Court Opinion

ID: 9961501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 21:04:42.871324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:50.093776
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 240207-U
                                           No. 1-24-0207B
                                      Order filed April 17, 2024
                                                                                        Sixth Division
 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
 by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                               IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                          FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                           )   Appeal from the
                                                                )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                  )   Cook County.
                                                                )
     v.                                                         )   No. 23 CR 0215301
                                                                )
 DATAVEON WATSON                                                )   The Honorable
                                                                )   Peggy Chiampas,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                 )   Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justice C.A. Walker concurred in the judgement.
           Justice Tailor dissented.

                                              ORDER

¶1        Held: Reversed and remanded, where the State did not timely petition to detain.

¶2        Simple questions often have simple answers. This appeal asks whether the State, like any

other litigant, must meet its deadlines under the law. We hold, yes, the State must do so. Here, the

State did not timely file when petitioning to detain Dataveon Watson under article 110 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), as amended by Public

Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. Because enforcing

the law requires complying with the law, we reverse and remand.
No. 1-24-0207B

¶3                                          Background

¶4     This prosecution began before the Pretrial Fairness Act took effect and eliminated cash

bail. See Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52. The trial court had imposed on Dataveon Watson

cash bail and, if paid, electronic monitoring. Watson petitioned under the new law to remove the

requirement that he deposit bail to secure pretrial release (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022)). In

reply, the State petitioned to deny him pretrial release (id. § 110-6.1(a)). At a hearing, the trial

court granted the parties leave to file their petitions and ordered Watson detained.

¶5                                            Hearing

¶6     Both parties announced ready, but Watson objected to litigating the State’s petition to

detain, which counsel contended was not timely. The State replied that recent caselaw from this

court interpreted the Code as amended by the Pretrial Fairness Act as permitting the State to

petition to detain within 21 days of receiving notice that a defendant wants to litigate any other

issue under the new law.

¶7     The trial court overruled Watson’s objection, concluding one of those recent decisions was

“controlling.” See People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 16 (holding State may petition

to deny pretrial release after defendant moves for relief from financial conditions pretrial release).

Because the State petitioned to detain Watson within 21 days after receiving notice of Watson’s

filing, the State’s petition was timely.

¶8     The trial court then held a hearing on the State’s petition to detain. Watson stood accused

of a detainable offense, being an armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2022)). 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(6)(D) (West 2022). After hearing the parties’ proffers, the trial court found: (i)

the proof was evident or the presumption great that Watson committed the offense; (ii) Watson

                                                -2-
No. 1-24-0207B

posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community; and (iii)

no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that threat. id. § 110-6.1(e). The trial

court entered a written order summarizing its findings.

¶9     The trial court did not hold a hearing on Watson’s petition to remove the requirement that

he deposit bail to secure pretrial release (id. § 110-7.5(b)). Nor did the trial court mention Watson’s

petition in its oral pronouncement granting the State’s petition. Yet the common law record

contains a written notation asserting Watson’s petition was “denied.”

¶ 10   We note the record raises factual questions about Watson’s present custody status. After

his arrest, Watson’s petition asserted that he was “transferred to the Illinois Department of

Corrections” because his “supervised release was revoked.” And the State’s proffer noted Watson

was on mandatory supervised release when the underlying offenses allegedly occurred.

¶ 11                                          Analysis

¶ 12   Watson partly seeks to reverse the trial court’s decision, arguing the State’s petition to

detain was not timely. We agree.

¶ 13   We review de novo the timeliness of the State’s petition to detain without deference to the

trial court. People v. Taylor, 2023 IL 128316, ¶ 45 (reviewing de novo issue of statutory

construction). Our “fundamental objective” is to “ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s

intent.” Taylor, 2023 IL 128316, ¶ 45. The statute’s plain language is the most reliable indicator

of the legislature’s intent. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006).

¶ 14   Section 110-6.1(c) of the Code dictates when the State may petition for pretrial detention.

The State may file: (i) at the defendant’s first appearance before a judge without notice to the

defendant or (ii) within 21 calendar days after the defendant was arrested and released, with

                                                 -3-
No. 1-24-0207B

reasonable notice to the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022). This provision applies

even if the State’s prosecution began before the effective date of the Pretrial Fairness Act. See

People v. Watkins-Romaine, 2024 IL App (1st) 232479, ¶ 50 (“[F]or individuals who were granted

release under the prior bail system yet remained in custody through no fault of their own, section

110-6.1 of the Code is silent and provides no remedy for the State.”).

¶ 15   In Watkins-Romaine, for example, this court reversed the trial court’s grant of the State’s

petition for pretrial detention as untimely. Watkins-Romaine, 2024 IL App (1st) 232479, ¶ 56. The

initial bond hearing occurred before the effective date of the Pretrial Fairness Act and so before

pertinent amendments to the Code. Id. ¶ 34. Several months later, after the Act’s effective date,

the trial court permitted the State to petition to detain the defendant, who had never been released

despite receiving cash bail as a condition of his pretrial release. Id. ¶¶ 5, 34. But permitting the

State to do so was “immensely unfair.” Id. ¶ 46. The plain language of the Code did not “permit

the State to have a second bite at the detention apple.” Id.

¶ 16   The record before us compels the same result. Watson’s bond hearing occurred before the

effective date of the Pretrial Fairness Act. There, the trial court imposed cash bail and, if paid,

electronic monitoring. Yet, after the Act’s effective date, the State petitioned to detain Watson,

who had never been released despite receiving cash bail as a condition of his pretrial release. As

in Watkins-Romaine, permitting the State to do so was immensely unfair and without a legal basis

under the plain language of the Code. Id. ¶¶ 34, 46.

¶ 17   In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge this court has not spoken consistently on this

issue. Indeed, the parties’ memos faithfully collect many dueling decisions within and across the

appellate court districts. Still, we take as our guide the Code and, in doing so, find Watkins-

                                                -4-
No. 1-24-0207B

Romaine best reasoned. See generally Id. ¶¶ 35-53 (declining to follow People v. Whitmore, 2023

IL App (1st) 231807; People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837; People v. Haisley, 2024 IL App

(1st) 232163). For the reasons Watkins-Romaine explains, reasons the dissent ignores, we likewise

decline to follow McDonald. Infra ¶¶ 37-39 (discussing People v. McDonald, 2024 IL App (1st)

232414). (The majority here concurred in McDonald but have reconsidered and changed our

minds, taking to heart these words of John Kenneth Galbraith, “Faced with the choice between

changing one’s mind and proving that there is no need to do so, almost everybody gets busy on

the proof.”) Cases like Whitmore, Jones, Haisley, and McDonald err by writing section 110-6.1

anew. We now clarify: “The fact that the Code’s timing requirements do not account for a

defendant’s first appearance after the amendment’s effective date should not and cannot be seen

as an oversight.” Watkins-Romaine, 2024 IL App (1st) 232479, ¶ 39.

¶ 18   Reviewing courts should not complicate the Code’s simple dictates to fix problems of their

own making. The Code must be our guide, not whatever we think the Code should say

“[p]ractically speaking.” Infra ¶ 41. For example, the dissent errs by transforming the State’s

petition to detain under section 110-6.1 into a “response” to Watson’s petition. Infra ¶ 41. The

Code makes clear that petitions to deny pretrial release under section 110-6.1 are distinct from

those to revoke pretrial release under section 110-6. Compare 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)

with id. § 110-6. Likewise, the Code contains no basis for the dissent’s assertion that the trial court

could have properly detained Watson when hearing his petition. See Watkins-Romaine, 2024 IL

App (1st) 232479, ¶ 39 (“If the legislature wanted the hearing triggered by section 110-7.5(b) to

include reconsideration of whether a defendant is eligible for release or if it wanted to give the

State the ability to file a petition for detention against defendants who had already been ordered

                                                 -5-
No. 1-24-0207B

released but remained in custody after the effective date of the amended Code, it would have said

so.”)

¶ 19    Finally, contrary to the dissent’s mistaken assertion (infra ¶ 39), we note the trial court has

not yet held a hearing on Watson’s petition to remove the requirement that he deposit bail to secure

pretrial release (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022)). Nor does the record clearly show Watson’s

custody status.

¶ 20    Section 110-7.5 of the Code explicitly addresses those who were arrested before the

amended Code’s effective date.

                  “(b) On or after January 1, 2023, any person who remains in pretrial detention after

        having been ordered released with pretrial conditions, including the condition of depositing

        security, shall be entitled to a hearing under subsection (e) of Section 110-5.” Id. § 110-

        7.5(b).

¶ 21    In turn, Section 110-5(e) describes the hearing to which a defendant may be entitled.

                  “If a person remains in pretrial detention 48 hours after having been ordered

        released with pretrial conditions, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the reason for

        continued detention. If the reason for continued detention is due to the unavailability or the

        defendant’s ineligibility for one or more pretrial conditions previously ordered by the court

        or directed by a pretrial services agency, the court shall reopen the conditions of release

        hearing to determine what available pretrial conditions exist that will reasonably ensure the

        appearance of a defendant as required, the safety of any other person, and the likelihood of

        compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release. The inability of a

        defendant to pay for a condition of release or any other ineligibility for a condition of

                                                  -6-
No. 1-24-0207B

        pretrial release shall not be used as a justification for the pretrial detention of that

        defendant.” Id. § 110-5(e).

¶ 22    On remand, the trial court should (i) make a factual finding about Watson’s custody status;

(ii) make a legal determination about whether Watson “remains in pretrial detention” and thus may

avail himself of sections 110-7.5(b) and 110-5(e) of the amended Code; and (iii) if so, then hold a

hearing on Watson’s petition that is consistent with those sections and this decision.

¶ 23    In light of the dueling positions by appellate panels, it would be for the legislature to clarify

its intent and not for the court to rewrite the statute. But, this issue will resolve itself because those

cases with cash bonds will evaporate with the passage of time.

¶ 24                                          Conclusion

¶ 25    The State, like any other litigant, must meet its deadlines under the law. The Code’s new

deadlines apply even if the State’s prosecution began before the effective date of the Pretrial

Fairness Act.

¶ 26    Reversed and remanded with instructions.

¶ 27    JUSTICE TAILOR, dissenting:

¶ 28    Simple questions do have simple answers, but if the question is truly simple, then the

answer should be the same every time. As the majority has acknowledged, this court, particularly

this division, has not spoken consistently on the issue of whether the State may file a petition to

detain pursuant to subsection 110-6.1(c)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022)),

when a defendant remains in pretrial detention because he was granted bail under the previous

statutory scheme but could not satisfy one of the conditions of his release, including the condition

of depositing security under subsection 110-7.5(b). 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022). Most

                                                  -7-
No. 1-24-0207B

recently, in People v. McDonald, 2024 IL App (1st) 232414, this division held that the State was

permitted to file a petition to detain under subsection 110-6.1(c)(1) under such circumstances.

Here, the majority has ignored McDonald, and has found, pursuant to People v. Watkins-Romaine,

2024 IL App (1st) 232479, ¶ 5, that the State is not permitted to file a petition to detain under

subsection 110-6.1(c)(1) in these circumstances. For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent

from the majority’s holding.

¶ 29   At issue here is the State’s petition to detain filed under subsection 110-6.1(c)(1), which

was filed in response to Watson’s petition to remove financial conditions. Subsection 110-6.1(c)(1)

provides,

       “A petition may be filed without prior notice to the defendant at the first appearance before

       a judge, or within the 21 calendar days, except as provided in Section 110-6, after arrest

       and release of the defendant upon reasonable notice to defendant; provided that while such

       petition is pending before the court, the defendant if previously released shall not be

       detained.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022).

¶ 30   Watson argues that the State lacked the statutory authority to file a petition to detain him

under section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1

(West 2022)), as section 110-6.1 does not apply to him. Watson further argues that pursuant to

subsection 110-7.5(b) (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022)), he was “entitled to a hearing under

subsection (e) of Section 110-5.” 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022). Subsection 110-5(e) states:

       “If a person remains in pretrial detention 48 hours after having been ordered released with

       pretrial conditions, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the reason for continued

       detention. If the reason for continued detention is due to the unavailability or the

                                               -8-
No. 1-24-0207B

       defendant’s ineligibility for one or more pretrial conditions previously ordered by the court

       or directed by a pretrial services agency, the court shall reopen the conditions of release

       hearing to determine what available pretrial conditions exist that will reasonably ensure the

       appearance of a defendant as required, the safety of any other person, and the likelihood of

       compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release. The inability of a

       defendant to pay for a condition of release or any other ineligibility for a condition of

       pretrial release shall not be used as a justification for the pretrial detention of that

       defendant.” Id. § 110-5(e).

¶ 31   In the alternative, Watson contends that if the State had the authority to file a petition to

detain him under section 110-6.1, then the State’s petition was untimely and should not have been

considered “where it was not filed at the initial appearance before a judge or within 21 days after

[he] was arrested and ordered released.” Watson does not challenge the circuit court’s findings

that: (1) the proof was evident and presumption great that Watson had committed a detainable

offense; (2) Watson posed a real and present threat to the safety of a person, persons, or the

community; or (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the threat posed by him.

¶ 32   When interpreting a statute, our fundamental objective “is to ascertain and give effect to

the legislature’s intent.” People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 14. In doing so, we look to “the

language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning” as “[t]he most reliable indicator

***.” Id. We must read the statue as a whole, “with each provision construed in connection with

every other section.” Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners of City of Chicago, 2012 IL

111928, ¶ 48. If the language is clear, “we must apply the statute as written without resort to other

tools of construction.” Id. But where the statute is ambiguous, we “may consider the reason and

                                                -9-
No. 1-24-0207B

necessity for the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and its ultimate aims.” People v. Taylor,

2023 IL 128316, ¶ 45. Additionally, “we presume that, in enacting the statute, the legislature did

not intend to produce absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results.” Id. We review matters of statutory

interpretation de novo. Id.

¶ 33   This court recently considered Watson’s arguments advanced by similarly situated

defendants in People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, and McDonald, 2024 IL App (1st)

232414. In Whitmore, the defendant argued that the State could not petition to detain him under

section 110-6.1 of the Code because he remained in pretrial detention under section 110-7.5(b).

The defendant further argued that even if the State could petition to detain him under section 110-

6.1, the State’s petition was untimely.

¶ 34   Whitmore argued that the language in subsection 110-7.5(b) of the Code, which provides

that “any person who remains in pretrial detention after having been ordered released with pretrial

conditions, including the condition of depositing security, shall be entitled to a hearing under

subsection (e) of Section 110-5,” required the circuit court to do nothing more than reconsider the

conditions of pretrial release. Id. ¶7 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b) (West 2022)). Therefore, he

argued, the State could not petition to detain him under section 110-6.1. In analyzing Whitmore’s

claim, we looked to the text of section 110-7.5:

               “(a) On or after January 1, 2023, any person having been previously released

       pretrial on the condition of the deposit of security shall be allowed to remain on pretrial

       release under the terms of their original bail bond. This Section shall not limit the State’s

       Attorney’s ability to file a verified petition for detention under Section 110-6.1 or a petition

       for revocation or sanctions under Section 110-6.

                                                - 10 -
No. 1-24-0207B

               (b) On or after January 1, 2023, any person who remains in pretrial detention after

       having been ordered released with pretrial conditions, including the condition of depositing

       security, shall be entitled to a hearing under subsection (e) of Section 110-5.

               On or after January 1, 2023, any person, not subject to subsection (b), who remains

       in pretrial detention and is eligible for detention under Section 110-6.1 shall be entitled to

       a hearing according to the following schedule:

                       (1) For persons charged with offenses under paragraphs (1) through (7) of

               subsection (a) of Section 110-6.1, the hearing shall be held within 90 days of the

               person’s motion for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions.

                       (2) For persons charged with offenses under paragraph (8) of subsection (a)

               of Section 110-6.1, the hearing shall be held within 60 days of the person’s motion

               for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions.

                       (3) For persons charged with all other offenses not listed in subsection (a)

               of Section 110-6.1, the hearing shall be held within 7 days of the person’s motion

               for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions.” (Emphasis added). 725 ILCS

               5/110-7.5(a), (b) (West 2022). .

¶ 35   We ultimately rejected Whitmore’s argument that section 110-6.1 was inapplicable to him.

We discussed the legislature’s use of the terms “sections” and “subsections” and, after looking at

the statute as a whole, found that the legislature’s intent was for “section” and “subsection” to have

different meanings and for those meanings to be consistent throughout section 110-7.5. Therefore,

we concluded that “ ‘[s]ection’ as used in subsection (a) refers to all of section 110-7.5 and not

only to subsection (a).” Id. We further found that the State’s section 110-6.1 petition was applicable

                                                - 11 -
No. 1-24-0207B

to Whitmore because “while a hearing under subsection 110-5(e) is normally compulsory, this

requirement does not preclude the State’s ability to seek denial of pretrial release” for “defendants

who were ordered released on bond but were still detained when the Act went into effect.” Id. ¶ 8.

¶ 36   We then addressed Whitmore’s argument that the State’s petition to detain under section

110-6.1 was untimely. Id. ¶ 10. Whitmore argued that section 110-6.1, which requires the State to

file a petition to detain without notice “at the first appearance before a judge” or with notice “within

the 21 calendar days *** after arrest and release ***,” was clear and unambiguous and that his

first appearance in court occurred on December 14, 2022, nearly a year before the State filed its

petition. Id. (quoting 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c) (West 2022)). Thus, he contended that the State’s

petition was untimely and it was barred from seeking to detain him.

¶ 37   We refused Whitmore’s interpretation of section 110-6.1 and found that the trial court did

not err in hearing the State’s petition. Id. ¶ 16. We found that the State petitioned to deny Whitmore

pretrial release after Whitmore moved for relief from the financial conditions of his release. The

hearing on Whitmore’s motion was his first appearance before a judge after the statute was

amended. The State filed its petition on the same day as the hearing and therefore the petition was

filed to be heard “at the first appearance before a judge.” Id. We found that the “[c]ode’s timing

requirement is meant to prevent the State from having an unlimited window in which to hail

defendants into court to determine whether they should be denied pretrial release.” Id. Therefore,

the trial court did not err in hearing the State’s petition to detain Whitmore. Id.

¶ 38   In McDonald, the defendant was arrested on September 2, 2020, and was ordered released

on September 3, 2020, by D-Bond of $1 million but was unable to post bond and remained in

custody. McDonald, 2024 IL App (1st) 232414, ¶ 18. After the statue was amended in September

                                                 - 12 -
No. 1-24-0207B

2023, the defendant filed a petition for pretrial release under the amended statute and the State

filed a pretrial detention petition under section 110-6.1. The court granted the State’s petition. Id.

¶ 27.

¶ 39    On appeal, the defendant argued that the State’s section 110-6.1 petition to detain was

untimely because it was filed more than 3 years after both his arrest and the order releasing him

on bail, and was filed on his second court appearance after the amended statute’s effective date.

Id. ¶ 27. This division of this court found the State’s petition timely even though it was not filed

on the defendant’s first appearance before a judge after the amended statue became effective on

September 18, 2023. We observed that without notice, the defendant filed his petition for pretrial

release on October 17, 2023, which was his first appearance before a judge after the statute was

amended. Id. ¶ 28. The State filed its petition on November 1, 2023, 14 days later. On that date, a

hearing on the petitions took place. Citing Whitmore with approval, we concluded that:

        “defendant’s filing of the pretrial release petition opened the door to proceedings dictated

        by the amended statute, including the State’s ability to file a pretrial detention petition in

        response. The amended statute anticipates the proceedings to occur just after a defendant’s

        arrest, at an initial pretrial detention hearing. However, in this case, defendant reopened the

        matter by filing a pretrial release petition three years after his initial bond hearing was held,

        thus availing himself of the benefit of the amended statute, but at the same time, he also

        subjected himself to the procedures dictated by the amended statute. He cannot now

        complain about application of the very statute he requested relief under.” Id. ¶ 28.

¶ 40    Here, similar to the defendant in Whitmore, I would find that Watson was subject to the

State’s petition to detain under subsection 110-6.1(c)(1). Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶

                                                 - 13 -
No. 1-24-0207B

11. Watson initiated the proceedings by filing his petition for pretrial release on December 27,

2023, and the case was set for hearing on the petition on January 9, 2024. The record also shows

that the circuit court granted the State leave to file its petition to detain on January 9, 2024. The

hearing on both petitions took place on January 9, 2024. Thus, the State’s petition to detain was

not untimely as it was filed at the first appearance before a judge after Watson filed his petition

indicating that he was “availing himself of the benefit of the amended statute.” McDonald, 2024

IL App (1st) 232414, ¶ 28. Watson’s prior appearances in court after the effective date of the

amended act and before he filed his petition for pretrial release are not relevant to the determination

of whether the State’s petition was timely filed. Rather, Watson’s filing of his petition for pretrial

release “opened the door to proceedings dictated by the amended statute, including the State’s

ability to file a pretrial detention petition in response.” Id. Because the State filed the petition for

detention on the first court date after Watson filed his petition, the State’s petition was not untimely

and the court did not err in considering it.

¶ 41    Accordingly, by filing the petition to remove a financial condition of pretrial release,

Watson initiated the proceedings under the amended statute, and the State was permitted to file a

timely petition to detain in response, which it did. Thus, I would find that the court had authority

to consider the State’s 110-6.1 petition.

¶ 42    Finally, even if the court erred in proceeding on the State’s petition to detain because it was

untimely, the error was harmless. Practically speaking, the State’s petition to detain is nothing

more than a response in opposition to Watson’s petition to remove financial conditions. As defense

counsel acknowledged, once Watson made a request for a hearing under section 110-5(e), “[t]he

State may make a proffer, but their proffer is for what conditions will ensure his appearance in

                                                 - 14 -
No. 1-24-0207B

court and the safety of the community.” Indeed, section 110-5(e) provides that in the event a

defendant remains in custody for 48 hours after being ordered released, “the court shall reopen the

conditions of release hearing to determine what available pretrial conditions exist that will

reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required, the safety of any other person, and

the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS

5/110-5(e) (West 2022)). In this case, the State proffered that Watson committed the detainable

offense of armed habitual criminal, that he posed a real and present danger to a person or persons,

as well as the community, and that no conditions could mitigate that risk. In other words, the State

argued that there were no conditions that ensured Watson’s appearance, the safety of any other

person and the likelihood of Watson’s compliance with pretrial conditions. Bail bond serves as a

deterrent to flight and to protect the public (Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 57) and before the

court could remove that financial condition, it was obligated to consider the pretrial public safety

assessment report completed on January 23, 2023, which indicated that Watson scored a three out

of six for new criminal activity and a two out of six for failure to appear; the State’s proffer; as

well as argument from defense counsel requesting the least restrictive means of pretrial release

before ultimately deciding to detain Watson. The court here undertook the very analysis that would

have been necessary to decide Watson’s petition to remove financial conditions. Thus, any error

by the court in proceeding on the State’s petition to detain rather than Watkin’s petition to remove

financial conditions was harmless where Watson does not challenge the court’s findings that: (1)

the proof was evident and presumption great that Watson had committed a detainable offense; (2)

Watson posed a real and present threat to the safety of a person, persons, or the community; or (3)

no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the threat posed by him.

                                               - 15 -
No. 1-24-0207B

¶ 43   For the forgoing reasons, I would affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

                                             - 16 -