Court Opinion

ID: 9686760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:05:15.905015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:21.943198
License: Public Domain

Chappell, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As far as important here, the city ordinance involved provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person * * * to sell or offer for sale, or dispose of in any manner, any obscene, lewd, or indecent book, picture, or other publication or thing.” (Italics supplied.)
As I view it, the words “dispose of in any manner” should be read in context with the words “to sell or offer for sale.” In doing so, the principle contained in the legal doctrines of “ejusdem generis” and “noscitur a sociis” gives the language a meaning which includes all related dispositions to another of “any obscene, lewd, or indecent” property which may be made consistent with the intent and purpose of the ordinance to prohibit the selling or offering for sale.
To “dispose of” in a popular sense as used in reference to property means to part with a right to or possession or ownership of it to another. If that does not take place, it could hardly be said that the property was disposed of when as here “dispose of in any manner” which, as general language, follows and is associated with “sell or offer for sale,” words of like kind or character. When used in that context, “dispose of in any manner” was intended to include all those cases where persons by some artifice, indirection, or design, have attempted to cover up or circumvent a sale or offer for sale of “obscene, lewd, or indecent book, picture, or other publication or thing” and thus evade the penalty of the law.
Viewed in such light, I am unable to comprehend *649that a citizen wholly innocent of any wrongdoing could be charged and convicted under the ordinance.
Authorities supporting the foregoing conclusions are too numerous to repeat here. They are cited in Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.), Vol. 12 A, pp. 497, 500, 501, 505, and 507; and Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.), Vol. 38, pp. 567, 568, and 569. See, also, 82 C. J. S., Statutes, § 331, p. 654, and § 332, p. 656, with authorities cited. In such last-cited section at page 660, dealing with the doctrine of “ejusdem generis” it is said: “It has been held especially applicable to penal or criminal statutes, and statutes which partake of the nature of criminal process.
“This rule or maxim is an illustration or specific application of the broader maxim noscitur a sociis, which is discussed supra § 331. * * *
“The rule finds application and has frequently been applied where such terms as ‘other,’ ‘any other,’ ‘others,’ ‘or otherwise,’ or ‘other thing’ follow an enumeration of particular classes, and where this occurs such words are to be read as ‘other such like,’ and are construed to include only others of like kind or character.”
As I view it, the district court erroneously dismissed the complaint and the judgment doing so should have been reversed.
I am authorized to say that Simmons, C. J., concurs in this dissent.