Court Opinion

ID: 2961486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 20:43:55.626712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:53.223966
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          September 15, 1992    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]                              _________________________          No. 92-1401                               RADIOCENTRO, INC., ETC.,                                Plaintiff, Appellant,                                          v.                               ALTOS COMPUTER SYSTEMS,                                 Defendant, Appellee.                              _________________________                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO                    [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]                                             ___________________                              _________________________                                        Before                                Selya, Circuit Judge,                                       _____________                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,                                     ____________________                             and Boyle,* District Judge.                                         ______________                              _________________________               Ciro A. Betancourt  and Eduardo A.  Betancourt on brief  for               __________________      ______________________          appellant.               Maggie Correa Aviles, Jaime E. Toro Monserrate and McConnell               ____________________  ________________________     _________          Valdes Kelley Sifre Griggs & Ruiz Suria on brief for appellee.          _______________________________________                              _________________________                              _________________________          _______________          *Chief Judge,  United States District  Court for the  District of          Rhode Island, sitting by designation.                    Per  Curiam.  Suit was started in this case on November                    ___________          27, 1990.  Early  on, the defendant sought basic discovery by way          of interrogatories, Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, and requests for document          production, Fed.  R. Civ. P.  34.  When  the plaintiff failed  to          respond  in  a  timeous  fashion,  defendant  formally  requested          compliance.  See D.P.R. Loc. R. 311.11.  After two such requests,                       ___          plaintiff agreed that it would comply  with the pending discovery          initiatives within a week.  It failed to do so.                    On  July 8,  1991,  still  empty-handed, the  defendant          moved to compel  discovery.  The plaintiff did not respond to the          motion but, at a status conference held  on July 16, 1991, before          a  magistrate-judge,  the plaintiff  offered  to  make amends  by          August  1, 1991.  Again, the plaintiff's promise was honored only          in  the breach.  When  defendant filed another  motion to compel,          the magistrate granted it,  ordering the plaintiff to comply with          the pending  discovery initiatives within five  days (from August          22, 1991)   "or face  the strong possibility of  dismissal."  The          plaintiff's ensuing motion for an extension of time was denied.                      The plaintiff continued to stonewall.  The magistrate's          five-day deadline was ignored.   Accordingly, the defendant moved          to  dismiss the action for plaintiff's failure to comply with the          discovery order.  At  long last, the plaintiff served  answers to          interrogatories.    Shortly  thereafter,   on  October  3,  1991,          plaintiff's counsel  failed to  appear at a  previously scheduled          pretrial  conference.   The  defendant  filed  another motion  to          dismiss, citing plaintiff's disregard  of the discovery order and                                          2          its boycotting of the scheduled status conference.  The plaintiff          opposed   dismissal,   attributing  noncompliance   to  counsel's          personal problems, a scheduling mix-up, and the like.                      On February  5, 1992, the district  judge dismissed the          action.   In  his order,  the judge  pointedly noted  plaintiff's          "unexcusable delays" in furnishing discovery, specifically  found          that plaintiff was guilty  of a "manifest pattern of  delay," and          concluded  that plaintiff  had shown    "total disregard"  of the          applicable rules and timetables.   Following denial of its motion          for reconsideration, plaintiff appealed.                    We need not  tarry.  The district  court's findings are          entirely supportable.  This  was no mere isolated slip.   Rather,          the  record here  is replete with evidence of broken promises and          other  conduct   betokening  a  cavalier  disregard  for  orderly          procedure.  The  plaintiff was  not only late    but  egregiously          late.  Its  recalcitrance persisted  in the face  of the  court's          specific  warning  that   further  delay   might  well   engender          dismissal.  The court's  timetable  for discovery  and trial  was          knocked  into  a  cocked hat.      On  this infelicitous  record,          dismissal was among the sanctions that the district court, in its          discretion, was entitled to employ.1  See National  Hockey League                                                ___________________________          v.  Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.,  427 U.S. 639, 642-43 (1976);              ______________________________                                        ____________________               1Plaintiff contends that  affirming the judgment below  will          result  in  punishing  an  innocent  client  for  its  attorney's          shortcomings.  To some extent,  that is true.  We have,  however,          regularly held that sort of argument to be overridden by the very          nature  of the adversary system.  See, e.g., Damiani, 704 F.2d at                                            ___  ____  _______          16; Corchado, 665 F.2d at 413; see also Link, 370 U.S. at 633-34.              ________                   ___ ____ ____                                          3          Link  v. Wabash  R.R., 370  U.S. 626,  633-35 (1962);  Spiller v.          ____     ____________                                  _______          U.S.V.  Labs.,  Inc., 842  F.2d 535,  537  (1st Cir.  1988); Farm          ____________________                                         ____          Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Fudge,  831 F.2d 18, 20 (1st Cir.  1987);          ____________________    _____          Damiani  v. Rhode Island Hospital,  704 F.2d 12,  15-16 (1st Cir.          _______     _____________________          1983); Corchado v. Puerto Rico Marine Management,  Inc., 665 F.2d                 ________    ____________________________________          410, 413 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).                                    _____ ______                    As  this appeal  presents no  substantial  question, we          need go no further. See 1st Cir. R. 27.1.                              ___          Affirmed.          ________                                          4