Court Opinion

ID: 9444189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:44:59.76227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:45.583028
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The court holds that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues presented. I cannot agree with this conclusion; and, since the decision will be important for both shippers and carriers in interstate commerce, I shall state briefly my reasons for dissenting.
*370In this instance the actions were brought by the plaintiff Railway Company. It invoked the jurisdiction of the court; and at no time did it raise the question of jurisdiction, either in the district court or in this court.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1337 provides that “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce * * *.”
49 U.S.C.A. § 3(2) provides for the payment of rates and charges on shipments, and 49 U.S.C.A. § 6(7) requires carriers to file and publish rates and charges to be paid by shippers. And a suit to recover an alleged freight undercharge arises under a law regulating commerce. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U.S. 201, 202, 203, 38 S.Ct. 429, 62 L.Ed. 1071. And see Bernstein Bros. Pipe & Machinery Co. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 10 Cir., 193 F.2d 441.
The language of the Supreme Court in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 294, 42 S.Ct. 477, 480, 66 L.Ed. 943, relied upon by the court, is applicable here, I think, where it is said: “Here no fact, evidential or ultimate, is in controversy, and there is no occasion for the exercise of administrative discretion. The task to be performed is to determine the meaning of words of the tariff which were used in' their ordinary sense and to apply that meaning to the undisputed facts. That operation was solely one of construction; and preliminary resort to the Commission was, therefore, unnecessary.”
It is the law, also, that “A rate tariff of a railroad, being written by the railroad, must be so construed that all ambiguities or reasonable doubts as to its meaning must be resolved against the railroad.” United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 178, 198 F.2d 958. And see Union Wire Rope Corporation v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 66 F.2d 965.
When the reasonableness of the rate or discrimination is not involved, the court has jurisdiction. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U.S. 70, 32 S.Ct. 189, 56 L.Ed. 355. And where a matter is free from doubt there is no occasion to apply to the Commission for a construction of the tariff. St. Louis, I. M. & So. Ry. v. H. F. Hasty & Sons, 255 U.S. 252, 256, 41 S.Ct. 269, 65 L.Ed. 614.
At the time the words “in bond” were first used in a tariff they meant alcohol on which the tax had not been paid (in the language of the government, the carriers and the shippers, they meant “tax free”), and in case of loss in transit the carrier paid only the value of the alcohol without including the internal revenue tax. That has always been the meaning of “in bond” as used in the tariffs, and the evidence to that effect is undisputed. Under the circumstances of this case as shown by the evidence it seems clear to me that the trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties thereto.
I think the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.