Court Opinion

ID: 9661423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:38:47.581599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:28.332281
License: Public Domain

W. O. MURRAY, Chief Justice
(dissenting) .
I do not concur in the opinion of the majority. It is desirable to give a liberal construction to the rules of procedure so as to allow an appeal rather than deny one, but if in order to do so you must ignore well-settled fundamental principles of law you will create far more havoc than' you will avert.
No principle is better established than that a cause is not pending in two courts at the same time. Nothing could be more confusing than to be unable to determine in which court your case is pending, and to have two courts exercising jurisdiction of the same case at the same time. The rule in Texas has always been, so far as I am able to determine, that when an appeal is perfected the entire cause is lifted from the trial court and transferred to the appellate court, and thereafter the trial court cannot take any further action which will affect the rights of the parties on appeal, until the appeal has been heard and the mandate of the appellate court returned to the trial court.
A complete statement of the law with reference to this matter is found in Section 335 of Volume 3-A, Tex.Jur., beginning at page 411, with citation of authority for each statement made.
Section 335 reads as follows:
“On Jurisdiction of Appellate Court. — Jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals attaches upon the timely perfection of an appeal or writ of error, that is, upon the giving of the notice of appeal and the filing of the bond or affidavit in lieu thereof, or, if the, affidavit is contested, on the overruling of the contest, or, in case of writ of error, on the filing of the petition and bond or affidavit in lieu thereof, or, if the affidavit be contested, on the overruling of the contest; and jurisdiction continues until the case is fully determined by the appellate court and its judgment is completely executed by the court below. Perfection of an appeal transfers the entire controversy to the appellate court, and clothes it with plenary exclusive jurisdiction over the entire controversy, both as to the parties and the subject matter, subject only to the power of the trial court to modify or set aside its judgment before adjournment of the term. That is to *482say, it doe's so unless the judgment de* termines-.two or more legally distinct controversies and an appeal is- taken, from the judgment as to but one of them. " Subject to this qualification, a suit is pending in the reviewing court' immediately upon perfection of the appeal, though active jurisdiction for the purpose of' adjudicating the case does not attach until compliance with the requirements as to filing transcript.
“When application for writ of error from the Supreme Court is filed, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court immediately attaches and the Court of Civil Appeals is thereafter without authority to -make any order in the case.”
The City of Corpus Christi perfected an appeal when it gave notice of appeal as set forth in the judgment. The trial court had no jurisdiction to thereafter permit the filing of a motion for a new trial, and had no jurisdiction to give effect to such motion by the overruling of it. 3-A Tex. Jur., § 337, p. 415; Garvin v. Hufft, Tex.Civ.App., 243 S.W.2d 391.
In Golden Rod Oil Co. No. 1 v. Golden West Oil Co. No. 1, Tex.Com.App., 293 S.W. 167, 168, the Court said: “A writ of error has the effect to deprive the trial court'of jurisdiction pending appeal. The defendants in error, by perfecting appeal by writ óf error, abandoned their motion for new trial in the trial court.”
Thus when judgment was rendered herein on November 19, 1953, and appellant gave notice of appeal, thereby perfecting its.appeal, the time for filing the record in this'Court was then 'and there fixed by the provisions of Rule 386,-T. R. C. P., at- sixty days' from rendition of, judgment. - Appellant could not thereafter enlarge its time for filing the record here by going back into the trial' court, which had lost jurisdiction- of both the parties and the subj ect matter, and file a motion for a new trial and have that court, which had lost jurisdiction, enter an order overruling such motion. The filing of the- motion and the action of the trial court in -overruling it were- both nullities and could not ¡have the effect of. enlarging the time within which appellant could file the record in this Court. ■
The appellant having failed to tender the record here within the sixty-day period provided for such filing, and having failed to file a motion requesting an enlargement of time, as is authorized by Rule 386, supra, has now lost its right to file the record here, and ap-pellee’s motion for affirmance on certificate should be granted.
Where an appeal is perfected by notice only, as in this case, the party desiring to appeal should be careful not to give such notice until he has made such motions as he desires to make and has them acted on by the trial court. Of course, the rule is to the contrary where the mere giving of notice of appeal does not perfect the appeal and thereby lift the case out of the trial court and into the appellate court.
It has always been recognized that even after an appeal has been perfected the trial judge has control of his records, until the end of the term, or until the time -prescribed-by Rule-330(1), and during that time he may modify or set aside a judgment, but this is the limit of his power. Houston Belt & T. Ry. Co. v. Hornberger, Tex.Civ.App., 141 S.W. 311, certified question answered, 106 Tex. 104, 157 S.W. 744.
The cases of Jones v. Elliott, 259 S.W.2d 288, and Barron v. James, 145 Tex. 283, 198,S.W.2d 256, are not in point, as no appeal was perfected in either case by the giving of notice of appeal, and in the Barron case not even by the filing of an appeal bond, as the appeal was attempted under Rule 385, T. R. C. P., which provides, in effect, that the appeal is not perfected unless and until the record is filed in the appellate court within twenty days after rendition of judgment. The case of Cude v. Sanderson, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 927, goes no further than to hold that the trial court' has power to set aside his judgment during the time he has control of his records under .the provisions of Rule 330(1).
I. respectfully dissent.