Court Opinion

ID: 9404729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-24 19:10:49.64041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:16.659888
License: Public Domain

NUMBERS 13-22-00472-CR, 13-22-00473-CR,13-22-00474-CR,
    13-22-00475-CR, 13-22-00476-CR, 13-22-00477-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ROY GUZMAN JR.,                                                             Appellant,

                                               v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                          Appellee.

                   On appeal from the 454th District Court
                         of Medina County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
            Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

      Pursuant to a global plea bargain agreement, appellant Roy Guzman Jr. entered

open pleas of guilty to two counts of manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance in

Penalty Group 1 in an amount less than one gram, state-jail felonies enhanced to second-
degree felonies; one count of engaging in organized criminal activity, a first-degree felony;

two counts of aggravated assault against a public servant, first-degree felonies enhanced

to a punishment range of twenty-five to ninety-nine years’ confinement; and one count of

felon in possession of a firearm, a third-degree felony enhanced to a second-degree

felony.1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (b); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§§ 12.42(a), (d), 12.425(b), 22.02(b)(2)(B), 46.04(a)(1), (e), 71.02(a)(1), (b). As part of

the plea agreement, the State and appellant also agreed that there would be no cap on

punishment for any of the offenses, appellant would waive his right to appeal his

convictions other than to challenge the punishments imposed, the State would

recommend that appellant’s sentences run concurrently, and the State would recommend

that appellant receive pretrial detention credit on each sentence. The trial court accepted

the pleas and after conducting a contested punishment hearing, sentenced appellant to

twenty years’ imprisonment for each of the drug offenses, twenty years’ imprisonment for

the possession of a firearm offense, twenty-five years’ imprisonment for the organized

criminal activity offense, fifty-five years’ imprisonment for one of the aggravated assaults,

and sixty years’ imprisonment for the other aggravated assault. The trial court ordered

the sentences to run concurrently and gave appellant pretrial detention credit on each

         1 Each offense was indicted under a separate trial court cause number and has a corresponding

appellate cause number. Appellate cause numbers 13-22-000472-CR and 13-22-00473-CR concern the
two drug offenses and arise under trial court cause numbers 16-05-11963-CR and 16-06-12012-CR.
Appellate cause number 13-22-00474-CR concerns the organized criminal activity offense and arises under
trial court cause number 17-05-12408-CR. Appellate cause numbers 13-22-000475-CR and 13-22-00476-
CR concern the aggravated assault offenses and arise under trial court cause numbers 17-08-12517-CR
and17-08-12518-CR. Finally, appellate cause number 13-22-00477-CR concerns the firearm offense and
arises under trial court cause number 17-08-12519-CR.
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sentence.2

        Although appellant filed notices of appeal in each case, his court-appointed

counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal.

See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm the trial court’s judgments.3

                                        I.       ANDERS BRIEF

        Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel

filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the record

yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated in any

of the six cause numbers. See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it

presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to

advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

(orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’

points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and

procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112

S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v.

State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

        In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

        2The judgments of conviction reflect that each case was heard by the 38th Judicial District Court;
however, Medina County is now served by the newly-created 454th Judicial District Court. See TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 24.598. Consequently, appellant’s cases have since been transferred to that court.
         Also, the judgments in appellate cause numbers 13-22-00476-CR and 13-22-00477-CR include
the alias “Roy Junior Guzman.” The judgments in the other cause numbers do not include an alias.
        3  These cases are before the Court on transfer from the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio
pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§§ 22.220(a) (delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the
authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for
the transfer).
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Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),

appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no

reversible error in the trial court’s judgments. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court

in writing that she: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a

motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed

appellant of his rights to file pro se responses, to review the record prior to filing those

responses, and to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeals are frivolous;

and (4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate records

that only requires appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within

ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408–09. In this case, appellant was granted access to the

appellate records but notified the Court that he “will not be filing a pro-se brief.” Instead,

appellant intends to “wait and file an 11.07 writ.”

                                II.    INDEPENDENT REVIEW

       Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record in each cause number and counsel’s brief,

and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State,

178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by

indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the

record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

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                                     III.     MOTION TO WITHDRAW

        In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five

days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion

and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for

discretionary review.4 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at

411 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

                                            IV.     CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                                             GINA M. BENAVIDES
                                                                             Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
22nd day of June, 2023.

         4 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of these

cases by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for
discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review
must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or
timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any
petition for discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id.
R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.
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