Court Opinion

ID: 9881938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 18:18:17.670595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.883014
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/4/23 Chapman v. St. Joseph Health System CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 LYNN CHAPMAN,

      Plaintiff and Appellant,                                         G061220

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-01092836)

 ST. JOSEPH HEALTH SYSTEM,                                             OPINION

      Defendant and Respondent.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, John C.
Gastelum, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Guerra Law and Jason E. Guerra for Plaintiff and Appellant.
                   Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Giancarlo Urey and Teresa Fitzgerald for
Defendant and Respondent.
              Plaintiff Lynn Chapman sued St. Joseph Health System (St. Joseph Health)
for sex and age discrimination and retaliation, all in violation of the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12900 et seq. The
complaint also contained claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy
and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, both of which were
entirely based on the same allegations underlying Chapman’s FEHA claims.
              Almost two years after Chapman filed her complaint, St. Joseph Health
successfully moved for summary judgment, or alternatively, for summary adjudication,
on grounds, inter alia, no triable issue of material fact existed as to any of Chapman’s
claims.
              We affirm. We have independently reviewed the record, including the
evidence proffered by the parties. The record is devoid of any evidence of discriminatory
pretext. There is also no evidence in the record showing St. Joseph Health retaliated
against Chapman for engaging in any FEHA-protected activity. In addition, there is no
evidence of outrageous conduct sufficient to establish a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress as a matter of law. Given the absence of a triable issue of material fact
as to Chapman’s discrimination and retaliation claims, and the lack of any evidence St.
Joseph Health engaged in outrageous conduct, summary judgment was properly granted.

     SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND ADDITIONAL
   EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY CHAPMAN IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION
                                              I.
                        CHAPMAN IS HIRED BY ST. JOSEPH HEALTH
              In 1987, Chapman was employed as a medical secretary by St. Joseph
Health’s predecessor, South Coast Medical Center. For 22 years, Chapman worked in

                                              2
South Coast Medical Center’s emergency department in either a clerical support role or
as an emergency room technician.
              After St. Joseph Health acquired South Coast Medical Center in 2009,
Chapman was offered the position of patient care technician (PCT) at Mission
Hospital-Laguna Beach (formerly South Coast Medical Center). In December 2010,
Chapman was promoted to the “PCT II” position, a position she held until the end of her
employment with St. Joseph Health in 2019. PCTs at Mission Hospital-Laguna Beach
provide basic but important nursing care for patients (e.g., assisting with activities of
daily living, hygiene, feeding) under the general supervision of a registered nurse. “The
position required, among other things, independent judgment, good verbal
communication, ‘positive interpersonal skills’ and the ‘ability to work with others in a
flexible cooperative manner.’”
              Chapman reported to nurse manager Mary Olivas from 2009 until 2016.
Chapman received “relatively positive yearly Performance Appraisals for the years 2010–
2016” with an overall rating of “On Target” in 2016, and before that, an “Above Target”
                                        1
rating in the years 2010 through 2015. After Olivas was replaced in that role by interim
nurse manager Josephine Zarnegar, who later became the nurse manager in May 2017,
Chapman reported to Zarnegar. Both Olivas and Zarnegar are older than Chapman.
              Chapman’s relationship with Zarnegar became strained when Zarnegar
became Chapman’s supervisor as charge nurse. Chapman felt she could not have a “two-
way conversation” with Zarnegar. Zarnegar yelled at Chapman and others, criticized
Chapman for things out of her control, and generally failed to treat people with respect.
              Chapman was offended Zarnegar commented that Chapman seemed
unhappy. Chapman also took offense when charge nurse Nicole Hooper advised

1
  Overall performance can be rated in one of the following categories: “Needs
Improvement,” “Developmental Opportunity,” “On Target,” “Above Target,” and
“Exceptional Performance.”

                                              3
Chapman to “‘stop bitching’” and labeled her a “‘complainer.’” Chapman was likewise
offended when another charge nurse, who was three years older than Chapman,
responded to Chapman’s complaint about using a new earpiece at work by saying: “‘It
gets harder when you get older.’”
                                              II.
                                  THE VERBAL WARNING
              On August 24, 2017, Zarnegar gave Chapman a “verbal warning,” which is
the “lowest level of discipline” (other than coaching which includes comments in annual
performance reviews) imposed by St. Joseph Health. That verbal warning was
documented on an employee conference record which stated:
              “Nature of problem (specific and behavioral, list facts, dates etc.):
Disruptive Behavior, poor communication and lack of teamwork, choosing not to do
assigned responsibilities[.]
              “State the Impact: Created an uncomfortable and disruptive situation
when you started the shift openly verbalizing your unhappiness. This makes for an
uncomfortable work environment for the staff. The communication loop is hampered by
your reactions like getting angry and walking away when the staff attempts to have
dialogue with you. The staff has shared that their comfort level with you has diminished
due to your reactionary behavior. This compromises the patient care arena and teamwork
model which is crucial for safe practice[.]
              “Expectations/Recommendations:
              “-To build trusting and open dialogue with team incorporating Team
STEPPS methodology[.]
              “-To start your shift with a positive attitude or by not sharing your negative
thoughts openly with the team.
              “-To follow the PCT checklist, especially completing the crucial
responsibilities including components which affect your co[-]workers at shift change.

                                              4
              “Expected Behavior/Performance:
              “-You will be positive and engaging with your staff[.]
              “-Communicate in a respectful manner with co-workers, family members,
patients and physicians[.]
              “-You will seek out the charge nurse and proper chain of command when
issues are concerning to you[.]
              “-You will participate in open communication during handoffs[.]
              “-You will complete all assigned tasks and responsibilities[.]
              “Failure to meet these requirements or to maintain satisfactory performance
will result in further disciplinary action, up to and including immediate termination.”
              Chapman had never before (or thereafter) received any other similar
discipline during her employment with St. Joseph Health. St. Joseph Health never
demoted her, reduced her hours, or cut her pay.
                                             III.
                             THE 2017 PERFORMANCE REVIEW
              Chapman’s 2017 performance review, dated October 1, 2017 and
conducted by Zarnegar, set forth an overall rating of “On Target” for the preceding year.
The evaluation also contained the following statement: “Lynn is a conscien[t]ious
employee. She struggles when tasked with multiple requests as well as prioritization.
She is respected by her peers but they have voiced uneasiness having discussions with her
as they see her [as] difficult to approach at times. The staff is challenged with effective
communication with her as she is perceived as temperamental and closed to receiving
feedback. Lynn is a champion of promoting safety for the department and is eager to
share her concerns. I would like to see Lynn foster [two-]way communication with her
peers in order to build trust and constructive messaging. I would also like Lynn to share
her knowledge by teaching a splinting class to the staff.”

                                              5
                                            IV.
                CHAPMAN SEEKS TO CHALLENGE THE VERBAL WARNING
              On October 12, 2017, Chapman e-mailed St. Joseph Health’s human
resources department stating: “I am filing a grievance. I contest a verbal warning given
to me on 8-24-2017. The statements were untrue and unwarranted. I am requesting an
amendment with comments to the verbal warning.” Six days later, Chapman e-mailed
Vanessa Begin of the human resources department which began: “After further
consideration, I request that the verbal warning given to me on 8-24-17 be removed from
my record and that action . . . be taken to ensure that my management discontinue their
hostile speech and actions against me. In my opinion, the unprofessional communication
provided by my management team causes unnecessary conflicts leading to diminished
performance levels and diminished well being of myself, my department, and ultimately
patient care.” In her three-page e-mail to Begin, Chapman provided her “perspective of
what was perceived as disruptive behavior,” and “answer[ed] the claim that [she]
choose[s] not to do assigned responsibilities.” (Boldface omitted.) She stated she
believed the warning was vague and “an example of the uncomfortable and unfriendly
communication that is typical of my manager Jo Zarnegar. Who in my opinion
discourages me from bringing up issues with my department that I might need my
managers help with and attacks me as a person leaving me without my own dignity.”
Nowhere in her e-mail does Chapman suggest she felt discriminated against because of
her gender or age, or in retaliation for previously reporting any FEHA-related concerns.
              On October 24, 2017, Chapman met with Begin and human resources
business partner Patrick Clarke regarding the issues raised in her e-mail and her request
to have the verbal warning removed from her employment record. After listening to

                                             6
Chapman, Begin and Clarke informed her they could not remove the verbal warning
                                                                                               2
because Chapman had failed to file a timely grievance pursuant to the grievance policy.
                                              V.
             CHAPMAN BEGINS AN APPROVED MEDICAL LEAVE OF ABSENCE
              Following the October 24 meeting, Chapman worked one last shift at
Mission Hospital-Laguna Beach on October 28, 2017. She then went out on an approved
medical leave of absence for a medical/mental health condition beginning on October 31,
2017; she never returned to work. Chapman submitted evidence she saw a psychologist
on October 31, 2017 and submitted to a further mental health evaluation the following
month. She was thereafter diagnosed with major depressive disorder, single episode and
post-traumatic stress disorder. She submitted evidence of subsequent reports affirming
those diagnoses.
              Shortly after beginning her medical leave, on November 9, 2017, Chapman
asked Begin to attach the following statement to her performance evaluation: “I am glad
to hear I am considered a conscien[tious] employee. I would like to share that one of the
things I like most about being a PCT in the ER at MLB is the multitasking aspect of the
position. However, it can be difficult to meet all the multitasking expectations of the
department being the only PCT. This is compounded by the large turnover in charge
nurses and staff as well as the varying expectations of the staff. I will also admit that it
has been more of a challenge for me to stay focused since the implementation of the
ear[]piece. With several alarms going off and a patient talking to you while a

2
  St. Joseph Health’s grievance procedure requires an employee to submit a written
grievance “to his or her immediate supervisor within 7 calendar days after the problem
becomes known to the employee.” At her deposition, St. Joseph Health’s Director of
Human Resources Terri Covert testified: “[T]here have been some situations where there
have been mitigating circumstances where that grievance has arrived a day or two later
that we may still put [it] into the grievance process.” Here, Chapman attempted to submit
a grievance over a month after the deadline passed to do so. No evidence was presented
showing any similar mitigating circumstances were present in this case.

                                              7
conversation between a nurse and a doctor are going on in my earpiece has made it
difficult to stay focused. I have brought many safety concerns forward over the past year.
It is often difficult to do. However, I value integrity and will be inflexible if I feel
concerned about the best interests of patients, staff or the department. I believe that two-
way communication is imperative and have been disappointed when the tools the
department once had such as debriefings have fallen by the way side. These are some
issues that I have attempted to communicate through the proper chain of command since
my review in hopes to overcome any obstacles to improve what I can.” Again, Chapman
did not allege any FEHA-related discrimination or retaliation conduct in her statement.
              Begin agreed to attach Chapman’s statement to her 2017 performance
evaluation. Begin refused Chapman’s request to also attach a written “reflection” by
another charge nurse on his “communication experiences” with Chapman at Mission
Hospital-Laguna Beach.
              Although in January 2018 Chapman exhausted her leave pursuant to the
Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.) and the Moore-Brown-
Roberti Family Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 12945.2), her health care provider extended her
leave multiple times and St. Joseph Health accommodated Chapman by granting her
additional leave time. At Chapman’s request, St. Joseph Health extended Chapman’s
leave at least five separate times over the course of almost two years.
                                              VI.
   AFTER CHAPMAN FAILS TO RESPOND TO COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT HER LEAVE OF
   ABSENCE AND ABILITY TO RETURN TO WORK, HER EMPLOYMENT IS TERMINATED
              In April 2019, July 2019, and again in August 2019—almost two years
after Chapman began her leave of absence—Begin left telephone messages for Chapman
to connect with her regarding Chapman’s leave of absence. On August 23, 2019,
Chapman filed a complaint with the Civil Rights Department (then known as the

                                               8
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing) and filed the instant lawsuit
against St. Joseph Health.
              Meanwhile, Begin had received no response from Chapman. On
August 28, 2019, Begin sent Chapman a letter stating, in relevant part: “Given the on-
going indefinite nature of your health condition and inability to return to work, we will
need to move forward with processing the end of your employment. However, I want to
stress that if you see any other alternatives or accommodations that would enable you to
return to work, please let me know by 9/9/2019. If we do not hear from you before
9/9/2019, we will begin processing the end of your employment. Please know that you
will be fully eligible for rehire with Mission Hospital, and if you see future open
positions, please do not hesitate to let me know of your interest and any questions you
may have.” (Boldface omitted.)
              Chapman did not respond to Begin’s letter. Accordingly, St. Joseph Health
processed the termination of Chapman’s employment on September 9, 2019, nearly two
years after she had last reported to work. That same day, Chapman served her complaint
on St. Joseph Health.
              Chapman was 53 years old when she started her medical leave of absence
and was 55 years old when her employment was terminated. St. Joseph Health filled
Chapman’s prior position with a female who is older than Chapman. It is also undisputed
“[t]he vast majority of employees in the Emergency Department during [Chapman]’s
employment were women, and several were older than [Chapman], including Olivas and
Zarnegar. In terms of PCTs in the Emergency Department, half were male and half were
female, and [Chapman] was not the oldest PCT.”
              As of November 23, 2020, Chapman had not been released to return to
work.

                                             9
                                PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                                               I.
                                      THE COMPLAINT
              Chapman’s complaint, filed in September 2019, contains claims against
St. Joseph Health for (1) sex discrimination in violation of FEHA (first cause of action);
(2) age discrimination in violation of FEHA (second cause of action); (3) retaliation in
violation of FEHA (third cause of action); (4) wrongful termination in violation of public
policy (fourth cause of action); and (5) intentional and/or negligent infliction of
emotional distress (fifth cause of action).
                                              II.
                ST. JOSEPH HEALTH’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
              In March 2021, St. Joseph Health filed a motion for summary judgment or,
in the alternative, for summary adjudication. St. Joseph Health argued there were no
triable issues of material fact and Chapman’s claims failed as a matter of law. In the
alternative, St. Joseph Health moved for an order adjudicating several specified issues. In
support of the motion, St. Joseph Health produced, inter alia, excerpts from Chapman’s
deposition and the declarations and deposition testimony of Teresa Fitzgerald (St Joseph
Health’s counsel), Begin, and Zarnegar, along with attached exhibits.
                                              III.
         CHAPMAN FILES AN OPPOSITION TO THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
              On June 14, 2021, Chapman filed a written opposition to the motion, in
support of which she submitted, inter alia, her own declaration, and excerpts from the
depositions of Begin and Covert. Chapman did not contend she was unable to complete
discovery before opposing the motion for summary judgment and did not seek a
continuance of the motion for summary judgment in her opposition. In her opposition,
she addressed only some of the grounds raised in the motion for summary judgment,
arguing: (1) the motion for summary judgment “should be both granted and denied in

                                              10
part as set forth herein and within [Chapman]’s concurrently filed opposition papers,
which are incorporated by reference”; (2) Chapman’s FEHA-related claims are not time-
barred because “the timing of [her] severe ‘PTSD’ diagnosis during employer-approved
leave establishes both a continuing violation and exhaustion of administrative
[remedies]”; and (3) Chapman’s “administrative remedies were unequivocally
exhausted.” (Boldface and some capitalization omitted.)
                                            IV.
  CHAPMAN FILES A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
  FILES AN EX PARTE APPLICATION SEEKING, INTER ALIA, TO ADVANCE THE HEARING
              Shortly after Chapman filed her opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, on June 21, 2021, she filed a motion for leave to file a first amended
complaint. The notice of motion stated: “This motion is being made on grounds that
Plaintiff’s medical condition and diagnosis with post-traumatic stress disorder (‘PTSD’)
caused as a result of the toxic workplace environment she endured by Defendants has
created extraordinary impediments to Plaintiff and her counsel’s ability to fully
communicate, such as recall facts and details of events, and solidify a ‘game plan’ as to
which causes of action should be dismissed and which should be pursued. Prior to this
development, while there were peaks of progress, there were also valleys of stagnation
creating ongoing uncertainty and counsel’s inability to promptly get information
requested which accumulated over time. This motion is being presented at Plaintiff’s
first available opportunity for the reasons set forth herein.” Chapman’s counsel’s
declaration was filed in support of the motion stating, inter alia, he was able to conduct

                                             11
the discovery he thought was needed with her cooperation because she had “improved
                                   3
significantly” during that time.
              A proposed first amended complaint was not filed with the motion.
Instead, attached to the motion is a document entitled “Appendix of Proposed Changes,”
listing Chapman’s proposed amendments to the complaint including to “[r]emove causes
of action for Employment Discrimination Based on Sex, Gender, and Age, and Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress” and to add a cause of action for “Constructive
Discharge in Violation of Public Policy.”
              Concurrently with the motion seeking leave to file a first amended
complaint, Chapman filed an ex parte application for orders: (1) continuing the date of
trial by 180 days (Chapman’s papers state a trial date of August 2, 2021 had been set in
the case); (2) providing an “Extension to Discovery Proceedings” (without specifying
what if any discovery Chapman might conduct); (3) specially setting the hearing on the
motion for leave to file a first amended complaint; and (4) continuing the hearing on St.
Joseph Health’s summary judgment motion (then set for hearing on June 22) by 120 days
“to allow [Chapman] to properly plead her claims.”
              Chapman’s declaration, filed in support of her ex parte application, stated:
“When this case was filed, [PTSD] symptom flare ups substantially interfered with my
ability to recall facts and answer questions, but as of early June 2021 I have reached a
point where I believe my attorneys are in possession of all the material facts necessary to
continue advocating on my behalf which has been made possible due to the passage of
time and the continued patience of my attorneys.” She further stated in her declaration

3
  Chapman’s counsel stated in his declaration: “Commencing in or about 2020, when
discovery proceedings demanded more communication and questions/answers as to
various fact-finding issues, while Ms. Chapman had improved significantly, it was
apparent Ms. Chapman was still struggling. However, with a little patience and
understanding, I was able to get what I needed to cooperate during discovery, but her
limitations were still obvious every time we talked.” (Italics added.)

                                            12
she was “fully on board” with her attorneys’ requests made on her behalf and she
possessed “the good faith belief that with a 6-month trial continuance, [she] would have
enough time to further recover and be at [her] best for trial.” In her counsel’s declaration
filed in support of the ex parte application, he stated that since filing the complaint,
“Plaintiff has diligently engaged in discovery, which includes taking at least 4
deposition[s] of Defendant’s officers/employees and propounding written discovery. In
addition, Plaintiff has complied with discovery propounded by Defendant and the parties
even attended private mediation . . . last fall without success.”
                                              V.
THE TRIAL COURT GRANTS CHAPMAN’S EX PARTE APPLICATION BUT LATER DENIES HER
            MOTION SEEKING LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
              The trial court granted Chapman’s ex parte application and (1) advanced
the October 5, 2021 hearing date on the motion for leave to file an amended complaint to
July 27, 2021; (2) continued the June 29, 2021 hearing date on the motion for summary
judgment to November 30, 2021; and (3) continued the August 2, 2021 jury trial date to
January 31, 2022. The court later continued the hearing on the motion for leave to file an
amended complaint to September 7, 2021.
              Following the hearing on the motion seeking leave to file an amended
complaint, the trial court denied the motion. In its minute order the trial court explained,
inter alia, Chapman was free to dismiss her sex/gender and age discrimination claims
without seeking to amend the complaint, the constructive discharge theory was addressed
in the motion for summary judgment, Chapman failed to explain her failure to seek an
amendment sooner, and the motion was solely based on counsel’s declaration stating
Chapman’s PTSD caused significant delay in his communication with her.
              Chapman does not challenge the trial court’s denial of her motion seeking
leave to file an amended complaint in this appeal. She also did not dismiss her

                                              13
discrimination claims or negligent infliction of emotional distress claim before the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment.
                                            VI.
           THE TRIAL COURT GRANTS THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
              The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on the ground
there were no triable issues of material fact as to any of Chapman’s claims. The trial
court overruled Chapman’s single objection to St. Joseph Health’s evidence. It also
sustained certain of St. Joseph Health’s evidentiary objections, and overruled other
specified evidentiary objections. No party challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings
in this appeal.
              Judgment was entered in favor of St. Joseph Health and against Chapman.
                    4
Chapman appealed.

4
  Inexplicably, notwithstanding Chapman’s failed effort to amend her complaint to
remove both FEHA discrimination claims and the negligent emotional distress claim,
Chapman’s appeal is not limited to challenging the retaliation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. At oral argument, however, Chapman’s counsel conceded
Chapman was not challenging summary judgment as to the FEHA discrimination claims.
  In the respondent’s brief, St. Joseph Health argues “Chapman’s unreasonable
arguments on appeal support[] an attorneys’ fees award under the FEHA.” (Boldface and
some capitalization omitted.) St. Joseph Health did not file the required motion for
sanctions pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1). We therefore deny St.
Joseph Health’s request for sanctions. This ruling does not affect any party’s right to
request attorney fees on appeal through a properly noticed motion in the trial court.

                                            14
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I.
                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW
              “‘On review of an order granting or denying summary judgment, we
examine the facts presented to the trial court and determine their effect as a matter of
law.’ [Citation.] We review the entire record, ‘considering all the evidence set forth in
the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections have been made and
sustained.’ [Citation.] Evidence presented in opposition to summary judgment is
liberally construed, with any doubts about the evidence resolved in favor of the party
opposing the motion. [Citation.] [¶] Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘where no
triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’ [Citation.] A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that the
plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.” (Regents of
University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.)
                                             II.
                                 DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
              Although Chapman has abandoned any challenge to the grant of summary
judgment as to her sex and age discrimination claims, we nevertheless review those
claims because her remaining claims are related to if not entirely dependent upon the
merit of the discrimination claims.

A. Burden-shifting Standard Applicable to FEHA Discrimination Claims
              In Wilkin v. Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 806, 820–822 (Wilkin), a panel of this court summarized the burden-shifting
standard applicable to discrimination claims brought under FEHA as follows:
              “‘California uses the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the
United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination based on a theory of

                                             15
disparate treatment. (Guz [v. Betchel National, Inc. (2000)] 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 [(Guz)];
see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792 (McDonnell Douglas).)
“This so-called McDonnell Douglas test reflects the principle that direct evidence of
intentional discrimination is rare, and that such claims must usually be proved
circumstantially. Thus, by successive steps of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows
discrimination to be inferred from facts that create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are
not satisfactorily explained.” [Citation.]
              “‘Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff has the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. [Citation.] To meet this burden, the
plaintiff must, at a minimum, show the employer took actions from which, if
unexplained, it can be inferred that it is more likely than not that such actions were based
on a prohibited discriminatory criterion. [Citation.] A prima facie case generally means
the plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected
class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position he or she sought or was performing
competently in the position held, (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action,
such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other
circumstance suggests a discriminatory motive. [Citation.]
              “‘If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then a presumption of
discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by
producing admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact the
employer took its actions for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. [Citation.] If the
employer meets that burden, the presumption of discrimination disappears, and the
plaintiff must challenge the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination or
offer other evidence of a discriminatory motive.’ [Citation.]
              “In Scotch [v. Art Institute of California (2009)] 173 Cal.App.4th [986,] at
pages 1004–1005 [(Scotch)], a panel of this court addressed the application of the
McDonnell Douglas test in the context of a motion for summary judgment: ‘As Guz

                                             16
explains, several decisions suggest that when an employee opposes an employer’s motion
for summary judgment of a discrimination claim, the employer must make the initial
showing of no merit and the McDonnell Douglas burdens are reversed. [Citation.] Other
decisions suggest the plaintiff can survive the employer’s summary judgment motion
merely by presenting, at the outset, evidence satisfying the prima facie elements of
McDonnell Douglas. [Citation.] Guz did not resolve the issue because the defendant in
that case proceeded to the second step of the McDonnell Douglas test and produced
admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that its actions
were taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. [Citation.]
              “‘In Kelly [v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005)] 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, the court
explained the Guz standard in light of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826: “A defendant employer’s motion for
summary judgment slightly modifies the order of these [McDonnell Douglas] showings.
If, as here, the motion for summary judgment relies in whole or in part on a showing of
nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge, the employer satisfies its burden as moving
party if it presents evidence of such nondiscriminatory reasons that would permit a trier
of fact to find, more likely than not, that they were the basis for the termination.
[Citations.] To defeat the motion, the employee then must adduce or point to evidence
raising a triable issue, that would permit a trier of fact to find by a preponderance that
intentional discrimination occurred. [Citations.] In determining whether these burdens
were met, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as the
nonmoving party, liberally construing [the plaintiff’s] evidence while strictly scrutinizing
defendant’s.”’” (Wilkin, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 820–822.) In Scotch, supra, 173
Cal.App.4th at page 1005, the appellate court “agreed with and applied the standard set
forth in Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, in affirming summary
judgment in favor of an employer as to a disability discrimination claim alleged under
FEHA.” (Wilkin, supra, at p. 822.)

                                              17
B. St. Joseph Health Met Its Burden of Presenting Evidence of Nondiscriminatory
   Reasons for Providing Negative Feedback and Terminating Chapman’s Employment
              In support of the first cause of action, Chapman alleged in the complaint
she “sustained adverse employment action by Defendant’s failure to prevent Plaintiff
from suffering from discrimination and harassment by Defendant and its employees
which consequently resulted in her anticipated termination of employment with
Defendant because of her sex and/or gender.” Chapman reiterated the same allegation in
relation to her age in support of the second cause of action. The complaint does not
identify the specific conduct she deemed to be an adverse employment action; it does not
mention the verbal warning or her 2017 performance evaluation.
              We question whether the verbal warning and/or the 2017 performance
evaluation alone would qualify as an adverse employment action under FEHA. (See
McRae v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 377, 392
[supervisor’s memorandum and letter of instruction did not rise to the level of an adverse
employment action because neither had any effect on the terms and conditions of
plaintiff’s employment]; Lefevre v. Design Professional Ins. Cos. (N.D.Cal. 1994) 1994
U.S. Dist. Lexis 20978 [considering it “dubious” a verbal warning constituted an adverse
employment action, as the plaintiff “was not demoted, docked pay or benefits, or
transferred to a less desirable position, and her job responsibilities were not altered in any
way”]; but see Akers v. County of San Diego (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1456 [negative
performance review and counseling memorandum accusing deputy district attorney of
incompetence, dishonesty and insubordination which eliminated or at least delayed
reasonable potential for promotion can constitute adverse employment actions].)
              Assuming the verbal warning and/or the 2017 performance evaluation
constituted adverse employment action, evidence of the verbal warning and 2017
performance evaluation shows they were issued for the legitimate business reason of
counseling Chapman for poor communication, cooperation, and completion of certain

                                             18
tasks. In addition, St Joseph Health produced evidence showing Chapman was given the
verbal warning by her supervisor Zarnegar following Zarnegar’s receipt of reports
Chapman had been having conflicts with other staff members.
              To the extent Chapman contends she suffered an adverse employment
action in the form of constructive discharge of employment, as pointed out by the trial
     5
court there is no evidence St. Joseph Health’s conduct “effectively force[d] [Chapman]
to resign,” noting “‘[c]riticism of an employee’s job performance, even “unfair or
outrageous” criticism, does not create the intolerable working conditions necessary to
support a claim of constructive discharge.’” In any event, as discussed ante, St. Joseph
Health produced evidence the criticism given to Chapman was provided for a legitimate
business reason.
              Even if on this record Chapman’s actual employment termination could
constitute an adverse employment action within the meaning of FEHA, St. Joseph Health
produced evidence showing, after almost two years of medical leave, St. Joseph Health
terminated Chapman’s employment after she failed to respond to several inquiries
regarding the status of that leave and her ability to return to work. Therefore, to the
extent Chapman contends the actual termination of her employment in September 2019
constituted an adverse employment action, as the trial court observed, “[t]here is also no
evidence plaintiff was able to return to work.”
              St. Joseph Health, therefore, satisfied its burden of presenting sufficient
evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons for Chapman’s verbal warning, the contents of her

5
  The trial court also found Chapman failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to her
constructive discharge theory because she failed to file her claim with the then-entitled
Department of Fair Employment and Housing within one year of the date she went on
medical leave, rejecting her “continuing violation” argument. We do not review the
court’s conclusion regarding whether Chapman’s claims based on a constructive
discharge theory are time-barred because those claims, for the reasons we discuss, fail on
the merits.

                                             19
2017 performance evaluation, and the termination of her employment, whether
constructive or actual. The burden therefore shifted to Chapman to “‘“adduce or point to
evidence raising a triable issue, that would permit a trier of fact to find by a
preponderance that intentional discrimination occurred.”’” (Wilkin, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th 806, 823.)

C. Chapman Did Not Present Any Evidence of Pretext for Discrimination
              Our review of the record shows Chapman failed to present any evidence the
verbal warning, the statements in the 2017 performance evaluation with which Chapman
disagrees, or the reasons given for her employment termination were “‘either false or
pretextual.’” (Faust v. California Portland Cement Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 864,
886.) She also did not provide any evidence showing St. Joseph Health acted with
discriminatory animus, “‘or evidence of each which would permit a reasonable trier of
fact to conclude the employer intentionally discriminated.’” (Ibid.)
              To show an employer’s reason for an adverse employment action is
pretextual, an employee “‘“cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong
or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated
the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.”’
[Citation.] To meet his or her burden, the employee ‘“must demonstrate such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could
rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’”’ and hence infer ‘“‘that the employer did
not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’”’ [Citation.] ‘[I]f
nondiscriminatory, [the employer’s] true reasons need not necessarily have been wise or
correct. [Citations.] While the objective soundness of an employer’s proffered reasons
supports their credibility . . . , the ultimate issue is simply whether the employer acted
with a motive to discriminate illegally. Thus, “legitimate” reasons [citation] in this

                                              20
context are reasons that are facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and which, if true, would
thus preclude a finding of discrimination.’” (Featherstone v. Southern California
Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1159–1160, italics omitted.)
              Furthermore, it is undisputed Chapman was replaced by an older woman.
In sum, accepting all of Chapman’s evidence, we conclude she failed to meet her burden
to “‘adduce or point to evidence raising a triable issue, that would permit a trier of fact to
find by a preponderance that intentional discrimination occurred.’” (Scotch, supra, 173
Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.) The trial court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment
in favor of St. Joseph Health on the first cause of action for sex discrimination and on the
second cause of action for age discrimination.
                                             III.
                                    RETALIATION CLAIM
              In the third cause of action, Chapman alleged retaliation in violation of
FEHA, Government Code section 12940, subdivision (h). To establish a prima facie case
of retaliation under FEHA, a plaintiff must show “(1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected
activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and
(3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.”
(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.)
              “In summary judgment proceedings, a FEHA retaliation claim is treated the
same as a FEHA discrimination claim: Where ‘“‘the employer presents admissible
evidence either that one or more of [the employee’s] prima facie elements is lacking, or
that the adverse employment action was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory [or
nonretaliatory] factors, the employer will be entitled to summary judgment unless the
[employee] produces admissible evidence which raises a triable issue of fact material to
the [employer’s] showing.’”’” (Wilkin, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 828.)
              The trial court granted summary judgment as to the FEHA retaliation claim
on the same grounds it granted summary judgment as to the discrimination claims (the

                                              21
latter of which Chapman no longer challenges). Accepting Chapman’s evidence, no
disputed issue of material fact exists. Summary judgment as to the retaliation claim was
therefore properly granted.
               In her opening brief, Chapman argues she might have been retaliated
against because she had “complained about perceived violations” regarding safety and
patient care, “wage and hour violations,” and “union organizing efforts.” Chapman’s
retaliation claim, however, was limited to retaliation in violation of FEHA. Government
Code section 12940, subdivision (h) makes clear an employer may not “discharge, expel,
or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any
practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified
or assisted in any proceeding under this part.” In other words, Chapman’s claim is for
retaliation for engaging in FEHA-related conduct. Therefore, this argument fails.
                                            IV.
           WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM
               In the fourth cause of action, Chapman alleged St. Joseph Health
terminated her employment in violation of public policy. “Apart from the terms of an
express or implied employment contract, an employer has no right to terminate
employment for a reason that contravenes fundamental public policy as expressed in a
constitutional or statutory provision.” (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
1238, 1252.)
               Chapman’s wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim was
based on her assertion St. Joseph Health terminated her employment “as a result of her
gender and age in violation of Government Code § 12900, et seq.” For the reasons
discussed ante, there are no triable issues of material fact as to Chapman’s FEHA claims.
Consequently, her claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails as a
matter of law. (Wilkin, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 831; Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc.

                                             22
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 229 [because the plaintiff’s FEHA claim failed, his wrongful
termination claim also failed].)
                                              V.
    INTENTIONAL AND/OR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS
              “The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are:
‘“(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of
the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.”’” (Christensen v.
Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) In order to be considered outrageous,
conduct must be “‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a
civilized community.’” (Ibid.) “Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress
‘“does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or
other trivialities.”’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.)
              Negligent infliction of emotional distress is simply a negligence claim, not
an independent tort. (Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790,
818.) An employer’s supervisory actions are inherently intentional and not the basis for a
negligence claim. (Semore v. Pool (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1105.)
              “Generally, the right to recover workers’ compensation benefits is the
exclusive remedy for an employee against an employer for a workplace injury.” (M.F. v.
Pacific Pearl Hotel Management LLC (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 693, 699.) A plaintiff,
however, “may pursue a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the
employment context where the conduct at issue violates FEHA and also satisfies the
elements of the claim.” (Light v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14
Cal.App.5th 75, 101, italics added.)
              Chapman’s fifth cause of action for intentional and/or negligent infliction
of emotional distress is entirely based on the allegations of her FEHA claims. We agree

                                             23
with the trial court that because Chapman did not show a triable issue of material fact
exists as to her FEHA discrimination or retaliation claims as discussed ante, her cause of
action for emotional distress fails as it is tethered to her FEHA claims.
              We also agree with the trial court that “[e]ven if viewed independently, the
emotional distress claim is preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act” because of the
dearth of evidence of outrageous conduct. “Managing personnel is not outrageous
conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare
and prosperity of society. A simple pleading of personnel management activity is
insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if
improper motivation is alleged. If personnel management decisions are improperly
motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer for discrimination.” (Janken v. GM
Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80; see Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club
(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 945–946.)
              None of the conduct alleged in the complaint or described in the evidence
produced by Chapman constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct. To the extent St.
Joseph Health provided Chapman with negative feedback, whether in the form of the
verbal warning, her 2017 performance evaluation, or otherwise, and failed to address her
employment-related complaints, such actions constituted personnel actions that do not
                                                      6
rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. Summary judgment, therefore, was
properly granted.

6
   In its ruling on the motion for summary judgment in this case, the trial court observed
“[i]n her deposition, plaintiff [testified she] took her leave of absence due to work-related
stress.”

                                              24
                                DISPOSITION
          The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.

                                           MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

GOETHALS, J.

                                      25