Court Opinion

ID: 9631407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:37:08.68015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:19.013228
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GRAY,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion. It is my view that the opinion is legally incorrect on the first, and dispositive, issue it addresses and, furthermore, that the result the Court reaches is laden with consequences far beyond what the Court appears to recognize. Because I would affirm the District Court on this issue, I would not address other issues raised on appeal.
Boiled down to its essence, the issue before us is whether Valerie Wilson was “admitted to the practice of law,” as that term is used in § 7-4-2701, MCA, while she was deemed to be practicing law under this Court’s Student Practice Rule. The Court concludes that she was and, on that basis, reverses the District Court. I conclude that she was not and, therefore, would affirm the District Court’s determination that she did not meet the statutory qualifications for appointment to the vacancy in the office of County Attorney for Jefferson County.
The phrase “admitted to the practice of law” is a term of art in legal circles. It is a different matter entirely from “practicing law” and the difference is clearly reflected in both statutes and Court orders and rules. The Court’s opinion in this case rests entirely on our Student Practice Rule and the statutory definition of when a person is deemed to be practicing law. I do not disagree with the Court’s citations to the language of these sources. Indeed, it is clear that, given the duties Ms. Wilson was authorized to perform under the supervision of an attorney admitted to the practice of law pursuant to our Student *118Practice Rule, she was “deemed practicing law” under § 37-61-201, MCA.
I strenuously disagree, however, with the Court’s quantum leap that “deemed practicing law” equates to “admitted to the practice of law.” This leap in logic is unsupported by any language in the Student Practice Rule or § 37-61-201, MCA; indeed, it is expressly contradicted by language in the Student Practice Rule which provides that the Rule-required certification by the dean of the law school “remain [s] in effect until the expiration of twelve (12) months after it is filed, or admission to the bar, whichever occurs first.” (Emphasis added.) More importantly, the Court’s conclusion totally ignores the statutes and Court rules regulating “admission to the practice of law.”
The statutes regarding admission of attorneys to the practice of law in Montana are found at Title 37, chapter 61, parts 1 and 2. Those statutes are clear that admitting an attorney to the practice of law is a formal action by this Court which can be taken only after requirements specified by statute and Court rule have been met.
Under § 37-61-101, MCA, this Court is authorized to establish rules for “the admission” of attorneys. Section 37-61-102, MCA, requires us to appoint an examining board to conduct the examination of “applicants for admission to the bar.” Only those persons who, among other things, possess the necessary qualifications of learning and ability are “entitled to admission as attorney and counselor in all the courts of this state.” Section 37-61-202, MCA.
The referenced qualifications for those seeking admission to the practice of law are set forth in both statute and this Court’s Rules for Admission to the State Bar of Montana, the latter having been adopted effective January 17, 1991. See In re the Rules for Admission to the Bar of the State of Montana (Admission Rules). Those qualifications are, inter alia, graduation from an accredited law school, application for admission to the bar, taking and passing a “strict examination,” and approval by this Court’s Committee on Character and Fitness. See §§ 37-61-204 and 37-61-205, MCA; Admission Rules.
When these qualifications are met, this Court must “admit [the person] as an attorney ... and must direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to [the person] by the clerk of the court, which certificate is [the person’s] license.” Section 37-61-206, MCA. An oath to support the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Montana and to faithfully discharge the duties of an attorney must be taken “on [the person’s] admission” and filed with the clerk of this Court. Section *11937-61-207, MCA. The clerk is statutorily mandated to keep a roll of attorneys “admitted to practice,” and the roll must be signed by “the person admitted” before the license can be issued. Section 37-61-209, MCA.
It is undisputed that Ms. Wilson had not met any of the statutory qualifications and requirements referenced immediately above at the time she began “practicing law” pursuant to our Student Practice Rule in June of 1990. At that time, she had completed the second of three years of law school; she was not “entitled” to admission to the practice of law pursuant to § 37-61-202, MCA, and, indeed, could not yet either apply for or take the “strict examination” required by § 37-61-204, MCA, and the Admission Rules. She had not been approved by this Court’s Committee on Character and Fitness. See Admission Rules. Thus, Ms. Wilson had not been found qualified, upon examination, for admission; she was not approved for admission to the practice of law by this Court’s Committee on Character and Fitness; she did not take the statutory oath, sign the clerk’s rolls or receive a license admitting her to the practice of law. See §§ 37-61-206 and 37-61-207, MCA; Admission Rules.
I am astonished at the apparent ease with which the Court ignores this significant body of statute and its own 14 pages of Admission Rules on the subject of admission to the practice of law by simply “holding” that a law student who, under our Student Practice Rule, assists attorneys admitted to the practice is, herself or himself, admitted to the practice of law. When did these students apply for admission? When did they take and pass the bar examination? When were they approved by the Committee on Character and Fitness? When did they take the required oath to support the federal and state constitutions? When did they sign the roll? When did they receive their licenses as attorneys? The obvious answer is that such students have done none of these things and, as a result, they neither have been, nor could be, admitted to the practice of law in Montana.
I wonder what we are to do at this point, given the Court’s decision in this case, with all those students operating under the Student Practice Rule. Even under the Court’s incorrect result, no guidance is provided regarding how much “practice” under the Student Practice Rule is sufficient to automatically admit the student to the practice of law. Is involvement in one case, under the supervision of an attorney admitted to practice, enough? And, if the student is admitted to the practice of law by virtue of the Student Practice Rule, why is it necessary that he or she be supervised at all?
*120In any event, since the Court holds that these students are already admitted to the practice of law, apparently we must ensure that they are issued a license and enrolled in the State Bar of Montana, which is — by order of this Court — comprised of “all persons admitted to the practice of law in this state.” See No. 12616, Supreme Court Order Creating The State Bar of Montana, dated January 29, 1974. I am confident that the students will be pleased to avoid the necessity of the otherwise upcoming and onerous bar examination upon their graduation from the University of Montana School of Law. I am equally confident that the number of students seeking to take clinical courses and provide other assistance to attorneys admitted to the practice of law will increase exponentially. Indeed, the State Bar of Montana may be glad to collect the obligatory dues from these heretofore. unknown admittees to the practice of law.
But what of this Court’s obligation to follow the law? And what of our obligation, discharged in the first instance via the statutes and Admission Rules, to take reasonable steps to ensure that the people of Montana are served by qualified attorneys of good moral character? Apparently these matters are of no interest or concern to the Court and it is well beyond my powers of reason to discern why.
To restate the obvious, I dissent in the most strenuous terms from the result reached on the first issue addressed in the Court’s opinion. I would affirm the District Court’s conclusions that Ms. Wilson was not admitted to the practice of law until October 8,1991, and, on that basis, that she had not been admitted to the practice of law for the statutorily-required period of time when she was appointed to the vacancy in the office of the County Attorney of Jefferson County. The District Court correctly concluded that Ms. Wilson was not qualified to be appointed to the vacancy.
JUSTICE NELSON joins in the foregoing dissent of JUSTICE GRAY.