Court Opinion

ID: 9530040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:56:35.485456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:59.053268
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE BARRY, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: The majority opinion, I believe is correct in deciding that the denial of the plaintiff’s motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion. Unquestionably, a telephone call on the morning of trial, after the prospective jurors have been assembled, is not the appropriate time or manner for requesting a continuance. However, I firmly believe that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to vacate. There is no doubt the trial court has the discretion to set aside any final order or judgment if so requested by a motion filed within 30 days after the entry thereof. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 50(5).) Moreover, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not interfere with the decision of the trial court. (Sarro v. Illinois Mutual Fire Insurance Co. (2d Dist. 1962), 34 Ill. App. 2d 270, 181 N.E.2d 187. See also Dienthal v. Branovacki (1st Dist. 1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 726, 320 N.E.2d 177.) But this does not mean that the appellate court is to give blanket approval to any and every such decision by the trial cotut. Recently, this court decided Ingersoll Aluminum Products Co. v. Busse (3d Dist. 1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 364 N.E.2d 1001. In that case, we found no abuse of discretion in vacating a default judgment even though the delaying tactics employed by the defendant in that case, and which resulted in the default, were a much more blatant disregard for the rules of the court than occurred in this case. Nevertheless, I specially concurred in Ingersoll because “the expenditure of court costs and attorney’s fees is not sufficient hardship to warrant denying the defendant-garnishee its day in court.” I believe that principal should be applied in this case to give the plaintiff his day in court. By comparing Ingersoll and the majority opinion in this case, it appears that this court would make the trial court’s decisions, in effect, unappealable by reason of an automatic affirmance. In this case, if the plaintiff is to be believed, and the defendants have not contradicted his story, the delay was caused by powers beyond the control of the plaintiff. In spite of the plaintiff’s attorney’s uncontradicted explanation in the verified motion to vacate, the majority makes an assumption which is not supported by the record. The majority indicates that, when discussing the situation with the trial judge on July 2,1976, the plaintiff’s counsel “knew that his client was in the country of Iraq and would not be present for trial on July 6,1976, yet he made the equivocal statement that he did not believe that his client would be present at trial.” There is no evidence that the plaintiff’s attorney knew his client could not return from Iraq on time and the plaintiff s verified motion to vacate states that the plaintiff, prior to his return on July 9,1976, made several attempts to return to the United States, but was unable to obtain permission from the government of Iraq to return to the United States until July 8, 1976. The exact contents of the telephone conversations between the plaintiff s attorney and the trial court was not disclosed by the record. Nevertheless, it appears the plaintiff was trying to return from Iraq, and a more valid inference from the conduct of the plaintiff’s attorney is that he was hopeful of the plaintiff returning in time for trial but could not be positive. This inference is supported by the fact that the record does not disclose any other continuance being requested by any of the parties, nor any delaying tactics being utilized. Furthermore, the plaintiff proceeded to take discovery depositions, submitted to being deposed by the defendants and participated in the pretrial conference. Not only do these actions suggest a strong interest in pursuing the case, but are inconsistent with the contrary inference. As a result, I believe that the plaintiff was trying to return from Iraq, that his attorney was unable to predict whether he would be able to leave Iraq on time, and that, contrary to fallacious assumption of the majority, the plaintiff s attorney did not “know” on July 2, 1976, that his client would not be present in the courtroom on the trial date. The majority appears to be justifying the denial of the motion to vacate by stating that the denial of the motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion, even though the tests for the determination of whether an abuse of discretion occurred in each instance is different. In addition, the defendants mistakenly argue that a dismissal order is presumptively valid and that the plaintiff has the burden of showing grounds for relief. Therefore, the argument continues, the denial of the motion to vacate was proper in this case because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence. However, the cases cited by the defendants involve motions to vacate under section 72 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 72), not section 50(5). Section 72 allows for a party to open a final judgment upon the recitation of and proof of the existence of certain traditional grounds for allowing such relief, whereas section 50(5) applies to judgments which are not final and does not require the allegation of any particular circumstances or grounds for relief. The joint committee comments to section 50(5) indicate that even the requirement of showing due cause by affidavit has been eliminated. (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 50, Joint Committee Comments, at 402 (Smith-Hurd 1968).) Furthermore, even where a motion to vacate is presented under section 72, facts properly alleged in a petition for reinstatement of a cause of action must be taken as true in the absence of a contest by the defendant. (Windmon v. Banks (1st Dist. 1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 870, 335 N.E.2d 116.) All that is required is that the trial court consider whether or not substantial justice is being done between the litigants and whether a hardship to the party in whose favor judgment was rendered will result from compelling a trial on the merits. People ex rel. Reid v. Adkins (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 402, 270 N.E.2d 841. The record discloses that the plaintiff had been diligent in prosecuting his case until the date of trial. The circumstances which necessitated the motion for a continuance were clearly beyond the control of the plaintiff. Given these uncontroverted facts, the trial court should have vacated the dismissal, and I believe, its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, it is my opinion, that the order of the Circuit Court of Knox County dismissing this cause with prejudice should be vacated and the cause remanded.