Court Opinion

ID: 9386471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 16:06:44.017425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.532438
License: Public Domain

J-S45010-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    HYKEEM HALE                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1939 EDA 2021

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 27, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-CR-0008869-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                 FILED APRIL 12, 2023

        Appellant, Hykeem Hale, appeals from the May 27, 2021 judgment of

sentence that imposed an aggregate sentence of 8 to 20 years’ incarceration.

Appellant’s sentence was imposed after a jury found Appellant guilty of

aggravated assault, firearms not to be carried without a license, as well as

carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania and after the court, at the conclusion of a waiver trial, found

Appellant guilty of persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell, or

transfer firearms.1 We affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence, as modified,

in accordance with this memorandum.

        The record reveals that, on March 31, 2021, a jury found Appellant guilty

of aggravated assault, firearms not to be carried without a license, and
____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a), 6106(a)(1), 6108, and 6105(a)(1), respectively.
J-S45010-22

carrying a firearm on public streets or public property in Philadelphia. N.T.,

3/31/21, at 109-110.         After the verdict was recorded and the jury was

dismissed by the trial court, the Commonwealth raised, with the trial court,

the pending charge of persons not to possess a firearm, which the

Commonwealth described as having been bifurcated from the three

aforementioned charges that were submitted to the jury.2 Id. at 111. The

Commonwealth stated that it was “willing to go forward with [this charge] as

a waiver trial[.]” Id. at 112. An on-the-record colloquy of Appellant ensued

and, ultimately, Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a

stipulated waiver trial.      Id. at 114-120.    Thereafter, the trial court found

Appellant guilty of persons not to possess a firearm. Id. at 121.

       On May 27, 2021, Appellant was sentenced to 8 to 20 years’

incarceration for aggravated assault; 3½ to 7 years’ incarceration for firearms

not to be carried without a license; 2 to 4 years’ incarceration for carrying a

firearm on public streets or public property in Philadelphia, and 8 to 20 years’

incarceration for persons not to possess a firearm.         Id. at 15; see also

Sentencing Order, 5/27/21. All sentences were set to run concurrently for an

aggregate sentence of 8 to 20 years’ incarceration. N.T., 5/27/21, at 15; see

also Sentencing Order, 5/27/21.

____________________________________________

2A trial court order bifurcating the aforementioned charge does not appear as
part of the certified record.

                                           -2-
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        On June 6, 2021, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion requesting

reconsideration of his sentence.          On August 25, 2021, Appellant filed a

supplemental post-sentence motion for reconsideration of his sentence. On

September 22, 2021, the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion.

This appeal followed.3

        Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

        [1.]     Did the [trial] court err when it permitted evidence in the
                 form of the drug-crime related qualities of the area where
                 the incident occurred and the telephone communications
                 of [Appellant] while he was in pre-trial incarceration?

        [2.]     Did the [trial] court err by failing to disclose prior to trial
                 its intimate familiarity with the area where the incident
                 occurred, and further, based its sentencing on the same
                 familiarity?

        [3.]     Did the [trial c]ourt error in sentencing [Appellant] to jail
                 where it promised [Appellant] on the record a sentence
                 of "no further penalty" in exchange for [Appellant’s]
                 waiver of his fundamental right to a jury trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

        Appellant’s first issue challenges the admissibility of evidence, a claim

we examine under a well-settled standard of review.

        Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the
        sound discretion of the trial court[,] and we will not reverse a trial
        court's decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an
        abuse of the trial court's discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
        merely an error of judgment[ but, rather, is] the overriding or
        misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
        manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will[,]
____________________________________________

3   Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

                                           -3-
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       or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. If in reaching a
       conclusion the trial court overrides or misapplies the law,
       discretion is then abused[,] and it is the duty of the appellate court
       to correct the error.

Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 78 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted), appeal denied, 244 A.3d 1222 (Pa. 2021).

       Here, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence

of the “drug-related quality of the neighborhood” where the incident

occurred,4 as well as recordings of Appellant’s telephone conversations while

incarcerated before trial, as evidence of Appellant’s motive pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2).5           Appellant’s Brief at 13-14.

Appellant argues,

       [he] was charged [with] aggravated assault and firearms related
       charges. The material facts are whether [he] intentional[ly] shot
       the [victim], and whether [he] knowingly possessed a firearm.
       The evidence of motive admitted here in the form of the
       drug-related quality of the neighborhood and [his] prison
       [telephone] calls are not relevant to any of the material facts for
       the charges or by inference, to the existence of a material fact.

____________________________________________

4 Appellant was found guilty of the aforementioned criminal offenses after the
jury and the trial court heard evidence that he shot the victim in the ankle and
lower leg on the corner of Frankford Avenue and Somerset Street in the City
of Philadelphia. Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/22, at 3-4.

5 Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) states that evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for the purpose of “proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident . . . if the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.Evid. 404(b)(2).

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Id. at 14. Appellant contends that “[f]or evidence of motive to be relevant,

there must be sufficient ground to believe that the crime under consideration

grew out of, or was in any way caused[] by[,] a prior set of circumstances.”

Id. (citations omitted). In the case sub judice, there is no evidence, Appellant

asserts, “that the incident grew out of, or was caused in any way[] by[,] prior

circumstances related to drug activity in the neighborhood or by virtue of

[tele]phone calls after the incident.” Id.

      Regarding Appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred in permitting

testimony that characterized the neighborhood in which the incident occurred

as having a “drug-related quality,” we first consider whether Appellant

preserved this issue. To preserve a challenge to the admissibility of evidence

for appellate review, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) requires a party

to make “a timely objection, motion to strike, or motion in limine” that “states

the specific ground, unless it is apparent from the context,” for the objection.

Pa.R.Evid. 103(a)(1)(A) and (B).         “The applicability of waiver principles

presents a question of law, over which our standard of review is de novo and

our scope of review is plenary.” Stapas v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 198 A.3d 1033,

1037 (Pa. 2018).

      “[I]t is axiomatic that issues are preserved when objections are made

timely to the error or offense[,]” and the “failure to offer a timely and specific

objection   results   in   waiver   of   the   claim[.]”   Commonwealth        v.

Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 821

(2009). “The rule is well[-]settled that a party complaining, on appeal, of the

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admission of evidence in the [trial] court [] will be confined to the specific

objection there made.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1041

(Pa. 2007) (original brackets omitted), citing Commonwealth v. Boden, 159

A.2d 894, 900 (Pa. 1960), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1035 (2008). “Issues not

raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

      Upon review, we concur with the trial court that Appellant waived this

issue because no objection was lodged at or near the time the characterization

of the neighborhood was presented at trial. Although Appellant does not cite

to specific instances where the words “drug-related quality” were used to

describe the neighborhood involved, we have found four instances in which

police officers referred to the neighborhood in question as a high

drug-trafficking area. N.T., 3/30/21, at 43 (describing the neighborhood as

an area where the police “always get complaints from the neighbors for people

using illegal narcotics”); see also id. at 89 (describing the neighborhood as

“a high narcotics area” where a “lot of shootings” occur and a “lot of crimes

happen”); id. at 101 (indicating that the corner where the incident took place

is a place where drug users hang out and a lot of drug use takes place,

including “open-air” drug use); id. at 116 (stating that the neighborhood was

a “high drug area” where anyone driving through the area would “see a lot of

open[-]air narcotics sales; not just pull up, go in a house, but it’s in the open

air”). At no point, during the trial, did Appellant’s counsel lodge an objection

on the record after the neighborhood in which the incident occurred was

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described as being a “high drug area.” As such, we find Appellant waived this

evidentiary challenge on appeal.

       Concerning Appellant’s challenge to the admission of the recordings of

telephone calls Appellant made while incarcerated, the Commonwealth

summarized the content of these recordings as follows:

       In these calls[,] there’s specific mentions of Somerset Street.
       They talk about the corner of Emerald [Street] and Somerset
       Street, Emerald [Street] and Hart Lane, Helen Street. [Appellant]
       tells his friend to make sure everyone’s laying low until he gets
       home. They’re talking about – they’re referencing street corners
       as real estate. They are talking about just a lot of specific street
       corners right in that general area [] and talking about the fact that
       they got [Appellant] out of the way, I’m [(Appellant)] not losing
       my real estate. I don’t know, my cousin got us out of the way, let
       these new guys move in [on] our real estate. They’re acting crazy
       out there, aren’t they? They don’t know who to pay homage too,
       huh?

N.T., 3/31/21, at 5-6.6

       “Generally speaking, evidence is admissible if it is relevant, that is, if it

logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at

issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption

regarding a material fact.” Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279, 284

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and original quotation marks omitted); see also

Pa.R.Evid. 402 (stating, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible”). To reiterate,

____________________________________________

6 The Commonwealth indicated that the streets and lane that are mentioned
in the recordings are within walking distance of the corner of Frankford Avenue
and Somerset Street, where the shooting incident in this case occurred. N.T.,
3/31/21, at 6.

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Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) states that evidence of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts may be admissible for the purpose of “proving motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of

mistake, or lack of accident . . . if the probative value of the evidence

outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Pa.R.Evid. 404(b)(2); see also

Kinard, 95 A.3d at 284; Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 43 (Pa.

2012) (stating, “[w]hile evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show conduct in conformity therewith,

evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible when offered to prove some

other relevant fact, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident”).

      In admitting the telephone recordings into evidence and permitting the

Commonwealth to play the recordings for the jury, the trial court held that

Appellant’s telephone conversations were relevant and admissible to support

the Commonwealth’s theory of motive, i.e. that Appellant had a vested

interest in the corner where the incident occurred, and he took action to

“defend his turf” and secure his interest. Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/22, at 7.

The trial court further explained, “the prison calls were relevant evidence in

supporting the Commonwealth’s theory [of] protecting ‘real estate,’ meaning

street corners where there is a high degree of drug trafficking[.]” Id. at 8.

“The evidence of the recorded prison calls of ‘protecting the real estate’ as it

relates to drug sales was offered to show motive for the crime committed and

was not introduced to show character evidence but rather to show why

                                     -8-
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Appellant was so invested in the general area of Frankford [Avenue] and

Somerset [Street] where the shooting took place.” Id.

      After careful review, we find the trial court’s evidentiary ruling regarding

the recordings of Appellant’s prison calls was not an abuse of the trial court’s

considerable discretion. As indicated by the Commonwealth, the recordings

involved Appellant’s discussion of his “real estate” and demonstrated his

perceived need to protect against “losing his real estate” to other people. We

concur with the trial court, and the record supports, that this evidence was

relevant to establish Appellant’s motive or intent for carrying out the shooting,

which was germane to a material element of Appellant’s aggravated assault

conviction. As such, Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s evidentiary ruling

regarding the recordings of prison calls is without merit.

      In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the trial judge erred when

she failed to recuse herself from the case because of her familiarity with the

neighborhood, having lived in the neighborhood where the incident occurred

when she was a child. Appellant’s Brief at 17-20. Appellant cites Pennsylvania

Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 as requiring a jurist to recuse himself or

herself from a case when disqualification is required, regardless of whether a

motion for recusal is filed. Id. at 17-18. At the very least, Appellant argues,

a jurist is required to disclose to the parties information the jurist believes

may be relevant to a motion for recusal. Id. at 18. Appellant contends the

trial judge in the case sub judice failed to inform the parties of her “personal

knowledge and intimate familiarity with the neighborhood where the incident

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took place” until the sentencing hearing.       Id. at 18.    Appellant further

contends that the trial judge’s familiarity with the neighborhood from

childhood gave rise for the “potential for impartiality.”

      The Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11(A) states, in pertinent

part, that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in

which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including

[when the] judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a

party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the

proceeding.” PA ST CSC Rule 2.11. An Official Comment to Rule 2.11 states

that “[a] judge’s obligation not to hear or decide matters in which

disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify

is filed.” Id. at Official Comment 2. While this Court may review the denial

of a motion to recuse a jurist for an abuse of discretion, this Court is without

jurisdiction to enforce the mandate that a jurist disqualify himself or herself

sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 60-62 (Pa. Super.

2014) (stating, “alleged bias stemming from facts gleaned from the judicial

proceedings will rarely be grounds for recusal” unless the party seeking

recusal demonstrates that the jurist’s opinion derives from an extrajudicial

source and denotes such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make

fair judgment impossible), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014); see also

2303 Bainbridge, LLC v. Steel River Bldg. Sys., Inc., 239 A.3d 1107, 1118

(Pa. Super. 2020) (stating, “an appellant’s reliance on the Code of Judicial

Conduct is ‘misplaced’ when arguing that [a] trial judge erred in failing to

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recuse [because e]nforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct is beyond the

jurisdiction of [this] Court” (citations and original brackets omitted)).

       Before imposing sentence on Appellant in the case sub judice, the trial

court, after learning that Appellant grew up in Philadelphia, commented as

follows:

       You know why I ask where [Appellant] grew up? Because this
       happened where I grew up, right. This incident happened where
       I grew up at Frankford [Avenue] and Somerset [Street]. So it
       really is like full circle for me. Obviously it’s been a long time, you
       know, I’m older, but that’s where I was as a kid walking up and
       down Frankford Avenue buying backpacks for school. Like, I have
       vivid memories of the toy store there on Frankford Avenue and
       the places we would buy penny candy.                ...     This is my
       neighborhood. It’s tough. It’s a big deal.

N.T., 5/27/21, at 7 (paragraph formatting omitted). To the extent Appellant

claims he is entitled to a new trial because the trial judge declined to recuse

from this matter, we conclude that Appellant waived this issue by failing to

make a recusal request promptly after learning of the trial judge’s personal

knowledge of the neighborhood in which the shooting incident occurred.7 See

Lomas v. Kravitz, 170 A.3d 181, 197 (Pa. 2017) (stating, “[A] party must
____________________________________________

7 Alternatively, there is no substantive merit to Appellant’s recusal claim. The
trial court’s personal, extrajudicial knowledge, as demonstrated by her
comments, related exclusively to the location as it existed years, if not
decades ago, when such a thing as “penny candy” still existed. The trial court
expressed no personal knowledge of this particular incident, Appellant, the
victim, or any of their relatives and close relations. Most county judges have
a youthful recollection of the county in which they preside. As such, there is
nothing in the trial court’s comments from which to infer favoritism or
antagonism of such a degree as to make fair judgment appear to be
impossible.

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seek recusal of a jurist at the earliest possible moment, i.e., when the party

knows of the facts that form the basis for a motion to recuse. If the party

fails to present a motion to recuse at that time, then the party's recusal issue

is time-barred and waived.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating, “[i]ssues

not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time

on appeal”).

      In his final issue, Appellant challenges his sentence on the grounds his

constitutional right to a jury trial and his due process rights were violated

when the trial court failed to adhere to its statement to impose “no further

penalty” on Appellant’s persons not to possess a firearm conviction.

Appellant’s Brief at 20-22. Appellant asserts that he waived his right to a jury

trial on this charge “based on a specific promise by the trial court to sentence

[him] to ‘no further penalty.’” Id. at 21. Appellant contends that when the

trial court sentenced him to 8 to 20 years’ incarceration upon finding Appellant

guilty in a non-jury trial of persons not to possess a firearm, he failed to

receive what he bargained for in the waiver process. Id. As such, Appellant

argues, he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to

a jury trial. Id.

      A claim that a representation as to sentencing invalidates an otherwise

valid jury waiver raises a question of law for which our standard of review is

de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Houck, 948

A.2d 780, 787 n.17 (Pa. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1056 (2008).

      It is well-established that,

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       [C]riminal defendants have a constitutionally guaranteed right to
       a trial by jury. In all cases, a defendant may waive a jury trial
       with approval by a judge of the court in which the case is pending.
       To be valid, [] a jury waiver must be knowing and voluntary, and
       the accused must be aware of the essential ingredients inherent
       to a jury trial. [T]he three ingredients are: 1) that the jury be
       chosen from members of the community (i.e., a jury of one's
       peers), 2) that the accused be allowed to participate in the
       selection of the jury panel, and 3) that the verdict be unanimous.

Houck, 948 A.2d at 787.8 “[I]t is clear that a defendant does not need to

know his possible sentence to execute a voluntary jury trial waiver.” Id.

       “[T]he voluntariness of a jury waiver can be undermined where the

defendant is informed of a range of potential sentences at a jury waiver

colloquy that is less than the sentence eventually imposed.” Id. at 788. “[I]f

a defendant seeks to invalidate an otherwise valid jury waiver based on a trial

court's recitation of his or her potential sentence, the defendant [is] required

to demonstrate that his or her understanding of the length of the potential

sentence was a material factor in making the decision to waive a jury trial.”

Id.

____________________________________________

8 Appellant’s issue does not encompass a challenge to his sentence on the
ground that the trial court failed to explain during the waiver colloquy the
“three ingredients” inherent to a jury trial, as discussed infra. As such, we
find Appellant waived such a challenge on appeal. Moreover, at the time of
the oral waiver colloquy in the case sub judice, Appellant had already
participated in the selection of a jury of his peers and was unanimously
convicted by the jury of the three aforementioned crimes. As such, Appellant
was adequately aware of the three essential ingredients inherent to a jury
trial.

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      Here, a review of the record demonstrates that as part of Appellant’s

oral colloquy in which he waived his right to a jury trial on the single charge

of persons not to possess a firearm, the following dialogue occurred:

      [Trial Court:]             I just know that I will likely give no
                                 further penalty on the [persons
                                 not to possess a firearm charge, if
                                 convicted,] given that he’s already
                                 convicted of [firearms not to be carried
                                 without a license and carrying firearms
                                 on public streets or public property in
                                 Philadelphia.]

      ...

      [Appellant’s Counsel:]     So, I’ll start from square one.
                                 [Appellant,] how old are you today?

      [Trial Court:]             We know he’s 40. We know he finished
                                 high school.    We know he’s on
                                 medication, so let’s just go to the
                                 nitty-gritty.

                                 Sir, [Appellant,] I know this is a lot
                                 after a verdict, but I want you to just
                                 take your time and listen to your
                                 attorney talk about the two options,
                                 basically, that you have today, okay,
                                 with respect to how we move forward
                                 with this last charge.

      [Appellant’s Counsel:]     [Appellant], you have the absolute
                                 right to have the jury hear the charge[]
                                 of [] a person not to possess a firearm.
                                 If you choose to, you can waive that
                                 right and ask [the trial court] to hear
                                 the charge[] without actually pleading
                                 guilty. It will be a stipulated trial
                                 before [the trial court] and [the trial
                                 court] will make a determination as to
                                 guilt or innocence. Are you okay with
                                 proceeding that way[?]

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     [Trial Court:]           Basically I heard all the testimony,
                              and, you know, the likelihood that I
                              would find you guilty of [persons not to
                              possess      a    firearm]     if    the
                              Commonwealth has proof that you are
                              a person who's not to possess a firearm
                              because     you    have    a   previous
                              conviction, which, if I'm not mistaken,
                              we bifurcated this so the jury wouldn't
                              have to know that you are a felon who
                              [the Commonwealth] argued was in
                              possession of firearm, right?

                              So the jury has already found that you
                              were in possession of a firearm, they
                              just didn't know that you were a felon
                              in possession of a firearm. So now the
                              Commonwealth is going to enter into
                              evidence what would make you a felon
                              not to be in possession of a firearm,
                              and based upon the jury's verdict and
                              the evidence that I heard in this case,
                              it's almost - I don't want to say it's a
                              sure thing, but a stipulated trial is
                              using all that evidence, it's a sure thing
                              I will likely convict you of [a person not
                              to possess a firearm], but I am telling
                              you now that you have my word
                              that I will not give you an
                              additional       penalty      for    [this
                              conviction]. Whatever penalty you
                              may or may not get for [firearms not
                              to be carried without a license and
                              carrying firearms on public streets or
                              public property in Philadelphia,] which
                              the jury convicted you of, you will get
                              no more punishment for [persons
                              not to possess a firearm] from me.

     [Appellant’s Counsel:]   Do    you   understand?     [(question
                              directed towards Appellant)]

     [Trial Court:]           Because what we would have to do is
                              bring the jury back out here, sit them
                              in the box, [the Commonwealth is]

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                              going to tell them that you have a
                              felony conviction, and then I'm going
                              to give them the jury instruction on
                              [persons not to possess a firearm], and
                              they're     gonna - you    know,    they
                              already found you guilty of [firearms
                              not to be carried without a license and
                              carrying firearms on public streets or
                              public    property    in   Philadelphia].
                              There's concrete proof that you're a
                              convicted felon, right?         It's not
                              disputable. You have a prior conviction
                              for [possession with the intent to
                              deliver a controlled substance] I think,
                              right, that would make you ineligible
                              [to possess a firearm]. You have a
                              prior conviction for a gun. That’s going
                              to make you ineligible and they'll find
                              you - I mean, I don't want to say what
                              they're going to do, but it's most
                              probable. So we can do it one of those
                              two ways. If you do it by stipulated
                              trial, you're going to get - either way
                              you're going to get no further
                              penalty.

     [Appellant’s Counsel:]   It's going to preserve your appellate
                              rights.

     [Trial Court:]           I don't want you to plead guilty.

     [Appellant’s Counsel:]   So you're pleading not guilty, and the
                              [trial  court]     is   making     the
                              determination based on the record and
                              based on what the Commonwealth is
                              going to present to [the trial court]
                              regarding your prior record.

     [Appellant:]             All right.

     [Appellant’s Counsel:]   You're okay with that?

     [Trial Court:]           I don't want you to feel forced or
                              pressured - I mean, you are being
                              pressured because we're at the
                              end of a jury trial and you've just

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                                  been convicted and now they want
                                  to go ahead and ask you to make
                                  rational decisions.

                                  Please someone remind me to never do
                                  this again. I will never do it again
                                  because it doesn't feel like this is a
                                  choice that this man is making of
                                  his own free will.

                                  The only other option is to bring the
                                  jury back. So, [Appellant], take a
                                  minute. I don't want to pressure you.
                                  I want you to take a minute to talk to
                                  your attorney. Do you want to [talk to
                                  your attorney privately]?

     [Appellant:]                 Yeah.

     [Trial Court:]               Okay. Go ahead.

                      ([Appellant] exited the courtroom.)

                      ([Appellant] entered the courtroom.)

     [Trial Court:]               [Appellant] --

     [Appellant:]                 Yes, ma'am.

     [Trial Court:]               -- hi. You had a chance to talk to your
                                  lawyer, right?

     [Appellant:]                 Yes.

     [Trial Court:]               It's a little calmer now.     And you
                                  understand the situation, right?

     [Appellant:]                 Yes.

     [Trial Court:]               All right. And I told you I'm not going
                                  to jam you up on this charge, and
                                  that whatever sentence you get is
                                  going to be based upon what the
                                  jury convicted you of, not this
                                  [charge]. Okay?

     [Appellant:]                 Yes.

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     [Trial Court:]   All right. You don't have to do this, you
                      didn't have to do that. Do you feel like
                      you're now clear-headed enough to
                      make a fair decision, something that
                      you had a chance to talk to your
                      attorney about, and a decision that
                      you're doing of your own free will?

     [Appellant:]     Yes.

     [Trial Court:]   All right. And you want to not have the
                      jury hear the [prior felony] evidence,
                      and you just want me to decide based
                      upon the evidence that was presented
                      against you at the trial as well as
                      whatever [the Commonwealth] is
                      going to tell me; is that right?

     [Appellant:]     Yes.

     [Trial Court:]   Okay. And you're making this decision
                      of your own free will?

     [Appellant:]     Yes.

     [Trial Court:]   We're not forcing you, we're not
                      threatening    you,   we're      not
                      promising you anything other than
                      I told you I'm going to give you no
                      further penalty on the [persons
                      not to possess a firearm charge]
                      and not jam you up over - on this
                      charge. You understand that, right?

     [Appellant:]     Yes.

     [Trial Court:]   That's the only promise that I gave
                      that this will not inhibit your decision,
                      correct?

     [Appellant:]     Yes.

     [Trial Court:]   All right. So it's a stipulated trial. But
                      if you're found guilty, you will not
                      be punished for this crime.

                         - 18 -
J-S45010-22

N.T., 3/31/21, at 112, 114-120 (paragraph formatting modified, emphasis

added).

       Throughout his oral colloquy,9 Appellant was repeatedly promised by the

trial court that “no further penalty” would be imposed if he agreed to waive

his right to a jury trial and the trial court subsequently convicted him of

persons not to possess a firearm. In other words, in exchange for Appellant’s

oral waiver of a jury trial, the trial court promised Appellant that he would not

receive a sentence, i.e. “no further penalty,” if he were found guilty of persons

not to possess a firearm.10

       In fashioning Appellant’s punishment, the trial court sentenced

Appellant, inter alia, to 8 to 20 years’ incarceration for his aggravated assault

conviction, as well as 8 to 20 years’ incarceration for his persons not to

possess a firearm conviction. Although the trial court ordered these sentences

to run concurrently (thereby imposing an aggregate sentence of 8 to 20 years’

incarceration), the trial court nonetheless imposed a sentence for Appellant’s

persons not to possess a firearm conviction. Thus, while Appellant reasonably

expected to receive “no further penalty” for the Section 6105 offense in

exchange for his waiver, he did, in fact, receive a sentence contrary to the

____________________________________________

9A waiver form, in which Appellant waived his right to a jury trial in writing,
does not appear as part of the trial court record.

10Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code states that, in fashioning a sentence,
a trial court may choose to impose no further penalty following a
determination of guilt. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a)(2).

                                          - 19 -
J-S45010-22

plain-language promises made by the trial court. Consequently, we find that

Appellant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial was unknowingly, unintelligently,

and involuntarily given based upon the record before us. Houck, 948 A.2d at

788 (stating, “the voluntariness of a jury waiver can be undermined where

the defendant is informed of a range of potential sentences at a jury waiver

colloquy that is less than the sentence eventually imposed”).11

       As such, we vacate Appellant’s sentence of 8 to 20 years’ incarceration

imposed for his persons not to possess a firearm conviction.       Because our

decision to vacate this aspect of Appellant’s judgment of sentence does not

alter the trial court’s overall sentencing scheme (Appellant’s overall sentence

remains as an aggregate sentence of 8 to 20 years’ incarceration), we affirm

Appellant’s judgment of sentence, as modified.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed, as modified.

       Judge Murray joins.

       Judge Stabile concurs in the result.

____________________________________________

11 We deem Appellant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial to be invalid in the
case sub judice because the trial court imposed a sentence of incarceration
after promising that “no further penalty” would be imposed in exchange for
Appellant’s waiver. If the trial court had, in fact, imposed no further penalty,
we would have found that, based upon the oral colloquy, Appellant validly
waived his right to jury trial.

                                          - 20 -
J-S45010-22

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/12/2023

                          - 21 -