Court Opinion

ID: 9913170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 22:12:20.157786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:36.495762
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 FAIRWAY COLLECTIONS, LLC,
                                                  No. 85042-3-I
                     Respondents,
                                                  DIVISION ONE
              v.
                                                  PUBLISHED OPINION
 MICHAEL I. TURNER and JANE DOE
 TURNER, husband and wife,

                     Appellants.

      CHUNG, J. — Fairway Collections, LLC, as Arbor Health’s assignee, sued

Michael Turner to collect medical debt he owed to Arbor Health. Turner asserted

counterclaims against Fairway for violations of the Washington Consumer

Protection Act (CPA), the Washington Collection Agency Act (CAA), and the

federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Initially, the counterclaims

were all based on whether the debt principal Fairway sought to collect was

authorized because Turner had not been screened for charity care. After Turner

was granted charity care that paid for 75 percent of his debt, Fairway accepted

his payment and stipulated to the dismissal of its claim against him. Fairway

moved to enforce a purported settlement agreement, and the court denied the

motion.

      Fairway moved for summary judgment on Turner’s counterclaims.

Subsequently, based on information obtained during discovery, Turner sought to
No. 85042-3-I/2

amend his counterclaims to add claims based on the rate and amount of

Fairway’s collection fee.

       The trial court granted Fairway’s motion for summary judgment and

dismissed Turner’s counterclaims. We conclude that there are genuine issues of

material fact as to each counterclaim. We therefore reverse the dismissal of

Turner’s counterclaims, affirm the trial court’s denial of Fairway’s motion to

enforce settlement, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

                                           FACTS

       Michael Turner was in a serious car accident on July 17, 2016, near

Morton, Washington. He cannot recollect the accident, and his first real memory

is waking up at a hospital in Seattle. On the day of the accident, unbeknownst to

him at the time, Turner was first treated at Morton General Hospital, 1 the hospital

nearest the scene of the accident, before transfer to Seattle for further care.

Turner believed insurance had paid all his medical bills related to the accident.

According to Arbor Health, it tried to collect its bill from him, though Turner claims

he never received any communication from it.

       On November 16, 2017, Morton General Hospital sent to Turner, “through

Fairway,” a “courtesy reminder” letter stating the amount due and warning,

“Should it be necessary to refer this account to Fairway Collections for

collections, a collection fee of 35% of the principal amount will be added.” That

       1 Lewis County Hospital District No. 1 does business as Arbor Health and was formerly

known as Morton General Hospital.

                                              2
No. 85042-3-I/3

letter does not use the words “charity care,” but it states, “Financial aid is

available to those who qualify.”

        In December 2017, Arbor Health assigned Turner’s debt of $7,432.42 to

Fairway, a Washington State licensed collections agency. From December 2017

to November 2020, Fairway claimed it sent four collection letters to Turner at two

different addresses, and that each letter demanded the $7,432.42 principal plus

collection fees of $2,972.77. 2 The collection fees, $2,972.77, amount to 40

percent of the principal of $7,432.42, not the 35 percent amount referenced in the

November 2017 letter from Morton General Hospital. Fairway’s form letters do

not mention charity care or financial aid.

        In January 2021, Fairway sued Turner for the debt principal and collection

fees. Turner does “not recall ever receiving a collection letter or statement

regarding [his] trip to the emergency room at Arbor Health.” He called Fairway

and learned the claimed debt was for treatment related to his July 2016 accident.

Turner was “frantic” to protect his good credit and called first one attorney and

then engaged another to address Fairway’s complaint.

        In February 2021, Turner answered Fairway’s complaint 3 and raised three

counterclaims: (1) a per se violation of the CPA 4 predicated on Fairway’s

        2 Fairway claims it did not retain copies of the actual letter and instead relies on a

template letter and a declaration from Gwen Turner as evidence of the contents of the letters.
Gwen Turner is a member of Fairway Collections, LLC, and its Chief Operations Officer. Because
she shares a surname with the appellant, Michael Turner, to avoid confusion, this opinion refers
to Gwen Turner by both her first and last name.
        3 Fairway filed suit in Grays Harbor County District Court, but Turner removed to Grays

Harbor County Superior Court because his answer sought injunctive relief. See RCW 4.14.010.
        4 Chapter 19.86 RCW.

                                               3
No. 85042-3-I/4

violation of the CAA; 5 (2) violation of the CPA, and (3) violation of the federal

FDCPA, also constituting a per se CPA violation. 6 Each of Turner’s

counterclaims alleged Fairway attempted to collect a debt that was not

authorized because he was not screened for charity care before the debt was

assigned to Fairway. 7 The parties do not dispute that Arbor Health did not screen

Turner for charity care before assigning his debt to Fairway.

        In April 2021, Turner offered to settle with Fairway. In the meantime,

Turner had applied for charity care, and on May 10, 2021, Arbor Health notified

him he had been approved and reduced his principal debt to $1,858.11. The next

day, May 11, 2021, Fairway emailed Turner that it had authority to accept a

mutual release and would circulate a proposed settlement agreement. Turner

rejected Fairway’s proposed agreement, stating that because it was conditioned

on including a release of claims against Arbor Health, a nonparty, it was a

counteroffer.

        On June 16, 2021, Fairway moved to enforce its proposed settlement

agreement. On June 18, 2021, Turner sent a check for $1,858.11 to Fairway,

thereby satisfying his debt to Arbor Health.

        The parties suspended their discovery while Fairway’s motion to enforce

settlement was pending. After the court denied Fairway’s motion to enforce in

        5 Chapter 19.16 RCW.
        6 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
        7 State law requires hospitals to make reduced cost charity care available to low-income

patients. RCW 70.170.060. Initiation of collection efforts “shall be precluded pending an initial
determination of sponsorship status”—i.e., until a person is screened for charity care eligibility.
WAC 246-453-020(1).

                                                  4
No. 85042-3-I/5

October 2021, Turner subpoenaed Arbor Health for contracts between it and

Fairway. Fairway objected to producing its collection contract with Arbor Health

until the court entered a protective order. Shortly thereafter, in its own initial

responses to Turner’s discovery requests, Fairway stated it would provide the

collection contract upon entry of a stipulated protective order, and it filed a motion

for a protective order relating to the subpoena to Arbor Health. The parties

exchanged drafts and agreed to a stipulated protective order relating to the

collection contract in November. Fairway agreed to sign and file the protective

order.

         Meanwhile, Arbor Health responded to Turner’s subpoena in November

2021 with a redacted copy of an earlier contract between it and Fairway. The

parties then stipulated to striking the hearing on Fairway’s motion for a protective

order relating to the subpoena to Arbor Health. However, Turner heard nothing

further regarding the stipulated protective order relating to Fairway’s discovery

responses that Fairway had agreed to file.

         Instead, on January 13, 2022, Fairway filed a motion for summary

judgment. On January 24, 2022, Fairway supplemented its production to Turner,

including a heavily redacted copy of its current contract with Arbor Health. The

next day, Arbor Health supplemented its production to Turner with the same

contract but unredacted. A previously redacted part of the contract states that, for

non-Medicare accounts, “Collection fees shall be added . . . at the rate of 35% of

the principal amount assigned.”

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No. 85042-3-I/6

        On February 4, Turner moved for leave to amend his counterclaims on the

basis that he had just learned that Fairway was not authorized to collect fees of

more than 35 percent. On February 17, Turner moved to strike Fairway’s

affidavits and responded to its motion for summary judgment. He argued again

that “Fairway sought to collect . . . more that it was legally allowed to collect.” He

also argued that the court should grant him a continuance to depose Fairway’s

COO, Gwen Turner, and Arbor Health’s CFO, Richard Boggess.

        Fairway replied on February 23. Its reply included a third declaration from

Gwen Turner. Her declaration states that, “Due to a typographical error, the rate

for non-Medicare accounts was typed incorrectly as [redacted]%.” Fairway

argued that “[t]he amount of the collection cost is not an issue in this case”

because it “had the right to charge [Turner] a collection cost under RCW

19.16.500.” On February 22, Turner filed an amended motion for leave to amend.

He argued that “[t]he 2014 collection contract reveals . . . that Fairway

demanded . . . several hundred dollars more than . . . allowed under the

collection contract between Arbor Health and Fairway.” 8

        On February 28, the trial court heard oral argument on both Turner’s

motion for leave to amend and Fairway’s motion for summary judgment on

Turner’s counterclaims. The court orally denied Turner leave to amend 9 and

granted Fairway’s motion for summary judgment. The court’s written order stated

        8 A collection fee of 35 percent of the $7,432.42 principal would have been $2,601.35.
        9 The court said that “leave is freely given,” but “based on the issues of undue delay and

prejudice to [Fairway], and futility, [it would] deny the motion to amend.”

                                                 6
No. 85042-3-I/7

that it considered Fairway’s motion for summary judgment as to Turner’s

counterclaims, Turner’s response, and Fairway’s reply. It dismissed Turner’s

counterclaims with prejudice. 10 The court’s written order did not address the

motion for leave to amend.

        Turner appeals the trial court’s denial of leave to amend his counterclaims

and its dismissal of his counterclaims. Fairway cross-appeals and assigns error

to the trial court’s denial of its motion to enforce the settlement agreement. 11

                                          DISCUSSION

        On appeal of an order granting summary judgment, we review de novo

whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Civil Rule (CR) 56(c); see Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164

Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). “The moving party has the burden of

showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Indoor

Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 162 Wn.2d 59, 70, 170

P.3d 10 (2007). We view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Elcon Constr., Inc. v. E. Wash. Univ., 174

Wn.2d 157, 164, 273 P.3d 965 (2012). “A genuine issue of material fact exists

where reasonable minds could differ on the facts controlling the outcome of the

        10 At the same hearing, the court granted Fairway’s unopposed motion to seal the

contract between it and Arbor Health based on the parties’ stipulated protective order.
          11 In May 2022, responding to the clerk of Division Two of this court, the parties stipulated

to a trial court order dismissing with prejudice all of Fairway’s claims against Turner.

                                                  7
No. 85042-3-I/8

litigation.” Ranger Ins. Co., 164 Wn.2d at 552. A “material fact” is one upon which

the outcome of the litigation depends. Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wn.2d 104, 108,

569 P.2d 1152 (1977).

       The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing of all of Turner’s

counterclaims. Those counterclaims alleged, first, that Fairway’s actions violated

the CPA based on violations of the CAA or the FDCPA, and second, that the

same actions independently violated the CPA.

I.     Summary Judgment Dismissal of CPA and FDCPA Claims

       The CPA broadly prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or

deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,” RCW

19.86.020. The purpose of the CPA is to complement the body of federal law

governing restraints of trade, unfair competition, and unfair, deceptive, and

fraudulent acts and practices in order to protect the public and foster honest and

fair competition. Panag, 166 Wn.2d at 37 (citing RCW 19.86.920).

       To prevail in a private CPA claim, the plaintiff must prove (1) an unfair or

deceptive act or practice, (2) occurring in trade or commerce, (3) affecting the

public interest, (4) injury to a person’s business or property, and (5) causation.

Hangman Ridge Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 784-85,

719 P.2d 531 (1986), cited in Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 166 Wn.2d

27, 37, 204 P.3d 885 (2009). A CPA claim may be predicated on either a per se

violation of a statute or on a deceptive practice unregulated by statute but

involving the public interest. Id. at 37 n.3.

                                           8
No. 85042-3-I/9

       A. Per Se Violation of the CPA

       A per se claim allows a plaintiff to satisfy the first three elements of the

CPA’s five-element test by proving a predicate violation of “a statute that contains

a specific legislative declaration of public interest impact.” RCW 19.86.093(2);

Hangman, 105 Wn.2d at 784-89. The CAA contains such a declaration. Panag,

166 Wn.2d at 53; see also RCW 19.16.440 (“the commission . . . of an act or

practice prohibited by RCW 19.16.250 . . . [is] declared to be unfair acts or

practices or unfair methods of competition in the conduct of trade or commerce

for the purposes of the application of the [CPA].”). A violation of the FDCPA also

constitutes a per se violation of the CPA, “reflecting the public policy significance”

of the “highly regulated field” of consumer debt collection. Panag, 166 Wn.2d at

53.

       Turner alleges two different ways that Fairway violated either the CAA or

the FDCPA, and thus violated the CPA per se. First, Turner claims Fairway

attempted to collect debt principal it was not authorized to collect because he

was not screened for charity care when Fairway filed its complaint. Second, he

claims Fairway attempted to collect collection fees greater than Arbor Health

authorized it to, i.e., 40 percent instead of 35 percent.

          1. Fairway’s efforts to collect the principal debt without screening for
             charity care

       Turner alleges that Fairway attempted to collect debt principal not

authorized for collection because he was not screened for charity care before

Fairway took action to collect his debt to Arbor Health. Fairway argues that it is

                                          9
No. 85042-3-I/10

not a hospital responsible for charity care, so it was authorized to collect the debt

principal. We agree with Turner that there is a genuine issue of material fact

about whether Fairway violated the FDCPA and, therefore, the CPA per se

because it falsely represented the character and status of the debt principal it

sought to collect.

        One predicate for Turner’s per se CPA claim is a claimed violation of the

CAA. The CAA includes as a prohibited practice that no licensed debt collector

shall “[t]hreaten to take any action against the debtor which the licensee cannot

legally take at the time the threat is made.” RCW 19.16.250(16).

        Turner also predicates his per se CPA claim on violations of the federal

FDCPA. 12 Similar to the CPA’s broad prohibition of “unfair or deceptive acts or

practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,” RCW 19.86.020, § 1692e of

the federal FDCPA broadly prohibits the “use of any false, deceptive, or

misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any

debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. It includes a nonexclusive list of sixteen practices that

are deemed to be “false, deceptive, or misleading,” one of which encompasses

the false representation of “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt[.]”

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Turner also claims Fairway violated FDCPA § 1692f,

which implements a sweeping ban on the use of “unfair or unconscionable

means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Among eight

        12 For a plaintiff to recover under the FDCPA, there are three threshold requirements:

(1) the plaintiff must be a “consumer”; (2) the defendant must be a “debt collector”; and (3) the
defendant must have committed some act or omission in violation of the FDCPA. Robinson v.
Managed Accounts Receivables Corp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Fairway
does not dispute that the first two elements are satisfied.

                                                10
No. 85042-3-I/11

nonexclusive examples of “unfair or unconscionable means,” of relevance here,

§ 1692f(1) prohibits “[t]he collection of any amount (including any interest, fee,

charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is

expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.”

       As to Turner’s claims based on collection letters sent by Fairway, the

evidence before the trial court included Turner’s declaration that he could not

recall receiving any letter from Fairway or Arbor Health and did not know he was

ever a patient at Arbor Health. According to Arbor Health’s CFO, Richard

Boggess, its former billing service provider destroyed billing statements sent

during 2016-2017 but on “information and belief,” he believes the letters Arbor

Health sent Turner would have included information about charity care. Fairway

also provided evidence that it sent a letter to Turner in 2016 stating it would add

a collection fee of 35 percent, as well as a letter in 2017 and three more in 2018.

Fairway did not maintain copies of those letters, but Gwen Turner provided a

template and attested to how the template’s blank fields would have been filled

in.

       The record also contains unrebutted evidence that Arbor Health properly

assigned its debt to Fairway. Turner provided no evidence as to the content of

the letters, as he claimed not to have received them. Thus, the only evidence at

summary judgment was that Arbor Health included charity care information in the

letters it sent, even if Turner did not receive them. Without any competent

evidence of a letter or bill sent to Turner prior to the filing of its lawsuit that failed

to apprise him that he could seek charity care to reduce the amount of his debt

                                            11
No. 85042-3-I/12

principal, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether such letters

violated the CAA or the FDCPA. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Turner’s

claims for per se CPA violations based on letters sent in 2016, 2017, 2018, and

2020. 13

        Turner also claims the complaint in the present lawsuit 14 violated the CPA,

CAA, and/or the FDCPA 15 because in it, Fairway failed to account for his

eligibility for charity care and, thus, sought to collect debt principal that it was not

authorized to collect. There is no dispute that, at the time Fairway filed its suit

against him, Turner had not been screened for charity care. The charity care act

requires that “[a]n initial determination of [charity care] sponsorship status shall

precede collection efforts directed at the patient.” RCW 70.170.060(10)(c). The

record evidence shows that when Turner subsequently applied for charity care in

May 2021, he was awarded 75 percent sponsorship. When Fairway learned that

Arbor Health awarded Turner charity care, as Gwen Turner attested, “Fairway

credited the balance, accepted the payment for the remaining balance from

Defendant’s attorney and dismissed the collection case based on the payment of

the charity care amount.”

        13 Turner’s counterclaims also alleged the content of collection letters Fairway declared it

sent him violated RCW 19.16.250(28) & (29). Below, Turner conceded those claims.
         14 The FDCPA’s statute of limitations is one year. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Thus, Turner

acknowledges that only his claim regarding the complaint with which Fairway initiated its lawsuit
is within the FDCPA statute of limitations, not the content of any letters Fairway sent to Turner
before it filed suit. Because Turner first became aware of Fairway’s collection efforts when it sued
him, the FDCPA’s statute of limitations accrued as of the date Fairway filed its suit, which was
January 4, 2021. See Naas v. Stolman, 130 F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1997).
         15 A lawsuit can be a communication subject to the CPA and FDCPA. Donohue v. Quick

Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We decide this issue and conclude that a
complaint served directly on a consumer to facilitate debt-collection efforts is a communication
subject to the requirements of §§ 1692e and 1692f.”).

                                                12
No. 85042-3-I/13

        However, the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, Clark v. Cap. Credit &

Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2006), meaning that debt

collectors are “liable for violations that are not knowing or intentional,” Reichert v.

Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., 531 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). In determining

whether a debt collector’s conduct violates § 1692e or f, a court “undertake[s] an

objective analysis” and asks “whether the ‘least sophisticated debtor would likely

be misled by a communication.’ ” Stimpson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 944

F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs. 660 F.3d

1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011)). “This is a legal, not a factual, determination.” Id.

Under this standard, a debtor need not show that he has “actually been misled or

deceived by the debt collector’s representation; instead, liability depends on

whether the hypothetical ‘least sophisticated debtor’ likely would be misled.”

Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2014). 16

        Further, the FDCPA punishes only material false statements. Donohue v.

Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010). Material false

statements are “those that could ‘cause the least sophisticated debtor to suffer a

disadvantage in charting a course of action in response to the collection effort.’ ”

Afewerki v. Anaya Law Grp., 868 F.3d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting

Tourgeman, 755 F.3d at 1121). In contrast, “immaterial statements, by definition,

        16 The hypothetical least sophisticated debtor is “distinguished from the ordinary,

reasonable person by being financially unsophisticated,” and “is comparatively uninformed and
naive about financial matters and functions as an ‘average consumer in the lowest quartile . . . of
consumer competence.’ ” Stimpson, 944 F.3d at 1196 (quoting Evory v. RJM Acquisitions
Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 2007)); see also Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney
Mickell, 688 F.3d 1015, 1027 (9th Cir. 2012) (the hypothetical least sophisticated debtor is
“uninformed, naive, and gullible”).

                                                13
No. 85042-3-I/14

do not affect a consumer’s ability to make intelligent decisions” because they are

“mere technical falsehoods that mislead no one.” Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1034.

        Fairway’s complaint alleging Turner owed $7,432.42 of debt principal is

material for the purposes of the FDCPA because such a complaint filed in court

and served on a consumer would likely mislead the hypothetical least

sophisticated debtor. As amended, Fairway’s complaint describes Turner’s debt

as follows:

        Defendants became indebted to ARBOR HEALTH for an account
        receivable which was incurred in the ordinary course of ARBOR
        HEALTH’s business, consisting of certain goods and medical
        services rendered to Defendant Michael I. Turner, which ARBOR
        HEALTH is duly licensed to render, for the principal assigned
        amount of $7432.42 plus collections costs per RCW 19.16.500
        (Government) of $2972.97 for the goods and services provided on
        or about July 17, 2016 and on or about July 22, 2016, no part of
        which has been paid, despite demand being made for those
        sums. 17

The complaint does not include any mention of charity care or advise Turner that

he may be eligible. 18

        Fairway argues that any obligation to provide information about charity

care did not apply to it, but rather, only to Arbor Health. It is true that the charity

care law at the time Turner was hospitalized placed only on hospitals the

obligation to make "every reasonable effort to determine . . . [t]he existence or

        17 The amount of collection costs is stated as either $2,972.97 or $2,972.77. The twenty-

cent difference has no legal significance here.
          18 The original complaint, for an “account stated” rather than an “account receivable,”

states the same amounts due as debt principal and collection fees and specifies that no pre-
judgment interest, late fees, handling fees, or treble damage amounts are owed. Like the
amended complaint, it does not include any mention of charity care or advise Turner he may be
eligible.

                                                14
No. 85042-3-I/15

nonexistence of private or public sponsorship which might cover in full or part the

charges for care rendered by the hospital to a patient.” Former RCW

70.170.060(10)(a) (2018). But by the time Fairway filed the lawsuit seeking to

collect the debt, the charity care law had been amended to create broader

obligations relating to medical debt, beyond the hospital. Effective October 1,

2018, the law requires the following:

       (8)(a) All hospital billing statements and other written
       communications concerning billing or collection of a hospital bill by
       a hospital must include the following or a substantially similar
       statement prominently displayed on the first page of the statement
       in both English and the second most spoken language in the
       hospital’s service area: You may qualify for free care or a discount
       on your hospital bill, whether or not you have insurance. Please
       contact our financial assistance office at [website] and [phone
       number].

RCW 70.170.060 (emphasis added).

       The law has no deadline by which a former patient must apply for

charity care. As Turner’s experience shows, a patient may seek screening

for charity care even after the bill has gone into collection. Even though

the obligation to screen for charity care applies to Arbor Health, not

Fairway, Fairway is responsible for including a notice about charity care

when seeking to collect on a hospital bill under the plain language of RCW

70.170.060. Additionally, Fairway accepted this duty to notify debtors as a

contractual obligation; its contract with Arbor Health states, “Client [Arbor

Health] assigns all rights and claims to collect the account on its behalf”

and, further, that “Fairway shall comply with all applicable laws and

regulations relating to debt collections . . . .”

                                            15
No. 85042-3-I/16

         One purpose of the 2018 amendments to the charity care law is

that patients are informed they may be eligible for charity care so they will

inquire about their eligibility. But Fairway’s complaint did not include that

information. Instead, Turner was obliged to investigate and obtain

assistance from counsel to seek a reduction of Arbor Health’s bill.

         Thus, the issue is not whether Fairway screened Turner. And it is

immaterial whether Turner was eventually screened and deemed eligible

for charity care, even though his ultimately successful application

establishes that he was. 19 Rather, focusing the inquiry on the content of

Fairway’s complaint, there is a question of fact as to whether Fairway

falsely represented the character, amount, or legal status of debt it sought

to collect. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) (“The false representation of the

character, amount, or legal status of any debt [is a violation.]”). And a

violation of the FDCPA is a per se violation of the CPA. Panag, 166 Wn.2d

at 53.

         Therefore, the record before the trial court establishes a genuine

issue of material fact about whether, at the time Fairway filed its suit, it

falsely represented the character, amount, and legal status of the debt it

         19 “Although the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, it excepts from liability those debt

collectors who satisfy the ‘narrow’ bona fide error defense.” McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg
& Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Reichert v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., 531
F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted)). A debt collector cannot be held liable under
the FDCPA if it “shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). But Fairway does not raise this
affirmative defense; it simply asserts that it is not a hospital so the charity care act cannot apply to
it.

                                                  16
No. 85042-3-I/17

sought to collect in violation of FDCPA § 1692e. This same evidence

establishes a question of fact as to Turner’s claim of a per se CPA

violation because a violation of the FDCPA constitutes a per se violation of

the CPA. 20 Id. at 53.

            2. Fairway’s efforts to recover collection fees

        Turner also claims that Fairway violated the CAA, and therefore the CPA

per se, because it charged collection fees of 40 percent of the debt principal

when its contract with Arbor Health allowed it to charge only 35 percent.

Procedurally, Fairway disputes that this claim was encompassed by Turner’s

initial counterclaims and argues the court properly denied Turner leave to amend

to add this claim. On the merits, Fairway claims that there was a clerical error in

the contract as to the proper amount Fairway could charge.

        Lewis County Hospital District No.1 d/b/a Arbor Health is a public entity,

and the CAA allows collection agencies to charge a collection fee when collecting

debts for public entities in an amount “left to the agreement of the governmental

entity and its collection agency or agencies.” RCW 19.16.500(1)(b). The CAA

defines as “reasonable” a contingent fee of up to 50 percent of the first $100,000

        20 Because the record creates a genuine issue of material fact as to Turner’s claim of a

violation of the FDCPA § 1692e, and thus the CPA per se, we need not determine whether the
same actions by Fairway also separately violated the CAA, RCW 19.16.250(16), by threatening to
take an action it could not legally take. The CAA is Washington’s counterpart to the FDCPA, and
“the CPA is intended to provide broader protection than exists under the common law or statute.”
Panag, 166 Wn.2d at 54. Also, we need not separately address whether Fairway’s complaint’s
failure to mention charity care violates FDCPA § 1692f, because § 1692f is a “catch-all” provision
that applies only to unfair conduct that does not violate any other section of the FDCPA. See,
e.g., Baker v. Allstate Fin. Servs., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (D. Minn. 2008) (“Congress
enacted Section 1692f to catch conduct not otherwise covered by the FDCPA.”); Scott v. Portfolio
Recovery Assocs., LLC, 139 F. Supp. 3d 956, 969 (S.D. Iowa 2015) (dismissing § 1692f claim
because garnishing wages without authorization falls under § 1692(e)(5)).

                                               17
No. 85042-3-I/18

and up to 35 percent over $100,000 of unpaid debt. RCW 19.16.500(1)(b).

However, the CAA states that it is a prohibited practice for a licensed collection

agency to

                (21) Collect or attempt to collect in addition to the principal
        amount of a claim any sum other than allowable interest, collection
        costs or handling fees expressly authorized by statute, and, in the
        case of suit, attorney’s fees and taxable court costs. A licensee
        may collect or attempt to collect collection costs and fees, including
        contingent collection fees, as authorized by a written agreement or
        contract, between the licensee’s client and the debtor, in the
        collection of a commercial claim. The amount charged to the debtor
        for collection services shall not exceed thirty-five percent of the
        commercial claim.

RCW 19.16.250(21) (emphasis added).

        After Arbor Health produced an unredacted version of its contract with

Fairway, which showed that their 2014 contract stated the amount Fairway could

collect as a collection fee was 35 percent of the principal balance, Turner sought

leave to amend his counterclaims based on this newly produced evidence. The

court denied the request for leave to amend in an oral ruling, and Turner assigns

error to that ruling. However, we need not address whether the court abused its

discretion in denying the motion to amend, because the summary judgment

record considered by the court included the unredacted 2014 contract, and the

briefing and oral argument by both parties addressed the issue of the correct

amount of Fairway’s collection fee. 21 “When issues not raised by the pleadings

        21 Along with his motion for leave to amend, Turner filed a declaration attaching the

unredacted 2014 contract that Arbor Health provided in response to his subpoena showing the 35
percent collection fee. Turner’s response to Fairway’s motion for summary judgment includes
argument that the 2014 contract with Arbor Health did not support a 40 percent fee and refers to
the unredacted 2014 contract. Fairway’s reply brief on summary judgment included a
supplemental declaration from Gwen Turner admitting that the 2014 contract produced by Arbor

                                                18
No. 85042-3-I/19

are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all

respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” CR 15(b).

        Turning to the merits of the collection fee issue, the summary judgment

record before the trial court included this evidence:

    •   The November 16, 2017, letter from Morton General Hospital addressed
        to Turner that was sent “through Fairway,” stating that if the bill were sent
        to collections, Fairway would add a collection fee of 35 percent.

    •   Arbor Health’s unredacted 2014 contract with Fairway stating that,
        “pursuant to . . . RCW 19.16.500,” “[c]ollection fees shall be added . . . at
        the rate of 35% of the principal amount assigned.”

    •   Fairway’s amended complaint seeking $2,972.97 in collection fees on debt
        principal of $7,432.42, which amounts to collection fees at the rate of 40
        percent, not 35 percent.

    •   Gwen Turner’s declaration stating that Arbor Health’s contract contained a
        “typographical error.” 22

        Because Turner’s counterclaim depends on whether Arbor Health’s

contract authorized it to collect fees of 40 percent, the amount of collection fees

Health contained a different amount for the fee, but claiming it was a “typographical error.” And at
oral argument on the summary judgment motion, both parties argued the issue of the correct
amount of Fairway’s collection fee. Thus, the unredacted contract showing a 35 percent agreed to
collection fee and Turner’s claims based on the allegation that Fairway charged more than 35
percent were before the court on summary judgment.
         22 On appeal, Turner argues that Gwen Turner’s February 22, 2022, declaration is not

admissible because “[e]xtrinsic evidence is not admissible to contradict the plain language of a
contract.” Turner misapplies the parol evidence rule. The issue here is not the formation of a
contract or the meaning of a term. Instead, Gwen Turner’s February 22 declaration is admissible
evidence because it is a sworn declaration made on personal knowledge about whether Arbor
Health’s unredacted contract stating 35 percent contains a typographical error. CR 56(e). Fairway
argues the same declaration is “undisputed evidence that the collections costs [it] demanded
w[ere] proper” because “Turner failed to present any evidence that the collection costs were
inflated.” Although Turner challenged Gwen Turner’s declaration below, he does not assign error
to any issue regarding its admissibility on appeal. But his failure to challenge it does not mean
Gwen Turner’s declaration is the only evidence regarding this issue. The 2014 contract itself,
which states the collection fee was 35 percent, was part of the summary judgment record, as
Turner’s attorney attested in his declaration that Arbor Health had provided it in response to a
subpoena.

                                                19
No. 85042-3-I/20

authorized by the contract is a material fact. Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to Turner, there is a genuine issue of material fact because the

letter, the contract, Fairway’s complaint, and the declaration cannot be reconciled

with one another. If Gwen Turner’s February 22 declaration is correct and Arbor

Health’s contract contains a typo, then Fairway had contractual authority to seek

40 percent in fees, but the November 16 letter Fairway sent to Turner is

incorrect. 23 If, on the other hand, Arbor Health’s unredacted contract is correct

and Fairway could collect 35 percent for non-Medicare accounts, then the letter

Fairway sent for Arbor Health is correct, but the amount of fees Fairway sought

to collect was not authorized and Gwen Turner’s February 22 declaration is not

correct.

       Reasonable minds could differ on these facts, so a genuine issue exists.

Ranger Ins. Co., 164 Wn.2d at 552. We thus conclude the summary judgment

evidence established genuine issues of material fact regarding Turner’s

counterclaims alleging a violation of the CAA as to the collection fees and, thus,

a per se CPA violation.

       B. Injury and Causation Elements of CPA Claim

       If there is sufficient proof regarding the violations of the FDCPA as to debt

principal and the CAA as to collection fees as discussed above, this evidence

establishes a per se CPA violation. See Panag, 166 Wn.2d at 53. A per se

violation establishes the first three elements of the Hangman test for a violation

       23 We note RCW 19.16.250(21) caps collection fees at 35 percent.

                                            20
No. 85042-3-I/21

of the CPA. 105 Wn.2d at 784-89. Thus, to survive summary judgment dismissal

of his CPA claims, Turner must also point to evidence sufficient to establish injury

and causation, the fourth and fifth elements of the Hangman test. Id. at 785.

       A “violation of the CPA requires some causal relationship between the

unfair or deceptive trade practice and the alleged injury to support a private right

of action.” Panag, 166 Wn.2d at 61. “The issue is whether the plaintiff was

wrongfully induced to pay money on a debt not owed ‘or to incur expenses that

would not otherwise have been incurred.’ ” Id. at 62 (quoting Wiginton v. Pac.

Credit Corp., 2 Haw. App. 435, 444-45, 634 P.2d 111 (1981)). “Consulting an

attorney to dispel uncertainty regarding the nature of an alleged debt is distinct

from consulting an attorney to institute a CPA claim,” so “[i]nvestigation expenses

and other costs resulting from a deceptive business practice sufficiently establish

injury.” Panag, 166 Wn.2d at 62.

       Here, the evidence showed that, when Fairway served its complaint on

Turner, he was “frantic” to protect his good credit, so he called one attorney and

then engaged another to manage Fairway’s claim. Turner thus incurred costs to

investigate the lawsuit filed by Fairway. This evidence is sufficient to establish a

genuine issue of material fact as to causation and damages, the fourth and fifth

elements of Turner’s CPA claim. Therefore, as there are also genuine issues of

fact regarding the first three elements through evidence of per se CPA violations,

                                         21
No. 85042-3-I/22

the trial court erred by dismissing Turner’s counterclaims under the CAA, the

FDCPA and the CPA. 24

II.     Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

        Fairway cross-appeals and assigns error to the trial court’s order denying

its motion to enforce a settlement agreement between the parties. Turner argues

that Fairway never agreed to his terms and he never agreed to its terms, so there

never was a settlement agreement for the court to enforce. We agree with

Turner.

        In Washington, a trial court’s authority to compel enforcement of a

settlement agreement is governed by CR 2A. Morris v. Maks, 69 Wn. App. 865,

868, 850 P.2d 1357 (1993). CR 2A states:

        No agreement or consent between parties or attorneys in respect to
        the proceedings in a cause, the purport of which is disputed, will be
        regarded by the court unless the same shall have been made and
        assented to in open court on the record, or entered in the minutes,
        or unless the evidence thereof shall be in writing and subscribed by
        the attorneys denying the same.

        At least two criteria govern whether an agreement is disputed within the

meaning of the rule. In re Marriage of Ferree, 71 Wn. App. 35, 40, 856 P.2d 706

(1993). “First, there must be a dispute over the existence or material terms of the

agreement, as opposed to a dispute over its immaterial terms.” Id. A material

term is one that goes to the “substance, gist, or legal effect” of the agreement. Id.

“Second, the dispute must be a genuine one,” meaning that the purpose of CR

         24 Based on this conclusion, we do not separately address Turner’s claims of non-per se

violations of the CPA.

                                               22
No. 85042-3-I/23

2A is served by barring the enforcement of an alleged agreement that is

genuinely disputed, “for such a dispute adds to the issues that must be tried.” Id.

at 40-41.

       CR 2A “supplements but does not supplant the common law of contracts.”

Ferree, 71 Wn. App. at 39. Washington follows the objective manifestation theory

of contracts, meaning the intent of the parties is determined by their objective

manifestations rather than any unexpressed subjective intent. Condon v.

Condon, 177 Wn.2d 150, 162, 298 P.3d 86 (2013).

       Summary judgment procedures apply to a motion to enforce a settlement

agreement under CR 2A: the moving party has the burden to prove, in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, that no genuine dispute exists regarding

an agreement’s existence or material terms. Id. at 161-62. We review a decision

regarding settlement enforcement de novo. Condon, 177 Wn.2d at 162; see also

id. at 161 n.4 (explaining that de novo review is appropriate despite abuse of

discretion having been the standard in the past).

       In April 2021, Turner offered in writing to settle. The offer stated that he

was “not interested in negotiating this offer. It is a take it or leave it offer.” His

offer proposed “a mutual release of all claims and a mutual dismissal with

prejudice of all claims.” It required Fairway and Arbor Health not to treat

settlement as a cancellation of debt for tax purposes, and it required them to

recall any reports issued to credit reporting agencies.

       The parties agreed to a May 12 deadline for Fairway’s response. On

May 11, Fairway emailed Turner that it and Arbor Health had “authority to accept

                                            23
No. 85042-3-I/24

a mutual walk away releasing all parties by both sides.” Fairway drafted “a

proposed settlement agreement” and “circulat[ed] it on [Fairway’s] side to see if

there are any proposed changes.” Fairway’s initial draft of a settlement

agreement did not include either the tax or credit reporting terms Turner required,

although its second draft did. Fairway also added terms not in Turner’s proposal

that imposed affirmative duties on him, including a confidentiality term, a

nondisparagement term, and a requirement that he indemnify Fairway against

any claim Medicare might assert. The proposal also addressed costs and

attorney’s fees. Turner regarded Fairway’s agreement as a counteroffer.

        Here, the record shows that neither Turner’s offer to Fairway nor Fairway’s

draft of a “confidential settlement agreement” memorializing settlement was

subscribed to by the other party. Rather, Fairway’s purported acceptance was a

counteroffer that added material terms: confidentiality, nondisparagement, and

indemnification. Further, Turner never signed Fairway’s settlement agreement,

and he expressly rejected it in several emails. We therefore conclude that CR 2A

is not satisfied because Fairway has not met its threshold burden to establish

that a settlement agreement exists about which there are no disputed material

terms. 25 We affirm the denial of Fairway’s motion to enforce settlement.

          25 Turner also argues that Fairway’s appeal should be dismissed because it failed to

perfect the record by including a verbatim report of proceedings of the parties’ oral argument
before the trial court on Fairway’s motion to enforce. While the party seeking review has the
burden to perfect the record, Rhinevault v. Rhinevault, 91 Wn. App. 688, 692, 959 P.2d 687
(1998), our review here is de novo, and the record contains all the documents that were before
the trial court. Moreover, the rules on appeal allowed Turner to add the transcript of oral argument
to the record if he wished. RAP 9.2. Consequently, we conclude that the record on appeal is
sufficient for de novo review of the errors assigned. See Favors v. Matzke, 53 Wn. App. 789, 794,
770 P.2d 686 (1989).

                                                24
No. 85042-3-I/25

III.   Fees and Costs

       In Turner’s opening brief, he requests this court to “reserve for the trial

court a decision on an award of attorney fees and costs” incurred on appeal.

Turner cites the CPA’s treble damages provision, RCW 19.86.090, which also

allows “the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee,” as well as 15

U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3), which likewise allows for “the costs of the action, together

with a reasonable attorney’s fee.”

       Because Turner is the party that substantially prevailed on appeal, he is

entitled to recover costs under RAP 14.2. If he prevails on remand, he may

request, and the trial court may award, costs and fees based on RCW 19.86.090

and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3).

       Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

WE CONCUR:

                                         25