Court Opinion

ID: 9919237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:02:21.850824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.797830
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Carranza CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D082083

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                        (Super. Ct. Nos. EMH000313,
                                                                    EMH000480, EMH000633)
 VICTOR CARRANZA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County,
Jeffrey B. Jones, Judge. Reversed with directions.
         Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
         Victor Carranza appeals an order extending his civil commitment to the
state hospital system as a person found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI)
on a charge of attempted murder. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187; 664.) Carranza
contends substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s findings that
he (1) met the felony predicate requirement and (2) represented a substantial
danger of physical harm to others because of his severe mental disorder.
Carranza also argues that he established a medication compliance
affirmative defense.
      We requested and received supplemental briefing on issues relating to
the trial court’s jurisdiction. Although we now decline to reverse the order on
jurisdictional grounds, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to support a
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Carranza currently poses a
substantial danger of physical harm to others under section 1026.5,
subdivision (b)(1). Accordingly, we reverse the court’s recommitment order
on that ground alone.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A. Carranza’s Commitment
      In 2003, Carranza heard voices telling him that the Mexican Mafia was
planning to torture his uncle, so Carranza attacked his uncle with a metal

bar believing that he was saving him from torture.2 Carranza was using
methamphetamine at the time of the offense and was subsequently diagnosed
with schizophrenia. The People’s recommitment petitions state that he was

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2     No exhibits or documents were admitted into evidence at the hearing to
extend Carranza’s commitment, even though the parties’ expert witnesses
both testified about information from state hospital records. However, since
neither party objected to the experts’ reliance on those records, and neither
party now contends that their testimony is inadmissible on hearsay grounds,
we include facts from the experts’ testimony here.

                                       2
charged with attempted murder (§§ 664, 187) and assault with a deadly

weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).3 Carranza pled not guilty, and after a hearing,
the trial court found Carranza NGI of attempted murder. The court ordered
him committed to a state hospital for treatment under section 1026 et seq.,
which governs the commitment and release of individuals found NGI.
      Carranza has remained under civil commitment since 2004. During
this time, the state has twice discharged him to an outpatient conditional
release program (CONREP). During his first CONREP discharge in 2008,
Carranza spent three years in the program before being re-hospitalized
because he had delusions that he contracted a contagious disease and was
going to be attacked. The hospital referred Carranza to CONREP again in
2016, but the state revoked his participation in 2018 after he tested positive
for methamphetamine and marijuana and behaved erratically.
      B. Recommitment Petitions
      On November 20, 2019, the People filed a petition to extend Carranza’s
commitment for another two years under section 1026.5, subdivision (b), from
March 8, 2020, to March 8, 2022. At a hearing in January 2020, the People
and the trial court confirmed that Carranza’s release date pursuant to section
1026.5 was March 8, 2020. The court proposed setting a trial date for the
petition in February 2020 to comply with the time limits in section 1026.5,

subdivision (b)(4).4 The parties agreed to waive time so that Carranza’s

3     Although Carranza contends the prosecution failed to prove he was
charged with a felony for purposes of section 1026.5, subdivision (a)
requirements, we need not decide that issue and note his alleged commitment
offenses only to provide relevant context.

4      Section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(4), provides in relevant part: “The court
shall conduct a hearing on the petition for extended commitment. . . . The
trial shall commence no later than 30 calendar days prior to the time the
                                       3
counsel could have him evaluated for CONREP eligibility. The court
characterized the time waiver as a “self-commitment” and set the matter for
a trial setting conference in February 2020.
      Due to COVID-19 restrictions, Carranza’s CONREP application, and
defense counsel’s requests for additional time after the state hospital denied
CONREP discharge, the matter was continued several times. Carranza’s
counsel continued to waive time. Apart from applying for CONREP, at no
point did Carranza request pre-trial release.
      In response to the court’s inquiry during a July 2020 hearing, the
People filed a statement asserting that March 8, 2020, was still Carranza’s
maximum commitment date, and that his “present commitment stems from
the petition to extend commitment that was timely filed by the prosecution
on November 20, 2019[.]” The People also noted that the time requirement
for trial under section 1026.5, subdivision (b)(4), had “been waived on several
occasions and thus the matter remains on a setting stage[.]”
      At a subsequent hearing in August 2020, confusion arose as to
“procedural issues” regarding Carranza’s time of commitment, and his
counsel waived time and requested another continuance. At another hearing
that month, Carranza stated he “wishe[d] to extend his commitment,” so his
counsel requested another continuance to discuss that with his client. The
record again notes that Carranza waived time and the court found “good
cause to continue the matter.” Numerous continuances followed—at defense
counsel’s request—to allow additional time to address communication and
procedural issues, time calculation, research, and obtain an expert witness.
Minute orders show that the court expressly noted good cause or time

person would otherwise have been released, unless that time is waived by the
person or unless good cause is shown.”
                                       4
waivers in connection with most of the continuances. Even after the court
initially set the case for trial in August 2021, that date was also continued
numerous times at defense counsel’s request, including to discuss a potential
agreement to resolve the case before trial.
      Meanwhile in September 2021, the People filed a second petition to
extend Carranza’s commitment, stating that per the unadjudicated original
petition, Carranza would be released on March 8, 2022. The second petition
requested that Carranza’s commitment be extended for another two years

from May 10, 2022, to March 8, 2024.5 A new case number was assigned to
the second petition, and the court heard the original and second petitions
together.
      The People filed the third and most recent petition for recommitment
on March 9, 2023, which sought to extend Carranza’s commitment from
March 8, 2023, to March 7, 2025. The People explained they did so out of an
“abundance of caution,” and the court noted this “might be a conservative
way to go about it[.]” At that point, the parties and the court were operating
under the assumption that the relevant maximum release date was March 8,
2023—rather than March 8, 2022, the end date for the second petition—for
reasons that remain unclear, even after we received the parties’
supplemental briefing.
      After the parties were unable to resolve the matter, the court
consolidated the three petitions and the case proceeded to a bench trial in
May 2023.

5     The People note in their supplemental letter brief that “[i]t is unclear
from the record why the [second] petition has a May 10, 2022 date for the
requested extension if the previous petition’s extension was set to expire on
March 8, 2022.”
                                       5
      C. Trial Testimony
      The People called Dr. Jason Rowden and Carranza called Dr. Alan
Abrams to testify as medical experts. The experts agreed that Carranza
suffers from schizophrenia, a severe mental disorder. They disagreed,
however, about whether Carranza would pose a substantial danger of
physical harm to others if released. Carranza also testified.
            1. Dr. Rowden
      Dr. Rowden, a clinical and forensic psychologist, interviewed Carranza
three times in 2021 and 2022 and reviewed Carranza’s previous evaluation
reports. Dr. Rowden noted that in 2021, Carranza reported having auditory
hallucinations involving the Mexican Mafia attempting to control him or
“sexually assaulting him[.]” But during a December 2022 interview,
Carranza said he was no longer hearing voices or experiencing paranoia.
Dr. Rowden noted that Carranza had been taking Risperidone for “quite some
time” but was not open to increasing his dosage or trying different medicines
“to more fully treat what he struggles with at times.” When Dr. Rowden
asked Carranza about his medication, Carranza said it was “working fine”
and he did not think he needed any changes. Dr. Rowden said Carranza was
not fully compliant with his medication because even though he took his
prescribed dose and the hospital had not sought an involuntary medication
order, Carranza was unwilling to be “open-minded or flexible about trying
different things or increasing meds to adequately treat” ongoing symptoms.
      Dr. Rowden opined that Carranza had “limited insight” into his mental
condition because, although he had a “basic awareness of some of the
symptoms,” he was “not fully aware” of, or not “fully forthright” about all of
them. Carranza was “somewhat guarded or paranoid” about discussing his
symptoms, and according to Dr. Rowden, his unwillingness to openly talk

                                       6
about his symptoms suggested an “[in]adequate understanding of his risk for
future dangerous behavior.”
      Dr. Rowden noted that Carranza’s lack of insight could also lead to a
relapse into substance abuse, which “often result[s]” in criminal and violent
behavior. But Dr. Rowden acknowledged Carranza had not engaged in
violence or threats of violence, had never been administered emergency
medication, had consistently attended group therapy, and showed “some sign
of some improvement,” with no indication of drug use since 2018.
Dr. Rowden attributed Carranza’s success to “being in a highly structured
and secure setting” at the hospital where access to drugs and alcohol is
limited, and staff monitors medication compliance.
      When asked about Carranza’s previous CONREP discharges,
Dr. Rowden said that for Carranza to qualify for CONREP, Carranza’s
treatment team would have had to believe he had “adequate insight” into his
mental illness, took responsibility for past actions, and had “a basic
understanding” of how his mental illness was involved in the committing
offense. Carranza would have had to show, among other things, that he was
“consistently participating in . . . and complying with treatment,” including
medication or group therapy. Dr. Rowden found it concerning, however, that
Carranza “still ha[d] difficulty acknowledging the reasons for why he was
revoked from CONREP in the past,” which demonstrated that Carranza
lacked insight and was “likely to repeat the same mistakes that led to those
problems[.]”
      Dr. Rowden concluded Carranza would be a danger to the community if
released because of his “difficulty fully acknowledging his symptoms,”
inconsistent success with CONREP, and guardedness about discussing
symptoms and medication changes. Dr. Rowden further opined that the

                                       7
stress of adapting to release could trigger more mental health symptoms or a
drug relapse, which could lead to violent behavior. In his view, Carranza was
not likely to comply with outpatient treatment because he did not “have an
adequate plan for how to manage his mental health condition.” But
Dr. Rowden acknowledged that Carranza said he wanted to continue taking
his medication, attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, have an AA
sponsor, and continue seeing his doctor. He noted that Carranza appeared to
recognize that he would have to take medication for the rest of his life, unless
his doctor instructed otherwise. Dr. Rowden also agreed that Carranza had
“a rudimentary understanding” of potential triggers for his mental illness
and drug use and said he would seek help from his doctor or his family if he
was having issues.
            2. Dr. Abrams
      Dr. Abrams, a psychiatrist specializing in addiction and forensic
psychiatry, interviewed Carranza once in 2022 and reviewed Carranza’s prior
evaluation reports. He concluded that Carranza would not pose a substantial
danger of physical harm to others because his underlying offense was “highly
related” to his substance abuse, and Carranza had a violence-free history
since then. Dr. Abrams noted that Carranza was committed to a sober
lifestyle, he had worked with a sponsor in CONREP, and there was “no
evidence” that Carranza “is likely to relapse.”
      Dr. Abrams also based his opinion on his view that Carranza was
unlikely to stop his medications “whether under supervision or not.” He
noted that Carranza had “never been written up for refusing medications or
not going along with his treatment plan,” and that Carranza appeared
sincere about not using drugs in the future. Dr. Abrams believed that
“without substance abuse and without going unmedicated, people with severe

                                       8
mental illness pose no greater risk of danger than the baseline population
rate.”
         Dr. Abrams further testified that Carranza had sufficient insight to
understand that he “suffers from a mental illness[,]” that “he can never use
illicit intoxicants again,” and that “he needs to see a doctor for the rest of his
life and take the prescribed treatment.” Carranza was also able to
understand that he attacked his uncle because he was abusing drugs and his
“imagination went crazy.” Carranza seemed willing and able to commit to a
lifetime of AA meetings, having a sponsor, seeing a psychiatrist, and seeing a
social worker or counselor. His thoughts were also “logical, linear, and
coherent” without disorganization or tangentiality. Dr. Abrams observed no
overt symptoms and noted that there was no indication Carranza’s treatment
team ever increased his medication dosage.
         Dr. Abrams acknowledged, however, that it was “a possibility”
Carranza could relapse, and he went on to say that as an addiction
psychiatrist, “my line is everyone relapses at some point” and that “25 years
of sobriety is not a guarantee against relapse.” When asked again whether it
was possible that Carranza might one day relapse, Dr. Abrams said it was “a
possibility” that could not be predicted with certainty, and that “anybody can
start using drugs and become dangerous.” Nevertheless, in light of
Carranza’s commitment to seeking treatment and support, Dr. Abrams
believed that Carranza could be released into the community without posing
a substantial risk of danger.
               3. Carranza
         Carranza testified briefly on his own behalf and said that he had been
attending AA meetings for the past 20 years, he previously had an AA
sponsor, and he intended to get another sponsor upon release. He expressed

                                         9
a desire to seek post-release mental health treatment to get his medications,
and he also intended to continue his education because he “was a straight A
student in college” and “got a certificate in air conditioning” during his first
CONREP discharge. Carranza said he would take medication as
recommended by his psychiatrist, and that he had been taking medication
without refusal for the past 20 years. He believed that he was “doing just
fine” on his current dosage according to what “the doctors told [him],” and
that there was no reason to increase it.
         D. Court’s Findings
      After hearing testimony, the trial court first found that Carranza was
still suffering from schizophrenia, a severe mental disorder. The court
further found that Carranza posed a substantial danger of physical harm to
others. Crediting Dr. Abrams’s testimony that Carranza’s substance abuse
played “an enormous role” in the underlying offense, the court went on to
conclude—based on Dr. Abrams’s “line” that “everyone relapses” and
Carranza’s 2018 positive drug screen in CONREP—that Carranza would “at
some point relapse to the use of methamphetamine.” The court extended
Carranza’s commitment from March 8, 2023, through March 7, 2025, the
period covered by the People’s third petition.
      The court ordered the People to prepare and submit a final
commitment order for signature. However, because no final order was
prepared at the time Carranza filed his notice of appeal, his appeal was
initially premature. (Salowitz Org. v. Traditional Indus. (1990) 219
Cal.App.3d 797, 808 [“Where findings of fact or some other type of formal
evidence of the judgment or order is required, an appeal does not lie from a
minute order.”]; see also Herrscher v. Herrscher (1953) 41 Cal.2d 300, 304–
306 [minute order that directs the preparation of a formal written order is

                                        10
not itself appealable].) At our request, the People obtained a final signed
commitment order dated September 13, 2023, which states that Carranza
continues to pose a substantial danger of harm to others. We now construe
the premature notice of appeal as being from the final commitment order.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.483(a)(1), 8.308(c).)
                                  DISCUSSION
                                         I
      We begin by discussing a procedural question we asked the parties to
address in supplemental briefing. Specifically, we first requested briefing on
whether the third petition granted by the trial court, which requested
Carranza’s re-commitment from March 8, 2023, to March 7, 2025, was filed
after his maximum commitment date had already expired. Second, if it had
in fact expired, we asked whether the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on
that petition. (See People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 235–236 [“As we
explained in [People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91], if an extension petition is
not filed before the current commitment ends, the defendant is no longer
subject to constraint under the NGI or [mentally disordered offender (MDO)]
statutes.”].)
      If Carranza’s maximum commitment date was March 8, 2023, as the
court and the parties apparently believed when the third petition was filed on
March 9, 2023, then that petition was filed one day late. The parties both
admit in their letter briefs, however, that there is no discernible explanation
for why the trial court and the parties believed Carranza’s maximum
commitment date was March 8, 2023 at the time the People filed the third
petition. The first petition covered the period from March 8, 2020 to March 8,
2022, and the second petition (filed in September 2021) covered the period
from May 10, 2022 to March 8, 2024. The People stated in their letter brief

                                        11
that they intended to file “consecutive petitions,” but admitted that they had
no explanation for the May 10, 2022 beginning date for the second petition,
nor could they explain the March 8, 2023 beginning date for the third
petition. One would expect that the third petition would cover March 8, 2024
through March 8, 2026, the two-year period immediately following expiration
of the period covered by the second petition. If it had, because the People
filed the third petition in March 2023, it would have fallen well before the
end of the period covered by the second petition. Yet neither the court nor
the parties explained why the third petition requested a two-year extension
from March 8, 2023 through March 7, 2025, and it is further unclear why the
trial court only granted the third petition.
      Regardless, the parties do not dispute that the People timely filed the
original November 2019 petition. The record also shows that the trial court
granted continuances from the initial filing up through the May 2023 trial
date at defense counsel’s request, usually with express reference to time
waivers and good cause shown. (See § 1026.5, subd. (b)(4).) Furthermore,
given the confusion in the record and the lack of an explanation for treating
March 8, 2023 as the relevant date for maximum commitment purposes, we
cannot conclude that the third petition was untimely. Though the record is
unclear on many things, it does indicate that Carranza and his counsel
requested multiple continuances and essentially agreed to extend his civil
commitment voluntarily until the petitions could be adjudicated.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s granting of the third
petition was improper on jurisdictional grounds. Rather, for the reasons that
follow, we reverse the trial court’s order because we agree with Carranza’s
contention that there was insufficient evidence to support his recommitment.

                                       12
                                        II
      “[W]e review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
extension order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the requirements of section 1026.5(b)(1) beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1165 (Zapisek).) Under
section 1026.5, a person who is found NGI may be committed to a state
hospital for a period no longer than the maximum prison sentence for his or
her offenses. (§§ 1026, 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).) This commitment may be
extended in up to two-year increments if, because “of a mental disease, defect,
or disorder, [the person] represents a substantial danger of physical harm to
others.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1), (8).) To establish the substantial danger of
physical harm element, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the person has, “ ‘at the very least, serious difficulty controlling
his [or her] potentially dangerous behavior.’ ” (People v. Redus (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 998, 1010 (Redus), quoting Zapisek, at p. 1165; People v.
Williams (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 861, 872.)
      The parties do not dispute that Carranza has a mental disorder, so we
focus on the substantial danger analysis. The People’s sole expert witness,
Dr. Rowden, recommended against release and reasoned that Carranza’s lack
of insight could lead to a relapse into substance abuse, which often results in
criminal and violent behavior. Dr. Rowden also believed Carranza had an
inadequate plan for how to comply with outpatient treatment and “manage
his mental health condition.”
      While a single expert opinion may be sufficient to constitute
substantial evidence to support recommitment (Zapisek, supra, 147
Cal.App.4th at p. 1165), the opinion cannot be based on a “ ‘ “guess, surmise
or conjecture, rather than relevant, probative facts” ’ ” (In re Anthony C.

                                        13
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1504). Here, there was little evidence beyond
conjecture and vague generalities that Carranza’s lack of insight would likely
lead to a relapse into substance abuse and a substantial danger of violence.
As Dr. Abrams observed, and Dr. Rowden did not refute, Carranza had
enough insight to understand that he “suffers from a mental illness[,]” that
“he can never use illicit intoxicants again,” and that “he needs to see a doctor
for the rest of his life and take the prescribed treatment.” Carranza was also
able to understand that he attacked his uncle because he was abusing drugs
and his “imagination went crazy.” The People presented no evidence as to
why this level of insight, even if limited, would make Carranza sufficiently
likely to relapse into drug use such that he would pose a substantial danger
of physical harm to others.
      Furthermore, Dr. Rowden acknowledged that Carranza had a “basic
understanding” of how his mental illness was involved in the committing
offense, and Carranza indicated he understood that he would have to take
medication for the rest of his life, unless instructed otherwise. Dr. Rowden
observed that Carranza was “somewhat guarded or paranoid” about
discussing his symptoms and resistant to increasing his medication dosage,
but he did not explain how this made Carranza’s insight into his symptoms so
inadequate that he met the standard for recommitment under section 1026.5.
In other words, while Dr. Rowden pointed out ways in which Carranza could
have more insight into his illness and triggers, he did not explain why
Carranza’s “basic” level of insight supported a conclusion that he posed a
substantial danger of physical harm. (Cf., e.g., People v. Kendrid (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1360, 1370 [substantial evidence to support NGI defendant’s
commitment where it was undisputed that defendant had “ ‘absolutely no
insight into his behaviors that lead to violence’ ”].)

                                        14
      The trial court also erroneously relied on an isolated comment
Dr. Abrams made that his “line” as an addiction psychiatrist “is everyone
relapses at some point[,]” even though he said just before that comment, and
shortly after, that it was only “a possibility” Carranza might relapse. And
earlier in his testimony, Dr. Abrams expressly said there was “no evidence
that Mr. Carranza is likely to relapse.” He went on to say that the possibility
of relapse could not be predicted with certainty, and that “anybody can start
using drugs and become dangerous.” Considering the totality of his
testimony, Dr. Abrams’s passing comment that “everyone relapses” is not a
basis for recommitting Carranza.
      As for Carranza’s plans for managing his symptoms upon release,
Dr. Rowden acknowledged that Carranza had “a rudimentary understanding”
of potential triggers for his mental illness symptoms and drug use—including
not taking medication—and that Carranza would seek help from his doctor or
his family if needed. He noted that Carranza planned to continue
participating in AA, was looking to get an AA sponsor, and would continue
taking his prescribed medication as he had been doing for decades. Carranza
also told Dr. Rowden that he would report voices when he heard them, as he
has done in the past. Although Dr. Rowden opined that Carranza did not
have an “adequate plan” for managing his symptoms, it is unclear why
Carranza’s plan was not adequate, especially given his proven ability to
participate in AA, attend group therapy, and take his medication.
      Our Supreme Court has recognized that in civil commitment schemes,
a “person’s amenability to voluntary treatment is a factor in determining
whether commitment is necessary. [Citations.]” (People v. Superior Court
(Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 928, citing People v. Bolden (1990) 217
Cal.App.3d 1591, 1600 [in NGI recommitment proceeding, defendant may

                                      15
present evidence that medication is effective and he will take medication];
People v. Williams (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1476, 1482–1483 [in NGI sanity
restoration proceeding, trial court erred by instructing that person could not
be restored to sanity unless it was shown he needed no medication].) Even if
Carranza’s understanding was “rudimentary,” the People presented no
evidence showing why his understanding of potential triggers, and his plans
for how to avoid them, were so inadequate that he posed a substantial risk of
physical harm to others.
      While the People emphasize that Carranza’s compliance can be
attributed to being in a hospital setting, the fact that Carranza continued to
take medication during CONREP discharges, and attend group therapy, at
least suggests that he would comply with prescribed treatment in the
community. The People’s argument would be more persuasive if Carranza
had resisted taking prescribed medication in the past or refused to
acknowledge his need for treatment. Without considering each individual’s
particular circumstances, the People’s argument—that a structured hospital
setting contributes to compliance—could be used against every committed
person. Moreover, as one Court of Appeal noted, while a court may be
“understandably concerned about [a committed person’s] ability to function
and keep himself safe if he were to stop taking his medication and
decompensate after being released from the hospital[,]” the person’s “risk of
danger to others, not his own welfare, is what was at issue” at his
recommitment trial. (People v. Johnson (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 96, 110, italics
omitted (Johnson).)
      The trial court relied on the fact that Carranza had a positive drug
screen while on CONREP the second time, but even then Carranza did not
engage in physically violent behavior. This undercuts the implication that

                                      16
substance abuse would lead Carranza to be violent. The court in Redus—in
finding insufficient evidence to support an NGI recommitment—found it
significant that there was no indication in the record of violent or aggressive
behavior, “even through CONREP releases and medication lapses.” (Redus,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 1012 [reversing commitment extension for
insufficient evidence despite the NGI defendant’s continuing delusions and
lack of insight about his underlying murder offense].) Although Dr. Rowden
testified that Carranza was reported to have displayed “erratic” and
“aggressive” behavior during his second CONREP discharge, when asked to
clarify, he said Carranza was “unwilling to admit to any wrongdoing”—but
made no mention of any physical aggression. Indeed, there is no evidence in
the record of any violence or any medication lapses by Carranza during his
20-year commitment, despite recurring symptoms during his first discharge,
and a drug relapse during his second.
      Lastly, the People rely on the fact that Carranza reported delusions in
2021, and on Dr. Rowden’s testimony that Carranza continues to have
“occasional auditory hallucinations[.]” But Dr. Rowden acknowledged that in
December 2022, Carranza said he no longer hears voices, and neither expert
concluded that Carranza exhibited any psychosis during their interviews.
      Even if Carranza was experiencing active symptoms of mental illness,
that fact alone would not be sufficient to support recommitment under the
case law. In People v. Cheatham (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 782 (Cheatham), the
Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence that Cheatham, who was found
NGI for escaping custody and resisting an officer, would pose a substantial
danger of physical harm to others. (Id. at p. 786.) He was diagnosed with
schizoaffective disorder and, like Carranza, substance abuse disorder. (Ibid.)
Evidence showed that while Cheatham’s medication did not stop his

                                        17
symptoms altogether in that he still heard voices, his medication made him
better able to manage his symptoms. (Ibid.) The prosecution’s experts in
Cheatham opined that given his past drug use, he might resort to drugs upon
release, which would “likely increase his mental health symptoms,” and in
turn “decrease his compliance with taking medications.” (Id. at pp. 787–788.)
Like Carranza, Cheatham acknowledged his mental illness and past
substance abuse and asserted that he would participate in AA, would not
relapse, and would rely on medication to help him cope with his auditory
hallucinations. (Id. at p. 788.)
      In reversing Cheatham’s recommitment order, the Court of Appeal
concluded that while “some individuals with Cheatham’s mental disorder
could have serious difficulty controlling their dangerous behavior in the event
that they discontinued their medication and their hallucinations . . .
resumed, there was no evidence that tied such a conclusion to Cheatham.
Our focus is not on some hypothetical person who shares Cheatham’s mental
disorder, but on Cheatham himself.” (Cheatham, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at
p. 790.) The court noted that even while Cheatham exhibited mental health
symptoms while on supervised release, the record included no reference to
dangerous behavior. (Ibid.) The court stated: “Although we accept that
Cheatham could relapse into drug and alcohol use if released, which could
then increase his mental health symptoms, we find this speculative outcome
insufficient in itself to support continued commitment due to substantial risk
of danger.” (Id. at p. 793.)
      Such is the case here. While Dr. Rowden’s testimony may support a
finding that someone with Carranza’s mental disorders could become
dangerous, the evidence did not connect that speculative possibility to
Carranza’s particular circumstances and history so as to support a finding

                                      18
beyond a reasonable doubt that Carranza posed a substantial risk of physical
harm to others. And while Cheatham’s underlying offense did not involve
violence in the way Carranza’s offense did, the numerous similarities in their
treatment and behavioral histories, and in the expert opinions presented at
trial, support the conclusion that there is also insufficient evidence to support
recommitment here. This aligns with the court’s conclusion in Cheatham
that we cannot assume that people with an extended record of non-violent
behavior “will struggle to control dangerous behavior simply because they
have, or are likely to have, active mental health symptoms—whether
triggered by drug use, alcohol use, or something else.” (Cheatham, supra, 82
Cal.App.5th at pp. 793–794.)
      Other cases have reached a similar result even when the defendant’s
commitment offense was violent. In Redus, for example, the commitment
offense was a murder involving postmortem intercourse with the victim. The
appellant in Redus was found NGI, and he still suffered from psychosis and
delusional thoughts involving “fixed false beliefs” at the time the People
sought his recommitment. (Redus, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1001, 1002–
1003.) Evidence also showed that Redus did not believe he had a mental
disorder, and that he had “homicidal thoughts” while on supervised release.
(Id. at pp. 1002–1003, 1005, 1007.) Moreover, his release to CONREP had
been revoked on three or four occasions. (Id. at p. 1002.) The Court of Appeal
nonetheless reversed his recommitment for lack of substantial evidence that
he would have serious difficulty controlling his potentially dangerous
behavior, finding no “hint of violence, threatening behavior, or aggressiveness
of any kind on the part of appellant over multiple decades, even through
CONREP releases and medication lapses. Rather, the evidence showed that
[Redus] has controlled his dangerous behavior for decades, despite his

                                       19
ongoing delusions and paranoia.” (Id. at p. 1012.) For these reasons, the
court concluded that the evidence failed to “provide the required link between
appellant’s ongoing mental illness and his purported difficulty in controlling
his potentially dangerous behavior.” (Id. at p. 1013.)
      The same is true here, and the record contains even more facts in
Carranza’s favor than Redus had. Unlike Redus, Carranza’s auditory
hallucinations appeared to be in remission, or were at least reduced, as of
December 2022. At no time did Carranza express having homicidal or violent
thoughts towards others, as Redus did. Dr. Abrams observed no indications
of psychosis, and Carranza at least has sufficient insight to acknowledge that
he suffers from a mental disorder. Furthermore, Carranza, unlike Redus,
experienced no medication lapses. These facts reinforce our conclusion that
“substantial evidence simply does not support the court’s finding that
[Carranza’s] mental illness causes, ‘at the very least, serious difficulty
controlling his potentially dangerous behaviors.’ ” (Redus, supra, 54
Cal.App.5th at p. 1013.)
      This court’s recent opinion in Jenkins is also analogous, even though
that case involved a mentally disordered offender proceeding under section
2970. (People v. Jenkins (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 142, 145 (Jenkins).) Jenkins
attacked her elderly landlord with a hammer and imprisoned him for several
hours in response to paranoid ideation. (Id. at pp. 145–146.) After she was
convicted of attempted murder and committed to a state hospital, the People
petitioned for recommitment and presented evidence that she remained
focused on delusions and maintained paranoid beliefs about her landlord.
(Id. at pp. 146–147.) The People’s experts reported that Jenkins had limited
insight, wanted to decrease or eliminate her medications, had a history of
failing to comply with prescribed medications, and exhibited aggressive

                                       20
behavior. (Id. at pp. 147–148.) But Jenkins also expressed a desire to live in
a board and care facility upon release, continue with her medications and
therapy, and get support from a church group. (Id. at pp. 148–149.) Like
Carranza, Jenkins’s commitment offense was the only evidence in the record
that she had ever been violent or dangerous. (Id. at p. 151.)
      We concluded in Jenkins that there was insufficient evidence to support
a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenkins represented a substantial
danger of physical harm to others. (Jenkins, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 145.)
Given that she had not been violent or physically aggressive since her
commitment offense, and because her behavior had improved and she had
significant medical issues and decreased mobility, this court reversed the
trial court’s recommitment order. (Id. at pp. 145, 153, 155–156.) We noted
that even though it is unnecessary to have “proof of a recent overt act” to
support recommitment (Jenkins, at p. 154, quoting People v. McKee (2010) 47
Cal.4th 1172, 1203), the court cannot overlook “ ‘the statutory requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the person currently poses a substantial

danger of physical harm to others’ ”6 (Jenkins, at p. 154, quoting Johnson,
supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 106–107).
      Johnson provides further support for our conclusion. In Johnson,
another case involving a section 2970 commitment proceeding, Johnson was
convicted of assault after he struck a stranger repeatedly with a board while
suffering from a delusion that she owed him money. (Johnson, supra, 55

6     A concurring opinion in Jenkins also expressed concern that the
People’s experts did not use any of the available standard violence risk
assessment tools in formulating their opinions. (See Jenkins, supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at pp. 156–160 (conc. opn. of Buchanan, J.).) The same is true of
the People’s expert in this case, Dr. Rowden, who used only his own clinical
judgment in reaching his opinions. “For decades, we have known that this is
a notoriously unreliable way of predicting future violence.” (Id. at p. 156.)
                                      21
Cal.App.5th at pp. 98–99.) During his commitment as an MDO with
schizophrenia, Johnson participated in CONREP twice, but was returned to
the hospital each time for being absent without leave. (Ibid.) During his
second CONREP discharge, Johnson left supervision and was found in a
delusional, paranoid, and unmedicated state. (Id. at p. 100.) Johnson often
refused to participate in group therapy and indicated he did not believe that
he had a mental illness or needed medication. (Id. at p. 99.) Although
Johnson had exhibited no violence or aggression during his commitment as
an MDO, the People’s experts opined that he would be dangerous if released
because he “did not fully recognize that he had a mental health issue” and
could “quickly decompensate” outside of a supervised setting, especially if
unmedicated. (Id. at pp. 99–102, 103.) One expert noted that Johnson still
had some delusions—including disbelief that he committed the underlying
offense—and that Johnson did not have a “relapse prevention plan” to
manage his illness. (Id. at p. 102.)
      In reversing the recommitment order, the Court of Appeal in Johnson
concluded that the record contained no evidence that Johnson’s mental illness
would lead him to endanger others because “the evidence show[ed] that when
he did stop taking his medication for two months” while absent from
CONREP, “although his symptoms of schizophrenia increased, he did not
engage in any violent behavior whatsoever.” (Johnson, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 109–110.) The court also observed that “a complete absence of violent
or aggressive behavior of any kind over a long period of time is necessarily an
important, objective factor that must not be ignored when determining a
[mentally disordered offender’s] dangerousness.” (Id. at p. 110.)
      Carranza’s case cannot meaningfully be distinguished from this body of
case law. If we were to determine that the expert testimony in this case

                                       22
constituted substantial evidence to support recommitment, then it is difficult
to imagine how any mentally ill person who had committed a violent
underlying offense, and had a history of substance abuse, could ever meet the
standard for release under section 1026.5, subdivision (b). While someone
falling into that category could hypothetically relapse and have serious
difficulty controlling their dangerous behavior, the People here failed to
adequately show—without speculating—why and how Carranza himself
posed an actual and substantial risk of danger, especially given his track
record for complying with prescribed medication and seeking out various
forms of treatment and support.
      Without any evidence bridging the gap from a purely theoretical risk of
danger to a real and substantial risk based on Carranza’s particular
symptoms, history, or other characteristics, we conclude that a rational trier
of fact could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he represents a
substantial danger of physical harm to others. (See § 1026.5, subd. (b)(1); cf.,
e.g., People v. Sudar (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 655, 663–664 [NGI defendant
suffered from same delusion he had when he committed underlying offense
“and consistently maintained that he would do the same thing in the same
circumstances”]; Zapisek, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1166–1167 [NGI
defendant repeatedly acted on delusions and paranoia in inappropriate ways
“so as to impose a danger to others,” “such as . . . taking steps to escape from
the hospital for fear that workmen would return to harm him, or aggressively
insisting on money he believed he was owed”]; People v. Bowers (2006) 145
Cal.App.4th 870, 879 [NGI defendant “continued to experience auditory
hallucinations which commanded her to hurt herself or others,” had recently
attempted suicide, had poor impulse and anger control, and had a history of
assaultive behavior toward others].)

                                       23
     Because we determine that substantial evidence does not support the
trial court’s order extending Carranza’s NGI commitment, we reverse on that
ground and do not reach Carranza’s remaining arguments.
                               DISPOSITION
     The trial court’s order of September 13, 2023 extending Carranza’s NGI
commitment is reversed. The trial court is directed to enter a new order
denying the People’s petition to extend Carranza’s commitment.

                                                             BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

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