Court Opinion

ID: 9774753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:32:39.262058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:15.135569
License: Public Domain

Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice, concurring. Mr. Roger Glasgow, an attorney, entered into a contingent fee arrangement with Broadway Arms in regard to an insurance contract claim against Aetna. During settlement negotiations, it appeared to him that a tort claim against Aetna had arisen as a result of Aetna’s bad faith in fulfilling the terms of their insurance contract. At that time Glasgow, realizing that he would be a witness in regard to the tort claim, partially withdrew from the case, and another attorney, Gary Eubanks, was hired by Broadway Arms to prosecute the tort claim. Glasgow, however, continued to participate through the contingent fee arrangement, not only in the contract claim, but also in regard to the tort claim in which he intended to testify. Glasgow’s full and complete withdrawal from the tort claim was required by the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility and the Disciplinary Rules which this court has adopted. DR 5-102 (A) states: If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the trial . . . This court, in its opinion, failed to distinguish between the two causes of action in stating that Glasgow could participate through the contingent fee plan. The damages are distinguishable. Glasgow should be allowed to participate in the contract claim pursuant to the initial fee arrangement; otherwise he would be completely deprived of his fee since he could not unilaterally alter the agreed fee arrangement. However, he should not participate in fees resulting from the tort claim since he was to be a witness. Also, Mr. Glasgow is prohibited from sharing in the contingent fee arrangement regarding the tort claim for yet another reason. The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility provides: DR 7-109(c): A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case . . . This section prohibits the payment of a witness contingent upon the outcome of a case. If Mr. Glasgow participates in the contingent fee arrangement regarding the tort claim, his compensation will necessarily be contingent upon the outcome of the case, a practice clearly prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility.