Court Opinion

ID: 9740048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:26:41.505232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:15.694972
License: Public Domain

CHEZEM, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur with the majority's result; however, I do not agree with the majority's path to that result. First, the majority cites Kendrick v. State (1988), Ind., 529 N.E.2d 1311 and Seay v. State (1990), Ind., 550 N.E.2d 1284 for the premise that Indiana Code 85-50-1-2(a) restricts the trial court's authority to order consecutive sentences to only those occasions where the court is meting out two or more terms of imprisonment. Regardless of the correctness or the true meaning of those decisions however, Kendrick and Seay do not apply to the case at hand.
*365The majority does correctly state that section (b) of I.C. 35-50-1-2 requires a court to impose consecutive sentences in instances where a defendant commits a crime while on probation or parole for another crime or while out on bond or his own recognizance. Further, the majority correctly makes note of the sparse record before us on the Attempted Robbery convietion and appropriately recites Fourth District's determination of the sentence relat ed to the Attempted Robbery conviction. However, I would also note that the appellant holds the obligation to provide a complete record to the reviewing court. Rondon v. State (1989), Ind., 584 N.E.2d 719, 729, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 LEd.2d 388. Failure to provide evidence of alleged error precludes our review of the alleged error. Id. Since the defendant has provided us no information regarding the timing of the commitment of the Attempted Robbery, we cannot know whether the imposition of consecutive sentences was improper. The defendant's decision to file three separate appeals for each probation violation has left this panel with an insufficient record as to the Attempted Robbery conviction which was before the Fourth District; therefore, we cannot determine when the Attempted Robbery was committed. In addition, the Fourth District, missing some of the facts supplied in this appeal, may have reached a different result if it would had some of the record from this appeal.
However we do not base our decisions on speculative and imaginary facts not before us. To hold otherwise encourages future litigants to provide us with only the parts of the trial court record which are most favorable to them. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur with the majority's result.