Court Opinion

ID: 9845310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:18:50.485521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:01.003053
License: Public Domain

HODGES, Justice, dissenting,
joined by SIMMS, Justice.
I agree with the result of part III of the majority’s opinion which directs the trial court to render judgment against Parishioner regarding her claims against the Elders for their pre-withdrawal acts. However, I disagree with the majority’s disposition which allows upon remand the imposition of tort liability upon the Church of Christ and the Elders for their disciplinary actions that occurred after Parishioner’s unilateral withdrawal of membership from the Collinsville Church of Christ by her September 25 letter. I believe the Church and the Elders were constitutionally protected under the First Amendment from civil liability to discipline Parishioner by the withdrawal of fellowship proceedings both during her church membership and after her unilateral withdrawal from the Church.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The Religion Clauses are made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (Establishment Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause).
In Williams v. Williams, 543 P.2d 1401, 1403 (Okla.1975), we observed:
“Freedom of religion, which is embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, reflects the philosophy the church and state should be separate, and that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its representative sphere.” (Citations omitted).
The courts may not intervene in purely ecclesiastical matters, including church disciplinary actions concerning the conformity of church members to the standards of morals required of them, unless such actions pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 289, 98 L.Ed.2d 249 (1987). Because I believe the disciplinary actions here do not constitute a sufficient threat to public peace, safety or order as to warrant civil court intervention, I respectfully dissent under the constitutional mandate of separation of church and state.
*793Although Parishioner does not question the Elders’ right to investigate and punish members who offend Church law, she alleges the actions of the Elders concerning her private acts constitute an extreme and outrageous abuse of their position, a breach of their promise of confidentiality and a trespass on her property.
The challenged actions of the Elders include five incidents which are as follows:
PRE-WITHDRAWAL ACTIONS
(1) “Laundromat Incident”: In the summer of either 1979 or 1980, the Elders contacted Parishioner in the public laundromat with her children and advised her to go to the church with them for an urgent meeting concerning the rumor regarding her affair with Mr. S. She left her children at the laundromat and accompanied the Elders to the church. The Elders told her not to see Mr. S. After the meeting they drove her back to the laundromat.
In my opinion the Elders’ actions were consistent with their religious duty to approach members in their capacity as pastors, overseers and bishops. Their conduct amounted to nothing more than a visit and discussion with Parishioner concerning her violation of the Church’s moral code.
(2) “Storm Incident”: In late summer of 1981, one of the Elders telephoned her and asked her to immediately come to the church building or they would come to her house. There had been a storm that day and the electricity was out at her house and the church building. She did not want to leave her children but she agreed to go to the church because she did not want the Elders to come to her house and talk in front of her children. Parishioner testified the Elders told her that whatever she said would be confidential; however this is disputed by the Elders. At the meeting she admitted she had committed fornication, told them she was going to come back to church and not see Mr. S. anymore. They told her she would have to go before the congregation and repent publicly of her sin of fornication.
Again, I think the Elders were merely following their religious procedures for discipline as Parishioner had not acknowledged the violation and repented after their first confrontation with her.
(3) “Driveway Incident”: On the evening of September 16, 1981, the Elders went to Parishioner’s house upon being informed by one of Parishioner’s children that she was with Mr. S. When Parishioner, three of her children and Mr. S. arrived at her house the Elders approached the car in the driveway. Parishioner told her children to go inside; however, one of the children stayed on the front porch approximately fifty feet from the car. The Elders wanted her to meet with them at the church building. Parishioner told the Elders she would not meet with them and asked them to leave. They proceeded to tell her if she did not repent and make a public acknowledgement of her sin of fornication, they would withdraw fellowship from her.
Once again, the Elders were only following Church disciplinary procedures.
POST-WITHDRAWAL ACTIONS
(4) On October 4, 1981, a letter was read before the congregation finding her to be in violation of certain scriptures relating to fornication, disobedience to the Elders and nonattendance at Church. The Elders encouraged the .congregation to continue to pray in her behalf and to contact her for the purpose of encouragement and exhortation. This action is consistent with church doctrine of which she was previously informed by the Elders’ September 21, 1981 letter to her.
The reading of the letter occurred at a Sunday worship service where members were present. The members were informed of her specific violation because the practice of withdrawal of fellowship requires cooperation from the entire membership. Also, such procedure operates as a deterrent of other members.
(5) On October 7, 1981, a letter detailing church action taken against Parishioner *794on October 4 was sent to four nearby Church of Christ congregations.
This action was consistent with church doctrine which she had been informed. Because the Church believes members of all churches which practice the precepts of the New Testament of the Bible constitute the universal Church, their disciplinary procedures include notification of nearby churches of Parishioner’s withdrawal of fellowship. This serves the purpose of purification of the Church and to prevent the sin from spreading.
In Paul, supra, in a factual situation very similar to the present case, the Ninth Circuit stated:
“Intangible or emotional harms cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of action against a church for its practices — or against its members. ... Offense to someone’s sensibilities resulting from religious conduct is simply not actionable in tort. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213]; cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 [91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284] (1971). Without society’s tolerance of offenses to sensibility, the protection of religious differences mandated by the first amendment would be meaningless.” Id. at 883.
There, a member of the Jehovah’s Witness Church withdrew from the Church by letter to the congregation after being advised that she could be disfellowshipped from the Church if she challenged the Elders’ decision to disfellowship her parents. Subsequent to her withdrawal of membership, the Governing Body of Jehovah’s Witnesses issued a new interpretation of the rules governing disassociated persons, abolishing the distinction between disassociated and disfellowshipped persons. Disassociated persons were to be treated as disfellowshipped persons, subject to the practice of shunning which is a form of ostracism similar to the Church of Christ’s practice of withdrawal of fellowship. After being shunned by her former friends and coreligionists, the former member brought suit for defamation, invasion of privacy, fraud and outrageous conduct.
The Ninth Circuit held that because the practice of shunning is a part of the faith of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Church is entitled to the free exercise of its religious beliefs under the Washington and United States Constitutions. It reasoned that to impose tort liability for shunning on the Church or its members “would in the long run have the same effect as prohibiting the practice and would compel the Church to abandon part of its religious teachings. ... The Church and its members would risk substantial damages every time a former Church member was shunned. In sum, a state tort law prohibition against shunning would directly restrict the free exercise of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious faith.” Id. at 881. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants finding the Church and its members have a constitutionally protected privilege to engage in the practice of shunning.
Furthermore, in my view, the courts have no power to review the disciplinary actions of the Elders of the Collinsville Church of Christ both before as well as after Parishioner’s withdrawal of membership. In Paul, supra, the Ninth Circuit rejected any distinction between present members and former members stating:
“Courts generally do not scrutinize closely the relationship among members (or former members) of a church. Churches are afforded great latitude when they impose discipline on members or former members. We agree with Justice Jackson’s view that ‘[r]eligious activities which concern only members of the faith are and ought to be free — as nearly absolutely free as anything can be.’ Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 [64 S.Ct. 438, 445, 88 L.Ed. 645] (1944) (concurring).” Id. at 883.
Parishioner had the religious freedom to join or not to join the Church of Christ, but, when she voluntarily joined, she became subject to all of its rules and laws, surrendered her religious liberty to that extent and should not now be entitled to relief from such discipline under its rules al*795though her religious convictions may have changed.
Church membership is one of contract and when a person joins a church he/she covenants expressly or impliedly that in consideration of the benefits of the relationship he/she will submit to its control and be governed by its laws, usages and custom. Watson, 80 U.S. at 729. The Church of Christ’s right to discipline Parishioner springs directly from the contract of membership. The terms of a contract of membership are contained in the customs and usages which have evolved from any written laws. The Church of Christ views the Bible as its only source of doctrine and has no written rules or bylaws. It is undisputed the Church of Christ practices the Biblically based disciplinary procedures which include the practice of withdrawal of fellowship. This Court’s review of the Church’s doctrine of lifetime membership and moral discipline is precisely the kind of action the Constitution forbids.
Parishioner does not assert the Elders deviated from the Church’s rules and regulations for discipline. Rather, she contends that because she was not instructed when she joined the Church that it considers its members as lifetime members and thus has no doctrinal provision for withdrawal of membership, she did not submit to this doctrinal belief. Even assuming this to be true, actual knowledge of this specific doctrine of the Church is of no consequence, however, because she impliedly consented to all of the Church’s laws and customs upon becoming a member. Also, Parishioner testified she had observed previous withdrawal of fellowship proceedings.
Discipline is a necessary incident to a contract establishing church membership. “ ‘The church as an organized body of members must have laws and ordinances for the regulation of its existence, and for the preservation of its doctrine and discipline, and also to maintain the purity of its membership. Without such laws and ordinances it would be impossible to maintain discipline and church establishment.’ ” C. Zollmann, American Church Law § 829 (1933) (quoting Satterlee v. United States, 20 App.D.C. 393, 407 (1902)). Consistent with these principles is the uncontested, twofold purpose of the Church of Christ’s disciplinary practice of withdrawal of fellowship: (1) to cause a disobedient member to miss the fellowship and to desire to repent, and (2) to purify the church and to prevent the sin from spreading, thus, operating as a deterrent to other members from committing the same sin.
The Church’s Biblically-based practice of withdrawal of membership requires cooperation by the other church members. The letter of Séptember 21, 1981, by the Elders to Parishioner detailed the meaning of withdrawal of fellowship, as follows:
“If by the close of the worship services Sunday morning, September 27, 1981, you have not indicated a penitent heart by a public acknowledgement of your sin of fornication, a statement will be read aloud to the congregation, with an exhortation for each to make contact with you for the purpose of encouragement, that you might ‘hear them’ and repent. If you so choose not to heed these exhortations, by the close of the worship services Sunday morning October 4, 1981, a statement will be read by the elders, to exclude you from the fellowship of the Body of Christ, (V-17) and notify sister congregations, which means (1) Not to associate with you, 1 Cor. 5:9, (2) Not to eat a meal or open our homes to you, 1 Cor. 5:11, (3) Not to bid you ‘God Speed’, 2 Jn. 11, (4) To hold ourselves aloof from you, 2 Thess. 3, and (5) Have no company with you, 2 Thess. 3:6 & 14.”
Whether the Church of Christ’s doctrine of withdrawal of fellowship may be viewed as unwise or improvident from an individual preference, is no concern of the courts. Our personal beliefs are not the constitutional standard; but rather, separation of church and state. Furthermore, the courts may not delve into whether the discipline imposed by the Elders was arbitrary or contrary to the Church’s own doctrine, laws and procedures. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue *796Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969); Oklahoma Dist. Court v. New Hope Assembly of God Ch., 548 P.2d 1029 (Okla.1976).
The First Amendment guarantees the freedom to worship as one chooses. The State may not thrust any sect on any person or coerce anyone to attend church. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 72 S.Ct. 679, 684, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952). A person may change his/her religious beliefs; and a person may join and leave a church for any reason. Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey v. Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640, 34 S.Ct. 932, 58 L.Ed. 1512 (1914). Parishioner may disassociate herself from the Church whenever she chooses as she has in fact done. Likewise, the Elders of the Church may after her withdrawal continue to believe that she is a member for life and invoke their disciplinary actions against her in conformity with their tenets and doctrines. The State cannot meddle in religious beliefs for religious convictions and questions of faith and discipline are fully protected under the First Amendment, except where they involve a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. In my opinion there is, in this case, no substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. Consequently, both Parishioner and the Elders are free to believe as they so desire, as the State shall not prefer one belief over another.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872), is the first case which addressed the principles limiting the role of civil courts in the resolution of religious controversies that incidentally affect civil rights. The Court in Watson cogently observed that it is inconsistent with the American concept of the relationship between church and state to permit civil courts to determine ecclesiastical questions. The United States Supreme Court has quoted extensively from this opinion in cases decided since Watson. E.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra; Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra. In language which has recently been described as having “a clear constitutional ring,” Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, the Watson Court stated:
“In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if anyone aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.
“Nor do we see that justice would be likely to be promoted by submitting those decisions to review in the ordinary judicial tribunals. Each of these large and influential bodies (to mention no others, let reference be had to the Protestant Episcopal, the Methodist Episcopal, and the Presbyterian churches) has a body of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of its own, to be found in their written organic laws, their books of discipline, in their collections of precedents, in their usage and customs, which as to each constitute a system of ecclesiastical law and religious faith that tasks the ablest minds to become familiar with. It is not to be supposed that the judges of *797the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one which is less so.” Id. 80 U.S. at 728-29.
In sum, upon joining the Church of Christ, Parishioner expressly and impliedly consented to the Church’s doctrine and was subject to its disciplinary procedures. The actions of the Elders taken against her were consistent with Church rules and laws both prior to and after her attempted unilateral withdrawal of membership. In my view, her withdrawal has no effect on the Elders’ actions. The disciplinary proceedings against Parishioner had already begun before her withdrawal, and the Elders’ post-withdrawal actions were merely a continuation of the initial proceedings against her.
I therefore would hold the Elders of the Church of Christ are free to discipline Parishioner as a Church member (and former member) under the protection of the First Amendment without State interference and Parishioner may not escape such discipline by unilaterally withdrawing her membership. I would find the trial court had no power of review over the disciplinary proceedings against Parishioner, a matter which is at the core of ecclesiastical concern, under the constitutional mandate of separation of church and state. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.