Court Opinion

ID: 9519286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:13:25.701386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:14.688584
License: Public Domain

SACKETT, J.
(concurring specially)
I concur specially. I agree with the majority. I would reverse.
Defendant-appellant Gaylen Bureo appeals the entry of a judgment against him and in favor of plaintiff-appellee Gallagher, Langlas & Gallagher, a Professional Corporation, engaged in the practice of law. The judgment in the amount of $14,588.53, based on an alleged oral contract, was for legal fees incurred by Burco’s daughter, defendant Lynn Roose, during plaintiffs representation of her in a dissolution action.
Unlike the majority, I do not find the record to contain substantial evidence of a definite agreement to guarantee attorney fees in the amount of $14,588.53, nor do I find evidence to support a claim of promissory estoppel.
To sustain proof of an oral contract, the terms must be sufficiently definite for a court to “determine with certainty the duty of each party and the conditions relative to performance.” Burke v. Hawkeye Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 474 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Iowa 1991); Severson v. Elberon Elevator, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa 1977).
While the trial court found a contract to guarantee payment of fees, the record does not reveal the terms of the guarantee. The trial court found on April 10, 1995, Bureo promised to pay for future services and was given an estimate of $1000 a day for trial, plus trial preparation.
Not addressed by the trial court in its findings were several letters and billing statements which clearly contradict such findings. A letter to Roose written on April 13, 1995, following the April 10 conference, said in part:
As I had also indicated to you, this is scheduled to be a 2-1/2 day trial, which will probably take $2,500.00 in legal time over the 2-1/2 day period, including preparation for trial. I want to make it clear that I will need that $2,500.00 additional retainer fee a week prior to the trial date.
Please thank your father for paying on your account Monday,.... (Emphasis added.)
Bureo contends this letter in no way reflects he agreed on April 10, 1995, to pay Roose’s account in cash or by executing a promissory note or that he was guaranteeing the account. With this assertion I agree. Furthermore, it suggests $2500 in total legal fees, not the $14,588.33 claimed in this suit.
On July 14, 1995, plaintiff sent a letter to Bureo that said:
Your daughter’s account at our office is seriously delinquent.... [TJhere have ¿1-ready been 4 days of trial and another day of trial at least is anticipated in this case. Our office has put over 100 hours in this case ... and we anticipate that the total owing to our office when this matter is concluded will be between $5,000.00 and $7,000.00. Obviously, Lynn has no way to pay us, and you have advanced sums on her behalf at my request before.1
Lynn tells me she has forwarded to you Promissory Notes and asked you to sign them and return them to our office, but we have not received them as of the date- of this letter.
If you cannot be responsible for the payment of Lynn’s account at this office, I don’t see how we can continue to represent her in any post trial matters which may *621occur, including the possibility that the court may want written final arguments. If we do not see that we are going to be paid for services already rendered on Lynn’s behalf, it is difficult to see why we should extend ourselves to render further services with no anticipation of payment.
I am enclosing a Promissory Note for you to sign in the amount of $5,000.00 to cover Lynn’s expenses. Obviously if you choose to do so, you can simply deposit the sum of $5,000.00 in cash in our office and we will apply it to Lynn’s account.
If either Mary Chicehelly or I have not heai’d from you one way or the other by Tuesday, July 18th, we will need to discuss whether or not we are in a position to render any further services to Lynn.
With the letter was a promissory note for $5000 providing, “Undersigned guarantees payment of account of his daughter, Lynn Roose, up to the amount of this note upon presentation by attorneys of statement for services at conclusion of custody trial.”
On July 28, 1995, plaintiff sent the following letter to Bureo that said in part:
Enclosed you will find an updated bill for representation of your daughter, Lynn, through July 27, 1995. You will note the total balance, including costs, is now over $10,000.00_ Despite frequent demands and requests by myself and Mary Chic-chelly for payment on this account, or the signing of a Promissory Note by you, you have ignored the situation.
I am enclosing another Promissory Note made payable to us in the amount of $10,000.00. Please be advised that unless this Promissory Note is executed and in our office by Tuesday, August 1st ... or unless this account is paid in full ... we will withdraw our representation of Lynn.... (Emphasis added.)
The promissory note enclosed with that letter said, “Undersigned guarantees payment of account of his daughter, Lynn Roose, up to the amount of this note [$10,000] upon presentation by attorneys of statement for services at conclusion of custody trial.”
Bureo argues while the district court’s conclusion is premised on the existence of a contract of guarantee, there is no evidence of the definite terms of any agreement. This correspondence supports this proposition.
Bureo also contends he was never given an accurate estimate of potential liability and he did not receive copies of the law firm’s interim billings. There were nineteen billings sent by the law firm to Roose. There is no evidence any of the billings were sent to Bureo. Nothing in the written correspondence talks of any guarantee on the part of Bureo. The total amount of the bill is in excess of the original estimate.
Plaintiff must present substantial evidence on each element of its claim. Swanson v. McGraw, 447 N.W.2d 541, 542-43 (Iowa 1989). A contract is generally not found to exist when the parties agree to a contract on a basis to be settled in the future. Air Host Cedar Rapids, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids Airport Comm’n, 464 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Iowa 1990). Plaintiff has failed to produce substantial evidence concerning definitive terms of an agreement, not only as to the terms of payment but, more particularly, the amount guaranteed. The majority finds these terms are as definite as many attorney-fee arrangements. I would suggest they are not, nor should they be when fees are sought from someone other than a client.
Plaintiffs evidence falls short of providing evidence that would support a finding that a meeting of the minds had occurred. See Whalen v. Connelly, 545 N.W.2d 284, 293 (Iowa 1996). Plaintiffs contentions as to the guarantee and the amount of the guarantee are contrary to its written correspondence.
I find there is not substantial evidence to prove plaintiff had a sufficiently definite oral contract with Bureo so it could be determined with certainty Bureo was obligated to plaintiff in the amount of the judgment entered by the district court.
Bureo contends any such claim is based on an oral contract and was a promise to pay a debt of another. He claims it would be barred by the statute of frauds. I agree with the majority there is not substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding defendant *622made an original promise which falls outside the statute of frauds.

. This language does not indicate a prior guarantee.