Court Opinion

ID: 9759542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:19:37.037106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.749659
License: Public Domain

J. JONES, Justice,
dissenting or, alternatively, concurring in the result.
I dissent because this does not appear to be a contested case under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Respondents have the right to seek judicial review of ITD’s decision. However, if this is properly considered to be a contested case, I concur that it should be dismissed for the reason that judicial review is premature. No final order has been issued by ITD and Respondents are entitled to the opportunity to request further proceedings.

THIS IS NOT A CONTESTED CASE

It is common knowledge that if something does not walk like a duck or talk like a duck, it is probably not a duck. Similarly, if a request for a state permit is not required to be processed as a contested case, if the request is not treated like a contested case by the processing agency, and if the agency does not comply with any of the requirements for handling a contested case, it probably is not a contested ease. That is the situation here.
While it is true that requests or applications for state licenses and permits are proceedings that may result in the issuance of an order, as defined in Idaho Code section 67-5201(12), arguably making the proceedings contested cases under Idaho Code section 67-5240, that is not the end of the inquiry. In order to be a contested case, it must be processed in accordance with the statutory requirements in Idaho Code sections 67-5242 through 5253. None of those *878requirements were complied with in this case. There was no notice of hearing, hearing, presiding officer, or recording of proceedings as required under section 5242. There was no recommended order, preliminary order, or final order as required by sections 5243 through 5246. There was no contested ease record upon which to base findings of fact as provided in section 5248. The “evidence” was not as contemplated in section 5251, making it unlikely that the record complied with section 5249. And, while section 5253 contemplates no ex-parte communications, the record here was based almost solely on ex-parte communications between ConocoPhillips/Emmert and ITD.
Further, as required under Idaho Code section 67-5206(2), the Idaho Attorney General has promulgated rules of administrative procedure that apply to administrative proceedings (AG Rules). IDAPA 04.11.01. According to Rule 1 of the AG Rules, “Every state agency that conducts rulemaking or hears contested cases must adopt individual rules of procedure as required by this chapter. Further every state agency will be considered to have adopted the procedural rules of this chapter unless the state agency by rule affirmatively declines to adopt this chapter, in whole or in part.” IDAPA 04.11.01.001.02. ITD has not affirmatively declined to adopt the AG Rules, except in certain narrow respects not relevant here, and therefore the AG Rules apply here. ITD did not follow the contested case rules set out in Subchapter B (Rules 100 through 800) of the AG Rules.11
Idaho Code section 67-5240 appears to make every application for a state license, permit, registration, or charter, a contested case subject to the contested case rules. However, the APA requires much more of a proceeding in order to properly categorize it as a contested case. The Legislature obviously recognized that it would be impractical and unnecessary to make each and every one of these proceedings a contested case. Indeed, it would impose a crushing burden on every state agency to have to appoint a hearing officer every time someone walked through the door wanting some sort of permit, or to be licensed as a lawyer, chiropractor, certified public accountant, or the like.12 Thus, the Legislature wisely provided that, “Unless prohibited by other provisions of law ... an agency or a presiding officer may decline to initiate a contested case ...” Idaho Code section 67-5241(1)(a). If an agency declines to initiate a contested case, the agency is to furnish a brief statement for the reasons therefor. Idaho Code section 67-5241(3). It is unknown whether that occurred in this case. What is known is that ITD did not consider this to be a contested case and did not process it as one. In its opening brief, ITD stated:
The issuance of permits is authorized in Idaho Code title 49. There is not any provision in title 49 which requires the Department to base its actions exclusively on a record. In fact, the permit process generally is not resolved in a contested case or an adjudicative manner. Accordingly, this is a not a case in which the Department was required to make its decision exclusively upon the administrative record.
Counsel for the Department conceded at oral argument that this case was not handled as a contested case.13
*879ITD apparently has a policy of declining to initiate contested cases in the context of permit applications. Rather, it appears that ITD generally treats these matters in an informal manner, comparable in some respects to the informal procedure described in AG Rule 100,14 “i.e., procedures without a record to be preserved for later agency or judicial review, without the necessity of representation according to Rule 202, without formal designation of parties, without the necessity of hearing examiners or other presiding officers, or without other formal procedures required by these rules for formal proceedings.” IDAPA 04.11.01.100.
Since the Department did not consider this to be a contested case and did not process it as a contested case but, rather, processed it informally, it is simply not a contested case. The Legislature gives an agency the option to decline to initiate a contested case and that is what occurred here. Therefore, the Respondents are entitled to review under Idaho Code section 67-5270(2) which provides, “A person aggrieved by final agency action other than an order in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter if the person complies with the requirements of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code.” While the permit and application documents, or the Memorandum of Decision, may be orders, they are not orders in a contested case because this was not a contested case. One need not be a “party” in order to obtain judicial review of a final agency action where the action is something “other than an order in a contested case” under the APA. An aggrieved person may seek judicial review of final agency action resulting outside the context of a contested case. As persons who live along the route and who will be affected by the transportation of the ConocoPhillips units, Respondents certainly appear to be aggrieved persons. As such, they have a right to be heard.

IF THIS IS A CONTESTED CASE, JUDICIAL REVIEW IS PREMATURE

If ITD’s declination to initiate a contested case in this matter was invalid for failure to *880“furnish a brief statement of the reasons for [its] decision” not to initiate a contested case or, if for some other reason not apparent in the record before the Court, this is properly considered to be a contested case, judicial review is premature because contested case proceedings have not run their course. If this is a contested case, I concur in the dismissal so that administrative proceeding can be completed, including the issuance of a proper final order.
The procedural analysis is complicated by the uncertainty as to when, or even if, ConocoPhillips/Emmert actually submitted an application for the overlegal permits. None of the parties have pointed to an application by ConocoPhillips, or its agent Emmert, prior to the four permit and application documents dated August 20, 2010. The copies of those documents in the file are not signed. Under the AG Rules, an application is the initial pleading that commences a contested case. IDAPA 04.11.01.200. If no application was submitted prior to August 20, 2010, it may be that a contested case was never properly initiated.
It appears axiomatic that there can be no parties to a contested case until a contested case is initiated. If ConocoPhillips/Emmert did not file an application until August 20, 2010, it could hardly have been a party before that time.15 Based upon the state of the record, it is difficult to say when a contested case was initiated, if indeed one was.
However, assuming that a contested case was initiated some time during the discussions between ConocoPhillips/Emmert and ITD, it was obviously conducted under informal procedure. IDAPA 04.11.01.101. Rule 102 of the AG Rules states:
If statute provides that informal procedures shall be followed with no opportunity for further formal administrative review, then no opportunity for later formal administrative proceedings must be offered following informal proceedings. Otherwise, except as provided in Rule 103,16 any person participating in an informal proceeding must be given an opportunity for a later formal administrative proceeding before the agency, at which time the parties may fully develop the record before the agency.
IDAPA 04.11.01.102. (emphasis added). None of the briefing before the Court discloses a statute that provides for the use of informal procedure with regard to the permits at issue here or that prohibits an opportunity for further formal administrative review. Therefore, persons participating in the informal proceedings at issue here, specifically including Respondents, must be given an opportunity for a later formal administrative proceeding in order to fully develop the record before ITD. While it is not entirely clear from the AG Rules, it appears that persons, other than applicants, who participate in informal proceedings may be entitled to party status when formal proceedings follow the informal proceedings. Such persons may qualify as petitioners (IDAPA 04.11.01.152), complainants (IDAPA 04.11.01.153) or protestants (IDAPA 04.11.01.155). If Respondents do fall within one of these categories, and it appears they might, they become parties upon the commencement of formal proceedings and need not file a petition for intervention to become a party during the course of the formal proceedings.
Furthermore, ITD has failed to issue a final order. The permits and Memorandum *881of Decision, all dated August 20, 2010, do not constitute final orders under the provisions of IDAPA. In Westway v. Idaho Transportation Dept., 139 Idaho 107, 73 P.3d 721 (2003), this Court considered and decided what constitutes a final order issued by ITD:
The next question is whether a final order was issued by the ITD. It does not argue that it has issued an order that would be final under the APA. The two documents in the record that could arguably constitute a final order are the August 14, 2000 letter written by ITD’s counsel and the September 14, 2000 letter entitled “Final Report” written by a roadway design engineer. Because neither of those persons was the “agency head” (the Idaho Transportation Board), they could only issue either a recommended order or a preliminary order. IDAHO CODE § 67-5243(1) (2001). A recommended order becomes final only after review by the agency head in accordance with Idaho Code § 67-5244. Id. There is no contention that the Idaho Transportation Board reviewed either of these letters. Therefore, neither letter was a recommended order that became final upon review by the agency head. A preliminary order can become final without review by the agency head, Id., but it must include “a statement that the order will become a final order without further notice” and “the actions necessary to obtain administrative review of the preliminary order.” IDAHO CODE § 67-5245(1) (2001). Neither of the letters contained those required statements. Therefore, they were not preliminary orders. Thus, no final order has been issued, nor does the record indicate that the ITD even complied with the hearing requirements in the APA.
Id. at 114, 73 P.3d at 728. The same situation pertains here. There is no indication anywhere in the “record” that the agency head reviewed or approved the permits or the Memorandum of Decision. Mr. Frew, who issued the Memorandum of Decision, is not the agency head. Neither the Memorandum of Decision nor the permits contain the finality statements required by the APA or by the AG Rules. See IDAPA 04.11.01.740. Furthermore, it should also be observed that the four permit and application documents are only conditional “orders.” Each permit states, “Permit not valid until Montana permit has been issued.” There is no evidence in the record that Montana has issued permits for the four loads.17 Thus, there is no final order in this proceeding and, as mentioned above, ITD has also failed to comply with the hearing requirements. Therefore, assuming this to be a contested case, I would concur that the case needs to be remanded for dismissal without prejudice so that the administrative proceedings can be completed in accordance with the AG Rules.
Justice BURDICK concurs.

.It is not even clear if, or when, a contested case might have been initiated in this matter. According to Rule 200 of the AG Rules, an application can initiate a contested case. IDAPA 04.11.01.200. Among the documents in the file before the Court are four documents entitled "Idaho Permit and Application for Over-Legal Permit and/or Load Movement," all dated August 20, 2010. If these were ConocoPhillips/Emmert's first applications for the four permits at issue here, it is unlikely a contested case was initiated prior to August 20, 2010. The copies of documents in the Court file do not appear to have been signed by or behalf of ConocoPhillips/Emmert, making it difficult to determine whether the applications ever became effective.

. In an affidavit submitted in support of ITD’s motion for expedited hearing, Mr. Frew pointed out that ITD issued over 28,000 overlegal permits in fiscal year 2010 for overweight and oversized vehicles. Conducting a contested case for each of these applications would be a daunting and costly undertaking.

. It would be unfair to deem this concession as a binding admission that the matter was not a contested case, just as it would unfair and incor*879rect to deem the Respondents’ attorney's concession that the Respondents were not parties in this matter to be a binding admission. Neither issue was raised or decided below, nor addressed in the briefing before the Court. We should base our decisions upon the actual facts and not upon what individual participants perceive them to be, particularly where the parties have not had an opportunity to brief and argue the issues. With regard to the contested case issue, while the concession by ITD does not constitute a legal admission, it certainly does have a bearing on the factual matter as to how ITD processes overlegal permit requests, including this one. It was by no means handled in the manner of a formal contested case. The question is whether ITD declined to process it as a contested case of any nature under the statutory authority of I.C. § 67-5241(1)(a) or whether ITD was processing it initially under the informal procedure provided for in the AG Rules. With regard to the issue of whether Respondents are parties, the concession by their attorney that they had not been admitted as parties was, at best, uninformed. It was fairly obvious when this case was presented on oral argument that Respondents’ attorney was not familiar with the various definitions of party participants in the AG Rules. The discussion revolved around the definition of a "party” in the context of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which definition does not apply in the context of an administrative proceeding. As one might expect, the AG Rules set out more relaxed definitions for an administrative proceeding that contemplate a broader range of parties than in a court proceeding. Again, this matter was not briefed or considered below and not briefed or argued before this Court. This Court has little basis to determine whether or not Respondents (or, for that matter, ConocoPhillips/Emmert) obtained party status in the administrative proceeding. As that determination is not necessary to the decision of this case, since the procedure in the administrative proceeding was informal under any definition, since the administrative proceeding produced no final order, and since Respondents will have the opportunity upon remand to seek party status (if they are not already parties) and to request a formal administrative proceeding under Rule 102 of the AG Rules, it is a matter of no import here.

. The AG Rules apply only to contested cases, the attorney general not having been authorized to promulgate agency rules for proceedings exempted under I.C. § 67-5241(1)(a). Thus, the AG Rules make no provision for procedures to be employed by the agency where it declines to initiate a contested case. The informal manner in which this case was processed need not necessarily comply with the informal procedure provisions of the AG Rules (Rules 100-103), as those rules are promulgated specifically to apply to contested cases.

. It is unclear when, or if, ConocoPhillips/Emmert became a “party” in the administrative proceeding. Whether a contested case is handled under informal or formal proceedings, it must be initiated by a pleading within the meaning of AG Rule 200. IDAPA 04.11.01.200. The record does not disclose any document that could be considered to be an initial pleading, with the possible exception of the four permit and application documents, dated August 20, 2010. ConocoPhillips/Emmert may have regarded this as a potential defect, as it did move to intervene in the administrative appeal before the district court on August 19, 2010, and was granted intervenor status by the district court judge. That occurred the day before the applications/permits were issued by ITD.

. Rule 103 of the AG Rules states that "informal proceedings do not substitute for formal proceedings and do not exhaust administrative remedies,” unless all parties agree to the contrary in writing. IDAPA 04.11.01.103. There is no such written agreement in this case. It seems fairly obvious that administrative remedies have not been exhausted here.

. Apparently, the permits will lie dormant until such time as the state of Montana issues permits. This creates an interesting situation, since the Idaho permits make no provision for inclement weather conditions. If the state of Montana were to approve permits for the loads on January 1 of 2011, the Idaho permits would automatically become valid for a period of five days. Thus, ConocoPhillips/Emmert would be faced with a situation where they would either have to make the risky decision to proceed over snow-covered roads or allow the permits to expire upon the fifth day from their issuance. It is unknown why ITD made no provision for inclement weather conditions.