Court Opinion

ID: 9693549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:49:32.624906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:48.384530
License: Public Domain

*315WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
(dissenting). The majority determines that on the record presented it would affirm findings that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to the presence of counsel. The majority then determines the trial courts’ findings, that the defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel, was not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. I disagree.
The waiver rule of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, recently reaffirmed in North Carolina v. Butler, — U.S. —-, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 60 L. Ed.2d 286 (1979), requires the determination be made on “the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson, supra at 464.
The defendant had substantial experience in criminal matters, acknowledged he fully understood his Miranda rights, and proceeded to make incriminating statements without his lawyer’s presence and advice in an effort to aggressively negotiate a deal which he considered advantageous to him. He outsmarted himself in his effort to deal, but that did not result from any lack of knowledge of his right to have counsel present.
I conclude the trial courts’ findings on this issue are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence and would reverse.