Court Opinion

ID: 9783946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:30:24.611341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:45.203411
License: Public Domain

VENTERS, J.,
dissenting:
I reluctantly dissent, on both procedural and substantive grounds. Because the substantive error I see in the majority opinion is of more enduring quality, I discuss it first.
Despite holding that “Machniak is not entitled to reap the benefit of a clerical error made in reducing his sentence to writing,” the majority bestows upon him that very benefit, and thus upon the Commonwealth the corresponding injustice. In so doing, this Court binds the parties to what we clearly rule to be a clerical error. We knowingly cement in place a written judgment that we know contains a clerical error. As plainly written, RCr 10.10 allows for the correction of clerical errors “at any time.” Now, according to the majority, “at any time” means any time “before the appeal is perfected, or ... after the appeal is perfected but while the ‘appeal is pending.’ ”
The majority holds that clerical errors become uncorrectable once the appellate process is over. Obviously, when the appellate courts render an opinion that is directly based upon the clerical error, future correction may be blocked by res Judicata, the law of the case doctrine, or even laches if the error has induced some degree of detrimental reliance. But otherwise, there is absolutely no reason for this new requirement that limits the correction of clerical errors. After all, some clerical errors not directly pertinent to issues on appeal may go unnoticed until long after the finality of the appeal, when a misspelled name, a misstated date or case number, or even a sentencing provision acquires critical importance.
Because the plain language of RCr 10.10 leaves the clerical error here subject to correction, we should have directly addressed as we did in the original opinion, the question of whether the judgment, imposed upon revocation of Machniak’s probation and which reflected the sentence imposed by the trial judge in open court at the original sentencing hearing, could be enforced. I find that preferable to majority’s decision to freeze in place the incorrect judgment.
The timing of this modified majority opinion is also of concern. The meaning of RCr 10.10, as now reconstructed by this Court, was never an issue in this case. It appears for the very first time as we deny the Commonwealth’s Petition for Rehearing and issue this modified opinion. It is a matter that was never presented or discussed in the Court of Appeals, it was not argued by the parties in the original briefs or oral argument presented to this Court, and was not even mentioned in the Commonwealth’s petition for rehearing or in Machniak’s response. We should not tackle a novel issue and re-interpret a well-established rule of criminal procedure in a published opinion at this stage of the appellate process, especially after denying a request for rehearing and denying the parties an opportunity to address it.
For those reasons, I dissent.
CUNNINGHAM, J., joins.