Court Opinion

ID: 9642018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:46:00.35498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:42.147866
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Judge,
concurring.
'I cannot agree with the majority’s manner of disposition of appellant’s third ground of error.
In that ground appellant complains of the exclusion of testimony by Leon Drake that George Moore (the deceased) had told him that Albert Moore and appellant were “jack artists,” or professional robbers. Appellant urges that this testimony was admissible to show that Moore’s state of mind was such that he would not have allowed Albert Moore and appellant to enter his house. This tends to support appellant’s testimony that he did not enter George Moore’s house.
The majority concludes that Moore’s statement to Drake was inadmissible hearsay because the statement would not serve to show Moore’s state of mind unless it were taken as true. This is incorrect. Moore’s statement would serve to show his state of mind if he believed the statement to be true, even if it were not true. Moore could have believed that appellant and Albert Moore were professional robbers even though they in fact were not.
Even assuming Moore’s statement were true, it nonetheless was admissible if offered not for its truth, but to show Moore's state of mind (provided such evidence was relevant).
Drake’s testimony did not involve any details of appellant’s past conduct, nor did it relate only to his past conduct. It is reasonable to infer from Moore’s statement that he believed Albert Moore and appel*271lant were continuing in their profession as robbers. Compare Jones, 515 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal.2d 881, 13 Cal.Rptr. 649, 362 P.2d 473 (1961) (cited in Jones). The statement was not so incriminating or inflammatory that the jury necessarily would be expected to consider it for its truth despite the trial court’s instructions concerning its limited admissibility. Contrast Shepard v. U. S., 290 U.S. 96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933). I conclude that Drake’s testimony was admissible.
I concur, however, because Drake’s testimony was of limited probative value with respect to appellant’s defense. Considering this fact and the strength of the state’s case against appellant, the exclusion of the testimony did not prejudice appellant.