Court Opinion

ID: 9428297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:22.791437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:12.747063
License: Public Domain

Justice Rehnquist,
with whom The Chief Justice joins, concurring in the result.
I agree with the resqlt reached by the plurality today and with most of its reasoning. I cannot, however, embrace the language contained in the last paragraph of Part II of the opinion which may be perceived as creating a per se rule requiring reversal of any criminal conviction involving a “violent crime” between members of different racial or ethnic groups if the district court refused to voir dire on the issue of racial prejudice. I do not disagree in toto with that paragraph, but fear that its use of the term “violent crime” .and the term “different racial or ethnic groups” is apt to spawn new litigation over the meaning of these terms and whether the trial court properly assessed the possibility of racial or ethnic prejudice infecting the selection of the jury. It is undoubtedly true that such prejudice may occur in the case of a defendant accused of a violent crime where the defendant and victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups, and it is also undoubtedly true that there are circumstances other than these which may suggest to the trial judge the need for an inquiry into the possibility of prejudice. But knowing the contentiousness of our profession, the suggestion that a precise definition of “violent crime” or “different racial or ethnic groups” will ever be arrived at *195leaves me unwilling to lay down the flat rule which seems to be proposed in the last paragraph of Part II. I would think that in the case of “violent crimes” where the defendant and victims are members of "different racial or ethnic groups,” the decision as to inquiry on voir dire as to racial or ethnic prejudice “remains primarily with the trial court, subject to case-by-case review by the appellate courts.” See ante, at 192. In my view, it is inappropriate for us to decide that there is always a “reasonable possibility” of prejudice solely because the crime is “violent.” I would also not rule out the possibility of a finding of harmless error, but that may well be embraced in footnote 7 to the plurality’s opinion.
As can be seen, my differences with the plurality are not great, but we are beseeched on so many appeals to reverse a judgment for procedural reasons which cannot fairly have been said to play a part in the factfinding process that I would leave somewhat more to the trial court’s discretion than does the plurality, the decision as to whether or not questions on such as racial or ethnic prejudice should be asked on voir dire. We cannot, in the nature of things, always lay down “bright line” rules, but we should try to avoid definitions that do not define or clarify and hence invite litigation. It seems to me quite conceivable that a thoroughly competent and fairminded district court judge could conclude that the asking of such questions, or the devotion of a substantial amount of time to the inquiry, could well exacerbate whatever prejudice might exist without substantially aiding in exposing it.