Court Opinion

ID: 9558217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:04:32.888061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:29.349675
License: Public Domain

BETTY B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
Because I agree that the eight-level sentencing enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(l) (Nov. 2000) was properly applied in this case, I concur in the judgment. The Commentary to the Guidelines contemplate application of the § 2J1.2(b)(l) enhancement for a strictly retaliatory act, thus reaching Calvert’s crime of conviction. U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(l) cmt. n. 5 (“The inclusion of ‘property damage’ under subsection (b)(1) is designed to address cases in which property damage is caused or threatened as a means of intimidation or retaliation (e.g., to intimidate a witness from, or retaliate against a witness for, testifying.”)) (emphasis added). Moreover, Calvert’s relevant offense, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (retaliation against a witness), is predicated on an intent to harm a witness and his jury made a specific finding that Calvert had such an intent. Little else is required to resolve Calvert’s appeal.
The majority opinion, although advancing some worthwhile views on how the judicial system should operate, concerns me because it carries the troubling potential of mandating legal standards on issues that are not before us, and have not been considered in the context of concrete facts raising genuine legal issues. The discussion of the interrelationship between retaliation against witnesses and the administration of justice generally is my concern. Maj. op. at 1240-42. Nearly all of this discussion is dicta that is unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. This is a Sentencing Guidelines case, and we do not assist the district courts by offering philosophical perspectives where concrete guidance is needed. Although I am reluctant to compound the problem with a separate concurrence, I feel compelled to clarify what we do not decide today. We do not identify or catalog “essential components” in the administration of justice relevant to § 2J1.2(b)(l). Maj. op. at 1241. Nor do we embrace or reject a “direct and immediate impact” standard for the application of a § 2J1.2(b)(l) enhancement. Maj. op. at 1241. We do not decide that § 2J1.2(b)(l) is properly applied where a defendant’s acts affect the public’s “respect and cooperation” in upholding the law. Id. We do not generally deem “irrelevant” the timing of a defendant’s retaliatory act in determining whether § 2J1.2(b)(l) applies, or decide that § 2J1.2(b)(l) applies where a defendant’s acts merely impose a “chilling effect” in unrelated proceedings. Id. Finally, we do not hold that § 2J1.2(b)(l) universally applies in all cases “with or without any connection to an identifiable discrete proceeding.” Maj. op. at 1242. The court’s commentary on these points is purely sur-plusage. Although much of this language *1246is spurred by the majority s good-faith desire to explain its decision, I reiterate that these words carry with them the troubling potential — as dicta often does — to be seen in future cases as legal standards that we have neither considered nor adopted.
We are charged with deciding only those issues presented in an appeal, based on the record before us. We invite mischief by straining unnecessarily to do more.