Court Opinion

ID: 9954485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 15:00:46.387094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:57.257966
License: Public Domain

22-981
United States v. Sommerville

                                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                       FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                        SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

       At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 26th day of March, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT:
           JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
           SUSAN L. CARNEY,
           STEVEN J. MENASHI,
                       Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                    Appellee,

                               v.                                           No. 22-981

TYREE SOMMERVILLE,

           Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________

FOR APPELLANT:                                       JEREMIAH DONOVAN, Law Offices of
                                                     Jeremiah Donovan, Old Saybrook, CT.

FOR APPELLEE:                                        CHARLES KRULY (Tiffany H. Lee, on the
                                                     brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for
                                                     Trini E. Ross, United States Attorney for
                                                     the Western District of New York,
                                                     Buffalo, NY.
       Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District
of New York (Sinatra, J.).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on May 2, 2022, is
AFFIRMED.

       Defendant-Appellant Tyree Sommerville was arrested in Buffalo, New York, on
December 6, 2020, after fleeing a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. The arresting
officers found a loaded, semiautomatic pistol on his person. When arrested, Sommerville
was on parole related to his 2014 state-court conviction for criminal possession of a weapon
in the second degree. His arrest triggered two separate criminal proceedings. In state court,
he was charged with and pleaded guilty to violating his parole, leading the state court to
revoke his parole and to order him to serve the remainder of his 2014 sentence in state
custody. And in federal court, he was charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of
violating the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The United
States District Court for the Western District of New York (Sinatra, J.) imposed an above-
guidelines, 30-month sentence on Sommerville for the federal offense, and ordered that
Sommerville serve that sentence consecutively to his state parole-revocation sentence.

       On appeal, Sommerville challenges his federal sentence as both procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. He maintains that Section 5G1.3(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines
required the District Court to direct that his federal sentence run concurrently with his state
sentence. He further contends that the District Court provided insufficient explanation for
the sentence it imposed, and that the consecutive aspect of the sentence makes the overall
sentence unconscionably high. He also argues that his trial counsel (who also filed his initial
brief on appeal) was unconstitutionally ineffective. We assume the parties’ familiarity with
the underlying facts, procedural history, and arguments on appeal, to which we refer only as
necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

       We review de novo a district court’s legal determination regarding which sentencing
guideline to apply. United States v. Brennan, 395 F.3d 59, 66 (2d Cir. 2005). If the district

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court’s legal determination was correct, we then review its application of that guideline for
abuse of discretion. Id. Objections that are not raised below are reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 2008).

       I.      Guidelines Selection

       Section 5G1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines addresses how the sentencing court
should proceed when a defendant to be federally sentenced is “subject to an undischarged
term of imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 (capitalization standardized). Subsection (b) of
Section 5G1.3 (“the Guideline”) provides that if the defendant’s undischarged term of
imprisonment “resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense,” the
new federal sentence “shall be imposed to run concurrently to the remainder of the
undischarged term of imprisonment.” Id. §§ 5G1.3(b), (b)(2) (emphases added). Subsection
(d) of the Guideline, on the other hand, directs that if Subsection (b) does not apply, the new
sentence “may be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively . . . to
achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.” Id. § 5G1.3(d).

       Sommerville argues that his state parole-revocation sentence “resulted from” the
same “offense” as his 2020 federal firearm possession crime, and that Subsection (b)
therefore obligated the District Court to run his federal sentence concurrently with his state
revocation sentence. See id. § 5G1.3(b). Our longstanding precedent, however, forecloses this
argument. In United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 237 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2000), we held that when
a state term of imprisonment is imposed for conduct that led to revocation of a defendant’s
parole, the state term “result[s]” not from the conduct that constituted the parole violation
but from the original offense for which the defendant was earlier sentenced and then released
on parole. Id. at 107–08. “[T]he underlying state crime was the only criminal ‘offense’ that,
by operation of law, ‘resulted’ in the additional period of imprisonment imposed for [the
defendant’s] violation of parole,” we reasoned. Id. at 108.

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        Sommerville offers us no basis for deviating from the rule of Garcia-Hernandez. The
Guideline has not been amended in any relevant way since then. 1 See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)
(1995); id. (2016). And we are bound by our prior decisions “unless and until the precedents
established therein are reversed en banc or by the Supreme Court.” Vincent v. Annucci, 63 F.4th
145, 150 n.23 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        We conclude accordingly that Sommerville’s state sentence “resulted from” his 2014
firearm possession and that, as he concedes, the 2014 offense was unrelated to his 2020
conviction for firearm possession and not “relevant conduct” under Subsection (b) of the
Guideline. Sommerville Supp. Br. at 15; cf. United States v. Ruffin, 841 F. App’x 319, 321 (2d
Cir. 2021) (treating prior state conviction as “relevant conduct” under Subsection (b) where
state conviction was based in part on possession of same gun as the one at issue in the
federal conviction). The District Court was therefore correct to sentence Sommerville in
accordance with the discretionary language of Subsection (d). 2

        The District Court also correctly took into account Application Note 4(C), which
recommends a consecutive sentence pursuant to Subsection (d) when “the defendant was
on . . . parole . . . at the time of the instant offense and has had such . . . parole . . . revoked.”
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 comment, n.4(C). The District Court understood that it retained discretion
to impose a consecutive or a concurrent sentence. See App’x at 108–09 (District Court

 1 The Garcia-Hernandez Court interpreted the 1995 version of the Sentencing Guidelines, which required a

concurrent sentence if the defendant’s “undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that
ha[d] been fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense.” U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.3(b) (1995). In 2003, the Commission changed “offense(s) that ha[d] been fully taken into account” to
“another offense that is relevant conduct . . . and that was the basis for an increase in the offense level for the
instant offense.” 68 F.R. 26960-01, 26975 (May 16, 2003). In doing so, it reaffirmed that the Commission
“recommends a consecutive sentence” when a defendant’s state parole has been revoked. Id. at 26977; see also
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 comment, n.4 (1995) (“If the defendant was on . . . parole . . . at the time of the instant
offense, and has had such . . . parole . . . revoked, the sentence for the instant offense should be imposed to
run consecutively.”); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 comment, n.4(C) (2016) (“[I]n cases in which the defendant was
on . . . parole . . . at the time of the instant offense and has had such . . . parole . . . revoked . . . the
Commission recommends that the sentence for the instant offense be imposed consecutively.”).
 2 Because we conclude that Subsection (d) of the Guideline applied here, we need not decide whether the

apparently mandatory language of Subsection (b) survives United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See
United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 628 n.2 (2d Cir. 2014) (reserving the same question).

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agreeing that “application note [4(C)] … recommends that the sentence be run
consecutively, not that the Court does not have discretion to run it concurrently or
consecutively”).

        II.     Procedural Reasonableness

        Subsection (d) of the Guideline authorized the District Court to impose either a
consecutive or concurrent sentence on Sommerville. Whichever its choice, however, the
court was bound to explain its reasons. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b) (requiring sentencing courts to
consider the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when deciding whether to impose a consecutive
sentence); United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2020) (“A sentence is procedurally
unreasonable if the district court . . . fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors . . . or fails
adequately to explain the chosen sentence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Sommerville argues that the District Court failed to fulfill this obligation. Because he did not
preserve this challenge below, we review the District Court’s ruling for plain error.
Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at 128.

        In explaining the 30-month, consecutive sentence that it imposed, the District Court
recounted that “[o]ver the last seven years,” Sommerville possessed “seven different
handguns.” App’x at 122. On one such occasion, a shooting was involved. The District
Court also highlighted that Sommerville was fleeing as the police tried to arrest him in
December 2020. It pointed out that his state parole had already been revoked several times.
It noted further with concern that the “[Presentence Report] mention[ed] gang
membership.” Id. In light of this history, the District Court characterized Sommerville as
“armed and dangerous.” Id. The District Court also reminded those present that it had
considered the Section 3553(a) factors and stated that it was imposing its sentence “mindful
of the current state court incarceration[,] . . . [Sommerville’s] personal history and
characteristics, and . . . [his] upbringing.” Id.

        Under Circuit law, these statements provide a sufficient explanation for the District
Court’s sentencing decision, including for its consecutive imposition of the sentence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 253 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Johnson, 681 F. App’x

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52, 55 (2d Cir. 2017). Further, to fulfill its obligation to provide an explanation for its
sentencing choice, the District Court need not “make specific findings with respect to any or
all of the factors listed in the Commentary or § 3553(a).” Brennan, 395 F.3d at 69 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Sommerville presents no evidence that would lead us to doubt
that the District Court faithfully discharged its obligation. Coppola, 671 F.3d at 253 (“[I]n the
absence of record evidence suggesting otherwise, we presume that the district court has
faithfully discharged its duty to consider the § 3553(a) factors.” (internal quotation marks
omitted and alterations adopted)).

        To the extent Sommerville argues that the District Court abused its discretion by
failing to consider the factors listed in the application notes to the Guideline regarding
consecutive and concurrent sentences, we are not persuaded. Application Note 4(A)
recommends that sentencing judges consider factors such as the “length of the prior
undischarged sentence” and “the time likely to be served before release” when deciding
whether to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 comment,
n.4(A)(ii–v). As Sommerville acknowledges, however, the comment’s recommendation is
advisory, and the absence of explicit consideration of those factors does not make the
sentencing court’s explanation procedurally inadequate. Sommerville Supp. Br. at 20 (citing
United States v. Margiotti, 85 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam)).

        Moreover, even assuming that the failure to consider advisory factors could
constitute plain error, no such error occurred here. Sommerville’s state sentence was
described in the Presentence Report, and his counsel discussed Sommerville’s expected
release date at the sentencing hearing. App’x at 115–16. The record leaves no doubt that
Judge Sinatra was aware of and considered both factors when setting Sommerville’s
sentence. Id. at 122 (“I have imposed a sentence mindful of the current state court
incarceration . . . ”).

        We therefore reject Sommerville’s procedural reasonableness argument.

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        III.     Substantive Reasonableness

        Sommerville next argues that it was substantively unreasonable for the District Court
to impose a consecutive sentence because doing so transformed his total term of
incarceration from 30 months to approximately 46 months. Sommerville Br. at 20. This
Court reviews the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion, giving
particular deference to the District Court’s decision. United States v. Park, 758 F.3d 193, 199
(2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). We will deem a sentence substantively unreasonable only in
“exceptional cases,” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc): that is,
only when it is “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of
law,” Park, 758 F.3d at 200 (internal quotation marks omitted).

        The sentencing transcript reflects that, in the circumstances presented by
Sommerville and his record, the District Court considered an above-guidelines, 30-month
sentence, running consecutive to the remainder of the state sentence, necessary to protect
the public and to deter further crimes. See App’x at 121–23. To be sure, Sommerville will
serve more time by virtue of the consecutive sentence than he would with a concurrent 30-
month sentence. The sentence imposed and the circumstances of his crime and history are
not, however, “exceptional” as required to support a rare finding of substantive
unreasonableness. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189.3

        IV.      Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

        After filing his opening brief on appeal with the assistance of his trial counsel,
Sommerville raised an ineffective assistance claim regarding that counsel’s representation in a
letter to this Court. He requested that we appoint new counsel. United States v. Sommerville, 22-
981 (2d Cir.), Dkt. 50. In response, trial counsel defended his performance in a strongly

 3 Sommerville’s remaining challenges to his sentence also fail. Sommerville argues in his opening brief that

“the district court should have categorically rejected the provisions of § 5G1.3[(d)] and related application
notes” because they are “not empirically grounded,” and create “arbitrary” “sentencing disparities.”
Sommerville Br. at 16, 18. His brief provides no support for these arguments, however. Sommerville also
asserts that the District Court “r[a]n his federal sentence consecutive[ly] . . . in reliance on the illegitimate
authority of application notes only.” Id. at 17. In this, he is mistaken. As reviewed above, Subsection 5G1.3(d)
explicitly authorized the District Court to impose a consecutive sentence, in its discretion.

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worded, three-page letter. Id., Dkt. 55. After reviewing these submissions, we granted
Sommerville’s request for new counsel and permitted him—through his new counsel—to
file a supplemental brief on appeal. Id., Dkt. 71, 75.

       In that supplemental brief, Sommerville asserted that his prior counsel provided
ineffective assistance in several respects: by, allegedly, incorrectly representing to
Sommerville that he would receive a concurrent sentence; by mishandling the sequencing of
his state and federal pleas; by failing to consult with Sommerville on important issues and
not providing him a copy of his Presentence Report; and by failing to advocate for a lower
sentence on the grounds of Sommerville’s arduous, COVID-related conditions of
confinement. Sommerville Supp. Br. at 22–23.

       This Court has three procedural options available to it when a direct appeal raises an
ineffective assistance claim not made in the district court: we may “(1) decline to hear the
claim, permitting the appellant to raise the issue as part of a subsequent petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255; (2) remand the claim to the district court for
necessary factfinding; or (3) decide the claim on the record before us.” United States v. Tarbell,
728 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has
advised that “‘in most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for
deciding claims of ineffective assistance,’” id. at 128–29 (quoting Massaro v. United States, 538
U.S. 500, 504 (2003)), and it is accordingly our Court’s practice to entertain such claims in a
Section 2255 proceeding, not on direct appeal, see, e.g., United States v. Gelzer, 829 F. App’x
562, 567 (2d Cir. 2020).

       In fact, Sommerville and the United States both request that we not decide the issue
on direct appeal but rather allow Sommerville to raise his ineffective assistance claim by way
of a Section 2255 petition. Sommerville Supp. Br. at 22–25; U.S. Supp. Br. at 10. We agree
that it would be best to consider his ineffective assistance allegations on a more fully
developed factual record. We therefore dismiss that claim now, without prejudice to his
pursuing it later in a separate Section 2255 proceeding.

                                             * * *

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For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.

                                        FOR THE COURT:

                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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