Court Opinion

ID: 9964007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 18:10:20.062208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.799961
License: Public Domain

J-S13013-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DOUGLAS CODY ALLEN FLOWER                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1291 WDA 2023

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 29, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                        CP-25-CR-0002405-2022

BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                          FILED: APRIL 26, 2024

       Appellant Douglas Cody Allen Flower appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County following his

open guilty plea to the charges of neglect of care-dependent person and

financial exploitation of older adult or care-dependent person.1 After a careful

review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On November

16, 2022, the Commonwealth filed an Information charging Appellant with

crimes in connection with the neglect of the elderly victim, who was

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2713(a)(1) and 3922.1, respectively. The Commonwealth

also charged Appellant with dealing in proceeds of unlawful activities, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 5111(a)(1); however, the charge was nol prossed as part of the
parties’ plea agreement.
J-S13013-24

Appellant’s father. On July 19, 2023, Appellant, who was represented by

counsel, proceeded to a scheduled case status conference hearing.

      At the commencement of the hearing, the trial court indicated

Appellant’s jury trial was set to begin on July 20, 2023. However, the

Commonwealth indicated it had conveyed a plea offer to Appellant’s counsel.

Counsel confirmed he conveyed the plea offer to Appellant; however, he noted

Appellant had not decided whether to accept or reject the plea offer. N.T.,

7/19/23, at 6-7. The trial court informed Appellant that it was Appellant’s

decision as to whether to accept the plea offer. Id. at 7. The Assistant District

Attorney (“ADA”) noted: “This would be [Appellant’s] last opportunity to

consider that plea offer because, after we adjourn for the day, if we commence

jury selection tomorrow morning, that plea offer will be withdrawn after we

break.” Id. at 9.

      In response, the following exchange occurred:

      THE COURT: [Appellant], again, the Commonwealth put that on
      the record. Again, I’m in no way, shape, or form guiding you one
      way or the other. I think you understand that because you and I
      have been pretty direct with each other here this afternoon. If
      you want, [Appellant], I would have the courtroom cleared out so
      you can speak to [defense counsel] if you wish. I do not want you
      to feel you’re obligated to do so or having anything forced upon
      you. I’m not trying to insinuate anything.
            [Appellant], do you want the opportunity to speak privately
      with [defense counsel] or do you just prefer that we just see you
      tomorrow morning when we pick a jury. There’s no wrong answer,
      [Appellant].
      [APPELLANT]: Thank you, Your Honor.

                                      -2-
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     THE COURT: If [defense counsel] comes back in and says he
     needs more time, I would certainly be willing to accommodate
     that. We will make sure it’s a private conversation.
           I absolutely want to reiterate this, [Appellant]. Just because
     I’m letting you speak to [defense counsel] is not any type of even
     an insinuation on my part as to what you should do.
           Do you understand that?
     [APPELLANT]: Yes, I do, Your Honor.
     THE COURT: Again, whether you want to speak about this
     resolution or you can talk more about trial strategy, I have no
     problem with that either way.
            [Defense counsel], I’m not going to put actually any type of
     time limit on it.
     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Judge.
     THE COURT: But, just for everybody’s sake that’s here, plan on
     about 15 minutes.
     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.
     THE COURT: If you need more time than that, let us know.
                                      ***
     [ADA]: I would just like to clarify one point, as far as the plea offer
     is concerned. The plea offer would be an agreement to a three to
     six years aggregate sentence.
     [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right, that had to be clear to me, yes.
     [ADA]: I just wanted to clarify that because I think there may
     have been a miscommunication.
          An alternative plea offer would be Counts 1 and 3 as
     charged, so the felony one and felony two, with no agreement on
     sentence, but then the parties could make their respective
     sentencing arguments.

Id. at 10-13.

     The trial court cleared the courtroom, and the record reveals Appellant

and defense counsel met from 2:47 p.m. to 3:33 p.m. Apparently having

conveyed he wished to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer, the ADA

                                      -3-
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entered the courtroom and informed Appellant that he should “look over [the

packet [he] was just handed.     It’s all the documents that are associated with

[the] guilty plea today.” Id. at 14. A few minutes later, the trial judge entered

the courtroom, and the following exchange occurred:

      THE COURT: When we had recessed previously, I gave you the
      chance to speak to [defense counsel] privately. That was some
      time ago. Do you feel you had enough time to speak to him about
      your possible options here this afternoon?
      [APPELLANT]: Yes, I have.
                                      ***
      THE COURT: All right, [Appellant]. I have a document in front of
      me. Do you still have a copy of the defendant’s statement of
      understanding of rights in front of you right now?
      [APPELLANT]: Yes.
      THE COURT: All right. I have a copy of that which has a signature
      above the line defendant. Is that your signature?
      [APPELLANT]: Yes, it is.
      THE COURT: All right.       Now, did you review this document
      carefully?
      [APPELLANT]: No.
      THE COURT: All right, I appreciate your candor. I want you to
      read along, though, that’s important because my job is to make
      sure that you understand your rights, the rights you have and the
      rights you’re giving up. So, I’d rather have you say that than say
      I read it but didn’t understand it. All right?
            Commonwealth, I’m going to take the lead on the colloquy.
      [ADA]: Thank you, your Honor.
      THE COURT: With regard to the first couple paragraphs, and this
      is somewhat stating the obvious, you have a constitutional right
      to a trial. Anybody charged with any criminal offense has a
      constitutional right to a trial. As you know, trial was scheduled,
      well, technically scheduled to begin tomorrow morning. By
      entering a plea of guilty you are giving up that right to go to trial.
            Do you understand that?

                                      -4-
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      [APPELLANT]: Yes.
      THE COURT: This document also indicates that you understand
      the charge which has been filed against you. I think there’s been
      extensive conversation about that.       That you received the
      paperwork. You’re also, as you’re well aware, entitled to the
      service of an attorney, that’s also a constitutional right. And
      [defense counsel] is currently representing you.         Do you
      acknowledge that?
      [APPELLANT]: Yes.
      THE COURT: Let’s go back to paragraph three, [Appellant], the
      details. With regard to the right to trial by jury, you would have
      a right to sit there next to [defense counsel] tomorrow, assist in
      the selection of the 12 jurors that would hear your case. You are
      entitled to the presumption of innocence at trial, and you could
      not be found guilty of the charges or any of the charges unless all
      12 jurors were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, all 12, that
      the Commonwealth had proven its case.
            Do you understand that?
      [APPELLANT]: Yes.
      THE COURT: By entering this plea, if I accept it, you are forever
      giving up that right to a trial on these charges.
            Do you understand that?
      [APPELLANT]: Yes, I do.

Id. at 14-18. Appellant confirmed he understood that, if he proceeded to trial,

he could elect or not elect to testify. Id. at 25.

      The ADA indicated the following:

            So, [Appellant], I do want to start with…the terms of the
      plea bargain in this case.       By signing the statement of
      understanding of rights you are acknowledging that there have
      been no other bargains, no other promise or threat of any kind
      that has caused you to induce—that has caused you to be induced
      into pleading guilty today….[Y]ou’ll be pleading guilty to Counts 1
      and 3, with Count 2 to be nol prossed, costs on the defendant.
      And there is no sentencing recommendation in this case.
            Because there is no sentencing recommendation, and
      although we did discuss the possible sentencing guidelines in this

                                       -5-
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      case previously during the brief status conference…I do still want
      to advise you because there is no recommendation that Count 1,
      being a felony of the first degree, carries a maximum possible
      period of incarceration of up to 20 years, a fine up to $25,000.00.
      Count 3, being a felony of the second degree, carries a maximum
      period of incarceration of up to ten years and a fine up to
      $25,000.00. And you could be sentenced consecutively at those
      counts so the maximum possible sentence that [the trial court
      judge] could impose, and I’m not saying that’s what he will impose
      because there is no recommendation in this case, but he could
      sentence you to a period of incarceration up to 30 years and fines
      of up to $50,000.00. Do you have questions about anything as
      I’ve explained them to you?
      [APPELLANT]: No, I do not.

Id. at 18-19. The trial court reiterated “there’s not a specific recommendation”

regarding sentencing. Id. at 19.

      The trial court asked Appellant if he had received a copy of the criminal

Information, and after Appellant confirmed his receipt thereof, the ADA

provided the facts underlying Appellant’s charges as follows:

             Essentially, the time frame that’s alleged in Count 1 states
      February 21, 2022, but the facts that would have been introduced
      at trial is that beginning in late 2021 and continuing through
      January 4, 2022, in Erie County, Pennsylvania, you, [Appellant],
      did intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause serious bodily
      injury by failing to provide treatment, care, goods or services
      necessary to preserve the health, safety or welfare of a care-
      dependent person for whom you were responsible. Specifically,
      that person was [your father]. And that your actions amounted
      to failing to feed [your father] for six to seven days at a time on
      multiple occasions, later causing him to be found in deplorable
      conditions lying on his bedroom floor unconscious and in mortal
      peril, eventually being admitted to UPMC Hamot with severe
      hypothermia. This course of conduct occurred in the area of
      [****] Saga Street in Lawrence Park Township, Erie County,
      Pennsylvania. And that by committing those acts you did commit
      the crime of neglect of a care-dependent person, a felony of the
      first degree.

                                     -6-
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Id. at 21.    When asked how he was pleading to this charge, Appellant

responded, “Guilty.” Id.

      Regarding Count 3, the ADA indicated:

             It’s further alleged at Count 3 that during the same course
      of time through the year 2021 and ultimately ending in February
      21, 2022, that you, [Appellant] being in a position of trust of an
      older adult or a care-dependent person did carry out the wrongful
      or unauthorized taking or attempt to take by withholding,
      appropriating, concealing, or using the money, assets, or property
      of an older adult or care-dependent person. Specifically, you used
      [the victim’s] debit card or a credit card to make 951 unauthorized
      transactions through two separate bank accounts and/or created
      a joint bank account in both your name and [the victim’s] name
      without authorization and/or sold multiple items of [the victim’s]
      property without his authorization amounting to an approximate
      total of $118,000.00—I’m sorry, $118,551.79 more or less, also
      occurring in the area of [****] Saga Street, Lawrence Park
      Township, Erie County, Pennsylvania, and that by doing so you
      committed the crime of financial exploitation of an older adult or
      care-dependent person, a felony of the second degree.

Id. at 22.    When asked how he was pleading to this charge, Appellant

responded, “Guilty.” Id.     The ADA confirmed that, as part of the plea

agreement, it was moving to nol pros Count 2-dealing in proceeds of unlawful

activities.

      The trial court asked Appellant if he understood the charges, and

Appellant responded, “Yes, I did.” Id. at 24. Defense counsel also confirmed

he was satisfied with the ADA’s reading of the facts underlying the charges to

which Appellant was pleading guilty. Id. Upon further questioning by the trial

court, Appellant confirmed he was not taking any medication or any substance

that would affect his ability to understand. Id.

                                     -7-
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     The following exchange then occurred:

     THE COURT: That leads me to what is now ultimately and solely
     your responsibility. I’ve going over with you very carefully the
     rights you have, the rights you’re giving up. Do you understand
     that no matter what advice you’ve been given by [defense
     counsel] or by anybody else that the decision to plead guilty and
     give up your right to go to trial that has to be your voluntary and
     intelligent decision? Do you understand that?
     [APPELLANT]: Yes, I do.
     THE COURT: Do you accept that?
     [APPELLANT]: Yes, I do.
     THE COURT: All right, based upon that response, I hereby
     conclude that your decision to give up your right to go to trial
     tomorrow, enter a plea, is knowing and voluntary, that you
     understand the possible consequences of your plea. I would also
     note for the record that the Commonwealth [is] prepared to
     proceed. The Commonwealth had made arrangements to bring in
     witnesses tomorrow.
                                     ***
            So, to summarize, [Appellant], there’s absolutely no law or
     statute that says I can prohibit you from trying to withdraw your
     plea, I am just telling you that I’d be the one making that decision
     and that’s why this colloquy with you has been so thorough. I’m
     trying to make sure you understand what you’re doing, and you
     accept responsibility for it. Does that make sense to you?
     [APPELLANT]: Yes.

Id. at 25-26.

     The trial court indicated it was accepting Appellant’s guilty plea as to

Counts 1 and 3, as well as granting the Commonwealth’s request to nol pros

Count 2.

     Prior to the sentencing hearing, on August 3, 2023, Appellant filed a

counseled motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therein, Appellant averred “he

wished to withdraw his guilty plea as he believes he is innocent, and counsel

                                    -8-
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talked him into a guilty plea….[Appellant] is maintaining his innocence [in]

this case.”   Appellant’s Presentence Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, filed

8/3/23.

      The Commonwealth filed a response in opposition thereto, and on

September 8, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s presentence

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. During the hearing, Appellant informed

the trial court he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea because he was “not guilty

of the charges filed against me.” N.T., 9/8/23, at 3. Appellant indicated that

he “pled guilty because I wanted out of jail. I’ve been in here over a year and

a half, or over—almost 14 months. It’s been long enough. I want release from

prison. I’ve had enough of this. I am not guilty.” Id. at 15.

      In response, the Commonwealth noted Appellant admitted his guilt

during an extensive guilty plea colloquy. Id. at 4-5, 15. The Commonwealth

averred Appellant’s “blanket claim of innocence does not satisfy” the standard

for withdrawal. Id. at 8. The Commonwealth indicated there is no evidence

Appellant’s counsel pressured him to plead guilty, and the ADA averred he

“believe[s] that [Appellant] just simply is [seeking to withdraw] his plea and

blaming all of this on his attorney because he doesn’t like that he’s been told

the truth by [his attorney] throughout this process.” Id. at 13-14.

      The Commonwealth then made an extensive proffer of evidence and

witnesses that it would present if the case were to go to trial. Id. at 10-12.

Specifically, the Commonwealth indicated police officers would have testified

                                     -9-
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they responded to Appellant’s residence where they found the victim, his

father, living in “deplorable conditions.” Id. at 10. The victim was comatose,

covered   in   feces/urine,   and   hypothermic.   Id.   When     he   regained

consciousness, the victim reported Appellant “fed him maybe one to two times

per week,” and the victim had lost “in excess of a hundred pounds as a result

of [Appellant’s] failure to feed or properly hydrate [the victim].” Id. “The

victim was covered in insect bites, skin conditions, things of that nature.” Id.

at 11. The victim, as well as his daughter, and the police would have testified

Appellant made “951 unauthorized [bank] transactions, as well as [conducted

unauthorized] dealings in some of the real property and movable property of

the victim, totaling $118,551.79.” Id.

      Moreover, the Commonwealth noted that it would be prejudiced if

Appellant were permitted to withdraw his guilty plea since the victim, as well

as many of the witnesses, were “elderly or infirm people” with fading

memories. Id. at 13. Further, the Commonwealth noted Appellant waited

until “the eve of jury selection” to accept the Commonwealth’s guilty plea

offer. Id. at 5.

      By order and opinion entered on September 25, 2023, the trial court

denied Appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On

September 29, 2023, Appellant proceeded to a sentencing hearing at which

Appellant’s counsel requested a concurrent standard range sentence.

Specifically, Appellant’s counsel requested the trial court impose an aggregate

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sentence of “11 and a half to 23 [months] followed by a period of supervision.”

N.T., 9/29/23, at 9.    The Commonwealth, on the other hand, requested

consecutive aggravated range sentences due to the “horrifying” nature of the

case, including Appellant’s long-term neglect of the victim, who lived solely

with Appellant. Id. at 10.

      The trial court imposed consecutive standard range sentences. Thus,

Appellant received an aggregate sentence of 42 months to 84 months in

prison. On October 27, 2023, Appellant, represented by new counsel, filed a

timely notice of appeal. All Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have been met.

      On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issue in his “Statement of

Questions Involved” (verbatim):

            The trial court erred in failing to allow the Defendant to
      withdraw his guilty plea when the defendant maintained that his
      attorney incorrectly persuaded him into entering a plea rather
      than fighting the charges at a trial and maintained that he was
      innocent.

Appellant’s Brief at 1 (unnecessary bold and capitalization omitted).

      Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his

presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We review the trial court’s

denial of Appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea for an

abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Baez, 169 A.3d 35, 39 (Pa.Super.

2017); Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1187 (Pa.Super. 2017).

      As this Court recently held:

            Where a defendant requests to withdraw his guilty plea
      before he is sentenced, the trial court has discretion to grant the

                                     - 11 -
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      withdrawal and that discretion is to be liberally exercised to permit
      withdrawal of the plea if two conditions are present: 1) the
      defendant demonstrates a fair and just reason for withdrawing the
      plea and 2) it is not shown that withdrawal of the plea would cause
      substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v.
      Carrasquillo, 631 Pa. 692, 115 A.3d 1284, 1291-92
      (2015); Baez, 169 A.3d at 39; Islas, 156 A.3d at 1188; see
      also Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A) (“At any time before the imposition of
      sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of
      the defendant,…the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo
      contendere and the substitution of a plea of not guilty”)[.]

Commonwealth v. Jamison, 284 A.3d 501, 505 (Pa.Super. 2022).

      Appellant claims he demonstrated a “fair and just reason” for

withdrawing his plea. Specifically, Appellant avers he maintained his

innocence, and he entered his guilty plea the day before trial because he was

“pressured” by his attorney to plead guilty. See Appellant’s Brief at 5.

            A plausible claim of innocence, supported by some facts or
      evidence in the record, constitutes a fair and just reason for
      allowing presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea. Islas, 156 A.3d
      at 1191-92. Where, however, the defendant merely makes a bare
      assertion that he is innocent without any proffer of any supporting
      basis for that claim, the trial court in its discretion may deny
      withdrawal on the ground that the defendant has not shown a fair
      and just reason for withdrawal of the plea. Commonwealth v.
      Norton, 650 Pa. 569, 201 A.3d 112, 120-23 (2019);
      Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 632 Pa. 3, 116 A.3d 1103, 1105,
      1107 (2015); Baez, 169 A.3d at 39-41.

Jamison, 284 A.3d at 505 (some citations omitted). See Carrasquillo,

supra (holding a fair and just reason exists where the defendant makes a

claim of innocence that is plausible).

            “Stated more broadly, the proper inquiry on consideration
      of such a withdrawal motion is whether the accused has made
      some colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, such

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     that permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and
     justice.” Norton, supra, 201 A.3d at 120-21[.] “[T]rial courts
     have discretion to assess the plausibility of claims of innocence.”
     Id. at 121.
           We review that exercise of discretion as follows:
                  When a [trial] court comes to a conclusion
           through the exercise of its discretion, there is a heavy
           burden [on the appellant] to show that this discretion
           has been abused. An appellant cannot meet this
           burden by simply persuading an appellate court that
           it may have reached a different conclusion than that
           reached by the trial court; rather, to overcome this
           heavy burden, the appellant must demonstrate that
           the trial court actually abused its discretionary power.
           An abuse of discretion will not be found based on a
           mere error of judgment, but rather exists where the
           [trial] court has reached a conclusion which overrides
           or misapplies the law, or where the judgment
           exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
           partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Absent an abuse
           of that discretion, an appellate court should not
           disturb a trial court’s ruling.
                                     ***
                  [I]t is important that appellate courts honor trial
           court’s discretion in these matters, as trial courts are
           in the unique position to assess the credibility of
           claims of innocence and measure, under the
           circumstances, whether defendants have made
           sincere and colorable claims that permitting
           withdrawal of their pleas would promote fairness and
           justice.
     Norton, supra, 201 A.3d at 120, 121 (citations omitted).
           The trial court’s discretion, however, is not unfettered.
     “[T]he term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom
     and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the
     framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of
     giving effect to the will of the judge.” Id. at 121[.] The trial court
     must be mindful that the law requires trial courts to grant
     presentence plea withdrawal motions liberally and make credibility
     determinations supported by the record. Id. The trial courts in
     exercising their discretion must recognize that before judgment,

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      the courts should show solicitude for a defendant who wishes to
      undo a waiver of all constitutional rights that surround the right
      to trial—perhaps the most devastating waiver possible under our
      constitution. Finally, this Court must not substitute its judgment
      for that of the trial court; rather, we must discern whether the
      trial court acted within its permissible discretion. Norton, supra,
      201 A.3d at 121.

Commonwealth v. Garcia, 280 A.3d 1019, 1023-23 (Pa.Super. 2022) (some

quotation marks and quotations omitted).

      Here, in explaining the reasons it concluded Appellant did not have a

“fair and just reason” for withdrawal of his plea, the trial court relevantly

indicated the following:

            At the hearing on July 19, 2023, (the day before trial was
      set to begin),…the Commonwealth explained, in great detail, the
      plea offer. [The trial court] then gave [Appellant] and his attorney
      as much time as needed to discuss the plea offer. Following the
      discussion, [Appellant] agreed to plead to two counts.
            [The trial court] conducted a very thorough colloquy before
      accepting the plea. During the colloquy, [Appellant] agreed
      (under oath) that no promises or threats had been made to him
      that caused him to plead. The relevant counts in the information
      were read to [Appellant], and he did not disagree with the facts.
      [The trial court] further stated: “Do you understand that no matter
      what advice you’ve been given by [your attorney] or by anyone
      else that the decision to plead guilty and give up your right to go
      to trial has to be your voluntary and intelligent decision?”
      [Appellant] replied, “Yes, I do.”
           Based on the colloquy, [the trial court] noted that “based
      upon that response, I hereby conclude that your decision to give
      up your right to trial tomorrow, and enter a plea [today], is
      knowing and voluntary, that you understand the consequences of
      your plea.    I would also note for the record that the
      Commonwealth is prepared to proceed. The Commonwealth has
      made arrangements to bring in witnesses tomorrow.”

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            At the September 8, 2023, hearing, the only reason
      [Appellant] gave for wanting to withdraw his plea was that he was
      innocent, and that his attorney “talked me into it.”
                                   ***
             [Appellant] entered his plea the day before his trial was to
      begin.    At the withdrawal hearing, [Appellant] asserted his
      innocence, but gave no details to support that claim….To the
      contrary, the Commonwealth indicated that there was substantial
      evidence of [Appellant’s] guilt, including the testimony of the
      victim and his family, as well as bank withdrawals. Moreover, [the
      trial court] conducted a thorough colloquy at [Appellant’s] plea
      [hearing], at which time [Appellant] indicated, under oath, that
      he understood the decision to plead guilty had “to be your
      voluntary decision.”
                                         ***
             In sum, although given the opportunity, [Appellant] did not
      make a colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, that
      permitting the withdrawal of his plea would promote fairness and
      justice. His claim of innocence is belied by the evidence, and thus
      not plausible. [The trial court] conducted a detailed colloquy, and
      [Appellant] indicated he understood what he was doing when he
      pled guilty.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/25/23, at 2-4 (citations to record omitted).

      We find no abuse of discretion. Norton, supra. Appellant avers that

he was “pressured” to plead guilty by his attorney. However, as the trial court

found, Appellant’s averment is belied by the record.

      Specifically, the day before jury selection was set to commence, during

a case status conference, the trial court was advised there was a plea

agreement “on the table.” Accordingly, the trial court informed Appellant that

he could either proceed with trial as scheduled or speak to his counsel further

about the Commonwealth’s plea offer. N.T., 7/19/23, at 11. The trial court

indicated Appellant was not obligated to speak to counsel about the plea offer,

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and the trial court was not trying to guide Appellant in one direction or the

other. Id.    Appellant indicated he understood and wished to communicate

further with counsel. Id.

      Approximately forty-five minutes later, the parties, as well as the trial

court judge, re-entered the courtroom, and Appellant confirmed he had

adequate time to speak to his counsel. Id. at 15. The Commonwealth set

forth the terms of the agreed upon plea bargain, and Appellant confirmed he

had no questions.      Id. at 19.   The Commonwealth set forth the facts

underlying Counts 1 and 3, and Appellant confirmed he understood the

charges.     Id. at 24. For each Count, Appellant specifically stated he was

“Guilty.” Id. at 21-22. Appellant is bound by his statements, and he cannot

now assert challenges to the plea that contradict his statements.         See

Jamison, supra.

      Moreover, Appellant confirmed that he understood the decision to plead

guilty was solely his decision to make, and the decision was not to be made

by his counsel. N.T., 7/19/23, at 25.     Appellant specifically confirmed he

understood what he was doing by pleading guilty, and he was accepting

responsibility for doing so. Id. at 26. Appellant confirmed he was signing a

plea agreement, and by doing so, he was “acknowledging that there have

been no other bargains, no other promise or threat of any kind that has caused

[him] to induce—that has caused [him] to be induced into pleading guilty

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today.” Id. at 18. As indicated supra, Appellant is bound by these statements,

and he cannot now make assertions contrary thereto. See Jamison, supra.

      Further, we note that in assessing the plausibility of Appellant’s claim of

innocence,   the   trial   court   properly     considered   the   strength   of   the

Commonwealth’s evidence (including statements by the victim, his other

family members, and evidence of the bank withdrawals) in relation to the

nature of Appellant’s claim (consisting solely of Appellant’s bald claim of

innocence, which the trial court found incredible). See Garcia, 280 A.3d at

1027; Islas, 156 A.3d at 1190.

      For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in finding Appellant’s claim of innocence was not plausible. See

Norton, supra. Thus, the trial court did not err in holding Appellant did not

have a fair and just reason for allowing the presentence withdrawal of his

guilty plea. See Jamison, supra.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

FILED: 4/26/2024

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