Court Opinion

ID: 9623870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:45:14.159082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:36.002526
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Chief Judge.
Clayton Monroe Haire brought suit against the City of Macon and Georgia 4-H Clubs Foundation, Inc. (“4-H Club”) seeking damages for injuries he incurred when he slipped and fell at a 4-H Club hog show held at a facility owned by the City. Haire dismissed 4-H Club without prejudice. The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, and Haire appeals.
We reverse. The evidence established that the show appellant was attending was held in a building constructed prior to 1900 which was being used as a show barn. It was appellant’s first visit to the barn, and he had never before traversed the ramp on which he fell. It is uncontroverted that the ramp had been built more than 30 years before appellant’s fall and had not been altered since 1959. The ramp, which filled the doorway connecting two buildings, was 12 feet wide, 15 inches at its highest point, and 67 inches long. The ramp was constructed of smooth surfaced concrete at a steep slope and had no handrail. There were no signs warning pedestrians about the ramp. Although the ramp was under a roof, at the time of appellant’s fall it *745had mud, water, and straw on it.
Appellant testified that the hog show was crowded with people and that he was walking six to twelve inches behind his mother. He stated that he was looking straight ahead when he saw his mother slip and then slipped himself on his first step on the ramp, although he did not know he was on a ramp until he was falling. Appellant testified that although the amount of mud and water was “usual” for a hog show, the mud and water on the ramp made it very slippery. He also testified that he knew he was in a barn and had to be careful. Appellant acknowledged that there was nothing in the area that distracted his attention.
It is uncontroverted that prior to appellant’s accident, the City had received no notification that anyone had fallen or been injured in any way while using the ramp.
Appellant produced the affidavit of his expert witness, John Hutchinson, who averred that the ramp was a hazardous condition presenting an unreasonable and unacceptable risk of serious injury to persons using the ramp and that it constituted such a hazardous condition even without the presence thereon of mud, water, or other foreign substances. He gave four reasons: (1) the ramp’s slope was too steep because it was a rise of one inch for every four and one half inches, and any slope greater than one inch for every eight inches was not safe for pedestrians; (2) the surface of the ramp was too smooth and slick for safe use by pedestrians; (3) the ramp had no handrails and being in excess of 88 inches wide should have had handrails on both sides and intermediate handrails; and (4) there were no markings or other signs to warn pedestrians that they were approaching a ramp. In his deposition, Hutchinson explained that he applied Southern Building Code standards promulgated in 1986 to the ramp and did not know what standards were in effect at the time the ramp was constructed. However, he testified that in his professional opinion, the ramp “was so out of the norm of ramps that you see in the ’70s and the ’80s and, now, in the ’90s, . . . that I guess I was just — my gosh, I was just overwhelmed.” In his opinion the ramp was so bad that he could easily see it as a cause of an accident and was “very surprised” when told there had been no other accidents.
Appellant contends the trial court erred by granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remain whether appellee was negligent in maintaining a ramp that was too steep, too smooth, and lacked handrails and warnings. Appellant bases his claim on common law negligence, having conceded in his brief that he has no negligence per se claim arising from the ramp’s noncompliance with any building codes because the building was a legal noncomplying use and not in violation of any applicable statutory provision. See Garnett v. Mathison, 179 Ga. App. 242 (1) *746(345 SE2d 919) (1986).
“For appellant to recover under a common law negligence theory, there must have been a defective condition on appell[ee]’s premises, which defect was the cause of appellant’s fall and of which appellee had superior knowledge. [Cit.] The law is clear that the basis for an owner’s liability for injury occurring to another while on the owner’s property is the owner’s superior knowledge of the danger or defect which was the proximate cause of the injury. The true ground of liability is the proprietor’s superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the property. It is when the perilous instrumentality is known to the owner or occupant and not known to the person injured that a recovery is permitted.” (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Id. at 242-243 (2). “ ‘(A)n owner or occupier of land is liable to invitees for injuries they sustain as a result of his failure to warn them of dangers which he was aware of, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known. (Cits.) However, a person is not expected to foresee and warn against dangers which are not reasonably expected, and which would not occur except under exceptional circumstances or from unexpected acts of the person injured. (Cit.)’. . . [Cit.]” Zellers v. Theater of the Stars, 171 Ga. App. 406, 407 (319 SE2d 553) (1984).
In Zellers, although the defendant had controlled an auditorium for six weeks a year for over 13 years, no one had ever been injured therein by plate glass breaking in the auditorium doors. Because of the lack of injuries, we held that the defendant had no actual knowledge that the doors of the auditorium, by containing plate glass rather than safety glass, were dangerous, id. at 407-408 (1), and that in the absence of injuries caused by the plate glass, there was no evidence to show or indicate that defendant had a duty to inspect the premises to discover and warn of the existence of the dangers of plate glass doors. Id. at 408 (2). However, “ ‘[o]n motion for summary judgment the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the respondent, and the respondent is given the benefit of every doubt.’ [Cit.] The movant has the burden to prove the non-existence of any genuine issue of material fact (OCGA § 9-11-56), and in so determining, the court will treat the respondent’s paper with considerable indulgence. [Cit.]” Mallard v. Jenkins, 179 Ga. App. 582 (347 SE2d 339) (1986). Hutchinson testified that in his professional opinion the ramp was a hazardous condition, deviating so far from the established norm that it was “overwhelming” and that “absolutely” it could easily be seen as the cause of an accident. There is thus some evidence in the record from which it could reasonably be inferred that despite the absence of prior accidents, the ramp in issue was so obviously a defective condition that its danger was visible and should have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary care even without the type of inspection that *747could distinguish plate glass from safety glass, as in Zellers, supra, or a slight deviation in the height of risers, as in Chisholm v. Fulton Supply Co., 184 Ga. App. 378, 379 (361 SE2d 540) (1987), and accordingly was a danger appellee reasonably could have foreseen and expected.
“ ‘The Summary Judgment Act does not authorize the trial court to sit as both judge and jury, weighing the evidence and deciding issues that are traditionally for the jury. (Cit.) The sole function of the court on a motion for summary judgment is, rather, to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. (Cits.) In the instant case it is clear that such issues exist.’ [Cit.]” Collins v. Newman Machine Co., 190 Ga. App. 879, 884 (380 SE2d 314) (1989). Given the conflict between Hutchinson’s testimony concerning the obviously hazardous condition of the ramp and the inferences to be drawn from the absence of prior accidents, a question of fact exists here whether the ramp was a defective condition which appellee, in the exercise of ordinary care in keeping its premises safe in the more than 30 years it has owned the premises, knew or should have known would cause injury to an invitee. OCGA § 51-3-1.
We have reviewed the evidence in the record regarding whether appellant’s fall was due to a defect in the ramp itself or to the mud and water on the ramp and do not agree with appellee that the evidence so clearly established that appellant slipped only because of the mud and water that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Likewise, in view of appellant’s total lack of familiarity with the barn and his testimony regarding the severely crowded conditions in the building, we cannot agree with appellee that as a matter of law, the ramp was a patent defect or that appellant failed to exercise ordinary care on his own behalf. “Questions as to diligence and negligence, including contributory negligence, being questions peculiarly for the jury, the court will decline to solve them except in plain and indisputable cases. It was not incumbent upon appellant to exercise that degree of care which would have absolutely prevented his injuries.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wall v. Southern R. Co., 196 Ga. App. 483, 485 (2) (396 SE2d 266) (1990).

Judgment reversed.

McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Carley, Pope and Cooper, JJ., concur. Birdsong, P. J., Beasley and Andrews, JJ., dissent.