Court Opinion

ID: 9701800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:38:48.335136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:29.846700
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
In Commonwealth v. Frazier, 471 Pa. 121, 369 A.2d 1224, (J444 of 1975, filed Feb. 28, 1977), we concluded that,
“. . . appellant’s right to be tried by an impartial jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of this Commonwealth, was violated because the nature of the pretrial publicity was such that one exposed to it would be unable to serve as an impartial juror, and because the extent of that pretrial publicity was such that virtually every prospective juror in the county was exposed to it.”
We reached this conclusion in part because the pretrial publicity “. . . directly implicated [Frazier] as the confessed killer of a young local girl.” Id. at 129, 369 A.2d at 1228. Thus, in Frazier, we were dealing with pretrial publicity exposing potential jurors to an accused’s prior criminal record and to his alleged confession. Exposure to such news accounts was held to be “inherently prejudicial”, thus requiring the prosecution to show that a sufficient period of time had elapsed between the publicity and the commencement of the jury selection process so that the effects of the publicity could properly have been said to have dissipated. The three areas of “inherently prejudicial” pretrial publicity referred to in Frazier, and summarized in the majority opinion here, were not intended to be all inclusive however. The potential for prejudice results from the jurors’ exposure, outside of the judicial process, to evidence which points the finger of guilt at the accused. It is the inculpatory content of the pretrial publicity that is im*278portant. The exact nature of this inculpatory content— whether it be publication of an accused’s prior criminal record, of an alleged confession, or, as here, evidence presented in a co-defendant’s trial — is relevant only because it has an unavoidable effect on the minds of prospective jurors. Where the content is such that it would deny an accused’s right to be tried by a “panel of impartial and ‘indifferent’ jurors”, Commonwealth v. Harkens, 459 Pa. 196, 199, 328 A.2d 156, 157 (1974), where a large percentage of the potential jurors in the county was exposed to such publicity, and where the prosecution has not shown the effects of such publicity to have dissipated, it is an abuse of discretion not to grant the requested change of venue. I believe that the nature of the pretrial publicity here, although different in content than the pretrial publicity in Frazier, was such that appellant was denied a fair trial by an “impartial and indifferent” jury, and I therefore dissent.
In the present case Wayne County, a relatively small, primarily rural county with a population of approximately 30,000, was saturated with news coverage concerning the crime for which appellant was tried and convicted. On August 15, 1974, less than two weeks before appellant’s initial request for a change of venue, and approximately one month before the commencement of jury selection for appellant’s trial, one of appellant’s co-defendants, Irma Garcia, was found guilty of murder and conspiracy for the slaying of Senen Garcia (the other two persons indicted had already plead guilty). Irma Garcia’s trial was the first murder trial to take place in Wayne County in over twenty years. It received widespread notoriety throughout the county; particular attention being focused on the four persons accused of the homicide. Testimony taken at the trial of Irma Garcia, which testimony was thoroughly reported by the news media, repeatedly implicated appellant as the person who actually killed Senen Garcia.
*279In Commonwealth v. Frazier, 471 Pa. 121, 369 A.2d 1224 (J444 of 1975, filed Feb. 28, 1977), relying on Commonwealth v. Pierce, 451 Pa. 190, 303 A.2d 209 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878, 94 S.Ct. 164, 38 L.Ed.2d 124 (1973), we concluded that pretrial publicity
. . can be pretrial publicity so sustained, so pervasive, so inflammatory, and so inculpatory as to demand a change of venue without putting the defendant to any burden of establishing a nexus between the publicity and actual jury prejudice.”
The effect of the pretrial publicity in the instant case is identical to the effect of the publicity in Pierce and Frazier. In each case, the pretrial news coverage caused a substantial portion of those people exposed to it to conclude that the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged. This fact was dramatically illustrated during the voir dire examination of prospective jurors held prior to appellant’s trial. Of a total of 228 prospective jurors who were interviewed individually, 111 were asked if they had read of the case in the newspapers or had seen or heard news coverage on television and radio. One hundred and one replied “yes”. Fifty-three were asked if they had discussed the case with their families or friends; forty-one replied that they had. Twenty-two were asked if they were familiar with the facts of the trial of appellant’s co-defendant, Irma Garcia, and if they knew the result of that trial; nineteen responded affirmatively. Sixty-four challenges for cause were made relating to the prospective jurors’ formation of fixed opinions of guilt which resulted from their exposure to the pretrial publicity; sixty-one of these challenges were granted.
These statistics confirm the conclusion that the pretrial publicity which formed the basis for appellant’s change of venue motion was “so sustained, so pervasive, so inflammatory, and so inculpatory” that a change of *280venue was the only means to assure that appellant was tried by a panel of “impartial and indifferent” jurors.
I would therefore reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.