Court Opinion

ID: 9425680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:15:25.353317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:56.927046
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice White,
concurring in part and dissenting in part..
The Lloyd-La Follette.Act, 5 U. S. C. § 7501 (a), pro- , vides that “[a]n individual in the competitive service may be. removed or suspended without pay only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.”1 The *172regulations of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), at which appellee was employed,- give content to “cause” by specifying grounds for removal which include “any action . . . which might result in . . . [a]ffecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of [OEO and] the Government” and any “criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the Government.” 2
' Aside from specifying the standards for discharges, •Congress has also established the procedural framework in which the discharge determinations are to be made. The employee is to ■ receive 30 days’ advance written notice of the action sought and of any charges preferred against him, a copy of the charges, and a *173reasonable time for filing a written answer to the charges. Before being terminated he may also make a personal appearance before an agency official, and implementing Civil Service Commission regulations provide that “[t]he right to answer personally includes the right to answer orally in person by being given a reasonable opportunity to make any representations which the employee believes might sWay the final decision on his case, but does not include rhe right to a trial or a formal hearing with examination of witnesses.” The regulations further provide that the “representative or representatives designated to hear the answer shall be persons who have. authority either to make a final' decision on the proposed .adverse action or to recommend what final decision should be made.” The employee is entitled to notice of the agency’s decision, in writing, and the notice must inform the employee “[w]hich of the reasons in the notice of proposed adverse action have been found sustained and which have been found not sustained.” 3 The employee *174may appeal from an adverse decision and is entitled to an evidentiary trial-type hearing at this stage.4 This later hearing affords the employee certain rights not available within OEO at the pretermination stage, particu*175larly the taking of testimony under oath and the cross-examination of witnesses.
Appellee Kennedy was a nonprobationary federal employee in the competitive civil service and held the position of field representative in the Chicago Regional Office of OEO. As such, he was entitled to the protection of the statutes and regulations outlined above. On February 18, 1972, Kennedy received a “Notification of Proposed Adverse Action” from the Regional Director of OEO, Wendell Verduin. The notice charged, - among other things, that Kennedy had made slanderous statements about Verduin and another coworker charging them with bribing or attempting to bribe a potential OEO grantee and had thereby caused disharmony in his office by preventing its smooth functioning. Verduin then ruled on March 20, 1972, after Kennedy had filed a written answer' objecting to the lack of certain procedures furnished at this preterminatidn hearing, but had declined to appear personally, that Kennedy be removed from his job with OEO, effective March 27, 1972.5
*176Kennedy then appealed directly to the Civil Service Commission and also instituted the present action. The first count of his complaint alleged' that the discharge procedure- of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, and the attendant Civil Service Commission regulations, deprived him of due process by failing to provide for a full hearing prior to termination. The second count alleged that he was- discharged because of certain conversations, in violation of his rights under the First Amendment. The single judge who reviewed the complaint convened a three-judge court to hear the first count, and dismissed the second, without prejudice to refiling after the Civil Service Commission ruled on his appeal. It was the court’s view that it should not act until the agency had the opportunity to review the merits of appellee’s First Amendment claim.
After the convening of the three-judge court, appellee amended his complaint, then limited to the due process claim, to include a challenge to the Lloyd-La Follette Act on the grounds that it was vague and overbroad and violated the First Amendment.
-The three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282 and 2284, granted summary judgment for appellee. 349 F. Supp. 863. It held that the discharge procedures violated due process because “[t]here was no provision . . . for,the decision on removal or suspension to be made by an impartial agency *177official, or for Kennedy (by his own means) to present witnesses; or for his right to confront adverse witnesses.” Id., at 865. The court also held that § 7501 was unconstitutional on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. The Government was ordered to reinstate Kennedy , to his former position with backpay and to conduct any future removal proceedings with a hearing consistent with its opinion. Appellants were also enjoined from further enforcement of the Lloyd-La Follette Act, and implementing regulations, as “construed to regulate the speech of competitive service employees.” Id., at 866.
I
In my view., three issues must be addressed in this ease. First, does the Due Process Clause require that there be a full trial-type hearing at some time when a Federal Government employee in the competitive service is terminated? Secondly, if such be the case, must this hearing be held prior to the discharge of the employee, and, if so, was the process afforded in this case adequate? Third, and as. an entirely separate matter, are the Lloyd-La Follette Act and its attendant regulations void for vagueness or overbreadth? I join the Court as to the third issue.-
II
I differ basically with the plurality’s view that “where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet,” and that “the propérty interest which appellee had in his employment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant of that interest.” Ante, at 153-154, 155. The rationale of this position quickly leads to the conclusion that even though *178the statute requires cause fqr discharge, the requisites of due process could equally have been satisfied had the law dispensed with any hearing at all, whether pretermination or post-termination.
The past cases of this-Court uniformly indicate that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.6 The principles of due process “come to us from the law of England . . . and their requirement was there designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary action of the crown and place him under the protection of the law.” Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 123 (1889). The “right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.” Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
This basic principle has unwaveringly been applied when private property has been taken by the State. A fundamental requirement of due process is “the opportunity to be heard.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). “It is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965). Where the Court has rejected the need for a hearing prior to the initial “taking,” a principal rationale has been that a' hearing would be provided before the taking became final. See North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908) (seizure of food unfit for consumption); Central Trust Co.. v. Garvan,. 254 U. S. 554 (1921) (seizure of property under Trading with the *179Enemy Act); Corn Exchange Bank v. Coler, 280 U. S. 218 (1930) (seizure of assets of an absconding husband); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 (1931) (collection of a tax); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944) (setting of price regulations); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245 (1947) (appointment of conservator of assets of savings and loan association); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U. S. 594 (1950) (séizure of misbranded articles in commerce). While these cases indicate that the particular interests involved might not have demanded a hearing immediately, they also reaffirm the principle that property may not be taken without a hearing at some time.
This principle has also been applied in situations where the State has licensed certain' activities. Where the grant or denial of a license has been involved, and the “right” to engage in business has been legitimately limited by the interest of the State in protecting its citizens from inexpert or unfit performance, the decision of the State to grant or deny a license has been subject to a hearing requirement. See, e. g., Dent v. West Virginia, supra (licensing of physicians); Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926) (licensing of 'accountant); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U. S. 96 (1963) (admission to the bar). The Court has put particular stress on the fact that the absence of a hearing would allow the State to be arbitrary in its grant or denial, and to make judgments on grounds other than the fitness of a particular person to pursue his chosen profession. In the context of admission to the bar, the Court has stated: “Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a mémber of a particular church. Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a- State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no *180basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory.” Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 239 ,(1957). The hearing requirement has equally been applied when the license was to be removed, In re Ruffalo, 390 U. S. 544 (1968), or a licensee has been subject to. state regulation, Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n of Ohio, 301 U. S. 292 (1937).
Similar principles prevail when the State affords its process and mechanism of dispute settlement, its law enforcement officers,,and its courts, in aiding one person to take property from another. Where there is a “taking” before a final determination of rights, as in some cases when the State seizes property, to protect one of the parties pendente lite, the Court has acted on the assumption that at some time a full hearing will be available, as when there is an attachment of property preliminary to resolution of the merits of a dispute, Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94 (1921); Coffin Brothers v. Bennett, 277 U. S. 29 (1928); McKay v. McInnes,, 279 U. S. 820 (1929,). The opportunity to defend one’s property before it is finally taken is so basic that it hardly bears repeating. Adequate notice of the court proceed-, ing must be furnished,. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950), and there must be jurisdiction over the person, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878).
Since there is a meed for some kind of hearing before a person is finally deprived of his property, the argument in the instant case, and that adopted in the plurality opinion, is that there is something different about a final' taking from an individual of property rights which have their origin in the public rather than the private sector of the economy, and, as applied here, that there is no need for any hearing at any time when the Government *181discharges a person from fas job, éven though good cause for the discharge is required. ,
In cases involving employment by the Government, the earliest cases of this-Court have distinguished between two situations, where the entitlement to the job is conditioned “at the pleasure” of the employer and where the job is to be held subject to certain requirements being met by the employee, as when discharge must be for “cause.” The Court has stated: “The inquiry is therefore whether there were any causes of removal prescribed by law .... If there were, then the rule woúld apply that where causes of removal are specified by constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period, notice and hearing are essential. If there were not, the appointing power could remove at pleasure or for such causé as it deemed sufficient.” Reagan v. United States, 182 U. S. 419, 425 (1901); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311, 314 (1903). The'Court has thus made clear that Congress may limit the total discretion of the Executive in firing an employee, by providing that terminations be for 'cause, and only for cause, and, if it does so, notice and a hearing are “essential.”
Where Executive discretion is not limited, there is no need for á hearing. In the latter event, where the statute has provided that employment was conditioned on “ ‘maintain [ing] the respect due to courts of justice'and judicial officers/ ” Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 14 (1857) (attorney and counsellor of court), or was subject to no conditions at all, Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 225 (1839) (clerk-of the court), no hearing is required. See also Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U. S. 99 (1890) (Navy officer could be removed at will); Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324 (1897) (district attorney could be terminated by the President at his pleasure); Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. 290 (1900) (post office *182clerks removable at pleasure). To like effect is Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 (1961), where the Court held that no hearing need be provided to a cook employed by a private concessionaire of the Navy before the Government revoked her security clearance. The revocation of security clearances was within the' “unfettered control” of the Navy in order “to manage the internal operation of an important' federal military establishment.” Id., at 896. The Court there assumed that “Rachel Brawner could not constitutionally have been excluded from the Gun Factory if the announced grounds for her exclusion had been patently arbitrary or discriminatory . . . .” Id., at 898.
Where the Congress has confined • Executive discretion, notice and hearing have been required. In Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 (1951), an organization was put on the Attorney General’s list, as disloyal to the United States, without a hearing before the Attorney General. The Executive. Order, as defined by implementing regulations, required the Executive to make an “appropriate determination” of disloyalty. It was apparent that members of organizations employed by the Government who belonged to an organization on the Attorney General’s list would be in danger of losing their jobs. The Court held, assuming . the facts as alleged by the complaints were true, that it would be arbitrary, and not consistent with an “appropriate determination,” to deny a hearing on the matter to the affected organizations. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed in his concurring opinion, “[t]he heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.” Id., at 170.
*183To some extent, McGrath, and like cases, see Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S. 474 (1959), depended on statutory construction — the intent of Congress to require that procedural fairness be observed in making decisions on security clearances or status, which affected employment— but it is obvious that the constitutional requirements of fairness were a guiding hand to the Court’s statutory interpretation. “Where administrative' action has raised serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that Congress or the President intended to afford those affected by. the action the traditional safeguards of due process,” and it has been “the Court’s concern that traditional forms of fair .procedure not be restricted by implication or without the most explicit action by the Nation’s lawmakers . . . .” Id., at 507-508.
The concern of- the Court that fundamental fairness be observed when the State deals with its employees has not been limited to action which is discriminatory and infringes on constitutionally protected rights, as in Wier man v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952); Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551 (1956); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958); Sherbert v. Verner,- 374 U. S. 398 (1963). See also Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U. S. 207 (1971). It has been observed that “constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.” Wieman v. Updegraff, supra, at 192; Slochower v. Board of Education, supra, at 556. (Emphasis added.) In Slochower, supra, New York law provided that a tenured employee taking the Fifth Amendment before a legislative committee inquiring into his official conduct could be fired. Quite apart from the Fifth Amendment “penalty” assessed by the State, the Court was concerned with the arbitrariness of drawing a conclusion, without a hearing, that any employee who *184took the Fifth Amendment was guilty or unfit for employment. The Court stated:
“This is- not to say that Slochower has a constitutional right to be an associate professor of German at Brooklyn College.- The State has broad powers in the selection and discharge of its employees, and it may be that proper inquiry would show Slochower’s continued employment to be inconsistent with a real interest of the State. But there has been no such inquiry here.” Id., at 559.
The Court’s decisions in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), reiterate the notion.that-the Executive Branch cannot.be arbitrary in depriving a person of his job, when the Legislative Branch has provided that a person cannot be fired except for cause, and, if anything, extend the principles beyond the facts of this case.
In Sindermann, a teacher who had held his position for a number of years but was not tenured under contract, alleged that he had de facto tenure under contract law. due to “the existence of rules or understandings” with the college which employed him, id., at 602. The Court held that if the professor could prove the existence of a property interest it would “obligate college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and challenge their sufficiency.” Id., at 603. In Roth, an assistant professor was hired for a fixed term of one academic year, and had no tenure. The Court, held that the teacher had río property interest in the job, since the terms of employment allowed that his contract not be renewed. The critical consideration was that the terms “did not provide for contract renewal absent 'sufficient, cause.”’ 408 XL S., at 578. The rights, to continued employment were determined by state law. The Court took great pains, *185however, to point out that a tenured appointment, providing for entitlement to a job, absent cause, would be a far different case.
These cases only serve to emphasize that where there is a legitimate entitlement to a job, as when a person is given employment subject to his meeting, certain specific conditions, due process requires, in order to insure against arbitrariness by the State in the administration of its law, that a person be given notice and a hearing before he is finally discharged. As the Court stated in Dismuke v. United States, 297 U. S. 167, 172 (1936):
’“If [the administrative officer] is authorized to determine questions of fact his decision must be accepted unless he exceeds his authority ... by failing to follow a procedure which satisfies elementary standards of fairness and reasonableness essential, to the due conduct of the proceeding which Congress has authorized.”
To be sure, to'determine the existence of the property interest, as for example, whether a teacher is tenured or not, one looks to the controlling law, in this case federal statutory law, the Lloyd-La Follette Act, which provides that a person can only be fired for cause. The fact that the origins of the property right are with the State makes no difference for the nature of the procedures required. While the State may define what is and what is not property, once having defined those rights the Constitution defines due process, and as I understand it six members of the Court are in agreement on this fundamental proposition.
I. conclude, therefore, that as a matter of due process, ' a hearing must be held at some time before a competitive civil service employee may be finally terminated for misconduct. Here, the Constitution and the Lloyd-La Follette Act converge, because a full trial-type hearing *186is provided by statute before termination from the service becomes final, by way of appeal either through OEO, the Civil Service Commission, or both.7
A different case might be put, of course, if the termination were fpr reasons of pure inefficiency, assuming such a general reason could be given, in which case it would be at least arguable that a hearing would serve no useful purpose and that judgments of this kind are best left to the discretion of administrative officials. This is not such a case, however, since Kennedy was terminated on specific charges of misconduct.
in
The second .question which must be addressed is whether a hearing of some sort must be held before any “taking” of the employee’s property interest, in his job occurs, even if a full hearing is available before that taking becomes final. I must resolve this question because in my view a full hearing must be afforded at some juncture and the claim is that it must occur prior to termination. If the right to any hearing itself is a pure matter of property definition, as the plurality opinion suggests, then that question need not be faced, for any kind of hearing, or no hearing at all, would suffice. As I have suggested, the State may not dispense with the minimum procedures defined by due process, but different considerations come into play when deciding whether a. pretermination hearing is required and, if it is, what kind of hearing must be had.
*187In passing upon claims to a hearing before preliminary but nonfinal deprivations, the usual rule of this Court has been that a full hearing at some time suffices. “We have repeatedly held that no hearing at the preliminary stage is required by due process so long as the requisite hearing is • held before. the final administrative order becomes effective.” “It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination.” Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U. S., at 598, 599. See also Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 596-597 (1931); Scottish Union & National Insurance Co. v. Bowland, 196 U. S. 611, 631-632 (1905); Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 593-594 (1881).- This has seemingly been the rule whether the State was taking property from-the person, as in the above-cited cases, or whether one person was taking it from another through the process of state courts. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94 (1921); Coffin Brothers v. Bennett, 277 U. S. 29 (1928); McKay v. McInnes, 279 U. S. 820 (1929).
In recent years, however, in a limited number of cases, the Court has held that a hearing, must be furnished at the first stage of taking, even where a later hearing was provided. This has been true in the revocation of a state-granted license, Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971), and in suits between private parties, where summary replevin procedures, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), or garnishment procedures, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969), were attacked, and when the State has sought to - terminate welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970).8
*188These conflicting lines of cases demonstrate, .as the Court stated in. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S., at 895, that “consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given- set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” .See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420, 440, 442 (1960); Goldberg v. Kelly; supra, at 263. In assessing whether a prior hearing is required, the Court has looked to how the legitimate interests asserted by the party asserting the need for a hearing, and the party opposing it, would be furthered or hindered.
In many cases, where the claim to a pretermination hearing has been rejected, it appears that the legitimate interest of the party opposing the hearing might be defeated outright if such hearing were to be held.9 For example, when the Government or a private party lays claim to property there is often the danger that the person in possession of the property may alienate or waste it, and the Government or private party may be without recourse. Thus, the Court has held that there is no need for a prior hearing where the Government has taken preliminary custody of alleged enemy property before actual title to the property is determined, Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 (1921); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239 (1921), or where a private creditor has sought to attach property of a-debtor. See Ownbey v. Morgan, supra; Coffin Brothers v. Bennett, supra; McKay v. Mclnnes, supra. Of course, such summary action must be authorized in such a manner as to minimize the possibilities of a mistaken deprivation, by a *189public official in the case of administrative action, or a judge where the processes of the court are used. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra.
The danger that the purpose of the .action may be defeated, or made exceedingly difficult, by requiring a prior hearing, is illustrated by North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908), where the Court sustained the constitutionality of an Illinois statute permitting health inspectors to enter cold-storage houses and “forthwith seize, condemn and destroy” unfit food. The defendants in the action claimed that while it may be necessary to seize the food pending a hearing, surely destruction of that food could not be justified. Nonetheless, the Court observed:
“If a hearing were to be always necessary, even under the circumstances of this case, the question at once arises as to what is to be done with the food in the meantime. Is it to remain with the cold storage company, and if so under what security that it will not be removed? To be sure that it will not be removed during the time necessary for the hearing, which might frequently .be indefinitely prolonged, some guard would probably have to be placed over , the subject-matter of the investigation, which would involve expense, and might not even then prove effectual.” Id., at 320.
Similar inabilities of the party claiming a right to á prior hearing, to make the moving party in the suit whole, have appeared where, incompetence and malfeasance- in the administration of a bank could precipitate a financial collapse in the community, which would go uncompensated, see Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S., at 250, or where, in the absence of a jeopardy assessment by the Tax Commissioner-, a taxpayer might waste or conceal his assets, see Phillips v. Commissioner, supra. In all *190such cases it is also significant that the party advancing the claim to a summary procédure stands ready to make whole the party who has been deprived of his property, if the.,initial taking proves to be wrongful, either by the credit of the public' fisc or by posting a bond.
Of course, this principle cannot be applied with success to explain the Court's decisions in cases holding that a pretermination hearing is required; it is not true that the party entitled to the hearing stands ready to compensate the adversary for what may be' the wrongful possession of the property in question during the pendency of the litigation. This- is vividly illustrated in Goldberg v. Kelly where the Court observed that “the benefits paid to ineligible recipients pending decision at the hearing probably cannot be recouped, since these recipients are likely to be judgment proof.” 397 U. S., at 266. Howevér, other considerations have proved decisive, such as: the. risk that the initial deprivation may be wrongful; the impact.' on the claimant to a hearing of not having the property while h.e waits for a full hearing; the interest ■ of the party opposing the prior hearing and asserting the need- for immediate possession in not alerting the current possessor to the lawsuit; and the risk of leaving’the property in possession of the current possessor between the time notice is supplied and the time of the preliminary hearing.
In jGoldberg and Sniadach, the Court observed that there was a substantial chance'that the claimant to the property, be it the State or garnishor, would lose in the ultimate resolution of the controversy. , In Goldberg, the Court took- note- of the “welfare bureaucracy’s difficulties in reaching correct decisions on eligibility.” 397 U. S., at 264 n.^12. Since the time of the decision in Goldberg, at least one study has shown that decisions to terminate benefits have been reversed with a fair degree of fre*191quency.10 Concern was also expressed with the use of garnishment in a vast number of cases where the debt was fraudulent. Sniadach, 395 U. S., at 341. In Fuentes, although no such empirical evidence was available, the risk of wrongful deprivations was unnecessarily increased by allowing a clerk, rather than a judge, to pass on the creditor’s claim for summary replevin. In Bell, the Court held unconstitutional a state statute requiring summary suspension of a driver’s license of any uninsured motorist who was unable after an accident to post security for the amount of the damages claimed against him. The only hearing held by the State on the issue of suspension excluded any consideration of fault, the standard on which the validity would ultimately turn. Without some kind of probable-cause determination of fault, it was obvious that many suspensions would prove to be unwarranted.
As for the impact on the current property possessor of not having an early pretermination hearing, the Court has held that without possession of the property a person may be unable to exist at even a minimum standard of decency. In Goldberg, where the person would have lost the last source of support available, aside from charity, the Court observed that “termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate.” 397 U. S., at 264. In fact, the magnitude of deprivation may be such as to prevent the welfare recipient from pursuing his right to a later full hearing. Jbid. In Sniadach, the seizure of an individual’s wages could “as a practical *192matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall.” 395 U. S., at 341-342 (footnote omitted). In Bell, the petitioner was a clergyman whose ministry required him to travel by car to cover three rural Georgia communities, and he was “severely handicapped in the performance of his ministerial duties by a suspension of his licenses.” 402 U. S., at 537. The impact of deprivation increases, of course; the longer the time period between the initial deprivation and the opportunity to have a full hearing. In Goldberg, the Court noted that although pertinent New York regulations provided that a “fair hearing” be held within 10 working days of. the. request, with decision within 12 working days thereafter, “[i]t was conceded in oral argument that these time limits are not in fact observed.” 397 U. S., at 260 n. 5. In Sniadach and Fuentes, there was no indication of the speed with which a court , ruling on garnishment and possession would be rendered, and of course the ultimate issues on the merits in such cases must wait for a still later determination. In Bell, the issue of liability might not be determined until , full trial proceedings in court.
The' last factor to be weighed in the balance is the danger, to the party claiming possession occasioned by alerting the current possessor to the lawsuit, and then leaving-, the property in his hands pending the holding of the preliminary hearing. In Goldberg and Sniadach, the property, right seized was a flow of income, in one case from the government, and in the other from..the private employer, pending the preliminary hearing. The government ran rió special risk by supplying notice in advance of the cutoff, since the government was in possession of the flow of income until it was turned over piecemeal to the welfare recipient. Further, though the government could assert in the welfare case that it would incur '.an uncompensated loss, that risk would only be *193incurréd from the time the last check is delivered until the pretermination hearing is held and the administrative agency, certainly has the power to offer a speedy hearing before that time is reached. See. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 266. In Sniadach, while it was true that the inability to garnish wages could leave the creditor uncompensated, if the debtor proved judgment .proof, this was a risk the creditor assumed at the outset by being unsecured. Further, notice to the debtor of the pendency of the lawsuit is not likely to increase the risk that the debtor will prove to be judgment proof, since the debtor is not likely to leave his job due to the pendency of the suit. Likewise, the risk to the creditor of the debtor’s drawing on his wages between the time of notice and the availability of a court hearing on the claim in no way interferes with the creditor’s claim to the future flow of earnings after the hearing has been held. The garnishor, therefore, asserts not only the right to take the debtor’s wages, but to take them before the controversy has been resolved. In Bell, the risk to the State of supplying notice to the licensee and of leaving the person in possession of the license until the hearing, was not at issue, since the state statute provided for notice and a presuspension hearing. There were few costs attached to expanding the scope of that hearing to include a probable-cause determination of fault.
With the above principles ■ in hand, is the tenured civil-service employee entitled to a pretermination hearing, such as that provided by the Lloyd-La Follette Act?
There would be a problem of uncompensatéd loss to the Government, if the employee were to draw wages without working for the period between notice of a discharge and a preliminary hearing. Yet, if the charge against the employee did not indicate that the employee should be *194excluded from the workplace pending this hearing, some work could be exacted by the Government in exchange for its payment of salary. One must also consider another type of cost to the Government, if preseparation héarings were provided — the necessity of keeping a person on the scene who might injure the public-interest through poor service or might create an uproar at the workplace. However, suspension with pay would obviate this problem.
On the employee’s side of the ledger; there is the danger of mistaken termination. Discharge decisions, made ex parte, may be reversed after full hearing. One study reveals that in fiscal year 1970, in agencies where full pretermination hearings were routine, employees contesting removal were successful almost 20% of the time. Merrill, Procedures for Adverse Actions Against Federal,, Employees, 59 Va. L. Rev. 196, 204 n. 35 (1973).
The impact on the employee of being without a job pending a full hearing is likely to be considerable because “[m]ore than 75 percent of actions contested within employing agencies require longer to decide than the 60 days prescribed by [Civil Service] Commission regulations. Over 50 percent take more than three months; and five percent are in process for longer than a year.” Id.; at 206. Of course, the discharged civil servant, deprived of his source of income, can seek employment in thg. private sector and so cut or minimize his losses, opportunities largely unavailable to the welfare recipient in Goldberg or the debtor in Sniadach: Nonetheless, the employee may not be able, to get a satisfactory position in the private sector, particularly a tenured one, and his marketability may be under a cloud due to the circumstances of his dismissal. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 83-84 (1973). . Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 574 n. 13. It should be stressed that *195if such employment is unavailable the Government may truly be pursuing a partially counter-productive policy by forcing the employee onto the "welfare rolls.
Finally, by providing a pretermination hearing, the Government runs ho risk through providing notice, since the employee cannot run away with his job, and can surely minimize its risk of uncompensated loss by eliminating the provision for personal appearances and setting early dates for filing written objections. Altogether different considerations as to notice might be applicable, if the employee would be likely to do damage to the Government if provided with such notice. See 5 CFR 1752.202 (c)(2) (1972), providing that an agency may dispense with the 30-day notice requirement “[w]hen there is reasonable cause to believe an employee is guilty of a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment can be imposed."
Perhaps partly on the basis of some of these constitutional considerations, Congress has. provided for pretermination hearings. Certainly the debate .'on the Lloyd-La Follette Act indicates that constitutional considerations were present in the minds of Congressmen' speaking in favor of the legislation.11 In any event, I conclude that the statute and regulations, to the extent they require 30 days’ advance notice and a right to make *196a written presentation, satisfy minimum constitutional requirements.
IV
Appellee in this case not only asserts that he is entitled to a hearing at some time before his property interest is finally terminated, and to a pretermination hearing of some kind before his wages are provisionally cut off, which are currently provided to him, but also argues that he must be furnished certain procedures at this preliminary hearing not provided by Congress: an impartial heáring examiner, an opportunity to present witnesses, and the right to engage in cross-examination. In other words, his claim is not only to a pretermination hearing, but one in which full trial-type procedures are ■ available.
A
■ The facts in this case show that the Regional Director, Verduin, who charged appellee Kennedy with making slanderous statements about him as to an alleged- bribe offer, also ruled in the preliminary hearing that Kennedy should be terminated.
The “Notification of Proposed Adverse Action,” signed by Verduin;. charged that appellee had “made statements knowingly against officials of this -agency which could harm or destroy their authority, official standing or refutation” and that appellee had engaged “in a course of conduct intended to produce public notoriety and conclusions on the part of the public, without any proof whatsover and in reckless disregard of the actual facts known to you [appellee], or reasonably discoverable by you [appellee], that officials of this agency had committed or attempted to commit acts of misfeasance, nonfeasance. and malfeasance.” Facts were- marshaled to-support, the charges that appellee had spoken at a union *197meeting "to the effect that • [Verduin and his assistant] had attempted to bribe Mr. James- White Eagle Stewart by offering him a $100,000 grant of.OEO funds if he would sigh a statement against you [appellee] and another employee,” and that appellee had spoken of the bribe to a newspaper reporter and to a radio station.
After appellee had received this notice, he made no response to the merits of the charges, but instead wrote to Verduin requesting that he was entitled to certain procedural rights at the' hearing, one of which was to have “a genuinely impartial hearing officer,” thus, furnishing Verduin with the opportunity to recuse himself and provide an alternative hearing examiner. This was not done.
In considering appellee’s claim to have- an impartial hearing examiner, we might start with a-first principle: “ [N]o man shall be a. judge in his own cause.” Bonham’s. Case, 8 Co. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610). Verduin’s reputation was certainly at stake in the charges, brought- against Kennedy. Indeed, the heart of the charge was that Kennedy had spoken of Verduin in reck-, less disregard of the truth. That Verduin almost seemed to be stating a libel complaint against Kennedy under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U, S. 254 (1964), dramatizes the personal conflict which precipitated the proposed termination.
Our decisions have stressed, in situations analogous to the one faced here, that the right to an impartial decision- ' maker is required by due process. The Court has h'eld that those with a substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972). -The Court has observed that disqualification because of interest has - been extended with equal force to administrative adjudications. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564, 579 (1973).
*198In the context of contempt before a judge, where a judge trying a defendant is the object of “efforts, to denounce, insult, and slander the court,” and “marked personal feelings were present on both sides,” the Court has held that criminal contempt proceedings should be .held before a judge other than the one reviled by the eontemnor. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455, 462, 464 (1971). See. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948); cf. In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133 (1955).
We have also stressed the need for impartiality in administrative proceedings, stating in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, that an “impartial decision maker is essential,” 397 U. S., at 271. (Citations omitted.) To the same effect was Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 485-486 (1972), involving revocation' of parole. In both Goldberg and Morrissey, this requirement was held to apply to pretermination hearings.12
It may be true that any hearing without an impartial hearing officer will reflect the-bias of the adjudicator. The interest of the Government in not so providing would appear slim.- Given the pretermination hearing, it would seem in the Government’s interest to avoid lengthy appeals occasioned by biased initial judgments, and it would be reasonable to expect more correct decisions at the initial stage at little cost if the hearing officer is impartial.
*199My view is a narrower one, however. Fairness and accuracy are not always threatened simply because the hearing examiner is the supervisor of an employee, or, as in this case, the Regional Director over many employees, including appellee. But here the hearing official was the object of slander that was the basis for the employee’s proposed discharge. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra. In ruling that the employee was to be terminated, the hearing examiner’s own reputation, as well as the efficiency of the service, was at stake; and although Mr. Verduin may have succeeded, in fact, in disassociating his own personal feelings from his decision as to the interests of OEO, the risk and the appearance that this was not the-case were too great to tolerate. In such situations the official normally charged with ..the discharge decision need only recuse and transfer the file to a person qualified to make the initial decision. We need not hold that the Lloyd-La Follette Act is unconstitutional for its lack of provision for an impartial hearing examiner. Congress is silent on the matter. We would rather assume, because of the constitutional problems in not so providing, that, if faced with the question (at least on the facts of this case) Congress would have so provided. Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U. S. 261, 272 (1968). “Where administrative action has raised serious constitutional problems, the Court has assumed that Congress or the President intended. to afford those affected by the action the traditional safeguards of due process.” Greene v. McElroy, 360 U. S., at. 507 (citations omitted) ,13
*200B
Appellee also claims a right to a full trial-type hearing at the pretermination stage, particularly asserting that he is denied due process, if not given the opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses.
While fully realizing the value of á full trial-type hearing as a method for ultimate resolution of the facts, see id., at 496-497, the pretermination hearing is riot held for the purpose of making such an ultimate determination. This is provided for through the appeal procedure where the employee is afforded the procedural rights he now seeks at an earlier stage of the proceedings. The function of the pretermination hearing is, and no more is required by due process; to make a probable-cause determination as to whether the charges brought against the employee are or are not true. Where the Court has held that pretermination hearings are required, in past decisions, it has spoken sparingly of the procedures to be required. Sniadach was silent on the matter, and Fuentes merely required something more than an’ex parte proceeding before a court clerk. In Bell, the Court held that the hearing must involve a probable-cause determination as tc the fault of the licensee, and “need not take the form of a full adjudication of the question of liability,” realizing that “ [a] procedural rule,that may satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy due process in every case.” 402 U. S., at 540. Thus, “procedural due process [was to] be satisfied by an inquiry limited to the determination whether there is a reasonable pos-sibility of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the.licensee.” Ibid.- We think the' clear implication of Bell to be that “full adjudication,” including presentation of witnesses and cross-examination, need not be- provided in every case where a pretermination *201hearing of some kind is required by due process or provided by the statute.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court struck a different note on procedures. ' Although stating that the only function of the pretermination hearing was “to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare department’s grounds for discontinuance of payments,” arid seemingly adopting á probable-cause standard, the Court required cross-examination of witnesses relied upon by the department. The Court was careful to observe, however, that these procedural rules were “tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.” 397 U. S., at 267, 268-269. The decision to cut off AFDC welfare payments leaves the recipient literally without any means to survive or support a family. While this level of deprivation may not be insisted upon as a necessary condition for requiring some kind of pretermination hearing, it may well be decisive in requiring the Government to provide specific procedures at the pretermination stage. The greater the level of deprivation which may flow from a decision, the less one may tolerate the risk of a mistaken decision, cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, and thus the Court in. Goldberg, while maintaining that the pretermination hearing was in the nature of a probable-cause determination, was less willing to allow a margin of error as to probable cause. Rules of procedure are often shaped by the risk of making an erroneous determination. See In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Indeed, all that was specifically not required in. Goldberg was a complete record and a comprehensive opinion. 397 U. S., at 267.
In this case, the employee is not totally without prospect for some form of support during the period between the pretermination and final hearing on appeal, though it may not be equivalent in earnings or tenure *202to his prior competitive service position. Although the employee may not be entitled to unemployment compensation, see Christian v. New York Dept. of Labor, 414 U. S. 614 (1974), since he has been terminated for cause he may get some form of employment in the private sector, and, if necessary, may draw on the welfare system in the interim. Given this basic floor of need, which the system provides, we should not' hold that procedural due process is so' inflexible as to require the Court to hold that the procedural protections, of a written statement and oral presentation to an impartial hearing examiner provided ’ by regulation, are insufficient. The Court stated in Richardson v. Wright, 405 U. S. 208 (1972), that new regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare-required that Social Security disability payments were not to be suspended in a pretermination hearing without “notice of a proposed suspension and the reasons therefor, plus an opportunity to submit rebuttal- evidence,” but could be without an oral presentation, since “[i]n the context of a comprehensive complex administrative program, the, administrative process must have a reasonable opportunity to , evolve procedures to meet needs as they arise.” Cf. Torres v. New York State Department of Labor, 333 F. Supp. 341 (SDNY 1971), aff’d, 405 U. S. 949 (1972). Necessarily, to some extent, the Court must share with Congress, in an area where one is called upon to judge the efficacy of particular procedures, a role in defining constitutional requirements, and Congress explicitly left it to the discretion of the' agency, as to whether such procedures were required. I would, not upset that judgment in this case. ’
In accord with these views, I would affirm the judgment of the three-judge court, ordering reinstatement and backpay, due to the failure to provide an impartial hearing officer at the pretermination hearing. I would. *203reverse that part of the court’s order enjoining the .application of the statute on First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth grounds.

 The full text of the Act’s pertinent provisions provides:
“(a) An individual in the competitive service may be removed or suspended without pay only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.
“(b) An individual in the competitive service whose removal or suspension without pay is sought is entitled to reasons in writing and to—
“(1) notice of the action sought and of any charges preferred against him;
“(2) a copy of the charges;
“(3) a reasonable time for filing a written answer'to the charges, with affidavits; and ^
“(4) a written decision on the answer at the earliest practicable date.
“Examination of witnesses, trial, orí hearing is not' required but may be provided in the discretion of the individual directing the removal or suspension without pay. Copies of the charges, the notice of hearting, the answer, the reasons for and the order of removal or suspension without pay, and also the reasons for reduction in grade or pay, shall be made a part of the records of the employing agency, and, *172on request, shall be furnished to the individual affected and to the Civil Service Commission.
“(c) This section applies to a preference eligible employee as defined by section 7511 of this title only if he so elects. This section does not apply to the suspension or removal of an employee under section 7532 of this title.” 5 U. S. C. § 7501.

 The regulation of the Civil Service Commission as to “Proscribed actions,” 5 CFR § 735.201a, provides:
"An employee shall avoid any action, whether or not specifically prohibited by this .suDpart, which might result in, or create the appearance of:
“■(a) Using public office for private gain;
“(b) Giving preferential treatment to any person; •
“(c) Impeding Government efficiency or economy;
“(d) Losing complete independence or impartiality;
“(e) Making a Government decision outside official channels; or
“(f) Affecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of the Government.”
The regulations, 5 CFR §735.209, also provided:
“An employee shall not engage in criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the Government.”

 The Civil Service Procedural Regulations, 5 CFR § 752.202, provide in relevant part:
“(a) Notice of proposed adverse action. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, an employee against whom adverse action is sought is entitled to at least 30 full days’ advance written notice, stating any and all reasons, specifically and in- detail, for the proposed action.
“(2) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (3) of this paragraph, the material on which the notice is based and. which is relied on to support the reasons in that notice, including statements of witnesses, documents, and investigative reports or extracts therefrom, shall be assembled and made available to the employee for his review. The notice shall inform the employee where he may review that material.
“(3) Material which cannot be disclosed to the employee, or to his designated physician under §294.401 of this'chapter, may not be used by an agency to support the reasons in the notice.
“(b)- Employee’s answer. Except as provided in paragraph (c)' of this section, an employee is entitled to a reasonable, time for *174answering a notice of proposed adverse action and for furnishing affidavits in support of his answer'. The time to be allowed depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, and shall be sufficient to afford the employee ample opportunity to review the material relied on by the agency to support the reasons in the notice and to prepare an answer and secure, affidavits. The agency shall provide the employee a reasonable- amount of official time for these purposes if he is otherwise in an active duty status. If the employee answers, the agency shall consider his answer in reaching its decision. The employee is entitled to answer personally, or in writing, or both personally and in writing. The right to answer personally includes the right to answer orally in person by being -given a reasonable opportunity to make any representations which the employee believes might- sway the final decision on his case, but does not include the right to a trial or formal hearing with examination of witnesses. When the employee requests an opportunity to answer personally, the agency shall make a representative or representatives available to hear his answer. The representative or representatives designated to hear the answer shall be persons who have authority either to make a final decision on the proposed adverse action or to recommend-what final decision should be made.
“(f) Notice of adverse decision. The employee is entitled to notice of the agency’s decision at the earliest practicable date. The agency shall deliver the notice of decision to the employee at or before the time the action will be made effective. The notice shall be in writing, be dated, and-inform the employee:
“(1) Which of the reasons in the notice of proposed adverse action have been found sustained and which have been -found not sustained . . . .”

 The Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 authorizes Civil Service Commission appeals from adverse agency decisions. See 5 U. S. C. § 7701. The Act itself applies- only to veterans of military service, 5 U. S. C. §§ 2108, 7511, but Executive Order No. 11491, printed in note following 5 U. S. C. § 7301, extends the Act’s protections to all nonpreference eligible employees in the classified service.

 Appellee’s response stated:
“The charges and proceedings brought against Mr. Kennedy are invalid and, in fact, unlawful for the-following two reasons among others.:
-“First, Mr. Kennedy is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing prior' to any adverse action being taken against him. This means a proceeding where there is a genuinely impartial; h< ¡aring officer, a proceeding where there is an opportunity to offer vitnesses and confront and cross examine those furnishing evidence against him, a proceeding where he will have an opportunity to respond to all evidence offered against him, a proceeding where a written record fe made of all evidence, testimony and argument, a proceeding where the decision will be based exclusively on the recoid, a proceeding where the decision will contain findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to all controverted issues, together with an analysis indicating the manner in which the controversies were resolved.
“The present adverse action procedure fails in substantial ways to provide all of these rudimentdry elements required for a due *176process hearing. It therefore fails to meet the requirements of due process secured by the Fifth Amendment to .the Constitution of the United States and is hence, invalid, null and void.
“Second, the charges brought against Mr. Kennedy are facially insufficient and illegal. As the adverse action makes clear, Mr. Kennedy is being punished for his conversations (inaccurately set forth in the adverse action) with union members and the public. Since the First Amendment protects such conversations these allegations are totally without merit.” App. 62.

 My views as to the requirements of due process where property interests are at stake does not deal with the entirely separate matter and requirements of due process when a person is deprived of liberty.

 Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 182 F. 2d 46 (1950), aff’d by an equally divided court, 341 U. S. 918 (1951), is not controlling. “The basis of this holding has been thoroughly undermined in the ensuing years” with the rejection of the “right-privilege” distinction. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 571 n. 9 (1972).

 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1971), is not properly part of this quartet of cases,, since no hearing was apparently ever provided to challenge the posting of one’s name as an excessive drinker.

 See generally Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1972).

 See Handler, Justice for the Welfare Recipient: Fair Hearings in ÁFDC — The Wisconsin Experience, 43 .Soc. Serv. Rev. 12, 22 (1969).

 Congressman Calder stated that the Act would “give assurance and confidence to the employees that they will at least get a square deal and will not permit of supervisory or executive officers filing charges of one kind against an employee and having him removed from the service or reduced in salary on evidence submitted on-matters entirely foreign to the original charges that the employee has answered in writing.” 48 Cong. Rec. 4654 (1912).
Congressman Konop-stated:
“Any man in public service should have-a right as a citizen to know why he is discharged from public duty, and as a citizen should certainly have a chance to be heard.” Id., at 5207.

 In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 579 n. 2 (1968), where the Court set aside a discharge by a Board of Education of a teacher for writing a letter to a newspaper attacking the Board, the -trier of fact, - the Board, was the same body that was the object of accusations in the letter. Although the Court did not rule on the due process question, since it was first raised here, it observed that “we do not propose to blind ourselves to the obvious defects in the fact-finding process occasioned by the Board's multiple functioning vis-a-vis appellant,” citing Turney v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927), and In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133 (1955).

 We further note that appellants suggest • that “the Act and regulations, fairly construed, require the .determination of cause, to be made without bias.” Brief for Appellants 24 n. 12.