Court Opinion

ID: 9698477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:51:41.313359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:41.269642
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
We deal in this case with a series of invasions of the home which culminated in the warrantless seizure of evidence. The trial court suppressed this evidence as a fruit of an illegal search of a private residence. I would affirm the trial court’s suppression order.
On May 5, 1987, Edward F. Momorella, the assistant fire marshal1 of Upper Moreland Township, responded to a report of a small fire in an apartment complex in Hunting-don Valley, Montgomery County. By the time Momorella arrived on the scene, the blaze had been extinguished by firemen. Momorella determined that the fire had originated in a foam rubber chair in the living room of a three room apartment rented by William Person, and that the fire had been caused by careless smoking. Momorella first inspected the living room, and then examined the other rooms of *216the apartment in order to ensure proper ventilation and to ascertain the extent of smoke damage. In one of the bedrooms, he observed what he believed to be controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. After viewing this evidence, he summoned Officer John McGowan of the Montgomery County Police who entered the apartment without first obtaining a search warrant. McGowan then notified his superior, Sergeant Alex Levy, who entered the apartment without first obtaining a search warrant. At some point, Mark DiSonni, another uniformed police officer, also entered the apartment without first obtaining a search warrant. When Mr. Person arrived home and entered his apartment, he was greeted by a policeman who placed him under arrest. Person admitted that he owned the controlled substances and drug paraphernalia, and these effects were then seized by police officers.
I agree with the majority that the fire marshal’s inspection of the apartment did not violate the fourth amendment. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the subsequent warrantless searches and seizures by police officers did not violate the fourth amendment.2
I. LEGAL SEARCH BY FIRE MARSHAL
At the very heart of the fourth amendment is a concern for the privacy of the home. A resident’s privacy interest in his home is so substantial that any warrantless, nonconsensual entry into the home by an agent of the government is ordinarily deemed to be an unreasonable search. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380-1382, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). No warrant is required, however, where government agents are confronted with exigent circumstances, such as a raging fire. No one could *217reasonably argue that firemen must consult a magistrate before entering a burning building to put out a blaze. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1950, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). Moreover, the exigency created by a fire does not dissipate the moment the flames are extinguished. Fire fighters have a compelling interest in searching fire-damaged premises in order to ensure that the fire does not rekindle and in order to prevent the destruction of evidence. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293, 104 S.Ct. 641, 646, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984). Thus, it is well established that in the immediate aftermath of a fire, fire fighters may thoroughly investigate the cause and origin of the fire without first securing a warrant. Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 36, 44-46, 511 A.2d 796, 800-801, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 643, 93 L.Ed.2d 700 (1986).
Appellee Person concedes that the firemen did not violate his constitutional rights when they entered his apartment to put out a fire. Person also concedes that Fire Marshal Momorella did not violate his constitutional rights when he entered the living room to find the cause and origin of the fire. Person’s claim is that Momorella had no right to enter the bedroom after the cause and origin of the fire already had been discovered. I disagree. According to Momorella’s uncontradicted testimony at the suppression hearing, he “proceeded to check out the rest of the apartment for smoke damage, and the amount of smoke to see if the fire department had ventilated.” R.R. at 5 (emphasis added). This search was proper. Among the gravest dangers created by a fire is the risk that residents will become ill after inhaling smoke or other noxious fumes. The fire department has as compelling an interest in ensuring proper ventilation as in preventing a fire from rekindling. I therefore conclude that a fire marshal has not only a right but also an obligation to enter any portion of a residence which may be congested with smoke. Moreover, since Momorella could lawfully enter the bedrooms to check the ventilation, he could also take the opportunity to survey the extent of smoke damage.
*218My disagreement with the majority concerns whether a fire marshal may conduct a warrantless search which bears no relation to his efforts to determine the cause and origin of a fire or to address a potential danger to public health. The majority would apparently allow the admission into evidence of any items discovered by a fire marshal who was “performing a task within the scope of his duties.” Majority Op. at 769. As the majority notes, a fire marshal’s duties include determining the nature and value of the property destroyed by a fire and whether such property was insured. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 16, § 6104. Thus, under the majority’s formulation, following a small fire in a basement, a fire marshal could rummage through the papers in a homeowner’s bedroom desk in the hope of finding fire insurance policies or sales receipts for damaged merchandise. This would be an unprecedented interference with the homeowner’s right to privacy.3
I would therefore hold that a fire marshal may conduct a warrantless search to determine the extent of smoke damage when the search is part of a broader effort to discover the cause and origin of the fire or to safeguard public health and when the search takes place within a reasonable period of time after the blaze is extinguished. I would not allow a fire marshal to conduct a warrantless search of any portion of the fire-damaged premises solely in order to *219determine the nature and value of the property destroyed. If a fire marshal needs to determine how much property was destroyed, he may proceed to search after obtaining either the consent of the resident or an administrative warrant. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. at 291-92, 104 S.Ct. at 645-46 (requiring administrative warrants for inspections by fire officials in absence of exigent circumstances). See generally Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (discussing administrative warrants).
II. ILLEGAL SEARCH BY POLICE
Although my reasoning differs from that of the majority, I agree that Fire Marshall Momorella’s search of appellee’s apartment was constitutional. The same cannot be said for the subsequent invasion of the apartment by Officer McGowan, Sergeant Levy, and Officer DiSonni. Unlike the fire marshal, the police could not rely on any exigent circumstance to justify their warrantless search of the apartment and seizure of contraband. This is not a case in which a fireman requested that the police assist him in investigating the cause and origin of a fire. Nor is this a case in which a fireman required police assistance in order to dispose of potentially explosive chemicals discovered during a post-fire inspection. See United States v. Urban, 710 F.2d 276 (6th Cir.1983); United States v. Callabrass, 607 F.2d 559 (2nd Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2163, 64 L.Ed.2d 794 (1980). Here, a fire marshal who had completed his investigation of the cause and origin of the fire came across a small amount a marijuana and some drug paraphernalia. These materials posed no immediate danger. The police had ample opportunity to secure a warrant before entering the apartment to seize the contraband. The trial court correctly held that their failure to do so requires suppression of the evidence.
It is of course true that under our fourth amendment jurisprudence, a defendant cannot object to a warrantless police entry of an area in which he does not have a legit*220imate expectation of privacy. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). A legitimate expectation of privacy exists where an individual exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516-17, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In Michigan v. Tyler, the United States Supreme Court noted:
[The] proposition — that innocent fire victims invariably have no protectible expectations of privacy in whatever remains of their property — is contrary to common experience. People may go on living in their homes or working in their offices after a fire. Even when that is impossible, private effects often remain in the fire damaged premises.
Id., 436 U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct. at 1948. Thus, although a devastating fire that reduces a building to ash and rubble might destroy any privacy interest therein, a resident will continue to enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy in his home in the aftermath of a small fire that is easily contained. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. at 292-93, 104 S.Ct. at 646-47; Commonwealth v. Ellis, 379 Pa.Super. 337, 345-346, 549 A.2d 1323, 1327 (1988).
It is undisputed that the fire in this case did not destroy Mr. Person’s legitimate expectation of privacy in his apartment. Therefore, the constitutionality of any post-fire search of the apartment would depend upon whether the purpose of the search was related to the exigency cause by the fire. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. at 292, 104 S.Ct. at 646. If the search is a direct response to the exigency created by the fire, a resident’s interest in privacy must yield to the compelling interests of the state. On the other hand, “if it is clearly shown that the search is not for the purpose of determining the cause and origin of the fire, but rather to obtain evidence of criminal activity, then such search must either be with consent or with a warrant.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. at 46, 511 A.2d at 801.
*221Today, the majority undermines this rule by allowing police to conduct a warrantless search of a fire-damaged apartment with the sole purpose of seizing controlled substances. The majority achieves this result by bootstrapping a warrantless police search with an improper objective, i.e. to seize drugs, onto a prior search by a fire marshal with a proper objective, i.e. to respond to the exigency created by the fire. The majority reasons that Mr. Person lost all expectation of privacy in his apartment after the fire marshal entered the rooms of the apartment and observed drugs in plain view. Therefore, the majority concludes, the police were free to retrace the fire marshal’s steps and seize the evidence.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the fact that the fire marshal observed drugs in plain view is irrelevant. It might be argued that a public official’s observation of contraband in plain view destroys all legitimate expectation of privacy in the contraband. It would not follow, however, that the observation of contraband can destroy a legitimate expectation of privacy in the building in which the contraband is stored. In this regard, Commonwealth v. Weik, 360 Pa.Super. 560, 521 A.2d 44 (1987) is instructive. In Weik, police officers looked through the windows of a shed on the defendant’s property and observed slot machines therein. The officers had probable cause to believe that the defendant was illegally maintaining the slot machines for gambling purposes. Instead of securing a search warrant, the officers forcibly entered the shed and seized the machines. A panel of the Superior Court concluded that although the machines were clearly in plain view, the observation of the machines did not alter the defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of his shed. Accordingly, the police conducted an illegal search when they entered the shed and took custody of the machines. See generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2039 (plain view alone cannot justify subsequent warrantless entry and seizure).
*222Under Weik, the police could not have entered appellee’s apartment even if they had personally observed the contraband through appellee’s bedroom window. Clearly then, the police could not have entered the apartment simply because another public official — a fire marshal — had observed the contraband. The question thus becomes whether the mere entry of the fire marshal into appellant’s apartment defeated appellee’s expectation of privacy so as to allow an independent entry by the police. I would hold that it did not.
Whether the fourth amendment bars a warrantless search by a particular government official must be assessed in light of the identity of the official and the reason for his search. A defendant may be entitled to full fourth amendment protection as against police searches even where a search by an employee of another government agency in the same location would fall within an exception to the warrant requirement. See generally Commonwealth v. Black, 365 Pa.Super. 502, 509-16, 530 A.2d 423, 427-30 (1987), allocatur granted, 518 Pa. 635, 542 A.2d 1365 (1988), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 520 Pa. 115, 552 A.2d 1046 (1989).
In Commonwealth v. Black, the defendant managed a private club which was licensed for the sale of alcohol. A municipal police officer accompanied agents of the Liquor Control Board on a raid of the club, and the defendant sought to suppress contraband that the police officer seized. The search by the Liquor Control Board agents was constitutional since it fell within an exception to the warrant requirement which permits searches of the alcoholic beverage industry where authorized by statute. See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970). At the time of the raid, however, no Pennsylvania statute authorized an administrative search of licensed clubs by municipal police officers. Since the police search did not come within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, a unanimous panel of the Superior Court found that the search infringed upon the defendant’s *223privacy interest in the club premises. The fact that the “closely regulated industries” exception to the warrant requirement permitted Liquor Control Board agents to search the club did not destroy Mr. Black’s legitimate expectation of privacy. Similarly, in the instant case, the fact that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement permitted the fire marshal’s search did not destroy appellee’s legitimate expectation of privacy.
The majority, however, refuses to recognize that appellee’s legitimate expectation of privacy was infringed when three uniformed policemen entered his apartment during his absence. Under the majority’s rationale, if one public official lawfully enters a residence, two, three, four, or a dozen more may follow. I do not believe that this view is consistent with commonly held societal understandings regarding the sanctity of the home. A tenant or homeowner should not be forced to endure an intrusion simply because a prior intrusion has gone before. At least where an area is so private that it falls at the very core of fourth amendment protection, each governmental intrusion ordinarily produces a separate injury to privacy and dignity. This is true of both the body and the home. Cf. Commonwealth v. Kean, 382 Pa.Super. 587, 613, 556 A.2d 374, 387 (1989) (“To be forced to disrobe before a stranger is an invasion of privacy; to be forced to disrobe before a second stranger and a third stranger is a further invasion of privacy. To be spied upon by a Peeping Tom while in bed is an invasion of privacy; to be spied upon by a series of Peeping Toms and then by the police is a greater invasion of privacy.”) Thus, a fire fighter who enters a home for the salutary purpose of extinguishing a fire does not pave the way for a general warrantless police search for evidence of crime.
I acknowledge that certain courts in other jurisdictions have held that a policeman may piggyback a search for criminal evidence on a fireman’s search to determine the cause of a fire. Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1002, 95 S.Ct. 320, 42 L.Ed.2d 277 (1974); United States v. Green, 474 F.2d 1385 (5th *224Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 829, 94 S.Ct. 55, 38 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 524 F.Supp. 199 (D.Del.1981), rev’d on other grounds, 690 F.2d 60 (3rd Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214, 103 S.Ct. 1212, 75 L.Ed.2d 450 (1983); State v. Bell, 108 Wash.2d 193, 737 P.2d 254 (1987). Each of these cases rests on the false premise that the fire fighter’s search wholly exhausts a resident’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the home.
The better view is reflected in United States v. Hoffman, 607 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.1979). In that case, a fireman observed a sawed-off shotgun after removing a smoldering mattress from the defendant’s trailer. The fireman notified Officer Heiden, a policeman, who then entered the trailer without a warrant and seized the weapon. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ordered the evidence suppressed. The court explained:
In this case, the warrantless entry of the police officer, following that of the firefighters, exceeded the scope of the initial intrusion by the firemen. Officer Heiden did not enter the trailer to aid in extinguishing the blaze or to investigate the cause. His only purpose in entering appellant’s trailer, as he forthrightly admitted, was to seize evidence of an unrelated crime. The fact that the police officer’s actual physical intrusion was no greater than that of the firemen does not control our examination of appellant’s Fourth Amendment violation. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351-53, 88 S.Ct. 507 [511-12] (1967); United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966, 97 S.Ct. 1645, 52 L.Ed.2d 356 (1977). Rather, “the Fourth Amendment protects people not places.” Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at 511. Fire victims do not abandon all reasonable expectations of privacy. Michigan v. Tyler, supra, 436 U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct. 1942 [1947]. One whose home is ablaze certainly should expect that firemen will enter in order to extinguish the fire. Likewise, one should also expect that these same firefighters will be looking for the source or cause of the fire while within *225the home. But, no citizen should reasonably expect that, because a fire has occurred in his home, and certain few officials may enter, any sort of public officer may thereafter invade his home for purposes unrelated ,to the initial intrusion.
Hoffman, 607 F.2d at 284-85 (footnotes omitted). I find this reasoning persuasive and would adopt it.
I further note that the limits which the majority imposes on the privacy of the home has potential consequences far beyond the context of post-fire inspections. Several of the dangers inherent in the theory that the majority adopts were perceptively analyzed by Chief Justice Pearson of the Washington Supreme Court in his concurring opinion in State v. Bell. I share the concerns expressed in the following portion of his commentary.
The majority holds that once one government agent lawfully enters and remains in an individual’s home, the reasonable expectation of privacy is destroyed, and other government agents may follow in the first agent’s footsteps____ The implications of such a conclusion are troublesome. First ... if no reasonable expectation of privacy remains in the home, then police officers may enter without justification — that is: without probable cause, without a warrant, and without any of the circumstances that typically justify a warrantless entry. Suppose that fire fighters had not discovered contraband in petitioner’s home but the police had just wandered by and decided to enter in hopes that something unlawful might turn up. Under the majority’s analysis, a dozen officers could crowd into the home for no purpose whatsoever: petitioner would have no Fourth Amendment claim to raise, for he would have no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Secondly, under the majority's analysis, once the fire fighters entered the home, the IRS agent, the INS agent, and the state social worker would be free to enter. As I indicated above, when no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a location, any government agent may enter. *226A call to the city ambulance for a medical emergency suddenly opens one’s home to the tax assessor and the marines. How can petitioner raise a Fourth Amendment objection when he has no reasonable expectation of privacy?
Although no one expects such outrageous scenarios to actually arise, they do illustrate the problem with the majority’s reasoning. A home is not like navigable airspace, a store, or a public pathway, where any federal or state officer may wander freely. We cannot dispense with the requirement that government officers entering a person’s home have some justification for their entry. What that justification may be will depend on the circumstances, but it certainly must be more than the observation that some other government officer “is already there”. It would be a grave disfigurement of the constitution to hold otherwise.
Finally, the majority’s reasoning would permit a different but perhaps more likely scenario — and one that is equally impermissible: circumvention of the probable cause and warrant requirements____
Under the majority’s analysis ... once a fire inspector lawfully enters a building to determine the cause or origin of a fire, police officers pursuing a criminal investigation may follow on the inspector’s heels without bothering to obtain the traditional “criminal” warrant. Whether such circumvention of the probable cause and warrant requirements for criminal investigations is ever likely to be a prevalent practice is beside the point; the critical question is whether the constitution would prevent the practice. I believe it would, although the majority opinion would suggest otherwise.
Bell, 108 Wash.2d at 207-09, 737 P.2d at 263-64 (Pearson, C.J., concurring).
I believe that the best policy is to protect against erosion of the fourth amendment by adhering to the general rule that each entry of the home by a government official must *227be made pursuant to a warrant or a traditionally recognized exception to the warrant requirement. I would follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit in Hoffman and hold that an entry into the home by a fire official under exigent circumstances cannot support a later intrusion into the home by a policeman with a wholly different objective. I would therefore conclude that the seizure of contraband in this case was the fruit of an unconstitutional police search of the apartment, and I would affirm the trial court’s suppression order.
III. ILLEGAL SEIZURE BY POLICE
Even if I could accept the majority’s argument that police could enter the apartment, I would still find that the police in the case sub judice conducted an illegal seizure. The majority holds that the police can seize only such evidence as the fire marshall would have been justified in seizing. See Majority Op. at 210-212. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that a Montgomery County fire marshal is justified in seizing evidence in a home which is unrelated to the investigation of arson or any related crime in the absence of exigent circumstances. Thus, the police could not validly seize contraband under the guise of “[standing] in the shoes of the fire marshall.” Id. at 213.
The question of which types of evidence a fire marshal is authorized to seize is primarily a matter of state law. The duties and responsibilities of a fire marshal are governed by the Counties Code. See Pa.Stat.Ann tit. 16, §§ 6101-6110 (Purdon 1956). Section 6104 of the Code states that a fire marshal shall attempt to save property from fire, pillage, theft, and destruction. Section 6105 grants fire marshals the power to arrest persons who have willfully set buildings on fire. Nothing in the Code indicates that fire marshals in Pennsylvania have general police powers and may seize evidence solely because it would be relevant to a prosecution for possession of controlled substances. Cf. Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. at 46, 511 A.2d at 801 (“[Foremen may seize any evidence which is in plain view of the cause and origin of the fire” (emphasis added)). Instead of *228seizing contraband on his own, a fire marshal should ordinarily inform a policeman of the existence of the contraband. The policeman should then seize the contraband after securing a proper warrant.
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the majority relies upon cases from other jurisdictions. In these cases, the powers of fire officials were governed by statutes which do not apply in this Commonwealth. In State v. Bell, supra, where an assistant fire marshal organized the seizure of marijuana plants, a Washington statute vested fire marshals with “police powers to enforce the laws of the state.” 108 Wash.2d at 203 n. 1, 737 P.2d at 260 n. 1 (Pearson, C.J., concurring) (citing RCW 48.48060(2)). Similarly, in United States v. Green, supra, an applicable Florida statute granted the state fire marshall “the same authority to ... make searches and seizures, as the sheriff or his deputies____” 474 F.2d at 1389 n. 2 (citing Fla.Stat.Ann. § 633.14). In United States v. Johnson, supra, an applicable section of a local code granted fire fighters “all the powers conferred by statute and ordinance upon constables, sheriffs and state police of the State of Delaware.” 524 F.Supp. at 205 n. 3 (citing Wilmington City Code 5-31). And in Steigler v. Anderson, supra, a case involving the seizure of evidence of arson, an applicable Delaware statute granted fire marshals the power to “enforce all laws and ordinances of the State ... having to do with ... the suppression of arson.” 496 F.2d at 796 n. 7 (citing Del.Code § 6607).
I would conclude that in the absence of such statutory language, a fire marshal would not be authorized to seize evidence evidence under the circumstances present in this case. Momorella would have acted improperly if he had seized the contraband himself instead of contacting Officer McGowan. Furthermore, when the police seized the contraband, they exceeded the limits of Momorella’s legitimate seizure power. The police seizure cannot be viewed as the functional equivalent of any seizure which the fire marshal could have carried out.
*229I express no opinion as to whether a hypothetical confiscation of the drugs by the fire marshal would have been an “unreasonable seizure” within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Not every act by a government official which exceeds the scope of his authority rises to the level of a constitutional violation. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 405-07, 490 A.2d 421, 426 (1985). Yet, since Momorella was not authorized to seize the contraband, he could not have been justified in seizing the contraband even though he observed it in plain view. And since Momorella would have had no justification for making the seizure, the police cannot justify their own seizure based upon what Momorella might have done. Accordingly, the warrantless seizure of evidence in this case does not even fall within the new exception to the warrant requirement that the majority today recognizes. The evidence should be suppressed.
I respectfully dissent.

. Assistant fire marshals have the same powers and perform the same duties as fire marshals. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 16, § 6101 (Purdon 1956). I refer to Momorella as a fire marshal throughout this opinion for the sake of simplicity.

. In his opinion justifying the suppression of evidence as the fruit of an unreasonable search and seizure, the trial court did not refer to the Pennsylvania Constitution. We must presume that the trial court suppressed the evidence on the basis of the federal constitution. The applicability of the fourth amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures to the facts of the instant case is the only issue presently before us. See Commonwealth v. Toanone, 381 Pa.Super. 336, 342-344, 553 A.2d 998, 1000-1001 (1989).

. A careful examination of the cases relied upon by the majority indicates that the evidence admitted was discovered by fire fighters who were investigating the cause and origin of a fire, ventilating the premises, rescuing trapped occupants, or taking action necessary to prevent a fire from rekindling, such as shutting off utilities or searching for smoldering embers. On the other hand, in United States v. Parr, 716 F.2d 796 (11th Cir.1983), the court suppressed evidence that a fireman discovered while attempting to secure valuables against looters. The Parr court reasoned that preventing the theft of valuables from fire-damaged premises was not a core firefighting function, and that a warrantless search conducted for this purpose was illegal, at least in the absence of standardized procedures which narrowly channeled the discretion of fire officials. The issue in Parr is a difficult one since it might be argued that preventing the theft of valuables serves an important public interest and requires immediate action. No immediate action is required when the sole purpose of a search is to ascertain the extent of smoke damage for insurance purposes.