Court Opinion

ID: 9829271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:08:39.077518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:59.282176
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[1 ] Upon further consideration of this case on motion for rehearing we have reached the conclusion that this court fell into error in affirming the judgment, and that a rehearing should be granted, the judgment reversed, and the cause remanded for a further trial. In Dowell v. Winters, 20 Tex. 794, in considering the question of diligence in cases of this sort, our Supreme Court announced and applied the following rule:
“But, where the trial has not been delayed, and there is an affidavit of merits, we think the default should be set aside, and the answer received, upon some showing by way of excuse for the failure to plead in time. The excuse proffered in this case was certainly very slight. But it appears that the counsel acted under a mistake of law. Both counsel and client appear finally to have done their best to make amends; they present what seems to be a strong case of merits; and there is reasdh to apprehend that, if not allowed to make defense, irreparable injury may be the consequence. For, having no such excuse for not having made his defense to the action as a court of equity would deem sufficient, the defendant may not be entitled to an injunction to stay execution upon the judgment, until he shall have established his cross-demands against the plaintiff in another suit. It does not appear that the trial would have been delayed; the plaintiff would not have been injured or hindered by reason of the default; and, on the whole, we conclude that the court ought, under the circumstances, to have set aside the judgment by default, upon the payment of costs, and permitted the defendant to answer to the merits of the action, and that the court erred in refusing it.”
Tested by the rule of diligence there prescribed, we have reached the conclusion that appellant’s motion in the court below to set aside the judgment by default disclosed sufficient diligence.
[2] Upon the second point decided against appellant, relating to the verification of the motion to set aside the judgment by default, we have reached the conclusion that, inasmuch as the verification was in compliance with the act of 1913 (Acts 33d Leg. c. 127, §§ 5, 6 [Vernon’s Say Ies’ Ann. Giv. St. 1914, arts. 1829a, 1829b]), which was then in force regulating practice, it was sufficient.
As to the other point, to the effect that it is not shown what, if any, evidence was heard by the court below when it considered the motion to set aside the default judgment, we are not prepared to hold that it was incumbent upon the appellant to make any showing in that regard.
[3, 4] However, it is not necessary to decide that point, as the record indicates, with reasonable certainty, that nothing outside of the motion was considered by the court. The order overruling the motion recites:
“And the court, having heard said motion read, and the argument of counsel thereon, and *1198fully understanding same, is of the opinion that said motion should be refused.”
A fair implication from the recital quoted justifies the conclusion that nothing but the motion and the argument of counsel thereon were presented to or considered by the trial court when the motion was disposed of.
In deciding the case before we did not find it necessary and did not pass upon the question as to whether the motion to set aside the default judgment, in connection with the answer filed at the same time, showed a meritorious defense. Having decided to change our former rulings upon the other questions, it has become necessary for us to consider the latter question, which has been done, and the conclusion reached that the motion and answer show a meritorious defense, which, briefly stated, is that, by the terms of the contract of insurance, it was stipulated that appellant was not to be liable if at the time of appellee’s injury he was riding a motorcycle, and appellant alleged that he was so doing at the time in question. We do not agree with appellee’s construction of the contract; but, on the contrary, hold that it exempts appellant from liability if appellee was riding a motorcycle at the time of his injury.
Eor the reasons stated, appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted, the former judgment of this court is set aside, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rehearing granted. Reversed and remanded.
MEMORANDUM DECISIONS