Court Opinion

ID: 9536387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:58:59.298558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:24.430740
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the results only of the majority opinion as it affirms the main appeal, and disagree with the results reached on the cross-appeal. With regard to the counterclaim, the court found that by the terms of the application for bond the plaintiff agreed to reimburse the defendant for all losses incurred by it and that the defendant had expended a total of $2,170.21 in plugging the well. Nevertheless, it found that the defendant had failed to mitigate damages in that its contract with Frank Yockey, defendant’s agent, to plug the well was entered into without receiving competitive bids and, that by Yockey’s own admission, the amount charged, in order to protect himself against extraordinary contingencies, was double that which he ordinarily would expect, and that no such contingencies existed in this case. He was asked if $2,000.00 was the usual and reasonable charge for comparable work and stated, “I figured my expenses and total time and came up with a certain amount and then for the hazard of redoing this work' — which often happens, I doubled that amount.” The court further found that the defendant made no effort to contract plaintiff in person, either in connection with the matter of plugging the well,, or in the, matter of enabling the plaintiff to salvage any materials or portions of the well, with the end result that salvageable materials in the well were destroyed or lost. The court also found that the salvageable materials were possibly of an equal value of the expenditures by the defendant in plugging the well, and set off one amount against the other in disallowing recovery to the defendant. The findings have ample support in the evidence. But the majority says that the issue of mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense, one which was neither pleaded nor-tried. Obviously, the issue of mitigation was tried. What else could Yockey have, been talking about? Both parties participated on this issue. The principle is well established that where issues not within the, ple.adings are fully litigated without, objection, as here, the pleadings should be treated as amended by the trial court, and so considered by this court on appeal so as to put. in. issue all litigated questions. Hall v. Bryant, 66 N.M. 280, 347 P.2d 171; Berkstresser v. Voight, 63 N.M. 470, 321 P.2d 1115; Luvaul v. Holmes, 63 N.M. 193, 315 P.2d 837. The record is replete with testimony not only as to the customary practice of salvaging materials whenever possible from wells to be plugged, but as to the materials in the subject well, their possible salvage value, and whether salvage of them by the defendant was contemplated . or ordered. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the materials used in the well could not have been salvaged, nor that the plaintiff, had he been advised of the action contemplated by the defendant, would not himself have arranged to plug the well and recover all salvageable materials. It is obvious the court took into consideration the fact that the plaintiff would not have paid, or contracted to pay, double the cost of plugging his well without any basis therefor in fact. Further, while both parties had a fixed obligation under the Commission’s order of November 15, 1961 to plug and abandon the well by January 15, 1962, no enforceable legal liability for failure to do so had accrued as to either of them on December 28, 1961, when defendant plugged the well. Steck v. Home Indemnity Company, 74 N.M. 419, 394 P.2d 267; Brock v. Western National Indemnity Company, 132 Cal.App. 2d 10, 281 P.2d 571; Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Hobbs, C.C.A., 10 Cir., 144 F.2d 5; Atterbury v. Carpenter, U.S.C.A., 9th Cir., 321 F.2d 921. It is obvious that the finding that the well was plugged at a proper time and in a proper manner refers to the actual plugging process as required by the Oil Conservation Commission, This issue was separate and apart from the issue of salvage or mitigation, I think the majority overlooks the consequences of its opinion. It not only denies the plaintiff the right to salvage his property, but awards double damages for the defendant’s premature plugging of the well. Also, it means that any time the Oil Conservation Commission orders a well plugged, the surety in all cases is free to move in prematurely and do the work, “sweep the well under the carpet,” so to speak, and thereby double the cost of plugging to the owner. Being fearful of this result, I dissent as to the cross-appeal. CHAVEZ, J., concurs.