Court Opinion

ID: 9532135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:18:33.276595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:41.013221
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
(dissenting): I am unable to concur in the majority opinion. I believe we should have ordered the trial court to direct the clerk of the court to forthwith deliver this currency to the defendant. I think it is so unusual for the public officials to do otherwise after one accused of theft has been acquitted that we have failed to grasp the background of similar situations. As I examine the authorities from the time of the “Appeal of Robbery” down through the statutes providing for the Writ of Restitution up to the enactment of our statutes, Chap. 129, Art. 9, Sec. 9, of the Laws of 1855 the attention of the courts was directed at perfecting the right of the owner of property to have it restored to him when the thief had been convicted. The reason in my mind the emphasis was placed on this phase of the law is, that it never or seldom occurred to any official not to return property to one charged with stealing it where he had been acquitted. If one examines the situation realistically this conclusion seems inescapable. It can be stated this way — a citizen on the street or in his home may be arrested with property in his possession. It may be taken from him and held by officers if there is a reason for believing it was stolen by him. I have no quarrel with that. It is all part of the rights thrown around the citizen in the preservation of his property rights, but how about preserving the rights of a man who is arrested? He is given a trial by a jury as the constitution provides. If he is acquitted, why on earth should not this property he is accused of stealing be returned to him? It was taken without a writ, without a bond, without anything except the officer’s reasonable belief that it might be stolen.
I do not have a quarrel with the holdings that a civil wrong and a criminal wrong are committed whenever property is stolen. Neither do I wish to hold that the civil right is merged in the criminal right. I do wish to hold that the process of arrest upon reasonable belief of guilt does not give the person who has a civil wrong to redréss the right to use the criminal process as a means of making his civil rights more effectual. That is exactly what the holding of this court in this appeal does.
Ragland was arrested many months ago. His property was taken from his possession and from the possession of his wife without any *537writ, with nothing more than the officer’s reasonable belief that he had stolen it. It was used as evidence. I do not have any quarrel with that. But until the complaining witness brings her action and it is completed this seizure of the currency without any writ, no attachment process, no garnishment, no replevin bond, nothing except the power of the state, is used to enable her to collect her debt if she ever gets a judgment against Ragland.
The statute provides that if Ragland had been convicted the court in which he was convicted should restore the money to her. I claim the same court has an inherent right to restore it to the acquitted defendant. (See Hale’s Pleas Of The Crown, Vol. II, 1st Am. Ed., p. 151.) Chapter 18 of that work has to do with search warrants. Actually our statutes, G. S. 1949, 62-1801 to 62-1813, are almost a paraphrasing of Sir Matthew Hale’s work above cited. Section 3 of that chapter is of especial interest. It provides:
“Now upon the return of this warrant executed, the justice, before whom it is returned, hath these things to do:
“1. As touching the goods brought before him, if it appears they were not stolen, they are to be restored to the possessor; if it appears they were stolen, they are not to be delivered to the proprietor, but deposited in the hand of the sheriff or constable, to the end the party robbed may proceed by indicting and convicting the offender to have restitution.
“2. As touching the party, that had the custody of the goods. If they were not stolen then he is to be discharged. . . ,”
There are some more respectable authorities for this holding.
Welch v. Gleason, 28 S. Car. 247, 5 S. E. 599, is a case where defendant had been acquitted of the theft of money. The currency had been given to the trial justice and after the acquittal he refused to deliver it to the acquitted defendant. He brought an action against the justice to recover possession of it. Some procedural questions receive the attention of the court, but in dealing with the question with which we are concerned the court said:
“It seems to us, therefore, that the case, as presented by the testimony, amounts simply to this, that tire plaintiff was arrested under a charge of larceny, and when carried before the defendant, as a trial justice, money found in his possession was taken from him and delivered to the trial justice; but when the charge, upon investigation, proved to be groundless and he was discharged from custody, he was clearly entitled to a return of the money. The defendant doubtless acted in good faith, under an honest but mistaken belief as to his duty in the premises, and this is manifestly the view taken by the Circuit Judge, from the fact that he has relieved him from the payment of costs. But while this is the case, he is nevertheless liable to the plaintiff for the amount of the money taken from him, even though it was done with the best of motives.”
*538The case of State v. Williams, 61 Iowa 517, 16 N. W. 586, is a case on almost all fours with this one. There defendant had been acquitted of the theft of the money. The complaining witness filed a motion in the criminal case to have the money returned to him. The court called a jury, which found in favor of the complaining witness. The court said:
“If the defendant had been convicted of stealing the money in question, the duty of the district court would have been clear. Section 4657 of the Code provides that if the ‘property stolen or embezzled has not been delivered to tire owner, the court before which the conviction was had may, on proof of his title, order its restoration.’ In such case, the conviction would be sufficient evidence that the money did not belong to the defendant. The only question for the court would be as to whether it belonged to the person from whom it was alleged to have been stolen. The court, we presume, might properly enough proceed to determine such question in a summary way. No third person would! be affected by the finding.
“But we have a case where the defendant was acquitted. We must presume, then, that the money was not stolen. For such a case the statute seems to make no provision. The money having been forcibly taken under a search warrant from a person presumptively innocent, it would seem to follow as a matter of course that the person holding the money in custody should deliver it to the person from whom it had been thus taken.”
In People Ex Rel Simpson Co. v. Kempner, 208 N. Y. 16, 101 N. E. 794, the court considered the claim of a pawn broker to a ring that had been taken from him under authority of a search warrant. The woman accused-of having stolen it was never tried because she was then in custody serving a sentence for another offense. The pawn broker claimed to have a lien on the ring and sought to have his title adjudicated in a civil action. The examining magistrate was about to adjudicate the title in the criminal case. The appellate division granted a writ of prohibition and on final hearing said:
“Where property voluntarily or by aid of a search warrant comes into the possession of a magistrate or court from the person or possession of one charged, with crime, and such person is thereafter convicted of having stolen the property that is so in the possession of the magistrate or court from the person claiming, to be the owner thereof, and there are no third persons claiming such property, it has doubtless been the practice, so long as there is any record of it, to order the property delivered to the person, who, as appears by the testimony-taken upon the trial, is the owner thereof. Such an order is analogous to the obsolute writ of restitution. When, however, the property has been taken by ai search warrant from the possession of a third person, and there is a controversy between the person from whom it is claimed that the property was stolen and the person from whom the possession of the property was taken by the search warrant, as to which is entitled to the possession thereof, a question is; *539presented that cannot be determined upon a criminal process. It is a matter wholly between the contending parties, and of no direct concern in the state. It must be determined in a civil action, in which the parties are by Constitution entitled to notice and a hearing, and, if demanded, to a trial of the issues by jury.”
This opinion is of interest to us here because it holds that where the person from whom the officers took the property was convicted and there is a dispute between the alleged thief and the owner claiming it, as to title to it, the matter should be adjudicated following the testimony in the criminal case, as analogous to the ancient writ of restitution, while where the dispute is between the owner and a third party it should be adjudicated in a civil action.
The books are full of cases holding that temporary retention of chattels alleged to have been stolen is within the police power and pending completion of a prosecution for the stealing, the court before whom the accused is tried should make no order for its return to him but should relegate him to civil remedies, if any. (See 24 C. J. S. 1258.) Emphasis should be placed on the holding this power is only for a temporary retention. Surely is this true and once the prosecution is completed and an acquittal has resulted the accused from whom the money or other property was seized should have it back and thus be put in as good a situation as when he was arrested and his property seized. It must be remembered he does not ask here to have the title to this currency tried. There is no dispute about thé title. It was in him when he was arrested and nothing has happened to change it. He merely asks to be put in the condition he was in when he was arrested.
I cannot escape the conviction that the exceptional amount of money involved here and the fact that this defendant is a poor man has caused the officers to go far beyond the scope of their duty with reference to the retention of this money. The result is to harass the defendant and cause him unnecessary expense even though he has stood at the bar of justice and been ordered discharged.
Wedell and Wertz, JJ., concur in the dissent.