Court Opinion

ID: 9901967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 19:02:20.906353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:42.428623
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/22/23 P. v. Ramirez CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          H050583
                                                                     (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                Super. Ct. No. CC120254)

             v.

 GLEN ALLEN RAMIREZ,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                I. INTRODUCTION
         In 2002, defendant Glen Allen Ramirez was convicted by jury of spousal rape by
force (former Pen. Code, § 262, subd. (a)(1)),1 forcible oral copulation (former § 288a,
subd. (c)(2)), and infliction of corporal injury on a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). Various
allegations were also found true, including that he suffered a prior serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of
50 years to life consecutive to a determinate term of 30 years, which included a five-year
enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction.
         In 2020, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) recommended that defendant’s sentence be recalled and that he be resentenced
pursuant to then section 1170, subdivision (d). The recommendation by the Secretary of

         1
             All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
the CDCR was based on a change in the law that gives a trial court the discretion to strike
a prior serious felony enhancement (see §§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 1385). After briefing by the
parties and a hearing, the trial court declined to recall and resentence defendant.
       On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in declining
to recall and resentence him because the court failed to make the requisite finding that he
poses an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike offense. He also argues that
there is no substantial evidence to support a conclusion that he poses an unreasonable risk
of committing a super strike offense.
       For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the order denying recall and
resentencing of defendant
                                   II. BACKGROUND
       A. The Offenses
       The victim was defendant’s estranged wife. The couple had been together for
approximately five years and had been married for 14 months. During the course of their
relationship, defendant was often physically abusive of the victim. The couple had
frequently broken up over defendant’s abuse and later reunited. At the time of the
offenses, the couple was separated.
       In August 2001, the victim arrived home to find defendant in her apartment. She
told him to leave. Defendant grabbed the victim’s wrists and pushed her into her
bedroom and onto the bed, facing up. When the victim tried to free herself, defendant
punched her hard underneath her right eye. The victim felt her face instantly swell up.
Later, defendant attempted to stab the victim in the knee with a knife. He then grabbed
her wrists, took her to the kitchen where he obtained a different knife that was seven or
eight inches with a pointed tip, and took her back to the bedroom. Defendant ordered the
victim to orally copulate him. She refused. When defendant attempted to force her to
orally copulate him, she put her hand in front of her mouth. At that point, defendant put
the knife to the victim’s face and repeated his demand that she orally copulate him. The

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victim complied. Defendant subsequently threatened to stab the victim if she did not
remove her clothes. After the victim removed her clothes, defendant raped her and then
stabbed her in the thigh. Defendant subsequently lifted the knife above his head and her
face and told her that she was going to die. The victim cried and repeatedly told him not
to do it. The victim had children from a previous marriage. She referred to her children,
including saying their names. Defendant’s face changed, and he brought his arm down.
       B. Verdicts and Sentencing
       In 2002, a jury convicted defendant of spousal rape by force (former § 262,
subd. (a)(1)), forcible oral copulation (former § 288a, subd. (c)(2)), and infliction of
corporal injury on a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). Various allegations were found true,
including that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury and/or personally used a
dangerous or deadly weapon as to certain counts, that he suffered a prior serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and that he suffered a prior strike conviction.
       According to the probation report, defendant had at least nine prior felony
convictions and at least 34 prior misdemeanor convictions. His prior felony convictions
included second degree burglary, escape by a misdemeanant, vehicle theft, and
possession of a controlled substance. Defendant also had a prior strike conviction for a
1983 robbery in which he demanded money from a donut shop employee while
pretending to have a weapon under his shirt. Defendant’s misdemeanor convictions
included two convictions for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, four convictions for
battery on a spouse, and convictions for violation of a domestic violence order, false
imprisonment, vehicle theft, vandalism, and being under the influence of a controlled
substance. Defendant was on probation at the time of the instant offenses.
       Defendant was originally sentenced for the current offenses in 2002 to an
indeterminate term of 80 years to life consecutive to a determinate term of 18 years.
Following a successful appeal regarding a sentencing issue, defendant was resentenced in

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2004 to an indeterminate term of 50 years to life consecutive to a determinate term of
30 years, which included a five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction.
       C. CDCR Recommendation for Recall of Sentence and Resentencing
       The Secretary of the CDCR sent a letter to the trial court dated January 9, 2020,
stating that defendant had been sentenced in 20022 and that his sentence included a prior
serious felony enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The Secretary
explained that the law had since changed to allow trial courts the discretion to strike a
prior serious felony enhancement (see §§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 1385). The Secretary
recommended that defendant’s sentence be recalled and that he be resentenced in
accordance with section 1170, former subdivision (d) (now section 1172.1). Various
documents were attached to the letter, including documents reflecting defendant’s
participation in Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous and his prison work
assignments.
       D. Trial Court’s First Order Denying Recall and Resentencing
       In February 2020, the trial court declined to recall defendant’s sentence. The court
indicated that although a legislative change had given courts the discretion to strike the
punishment for a serious felony enhancement, defendant’s case had been final for many
years by that time. The court stated that it was declining to use its authority to recall
defendant’s sentence “simply to avoid the lack of retroactivity” regarding the discretion
to strike the punishment for the enhancement.

       2
         The Secretary’s letter indicated that defendant had been convicted in 2002 “for
violating section(s) 273” (misdemeanor prohibiting the payment for consent to adoption
of a child). Contrary to the Secretary’s letter, defendant had not been convicted of
violating this section but rather had been convicted of the three offenses that we have
recited above.

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       E. Appeal Regarding First Order Denying Recall of Sentence
       Defendant appealed, and this court reversed the trial court’s order. (People v.
Ramirez (Sept. 7, 2021, H047929) [nonpub. opn.].) This court determined that
“[a]lthough the impetus for the CDCR’s recommendation under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) was the possibility that an ameliorative change in the law could be
applied to [defendant’s] case, the letter reflected the CDCR’s individualized
recommendation, based on an assessment of multiple factors, that [defendant’s] sentence
should be recalled.” (Ibid.) This court remanded the matter to the trial court to exercise
its discretion under then section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to recall and resentence
defendant.
       F. Briefing by the Parties After Remand
       After the matter was remanded to the trial court, defendant filed a memorandum of
points and authorities in support of recall and resentencing. Defendant contended that
although he had suffered a conviction for forced oral copulation, a sexually violent
offense, the incident was remote in time and his “growth in prison and his deep
awareness of his addiction issues, strongly indicate that he would pose no threat to
anyone, were he to return to society.” Defendant argued that the court should dismiss his
prior strike conviction, his prior serious felony conviction, and the allegation that he
personally committed great bodily injury.
       Defendant also submitted documents in support of his request. The documents
included a letter acknowledging the offenses against the victim and a separate letter of
apology to the victim. He provided certificates reflecting his participation in Alcoholics
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. Defendant also completed a written relapse
prevention plan. Other documents reflected his work in prison as a barber and a porter,
as well as his attendance or participation in various programs such as victim awareness.
Defendant provided documents showing that he had been disciplined in prison for
incidents between 2004 and 2008, but that he had not received any serious discipline

                                              5
since then. Further, according to defendant, the documents showed that he was at the
lowest security facility that was possible for a life prisoner serving a sentence for sexual
assault-related crimes.
       The prosecutor filed written opposition to the requests for resentencing and to
dismiss the prior strike conviction. The prosecutor also provided copies of the reporter’s
transcript of the victim’s testimony from trial, the probation report that was prepared in
connection with defendant’s original sentencing, and the reporter’s transcript of the
original sentencing hearing. The prosecutor recounted the facts of the 2001 incident
leading to defendant’s convictions for spousal rape by force, forcible oral copulation, and
infliction of corporal injury on a spouse. The prosecutor contended that defendant had a
long history of domestic violence against the victim, including multiple convictions from
1995 through 1998 and 2001 for hitting, slapping, and punching her. The prosecutor also
referred to defendant’s prior nine felony convictions, which included a prior strike
conviction for a 1983 robbery, and numerous misdemeanor convictions. Further, the
prosecutor referred to defendant’s rules violations reports for the various periods of time
that defendant had been in prison, including for having an inmate manufactured weapon
(1984 and 1985), attempted assault on another inmate (1985), force/violence on another
inmate (2004), covering a cell window (2006), and fighting with an inmate (2008). The
prosecutor contended that defendant had not led a crime-free life since 1985 and his
record now included four violent strikes. The prosecutor argued that while defendant was
to be “commend[ed] . . . for his programming efforts” while in prison, there was no
“justification” warranting recall and resentencing of defendant.
       G. The Hearing Regarding Recall and Resentencing
       The trial court held a hearing regarding the CDCR recommendation for recall and
resentencing on October 4, 2022.

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                                  1. Defendant’s Argument
       Defendant’s trial counsel argued that defendant should be resentenced because he
was not a danger to society, his prior serious felony conviction should be stricken, and his
motion to dismiss his prior strike should be granted. Defense counsel argued that
defendant had “committed himself to changing his life” since his last rules violation in
prison in 2008. Defendant was “clear of the drugs,” had “done great work in terms of
rehabilitating himself in that way,” and he knew that he was “an addict for life.” Defense
counsel argued that there was “evidence of decreasing dangerousness” because
defendant’s prior strike conviction for the 1985 robbery was remote in time and the
offenses in the instant case were from 2001, his “personal acknowledgement of the
damage that he’s done,” and he would be addressing daily his “terrible addiction” which
was “one of the main causes of that damage.”
       Defendant sought to make an “apology statement” to the victim, who was outside
the courtroom but declined to be present for the statement. Defendant stated that he was
“sorry for what happened to [the victim]”; expressed being “ashamed of [his] actions
towards [her], the kids, and [her] parents”; and stated that he took “full responsibility” for
what happened. Defendant stated that he had been working on his substance abuse and
behavior issues through Narcotics Anonymous and that he had been involved in domestic
violence and victim awareness courses or groups.
                               2. The Prosecutor’s Argument
       The prosecutor contended that the trial court should not recall defendant’s
sentence but, if it did, it should impose the same sentence, in view of the original
probation report and sentencing in the case. The prosecutor argued that defendant had
an “extended” history of domestic violence against the victim spanning five or six years
which culminated in the violent 2001 incident. The prosecutor contended that the
original sentencing judge “heard the entire jury trial” and there was no indication that that
judge “would have granted [defendant] any bit of leniency for the crimes that he

                                              7
committed especially considering the domestic violence history . . . and [defendant’s]
criminal history.” The prosecutor argued that defendant went from committing multiple
misdemeanor crimes to committing the strike offense for robbery in 1985, followed by
four or five domestic violence convictions involving the victim in the 1990’s, and then
committing the instant three offenses which were “horrific crimes.” The prosecutor
contended that defendant “present[ed] an increasing level of seriousness and
dangerousness in his criminal conduct.”
       The victim made an appearance in court and made the following statement:
       “20 years ago when I was asked by the judge at the end of the hearing if I wanted
to make a victim impact statement I declined as I had overwhelming fear and anxiety and
I just wanted to leave the courtroom and put this all behind me. Today I have that same
overwhelming fear and anxiety as I never thought that I would have to visit this part of
my life again. However, this time I feel the need to share with you how fearful I am for
my life and for the life of my family. And I ask the Court to please take into
consideration my following statement when determining [defendant’s] new sentence and
why the Court should not consider reasons for an early release.
       “During my relationship with [defendant] I endured severe physical, mental, and
emotional abuse that still has an impact on my life today. Early on in my relationship
with [defendant] he would tell me, ‘God made you for me and me for you.’ What
seemed like a romantic notion at the time eventually became a very sinister premonition
for my future with him. During our relationship I tried to leave several times and each
time it resulted in him stalking me. He would call and follow me relentlessly. There
were many times I’d be driving alone or with my children and all of a sudden I’d see him
following me in his car and he would try to get me to pull over. He would wait until I
was alone and would ambush me and try to convince me to reconcile our differences
when I refused he would physically assault me and torture me . . . by twisting my wrists
which has left me with pain and weakness in my wrists that persist to this day.

                                             8
       “Afterwards he would apologize and tried to treat the physical damage he caused
me and I would foolishly take him back after feeling bad because I knew he cared for me.
I didn’t realize at the time that this vicious cycle was an abusive relationship. . . . [N]ow,
I could tell you hours of stories about how [defendant] would randomly appear when I
had left him, but I will only focus on a few to illustrate why I have a fear of [defendant’s]
release. Like the time I was staying at my parent’s house after I had broke up with him
the month before. One night he came to my parent’s house late at night after he called
me wanting to come over to talk. I had told him over the phone I was never going back
to him and that my parents would have him arrested for trespassing if he came over, that
didn’t stop him. He came over, knocked on my window and started yelling when I told
him to leave.
       “I got scared he would wake up my parents so I told him to go to the front of the
house. When I opened the front door, he grabbed me by the neck and dragged me around
the corner to the next street over. He had a hammer in his waistband. . . . [M]y brother,
who had lived with my mom at the time and noticed I was missing went looking for
me. . . . He found me with [defendant] on the next street over and called the police
which led to [defendant’s] arrest.
       “Several days later my brother and my father took my children to pick walnuts in
the orchard across the street from my parent’s house. It was then that they found
[defendant’s] jacket, cigarette buds, and the bubble gum he always chewed, lying on a
pile on the ground behind a tree across from my parent’s house. He had been watching
their house. He always found a way to watch me.
       “Another time my [other] ex-husband was bringing our son back from Karate one
evening to my parent’s house and saw [defendant] hiding under my father’s vehicle in my
parent’s driveway. My [other] ex-husband called my parents and got out of his truck to
confront [defendant], but [defendant] got up and ran off.

                                              9
       “And another time [defendant] had broken into my second[-]floor apartment . . . in
San Jose . . . and hid inside until I got home.
       “All of these incidents illustrate [defendant’s] dangerous and unpredictable nature
and this is just the stalking side, this doesn’t even include the physical abuse that I
endured throughout the relationship. I won’t go into detail on all of that as it makes me
sick to my stomach now.
       “However, . . . if you’ve read through the various police reports that were filed
over the years, you’ll have some idea of what I’ve experienced, but even these only
scratch the surface. Anyone who knows that domestic violence can be a precursor to
homicide could have seen the warnings from all the reports filed over the years, which
bring me to my final point.
       “. . . [N]ow I want to explain the main reason I don’t think that [defendant] should
be considered for an early release.
       “[Defendant] was never one to let things go. [Defendant’s] stalking was a
symptom of a greater problem of obsession. In February 2010, eight years after
[defendant] was incarcerated for this crime and a day or two from my daughter’s 18th
birthday, my daughter received a piece of mail at my [other] ex-husband’s home with a
return address of my parent’s house in San Jose, which had been postmarked from San
Francisco. When my [other] ex-husband saw the piece of mail, he was perplexed as my
parents had sold that home and moved five years earlier to retire to another state and they
would have sent any mail to her to my address where she lived. However, when he gave
it to my daughter, she and I recognized [defendant’s] handwriting. It was a birthday card
for her[. I]t said that he was sorry for what he’s done and that he would always love her.
And it said, ‘love, you know who.’ It was unnerving and just confirmed that even eight
years later, he was not over the situation.
       “What is more alarming is that even after knowing he had a no contact order, he
was able to get out a letter to her from prison via some, sort of, method. . . . [T]hat kind

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of persistence is what scares me and should concern the Court. [Defendant] would often
tell me the only way this relationship will ever be over is in your death or mine. That was
not an exaggeration.
       “He proved that on the night of the crime when he broke into my home[,] raped
me, stabbed me, physically assaulted me, and told me I was going to die that night. I can
still remember the look in his face as he held a knife above my head on that night. . . .
[I]f I didn’t cry, plead for my life and call out my daughter’s name . . . over and over and
tell him what this would do to her as I knew she was the one person in this world I felt he
truly loved, I am certain I would not be here today.
       “If the Court decides to release [defendant], I want them to remember that -- those
words and his actions are the reason for my fear. Please don’t make me relive the fear of
always having to look over my shoulder or the fear that he may harm my family. I
implore you. I don’t feel [defendant] is capable of letting the past go and releasing him
puts me and my family in danger. I am asking the Court to take this into consideration
with its decision. Thank you.”
                                 3. The Trial Court’s Ruling
       The trial court indicated that it was taking a recess “to reflect on what ha[d] been
presented” in the courtroom before announcing its decision regarding resentencing. After
the recess, the court stated that, “[h]aving considered the totality of the circumstances,
including preconviction and postconviction factors,” and having heard from defendant
and the victim, the court was denying the recommendation and request to recall
defendant’s sentence and to resentence him in a “different way.” The court stated that the
“original term continues to serve the interest of justice . . . for a variety of reasons
including the following:
       “The parties have been in clear agreement that the circumstances of the offenses
for which [defendant] was convicted and for which he has been sentenced are extremely
heinous, violent, terrifying, disturbing, and certainly of the nature of crimes for which the

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original sentencing Court and this Court continues to believe that the [L]egislature
intended the most significant consequences to be available to a sentencing Court to
address public safety, punitive consequences, rehabilitative efforts in the interest of
victims.
       “In this particular case, the Court does believe that there is still an unjustifiable
risk to public safety if [defendant] were to be resentenced or sentenced differently . . . in
a way that would allow his earlier release from custody.
       “[Defendant’s] crimes, as they have been described in the Court files and also as
they were described articulately and I’m sure with great difficulty by Ms. Doe today, are
crimes that show the highest degree of domestic violence, the dynamic of power and
control, controlling behavior and the type of the high degree of lethality that should cause
any sentencing Court significant concern. These crimes were not isolated events, but
reflected a pattern of conduct over a period of significant time in which [defendant]
showed the highest degree of danger, placed Ms. Doe in legitimate and sustained fear.
Fear that continues to this day, fear that, as she expressed continues to exist in her
mind . . . if [defendant] were to potentially be released from custody upon resentencing.
       “This Court believes that the evidence in the case supports Ms. Doe’s opinion and
assessment of her own circumstances with respect to her previous and continued
relationship to [defendant] as her abuser and as the criminal offender who has changed
her life for the negative as a result of his criminal behavior, which included not only
sexual assault, but crimes of violence, the use of weapons that were committed while on
probation, that were committed at a time when [defendant] . . . had already been
subjected to efforts of substance abuse treatment, that were committed at a time when
[defendant] already had a significant and substantial criminal history of both felony and
misdemeanor conduct, including a serious felony or strike prior conviction in his criminal
history.

                                              12
       “As far as postconviction conduct, [defendant] has made some efforts that have
been presented towards substance abuse rehabilitation and other self-improvement efforts
while incarcerated. He has suffered rules violations in the state prison. He has also been
apparently free of rules violations for some number of years, but he has experienced both
in his postconviction history while in the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
       “With respect to his rehabilitative efforts, the Court believes that at this hearing
the emphasis that has been put on substance abuse treatment and addiction services while
positive are a far cry from addressing concerns of the root problem, and the root issues
that caused [defendant] to be an extreme offender of sexual assault and domestic violence
and continue to make him an unreasonable risk to public safety today.
       “The issues related to stalking behavior[,] power and control dynamics, threats to
kill in the colloquial, ‘if I can [sic] have you no one will,’ the threats to Ms. Doe[] as to
how the relationship between the two of them would [someday] end, are still acute.
       “[Defendant] still has the capability to carry those threats to conclusion, and the
Court does not believe that his rehabilitative efforts with respect to Narcotics Anonymous
and substance abuse treatment assuage any of the concerns that the Court would have in
that regard.
       “[Defendant] was not a young person when he committed these offenses, although
he is an older person now. And the Court does not believe that there are any particular
mitigating factors to be had with respect to his age at the time of the offenses.
       “Also, while the Court appreciates [defendant’s] showing of remorse and his
statements in that regard today and does not necessarily find them to lack credibility, the
Court also acknowledges that in 2002 at the time of original sentencing [defendant] was
stating remorse at that time and just as today in considering whether it would be in the
interest of justice . . . to strike any strike prior conviction allegations . . . and under the
totality of the circumstances.

                                                13
       “This Court believes that under the totality of the circumstances no exercise of
discretion in that regard would be within the interest of justice then or now based on all
of the circumstances that exist in this case, the Court believes that even upon a
presumption of recall of sentence and resentencing, that presumption is overcome by risk
to public safety and for these reasons the Court is going to leave the sentence as
previously imposed with no changes.”
                                     III. DISCUSSION
       On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in declining
to recall and resentence him because the court failed to make the requisite finding that he
poses an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike offense. He also argues that
there is not substantial evidence to support a conclusion that he poses an unreasonable
risk of committing a super strike offense. Defendant requests that the trial court be
directed to recall his sentence and conduct further proceedings.
       The Attorney General contends that no abuse of discretion has been shown. The
Attorney General argues that the trial court made the requisite findings and that
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination.
       A. General Legal Principles Regarding Recall and Resentencing Under
           Section 1172.1
       Section 1172.1, subdivision (a) provides that a trial court “may, . . . at any time
upon the recommendation of the secretary[,] . . . recall the sentence and commitment
previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not
previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided
the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” This provision
“authorizes the Secretary of the CDCR to recommend to the superior court that the court
recall a previously imposed sentence and resentence the defendant. [Citations.] The
CDCR recommendation furnishes the court with jurisdiction it would not otherwise have
to recall and resentence and is ‘an invitation to the court to exercise its equitable

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jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]” (People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1040
[discussing former §§ 1170, subd. (d)(1) and 1170.03]; see People v. Salgado (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 376, 378 & fn. 2 [explaining that recall and resentencing provisions of
former § 1170, subd. (d)(1) were moved to new § 1170.03, which was later renumbered
as § 1172.1].)
       In recalling and resentencing the defendant, “the court may consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,
time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk
for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the
original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(4).) “The resentencing court may, in the interest of justice,”
“[r]educe a defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(3)(A).)
       Relevant here, section 1172.1 also provides that if the “resentencing request . . . is
from the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,” then “[t]here
shall be a presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the defendant, which may only
be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.” (Id., subd. (b)(2), italics added.)
Subdivision (c) of section 1170.18 in turn defines an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety as “an unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a new violent
felony within the meaning of [section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)].” (Italics added.)
This “subdivision of section 667 identifies eight types of particularly serious or violent
felonies, known colloquially as ‘super strikes.’ ” (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th
347, 351, fn. omitted (Valencia).) These super strikes include (1) “[a]ny homicide
offense, including any attempted homicide offense, defined in Sections 187 to 191.5,
inclusive” and (2) a “ ‘sexually violent offense’ as defined in subdivision (b) of

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Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.”3 (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I), (IV).)
A sexually violent offense is a statutorily specified sex crime, including rape (§ 261) and
oral copulation (former § 288a, now § 287), “when committed by force, violence, duress,
menace, fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person, or
threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person.” (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (b).)
       In this case, the Secretary of the CDCR recommended recall and resentencing of
defendant to the trial court. Consequently, the statutory presumption favoring recall and
resentencing applies (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2)), and the trial court must find “an
unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a [super strike offense]” to overcome
the presumption. (§ 1170.18, subd. (c); see Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 351.) A trial
court’s “generalized concern about [a defendant’s] ‘ability to continue to commit
crimes’ ” is not sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of recall and
resentencing. (Nijmeddin v. Superior Court (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 77, 83 [analyzing
presumption for compassionate release under § 1172.2].)

       3
         The complete list of the eight types of super strikes is as follows: “(I) A
‘sexually violent offense’ as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code. [¶] (II) Oral copulation with a child who is under 14 years of age
and more than 10 years younger than the defendant as defined by Section 288a, sodomy
with another person who is under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than
the defendant as defined by Section 286, or sexual penetration with another person who is
under 14 years of age and more than 10 years younger than the defendant, as defined by
Section 289. [¶] (III) A lewd or lascivious act involving a child under 14 years of age, in
violation of Section 288. [¶] (IV) Any homicide offense, including any attempted
homicide offense, defined in Sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive. [¶] (V) Solicitation to
commit murder as defined in Section 653f. [¶] (VI) Assault with a machinegun on a
peace officer or firefighter, as defined in paragraph (3) of subdivision (d) of Section 245.
[¶] (VII) Possession of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of Section 11418. [¶] (VIII) Any serious or violent felony offense
punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I–
VIII).)

                                             16
       “We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court’s denial of
recall. [Citations.]” (People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082 (E.M.).) “[A]n
abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision . . . on an incorrect legal
standard [citations].” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156 (Knoller).) Further,
under the abuse of discretion standard, “a trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for
substantial evidence.” (In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 470 (White).)
       B. Analysis
       Defendant contends that to overcome the statutory presumption in favor of recall
and resentencing, the trial court had to make a finding that he posed an unreasonable risk
of committing a super strike offense. He argues that the court did not make such a
finding in this case, and therefore the court abused its discretion in declining to recall and
resentence him. Defendant argues that the court simply “focused on what [he] could do
rather than the probability that he would do those things” and that the court expressed
only a generalized concern about his ability to continue to commit crimes without making
any finding regarding the risk of him committing a super strike offense. (Italics omitted.)
Defendant further contends that there is no substantial evidence to support a conclusion
that he poses an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike offense.
       We determine that the trial court made the requisite finding that “defendant is an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2)), meaning “an
unreasonable risk that [he] will commit a [super strike offense]” (§ 1170.18, subd. (c);
see Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 351).
       First, the trial court expressly referred to the likelihood of the risk. The court
stated that there was “still an unjustifiable risk to public safety if [defendant] were to be
resentenced or sentenced differently” and that he continued to be “an unreasonable risk to
public safety today.” (See §§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2), 1170.18, subd. (c).)
       Second, the trial court made it clear that it was addressing the unreasonable risk of
defendant committing super strike offenses, such as sexually violent offenses and murder.

                                               17
(See §§ 1170.18, subd. (c), 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I), (IV).) In this regard, the court
referred to the commitment offenses, which showed “the highest degree of domestic
violence” and a “high degree of lethality” and which were part of “a pattern of conduct
over a period of significant time in which [defendant] showed the highest degree of
danger.” The court likewise stated that defendant’s offenses “included not only sexual
assault, but crimes of violence, the use of weapons.” The court explained that “the root
issues that caused [defendant] to be an extreme offender of sexual assault and domestic
violence . . . continue to make him an unreasonable risk to public safety today.” The
court further explained, “The issues related to stalking behavior[,] power and control
dynamics, threats to kill in the colloquial, ‘if I can [sic] have you no one will,’ the threats
to Ms. Doe[] as to how the relationship between the two of them would [someday] end,
are still acute. [¶] [Defendant] still has the capability to carry those threats to
conclusion . . . .” It is apparent from these statements that the court believed that not
only was there an unreasonable risk of defendant committing another sexually violent
offense, that is, a sex crime such as rape or oral copulation by force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (b)), but that there was also an
unreasonable risk that he would kill the victim.
       Third, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that defendant posed
an unreasonable risk of danger of committing a super strike offense, that is a forcible sex
crime or murder. The record reflects that defendant engaged in domestic violence for
years against the victim, culminating in forcible sex acts against her, stabbing her, and
threatening to kill her. As the court explained, defendant’s “substance abuse treatment
and addiction services while positive are a far cry from addressing concerns of the root
problem, and the root issues that caused [defendant] to be an extreme offender of sexual
assault and domestic violence and continue to make him an unreasonable risk to public
safety today. [¶] The issues related to stalking behavior[,] power and control dynamics,
threats to kill in the colloquial, ‘if I can [sic] have you no one will,’ the threats to

                                               18
Ms. Doe[] as to how the relationship between the two of them would [someday] end, are
still acute.”
       We are not persuaded by defendant’s contention that his current age (62 years old)
and lack of recent prison rules violations indicate that he is no longer “an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2)). As the trial court observed about
his convictions for spousal rape by force, forcible oral copulation, and infliction of
corporal injury on a spouse, defendant, who was 40 years old at the time, “was not a
young person when he committed these offenses, although he is an older person now.”
Defendant does not provide any persuasive argument, let alone evidence or authority,
indicating that his current age makes him less likely to commit forcible sex crimes or
murder against a female partner, particularly when, as explained by the trial court, the
record does not reflect that defendant has addressed “the root problem, and the root issues
that caused [him] to be an extreme offender of sexual assault and domestic violence.”
       Defendant similarly fails to persuasively articulate, let alone support with evidence
or authority, how his apparently recent good behavior while confined in prison with other
inmates equates with a lessened risk of him continuing to engage in violent sex crimes
against, or the murder of, a female partner. As the trial court found, defendant had
engaged in “a pattern of conduct over a period of significant time in which [he] showed
the highest degree of danger” by engaging in “crimes that show the highest degree of
domestic violence, the dynamic of power and control, . . . and the type of . . . high degree
of lethality” against an intimate partner. The crimes “included not only sexual assault,
but . . . violence, the use of weapons.” As the court explained, defendant’s “rehabilitative
efforts” had not addressed the “the root issues that caused [him] to be an extreme
offender of sexual assault and domestic violence and continue to make him an
unreasonable risk to public safety today. [¶] The issues related to stalking behavior[,]
power and control dynamics, threats to kill in the colloquial, ‘if I can [sic] have you no
one will,’ the threats to Ms. Doe[] as to how the relationship between the two of them

                                             19
would [someday] end, are still acute.” His substance abuse treatment did not “assuage
any of the concerns” about him “carry[ing] those threats to conclusion.”
       In sum, the trial court’s statements clearly reflect that it found “defendant is an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2)), meaning “an
unreasonable risk that [he] will commit a [super strike offense]” (§ 1170.18, subd. (c);
see Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 351). Substantial evidence supports the court’s
finding. The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
presumption in favor of recall and resentencing had been overcome and in declining to
recall and resentence defendant. (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2); E.M., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1082; Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 156; White, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 470.)
                                    IV. DISPOSITION
       The order denying recall and resentencing of defendant is affirmed.

                                             20
                                 BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

GREENWOOD, P.J.

ADAMS, J.*

People v. Ramirez
H050583

      *
       Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.