Court Opinion

ID: 9942744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 20:04:19.71861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:23.877332
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/21/24 In re G.M. CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                           DIVISION SIX

In re G.M., a Person Coming                                    2d Juv. No. B319977
Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                (Super. Ct. No. YJ40725)
                                                               (Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

     Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

G.M.,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      G.M. appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders
entered after the juvenile court found that he committed voluntary
manslaughter (Pen. Code,1 § 192, subd. (a)), sustained a Welfare
and Institutions Code section 602 petition, and ordered suitable
placement in a secure facility. G.M. contends there was insufficient

         1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
evidence to support the court’s finding that he committed
manslaughter. We affirm.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       In 2021, G.M. was a 16-year-old resident of the short-term
residential treatment program (STRTP) at Wayfinder, a group
home for minors. During the afternoon of January 2, a fight broke
out between I.C. and another STRTP resident. I.C. suffered a black
eye during the fight. He grew angry and vandalized Wayfinder
property for the next several hours. Wayfinder staff did not
intervene.
       Around 8:00 p.m., night shift supervisor Eryn Watkins locked
I.C. out of his room. When the other STRTP residents learned of
this, they began to throw food and damage Wayfinder property.
Watkins tried to deescalate the situation and called police to tell
them what was going on. Police refused to respond absent a
physical altercation.
       I.C. threatened several Wayfinder staff members, including
David Hillman, David Le’Gall, and William Wiley-Yancy. Other
STRTP residents, including G.M., encouraged I.C. to challenge staff
members to fight. After I.C. challenged Wiley-Yancy, Wiley-Yancy
took I.C. outside for a walk so he could calm down.
       G.M. and several other STRTP residents and staff members
followed I.C. and Wiley-Yancy outside. After I.C. repeatedly
challenged Wiley-Yancy, Watkins stepped in and tried to calm the
situation. Other Wayfinder staff members did the same.
       I.C. punched Wiley-Yancy on the shoulder, and Le’Gall
tackled him to the ground. Other residents then began to attack
staff members, including one STRTP resident who headbutted
Hillman. After the attacks subsided, Hillman said he could not
breathe and staggered around the courtyard. Residents, including

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G.M., then restarted their attacks on Hillman. Some punched him,
while others pulled his hair. One resident stomped on Hillman’s
head multiple times. Others repeatedly punched him in the face.
Still others kicked him in the head and body.
       Hillman eventually got up, but was stumbling and had
difficulty walking. STRTP residents, including G.M., then attacked
Hillman a third time. G.M. punched Hillman several times, hitting
his lower body.
       Sheriff’s deputies arrived and arrested the STRTP residents
involved in the assaults. Watkins called an ambulance for Hillman.
He subsequently died from blunt force trauma to the head.
       Prosecutors filed a petition alleging that G.M. murdered
Hillman. (§ 187, subd. (a).) At the jurisdictional hearing, Dr.
Francesca Lehman, an expert on adolescent brain development,
testified that G.M. was at the stage of development associated with
the most high-risk behavior. G.M. had also experienced significant
trauma that could hinder his ability to regulate his emotions: He
witnessed his mother endure physical and sexual abuse, and on
occasion intervened to try to protect her. She had substance abuse
and mental health issues, and provided G.M. with alcohol and
methamphetamines. G.M.’s father died of cancer just four months
before the attack on Hillman. His mother’s parental rights were
terminated one month later, which resulted in his placement at
Wayfinder.
       Additionally, G.M. suffered from posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), which can damage the emotional response system.
A hallmark feature of PTSD is hypervigilance, which can trigger a
fight-or-flight response or a violent reaction. Dr. Lehman opined
that the presence of larger peers who were seemingly unchecked by
Wayfinder staff members could trigger G.M.’s PTSD.

                                 3
       G.M. had also been diagnosed with severe depressive
disorder, which limited his ability to make reasoned decisions and
increased his emotionally driven decisions. He was hospitalized
twice for depression and mental health issues, and had been placed
on psychiatric holds during the months prior to the attack on
Hillman. He twice attempted suicide, and lost more than 70
pounds.
       Dr. Lehman explained that social and peer influences are
hallmarks of adolescence. G.M. naturally would want to fit in with
his peers. Placing lower-risk youths like G.M. with higher-risk
youths is not advised because the lower-risk youths would be
susceptible to influence. Given G.M.’s history of trauma and PTSD,
his exposure to an emotionally aroused state would negatively
affect his decision-making and ability to appreciate risks.
       After the conclusion of testimony, the juvenile court
considered jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter. (See
CALCRIM Nos. 570 [heat of passion] and 571 [imperfect
self-defense or imperfect defense of another].) As to heat of passion,
the court noted there was “some evidence” that Wiley-Yancy
provoked G.M. and the other STRTP residents by daring I.C. to hit
him and then laughing when he did. And as to imperfect defense of
another, the court noted that “if it was [G.M.’s] plan to go to the
aide [sic] of [I.C.], it was an unreasonable one under the
circumstances.”
       The prosecutor argued G.M. acted with implied malice when
he punched Hillman because Hillman was defenseless and had
already been punched and kicked repeatedly by STRTP residents.
She argued G.M. was at least culpable of murder as an aider and
abettor. She also argued that the juvenile court should not reduce
G.M.’s culpability to voluntary manslaughter because the evidence

                                  4
did not show he was adequately provoked or acted in imperfect self-
defense or defense of others.
       Defense counsel argued voluntary manslaughter—under the
theories of both heat of passion and imperfect defense of others—
required a finding of implied malice that is later negated. He
explained that to find that G.M. committed voluntary manslaughter
the court first had to “determine [that] he had the intent to kill;
implied. It’s not an attempt to injure, it’s not an intent to cause a
lot of damage. [¶] [The prosecutor] must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that [G.M.] had the implied intent to kill David Hillman” or
that “[h]e deliberately acted with conscious disregard[.]” And to
find G.M. guilty of manslaughter as an aider and abettor the
prosecutor had to show that he “had the implied malice second
degree murder intent, with knowledge of what the perpetrator was
going to do.” Counsel argued G.M. did not act with any of these
mental states because, according to Dr. Lehman, “whatever took
place in that dark grassy area triggered something [that] then
started this cascade of emotions.”
       The juvenile court found that G.M. was not a direct
perpetrator of Hillman’s murder. Therefore, “the real issue [was]
whether [he] personally harbored an intent to aid the perpetrators
in committing the life-endangering act with the knowledge that the
act was dangerous to human life and that he consciously
disregarded that danger.” The court had “no doubt” that G.M.
suffers from the mental health issues Dr. Lehman discussed, and
did so during the attack on Hillman. And it found that G.M. “did
not personally appreciate that his conduct and the conduct of others
was dangerous to human life at that time.” It nevertheless found
that he committed voluntary manslaughter:

                                  5
      “I do find in this case the lesser[-]included offense of
      voluntary manslaughter to be true, pursuant to Penal
      Code section 192[,] subsection (a). And that is the
      unlawful killing of a human being without malice[,]
      [b]ased on heat of passion, sudden quarrel[,] or
      imperfect self[-]defense. And I just believe that there
      was no plan clearly to end Mr. Hillman’s life on that
      evening.”

The court ordered G.M. suitably placed in a secure facility, for a
maximum term of six years.
                             DISCUSSION
       G.M. contends there was insufficient evidence to support the
finding that he committed voluntary manslaughter because the
juvenile court found that he did not harbor reckless disregard for
human life. We disagree.
       “Murder, whether in the first or second degree, requires
malice aforethought.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 844
(Gentile), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.) “Malice can be express
or implied.” (Gentile, at p. 844.) “It is express when there is a
manifest intent to kill [citation]; it is implied if someone kills with
‘no considerable provocation or when the circumstances attending
the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart’ [citation].”
(Ibid., alterations omitted.)
       Implied malice has “ ‘ “both a physical and a mental
component.” ’ ” (People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 965.)
“ ‘ “The physical component is satisfied by the performance of ‘an
act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.’ ” ’ ”
(Ibid.) “ ‘ “The mental component is the requirement that the
defendant ‘knows that [their] conduct endangers the life of another

                                  6
and acts with a conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid., alterations
omitted.)
       “When a person directly perpetrates a killing, it is the
perpetrator who must possess . . . malice.” (Gentile, supra, 10
Cal.5th at p. 844.) “[W]hen a person directly aids and abets a
murder,” however, it is “the aider and abettor [who] must possess
malice aforethought.” (Ibid.)
       If malice is negated, an unlawful killing may be voluntary
manslaughter rather than murder. (People v. Landry (2016) 2
Cal.5th 52, 97; see § 192, subd. (a).) “[M]alice may be negated by
evidence that . . . the defendant acted in a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion.” (Landry, at p. 97.) This occurs when “ ‘ “the killer’s
reason was actually obscured as the result of a strong passion
aroused by a ‘provocation’ sufficient to cause an ‘ “ordinary person
of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and
reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.” ’ ” ’ ”
(Ibid., alterations omitted.) Malice may also be negated by the
“imperfect defense of others,” which is “the actual but unreasonable
belief [the defendant] must defend another from imminent danger
of death or great bodily injury.” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61
Cal.4th 227, 270-271.)
       G.M. argues the juvenile court’s statement that he “did not
personally appreciate that his conduct and the conduct of others
was dangerous to human life” conflicts with the mental state
required for voluntary manslaughter, undermining the finding that
he committed that crime. But this inconsistency does not
demonstrate there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s
finding that G.M. committed voluntary manslaughter. (Cf. People
v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 656 [inconsistent verdicts are
allowed to stand].) In our view, the court understood the mental

                                   7
state required to find that G.M. committed voluntary manslaughter.
It considered CALCRIM Nos. 570 and 571—both of which state that
voluntary manslaughter involves a killing that would otherwise be
murder—and explained how there was evidence that supported
each theory. It noted there was “some evidence” that Wiley-Yancy
provoked the STRTP residents, including G.M., by daring I.C. to hit
him and laughing when he did. And it noted that G.M.’s
participation in the attacks on Hillman was unreasonable.
       The prosecutor argued against these theories, emphasizing
that, in her view, G.M. acted with implied malice. Defense counsel
similarly discussed implied malice, arguing the prosecutor had not
proven that G.M. acted with conscious disregard for human life.
The juvenile court reiterated the proper mental state when finding
that G.M. committed voluntary manslaughter, stating that the
crime is “the unlawful killing of a human being without malice[,]
[b]ased on heat of passion, sudden quarrel[,] or imperfect self[-
]defense.”
       Moreover, when we review for substantial evidence, we do not
evaluate statements in isolation. Rather, “we review the whole
record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357, italics
omitted.) So long as “[t]he record . . . disclose[s] substantial
evidence to support the [juvenile court’s finding]—i.e., evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value”—reversal is
unwarranted. (Ibid.)
       Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that G.M. acted with a conscious disregard for Hillman’s
life. Hillman was staggering around the courtyard and said he
could not breathe after the first attack on him. But STRTP

                                  8
residents—including G.M.—then attacked again, punching and
kicking him, pulling his hair, and stomping on his head. During
this attack Hillman again said he could not breathe. He was also
stumbling and needed the assistance of other Wayfinder staff
members to get to his feet. Despite these indications of injury, G.M.
and other STRTP residents again attacked Hillman. Given these
indications of injury, it can be inferred that G.M. knew that he and
his fellow STRTP residents’ actions were dangerous to human life
and that he consciously disregarded that danger.
       Substantial evidence also supports the court’s finding that the
implied malice G.M. harbored was later negated because of heat of
passion or imperfect self-defense. As the court noted, there was
evidence of provocation when Wiley-Yancy dared I.C. to hit him and
then laughed at I.C. It could also be inferred that G.M.
unreasonably went to I.C.’s aid. Either factor was sufficient to
negate the implied malice G.M. harbored. Substantial evidence
thus supports the determination that G.M. had the mental state
required to commit voluntary manslaughter.
                             DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders,
entered March 29, 2022, are affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.           YEGAN, J.

                                  9
                  J. Christopher Smith, Judge

             Superior Court County of Los Angeles

                ______________________________

      Stephen A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.