Court Opinion

ID: 9666250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:08:56.543445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:25.373553
License: Public Domain

NORVELL, Justice
(dissenting).
I do not agree with the Court’s approach to this case nor the decision herein which in effect reduces the responsibility of a professional pharmacist to that of a mere label reader. This is not a criminal case but one involving a statute designed to protect the public interest by providing for a board of professionals to govern and control the practice of pharmacy. This Court has now re-written a portion of the statute by redefining the statutory definition of the term “substitution” contained in Article 4542a, § 12(h) by inserting the word “knowingly” therein. This in itself is a substitution of sorts and to my mind runs contrary to the clear intent of the Legislature. It also makes readily available the time honored defense of “I didn’t know it was loaded”, and runs counter to the experience of the federal authorities in effecting an efficient control over drugs and foodstuffs. I do not believe that the doctrine of caveat emptor should be applied to purchases of processed foodstuffs, drugs and medicines. Surely a professional pharmacist is in a much better position to know the nature and properties of chemicals that go into a prescription than is the patient-consumer. And this is true, no matter how complicated the chemical formula of a drug may be. A duty is owed by any profession to the public which it purports to serve. In my opinion the professional board has fairly discharged the obligations enjoined upon it by law. The penalty assessed by it was neither harsh nor unreasonable. This Court should not interfere with its action.
I am wholly in accord with the able opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, 382 S.W.2d 496, and hence pretermit further discussion. I respectfully dissent from the order reversing the Court of Civil Appeals.
GRIFFIN and STEAKLEY, JJ., join in this dissent.