Court Opinion

ID: 9370062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 18:02:44.136797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:19.103149
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/10/23 P. v. Delgado CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B318206

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. MA080979)
         v.

JAVIER MONTES DELGADO,

         Defendant and Appellant

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Robert G. Chu, Judge. Affirmed.
      William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo, Acting Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        __________________________________
                         INTRODUCTION

      A jury convicted Javier Montes Delgado on a single count of
attempted carjacking (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 215, subd. (a)).1 The
court imposed a five-year prison sentence and ordered Delgado to
“stay away” from the victim of the carjacking, Delgado’s father.
Delgado appeals the imposition of the protective order, arguing
that no statute authorized the court to impose it. Alternatively,
Delgado contends the order is unconstitutionally vague. We
affirm.

           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      On March 16, 2021, Delgado’s father, Javier Delgado, Sr.
(Delgado, Sr.), discovered Delgado inside a car on Delgado, Sr.’s
property. Delgado, Sr., having previously secured a protective
order against Delgado, did not want Delgado on the property.
The next day, Delgado confronted Delgado, Sr., threw part of a
fence at him, threw his father to the ground, and threatened to
“beat [him] up” if he did not give Delgado the keys to his truck.
In the ensuing scuffle, Delgado acquired the truck keys, and
Delgado, Sr. acquired injuries to his face, back and neck.
Delgado, Sr. called 911. When sheriff’s deputies arrived,
Delgado, Sr. told the deputies Delgado had tried to take his truck.
The deputies observed redness on Delgado, Sr.’s neck and chest.
      On June 3, 2021, the People charged Delgado by
information with one count of attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215,
subd. (a)), and two prior “strike” allegations pursuant to the

1       Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

                                 2
Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). On
December 9, 2021, in a bifurcated trial, a jury convicted Delgado
on the attempted carjacking charge. The court found the prior
strike allegations true but struck one strike in the interest of
justice.
       On January 28, 2021, the court sentenced Delgado to a five-
year prison term (one-half the middle term doubled). In response
to the court’s inquiry, Delgado, Sr. requested a protective order.
The court then stated, “The court orders the defendant to stay
100 yards away from and have no contact with Javier Verdugo
Delgado.” The court specified the no-contact order would last for
10 years. The minute order stated, “A ten year criminal
protective order regarding protected person Javier B. [sic]
Delgado is signed and filed this date and deemed fully
incorporated herein by reference.” The minute order also stated,
“Obey the protective order issued in this or any other case” and
“Defendant is served with a copy of the protective order in open
court.”2
       Delgado timely appealed.

2     The abstract of judgment stated, “Obey protective order in
this/any other case. Stay away from Javier B. [sic] Delgado.”

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                           DISCUSSION

    A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       We review statutory interpretation issues de novo.
(People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) “‘“‘“As in any
case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task
here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate
the law's purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the
statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense
meaning.”’”’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.)
“‘“[W]e look to ‘the entire substance of the statute . . . in order to
determine the scope and purpose of the provision . . . [Citation.]’
[Citation.] That is, we construe the words in question “‘in
context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the
statute . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We must harmonize ‘the
various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by considering the
particular clause or section in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole.”’”’” (Ibid.)
       “A claim that a sentence is unauthorized . . . may be raised
for the first time on appeal, and is subject to judicial correction
whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court.”
(People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6.)
       “‘[T]he defendant . . . bears the burden to provide a record
on appeal which affirmatively shows that there was error below,
and any uncertainty in the record must be resolved against the
defendant.’” (People v. Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856, 866; see
People v. Green (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 991, 1001 [“‘all
presumptions and intendments are in favor of the regularity of
the action of the lower court in the absence of a record to the
contrary’”].)

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   B. The Court Issued a Valid Protective Order
       Delgado contends that the court did not issue a written
protective order, lacked any statutory basis to issue an order (oral
or written), and even if it did have a statutory basis and did issue
a written order, the one it issued suffers from unconstitutional
vagueness. The People contend the court issued a sufficiently
specific, statutorily authorized, written protective order.
Although the actual protective order does not appear in the
appellate record, the record supports the People’s interpretation.

       1. The court issued a written protective order
       Citing the court’s statements in open court, in his opening
brief Delgado argued that the court only issued an oral protective
order, not a written one. He softened that argument on reply in
light of the People’s citations to the record, with good reason. The
record confirms the court did issue a written protective order.
The minute order referred to a “signed and filed” 10-year
protective order. The minute order also reflected Delgado was
“served with a copy of the protective order in open court.” The
references to a signed and filed order, a copy of which was served
on Delgado, referred to a written protective order. Simply
because the court chose also to reiterate the important provisions
of that order orally with Delgado in court does not overcome the
presumption in favor of the “regularity of the action of the lower
court.” (People v. Green, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 1001.)

      2. The relevant statutes allowed the court to issue the
         protective order
      Delgado contends the court erred when it imposed a
protective order. He argues that “section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1)

                                 5
does not apply because this was not a domestic violence case.” He
further argues the court can issue a section 136.2,
subdivision (i)(1), protective order only against someone “‘within
the household.’” Delgado misunderstands the breadth and
meaning of section 136.2.
       As Delgado rightly states, a court lacks statutory authority
to impose a domestic violence protective order pursuant to
section 136.2, subdivision (i), if the conviction does not involve a
“qualifying domestic violence offense.” (People v. Garcia (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 887, 901.) However, section 136.2,
subdivision (i)(1), allows the issuance of a no-contact order
whenever “a criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime
involving domestic violence” against certain defined persons,
including, as relevant here, a father. (Fam. Code, § 6211,
subd. (f).) Qualifying conduct includes “molesting, attacking,
striking, stalking, threatening . . . or disturbing the peace of the
other party.” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a).) Disturbing the
peace means “‘“conduct that destroys the mental or emotional
calm of the other party.”’” (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
343, 360 [italics in original].)
       Delgado’s conduct easily falls within these parameters.
According to Delgado, Sr.’s testimony at trial, corroborated by the
investigating officer’s observations of Delgado, Sr.’s injuries,
Delgado attacked, struck, and/or threatened his father, and
certainly disturbed his peace.
       After asserting in his opening brief that section 136.2,
subdivision (i)(1), did not apply because “this was not a domestic
violence case,” Delgado concedes on reply that his conviction
“meets the first criteria of a ‘domestic violence crime,’” thereby
authorizing the court to consider issuing a 10-year no-contact

                                 6
order. However, relying on People v. Race (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th
211, 219 (Race), Delgado asserts Delgado, Sr. does not qualify as
a “victim” because section 136.2 requires the victim and the
perpetrator to reside “within the household.”
       Neither section 136.2 nor Race includes such a restriction.
To the contrary, by incorporating the domestic violence definition
in Family Code section 6211, section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1),
expressly contemplates orders protecting several categories of
victim who likely would not reside in the same household as the
domestic violence defendant. These categories include a “former
spouse,” a “former cohabitant,” and someone with whom the
defendant had a past “dating or engagement relationship.” (Fam.
Code, § 6211.) As one (common) example, based on these
provisions victims might secure a protective order against
someone they had not dated in years, and with whom they
certainly do not live. Moreover, the statutory definition of victim
has no “household” requirement: “As used in the chapter
containing section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), ‘“[v]ictim” means any
natural person with respect to whom there is reason to believe
that any crime as defined under the laws of this state . . . is being
or has been perpetrated or attempted to be perpetrated.’ (§ 136,
subd. (3).).” (People v. Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
205, 211 (Delarosarauda); accord, People v. Beckemeyer (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 461, 465 (Beckemeyer).) Based on this plain
statutory language, Delgado, Sr. unquestionably qualifies as a
“victim.” Delgado attacked him, caused injury to multiple areas
of his body, threatened to “beat him up,” tried to take his truck,
and, at a minimum, disturbed his peace. Nothing in the
language of section 136.2 required Delgado, Sr. to live in the
same household with Delgado to qualify for a protective order.

                                  7
       That leaves Race. In Race, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th 211, the
defendant pleaded no contest to attempted lewd and lascivious
acts on a child (his niece) under the age of 14 (§§ 664, 288,
subd. (a)). A different count, alleging the same conduct against
defendant’s daughter, was dismissed as part of the plea
agreement. The plea agreement included a waiver pursuant to
People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758, allowing the court to
consider the dismissed count for purposes of sentencing and
restitution. (Race, at p. 215.) At sentencing, the court issued a
protective order prohibiting the defendant from contacting both
the niece and the daughter because the daughter had reported
extensive sexual abuse perpetrated on her by her father, the
defendant.
       On appeal, defendant contended the daughter did not
qualify as a “victim” for purposes of section 136.2,
subdivision (i)(1). The court rejected that argument: “We hold
that section 136 defines a ‘victim’ in a broad enough manner in
which to include a victim of a charged count of which defendant
does not stand convicted so long as the court had some competent
evidence before it with which to conclude there was reason to
believe the individual was a victim of a broadly defined domestic-
violence-related offense involving harm or attempted harm such
that a criminal protective order should be issued.” (Race, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at p. 216.) The “household” language appears
later in the opinion, after the Race court surveyed several other
cases, including Delarosarauda and Beckemeyer (neither of which
mentions a “household” requirement). Summarizing those cases
in light of the specific facts at issue in Race, the court stated the
“rule” that the term “‘victim’” “must be construed broadly to
include any individual against whom there is ‘some evidence’

                                  8
from which the court could find the defendant had committed or
attempted to commit some harm within the household.” (Race, at
p. 219.)
       Race does not aid our analysis here for at least two reasons.
First, the court in Race addressed an argument not made and not
relevant here—whether it could issue a protective order naming a
victim in a dismissed count. Second, the Race court did not
address the argument Delgado does make here, that
section 136.2, despite its clear language, somehow includes a
mandate that defendant and victim reside in the same household.
Because Race involves different facts and legal issues, it does not
mean what Delgado says it does or help advance his argument.
       Accordingly, the court properly considered, as section 136.2
requires, a protective order requiring Delgado to stay away from,
and have no contact with, Delgado, Sr.

       3. The protective order, combined with the court’s
          admonition, is not impermissibly vague
       Delgado finally argues that even if the court had the
authority to issue the protective order, the one it issued is vague
because it lacks a “scienter requirement.” Both parties analogize
to cases involving probation conditions. However, the cases on
which Delgado relies differ factually. For example, in People v.
Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, the court modified a probation
condition that the defendant not associate with gang members or
display any gang insignia. In that case, the defendant could not
necessarily know if indicia he displayed would be gang related or
if the people with whom he associated had any gang affiliation.
Accordingly, the court modified the “displaying” and “associating”
conditions to include a knowledge requirement, so that the

                                 9
defendant could not knowingly display indicia of gang
membership or associate with persons “known to” the defendant
to be gang members. (Id. at pp. 628-629.) Similarly, in In re
Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, the court added a
knowledge requirement to a probation condition prohibiting the
defendant from remaining in a “‘building, vehicle or in the
presence of any person where dangerous or deadly weapons or
firearms or ammunition exist.’” (Id. at pp. 912-913.) Because the
defendant could not know if someone in the same building had a
concealed firearm, for example, the court modified the condition
based on overbreadth concerns.
       No such infirmity infects the protective order here. The
void-for-vagueness doctrine, “which derives from the due process
concept of fair warning, bars the government from enforcing a
provision that ‘forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague’ that people of ‘common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application.’” (People v. Hall
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500.) “To withstand a constitutional
challenge on the ground of vagueness, a probation condition must
be sufficiently definite to inform the probationer what conduct is
required or prohibited, and to enable the court to determine
whether the probationer has violated the condition.” (Ibid.)
       Delgado obviously knows his father, a fact that
distinguishes this case from cases like In re Victor L., supra,
182 Cal.App.4th 902 and People v. Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th
615, where the prohibited conduct may not be clear to the
defendant in any given situation. Indeed, since In re Victor L.,
courts have split as to whether probation conditions imposed
without an express knowledge requirement necessitate
modification to add one. (Compare People v. Patel (2011)

                                10
196 Cal.App.4th 956, 960 [frustrated with “dismaying regularity”
with which the court needed to address requests to modify
probation conditions to add knowledge requirement, and in light
of “substantial uncontradicted body of case law” that requires
proof of scienter for probation violations involving “presence,
possession, association, or other actions,” the court would “now
give notice” going forward that it would construe all such
probation conditions to have a knowledge requirement] with
People v Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1351 [declining to
follow Patel and modifying probation condition restricting
internet access to include a knowledge requirement].) These
cases generally do not involve protective orders but rather
undefined groups of people or categories of conduct where a
probationer could (arguably) unwittingly violate a probation
condition restricting conduct (e.g., accessing the internet, being
near guns that could be concealed). (In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875, 890 [probation condition that defendant not
associate with anyone “‘disapproved of by probation’” was
unconstitutionally vague unless the court added a knowledge
requirement because defendant could not otherwise know from
whom defendant must stay away unless the probation
department provided that information].)
      A no-contact order protecting an individual differs from a
probation condition because the defendant typically knows the
person identified, and certainly did in this case. For that reason,
among others, courts interpret a no-contact order that expressly
protects a victim of a prior act of domestic violence to imply a
knowledge requirement. (See People v. Rodriguez (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 578, 594 [“No reasonable law enforcement officer
or judge can expect probationers to know where their victims are

                                11
at all times. The challenged condition does not require defendant
to stay away from all locations where the victim might
conceivably be. It requires defendant to remove himself (‘Stay
away at least 100 yards . . . .’) when he knows or learns of a
victim’s presence.”], disapproved on other grounds by People v.
Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th 484; see also People v. Hartley (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 620, 635 [“The addition of an express knowledge
requirement [to the stay-away order] would only make explicit
what already is implicit: Hartley must be aware of or have
knowledge of the driver in order to personally–or by other
means–contact him.”].)
       We also disagree with Delgado that the term “no contact”
suffers from any impermissible ambiguity. The record strongly
suggests the court served Delgado with a standard form
protective order, which would specify that contact cannot be
through a third party or by electronic, written, or other means.
In any event, no contact means no contact. The protective order
does not need to delineate all prohibited forms of contact to pass
constitutional muster. The phrase gives Delgado “fair warning”
as to what he may not do and explains precisely the prohibited
conduct. (People v. Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 500.) We find no
ambiguity that warrants modification.

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                        DISPOSITION

     The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.

                                    HOWARD, J.*

We concur:

     PERLUSS, P. J.

     SEGAL, J.

*     Judge of the Marin County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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