Court Opinion

ID: 9736903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:09:25.727098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:55.238556
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).'
The trial court decision interpreting the term “written agreement” in SDCL 58-11-9.3 to mean a written document “signed by the insured ” exceeds the plain, ordinary and popular meaning of the statutory language. (Emphasis added). An agreement is “a coming together of minds.” Black’s Law Dictionary 62 (5th ed. 1979). A written contract “is one which in all its terms is in writing.” Id. at 294. Accordingly, a written agreement is a coming together of minds with the terms of the coming together in writing. Although the writing may normally be signed by the parties, it is not a prerequisite for the existence of a written agreement.
There is a vast difference between statutorily mandated uninsured and underin-sured motorist coverage and the simple requirement that limiting coverage for a named individual be done by written agreement. To omit the former requires a writing signed by the parties. See Kincer v. Reserve Ins. Co., 11 Cal.App.3d 714, 90 Cal.Rptr. 94 (1970). However, to limit coverage, which the contracting parties may freely do, only requires a writing. Furthermore, this statutory interpretation does not put the insured at the mercy of the insurer, as the majority claims, because the insurer must still establish the existence of a written agreement.
The majority opinion notes that:
[tjestimony and deposition exhibits were presented to the trial court concerning Larry Merrill’s requests to exclude his children (including Tamara) from coverage and that his premiums be reduced (requested on at least three occasions) to reflect the exclusions^]
yet fails to note that:
1) Larry Merrill did not pay for coverage for Tamara, and
2) the written endorsements excluding coverage may have become a part of a written agreement, if not when they were received by the insured, then when the policy to which they became attached was reissued or renewed and paid for.
This evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of an agreement about policy coverage. Consequently, summary judgment was clearly improper. State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Thiewes, 448 N.W.2d 1 (S.D.1989); Groseth Int'l, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159 (S.D.1987); Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801 (S.D.1987).
Therefore, we should reverse and remand to determine whether an agreement exists “in writing.”