Court Opinion

ID: 9745061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:31:37.590311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:55.224251
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority but my analysis differs concerning the first two issues, viz. the introduction of the letter into evidence and the refusal to allow all of plaintiff’s deposition to be introduced.
*341Before addressing those issues I deem it necessary to mention another problem. The transcript as submitted by the appellant exhibits a deficiency which we see with some regularity. The table of contents prepared by counsel and inserted at the beginning of the transcript does not contain references to the witnesses and evidence introduced at trial. The only index to the bill of exceptions containing the evidence is that prepared by the court reporter. It is located in the middle of the transcript where her work begins and the page references are not those of the pages as they appear and are numbered in the transcript. This, of course, does not comply with the requirements of Indiana Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 7.1(C) that the table of contents refer to the initial page of “witnesses on direct, cross and redirect examination, offers to prove, objections and the like in such a manner as to allow the court to locate matters placed in issue upon the appeal.”
The problem occasioned by this departure is compounded by appellant’s failure to make marginal notations on all pages of the transcript (AP 7.2(A)(3)), and the failure in the argument portion of the brief to cite either the pages in the record where the issue appears (AP 8.3(A)(7)) or to state verbatim the question, objection, answer, etc.
We are hopefully past the day when the technical infraction of one of the appellate rules on form will result in automatic af-firmance of the trial court’s decision. Yet the rules are adopted for a purpose and prior cases have noted that they bind us as well as the litigants. Accordingly, it is my view that where such defaults actually impede the court’s review of an alleged error, it is proper to deem that error waived for the failure of counsel to present cogent argument or his failure to carry his burden of demonstrating harmful error.
I cannot agree with the majority that the letter introduced as Exhibit “H” concerns only damages and therefore presents no issue. A portion of the letter questions the basic credibility of the plaintiff. I do agree that no error is present.
On cross-examination of Dr. Eades, plaintiff’s counsel attempted to insinuate that he was a “hired gun” for the defense whose testimony was purchased to defeat plaintiff’s claim. The letter sent by defense counsel to both Dr. Eades and Dr. Arens in February 1979 instructed them that the object of their examinations was to determine “what is truthfully at the base of this woman’s problems.” The trial court acted within the proper ambit of his discretion in determining that the plaintiff had effectively opened the door to permit the evidence.
As to that portion of the letter which was objectionable, any potential error was waived when plaintiff failed to object to that specific portion of the letter. City of Logansport v. Dykeman (1888), 116 Ind. 15, 17 N.E. 587; McCormick on Evidence (2nd Ed.) § 52, p. 117.
Concerning the second issue I do not disapprove of the majority’s rule although I do not find authority for it either in the trial rules or the two cases cited.
On cross-examination of the plaintiff, counsel for the city inquired about certain questions asked and her responses thereto in a deposition. Her answers at trial concerning her prior testimony were noncommittal. Therefore, to establish impeachment the defendant introduced those parts of her deposition into evidence during its case in chief. On rebuttal the plaintiff sought to introduce the entire deposition into evidence. The court rejected this offer but permitted introduction of those parts which were relevant to the portions introduced by the city.1
Trial Rule 32(A)(4) provides,
“If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts.” (Emphasis added)
The rule rather plainly says that when the city introduced part of the deposition, *342the plaintiff was entitled to introduce the rest, to the extent, of course, that the rest was properly admissible. See TR 32(A).
Wynder v. Lonergan (1972), 153 Ind.App. 92, 286 N.E.2d 413 simply held that pursuant to TR 32(B) and (D)(3) it is proper to exclude those portions of a deposition which attempt to present inadmissible evidence. Manning v. Allgood (1980), Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 811 concerned an argument over how much of a deposition should be required to be presented by the party originally attempting to use it. The opposing party did, in fact, introduce the balance of the deposition. Both cases fall short of the majority’s intimation that the trial court may elect to exclude a portion of a properly offered deposition.
I suppose, as urged by city’s counsel at trial, that we could construct a special rule to contemplate the situation where a deposition is utilized only for impeachment purposes. That, however, I find unnecessary.
When the city introduced a portion of her deposition, the plaintiff was entitled to introduce the balance. The trial court committed error when it refused the offer. The error was, however, clearly harmless. The plaintiff testified in full in person at the trial. She had full opportunity to explain the allegedly impeaching portion of the deposition in redirect examination. Moreover, the relevant additional portions of the deposition were admitted on rebuttal. Under such circumstances there was no harmful error committed. TR 61.
I concur with the majority as to the other issues presented.

. Interestingly, appellant’s argument accepts the characterization of the parts allowed.