Court Opinion

ID: 9737530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:27:50.474768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.584949
License: Public Domain

Vandek Wal, J.
Defendant, his wife and others were charged with conspiracy to promote a lottery.1 On arraignment defendant filed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty to an added count of keeping and occupying a building for gambling purposes.2 The court accepted the plea of guilty after questioning the defendant to determine that the plea was voluntary and not induced by any promise of reward. At that time the court permitted the prosecuting attorney, with the concurrence of the Livonia police department, to dismiss the case as against Evelyn Hollman.
On the day defendant was to be sentenced his attorney made a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty in order to proceed with a full jury trial. The ground offered for the motion was that defendant was, in fact, innocent but had pleaded guilty at the behest of his wife who was allegedly too ill to withstand the pressures of a trial. The motion was *234denied, and defendant was found guilty of keeping and occupying a building for gambling purposes, placed on probation for one year, and fined $500 in costs.
Defendant appeals the denial of Ms motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and seeks an order for a trial on the merits.
In order to protect the substantial constitutional rights involved, the courts of this jurisdiction have generally been sympathetic to criminal defendants who wish to withdraw their plea of guilty at any time before sentence.
“It has been repeatedly held by this Court that a defendant in a criminal case may withdraw Ms plea of guilty at any time before sentence is imposed.
“ ‘We have no question that at any time before sentence the plea of guilty may be changed by the court to one of not guilty.’ People v. Utter (1920), 209 Mich 214, 224.
“ ‘A considerate procedure of long recognition in this jurisdiction admits of withdrawal of a plea of guilty at any time before sentence.’ People v. Piechowiak (1936), 278 Mich 550, 552.
“ ‘A plea of guilty may be withdrawn at any time before sentence.’ People v. Wexner (1937), (syllabus) 280 Mich 696.
“ ‘The first question has been ruled upon by this court on two occasions recently, and it is now the settled rule in this State that a plea of guilty may be withdrawn at any time before sentence.’ People v. Stone (1940), 293 Mich 658, 661.
“ We are committed to the doctrine that a defendant may withdraw his plea at any time before sentence has been imposed.’ People v. Vasques (1942), 303 Mich 340, 342.” People v. Sheppard (1947), 316 Mich 665, 667, 668. *235See, also, People v. Hollingsworth (1953), 338 Mich 161, 163, 164, and People v. Anderson (1948), 321 Mich 533, 535, 536.
There is a sound policy argument behind the numerous cases permitting the withdrawal of a plea of guilty before sentence.
“The rationale behind these cases is apparent. The right to trial by jury in criminal cases is a substantial constitutional right, as are the attendant rights of confrontation, cross-examination, et cetera. "While these rights may be waived by the defendant, the law has erected many safeguards to protect him against his own ignorance, or folly, and against the pressures that might be applied by others. In the case in which the defendant has pleaded guilty, and then desires to avail himself of his constitutional guarantees, the law will not punish him for his indiscretion.” People v. Banning (1950), 329 Mich 1, 7.
Permission to withdraw a plea of guilty must be liberally granted, especially where, as in the instant case, no trial has commenced and the record shows circumstances that cast grave suspicion upon the veracity and voluntariness of the guilty plea. "We hold that it was an abuse of discretion to deny defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty.
The effect of defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial was nullified by his subsequent motion for a trial by jury. At any time prior to trial and sentencing, courts must be patient with indecisive defendants concerning their basic constitutional right to a trial by jury.
The first count of the information was never dismissed.
Reversed and remanded for a full trial to determine defendant’s guilt or innocence on both counts specified in the information.
*236T. Gr. Kavanagh, J., concurred with Vander Wal, J.

 OL 1948, §§ 750.372, 750.505 (Stat Ann 1954 Eev §§ 28.604, 28.773).

 CL 1948, § 750.302 (Stat Ann 1954 Eev § 28.534).