Court Opinion

ID: 9861341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:54:31.44956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:13.712018
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent, believing that the Henderson five-factor test was essentially met and established an employer-employee relationship between P & G and the plaintiffs. See Henderson v. Jennie Edmundson Hosp., 178 N.W.2d 429, 431 (Iowa 1970). I readily concede there is a certain anomaly in according P & G the status it strained hard to avoid in its contract with Kelly. ' This is not, however, an equity case in which estop-pel is or could be asserted. To apply equitable principles in this type of action causes havoc with even more important legal principles.
The majority of jurisdictions support the doctrine of dual employment for “borrowed” employees or for employees forwarded by a labor-broker. Under the doctrine the worker has simultaneous or dual employment with both the forwarding and receiving employer. I understand that the majority concedes that our basis for rejecting the doctrine no longer exists. Recognizing the doctrine should control this appeal.
I. The majority, on the basis of our holdings in Henderson and Rouse v. State, 369 N.W.2d 811 (Iowa 1985), contends that the five-factor test is not implicated because “no contract of hire as a matter of law has been shown.” They further state, in reliance on these authorities, that the “factors are only an aid to analysis, ... and of secondary consideration to the contract requirement.” In all respect, I am convinced the cited cases do not so hold.
The very purpose of the five-factor test is to determine whether there is an implied contract of hire; the test would be unnecessary in cases where an employer-employee relationship is already established by contract. Consent to the contract is essentially inferred when the five-factor test indicates employment. Henderson in fact holds that the five-factor test determines whether an employer-employee relationship exists and that such a relationship implies a contract on the part of the employer to hire and on the part of the employee to perform services. Henderson, 178 N.W.2d at 431.
Rouse does state that the five-factor test is an “aid to analysis.” 369 N.W.2d at 814. It does not hold it is “only an aid,” neither does it say, or suggest, it is of secondary importance to the contract requirement. Id.
The majority somehow sees the subject and purpose of the five-factor test as being a prerequisite for its application. This strikes me as simply wrong.
II. My main concern is with the precedent I perceive in the majority holding. The five-factor test recognized, and I think misapplied, by the majority was first developed in ordinary workers’ compensation claims. Because a much greater societal prize is involved there than in an occasional negli*898gence suit, the majority holding seems highly likely to haunt us. Future injured workers employed by dual employers are in peril of facing rejection of workers’ compensation benefits on the claim that there is no employment relationship. This would be most unfair in cases where routine workers’ compensation claims arise and the forwarding employer failed in its contractual responsibilities to provide workers’ compensation coverage.
We will then find we have paid too high a price for allowing these plaintiffs to proceed with their tort claims. Consistency with this majority holding will demand that we exonerate some future employer the responsibility for providing workers’ compensation coverage. We should allow P & G the statutory immunity that, under these circumstances, an overwhelming majority of cases from other states have allowed. Pettaway v. Mobile Paint Mfg. Co., 467 So.2d 228 (Ala.1985) (special employer immune to negligence suit where special employer controls details of employee’s work and work was performed for benefit of special employer); Daniels v. Riley’s Health & Fitness Ctr., 310 Ark. 756, 840 S.W.2d 177 (1992) (holding a temporary employee was dual employee of both an athletic club and temporary service which placed him, leaving only a workers’ compensation remedy); Freeman v. Augustine’s, 46 Ill.App.3d 230, 4 Ill.Dec. 870, 360 N.E.2d 1245 (1977) (finding a temporary employee of a restaurant, whether a borrowed or joint employee, was an employee of the restaurant, barring her negligence action); Chicago’s Fitness Worker’s Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 61 Ill.2d 340, 335 N.E.2d 434 (1975) (holding workers’ compensation liability was joint and several between special and general employer of a temporary employee); Fox v. Contract Beverage Packers, 398 N.E.2d 709 (Ind.1980) (finding a special employer, a manufacturing concern, was the employer of a temporary employee thereby barring temporary employer’s negligence action); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 69 Md.App. 664, 519 A.2d 760 (1987) (holding a temporary employee of Manpower, Inc. who was injured while working for a special employer could not bring tort suit against special employer); Arntz v. Southwestern Wilbert Corp., 156 Mich.App. 309, 401 N.W.2d 358 (1986) (holding that, under economic reality test, both state and business to whom “work fare” participant had been assigned were participant’s employers for purpose of workers’ compensation, barring his negligence action); Farrell v. Dearborn Mfg. Co., 416 Mich. 267, 330 N.W.2d 397 (1982) (holding that the employee of a labor broker was provided to the broker’s customer, under the economic reality test, was barred from bringing a negligence action against the customer); Renfroe v. Higgins Mfg. Co., 17 Mich.App. 259, 169 N.W.2d 326 (1969) (same); Solakis v. Roberts, 395 Mich. 13, 233 N.W.2d 1 (1975) (same); Danek v. Meldrum Mfg. & Eng’g Co., 312 Minn. 404, 252 N.W.2d 255 (1977) (even though contract between special and general employer read “customer acknowledges and agrees that the persons assigned are the special employees of [special employer] and not employees of the customer,” special employer found to be “employer” for workers’ compensation purposes); Wright v. Habco, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 34 (Mo.1967) (special employer of temporary employee found to be employer for workers’ compensation purposes); Antheunisse v. Tiffany Co., 229 N.J.Super. 399, 551 A.2d 1006 (1988) (same); Lesanti v. Harmach Indus., 175 A.D.2d 664, 664, 573 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1991) (holding that where the temporary employee reported at the special employer’s plant, punched a time clock, was supervised in her production work by special employer, and work was for the benefit of the special employer, a negligence suit was barred under the workers’ compensation system); Richiusa v. Kahn Lumber & Millwork Co., 148 A.D.2d 690, 539 N.Y.S.2d 438 (1989) (finding that an employee who worked at a truck repair shop for two years, received uniforms from the company, was instructed and supervised by a company foreman, and who filed for workers’ compensation benefits was an employee of the company resulting in a dismissal of employee’s tort suit); Campbell v. Central Terminal Warehouse, 56 Ohio St.2d 173, 10 Ohio Op.3d 342, 383 N.E.2d 135 (1978) (holding a special employer was the employer of a temporary employee for workers’ compensation purposes, thereby precluding a negligence action); Robinson v. Omark Indus., 46 Or.App. 263, 611 P.2d 665 (1980) *899(holding that where the temporary employee received workers’ compensation from the special employer and was under the control of a special employer, the special employer was immune from tort liability); Denison v. Haeber Roofing Co., 767 S.W.2d 862 (Tex.App.1989) (same). Contra Novenson v. Spokane Culvert & Fabrication Co., 91 Wash.2d 550, 588 P.2d 1174 (1979) (finding, 5-4, that a temporary worker who was injured working for a customer of a temporary employment agency was not employee of the customer and thereby allowing tort action). While not controlling it is significant that we denied further review from a case of our own court of appeals that held in accordance with the majority holdings. Jones v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 487 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa App.1992).
III. The five-factor test, applied here to undisputed facts, clearly establishes an employment relationship between plaintiffs and P & G. I do not consider the question to be at all close. We should take great care in applying the five-factor test, remembering that employers may or may not acquire their temporary workers through a labor broker. Focus should be on the relationship between the temporary worker and the ultimate employer who in the future may wish to resist, not a tort suit, but a host of workers’ compensation claims.
Because the alleged injuries arose while the plaintiffs worked at the P & G plant, the concern is only with work done there, not any other work done by plaintiffs for Kelly. This is especially important in considering the first (right of selection) and third (right to discharge) tests. P & G could not fire an employee from Kelly but could end its own relationship with the Kelly employee. P & G could also initially reject any employee sent to it by Kelly. This plainly amounts to a right of selection.
As to the second (responsibility to pay wages) test, P & G was required to pay Kelly an hourly rate per worker. Kelly implemented the payment of wages; P & G was responsible for them. Responsibility for payment is the key.
P & G’s right to discharge employees is given in its contractual right to request “reassignment to another Kelly account” of any furnished worker. This terminates the relationship of the “reassigned” employee with P & G and establishes the third factor (right to discharge).
The fourth factor (right to control work) test is also clearly satisfied. The record shows:
(1) P & G determined the hours and shifts available to plaintiffs;
(2) plaintiffs were trained by full-time P & G personnel;
(3) plaintiffs were shown P & G videotapes or slides pertaining to how they were to conduct themselves at P & G;
(4) plaintiffs were supervised in the hands-on operation of the lines;
(5) P & G determined the need for Kelly temporaries;
(6) P & G established the quality of work to be performed by plaintiffs;
(7) P & G established all safety rules to which plaintiffs adhered;
(8) P & G provided all equipment or items to be used by plaintiffs, including machinery, tools, safety glasses, gloves and hair nets or restrainers;
(9) P & G controlled the time for breaks and lunch hours;
(10) P & G provided all the line machinery equipment and raw materials that go into the line; and
(11) P & G provided any support personnel needed to assist plaintiffs.
It is true that Kelly maintained an on-site supervisor at the P & G plant, but the duties of Kelly’s on-site supervisor were perfunctory and limited to:
(1) receiving requisitions from P & G for the number of workers needed;
(2) sitting at a designated gate and cheeking the assigned Kelly temporaries in and out of the plant;
(3) unless a specific request was made assigning the Kelly temporaries to production lines of P & G where P & G indicated they were needed;
(4) receiving complaints regarding problems involving Kelly temporaries and attempting to resolve them; and
*900(5) maintaining records of performance and attendance.
It is clear that P & G held full and final authority at the plant to dictate how, where and when plaintiffs’ work was to be done.
I think the fifth (for whose benefit work is performed) test is also satisfied. Although plaintiffs’ work may also be said to have benefited Kelly, the work clearly benefited P & G.
I would affirm.
NEUMAN, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ., join this dissent.