Court Opinion

ID: 9720806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:41:47.822931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:21.409893
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring: Although I fully agree with the court’s opinion in this case, I specially concur to express concerns about — and suggestions regarding — Illinois law on stipulations in criminal cases. I. AN ANALYSIS OF ILLINOIS LAW ON STIPULATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES A. Background In People v. Campbell, 332 Ill. App. 3d 808, 773 N.E.2d 218 (2002), the defendant, who had been convicted of criminal trespass to a residence, argued on appeal that he had been denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him because, absent his knowing consent, defense counsel stipulated to the testimony of a key State witness. This court held that, with two exceptions, defense counsel can stipulate to prosecution testimony without a defendant’s knowing consent because the decision to stipulate is a matter of trial strategy within defense counsel’s sound judgment. The two exceptions arise under the following situations: (1) when the State’s entire case is to be presented by stipulation or (2) when the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant. Campbell, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 814, 773 N.E.2d at 223. The supreme court affirmed the Fourth District’s judgment, but — regrettably—not on the same basis. Instead, the supreme court wrote the following: “We agree that defense counsel may waive a defendant’s right of confrontation as long as the defendant does not object and the decision to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and strategy. *** We therefore affirm the appellate court’s finding that defense counsel may stipulate to the admission of evidence and thereby waive his client’s constitutional right to confrontation.” (Emphasis added.) Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 217, 802 N.E.2d at 1213. B. The Supreme Court’s Discussion in Campbell of the Decisions Belonging Personally to the Defendant In Campbell, the supreme court addressed whether the decision to stipulate to certain State’s evidence is one of those decisions that belongs personally to the criminal defendant. The court began its analysis by discussing its decision in People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 604 N.E.2d 275 (1992), as follows: “In People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 604 N.E.2d 275 (1992), this court held that there are four decisions that ultimately belong to the defendant in a criminal case after consultation with his attorney: (1) what plea to enter; (2) whether to waive a jury trial; (3) whether to testify in his own behalf; and (4) whether to appeal. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54[, 604 N.E.2d at 281]. This court then stated that: ‘Beyond these four decisions, however, trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after consulting with his client. Such matters include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike and what trial motions should be made. [Citation.] Such matters also include the defense to be presented at trial.’ Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54[, 604 N.E.2d at 281]. This court then held that the defendant’s constitutional right to due process was not violated when his trial counsel presented a defense against defendant’s wishes, because the defense theory to be presented at trial is not one of the matters that a defendant has the ultimate right to decide. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54[, 604 N.E.2d at 281].” Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 210, 802 N.E.2d at 1209. The Campbell court then discussed its decision in People v. Brock-smith, 162 Ill. 2d 224, 642 N.E.2d 1230 (1994). In that case, the supreme court held that in addition to the decisions specified in Ramey, a defendant also had the exclusive right to decide whether to submit an instruction on a lesser-included offense at the conclusion of the evidence. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d at 229, 642 N.E.2d at 1232. The court reasoned that (1) the decision to tender a lesser-included offense is analogous to the decision of what plea to enter and (2) the two decisions should be treated the same. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d at 229, 642 N.E.2d at 1232. Consequently, because defense counsel rather than the defendant made the ultimate decision to tender a lesser-included offense instruction, the defendant’s conviction on the lesser-included offense was reversed. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d at 229-30, 642 N.E.2d at 1233. C. The “As Long As” Clause of Campbell After discussing Ramey and Broeksmith, the Campbell court took a different approach in addressing a defendant’s role when defense counsel stipulates to the admission of evidence. In Ramey and Brock-smith, the supreme court held that apart from the five decisions that belong personally to the defendant, defense counsel has decision-making authority after consulting with the defendant. In Campbell, however, the court held that when it comes to the question of whether to stipulate to evidence, defense counsel has decision-making authority “as long as the defendant does not object and the decision to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and strategy.” (Emphasis added.) Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 217, 802 N.E.2d at 1213. Thus, under Campbell’s “as long as” clause, defense counsel has the authority to enter into a binding stipulation unless one of two things happen: (1) the defendant objects or (2) the trial court or a reviewing court concludes that counsel’s decision to stipulate does not rise to the level of trial tactics and strategy. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 217, 802 N.E.2d at 1213. 1. The Objection Prong of Campbell’s “As Long As” Clause a. Cases Interpreting Campbell’s First Prong In People v. Phillips, 352 Ill. App. 3d 867, 817 N.E.2d 566 (2004) (Phillips IP), the Third District interpreted the first prong of Campbell’s “as long as” clause. In that case, the defendant was charged with several drug offenses. At her trial, the prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated to the admission in evidence of laboratory reports establishing the identity and weight of the drugs at issue. The laboratory technician who tested and weighed the drugs did not testify at the defendant’s trial, but the record contained no showing that the defendant objected to the admission of the lab reports by stipulation. Phillips II, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 868, 817 N.E.2d at 568. The Third District had initially affirmed the defendant’s conviction, rejecting her claim that the admission of the stipulation violated her right of confrontation. People v. Phillips, 326 Ill. App. 3d 157, 759 N.E.2d 946 (2001) (Phillips I). However, in People v. Phillips, 208 Ill. 2d 550, 804 N.E.2d 1066 (2004), the Supreme Court of Illinois vacated that decision and remanded the cause to the Third District to reconsider its judgment in light of the supreme court’s decision in Campbell. On remand, the Third District reversed the defendant’s conviction, explaining as follows: “Construing the fundamental constitutional right [of confrontation] in conjunction with the supreme court’s decision in Campbell, we conclude that in order to waive the defendant’s sixth[-]amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence, there must be some affirmative showing or indication by the defendant in the record that he or she did not object to or dissent from the attorney’s decision to stipulate. *** *** [T]he requirement of a voluntary, knowing[,] and intelligent waiver is inherent in defendant’s election not to object to stipulating and *** there needs to be some evidence in the record that defendant knowingly waived [his right to confrontation]. That is to say[,] that he or she was advised of the right to confront witnesses and of the nature and legal impact of waiving that right through the proposed stipulation, and either concurred with or objected to it.” (Emphasis in original.) Phillips II, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 871, 817 N.E.2d at 570-71. The Third District then considered the record before it in light of its interpretation of Campbell and concluded as follows: “[A] review of the record in the present case discloses nothing that demonstrates (or even suggests) that the attorney explained to [the defendant] what decisions were generally made by him absent her objection or, more specifically, what a stipulation is and its legal impact, what he intended to stipulate to, and what the implications were of stipulating to the specific data in the lab reports. A failure to provide the defendant with that basic information deprives her of a meaningful opportunity to make a reasoned objection. Nor is there any representation by the attorney to the court that he discussed these matters with his client and she did not object. In a situation such as the one suggested by nothing more than the absence of an objection in the instant record, the defendant would have needed a combination of some rudimentary understanding of the legal concept of stipulation (which we do not believe can be fairly assumed) and enough luck to ‘alert’ to the word in the course of the trial. Such a hit[-]or[-]miss proposition simply cannot result in either a reasoned objection or a knowing and voluntary assignment of her right to waive confrontation to her attorney, and we do not believe that it was the intent of our supreme court to validate a complete disregard of a defendant’s interest in this constitutional right.” Phillips II, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 817 N.E.2d at 571. Thus, the Third District held that when a defendant is stipulating to the admission of evidence, the record must affirmatively show that he was (1) advised of his right to confrontation, (2) informed of the impact of waiving that right, and (3) either concurred with or objected to that waiver. Since Phillips II, several decisions from the First and Third District Appellate Courts rejected the Phillips court’s approach and have held that the record need not affirmatively show that the defendant was informed of, and explicitly waived, his confrontation-clause rights. In each case, the appellate court concluded that the supreme court’s Campbell decision did not require such an affirmative showing. See People v. Scott, 355 Ill. App. 3d 741, 745, 824 N.E.2d 302, 307 (2005) (in which a different panel from the Third District Appellate Court held that the Phillips II court misinterpreted Campbell)-, People v. Banks, 358 Ill. App. 3d 924, 926, 833 N.E.2d 928, 930 (2005); People v. Foerster, 359 Ill. App. 3d 198, 200, 833 N.E.2d 942, 944 (2005); People v. Orta, 361 Ill. App. 3d 342, 350-51, 836 N.E.2d 811, 818-19 (2005); People v. Rodriguez, 362 Ill. App. 3d 44, 47-48, 839 N.E.2d 543, 546-47 (2005). The supreme court has now reversed the Third District in Phillips II and rejected the concerns the appellate court expressed therein. In Phillips, 217 Ill. 2d at 288, 840 N.E.2d at 1205 (Phillips III), the supreme court reversed the Third District and explained as follows: “In sum, it is not necessary for either the court or counsel to admonish a defendant about the implications and consequences of a stipulation, and defendant’s explicit agreement to the stipulation on the record is not required where, as here, (1) defense counsel’s decision to stipulate appears to have been a matter of trial tactics and strategy and defendant does not object to counsel’s decision, and (2) the State’s entire case is not presented by stipulation, the defendant does present or preserve a defense, and the stipulation does not include a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict.” (Emphasis in original.) Even more recently, in People v. Medina, 221 Ill. 2d 394, 404-08, 851 N.E.2d 1220, 1225-28 (2006), the supreme court (when discussing what admonitions, if any, a defendant must receive informing him about his personal right to seek a lesser-included-offense instruction) reaffirmed its decisions both in Campbell and Phillips III. b. Further Discussion of the Objection Prong For the reasons that follow, I respectfully conclude that the supreme court’s standard for dealing with stipulations will likely prove unworkable. In Campbell, the supreme court wrote that defense counsel may waive a defendant’s right of confrontation as long as the defendant does not object. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 217, 802 N.E.2d at 1213. However, left unspoken is what happens if the defendant does object. In other words, does his objection trump the decision of his trial counsel to stipulate to the evidence at issue? Under Campbell, the answer appears to be “yes.” Such an approach makes sense with regard to the five decisions personally belonging to the defendant. In such cases, the defendant’s wishes trump any position of defense counsel to the contrary. For instance, a defendant possesses the personal right to decide whether to take the witness stand even if his trial counsel believes his decision to be unwise. Similarly, a defendant can insist on having a jury trial (or a bench trial) even if his trial counsel believes that decision to be unwise. However, in situations in which the issue is one addressed to trial counsel’s judgment, not the defendant’s, such an approach makes no sense. For instance, in Ramey, a death-penalty murder case, the defendant’s trial counsel presented a defense of self-defense against his client’s wishes, yet the supreme court affirmed. In so concluding, the court cited the American Bar Association (ABA) standards for criminal justice that provide that trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy, after consulting with his client. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 53-54, 604 N.E.2d at 281; 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice §4 — 5.2 (2d ed. Supp. 1986). Ramey did not indicate how much “consulting with his client” defense counsel did in that case, but however much occurred, it was apparently not enough to persuade the defendant that his counsel’s strategy was correct. Following the supreme court’s decision in Ramey, Illinois courts of review have repeatedly reiterated how trial counsel is in total control of the case except for the decisions Ramey identified as belonging to the defendant. See, for instance, People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 310, 688 N.E.2d 1156, 1162 (1997) (“Decisions concerning which witnesses to call at trial and what evidence to present on [the] defendant’s behalf ultimately rest with trial counsel”); People v. Hamilton, 361 Ill. App. 3d 836, 847, 838 N.E.2d 160, 170 (2005) (“Generally, decisions concerning which witnesses to call and which evidence to present on a defendant’s behalf are viewed as matters of trial strategy”); People v. Patterson, 347 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1054, 808 N.E.2d 1159, 1167 (2004) (“The decision whether to call particular witnesses and the manner and extent of cross-examination are matters of trial strategy and thus will not ordinarily support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim”); People v. McKinney, 260 Ill. App. 3d 539, 546, 631 N.E.2d 1281, 1288-89 (1994) (an attorney’s decision as to how or whether to cross-examine a witness is generally a matter of trial strategy); People v. Campbell, 264 Ill. App. 3d 712, 732, 636 N.E.2d 575, 589 (1992) (trial counsel is in charge of what questions to ask prospective jurors during voir dire examination). Although, as the Ramey court stated, a defendant’s trial counsel should no doubt “consult[ ] with his client” with regard to matters of tactics and strategy (Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54, 604 N.E.2d at 281), in neither Ramey nor any of the foregoing cases (or any others I have found) is there any hint that the defendant, by stating his objection to his counsel’s actions, is thereby entitled to trump them. Yet, that is exactly what Campbell seems to hold — that a defendant’s objection to his trial counsel’s strategic decision to stipulate to some of the State’s evidence trumps counsel’s decision. Nothing about stipulation practice elevates it for special treatment. Instead, the decision whether to stipulate should be seen as merely one of several important judgments defense counsel may be called upon to make during trial. Surely, this decision is no more important than (1) the decision about how — and whether — to cross-examine a State witness; (2) the decision about which, if any, defense witnesses to call; or (3) the decision about what questions to ask the defendant should he choose to testify. And, in my judgment, the decision whether to stipulate seems rather less important than the decision about what defense to assert at defendant’s trial. Yet, all of the foregoing decisions belong exclusively to defense counsel, and his decision prevails even over the defendant’s objection. See Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 53, 604 N.E.2d at 281. Another problematic aspect of the objection prong is that its language does not specify to whom or in what form the defendant must object. For example, is it sufficient for the defendant to “object” to his defense counsel? Or, does he have to raise an objection to the trial court and on the record? Last, although Campbell appears to hold that if a defendant objects to his counsel’s decision to stipulate, his objection trumps counsel’s strategic decision, Campbell contains no requirement that either defense counsel or the trial court make the defendant aware that he possesses this power. Thus, the objection prong seems to protect only those few defendants who bring to their trial sufficient knowledge of criminal procedure to understand that they, not their counsel, have the final authority regarding stipulations. 2. The Legitimate-Trial-Tactics or Trial-Strategy Prong of the “As Long As” Clause The second prong of Campbell’s “as long as” clause provides that trial counsel’s decision to stipulate be a matter of trial tactics and strategy. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 217, 802 N.E.2d at 1213. However, Campbell did not indicate whether — and how — trial courts are supposed to address this second prong. That is, should a trial court sua sponte challenge whether counsel’s decision to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and strategy if it is not immediately apparent to the trial court why this is so? Of course, the trial court would have to raise this issue sua sponte because the prosecutor, with whom defense counsel is offering to stipulate, will not be raising it. And if it does not appear to the trial court that counsel’s decision to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and strategy, then what sort of inquiry should — or must — the court make before rejecting the stipulation? Questions of whether the conduct of defense counsel constitutes a matter of trial tactics or strategy are usually not appropriate subjects of judicial scrutiny — and with good reason. Trial courts know the charge against the defendant but generally have only a minimal understanding of the likely evidence both sides will present at trial. This is especially true at the beginning of the proceedings, when the trial court is in no position to judge whether the acceptance of an offered stipulation constitutes trial tactics or trial strategy. Perhaps the most fundamental problem with the legitimate-trial-tactics or trial-strategy prong is this: Trial courts never ask, should not ask, and cannot know what defense counsel’s trial strategy is going to be. However, to determine whether a stipulation represents a matter of legitimate trial strategy, the court may be forced at some point to ask defense counsel for an explanation unless the circumstances at trial made the reasons for the stipulation obvious. And, if the court determines it must do so, should it ask defense counsel on the record? Further, if the court does so inquire and if the prosecutor cannot be present (as seems obvious), then does not the discussion constitute an otherwise improper ex parte conversation? The only situation I am familiar with in which trial and reviewing courts are called upon to evaluate the reasonableness of a defense counsel’s trial tactics or trial strategy is if the defendant raises the issue (either in the trial court after conviction, on direct appeal, or in a postconviction petition) of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, under these circumstances, the defendant has waived his right to the attorney-client privilege, and either party to the proceedings can call defendant’s trial counsel to testify regarding what he did and why he did it at defendant’s trial. See People v. O’Banner, 215 Ill. App. 3d 778, 793, 575 N.E.2d 1261, 1270 (1991). And, of course, the case is over, not still being litigated. When a defendant raises an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal, many courts have often declined to resolve that issue, directing the defendant, instead, to file a postconviction petition, so that a record can be made regarding the subject of trial counsel’s handling of the case. Courts so holding have explained that they wish to avoid speculating from a silent record. See People v. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d 708, 726, 550 N.E.2d 284, 296 (1990) (claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are often better made in proceedings on a petition for postconviction relief, where a complete record can be made); see also People v. Durgan, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1141-42, 806 N.E.2d 1233, 1249-50 (2004) (reaffirming Kunze and declining to address on direct appeal trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress certain evidence); People v. Cameron, 336 Ill. App. 3d 548, 552, 784 N.E.2d 438, 441 (2003) (reaffirming Kunze and declining to address on direct appeal whether trial counsel’s failure to request a certain jury instruction constituted ineffective assistance); In re Carmody, 274 Ill. App. 3d 46, 56, 653 N.E.2d 977, 984 (1995) (noting that the record on direct appeal of a criminal case rarely contains any explanation of the tactics of trial counsel and holding that, if those tactics are to be the subject of scrutiny, a record should be developed in which they can effectively be reviewed). Yet, in a stipulation context, when nothing appears in the trial record to explain defense counsel’s decision to stipulate, complying with the second prong of the “as long as” clause will require reviewing courts to speculate regarding what motivated trial counsel to stipulate. Those courts must somehow further decide whether, under the circumstances of the case, counsel’s decision was a matter of trial strategy or trial tactics. D. Stipulations Epilogue I have discussed Campbell and its progeny at some length as I respectfully suggest that the supreme court revisit the “as long as” clause. In the few years since Campbell was decided, many opinions have been issued addressing the matter of defense counsel’s stipulation at trial in the absence of (1) an objection by the defendant and (2) any admonition by the trial court to the defendant concerning the stipulation. This large number of opinions on a particular point of law in such a short time comes as no surprise, given that stipulations occur with great frequency in criminal trials. Because of this frequency, the criminal trial bench and bar need a bright-line rule on counsel’s authority to enter into stipulations. They need to know whether — like the decisions about what defense to present or which witnesses to call — the power to decide whether to stipulate resides solely in defense counsel. Or whether, like the decision whether to waive a jury trial or to testify, the decision to stipulate lies solely with the defendant personally. The new approach of Campbell’s “as long as” clause does not provide the criminal trial bench and bar the guidance they need. I would prefer for the supreme court to decide that the decision to stipulate belongs to defense counsel without caveats. However, if the supreme court concludes otherwise, so be it. At least then the criminal bench and bar would know that whenever a stipulation is proposed at trial, the trial court needs to suspend the proceedings, admonish the defendant personally on the record about his right not to agree to the stipulation, and then (assuming the defendant agrees) make a finding that the defendant has intelligently and knowingly waived his right to object to the proposed stipulation.