Court Opinion

ID: 9389629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 22:02:29.077241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:28.887429
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/3/23; certified for publication 4/25/23 (order attached)

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                               FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION ONE

 CARI MCCORMICK,
            Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                           A164672
 v.
 CALIFORNIA PUBLIC                                         (Lake County
 EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT                                     Super. Ct. No. CV416903)
 SYSTEM,
            Defendant and Respondent.

        Cari McCormick sought disability retirement based on symptoms
caused by her office environment, and the California Public Employees’
Retirement System (CalPERS) denied her application. After the trial court
denied her petition for a writ of administrative mandate, we issued a
published opinion reversing the judgment. (McCormick v. Public Employees’
Retirement System (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 428, 430–431 (McCormick I).) We
held that CalPERS members are eligible for disability requirement under the
Public Employees’ Retirement Law (PERL) (Gov. Code, § 20000 et seq.) when
they can no longer perform their usual duties at the location where they are
required to work.1 (McCormick I, at pp. 430–431.) We also clarified that a

       All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless
        1

otherwise noted.

                                                    1
CalPERS member need not request an accommodation to become eligible for
disability retirement. (Id. at p. 441.)
      On remand, McCormick filed a motion under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5 (section 1021.5), which authorizes the award of attorney fees
to a prevailing party when the action has conferred “a significant benefit . . .
on the general public or a large class of persons.” She now appeals from the
denial of that motion, contending that the trial court erred by concluding she
did not satisfy the significant-benefit requirement. Applying a de novo
standard of review, we agree with McCormick that our prior opinion
conferred a significant benefit on the public and that she is otherwise entitled
to attorney fees under section 1021.5.2 Thus, we reverse and remand for the
court to determine the appropriate amount of fees to award.
                                     I.
                           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                                BACKGROUND
      A detailed summary of the underlying facts is set forth in McCormick I.
Beginning in 2002, McCormick worked as an appraiser for Lake County, a
position that required her to perform most of her work in the Lakeport
courthouse. (McCormick I, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 431.) She began
experiencing pain and fatigue in 2010, and by 2012, she was unable to finish
a full day of work at the courthouse. (Ibid.) She felt much better when she
was at home or outside, but her supervisors did not allow her to telecommute
or work elsewhere. (Ibid.) The following year, after she exhausted her
medical leave, Lake County terminated her employment. (Ibid.)

      2As a result of this conclusion, we need not address McCormick’s claim
that the trial court erred by admitting the declaration of a CalPERS
employee about the dearth of disability-retirement applications presenting a
similar fact pattern to hers.

                                          2
      McCormick then submitted an application for disability retirement to
CalPERS, which was denied. (McCormick I, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 432.)
She appealed the decision, and an administrative hearing on the appeal was
held in mid-2016. (Ibid.) At the hearing, she presented a doctor’s opinion
that she had “ ‘[a]llergic rhinitis’ and an ‘allergic-like reaction of unknown
etiology’ ” that were triggered by the courthouse. (Ibid.) CalPERS presented
another doctor’s opinion that “while there was no doubt McCormick was
experiencing real symptoms that were associated with her workplace, ‘if the
environment [could] be amended or . . . accommodations [could be provided]
to help her, then she would not be disabled.’ ” (Ibid.) A few months later,
CalPERS denied McCormick’s administrative appeal. (Id. at p. 433.)
      After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration of CalPERS’s decision,
McCormick filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the trial
court. (McCormick I, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) The court denied the
petition in February 2018. (Ibid.) It concluded that because McCormick
would be physically capable of performing her job duties if the courthouse
“ ‘was purged of the offending triggers’ ” or if she was “ ‘transferred to a
different location so as to avoid those offending triggers,’ ” she was not
permanently disabled so as to qualify for disability retirement. (Ibid.)
      McCormick appealed the denial of her writ petition to this court. In
October 2019, we issued an opinion reversing the order denying the petition
and remanding for further proceedings. (McCormick I, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th
at p. 442.) We held that “employees are eligible for CalPERS disability
retirement under . . . section 21156 when, due to a disability, they can no
longer perform their usual duties at the only location where their employer
will allow them to work, even if they might be able to perform those duties at
a theoretical different location.” (Id. at pp. 430–431, fn. omitted.) In doing

                                        3
so, we also emphasized that requesting an accommodation is not a
prerequisite to eligibility. (Id. at pp. 440–441.) McCormick was entitled to
relief because “her usual duties required [her] to work in the Lakeport
courthouse, and whether she could have performed her duties elsewhere
[was] irrelevant to her eligibility for disability retirement.” (Id. at p. 441.)
      After this court issued McCormick I, CalPERS approved McCormick’s
application for disability retirement, and McCormick began receiving
benefits. In November 2020, the trial court entered a stipulated judgment in
her favor. The following January, she filed a motion for attorney fees under
section 1021.5. Contending that her lawsuit conferred a significant benefit
on the general public or a large class of persons, namely “the nearly [two]
million CalPERS members” who might “potentially become eligible for
disability retirement benefits,” she sought approximately $812,000 in
attorney fees, representing a lodestar of $270,820 with a 3.0 multiplier.
      CalPERS opposed the motion, arguing that “[t]he esoteric and fact-
specific nature” of the issue McCormick I addressed made it “doubtful that
anyone else will benefit from this litigation.” CalPERS claimed that in the
past decade it had not received an application for disability retirement
“alleging similar facts,” which it characterized as being “ ‘allergic’ to [one’s]
work location” and not receiving “a reasonable accommodation to work
elsewhere.” In support, CalPERS submitted a declaration from a manager in
its benefits division stating that in her 31 years with the agency, she was “not
aware of any application in which a CalPERS member . . . [sought disability
retirement] based on an alleged allergic condition caused by their place of
work in which the employer allegedly failed to provide a reasonable
accommodation.”

                                         4
      In May 2021, after a hearing, the trial court orally denied McCormick’s
motion. At her request, a statement of decision was issued, which
transcribed the court’s oral ruling. Relying on Woodland Hills Residents
Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917 (Woodland Hills), the court
determined that our holding in McCormick I did not confer a significant
benefit under section 1021.5, even though it enforced an important right
through a published opinion. Reasoning that the group affected by
McCormick I comprised only people applying for disability retirement who
“were able to work except for a temporary disability that was susceptible to
accommodation which did not occur,” the court found there was no evidence
to suggest that group was sufficiently large to warrant attorney fees under
section 1021.5.
                                        II.
                                   DISCUSSION
      A.    General Legal Standards
      Section 1021.5, “a codification of the ‘private attorney general’ doctrine,
recognizes that ‘privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the
effectuation of the fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or
statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism authorizing the
award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce such important public
policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.’ ” (Roybal v.
Governing Bd. of Salinas City Elementary School Dist. (2008)
159 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1147, quoting Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at
p. 933.) Thus, “ ‘ “the fundamental objective of the doctrine is to encourage
suits enforcing important public policies by providing substantial attorney
fees to successful litigants in such cases.” ’ ” (Vasquez v. State of California
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 250.)

                                        5
      Section 1021.5 authorizes a court to “award attorneys’ fees to a
successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has
resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest
if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been
conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity
and financial burden of private enforcement . . . are such as to make the
award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be
paid out of the recovery, if any.” The party seeking fees has the burden “ ‘to
establish each prerequisite to an award’ ” under the statute. (Samantha C. v.
State Dept. of Developmental Services (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 71, 78.)
      Here, CalPERS does not contest that McCormick was a successful
party and that her lawsuit resulted in the enforcement of an important right
affecting the public interest. (See City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire
Retirement System (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 688, 710–711 (City of Oakland)
[recognizing “societal importance of public employee pension rights”].) But it
claims that the trial court properly concluded that McCormick failed to
satisfy the separate requirement that her lawsuit conferred a significant
benefit on the general public or a large class of persons. (See Woodland Hills,
supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 935.) Whereas the important-right requirement
“merely calls for an examination of the subject matter of the action—i.e.,
whether the right involved was of sufficient societal importance,” the
significant-benefit requirement “calls for an examination whether the
litigation has had a beneficial impact on the public as a whole or on a group
of private parties which is sufficiently large to justify a fee award.”
(Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1417, disapproved
on another ground in Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2008)
42 Cal.4th 1142, 1152–1153 & fn. 7.)

                                        6
      Generally, we review an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5 for
an abuse of discretion. (Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2011)
52 Cal.4th 1018, 1025.) But the standard of review “depends on the extent to
which there were issues of fact below. If the issue is whether the criteria for
an award of attorney fees and costs in this context have been satisfied, ‘this
may be a mixed question of law and fact and, if factual questions
predominate, may warrant a deferential standard of review.’ [Citation.] If,
on the other hand, the underlying facts are largely undisputed and the issue
calls for statutory construction, it is a question of law that is reviewed de
novo.” (Roybal v. Governing Bd. of Salinas City Elementary School Dist.,
supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148; see Serrano, at pp. 1025–1026.)
      McCormick urges us to apply de novo review because when “a
published appellate opinion . . . provides the basis upon which attorney fees
are sought, . . . the Court of Appeal[] is at least as well positioned as the trial
court to determine whether [s]ection 1021.5 fees should be awarded.” We
agree that we can independently determine the legal significance of our prior
opinion and whether it “ ‘ “confers a significant benefit to the general public
or a broad class of citizens.” ’ ” (Robles v. Employment Development Dept.
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 191, 203 (Robles).) More generally, “[h]ow many
people will receive what kind of benefit, and how much, as a result of a given
legal action is usually more of a value judgment than an issue of fact. And
most often it is a value judgment about legal effects and the like which
appellate courts are well situated to make.” (Los Angeles Police Protective
League v. City of Los Angeles (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1, 9.) Thus, we will
independently review the trial court’s assessment of the significant-benefit
element, “ ‘ “pay[ing] ‘ “particular attention to [its] stated reasons in denying
. . . fees and [seeing] whether it applied the proper standards of law in

                                         7
reaching its decision.” ’ ” ’ ” (City of Oakland, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 698;
see Los Angeles Police, at p. 9.)
      B.     McCormick’s Case Satisfies the Significant-benefit Requirement.
      When determining whether a lawsuit conferred a significant benefit on
the general public or a large class of persons, a trial court should perform “a
realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains
which have resulted in a particular case.” (Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d
at pp. 939–940.) “The extent of [the significant benefit] ‘ “ ‘need not be
great,’ ” ’ ‘[n]or is it required that the class of persons benefited be “ ‘readily
ascertainable.’ ” ’ ” (Doe v. Westmont College (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 753, 764;
Indio Police Command Unit Assn. v. City of Indio (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 521,
543 (Indio Police).) “Furthermore, ‘evidence of the size of the population
benefited by a private suit is not always required. The substantial benefit
may be conceptual or doctrinal, and need not be actual and concrete, so long
as the public is primarily benefited.’ ” (Indio Police, at pp. 543–544.)
      McCormick offers several arguments for why this litigation conferred a
significant benefit on the public or a large group of persons. Her arguments
fall into two categories: those that broadly claim the significant-benefit
requirement is met because the rights at issue are important, and those that
focus on McCormick I’s particular holdings and likely impact. We agree with
the trial court that satisfaction of the significant-benefit requirement is not
“automatic” just because this case involves important rights and resulted in a
published opinion. But in assessing whether McCormick I conveyed a
significant benefit, the court took too narrow a view of the opinion’s impact
and thus the group on which it conferred a benefit. Applying our
independent judgment, we conclude that the significant-benefit requirement
is satisfied here.

                                          8
            1.     The significant-benefit requirement is not met merely
                   because McCormick vindicated important statutory rights.
      McCormick begins by claiming that “litigation that enforces
fundamental rights necessarily confers a significant benefit on society as a
whole.” True, “the public always has a significant interest in seeing that
legal strictures are properly enforced and thus, in a real sense, the public
always derives a ‘benefit’ when illegal private or public conduct is rectified.
Both the statutory language (‘significant’ benefit) and prior case law,
however, indicate that the Legislature did not intend to authorize an award
of attorney fees in every case involving a statutory violation.” (Woodland
Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 939; Baxter v. Salutary Sportsclubs, Inc. (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 941, 945.) Rather, section 1021.5’s “ ‘purpose is to provide
some incentive for the plaintiff who acts as a true private attorney general
. . . despite the fact that [the plaintiff’s] own financial stake in the outcome
would not by itself constitute an adequate incentive to litigate.’ ” (Flannery v.
California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 635.) Thus, “a plaintiff
who enforces a statutory right is not necessarily entitled to section 1021.5
fees when the primary effect of the suit is to vindicate an individual economic
interest,” though fees may not be denied on that basis alone. (Graham v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 578, fn. 9; Indio Police, supra,
230 Cal.App.4th at p. 543.)
      Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, on which McCormick
relies, illustrates this principle. In Press, the Supreme Court determined
that a section 1021.5 award in a case involving the public collection of
signatures for a ballot initiative was proper because “the general public
benefitted from the enforcement of fundamental constitutional rights—those
embodied in the free speech and petition provisions of the California
Constitution.” (Press, at pp. 316, 319.) But the Court also emphasized that

                                         9
“not all lawsuits enforcing constitutional guarantees,” much less statutory
rights, “will warrant an award of fees.” (Id. at p. 319, fn. 7.) Rather, fees
may be unwarranted if the right at issue is essentially economic, such as the
right to be free from unconstitutional takings of private property, and “the
primary effect of the judgment” is to advance the “plaintiffs’ personal
economic interests.” (Ibid.) Thus, Press hardly supports the conclusion that
McCormick’s vindication of her statutory right to disability retirement
benefits, in which she has a clear pecuniary interest, necessarily conveyed a
significant benefit on the public.
      To be sure, the PERL has an important purpose, “to effect economy and
efficiency in the public service” by providing a mechanism for replacing
“employees who become superannuated or otherwise incapacitated.”
(§ 20001.) But we cannot agree with McCormick’s contention that her suit
conveyed a significant public benefit just because it enforced the PERL.
Although the importance of the right or principle at issue is undoubtedly
relevant, the analysis generally requires a case-specific analysis of the benefit
bestowed. (See Woodland Hills, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 939; Baxter v.
Salutary Sportsclubs, Inc., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 945; see also
Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1417.)
      Nor can we agree with McCormick’s similarly broad assertion that “[a]
case requiring that existing law be followed confers a significant benefit on
the public.” “The fact that litigation enforces existing rights does not mean
that a substantial benefit to the public cannot result,” since “the declaration
of rights in ‘landmark’ cases would have little meaning if those rights could
not be ‘enforced’ in subsequent litigation.” (Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc., supra,
34 Cal.3d at p. 318.) Still, while “the making of new law is not a prerequisite
to a fee award under section 1021.5” (Robles, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 204,

                                       10
italics added), a significant benefit is not conferred on the public every time a
case enforces existing law.
            2.    McCormick I conferred a significant benefit on the public.
      McCormick also contends that her lawsuit conferred a significant
benefit on the public or a large group of persons because it resulted in
McCormick I, which “announced two significant clarifications of the PERL.”
On this point, we agree. Although the trial court correctly recognized that
the significant-benefit requirement was not satisfied just because
McCormick’s prior appeal resulted in a published opinion, it took too cramped
a view of the benefit McCormick I conferred.
      Initially, we cannot accept McCormick’s sweeping contention that “[a]
published appellate decision enforcing important societal rights in and of
itself confers a significant benefit on a large class of persons under
[s]ection 1021.5.” “[W]hether litigation generates important appellate
precedent is a factor courts may consider” in deciding whether to award fees
under the statute, but it is not determinative, even for whether the less
onerous “important right affecting the public interest” requirement is met.
(Adoption of Joshua S. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 945, 958, italics added; City of
Oakland, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 710; Los Angeles Police Protective
League v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 12.) The decisions
McCormick cites, to the extent they even analyze a section 1021.5 issue, do
not hold otherwise. Rather, they considered whether a published opinion had
a significant and broad enough benefit, beyond its mere existence, to warrant
an award under the statute. (See, e.g., Early v. Becerra (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 726, 739–741; Samantha C. v. State Dept. of Developmental
Services, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 79–80.)

                                       11
      We therefore turn to the substance of McCormick I. Our legal analysis
in that opinion had two primary parts. First, we concluded that whether
CalPERS members are “incapacitated physically or mentally for the
performance of [their] duties” as required to be eligible for disability
retirement under the PERL (§ 21156, subd. (a)(1)) turns on their “ability to
perform their duties for their actual employers, not their ability to perform
those duties in the abstract.” (McCormick I, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 435, 437.) We relied in part on the 2006 amendment of section 21156 to
“ ‘reaffirm CalPERS’[s] historical practice’ ” of judging a member’s capacity to
perform the usual duties required by the member’s current employer, not
those required by some other CalPERS-covered employer. (McCormick I, at
pp. 436–437.)
      Second, we concluded that “CalPERS cannot deny disability retirement
on the basis that a member could perform [the member’s] usual duties with
an accommodation that was not provided.” (McCormick I, supra,
41 Cal.App.5th at p. 439, italics and some capitalization omitted.) We
explained that a member is eligible for disability retirement even if it would
be possible to perform the member’s usual duties with an accommodation,
because the PERL does not condition eligibility on first seeking an
accommodation. (Id. at pp. 440–441.)
      The trial court concluded that McCormick I “added to the law” only to
the extent it held that a CalPERS member who was “able to work except for a
temporary disability that was susceptible to accommodation which did not
occur” was eligible for disability retirement. Noting the “environmentally
based” nature of McCormick’s disability, the court determined that applicants
for disability retirement “generally speaking are not going to be able to utilize
[McCormick I] because it doesn’t pertain to the garden[-]variety or run-of-the-

                                       12
mill disability pension cases. By that I mean taking the environmental part
of it out of the equation, this decision adds nothing to the body of law that
already exists.” The court also commented that while a larger group of
CalPERS members might be able to rely on the opinion’s discussion of the
accommodation issue, that discussion was “gratuitous dicta.”
      The trial court’s view of McCormick I was too narrow. The benefit a
published opinion confers is not limited to its specific holdings or the new law
it may make. (See Robles, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 204.) “Rather, a
‘central function’ of the private attorney general statute is ‘ “to call public
officials to account and to insist that they enforce the law,” ’ ” and that
purpose is furthered when an opinion illuminates or emphasizes the contours
of existing law and requires an agency to follow it. (Ibid.)
      The two main conclusions we reached in McCormick I confer a benefit
on a group larger than those CalPERS members who might seek disability
retirement in factual circumstances similar to McCormick’s. Our opinion not
only concluded that McCormick herself was eligible for disability retirement
but also emphasized that disability must be judged in light of a member’s
actual job location and duties and that members need not seek an
accommodation to become eligible. Although the latter conclusion was
technically dicta because McCormick did seek an accommodation (see
McCormick I, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 441), that does not mean it will be
ignored going forward. Rather, the principles we discussed may well affect
cases that do not involve environmentally based disabilities like
McCormick’s.

                                        13
      More broadly, by resulting in an appellate opinion enforcing the PERL,
this litigation benefited the general public.3 Although enforcement of the
PERL alone or publication of an opinion alone does not automatically confer a
significant benefit on the public, in our view McCormick I’s interpretation of
section 21156 did. As a result, evidence on the size of the group benefited
was not required. (See Indio Police, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 543.)
      Two decisions inform our conclusion that McCormick I conferred a
significant benefit on the public. In Robles, our colleagues in Division Four
held that a significant public benefit resulted from their previous published
opinion in an unemployment-benefits case. (Robles, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 196, 203–204.) The prior opinion held that the conduct for which the
claimant was fired, attempting “to use his annual employee shoe allowance to
buy a pair of shoes for an injured friend,” did not “ ‘support a finding of
misconduct within the meaning of section 1256 of the Unemployment
Insurance Code.’ ” (Id. at pp. 195–196.) The opinion determined that
“ ‘employee behavior constitutes misconduct for purposes of section 1256 only
if it somehow demonstrates culpability or bad faith,’ ” and there is a
presumption that an employee was fired “for reasons other than misconduct,
absent written notice from the employer to the contrary.” (Id. at p. 196.)
      Robles disagreed with the trial court that a section 1021.5 award was
unwarranted because the prior opinion “was fact specific and . . . case law
already existed defining misconduct in the unemployment insurance context.”
(Robles, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 204.) By applying existing law that “was

      3CalPERS states that McCormick “does not claim—nor could she—that
the general public received benefits as a result of her lawsuit.” To the extent
CalPERS suggests McCormick waived the argument that this litigation
conferred a significant benefit on the public, we disagree. Her opening brief
repeatedly claims that the public benefited from her lawsuit.

                                        14
being completely disregarded” and “emphasizing the statutory presumption
against a finding of misconduct,” the prior opinion “provided a significant
benefit, both to the public generally and specifically to those who might
otherwise improperly be denied the unemployment benefits to which they
were due.” (Ibid.)
      In Robinson v. City of Chowchilla (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 382, the Fifth
District Court of Appeal concluded that a published opinion addressing
procedural protections afforded to police chiefs under the Public Safety
Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) (§ 3300 et seq.) conveyed a
significant benefit on not only police chiefs but “the citizenry of the state.”
(Robinson, at pp. 387, 399; see § 3304, subd. (c).) Robinson highlighted a line
of decisions “concluding that a peace officer’s lawsuit resulting in a published
decision clarifying the procedural protections contained in POBRA conferred
a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of people.”
(Robinson, at pp. 398–399.) These decisions followed a POBRA case in which
the Supreme Court also concluded the significant-benefit requirement was
met, explaining, “Since enforcement of [POBRA] should help to maintain
stable relations between peace officers and their employers and thus to
assure effective law enforcement, [this] action directly inures to the benefit of
the citizenry of this state. [Citation.] No one can be heard to protest that
effective law enforcement is not a ‘significant benefit.’ ” (Baggett v. Gates
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 143; Robinson, at p. 398.)
      Like the statutory schemes at issue in Robles and Robinson, the PERL
conveys important employment-related benefits and protections. “The
legislative purpose of public employee pension programs is well-established.
[These programs] ‘ “serve two objectives: to induce persons to enter and
continue in public service, and to provide subsistence for disabled or retired

                                        15
employees and their dependents.” ’ [Citation.] Disability pension laws are
intended to alleviate the harshness that would accompany the termination of
an employee who has become medically unable to perform [the employee’s]
duties.” (Haywood v. American River Fire Protection Dist. (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1304.) Thus, pension programs “help induce faithful
public service.” (Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 325, fn. 4;
Wilmont v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 631, 661–662.)
       Based on Robles and Robinson, we conclude that McCormick I
conveyed a significant benefit on the public. Similar to the opinion discussed
in Robles, our prior opinion addressed a statutory scheme bearing on
employment benefits for millions of people, clarifying existing law and
requiring it to be followed. And similar to the opinion discussed in Robinson,
our prior opinion clarified and protected the rights of employees who serve
the public. If a published opinion enforcing police chiefs’ procedural rights
confers a significant public benefit by “ ‘assur[ing] effective law enforcement’ ”
(Robinson v. City of Chowchilla, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 398), then a
published opinion enforcing the PERL does the same by assuring ongoing
public service.
       In arguing that the significant-benefit requirement is not satisfied,
CalPERS primarily relies on two decisions, Pacific Legal Foundation v.
California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158 (PLF) and Angelheart v. City of
Burbank (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 460 (Angelheart). Both cases are
distinguishable because they did not result in published opinions on the
merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.
      In PLF, the plaintiffs obtained a writ of administrative mandate
against the California Coastal Commission that struck a permit condition

                                       16
requiring them to dedicate an easement through their property. (PLF, supra,
33 Cal.3d at pp. 163–164.) The Commission appealed, but the appeal was
dismissed at its request, and the plaintiffs sought appellate attorney fees
under section 1021.5. (PLF, at pp. 164–165.) The Supreme Court concluded
“that the primary effect of the judgment was to invalidate the particular
permit condition imposed” based on the lack of evidence to support the
Commission’s determination. (Id. at p. 167.) Therefore, the trial court’s
judgment “vindicated only the rights of the owners of a single parcel of
property” and “in no way represent[ed], for example, a ringing declaration of
the rights of all or most landowners in the coastal zone.” (Ibid.)
      In Angelheart, the plaintiffs successfully challenged a city ordinance
that limited their ability to run a large in-home daycare. (Angelheart, supra,
232 Cal.App.3d at p. 463.) The trial court awarded them attorney fees under
section 1021.5. (Angelheart, at pp. 465–466.) The Second District Court of
Appeal reversed the award on the basis that the significant-benefit
requirement was not met. (Id. at pp. 468–470.) It explained, “[T]here is no
evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion that all of the
residents of Burbank seeking child care benefited from the action. In fact,
there is no evidence that there was any other person in Burbank, like the
[plaintiffs], who sought a permit for more than the 10 children allowed in a
family day-care home under the former municipal ordinance. There is no
evidence that the [plaintiffs’] action, although successful and involving an
important public policy, affected a large class of persons.” (Id. at p. 467.)
      Although the plaintiffs in PLF and Angelheart obtained favorable
judgments, those judgments were not reviewed in a published opinion. Thus,
neither case developed or elucidated the law governing the rights at issue for
a broader audience. Had McCormick prevailed in the trial court without the

                                       17
need for McCormick I, we might agree there is no evidence that the judgment
requiring CalPERS to grant her application for disability retirement
significantly benefited a large group of persons. But since her case resulted
in a published opinion addressing eligibility for disability retirement under
the PERL, we conclude that it conveyed a significant benefit on the public
under Robles and Robinson.
      C.    Our Disposition
      Having concluded that McCormick’s lawsuit conferred a significant
benefit on the public, we turn to the appropriate disposition. McCormick
argues that the trial court found that she satisfied all the other requirements
for an award under section 1021.5, meaning that we may order that she is
entitled to attorney fees. The court made comments suggesting it believed
the other statutory requirements were satisfied, and CalPERS does not
contest that McCormick should be awarded fees if she meets the significant-
benefit requirement. Therefore, we reverse the order denying her motion
under section 1021.5 and direct the court to enter a new order granting the
motion.
      As McCormick properly recognizes, the fact that she is entitled to an
award under section 1021.5 does not mean she is necessarily entitled to the
full amount she seeks, which is over $812,000. We express no view on
whether that figure is appropriate. Rather, on remand, the trial court shall
exercise its discretion to determine the amount of the award. In doing so, it
“may legitimately restrict the award to only that portion of the attorneys’
efforts that furthered the litigation of issues of public importance.”
(Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1226.)

                                       18
                                        III.
                                   DISPOSITION
      The order denying McCormick’s motion for attorney fees under
section 1021.5 is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to enter
an order granting the motion and awarding attorney fees in an amount the
trial court shall calculate in the first instance.

                                         19
                                         _________________________
                                         Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Margulies, J.

_________________________
Swope, J. *

     *Judge of the Superior Court of the County of San Mateo, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

McCormick v. CalPERS A164672

                                    20
Filed 4/25/23
                      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION ONE

 CARI MCCORMICK,
         Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                               A164672
 v.
 CALIFORNIA PUBLIC                             (Lake County
 EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT                         Super. Ct. No. CV416903)
 SYSTEM,
                                             ORDER GRANTING
         Defendant and Respondent.
                                             PUBLICATION

                                             [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:
       The opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed on April 3, 2023, was not
certified for publication in the Official Reports. After this court’s review of
appellant’s request under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120, and good
cause established under rule 8.1105, it is hereby ordered that the opinion
should be published in the Official Reports.

                                            _________________________
                                            Humes, P.J.
Trial Court:

      Superior Court of the County of Lake

Trial Judge:

      Hon. David W. Herrick

Counsel:

     Benjamin Karpilow, Meechan, Rosenthal & Karpilow, P.C., for Plaintiff
and Appellant

      Raymond A. Cardozo, Kathryn M. Bayes, Reed Smith LLP, Elizabeth
Yelland, California Public Employees’ Retirement System, for Defendant and
Respondent

McCormick v. CalPERS A164672