Court Opinion

ID: 9828762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:43:05.757596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:52.910783
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant ignores the fact that the requirements as to residence of a petitioner for divorce must be proved as well- as alleged. Appellant appears to have the idea that such allegations are mere matters of form, which, if made by either party, confer jurisdiction, and then, having served such useful purpose, may be quietly discarded. In the Charlton Case the court said: “The purpose of the statute was to protect, not only the defendant in divorce proceedings, but also the interests of society, against fly-by-night divorce suits instituted by birds of passage, who, with no stability of residence, might use the courts to procure divorces upon ■ false grounds, and *19sometimes by collusion with the opposite party-” "Set appellant contends tliat, if neither party has the residential qualifications prescribed by statute, one of them can bring a divorce suit, and, if the other files a cross-action, the court can grant the cross-action. By collusion, which is always very difficult and frequently impossible to prove, “fly-by-night” divorces could be obtained without any difficulty, and our laws set at naught. Persons residing in other states, if desirous of being divorced, could easily arrange for one to file suit in Texas for divorce, and for the other to go to Texas when the court is in session, file a cross-antion, and obtain the divorce.
Appellant says that “the rule is to prevent the plaintiff from doing wrong, not the defendant; to prevent the plaintiff from collusion, fraud, tricks.” This is a strange and wholly unwarranted conception of the purpose of the law. As collusion necessarily implies the participation of both pasties, it is impossible to see why one would be less guilty than the other. Appellant appears to think that a party who is plaintiff should not be given a divorce without alleging and proving the statutory requirements as to residence, because it might permit of collusion and fraudulent divorces, but, if the collusion and fraud be carried a step further, and suit is filed by one not having the necessary requirements, and the other, who also does not possess the necessary requirements as to residence, files a cross-action, then the statute can be successfully circumvented, and the collusion and fraud will no longer be an abomination in the eyes of the law. Such is not our conception of the law, nor.did the court announce any such rule in the Charl-ton Case. In that case evidence was heard, and, if it had not shown that plaintiff’s alle•gation as to residence was sustained, the court would not have omitted such an important fact in passing upon the case. We repeat that no issue was made in the appellate court as to jurisdiction based upon the theory that neither party had the statutory qualifications as to residence; but the case was treated and discussed as one where plaintiff had such qualifications, but defendant did not. In this case, the sworn petition affirmatively alleges that A. J. Swearingen did not, at- the time he presented his petition, have the qualifications as to residence prescribed by law. This allegation is not denied.
It is not alleged that Mrs. Swearingen had such qualifications. Yet appellant wants the case treated as a divorce suit, so far as granting a temporary injunction is concerned. She prays that the divorce decree be not set aside, unless the court can grant her, a divorce, and, having pleaded facts showing that the court cannot permit the maintenance of a suit by her for divorce, complains because a temporary injunction was not granted on the ground that this is a divorce suit. If a petition for divorce is filed which does not show the necessary facts as to residence, could it be contended that the court ought to grant plaintiff a temporay injunction? If a cross-action is filed which shows that the court acquired no jurisdiction on account of plaintiff’s residence, and does not show that it had any by reason of the residence of defendant, should the court grant an injunction because it is a divorce suit? These questions must certainly be answered in the negative. Appellant quotes the rule that: “A court of equity which has obtained jurisdiction of a controversy on any ground, or for any purpose, will retain jurisdiction for the purpose of administering complete relief and doing entire justice with respect to the subject-matter.” This is discussed at great length and many authorities cited, but appellant begs the question. If it be assumed that, when plaintiff in a divorce suit alleges the statutory requirements as to residence, the court has jurisdiction of the case, and retains it, even though the evidence shows that such allegation is false, then the quoted rule may be applied, but that is assuming the whole question. The statute requires the fact of residence and not the mere allegation thereof, and, if the proof shows that the allegation as to residence is false, plaintiff cannot maintain his suit, and the case should be dismissed; Speer on Married Women, § 343; Nelson on Divorce and Separation, §§ 48, 731; Gamblin v. Gamblin, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 479, 114 S. W. 408; McLean v. Randell, 135 S. W. 1117; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 138 S. W. 205. Nor can we concede that allegations which, if established, may be sufficient to set aside a decree for divorce are equivalent to a suit for divorce, and that therefore the provisions of the divorce statutes with reference to injunctions may be applied. Such, in effect, is appellant’s contention made at the conclusion of the discussion on jurisdiction of courts of equity.
Appellant objects strenuously to our mention of fáets disclosed in one of the sworn answers filed in this case, contending that, as the trial court held the petition insufficient to require the granting of a temporary injunction, we should not give any weight to the answers. The law contemplates that, when a sworn answer is filed, the question whether a temporay injunction should be granted will be determined upon both bill and answer. Article 4645, Revised Statutes 1911. If the court’s ruling is correct upon the bill and answer, the judgment should be affirmed. We think the petition, when considered by itself, shows its insufficiency to entitle appellant to such relief, but see no impropriety in mentioning the allegations of the answer, which are proper to be considered, nor in holding that such facts present a case in which a strong showing should be made before we would be justified in holding that the trial court abused its discretion.
The motion is overruled.