Court Opinion

ID: 9745264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:44:17.801509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:58.255814
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
Following the jury sentencing hearing, the jury, after deliberating for one hour, returned a unanimous recommendation that the death penalty not be imposed. Two weeks later at the judge sentencing hearing, the judge overrode that recommendation and sentenced appellant to die.: The conviction should be affirmed, but several independent legal grounds exist which require the penalty of death to be vacated.
1.
Upon considerations going to the meaning and spirit of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the like provision of the Indiana Constitution, Art. 1, § 14, a sentencing judge cannot be permitted to override a jury recommendation of no death penalty arrived at pursuant to the death sentence statute, Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9. A jury verdict of not guilty on the issue of guilt or innocence is absolutely beyond the authority of judges to override. Fong Foo v. United States, (1962) 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629. This fixed and unyielding characteristic of the jury verdict of acquittal exists by reason of the pronouncements of courts that the Double Jeopardy Clauses require it to exist. No state statute or act of Congress can change this. Only a constitutional amendment could do so. Justice Blackmun for the United States Supreme Court in Bullington v. Missouri, (1981) 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270, in referring to the immutability of the verdict of acquittal states:
"The values that underlie this principle, stated for the Court by Justice Black, are equally applicable when a jury has rejected the State's claim that the defendant deserves to die:
'The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty' Green v. United States, 355 U.S. [184], at 187-188, 78 S.Ct. [221], at 223-224 [2 L.Ed.2d 199].
See also United States v. DiFranceseo, 449 U.S. [117], at 136, 101 S.Ct. [426], at 437 [66 L.Ed.2d 328]. The 'embarrassment, expense and ordeal' and the 'anxiety and insecurity' faced by a defendant at the penalty phase of a Missouri capital murder trial surely are at least equivalent to that faced by any defendant at the guilt phase of a criminal trial. The 'unacceptably high risk that the [prosecution], with its superior resources, would wear down a defendant, id., at 130, 101 S.Ct., at 433, thereby leading to an erroneously imposed death sentence, would exist if the State were to have a further opportunity to convince a jury to impose the ultimate punishment. Missouri's use of the reasonable doubt standard indicates that in a capital sentencing proceeding, it is the State, not the defendant, that should bear 'almost the entire risk of error' Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. [418], at 424, 99 S.Ct. [1804], at 1808 [60 L.Ed.2d 323]." 451 U.S. at 445-446, 101 S.Ct. at 1861-1962.
That court went on to announce that the sentencing proceeding before the Missouri jury was like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, and that as a consequence thereof, a resultant jury rejection of the death penalty, by reason of the Double Jeopardy Clause has the same immutable characteristic as the jury verdict of not guilty. Appellant contends that the jury recommendation against imposition of the death penalty under the Indiana death sentence statute should be treated in like manner, and that therefore the sentencing *1065judge in making a final determination of the sentence can have no power to override it and impose death. I agree. The recommendation of the jury against death should have the force of an acquittal of the death sentence, and a recommendation that the death penalty be imposed should have the same force as a verdict of guilty.
Pursuant to the statute the jury reconvenes in court for the sentencing hearing. It is presided over by the judge. The defendant is present with his counsel and the state by its trial prosecutor. Evidence is presented in an adversarial setting. The jury receives the instruction from the court regarding the issues presented which include the question of whether an aggravating circumstance exists and whether it is of such a character as not to be outweighed by mitigating circumstances. The burden is upon the state to prove the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. The lawyers make final arguments to the jury. The jury retires to deliberate and returns into open court with its verdict in the form of a recommendation. This is a full seale jury trial in every sense of those terms. The defendant must surely feel that he is in "direct peril" of receiving the death penalty as he stands to receive the recommendation of the jury. Cf., Green v. United States, (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199.
The majority opinion concludes that the Bullington rationale does not apply to the Indiana situation because (1) the recommendation of the jury is not final and binding upon the sentencing judge, as was the case in Missouri, and (2) the recommendation does not necessarily reflect the jury's determination that the State failed in its burden to prove an aggravating cireumstance. I cannot agree that these two distinctions rob the Indiana death sentencing hearing before a jury of its trial character and force. It must be evident that the jury recommendation against imposition of death will have a great and profound persuasive force in determining what choice the judge will make at final determination time. The jury recommendation must be unanimous. Judy v. State, (1981) Ind., 416 N.E.2d 95. It is the personal judgment of twelve adult individuals of good will selected from a list comprised of a fair cross section of the community. The judge is also a member of that same community, sharing in its life and experience. The probability is very high that the judge, upon consideration of the recommendation will be brought to the brink of agreement with it in the very nature of things. The jury recommendation against death is so much like a binding decision, that constitutional protection against a second hearing before the judge on the propriety of death should be afforded. Cf., Breed v. Jones, (1975) 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346.
I also cannot agree with the analysis made by the majority of the underlying bases of the jury recommendation of no death in distinguishing this case from Bull-ington. According to the Indiana statute:
"(e) .... The jury may recommend the death penalty only if it finds:
(1) That the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the aggravating circumstances exists; and
(2) That any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances." Ind.Code § 85-50-2-9.
According to this statute, a jury recommendation of no death would have one of two necessary characteristics. Logically, it would either be based upon the jury's determination that the State had failed to establish historical facts constituting an aggravating circumstance, or it would be based upon the jury's determination that the evidence presented had established historical facts constituting some mitigating circumstance. In either event, the judge's later procedure to decide whether the death penalty should be imposed, using "the same standards that the jury was required to consider" would result in a retrial upon the same questions of fact and any decision of the judge to override a jury recommendation of no death including as in the present case his express finding of no mitigating cireumstances, would necessarily resolve *1066one of those same questions of fact in a manner contrary to the manner in which the jury resolved it. Under our legal tradition, the determination of fact by a jury in favor of the defendant in a criminal case is not subject to being resolved at a later date by a judge in such a manner as to place the defendant in a worse position.
In the case of United States v. DiFrancesco, (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328, it is said:
"The exaltation of form over substance is to be avoided. The Court has said that in the double jeopardy context it is the substance of the action that is controlling, and not the label given that action." 449 U.S., at 142, 101 S.Ct., at 440.
Here the statutory label is "recommendation". The substance beneath it is a factual adjudication and moral judgment of the jury, not a court master, not a court commissioner, but a jury of twelve, that the human qualities which warrant imposition of the death penalty are not present in Thomas N. Schiro. This favorable jury determination was awarded in a fair and open adversarial confrontation with the prosecu-torial forces of the State. Since that award came from a jury after a full-blown trial, a judge, applying the same rational and specific standards as the jury was required to use, cannot, consistent with the protection of the guarantee against double jeopardy, upon making contrary factual findings, take it away.
IL.
The nune pro tunc entry of the judge first notes that the verdict of the jury finding appellant Schiro guilty of murder while committing or attempting the crime of rape as charged in Count II was returned to court on September 18, 1981. The jury reconvened on September 15, 1981 and a death sentence hearing was held pursuant to Ind.Code § 85-50-2-9 resulting that day in a recommendation that the déath penalty mot be imposed. It further reflects a sentencing hearing was held on October 2, 1981, and continues in part pertinent to the judge's final determination that the sentence of death be imposed:
"On October 2, 1981, this Court having reviewed the evidence of the trial and having considered the written pre-sen-tence report, and having heard the arguments of counsel and the statement of the Defendant, gives the following reasons for the imposition of its death sentence.
These are the aggravating cireumstanc-es which the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Indiana Code, Section 85-50-2-9, Subsection [1] The Aggravating circumstances alleged.
(b) The aggravating circumstances are as follows:
(1) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape, or robbery.
1. The verdict of the jury on September 12, 1981, found the Defendant Thomas N. Schiro guilty of Murder while committing and attempting statutory rape.
2. The jury rejected the plea of insanity by its verdict.
Since aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it remains to consider whether any mitigating circumstances exist and outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
As for rhitigating circumstances, the Court finds none. Under Indiana Code § 85-50-2-9, subsection (c) the mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section are as follows...."
At this point in the entry, the judge notes each mitigating cireumstance and upon consideration of evidence rejects each possibility. After proceeding through that, the entry continues:
"Since the State proved 'beyond a reasonable doubt that existence of at least (1) of the aggravating circumstances alleged', (Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9, Section 9[9] ) and the Court finds no mitigating cireumstances to outweigh it, the death sentence is required by the Stat*1067utes of the State of Indiana. This Court has no choice but to follow the law.
The Defendant is to be executed, as by law provided, on the 28th day of January, 1982, before sunrise."
Indiana Code § 85-50-2-9, the death sentence statute, provides in pertinent part as follows:
"(a) The state may seek a death sentence for murder by alleging, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b) of this section. In the sentencing hearing after a person is con-vieted of murder, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the aggravating circumstances alleged.
(b) The aggravating circumstances are as follows:
(1) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape, or robbery.
* # # "k * ha
(c) The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section are as follows:
y * * * # #
(d) If the defendant was convicted of murder in a jury trial, the jury shall reconvene for the sentencing hearing; if the trial was to the court, or the judgment was entered on a guilty plea, the court alone shall conduct the sentencing hearing. The jury, or the court, may consider all the evidence introduced at the trial stage of the proceedings, together with new evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. The defendant may present any additional evidence relevant to:
(1) The aggravating circumstances alleged; or
(2) Any of the mitigating cireumstanc-es listed in subsection (c) of this section.
(e) If the hearing is by jury, the jury shall recommend to the court whether the death penalty should be imposed. The jury may recommend the death penalty only if it finds:
(1) That the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the aggravating circumstances exists; and
(2) That any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances.
The court shall make the final determination of the sentence, after considering the jury's recommendation, and the sentence shall be based on the same standards that the jury was required to consider. The court is not bound by the jury's recommendation." (Emphasis added.)
Indiana Code § 85-50-2-9(e)(2) requires the sentencing judge to make the final determination of whether the death penalty should be imposed "based upon the same standards that the jury was required to consider." The standards referred to are the two listed in the same paragraph of the statute, the first of which is:
"(1) That the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the aggravating circumstances exists; and"
The aggravating circumstance alleged in Count IIA is as follows:
"(1) The murder of Laura Luebbehu-sen charged in Count II was intentionally committed by the defendant, Thomas N. Schiro, during the commission of the crime of Rape, as more particularly described in the Information ...."
According to the requirements of these provisions, it was necessary for the sentencing judge to personally conclude as a trier of fact that the State, at the sentencing hearing before the jury, proved to a moral certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas Schiro strangled and thus killed Laura Luebbehusen while committing or attempting to commit a rape upon her, and at the time his mind had formed the mens rea identified by Ind.Code § 85-41-2-2 as "intentional", ie., that he had had a conscious objective to strangle and kill. I can *1068find no direct statement in the judge's records and statement of reasons quoted above for imposing the death penalty that he personally reached this level of certainty upon each of these elements comprising the aggravating circumstance. Quite obviously, until the point in time is reached that the judge conducts his own sentencing hearing to finally determine the sentence, he has not been called upon to make a factual determination beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of the aggravating circumstance. The fact that the jury may have done so on some of the same elements in arriving at its verdict of guilty and in rejecting the plea of insanity as noted by the judge, cannot supplant the judge's obligation to do so. This finding of an aggravating circumstance by the sentencing judge is at the very core and heart of the final determination that death is to be imposed. The sentencing judge has not communicated to this Supreme Court Justice that he arrived at that finding at the required level of certainty. For this reason also, I cannot vote to permit his final determination to stand.
PRENTICE, J., concurs in part with concurring and dissenting opinion.