Court Opinion

ID: 9662148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:00:33.47562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:37.153833
License: Public Domain

KAROHL, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because defendant’s “defaults” in discovery occurred during a time: (1) the court was proceeding without the presence of a necessary party; and, (2) that jurisdictional defect was noticed to the court by defendant’s motion to dismiss filed long BEFORE any discovery failure occurred. As a matter of law, the trial court entered sanction orders against defendant in a case where, and at a time when, it had not acquired jurisdiction.
I also dissent because the addition of a necessary-party plaintiff after defendant was sanctioned and defaulted denies defendant a guaranteed right to defend against claims and prosecute claims against the “plaintiff’ who was not in the case before or when the judge sanctioned defendant. The trial court order to add a necessary party under the facts was not a matter of discretion reviewable for abuse. It was error as a matter of law.
Defendant’s conduct leading to extreme sanctions, stinking the answer, and granting a default was absolutely and entirely blameworthy. If the court had considered defendant’s motion to dismiss, waited for the missing necessary party to join in the petition, and found defendant’s discovery defaults and unprofessional conduct occurred THEREAFTER, the sanctions and judgment by default would have been fully warranted. But that is not what happened.
The case proceeded as follows:
January 23, 1992 — petition filed;
March 3, 1992 — defendant’s motion to dismiss;
April 20, 1992 — motion for sanctions and to strike defendant’s pleadings;
October 26, 1992 — motion to substitute parties;
January 20, 1993 — second motion for sanctions and to strike defendant’s pleadings;
January 27, 1993 — order for sanctions and to strike defendant’s pleadings entered;
November 22, 1993 — defendant’s motion to set aside judgment and to dismiss; and
November 29, 1993 — trial court entered order to substitute parties, added the missing plaintiff and denied the motion to set aside judgment.
The problem is the court had no jurisdiction until November 29, 1993. All partners are necessary-parties plaintiff in an action to enforce an obligation due the partnership. Allgeier, Martin and Associates v. Ashmore, 508 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Mo.App.1974). The absence of a necessary party is fundamental and jurisdictional. Vitale v. City of Kansas City, 701 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Mo.App.1985).
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a necessary-party plaintiff within six weeks of the filing of the petition. Plaintiffs and the court were on actual notice from the motion of the defect even before any discovery efforts were begun. Thus, any concerns for preventing “sandbagging” are wholly inapplicable. The defect and the cure was always within the knowledge and discretion of plaintiffs. Only three of four partners filed suit. All that was required before discovery began was to add their fourth partner as a party. The missing plaintiff was a necessary party. Allgeier, Martin and Associates, 508 S.W.2d at 525, citing Wittels v. Dubinsky, 343 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Mo.App.1961). No discovery was necessary to identify a missing necessary party; it was a known missing, not an unknown or unidentified *86missing plaintiff that deprived the court of jurisdiction. No objection to addition of the missing plaintiff was required. The timely motion contesting jurisdiction preserved the issue.
The division opinion says, “An earlier substitution [adding the missing partner as a plaintiff] would have in no way affected the course of the litigation.” Where sanctions were imposed against defendant before a necessary party plaintiff was “substituted,” it cannot be said that sanctions would or would not have been involved if the court had acquired jurisdiction before the discovery violations occurred. Defendant did not comply with discovery requests. At the time of defendant’s misconduct, the court did not have jurisdiction over the cause. The original plaintiffs were solely at fault for the absence of jurisdiction. What may have occurred after plaintiffs cured the jurisdictional defect cannot be known. What is certain, defendant did not breach any duty relating to discovery conduct at any time the court had jurisdiction over the cause of action. The analysis of trial court error must focus on the file at the time the court entered the order striking defendant’s pleadings, not at the time the required missing partner was added to give the court jurisdiction to enter a valid judgment. It is fundamentally unfair to “kill” defendant’s defense and counterclaim to the benefit of a partner who was not before the court, the missing plaintiff.
The appropriate remedy is to remand and begin anew with the addition of the necessary party, allow time for an answer and counterclaim, if any, and proceed with the lawsuit. The prior defaults are part of the record and available as support for severe sanctions in the event of any future improper conduct by defendant. They are to be neither excused, or forgotten. But entry of a sanction order by a court whose jurisdiction was properly contested is not sustainable, even if an appellate court would prefer to affirm.