Court Opinion

ID: 9770408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:03:59.436722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:17.149529
License: Public Domain

PALMORE, Judge
(dissenting).
Realizing that this is a close case, it is with some reluctance that I register this dissent from the majority opinion. However, I cannot avoid the conviction that if the Commonwealth were not involved the decision would have been different, and I do not accept the philosophy that in its dealings with the public the state should be held to a lesser standard of responsibility than is applied to those with whom it deals.
The contract which has been construed here was prepared by the state and therefore should be strictly construed in favor of the contractor. This litigation would not have arisen had the contract included •even one simple, direct, catego..cal sentence ■stating explicitly that the Highway Department would not be responsible for delays resulting from the delays and defaults of ■other contractors. This meaning cannot be derived from Section 2.6 of the Special Provisions without warping it out of context. The pertinent paragraph of that section reads as follows:
“The right is reserved by the Department to have other work performed by other contractors and by its own forces and to permit public utility companies and others to do work during the construction of, and within the limits of or adjacent to, the Project. The Contractor shall conduct his operations and cooperate with such other parties so that interference with such ■other work will be reduced to a minimum. The Contractor shall agree, and hereby does agree, to make no claims against the Department for additional compensation due to delays or other conditions created by the operations of such other parties. Should a difference of opinion arise as to the rights of the Contractor and others working within the limits of or adjacent to the Project, the Engineer will decide as to the respective rights of the various parties involved in order to assure the completion of the Department’s work in general harmony and in a satisfactory manner and his decision shall be final and binding upon the Contractor.”
It seems clear to me that the “no claims” sentence in the foregoing paragraph refers to delays created by the active interference *237■of other parties working at the same time and that it does not fairly encompass delays occasioned by the mere failure of other •contractors to carry out necessary preliminary work. The words, “created by the operations of such other parties” (emphasis added) connote delays caused by the action> •but not inaction, of other parties.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, the result reached in this case must rest on an implication derived from Section 1.65 of the Standard Provisions, which is entitled Time of Completion and Extension of Time, pertinent portions of which read as follows :
“The construction herein provided for is to be completed within certain times as set forth in Section 2, ‘Special Provisions,’ and payments provided for the job, in accordance with the prices bid therefor in the Proposal, shall be understood and agreed to cover all risks and expenses of delays except as otherwise herein provided. * * * ”
But as pointed out in the majority opinion, Section 1.67 of the Standard Provi•sions (Suspension of Work) expressly recognizes that if the state suspends the work for a reason not involving any failure on fhe part of the contractor to carry out his ■duties he may, after 10 days, assert a claim for his resulting expenses. The state did ■not formally suspend the work in this case, but the trial court held that its failure to 'have the grade work ready was tantamount fo a suspension. Moreover, equity regards that as done which should have been done. Here the state ordered the contractor to Ibring its forces and equipment into the field and maintain a state of readiness when it knew that in all probability the way would not be prepared in time. Should it not 'therefore have ordered a suspension? I .agree with the trial court that it should liave.
It should be borne in mind that the contractor had received its work order in November of 1954 and that its preparatory op■erations from that time on were closely observed and expedited by the state. The contract provided for cancellation and re-letting in the event the contractor failed to commence performance as required. How, then, in the absence of an order from the state temporarily suspending its performance, was the contractor “left free to make its own decision concerning the use of its personnel and equipment which had been sent to the job-site,” as suggested in the majority opinion? True, this contractor could have taken the risk, upon scouting the situation, of making its own estimate of when the job would be ready, but in the face of its contract and directions to proceed this was a risk it was not obliged to take. It was clearly up to the state to say, in the form of a temporary suspension, that the contractor was free to make some other disposition of his forces and equipment.
It was the opinion of the trial court that the contract under consideration impliedly required the state to have the grade work completed in time to enable the paving contractor to proceed on schedule, and that its failure to do so was a breach of the contract. The majority opinion finesses the point by saying that even if there was a breach, the contract provided “no-damages.” Apparently this sort of terminology has been employed in other jurisdictions, but I find it unacceptable. A breach without a remedy is no breach at all. The state either has breached this contract or it has not breached it. And if the contract has been breached the contractor is entitled to his damages. My conception of the breach is this: As the contract was written there was neither an express nor an implied guaranty on the part of the state that the grade work would be done on schedule. But it is implicit in the contract that the state, in co-ordinating all of the work on the project, would not order the contractor onto the scene and keep him there (which it did by not suspending his contract and granting him an extension in due time to enable him to avoid or mitigate his damages) without reasonable assurance on its own part that the grade work would *238be sufficiently advanced to permit him to commence his paving operations. This obligation was violated by the conduct of the state in the administration of the contract. In this connection, it is significant to note that the entire amount of delay for which the trial court has computed damages in this case was covered by extensions granted by the state to the grading contractor. Under the circumstances I can draw no fair and just conclusion except that this contractor did not receive from the state the treatment he was entitled to expect under the contract, and that he has a cause of action for his damages.
BIRD, C. concurs in this dissent.