Court Opinion

ID: 9611007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:50:39.569488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:08.084464
License: Public Domain

BRIDGES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Because I conclude the evidence that cocaine was recovered from the house in which appellant was arrested was properly admitted to show appellant’s knowledge and intent, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.
As discussed by the majority, the record in this case shows that Robert S., an undercover narcotics officer, went to a known drug house in south Dallas on December *71218, 2001. Robert spoke with appellant about purchasing some marijuana. Appellant indicated that could be done, and he led Robert inside the house and told Robert to leave his telephone number. Robert left his name and number and left the house. On December 31, 2001, Robert returned to the house with his partner, also an undercover narcotics officer. Robert knocked on the front door of the house while his partner stayed in the car. A black male moved a curtain to the side and told Robert to go around back. Robert went to the back of the house and knocked on the back door in an attempt to get inside the house once again. Appellant partially opened a window and called Robert over. Robert gave appellant $220 in exchange for several large pieces of loose crack cocaine. Robert did not immediately arrest appellant because there were three other locations from which crack was being sold on appellant’s street, and Robert intended to come back at a later date and “hit” all four locations at the same time.
On January 14, 2002, Robert returned to the house where he had purchased drugs from appellant in an effort to get more information to allow him to execute a search warrant on the house. Robert spoke with appellant for approximately three minutes and noticed appellant had a tattoo by his right eye. On January 17, 2002, Robert executed a search warrant on appellant’s house. Dallas police sergeant David Nofzinger, who assisted in executing the warrant, confronted appellant, who was standing in front of a couch. Directly to appellant’s right was a double-barreled shotgun leaning against the wall. Appellant ignored Nofzinger’s instruction to get down, and Nofzinger threw appellant to the floor. Appellant was arrested in the living room, and police found in the front bedroom a Verizon wireless bill and a receipt for the purchase of a car belonging to appellant. In the back room, police found three grams of cocaine in the form of loose rocks arranged in a row inside a metal pan sitting on a waist-high freezer. In the den area, a small amount of marijuana was sitting on a table. The only other person present in the house was a juvenile female, and police took her into custody as a runaway. That same day, other warrants were executed on appellant’s street.
At appellant’s trial, the court admitted the evidence of the three grams of cocaine, marijuana, and shotgun that were in the house when appellant was arrested. Appellant did not object to the admission of the shotgun. Appellant complains only of the admission of the three grams of cocaine. The trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence will be upheld on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (op. on reh’g). That is to say, as long as the trial court’s ruling was at least within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the appellate court will not intercede. Id. Whether objected-to evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” has relevance apart from character conformity, as required by rule of evidence 404(b), is also a question for the trial court. Id. The trial court must conclude that the evidence tends in logic and common experience to serve some purpose other than character conformity to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Id. An appellate court owes no less deference to the trial judge in making this judgment than it affords him in making any other relevancy call. Id.
Here, the record shows that, on three occasions before executing the search warrant, Robert visited the house where appellant had sold drugs. Robert purchased loose rocks of cocaine from appellant at the back window of the house, and Robert visited and spoke with appellant at the *713house three days before executing the search warrant. Although the State did not prove that appellant actually owned the house, Robert testified he had never encountered a drug dealer who had the house deeded to him. In fact, appellant was present at the house every time Robert stopped by between December 18, 2001, and January 17, 2002. Further, appellant’s cellular telephone bill and the receipt for a car purchase were in the front bedroom. At the time appellant was arrested, a shotgun was leaning against the wall next to appellant, and cocaine was found in plain view in the back room. Robert had previously purchased cocaine from the back room.
Nevertheless, appellant’s theory of the case was that he was not present on December 31, 2001, when Robert purchased cocaine at the same house in which appellant was arrested. An extraneous offense may be admissible to show identity only when identity is an issue in the case. Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). When the State’s only identifying witness is impeached on cross-examination, raising the issue of identity, the extraneous offense becomes admissible. Siqueiros v. State, 685 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). The identification of a defendant can be impeached by cross-examination of the witness about, among other things, an earlier misidentification of the defendant. Id.; see Gillon v. State, 492 S.W.2d 948, 948-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1973).
Here, during the State’s case-in-chief, appellant’s counsel cross-examined Robert concerning his description of appellant and his identification of appellant as the person Robert spoke with on December 18. Robert testified he could not recall the clothes appellant was wearing, and Robert had no description written in his notes. Robert testified that, during the encounter on December 31, the black male who moved the curtain and told Robert to go to the back of the house was “the twin.” Robert’s report on the December 31 encounter did not mention the tattoo by appellant’s right eye or gold teeth. Robert testified he did not see appellant’s tattoo until January 14. Appellant’s counsel questioned Robert about whether the tattoo Robert did not recognize until January 14 was “the connecting link” back to the encounter on December 31. Robert testified that “all the circumstances all put together” helped him identify appellant.
I would conclude that the cross-examination of Robert was sufficient to make identity an issue in the case. See Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 519; Siqueiros, 685 S.W.2d at 71. Further, because appellant’s theory of the case was that he was not the person who sold Robert drugs, evidence affirmatively linking appellant to the house and its contents and the previous drug sale was relevant because it contradicted appellant’s theory that he had been misidentified as the person who sold the drugs. See Johnigan v. State, 69 S.W.3d 749, 755-56 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2002, pet. ref'd) (guns, cocaine-based drugs, bullets, appellant’s driver’s license and papers seized in search of appellant’s house twenty-six hours after sale of cocaine relevant to contradict appellant’s contention he was misidentified). I would reach this conclusion despite the fact that the State did not prove who actually owned the house in which appellant was arrested, and the cocaine was in the back room of the house, not the living room where appellant was discovered.
The majority cites Alexander v. State, 88 S.W.3d 772 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd), for the proposition that the cocaine found on the day of the arrest did not serve to make a fact of consequence more or less probable. In Alexander, the court concluded a revolver found *714in the residence where appellant was arrested was not relevant to any fact of consequence and was, therefore, erroneously admitted. Alexander, 88 S.W.3d at 777-78. Alexander was arrested at “a residence” in Bryan, Texas, approximately three weeks after he used a rifle to shoot a man in Dallas. The Alexander court stated there was no showing that the residence belonged to Alexander nor any evidence as to where the revolver was located in the residence. Id. at 777. Thus, Alexander addressed the relevance of a handgun that was (1) not used in the commission of the charged offense, (2) not per se illegal, and (3) not found at or near the scene of the charged offense. However, in this case, the cocaine found on the day of the arrest was the same substance sold in the charged offense, was illegal, and was found at the scene of the previous sale with which appellant was charged. Under these circumstances, I would conclude Alexander does not support the exclusion of the cocaine found on the day of appellant’s arrest.
In addition, the record shows the trial court admitted the evidence of the extraneous offense and charged the jury that it was to consider the evidence only in determining appellant’s intent and knowledge. Because the indictment alleged appellant “intentionally and knowingly” delivered cocaine, appellant’s intent and knowledge became elements the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Morgan v. State, 692 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Powell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 369, 383 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd). I would conclude the trial court could have reasonably determined appellant’s subsequent act of being in the house with cocaine in the back room and a shotgun nearby tended to make more probable the allegation that appellant intended to deliver the cocaine in the charged offense. See Powell, 5 S.W.3d at 383 (subsequent extraneous drug possession offense tended to make more probable allegation that appellant intended to deliver drugs in charged offense); Mason v. State, 99 S.W.3d 652, 656 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.) (no abuse of discretion to admit evidence of extraneous drug transactions in 2001 as circumstantial evidence of appellant’s knowing possession of cocaine in 1999). The fact that appellant’s extraneous conduct occurred after the acts constituting the offense on trial does not render the evidence inadmissible under rule 404(b). Powell, 5 S.W.3d 369, 383. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, I would conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of the drugs and shotgun present at the house at the time of appellant’s arrest. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391; Powell, 5 S.W.3d at 383. Therefore, I would resolve appellant’s second issue against him.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.