Court Opinion

ID: 9455982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:39:11.080266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:48.821609
License: Public Domain

JOHN W. PECK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I regret that I cannot join in the majority opinion for a number of reasons.
While I am in wholehearted accord with the doctrine which extends to the trial judge a large discretion in determining when news articles have resulted in prejudice (Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959)), that exercise must be consistent with the facts set forth in the record. While the District Judge made no specific findings as to which and how many jurors read the offending material, the majority opinion undertakes a detailed summary in this regard. Unfortunately, I am unable to agree that these findings are supported by the record. For reasons which become apparent upon a reading of the transcript, it is impossible to state with certainty exactly how many members of the panel *291had read certain articles or had heard discussions concerning them in the jury-room.1 *A fair reading of the transcript of that hearing, however, would seem to establish that two members read the article in the Detroit News, two read the article in the Detroit Free Press, while another stated that he read an article without specifying the paper. Five other jurors stated that they saw one or another of the articles but did not read them. Only four of the fourteen' testified that they had neither seen nor read either of the accounts. Two copies of the Free Press of January 22, 1969, were recovered from the jury room by the bailiff. The extent of the discussion within the jury room cannot, in my view, be satisfactorily determined.
While the statements of the jurors are accepted at face value, in passing it is observed without criticism of them that in the circumstances an understatement of the facts would be more normal than an overstatement. The jurors were neither specifically sworn nor reminded of any previous oath. Whether they spoke under the penalties of perjury presents an interesting question of law, but it would appear unlikely that the jurors considered themselves so bound. At the same time, they may well, however, erroneously, have felt that the subject newspaper stories were within the proscription of the Court’s instruction under which they were prohibited from reading articles concerning the case being tried, and a natural reluctance to admit having read the stories would follow. By the same token, however, it can scarcely be doubted that any juror who stated that he read and discussed either article had done so.
For present purposes I assume the weakest case presented by the appellant and consider that only two members of the panel2 read the article in The Detroit News referring to appellant as “Matthew (Mike the Enforcer) Rubino, reputed Mafia Leader,” and deal only with the consequences of their exposure to the article in which that phrase appeared. Since proceeding on that assumption, I would first summarily sweep aside an oral argument presented by the government when this case was heard and apparently adopted by the majority to the effect that Rubino had the burden of moving that these two jurors be replaced by the alternates and that having failed to make such a motion he will not now be heard to complain. Alternates are provided to fill vacancies in a jury box resulting from misadventure, and are not sworn so that the defendant may be required to play Russian Roulette. Rule 24(c), Fed.R. Crim.P.
Assuming, then, that two members of the panel have read the offending material, and further assuming for the moment that the taint is of indelible nature, the question presented is how many rotten apples does it take to spoil the barrel. To hold that possession of prejudicial information by any number less than the panel’s total invites endless and obviously futile speculation. For example, should we here speculate as to whether the two readers of The Detroit News were dominant and articulate or meek and quiescent members of the panel? To state such questions is to answer them, and I would hold that if the accused material is in fact prejudicial *292its possession by even one member of the panel must be fatal.
Before moving to a consideration of the virulence of the offending statement it is observed that none of the cases dealing with allegedly prejudicial material is in point because the leading Supreme Court opinions in this area deal with cases wherein the publicity was concerned with the case at trial. See, e. g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966) (exposure of the jury to highly publicized and prejudicial accounts and comments concerning the trial); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965) (extensive television and broadcast coverage of the pretrial hearing and portions of the trial); Ri-deau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963) (televised interrogation and interview of the accused where he confessed to several crimes), and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961) (intense community prejudice and jurors’ sentiment of partiality against the accused).
Except in extraordinary circumstances (Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra; Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 71 S.Ct. 549, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1951)), the trial court has had and has exercised the means of insulating the jurors from tainting publicity, and there remained for adjudication only the issu.e of the effectiveness of the insulation or the result of such penetration through it as occurred. See, e. g., Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968); Holmes v. United States, 284 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1960); Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1955); and Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1953). Therein the accusing finger has been pointed either at the trial judge for a failure to provide that insulation or at jurors who have circumvented it. Such is not the situation here, where the tainting material emanated from a source not only beyond the control of the trial court but from a source which would never reasonably fall within the most cautious judge’s contemplation. Thus while these opinions provide much helpful reasoning none is controlling. The majority opinion places emphasis on the fact that “[t]here is no contention that any of this publicity was generated by a representative of the United States.” I can see no significance in this circumstance. As Judge Cecil of this Court stated in a generally analogous situation, “Because we are concerned with the prejudicial effect of [the] statement, it is immaterial whether the actions of the prosecutor were intentional or otherwise. The specific question before us is whether the prejudicial effect of this incompetent testimony was cured by the admonition of the judge.” United States v. Smith, 403 F.2d 74, 76 (6th Cir. 1968).
The determination as to whether the material under attack is prejudicial in the present context may best be resolved on the basis of whether its admission into evidence over objection would constitute grounds for a mistrial or for the subsequent vacation or reversal of a judgment entered on a verdict. Thus whether the receipt in evidence of page 1 of The Detroit News of January 21, 1969, would constitute such prejudicial error becomes pertinent. No organization (if that be an acceptable term) today strikes such terror to the American heart as does the Mafia. A current best seller in the field of American fiction depicts its evils, as do both fictional and allegedly factual presentations by national media. Its corruptions are constantly chronicled and its atrocities in every area of unsavory activity are endlessly portrayed in vivid detail. We daily hear and read how the ill-gotten gains of its narcotic traffic, prostitution rings, usury rackets and murders by contract are invested in staggering sums in legitimate enterprises of every nature, frequently placing control in the hands of shadowy arch criminals. These observations are not based on facts that have not come into this record through admissible evidence safeguarded by confrontation and cross-examination of a *293witness testifying under oath, but neither did the appellant’s characterization as “Matthew (Mike the Enforcer) Rub-ino, reputed Mafia leader,” get into the record that way. I am of the view that had this clearly inadmissible statement been received by the jury in the courtroom, no amount of judicial instruction could have eliminated its prejudicial effect. Similarly, I must conclude that the acquisition of prejudicial material outside the courtroom by at. least two members of the jury in the present case requires reversal. I add that while standing alone the knowledge of at least some jurors of Judge Baum’s deprecating if not incriminating references to Mr. Louisell probably would not constitute prejudicial error, this circumstance adds support to my conviction that the judgment should be vacated.
I would, however reluctantly, vacate the judgment and remand the cause for retrial.

. An example of this difficulty may be seen in this question and answer:
“Q. [W]as Mr. Louisell discussed in the jury room today?
“A. Not to me, Your Honor.”
In the absence of a clarification, the non-responsive answer leaves open the question of whether the juror heard a discussion about Mr. Louisell among other jurors. That the trial judge had. some reservations in this area is apparent. Prior to expressing satisfaction as to the jurors’ ability to render a fair and impartial verdict, he stated, “You really never know the extent of what the jurors saw or read.”

. The fact that the majority and I differ as to whether one or two had read this article does not alter the principles involved.