Court Opinion

ID: 9744996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:27:49.160296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:54.346971
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE EARNS, dissenting: Prior to the adoption of Rule 329, the basis for an amendment or correction of the record had to be found in the record itself. This meant that an amendment or correction could be based upon some written memorial from the records or quasi records of the court, but not upon the memory of witnesses, the recollection of the judge, or supporting affidavits. (People v. Okulczyk, 410 Ill. 115, 101 N.E.2d 529 (1951); People v. Miller, 365 Ill. 56, 5 N.E.2d 458 (1936); Woodward v. Ruel, 355 Ill. 163, 188 N.E. 911 (1933).) The majority opinion automatically assumes that the court’s power to amend or correct the record under Rule 329 is similarly limited. I do not agree with this interpretation of thé rule and, therefore, respectfully dissent. Rule 329 was adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court as part of a complete revision of the rules relating to appellate procedure. It is intended as a “comprehensive liberalization” of the procedure for insuring an accurate and complete record on appeal. (See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 329, Committee Comments and Historical and Practice Notes at 105 (Smith-Hurd 1976).) The explicit statement in Rule 329 that, “[mjaterial omissions * * ” may be corrected # has no counterpart in the former rules, and should, in my opinion, be interpreted to mean exactly what it says. Nevertheless, many decisions have ignored the plain language of Rule 329 and continued to require a memorial in the record as the basis for correcting material omissions. This has the anomalous effect of allowing the correction of a material omission only if the “omission” already appears somewhere in the record. Such a construction, rendering a portion of Rule 329 superfluous and of no meaning, should be avoided. People v. Redmond, 59 Ill. 2d 328, 320 N.E .2d 321 (1974). I agree with the interpretation of Rule 329 which was employed in People v. Pickett, 35 Ill. App. 3d 909, 342 N.E.2d 766 (1st Dist. 1976). In the Pickett case, a severe storm prevented one of the jurors from attending the last day of trial, and an alternate juror was used in his place. The original record on appeal contained no reference to this substitution or to an in-chambers meeting where the parties agreed to the use of the alternate juror. The trial judge issued an order, based upon his independent recollection, correcting the record to reflect both the substitution and the in-chambers meeting. The appellate court upheld the validity of this order, saying merely that Supreme Court Rule 329 authorized correction of the record to supply a material omission. The court was also influenced by the fact that the defendant did not dispute the accuracy of the circuit court’s order. The majority quotes language from Hartgraves v. Don Cartage Co., 63 Ill. 2d 425, 348 N.E.2d 457 (1976), in support of its interpretation of Rule 329. In Hartgraves, a juror was injured and unable to attend trial. The record indicated that the trial was completed with 11 jurors despite defendant’s clear demand for a verdict by a jury of 12. The record also disclosed that defendant moved for a mistrial in the trial court, alleging a violation of his constitutional right to trial by jury, and that the trial court denied defendant’s motion. The trial judge, relying on his “clear memory,” amended the record to include an off-the-record discussion in chambers where defense counsel suggested that the judge overrule his motion for a mistrial and agreed that the trial could proceed with 11 jurors. On review, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge acted improperly in amending the record. The court reasoned that: “Here there is no disagreement on whether the record accurately discloses what occurred in court. Nothing that was stated at trial has been omitted or improperly transcribed.” 63 Ill. 2d 425, 429, 348 N.E.2d 457, 459. (Emphasis added.) My understanding of the Hartgraves decision is that impeachment of the record with evidence of an off-the-record, in-chambers discussion is not permitted under Rule 329. The State’s contention in the instant case is that defendant’s waiver of trial by jury in open court was inadvertently omitted from the record. Nothing in the record contradicts this assertion nor has defendant contested the accuracy of the bystander’s report. Hartgraves is, therefore, distinguishable from the instant case, and does not require us to exclude the State’s bystander’s report from the record. The failure of the record to include evidence of defendant’s waiver of jury trial is a “material omission” which, under my reading of Rule 329, may properly be corrected through the use of a bystander’s report. I would, therefore, grant the State’s motion to add its bystander’s report to the record.