Court Opinion

ID: 9861677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:19:02.395616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:49.348218
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SLATER, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the penalties for theft and theft by deception from a person over 60 violate the proportionate penalties clause. Theft of property valued between $10,000 and $100,000 is a Class 2 felony. 720 ILCS 5/16 — 1(b)(5) (West 1998). In a case such as this, where the victims are over 60 years of age, a defendant is eligible for an extended term. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 5— 3.2(b)(4)(ii) (West 1998). Theft by deception of property valued at $5,000 or more from a victim 60 or older is also a Class 2 felony. 720 ILCS 5/16 — 1(b)(7) (West 1998). A defendant would not, however, be subject to an extended term on the basis of the victim’s age because doing so would constitute double enhancement. The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) prohibits the application of disparate penalties to offenses that are substantively identical. See People v. Lewis, 175 Ill. 2d 412, 677 N.E.2d 830 (1996); People v. Christy, 139 Ill. 2d 172, 564 N.E.2d 770 (1990); see also People v. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 687 N.E.2d 24 (1997). Where different offenses are at issue, however, no constitutional violation exists unless: (1) the penalty is cruel, degrading, or shocks the moral sense of the community; or (2) a less serious offense is punished more harshly than one that is more serious. See Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 687 N.E.2d 24. The majority’s error is in finding that theft and theft by deception “require the same elements.” 332 Ill. App. 3d at 690. In People v. Fowler, 72 Ill. App. 3d 491, 494-95, 390 N.E.2d 1377, 1380 (1979), cited by the majority, the court stated that the various subparagraphs of the theft statute “do not undertake to create a series of separate offenses, but rather to create a single offense of theft which may be performed in a number of ways.” Fowler relied on People v. Marino, 44 Ill. 2d 562, 256 N.E.2d 770 (1970), where the defendants were charged with obtaining and exerting unauthorized control over property under section 16 — 1(a). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 38, par. 16—1(a). The defendants claimed that they should have been charged under section 16 — 1(d) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 38, par. 16 — 1(d)) (obtaining control over stolen property) because the property had been stolen six months earlier. Our supreme court stated that receiving stolen property under subsection (d) was “not a separate offense” but was included within subsection (a). Marino, 44 Ill. 2d at 576, 256 N.E.2d at 778. Although under Marino and Fowler theft by obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over property may not be a separate offense from obtaining control by deception, the two are not identical. “Deception” includes creating a false impression, preventing another from acquiring information pertinent to a transaction or falsely promising performance. See 720 ILCS 5/15 — 4 (West 1998). “Obtaining or exerting control,” on the other hand, “includes but is not limited to the taking, carrying away, or the sale, conveyance, or transfer of title to, or interest in, or possession of property.” 720 ILCS 5/15 — 8 (West 1998). Thus, properly understood, theft by deception is not a “separate offense” but is a particular manner of obtaining unauthorized control. One could argue whether the additional element of deception should merit more, less or the same punishment as simply taking or carrying away property, but the point is that they are not the same. “The legislature, institutionally, is more aware than the courts of the evils confronting our society and, therefore, is more capable of gauging the seriousness of various offenses.” People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 319, 473 N.E.2d 1300, 1305 (1985). Accordingly, courts will generally defer to a legislative judgment that one particular offense is more serious than another. Davis, 177 Ill. 2d 495, 687 N.E.2d 24. I would submit that similar deference is due when the legislature makes a judgment that the manner in which an offense is committed merits more or less punishment. Such a legislative scheme is certainly not unknown. For example, the punishment for aggravated assault is a Class A misdemeanor when the person assaulted is a teacher, peace officer or fireman (see 720 ILCS 5/12 — 2(a)(3), (a)(6), (b) (West 2000)) but is a Class 4 felony when it involves a correctional officer or employee (720 ILCS 5/12 — 2(a)(14), (a)(15), (b) (West 2000)). Here the legislature singled out theft by deception from a victim 60 years of age or older as warranting different punishment from other types of theft. The provision at issue is both more harsh and more lenient. It is more harsh in that it sets a lower threshold in terms of property value ($5,000 versus $10,000) for a Class 2 felony. It is more lenient in the sense that the victim’s age cannot be the basis for imposing an extended-term sentence. Although perhaps not a model of consistency, I do not believe it violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. I would affirm the defendant’s sentence.