Court Opinion

ID: 9911203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 18:02:32.248072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:31.906494
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/19/23 P. v. Whitlatch CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

THE PEOPLE,                                                                                  C096642

                   Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. No. STK-CR-FE-
                                                                                     2019-0003141)
         v.

ANDREW WHITLATCH,

                   Defendant and Appellant.

                                          SUMMARY OF THE APPEAL
         In August 2018, when he was 16 years old, the defendant Andrew Whitlatch
participated in a carjacking with another juvenile, K.N. During the carjacking, K.N.
fatally shot the victim. The defendant had supplied K.N. with the gun.

                                                             1
       The People filed a wardship petition in juvenile court. Following a Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707 hearing, the juvenile court transferred the defendant to the
jurisdiction of the criminal court. A jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree
murder and carjacking.
       On appeal, the defendant makes two arguments.
       First, the defendant argues that we must remand the case for a new Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707 hearing due to ameliorative amendments made to the law
during the pendency of this action. The People agree and remand on this point is
required.
       Second, the defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to show he
demonstrated a reckless indifference to human life that was necessary to convict him of
first-degree murder under the theory argued by the People below. We affirm this finding.

                       FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

       Facts

       On August 15, 2018, J.D. worked at a Panda Express located in Stockton,
California. He finished work at 1:46 a.m.
       Videos taken from the area around the Panda Express show what happened in the
next four minutes. First, J.D. approached his car, a gold Honda Accord. K.N., a juvenile,
then approached J.D., pointing a gun. K.N. and the victim walked around the parking lot
in the area of the car for a short time, then, after a little over a minute and a half, the
defendant, then aged 16, walked into the view of the camera. J.D. looked like he was
trying to leave and get away from K.N. and the defendant, and at one point, he flinched
as if he had been hit in the head. Both K.N. and the defendant appeared to be blocking
J.D.’s attempts to leave. Then, while both K.N. and the defendant were standing close to
J.D., J.D. collapsed to the ground, and he remained motionless for the remainder of the
video. The defendant then could no longer be seen in the videos, his actions perhaps

                                                2
blocked from view by a column. K.N. took something from J.D.’s pocket, probably keys
to J.D.’s car, got in the car and drove off. Police officers arrived at the scene shortly
before the videos end.
       The defendant later told detectives he supplied K.N. with the gun that was used in
the carjacking.
       The officers who arrived at the area of the Panda Express found J.D. lying on the
ground, unresponsive, not breathing, a pool of blood around his head, and a gunshot
wound to his head. J.D. was transported to the hospital and pronounced dead, his death
caused by a gunshot wound to his head. Officers found an expended .38 caliber (or .57
caliber) bullet in the area near the restaurant.
       An officer with the Stockton Police Department later investigated the license plate
number of the stolen car through a plate-reader system and learned the car had been
scanned by readers four times between 3:05 and 4:36 a.m. in Sacramento.
       At around 6:20 a.m., in Sacramento, officers patrolling an area in south
Sacramento heard the sound of tires screeching and found the Honda crashed into a tree.
The defendant had been doings “donuts” with the car in a parking lot when it crashed.
       Officers arrested three people who had gotten out of the car, including the
defendant, who had run from the area of the crash. They also detained a fourth person
who appeared to have been on a bicycle. The other detained individuals included K.N.,
V.R., and R.W.
       The defendant’s backpack contained a gun holster. V.R.’s backpack contained a
black Ruger LCR Revolver. A plastic baggie containing five live Speer .38 special
bullets was found in the center console of the car.
       The Stockton Police Department asked the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department to
help to arrange interview rooms for the four people who had been arrested or detained.
Members of the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department took the four to an interview facility
and placed each in a separate interview room. It was possible for people outside the

                                               3
rooms to hear people in the rooms if they were yelling. The rooms were “monitored” and
“recorded.”
       After leaving the Sacramento Sheriff’s Office, and before they were booked at the
Stockton Police Department, Stockton police officers took K.N. and the defendant to the
hospital to have them medically cleared. An officer overheard K.N. say that he had held
J.D. up at gunpoint for about 15 minutes while they argued about the victim giving up his
car. K.N. said he shot J.D. when J.D. said the gun was not real. K.N. then mimicked
how the victim fell.

       Statements by the Defendant

       The recording made of the detained parties speaking to each other and the
interview between the defendant and detectives are of particular interest here.

       Recorded Conversation with K.N. and Witnesses

       Conversations the defendant, K.N., V.R., and R.W. had among themselves as they
sat in separate interview rooms at the Sacramento Sheriff’s Station were recorded.
       During the conversations, the defendant told the others the homicide had been
recorded on video and defendant said the gun was his.
       K.N. said his prints would be found on the gun and ammunition when the
detectives examined those items for prints.
       When V.R. asked what a homicide is, the defendant answered, “a homicide is a
murder.” K.N. said, “[b]asically we just killed him and left him there on the scene.” The
defendant said, “[t]hat nigga was DOA.”
       The defendant said, “I told you, bruh, just let me do it, bruh, and you did not
listen.”
       The defendant said, “[f]uck, bruh, we should not have killed that nigga, bruh.” He
said, “we didn’t need to kill that nigga, bruh?” He said, “I told you, bruh. You should
have just came when I told you to come, bruh.”

                                              4
       K.N. said, “after I pistol whipped him, I shoulda’ never shot him.” The defendant
responded, “[b]ruh, I thought that nigga was still alive, bruh.” K.N. responded, “Cuddy,
he’s not. I’m sorry to say, but he’s not.” The defendant said, “I think that bruh is still
alive, bruh.” K.N. said, “I shot him in his head.”
       The defendant and K.N. acknowledged seeing the cameras and looking at them
while the crime was happening. V.R. asked, “[w]hat the fuck did y’all think was gonna
happen then?” The defendant responded, “[w]e thought that nigga was just gonna give us
the car keys.” He said, “[t]hat nigga wouldn’t give us the car keys. What you mean,
what happened after that? [¶] . . . (Unintelligible) started trying to walk around and shit
over that little ass fuckin’ Honda that he woulda’ got back.” K.N. said, “[h]e just kept
tryin’ to fuckin’ walk away and I’m like bruh, just gimme the keys, bro. He woulda’ told
em about our faces and we would have been on camera anyway and they would’ve
started lookin’ for us.”
       The defendant asked, “[m]an, bruh, why’d you have to (unintelligible) him, bruh?
You could have hit him in the leg or somethin’. What happened to like, if he don’t give it
up, I’ma leg shot him? Remember that?” When K.N. asked, “[h]uh?” the defendant
added, “Remember what we agreed on, nigga? We agreed if somebody don’t give it up,
nigga, we just gonna shoot them in the leg, nigga.” K.N. responded, “I forgot, cuddy.”
The defendant asked, “[s]o, you just knocked that nigga’s helmet off?” K.N. responded,
“Cuddy, I forgot.”

       Detective Interview

       Two detectives interviewed the defendant.
       During the interview, the defendant said he only recently met K.N. and just knew
him as “K.”

                                              5
       Initially, when asked why he thought he was being interviewed, the defendant said
he was doing donuts and crashed into a tree. At first, the defendant said he did not know
whose car it was.
       The defendant said he had read on a computer monitor while detained that the
homicide unit was coming from Stockton.
       The defendant said, “I didn’t kill nobody.”
       After a bit, the detectives asked the defendant if he knew anything about the car
getting stolen. The defendant said, “I didn’t have nothin’ to do with it. And I did not
even want that person to get shot for it. Like, I really honestly did not want that person to
get shot over a car. [¶] . . . [¶] That was uncalled for.”
       The defendant characterized the situation as escalating because J.D. refused to
hand over the keys to the car. The defendant said, “I just remember just tellin’ him just
like, ‘Leave it alone, bro. Just stop.’ I’m like, ‘He’s done, bro. Don’t – he’s not fittin’ to
give us the car. Come on.’ And then, I left – I started leavin’. And then, I look back and
I see the cop goin’ this way.” The defendant said, “[r]ight when I see the cop go this
way, I heard, ‘Pop!’ And I looked – and I looked. I just took off runnin’.”
       The defendant suggested that at one point he tried to walk away from the conflict,
but he returned to try to “calm” things down by trying to persuade J.D. to give up the
keys to the car, “you seen me on the camera. ‘Cause I was walkin’ away. I walked back.
. . . And I tell him like, ‘Come on, bruh. Just give us the keys, bruh.’ Like, I’m trying to
calm him down. Like, ‘Come on bruh, just give us the keys, bruh.’ He’s not trying to
give us the keys. And then . . . he got pistol whipped. And he still didn’t wanna give us
the keys. So, I’m like, ‘all right, fuck it. Come on.’ ”
       The defendant said the victim had been crying and saying, “ ‘Don’t do this. Please
don’t do this.’ ” The defendant tried to take the keys by grabbing a lanyard around J.D.’s
neck. But he did not obtain the keys.

                                              6
       The defendant told the detectives that before the fatal shooting, he was moving to
leave. He said, “[a]nd then, you see me start leavin’ on the camera. And then, I – I
turned around and come back. And then, I turned around ‘cause I seen the police. And
then, that’s when I tried to tell him somethin’, but . . .”
       The defendant said when he saw the police, he was ready to start running, and the
victim was already bleeding from the face. He thought K.N. was going to come behind
him. But, according to the defendant, then he heard someone say, “ ‘Ah! Ah! Ah! Oh,
yeah, get in’ ” the car.
       The defendant repeated he was trying to get away from everything when he heard
the gunshot. According to the defendant, when he saw the police, he began to run, then
he heard a gunshot. Then he looked back and saw the victim on the ground and kept
running. Then, K.N. picked the defendant up in the car.

       Procedural Background

               Proceedings in the Juvenile Court

       The People filed a wardship petition in juvenile court that alleged defendant
committed murder (Pen. Code, § 187); attempted second-degree robbery (Pen. Code.,
§§ 211 & 664); and carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)). The People also alleged
that the principal was armed with a handgun as contemplated by Penal Code section
12022, subdivision (a)(1), during the commission of the alleged offenses. In the petition,
the People made a request for a transfer hearing to determine whether the defendant
should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707. The juvenile court granted the request for transfer on
March 5, 2019.
       In considering the request for transfer, the juvenile court stated it was the burden
of the People to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there should be a transfer
of jurisdiction to the criminal court. In addition to other evidence, in making its ruling,

                                               7
the juvenile court considered the testimony of a forensic psychologist called by the
defendant, the defendant’s prior history of delinquency, the defendant’s record of
incidents while in juvenile custody before, and the defendant’s prior performance in
juvenile justice rehabilitation and drug treatment programs.
         The juvenile court considered five criteria identified in Welfare and Institutions
Code section 707, subdivision (a)(3), subparts (A)-(E), and found that the People had
sustained their burden on four of the five criteria. In analyzing the criteria, the juvenile
court considered each of the factors identified by the statute for consideration in the
evaluation of each criteria. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
         Specifically, the juvenile court found the People had sustained their burden as to
the first criterion, which looks to “the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the
minor.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).) In finding the People had
satisfied their burden on this factor, the juvenile court wrote, “the court finds that [the
defendant’s] degree of criminal sophistication has increased over time, and that in the
spectrum of the hundreds of [minors] that have appeared before this court, he is in the
upper range. Instead of rehabilitating through the services offered to him over the past
three or four years, [the defendant] has grown more criminally sophisticated during that
time.”
         The juvenile court found the People had sustained their burden on the second
criterion, which requires the court to consider “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated
prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” In considering this criterion,
the court noted the forensic psychologist retained by the defendant had opined that the
defendant had the ability to mature. The court said it agreed with the psychologist that
the defendant’s frontal cortex would continue to develop until he was 25 and that,
consequently, “his abilities to make sound decisions and comprehend future
consequences can improve.” The juvenile court also stated that it believed that if the
defendant was committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice “and engaged, really

                                               8
engaged, in the Division’s evidenced-based programming, he might rehabilitate and
become law abiding. . . . The problem, however, is that there is no evidence that [the
defendant] will engage in those services.”
       The juvenile court continued, “[b]ased on the evidence presented, the court
questions whether [the defendant] could be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction even if he engaged in the rehabilitative services offered. The
more pressing question is whether [the defendant] will engage in any of the services that
would be provided to him through the juvenile court system, which includes [the Division
of Juvenile Justice]. Unfortunately [the defendant] has a history of fighting against the
juvenile court’s efforts to rehabilitate him, and he lives his life the way he wants to. He
has repeatedly and consistently shunned the help of the probation department, group
homes, law enforcement, his social worker and the judges in the dependency and
delinquency courts. Accordingly, the court projects that [the defendant] would not
meaningfully engage in treatment provided by the juvenile court and, thus by logical
extension, there is not enough time within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to rehabilitate
him. The court finds that there is no evidence or reason to believe that [the defendant]
would engage in rehabilitation services offered to him.” (Fns. omitted.) The court noted
that the defendant had reported that he had attended treatment programs in three group
homes and had claimed they were, “ ‘a bunch of nonsense.’ ”
       The juvenile court found that the People had not sustained their burden on the
third criterion, the “minor’s previous delinquent history.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707,
subd. (a)(3)(C).) However, in reaching this finding the juvenile court did consider
incident reports covering the defendant’s behavior during six periods in juvenile hall.
The court noted the portion of those incidents it identified in its ruling, “reflects [the
defendant’s] growing disdain for authority and his disregard for the rights and feelings of
others. His record of incidents in the Hall is the longest this court has seen.”

                                               9
       The juvenile court found that the People had sustained their burden on the fourth
criterion, which looks to the “ ‘[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate the minor.’ ” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(D).) The court wrote,
“[t]he success of the dependency and delinquency courts’ attempts to rehabilitate [the
defendant] have been an utter failure to date, but that is neither due to a lack of effort by
either court nor the adequacy of services provided him. Unfortunately the old adage that
‘you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink’ applies to this situation.” The
court found the defendant “has refused to take advantage of the court’s efforts to
rehabilitate him and get him back to his mother. . . . Some minors . . . have to be placed
at several group homes before the ‘right fit’ is found, but many nevertheless complete
their treatment. Sadly for [the defendant] and the people he has impacted, [the defendant]
has squandered multiple opportunities to rehabilitate.”
       The juvenile court found that the People had sustained their burden on the fifth
criterion regarding the “ ‘circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition
to have been committed by the minor.’ ” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3)(E).)
       In summarizing its findings, the juvenile court stated the defendant’s “criminal
sophistication has deepened over time, and he has repeatedly failed to comply with court
orders and has resisted all court efforts to rehabilitate him. As such, his unwillingness to
rehabilitate is a strong indicator that he would not rehabilitate under juvenile court
supervision, including” if he is at the Division of Juvenile Justice. It added, “[h]is disdain
for authority has grown over the years, and he has misbehaved on a consistent basis while
in a custodial setting. His delinquent history, when combined with other factors, leads
[us] to conclude [the defendant] is not likely to reform under juvenile court services.”
The juvenile court concluded, “[a]fter careful consideration of the evidence and foregoing
criteria and factors, the court finds that [the People have] established by a preponderance
of the evidence that [the defendant] is not a suitable candidate for treatment under the
juvenile court system.”

                                              10
       Proceedings in the Criminal Court

       The People filed an information on March 9, 2021, that charged the defendant
with three counts. On the People’s motion, the trial court later dismissed the second
count, and the People filed an amended information realleging the first and third counts.
The first remaining count charged the defendant with willfully, intentionally, and with
malice aforethought murdering J.D. under Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a). The
second remaining count accused the defendant of the carjacking of J.D. under Penal Code
section 215, subdivision (a). Both counts included enhancement allegations that the
principal in the commission of the offense was armed with a firearm as contemplated by
Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). Both counts also alleged that the
defendant was 16 years old or older at the time of the offense as contemplated by Welfare
and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d)(1).
       The jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and carjacking. On
both counts, the jury found true that the principal in the offense was armed with a firearm
as contemplated by Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).
       The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
       On July 18, 2022, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 25 years to life on the
murder conviction. The trial court stayed the enhancement punishment on the murder
conviction under Penal Code section 654. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a
determinate low term of three years for the carjacking, with a one-year enhancement for
the Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (a)(1) finding, for a total of four years on the
carjacking offense. The court also set fines at $10,000 under Penal Code section 1202.4
and at $10,000 under Penal Code section 1202.45.
       The defendant filed a notice of appeal on July 21, 2022.

                                            11
                                        DISCUSSION

                                               I

              Impact of Changes to the Statute Governing Transfer Hearings

       The defendant contends, and the People concede, that amendments to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707 adopted by the passage of Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess., Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1) (Assembly Bill 2361) apply retroactively, and
remand is necessary so the juvenile court may conduct a new transfer hearing under a
newly heightened standard. We must agree.

       A.     Amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code Section 707

       Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivisions (a)(1), allows prosecutors
to move to have a minor that is 16 years or older transferred from the jurisdiction of a
juvenile court to criminal court when the minor is alleged to have committed one of a list
of criminal offenses. The enumerated offenses include murder and carjacking. (Id. at
subd. (b)(1) & (25).) Once the prosecutor makes a motion, the court must order the
probation officer to submit a report on the behavioral patterns and social history of the
minor. (Id. at subd. (a)(1).)
       After the probation officer report is submitted and the court considers “any other
relevant evidence . . . the minor may wish to submit” the juvenile court must make its
decision. (Welf. and Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).) In making its decision, the court
must consider the five specified criteria the juvenile court considered in this action: (1)
the “degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor”; (2) “[w]hether the minor
can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”; (3) the
minor’s prior delinquent history; (4) the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile
court to rehabilitate the minor”; and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense
alleged in the petition to have been committed by the minor.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3).) If the

                                              12
juvenile court orders a transfer of jurisdiction to criminal court, “the court shall recite the
basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes.”
       At the time of defendant’s transfer hearing, the governing law and the
corresponding rule of court required a petitioning prosecutor to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that “the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal
jurisdiction.” (Former § 707, subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1012, § 1; Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a).)
       Effective January 1, 2023, with Assembly Bill 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), the
Legislature amended section 707, adding the following language: “In order to find that
the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by
clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3), as
amended by Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1, italics added.) It also added a requirement that the
juvenile court’s recitation of its basis for transferring a case to criminal court, “shall
include the reasons supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Ibid.)
       We note three ways the amendments changed the operation of Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707.
       First, the amendments raised the prosecution’s burden from a preponderance of the
evidence to clear and convincing evidence. (In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277,
1284; In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.) “ ‘The standard of proof known as
clear and convincing evidence demands a degree of certainty greater than that involved
with the preponderance standard, but less than what is required by the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998 []; see
also Evid. Code, § 115.) ‘ “Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high
probability.’ (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919 [], superseded by statute on
another issue as stated in In re Cody W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 221, 229–230 []; accord,

                                              13
Judicial Council of Cal., Civ. Jury Instns. (2023) CACI No. 201.) Courts have also
described the standard ‘as requiring that the evidence be “ ‘so clear as to leave no
substantial doubt’; ‘sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every
reasonable mind.’ ” ’ (In re Angelia P., at p. 919.)” (In re S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1286.)
       “Second, under the previous version whether the minor is amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was one of five factors for
the court to consider in determining whether the case should be transferred to criminal
court. The amendment states it as the ultimate question for the court to decide.
Nevertheless, in deciding that question, the amendment requires the court to consider the
same five factors listed in the previous version.” (In re E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 416; see also In re S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286.) Among other things, this
changed focus to rehabilitation “means courts must take care not to place too much
weight on the probation officer’s ‘report on the behavioral patterns and social history of
the minor.’ ([Welf. & Inst. Code,] § 707, subd. (a)(1).)” (In re S.S., supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1287.)
       Third, “the previous version required that if the juvenile court orders a transfer, it
shall recite the basis for its decision in the order. The amended statute requires the court
to not only recite the basis for its decision, but also the reasons supporting the court’s
finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.” (In re E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 416.)

       B.     Retroactivity

       We agree with both parties that the amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 707 apply retroactively to this case. As another panel of this court explained in In
re S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pages 1288-1289, the amendments contained in
Assembly Bill 2361 have “similar ameliorative effects to amendments made to section

                                              14
707 by Proposition 57,” which the voters passed in 2016, and “which prohibited
prosecutors from charging juveniles with crimes directly in a court of criminal
jurisdiction and gave the prosecution the burden of proof at transfer hearings. ([Welf. &
Inst. Code,] § 707, former subd. (a)(1), as amended by Prop. 57 (Nov. 9, 2016) § 4.2;
Evid. Code, § 500; see People v. Superior Court (Lara)[ (2018)] 4 Cal.5th [299,] 303.)
Our Supreme Court held those amendments applied retroactively because they effectively
reduced the possible punishment for juveniles: ‘[t]he possibility of being treated as a
juvenile in juvenile court—where rehabilitation is the goal—rather than being tried and
sentenced as an adult can result in dramatically different and more lenient treatment.’
(Lara, at p. 303; see In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 []; People v. Francis (1969)
71 Cal.2d 66 [].) . . . Accordingly, we conclude the current version of [Welfare and
Institutions Code] section 707 applies retroactively to minor’s case, which is not yet final.
(See People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 45 [] [presumption of retroactivity
‘ “ ‘applies to any such proceeding which, at the time of the supervening legislation, has
not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it’ ” ’].)”

       C.     Necessity of Remand on this Record

       Here, “[t]he juvenile court expressly applied the former preponderance of the
evidence standard and directed its analysis to whether minor was ‘fit for juvenile court,’
not whether minor is ‘amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.’ Though it applied the law in effect at the time, the juvenile court violated
the . . . current version of section 707.” (In re S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 1289.)
Thus, under the retroactively applied amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 707, the juvenile court erred in how it reached its order to transfer the defendant
to the jurisdiction of the criminal court. (See ibid. [“We also agree with the parties that,
applying the amendments to section 707 retroactively, the juvenile court erred in ordering
minor’s transfer”].)

                                              15
       The defendant argues, and the People agree, that considering this error, we must
remand this case for a new transfer hearing in the juvenile court. Under the guidance of
our Supreme Court’s decision in In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 712-716, we agree.
       At issue in In re F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at page 704, was the application of
Welfare and Institutions Code section 702, which requires that when a minor has been
found to have committed a wobbler offense “the court shall declare the offense to be a
misdemeanor or felony.” In In re F.M., the juvenile court had not complied with this
statutory mandate. (Id. at p. 705.) In remanding the case for reconsideration, our
Supreme Court held that an error under Welfare and Institutions Code section 702
“requires remand unless the record as a whole demonstrates that the juvenile court ‘was
aware of, and exercised its discretion’ as to wobblers.” (In re F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 705.) In so doing, the Court distinguished the juvenile court’s error from those at issue
in cases that had applied the standard articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836, “[t]hat a ‘miscarriage of justice’ should be declared” and a reconsideration on
remand required “only when the court, ‘after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence,’ is of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a result
more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the
error.” (See In re F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 714-715.)
       First, the court observed that the cases the People had cited to support the use of
the Watson standard involved the sentencing of adults. (In re F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 715.) This distinction was not insignificant, as the Court had previously noted that
Welfare and Institutions Code section 702’s requirement that the court affirmatively
declare the nature of the offense served the critical role of showing the juvenile court was
“aware of, and actually exercises, its discretion.” (In re F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) The court had noted the awareness and exercise of this discretion comported
with the specific functions of the juvenile court to protect the public and the minors under
its jurisdiction, to preserve family ties when possible, and “ ‘to secure for the minor

                                              16
custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have
been given by his or her parents’ ([Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a)]).” (In re F.M.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 708.) The Court noted that statutes applicable in the juvenile court
context must be liberally construed to carry out these purposes. (Ibid.; see also Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (a).)
       Second, the Court observed that applying a Watson standard “does not address the
risk of courts misapprehending the extent of their lawful authority in this particular
context.” (In re F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 716.)
       Finally, the Court reasoned, “there is a practical difference in assessing the effect
of an error when the court has not articulated whether a discretionary decision was made
in the first place, as compared to when there were errors in a decision the court actually
rendered. In the latter scenario, we may decline to remand because the record reflects
aggravating circumstances so numerous that it would be ‘inconceivable’ that the trial
court would ‘impose a different sentence’ absent the error. [Citation.] By contrast,
where the concern is that no discretionary decision was made, attempting to discern the
likelihood of a ‘more favorable’ decision is a more speculative inquiry. Instead of
hypothesizing what decision the juvenile court would have made if it had understood the
extent of its lawful authority, reviewing courts have consistently held that remand is
appropriate in these circumstances. [Citation.]” (In re F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 716.)
       Here too, we are considering the application of a statute applicable in juvenile
courts to minor defendants. Thus, we are cognizant that our assessment of “the risk of
courts misapprehending the extent of their lawful authority” in conducting a Welfare and
Institutions Code section 707 hearing are informed by the same general policies that
governed the Court’s consideration of whether to remand the matter in In re F.M., supra,
14 Cal.5th at page 716. Additionally, while here the record does reflect that the juvenile
court did make a decision on the request, it did so under a version of the statute that had
both a different focus and a lighter burden on the prosecutor. Trying to discern how the

                                             17
juvenile court would have ruled under its current lawful authority would require
speculation. In this circumstance, we find the better course would be to remand the
matter to the juvenile court to consider this matter under the current statutory scheme.

                                             II

                        Substantial Evidence Supports the Verdict

       In a second argument, the defendant argues that his first-degree murder conviction
must be reversed because there is insufficient evidence that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life.

       A.     Further Procedural Background

       The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 540B. regarding when a defendant
can be found guilty of first-degree felony murder when a coparticipant in a crime has
committed the act resulting in the victim’s death. The instruction states that “[a] person
acts with reckless indifference to human life when he knowingly engages in criminal
activity that he knows involves a grave risk of death.” The instruction also provides a list
of factors the jury could consider in determining if the defendant acted with reckless
indifference towards human life including if the defendant knew a lethal weapon would
be present, if the defendant knew the weapon was likely to be used, if the defendant was
near the person killed when the killing occurred, if the defendant had an opportunity to
stop the killing or help the victim, the length of the crime, if the defendant knew of
anything that might make the coparticipant likely to kill, and if the defendant did
anything to minimize the possibility of violence.
       The instruction stated that no one of the factors “is necessary, nor is any one of
them necessarily enough, to determine whether the defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life.”
       The prosecutor relied on the felony murder theories articulated in this instruction
in making their closing argument for finding the defendant guilty on the murder charge.

                                             18
They said they did not need to prove that the defendant intended for J.D. to be killed.
The prosecutor argued, “[i]t doesn’t matter that he says throughout the interview” with
detectives that he “didn’t want the victim to die. What we’re saying here is that he knew
that at the carjacking . . . by telling a 13-year-old to shoot a person in the leg”
demonstrated “such [a] reckless indifference to human life that . . . he’s liable for
murder.”

       B.       Standard of Review

       This court’s role in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is limited.
(People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738.) When considering a claim of insufficient
evidence, we examine the entire record to assess whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Zamudio (2008)
43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Thus, “we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury
could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even
testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a
judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we
look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient
evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

       C.       First-Degree Murder When Showing Reckless Indifference as a
Coparticipant

       Murder is the unlawful killing of another human being with malice aforethought.
(Pen Code, § 187, subd. (a).) A murder that is committed during the perpetration of a
carjacking is murder in the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 188, subd. (a).) A participant in a

                                              19
carjacking who is not the actual killer may be liable if they were a “major participant in”
the carjacking “and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (Pen Code, § 189, subd. (e)(3).) Penal Code section
190.2, subdivision (d), refers to a person who, “with reckless indifference to human life
and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or
assists in the commission of” an enumerated felony, which can be carjacking, “which
results in the death of some person or persons.” (See also Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)(L).)
       “Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective element.
([People v.] Clark[ (2016)] 63 Cal.4th [522,] 617.) As to the subjective element, ‘[t]he
defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the
particular offense is committed,’ and he or she must consciously disregard ‘the
significant risk of death his or her actions create.’ ([People v.] Banks[ (2015)] 61 Cal.4th
[788,] 801; see Clark, at p. 617.) As to the objective element, ‘ “[t]he risk [of death]
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor’s situation.” ’ (Clark, at p. 617, quoting Model Pen. Code, § 2.02, subd. (2)(c).)
‘Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any [violent felony]
is insufficient’ to establish reckless indifference to human life; ‘only knowingly creating
a “grave risk of death” ’ satisfies the statutory requirement. (Banks, at p. 808.) Notably,
‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an armed robbery could anticipate lethal force might
be used’ is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life. (Ibid.; see
Clark, at p. 623.)” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677; see also In re Bennett
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1022.)
       In People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pages 618-623, our Supreme Court
identified five “case-specific factors that this court and other state appellate courts have

                                              20
considered in upholding a determination of reckless indifference to human life in cases
involving nonshooter aiders and abettors to commercial armed robbery felony murders.”
(Clark, at p. 618.) The five factors included (1) the defendant’s knowledge of weapons
and the use and number of weapons, (2) the defendant’s physical presence at the crime
and opportunities the defendant had to restrain the crime or aid the victim, (3) the
duration of the felony, (4) the defendant’s knowledge of the cohort’s likelihood of killing,
and (5) the defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of violence during the felony. (Id. at
pp. 618-623; see also In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
       The Clark court stressed that, “ ‘[n]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor
is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’ (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)” (People
v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Thus, “the mere fact of a defendant’s awareness
that a gun will be used in the felony is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to
human life.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.)

       D.     Application to these Facts

       Here, the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant consciously
disregarded the significant risk of death his actions created: he supplied K.N. a gun, and
he blocked J.D. from efforts to get away from the scene while K.N. aimed a gun at J.D.
       In advancing his argument, the defendant points to the discussions about having
plans to shoot a victim in the leg if needed to secure the car and observes the defendant
may have lacked the adult sophistication to appreciate that shooting someone in the leg
could be lethal. But that discussion also demonstrates the defendant appreciated that the
gun might be used. Indeed, it suggests that preliminary discussions between K.N. and the
defendant did not anticipate the two parties would back off if a potential victim would not
give up a car. Instead, they contemplated engaging the use of a firearm.
       Similarly, the defendant’s statements that he knew he should have tried to carry
out the carjacking instead of K.N. demonstrates an appreciation of the risk of equipping

                                              21
his younger coparticipant with a loaded gun. Finally, contrary to the defendant’s
representations to detectives, the video reveals that when J.D. was shot, the defendant
was not well-engaged in the process of attempting to leave the scene and stop the
violence. He remained near the victim when K.N. made the fatal shot.
       Sufficient evidence also supports a finding that the defendant objectively should
have been aware of the risks involved in this carjacking, particularly as it progressed and
continued to escalate. “Proximity to the murder and the events leading up to it may be
particularly significant where . . . the murder is a culmination or a foreseeable result of
several intermediate steps, or where the participant who personally commits the murder
exhibits behavior tending to suggest a willingness to use lethal force. In such cases, ‘the
defendant’s presence allows him to observe his cohorts so that it is fair to conclude that
he shared in their actions and mental state. . . . [Moreover,] the defendant’s presence
gives him an opportunity to act as a restraining influence on murderous cohorts. If the
defendant fails to act as a restraining influence, then the defendant is arguably more at
fault for the resulting murders.’ (McCord, State Death Sentencing for Felony Murder
Accomplices under the Emnund and Tison Standards (2000) 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 843, 873
(hereafter State Death Sentencing)).” (People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.)
       The defendant saw K.N. pistol whip J.D. By the defendant’s account, J.D. was
begging the parties to stop. He was sufficiently involved in the actual carjacking to know
it was escalating and the video suggests he took no meaningful actions to stop the crime.
Thus, the evidence demonstrated that, in this situation, the risk was of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the defendant’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involved a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the defendant’s situation.

                                             22
                                        DISPOSITION
       The judgment is conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile
court to conduct a Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 hearing pursuant to current
law. If the matter is transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the criminal court is
directed to reinstate the verdict and the sentence already imposed.

                                                   HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

RENNER, J.

KEITHLEY, J.

 Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                              23