Court Opinion

ID: 9916389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 22:03:28.102909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:13.192739
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (4th) 231191-U
          NOTICE                                                                     FILED
This Order was filed under                   NO. 4-23-1191                         January 9, 2024
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                        Carla Bender
not precedent except in the          IN THE APPELLATE COURT                     4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed                                                         Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                             OF ILLINOIS

                                          FOURTH DISTRICT

   THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )      Appeal from the
              Plaintiff-Appellee,                               )      Circuit Court of
              v.                                                )      Livingston County
   ADAM ERIKKILA,                                               )      No. 23CF378
              Defendant-Appellant.                              )
                                                                )      Honorable
                                                                )      Mary E. Koll,
                                                                )      Judge Presiding.

                   JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
                   Justices Cavanagh and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER
  ¶1       Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
                 in denying defendant pretrial release.

  ¶2               Defendant, Adam Erikkila, appeals the circuit court’s order denying him pretrial

  release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS

  5/art. 110 (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023),

  commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1,

  2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (setting

  the Act’s effective date as September 18, 2023).

  ¶3               On appeal, defendant argues this court should overturn the circuit court’s decision

  because the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence he posed a real and present
threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community and no condition or combination

of conditions could mitigate that threat. He further argues the court erred in its determination that

no condition or combination thereof would reasonably ensure his appearance at later hearings or

prevent him from committing another offense. We affirm.

¶4                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶5             On October 20, 2023, the State charged defendant with one count of criminal

sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20 (West 2022)). That same day, the State filed a verified

petition to deny defendant pretrial release under section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS

5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), as amended by the Act. The State alleged defendant was charged with a

qualifying offense, and defendant’s pretrial release posed a real and present threat to the safety of

persons or the community (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(5) (West 2022)).

¶6             At the detention hearing, the State asked the circuit court to consider the

information contained in the pretrial investigation report and proffered the following factual

basis in support of its verified petition. According to the State, on October 18, 2023, officers of

the Pontiac Police Department received a phone call from defendant’s wife, C.E., who

“report[ed] being sexually abused by her husband.” C.E. “related that [defendant] had raped her

while she was unconscious or inebriated where she could not consent to having sex. She further

related that she had discovered this *** after finding videos where [defendant] recorded himself

penetrating her vagina with his penis.” C.E. “stated the videos were under a secure folder in

[defendant]’s phone that was passcode protected” and “that she obtained the videos when she

was looking through [defendant]’s phone in the past.” While C.E. could not find her copies of

the videos, she was able to send some of the images she had, “and it was evident to law

enforcement the images were of her naked.”

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¶7             C.E. told officers she and defendant had three children together. The couple had

been married for approximately eight years but recently separated. Defendant resided in Dana,

Illinois, but C.E. worried “[defendant] was not at the residence in Dana and could be at their

primary residence at 817 Mohave Drive in Pontiac.” C.E. expressed concern over defendant’s

mental condition and told officers defendant suffered from severe depression and had attempted

suicide in the past. C.E. also “feared [defendant] might become aggressive towards her if he

learned about her calling the police,” even though he had never been violent towards her or their

children. Officers advised C.E. to seek an order of protection “and at some point ***, [C.E.]

requested a callback again.”

¶8             On that call, officers asked C.E. to “bring [defendant]’s phone to the police

department for further investigation” and “learned that none of [defendant]’s family or friends

had *** seen or heard from him all day.” Defendant was eventually located lying in the backseat

of his vehicle near the residence of Anthony Hobart who had previously “caught his wife ***

with [defendant] at [his] home overnight.” Defendant told police he was waiting for Hobart to

leave so he could retrieve his phone and keys. Defendant “denied having any suicidal thoughts or

plans to hurt himself.”

¶9             Officers then spoke with defendant at the police station. Defendant indicated he

understood his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and agreed to speak

with the officers. When asked about C.E.’s allegations against him, defendant “denied any

wrongdoing[,] stating that he and [C.E.] still have consensual sex regularly.” Officers also

requested defendant consent to a search of his phone to determine if C.E.’s allegations were

accurate. Defendant agreed but initially entered incorrect passcodes. After several unsuccessful

attempts, officers unlocked defendant’s phone and located “several distinct videos of [defendant]

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penetrating [C.E.] vaginally with his penis; and it was very evident to law enforcement she was

unconscious, her body was laying limp and motionless in an unreactive state with her eyes

closed.”

¶ 10           During the parties’ arguments to the circuit court, the State emphasized the

seriousness of the offense and reiterated C.E.’s concern over retaliation from defendant after

“becoming aware that she’s reported these things occurring to the police.” The State also noted

defendant underwent an Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA) and received “a

score level that 53% of the people in his category do recidivate” despite scoring a 0 out of 14 on

the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI).

¶ 11           Defense counsel highlighted defendant’s VPRAI score and asserted defendant

“ha[d] never been in trouble before. He is employed, he does have a good job; and he would

agree to any pretrial conditions imposed by this Court.” Further, counsel argued defendant had

“somewhere else to go” and “would agree to no contact with [the victim] or the children” even

though “there ha[d] never been any kind of abuse between [the victim] and the defendant along

with her children.”

¶ 12           In determining whether defendant should be released from pretrial detention, the

circuit court noted defendant’s offense was detainable and that the State had gathered “incredibly

strong evidence of [defendant’s] guilt.” The court also considered defendant’s employment,

VPRAI score, and lack of criminal history. However, the court found it “very concerning that

even with that complete lack of criminal history, [defendant] still scored a 5 on the ODARA

which places [him] in *** a high category.” The court pointed out “80% of people who take this

assessment scored lower than [defendant] did, and this assessment is designed to specifically

predict domestic violence reassault, which is a much more specific indicator than the VPRAI on

                                               -4-
that specific issue.” Ultimately, the court found defendant posed a real and significant danger to

the victim and no conditions or combination thereof could mitigate that risk. In doing so, the

court noted C.E.’s fear for her safety after learning about “what is alleged to have happened here

to her” as well as defendant’s “possible suicidal ideations which also makes this a more risky

situation.”

¶ 13           The circuit court then entered a written order, finding (1) defendant was charged

with a detainable offense and the proof was evident or presumption great that defendant

committed the offense, (2) defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the victim of

the offense, (3) no conditions or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present

threat, and (4) pretrial release should be denied because less restrictive conditions would not

avoid that threat or ensure defendant’s appearance as required. After the court entered its written

order denying defendant pretrial release, defendant filed his notice of appeal under Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(1)(iv) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023).

¶ 14           This appeal followed.

¶ 15                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16           On December 21, 2023, the Office of the State Appellate Defender, defendant’s

appointed counsel on appeal, filed a notice with this court indicating it was not filing a Rule

604(h) memorandum. Thus, we examine the arguments set forth in defendant’s notice of appeal.

¶ 17           According to defendant’s notice of appeal, the State failed to prove by clear and

convincing evidence defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the

community based on the facts of this case. Defendant explained his “VPRAI *** score was 0 and

[he] proffered that he would abide by pretrial conditions including reporting and any assessments

                                                -5-
deemed necessary.” Defendant asserted he “has no criminal history and [he] is 31 years old with

a well paying job.”

¶ 18           Defendant also argued the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat he posed

to the safety of any person or the community based on the facts of this case. According to

defendant, “[i]n addition to no criminal history, he has no failure to appear warrants issued as

well.” Finally, based on the foregoing arguments, defendant asserted the circuit court erred in its

determination that no condition or combination thereof would reasonably ensure his appearance

at later hearings or prevent him from committing another offense.

¶ 19           The determination of whether pretrial release should be granted or denied is

reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837,

¶¶ 27, 30. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the circuit court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful

or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would agree with the position adopted by the

[circuit] court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st)

191253, ¶ 9, 143 N.E.3d 833. Under this standard, a reviewing court will not substitute its own

judgment for that of the circuit court simply because it would have analyzed the proper factors

differently. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. Likewise, “we will not substitute

our own judgment for the trier of fact on issues regarding the weight of the evidence or the

credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Vega, 2018 IL App (1st) 160619, ¶ 44, 123 N.E.3d 393.

¶ 20           Before denying pretrial release, the State must prove by clear and convincing

evidence “the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or

the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case,” and “no condition or

combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can

                                                -6-
mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.”

725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2), (3)(i) (West 2022). Section 110-6.1 of the Code instructs the court to

consider “the specific articulable facts of the case” and provides nine factors the court can also

consider when assessing the real and present threat allegation. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West

2022).

¶ 21           Here, defendant essentially asks this court to assess the situation anew and

substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court—which we will not do. Inman, 2023 IL App

(4th) 230864, ¶ 11. “[W]e are not reviewing the State’s evidence anew. Instead, we are

reviewing the circuit court’s evaluation of that evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Inman, 2023

IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. Per the Code, the court determined defendant’s offense was

detainable and that the State had gathered “incredibly strong evidence of [defendant’s] guilt.”

See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022). The court went on to consider defendant’s history

and characteristics, noting defendant was employed, scored a zero on the VPRAI, and had no

criminal history. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(2) (West 2022). However, the court found it “very

concerning that even with that complete lack of criminal history, [defendant] still scored a 5 on

the ODARA ***.” The court pointed out “80% of people who take this assessment scored lower

than [defendant] did, and this assessment is designed to specifically predict domestic violence

reassault, which is a much more specific indicator than the VPRAI on that specific issue.” The

Code allows the court to consider the specific, articulable facts of the case, the nature and

circumstances of any offense, and “[a]ny other factors *** deemed by the court to have a

reasonable bearing upon the defendant’s propensity or reputation for violent, abusive, or

assaultive behavior.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1), (9) (West 2022).

                                                -7-
¶ 22            Further, the circuit court entered a detention order compliant with the language of

section 110-6.1 of the Code in which the court found (1) defendant was charged with a

detainable offense and the proof was evident or presumption great defendant committed the

offense (see 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022)), (2) defendant posed a real and present

threat to the victim of the offense (see 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2) (West 2022)), (3) no conditions

or combination of conditions under subsection 110-10(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-10(b)

(West 2022)) could mitigate the real and present threat (see 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West

2022)), and (4) pretrial release should be denied because less restrictive conditions would not

avoid that threat or ensure defendant’s appearance as required (see 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1)

(West 2022)).

¶ 23            Because the circuit court complied with the Code’s requirements and made the

necessary findings, we cannot say the court’s decision was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.

See Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9. Accordingly, defendant’s arguments the court

abused its discretion by denying him pretrial release are meritless. See Inman, 2023 IL App (4th)

230864, ¶ 11.

¶ 24                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25            For all these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 26            Affirmed.

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