Court Opinion

ID: 7820568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:53:05.391616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:43.755709
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. The majority has again displayed clairvoyant powers which I, as of this date, have been unable to achieve. They have held that appellant voluntarily left her work without good cause. The first thing we should do is look at the facts. Appellant had been employed for the appellee for almost four years when she approached the appellee, her employer, on March 15, 1977, and requested a raise because she was making a salary different from the other employees and stated she needed more money. Appellee denied her request for a wage increase and thereupon she informed appellee that she would begin to look for a new job on her off-hours and during her lunch break. She specifically stated she wanted to continue to work while she sought new employment. The next afternoon, March 16, 1977, appellant was informed by appellee that she could not search for a new job while employed by them. Her contract of employment was terminated and she was given two weeks severance pay. Appellant made claim for unemployment benefits, and the Arkansas Employment Security Division denied her claim on the grounds that she had voluntarily left her last employment without good cause. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1106 states: Disqualification for benefits. — For all claims filed on and after July 1, 1973, if so found by the Director an individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (a) Voluntarily leaving work. If he voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work, left his last work, such disqualification shall continue until, subsequent to filing his claim, he had had at least thirty (30) days of covered employment. Provided no individual shall be disqualified under this subsection if, after making reasonable efforts to preserve his job rights, he left his last work due to a personal emergency of such nature and compelling urgency that it would be contrary to good conscience to impose a disqualification. . . Disqualification, under this statute, is conditioned upon the employee voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work leaving the employment. It is true appellant expressed dissatisfaction with her wages and indicated she intended to look elsewhere for a better paying job. So far as I have been able to determine, there is no statutory prohibition against looking for another job. It may be true that her employment would have developed into an unsatisfactory relationship and she could have subsequently been fired for cause in such event; however, if we are going to speculate, as the majority do, we might as well speculate that she would have cooled down, changed her mind, and continued the job which she had held for almost four years. There is no evidence that her work had been unsatisfactory up until this time. The majority in this case simply fail to construe the law in accordance with its plain meaning and go so far as to penalize appellant for being honest and truthful with her employer. The very foundation and purpose of the Act is to allow a person, who is discharged without good cause connected with the work, to be able to draw a meager subsistence while seeking other employment. Appellant has been denied that right in this case. In my opinion, the majority clearly disregards the plain meaning of the words and the intent of this statute. Therefore, I would reverse and remand with directions to allow appellant to collect her unemployment benefits. Hickman, J., joins in the dissent.