Court Opinion

ID: 9900190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:01:52.442127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:01.646792
License: Public Domain

ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS
 Appeals of -                                 )
                                              )
 Amatea/Grimberg JV                           )    ASBCA Nos. 60426, 60427, 60428
                                              )               60689, 60690, 60691
                                              )               61252, 61402, 61715
                                              )
 Under Contract No. N40080-09-C-0171          )

 APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT:                    Stephen H. Swart, Esq.
                                                   Arnie B. Mason, Esq.
                                                   Melisa A. Roy, Esq.
                                                    Williams Mullen
                                                    Tysons Corner, VA

 APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT:                   Craig D. Jensen, Esq.
                                                    Navy Chief Trial Attorney
                                                   Joshua S. Kauke, Esq.
                                                    Trial Attorney

                 OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE PROUTY

        These nine appeals, brought pursuant to Board Rule 11, stem from disputes
over the performance of a design/build construction contract (the contract) to erect a
laboratory building for the Engineering Directorate of the Naval Surface Warfare
Center located at Indian Head, Maryland. Many things went wrong during the
pendency of the project, beginning with poor site conditions that required remediation,
and including disputes over the partial re-design of the fire sprinkler system and who
was responsible for the installation of an electronic security system. Appellant, the
Amatea/Grimberg Joint Venture (AGJV or the joint venture) maintains that
respondent, the United States Navy (the Navy), only made things worse by the
contentious manner in which it administered the contract: unreasonably refusing to
allow AGJV to work on nights and weekends and wrongfully refusing to extend the
project completion date, therefore requiring AGJV to incur the additional expenses
that followed from accelerating its work. The joint venture also argues that the
Navy’s imposition of liquidated damages for the late completion of the project was
unjust, given the Navy’s supposed responsibility for the delays and the Navy’s use of
an unreasonable beneficial occupancy date.

        As will be explained below, the Navy largely—but not completely—prevails
here. The conditions at the site, though an absolute mess after AGJV began working
on it, were not inconsistent with what could have been anticipated from the
information provided by the Navy with the solicitation and were somewhat
AGJV’s fault. Moreover, the contracting officer’s (CO’s) decision not to afford
AGJV the opportunity for night and weekend work was not a breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing as the Navy had sufficient reasons to deny the request to
make its exercise of discretion reasonable. On the other hand, the Navy does owe
AGJV additional money for the fire sprinkler system (not as much as AGJV claims)
and for the electronic security system which was required by the contract but was not
completely paid for by the Navy. Additionally, the Navy should have found the
building ready for beneficial occupancy at an earlier date than it did, which leads to
lower liquidated damages due the government. Finally, we find the acceleration
claims to be unsupported.

                                 FINDINGS OF FACT

       I. The Contract

        The contract to erect the laboratory building that is the subject of this dispute
(the lab building) was a design/build contract that was awarded as a competitive small
business set-aside. The procurement was done in two phases: in the first phase, the
Navy basically selected a small number of contractors that (based on the solicitation
criteria) were suited to perform the work. In the second phase, those contractors
selected in the first phase responded to the solicitation for the project and were judged
upon that response. (See generally, R4, tab 1) AGJV was one of the three teams that
were selected by the first phase of the procurement and were invited to participate in
the second phase by responding to the solicitation (R4, tab 3 at GOV 35). 1

        On July 10, 2009, the government issued the request for proposals (RFP)
(R4, tab 3 at GOV 32) 2. The RFP included various contract line items, and provided
that the work to be performed under each line item was delineated in the

1
  The government has placed Bates numbers at the bottom of the pages of its Rule 4
       file, beginning with the descriptor “GOV_ORIG_R4_” after which follows a
       seven-digit number, beginning with zeroes. For greater ease of use, we replace
       this with “GOV ___” in which the seven-digit number is replaced by only the
       digits actually used. Thus, for example, we replace GOV ORIG-R4 0000005
       with GOV 5. We similarly curtail appellant’s Bates numbers to “APP __”
       followed by only the digits actually used.
2
  The solicitation is at tab 3 of the Rule 4 file, while the executed contract, which
       incorporates some portions of the solicitation (as noted below), is at tab 24.
       Throughout the remainder of this opinion, we generally cite the solicitation
       document at tab 24, since that is associated with the executed contract.

                                            2
RFP’s technical specifications and drawings, which were organized into “parts” (id.
at GOV 37-38; R4, tabs 4-9).

        On September 30, 2009, AGJV was awarded the contract to build the lab
building along with several related line items from the solicitation. The contract was
in the amount of $10,574,419, with a contract completion date of March 31, 2011. (R4,
tab 24 at GOV 1153) Of relevance here, the contract incorporated the RFP’s Price
Schedule and the specifications and drawings (R4, tab 24 at GOV 1155). 3

        The contract included the standard liquidated damages clause found in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) at section 52.211-12 Liquidated Damages –
Construction (SEP 2000), which, modified to insert a specific dollar figure, provided
in part that: “[i]f the Contractor fails to complete the work within the time specified
by the contract, the Contractor shall pay liquidated damages to the government in the
amount of $5,250 for each calendar day of delay until the work is completed or
accepted” (R4, tab 24 at GOV 1190).

       II. Early Contract Extensions

       On May 3, 2010, the parties agreed to add a number of enhancements to the
building to increase its energy efficiency. By bilateral 4 contract Modification
No. A00001 (Mod 1), AGJV agreed to make the various energy efficiency
enhancements to the building for an additional $1,040,783 (raising the contract price to
$11,615,202) and a 90-day extension to the contract completion date, which would
now be June 29, 2011. (R4, tab 26 at GOV 1218) This modification was followed
within a few days by Modification No. A00003 (Mod 3). Mod 3 was another bilateral 5
contract modification. This one, extending the time for performance by 224 days, until
February 8, 2012, in recognition of delays in the FY09 Demolition and Footprint
Reduction Program which would have affected the construction site. This was a

3
  Although these portions of the RFP were incorporated into the contract, the parties,
       throughout performance and during this litigation, generally continued to refer
       to them as RFP provisions, not contract provisions. For consistency, we adopt
       the parties’ terminology.
4
  The copy of Mod 1 in the government-provided Rule 4 file is signed by the
       government, but not by AGJV (see R4, tab 26). Since AGJV does not raise an
       argument over this, we will presume that it was, in fact, a bilateral modification
       and that the Navy was either sloppy in obtaining AGJV’s signature after
       forwarding the modification to AGJV or in its records-keeping. This is an
       all-too-common problem. See, e.g., Metro Machine d/b/a General Dynamics
       NASSCO-Norfolk, ASBCA No. 62221, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,096 at 185,002 n.5.
5
  Yet again, with only the government’s signature present (see R4, tab 28 at GOV 1225).

                                           3
no-cost modification, with the contract price remaining at $11,617,761. 6 (R4, tab 28
at GOV 1225)

       AGJV characterizes these as “significant delays” for which the Navy admitted
responsibility (app. br. at 2-3). This is true to the extent that the extension of the
contract completion date by more than 10 months was certainly significant and also a
matter of the Navy’s responsibility. On the other hand, to the extent that it implies
AGJV was not made whole by the extra time granted by the Navy in the two
modifications, it is mistaken, since that was the point of the two negotiated
modifications in question—both of which characterized themselves as acting as an
“accord and satisfaction” for the extra time required (R4, tab 26 at GOV 1218, 28
at GOV 1226).

       III. A Differing Site Condition?

        Appeal No. 61252 is about an alleged differing site condition: to use a
descriptive, but far from technical, term, the site turned into a muddy mess during the
rains that occurred after the site was cleared, and the soil was too weak to support the
construction in some areas. Muddy fields may, to the casual observer, seem to be the
kind of thing one would expect to follow heavy rains, but AGJV asserts that the soil
was of a character that was far worse than should have been anticipated based on the
government’s description of it, leading to far greater time and expense to remedy than
should have been expected.

       A. Relevant Contract Documents

          1. Contract Provisions Governing the Site and its Investigation

        As would be expected, the contract included the standard differing site
conditions clause prescribed by the FAR 52.236-2, DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS
(APR 1984), which it incorporated by reference (see R4, tab 24 at GOV 1188). The
solicitation also included the site visit requirement associated with the differing site
conditions clause in both, FAR 52.236-27, SITE VISIT (CONSTRUCTION)
(FEB 1995), which was included verbatim in the document (id. at GOV 1168), and a
similar provision, FAR 52.236-3, SITE INVESTIGATION AND CONDITIONS
AFFECTING THE WORK (APR 1984), acknowledging that the contractor had
investigated the site and was satisfied that it understood the conditions that would
affect the work, which was incorporated by reference (id. at GOV 1188). 7 The site
visit provision specified that a site visit would be scheduled and included as an

6
  Contract Modification No. A00002 previously increased the contract price by $2,559
       to pay for the removal of asbestos pipes (R4, tab 27 at GOV 1222).
7
  The two provisions are not contradictory and serve slightly different purposes.

                                            4
amendment to the solicitation (id. at GOV 1168), which, in fact, happened (R4, tab 10)
and was attended by Larry Zimmerman on behalf of John Grimberg Company
(Grimberg) (R4, tab 12 at GOV 1037). 8

       Two parts of the RFP discussed the subsurface data (primarily in the guise of
boring logs and what the respective party’s responsibilities were. It would be fair to
say that, in general, the Navy sought to avoid making too many promises about what
would be encountered. In Part 3 of the RFP, Section G10 on site preparation, the
Navy wrote that:

                A Geotechnical exploration has been performed at the site,
                and the data obtained is presented in a Geotechnical Data
                Report included in this RFP. The subsurface data and
                information presented in the report are only for the
                Contractor’s information and are not guaranteed to fully
                represent all subsurface conditions. The Government
                shall not be responsible for any interpretation or
                conclusion by the Contractor drawn from the data or
                information.

                The Geotechnical Data Report included with this RFP is
                provided only to better convey data (boring logs, testing,
                etc) or to document observed site conditions.
                Requirements stated in Part Three and Part Four of this
                RFP take precedence over any content included in the
                Geotechnical Data Report.

                The Contractor is required to retain a geotechnical
                engineer experienced and licensed in the geographic region
                of the project to interpret the provided data as related to his
                design concept and develop requirements for bidding.
                Additional requirements for the geotechnical design of this
                project are provided elsewhere in this RFP.

                Minor variations between borings should be anticipated.
                The Contractor shall bear all costs associated with the site
                preparation and actual foundation except as allowed by the

8
    The government notes in its proposed findings of fact that neither the joint venture,
         nor its subcontractors attended the site visit; rather, only Mr. Zimmerman came
         on behalf of Grimberg (gov’t br. at 35). Since the joint venture is comprised of
         employees of its constituent companies, this strikes us as an insignificant
         quibble.

                                              5
             Contract Clause FAR 52.236-2, “Differing Site
             Conditions”. The Contractor’s Geotechnical Engineer
             shall perform additional subsurface investigation as
             required to adequately determine all applicable
             geotechnical factors including the type and capacity of the
             project foundation(s). The Contractor’s Geotechnical
             Engineer shall consider the provided information and any
             additional information obtained and prepare a report as
             described in other portions of this RFP.

(R4, tab 5 at GOV 450)

       In Part 4 of the RFP, Section A10, Foundations, the General section provides in
relevant part:

             Government Provided Subsurface Information

             Subsurface data and information is only for the
             Contractor’s information and is not guaranteed to fully
             represent all subsurface conditions. The Government shall
             not be responsible for any interpretation or conclusion by
             the Contractor drawn from the data or information. See
             Geotechnical Report located in Part Six.

             The assumptions, analysis, and recommendations of the
             accompanying “data geotechnical” report were developed
             for preliminary planning purposes only and may not be
             based upon present project requirements. Requirements
             stated in Parts 3 and 4 of the RFP take precedence over any
             content of any included “data geotechnical” report.

             The Contractor shall commission the services of a
             geotechnical engineer registered as a Professional Engineer
             and experienced with the soils in the Geographic region of
             the project.

             The Design Build Contractor’s Geotechnical Engineer
             shall perform subsurface investigations and laboratory
             testing and submit a soils report of the soil present on the
             project site.

(R4, tab 6 at GOV 475)

                                           6
          2. The Government-Provided Boring Logs

       As alluded to in the contract sections above, Part 6 of the RFP included boring
logs created by Dewberry & Davis, LLC, a firm that the government contracted to
perform the geotechnical investigation (R4, tab 8 at GOV 853-942). Interestingly
enough, the laboratory testing associated with this work was performed by ECS
Mid-Atlantic, LLC (see id. at GOV 913)—the same company that (we shall see in the
next section) AGJV would later hire as its geotechnical engineer. There were
12 boreholes in the planned location of the building and five in the planned location of
the parking lot and access roadway areas (R4, tab 156 at GOV 28903-04, 29010).

        We will spare the reader a borehole-by-borehole description of what was found,
but we have reviewed them and find them consistent with the general description
provided by the Navy’s geotechnical engineering expert, Mr. Karl Hren, P.E., which is
that the near surface soils were clays and fine-grained silts (Hren decl., ¶¶ 7, 13-15).
More specifically, the top four feet were all fine-grained, CL, ML, or CH soil types (id.
¶ 15; R4, tab 8 at GOV 858). 9 The CL soils, which were the most common type of soil
characterized in the boring logs (see R4, tab 8 at GOV 858), are known as “lean clays”
(see R4, tab 8 at GOV 868)—a fact that will have some salience much later in this
opinion.

         According to Mr. Hren (and consistent with our review of the boring logs in the
RFP (see R4, tab 8 at GOV 871-905)), in the upper two feet of the soil samples, the
“blow count” was consistent with soil that was, for the most part, “soft” to “medium
stiff” 10 (Hren decl. ¶¶ 12-13). No evidence has been presented by AGJV that
contradicts the accuracy of this characterization. Moreover, no evidence has been
presented that there was anything wrong or flawed about the Dewberry & Davis
reports or the methodology that they used.

       B. AGJV’s Geotechnical Reports

      As required by the contract, AGJV retained its own geotechnical expert prior to
beginning its excavation work: ECS Mid-Atlantic, LLC (ECS). ECS provided a

9
  Mr. Hren states that all were CL, ML, or CH in the first four feet, but we note that,
       for borehole B-10, the sample between two-and-a-half feet and four feet depth
       was MH (see R4, tab 8 at GOV 858). MH is a fine-grained silt that sits
       between CL and CH on the “Uniform Soil Classification System” chart that
       accompanied the boring log report in the RFP (see R4, tab 8 at GOV 868).
       Thus, the slight misstatement is of trivial import.
10
   The consistency of silt and clay soil is described in a spectrum, with the grades
       running from “very soft” to “soft” to “medium stiff (firm)” to “stiff” to “very
       stiff” and then “hard” and, finally, “very hard” (see R4, tab 8 at GOV 870).

                                           7
preliminary report to AGJV on August 6, 2009 (Hren decl. attach.) and a more
comprehensive one on March 12, 2010 as revised on August 20, 2010 (R4, tab 156).
The later report relied on the government-provided boring logs from
Dewberry & Davis for much of its conclusions, though ECS had considered its
knowledge of the region and also run two seismic lines and conducted three shallow
“hand auger” borings of its own upon which it performed laboratory work (R4, tab 156
at GOV 28899, GOV 28903-07). A map of the boring locations included in the ECS
report shows that ECS’s three hand-augered sites were generally in the area in which
the parking lot would be built (id. at GOV 29010). In multiple locations, the report
qualified that its conclusions were based, in part, upon the Dewberry & Davis boring
data for which it did not vouch since it was not involved in collecting it (see, e.g., R4,
tab 156 at GOV 28904 (“we cannot be responsible for the completeness and accuracy
of [this] information”), GOV 28911, GOV 28921)).

        In general, the report described the data as to be consistent with what would be
expected in the site’s geographic location (R4, tab 156 at GOV 28909). The report
also included numerous warnings about the potential for soft soil conditions 11 and
pro-active steps that AGJV would need to take to ensure that the soils were not made
unsuitable. The list of steps was long and included: the use of a smooth-drum roller at the
end of every workday to seal the fill or subgrade material to prevent infiltration of
moisture (id. at GOV 28912, 28921); keeping “[t]he surface of the site . . . properly graded
in order to enhance drainage of the surface water away from the proposed construction
areas during the earthwork phase” (id. at GOV 28920-21); after the final subgrade
elevation was established during grading, “protect[ing the surface] with the required
thickness of compacted graded aggregate to reduce erosion potential and loss of subgrade
strength” (id. at GOV 28921); making it the “earthwork contractor’s responsibility to
maintain the site soils within a workable moisture content range to obtain the required
in-place density and maintain a stable subgrade . . . [including] [s]carifying and drying
operations” as a matter of course and not an extra (id.); and, finally, “that construction
equipment cannot be permitted to randomly run across the site, especially once the desired
final grades have been established. Construction equipment should be limited to
designated lanes and areas, especially during wet periods, to help minimize disturbance of
the site subgrades.” (Id.)

        In short, ECS identified many things that could go wrong to make the soils
at the site unsuitable and recommended several actions to prevent this.

11
     As a matter of course, the report noted that the cleared and graded area should be
         subject to a “proofrolling” and other “special efforts” to identify localized areas
         of soft or unsuitable soils, which should be removed (R4, tab 156
         at GOV 28911). This indicates to us that, given the conditions reflected in the
         government’s data, such localized unsuitable areas were to be expected.

                                               8
       C. What Happened During Contract Performance?

          1. At the Building Pad

        “Clearing and grubbing” (removing vegetation) at the building site began on
March 17, 2011 (Bricker rebuttal decl. ¶ 24; R4, tab 289 at GOV 29765). After that
work was accomplished, AGJV’s earthworks contractor began preparing the area of
the building pad for the foundation. In general terms, AGJV planned to strip off the
first two feet of soil (the soil that had been characterized as soft to firm) and place an
amount of “fill” on top of the remaining soil, which AGJV expected to be very firm, as
reflected in the boring logs (Graham rebuttal decl. ¶ 14). To ensure that the soil was,
in fact, firm enough to support the foundation, AGJV’s contractor performed a
“proofing” or “proof rolling” test 12 on May 9, 2011 (Hurt rebuttal decl. ¶ 6). The soil
failed that test (id.; app. supp. R4, tab 78 at APP 638). Photos and undisputed
testimony provided by AGJV show that the earth was, in fact, a wet mess and anything
but firm (see Hurt rebuttal decl. ¶ 11; app. supp. R4, tab 140). An ECS employee on
site was able to insert a metal rod approximately 18 inches into the soil with ease (app.
supp. R4, tab 141 at APP 2578). Mr. Robert Hurt (AGJV’s project superintendent on
the site) reported in a contemporaneous email that about half the soil at the building
pad location needed to be excavated an additional one or two feet and replaced with
fill (app. supp. R4, tab 140 at APP 2566).

        The government, through Mr. Karl Hren’s declaration, alleges that there was a
reason for that: AGJV did little to protect the excavated area from the elements 13
(see Hren decl. ¶ 20). In rebuttal, Mr. Craig Bricker, who was AGJV’s quality control
manager for much of the project, alleges that, actually, AGJV’s subcontractor did
perform grading of the site to promote proper drainage (see Bricker rebuttal decl.
¶ 27). A problem, however, with Mr. Bricker’s observations is that he was assigned to
a different project from March 22, 2011 to July 8, 2011 (see Bricker rebuttal decl. ¶ 3),
which means that his discussions about matters at this time are not based on first-hand
knowledge. Mr. Hurt testified in his declaration that, although he could not “recall all
of the specific details of the construction of the Project on a daily basis,” he did recall

12
   A “proofing” or “proof rolling” test involves rolling a loaded piece of equipment
       over the soil to identify unsuitable or unstable soils (see R4, tab 156
       at GOV 28911).
13
   The government also provides the declaration of Mr. Joshua Wustner, the
       Navy’s on-site engineering technician, who provided his first-hand observations
       of drainage and other issues at the site (see Wustner decl. passim). But
       Mr. Wustner, as AGJV points out, was not assigned to work on the project until
       December 2011 (see id. ¶ 1), hence his observations would not be pertinent to
       the spring and summer of 2011 when issues arose for the area of the building
       pad.

                                             9
the standard operating procedure used by Grimberg when he was with the company
and that would have included grading the site to drain and constructing a berm to
divert water from the site as well as using a hose to pump out any water (Hurt rebuttal
decl. ¶¶ 8-9). Indeed, the berm and hose may be seen in a photograph, dated
March 23, 2011, attached to Mr. Hurt’s declaration (id. ¶ 10). 14 AGJV further states in
its proposed findings of fact that its procedures also called for using a plastic tarp to
cover the site at night or when it rained and that, in fact, it did so—pointing to a small
white bundle in two of the accompanying photographs of the site that is supposedly the
tarp (see app. br. at 76-77 (¶¶ 219-20)). This assertion of counsel is completely
unsupported: the two declarations cited by AGJV (the Hurt Rebuttal Declaration and
the Bricker Rebuttal Declaration, see app. br. at 76-77) make no reference to the tarp,
much less its being a standard operating procedure; moreover, the white bundle in the
photographs (see app. br. at 77; duplicating photos at app. supp. R4, tab 140
at APP 2567, APP 2572), if it even is a tarp, appears relatively small and the photos
are no evidence that it was ever used. We reviewed government quality control logs
from March 2011 through July 2011 and, notwithstanding AGJV’s grading or other
efforts, see multiple instances of the site being wet and unworkable after heavy rains
(R4, tab 289 at GOV 29766-69) and no indication of tarps or other such implements
being utilized (id.). AGJV’s daily reports likewise, generally show a number of
instances of the site being too wet to work at and make no indication of the use of tarps
(app. supp. R4, tab 78, passim).

             2. The Parking lot and Roadway Areas

       AGJV’s excavation contractor encountered similar problems with the
excavation for the parking lot and roadways. As early as April 6, 2011, AGJV
reported to the government that it was encountering unsuitable soils during its roadway
excavation and needed to temporarily halt its excavation activities on the site (app.
supp. R4, tab 137). By April 29, 2011, AGJV’s project manager, Mr. Joseph Duda,
reported in an internal email that the company had decided that the problem with the
access road could be temporarily remedied by use of geotextile and stone and that
“[b]y summertime, these soils should dry out and be more suitable for use as
contemplated in the soils report” (app. supp. R4, tab 139).

       On June 23, 2011, Mr. Hurt sent an email to Ensign Seth Jones, the contracting
officer’s technical representative (COTR), reporting that the soil in the roadway had
too high a moisture content and that AGJV would need to bring in structural fill for
use on the roadway (app. supp. R4, tab 145). On July 28, 2011, Mr. Duda sent an

14
     Although Mr. Hurt does not state as much, that same photograph, taken just a few
         days after the clearing and grubbing operations began, shows a greatly
         disturbed landscape (Hurt rebuttal decl. ¶ 10), as one might expect, given the
         work recently done to remove the trees and shrubbery that had been present.

                                             10
email to Ensign Jones about the excavation in the parking lot area, reporting that
AGJV had done its rough excavation over a month earlier and allowed the area to dry,
but that it still had too high a moisture content, requiring further undercutting of the
excavated area and bringing in more structural fill (app. supp. R4, tab 150
at APP 2626). 15

        The record does not indicate any further significant issues in the excavation
until almost a year later, in May 2012, when AGJV’s subcontractor was working on
the site entrance and connection to the nearest local road (Benson Road). According
to an HCEA field report, on May 11, 2012, after the excavation subcontractor,
Jimmy Richards, had cut the eastern half of the site entrance area to subgrade
elevation, HCEA, performed a proof roll which revealed “unstable areas.” Just as ECS
had used a probe near the building foundation in the prior year. HCEA used one
at this location for the unstable areas and found it was able to penetrate 8 to 20 inches.
(App. supp. R4, tab 283 at APP 3526) The HCEA notes don’t directly say so, but it
appears that the worst of it was in the first 15 feet of the entrance road, which HCEA
recommended be cut an additional two feet and filled with river gravel, while the
remaining 115 feet of this portion of the road was recommended be cut only an
additional one foot and filled with river gravel (id.).

       The record does not reflect what efforts, if any, were used to dry the Benson
Road entrance area between the time that Jimmy Richards cut it in the first instance
and HCEA proof rolled it. A May 17, 2012 proof-rolling of the parking lot area
performed by HCEA found “[a] few areas” that were unstable due to recent rainfall
and due to ponding occurring in the area. HCEA recommended that Jimmy Richards
drain the area, which it did, and it was able to pass the proof-rolling the next day. 16
(App. supp. R4, tab 283 at APP 3527-28)

15
   At some point, about the time that differing site conditions issues first came to a head,
       AGJV changed both its earthwork subcontractor and its supervisory geotechnical
       subcontractor. Its original excavation subcontractor was “Division 2” (see, e.g.,
       app. supp. R4, tab 78 at APP 529), but no reference of that company is made after
       July 8, 2011 (see id. at APP 711). “Jimmy Richards”, which was involved from
       the beginning of the project (see, e.g., id. at APP 546) is the excavation contractor
       we see discussed moving forward (id. passim). Likewise, the geotechnical
       subcontractor, ECS, which last appears in AGJV’s daily logs on June 24, 2011
       (id. at APP 704), seems to have been replaced by Hillis-Carnes (also referred to
       as HCEA) by June 27, 2011 (id. at APP 706). The record does not reflect why
       these changes were made.
16
   There appears to be some disconnect on the date because there are two HCEA
       reports dated May 17, 2012, but they appear to be discussing matters that
       happened a day or two apart (see app. supp. R4, tab 283 at APP 3527-28). We
       do not perceive this to be a significant issue.

                                           11
         On May 31, 2012, work on the western side of the road entrance is alleged to
have encountered similar problems to those on the eastern side of the road entrance:
after cutting the area two feet, Jimmy Richards was advised by HCEA to cut another
foot to remove unsuitable material that remained (app. supp. R4, tab 283
at APP 3663). 17 Oddly, AGJV’s own daily report for this date notes that the “2 foot
cut was determined to reach solid ground” (id. at APP 3648), which suggests that the
two-foot cut had reached suitable soils. Whatever the case, by email sent that day,
Mr. Bricker notified Ensign Jones that AGJV had encountered a differing site
condition at the west side of the entrance and that AGJV would proceed as directed by
its geotechnical consultant unless directed otherwise (id. at APP 3640-41). In
response, Ensign Jones stated that the Navy did not consider there to be a differing site
condition but directed AGJV to remove any unsuitable soil and replace it with suitable
fill as required by the contract (id. at APP 3640).

      AGJV does not appear to have alleged any other differing site conditions
beyond those discussed above.

         D. Evidence About What AGJV may Have Done to the Condition of the Site

        The Navy has submitted evidence, primarily through a declaration by Mr. Joshua
Wustner, who was the Navy’s on-site engineering technician, that AGJV did a poor job
controlling the wet conditions on the site (see generally Wustner decl. ¶¶ 6-11).
Mr. Wustner who, it should be noted, did not become involved with the project until
December 2011 (see id. ¶ 1), asserted that the site was lacking in ditches, mounds, and
dikes that would have helped abate the watering issues (id. ¶ 9). Mr. Wustner also
discussed the concurrence of geothermal well drilling on site (which used a drilling
fluid that created a slurry) made for a “soupy mess everywhere” (id. ¶ 7). Other
excavations on the site for utilities only added to the disturbed soil (id. ¶ 8). According
to Mr. Wustner, he remembers returning to his office from the site often during the
winter and spring of 2011-2012 and tracking in muck and mud (id. ¶ 7). Mr. Wustner
also makes the point that the entry road had been used throughout construction by all
the trucks and heavy equipment entering and leaving the site prior to the proof roll
failures in December 2011 and May 2012 so the soil there had been significantly
disturbed by AGJV (id. ¶ 5).

       AGJV, needless to say, does not think very highly of Mr. Wustner’s testimony
and offered multiple declarations in rebuttal to him. Mr. Hurt’s rebuttal declaration
discusses the geothermal wells being dug in November and December of 2011,
meaning that they could not have been at issue for the building pad (Hurt rebuttal decl.

17
     HCEA, in fact, noted saturated soils, with deep ruts from contractor trucks the
        previous day (app. supp. R4, tab 283 at APP 3662).

                                             12
¶ 13). But Mr. Wustner does not allege that they were related to the building pad
problems, which occurred well prior to his involvement in the project.

        Mr. Bricker provided a far more extensive rebuttal declaration challenging
Mr. Wustner’s testimony (see Bricker rebuttal decl. passim). Mr. Bricker first takes issue
with Mr. Wustner’s statement that he observed a proof-roll failure at the main entrance in
December 2011 (see id. ¶ 7 (citing Wustner decl. ¶ 6)). According to Mr. Bricker, there
was no proof roll test at the main entrance until May 11, 2012 (id. ¶ 8). More
significantly, Mr. Bricker states that Mr. Wustner was wrong to allege that the problems
with the main entrance were caused by its use for construction traffic since the
“outbound” side of the entrance, where the most problems were encountered, was not
used by construction traffic, (id. ¶ 12) though, presumably, that meant that the “inbound”
side of the entrance was. Mr. Bricker further states that the geothermal wells (drilled
several months before the problems with the entrance were encountered) were far enough
away from the entrance not to have caused an issue with it (id. ¶¶ 14-17). He also stated
that the utility trenches, which Mr. Wustner had identified as a contributor to soil
instability along with the geothermal well drilling (id. ¶ 21 (citing Wustner decl. ¶ 10)),
were far from the site of the geothermal wells (id. ¶ 21) and only “to the right” of the
outbound lane and “away from” the cut area for the entrance (id. ¶ 26). In general, the
excavations identified by Mr. Wustner were, according to Mr. Bricker, performed several
months before the cut on the main entrance (id. ¶ 25). Mr. Bricker also takes issue with
Mr. Wustner’s statements that broken water lines had flooded the property on numerous
occasions (id. ¶ 28 (citing Wustner decl. ¶ 26)). Mr. Bricker conceded that AGJV’s
subcontractors had damaged government property two or three times, but did not recall a
broken water line flooding the site (id. ¶ 28).

        As a matter of fact finding, we find Mr. Bricker’s statements of fact generally
credible, but their effect on the general issues raised by the Wustner testimony is
limited. With respect to the divergence in dates for the proof roll failure at the
entrance, we have reviewed AGJV’s and the government’s contemporary quality
control reports for that time period and found that they reflect compaction testing by
AGJV’s geotechnical contractor on December 22, 2011 and many other days
throughout the late December/early January 2022 time period, but no proof rolling
at the entrance in December 2011 (see, e.g., R4, tab 289 at GOV 29782; app. supp. R4,
tab 78, APP 939, APP 941, APP 943, APP 949, APP 958, APP 960, APP 970). This is
not a particularly significant issue and very little of the Wustner declaration rests upon
it. We have looked at the location of the geothermal wells as denoted in the
photographs accompanying Mr. Bricker’s rebuttal declaration (see Bricker rebuttal
decl. ¶¶ 18-20) and compared them to the best general map of the construction site that
we have found in the record (R4, tab 9 at GOV 1011) and agree that the geothermal
drilling sites seem to be some distance from the entrance road. Does that mean that
the slurry from the geothermal drilling would have had no effect on the entrance road?
Perhaps not, but Mr. Wustner does not allege that it did; merely that it contributed to

                                           13
the general mess of the site. Of far greater importance is the status of the cut at the
entrance road. We have also looked at the entrance and exit roads depicted in the map
of the construction site and they are adjacent to each-other (see id.), and we have little
faith that construction equipment traversing the entrance road to and from the building
site would limit itself completely to the “inbound” side of the entrance, much less that
it would leave this adjacent area undisturbed. Moreover, the utility trench adjacent to
the outbound lane of the entrance ramp is another clear source of disruption for nearby
soils. We have also reviewed the daily reports and find three or four incidents of
AGJV or its subcontractors striking pipes that subsequently disgorged water into the
site (see app. supp. R4, tab 78 at APP 608-09 (April 18, 2011 water main strike);
tab 78 at APP 676 (June 6, 2011 water line strike); R4, tab 289 at GOV 29767 (same);
R4, tab 289 GOV 29768 (June 24, 2011 broken fire hydrant); app. supp. R4, tab 78
at APP 7510-51, 753 (August 8, 2011 sewer line broken, continued leaks the following
day); R4, tab 289 at GOV 29772 (same)). Ensign Jones, the COTR, discusses all of
these incidents in detail in the declaration he submitted for this appeal, and his
narrative description leaves little doubt that these incidents significantly disturbed the
soil (see Jones decl. ¶ 15). The evidence, then, is consistent with a finding that,
regardless of the fine details, AGJV’s subcontractors did not do a particularly good job
of keeping the ground dry and undisturbed, and the soils, in particular, at the entrance,
took a beating.

       E. What the Parties’ Respective Experts Have to say

       The government has provided the expert testimony of Mr. Karl Hren
(mentioned in section III. A. 2. above). Mr. Hren, a Professional Engineer (P.E.) is a
NAVFAC employee whose job for the six years prior to executing his declaration for
this appeal was to be an in-house geotechnical expert for the Navy (Hren decl. ¶¶ 1-2).
He received a masters degree in geotechnical engineering from the University of
Florida in 1994 and has been working in the field ever since (id. ¶¶ 1-3). AGJV has
made no objection to his being considered an expert and we consider him to be an
expert in the field of geotechnical engineering.

      Mr. Hren’s bottom line is that, based upon the soils reflected in the borings,
what happened at the site was AGJV’s fault and it should have known what to expect
(Hren decl. ¶¶ 21-22). We will break this down somewhat.

       First, Mr. Hren discussed the nature of the soils reflected in the boring logs. As
discussed above, he characterized the top four feet of the site as fine-grained, CL, ML,
or CH (Hren decl. ¶ 15). These soil types, Mr. Hren explained “are generally
recognized in the construction industry as being more difficult types of soils in which
to control moisture and allow recompaction once disturbed” (id.). Mr. Hren makes the
further observation that AGJV has presented no evidence that the soils were anything
but what the boreholes said they would be (id. ¶ 16). Though we, of course, are the

                                           14
ultimate arbiters of what AGJV proved and didn’t prove, we take this portion of
Mr. Hren’s testimony to mean that the evidence presented by AGJV of the field
conditions was not inconsistent with the borehole records being an accurate
representation of the conditions of the site when they were taken.

       Mr. Hren also testifies that his review of the daily reports showed that AGJV
had “repeatedly disturbed the soil and allowed rain water and water from broken
underground water lines at or near the site to saturate the soil” (Hren decl. ¶ 16). His
view of the effect of the geothermal drilling fluid that was on the site near the wells
was that it contributed to water retention and thus weakening of the soil (id.).

        Mr. Hren addresses AGJV’s contention that, after it stripped the top layers of
the soil, the remaining soil should have been strong enough to support the
construction. He states that this would only be true if the soil were as stiff as AGJV
stated it was (which Mr. Hren found to be an exaggeration of the boring reports) and if
the soils had been immediately protected after clearing and grubbing and that existing
soils had been protected from rainwater and other site activities that would have
weakened them. (Hren decl. ¶¶ 19-20)

       We recognize that, as a Navy employee, Mr. Hren has reason to be biased in
favor of the Navy, and take that into account when weighing his testimony.
Nevertheless, we find that his testimony is consistent with what we have observed in
the record, the recommendations made by AGJV’s original geotechnical consultant,
ECS, and our review of the boring records. We thus find him to be credible.

        AGJV does not present any expert testimony, per se, but does present the
testimony of its estimators and personnel on site to rebut the factual bases of
Mr. Hren’s testimony. Mr. James Graham, a professional engineer licensed by the
state of Maryland with more than 40 years of experience in construction and a
principal of Grimberg was the estimator for the project (Graham rebuttal decl. ¶¶ 2-9).
He testified that based upon the geotechnical data provided in the RFP, AGJV
expected that it could remove the top two feet of soil on the site, which would leave
soil suitable for proof rolling (id. ¶¶ 12-14). Mr. Graham further discussed the soils
near the roadway entrance, explaining that the inbound lane passed the proof rolling
testing but the outbound lane did not (id. ¶18). He then explained that, based on the
single boring taken near the entrance, he had expected to need to excavate only
two feet, down to the 106.8-foot subgrade, but, instead, was required to excavate down
to the 105.12-foot subgrade. 18 (Id. ¶¶ 20-21) Although his declaration is characterized
as a rebuttal of Mr. Hren’s (and others’) (see id. ¶ 1), Mr. Graham does not directly
address any of Mr. Hren’s conclusions or statements of fact.

18
     This is approximately 1.7 feet deeper.

                                              15
       Mr. Hurt’s rebuttal declaration also purports to refute Mr. Hren’s testimony
(see Hurt rebuttal decl. ¶ 1), but does not address his contentions directly. Instead, it
makes the point that Mr. Hren was not at the site (id. ¶ 6) and remarks that the
geothermal drilling occurred long after the problems were encountered at the building
pad (see id. ¶ 13). As discussed above, Mr. Hurt also explained the general approach
to dewatering and protecting excavations that he performed while working for
Grimberg and that he believed were done on the site in question (id. ¶¶ 8-10).

        Mr. Duda (previously identified as AGJV’s project manager) provided a
rebuttal declaration that made the point that the geothermal wells were installed long
after the building pad (see Duda rebuttal decl. ¶ 4), but made no other challenge to
Mr. Hren’s testimony.

       F. AGJV Submits and the CO Denies a Differing Sites Condition Claim

        On February 15, 2013, AGJV submitted a request for equitable adjustment
(REA) to the contracting officer (CO) seeking $294,305 in increased costs due to
unsuitable soils. The REA explicitly provided that it did not seek delay damages,
which would be sought in a separate REA. (R4, tab 533 at GOV 31768) The parties
have not pointed to any government response to this REA and on December 15, 2016,
AGJV submitted a certified claim to the CO seeking $185,096 in costs incurred due to
differing site conditions related to the soil at the building pad and the west and east
sides of the Benson Road connection to the building (R4, tab 575 at GOV 32892,
32894-96). Like the REA, this claim reserved the right to seek delay damages at a
later time (id. at GOV 32897). Nevertheless, there is no evidence of a further claim
seeking delay damages based upon the alleged differing site conditions. On July 14,
2017, the CO issued a summary decision denying the claim in its entirety (app. supp.
R4, tab 285).

      AGJV timely appealed this decision to the Board and we docketed it as Appeal
No. 61252.

       IV. AGJV Wants to Work Extra Hours, Including Weekends; the Navy Only
           Gives it Some of What it Wants

       Though it does not appear that site issues appreciably delayed the project
(AGJV never having made a delay claim based upon differing site conditions), by late
2011 / early 2012, it was clear to AGJV that it was running behind schedule and would
have difficulty completing the project before its completion date. As we discuss in
more detail below, AGJV sought the government’s permission to work beyond the
usual hours set forth in the contract (something the contract permitted it to request and
the CO to grant), but the Navy denied its blanket requests for weekend work even
though the Navy did permit extra hours of work during the week and work on a

                                           16
handful of Saturdays. AGJV would ultimately claim this denial of blanket work hour
extensions to be a breach of contract, pursued here in Appeal No. 61402.

       A. Contract Provisions Governing Working Hours

       There are two clauses governing the working hours in the contract.
Specification 1.2.2., Working Hours, provides:

              Regular working hours shall consist of an 8 ½ hour period
              established by the Contracting Officer, between 7 a.m. and
              3:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding Government
              holidays.

(R4, tab 4 at GOV 104)

      And the relevant portion of Specification 1.2.3, Work Outside Regular Hours,
provides:
            Work outside regular working hours requires Contracting
            Officer approval. Make application 15 calendar days prior
            to such work to allow arrangements to be made by the
            Government. Based on the justification provided, the
            Contracting Officer may approve work outside regular
            hours. . . .

(R4, tab 4 at GOV 104)

       B. Evidence Presented by ACJV About its Experience With Similar Clauses in
          Other Contracts (and Limitations on That Evidence)

       Working hour provisions in a government contract are not unique.
Mr. Grimberg explained in his declaration that similar provisions existed in other
government contracts that his company had performed and he specifically cited to
three of them involving the Navy during approximately the same time period
(see Grimberg decl. ¶¶ 13-14). Mr. Grimberg has reproduced the working hours
sections of these contracts and, in some ways, they are quite similar to the present
provisions, but, in others, somewhat different (see id. ¶ 14).

       The first contract cited by Mr. Grimberg, “the Explosives Contract” varied from
the contract here because it had slightly different working hours, a shorter period for
requesting authority to work outside the hours, and a comprehensive list of
information required to be provided in the request (see Grimberg decl. ¶ 14 a.). We do
not consider these differences to be material to the dispute here.

                                           17
       The second contract cited by Mr. Grimberg, “the Buildings 3 & 5 Contract”
at the Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, MD, awarded in September 2010 and
performed during the same time period as the contract here (see Grimberg decl.
¶ 13 b.) differed more significantly, including not only the 8 1/2 -hour period for
Mondays through Fridays, but also 7 a.m. through 11 p.m. on Saturdays. Hours
outside of these times required a request 20 days beforehand. (See Grimberg decl.
¶ 14 b.) The inclusion of two full shifts for Saturday is, to us, a material difference.

        The final contract cited by Mr. Grimberg, “the Dahlgren contract,” provided
that regular working hours would be for 8 1/2 hours Monday through Friday. The
section dealing with hours outside of regular hours was similar to that in the present
contract, but did not include the phrase stating that, “[b]ased on the justification
provided, the Contracting Officer may approve work outside regular hours.”
(See Grimberg decl. ¶ 14 c.)

       Mr. Grimberg testified that, based on his many years of government contracting
experience (and the Board agrees that his experience has been substantial (see
Grimberg decl. ¶¶ 2, 4)), he expected that the Navy would exercise its discretion to
allow work outside of regular hours “reasonably, as it had done previously” (id. ¶ 18).
He further stated that, based upon this experience, AGJV bid upon the contract, with
the expectation that the Navy would reasonably exercise its discretion to allow work
outside of regular hours (id. ¶ 19).

       Although it is certainly possible that its experience with other unspecified
contracts informed AGJV’s bid with respect to the working hours issue, we find it
unlikely that AGJV’s experience with the three contracts specified in Mr. Grimberg’s
declaration did. That’s because of their dates. Recall that the contract was awarded on
September 30, 2009. According to the exhibits attached to Mr. Grimberg’s
declaration, the RFP for the Explosives Contract was issued on May 19, 2008
(Grimberg decl., ex. 1 at 1). We do not know when the contract was awarded or work
begun, but it was plainly some time after its RFP was issued. For the Buildings 3 & 5
Contract, the exhibit attached to Mr. Grimberg’s declaration indicates that it was
issued on June 21, 2010 (Grimberg decl., ex. 2 at 1), almost a year after contract award
in our case. And for the Dahlgren contract, the exhibit attached to Mr. Grimberg’s
declaration, the specifications are dated February 25, 2013 (Grimberg decl., ex. 3 at 2)
and forwarded to John Grimberg, Inc. on April 1, 2013 (id. at, 1), several months after
performance on the contract here was concluded and years after the submission of
AGJV’s bid. Thus, with the possible exception of the Explosives Contract, it was a
temporal impossibility for AGJV’s experience with the identified contracts to have
informed its bid on this contract.

       We also note that Mr. Grimberg has not identified in what way and with any
specifics the manner in which the Navy “reasonably” exercised its discretion in prior

                                            18
contracts, leaving us with no indication of how those exercises in discretion would
compare to the Navy’s actions in the case before us.

       In addition to Mr. Grimberg’s declaration on this subject, AGJV presents the
rebuttal declaration of Mr. Graham, whose role as an estimator we have already
discussed above for the differing site conditions issue. Mr. Graham stated that, other
than this project, he did not recall any other project performed at the same location for
the Navy in which requests to work outside the regular working hours were routinely
denied (Graham decl. ¶ 16). This declaration is of limited utility to us because we
have no idea how often such requests may have been made or how their circumstances
would have compared to those in this contract.

       C. AGJV Makes a Standing Request to Work Outside Regular Hours; the CO
          Largely Denies it, but Gives AGJV Partial Relief

        The first mention of working outside regular hours in the record (at least as
identified in AGJV’s brief, (see app. br. at 32)) is an email from AGJV to the Navy,
dated July 20, 2011, seeking permission to work Saturday July 23, 2011 from 6 a.m. to
4 p.m. (app. supp. R4, tab 147 at APP 2622-23). The Navy denied that request, stating
that it was the Navy’s “understanding that the nature of the work to be performed is
not unusual or extraordinary and can be completed during normal working hours,
Monday thru Friday” (id. at APP 2622). The next time this issue arose in the facts
brought in this appeal 19 was in a discussion held between the parties on October 5,
2011 and reflected in meeting minutes kept by AGJV in which AGJV was reminded
that the coming Monday was Columbus Day, a federal holiday, and if AGJV wished to
work on site that day, it would have to request it to the CO and “demonstrate gov
benefit” (app. supp. R4, tab 33 at APP 157). AGJV has pointed to no evidence, and
we have seen none, about whether this was, in fact, requested and whether it was
granted.

       On January 4, 2012, AGJV informed the Navy that it intended to begin
requesting work on Saturdays “after the holidays” 20 (app. supp. R4, tab 44

19
   As will be discussed below, AGJV’s certified claim on this matter gave greater
       emphasis to events that occurred in the spring and summer of 2011 (R4, tab 88
       at GOV 1595-96), but the earlier dates are not the focus of the facts presented
       by AGJV today (see app. br. at 32-44).
20
   The meeting minutes prepared by AGJV for January 18, 2012 suggest that this
       statement was made at the preceding meeting, December 28, 2011, and that
       during the January 4, 2012 meeting AGJV stated it would submit a justification
       for the request (app. supp. R4, tab 46 at APP 229). This is consistent with the
       “after the holidays” statement in the January 4, 2012 minutes, but the minutes

                                           19
at APP 216). Reference to the issue was made in the January 18, 2012 meeting
minutes (see app. supp. R4, tab 46 at APP 229). Later meeting minutes reflect that,
at the January 18, 2012 meeting, AGJV, in fact, formally requested “to work every
Saturday from here until the end of the job” (app. supp. R4, tab 47 at APP 236) and
that the Navy rejected it on January 25, 2012, the following week, stating that “a
cost/benefit analysis was performed on the cost of the Navy working overtime vs the
need for the delivery dates of the building” (app. supp. R4, tab 48 at APP 244).

       The same day as that rejection, AGJV submitted a revised completion schedule
to the Navy and implored it to allow work on Saturdays and “extended hours” 21
despite its earlier rejections (app. supp. R4, tab 86 at APP 1789-90).

        More discussions followed the January 25, 2012 rejection. Meeting minutes
reflect requests for “after hours” or “off hours” 22 work made by AGJV on February 1,
February 15, February 22, and February 29. All were denied. On March 7, 2012,
apparently reflecting the Navy’s explanation, the minutes stated “[n]ot available to
anyone. Has to be approved by the Navy Yard.” According to the minutes, on
March 28, 2012, the Navy conveyed that “there is going to be no change on this.”
(App. supp. R4, tab 56 at APP 311)

       The next significant discussion about after hours work is reflected in the June 6,
2012 meeting minutes in which AGJV wrote: “We would still like to continue
requesting Saturdays as we have been – it would be a big help. We would even be
willing as we have previously stated, to pay for Navy personnel who need to be here”
(app. supp. R4, tab 64 at APP 396). At this meeting, though refusing to permit
Saturday work, the Navy agreed to extend the work period on Mondays through
Fridays 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. (app. supp. R4, tab 65 at APP 402). This extension of
workday hours actually appears to have been permitted much earlier—starting in
January 2012. According to an internal Navy email relied upon by the
government’s scheduling expert, Mr. David Reichard, AGJV averaged 10-11 hour

       of the December 28, 2011 meeting make no mention of it (see app. supp. R4,
       tab 43).
21
   “Extended hours” was not defined in the letter, but the proposed completion
       schedule attached to this letter included approximately a month of “night shift”
       work on drywall installation (see app. supp. R4, tab 86 at APP 1791)
22
   Exactly how much “after hours” or “off hours” work AGJV was requesting is not
       immediately clear from the record (except for the drywall installation “night
       shift” discussed above), especially compared to the Saturdays it was more
       explicitly and concretely requesting.

                                           20
days in February through May of 2012, with the average dipping to 8-10 hours in the
June-July time period (Reichard Report at 41). 23

       On three occasions in 2012, moreover, the Navy did allow work on Saturdays,
apparently because it involved utilities: February 4, February 11, and September 29
(app. supp. R4, tab 293 at APP 4823-24, APP 4851-54, APP 5700-03).

        Although, as noted above, AGJV did take advantage of some of the extra
weekday hours offered by the Navy (see also Gannon decl. ¶ 5), it generally found this
to be an unsatisfactory solution. According to AGJV, construction workers tend to be
less efficient during 12-hour days due to fatigue, so the gains in hours are offset by the
loss in productivity (Grimberg decl. ¶¶ 33-35; Duda decl. ¶¶ 43-45; Greenwell decl.
¶¶ 41-42). In the meantime, according to AGJV, one of the advantages of working
two full shifts in a day is that the worksite can be less crowded so that workers for one
trade will not get in the way of workers for another (Grimberg decl. ¶ 36; Duda decl.
¶¶ 46-47; Greenwell decl. ¶¶ 43-44).

        The Navy does not challenge the evidence that workers are not as efficient in a
12-hour shift as in an 8-hour shift, nor does it disagree that a less crowded construction
site might be more efficient. Upon consideration of the evidence, then, we do find that
workers in sustained 12-hour shifts are likely not as efficient as they are in shorter
shifts. On the other hand, we do not believe the 12 hours of availability was a
completely empty gesture by the Navy: AGJV took the opportunity to use at least
some of the extra available time and presumably did so for a reason.

        We also note that some of AGJV’s declarations included a demonstrative table
purportedly showing that the Navy only permitted it to work five shifts a week, when,
in fact, a week properly contained 14 potential shifts if only the Navy had permitted
two shifts a day, seven days a week (see, e.g., Duda decl. ¶ 41; Greenwell decl. ¶ 38;
see also Grimberg decl. ¶ 29 (making same point in text without the table)). We find
this table to be misleading. AGJV never requested to work on Sundays, nor two shifts
on Saturdays. Moreover, AGJV has not provided any evidence that it and
its subcontractors had the wherewithal to staff an effective tripling of the number of
hours worked by qualified employees on the project. Indeed, AGJV has provided
no evidence of how many shifts it could or would have filled if the Navy had allowed
it more access.

23
     Mr. Reichard’s report was submitted with the government’s declarations in
         accordance with our scheduling order.

                                           21
      D. The CO’s Justification for not Granting AGJV all it Requested

        The decision about whether to approve extra work hours was made by
Ms. Linda Atchinson, the Navy Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) (see
Atchinson decl. ¶¶ 19-26). Ms. Atchinson made the decision to mostly disapprove the
request based upon the advice of her engineering staff, but also based upon a personal
visit she made to the site (id. ¶ 23). She described her decision-making to be based
upon a balance of the benefit to the project compared to using the “limited resources
we had for surveillance, especially after hours or on weekends” (id. ¶ 21).

       According to Ms. Atchinson, her visit to the worksite led her to question
whether AGJV would use any additional time in a productive way because there was
no work going on at all when she arrived (Atchinson decl. ¶ 23). 24 She also saw
no increase in productivity in the weekend days that she did permit or in the extra
weekday hours granted (id. ¶ 24). Mr. Patrick Gannon, who supervised the
Navy’s engineering team from the project (Gannon decl. ¶ 1), confirmed
Ms. Atchinson’s impression, noting that on one Saturday that AGJV was permitted to
work the company was unprepared for it (Gannon rebuttal decl. ¶ 6).

        Against what she considered uncertain benefits to the Navy, Ms. Atchinson
weighed the costs to the Navy. The Navy’s experience with AGJV’s subcontractors
cutting utilities and doing other damage to the site convinced the Navy that it needed
to have a construction manager or engineering technician on site during the extra hours
(see Gannon decl. ¶ 5; Gannon rebuttal decl. ¶ 5; see also Jones rebuttal decl.
¶ 5 (tying extra hours issue to concerns about need for supervision); Atchinson decl.
¶ 26 (expressing Navy concern for “safety and security at the project site”)). With that
in mind, Ms. Atchinson and Mr. Gannon considered the practical issues of getting
personnel to work the added hours. In the first place, Mr. Gannon’s office was
relatively short staffed at the time (Atchinson decl. ¶¶ 22; 25). Moreover, providing
such a supervisor would require working overtime, which was controlled by
“NAVFAC” 25 in Washington, DC and was “generally only approved for emergency
situations to avoid mission impacts” (Gannon decl. ¶ 4). One example Mr. Gannon
provided was for matters involving utility outages (id. ¶ 4). Although AGJV did offer

24
   Mr. Greenwell provides testimony that, at the time in question, the workers were on
       a scheduled break (Greenwell rebuttal decl. ¶ 14). We suspect an experienced
       ACO would recognize a short break for what it was and, though we doubt
       Ms. Atchinson’s experience of finding nobody working on the site was the
       norm, we also suspect that she truly did encounter a day of less than full
       utilization of the potential workforce and understand why that would color her
       perceptions of AGJV.
25
   We presume this is the same as “the Navy Yard” mentioned in the meeting minutes
       discussed above.

                                          22
to pay for the overtime, fiscal law does not permit this, so it was not a viable option
(id. ¶ 5).

         Ms. Atchinson summed up her thinking:

                In addition to the fact that I really did not have the staff to
                be able to supervise AGJV on Saturdays, there was
                no reason, based on their performance, to believe they
                would be more productive if they were allowed to work
                Saturdays.

(Atchinson decl. ¶ 25)

         E. AGJV Files a Claim on the Work Hours Issue

       On August 2, 2017, 26 AGJV submitted to the CO a certified claim, dated
July 31, 2017, seeking a decision that the Navy’s denial of AGJV’s requests to work
outside of regular work hours was a breach of contract (R4, tab 88). The claim alleges
the Navy’s refusal to allow work outside of regular hours began in the spring and
summer of 2011 (id. at GOV 1595). In addition to seeking a return of the
$199,500 that the Navy continued to hold in liquidated damages for the delayed
completion of the project, AGJV also indicated that it would seek delay damages
“under a separate cover” (id. at GOV 1605). No such follow-up claim appears to have
been submitted.

     The Navy did not decide this claim within 60 days, and on November 2, 2017,
AGJV appealed this “deemed denial” to the Board. It has been docketed as Appeal
Number 61402.

         V. Redesign and Delays With the Fire Sprinkler System

        Appeal Nos. 60428 and 60691 involve claims regarding the fire sprinkler
system. AGJV alleges that it was forced to perform additional water flow tests; that
the results of those tests necessitated re-design of the system and additional costs; and
that the government imposed other unnecessary requirements upon it for the fire
sprinkler system.

26
     The August 2, 2017 submittal date is not reflected in the record cited by AGJV, but
         it is alleged in the paragraph 5 of AGJV’s complaint in this appeal and
         conceded in the corresponding paragraph of the Navy’s answer.

                                               23
          A. The Contractual Requirements

       The RFP includes Section D40, Fire Protection, which requires the installation
of an integrated fire alarm and suppression system (R4, tab 5 at GOV 438). The
section requires that all design documents and calculations for it be prepared by, or
under the supervision of, AGJV’s Qualified Fire Protection Engineer, the Fire
Protection Designer of Record (FPDOR) (id.).

       Subsection D4020, Fire Suppression Water Supply and Equipment, includes
water pressure and flow rate figures that the contractor was directed use in performing
its hydraulic calculations (R4, tab 5 at GOV 439). Section D4040, Sprinkler Systems,
requires that the contractor perform “a minimum of two fire flow tests in order to
obtain data for hydraulic calculations” necessary for the sprinkler design, 27 with the
CO to provide the location for these tests (id.).

      The design-build specifications in the Performance Technical Specification
(PTS) on this matter provide further detail (R4, tab 6 at GOV 663). PTS Section D 40,
subsection 1.3, Design Submittals, specified that design submittals would be made in
accordance with Section Z10 of the PTS, UFGS 28 section 01 33 10.05 20, Design
Submittal Procedures, UFC 29 1-300- 09N, Design Procedures, and UFC 3-600-lON,
Fire Protection Engineering (id. at GOV 666).

      B. AGJV Hires a Fire Protection Designer of Record and Also a Subcontractor
         to Install the Fire Sprinkler

       On December 7, 2009, AGJV entered a contract with Alphatec, P.C.
(Alphatec), to provide architect/engineering (A/E) services for the project, including
designing the fire alarm and sprinkler systems (R4, tab 766-09 at GOV 34662, 34672),
with Mr. Steve Bur of Alphatec to be its FPDOR (Bur decl. ¶ 7). Mr. Bur appears to
us to possess all the necessary background required for that position (see id., ¶¶ 2-5)
and the Navy has not challenged it. We consider him to be an expert witness.

27
   It may seem inconsistent for the RFP to provide numbers for “hydraulic
        calculations” while it also requires new water flow tests for such calculations
        after contract award. We suspect the seeming inconsistency can be harmonized
        by recognizing the first figures as being provided to potential contractors for
        bidding purposes, with the contractor-conducted tests performed after contract
        award being required to inform the final design in this design-build contract.
        To the extent the figures in the two sets of tests were different to the
        disadvantage of the contractor, it could pursue an appropriate remedy.
28
   UFGS is short for Uniform Facility Guide Specification (see R4, tab 6 at GOV 749).
29
   UFC is short for “Unified Facilities Criteria” (see R4, tab 6 at GOV 746), a set of
        rules applicable to the Department of Defense.

                                          24
        On December 4, 2009 (just a few days before AGJV formally entered its
contract with Alphatec), Mr. Keith Cunningham of National Fire Protection (plainly
on behalf of AGJV) 30 performed flow tests on three fire hydrants (see R4, Tab 766-10
at GOV 34703-05). 31 Although the contract specified that the CO would select the
hydrants to be tested, that does not appear to have happened here. Instead,
Mr. Enrique Uribe, then a contract employee for the Navy, who was assigned to
observe the water flow tests on behalf of the Navy, showed Mr. Cunningham where
the river water mains were, and allowed him to choose the fire hydrants to test.
In fact, according to Mr. Uribe (and undisputed by AGJV), Mr. Cunnigham tested on a
different set of water mains than those that Mr. Uribe showed him. (Uribe decl. ¶ 4)
As explained by the government’s expert witness, Mr. Douglas Fisher, 32 of the three
different flow tests performed that day, one overperformed the test results contained in
the RFP and the other two underperformed it— one, substantially (Fisher Rebuttal
decl. ¶ 5; Fisher Report at 7-8).

        On February 19, 2010, Alphatec provided a “Design Development”
(35% progress) submittal to the Navy for review (Fisher Report at 8). The
government made a number of comments on this document, including several relevant
to the issues before us, including emphasizing the requirement that the plans provide
the name and qualifications of the Design Build Fire Protection Engineer (DBFPE) 33
and that the water supply analysis indicate that the fire flow test had been conducted

30
   The government’s expert report, dated July 20, 2022, by Mr. Douglas Fisher states
       that these tests were performed under the direction of Alphatec (Fisher Report
       at 7). Although Mr. Cunningham does not appear to be an Alphatec employee,
       there is email traffic preceding the test and discussing it which included
       Mr. Bur (see app. supp R4, tab 120 at APP 2340), which satisfies us that he and
       Alphatec were, indeed, involved, even if the contract had not been formally
       awarded yet.
31
   AGJV’s proposed findings of fact state that two were performed on December 2,
       2009, while one was performed on December 4 (app. br. at 94-95 (¶ 273)). Our
       review of the documents suggests the better reading is that a test was attempted
       on December 2, 2009, but was considered unsatisfactory for various reasons
       (see app. supp R4, tab 120 at APP 2339) and that there were, in fact three tests
       performed on December 4, as reflected by the date affixed to all three test
       results in the record (see R4, tab 766-10 at GOV 34703-05). In the end, though,
       it does not matter if they were performed on one day in early December 2009 or
       over two days in the same time period.
32
   Mr. Fisher is a Fire Protection Engineer, licensed by the State of Maryland, is a
       Fellow in the Society of Fire Protection Engineers, and has 28 years of
       experience in the field (Fisher Rebuttal decl. ¶¶ 1-2). We consider him to be an
       expert in the field of fire protection engineering.
33
   We believe the DBFPE was merely the FPDOR by a different name.

                                          25
under the supervision of the DBFPE (R4, tab 134 at GOV 28785, 28787; Fisher Report
at 8-9). Alphatec submitted subsequent designs and calculations to the government,
including a Corrected Final Design package, dated July 8, 2011 (see Fisher Report at
9).

       Prior to award of the contract, AGJV requested preliminary price quotes from
potential fire sprinkler subcontractors, based upon the RFP. Fire-Mak, Inc. (Fire-Mak)
was the lowest bidder. In early 2011, AGJV provided three of the potential fire
sprinkler subcontractors (including Fire-Mak) with drawings and analysis that it had
submitted to the government on October 15, 2010 (plainly, prior to the final drawings
Alphatec submitted in July 2011), and sought pricing from them. In early
March 2011, Fire-Mak and the other potential subcontractors provided their proposed
prices. After some negotiation, Fire-Mak and AGJV executed a contract on
November 11, 2011. (Fisher Report at 10)

       In return for payment to Fire-Mak of $75,000, the contract between the two
required Fire-Mak to “Furnish and install [the fire sprinkler system as per the RFP (as
amended) and the submissions made to the government by Alphatec] dated 15 October
2010 and all other contract documents as the[y] apply.” This contract also required
one hydrant flow test if required by the authority having jurisdiction. (Fisher Report
at 10-11)

         C. The Long Road to Design Approval for the Sprinkler System

    The Corrected Final Design package (which appears to have embraced more than
just the sprinkler system) was submitted to the government by Alphatec on July 8,
2011. Of note, this design indicated 3-inch piping for the water sprinkler cross mains,
4-inch piping for the sprinkler system’s floor control valve assembly, and 6-inch
piping for the sprinkler riser (Fisher Report at 9-10). There is no indication in the
briefing or the record (as far as we can see) 34 indicating that the government had any
problem with the sprinkler aspect of this package.

        On October 27, 2011, AGJV provided fire sprinkler material data to the Navy.
A little more than a week later, on November 4, 2011, the Navy informed AGJV that it
needed Fire-Mak’s shop drawings and calculations to complete its review. AGJV
submitted these to the Navy on January 23, 2012. The Navy rejected the submittal on
January 26, 2012. (Fisher Report, at 2)

34
     Needless to say, given the size of the record, just because we have not found an item
         does not mean that it does not exist even though we have performed some
         independent review of the Rule 4 file and its supplements. It is incumbent on
         the parties to direct us to matters they wish us to consider, and if they do not
         do so, they have no basis to complain.

                                             26
       The Navy’s rejection of the submittal included twelve comments, six of which
would have been sufficient to justify the rejection (assuming they were proper).
Relevant to the issues before us, comment d required “a hose connection at the roof as
indicated on NFPA 14 Section 7.3.2. (5)” (Fisher Report at 13). Also relevant to us,
comment k stated, “[p]lease update the flow test as it is more than 2 years old” (id.).

       In its February 10, 2012 response to the Navy’s rejection, AGJV argued that the
hose valve should not be required for the roof because the building had a stair
enclosure with access to the roof and that the top landing of that stair enclosure had a
hose valve. AGJV argued that the 2010 edition of NFPA 14 had clarified that only
one standpipe was necessary to service the roof. (Fisher Report at 13) The relevant
portion of the NFPA from 2007 (which the contract required AGJV to hew to)
provides:
               7.3.2 Class I Systems. Class I systems shall be provided
               with 2 ½ in. (65 mm) hose connections in the following
               locations:

                -- -- --

                (5) At the highest landing of stairways with stairway
                access to a roof, and on roofs with a slope of less than 3 in
                12 where stairways do not access the roof.

(See Ex. D to Status Report, dated September 30, 2022) 35 The roof slope for the building
was less than 3 in 12, but the stairways accessed the roof (Bur rebuttal decl. ¶ 9).

      Meanwhile, the 2010 version of NFPA 14 is slightly changed, with
subparagraph 5 of section 7.3.2 now stating:

                (5) At the highest landing of stairways with stairway
                access to a roof or on roofs with a slope of less than 4 in 12
                where stairways do not access the roof.

(See ex. E to Status Report, dated September 30, 2022)

       The 2010 NFPA has an annex providing explanations of the intent of the code.
The commentary for section 7.3.2 (contained in A.7.3.2) provides in relevant part:
“Only one standpipe is necessary to serve the roof; it is not the intent to extend each
standpipe to the roof level” (see Ex. E to Status Report, dated September 30, 2022).

35
     Because the NFPA standards did not appear to exist in the record, but were
         necessary for our decision, we directed appellant to provide them, which it did
         as attachments to this status report.

                                             27
The government’s expert, Mr. Fisher, opines that the Navy was correct and consistent
with the 2007 NFPA Code to require the additional hose connection at the roof (Fisher
Report at 13-14); AGJV’s expert, Mr. Bur, disagrees (Bur rebuttal decl. ¶¶ 7-10).

        In the same response to the Navy in which it disputed the need for the hose
connection on the rooftop, AGJV agreed to perform the additional flow test and stated
that the “FPDOR will be available upon request to assist in the set up and to witness
the new flow test” (Fisher Report at 13). The requirement for a “recent” flow test
prior to design comes from UFC 3-600-01, para 4-2.3.5.1, which states that
calculations for design were required to “be based on recent water flow test data”
(id. at 14). NFPA 14 (which is the standard for the installation of standpipe and hose
systems), Section 10.2 also states that “[t]ests for the purpose of system design
shall not be conducted more than 1 year prior to system design” (id.; see also Ex. D 36
to Status Report, dated September 30, 2022).

        Fire-Mak performed two water flow tests on February 17, 2012. The water
flow was less than the flow test reported in the RFP and less than two of the three tests
performed on behalf of AGJV in December 2009, though it showed a higher flow than
one of the three December 2009 tests (Fisher Report at 14-15; Bur decl. ¶¶ 22-23).
The consequence of these new tests was that Fire-Mak needed to revise portions of the
design reflected in the shop drawings it provided (increasing the diameter of some
pipes, for the most part) to account for the lower flow rate (Bur decl. ¶ 26; Bur rebuttal
decl. ¶ 11).

        Regardless of whether Fire-Mak changed its shop drawings after the new flow
tests (which he effectively concedes), Mr. Fisher argues that the flow tests did not alter
what was required from Fire-Mak since the original design by Alphatec had pipes of a
diameter that would have accommodated the lower flow rate (Fisher Report at 16-17).
Mr. Bur of Alphatec counters that Alphatec’s final corrected drawings are irrelevant
since AGJV had delegated the sprinkler design to Fire-Mak, and its original shop
drawings (which would have been adequate under the December 2009 flow test
results), included the smaller pipes (Bur rebuttal decl. ¶ 13). We will address this issue
in more detail in the Decision section, below, but note that the Navy has provided
no evidence that AGJV’s subcontract with Fire-Mak required it to provide the larger
pipes that had been included in Alphatec’s final corrected drawings.

36
     Exhibit D to the September 30, 2022 status report is the 2007 version of NFPA 14.
         This is particularly important because AGJV alleges that the one-year
         requirement was not present in the 2007 NFPA 13, which governs fire
         sprinklers (app. br. at 152). This is true, but NFPA 14 also applies to the
         contract, as noted above.

                                            28
        Regardless of matters of responsibility, new drawings needed to be made and
approved. Although the date is not clear from the record, Fire-Mak made a new
submission to Alphatec for review sometime between the flow tests and March 5,
2012. We know this because on March 5, 2012, Mr. Bur of Alphatec approved the
submission “as noted,” identifying eight different problems with the submission that
needed to be remedied prior to submission to the government (R4, tab 330
at GOV 30104). In a document dated March 13, 2011 (it is obvious to us that it was
written in 2012 and that “2011” was a typo), Fire-Mak forwarded a revised submission
directly to AGJV, informing it that it had addressed Alphatec’s eight concerns (id.
at GOV 30103). It was received by AGJV the next day, March 13, 2012 (id.
at GOV 30102). On March 15, 2012, the documents were sent from AGJV to
Alphatec and they were received by Alphatec on March 19, 2012 (id. at GOV
30101). 37 On March 22, 2012, Mr. Bur approved the submittal “as noted,” having
identified five different issues requiring Fire-Mak’s attention (id. at GOV 30100). The
drawings and calculations were submitted to the Navy for approval on March 29, 2012
by AGJV (R4, tabs 52, 334).

        On April 12, 2012, Ensign Jones asked AGJV for Fire-Mak’s response to
comments made by the Navy to Fire-Mak’s original submittal that it had rejected.
AGJV responded on April 13, 2012, including an attachment that had apparently been
provided earlier and indicated that the comments had been incorporated into the
March 29, 2012 submittal to the Navy. (R4, tab 337) In response, on April 16, 2012,
Ensign Jones explained that the document provided by the Navy included questions for
some items, rather than a resolution of the issues. AGJV responded on April 17, 2012,
that there was no new separate document from Fire-Mak since the response to the
government’s prior comments was effectively embedded in the new drawings and
calculations. (R4, tab 338) Ensign Jones returned to the issue again on April 19, 2012,
and asked AGJV for a simple letter from Fire-Mak explaining how the new
submission addressed the issues raised with the first one, stating that, without it, the
NAVFAC fire protection engineer (Mr. Uribe) would likely reject the submission. On
April 25, 2012, AGJV forwarded the requested letter to Ensign Jones. (R4, tab 341)
On April 30, 2012, the Navy approved AGJV’s revised submittal with some comments
that did not prevent Fire-Mak from beginning fabrication of the system (R4, tab 345).

         D. The Fire Sprinkler Claim

      On May 10, 2012, AGJV submitted a change order request styled as “Proposal
No. 88” seeking $20,729 in compensation for additional fire sprinkler work (app. supp.

37
     It is not clear to us why the documents were sent to Alphatec by AGJV, but a likely
           explanation is that Fire-Mak was expected by AGJV to route its submittals
           through Alphatec before they were sent to AGJV for provision to the
           government.

                                            29
R4, tab 122 at APP 2397). It sought compensation for performing the February 2012
flow tests; for redesigning the stand pipe for the roof; and for redesigning the system
to account for the lesser water flow (id.). In part, it based its entitlement to this
compensation on the FAR’s Changes Clause, 52.243-4 (JUN 2007) (see id. at APP
2356, n.3), which, in fact, is incorporated into the contract (R4, tab 24 at GOV 1189).
It alleged that the fire sprinkler problems were responsible for 54 days of delay, but
did not seek compensation for that because it was concurrent with other delays (app.
supp. R4, tab 122 at APP 2398). The CO formally rejected this change order request
by a letter dated October 23, 2012 (R4, tab 81).

       On July 29, 2013, AGJV submitted a certified claim to the CO seeking
$22,141 in costs associated with the sprinkler flow tests and redesign (R4, tab 85).
This claim was only for money damages and provided that damages as a result of
delays to the project would be “addressed in separate Requests for Equitable
Adjustment” (id. at GOV 1571). In part, this claim advanced the theory that the costs
had been affected by the differing site condition of the water pressure from the
February 2012 flow tests being materially lower than the flow test results included in
the RFP (id. at GOV 1575-77).

       On December 17, 2015, the CO issued a decision denying the claim in whole
(R4, tab 87). AGJV filed a timely notice of appeal with the Board on January 27,
2016, which we docketed as ASBCA No. 60428.

       On May 19, 2016, the CO issued a one paragraph revision to its December 17,
2015 final decision, noting a different beneficial occupancy date for the project (R4,
tab 87 at GOV 1589). AGJV filed with the Board what it characterizes as a protective
notice of appeal to this decision on July 15, 2016, which we docketed as ASBCA
No. 60691.

       VI. The Electronic Security System

       At about the same time that the fire sprinkler dispute was heating up, the parties
also had a significant dispute about who was responsible for providing the Electronic
Security System (ESS) under the contract. This dispute, reflected in Appeal
Nos. 60426 and 60689, had consequences for the timing of its installation and thus is
related to claims of delay.

       A. Contractual Provisions

       Section D5030 of the RFP, Communications and Security, is the earliest
mention of the ESS in that document. In part, it states, “[t]he infrastructure (conduit
and junction boxes) for a complete security and access control system will be provided
under this contract.” (R4, tab 5 at GOV 442)

                                           30
        It later specified that:

               The General Contractor shall provide/install all conduit
               and junction boxes and the subcontractor shall procure and
               install all electronic equipment (commercial off the shelf)
               including computer, hardware, software, UPS, door strikes,
               etc. The security subcontractor shall visit the site and
               review security conduit at the rough-in stage.

(Id.)

       The most detailed provision of the RFP regarding the ESS requirements is
Section D503005, Security Systems (R4 tab 5 at GOV 443-44). In part, it provides
that:
            The General Construction Contractor must sub out the
            electronic security system installation to a contractor who
            has direct experience in installing/integrating the new
            system and must have performed Integrated Security
            Management System (ISMS)/Electronic Security System
            (ESS) projects for the Navy for the past 18 months. The
            subcontractor must have a current certification as a Value
            Added Reseller, as both a supplier of the base approved
            (Security Department) Electronic Security System (ESS)
            equipment, and installer of the base approved ESS. Any
            licenses for system software upgrades must be included in
            this installation. A complete design indicating all major
            equipment in the security system shall be provided to the
            Government for review. This drawing package shall be a
            controlled document and shall be updated as needed.

(R4, tab 5, at GOV 443) Later paragraphs in the same section set forth requirements
for the ESS and require that the contractor “provide” numerous features in the ESS (id.
at GOV 443-44). This later text also imposes requirements about how the ESS
subcontractor and the general contractor should work together for installation:

               The General Contractor must coordinate the construction
               of the facility with the ESS subcontractor to allow him
               enough time to inspect the conduit and junction boxes
               before he starts closing walls to make certain that all
               necessary conduit and junction boxes are in the proper
               locations.

(R4, tab 5 at GOV 443)

                                           31
        The RFP also states that “[t]he contractor shall submit the ESS design, as well
as the testing and commissioning plan to the Government for review and approval”
(id. at GOV 444).

        Section G403007 of the RFP provides that the ESS discussed in Section
D503005 (discussed immediately above) was for the interior of the project and then
sets forth requirements for the provision of the exterior ESS. This included magnetic
switches, card readers, and exit buttons, and required conduit and junction boxes be
provided to all exterior doors. It also required, with Section G409001, “rough-ins” for
exterior closed circuit television cameras. 38 (See R4, tab 5 at GOV 469)

        Without getting ahead of the legal discussion to follow in the Decision section
below, one basis for the dispute over whether the RFP requires installation of the ESS
lies in its discussion of funding in Section D503005. In relevant part, the section
provides:
                Since the funding (OPN funds) for design, procurement,
                and installation of the ESS will be provided separately, the
                base contracting officer must contact Mr. Mike Viggiano,
                at NFESC Port Hueneme, CA at [phone number
                redacted] 39 to coordinate the transfer of funds. MCON
                Construction Project funds can not be used for the
                Electronic Security System.

(R4, tab 5 at GOV 443) The parties have not directed us to any part of the record
indicating how the ESS costs were to be bid, and our review of AGJV’s Phase II
Proposal documents (see R4, tabs 18, 22) has not found anything immediately
apparent as being material to the issue.

       B. How The Parties Initially Treated the ESS Requirement

       The initial design analysis prepared for the project by AGJV 40, dated
November 25, 2009, which was quite skeletal, included a section on the Security
System which, in toto, provided: “An empty conduit system shall be provided for the
security, access and CCTV [closed circuit television] systems per the RFP” (R4,

38
   We take this to mean that exterior closed circuit television cameras were not
        required to be installed by the contract, but that the contractor was expected to
        create an infrastructure for them if they were later desired.
39
   We have deleted Mr. Viggiano’s phone number in this published decision.
40
   It was labeled as being done by Grimberg, rather than AGJV (see R4, tab 126
        at GOV 28580), though, of course, it was submitted on behalf of the joint
        venture.

                                            32
tab 103 at GOV 28360). Identical language may be found in the February 19, 2010
Design Development Design Analysis (see R4, tab 126 at GOV 28610).

        In a series of discussions about subsequent design submissions, Mr. Angelo
Tjournas from the Navy initiated an inquiry on July 27, 2010 regarding the exterior
CCTV system in which he stated that he did “not have a copy of the RFP but the
security system is to be bid as a bid item.” On August 4, 2010, Mr. Caudle replied on
behalf of AGJV stating that “the security system components” would be provided
“under a separate contract” and that AGJV would provide the “infrastructure” for the
exterior cameras. On August 19, Mr. Tjournas responded that, “[a]ll we need is
infrastructure for the ESS contractor to add devices.” Mr. Caudle replied on
August 30 that the conduit necessary for the cameras was shown in the drawings and
the installation would be completed by the ESS contractor. On October 6, 2010,
Mr. Tjournas closed the issue without further comment. (R4, tab 150 at GOV 1342)

       In page E001 of the design drawings issued for construction on October 15,
2010, under “SECURITY,” Alphatec 41 wrote: “THE SECURITY SYSTEM FINAL
DESIGN AND COORDINATION AND CONSTRUCTION WILL BE PROVIDED
UNDER A SEPARATE CONTRACT. THIS CONTRACT INCLUDES THE
INFRASTRUCTURE ONLY. REFER TO THESE DRAWINGS AND DETAILS
FOR MORE INFORMATION” (app. supp. R4, tab 132). The record does not indicate
the government’s making any objection to this characterization.

         C. The Parties Recognize a Disconnect

        On January 4, 2012, AGJV asked the Navy to set up a meeting with the security
subcontractor for the project (app. supp. R4, tab 87 at APP 1796). The parties had a
meeting on February 13, 2012 to discuss the matter and Mr. Duda of AGJV stated that
the Navy was responsible for getting the security contractor. Ms. Julie Jacko from
Naval Facilities Command sent Mr. Duda an email valentine of sorts the next day,
informing him that, no, under the RFP, AGJV was responsible for obtaining a
subcontractor to design and install the security system. (Id. at APP 1797) Mr. Duda
responded the same day, advancing the argument that the RFP made the subcontractor
the responsibility of the Navy and arguing that the contract documents made the
security system a separate contract and that Mr. Tjournas, who had been coordinating
design with Alphatec on behalf of the Navy, held the same view (id. at APP 1796-97).
More email was exchanged the same day, with Mr. Amanze from the Navy reiterating
the position that the RFP required AGJV to obtain a subcontractor, while Mr. Duda
reiterated the position that he had articulated to Ms. Jacko (app. supp. R4, tab 175
at APP 2672).

41
     Alphatec performed these design services on behalf of AGJV as previously
         discussed.

                                           33
         D. The Parties Attempt to Negotiate a Change Order to pay for the ESS

       The parties have pointed to no further correspondence in the record regarding
responsibility for the ESS. At some point, however, we can infer that the Navy
decided to bite the bullet and pay AGJV an additional sum to have it designed, built,
and installed. To that end, on March 6, 2012, the Navy issued an “RFP Modification”
pursuant to the contract’s Changes Clause, directing AGJV to submit a proposal to
design and build a security system for the project that would meet the requirements of
the original RFP; provide acceptance tests and inspections of the security system as
required by the original RFP; and to update all project drawings to incorporate the
approved security system design (R4, tab 46 at GOV 1321-22). The RFP Modification
made AGJV’s cost proposal due on March 20, 2012 and allowed for the possibility
that AGJV might request more time to complete the contract, although it required
AGJV to justify any such time extension (id. at GOV 1321).

       On March 9, 2012, the Navy sent another letter to AGJV, authorizing it to incur
$20,000 in costs on the ESS, but no more prior to acceptance of its proposal (R4,
tab 47 at GOV 1324).

       On March 20, 2012, AGJV submitted its proposal (R4, tab 49 at GOV 1329). It
sought $176,382 in direct costs for the ESS subcontractor, Executive Technologies
Corporation (ETC); $19,288 in its own direct costs ($17,638 of which was for
Alphatec to incorporate an ESS into its pre-existing design (see id. at GOV 1331)),
plus a markup; a 13-week time extension; extended overhead for that time extension,
summing to $203,996; markups and a 6 % profit. The grand total was $445,679. (Id.
at GOV 1330)

        The government found the proposal excessive. The CO sent a letter to AGJV
on March 22, 2012, detailing the Navy’s objections, including the Navy’s view that
AGJV’s proposal was charging it for work that it had already acknowledged it was
required to do (the conduit); design work that should have been unnecessary; and
(what the government believed to be) an unsupported 13-week time extension. The
letter directed AGJV to submit a new proposal. (R4, tab 50) A subsequent email to
AGJV from Ms. Jacko on April 4, 2012, gave a condensed version of issues that
needed to be addressed in a resubmittal (R4, tab 53). That was rejected by AGJV in an
undated letter sent shortly thereafter (R4, tab 54).

        The parties apparently had a meeting on April 16, 2012, that didn’t resolve
matters, and on April 25, 42 2012, AGJV sent a letter to the Navy “stand[ing] behind”
its earlier proposal and asking the Navy to simply issue a unilateral change order so

42
     The letter is dated March 25, rather than April 25, but, as it references events in
         April (see R4, tab 51), we are persuaded that this is just another typo.

                                              34
that construction would be delayed no further. The letter promised that the design
would be completed within three weeks of the receipt of the unilateral change order.
(R4, tab 51)

       The Navy refused to issue the requested unilateral change order. Instead, on
April 30, 2012, the CO wrote to AGJV that it could not issue a change order until it
considered AGJV’s final design of the ESS so that it would know what equipment it
would be purchasing in the change order. It further directed that AGJV provide the
final design by May 14, 2012. (R4, tab 61)

       On May 14, 2012, AGJV submitted a new ESS proposal to the Navy. The
bottom line was slightly higher than its earlier offer (now, $452,304 versus the
$445,679 mentioned above) and it included a detailed estimate from its proposed
subcontractor, ETC. (R4, tab 63) The Navy asked for revisions shortly after receiving
the proposal and, on May 23, 2012, AGJV forwarded a revised version of its proposal,
including an updated breakdown of costs from its subcontractor (R4, tab 65
at GOV 1414). There was more back and forth, with a slightly revised proposal being
submitted the next day, May 24 (R4, tab 66); government comments being provided
on June 5 (see R4, tab 67 at GOV 1436 (referencing comments)); and a final revised
version being submitted by AGJV on June 6 (R4, tab 67), which was approved by the
government on or about June 9, 2012 (Duda decl. ¶ 26; Greenwell decl. ¶ 23).

       The government did not agree to the 13-week time extension sought by AGJV.
Instead, the CO sent a letter to AGJV stating that installation of the ESS was a
requirement of the contract and that AGJV should have planned on it. (R4, tab 68
at GOV 1447-48) On the other hand, “[i]n the interest of partnering,” the Navy
decided to allow ESS work to be considered independent of substantial completion,
meaning that the beneficial occupancy date (BOD) could be determined to have been
met even if there were items remaining to be completed for the ESS. Put another way,
there would be no liquidated damages assessed “solely for non-completion of the
ESS.” (Id. at GOV 1448)

       It is important to recognize that, though the parties had agreed to the scope of
work and the government had apparently approved AGJV’s and ETC’s plans by
June 9, 2012, no change order had issued. As will be seen below, that did not occur
until November 2012.

       E. The Work on Installing the ESS

       Even before the Navy approved the ESS plans, AGJV and ETC performed
some work related to the ESS. On March 14, 2012, AGJV sent a letter to the Navy
inquiring whether it should delay closing the drywall at the building site because of the
RFP’s requirement for the drywall to remain open until the ESS conduits and boxes

                                           35
could be inspected (R4, tab 48). We did not see a response to this request in the
record, but presumably the Navy communicated that, consistent with the RFP, the
drywall was to remain open until investigation. We can surmise as much because on
April 26, 2012, AGJV sent a letter to Ms. Jacko informing her that ETC had inspected
the conduit rough-ins and was satisfied with them and that AGJV would proceed to
close the drywall (R4, tab 57).

       More significant work installing the ESS began quickly after the Navy
approved ETC’s design in early June. On June 18, 2012, AGJV reported to the Navy
that ETC had begun work at the site on June 11, 2012 and expected to be finished by
July 23, 2012 (R4, tab 69 at GOV 1451). By June 13 (just two days later), AGJV was
reporting that the work was 65% complete in the field (app. supp. R4, tab 67
at APP 410).

        On about June 24, 2012, AGJV requested that the Navy provide it 10 IP
addresses for use by the security equipment (Greenwell decl. ¶ 25; Duda decl. ¶ 28;
app. supp. R4, tab 262 at APP 3237). There were delays in getting this information to
AGJV (in part, because the particular IP addresses to be provided depended upon the
equipment they were to be used for; in part because some of the responsible Navy
individuals were on leave at the time the request was being processed) (see app. supp.
R4, tab 262). Ultimately, the IP addresses were provided at the end of July 2012 and
then revised on or about August 1, 2012 (Greenwell decl. ¶ 25; Duda decl. ¶ 28). On
July 18, 2012, while awaiting the IP addresses, AGJV reported that ETC had “done all
that they can do” until it received the IP addresses and that, after their receipt, it would
take approximately two weeks to conclude the work, which appears to have mostly
involved setting up for testing (see app. supp. R4, tab 70 at APP 437). Though the
lack of IP addresses plainly prevented testing of the system, there is no evidence
before us that it delayed the hardware installation.

       After receipt of the IP addresses, the parties originally scheduled the ESS
testing for August 9, 2012, but re-scheduled it for August 17, 2012. On August 22,
2012, the ESS system testing was considered complete, and the system was accepted.
(App. supp. R4, tab 294 at APP 5781)

       F. The Change Order for the ESS is Issued

        On November 21, 2012, the CO executed Modification No. P00002 (Mod P2),
which purported to be effective on November 19 (R4, tab 82 at GOV 1551). Mod P2
was a unilateral modification that provided authorization and funding for AGJV to
design, install, and test the ESS. In particular, it stated that it was being issued
“to allocate payment for the security system through Anti-Terrorism Force Protection
AT/FP funding.” It provided $151,019 in additional funding to the contract to pay for
it and added 91 days (13 weeks, it turns out) to the contract completion date, making it

                                             36
June 28, 2012. It did not, however, purport to pay AGJV overhead on those 91 days.
The extra 91 days, nevertheless, affected the Navy’s calculation of liquidated damages
for late contract completion (much more on that subject below), and caused the Navy
to release $477,750 to AGJV. (Id. at GOV 1552-53)

      Important to the arguments that AGJV would later make, Mod P2 refers to
“new work.” The work detailed in that section was to:

                (1) Design and build a security system for MILCON
                P-166 IAW the requirements of the P-166 RFP Part 3
                Section D503005 and G403007.

                (2) Provide all acceptance tests and inspections of the
                security system as required by P-166 RFP Part 3 Section
                D503006.

                (3) Update all applicable project drawings for MILCON
                P-166 to incorporate the approved security system design.

(Id. at 1552)

       Mod P2 rejected $7,724.72 in costs associated with labor on the exterior
systems and $1,668.52 in costs associated with exterior materials (id.). Markups
acknowledged in Mod P2 included 5% prime contractor overhead on subcontractors;
6% prime contractor profit; and 1% bonding (id.), thus, Mod P2’s disallowance of
those costs would sum to $10,520.34 ($7,724 + $1,668 = $9,393.24, which is then
multiplied by 112% to account for the markups).

       G. AGJV’s ESS Claim

        Needless to say, Mod P2 did not satisfy AGJV. On July 2, 2013, AGJV
submitted a certified claim to the CO. This ESS claim sought an additional $30,513 in
direct costs for the work associated with Mod P2. These were comprised of $16,513
for the exterior ESS components; $11,999 for Alphatec’s additional design work; and
$2,001 for the additional work required by AGJV’s scheduler. (R4, tab 84
at GOV 1559-62, GOV 1569) It also sought an additional 55-day contract extension
and a release of all liquidated damages on the contract (id. at GOV 1562). The theory
for the extra 55-day extension was that the ESS was not accepted until August 22,
2012, which was 55 days after June 28, 2012— the contract extension contained in
Mod P2 (id.). The release of all liquidated damages (an amount greater than the

                                            37
55-day calendar day extension) 43 was premised upon notions that liquidated damages
were inappropriate when the government extended the period of contract performance
(id. at GOV 1566-68). AGJV recognized that this may be an unpersuasive argument
(and, as discussed below, it is, indeed, unpersuasive) and made the fallback argument
that the government should at least release the $288,750 in liquidated damages that
were associated with the 55-day extension (id. at GOV 1568).

       The CO’s decision on the claim, issued on December 18, 2015, was largely a
victory for AGJV. The CO denied the extra costs and the request to set aside all
liquidated damages but granted the 55-day contract extension (until August 22, 2012),
thereby releasing the corresponding $288,750 in liquidated damages, along with
$12,698.62 in interest. (R4, tab 86 at GOV 1584-85).

      AGJV filed a notice of appeal of this decision on January 27, 2016, and the
Board docketed it as Appeal No. 60426.

       On May 19, 2016, the CO issued a revised final decision, leaving its previous
decision intact, but also affirmatively seeking the remaining $199,500 in liquidated
damages (R4, tab 86 at GOV 1582-83).

       AGJV filed a protective notice of appeal of this final decision on July 15, 2016,
and the Board docketed it as Appeal No. 60689.

         VII. The Government’s Imposition of Liquidated Damages

      Inasmuch as liquidated damages have come into play with the ESS issues, we
now turn to issues of the contract completion date and the beneficial occupancy date,
which are relevant to Appeal Nos. 60427 and 60690.

         A. Contract Extensions Prior to Mod P2

       In a contract modification effective July 7, 2011, but executed by the CO on
August 19, 2011, the Navy extended the contract completion date (CCD) by
eight calendar days: from February 8, 2012 to February 16, 2012 (see R4, tab 29
at GOV 1232-33). This was a bilateral modification, as it was also signed by AGJV
on August 12, 2011 (see id. at GOV 1234). The modification included the words:

43
     The Navy held $488,250 in liquidated damages at the time of this claim, which is
         more than the 55 days multiplied by the $5,250 per day liquidated damages rate
         of the contract (R4, tab 84 at GOV 1568).

                                           38
              CONTRACTOR’S RELEASE. Acceptance of this
              modification by the contractor constitutes an accord and
              satisfaction and represents payment in full for both time
              and money and for any and all costs, impact effect, and for
              delays and disruptions arising out of, or incidental to, the
              work as herein revised.

(Id. at GOV 1232; GOV 1234)

       The next change to the CCD came through another contract modification,
Modification No. A00006 (Mod 6), dated October 13, 2011 (see R4, tab 31). Mod 6
purports to be a bilateral modification, and its text states that it was the result of
negotiations held on October 11, 2011 (see id. at GOV 1246), but the record does not
include the signature of an AGJV representative on it (see R4, tab 31 at GOV 1245).
In any event, Mod 6 was a no-cost modification that extended the CCD by 42 days, to
March 29, 2012, as a result of the “unusual weather experienced during Hurricane
Irene and Tropical Storm Lee as well as due to an excess number of rain fall days
experienced during Spring 2011” (id. at GOV 1246).

       B. The Government Expresses Schedule Concerns and Imposes Liquidated
          Damages

       When the March 29, 2012 CCD date came and went without completion of the
project, the Navy CO began imposing liquidated damages at the $5,250 daily rate
provided by the contract by withholding funds from AGJV’s monthly invoices
(see R4, tab 59 at GOV 1368). The parties had seen the delayed completion of the
project coming for a long time. The Navy sent its first letter of concern about
completion delays on July 7, 2011 (R4, tab 37), with a second one being issued on
January 11, 2012 after AGJV’s construction schedule submitted by AGJV on
January 9, 2012 indicated a CCD of June 13, 2012 (R4, tab 38). The January 11,
2012 letter warned of liquidated damages (id.). Another letter of concern was sent on
April 27, 2012 after liquidated damages had begun to be assessed, though the parties
already had several in-person meetings in which scheduling concerns had been front
and center by this time (R4, tab 59 at GOV 1368-69; Gannon decl. ¶ 6).

       C. Completion of the Project

          1. Problems That Affected the Completion

        There were a lot of things going on that hindered the completion of the project
that had nothing to do with the Navy, the ESS, or the sprinkler system. The
installation of the roof and the windows were critical, not just for their own sake but
also for permitting work to begin on the interior of the building once it could dry out

                                           39
from the elements (Reichard Report at 15-16). 44 A table in Mr. Reichard’s report
comparing AGJV’s plans as of November 30, 2011 with the same plans three months
later, on February 29, 2012, demonstrates how this work was delayed: the roof
membrane was delayed from being completed on January 3, 2012 to March 7, 2012;
and the windows, which were to be delivered on January 6, 2012, were not, in fact,
delivered until March 5, 2012 (Reichard Report at 16). Structural metal spandrels,
necessary for the sunshades (related to the windows) were also seriously delayed in
their delivery (id. at 14; Wustner decl. ¶ 13). Though AGJV attempted to mitigate the
problem of roofing delay by taking “temporary protective measures,” these measures
were suboptimal and allowed water entry into the building (Reichard Report at 15).
Indeed, these problems led to a requirement to remove and replace wet drywall
(Wustner decl. ¶ 21; R4, tab 55 (April 23, 2012 email noting water infiltration in
multiple areas requiring replacement of drywall)). The roof, apparently, was never
quite right and ultimately needed replacing after the contract was completed (Wustner
decl. ¶ 14; Gannon rebuttal decl. ¶ 7).

        And it took substantial time for AGJV to get the installation of the windows and
the window curtain wall 45 right. The windows were required to be tested before being
installed (in the late spring / early summer of 2012), but AGJV’s installer failed to
conduct the tests. The tests were then conducted, the windows failed, and then needed
to be removed and reinstalled. (Wustner decl. ¶¶ 21-22). The problems with the
windows led to further water infiltration, requiring the replacement of damaged carpet
and yet more drywall (id. ¶ 23).

       Additional problems abounded in the installation of the HVAC system and
other mechanical aspects of the building. Mr. Barry Amrich, P.E., is a mechanical
engineering subject matter expert who was brought in by NAVFAC in April/May 2012
to inspect the mechanical equipment and system installation of the project (Amrich
decl. ¶¶ 2, 5). Mr. Amrich’s first inspection, on April 27, 2012, turned up a host of
problems with the HVAC and plumbing systems including: duct and piping insulation
was often torn or compressed; pipes and ducts penetrated fire partitions without wall
sleeves or other fire protection; poorly installed ducts; a water heater that was
“‘pinned’ in” by pipes so that it could not be easily removed if necessary for
replacement; space deficiencies where, essentially, too much equipment was crowded

44
   We cite here the report of David Reichard, P.E., dated July 20, 2020. Mr. Reichard,
       whose curriculum vitae indicates 25 years of experience in the construction
       industry and multiple instances of being recognized as a scheduling expert by
       the Board, state courts, and United States District Courts (see Reichard Report,
       attach. 1), is the government’s scheduling expert, and AGJV has made
       no objection to our consideration of his testimony as an expert, which we do.
45
   The “window curtain wall” was essentially a wall that was a window from the slab
       to the ceiling (see R4, tab 5 at GOV 415).

                                          40
into too small a space; and many other defects in workmanship including such things
as problems with ductwork and a joint of two exterior walls that was so poor that he
could see through it from the inside to the outside even as drywall and insulation were
being installed which would be open to the elements (id. ¶ 6).

       Mr. Amrich continued to see significant and extensive problems as he visited
the building in May through July 2012 that we will summarize as shoddy
workmanship throughout the HVAC space that was often below the industry and RFP
standards (see Amrich decl. ¶¶ 7-28). Nevertheless, by late July, Mr. Amrich was
writing his colleagues about the beneficial occupancy date (BOD) and what needed to
be done to meet it (id. ¶ 29).

          2. The Beneficial Occupancy Date

       For all its problems, however, work on the project slowly advanced.

        The BOD is, for lack of a more precise term, “squishy.” In the end, most of the
issues that the Navy identified as affecting the BOD were complete by September 18,
2012, although some were not and would remain problematic for some time. The
Navy did not move into the building at that time, but (as will be seen) retroactively set
the BOD for September 30, 2012, which appears to have been somewhat arbitrary.
We discuss all this in more detail below.

         First, we include the list of primary issues the Navy identified in the Summer of
2012 as affecting the BOD. On July 2, 2012, AGJV sent the Navy a rather ambitious
letter, seeking to have the building declared ready for beneficial occupancy,
notwithstanding the significant punch list with un-resolved items that it attached to the
letter (see app. supp. R4, tab 107). The Navy was unpersuaded, and in a letter dated
July 7, 2012, rejected AGJV’s request, reminding AGJV that it had provided it a
“Red Zone” checklist at a meeting on June 18, 2012 and that there were five large
items that stood in the way of accepting the building: 1) certification of the roof;
2) acceptance of the furniture, fixtures and equipment (FF & E); 3) acceptance of the
fire protection system; 4) completion of the testing and balancing of the HVAC
system; and 5) correction of operations and maintenance support information (OMSI)
deficiencies. The letter also noted that the list of five items was “not a complete list”
and referred AGJV to the Red Zone checklist. (R4, tab 75 at GOV 1506)

        About a month later, on August 6, 2012, the Navy sent another letter to AGJV
about beneficial occupancy. In this letter, the Navy stated that it wanted to “bring to
your attention some additional concerns we feel may impact your progress.” It listed
the five items called out in the July 9 letter and added a sixth: “Windows need to pass
all required acceptance tests.” Like the July 9 letter, this one explained that these were

                                           41
the major points, but that there were others preventing acceptance of the building as
well. (R4, tab 456 at GOV 30792)

        In a five-page letter dated August 7, 2012, complaining about the assessment of
liquidated damages, notwithstanding the Navy’s refusal to allow weekend work,
AGJV inserted a line stating that it “believes it is now substantially complete with the
project” (app. supp. R4, tab 109 at APP 1935). This letter did not address the concerns
set forth in the Navy’s correspondence (id. at APP 1931-35). On August 10, 2012,
AGJV sent another letter to the Navy purely on the subject of beneficial occupancy.
This letter went into great detail about the six primary issues raised by the
Navy’s August 6 letter, largely arguing that they were already completed, on the way
to being completed, or not necessary for beneficial occupancy. (App. supp. R4,
tab 110) A subsequent letter from AGJV to the CO, dated August 29, 2012, laid out
AGJV’s plans for completing the final work necessary for occupancy (see app. supp.
R4, tab 112).

        In its brief, AGJV goes into detail about the six issues that the Navy had
asserted were its primary concerns regarding beneficial occupancy (see app. br.
at 51-55), but the Navy, for its own reasons, chose not to address these issues in any
detail in its response. We have reviewed the evidence and conclude that:

       First, the roof system was completely installed, inspected, and approved by the
subcontractor and manufacturer by August 22, 2012. We base this finding on the
unrefuted declaration of John Greenwell, who says so directly (see Greenwell decl. ¶ 59),
though we make this finding with some trepidation because the documentary evidence
referenced in AGJV’s brief for this proposition (see app. br. at 51-52 (citing R4, tab 481
at GOV 31304, 31306; 492 at GOV 31371)) does not actually support this finding, and,
instead, demonstrates a failure of the roof inspection on August 6, 2012 (R4, tab 481
at GOV 31306). Nevertheless, Mr. Greenwell’s testimony is unrefuted and, based upon
the evidence before us, we find it, more probably than not, true.

       Second, as AGJV asserted in its August 10, 2012, letter (see app. supp. R4,
tab 110 at APP 1936), the FF&E was apparently delivered and installed in the first
two weeks of June 2012. We see evidence of this in the daily reports for this time
period (see app. supp. R4, tab 78 at APP 1195-APP 1224). We see no rebuttal of this
allegation from the government except its brief’s reference to the need to move some
furniture in late September/early October 2012 to allow for carpet remediation caused
by flooding from leaky windows (see gov’t br. at 134-35 (citing 46 app. supp. R4,

46
     Navy counsel cited to the entire 887-page tab containing all the contractor’s reports,
        rather than including the pin cites that we have provided above. Needless to
        say, that was inadequate.

                                              42
tab 78 at APP 1380-87)), but this does not prove that the FF&E had not been properly
installed earlier.

        Third, acceptance of the fire alarm and fire protection system was apparently
completed by the end of August, 2012. First, the sprinkler system was actually
completed prior to July 30, 2012 (see app. supp. R4, tab 112 at APP 1955). Despite
the Navy’s identification of numerous defects in the fire alarm and fire protection
systems in a July 30, 2012 report (see id. at APP 1955-56), Mr. Greenwell and
Mr. Duda testified that all the issues that would affect beneficial occupancy were
completed by August 29, 2012 (see Greenwell decl. ¶¶ 68-72; Duda decl. ¶¶ 71-75).
The Navy has identified no contrary evidence except for a portion of Mr. Fisher’s
expert report (about fire sprinklers) which concedes that the sprinklers were approved
earlier, but that the fire alarm system was not approved until September 19, 2012
(see gov’t br. at 104 (citing Fisher Report at 19-20)). Since the Fisher Report is not
focused on the fire alarm system and cites no basis for its September 19 date that
we may independently verify, 47 we will give greater weight to the testimony of
AGJV’s two project managers.

       Fourth, the HVAC system appears to have been ready for use by September 18,
2012. Messrs. Greenwell and Duda testified on behalf of AGJV that the HVAC
system was ready for use on August 10, 2012 (Greenwell decl. ¶ 61; Duda decl. ¶ 64),
but the daily reports indicate otherwise. Namely, the September 18, 2012 daily report
shows multiple workers onsite, including four specifically to handle HVAC issues,
with the word, “commissioning,” contained in their work description (app. supp. R4,
tab 78 at APP 1364). The next page of the daily report contains this paragraph:

                 Punch list. Cutting pavers for placement on green roof.
                 HVAC punch list/commissioning. Demonstrate smoke
                 detector works in elevator shaft. Performed Dynamic
                 testing of West elevation current wall. HVAC technician
                 for troubleshooting AHU-2 and final commissioning.
                 Function testing and verification of HVAC equipment with
                 NAVFAC. Install grommets in counter tops at reception
                 desk. Curtain wall installer onsite for testing. Verify FA
                 alarm is operating as designed with AHJ. Onsite for final
                 commissioning and verification of HVAC equipment
                 operation with NAVFAC.

(Id. at APP 1365)

47
     While it is possible that there is additional support for this date somewhere in the
         vast record of this case, it is not readily apparent to us where it might be, and
         we have already done more than enough of the Navy’s work for it.

                                              43
        AGJV characterized all the work being done on September 18, 2012 as mere
“punch list” work (see app. br. at 52 n.3) and, indeed, its daily report uses that
moniker, but at the end of the day, the HVAC system, by AGJV’s own
characterization, was neither verified with NAVFAC, nor considered commissioned
until this day. And AGJV has provided no basis for us to question the withholding of
commissioning until this date as unreasonable. To us, that means that, despite having
finished a large number of items on the road to completion, the HVAC system, a
prerequisite for building occupancy, was not considered complete until this date.
Indeed, Mr. Duda states that September 18, 2012 was the date at which the Navy
“signed off” on completion of the HVAC system (Duda decl. ¶ 65). 48

        The government argues that, even by the September 29, 2012 BOD that it (in its
view) generously selected, the HVAC system was not complete. In support of this
assertion, it cites Mr. Amrich’s declaration and the declaration of Mr. Matthew
Konschak, who, among other things, notes that the building was extremely cold in
October when he visited it before personnel moved in. (See gov’t br. at 135 (citing
Amrich decl. ¶¶ 41-42); gov’t br. at 81, 136 (citing Konschak decl. ¶ 7)) But, as cited
by the government, Mr. Amrich’s concerns regarding the BOD are too general in
nature to override the apparent agreement of the Navy to commission the HVAC
system on September 18, 2012; and Mr. Konschak’s evidence that the building was
cold one day in October 2012 could be explained by a host of factors that are not
deficiencies that would preclude beneficial occupancy. To be sure, there is evidence
that the HVAC system had significant problems after the BOD, as Mr. Amrich
discussed at length in his declaration, but the Navy accepted it on September 18, 2012,
and many of those problems did not manifest themselves until after substantial
completion and the move-in.

       Fifth, there is no evidence that the OMSI deficiencies were a significant issue
into August 2012: as AGJV has argued (see app. br. at 55), the Navy considered
OMSI information to be necessary for final completion, but not to preclude a finding
of substantial completion in this particular case (see Greenwell decl. ¶ 73; Duda decl.
¶ 76). The Navy has produced no evidence to contradict these declarations.

        Finally, there is the issue of the windows, which were a continuing headache
for all involved. As discussed above, they were initially installed improperly and
required a remediation plan. In fact, as AGJV admitted in its August 29, 2012 letter to
the CO, proposing its way forward to conclude the project, although the curtain wall

48
     We note that there were still technicians working on the HVAC system the next
        two days, according to the daily reports, but they seem to be much more limited
        in scope (see app. supp. R4, tab 78 at APP 1366-69) and we conclude that
        September 18, 2012 was, in fact, the day, that the Navy conceded the HVAC
        system was substantially complete.

                                           44
appeared to have finally been fixed, after having failed a third party test (apparently
sometime in August) (see app. supp. R4, tab 112 at APP 1949), AGJV still needed to
repair the other windows, though it had a repair plan that was to be concluded by
September 7, 2012 (see id. at APP 1950). As AGJV notes in its brief, the last of the
remediation work reflected in its daily production reports occurred on September 4,
2012 (see app. br. at 53 (citing app. supp. R4, tab 78 at APP 1334-45)). What AGJV
does not note in its brief is that there was a requirement for third party testing of the
window curtain (acknowledged in its August 29, 2012 letter to the CO (see app. supp.
R4, tab 112 at APP 1949)), which was not fulfilled until September 18, 2012 (see app.
supp. R4, tab 78 at APP 1364-65 (reflecting the testing by the curtain wall installer)).
We also note that, according to AGJV, the reason the testing for the curtain wall was
conducted on September 18, 2012 and not earlier was because of the availability of
AGJV’s subcontractor, which AGJV had attempted to have come earlier (see app.
supp. R4, tab 112 at APP 1949).

       Considering the multiple and ongoing failures of the windows, we do not
consider this testing to have been a mere formality, but a necessity before the Navy
could consider the building ready for occupancy. 49

         Because the Navy has not given us any other bases for challenging a BOD after
the curtain wall and HVAC were accepted, we find the building was apparently ready
for its intended use as of September 18, 2012.

       D. The Navy’s Adjustment of Liquidated Damages and AGJV’s Claims on the
          Same

        On October 19, 2012, the Navy sent a letter to AGJV remarking upon an
inspection of the building conducted on October 10, 2012 and listing the many things
that needed to be completed on the building under the contract (see R4, tab 80). The
letter also set the BOD at September 29, 50 2012, though it did not provide much of a
rationale for that date (see id. at GOV 1522). The Navy now suggests that the
September 29, 2012 date was more of an act of grace towards the contractor than a
belief that the building was truly ready to use by that date since it was not really ready
to use until sometime after that date, notwithstanding a November 1, 2012
ribbon-cutting ceremony (see Konschak decl. ¶ 7).

49
   The windows (and roof) apparently leaked again in October 2012 (see Konschak
       decl. ¶ 7), but this occurred after the windows passed inspection and after the
       date that the government set as the BOD.
50
   At one point, the Navy’s brief says the 28th of September (gov’t br. at 133). This
       was apparently a typo.

                                            45
       In any event, as discussed in the section on the ESS above, the CO ultimately
adjusted the liquidated damages to match the (unilaterally decided) contract
completion date of August 22, 2012. Thus, the liquidated damages currently held by
the Navy are for the 38-day period of August 23, 2012 until September 29, 2012
at $5,250 per day, which sums to $199,500. (R4, tab 86 at GOV 1582-83)

      AGJV appealed the Navy’s initial imposition of liquidated damages in Appeal
No. 60427 and then revisited the matter when it submitted Appeal No. 60690 after the
Navy reduced its liquidated damages.

       VIII. Acceleration

        As the reader may recall from the discussion above, from October 13, 2011
until the issuance of Mod P2 on November 21, 2012, the CCD was contractually set
at March 29, 2012 and the Navy, beginning in April 2012, was withholding liquidated
damages from AGJV. According to AGJV, though it took the position that it was not
at fault, the Navy’s inflexibility on the CCD; its imposition of liquidated damages; and
its refusal to allow weekend work caused AGJV to order accelerated and overtime
work from its subcontractors at substantial additional cost (see Greenwell decl. ¶ 46;
Duda decl. ¶ 49). This acceleration, according to AGJV, began in the week ending
May 1, 2012, and concluded the week ending August 30, 2012 (see Greenwell decl.
¶ 47 (acceleration ended on August 28, 2012)); Duda decl. ¶ 50 (same); see also app.
br. at 45-46 (citing app. supp. R4, tab 210 at APP 2842; 215 at APP 2946; 221 at
APP 3000; 224 at APP 3024; 230 at APP 3080; 238 at APP 3126; 243 at APP 3170-72;
286 at APP 3827-36)).

       According to AGJV, it assigned additional supervisors during the alleged
acceleration period, increased the supervisory roles of others, and brought in additional
equipment (Greenwell decl. ¶¶ 48-49; Duda decl. ¶¶ 51-52). For these particular
allegedly added expenses, AGJV has not, in its statement of facts or declarations,
explained how acceleration increased their costs. That is, there is no evidence that the
costs of more supervisors for a shorter period of time (via acceleration) was greater
than a smaller number of supervisors over a longer period of time would have been.
The same goes for the extra equipment.

        AGJV’s two relevant declarations (by Messrs. Duda and Greenwell), without
documentary support and in word-for-word identical language, also assert that there
were acceleration costs from its subcontractors, including a labor claim from its
electrical subcontractor, LACO; an acceleration claim from its FF & E subcontractor;
the cost of its flooring contractor providing a moisture barrier for a concrete pour
performed before windows were installed; and the expediting of HVAC balance
testing which required more work from the original contractor and the hiring of an
additional subcontractor (Duda decl. ¶ 53; Greenwell decl. ¶ 50).

                                           46
        AGJV does provide some separate documentary evidence through some email
correspondence that its subcontractors charged it more due to overtime allegedly
incurred due to acceleration: on April 27, 2012, AGJV directed its electrical
subcontractor, LACO Electric, to increase manpower to complete the job in
“4-6 weeks” (app. supp. R4, tab 210 at APP 2842), and two weeks later LACO noted
that it began working 10-hour days in response (but it had not availed itself of the
10-hour days beforehand) (app. supp. R4, tab 221 at APP 3000); on May 25, 2012,
AGJV met with its furniture installation subcontractor, Price Modern, and requested
delivery and installation be completed by June 15, 2012, which led to a commitment to
work 12-hour days, but also a demand for an $84,450 change order by Price Modern
for “the accelerated schedule and storage fees incurred by Price Modern to date” 51
(app. supp. R4, tab 230 at APP 3080); and on June 7, 2012, AGJV told an HVAC
contractor, Baltimore Air Balance, that it would need to work whatever hours were
necessary to complete its work and that it would then need to submit a request for
extra compensation if that was work outside the contract (app. supp. R4, tab 238
at APP 3127).

       We do not find the evidence before us that there were acceleration costs to be
overwhelming and, in many instances, the documentary evidence raises as many
questions as it answers, but the unrefuted declarations of Messrs. Duda and Greenwell
have enough evidentiary weight to persuade us that, after the end of April 2012, AGJV
did direct at least some of its subcontractors to act with greater speed and this direction
did increase the costs charged to AGJV.

       On April 26, 2018, AGJV submitted a certified claim to the CO seeking
$524,783 that it asserted was due as a result of acceleration (see app. supp. R4,
tab 286). The CO has not decided this claim and, on July 23, 2018, AGJV appealed
this deemed denial to the Board. We docketed it as Appeal Number 61715.

             IX. A Final, but Significant, Evidentiary Note

        AGJV has not cited a scheduling expert of its own anywhere in its opening or
reply briefs and we have not found one within the Rule 4 File or AGJV’s supplement
thereto. Thus, we have before us no assertion from AGJV of the number of days
particular government actions may have delayed completion of the project along its
critical path except, perhaps, in the requests for additional time that AGJV made to the
government during contract performance. The government, on the other hand, has
provided a report from its scheduling expert, Mr. Reichard, which we have discussed

51
     We are not certain how storage fees are related to the acceleration claim as they
         appear to be more a reflection that, because the building was behind schedule,
         Price Modern had been required to hold the furniture longer than originally
         contracted for.

                                            47
earlier. Mr. Reichard’s conclusions include a finding that the ESS work did not delay
AGJV’s completion of the project because, among other things, AGJV’s schedule was
planned to be completed by June 15, 2012, while the ESS was not set to be installed
until June 19, 2012 (Reichard Report at 29) and that, in general, “no excusable or
compensable delay occurred after November 30, 2011,” a date when AGJV had
contended to the Navy it had expected to complete the project by March 29, 2012
(see id. at 46).
                                      DECISION

        As alluded to above, for the most part, the Navy has the better argument:
AGJV has not proved that the representations of the site conditions in the contract
were misleading and, to the extent that the soil encountered was weaker than reflected
in the boring logs, there is ample evidence supporting a finding that this was caused by
the weather conditions and AGJV’s work on the site. Moreover, no reasonable
interpretation of the contract or extension of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
would have entitled AGJV to impose upon the Navy a right to work more than double
the number of shifts explicitly permitted in the contract and most of the delays to the
contract completion date were plainly AGJV’s or its subcontractors’ responsibility.
On the other hand, there were changes to the fire sprinkler system that are the
responsibility of the Navy for which it owes compensation to AGJV. Some costs of
the ESS too, remain owed by the Navy to AGJV despite the system’s being
contractually required. Likewise, the contract was substantially completed at an
earlier date than selected by the CO for purposes of liquidated damages assessments.
We discuss this all in more detail below.

       I. Consideration of Appeals Under Board Rule 11 and the Burden of Proof

        This appeal is proceeding under Board Rule 11, which allows the parties to
waive a hearing and instead have the Board issue a decision based on the record.
Board Rule 11(a). “Unlike a motion for summary judgment, which must be
adjudicated on the basis of a set of undisputed facts, pursuant to Board Rule 11, the
Board ‘may make findings of fact on disputed facts.’” U.S. Coating Specialties &
Supplies, LLC, ASBCA No. 58245, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,702 at 183,031 (citation omitted).
With one exception, as the proponent of its claims, AGJV bears the burden of proving
liability and damages in this appeal. Stobil Enter., ASBCA Nos. 61688, 61689,
19-1 BCA ¶ 37,400 at 181,809 (citing Wilner v. United States, 24 F.3d 1397, 1401-02
(Fed. Cir. 1994)). The exception is liquidated damages, which are effectively a
government claim to which it bears the burden of proof initially, but the burden lies
with the contractor if it seeks to prove the delay was excusable. Sauer v. Danzig,
224 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Metro Machine d/b/a General
Dynamics NASSCO Norfolk, ASBCA No. 62221, 22-1 BCA ¶ 38,096 at 185,009.

                                          48
       II. AGJV Does Not Prevail in its Differing Site Condition Claim

       A. The Requirements for a Type I Differing Site Conditions Claim

        Differing site conditions are bread and butter claims in government contracting
and the law is correspondingly well settled. See, e.g. Olympus Corp. v. United States,
98 F.3d 1314, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing the decades of well-established
law governing differing site conditions). A Type I differing site condition, such as that
alleged here, is premised upon the notion that the government has misrepresented
conditions at the site and the contractor reasonably relied upon this representation to
its detriment. As good a description as any of the elements of such a claim may be
found in the Federal Circuit’s decision of Int’l Tech. Corp. v. Winter, 523 F.3d 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2008):

              In order to prevail on such a site conditions claim, a
              contractor must establish four elements. First, the
              contractor must prove that a reasonable contractor reading
              the contract documents as a whole would interpret them as
              making a representation as to the site conditions. See
              Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d [1372, 1376
              (Fed. Cir. 2007)] (“[A] contractor must first prove, as a
              threshold matter, that the contract contained some
              identification of the conditions to be encountered at the
              site.”); H.B. Mac, Inc. v. United States, 153 F.3d 1338,
              1345 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that the court “place[s]
              itself into the shoes of a reasonable and prudent contractor
              and decide[s] how such a contractor would act in
              interpreting the contract documents”) . . . . Second, the
              contractor must prove that the actual site conditions were
              not reasonably foreseeable to the contractor, with the
              information available to the particular contractor outside
              the contract documents, i.e., that the contractor “reasonably
              relied” on the representations. Renda Marine, 509 F.3d
              at 1376 (“[T]he contractor must demonstrate that the
              conditions encountered were not reasonably foreseeable in
              light of all information available to the contractor when
              bidding [and] that the contractor reasonably relied upon its
              original interpretation of the contract.”) . . . . Third, the
              contractor must prove that the particular contractor in fact
              relied on the contract representation. See id. at 1376 . . . .
              Fourth, the contractor must prove that the conditions
              differed materially from those represented . . . . See id.

                                           49
Id. at 1348-49. See also CKY, Inc., ASBCA No. 60451, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,575
at 182,454.

       One important factor to keep in mind for the dispute before us today is just
what is considered to be represented by the contract documents. The contract
documents are not a guarantee that the site will remain forever the way it was when the
borings or other geotechnical survey data were taken. Rather, they are a representation
of what the latent conditions were at the time of contract execution. Olympus Corp.,
98 F.3d at 1316-18.

       Thus, in the case of Southwest Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 13223, 69-1 BCA
¶ 7,424, which bears some similarities to the facts here, we held that the government
was not liable for a differing site condition when heavy rains, subsequent to contract
award, turned the formerly dry soil at Whiteman Air Force Base into a “temporary
quagmire.” 69-1 BCA at 34,492-93. To be sure, the analysis that we applied in
Southwest Engineering involved a Type II differing site condition, but the temporal
nature of the conditions subsequent to contract award would apply equally to a Type I
condition. As we held in that case, explaining why the changed conditions were not
the responsibility of the government, “the [condition] encountered by appellant
was not a condition of the soil which antedated, or existed at, the time when the
contract was entered into.” Id. (citing John McShain, Inc. v. United States, 179 Ct.Cl.
632, 638, 375 F.2d 829, 833 (1967)). Aptly enough, Southwest Engineering involved
“lean clays,” just like those presented here, and we noted that, “[t]he fact that lean
clayey soil will become difficult to compact . . . when excessively moist from rains is a
phenomenon of common knowledge in the construction industry . . . .” Id. at 34,493.

       B. AGJV has not Proved That the Soils Were Different Than Represented in
          the Contract Documents

        Notably absent from the evidence presented by AGJV is any suggestion that the
type of soil encountered was different than that represented in the boring logs. Yes,
AGJV alleged that its firmness was different than anticipated—at least at some spots—
but not that its composition was any different than represented. Nor is there any
evidence that, at the time the borings were made, the “blow counts,” representing how
firm the soil was, were in any way inaccurate or a misrepresentation of the soil’s status
at the time. Though AGJV’s witnesses have testified that there was less-than-firm soil
at the two-foot level at the time they sought to compact it, they have not provided
evidence that this proves there was a misrepresentation in the documents. This is
especially so since, as discussed in the Facts section, above, Part 3, Section G10 of the
RFP cautioned that the geotechnical data that had been provided with the RFP was
“not guaranteed to fully represent all subsurface conditions” and that bidders should
expect “minor variations between the borings.”

                                           50
        The RFP’s expressed limitations are consistent with the Federal Circuit’s
explanation of just what is represented by a boring log. In H.B. Mac, the agency had
provided several boring logs of the property in question, but had not taken borings
near the site of some of the work. When the company performed work at the site near
where the borings had been taken, it found that the soil was consistent with what had
been represented, but when it performed work away from the boreholes, it encountered
soil different than reflected in the logs that had been provided. H.B. Mac, 153 F.3d
1341-42. The court did not find that the boring logs necessarily represented what
conditions would be throughout the entire project, but represented what the conditions
were where the samples were taken and that it was a question of fact whether a
reasonable contractor, armed with the knowledge such a contractor was expected to
possess, would have relied upon them to extrapolate the subsurface conditions at some
distance from where they were taken. Id. at 1347-48. Applying such reasoning here,
we conclude that the borings provided in the RFP did not constitute a Navy guarantee
that, throughout the entire location of the project, the subsurface conditions would be
identical to that found in the 17 borings; rather, the borings provided a baseline of
information and it was the responsibility of the contractor to make a reasonable
determination of what it should expect to encounter based upon what the boring logs
showed, where they were located, and other information available to a reasonable
contractor. If a reasonable contractor would rely on a single boring at the site of the
entrance road to plan exactly how deep the firm soil would be throughout the entirety
of that area, then the government would be responsible for any deviation from such
reasonable expectations. Conversely, if a reasonable contractor would make only
limited presumptions based upon a single boring in a particular area, the government is
not responsible for any unreasonable extrapolations.

        For our purposes, we are helped by the fact that the RFP required AGJV to
obtain a geotechnical expert to interpret the subsurface data. The report by ECS (with
which neither party appears to take issue) warns of just the sorts of problems that
AGJV encountered, prescribing pro-active steps to prevent soft soil conditions.
Moreover, ECS anticipated, almost as a given, that AGJV would encounter some areas
of soft or unsuitable soils that would need to be identified, removed, and replaced.
Mr. Hren’s expert testimony on behalf of the government is consistent with the ECS
report, and amplifies the evidence that the type of soil present at the site was liable to
have moisture control problems once disturbed.

        Although AGJV argues that it properly dewatered the site and took steps to
ensure that the ECS recommendations were complied with, we find the direct evidence
of this to be lacking. No individual for AGJV has testified that such actions were
taken except that it was usually the way things were done on a Grimberg job.
No reflection of such steps can be found in any of the daily reports as we would expect
if they had been rigorously followed. Instead, the daily reports reflect ample rain and
a relatively poorly controlled job site with slurry from the geothermal wells making

                                           51
some (but likely limited) negative impact to the soil, but also utility trenches, the
moving of heavy construction equipment and multiple instances of local flooding
caused by water main breaks that were the responsibility of AGJV all doing their part
to disturb the soil.

       In sum, given our findings of fact regarding the treatment of the work site, the
soil conditions encountered were exactly those that ECS warned AGJV it could
encounter and are consistent with Mr. Hren’s expert testimony. We find no differing
site condition and deny this appeal.

         III. AGJV had no Contractual Right to Work After Hours and the CO’s Refusal
              to Grant it Carte Blanche to do so was no Violation of the Duty of Good
              Faith and Fair Dealing

         A. AGJV had no Contractual Right to Work After Hours

        The contract specified the regular hours of work as being the 8 1/2-hour period
between 7:00 a.m. and 3:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding government
holidays. This is straightforward enough. So, too, is the contractual right to
exceptions: it requires approval of the CO and the contractual provision states that the
CO “may approve” such a request “[b]ased on the justification provided.” The use of
“may,” rather than “shall,” means that the CO has the discretion to say no. Cf.
Andersen Consulting v. United States, 959 F.2d 929, 932 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“may” in a
statute connotes discretion).

       Moreover, nothing about these contract provisions is in any way ambiguous,
which means that extrinsic evidence of AGJV’s experience in other contracts has
no bearing upon the way we should interpret this particular contract. United States v.
Ford Motor Co., 463 F.3d 1267, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Barron Bancshares, Inc. v.
United States, 366 F.3d 1360, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 52 Even if we were to consider
the evidence of past practice that AGJV has provided, we would find it far less
compelling than AGJV makes it out to be. As discussed in the Facts section, above,

52
     Citing TEG-Paradigm Envt’l, Inc. v, United States, 465 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed.
          Cir. 2006) and other cases, AGJV argues that “[t]he plain language of the
          contract must also be construed in accordance with the parties’ course of prior
          dealings.” (See app. br. at 119). This was a surprising sentence for us to read
          because TEG-Paradigm is commonly cited for the proposition that, once a
          contract’s terms are found to be unambiguous, there is usually no need to
          engage in the consideration of extrinsic evidence. See 465 F.3d at 1338. In any
          event, the TEG-Paradigm court’s examination of prior dealings was limited to
          confirming for itself that it read the plain language of the contract consistently
          with the parties’ understanding and nothing more. Id. at 1339.

                                              52
most of the instances cited by AGJV were materially different than the circumstances
presented here, involved contracts which post-dated this one, and the evidence was far
from conclusive as to what obligations the Navy had taken upon itself to approve work
outside of regular hours. No instances cited by AGJV involved the Navy’s granting
the kind of wholesale, blanket extensions of work time requested here.

       B. The Navy’s Denial of AGJV’s Requests for Saturday Work was not a
          Violation of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

       AGJV argues that, to the extent that the work hours clause gave the CO the
discretion to allow work outside regular hours, the CO was required to exercise that
discretion reasonably and that the CO’s failure to do so here constituted a violation of
the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing (app. br. at 115-28).

          1. The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Does Require the Reasonable
             Exercise of the CO’s Discretion as Cabined by the Terms of the Contract

       The doctrine of good faith and fair dealing is based upon the notion that every
contract “imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and enforcement.” Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984,
990 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981));
see also Kelly-Ryan, Inc., ASBCA No. 57168, 18-1 BCA ¶ 36,944 at 180,030;
Relyant, LLC, ASBCA No. 59809, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,085 at 180,539. Pursuant to this
implicit duty, each party’s obligations “include the duty not to interfere with the other
party’s performance and not to act so as to destroy the reasonable expectations of the
other party regarding the fruits of the contract.” Metcalf, 742 F.3d at 991 (quoting
Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

      This duty is not free-floating but is tied to the explicit terms of the contract. As
we explained in Relyant:

              [T]his implicit duty “cannot expand a party’s contractual
              duties beyond those in the express contract or create duties
              inconsistent with the contract’s provisions.” Metcalf,
              742 F.3d at 991 (quoting Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v.
              United States, 596 F.3d 817, 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Thus,
              the duty “is limited by the original bargain: it prevents a
              party’s acts or omissions that, though not proscribed by the
              contract expressly, are inconsistent with the contract’s
              purpose and deprive the other party of the contemplated
              value.” Metcalf, 742 F.3d at 991.

              ---

                                            53
                [T]he doctrine imposes duties that fall within the broad
                outlines set forth by the express terms of the contract,
                approximating the parties’ intent, as divined by the express
                terms of the contract, for addressing circumstances not
                specifically set forth by the contract. This interpretation is
                consistent with the Metcalf court’s reference to
                “faithfulness to an agreed common purpose.” 742 F.3d
                at 991 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
                § 205 cmt. a). As we noted in a pre-Metcalf opinion, the
                proper inquiry regarding the duty often boils down to
                questions of “reasonableness” of the government’s actions,
                see Free & Ben, Inc., ASBCA No. 56129, 09-1 BCA
                ¶ 34,127 at 168,742, although we do not hold here that
                every unreasonable government action necessarily
                constitutes a breach of the duty.

18-1 BCA ¶ 37,085 at 180,539. The Federal Circuit’s decision in Dobyns v. United
States, 915 F.3d 733 (Fed. Cir. 2019), further made clear that “the duty must be ‘keyed
to the obligations and opportunities established in the contract’ so as not to
fundamentally alter the parties’ intended allocations of burdens and benefits associated
with the contract.” 915 F.3d at 739 (quoting Lakeshore Eng’g Servs., Inc. v. United
States, 748 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).

         2. The Boundaries of Reasonable Discretion Here

       The contract provisions at issue here direct a specified work schedule, but allow
the CO to make exceptions “based upon the justifications provided” with 15 days
advanced notice. Based upon the arguments before us, what this means in the context
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is that when extra hours are requested, the
CO’s determinations should be subject to a review for abuse of discretion; that is, the
CO should be expected to act reasonably. 53

       Neither party has cited a case in which it was held that the duty of good faith
and fair dealing had been breached by a CO’s failure to grant extra workdays in
circumstances similar to those here. AGJV has cited cases in other tribunals, notably
the 1975 decision by the Department of Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals in
Greenwood Constr. Co., AGBCA No. 435, 75-2 BCA ¶ 11,624, which, AGJV asserts,

53
     We are hesitant to hold that in every instance in which a contract grants discretion to
         the CO, that exercise of discretion is always subjected to a reasonableness
         review due to the existence of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, even if
         that may often be the case. Here, though, there is no convincing argument
         advanced that this exercise of discretion should not be so reviewed.

                                              54
held that the government’s failure to approve weekend work when the contractor was
behind schedule precluded the government from assessing liquidated damages (app.
br. at 127-28). But Greenwood, which is not binding on us in any event, does not
include any analysis about the application of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
and involves a very different clause involving the hours of work—never setting
expected days or the parameters of the CO’s review. See 75-2 BCA ¶ 11,624
at 55,492. It is decidedly unhelpful here.

       The other case cited by AGJV, Manuel Bros., Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl.
8 (2002), (see app. br. at 122), which, too, is not binding upon us, appears to support
the government’s position. In Manuel Bros., the CO refused a blanket request for
12-hour days and work on Saturdays, but did grant 23 extra workdays. This, the Court
of Federal Claims found, was no abuse of discretion. Manuel Bros., 55 Fed. Cl.
at 40-41. Thus, though the number of workdays granted by the CO in Manuel Bros.
was relatively high, they were individually decided and the refusal to grant a blanket
extension was not an abuse of discretion.

       3. The CO did not Abuse her Discretion

        We find that the CO reasonably exercised her discretion in denying
AGJV’s blanket requests for additional work hours. First, it is important to note that
she granted three weekend days plus 12-hour weekdays. Given the fact that this
12-hour shift availability was utilized from January 2012 until at least July of that
year, the amount of time granted compares very favorably to the 23 days provided in
the Manuel Bros. case discussed above and which AGJV cites to as support for its
view that the duty of good faith and fair dealing applies to the granting of extra work
hours. 54

       Moreover, providing the time requested for every Saturday from January
through July of 2012 would have imposed significant costs upon the government.
With respect to financial costs, as Mr. Gannon testified, the work would have required
the presence of a government representative who would have been paid overtime –
overtime that was not regularly available due to Navy policies which were not
particularly directed at AGJV. As Mr. Gannon testified, AGJV’s offer to pay for the
overtime was a hollow promise because such augmentation of appropriated funds,
without Congressional authorization, is contrary to fiscal law. 55

54
   Though AGJV has argued that the 12-hour days were no better than 8-hour shifts, as
       discussed in our findings of fact, we find this to be exaggerated: AGJV would
       not have availed itself of the opportunity if it had not been to its benefit.
55
   This unrebutted testimony is consistent with our long understanding of the operation
       of fiscal law. Though not cited by either party, the Department of Defense
       Financial Management Regulation (FMR), DoD 7000.14-R, ¶ 2.1.10 (June

                                           55
       There would also have been the cost to the personnel involved.
Mr. Gannon’s office, from whom the site supervisors would have come, was short
staffed at the time, and providing an individual every Saturday, in addition to covering
the 12-hour days during the week would have presented real challenges. 56

       Against these costs to the Navy and serious practicability challenges, the ACO
weighed what would be advanced by agreeing to AGJV’s blanket requests. Her
observations did not support a conclusion that a grant of blanket requests would be
well-used, and we find this conclusion not unreasonable or unsupported.

       Thus, considering all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
ACO’s consideration of AGJV’s blanket requests to work on the weekends, including
her granting AGJV the right to work 50% longer shifts during the week than were
anticipated by the contract, we do not find her denial of these requests to constitute an
abuse of her discretion. 57 This appeal is denied.

       IV. AGJV is Entitled to Some Relief on its Fire Sprinkler Claims

        AGJV’s fire sprinkler claims basically have two components: first, that AGJV
encountered a differing site conditions claim because the water flow was less than
reflected in the RFP; and, second, that the Navy forced it to do work beyond that
required by the contract by performing a second water flow test and also by including
an unnecessary extra standpipe on the roof. As will be seen, we agree with AGJV that
the lower water pressure it encountered, and which required its subcontractor to
redesign the system was a differing site condition. We also agree with AGJV that it
should not have been required to provide the extra standpipe. Nevertheless,
AGJV’s subcontractor should have performed the additional water flow test prior to

       2020) characterizes the receipt of funds without Congressional authorization
       and their deposit anywhere but the Miscellaneous Receipts account of the
       United States Department of the Treasury as an augmentation of an
       appropriation, in violation of the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1342
       and 31 U.S.C. § 1517. Here, AGJV fails to identify any statutory authority that
       would permit the Navy to accept non-appropriated funds from AGJV to cover
       federal overtime pay.
56
   The incredible assertions in AGJV’s brief that the Navy should have supported two
       8-hour shifts a day, seven days a week (an accommodation never requested)
       would obviously have imposed even more significant costs on the Navy
       personnel who would have needed to oversee the construction.
57
   Had AGJV made more directed requests, to work on particular weekends for
       particular reasons, we might have come to a different conclusion (or we might
       not have – after all, the ACO did grant the request on three other occasions), but
       that is not what was presented here.

                                           56
creating its design, thus the government is not liable for the costs of conducting the
flow test and the proper liability upon the government is not the cost of having to
repeat the design of the system, but whatever additional costs would have been
incurred in designing and building a system that could operate with the lower water
flow and the unnecessary standpipe compared to designing and building a system that
could handle the higher flowrate anticipated and without the flow rate.

         A. Applicable Legal Principles – Differing Site Conditions and Constructive
            Changes

        We have discussed the differing site conditions clause at length earlier in this
decision. We note that, though differing site conditions cases most often involve
geologic or geotechnical data, we see no reason why the language in the differing site
conditions clause (applying to “subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site,”
see FAR 52.236-2(a)) should not apply to information about such things as the water
flow rates at the pipes involved here (which is, after all, a physical condition at the
site), and the Navy has not argued otherwise. 58

        The alleged additional work required by the Navy, AGJV argues, is a
constructive change to the contract (app. br. at 151-52). Constructive change
allegations are also commonplace in government contract disputes and are
straightforward: “To demonstrate a constructive change, a plaintiff must show (1) that
it performed work beyond the contract’s requirements, and (2) that the additional work
was ordered, expressly or impliedly, by the government.” BGT Holdings, LLC v.
United States, 948 F.3d 1003, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Bell/Heery v. United
States, 739 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Once a constructive change has been
found, the government is obligated to compensate the contractor for its additional
costs. Aydin Corp. v. Widnall, 61 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing J.B.
Williams Co. v. United States, 450 F.2d 1379, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1971)). Just like the
circumstances in the Changes Clause, however, the contractor is generally obligated to
inform the CO that it considers the work being ordered to be beyond the scope of the
contract within 20 days of that direction. FAR 52.243-4(d); K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v.
United States, 778 F.3d 1000, 1009-10 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Indeed, in K-Con, the
contractor’s compliance with the government’s directives and failure to object or assert

58
     Arguably, though no party asserted it, these claims might have been pursued as
         defective specifications. See, e.g., Robins Maint. v. United States, 265 F.3d
         1254, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (defective specifications found when contract
         specifications are inaccurate and mislead the contractor); see also Comtrol, Inc.
         v. United States, 294 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (differing site conditions
         and defective specifications cases, though distinct in theory, may collapse into
         the same cause of action under the appropriate facts). Perhaps. If they had
         been, we have no reason to believe the results would have been any different.

                                             57
that it was a violation of contract terms until two years later supported a finding that
the contractor was not entitled to compensation for the constructive change.
K-Con, 778 F.3d 1009-11.

         B. The Flow Rate was a Differing Site Condition

        The evidence before us does not tell us why, but there is no factual dispute that
the water flow rate which dictated the ultimate design of the fire sprinklers was
different than that represented in the solicitation. Although it may be considered odd
that the Navy provided flow rate information in the solicitation and then required the
contract awardee to conduct its own tests, this is consistent with the industry standards
noted above, requiring recent (within a year of design) flow tests—standards that
would not be met if AGJV had relied only on the flow test information contained in
the solicitation.

        Does this difference make a differing site condition as AGJV contends? The
Navy makes no effort, whatsoever, to argue that it does not, focusing instead on the
damages and asserting that there were none (see gov’t br. at 146-48). In any event, we
are satisfied that AGJV has met the criteria for a differing site condition claim that we
cited earlier from International Technology Corp.: a reasonable contractor would have
read the solicitation as making a representation of the site conditions (here, the water
flow rate); there is no basis for AGJV to have foreseen that the conditions would
change to the degree that they did; AGJV relied upon the flow rate in the solicitation
since its firm fixed price subcontract with Fire-Mak was premised upon the flow rates
included in the solicitation (which appear to have been substantially the same as in the
2009 flow test conducted on AGJV’s behalf); 59 and, inasmuch as the lower flow rates
experienced in 2011 required a re-design of the sprinkler system, they were plainly
materially different. See 523 F.3d 1348-49.

59
     We imagine that the Navy might have advanced an argument that it was
         AGJV’s own post-award flow tests that it relied upon when it made its contract
         with Fire-Mak, and not the tests in the solicitation. That would have been an
         interesting argument had the Navy bothered to make it. But at the end of the
         day, we are persuaded that AGJV bid upon a contract that represented one
         particular flow rate, but was required to build a fire sprinkler system that could
         accommodate a lower flow rate. Given the absolute lack of argument to the
         contrary in this particular case, we will not find that this constitutes anything
         but a differing site condition.

                                              58
         C. Requiring a Recent Flow Test was not a Constructive Change to the
            Contract

       We find AGJV’s argument that it was not required by the contract to perform a
flow test within one year of submitting its design to be unpersuasive. First, as
discussed in the Facts section above, the UFC standards required that the design be
based on “recent water flow test data.” Though “recent” is undefined there, NFPA
standards in effect at the time of contract award (and which the parties relied upon)
required a flow test within one year of the design of the hose and standpipe system,
which is part of the system that AGJV was required to install. Requiring compliance
with contractual requirements is no change.

       This was no surprise to AGJV, which explicitly contracted with Fire-Mak to
perform a flow test if required. 60 Moreover, AGJV appears to have acceded, without
complaint, to the Navy’s direction to perform an additional flow test after it submitted
Fire-Mak’s plans and calculations to the Navy for review. Though it complained
about other aspects of the Navy’s rejection of its plans (notably, about the standpipe),
AGJV’s acquiescence to the direction to perform a new flow test dooms that portion of
its constructive change claim because it indicates that a current flow test was required
by the contract and also because it was a failure to comply with the prerequisites of the
Changes Clause.

         D. Requiring the Standpipe on the Rooftop was a Change

        Simply enough, as noted in the in the Facts section, NFPA 14 does not require a
standpipe on the rooftop if there is access to the roof from the highest landing and
there was a hose connection in that landing. Since there was such access, it was
sufficient to have the hose connection in that landing as Fire-Mak and AGJV had
initially proposed. Re-writing the plans to include the extra standpipe and the extra
costs to install it constituted a contract change for which AGJV is entitled
compensation.

         E. The Navy’s Responsibility for AGJV’s Fire Sprinkler Costs

       Though the appeal has been broken into “entitlement” and “quantum”
components, at the entitlement stage it is still necessary to determine what costs the
contractor will be entitled to. Here, it is not all that AGJV anticipates.

60
     This would be another basis for denying these “costs” to AGJV: it had a firm fixed
         price contract with Fire-Mak that covered this contingency and would have
         shielded it (AGJV) from incurring any additional costs for Fire-Mak’s running
         the extra flow test.

                                            59
        Having found a differing site condition, we find that AGJV is entitled to the
extra costs that flowed from it. That increased cost is whatever AGJV can prove was
the difference in cost of a fire sprinkler system that meet the needs of the higher flow
rates represented by the solicitation versus the needs of the lower flow rates it
ultimately encountered. It appears, for example, that the new design required wider
pipes. If, as we assume, larger diameter pipes are more expensive than the smaller
pipes AGJV and Fire-Mak planned on, then it is entitled to the difference in price of
the pipes and any other costs that increased as a consequence of the lower flow.

       AGJV is also entitled to the material, labor, and design costs associated with the
additional stand pipe, as they would not have been incurred except for the contract
change.

        AGJV is not entitled to redesign costs stemming from the larger re-design
required when the additional flow tests demonstrated that the initial Fire-Mak design
was inadequate. Those tests were contractually required and expected to be
considered prior to the final design by AGJV and its subcontractor. Yes, those flow
tests disclosed the differing site condition, but if they had been accomplished prior to
Fire-Mak’s design, as required, Fire-Mak would not have had to re-accomplish said
design. 61

         V. The Mess That is the ESS, and why AGJV is Entitled to no Additional
            Time, but Some Additional Costs for it

        The parties have engaged in an argument over whether the contract required
AGJV to install the ESS (albeit, through an approved subcontractor and paid for
separately) (see gov’t br. at 148-49; app. reply br. at 52-60). We find that it did:
Section D603005, Security Systems, which we quote more fully in the Facts section
above, provides, in unambiguous terms, that the “[contractor] must sub out the
electronic security system installation to a contractor with direct experience in
installing/integrating the new system . . . .” The other sections cited in the Facts
section also make clear the intention that the prime contractor hire an ESS
subcontractor at government expense, but be responsible for building the infrastructure
(such as conduit) for the ESS and coordinating with that subcontractor. Though the
parties appear to have inexplicably forgotten what was in the RFP during the first two
years of contract performance, this does not matter because, in general, absent
ambiguity we do not go beyond the terms of the contract to interpret it, see, e.g.,

61
     Theoretically, we suppose, it could be more expensive to design a fire sprinkler
         system that could handle a low flow rate than one for a high flow rate, though
         that seems unlikely to us in these circumstances. If it is, in fact, the case,
         however, AGJV is welcome to present evidence supporting this theory and it
         would be entitled to the difference.

                                            60
TEG-Paradigm, 465 F.3d at 1339, and this includes prior performance in particular.
See Watts Constructors, LLC, ASBCA No. 61493, 20-1 BCA ¶ 37,563 at 182,386.

        Yet, this conclusion, which, at first blush, seems so central to the dispute,
actually matters little (if at all) to the ultimate resolution of the appeal before us.
This is primarily because of the effects of Mod P2, which gave AGJV most of what it
was seeking as if the ESS work were not required by the contract, leaving only the
questions of whether AGJV was entitled to more time on the contract than given by
the modification and whether it was fully compensated for ESS work that it performed
and was intended to be separately funded. As discussed below, we find that AGJV is
entitled to no additional time for its work on the ESS, but is owed more money.

       A. AGJV has not proved That the Government is Responsible for Delay
          Caused by the ESS

        Though we find that, under the contract, AGJV was responsible for obtaining
an ESS subcontractor, to be paid by a separate Navy entity, that, by itself, does not
quite let the Navy off the hook: it waited more than two years after contract award
before taking steps to provide funding for that ESS subcontractor and it can be argued
that it did not move with the speed it could or should have even then. To be sure, our
finding that installation of the ESS was AGJV’s contractual obligation diminishes the
strength of this argument, but, even so, in the right circumstances, we might need to
consider how to apportion blame between the parties for the delays in beginning work
on the ESS.

       These are not those circumstances. Though the CO ultimately extended the
contract completion date by 126 days to account for the ESS, in truth, there is
no evidence that installation of the ESS played any role in the delay in completing the
contract. Rather, as discussed at length in the Facts above, the real problems were to
be found elsewhere, such as the roof, the curtain wall, the windows, and the HVAC
system. Moreover, the CO informed AGJV that the ESS would play no role in
determining the substantial completion date: had everything else been completed
except for the ESS, that would have been fine.

        The record provides little indication that the installation of the ESS appreciably
impacted other work on the building. The only instance where it might have had any
impact that we have noticed is the fact that AGJV held off on closing some drywall on
March 14, 2012 to allow for inspection of ESS conduit and boxes and did not close
that drywall until about April 26, 2012. But the record is bereft of any evidence that
even this action had any effect on the critical path of project completion. On its face,
this drywall matter does not appear to be significant; it was nothing that AGJV
complained about at the time; and there is no evidence that it affected the critical path.
For its own reasons, AGJV provided no scheduling expert on this (or any other

                                            61
matter), while the Navy provided Mr. Reichard, who provided evidence that the ESS
installation caused no delay to the completion of the project. With the evidence as it
stands, we would have no basis to award any delay days to AGJV for the Navy’s late
direction to install an ESS system even if we were to find that all fault for this was
with the Navy.

       B. AGJV is Entitled to Some Other Costs Associated With its Claim

        The other issue before us is the $30,513 in direct costs that AGJV asserts were
not covered by Mod P2. The Navy argues that exterior work was plainly required by
section G403007 of the contract, which was a section not subject to the requirement
for a separate funding stream discussed in Section D503005 (gov’t br. at 148-49). But
Section D503005 provides that “MCON Construction Project funds cannot be used”
for the ESS, meaning that the funding must all come from a stream separate and apart
from the general contract award. This section makes no distinction between the
interior and exterior ESS. Hence, there is no basis to withhold the moneys requested
for exterior ESS work. 62 The remaining money sought is for design work on the ESS
and scheduling associated with it. The Navy makes no argument on this matter and
the aspects of separate funding for the ESS in Section D503005 applies to its “design,
procurement and installation” and is not limited to expenses incurred by the ESS
subcontractor. To the extent that AGJV incurred these costs for design and installation
of the ESS—a matter the Navy does not appear to seriously dispute, it is entitled to
them. 63

       VI. AGJV is Entitled to the Return of Some Liquidated Damages

       The liquidated damages here are straightforward: they are the difference
in time between the BOD and the CCD as extended by contract modifications. 64 The
last contract extension (made long after the contract was actually complete) brought
the CCD to August 22, 2012. The government had found the BOD to be
September 29, 2012, and withheld liquidated damages based upon the difference
between those two dates. Since, earlier in this opinion, we found that the building was
ready for its intended use on September 18, 2012, there is a difference of 11 days of
liquidated damages that the government will need to return to AGJV.

62
   To be clear, we are not speaking here of the infrastructure work to support the ESS,
       which all agree was required by the contract here and not subject to a separate
       funding stream, just the actual ESS components, themselves.
63
   As the parties chose to separate quantum from entitlement at this stage of the
       proceedings, we do not decide here exactly how much these costs are.
64
   Of course, if the CCD should have been extended farther due to changes to the
       contract, we would be required to take that into account, but that did not happen
       here.

                                          62
        This is a relatively straightforward application of the (found) facts to a standard
contract clause. AGJV also makes the argument that, because the government
extended the work on the contract after the CCD, it cannot collect liquidated damages
(see app. br. at 133-35). This is a misapplication of the cases that AGJV cites and the
facts presented here. Those cases (e.g., Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock co. v.
United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 154 (1932); Framlau Corp., ASBCA No. 14479, 71-2 BCA ¶
9,082) stand for the simple proposition that, for purposes of liquidated damages, the
government cannot add work to a contract after its completion date and expect it to be
completed without extending the contract’s completion date. What they do not stand
for is the notion that, if any work is added to a contract after the original CCD, the
government is forever barred from asserting liquidated damages, even if the CCD has
been properly adjusted to take into account the extra work. The extra work alleged
here, having to do with the fire sprinkler and ESS, had no bearing, whatsoever, on the
BOD. Though the government very generously extended the CCD in Mod P2 and in
the CO’s decision on the ESS claim, ostensibly as a result of the ESS work, that
does not mean that the government was actually at fault and that it was responsible for
delays in the number of days it extended the CCD. See, e.g., England v. Sherman R.
Smoot Corp., 388 F.3d 844, 856-57 (Fed. Cir. 2004). More to the point, there is no
evidence that any of the work being performed after the final CCD had passed was a
consequence of extra work having been imposed by the government. To the contrary,
the fire sprinkler system was long completed before the CCD as was the ESS. And
even if the ESS had not been completed as early as it was, it would have had
no bearing on the BOD since the CO had already agreed not to consider it for BOD
purposes.

       Entitlement to liquidated damages from the CCD of August 22, 2012 until the
BOD of September 18, 2012 at the contractual rate of $5,250 per day was proved by
the government.

         VII. AGJV is not Entitled to Acceleration Costs

        The last claim we address is acceleration costs. AGJV argues that, because of the
government’s demand that it perform additional work on the ESS and fire sprinkler
system for which it did not initially extend the performance period and the government’s
failure to permit additional night and weekend work, it was forced to incur overtime and
otherwise accelerate its work to minimize the government’s imposition of liquidated
damages. This, according to AGJV, makes out a constructive acceleration claim, long
recognized by the Board. (See app. br. at 135-36 (citing Parsons Evergreen, LLC,
ASBCA No. 58634, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,137 at 180,811-12, 65 partially overturned on other

65
     AGJV’s brief referenced the Westlaw “star” cites, but we replace them here with
        pinpoint citations from the Board’s reporter.

                                            63
grounds, Parsons Evergreen, LLC v. Sec’y of Air Force, 968 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2020);
IAP Worldwide Servs., Inc., ASBCA No. 59397 et al., 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,763 at 179,
158-60))

       We agree with AGJV’s general explication of constructive acceleration law,
which was explained straightforwardly by the Federal Circuit in Zafer Taahhut Insaat
ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States, 833 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016): “Constructive
acceleration often occurs when the government demands compliance with an original
contract deadline despite excusable delay by the contractor.” Id. at 1562 (quoted by
IAP Worldwide Servs., 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,763 at 179,158). The five elements of
constructive acceleration are: 1) the contractor encountered an excusable delay; 2) the
contractor made a timely request for an extension of time to complete the contract;
3) the government denied the request or did not act on it in a reasonable period of
time; 4) the government insisted on completion of the contract in a lesser period of
time than the excusable delay would have permitted; and 5) that the contractor
incurred added expense to compensate for the lost time and remain on schedule. Zafer
Taahhut, 833 F.3d at 1362 (citing Fraser Constr. Co. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1534,
1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).

       AGJV’s acceleration argument is facially reasonable: when the government
started assessing liquidated damages against AGJV in April 2012, it had no choice but
to accelerate its work and incur overtime costs because it had no way of knowing that
the government would ever extend the completion date in the manner that it did with
Mod P2 and the CO’s later extension after the ESS claim. We also credit
AGJV’s evidence that it incurred acceleration costs through overtime for several of its
subcontractors.

       But this is not enough for AGJV to prevail. The most salient fact here is that
there was no excusable delay for most of the work on the project (e.g., the roof, the
HVAC system, and the windows), and that was the work that dragged completion of
the project out to September 18, 2012. To underscore the essential: there has been
zero evidence presented by AGJV that work on the ESS or the fire sprinklers caused a
delay in the critical path to project completion and certainly nothing on the order of the
amount of time that the Navy ultimately granted (put another way, the excusable delay
was certainly not greater than the extensions granted by the Navy). Hence, as we
discussed in the section on liquidated damages above, the sprinkler and the ESS were
not the problems that held up contract completion and, even after the Navy’s generous
extension of time for the ESS, AGJV was still almost four weeks late in completing
the project. AGJV’s “acceleration” may well have been motivated by the initial
March 29, 2012 completion date, but even if, in March, 2012, the Navy had extended
the completion date until the August 22, 2012 date that it ultimately granted, AGJV
would still have had to significantly pick up the pace on its work in May 2012 as it did
because even the “acceleration” it undertook when it thought it had less time than was

                                           64
ultimately granted was insufficient for it to timely complete the project. 66 AGJV has
not cited nor have we found a case where the contractor completes the work after the
date for which the government should have granted an extension and is nevertheless
able to recover on an acceleration claim.

         AGJV’s appeal on constructive acceleration is thus denied.

                                     CONCLUSION

         For the reasons discussed above:

         We deny Appeal No. 61252, the differing site conditions claim.

         We deny Appeal No. 61402, the claim regarding working hours.

       As detailed above, we grant, in part, Appeal No. 60428, the fire sprinkler claim.
Appeal No. 60691, which was a protective appeal on the same matter is subsumed into
our decision on Appeal No. 60428. Appeal No. 60428 is remanded to the parties to
calculate damages in accordance with this decision.

       As detailed above, we grant, in part, Appeal No. 60426, the ESS claim. Appeal
No. 60689, which was another protective appeal on this subject is subsumed into our
decision on Appeal No. 60426. Appeal No. 60426 is remanded to the parties to
calculate damages in accordance with this decision.

       The liquidated damages asserted by the Navy and appealed in Appeal
Nos. 60427 and 60690 are partially sustained and partially denied. Because Appeal
No. 60690 is the appeal of the most up to date government claim for liquidated
damages, we consider Appeal No. 60427 to be subsumed to it. The quantum for
liquidated damages needs no remand: the government holds the money, to our
understanding, and we have held that 11 days of damages at $5,250 per day are due
and owing to AGJV, which sums to $57,750.

66
     Could AGJV argue that it would have accelerated its work less had it known in
         April 2012 that it had until August 22, 2012? Such a hypothetical argument
         would be unconvincing because if it put in less work in May, it would have
         presumably completed the project even later than it did and been subject to
         greater liquidated damages. In any event, the evidence does not support such a
         fine parsing of degrees of lateness by AGJV.

                                            65
     The parties have not briefed the subject of when interest should accrue on these
damages, so this must be addressed on the remand to the parties.

       Finally, Appeal No. 61715, for the acceleration claim, is denied.

       Dated: May 30, 2023

                                                    J. REID PROUTY
                                                    Administrative Judge
                                                    Vice Chairman
                                                    Armed Services Board
                                                    of Contract Appeals

 I concur                                           I concur

 RICHARD SHACKLEFORD                                ELIZABETH WITWER
 Administrative Judge                               Administrative Judge
 Acting Chairman                                    Armed Services Board
 Armed Services Board                               of Contract Appeals
 of Contract Appeals

       I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 60426, 60427, 60428,
60689, 60690, 60691, 61252, 61402, 61715, Appeals of Amatea/Grimberg JV,
rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter.

       Dated: May 30, 2023

                                                PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS
                                                Recorder, Armed Services
                                                Board of Contract Appeals

                                           66