Court Opinion

ID: 9728793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:16:33.355423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:52.136998
License: Public Domain

D.C. Riley, J.
(concurring). Although I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion, I cannot endorse the majority’s discussion of Issue II of the appeals of Kendrick and Woodward.
In Issue I the majority, citing People v Baines, 82 Mich App 438; 266 NW2d 839 (1978), holds that the question, being whether the defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights were violated when their probation revocation hearings were held prior to their trials, should be deferred until a more appropriate case is presented. I agree with this result, which does comport with the decision in Baines, supra, since defendants did not assert their Fifth Amendment claim at the revocation hearing or raise the issue at the subsequent trial, choosing instead to testify.
In Issue II, the majority initially holds that the probation revocation statute, MCL 771.4; MSA 28.1134, is not violated when the revocation hearing precedes the trial. I agree with this result only for the precise reason that the statute is satisfied *141by a lower standard of proof than applicable in a trial.
My reluctance to fully concur in the majority’s opinion is based upon the additional language in Issue II, where the majority states that since one proceeding must occur first "there is no reason why it cannot be the revocation hearing”. The majority then cites Baines, supra, for this conclusion. I feel that this language is both unnecessary to the decision and too broad in scope.
In Issue I the majority clearly implied that there may be Fifth Amendment problems relating to the sequence of the two proceedings. See 74 Mich L Rev 525 (1976). This question was deferred only because of the factual context of the instant case. However, the cited language in Issue II can be reasonably read to hold that no problems, either Fifth Amendment or otherwise, prevent the revocation hearing from occurring first. While such a reading may be arguably out of context, I do not think our opinion should even appear to foreclose the decision we deliberately left open in Issue I. In addition, I do not read Baines, supra, to hold that a revocation hearing can always predate the trial.
I therefore concur in the result reached on the facts of the present case, while emphasizing that the Fifth Amendment issue raised was decided limited to those facts.