed
Claimant as a delivery driver. Claimant’s duties included traveling to dental offices
and interacting with their receptionists. Claimant resides with his wife, who has
chronic pulmonary issues, hypertension, asthma, and a clotting disorder, and is

      1
         Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §
802(b) (relating to leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature).
obese. From the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Claimant was concerned about
performing his job duties, given his wife’s health challenges. Claimant had multiple
discussions with Employer regarding the matter. Employer agreed to give Claimant
time off from work, beginning March 14, 2020, due to his concerns. Thereafter,
Employer provided Claimant the ability to continue working during the COVID-19
pandemic. Subsequent to Claimant’s last day worked, Employer made multiple
efforts to return him to his position, which Claimant declined.
                   On March 22, 2020, Claimant applied for UC benefits. On May 26,
2020, the Altoona UC Service Center determined that Claimant was eligible for UC
benefits under Section 401(d)(1) of the Law.2 Employer appealed from the UC
Service Center’s determination. On July 10, 2020, the Referee held a hearing. On
July 14, 2020, the Referee reversed the UC Service Center’s determination and
found Claimant ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law.
Claimant appealed to the UCBR. On September 2, 2020, the UCBR affirmed the
Referee’s decision. Claimant appealed to this Court.3
                   Initially, Section 402(b) of the Law provides, in relevant part, that an
employee shall be ineligible for UC benefits for any week “[i]n which his
unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and
compelling nature[.]” 43 P.S. § 802(b). This Court has explained:

                   The claimant has the burden of proving that []he had a
                   necessitous and compelling cause for voluntarily
                   terminating h[is] employment. PECO Energy Co. v.
                   Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev[.], 682 A.2d 58, 60 (Pa.

         2
             43 P.S. § 801(d)(1) (relating to an employee’s ability to work and availability for suitable
work).
         This Court’s review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,
         3

whether an error of law was committed, whether the agency’s practices or procedures were
violated, or whether the findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of
the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.

                                                     2
              Cmwlth. 1996). A necessitous and compelling cause is
              that which “results from circumstances which produce
              pressure to terminate employment that is both real and
              substantial, and which would compel a reasonable person
              under the circumstances to act in the same manner.”
              Taylor v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev[.], . . . 378 A.2d
              829, 832-33 ([Pa.] 1977). To meet this burden, the
              claimant must generally demonstrate that []he took
              “all necessary and reasonable steps to preserve the
              employment relationship.” PECO Energy Co., 682 A.2d
              at 61.

St. Clair Hosp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 154 A.3d 401, 404-05 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc) (emphasis added).
              Claimant argues that he satisfied his burden of proving a compelling
and necessitous reason to quit his job because he discussed his concerns with
Employer many times and Employer stated that it could not ameliorate those
concerns. Claimant cites Concordia of South Hills v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 602 C.D. 2022, filed August 17, 2023)
(Concordia), and Lundberg v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Pa.
Cmwlth. No. 29 C.D. 2021, filed October 14, 2021), to support his position.4
Employer rejoins that Claimant’s perceived risk to his health and his wife’s health
does not give rise to a necessitous and compelling reason not to return to work.
              In Concordia, this Court illuminated:

              [I]n a COVID[-19 pandemic]-related case where an
              employee has a concern about the utilization of inadequate
              safety measures, or fears related to [his] health, or both,
              the burden to make a reasonable effort to preserve
              employment requires an employee to give notice to the
              employer as to [his] concerns and health conditions and
              to allow the employer an opportunity to modify the

       4
         This Court’s memorandum opinions issued after January 15, 2008, may only be cited “for
[their] persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth
Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                              3
                employee’s work conditions. See Lundberg . . . [,] slip op.
                at 3.[5] “This is the case even where there is a real and
                serious safety concern, or where a[n employee] has a
                medical condition which endangers h[im].” Id. (first
                citing Iaconelli v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 423
                A.2d 754, 756 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980), then citing St. Clair
                Hosp. . . . “Once [a concern is] communicated, an
                employer must have a reasonable opportunity to make
                accommodations with respect to the work conditions
                and/or medical condition.” Id. (citing Blackwell v.
                Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 555 A.2d 279, 281-82
                & n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989)).

Concordia, slip op. at 5-6 (bold and italic emphasis added). The Concordia Court
held that the claimant met her burden of proving that she left work for cause of a
necessitous and compelling nature because she had communicated her specific
issues and concerns to her employer, i.e., she told her supervisor that she was
concerned that others were not following the COVID-19 pandemic protocols and
requested a transfer to the kitchen, but the employer failed to accommodate her
concerns or instruct her on how to otherwise properly request a transfer.
                Here, Claimant testified:

                I had met with the two gentlemen, [Employer’s managers
                Jon Gaich (Gaich)] and Dale,[6] on my last day of work on
                [March 13, 2020,] and voiced concerns about, boy, if this
                blows up and things get really bad[,] I’m going to have
                to, you know, look at things because my number one
                concern is my safety, health for me and my wife.

       5
           In Lundberg, this Court held, as it related it to the COVID-19 pandemic:
                While one can sympathize with [the c]laimant’s fears in the face of
                the chaos attendant to the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic,
                the [L]aw does not excuse h[im] of the duty to inform [the e]mployer
                of h[is] safety concerns and health problems and afford [the
                e]mployer the opportunity to mitigate and/or accommodate
                them.
Id., slip op. at 4 (emphasis added).
         6
           Dale’s last name does not appear in the Certified Record.
                                                 4
Certified Record (C.R.) at 104 (emphasis added). Claimant further related, on May
7, 2020:

            [Gaich] had contacted me and wanted to know if I was
            willing to come back yet. And I guess he was saying they
            started, starting [sic] to see the need for drivers. And I told
            him, you know, I appreciated him contacting me and I
            wanted to have a -- because he initially contacted me by
            text. During the conversation, I kind of reiterated what
            had been discussed on that Friday while I talked to him
            and Dale both before and after my shift on [March 13,
            2020,] that I’m not comfortable coming back, you know,
            right now because of concern for safety and health for
            myself and my wife who is at a very high risk and
            vulnerable because of various medical conditions.

C.R. at 104 (emphasis added).
            Claimant described:

            C[laimant’s] L[awyer:] Did you get a text message on
            May 22[, 2020,] asking you if you could return to work
            again?
            C[laimant:] I did.
            C[laimant’s] L[awyer:] And did you respond?
            C[laimant:] I did. And I, excuse me, trying to look
            through my documents here. Yeah, I said this, like I said
            in the text, speaks for itself. I think he really had not
            changed since I spoke with [Gaich] on May 7[, 2020,] that
            I would assess the situation about returning to work
            when we get into the green phase as described by the
            Governor.
            C[laimant’s] L[awyer:] Now, June [3, 2020,] did [Gaich]
            text you and offer you a job to return to work as a driver
            on [] June [] 5th, 2020?
            C[laimant:] He did say that since the county is going back
            to green phase on Friday that there . . . would probably be
            a need for me to return. And I said it’s about time that
            my wife and I discussed it[,] and we still believe it’s best
            to proceed with caution because of the very high risk

                                          5
             that we both have because of our age and her medical
             conditions. And we wanted to see if there was an
             increased number of cases, resurgence, more or less,
             because of people gathering more because of good
             weather and all the things like that. So just still very
             weary and concerned for safety and health for myself
             and my wife.

C.R. at 105 (emphasis added).
             Gaich testified that Employer “already had strict disinfection protocols
in place because [it] handle[s] work coming from patients’ mouth[s].” C.R. at 107;
see also C.R. at 133; UCBR Finding of Fact (FOF) 12 (“[E]mployer is a dental lab
and, as such, has strict disinfection protocols.”). Gaich further related:

             [Employer] also ramped up additional things according to
             the Worker and Building Safety Order set forth by the
             [s]tate.    Mask requirements, [Employer] suppl[ies]
             everybody with gloves, hand sanitizer, all that. A follow-
             up email [sic], [Employer] made the use of face masks
             mandatory. And for those who wouldn’t comply, I do
             believe [Employer] had said in there [Employer] will send
             you home immediately for not complying. I think that was
             before the [s]tate even said that businesses need to do that.
             So [Employer] kind of wanted to jump on that and be as
             proactive as [it] can [sic]. For not only just the drivers, but
             all employees here, [Employer] suppl[ies] [Personal
             Protective Equipment] as long as we can get it. Face
             masks, gloves [Employer] suppl[ies]. [Employer] do[es]
             supply disinfecting wipes and spray for everybody
             including the drivers are instructed to wipe down their
             vehicles before they start the day and when they finish the
             day. And [Employer] also ha[s] hand sanitizer here for
             everybody to use that wants to use that.

C.R. at 108; see also C.R. at 107; UCBR FOF 12 (“[E]mployer instituted specific
measures to address COVID-19, such as providing its employees with masks,
gloves, hand sanitizer, and disinfecting wipes, and instructing its drivers to disinfect
the vehicle before and after work.”).

                                           6
            Although Claimant expressed his concern to Employer, he merely
raised a general fear for his and his wife’s safety. Claimant chose to leave his job
even though Employer had safety measures in place and without specifically
communicating how Employer’s safety measures did not address his situation and,
thus, did not allow Employer to offer any mitigation and/or accommodation.

            While one can sympathize with Claimant’s fears in the
            face of the chaos attendant to the early stages of the
            COVID-19 pandemic, the law does not excuse h[im] of the
            duty to inform Employer of h[is] safety concerns and
            health problems and afford Employer the opportunity
            to mitigate and/or accommodate them.

Lundberg, slip op. at 4 (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court is constrained to
affirm the UCBR’s order.
            For all of the above reasons, the UCBR’s order is affirmed.

                                      _________________________________
                                      ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

                                         7
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard G. Mroz,                      :
                   Petitioner         :
                                      :
            v.                        :
                                      :
Unemployment Compensation             :
Board of Review,                      :   No. 1028 C.D. 2020
                 Respondent           :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 19th day of April, 2024, the Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review’s September 2, 2020 order is affirmed.

                                    _________________________________
                                    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge