Court Opinion

ID: 9554331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 18:00:30.39194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:38.080481
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 19-2266
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                v.

SAMUEL NICHOLS,
                                              Defendant-Appellant.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
          Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
        No. 1:15-cr-00756-1 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.
                    ____________________

    ARGUED JANUARY 18, 2023 — DECIDED AUGUST 8, 2023
                ____________________

   Before SCUDDER, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit
Judges.
    KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. The Sixth Amendment guarantees
defendants the eﬀective assistance of counsel. At the same
time, the Constitution does not demand that defendants ac-
cept that assistance: The Sixth Amendment guarantees a de-
fendant’s right to forgo counsel’s assistance and defend him-
self. This case is about the intersection of those sometimes
counterposed rights.
2                                                 No. 19-2266

    Samuel Nichols was sentenced to life in prison after repre-
senting himself against a multi-count sex traﬃcking indict-
ment. With the aid of counsel, Nichols now argues that the
district court erred in allowing him to go it alone because he
was incapable of representing himself. But district courts are
not permitted to foist counsel upon competent defendants, so
we aﬃrm.
                               I
    The details of Samuel Nichols’s criminal conduct are un-
important to his appeal. It suﬃces to say that Nichols engaged
in sex traﬃcking, a federal crime, and sometimes used vio-
lence in the process. The government ﬁrst brought charges for
those oﬀenses in December 2015. If convicted, Nichols faced
a maximum sentence of Life.
   The district court appointed James Graham and Heather
Winslow to represent Nichols. Graham and Winslow both
have extensive experience representing defendants facing
various sex traﬃcking charges. The ﬁrst eight months of their
representation proceeded without fanfare. Then, things
changed.
                              A
    In September 2016, Graham and Winslow moved to dis-
miss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. They did so
noting that, while “these issues lack merit,” “these motions
are of great importance to Mr. Nichols”; the pair believed that
“failing to ﬁle the instant motions would result in a break-
down of the attorney/client relationship.” The district court,
predictably, denied the motion.
  Despite the pair’s eﬀorts, the relationship broke down an-
yway. In March 2017, Nichols ﬁled a pro se motion seeking an
No. 19-2266                                                  3

ex parte hearing. Nichols claimed that Graham and Winslow
failed to ﬁle various motions related to perceived multiplicity
(or diﬀerent counts charging the same wrongdoing) in the in-
dictment against him. Their failure to do so, Nichols con-
tended, amounted to ineﬀective assistance of counsel. At a sta-
tus hearing on that motion, the district court issued what
would be the ﬁrst of many warnings to Nichols about the per-
ils of self-representation. Nichols responded that he “would
rather just have new counsel.” The district court replied, “You
don’t just get to have a revolving door of counsel. I’ve given
you two. I have two very talented defense attorneys. You
don’t get any more. You don’t get a third because you don’t
like them.” The district court then told Nichols to confer with
Graham and Winslow about the consequences of proceeding
pro se and informed him that it would not appoint new coun-
sel. After Nichols and his attorneys conferred and asked for
some time to decide, the district court added:
      Here’s what I’m going to tell you right now, Mr.
      Nichols. I’m going to say it very directly and
      very cleanly. I am not giving you another law-
      yer if you get rid of these two lawyers. I’ve al-
      ready given you two. You have a constitutional
      right to have a lawyer represent you in a felony
      criminal charge such as this. You should have a
      lawyer represent you. If you cannot work with
      your lawyers, then I cannot make them repre-
      sent you because they have an obligation to only
      ﬁle motions with me that are under the facts and
      the law that are accurate, okay? So if you choose
      not to work with them, you must go on your
      own. And that’s not a smart idea. You don’t
4                                                No. 19-2266

      have training. You don’t have the experience.
      And it’s not a smart idea.
Nichols felt he was between a rock and a hard place:
      NICHOLS: And I understand what you saying,
      too. But you putting me in a tough position.
      DISTRICT COURT: No, you’re putting yourself in
      that position.
      NICHOLS: I’m not. I’m just trying to do what I
      feel is best for me, but the Court—
      DISTRICT COURT: What’s best for you is to be rep-
      resented by a lawyer who knows the law.
      NICHOLS: I’m going to let you—I’m not trying to
      give you no hard time, so whatever you all do,
      you all going to do anyway.
      DISTRICT COURT: It’s going to be your choice, not
      mine.
   The next month, Nichols informed the court that he
wished to discharge Graham and Winslow.
      NICHOLS: I would still like to stick with what I
      was trying to do in the ﬁrst place.
      DISTRICT COURT: Which is what?
      NICHOLS: I told you I—you said you wasn’t go-
      ing to appoint me new counsel, but that’s what
      I wanted. So I don’t know how it’s going to
      work or what’s going to happen, but that’s—
      that’s still what I would like to do.
No. 19-2266                                                     5

                             ***
       DISTRICT COURT: So you are going to reject these
       two attorneys to get a new attorney? For what
       reason?
       NICHOLS: That’s what I would like to do.
       DISTRICT COURT: No, why? You don’t get to do
       that. You have a right to have an attorney. You
       have a constitutional right to have someone rep-
       resent you, and I’m giving you that right. Why
       are you rejecting Mr. Graham and Ms. Wins-
       low?
Nichols explained his belief that insuﬃcient progress had
been made in his case and took exception once more to Gra-
ham and Winslow’s refusal to make frivolous arguments. He
concluded that “I just don’t feel like it’s in my best interest to
stick with these attorneys.” After a ﬁnal admonition that
Nichols was not getting another attorney, the district court
distilled the question to its essence:
       DISTRICT COURT: Are you going to work with
       Mr. Graham?
       NICHOLS: No.
       DISTRICT COURT: Are you going to work—
       NICHOLS: No.
       DISTRICT COURT: —with Ms. Winslow? Okay.
       So then they have irreconcilable diﬀerences.
       They can’t represent you. And you have ﬁred
       them. They’re gone. They are allowed to be oﬀ.
       And I’m not giving you another lawyer.
       NICHOLS: Okay.
6                                                 No. 19-2266

      DISTRICT COURT: It doesn’t work that way. You
      don’t just keep getting lawyers because you
      don’t like their advice.
      NICHOLS: That’s not what I said. But, okay, I un-
      derstand.
      DISTRICT COURT: So you’re on your own.
      NICHOLS: I understand.
    Even after Graham and Winslow were appointed standby
counsel, Nichols objected. The pair, according to Nichols,
“made arguments in favor of the government” by citing bind-
ing caselaw that the government and district court relied on
in denying the frivolous motion to dismiss. Nichols believed
they had an intolerable conﬂict of interest and felt that his
right to eﬀective assistance of counsel was not being honored.
Nichols wrote that his legal knowledge was “not up to [the]
standard to represent myself at this point, thus making [me]
feel that the courts are forcing me to go pro se.” Nichols once
again asked that the court appoint him new counsel and re-
move Graham and Winslow as standby counsel. The district
court denied that request, concluding that Nichols had no ba-
sis for rejecting Graham and Winslow.
                              B
    In August 2017, Nichols asked to be evaluated by a psy-
chologist to determine whether he was competent to stand
trial and represent himself. Nichols stated that his mental
state—he had diagnoses for depression, anxiety, and
ADHD—was “making it diﬃcult to prepare for trial.” The
district court tried to hold a hearing on his motion, but Nich-
ols refused to appear. Graham and Winslow, however, did at-
tend; they stated that, based on their interactions with
No. 19-2266                                                    7

Nichols, they did not think a competency evaluation was nec-
essary in the ﬁrst place.
    Still, the district court ordered the requested evaluation
and tasked Dr. Diana Goldstein with determining whether
Nichols was suﬀering from a mental disease or defect that
would impair his ability to prepare for trial or represent him-
self at trial. The court selected Dr. Goldstein, in part, because
she had performed thousands of similar examinations.
    Dr. Goldstein spent 14 hours with Nichols over two days;
he cooperated with her examination. After administering a
battery of tests, Dr. Goldstein concluded that Nichols was
competent to stand trial and to proceed pro se if he wished.
Of particular note, Dr. Goldstein suggested that Nichols
might be feigning a mental disorder. She also found no evi-
dence of any signiﬁcant psychiatric disorder, past or present.
Dr. Goldstein recounted Nichols’s long history of signiﬁcant
behavioral problems and learning diﬃculties, including peri-
ods of medication and hospitalization, as well as time spent
as a ward of the state. The behavioral issues led Dr. Goldstein
to conclude that Nichols might have suﬀered from an opposi-
tional-deﬁant or conduct disorder. But she also concluded
that, because such disorders are behavioral rather than men-
tal, neither impacted Nichols’s ability to understand the pro-
ceedings against him, and his competency was thus unaf-
fected.
    The district court scheduled a hearing to discuss Dr. Gold-
stein’s evaluation and conclusions. Yet again, Nichols refused
to appear at that hearing. After the district court authorized
the Marshals to guarantee Nichols’s appearance in court, the
district court held a hearing to discuss Dr. Goldstein’s report
with Nichols, his standby counsel, and the government.
8                                                 No. 19-2266

    At that hearing, Nichols requested that he undergo a sec-
ond evaluation by an expert of standby counsel’s choosing,
which the district court granted. The district court also con-
ducted an extensive colloquy with Nichols based on his con-
tinued insistence that he wanted a new lawyer, rather than to
represent himself. The district court canvassed Nichols’s edu-
cational background, lengthy criminal history, lack of legal
training, prior experiences with attorneys (he sometimes ﬁred
them), experience with trials (one bench trial), unfamiliarity
with federal court, and the consequences he faced if convicted
of the charges against him. The district court then found once
again that Nichols had constructively waived the right to
counsel by refusing to work with Graham and Winslow. And,
once again, the district court presented Nichols with three op-
tions: work with appointed counsel, retain private counsel, or
proceed pro se. By default, he chose to represent himself.
    Standby counsel selected Dr. Michael Fields to perform
the second competency evaluation. But Dr. Fields was unable
to complete a single test because of Nichols’s obstreperous be-
havior throughout the examination. Without his own results,
Dr. Fields drew from Dr. Goldstein’s report, conversations
with standby counsel, and a 90-minute interview he con-
ducted with Nichols to write his report. Dr. Fields concluded
that Nichols understood “the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him” and that Nichols’s “competency to
stand trial [was] not diminished by a severe emotional disor-
der.” Still, Dr. Fields concluded that Nichols could not stand
trial because he could not work with the representation that
he was being oﬀered: It was Dr. Fields’s “clinical sense” that
Nichols’s “lack of willingness to work with legal counsel”
rendered him incompetent.
No. 19-2266                                                  9

    The district court held a contested competency hearing at
which both experts testiﬁed and were cross-examined. The
government ﬁrst introduced recorded jail calls between Nich-
ols and various associates. On one call, Nichols said:
      I got [trial] pushed back. It’s pushed back all the
      way to March, shit, cause I’m working on this,
      I’m working on this shit and trying to get myself
      up out of here and trying to ﬁnd loopholes and
      shit. I still need a lot of time.
                              ***
      I really don’t want to go to trial. I really want to
      get enough shit on [the victims] so [the govern-
      ment] can probably, like give me a plea or do
      some you know what I’m saying and do some-
      thing better than what they talking.
In response to an associate’s question about whether he had
an attorney, Nichols added the following:
      The attorneys are terrible. I ﬁred their ass, bro. I
      ﬁred their ass and then my Judge forced them to
      be my standby counsel, so right now I’m, I’m
      pro se right now but they my stand, they—they
      my standby counsel, the attorneys that I ﬁred.
Nichols’s associate then became incredulous:
      ASSOCIATE: Oh man, I don’t care what—I don’t
      care what books you done read [ ]. Ain’t no way
      in hell you is gonna be better than—you your-
      self is gonna be better than the fucking attorney,
      G. I’m just gonna keep it real with you.
      NICHOLS: Yeah, I know that.
10                                                   No. 19-2266

    After these calls were played, Dr. Goldstein took the stand.
She explained the tests she performed to determine Nichols’s
competency and relayed what she learned about his child-
hood, upbringing, family life, and educational history. She re-
iterated her conclusion that, despite Nichols’s long history of
behavioral and learning diﬃculties, he was not suﬀering from
a major mental disorder and was more than capable of under-
standing the proceedings against him. In her opinion, he was
“oppositional and deﬁant,” but he could “make a decision to
work with someone or not.” She concluded that, although
“[i]t’s never a good idea” to represent yourself, Nichols was
“perfectly capable of doing so.”
    Dr. Fields also testiﬁed. He conceded that Dr. Goldstein
“did a marvelous job in going through the competency por-
tion of the report” and agreed that Nichols “underst[ood]
fairly well the basic aspects of the court and all the things that
go [on] in court.” Dr. Fields acknowledged that he could not
complete any testing but said that additional tests were likely
unnecessary: “to go through [the tests] again, you know,
probably wouldn’t have been any more thorough. And [Dr.
Goldstein] had only seen him four months prior.” Dr. Fields
reaﬃrmed his opinion that Nichols was not suﬀering from a
severe emotional or mental disorder. In his view, Nichols
“was not really willing to work with the legal counsel he
[had]. … So he was in somewhat of a conundrum. He under-
stood he really can’t do this pro se. He would like to have
other legal counsel.” Although Dr. Fields couldn’t conﬁrm
whether Nichols had an emotional disorder due to his inabil-
ity to complete his own testing, he nonetheless concluded that
Nichols “was not really competent to stand trial.” He testiﬁed
that Nichols was “unable to comport himself eﬀectively with
representation that[ ] [had] been given to him” and therefore
No. 19-2266                                                   11

could not prepare adequately for trial. On cross-examination,
Dr. Fields conceded that it was Nichols’s own choice to not
work with his counsel and that “[b]eing unwilling is not the
same as unable.”
    The district court found Nichols competent at the close of
the competency hearing. It credited Dr. Goldstein’s report
and discounted Dr. Fields’s: Dr. Goldstein’s report was based
on extensive testing; Dr. Fields’s was not. Moreover, Dr.
Fields’s conclusion did not address the court’s question. It
was Dr. Fields’s “clinical sense” that Nichols could not stand
trial because he would not work with counsel, but that said
nothing about whether Nichols was suﬀering from a mental
disease or defect that inhibited his comprehension of the pro-
ceedings against him. On that front, Dr. Fields agreed with
Dr. Goldstein’s conclusion. The district court drew on Dr.
Goldstein’s report, the deﬁciencies in Dr. Fields’s, their testi-
mony at the competency hearing, the recorded jail calls, and
its own observations of Nichols’s in-court demeanor in ulti-
mately ﬁnding Nichols competent to stand trial.
   After making that ﬁnding, the district court reviewed
Nichols’s options one last time:
       DISTRICT COURT: Your choices I’ll go through
       again. Pro se without working with them, or let
       them represent you. That’s your choice.
       [Trial is] starting March 12th. They’ll pick a jury
       on March 12th.
       NICHOLS: Okay.
12                                                         No. 19-2266

        DISTRICT COURT: Are you going to work with
        them?
        NICHOLS: No.
Just before the close of the hearing, Nichols added, “I’m not
working with anybody. I’ll just accept my fate.”
                                    C
    Trial began as scheduled on March 12, 2018. The jury con-
victed Nichols on most of the charges, but it acquitted him of
one count. Nichols then accepted the assistance of counsel.
Before sentencing, the defense sought yet another compe-
tency evaluation, one that would apply retroactively such that
a new trial would be required. The district court allowed a
competency evaluation for sentencing but declined to make
any ﬁnding of incompetency retroactive. In any event, the
presentencing competency hearing mirrored those that came
before trial: Nichols was competent.
    At sentencing, the district court imposed a within-Guide-
lines sentence of Life. Nichols, with counsel’s assistance, * now
appeals. He challenges the district court’s ﬁnding that he was
competent to represent himself, its ﬁnding that he waived the
right to counsel, and its application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines.
                                    II
   Nichols argues that the district court should not have let
him represent himself. We break his objection into two parts:

* We appointed Erika Bierma of Axley Brynelson LLP to represent Nichols

 in this appeal. She has ably discharged that responsibility, for which we
 are grateful.
No. 19-2266                                                   13

whether he was competent to stand trial and whether he
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
                               A
    To stand trial a defendant must have both a “suﬃcient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding” and “a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky
v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (cleaned up). The dis-
trict court, after ordering two competency evaluations, found
that Nichols could stand trial. We review that determination
for clear error. United States v. Moore, 425 F.3d 1061, 1074 (7th
Cir. 2005).
    Notably, Nichols does not challenge the district court’s
ﬁnding that he was competent to stand trial. Instead, he ar-
gues only that he was not competent to represent himself.
Nichols says Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), required
the district court to inquire into not only whether he was com-
petent to stand trial, but whether he was competent to repre-
sent himself, too. He is mistaken. Edwards is a rule of permis-
sion, not requirement: Courts may restrict a defendant’s right
to represent himself if, and only if, he falls into a “grey area”
of competence—where the defendant understands the pro-
ceedings against him but labors under serious delusions or
suﬀers from otherwise debilitating mental inﬁrmities. Id. at
175–78; see also United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 385, 392 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“Because both state and federal courts are bound
to uphold the right to a fair trial (nixing trial of the mentally
incompetent) and the right to self-representation, it follows
that Edwards applies to the federal courts equally.”) (cleaned
up); United States v. Anzaldi, 800 F.3d 872, 879 (7th Cir. 2015)
(“Edwards simply means that the Constitution may have
14                                                  No. 19-2266

allowed the trial judge to block [the defendant’s] request to go
it alone, but it certainly didn’t require it.”) (cleaned up). One
might argue that any defendant who thinks he can do a better
job than able defense counsel labors under some sort of delu-
sion. But the mere desire to exercise the right to self-represen-
tation is not a “serious delusion.” “Both savvy and foolish de-
fendants have a constitutional right to self-representation.”
United States v. Johnson, 980 F.3d 570, 578 (7th Cir. 2020).
    Even if Edwards did require, rather than merely permit, a
more searching inquiry of those seeking to represent them-
selves, “[s]evere mental illness appears to be a condition prec-
edent [to Edwards’s applicability].” Berry, 565 F.3d at 391. In
Jordan v. Hepp, 831 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2016), we wrote that the
narrow grey zone identiﬁed in Edwards addressed the “seri-
ous problem of the mentally ill or mentally impaired person,
who cannot handle matters himself and who needs a lawyer
almost in the capacity of a guardian.” Id. at 845. We ﬁnd no
evidence that Nichols suﬀered from the type of serious delu-
sions or debilitating inﬁrmity Edwards contemplates. From the
record, Nichols comes across at times as self-assured, obsti-
nate, and a bit impulsive. At the same time, he could recognize
inconsistencies, adjust his tone to his audience, and seek guid-
ance when it would be useful. Indeed, Dr. Goldstein con-
cluded that Nichols was competent to represent himself if he
chose to do so. Nichols presented no evidence that he fell into
the narrow category of defendants Edwards identiﬁed, so the
district court had no occasion to consider whether a more
searching inquiry was warranted.
   The district court’s ﬁnding that Nichols was competent to
stand trial was far from clearly erroneous. Dr. Goldstein con-
cluded that Nichols had ample familiarity with the criminal
No. 19-2266                                                    15

justice system and the procedures that would be followed,
with the charges and consequences he faced, and with the
ramiﬁcations of electing to represent himself. Dr. Goldstein
also found no evidence of a major psychological disturbance
that would have impeded Nichols’s ability to aid in his own
defense. Dr. Fields (Nichols’s expert) concluded that Nichols
was “not really competent to stand trial … [b]ecause he’s un-
able to comport himself eﬀectively with representation that’s
been given him.” This was so “[d]espite the fact that he un-
derstands fairly well the basic aspects of the court and all the
things that go [on] in court basically, and he’s done that very
well.” On this record, the district court was well within its dis-
cretion to disregard Dr. Fields’s conclusion. Dr. Fields spent
just 90 minutes with Nichols, never conducted the standard
battery of tests (as Dr. Goldstein had), and rooted his conclu-
sion—that Nichols could not assist his lawyers—in a vague
“clinical sense” rather than a legally cognizable standard (i.e.,
competent or not).
    An unwillingness to assist counsel is not an incapacity to
do so. Coupled with the ample evidence that the district court
reviewed (expert reports, jail calls, in-court demeanor), the
district court’s ﬁnding—after a contested hearing—that Nich-
ols was competent to stand trial was not clearly erroneous.
                                B
    A defendant may exercise his Sixth Amendment right to
represent himself in two ways. The ﬁrst is by an aﬃrmative
waiver of his right to counsel—a statement that the defendant
wishes to go it alone. The second is through a constructive
waiver—conduct evidencing a refusal to accept counsel’s as-
sistance and the limitations that accompany it. As a mixed
question of law and fact, we give no deference to a district
16                                                    No. 19-2266

court’s legal conclusion that a defendant has constructively
waived counsel, but we review the district court’s underlying
factual ﬁndings for clear error. United States v. Balsiger, 910
F.3d 942, 951−52 (7th Cir. 2018). In other words, we review
whether a district court’s ﬁnding that a defendant will not
work with his counsel based on his statements, conduct, and
so on—things the district court is best positioned to judge—
for clear error. Id. But we decide for ourselves whether that
refusal constitutes a knowing and intelligent waiver of coun-
sel’s assistance. Id. “Counsel plays a vital role in criminal pro-
ceedings, so we indulge every reasonable presumption
against the waiver.” United States v. Jones, 65 F.4th 926, 929 (7th
Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
                                1
   The district court found that Nichols constructively
waived his right to counsel by ﬁling frivolous pro se motions
and by refusing to work with his court-appointed counsel.
That ﬁnding was not clearly erroneous.
    Nichols tried to ﬁle motions that had no basis in law, so
his lawyers refused to ﬁle them or, when they did, they noted
their belief that the motions were frivolous. This led Nichols
to believe that his lawyers were working against him and for
the government. At the same time, Nichols repeatedly stated
that he did not want to proceed pro se: He wanted diﬀerent
lawyers; he did not relish the idea of representing himself. But
the right to counsel is not the right to counsel of one’s choos-
ing. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617,
624 (1989). And no defendant can insist that counsel make
frivolous arguments. Likewise, “[a] defendant has no right to
indeﬁnite delays while he tries on new lawyers unless he has
a [valid] reason for dissatisfaction with the old.” United States
No. 19-2266                                                   17

v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 671 (7th Cir. 2001). It is beyond dispute
that Graham and Winslow oﬀered Nichols competent, highly
experienced counsel. Nichols’s desire that they abandon their
ethical obligations was not a fair basis for dissatisfaction with
their performance. The district court did not err by ﬁnding
that no conﬂict of interest existed between them.
    More than once, the district court acknowledged Nichols’s
desire to have a diﬀerent lawyer appointed but reminded him
that he was not entitled to one and that his only other option
was to represent himself. Nichols may not have wanted to
represent himself but by refusing the help of competent court-
appointed counsel, he exhausted his options. “[W]here a de-
fendant repeatedly complains of his appointed counsel the
district judge may give him an ultimatum to either work with
his attorneys or represent himself.” United States v. Volpen-
testa, 727 F.3d 666, 676 (7th Cir. 2013). We have aﬃrmed a dis-
trict court’s ﬁnding that a defendant elected to proceed pro se
even though “he repeatedly asserted he was not waiving his
right to counsel and relied on standby counsel.” Balsiger, 910
F.3d at 954. That makes sense: “If you’re given several options,
and turn down all but one, you’ve selected the one you didn’t
turn down.” Oreye, 263 F.3d at 670. Even indulging every rea-
sonable presumption to the contrary, we have no basis to dis-
turb the district court’s ﬁnding that Nichols would not work
with his appointed counsel. Our next task is to determine
whether that constructive waiver was knowing and volun-
tary.
                               2
    A defendant must be aware of the dangers and damages
of self-representation so that the record will establish that he
knew what he was doing and that his choice was made with
18                                                  No. 19-2266

eyes wide open. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
The district court must conduct a thorough inquiry with a de-
fendant that probes his age, education, and understanding of
the charges against him and the potential consequences
should he be found guilty. Johnson, 980 F.3d at 577. Four non-
exhaustive and ﬂexible factors guide whether a defendant’s
waiver was knowing and intelligent:
       (1) whether and to what extent the district court
       conducted a formal hearing into the defendant’s
       decision to represent himself; (2) other evidence
       in the record that establishes whether the de-
       fendant understood the dangers and disad-
       vantages of self-representation; (3) the back-
       ground and experience of the defendant; and
       (4) the context of the defendant’s decision to
       waive his right to counsel.
Id. (quoting United States v. Cooper, 591 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.
2010)). With these factors as our guide, we conclude that Nich-
ols’s constructive waiver was knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary.
    Because the district court did not conduct a discrete Faretta
hearing, the ﬁrst factor weighs against ﬁnding a knowing and
voluntary waiver. That conclusion is not dispositive, how-
ever, for we have never required a standalone inquiry. Balsi-
ger, 910 F.3d at 953. When the record demonstrates that a de-
fendant understood the risks of self-representation, the lack
of an exhaustive, standalone inquiry is of little signiﬁcance.
   Such is the case here. The record reveals that Nichols un-
derstood the tough road that pro se defendants must walk.
Johnson, 980 F.3d at 577. Across multiple hearings, the district
No. 19-2266                                                  19

court engaged in a colloquy with Nichols about the penalties
he faced, his deep familiarity with criminal proceedings, his
prior experiences with both appointed and retained defense
counsel, his educational history, the challenges that he would
face in representing himself, and the experience and qualiﬁ-
cations of his appointed counsel. The district court also
looked to Nichols’s conversations with friends and his state-
ments to Dr. Goldstein, all of which conveyed that he was em-
bracing the risks he faced. This evidence strongly supports the
district court’s ﬁnding of a knowing and voluntary waiver.
   Nichols’s background also favors a ﬁnding that his waiver
was knowing and voluntary. Nichols graduated from high
school and had some college education. More importantly, he
had faced many criminal charges in the past—this was not a
ﬁrst-time defendant unwise to the complexity of a criminal
case and its potential consequences. Prior experiences with
defense counsel yielded mixed results for Nichols: sometimes
they worked out; other times he ﬁred them and retained pri-
vate counsel. And on at least one occasion he was found not
guilty with counsel’s aid.
    Beyond the responses Nichols gave during its inquiries,
the district court also had the beneﬁt of Dr. Goldstein’s exten-
sive report and her testimony at the competency hearing. She
explained that Nichols was well acquainted with the charges
against him. During her interview with him, Nichols ex-
plained his theory of his defense—that he never coerced any
of his victims. He explained that a criminal complaint initiates
a case; he understood the diﬀerences between grand and petit
juries, as well as the roles of judges, jurors, prosecutors, and
defense counsel. He even knew that the Sentencing Guide-
lines are just advisory. Moreover, Dr. Goldstein’s report
20                                                   No. 19-2266

canvassed Nichols’s educational and behavioral history in
great detail. The district court could rely on all of this when
ﬁnding Nichols’s waiver to be knowing and voluntary.
    The ﬁnal factor—the context of the defendant’s waiver—
weighs heavily against Nichols. “A waiver is likely knowing
and voluntary if the defendant gave it for strategic reasons or
after repeatedly rejecting the assistance of counsel.” United
States v. England, 507 F.3d 581, 588 (7th Cir. 2007). We’ve ex-
plained in detail the circumstances that led to the district
court’s decision to treat Nichols as a pro se defendant: Nichols
wanted to make baseless arguments rather than accept coun-
sel’s help. He also was trying to get himself “up out of here
and trying to ﬁnd loopholes and shit.” That his strategy failed
makes it no less a strategy. Nichols insisted that he did not
want to represent himself but, in this case, actions speak
louder than his words. United States v. Murphy, 469 F.3d 1130,
1136 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] defendant can waive his right to
counsel through conduct as well as words.”). That does not
mean, however, that his words do not have weight. At the
close of the competency hearing, Nichols said, “I’d rather go
to jail on my own. I’ll work for myself than let somebody else
send me to jail.” Preferring to be the master of his own fate,
Nichols strategically abandoned his right to counsel.
    Taken together, the record reveals that Nichols’s decision
to reject the assistance of counsel was made knowingly and
voluntarily. As it often does, that choice yielded results Nich-
ols views as suboptimal. But it was a choice Nichols made
with eyes wide open.
                                 *
   Confronted with a defendant who refused to work with
counsel, the district court faced a choice. It could force Nichols
No. 19-2266                                                    21

to accept counsel’s help, in contravention of his Sixth Amend-
ment right to represent himself. Or it could allow Nichols to
represent himself and risk a claim that he was incompetent to
stand trial, in contravention of his Sixth Amendment and due
process rights. The district court chose correctly. Nichols was
competent to stand trial and knowingly and voluntarily re-
fused counsel’s assistance. We aﬃrm the district court’s deci-
sion to allow Nichols to represent himself, a right the Consti-
tution guarantees.
                               III
    Turning to sentencing, Nichols brings a procedural chal-
lenge to the district court’s imposition of a life sentence, argu-
ing that the district court erred in determining the base of-
fense level applicable to Count 1, the conspiracy count. The
gist of his argument focuses on the text of § 2G1.1(a) of the
Sentencing Guidelines, which provides a base oﬀense level of
34 “if the oﬀense of conviction is 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1)” and a
base oﬀense level of 14 if “otherwise.” Since Nichols was con-
victed of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) as to Count 1, he says
that his “oﬀense of conviction” is “otherwise,” yielding a base
oﬀense level of 14. The Probation Oﬃcer agreed with Nichols.
Even though the PSR already calculated Nichols’s ﬁnal
Guidelines range to be Life, the government objected. In its
view, the correct base oﬀense level for Count 1 was 34 because
the conduct Nichols conspired to undertake (as evidenced by
the other counts he was convicted of) was punishable by
§ 1591(b)(1). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.7 (“Unless otherwise
speciﬁed, an express direction to apply a particular factor
only if the defendant was convicted of a particular statute in-
cludes the determination of the oﬀense level where the de-
fendant was convicted of conspiracy … .”). The district court
22                                                 No. 19-2266

sided with the government, a decision Nichols now chal-
lenges.
    Since Nichols’s sentencing, circuits have split as to how
§ 2G1.1 should be applied to those convicted of violating
§ 1594(c). Compare United States v. Wei Lin, 841 F.3d 823, 825–
27 (9th Cir. 2016) (agreeing with Nichols) with United States v.
Sims, 957 F.3d 362, 363−64 (3d Cir. 2020) and United States v.
Carter, 960 F.3d 1007, 1013−14 (8th Cir. 2020) (agreeing with
the government and the district court).
    We need not weigh in. As the district court observed, both
before and after the government’s objection, the Guidelines
recommended Life—the sentence Nichols received. Any error
in determining the base oﬀense level as to the conspiracy
count was therefore harmless beyond any doubt. United States
v. Anderson, 517 F.3d 953, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2008).
                                                     AFFIRMED