Court Opinion

ID: 9491457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:14:43.376265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:45.321199
License: Public Domain

DISSENT
R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion because I disagree with its reading of Ohio law and conclusion that the conduct alleged in this suit falls within the defendants’ scope of employment. Therefore, I do not believe that the United States should be substituted as the defendant in this action.
The majority considers Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 486, 575 N.E.2d 428 (1991), a departure of sorts from the general principles of Ohio law regarding scope of employment, and bases its conclusion in this case on only that one decision. In Kerans, the court concluded that a jury could find a store manager’s alleged sexual harassment to be within the scope of his employment if the manager had supervisory authority over the plaintiff and used such authority to cause the plaintiff to feel compelled to endure .his conduct in order to remain employed. Id. at 432. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Kerans is dispositive of the issue presented in this case. The resolution of scope of employment questions varies from case to case; we are not bound by one decision’s determination that summary judgment was not warranted in.a particular factual circumstance.
Although the majority opinion sets out the basic facts of this case, I have included the district court’s synopsis of the facts alleged in the complaint, as it presents a somewhat fuller picture of the conduct and circumstances alleged. As taken from the district court’s opinion, the factual scenario is as follows:
After graduating from the University of Akron, Plaintiff, Dorothy Mackey, became a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force. In September 1991, Plaintiff was assigned as Squadron Section Commander at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (Wright-Patterson) in Dayton, Ohio. In this position, Plaintiff reported to and interacted with the Defendants in this action, Colonel David W. Milam and Lt. Colonel Travis E. Elmore. As Squadron Section Commander, Plaintiff was responsible for the Weight Management Program (WMP) and the Cycle Ergometry Program (CEP), both designed to measure and ensure the physical fitness and readiness of military personnel.
Defendant Colonel Milam, retired, served as Inspector General and Chief of Staff for the Aeronautical Systems Division of WrighL-Patterson at the time the alleged incidents occurred. Defendant Lt. Colonel Elmore reported to Colonel Milam. His official title at the time of these incidents was Assistant Chief of Staff for the Aeronautical Systems Division and Assistant Inspector General. Both Defendants were Plaintiffs immediate supervisors.
Plaintiff alleges various instances of sexual harassment against both Defendants while she served as Squadron Section Commander. These allegations include *653charges of both verbal harassment and physical contact that, if true, constitute serious misconduct. Specifically, with regard to Colonel Milam, Plaintiff alleges that: (1) While Plaintiff was reporting to Colonel Milam in his office regarding the WMP checks, the Colonel would often close and lock the door behind Plaintiff; (2) During these briefings and on several occasions Colonel Milam -would eye. Plaintiff from head to toe and make suggestive remarks such as “This is what I prefer”; (3) Colonel Milam would invade Plaintiffs “intimate zone” by standing so close to her as to enable her to feel his breath on her face and neck; (4) Colonel Milam often touched Plaintiff by placing his hand on her hand or squeezing her arm while she briefed him on the WMP program.
Plaintiffs allegations regarding Lt. Colonel Elmore’s conduct are even more severe. According to the Complaint, Lt. Colonel Elmore made it clear early on in the relationship that he was interested in Plaintiffs body. He appeared to have had a particular interest in Plaintiffs breasts, even going so far as to comment on one occasion that her erect nipples were “a natural reaction” from the cold. Lt. Colonel Elmore repeatedly made inquiries into Plaintiffs waist size, even taking the liberty of placing his hands around her waist on more than one occasion. Elmore would often make an approving remark such as, “Very nice — very nice,” if Plaintiff were wearing her skirted uniform, but Elmore allegedly lost interest if she were wearing the pants uniform. Plaintiff alleges that over time the Lt. Colonel’s conduct became increasingly more physical. Elmore once began to massage the back of Plaintiffs neck after it had popped audibly in his presence. One another occasion, after Plaintiff had twisted her right knee and was treated by a physician, Lt. Colonel Elmore took the opportunity to examine the knee himself.
Finally, in a truly bizarre and disturbing event, Plaintiff alleges that Elmore began to replicate a quasi-pelvie exam on Plaintiff while in his office." Plaintiff mentioned to Elmore that she was not feeling well. Lt. Colonel Elmore allegedly got out of his chair, walked over to Plaintiff, and placed both of his hands on her stomach and pressed down. He began to move his hands down the front of her pants, with his thumbs up and fingers wrapped around her back. Elmore continued to move his hands downward, pressing in on Plaintiffs abdomen despite her protests. When the Lt. Colonel got to Plaintiffs pubic area, Elmore said that she should see a physician.
All of Plaintiffs allegations, with the exception ' of oné incident in August 1992, occurred on the military base during working hours. The August incident involved Elmore allegedly calling Plaintiff at her apartment around 10:00 p.m. from an off-base night spot and insisting that she meet him there. Plaintiff agreed to meet Lt. Colonel Elmore after he mentioned that he could review her resume which he had with him. When Plaintiff arrived, Elmore was alone and had placed an order for food. Elmore asked about her neck and back, and he began rubbing his hand up and down her back. Plaintiff claims that on several occasions, his hand dropped below her waist. After refusing Lt. Colonel El-more’s request to dance, Plaintiff claims she attempted to leave, but Elmore physically prevented her from entering her car by leaning against! the driver’s side door. Thirty minutes láter, Elmore finally relinquished, and allowed Plaintiff to drive home alone.
Mackey v. Milam, No. C-3-96-140, at 1-4 (S.D.Ohio Dec. 11, 1996).
The majority reasons that Milam and El-more’s actions were within the scope of their employment simply because they had direct supervisory power over Mackey and because most of the incidents occurred during working hours. This reasoning is not supported by Ohio law. InKerans, the decision upon which the majority relies, the Ohio Supreme Court did not hold that a supervisor’s sexual harassment of an employee is per se within a supervisor’s scope of employment by virtue of a supervisor’s ability to sexually harass. Rather, the court held that if a supervisor used his authority to cause the subordinate employee to feel compelled to endure his *654advances in order to keep her job, then a jury could reasonably find that the supervisor acted within the scope of his employment. Kerans, 575 N.E.2d at 432.1 The Keransc-ourt went on to state that “[ejven if [the supervisor’s] activities took place outside the scope of employment, summary judgment against appellants’ claims would not be proper,” noting that the employer may be liable for failing to take appropriate action if the employer knows or had reason to know that its employee posed a risk of harm to other employees. 575 N.E.2d at 432. The Kerans decision has been characterized as holding that “the torts of co-workers predicated upon sexual harassment are within the scope of employment if the employer was negligent in not preventing that malfeasance.” Baab v. AMR Services Corp., 811 F.Supp. 1246, 1267 (N.D.Ohio 1993). Thus, the Kerans court did not rely entirely upon the issue of scope of employment to conclude that summary judgment was not warranted in that ease.
I do not believe that Kerans, or Ohio law in general, suggests that all an employee’s acts are within the scope of employment simply because he is in a supervisory position which enables him to engage in tortious conduct.- To say such leads to the conclusion that -innumerable tortious acts committed upon lower-ranking employees by supervisors will be considered within the scope of employment. In my mind, this reasoning and its inevitable conclusion defy common sense. The fact that Elmore and Milam would not have been able to commit the alleged conduct absent their positions as supervisors avoids the question presented. It goes without saying that the conduct would not have occurred if Mackey had not had an association with the defendants by virtue of her employment. Our task is to determine whether these supervisors were acting within their scope of employment when they engaged in the alleged conduct.
In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court has more recently restated its position regarding whether an employee’s conduct falls within the scope of his employment, albeit not in the context in which a supervisor was the tort-feasor. See Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St.3d 326, 587 N.E.2d 825, 829 (1992). In Osborne, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that in order for an employee’s conduct to be considered within the scope of his employment, “the behavior giving rise to the tort must be ‘calculated to facilitate or promote the business for which the servant was employed....’” 587 N.E.2d at 829 (citations omitted).
In general, an intentional and willful attack committed by an agent or employee, to vent his own spleen or malevolence against the injured person, is a clear departure from his employment_ Stated otherwise, an employer is not liable for independent self-serving acts of his employees which in no way facilitate or promote his business.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see also Henson v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 14 F.3d 1143, 1147 (6th Cir.1994) (stating that under Ohio law, “an employee is not acting within the scope of employment if its acts are self-serving and in no way facilitate or promote business”), amended on rehearing, 23 F.3d 990 (6th Cir.1994).
Clearly, the conduct alleged here was intended to neither facilitate nor promote the business of the United States Air Force. The Air Force does not promote, facilitate or condone sexual harassment; in fact, it has promulgated regulations prohibiting such conduct. In Osborne, the Ohio Supreme Court offered further guidance, drawing on its long-established precedent. “ ‘When an employee diverts from the straight and narrow performance of his task, the diversion is not an abandonment of his responsibility and service to his employer unless his act is so divergent that its very character severs the relationship of employer and employee.'” Id. at 829 (citations omitted) (emphasis add*655ed); Mumford v. Interplast, Inc., 119 Ohio App.3d 724, 696 N.E.2d 259, 265 (1997) (stating that “an employee is acting outside the scope of employment where the act has no relationship to the employer’s business or is so divergent that its very character severs the employer-employee relationship”). It is clear to me that the nature of the conduct alleged here is so divergent from the defendants’ legitimate duties and work activities that it severed the employer-employee relationship between the Air Force and the defendants.
In sum, I believe that the majority improperly extended the holding of Kerans and disregarded other Ohio decisions relevant to determining the issue of whether an employee’s conduct falls within the scope of his employment. In my view, the majority opinion thus misconstrues Ohio law. The Kerans decision, upon which the majority relies, supports the imposition of liability against a negligent employer by considering the employer’s potential liability for an employee’s actions. Here, the majority’s application of Kerans provides for the opposite result. By considering the defendants’ actions to fall within the scope of their employment, the majority enables the defendants, as well as their employer — the United States — to escape liability because the United States is immune from suit. Plaintiff is thus left without a remedy for the egregious actions of the defendants. I do not believe that Ohio law can be construed to permit such an inequitable result. In my opinion, the defendants’ conduct was plainly a personal deviation and not within the scope of their employment as defined by Ohio law. As a result, the United States should not be substituted as the defendant in this action. I would therefore affirm the district court’s reinstatement of Milam and Elmore as defendants in this action.

. The majority represents that the Kerans Court held that when the harassment takes place during working hours, at the office and by someone with the authority to hire, fire, promote and discipline the plaintiff, "it will normally fall within the employee's scope of employment." See slip op. at p. 650. The Kerans Court did not make that statement. Rather, it summarized a federal district court's decision in which there were such circumstances. See Kerans, 575 N.E.2d at 432 (summarizing holding of Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 F.Supp. 774 (S.D.Ohio 1988)).