Court Opinion

ID: 9659905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:58:08.141037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:12.842753
License: Public Domain

*615Irwin, Judge,
dissenting.
The first question which must be answered in this appeal is, What is the standard of care applicable to the design and installation, in a maximum security correctional facility, of a retrofitted top bunk hanging more than 4 feet above a concrete floor? The majority opinion fails to address this question. The majority states, “To the extent that expert testimony was required by Nichols to establish a lack of care by DCCC and without commenting on the required standard of care, Nichols produced Atlas ....” (Emphasis supplied.) The majority further states that “it is clear from the trial court’s findings and conclusions that the trial court did not credit Atlas’ opinions and that his opinions were outweighed by other evidence presented by the county . ...” (Emphasis supplied.)
I think the majority makes an error that is not inconsequential in not “commenting on the required standard of care.” I conclude this because the trial court used the wrong standard of care in rendering its decision and erroneously discounted the only expert opinion regarding the proper standard of care simply because Atlas did not state that he relied upon any particular treatise or book in rendering his opinions. The majority also incorrectly states that “[Atlas’] opinions were outweighed by other evidence presented by the county.” It is undisputed that the county presented no expert testimony to rebut Atlas and, to borrow from the majority’s language, “[t]o the extent that expert testimony was required,” Nichols provided the only expert testimony in this record. The majority does not and cannot indicate what evidence was presented by the county to outweigh Atlas’ opinions because there was none.
It is axiomatic that in order to succeed in an action based on negligence, the plaintiff must establish the defendant’s duty not to injure the plaintiff, breach of that duty, proximate causation, and damages. Ackles v. Luttrell, 252 Neb. 273, 561 N.W.2d 573 (1997). The instant case was bifurcated, and therefore the sole issue to be decided at this point in the legal process is that of liability. Trial on the issue of liability involves the elements of duty not to injure the plaintiff and breach of that duty. See Scholl v. County of Boone, 250 Neb. 283, 549 N.W.2d 144 (1996). In a negligence case, the duty not to injure encompasses *616the concept of standard of care. “A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.” W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 53 at 356 (5th ed. 1984).
Expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care in cases in which the trier of fact is faced with matters requiring special knowledge or skill on subjects which are not within the realm of the ordinary experience of people. The necessity of such testimony “arises from the fact that the judicial system is called upon to make determinations which require specialized knowledge in fields in which the trier of fact is ignorant or relatively so.” Halligan v. Cotton, 193 Neb. 331, 340, 227 N.W.2d 10, 15 (1975). It is interesting to note that in the present case, the county first contacted an architect to design these bunks but then elected to do the job itself. The law is clear that when a nonprofessional decides to perform services in professional areas, such as architecture or construction herein, that nonprofessional is required to exercise the same level of skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965). Although there is an exception to this rule noted in the Restatement, it is nqt pertinent to the facts of this case. The county chose to perform the services of an architect and builder and was therefore bound to perform according to the standards applicable to such professions.
The trial judge, according to his multipage order, found the following proposition of law to be controlling on the issue of what standard of care is applicable here: “ ‘[A] jailer has a duty to exercise that degree of care necessary to provide reasonably adequate protection for his prisoners.’ Daniels v. Anders[e]n, 195 Neb. 95, 98, [237 N.W.2d 397, 400] (197[5]), quoting 60 Am.Jur.2d Penal and Correctional Institutions §17 [(1972)]; Restatement of Torts 2d §320 [(1965)].” In other, words, the trial judge found that the standard of care to be applied to the design and installation issues in this case is one of ordinary reasonableness, capable of ascertainment without the assistance of expert testimony. As such, the trial court applied the wrong *617standard of care in assessing Nichols’ claim and proof, and was clearly wrong in concluding that Nichols failed to meet his burden of proof.
The Daniels case cited by the trial court involved a plaintiff-inmate who was attacked by a fellow inmate while locked in a “drunk tank.” The negligence claim in Daniels was distinguishable from the issues dealt with in the case before us. I would agree that an act of negligence involving personal violence among inmates may not require expert testimony to establish the standard of care. However, the case at hand involves design and installation of a retrofitted top bunk that must be suspended from the wall of a jail. While regrettably we all may have some experience with physical assault, either actual or vicarious, few of us are familiar in any maimer with designing and building furniture for a maximum security jail. I must respectfully disagree with the majority opinion which tacitly endorses the conclusion of the trial court that expert testimony was unnecessary.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has held on several occasions that in a claim for professional negligence, the standard of care must be established by expert testimony, and failing such expert testimony, a prima facie case of negligence has not been established. See, e.g., Overland Constructors v. Millard School Dist., 220 Neb. 220, 369 N.W.2d 69 (1985). Because the county was performing a professional service, in this case design and installation, the county is held to the same standard as a professional in the fields of architecture and construction. As such, this case should be treated like any other professional negligence case, and expert testimony is needed to establish the standard of care.
Nichols called Atlas via videotaped deposition to provide expert testimony on the standard of care. To determine whether Nichols, through Atlas’ testimony, succeeded in setting forth a prima facie case, it is necessary to review Atlas’ qualifications as an expert, as well as his testimony regarding the standard of care applicable to the design and installation of this bunk bed. Atlas has bachelor’s degrees in architecture and criminal justice from the University of Florida and the University of South Florida, respectively. He has a master’s degree in architecture from the University of Illinois. Atlas also earned a doctorate in criminology from Florida State University. The record is undis*618puted that these are the highest credentials in the country regarding design of correctional facilities.
As part of his architectural education and experience, Atlas studied design and construction of both new and remodeled correctional facilities. While in college, Atlas worked for and did an architectural internship at the Florida Department of Corrections. His work for the Florida Department of Corrections included the preparation of documents for retrofitting existing buildings and housing units. During this time, he gained experience planning and constructing inmate cells in correctional facilities.
After his college work, Atlas was employed by a national architectural firm, specializing in jail and prison construction. His position involved the design of large prison facilities in California and architectural programming of several new jails. Atlas next worked for an architectural firm in Coral Gables, Florida, that had recently obtained a commission for a $44 million correctional facility in Dade County, Florida. He worked with a team responsible for the architectural program and design for bunking within this 1,000-bed facility. Later, Atlas started his own company and began doing work for the National Institution of Corrections, which is part of the Department of Justice. He served as a technical consultant and participated as a trainer in a program for the planning of new institutions. Atlas also worked as an onsite technical assistant consultant where he was sent around the country to look at jails experiencing overcrowding. He assisted in planning architectural renovations to deal with overcrowding.
As part of his work, Atlas has instructed county officials and other correctional or jail administrators regarding their standard of care to be followed in their endeavors. He testified that the American Corrections Association was generally regarded as the “national industry standard.”. Atlas has also published papers on correctional architecture, taught at various universities regarding criminal justice issues, and testified as an expert witness in other cases.
In preparation for his testimony, Atlas reviewed various documents, including depositions, floor plans, cell designs and layouts, sketches, correspondence, and pleadings, all provided to *619him by counsel. Atlas also testified that he reviewed the American Corrections Association Adult Detention Center standards.
Atlas concluded that the bunk bed in the present case was designed and constructed in such a manner that there existed unacceptable flexibility and movement and that the bed was anchored to the wall in a manner that did not provide sufficient rigidity to prevent working itself loose from the wall. He also felt it was substandard as a construction technique to fail to use “lock washers” when bolting the bed to the steel “all-threads.” Specifically, he stated:
[Nichols’ counsel:] In terms of the wooden bunk itself, your criticism as to the way it’s attached goes to the lack of a lock washer and the spacing that is exhibited and the failure to have a method of rigid attachment to the side walls such as a weld?
[Atlas:] That is correct.
. . . And in addition to that, that they didn’t provide a proper anchoring device to anchor the bolts to the wood. We have a connection between two different materials of steel to wood, and they could have used a sleeve or some kind of device that would have allowed anchoring and transferring the weight from the steel rod to the wood in a better manner.
[Nichols’ counsel:] Then it is your opinion that eventually these bunks were going to come loose and that this was an accident waiting to happen?
[Atlas:] Yes, sir.
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the record does not establish that “a faceplate was bolted either to the wall near the beds or to the beds themselves [to reach] the upper bunk with safety.” (Emphasis supplied.) The testimony relied upon by the majority in this regard, which was given by the coordinator of public properties, closely follows testimony by the same witness that “the planned method of ingress and egress from the upper bunk” was “[j]ust to step on the edge of the lower bunk.” The witness indicated that there was a faceplate on the bed, not a plate designed for use in getting to the upper bunks.
*620Finally, Atlas testified that there was no adequate, safe means of ingress and egress to the upper bunk. Atlas specifically testified that using the lower bunk as a step was unsafe and that the stool was too far from the bunks to be used safely. Additionally, Atlas’ failure to specifically “opine that the existing faceplate [on the bed] was inadequate [as a means of ingress and egress],” as noted by the majority, does not represent a tacit admission of the plate’s adequacy. Rather, from my review of the record, it is a result of the fact that no one asked Atlas about the faceplate at trial. This is likely a direct result of the fact that no one has ever represented that the faceplate was to serve as a means of accessing the upper bunk.
The trial court’s order stated that Atlas testified:
[T]he design and maintenance of these bunks, and Nichols’ bunk in particular, was below the standard of care for penal institutions. The wood frame construction was improper (“a Mom and Pop” job). (Stronger) Metal frames should have been used; and the frames should have been welded or lock washered to the walls. Foot stools, ladders or other access devices should have been provided.
The order went on to state:
As to the design critique, Atlas did not name any architectural guide or structural authority, either within or without the correctional industry, which would, as a matter of due care, specify wood rather than metal construction. No treatise, scholarly work, or accepted source was mentioned in support of this criticism. ... A similar observation applies to Atlas’ complaint that the frames should have been welded or lock washered to the walls. While I have no doubt that a stronger bed could have been constructed, I cannot say that the DCCC was negligent in failing to install stronger frames in this instance.
The above-quoted language from, the trial court’s order is significant in two respects. First, it is apparent that the court concluded that Atlas’ opinion was that the design and installation of the bunk did not meet acceptable professional standards. This is a factual conclusion of the trial court that, as the majority has noted, we are not free to dispute on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. A review of the bill of exceptions shows that this fac*621tual detennination of the judge is supported by the record, and we are obliged to accept it.
The second significant aspect of the trial court’s language quoted above is the court’s conclusion that because no treatise, book, publication, or guide was relied on by Atlas in forming his opinion, the court was free to totally disregard it. While oftentimes experts do rely on such sources for their opinion, nothing in statute or case law requires reliance on such materials in every instance. If such were the case, the author of the most learned treatise on a subject would be precluded from testifying until a publisher was first found to put the information in print. “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-702 (Reissue 1995). Atlas was qualified as an expert, he possessed a sufficient and proper foundation or factual basis for his opinion, and his testimony was necessary for the trier of fact to establish and evaluate the standard of care in this case.
Although expert testimony was necessary for Nichols to establish the standard of care in order to prove a prima facie case, the testimony of Atlas satisfied that requirement. The county presented absolutely no expert testimony to rebut the standard of care as ably presented by Atlas. The trial court was clearly wrong in finding Atlas’ opinion was inadequate simply because it was not based on a treatise, a scholarly work, or an accepted source.
Having concluded that expert testimony was necessary to establish the standard of care owed to Nichols, that Nichols offered sufficient expert testimony to establish the standard of care, and that the county offered no expert testimony to rebut Atlas, the final question is whether the trial court erred in finding that Nichols did not establish liability. The answer is and must be “Yes.” Not only did the county fail to rebut the standard of care as articulated by Atlas, it also failed to rebut the design and installation breaches laid out by him. These breaches include the failure to design and construct the bunk with sufficient rigidity to prevent the bed from working itself loose from *622the wall, the failure to use lock washers when bolting the bed-frame to the “all-threads,” and the failure to provide a safe means of access to the upper bunks. In fact, the county does not dispute that these deficiencies existed but contends that they simply do not fall below the standard of care of how a reasonable person would have designed and installed the retrofitted bunk. This stance by the county is as incorrect as the trial court’s conclusion because it assumes a standard of care of ordinary reasonableness, rather than the applicable higher standard of care required of a professional. The law is clear that when a person decides to perform services in professional areas such as architecture or construction, that person is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade.
The trial court’s failure to use the appropriate standard of care renders its conclusions clearly wrong. The judgment should be reversed and the case remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of Nichols on the issue of liability and proceed to trial on the issues of proximate cause and damages.