Court Opinion

ID: 9907492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 16:07:02.112156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:47.874147
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1905
                            Filed December 6, 2023

CONSERVATORSHIP OF            JANICE     GEERDES       by   LAURA      JENKINS,
Conservator,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ALBERT GOMEZ CRUZ,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Kossuth County, Don E. Courtney,

Judge.

      Albert Cruz appeals the invalidation of a quitclaim deed because of undue

influence and lack of mental capacity to execute the deed. AFFIRMED.

      Shaun Thompson of Newman Thompson & Gray PC, Forest City, for

appellant.

      Kevin R. Sander of Fitzgibbons Law Firm, L.L.C., Estherville, for appellee.

      Heard by Bower, C.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
                                            2

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

       Janice Geerdes, a seventy-nine-year-old widow, deeded her long-time

friend and business partner, Albert Cruz, her half-interest in property where they

operated their joint hog operation and Cruz also lived. Six months later, one of

Geerdes’s daughters became her conservator and eventually sued Cruz to

invalidate the quitclaim deed conveying the property. After a bench trial, the district

court invalidated the deed—finding that Geerdes lacked the mental capacity to

execute the deed and was subject to undue influence by Cruz. Cruz appeals,

arguing that both findings were in error.

       While this is a close case, when giving the district court’s fact findings the

weight they are entitled, we agree on our de novo review that the conservator has

proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Geerdes lacked the

mental capacity to execute the deed. Therefore, we affirm on that basis and

decline to reach the district court’s alternative basis for invalidating the deed.

                                            I.

       Geerdes and her husband lived in Swea City, where they eventually owned

nearly 300 acres of farmland. Cruz met Geerdes and her husband in the early

1990s when he moved to the area and rented a home from the couple. He was

about twenty years younger than Geerdes. And he quickly became friends with

them. After her husband’s death in 1999, Cruz continued his friendship with

Geerdes, seeing her most days and helping her with tasks such as cleaning and

driving her to the store or the doctor.

       Geerdes used her farmland to generate income by renting it or by enrolling

it in conservation programs. But she also began some business ventures with
                                         3

Cruz. They drove a semi-trailer truck together for a while beginning in about 2004.

Around the same time, they also started a hog operation on a small portion of

Geerdes’s property.

       They constructed and operated the facility to raise hogs on a 9.64-acre

parcel of farmland through a partnership called Blue Acres Pork. Cruz provided

the labor—he is largely unable to read or write—and Geerdes ran the business

side. Cruz cleaned the land to prepare it for construction and cared for the hogs

for the first six months of the operation, after which the partnership used a third-

party to care for the hogs.

       As a part of this arrangement, in September 2004, Geerdes executed a

warranty deed conveying a half-interest in the 9.64-acre parcel, which they then

owned as tenants in common. The deed notes the conveyance was an absolute

gift with no consideration. This first deed is not challenged here.

       Geerdes received the entire income from their hog-operation partnership.

But she then bought Cruz items such as groceries and gasoline or gave Cruz

checks to pay him his share of the partnership income. Tax returns show Blue

Acres Pork earned $73,406 in 2018 and $88,310 in 2019.

       Geerdes involved Cruz in other significant decisions as well. Around 2016,

Geerdes sold eighty acres of her farmland to a third party. Cruz advised Geerdes

and accompanied her to meet with the lawyer for the sale. Geerdes ended up

accepting a reduced per-acre price for the land to receive the full sales price

immediately. The sale incurred a significant tax bill that Geerdes failed to timely

pay.
                                            4

       In April 2017, Geerdes saw an occupational therapist for a cognitive

assessment. The therapist performed the Saint Louis University Mental Status

Examination (SLUMS) and the Revised Allen Cognitive Performance Test (CPT).

On the SLUMS, she scored nineteen out of thirty points, and the therapist’s notes

indicate a score below twenty-one “denotes dementia for a person with a high

school education.” On the CPT, she scored thirty-three out of thirty-nine points,

which denotes “mild cognitive-function disability.” The notes explained that this

disability may cause—among other impairments—problems with “judgment,

reasoning, and planning ahead,” and may cause Geerdes to “be impulsive or have

problems anticipating consequences before acting.” The therapist concluded she

had “underlying dementia” and “needs frequent check-in support and assistance

with instrumental activities of daily living.”

       Later that year, Geerdes was injured in a vehicle accident, requiring her to

stay in the hospital for about one month. And in January 2018, Geerdes returned

to occupational therapy for another assessment. She received similar scores on

the SLUMS and CPT, though the notes indicate “previous testing experience may

have favorably influenced testing scores.” The therapist notes also said that

Geerdes self-reported “recent mental status changes including decreased

memory.” And the therapist again concluded that Geerdes had dementia and

“should receive assistance with bill paying” and “managing finances.”

       By this time, Geerdes’s family also observed that Geerdes “seemed

confused about a lot of things and pretty forgetful,” so one of her daughters, Laura

Jenkins, was indeed helping with her finances and bills. For example, Geerdes

struggled to understand that bills had to be paid monthly. And she would try to
                                        5

write checks or withdraw money from the ATM when she lacked sufficient funds in

her account. Jenkins and another of Geerdes’s daughters both observed that

Geerdes’s mental functioning continued to worsen after the accident. So did the

farmer who rented land from Geerdes and often visited with her about financial

and business matters. He testified that after the accident, mentally, Geerdes “was

never the same again.”

      About a year later, in January 2019, Geerdes set about transferring to Cruz

her remaining half-interest in the 9.64-acre property where they operated the hog

business. By this time, Cruz also lived on the property with his daughter. Geerdes

and Cruz met with Gayle Lemmon—an accountant who had worked with Cruz,

Geerdes, and their partnership—to discuss executing a quitclaim deed for Geerdes

to transfer her half-interest to Cruz. According to Lemmon, Geerdes did most of

the talking during their meeting, drew a description of the land, and appeared to

be the main decision-maker. She also testified Cruz “was kind of like a son to”

Geerdes and Geerdes wanted to be sure Cruz received his share of the property.

      Lemmon referred the pair to an attorney—who had never worked for

Geerdes—to draft the quitclaim deed that same day. And they later returned to

Lemmon to sign the deed in her presence, as she notarized it. The quitclaim deed

notes Cruz paid Geerdes $1 in consideration for her property interest.          In

Lemmon’s opinion, Geerdes appeared to have similar decision-making capabilities

while meeting about the deed as Lemmon had observed before. At some point,

Geerdes gave Lemmon a handwritten note, which says, “what I help [sic] Albert

Cruz is nobody [sic] concern.”
                                        6

      Jenkins discovered the quitclaim deed a couple of months later, in March

2019, while helping Geerdes with her finances. When Jenkins told her mother that

the deed transferred the second half of the hog-business property to Cruz,

Geerdes repeatedly denied that she had done so and told Jenkins “that’s not what

I wanted.” Geerdes was often short of money around this time and had outstanding

loans—including a loan of over $100,000 on the property she deeded to Cruz—as

well as a remaining tax obligation from her 2016 sale of farmland.

      Four months later, Jenkins became Geerdes’s conservator. Shortly after,

Geerdes moved to Kansas to live with another daughter, who immediately noticed

that “her mental capacities wasn’t good.” Geerdes could not use a calculator to

help with adding up receipts or take care of personal tasks like bathing, shaving,

or combing hair. Geerdes shared that she had “a mess going on” and was “just

waiting to die.” By the end of the year, a Kansas court had appointed this daughter

as Geerdes’s guardian.

      Jenkins, as Geerdes’s conservator, sued Cruz in May 2020 to set aside the

quitclaim deed. After a bench trial two years later, the district court found that

Geerdes lacked mental capacity to execute the deed and Cruz exerted undue

influence over Geerdes. The court thus set aside the deed. And Cruz now

appeals.

                                        II.

      The parties agree that this action to set aside the deed was heard in equity,

so we apply de novo review. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Est. of Herm, 284 N.W.2d

191, 199 (Iowa 1979). We give weight to the fact findings of the district court,

especially with regard to witness credibility, but we are not bound by them.
                                          7

Mendenhall v. Judy, 671 N.W.2d 452, 454 (Iowa 2003); see also Iowa R. App.

P. 6.904(3)(g). Still, in a close case such as this, that weight may tip the balance.

See Groves v. Groves, 82 N.W.2d 124, 130 (Iowa 1957) (“While the case may be

close, when we give these findings the weight to which they are entitled we are not

justified in reaching a contrary conclusion.”).

       To set aside the deed because of a lack of mental capacity, the conservator

“had the burden to show by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that at the

time [Geerdes] made the deed she was incapable of understanding in any

reasonable manner the nature of the transaction and its consequences and effects

upon her rights and interests.” Id. at 131; see also Costello v. Costello, 186 N.W.2d

651, 654 (Iowa 1971) (describing issue as whether grantor “possess[ed] sufficient

consciousness or mentality . . . to understand the import of her acts”). “A higher

degree of mental competence is required for the transaction of ordinary business

and the making of contracts than is necessary for testamentary disposition of

property.” Costello, 186 N.W.2d at 654–55 (citation omitted).1 And it is not

necessary “to establish complete mental incapacity.” Brewster v. Brewster, 188

N.W. 672, 674 (Iowa 1922).

       In evaluating Geerdes’s mental capacity to execute the deed, we may judge

her “weakness of mind” based on “other acts within a reasonable time prior and

subsequent to” her execution of the deed. Id. We may also consider her “physical

1 Cruz summarily argues that we should instead apply the lower testamentary

standard because the quitclaim deed “was a gift.” But Cruz cites no authority for
extending this standard beyond dispositions under a will. We thus follow well-
settled law requiring higher mental competence for all other transactions. See
Costello, 186 N.W.2d at 654–55.
                                         8

condition; the adequacy of consideration; whether or not the conveyance was

improvident; [and] the relation of trust and confidence between” herself and Cruz.

Id. Because this is a fact-specific inquiry, prior cases “are of little moment, and

afford but weak precedents” in considering the proper result here. Id. at 673.

       At the time Geerdes signed the 2019 deed, her physical health was fair as

she still lived independently—though with considerable help from her children and

Cruz with her finances and daily activities. The exact value of Geerdes’s half-

interest in the hog site is not in the record, but the $1 consideration Cruz paid for

that half-interest is clearly not even close to fair compensation for the property.

This transaction was also improvident considering that Geerdes was often low on

cash and had large outstanding financial obligations, including a loan on the very

land she was transferring. And Geerdes placed significant trust and confidence in

Cruz as a decades-long friend and business partner, as shown by their joint

business ventures and his advice for the 2016 sale of farmland.

       Another factor in evaluating mental capacity is the lack of independent

advice. See Daughton v. Parson, 423 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).

Cruz notes that he and Geerdes saw both accountant Lemmon and an attorney

before Geerdes signed the deed. But Cruz did not testify that Geerdes received

any independent advice about the deed. What’s more, according to Lemmon,

Geerdes came to her for the express purpose of transferring the hog-operations

property to Cruz. Lemmon did not say that she gave her any advice beyond

directing her to an attorney to draft the deed. Geerdes and Cruz met that attorney

for the first and only time later that day. And others with whom Geerdes normally

discussed financial matters—her daughter Jenkins and her farm tenant—testified
                                         9

that she never discussed the possible transfer before signing the deed.

Considering all this testimony and the compressed timeline, there is no indication

Geerdes received any meaningful independent advice before signing the deed.

      But most important to our analysis is Geerdes’s mental weakness before

and after signing the deed. Her medical records show signs of dementia beginning

nearly two years before signing the deed. Indeed, her occupational therapist

specifically noted that her mental impairment could cause her to “be impulsive or

have problems anticipating consequences before acting” as well as issues with

“judgment, reasoning, and planning ahead.”             And consistent with the

recommendations of the therapist—at the same time Geerdes signed the deed—

Jenkins managed all her finances because Geerdes no longer understood how to

do so on her own.

      Her children and her farm tenant also testified that her mental condition had

not improved by the time she signed the deed. Just two months after signing the

deed, when Jenkins discovered the deed, Geerdes did not remember or

understand its effect. And only six months after signing the deed, Geerdes moved

in with one of her daughters and was no longer living independently. Indeed, while

neither judicial proceeding is part of our record, Geerdes was under both a

conservatorship and a guardianship within one year of signing the deed.

      Cruz maintains the conservator did not carry her burden to prove lack of

mental capacity. And to be sure, Geerdes’s medical records show only “mild”

cognitive impairment.    See Daughton, 423 N.W.2d at 897 (“[M]ere mental

weakness or unsoundness to some degree is not sufficient in the absence of fraud

or undue influence, to invalidate a contract.” (citation omitted)). Lemmon, the only
                                          10

non-party witness who testified to Geerdes’s mental state at the specific times

Geerdes requested and signed the deed, said she appeared to understand the

deed. The conservator did not present expert testimony, and her only witnesses

were Geerdes’s children and her farm tenant—all of whom displayed animosity

toward Cruz and, at least as to her children, could benefit from the hog site interest

being returned to Geerdes. Accord Hart v. Lundby, 137 N.W.2d 642, 647 (Iowa

1965) (“Failure to call witnesses, expert or nonexpert, or failure to ask questions

of witnesses who are closely and intimately acquainted with testator as to the

question of mental incapacity militates against a contestant.”).

       But to the extent the witness testimony was in conflict, the district court’s

thorough fact findings show that it implicitly found the conservator’s witnesses

more credible on their observations of Geerdes’s mental state around the time she

signed the deed. We place weight on these findings. See Mendenhall, 671

N.W.2d at 454. We also discount Lemmon’s observations because of the limited

nature of her meetings with Geerdes concerning the deed compared to the more

extensive interactions of the other witnesses.2 And Cruz left the conservator’s

medical evidence of Geerdes’s mental weakness unchallenged—presenting no

2 Admittedly, there is some intellectual tension in the long-standing dictates that

we simultaneously “give weight to the trial court’s findings” and conduct “de novo”
review. Groves, 82 N.W.2d at 131. But unlike the dissent, we see no inconsistency
in giving those findings weight while also independently assessing and explaining
the bases for them that can be seen from the written record. Since we are agreeing
with the district court’s findings, it would be of no consequence if the district court
also had other reasons—such as witness demeanor—not apparent from the record
for discounting Lemmon’s testimony.
                                          11

conflicting medical evaluation nor any expert testimony to undermine the otherwise

clear conclusions in the medical records.3

       Considering the heightened mental capacity required for an inter vivos

transfer and the record as a whole—especially Geerdes’s mental state in the

months before and after signing the deed—we agree the conservator carried her

burden to prove Geerdes did not understand the effect of the deed when she

signed it. We thus affirm the district court’s ruling invalidating the deed transferring

Geerdes’s half-interest in the hog-operation property to Cruz because she lacked

the mental capacity to execute it.

       AFFIRMED.

       Bower, C.J., concurs; Buller, J., dissents.

3 We recognize that Cruz did not have to present any evidence at all since the

burden of proof always remains on the conservator seeking to invalidate the deed.
See Groves, 82 N.W.2d at 131. But in the absence of any evidence in this record
that this medical evidence is unreliable, we will not disregard it based on mere
arguments on appeal or expert testimony presented in other cases from other
jurisdictions.
                                          12

BULLER, Judge (dissenting).

         “Clear and convincing evidence is the highest evidentiary burden in civil

cases.     It means there must be no serious or substantial doubt about the

correctness of a particular conclusion drawn from the evidence.” In re N.C., 952

N.W.2d 151, 153 (Iowa 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Because I believe the majority opinion is not faithful to the burden of proof required

by precedent and erroneously defers to a district court ruling that lacks credibility

findings or assessment of any expert testimony, I cannot join. I would reverse the

district court because I believe after-the-fact observations by self-interested lay

witnesses, standing alone, are not enough to satisfy our highest civil burden. In

this record, the sole unbiased witness described Geerdes as entirely capable when

transferring property consistent with her expressed wishes. Based on this record,

I would find the district court erred when it invalidated Geerdes’s transfer of

property to Cruz. I dissent.

         But first, a point of agreement. The majority opinion bypasses the primary

holding of the district court, which was that Geerdes and Cruz were in a

“confidential relationship” that triggered a presumption of undue influence (and

placed the burden of proof on Cruz). This finding made up the lion’s share of the

district court ruling but is not relied on by the majority opinion, presumably because

it is not supported by the record. I would find the district court’s conclusion on

undue influence was a material error warranting reversal, and I am concerned it

colored the remainder of the ruling by impermissibly shifting the burden of proof.

         Where I part ways with the majority opinion is in its reliance on capacity as

an alternative basis to affirm. The capacity analysis by the district court was
                                         13

abbreviated and ran only a handful of sentences at the very end of the opinion.

This is what it says, in its entirety:

       Even if the court were to find that they were not in a confidential
       relationship the court finds that [Geerdes] lacked the requisite mental
       capacity to quit claim her interest in the property. Her medical
       records indicated as early as 2017 that she had dementia. The
       dementia in combination with her age and physical health, the lack
       of consideration, and the improvident nature of the transaction given
       that she retained the debt on the property convinces this court that
       from the entire record there is clear, convincing, and satisfactory
       evidence that the grantor, [Geerdes], did not possess sufficient
       consciousness or mentality to understand the import of her acts
       when the deed was executed. The deed therefore must be and is
       set aside. The court finds the conveyance invalid.

The majority expands on this holding significantly to affirm. Based on my review

of the record and precedent, I cannot join the majority in finding this analysis is

supported by clear and convincing evidence such that we can invalidate Geerdes’s

property rights. I would instead reverse the district court.

       A. “The Highest Evidentiary Burden in Civil Cases”

       I appreciate the majority’s acknowledgement this is a “close case,” and I

agree. Often in civil litigation, a “close case” can still supply a victory for the

plaintiff, as the typical burden of proof is only by a preponderance of the evidence.

Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(f). In other words, it’s usually enough that a plaintiff has

proven the facts supporting a claim are probably true. See Holliday v. Rain & Hail

L.L.C., 690 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Iowa 2004). If the law only required a preponderance

of the evidence to affirm here—a determination Geerdes probably lacked

capacity—I might not be writing separately. But the law requires more when a

plaintiff seeks to invalidate someone’s right to transfer property as they wish.
                                        14

      “On [a] claim of mental incapacity [the] plaintiff ha[s] the burden to show by

clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that at the time she made the deed she

was incapable of understanding in any reasonable manner the nature of the

transaction and its consequences and effects upon her rights and interests.”

Groves v. Groves, 82 N.W.2d 124, 131 (Iowa 1957); see Daughton v. Parson, 423

N.W.2d 894, 896 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (“The party alleging lack of mental capacity

sufficient to execute a deed has the burden of proving by clear, convincing, and

satisfactory evidence that the grantor did not possess ‘sufficient consciousness or

mentality . . . to understand the import of her acts’ when the deed was executed.”).

As I mentioned at the outset, clear and convincing “means there must be no

serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of a particular conclusion drawn

from the evidence.” N.C., 952 N.W.2d at 153 (citation omitted). This burden “refers

to the character or nature of the evidence, whereas ‘preponderance’ of the

evidence is a quantitative measure.” Holliday, 690 N.W.2d at 64 (citation omitted).

      I have serious and substantial doubt about the correctness of the district

court’s conclusions here.    While there are certainly occasions where I would

appropriately affirm a “close” civil case decided by preponderance of the evidence,

even on de novo review, I cannot do so in a case that commands our “highest

evidentiary burden in civil cases.” See N.C., 952 N.W.2d at 153. To invalidate a

person’s autonomy over their property requires more than a close evidentiary

record, and our case law compels me to reverse.

      B. The Best Evidence in this Thin Record Supports Reversal

      I have no serious complaints about the majority opinion’s recitation of facts,

but I think what’s contained in this unusually thin record warrants additional
                                       15

discussion. Of the six lay witnesses who testified at trial, Cruz and accountant

Lemmon are the only witnesses who could testify regarding Geerdes’s capacity on

the day she signed the deed. Setting aside Cruz’s testimony due to his interest in

the case, we are left with the testimony of Lemmon, who has no dog in this fight.

       Lemmon explained she provided tax services to Geerdes for around fifteen

years before Geerdes came to her in 2019 and requested help transferring

property to Cruz. Lemmon described how Geerdes’s request was unambiguous

and Geerdes—not Cruz—was the one “doing most of the talking” and “driving the

decision.” Lemmon observed Geerdes had a good understanding of the property

she was transferring “[b]ecause she even drew out the description of it and where

she wanted the lines to go on an aerial photograph.” Cf. In re Est. of Johnson,

No. 22-1730, 2023 WL 7015335, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2023) (“[C]ourts

consider a testator’s understanding of the nature of the interest held in their

property when deciding whether the testator had capacity.”). Lemmon opined that

Geerdes appeared “to be in a similar mindset regarding her decision-making

capabilities” in 2019 as Geerdes had been in 2004 when they first met. And she

relayed to the court that Geerdes told her she wanted to execute the deed “to make

sure that [Cruz] had gotten his share of the property” because her daughters “did

not like” Cruz. This explanation is borne out and corroborated by Geerdes’s

handwritten note and reflected in the apparent animosity between Cruz and her

daughters at trial.

       Weighing this good evidence of capacity against the daughters’ and farm

tenant’s self-interested testimony describing Geerdes’s mental status on other

dates, I have serious doubts about the correctness of the district court’s
                                           16

conclusion. The majority opinion may be right that this was an “improvident”

decision from a purely financial perspective. But it’s clear from this record that

Geerdes wanted to transfer the property to Cruz for personal, rather than financial,

reasons. This makes sense given the history between the two, which the majority

opinion fairly summarizes in describing them as “long-time friend[s] and business

partner[s].” I do not believe our law allows us to strip a person’s autonomy when

their motivation to transfer property is more personal than profit driven. Among the

limited pertinent facts in this record, the better evidence suggests Geerdes had

capacity when she signed the deed. I cannot find by clear and convincing evidence

that Geerdes “was incapable of understanding in any reasonable manner the

nature of the transaction and its consequences and effects upon her rights and

interests.” Groves, 82 N.W.2d at 131; see Daughton, 423 N.W.2d at 896.

       Perhaps more important than what’s in this record, however, is what’s

missing: credibility findings and expert testimony.

       C. No Credibility Findings

       I have written before about “the difficult position the appellate courts are put

in when the district court does not make express credibility findings or explain why

it is rejecting what appears to be credible testimony in favor of other evidence.”

Connell v. Barker, No. 22-1791, 2023 WL 4759458, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.

July 26, 2023) (Buller, J., specially concurring). This is another case where the

district court’s failure to make credibility findings hamstrings our review. The

majority opinion apparently concedes there were no explicit credibility findings

anywhere in the district court’s ruling and instead insists the district court “implicitly

found the conservator’s witnesses more credible on their observations of
                                           17

Geerdes’s mental state around the time she signed the deed.” I’ve looked carefully

for any implicit credibility findings in the district court ruling, and I can’t find them.

The entirety of the district court’s capacity analysis is reproduced near the

beginning of this dissent, and I sincerely question whether anything in that five-

sentence paragraph can be stretched into an implicit credibility determination. At

most, the facts section of the ruling contains a summary of the evidence presented

at trial, which does nothing to facilitate appellate review. It seems to me the

majority opinion is paying deference to the outcome below—rather than the fact

findings—which I doubt our law supports. E.g., In re Est. of Johnson, 739 N.W.2d

493, 496 (Iowa 2007) (“Of course, under a de novo review we will make our own

legal conclusions, as we are not bound by and give no deference to the trial court’s

conclusions of law.”).

       Confusingly, the majority opinion “place[s] weight” on and defers to the

district court’s purported credibility findings made below, but simultaneously makes

its own credibility findings about Lemmon based on “the limited nature of her

meetings with Geerdes concerning the deed.” Setting aside that this overlooks the

fifteen-year history between Lemmon and Geerdes, the district court never

expressed concern about the “limited nature” of their contact surrounding the deed.

This is a credibility finding made for the first time on appeal.            This finding

undermines the basis for the majority opinion’s deference to the district court,

which is premised on the factfinder being in a better position to evaluate credibility.

My perspective is we should either admit the ruling does not contain fact-findings

supported by credibility determinations or we should restrain ourselves from

judging credibility ourselves on a cold record—we can’t have it both ways.
                                           18

       D. No Expert Testimony

       Given the significant burden required to invalidate Geerdes’s property

rights, I would also find the lack of expert testimony fatal to the plaintiff’s challenge

to Geerdes’s capacity. I am not personally inclined toward a rule requiring expert

testimony in every case litigating capacity, and it appears the majority rule prefers

this be decided on a case-by-case basis. See State v. Gardiner, 895 A.2d 703,

712 n.11 (R.I. 2006) (collecting cases); but see In re Est. of Boyd, 798 S.E.2d 330,

332 n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (noting that, among other things, “the submission of

[a person’s] medical records without expert testimony interpreting them” is

insufficient to meet the burden to prove incapacity).

       In this particular case, the record is too thin to find lack of capacity by clear

and convincing evidence without the benefit of expert testimony. For just one

example of why, the medical records the majority opinion claims offer “clear

conclusions” actually use generic and wishy-washy language like “[p]roblems may

be observed,” “[m]inor problems may be noticed,” “the person may be impulsive or

have problems,” and “difficulties may manifest” in describing the “mild” cognition

issues suggested by limited testing. And even these records—arguably the best

evidence supporting the plaintiff—were created a year before the transfer and by

an occupational therapist, who I am skeptical could opine on capacity under Iowa

Rule of Evidence 5.702. See Iowa Code § 148B.2(3) (2022) (on the scope of

practice for occupational therapists); Iowa Admin r. 645–208.1 (same). Neither

our court nor the district court have the appropriate medical expertise to

extrapolate from the conditional and ambiguous language about capacity in the

records to the certainty required by the clear-and-convincing evidentiary burden.
                                         19

These facts are a far cry from the rare appellate case affirming incapacity absent

expert testimony. See Gibbons v. Redmond, 49 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Kan. 1935)

(describing record where, despite no relevant physical limitation, testator’s mental

decline was so severe he could not sign his own name). And the records, contrary

to the majority opinion’s assertion, offer no “clear conclusions.”

       In conducting a review of comparable cases from other jurisdictions, it

seems telling that virtually every case to consider the import of cognitive testing

like the SLUMS (relied on by the district court and majority opinion) has turned on

expert testimony—and usually that of more than one expert. See, e.g., Wiseman

v. Keeter, 550 S.W.3d 883, 884 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018) (summarizing expert

testimony explaining a SLUMS score of 1/30); In re Guardianship of A.M.Q.,

No. 2015AP2614, 2017 WL 1386352, at *3–4 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2017)

(summarizing competing expert testimony on SLUMS and other cognitive testing);

In re Coleman, No. 2132 EDA 2014, 2015 WL 7355666, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar.

30, 2015) (summarizing expert testimony explaining SLUMS scores of 17/30 and

23/30 in the context of other cognitive testing). I have not found any case from any

jurisdiction where an appellate court has affirmed a finding of incapacity based

upon a borderline score—like Geerdes’s SLUMS results—absent expert

testimony. And I cannot join the majority to be the first to do so.

       To the extent I have found comparable cases, some courts have recognized

that SLUMS scores well-below Geerdes’s do not necessarily indicate incapacity in

civil litigation or incompetence to stand criminal trial. See United States v. Kight,

No. 1:16-CR-99-WSD, 2018 WL 672119, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 2, 2018) (finding

offender with score of 17/30 on SLUMS was competent to stand trial); In re Est. of
                                          20

Kusmanoff, 83 N.E.3d 1144, 1172 (lll. App. Ct. 2017) (finding guardianship not

appropriate, and that subject of proceedings still had capacity, despite “mild or

moderate decline in cognitive function,” including memory loss and other difficulties

documented in part by a 13/30 SLUMS score). This casts further doubt on the

district court ruling in the absence of expert testimony.

       Last on this front, I specifically disagree with the majority opinion’s criticism

that “Cruz left the conservator’s medical evidence unchallenged” because he did

not present his own medical evaluation or expert testimony.              This criticism

inappropriately shifts the burden to Cruz, who—absent a proven confidential

relationship—had no obligation to furnish evidence, and certainly no duty to find

his own expert to rebut testimony never offered by the plaintiff. It seems the

majority opinion has committed the same error as the district court, implicitly

shifting the burden to Cruz rather than the plaintiff where it belongs. At risk of

beating a dead burden-of-proof horse, the plaintiff bore the highest burden

authorized by civil law, and I believe it is error to shift the plaintiff’s shortcomings

to a defendant who need put forward no evidence to prevail.

       In sum, I dissent because I believe the plaintiff did not prove its case to the

satisfaction of our highest evidentiary burden. Absent credibility findings or expert

testimony, the district court ruling is not supported by clear and convincing

evidence. The United States Supreme Court has consistently informed us the level

of certainty required by the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is “necessary

to preserve fundamental fairness” in proceedings “that threaten the individual

involved with a significant deprivation of liberty or stigma.” See Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Finding a “close case” with a thin record to be sufficient evidence in those

proceedings would be troubling. See, e.g., id. (irrevocable termination of parental

rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (involuntary civil

commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (deportation from United

States); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (denaturalization). The

evidence in this case does not rise to the level of clear and convincing, as

precedent requires us to find before invalidating invalidate an Iowan’s right to

transfer property. I would reverse.