Court Opinion

ID: 9740042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:26:27.628838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:15.550267
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RIZZI, dissenting: After the original majority and dissenting opinions were filed, the defendant filed a petition for rehearing. The majority denied the petition for rehearing but has filed a replacement opinion entitled “Modified on Denial of Rehearing.” Except for what I have to say in the following three paragraphs, I do not find anything in the Modified on Denial of Rehearing opinion that warrants comment other than what was contained in my dissenting opinion as originally filed. In a footnote in the Modified on Denial of Rehearing opinion, the majority states that in two other cases I declined to reverse “by reason of lost evidence.” In another footnote, the majority states that in my dissent I cited 31 cases where the State has either lost or destroyed evidence but that I neglected “to indicate that none, except Hammock, was reversed by reason of the loss or destruction by the State of such evidence.” (235 Ill. App. 3d at 427 n.2.) These footnote references demonstrate what I believe is wrong with the majority’s thinking. The majority does not see the existence of the problem, which is that the lost or destroyed evidence by the State is not peculiar to this case but rather appears to be part of a pattern. If you do not see the problem, you cannot do anything about it — but the problem will continue! Now that the majority has denied the petition for rehearing and filed its Modified on Denial of Rehearing opinion, the State will never explain what happened to the missing tape or tapes and another case will have been affirmed where the State has inexplicably not produced evidence in its possession. Unfortunately, the judiciary has established a pattern of condonation which leads to perpetuation of the problem; that itself is a problem. Pity the next accused who will be faced with the State inexplicably not producing evidence in its possession — and there surely will be others. In our adversarial criminal justice system, the State will continue to do that which it can get away with doing. The remainder of my dissent remains as it was originally filed in response to the majority’s opinion as originally filed. I dissent because the trial judge erred in not either barring the testimony of K.H. or conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine what the State did with the tape or tapes of the two interviews that were taken of K.H. prior to trial. I would reverse and remand for a new trial. This case bears the head of Janus. One face looks at the defendant and the other face looks at the prosecution, i.e., the State. The face that looks at the defendant sees the acts which the defendant is accused of committing and the jury’s verdict of guilty. The other face looks at the intolerable conduct of the State in having evidence inexplicably vanish in a case of this nature. This puts me in a position comparable to Odysseus between Scylla and Charybdis. Whichever direction I choose to look, I see something that agitates and alarms. Unlike the majority, I choose to look in the direction of and assay the intolerable conduct of the State because that issue is so paramount that it transcends the case itself. This is plainly evident by the fact that the State’s loss of evidence is not peculiar to this case; rather, it appears to be part of a pattern. The issue of the State12 either losing or destroying evidence in its possession prior to trial has been raised on appeal in no fewer than the following cases: People v. Stevenson (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 342, 562 N.E.2d 330 (baseball bat used in attack and victim’s wallet recovered at the scene of the crime were lost); People v. Lann (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 623, 551 N.E.2d 276 (imitation police badge, bloodstained skullcap, bloodstained hammer and victim’s wallet found in defendant’s possession were destroyed); People v. Everette (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 543 N.E.2d 1040 (gun used in murder was destroyed by the State); People v. Davis (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 792 (defendant’s briefcase and its contents were lost while in the State’s possession); People v. Nunn (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 253, 541 N.E.2d 182 (audio tape of police officer’s dictation of his notes was destroyed after the trial court ordered that the tapes be preserved); People v. Young (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 488, 581 N.E.2d 241 (confiscated controlled substance was destroyed); People v. Stallings (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 570 N.E.2d 820 (X rays and tissue samples necessary to support defendant’s contention that victim’s death was not caused by defendant’s actions were destroyed prior to independent inspection and chemical analysis by defense counsel); People v. Kidd (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 536 N.E.2d 816 (gunshot residue test performed on another suspect was destroyed by police before it was tested or analyzed); People v. Colley (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 798, 528 N.E.2d 223 (bullet inventoried by police was lost prior to trial); People v. Ambrose (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 87, 525 N.E.2d 536 (tires recovered from stolen car were destroyed prior to defense counsel’s inspection of the tires); People v. Sims (1987), 166 Ill. App. 3d 289, 519 N.E.2d 921 (State failed to preserve a tire and beer cans to test for defendant’s fingerprints); People v. Zayas (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 554, 510 N.E.2d 1125 (gun used in murder was destroyed), rev’d (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 284, 546 N.E.2d 513; People v. Linseott (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 71, 511 N.E.2d 1303, rev’d (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 22, 566 N.E.2d 1355 (sole vaginal swab taken from deceased victim was destroyed during unilateral testing by State and therefore the swab was unavailable for independent analysis); People v. Lucente (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 133, 506 N.E.2d 1269 (police reports ordered to be produced by the trial court could not be located); People v. Guest (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 72, 503 N.E.2d 255 (bullet lost); People v. Emrich (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 343, 498 N.E.2d 1140 (State failed to properly preserve blood sample taken from defendant prior to independent analysis by defense counsel); People v. Balfour (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 215, 498 N.E.2d 547 (photographs of defendant reenacting his encounter with victim lost); People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 201, 478 N.E.2d 392 (a prescription pill bottle bearing victim’s name found in automobile driven by defendant lost); People v. White (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 262, 479 N.E.2d 1121 (supplemental police report prepared by arresting officer lost); People v. Clark (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 14, 463 N.E.2d 981 (State failed to preserve testing specimens taken from victim’s vagina precluding independent chemical analysis by defense counsel); People v. Hammock (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 874, 460 N.E.2d 378 (State failed to produce a videotape of defendant’s reenactment of a homicide); People v. Smith (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 449 N.E.2d 912 (relevant portions of the arresting officer’s police report lost); People v. Lopez (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 792, 438 N.E.2d 504 (confiscated controlled substance was destroyed and unavailable for independent chemical analysis by defense counsel); People v. Jones (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 652, 575 N.E.2d 561 (confiscated money disappeared prior to trial); People v. Lampkin (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 570, 550 N.E.2d 278 (victim’s blood samples were not properly preserved); People v. Luallen (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 862, 544 N.E.2d 1206 (videotape of defendant taken by police shortly after her arrest was lost); People v. Ebener (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 232, 514 N.E.2d 205 (after trial court ordered controlled substances preserved for independent chemical analysis by defense counsel, all confiscated controlled substance was consumed by police testing and unavailable for independent chemical analysis); People v. Montague (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 332, 500 N.E.2d 592 (knife used in murder disappeared); People v. Howard (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 967, 474 N.E.2d 1345 (blood samples taken from the scene of murder were disposed of prior to independent analysis by defense counsel); People v. Vargas (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 787, 452 N.E.2d 736 (communication recordings were destroyed after the trial court ordered that the recordings be preserved). All but seven of the cases cited were tried in Cook County. As a member of the criminal justice system, I cannot help but be riveted with deep concern and anguish at what is happening. There appears to be a black hole somewhere in the State’s evidence vault so condensed that evidence cannot be retrieved from its gravitational field. I would not only reach a different result than the majority in this case, but I also disagree with other conclusions of the majority. Under the circumstances involved in this case, it behooves me to point out these differences. Bearing in mind that there was no evidentiary hearing or verification as to what happened to the tape or tapes, I first note that the majority apparently assumes that the tape or tapes were lost in a good-faith measure merely because the prosecutors said in statements not under oath or verified that the tape or tapes cannot be found. It is as if the majority has misread the maxim vox populi, vox Dei to mean vox prosequitur, vox Dei. Of course, the correct maxim to be applied to statements made by the prosecutor is vox, et praeterea nihil. Mere statements by a prosecutor that are not under oath or verified cannot suffice to establish what happened to evidence that was lost while in the State’s possession since the prosecutor represents a party involved in an adversarial proceeding. When a person’s liberty is hanging in the balance there is simply too much at stake to allow the State .to lose evidence without verified detailed specifics as to what occurred. I next address the following conclusion of the majority: “During pretrial investigation, K.H., who was serving in the Army in California, was contacted and interviewed twice by a Salinas, California, police officer in early February 1988. On those occasions, the officer surreptitiously tape-recorded the interviews. Based upon their conversations, the officer wrote a five-page summary of K.H.’s statements and sent the written report and tape to the Cook County sheriff’s office in Chicago, which forwarded the evidence to the Cook County State’s Attorney.” (235 Ill. App. 3d at 423.) I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the two interviews of K.H. that were conducted by Detective James Brown were on one tape. There is no evidence that the majority’s conclusion is true, and Detective Brown’s written report indicates otherwise. This further demonstrates why an evidentiary hearing is necessary in this case: We do not even know whether one or two tapes are missing. In his written report, after referring to his first interview with K.H. on February 1, 1988, Detective Brown states: “My interview with K.H. was surreptitiously recorded utilizing a microcassette recorder. The original of that recording, along with a copy of this report, will be forwarded to Det. Farley.” Finally, at the conclusion of his written report, Detective Brown states: “A copy of this report, along with the tapes of the interviews conducted with K.H., will be forwarded to Det. Farley.” Surely, based on what Detective Brown wrote in his report, one can reasonably conclude that there were actually two tapes that are missing rather than one — but we don’t know! Two other aspects of the missing tape or tapes bear mention here. The first involves Detective Brown and the circumstances surrounding the taping of the interviews with K.H. The second is the plausibility of the prosecutors’13 statements that they never heard the tape or tapes and one prosecutor’s statement that “they were somehow lost in the transfer and change of personnel involved in the case.” Detective Brown’s written report is the only document in the record relating to the tape or tapes. The report is dated February 3, 1988. According to the written report, on January 28, 1988, Detective Brown received a telephone call from Detective Robert Farley of the Illinois Cook County sheriff’s office. The written report states that Detective Farley “is involved in the investigation of a major molestation case involving a Rev. Paul Hall.” According to the written report, in the telephone call Farley requested assistance in that “he needed K.H. contacted and an initial statement obtained.” The written report provides that Detective Brown agreed to aid in the investigation and made arrangements to see K.H., and that he spoke with K.H. “in his patrol vehicle in less than ideal conditions.” In his written report Detective Brown further states: “My interview with K.H. was surreptitiously recorded utilizing a microcassette recorder. The original of that recording, along with a copy of this report, will be forwarded to Detective Farley.” After the interview, Detective Brown arranged for a second interview with K.H. to take place on February 3, 1988. According to the written report, on February 2, 1988, Detective Brown spoke with Cook County Assistant State’s Attorney Diane Romza. Romza is the same person who was one of the prosecuting attorneys in the defendant’s trial. According to the written report, Assistant State’s Attorney Romza indicated to Detective Brown “the possibility of K.H. being flown back to the Chicago area for the purpose of being interviewed and/or giving a statement before the grand jury.” The written report also states that Romza asked Detective Brown to approach K.H. and make inquiry to see if he would be so amenable. In addition, the written report states that when Detective Brown met K.H. on February 3, 1988, he transported him to the Salinas police department office. While en route, Detective Brown told K.H. about the possibility of his being requested to fly to the Chicago area to meet with Assistant State’s Attorney Diane Romza, and K.H. agreed to comply with the request. Upon arrival at the Salinas police department office, Detective Brown telephoned Detective Farley and advised him of the conversation he had with K.H. Detective Farley then spoke with K.H. and obtained the necessary information to start the process to have K.H. released from military duty long enough to have him flown to Chicago to testify before the grand jury. The written report further states that Detective Farley then asked Detective Brown to interview K.H. and “specifically cover some questions for the Illinois State Attorney, such as was K.H. shown any pornographic homosexual videos, was K.H. ever asked to wear women’s clothing, that other persons were present in sexual three-somes with the reverend and what activity occurred in connection with the boys choir.” According to the written report, Detective Brown’s second interview with K.H. was conducted in the detective interview room and was recorded. The written report also provides: “Based upon the advice of my Detective Captain, I limited the scope of my interview to those areas specifically requested that inquiry be made into by the Illinois State Attorney. This was done to limit my susceptibility to having to answer to a subpoena originating from the state of Illinois.” Detective Brown’s written report also contains what one of the prosecuting trial attorneys described as a “synopsis” of the two interviews with K.H. The written report further states that the tapes of Detective Brown’s interviews with K.H. were forwarded to Detective Farley. When Detective Brown sent the written report14 to Detective Farley, he included the following note: “2/3/88 Dear Bob, Hope this is a help to you. If you need further help with this case from this end please call. Sounds like a great case— the kind legends are made from. Take Care Is/ James Brown” In addition, with respect to Detective Brown’s February 3, 1988, written report, on the first page it is stated: “Person No. 1 K.H. Person No. 2 FARLEY, ROBERT Person No. 3 ROMZA, DIANE” In the written report it is also stated that Detective Brown spoke with “Illinois State Attorney Romza” on February 2, 1988, and that Romza asked Detective Brown to ask K.H. if he would be willing to return to Chicago “for the purpose of being interviewed and/or giving a statement before the grand jury.” The telephone conversation between Detective Brown and Assistant State’s Attorney Romza took place the day after Detective Brown surreptitiously recorded the first interview with K.H. At trial, when the nonproduction of the tapes was being discussed, the following colloquy occurred: “MS. ROMZA-KUTZ: I think it’s very important that I have never heard of the content of this one tape. It is not two tape recordings to my knowledge, according to Det. Farley, neither Mr. Cahill’s. That tape was made without our knowledge during the investigation of Paul Hall. It was, in fact, sent to Det. Farley of the Cook County Sheriff’s Police, that was then turned over to an Assistant who was assigned to the case. THE COURT: It is one office, State’s Attorney’s Office. MS. ROMZA-KUTZ: I agree, Judge. However my understanding, the tape was presented to a police officer, so he is aware of the content of the tape as much as the State is. THE COURT: Is it verbatim? MS. ROMZA-KUTZ: No. I believe it would probably be a summary. I would be misleading the Court if I said it was verbatim. It’s a very explicit point of the conversation. At this time, Judge, we cannot present those tapes. We do not have them; we have not heard them. I cannot convey to the Court what the content, neither can the previous assistant that was assigned to the case.” It thus appears from the record that one of the prosecuting trial attorneys who was assigned to this case talked to Detective Brown about one of the two interviews that Detective Brown had with K.H. that was recorded on one of the tapes. Also, the first page of the written report bears the prosecutor’s name. At trial, the prosecutor denied any knowledge of the tape or tapes. Under the circumstances, there should have been an evidentiary hearing as to what the “Assistant who was assigned to the case” did with the tape or tapes and what happened thereafter. I note that no logs relating to the deposit or withdrawal of the tapes from the State’s Attorney’s evidence vault appear in the record. In addition, I disagree with the following conclusion of the majority: “Similarly, although the trial court in the present case could only speculate on what the tape might contain, there is a strong likelihood that the officer’s memorandum made contemporaneously with the tape is accurate since its author would not have known that the tape would not be available to compare against his five-page report.” (235 Ill. App. 3d at 425.) The statement that the officer’s memorandum was made contemporaneously with the tape is not borne out by the record. Indeed, the record suggests that the tape was not used in preparing the report. In the trial court, the following colloquy occurred: “THE COURT: Has either side made inquiry as to whether or not that report was made, or that report was prepared by the police department out there after they re-listened to the tape, or under what circumstances was the report prepared? That seems to be the only remnant left of that interview. MR. CAHILL: From my reading of the report, I did talk to the police officer, but it was my understanding that the report was prepared from the conversations. I don’t think the actual— although I don’t know, but it doesn’t appear that the tape was used in preparing the report.” Moreover, Detective Brown’s written report and his note to Detective Farley are telling. In his report he states proudly that he “surreptitiously” tape-recorded his interview with K.H. In his note he states: “Sounds like a great case — the kind legends are made from.” To me, Detective Brown’s actions are indicative of an overzealous law enforcement officer whose statements warrant doubt rather than believability. Under the circumstances, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “there is a strong likelihood” that Detective Brown’s written synopsis is accurate. In addition, the majority states: “[W]e believe that reversal is unwarranted by reason of this violation because *** (v) defense counsel never sought to interview the California police officer or take advantage of the opportunity to conduct a pretrial interview of K.H. on the day the trial started.” (235 Ill. App. 3d at 432.) I have already discussed the fact that it is readily apparent that Detective Brown was an overzealous police officer in regards to this investigation, so it is unlikely that a pretrial interview without the benefit of the tape or .tapes would have been revealing. This conclusion is buttressed by Detective Brown’s own written statement in his report: “Based upon the advice of my Detective Captain, I limited the scope of my interview to those areas specifically requested that inquiry be made into by the Illinois State Attorney. This was done to limit my susceptibility to have to answer to a subpoena originating from the state of Illinois.” With respect to defense counsel not taking “advantage” of the opportunity to interview K.H., the record reflects that the following occurred: “MR. TUITE: Yes. As to a hearing, Mr. Stratton can be sworn and testify he did talk to K.H. and talked about the incident. K.H. said, I have to talk to Ms. Romza, and when Mr. Stratton got back, then he said, no, I don’t want to talk to you. Now, I’m not again casting aspersions, but maybe you want a hearing as to why K.H., after talking to Ms. Romza, did not want to talk to the Defense. But we did make an attempt to talk to him, on two occasions we talked, and so maybe he is lying, maybe he didn’t talk to Ms. Romza, and using that as an excuse, maybe he did talk to Ms. Romza, and she gave him legal advice that he could talk or not talk as he wished. But we made two attempts to talk to him. The first attempt was, I have to talk to Ms. Romza; the second attempt is, I talked to Ms. Romza. I don’t want to talk to you. So the initial interview becomes that much more important back in ’88, because the police got to interview him. We don’t get to interview him, and the record of that interview is only in a summary supposedly by a police officer that the tape is missing.” It is therefore plain from the record that there would have been no advantage to the defense to conduct a pretrial interview of K.H. on the day the trial started. In addition, in view of the majority’s discussion as to what defense counsel did not do -with respect to the missing tape or tapes, it should be pointed out that defense counsel vigorously contested the State’s contention as to the content of the tape or tapes and the whereabouts of the lost tape or tapes. Plainly, the record establishes that defense counsel assailed the representations of the prosecutors as to the State’s failure to come forward with the tape or tapes. The following colloquy occurred at trial: “MR. TUITE: We have basically outlined that to the Court before the recess, but perhaps the Court may want to hear from witnesses. But I think it is undisputed that K.H., whose testimony your Honor has said will be allowed in as proof of other crimes, was interviewed in January or February of 1988 out in California. The Salinas County Police were requested to find him with a Court Reporter and interview him with respect to any acts of sexual conduct between himself and Reverend Hall when he lived at Reverend Hall’s house. The report says that the interview was tape-recorded. The report further says that there was another interview February 3rd, and that was tape-recorded. Whether it was put on one tape, or two tapes were then reduced to one tape, we don’t know. But we know from the report at least that there were two tape recorded interviews with K.H. We know that under the law, we would be entitled to see those or hear those under discovery because it is probably even more appropriate than a summary of what we usually see in police reports, a summary of what the witness said. This is the exact words and voice of the witness. That tape recorder, at least in the report, and I think it is not disputed, was sent by the Salinas County Police to Detective Farley of the Cook County Sheriff’s Police here in Illinois, which was then given to an Assistant State’s Attorney, whether it be Reginald Baker who had this case originally, or Mr. Derback, who was part of this case originally. But somebody had that tape recorder in their possession while being a member of the State’s Attorney’s staff. Ms. Romza — and I have no doubt, no reason to doubt her word and I do not do so by comments — Mr. Cahill said, we don’t know where it is at. We can’t find it. Well, it was obviously in their office. Somebody had it, and.I would only venture to say that if I had a statement from a witness that I intend to put on as a Defense witness, and notified somebody I have a tape recorder — tape recorded statements of that witness, which I have to furnish under the discovery rules, before I put that witness on the stand, and I, at the eve of trial, said I can’t find it, the inference would be — and I think the inference is — that it is damaging. The inference is that when you have a piece of evidence and you don’t use it, the inference, whether it’s a true inference or not, the inference is that it will be damaging to the side who didn’t produce it.” It must also be borne in mind that the State itself considered K.H. to be an important witness at trial. The State therefore must have realized that the tape or tapes of his interviews were important to maintain and safeguard. This is demonstrated by the statement of the prosecutor at trial: “MR. CAHILL: I think it’s also very critical, Judge, Counsel indicated that K.H. is not a main witness, but I think that’s quite to the contrary. I think he is a witness to David’s incident of sexual abuse by Mr. Hall. Mr. K.H. was present when, I believe, two of the sexual encounters occurred between the Defendant, and I think he is an important witness. To argue that he is not an important witness, and is really collateral, and we can exclude him, Judge, I just don’t think will hold water.” When as in this case the State does not produce evidence that was in its possession for safekeeping, we must be mindful that ours is an adversarial criminal justice system. The stark realities are such that what occurs with evidence when it is in the possession of the State prior to trial is not always what the unsophisticated would suspect. Under the circumstances, it is obvious that this case has an issue that transcends the case itself and has an existence of its own. Where the State is involved in what has been described as “the investigation of a major molestation case” and it inexplicably cannot produce taped interviews of what the prosecutor himself described as “an important witness,” and no evidentiary hearing or investigation is conducted as to what happened to the taped interviews, something is wrong with our criminal justice system. Moreover, when we take into account that the loss or destruction of evidence by the State is not peculiar to this case, an evidentiary hearing or an open investigation is vital. The integrity of our criminal justice system is at stake. We, as judges, must therefore make it plain that there is no longer any room within the conscience of the criminal justice system in Illinois for approving, condoning or making judicial sanctimonious admonitions that go unheeded when the State cannot produce evidence that was in its possession prior to trial. Trial judges should conduct a thorough evidentiary hearing in situations where the State fails to produce evidence in its possession. If no evidentiary hearing is conducted, testimony having a nexus to the missing evidence should be barred. Accused citizens with their precious liberty at stake are entitled to nothing less. Moreover, the past demonstrates that it is unrealistic to believe that any lesser judicial command will have any meaningful effect. Accordingly, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial consistent with what is stated herein.  The State referred to here includes the police since they are part of the prosecutorial team.   There were two trial prosecutors: Ms. Diane Romza-Kutz and Mr. Michael Cahill. There were two trial attorneys for defendant: Mr. Patrick Tuite and Mr. Brent Stratton.   The record is unclear as to whether the transmittal of the written report included the tape or tapes.