Court Opinion

ID: 9848730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:26:06.629906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:40.620477
License: Public Domain

PARKER, J.,
dissenting: The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that, as she approached the intersection of Edinborough and Magnolia Streets, she “observed defendant’s vehicle travelling west on Edin-borough Street at a high rate of speed.” On direct examination she testified that, when she first saw defendant’s car, it was going at a rapid rate of speed; that she expected it to stop at the stop sign; that when she entered the intersection she saw it was not stopping at the stop sign. *214On cross-examination she testified that, when she saw defendant’s car coming at a high rate of speed, the car was a city block or less from the intersection, and she would say it was going 30 to 35 miles an hour: that she was closer to the intersection than the defendant was.
This is a part of plaintiff’s testimony on cross-examination:
“Q You saw him coming at a high rate of speed?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do when you saw a car approaching the same intersection at a high rate of speed?
A I naturally expected the car to stop and, knowing there was a stop sign, I didn’t see any sense in keeping on looking. I continued on my way. I did slow down but I did not stop. My speed was within 15 to 20 miles.”
This is another part of plaintiff’s testimony on cross-examination:
“The car I saw coming was going at a rapid rate of speed.
Q By rapid do you mean around 35 to 40 miles an hour?
A It was rapid; I don’t know. There was a stop sign and I expected him to stop.
Q Answer my question! Would you say it was going as fast as 35 to 40 miles per hour?
A I would say 30 to 35.
Q As you went on towards the intersection you kept watching it?
A I noticed the car; but I thought he was stopping, and knowing the stop signs were there, I didn’t see any sense of keeping on watching the car.
Q You mean, after having seen the car approaching at a high rate of speed, you didn’t see any sense in looking to see if it stopped or not?
A What good would it have done?
Q Is that what you said, you didn’t see any sense in noticing that car any more, that is right; that is what you said, isn’t it?
A Do I have to answer that question right on?
Couet: Just answer counsel’s questions.
Q That is what you said, isn’t it?
A That is right.
Q And you drove on into that intersection knowing that it was an intersection, didn’t you?
A It was a cross street.
Q And you drove on in there knowing there was a car approaching from your right at a rapid rate of speed, didn’t you; that is right isn’t it?
A Yes.
*215Q And you and that car got into that intersection about the same time, didn’t you?
A We met there.”
There is plenary evidence tending to show that the defendant is guilty of actionable negligence.
However, the plaintiff, who was the motorist on the dominant highway, had actual knowledge that the defendant, who was the motorist on the servient highway, was approaching this intersection a city block or less away at a speed of 30 to 35 miles an hour. Such knowledge on her part, in my opinion, was sufficient to put a person of ordinary prudence on notice that the defendant was either unaware of her presence, or did not intend to, or could not stop in time to yield the right of way to the plaintiff on the dominant highway. Under such circumstances plaintiff had no right to assume that the defendant would stop at the stop sign, and yield her the right-of-way. Marshburn v. Patterson, 241 N.C. 441, 85 S.E. 2d 683; Loving v. Whitton, 241 N.C. 273, 84 S.E. 2d 919; Guthrie v. Gocking, 214 N.C. 513, 199 S.E. 707.
Yet, the plaintiff with such actual knowledge of the defendant’s speed within a city block or less of the intersection gave this testimony as to her actions: “I noticed the car; but I thought he was stopping, and knowing the stop signs were there, I didn’t see any sense of keeping on watching the car.” When the plaintiff saw the defendant’s car, she was far enough away from the intersection at her speed to stop. In my opinion, the plaintiff’s evidence establishes contributory negligence so clearly that no other conclusion may be reasonably drawn therefrom, and the defendant is entitled to have his judgment of nonsuit sustained. Sheldon v. Childers, 240 N.C. 449, 82 S.E. 2d 396; Morrisette v. Boone Co., 235 N.C. 162, 69 S.E. 2d 239.
Marshburn v. Patterson, supra, is distinguishable. In that case Marshburn, without looking to the right or to the left, drove into the intersection. He did not see the Eddleman vehicle prior to the collision. The Court said: “Thus the evidence is conflicting as to the condition existing at the time, particularly in respect to whether the operator of the Marshburn automobile was put on notice that Patterson would not yield the right-of-way. Hence, it was a question for the jury.” (Italics mine.) Patterson was driving the Eddleman automobile.
The plaintiff has proved herself out of court. She knowingly, “took a chance and lost.” Stamey v. R. R., 208 N.C. 668, 182 S.E. 130.
I vote to affirm.