Court Opinion

ID: 9850208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:53:25.347638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:33.118463
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree with the majority opinion that the trial court erred by failing to consider whether the termination of husband’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. In reaching this result, however, the majority incorrectly characterizes the issue as one involving merely child custody and inappropriately focuses on OCGA § 19-7-1, a statute placing custody and decision-making control over a child with the parents and enumerating ways in which that parental control may be lost. In my opinion, the correctness of the trial court’s order terminating husband’s parental rights and the resolution of this appeal depends not on application of OCGA § 19-7-1 but OCGA § 15-11-94, the statute that specifically provides the conditions and procedures under which parental rights may be terminated in Georgia.
It is indisputable that a parent possesses certain powers of control and rights and obligations with respect to a child arising from the parent-child relationship. It is equally indisputable that these parental powers of control and commensurate rights can be forfeited only “in one of the modes recognized by law.” Miller v. Wallace, 76 Ga. 479, 486 (1886). For example, under Georgia law, a parent may relinquish parental powers of control over a child by voluntary *91contract pursuant to which the child is released to a third party, OCGA § 19-7-1 (b); may surrender or terminate parental rights by consenting to the adoption of the child, OCGA § 19-8-4, § 19-8-5, § 19-8-6, or § 19-8-7; or may have their parental rights terminated pursuantto OCGA § 15-11-93 etseq. Although the issue in this appeal originally arose out of a custody dispute involving only the parties’ power of parental control over their daughter, see OCGA § 19-7-1, by the parties’ agreement and the incorporation of the agreement in the final order the issue turned into one involving the complete forfeiture of husband’s parental rights.4 Thus, the court’s order affects not only husband’s parental powers of control over the child but terminates in their entirety all of husband’s rights and obligations with respect to the child arising from the parental relationship, thereby rendering OCGA § 15-11-94 the applicable statutory authority. See generally Watkins v. Watkins, 266 Ga. 269 (466 SE2d 860) (1996) (custody dispute turned into Title 15 deprivation proceeding where court found minor children deprived and awarded custody to DFACS).
Decided December 1, 2005.
Sarah M. Tipton-Downie, for appellant.
Durden, Kaufold, Rice & Barfield, Howard C. Kaufold, Jr., for appellee.
Under clearly established Georgia law, courts must follow the applicable provisions of OCGA § 15-11-93 et seq. in order to terminate the parental rights of a parent. In the Interest of J. E. E., 228 Ga. App. 831 (2) (493 SE2d 34) (1997). Because the parties to this appeal chose termination of parental rights as the “mode” to end the parent-child relationship between husband and his daughter, I would hold that the trial court erroneously terminated husband’s parental rights without complying with the requirements of OCGA § 15-11-93 et seq., including the requirement that the court consider the best interest of the child. See OCGA § 15-11-94 (a); Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Ammons, 263 Ga. 382 (436 SE2d 316) (1993). Accordingly, I agree that the trial court’s order must be reversed.

 The trial court’s order expressly terminated husband’s parental rights, holding that husband “shall have no further parental rights, privileges, or interest in the minor child involved in this matter.”