Court Opinion

ID: 9964782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 19:09:27.447226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:41.864067
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Hinkle v. Mingo, 2024-Ohio-1665.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

James Hinkle,                                       :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,                :               No. 23AP-660
                                                                 (C.P.C. No. 23CV-4833)
v.                                                  :
                                                               (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Judge Stephanie Mingo,                              :

                Defendant-Appellee.                 :

                                             D E C I S I O N

                                     Rendered on April 30, 2024

                On brief: James Hinkle, pro se. Argued: James Hinkle.

                On brief: Zach Klein, City Attorney, and Aaron D. Epstein,
                for appellee. Argued: Aaron D. Epstein.

                 APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

PER CURIAM.
        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, James Hinkle, pro se, appeals from a decision and order
of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to dismiss of
defendant-appellee, Judge Stephanie Mingo. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} On July 10, 2023, Hinkle filed a complaint against Judge Mingo, alleging
Judge Mingo lacked jurisdiction to issue a judgment against him in a separate matter in the
Franklin County Municipal Court, Environmental Division (“the nuisance case”). The
nuisance case involved a nuisance complaint initiated by the City of Columbus against a
property Hinkle owned. Judge Mingo presided over the nuisance case and, on January 16,
2020, issued a judgment entry finding the defendants, including Hinkle, in contempt of
court for failing to abate a nuisance. Hinkle filed a direct appeal from the judgment entry
No. 23AP-660                                                                                2

in the nuisance case, and this court affirmed the contempt order. Columbus v. ACM Vision,
V, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-79, 2021-Ohio-925. Through his complaint in the instant
case, Hinkle asserted Judge Mingo lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in the nuisance case
because the property at issue in that case did not meet the statutory definition of a building
constituting a public nuisance pursuant to R.C. 3767.41(A). Additionally, Hinkle sought to
obtain the name and address of the original complainer in the nuisance case.
       {¶ 3} Judge Mingo filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss Hinkle’s complaint on
August 4, 2023, arguing the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Hinkle filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on August 14, 2023. In an
October 12, 2023 decision and order, the trial court granted Judge Mingo’s motion to
dismiss, finding Hinkle’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Hinkle timely appeals.
II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 4} Hinkle assigns the following four assignments of error for our review:

              [I.] Failure to hear the case in the lower court undermines the
              courts’ original jurisdiction. It was the Court of Common
              Pleas authority to hear and decide on the case for the first time
              before any appellate review occurs. Here I was denied access
              to the courts.

              [II.] The court judge additionally erred as even though the
              courts agreed with me that I was right, “Although factual
              allegations in the complaint are taken to be true…” they refuse
              to do anything about it, as in my request to dismissing the case
              in the municipal court with prejudice.

              [III.] Judge failed to address the dismissal as with or without
              prejudice. “Therefore, as Hinkle has not alleged a cause of
              action or requested relief which this Court can grant, the
              Complaint must be DISMISSED, pursuant to Civil Rule
              12(B)(6).

              [IV.] The Judge involved in the municipal case would need to
              know who the plaintiff/claimant is as if the plaintiff does not
              show to court, the courts are capable of dismissing the case
              with prejudice. The plaintiff has to show up to court, as the
              plaintiff must still prove what he or she is entitled to if
              anything.
No. 23AP-660                                                                                 3

(Sic passim.)
III. Discussion
       {¶ 5} Hinkle’s four assignments of error are interrelated, and we address them
jointly. Taken together, Hinkle’s four assignments of error assert the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
       {¶ 6} Under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to
dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union,
Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245 (1975). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Civ.R.
12(B)(6), the court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,
presume all factual allegations in the complaint are true, and make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Mitchell, Admr. v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190,
192 (1988). The dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is proper when it
appears, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief.
Walsh v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-109, 2022-Ohio-272, ¶ 6. When
reviewing a decision on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, this court’s standard of review is de novo. Foreman v. Ohio
Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-15, 2014-Ohio-2793, ¶ 9.
       {¶ 7} The complaint does not identify an express cause of action. In the caption of
the complaint, however, Hinkle states Judge Mingo lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in
the nuisance case. To the extent Hinkle intended to assert a genuine challenge to Judge
Mingo’s subject-matter jurisdiction, his remedy was to raise that issue in a direct appeal to
this court from the nuisance case or file an appropriate original action.           See Ohio
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) (“[c]ourts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction
as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final
orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district”); State ex
rel. Holman v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 171 Ohio St.3d 806, 2023-Ohio-692, ¶ 10 (“[a] writ
of prohibition may issue to correct the result of a prior jurisdictionally unauthorized action
‘[i]f an inferior tribunal patently and unambiguously lack[ed] jurisdiction’ ”), quoting State
ex rel. Baker v. State Personnel Bd. of Rev., 85 Ohio St.3d 640, 642 (1999). Simply stating
No. 23AP-660                                                                                 4

Judge Mingo lacked subject-matter jurisdiction does not create a cause of action in the
common pleas court.
       {¶ 8} Despite the framing of his complaint as a challenge to the municipal court’s
jurisdiction, it is clear from the body of the complaint that Hinkle seeks review of the merits
of Judge Mingo’s ruling in the nuisance case, asserting Judge Mingo erred in her
interpretation and application of R.C. 3767.41(A)(1). The court of common pleas, however,
does not have the authority to review rulings made in the municipal court. See Lingo v.
State, 138 Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, ¶ 51 (“[a] court of common pleas has no power
to vacate a final order rendered by a municipal court”); Ohio Constitution, Article IV,
Section 4(B) (the courts of common pleas have original jurisdiction over all justiciable
matters and “such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies
as may be provided by law”). The remedy for review of any alleged error in Judge Mingo’s
ruling was an appeal to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. State v. Fawcett, 91 Ohio St.3d
1 (2000), syllabus (“[c]ourts of appeals have jurisdiction to review judgments entered by
those inferior courts located within the territorial boundaries of their appellate districts”);
R.C. 2501.02(C) (“[i]n addition to the original jurisdiction conferred by Section 3 of Article
IV, Ohio Constitution, the court of appeals shall have jurisdiction * * * to review * * *
judgments or final orders of courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the
district”). As noted above, Hinkle already filed a direct appeal in the nuisance case, and this
court affirmed. ACM Vision, V, L.L.C. at ¶ 42.
       {¶ 9} Additionally, to the extent the complaint seeks the name and address of the
original complainer in the nuisance case, Hinkle does not identify any cause of action that
would require the disclosure of such information, nor does the complaint allege Judge
Mingo is in possession of such information or is under a legal obligation to disclose the
information. The request for information, without more, does not state a claim for relief.
       {¶ 10} Lastly, we note that while Hinkle assigns as error the trial court’s failure to
indicate whether the dismissal was with prejudice, Hinkle failed to separately argue this
assignment of error as required by App.R. 16. Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(2), “[t]he court
may disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to
identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue
the assignment separately in the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A).” Notwithstanding
No. 23AP-660                                                                                    5

Hinkle’s failure to separately argue this assignment, we are mindful of the general rule that
“a dismissal for failure to state a claim is without prejudice except in those cases where the
claim cannot be pleaded in any other way.” Fletcher v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 120 Ohio
St.3d 167, 2008-Ohio-5379, ¶ 17, citing Collins v. Natl. City Bank, 2d Dist. No. 19884,
2003-Ohio-6893, ¶ 51 (“[a]n order of dismissal entered pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is an
adjudication on the merits of the issue the rule presents, which is whether a pleading put
before the court states a claim for relief. It does not adjudicate the merits of the claim itself,
unless it can be pleaded in no other way”).
       {¶ 11} Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Hinkle’s complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because the trial court did not err in granting
Judge Mingo’s motion to dismiss, we overrule Hinkle’s four assignments of error.
IV. Disposition
       {¶ 12} Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in granting Judge
Mingo’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Having overruled Hinkle’s four assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                           Judgment affirmed.

             LUPER SCHUSTER, BEATTY BLUNT, and LELAND, JJ., concur.