Court Opinion

ID: 9881574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 14:08:04.676244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:29.186920
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-876

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                JAVIER TORRES.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant admitted in 1999 to sufficient facts to

 permit a finding of guilt with respect to a single charge of

 distribution of a class A substance, G. L. c. 94C § 32 (a).                The

 plea judge ordered that the charge be continued without a

 finding; as part of the agreed-on disposition between the

 Commonwealth and the defendant, the two other charges, including

 a school zone enhancement, 1 were dismissed.           Over twenty years

 later, in 2021, the defendant, claiming ineffective assistance

 of counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his admissions to facts,

 which was denied. 2     In turn, the defendant filed a motion to

 1 This charge requires a mandatory two-year term of commitment on
 conviction. See G. L. c. 94C, § 32J.
 2 The defendant has had repeated interactions with the criminal

 justice system during the intervening period. In 2005, he was
 convicted in Suffolk and Essex Superior Courts of four charges
reconsider, which was also denied.    He now appeals from the

orders denying both motions.   On appeal, the defendant asserts

that the motion judge erred in denying his motions because he

received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial

counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of

his admissions, in violation of his Federal and State

constitutional rights.   Discerning no error, we affirm.

     Discussion.   "A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is treated

as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P.

30 (b)," as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).    Commonwealth v.

Sylvain, 473 Mass. 832, 835 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v.

DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 178 (2014).    We review the denial of

such a motion for a significant error of law or other abuse of

discretion.   See Sylvain, supra; Commonwealth v. Gordon, 82

Mass. App. Ct. 389, 393-394 (2012).    To establish that he is

entitled to a new trial, the defendant is required to show that

(1) by not advising him of the immigration consequences he would

face if convicted of distribution of a class A substance, his

plea counsel's conduct fell below the standard of an ordinary,

fallible lawyer, and (2) that shortcoming prejudiced him.    See

Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).    See also

Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 51-52 (2015)

related to trafficking, distributing, and possessing controlled
substances and was sentenced to State prison in both cases.

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(ineffective assistance of counsel on immigration consequences

of plea).

     With respect to the first prong of the Saferian analysis,

the motion judge briefly recited the defendant's argument and

held that "[b]ased on a review of all the evidence, . . . [the]

[a]ttorney's advice was ineffective."   Neither party disputes

that finding, and we agree with the motion judge that plea

counsel's advice was ineffective.    See Commonwealth v. Chleikh,

82 Mass. App. Ct. 718, 723 (2012).   The motion judge then

addressed the second prong and determined that the defendant had

not satisfied his burden to show that plea counsel's substandard

conduct prejudiced him and, as stated, denied the motions.    We

therefore turn directly to the question of prejudice.

     "In the context of a guilty plea, in order to satisfy the

prejudice requirement, the defendant has the burden of

establishing that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial" (quotations omitted).

Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 55, quoting Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460

Mass. 30, 47 (2011).   To establish that reasonable probability,

"[a]t a minimum, . . . the defendant must aver that to be the

case."   Lavrinenko, supra, quoting Clarke, supra.   Having made

such an assertion, "[the defendant] must [then] convince the

court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been

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rational under the circumstances" (quotation omitted).      DeJesus,

468 Mass. at 183, quoting Clarke, supra.

       "To prove that rejecting the plea would have been rational
       under the circumstances, the defendant bears the
       substantial burden of showing that (1) he [or she] had an
       available, substantial ground of defence, . . . that would
       have been pursued if he [or she] had been correctly advised
       of the dire immigration consequences attendant to accepting
       the plea bargain; (2) there is a reasonable probability
       that a different plea bargain (absent such consequences)
       could have been negotiated at the time; or (3) the presence
       of special circumstances that support the conclusion that
       he placed, or would have placed, particular emphasis on
       immigration consequences in deciding whether to plead
       guilty" (quotations omitted).

Lavrinenko, supra at 55-56, quoting Clarke, supra at 47-48.

       We conclude that the motion judge did not abuse his

discretion by finding that the defendant had not carried this

substantial burden.    Although the defendant met the threshold

requirement by submitting an affidavit averring that he would

not have accepted the plea deal but for plea counsel's errors,

several factors suggest that rejection of the plea deal would

not have been rational in the circumstances.    See Clarke, 460

Mass. at 47-48.    Most significantly, the Commonwealth's evidence

against the defendant was overwhelming.    See id. at 48.    Two

undercover police detectives observed the defendant engage in a

narcotics transaction in plain view and recovered two glassine

packets filled with a white substance 3 from the purchaser

3   The detectives believed this substance was heroin.

                                  4
immediately thereafter.   Although the defendant argues that the

twenty-foot distance between himself and the detectives at the

time of the sale would have been enough to create reasonable

doubt as to his guilt, we are not persuaded. 4   Moreover, the

record suggests that the school zone violation with which the

defendant was charged was equally supported by the evidence.

If, as is the case here, the likelihood of conviction was almost

certain, rejecting a plea deal that allowed the defendant to

avoid incarceration without exposing him to a greater risk of

deportation than that inherent in his conviction of the same and

other offenses after trial would not have been rational.    See

Clarke, supra at 47-48.

     The defendant argues that special circumstances existed

that would have led him to reject a plea bargain had he been

properly advised by plea counsel. 5   To support this claim in the

trial court, he offered a 2021 affidavit in which he cited his

ties to the United States at the time of the plea, including his

status as a permanent resident, employment, and the presence of

his brother and sister in the country.    He further referenced

4 The defendant also contends that the lack of additional
evidence of drug distribution weakened the Commonwealth's case,
but we are not convinced that additional evidence would have
been necessary.
5 The Commonwealth's strong case against the defendant

effectively forecloses any argument pertaining to an available
defense or alternative plea arrangement. See Clarke, 460 Mass.
at 47-48.

                                 5
his marriage to a United States citizen, his home ownership

here, and his adult children living in the United States but

does not claim that those factors existed at the time of his

plea in 1999. 6   Without more, we cannot conclude that proceeding

to trial in the face of a likely conviction and predictably more

severe penalty would have been rational, and we accordingly

discern no abuse of discretion in the motion judge's denial of

the defendant's motion.    See Clarke, 460 Mass. at 47-48.

                                      Orders denying motions to
                                        withdraw admissions to
                                        facts and for
                                        reconsideration affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                        Desmond & Hand, JJ. 7),

                                      Clerk

Entered:   October 3, 2023.

6 Moreover, we note that the defendant came to the United States
from the Dominican Republic as an adult and has not claimed any
type of economic or persecutorial hardship associated with his
life there. See, e.g., Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 47-49.
7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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