Court Opinion

ID: 9673109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:06:19.042644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.246325
License: Public Domain

Saad, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
Pursuant to MCL 257.625a(6)(d); MSA 9.2325(l)(6)(d), the relevant inquiry is whether defendant was given a “reasonable opportunity” to have an independent alcohol-content test performed by a person of his own choosing “within a reasonable time” after his detention. Here, defendant was given a reasonable opportunity to have an independent alcohol-content test, but he did not exercise his right within a reasonable time.
With respect to the reasonableness of the opportunity afforded defendant to obtain an independent test, *182defendant was advised of his right to such a test shortly after he arrived at the police station, at approximately 11:35 P.M. The trial court found as fact that defendant did not express any interest in an independent test until his wife called the police station on his behalf at 2:20 A.M. Accordingly, approximately three hours and forty-five minutes elapsed between defendant’s notification of his right and his request.
We note that this case is distinguishable from prior cases in which the courts have found a violation of the defendant’s rights. The police did not fail to read defendant his rights, contrast People v Koval, 371 Mich 453; 124 NW2d 274 (1963); a test was not denied because of the unavailability of a doctor, contrast People v Burton, 13 Mich App 203; 163 NW2d 823 (1968); the police did not attempt to talk defendant out of an independent test, contrast People v Underwood, 153 Mich App 598; 396 NW2d 443 (1986); and defendant was not deprived of the choice of who would perform the independent test, contrast People v Dicks, 190 Mich App 694; 476 NW2d 500 (1991). Here, defendant had the opportunity, but he simply failed to pursue it when it was available.
The next issue is the reasonableness of the time between defendant’s detention and his request for an independent test. As noted in the majority opinion, approximately three hours and forty-five minutes elapsed from the time defendant was first detained to the time he expressed an interest in an independent test. Without establishing a bright-line rule regarding what constitutes a reasonable period, I would hold that an interval of three hours and forty-five minutes is not reasonable. Cf. People v Schwab, 173 Mich App *183101; 433 NW2d 824 (1988) (where a two-hour delay was held to be unreasonable).
In sum, defendant here waited approximately three hours and forty-five minutes to request an independent alcohol-content test by means of his phone call to his wife. He did not request an independent test when he was arrested, when he was tested by police, when he was booked into jail and notified of his rights, or when he sat in the cell for hours. The opportunity to request an independent test was, by all appearances, open to him, but he sat on his rights. The statutory purpose was met; its frustration came not from the sheriffs denial of an independent test, but by defendant’s delay in requesting such a test.1
I would affirm the circuit court’s decision, although for reasons other than those expressed by the circuit court.

 I am mindful of the potential difficulties of allowing individual police officers to make the initial determination whether a request for an independent test is timely. However, I need not address that concern here because of the unusually long delay by defendant in this case.