Court Opinion

ID: 9580764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:08:40.34063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:30.566192
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). A dismissal of this appeal on jurisdictional grounds deprives plaintiffs of any claim for workmen’s compensation or occupational disease benefits. The dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim “without prejudice” in the trial court means without prejudice to the right to bring another suit as if no suit had been brought. Palmer v. Rucker, 289 Ala. 496, 268 So.2d 773 (1972); Chambreau v. Coughlan, 263 Cal.App.2d 712, 69 Cal.Rptr. 783 (1968). A dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as if no action had been instituted. Taylor v. Slater, 21 R.I. 104, 41 A. 1001 (1898). McCuistion v. McCuistion, 73 N.M. 27, 385 P.2d 357 (1963) involved a voluntary dismissal. The Court said: The voluntary dismissal of a suit leaves a situation . . . the same as though the suit had never been brought; and upon such voluntary dismissal, all prior proceedings and orders in the case are vitiated and annulled, and jurisdiction of the court is immediately terminated. [Emphasis added] [73 N.M. at 29, 385 P.2d at 358] McCuistion was followed in Gonzales v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int. U., 77 N.M. 61, 419 P.2d 257 (1966). The rule is the same whether the dismissal is made of a claim “without prejudice” by a court or a voluntary dismissal is made by a party. Under this rule, another claim can be made provided it is not barred by the statute of limitations. Section 59-10-13.6, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and § 59-11-15.1, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 1) of the Occupational Disease Disablement Law provide that claims shall be filed not later than one year after the failure or refusal of the employer or insurer to pay benefits. If the claim is not filed in time, it is forever barred. If the plaintiffs file another suit for compensation or disease benefits, the limitation period remains a valid defense because dismissal without prejudice does not take away any defense. Taylor, supra, including the limitation defense. Keron v. Namer Investment Corporation, 4 Wash.App. 809, 484 P.2d 1152 (1971); Lighthouse v. Great Western Land & Cattle Corp., 88 Nev. 55, 493 P.2d 296 (1972). Plaintiffs’ claim arose in October, 1975. The statute of limitations has run. I dissent, not to compliment plaintiffs’ attorneys, but to assist fourteen plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in eight counts. Counts I and II were claims for workmen’s compensation and occupational disease benefits. Counts III and IV were against defendant Shube, the employee, for negligence. Court V was against defendant Transamerica Insurance Company, the employer’s insurer, for negligence. Defendants Shube and Transamerica Insurance Company filed a motion for dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint “with prejudice” for the following reasons: (1) The complaint failed to state a claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the Occupational Disease Act. (2) The complaint joins several causes of action. (3) The complaint contains allegations against Krohn Industries and Shube that would entitle these defendants to a jury trial and same cannot be joined with a workmen’s compensation or an occupational disease claim. The trial court, without stating any reasons therefor, dismissed Counts I and II of plaintiffs’ claim against these defendants “without prejudice”. The trial court was evidently misled by defendants’ arguments. Plaintiffs’ claims under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act each alleged damages for “mental pain and anguish in the amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00)” for a total of $14,000,000.00. This is absurd. But it is clear to me that this allegation appeared in the first two claims to constitute a predicate for damages against these defendants and others in additional claims for personal injuries. Plaintiffs’ Counts I and II stated a claim for relief against these defendants for workmen’s compensation or occupational disease. The only basis for defendants’ motion for dismissal “with prejudice” was the joinder of several causes of action against the employer and the insurance company. This motion to dismiss called to the court’s attention the necessity to sever the claims and not to dismiss the counts. “Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately.” Section 21-1-1(21), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4). A plaintiff can join as many claims as he may have against an opposing party. Section 21-1-1(18), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4). Dismissal “without prejudice” in this case is a final judgment because plaintiffs have no right to a claim for relief under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the Occupational Disease Act. This case should be remanded to the district court to vacate the dismissal “without prejudice”, and enter an order severing Counts I and II from the other counts and order the plaintiffs to proceed for a hearing on Counts I and II.