Court Opinion

ID: 9942369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 21:10:53.105423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:59.803669
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Burrell, 2024-Ohio-638.]

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                  CASE NO. 2023-P-0053

                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                Criminal Appeal from the
         - vs -                                 Court of Common Pleas

QUENTON BURRELL, JR.,
                                                Trial Court No. 2023 CR 00435
                  Defendant-Appellee.

                                             OPINION

                                    Decided: February 20, 2024
                                 Judgment: Reversed and remanded

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Theresa M. Scahill, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).

James R. Eskridge, Megargel, Eskridge, and Mullins, LLP, 231 South Chestnut Street,
Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Defendant-Appellee).

MATT LYNCH, J.

        {¶1}      Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from the lower court’s

sentences of defendant-appellee, Quenton Burrell, Jr., for Illegal Conveyance of

Prohibited Items onto the Grounds of a Detention Facility and Aggravated Possession of

Drugs. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the lower court and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

        {¶2}      On April 20, 2023, the Portage County Grand Jury issued an Indictment,

charging Burrell with Illegal Conveyance of Prohibited Items onto the Grounds of a

Detention Facility, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2921.36; and five counts
of Aggravated Possession of Drugs, felonies of the third, fourth, and fifth degree, in

violation of R.C. 2925.11.

      {¶3}    On June 21, 2023, a plea hearing was held and a written plea agreement

was filed. Burrell pled guilty to Illegal Conveyance (Count One) and two counts of

Aggravated Possession (Counts Three and Six), felonies of the third and fourth degree.

The court accepted his pleas and found him guilty of the offenses. It then proceeded to

sentence Burrell and found the following: “In count one, you’re sentenced to nine months;

in count three, you’re sentenced to seven months; in count six, you’re sentenced to nine

months.   The sentences imposed under counts one and six are suspended.                The

aggregate sentence is seven months at the Lorain Correctional Institution.” The trial court

memorialized the plea and sentence in an entry which repeated that “[t]he sentence on

Counts One and Six are suspended” and his sentence was “an aggregate total of 7

months, or until otherwise legally released.” The entry also stated, in relation to its

discussion of accepting the guilty plea that “if the Defendant is granted community control

at any point, the Defendant will have conditions to follow and if the Defendant violates

any of those conditions, there could be given a longer period under Court control and/or

greater restrictions, or a prison term of 36 months for the felonies of the Third Degree,

and 18 months for the Felony Four.” It did not state that a term of community control was

imposed as part of the sentence.

      {¶4}    The State appeals and raises the following assignment of error:

      {¶5}    “The trial court erred by suspending the prison sentences on the illegal

conveyance and third-degree felony aggravated possession counts.”

      {¶6}    The State argues that the lower court did not have authority to suspend the

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sentences for Illegal Conveyance and the third-degree felony Aggravated Possession

count (Count Six) as there is no statutory provision allowing it to do so.

       {¶7}   Prior to addressing whether the trial court’s sentence was contrary to law,

we first consider Burrell’s argument that this issue is moot. Burrell argues that this matter

is moot because he was set to complete his prison sentence on November 14, 2023. He

contends that when a sentence is complete, errors relating to the issuance of that

sentence render an appeal moot.

       {¶8}   Courts have held that “when the prison sentence has already been served

and the underlying conviction is not at issue, an assertion that the trial court erred in

determining the length of that sentence is a moot issue because no relief can be granted.”

State v. Biscardi, 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2019-P-0003 and 2019-P-0004, 2019-Ohio-

4653, ¶ 13; State v. Edwards, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2023-L-070, 2023-Ohio-4602, ¶ 8

(defendant’s challenge to his consecutive sentences was moot since he had already

served the sentence and “there is no relief this court can afford appellant”) (citation

omitted). The foregoing authority, however, is cited in relation to appeals by criminal

defendants requesting a reduction of their sentences rather than in a sentencing appeal

by the State. Burrell recognizes the foregoing but argues: “[J]ustice is blind. This case

is either moot or it[’]s not because the defendant has served his sentence. What is good

for the goose is good for the gander.” We disagree with this argument.

       {¶9}   In the case of a defendant seeking to reduce his sentence, the completion

of this sentence renders it impossible for the appellate court to provide such a remedy.

In contrast, in the case of an appeal filed by the State, completion of the sentence issued

by the trial court does not prevent the defendant from serving a potentially longer

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sentence if one is ordered on appeal. This issue was addressed by the Tenth District in

State v. Marcum, 2015-Ohio-5237, 54 N.E.3d 719 (10th Dist.). In Marcum, the State

appealed the trial court’s sentence, arguing that it was contrary to law. The appellate

court recognized the different considerations in appeals initiated by the State in contrast

to a defendant. While a defendant’s appeal of a sentence already served is moot due to

the lack of an effective remedy, “the same reasoning does not apply when the state is the

party appealing a sentence, as is the case here, because the state’s challenge to the

leniency of a sentence can result in an effective remedy.” Id. at ¶ 7.

       {¶10} It has further been observed that a defendant has “‘no legitimate

expectation of finality in a sentence that remains subject to direct review’” and which has

been appealed by the State. (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 8, citing State v. Roberts, 119

Ohio St.3d 294, 2008-Ohio-3835, 893 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. “[W]hen there is no legitimate

expectation of finality in a sentence that remains subject to direct review, the defendant

may be resentenced even after the defendant is released from prison.” Id.; State v.

Christian, 159 Ohio St.3d 510, 2020-Ohio-828, 152 N.E.3d 216, ¶ 18 (“[b]ecause

[defendant’s] sentences * * * were subject to correction * * *, [defendant] had no

expectation of finality in those portions of her original sentence” and it was appropriate to

resentence her although she had completed her previously ordered prison term).

       {¶11} Burrell cites State v. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526, 2013-Ohio-5014, 1

N.E.3d 382, as authority for the proposition that there is a jurisdictional concern. In

Holdcroft, the Supreme Court indicated that a trial court loses jurisdiction to sentence a

defendant in certain circumstances when he has already served his term of incarceration.

It indicated that where a “valid prison sanction has been served * * * the court has lost

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jurisdiction to modify the sentence.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 14. We emphasize, however,

that the court held: “Neither this court’s jurisprudence nor Ohio’s criminal-sentencing

statutes allow a trial court to resentence a defendant for an offense when the defendant

has already completed the prison sanction for that offense.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶

19. In State v. Ervin, 2018-Ohio-1359, 110 N.E.3d 554 (12th Dist.), the Twelfth District

distinguished Holdcroft where the defendant had completed a prison term for a firearm

specification but not for the underlying offenses, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction

to resentence on those offenses. Id. at ¶ 18-20. Here, while Burrell completed his

sentence for count three, the State is not seeking resentencing for that offense. Rather,

it requests that an improperly imposed suspended sentence for separate offenses be

corrected.

       {¶12} Further, the Holdcroft court noted that “a defendant’s legitimate expectation

of finality plays [a role] in constraining the court’s authority to review a sentence.” Id. at ¶

18. See also State v. Brasher, 171 Ohio St.3d 534, 2022-Ohio-4703, 218 N.E.3d 899, ¶

23 (“had the victims pursued restitution in a direct appeal, the trial court’s judgment would

not have become final, avoiding the timing and jurisdictional issues created by the

absence of a timely appeal and [the defendant’s] completion of his sentence”). As noted

above, the timely direct appeal initiated by the State avoided concerns about the court

lacking authority to correct its sentence since Burrell did not have a legitimate expectation

of finality. See State v. Armengau, 2020-Ohio-3552, 154 N.E.3d 1085, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.),

citing Holdcroft at ¶ 18 (“only after direct appeal is concluded or the time to appeal has

expired does it become true that ‘[a] trial court does not have the authority to resentence

a defendant * * * after the defendant has already served the prison term for that offense’”).

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As noted above, the Supreme Court in Christian found that the trial court had authority to

resentence a defendant although she had been confined for the length of the original

prison term since the sentence was challenged in a direct appeal. Id. at ¶ 28. Since the

present appeal is not moot and the sentence is subject to review and correction by the

trial court, we will proceed to consideration of whether the trial court’s sentence was

contrary to law.

       {¶13} R.C. 2953.08(B)(2) permits the prosecutor to appeal a felony sentence

when the sentence is contrary to law. “The appellate court may increase, reduce, or

otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the

sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing * * * if it clearly

and convincingly finds” that “the sentence is * * * contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).

       {¶14} The State concedes that it did not object to the sentence in the trial court

and that this matter should be reviewed for plain error. Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B) “[p]lain

errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not

brought to the attention of the court.” “In order to prevail under a plain error standard, an

appellant must demonstrate that there was an obvious error in the proceedings and, but

for the error, the outcome would have been otherwise.” State v. Lefkowitz, 11th Dist.

Trumbull No. 2021-T-0054, 2022-Ohio-4052, ¶ 15. “It is well settled that a sentence that

is contrary to law is plain error and an appellate court may review it for plain error.” State

v. Efford, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 112077 and 112078, 2023-Ohio-3360, ¶ 18.

       {¶15} The State contends that the lower court acted outside of its statutory

authority when it gave him suspended sentences on two felony counts, Illegal

Conveyance and Aggravated Possession (Count Six), as such a sentence is

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impermissible.

       {¶16} “[I]n Ohio, judges have no inherent power to create sentences, and the only

sentence that a trial judge may impose is that provided for by statute.” State v. Hitchcock,

157 Ohio St.3d 215, 2019-Ohio-3246, 134 N.E.3d 164, ¶ 18; State v. Williams, 148 Ohio

St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 22 (a court may “impose sentences only as

provided by statute”).

       {¶17} Prior to the enactment of SB-2 in 1995, “it was a regular practice in felony

sentencing to impose a prison sentence and then suspend the sentence and grant

probation with specific terms and conditions.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Anderson, 143

Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, 35 N.E.3d 512, ¶ 21. However, “[c]urrent felony

sentencing statutes * * * require trial courts to impose either a prison term or community

control sanctions on each count.” (Citation omitted.) Id at ¶ 23. “The [post-SB 2 felony-

sentencing] statutes no longer discuss ‘suspension’ of sentence; rather, the alternative to

a sentence of imprisonment is a sentence of community control sanctions.” Id. citing

Baldwin's Ohio Practice, Criminal Law, Section 119:2. Appellate courts have consistently

held that, in issuing a felony sentence, a court may not order a defendant to serve a

suspended sentence. State v. Duncan, 2016-Ohio-5559, 61 N.E.3d 61, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.)

(“a sentencing court can no longer suspend a prison term”); State v. Lugo-Casiano, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112449, 2023-Ohio-3711, ¶ 17 and 21 (“current felony sentencing

statutes do not allow a sentencing court to suspend a prison term” and the court’s

issuance of a suspended sentence was contrary to law and constituted plain error); State

v. Berry, 2012-Ohio-4660, 980 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.) (“there is no provision in the

sentencing statute which permits a court to suspend a prison term”) (citation omitted).

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       {¶18} We are aware of no authority providing for the imposition of suspended

sentences for these offenses and Burrell does not provide contrary arguments on the

merits of this issue, arguing only in his brief that the matter is moot. “[C]ourts of common

pleas do not have inherent power to suspend execution of a sentence in a criminal case

and may order such suspension only as authorized by statute.” State v. Smith, 42 Ohio

St.3d 60, 537 N.E.2d 198 (1989), paragraph one of the syllabus. The trial court failed to

order either the imposition of a prison term or a term of community control as required

under the sentencing statutes on the relevant offenses. Anderson at ¶ 23. We find that

the trial court erred in ordering suspended sentences for Illegal Conveyance and

Aggravated Possession of Drugs (Count Six), vacate those sentences, and remand this

matter for resentencing on those offenses. See Lugo-Casiano at ¶ 22 (“[t]he suspended

sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing”).

       {¶19} The sole assignment of error is with merit.

       {¶20} For the foregoing reasons, Burrell’s sentences for Illegal Conveyance of

Prohibited Items onto the Grounds of a Detention Facility and Aggravated Possession of

Drugs (Count Six) are reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. Cost to be taxed against appellee.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.

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