Court Opinion

ID: 9672438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:55:11.824361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:16.168319
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Chief Justice
(special concurrence).
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but believe they have made decisions on legal issues which are unnecessary.
The parties in this case stipulated the trial court (habeas corpus) could render its decision based on the trial transcript of the jury trial for burglary without taking any additional testimony. The trial court (habe-as corpus) found “the sole basis for the arrest of Chief Eagle was the “magistrates letter” and “he was subsequently identified as a suspect in a burglary.” Testimony of the arresting officer at the trial — which was never controverted — establishes the original arrest was based solely on the “magistrates letter.” This testimony further establishes after the petitioner was identified in the police station, petitioner was then charged with burglary before he was placed in the holding area of the jail.
Petitioners arrest for burglary was a subsequent independent occurrence as a result of the fortuitous meeting at the police station. That is the record before us upon which we have to render our decision. Whether the arrest pursuant to the “magistrates letter” was legal or illegal has no relationship to the suppression of the evidence in the burglary case. The arrest or charge in the burglary case was a valid arrest based upon the identification by the victim and hence the evidence obtained as a result of that arrest was not subject to suppression.
In my opinion this case turns on the fact the “magistrate’s letter” was not used as a pretext by the police to arrest Chief Eagle for the burglary. Therefore, it is unnecessary to rule on (1) the legality of whether appellee could be imprisoned for nonpayment of a fine; and, (2) apply the good faith exception enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1985) and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984).