Court Opinion

ID: 9706508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:45:09.892756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:23.225253
License: Public Domain

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Justice,
concurring.
While I agree with the majority that a trial judge is responsible for the general conduct and management of a trial, the supporting authority offered does not address the particular circumstances presented here. Further, practitioners have long struggled with the fact that, for the most part, neither the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure outlines the steps necessary for preserving error in order to complain of the trial court’s discretionary acts in controlling the trial. It is only in case law that these hurdles are explained, and then usually in the context of describing what an appellant has not done.
Over the years, we have seen efforts by the trial courts to limit the time allotted for various stages of the trial.1 Limitations on opening and closing argument are routine and rarely the basis for complaint on appeal while limitations on voir dire trigger greater consternation.2 Generally speaking, to complain of insufficient time for voir dire, a litigant must indicate a desire to continue, request additional time, and make of a bill of exception revealing any questions that were not asked because of a lack of time. Kendall v. Whataburger, Inc., 759 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). The general principles enunciated in criminal case law also apply in the safeguarding of similar rights in civil matters. Dickson v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 730 S.W.2d 82 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1987, writ refd n.r.e.). In the criminal arena, the courts have developed a three-pronged test for evaluating the reasonableness of a time limitation. A defendant must establish that there was no attempt to prolong the voir dire, that defense counsel was not permitted to ask proper and relevant questions, and that counsel was not permitted to examine jurors who ultimately served on the jury because of insufficient time. Smith v. State, 703 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Ratliff v. State, 690 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).
As this case demonstrates, however, many courts have undertaken yet another means of trial management — limiting the total amount of time available for trial. For example, the attorneys are advised at the outset that each will have ten hours in which to present his or her side of the case. This time allotment includes all of the direct testimony offered, all of the cross-examination of the adversary’s witnesses, and all of the objections lodged. To date, no appellate court has determined whether such a restriction is constitutional and if so, what steps are necessary in order to preserve error to complain of the amount of time allotted. Is a “prior restraint” timetable a violation of the due process clause and/or the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution? One could argue that while a court certainly has the discretion, authority, and probably the responsibility to control the docket [which would include the ability to tell *156counsel to “move along” or to begin restricting repetitive and cumulative testimony], the authority does not extend to a blanket prior restraint of the amount of testimony which may be tendered, particularly in light of the fact that the court has no knowledge at the beginning of the trial that such limitations will be necessary. Furthermore, what steps must be taken to complain of an overly restrictive timetable? Must counsel comply with the restrictions imposed by the cases addressing an imposition of a time restriction in the voir dire process? If so, then more time must be requested and an offer of proof tendered concerning the evidence a party was unable to adduce because of the time limitations. In the meantime, to be on the safe side, counsel should cover all of these steps when complaining of an unreasonable time limitation.3
Because the constitutional concerns are not properly before us, because error was not preserved, and because even if it were, we could not conduct a meaningful harm analysis without a bill of exception indicating the evidence Walton was prohibited from introducing, I concur.

. These efforts are certainly understandable and there is increasing pressure to adopt trial management techniques in light of legislatively imposed performance measures.

. The current debate in the Supreme Court Rules Advisory Committee — whether the court should adopt a rule of procedure outlining permissible restrictions on voir dire — • demonstrates the sanctity with which the voir dire process is viewed by seasoned litigators.

. I emphasize unreasonable because I agree with the majority that we would be hard-pressed to find error where, as here, the parties were subjected only to time limitations which they advised the court were reasonable given the issues presented. And while the trial frequently takes longer than predicted, I cannot fault a trial judge for expecting the litigants to adhere to self-imposed time constraints where the record is devoid of any explanation to the trial court, or to this Court, as to why additional time was needed and what additional evidence would have been offered had more time been granted.