Court Opinion

ID: 9516336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:40:44.986318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:42.324191
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority's conclusion that Alvaro Jose Garcia's judgment of conviction should be affirmed. Majority op. at 71. I further agree with the majority's analysis concerning the lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy in the air space surrounding an unoccupied automobile, parked in a public motel parking lot. Majority op. at 73-75. I write separately, however, solely to address the underlying and additional question of whether a canine "sniff1 test is a "search" within *77the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 As the majority notes, Garcia's challenge to his conviction "raises an issue of first impression in Wisconsin." Majority op. at 73. While the majority then concludes that "the dog sniff in this case does not constitute a 'search,'" see majority op. at 71, the majority does not specifically address the unique nature of the canine "sniff' test as applied within the framework of the Fourth Amendment.2 This omission should be rectified.
As stated by one commentator:
In recent years police have made extensive use of specially trained dogs to detect the presence of explosives or, more commonly, narcotics. These dogs are utilized in checking persons and effects crossing the border into the United States, luggage accompanying persons travelling by airline or bus, freight shipped by airline, and the contents of vehicles and storage facilities. In light of the careful training which these dogs receive, an "alert" by a dog is deemed to constitute probable cause for an arrest or search if sufficient showing is made as to *78the reliability of the particular dog used in detecting the presence of a particular type of contraband. The more difficult question, which is of primary concern here, is whether such use of "canine cannabis connoisseurs" or similarly trained dogs itself constitutes a search so as to be subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment.
1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.2(f) at 366-67 (2d ed. 1987) (footnotes omitted).3 Our supreme court has never spoken on this issue,4 and the United States Supreme Court has directly addressed this issue only once.
In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the Court discussed the use of a canine "sniff" test on "seized" luggage at an airport, stating:
We have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. A "canine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as *79does, for example, an officer's rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods.
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here — exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine — did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 707 (emphasis added; citation omitted). The general holding of Place has become firmly established in many jurisdictions: The "sniff' search of an inanimate object does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.5 Place, of course, left many open questions. The foremost of which is whether a canine "sniff1 search of a person, or objects within the immediate possession of a person, falls within the definition of a Fourth Amendment "search." We, however,
*81need not address this question in the principal case because the police subjected only the exterior of Garcia's unoccupied automobile to the nasal perusal of "Zig/Z," the drug detection dog.
I agree with the conclusion of most jurisdictions that the mere imposition of a canine's trained "olfactory genius" to the exterior of an inanimate object, and more specifically, the exterior of an automobile, does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 788 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 (1992).6 But, as many jurisdictions have also recognized, while the canine "sniff' test may not in itself be a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the police conducting the test must still have properly gained access to the inanimate object in question before they can subject it to the canine inspection.7 The detectives in the case at bar had properly gained access to the automobile because it was located in a public parking lot.
The acknowledgment that there is a diminished expectation of privacy with regard to an automobile operated on a public highway is firmly entrenched in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-93 (1985). As such, an automobile does not carry with it the same degree of Fourth Amendment protective scrutiny as that of a person's home or apartment. See United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (2d. Cir) (canine "sniff" search outside defendant's apartment door constituted search subject to Fourth Amendment limitations), cert, denied sub nom., Fisher v. United States, 474 U.S. 819 (1985). Accordingly, the exterior of an automobile located in an easily accessible, public8 location carries with it no "legitimate expectation of privacy." See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("A 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed."). Further, society does not accord a motel's public parking lot greater expectations of privacy simply because the automobile's owner or operator rented a room at that motel. See United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[M]otel *82guests [have] no reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel's parking lot."); United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523, 1526 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that motel parking space rented with room carries with it no more expectation of privacy than that of the parking lot in general).
Accordingly, in the case at bar, Garcia's 1993 Nissan Maxima was parked in the open and publicly accessible parking lot at the Red Roof Inn. "[T]here is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the air space around a car that is parked in a motel parking lot." Majority op. at 75. Detectives Leffler and Wilke, and "Zig/Z" properly gained access to the exterior of Garcia's car in their routine patrol of motel parking lots near the airport. As such, "Zig/Z'"s subsequent "sniff' test was proper and gave the police reasonable suspicion to further investigate Garcia. I conclude that Garcia's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated and that the trial court made the proper ruling at the suppression hearing.

 Garcia bases his appeal solely on an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He does not make a concomitant challenge under Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. I note, however, that the rights recognized in Article I, Section 11 are coextensive with those in the Fourth Amendment. State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 171-76, 388 N.W.2d 565, 573-75, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986).

 I realize that the majority wishes to resolve the case "on the narrowest possible grounds," see State v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Ct. App. 1989); however, because this is a case of first impression in Wisconsin, I believe further background and discussion of the canine "sniff1 test is necessary.

 For an overview of the development of the law concerning canine "sniff tests see William M. FitzGerald, Comment, The Constitutionality of the Canine Sniff Search: From Katz To Dogs, 68 Mabq. L. REV. 57,64-82 (1984). See also Stefan Epstein, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog to Detect Narcotics or Drugs as Unreasonable Search in Violation of Fourth Amendment, 31 A.L.R. FED. 931 (1977 & Supp. 1994).

A different panel of this court tangentially discussed the issue of "canine" sniff tests on a challenge to police use of a infrared-sensing device to detect heat emanating from marijuana cultivation lamps in the defendant's basement. See State v. McKee, 181 Wis. 2d 354, 361-62, 510 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1993) (comparing heat-sensing devices to drug "sniffing dogs").

 See FitzGerald, supra note 3, at 81 (discussing uniformity of federal courts on canine "sniff" cases).

 See also United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1106 (5th Cir.) ("A dog 'sniff is not a search.") cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 155 (1993); United States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 203-05 (10th Cir. 1990) (canine "sniff of vehicle is not a search subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny); United States v. Coyler, 878 F.2d 469, 474-76 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (canine "sniff of train sleeper compartment . from public corridor not a search within the meaning of Fourth Amendment); State v. Morrison, 500 N.W.2d 547, 554 (Neb. 1993) (postal inspector subjecting package to canine "sniff was not a search); State v. Fikes, 616 So. 2d 789, 791 (La. Ct. App. 1993) ("sniff' by well-trained narcotics dog is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).

 The public location of an object is fundamental to the question of whether a subsequent canine "sniff" test is a search. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) ("[E]xposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine — did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." (Emphasis added.)).