Court Opinion

ID: 9572150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:39:02.337078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:40.625479
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — The majority holds that two deeds *920are effective to pass property at death even though the deeds were neither valid inter vivos conveyances nor valid testamentary dispositions of property. In so holding, the majority radically alters the long-standing requirements for the effective conveyance of property by deed and misconstrues the nature and purpose of RCW 11.02.090.1 dissent.
Analysis
Mary O'Brien attempted to use two deeds to make a testamentary disposition of her Seattle and Camano properties to her daughter, Peaches Robinson. In Washington, a deed can operate as a "will substitute" in that a grantor by deed can retain a life estate in property with a future interest passing to the grantee upon the death of the grantor. See, e.g., Severson v. First Baptist Church, 34 Wn.2d 297, 208 P.2d 616 (1949); In re Estate of Kirkpatrick, 140 Wash. 452, 249 P. 980 (1926). A deed, in order to be valid, must be delivered by the grantor to the grantee. Juel v. Doll, 51 Wn.2d 435, 436-37, 319 P.2d 543 (1957); see 2 Washington State Bar Ass'n, Real Property Deskbook §§ 30.11-.21 (2d ed. 1986). To constitute a delivery "it must be clearly apparent that the grantor intended that the deed should presently pass title." Juel, at 437.
The trial court found that O'Brien "retained control, possession and use of the properties] and up to the date of her death made no delivery of the properties] or [of] the deed[s].'' Clerk's Papers, at 8, 10. The trial court concluded that O'Brien made no delivery in the sense that "she did not intend an immediate transfer of the property but was intending to have a testamentary disposition take effect only at her death ..." Clerk's Papers, at 11, 13.
The parties in their petition for review and answer do not challenge the trial court's findings that the deeds were not delivered. Rather than accept these findings as verities, as the court is mandated to do (Pier 67, Inc. v. King Cy., 71 Wn.2d 92, 94, 426 P.2d 610 (1967)), the majority does the reverse, and holds that the legal requirements of delivery have been satisfied. The majority reaches the incongruous *921conclusion that a present intent to transfer property can be found upon proof of a future intent to transfer upon the grantor's death. Majority, at 919.
The majority's analysis fails to perceive the distinction between inter vivos and testamentary dispositions of property. By failing to perceive this distinction, the majority has altered the rule that an undelivered deed cannot convey an interest in property. I would hold, based on the undisputed facts, that Mary O'Brien failed to execute valid deeds conveying her property to Robinson as there was no delivery of the deeds.
The majority's conclusion that the deeds meet the legal requirements of delivery should have ended the matter as a valid deed is effective to pass an interest in property at death. The majority, however, goes on to hold that these undelivered deeds effectively passed title to Robinson by operation of RCW 11.02.090. The statute provides in relevant part:
(1) Any of the following provisions in an insurance policy, contract of employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, deposit agreement, pension plan, joint tenancy, community property agreement, trust agreement, conveyance, or any other written instrument effective as a contract, gift, conveyance, or trust is deemed to be non-testamentary, and this title [RCW Title 11] does not invalidate the instrument or any provision:
(c) that any property which is the subject of the instrument shall pass to a person designated by the decedent in either the instrument or a separate writing, including a will, executed at the same time as the instrument or subsequently.
(Italics mine.)
The majority reaches the obvious conclusion that the word "conveyance" is not modified by the subsequent language "effective as a conveyance". Majority, at 918. The majority's statutory construction analysis misses the mark. The question still remains as to whether RCW 11.02.090 is intended to validate an otherwise invalid conveyance.
*922The statute was adopted almost verbatim from section 6-201 of the Uniform Probate Code. Section 6-201 "authorizes a variety of contractual arrangements which have in the past been treated as testamentary. . . . The sole purpose of this section is to eliminate the testamentary characterization from the arrangements falling within the terms of the section." Uniform Probate Code § 6-201, 8 U.L.A. 534, comment, at 534-35 (1983). RCW 11.02.090, like section 6-201, characterize as nontestamentary certain provisions in written instruments that call for the transfer of property at death. By characterizing these provisions as nontestamentary, they are immune from invalidation due to noncompliance with the statute of wills, RCW 11.12.020.
I find nothing in RCW 11.02.090 indicating that the Legislature intended to eliminate the legal requirements governing a valid inter vivos conveyance by deed. The statute is intended to validate an instrument against testamentary attack only where the instrument has been made in the manner usual to the type of transaction involved. The rule applicable here is that enunciated by Professors Reutlinger and Oltman: "The statute [RCW 11.02.090] does not validate an otherwise-ineffective agreement, but operates only to prevent ’testamentary’ invalidation of an instrument . . ." M. Reutlinger & W. Oltman, Wills and Intestate Succession 352 (1985); accord, First Nat'l Bank v. Bloom, 264 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1978).
O’Brien’s purported transfers of her property did not fail because they did not comply with the requirements of the statute of wills. The deeds failed because they were undelivered and had no independent legal effect. As the deeds were never valid inter vivos conveyances, they did not come within the scope of RCW 11.02.090.
Holding that the deeds were not effective to pass an interest at death does not render a portion of RCW 11.02-.090 meaningless as the majority contends. Professor Richard V. Wellman, formerly chief reporter for the Uniform Probate Code, wrote that section 6-201 "might prove to be a very important provision of the Code. On the other hand, *923it could be viewed as adding nothing to existing case law." Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 Conn. L. Rev. 453, 484 (1970). In the context of a conveyance of an interest in land at death, RCW 11.02.090 added nothing to existing Washington law.
The Legislature enacted RCW 11.02.090 to eliminate the uncertainty and litigation that often arose when various commonly used inter vivos agreements contained provisions that were intended to have effect at death. M. Reutlinger & W. Oltman, at 352; see Uniform Probate Code § 6-201, comment. The statute does not itself validate any such instrument.
Conclusion
The unchallenged facts are that the deeds were not delivered during O'Brien's lifetime and therefore they were not valid inter vivos conveyances. As the conveyances were never valid, they did not come within the scope of RCW 11.02.090.
I would affirm the holding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals divesting Peaches Robinson of title and vesting title to such property in the estate of Mary O'Brien.
Swedberg, J. Pro Tern., concurs with Dore, J.
Reconsideration denied April 7, 1988.