Court Opinion

ID: 9473225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:23:20.564519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:23.826319
License: Public Domain

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the foregoing decision, but disagree with the majority’s dictum which says that section 2113(e) applies to these facts. Because I am convinced that the section does not apply, and because no court has extended it to a murder which occurred hours before a robbery, I must disagree with the majority’s attempt to extend the statute. Not only did the murder occur hours before the robbery, but defendant Jackson was exonerated of the murder. I would not ignore the jury’s factual finding of innocence and extend the statute in disregard of that verdict. Extension of the statute is totally unnecessary for our decision, and I believe the majority’s dictum which does so is unsound.
Section 2113(e) provides enhanced punishment for bank robberies in which there is “aggravating” conduct in addition to the basic section 2113(a) offense. The applicability of the enhanced punishment depends, of course, on whether the actor’s conduct fits within the precise language of the enhancement subsection. United States v. Jones, 678 F.2d 102, 104 (9th Cir.1982).
The precise language of section 2113(e) is:
Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense, or in freeing himself or attempting to free himself from arrest or confinement for such offense, kills any person, or forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person, shall be imprisoned not less than ten years, or punished by death if the verdict of the jury shall so direct.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (emphasis added).
The statute was originally enacted against a background of national concern with interstate bank robberies. The language of the subsection itself, unchanged since 1934, demonstrates the congressional *708purpose was to provide protection for banks, bank personnel, customers, law enforcement officers and those who aid them in capturing bank robbers, by enhancing the punishment of one who kills or kidnaps a person while “committing any offense defined in this Act.” The offense defined in the Act is bank robbery.
As the majority has shown, there are cases which have held that killings which happen even long after the robbery may be section 2113 violations, if the defendant was attempting to escape or avoid capture. Extensive research has uncovered not one single case in which a killing four or five hours before the robbery has been held to be a violation of this code section. I interpret United States v. Fleming, 594 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 2863, 61 L.Ed.2d 299 (1979), differently from the majority. The Seventh Circuit made a factual finding that the murder occurred after the robbery and, therefore, fell plainly within the statutory prohibition. The court, in a footnote, said: “Defendants contend that the killing ... could have just as easily occurred before the robbery but the evidence amply supports the finding that [she] was killed after the robbery.” Id. at 608 n. 15. The reasonable inference from the court’s footnote is that before and after made a difference in the court’s decision.
Therefore, I cannot agree that the defendant was properly charged under section 2113(e), and I think the admission of the murder evidence was error. Under the Chapman standard, the error was harmless as Jackson was acquitted of the murder charge, and there was substantial independent evidence of his participation in the bank robbery. Therefore, the prejudice that flowed from the murder evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
Congress may well want to amend the statute, but it is not the function of the judiciary to do so.