Court Opinion

ID: 9613510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:17:39.755876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:29.607402
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J.
Concurring and Dissenting. I agree with the majority that those portions of Proposition 115 authorizing the use of certain hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings do not violate the state or the federal Constitution. I also agree that “reader” testimony, such as that offered by the prosecution in this case, is inconsistent with the purposes underlying Proposition 115, and thus defendant should not have been held to answer in the superior court.
But the manner in which the majority dispenses with “reader” testimony is deficient. Presented with language in Proposition 115 of uncertain meaning, the majority reaches a decision that compounds, rather than resolves, the uncertainty. In legal proceedings, uncertainty means litigation, and litigation means delay. By failing to articulate a workable “bright line” rule for hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings, the majority opinion poses a perplexing problem for magistrates and attorneys who will have to decipher its Delphic utterances, frustrating Proposition 115’s goal of making our system of criminal justice both “swift and fair.”
I.
To determine the scope of Proposition 115’s scheme permitting the use of hearsay testimony at preliminary hearings, it is necessary to focus on two of *1087its provisions: a constitutional amendment authorizing the use of hearsay testimony and a statutory provision implementing the constitutional authorization.1
The initiative’s amendment adds article I, section 30, subdivision (b) (article I, section 30(b)) to the California Constitution. That provision reads: “In order to protect victims and witnesses in criminal cases, hearsay evidence shall be admissible at preliminary hearings, as prescribed by the Legislature or by the people through the initiative process.”
To implement this amendment to the state Constitution, Proposition 115 adds to the Penal Code section 872, subdivision (b) (section 872(b); all further statutory references are to the Penal Code), which provides: “[At a preliminary hearing] the finding of probable cause may be based in whole or in part upon the sworn testimony of a law enforcement officer relating the statements of declarants made out of court offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Any law enforcement officer testifying as to hearsay statements shall either have five years of law enforcement experience or have completed a training course certified by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training which includes training in the investigation and reporting of cases and testifying at preliminary hearings.”
As I shall explain, in determining whether the hearsay testimony offered in this case was admissible, both of these provisions must be considered.
II.
In this case, Officer Navin stopped defendant for speeding, and, based on observations leading her to believe that defendant had been driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, arrested him. But Navin did not testify at defendant’s preliminary hearing, at which the only witness called by the People was Officer Alexander. He had the requisite five years of law enforcement experience set forth in section 872(b). He had, however, never discussed the case with Officer Navin, and did not even know whether Navin was a man or a woman. Nevertheless, the magistrate allowed Officer Alexander to testify about Officer Navin’s observations, by reading from Navin’s police report. Based on this testimony, the magistrate held defendant to answer in the superior court.
*1088I agree with the majority that Officer Alexander’s “reader” testimony is inadmissible under section 872(b). As the majority observes, section 872(b)’s requirement that officers who give hearsay testimony must either have five years of experience or complete a training course covering the “investigation and reporting” of criminal cases “was intended to enhance the reliability of hearsay testimony at preliminary hearings.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1073, italics in original.) That requirement would be rendered meaningless if a police officer simply read from another officer’s report.
The majority, however, would permit “reader” testimony if the testifying officer has “sufficient knowledge of the crime or the circumstances under which the out-of-court statement was made so as to meaningfully assist the magistrate in assessing the reliability of the statement.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1072-1073.) This is where I part company with the majority. By permitting hearsay testimony in these circumstances, the majority fails to take into account Proposition 115’s express purpose in permitting hearsay testimony at preliminary hearings, as described in article I, section 30(b).
Article I, section 30(b) explains that Proposition 115 permits hearsay at the preliminary hearing “to protect victims and witnesses in criminal cases . . . .” Although the provision does not explain what victims and witnesses are to be protected from, several possibilities come immediately to mind. Testifying causes victims and witnesses to relive an often stressful and traumatic experience, it disrupts their daily routines, and it provides an opportunity for harassment or retaliation by the defendant or friends of the defendant. If the recollections of victims and witnesses can be presented through the hearsay testimony of an officer, these hazards and inconveniences are avoided.
The objective of article I, section 30(b), can be achieved by applying its protections to victims and witnesses other than police officers. Compared to private citizens who are victims of or witnesses to a crime, officers testifying at a preliminary hearing are significantly less likely to be harassed or intimidated by criminal defendants, and less likely to be reliving an unusually stressful or traumatic experience. And although officers may have their daily routines disrupted by court appearances, such appearances are within the scope of their duties. An officer’s job is not finished when a suspect is arrested; rather, it continues through conviction and punishment. Like prosecutors and judges, officers are an integral part of the criminal justice system. Attendance at court is an occupational hazard of a career in law enforcement.
In sum, protection of private citizens rather than police officer witnesses appears to have been the fundamental concern underlying the phrase “to *1089protect victims and witnesses in criminal cases,” as expressed in article I, section 30(b). Accordingly, section 872(b), which implements article I, section 30(b), should be construed as establishing a new general hearsay exception for the out-of-court statements of private citizens only, not those of police officers. Not only would this construction implement the purposes of Proposition 115, it would also create a clear, workable standard that would meaningfully assist magistrates and attorneys.
The majority opinion makes no attempt to explain how its interpretation of section 872(b) is consistent with the purpose of “protect[ing] victims and witnesses” set forth in article I, section 30(b). It merely makes a broad and unsupported assertion that qualified officers may “relate out-of-court statements by crime victims or witnesses, including other law enforcement personnel . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1072.) For the reasons I have expressed above, this assertion is inconsistent with the intent of Proposition 115.
III.
Not only is the majority’s holding unfaithful to the intent of Proposition 115, it is also likely to mire the criminal justice system in confusion.
The majority holds that an officer can testify based on another officer’s report if the testifying officer’s “knowledge of the crime or the circumstances” is sufficient to “meaningfully assist the magistrate” in determining reliability. This vague test contains no guidance whatsoever for magistrates and litigators, leaving them adrift on the flood of litigation likely to ensue from efforts to grasp the meaning of the majority’s ill defined terminology regarding the testifying officer’s “knowledge of the crime or the circumstances” and ability to “meaningfully assist the magistrate.”
Can officers “meaningfully assist the magistrate" if they observed the preparation of the police report, but have no independent knowledge of the circumstances of the offense? Is the majority’s “meaningful assistance” requirement met if, before testifying at the preliminary hearing, the testifying officer spoke to the officer who prepared the report and was assured of the reliability of the report, but the two officers did not discuss the contents of the report? What if the testifying officer’s “knowledge of the crime” was gained from reading a number of police reports that had been prepared by various officers—can that officer then testify as to the contents of each of the reports he or she has read? And if, after the magistrate ruled the testimony to be inadmissible, the testifying officer telephones the officer who prepared the report and discusses its contents for five or ten minutes, can the testify*1090ing officer then resume the witness stand and read from the other officer’s report?
Because the majority’s vague and confusing test will not answer these questions, different magistrates presented with similar facts will make inconsistent rulings. To resolve the inconsistencies and uncertainties, the parties will be required to resort to the time-consuming pursuit of appellate remedies. Eventually the Courts of Appeal will provide content to the majority’s empty formulation. In the meantime, however, the majority’s failure to create a workable “bright line” rule for hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings will serve to obstruct, rather than to streamline, the criminal justice system, thereby frustrating the people’s expressed purpose to create “a system in which justice is swift and fair” (Prop. 115, § 1, subd. (c), Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) [Stats. 1990, No. 1 Deering’s Adv. Legis. Service, p. 265]).

As the majority explains, a constitutional amendment was required because under previous California law the confrontation clause of the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15) limited the use of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings. (Mills v. Superior Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 951 [232 Cal.Rptr. 141, 728 P.2d 211]; see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1076-1077.)