Court Opinion

ID: 9775612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:04:54.083396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:29.421342
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. The majority opinion fails to address the most crucial issue presented by this appeal. Because of the importance of this case, I set out the reasons for my dissent in some detail.
I.
I turn first to Art. 37.071(b) (2), Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., noting that this provision basing the imposition of capital punishment upon the probability of future events appears to be unique to this State. A survey of the capital punishment statutes of other states fails to reveal any provision similar to the “probability” issue of Article 37.071. In all the statutes reviewed, the aggravating circumstances upon which imposition of the death penalty rests concern either prior acts of criminal conduct or the means of circumstances surrounding the commis*947sion of the offense for which the accused is on trial.1
The threshold question in this appeal, as presented by appellant’s first ground of error, is: What did the Legislature mean when it provided that a man’s life or death shall rest upon whether there exists “a probability” that he will perform certain acts in the future? The question is not an academic one, since a significant part of appellant’s challenge is that the phrase “a probability” is so vague and overbroad as to be unconstitutional, and that this overbreadth is compounded beyond logical and rational understanding by the statutory requirement that the stated “probability” must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In view of this serious challenge to the statute now confronting us, it is incumbent upon this Court to determine whether it is possible to define the phrase “a probability.” This the majority has not done.
Since the phrase “a probability” is not defined within Article 37.071 itself, a further search is necessary.
II.
I necessarily begin with an examination of the Code of Criminal Procedure itself. Article 3.01, V.A.C.C.P., requires this Court to construe all “words, phrases and terms used in this Code” in their “usual acceptation in common language, except where specially defined.” 2
However, we must also be guided by the Texas Code Construction Act, which applies to any amendment to our Code of Criminal Procedure enacted by the 60th or any subsequent Legislature. Art. 5429b-2, Sec. 1.02(2), Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. (Supp.1974); Barbee v. State, 432 S.W.2d 78, 82 (Tex.Crim.App.1968), cert. den. 395 U.S. 924 (1969). Since Article .37.071, as noted earlier, was enacted in 1973 by the 63rd Legislature, it falls within the province of the Code Construction Act. Section 2.01 of the Code Construction Act, which is clearly more specific than Art. 3.01, V.A. C.C.P., supra, is as follows:
“Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.3
A careful reading of this language compels me to conclude that if there is a “technical or particular meaning” of the phrase “a probability,” we are bound to construe that phrase accordingly.
I find that there is a widely accepted “technical definition” of the word probability.
Webster’s4 gives a typical example of this definition:
“In the doctrine of chance, the likelihood of the occurrence of any particular form of an event, estimated as the ratio of the number of ways in which that form might occur to the whole number of ways in which the event might occur in any form (all such elementary forms being assumed as equally probable) ; the limit of the ratio of the frequency of that form of the event to the entire frequency of the event in all forms as the number of trials is increased indefinitely. Thus, as an unweighted die thrown up may fall equally well with any of its six *948faces up, there are six ways of happening; the ace can turn up in only one way; the chance of the ace is 1 out of 6 (⅛)-”
Thus defined, a probability is simply a chance — however large or small — as measured and defined in mathematical or statistical terms.
Certainly this clear definition of probability, though without vagueness in the meaning of the term itself, leaves much vagueness in the issue submitted under Article 37.071(b) (2), because even with this definition the question would by its terms, be answered in the affirmative for all individuals, no matter how saintly. That is, there is beyond any doubt some mathematical chance that all persons “would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”
I doubt that such a definition and such a construction were intended by the Legislature. Further, I am ever mindful of the important rule of construction that statutes carry with them a strong presumption in favor of their validity. Art. 5429b-2, supra, Sec. 3.01(1); Ex Parte Wilson, 374 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex.Cr.App.1964); Delorme v. State, 488 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). I feel bound nonetheless by the requirement of Section 2.01 of our Code Construction Act, which requires us to adopt the technical meaning of the phrase, regardless of whether it has obtained that meaning “by legislative definition or otherwise.” 5
The conclusion is thus inescapable that the appellant’s punishment was decided to a significant degree by the answer to a question which — as a result of its vagueness and overbreadth — could not have been answered in his favor. It is equally clear that such a procedure violates due process and thus constitutes error.6
III.
Nor can I conclude that the error was harmless. At the outset, it is clear that in enacting Article 37.071 the Texas Legislature responded to the Supreme Court’s opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), by putting strict limits on the jury’s discretion in assessing the death penalty, but not by eliminating such discretion entirely. See Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974). It is equally clear from the foregoing analysis of subsection (b) (2) of Article 37.071 that subsection (b) (2) allows no discretion whatsoever to the jury called upon to answer a special issue drafted in accord with its language. Such a special issue must always be answered “yes,” and the statute is thus made more mandatory in the instant case *949by a factor of one-half. This was clearly not the intent of the Legislature. See the discussion of Furman, infra.
It must also be noted that a proper statutory construction of subsection (b) (2) substantially increases a defendant’s chances of receiving the ultimate penalty. Thus, under such a construction, the appellant in this case was not, as he thought, confronted with two special issues, with the knowledge that a negative answer to either one of them would save him from the death penalty; he was instead faced with only one such issue, since a negative answer to special issue number two was by definition foreclosed. The appellant’s actual chance of receiving the death penalty was therefore increased by one-half. Since the statute was 50 percent more mandatory than the appellant could have realized, I fail to see how he could not have been harmed.
The error clearly was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); consequently, the judgment should be reversed.
IV.
Justice under law requires that I not end this inquiry on such a note. It must next be asked whether this unconstitutional portion of Article 37.071 renders the entire statute invalid. Delorme v. State, supra.7
As noted earlier in this opinion, Article 37.071 was created by the 63rd Legislature as part of Chapter 426 of the Acts of that Legislature. Section 7 of that Chapter provides:
“If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are declared to be severable.” 8
Before we can determine whether a portion of an Act is severable, it is obvious that we must first be able to “give effect” to the remainder of the Act. I therefore turn to the issue of the constitutionality of Article 37.071, supra, Article 1257, supra, and the remainder of Chapter 426.
Appellant urges that Article 37.071 and Article 1257 violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Federal Constitution. Appellant specifically relies upon Furman v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).
This Court stated in Lopez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), that “the per curiam opinion and the nine separate opinions filed by the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, in Furman and Branch, leave much to be desired from the standpoint of clarity . . . . ” An examination of those opinions reflects that while two of the Justices in the Fur-man “majority” would totally abolish the death penalty in this country, 408 U.S. at 257-306, 314-374, 92 S.Ct. 2726, the three other Justices voting to reverse limit their condemnation to the unfettered nature of the discretion given to judges and juries called upon to decide the issue. 408 U.S., at 240-257, 306-314, 92 S.Ct. 2726.9
*950In applying Furman to non-mandatory death penalty statutes like our own, the courts in some other states have- — quite properly, I believe — looked to these three latter opinions for whatever guidance they dared to glean from Furman. See, e. g., Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 204 S.E.2d 612, 614-615 (1974).
I especially agree with the Georgia Supreme Court’s interpretation of Furman. In Coley, that Court convincingly concluded that Furman allows “for new legislation by the States permitting the exercise of some controlled discretion through the use of objective standards by which the sentencing authority may be guided in imposing the penalty of death.” Coley, supra, at 615 10
After a careful examination, I have concluded that the remaining portion of Article 37.071 — after the excising of subsection (b) (2) — provides for the type of controlled discretion and objective standards contemplated by the opinions in Furman. I would hold that the statute, minus the offending subsection, is constitutional and should be so enforced. Furman v. Georgia, supra; Delorme v. State, supra.11
Appellant also challenges other portions of the death penalty act. Along with the majority, I have concluded that the remainder of Chapter 426, like the unsevered segment of Article 37.071, is constitutional.
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.

. See, e. g., the statutes of California, Cal. Penal Code Sec. 190.2; Colorado, CHS 39-11-103(6) ; Ohio, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. Sec. 2929.04; Pennsylvania, 18 Pa. S. See. 1311(d). Also see the statutes of Indiana, Ind.Ann.Stat. Sec. 10-3401(b); Louisiana, 14 L.S.A. Sec. 30; Oklahoma, 21 O.S.A. See. 701.1.

. Cf. Art. 8, Y.A.P.C. (1925).

. Compare Art. 10, V.A.C.S. (1969).

. Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language (2d Ed. Unabridged 1944), pp. 1970-1971, syl. 3; for other similar examples see: 2 Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (1971), p. 2309, syl. 3; Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged Ed. 1967), p. 1146, syl. 4.

. I have strong reservations about any construction which places technical definitions above common sense understanding. But my respect for the law and the institutional integrity of our state government requires me to yield to the clear intent of our Legislature, as embodied in the language of Section 2.01, supra. See Duncan v. Magette, 25 Tex. 245, 253-254 (1860). I would add that even with a common sense definition of probability, subsection (b) (2) has serious flaws. See the separate opinion of my brother Odom, as well as footnote 6, infra.

. I have other, graver reservations about subsection (b) (2). Under this subsection we go beyond our traditional understanding of reasonable doubt, which is based on the defensible premise that where acts have been performed, they can be proven to have produced an incident beyond a reasonable doubt. This concept has been tried, tested, and proven valid.
But under subsection (b) (2) the jury is required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual, the defendant, will in the future perform certain acts. This adopts the principle of predestination: That man is destined to do certain things and hence has no control over his actions. If this be true, we should not punish or attempt to rehabilitate, since the defendant is no more responsible for his acts than an individual who is insane at the time he commits an offense.
However, if individuals are responsible for their acts — as I believe — this cannot be true; yet if individuals are so responsible, (b) (2) is unconstitutional, since it is impossible to prove beyond a reaonable doubt or to a moral certainty that a person will act in a certain manner in the future.

. In Delorme, this Court found a portion of Article 152, V.A.P.C., to be unconstitutional. We nonetheless held that the statute could be validly enforced by excising the offending portion. Delorme v. State, supra, 488 S.W.2d, at 811-812.

. Even without this severability clause, it would be necessary to determine whether the invalidity of the subsection (b) (2) renders all of Article 37.071 invalid. See Delorme v. State, supra, and cases there cited.

 I also note that the four dissenting Justices concluded- — for various reasons — that the death penalty was constitutional as currently applied by the various states. 408 U.S., at 375-470, 02 S.Ct. 2726.

. I also agree with the Georgia court’s emphasis on new legislation. Like the Texas Legislature, the Georgia General Assembly enacted a new death penalty statute after the decision in Furman. A mere re-interpretation of a death penalty statute in effect prior to the decision in Furman might well be subject to a serious challenge as an ex post facto law. Cf. Commonwealth v. Harrington, 323 N.E.2d 895, 16 Cr.L. 2506, 2507 (Mass.1975).

. In doing so I reiterate what this Court said in Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). “This Court holds to the opinion that it has enunciated many times before that under the Constitution of the United States or the State of Texas, that the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment.” See also State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 6 (Fla.1973).