Court Opinion

ID: 9648472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:22:28.924952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:01.499529
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe that the Court of Appeals’ majority reached the right solution to the problem before us and would reverse the judgment terminating the mother’s rights as a parent and allowing the adoption of the child by a stepmother.
The removal of parental rights without consent is a drastic thing, carefully limited by the statutes. We made it clear, in our earlier opinion in this case, In re Adoption of W.B.L., 647 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. banc 1983), that abandonment for the one-year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition must be shown. The evidence before us shows conclusively that, before the petition for adoption was filed, the natural mother took the only steps available to her to repent of any abandonment. She sought to visit the child and was met by an abject, wrongful refusal. Had the visit been allowed, the one-year period of abandonment would have been interrupted. The principal opinion allows the father to profit by his own wrong. Nor can he justify his conduct by saying that he simply followed his attorney’s advice.
The result makes a mockery of the proposition, to which the principal opinion does lip service, that “a parent may repent of abandonment,” and apparently precludes repentance if the other parent has consulted counsel about terminating the repenting parent’s rights. The reiteration of the principle that “adoption statutes are to be construed strictly in favor of the natural parents” likewise has a hollow sound, in view of the result reached. The statute governing this case required a showing that the challenged parent “willfully abandoned” the child. These are strong words. The record does not support the required finding. The principal opinion ignores our unanimous opinion in Adoption of R.A.B. v. R.A.B., 562 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. banc 1978).
Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976) does not stand as a bar to reversal. There simply is no evidence to support the finding of willful abandonment during the critical period. The attempted contact, which was frustrated by the father’s refusal, and the subsequent filing of a contempt action, were unequivocal and admitted steps refuting the claim of abandonment. There is no basis for the trial judge’s branding them “half-hearted and token.” Nor can I fault the mother for not persisting in the contempt proceeding when *457it could be assumed that the present action would lead to a determination of the whole matter in accordance with the law, or for failure to attempt visits while the litigation was pending.
It is idle, furthermore, to pretend that memory of his true mother can be erased from the memory of this 10 year old child. The legislature was wise in enunciating strict standards for abandonment. I doubt that the Court will help matters by relaxing these standards.
The trial judge well might believe that it would be better for the child if the natural mother were completely eliminated from his life and thought. But this is not enough. This is not a custody case. The mother who bore the child has rights, carefully delineated by law. The principal opinion ignores these rights and gives trial judges powers not intended.