Court Opinion

ID: 9560879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:58:16.621042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:18.009308
License: Public Domain

FLETCHER, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially.
Rather than interpreting the employment “contract” between the chief magistrate and assistant magistrate, I would rely on the intent of the appointing authority in deciding whether the assistant magistrate serves in a full-time capacity when the order of appointment is silent on the issue. Because the undisputed evidence shows that the chief magistrate intended to appoint Blackmon to the part-time position of assistant magistrate, I conclude that the commissioner is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Georgia General Assembly created a statewide system of magistrate courts in 1983, as required by the Georgia Constitution, to replace the justice of the peace courts.1 The Georgia Code provides that the chief magistrate shall be elected by the voters of the county, and the chief magistrate shall appoint other magistrates with the consent of the superior court judges unless otherwise provided by local law.2 OCGA § 15-10-23 sets the minimum salary for both magistrates who serve in a full-time capacity and those who serve in less *438than a full-time capacity.3 The statute does not define who is a full-time or part-time magistrate; rather, it merely establishes that a magistrate must work at least 40 hours a week to be eligible for the minimum annual salary for full-time magistrates.
Decided May 30, 2000.
Jenkins & Nelson, G. Carey Nelson III, Peter R. Olson, for appellants.
Wood, Odom & Edge, Arthur B. Edge TV, for appellee.
Since there are several assistant magistrates who have filed lawsuits claiming that they are entitled to pay as a full-time magistrate because they work full-time for the magistrate court, I would establish a broader rule of law than the majority opinion does. I conclude that the better approach is to determine the magistrate’s status based on the appointing authority’s intent rather than the magistrate’s duties, job performance, or employment contract. Therefore, I would hold that the intent of the chief magistrate who makes the appointment under OCGA § 15-10-20 (d) controls in deciding whether a magistrate serves in a full-time capacity when the appointment order fails to cover the issue.
In this case, the chief magistrate appointed Penny Blackmon as an assistant magistrate judge of the Magistrate Court of Bartow County. He states that the assistant magistrate position is part-time and that he appointed Blackmon to be a part-time magistrate. Blackmon does not dispute her designation as an assistant magistrate or the fact that assistant magistrates generally work part time. Since the undisputed evidence shows that the chief magistrate intended to appoint Blackmon to the part-time position of assistant magistrate, I concur with the majority that the trial court should have granted summary judgment to the county.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham and Justice Hunstein join in this special concurrence.

 See Ga. Const, art. VI, sec. X, para. I (1983); 1983 Ga. Laws 884.

 See OCGA § 15-10-20 (d).

 See OCGA § 15-10-23 (a) & (c).