Court Opinion

ID: 9912177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 19:02:47.165656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:37.996844
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/21/23 P. v. Ohlinger CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081007

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.
                                                                     (Super. Ct. No. FVI19002547)
WILLIAM DEXTER OHLINGER,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Michael A. Smith, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded with
instructions.
         Michael Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
         After a jury convicted William Dexter Ohlinger of multiple felonies and
enhancements, the trial court initially sentenced him to 22 years in prison.
The sentence included gang enhancements (Pen. Code,1 § 186.22, subd. (b))
and a 10-year gang-related firearm enhancement based on the jury’s finding
that a principal personally used a firearm in the commission of a robbery
charged in count 18 (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)(1)). In Ohlinger’s prior
appeal from the original judgment, we reversed the jury’s true findings on all
of the section 186.22 gang enhancements, including for the robbery count
(count 18). (People v. Ohlinger (May 27, 2022, D078839) [nonpub. opn.].)
However, we did not vacate the related firearm enhancement attached to that
count under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), which was contingent on the
gang enhancement true findings under section 186.22. On remand, the
People chose not to retry the gang enhancements, and at Ohlinger’s
resentencing hearing, the court imposed a new sentence for count 18. The
court also re-imposed the 10-year gang-related firearm enhancement for
count 18 under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1).
      On appeal, Ohlinger contends that: (1) the firearm enhancement must
be stricken because imposing the enhancement was unauthorized by law once
the gang enhancement true findings were vacated; and (2) the matter must
be remanded because the trial court was unaware that Senate Bill No. 81
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1385 to limit its discretion to impose
multiple enhancements.
      The People concede that the gang-related firearm enhancement must
be stricken, and that on remand the trial court may consider Senate Bill
No. 81’s revisions to section 1385. The People argue, however, that they
should be allowed to retry the firearm allegation under subdivision (b) of
section 12022.53, which authorizes a 10-year sentence enhancement for a

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
noted.

                                       2
person who “personally uses a firearm” in commission of the attendant
felony. In supplemental briefing, Ohlinger contends that allowing the People
to retry the firearm enhancement on an uncharged factual theory that
Ohlinger personally used a firearm would violate his statutory and due
process rights to fair notice of the specific sentencing allegations. He also
argues that principles of forfeiture, waiver, and estoppel preclude the People
from retrying the enhancement. Lastly, he concedes that the trial court
would have discretion on remand to impose a similar, but lesser vicarious
arming enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), based on
findings already made by the jury as to section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1).
      We agree with the parties that we must strike the firearm
enhancement for a principal in a gang-related crime personally using a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)), and that the trial court may consider
revised section 1385 on remand. We conclude, however, that on remand the
People cannot retry the firearm enhancement on an uncharged personal use
theory under section 12022.53, subdivision (b), because doing so would violate
Ohlinger’s statutory and due process right to fair notice of the specific
enhancement allegations and the supporting facts. We also conclude that
principles of forfeiture and waiver preclude the People from asserting an
uncharged subdivision (b) personal use enhancement for the first time on

remand.2 Lastly, we conclude that the court has discretion on remand to
impose a lesser vicarious arming enhancement under section 12022,
subdivision (a)(1), based on the findings already made by the jury as to

2     The People argue in their brief that double jeopardy does not bar a
retrial of the personal use firearm enhancement. Because we conclude that
retrial is precluded on other grounds, we need not reach the question of
whether double jeopardy also bars a retrial of the enhancement.

                                        3
section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1). Accordingly, we reverse in part and
remand for resentencing.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The underlying facts in this case are summarized in our prior opinion.
As relevant here, a jury convicted Ohlinger of 19 felonies committed between
April and September 2019, including robbery of a marijuana grow house on
September 19. (See People v. Ohlinger, supra, D078839.) The jury also found
that Ohlinger committed the robbery and some of the other crimes for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang.

(§ 186.22, subd. (b).)3 It also found that a principal in the commission of the
robbery personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1).)
      In 2020, the trial court sentenced Ohlinger to 22 years in prison. His
sentence included an upper term of five years for second degree robbery
(§ 211, count 18), plus a 10-year term for the gang-related firearm
enhancement arising out of a principal’s use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds.
(b) & (e)(1); § 186.22). Together, section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1)
provide that a 10-year enhancement applies when the defendant is a
principal in the commission of certain felonies, the defendant violated the
gang enhancement provision of section 186.22, subdivision (b), and any
principal personally used a firearm in committing the offense. (See
§ 12022.53, subds. (a), (b), & (e)(1).) In other words, a firearm enhancement

3      Section 186.22, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part that “a person
who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or
in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction
of that felony, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed for
the felony or attempted felony of which the person has been convicted, be
punished” with additional terms depending on the nature of the felony and
the court’s discretion. (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)-(b)(5).)

                                        4
under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) imposes “vicarious liability” for
another’s personal use of a firearm “on aiders and abettors who commit
crimes in participation [with] a criminal street gang.” (People v. Garcia
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1171.)
      Ohlinger appealed the judgment, and because of changes in the law, we
reversed the jury’s true findings on the section 186.22, subdivision (b) gang
enhancements, including for count 18. This court did not, however, vacate
the section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) firearm enhancement attached to that
count, which was contingent on the gang enhancement true findings under
section 186.22. We vacated Ohlinger’s sentence for count 18 and directed the
trial court to resentence Ohlinger. We also directed the trial court to give the
People the opportunity to retry the section 186.22 gang enhancements in
accordance with newly enacted legislation. (People v. Ohlinger, supra,
D078839.)
      The People chose not to retry the section 186.22 gang enhancements.
At Ohlinger’s resentencing hearing in 2022, the court imposed the middle
term of three years for his second degree robbery conviction (§ 211, count 18)
instead of the former five-year upper term. The court also re-imposed the
attendant 10-year firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision
(e)(1), after “looking at the totality of the circumstances” and considering that
“firearms were brandished and used to compel compliance” during the
robbery.
      Ohlinger timely appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I
      The parties agree that the section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) gang-
related firearm enhancement must be reversed, and the case remanded for

                                        5
another resentencing. We agree with the parties and accept the People’s
concession on this point because “the firearm enhancement alleged under
section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1), is contingent on a true finding on the
gang enhancement under section 186.22,” which we reversed in the prior
appeal and the People chose not to retry. (People v. Cooper (2023) 14 Cal.5th
735, 746.) The trial court dismissed the section 186.22 gang enhancements in
accordance with this court’s prior opinion, and thus there is no longer a
lawful basis for imposing the gang-related section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1)
firearm enhancement. (See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [“[A]
sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’ where it could not lawfully be imposed
under any circumstance in the particular case.”].) Accordingly, we must
reverse the jury’s true finding on the gang-related firearm enhancement.
      We turn next to whether the People should be allowed to retry Ohlinger
to impose a standalone 10-year firearm enhancement on a personal use
theory under section 12022.53, subdivision (b). We conclude that the
prosecution is barred for two independent reasons: (1) doing so would violate
Ohlinger’s statutory and due process rights to fair notice of the specific
enhancement allegations and supporting facts; and (2) principles of forfeiture
and waiver preclude the People from alleging the subdivision (b) personal use
enhancement for the first time on remand.
      A. Statutory and Due Process Rights to Fair Notice
      Section 12022.53, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part that “a
person who, in the commission of a felony” such as robbery, “personally uses a
firearm, shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of
imprisonment . . . for 10 years.” (Italics added.) As noted, section 12022.53,
subdivision (e)(1), provides that the section’s firearm enhancements “shall
apply to any person who is a principal in the commission of an offense if both

                                        6
of the following are pled and proved: [¶] (A) The person violated subdivision
(b) of Section 186.22. [¶] (B) Any principal in the offense committed any act
specified in subdivision (b), (c), or (d).” (Italics added.) Section 186.22,
subdivision (b), contains criteria for imposing enhancements based on gang
participation. Thus, section 12022.53, subdivision (b), requires personal use
of the firearm by the defendant himself, whereas subdivision (e) only requires
that a principal in a gang-related crime personally use a firearm.
      “As a rule, all sentence enhancements ‘shall be alleged in the
accusatory pleading and either admitted by the defendant in open court or
found to be true by the trier of fact.’ ” (People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th
946, 953 (Anderson), quoting § 1170.1, subd. (e).) Firearm enhancements are
no exception. “Another statutory pleading provision, specific to section
12022.53 enhancements, restates the same basic point: For any of the
firearm enhancements prescribed by section 12022.53 to apply, ‘the existence
of any fact required [by the relevant provision] shall be alleged in the
accusatory pleading and either admitted by the defendant in open court or
found to be true by the trier of fact.’ [Citations.]” (Anderson, at p. 953,
quoting § 12022.53, subd. (j); see People v. Garcia, supra, 28 Cal.4th at
p. 1175 [describing § 12022.53, subd. (j), as “simply a restatement of section
1170.1, subdivision (e)”].)
      The People argue that the amended information in this case gave
Ohlinger adequate notice that the prosecution would seek to impose a
personal use firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b).
We disagree. Although the summary table in the amended information listed
“PC12022.53(b)” for count 18, the substantive allegations for count 18 in the
body of the charging document alleged only that Ohlinger and his co-
defendant committed robbery, and “a principal personally used a firearm, a

                                         7
handgun, within the meaning of Penal Code sections 12022.53(b) and (e)(1).”
(Italics added.) The amended information thus only alleged a vicarious
section 12022.53 enhancement in connection with the gang participation
criteria included in subdivision (e)(1), with no allegation that Ohlinger
personally used a firearm.
      The language of section 12022.53, subdivision (j), clearly states that for
a firearm enhancement under subdivision (b) to apply, the accusatory
pleading must allege “the existence of any fact required” by that subdivision
and it must be “either admitted by the defendant in open court or found to be
true by the trier of fact.” An essential fact required by subdivision (b) is that
the defendant must have personally used a firearm. Yet nowhere did the
amended information allege that Ohlinger himself used a firearm in the
commission of a robbery, as required for a standalone subdivision (b)
enhancement. Because the People did not comply with statutory pleading
requirements at the outset, we conclude they cannot now seek to impose the
personal use firearm enhancement for the first time on remand for
resentencing.
      Moreover, beneath the statutory pleading requirements “lies a bedrock
principle of due process. ‘ “No principle of procedural due process is more
clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be
heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the
constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts,
state or federal.” [Citations.] “A criminal defendant must be given fair notice
of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable
opportunity properly to prepare a defense and avoid unfair surprise at trial.” ’
[Citation.]” (Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 953.) This principle applies to
sentence enhancements as well as substantive offenses. (Ibid.) A defendant

                                        8
has the “right to fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement allegations
that will be invoked to increase punishment for his crimes.” (People v.
Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 747.) Due process permits imposition of an
uncharged sentence enhancement only if “the facts supporting its imposition
are alleged and found true.” (People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 699
(Tirado).)
         As noted, the People did not allege facts supporting a standalone
personal use firearm enhancement apart from gang participation. Ohlinger
only had fair notice that the People would seek to impose a vicarious gang-
related firearm enhancement for a principal’s personal use of a firearm, not
for his own personal use of a firearm. If the amended information made clear
that the prosecution would assert a factual theory to support a standalone
section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancement for his own personal use,
Ohlinger may have presented different or additional evidence at trial to
defend against the allegation that he himself used a firearm in the
commission of the robbery. But the charging document did not allege that
fact, and the record shows Ohlinger never conceded it.
         We therefore conclude that the People are precluded from retrying the
personal use firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b),
because doing so would violate Ohlinger’s statutory and due process rights to
fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement allegations and supporting
facts.
         B. Forfeiture of Personal Use Firearm Enhancement
         We also conclude that principles of forfeiture and waiver bar the People
from retrying the firearm enhancement under an uncharged personal use
theory under section 12022.53, subdivision (b). As noted, the People neither
pled nor ensured jury findings for a personal use enhancement under

                                         9
subdivision (b), despite having the opportunity to do so. (See People v. Botello
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1028–1029 (Botello) [“the prosecution’s failure
to comply with the pleading requirements of subdivision (e)(1) constitutes a
forfeiture of the right to rely on subdivision (e)(1) for the first time on
appeal”].) The People never sought to amend the information to allege
personal use by Ohlinger under subdivision (b), nor did they argue that
Ohlinger should be sentenced under that subdivision alone. (Botello, at
p. 1029.)
      The People also do not contend that their failure to plead the
standalone personal use firearm enhancement “was based on mistake or
other excusable neglect.” (Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 749.) In fact,
however, the amended information did expressly allege gang and “on-bail”
enhancements as to count 18, as required by statute. (§ 12022.53, subd. (e)(1)
[enhancement applies if “pled and proved”]; § 12022.1, subd. (c)
[“enhancement allegation provided in subdivision (b) shall be pleaded in the
information or indictment”].) “There can be little doubt that the prosecution
understood” the pleading requirements “and knew how to comply with them.”
(Mancebo, at p. 749.) We therefore treat the People’s failure to include a
standalone personal firearm use allegation in the amended information as a
“discretionary charging decision[,]” which means that “the doctrines of waiver
and estoppel” apply. (Ibid.)
      The People rely on cases involving post-conviction changes in the law to
argue that forfeiture and waiver do not apply. But those cases are
distinguishable. In People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539 (Garcia), the
Supreme Court reversed a jury’s felony-murder special circumstance finding
because while the appeal in Garcia was pending, the Court established a rule
in Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 (Carlos) which changed

                                        10
proof requirements for that special circumstance. (Garcia, at pp. 544–545.)
The Court in Garcia found that because Carlos held that an actual killer had
to act with intent to kill to be liable for a felony-murder special circumstance,
the jury’s finding in Garcia had to be reversed with permission for the
prosecution to retry that particular circumstance. (Garcia, at pp. 557–558.)
      In People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, the Supreme Court invalidated
the defendant’s first degree murder conviction after holding that an aider and
abettor cannot be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at pp. 158–159.) The Court
allowed the People to retry the first degree murder charge under a valid
direct aiding and abetting theory instead. (Id. at p. 168.) Similarly, People v.
Hola (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 362 (Hola) and People v. Gutierrez (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 847 (Gutierrez) both involved juries finding defendants guilty
based on theories later determined to be legally invalid. In both cases, the
Courts of Appeal reversed the defendants’ convictions and allowed the People
to retry those specific charges on a valid theory of culpability. (Hola, at
p. 377; Gutierrez, at p. 863.)
      All of these cases involved situations where the People were allowed to
retry the specific enhancement, charge, or finding that was itself invalidated
on appeal due to post-conviction changes in the law. The People could seek
retrial in those cases because the prosecution had not misinterpreted or failed
to follow established law at the outset, and could not have anticipated the
change in the law that occurred later. (See Gutierrez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th
at p. 858.) Here, however, there was no substantive change to section
12022.53, subdivision (b), during or after Ohlinger’s trial. The Legislature
did make changes to section 186.22, which also impacted section 12022.53,
subdivision (e), and the People were given an opportunity to retry the specific

                                       11
affected enhancements. But the requirements for pleading and proving a
personal use firearm enhancement under 12022.53, subdivision (b), were
well-established and unchanged throughout the proceedings below.
       Under these circumstances, we conclude that principles of forfeiture
and waiver preclude the People from seeking retrial of a standalone firearm
enhancement on a personal use theory under section 12022.53, subdivision
(b).
                                        II
       We next consider whether the trial court nevertheless has discretion at
resentencing to impose a lesser vicarious arming enhancement under section
12022, subdivision (a)(1), based on the findings already made by the jury as
to section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1). In an unusual twist, Ohlinger argues
that the trial court does have discretion to impose the lesser enhancement on
remand, and the People argue that it does not. We conclude that it does.
       Section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), provides in relevant part that “a
person who is armed with a firearm in the commission of a felony or
attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of
imprisonment . . . for one year, unless the arming is an element of that
offense. This additional term shall apply to a person who is a principal in the
commission of a felony or attempted felony if one or more of the principals is
armed with a firearm, whether or not the person is personally armed with a
firearm.”
       The People do not dispute that in finding true the gang-related firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1), the jury also
found true the necessary elements for the section 12022, subdivision (a)(1)
enhancement. Specifically, the jury found that a principal in the commission
of the robbery personally used a firearm, which necessarily means that a

                                       12
principal was armed with a firearm. (People v. Strickland (1974) 11 Cal.3d
946, 961.) But the People contend that imposition of the lesser section 12022
enhancement is precluded by the language of section 12022.53, subdivision
(j). In relevant part, subdivision (j) provides that when an enhancement
under section 12022.53 “has been admitted or found to be true, the court
shall impose punishment for that enhancement pursuant to this section
rather than imposing punishment authorized under any other law, unless
another enhancement provides for a greater penalty or a longer term of
imprisonment.”

                                     13
      We agree with the decision in People v. Fuller (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
394, review granted November 22, 2022, S276762 (Fuller), in which the Court
of Appeal noted that while the text of section 12022.53, subdivision (j)
“suggests that the only lesser enhancement that may be imposed when an
enhancement under section 12022.53 has been found true would be another
enhancement under section 12022.53[,] . . . Tirado held that (1) subdivision
(j) of section 12022.53 does not limit a court’s discretion to impose uncharged
lesser enhancements [citation], and (2) ‘imposition of an uncharged
enhancement is permitted so long as the facts supporting its imposition are
alleged and found true’ [citation].” (Fuller, at pp. 402–403, quoting Tirado,

supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 699–700.)4
      We also find persuasive the analysis in People v. Johnson (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 1074, review granted December 14, 2022, S277196 (Johnson),
which reached the same conclusion as Fuller. In Johnson, the Court of
Appeal noted that section 12022.53, subdivision (h), provides that a “court
may, in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and at the time of
sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be
imposed by this section.” (Johnson, at p. 1084.) The court reasoned that
“even assuming that both section 12022.53(f) and section 12022.53(j) are
mandatory when punishment is being imposed pursuant to an existing section
12022.53 enhancement . . . , if the trial court strikes all section 12022.53

4     A recent published decision reaches the opposite conclusion. (See
People v. Lewis (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 34 [concluding § 12022.53, subd. (j)
prevented the trial court from substituting the defendant’s § 12022.53
firearm enhancement for a more lenient firearm enhancement under
§ 12022.5, subd. (a)].) The issue of whether trial courts have the discretion to
strike section 12022.53 enhancements and instead impose lesser uncharged
enhancements under section 12022.5 is currently pending before the
Supreme Court. (See People v. McDavid (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 763, review
granted September 28, 2022, S275940.)

                                       14
enhancements alleged and found true by the jury under section 12022.53(h),
none of the mandatory provisions in section 12022.53(f) or section 12022.53(j)
apply.” (Johnson, at p. 1089.) We agree with the court’s conclusion in
Johnson that “while section 12022.53(j) continues to require trial courts to
impose a section 12022.53 enhancement that is charged and admitted or
found true and not subsequently stricken, section 12022.53(h) now permits
striking of any or all of the section 12022.53 enhancements and, if all are
stricken, imposition of a lesser enhancement when discretion is exercised
pursuant to section 1385.” (Johnson, at pp. 1089–1090.)
      Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court has discretion on remand
to impose a lesser vicarious arming enhancement under section 12022,
subdivision (a)(1), based on the findings already made by the jury as to
section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1).
                                        III
      Lastly, the parties agree that on remand, the trial court may consider
Senate Bill No. 81’s revisions to section 1385 which limit the court’s
discretion to impose multiple enhancements. Specifically, section 1385 now
provides that the presence of one of nine enumerated “mitigating
circumstances” “weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement[]
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
386, 391, review granted March 22, 2023, S278309.)
      Although the People argue that Ohlinger forfeited his claim that the
court failed to consider the option of striking enhancements under amended
section 1385, the prosecution nonetheless concedes that Ohlinger can raise
his section 1385 arguments at resentencing. We agree. The general rule on
remand is that the trial court may revisit all of its prior sentencing decisions.

                                        15
(See People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425 [“the full
resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when
resentencing a defendant”]; accord, People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893
[under the full resentencing rule, when part of a sentence is stricken, a
remand for a full resentencing is appropriate to allow the trial court to
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances].) On
remand, the trial court may therefore consider amended section 1385 and
resentence Ohlinger accordingly.

                                       16
                                DISPOSITION
      Ohlinger’s sentence and the jury’s true finding on the gang-related
firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)(1)) as to count 18 are
reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. At
resentencing, the trial court may revisit its prior sentencing decisions and is
directed to consider (a) whether to exercise its discretion to dismiss any
enhancements under amended section 1385, and (b) whether to impose the
lesser vicarious firearm enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).
We express no opinion on how the court should exercise its sentencing
discretion on remand. Following the conclusion of proceedings on remand,
the trial court shall amend the abstract of judgment as necessary and
forward copies of the amended abstract to the appropriate law enforcement
and custodial officials. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                                BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

KELETY, J.

                                       17