Court Opinion

ID: 9890657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 21:00:35.547545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:39.462378
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4593

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        KHEUNGKHAM VONGPHAKDY,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (3:21-cr-00184-KDB-DSC-1)

        Submitted: August 31, 2023                                    Decided: October 12, 2023

        Before AGEE and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Jared P. Martin, Assistant Federal
        Public Defender, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
        FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King,
        United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
        THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               A federal jury convicted Kheungkham Vongphakdy of unlawful procurement of

        naturalization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a).         The district court sentenced

        Vongphakdy to four months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Vongphakdy challenges the

        district court’s decision to admit evidence that he alleges was obtained in violation of

        Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as well as the denial of his motion to suppress

        evidence of a prior guilty plea he entered in state court because he asserts that his counsel

        in the state court proceedings rendered ineffective assistance. We affirm.

               Vongphakdy first argues that the district court reversibly erred by allowing the

        Government to introduce evidence obtained in violation of Miranda regarding his ability

        to respond to an English-language interrogation. “[T]he Fifth Amendment guarantees that

        ‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”

        United States v. Khweis, 971 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting U.S. Const. amend.

        V). “Recognizing that the pressure and isolation inherent in custodial interrogation could

        overcome the resilience of a suspect otherwise not inclined to incriminate himself, the

        Supreme Court in Miranda instituted measures to [e]nsure that the right against

        compulsory self-incrimination is protected.” Id. (cleaned up). “Thus, unless a defendant

        is advised of his Fifth Amendment rights pursuant to Miranda and voluntarily waives those

        rights, statements he makes during a custodial interrogation must be suppressed.” United

        States v. Azua-Rinconada, 914 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir. 2019).

               We discern no error by the district court. “To qualify for the Fifth Amendment

        privilege, a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.” Hiibel v.

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        Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004). The Fifth Amendment privilege

        against self-incrimination thus only protects a defendant from being compelled to provide

        “testimonial” evidence, meaning that the communication “must itself, explicitly or

        implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.” United States v. Oriakhi, 57

        F.3d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the Supreme

        Court has explicitly distinguished between “the use of compulsion to extort

        communications from a defendant” and merely “compelling a person to engage in conduct

        that may be incriminating,” such as providing samples of one’s voice, handwriting, or

        physical appearance, all of which are constitutionally permissible.        United States v.

        Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2000). We conclude that the language spoken by a person

        during otherwise privileged communications, while potentially incriminating, does not, by

        itself, “relate a factual assertion or disclose information” and that it is therefore not

        testimonial evidence subject to suppression under Miranda. See Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1299;

        see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 590-99 (1990) (noting that impaired

        defendant’s slurring of his speech in response to questions during interrogation was

        incriminating but not testimonial where the incriminating nature of that fact was not based

        on content of his answers).

               In any event, admission of a defendant’s statement obtained in violation of Miranda

        does not mandate a new trial if “the admission of the statement at issue was harmless

        beyond a reasonable doubt, such that it is clear that a rational fact finder would have found

        the defendant guilty absent the error.” United States v. Giddins, 858 F.3d 870, 885 (4th

        Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the Miranda context, factors relevant to

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        harmlessness include: “(1) the importance of the statement to the government’s case;

        (2) the impact on credibility of other evidence; and (3) the admission of prejudicial

        evidence based solely on the admission of the statement.” Id. at 886 (citing Arizona v.

        Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 297-300 (1991)). Even assuming that a Miranda violation

        occurred, we conclude that the Government has met its burden to establish “that the

        admission of the [statement] did not contribute to [Vongphakdy’s] conviction.”

        Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296.

               Turning to Vongphakdy’s remaining claim, when considering a district court’s

        denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review factual findings for clear error and legal

        conclusions de novo. United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021). Guilty

        pleas are ordinarily “presumed to be valid,” as they are “protected by a strong presumption

        . . . of regularity.” United States v. Locke, 932 F.3d 196, 199 (4th Cir. 2019). Further, “a

        trial for a subsequent offense” is ordinarily “not the appropriate forum to assess the validity

        of [a] prior conviction.” United States v. Anglin, 284 F.3d 407, 410 (2d Cir. 2002). While

        Vongphakdy contends that he should have been permitted to challenge the admission of

        his state court guilty plea because his state counsel allegedly provided constitutionally

        ineffective assistance under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.

        356 (2010), we conclude that Vongphakdy’s claim was not cognizable in his federal

        prosecution, cf. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494, 496-97 (1994); see also

        Mondragon v. Holder, 706 F.3d 535, 543-44 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding Custis barred

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        challenge to prior conviction based on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in removal

        proceedings). *

               Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                       AFFIRMED

               *
                 We “may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record,” notwithstanding the
        reasoning of the district court. United States v. Riley, 856 F.3d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 2017)
        (internal quotation marks omitted).

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