Court Opinion

ID: 9391172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 14:07:09.380052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.906585
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Shaw v. Black, 2023-Ohio-1428.]

STATE OF OHIO                    )                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                 )ss:                  NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN                 )

PIERRE SHAW
                                                       C.A. No.        22CA011930
        Petitioner

        v.
                                                       ORIGINAL ACTION IN
JENNIFER BLACK, WARDEN                                 HABEAS CORPUS

        Respondent

Dated: May 1, 2023

        PER CURIAM.

        {¶1}    Pierre Shaw has petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus to compel

Respondent, Jennifer Black, to release him from custody. Warden Black has moved to dismiss.

For the following reasons, this Court grants the motion to dismiss.

        {¶2}    When this Court reviews a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we must

presume that all of the factual allegations in the petition are true and make all reasonable inferences

in favor of the nonmoving party. State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson, 69 Ohio St.3d 489, 490 (1994).

A petition can only be dismissed when, having viewed it in this way, it appears beyond doubt that

the petitioner can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to the relief requested. Goudlock v.

Voorhies, 119 Ohio St.3d 389, 2008-Ohio-4787, ¶ 7. With this standard in mind, we begin with

the facts alleged in the petition.

        {¶3}    According to Mr. Shaw’s petition, he was convicted of robbery in 2007 and

sentenced to four years in prison. The judgment of conviction included a notification regarding
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                                                                                            Page 2 of 4

postrelease control, but it did not state that postrelease control is imposed “pursuant to R.C.

2967.28.”

        {¶4}   Mr. Shaw served his sentence and, after his release, violated the terms of his

postrelease control by committing a new offense. After he served a federal prison term, the Adult

Parole Authority held a hearing and determined that he violated the terms of his postrelease control.

He received a prison-term sanction which he is currently serving in the Lorain Correctional

Institution.

        {¶5}   Mr. Shaw filed this petition seeking his immediate release from custody. Relying

on State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, ¶ 1, he contends that his judgment of

conviction, which failed to cite to R.C. 2967.28, did not authorize the Adult Parole Authority to

validly impose postrelease control.

        {¶6}   State habeas corpus relief is available in specific, extraordinary circumstances.

R.C. Chapter 2725 prescribes the procedure for bringing a habeas corpus action. The petitioner

must file a petition that contains specific, required, information. If the petition fails to state a

claim, this Court should dismiss it. Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 327 (2001). For this Court

to grant the writ, Mr. Shaw must demonstrate that there is an unlawful restraint of his liberty or

that the judgment of conviction and sentence is void due to lack of jurisdiction. Pegan v. Crawmer,

76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99-100 (1996). Mr. Shaw has alleged that the Adult Parole Authority could not

supervise him on postrelease control because the judgment of conviction is erroneous for failing

to include a cite to R.C. 2967.28.

        {¶7}   As noted above, to dismiss a petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond

doubt from the petition, after all factual allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences

are made in favor of Mr. Shaw, that he can prove no set of facts warranting relief. State ex rel.
                                                                                  C.A. No. 22CA011930
                                                                                             Page 3 of 4

Dehler v. Sutula, Judge, 74 Ohio St.3d 33, 34 (1995). “A writ of habeas corpus is warranted in

certain extraordinary circumstances ‘where there is an unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty and

there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.’” Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper, 93

Ohio St.3d 614, 616 (2001), quoting Pegan v. Crawmer, 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99 (1996).

       {¶8}    Mr. Shaw has asserted that the Adult Parole Authority could not supervise him on

postrelease control because the judgment of conviction fails to cite to R.C. 2967.28. According to

Mr. Shaw, pursuant to State v. Grimes, this failure means that the judgment of conviction did not

validly impose postrelease control.

       {¶9}    Since Grimes was decided, the Supreme Court has reconsidered its approach to

postrelease control notification sentencing errors. The Court has “reject[ed] the notion that the

failure to incorporate a notice of the consequences of a violation of postrelease control in the

sentencing entry as required by Grimes renders the sentence void to the extent that it does not

properly impose postrelease control.” State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 6.

See, also, State v. Hudson, 161 Ohio St.3d 166, 2020-Ohio-3849. In other words, an error in the

imposition of postrelease control renders the judgment of conviction voidable, not void.

       {¶10} To the extent there is any error in the trial court’s imposition of postrelease control

in Mr. Shaw’s judgment of conviction, that error renders the judgment of conviction voidable, not

void. Hudson at ¶ 14. Because Mr. Shaw could have raised this error on appeal, his argument that

the trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control is barred by res judicata. Id. at ¶ 16.

       {¶11} Considering all of the allegations in Mr. Shaw’s petition as true, they are

insufficient to warrant habeas corpus relief. The motion to dismiss is granted, and this case is

dismissed. Costs are taxed to Mr. Shaw.
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                                                                                          Page 4 of 4

       {¶12} The clerk of courts is hereby directed to serve upon all parties not in default notice

of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. See Civ.R. 58.

                                                     JENNIFER L. HENSAL
                                                     FOR THE COURT

SUTTON, J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

PIERRE SHAW, Pro Se, Petitioner.

DAVE YOST, Attorney General, and STEPHANIE L. WATSON, Assistant Attorney General, for
Respondent.