Court Opinion

ID: 9945716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:04:06.495307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.595826
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed February 28, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1610
                        Lower Tribunal No. F18-767
                           ________________

                         Vladimir Jean Moise,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                          The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

      An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Miguel M. de
la O, Judge.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before MILLER, GORDO, and BOKOR, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Affirmed. See Johnson v. State, 903 So. 2d 888, 897 (Fla. 2005) (“A

venire member’s expression of an opinion before the entire panel is not

normally considered sufficient to taint the remainder of the panel.”); Warren

v. State, 307 So. 3d 871, 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (holding remarks that “carry

the potential for confusion,” yet not “‘so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire

trial,’” do not constitute fundamental error) (quoting Rutherford v. Moore, 774

So. 2d 637, 646 (Fla. 2000)); Weddington v. State, 270 So. 3d 468, 470 (Fla.

1st DCA 2019) (finding no fundamental error where “the trial judge’s . . .

hypothetical . . . [bore] no resemblance to the sexual battery and battery

charges against [a]ppellant, and the judge’s comments about the

hypothetical did not express his view on the weight of the evidence, the

credibility of a witness, or the guilt of [a]ppellant”); Cheatham v. State, 346

So. 2d 1218, 1218–19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (“The general rule is that the

granting or denial of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the

trial court, and the court’s action with respect thereto will be reversed only

upon a showing of a palpable abuse of discretion.”); Jones v. State, 125 So.

3d 917, 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (affirming denial of motion for continuance

where “[n]o attempt was made to indicate or proffer the nature of the

anticipated testimony of any of the three defense witnesses”).

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