Court Opinion

ID: 9538061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:29:38.504145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:25.901102
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Justice
(dissenting in part) :
I dissent from the majority with respect to certain errors as indicated below.

Assignments 25, 27, 30, and 34

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, testimony that similar land had been sold for a certain price.
Appellee’s expert witness, a land appraiser, was permitted to testify on direct examination that certain allegedly similar and comparable tracts of land had been sold for certain prices. For example, the witness testified that, in his appraisal of the lands of appellant, the witness had considered a sale of other .land, one hundred acres, sold in 1961 by Mary Catherine Storrs Jackson, grantor, to Ralph Bryant and E. C. Mercer, grantees. The evidence is clear that the witness did not participate in the sale and his only knowledge of the price paid by the grantees is derived from what someone told the witness or what the witness learned by looking at the record where the deed from Jackson to Bryant and Mercer is recorded in the office of the judge of probate.
The ruling complained of in Assignment 25, which relates to the Jackson sale, appears in the transcript as follows:
“Q Thank you, sir. Now, what was the sales price of that property ?
“MR. GEORGE P. HOWARD: We object to that, if Your Honor please, on the grounds that it calls for hearsay; on the grounds that it is not shown; he is not shown to have had actual knowledge of it; on the grounds that the land hasn’t been shown to have been comparable land, similarly situated on the ground; that it hasn’t been shown to be a voluntary, free sale; on the grounds that he has no personal knowledge of this sale, by his own testimony.
“THE COURT: Well, the thing that’s worrying the Court about it, just to be frank with you, is------which is the date of the sale ?
“MR. JESSE S. VOGTLE, (CONTINUING.)
“Q What is the date of the sale ?
“A March the 30th., 1961.
“THE COURT: I’ll overrulé your objection.
*36“MR. GEORGE P. HOWARD: Reserve an exception.
“MR. JESSE S. VOGTLE, (CONTINUING.)
“Q If you would, state the consideration of that, please, sir ?
“A The deed consideration states Twenty Thousand Dollars. My--------
“MR. GEORGE P. HOWARD: Now, if Your Honor please, we move that that ______we object to that part of it as not being responsive, what part the consideration shows on the deed------
“MR. JESSE S. VOGTLE: Well, he wasn’t through answering the question, Your Honor. He was------
“THE COURT: Let him answer the question, and then object, or move to exclude it.
“MR. GEORGE P. HOWARD: All right, sir.
“MR. JESSE S. VOGTLE, (CONTINUING.)
“THE WITNESS: In my investigation of this transaction, it showed that an additional One Thousand Dollars was paid to a tenant, who had a prior interest in the form of a Lessee’s interest, on this property, so the total purchase price for the one hundred acres was Twenty-One Thousand Dollars, confirmed by the grantee.”
The condemnor argues that the hearsay testimony as to sales price is admissible because a party should be permitted to show by the expert witness the basis on which he arrived at his opinion of value. Under the so-called Texas rule, some courts so hold. Some of the federal circuits appear to hold that the trial court has discretion to admit hearsay sales price testimony. A most helpful annotation on the question appears in 95 A.L.R.2d 1218.
. . . ‘As a general proposition, what one man says not upon oath, can not be evidence against another man. . . . . ’ ” Mobile & Montgomery Railroad Co. v. Ashcraft, 48 Ala. 15, 30.
A further objection to hearsay is the absence of opportunity to cross-examine the person who allegedly made the hearsay statement.
A number of courts have held that testimony by an expert witness stating the sales price of comparable land is not admissible on direct examination where the testimony is founded on hearsay.
An Ohio court said:
“In examining the record, we find that in one instance a witness for the Commission, — Mayer,.—testified on direct examination as to the sale of twenty-five acres on Bryne Road, the record showing that the witness based his testimony on tax stamps affixed to the deed. We have previously ruled that such testimony predicated solely upon examination of tax stamps is inadmissible.” (Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 124 N.E.2d at 434) “In Re Appropriation of Property of Ellis (1955, App.) 70 Ohio L.Abs. 417, 124 N.E.2d 424, revd. on other grounds in Re Ohio Turnpike Com., 164 Ohio St. 377, 58 Ohio Ops. 179, 131 N.E.2d 397, app. dismd. and cert. den. Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Com., 352 U.S. 806, 1 L.Ed.2d 39, 77 S.Ct. 51, reh. den. 352 U.S. 945, 1 L.Ed.2d 240, 77 S.Ct. 260.” (95 A.L.R.2d 1221)
The Supreme Court of Colorado has said:
“Counsel for the city complain that its expert witnesses were not permitted to testify as to the amounts of the considerations recited in recorded deeds between third persons covering property in the vicinity allegedly similar to that of defendants, or as shown by the revenue stamps affixed thereto, or gained by them from conversations with third parties who were not witnesses, as partially showing the basis upon which such witnesses arrived at their estimates of the *37market value of the lands taken. This contention is without merit. ‘Proof of sales must be made by witnesses testifying directly to the facts, not by the consideration recited in deeds between third parties.’ Lewis on Eminent Domain, 3d ed. vol. 2, page 1143, § 662. See, also, Central R. R. Co. v. State Tax Dept., 112 N.J.L. 5, 169 A. 489; Rose v. City of Taunton, 119 Mass. 99, and O’Hare v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 139 Ill. 151, 28 N.E. 923. ‘A witness who has given his opinion as to value may state the reasons for his opinion, and he may of course state as such reasons any circumstances which he would be allowed to give in evidence as independent facts; but he cannot under the guise of fortifying his opinion state to the jury any facts which, either because the facts themselves are not relevant or because his knowledge of the facts is entirely based on hearsay, are themselves inadmissible.’ Nichols on Eminent Domain, 2d Ed., vol. 2, p. 1188, § 453.” City and County of Denver v. Quick, 108 Colo. 111, 113 P. 2d 999, 134 A.L.R. 1120, 1124, 1125.
The Georgia Court of Appeals said :
“Condemnee objected to the allowance of such evidence upon the ground that it would be hearsay. The court sustained the objection, and special ground 2 of the motion for new trial assigns this ruling as error upon the ground that ‘[t]he exclusion of said evidence prevented movant from showing the value of comparable lands for their [the jury’s] consideration in arriving at the market value of the land sought to be condemned.’
“The court did not commit error. We do not have involved here the rule announced in Garner v. Gwinnett County, 105 Ga.App. 714, 125 S.E.2d 563; Gulf Refining Co. v. Smith, 164 Ga. 811(4), 139 S.E. 716; and Landrum v. Swann, 8 Ga.App. 209, 68 S.E. 862, that a witness may give his opinion as to the value of property although his testimony rests upon hearsay. Nor do we have a ruling which prevented the condemnor from showing by competent evidence the value of lands similar to thát being condemned. (Citations Omitted) But we are concerned with the question of who is a proper person to testify to the facts sought to be elicited from this witness. While this witness, who was qualified as an expert, could give his opinion as to the value of the property based upon his investigation, although his opinion may have been formed on the basis of hearsay, he could not testify as a fact that a specific piece of property comparable to the condemnee’s property was sold at a certain amount when he had no actual knowledge of such fact except what someone, not a party to the suit, told him. It follows, of course, that a witness must have actual knowledge of a fact before it is proper to allow him to testify positively as to the existence of such fact. Code § 38-301. Special ground 2 is not meritorious.” State Highway Department v. Wilkes, 106 Ga. App. 634, 636, 637, 127 S.E.2d 715, 717.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa- . chusetts said:
“A real estate witness, called by the Authority, who, from the record, does not appear to have had special experience in. determining the value of the type of camp property here involved, was permitted to testify to the limited value of the property for conventional residential purposes. No objection was made to the admission of this evidence, but exception was taken to his being allowed to give the price at which a nearby property (not shown to have been similarly used for camp purposes) had been sold in 1951, at least three years before the taking, because the witness had only hearsay knowledge of the price paid in a transaction in Which he had not participated. Although an expert witness may give the reasons for his opinion, even if gained from hearsay, Davenport v. Haskell, 293 Mass. 454, 459, 200 N.E. 409, this should be done in such terms that inadmissible hearsay is not introduced in *38a manner prejudicial to a party. Without producing a party to the sale, who could be subjected to cross-examination, direct testimony about the terms of a particular transaction should not have been admitted over objection. See Hunt v. City of Boston, 152 Mass. 168, 171, 25 N.E. 82; Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 195 Mass. 100, 108, 80 N.E. 799. See also by analogy Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 514, 519-520, 109 N.E.2d 148.” Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 335 Mass. 189, 199, 138 N.E.2d 769, 776.
I am of opinion that the holding of the courts whom I have quoted is supported by the better reasoning.
We are not here concerned with testimony of an expert trading in a fungible commodity such as cotton, as in Burks v. Hubbard, 69 Ala. 379.
There is a statement near the end of the opinion in State v. Sharp, 278 Ala. 668, 670, 180 So.2d 264, 266, that “ . . . . we have held that on the question of admissibility of evidence of the sales prices of other lands voluntarily sold and the question of similarity, much must be left to the discretion of the trial court. Popwell v. Shelby County, 272 Ala. 287, 130 So.2d 170, 87 A.L.R.2d 1148.”
Sharp cannot be authority that hearsay sales price evidence is admissible because only one assignment of error was argued in Sharp, that assignment was that the trial court erred in sustaining objection to an' exhibit offered by appellant, and this court affirmed.
In Popwell, no question was presented as to the admissibility of hearsay sales price evidence. This court, citing Southern Electric Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 269 Ala. 9, 110 So.2d 308, did say “. . . . that on the question of similarity much must be left to the discretion of the trial court . . . .” (272 Ala. at 292, 293, 130 So.2d at 175), but nothing was said relating to the admissibility of evidence to prove the actual price for which similar lands had been sold.
In Leibacher, the court held in paragraphs [19, 20] and [24] that the trial court was not in error in sustaining objection to questions, propounded to the condemnee and his wife, seeking to show the price that the condemnee had paid for the condemned property ten years prior to the taking. Leibacher is not contrary to what I have said here.
I am of opinion that the rulings complained of in Assignments 25, 27, 30, and 34 were error.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and McCALL, J., concur.

Assignments 29 and 37

Over appellant’s objection, the court permitted appellee to introduce into evidence a copy of the record of the deed executed by Mary Catherine Storrs Jackson to Bryant and Mercer in the sale mentioned above, and also a copy of the record of another deed showing a sale of other allegedly similar land by strangers to this suit. The judge of probate certified that these exhibits were true and correct copies of the records in his office.
In a Rhode Island tax assessment case, the value of certain land was the point in issue. On this issue, the trial judge considered evidence as to the amount of revenue stamps placed on certain deeds evidencing sales of other tracts of similar land. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that this was not reversible error because, in respect to four of the sales, the broker who conducted them testified of his own knowledge as to the amount of the consideration in each case and the testimony as to the revenue stamps did not sufficiently prejudice appellant so as to require reversal. The court did hold that considering the evidence as to revenue stamps was erroneous and had this to say:
“For the purpose of establishing the consideration paid in sales of a number of *39other estates of the same general character as that of the petitioner within a year of the assessment, the justice considered evidence as to the amount of revenue stamps which had been placed on the deeds evidencing those transactions. These rulings were erroneous. Evidence as to the acts of strangers to this proceeding is not competent to affect the rights of the respondents. If the sales were fair and made in a fair market it would be proper to show the price for which such sales had been made, as bearing upon the question of the market value of the petitioner’s estate. This should be by means of sworn evidence from witnesses having a knowledge of the transactions, who would be subject to cross-examination.
“The rulings of the justice in this regard are not supported by a presumption that the persons placing the revenue stamps upon the deeds were strictly complying with the federal revenue laws. .” Aspegren v. Tax Assessors of City of Newport (R.I.), 125 A. .213, 215.
In the instant case, the recital of the consideration in the copy of the deed received in evidence is nothing more than a statement by the party signing the deed that the consideration was the recited number of dollars. The parties to the deed are not parties to this suit nor in privity with the appellant. The party signing the deed was not available for cross-examination by appellant. I have already undertaken to show that testimony, to the effect that a person not present in court had made oral statements stating the sales price, is hearsay and not admissible. It would not have been permissible for appellee’s witnesses to testify as to the ex parte oral statements of the parties who signed the deeds “. . . . and ‘a statement otherwise objectionable as hearsay does not become competent because it has been reduced to writing.’ 31 C.J.S. Evidence, § 194, page 930; Ex parte McLendon, 239 Ala. 564, 195 So. 733; Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Williams, 230 Ala. 681, 163 So. 321.” Thornton v. City of Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651, 655, 35 So.2d 545, 547, 7 A.L.R.2d 773.
I am of opinion that admission of the copies of the deeds was error.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON, J., concur.