Court Opinion

ID: 9723901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:37:33.145708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:53.192820
License: Public Domain

Taylor, P.J.
(dissenting). In the present case, the plaintiffs (buyers) offered $155,000 for the house, indicating that $124,000 of that sum (eighty percent of the purchase price) was to be secured by a mortgage. Defendants (sellers) made a counteroffer of $160,000, and left the $124,000 mortgage amount unchanged. Plaintiffs signed the counteroffer, but changed the amount of the price to be mortgaged to $128,000 (eighty percent of the agreed-upon price). The trial court found as fact that defendants saw (although they did not initial) the change made by plaintiffs, and conducted themselves in such a fashion as to indicate by their actions that the change was not a material term of the contract. I would affirm the decision of the trial court.
It is well-established contract law that the material elements of a real estate contract are the *240identity of the property, the parties, and the consideration. Brotman v Roelofs, 70 Mich App 719, 727; 246 NW2d 368 (1976). Such a contract must be in writing, specify the time of performance, and be signed by the parties in order to comport with the statute of frauds, MCL 566.106; MSA 26.906. McFadden v Imus, 192 Mich App 629, 633; 481 NW2d 812 (1992). These requirements have all been met in the present case. The issue presented is whether a change in the manner in which consideration was to be paid constituted a material change in contract terms such that no meeting of the minds occurred, i.e., no contract was formed. Guyan Coal & Coke Co v Wholesale Coal Co, 229 Mich 257, 260; 201 NW 194 (1924); Kamalnath v Mercy Memorial Hosp Corp, 194 Mich App 543, 548; 487 NW2d 499 (1992). This question may be answered by discerning what the parties intended, yet the majority treats the materiality question as if it were a question of law rather than a question of fact. I would find that the trial court properly ascertained whether defendants thought the change in the mortgage amount was material by looking to defendants’ conduct after seeing the change. Kamalnath, supra, and cases therein cited.
In this regard, the trial court made the following factual findings:
[I]n determining whether there was a meeting of the minds, a court examines the visible acts of the parties. Defendants signed the petition for confirmation [of the sale in the probate court] . . . [and] the necessary probate documents for confirmation of the sale were filed .... All of these actions were done after defendants initially attempted to revoke the counter-offer. However, defendant Henry Cornillie [who wanted to buy the house himself] claimed he signed these papers in error as he did not know what he was signing. The Court is *241not persuaded by this defendant’s testimony as to these facts. The Court finds Henry is an intelligent man of at least average business mentality. The Court does not believe an independent businessman, such as Henry . . . would not review the documents prior to signing them. Henry signed the probate forms and will not now be heard to say he did not review them. The Court concludes the defendants’ actions evidence[d] their belief as to a meeting of the minds and their position as to a valid contract.
After a thorough review of the record, I conclude that the trial court’s findings represent a fair interpretation of the evidence presented at trial, and so would affirm.