Court Opinion

ID: 9549927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:26:38.516872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:04.257328
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Associate Chief
Justice, dissenting:
I dissent.
The majority holds that appointed defense counsel’s conflict of interest arising out of his position as a part-time city prosecutor is not reversible error although we held such a conflict to be per se reversible error in State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). The majority reaches its conclusion by reasoning that Brown should not be applied retroactively. I submit that the majority ignores precedent from both this Court and the United States Supreme Court that mandates reversal notwithstanding the issue of whether Brown itself should have retroactive effect. Brown was based on this Court’s supervisory authority, but that case nevertheless implicated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Regardless of whether the specific holding in Brown is applicable, the Sixth Amendment issue is raised whenever a defendant’s attorney has a conflict of interest; yet the majority barely discusses it. I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the holding in Brown is unavailing to Gordon. Because the issues underlying Brown are of a constitutional nature, the Supreme Court’s holding in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), requires this Court to follow the federal rule applying all judicial decisions retroactively. I would therefore hold that the judgment must be reversed.
I. VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Whether our decision in Broum should apply retroactively is irrelevant to the central issue in this case. At the time of Gordon’s and Brown’s trials, this Court and the United States Supreme Court had already treated the issue of the impact of serious conflicts of interest upon a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and due process. Those decisions thus constituted established precedent before Gordon ever came to trial. In State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 856-57 (Utah 1992), we chose not to address these constitutional issues. It is nevertheless clear that the Constitution is implicated in situations where defense counsel are also part-time prosecutors. Hence, if the majority here wishes to conclude that Gordon’s trial was not constitutionally flawed, it cannot simply rely on the proposition that Brown is inapplicable because it was based on our so-called supervisory power rather than on the constitutional right to counsel itself. The Court must show that the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clauses were not violated in this ease, or that if they were violated the error is somehow harmless. Yet the majority opinion accords only the most cursory treatment to these unavoidable constitutional issues.
In doing so, the majority opinion notes, ‘We had the clear opportunity to enunciate such a [constitutional] holding in Brown but expressly refused to do so.” This is true. In Brown we merely followed the principle that constitutional issues ought to be avoided when another basis for decision is available. *358Because we reversed Brown’s conviction on that other basis, constitutional analysis became superfluous — not because it was not pertinent to the issues raised, but because it could not influence the outcome. In this case, however, where the majority claims it can find no state law ground for reversal, the federal issues must, in that event, be addressed. The purported absence of a state law ground for decision does not make the federal ground magically disappear.
Before either Brown or Gordon came to trial, it was well established that “the assistance of counsel is among those ‘constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.’ ” Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). In that regard, the United States Supreme Court has held that where there is an unconstitutional conflict of interest, it will not “indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from [the resulting] denial [of the assistance of counsel].” Glosser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Holloway, 435 U.S. at 490, 98 S.Ct. at 1181; see also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271-72, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1103, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (holding same on due process grounds). Rather, prejudice will be presumed and the judgment reversed. This Court rendered the same holding and adopted the same rule in State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1980). In that case, one attorney represented two eodefendants. One eodefendant elected to plead guilty and testify against the other. Relying on Holloway, this Court held that such a conflict of interest required a per se reversal of Smith’s conviction. Id.
Because Glosser and much of its progeny were cases in which the conflict of interest arose out of joint representation of multiple defendants and because such joint representation may actually be appropriate in certain cases, Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-83, 98 S.Ct. at 1177-78 (stating that “certain advantages might accrue from joint representation”), the Supreme Court has required the factual predicate of an objection to a conflict of interest before the per se reversal rule may be invoked: “[A] defendant who raised no objection [to the conflict of interest] at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718.1 In reference to the facts of Gordon’s case, however, it is clear that it has never been appropriate for an appointed defense attorney to simultaneously function as a part-time city prosecutor.2 Brown established that “it is clear that conflicts of interest inhere whenever a city prosecutor is appointed to represent an indigent defendant.”3 853 P.2d at 858; see also People v. Washington, 101 Ill.2d 104, 77 Ill. Dec. 770, 772-74, 461 N.E.2d 393, 395-97 (applying per se reversal rule in case where *359part-time prosecutor acted as defense counsel), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 442, 83 L.Ed.2d 367 (1984).4 Yet the majority persists in asserting that the potential for prejudice arising from a conflict when “defense counsel ... has concurrent prosecuto-rial duties ... is much more remote” than the potential for prejudice arising out of a conflict due to “joint representation of multiple defendants.” This assertion is supremely ironic because now under the law in Utah, concurrent representation of codefendants is permitted in appropriate circumstances, see Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-83, 98 S.Ct. at 1177-78, while under no circumstances may a part-time prosecutor represent any criminal defendant anywhere. If Brown established anything, it is the principle that the factual predicate of an actual conflict of interest is always present when a part-time prosecutor acts as a defense attorney. Brown, 853 P.2d at 856-57, 859. A logical constitutional analysis requires that Gordon’s conviction be reversed.
II. APPLICABILITY OF RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS
The majority also fails to recognize that Brown is applicable to this ease even under retroactivity analysis. Because Brown could have been decided on federal constitutional grounds, this Court is bound by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), which unequivocally held that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.” Id. (emphasis added). “The Supremacy Clause ... does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach to retroactivity under state law.”5 Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, -, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 2519, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).
The majority attempts to circumvent this mandate by noting that Brown was expressly based on our “supervisory power” and holding that when we invoke that power, “it is a clear indication that the decision will apply only to future cases.”6 Yet, as I have already pointed out, our choice of that analytical path cannot eliminate the underlying constitutional concerns. Under the majori*360ty’s analysis, any time we face a constitutional issue, we can simply assert our supervisory authority as an alternate basis for decision and thereby render the ruling in Griffith a nullity when it comes time to address the retroactivity of the underlying case. Although Harper acknowledged the availability of differing retroactivity analysis on purely state law grounds, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2519, I doubt seriously that the United States Supreme Court would permit the majority’s subterfuge if a case such as Gordon’s were brought before it on a writ of certiorari. The holding in Brown provides neither an independent nor an adequate state law ground for ignoring the requirements of Griffith. Harper, 509 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2518-19.
Likewise, the majority’s holding that Brown falls within one of the exceptions to the general rule of retroactivity that a “new rule governing criminal procedure [which] constitutes a clear break with the past” is also explicitly barred by Griffith. 479 U.S. at 328, 107 S.Ct. at 716. And even if we were at liberty to apply it, the policy reason behind it — refraining from punishing prosecutors post facto for violating procedural rules that were not in force at the time of trial — would not be present.7 Brown did not establish a procedural rule constituting a clear break with the past. It merely dictated the consequences on appeal of a conflict of interest occurring in the trial court. Because it would have been prudent and reasonable to assume, even prior to Brown, that the appointment of defense counsel who was also a part-time city prosecutor within the same county could constitute an impermissible conflict of interest, Brown did not create any new procedural rules. If anything, given the available precedent which I have already discussed, courts should have been on notice that such a conflict could result in precisely the consequence ultimately dictated by Brown.
In sum, I submit that defendant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial.
DURHAM, J., concurs in STEWART’s, Associate C.J., dissenting opinion.

. Prior to Cuyler, this Court held in Smith, “ 'The law will not assume that counsel has advised his client of his inadequacies or those of his associates.' ” 621 P.2d at 699 (quoting Commonwealth v. Via, 455 Pa. 373, 316 A.2d 895, 898 (1974)). Gordon was not informed of his attorney's conflict of interest and had no reason to suspect it. Arguably then, notwithstanding Cuyler, Gordon is entitled to application of the more lenient Holloway rule because he had no plausible reason for suspecting his attorney's conflict, whereas, in the Cuyler line of cases, the conflict was reasonably apparent even to the individual defendants.

. The majority asserts that Brown was prophylactic in nature. A reading of that case, however, admits no such interpretation. The language proscribing the dual role of prosecutor and defender in Brown unequivocally asserts that the "vital interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized when a city prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of an accused.” Brown, 853 P.2d at 856-57. If, as the majority now claims, retroactive application of Brown "would unjustly benefit many defendants," then it is difficult to understand why we elected in Brown to impose such a harsh consequence on appeal for conflicts of interest involving part-time prosecutors serving as defense counsel.

.It should be noted that this particular point essentially served as a factual basis for this Court’s legal conclusion setting forth the consequences of the self-evident conflict. Even assuming that the legal consequences of Brown (i.e., a per se reversal based on supervisory authority) are not "retroactively” applicable to Gordon's case, we are certainly entitled to rely on Brown as evidence establishing the factual predicate for a per se reversal pursuant to the constitutional grounds set forth in Glasser and its progeny.

. ■ It must be conceded that there is contra authority in other jurisdictions. Mitchell v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 77, 79-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 912, 103 S.Ct. 222, 74 L.Ed.2d 176 (1982), held without any supporting citations that the Sixth Amendment does not require a per se reversal when a part-time ci1y prosecutor acts as a defense attorney. The same circuit recently limited the applicability of the per se reversal rule to situations involving "multiple representation” despite a complete lack of any textual evidence that the Supreme Court intended to impose such a limitation. Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1272 (5th Cir.1995). The Iowa Court of Appeals in Bumgardner v. State, 401 N.W.2d 211, 213-14 (Iowa Ct.App.1986), also declined to adopt a per se rule under the part-time prosecutor fact pattern. Bumgardner, however, virtually ignores pertinent constitutional authority in favor of policy reasoning avoiding the disqualification of all part-time prosecutors in rural counties where it would be difficult to appoint a defense attorney who did not have such a conflict of interest. In light of our holding in Brown, we can hardly employ similar policy reasoning in this case.

. The majority claims that "even where we have adopted a new rule that is of constitutional dimension, we have been reluctant to give it retroactive effect.” This assertion is incorrect. "In the vast majority of cases, the stated law of a decision is effective both prospectively and retrospectively, even a decision which overrules prior law. Therefore, unless a substantial injustice would occur from retrospective application, we will apply a decision both prospectively and retrospectively.” Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 1992). In any event, Griffith and Harper make clear that we are not at liberty to be "reluctant” when it comes to affording retroactive effect to decisions of a "constitutional dimension.”

.The majority here misconstrues our prior precedent. For support, the majority relies upon dicta contained in a footnote in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 406-07 n. 7 (Utah 1994). The Menzies majority, responding to my dissent in that case, briefly treated the issue of whether the holdings in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147-48 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result, joined by Zimmerman and Durham, JJ.) (invalidating inappropriate language in a jury instruction), and State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989) (same), applied retroactively. The Menzies majority, apparently relying in part on the fact that the stated authority underlying Johnson and Ireland was our supervisory power, asserted that their holding applied only *360prospectively. That is nonetheless a far cry from holding that all decisions grounded in our so-called supervisory power—whatever that means apart from our appellate power—are ineligible for the retroactive application that is traditionally accorded to judicial decisions. State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 583 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986); see also Heslop, 839 P.2d at 835; Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984).

. The majority argues that applying the rule in Brown to this case will harm the "efficient administration of justice." I disagree. Giving Gordon the benefit of this Court's ruling in Brown will cause no disruption of any significance in the criminal justice system. If there be other defendants who are incarcerated as a result of trials in which they were represented by part-time city prosecutors, their cases would have to come before the cotuts on writs of habeas corpus, and the rules of law that would apply under those circumstances are entirely different from the rule that should prevail here.