Court Opinion

ID: 9671887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:44:30.387953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:12.785979
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Smith
dissenting in part.
I agree with' the holding of the majority in every respect with the exception of its holding to the effect that this is a case where the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal, and, therefore, a writ of mandamus will not issue to forestall or to correct errors of a trial court, even though the trial court could have in this case entered no judgment other than one of mistrial. I think that where the trial court, as in this case, clearly acted in viola*369tion of its duty under the law in refusing to declare a mistrial, the writ of mandamus should issue commanding the judge to perform its duty and enter the only judgment it could legally enter which was one declaring a mistrial. See Terrell v. Greene, 88 Texas 539, 31 S.W. 631. When it has been definitely determined that a court has acted in violation of the law, then the fact that a right of appeal might exist does not mean that the losing party must resort to such remedy. In a situation such as we have here this Court should not hesitate to cause the writ of mandamus to issue, or follow the practice adopted in Womack v. Berry 156 Texas 44, 291 S.W. 2d 677, and other cases heretofore decided, wherein this Court assumed that the trial court would enter proper orders in accordance with the opinion and for that reason alone the writ did not issue. The opinions referred to, however, make it clear that the clerk should issue the appropriate writs in the event the trial court failed to enter the proper order.
Rule 174(b), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a trial court some discretion in separating causes of action, et cetera, does not extend to the separation of an indivisible cause of action such as we have here. A trial court has no discretion except to grant a mistrial where the suit constitutes an indivisible cause of action. The action, therefore, of the trial court in entering its order severing the damage issue, which is a material issue of an indivisible cause of action, is not authorized under Rule 174 (b), supra. It follows that the interlocutory order of severance is void, and any proceedings other than the entry of an order declaring a mistrial would be a nullity. The majority admits this to be true, but insists that the writ of mandamus should not issue, assigning as a reason therefor that the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal. It is my position that since the issues involved in this case are indivisible, and since the verdict of the jury was incomplete, the trial judge had no discretion in the matter. There is nothing in dispute and no necessity exists for compelling the relator to resort to appellate appeal from a void and useless act. I do not mean to indicate herein in any way that the trial judge will act contrary to the views expressed in the majority opinion, but I do say that the majority opinion unnecessarily leaves the way open for contrary action to be taken.
This Court in the case of Womack v. Berry, supra, recognized that the rule denying mandamus with respect to matters of a discretionary character is not without limitation, and held that the writ may issue in a proper case to correct a clear abuse *370of discretion. This Court in announcing that the rule denying mandamus was subject to limitations had just said in the preceding paragraph “* * * And it has been held that the determination of the issues of severance invokes the discretionary or judicial powers of the trial court and is not subject to control by mandamus.” It is my contention that if the writ may issue in a proper case to correct a clear abuse of discretion, most assuredly it will issue in a proper case such as this where the judge has no discretion to act but one way. Our decision in this case and the opinions of this Court in the past renders it clear that the trial judge did not have the power or authority to order a severance of the trial of issues in this indivisible cause of action. Under the record, mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the trial judge to perform the specific duty required by law, which is, in this instance, to enter its order declaring a mistrial. The right of mandamus being clearly established, it follows that the question of adequate remedy by appeal becomes immaterial. Having the power to issue the writ of mandamus directing the judge of the 14th Judicial District to proceed to grant relator’s motion for mistrial, we necessarily have the power and should issue, if necessary, the writ of prohibition and injunction permanently restraining said judge from proceeding to trial on the severed damage issue. We have the power under the Constitution to issue all writs necessary to enforce our jurisdiction to the end that the trial court will proceed with the trial of this case, unimpeded by the orders or possible orders of any other court. See Cleveland v. Ward , 116 Texas 1, 285 S.W. 1063. This power precludes any idea of remedy by appeal.
This case is beyond the point where it can be tried according to the best judgment of the trial court or the Court of Civil Appeals. But, the question here involved must be determined by this Court. We have determined the primary issue in favor of the relator. The void act of the judge in this case can be and should be revised by the writ of mandamus. See Terrell v. Greene, supra.
I would grant the writ of mandamus and all ancillary writs necessary, unless the trial judge voluntarily responded by entering the order declaring a mistrial and proceeded in all things in' accordance with this dissent, and consistent with the law as announced in the majority opinion on the questions other than the question of granting of the writ of mandamus. I concur with the majority in part and dissent in part.
Opinion delivered March 19, 1958.
Rehearing overruled, April 23, 1958.