Court Opinion

ID: 9794756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:11:03.733421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:48.612688
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Moore
dissenting.
This is an original proceeding in this court in which petitioner sought to obtain relief with reference to the election of state senators and representatives pursuant to a purported amendment to the apportionment provisions of the Constitution of Colorado (Article V, Sections 44-47), and the legislation adopted by the General Assembly following the election of 1962 at which said purported constitutional amendment was approved by the people. On the original petition we issued our rule to show cause. On the day prior to that on which the matter was set for oral argument, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Andres Lucas et al., etc., v. The Forty-fourth General Assembly of the *307State of Colorado, et al., announced June 15, 1964, the effect of which was to invalidate the above referred to constitutional amendment and much of the legislative act which had been adopted in implementing same. The questions originally presented by petitioner were made moot by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
We granted leave to petitioner to file an amended petition in which the apportionment statute adopted by the legislature, called in special session for the purpose of meeting the requirement of the federal courts, was attacked as being in violation of Article V, Section 47 of the Colorado Constitution. A rule to show cause issued as prayed in the amended petition; the respondents made answer; and oral arguments have been had.
I address myself to the single question we are called upon to determine, which is stated as follows: May a county be divided to form two or more senatorial or representative districts, each of them to be totally within such county?
The pertinent section of the Colorado Constitution is Article V, Section 47, which reads as follows:
“Senatorial and representative districts may be altered from time to time, as public convenience may require. When a senatorial or representative district shall be composed of two or more counties, they shall be contiguous, and the district as compact as may be. No county shall be divided in the formation of a senatorial or representative district.”
The act of the General Assembly adopted July 8, 1964, and signed by the Governor the same day, contains the following provision:
“SENATORIAL DISTRICTS— NUMBER — COMPOSITION— (1) Districts 1-9 — city and county of Denver. There shall be nine senatorial districts within the city and county of Denver which shall be numbered as follows and shall consist of the following whole general election precincts: * * *”
*308The election precincts forming a part of each of the nine senatorial districts are then identified. Similar provisions are contained within the Act creating senatorial districts in El Paso, Jefferson, Pueblo, Adams, and Arapahoe counties. The Act also creates eighteen “representative districts” within the City and County of Denver, and multiple “representative districts” in other counties within the territorial limits of each such county.
The question before us is one which involves an interpretation of the state constitution, and in this field our court is the final arbiter. Under well established law the federal courts are obligated to accept the interpretation given to state constitutions by the highest court of the state. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U. S. 167:
“This now well-established procedure is aimed at the avoidance of unnecessary interference by the federal courts with proper and validly administered state concerns, a course so essential to the balanced working of our federal system. To minimize the possibility of such interference a ‘scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments . . . should at all times actuate the federal courts,’ Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525, as their ‘contribution ... in furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal authority . . .’ Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 501. In the service of this doctrine, which this Court has applied in many different contexts, no principle has found more consistent or clear expression than that the federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of state enactments fairly open to interpretation until the state courts have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass upon them. * * *”
We have issued the rule to show cause in this case and have had arguments pertinent to the question involved in order that the three judge special Federal *309Court sitting pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, supra, may have the benefit of our interpretation of the Colorado Constitution in so far as pertinent to the matter pending before that court.
As was stated by this court in Johnson v. McDonald, 97 Colo. 324, 49 P.2d 1017:
“Our determination of this cause will be less difficult, if at the threshold of our consideration, we bear in mind the foregoing conception of the nature of our state Constitution, and if we further bear in mind that the function of courts in passing upon the constitutionality of legislative acts is to determine whether the Constitution inhibits or limits the power sought to be exercised thereby, rather than to determine the wisdom or policy of the acts. Courts are concerned with questions of the power of the legislature to act, but not with the policy it pursues within its powers. The determination of legislative policy within its powers is the prerogative of the legislature solely. This principle of law is well expressed in Commonwealth ex rel. v. Reeder, 171 Pa. 505, 513, 33 Atl. 67, 33 L.R.A. 141, quoted with approval in Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65 (173 Atl. 289), at page 75: ‘Whatever the people have not, by their constitution, restrained themselves from doing, they, through their representatives in the legislature, may do. This latter body represents their will just as completely as a constitutional convention, in all matters left open by the written constitution. Certain grants of power, very specifically set forth, were made by the state to the United States, and these cannot be revoked or disregarded by state legislation; then come the specific restraints imposed by our own constitution upon our own legislature; these must be respected; but in that wide domain not included in either of these boundaries the right of the people through the legislature to enact such laws as they choose, is absolute. Of the use the people may make of this unrestrained power, it is *310not the business of the courts to inquire. We peruse the expressions of their will in the statute; then examine the constitution and ascertain if this instrument says “Thou shalt not,” and if we find no inhibition, then the statute is the law, simply because it is the will of the people and not because it is wise or unwise.’ ”
To like effect is the opinion in District Landowners Trust, et al., v. County of Adams, et al., 104 Colo., 146, 89 P.2d 251.
In reaching a conclusion on the question as to whether the act of the legislature violates the above quoted section of the constitution, I have given due consideration to the following pronouncements of this court:
First. “A statute should be construed in a manner to harmonize it with existing constitutional provisions if it is reasonably possible to do so.” Cooper Motors v. Commissioners, 131 Colo. 78, 279 P. (2d) 685; People v. Morgan, 79 Colo. 504, 246 Pac. 1024.
Second. “In construing a constitutional provision, courts should ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers thereof and of the people who adopted it, and, in so doing, technical rules of construction should not be applied so as to defeat the objectives sought to be accomplished by the provision under consideration.” Cooper Motors v. Commissioners, supra.
Third. “If separate clauses in the same constitutional or statutory enactment can by one construction be harmonized so as to produce no inconsistencies, and, by a different construction, one phrase or clause thereof becomes antagonistic and out of harmony with another, courts should adopt that construction which creates no inconsistency.” Cooper Motors v. Commissioners, supra.
Fourth. “Proper construction requires that each part of a constitutional provision or statute must be read in connection with all other pertinent sections * * Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441.
The constitutional provision here involved contains three sentences, and each should be considered in the *311light of that which is contained in the other two. The first sentence makes it clear that “senatorial and representative districts may be altered from time to time, as public convenience may require ” (Emphasis supplied.) The contention of petitioner would require us to hold that this provision applies only to those districts which are made up of more than one county. No such limitation on the power of the legislature to alter a district in order to serve the public convenience can logically be found in the words used in the first sentence of the section under consideration. The clear implication of that language is that to serve the public convenience senatorial and representative districts may be altered whether they are single or multiple county districts.
The second sentence of the section under consideration adds strength to the conclusion because in it we deal with distinctions to be drawn between single county districts and multiple county districts and it is required that in multiple county districts any change in such district must not operate to make it consist of non-contiguous counties.
Bearing these sections clearly in mind we next find the statement, “No county shall be divided in the formation of a senatorial or representative district.” This follows the sentence which refers to multiple county districts. To give effect to all three sentences contained in the questioned constitutional provision I would give it the interpretation which was applied by the General Assembly, namely, that since every new senatorial and representative district created by the act of the legislature is entirely within a specific county, there was no “division” of the county within the meaning of the third sentence of the section. The General Assembly determined that as long as a district was within a single county it did not offend the constitution and only if a senatorial or representative district purported to take in a portion of two or more counties would there be a *312“divided” county in the formation of a district. The General Assembly reasoned that more than one district within a county, in order to serve the convenience of the people, is not prohibited, but the prohibition upon their power prevents the placing of parts of two or more counties within a single district.
It cannot be seriously questioned that the “public convenience” requires the enactment of the proposed changes in the densely populated single-county districts, to a much greater degree than in those areas in which only a few senators and representatives are selected.
While reasonably minded persons may differ on the interpretation to be given the constitutional provision under consideration, the legislative interpretation is a reasonable one and under the legal principles herein-above mentioned I would give approval to that interpretation which will uphold both the Act and the constitutional provision.
Accordingly it is my opinion that the legislative Act does not offend the Constitution of Colorado and I would discharge the rule to show cause.
The foregoing views have been rejected by the majority of this court. Although I dissent I must now assume that the Act of the legislature is unconstitutional. The majority opinion so declares in emphatic and unmistakable terms. Being unconstitutional, the Act is void. The procedures condemned as being in violation of fundamental law have had no validity at any time since the 8th day of July when the unconstitutional measure was “enacted” by the legislature and signed by the Governor under the mistaken belief that it was a proper exercise of legislative power. This act of the legislature is either good or it is bad when subjected to the test of the Colorado Constitution. The majority has condemned it under that test!
But the majority concludes that it would be expedient to temporarily suspend the effectiveness of constitutional limitations upon governmental power until an *313“election” can be conducted under the provisions of the very statute which is denounced as being unconstitutional! This is an extremely dangerous doctrine. “A resort to expediency in the law is always dangerous.” City of Canon City v. Clyde James Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614. I have great difficulty in reconciling the views expressed in the majority opinion with the words employed by the same author in Canon City v. Merris, supra, where we find:
“Expedience .may not override the Constitution of Colorado; it should not dethrone rights guaranteed thereunder. ‘If, one by one, the rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution can and must, for expediency’s sake, be violated, abolished, stricken from that immortal document, and from state Constitutions, we will find ourselves governed by expediency, not laws or Constitutions, and the revolution will have come.’ State v. Arregui, 44 Ida. 43, 254 Pac. 788, 52 A.L.R. 463. See Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298, 65 L. Ed. 647, 41 Sup. Ct. 261.”
The majority has said the law is unconstitutional and necessarily void for complete lack of power in the legislature to enact it. Notwithstanding this controlling conclusion, the majority opinion initiates a new doctrine for the determination of the legality of state statutes being tested by the state constitution. For lack of better name I shall call it the doctrine of “transient validity” under which a semblance of temporary effectiveness is mysteriously breathed into the nullity spawned by the legislature. It is a sort of “Here today — gone tomorrow” power to the existence of which I cannot subscribe and in the creation of which I can have no part.
As a member of this court, who cannot agree that the Act was beyond the power of the legislature to adopt, I am nevertheless bound by the decision of the majority. All federal courts are also bound by this determination. This assertion is firmly established by *314decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which are too numerous to mention by name. It is also firmly established by decisions of the courts of last resort in every state in the Union. It is also recognized by a federal statute known as the “Rules of Decisions Statute.” Tit. 28 § 1652, U.S.C.A., in which it is provided that “* * * the laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision” in the federal courts. For a quick reference to hundreds of cases from all jurisdictions supporting this fundamental rule, I direct attention to 36 C.J.S. pages 393-402 where they are collected under a statement of the general rule which reads as follows:
“The decision of the highest court of a state as to the construction and application of its own constitution or statutes is binding on federal courts, except in so far as a federal question is involved, or unless following the state decision would conflict with the United States Constitution, treaties, or statutes.”
There isn’t the slightest suggestion that the question resolved by this court involves a federal question of any kind.
In carrying out the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly, supra, it would be a simple matter for the three-judge federal court to insure an election that provided “equal protection of the law” under the federal constitution, and at the same time be in full harmony with the provisions of the state constitution as that instrument has been construed by this court. There is no authority in the mandate of the U. S. Supreme Court which justifies the holding of an unconstitutional election at the state level in order that equal protection of the law may be secured, when an election in conformity with the state constitution can be had which also insures equal protection of the law!
*315This court, in my judgment, is anticipating that the federal court will disregard all the law that has ever been written thus far which is pertinent to the issue, and will order an election upon a purely state issue under procedures set up by a state law which the majority opinion says violates the state constitution. I cannot believe that so little remains of state sovereignty. If, however, the fears of the majority are justified by subsequent events, the cure for the resultant injury to state sovereignty and for the disease of usurpation of judicial power is not for this court to emasculate and destroy the protections guaranteed to the citizens of the state by the Constitution of Colorado. This court has no power to suspend provisions of the constitution for a single day, much less to order the election officials of this state to proceed in an unconstitutional manner to the election of an illegal legislative body by conducting an election under a law which is strongly denounced as being a violation of the constitution of the state!
It is said in the majority opinion: “* * * Like the chancellor, if we can find no precedent we must establish one. The court should be resourceful in fashioning a remedy commensurate with a complex situation.” I cannot agree that “in fashioning a remedy” to meet a “complex situation” this court, or any federal court, in the absence of a federal question has the power to eliminate state constitutional protections for any specified length of time. The name for such judicial conduct is not “resourceful.” If we are to nullify constitutional provisions on the grounds of expediency every time we have a “complex situation” the future will present many more opportunities to make use of the majority opinion as a precedent to further emasculate and destroy constitutional government. The question might well be asked: When and where do we stop the Frittering away of Constitutional Protections?
For the foregoing reasons I place of record this protest to the disposition made of this case wherein it is *316said: “We stay the effect of our judgment nullifying Senate Bill No. 1 until the completion of the session of the legislature to be held in 1965.”