Court Opinion

ID: 9890616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 18:04:16.300366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:38.448544
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/13/23 P. v. Mitchell CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Yuba)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097390

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. No. CRF21-00854)

           v.

 JAMES CHESTER MITCHELL,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant James Chester Mitchell pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly
weapon. After failing to complete a residential treatment program, the trial court
imposed the upper-term sentence stipulated to as part of defendant’s plea agreement.
Defendant now contends that the matter must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing
because the changes to Penal Code section 1170 made by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567) limit the court’s ability to impose an upper term

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sentence even when defendant agreed to it as part of a stipulated sentence. We affirm the
judgment.

                     FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On April 3, 2021, defendant had an altercation with his mother’s roommate during which
the roommate got hit in the head with a baseball bat. Defendant was charged with assault
with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) (statutory section citations that
follow are found in the Penal Code unless otherwise set forth) and failure to appear
(§ 1320.5). As to both offenses, it was alleged that defendant suffered a prior strike
conviction. (§§ 667, 1170.12.) As to the assault with a deadly weapon, it was further
alleged that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (a).) And as
to the failure to appear, an enhancement was further alleged for committing a new felony
offense while on bail (§ 12022.1).
       On October 8, 2021, defendant pleaded no contest to assault with a deadly weapon
and admitted one serious prior felony conviction. The plea agreement granted defendant
an opportunity to complete a one-year residential treatment program. If unsuccessful,
defendant agreed to be sentenced to the upper term of four years, which would be
doubled to eight years based on the prior strike. Under the agreement, the sentencing
court would retain discretion to impose an additional five years for the prior serious
felony.
       Defendant failed to report to the residential program as ordered. After being given
an additional opportunity to enter the program, he left after only one day. The trial court
issued a warrant for his arrest. In exchange for the People dismissing charges in a
different case, defendant agreed to the trial court imposing the previously stipulated
upper-term sentence and additionally stipulated to the five-year term for the prior serious
felony. The trial court sentenced defendant accordingly.

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                                         DISCUSSION

                                                I

                                Certificate of Probable Cause

       The People first argue that this appeal must be dismissed because defendant did
not obtain a certificate of probable cause from the trial court.
       “Penal Code section 1237.5 provides that a defendant may not appeal ‘from a
judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere’ unless the defendant has
applied to the trial court for, and the trial court has executed and filed, ‘a certificate of
probable cause for such appeal.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759,
766.) “Exempt from this certificate requirement are postplea claims, including
sentencing issues, that do not challenge the validity of the plea.” (People v. Cuevas
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 379, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(4)(B).)
       In certain contexts, “ ‘a challenge to a negotiated sentence imposed as part of a
plea bargain is properly viewed as a challenge to the validity of the plea itself.’ ” (People
v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 694-695.) But in Stamps, our Supreme Court held that a
certificate of probable cause was not required for a defendant to seek relief based on a
change in law that benefited a defendant. (Id. at pp. 695-696.) The court explained:
“[Defendant] is seeking retroactive application of a subsequently enacted ameliorative
provision, which he contends has been incorporated into his plea agreement. We agree
defendant was not required to obtain a certificate. His appellate claim does not constitute
an attack on the validity of his plea because the claim does not challenge his plea as
defective when made.” (Id. at p. 696.)
       The same result is applicable here. Defendant does not argue that his plea
agreement was defective when made in October 2021. Rather, he seeks relief because of

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a change in law that took effect on January 1, 2022. Accordingly, no certificate of
probable cause was required.1

                                              II

                                   Upper Term Sentencing

       Turning to the merits, defendant’s sole contention is that the trial court erred in
sentencing him to the upper term because of the changes introduced by Senate Bill
No. 567. Senate Bill No. 567, effective January 1, 2022, amended section 1170 to limit
the trial court’s ability to impose an upper term determinate sentence by making the
middle term the presumptive prison term unless specified circumstances exist. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(1)-(2); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) A trial court “may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
       Notwithstanding the fact that defendant agreed to the upper term as part of his
negotiated plea agreement, defendant argues that the trial court was required to rely on
aggravating circumstances properly found pursuant to the amended section 1170. The
People submit, however, that amended section 1170 does not apply where a trial court
imposes a stipulated sentence.

1 The People argue that because defendant re-stipulated to the sentence after Senate Bill
No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3) went into effect, Stamps does not apply. But Stamps
says a certificate is not required when the claim “does not challenge [the] plea as
defective when made.” (People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 696.) Because
defendant first agreed to his plea prior to Senate Bill No. 567 going into effect, the most
faithful application of Stamps is to find that a certificate of probable cause is not required.

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       Our Supreme Court is now poised to resolve this question, having granted review
in People v. Mitchell (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1051, review granted December 14, 2022,
S277314 (Mitchell). In the meantime, we agree with the People for the reasons set forth
in Mitchell. “[A] stipulated plea agreement ‘gave the court no room to exercise
discretion in the selection of a low, middle, or high term’ under former section 1170,
subdivision (b).” (Id. at p. 1058, quoting People v. Brooks (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1099,
1109.) “ ‘When a court accepts a plea bargain, the court must impose a sentence within
the limits of that bargain. [Citations.] Thus, a court may not modify the terms of a plea
agreement while otherwise leaving the agreement intact, “nor may the court effectively
withdraw its approval by later modifying the terms of the agreement it had approved.” ’ ”
(Mitchell, at pp. 1057-1058, review granted, quoting Brooks, at pp. 1106-1107.) When
the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term pursuant to the stipulated plea
agreement, “[t]he court had no opportunity to exercise any discretion in deciding whether
the imposition of the upper, middle, or lower term would best serve ‘the interests of
justice’ under former section 1170, subdivision (b).” (Mitchell, at p. 1058, review
granted.)
       “[A]mended section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) states that where an offense provides
for a sentencing triad, the trial court ‘shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a
sentence not to exceed the middle term except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).’ ”
(Mitchell, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 1058, review granted.) “This language indicates
that the statute was not intended to apply to sentences imposed pursuant to a stipulated
plea agreement, as the trial court lack[ed] discretion to select the sentence in the first
place.” (Ibid., review granted.) There was thus “no occasion for the trial court to find
any aggravating facts in order to justify the imposition of an upper term at sentencing.”
(Id. at p. 1059, review granted; see also People v. Sallee (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 330, 338,
review granted Apr. 26, 2023, S278690 [when “the court imposed a stipulated sentence
pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement . . . the court’s discretion was limited to

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approving or rejecting the bargain . . . [and] [t]he court did not exercise discretion to
select between the lower, middle, or upper term based on any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances”].)
       Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim that the recent amendments to section
1170 apply to his stipulated sentence.

                                         DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                   HULL, J.

We concur:

EARL, P. J.

ROBIE, J.

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