Court Opinion

ID: 9665105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:40:04.361459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:13.091800
License: Public Domain

Robert H. Dudley, Justice, dissenting. Joe Smothers employed James Clouette to represent him on three criminal charges. Smothers was convicted on each charge and subsequently filed this legal malpractice suit against Clouette. Smothers alleged that Clouette was negligent in representing him because he failed to timely perfect an appeal and then failed to seek a belated appeal. Smothers asked for $750,000 in damages for mental anguish as a result of being incarcerated. However, Smothers did not plead alleging that, but for the failure to perfect the appeal, the result in the underlying criminal charges would have been different. In response to Smothers’s complaint, Clouette filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, see Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and a motion for summary judgment because the statute of limitations had run. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss without specifying whether it was based on 12(b)(6) or on summary judgment. The majority opinion holds that the granting of summary judgment was in error, and I agree. However, I would not reverse and remand, because the trial court could have correctly granted the motion based on Rule 12(b)(6). We have often held that we will affirm a trial court if the trial court reached the right result, even though the trial court may have given the wrong reason. Marine Servs. Unlimited, Inc. v. Rake, 323 Ark. 757, 918 S.W.2d 132 (1996). Here, the trial court reached the right result, because the case should have been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. In order to state a cause of action for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must show that but for the alleged negligence, the result in the underlying action would have been different. Schmidt v. Pearson, Evans & Chadwick, 326 Ark. 499, 931 S.W.2d 774 (1996); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Adams, 326 Ark. 300, 930 S.W.2d 374 (1996); Anthony v. Kaplan, 324 Ark. 52, 918 S.W.2d 174 (1996); Callahan v. Clark, 321 Ark. 376, 901 S.W.2d 842 (1995). Smothers did not plead any facts showing that, if the appeal had been perfected, the underlying results would have been different. Thus, the trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss, but should have based the dismissal on Smothers’s failure to state a cause of action. The trial court granted a dismissal, but it should have granted a dismissal without prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. We should affirm, but modify the dismissal to one without prejudice. The case of Ratliff v. Moss, 284 Ark. 16, 678 S.W.2d 369 (1984), is squarely on point. GLAZE, J., joins in this dissent.