Court Opinion

ID: 8894101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 23:40:34.376311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:22.679962
License: Public Domain

Judge Wynn
dissenting:
I believe that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting the Rule 60 relief sought by Ms. Carpenter.
First, the record indicates that grounds for excusable neglect existed in this case. It is undisputed that Ms. Carpenter suffers from a genetic disease known as Myotonic Dystrophy (a disease similar to Muscular Dystrophy) which leaves her physically disabled. She therefore has been unemployable and is unable to drive. Moreover, she lives in a basement apartment without a telephone. Also, her child, Brittany, the subject of this termination proceeding, suffers from the same disease having apparently inherited the trait from her mother. Brittany receives SSI benefits which are paid directly to DSS.
On at least two occasions prior to the termination hearing on 4 June 1996, Ms. Carpenter appeared in district court for hearings *358scheduled on the petition to terminate her parental rights. On each occasion, the matters were continued at the behest of the trial judges who recused themselves because of personal conflicts with the case. Apparently, on each of these two occasions, she relied on her husband to get her to the hearings and was able to attend without incidence.
Like the first two hearings, Ms. Carpenter relied on her husband to transport her on 4 June 1996 to the third scheduled hearing on the petition to terminate her parental rights. Undisputedly, she asked him to take her to district court on that date as she had on the two prior occasions. He refused. With no means of transportation, no telephone and no evidence that her in-laws who lived near her were available or willing to take her to court, she, although desiring to be present at the hearing to terminate her relationship with her daughter, could not attend. This, I believe, is sufficient evidence to show that this disabled mother showed that her absence was due to excusable neglect.
Second, Ms. Carpenter showed that she had a meritorious defense to the petition. In her affidavit, she points out that the plans for reunification by DSS were inadequate to promote reunification with her daughter. The record shows that the plan called for her husband to transport her to visit with the child at a child care center during his lunch break. While some visits were made, the trial court found that the efforts were inadequate. Apparently, like the 4 June 1996 hearing, the husband did not provide transportation to all or most of the visits. It is significant to note that DSS, although fully aware of her debilitating condition and transportation difficulties, made no effort to arrange in-home visits with the child.
In sum, I conclude that Ms. Carpenter showed that her absence at the 4 June 1996 hearing was due to excusable neglect and that there was evidence that she had a meritorious defense to the petition. I believe the trial court should have granted the continuance at the third hearing to allow Ms. Carpenter an additional opportunity to be present. I, therefore, dissent.