Court Opinion

ID: 9917353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 05:04:30.383145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:24.947390
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re HART/HART-WHITE, Minors.                                       January 11, 2024

                                                                     No. 365762
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2019-000134-NA

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor children, KDH and KHW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to
adjudication continue to exist). Because the trial court did not err when it found that termination
of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, we affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        Throughout 2018, Children’s Protective Services (“CPS”) investigated this family for
complaints of alcohol abuse, improper supervision, physical abuse, physical and educational
neglect, and domestic violence. In December 2018, while respondent and the two children were
staying at a shelter in Jackson, Michigan, a staff person contacted CPS to report that respondent
was drunk and unable to properly supervise her children. It was also reported that, the previous
day, respondent, while intoxicated, struck then nine-year-old KHW across the face and had earlier
put out a cigarette on KHW’s face. During the CPS investigation that followed, respondent
admitted to drinking large quantities of alcohol in front of the children and attempting to care for
them while intoxicated.

       On December 6, 2018, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services
(“DHHS”), petitioned the Jackson Circuit Court to take jurisdiction and remove the children from
respondent’s care and the care of their respective fathers.1 An ex parte order entered that day

1
 In July 2021, the trial court terminated the parental rights of KHW’s father and KDH’s father.
Neither father appeared during any of the lower court proceedings, nor have they appealed.

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authorized DHHS to remove the children and place them in protective custody. The Jackson
Circuit Court later authorized the petition and formally removed the children from the care of
respondent and their respective fathers. In January 2019, the matter was transferred to Wayne
County.

        In August 2019, respondent entered a plea in which she admitted that at the time the petition
was filed, she had a severe alcohol abuse problem, that she was impaired by alcohol in front of her
children, and that her alcohol abuse was harmful to the children’s psychological well-being. The
court accepted respondent’s plea and found statutory grounds to assume jurisdiction over the
children. During the dispositional hearing that immediately followed, the court ordered respondent
to comply with a parent-agency treatment plan that included, among other things, respondent’s
participation in parenting classes, a psychological evaluation, and substance abuse counseling.
Respondent was also required to attend parenting time and submit to random weekly drug and
alcohol screens. Finally, respondent was required to communicate with the caseworker and obtain
and maintain suitable housing and a legal source of income.

        During the three years that followed the adjudication and disposition, respondent’s
participation in her treatment plan was inconsistent and largely unsuccessful in removing the
barriers to reunification Ultimately, in August 2022, DHHS petitioned the court to terminate
respondent’s parental rights. After three days of hearings, the trial court found that clear and
convincing evidence supported termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The court further found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in
the children’s best interests. Respondent now appeals.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

        Respondent’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred when it found that
termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. We find no error in this
regard.

        “If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of
parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be
made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). When considering whether termination of parental rights is in a
child’s best interests, a court may consider a variety of factors. In re White, 303 Mich App 701,
713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). These factors include the bond between the child and the parent, the
parent’s ability to parent the child, the child’s need for permanency and stability, the advantages
of a foster home over the parent’s home, the parent’s compliance with the case service plan, the
parent’s visitation history with the child, the child’s well-being, and the possibility of adoption.
Id. at 713-714. In addition, the trial court should consider the child’s safety and well-being,
including the risk of harm a child might face if returned to the parent’s care. See In re VanDalen,
293 Mich App 120, 142; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). The court may also consider psychological
evaluations, the child’s age, continued involvement in domestic violence, and a parent’s history.
In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 131; 777 NW2d 728 (2009).

        “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best
interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. The court’s focus must be on the child and not the

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parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 87; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). Of note, when more than one
child is involved, a trial court must consider each child’s best interests separately. In re Olive/Metts
Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A trial court need not, however, make
“individual” and “redundant factual findings” if the children’s interests do not significantly differ.
In re White, 303 Mich App at 715-716. Whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best
interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90.
This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a
child’s best interests. In re Jones, 286 Mich App at 129. The trial court’s finding is clearly
erroneous “if, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re JK, 468 Mich
202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).

        The trial court did not clearly err when it found that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. There was overwhelming evidence that respondent could
not provide her children with safety, stability, and permanence.

        After the children were removed from the home in late 2018, respondent entered a plea in
which she admitted to a severe alcohol abuse issue and that she attempted to parent the children
while intoxicated. Respondent also admitted that her alcohol abuse was harmful to the children’s
psychological well-being. Respondent was offered services that included individual therapy with
a substance abuse component. Respondent was also required to submit to weekly random drug
and alcohol screens. Despite these court-ordered services, respondent did not consistently
participate in the random weekly drug and alcohol testing. As a consequence, there was simply
no credible evidence from which it could be determined that respondent was living a sober and
substance-free lifestyle. Respondent’s refusal to submit to the screening clearly impeded the
therapeutic process. The caseworker testified that respondent was engaged during her therapy, but
because respondent had not consistently participated in screens, the therapist was unable to
actually monitor or confirm that respondent was abstaining from alcohol.

        The court and the parties all recognized that the results of these screens would confirm
respondent’s sobriety and help determine whether the children would be safe in her care. Indeed,
the court granted respondent an inordinate amount of time to comply with the requirement that she
participate in weekly random drug and alcohol screening. The court continued the termination
hearing twice to provide respondent with the opportunity to submit to the required drug and alcohol
screens. In addition, DHHS attempted to work with respondent to assist her in providing the
requested screens. It also was willing to accept the results of several screens that allegedly were
performed by one of respondent’s employers. Indeed, the court continued the termination hearing
30 days to allow respondent to produce the employment drug screens. The promised test results
never materialized and respondent did not attend the final day of the termination hearing when the
screening results were expected to be produced. The record was devoid of any evidence from
which the court could conclude that respondent had adequately addressed her alcohol abuse issues.

       Respondent’s cavalier attitude toward the drug-screening component of her treatment plan
was probative of her lack of commitment to the children. Similarly, her inconsistent attendance at
parenting time was compelling evidence that respondent was unwilling or unable to put her
children’s needs ahead of her own. The caseworker explained that respondent was offered
parenting time once a week, for two hours. During the approximately three years the children

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were in care, respondent missed 60 percent of the offered visits. Even when the COVID-19
pandemic led to virtual visits, a less engaging alternative but a more convenient one, respondent
only had a 75% attendance rate. Further, when respondent did attend parenting time, she was
offered two-hour visits, but she was only willing to stay for one hour. Respondent offered a
multitude of excuses for her unwillingness to take advantage of all of the parenting time allotted,
but her testimony in this regard was often contradictory, thereby affecting the credibility of her
excuses.

        Respondent argues that a strong bond existed between her and the children. Admittedly,
the caseworker confirmed the presence of an appropriate parent-child bond, and there was
testimony that the children were always happy to see respondent. The guardian ad litem also
reported that KHW, a teenager at the time of termination, did not want respondent’s parental rights
terminated. However, the strength of the bond is questionable in light of respondent’s poor
participation in parenting time. There was testimony that respondent became belligerent during
parenting time and she was overheard blaming KHW for the family’s circumstances. In any event,
regardless of the strength of any bond, the trial court could properly conclude from the evidence
that this factor did not outweigh the children’s need for a safe and stable home that was free from
alcohol abuse and a parent with unresolved substance abuse issues.

         A preponderance of the evidence established that respondent could not provide a safe,
stable, and permanent living environment for the children. By contrast, there was testimony that
the children were thriving in their nonrelative foster home. At the time of termination, the matter
had been pending for more than three years. KHW was 13 years old and had spent critical years
in a child’s development in the foster care system. KDH, seven years old at the time of termination,
had spent more than half of her young life in foster care. The children had been placed together
in the same foster home for more than 2½ years. The foster parent was meeting the children’s
needs and a bond existed between the children and their caregiver. Although the foster mother
expressed a willingness to provide long-term care for the children, she had not yet decided whether
she was able to adopt both children. Nonetheless, the caseworker opined that the children were
better off in the current foster home than they would be if returned to respondent’s care. When
balancing the best-interest factors, a court may consider the advantages of a foster home over the
parent’s home and the possibility of adoption. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42.

        At the time of termination, the children were in a stable home where their needs were being
met and would continue to be met until a more permanent placement could be achieved.
Termination of respondent’s parental rights was the only avenue by which the children had the
possibility of achieving the permanency offered by a stable adoptive home. Accordingly, the trial
court did not clearly err when it found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                             /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                             /s/ Noah P. Hood

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