Court Opinion

ID: 9831802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:22:02.068213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:38.078279
License: Public Domain

■ On Appellees’ ■ Motion for Rehearing.
The parties to this cause have favored the court with very able oral and written arguments, the appellants in support of its original judgment, the appellees contending that it was in error upon both supporting grounds as enunciated in the court’s opinion.
Upon a mature reconsideration in ¡the light of the help thus accorded, we are constrained to adhere to the- determination before made, and, in doing so, -to reiterate without change or addendum the holding that the contract as declared upon was not illegal. We desire, however, to modify the opinion in 'so far as it held that appellees’ insistence that appellants’ declaration on the prior verbal agreement that no other meal for those ports would be transported on the same steamer varied the subsequent written contract could not be raised on general demurrer. The opinion contained this paragraph in reference to that feature:
“As concerns the latter of these defensive presentments, it cites a recognized rule of evidence, applicable in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake (R. S. art. 3687, rule 20, •subd. 19, and cited authorities of V. S. T. O. S. of 1914, vol. 3, p. 2574), but it may ■not be raised. on general demurrer (Townes’ Texas Pleading [2d Ed.] bottom page 530 and top of 531, and appended cases).”
That pronouncement, if not actually unsound, is at least very doubtful, and is now withdrawn.
It seems clear to us, however, that the general demurrer was not good to the pleading as thus drawn, and that it was entirely competent to declare upon the two undertakings in the same cause of action; the averment of the understanding -that the 1,500 tons specified would be the only meal on the vessel furnished, termed the “sole discharge clause,” *136being taken as true, presented in legal effect a collateral, or separate, parol agreement, i that was further alleged to have been not only the controlling inducement for the acceptance of the written confirmation set out, but also to have been omitted from it at the special instance and request of the appellees. It was therefore plainly an independent undertaking, not a part of the writing, nor contradictory of its terms, but entered into as an inducement to the making of it. This, under well-settled authority, was subject to proof and enforcement as such, although not referred to in nor made a pant of the writing.
■ The following authorities, it is thought, fully support this conclusion: 17 Texas Jurisprudence, “Evidence,” Civil Cases, pars. 358, 370, and 371; New York Rife Insurance Company v. Thomas, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 149, 104 S. W. 1074; Callaway v. Albin, 114 Tex. 5, 261 S. W. 372; Loveless v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.) 274 S. W. 658; Lee v. First National Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 254 S. W. 394; Downey v. Hatter (Tex. Civ. App.) 48 S. W. 52; Blair v. Slosson, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 403, 66 S. W. 112.
The motion, has 'been overruled.
Overruled.