Court Opinion

ID: 9790450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:53:08.646307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.627369
License: Public Domain

WARREN, P. J.,
dissenting.
In this appeal from a month-long trial, I dissent because the majority reverses the trial court on claimed errors that were not properly preserved for our review and did not work to defendant’s prejudice.
*608The state introduced expert testimony regarding BWS for the purposes of explaining the dynamics of Ram-beck’s relationship with defendant. It was defendant’s theory of the case that Rambeck abused and murdered her own child. The state offered evidence that Rambeck had been physically and emotionally abused by defendant. It then offered the testimony of Professor Klingbeil to explain why Rambeck did not notice or ignored evidence that her daughter was abused, why she failed to report it, and, further, to explain why Rambeck continued her relationship with defendant after her daughter’s death. Below, defendant challenged Klingbeil’s testimony on the grounds that she lacked the requisite qualifications to offer an expert opinion and diagnosis regarding BWS. Defendant contended that Klingbeil lacked the training and expertise to make such a diagnosis and that her basis of knowledge went to “profile” knowledge, or knowledge of average demographic facts, which defendant contended was not a sufficient basis upon which to render an expert opinion or diagnosis. The trial court properly overruled that objection and defendant does not make that argument on appeal. Defendant raises for the first time on appeal the issue that BWS is not scientifically valid under State v. Brown, 297 Or 404, 687 P2d 751 (1984).1 Because that argument was not raised before the trial court, the majority is mistaken in addressing it.2
*609On cross-examination of Klingbeil, defendant sought to rebut the state’s BWS evidence with evidence that Ram-beck engaged in “Pecking Order Battering” (POB), a condition sometimes associated with BWS. POB is the theory that some battered women respond to the stress of their situation by battering their children. Defendant sought to pursue that line of questioning as support for his theory that Rambeck was the guilty party. The trial court allowed defendant to inquire generally about POB but precluded him from asking, specifically, about Rambeck’s alleged mistreatment of her other two children. On review, the majority concludes:
“Because of the trial court’s preemptive ruling, counsel then chose not to inquire further for strategic purposes. Consequently, the jury heard no evidence about POB. We perceive no waiver by defense counsel of his intention to ask Klingbeil about the import of specific instances of Ram-beck’s mistreatment.” 147 Or App at 603.
The majority is wrong. The pertinent portion of the trial transcript provides:
*610“[Defense Counsel]: Okay. We’re inclined to not ask the question and not get into the whole area, so I won’t ask about pecking order battering or this DSM-III-R criterion.”
With that statement, defendant, for strategic purposes, or otherwise, acquiesced in the trial court’s ruling. When a party, for strategic purposes declines to make an offer of proof, that constitutes a waiver of error, not its preservation. The trial court’s ruling did not foreclose defendant from making an offer of proof about Rambeck’s alleged mistreatment of her other children. Rather, defendant simply accepted the trial court’s ruling and moved on with his case.
Even if we reach the merits of defendant’s objection, however, the majoritys conclusion that the trial court’s ruling warrants reversal is unfounded on two grounds. First, there is simply no evidence in the record that the trial court’s ruling was prejudicial to defendant’s case. That is because there was nothing favorable that defendant had to gain by following that line of inquiry.3 Klingbeil testified, first, that *611she did not see any evidence of POB. The uncontroverted evidence is that even if Klingbeil had concluded that Rambeck had exhibited symptoms of POB, it would not have changed her diagnosis. And second, even assuming that there was evidence that Rambeck mistreated her other children, the verbatim portion of the transcript upon which defendant bases his assignment of error, ORAP 5.45(4), fails to direct us to any place in the record where he made the requisite offer of proof under OEC 103 or that the hypothetical instances of mistreatment actually happened. Defendant failed to preserve this question for our review. In this light, there is simply no reason why the majority has to take us on this excursion through the theories of the Battered Woman Syndrome and Pecking Order Battering.
Finally, the majority concludes that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to grant defendant’s motion, just before closing arguments, to limit the state’s use of the previously admitted evidence of defendant’s mistreatment of Rambeck. The trial court admitted testimony of defendant’s assaultive behavior over defendant’s objection that the evidence was unduly prejudicial. Defendant concedes on appeal that the evidence was relevant for one of the purposes for which it was offered. There was no abuse of discretion when the trial court found it not unduly prejudicial. Defendant did not at that time seek to limit the state’s use of that evidence to the purpose for which it was properly admitted. OEC 105.
Defendant’s motion to limit the use of the admitted evidence came just before closing arguments, almost a month after the evidence had been introduced. The trial court denied defendant’s motion:
“[The testimony regarding defendant’s treatment of Lisa Rambeck] didn’t come in with any restrictions, such as an impeachment of something like that. It’s evidence in the *612case to prove a particular thing. If it proves something else, so be it. Motion will be denied.”
Defendant assigns that ruling as error. His specific argument, however, focuses on the following statements made by the state in closing argument:
“The [defendant] is a violent, assaultive animal, [and] he engaged in that same behavior that he engaged it with Lisa Rambeck with Sarah Rambeck, and that * * * behavior caused [Sarah’s] death.
«* * * * if:
“We have, in the short slice of the Defendant’s life that we know of that relates to this case, eight or nine or ten, whatever there are, violent, explosive, unprovoked incidents that are compatible with the actions of the killer of Sarah Rambeck[.]
«if: if: * if: *
“In addition to the fact that there are a number of these violent and explosive episodes, when we look at the particulars of them further, we see similarities between what happened in them and what happened to Sarah Rambeck.
«if: if: if: if: if:
“And isn’t there a strong similarity between [the defendant grabbing Lisa Rambeck by the head] * * * and what happened to Sarah Rambeck that caused her skull fracture?”
As a general proposition, evidence admitted generally, without restriction, can be used by the jury for any purpose, even an improper one. American Prod. Co. v. Marion Creamery Co., 214 Or 103, 112, 327 P2d 1104 (1958); see also Frank R. Lacy, Evidence - 1959 Oregon Survey, 39 Or Law Rev 19 (1960) (“Everyone knows that testimony offered and received without express limitation as to its use may be used by the trier of fact for any purpose that logic will permit.”)
Moreover, the court’s ruling did not foreclose defendant from objecting to the state’s comments if they were otherwise improper. If the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument were unduly inflammatory, defendant did not object to them at the time they were made, nor did defendant *613move for a mistrial. A timely objection would have allowed the trial court to take appropriate action to correct any harm. State v. Shafer, 222 Or 230, 235, 351 P2d 941 (1960); State v. Sims, 105 Or App 318, 323, 804 P2d 1205, rev den 311 Or 433 (1991); see also State v. Wilson, 69 Or App 569, 687 P2d 800 (1984), rev den 298 Or 553 (1985) (on the defendant’s timely objection, the trial court properly cured any prejudicial effect arising from the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant as an “animal” during closing argument, where the trial court instructed the prosecutor to refrain from further use of that term in the presence of the jury and specifically instructed the jury that the arguments of counsel were not to be considered as evidence in the case). The majority premises its result on the proposition that closing argument was the first time that the jury could make improper use of the testimony of defendant’s mistreatment of Rambeck and her friends. In this trial that had gone on for almost a month, the jury was left to consider that evidence for whatever it might have proven. The majority is simply wrong that this is the first time defendant could have been harmed by the evidence.
It is an unquestioned proposition of law that if unduly prejudicial events occur during a trial, failure to make a timely motion for a mistrial waives that error. It is a strange proposition then, when evidence is properly admitted and no limitation is requested at that time, that a month later the error may be preserved by a motion never before made. I believe that when evidence is properly admitted without limitation the trial court does not abuse its discretion in failing later to instruct the jury that it must limit the use of that evidence.
In summary, the evidence was admitted, over objection but without restriction. The evidence was properly admitted for at least one of the purposes for which it was offered. It was relevant to show why Rambeck reacted as she did toward defendant after Sarah’s death. The trial court received testimony regarding defendant’s physical and verbal mistreatment of Rambeck almost a month before defendant sought to limit its use by the state. The jury was left to consider the evidence and draw its own inferences during that time. The trial court had no obligation to grant defendant’s untimely motion. In addition, defendant did not object *614to the state’s particular argument nor did he move for a mistrial.4 Simply put, defendant did not preserve the alleged error, and should not now be heard to complain.
For these reasons I dissent.

 In his brief, defendant provides: “The narrow question presented in this Assignment of Error is, therefore, whether Ms. Klingbeil’s testimony relating to BWS satisfied the requirements of State v. O’Key [, 321 Or 285, 899 P2d 663 (1995)].”

 1. Preservation of Error
The majority is just plain wrong in maintaining that the “extensive memoranda” that the parties filed below properly preserved this issue for our review. Nowhere in the record does defendant challenge the BWS testimony on the ground that it fails to satisfy the Brown criteria. The “extensive memoranda” that the majority relies on simply state, without argument, that Brown “is the leading Oregon case with regard to the admissibility of expert medical or scientific evidence.” The memorandum then proceeds, in summary fashion and without application to the facts in this case, to set out the criteria in Brown. Contrary to the majority’s position, it takes more than a mere passing reference to raise an issue at trial. The rules pertaining to preservation of error are intended to advance goals such as ensuring that the positions of the parties are presented clearly to the trial court and that parties are not taken by surprise, misled, or denied opportunities to meet an argument. The majority’s lunge to address defendant’s assignment on a fashionable topic fails to honor a fundamental tenet of appellate procedure.
*6092. Appellate Scope of Review
Furthermore, defendant has failed properly to raise the claim of error on appeal. ORAP 5.45(4) provides:
“Each assignment of error shall be clearly and concisely stated under a separate and appropriate heading, must be specific and must set out verbatim the pertinent portions of the record, if it relates to a specific ruling that is being challenged.”(Emphasis supplied.)
Because defendant failed to raise the issue below, it is no surprise that his assignment of error fails to comport with ORAP 5.45(4). When a defendant cannot direct us to any place in the record where he raised the issue below, we should decline to search the record in an attempt to find support for his arguments. ORAP 5.45(3); State v. Kolbe, 115 Or App 268, 273-74, 838 P2d 612 (1992), rev den 315 Or 644 (1993). Appellate courts are limited in their scope of review, and that means that we do not entertain any theory that was not placed before the trial court. State v. Hickman, 273 Or 358, 360, 540 P2d 1406 (1975). By indulging defendant’s arguments, the majority disregards that principle.
3. The Merits
Finally, the majority stylizes all of the evidence of defendant’s mistreatment of Rambeck as evidence of BWS. Even assuming that such a syndrome exists, the majority’s treatment of that issue here is premature because a jury is always entitled to know about a person’s background in order to understand why that person responds in a certain way to certain situations. That a victim’s response is consistent with that person’s prior experience with the accused is always properly admissible evidence. State v. Hall, 108 Or App 12, 17, 814 P2d 172, rev den 312 Or 151 (1991).

 When the state was making its offer of proof regarding Klingbeil’s testimony, defendant, on cross-examination, asked whether POB was one of the identifiers, in terms of behavioral characteristics, of BWS. Defendant then asked Klingbeil to explain the phenomenon of POB and she did. Defendant then proceeded to question Klingbeil as follows:
“[Defense Counsel]: Would it change your opinion that Lisa Rambeck was a battered woman if you knew she had battered her children?
“[Klingbeil]: No, it wouldn’t change my opinion about whether she was a battered woman or not.
«‡ * & * *
“[Defense Counsel]: Hypothetically speaking, if I provided you with information, hypothetically, that Miss Rambeck abused her own children, you have indicated that would not change your diagnosis?
“[Klingbeil]: Not necessarily change my diagnosis.
«;>: ‡ ‡‡‡
“[Defense Counsel]: If you were told that Miss Rambeck, within a month before the death of Sarah, was observed slapping her then six-year-old son on the head and mouth, slapping her four-year-old daughter on the head and mouth, saying things — apologies for the language — but saying such things as, ‘Shut your fucking mouth. Shut the fuck up,’ and then was observed pulling them by the hair into a car, would that change your diagnosis that Lisa Ram-beck was a battered woman?
“[Klingbeil]: No.
“[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And would the reason for that be because that behavior could be consistent with your diagnosis?
“[Klingbeil]: Could be.
*611“[Defense Counsel]: And if you were told that in 1989, when Vanessa was * ** * 18 months of age, Miss Rambeck was observed to become extremely frustrated at her 18-month-old daughter’s crying and was observed to shake her violently and slam her into a crib, would that change your diagnosis that Lisa Rambeck was a battered woman?
“[Klingbeil]: No, it doesn’t have anything to do with the relationship she’s having in this case with Defendant." (Emphasis supplied.)

 I express no comment as to the propriety of the prosecutor’s argument.