Court Opinion

ID: 9459165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:12:17.378207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:02.829367
License: Public Domain

COFFIN, Chief-Judge
(dissenting in part).
I have no difficulty in agreeing with the court that habeas corpus jurisdiction lies in the district court. I have more difficulty in agreeing that exhaustion of petitioner’s military administrative remedies is required before we can give any relief at all, even if he were to present a substantial claim that the military’s jurisdiction over him had terminated, when- a substantial challenge to the military’s right to try a serviceman for a non-serviee-conneeted crime by court-martial, O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969), may not be subject to exhaustion, Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 696, n. 8, 89 S.Ct. 1876, 23 L.Ed.2d 631 (1969) ; Lyle v. Kincaid, 344 F.Supp. 223, 224 (M.D.Fla.1972). Yet I do agree that the distinction between exhaustion of military administrative and military judicial remedies is very much alive. See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972). But cf. Scaggs v. Larsen, 396 U.S. 1206, 1209, 90 S.Ct. 5, 24 L.Ed.2d 28 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1969). Even if complete exhaustion may not always be required, Beaty v. Kenan, 420 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1969), petitioner has yet some distance to travel before a court might order his discharge.
However, I depart from the court’s view in saying that it is of no concern to us how petitioner may be treated while he exhausts his remedies. I see no advantage to the military and considerable injustice to petitioner in retaining him in custody in the event that he ultimate*660ly prevails, and no disadvantage to the military if he does not — since the time would thereafter be served.* But here the Army, for reasons best known to it, wants petitioner at Ft. Devens and I find no hard authority for denying its request. My disagreement is reduced to what the court considers a premature issue — the legitimacy of applying to petitioner in these circumstances the routine Ft. Devens policy of confining returnees in a fenced-in “personnel control facility” for two weeks. No reason, security or other, being advanced, I can only attribute a punitive one, i. e., punishment before the merits are resolved, which seems improper on its face. United States ex rel. Chaparro v. Resor, 412 F. 2d 443 (4th Cir. 1969). I would therefore follow the procedure in Noyd, supra at 699, by giving the Army the option to treat petitioner like other non-offending servicemen and not confine him. If it does not choose this path, I would stay its action to give petitioner the opportunity to present his arguments on the confinement issue to the Court of Military Appeals.

 I am influenced by my view of the merits of petitioner’s ease, which is perhaps more favorable than that of the court. Petitioner’s voluntary appearances before the Providence recruiter, who was obliged to report petitioner as having returned to military control, see AR-190 :l-3a, 190-9:3-4, 190-9 :l-3g, 630-10 :l-3g, and other circumstances give his claim comparable strength to those other “lost servicemen” whose claims have been upheld. See McFarlane v. DeYoung, 431 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1970) ; Forbes v. Laird, 340 F.Supp. 193, 196 (E.D.Wis. 1971) ; Patnode v. Alexander, 3 S.S.L.R. 3328 (D.Md.1970) (period of Jan. 1967-Feb. 1969).