Court Opinion

ID: 9707772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:20:57.495653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:38.003347
License: Public Domain

WATHEN, Justice,
with whom ROBERTS and CLIFFORD, JJ., join dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. In Faucher v. City of Auburn, 465 A.2d 1120 (Me.1983), we dealt with a notice that was deficient in three respects: “it was oral, it was not addressed to the proper person, and it did not give notice that a claim for damages was being made.” Id. at 1122-23. In that case, we concluded that those three deficiencies, “taken together, result in a failure of substantial compliance with the notice requirements of the statute.” Id. at 1123 (emphasis added). Because the case before us involves only two of the three defects presented in Faucher, we are compelled to draw a finer line. The statement obtained from Mr. Hall was in writing, but it was given to the adjuster for the Town’s insurance carrier rather than one of the selectmen or assessors. Moreover, it is clear that the written statement obtained from Mr. Hall does not include a statement of the amount of monetary damages claimed, as required by 14 M.R.S.A. § 8107(1)(E). Admittedly, the notice is defective in form. The question is not, as the Court seems to believe, whether the Hall’s statement can be distinguished from “any statement taken by an insurance adjuster.” Rather, the question is whether the information provided by that statement substantially complies with the requirements of section 8107.
Although we observed in Faucher that notice to a teacher and school principal of a claim against the city was not in compliance with the statute, our holding was premised upon the additional fact that we were dealing with an alleged oral notice. In a more recent case involving a written notice of claim against a county and the sheriff, we found substantial compliance even though the notice was delivered to the sheriff rather than to one of the county commissioners, their clerk, or the county treasurer as required by M.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(4). Robinson v. Washington County, 529 A.2d 1357 (Me.1987). We noted that the purpose of the statute “is to assure that the notice will be received by an official having authority to deal with plaintiffs’ claim or that the official receiving the notice is one charged with the duty of transmitting the notice to the proper officials.” Id. at 1360 (quoting Faucher, 465 A.2d at 1123). In light of that purpose, it is difficult to imagine a more efficacious notice *665than the one which was provided to the Town’s insurer in this case. Ordinarily the notice would first be given to one of the Town Selectmen, who would in turn forward it to the insurer. Here, because the insurer received a report of the accident from the Town, the insurer obtained the information directly. It is hard to imagine that the substance of the notice requirement has not been fulfilled in this regard.
Similarly, the remaining defect should not bar a finding of substantial compliance. In Faucher the alleged oral notice did not include the assertion of any claim much less a statement of monetary damages. Here, the only element missing is a statement of monetary damages claimed. The written statement otherwise contains a full description of plaintiffs’ injuries, complaints, and loss of work and identifies the treating physician. Even when taken together with the defect in delivery I am not persuaded that the failure to state the amount of damages claimed requires a reversal of the Superior Court’s finding of substantial compliance. I would affirm.