Court Opinion

ID: 9772078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:06:56.071604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:41.958430
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice.
I respectfully dissent.
The developer claims paragraph eight set out in the Court’s opinion as his authority to disapprove the Davises’ plans. Essentially, his testimony, and appellees’ argument, is that Northwest Hills has been developed pursuant to a general plan or scheme to insure a residential area of “high standards,” and that appellants’ placement far back on the lot would not be compatible with the area. There is no evidence that the Davis house would not be constructed of the “highest standards.”
The question for our determination is whether paragraph number eight can justify restrictions as to setback more burdensome than those contained in the seventh paragraph also set out in the Court’s opinion. I would hold that it cannot.
The trial court submitted two special issues to the jury. The first was: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the developer of Northwest Hills, in refusing to approve the Davis plans and plot plan, acted reasonably and in pursuance of a general plan or scheme to insure the development of the subdivision as a residential area of higher standards?” The answer was: “We do.”
The other special issues submitted was: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the only reason considered by the developer in refusing to approve the Davis’ plans and plot plan was the effect of the Davis’ house upon the view from the Huey house?” The answer was: “We do not.”
Along with the jury’s answers to special issues, the trial court also filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court found that the developer is “entitled to refuse plans and plot plans provided he acts in good faith and has reasonable grounds which help insure the development of the subdivision as a residential area of high standards.”
When restrictive covenants are imposed pursuant to a general scheme or plan, and the elements of the plan are secured by covenants embodying the restrictions, the *958covenants are valid and binding on the developer and all purchasers of lots. Huey v. Davis, 556 S.W.2d at 863; Curlee v. Walker, 112 Tex. 40, 244 S.W. 497 (1922). We are still in agreement with this general principle.
In disapproving plans because they do not conform to a general plan or scheme, the developer must act in good faith, and be able to specify the reason for disapproval. This is so because of the general rule that restrictions are construed strictly in favor of the grantee and against the grantor and in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the land. MacDonald v. Painter, 441 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.1969). If the developer is able to show by the evidence that a general plan or scheme was adopted, and further demonstrates that approval was denied because of a deviation from the general scheme, then the developer’s action will not be disturbed.
Keeping in mind the general theory stated above, I have reviewed the evidence and am convinced that the only reason that approval was denied in this case was due to the proposed placement of the Davises’ house on their lot. David Barrow, one of the developers, repeatedly testified that the plans would have been approved were it not for the placement of the house. He said that the design, materials and the appearance of the house were in conformity with a residential area of high standards, and that the only problem with the house was “the position of it.” There is no evidence that appellants deviated in any manner from a general plan or scheme, with the possible exception of placement, which will not justify disapproval in this case.
Paragraph seven of the restrictive covenants contains specific restrictions as to the placement of the house on the lot. The Davises conformed to those limitations. I would conclude that the eighth paragraph cannot justify restrictions as to placement which cancel out the specific restrictions of the seventh paragraph.
In Johnson v. Dick, 281 S.W.2d 171 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1955, no writ), an architectural control committee set aside the requirements of a restrictive covenant by decreasing the setback restriction. Speaking of the authority of the committee, the court stated, “While it is authorized to determine whether or not a proposed structure complies with the general scheme of development adopted for the subdivision, it is not empowered to write new restrictive covenants, nor to cancel out and obliterate existing ones.” 281 S.W.2d at 175.
The leading ease of Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 34 Cal.2d 442, 211 P.2d 302 (1949), which was cited in this Court’s previous opinion, also stands for the proposition that the developer may deny permission only where there are no other specific restrictions which could provide a framework within which the right to approve plans could be said to be confined.
By ordering the Davises to build their home eighteen feet further from the rear line and four feet further from the Huey residence, the developer was necessarily varying the minimum setbacks of paragraph seven, and placing a more burdensome restriction on the Davises’ use of their land. To hold otherwise would be in contradiction of the well-recognized principle that restrictive covenants are construed strictly against the grantor and in favor of the free use of the land. MacDonald v. Painter, supra; Johnson v. Wellborn, 181 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1944, writ ref’d w. o. m.).
Another case directly on point is Bass v. Helseth, 116 Cal.App.2d 75, 253 P.2d 525 (Cal.App.1953).1 Here one restrictive covenant gave a free right of approval to the developer and another covenant contained specific provisions as to location of the buildings on the lots. The court held that *959the covenant giving a free right of approval could not justify restrictions more burdensome than those contained in another covenant.
Consequently, the answers to special issues numbers 1 and 2 will not support a judgment in this case.
I would hold that the developer exceeded his authority in disapproving the Davises’ plans because to do so burdened the Davis-es’ use of their land beyond the restrictions of paragraph seven.
. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment dissolving the permanent injunction.

. Also in accord is Lushing v. Riviera Estates Association, 196 Cal.App.2d 687, 16 Cal.Rptr. 763 (1961) (holding that where restrictions themselves give definition to building site, developer cannot add to that definition).