Court Opinion

ID: 9692014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:36:39.920886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:29.798062
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
The Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person on the basis of race with respect to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Minn.Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2(3) (2008). The MHRA also prohibits an employer from engaging in any reprisal against any person because that person opposed a practice forbidden under the MHRA. MinmStat. § 363A.15(1) (2008). The court holds that “Capella’s decision not to place L.A. on a PIP cannot reasonably be believed to constitute an adverse employment action against L.A. or other employees.” While I agree that not placing L.A. on a PIP cannot reasonably be believed to constitute an adverse employment action against L.A., I would hold that Bahr has alleged a viable reprisal claim based on her claim that she opposed Capella’s discrimination against employees other than L.A.
Bahr complains that Capella asked her to depart from standard performance improvement methods with L.A., which was not done with any other employees. Specifically, Bahr was instructed to “move slowly” in the review process to “minimize the performance issues raised” in the review and to allow the legal department to review L.A.’s performance review before showing it to L.A. All of these actions benefited L.A. Generally, to prevail on an employment discrimination claim, the employer must have taken some adverse employment action against the employee. Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn.2001). Because Capella’s actions with respect to L.A. benefited L.A., there was no basis for Bahr to believe that Capella had taken any adverse employment action against L.A. resulting in employment discrimination. Although Bahr had no basis to believe that Capella had engaged in employment discrimination against L.A., Bahr may have reasonably believed that Capella’s race-based preferential treatment of L.A., constituted reverse discrimination against Capella’s non-black employees who were subject to all of Capella’s performance and disciplinary standards. Therefore, I would hold that Bahr stated a sufficient retaliation claim with respect to Cappella’s alleged discrimination against employees other than L.A. and would remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.