Court Opinion

ID: 9914310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 23:00:33.857503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:11.811432
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALASKA RAILROAD                          No. 22-35573
CORPORATION,
                                       D.C. No. 3:20-cv-
             Plaintiff-Appellee,         00232-JMK
 v.

FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION                 ORDER AND
ADDITION NO. 1 AND ADDITION               OPINION
NO. 2 PROPERTY OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, a non-profit,

             Defendant-Appellant,
and

MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE,
DEPT OF LAW,

             Intervenor-Defendant.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of Alaska
      Joshua M. Kindred, District Judge, Presiding

        Argued and Submitted August 15, 2023
                 Anchorage, Alaska

               Filed December 29, 2023
2        ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION

    Before: Richard A. Paez, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, and
             Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.

                            Order;
                   Opinion by Judge Nguyen

                          SUMMARY *

                         Property Law

    In a case in which Chief Judge Murguia is recused and
Judge Bade was drawn as a replacement judge, the panel (1)
withdrew the opinion filed on September 18, 2023; (2) filed
a new opinion, reflecting Judge Bade’s concurrence,
affirming the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
Alaska Railroad Corp. (“ARRC”) in its action seeking to
quiet title in a railroad right-of-way and to clarify that
ARRC’s interest in the right-of-way includes an exclusive-
use easement; (3) denied a petition for panel rehearing; and
(4) denied a petition for rehearing en banc.
    ARRC, a state-owned corporation, owns and operates
Alaska’s railroad system. It possesses a right-of-way on
which it operates a section of track next to an air strip owned
by Flying Crown Subdivision No. 1 and Addition No. 2
Property Owners Association. ARRC’s right-of-way
includes one-hundred feet on either side of the track’s center

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
        ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION      3

line, some of which directly overlaps with Flying Crown’s
air strip.
     The panel held that the Alaska Railroad Act of 1914
authorized the creation of the Alaska Railroad, a federal
railroad, and reserved railroad rights-of-way to the United
States. The Alaska Railroad Transfer Act of 1982
authorized the federal government to transfer nearly all of
the Alaska Railroad property rights to ARRC.
    In 1950, the United States issued the “Sperstad Patent”
to Flying Crown’s predecessor in interest. The Alaska
Railroad’s track already traversed the land, and the Sperstad
Patent reserved a railroad right-of-way. The panel held that
the 1914 Act did not reveal the scope of the right-of-way
retained by the government. Considering common law
principles, the sovereign grantor canon, and the court’s
interpretation of the general right-of-way statute adopted by
Congress in 1875, the panel concluded that, in the Sperstad
Patent, the federal government intended to reserve an
exclusive-use easement under the 1914 Act. The panel
further held that the federal government transferred the
exclusive-use easement it retained under the 1914 Act to
ARRC under the Alaska Railroad Transfer Act of 1982.

                        COUNSEL

Jeffrey W. McCoy (argued), Pacific Legal Foundation,
Highlands Ranch, Colorado; Damien M. Schiff, Pacific
Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California; Paige E. Gillard,
Pacific Legal Foundation, Arlington, Virginia; Eva R.
Gardner, Ashburn & Mason PC, Anchorage, Alaska;
4       ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION

Thomas E. Meacham, Thomas E. Meacham Attorney at
Law, Anchorage, Alaska; for Defendant-Appellant.
Michael C. Geraghty (argued) and William G. Cason,
Holland & Hart LLP, Anchorage, Alaska, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Ashley C. Brown and John A. Lehman, Kemppel Huffman
and Ellis PC, Anchorage, Alaska, for Amicus Curiae
Matanuska Telecom Association, Inc.

                         ORDER

    The Honorable Chief Judge Mary Murguia is recused
from this case and Judge Bade was drawn as a replacement
judge pursuant to General Order 3.2h (Dkt. No. 45). The
opinion filed on September 18, 2023 is hereby withdrawn. A
new opinion reflecting Judge Bade’s concurrence will be
filed contemporaneously with this order.
    The panel has voted to deny the petition for panel
rehearing. Judge Nguyen and Judge Bade have voted to
deny the petition for rehearing en banc, and Judge Paez has
so recommended.
    The full court has been advised of the petition for
rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on
whether to rehear the matter en banc. See Fed. R. App. P.
35.
    The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for
rehearing en banc are denied. No further petitions for panel
rehearing or rehearing en banc will be entertained.
        ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION       5

                         OPINION

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:

    This case concerns the property rights of two uniquely
Alaskan entities. On one side is Flying Crown Subdivision
Addition No. 1 and No. 2 Property Owners Association
(“Flying Crown”), a homeowners’ association for the
eponymous subdivision in Anchorage, Alaska. Flying
Crown is one of many subdivisions nestled in South
Anchorage. But it is not your average subdivision. The
homes in Flying Crown back up to a small air strip. A Flying
Crown homeowner can walk out her back door, hop into the
plane parked in her backyard, and conveniently taxi her
plane directly onto the grassy take-off and landing strip that
abuts her backyard. Some of Flying Crown’s homeowners
selected the subdivision for that very reason.
    On the other side is the Alaska Railroad Corporation
(“ARRC”), a state-owned corporation that owns and
operates Alaska’s railroad system. The railroad carries
millions of tons of cargo, connects rural communities to
population centers in Anchorage and Fairbanks, and allows
tourists to travel to remote regions off the state’s road
system. ARRC also possesses a right-of-way on which it
operates a section of track adjacent to Flying Crown’s air
strip. Its right-of-way includes one-hundred feet on either
side of the track’s center line, some of which directly
overlaps with Flying Crown’s air strip.
    For decades, Flying Crown and ARRC coexisted
peacefully. ARRC operated its railroad, and Flying Crown’s
homeowners took off and landed on the adjacent air strip.
Neither party was legally certain of the exact property right,
but it did not seem to matter. As far as we are aware, no
6       ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION

significant problems arose because both parties acted in the
spirit of mutual accommodation.
     In 2019, Flying Crown sent ARRC a letter demanding
that ARRC relinquish any claim to exclusive use of the right-
of-way. In response, ARRC filed this action seeking to quiet
title in the right-of-way and to clarify that ARRC’s interest
in the right-of-way includes an exclusive-use easement.
ARRC’s claim raises challenging questions about the proper
interpretation of the Alaska Railroad Act of 1914 and the
Alaska Railroad Transfer Act of 1982. We will explain the
legal issues in more detail below, but suffice it to say that, as
a matter of safety, the railroad must possess the right to
exclude anyone—including Flying Crown homeowners—
from its right-of-way. Accordingly, we hold that ARRC
possesses at least an exclusive-use easement in its right-of-
way crossing Flying Crown’s property. Because the district
court properly granted summary judgment to ARRC and
denied Flying Crown’s cross-motion for summary judgment,
we affirm.
     I. Factual, Legal, and Procedural Background
    The parties rely on railroad statutes from both the
contiguous United States and Alaska. We start by reviewing
the relevant history of railroad acts in the continental United
States and Alaska before turning to the factual and
procedural background of this litigation.
     A. Railroads in the Continental United States
     The continental United States experienced a significant
boom in railroad growth in the 1800s. Between 1850 and
1871, “Congress embarked on a policy of subsidizing
railroad construction by lavish grants from the public
domain.” Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262,
         ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION              7

273 (1942). Congress granted “rights of way through the
public domain, accompanied by outright grants of land along
those rights of way,” conveyed in “checkerboard blocks.”
Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 572 U.S.
93, 96–97 (2014). This policy enabled railroad companies
to “either develop their lots or sell them, to finance
construction of rail lines and encourage the settlement of
future customers.” Id. at 97.
    The Supreme Court characterized these pre-1871 rights-
of-way as “limited fee[s].” 1 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend,
190 U.S. 267, 271 (1903). The pre-1871 rights-of-way were
unquestionably exclusive. See New Mexico v. U.S. Tr. Co.,
172 U.S. 171, 183 (1898) (holding that the railroad’s right-
of-way is “more than an ordinary easement” because it has
the “attributes of the fee, perpetuity and exclusive use and
possession”); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 195 U.S.
540, 570 (1904) (“A railroad right of way is a very
substantial thing. It is more than a mere right of passage. It
is more than an easement [and] . . . ‘whatever it may be
called, it is, in substance, an interest in the land, special and
exclusive in its nature.’” (citation omitted)).
     Congress’s generous land-grant policy proved
unpopular. Western settlers complained that it discouraged
settlement because railroads were slow to sell their land.
Brandt, 572 U.S. at 97. As a result of this and other
criticisms, “[a]fter 1871 outright grants of public lands to

1
  The Supreme Court initially called the pre-1871 grants “absolute
grant[s],” see St. Joseph & Denver City R.R. Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U.S.
426, 429–30 (1880), before adopting the “limited fee” designation, see
Barahona v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 881 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“[T]he Court apparently endorsed the conclusion that the pre-1871
grants were of a limited fee.”).
8         ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION

private railroad companies seem to have been discontinued.”
Great N., 315 U.S. at 274. Between 1871 and 1875,
Congress passed a series of one-off acts granting individual
railroads particular rights-of-way through public land in the
western United States. Id. After several years, “[t]he burden
of this special legislation moved Congress to adopt [a]
general right of way statute” in 1875. Id. at 275.
    The Supreme Court distinguished 1875 Act right-of-way
grants from their pre-1871 predecessors. Unlike pre-1871
acts, the 1875 Act “grants only an easement, and not a fee.”
Id. at 271; see also Brandt, 572 U.S. at 104 (“[T]he [Great
Northern] Court specifically rejected the notion that the right
of way conferred even a ‘limited fee.’” (citation omitted)).2
The Supreme Court has not, however, determined whether
1875 Act rights-of-way are exclusive in nature.
                     B. Railroads in Alaska
    Alaska’s railroad boom lagged several decades behind
the contiguous United States. In the late 1800s and early
1900s, private railroads began investing in Alaska in hopes
of capitalizing on the Klondike Gold Rush. But the
conditions in Alaska proved challenging and, ultimately,
private railroads failed. Recognizing that the developing
territory needed a reliable railroad, Congress passed the

2
  The earliest case interpreting an 1875 Act right-of-way called the
railroad’s interest in its right-of-way a “limited fee.” See Rio Grande W.
Ry. Co. v. Stringham, 239 U.S. 44, 47 (1915) (stating that “[t]he right of
way granted by [the 1875 Act] is neither a mere easement, nor a fee
simple absolute, but a limited fee [that] carries with it the incidents and
remedies usually attending the fee”). Thus, it initially seemed that the
Supreme Court would treat 1875 Act easements like their pre-1871
predecessors. But the Supreme Court roundly rejected this position in
Great Northern, 315 U.S. at 271.
        ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION        9

Alaska Railroad Act of 1914 (“1914 Act”). See Act of
March 12, 1914, ch. 37, 38 Stat. 305 (formerly codified at 43
U.S.C. § 975, et seq.). The 1914 Act authorized the president
to “locate, construct and operate railroads in the Territory of
Alaska.” Id. The Alaska Railroad was the first—and only—
federally constructed and operated railroad in the United
States. United States v. City of Anchorage, 437 F.2d 1081,
1082 (9th Cir. 1971).
    To make the railroad possible, the 1914 Act required that
future land patents by the federal government in Alaska
“reserve[] to the United States a right of way for the
construction of railroads, telegraph and telephone lines to the
extent of one hundred feet on either side of the center line of
any such road.” 1914 Act § 1.
     In the early 1980s, the federal government decided that
Alaska should take over ownership and management of the
railroad. S. Rep. No. 97-479, at 5 (1982). Congress enacted
the Alaska Railroad Transfer Act of 1982 (“ARTA”), 45
U.S.C. §§ 1201–14, which authorized the federal
government to transfer nearly all of its railroad’s property
rights to the state of Alaska’s new state-owned Alaska
Railroad Corporation. Today, ARRC continues to own and
operate Alaska’s full-service freight and passenger railroad.
                C. Litigation Background
    On February 15, 1950, the United States issued federal
patent No. 1128320 to Thomas Sperstad (“Sperstad Patent”),
Flying Crown’s predecessor in interest. As required by the
1914 Act, the Sperstad Patent “reserved to the United States
a right of way for the construction of railroads, telegraph and
telephone lines in accordance with the Act of March 12,
1914.” The Alaska Railroad’s track already traversed the
10      ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION

land when the federal government issued the Sperstad
Patent.
    In 1965, John Graham purchased a piece of the Sperstad
Patent to develop the Flying Crown subdivision. Oceanview
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Quadrant Const. & Eng’g, 680
P.2d 793, 795 (Alaska 1984). By 1962, an airstrip—which
overlapped with the railroad’s right-of-way—was built on
the Sperstad land. Id. Many of Flying Crown’s homeowners
are pilots and selected the subdivision because of the airstrip.
    Following ARTA’s enactment in 1983, the federal
government transferred the Alaska Railroad’s easement over
what was originally the Sperstad Patent to ARRC, first by
interim conveyance and later pursuant to Patent No. 50-
2006-0363. The patent purported to convey “not less than
an exclusive-use easement” to ARRC.
     ARRC and the Flying Crown homeowners coexisted
peacefully for decades. At some point, ARRC began
charging Flying Crown an annual $4,500 permitting fee to
use the airstrip on the right-of-way. Flying Crown objected
to the fee, but the parties seemed to have resolved the issue
without litigation—ARRC terminated the fee in 2017.
ARRC does not currently charge Flying Crown any
permitting fees. Counsel for ARRC represented at oral
argument that ARRC has no plans to reinstate the permitting
fee.
    Nevertheless, in 2019, Flying Crown sent ARRC a letter
claiming that the ARTA transfer had “attempted to award
property rights no longer owned by the federal government”
and demanding that “ARRC immediately proclaim, by
means of a legally recordable document, that it relinquishes
any and all claim to ‘exclusive use’ of the right-of-way.” In
response, ARRC filed this action seeking to quiet title in the
        ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION       11

right-of-way and to clarify that ARRC’s interest in the right-
of-way includes an exclusive-use easement.
    The district court granted ARRC’s motion for summary
judgment and denied Flying Crown’s cross motion. The
court held “that ARRC possesses the interest to at least an
exclusive-use easement . . . in its [right-of-way] crossing
Flying Crown’s property.” Flying Crown appealed.
        II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
    We have jurisdiction because this case turns on
“substantial questions of federal law.” See Grable & Sons
Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We review de novo the
district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment, First
Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, 860 F.3d 1263, 1271 (9th Cir. 2017),
and we affirm.
                        III. Analysis
                      A. The 1914 Act
    The Sperstad Patent “reserved to the United States a right
of way for the construction of railroads . . . in accordance
with the [Alaska Railroad Act of 1914].” Accordingly, we
turn first to the scope of the interest reserved by the federal
government under the 1914 Act.
    The 1914 Act does not define the scope of a “right-of-
way,” nor does it include any textual hints as to the right-of-
way’s exclusivity or lack thereof. Flying Crown contends
that the federal government had no exclusive easement under
the 1914 Act and therefore cannot transfer such interest to
the state; ARRC takes the opposite position. But neither
party relies on a purely textual argument. In the absence of
textual guidance, we rely on contextual indicators—
12       ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION

common law principles, the sovereign-grantor canon, and a
contemporaneous railroad act from the contiguous United
States—to determine whether the federal government
intended to reserve an exclusive-use easement under the
1914 Act. We conclude that it did.
                  i. Common Law Principles
    We begin with “basic common law principles.” Brandt,
572 U.S. at 106; accord id. at 104–06. 3 Flying Crown
contends that, under common law, easements are by nature
nonexclusive. Not so. “Easements . . . may be exclusive or
nonexclusive,” and “[t]he degree of exclusivity of the rights
conferred by an easement . . . is highly variable.”
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.2 cmt. c
(2000); see also id. § 1.2 cmt. d (“Easements and profits may
authorize the exclusive use of portions of the servient
estate[.]”). Exclusivity is a spectrum that ranges from “no
right to exclude anyone” to “the right to exclude everyone,”
and nearly everything in between. Id. § 1.2 cmt. c.
    To determine the degree of exclusivity, “[a] servitude
should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the
parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument,
or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude,
and to carry out the purpose for which it was created.” Id.
§ 4.1(1); see also Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S.
668, 682 (1979) (holding that a railroad act should “receive
such a construction as will carry out the intent of Congress”
which can be determined by “the condition of the country
when the acts were passed, as well as to the purpose declared
on their face” (citation omitted)). Because language in the

3
  We draw the relevant common law principles from the Restatement
(Third) of Property: Servitudes, just as the Supreme Court did in Brandt.
        ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION       13

Sperstad Patent and the underlying 1914 Act provide little
guidance, we look instead to the purpose and circumstances
of the right-of-way reservation to determine the parties’
intent. Both weigh in favor of a finding an exclusive-use
easement interest.
     The express purpose of right-of-way reservations made
pursuant to the 1914 Act was “for the construction of
railroads.” The intent of the railroad was to

       aid in the development of the agricultural and
       mineral or other resources of Alaska, and the
       settlement of the public lands therein,
       and . . . to provide transportation of coal for
       the Army and Navy, transportation of troops,
       arms, munitions of war, the mails, and for
       other governmental and public uses, and for
       the transportation of passengers and property.

1914 Act § 1; see also City of Anchorage, 437 F.2d at 1082
(“The purpose of this railroad was to aid in the development
of the natural resources of the Territory and the settlement of
its public lands by providing necessary transportation from
the coast to the interior.”).
    An exclusive-use easement best serves this purpose.
Safe and efficient operation requires railroads to have the
ability to exclude anyone, including the servient estate
owner, at any time. Contrary to Flying Crown’s contention,
an exclusive-use easement does not impair the statute’s
settlement purpose. If anything, it facilitates settlement by
ensuring that settlers have dependable access to
transportation and goods.
14      ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION

     Railroad rights-of-way are necessarily different than
traditional easements because of the purpose of the
easement. Our circuit has recognized as much. See
Barahona, 881 F.3d at 1134 (“It is beyond dispute that a
railroad right of way confers more than a right to simply run
trains over the land.”). Logically, the scope of an easement
intended to facilitate the passage of large, fast-moving
machinery differs from, say, an easement to walk across a
neighbor’s land to access the beach. See, e.g., New Mexico,
172 U.S. at 181–82 (“[Right-of-way] may mean one thing in
a grant to a natural person for private purposes, and another
thing in a grant to a railroad for public purposes, as different
as the purposes and uses and necessities, respectively, are.”).
Thus, the purpose of the 1914 Act—to provide a railroad for
the territory of Alaska—is best served by an exclusive-use
easement.
    The circumstances that led to the creation of the right-of-
way also weigh in favor of finding an exclusive-use
easement. See Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 682; Restatement
§ 4.1(1); see also United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.
(“Union Pac. I”), 91 U.S. 72, 79 (1875). Flying Crown
contends that the context that led to the 1914 Act is
comparable to the contemporaneous 1875 Act in the
contiguous United States. But “Alaska is often the
exception, not the rule.” Sturgeon v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066,
1080 (2019) (citation omitted); Yellen v. Confederated
Tribes of the Chehalis Rsrv., 141 S. Ct. 2434, 2438 (2021)
(highlighting “the unique circumstances of Alaska”).
     As discussed above, the federal government supported
railroads in the contiguous United States through generous
land grants until public resentment developed. Brandt, 572
U.S. at 97. The 1875 Act resulted from Congress’s shift
away from such extravagant subsidies. Alaska was different.
        ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION          15

Unlike the booming railroad industry in the contiguous
United States, Alaskan railroad companies struggled and
frequently failed. In response, the federal government
introduced a radical new policy—the government itself
would construct and operate the Alaska Railroad.
Consequently, widespread frustration with private railroads’
unmerited enrichment at the expense of the public—the very
circumstance that led to the 1875 Act—never occurred in
Alaska.
     If anything, the circumstances that gave rise to the
Alaska Railroad were more like the pre-1871, rather than the
post-1875, western United States. The western United States
was a vast, undeveloped land before the completion of the
transcontinental railroad in 1869, see Union Pac. I, 91 U.S.
at 80; Alaska was a similarly vast, undeveloped territory in
the early 1900s, see H.R. Rep. No. 92, at 11 (1913). Both
territories held the promise of abundant agricultural and
mineral resources, as well as the potential for settlement. See
Union Pac. I, 91 U.S. at 80; 1914 Act § 1. And just as
Congress viewed the Alaska Railroad as a critical tool for
the impending global unrest in 1914, see 51 Cong. Rec.
S1896 (1914) (“[O]ne of the prime motive powers behind
this bill, or one of the reasons urged for its passage, is that it
is a great military necessity.”), it similarly viewed a railroad
as essential to Civil War-era security when it passed the pre-
1871 acts, see Brandt, 572 U.S. at 96 (“The Civil War
spurred the effort to develop a transcontinental railroad[.]”).
    In both contexts, serious risks led to substantial
government involvement in creation of the railroad. In the
pre-1871 western United States, “[t]he risks were great and
the costs were staggering,” and thus “[p]opular sentiment
grew for the Government to play a role in supporting the
massive project.” Brandt, 572 U.S. at 96 (“[T]he Federal
16       ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION

Government ought to render immediate and efficient aid in
its construction.” (citation omitted)).        The federal
government acquiesced by offering generous land grants for
railroad rights-of-way. In 1914 Alaska, where the risks were
arguably greater and the costs even more staggering, the
government saw the need to play a more active role in
developing the railroad. H.R. Rep. No. 92, at 12 (1913)
(describing the Alaska Railroad as an “immense
undertaking” in light of the “extreme cold” which requires a
railroad “aided or built by [the] government[]”).
    These parallels make sense. The United States acquired
the western territories between 1803 and 1853. Brandt, 572
U.S. at 95 (beginning with the Louisiana Purchase through
the Gadsden Purchase). The United States purchased the
Alaska territory in 1867. Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S.
75, 83 (2005). Thus, development in Alaska was several
decades behind the western United States. It is unsurprising,
then, that the circumstances of pre-1871 western United
States—where the government granted railroad rights-of-
way in exclusive-use limited fee—offer a more apt analogy
to 1914 Alaska than the post-1875 western United States.
Thus, the circumstances of the 1914 Act weigh in favor of
finding at least an exclusive-use easement.
                 ii. Sovereign-Grantor Canon
   The sovereign-grantor canon also militates in favor of
exclusivity. 4 Under the canon, “[any] doubts . . . are

4
 Flying Crown contends that the sovereign-grantor rule applies with less
vigor to railroad acts. We disagree. Leo Sheep’s statement that “this
Court long ago declined to apply [the sovereign grantor] canon in its full
vigor to grants under the railroad Acts” introduces some confusion when
read in isolation. 440 U.S. at 682. But Leo Sheep stands for the
          ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION                  17

resolved for the Government, not against it.” United States
v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (“Union Pac. II”), 353 U.S. 112, 116
(1957). Here, the structure of the 1914 Act right-of-way—
a reservation to the government instead of a grant to a private
company—requires us to apply the sovereign-grantor rule to
construe the right-of-way reserved to the government
expansively.
    Flying Crown emphasizes the Supreme Court’s common
articulation of the principle—“nothing passes except what is
conveyed in clear language”—to argue that we should limit
the government’s reservation to its explicit language. But
Supreme Court cases that cite the principle arise from a
governmental grant of a right-of-way to a private party. See
Great N., 315 U.S. at 272; Union Pac. II, 353 U.S. at 116;
Brandt, 572 U.S. at 110 n.5. In that context, the Court has
limited the grant to its explicit terms. But, here, the
government reserved a right-of-way to itself. If we were to
limit the reservation to its explicit terms, we would resolve
doubts against the government—not for it. We instead
follow the animating principle behind the sovereign-grantor
canon, that ambiguity in land grants should be resolved in
favor of the government, to interpret the reservation
expansively. Thus, the sovereign-grantor canon weighs in
favor of finding at least an exclusive-use easement.

proposition that the sovereign-grantor rule cannot overcome the
legislature’s stated or implied intent—not that the sovereign-grantor rule
no longer applies. Id. (“[P]ublic grants are construed strictly against the
grantees, but they are not to be so construed as to defeat the intent of the
legislature[.]” (citation omitted)).
18      ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION

         iii. Contemporaneous Railroad Statute
    Finally, reading the 1914 Act in concert with the 1875
Act supports exclusivity. Flying Crown contends that the
1875 Act granted nonexclusive easements and that similar
language in the 1914 Act dictates the same conclusion. As
noted above, the 1875 Act is an inapt analogy to the 1914
Act. But even assuming the 1875 Act is pertinent, Flying
Crown’s argument fails because it rests on the faulty premise
that the 1875 Act granted nonexclusive easements.
    The Supreme Court has opined on several aspects of the
interest granted by an 1875 Act right-of-way. For instance,
an 1875 Act right-of-way does not include the right to drill
for and remove subsurface oil, gas, and minerals. Great N.,
315 U.S. at 279. And when the railroad abandons an 1875
Act easement, the easement extinguishes, and the interest
goes to the servient landowner (not the government).
Brandt, 572 U.S. at 105–06.
    But the Supreme Court has never addressed whether an
1875 Act easement is exclusive or nonexclusive. See L.K.L.
Assocs., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 17 F.4th 1287, 1308
(10th Cir. 2021) (Briscoe, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“What the Supreme Court did not address
in Brandt, because it did not need to, is whether an easement
granted under the 1875 Act is exclusive or non-exclusive.”).
The only circuit to answer the question, the Tenth Circuit,
held that “[a]n 1875 Act easement allows the grantee to
exclude everyone—including the grantor and fee owner.”
Id. at 1295.
    We see no reason to depart from our sister circuit’s sound
reasoning. The 1875 Act stated that a railroad could not
exclude its competitors from physically narrow passages like
canyons. 43 U.S.C. § 935. The Tenth Circuit held that this
        ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION       19

language implied that an 1875 Act easement is exclusive,
subject to specific exceptions such as in narrow passages.
L.K.L., 17 F.4th at 1295–96. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit
rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that Brandt and Great
Northern foreclosed exclusivity. Id. at 1297 (holding that
Brandt and Great Northern turned on the difference between
an easement and a possessory interest, which “is not relevant
to whether a railroad with an 1875 Act easement has the right
to exclude”). We agree. And if the 1875 Act grants
exclusive-use easements, then it is only logical that the
federal government reserved no less than an exclusive-use
easement for itself in Alaska. Indeed, Flying Crown offers
no rationale for why the federal government would reserve a
lesser property interest for itself in the 1914 Act than it
granted to private railroads in the 1875 Act.
               *              *               *
    In sum, the language of the 1914 Act does not reveal the
scope of the right-of-way retained by the government. But
common law principles, the sovereign grantor canon, and
our interpretation of the 1875 Act all lead us to hold that the
federal government reserved no less than an exclusive-use
easement under the 1914 Act.
                         B. ARTA
    We turn now to the scope of the interest transferred from
the federal government to ARRC pursuant to ARTA. We
hold that the federal government transferred the exclusive-
use easement it retained under the 1914 Act to ARRC under
ARTA.
    ARTA requires the federal government to grant “not less
than an exclusive-use easement” to the State under certain
circumstances, all of which were met here. 45 U.S.C.
20      ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION

§ 1205(b)(4)(B). Specifically, as relevant here, ARTA set
out the following “procedures applicable” to lands to be
transferred:

       [w]here lands within the right-of-way, or any
       interest in such lands, have been conveyed
       from Federal ownership prior to January 14,
       1983, or is subject to a claim of valid existing
       rights by a party other than a Village
       Corporation, the conveyance to the State of
       the Federal interest in such properties
       pursuant to section 1203(b)(1)(B) or (2) of
       this title shall grant not less than an exclusive-
       use easement in such properties.

Id. (emphasis added).
    The Sperstad Patent meets all the conditions of
§ 1205(b)(4)(B). The Sperstad Patent included land within
the railroad right-of-way. The federal government granted
the Sperstad Patent in 1950, meaning that the land was
“conveyed from Federal ownership prior to January 14,
1983.” Id. And ARTA authorized transfer of the easement
across the Sperstad Patent pursuant to 45 U.S.C.
§ 1203(b)(1)(B). Under the plain text of § 1205(b)(4)(B),
then, “the conveyance to the State of the Federal interest” in
this case “shall grant not less than an exclusive-use
easement.”
    Citing to Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, Flying
Crown instead contends that we should apply the distributive
canon to read § 1205(b)(4)(B) as referring to property
interests that have been conveyed and are subject to a claim
of valid existing rights or property interests that have not
been conveyed and are subject to a claim of valid existing
        ALASKA R.R. CORP. V. FLYING CROWN SUBDIVISION     21

rights. 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141–42 (2018). But the distributive
canon has no role here. The Supreme Court held in Encino
that “‘or’ is ‘almost always disjunctive.’” Id. at 1141
(quoting United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 45 (2013)).
Indeed, the Court eschewed the distributive canon in favor
of the ordinary, disjunctive meaning of “or” because it was
the “more natural reading.” Id. at 1142. Likewise, we find
that the ordinary, disjunctive reading is the most natural
reading of § 1205(b)(4)(B).
                      IV. Conclusion
    We hold that the 1914 Act reserved an exclusive-use
easement for the Alaska Railroad and that the federal
government transferred that exclusive-use easement to the
state under ARTA. Accordingly, the district court properly
granted ARRC’s motion for summary judgment and denied
Flying Crown’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
   AFFIRMED.