Court Opinion

ID: 9698428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:50:08.666998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:40.906215
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
Although I agree with the majority that appellant was incorrectly sentenced on the attempted burglary charge, I should go further and grant appellant a new trial because, *515when he pleaded guilty, he was deprived of his right to effective counsel.1
The majority correctly notes that in Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 258 Pa.Super. 183, 392 A.2d 745 (1978), we held that if it would have been a conflict of interest for one public defender to represent more than one defendant, it would have been equally a conflict for two or more public defenders from the same office to do so. The majority then goes on, however, to reject appellant’s two specific allegations of conflict of interest. I agree with the majority that appellant’s first allegation, that as part of a coordinated strategy with his co-defendant he had to abandon a good defense to the charge of escape, is not supported by the record. I have much more difficulty, however, with the majority’s treatment of appellant’s second allegation, that his counsel’s advice to plead guilty did not constitute effective representation because it was motivated by counsel’s knowledge that since appellant and his co-defendant had implicated each other to the police, it might be necessary for counsel to attack the credibility of the co-defendant, i. e., of his fellow counsel’s client. The majority believes that appellant waived consideration of this second allegation because he did not also allege that his guilty plea was involuntary or unknowing. However, we are not to read a PCHA petition as though it had to follow common law rules of pleading. Appellant is saying that he pleaded guilty on the basis of counsel’s advice, but that that advise was tainted by conflict of interest. To me, this is a clear allegation that appellant did not plead guilty intelligently. Furthermore, in Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 318 A.2d 354 (1974), the *516leading case, the appellant had pleaded guilty on the basis of advice he later alleged to be tainted by a conflict of interest. While the Court did not explicitly deal with the question of whether the guilty plea was therefore not intelligent, once it concluded that there was a conflict of interest, it invalidated the plea. We should, therefore, consider appellant’s allegation on the merits.
On the merits, Breaker is again instructive. The Court there believed that the appellant had “amply demonstrated the possibility of harm” resulting from his sharing counsel with a co-defendant who had previously implicated him. 456 Pa. at 345, 318 A.2d at 356. The Court stated:
In the instant case there was no other choice open to Mangold’s attorney [Mangold was the co-defendant; his attorney also represented the appellant, Breaker] but to advise appellant to plead guilty. Had appellant pleaded not guilty, counsel would then have been confronted with the necessity of cross-examining the “implicating” client, Frank Mangold. By doing so, counsel might well have violated his duty to Mangold.
456 Pa. 346 n. 3, 318 A.2d 356 n. 3.
The facts here reveal a similar problem. Although appellant and his co-defendant, Robert Defrain, were represented in the bulk of the proceedings by two different attorneys, the attorneys worked closely together. There were at least four or five meetings at which appellant, his co-defendant and both attorneys were present. N.T. at 8, 22, 29, 42, 43 (PCHA Hearing, Feb. 1, 1978). Moreover, both attorneys were aware that appellant and his co-defendant had implicated each other to the police. N.T. at 33, 34. Indeed, at one point Def rain’s attorney, Thomas James, said that he had suggested the possibility of testifying to Defrain, but that Defrain did not want to testify against appellant because they were “very close friends.” N.T. at 43.
Whether Defrain would or would not have testified against appellant is obviously unknowable. Nevertheless, if *517Defrain had chosen to implicate appellant at trial, appellant’s counsel, Cleveland Hummel, would have been in a difficult position. He would have owed appellant a duty to cross-examine Defrain vigorously. Yet this would have been difficult because Hummel was affiliated with James and had planned the case with him. In short, as appellant’s counsel, Hummel had a strong incentive to urge appellant to plead guilty. This alone, I suggest, is enough to show a “possibility of harm” in Hummel’s representation of appellant.
There is additional evidence of a conflict of interest. Initially, James represented both appellant and Defrain. Within a month of their arrest, he withdrew as appellant’s counsel because, as he wrote appellant, “there will possibly be a conflict of interest with one attorney representing both of you.” N.T. at 41. Although James’s letter did not elaborate on the conflict he foresaw, it remains a highly probative admission of conflict. The legal profession recognizes that a lawyer is a good judge of whether a conflict of interest exists. See Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B) (“A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, . . . ”). In Commonwealth v. Knight, 245 Pa.Super. 337, 343, 369 A.2d 431, 434 (1976), (concurring opinion), where the conflict of interest issue was close, I especially noted the fact that the attorney had expressed a desire to withdraw from the case. Here, it is to be regretted that upon perceiving a possible conflict, James chose to turn appellant’s case over to his colleague, Hummel, who accepted it.2
I should grant appellant a new trial.

. The majority assumes without discussion that appellant may raise the ineffectiveness claim before us, in spite of the fact that his trial counsel was remiss in not filing a petition to withdraw the guilty plea. It is generally proper procedure when challenging a guilty plea to file a petition to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 251 Pa.Super. 36, 379 A.2d 319 (1977). However, in Commonwealth v. Strader, 262 Pa.Super. 166, 396 A.2d 697 (1978), we held that where the appellant’s PCHA petition claimed that he was unlawfully induced to plead guilty because of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, trial counsel’s failure to file a petition to withdraw did not constitute a waiver of the ineffectiveness claim.

. Hummel testified that he and James are the only two public defenders in Columbia County. He also testified that the court had appointed outside counsel where there were conflicts involving more than two defendants, but that where there were only two defendants, “we take both of them.” N.T. at 27. This policy, I submit, should be reconsidered.