Court Opinion

ID: 9577048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:31:11.776756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:52.950682
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring specially.
I would hold that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Farley’s 1986 conviction. I believe that the majority opinion displays a slavish adherence to precedent, the direction of which badly needs reexamining by this court.
It is fundamental to our system of criminal justice that evidence of a defendant’s general character is irrelevant and inadmissible.11 Character evidence is excluded because a jury must determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence based solely on evidence relevant to the crime charged, and not based on a belief that the defendant has a criminal character or a general propensity to commit bad acts.12 Evidence of an independent crime or bad act committed by the defendant undoubtedly reflects on the defendant’s character. Indeed, evidence of a prior crime is character evidence of the worst sort because such evidence indicates a criminal character. As such, it has great potential for leading a jury to convict a defendant of a crime based solely on the defendant’s character. Hence, it has long been a general rule that evidence of other crimes or bad acts is inadmissible character evidence.13 As there may be instances, however, in which evidence of a prior crime or act is relevant to a legitimate and material issue — some material issue other than the defendant’s character — this court recognizes a limited exception for such evidence to the rule prohibiting character evidence. One of the earliest cases defining this exception and its parameters is Cawthon v. State,14
*629When one is . . . charged with the commission of a crime, proof of a distinct and independent offense is never admissible, unless there is some logical connection between the two, from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish the other.
Specifically, the Cawthon court held that independent crime evidence might be relevant when the extraneous crime forms part of the res gestae or is one of a system of mutually dependent crimes; when there is a connection between the two crimes in the mind of the criminal; or when evidence of the extraneous crime shows guilty knowledge, identifies the defendant, shows prior attempts by the defendant to commit the same crime as the crime charged, or tends to prove malice, intent, or motive.
Unfortunately, over the years courts have applied and expanded the exception to the rule prohibiting evidence of an independent act or crime to the extent that the exception often swallows the rule. Trial courts often allow independent crime evidence only because the circumstances of the independent crime are somewhat similar to the circumstances of the crime charged, without sufficient analysis of whether, because of that similarity, the independent crime evidence is actually relevant to an issue being tried. And this state’s appellate courts have often affirmed such decisions by trial courts with equally insufficient analysis. I believe that it is critical to the sanctity of jurisprudence in this state that this Court narrow its application of the exception to the rule prohibiting independent crime evidence, remembering that the exception is contrary to the fundamental and important prohibition against character evidence.
With respect to the independent crime in this case, the court heard testimony before trial from Joseph Markowitz and Robert Halbherr, both of whom lived in the same Chicago neighborhood as Farley for some years.15 They testified that in May 1986 they had gone behind the school yard to drink a six-pack of beer and were joined by Farley. Markowitz, then 20, said something that offended Farley, and Farley grabbed Markowitz from behind and held a knife to his throat. Halbherr, then 21, came at Farley with a broken bottle, and Farley ran. Markowitz and Halbherr chased Farley, and when they caught up Farley was accompanied by his brother and two or three other boys. The two sides fought. Farley fought with Marko*630witz, and Farley and one other person kicked Markowitz in the head while he was on the ground, causing partial hearing loss.
Applying the framework of Williams v. State16 to these facts, the trial court ruled (1) that the evidence of the independent crime was relevant to Farley’s “bent of mind” and “course of conduct” in this case; (2) that there was no question that Farley committed the independent act; and (3) that the crimes were sufficiently similar because Croft and the 1986 victim suffered similar head injuries from being beaten and kicked in the head. I disagree with the trial court’s rulings on the first and third prongs. First, “bent of mind” and “course of conduct” have evolved into amorphous catch-phrases, difficult to define and slippery in application. While they may be legitimate purposes for introducing independent crime evidence under some circumstances,17 careful analysis of the relevance of the evidence is especially important when those purposes are claimed. Such careful scrutiny is essential because a person’s bent of mind is dangerously close to being his character, and a person’s course of conduct could easily show nothing more than a mere propensity to act in a certain manner.18
In this case, proof of Farley’s 1986 conviction tended to show nothing relevant to the issues in the trial of the crime charged. The evidence only demonstrated Farley’s bad character and his propensity to act in a criminal fashion. As to similarity, the circumstances surrounding the 1986 fight and those surrounding Farley’s altercation with Croft were not remotely similar or connected. One was a group skirmish between young neighborhood toughs in Chicago and the other was a one-on-one fist fight between two grown men in Georgia seven years later. Both the state and the trial court seize on the fact that in both fights Farley kicked or hit his opponent in the head after his opponent was on the ground. That fact certainly denigrates Farley’s character, but it is not enough to render admissible the evidence of the first crime. There is nothing in the circumstances of the first fight that is so unique to Farley that it sets Farley apart or in any way tends to prove that Farley committed the second crime. In fact, proof of the 1986 crime tends to show nothing more than Farley’s bad character.
Farley also argues that the prejudicial impact of the independent *631act evidence outweighed its probative value, and that the trial court erred by failing to balance the prejudicial impact and the probative value on the record.19 “It has long been the rule in Georgia that evidence of an independent crime is never admissible unless the prejudice it creates is outweighed by its relevancy to the issues on trial.”20 The trial court’s authority to exclude otherwise relevant evidence because of its undue prejudice helps safeguard a defendant’s right to a fair trial. I would hold that a trial court must make part of the record its determination as to whether the prejudicial impact of independent crime evidence outweighs its probative value.21 Such a requirement would help ensure that this important balancing test is performed, and make it possible for an appellate court to resolve whether the trial court correctly decided the issue. Furthermore, I believe that the prejudicial effect of the independent crime evidence in this case did outweigh its probative value, because the two incidents were remote in time, because there was substantial evidence of Farley’s guilt of the crime charged without the independent act evidence, and because the state did not need the evidence to establish any element of the crime charged.
Although the evidence of the independent crime should not have been admitted, I would hold that the error is not reversible. The evidence establishing Farley’s guilt of the offense of felony murder is overwhelming. Two eyewitnesses to the fight — Sarah Davis and her neighbor — testified at trial and identified Farley as the person who stood kicking the victim in the head while the victim was still on the ground making no attempt to fight back. Farley himself testified that he fought with the victim, but stated that the victim hit the ground after one punch to the jaw and he did not hit or kick the victim again after that. Farley’s testimony was sufficient in itself to support a conviction for felony murder. Thus I would hold that it is highly probable that the admission of the independent crime evidence did not contribute to the jury’s verdict,22 and I concur in the majority’s af-firmance of the conviction.
I am authorized to state that Justice Fletcher joins this special concurrence.
*632Decided June 30, 1995
Reconsideration denied July 28, 1995.
Joe Frank Harris, for appellant.
T. Joseph Campbell, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Marla-Deen Brooks, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 See OCGA § 24-2-2. Character evidence is admissible if “the nature of the action involves such character,” id., or if the defendant first puts his character in issue, OCGA § 24-9-20.

 Stewart v. State, 263 Ga. 843, 847 (440 SE2d 452) (1994) (Hunt, C. J., dissenting).

 See Farmer v. State, 100 Ga. 41, 43 (2) (28 SE 26) (1896).

 119 Ga. 395, 408-411 (46 SE 897) (1904). The Farmer court had expressed a more limited definition of the exception:
[Ejvidence of other representations or transactions may be received, as tending to *629show motive or intent, when the transactions are so connected in time and so similar in their other relations that the same motive may reasonably be imputed to all.
Farmer, 100 Ga. at 43.

 The trial court heard this testimony during a pre-trial hearing held pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3.

 261 Ga. 640 (409 SE2d 649) (1991). Echoing Farmer and Cawthon, Williams held that if the state wishes to introduce evidence of a defendant’s independent act or crime, it must affirmatively show that the evidence is offered for a specific, non-character, purpose. The state must also demonstrate that there is such a logical connection between the crimes, or that the crimes are so similar, that proof of the independent crime tends to prove that the defendant committed the crime charged.

 See, e.g., Peppers v. State, 261 Ga. 338, 340 (404 SE2d 788) (1991); Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141, 142 (317 SE2d 531) (1984).

 See Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence, p. 145, § 11.13 (1995).

 See Oller v. State, 187 Ga. App. 818 (371 SE2d 455) (1988).

 Robinson v. State, 246 Ga. 469, 470 (271 SE2d 786) (1980).

 See Adams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 29, 34 (430 SE2d 35) (1993) (requiring that a trial court balance probative value and prejudicial impact on the record in cases involving the sexual abuse of children).

 Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59 (230 SE2d 869) (1976). See also Barrett v. State, 263 Ga. 533, 535 (436 SE2d 480) (1993) and Hill v. State, 263 Ga. 37, 43 (427 SE2d 770) (1993), both holding that admission of independent crime evidence was harmless error.