Court Opinion

ID: 9580733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:08:17.061324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:29.095475
License: Public Domain

FLETCHER, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the interpretation of OCGA § 9-11-11.1, Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, in Division 1 of the majority opinion. However, *457I dissent to Division 2 of the majority opinion remanding the cases to the Court of Appeals because that court has already made the substantive determination the majority seeks.
Decided September 27, 2004.
Lipshutz, Greenblatt & King, Edward L. Greenblatt, James V. Zito, Janet L. Bozeman, for appellants.
Stuckey & Manheimer, Hollie G. Manheimer, Gerald R. Weber, Begner & Begner, Alan I. Begner, Katie K. Wood, for appellees.
The majority has decided to remand the cases only because the Court of Appeals’s rulings did not explicitly state that Harkins and Mills made the complained-about statements “in good faith” (majority opinion, p. 452). A defendant’s good faith is necessary for the statements to be privileged under OCGA § 51-5-7 (4), one of three substantive means for dismissing suits under the anti-SLAPP statute.1 But the Court of Appeals’s rulings clearly show that the court deemed the undisputed evidence in these cases insufficient to maintain an action against either Harkins or Mills under the anti-SLAPP statute because their statements were privileged under OCGA § 51-5-7 (4). The statutes do not require a court to use the magic words “in good faith” to dismiss a claim, and the clear import of the Court of Appeals’s holdings was that the statements were made in good faith.2 Therefore, I dissent to the majority’s decision to remand.
The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to quickly end oppressive and speech-chilling litigation against those who attempt to participate in discussions on matters of public importance. Harkins and Mills have already endured far too many court proceedings for attempting to enhance public discourse on important issues regarding the treatment of animals, and the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the suits against them should be dismissed.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears joins in this opinion.
*458Douglas P. Haines, Dion A. Sullivan, Justine I. Thompson, Craig L. Goodmark, Joyner & Burnette, Mary Margaret Oliver, George L. Howell, Gary M. Newberry, William A. Mudd, amici curiae.

 As the majority opinion correctly states, a claim can also he dismissed under the anti-SLAPP statute if “the claimant or his attorney did not reasonably believe that the claim was well grounded in fact and that it was warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the modification of existing law... [or] the claim was interposed for an improper purpose...” (majority opinion, p. 452).

 Harkins v. Atlanta Humane Society, 264 Ga. App. 356, 360 (590 SE2d 737) (2003) (“the undisputed facts of record here indicate that the statements made by Harkins were protected statements under the anti-SLAPP statute”); Atlanta Humane Society v. Mills, 264 Ga. App. 597 (591 SE2d 423) (2003) (lawsuit against Mills should be dismissed for same reason the Court of Appeals dismissed the lawsuit against Harkins).