Court Opinion

ID: 9744908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:22:30.013453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:52.560375
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting: The majority concludes that it is constitutionally permissible for a police officer to force a passenger in an automobile stopped for a minor traffic violation to return to the scene of the stop after that individual has exercised his right to walk away. According to the majority, such police action is appropriate "in instances where an officer fears for his personal safety.” 294 Ill. App. 3d at 212. Under this rationale, a police officer is now empowered to detain innocent passengers in situations where there is not a scintilla of objectively reasonable evidence that the officer faces any potential risk of harm. I simply cannot agree to this far-reaching expansion of police power at the expense of individual liberty. I therefore respectfully dissent. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a police officer may order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit the car as a precautionary measure for the officer’s safety. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109-11, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 336-37, 98 S. Ct. at 332-33. More recently, in Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997), the Court held that the Mimms rule applies to passengers as well as drivers. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 412-13, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 47-48, 117 S. Ct. at 885-86. Thus, a police officer may now order a passenger to exit a car pending the completion of a traffic stop. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 48, 117 S. Ct. at 886. In both cases, the underpinning of the Court’s conclusion was that, once a car was lawfully stopped by police, any additional intrusion on an individual’s liberty is de minimis and is outweighed by consideration of the officer’s safety at the scene of the traffic stop. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 48, 117 S. Ct. at 886; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 337, 98 S. Ct. at 333. In light of these two Supreme Court decisions, the majority concludes that it would be "illogical to grant an officer the right to order a passenger out of the vehicle, but not to allow the officer to have control over the passenger’s movement during the duration of the traffic stop.” 294 Ill. App. 3d at 211-12. The critical flaw in the majority’s argument, however, is that it is framed in the context of a Mimms/ Wilson stop, where asking a driver or passenger to exit an already stopped car is merely a de minimis intrusion on that person’s freedom. In other words, the majority’s rule contemplates the situation where a police officer orders a passenger to exit a car and, during the course of the traffic stop, the passenger attempts to flee the scene, makes a furtive movement, or somehow threatens the officer’s safety. I have no doubt that in such a situation a police officer would have an "articulable suspicion of possible danger” which would justify detaining the passenger pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 416-17, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 49-50, 117 S. Ct. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy, J.). We are not faced with such a case here, nor was the Court in Wilson. Rather, our case involves an individual who exited the car of his own volition and was proceeding away from the scene at the time of Officer Gulley’s commands to return. It does not follow that any intrusion on this person’s freedom is de minimis. Importantly, defendant was walking away from the scene and posed no threat to Officer Gulley’s safety. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant threatened Officer Gulley in any way. In fact, Officer Gulley himself testified that he did not observe anything suspicious in defendant’s hands or anything that indicated that defendant had committed or was committing a crime. Of course, it is true that Officer Gulley stated that he asked defendant to return to the scene "just for [his] safety.” Such a self-serving and highly subjective remark, without any supporting evidence, is simply insufficient to justify a restriction on individual freedom. The majority argues that "the passenger could leave the scene and ambush the officer during the remainder of the stop.” 294 Ill. App. 3d at 212. Such thinking is speculative at best, paranoid at worst. The vast number of traffic stops in this country do not involve violence of any type. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 416-22, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 49-52, 117 S. Ct. at 887-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy, J.). Of those that do end violently, most violence almost certainly occurs during the initial encounter between the officer and the driver and any passengers; in other words, I envision that few, if any, violent traffic stops involve situations where someone leaves the scene only to return later to "ambush” the officer. Moreover, because our case lacks any evidence of potential harm to the officer but still condones the restriction of individual liberty under the guise of officer safety, the rule announced by the majority will affect hundreds of innocent passengers stopped daily in this state. A police officer need not articulate anything more than a baseless concern for his safety in order to command a citizen who is exercising his constitutional right to walk away to return to the scene. As Justice Stevens noted in Wilson, "Most traffic stops involve otherwise law-abiding citizens ***.” Wilson, 519 U.S. at 417-18, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 50, 117 S. Ct. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy, J.). I know of no crime defendant was committing at the time he chose to walk away from the scene of the stop in this case. Neither Officer Gulley nor the majority can point to any criminal activity by defendant. Neither Officer Gulley nor the majority can articulate any facts that demonstrate a potential threat to the officer’s safety at the scene. Therefore, I cannot agree that Officer Gulley’s actions amount to a de minimis intrusion on defendant’s freedom. I believe that ordering an individual to return to the scene, in the presence of a barking police dog, after he has already exercised his right to walk away is far more than the de minimis intrusion the Mimms and Wilson Courts discussed. An individual in defendant’s position has the constitutional right to be free from arbitrary police interference and unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, I would reverse his conviction. Finally, I briefly note my disagreement with the majority’s Miranda analysis, an issue that was not raised by the parties. In order to justify Officer Gulley’s questioning of defendant, the majority submits that "in instances where the immediate physical safety of an officer is at stake, the officer may inquire [of a seized person] as to the presence of weapons without first advising the individual of his Miranda rights.” (Emphasis added.) 294 Ill. App. 3d at 213. Assuming that I agreed with this proposition, for which the majority cites no Illinois authority, I could not apply it in this case. There is simply no evidence to support Officer Gulley’s statement regarding concerns for his safety; there is nothing in the record from which a court could conclude that his "immediate physical safety” was threatened and he was therefore justified in questioning defendant absent a Miranda warning. Therefore, I believe that the majority also erroneously concludes that Officer Gulley conducted a valid search and seizure. In sum, I believe that the majority’s decision to increase police power at the expense of constitutional rights necessarily increases the possibility that such power will be abused. The majority’s conclusion certainly denigrates the time-honored tradition that the fourth amendment is meant to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. In my opinion, the search and seizure of defendant in this case was unreasonable because it was not based on anything other than a police officer’s subjective and unfounded safety concern. I therefore dissent.