Court Opinion

ID: 9532852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:25:32.429118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:51.301707
License: Public Domain

OPINION
SHARPNACK, Chief Judge
Northern Indiana Public Service Company (“NIPSCO”) appeals a judgment in favor of Hassan Dabagia on his claims for defamation and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. NIP-*297SCO raises the following issues that we consolidate and restate as:
1) Whether the trial court erred when it denied NIPSCO’s motion for summary judgment on Dabagia’s claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
2) Whether the trial court erred when it denied NIPSCO’s motion for summary judgment on one of Dabagia’s claims for defamation; and
3) Whether the trial court erred when it entered judgment for Dabagia on his other claims for defamation.
We reverse and remand.
The relevant facts follow. NIPSCO is a public utility company that furnishes gas and electric services to customers in northern Indiana. Dabagia was employed by NIPSCO from June 1, 1981, until he was fired on April 28, 1994. Dabagia worked for NIPSCO in a number of positions, but at the time of his discharge he was a sales representative. His responsibilities included contacting NIPSCO customers, assessing their gas and electric needs, and suggesting the installation of new equipment which would increase the customers’ energy efficiency.
In 1992, NIPSCO began a sales incentives program to generate greater electrical and gas revenues. Sales representatives who participated in the program negotiated with their supervisors annually to set monetary goals for the amount of sales events they would generate during the year. A sales event occurred when a customer notified NIPSCO that it wanted to add new equipment or modify existing equipment, thereby resulting in an increase in the customer’s energy usage. The salesperson would then record the information provided by the customer on a sales event form. Salespersons participating in the sales incentive program were required to perform extra work in addition to their normal duties. If a salesperson met or exceeded his or her monetary goal for the year, then he or she would receive a percentage of NIPSCO’s projected new income from the customer’s increased energy usage as a bonus.
In 1993, Dabagia negotiated a sales incentive agreement with his supervisor in which he set á sales goal of $650,000, the highest goal among all NIPSCO sales representatives in his district. Dabagia completed 133 sales event forms for the program in 1993, and he exceeded his sales goal for the year. As a result, he earned $72,072.72 in incentive pay and a quarterly bonus of $3,315 from the program in addition to his base salary.
In early 1994, NIPSCO’s management discovered a discrepancy between the projected increased energy usage reported during the 1993 sales incentive program and actual energy usage. NIPSCO’s internal audit department began a review of the 1993 incentive sales program to identify the causes of the discrepancy. NIP-SCO auditors Ed Stood and Jim Cook called approximately 100 of the customers who had participated in the 1993 sales program and asked them if equipment had actually been installed or modified as described on their sales event forms. During the course of the audit, the auditors determined that eight of Dabagia’s 1993 sales event forms projected extra energy usage by the customers, but the extra energy usage never occurred. On each of the eight forms, Dabagia claimed that the customer had installed new equipment which would result in increased energy usage. In each case, however, the equipment was not installed as described on the form, and the equipment had either never been installed or had been installed years before Dabagia contacted the customer.
The auditors contacted Dabagia in late March 1994 and scheduled a meeting with him to discuss the audit. Dabagia met with Ed Stood and David Vajda, both NIP-SCO auditors, on April 6, 1994. They questioned Dabagia about his job and his perceptions of the 1993 sales event program. Vajda and Stood then asked Daba-*298gia about each of the eight sales event forms and told him that all of the forms contained inaccurate information about equipment installation. Dabagia stated that he had relied on the customers’ assertions that the work was going to be done when he filled out the forms.
A second meeting took place on April 28, 1994. Dabagia, Vajda, and Stood were present, as were John Higley, who was NIPSCO’s Director of Marketing, and Ronald Wilder, an attorney representing NIPSCO. Dabagia was again questioned about the eight sales event forms. Daba-gia insisted that he believed that the information on the forms was correct at the time he recorded it, but he also recognized that the forms contained inaccurate information. The officials told Dabagia to resign or be fired. Dabagia refused to resign, and he was suspended from employment at the end of the meeting.
Later that same day, Dabagia returned all of the incentive pay he had earned in 1993. On May 9, 1994, Mark Maassel, a NIPSCO Vice President, met with Daba-gia and fired him. On May 23, NIPSCO returned most of Dabagia’s 1993 incentive pay. NIPSCO kept $6,745.71 of the bonus money because, according to its calculations, that was the amount of unearned bonus pay that Dabagia had received from the inaccurate sales event forms.
Dabagia filed a complaint on Sept. 13, 1994, alleging breach of an employment contract, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and defamation. NIPSCO filed a motion for summary judgment on all of Dabagia’s claims, and the trial court denied NIPSCO’s motion. The trial court also decided that the case would be tried before an advisory jury. Trial was held on June 9-13, 1997. At the close of Dabagia’s case, NIPSCO moved for dismissal under Ind. T.R. 41(B) or, in the alternative, judgment on the evidence under Ind. T.R. 50(A). The trial court denied NIPSCO’s motion. 'The jury returned an advisory verdict for NIPSCO on Dabagia’s claim for breach of contract. However, the jury also returned an advisory verdict for Dabagia on his claims for defamation and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and it awarded him $1,877,271.00 in damages.
On July 9, 1997, NIPSCO filed a motion to correct the advisory verdict and a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court heard oral argument, and the parties both submitted their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on December 18, 1997. The trial court entered judgment on January 9, 1998, in which it adopted the advisory jury verdicts, “except as to the damages,” and adopted Dabagia’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, again “except as to damages.” Record, p. 738. The trial court awarded Dabagia $500,000 for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and $500,000 for defamation.
I.
The first issue is whether the trial court erred when it denied NIPSCO’s motion for summary judgment on Dabagia’s claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. NIPSCO contends that Dabagia was an at will employee of NIPSCO and that the sales incentive agreement did not change his employment status. Therefore, NIPSCO claims, no implied covenant was created, and NIPSCO was free to dismiss Dabagia at any time and for any reason.
At the outset, we note that although this case proceeded to trial, and the trial court entered final judgment on Dabagia’s claims, we may still review the trial court’s ruling on NIPSCO’s motion for summary judgment. See Manning v. Allgood, 412 N.E.2d 811, 817 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) trans. denied.1
*299Next, we set out the standard of review for rulings on summary judgment. The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there is no factual dispute and which may be determined as a matter of law. Orem v. Ivy Tech State College, 711 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), reh’g denied. When reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment, this court applies the same standard as does the trial court. Id. at 867-868. Summary judgment should be granted only if the designated evidentiary material shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Orem, 711 N.E.2d at 868. Generally, construction of a written contract is a question of law for which summary judgment is particularly appropriate. Orem, 711 N.E.2d at 870. We must consider all the material designated by the parties, including pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and testimony, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Heeb v. Smith, 613 N.E.2d 416, 419-420 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied. If we have any doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we must resolve those doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. If no genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Turning to the question of Dabagia’s employment status, our supreme court has held that there are two types of employment: (1) employment for a definite or ascertainable term; and (2) employment at will. Orr v. Westminster Village North, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ind.1997). If an employment contract contains no definite or ascertainable terms of employment, then the employment agreement is at will and presumptively terminable at any time, with or without cause, by either party. Id. The presumption that an employment arrangement is at will is strong in Indiana. Id.
There are three recognized exceptions to the employment at will doctrine. The first occurs when the employee provides adequate independent consideration to the employment contract, thereby establishing that the parties intended to form an employment relationship in which the employee can only be. terminated for good cause. Id. at 718. The second exception arises when the discharge of an employee violates a clear statutory expression of an employee’s right or duty. Id. Finally, an employee may invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel to prevent an employer from firing the employee without good cause, if the employee pleads promissory estoppel with particularity. Id. In the instant case, Dabagia has not argued that NIPSCO has violated any of his clearly established statutory rights or duties, and he has not plead promissory estoppel, so our analysis must focus upon whether Dabagia’s sales incentive agreement provided adequate independent consideration on his part.
The sales incentive forms signed by Da-» bagia and his supervisors make no explicit reference to a term of employment. Therefore, Dabagia’s employment at NIP-SCO was presumptively terminable at any time, with or without cause. See Orem, 711 N.E.2d at 870. We must now consider whether Dabagia supplied “adequate independent consideration” in the Agreement to rebut the presumption of employment at will. Id.
In Orem, an employee and his employer signed an agreement in which the employee agreed to drop his grievances against the employer in exchange for being appointed to a certain position with the employer. Id. at 867. When the employee’s job was eliminated five years later, he sued *300the employer, claiming that when he agreed to release his grievances, he provided independent consideration which altered their employment relationship so that he could only be terminated for good cause. Id. at 870. We affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in the employer’s favor because the evidence showed that the employee had not provided independent consideration. Id. at 871. Instead, the employee had only fairly bargained for appointment to a certain job in exchange for releasing his grievances. Id.
In the case at bar, Dabagia agreed to accomplish a number of tasks for NIPSCO under the 1993 sales incentive program, including earning $650,000 in additional electric margin for the company. However, Dabagia was compensated in the form of incentive bonuses for all of the extra work he performed. An examination of the materials presented -with both parties’ briefs at the summary judgment stage reveals no evidence that Dabagia had bargained for job security as compensation for participating in the incentive program. Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no evidence of adequate independent consideration which would rebut the presumption of employment at will. Therefore, Daba-gia was an at-will employee during 1993 and 1994. See id. at 872.
The case cited by Dabagia can be distinguished. In Weiser v. Godby Brothers, Inc., a salesperson sued his former employer, claiming that the employer had fired him in order to avoid paying commissions to him pursuant to the parties’ “Sales Compensation Plan.” Weiser v. Godby Brothers, Inc., 659 N.E.2d 237, 238 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), reh’g denied, trans. denied. The sole issue in that case was whether the employee had a right to his commissions, not whether he could only be fired for good cause, and we specifically noted there that “we are not concerned with the validity of the termination.” Id. at 239. Therefore, Weiser is inapplicable to this case because it addresses employees’ rights to their commissions, not limits upon the employer’s right to fire employees at will.
Because, as a matter of law, Dabagia was an employee at will when he was terminated, Dabagia’s claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must fail. It is undisputed that “Indiana does not recognize such a cause of action in employment at will contexts.” Mehling v. Dubois County Farm Bureau, 601 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Therefore, at the summary judgment stage, he could not have prevailed on this claim. See id. Because there is no dispute of material fact regarding the absence of independent consideration, and because Da-bagia could not have prevailed on his claim for breach of an implied covenant as a matter of law, summary judgment should have been granted to NIPSCO on Daba-gia’s claim. See Orem, 711 N.E.2d at 872. Therefore, we must reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of NIPSCO on Dabagia’s claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
II.
The next issue is whether the trial court erred when it denied NIPSCO’s motion for summary judgment on one of Dabagia’s claims for defamation. At the summary judgment stage, Dabagia alleged that NIPSCO Vice President Mark Maassel defamed him at a meeting of NIPSCO employees following his termination. NIPSCO now asserts that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the statements were true and Maassel was shielded by a qualified privilege.2
*301Our standard of review on summary judgment is set forth above, but we add that when the defendant is the moving party, the defendant must show that the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiffs cause of action or that the defendant has a factually unchallenged affirmative defense which bars the plaintiffs claim. Rambo v. Cohen, 587 N.E.2d 140, 145 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
To maintain an action for defamation, a plaintiff must prove a communication with four elements: 1) defamatory imputation; 2) malice; 3) publication; and 4) damages. Schrader v. Eli Lilly & Co., 639 N.E.2d 258, 261 (Ind.1994), reh’g denied. Initially, the determination of whether a communication is defamatory is a question of law for the court; it is to be presented to the jury as a question of fact only if the communication is reasonably susceptible to either defamatory or nondefamatory interpretation. Rambo, 587 N.E.2d at 145. In making such a determination, the communication is to be viewed in context and given its plain and natural meaning. Id. (quoting Jacobs v. City of Columbus, 454 N.E.2d 1253, 1264 (Ind.Ct.App.1983), trans. denied). However, not all defamation is actionable. Van Eaton v. Fink, 697 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), reh’g denied. True statements never give rise to liability for defamation. Conwell v. Beatty, 667 N.E.2d 768, 774 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), reh’g denied. This fun'damental doctrine is set forth in our state constitution. Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 10 (“In all prosecutions for libel, the truth of the matters alleged to be libellous, may be given in justification.”).
In this case, the allegation of defamation at issue arose out of a meeting of NIPSCO sales employees held on May 16, 1994, shortly after Dabagia’s termination. NIP-SCO Vice-President Mark Maassel told everyone present that “[t]he audit’s complete, everything has been satisfied up to this point; however, Hassan Dabagia has been let go.” Record, p. 122.
NIPSCO contends that Maassel’s statements were not defamatory because they were true. It is undisputed that Mark Maassel had fired Dabagia on May 9,1994. Furthermore, Dabagia presented no evidence at the summary judgment stage that, at the time Maassel made the statements, the audit was not yet complete. Therefore, Maassel’s remarks were true and non-defamatory. Conwell, 667 N.E.2d at 774 (holding that a statement by sheriff that a deputy had previously been the subject of a criminal investigation was true and non-defamatory). Dabagia argues that Maassel’s announcement implied wrongdoing on his part in the minds of the employees at the meeting and was consequently false by implication. This argument, however, speaks more to the element of defamatory imputation than the affirmative defense of truth. There being no material dispute of fact as to the truth of Maassel’s statements, NIPSCO was entitled to summary judgment on this claim of defamation. See Associates Corp. of N. Am. v. Smithley, 621 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that summary judgment should have been granted for defendant on plaintiffs claim of defamation because the statement was true). Because there was no defamatory statement here, we do not reach NIPSCO’s defense of qualified immunity. See Conwell, 667 N.E.2d at 775. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of NIPSCO on this claim for defamation.
III.
The third issue is whether the trial court erred when it entered judgment for Daba-*302gia on his other two claims of defamation. We will address each claim in turn.
Our standard of review for findings of fact and conclusions thereon is governed by Indiana Trial Rule 52, which provides, “[o]n appeal of claims tried by the court without a jury ..., the court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” T.R. 52. In applying this rule, we employ a two-tiered standard of review. OVRS Acquisition Corp. v. Community Health Serv., Inc., 657 N.E.2d 117, 123-124 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), reh’g denied, trans. denied. First, we consider whether the evidence supports the findings. Id. In determining whether findings are clearly erroneous, we construe the findings liberally in support of the judgment. Id. The findings are clearly erroneous only when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced a mistake has been made. Id. Next, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous when unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Id. We consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. We must affirm the judgment of the trial court unless the evidence points ineontrovertibly to an opposite conclusion. Id. Our discussion of Indiana’s defamation law is set forth above.
A.
During the audit of the 1993 incentive program, the auditors contacted NIPSCO customer Marquette Mall and spoke with James Losiniecki, a mall employee who had talked with Dabagia in 1993 about installing new equipment. They told Losiniecki that “they were doing some investigating into Haasen’s [sic] work.” Record, p. 1194. Losiniecki told the auditor that the equipment had not been installed, and he testified that he felt as if the auditor was “looking for something that [Dabagia] did wrong.” Record, p. 1196. The tone of the discussion left Losiniecki with the impression that Daba-gia “got caught doing something he wasn’t supposed to be doing.” Record, p. 1194. NIPSCO argues that the auditor’s statement to Losiniecki is not defamatory because it is true.
Dabagia does not contest the truth of the statement, and he has produced no evidence that the auditors contacted Losi-niecki for any other reason than to determine if Dabagia’s sales event form for Marquette Mall was accurate. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is no evidence that this statement is false. Therefore, the statement is true and nondefamatory. See Conwell, 667 N.E.2d at 774.
Dabagia contends that Losinieeki’s feelings that the auditor was “looking for something that [Dabagia] did wrong” and that Dabagia “got caught doing something he wasn’t supposed to be doing” imputed misconduct to him. Record, pp. 1194, 1196. It is true that Losiniecki’s feelings are evidence of imputed misconduct, but his beliefs are irrelevant to the question of whether the auditor’s statement is true or false. Dabagia also correctly points out that allegedly defamatory statements must be construed in light of the circumstances of their utterance. However, this point is once again relevant to the issue of imputed misconduct, not the affirmative defense of truth. See Rambo v. Cohen, 587 N.E.2d 140, 145 (Ind.Ct.App.1992).3
*303The evidence points incontrovertibly to the conclusion that the auditor’s statement was true, and so the statement cannot be defamatory. We do not reach NIPSCO’s defense of qualified immunity because there was no defamatory statement here. See Conwell, 667 N.E.2d at 775. Because the auditor’s statement was nondefamato-ry, a review of the record has left this court with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See OVRS, 657 N.E.2d at 123-124. Therefore, we must reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court with instructions that the judgment for Dabagia on this claim of defamation be vacated and judgment entered in favor of NIPSCO.
B.
We now turn to Dabagia’s third claim of defamation. NIPSCO argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that ethnic slurs of Dabagia by a NIPSCO supervisor were defamatory because: 1) there was no defamatory imputation in the remarks, and 2) there is no evidence that the remarks caused special damages to Dabagia. Mary Wellnitz, who was Dabagia’s supervisor in early 1994, made both of the remarks at issue. Mark Dranger, a NIPSCO sales engineer, testified that in early 1994 he went to a restaurant with Wellnitz and Mark Maassel, a NIPSCO executive. Dranger heard Wellnitz say, “[w]ell my section ought to win because we’ve got the camel jockey leading the way.” Dranger also testified that he once heard Wellnitz refer to Dabagia as “that Arab.”
While racial slurs and epithets are contemptible and do not belong in a civil society, they are generally not defamatory in the absence of particular circumstances that make them so. It would be necessary to show either that the words were intended and understood to be a statement about the subject that was defamatory in itself or that, under the circumstances, lowered the subject in the eyes of the community or deterred others from associating with the subject. See Rambo, 587 N.E.2d at 147. For example, if calling Dabagia a “camel jockey” was intended to mean and was understood to mean that he was a “thief,” then the statement would be defamatory. However, where it is necessary to prove the defamatory nature of the statement, the defamation is per quod and not per se. In such a case it is necessary to show that special damages were caused by the statement. See id. at 145. Damages are not presumed to follow from the statement as is the case in defamation per se. See id.
In this case, the only evidence before the trial court was that Wellnitz had referred to Dabagia as a “camel jockey” and “that Arab.” Both statements are racist terms which identify Dabagia as an Arab, but that meaning is not by itself defamatory. In the absence of evidence that those phrases had a certain meaning among Wellnitz, Dranger and Maassel, lowered Dabagia’s esteem in the eyes of Dranger and Maassel, or deterred Dranger and Maassel from associating with Dabagia, the epithets alone are not actionable. See *304Rambo, 587 N.E.2d at 147-148 (discussing decisions from other jurisdictions involving racially offensive remarks).
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that Wellnitz’s slurs were defamatory per quod, NIPSCO contends that Dabagia failed to show that his damages, namely lost wages and medical bills, were caused by Wellnitz’s remarks. A plaintiff pleading special damages due to defamation, whether per quod or per se, must plead and demonstrate that the special damages were “incurred as a natural and proximate consequence of the wrongful act.” Stanley v. Kelley, 422 N.E.2d 663, 668-669 (Ind.Ct.App.1981), rejected in part on other grounds by Bochnowski v. Peoples Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 571 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1991). In Stanley, a director of sales for a corporation who was fired for proselytizing sales representatives sued a former subordinate, alleging that he was actually fired because the subordinate had openly accused him of disloyalty to the corporation. Id. at 666. The trial court granted the subordinate’s motion to correct errors and motion for judgment on the evidence, and we affirmed the trial court’s judgment because the weight of the evidence did not show that the defendant’s statement alone proximately caused plaintiffs termination. Id. at 669.
In this case, the evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that Wellnitz referred to Dabagia as a “camel jockey” in early 1994 in the presence of NIPSCO Vice President Mark Maassel, who laughed at Wellnitz’s remark. There is no evidence in the record to show that Welln-itz’s remark was the proximate cause of Dabagia’s termination, which took place months later. The trial court found that the remark was a factor in Dabagia’s termination and subsequent damages, but there is no evidence in the record to support this finding. Since the evidence does not show that Wellnitz’s ethnic slur caused Dabagia’s damages, Dabagia’s claim of defamation cannot prevail. See Stanley, 422 N.E.2d at 669. A review of the record has left us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made because the evidence does not support the findings. See OVRS, 657 N.E.2d at 123-124. Therefore, we must reverse the trial court’s judgment for Da-bagia on this claim of defamation and remand with instructions that judgment should be entered in favor of NIPSCO on this claim.
We find that summary judgment should have been granted in NIPSCO’s favor on Dabagia’s claim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and on one of his claims for defamation. Furthermore, NIPSCO was entitled to judgment on Dabagia’s other two claims of defamation.
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. We remand with instructions to enter judgment for the defendant.
Reversed.
DARDEN, J. concurs.
ROBB, J. concurs with separate opinion.

. NIPSCO does not appeal the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment on Dabagia’s claim for breach of contract. Since NIPSCO was successful on this claim at *299trial, it would serve no useful purpose to review the issue now. See Morris v. G. Rassel, Inc., 576 N.E.2d 596, 598 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (stating that it is pointless to review denial of summary judgment when the movant subsequently succeeds on the claim at trial).

. NIPSCO also alleged that Maassel’s statements at the meeting lacked defamatory imputation. NIPSCO has failed to argue or cite to any cases or relevant authority in support of this contention. Ind. Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7) requires that the appellant support *301each contention with an argument, including citations to legal authorities and the record for support. Choung v. Jemma, 708 N.E.2d 7, 13 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), reh’g denied. Failure to present any argument or citations to authority in support of the defamatory imputation contention constitutes a waiver of the alleged error for appellate review. See id.

. The cases cited by Dabagia are distinguishable from the one at bar. In Elliott v. Roach, we held that there was a factual dispute regarding the defense of truth because there was conflicting evidence of whether a rental agent had acted "falsely” and "dishonestly,” as a former tenant had claimed. Elliott v. Roach, 409 N.E.2d 661, 681 (Ind.Ct.App.1980). In this case, there is no dispute that the auditors were, in fact, investigating Daba-gia's work, as the auditor asserted. In Long v. Durnil, summary judgment was inappropri*303ate for the defendant on plaintiffs claim of defamation because there was conflicting evidence of whether the plaintiff was indeed a "target[ ] of a grand jury investigation. Long v. Durnil, 697 N.E.2d 100, 105 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied, 714 N.E.2d 164. In this case, there is no dispute in the record that the NIPSCO auditor’s statement to Losi-niecki was true. In Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., we held that summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ defamation claims was inappropriate because the defendant newspaper had juxtaposed otherwise true headlines with otherwise true stories so that a reader could have received the false impression that the plaintiffs were connected with a brothel investigation. Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ind.App. 548, 555-556, 372 N.E.2d 1211, 1218-1219 (Ind.Ct.App.1978). Here, all that was present was a simple statement of fact which was not susceptible to misinterpretation. Finally, truth as an affirmative'defense was hot an issue in Owens v. Schoenberger, 681 N.E.2d 760 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), reh’g denied, and Street v. Shoe Carnival, Inc., 660 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).