Court Opinion

ID: 9941294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:14:20.643988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:30.523851
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                          NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                   Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2022-CA-1225-MR

MAC SAWYERS                                                                     APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  HONORABLE MITCHELL PERRY, JUDGE
                           ACTION NO. 19-CI-007889

LOUISVILLE JEFFERSON COUNTY
METRO GOVERNMENT OFFICES
OF PLANNING & DESIGN
SERVICES; DEVELOP LOUISVILLE;
AND LOUISVILLE JEFFERSON
COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT
BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENTS                                                      APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                           REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Mac Sawyer1 has appealed from the opinion and order of

the Jefferson Circuit Court upholding a decision of the Louisville Metro Board of

1
  The appellant’s last name is listed as Sawyer or Sawyers throughout the record, including the
notice of appeal, where it is listed as Sawyer in the caption and Sawyers in the body. We shall
refer to him as Sawyer in this Opinion as that is the version used in his appellate brief.
Zoning Adjustment (the Board) affirming the denial of Sawyer’s application to

declare his nonresidential use of property on National Turnpike as a legal,

nonconforming use due to a lack of continuous use since 1943. Because we hold

that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and that the circuit court erred in affirming,

we reverse and remand.

             In May 2019, Sawyer filed a Nonconforming Rights Application with

the Louisville Metro Planning & Design Services regarding the use of his property

at 9705 National Turnpike in Louisville, Kentucky, which was zoned residential.

He described his nonconforming use as follows:

             The use is commercial/industrial property used to store
             house and building moving equipment, including, but not
             limited to, backhoes, trucks, trailers, cribbing, timber,
             pipes and other related equipment stored over the entire
             lot, storage of general contracting equipment, including,
             but not limited to, construction supplies, heavy
             equipment, tools, machines, etc., storage and dispatch of
             carpet cleaning vans and carpet cleaning equipment. In
             the front portion and garage there are jacks, jacking
             machines, blacksmith supplies, and [a] blacksmith shop.

Included with his application were affidavits, maps, permits, and photos of

equipment storage, job sites, workers, transport, completed jobs, blacksmith work,

and steel and equipment handling “showing that the property has been used as

commercial/industrial property since the 1930s.” He claimed these documents

established that the property never stopped being used commercially.

                                         -2-
             Sawyer attached his own affidavit, outlining his use and ownership of

the property since the 1970s, including his interactions with the Metro Government

employees, as well as the use by prior owners. He also included a chronology of

prior owners back to 1933 and witnesses who remembered that “maybe as early as

1937” a business buying and selling steel had been operated at the property, along

with supporting affidavits.

             The record contains e-mail communications from and between city

planners. Associate planner Nia Holt sent an e-mail on May 24, 2019, as follows:

             The applicant is requesting commercial uses (carpet
             cleaning, blacksmith shop, & house moving businesses
             [storage yard and contractor shop written onto printed out
             message]) and the equipment storage associated with the
             commercial uses in the R-4 zoning district. The property
             is located outside of the original city and the applicant
             was required to provide evidence going back to 1943.
             PVA list the property as single-family residence. Zoning
             maps from the 40s list the subject property as zoning
             class “A – One Family District.” Later zoning maps
             from the 1960s and 1990s list the property as R-4. The
             Directories show a listing of the business or the property
             owner listed in the deeds provided from 2000, 1998,
             1993, 1991, 1985, 1975, 1972, 1971, and 1963. The
             aerial maps from [sic] do not show outdoor storage until
             the 1980s.

             The applicant states in the application that he has lived
             and work[ed] out of this property for over 40 years (see
             attached timeline). He rented from the previous owner
             before he bought the house and all the businesses on the
             property (see attached affidavit). Affidavits from
             neighboring property owners state that the property has
             been used both as a residence and a business since the

                                        -3-
             late ‘30s/early 40s. The applicant has provided pictures
             from dating back to the 1960s of the various businesses
             that have been based on the property and its workers.
             There are also records (invoices, tax forms, work orders,
             etc.) of the business going back to the 1970s. I have
             attached the summary of the documents. I have the entire
             binder in my office if you would like to see in the
             information.

And on June 6, 2019, Ms. Holt sent an e-mail to Sawyer:

             We have reviewed the materials submitted for this case.
             We cannot identify a specific use that can be consistently
             dated back nor conclusive evidence to support
             nonconforming rights to 1943. The team of senior
             planners have determined that this case cannot be
             approved at staff level and you will need to appeal to the
             Board of Zoning Adjustment (BOZA). The first step is
             to tell us the exact land use or uses from the Louisville
             Metro Land Development Code (LDC) you are
             requesting nonconforming rights for so we can respond
             to that use(s) request in our letter response. This way
             you will have already identified the uses you are
             appealing BOZA for. If you are requesting more than
             one use in your appeal you must submit a plan that shows
             where on the property each land use is located. I have
             attached the appropriate section of the LDC and the
             appeal application for your convenience.

             On August 9, 2019, Chris French, a Planning & Design Supervisor,

sent a letter to Sawyer providing him with notice that he had not established the

nonconforming use rights for a blacksmith and contractor’s shop with a storage

yard for 9705 National Turnpike. Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)

100.257, Sawyer appealed to the Board. In his appeal, Sawyer maintained that he

had conclusively proven the requisite commercial and industrial use of his property

                                        -4-
since the 1930s. Further, alleging that an employee of the agency, April Robbins,

had previously determined that the property was nonconforming, Sawyer argued

the agency should not be permitted to arbitrarily reach a contrary result.

             Prior to the public hearing, a Staff Report was completed, which

included a summary of the case, an analysis of the issues, and a conclusion:

             STAFF ANALYSIS/FINDINGS

             ....

             The Appellant provided extensive documentation related
             to his ownership and use of the property for non-
             residential activities related to uses that fit the M-2
             zoning category under a blacksmith, contractor’s shop,
             and storage yard. However, affidavits from some
             neighboring property owners, nearby business owners,
             and relatives of previous owners is the only information
             that was provided for the time period prior to the 1960s.
             Staff looked at the files within the Office of Planning and
             Design Services and could not find any information
             regarding the use of the property as a blacksmith,
             contractor’s shop, or storage yard. Staff looked at an
             aerial photograph from the [sic] 1946 (Attachment 3)
             which does not show the storage of equipment, vehicles,
             or materials on the property as discussed in the affidavits.
             Without information to corroborate the affidavits staff
             cannot determine that the use existed on the property
             since 1943.

             In the Appellant[’]s basis of appeal, he lists information
             identified as zoning enforcement notes from previous
             zoning enforcement officers, which the Appellant is
             using to state that he had nonconforming rights; however,
             staff could not find documentation that the property was
             formally granted nonconforming rights. The former

                                         -5-
             zoning enforcement officers listed may not have had the
             authority to grant nonconforming rights.

             In addition, the Appellant asserts that he can satisfy that
             the use existed since the 1960s, but a requirement to go
             back to 1943 is a very high bar and that the affidavits
             submitted by individuals for the period preceding the
             1960s should be sufficient to grant nonconforming rights.

             Staff Conclusions

             Staff did not have sufficient information in the review of
             the nonconforming rights case that the nonresidential use
             existed on the property in 1943. The Appellant has not
             submitted additional information to change staff’s
             previous conclusion. Therefore, staff believes that the
             original decision was correct, and the property does not
             have established nonconforming rights for a blacksmith,
             contractor’s shop, and storage yard.

The report listed the two questions the Board had to determine as: 1) “Did the

nonresidential use (blacksmith, contractor’s shop, and storage yard) exist on the

property in 1943?” and 2) “If yes to question 1, did this use of the property

continue to the present day?”

             The Board held a public hearing on November 18, 2019, where

Sawyer appeared with his counsel, who called witnesses and set forth arguments

that the evidence supported a finding that the nonconforming use had been

continuous since prior to 1943. In rebuttal, French discussed that Sawyer’s

property had always been zoned residential. There had been proposed zoning as a

part of a study that showed the property could be zoned commercial/industrial, but

                                         -6-
an area-wide rezoning had never happened. French said that a staff supervisor had

reached out to April Robbins. She did not have any recollection of writing a letter

granting nonconforming rights. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board Chair

found that the nonconforming use has existed prior to 1943. However, she did not

conclude that it was continuous:

             Based on testimony I heard today, the present use did not
             continue to the present day because various people sold
             the property. No one gave us existing evidence as to how
             long the property was vacant or remained unused. So I’ll
             say the use was not continuous to the present day.

The minutes reflect that the Board found that the non-residential use (blacksmith,

contractor’s shop, and storage yard) may have existed on the property in 1943 but

that the use of the property did not continue to the present day. Therefore, the

Board upheld the administrative decision and denied Sawyer’s appeal.

             Sawyer filed a complaint with the Jefferson Circuit Court in

December 2019 against the Board and Louisville-Jefferson County Metro

Government, Office of Planning and Design Services Develop Louisville,

(collectively, the Metro Defendants or appellees) to appeal the Board’s November

18, 2019, decision pursuant to KRS 100.347(1).

             In his brief, Sawyer detailed the history of the property and the

evidence in the administrative record establishing the continuity of its use as

commercial/industrial. He discussed his 2007 interaction with Metro Government

                                         -7-
Inspector April Robbins, including the November 2007 letter and her notes in the

log. Sawyer argued that the Metro Defendants erred because they applied the

wrong standard of review in concluding an absence of nonconforming rights

pursuant to either KRS 100.253(1) or (3). The Board members failed to conduct a

careful review of the evidence due to the late receipt of the lengthy file and failed

to make sufficient factual findings regarding the lack of continuity of

nonconforming use. He argued that the court could not conduct a non-speculative

review of the Board’s decision absent more information about when the Board

thought the use was non-continuous, when it ceased, and the evidence supporting

the conclusion. Sawyer urged the court to vacate the decision and remand with

instructions to better explain its decision or grant his application. Sawyer argued

that the decision was arbitrary as being against the weight of the substantial

evidence. In their responsive brief, the Metro Defendants argued that the Board’s

decision complied with due process and was supported by substantial evidence.

                 The circuit court heard arguments from the parties in July2 and entered

an opinion and order on September 19, 2022, affirming the Board’s decision. The

court held that the Board’s decision was based on substantial evidence and

therefore was not arbitrary, noting that the Board was “free to weigh the evidence

as it chooses within the bounds of due process and applicable law. The affidavits

2
    The video recording of the July 14, 2022, oral arguments is not in the certified record.

                                                  -8-
presented by Mr. Sawyer were given less weight by the Board because they were

from neighbors who gave general conclusions based on passing observations or

information obtained from relatives.” It also found no issue with the Board’s

adoption of and reliance on the Staff Report, holding that it was appropriate for the

Board to incorporate the report into its findings of fact. This appeal now follows.

             On appeal, Sawyer raises several issues related to the propriety of the

Board’s decision, including whether it was based upon substantial evidence,

whether his due process rights were violated, whether the Board should only have

considered whether there was continuous use since 2008, and whether the

doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, detrimental reliance, or laches should

apply.

             The Metro Defendants (now the appellees) contend that Sawyer failed

to preserve for our review his arguments related to continuous use since 2008 and

the application of various doctrines. We agree. While Sawyer alleged that he had

“reasonably relied” upon April Robbins’ determination that his use was a legal,

nonconforming use, he did not raise this issue, or any of these other arguments, in

his brief before the circuit court. Therefore, these arguments have not been

preserved for our review.

             “The appellate court reviews for errors, and a nonruling
             is not reviewable when the issue has not been presented
             to the trial court for decision.” Turner v. Commonwealth,
             460 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Ky. 1970); see also Hatton v.

                                          -9-
            Commonwealth, 409 S.W.2d 818, 819-20 (Ky. 1966).
            “[I]t is the accepted rule that a question of law which is
            not presented to or passed upon by the trial court cannot
            be raised here for the first time.” Hutchings v. Louisville
            Trust Co., 276 S.W.2d 461, 466 (Ky. 1955); Benefit
            Ass’n of Ry. Employees v. Secrest, 239 Ky. 400, 39
            S.W.2d 682, 687 (1931). “The underlying principle of
            the rule is to afford an opportunity to the trial court,
            before or during the trial or hearing, to rule upon the
            question raised.” Hartsock v. Commonwealth, 382
            S.W.2d 861, 864 (Ky. 1964).

                  Because this allegation of error was not properly
            presented or preserved in the trial court, it cannot serve as
            the basis of reversal on appeal.

Jones v. Livesay, 551 S.W.3d 47, 52-53 (Ky. App. 2018). We also agree with the

appellees that Sawyer failed to comply with Kentucky Rules of Appellate

Procedure (RAP) 32(A)(4) by including a statement at the beginning of each

argument referencing whether and how each issue was preserved. Accordingly, we

shall not consider these arguments.

            We shall now review the remaining arguments Sawyer has raised.

Our proper standard of review is set forth in Baesler v. Lexington-Fayette Urban

County Government, 237 S.W.3d 209 (Ky. App. 2007), as follows:

                   Judicial review of an administrative decision is
            concerned with whether the action of the agency was
            arbitrary. American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville
            and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm’n, 379
            S.W.2d 450, 456 (Ky. 1964). Three grounds exist for
            finding that an agency’s decision was arbitrary: (1) the
            agency acted in excess of its statutory powers, (2) the
            agency did not afford procedural due process, and (3) the

                                        -10-
             agency’s decision was not supported by substantial
             evidence. Id.

Baesler, 237 S.W.3d at 212.

             We shall first consider whether Sawyer’s due process rights were

violated.

             Procedural due process is required in proceedings before
             a zoning board. Morris v. City of Catlettsburg, Ky., 437
             S.W.2d 753 (1969). The requisite procedural elements
             are a hearing, the taking and weighing of evidence, a
             finding of fact based upon an evaluation of the evidence
             and conclusions supported by substantial evidence. [City
             of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 177 (Ky.
             1971)]. Proceedings before a Board of Zoning
             Adjustment were held to be a denial of procedural due
             process where there was no real hearing, no taking of
             evidence and no finding of fact. Morris, supra. A trial-
             type hearing is automatically required for disputes of
             adjudicative facts (as opposed to legislative facts).

                   It is beyond cavil that a hearing held for the
             purpose of granting and denying a zone change is of an
             adjudicatory nature. McDonald, supra.

Kaelin v. City of Louisville, 643 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Ky. 1982).

             In this argument, Sawyer contends that the Board members could not

have reviewed the more than 550 pages submitted prior to the hearing as these

documents were received shortly before the hearing and were only viewable on

their cell phones. But as the appellees point out, the vast majority of these

documents had been sent to the Board members prior to the date of the hearing.

The only additional documents sent the day of the hearing totaled about 11 pages,

                                         -11-
which included notes and correspondence from Ms. Robbins.3 We find no

infringement of Sawyer’s due process rights, as he was permitted to be heard,

presented evidence and testimony at the hearing, cross-examined opposing

witnesses, and the Board Chair provided her reasoning, albeit brief, for the denial

of the application.

              Next, we shall consider whether the circuit court properly determined

that the Board based its decision to deny the application on substantial evidence.

                     We first note that, “‘substantial evidence’ means
              evidence of substance and relevant consequence having
              the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of
              reasonable men.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v.
              Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998).
              Furthermore, “[t]he administrative agency’s findings will
              be upheld even though there exists evidence to the
              contrary in the record.” Kentucky Unemployment Ins.
              Comm’n v. Landmark Community Newspapers of
              Kentucky, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575, 578-79 (Ky. 2002).

Baesler, 237 S.W.3d at 213. And in Ball v. Oldham County Planning and Zoning

Commission, 375 S.W.3d 79 (Ky. App. 2012), this Court provided additional

guidance:

                     In weighing the substantiality of the evidence
              supporting an administrative decision, “a reviewing court
              must hold fast to the guiding principle that the trier of
              facts is afforded great latitude in its evaluation of the

3
 The record contains a November 18, 2019, email from attorney Nicholson to French informing
him that two attachments were missing from the statement of appeal – the Zoning and Inspection
Case Notes (11 pages) and Ms. Robbins’ November 16, 2007, letter to Laura Bailey (Sawyer’s
girlfriend who lived with him).

                                            -12-
             evidence heard and the credibility of witnesses appearing
             before it.” Bowling v. Natural Res. & Envtl. Prot.
             Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406, 409-10 (Ky. App. 1994).
             Thus, “although a reviewing court may arrive at a
             different conclusion than the trier of fact in its
             consideration of the evidence in the record, this does not
             necessarily deprive the agency’s decision of support by
             substantial evidence.” Id. at 410. Moreover, on
             determinations of fact “[t]he administrative agency’s
             findings will be upheld even though there exists evidence
             to the contrary in the record.” Kentucky Unemployment
             Ins. Comm’n v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of
             Kentucky, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Ky. 2002).
             Ultimately, this Court cannot substitute its judgment on a
             factual issue “unless the agency’s decision is arbitrary
             and capricious.” McManus v. Kentucky Ret. Sys., 124
             S.W.3d 454, 458 (Ky. App. 2003); see also Stout v.
             Jenkins, 268 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Ky. 1954).

Ball, 375 S.W.3d at 86.

             In KRS 100.253, the General Assembly set forth the basis to establish

a legal, nonconforming use, and that statute provides, in relevant part, that:

             (1) The lawful use of a building or premises, existing at
             the time of the adoption of any zoning regulations
             affecting it, may be continued, although such use does
             not conform to the provisions of such regulations, except
             as otherwise provided herein.

             (2) The board of adjustment shall not allow the
             enlargement or extension of a nonconforming use beyond
             the scope and area of its operation at the time the
             regulation which makes its use nonconforming was
             adopted, nor shall the board permit a change from one (1)
             nonconforming use to another unless the new
             nonconforming use is in the same or a more restrictive
             classification[.]

                                         -13-
Louisville and Jefferson County’s master plan for zoning was adopted in 1943, see

Louisville and Jefferson County Air Board v. Porter, 397 S.W.2d 146, 147 (Ky.

1965), meaning that to establish a legal, nonconforming use, an applicant must

prove that the use had been in existence and continuous since 1943.

             In the present case, the Board agreed with Sawyer that the

nonconforming use as a blacksmith, contractor’s shop, and storage yard had been

in existence since 1943. However, it disagreed that Sawyer had established that

this use had been continuous since that time because there was no evidence that the

use continued during the transfers in ownership. Sawyer argues that neither the

Board nor the circuit court considered whether the nonconforming use had been

abandoned for more than 12 months as set forth in the application and that the

Board had not identified a specific period of nonuse in its findings. He asserts that

there was no evidence that any prior owner had abandoned the nonconforming use.

             In support of this argument, Sawyer cites to Martin v. Beehan, 689

S.W.2d 29 (Ky. App. 1985), to assert that there was no evidence that any prior

owner had abandoned the nonconforming use for more than 12 months. While

Martin addressed the discontinuation period in Covington’s zoning code, not

Louisville’s, we note that the Nonconforming Rights Application contains a

section asking whether “[t]he use existed continuously on the property since the

time it became nonconforming, without an interruption of more than twelve (12)

                                        -14-
consecutive months.” Sawyer states there was no evidence of any specific period

when the property’s use as a commercial entity had been discontinued. Sawyer

also cites to City of Bowling Green v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 893, 894 (Ky. 1960), in

which the former Court of Appeals held that,

             [T]he “established use” of property referred to in the
             ordinance is not limited to the actual activities on the day
             of its enactment. It is well recognized that a temporary
             vacancy or non-user of the premises without evidence of
             an intention to abandon the non-conforming use does not
             extinguish it.

The Court concluded that a nine-month vacancy did not terminate the building’s

established commercial use. Id. Here, Sawyer asserts that it was enough that he

provided affidavits that established a continuous commercial use dating back to

prior to 1943 and that a single aerial photograph was not enough to prove that the

property had been abandoned for a period of more than 12 months.

             The appellees argue that Martin and Miller are distinguishable from

the present case because they address abandonment and a temporary vacancy

rather than whether a continuous use existed. They urge this Court to consider the

unreported decision in Louisville Metro Board of Zoning Adjustment v. A-1

Sanitation, No. 2007-CA-000484-MR, 2008 WL 399642, at *3 (Ky. App. Feb. 15,

2008), as it relates to the use of affidavits to establish continuous use:

                   The use of the property between 1953 and 1962
             was addressed only by the Halls’ affidavit statements that
             they knew the property had been “used continuously for

                                          -15-
            industrial purposes as long as [they could] remember,
            certainly at least from the mid-1940’s[,]” and by the
            BOZA staff report which stated that no information was
            found to show how the property was used before 1962.
            Even if the Halls’ statements could be found to indicate
            that, from the mid-1940’s forward, they were specifically
            aware of the alleged industrial use of the particular tract
            of property which they later purchased, rather than
            simply aware of the general use of property in that
            vicinity, no substantial evidence was adduced to show
            and compare the nature of the alleged industrial uses of
            the property before and after the 1953 rezoning. Thus,
            there was no showing that any nonconforming use of the
            property after 1953 was not an enlargement of the
            property’s prior use. KRS 100.253. Further, even if
            there was a permissible nonconforming use of the
            property between 1953 and 1962, no substantial evidence
            was adduced to show that the property’s nonconforming
            use after 1962 was not an enlargement or extension of
            any prior permissible nonconforming use. KRS
            100.253(2). Hence, appellees failed to meet their burden
            of providing substantial evidence to show that there was
            a continuous nonconforming use of the property after
            1953, and that they were entitled to continue such
            nonconforming use in accordance with the limitations of
            KRS 100.253.

            We are persuaded by Sawyer’s argument that there is not substantial

evidence in the record to support the Board’s finding that the use was not

continuous. We reach this decision based upon the way the Board answered the

two questions posed to it at the hearing. The Board answered “yes” to the question

as to whether the nonresidential use dated back to prior to 1943 when Louisville’s

zoning master plan was adopted. It then went on to answer “no” to the second

question as to whether this commercial use was continuous from that time. We

                                        -16-
agree with Sawyer that the 1946 photo filed with the Staff Report, which appears

to show that nothing was being stored on the property at that time, was not enough

to establish that the use had been discontinued for an adequate period of time to

deem the use as having been abandoned.

                 In addition, two affidavits from Larry Kettler from 2007 and 2019

establish that the commercial use was continuous when the property was

transferred to each new owner. Mr. Kettler stated that James Gibson used the

property to store steel and equipment from the early 1940s until the mid-1950s

when he sold the business to Alex Shepherd. Mr. Shepherd continued operating

the business in the same manner. In 1956, Joe Masterson purchased the business

and the property, and he did blacksmith work, worked with steel, and operated a

retail shop. He also rented space to Herman Slaughter, who had been using the

back acreage to store steel, trucks, and equipment. In 1970, Sawyer purchased the

house moving business from Mr. Slaughter and later purchased the property from

Harold Taylor,4 who had been running a carpet cleaning company from the

property.

                 The Staff Report relied upon the 1946 aerial photograph to support the

assertion that the nonconforming use had not existed in 1943. However, the Board

disagreed with this assertion in answering “yes” to the first question as to whether

4
    Sawyer stated that Masterson sold the property to Taylor in 1973.

                                                -17-
a nonconforming use dated back to 1943. This photo, without another one to

compare it to, cannot establish that the nonconforming use had stopped for any

period of time sufficient to constitute an abandonment. We note that in A-1

Sanitation, supra, the affidavits at issue were from the property owners. Here,

Sawyer submitted affidavits from neighbors and did not rely solely upon his own

sworn testimony. While the Board was certainly able to weigh the evidence as it

chose, there was not substantial evidence in the record to support its finding that

the nonconforming use had not been continuous. Mr. Kettler’s affidavits, as well

as other affidavits filed in the record, certainly established continuous use. Had the

Board found that the nonconforming use did not exist prior to 1943, the result

would be different. Accordingly, we must hold that the Board’s denial of Sawyer’s

application was arbitrary and that the circuit court erred in affirming that decision.

             For the foregoing reasons, the Jefferson Circuit Court’s September 19,

2022, opinion is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings in

accordance with this Opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -18-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Alan S. Rubin             Michael J. O’Connell
Louisville, Kentucky      Jefferson County Attorney

                          Laura M. Ferguson
                          Travis J. Fiechter
                          Assistant Jefferson County Attorneys
                          Louisville, Kentucky

                        -19-