Court Opinion

ID: 89120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:01:57+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:34.418318
License: Public Domain

90 U.S. 405 (____)
23 Wall. 405
RAILROAD COMPANY
v.
SWASEY.
Supreme Court of United States.

*408 Messrs. W.J. Budd and F.C. Brewster, in support of the motion to dismiss.
Messrs. W.H. Battle and W.N.H. Smith, contra.
*409 The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
An appeal may be taken from a decree of foreclosure and sale when the rights of the parties have all been settled and nothing remains to be done by the court but to make the sale and pay out the proceeds. This has long been settled.[] The sale in such a case is the execution of the decree. By means of it the rights of the parties, as settled, are enforced.
But to justify such a sale, without consent, the amount *410 due upon the debt must be determined and the property to be sold ascertained and defined. Until this is done the rights of the parties are not all settled. Final process for the collection of money cannot issue until the amount to be paid or collected by the process, if not paid, has been adjudged. So, too, process for the sale of specific property cannot issue until the property to be sold has been judicially identified. Such adjudications require the action of the court. A reference to a master to ascertain and report the facts is not sufficient. A master's report settles no rights. Its office is to present the case to the court in such a manner that intelligent action may be there had, and it is this action by the court, not the report, that finally determines the rights of the parties.
With these well-settled principles as our guide, it is easy to see that the decree here appealed from is not final. The amount of the debt which the State must pay in order to stop the sale has not been determined, neither has it been determined what amount of stock may be sold if the debt is not paid. In each of these questions the State has a direct interest, and through its representatives in court has the right to be heard. They must be settled before the litigation can be said to be at an end.
The amount of the debt and the proportion of stock applicable to its payment are, therefore, still open for future adjudication between the parties. Thus far the court has done no more than declare that for the security of the payment of so much as is due, the plaintiff and those he represents have a lien upon their equitable proportion of the stock, and that the lien may be enforced by sale, if payment of the debt is not made. It has also declared its determination to order a sale, if payment of the debt is not made or satisfactorily provided for by April 1st, 1875. In order that proper action may be had when this time arrives, the master has been directed to state the account of the indebtedness to the plaintiff and those he represents, and of their proportion of securities pledged by the State. In this, as it seems to us, the court has acted upon the suggestion in Forgay v. *411 Conrad,[*] and by an interlocutory order announced the opinion it had formed as to the rights of the parties and the principles of the decree it would finally render, leaving the entry of the final decree in form to be made when the amount due has been ascertained and an apportionment of the stock made. In this way the rights of all parties can be protected and no injustice done.
In this connection it may not be improper to call the attention of the Circuit Courts to what was said by Chief Justice Taney in Forgay v. Conrad, as to the care which ought to be exercised in the preparation of decrees of this character. Much time of this court and expense of litigants will be saved if more attention is given to the form of decrees when entered.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
NOTES
[]  Ray v. Law, 3 Cranch, 179; Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 13 Peters, 15.
[*]  6 Howard, 201.