Court Opinion

ID: 9684746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:10:14.595692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:59.281778
License: Public Domain

ODOM, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant was convicted for attempted rape and punishment was assessed at three years. On appeal the Court of Appeals held fundamental error in the jury charge required reversal. Boston v. State, 629 S.W.2d 774 (Tex.App.1981). We granted the State’s Petition for Discretionary Review in order to consider that issue.
The indictment charged that appellant did:
“with the specific intent to commit the offense of rape, attempt to have sexual intercourse with L_W_, hereinafter called complainant, a female not his wife, without the consent of the said complainant, by knowingly and intentionally using force and threats; said attempt amounting to more than mere preparation that tended but failed to effect the commission of the offense intended.”
In its charge the court instructed the jury on the law of rape and the degree of force or threats required, and then applied the law to the facts of the case in this language:
“A person commits an offense if he has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, without the female’s consent.
“The intercourse is without the female’s consent if he compels her to submit or participate by force that overcomes such earnest resistance as might reasonably be expected under the circumstances; or, if he compels her to submit or participate by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution.

“Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that on or about the 20th day of December, 1979, in Dallas County, Texas, the defendant, William Douglas Boston, did then and there unlawfully with the specific intent to commit the offense of rape, attempt to have sexual intercourse with L_ W_, a female not his wife, without the consent of the said L-W_, by knowingly or intentionally using force or threats; said attempt amounting to more than mere preparation that tended but failed to effect the commission of the offense intended, then you will find the defendant guilty of attempted rape, as charged in the indictment.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals observed that at the time of the offense V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 21.02(b)(2) created a different standard for the threat required to establish rape than the standard given in the court’s charge. At that time Sec. 21.02(b)(2) provided:
“(2) he compels her to submit or participate by any threat, communicated by actions, words or deeds, that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution, under the same or similar circumstances, because of a reasonable fear of harm;” (Emphasis added.)
The emphasized statutory language was omitted from the court’s charge. The Court of Appeals held this omission constituted fundamental error for three reasons:
“First, the charge diminished the State’s burden of proof; second, it authorized conviction of appellant for noncriminal conduct; and third, it omitted an essential element of the offense of rape.” Boston v. State, supra, at 776.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals presents a sound discussion of the issue of fundamental error in a jury charge. A sharper focus on the elements of attempted *804rape, however, will make the correctness of that court’s decision clearer.
The elements of criminal attempt are:
1) a person
2) with specific intent to commit an offense (rape)
3) does an act amounting to more than mere preparation
4) that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.
Baldwin v. State, 538 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Colman v. State, 542 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Whitlow v. State, 609 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
In its brief before this Court the State argues that criminal attempt does not require proof of a completed offense, Jones v. State, 576 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), nor does it require every act short of actual commission. Cody v. State, 605 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). To establish attempted rape under the indictment in this case, the State argues, it was not necessary to prove the threats were of the degree defined in Sec. 21.02(b)(2), supra, and therefore the erroneous statement of that standard was not fundamental error.
The State’s argument would be persuasive if the only elements affected by the erroneous charge were the third and fourth, i.e., the conduct of appellant. It was, however, also necessary for the jury to find that appellant had the specific intent to commit rape before it could convict. To make such a finding it was necessary for the jury to have a correct definition of rape in its charge. The charge, having presented an incorrect definition of rape, was fundamentally defective.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. I dissent to the majority’s disposition of the issue.
ROBERTS and TEAGUE, JJ., join this dissent.