Court Opinion

ID: 9399511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 14:05:39.81743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:24.860748
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-942

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                              STEPHEN H. SMITH.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       After a jury-waived trial, the defendant was convicted of

 assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon in violation

 of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b), and assault and battery on a

 household member in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a).                  On

 appeal, he claims that there was insufficient evidence to

 support the assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon

 conviction, and that the trial judge improperly struck testimony

 relevant to his claim that the victim was the first aggressor.

 We affirm.

       Background.     We summarize the evidence presented at trial

 in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving

 certain details for the discussion of specific issues.               See

 Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).                The

 victim testified that during the night of November 7, 2019, into
the morning of November 8, 2019, she and the defendant, who were

in a dating relationship, were in the victim's apartment, where

the defendant stayed often.    The two were in the kitchen when

the defendant told the victim that he had taken twenty Klonopin

pills in a suicide attempt, and an argument followed.          After the

victim failed to convince the defendant to go to the hospital,

she reached for her cell phone, at which point the defendant

grabbed a knife and pointed it at her.      As the victim left the

kitchen to go to her room, she saw that the defendant was

cutting his arm with the knife.       She once again tried to pick up

her cell phone from the kitchen table, but was unable to reach

it, as the defendant began to chase her through the apartment

with the knife.   During the ensuing encounter, the defendant

straddled the victim while she was on a couch, held her down,

and waived the knife in her face.      The defendant ended up

striking the victim with the knife, resulting in a serious

laceration to her hand requiring twenty-two stitches.          The

victim was able to escape to a neighbor's apartment.       The police

were called.

    Discussion.    1.   Sufficiency of the evidence.     The

defendant contends that the evidence only showed that he waved a

knife in the face of the victim, which resulted in her getting

injured when she attempted to block it, not that he

intentionally struck her.     Thus, he argues that while there was

                                  2
sufficient evidence to support a conviction of a reckless

assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, there was

insufficient evidence to support a conviction of an intentional

assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.   When

reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we determine

whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"

(citation omitted).   Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677.

     Assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon can be

proven under either a theory of intentional or reckless battery.

See Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 803, 807 (2009).1

When the factfinder is instructed on both theories, a conviction

may be upheld on sufficient proof of either theory.   See, e.g.,

id. at 807-808.   Because in jury-waived cases trial judges are

presumed to have instructed themselves properly on the law, see

Commonwealth v. Milo M., 433 Mass. 149, 152 (2001), we presume

that the trial judge here properly instructed herself as to both

1 "Intentional assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon
requires an intentional, unjustified touching, however slight,
by means of [a] dangerous weapon" (quotation and citation
omitted). Commonwealth v. Ashford, 486 Mass. 450, 460 (2020).
In contrast, a recklessness theory requires "the intentional
commission of a wanton or reckless act (something more than
gross negligence) causing physical or bodily injury to another
by means of a dangerous weapon" (footnote, quotation, and
citation omitted). Id. at 460-461.

                                 3
theories.   Given that there was evidence that the defendant was

straddling the victim while waving a knife over her face, and

that the defendant concedes that there was sufficient evidence

to uphold the conviction on a theory of recklessness, we

conclude there was no error.2

     2.   Adjutant evidence.    "[W]here a claim of self-defense

has been asserted and the identity of the first aggressor is in

dispute . . . trial judges have the discretion to admit in

evidence specific incidents of violence that the victim is

reasonably alleged to have initiated."     Commonwealth v.

Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 650 (2005).     During the trial,

testimony was elicited regarding prior violent conduct of both

the defendant and the victim.    The trial judge allowed the

testimony on the condition that the defendant was able to raise

a claim of self-defense.3   After the defendant concluded his

2 We also conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence
under a theory of an intentional assault and battery by means of
a dangerous weapon, as the trial judge could have inferred that
the defendant intended to strike the victim with the knife after
chasing her around the apartment with it, holding her down while
on top of her, and then waving the knife over her face.
3 For a defendant to be entitled to a self-defense instruction,

there must be evidence warranting at least a reasonable doubt
that he "(1) had reasonable ground to believe and actually did
believe that he was in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily harm, from which he could save himself only by using
deadly force, (2) had availed himself of all proper means to
avoid physical combat before resorting to the use of deadly
force, and (3) used no more force than was reasonably necessary

                                  4
testimony, the Commonwealth moved to strike the victim's prior

Adjutant testimony and to disallow any such further testimony.

The trial judge ruled that "it's not real clear from [the

defendant's] testimony, particularly with the charge of assault

and battery dangerous weapon, how he was acting in self-

defense," and allowed the Commonwealth's motion.   On appeal, the

defendant argues that the evidence was sufficient to support a

claim of self-defense and, therefore, that he should have been

permitted to introduce evidence that the victim was the first

aggressor.

    We discern no error in the trial judge's conclusion that

there was insufficient evidence that the defendant acted in

self-defense and, therefore, the evidence at issue was properly

excluded.    Even accepting all reasonable inferences in the

defendant's favor, see Commonwealth v. Pike, 428 Mass. 393, 395

(1998), the defendant provided no evidence that he used the

knife in self-defense.   The defendant testified that the victim

attacked him with the knife, that he received cuts during the

altercation, and that he pushed the victim away and ran out of

the apartment.   However, he also testified that he never grabbed

the knife at all, and offered no explanation for how the victim

in all the circumstances of the case" (citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 733 (2007).

                                  5
received her injuries.4   His testimony did not raise a claim of

self-defense, but instead presented an entirely alternative

account of the incident -- one that did not explain how the

victim suffered a significant laceration.   In sum, there was no

evidence to support a claim of self-defense.   See Commonwealth

v. Bertrand, 385 Mass. 356, 362-363 (1982) (where defendant

insisted he did not inflict blows that killed victim, his

testimony raised no issue of self-defense); Commonwealth v.

Clark, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 392, 396-397 (1985) (defendant not

entitled to self-defense instruction for assault and battery by

means of a dangerous weapon charge involving knife where

4 During closing arguments, defense counsel stated he had no
theory as to how the victim received her cuts:
     Judge: "So are -- so you're suggesting that [the victim]
     cut herself?"
     Defense counsel: "Your Honor, I don't know what happened.
     I –"
     Judge: "Okay."
     Defense counsel: "-- really don't. And if I did, I don't
     think we would be here right now."

                                 6
defendant testified he took knife from victim but only pushed

her and hit her with his hand).

                                      Judgments affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Vuono, Henry &
                                        Grant, JJ.5),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    June 5, 2023.

5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  7