Court Opinion

ID: 9797496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:22:15.910993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:56:25.472560
License: Public Domain

CHAPEL, J.,
dissenting:
T1 In Proposition II Leech claims the State engaged in "sentence entrapment" by setting him up with an ounce of methamphetamine, which would automatically warrant a trafficking charge. As the majority notes, sentencing entrapment occurs when the State causes a defendant initially predisposed to commit a lesser crime to commit a more serious offense. Sentencing entrapment is often associated with reverse sting operations where mandatory sentences result from a particular quantity of drugs.1
T2 Leech claims the police department's decision to provide him (through the confidential informant, Peterman) with an ounce of methamphetamine, ensuring he would be charged with trafficking, unfairly entrapped him into the more serious charge and longer sentence associated with that crime. A charge for trafficking is dependent solely on the amount of the drug possessed and has significant sentencing implications, including mandatory punishment and loss of Department of Corrections credits while serving the prison sentence.2
T3 Although I agree with the majority's adoption of the doctrine of sentencing entrapment, I cannot agree with the majority opinion's analysis of the "entrapment" issue. The majority initially correctly states that sentencing entrapment differs from the traditional defense of entrapment. However, the opinion appears to conflate the two doctrines, viewing sentencing entrapment entirely through the prism of entrapment principles. The opinion suggests that the traditional instruction on entrapment, which does not apply here, should be modified where necessary to reflect factual cireum-stances underlying sentencing entrapment. Finally, the majority completely fails to apply even this sketchy understanding of sentencing entrapment to the facts of this case. After very briefly discussing the doctrine of sentencing entrapment, the majority even more briefly concludes "[tlhere is no evidence of entrapment in the record." 3 The majority concludes without discussion that, had Leech requested an instruction on entrapment it would not have been supported by the evidence. This is neither surprising, since Leech has no entrapment claim, nor relevant, since entrapment and sentencing entrapment are fundamentally different doctrines.
*992{4 Every state and federal jurisdiction but one, whether or not they recognize the doe-trine, defines sentencing entrapment as the claim that a defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped by the State into committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.4 The question here is whether a defendant is predisposed to possess or sell the greater quantity of drugs required for trafficking, or merely predisposed to commit a lesser drug offense. The Eighth Circuit de-seribed the standard used by the majority of the courts analyzing this issue: "The government's conduct, however, does not have to be outrageous. Rather, the facts should be evaluated by focusing on the defendant's predisposition." 5 The government's conduct is relevant to the extent that the State provides the inducement for the defendant to commit a greater offense.6
15 Several courts have defined and discussed sentencing entrapment before declining to reject or adopt it, ultimately concluding it was not factually supported in particular cases.7 Hawaii and Pennsylvania, along with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, have adopted the doctrine but found it did not apply to the facts before it.8 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have adopted sentencing entrapment.9 The Eleventh Circuit has rejected the sentencing entrapment defense.10 The D.C. Circuit discussed sentencing entrapment but concluded a defendant predisposed to sell powder cocaine and eager to commit a crime was not entrapped by government agents' insistence that he sell crack cocaine.11 Congress has also recognized the potential for government misconduct inherent in sting operations. In 1998 Congress modified the federal Sentencing Guidelines to allow for some sentencing relief in reverse sting cases. Where a law enforcement agent sells a drug for a substantially lower price so a defendant will buy significantly more than he would have otherwise, the sentencing court may depart downward from the sentence recommended in the guidelines.12
T6 This claim has the most foree when made in connection with reverse sting operations and situations where government agents choose to deal in a specific amount of drugs expressly in order to charge a greater *993offense.13 Our criminal justice system allots wide discretion to prosecutors to determine the appropriate charge for any person accused of committing a crime. This discretion is bounded on the one hand by the Legislature's strict definitions of specific crimes, and on the other by a particular defendant's actions. In drug cases, the Legislature has defined certain offenses solely by the weight or amount of drugs possessed, and made sentencing provisions mandatory on the weight or amount alone. Where State agents exert undue influence on a person to commit a crime greater than the one he would normally commit, and where that action determines the defendant's sentence, the prosecutor no longer has any discretion. Instead, the charging decision-making is moved back to the individual drug agent, or even the confidential informant. Law .enforcement agents may take a person suspected of past drug dealing and create a specific crime.14 In this case Peterman approached Leech at a police officer's request, suggested a drug deal, named the amount, and provided the drugs. The officers intended to supply enough methamphetamine to convict Leech of trafficking.
T7 As the Eighth Cireuit put it in United States v. Stavig, "[We continue to be deeply concerned about the proclivity of reverse-sting operations, such as this one, to raise questions of sentencing entrapment. Sentencing entrapment claims arise in this context largely because 'sentencing discretion is delegated all the way down to the individual drug agent operating in the field'" 15 The Court went on, "Because of the great potential for abuse, these cases require the most careful serutiny and a probing examination by the district court." 16 In United States v. Searcy the Eighth Circuit continued this theme: "The danger of government abuse is great because in many cases, including this one, the government may influence and, in some cases control, the quantity and kind of a drug involved in the offense." 17
T8 In United States v. Staufer, the Ninth Cireuit discussed the concerns raised when government agents convince a defendant to deal in significantly larger quantities of drugs than his previous history would support, and concluded courts must ensure the State "has some reason to believe that defendants are predisposed to engage in a drug deal of the magnitude for which they are prosecuted." 18 The Court stated it is unfair and arbitrary to let agents put unwarranted pressure on a defendant to commit a crime which would increase his sentence without regard for his predisposition, his capacity to commit the crime unaided, and the extent of his culpability.19 "Drug agents can decide, apparently without any supervision by anybody to negotiate with somebody for an ounce, a pound, a kilo, 100 kilos, a million kilos of a substance and, of course, if the defendant bites at the bait, then that amount chosen by the drug agent will determine his drug sentence.20 That is exactly what happened here,
T 9 The Tenth Cireuit is the only jurisdiction which does not define "sentencing entrapment" as State entrapment of a defendant, predisposed to a lesser crime, into committing a greater offense. In 1992, in United States v. Mosley,21 the Tenth Cireuit considered the defense of outrageous govern*994ment conduct. In a thorough and well-reasoned discussion Mosley adopted the defense, delineated the factors necessary to prove outrageous government conduct occurred, and noted very few instances of government conduct would warrant any type of relief The Court specifically concluded "it is not outrageous for the government to induce a defendant to repeat or continue a crime or even to induce him to expand or extend previous criminal activity." 22 Mosley did not consider, discuss or rule on either sentencing entrapment or sentencing manipulation.
T 10 In 1996, the Tenth Circuit considered a sentencing entrapment claim resulting from a reverse sting in United States v. Lacey.23 Rather than join every other jurisdiction which had discussed the issue of sentencing entrapment, and treat it as a separate defense, the Court returned to Mosley. In a footnote the Court rejected the common consensus that sentencing entrapment focuses on a defendant's predisposition, and stated that, in the Tenth Cireuit, the claim would be treated as one of outrageous conduct focusing on the actions of the government.24 Having determined that sentencing entrapment was merely another form of a claim of outrageous government conduct, the Court applied Mosley, and held government conduct could not be outrageous where agents induce a defendant to expand or extend his criminal activity by making a bigger buy.25 Lacey also determined that sentencing manipulation was merely another outrageous government conduct claim and, applying Mosley, rejected Lacey's arguments.26
T11 The Tenth Cireuit stands alone in refusing to treat sentencing manipulation and sentencing entrapment as doctrines separate from the defense of outrageous government conduct. - The Court gave no reason for this decision, other than the fact that the Court already had a discussion of outrageous government conduct available in Mosley.27 The weight of authority, analysis of the claims themselves, and common sense suggests there is a difference between sentencing entrapment or manipulation and outrageous government conduct. That difference has been articulated by the other jurisdictions. After carefully considering all the arguments, definitions, discussions and claims, I would adopt the sentencing entrapment doctrine as traditionally defined, and hold that sentencing entrapment occurs when official conduct leads a defendant, predisposed to commit a lesser crime, into committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment. Further, while I do not dispute the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that government conduct is not outrageous simply because agents induce a defendant to expand his activity by making a bigger buy, that is not the question for sentencing entrapment. The analysis should focus not on the agent's conduct in encouraging a defendant to engage in a larger transaction, but on the defendant's predisposition. The question becomes: did State agents induce a defendant, who was otherwise predisposed to a lesser crime, to commit a significantly greater offense leading to greater punishment?
{12 In the majority of jurisdictions considering sentence entrapment, the issue is resolved by the court because most jurisdictions do not have jury sentencing. The United States Supreme Court has held that Oklahoma defendants have a liberty interest in having a jury impose sentence.28 The Su*995preme Court based this holding on Oklahoma's statute creating the right to have a Jury fix punishment.29 Although this right is not absolute,30 the statute does grant to the defendant the right to jury sentencing in the first instance. I would hold that, after a trial court determines evidence has been presented to support a claim of sentencing entrapment, the defense shall be presented to the jury. A properly instructed jury may determine whether, under the facts of each case, sentencing entrapment applies I would promulgate a separate instruction on sentence entrapment, rather than modify the language of the existing entrapment instruction as the majority suggests.
" 13 Nothing in the record suggests Leech had previously dealt in large quantities of methamphetamine. Peterman testified he had borrowed $100 to buy ingredients, and said fourteen grams (half an ounce) as payment for that debt was about right.31 Of course, fourteen grams is not within the amount necessary for a trafficking charge. Agent Snowden testified Officer Pritchett asked him for an ounce of methamphetamine, and Officer Pritchett testified he arranged to do a "trafficking reverse" with Peterman and Leech. Peterman offered Leech half an ounce as payment for the $100, and explained he wanted Leech to take the other half ounce and sell it for him. Peterman testified he had borrowed money from Leech before to make methamphetamine, which he repaid or planned to repay in "product". Peterman also testified that Leech had both sold and given him drugs in the past. Peterman said he usually used a quarter of a gram at a time and he would buy small quantities-often a $20 "bump"-from Leech. Peterman also provided Leech eight-balls (8 1/2 grams) of crank to sell for him four or five times.
T14 All the evidence shows Leech was predisposed at most to accept and/or sell the 14 grams of methamphetamine Peterman owed him. In fact, the record shows Leech usually dealt in much smaller quantities than 14 grams, which itself is 6 grams short of the minimum quantity necessary for trafficking. Had the State not set up a "trafficking reverse," Leech would have committed the crime of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute.32 The State acquired a confidential informant in Peterman, targeted Leech, asked Peterman to set up a deal, and both determined and provided the quantity of drugs used. The record amply supports Leech's contention that government agents improperly enlarged the seope of the crime Leech was prepared to commit, in order to secure a trafficking conviction. This fits squarely within the traditional scope of sentencing entrapment. Leech should have had an opportunity to present this defense to the jury for a determination of sentencing entrapment. I would reverse and remand the case for a new trial.

. See, eg., United States v. Kaczmarski, 939 F.Supp. 1176, 1180 (E.D.Penn.1996), aff'd by U.S. v. Kaczmarski, 114 F.3d 1173 (3rd Cir.1997), cert. denied, Sliwowski v. U.S., 522 U.S. 901, 118 S.Ct. 251, 139 L.Ed.2d 179 (1997). There is no credible claim that Leech was entrapped in the traditional sense; it is not entrapment where police furnish a defendant an opportunity to commit a crime. See, eg., Cooper v. State, 1991 OK CR 54, 810 P.2d 1303, 1305.

. 63 0.$.2001, §§ 2-415(B)(1), (C)4, (D)(1) (first offender subject to not less than twice the term of imprisonment provided in the non-trafficking drug statutes, and the terms of imprisonment not subject to statutory provisions for suspension, deferral or probation, or state correctional institution earned credits other than achievement credits).

. Op. at 990.

. United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 438 (3rd Cir.1994); United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir.1994); United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 75 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Okey, 47 F.3d 238, 240 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Sancher, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 967, 119 S.Ct 414, 142 L.Ed.2d 336 (1998); United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329 (D.C.Cir.1995), cert. denied 517 U.S. 1147, 116 S.Ct. 1445, 134 L.Ed.2d 565 (1996); People v. Graves, 93 Cal.App.4th 1171, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 708, 713 (2001); State v. Yip, 92 Hawai'i 98, 987 P.2d 996, 1010 (Haw.Ct.App.1999); State v. Phillips, 2000 WL 328074 (Iowa App.2000) (unpublished opinion); People v. Ealy, 222 Mich.App. 508, 564 N.W.2d 168, 170 (1997) Commonwealth v. Petzold, 701 A.2d 1363, 1365 (Pa.Super.1997).

. Searcy, 233 F.3d at 1100 (internal quotation omitted).

. Searcy, 233 F.3d at 1101.

. Raven, 39 F.3d at 438; Jones, 18 F.3d at 1154; Okey, 47 F.3d at 240 (the Seventh Circuit subsequently specifically rejected the doctrine of sentencing manipulation, see supra n. 15, but has neither adopted nor rejected sentencing entrapment); Graves, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d at 713; Ealy 564 N.W.2d at 170.

. Yip 987 P.2d at 1010; Petzold, 701 A.2d at 1336-37; Kaczmarski, 939 F.Supp. at 1182. The Third Circuit has neither adopted nor banned sentencing entrapment. See United States v. Scavetti, 1999 WL 80368 (E.D.Pa.1999) (not for publication).

. Searcy, 233 F.3d at 1099; United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir.1993); Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1108.

. Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1414.

. Walls, 70 F.3d at 1329 (the Court also concluded there is no basis for outrageous government conduct to support a downward sentence modification, but this appears to be a separate discussion of the "outrageous government conduct" defense).

. 18 U.S.CAUSSG FSG § 2D1.1, comment (n. 12, 17) (Nov.1994).

. See, e.g., State v. Yip, 987 P.2d at 1010.

. - Government agents acting with unlimited discretion may, as they did here, create crimes. While not finding sentencing entrapment because the defendant was explicitly willing to act as courier for any amount of heroin, the Third Circuit was extremely troubled where an offense was entirely set up by the Government, with a willing defendant who had no means otherwise to carry out his plan, and where the narcotics transaction never took place. (Raven, 39 F.3d at 439).

. United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1247 (8th Cir.1996), quoting United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir.1994) (internal quotation omitted).

. Id.

. Searcy, 233 F.3d at 1099.

. Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1107.

. Id.

. Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1107-08.

. 965 F.2d 906, 908 (10th Cir.1992).

. Mosley, 965 F.2d at 911.

. 86 F.3d 956 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 944, 117 S.Ct. 331, 136 L.Ed.2d 244 (1996).

. Lacey, 86 F.3d at 963, n. 5.

. Lacey, 86 F.3d at 965.

. Lacey, 86 F.3d at 963.

. In a more recent unpublished opinion on outrageous government conduct, a panel of the Tenth Circuit discusses evidence on a defendant's predisposition to commit a crime, cites Lacey to note that proof of predisposition to the larger crime is not a part of Tenth Circuit analysis ("even were our analysis to turn on such a distinction''), but cites Staufer as well, suggesting that at least one panel may be factually inclined to consider predisposition. This case had no claim of sentencing entrapment or manipulation. United States v. Sims, 153 F.3d 729 (Table), 1998 WL 380970(10th Cir.1998).

. Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 2229, 65 L.Ed.2d 175 (1980).

. 22 0.$.2001, § 926.

. 22 0.$.2001, § 927 (trial court may fix punishment where none recommended by jury); 22 0.S.2001, § 970 (granting defendant right of al-locution); 22 0.9.2001, § 982a (trial court may modify a sentence by directing imposition of another penalty at any time within twelve months after the sentence is imposed); 22 0.8. 2001, § 982 (to aid in its sentencing determination, a trial court must require a presentence investigation upon conviction of certain violent felonies); 22 0.$.2001, § 973 (where the trial court hears extra evidence in the case of a plea, or determines punishment, the trial court may schedule a hearing on evidence of aggravation or mitigation of punishment.)

. Peterman testified that an ounce of methamphetamine, sold whole, was worth about $1000; a tenth of a gram was worth $20, and an eight-ball (3 1/2 grams, a common amount) was worth $250 or $300. [Trial Tr. I 130, 149, 157, 160-61] Leech's half ounce was worth as much as $2800.

. 63 0.$.2001, § 2-401(B)(2).