Court Opinion

ID: 9720872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:43:40.007574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:21.905181
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion for the following reasons:
The first question asked the jury on the special verdict form read as follows:
“Did James Pomush consent to the surgery when performed by Dr. Brian J. McGroarty?”
Prior to the time the jury was charged, plaintiffs strenuously protested to the district court that the question was not sufficiently clear because it is undisputed by plaintiffs that Pomush did consent to the cystoscopy. Plaintiffs claim that, instead, the interrogatory should specifically have inquired whether James Pomush consented to the vasectomy. For example, in urging the trial court to modify its special verdict form, plaintiffs’ counsel stated:
“No, wait a minute. I am not sure I understood it the way you framed your question. I am saying this, I would get exception to that verdict form as stated, because I think that the question is, under the terms of this record, is, ‘Was there a valid existing consent to the vasectomy at the time that it was performed?’ Now we might as well call a spade a spade. We are talking about a vasectomy, nothing else. Was there a valid existing consent to the performing the vasectomy at the time that it was performed? That is number one.”
In support of their post-trial motions, plaintiffs similarly contended that the trial court erred by failing to submit the following question to the jury:
“Was there a validly existing consent on the part of the Plaintiff to the performance of the vasectomy at the time that Dr. McGroarty performed the vasectomy?”
On appeal, plaintiffs continue to argue that the question submitted to the jury was improper.
I am persuaded by plaintiffs’ contention. The jury, as the finder of fact, must clearly be informed of the decisions it is asked to make. Where the questions propounded to it are ambiguous and unclear in application to the case, basic elements of a fair trial are lacking. Thus, the interrogatories posed to the jury must be clear and precise so that there is no likelihood of confusion. See, Wolle v. Jorgenson, 256 Minn. 462, 99 N.W.2d 57 (1959). In this case I can discern no reason for the trial court’s refusal to specifically refer to the vasectomy in “Question 1.” Use of the general term “surgery” in the interrogatory serves no purpose other than to confuse the jury. After all, the record discloses that Pomush did authorize the cystoscopy which was performed and arguably consented to certain surgery which was not done. The precise question for the jury’s resolution was whether plaintiff consented to the vasectomy. To prevent the possibility of confusion on the part of the jury, the trial court should have worded the interrogatory as requested by plaintiffs.
It is also difficult to understand why the hospital’s entire liability depended on *95whether or not McGroarty received consent from Pomush. The wording of “Question 2” of the special verdict foreclosed a finding of negligence when the jury answered “Question 1” in the affirmative.
It is possible that Midway could be found negligent .even if Pomush had previously given his consent for a vasectomy to Dr. McGroarty. It could be argued that although Pomush had at one time authorized Dr. McGroarty to perform the vasectomy, Midway knew he had become reluctant, as the record clearly shows, and intended to or did revoke his consent. Accordingly, it can be contended that Midway, in failing to inform the doctor of the patient’s reluctance, as reported in the hospital records, was negligent. Plaintiffs communicated this theory of recovery to the trial court but it was rejected.1
It must be emphasized that, based upon the evidence in this case, there was not only a question of consent as Question 1 of the special verdict indicates, but also a question as to whether, in any event, there was negligence in proceeding with surgery. If plaintiff’s testimony is credible, it is difficult to imagine what more he could have done to prevent this vasectomy. With this in mind, appropriate questions should have been fashioned for the jury.
The majority also indicates that the jury’s findings that plaintiffs incurred no damages are reasonably supported by the record. I cannot agree. A medical expert testified that the vasectomy caused Pomush to suffer from a permanent state of severe depression. In addition, many friends of Pomush testified that his personality has changed dramatically since the vasectomy. Defendants did not introduce any evidence to rebut these claims. Uncontradicted evidence also shows that these changes in James Pomush had an adverse effect on Gudrun Pomush’s relationship with her husband. Accordingly, the record does not reasonably support the jury’s determination of no damages for plaintiffs.
It seems clear that the interrogatories of the special verdict were incomplete and improper as submitted to the jury, and that the jury’s decision regarding damages finds no support in the record.
I would reverse.
OTIS and TODD, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

. Plaintiffs also raised this issue in their motion for a new trial by stating: “The evidence in this case establishes conclusively the defendant Hospital was negligent in failing to follow its established standard of care in informing Dr. McGroarty of Plaintiff’s unwillingness to consent to a vasectomy and the modification of the surgical consent form; the evidence further establishes conclusively that said negligence was a direct cause of the resulting vasectomy and the damages.” The trial court, in its memorandum, did not specifically respond to this claim.