Court Opinion

ID: 9683777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:36:38.282399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:55.391705
License: Public Domain

ODOM, Judge,
dissenting.
This case should not be reversed. It is true that Craig Valashek, Assistant Probation Officer for Wichita County, was testifying to facts of which he had no personal knowledge but which were obviously evi*273denced by notations in appellant’s file. His testimony was therefore hearsay. Such testimony would be subject to the rule excluding hearsay from consideration as evidence, a rule which has been applied to probation revocation hearings. Maden v. State, 542 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex.Cr.App.). However, there was no objection to the State’s attempt to introduce appellant’s probation records through Valashek’s hearsay testimony. This Court has frequently held that hearsay is without probative value, even if admitted without objection. See Lumpkin v. State, 524 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex.Cr.App.); Reynolds v. State, 489 S.W.2d 866, 872 (Tex.Cr.App.); Cherb v. State, 472 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Tex.Cr.App.). Hearsay testimony admitted at probation revocation hearings has fallen within that rule. Maden v. State, supra. I submit that we should reconsider these rules and hold that hearsay testimony admitted without objection at a probation revocation hearing should be accorded the same probative value as other evidence and may be considered in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment revoking probation.
Texas and Georgia are the only two jurisdictions which have followed the rule that unobjected to hearsay testimony has no probative value and will not support a judgment. See Lumpkin v. State, 524 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex.Cr.App.); Henry v. Phillips, 105 Tex. 459, 151 S.W. 533 (1912); Eastlick v. Southern Ry. Co., 116 Ga. 48, 42 S.E. 499 (1902). See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 890 (1961). In addition, a few courts have held that hearsay testimony admitted without objection will not support a criminal conviction where it is the only evidence to sustain the conviction. See Glenn v. United States, 271 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1959); State v. Allien, 366 So.2d 1308 (La.1978) (hearsay recanted in-court by out-of-court declar-ants); People v. Hines, 12 Ill.App.3d 582, 299 N.E.2d 581 (1973) (hearsay expressly contradicted by testimony of defendant). In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, however, hearsay admitted without objection is accorded probative value and may be considered by the triers of fact for whatever it is worth logically. This extends to allowing such evidence to constitute sufficient evidence of the commission of an offense or a vital element of an offense. See, e. g., Turentine v. State, 384 N.E.2d 1119, 1121 (Ind.Ct.App.1979); People v. Maciejewski, 68 Mich.App. 1, 241 N.W.2d 736 (1976); State v. Charles, 538 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Mo.Ct.App.1976); Robinson v. State, 17 Md.App. 451, 302 A.2d 659, 665 (1973). See generally Annot., 79 A.L. R.2d 890 (1961). Long ago, courts which adhere to the majority rule spelled out why unobjected to hearsay may be relied upon to sustain a verdict or finding:
“The hearsay rule is merely an exclusionary principle limiting its admissibility and in no sense a canon of relevancy — its probative force, where admitted without objection, being for the jury and not for the court to determine . . . ‘Hearsay evidence usually is rejected because it lacks the corroboration of an oath or affirmation, and not because it has no material tendency to induce belief.’ ”
State v. White, 215 S.C. 450, 55 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1949). And, similarly:
“Hearsay evidence may accurately portray a given set of circumstances. The reasons which exclude such a portrayal do not detract from its truth or accurateness. These reasons are the legal barriers which have been erected by the law, and which, in the interest of justice, the parties may move aside. Under this reasoning the evidence is then competent to the full extent of such probative value as it may have under all the circumstances.”
Poluski v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 286 Pa. 473, 133 A. 819, 820 (1926). Furthermore, it has been said of hearsay that “if relevancy were not assumed, no special rule of exclusion would be required.” Barlow v. Verrill, 88 N.H. 25, 183 A. 857, 859 (1936). We agree with the rationale which underlies the majority rule.
In the area of probation revocation, the courts show still greater liberality in upholding the admission of hearsay testimony.
Clearly, this liberality is attributable largely to the different procedural and *274evidentiary standards applicable to a prosecution for a criminal offense and to a hearing for revocation of probation, which is administrative, not criminal, in nature. The prior decisions of this Court have established, for instance, that a probationer does not have a right to trial by jury at a revocation hearing,1 that the decision of a court to revoke may be supported by uncorroborated accomplice testimony,2 that in a probation revocation proceeding the State need only prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence,3 and that double jeopardy provisions are not applicable to probation revocation proceedings.4 Some jurisdictions, of course, take the logical position that unob-jected to hearsay testimony alone will support an order revoking probation. See State v. Welch, 114 R.I. 187, 330 A.2d 400, 402 (1975). Moreover, numerous opinions have gone further and have allowed hearsay testimony to form the basis of a revocation order even when the testimony has been objected to when offered at the hearing. See, e. g., United States v. Pattman, 535 F.2d 1062, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); State v. Belcher, 111 Ariz. 580, 535 P.2d 1297, 1298-99 (1975) (hearsay admissible under statute); State v. Welch, supra. Contra, Robbins v. State, 318 So.2d 472 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975). Further, one of the courts which has held elsewhere that unob-jected to hearsay alone will not support a conviction has indicated that the result might be different in the context of probation revocation. People v. White, 33 Ill. App.3d 523, 338 N.E.2d 81, 86 (1975). None of the authorities reviewed from majority rule jurisdictions have held squarely that unobjected to hearsay testimony lacks sufficient probativeness to support an order revoking probation. The authorities discussed herein provide ample support for the limited holding which I propose today. I would hold that hearsay testimony admitted without objection at a probation revocation hearing has probative value and may constitute sufficient evidence in support of an order revoking probation. Our conflicting holding in Maden v. State, 542 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex.Cr.App.), should be overruled.
The rule discussed herein would not in any way affect the requirement that any hearsay testimony admitted must be sufficiently reliable and trustworthy before it may be accorded probative value on the issue whether a probationer has violated the conditions of his probation. Usually, this requirement will be satisfied when, as in the case at bar, the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the hearsay evidence which he has offered. See Hol-dren v. People, 168 Colo. 474, 452 P.2d 28, 30 (1969); Moore v. Stamps, 507 S.W.2d 939, 949 (Mo.Ct.App.1974). Applying these considerations to the hearsay testimony offered by the witness Valashek at appellant’s probation revocation hearing, the testimony was sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to form the basis of the order revoking probation. The evidence introduced at appellant’s revocation hearing was sufficient to support the action of the trial judge in entering the order revoking appellant’s probation.
I respectfully dissent.
DOUGLAS, TOM G. DAVIS and W. C. DAVIS, JJ., join this opinion.

. E. g., Hulsey v. State, 447 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.Cr.App.).

. E. g., Barnes v. State, 467 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.Cr.App.).

. E. g., Kelly v. State, 483 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Cr.App.).

. Davenport v. State, 574 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.Cr.App.).