Court Opinion

ID: 9857809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:02:11.120068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:29.541539
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Associate Justice (concurring). I agree with the result reached by the majority in reversing this case because I do not think the testimony of G-rady England was admissible in evidence. However I do disagree with the majority opinion in two respects as set out below. 1. In my opinion Instruction No. 3 given at the request of appellee was not erroneous. My knowledge of the meaning of the English language impels me to conclude that the word “sole” as used in the instruction was sufficient to leave no doubt in the minds of the jury that there could be no other proximate cause than that of the defendant’s negligence, and that consequently it did not ignore the defense of contributory negligence which was adequately set forth in other instructions. 2. In my opinion the instruction on the measure of damages given by the court and set out in the majority opinion is a correct and proper instruction, i. e. the difference between the market value of the automobile immediately before and after the collision occurred. It is conceded that this would have been the proper instruction if the damaged automobile had belonged to a member of the general public rather than to an automobile dealer. It seems to me that the majority in announcing the rule it did — the difference between the wholesale market value of the ear immediately before and after the collision — failed to take into consideration that the car was not completely destroyed. I concede that where goods, belonging to a retailer, are completely destroyed the measure of damages is as stated by the majority. On the other hand, where such goods are only damaged, the proper rule is the general rule first ¡announced. There are several reasons supporting my contention. In the first place, the General Fire Extinguisher case [cited by appellant] does not sustain the rule announced by the majority. In that case the court announced the correct rule as to the measure of damages, where goods are injured hut not totally destroyed; as follows: “If you find for the plaintiff you will assess its damages at such sum as you may find from the evidence to be the difference between the market value of the goods injured or damaged . . . immediately before they were damaged and the market value thereof immediately after they were damaged.” In the second place, it is my contention that the same figure would be arrived at regardless of whether market value or wholesale value is tised. A simple example will suffice to explain. If it costs $100 to replace the fender on an automobile, this figure would be the damage done to the automobile, if a fender is knocked off, regardless of whether the automobile belonged to an individual or a car dealer. In the third place, it seems to me that the rule announced by the majority would be hard if not impossible to apply. Just what is meant by the wholesale value of a damaged automobile. So far as I know there is no such thing, but if there is then it is obvious that there are only a few people in the State of Arkansas who know what it is and who would be available to testify in an ordinary collision suit.