Court Opinion

ID: 9889915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 19:01:09.686609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:49.402813
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 11 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    23-10017

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                1:19-cr-00064-LEK-1
 v.

RAPHAEL SAKARIA,                                MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of Hawaii
                   Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted October 3, 2023**
                                Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: BERZON, MILLER, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

      Raphael Sakaria appeals the district court’s decision denying his motion for

sentence reduction and compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
       “We review 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) sentence reduction decisions for abuse

of discretion.” United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2022). A

district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard or if its

“application of the correct legal standard [is] (1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3)

without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.”

United States v. Sivilla, 714 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States

v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009)).

       The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sakaria’s motion for

sentence reduction and compassionate release. Under section 3582(c)(1)(A), a

district court may “reduce [a] term of imprisonment . . . if it finds that . . .

extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction,” and that “such a

reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing

Commission.” See also United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1283–84 (9th Cir.

2021) (per curiam). In determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons

warrant a sentence reduction, “district courts may consider non-retroactive changes

in sentencing law, in combination with other factors particular to the individual

defendant.” Chen, 48 F.4th at 1098. Here, the district court did just that. The court

assumed that, had Sakaria been sentenced today, he would have received a

sentence 10 to 12 months shorter than the sentence he is currently serving. The

court concluded, however, that this did not amount to an extraordinary and

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compelling reason under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), “especially given the nature and

circumstances of [Sakaria’s] offense that involved a significant drug trafficking

conspiracy.” That analysis was neither illogical nor implausible.

      Sakaria argues that, once the district court assumed that he would have

received a shorter sentence had he been sentenced today, the court had no choice

but to grant his motion. In effect, Sakaria asks us to transform a non-retroactive

change in sentencing law—which the district court may consider in its discretion—

into a fully retroactive change that the district court must apply. But we have

explained that “allowing defendants to petition for compassionate release, based in

part on the sentencing disparities created by [a non-retroactive change in

sentencing law], does not automatically make every defendant who received a . . .

sentence [under the superseded law] eligible for a sentence reduction.” Chen, 48

F.4th at 1100. Rather, where a defendant moves for compassionate release, “the

determination of what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons for

sentence reduction lies squarely within the district court’s discretion.” Id. at 1095.

      AFFIRMED.

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