Court Opinion

ID: 9897922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:07.842542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:22.677495
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                              DIVISION ONE

 In the Matter of the Dependency of                 No. 84772-4-I
                                                    (consolidated with No. 84773-2-I)
 G.C.B. and M.J.B.-L.,

                                                    PUBLISHED OPINION
                            Minor children.

          BOWMAN, J. — R.B. appeals an order terminating his parental rights to

G.C.B. and M.J.B.-L. He argues that the trial court erred by allowing him to

proceed pro se in the termination proceedings because he did not knowingly and

unequivocally waive his right to counsel. He also argues insufficient evidence

supports the trial court’s findings that the Department of Children, Youth, and

Families (Department) made efforts to support a guardianship. Because the

record shows that R.B. clearly and voluntarily relinquished his statutory right to

an attorney and that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we

affirm.

                                       FACTS1

          R.B. is the father of G.C.B. and M.J.B.-L. G.C.B. was born in December

2011 and M.J.B.-L. was born in August 2009. The children’s mother, M.L.,

relinquished her parental rights to both children by agreement in 2017.

          1
        The facts are also set forth in In re Dependency of G.C.B., No. 77943-5-I
(Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2019) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/
pdf/779435.pdf. We repeat them only as necessary.
No. 84772-4-I (consol. with No. 84773-2-I)/2

       On June 23, 2015, Burlington police responded to a call about a small

child walking down a busy street alone. The police identified the child as three-

year-old G.C.B., whom they recognized from an incident about two weeks earlier

when they found him “wandering” alone in a motel parking lot. The police took

protective custody of G.C.B., his older half-brother S.L.,2 and his sister M.J.B.-L.

In the following days, the Department took all three children to the hospital to be

examined. The examinations showed that the children suffered medical and

dental neglect and were significantly malnourished. There were also concerns

that the children had been exposed to a serious infectious disease.

       On June 25, 2015, the Department filed dependency petitions for G.C.B.

and M.J.B.-L. in Skagit County Superior Court. In September, the court found

the children dependent. The court ordered several services for R.B., including a

psychological evaluation with a parenting component, age-appropriate parenting

instruction, and nutritional education. It also ordered R.B. to participate in all

medical and dental appointments for the children and submit to tuberculosis

testing. Finally, the court granted R.B. visitation twice a month for two hours so

long as he tested negative for tuberculosis.

       In August 2016, the Department petitioned to terminate R.B.’s parental

rights. The Department alleged that R.B. did not participate in the court-ordered

services and could not provide a stable home for the children.

       Psychologist Dr. Evan Freedman evaluated R.B. in February 2017 and

diagnosed him with schizoid personality traits, presenting paranoid and

       2
           S.L. is not a part of this appeal.

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No. 84772-4-I (consol. with No. 84773-2-I)/3

narcissistic characteristics. He observed that R.B. has a “pattern of detachment

in personal relationships” and “indifference to criticism,” causing “significant

difficulty in facilitating attachment with his children.”

       A termination trial began in December 2017.3 Dr. Freedman testified

about R.B.’s difficulty in forming relationships. He said that the children did not

seem happy to see their father and that R.B. seemed “ ‘quite distant’ ” from

them.4 The Department also showed that R.B. stopped visiting the children in

April 2017 and had not seen either child since.

       After the trial, the court entered an order terminating R.B.’s parental rights

to G.C.B. and M.J.B.-L. R.B. appealed, and we reversed and remanded for

further proceedings.5

       In April 2021, the Department filed new termination petitions. At a

preliminary hearing on June 15, R.B. requested to represent himself. A superior

court commissioner engaged R.B. in a colloquy, inquiring into his education level,

legal knowledge, and experience with parental termination proceedings. The

       3
         Two months before trial, the Department initiated dependency proceedings for
R.B.’s youngest son, A.B. The Department ultimately petitioned to terminate R.B.’s
parental rights to A.B. While the Department monitored all three children, A.B.’s case
remained on a “different track,” and he is not a part of this appeal.
       4
           G.C.B., slip op. at 5.
       5
         G.C.B., slip op. at 11-12. R.B. alleged a due process violation because the
Department did not notify him during the dependency that it would consider either the
lack of an emotional bond with the children or his schizoid personality traits as a basis
for terminating his parental rights. Id. at 8. We agreed and remanded for the trial court
to consider whether termination was appropriate based on “the parental deficiencies of
which the father was properly notified.” Id. at 11-12. We did not address whether the
Department offered services specifically tailored to address R.B.’s insufficient bonding
with the children and his schizoid personality traits or whether R.B. could remedy his
parental deficiencies so that the Department could return the children to him in the near
future. Id. at 12.

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commissioner stressed the technical nature of the rules of evidence and warned

R.B. of the risks of proceeding without counsel. Still, R.B. expressed a desire to

proceed pro se, and the court granted his request.

       On July 15, 2022, the court held a hearing to determine whether to appoint

standby counsel for R.B. During the hearing, the superior court judge asked R.B.

if he still wanted to proceed pro se, to which R.B. replied, “I would like to have

standby counsel, but I would like to proceed pro se.” The court appointed a

standby attorney.

       The court held the second termination trial over four days in September

and October 2022. R.B. represented himself with standby counsel. R.B.

acknowledged that he had no bond with his children. But he asked the court to

leave his parental rights intact. He testified that in his “ideal situation,” G.C.B.

and M.J.B.-L. would remain with their current caregivers, the caregivers would

maintain financial responsibility for the children, and he would “slowly integrate

[him]self into the [children’s] lives” and establish a relationship with them.6

       On November 3, 2022, the trial court made its oral ruling terminating

R.B.’s parental rights to G.C.B. and M.J.B.-L. The court stated:

               I’ve been primarily influenced by the amount of time that has
       occurred in the lives of these children during the period of
       dependency. The amount of time that’s been afforded, the services
       that have been offered, and the lack of progress towards any sort of
       visitation or reunification with the children.

The court “specifically considered whether a guardianship or some lessor type of

       6
           While R.B.’s proposal does not amount to a formal guardianship, the parties
treat it as such for the purpose of appeal.

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arrangement might be available or appropriate here” but ultimately decided that

because the caregivers want to adopt the children, any “alternative” to

termination would only be a barrier to permanent placement for them. The court

entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its ruling.

       R.B. appeals.

                                     ANALYSIS

       R.B. argues that the trial court erred by allowing him to proceed pro se in

the termination proceedings because he did not knowingly and unequivocally

waive his right to counsel. He also argues insufficient evidence supports the trial

court’s findings that the Department made efforts to support a guardianship.

Waiver of Right to Counsel

       R.B. argues that the trial court erred by granting his request to proceed

pro se because he did not unequivocally and knowingly waive his right to

counsel. We disagree.

       We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to proceed pro

se for abuse of discretion. State v. Curry, 191 Wn.2d 475, 483, 423 P.3d 179

(2018). A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable,

reached by applying the wrong legal standard, or rests on facts unsupported by

the record. Id. at 483-84. The burden to show an invalid waiver of the right to

counsel rests with the person asserting error. State v. Hahn, 106 Wn.2d 885,

901, 726 P.2d 25 (1986).

       “Unless waived in court,” RCW 13.34.090(2) provides parents a right to

counsel at “all stages of a proceeding in which a child is alleged to be

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dependent,” including termination proceedings. In re Welfare of J.M., 130 Wn.

App. 912, 921, 125 P.3d 245 (2005). The right derives from the due process

guarantees of article I, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution and the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re Dependency of

G.G., 185 Wn. App. 813, 826, 344 P.3d 234 (2015); J.M., 130 Wn. App. at 921.

Termination proceedings are civil in nature, so the right to counsel guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment does not apply. In re Welfare of S.E., 63 Wn. App. 244,

249, 820 P.2d 47 (1991); U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

       A parent can waive the right to counsel by (1) voluntarily relinquishing the

right, (2) waiving it by conduct, or (3) forfeiting it. In re Dependency of V.R.R.,

134 Wn. App. 573, 582, 141 P.3d 85 (2006). Waiver must be a knowing and

voluntary relinquishment and is typically shown by an affirmative verbal request.

Id. The trial court must ensure that a parent waiving their right to counsel is

aware of the risks of self-representation. In re Welfare of G.E., 116 Wn. App.

326, 334, 65 P.3d 1219 (2003).

       Citing G.E., R.B. argues that a court considering a parent’s request to

proceed pro se must “use a similar framework to that in the criminal context to

assess whether a parent properly waives his right to counsel.” R.B. reads the

holding in G.E. too broadly.

       In G.E., Division Two of this court acknowledged that we “have yet to

clearly state whether parents must make a knowing and intelligent waiver of their

right to counsel equal to the standards found in criminal law cases.” 116 Wn.

App. at 333. It then held that “because the statutory right to counsel at issue

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No. 84772-4-I (consol. with No. 84773-2-I)/7

here requires appointment of counsel absent a waiver in court, the evidence of

waiver required to be on the record is similar” to that in a criminal case. Id. at

333-34. So, the waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and affirmatively expressed

on the record. Id. But the court did not mandate any particular framework or

colloquy in which a court must engage to assess whether a parent affirmatively,

knowingly, and voluntarily waives their right to counsel. And we decline to do so

here.7

         Still, even using his proposed criminal proceeding framework, R.B.’s

challenge to the validity of his waiver fails. As discussed below, the record

shows he unequivocally requested to proceed pro se and knowingly and

voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

         A. Unequivocal Request

         R.B. argues that “[t]he court’s colloquy does not establish [he]

unequivocally requested to proceed pro se.” We disagree.

         A defendant must “ ‘make an explicit choice between exercising the right

to counsel and the right to self-representation so that a court may be reasonably

certain that the defendant wishes to represent himself.’ ” State v. Curry, 191

Wn.2d 475, 490, 423 P.3d 179 (2018) (quoting United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516,

519 (9th Cir. 1994)). In assessing whether a request to proceed pro se is

         7
          Nor does G.E. conclude, as R.B. suggests, that a court must indulge in every
reasonable presumption against a parent’s waiver of their right to counsel. We do not
reach this issue because the parties did not brief it. See RAP 10.3(a)(6). But we note
that the presumption arises in the constitutional context of safeguarding a criminal
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Nonetheless, even if we applied the
presumption, the evidence shows R.H. knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel.

                                           7
No. 84772-4-I (consol. with No. 84773-2-I)/8

unequivocal, we look to factors such as whether the request was formal or

spontaneous, whether the defendant truly sought to represent himself or was just

expressing frustration, and whether the defendant made the request because of

a disagreement with counsel over trial strategy. Id. at 478-88. We assess these

factors on a case-by-case basis, considering the surrounding facts and

circumstances. Id. at 490. And “when a defendant makes a clear and knowing

request to proceed pro se, such a request is not rendered equivocal by the fact

that the defendant is motivated by something other than a singular desire to

conduct his or her own defense.” State v. Modica, 136 Wn. App. 434, 442, 149

P.3d 446 (2006), aff’d, 164 Wn.2d 83, 186 P.3d 1062 (2008).

       On June 15, 2021, R.B. appeared with counsel for a preliminary hearing.

His attorney told the court commissioner that R.B. “is here and prepared to ask to

represent himself” on the termination matters. The commissioner then engaged

R.B. in an extensive discussion about the risks and procedures involved in

proceeding pro se. The court asked R.B. “how far [he] went in school” and if he

had “any training in the law.” It warned R.B. that he would not “have the benefit

of an attorney’s knowledge of law in the area of dependencies or termination,”

that there are rules of evidence he must follow, and that he may have to engage

in “awkward” testimony where “you have to pose questions to yourself and then

answer the questions.” The commissioner also reiterated the seriousness of the

potential outcome.

       At the end of this colloquy, R.B. said, “I understand.” The commissioner

then asked R.B. if it was still his “desire to represent [him]self knowing how

                                         8
No. 84772-4-I (consol. with No. 84773-2-I)/9

difficult it may be.” R.B. said, “I’m not concerned about the difficulty. I’m just . . .

concerned about the truth being heard.” The commissioner then asked R.B. if

anybody “forced [him] to make this decision to represent [him]self,” to which R.B.

answered, “No, sir.”

       The record shows that R.B. clearly expressed his desire to represent

himself because he believed it was a more effective way for “the truth to be

heard.”

       Still, R.B. argues his waiver was equivocal because after the court

described the procedural difficulties he may face testifying as a pro se litigant,

R.B. stated, “[I]f I’m not going to be given an opportunity [to testify], then I should

probably have legal counsel.” But after R.B.’s comment, the court told him, “I’m

not saying that you wouldn’t be able to give testimony. I’m just telling you that

there may be requirements for the way your testimony is presented that might

make it difficult for you to get your evidence in to the court.” After the court’s

explanation, R.B. clearly acknowledged that he would still like to represent

himself.

       Further, more than a year later, R.B. again acknowledged that he would

like to proceed pro se. On July 15, 2022, R.B. appeared before a superior court

judge to address appointment of standby counsel. The court confirmed that R.B.

had waived his right to counsel after a discussion with the commissioner a year

earlier. It then asked R.B., “Is that still your decision? Is there any — do you

have any different decision today as we get on the eve of your trials?” R.B.

replied, “I would like to have standby counsel, but I would like to proceed pro se

                                           9
No. 84772-4-I (consol. with No. 84773-2-I)/10

with [standby] counsel.” R.B. again explained that he wanted to represent

himself because “[i]t feels like the system is designed in such a way that my

voice is and my true stance is unable to be heard due to the design of the

system. So I believe that the best way for that to be heard is to go pro se.” The

court then appointed standby counsel.

       Finally, in closing argument, R.B. again acknowledged he made an explicit

choice to proceed pro se. He told the court that it “was not some sort of half-

hatched idea for me to represent myself. I’m sure I didn’t perform the best, you

know, there is a lot about the legal system I don’t know, but I decided to do it

because I felt that it was best for my children.”

       The trial court did not err by concluding that R.B. unequivocally requested

to proceed pro se.

       B. Knowing and Intelligent Waiver

       R.B. argues that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to

counsel because the trial court did not explain to him the nature of a termination

proceeding and the potential consequences. Again, we disagree.

       A defendant must understand the dangers and disadvantages of self-

representation to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975).

While there are no strict rules governing the method for determining whether a

defendant understands the risks of proceeding pro se, the preferred procedure is

a colloquy on the record. Modica, 136 Wn. App. at 441. In criminal cases, this

colloquy should inform the defendant of the nature of the charges, the maximum

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No. 84772-4-I (consol. with No. 84773-2-I)/11

penalty faced, and the technical and procedural rules that will govern the

presentation of a defense. Id.

       In assessing a defendant’s understanding of the seriousness of the

charges, “[t]he knowledge required to waive counsel may be gained from

participation in an earlier trial on the same matter.” State v. Conlin, 49 Wn. App.

593, 595-96, 744 P.2d 1094 (1987). This is because a defendant who was

present during a previous trial for the same charge

       was afforded an . . . opportunity to learn about trial practice as
       specifically applied to his case during the first trial. . . . [H]e
       witnessed firsthand a full, totally realistic demonstration and
       application of what to expect, what the problems of presenting his
       defense were and precisely how to do it.

State v. Strodtbeck, 46 Wn. App. 26, 29, 728 P.2d 622 (1986).

       As discussed above, a court commissioner conducted a detailed colloquy

with R.B. on the risks and requirements of self-representation. The

commissioner informed R.B. that he would be “risking an outcome you don’t

want” if he chose to proceed without the benefit of an attorney’s knowledge of

law in the area of dependencies and terminations. The commissioner advised

R.B. of the procedural and technical difficulties governing the presentation of his

defense, warning R.B. that “at a trial where you’d be representing yourself, you

would have to present evidence to the court, and there’s some rules of evidence

that apply.” The court cautioned that “lawyers who have been doing this for

some time are familiar with the rules of evidence and know the trial procedures,

and I expect would do a better job representing your interests than you would on

your own.” The commissioner also warned R.B. that representing himself was ill-

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No. 84772-4-I (consol. with No. 84773-2-I)/12

advised, stating, “The court will allow [R.B.] to represent himself, even though I

think that’s an unwise decision under the circumstances.”

       R.B. argues that the colloquy with the commissioner was insufficient

because the court did not inform him of the specific allegations in the termination

petition or the consequences should the Department prevail at trial. But R.B.

was present throughout his termination trial in 2017. Indeed, the trial court

terminated his parental rights to G.C.B. and M.J.B.-L. at the end of that trial, so

R.B. was aware of the nature of the allegations against him and experienced the

consequences of an adverse outcome. And R.B. acknowledged as much during

his colloquy with the superior court commissioner in June 2021. When the

commissioner asked if he was familiar with “trial procedure,” R.B. replied, “Yes.

I’ve been to a termination trial before.”8

       The record shows that R.B. made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his

right to counsel.

Substantial Evidence

       R.B. argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s

finding that the Department “made efforts to support the permanent option of

guardianship” and that the children’s current caregiver “is not interested in being

a guardian.” Specifically, R.B. argues that recent amendments to RCW

13.34.180(1)(f) impose an affirmative duty on the Department to make efforts to

       8
        We note that since September 2017, R.B. was simultaneously involved in
dependency and termination proceedings involving his youngest son, A.B. Counsel
represented him in those proceedings.

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No. 84772-4-I (consol. with No. 84773-2-I)/13

support his proposed guardianship, which the Department did not do. We

disagree.

       Our review of a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights is limited

to assessing whether substantial evidence supports the court’s findings. In re

Parental Rights to D.H., 195 Wn.2d 710, 718, 464 P.3d 215 (2020). “Substantial

evidence” is “evidence in sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational

person of the truth of the declared premise.” In re Welfare of T.B., 150 Wn. App.

599, 607, 209 P.3d 497 (2009). Because of the fact-specific nature of

termination proceedings, deference to the trial court is particularly important. In

re Parental Rights to K.M.M., 186 Wn.2d 466, 477, 379 P.3d 75 (2016) (we defer

to the trial court’s determinations of witness credibility and the persuasiveness of

the evidence).

       We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. K.M.M., 187 Wn.

App. at 572. Our goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. We first look

to the plain meaning of a statute as an expression of intent. Id. If the language

is plain and unambiguous, our inquiry ends. Id.

       Chapter 13.34 RCW creates a two-step framework for terminating parental

rights. First, the Department must show that it satisfied its statutory obligations

under the six elements of RCW 13.34.180(1) by clear, cogent, and convincing

evidence, and then it must establish that termination of parental rights would be

in the child’s best interest by a preponderance of the evidence. RCW 13.34.190;

In re Welfare of A.B., 168 Wn.2d 908, 911, 232 P.3d 1104 (2010). Under RCW

13.34.180(1)(f), the Department must show that “continuation of the parent and

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child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into

a stable and permanent home.”9

       The Department can prove RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) two ways. In re Welfare

of R.H., 176 Wn. App. 419, 428, 309 P.3d 620 (2013). First, the Department can

show that prospects for a permanent home exist but that continuing the parent-

child relationship prevents the child from obtaining that placement. Id. Or the

Department can show that the parent-child relationship has a damaging and

destabilizing effect on the child that would negatively impact the child’s

integration into a permanent home. Id. The availability of an identified

guardianship placement can be material to determining whether the Department

proved either of these means of satisfying the statute. Id.; see also In re Welfare

of N.M., 184 Wn. App. 665, 673, 346 P.3d 762 (2014).

       9
          The Department must also establish:
                (a) That the child has been found to be a dependent child;
                (b) That the court has entered a dispositional order pursuant to
        RCW 13.34.130;
                (c) That the child has been removed or will, at the time of the
        hearing, have been removed from the custody of the parent for a period
        of at least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency;
                (d) That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been
        expressly and understandably offered or provided and all necessary
        services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental
        deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and
        understandably offered or provided; and
                (e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so
        that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future.
RCW 13.34.180(1). R.B. does not challenge the trial court’s findings on requirements
(a) through (e) of RCW 13.34.180(1).

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         In R.H., Division Two of our court explained that the availability of a

guardianship “is evidence that the trial court should consider when determining

whether the [Department] has met its burden to prove RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).”

176 Wn. App. at 428-29. In a similar vein, the legislature amended RCW

13.34.180(1)(f) in 2022, directing the trial court to “consider the efforts taken by

the [D]epartment to support a guardianship and whether a guardianship is

available as a permanent option for the child” when determining whether the

Department met its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). LAWS OF 2022, ch. 127,

§ 2.10

         Here, the trial court considered whether guardianship was a viable option

and the Department’s efforts to support a guardianship. It then found:

         The [D]epartment has made efforts to support the permanent option
         of guardianship with the caregivers and to pursue whether
         guardianship is a good fit for the family and whether it is an option
         at all. The current placement, with whom the child[ren] [have] been
         placed for over [three] years, is not interested in being a guardian
         and would like to adopt. Due to the lack of parent child relationship,
         adoption is in the best interest of the child[ren].

         R.B. argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding

because “[n]o evidence existed that the Department made a single effort” to

support his proposed guardianship with the current caregivers. R.B. suggests

         10
           At the same time, the legislature added language to RCW 13.34.145, requiring
the trial court to instruct the Department to “discuss guardianship as a permanent option
for the child with the child’s parents and caregiver as an alternative to termination of
parental rights and adoption” when the child has resided out of the home for more than
six months. RCW 13.34.145(7)(b) (LAWS OF 2022, ch. 127, § 1). The record does not
show whether the trial court issued such an order here, but we note the caregiver
testified that the Department discussed with her “the potential for guardianship.”

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that the 2022 amendment creates a new element under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f)—

that the Department must make efforts to support a proposed guardianship. He

is incorrect.

       Our courts have long held that the Department need not disprove the

availability of a guardianship placement to satisfy its burden under RCW

13.34.180(1)(f). R.H., 176 Wn. App. at 428. And the 2022 amendment to

section (1)(f) does not create such a burden. Indeed, the original proposed

amendment to RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) included language requiring the Department

to “demonstrate that a guardianship is not sufficient to protect the health, safety,

and welfare of the child.” H.B. 1747, at 9-10, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.

2022). But the legislature rejected that language in favor of leaving discretion

with the trial judge. See RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) (“the court must consider the

efforts taken by the [D]epartment to support a guardianship and whether a

guardianship is available as a permanent option for the child”). The plain

language of the amended section requires the trial court to consider the viability

of guardianship as a factor when assessing whether the Department has shown

that “continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the

child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.”

       Whether guardianship is a viable alternative to termination is a case-

specific determination, considering factors relevant to the best interests of the

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child. In re Dependency of A.C., 123 Wn. App. 244, 254-55, 98 P.3d 89 (2004).11

And even when an identified guardianship is available, “there will be

circumstances under which termination, rather than guardianship, is the

appropriate course of action.” R.H., 176 Wn. App. at 429.

       When considering whether guardianship is an appropriate course of

action, courts should consider factors such as (1) the qualifications of the

proposed guardian, (2) the strength and nature of the parent-child bond, (3) the

benefit of continued contact with the parent or extended family, (4) the need for

continued state involvement and services, (5) the likelihood the child would be

adopted if the court terminated parental rights, and (6) any other case-specific

factors relevant to the best interests of the child. A.C., 123 Wn. App. at 254-55.

The 2022 amendment to RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) does not change this analysis.

Rather, it ensures due consideration of a guardianship by requiring the court to

contemplate whether a viable guardianship option exists when assessing

whether the Department has met its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). And it

reinforces the trial court’s authority to reject termination of parental rights should

       11
          R.B. also assigns error to the trial court’s finding that “[d]ue to the lack of
parent child relationship, adoption is in the best interest of the child[ren].” According to
R.B., the finding is error because the court must first decide whether the Department met
its burden to show all six elements under RCW 13.34.180(1) before determining whether
termination is in the children’s best interests. See RCW 13.34.190. But R.B. confuses
the court’s consideration of whether guardianship is a viable option with the statutory
requirement that the Department show by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination is in the best interests of the children. Compare RCW 13.34.190(1)(b), and
A.B., 168 Wn.2d at 911, with A.C., 123 Wn. App. at 254-55. The record shows the trial
court properly made its finding that termination is in the best interest of the children after
determining that the Department met its burden to satisfy the elements of RCW
13.34.180(1)(f).

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it conclude the Department has not adequately explored a viable guardianship

option.

       Here, a Department caseworker testified that a guardianship was not a

viable alternative to termination because the children were thriving in their current

placement, and a guardianship would keep them “in limbo” with negative

“consequences.” The children’s guardian ad litem also testified about her opinion

on “guardianship versus adoption.” She concluded that “adoption would be in

their best interest” because of the children’s ages and the “lack of stability for

seven years.” She reiterated that R.B. did not see his children for five of those

years, has no relationship or bond with them, and has shown no “ability to

parent.” And the current caregiver to both children testified that her family

“discussed the potential for guardianship or adoption with the Department.” She

said that her family preferred adoption and that their home had already “been

approved for adoption.” Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings

that the children’s caregivers were “not interested” in being guardians and that a

guardianship would diminish the children’s integration into a stable and

permanent home.

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      Because the trial court did not err when it allowed R.B. to proceed pro se

and substantial evidence supports the court’s findings, we affirm termination of

his parental rights to G.C.B. and M.J.B.-L.

WE CONCUR:

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