Court Opinion

ID: 9538710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:40:24.270812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:06.401556
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.,
dissenting: As I view the court’s opinion, it correctly states the venerable rule that in the construction of wills the intention of the testator, as gathered from the will’s four comers, is to be given effect, but it then fails to apply that rule.
*105It may be granted that the language of Paragraph VII of the will is confusing, as the court has termed it. But, although its provisions are inartistically phrased, I have no difficulty in discerning from the language used an intent on the testator’s part to provide liis second wife with a furnished house for so long as she lived or should occupy the residence. To me, this is a far more logical construction to place on the phraseology employed by the testator than an intent on his part to give her the furnishings, including the family silver, outright.
In my opinion, the will, in its entirety, evidences the testator’s desire that title to all his property, including personalty, should vest in his own children subject to the occupancy of his widow. Paragraph VII carries out such a design, if it be construed, as I think it should, to make available to the second Mrs. Benelli a furnished home during her life or so long as she occupied the same.
Since I believe that Mr. Benelli’s intention can be deduced from the will itself, as viewed in the context of his second marriage, I see no reason to search for or apply additional rules of construction. I would reverse the judgment and, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Price, C. J., and Fatzer, J., join in the foregoing dissent.