Court Opinion

ID: 9841319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 22:00:45.586283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:32.688103
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LOKESH VUYYURU,

               Plaintiff,
       v.                                            Civil Action No. 22-1453 (TJK)
Y.S. JAGAN MOHAN REDDY et al.,

               Defendants.

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff sued under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organi-

zations Act against ten named and five anonymous defendants. The Court has since dismissed one

of those defendants, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, from the case. Of the nine remaining

named defendants, six are officials of the Indian government, and one is the chair of the World

Economic Forum. No named defendant has appeared, and the Clerk of Court entered default

against them. Plaintiff now moves for default judgment. But his complaint fails to present a

federal question suitable for decision. Instead, it advances vague, unsupported claims of a wide-

ranging conspiracy involving the Indian and United States governments and the World Economic

Forum. When stripped of such allegations, his complaint contains nothing but unconnected events

that fail to support Plaintiff’s conclusions or any conceivable claims. Thus, the Court will deny

his motion and sua sponte dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I.     Background

       A.      Factual Background

       Plaintiff’s sprawling complaint accuses a host of powerful people of wrongdoing. For ex-

ample, Plaintiff accuses Defendant Jagan Reddy of “rampant corruption and looting of . . . re-

sources” intended to alleviate the COVID-19 pandemic, importing heroin into India, and hacking
unsuspecting users’ cellphones. See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 33, 53–56. Plaintiff also goes as

far as accusing Defendant Ramakrishna Reddy of “every crime in the text book [sic].” Compl.

¶ 7. The shotgun, conclusory nature of Plaintiff’s pleading—combined with its length and

breadth—makes it difficult to discern the exact nature of his claims. But because he appears pro

se, the Court has attempted to “infer the claims made wherever possible,” seeking to identify “all

possible legal theories that could apply.” See Davis v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 2d 23, 26

(D.D.C. 2014).

        The factual core of his complaint seems to relate to plans to develop a city in India. In

short, Plaintiff says he developed “[t]emplates” for a “futuristic city” that would serve as the capital

of an Indian state. See Compl. ¶¶ 50–52. Plaintiff gave those templates to local officials. See

Compl. ¶ 116. Among other things, Plaintiff planned to open offices of his businesses there. See

Compl. ¶¶ 16, 103, 122–23. But a “criminal syndicate” comprising the Indian prime minister, the

chair of the World Economic Forum, and various other Indian officials destroyed those plans,

causing “huge financial losses.” See Compl. ¶¶ 6, 26, 61, 133.

        Beyond that outline, specific allegations are hard to pin down. What follows is the Court’s

attempt to construct a narrative from Plaintiff’s filings, including those beyond his complaint.

                                           *       *       *

        Plaintiff is a physician, philanthropist, publisher, businessman, and social activist. Compl.

¶ 14. He is a U.S. citizen, ECF No. 12 at 2, but he “moved to India in 2014.” Compl. ¶ 121.

Plaintiff runs a newspaper called the Virginia Times and edits a magazine called Dolus. Compl.

¶ 15. He also publishes on social media. Id. His editorial work has often criticized Defendants

and the Indian government. See id. He has also accused Defendants of wrongdoing through other

channels, such as interviews with other journalists and by direct messages to Defendants. See

                                                   2
Compl. ¶¶ 84–86, 124, 127, 135–36.

        Plaintiff has started several other businesses, including a health-care business and an infor-

mation-technology business in the city he hoped to develop. See Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff also

opened a hospital elsewhere in India in 2014. See ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 17.

        Seven of the ten named defendants are officials of the Indian government. Their titles

include prime minister, chief minister, “de-facto chief minister,” and various election commission-

ers. See Compl. ¶¶ 3–12. The remaining named defendants are the chair of the World Economic

Forum, Compl. ¶ 6, a “business man [sic],” Compl. ¶ 5, and a “broker[ ]” for whom Plaintiff gave

no specific official title, Compl. ¶ 10.

        Plaintiff also named five anonymous defendants. He describes them collectively as “indi-

viduals and organizations in various powerful positions in America.” See Compl. ¶ 63 (capitali-

zation altered). Of those, one is “a powerful American politician,” who aided other defendants by

“bringing . . . dirty money to America.” See Compl. ¶ 138. Another, whose name Plaintiff later

provided, is “a de facto key operator of [sic] Prime Minister of India’s office.” ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 3.

Plaintiff made a few collateral references to a third anonymous defendant, who appears to have

the ability to influence Indian elections and to incite others in India to act violently. See Compl.

¶¶ 100–102, 118, 120, 122, 131, 133–34. But Plaintiff did not otherwise identify this defendant.

Plaintiff provided no information about the other two anonymous defendants.

        Plaintiff is familiar with Defendants’ actions because he “dealt with” them “in various ca-

pacities from 2014 to 2021.” See ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 20. At some point, Plaintiff came to believe

that Defendants were acting illegally in the city where his hospital was located. See Compl. ¶ 37.

He also believed Defendants conspired to interfere in Indian elections in violation of that nation’s

laws and constitution. See Compl. ¶¶ 38–44, 84–86.

                                                  3
       Plaintiff’s plans for a futuristic capital city required the input of American architectural,

engineering, and design firms. See Compl. ¶ 51. Plaintiff also “personally spent money”—$5 mil-

lion—on developing those plans. See Compl. ¶ 115; ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 18. He gave those plans to

local officials in June 2014. Compl. ¶ 97. At first, Prime Minister Modi supported his proposal.

See Compl. ¶ 98. Indeed, he had endorsed the idea even before he became prime minister. See

Compl. ¶ 115. But later—thanks to alleged bribery—Defendants undermined the plan with “sys-

tematic organized propaganda.” See Compl. ¶ 99. That propaganda included “false cases in the

courts” and a “nonsense book” on the city. See Compl. ¶ 118. Instead of Plaintiff’s plan, Defend-

ants announced they would build “Three Capitals.” See Compl. ¶ 152(dd).

       In August 2014, Plaintiff arranged a collaborative meeting in Virginia with an American

company. See ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 9. Plaintiff, however, missed that meeting. See id. ¶ 12. Later, he

learned that a representative of Prime Minister Modi had attended the meeting and informed com-

pany representatives that they would need to bribe Prime Minister Modi to do business in India.

See id. ¶¶ 8–11. In response, the company threw the representative out of the office. See id. ¶ 13.

       In February 2018, “political goons of the defendants” “looted” Plaintiff’s hospital. ECF

No. 13-2 ¶ 17. Plaintiff told “American embassies” about that incident and other related corrup-

tion. See Compl. ¶ 135. Defendants, though, committed “at least two acts of witness retaliation

against Plaintiff and other [U.S.] citizens.” See Compl. ¶ 143. They also assaulted his employees

and destroyed his equipment, forcing his hospital to close. See id.

       In June 2019, Jagan Reddy became chief minister of the state in which Plaintiff’s city was

to be built. See Compl. ¶ 103. Jagan Reddy “directly shut down” Plaintiff’s project. Id. His

efforts included “violence and destruction.” See Compl. ¶ 119. Fifteen months after those efforts

began, Plaintiff’s offices in the city closed. See Compl. ¶¶ 103. Plaintiff suggests that Defendants

                                                 4
retaliated against him for his prior criticisms, including his exposure of election fraud. See Compl.

¶¶ 143–44, 146–47, 158. Alternatively, he attributes their actions to his refusal to bribe them. See

ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 19. As a result, Plaintiff and his businesses, including those in the city and the

Virginia Times, suffered financial losses. See Compl. at 53. Plaintiff estimates those losses at

$150,000. Cf. ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 29 (describing his alleged “unliquidated damages”).

       Perhaps as part of that unrest, Defendants “attack[ed] American investors,” driving them

out of India, which permitted Defendants to “grab their assets for pennies on dollars [sic].” See

Compl. ¶ 136. For the same purpose, Defendants “incit[ed] violence” by others. See Compl.

¶ 150(d). The United States experienced resulting harm from reduced tax revenue and job losses.

See ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 7. Because of Defendants’ corruption, Plaintiff says, American companies

could not do business, forgoing “billions of dollars” in revenue. See Compl. ¶¶ 46, 50–51, 95.

       During the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiff provided humanitarian aid to India. See Compl.

¶ 53, 125. His efforts were frustrated, though, by what he views as Defendants’ inappropriate use

of resources such as vaccines and bleach. See Compl. ¶¶ 53–55. Those transactions generated

money that Defendants funneled into companies owned by Defendant Adani.                 See Compl.

¶¶ 53–58. The World Economic Forum is involved in laundering those funds. See Compl.

¶¶ 61–62. Separately, Jagan Reddy stores his ill-gotten gains in various “shell suite case compa-

nies,” offshore bank accounts, and fraudulent charities. Compl. ¶¶ 77–80, 88. Collectively, De-

fendants have sent much of that money to the United States—“more than $250 billion dollars [sic]

in less than 10 years.” See Compl. ¶ 90.

       That money has been used to construct “a parallel economy” and to bribe U.S. politicians.

See Compl. ¶ 92. It has also been used to create a “parallel [g]overnment” in the United States,

supported by the “parallel economy,” which “wield[s] unbelievable power in [U.S.] government.”

                                                 5
See Compl. ¶ 152(k). As an example of that power, the money was used to bribe “Virginia Poli-

ticians” to write “Amicus briefs” that led the “Supreme court of Virginia” to “exonerate” former

governor Bob McDonnell. See ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 27. 1

       In September 2021, Plaintiff tried personally to arrest Prime Minister Modi. See Compl.

¶ 152(ff). Although Plaintiff “got permission from Park services and informed the secret service,”

Prime Minister Modi “escaped.” Id.

                                         *       *       *

       The remaining allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint have even less narrative coherence. For

example, he devotes considerable space to attacking Defendants’ lineages, claiming that they de-

scend from criminals and corrupt officials. See Compl. ¶¶ 17–20, 25, 66, 78–79. Apparently as

background information, Plaintiff also elaborates on the ways he thinks Defendants and others

became wealthy and came to power. See Compl. ¶¶ 21–24, 26–36, 38–45, 48, 57, 60, 65–79,

81–83, 87, 89, 96, 100–01, 106–09, 149. He accuses them of terrible—but seemingly unrelated—

acts such as murder, rape, massive thefts, fraud, looting, “thuggery,” corruption, smuggling, black-

mail, censorship, neglecting impoverished people, and religious persecution. See Compl. ¶¶ 25,

47, 49, 56, 58–59, 61–62, 68, 88, 110–11, 126, 128–32, 150–54. And he derides their poor intel-

ligence and lack of education. See Compl. ¶¶ 101–02, 118, 134; ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 4.

                                         *       *       *

       Plaintiff’s complaint brings three categories of claims. The first asserts “abuse of process,”

but Plaintiff does not specify under what legal authority. See Compl. ¶¶ 64–112. The second

asserts “statutory business conspiracy,” and again Plaintiff does not suggest what statute he means

       1
      Plaintiff elsewhere suggests that the money was instead (or also) used to bring about
McDonnell’s “Down fall [sic].” See Compl. ¶ 93.

                                                 6
to invoke. See Compl. ¶¶ 113–38. The third asserts violations of the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (“RICO”), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. See Compl.

¶¶ 139–70.

       B.      Procedural History

       Plaintiff filed a series of hand-written affidavits attesting service on the named Indian de-

fendants. See generally ECF No. 6. Each such affidavit reports that he personally served the

“Ministry of Law & Justice under [the] Hague Convention.” See id. at 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15,

17, 19. As to Defendant Schwab, Plaintiff filed an affidavit reporting that he mailed the summons

and complaint to an address in Cologny, Switzerland, see ECF No. 7, and a document that appar-

ently is meant to reflect service on Schwab consistent with the requirements of the Hague Con-

vention, see ECF No. 10. When Defendants did not appear, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of default

swearing he had “served the summons as directed by the Honorable court.” See ECF No. 8 at 2.

The Clerk of Court entered default against all Defendants. See ECF No. 9.

       The United States then filed a suggestion of immunity for Defendant Prime Minister Modi.

See ECF No. 11. Noting that Prime Minister Modi is currently “India’s head of government,” ECF

No. 11-1, it argued that he is immune from suit, ECF No. 11 at 1–7. The Court allowed Plaintiff

to respond to that notice, Min. Order of Dec. 8, 2022, and he agreed to withdraw his claims against

Prime Minister Modi, ECF No. 12 at 1. Thus, the Court dismissed Defendant Prime Minister Modi

from the case. Min. Order of Dec. 29, 2022.

       Plaintiff now moves for default judgment as to the remaining defendants. See ECF No. 13.

He asks the Court to enter default judgment for “$5.1 Billion,” divided up in varying amounts

                                                7
among them. See ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 12. 2 That number does not appear to include his separate re-

quest for “unliquidated damages in the amount of $150,000,” and on top of those figures, he re-

quests “[a]ttorney fees of $25,000.” See ECF No. 13-1 ¶ 11.

II.    Legal Standards

       Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 creates a “two-step procedure” for obtaining a default

judgment. Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 134 F. Supp. 3d 99, 102 (D.D.C. 2015). First,

after a defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend,” the plaintiff may request that the Clerk

of the Court enter default against that defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after default is

entered, the plaintiff may move for a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). An entry of

default “establishes the defaulting party's liability for the well-pleaded allegations of the com-

plaint.” Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (D.D.C. 2011) (collecting

cases). But this “does not automatically establish liability in the amount claimed by the plaintiff.”

Carazani v. Zegarra, 972 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2013). Instead—unless the plaintiff seeks a

sum certain—the Court “is required to make an independent determination of the sum to be

awarded.” See Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. R.W. Amrine Drywall Co.,

239 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2002).

       Before awarding damages against absent parties, the Court has an “affirmative obligation”

to ensure it has subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. See James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v.

Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Karcher v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 396 F. Supp.

3d 12, 21 (D.D.C. 2019). That is, it must verify that Plaintiff pleaded “facts sufficient to establish

subject matter jurisdiction,” Herbin v. Seau, 317 F. Supp. 3d 568, 572 (D.D.C. 2018) (quotation

       2
           The requests specified elsewhere in his motion appear to add up to $11 billion, or $10
billion if the request against Prime Minister Modi is excluded. See ECF No. 13 ¶¶ 1–10.

                                                  8
omitted), and to make a prima facie showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defend-

ants, see Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Meeting that burden requires more

than conclusory statements and bald accusations. See Hasenfus v. Corp. Air Servs., 700 F. Supp.

58, 62 (D.D.C. 1988); Affordable Hous. Specialist, LLC v. J&L Cattle Co., LLC, No. 21-CV-2854

(CKK), 2022 WL 8180359, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2022). If Plaintiff fails to meet that burden,

the Court should not only deny the motion, but it should also dismiss the complaint. See Herbin,

317 F. Supp. 3d at 572; Trudel v. Suntrust Bank, 302 F. Supp. 3d 140, 144 (D.D.C. 2018).

       Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must construe his filings liberally. See Bow-

man v. Iddon, 848 F.3d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2017). That means, among other things, considering

factual allegations from all his filings, not just his complaint. See Watson v. D.C. Water & Sewer

Auth., 249 F. Supp. 3d 462, 464 (D.D.C. 2017); Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d

146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Ultimately, though, that lower standard does not absolve Plaintiff of

the need to plausibly plead facts that establish jurisdiction. See Bickford v. United States, 808 F.

Supp. 2d 175, 179 (D.D.C. 2011).

III.   Analysis

       Plaintiff’s filings establish neither subject-matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction over

any defendant. At bottom, he offers just a diffuse list of misfortunes without anything besides

conclusory allegations to connect them to Defendants. For that reason, he has failed to establish a

substantial federal question over which this Court has jurisdiction. What is more, his allegations

do not suggest any specific contacts between Defendants and the United States, let alone the Dis-

trict of Columbia. Nor do they hint that Defendants’ supposed schemes were motivated by their

desire to harm the United States generally. For those reasons, Plaintiff has failed to make a prima

facie case for personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Thus, the Court will deny his motion for

default judgment and sua sponte dismiss his complaint.

                                                  9
       A.      The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Because Plaintiff’s Claims Are
               Patently Insubstantial

       Federal courts have “limited jurisdiction” and must presume unless a party shows other-

wise that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.

of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). That limited jurisdiction does not include claims “so attenu-

ated . . . as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, or obviously frivolous.” Wil-

liams v. Davis, No. 22-CV-02178 (APM), 2022 WL 3585650, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2022) (quot-

ing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974)) (alterations adopted). The term for such

claims is “patently insubstantial”—and they “may be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.” Tooley

v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).

       A patently insubstantial claim is “essentially fictitious,” not just “doubtful or questiona-

ble.” See Ord v. District of Columbia, 587 F.3d 1136, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).

And that is a factual conclusion, not a legal one. See id. Prototypical examples include “bizarre

conspiracy theories, fantastic government manipulations of the will or mind, or any sort of super-

natural intervention.” See Bickford, 808 F.2d at 179 (quotation omitted and alterations adopted).

A plaintiff has alleged such a bizarre conspiracy theory if he describes grave malfeasance coordi-

nated among many people, particularly high-ranking government and business officials, without

giving specifics or revealing the basis of his knowledge. 3 Such allegations are “inherently unreal-

istic” and so need not be presumed true. See Roum v. Bush, 461 F. Supp. 2d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 2006).

       3
         See, e.g., Baszak v. FBI, 816 F. Supp. 2d 66, 68–69 (D.D.C. 2011); Bickford, 808 F. Supp.
at 182; Wightman-Cervantes v. Mueller, 750 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D.D.C. 2010); Lamb v. ATF,
No. 20-CV-3036 (TJK), 2022 WL 203433, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-5038,
2022 WL 2387560 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 2022); Big Sky Civ. Tr. v. United States, No. 21-CV-1282
(TJK), 2022 WL 1471423, at *3 (D.D.C. May 10, 2022); Williams, 2022 WL 3585650, at *1;
Williams v. D.C. Superior Ct., No. 22-CV-2993 (APM), 2022 WL 6726801, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct.
11, 2022); Gilberti v. Fed. Rsrv. Sys., No. 19-CV-738 (KBJ), 2019 WL 1901293, at *2 (D.D.C.
Apr. 29, 2019), aff’d, No. 19-5264, 2020 WL 1487738 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 2020).

                                                10
        That is the nature of Plaintiff’s allegations. He describes a vast conspiracy that includes

the Prime Minister of India, several other Indian officials, the World Economic Forum, and U.S.

politicians. 4 He claims the conspiracy, despite overall aims that could hardly be more grandiose,

has devoted substantial energy to targeting him specifically. 5 That conspiracy, if Plaintiff is to be

believed, has also been fantastically successful—yet imperceptibly so—in having managed to

amass incalculable wealth and even to create a parallel U.S. government and economy. 6 For all

that, the only hints at the basis of Plaintiff’s knowledge are his claims to have “studied, re-

searched[,] and observed” hacking of election machines and that he once “came to know about a

memo” with unspecified contents. 7 Thus, his allegations about Defendants’ conspiracy are essen-

tially fictitious, and the Court will not presume their truth.

        4
          Compare Compl. ¶¶ 6, 26, 61, 63, 133, 138, with Ellis v. Jackson, 319 F. Supp. 3d 23, 33
(D.D.C. 2018) (describing as “obviously frivolous” allegations of a “wide-ranging scheme, one
that includes current and former government employees . . . from IRS employees to a former Pres-
ident to federal judges” (quotation omitted)).
        5
          Compare Compl. ¶¶ 99, 118, 143; ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 17 with Big Sky Civ. Tr., 2022 WL
1471423, at *1 (“[Plaintiff] alleges that he has been the target of coordinated plans between certain
federal agencies, state and local government components, and private telecommunications com-
panies over the past three decades.”); Tooley, 586 F.3d at 1009 (noting that the supposed motive
of the allegedly wrongful activity was “to persecute [Plaintiff] for remarks critical of the [govern-
ment], remarks likely indistinguishable from those of millions of [others]”); Walsh v. Comey, 118
F. Supp. 3d 22, 26 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[Plaintiff] alleges a decades-long, government-wide conspir-
acy targeting him and perpetrated by numerous high-level government officials.”).
        6
         Compare Compl. ¶¶ 21–24, 26–36, 38–45, 48, 57, 60, 65–79, 81–83, 87, 89, 92, 96,
100–01, 106–09, 149, 152(k), with Tooley, 586 F.3d at 1009 (noting that an alleged conspiracy
employed technology “well beyond state of the art”); Lewis v. Bayh, 577 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54
(D.D.C. 2008) (noting that an incredible alleged conspiracy had “cause[d] a power outage affecting
the west side of Los Angeles”).
        7
         Compare Compl. ¶¶ 37, 84, 152(t), with Richards v. Duke Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222,
233 (D.D.C. 2007) (“Plaintiff has only offered a laundry list of wrongful acts and conclusory alle-
gations to support her theory of a conspiracy[,] which is insufficient to allow the case to go for-
ward.” (quotation omitted)); Curran v. Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[P]laintiff’s
allegations . . . are conclusory and unsupported by factual details.”).

                                                  11
       That conclusion leaves Plaintiff’s personal misfortunes, which the Court will assume hap-

pened. See, e.g., Lamb, 2022 WL 203433, at *3. But those misfortunes are diffuse, and Plaintiff

provides little detail about them. For example, he proposed, at his own cost, plans to develop a

city that governing officials did not adopt. See Compl. ¶¶ 51, 97, 115, 152(dd). His meeting with

an American company did not go as planned. See ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 8–13. His businesses experi-

enced adversity, including even physical destruction, and he had to close some of them. See

Compl. ¶¶ 103, 119, 143; id. at 53; ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 17. And his efforts to alleviate the effects of

COVID-19 in India were not as effective as he hoped. See Compl. ¶¶ 53, 125.

       Nothing about those allegations, however, suggests Defendants’ involvement. They ap-

pear to be merely “a series of unconnected events” Plaintiff has lumped together “to support [his]

conclusion that [he] has been singled out for harassment.” See Curran, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 34.

Most of life’s disappointments are not caused by shadowy cabals of international criminals, and

Plaintiff offers nothing concrete to suggest that he is the exception to that rule.

       Thus, under the patently insubstantial doctrine, Plaintiff’s claims “cannot go forward.” See

Yi Tai Shao v. Roberts, No. 18-CV-1233 (RC), 2019 WL 249855, at *16 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2019),

aff’d, No. 19-5014, 2019 WL 3955710 (D.C. Cir. July 31, 2019). The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

       B.      Plaintiff Has Not Made a Prima Facie Showing that the Court Has Personal
               Jurisdiction over Any Defendant

       Even if Plaintiff’s claims were not patently insubstantial, the Court would still deny his

motion for default judgment and dismiss his complaint. That is because he also has not made a

prima facie showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over any defendant. 8

       8
          The Court need not have subject-matter jurisdiction to assess whether it has personal
jurisdiction. See Williams v. Romarm, SA, 756 F.3d 777, 781 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

                                                  12
       Personal jurisdiction has two variants: general and specific. See generally Goodyear Dun-

lop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). A court has general jurisdiction—juris-

diction for all purposes—over a defendant in the forum where he is “at home.” See Daimler A.G.

v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). A court has specific jurisdiction—jurisdiction linked to a

particular claim—when the claim is sufficiently related to a defendant’s contacts with the forum.

See generally Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021).

       To make a prima facie case for general jurisdiction, Plaintiff had to allege facts suggesting

Defendants are continuously and systematically affiliated with the District of Columbia. See

Toumazou v. Turkish Republic of N. Cyprus, 71 F. Supp. 3d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2014). For example, a

court in this district found that standard satisfied when the plaintiff “submitted several public rec-

ord searches and business filings[ ] indicating that . . . two limited liability companies . . . [with

which a defendant was associated] both maintain a standard address in the District of Columbia”

and systematically do business here. See GAG Enters., Inc. v. Rayford, 312 F.R.D. 230, 232–33

(D.D.C. 2015). For an individual, after all, the “paradigm forum” is his “domicile.” Daimler A.G.,

571 U.S. at 137.

       Plaintiff’s filings do not mention any specific action taken in the District of Columbia.

They say nothing about where any defendant lives or does business, although it is likely safe to

infer that the officials of the Indian government live and conduct their busines in that country.

Thus, his filings do not provide any basis to infer that Defendants have continuous and systematic

contacts with the District of Columbia, let alone that they are domiciled here. So Plaintiff has not

made a prima facie case for general jurisdiction.

       Finding specific jurisdiction has two parts. First, the Court must conclude that a statute

authorizes jurisdiction against a nondomiciliary. See U.S. Dominion, Inc. v. Powell, 554 F. Supp.

                                                 13
3d 42, 65 (D.D.C. 2021). Second, and if a statute does authorize such jurisdiction, the Court must

conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause. See id.

       Even if the Court assumes without deciding that there is a statutory basis for jurisdiction,

exercising it would not comport with due process. Thus, Plaintiff has not made a prima facie

showing of specific jurisdiction.

       To make such a showing, Plaintiff must allege “pertinent jurisdictional facts.” See First

Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Those facts establish

jurisdiction if they permit the Court to conclude that a defendant made purposeful contact with the

forum and that Plaintiff’s claims arise from those contacts. See Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct.

at 1024–25. That is, under this theory, Plaintiff needs “an affiliation between the forum and the

underlying controversy.” See id. at 1025 (quotation omitted). For a prima facie showing, those

conclusions must be a “reasonable inference” from Plaintiff’s filings. See Lewis v. Mutond, 62

F.4th 587, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted).

       Plaintiff’s filings do not so much as mention the District of Columbia. All but two of the

acts he mentions happened in India or (in Schwab’s case) Switzerland. And both exceptions—the

meeting with the American company, and the influencing of former Governor McDonnell’s crim-

inal case—happened in Virginia, not the District of Columbia. See Compl. ¶ 93; ECF No. 13-2

¶¶ 9, 27. Moreover, for both sets of allegations, Plaintiff never even says who attended the meeting

or bribed politicians. The man who attended the meeting is allegedly “a close friend of Narendra

Modi”—but not necessarily a defendant or even acting on the prime minister’s behalf. See ECF

No. 13-2 ¶ 10. Thus, the Court has no conceivable basis, for several reasons, for inferring from

Plaintiff’s filings that any defendant made purposeful contacts with the District of Columbia, let

alone in a way that gave rise to Plaintiff’s claims.

                                                 14
       Still, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), 9 the Circuit has recognized that a de-

fendant’s “contacts with the nation as a whole” can establish jurisdiction. See Mwani, 417 F.3d

at 11. But even assuming that rule otherwise applies here, Plaintiff’s allegations fall well short of

the required showing under that rule too.

       As relevant here, jurisdiction is sometimes established even without “specific, physical

contact” with the United States. See Mwani, 417 F.3d at 12. That is so if a defendant’s “efforts

are purposefully directed” at the United States such that he has “fair warning that [his] activities

would subject [him] to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at 13 (quotation omitted). In

Mwani, for example, the Circuit found that standard satisfied as to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda,

noting that their objective for the conduct related to the plaintiffs’ claims was “to cause pain and

sow terror in . . . the United States.” Id. That is a high bar, and it is not satisfied just because a

defendant knew that his actions might impact a U.S. citizen or even the country generally. See

Lewis, 62 F.4th at 595; Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 33 (D.D.C. 2015) (distin-

guishing Mwani because the case “[did] not involve an attack on an American embassy or . . . in-

volve overt acts, within U.S. borders, furthering a conspiracy to attack the U.S.”), aff’d, 851 F.3d

45 (D.C. Cir. 2017). As another court in this district put it, to establish jurisdiction under this

theory, a plaintiff’s filings must “give rise to the conclusion that defendants must have been tar-

geting the United States . . . as opposed to one resident.” See Cengiz v. Salman, No. 20-CV-3009

(JDB), 2022 WL 17475400, at *12 n.17 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2022).

       The Court could not so conclude from Plaintiff’s filings. The only allegations conceivably

       9
         “For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service
establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction
in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the
United States Constitution and laws.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).

                                                  15
relevant to that theory are his claims that some individuals laundered money in the United States,

see, e.g., Compl. ¶ 90, and that three defendants attacked “American investors” to induce them to

leave India so Defendants could “grab their assets,” see Compl. ¶ 136. 10 Neither allegation sug-

gests that Defendants’ motivation was to harm the United States. Plaintiff himself says the purpose

of targeting American investors was to acquire wealth—not “to cause pain and sow terror in . . . the

United States.” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 12. Even assuming Defendants knew that their actions would

impact U.S. citizens, that awareness does not satisfy the standard.        See Cengiz, 2022 WL

17475400, at *12 n.17.

       For those reasons, Plaintiff’s filings do not permit the inference that the Court has either

general or specific personal jurisdiction over any defendant. Thus, the Court would deny his mo-

tion for default judgment and dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on this alternative ground even if it

were not otherwise patently insubstantial. See Trudel, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 144.

                                         *       *       *

       Finally, the Court will not permit Plaintiff to amend his complaint. The Court need not

allow amendment if doing so would be “futile.” See James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82

F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996). And “given that the complaint is . . . patently insubstantial,

allowing [Plaintiff] to amend it would be futile.” Lamb, 2022 WL 203433, at *7. Thus—although

the Court’s dismissal is on jurisdictional grounds and so operates without prejudice—its dismissal

will be “final and appealable” as a dismissal of the case, not just the complaint. See N. Am. But-

terfly Ass’n v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

       10
          Insofar as the Court can make any sense of Plaintiff’s allegations that someone has cre-
ated a parallel government and a parallel economy in the United States, see Compl. ¶¶ 92, 152(k),
those allegations do not explain who is responsible, which does not allow the Court to connect
Defendants with those activities. Plaintiff mentions Prime Minister Modi’s name in connection
with that claim, see Compl. ¶ 92, but Prime Minister Modi is no longer a defendant.

                                                16
IV.    Conclusion

       For all the above reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and

sua sponte dismiss the case. A separate order will issue.

                                                            /s/ Timothy J. Kelly
                                                            TIMOTHY J. KELLY
                                                            United States District Judge
Date: September 21, 2023

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