Court Opinion

ID: 9564963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:12:24.992526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:17.407910
License: Public Domain

*664Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. 1. Code § 105-2015 provides: “The question of damages being one for the jury, the court should not interfere, unless the damages are either so small or so excessive as to justify the inference of gross mistake or undue bias.” My understanding of this Code Section is that it does not have reference to a gross mistake, or any other kind of mistake on the part of a trial judge, which is not excepted to. When the judge in this case erroneously charged the law of comparative negligence and such a charge was not excepted to, the charge became the law of the case. The failure to except to the charge in this case made it the law of the case, whether right or wrong, that the evidence authorized the jury to find that there was comparative negligence. The Code Section above referred to contemplates as the reason for an inadequate or excessive verdict some unknown reason which influenced the jury, which could be a gross mistake of some unknown kind or bias for some unknown reason on the part of the juiy. When a verdict is wholly inadequate, as in this case, it should not be set aside when there is an explanation for it which excludes the idea of bias or gross mistake on the part of the jury. For this reason the grounds complaining of the charge of accident and inadequacy of the verdict are without merit for the reason that it must be assumed that the judge’s charge on comparative negligence is the basis for the inadequate verdict. For this reason the ruling in Riggs v. Watson, 77 Ga. App. 62 (47 SE2d 900), is not controlling. The general grounds of the motion for a new trial are without merit because they raise only one question of law and that is that the verdict, for want of any evidence to support it, is contrary to law. Jackson v. Sapp, 210 Ga. 134 (1) (78 SE2d 23). The case of Lee v. Hill, 28 Ga. App. 312 (111 SE 211) is contrary to the principle stated in Jackson v. Sapp, supra, and innumerable other cases from this court and the Supreme Court. The ruling in the Lee v. Hill case means that the ground of a motion for a new trial that a verdict is contrary to law is equivalent to an exception to an erroneous charge of the court. If we adopt this ruling from Lee v. Hill we are revolutionizing the strict requirements in innumerable cases from both Appellate Courts as to the express and explicit exceptions to rulings by *665trial judges in the trial of cases. An incorrect charge unexcepted to is just as much the law of the case as a judgment overruling a general demurrer which is unexcepted to, and if anything in the record shows what the law of the case is this court has to take notice of it in adjudicating the issues in the case. If the law stated in Lee v. Hill is correct, the necessity for an exception to an erroneous ruling or charge by the trial court in many cases would be a thing of the past. It may be that more liberal rules should be adopted but I know of none now in effect in this State which could produce the result reached by the majority.
2. In my view of the case it is immaterial whether there is a question of comparative negligence in the case. Even if there is no such evidence, under the charge of the court on the subject of comparative negligence unexcepted to, the issue was put into the case and authorized the jury to find on the subject. My personal view is that the evidence did not authorize a finding of comparative negligence. The only kind of negligence in this case upon the part of the driver who went into the intersection legally, which could be considered by the jury under a proper charge, would be the question of his negligence in not avoiding the consequences of the other driver’s negligence after he discovered it or should have discovered it by the exercise of ordinary care. If the driver who went into the intersection lawfully could not have thus avoided the other’s negligence he would not be charged with contributory or comparative negligence.