Court Opinion

ID: 9797391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:19:28.920261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:51.779803
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J., Concurring.
In my view, once defendant informed the officers he was no longer on parole and displayed his certificate of discharge, they could not have had an “objectively reasonable belief’ that their conduct was lawful. (United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 918 [104 S.Ct. 3405, 3418, 82 L.Ed.2d 677] (Leon); see Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 U.S. 340, 349 [107 S.Ct. 1160, 1166-1167, 94 L.Ed.2d 364].) In the absence of objective reasonableness, the prosecution cannot rely on the Leon good faith exception to avoid imposition of an exclusionary remedy for an illegal search. It is therefore unnecessary to make any generalized pronouncements as to the circumstances in which parole officers or California Department of Corrections (CDC) clerks might be “adjuncts to the law enforcement team” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 917 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3417]), thereby precluding application of Leon’s good faith rationale.
In Leon, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that one predicate of any good faith exception is the objective reasonableness of the officer’s conduct. (See Leon, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 919, fn. 20 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3419].) “[RJeliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable, [citation] and it is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.” (Id. at pp. 922-923 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3420], fns. omitted.) “Accordingly, our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization. In making this determination, all of the circumstances . . . may be considered.” (Id. at p. 922, fn. 23 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3420].)
*53In the present context, this standard of reasonableness requires the officer to have a firm basis for believing the defendant is on parole and subject to a search condition. For example, in People v. Tellez (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 876, 880 [180 Cal.Rptr. 579], the evidence was “uncontradicted that the officers were informed by appellant’s parole officer and appellant, that he was in fact on parole [with a search condition]. Their reliance on this information was reasonable and they acted thereon in good faith.” Therefore, the court refused to suppress evidence recovered in a subsequent search even though the appellant’s parole status had terminated several months earlier. (Ibid.; see People v. Washington (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 434, 439 [186 Cal.Rptr. 3]; cf. Hill v. California (1971) 401 U.S. 797, 804 [91 S.Ct. 1106, 1111, 28 L.Ed.2d 484] [arrest and search incident thereto upheld even though officers arrested wrong individual because “the officers’ mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time”].)
In this case, the officers relied entirely on the “parole listing” provided by the CDC, which they made no attempt to verify through some primary source. (Cf. Hill v. California, supra, 401 U.S. at pp. 802-803 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1110].) Although they contacted Officer Mora, she apparently was not defendant’s parole officer and acted as no more than a “ ‘rubber stamp’ ” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 914 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3416]), merely confirming what little secondary information the officers already knew. Moreover, when they attempted to execute the search, defendant verbally challenged their authority to proceed without a warrant and in support of his assertions presented his certificate of discharge from the CDC, a document the officers had no reason to think was falsified.1 (Cf. Hill v. California, supra, 401 U.S. at p. 803 & fn. 7 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1110].) Mora had no definitive response to defendant’s claim and apparently did not examine the certificate.
Given “all of the circumstances” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 922, fn. 23 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3420]), no “reasonably well trained officer” (ibid.) would have proceeded without first confirming defendant’s parole status, either prior to embarking for the motel or, at the latest, when informed of defendant’s discharge. While defendant may not have been a disinterested source of this information, he certainly was a knowledgeable one the officers had no legitimate reason to disregard. The constitutional justification for subjecting *54parolees to warrantless searches is predicated on the administrative needs of the parole system in “monitoring [the] transition from inmate to free citizen.” (People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 752 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d 445].) Once an individual has successfully made this transition, he regains full Fourth Amendment protection, which law enforcement must recognize and respect. Other than a warrant issued on probable cause or some other exception to the warrant requirement, defendant’s parole search condition provided the basis on which the officers could conduct a reasonable search of his motel room. It was therefore incumbent on them to resolve the uncertainty of his status to ensure a valid search.
Since the officers did not act “in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment” (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 918 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3418]), it is unnecessary to determine whether the statutory scheme delineating the duties and authority of parole officers renders them adjuncts of the law enforcement team when they accompany police officers in executing a parole search. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 39-40.) Notwithstanding these provisions, “[p]arole agents, in contrast to police officers, are not ‘engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’ [citation]; instead, their primary concern is whether their parolees should remain free on parole.” (Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott (1998) 524 U.S. 357, 368 [118 S.Ct. 2014, 2022, 141 L.Ed.2d 344]; see People v. Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 752-753.) In discharging this responsibility during the transition period, parole officers must both assess the efficacy of rehabilitation and protect the public. (People v. Reyes, at pp. 752-753.) It is primarily for these reasons, not law enforcement purposes, that they have peace officer status—with its attendant authority to carry firearms, make arrests, etc.—in relation to their supervisory duties. Granted, in some instances they may assist or cooperate with law enforcement for the purpose of uncovering evidence of illegal activity. (See U.S. v. Richardson (9th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2d 439, 441; see also Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, at p. 369 [118 S.Ct. at pp. 2022-2023].) But courts should suppress evidence only when the facts clearly establish that a parole officer has acted in a law enforcement capacity. (Cf. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 918 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3418] [“suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule”].)
I similarly do not endorse the unqualified characterization of CDC clerks who prepare and disseminate the parole listings as adjuncts of law enforcement. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 44-46.) Nothing in the language or legislative history of Penal Code section 3003, or any other statute cited by the majority, supports the conclusion the Legislature intended—simply by *55requiring CDC clerks routinely to provide department records to local law enforcement—that they would become enmeshed in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” (Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1, 15 [115 S.Ct. 1185, 1193, 131 L.Ed.2d 34]) thereby narrowing the scope of the good faith exception. The legislation merely sought to regularize and make more efficient the previously ad hoc process of local agencies requesting the information as needed. The function of CDC clerks remains to assist in the department’s discharge of its responsibilities to parolees and the public, not law enforcement.
The constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was motivated by the abhorrence of the general warrants and writs of assistance that in England and the American colonies symbolized governmental overreaching and abuse of authority. (See Steagald v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 204, 220 [101 S.Ct. 1642, 1651-1652, 68 L.Ed.2d 38].) In the criminal context, the courts have chosen to enforce this prohibition by the exclusionary rule, while at the same time recognizing the “substantial social costs” it exacts. (See Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 907 & fn. 6 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3412].) For this reason, and because the rule “renders the Fourth Amendment contemptible in the eyes of judges and citizens” (Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles (1994) 107 Harv. L.Rev. 757, 799) and “may well ‘generate] disrespect for the law and administration of justice’ ” (Leon, at p. 908 [104 S.Ct. at p. 3412]), we should avoid formulating overbroad Fourth Amendment principles that ultimately are “oblivious or hostile to the common sense of common people” and “often abandoned] ... to avoid absurdity.” (Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, at p. 759.) Here, however, the officers’ unreasonable conduct falls squarely within the intended scope of the Fourth Amendment. Assuming the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally appropriate remedy (see id. at pp. 785-800), suppression of the evidence seized here vindicates rather than breeds contempt for constitutional rights.

It is clear from the record that defendant immediately informed the officers he had been discharged from parole when they came to his motel room. While it is somewhat less clear exactly when he presented his certificate of discharge, it reasonably appears he did so at a point when the officers could have suspended their activities and resolved his parole status before searching. In any event, since the prosecution had the burden to justify the search (People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 596 [286 Cal.Rptr. 780, 818 P.2d 63]), any deficiency in this regard would not be defendant’s responsibility.