Court Opinion

ID: 9772181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:09:41.310934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.475267
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. However, I would sustain point of error one. As noted by the majority, the genesis of the point was a bench hearing, which covers 28 pages in the statement of facts. In the course of this hearing, appellant repeatedly objected that the state had failed to establish the proper “predicate” under Boutwell. The state repeatedly countered that the extraneous conduct was “res gestae.” The trial court ultimately admitted the evidence.
At the outset, I must stress that at no time during the course of this lengthy hearing did anyone mention the Rules of Criminal Evidence. A “predicate” objection does not preserve error under the Rules. Boutwell v. State, 719 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), has no legal force independent of Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 404(b). Vernon v. State, 841 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). The principle of “res gestae” in the sense the term is employed here to describe the background of the transaction, likewise was not incorporated into the Rules. Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (opinion on rehearing). Vernon was decided after the trial of this cause, but long before appellant filed his appellate brief. Another case, Owens v. State, 827 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), had been decided before this trial, and might have illuminated the trial court, but apparently neither the state’s attorney nor the defense attorney was aware of it. I also note that no one mentioned Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (opinion on rehearing). Had the court been cited to this case, it would almost certainly have performed a different analysis and our review would be simpler. As it was, the case law cited by the parties in the hearing before the trial court was as outdated as a leisure suit in a karaoke bar.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tex. R.CRIM.Evid. 401. “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident_” Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 404(b).
An objection that evidence constitutes an “extraneous offense” is ordinarily sufficient to apprise the court of the nature of the complaint under Rule 404(b). Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387. Once that complaint is lodged, it is incumbent upon the proponent of the evidence to satisfy the trial court that the extraneous conduct has relevance apart from its tendency to prove character and action in conformity therewith. Id. Evidence which is not relevant is absolutely inadmissible. Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 402.
It must be considered that the proceedings below were improperly presented in the context of Boutwell. Appellant clearly objected to the evidence because it was extraneous, that is, not within the ambit of the charged offense. Under Montgomery, this is a sufficient Rule 404(b) objection. Indeed, appellant assumed his burden was greater than it actually was, because Boutwell recognizes an exception to the general admissibility of extraneous conduct which the Rules do not recognize, namely the notorious “res gestae” background contextual evidence. Rogers, 853 S.W.2d at 33; Mayes v. State, 816 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Under the Rules, when faced with a Rule 404(b) objection, the proponent of that evidence must then satisfy the trial court that the evidence is relevant to a material issue. I conclude appellant’s objection was sufficient to require the trial court to determine whether the evidence was admissible under Rules 401 and 404(b).
*141In reviewing the trial court’s determination of relevancy, an appeals court will reverse the trial court only if by no reasonable perception of common experience can it be concluded that the evidence tends to serve some purpose other than character conformity to make the existence of an elemental fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. The issue must be considered in light of the legal standard announced in Vernon, not the Boutwell analysis employed by the trial court. See, McGlothlin v. State, 848 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (opinion on rehearing).
The state offered the extraneous conduct to show the prior relationship of the defendant and the victim. Each sexual act is a distinct offense, so the evidence of prior relationship is not “same transaction contextual evidence” which might be admissible out of necessity. Rogers, 853 S.W.2d at 33. Background contextual evidence is not admissible unless it makes an elemental fact more or less probable. The state did not suggest which elemental fact the extraneous conduct evidence tended to prove or disprove. The victim testified that appellant took the victim’s hand, placed it on appellant’s penis, grasped the victim’s wrist and forced the victim’s hand up and down until appellant ejaculated. Extraneous acts may be admitted to show specific intent. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 394. The specific alleged conduct in this ease, however, is not susceptible to an interpretation other than intent to arouse and gratify, so the evidence does not make that element more probable. Where the occurrence of the offense is the only fact in dispute, as is the case here, any theory of admissibility must stand or fall on whether it legitimately assisted the jury in determining that fact. Owens, 827 S.W.2d at 916. The state argues that appellant placed the victim’s credibility at issue, but the Court of Criminal Appeals noted, in reviewing a case where the appellant’s older daughter testified that she too was sexually assaulted by her father at age eleven, that general credibility of a witness in a criminal trial is not a material issue in the sense that it will justify the admission of inherently prejudicial evidence of details of an extraneous offense to bolster the victim’s testimony. Id.
The state argues on appeal that appellant impeached the victim’s credibility and opened the door to the extraneous offenses by cross-examining the investigating officer about her report of her initial interview with the victim. The state contends that the defense challenged the victim’s credibility by cross-examining the victim about the date the offense occurred (ironically, whether the offense occurred on Good Friday, April 13, 1990) and by calling witnesses to testify that the victim was not at appellant’s house on April 13, 1990, the date alleged in the indictment. The extraneous offense evidence was not offered in rebuttal, but on initial direct examination by the state. Appellant did not waive error by later eliciting this testimony. “[E]rror is not waived when the evidence is brought in later in an effort to meet, rebut, destroy, deny or explain the improperly admitted evidence.” Rogers, 853 S.W.2d at 35. In the case cited by the state, Pavlacka v. State, 848 S.W.2d 325 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist. 1993, pet. granted), the complainant was recalled to the stand after the defendant testified that the acts had not occurred and the defense had attempted to impeach the complainant with a prior inconsistent statement. The state’s argument that appellant opened the door to specific instances of misconduct under Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 405(b) fails for the same reason. The evidence might well have been admissible once the defense cross-examined the victim, put witnesses on the stand to challenge the victim’s presence at the scene on the alleged date of the offense, and paraded reputation witnesses to vouch for appellant’s decent moral character. It is obvious from defense counsel’s opening statement to the jury that the defense intended to attack the victim’s credibility, but for some unfathomable reason the state elected to offer the extraneous conduct on direct without waiting for a valid excuse for its admission.
At the time the extraneous conduct was offered, the victim’s credibility had not been impeached. Furthermore, the extraneous conduct does not rebut the challenge to his testimony because the testimony concerning the extraneous offenses was subject to the *142same challenge as the testimony concerning the indicted offense and therefore could not logically rebut a challenge to the victim’s credibility. Jessup v. State, 853 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. filed); Hill v. State, 852 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. refused). I conclude the state failed to offer the evidence for an admissible purpose under Rule 404(b).
In contrast to the state’s assertion that appellant failed to lodge a Rule 403 objection, defense counsel did argue that the prejudicial effect must not outweigh the relevancy, and at the close of the hearing stated, “Of course, Your Honor, you know our same objection as to being inflammatory and prejudicial.” Flores v. State, 840 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, no pet.), held a virtually identical objection was sufficient to impose a duty upon the trial court to conduct a Rule 403 balancing test. Regardless, since the extraneous conduct was not shown to be relevant to a fact of consequence aside from criminal propensity, it was not admissible and no further analysis was necessary pursuant to Tex. R.CRIM.Evid. 403. The trial court erred in admitting the evidence of extraneous conduct. Appellant did not bring forward a statement of facts of the jury argument. Therefore, I cannot determine whether the state increased the harm by arguing the extraneous offenses to the jury. Nevertheless, this conduct was reprehensible in nature, of the same type as the charged conduct, and showed a long history of sexual abuse of the complainant. I cannot say that its admission had no effect upon the conviction of the accused. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2). Consequently, I would sustain point of error one and reverse for that reason alone.
I join the majority in their disposition of point of error two and their reversal.1

. The majority does not address it, but the state argues and raises as a cross-point that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the entire report of officer Dolly Dill, the state’s first witness on case-in-chief. The state contends that the entire statement, which mentions extraneous offenses, was admissible under the rule of optional completeness. TexR.Crim.Evid. 107. This is not a matter which the state may appeal. TexCode Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 44.01 (Vernon Supp.1994). We should dismiss the state's cross-point for lack of jurisdiction. See, State v. Manning, 833 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.App.—Waco 1992. no pet.).