Court Opinion

ID: 9490376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:41:33.469768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:03.770205
License: Public Domain

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that the judgment on the retaliation claim should be upheld, but I respectfully dissent from the Court’s action on the harassment claim.
In my view, the District Court’s instructions to the jury were correct. If we look to general “agency principles,” Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2408, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), it was entirely proper to tell the jury that they could hold the city liable for Gross’s conduct if that conduct was within the scope of his employment. Moreover, I do not believe that the “knew or should have known” language which the Court quotes from certain of our previous- opinions was intended to establish a controlling rule of law in cases, like the present one, where the alleged harasser is a high-level supervisor. No such requirement is imposed in other kinds of tort cases, and I do not see why a special rule of law, particularly protective of corporate or governmental entities who are sued, should be fashioned for sexual-harassment cases.
I briefly restate the facts. Mr. Gross was the top person in the city clerk’s office. He *1370reported directly to the city council, which had appointed him. Gross’s harassing acts included commenting about Davis’s attire, monitoring with whom Davis spoke on the telephone while at work, following Davis on her business expeditions to other city offices, waiting outside the women’s restroom to ensure that Davis was not conversing with other men, and spreading false rumors to other city employees about Davis’s alleged promiscuity. In short, nearly all of Gross’s harassment occurred at work and during work hours, and was the kind of conduct that he could engage in because of his position as a supervisor.
The panel cites Smith v. St. Louis University, 109 F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir.1997), for the proposition that this Circuit requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that an employer knew or should have known of harassment, even that conducted by a supervisor, to establish Title VII liability. But Smith does not foreclose the use of the District Court’s instruction; in fact, it preserved the very possibility. Whether the University had actual notice was never at issue; only the promptness of the University’s response was. Id. at 1265. Moreover, the opinion left open the possibility that Smith could attempt to demonstrate at trial that the University had constructive notice of the harassment (thereby making the response less prompt) before she provided it with actual notice. Id. at 1265 n. 3 (“Smith may be able to demonstrate that the [University] had constructive notice (whether because [the alleged harasser] occupied the top position within the Department, because the harassment was obvious to everyone, or because of some other reason) before Smith’s initial complaint provided actual notice.”) (emphasis added). I do not think that Smith’s recitation of the ordinarily employed elements of a Title VII case limits a district judge’s discretion to tailor his jury instructions appropriately to the facts of the case before him.
Callanan v. Runyun, 75 F.3d 1293 (8th Cir.1996), and Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc., 955 F.2d 559 (8th Cir.1992), likewise did not resolve the question in this Circuit. In Callanan, this Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant on the grounds that the conduct alleged “fell far short of proving the sort of sustained harassment” necessary to support a hostile-environment action. Id. at 1296. The opinion never addressed the “knew or should have known” element, obviating the need for considering the issue by holding that the remedial action taken was prompt and appropriate. Ibid. Bums also did not determine the answer to the question. It held that the “knew or should have known” element was clearly supported by the record, 955 F.2d at 564, reversed the district court’s judgment for the defendant, and remanded, on the ground that the district court erred in its analysis of whether the harassment was unwelcome and sufficiently severe or pervasive. Id. at 565-66. Because the employer’s knowledge had been clearly established below, the Court had no need to address the issue. Neither of these cases, therefore, decided whether in this Circuit a district judge must always give a “knew or should have known” instruction in cases of hostile-work-environment harassment by a superior. If the alleged harasser is a coworker, instead of a supervisor, the “knew or should have known” formula makes sense, but in the case of a supervisor, especially the head of a department, it does not. The supervisor effectively is the employer.
The most persuasive authority cited by the Court is Kinman v. Omaha Public School District, 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir.1996). That was a claim, brought under Title IX, that a teacher had harassed a student. Citing Title VII cases, the Kinman opinion states that the “knew or should have known” standard applies. But the opinion does not say that this standard always applies in case of hostile-environment harassment of employees. Indeed, the Kinman court, citing Meritor, stated that “when a supervisor uses the power delegated specifically to him by his employer to discriminate on the basis of sex, that employee’s actions should be imputed to the employer.” 94 F.3d at 469. The opinion does add that “in a hostile environment sexual harassment ease, ‘the usual basis for a finding of agency will often disappear,’ ” ibid. (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71, 106 S.Ct. at 2407). This passage clearly leaves open the possibility that there will be hostile-environ*1371ment sexual harassment eases in which the usual basis for a finding of agency will be present. I believe that this is such a case. Here, the harasser was a high-level supervisor, at the highest level below the governing body of the city. He was exercising power over the work environment that the city had given him. It makes sense to hold the city responsible for his acts.
I would hold that a district court may give an instruction along the lines of the one given in this case when the alleged harasser is a high-level supervisor, and his acts can therefore be imputed directly to the employer. Meritor instructed courts to look to general “agency principles” to decide when the harassing acts of an employee can be imputed to an employer. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72, 106 S.Ct. at 2408. It further explained that, although an employer would not be strictly liable for sexual harassment, an “absence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability.” Ibid. Where, as here, the alleged harasser is, for all pertinent purposes, the highest official of the employer, I would hold that a district court may instruct the jury that it need find only that the harasser was an agent of the employer and was acting within the scope of employment.
A corporate or governmental entity cannot act by itself. Their personification is a legal fiction, and they can effectuate their goals only through their agents. See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir.1986). As Judge Posner explained it:
Since the acts of a corporation are acts of human beings, to say that the “corporation” has committed some wrong ... simply means that someone at the decision-making level in the corporate hierarchy has committed the wrong; the deliberate act of such a person is the corporation’s deliberate act.... Whether his superiors know or should have known what he did is irrelevant; it becomes relevant only where the wrong is committed by someone below the managerial level.
Ibid. Likewise, the entity does not itself have a mental capacity by which it can gain knowledge of its employees’ wrongdoings. The employer necessarily relies on its agents to ensure that it complies with the laws and does not become subject to liability. When an employer gives a person essentially plenary authority over a department, as the city gave Gross here, that person is the employer for purposes of Title VII, and his acts within the scope of employment are done with the knowledge of the employer, because he necessarily, as the employer, has knowledge of his own actions. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.1993) (holding county could be liable for county attorney’s creation of hostile work environment without separate report to county, because county attorney, who had power to hire, fire, and supervise his secretary, “operate[d] as the alter ego of the employer”); see also Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343 (4th Cir.1995) (upholding hotel’s hostile work environment liability for the general manager and corporate vice president’s sodomizing of employee, despite plaintiffs not otherwise notifying corporation). This would be true as well if other supervisors with power to alter the workplace environment, or those whose specific duty it was to ensure a harassment-free workplace, were themselves the harassers.
Of course, to hold the employer liable, its tortfeasing employee must have been acting within the scope of employment. This is not too difficult to show, particularly in this case, for acts on the employer’s premises, or during errands at his behest, or other acts plausibly related to employment will meet this standard. See, e.g., Doe by Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Services, Inc., 945 F.2d 1422, 1425-26 (8th Cir.1991) (upholding jury’s verdict against security-guard company for its guards’ having surreptitiously videotaped fashion models in dressing room); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir.1968) (upholding liability of government for drunken seaman’s causing dry dock to fill with water, thereby causing ship to crash into and damage dry-dock wall); Vlotho v. Hardin County, 509 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1993) (issue of fact existed as to whether county engineer was acting within scope of employment when he had county bridge he thought dangerous destroyed, without ob-*1372taming board’s approval as county policy required). The fact that the act itself is tor-tious, of which an employer would almost always disapprove, does not matter, for the law looks at the conduct with greater generality than that. Otherwise no employer would ever be held liable for its employees’ tortious acts. E.g., Briner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 869-70 (Iowa 1983) (upholding truck owner’s liability for his employee’s causing accident when driving truck while heavily intoxicated and tired, despite employer’s prohibition on driving while drunk). Courts have never construed the scope-of-employment test so narrowly as to exclude all an employee’s acts of which an employer would, in retrospect, disapprove. Rather, they consider whether the unlawful acts would foreseeably be committed by employees.
Most circuits that have considered the issue have resolved it as I would. See Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 779-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1213, 114 S.Ct. 2693, 129 L.Ed.2d 824 (1994); Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1351-52 (4th Cir.1995); Canutillo Independent School Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2434, 138 L.Ed.2d 195 (1997); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir,), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1041, 113 S.Ct. 831, 121 L.Ed.2d 701 (1992); Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 102 F.3d 848, 860 (7th Cir.1996), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 102 F.3d at 863 (7th Cir.1997); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.1993). Those that have come to a different conclusion appear to have done so because the supervisor with knowledge was not at a level high enough to justify imputing his knowledge to the employer, see Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir.1994); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir.1997) (en banc) (7-5), or because the supervisor was not acting in the scope of employment, Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397-98 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 569, 133 L.Ed.2d 493 (1995).