Court Opinion

ID: 9667640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:51:14.03964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:39.454199
License: Public Domain

WHITE, J.,
concurs in result.
OVERSTREET, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part on Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review.
It is clear that appellant’s sole complaint is as to notice for a deadly weapon affirmative finding and not as to the propriety of a deadly weapon finding when the gravamen of the offense is possession of the same deadly weapon. The majority has decided this case on an issue not raised. I quote from appellant’s motion for rehearing before the Eleventh Court of Appeals under argument and authorities:
The Honorable Court is correct in its contention that a felony weapons charge may be the basis for a finding of use or possession of a deadly weapon after verdict is rendered. Once it is established that the State has elected to proceed with its proof in the matter, the Courts have generally relied on a broad interpretation of “use” and “exhibition.” (Citations omitted.)
However, this case rests not with the legal sufficiency of the evidence ..., rather this case, and [a]ppellant[’]s argument, rests on the procedural error which allowed the Court to find that [a]p-pellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon. (Emphasis in original.) Neither proper notice, nor a prima facie showing from the indictment in this case exists for a proper finding....
Even if it can be argued that appellant complains of notice and/or propriety of a deadly weapon affirmative finding when the gravamen of the offense is possession of the same deadly weapon, I believe appellant loses on either or both issues. Therefore I will address the propriety of the affirmative finding in a weapons case.
I.
DEADLY WEAPON FINDING NOTICE
It is very well-settled that a defendant is entitled to notice in some form that the State intends to pursue the entry of an affirmative finding of the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon. Grettenberg v. State, 790 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). The majority correctly holds that appellant had notice and I concur.
II.
APPLICABILITY OF DEADLY WEAPON FINDING
As for the requirement that the deadly weapon be “used or exhibited in the com*645mission of the offense,” we explained in detail the employment of the terms “use” and “exhibit” as such pertains to affirmative findings in Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). We also attempted therein to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. I must conclude now, as this Court did then, that the evolution of Article 42.12, § 3g, Y.A.C.C.P., sheds no light on what the Legislature intended either by “use ... of a deadly weapon” or whether such an affirmative deadly weapon finding was intended in offenses where the felony itself is possession of the prohibited weapon, as is the case herein. Id. at 940.
Based upon the definitions elucidated in Patterson above, “use” is more applicable to these facts. “Use,” in the deadly weapon affirmative finding context, includes any employment of the weapon, even its simple possession, if such possession facilitates the associated felony. Id. at 941. There, this Court basically accepted the following reasoning of the court of appeals, found in Patterson v. State, 723 S.W.2d 308, 314-315 (Tex.App. — Austin 1987):
Because art. 42.12 § 3g(a)(2) excludes no felony from its scope, it appears that the intended meaning of the statutory expression, “used ... during the commission of a felony offense,” must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate any felony offense falling within the purpose of the statute.
We believe that purpose to be the imposition of a greater detriment, in this instance the denial of probation and the delay of parole eligibility, in order to diminish the danger to human life that could be expected to arise in the circumstances that attend a felony offense when its commission is accompanied by a deadly weapon. [Emphasis in original.]
Id. at 941.
III.
CONCLUSION
Thus, although the possession itself is the felony offense, the logical extension of the above reasoning leads me to conclude that a deadly weapon finding, by its very nature, is also indicated by the mere possession of same. Therefore I concur in the majority’s determination that appellant was put on notice of the State’s intent to seek a deadly weapon affirmative finding. However, because there is no prohibition against entering such a deadly weapon finding for an offense in which the possession of the deadly weapon was the gravamen of the offense, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s holding to the contrary.