Court Opinion

ID: 9623235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:30:13.287989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:09.233662
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
Johnson sued Dill’s Food City for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell in a puddle of tea while shopping at the Dill’s Food City store. The store was well lit and the floor was white. Johnson walked down the pickle aisle, looking at the shelves in search of pickles, until she slipped and fell in a muddy puddle of tea. Johnson did not see the puddle until after she had fallen in it. In her deposition, Johnson admitted that the brown puddle on the white floor was larger than a 12-inch pizza and she would have seen it if she had looked down at the floor. She further stated that she was looking at pickles on the shelf before she fell and that nothing else was distracting or diverting her attention at the time. Johnson also stated that a store employee told her that she was aware of the puddle and had been trying to warn customers to avoid it.
“[I]n order to state a cause of action in a case where the plaintiff *658alleges that due to an act of negligence by the defendant he slipped and fell on a foreign substance on the defendant’s floor, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance and (2) that the plaintiff was without knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from discovering the foreign substance.” Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623 (272 SE2d 327) (1980).
Even if we construe the employee’s statement to Johnson as probative evidence that Dill’s had actual knowledge of the puddle under an exception to the hearsay rule (compare Brooks v. Kroger Co., 194 Ga. App. 215, 216 (390 SE2d 280) (1990)), the second part of the Alterman Foods test requires Johnson to show that, despite exercising ordinary care for her own safety, she was without knowledge of the puddle’s presence. While Johnson stated in her deposition that she did not see the puddle, she also stated that the puddle was clearly visible and that she would have seen it had she looked down at the floor.
Under the second prong of Alterman Foods, “ ‘(t)he customer must exercise ordinary care for his own safety, and must by the same degree of care avoid the effect of the merchant’s negligence after it becomes apparent to him or in the exercise of ordinary care he should have learned of it. He must make use of all his senses in a reasonable measure amounting to ordinary care in discovering and avoiding those things that might cause hurt to him.’ ” Alterman Foods, supra at 623. Thus, under Alterman Foods Johnson cannot recover if, by the exercise of ordinary care, she should have seen and avoided the plainly visible puddle.
The duty to exercise ordinary care to discover and avoid defective conditions does not require a customer to continuously scan the floor for defects under all circumstances, but it does require, as a matter of law, the use of one’s eyesight to discover and avoid plainly visible hazards in one’s path. Vermont American Corp. v. Day, 217 Ga. App. 65, 66 (456 SE2d 618) (1995); J. H. Harvey Co. v. Johnson, 211 Ga. App. 809, 811 (440 SE2d 548) (1994); Yeaple v. Grand Union Co., 207 Ga. App. 15, 16 (427 SE2d 13) (1992); Sinclair v. Orozco, 205 Ga. App. 498, 499 (423 SE2d 25) (1992). Accordingly, where, as here, Johnson claims she was injured by a plainly visible defect in her path, and it is undisputed that she would have seen the defect if she looked, this Court has consistently held under the second prong of Alterman Foods that the plaintiff is barred from recovery, as a matter of law, for failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety. Vermont American Corp., supra at 66-67; Edwards v. Wal-Mart Stores, 215 Ga. App. 336, 338 (449 SE2d 613) (1994); Bruno’s, Inc. v. Pendley, 215 Ga. App. 108 (449 SE2d 637) (1994); Colevins v. Federated Dept. Stores, 213 Ga. App. 49, 52 (443 SE2d 871) (1994); J. H. Har*659vey Co. v. Kinchen, 213 Ga. App. 868, 869 (446 SE2d 218) (1994); Johnson, supra at 811; Winn Dixie Stores v. Carroll, 212 Ga. App. 234 (441 SE2d 432) (1994); Foodmax v. Terry, 210 Ga. App. 511, 513 (436 SE2d 725) (1993); Sinclair, supra; Riggs v. Great A & P Tea Co., 205 Ga. App. 608, 609 (423 SE2d 8) (1992).
Moreover, any claim by Johnson that she was looking at the pickles on the shelf rather than at the floor does not create a question of fact under the “distraction doctrine.” Looking at items on the shelves of stores is not a distraction attributable to the defendant store but is a self-induced distraction which did not excuse Johnson from exercising ordinary care to discover and avoid the plainly visible hazard. Riggs, supra at 609-610; Terry, supra at 513; Redding v. Sinclair Refining Co., 105 Ga. App. 375, 379 (124 SE2d 688) (1962). Accordingly, Johnson cannot claim that “for some reason attributable to the defendant [she] was prevented from discovering the [hazard].” Alterman Foods, supra at 623.
Johnson admitted the puddle was plainly visible and that she would have seen it had she looked at the floor. There is no evidence that she was prevented from seeing and avoiding the puddle for some reason attributable to the store. Accordingly, she failed, as a matter of law, to exercise ordinary care by discovering and avoiding the puddle and is barred from recovery under Alterman Foods, supra.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong, Judge Johnson and Judge Smith join in this dissent.