Court Opinion

ID: 9630830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:22:17.104748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:14.383167
License: Public Domain

Justice SCOTT,
specially concurring:
I join Justice Mullarkey’s special concurrence. I write separately, nonetheless, to address the jurisdictional issue raised in footnote five of the majority opinion, maj. op. at 675 n. 5, and to make clear my concern that, if the majority opinion is read too broadly, (1) untimely filings made in reliance upon motions to reconsider may result in dismissal for want of jurisdiction, and (2) motions to reconsider will burden resolution of interlocutory matters with unnecessary review and delay.1
I
We cannot ignore jurisdiction’s role as a predicate for our review. Our power to accept interlocutory appeals is governed in significant party by C.A.R. 4.1, which provides:
(a) Grounds. The state may file an interlocutory appeal in the supreme court from a ruling of a district court granting a motion under Crim.P. 41(e) and (g) and Crim.P. 41.1(i) made in advance of trial by the defendant ... to suppress evidence. ...
(b) Limitation on Time of Issuance. No interlocutory appeal shall be filed after ten days from the entry of the order com~ *680plained of. It shall not be a condition for the filing of such interlocutory appeal that a motion for a new trial or rehearing shall have been filed and denied in the trial court.
C.A.R. 4.1, 7B C.R.S. (1984) (emphasis added). Thus, in order for this court to have jurisdiction, the prosecution must “file an interlocutory appeal within a timely manner,” maj. op. at 675 n. 5, or within ten days of the “order complained of.” The failure to do so “would deprive this court of jurisdiction” to review the ruling of the trial court. Id. “[T]he judgments of a court acting outside of the limits of the constitutional and statutory provisions defining its subject matter jurisdiction are void.” Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 513 (Colo.1986).
Given the clear requirements of C.A.R. 4.1, it is important to note the circumstances contributing to the timeliness of the interlocutory appeal presented here. On October 12, 1995, the trial court granted the motion to suppress, but agreed to “continue the matter to next week.” On October 19, 1995, the People orally entered a motion to reconsider. At the end of that hearing, the district attorney asked, “[m]y concern is the 10-day rule on interlocutory appeals. Is the Court holding that it may consider a ruling reversible so that my 10-day period did not start until Thursday, or do I need to file something?” The court replied to this question stating, “[i]t won’t start until I make a final ruling on Monday.” On October 23, 1995, the court denied the motion to reconsider. The motion to suppress, therefore became “final” on October 23, 1995. The People filed a notice of interlocutory appeal on October 30,1995.
After examining the facts of the instant case, I find that the motion to reconsider was not a prosecutorial fiction. Three factors are critical in this determination. First, assuming the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress on October 12, 1995, the motion to reconsider was filed, heard, and determined by the trial court on Monday, October 23, 1995, within the ten-day period for filing appeals with this court. Second, on October 19,1995, at the hearing on its motion to reconsider, the prosecution, critically aware of the ten-day rule, voiced its concern that its motion not interfere with the timeliness of its interlocutory appeal and, apparently because it did not consider its earlier ruling final, the trial court indicated the ten-day period had not begun to run. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in my reading of the record and the transcript of the various hearings of October 12, 19, and 23, the trial court effectively reopened its October 12 order suppressing evidence by informing both the prosecution and the defendant that its order would not be “final” until its decision October 23, 1995. Given these facts it does not appear that the prosecution’s motivation was to cause delay, nor were the defendant’s rights to a speedy trial implicated.
In this case, the “order complained of’ was “final” on October 23, 1995. Within ten days of the trial court’s final order and ruling, the prosecution filed its petition with this court seeking review. In any event, I view the majority opinion as not positing an exception to the jurisdictional ten-day period by which a petition for review must be filed in this court.
II
If a judge reconsiders an earlier ruling, it is only logical and reasonable that his or her modified ruling may be appealed. And, when appealed, review necessarily includes both the original ruling as well as the modified ruling. However, in light of the ten-day requirement set forth in C.A.R. 4.1, temporal limitations consistent with jurisdictional requirements must be considered. Elaboration is unnecessary under the facts present here because the prosecution and the trial court acted timely and reasonably so as not to raise those concerns. However, for example, questions regarding the tolling and the tacking of days between the original ruling, the motion to reconsider, the modified ruling, and the petition filed in this court could arise under different facts. Moreover, even though a timely filing by the prosecution within the ten-day period would otherwise meet the requirements of C.A.R. 4.1, it would not obviate speedy trial considerations in instances where the prosecution failed to file *681the motion to reconsider contemporaneously ■with the suppression order or where, inadvertently or otherwise, the trial court failed to rule on the motion within a reasonable period of time.
Ill
Accordingly, although I agree with the majority that the suppression order should be reversed, I would remand to the trial court for further proceedings. Today, however, I also make clear my concerns regarding the running of the ten-day period for jurisdiction in this court pursuant to Rule 4.1.

. When permitted to toll the ten-day filing period under C.A.R. 4.1, 7B C.R.S. (1984), motions to reconsider present the potential for delay and implicate a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial guaranteed by art. II, § 16 of the Colorado Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Martin v. People, 738 P.2d 789, 791 (Colo.1987).