Court Opinion

ID: 9901944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 18:08:34.199128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:41.783463
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re A.C.J., 2023-Ohio-4218.]

                                COURT OF APPEALS OOHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE A.C.J.                                    :
                                                :            No. 112745
A Minor Child                                   :
                                                :
[Appeal by D.T., a Nonparent]                   :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 22, 2023

             Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                    Juvenile Division
                                  Case No. FA21109926

                                          Appearances:

                 Cavitch, Familo & Durkin Co. LPA and Bradley Hull IV,
                 for appellant.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.:

                   Appellant D.T., a nonparent, appeals from the juvenile court’s order

that denied his motion for custody or companionship rights of A.C.J., a minor child

(d.o.b. 4/08/2010). Based upon the trial court’s order, A.C.J. remains in the custody

of his Mother, A.J. (“Mother”). The child’s biological father has not been identified,

is not actively engaged in A.C.J.’s life, and is not a party to this appeal. For the

following reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.
Factual and Procedural History

              This matter stems from the relationship between D.T., Mother, and

A.C.J. On June 20, 2010, D.T. met Mother as she walked down a street; A.C.J. was

two months old at the time. D.T. and Mother engaged in an intimate relationship

for a short period of time. After the relationship ended, D.T. maintained interactions

with Mother and A.C.J. D.T. contends that he last saw A.C.J. in August 2021.

              On November 4, 2021, D.T. filed a complaint in Cuyahoga J.C. No.

FA21109926 seeking third-party custody or companionship time with A.C.J. D.T.

alleged that Mother was unfit to have custody and control of A.C.J. as demonstrated

by her inattention and neglect of the child; her failure to provide basic needs; her

residing in an unsafe, violent neighborhood; and the fact that A.C.J. ran away from

Mother’s home. D.T. alleged that he had acted as a father figure for the duration of

A.C.J.’s life, and he is competent to have custody of A.C.J. D.T. sought emergency

custody or, alternatively, emergency companionship rights until a hearing was held

following which the court should grant D.T. sole custody of the child. On the same

date, D.T. filed a motion for emergency custody and companionship time.

              On November 8, 2021, the juvenile court appointed Attorney Pinkie

Clark as guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for A.C.J.

              On November 12, 2021, Mother filed a pro se answer to the complaint.

Mother alleged she is the sole parent of A.C.J.; the child’s biological father is not

involved in their lives. Mother alleged that she and D.T. were previously engaged in

an intimate relationship for two months, but have not dated for seven years.
               The parties attempted a mediation but were unable to resolve the

matter. On December 22, 2021, and January 3, 2022, the juvenile court held video

hearings to address D.T.’s motion for emergency custody and companionship but

no persons were present for the hearings. On January 4, 2022, the juvenile court

dismissed D.T.’s motion for emergency custody and companionship, without

prejudice.

               On January 31, 2022, D.T. filed a second motion for emergency

custody and companionship. On March 22, 2022, the juvenile court held a hearing

on the motion; present at the hearing were Mother, D.T., and D.T.’s counsel. The

court held the motion in abeyance to allow Mother time to retain counsel.

               The trial court’s July 13, 2022 journal entry indicates that the GAL

and Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“the agency” or

“CCDCFS”) made home visits and spoke with A.C.J. and determined there were no

concerns about the care and custody of the child. On December 12, 2022, the GAL

submitted to the juvenile court her report and recommendation to maintain A.C.J.’s

custody with Mother.

               On December 20, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on D.T.’s

complaint for custody or companionship time. D.T., his counsel, Mother, and the

GAL participated at the hearing.

               D.T. testified that he and Mother were involved in a relationship for a

couple of weeks in 2010. D.T. continued seeing A.C.J. even after D.T. and Mother

ended their relationship. D.T. testified that he was not the biological father of A.C.J.,
but he has held a strong bond with the child since A.C.J. was two months old. D.T.

testified that A.C.J. refers to him as his dad. D.T. testified that from 2010 to 2013,

Mother would bring A.C.J. to visit and in exchange D.T. compensated Mother: “I

was a single man, she’s a woman coming over, she needs help. I gave her cash. We

may go eat. We may have casual sex.” Tr. 106. D.T. stated that Mother would

withhold his access to A.C.J. if she felt D.T. had not paid her sufficient funds.

               D.T. testified that he considered himself a father figure for A.C.J.

starting in 2012:

      [S]he kept needing money and I was sympathetic toward the child, and
      I explained to her several times that we’re not getting along, but I will
      be a father to the child if we can agree upon that, and she would agree
      upon that when things suited her well.

      When I didn’t give her enough money, she would renege.

Tr. 99. D.T. testified that he and Mother entered an oral agreement in 2015 agreeing

D.T. could act as A.C.J.’s father.

               D.T. testified that in 2015 A.C.J. had difficulty in school and,

therefore, A.C.J. lived with D.T. and his mother from 2015 through 2016 and during

the summers of 2016, 2017, and 2018. D.T. testified that from September 2016

through September 2018, A.C.J. would alternate between the homes of D.T. and

Mother, depending upon the adult’s work schedules.           D.T. testified that from

September 2018 through August 2021, Mother would allow D.T. access to A.C.J.

temporarily but would then prevent him from seeing A.C.J. because she did not
receive enough money from D.T.: “I have to actually pay her to see him. It’s been

like that for the last 12 years.” Tr. 112.

               D.T. testified that Mother was an unfit parent because she yelled at

and hit A.C.J. D.T. testified that when A.C.J. was younger, Mother whipped him

with the cord from an iron, leaving marks on his shoulders. D.T. testified that he

observed Mother hit A.C.J. on his back and arms with a broom when he did not

properly clean his room. D.T. testified that Mother roughly handled A.C.J. D.T.

testified that Mother threw away A.C.J.’s television set and broke his PlayStation

console and cell phone as forms of punishment. D.T. testified that Mother “whooped

[A.C.J.] real bad” for contacting D.T. Tr. 124. D.T. testified that he observed verbal

abuse by Mother, who used profanities directed at the child and threatened to throw

him out of her house. D.T. testified that A.C.J. ran away from Mother’s home to

D.T.’s home on two occasions, and he believed A.C.J. also ran away to someone else’s

home. D.T. testified that he reported Mother to the agency in 2021, but he did not

know the outcome of the investigation. D.T. testified that Mother lived in a “very

bad” neighborhood. Tr. 119.

               D.T. testified that he drafted exhibit No. 1 — a letter dated September

1, 2016, that referenced A.C.J. as D.T.’s stepson and stated Mother and D.T. were

jointly raising A.C.J. D.T. and Mother signed and submitted the letter in an attempt

to obtain food stamps for D.T. On his own initiative, D.T. also attempted to add

A.C.J. to his medical insurance plan.
              Mother testified that she and D.T. engaged in a relationship for two

to four weeks in July 2010. Mother testified that D.T. is not the biological father of

A.C.J., and D.T. has no obligation to pay child support for the child. Mother denied

that she asked D.T. for money over the years, but stated she accepted money when

offered.

              Mother testified that for a few months during the summer of 2016,

she and D.T. shared custody of A.C.J.; Mother denied that A.C.J. lived with D.T. for

an entire year. Mother testified that D.T. last had physical contact with A.C.J. in

2018, when A.C.J. watched pornography while in D.T.’s care; following that

incident, Mother no longer allowed D.T. contact with the child.

              Mother testified that she did not verbally abuse A.C.J. or yell

obscenities at the child. Mother testified that she enrolled A.C.J. in school and she

takes him to the doctor when needed. Mother testified that A.C.J.’s grades were

declining in September 2021, but he improved his grades within a few months.

Mother testified that she recently placed A.C.J. on medication that improved his

behavior. Mother testified that her punishment of A.C.J. includes withholding his

phone and video games; she denied withholding food or engaging in physical

punishment. Mother testified that she has been investigated by the agency, but

A.C.J. has never been removed from her custody.

              Mother testified that A.C.J. did not call D.T. his father. Mother

admitted that A.C.J. twice ran away to his neighbor’s home and in 2021 he ran away

from respite care to D.T.’s home.
              Mother testified that she has owned her home for 14 years. Mother

denied that she lived in an unsafe neighborhood and described her home as

“awesome” and “really safe.” Tr. 35. Mother testified that the police were called to

her home four times in the past three years for wellness checks and in response to

Mother’s calls when D.T. appeared at her home uninvited. Mother denied that the

police were called to her home because she discharged a firearm in her front yard.

Mother testified that D.T. threatened to take her to court if she did not allow him to

see A.C.J.

              Mother denied that she executed a document whereby she agreed to

share her parental rights with D.T. Mother denied that she and D.T. ever lived

together.

              Clarence Mitchell (“Mitchell”), D.T.’s neighbor, testified on D.T.’s

behalf. Mitchell testified that D.T. and A.C.J. engaged in father-son activities such

as learning how to ride a bicycle, playing sports, and building items. Mitchell

testified that he knows A.C.J. as D.T.’s son and A.C.J. referred to D.T. as “dad.”

Mitchell testified that he did not know of a time when A.C.J. lived permanently with

D.T., but he recalls the child being present on weekends. Mitchell testified that D.T.

served as a positive role model to A.C.J., and D.T. provided financial support to

Mother. Mitchell also testified that A.C.J. appeared well-cared for; nothing in his

appearance caused him concern for the child.

              D.J., mother of D.T., testified that she referred to A.C.J. as her

grandchild and the child has lived in her home, with D.T., at various times. D.J.
testified that as a young child, A.C.J. called her “grandma,” and she felt D.T. and

A.C.J. had a father-son relationship. D.J. testified that A.C.J. spent holidays with

her and her family.

               The GAL testified that she met with A.C.J. in his home, outside of

Mother’s presence, and at an unannounced visit at the child’s school. The GAL

testified that A.C.J. likes the people he interacts with at D.T.’s home, but he wants

to live with his Mother. The GAL testified that she was concerned about Mother

accepting money in exchange for allowing A.C.J. to spend time with D.T., but she

heard no statements about inappropriate behavior. The GAL testified that there was

no reason A.C.J. could not live in Mother’s neighborhood. The GAL testified that

A.C.J. is “doing well,” and the agency has not opened a case against Mother. The

GAL testified that she was unaware of any evidence that Mother is unfit.

               Following trial, the magistrate issued a journal entry on December

30, 2022, that found Mother was not unfit or unsuitable to provide care for A.C.J.

The court further found that D.T. had no legal rights to the child and was not eligible

for an order of companionship under R.C. 3109.12.

               On January 12, 2023, D.T. filed objections to the magistrate’s

decision. On April 7, 2023, D.T. filed the transcript and supplemental objections to

the magistrate’s decision.

               On April 17, 2023, the trial court reviewed D.T.’s objections to the

magistrate’s decision, the transcript, and the GAL’s recommendations and made the

following findings:
The Court finds the mother of the child and D.T. had a [casual]
relationship for a couple of weeks in the summer of 2010, when the
child was two or three months old. They met while the mother was
walking down the street.

The Court further finds that D.T. is not the child’s father. He did not
meet the mother until after the child was born. The mother and D.T.
never lived together and never as a family with the child.

The court further finds that D.T. wanted to be the father figure for the
child and would pay the mother either in money or kind to be the father
of the child. The court further finds that if D.T. did not pay the mother
or give her something, like the use of a car, she would not let him see
the child. The mother would often stop visits with the child because he
did not pay her enough.

The court further finds that D.T. offered to help her with the child,
which she accepted. As time went on mother would ask for help and
D.T. would help her when asked.

The court further finds that the mother would occasionally, especially
at the beginning of the relationship, leave the child in the care of D.T.
or his mother for days at a time.

The court further finds that in 2012 the mother and D.T. agreed that he
would be the father to the child, but the mother reneged on that
agreement a short time later when D.T. did not pay her.

The court further finds that the child has had behavior problems,
especially at school. He has run away on a number of occasions. He
ran to D.T.’s home and to a friend’s home but was returned to the
mother each time.

The mother owns her own home and has owned for a number of years.
Though the home [may be] in a dangerous neighborhood there are a
number of single-family homes that are well kept. There was no
evidence presented that the neighborhood was too dangerous for the
child to reside.

The court further finds that D.T. has made referrals to Cuyahoga
County Division of Children and Family Services about the care of the
child and requests for welfare checks by the police department to the
mother’s home. The referrals to Cuyahoga County Division of Children
      have not resulted in a case being opened and the welfare checks did not
      result in a finding that the child was in any harm.

The trial court found that D.T. did not show that Mother is an unfit parent and,

therefore, dismissed D.T.’s application to determine custody or companionship.

              On May 22, 2023, D.T. filed a timely appeal from the trial court’s April

17, 2023 judgment entry presenting a sole assignment of error for our review:

      The trial court committed reversible error in determining that D.T. did
      not meet his burden of proof in showing that he should be granted
      custody and/or companionship of the minor child.

Legal Analysis

              D.T. argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion when

it denied his motion for custody or companionship of A.C.J.

              We review a trial court’s custody determination under an abuse of

discretion standard. In re P.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109968, 2021-Ohio-3358,

¶ 32, citing Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 523 N.E.2d 846 (1988). The term

abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140

(1983); Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463.

Unsuitability Determination

              “[T]he overriding principle in custody cases between a parent and

nonparent is that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care,

custody, and management of their children.” Hockstok v. Hockstok, 98 Ohio St.3d
238, 2002-Ohio-7208, 781 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 16, citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.

745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).

                 In a child custody proceeding between a parent and a nonparent, a

trial court must first make a parental unsuitability determination before legal

custody may be awarded to the nonparent. A finding of unsuitability requires the

trial court to

       determin[e] that a preponderance of the evidence shows that the
       parent abandoned the child, that the parent contractually relinquished
       custody of the child, that the parent has become totally incapable of
       supporting or caring for the child, or that an award of custody to the
       parent would be detrimental to the child.

In re Perales, 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (1977), syllabus. ““‘Preponderance

of the evidence’ means ‘evidence that’s more probable, more persuasive, or of

greater probative value.’”” In re C.V.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99426, 2013-Ohio-

3361, ¶ 6, quoting In re M.F., 5th Dist. Ashland No. 12-COA-036, 2013-Ohio-1755,

quoting State v. Finkes, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-310, 2002-Ohio-1439.

                 Where a trial court finds that one of the identified circumstances

exists, the parent may be adjudged unsuitable. Hockstok at ¶ 17. We emphasize that

“‘[t]he appropriate analysis is whether the natural parent] is unsuitable as

custodian, not whether someone else is more suitable.’” In re D.C.J., 2012-Ohio-

4154, 976 N.E.2d 931, ¶ 58 (8th Dist.), quoting In re S.M., 160 Ohio App.3d 794,

2005-Ohio-2187, 828 N.E.2d 1044, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.), (McMonagle, J., concurring).

The nonparent bears the burden to demonstrate the parent’s unsuitability. In re
D.C.J. at ¶ 58, citing Scavio v. Ordway, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-09-07, 2010-Ohio-

984, ¶ 26.

                 D.T. argues that he and Mother entered a mutual agreement by which

D.T. would be a father figure to A.C.J. and he would help the child. D.T. further

argues that Mother intended for D.T. to be A.C.J.’s father or to surrender parental

rights to D.T. D.T. also argues that Mother’s neighborhood is too dangerous for

A.C.J. to reside there.

                 In Ohio, a parent may relinquish parental rights to a third-party

nonparent as evidenced by either a written instrument or through the parent’s

conduct. In re Lapiana, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 93691 and 93692, 2010-Ohio-

3606, ¶ 30-33. ““[A] written agreement, while instructive, is not necessary; a parent

may relinquish custody by conduct, and a court must look at the evidence as a

whole.”” In re R.M.R., 2016-Ohio-303, 59 N.E.3d 540, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), quoting

Masitto v. Masitto, 22 Ohio St.3d 63, 66, 488 N.E.2d 857 (1986).                  The

relinquishment of a parent’s rights to custody is a question of fact determined by the

testimony and evidence presented in each case. In re Lapiana at ¶ 30, quoting

Masitto at 66.

                 The evidence demonstrates that Mother and D.T. did not live together

nor did they enter a written agreement whereby Mother relinquished or extended

parental custody to D.T. Mother left A.C.J. in D.T.’s care and custody sporadically

from 2010 through 2018. D.T. occasionally picked up A.C.J. from school and

attended a few school functions. D.T. testified that he and Mother entered a verbal
agreement in 2015 to allow D.T. to act as A.C.J.’s father, but he also stated that

Mother reneged on that agreement. The testimony on whether A.C.J. referred to

D.T. as his father varied — D.T. and his neighbor Mitchell testified that he did but

Mother denied such an allegation.

               All parties concede that D.T. provided Mother with money and other

goods, and he purchased items for A.C.J. But these acts alone do not equate to

Mother’s relinquishment of parental rights. Similarly, singular incidents — such as

the September 1, 2016 letter seeking food stamps for D.T. on A.C.J.’s behalf or D.T.’s

attempt to add A.C.J. to his work medical insurance policy — do not demonstrate

that Mother relinquished parental rights to D.T. Compare In re Lapiana. (A

parent’s conduct demonstrated relinquishment of sole custody rights to a third-

party nonparent where the couple, who was in a committed ten-year relationship,

bought a home together; planned to have two children; the children, friends,

teachers, health insurance carriers, doctors, and others in the community referred

to the nonparent as the children’s mother; and the parent and nonparent entered a

written agreement to jointly raise the first born child.).

               The record does not show that Mother abandoned A.C.J., that Mother

was totally incapable of supporting or caring for A.C.J., or that an award of custody

to Mother would have been detrimental to A.C.J. Mother is gainfully employed and

owns the home where she resides with A.C.J. Mother enrolled A.C.J. in school and

recently obtained prescriptions for the child to assist with ADHD. While D.T.

testified that Mother was abusive and withheld food from the child, the agency
investigated Mother and declined to create a case plan or bring charges against her.

And while D.T. testified that Mother’s neighborhood was unsafe, the GAL testified

there were well-cared for single-family homes in the area, and she did not agree that

A.C.J. could not reside there with Mother. The GAL also recommended A.C.J.

remain in Mother’s custody.

                 For the foregoing reasons, D.T. did not meet his burden to

demonstrate Mother was an unsuitable parent and, therefore, the trial court did not

err when it denied D.T. an award of custody.

Companionship Rights

                 D.T. argued, alternatively, that he was entitled to companionship

rights with the child. R.C. 3109.12 governs companionship rights and reads in

relevant part:

      (A) If a child is born to an unmarried woman, the parents of the woman
      and any relative of the woman may file a complaint requesting the court
      of common pleas of the county in which the child resides to grant them
      reasonable companionship or visitation rights with the child. If a child
      is born to an unmarried woman and if the father of the child has
      acknowledged the child and that acknowledgment has become final
      pursuant to section 2151.232, 3111.25, or 3111.821 of the Revised Code
      or has been determined in an action under Chapter 3111. of the Revised
      Code to be the father of the child, the father may file a complaint
      requesting that the court of appropriate jurisdiction of the county in
      which the child resides grant him reasonable parenting time rights with
      the child and the parents of the father and any relative of the father may
      file a complaint requesting that the court grant them reasonable
      companionship or visitation rights with the child.

                 Pursuant to the statute, only the parents or relative of an unmarried

woman or the acknowledged father of a child born to an unmarried woman is
entitled to companionship rights. D.T. is not the acknowledged father of A.C.J. and,

thus, has no rights under the statute to seek companionship time with the child.

               We note that much of the trial testimony related to D.T.’s allegation

that he would be a more suitable parent for A.C.J. D.T. testified that “I’ll be a better

parent. Even absolutely a better location. I want him to live with me. He’ll be safer

and be more educated. He’ll be in a safer environment. People will love him. He

spends a lot of time by [himself] in the house.” Tr. 134. We acknowledge that D.T.

may have been a positive influence in the child’s life, and he may have contributed

financially and emotionally to A.C.J.’s well-being. However, the trial court’s focus

was whether the parent — Mother — was a suitable parent, rather than D.T.’s

suitability. In re O.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109355, 2020-Ohio-4835, ¶ 16, citing

In re C.V.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99426, 2013-Ohio-3361 at ¶ 15. The trial court

could not compare or consider which home was better suited for A.C.J. without

evidence that Mother was unsuitable.

               Absent a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Mother

was unsuitable as a parent or that D.T. qualified for companionship rights under

R.C. 3109.12, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied D.T.’s motion

for custody or companionship.

               Judgment affirmed.
      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

__________________________________
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR