Court Opinion

ID: 9793867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:54:35.466716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:46.407798
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Justice,
with whom WATT, Justice, joins, concurring in the court’s judgment.
Today’s judgment injects some more ambiguity into Oklahoma’s jurisprudence. Although this case presents an opportunity to revisit extant case law on the validity of household exclusion clauses and to harmonize it with the provisions of the compulsory liability insurance article in the “Financial Responsibility Act” [Article or Act],1 the court, unable to gamer five votes for any analysis of its disposition, stays on a clouded course by declaring invalid the household exclusion clause in this case. While I agree in the result reached by the court — that the plaintiff-estate should be entitled to the statutory minimum of $10,000 on each of the three liability insurance policies in suit — I write separately to provide my own rationale for acceding to the court’s disposition. My concern is that lower courts will misconstrue today’s judgment as a license to take an expansive view of public policy. Broad contractual invalidation does not flow from our compulsory insurance laws. Until this court revisits the issue before us and clarifies the ambiguity created by today’s judgment, lower courts should continue to follow extant jurisprudence. A household exclusion clause is offensive to the Act only insofar as it leaves sans minimum protection those related members who do not own a car. This plaintiff’s decedent, who stands in the wrongly excluded class, is hence entitled to minimum mandated coverage: It is for this reason that I concur in today’s judgment.
I
THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION
Frances Morgan [Owner] gave J. Michael George [Father] permission to borrow her ear on August 6, 1983. Father fell asleep at the wheel, crashing the car and killing his five-year-old son, Jeffrey George [Son].2
Owner’s vehicle was insured by the defendant, State Farm Insurance Company [State Farm or Insurer], which had issued a liability insurance policy in the amount of $100,000. Father was insured with the same insurer by two policies which provide liability coverage of $25,000 per policy. The total liability protection under the three policies is $150,000. In addition to liability coverage, all three insurance policies afford uninsured motorist [UM] coverage in the amount of $15,000 each, for a total of $45,000.
The two liability policies issued to Father and the policy issued to Owner contain identical exclusionary provisions. They deprive of coverage two classes of persons: (1) the *884insured; and (2) members of the family of an insured who reside in the same household as the insured. The policies define “insured” persons as the named insured; the spouse of the named insured if he or she is a resident of the same household; relatives of the named insured if they reside in the same household; drivers operating with permission of the insured; and certain organizations.3
Father was an insured under all three policies — as a named insured under his two policies and a permissive user under Owner’s policy. Son, who was a relative and a member of the insured’s household, was excluded from coverage by virtue of the household exclusion clauses of the policies.
As special administrator of Son’s estate [Estate], Larry M. Nation claimed against State Farm for full liability and UM coverage provided by the three policies. Insurer denied liability under all three policies, asserting the household exclusion clauses in each of the policies relieve it from obligation to the Son who was a member of the insured’s household.
The Estate sued Father and State Farm, claiming the clause is invalid and thus does not exonerate State Farm of its liability under the policies. During the pendency of the lawsuit, State Farm brought an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma to declare the household exclusion clause to be valid under Oklahoma law. The federal court ruled the exclusion was valid with respect to the liability insurance, but held State Farm liable for the UM coverage, noting that the household exclusion rendered the Father-operated vehicle uninsured. State Farm subsequently admitted liability under the three UM policies and tendered to the Estate $45,000. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Estate sought corrective relief from the trial court’s denial of insurer’s liability coverage. The federal appeal has been stayed pending the outcome of this state-court review.
After a non-jury trial, the state district court entered judgment against Father in the amount of $130,000. From this figure, the court deducted the $45,000 already received by the Estate in UM coverage proceeds.
In a postjudgment garnishment proceeding against State Farm, the Estate sought payment for the balance under the liability policies claimed to be due — $85,000. Both the Estate and State Farm moved for summary disposition of the proceeding. The trial court summarily adjudicated the garnishment claim in favor of State Farm. The Estate appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the nisi prius decision and remanded the cause, finding the household exclusion invalid and holding the Insurer liable to the extent of the three policies’ total liability limits.
*885ii
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION CLAUSE
Ambiguous precedent can be a license for teleological idealism.4 My concern is that lower courts might give today’s disposition an overexpansive sweep by following trends present in jurisdictions known for their anti-insurance jurisprudence and opting for broad invalidation of all household exclusion clauses.
A.

Legal Immunity And Contractual Exclusion

At common law the rule of parental immunity prevented unemancipated minors from suing their parents for ordinary negligence. Although this rule is grounded on valid principles, the modern trend has been to abolish or abridge the parental immunity doctrine.5
One reason for the bar of intrafamily claims is that lawsuits by children against their parents were believed to disrupt family congeniality.6 This rationale has been widely criticized and is often not relevant where third-party insurance companies pay the cost of the judgment.7 Indeed, many courts take the view that when a third party pays damages to the injured family member, the lawsuit reheves, rather than increases, stress within the family circle.8
Another reason for intrafamily immunity is the potential for fraudulent and collusive claims where a third-party insurance company may be hable for the judgment.9 It is possible for insured parties to feign injuries or fraudulently attribute them to automobile-related mishaps when in fact they were caused by other events. Many jurisdictions deem it unnecessary to bar suits on legal immunity grounds because intrafamilial fraud is beheved to be discoverable and preventable on proper investigation.10
Although in vehicular negligence cases in-trafamily immunity (to the extent of a parent’s automobile liability insurance) has previously been eroded,11 today’s judgment could be misinterpreted as going well beyond this court’s extant jurisprudence12 and beyond legislative mandate13 — by forbidding neutrahty through contractual agreements. This is not my view of today’s per curiam disposition which stands narrowly limited to the facts. Insurance liability contracts typically contain standard clauses which deny coverage to members of the insured’s household. Insurers argue these household exclusions protect them from fraudulent and collusive lawsuits, the cost of which would be passed along to other policyholders. While many jurisdictions dismiss these concerns as invalid, the insurer should be allowed to restrict coverage based upon its experience, irrespective of how insubstantial courts14 may consider these business concerns to be, so long as the limitations do not run afoul of clear policy of the law.
*886B.

Statutorily Articulated Public Policy And Oklahoma’s Compulsory Insurance Law

Oklahoma’s Financial Responsibility Act requires that owners maintain liability insurance on their automobiles.15 By requiring owners to guarantee their financial responsibility in case of an accident, the legislature expressed a recognizable public policy that motorists carry insurance so victims of their negligence can be compensated. This clearly articulated public policy must override private agreements that restrict coverage where the contractual strictures do not square with the purpose of the Act.16
Insurance policy clauses which operate to deny coverage to the general public are void as contrary to statutorily articulated public policy.17 The Act’s principal purpose is to protect “the public using the highways from financial hardship which may result from the use of automobiles by financially irresponsible persons.”18 In Young v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.,19 this court examined a provision in an automobile policy which withheld liability coverage from the insured vehicle if it were operated by one under the age of 25. The restriction, we concluded, was contrary to statutorily expressed public policy because it impermissibly limited the scope of an insured’s liability vis-a-vis innocent victims of the operator’s negligence.20 In Equity Mutual Ins. Co. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nursery, Inc.,21 we likewise declared void a policy covenant which provided that the liability coverage would not apply when the vehicle was operated beyond a 200-mile radius of the owner’s place of business. This restriction had the effect of rendering the vehicle uninsured vis-á-vis statutorily protected third parties. In yet another case— State Farm Auto Ins. Co. v. Greer22 — we concluded that when the terms of an insurance contract bar all potential claimants, they are void as contrary to the public policy expressed in the compulsory insurance law.
Young, Equity Mutual and Greer can be distinguished from the situation at bar. The covenants present in those policies would have excluded from coverage all potential claimants. The covenant of which the Estate complains in this case does not withhold pro-*887teetion from all members of the public, but rather would bar only a very small class of potential claimants: car passengers related to the insured who reside in the insured’s household.
Insurance policy clauses that place beyond coverage narrow classes of potential victims have been upheld as not contrary to public policy,23 In Looney v. Farmers Ins. Group,24 a woman was injured when her husband wrecked the car in which she was riding. The wife sued to recover under an insurance policy covering the vehicle. The insurance company defended against the claim by contending she was excluded as a named insured and by the household exclusion clause. We held the household exclusion valid because the wife of an insured was not a member of the public which the compulsory insurance law was intended to protect.25 Looney supports the distinction that policy clauses which withhold coverage from the general public are void, but those which exclude but a narrow class of persons do not offend public policy.
Applying OHahoma law to similar facts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Farmers Ins. Co. v. McClain26 upheld a household exclusion clause identical to the me challenged here by the Estate,27 A permissive user had borrowed an automobile and wrecked it, injuring his wife. The federal court held the household exclusion applied to the case and denied coverage to the plaintiff.28 McClain is not altogether illuminating because the court did not discuss the public policy implications of the exclusionary clause.29
The states are divided on whether public policy articulated by compulsory insurance laws requires that the exclusion here under review be declared void as contrary to statutorily laid down public policy.30 No single approach to public policy attacks upon household exclusion clauses can be regarded as the majority trend. The following jurisdictions, all with compulsory liability coverage, have invalidated the household exclusion clause on public policy reasons: Delaware,31 Idaho,32 Michigan,33 Montana,34 New Jersey,35 New Mexico,36 North Dakota,37 *888South Carolina38 and Texas.39 In the following jurisdictions household exclusion clauses have been held unenforceable insofar as they deny minimum statutory coverage: Arizona,40 Kansas,41 Kentucky,42 Maryland,43 Missouri,44 Nevada,45 New York,46 South Dakota,47 Utah,48 Washington,49 and Wyoming.50 Household exclusion clauses withstood public policy challenges in the following jurisdictions: Alabama,51 California,52 Colorado,53 *889Florida,54 Georgia,55 Illinois,56 Indiana,57 Iowa,58 Massachusetts,59 Pennsylvania,60 and Rhode Island.61
Ill
TODAY’S JUDGMENT PERPETUATES AMBIGUITY
A.

A Conclusion In Need Of A Rationale For Want Of Five Votes To Support Any One Of The Competing Solutions

Although I agree with the court’s result, I am concerned by our inability to craft a discernible standard for today’s dispositional words “that upon the facts of this ease the household exclusion is invalid insofar as it attempts to defeat the legislature’s mandate of a minimum amount of liability insurance coverage available for persons in the position of the deceased passenger here.” (Emphasis added.)
The italicized passage unveils an underlying ambiguity to which I must direct myself. Because nothing in the disposition indicates what is meant by “persons in the position of the deceased passenger here,” the quoted language lends itself to countless interpretations. Is the “position” one of a household member, a relative, a passenger, a minor, all persons, non-car owners, those without their own insurance, or some combination of the above?
The court “granted certiorari to review this question of first impression,” but regrettably offers no discernible standard for future guidance. Because today’s judgment— accompanied by separate writings with diverse views — leaves lower courts free to place their own imprint on the meaning of “in the position of the deceased passenger here,” we will doubtless have to revisit the question in the not-too-distant future to elucidate on the cryptically worded judgment.
B.

Looney Unresolved

The teachings of Looney,62 which upheld both the household and named insured exclusions as not repugnant to the Financial Responsibility Act, cannot be ignored. There, we concluded that the Act was not relevant to a determination of the validity of policy exclusions.63
*890Nina Looney was denied coverage because two valid policy exclusions applied to her: a household exclusion clause and an exclusion of the named insured.64 Looney is not distinguishable from the situation at bar. The court acknowledged there that the policy provisions applied in the disjunctive, not in the conjunctive. The claimant would have been denied coverage if only one of these exclusionary clauses was applicable. Because both clauses applied and we concluded that both were valid, we did not determine which was effective, to deny coverage.65
C.

Fragile Underpinnings Of Broad Invalidation

Based upon an expansive view of previously unarticulated public policy, some justices would press for a broad invalidation of household exclusion clauses. The Act — presumably the source for their perceived public policy mandate — expressly allows exclusions by agreement,66 The legislature contemplates that some policy provisions are compatible with the Financial Responsibility Act, despite their effect of excluding certain individuals from coverage.67 The Act provides that others may be excluded from coverage by policy provisions, thus enabling individual insureds to keep their insurance rates at an acceptable level. Persons are not required to insure themselves or others they choose to exclude by name in the policy.68 All these choices are allowed by the express language of the Act.69 The household exclusion clause does what the insured could have done with the blessing of the legislature — exclude specific individuals (e.g., household members) from coverage.70
The blanket invalidation approach pressed by some justices fails to distinguish between permissible and impermissible exclusions. The legislature has authorized some exclusions as valid.71 The court has stated previously that some exclusions are invalid.72 Freedom of contract can be restricted only in the name of articulated public policy.73 It is important to strike a balance between the competing interests of freedom of contract and the legislatively declared imperative of protection for the public. I agree that public policy controls over restrictive contractual provisions that give less protection than the law commands. But since the Act expressly contemplates — if not authorizes— liability exclusions by contract, it is improper to ignore the specific in favor of the more general provisions in the Act.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schwartz, a recent federal case, affords no support for the broad invalidation argument.74 There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that Oklahoma law was unsettled on the validity of household exclusion clauses when gauged by our compulsory. insurance law. Nevertheless, the federal court concluded such clauses violated public policy. By rejecting the clear teachings of Looney as “non-binding dictum”75 while embracing the “general sentiment” from Unah *891v. Martin,76 the federal court stopped short of giving full effect to Oklahoma’s extant compulsory insurance jurisprudence. Federal courts must follow settled state law rather than speculate on its uncertain course.77 Because Schwartz lacks support in our precedent, little guidance can be gleaned from that decision.
D.

The Proper Treatment Of Household Exclusions

Household exclusion clauses should be held invalid only insofar as they would withhold coverage from those who are neither required nor expected to purchase automobile protection — individuals who do not own a car78 Recognizing how unlikely it would be for non-owners to maintain UM coverage for personal protection, I would deem it consistent with statutorily articulated public policy to allow these non-owners to recover under another’s liability policy, notwithstanding an otherwise applicable household exclusion clause. These clauses should remain effective as to those related household members who own a car.
The purpose of liability coverage is to protect other motorists from the insured’s negligence,79 whereas UM coverage protects the insured and any passengers from actionable harm inflicted by other uninsured and under-insured motorists.80 Although the household exclusion for liability coverage deprives family members of liability protection, it does not prevent individuals from insuring themselves and their families by securing additional UM coverage. Indeed, the statutory regime for UM coverage contemplates insureds’ purchase of UM protection at higher limits. Nay, it requires insurance companies, if requested, to offer increased coverage.81 By affording insureds the freedom to choose the level of protection, we relieve them from having to secure unwanted coverage.
Those who desire to invalidate broadly all household exclusion clauses would impose upon the insurer a risk for which the insured did not contract.82 At first blush, one might think a broad invalidation of all exclusionary clauses would be a victory for consumers. No such benefit can unfortunately be conferred upon the insured public without the tacit concurrent imposition of corresponding costs. Premiums are based upon potential exposure and actuarial soundness. The expanded coverage that would be thrust upon insurers would doubtless be passed on to all affected consumers in the form of higher premiums.83
IV
SUMMARY
Today’s per curiam disposition is regrettably devoid of precedential value or guidance for our courts. Were I writing for the court’s majority, I would hold that qualified household members excluded by the policy— i.e., those who do not own a car — shall be deemed insured to the limits of the insured’s liability coverage, absent some explicit provisions in the policy which afford them at least the mandated minimum protection,84 *892In order to afford the insurers ample notice and opportunity to alter their offers of UM coverage for those who would fall into the protected household member class, I would apply the full impact of today’s new rule against exclusion from coverage only to those claims which shall arise after nine months from the date of the mandate in this case. As for this case and for all litigable claims that have arisen before the date of this mandate, as well as for those that shall arise during a nine-month period immediately after the mandate’s issuance, I would hold that improperly excluded household members (those who do not own a car) will be deemed covered solely to the extent of the minimum statutory mandate — $10,000 for each person and $20,000 for each accident,85

. For the pertinent terms of 47 O.S.1991 § 7-601(B) (Article VI. Compulsory Liability Insurance of the "Financial Responsibility Act”) and 47 O.S.1991 § 7-324(b)(2), which sets out the specific requirements for a motor vehicle liability policy, see infra note 15.

. Although the record is not crystal clear on this point, I would assume that a five-year old child who is not yet qualified to hold a driver's license, 47 O.S.Supp.1992 § 6-101(B)(5), did not own an insured car at the time of his death. All the insurance policies covering this event are in the record and none of them shows the child as the named insured. From the absence in the record of an automobile policy designating the child as the named insured, I would infer that he did not own a car.

. The policies provide in pertinent part:
"INSURING AGREEMENTS
4 4 4 4 4 4
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
(A) bodily injury sustained by other persons,
(B) property damage,
4 4 4 4 4 4
EXCLUSIONS — SECTION I THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY UNDER:
[[Image here]]
(h) COVERAGE A, TO BODILY INJURY TO ANY INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF AN INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD OF THE INSURED;
4 4 4 4 4 4
Definitions — Section I
Insured — the unqualified word 'insured' includes:
(1) the named insured, and
(2) if the named insured is a person or persons, also includes his or their spouse(s), if a resident of the same household, and
(3) if residents of the same household, the relatives of the first person named in the declarations, or of his spouse, and
(4) any other person while using the owned motor vehicle, PROVIDED THE OPERATION AND THE ACTUAL USE OF SUCH VEHICLE ARE WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE NAMED INSURED OR SUCH SPOUSE AND ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SUCH PERMISSION, and
(5) under coverages A and B any other person or organization, but only with respect to his or its liability for the use of such owned motor vehicle by an insured as defined in the four subsections above.” (Emphasis original.)

. Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 2350 (1961) defines teleological idealism as "an idealistic philosophy that endeavors to reconcile the ethicoreligious idealism of Fichte with the stricter critical idealism of Kant.” This concept, as applied to jurisprudence, denotes a result not reached by a logical or legal mechanism, but by one in which decisions are made based upon a judge's own vision of utility rather than on statutory objectives.

. Unah By and Through Unah v. Martin, Okl., 676 P.2d 1366, 1367 n. 2 (1984).

. Id. at 1368, citing Tucker v. Tucker, Okl., 395 P.2d 67 (1964).

. Unah, supra note 5 at 1368-1369.

. Id. at 1369-1370.

. Id. at 1369.

. Id. at 1369-1370.

. Id. at 1370.

. Young v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., Okl., 743 P.2d 1084, 1088 (1987). "We do not necessarily find that this intent is so broad as to eliminate all possible bargaining regarding liability exclusions which may be contained in the required liability insurance policies.” Id.

. See 47 O.S.1991 § 7-324(b)(2), infra note 15.

. Unah, supra note 5 at 1369.

. The terms of 47 O.S.1991 § 7-601(B) provide in pertinent part:
"B. On and after January 1, 1983, every owner of a motor vehicle registered in this state, other than a licensed used motor vehicle dealer, shall, at all times, maintain in force with respect to such vehicle security for the payment of loss resulting from the liability imposed by law for bodily injury, death and property damage sustained by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of the vehicle....”
The quoted language was not changed by the 1993 amendment (Okl.Sess.L.1993, Ch. 301, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1993). Neither does the amendment have any effect on this litigation.
The terms of 47 O.S.1991 § 7-324(b)(2) require an owner’s liability insurance policy to:
"insure the person named therein and any other person except as herein provided, as insured, using any such vehicle or vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such vehicle or vehicles within the United States of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each such vehicle, as follows: Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to said limit for one person, Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident.”

. Id.

. Young, supra note 12 at 1087-1088; Equity Mut. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nursery, Okl., 747 P.2d 947, 953-954 (1987).

. Looney v. Farmers Ins. Group, Okl., 616 P.2d 1138, 1142 (1980), citing New York Underwriter’s Ins. Co. v. Superior Court of Arizona, 104 Ariz. 544, 456 P.2d 914, 915 (1969) (emphasis in the original).

. Young, supra note 12 at 1088.

. Id. at 1088.

. Equity, supra note 17 at 952.

. Okl., 777 P.2d 941, 943 (1989).

. Looney, supra note 18 at 1142; Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. v. McClain, 603 F.2d 821, 823-824 (10th Cir.1979).

. Looney, supra note 18.

. Id. at 1142.

. Supra note 23.

. McClain, supra note 23 at 823-824.

. Id. at 823.

. Id. at 823.

. A leading treatise on liability insurance, Irvin E. Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance (1991 supp.), states that "[w]here liability coverage is compulsory, a majority of the courts have invalidated the household exclusion clause on the ground that it denies a class of claimants the protection the legislation was designed to afford.” Id. at § 19.07[2] (1991 supp.). This is an oversimplification. Our research reveals a much closer split than indicated by Schermer.
The Estate relies upon a law review article, Christina Schuler, Family Exclusion Clauses Void in Automobile Insurance Policies, 35 Drake L. Rev. 817 (1987). This article is unfortunately not quite up to date and is erroneous in a number of important respects. It incorrectly states, for example, that Oklahoma declared the household exclusion void in Unah, supra note 5 at 821.

. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wagamon, 541 A.2d 557, 560-562 (Del.Supr.1988) (declaring household exclusion void and imposing liability to the policy limits).

. Farmers Ins. Group v. Reed, 109 Idaho 849, 854, 712 P.2d 550, 555 (1985) (declaring household exclusion void).

. State Farm Ins. Co. v. Sivey, 404 Mich. 51, 272 N.W.2d 555, 558 (1978) (declaring passenger exemption void).

. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 820, 824 (1983) (declaring household exclusion void).

. Kish v. Motor Club of America Ins. Co., 108 N.J.Super. 405, 261 A.2d 662, 666 (declaring household exclusion void and imposing liability to policy limits, not the statutory minimum), cert. denied, 55 NJ. 595, 264 A.2d 68 (1970).

. Estep v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 105, 111, 703 P.2d 882, 888 (1985) (declaring household exclusion void).

. Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 885 (N.D.1976) (declaring household exclusion void and imposing liability to the policy limits).

. Jordan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 264 S.C. 294, 214 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1975) (declaring household exclusion void).

. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 829 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex.Ct.App.1992) (declaring household exclusion void).

. Arceneaux v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 113 Ariz. 216, 217, 550 P.2d 87, 88 (1976) (declaring household exclusion void to extent of statutory minimum coverage).

. DeWitt v. Young, 229 Kan. 474, 625 P.2d 478, 483 (1981) (declaring household exclusion clause void to the extent of statutory minimum coverage).

. Beacon Ins. Co. of America v. State Farm, 795 S.W.2d 62 (Ky.1990); Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Ky.1981) (declaring household exclusion clause invalid to the extent it dilutes the statutory minimum coverage).

. State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide Mut., 307 Md. 631, 516 A.2d 586, 592 (Md.App.1986); Jennings v. Government Empl. Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166, 170 (Ct.App.1985) (declaring household exclusion void to the extent of statutory minimum coverage).

. Halpin v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo.1992) (declaring household exclusion void to the extent of statutory minimum coverage).

. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Young, 108 Nev. 328, 331, 832 P.2d 376, 379 (1992); and Estate of Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 93 Nev. 348, 350, 566 P.2d 81, 83 (1977) (both declaring household exclusion void to the extent of minimum coverage).

. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Anzalone, 119 Misc.2d 222, 462 N.Y.S.2d 738, 740 (N.Y.App.Div.1983) (upholding household exclusion with respect to spouse, and voiding household exclusion with respect to other members of the household, e.g., children).

. Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Croyle, 479 N.W.2d 881, 884 (S.D.1992) (declaring household exclusion void to the extent of statutory minimum coverage).

. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Utah 1987); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1985) (declaring household exclusion void to the extent of statutory minimum coverage).

. Mutual ofEnumclaw v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash.2d 203, 643 P.2d 441, 446 (1982) (declaring household exclusion void where it purports to deny coverage to children). The court reserved in Wiscomb the question of the validity of motor vehicle insurance policy exclusion consciously bargained for by the insurer and its insured. In Progressive Cas Ins. Co. v. Jester, 102 Wash.2d 78, 683 P.2d 180, 182 (1984), the court rejects the dicta of Wiscomb, supra, that a bargained-for exclusion violates public policy where it purports to deny coverage to any person not a party to the insurance contract.

. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Ins. Dept., 672 P.2d 810, 814 (Wyo.1983) (declaring household exclusion void to the extent of statutory minimum coverage).

. Hutcheson v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 435 So.2d 734, 737 (Ala.1983) (finding household exclusion clause a valid exercise of insurer's contractual rights and not contrary to public policy).

. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cocking, 29 Cal.3d 383, 173 Cal.Rptr. 846, 849-50, 628 P.2d 1, 4 (1981) (upholding household exclusion clause).

. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Feghali, 814 P.2d 863, 866-867 (Colo.1991) (upholding household exclusion against an equal protection challenge); Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo.1990) (holding that the legislature, in Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585, 592 (Colo.1984), abrogated all case law which had declared household exclusions void).

. Amica Mut. Ins. v. Wells, 507 So.2d 750, 752 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (upholding household exclusion clause).

. Stepho v. Allstate Ins. Co., 259 Ga. 475, 383 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1989); Southern Guar. Ins. v. Preferred Risk, 257 Ga. 355, 359 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1987) (holding household exclusion not per se void, but its efficacy subject to case-by-case assessment to determine if it unfairly penalizes innocent victims; the opinion concludes, after scrutiny, that the clause challenged in that case is valid).

. Severs v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 89 Ill.2d 515, 61 Ill.Dec. 137, 139, 434 N.E.2d 290, 292 (1982) (finding household exclusion valid given the absence of legislative intent to the contrary).

. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Henry By Next Friend Henry, 563 N.E.2d 1265, 1268-1269 (Ind.1990) (upholding household exclusion clauses under compulsory financial responsibility law); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boles, 481 N.E.2d 1096, 1098 (Xnd. 1985) (upholding household exclusion clause under pre-compulsory financial responsibility statutory scheme); United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hanley, 172 Ind.App. 329, 360 N.E.2d 247, 250 (1977) (upholding household exclusion clause).

. Walker v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 340 N.W.2d 599, 603 (Iowa 1983) (upholding household exclusion clause on freedom of contract grounds); Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Iowa 1973) (upholding household exclusion clause).

. Hahn v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 28 Mass.App. 181, 547 N.E.2d 1144, 1145 (1989) (finding valid the exclusion of insured in homeowner's policy from coverage for bodily injury).

. Paiano v. Home Ins. Co., 253 Pa.Super. 519, 385 A.2d 460, 462 (1978) (finding household exclusion not contrary to public policy).

. Faraj v. Allstate Ins. Co., 486 A.2d 582, 588 (R.I.1984) (finding household exclusion valid where insurance statutes do not purport to define the scope of required coverage).

. Supra note 18.

. In Looney, supra note 18 at 1141, we observed that the purpose of the Act's compulsory liability insurance provisions is to compel motor vehicle owners to maintain liability insurance — not to determine proper policy exclusions.

. The Looney policy provided: “This policy does not apply to ... the liability of any insured for bodily injury to (a) any member of the same household of such insured of the same household of such insured except a servant, or (b) the named insured.” Looney, supra note 18 at 1139.

. Looney, supra note 18 at 1141.

. The pertinent terms of 47 O.S.1991 § 7-324(b) and (c) are:
“(b) Owner's policy. Such owner's policy of liability insurance: * * *
(c) May by agreement in a separate written endorsement between any named insured and the insurer exclude as insured any person or persons designated by name from coverage under the policy.” (emphasis added.)

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. See supra note 15 for the pertinent terms of 47 O.S.1991 § 7-324(<s)(b).

. See Young, supra note 12; Equity, supra note 17.

. Burk v. K-Mart Corp., Okl., 770 P.2d 24, 28 (1989).

. 933 F.2d 848 (10th Cir.1991).

. Id. at 851.

. Id. at 852. Unah, supra note 5, abrogates parental immunity's grossly overextended sweep and sanctions filial recovery to the extent of the parent’s automobile liability insurance.

. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-234, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1221-1222, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991); McLin v. Trimble, Okl., 795 P.2d 1035, 1047 (1990) (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting); Lepak v. McClain, Okl., 844 P.2d 852, 860 n. 8 (1992) (Opala, C.J., concurring).

. See 47 O.S.1991 § 7-601(B), supra note 15.

. See Equity, supra note 17 at 951.

. See Moser v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Okl., 731 P.2d 406, 408 (1987).

. The UM provisions in 36 O.S.Í991 § 3636(B) require insurance companies to offer additional UM coverage up to the limits of the insured’s liability coverage.

. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wendt, Okl., 708 P.2d 581, 587 (1985) (Opala, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

. Wendt, supra note 82 at 591.

. The legal effect of today's judgment and of my view is that for UM purposes this underage plaintiff is more aptly to be described as an underin-sured rather than uninsured person.

. The terms of 47 O.S.1991 § 7-324(b)(2) provide in pertinent part that automobile liability insurance policies:
"Shall insure ... against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages ... subject to limits ... as follows: Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to said limit for one person, Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident.” (Emphasis added.)