Court Opinion

ID: 4374803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2019-03-07 16:03:02.119615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:30.941062
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                         No. 1D18-1843
                 _____________________________

JUAN L. JENKINS,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Mark W. Moseley, Judge.

                          March 7, 2019

PER CURIAM.

     In 2007, Juan Jenkins pleaded no contest to aggravated
battery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Pursuant
to a plea agreement, the court sentenced Jenkins to two concurrent
probation terms. After Jenkins violated probation, the court
sentenced him to two consecutive fifteen-year prison terms—a
total of thirty years. This court affirmed that sentence without a
written opinion. See Jenkins v. State, 995 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA
2008) (table).

    Jenkins then filed a rule 3.800(a) motion, contending his
sentence was illegal. The trial court denied the motion, and
Jenkins now appeals. Jenkins first argues that his thirty-year
sentence violates his original plea agreement. But “when a
defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea bargain and the court
places him on probation, if he violates his probation the court can
sentence him to a term in excess of the provisions of the original
bargain.” State v. Segarra, 388 So. 2d 1017, 1018 (Fla. 1980).
Jenkins also argues that because his probationary terms were
concurrent, his sentences after he violated probation must likewise
be concurrent. We reject this argument as well. “The fact that the
original terms of probation were ordered to run concurrently does
not mandate that the sentences imposed after violation of
probation also run concurrently.” Troncoso v. State, 825 So. 2d 494,
497 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); accord Ellis v. State, 406 So. 2d 76, 78
(Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Finally, we reject Jenkins’s argument that his
consecutive sentences violate double jeopardy. See § 921.16, Fla.
Stat. (2005); State v. Cantrell, 417 So. 2d 260, 260 (Fla. 1982).

    AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, WINSOR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Juan L. Jenkins, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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