Court Opinion

ID: 2964916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:55.727766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:26.230418
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
          No. 97-1036
                                   UNITED STATES,
                                      Appellee,
                                         v.
                                   KEVIN WHIFFEN,
                               Defendant - Appellant.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
                   [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                             Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                             and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                _____________________
               Bjorn Lange, Assistant Federal Defender, for appellant.
               Jean 
                    B. 
                       Weld, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
          Paul M. Gagnon, United States Attorney, and Peter E. Papps, First
          Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
                                ____________________
                                  August 29, 1997
                                ____________________

                    TORRUELLA,  Chief  Judge. Defendant-appellant Kevin
          Whiffen ("Whiffen") was tried and convicted on four counts of
          transmitting threatening communications in interstate commerce in
          violation of 18 U.S.C. S 875(c). Whiffen now appeals, arguing that
          the indictment failed to allege an offense, that the court should
          have granted his motion under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
          Criminal Procedure for a judgment of acquittal on all counts, and
          that the court erred in its jury instructions. We affirm.
                                   I. Background
                    In 1993, Whiffen, a resident of New Hampshire, was
          driving a car that was involved in a two-vehicle accident in Rhode
          Island. The other car was insured by Allstate Insurance
          ("Allstate"). Allstate paid a claim to its insured and sought
          reimbursement from Whiffen in the amount of approximately $11,000.
          The claim was eventually turned over to Universal Fidelity
          Corporation ("UFC"), located in Florida, for collection. On
          October 11, 1995, UFC sent a letter to Whiffen, informing him that
          the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles had been notified of
          his failure to pay and warning that if he failed to pay the claim
          within thirty days, he risked losing his license.
                    On October 17, 1995, Whiffen returned a telephone call
          from Kelly Terrell ("Terrell"), a UFC collector. During the call,
          Whiffen was "very belligerent," and when Terrell stated that she
          could have Whiffen's license suspended, Whiffen said that "the
          building will go boom." At that point, Terrell disconnected the
          line.
                                         -2-

                    Several minutes later, Whiffen called back. The call was
          transferred to Terrell, and Whiffen told her that "the building
          will go boom."
                    Whiffen called back a third time, speaking on this
          occasion with Anna Walls ("Walls") of UFC. He asked that a message
          be relayed to Terrell that "buildings go boom boom."
                    On the evening of October 17, 1995, Walls' supervisor,
          Mark Gallo ("Gallo"), called Whiffen to confirm the name of his
          attorney and to ask him to pay his bill. Gallo asked Whiffen if he
          intended to drive to Florida and blow up the building. Whiffen
          responded that he had friends in Florida who would "take care of it
          for him."
                    As a result of Whiffen's statements, UFC closed their
          file on Whiffen and returned the account to Allstate. On
          October 29, 1995, Whiffen telephoned Allstate's Bedford, New
          Hampshire office. The call was automatically transferred to Sheryl
          Johnson, a manager at Allstate's St. Petersburg, Florida office.
          Whiffen told her that "Allstate had better stop messing with me or
          else I'm going to blow up their building."
                              II. The Requisite Intent
                    Although Whiffen makes several claims on appeal, all of
          them turn on the question of whether the threats made by Whiffen
          constitute threats to the person of another. In order to resolve
          this question, we must determine the intent necessary for
          conviction under section 875.
                                         -3-

                    The centerpiece of Whiffen's appeal is the claim that 18
          U.S.C. S 875(c) is a specific intent crime. In other words, in
          order to obtain a conviction, the government must prove that the
          defendant intended his communication to be received as a threat.
          In support of this view, Whiffen cites 
                                                United States
                                                              v. 
                                                                 Twine, 853
          F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988). In  Twine, the Ninth Circuit concluded
          that "the showing of an intent to threaten, required by S 875(c)
          . . . is a showing of specific intent."  Id. at 680.
                    Other circuits, however, disagree with 
                                                          Twine. In  United
          States v. 
                   DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1992), for example, the
          Sixth Circuit concluded that "S 875(c) does not require specific
          intent in regard to the threat element of the offense, but only
          general intent."  Id. at 150. Under a general intent standard,
          whether a communication is a "true threat" is determined
          objectively from all the surrounding facts and circumstances,
          rather than from the defendant's subjective purpose. A general
          intent standard has also been adopted by three other circuits. 
                                                                        See
          United 
                 States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 81 (5th Cir. 1997),   United
          States v. Himelwright, 42 F.2d 777, 782-83 (3d Cir. 1994), United
          States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1063-66 (4th Cir. 1994),     cert.
          denied, 514 U.S. 1097 (1995). The test espoused in these cases is
          stated in Darby:
                              
           Even within the Ninth Circuit there is some question about the
          continuing validity of Twine.  See United 
                                                    States v. King, 920 F.
          Supp. 1978, 1079-80 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (suggesting that       Twine
          conflicts with both prior and subsequent Ninth Circuit precedent).
                                         -4-

                      [T]o establish a violation of section
                      875(c), the government must establish that
                      the defendant intended to transmit the
                      interstate communication and that the
                      communication contained a true threat.
                      Whether a communication in fact contains a
                      true threat is determined by the
                      interpretation of a reasonable recipient
                      familiar with the context of the
                      communication. The government does not
                      have to prove that the defendant
                      subjectively intended for this recipient
                      to understand the communication as a
                      threat.
          Darby, 37 F.3d at 1066. Our sister circuits have also considered
          what constitutes a "true threat" under other federal threat
          statutes.  See United 
                                States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st
          Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).
                    Although the intent requirement of section 875(c) has not
          previously been decided by this court, we recently had occasion to
          determine the requisite intent under a different threat statute, 18
          U.S.C. S 115(a)(1)(B), which criminalizes threats directed at
          federal agents.
                    In determining what constitutes a "true threat," the
          Fulmer panel found the governing standard to be "whether [the
          defendant] should have reasonably foreseen that the statement he
          uttered would be taken as a threat by those to whom it is made."
          Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491. This test takes into consideration the
          context in which the remark was made and avoids the risk that an
          otherwise innocuous statement might become a threat if directed at
          an unusually sensitive listener. This approach also protects
          listeners from statements that are reasonably interpreted as
          threats, even if the speaker lacks the subjective, specific intent
                                         -5-

          to threaten, or, as would be more common, the government is unable
          to prove such specific intent which, by its nature, is difficult to
          demonstrate. 
                    For these reasons, we believe that the logic of Fulmer,
          which considered 18 U.S.C. S 115(a)(1)(B), applies with full force
          to 18 U.S.C. S 875, and we adopt the same standard for the latter
          statute. In doing so, we are also aligning ourselves with the
          majority view of our sister circuits, as discussed supra. Having
          established that section 875(c) requires only a general intent, we
          are able to engage each of Whiffen's specific claims.
                         III. Failure to Allege an Offense
                    Whiffen's first claim of error relates to his pre-trial
          motion, under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
          Procedure, to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege an
          offense. Whiffen was charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. S 875(c)
          which prohibits the transmission in interstate commerce of "any
          threat to injure the person of another." The indictment alleges
          that Whiffen made such a communication when he stated that "[y]our
          building will go boom"; "the building will go boom"; "buildings go
          boom"; and "Allstate had better stop messing with me or else I'm
          going to blow up their building."
                    On appeal, Whiffen argues that his motion to dismiss
          should have been granted on the grounds that the indictment "fails
          to allege 'unequivocal, unconditional and specific expressions of
          intention immediately to inflict injury' to another person." Brief
                                         -6-

          of Appellant at 7 (quoting 
                                    United States
                                                  v. 
                                                     Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020,
          1027 (2d Cir. 1976)).
                    Having determined that specific intent is not the
          standard under which Whiffen's statements should be judged, it is
          clear that the failure to allege specific intent is not grounds for
          dismissal. "[A]n indictment is sufficiently particular if it
          elucidates the elements of a crime, enlightens a defendant as to
          the nature of the charges against which she must defend, and
          enables her to plead double jeopardy in bar of future prosecutions
          for the same offense."  United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161,
          1192 (1st Cir. 1993); 
                               see also
                                        Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). Although
          the four counts contain slightly different wording, we present only
          Count I, which is representative of the other counts. Count I
          states that:
                      On or about October 17, 1995, in the
                      District of New Hampshire, the defendant,
                      Kevin Whiffen knowingly and willfully
                      transmitted in interstate commerce between
                      Farmington, New Hampshire and Tampa,
                      Florida, a communication containing a
                      threat to injure Kelly Terrell and other
                      employees of Universal Fidelity
                      Corporation, Tampa, Florida, to wit, "Your
                      building will go boom." All in violation
                      of Title 18, United States Code, Section
                      875(c).
          It is our view that the indictment states the offense for which
          Whiffen has been convicted. The elements of the crime are
          elucidated and the indictment is sufficient to plead double
          jeopardy should future prosecutions be brought against Whiffen for
          the same offense. The indictment basically tracks the language of
          section 875(c), which states: "Whoever transmits in interstate or
                                         -7-

          foreign commerce any communication containing . . . any threat to
          injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title and
          imprisoned for not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C.
          S 875(c). We find the indictment to be sufficient.  See 
                                                                  Darby, 37
          F.3d at 1063.
                    Appellant also argues that the indictment is inadequate
          because it "alleges threats that a building or buildings would 'go
          boom.' . . . It does not allege that any person would be present
          or hurt by any such explosion." Brief of Appellant at 6. The
          indictment does, however, allege that each of the threats was a
          threat to injure the person of another. In Count I, for example,
          it is stated that the communication contained "a threat to injure
          Kelly Terrell and other employees of Universal Fidelity
          Corporation." Whiffen's argument appears to be that threats to
          blow up the building are, as a matter of law, not threats against
          a person. Like the district court, we are unwilling to conclude
          that his words did not contain a threat to injure a person. One
          possible interpretation of a threat to blow up a building is that
          the building will be blown up with people inside. Such an
          interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the threat was a
          threat against those who work in the building. Alternatively, such
          a threat may be interpreted as a threat to blow up the building
          only when it is empty. Under this interpretation, Whiffen's
          statement would not constitute a threat against a person. The
          proper interpretation of Whiffen's remarks, however, is a question
          of fact and, therefore, appropriately left for the jury. We cannot
                                         -8-

          conclude that the interpretation preferred by Whiffen is, as a
          matter of law, the correct one.
                    Whiffen argues that we must interpret section 875(c)
          narrowly in order to avoid violation of his First Amendment rights.
          In support, he cites Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969),
          in which the defendant was accused of threatening the President.
          The primary concern of the Court in  Watts was the protection of
          constitutionally protected political speech.  See id. at 706-08.
          Whiffen does not claim that his statements were a form of political
          speech.
                    In any event, a true threat is not protected by the First
          Amendment.  See  Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1492-93;   United 
                                                                 States v.
          Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990). For this
          reason, a conviction upon a finding that the statements were true
          threats would not violate Whiffen's constitutionally protected
          right to speech.
                             IV.  Judgment of Acquittal
                    Whiffen also appeals the denial of his motion, under Rule
          29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for a judgment of
          acquittal on all counts. We review the district court's ruling
          deferentially, considering the evidence "in the light most
          compatible with the verdict, resolv[ing] all credibility disputes
          in the verdict's favor, and then reach[ing] a judgment about
          whether a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable
          doubt." United States
                                v. 
                                   Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 974 (1st Cir. 1995).
                                         -9-

                    Whiffen claims that even under this deferential standard,
          the evidence "failed to prove a true threat to injure 'the person
          of another.'" Brief of Appellant at 8. This argument is,
          ultimately, a claim that the words spoken -- on which there is no
          dispute -- did not constitute a true threat. Specifically, Whiffen
          argues that "any reasonable person familiar with the context of
          those statements could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that they
          were true threats under S 875(c). They were frustrated,
          inarticulate, and empty words." Brief of Appellant at 10.
                    There is no dispute that Whiffen made the statements,
          there is disagreement only with respect to their proper
          interpretation. Whether or not Whiffen's statements were true
          threats is determined by applying the 
                                               Fulmer test discussed above.
          At trial, the government presented testimony that Terrell notified
          two supervisors about Whiffen's call, and informed Stacie Thompson,
          the person responsible for incoming mail, to "be very careful with
          any packages coming in from this area because there was a bomb
          threat." Tr., April 9, 1996, at 41. Both Terrell and Walls
          testified that this was the only bomb threat they had ever received
          while working in claims collection. Walls, who has fifteen years
          experience in third party collections, testified that by Whiffen's
          third call she was afraid. Joseph Suozzo, a claim manager in
          Allstate's Bedford, New Hampshire office, testified that, in
          reaction to the phone calls from Whiffen, a security guard was
          hired for the Bedford office and the claim against Whiffen was not
          pursued. This evidence regarding the reaction of the listeners is
                                        -10-

          not conclusive, but it does suggest that at least these individuals
          perceived the statements to be threats.
                    Faced with this evidence, as well as the content of the
          statements and other contextual information, a reasonable jury
          could have found that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen
          that the statement he uttered would be taken as a threat by those
          to whom it was made. For that reason, we affirm the denial of
          Whiffen's motion for judgments of acquittal on all counts.
                    With respect to count four, Whiffen argues that he was
          unaware that his in-state call was re-routed to Florida. His lack
          of knowledge, however, does not constitute a defense. "[W]hile the
          Government was required to prove that [the defendant]'s phone call
          crossed a state line (a fact not in dispute here), the Government
          did not need to prove that [the defendant] knew of the interstate
          nexus."  Darby, 37 F.3d at 1067.
                                V. Jury Instructions
                    Finally, Whiffen challenges the jury instructions. He
          claims error in the district court's failure to instruct the jury
          that violation of section 875(c) is a specific intent crime. In
          our discussion of this issue, 
                                       supra section II, we determined that
          section 875(c) is a general intent crime. The failure to provide
          instructions to the effect that it is a specific intent crime,
          therefore, cannot be error.
                    Whiffen makes the additional argument that the jury
          instructions failed to meet the requirements of Fulmer. We turn,
          therefore, to consider whether the requirements set forth in that
                                        -11-

          opinion, which we have determined apply in this case, were
          satisfied by the district court.
                    Fulmer instructs that "the appropriate standard under
          which a defendant may be convicted for making a threat is whether
          he should have reasonably foreseen that the statement he uttered
          would be taken as a threat by those to whom it is made."  Fulmer,
          108 F.3d at 1491.
                    The jury instructions actually given in the instant case
          were:
                      To sustain its burden with regard to the
                      second element the government must prove
                      beyond a reasonable doubt that the
                      communication contained a threat. A
                      threat is a serious statement or
                      communication expressing an intention to
                      inflict bodily injury upon another person
                      which, under the surrounding
                      circumstances, and in context, would cause
                      apprehension in a reasonable person that
                      the person making the threat will act on
                      it. A criminal threat must be
                      distinguished from words used as mere idle
                      or careless talk, hyperbole, exaggeration,
                      or something said in a joking manner.
                      Those are not threats within the meaning
                      of the statute involved in this case. In
                      other words, the communication must be
                      unconditional and a true threat or one
                      properly perceived by a reasonable person
                      as a real or genuine threat to injure
                      another. The government has the burden of
                      proving beyond a reasonable doubt that an
                      ordinary reasonable person, familiar with
                      the context and circumstances surrounding
                      the communication, would interpret the
                      communication as a genuine threat to
                      injure another person. . . . The
                      government is not required to prove that
                      the defendant subjectively intended the
                      recipient to understand the communication
                      was a threat, nor need to prove that the
                      defendant intended to or was actually able
                      to carry out the threat made. [T]he
                                        -12-

                      government must prove that the threat was
                      an unequivocal and unconditional
                      expression of intent to cause bodily
                      injury to another person and would cause a
                      reasonable person in the recipient's
                      circumstances to fear that he, she or
                      another person faced an imminent risk of
                      bodily injury.
          Tr. 9/5/96, at 14-15.
                    Comparing the instructions given to those required under
          the Fulmer analysis, we see that the district court instructions
          failed to inform the jury that it must consider whether the
          defendant could reasonably have foreseen that the statement would
          be taken as a threat. The instructions given indicate that it is
          sufficient if the communication would cause apprehension in a
          reasonable listener. In light of     Fulmer, this focus on the
          recipient of the threat rather than the defendant could be viewed
          as error, although we note in fairness to the district court that
          Fulmer was decided some months after the trial in this case. In
          any event, in this case, as in many others, the distinction is
          without practical importance.
                    We do not reverse a conviction based on an error in the
          jury instructions if "it is highly probable that the error did not
          contribute to the verdict." United States
                                                   v. 
                                                      Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992,
          999 (1st Cir. 1996). An error that is certain to have had no
          significant impact on the jury is harmless.
                    The facts of this case are such that the instructions
          required under Fulmer and the instructions actually given in this
          case are functionally equivalent. In certain situations, as in
          Fulmer, there may be information known to the listener, but not to
                                        -13-

          the speaker (or vice versa), that would cause a reasonable listener
          to perceive a statement as an expression of an intent to injure
          despite the fact that a reasonable speaker would not view it as
          such. That is not the case here. It is not possible that the
          words spoken by Whiffen were reasonably understood by the employees
          of UFC and Allstate as an expression of an intent to injure, and
          yet such an outcome would not have been foreseen by a reasonable
          speaker in Whiffen's position. This is so because, unlike in
          Fulmer, Whiffen did not employ language that held a different
          meaning for him than it did for the listeners.
                    We conclude, therefore, that the imperfection in the jury
          instructions could not have affected the verdict. The error was
          harmless.
                                   VI. Conclusion
                    For the reasons stated herein, we 
                                                     affirm 
                                                            the judgment of
          the district court.
                                        -14-