Court Opinion

ID: 9740355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:33:11.146462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:17.613405
License: Public Domain

Todd, Justice.
The widow of decedent seeks review of an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission denying her benefits because her husband committed suicide. The decedent was injured prior *358to the adoption of a statute making suicide noncompensable, but committed suicide thereafter. We affirm.
On September 12, 1966, the decedent, Neil L. Schwartz, sustained a personal injury to his back and spine arising out of and during the course of his employment with Warren Taimo, d.b.a. Warren’s Masonry. Compensation was paid by the employer through January 30, 1967, at which time it was discontinued. On July 27, 1967, the employee filed a claim petition for additional compensation. Prior to the hearing of this claim, an amendment to Minn. St. 176.021, subd. I,1 became effective on September 1, 1967, adding to the statute the following words: “[Sjuicides are not compensable.”
In January 1968 a hearing was held on the employee’s claim petition, and he was awarded additional continuing temporary total disability benefits. These benefits were paid by the employer’s insurance company to the date of decedent’s death on May 3, 1968. The decedent was extremely depressed following his injury and his inability to regain full health. He became deranged and confused and was confined for a while at Rochester State Hospital for treatment. His condition appeared to improve and he was released from the hospital. Upon returning home, he again became depressed and remained in such a state to the time of his suicide. The compensation judge found that the suicide arose out of and in the course of his employment in that it was a direct and proximate result of his personal injury on September 12, 1966. He determined that the emotional reaction evoked by that injury, the incapacity caused by it, and the traumatic neurosis and psychosis flowing from it all contributed to the psychotic condition of the decedent at the time he took his own life. The evidence in the record sustains such a finding. Absent the passage of the statute in question, the relator-widow and dependent children would be entitled to death benefits under our workmen’s compensation statute.
The relator raises two issues upon this appeal: (1) Under the *359circumstances and facts of this case, does the amendment to § 176.021, subd. 1, have the effect of cutting off dependents’ rights to death benefits? (2) Under the circumstances and facts of this case, does the amendment to the statute deprive relator of her constitutional rights under Minn. Const, art. 1, § 2, and art. 4, §§ 33 and 34, and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
In reviewing decisions relating to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, this court is guided by certain general principles. Historically, the Workmen’s Compensation Act gave employees rights of recovery against the employer and eliminated certain common-law defenses, such as contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant doctrine. In balancing this off, the employee was denied the right to file a common-law action against his employer for those injuries covered in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally construed so as to give effect to its full purpose. As we stated in Kolbeck v. Myhra, 255 Minn. 341, 344, 96 N. W. 2d 633, 635 (1959):
“* * * Since workmen’s compensation statutes are highly remedial and humanitarian in purpose, they must be given a broad, liberal construction in the interests of the workmen.”
However, even though the court will liberally construe the language of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it cannot and will not legislate or depart from the clear and accepted meaning of words used in the statute.
The rights of the decedent were fixed at the time of the accident. Schmahl v. School District No. 12, 200 Minn. 294, 274 N. W. 168 (1937). Rights of dependents are derivative from the employee’s claim and proceedings by dependents after the death of the employee are merely a continuation of the proceedings commenced prior to death. Nyberg v. Little Falls Black Granite Co. 202 Minn. 86, 277 N. W. 536 (1938); Susnik v. Oliver Iron Min. Co. 205 Minn. 325, 286 N. W. 249 (1939); Johnson v. Pillsbury Flour Mills Co. 203 Minn. 347, 281 N. W. 290 (1938).
*360Minnesota has clearly determined that the rights of the dependents are separate, inchoate rights which become effective at the date of death and are governed by any intervening statutes passed and becoming effective between the date of injury and the date of death. In State ex rel. Carlson v. District Court, 131 Minn. 96, 97, 154 N. W. 661 (1915), we said:
“* * * The claim of plaintiff for compensation does not arise from the injury to her husband, but is a new and distinct right of action created by his death.”
In Lewis v. Connolly Contracting Co. 196 Minn. 108, 115, 264 N. W. 581, 584 (1936), this court held that the compensation to dependents for the death of a workman is a “different, distinct, and independent statutory right,” and the cause of action given to the dependent arises at the time of death.
In Warner v. Zaiser, 184 Minn. 598, 239 N. W. 761 (1931), we held that the benefits and liabilities arising because of the employee’s death are fixed at the time of death, and said (184 Minn. 601, 239 N. W. 762) :
"* * * The legislature may change the scale of weekly or other benefits prior to the occurrence of the accident; it may change the benefits to be received by the widow of an employe prior to the death.”
The position of this court was summarized in Carroll v. State, 242 Minn. 70, 78, 64 N. W. 2d 166, 172 (1954), where we said:
“We have held on a number of occasions that the rights of dependents to recover death benefits are separate and distinct from the rights of an employee to recover compensation or medical or hospital benefits during his lifetime. * * *
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“We also hold that the law in effect at the time of the employee’s death governs the rights of the dependents. State ex rel. Carlson v. District Court, [131 Minn. 96, 154 N. W. 661 (1915)] ; State ex rel. Globe Ind. Co. v. District Court, 132 Minn. 249, 156 N. W. 120 [1916] ; Soderstrom v. Curry & Whyte, Inc. 143 Minn. *361154, 173 N. W. 649 [1919] ; Warner v. Zaiser, 184 Minn. 598, 239 N. W. 761 [1931]; Ogren v. City of Duluth, 219 Minn. 555, 18 N. W. (2d) 535 [1945]; Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc. 234 Minn. 517, 48 N. W. (2d) 735 [1951].
“We realize that the authorities are not in accord on this question. While decisions from foreign jurisdictions are often of little value unless the statutory provisions upon which the decision is based are the same or similar to ours, it does seem that we follow what might well be designated the minority view. For an annotation on the subject, see 82 A. L. R. 1244.”
The relator asserts that the language of the statute regarding suicide is silent as to the proceedings to which it applies, and argues that since the accident in question occurred prior to the adoption of the statute, it is not covered thereby. She further argues that since the compensation hearing had been commenced and compensation was being paid, her claim was merely a continuation of an existing hearing; that there is only one proceeding for one casualty under the workmen’s compensation law. She further argues that we should distinguish State ex rel. Carlson v. District Court, supra, and other similar cases on the basis that they deal with the payment of additional compensation and statutes governing the quantum of payments and not with the merits of the. right to recover.
To adopt the argument of relator in whole or in part would require a reversal of our prior holdings, and we are not prepared to so do. The language of the statute is clear and explicit and makes suicides which occur after September 1, 1967, noncompensable. This is what occurred under the facts of this case, and we are bound by our prior holdings to apply the law in effect at the date of death.
Relator also attacks the constitutionality of the statute as applied to decedent’s dependents. She contends that it is violative of due process since it destroys existing rights. However, this argument is based on an assumption that there was an existing right under the laws of the State of Minnesota, and as stated *362above, we have consistently held that all of the rights of the dependents are fixed as of the date of death. Therefore, there can be no destruction of rights since none existed at the time of the passage of the statute.
Relator also argues that the statute is violative of equal protection. This poses a narrower and more difficult question. In considering any legislation which is attacked as a denial of equal protection, we apply certain guiding principles which have evolved from many of our cases. The rule is that legislative classification will be held to be constitutionally valid if—
(1) the classification uniformly, without discrimination, applies to and embraces all who are similarly situated with respect to conditions or wants justifying appropriate legislation;
(2) the distinctions which separate those who are included within the classifications from those who are excluded are not manifestly arbitrary or fanciful, but are genuine and substantial so as to provide a natural and reasonable basis in the necessity or circumstances of the members of the classification to justify different legislation adapted to their peculiar conditions and needs; and
(3) the classification is germane or relevant to the purpose of the law; that is, there must be an evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the remedy or regulations therefor which the law purports to provide.2
Another fundamental principle frequently stated is that one alone may constitute a class as well as a thousand, but the fewer there are in a class, the more closely the courts will scrutinize the act to see if its classification constitutes an evasion of the *363constitution. Hamlin v. Ladd, 217 Minn. 249, 14 N. W. 2d 396 (1944); Loew v. Hagerle Brothers, 226 Minn. 485, 33 N. W. 2d 598 (1948).
Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is not unconstitutional where it affects all persons similarly situated and the classification is not arbitrary. Grounds for the discrimination between the persons similarly situated may be slight, the question being primarily for the legislature, and unless it is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable, it will be sustained. State v. International Harvester Co. 241 Minn. 367, 63 N. W. 2d 547, appeal dismissed, 348 U. S. 853, 75 S. Ct. 78, 99 L. ed. 672 (1954).
The general rule to be followed by the court is set forth in 3B Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 1669:
“* * * When the legislature has determined that a sufficient distinction exists between two classes of persons to justify applying rules to one class which do not apply to the other, such determination is binding upon the courts, unless they can point out that the distinction is purely fanciful and arbitrary, and that no substantial or logical basis exists therefor.”
Further, 17B Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 8931, sets forth additional rules to be considered by the court:
“A law is not to be declared unconstitutional by the courts unless palpably so. The power of the courts in this regard is to be exercised only when absolutely necessary, and then with extreme caution. Unless a law is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt it must be sustained.
“Every presumption is invoked in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, and the courts should not declare it unconstitutional except when satisfied, after careful consideration, that it conflicts with some provision of the state or federal constitution.
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“A law is not to be declared unconstitutional merely because the court deems it bad policy or bad economics.”
*364While recent decisions suggest that the United States Supreme Court is scrutinizing challenged statutes more closely than formerly in determining whether a statutory classification bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose,3 it was stated in Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. 406 U. S. 164, 174, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 1406, 31 L. ed. 2d 768, 778 (1972):
“Finally, we are mindful that States have frequently drawn arbitrary lines in workmen’s compensation and wrongful-death statutes to facilitate potentially difficult problems of proof. Nothing in our decision would impose on state court systems a greater burden in this regard.”
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we cannot hold that the statute in question is unconstitutional and a denial of equal protection. While this court may regard this legislation as harsh and regressive because of the fact that Minnesota is the only state to single out suicide as noncompensable, we are compelled by our former decisions to regard the rights of recovery under the Workmen’s Compensation Act as purely creatures of statute, properly subject to legislative action only.
We affirm the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Neither party is allowed costs on this appeal.
Affirmed.

 Ex. Sess. L. 1967, c. 40, § 3.

Loew v. Hagerle Brothers, 226 Minn. 485, 33 N. W. 2d 598 (1948); Hamlin v. Ladd, 217 Minn. 249, 14 N. W. 2d 396 (1944); Eldred v. Division of Employment & Security, 209 Minn. 58, 295 N. W. 412 (1940); Arens v. Village of Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 61 N. W. 2d 508 (1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U. S. 949, 74 S. Ct. 680, 98 L. ed. 1096 (1954); Kellerman v. City of St. Paul, 211 Minn. 351, 1 N. W. 2d 378 (1941); Gardner v. County of Itasca, 280 Minn. 51, 157 N. W. 2d 753 (1968).

 See, James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 2027, 32 L. ed. 2d 600 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. 406 U. S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 31 L. ed. 2d 768 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 31 L. ed. 2d 349 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251, 30 L. ed. 2d 225 (1971).