Court Opinion

ID: 9493912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:23:11.854937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:06.258124
License: Public Domain

MERRITT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree that the defendant can enter into a plea agreement that waives further statutory and constitutional procedures. I agree that he did so in this case. But the district judge’s decision to re-sentence the defendant following his violation of the sentencing agreement should be affirmed.
*587By holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to re-sentence Ross following his breach of the original sentencing agreement, the majority opinion tends to deter players in the criminal process from entering into a sentencing agreement because the district court now lacks the teeth to enforce the original contract. As a result of this ruling, if a defendant waives his right to future litigation in exchange for a lighter sentence, but then brings a new action anyway (thereby forcing the government to respond and depriving it of the benefit of its bargain), the district court cannot penalize the defendant by re-sentencing him using the sentence that would have applied in the absence of any agreement. Consequently, prosecutors will be less likely to allow defendants to enter into these agreements because they know the contract cannot be enforced should the defendant choose to breach it. In addition, the district court will be unable to simply refuse to hear the defendant’s new claim because there is always the possible that the claimed Brady violation or new evidence will prove meritorious.
These agreements greatly benefit all three “players” in the criminal justice system. Defendants receive shorter sentences, prosecutors reduce their caseload, and coiu’ts are freed from some of the many frivolous criminal appeals with which we now deal. Our court’s opinion deters all three participants from using this valuable tool.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.