Court Opinion

ID: 9744172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:55:17.308968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:47.184506
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent from the majority opinion in its entirety in this cause. The holding of the majority will frustrate and confound trial courts in their efforts to implement the insanity issue in criminal trials, and render it impossible for them to effectively present this issue to the jury.
Appellant McCall has never claimed, nor is there any evidence, that he refused to cooperate with the court-appointed psychiatrists because of his alleged insanity or incompetence. In fact, the evidence was to the contrary. Both expert witnesses testified that the defendant refused to have anything to do with them. Both of them were able to testify that, because they had examined him on previous occasions concerning another case, and because they were able to look at hospital records, it was their opinion that he was sane at the time he committed the crime. Appellant did not address this issue and attempt to show the trial court or this Court that the reason for his obstreperous conduct toward the expert witnesses was based on an insane condition that prevented him from acting rationally, so that it might be said that his very refusal was evidence of his insanity.
The appellant made an offer to prove which was directed to the proposed testimony of Rev. Ludwig and was as follows:
“Your Honor, at this time I’d like to make an offer to prove what Rev. Ludwig would have testified to. . . .1 would like to prove, make an offer that Rev. Ludwig had various conferences with Bill McCall, has known Bill McCall for thirteen years, has helped the family at various times from the time Bill McCall was a minor through his Army time, after he returned home from the Army he had many interviews and consultations with Rev. Ludwig. At no time do I think Rev. Ludwig would testify that he was not paid for this. He would also testify to the fact that Bill McCall’s intellectual ability in his opinion was extremely low. That he had a very insecure emotional life . .; that Bill McCall was twice married, once to a woman he met in one week, therefore showing a limit to his capabilities to form responsible actions. And that the personality of Bill McCall was one of a child who never grew up, either emotionally or intellectually. That Bill McCall could not conform to the conduct of law, and that at the time he did not know right from wrong. And that he saw Bill McCall two weeks before the time of the incident. Bill McCall came to him for help.
That Bill McCall was unstable, easily influenced, easily led, and had come to Rev. Ludwig on many occasions for advice as to what were the right and wrong actions to take on various occasions. And that Rev. Ludwig in his opinion would find Bill McCall not able to conform his actions to law.
Record at 916-17. This testimony of Ludwig is obviously the typical testimony of an expert witness relating to the defendant’s *1224ability to conform his conduct to the law and to know right from wrong at the time he committed the crime. The proffered testimony concerns the issue the two psychiatrists were appointed to inquire into and testify to. The presentation of their testimony sets the stage for placing the insanity issue before the jury. The fact that the court-appointed psychiatrists were able to give opinions as to McCall’s sanity does not support appellant’s contention that he had a right to proceed with his own evidence concerning his sanity. The effect of the testimony of these two witnesses was that, from their past observations, and those made at the time they confronted him and attempted to question him, they concluded he was sane. However, the weight of their testimony in this case was severely weakened by their inability to examine him at all regarding the facts and circumstances of this incident, and the jury was thus deprived of expert testimony concerning this ease. A jury will be deprived in this manner the vast majority of times a defendant refuses to cooperate with witnesses called by the court, because in most cases the court-appointed psychiatrists would not have previously examined the defendant and formulated an opinion so that they could meaningfully testify. Yet, the majority opinion condones this situation, and further allows the defendant to bring witnesses of his own who will testify that he was insane when the crime was committed.
The defense of insanity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the defendant to become an issue in the case. It is a humane provision of the law, responding to due process considerations for those who violate society’s laws, sometimes violently, not through criminal or irresponsible abandon, but because of the infirmity of a mentally diseased or defective mind. Persons found to be in such a state are not required by society to suffer the criminal penalty for their acts, but are referred to the civil side of the docket for commitment to mental institutions for medical treatment and safe-keeping. The legislature provided for the manner in which such a plea should be advanced and the procedure to be followed in presenting the issue. Ind. Code § 35-5-2-2 et seq. (Burns 1975). These provisions have been placed in our law for the benefit of this defendant and others who claim their acts were prompted by insanity.
The defendant in this case called upon this special plea to present his defense in the case, and then refused to follow the provisions set out for the implementation of this defense. Again, I emphasize there was no showing, nor any attempt to show, that the actions of the defendant in refusing to cooperate were caused by the infirmity of a mental disease or defect. If there had been evidence that the defendant, at the very time he refused to cooperate, was insane and that his acts of refusal were based on insanity, that, of course, would be competent evidence to be presented to the jury for their consideration, along with all other evidence on the question of sanity. That is not the case before us. The majority opinion allows a defendant to call on the plea of insanity, refuse to cooperate in any way with the court-appointed expert witnesses, and then “have his cake and eat it too,” by calling his witnesses, who will testify that he was insane when he committed the crime. Such a tactic allows a defendant to frustrate and prostitute humane and sound principles of law, and places the trial courts of this State in a position of being unable to meaningfully and effectively present before the jury the question of the defendant’s sanity.
The majority attempts to comfort us by stating that all that needs to be done is to have the trial judge tell the jury that the defendant refused to cooperate with the expert witnesses, and then leave it to the jury to decide whether or not that refusal was based on insanity. In the first place, this admonishment will give the jury nothing to use as a basis for determining why or under what circumstances the defendant refused to cooperate, and thereby leave them to speculate on the reason. Secondly, the judge’s statement concerning the defendant’s actions would not be evidence and would not be useful at all to the jury in making their decision on the question of the defendant’s sanity. There is little comfort, then, in this suggested procedure.
*1225The trial court’s refusal of appellants tender of evidence in regard to his sanity was not so much a sanction as it was a provision that if the defendant refused to follow the procedure set down in the law for the presentation of the insanity issue, then neither would he be permitted to offer any expert testimony on that subject. I think this was a proper posture for the court to take, and, in part, is the posture taken by Lee v. County Court of Erie County, (1971) 27 N.Y.2d 432, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, 267 N.E.2d 452, cert. denied 404 U.S. 823, 92 S.Ct. 46, 30 L.Ed.2d 50, of which I approve and which the majority has rejected. It is also consistent with our holding in State ex rel. Kiritsis v. Marion Probate Court, (1978) Ind., 381 N.E.2d 1245.
I further disagree with the majority in its assessment that Ludwig, in fact, would have been a lay witness. Moreover, I believe that even if he would have been a lay witness, the court properly refused his testimony. If the defendant refused to have the issue of insanity presented accordingly to statute by the court-appointed psychiatrists, then I think the court could have properly foreclosed him from presenting any evidence on that subject. Secondly, there is no way under the law that the proffered testimony of Ludwig, as presented in the offer to prove, could have been presented as lay testimony. As the experts quoted in the majority opinion provide, a lay witness can only testify as to the facts on which he speaks, and then only on his observations or that which he has gained through his senses. This witness had not seen the defendant for two weeks. According to the offer to prove, Ludwig would have testified that, based on his previous counselling with the appellant, it was his opinion appellant could not conform his conduct to the law and was not able to discern right from wrong. A lay witness is not competent to testify to this. A lay witness could testify that, as he observed the defendant, it appeared to him that the defendant did not act normally or that he showed some emotion or lack of emotion, or something otherwise apparent and observable by any other person. Whether these observations lead one to conclude that the defendant was legally insane is an area for the trier of fact to determine, not the lay witness giving the testimony.
Before Ludwig could testify to the matters stated in the offer to prove, he would have had to have been qualified as an expert witness to the satisfaction of the court. It appears that, based on his education and experience, he did have such qualifications, and as a matter of fact, the trial court indicated that it considered him to be an expert witness. Lay witnesses are usually people who are near the defendant at or near the time of the occurrence of the crime, such as neighbors, family members, police officers, ambulance drivers, or other eyewitnesses who testify as to what they observed about the defendant. These witnesses are not permitted to go in to a psychological or psychiatric analysis of the defendant’s mental stability, but only to recite their observations, so that the jury might make this decision.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
GIVAN, C. J., concurs.