Court Opinion

ID: 9390163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 21:01:31.971804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:31.652789
License: Public Domain

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                                              UNPUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 22-1381

        BRIAN PEPPER,

                    Plaintiff - Appellant,

              v.

        COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

                    Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Greenville. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior District Judge. (6:20-cv-04159-CMC)

        Argued: March 10, 2023                                           Decided: April 25, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ARGUED: George C. Piemonte, MARTIN, JONES & PIEMONTE, Charlotte, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. William Feldman, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
        Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michel Phillips, MARTIN, JONES &
        PIEMONTE, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Brian C. O’Donnell, Regional
        Chief Counsel, Katie M. Gaughan, Supervisory Attorney, Office of the General Counsel,
        M. Jared Littman, Special Assistant United States Attorney, SOCIAL SECURITY
        ADMINSTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Corey F. Ellis, United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for
        Appellee.
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        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               This appeal arises from Brian Pepper’s application for supplemental security

        income benefits under the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1383f. According

        to Pepper, he became unable to work in 2017, at the age of 27, due primarily to his Crohn’s

        disease, depression, and anxiety. Following a hearing, an ALJ disagreed, and after

        exhausting his administrative appeals, Pepper took his case to federal district court. The

        district court affirmed the denial of benefits, and for the reasons given below, we now

        affirm the judgment of the district court.

               We review the ALJ’s disability determination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and

        must uphold that determination if the ALJ “applied correct legal standards” and if the

        “factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Dowling v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec.

        Admin., 986 F.3d 377, 382–83 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our

        review for substantial evidence does not permit us to “reweigh conflicting evidence, make

        credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.” Shinaberry v.

        Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Instead, if there is conflicting

        evidence as to disability, “we defer to the ALJ’s decision.” Id.

               At issue in this case is the ALJ’s assessment of Pepper’s “residual functional

        capacity,” or “RFC” – “the most [the] claimant can still do despite all of [his] medically

        determinable impairments.” Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 689 (4th Cir. 2018)

        (internal quotation marks omitted). The RFC is a key part of the five-step process by which

        an ALJ determines disability. Only if the ALJ finds that the claimant, in light of his RFC,

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        cannot perform jobs available in the national economy will the claimant qualify for

        disability benefits. See id. 1

               Here, the ALJ found that Pepper had four medically determinable impairments

        severe enough to limit his job performance: anxiety disorder; depression; obesity; and

        Crohn’s disease, a chronic inflammatory bowel condition. See Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th

        511, 514 (4th Cir. 2021) (describing Crohn’s disease). As for obesity and Crohn’s disease,

        the ALJ determined, Pepper’s physical examinations remained largely normal and

        “demonstrated that he retained a high degree of functioning physically.” A.R. 21. Pepper’s

        Crohn’s disease was well-controlled by medication; his gastroenterology records showed

        “only normal findings,” and his symptoms – primarily diarrhea – were relatively mild.

        A.R. 24. Pepper’s depression and anxiety also responded to medication, the ALJ found,

        and his mental status examinations had yielded “grossly normal” results indicating a “high

        degree of functioning mentally.” A.R. 22. Indeed, the ALJ noted, Pepper’s treating

        physician, Dr. Suresh Khandekar, opined that “getting a job will help [Pepper]

        psychologically.” A.R. 24.

               1
                  The full five-step process, established by Social Security Administration
        regulation and applied by the ALJ here, is as follows: “[T]he ALJ asks at step one whether
        the claimant has been working; at step two, whether the claimant’s medical impairments
        meet the regulations’ severity and duration requirements; at step three, whether the medical
        impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in the regulations; at step four, whether
        the claimant can perform [his] past work given the limitations caused by [his] medical
        impairments; and at step five, whether the claimant can perform other work.” Mascio v.
        Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
        The RFC assessment is undertaken after step three and before an ALJ considers steps four
        and five. See Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635.

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               Based on this analysis, the ALJ found that Pepper had the residual functional

        capacity to:

               perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except the claimant can
               frequently climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. He can have
               frequent exposure to workplace hazards. He is limited to simple, routine
               tasks performed two-hours at a time, but no fast-paced production rate work.
               He can have occasional interaction with the public and coworkers. He will
               be off task less than 10% of the workday in addition to regularly scheduled
               breaks.

        A.R. 19. The ALJ then concluded – here relying on the testimony of a vocational expert –

        that despite these limitations, a significant number of jobs would be available to Pepper in

        the national economy. Accordingly, the ALJ found Pepper not disabled and denied his

        application for benefits.

               On appeal, Pepper argues primarily that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of

        his treating physician, Dr. Khandekar, as to the extent of his Crohn’s disease-related

        limitations. But the record is to the contrary: The ALJ found “Khandekar’s opinion []

        persuasive,” A.R. 24, and incorporated limitations substantially aligned with that opinion

        into Pepper’s RFC. Pepper focuses on his need for unscheduled bathroom breaks to

        manage his diarrhea, and on Khandekar’s view that he “may need” such breaks “2–3 times

        at the most” during an eight-hour workday, for an average of “15 min[utes]” each.

        A.R. 720. But as the ALJ explained, the RFC accounts for such a requirement, allowing

        for a “time off task limitation” of up to 10 percent of an eight-hour workday (or roughly

        48 minutes) for “pain and bathroom breaks.” A.R. 24. It was only “greater limitations” –

        that is, bathroom-related accommodations going beyond those identified by Dr. Khandekar

        – that the ALJ viewed as “inconsistent with longitudinal evidence and findings.” Id.

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        (emphasis added). In short, the factual premise of Pepper’s claim – that the ALJ refused

        to credit Dr. Khandekar’s opinion as to bathroom breaks – is simply mistaken.

               Nor are we persuaded by Pepper’s related claim that the ALJ failed to properly

        evaluate the opinion of Dr. Khandekar under revised agency regulations. As the district

        court explained, the ALJ applied the correct legal standard to the medical opinion of

        Pepper’s treating physician, giving it no special deference or specific evidentiary weight

        and instead focusing on its supportability and its consistency with other record evidence.

        See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. Like the district court, we find that the ALJ’s assessment under

        this standard is supported by substantial evidence, giving us no basis for disturbing it.

               Finally, Pepper takes issue with the ALJ’s determination that he remains able to

        work despite his mental impairments. There is no dispute that Pepper’s impairments are

        serious: As the ALJ recognized, Pepper has been diagnosed with severe depression and

        has reported past suicide attempts. But the ALJ carefully considered Pepper’s entire

        medical record, including his responsiveness to medication, multiple expert reports finding

        that he maintains a high degree of mental functioning and the capacity to work, and his

        own treating physician’s assessment that working will “help him psychologically.”

        A.R. 721. The ALJ also incorporated into Pepper’s RFC significant limitations addressing

        his mental condition, restricting him to simple and routine tasks performed without time

        pressure and to only occasional interaction with the public and coworkers. 2 Although

               2
                 For the first time on appeal, Pepper takes issue with one of those limitations,
        arguing that the prohibition on “fast-paced production rate work,” A.R. 19, is too vague.
        We generally will not consider an argument that was not preserved in the district court.
        See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014). And while we may depart from
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        Pepper would have us weigh the evidence differently, it is not our job to second-guess the

        ALJ’s considered decision. See Shinaberry, 952 F.3d at 123. Because substantial evidence

        supports the ALJ’s determination that Pepper’s impairments do not warrant a still more

        limited RFC, we defer to the ALJ. Id.

              For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                                                                     AFFIRMED

        that rule in “exceptional circumstances” to correct a manifest and fundamental error, see
        id., this is not such a case: While we have required additional explanation for some
        restrictions aimed at similar concerns, see, e.g., Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 312
        (4th Cir. 2019) (remanding for elaboration on prohibition of “production rate or demand
        pace” work), we note that this one is clearer – specifying that the target is “fast-paced”
        work – and that the ALJ further elaborated at the hearing, explaining to the vocational
        expert that what was precluded was “fast assembly line work,” A.R. 51. Under these
        circumstances, applying our usual forfeiture bar works no injustice. See In re Under Seal,
        749 F.3d at 285.

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