Court Opinion

ID: 9672042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:47:53.637041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:13.843934
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
GUITTARD, Justice.
In their motion for rehearing plaintiffs contend that we should presume that the trial court made implied findings on omitted elements of his theories of contract and promissory estoppel under Tex.R.Civ.P. 299, which provides:
Where findings of fact are filed by the trial court they shall form the basis of the judgment upon all grounds of recovery and of defense embraced therein. The judgment may not be supported upon appeal by a presumption of finding upon any ground of recovery or defense, no element of which has been found by the trial court; but where one or more elements thereof have been found by the trial court, omitted unrequested elements, where supported by evidence, will be supplied by presumption in support of the judgment. Refusal of the court to make a finding requested shall be reviewable on appeal.
Plaintiffs also cite Pinson v. Dreymala, 320 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1958, writ dism’d) for its holding that failure of an appellant to request additional findings effects a waiver of a ground of defense no element of which has been found.
Neither Pinson nor Rule 299 supports plaintiffs’ contention. The theories of contract and promissory estoppel are not *856defenses to this suit, but are grounds of recovery on which plaintiffs now seek to sustain the trial court’s judgment, although the record fails to show that these grounds were presented in the trial court. Consequently, defendant’s failure to request findings on these grounds cannot be considered as a waiver of any defense. If there is any waiver here, plaintiffs must be held to have waived any ground of recovery on which no element was found, and on which they requested no supplemental findings.
The main question raised in the motion for rehearing is whether the court has made findings of any elements of contract or promissory estoppel, so that “omitted unrequested elements” may be supported by presumption under the provisions of Rule 299. We conclude that no implied findings may be presumed in support of either ground of recovery.
In the first place, none of the court’s recited findings of fact appears to establish any element of either of these grounds of recovery. We see no finding concerning any of the elements of a contract, and neither can we identify any finding as a distinctive element of promissory estoppel. All the findings of fact appear to relate to the “reliance” theory pleaded by plaintiffs and adopted by the trial court, as indicated by the court’s conclusions of law.
In the second place, no additional finding can be presumed because, as the court’s conclusions of law show, the judgment is expressly based on the findings recited. The rule that supplemental findings necessary to support the judgment are presumed has no application when the findings and conclusions disclose a different basis for the judgment. Burford v. Pounders, 145 Tex. 460, 199 S.W.2d 141, 145 (1947); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 299 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1957, per Pope, J., no writ). In particular, the record excludes any presumption of an implied finding by the court that the amount awarded in the judgment was the amount which was necessary to put plaintiffs in the position they would have been in if they had not sold their bonds in reliance on such representation. The court found that plaintiffs were entitled to recover “their interest” in the amount of $9,262.50 for Kiser and $8,585 for Fox as a result of such reliance, and these were the amounts awarded in the judgment. According to the principle applied in the cases above cited, Rule 299 does not authorize us to imply a finding on the correct measure of damages when the record clearly shows that the amount awarded by the court was determined by applying an erroneous measure of damages.
In the third place, both of these grounds of recovery were waived by lack of pleadings. Neither a contract nor a promise as a basis for estoppel was pleaded by plaintiffs. The petition alleges only a representation by defendant and reliance by plaintiffs. Nothing in the record indicates that issues relating to either of these grounds of recovery were tried by implied consent. No implied findings can be presumed to support the judgment on a theory of recovery which was waived by lack of pleading.
Plaintiffs also contend that an af-firmance, rather than a reversal, should follow from our holding that a fact issue exists as to whether the teletype message of May 18, 1972, was in error. They insist that defendant waived the defense of mistake by not requesting additional findings of fact. This argument misconceives the ground of our opinion. We were not concerned with the equitable defense of mistake, which might be available if the suit were based on contract. We pointed out that no contract was alleged by plaintiffs or found by the trial court. The “error” in the teletype message, if it was an error, was a matter which went to the eviden-tiary value of that message in determining whether plaintiffs sustained damages in reliance on defendant’s representation. The amount of damages was not a defensive *857matter, but was an essential element of plaintiffs’ case.
Finally, plaintiffs object to our consideration of the testimony of defendant’s manager Bernstein concerning defendant’s practices under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Security Dealers. Plaintiffs contend that they were not bound by any custom of security dealers because the contract between the parties was clear and complete, citing Republic Nat’l Bank v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 427 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1968, writ ref’d n. r. e.). This contention is without merit because no contract was pleaded or found by the trial court, and for reasons already stated, neither can the judgment be supported here by an implied finding of such a contract.
Motion overruled.