Court Opinion

ID: 9851867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:20:46.639589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:18.086136
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent because, in my view, the trial court erred by refusing to give the defendant’s tendered instruction or a similar one defining the term “voluntary” in a context of a confession allegedly induced by threats or promises. The majority concludes that “any effort to articulate a precise definition might unduly restrict the *411jury in its consideration of the voluntanness of a confession.” Majority opinion at 409. It is precisely because the term “voluntary” is so amorphous, however, that further specification of its meaning is necessary if the jury is to perform its proper function under the law.
In order to pass constitutional muster, a confession must be voluntary. The ultimate test of voluntariness is whether the statement is a product of a rational intellect and a free will. E.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960); People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo.1985); People v. Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230 (Colo.1982); Hunter v. People, 655 P.2d 374 (Colo.1982). More specifically, a confession is not voluntary if it is extracted by any sort of threat, promise, or by the exertion of any improper influence. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); People v. Parada, 188 Colo. 230, 533 P.2d 1121 (1975); People v. Pineda, 182 Colo. 385, 513 P.2d 452 (1973). Other courts have held that when a confession is admitted into evidence, the trial court should correctly instruct the jury on the meaning of voluntariness. E.g., Leonard v. United States, 278 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.1960); Bellamy v. State, 435 A.2d 821 (Md.App.1981); State v. Bridges, 491 S.W.2d 543 (Mo.1973).
Unless the court informs the jury that a confession induced by a threat or promise is involuntary, the jury is invited to devise its own standard of voluntariness. That standard is limited only by the imagination of each juror and could easily encompass statements consciously given notwithstanding the fact that they were extracted by a threat or promise.1 The application of such a standard, however, would clearly contravene the constitutional standard of volun-tariness in the context of a confession.
The defendant in this case testified that her confession was induced by the threat and promise of the security consultant. The court, therefore, should have specifically instructed the jury, as requested by the defendant, that if they found the confession was so induced, such confession would not be voluntary and should be disregarded. The failure to give such an instruction was error.
I am authorized to say that Justice LOHR and Justice NEIGHBORS join in this dissent.

. The Colorado Criminal Code, for example, defines a "voluntary act” as "an act performed consciously as a result of effort or determination." § 18-1-501(9), 8 C.R.S. (1978). Similarly, Webster's Dictionary, relied on by the majority, includes as one of the definitions of the term "done by design or intention, not accidental." Webster's Third International Dictionary, 2564 (1976). Under these definitions, a confession obtained as a result of a threat or promise could still be viewed as "an act performed consciously as a result of effort or determination” or, for that matter, an act "done by design or intention.” Moreover, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines a voluntary confession as "one made spontaneously by a person accused of crime, free from influence of any extraneous disturbing cause, and in particular, not influenced, or extorted by violence, threats, or promises.” Id. at 269. The legal definition of a "voluntary confession” is thus substantially different from the definition of “voluntary act” in section 18-1-501(9) and the definition of "voluntary” in Webster’s Dictionary.