Court Opinion

ID: 9624703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:14:22.556418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:53.273482
License: Public Domain

On Motion For Rehearing.
The appellants contend on motion for rehearing that this court has overlooked certain opinions of the Attorney General and the rule on the weight to be given them set forth in Undercofler v. Eastern Air Lines, 221 Ga. 824 (147 SE2d 436) and Thompson v. Eastern Air Lines, 200 Ga. 216 (39 SE2d 225). Quite to the contrary, the administrative opinions of the Attorney General and the above cases were considered by the court in rendering our original opinion in this case. The opinions of the Attorney General relied upon *213by the appellants and the rule pronounced in Undercofler and Thompson have no applicability to this case. Contrary to appellants’ contention, the Attorney General’s opinions on this subject have not consistently stated that pension trusts are exempt from payment of this tax. Indeed, they have been quite inconsistent. It is a fact that each of the two Attorneys General concerned with the question has expressed opinions that pension trusts are not exempt. See Opinions of the Attorney General (Eugene Cook) — 1963— June 14, 1965, Intangibles Tax, p. 585 and Ibid (Arthur Bolton) 1970, Re: Intangible Taxes (3), p. 75. It is also true that an opinion to the contrary was expressed by the late Attorney General Eugene Cook. See Ibid 1954-56, Intangible Tax — Non-profit Organization, pp. 797-798. However, even if these- various administrative opinions had been consistent (which we have shown they were not), the rule that these opinions aré persuasive and will be given great weight would not apply in this case. That rule only applies in the interpretation of a doubtful statute. The statutes here are clear and permit only the interpretation which we have applied, i. e., that no exemption was granted pension trusts from the payment of the tax imposed by Section 4 of the Intangible Property Tax Act of 1953 by any of the statutes involved. A legislative intent to levy the tax is manifest. See Section 18 of the Act. Thus, any administrative interpretation which might have been to the contrary could not be followed in determining the issue here. Standard Oil Co. v. State Rev. Comm., 179 Ga. 371 (176 SE 1); Elder v. Home Building &c. Assn., 188 Ga. 113 (2) (3 SE2d 75, 122 ALR 738); Suttles v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495 (19 SE2d 396).

Motion for rehearing denied.

Bell, C. J., Pannell and Deen, JJ., concur.