Court Opinion

ID: 9878286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 16:52:25.143472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:34.571200
License: Public Domain

JERRY L. GOODMAN, C.J.,
dissenting:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from Part II of the Majority’s Opinion.
¶ 2 As the Majority notes, Virginia Mae Pierce executed the Christopher Hannah Pierce 1994 Irrevocable Trust Agreement (Trust) on October 18, 1994. Christopher Hannah Pierce (Pierce) is a primary beneficiary of the Trust. The Trust grants Pierce the power to appoint by will all or any part of the principal of Trust to or for the benefit of “the issue of [Pierce] living on the date of the exercise of this power of appointment.. However, that no appointment shall benefit directly or indirectly persons other than members of the restricted group who are the objects of this power,.” Trust further provides in,4,12 that “a power of appointment, granted herein may be exercised by the holder thereof only if specific reference to the *326power granted herein is made in the document purporting to exercise such power.”
¶ 3 Pierce executed his Last Will and Testament (Will) on July 26, 2013. Article 2, Section 4 of the Will provides:
I own a beneficial interest in a Trust, said Trust having title to the property located at [Nichols Hills property]. I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my wife, a life estate in said real property, .. The remainder of my beneficial interest in said property I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my son, [CP].
¶ 4 The parties dispute whether Pierce effectively exercised the power of appointment granted him in the Trust through his Will. Appellants contend Pierce’s purported exercise of the power of appointment in his Will failed to conform to the Trust’s formal requirements. Appellee disagrees, asserting the Trust grants Pierce broad and expansive appointment power that he exercised in favor of CP. Appellee further asserts Oklahoma law expressly excuses the performance of technical formalities of the type Appellants insist, citing 60 O.S.2011, 299.4, which provides:
A power of appointment authorized to be exercised by an instrument which would not be sufficient to transfer title to the property covered by the power shall not be void, but its execution shall conform to the provisions of this act. When the power of appointment directs that formalities in addition to those prescribed in this act be observed in the execution of the power, the direction may be disregarded.
¶ 5 The Court of Civil Appeal (COCA) addressed 299.4 in In the Matter of Allen A. Atwood Trust, 2001 OK CIV APP 49, 23 P.3d 309. COCA rejected Appellee’s interpretation of 299.4, stating:
The statutes use the word “formalities” in two other instances. The first, in Section 299.2, deals with the execution of an instrument which creates the power of appointment. The second, Section 299.3, relates to formalities of execution of the instrument purporting to exercise the power of appointment. Clearly, the second sentence of Section 299.4 accomplishes the elimination of the need for any additional formality in the execution of the document creating the power of appointment. This construction is supported by the author of the Bill leading to the enactment of Section 299.4 and Professor Rarick. Joseph F. Rarick and Robert Henry, The Oklahoma Powers of Appointment Act of 1977, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 787, 796-97 (1979). There, the authors note that Section 299.4 deals with matters of execution and simply avoids pitfalls attendant to failure to follow the rules regarding execution of the applicable instrument. In summary, under this construction, Section 299.4 simplifies the requirements for execution of a document creating a power of appointment or a document exercising the power of appoint ment..
This construction also coincides with prior Oklahoma law and the Restatement (First) of Property 346 (1977). Pursuant to the Restatement, when exercising the power of appointment, the donee was required to observe the formalities imposed by law and by the donor for the execution of the instrument of appointment. However, as noted in the comments, some state statutes declared that a donor’s demand for greater formalities in the execution of the instrument of appointment may be disregarded. Oklahoma was one such state. 60 O.S.1971, 229-230. Thus, current law as codified by Section 299.4; continues the previous law abrogating the need to conform to additional demands of formality in the execution of the appointment instrument that may be imposed by donor.
However, cases have used the term “exercise of the power” interchangeably with “execution of the power.” Thus, the next question asks what effect, if any, does Section 299.4 have on the common law rule. The generally accepted common law rule is that a donor of a power of appointment may place limitations on the exercise of the power, such as were contained in Allen, Sr.’s Trust, and, when that occurs, the donee must comply with the limitations.. Therefore, if “execution of the power,” as used in the second sentence of Section 299.4, can be interchanged with “exercise of the power” and the phrase also means that instructions as well as procedural for*327malities may be disregarded, then Section 299.4 is in derogation of the common law. In such case the statute is to be liberally construed with a view to effect its object and to promote justice. 25 O.S.1991, 29. However, statutory alterations of the common law must be clearly and plainly expressed and an intent to effect a change will not be inferred from ambiguous or inclusive text. Jones v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 1994 OK 89, ¶17, 894 P.2d 415, 419-20.
This Court holds that the second sentence of Section 299.4 achieves the single function of dispensing with procedural formalities. There is not a clear intent in the statute’s language to do anything other than to continue the rule of dispensing with excess formality in the execution of a document. However, Section 299.4 does not alter the rule that a donor may place limitations upon the scope and extent of the power, and that such limitations are controlling.
Id. at ¶¶19-22, 24-25 (emphasis in original).
¶ 6 COCA continued this construction of powers of appointment in Edwards v. Urice, 2004 OK CIV APP 86, 99 P.3d 256, citing with approval the Restatement Second, Property (Donative Transfers) 17.1, which provides:
[i]n order for a donee to exercise a power effectively it must be established: (1) That the donee intended to exercise it; and (2) That the expression of the intention complies with the requirements of exercise imposed by the donor and by rules of law.
Id. at ¶15, at 259-60. “The formal requisites of an appointment are satisfied if the appointment complies with the formalities required by law for the transfer by the donee of owned property that is similar to the appointive property and with any additional formalities the donor specifies.” Edwards, at ¶15, at 260 (citing Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) 18.2).
¶7 Accordingly, I find Pierce failed to effectively exercise the power of appointment in accordance with the Trust’s formal requirements. Pierce did not specifically reference the power of appointment in his Will as required by the Trust in 4.12. Rather, the Will contains a general reference to a trust and property held by a trust. In addition, Pierce attempted to leave an interest, a life estate, to an individual that was not an “issue,” i.e., Vanessa, in direct contravention to the directives of the Trust. Accordingly, Pierce’s purported exercise of the power of appointment failed to conform to the Trust’s formal requirements and was therefore ineffective. I would reverse the trial court’s order granting Appellee summary judgment.