Court Opinion

ID: 9473589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:33:46.389547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:36.982366
License: Public Domain

FAGG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the court that the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination that Jelinek has the capacity to engage in light work. However, I dissent from the court’s order of remand because I believe the AU also properly found that Jelinek’s complaints of disabling pain are not fully credible and that his ability to perform light work is unimpaired by pain. Accordingly, the AU committed no error by applying the grid and finding Jelinek not disabled.
The AU gave specific reasons for rejecting Jelinek’s subjective complaints. First, the AU considered the objective medical evidence, some of which indicated that Jeli-nek’s physical condition could not reasonably be expected to produce the degree of pain claimed by Jelinek. Second, the AU considered Jelinek’s extensive range of dai*512ly activities: among other things, he drives an automobile without much difficulty; he can walk a mile, carry groceries, tend a garden, and move bales of hay for his sheep; he operates a tractor for mowing and snow removal on his ten acre homestead — all of which demonstrate physical strength, endurance, and tolerance for the demands of light work.
The backdrop of other evidence also supports the ALJ’s determination. Jelinek confided to one rehabilitation specialist that he has little difficulty with his pain unless he overexerts himself. Jelinek completed a three day battery of vocational tests at the Sister Kenny Institute, and, despite his verbal complaints, he exhibited no “observable pain behaviors.” Over the course of his pain rehabilitation program, Jelinek’s ability to stand improved, and Dr. Anderson concluded that Jelinek had become “more able to manage his pain.” Jelinek testified before the AU that he could sit for prolonged periods as long as he gets the chance to stretch. Both Doctors Anderson and Bergom concluded that Jelinek could and should go back to work.
Finally, the record discloses reasons for Jelinek’s complaints that have nothing to do with any medical impairment. Several doctors noted Jelinek’s unfounded fear of heart attack or further injury should he return to work. Jelinek indicated that he is unwilling to relocate from his rural acreage to any place where work is available. Jeli-nek’s private disability benefit also gives him a motive to perpetuate his disability status.
That “there can be no doubt that Jelinek experiences pain,” ante at 511, does not answer the question of whether Jelinek suffers from an impairment. This is not a case in which an AU ignored or rejected the subjective complaints of pain; instead, the AU complied with our directive that he must consider the totality of the evidence. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1984). The AU found from more persuasive evidence in the record that Jeli-nek’s pain was not at a level of severity that would interfere with his ability physically to perform a full range of light work. Because there is substantial evidence for the AU’s determination that Jelinek does not suffer from a non-exertional impairment which affects his ability to engage in light work, “there was no error in the application of the grid.” Smith v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 184, 187 n. 6 (8th Cir.1985). Thus, I would affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary.