Court Opinion

ID: 9700028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:07:04.625009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:03.068785
License: Public Domain

Edwards, J.
(concurring). Douglas Crilly was at the time of this accident a minor 16 years of age. He had been employed by one Clarence Ballou who, according to the record, was subcontractor of defendant Sam B. "Wisdom, doing business as Wisdom Booting & Siding, and insured by defendant Travelers Insurance Company.
Ballou apparently employed several boys, including plaintiff and his own stepson Arthur Wozniak, aged about 16, to assist him in the application of siding on new house construction. Douglas Crilly worked in this relationship only 3 full days, on the last of which he received an injury to his right eye which subsequently occasioned the loss of industrial vision therein.
Both Arthur Wozniak and Douglas Crilly were at the time of the injury illegally employed by defend*335ant Ballon in that they were below 18 years of age, and that no work permit for either had been secured as required by PA 1947, No 157 (CL 1948, §409.1 et seq. [Stat Ann 1950 Bev § 17.701 et seq.\), commonly called the “ITittle act.”
After reviewing various conflicts in testimony as to how this injury occurred (it appearing that both hoys originally undertook to deny the horseplay which occasioned same), the majority of the appeal board entered the following finding:
“We find as follows: Douglas Crilly and Arthur Wozniak were engaged in playfully throwing objects at each other immediately preceding the injury of Douglas on July 9, 1953. During the course of such conduct a piece of shingle struck Douglas in the right eye inflicting serious injury and causing the loss of industrial vision in such eye. Douglas and Wozniak were engaged in horseplay which resulted in the injury. Ballou, their employer, had not condoned the horseplay. He had warned and instructed them against it. At the time the accidental injury occurred Ballou was outside the house and did not observe the particular incident. Douglas Crilly did not receive a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.”
This finding paralleled the finding of the referee.
Delbert Storie, member of the workmen’s compensation appeal board, filed a dissenting opinion, the essence of which may be summarized as follows:
“Employers who choose to reap the labors of these immature children and bring them together must accept as a responsibility such antics of immaturity. It is not enough for them to say they did not condone the acts. Employers who reap the bounties of our minor children’s labors must not he permitted to escape the responsibilities of injuries occurring because of the immature judgment of those they choose to employ. It is proper to assess the cost of such *336injuries to the products created by these minors’ labors.”
We are, of course, required to accept the findings of fact of the appeal board where there is evidence to sustain the same. CL 1948, § 413.12 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.186). It is, however, obvious that the majority of the appeal board felt constrained to enter their last finding, namely, that “Douglas Crilly did not receive a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment,” because of their preceding finding of fact that “Douglas and Wozniak were engaged in horseplay which resulted in the injury,” and the application thereto of previous decisions of this Court dealing with horseplay: Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co., 200 Mich 275 (LRA 1918E, 507); Jones v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 284 Mich 358; Derhammer v. Detroit News, 229 Mich 658; Steffes v. Ford Motor Co., 239 Mich 501.
These cases stand for a judicial restriction upon the effect of the workmen’s compensation statute generally, to the effect that injuries resulting from horseplay in the course ■ of employment cannot be regarded as compensable. We do not find any such limitation in the statute itself.
As to our current fact situation, there are 2 applicable statutory provisions: First, that of part 2,
“An employee who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment * * * shall be paid compensation.” CL 1948, § 412.1 (Stat Ann 195Ó Rev § 17.151).
The second provision is part 2, § 2:
“If the employee is injured by reason of his intentional and wilful misconduct, he shall not receive compensation under the provisions of this act.” CL 1948, § 412.2 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.152).
*337These 2 statutory tests are the controlling factors in this case. I concur with Mr. Justice Smith’s excellent discussion of the common-law doctrines of “liability based on fault” and “scope of employment” and his holding that they are entirely irrelevant in a workmen’s compensation proceeding, there being no such restrictions in the statute.
Our 2 questions in this case are, therefore, (1) Did the accident arise out of and in the course of employment; and (2) Was it due to wilful misconduct on the part of the claimant.
As to the first of these, it is conceded by all that this accident arose in the course of employment. Douglas Crilly testified that at the time of the accident he was carrying shingles up the stairs to the second floor of a house under construction. Arthur Wozniak testified that he was cleaning up around the cutter and in that process threw the piece of shingle which struck Douglas.
Our real question is, Did the accident arise out of the employment?
The appeal board indicated disbelief of Douglas’ testimony to the extent that it denied horseplay, and this conclusion, on this record, is certainly within their statutory discretion. CL 1948, § 413.12 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.186).
It does appear, however, that both boys were on the job at the time, and there is no evidence which disputes their testimony that they were actually engaged in the work. The object which occasioned the injury was a scrap of shingle which Arthur had cut and which he playfully threw at Douglas.
If it be argued that the casting of the shingle was caused by a boy’s animal spirits rather than, by his employment, the answer, in part, is certainly that this employer; in violation of State policy and law, saw fit to hire the animal spirits with the boy. In the writer’s view, it would take an unjustifiably nar*338row construction of the words “out of” and “in the course of” the employment to hold that this injury did not thus arise.
The appeal board entered no finding on the second possible ground of statutory disqualification, “wilful misconduct.” We do not feel, however, that the record before us would sustain disqualification on this ground. Wilful misconduct implies something-more than negligence, and more than a violation of rules or instructions. Gignac v. Studebaker Corporation, 186 Mich 574; Beaudry v. Watkins, 191 Mich 445 (LRA1916F, 576); Day v. Gold Star Dairy, 307 Mich 383.
See, also, Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis 249 (296 NW 636); Boynton Cab Co. v. Schroeder, 237 Wis 264 (296 NW 642); M. F. A. Milling Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 350 Mo 1102 (169 SW2d 929, 146 ALR 239).
For the reasons cited, we feel that to the extent that the Tarpper, Jones, Derhammer, and Steffes Cases, supra, represent a holding by this Court that where horseplay occasions a personal injury, that fact of and by itself bars recovery in a workmen’s compensation proceeding, they are overruled.
With them, the last sentence of the findings of the appeal board likewise falls, it having been based, in our view, on the case law now overruled.
More need not be said in this matter in view of Justice Smith’s comprehensive opinion, with which the writer at this point concurs except for the general discussion and holding pertaining to malicious aggressor cases contained therein. The instant case, in my view, does not require decision on this line of cases.
For the reasons indicated and with the exception noted, I concur in the opinion and in the result of Mr. Justice Smith.