Court Opinion

ID: 9574275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:03:51.944636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:19.358667
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). This case is about the constitutional right of a defendant to present an affirmative defense to a criminal charge. I conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court erred by not compelling Cisler to invoke the Fifth Amendment in the presence of the jury and by not instructing the jury that an adverse inference could be drawn from that invocation. Because we do not have the trial record before us, I cannot determine whether this error was prejudicial. The consequences of submitting an incomplete trial court record on appeal fall on the defendant who brought this matter to the court. Accordingly, the conviction should be affirmed.
I agree with the majority opinion and the court of appeals' opinion that the defendant was able to present considerable evidence in support of her theory that Cisler caused the victim’s death. Nevertheless, the inference the jury could have drawn from Cisler's refusal to answer would have "added critical weight" to the defendant's affirmative defense. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 186-187 (1963). I therefore conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court erred.
*305The interests behind the prohibition against allowing a jury to draw an adverse inference from a witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a criminal case are clearly set forth by the majority, Majority opinion at 301-303, and under most circumstances, I would entirely agree with this analysis. There are constitutional implications if the state uses against the defendant invocations of the privilege against self-incrimination by prosecution witnesses or the defendant. It would also be unwise to allow defendants to create a reasonable doubt by calling to the stand witnesses who would plead the Fifth Amendment.
We must not forget, however, that the principal reason for our unwillingness to allow the jury to draw an adverse inference from an invocation of the Fifth Amendment is that we do not want the defendant to be prejudiced for exercising a constitutional right. In other words, under most circumstances the defendant benefits from the rule articulated in sec. 905.13. However, in the case at bar, the defendant's ability to mount an affirmative defense is potentially compromised by the operation of the statute. Here, the interests underlying the rule militate in favor of requiring Cisler to invoke the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury. In addition, the reasons for which we generally prohibit the jury from drawing an adverse inference from such an invocation are not present.
Several circumstances distinguish this case. First, in a criminal case the state ordinarily has the burden to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the statute involved in this case is very unusual. It puts the burden on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (the civil standard) that she did not cause the death. In other words, she must prove that the death would have occurred even if she had not *306been under the influence of an intoxicant. Section 940.09(2), Stats. 1991-92.
Second, the defendant testified, so we do not have the problem of commenting on the criminal defendant's failure to testify.
Third, the defendant presented sufficient evidence supporting her theory that Cisler caused the victim's death. We therefore need not be concerned about collusion or fraud on the court.
According to the state's brief, several cases in other jurisdictions bar the drawing of any inference from a witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a criminal case. According to these courts, the jury may think it high court drama for a witness "to take the Fifth," yet the probative value of a witness exercising the privilege is limited. A witness need not justify the fear of incrimination; a witness is not subject to cross examination; and a witness may invoke the constitutional privilege against self incrimination for a reason other than guilt. Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971). "Thus inferring guilt from the mere exercise of the privilege would be improper and is at best based on speculation, not evidence." People v. Mincey, 827 P.2d 388, 408 (Cal.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 637 (1992).*
Although good reasons might exist for excluding any inference from a witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, whether in civil or criminal cases, this court has not accepted them. In adopting sec. (Rule) 905.13, Stats. 1991-92, the court has con-*307eluded that a jury in a civil case may draw an adverse inference from a claim of privilege. But the limitation of adverse inference to civil cases presents a problem of constitutional dimensions in the case at bar.
For the reasons set forth, I concur.
I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH joins this concurrence.

For cases discussing the adverse inferences which may or may not be drawn from invocation of the privilege, see 8 Wig-more on Evidence sec. 2272 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (Walter A. Reiser 1994 Supp.).