Court Opinion

ID: 9644024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:46:42.398759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:07.556785
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
Provision is made by statute, Act of June 3, 1971, PL 124, No. 6,, § 1 (§ 509(a) (46) (12 PS § 681), that whenever a party has requested binding instructions on an issue, and that request has been reserved or declined by the court, the party presenting the point may, if certain procedural requirements are complied with, move for judgment non obstante veredicto upon the whole record. It then becomes the duty of the court, if it does not grant a new trial, to certify the evidence, and to enter such judgment as should have been entered on that evidence. The party against whom the judgment is rendered may then appeal.
In the instant case, appellant properly submitted a request for binding instructions at the close of appellee’s (plaintiff’s) presentation of the evidence. After the jury verdict was announced, appellant moved for judgment n. o. v. The controlling question to be determined by the court in such a situation is whether the request for binding instruction should have been given either at the time it was submitted (at the close of plaintiff’s case) or at the close of the trial. F. W. Wise Gas Co. v. Beech Creek R. Co., 437 Pa. 389, 263 A.2d 313 (1970). If binding instructions should have been given, entry of judgment n. o. v. is proper. In effect, the entry of the judgment n. o. v. is to correct the court’s error in allowing a certain question to go to the jury.
The purpose of providing for the entry of a judgment n. o. v. is to give the court an opportunity for more delib*382erate review and consideration of the law applicable to the facts than ordinarily can be had at trial. For this reason, the request for binding instructions must be submitted in writing in order to preserve the right to have a judgment n. o. v. entered. See Dora v. Dora, 392 Pa. 433, 141 A.2d 587 (1958). The court is then obligated to pass on the propriety of the request for binding instructions, and in doing so, has an obligation to apply the “correct” law, as that law is determined to be at the time of the court’s deliberations in the matter for judgment n. o. v. Concluding as the majority does, that a party waives the right to have the “correct” law applied to the motion for judgment n. o. v. by failing to object to an erroneous jury instruction, ignores the purpose for allowing motions for judgment n. o. v. (to afford the court an opportunity to consider the question more fully than is possible at trial). I therefore dissent.
Appellant’s actions in this case fully complied with the statutory conditions required before a motion for judgment n. o. v. may be considered. The motion for judgment n. o. v. was considered by the court en banc, and denied on its merits. Appellant, having done everything required of it by the statute, is entitled to appellate review of the merits of its motion for judgment n. o. v. We should therefore vacate the order of the Superior Court and remand the case to the Superior Court for consideration of the merits of appellant’s motion for judgment n. o. v.
I would also like to express my view that if I were to reach the merits of appellant’s motion for judgment n. o. v., I would hold that the trial court’s denial of that motion was proper because appellee presented sufficient facts to create a jury question as to whether appellant negligently caused the alleged harm to appellee. Since I *383believe that the proper legal standard to apply in a case such as this would allow recovery if plaintiff had shown either that defendant knew or that defendant should have known that its actions were substantially certain to result in plaintiff’s discharge.