Court Opinion

ID: 9640209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:01:06.706095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:28.269034
License: Public Domain

HANEY, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the result.
I think it unnecessary to consider the question as to whether National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. -, 108 A.L.R. 1352, overruled Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160, though in my opinion the effect of the former decision is substantially to- abandon the doctrine of the latter case. The present act is free from the constitutional objections raised in this case.
The Supreme Court said in the National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin, supra, for reasons pointed out: “These cases [Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra, and Schechter Corporation v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947] are not controlling here.” For stronger reasons we can well say “These *790cases” are not controlling in the instant case. . *
Amici curias raise two questions in addition to those argued by appellant, which we should consider.
First. It is argued that the marketing agreement was not authorized by the original act, and therefore the orders are not based on a valid marketing agreement and are void. Section 8(2) of the original act (48 Stat. 34) authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into marketing agreements with “others engaged in the handling,, in the current of interstate or foreign commerce of any agricultural commodity.” The marketing agreement involved herein was entered into pursuant to that provision.
By the amendment of August 24, 1933, the foregoing provision was re-enacted with some amendments thereto, as secion 8b (7 U.S.C.A, § 608b). I believe, therefore, that the marketing agreement was validly made. The provision in the amended act that the marketing agreement must be entered into pursuant to section 8b is fulfilled, because the agreement was entered into, pursuant to section 8(2) of the original act, which is now section 8b of the amended act.
Second. Jurisdiction was given to the District Court “to enforce, and to prevent and restrain any person from violating the provisions * * * of any order, regulation or agreement heretofore or hereafter made,” by the Act of May 9, 1934. 48 Stat. 675, as amended t)y Act Aug. 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 762 (7 U.S.C.A. § .608a). The provisions- for orders in relation to citrus fruits was not added to the act until August, 1935. Therefore, argue amici curia, jurisdiction was not given with respect to orders and agreements relating to citrus fruits.
The Act of June 19, 1936 (49 Stat. 1539, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 608a-1, 613a), repealed parts of the Act of May 9, 1934, but expressly provided “but in all other respects such amendatory Act [said sections] [May 9, 1934] shall be and remain in force and ef-. feet until December 31, 1937.” (7 U.S.C.A. § 613a.) This amounted to a re-enactment sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court below regarding the orders in question.
The bill herein was filed March 10, 1936, prior to the act conferring jurisdiction. The answer was filed July 10, 1936. The case was submitted to the court below on the same date upon a stipulation of facts thereafter to be filed.- Such stipulation was filed August 20, 1936. Decree was entered September 24, 1936, at a time when the court below had jurisdiction. The fact that the suit was filed before jurisdiction was conferred does not invalidate the decree made after jurisdiction over the subject-matter was conferred by statute.