Court Opinion

ID: 9406554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-01 06:00:20.248534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:31.389576
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JUSTIN P. SMITH,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                       PH-0752-17-0139-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: June 30, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Kristyn M. Houchen, Esquire, Ventura, California, for the appellant.

           Shelly S. Glenn, Baltimore, Maryland, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed the appeal of his removal for lack of jurisdiction, as he failed to
     demonstrate that the waiver of Board appeal rights in the last chance agreement
     (LCA) that he entered into with the agency should not be enforced. Generally, we

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial
     decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based
     on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application
     of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review.     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and
     AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         In January 2015, the agency proposed to remove the appellant from the
     Federal service due to conduct unbecoming, loafing while on duty, and lack of
     candor. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 53-55. On May 1, 2015, the appellant
     voluntarily entered into an LCA with the agency wherein he admitted to the
     charges of misconduct in the proposal and agreed that his removal was the
     traditional penalty for his misconduct.     Id. at 51-52.   Through the LCA, the
     agency agreed to hold the decision to remove the appellant in abeyance in
     exchange for him not engaging in any act of sustained misconduct over a 2-year
     period from the May 1, 2015 effective date of the agreement. Id. In the event
     that the appellant violated the LCA by committing an act of sustained misconduct
     and the agency issued the removal decision held in abeyance, the ap pellant agreed
     to waive his rights to appeal such a removal to the Board. Id.
                                                                                       3

¶3        On May 13, 2016, the appellant and his first-line supervisor engaged in a
     verbal altercation in the presence of another employee and a customer of the
     office. IAF, Tab 5 at 30-32, 35, 37; Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of
     customer), (testimony of the employee who witnessed the altercation). During
     this altercation, the appellant used profanity and raised his voice. IAF, Tab 5
     at 30-32, 35, 37; HCD (testimony of customer), (testimony of the employee who
     witnessed the altercation). The customer who witnessed this incident felt nervous
     and uncomfortable. IAF, Tab 5 at 37; HCD (testimony of customer). The agency
     determined that since the appellant’s behavior constituted misconduct, he was in
     breach of the LCA. IAF, Tab 5 at 19-20. As a result, the agency reinstated the
     removal decision held in abeyance from 2015 and the appellant’s removal became
     effective December 13, 2016. Id.
¶4        The appellant filed an initial appeal with the Board over his removal
     claiming that he did not violate the LCA. IAF, Tab 1 at 7. After holding a
     jurisdictional hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 18, Initial Deci sion (ID).
     The administrative judge determined that the appellant failed to meet his burden
     of proving that the Board has jurisdiction over the appeal of his removal, as he
     did not demonstrate that the waiver of appeal rights in the LCA should not be
     enforced. ID at 1-9. Further, the administrative judge found that, because the
     Board lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying removal action, it could not
     address the appellant’s affirmative defenses.    ID at 9.    The appellant filed a
     petition for review of the initial decision, to which the agency responded in
     opposition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.
                                                                                         4

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5        An appellant bears the burden to establish by preponderant evidence that his
     appeal is within the Board’s jurisdiction. 2 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). The
     Board generally lacks jurisdiction over an action taken pursuant to an LCA in
     which an appellant waives his rights to appeal to the Board. Willis v. Department
     of Defense, 105 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 17 (2007). To establish that a waiver of appeal
     rights in an LCA should not be enforced, an appellant must show one of the
     following: (1) he complied with the LCA; (2) the agency materially breached the
     LCA or acted in bad faith; (3) he did not voluntarily enter into the LCA; or
     (4) the LCA resulted from fraud or mutual mistake. 3 Id.
¶6        On review, the appellant claims that the administrative judge erred in not
     considering the arguments that he raised regarding his first -line supervisor. PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 7-8, 11-12. The appellant alleges that his former supervisor is to
     blame for his conduct since she provoked him, and that as a supervisor, the
     agency needed to hold her to a higher standard. Id. The appellant reasons that
     the agency should not have disciplined him for his conduct, as his supervisor only
     received an admonishment for her role in the altercation, the lowest form of
     discipline. Id. at 8, 11. The appellant then states that the agency violated his due
     process rights because, prior to his removal, he did not receive notice that arguing
     with his supervisor constituted misconduct. Id. at 9-10.
¶7        These arguments relate to the penalty determination, which the Board will
     not consider here due to the lack of jurisdiction over the removal taken pursuant

     2
      Preponderant evidence is defined as the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
     person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
     contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
     3
        At the hearing and on review, the appellant proffered no argument that he
     involuntarily entered the LCA or that the LCA resulted from fraud or mutual mistake.
     Throughout the adjudication of this appeal, the appellant and the agency showed a
     mutual understanding of the terms of the LCA and neither disputed the agreement’s
     contents or effect. IAF, Tab 1 at 7, Tab 4 at 4-5, Tab 5 at 8-9, Tab 12 at 4-5, Tab 13
     at 4.
                                                                                         5

     to an LCA with a valid waiver of Board appeal rights. See Martin v. Department
     of Defense, 70 M.S.P.R. 653, 657 (1996); see also Voss v. U.S. Postal Service,
     119 M.S.P.R. 324, ¶ 10 (2013) (remanding an appeal for the administrative judge
     to reconsider the reasonableness of the penalty in light of the appellant’s
     disparate penalty claim); Wilburn v. U.S. Postal Service, 28 M.S.P.R. 524, 527
     (1985) (holding that provocation is a mitigating factor); Douglas v. Veterans
     Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305 (1981) (finding that the clarity with which
     the employee was on notice or had been warned about the conduct in question is a
     factor to be considered when determining the appropriateness of a penalty). In
     any event, an agency is not required to describe in detail all potentially prohibited
     employee conduct and subsequent discipline. See Goldstein v. Department of the
     Treasury, 62 M.S.P.R. 622, 627 (1994), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
     62 F.3d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Table); see also Byers v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 89 M.S.P.R. 655, ¶ 24 (2001) (finding that the agency did not need to
     outline every possible example of patient abuse in its training manuals and
     seminars).
¶8         The appellant then alleges on review that the administrative judge
     considered additional allegations of misconduct, outside of the removal decision,
     when finding that he did not comply with the LCA. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12 -13.
     The additional allegations that the appellant cites consist of the employee’s
     hearing testimony concerning what she witnessed during the May 13, 2016
     altercation. Id. The administrative judge weighed this testimony as evidence, not
     as further allegations of misconduct. ID at 8. This argument provides no basis to
     disturb the initial decision.
¶9         On review, the appellant contends that the initial decision fails to provide
     clear and reasoned findings and conclusions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-15. Initial
     decisions must contain findings of fact and conclusions of law for the material
     issues presented in the record, along with the corresponding reasons or bases.
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.111(b)(1)-(2); see Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management,
                                                                                           6

      1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980). The initial decision issued here meets this standard.
      ID at 1-9. The appellant also states that the initial decision is deficient because
      the administrative judge did not assess whether the agency proved by
      preponderant evidence that he engaged in misconduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14.
      The burden was not on the agency to do so. As a result of the LCA, in which the
      appellant agreed to a waiver of Board appeal rights, the administrative judge first
      needed to determine whether the Board had jurisdiction over the appeal. Willis,
      105 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 17; IAF, Tab 5 at 19-20, 51-52. The burden was on the
      appellant to establish jurisdiction. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). Because the
      appellant failed to meet his requisite burden of proving jurisdiction, the
      administrative judge properly dismissed the appeal.
¶10         The appellant further argues on review that the administrative judge erred
      by finding the hearing testimony of the employee who witnessed the altercation
      more credible than his testimony.       PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-16.         To resolve
      credibility issues, an administrative judge must identify the factual questions in
      dispute, summarize the evidence on each disputed question, state which version
      she believes, and explain in detail why she found the chosen version more
      credible, considering such factors as: (1) the witness ’s opportunity and capacity
      to observe the event or act in question; (2) the witness’s character; (3) any prior
      inconsistent statement by the witness; (4) a witness’s bias, or lack of bias; (5) the
      contradiction of the witness’s version of events by other evidence or its
      consistency with other evidence; (6) the inherent improbability of the witness’s
      version of events; and (7) the witness’s demeanor. Hillen v. Department of the
      Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987).
¶11         The employee who witnessed the altercation between the appellant and his
      first-line supervisor testified that the appellant used profanity, while the appellant
                                                                                              7

      contends that he did not recollect doing so. 4 HCD (testimony of the appellant),
      (testimony of the employee who witnessed the altercation). The administrative
      judge analyzed the appropriate Hillen factors in finding the employee’s testimony
      more credible. ID at 4-6. The administrative judge considered that the statement
      prepared by the employee following the altercation did not reference the use of
      profanity,   but    determined    that    this   employee’s   hearing    testimony    was
      substantially consistent with the rest of her previous statement prepared closer to
      the date of the argument. ID at 5; IAF, Tab 5 at 35; HCD (testimony of the
      employee who witnessed the altercation).              The administrative judge also
      referenced the contemporaneous email that the appellant’s first -line supervisor
      sent on May 13, 2016, in which she too stated that the appellant cursed at her,
      further corroborating this employee’s testimony.           ID at 5; IAF, Tab 5 at 32.
      Moreover, the administrative judge found that this employee had no reason for
      bias against the appellant. ID at 5. The accounts of the altercation from the
      appellant’s first-line supervisor and the other witness align with this employee’s
      testimony as well. IAF, Tab 5 at 30-32, 35, 37; HCD (testimony of customer),
      (testimony of the employee who witnessed the altercation).
¶12         In summary, the administrative judge found that, after assessing each
      witness’s    demeanor    and     taking   into   account   the   first-line   supervisor’s
      contemporaneous email, the employee’s testimony regarding the use of profanity
      was credible.      ID at 6.    The Board must defer to an administrative judge’s
      credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on
      observing the demeanor of a testifying witness. Haebe v. Department of Justice,

      4
        In the removal decision, the agency did not allege that the appellant used profanity;
      rather, it concluded that he committed misconduct by engaging in a verbal altercation
      with his supervisor. IAF, Tab 5 at 20. During the hearing, conflicting testimony was
      taken on whether the appellant used profanity during the altercation, but the agency’s
      decision that the appellant engaged in misconduct and violated the LCA did not hinge
      on the appellant’s use of profanity. IAF, Tab 5 at 9-10, 12-13, 20; HCD (testimony of
      the appellant), (testimony of the employee who witnessed the altercation).
                                                                                            8

      288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002).              The Board may overturn such
      determinations only when it has sufficiently sound reasons for doing so.             Id.
      There is no sufficiently sound reason for doing so in this matter.
¶13         Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.             5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which case s fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

            (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
      judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
      Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
      within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.              5 U.S.C.
      § 7703(b)(1)(A).

      5
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        9

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
                                                                                10

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     11

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5
U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           12

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.