Court Opinion

ID: 9685206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:26:11.547722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:03.322094
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, P. J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of armed robbery, contrary to MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and sentenced to serve 15 to 30 years in prison. He now appeals as of right, raising seven allegations of error, of which five merit discussion by this Court.
This is the second time that this case has come before this Court. Accordingly, facts will only be presented when warranted by our discussion of the issues. For a more detailed description of the facts, see People v Drew, 67 Mich App 295; 240 NW2d 776 (1976).
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing *60regarding the admissibility of a witness’s identification of defendant.
Defendant was accorded an evidentiary hearing prior to his first trial. The trial court found that the witness’s identification was admissible. This Court upheld the trial court’s determination regarding the admissibility of the witness’s testimony identifying defendant when this case was previously before this Court. As this Court stated:
"Under the circumstances in the case at bar, we believe that the prosecution showed by clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Gossett (Phillips) had an independent basis for her identification of the defendant. Therefore, we ñnd no error in the lower court’s decision to admit her identiñcation testimony.” People v Drew, supra, 299. (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant has presented no new evidence that would cause the trial court to determine that the witness’s testimony would not be admissible. This Court’s prior ruling in the instant case was and is "the law of the case”. People v Bergin, 63 Mich App 526; 234 NW2d 687 (1975), People v McDonald, 239 Mich 253; 214 NW 186 (1927). We find no error in respect to this issue.
Defendant next contends that it was error for the trial court to preside over defendant’s second jury trial after having presided at defendant’s first jury trial on the same charge.
It is well established that no error can be predicated on a trial judge’s failure to disqualify himself from presiding over a trial unless the defendant timely moves for such disqualification. People v Dudley, 393 Mich 762; 223 NW2d 297 (1974), People v Stockford, 59 Mich App 423; 229 NW2d 484 (1975). In the instant case, defendant made no such motion, and, accordingly, we find no error.
*61Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for mistrial based upon the prosecutor’s line of questioning regarding "mug shot” photographs and pictures received from police sources. We disagree.
Our review of the record reveals that the testimony was elicited for the purpose of establishing what pictures were used in the photographic lineup which identified defendant. The testimony was not particularly inflammatory nor was it deliberately injected into the proceedings to prejudice the defendant. Under such circumstances we find no reversible error. See People v Swan, 56 Mich App 22; 223 NW2d 346 (1974), People v Hadley, 67 Mich App 688; 242 NW2d 32 (1976).
The penultimate issue which this Court will address concerns the prosecutor’s comments during his closing arguments in respect to defendant’s prior convictions.
Defendant claims that the references made by the prosecutor to his prior convictions were improper and require reversal of his conviction. We disagree.
It is well established that a prosecuting attorney can relate the evidence adduced at trial and draw conclusions therefrom during closing arguments. People v Davis, 57 Mich App 505; 226 NW2d 540 (1975).
The prosecutor stayed within these bounds by limiting his reference in regard to defendant’s prior convictions to the issue of defendant’s credibility. See People v DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410; 213 NW2d 97 (1973).
Defendant’s final allegation of error concerns an instruction given by the trial court which was first requested and later withdrawn by defense counsel.
The instruction at issue was to inform the jury *62to weigh defendant’s prior convictions in connection with his credibility only. Defense counsel withdrew his request for the instruction, apparently not wanting to remind the jury of defendant’s past convictions. The trial court indicated that the instruction would not be given. However, the trial court later gave the instruction at issue.
Although it was error for the trial court to first grant defense counsel’s request not to give an instruction and later give that very instruction, it was not reversible error.
The standard for harmless error is found in People v Swan, 56 Mich App 22, 31; 223 NW2d 346 (1974):
"The standards by which we measure error to determine whether it is reversible, or merely harmless, have become well settled.
" 'Where it is claimed that error is harmless, two inquiries are pertinent. First, is the error so offensive to maintenance of a sound judicial process that it never can be regarded as harmless? * * * Second, if not so basic, can we declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?’
"People v Mobley, 390 Mich 57, 65; 210 NW2d 327, 332 (1973), People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 563; 194 NW2d 709, 713 (1972), People v Wichman, 15 Mich App 110, 116; 166 NW2d 298, 302 (1968).”
A review of the record discloses that this error was truly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction given by the court was in favor of defendant since it was to insure that prejudice did not result in the jurors’ minds from defendant’s prior felony convictions. The error was essentially in favor of defendant.
We also note that the evidence adduced at trial was overwhelming in respect to defendant’s guilt.
*63Under such circumstances, we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.
Bashara, J., concurred.