Court Opinion

ID: 9488397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:43:59.834938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:51.782093
License: Public Domain

SAROKIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that “the district court erred by making credibility determinations from its de novo review of the record without the benefit of having viewed the witnesses’ demeanor” and that many of the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. Maj.Op. at 484. However, I dissent because I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the case. Instead of vacating and remanding to the district court for further review, id., I would reverse and remand for the district court to grant Hill’s habeas petition. Based upon a review of the record, I believe that Hill has met his burden of showing that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Specifically, I conclude that the factual findings of the district court were clearly eiToneous, and I would adopt the factual findings and credibility determinations of the magistrate judge, who actually held an evi-dentiary hearing, in support of my conclusion that Hill’s petition should be granted.
The district court, based on its de novo review of the record, determined that Hill’s guilty plea was constitutionally valid, even though the trial judge had failed to advise Hill of any of his Boykin rights and even though the magistrate judge, after an eviden-tiary hearing, concluded that Hill’s guilty plea was constitutionally invalid. The magistrate judge relied on: (1) Hill’s uncontrovert-ed testimony at the hearing that he was not aware of the rights he was waiving when he pled guilty; (2) Hill’s limited education; (3) a prior criminal history which does not indicate a familiarity with this particular area of the law; (4) Hill’s former attorney’s testimony that he cannot specifically recall advising Hill of his rights, but that he generally discusses these rights with his clients; (5) the state trial judge’s failure to apprise Hill of the litany of rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty; and (6) a plea form that did not contain an exposition of these rights.
For reasons to be discussed, I conclude that the district court’s factual findings concerning the voluntariness of Hill’s guilty plea were clearly erroneous. Furthermore, I believe that the magistrate judge’s factual findings and credibility determinations, which were based on an evidentiary hearing, were essentially correct and that these findings lead to the inescapable conclusion that Hill’s guilty plea is constitutionally invalid.
The district court relied heavily on the correspondence between Hill and his attorney. However, the correspondence between Hill’s former attorney and Hill makes no mention of Hill’s constitutional rights or that those rights are waived by pleading guilty. Although the correspondence does discuss a hypothetical jury trial, it does not specifically mention that Hill has the right to a jury trial and that this right is waived by pleading guilty. Notably, at the time of the correspondence, Hill was reading at a seventh grade level. Moreover, even were we to find that an attorney’s mere mention of the word “jury” in correspondence with a defendant is *485sufficient to apprise a defendant of his constitutional right to a jury trial and that this right is waived by pleading guilty, under Boykin a defendant must understand and appreciate the entire panoply of rights that he is about to waive by pleading guilty. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44, 89 S.Ct. at 1712-13. In the correspondence, there is no evidence of a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination or of the right to confront one’s accusers. In fact, there is no evidence of knowledge or waiver of these two rights by the defendant anywhere else in the record.
Furthermore, Hill testified at the eviden-tiary hearing that at the time he entered his guilty plea he did not know of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. Hill’s testimony that he was unaware of these rights went uncontroverted.
Hill’s former attorney testified at the hearing that his standard practice was to advise clients of their constitutional rights, but that he could not remember whether he advised Hill of these rights. I conclude that the district court erroneously relied on the attorney’s testimony that he believed Hill was aware of his constitutional rights, notwithstanding that the attorney admitted he could not remember whether he advised Hill of his rights or that these rights would be waived by pleading guilty.
Additionally, the state trial judge failed to advise Hill of any of his constitutional rights, and, thus, the plea colloquy does not establish that Hill knew of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. Therefore, the district court’s reliance on the plea colloquy to establish that Hill knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights when pleading guilty was in error.
The following findings of the magistrate judge lend further support to the conclusion that Hill’s guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. Defendant in the instant case had no previous experience with the criminal justice system which would show an independent awareness of the rights that were waived. Hill had never participated in a jury trial, either as a defendant or as a witness. Hill was charged with several offenses as a juvenile but was never advised of his constitutional rights in connection with those charges and never served a prison sentence. Hill’s adult criminal record consisted of one conviction for shoplifting for which Hill pled guilty; Hill was fined and received one year of probation. Hill was never advised of his constitutional rights in connection with his conviction for shoplifting. Finally, the plea form signed by Hill did not contain an exposition of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.
In sum, after a careful examination of the record, I am firmly convinced that the district court’s findings concerning the volun-tariness of Hill’s guilty plea were clearly erroneous. I believe that Hill has sustained his burden of showing that he was neither aware of nor understood the constitutional rights which he waived by pleading guilty, and, thus, his plea was not knowing and voluntary and is invalid. As the magistrate judge in the instant ease recommended, Hill’s guilty plea and conviction should be set aside, and the case remanded to the state court to afford Hill the opportunity to plead anew. A further hearing before the district court would serve no purpose because all of the relevant facts have been presented and appropriate findings made therefrom.