Court Opinion

ID: 9443349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:18:04.08515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:27.504991
License: Public Domain

JAMES ALGER FEE, District Judge
(dissenting and suggesting a rehearing en banc of all Circuit Judges).
This cause involves the disposition of over $21,000,000. The solution requires application of novel statutory language affecting the fields of bankruptcy and taxes. I have expressed myself heretofore and still feel that the findings of -the lower court do not support the determination made by two judges on the panel here.
I am unable to agree with either the denial of rehearing or the striking of the petitions which ask for a rehearing by the *1013full complement of Circuit Judges of this Court en banc. Two District Judges and one Circuit Judge constituted the panel which heard the case. As has been pointed out in this serious and important litigation, three District Judges have, respectively, expressed three widely divergent views, while no member of the Court of Appeals has written a line on the merits.
I therefore suggest to the Court of Appeals a rehearing en banc of all the Circuit Judges. For this there is precedent in this Circuit.1 The practice, as I understand it, substantially accords with that of the Third Circuit,2 which is admirable. Inasmuch as this might be the court of last resort in this case, it seems fairer to have the issues disposed of by Circuit Judges.
The Supreme Court of the United States at least once has given permission to an appellant to apply to this court for a hearing en banc. 316 U.S. 649, 62 S.Ct. 1301, 86 L.Ed. 1732.3 In taking that action, reference was made to Textile Mills Securities Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249.
In Re Petition of Western Pacific Railroad Corporation for Leave to File a Motion Denominated “Motion To Vacate Order Striking Appellant’s Petition For Rehearing En Banc and Reinstating Such Petition.”
Before DENMAN, MATHEWS, STEPHENS, HEALY, BONE, ORR, and POPE, Circuit Judges.
HEALY, Circuit Judge.
Case No. 12,506, supra, upon its coming at issue in this court, was regularly assigned for hearing and determination to a court or division of three judges comprising Circuit Judge Healy and District Judges Fee and Byrne. Subsequent to argument and submission of the case the court handed down an opinion and order affirming the judgment of the district court, Judge Fee dissenting. Thereafter the appellants petitioned for “rehearing and rehearing en banc,” and the court on January 30, 1952, denied the petition, Judge Fee again dissenting. Insofar as the petition sought a rehearing in banc it was ordered stricken as unauthorized by law or practice.
On March 10, 1952, the Western Pacific Corporation presented the petition for leave described in the caption. In its supporting brief it asserts that it is its right under the law to have its petition for rehearing considered and acted upon by all the circuit judges. On order of a majority of the circuit judges, the court has been assembled in banc for the purpose of announcing the principles of law and practice it deems applicable in respect of in banc hearings. This course is thought appropriate in order that litigants and the bar may be advised not only of the position taken by the court but of the reasons for it.1
The governing statutory provision, 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c), reads:
“(c) Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court *1014or division of not mo-re than three judges, unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in active service. A court in banc shall consist of all active circuit judges of the circuit.” 2
The obvious intendment of this statute is to perpetuate the United States Courts of Appeals as courts of three judges in all cases save those in which an in banc hearing is ordered by all or a majority of the circuit judges. No doubt .Congress was fully alive to the fact that these courts,. despite the increase in their membership, would be unable to keep abreast of the constantly growing volume of judicial business unless they continued in all normal circumstances to function as courts of three.
Important light will be shed on the problem under inquiry if we examine the method pursued in the assignment of cases, as prescribed by our Rule 4.3 In practice the calendars for the court are tentatively made up by the chief judge in collaboration with the clerk. On these calendars each case is assigned for hearing, and determination to a court or division of three named judges, unless it has been otherwise ordered. The proposed calendar is circulated among all the judges, and any designation or assignment may be modified or set aside by a majority. When the calendar is approved by the judges their action is uniformly manifested by their initialing the same, as is done in the case of court orders generally. Thus the calendar as finally adopted, evidences or necessarily implies at least the tentative determination of the judges that the cases assigned to courts of three are not of such character as to warrant their being heard before the court in banc. In the instances in which at the time of assignment it is agreed by all or a majority of the judges that a particular case should be heard and determined in banc, it is calendared as such.4 It some*1015times occurs, too, that examination of a case preliminary to hearing, or consideration of it after argument, leads the judges to whom it was assigned to conclude that it is an appropriate cause for in banc consideration, and they so indicate to the remaining judges. If the latter or a majority of all agree, the case is then reassigned for hearing by all the judges.5
If we examine the status of Case No. 12,506 in the light of this practice, it becomes apparent that it was calendared and heard by court order as one in which in ■banc consideration was not deemed requisite. There remains to inquire whether the losing party in the cause is at this juncture entitled as of right to have its petition for rehearing considered and ruled upon by a court composed of all the circuit judges.
The statute, it will be recalled, commits to a “court or division of not more than three judges” the power to hear and determine the cases and controversies assigned to it. Obviously its determination of any such case or controversy is a decision of the Court of Appeals, and as such is a final decision, subject to review only as prescribed by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1254. Circuit judges other than those designated to sit on such court or division are not members of it, and officially they play, and are entitled to play, no part in its deliberatioss at any stage. That this is so is made clear by subdivision (a) of § 46, see Note 2 above, providing that “Circuit judges shall sit on the court and its divisions in such order and at such times as the court directs.” If regard be had for this mandate circuit judges may not intrude themselves, or be compelled on petition of a losing party to intrude, upon a court or division on which they have not by order of the court been directed to sit.
A petition for rehearing in any such case, whatever its form or wording, must necessarily be treated as addressed to- and is solely for disposition by the court or division to which the case was assigned for determination. If the court so constituted, or a majority of its members, denies the petition, that ends the matter so far as concerns the Court of Appeals. If it grants a rehearing it may follow either of two courses: (a) it may, and in all ordinary situations does, rehear the case itself; or (b) it may for reasons thought adequate suggest to the nonparticipating judges that the case is one which ought to be reheard in banc; and if all or a majority of the circuit judges agree, the case is then placed on the calendar for in banc consideration.6
Adoption of the view currently being urged would render merely tentative or provisional the decisions of the court in 98 per cent or more of the cases that come before it. On petition of a dissatisfied party its decisions would automatically be subject to a species of horizontal appeal which would completely nullify the prim'e statutory objective of effecting a division of the court’s work. The judges other than those to whom" the cases had been assigned would perforce be required to acquaint *1016themselves with the issues and problems involved in the same painstaking manner as did their associates who had heard and determined the causes initially, and this without the latter’s advantage of having heard oral argument. Obviously, unless he is prepared to stultify himself, no judge would undertake to rule upon petitions for rehearing without adequate and full study and investigation of the merits.
On these considerations and in harmony with its understanding of the statutory scheme, the court has consistently retained to itself as a matter of administrative and intramural concern only the problem whether or not any given case should be heard or reheard in banc. Accordingly, in the exercise of its uncontrolled discretion the court has declined altogether to entertain petitions of litigants for such hearings. The position it takes is that, apart from the possible disqualification of a judge, the composition of the court to which a case may be assigned for determination is a matter wholly outside the province of the parties.
It has been remarked by some commentators that the procedure outlined by Congress for the Courts of Appeals involves a distinct hazard of intracircuit conflicts. The hazard, we think, may easily be overestimated. It is minimized by the alertness of counsel and by informal and unofficial interchanges among the judges. Where conflicts occur they are capable of remedy by in banc action without wholesale duplication of effort, as our own practice and experience have demonstrated.
The petition for rehearing in this cause has already been authoritatively denied by the division to which the cause was assigned. The petition for leave to file, addressed to the court in banc, is denied.
From this time forward petitions, if any, for rehearing in banc in cases determined by divisions of three judges will be considered and disposed of by the latter as ordinary petitions for rehearing.
DENMAN, Chief Judge, dissenting from the court’s holding that the circuit judges not participating in a division, here six of the seven such judges, (a) are without power to consider a litigant’s petition for a rehearing, en banc, and (b) where a rehearing or rehearing en banc has been denied by a division, are without power to vote to grant a rehearing en banc, if two of the division’s judges, here with but one circuit judge, do not desire such a rehearing. This appears from the following language of the opinion:
“A petition for rehearing in any such case, whatever its form or wording, must necessarily 1 be treated as addressed to and is solely for disposition by the court or division to-which the case was assigned for determination. If the court so constituted, or a majority of its members, denies the petition, that ends the matter so far as concerns the Court of Appeals. If it grants a rehearing it may follow either of two courses: (a) it may, and in all ordinary situations does, rehear the case itself; or (b) it may for reasons thought adequate suggest to the nonparticipating judges that the case is one which ought to be reheard in banc; and if all or a majority of the circuit judges agree, the case is then placed on the calendar for in banc consideration.
******
“The statute, it will be recalled, commits to a 'court or division of not more than three judges’ the power to hear and determine the cases and controversies assigned to it. Obviously its determination of any such case or controversy is a decision of the Court of Appeals, and as such is a final decision, subject to review ONLY as prescribed by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1254.” Thus squarely is denied the power of the court en banc to review a division’s decision in a “rehearing en banc * * * ordered by a majority of the circuit judges.” See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
“From this time forward petitions, if any, for rehearing in. banc in cases determined by divisions of three judges wilt be considered and disposed of by the latter as ordinary petitions for rehearing.”
In this case the Western Pacific Railroad Corporation, hereafter the Corporation, pe*1017titions the Court en banc for leave to file a petition for a rehearing en banc. The latter seeks to establish, inter alia, that the judgment of the division which heard the case decided the main issue therein contrary to the decision of a prior division of this court.
The division in the instant case, consisting of one circuit judge and two district judges, has ordered “stricken” a petition addressed to the seven judges constituting the court en banc. This order follows a precedent of similar strikings of petitions for rehearings en banc in the ■cases of Kronberg v. Hale, 9 Cir., 181 F.2d 767; Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Myers, 9 Cir., 181 F.2d 1008; Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 9 Cir., 182 F.2d 256.
Since Kronberg v. Hale, the Clerk has •distributed no petitions for rehearings en banc to the non-participating circuit judges. From a casual remark of counsel in a so•cial contact, I learned of the Corporation’s instant petition and instructed the Clerk to distribute it to the six circuit judges not sitting in the division. But for this casual •discovery and my suggestion that the stature and determination of the Corporation’s counsel made it likely they would seek mandamus in the Supreme Court, the petition would have had the “striking” treatment of the above cases.
The court’s opinion came after a conference originally called for the consideration of the adoption of the rule considered last in this dissent, which would have made the burden of such petitions one we ■easily could bear.
A. The court’s decision violates (as well as ignores) the Supreme Court’s decision in United. States ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 649, 650, <52 S.Ct. 1301, 86 L.Ed. 1732, a decision aimed to settle differences in the circuit’s divisions.
The case of Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249, held that notwithstanding the three-judge provision of section 212 of title 28 U.S.C., 1940 ed., a court of appeals might lawfuly consist of a greater number of judges, and that the five active circuit judges of the third circuit might sit in banc for the determination of an appeal.
The Third Circuit in C.I.R. v. Textile Mills Securities Corp., 117 F.2d 62 at page 70, in holding that its five circuit judges could sit en banc, states that otherwise they would not have the' power to correct differing views of the judges in the divisions of the court such as the Supreme Court describes as occurring in the Fifth Circuit in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308 U.S. 180, 181, 60 S.Ct. 221, 84 L.Ed. 176.2
The Supreme Court in its Textile Mills case, 314 U.S. at page 334, 62 S.Ct. at page 277, in affirming the Third Circuit and overruling our decision in Lang’s Estate v. C. I. R., 97 F.2d 867, 869, where we held we could not sit en banc where two divisions of the court differed as to the law controlling, states of rehearings en banc 3 that:
“ * * * Certainly, the result reached makes for more effective judicial ad*1018ministration. Conflicts within a circuit will he avoided. Finality of decision in the circuit courts of appeal will be promoted. Those considerations are especially important in view of the fact that in our federal judicial system these courts are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary cases. * * * ”
In enacting 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) Congress codified the Textile Mills decision, the Reviser’s Notes stating that that section “preserves the interpretation established . by the Textile Mills case.”
Prior to this codification of the Textile Mills decision, there was decided by one division of this circuit the case of U. S. ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 118 F.2d 998, and later in a division of three other judges, the case of Crockett v. United States, 9 Cir., 125 F.2d 547. The two divisions differed on the controlling law. Certiorari was sought in the Robinson case before the Crockett case was decided and it was denied. A petition for rehearing in, the Supreme Court was, denied. The Crockett case was then called to the attention of the court in a second petition for rehearing which was granted. The order denying the petition for certiorari was set aside and the writ of certiorari granted. Certainly this action of the Supreme Court was purposeful and deliberate.
In granting certiorari the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 649, 62 S.Ct. 1301, 86 L;Ed. 1732, held it was the duty of this court en banc to entertain a petition for leave to file a petition for rehearing en banc, for it vacated our judgment and remanded the case to us, stating:
“ * * * In view of the conflict of views which has arisen among the judges of the Ninth Circuit with respect to the decision in this case (see U. S. ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston, 118 F.2d 998, 1001, and Crockett v. United States, 125 F.2d 547, 548, 549), and in view of this Court’s decision in Waley v. Johnston, 315 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. [1302], reversing 9 Cir., 124 F.2d 587, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceedings, including leave to petitioner to apply for a hearing before the court en banc. See Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. [249], * * *”
The Corporation strongly urges the above-contentions in its denied petition, all of which is ignored in this court’s opinion. Instead it is said of the seeking of the leave to file the petition, that consideration of such action by any of the circuit judges not. in the division (here six) would be “to intrude upon-a * * * division on which, they have not by order of the court been directed to sit.”
How absurd it was, one must conclude, for the Supreme Court to order such an intrusion in U. S. ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston !
B. The cavalier refrisal of the court to consider the contentions of the corpo- ■ ration’s petition.
The shabby treatment of the litigant and his counsel' in refusing to consider their contentions and authorities comes after the court(s claim that its opinion gives consideration to "the principles of law * * * which it deems applicable to en banc hearings.”
No self respecting federal judge sleeps comfortably if he is conscious of having rendered an opinion deciding a. case in which he has purposely failed to consider a substantial contention supported by authorities submitted to him and by such evasion has based his decision on a ground directly opposed to the evaded contention.
A possible explanation for the silent treatment of the litigant’s contention and authorities in this case is that U. S. ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston was deemed irrelevant because decided before the codification of the Textile Mills case in 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). That seems absurd, however, for the Supreme Court’s construction of a law before its exact codification, as here, is applicable after codification. Otherwise, why in 28 United States Code Annotated are there the thousands of citations in sections of the Judicial Code, enacted in 1948, which codifies the then law and statutes?
C. The opinion’s absurd misstatements respecting the assignment of cases to the court’s divisions.
*1019The opinion states :
“ * * * Thus the calendar as finally adopted evidences or necessarily implies at least the tentative predetermination of the judges that the cases assigned to courts of three are not of such character as to warrant their being heard before the court in banc Jjc * * it
The Supreme Court in the Textile Mills case has established a definite criterion for the' rehearings en banc provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). It is the only one there stated, though there are others. It is that conflicts of law between the decisions of two of the court’s divisions are cause for rehearing en banc. By clearing the law en banc, the circuit does so for the 96.3% of litigation in which this court’s decisions are final.
Such en banc action prevents the burden on the Supreme Court, such as in the certification of the question of such differing divisions in Lang’s Estate v. C. I. R., 3 Cir., 97 F.2d 867, 869, a burden the Supreme Court later refused to assume in its return of U. S. ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston for our en banc consideration of our divisions’ divergencies.
It is almost a rude question to ask, “How, in heaven’s name, are the seven judges en banc to know tentatively or otherwise that the division to which they assign the case will thereafter decide it without conflict with a prior decision of a different division”? The phrase, “How, in heaven’s name,” is used advisedly, for our tentative decision would require divine omniscience.
The opinion states that another criterion is whether the case to be assigned to a division is “one involving constitutional questions.”
The slightest reflection shows that the court en banc could make its tentative assignment of a case to a division because not involving a constitutional question only by examination of all the briefs in all the cases to be assigned to determine whether such a constitutional contention is at issue.
Were this truly what we have done, it would have involved a volume of judicial effort comparable to that the court’s opinion seeks to avoid with petitions for re-hearin'gs en banc.
In the eleven years since the Textile Mills case, the Clerk advises, we have assigned to division over two thousand two hundred cases. In but nineteen cases, less than one per cent, have they been assigned to the court en banc. These were cases whose extraordinary importance had wide newspaper notoriety. In none of the remaining two thousand two hundred cases has the court en banc assigned them to division after an examination of the briefs for that purpose.
D. Further to avoid considering the corporation’s contention and authorities, the opinion misstates the source of the contention that rehearings en banc are needed to cure the divergence of divisions.
On the source of this contention the court’s opinion states, “It has been remarked by some commentators that the procedure outlined by Congress for the Courts of Appeals involves a distinct hazard of intracircuit conflicts.”
“Some commentators” ! To what extent will the court go in order to avoid mentioning that this hazard was stated first by the Third Circuit in the Textile Mills case and on its appeal by the Supreme Court, and later implicitly by the Supreme Court in returning, U. S. ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston to this court because of the difference in viewpoint of our divisions. That is to say, in such holdings on the criterion of divergence, the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court are no more than mere commentators.
The opinion seeks to minimize the likelihood of a division overruling sub silentio a prior division’s holding and this with the certainty of nine judges and three divisions in the near future.4 The idea is that the judges in the division so acting, “by informal and unofficial interchanges” with the nonparticipating judges, will advise the latter that the decision is at variance with that of a prior division. In my seventeen *1020years on the bench I have had no associate so confess his mistaken act.
An examination of the three cases cited, supra, the Kromberg, Fruehauf Trailer and Northwestern Mutual cases, in which the petitions for rehearing en banc were stricken, shows that two of them were founded on such conflict of divisions and the third on conflicts in district court decisions on important matters. Also in the seven cases of Bradley Mining Co. v. Boice, 9 Cir., 194 F.2d 80; Acheson v. Kuniyuki, 9 Cir., 189 F.2d 741, 190 F.2d 897; Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Kingsbury, 9 Cir., 175 F.2d 983; Tanimura v. United States, 9 Cir., 195 F.2d 329; People of State of California v. United States, 9 Cir., 181 F.2d 598; Sunbeam Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 9 Cir., 183 F.2d 969, and Zamloch v. United States, 9 Cir., 193 F.2d 889, the division judges refused consideration of the petition addressed to the seven and thus prevented the court en banc from considering the contention in each that the division’s decision conflicted with the decision of a prior division.
E. The court’s confessed fear of the burden of an overwhelming volume of such petitions may be avoided by an amendment of its rules.
Against a flood of such petitions we can protect ourselves, as has the Supreme Court, by amending our Rule 25 as follows:
“Rule 25.
“Rehearing
“A petition for rehearing of a decision by a division of the court may be presented within 30 days after judgment. It must be printed, and briefly and distinctly state its grounds, and be supported by certificate of counsel that in his judgment it is well founded and that it is not interposed for delay. Twenty printed copies must be filed with the clerk of this court.
“Where there has been a denial of a rehearing of a decision by a division, a petition for a rehearing in bank may be filed within fifteen days. The petition shall be in the form above described and with the same certificate of ' counsel. No petition will be entertained, unless one of the judges participating in that decision shall join in seeking such rehearing.”
The Supreme Court has similarly protected itself on its petitions for rehearing by a provision in its Rule 33, 28 U.S.C.A., of which the pertinent portion is;,
“Such petition * * * will not be granted, unless a justice who concurred in the judgment or decision desires it, and a majority of the court so determines.”
In the last seven years there have been-but 75 dissents, an average of less than 11 per year. Probably less than 11 judges-per year would join in petitioning for a. rehearing en banc.
In view of our prospective three divisions: and the likely need for such rehearings en banc, an average of eleven such petitions: would not be an intolerable burden, less-than 4% of our submitted cases. It would substantially reduce the likelihood of conflict between the divisions.
By requiring first a rehearing by the division, the district judges would not be barred from the reconsideration of a decision..
The motion to file should have been considered on its merits and granted.
Supplement to dissenting opinion of Chief' Judge DENMAN, filed herein on July 9, 1952.
DENMAN, Chief Judge.
Since the writing of my dissenting opinion herein I have been advised by Chief' Judge Harold M. Stephens of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that that court has rendered a. series of decisions in conflict with the decision of this court on the question of the right to consider a petition or motion for-rehearing in banc where made by a litigant alone or by a single judge in the division which has decided the case.
It thus appears that this case is of the character described in Rule 38, subd. 5(b) of the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. The decisions of the Court of Appeals for the-District of Columbia determining its practice there are those contained in the following communication to me from Chief Judge Stephens:
“Washington, D. C.
September 11, 1952.
Honorable William Denman
Chief Judge
U. S. Court of Appeals
United States Post Office and Courthouse-
San Francisco My dear Judge Denman:
In response to your inquiry regarding-the practice in this court with respect to hearings in banc and rehearings in banc-under the provisions of Section 4£ of Title 28 of the United States Code, I wish to advise as follows:
*1021In determining in which cases to sit in banc, two methods have been followed in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, namely:
/I/ Any judge or judges or any division of the court may request that a case be heard originally or reheard in banc. Such judge or judges or division of the court usually addresses a memorandum to all of the active circuit judges indicating why he or they thinks the case should either be heard or reheard in banc, and requests the judges to notify the chief judge of their votes on the request. If a majority favor the in banc hearing, and order to that effect is entered and the case is scheduled for the in banc hearing or rehearing.
/2/ Any party to a case may by written motion or petition request that the original hearing or a rehearing to be held in banc. Such a motion or petition is submitted to and ruled upon by all of the active circuit judges of the circuit.
In the following cases rehearings in banc were ordered on the request of one member of the division of the court which originally heard the case:
No. 10446, Kephart v. Kephart, U.S.App.D.C., 193 F.2d 677.
No. 11081, Quinn v. U. S. Not yet decided.
No. 10943, Emspak v. U. S. Not yet decided.
In the following case rehearing in banc was ordered on the request of a judge not a member of the division which originally heard the case:
No. 10063, Stewart v. Overholser, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 186 F.2d 339.
In the following cases the original hearings in banc were ordered on the request of the original division:
No. 11039, Thompson Co. v. D. C. Not yet decided.
No. 11044, D. C. v. Thompson Co. Not yet decided.
In the following case the original hearing in banc was ordered on the request of one member of the court:
No. 10473, Overholser v. Boddie, 87 U.S. App.D.C. 186, 184 F.2d 240, 21 A.L.R.2d 999.
In the following cases rehearings in banc were ordered on the petition of one of the parties:
No. 10504, in the Matter of John W. Carter, U.S.App.D.C., 192 F.2d 15.
No. 10854, Columbia National Bank v. D. C., U.S.App.D.C., 195 F.2d 942.
No. 10846, Citizens Bank v. D. C., U.S.App.D.C., 195 F.2d 946.
No. 10835, D. C. v. Catholic Education Press, U.S.App.D.C., -F.2d-.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Harold M. Stephens
Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.”
It is ordered that the above opinion be printed as a part of the record in this case and that a properly certified copy be sent to the Supreme Court of the United States as a part of the certiorari proceedings sought by Western Pacific Railroad Corporation.

. Judges Denman, Mathews, and Stephens sat in Hopper v. United States, 9 Cir., 142 F.2d 167, and Judges Wilbur, Denman and Healy sat in Crutchfield v. United States, 9 Cir., 142 F.2d 170. At page 177 of 142 F.2d appears Circuit Judge William Denman’s motion for a rehearing en bane of the Hopper case, supra, wherein it is stated that the cause is “now pending on petition for rehearing in this court”. Accordingly, the rehearing of that case was held en banc before Judges Wilbur, Garreelit, Denman, Mathews, Stephens and Healy, being all of the Circuit Judges of this Court. Hopper v. United States, 9 Cir., 142 F.2d 181.

. United States v. Gallagher, 3 Cir., 183 F.2d 342, was heard by a panel of two Circuit Judges and one District Judge, and, upon suggestion of one of the Judges, was heard en banc by all Circuit Judges.

. See. Robinson v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 130 F.2d 202.

. In recent years it has become the custom of counsel almost as a matter of course to petition the full membership of the court for a rehearing in banc, upon suffering an adverse decision at the hands of a court of three judges. This hopeful concept of the right of litigants appears to stem from declarations in the dissenting opinion in Independence Lead Mines v. Kingsbury, 9 Cir., 1949, 175 F.2d 983, at page 992, certiorari denied 338 U.S. 900, 70 S.Ct. 249, 94 L.Ed. 554, to the effect that two judges in a court or divi*1014sion of three are without authority to pass upon or deny a petition for rehearing addressed to all the circuit judges.
The numerous petitions of this nature have been disposed of by the court or division concerned either (1) by ignoring the application for in banc action and treating the petitions simply as ordinary petitions for rehearing, or (2) by striking them insofar as they sought in banc action. The treatment has not in the least served to discourage losing counsel or to stem the growing tide of such petitions.

. The section was enacted as part of the 1948 Judicial Code revision. In its entirety it reads as follows:
“§ 46. Assignment of judges; divisions; hearings; quorum
“(a) Circuit judges shall sit on .the court and its divisions in such order and at such times as the court directs.
“(b) In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing arid determination of cases and controversies by separate divisions, each consisting of three judges. Such divisions shall sit at the times and places and hear the cases and controversies assigned as the court directs.
“(c) Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or divi-. ion of not more than three judges, unless, a hearing or rehearing befo.re the court in' banc is ordered by a mrijofity of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in active service. . A court in banc shall consist of all active circuit judges of the-circuit.
“(d) A majority of the number of judges authorized to constitute a court or division thereof, as provided in paragraph (c), shall constitute a quorum.”

. Rule 4, subdivisions 1 and 2, reads:
“Assigning of Causes for Hearing
“1. The calendars of the court shallr be made up by the Clerk under the direction of the Chief Judge subject to the-approval of the majority of the judges.
“2. The Chief Judge after conference-with the Circuit Judges shall designate and assign the judges who are to hear-the causes placed upon the calendars of' the court; such designation or assignment may be modified or set aside by a-riiajority of the judges.”

. Since the decision in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 1941, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249 approximately thirty cases in all-have-been heard in banc in this circuit. .Nineteen of these, or about two-thirds of the-whole, were assigned to the court in banc at the time they were originally calendared. Perhaps more than half of’ the nineteen were cases of great public-consequence, such, for example, as those-growing out of the suspension during the. *1015war of the writ of habeas corpus and the institution of martial law in Hawaii, or cases involving the forcible removal of the Japanese from the Pacific Coast states. Others were contempt matters involving claimed violations of the constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination.
There are no definite criteria that we know of by which to determine what cases are suitable for in banc consideration. However, causes of extraordinary public importance or those involving constitutional questions probably belong in the category.

. McCoy v. United States, 9 Cir., 169 F.2d 776; Samuel v. United States, 9 Cir,, 169 F.2d 787; Tee Hit Ton Tribe v. Olson, 9 Cir., 160 F.2d 525; Los Angeles Building & Construction Trades Council v. LeBaron, 9 Cir., 185 F.2d 405; Price v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 159 F.2d 234, Id., 9 Cir., 161 F.2d 705.

. This was the course followed in Hopper v. United States, 9 Cir., 142 F.2d 181; Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie, 9 Cir., 180 F.2d 295, Id., 9 Cir., 186 F.2d 926; Evaporated Milk Ass’n v. Roche, 9 Cir., 130 F.2d 843; and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 9 Cir., 139 F.2d 298. In the Hopper case, supra, and to a lesser degree in Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie, intraeircuit conflicts were resolved. The other two cases cited in this note were nondescript matters.

. Emphasis hereafter appearing in quoted matter is supplied.

. Following this the Textile Mills case states at page 71 of 117 F.2d:
«* * * Where, however, there is a difference in view among the judges upon a question of fundamental importance, and especially in a case where two of the three judges sitting in a case may have a view contrary to that of the other three judges of the court, it is advisable that the whole court have the opportunity, if it thinks it necessary, to hear and decide the question. * * * ”

. What is said of the need of rehearings en banc for the then Third Circuit applies a fortiori today to the Ninth Circuit. The Third Circuit in the 1941 fiscal year had but five judges and 285 docket-ipgs. The Ninth Circuit- has had an increase in population of six million in twelve years. In the' fiscal year 1952 it had 446 docketings. On the national average of docketings for circuit judges the Ninth Circuit should have ten judges. It has seven judges but the Senate has passed a bill increasing the judge-ships to nine and the House Judiciary Committee has agreed they are needed. No doubt within a year we will have nine judges with three divisions sitting simultaneously. That is to say, we have 56% more docketings and will have almost half again the number of divisions in which exist the hazard of conflicting decision referred to in the Textile Mills decisions.

. See footnote 3, supra;'