Court Opinion

ID: 9943906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 15:16:09.803714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:51:50.386457
License: Public Domain

I do not concur in the opinion of the majority. In this suit for a temporary injunction it is unimportant in the year 1952 whether obligations were created in 1951 in Starr County by the commissioners' court of the county in violation of the budget for that year, unless such obligations were created in violation of art. 11, § 7, of the Constitution of the State of Texas. There is nothing in the budget law, art. 689a-1 et seq., which provides that any obligation against a county which is not contained in its current budget is null and void and can never be paid, not even on a quantum meruit basis. Waller County v. Freelove, Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W.2d 602.
The State Constitution, art. 11, § 7, reads in part as follows:
 "* * * But no debt for any purpose shall ever be incurred in any manner by any city or county unless provision is made, at the time of creating the same, for levying and collecting a sufficient tax to pay the interest thereon and provide at least two per cent (2%) as a sinking fund; * * *."
A 'debt' has been defined as comprehending any pecuniary obligation imposed by contract, except such as is at the date of the agreement, within the lawful and reasonable contemplation of the parties, to be satisfied out of the current revenue for the year, or out of some fund then within the immediate control of the commissioners' court. 11 Tex.Jur. p. 670, § 121.
 "Debts for the ordinary running expenses of a county, payable within a year out of the incoming revenues of the year, and with other indebtedness not clearly in excess of the yearly income for general purposes, are not within the purview of the statute and may be lawfully created without the making of special provision for their payment." 11 Tex.Jur. 670, § 121; City of Corpus Christi v. Woessner, 58 Tex. 462; Foard County v. Sandifer, 105 Tex. 420, 151 S.W. 523; Austin Bros. v. Montague County, Tex.Civ.App., 291 S.W. 628; Boesen v. County of Potter, 173 S.W. 462; Ault v. Hill County, 102 Tex. 335, 116 S.W. 359; Cochran County v. West Audit Co., Tex.Civ.App., 10 S.W.2d 229; Morrison v. Kohler, Tex.Civ.App., 207 S.W.2d 951; Waller County v. Freelove, Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W.2d 602.
There is another reason why the trial judge properly dissolved the temporary injunction. The record shows that the injunction herein sought is against the commissioners' court to prohibit them from paying out money for services rendered by various persons for Starr County at the request of the commissioners' court. In any event the county must pay to these individuals the reasonable value of such services, the benefit of which has been accepted by the county. Waller County v. Freelove, supra; City of Mission v. Eureka Fire House Co., Tex.Civ.App., 67 S.W.2d 455; Sluder v. City of San Antonio, Tex.Com.App., 2 S.W.2d 841; City of Houston v. Finn,139 Tex. 111, 161 S.W.2d 776; Hayward v. City of Corpus Christi, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 995; 4 Tex.Jur. 726. Before appellant would be entitled to the temporary injunction which he seeks, he would have to go further and show that the commissioners' court of Starr County is threatening to pay these parties more than the reasonable value of the services which they have rendered for the county. To grant the temporary injunction here prayed for would be for this Court to declare void certain supposed obligations of Starr County without knowing under what circumstances they were created, what value the county received for such services, or the amount of such supposed debts. As a matter of fact, we cannot tell from the record whether any such obligations exist. The holders of these obligations, if any, are not made parties to this suit and we are here asked to declare their claims against the county, if any, null and void without their having had their day in court.
The order of the trial judge dissolving the temporary injunction should be affirmed. *Page 247