Court Opinion

ID: 9661922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:54:59.31124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:35.171736
License: Public Domain

BARDGETT, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
As pointed out in the principal opinion, the trial court instructed the jury as required by MAI-CR 2.04, Note 3(d), with reference to the assessment of punishment for the felony of stealing over $50.00. In my opinion this Court erred in causing and allowing an instruction to be given to a jury which tells the jury it “will fix” the defendant’s punishment within certain limits, when such action by the jury is to be treated as mere surplusage if the punishment attends a jury conviction of a felony under the former second offender act.
It is clear that the jury was incorrectly instructed but that, under the instruction given, the jury justifiably believed it had the power to assess punishment whether the conviction was for stealing under $50.00 (a misdemeanor) or over $50.00 (a felony). The assessment of punishment by the jury of one year for the offense of stealing over $50.00 was within the statutory limits and, ordinarily, the court would have no power whatever to increase such a punishment. See sections 546.410-546.450 RSMo 1969. Although the principal opinion states that the jury’s assessment of punishment was, at best, merely advisory, the point is that the jury did not know that and must have believed its assessment of punishment— whether on conviction of stealing over $50.00 or under $50.00 — would have the same efficacy.
So, it cannot be doubted that the jury was incorrectly instructed and, in effect, told it could do something that the law did not permit. We do not know, of course, what was said in the jury room or how they went about arriving at their verdict and punishment. Nevertheless, we know from our experience in the trial of cases as lawyers and judges that the amount of punishment a defendant may receive is often more important to the defendant and the prosecutor than the stigma attached to the conviction itself. And many convictions on pleas of guilty have been set aside for failure to fully apprise a defendant of the range of punishment.
Here the defendant testified that he did steal at least four lengths of pipe. The questions for the jury were how much did he steal and what should the punishment be. Juries have the power to compromise in arriving at a total verdict and a verdict in a criminal case is final whether or not there are compromises in the jury room. That compromise will often involve an adjustment of views on punishment when the jury is told it has a broad range within which to work.
By the verdict in this case we know the jury believed defendant should be punished by one year in jail. Would the jury have found defendant guilty of the felony had it known that the one year was merely advisory when assessed for a felony but final as the maximum that defendant could serve if assessed for the misdemeanor? Of course I do not know the answer but my opinion is that, had it known the truth, the jurors *350would have adjusted their views so as to return a verdict of guilty of the misdemeanor. That is, admittedly, speculation, but no more speculation than to suppose the incorrect information in the instruction did not cause or allow a miscarriage of justice to occur.
At the behest of trial courts and the bar, this court appointed a committee of knowledgeable lawyers and judges and assigned them the task of formulating criminal instructions and notes as to their use. The court then approved them and mandated their use. We should recognize that when put into practice instructions and notes may be incorrect or bring about unjust situations, as here. When that happens, we should stand ready to correct the injustice and change the instructions and notes.
In my opinion the defendant was prejudiced because the jury was led to believe it had power to sentence for the felony. This gave the jury the impression that it had an alternative which, in law, it did not. The error can be corrected by vacating the five-year sentence and remanding the case to the circuit court for sentencing within that permitted by § 560.161(2), but not to exceed the one year set by the jury.
I would also strike Note 3(d) of MAI-CR 2.04 and require that the jury be informed of the punishments available on the felony conviction and told that the court, not the jury, would assess punishment if the conviction is for the felony.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of conviction but vacate the judge-imposed sentence of five years imprisonment and remand the cause to the judge for re-sentencing within the limits set by 560.161(2) RSMo Supp.1975, but not to exceed the jury assessment of one year in jail.
I therefore dissent.