Court Opinion

ID: 9490174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:35:01.238401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:56.218735
License: Public Domain

HUG, Chief Judge,
concurring:
While concurring in the Per Curiam opinion, I add these observations.
I read the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in United States v. Watts, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997), to be based upon an interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. As Justice Breyer notes in concurring, “I join the Court’s per curiam opinion while noting that it poses no obstacle to the Commission itself deciding whether or not to enhance a sentence on the basis of conduct that a sentencing judge concludes did take place, but in respect to which a jury acquitted the defendant.” Id. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 638. I hope that the Sentencing Commission will give special consideration to the jurisprudential wisdom of basing a sentence on alleged conduct of which a defendant has been acquitted by a jury.
The prosecution has elected to charge the defendant with two offenses. The defendant has mounted a defense to both charges. The judicial processes have been utilized to determine guilt or innocence. The jury has been asked to devote the time and energy to hear the evidence presented at trial, to consider that evidence in light of the instructions, and to render a verdict. It is difficult for me to see how the jury’s effort is not seriously undercut, and in fact nullified, when the sentence of a defendant, after an acquittal on a charge, is the same as if the defendant had been convicted.
I can envision the difficulty of a defense counsel explaining to his client, “The jury convicted you of one count, but acquitted you of the other, however, under the Sentencing Guidelines the judge has sentenced you as though you were convicted of both.” A likely reply, “But doesn’t the judge have to respect the jury’s determination?” The attorney explains, “Oh no, you see the judge views the facts under a different burden of proof.” The defendant: “Then for all practical purposes the jury’s acquittal had no effect at all; I thought I had the right to a jury finding me guilty of the crime before I got sentenced for committing it.” Attorney: “No, you don’t seem to understand; the judge doesn’t have to pay any attention to what the jury did, because he operates under a different burden of proof. We lawyers and judges understand that sort of thing, even though it may not make common sense to you.”
One wonders what the reaction of the jury would be if the jurors were told at the outset, “If you convict the defendant on one charge, but acquit her on the other, the judge, utilizing a different burden of proof, can sentence the defendant as though you had convicted her on both.” Would this resonate with the jury as being fair to the defendant, worthwhile of their time and effort, and instill respect and admiration for our system of justice? I seriously doubt it.
The man on the street would be quite surprised to learn that our present guideline approach to sentencing permits a person to be charged with two offenses, convicted of one, acquitted of the other, and yet be sentenced as though he had been convicted of both. Sentencing on the basis of acquitted conduct gives the impression of a judge being able to second-guess a jury that has acquitted a defendant, despite our explanations about burdens of proof. For this reason, I believe consideration of this issue by the Sentencing Commission is most advisable.