Court Opinion

ID: 9398308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 20:00:52.933562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:32.517021
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                        For the First Circuit

Nos. 22-1297, 22-1609

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                              Appellee,

                                 v.

                          PAUL IWUANYANWU,

                        Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

          [Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]

                               Before

                   Gelpí, Lynch, and Thompson,
                         Circuit Judges.

     Christine DeMaso, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for
appellant.
     Alexia R. De Vincentis, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Rachael S. Rollins, United States Attorney, was on brief,
for appellee.

                            May 30, 2023
            GELPÍ,    Circuit    Judge.        Appellant   Paul    Iwuanyanwu

("Iwuanyanwu") participated in two fraud schemes, business email

compromise ("BEC") and online romance, for which he pled guilty to

one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, two counts of wire

fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, one count of

mail fraud, and one count of engaging in monetary transactions in

property    derived   from   specified     unlawful     activity   ("unlawful

monetary transactions").         The district court, considering the

unauthorized use of a third-party identity and the substantial

financial    hardship   caused    to   one   of   the   victims,    sentenced

Iwuanyanwu to thirty months imprisonment, which represented a

downward    variance     from    the      Guidelines     Sentencing    range.

Iwuanyanwu now challenges the district court's imposition of two

Sentencing Guidelines enhancements: (1) the unauthorized use of a

means of identification unlawfully to produce another means of

identification and (2) substantial financial hardship caused to

one of the victims.     For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

            I. Background

            Relevant Facts

            Because this appeal follows a guilty plea, we draw the

facts from the uncontested portions of the Presentence Report

("PSR") and the transcript of the sentencing hearing.                  United

States v. Bishoff, 58 F.4th 18, 20 n.1 (1st Cir. 2023).             First, we

introduce what a business email compromise ("BEC") scheme is; next,

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we outline the conspiracy against specific victims.            Finally, we

review the procedural history of the case before appeal.

           BEC Fraud Scheme

           From April 2017 through March 2019, Iwuanyanwu engaged

in   a   BEC    scheme.   BEC    scams     involve   fraudulent   business

transactions conducted via wire transfer payments.            The fraud is

carried out by compromising and/or "spoofing" legitimate business

email accounts through computer intrusion techniques, such as

phishing, with the goal of inducing employees at a targeted company

to transfer funds without authorization, most often to accounts

controlled by the perpetrators of the scheme.           Here, the spoofed

email addresses looked almost exactly like the email addresses

belonging to the victims.

           Funds Diverted from Russian Company

           On    approximately   May 21,    2018,    Victim   Company 1   (a

custom tube and pipe manufacturer based in Illinois) emailed Victim

Company 3 (a construction company based in Moscow, Russia) an

invoice for $888,274 pursuant to a contract between both.          Because

Victim Company 1's email had at some point been compromised, the

email and attachment were redirected to emails controlled by the

co-conspirators.      One or more co-conspirators then altered the

attached invoice, by adding payment instructions, and subsequently

sent the altered invoice to Victim Company 3 from a spoofed email

account.   The altered invoice instructed Victim Company 3 to wire

                                    - 3 -
payments to a Regions Bank account opened by one of Iwuanyanwu's

co-conspirators.      Prior to the transfer, however, Regions Bank

closed the account.

            As a result of the account's closure, on or about July 6,

2018, Iwuanyanwu opened an account at a Bank of America branch in

Medfield,    Massachusetts     in    the    name    of   Victim   Company 1.

Iwuanyanwu falsely listed himself as the owner of the business,

the sole account holder, and the only authorized signer.                    On

approximately July 9, 2018, one or more of the co-conspirators,

pretending to be Victim Company 1, sent a new invoice to Victim

Company 3 instructing the company to transfer $884,274 to the newly

opened Bank of America account.            A week later, Victim Company 3

wired $884,274 from its bank in Russia to the Bank of America

account    that   Iwuanyanwu   had   recently      opened.   A    day   later,

Iwuanyanwu transferred $95,320 from the Bank of America account to

a Citibank, N.A. account in New York, held by a Nigerian bank.

            Funds Diverted from Pakistani Company

            Later that year, on approximately October 18, 2018, an

individual posing as S.P.1 used a false Florida driver's license

to open a Branch Banking and Trust ("BB&T") account in the name of

S.P. DBA Quantek Renovation ("S.P. DBA" or "S.P. account").                  A

real person, posing as S.P., used S.P.'s actual birth date and

1   Initials are used throughout to protect the victim's identity.

                                      - 4 -
social security number to open the account.              The real S.P. did not

know about or authorize the use of his identity and personal

identifying     information.         From    approximately    November 17    to

November 19, 2018, Iwuanyanwu exchanged WhatsApp messages with a

co-conspirator who identified himself as "More Blessing 1" in the

messaging platform.    They exchanged information about the S.P. DBA

account.

           On   approximately    November 27, 2018, a WhatsApp user

identified    as   "Motorola    1"     notified      Iwuanyanwu   that    Victim

Company 4 (a Pakistani textile company) made a wire transfer to

the S.P. account.     From approximately November 27 to December 5,

2018, the S.P. account received eight international transfers

totaling $164,327.     BB&T closed the account shortly thereafter.

           Attempted Diversion of Funds from Victim Company 6

           On   or   about   July 19,        2018,   a   co-conspirator    sent

Iwuanyanwu a WhatsApp message stating the name of Victim Company 6.

That same day, Iwuanyanwu went to a Santander Bank branch and

opened an account in the name of Victim Company 6, which he

attested to being the owner of.             Although a co-conspirator later

sent a spoofed email to a customer of Victim Company 6 with

instructions on how to remit payment via wire transfer, no funds

were ever wired to said Santander Bank account.

           Online Romance Fraud Scheme

                                        - 5 -
            From around 2016 through January 2020, Iwuanyanwu, and

one or more co-conspirators, conspired to defraud victims that

they encountered on online dating sites by persuading them to send

and/or receive money on their behalf.     Iwuanyanwu, and one or more

co-conspirators, cashed and withdrew funds from the accounts to

which victim funds were sent.

            Victim A

            In connection with this scheme, from March 2018 through

approximately January 2020, Iwuanyanwu persuaded Victim A (who

allegedly was his long-time girlfriend at the time) to open several

bank accounts for him to receive transfers that he claimed were

for a car business.      Victim A opened a Crescent Credit Union

account in her own name and another account at Citizens Bank in

the name of WJ Export.     The latter was used in connection with

Victim B.

            Victim B

            In or about February and March 2019, an individual using

the identity "Sergey Vince" (not Iwuanyanwu or the named co-

conspirator), who was in an online romantic relationship with

Victim B, told Victim B that he was traveling for work and needed

some money because he ran short of funds.       Victim B, a disabled

and unemployed woman, agreed to help him out.          "Sergey" then

provided her the account information for the WJ Export Citizens

Bank account that had been opened by Victim A at Iwuanyanwu's

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direction.      Between February 20, 2019, and March 6, 2019, at

"Sergey's" request, Victim B sent $6,000 via two $3,000 wire

transfers.     Between February 21-22, 2019, Iwuanyanwu made five

separate withdrawals of $600 cash from the account that Victim B

had sent money to.     On or about March 6, 2019, Iwuanyanwu asked

Victim A to accompany him to the bank to withdraw $3,000 from the

account that she had opened for him.        Later that day, Iwuanyanwu

and Victim A went to the bank and withdrew the $3,000.

           Victim C

           Beginning   in   2016,   Victim C   engaged   in   an   online

relationship with an individual (not Iwuanyanwu) who she believed

was in Africa.      Between April and November 2018, Victim C was

fraudulently induced to send funds to various bank accounts in

Ghana and Nigeria, totaling more than $10,000.            On or about

February 28, 2019, Iwuanyanwu deposited into his personal bank

account a money order for $500 that Victim C had sent one of his

co-conspirators the day before.     About a week later, following the

commands of one of Iwuanyanwu's co-conspirators, Victim C sent via

United States mail a $500 money order to Iwuanyanwu's Medfield

address.     Victim C believed she was sending the money to help pay

her online friend's rent.

           Procedural Background

           In April 2019, a grand jury indicted Iwuanyanwu and a

co-conspirator (not a party to this appeal), charging them each

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with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud related to the

BEC scheme, one count of wire fraud, and charging Iwuanyanwu with

one   count     of    engaging      in    an    unlawful       monetary        transaction.

However,      in     July   2020,    the       grand    jury    issued         a   six-count

superseding        indictment       against      Iwuanyanwu       charging         him    with

conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349;

two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343;

conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349;

mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; and unlawful monetary

transactions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.                            On October 27,

2021, Iwuanyanwu pled guilty to all six counts of the superseding

indictment.

              The     parties    and      the    Probation      Office         agreed     that

Iwuanyanwu's criminal history category was I, his base offense

level was seven, a fourteen-point enhancement applied because of

the loss amount, and a three-point deduction applied for acceptance

of responsibility.          The PSR added a two-point enhancement pursuant

to    U.S.S.G.        § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii)             because       Iwuanyanwu          used

fraudulent         certificates      of    incorporation         to       open     the    bank

accounts.       He objected.        In response to Iwuanyanwu's objection to

the § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii) enhancement, the Amended PSR instead

applied    an      enhancement      for    unauthorized         use       of   a   means    of

identification        on    subsection      (C)(i)      because       a    member    of    the

conspiracy used S.P.'s identity to open a bank account.                                    The

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Amended PSR also added a two-point enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(iii) based on the substantial financial hardship

Victim B endured.    Iwuanyanwu objected to both enhancements in his

sentencing memorandum.

            At the sentencing hearing, the district court adopted

the Amended PSR's Guideline calculation, overruling Iwuanyanwu's

objections to both enhancements.        The applicable sentencing range

was forty-one to fifty-one months.         The district court, however,

sentenced him, by way of a downward variance, to thirty months

imprisonment,    followed   by   two    years   of   supervised   release.

Iwaunyanwu timely appealed.

            II. Standard of Review

            We review preserved challenges to the district court's

application of Sentencing Guidelines enhancements for abuse of

discretion.     United States v. Ilarraza, 963 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.

2020).     However, this standard is not "monolithic."        Id.    Thus,

"our review . . . consists of 'clear error review [of] factual

findings, de novo review [of] interpretations and applications of

the [G]uidelines, and abuse of discretion review [of] judgment

calls.'"    United States v. Kitts, 27 F.4th 777, 789 (1st Cir. 2022)

(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 870

F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2017)).

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            III. Discussion

            Enhancement     for       Unauthorized     Use       of    Means   of

Identification

            Iwuanyanwu challenges the district court's application

of a two-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(C)(i)

related to the use of S.P.'s identity.            He asserts that it was not

foreseeable to him that the conspiracy would use the identity of

a third party     (S.P.'s name, birth date, and social security

number), who was not involved in the scheme, to fraudulently open

a bank account.       He further contends that the government did not

prove that he knew or should have known that the bank account was

not opened by S.P.

            The enhancement at issue here provides for a two-point

increase for "the unauthorized transfer or use of any means of

identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of

identification[.]"          U.S.S.G.       § 2B1.1(b)(11)(C)(i).               The

Guidelines' commentary clarifies that it "applies in a case in

which a means of identification of an individual other than the

defendant   (or   a    person   for    whose     conduct   the    defendant    is

accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)) is used without that

individual's authorization unlawfully to produce or obtain another

means of identification."         Id. cmt. n.10(C)(i).                A means of

identification, such as a name, social security number, date of

birth, or any other personal identification number, see 18 U.S.C.

                                        - 10 -
§ 1028(d)(7),      "shall      be    of   an    actual   (i.e.,      not   fictitious)

individual, other than the defendant," U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1.

For   example,     a   defendant      who      obtains    a   bank    loan    using   an

individual's personal information, such as that listed above, is

eligible     for       this    enhancement.              U.S.S.G.      § 2B1.1       cmt.

n.10(C)(ii)(I).

             Although individual conduct can trigger the enhancement,

in the case of joint criminal activity -- such as the conspiracy

here -- the enhancement may apply based on a co-conspirator's

actions if said actions "were (i) within the scope of the jointly

undertaken     criminal       activity,        (ii) in    furtherance        of   [said]

activity, and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that

criminal activity."           U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).             In other words,

Iwuanyanwu is "not automatically saddled with the full weight of

the conspiracy's wrongdoing[,]" but we will find him responsible

if his co-conspirators' acts "were reasonably foreseeable by him

so long as those acts were committed" in furtherance of the

conspiracy and within its scope.                United States v. Soto-Villar, 40

F.4th 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Sepulveda,

15 F.3d 1161, 1197 (1st Cir. 1993)). The government must establish

by    a   preponderance       that    the      unauthorized     use    of    means    of

identification was reasonably foreseeable to Iwuanyanwu.                          Cf. id.

We now turn to the issue before us.

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           "Whether   the    conduct    was     reasonably    foreseeable        to

[Iwuanyanwu] is a fact-bound determination that we review for clear

error."    United States v. Sandoval, 6 F.4th 63, 106 (1st Cir.

2021).    Here, the district court found that, based on the record

and what was said at the sentencing hearing, the misuse was

reasonably foreseeable to Iwuanyanwu.             Thus, we will only find

clear error if "on the whole of the record, we form a strong,

unyielding belief that a mistake has been made."             United States v.

Teixeira, 62 F.4th 10, 24 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States

v. Franklin, 51 F.4th 391, 399 (1st Cir. 2022)).

           Before us, Iwuanyanwu argues that he could not have

foreseen that a co-conspirator would have fraudulently used S.P.'s

identity to open an account in S.P.'s name because he "had limited

involvement in the conspiracy" and the scheme's modus operandi was

that   conspirators   would   open     bank     accounts    "with      their   own

identities."     Moreover,    Iwuanyanwu      asserts      that   he    played   a

"middleman role" in the scheme.         We are unpersuaded.            The record

establishes that Iwuanyanwu was not a passive spectator in the

conspiracy.    He knew the scheme inside and out.

           For instance, in a WhatsApp exchange with Motorola 1

regarding the delay in the withdrawal of money from the S.P.

account, Iwuanyanwu expressed that in this kind of "business[,]

sometimes things like this happen."           He expressed confidence that

the money was going to be withdrawn soon and advised Motorola 1 to

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"relax," "be positive," and not worry.       The reasonable import of

Iwuanyanwu's statements is that he is well-versed in the ups and

downs of BEC schemes.        Moreover, we must not overlook the fact

that Iwuanyanwu coordinated with "specialists" in schemes like the

one here, who drove fifteen hours to withdraw money from the S.P.

account.2    Said level of coordination belies his assertion that he

had a limited role or was merely a middleman.

            Additionally, although he opened two bank accounts using

his own name, he did so by falsely listing himself as the owner,

the sole account holder, and the only authorized signer of Victim

Company 1 and Victim Company 6 respectively.        Moreover, he used

fraudulent    certificates    of   incorporation   to   open   the   bank

accounts. Iwuanyanwu had no affiliation with either company. Even

assuming arguendo that Iwuanyanwu was not one of the main players

in the scheme, his use of fraudulent corporate documents to open

bank accounts    used to     perpetrate the fraud is sufficient to

establish that it was reasonably foreseeable to him that the

conspiracy could use false identities when opening additional bank

accounts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

2It is unclear from the record who the so-called "specialists"
were and what their expertise was. However, from the conversation
between Iwuanyanwu and Motorola 1, we infer that the "specialists"
were individuals accustomed to withdrawing large amounts of cash
from fraudulent bank accounts that were part of BEC schemes.

                                    - 13 -
          Lastly, Iwuanyanwu relies on a Fifth Circuit case to

argue that the misuse of a means of identification enhancement was

improperly applied.     Our reading of that case leads us to the

opposite conclusion.    In United States v. Jones, the Fifth Circuit

held that the district court correctly applied the misuse of a

means of identification enhancement, such as here, because Jones,

who acted as a runner in a fraudulent check cashing scheme, could

reasonably foresee that the photograph that she provided would be

used by the scheme operators to create a false identification card

containing her photograph but someone else's personal information.

533   F. App'x   448,      459-60     (5th    Cir.   2013)    (per     curiam)

(unpublished).     As to the six-point enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(C)    (for     an     offense     resulting    in    substantial

financial hardship to twenty-five or more victims), the Fifth

Circuit determined that the district court erred in applying said

enhancement because Jones could not have foreseen that the scheme

operators were getting personal information by stealing mail from

collection boxes.    Id. at 454-55.

          Iwuanyanwu posits that, similar to Jones, he had a

limited role in a larger conspiracy.          He claims that he was unaware

of the other methods used by the scheme to open bank accounts, and

thus, the enhancement is inapplicable.           The district court did not

err in rejecting this argument.         Iwuanyanwu was actively involved

in the discussions regarding the S.P. account.                    He exchanged

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messages via WhatsApp with Motorola 1 and More Blessing when

someone   who     pretended    to    be        S.P. -- possibly    another       co-

conspirator -- called BB&T to inquire about the account given that

there was trouble withdrawing money from it.              Likewise, Iwuanyanwu

would like us to accept that he believed S.P. had opened the bank

account himself "even though []Iwuanyanwu and his co-conspirators

were using the account without S.P.'s knowledge and for nefarious

purposes."    Again, such a contention defies reason given that S.P.

would have noticed unknown transactions involving large sums of

money, coming from international banks, and would have likely

flagged   this    activity    to    his    bank.      Certainly,       someone    in

Iwuanyanwu's position would have thought that a co-conspirator had

fraudulently opened the account in S.P.'s name or that S.P. was

himself   a     co-conspirator      or     someone     participating      in     the

conspiracy.      Furthermore, as discussed supra, Iwuanyanwu himself

used   fraudulent    certificates         of    incorporation     to   open    bank

accounts, undercutting his argument that the use of fraudulent

identifying      documents    to    open       accounts   was   not    reasonably

foreseeable.     Last, but not least, Iwuanyanwu fails to explain why

misusing corporate documents is different from misusing personal

identification information.

           The evidence establishes by a preponderance that it was

reasonably foreseeable to Iwuanyanwu that                 his co-conspirators

could open a bank account using a fraudulent name to further the

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scheme. Given that the district court's "conclusions were properly

rooted in the evidence and its inferences founded in logical

reasoning," Sandoval, 6 F.4th at 106 (quoting United States v.

Hernández, 218 F.3d 58, 71 (1st Cir. 2000)), the district court

did not clearly err in applying the two-point enhancement.

           Enhancement for Substantial Financial Hardship

           Iwuanyanwu also objects to the two-point enhancement for

causing Victim B substantial financial hardship.             The conspiracy

obtained in a one-month period approximately $6,000 from Victim B,

who is disabled, unable to work, and lives with a fixed income of

$1,000 per month.      The Amended PSR notes that Victim B "received

a limited income" and that the amount wired to Iwuanyanwu "was

equal to almost six months of income."          As a result, Victim B had

to take out personal loans shortly thereafter to pay her medical

expenses because she had sent to the conspirators all the money

that she had available at the time.

           The     Sentencing    Guidelines    provide     for   a   two-point

enhancement when the offense "resulted in substantial financial

hardship to one or more victims."          U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(iii).

The   commentary    thereto     provides    that,   when   considering   said

enhancement, the district court

           shall consider, among other factors, whether
           the offense resulted in the victim[:]

           (i) becoming insolvent;

                                      - 16 -
           (ii) filing for bankruptcy . . .;

           (iii) suffering  substantial  loss   of  a
           retirement, education, or other savings or
           investment fund;

           (iv) making substantial changes to his or her
           employment, such as postponing his or her
           retirement plans;

           (v) making substantial changes to his or her
           living arrangements, such as relocating to a
           less expensive home; and

           (vi) suffering substantial harm to his or her
           ability to obtain credit.

Id. cmt. n.4(F).     We are mindful that our inquiry must "focus on

the    victim['s]   individual   circumstances,"    "plac[ing]     greater

emphasis on the     extent of harm     that [a] particular       victim[]

suffer[s]."    United States v. George, 949 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th

Cir.   2020)   (quoting   Sentencing   Guidelines   for   Unites   States

Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 25,782-01, 25,791 (May 5, 2015)).        We review

the factual findings underlying the sentencing enhancement for

clear error.    See Kitts, 27 F.4th at 789.

           Iwuanyanwu challenges the finding that Victim B suffered

substantial financial hardship because the loans, which were used

to pay medical expenses that Victim B incurred, were taken out

after the wire transfers.     The record supports a finding that the

loans were a direct consequence of the scheme because, if Victim

B had not been induced to send the wire transfers, she would have

had the means to cover her medical bills.           Her loss of savings

                                   - 17 -
"inescapably constitutes substantial financial hardship within the

ambit of the [G]uidelines."      Id. at 790.

            Next,   Iwuanyanwu   contends      that    the   money    Victim   B

transferred   was   some    "extra"   money     that   she   had     available.

However, the record plainly shows how little "extra" money Victim

B   had   after   meeting   life's    basic    necessities.          Few   other

substantial life changes could have occurred as a result of her

loss because she could not work and already resided with her

daughter.   Lastly, Iwuanyanwu argues that Victim B visited a local

casino frequently, refuting her financial hardship claim.                      We

reject this argument given that the repeat nature of her visits to

the casino appears to be incentivized by vouchers sent by the

casino,   which were    valid only for         specific periods       of time.

Because we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in

finding that Victim B suffered substantial financial hardship, we

find no abuse of discretion in the district court's application of

said sentencing enhancement.

            Affirmed.

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