Court Opinion

ID: 9906056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:03:49.546929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.133149
License: Public Domain

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                      )
                                        )
         v.                             )     I.D. No. 1012004307A
                                        )
PABLO D. MELENDEZ,                      )
         Defendant.                     )

                          Date Submitted: August 23, 2023
                          Date Decided: November 30, 2023

                Upon Defendant’s Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence

         This 30th day of November, 2023, upon consideration of Defendant Pablo

Damiani-Melendez’s Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence1, the State’s

Response in Opposition and the record in this matter, it appears to the Court that:

         1.     On   October   7,   2011,   Defendant    Pablo   Damiani-Melendez

(“Defendant”) was convicted of eighteen counts of Robbery in the First Degree,

thirty-three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony

(“PFDCF”), eleven counts of Wearing a Disguise, six counts of Conspiracy in the

Second Degree, six counts of Aggravated Menacing, eight counts of Attempted

Robbery in the First Degree, and one count of Reckless Endangering in the First

1
    D.I. 182.
Degree following a nine-day jury trial.2 Defendant was thereafter sentenced to a

total 297 years in prison at Level V.3

      2.     Defendant filed a direct appeal, at the conclusion of which, the

Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions.4 Defendant then filed a motion

for postconviction relief, which was denied by this Court; that denial was later

affirmed by the Supreme Court.5 Following those decisions, Defendant petitioned

the District Court of Delaware for a writ of Habeas Corpus, which was also denied.6

      3.     Melendez now seeks relief under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a) claiming his

sentence is illegal as violative of: 1) the multiplicity doctrine, 2) cumulative

sentencing as it violates the prohibition against double jeopardy protections of both

the United States and Delaware Constitutions, 3) “Single Theft Rule,” and 4) that it

is contrary to the legislative intent of 11 Del. C. Sections: 206, 512, 531, 602, 832,

1447, 4205, 4201, 4204, and 6581.7 In particular, Melendez contends that when the

General Assembly drafted 11 Del. C. § 206 its intent was to “allow a person to only

be convicted of one offense;”8 and the legislative intent under 11 Del. C. § 4205 was

2
  D.I. 62.
3
  Sentencing Order.
4
  Damiani-Melendez v. State, 55 A.3d 357 (Del. 2012).
5
  State v. Damiani-Melendez, 2015 WL 9015051 (Del. Super. 2015); Damiani-
Melendez v. State, 2016 WL 2928891 (Del. 2016).
6
  See Damiani-Melendez v. Metzger, 2020 WL 636196 (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2020).
7
  D.I. 182 at 3-4.
8
  Id. at 7.
to establish maximum prison terms for each class of felony.9 Melendez further cites

to a slew of case law to suggest his sentence was “multiplicitous [sic] and

cumulative” in violation of his constitutional rights. Melendez additionally cites to

various Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in support of his motion.10

      4.     The State responded in opposition, arguing that Melendez’s sentence

was legal, as each sentence was based upon a separate and distinct crime, thus not

violative of double jeopardy or its related constitutional protections. It argues that

Delaware decisional law has addressed and confirmed the constitutionality of

separate sentences for a Robbery First Degree conviction and the companion charge

of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.               The State

additionally points out that while Melendez’s motion is lengthy, it simply recites

case law pertaining to property crimes and does not show a relationship to how that

case law is binding on the violent crimes to which he was convicted and sentenced.11

      5.     Under Rule 35(a), the Court may correct an illegal sentence at any

time.12 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds the statutorily authorized limits, violates

the Double Jeopardy Clause, “is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in

which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be

9
  Id.
10
   Id.
11
   D.I. 185.
12
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a).
imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence

which the judgment of conviction did not authorize.”13

      6.     Title 11 Del. C. § 206(a) establishes that prosecution for more than one

offense can occur out of the same course of conduct when “the same conduct of a

defendant may establish the commission of more than 1 offense.”14 The federal

Double Jeopardy Clause protects against 1) a second prosecution for the same

offense; 2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and 3) against

multiple punishments for the same offense.15 Melendez’s motion, however, focuses

on the multiplicity issue. Delaware Courts define multiplicity as “the charging of a

single offense in more than one count of an indictment.”16 Dividing one offense into

multiple counts would violate the federal and state Double Jeopardy Clause.17

      7.     Because this claim was brought under the Delaware and United States

Constitutions, the Court must “apply a logical, deductive analytical process” to

determine if the Delaware Constitution affords any protection beyond the United

States Constitution.18 The federal and state Double Jeopardy Clauses are virtually

13
   Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577 (Del. 1998).
14
   11 Del. C. § 206 (b), see also Poteat v. State, 840 A.2d 599, 604 (Del. 2003)
(holding that the legislative intended for Aggravated Menacing to be a lesser-
included offense of First-Degree Robbery so convictions for those separate crimes
with the same act and intention must be merged).
15
   North Carolina v Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (citations omitted).
16
   Washington v. State, 836 A.2d 485 (Del. 2003).
17
   Id.
18
   Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 292 (Del. 1999).
identical so “examination of the Delaware Constitution must necessarily be the final

step.”19

      8.     Following such a review, Melendez’s multiplicity argument fails.

Melendez’s argument that his multiple robberies should lead to only one charge is

contrary to the law. Melendez engaged in separate acts and formed a separate intent

for each of his crimes. His actions were not a part of single, continuous course of

conduct but of separate and distinct crimes. Therefore, the principles of multiplicity

and double jeopardy are not implicated.20

      9.     Similarly, Melendez’s merger argument on the PFDCF conviction fails.

The imposition of consecutive sentences for convictions of Robbery in the First

Degree and PFDCF are permissible, even when both charges relate to the same

criminal conduct.21

      10.    The State was correct in its assertion that while Melendez filed a

lengthy motion, the majority simply recited case law without applying the case law

19
   State v. Ryle, 2021 WL 2272851 (Del. Super. June 2, 2021) (citing Tarr v, State,
486 A.2d 672, 673 (Del. 1984)), aff'd, 271 A.3d 1142 (Del. 2022).
20
   See Washington, 836 A.2d at 485 (finding that the defendant’s convictions for
two counts of first-degree robbery and two counts of possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony passed constitutional muster because the acts were
sufficiently separated in location and time and thus required defendant to have
formed distinct intents for each offense.).
21
   Le Compte v. State, 516 A.2d 898 (Del. 1986).
to the claims alleged and the legal principles he claims were violated. Nonetheless,

all cases and claims were considered in this Order.

      11.    Melendez was convicted based upon evidence that he committed a

spree of robberies from September 2010 until he was caught on December 7, 2010.

In each crime, evidence was presented to establish that Melendez’s victims were

either forced to give up property or threatened with a firearm to prevent the victim

from interfering with the robbery. The sentences Melendez received for each of the

crimes of which he was convicted were for separate and distinct crimes that do not

run afoul of either the legislative intent of the cited statutes or the protection against

double jeopardy in either the State of Federal Constitution. His sentences were not

cumulative nor multiplicative.

      THEREFORE, Pablo Damiani-Melendez’s Motion to Correct Illegal

Sentence under Rule 35(a) is DENIED.

      IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                   _____________________________
                                                      Danielle J. Brennan, Judge

Cc:   Cari Chapman, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General
      Pablo Melendez (SBI: 00410155), Pro Se
      Original to Criminal Prothonotary