Court Opinion

ID: 9489316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:11:50.19683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:27.388436
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
The government charged Allen with making false statements in loan applications to federally insured financial institutions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014. Proof of federal insurance, therefore, not only was essential to “the establishment of federal jurisdiction,” *773United States v. Schultz, 17 F.3d 723, 725 (5th Cir.1994), but it also constituted an essential element of the offense, see United States v. Bellucci, 995 F.2d 157, 160 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2719, 129 L.Ed.2d 844 (1994). Having failed to point to any evidence establishing the essential element of federal insurance during the trial or at oral argument, the government was afforded a final opportunity to identify that evidence in a supplemental brief that this court requested. As far as I am concerned, our solicitude proved of no assistance to the government because, after considering its supplemental briefing, I still believe that the government failed to carry its burden with respect to an element of the offense not only as to the two counts involving the Southern Federal Credit Union, as the majority concludes, but also as to the thirty-three counts involving the Western Bank of Oregon. I, therefore, dissent.
The government’s “proof’ that the Western Bank of Oregon was federally insured consists of two forms: exhibits 6-e and 16-d, a loan transaction and a loan employment verification form. The first form, Exhibit 6-e, can be given no weight. It states, as the majority notes, “HEAD OFFICE COOS BAY OREGON MEMBER FDIC,” and is all but illegible. The government asserts that the form was displayed on an overheard screen. We have no way of knowing, however, whether the exhibit was any more legible when so displayed. In all likelihood, it was not. In any event, to the extent that one can decipher the exhibit’s message, it is highly ambiguous. It is unclear that any juror would have understood that the particular branch involved in this ease, and not just the head office, was federally insured.
In actuality, then, it is the second form, Exhibit 16-d, that represents the sum total of the government’s evidence. Although the form states “Member FDIC” in small print at the bottom of the page, it is not dated. The majority concludes that one could infer that the form was completed in 1989. The government itself did not draw this inference, however, and one can only wonder whether any juror would have done so on his own. In the end, the government’s evidence proving that the bank was federally insured during the relevant time period boils down to a form the significance of which would in all likelihood escape most, if not all, jurors.
I do not believe that the second form, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, is sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, what is both an essential element of the offense and a jurisdictional requirement. This is particularly true, in my view, because the government did not at the time of trial even consider this thin reed to constitute evidence that was relevant to or probative of the issue of federal insurance and never advised the jury that it constituted such evidence. At trial, the government never once suggested that somewhere in the exhibits submitted to the jury lay the proof of federal insurance. Instead, the government relied exclusively on the testimony of a bank officer to establish that critical element of the offense — evidence that the majority properly concludes is of no relevance and of probative value. Only when this court afforded the government a final opportunity to sift through the record did it discover the form on which the majority rests its decision. Because the government never argued to the jury that the form tended to establish the existence of federal insurance, it is highly unlikely that any juror considered, or could have considered, it probative on that issue. Accordingly, I must disagree with my colleagues in the majority: I conclude that no reasonable juror could have found that the government proved the element of federal insurance beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. James, 987 F.2d 648, 650 (9th Cir.1993).
We should not affirm a conviction when the government has so cavalierly failed to prove an essential element of the offense, particularly where that element is so easily proven, and the government has been previously warned of the consequences of its negligent conduct. As the Fifth Circuit forcefully stated with respect to the government’s attitude toward proving the existence of FDIC insurance:
Certainly we recognize the possibility that we or our sister Courts may some day be faced with an insufficiency of the evidence *774of insurance ... which would warrant reversal. Indeed, we have difficulty comprehending why the Government repeatedly fails to prove this element more carefully since the Government’s burden is so simple and straightforward. As in the other cases we have discussed, the Government treads perilously close to reversal in this case, and may soon find itself crossing the line from sufficiency to insufficiency.
United States v. Platenburg, 657 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir.1981) (citation omitted). See Schultz, 17 F.3d at 727 n. 11 (noting that the Fifth Circuit “has often warned that insufficient attention to the jurisdiction element might become the Government’s nemesis”). In our own circuit, the day the government crossed the line came once before, in James. Still, the government, for some unexplained reason, persists in ignoring the need to prove an essential element of the offense. We should not now suddenly retreat from the principle we have so carefully tried to establish in order to rescue an improper and unjustifiable conviction.
The sufficiency of the evidence standard is generous, but not limitless. Accordingly, while I concur with respect to counts 21 and 47, I would reverse the convictions as to the remaining thirty-three counts, and therefore dissent as to those counts.