Court Opinion

ID: 9965045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 16:01:00.717571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:39.952392
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13564    Document: 49-1     Date Filed: 05/01/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13564
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MICHAEL J. DACORTA,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cr-00605-WFJ-CPT-1
                          ____________________
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                 22-13564

       Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             Michael J. DaCorta appeals his convictions for conspiracy to
       commit wire fraud and mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349,
       knowingly engaging in an illegal monetary transaction, in violation
       of 18 U.S.C. § 1957, and willfully making a false and fraudulent
       statement on an income tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
       7206(1).
               DaCorta argues that the district court erred by concluding
       that he was not in custody when law enforcement interrogated him
       for more than two hours without giving him Miranda warnings. 1
       He also argues that the district court erred by overruling his objec-
       tion to the government’s non-pattern jury instruction. DaCorta
       further argues that the district court erred by refusing to give his
       requested jury instructions. Finally, DaCorta argues that the dis-
       trict court erred by denying his motions for a mistrial and curative
       instruction.
                                              I.
              We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
       evidence under a mixed standard, reviewing the court’s fact-finding
       for clear error and the application of the law to those facts de novo.
       United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006). The

       1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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       22-13564               Opinion of the Court                          3

       court’s factual findings are construed in the light most favorable to
       the prevailing party. Id. “Whether a person was in custody and
       entitled to Miranda warnings is a mixed question of law and fact,”
       and we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error
       and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. McDowell, 250
       F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 2001).
              In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme
       Court held that the government may not use statements “stem-
       ming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
       demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
       the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. at 444.
              A defendant is “in custody” for Miranda purposes when “un-
       der the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable man in his posi-
       tion would feel a restraint on his freedom of movement . . . to such
       extent that he would not feel free to leave.” McDowell, 250 F.3d at
       1362 (quotation marks and citation omitted and alterations
       adopted). “The test is objective: the actual, subjective beliefs of the
       defendant and the interviewing officer on whether the defendant
       was free to leave are irrelevant.” Id. A person is “in custody” for
       Miranda purposes only when there is a “formal arrest or restraint
       on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
       arrest.” United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2006)
       (quotation marks and citation omitted).
             Here, the district court did not err by denying DaCorta’s
       suppression motion because it properly found that he was not in
       custody at the time that he made his challenged statements. Under
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13564

       the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in DaCorta’s
       position would not have felt sufficient restraint such that he was
       not free to leave. McDowell, 250 F.3d at 1362.
              Although law enforcement instructed DaCorta to stand out-
       side while they conducted an initial protective sweep of his home,
       DaCorta and his family were not handcuffed, physically restrained,
       subjected to harsh language, advised that they were under arrest,
       or told that they could not leave their house during this time. He
       voluntarily followed the agents back into the house for an inter-
       view. Although the agents never explicitly told DaCorta that the
       was free to leave, DaCorta agreed to the interview after an agent
       told him that he was not under arrest, that he was not obligated to
       answer any questions, and that he could end the interview at any
       time. See United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347–48 (11th Cir.
       2006). Thus, there was no “restraint on freedom of movement of
       the degree associated with a formal arrest,” and DaCorta was not
       “in custody” for Miranda purposes. Street, 472 F.3d at 1310.
                                         II.
              We review the legal correctness of a jury instruction de
       novo, but we defer to the district court on questions of phrasing
       absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265,
       1270 (11th Cir. 2000). We review alleged errors in a jury instruc-
       tion “to determine whether the court’s charge, considered as a
       whole, sufficiently instruct[ed] the jury so that the jurors un-
       der[stood] the issues involved and [were] not misled.” United States
       v. Shores, 966 F.2d 1383, 1386 (11th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks and
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       22-13564               Opinion of the Court                          5

       citation omitted). “The district court has broad discretion in for-
       mulating a jury charge as long as the charge as a whole is a correct
       statement of the law.” United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 969 (11th
       Cir. 1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
              “[T]he law is well established that where an indictment
       charges in the conjunctive several means of violating a statute, a
       conviction may be obtained on proof of only one of the means, and
       accordingly the jury instruction may be properly framed in the dis-
       junctive.” United States v. Gutierrez, 745 F.3d 463, 473 (11th Cir.
       2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
               Here, the district court did not err by including the govern-
       ment’s use of the disjunctive in the final jury instructions. It cor-
       rectly advised the jury that, although the superseding indictment
       charged DaCorta with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail
       fraud, it need only find him guilty of one of the means to sustain a
       conviction for conspiracy. See Gutierrez, 745 F.3d at 473. The jury’s
       obligation to find that DaCorta was guilty of all the offense ele-
       ments remained unchanged. Because the government’s jury in-
       struction was a correct statement of law, and did not mislead the
       jury, the district court correctly overruled DaCorta’s objection.
       Schlei, 122 F.3d at 969; Shores, 966 F.2d at 1386. Accordingly, we
       affirm as to this issue.
                                        III.
             “[A]n appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only
       passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13564

       supporting arguments and authority.” United States v. Esformes, 60
       F.4th 621, 635 (11th Cir. 2023).
              Here, DaCorta’s claim that the district court erred by refus-
       ing to give his requested jury instructions is raised in a perfunctory
       manner. Esformes, 60 F.4th at 635. His argument is composed al-
       most entirely of trial transcript excerpts and excerpts from his pro-
       posed jury instructions. See id. DaCorta’s lone citation to authority
       only informs this Court of the standard of review. Finally, rather
       than setting forth developed arguments, DaCorta supports his
       claim with only a single conclusory sentence, which states that his
       requested instructions “accurately stated the law, provided helpful
       and relevant guidance to the jury, and clarified the application of
       the court’s instructions to the particular factual matters that arose
       during trial.” Accordingly, DaCorta has abandoned his argument.
                                        IV.
               Esformes’s abandonment standard governs this issue as well.
       Here, DaCorta’s claim that the district court erred by denying his
       motions for a mistrial and curative instruction is, again, raised in a
       perfunctory manner. Id. Again, his argument is comprised almost
       entirely of trial transcript excerpts. His lone citation to authority—
       again—gives us only the standard of review. Finally, his only sup-
       porting argument is—again—a single conclusory sentence, which
       states that the district court abused its discretion by denying his re-
       quest for a curative instruction, after a government witness made
       a comment to the jury that was “gratuitous” and “inflammatory.”
       Accordingly, DaCorta has abandoned his argument.
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       22-13564           Opinion of the Court                     7

             AFFIRMED.