Court Opinion

ID: 9774925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:38:22.626286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:17.765754
License: Public Domain

OVERSTREET, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority has this day correctly decided that the prosecutor did, in fact, properly abandon the counts in question on the record before jeopardy had attached during the first trial in 1982. I write to concur in this result; however, I respectfully dissent to that portion of the opinion which designates an inappropriate portion of the record as reflecting the valid abandonment.
I.
The majority reaches its conclusion by presuming a set of facts from the trial court’s 1982 docket sheets and the prosecutor’s testimony following the second trial in 1988. The docket sheet entries, which the majority presumes are correct, note that the charge in question was abandoned and dismissed by the prosecution four days before the jury was impaneled and sworn. This leads to an unquestioned reliability upon the docket sheets which may or may not be made contemporaneously with the date of the docketed entry. A docket entry is a memorandum made for the court’s, judge’s, and staff’s information and forms no part of the judgment actually entered. 47 TEX.JUR.3RD § 15.
I differ with the majority opinion that the prosecutor’s testimony at the post-trial hearing in 1988 corroborated the docket sheets, and that the presumptions from the docket entries resolve the issue. The prosecutor candidly denies contemporaneous knowledge of the docket sheet entries. He testified at the 1988 post-trial hearing that his intent was not to dismiss but to abandon only; and that he reindicted, among other reasons because he noticed the entry on the docket sheets of “dismissal” of paragraphs contrary to his intent. He then proceeded to define his concept of the difference in abandonment versus dismissal. While in this factual situation, the two do have the same effect for jeopardy purposes, the two may differ in effect on the statute of limitations when applicable. This explains to some extent the prosecutor’s avid repudiation of the two of them being entered into the docket sheet simultaneously.1
It is apparent from his testimony that the prosecutor did not recall having performed any affirmative act of abandonment and so was arguing that if he was passive, then all paragraphs should have been active “depending on what the law is in that area.” The defense, on the other hand, is requesting that something more be required. This leads to the primary concern of this appeal, which is to decipher just what the law is in this area.
II.
The real concern both in this matter as well as Ex parte Preston, 833 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), is whether some overt and affirmative act must be taken on the part of the prosecutor to make the abandonment effective or can the State presume that its intent is known if it remains passive. When and to what does jeopardy attach was not the dilemma. Exactly what are the minimal requirements for effecting abandonment was the dilemma which concerned all parties.
*6We are deciding today that some affirmative act is required. I hesitate to rely on a docket entry and the prosecutor’s partial renunciation of it years later to resolve whether, when, and where the affirmative act occurred. I believe it more prudent to require a showing in the statement of facts where the party actively abandons the count. While the prosecutor did not recall, he did in fact effect a valid abandonment in the 1982 pretrial hearings, on the record, in the presence of defendants, and with the permission of the court.2 These docket entries did not correctly reflect the record insomuch as there was no discussion or agreement to “dismiss,” but only to “abandon” the relevant counts. However, given the record reflected in footnote 2, there is no need to accord the 1982 docket sheet entries with the 1988 hearings.
I would hold today that jeopardy does not bar retrial not because of what the docket sheet notes or because of what the prosecutor “intends” it note; instead, the count is active because the prosecutor unwittingly did it right in 1982. In summary, the relevant portion of the record reflects that the State properly abandoned all but the aggravated robbery count in a pretrial proceeding immediately prior to voir dire during the first trial in 1982, thereby effectively preserving the count in question.
I agree with the majority that in order for the act of abandonment to be effective, it must be affirmative and on the record, prior to jeopardy attaching. As noted, there is nothing novel about this concept. “[Sjuch abandonment or dismissal must be requested in open court with the defendant present ...” Slip Opinion at 3. Jeopardy attaches to all counts which are present in the indictment which have not been abandoned, dismissed or severed on the record, prior to the jury being sworn. Patterson v. State, 581 S.W.2d 696. I otherwise concur with the results and the distinguishing of Ex parte Preston, 833 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Cr.App.1992), insomuch as that record in Preston, supra, did not reflect abandonment or dismissal on the record prior to jeopardy attaching.

. This testimony repudiates the presumption of correctness of the docket entry. The prosecutor "intended” abandonment only. He wanted the counts to remain active without a need to rein-dict. The dismissal meant he had to reindict in order to toll the statute and keep the counts active.

. “MR. HARDIN: Your Honor, at this time the State is going to move to abandon all paragraphs(sic) in the Indictments except the fourth one which alleges aggravated robbery and is the paragraph [sic] that alleges during the course of robbery that Mrs. Lew was placed in fear of imminent bodily injury and death.
THE COURT: You are abandoning paragraphs [sic] one (1), two (2), three (3) and five (5).
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THE COURT: In other words, you are trying straight ‘aggravated robbery.’
MR. HARDIN: Yes, sir. My Indictment doesn't allege a shooting.
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THE COURT: Your Motion to Abandon paragraphs [sic] one (I), two (2), three (3), and five (5) will be granted. That is as to each Defendant, is that correct?”
MR. HARDIN: Yes, sir.