Court Opinion

ID: 9890849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 17:01:09.691799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:29.977768
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 16 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAOLA FRENCH; RUSSELL FRENCH,                   No.    22-55571

                Plaintiffs-Appellees,           D.C. No.
                                                5:20-cv-00416-JGB-SP
 v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,                            MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant,

and

SALVADOR SANCHEZ, in his official
capacity and in his individual capacity;
DOES, 1-10, inclusive,

                Defendants.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                    Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted August 15, 2023
                              Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, CHRISTEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

      The City of Los Angeles appeals from the district court’s denial of the City’s

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
motion for a new trial and renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.

Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      1. The City argues that the district court prejudicially erred by excusing

Sanchez from testifying on the expectation that he would validly invoke the Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to any question asked. Such so-

called “blanket” invocations of the Fifth Amendment are disfavored in both

criminal and civil contexts; the general rule is that a witness must invoke the

privilege in response to each question asked. See United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d

735, 741 (9th Cir. 1977). Even so, we have recognized a narrow exception in the

criminal context where “the court, based on its knowledge of the case and of the

testimony expected from the witness, can conclude that the witness could

legitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant questions.” United States v.

Tsui, 646 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

It is an open question in our Circuit whether there is a similar narrow exception to

the general rule in civil cases.

      In civil cases, unlike in criminal cases, a trial court can permit the jury to

make an adverse inference from a witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination in some circumstances. An adverse inference

simply means that the jury, when so instructed by a judge, is allowed to assume

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that a witness’s refusal to answer a question indicates that the actual answer would

have been harmful to the witness. In the civil context, the court must decide both

(a) what specific adverse inference the jury can draw, and (b) whether to allow the

adverse instruction. The court makes both decisions on a question-by-question

basis. See Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1264–65 (9th Cir.

2000). A court’s decision to allow an adverse inference in response to a witness’s

invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination thus assumes that the witness

first invoked the privilege on a question-by-question basis. See id.

      In a civil case, completely excusing a witness from testifying based on a

blanket invocation of the privilege could interfere with the proper drawing of an

adverse inference on a question-specific basis. Here, however, the district court

essentially conducted the question-by-question invocation “on paper” for the

purpose of allowing the jury to draw adverse inferences on a question-specific

basis. The district court allowed the City to submit a list of questions to which

Sanchez had invoked the privilege in his previous deposition. The district court

then granted the City’s request for an adverse inference instruction to the jury as to

every question on that list. The district court also allowed the parties to play

portions of the video deposition at trial, and the district court instructed the jury to

treat the video deposition as Sanchez’s live testimony.

      We need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in

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excusing Sanchez from testifying under these circumstances, because even if the

district court erred, the error “did not materially affect the verdict.” Barranco v. 3D

Sys. Corp., 952 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The parties

agreed to admit video of Sanchez’s deposition testimony. At the hearing on

Sanchez’s request to be excused from testifying on the witness stand, the City

primarily argued that the deposition video was insufficient because the jury could

better assess Sanchez’s credibility through live testimony. When the district court

rejected that argument, the City also noted that “depositions obviously only cover

certain questions.” Although that statement suggests the City would have asked

Sanchez more questions at trial, the City did not identify to the district court any

additional questions it would have asked Sanchez. Further, when the court gave the

City the opportunity to submit a list of questions from which an adverse inference

could be drawn, the City did not ask to add any new questions or press for any

additional adverse inferences. And during closing, the City used Sanchez’s

invocations in his video deposition to make the very arguments it insisted it would

have made if Sanchez had given live testimony—i.e., that his invocations in

response to questions about his conduct demonstrated he was not acting within the

course and scope of his employment. Although the City argues on appeal that it

should have been permitted to pursue different lines of questioning, the City

declined to make these arguments in the district court. See In re Mortg. Elec.

                                           4
Registration Sys., Inc., 754 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]rguments not raised

in the district court will not be considered for the first time on appeal.”). Given

these circumstances, even assuming that the court erred, any such error was

harmless.

      2. The district court did not err in allowing a scope-of-employment jury

instruction based on California Civil Jury Instruction (CACI) No. 3720. Under

California’s scope of employment rule, “[a] nexus must exist between the

employment and the tort if the employer is fairly to be held liable.” Xue Lu v.

Powell, 621 F.3d 944, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2010). The California Supreme Court has

interpreted the scope of employment “broadly under the respondeat superior

doctrine.” Farmers Ins. Grp. v. County of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992, 1004

(1995) (collecting cases). We have recognized that California’s scope of

employment rule is significantly broader than the traditional rule. See Xue Lu, 621

F.3d at 948. Moreover, California appellate courts repeatedly have cited CACI

3720 as a correct statement of California law, and the California Supreme Court

has declined to review those opinions. See, e.g., Baptist v. Robinson, 49 Cal. Rptr.

3d 153, 160–62 (Ct. App. 2006); Fitzgibbons v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings,

Inc., No. G048413, 2015 WL 1954643, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2015), as

modified on denial of reh’g (May 29, 2015). Accordingly, the district court did not

err in approving a jury instruction that relied on CACI 3720’s long-ratified

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language.1

      3. The district court did not err in denying the City’s renewed motion for

judgment as a matter of law because substantial evidence supports the jury’s

conclusion that Sanchez was acting within the scope of his employment when he

shot the Frenches. “A renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is properly

granted only if the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is

contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060,

1066 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, Sanchez

used a personal weapon and holster, was in civilian clothes, and was off-duty and

out of his duty area. But Sanchez also self-identified as a police officer on the

scene, told first responders that he thought he was responding to an active shooter,

testified that he relied upon his police training, used ammunition issued by the Los

Angeles Police Department, and was allowed to carry a concealed weapon and

high-capacity magazine off-duty without a permit by virtue of his employment

with the Los Angeles Police Department. Construed in the light most favorable to

the Frenches, this evidence and the remainder of the record does not permit only

one reasonable conclusion contrary to the jury’s verdict that Sanchez acted within

1
 For this reason, we also decline the City’s invitation to certify the question to the
California Supreme Court, as we have little doubt that the California Supreme
Court would uphold CACI 3720 as a correct statement of the law.

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the scope of his employment.

      AFFIRMED.

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