Court Opinion

ID: 9369229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 15:00:33.082491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:13.717952
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-12493    Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2023    Page: 1 of 38

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-12493
                           ____________________

        CHERRI WALKER,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cv-00506-HNJ
                           ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                      21-11736

        Before LAGOA and BRASHER, Circuit Judges, and BOULEE,* District
        Judge.
        LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
               This case arises from an insurance dispute between Cherri
        Walker and Life Insurance Company of North America (“LINA”).
        Between 2013 and 2015, LINA made multiple determinations that
        Walker did not qualify for disability benefits under her long-term
        disability insurance policy and her life insurance policy. In re-
        sponse, Walker sued LINA for breach of contract and bad-faith fail-
        ure to provide insurance benefits.
                The district court granted summary judgment for LINA on
        Walker’s bad-faith claim based on the multiple medical opinions
        that supported LINA’s determinations. At a pre-trial hearing, the
        district court held that, under Alabama law, Walker could not re-
        cover mental anguish damages for her breach of contract claim and
        excluded evidence of such damages. Finally, following a jury ver-
        dict in Walker’s favor on the breach of contract claim related to the
        long-term disability insurance policy, the district court determined
        that Walker was entitled to simple pre-judgment interest at a rate
        of 1.5 percent under the policy and simple post-judgment interest
        at a rate of 0.08 percent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. In determin-
        ing that the long-term disability insurance policy provided for sim-
        ple rather than compound interest, the district court struck a

        * Honorable  J.P. Boulee, United States District Judge for the Northern District
        of Georgia, sitting by designation.
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        21-12493                    Opinion of the Court                                 3

        document produced by Walker because it was not properly au-
        thenticated.
               Walker now argues that the district court erred at each of
        these steps. After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argu-
        ment, we affirm all of the district court’s rulings on appeal.
                 I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               Walker is a citizen of Alabama. The Healthcare Authority
        of Athens Limestone Hospital (the “Authority”) is a state entity
        that operates the Athens Limestone Hospital in Athens, Alabama.
        The Authority employed Walker as a respiratory therapist and as a
        director.
               The Authority held for the benefit of its employees two
        group insurance policies: (1) a long-term disability insurance policy
        and (2) a life insurance policy.1 LINA, a citizen of Pennsylvania,
        issued both policies.

        1 The life insurance policy provides certain disability benefits (e.g., waiver of
        premium, extension of coverage) separate from the disability policy. The jury
        did not find in Walker’s favor on the life insurance policy, however, and the
        issues raised in this appeal relate solely to the disability policy. Thus, while we
        sometimes refer to the life policy during our discussion of the factual and pro-
        cedural history of this case, we do not discuss in any detail the terms of that
        policy as they are not relevant to our consideration of the issues before us on
        this appeal.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-12493

              The disability policy provides for monthly disability pay-
        ments if an employee becomes “disabled.” The policy defines “dis-
        abled” as follows:
              The Employee is considered Disabled if, solely be-
              cause of Injury or Sickness, he or she is:
                  1. unable to perform the material duties of his or
                     her Regular Occupation; and
                  2. unable to earn 80% or more of his or her In-
                     dexed Earnings from working in his or her
                     Regular Occupation.
              After Disability Benefits have been payable for 24
              months, the Employee is considered Disabled if,
              solely due to Injury or Sickness, he or she is:
                  1. unable to perform the material duties of any
                     occupation for which he or she is, or may rea-
                     sonably become, qualified based on education,
                     training or experience; and
                  2. unable to earn 60% or more of his or her In-
                     dexed Earnings.
        Thus, the disability policy defines “disabled” differently, using one
        definition for initial claims and a more stringent definition after
        benefits have been payable for twenty-four months.
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        21-12493                  Opinion of the Court                               5

               Separately, for initial coverage purposes, the policy gener-
        ally requires an elimination period of ninety days. 2 And as relevant
        to interest paid on claims, the disability policy provides:
               Time of Payment
               Disability Benefits will be paid within 45 days, upon
               receipt of due written proof of loss, at regular inter-
               vals of not more than one month. Disability Benefits
               not paid within 45 days of receipt of due written proof
               of loss shall be considered overdue. The Insurance
               Company will pay the insured one and one-half per-
               cent per month on the amount of any claim which is
               considered overdue until it is finally settled and adju-
               dicated.
               Any balance unpaid at the end of any period for which
               the Insurance Company is liable will be paid at that
               time.
               On October 12, 2012, Walker ceased working at the Author-
        ity due to fibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis, and chronic pain.
        Walker subsequently submitted disability claims under both the
        disability policy and the life policy. On February 26, 2013, the Au-
        thority’s Director of Human Resources, Sabrina Weaver, emailed
        LINA. At that point, LINA had not yet approved either of Walker’s

        2 In the insurance industry, the term “elimination period” refers to the length
        of time between the occurrence of a qualifying event/condition and the re-
        ceipt of benefits. Thus, under the disability policy, a disabled employee will
        begin receiving monthly benefits ninety days after the date of his or her disa-
        bility.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12493

        disability claims. In her email, Weaver stated: “The delay in finding
        resolution to Ms. Walker’s request for [short-term disability] and
        LTD has caused her severe stress which has triggered an adrenal
        crash. She has an appointment with a lawyer today following her
        doctor’s appointment.” LINA approved Walker’s claim under the
        disability policy the next day.
               By doing so, LINA found that Walker was incapable of per-
        forming the material duties of her regular occupation and of earn-
        ing at least 80 percent of her regular earnings and therefore deter-
        mined that she was entitled to twenty-four months of disability
        benefits. For some reason, LINA designated August 12, 2012, as
        Walker’s date of disability, making November 11, 2012, the effec-
        tive start date for the disability benefits pursuant to the disability
        policy’s ninety-day elimination period. LINA’s long-term disability
        claims manager, Deborah Bacak, later acknowledged that it was a
        mistake to select August 12, 2012, as Walker’s date of disability
        given that Walker continued to work through October 12, 2012. In
        light of its decision to approve Walker’s claims for disability bene-
        fits under the disability policy, LINA also automatically provision-
        ally approved Walker’s claim for waiver of premium under the life
        policy.
               On July 9, 2013, LINA sent Walker a letter indicating that it
        was reviewing her claim for waiver of premium under the life pol-
        icy. The letter requested that Walker provide LINA with addi-
        tional medical information from her physicians, including infor-
        mation about her diagnosis and functional abilities. The letter also
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        21-12493               Opinion of the Court                       7

        warned Walker that failure to provide the requested information
        to LINA by August 22, 2013, “may result in an extension of the time
        period required [for LINA] to make a decision, or [LINA’s] decision
        may be based on the available information on file.” LINA followed
        up with Walker in a letter dated July 24, 2013, reiterating the need
        for additional information and reminding her of the August 22,
        2013, deadline.
               On August 29, 2013, based on a review of the then-available
        information, LINA decided not to approve Walker for continued
        waiver of premium under the life policy. In arriving at that deci-
        sion, LINA considered, among other things, the opinion of Larry
        Featherston, a rehabilitation specialist who concluded that Walker
        could perform some occupations in her local labor market. Walker
        appealed LINA’s August 29, 2013, decision three times over the
        next year and a half, and LINA affirmed that decision each time.
               Meanwhile, separate from her claims for disability benefits
        under the two insurance policies, Walker applied for Social Secu-
        rity Disability Benefits. On April 8, 2014—after LINA had already
        twice affirmed its decision to deny Walker benefits under the life
        policy—the Social Security Administration (the “SSA”) approved
        Walker for disability benefits and recognized a period of disability
        beginning on October 12, 2012. In making that decision, the SSA
        afforded “great weight” to the residual functional capacity ques-
        tionnaires submitted by Dr. Nancy Neighbors, Walker’s primary
        care physician, which showed that Walker suffered from intracta-
        ble pain at multiple sites, experienced adrenal fatigue and
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                21-12493

        fibromyalgia pain one to three times a week that confined her to
        bed, experienced a reduced range of motion, and could not return
        to work. The SSA afforded only “partial weight” to the functional
        capacity evaluation completed by Heidi Teague on January 7, 2013,
        which concluded that Walker could perform sedentary work.
               On June 10, 2014, around two months after the favorable
        SSA decision, LINA informed Walker that it had reviewed her
        claim under the disability policy and determined that she would no
        longer qualify for disability benefits beyond November 2014—the
        end of the initial twenty-four-month benefits period. As part of its
        review, LINA considered a report completed by Dr. Matthew
        Lundquist on May 28, 2014. Dr. Lundquist’s report agreed with
        Teague’s determination that Walker could perform sedentary
        work and disagreed with some of Dr. Neighbors’s findings. LINA
        also considered a Transferable Skills Analysis performed by Colin
        Loris, a rehabilitation specialist. Loris’s analysis concluded that
        Walker could perform some occupations in her local labor market,
        specifically the positions of office manager and health care facility
        administrator. Based on these opinions, LINA determined that
        Walker did not qualify as “disabled” for purposes of continuing to
        receive benefits under the disability policy beyond the initial
        twenty-four-month coverage period. Walker appealed that deci-
        sion.
             In considering Walker’s appeal, LINA retained Dr. David
        Knapp, an independent board-certified rheumatologist, to review
        Walker’s medical record and physical condition. Dr. Knapp’s
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        21-12493                  Opinion of the Court                               9

        review process included conferring by telephone with Walker’s pri-
        mary care physician, Dr. Neighbors, and Walker’s rheumatologist,
        Dr. Kun Chen. Like Dr. Lundquist, Dr. Knapp prepared a compre-
        hensive report detailing his analysis and findings. That report con-
        cluded that Walker “does not require any medically necessary
        work activity restrictions” and “is not physically functionally lim-
        ited.” In light of that report, LINA affirmed its decision to deny
        Walker benefits beyond the twenty-four-month initial coverage pe-
        riod under the disability policy.
               Following these unfavorable decisions, Walker sued LINA
        in federal court, relying on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
        § 1332. The operative complaint asserts two claims against LINA
        under Alabama law: (1) breach of contract, and (2) bad-faith failure
        to provide insurance benefits.
               LINA eventually moved for summary judgment on both of
        Walker’s claims. As to the breach of contract claim, LINA argued
        that the record established that Walker did not meet the applicable
        definition of “disabled” under the two insurance policies. As to the
        bad-faith claim, LINA asserted that it had at least an “arguable rea-
        son” for denying Walker benefits under both policies based on the
        medical opinions indicating that Walker was physically capable of
        working.3

        3As explained below, the third essential element of bad-faith claims under Al-
        abama law is the absence of an arguable reason for failing to provide benefits.
        State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Brechbill, 144 So. 3d 248, 256–58 (Ala. 2013).
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      21-12493

                The district court granted in part and denied in part LINA’s
        motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the mo-
        tion as to the breach of contract claim “[b]ecause reasonable jurors
        could reach opposite conclusions regarding Walker’s disability sta-
        tus after evaluating the evidence presented.” But the district court
        agreed that LINA had an arguable reason for denying benefits
        based on the available record and therefore granted the motion as
        to the bad-faith claim. In explaining its reasoning on this point, the
        district court noted that “it must apply the [directed verdict] stand-
        ard in evaluating the third element” of bad-faith claims. In denying
        Walker's subsequent motion for reconsideration, the district court
        clarified its discussion of the directed verdict standard and reaf-
        firmed its position that, under the ordinary summary judgment
        standard, Walker’s bad-faith claim was defeated by the existence of
        an arguable reason for denial. 4 The district court also noted that
        there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
        insurer had actually considered that reason in this case because
        LINA expressly referenced the relevant medical opinions in its

        Thus, an insured cannot succeed on a bad-faith claim if the insurer had an ar-
        guable reason for denying benefits. Id. at 258.
        4In its order denying reconsideration, the district court correctly noted that,
        up until her motion for reconsideration, Walker had not specified whether the
        bad-faith claim was of the “normal” or “abnormal” variety.
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        21-12493                   Opinion of the Court                               11

        denial decisions. 5 Accordingly, the case proceeded to trial on
        Walker’s breach of contract claim alone.
                Before trial, LINA filed a motion in limine and a trial brief,
        arguing in both that the district court should exclude evidence of
        mental anguish damages because such damages are unavailable un-
        der Alabama law for Walker’s breach of contract claim. In the trial
        brief, LINA further argued that any calculation of pre-judgment in-
        terest must be done by the court and not the jury. In response,
        Walker asserted that LINA had waived the mental anguish dam-
        ages argument by failing to raise it on summary judgment and that,
        in any event, mental anguish damages are available for her breach
        of contract claim under Alabama law. Walker also acknowledged
        that the court, not the jury, calculates the interest owed, but she
        maintained that the insurance policies provide for a compound in-
        terest rate of 1.5 percent. The district court ruled that mental an-
        guish damages were unavailable to Walker on her breach of con-
        tract claim and that the court would calculate pre-judgment

        5Walker’s motion for reconsideration also argued that summary judgment
        was inappropriate given LINA’s unexplained and unjustified alteration of
        Walker’s date of disability. Although the district court did not specifically ad-
        dress this argument in its order denying reconsideration, Walker has not de-
        veloped any argument on appeal related to LINA’s alteration of her date of
        disability, and the issue has thus been abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate
        Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014); see also United States v.
        Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871–74 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  21-12493

        interest, but it did not, at that time, resolve the issue of simple ver-
        sus compound interest.
               The jury ultimately reached a verdict, finding for Walker on
        the breach of contract claim, but only for the disability policy, and
        awarded Walker $160,342.00.
               One week later, Walker submitted a brief containing pro-
        posed interest calculations for her successful breach of contract
        claim. Walker maintained that the disability policy provides for an
        interest rate of 1.5 percent, compounded monthly. In support of
        that position, Walker cited a series of other district court cases in
        which LINA ultimately either agreed or had to pay compound in-
        terest under substantially similar insurance policies. Walker also
        produced, for the first time, a document that purported to be an
        excerpt of LINA’s Claims Policies and Procedures Manual. That
        document states that “[a]ll interest paid is compounded interest,
        unless the contract language specifically directs some other
        method of interest calculation.” Lastly, Walker highlighted the fol-
        lowing deposition testimony of LINA’s corporate representative,
        Richard Lodi:
               Q.     And just so -- to be clear here, is the interest at
                      one and a half percent, is it compounded
                      monthly or compounded annually?
               [Objection to form: foundation.]
               A.     It doesn’t indicate that. It just says the insur-
                      ance company will pay the insured one and
                      one-half percent per month on the amount of
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        21-12493               Opinion of the Court                        13

                     any claim which is considered overdue until it
                     is finally settled and adjudicated.
              Q.     So what does that mean?
              A.     Other than what it says, I can’t add to that.
              Q.     If it’s one and half percent per month which
                     would imply that it’s compounded monthly
                     that would be a reasonable interpretation even
                     if you disagree with it?
              [Objection to form: foundation.]
              A.     That seems reasonable.
                LINA moved to strike both the excerpt and the deposition
        testimony. As to the excerpt, LINA argued that the document had
        not been produced during discovery, had not been presented at
        trial, and had not been authenticated. As to the deposition testi-
        mony, LINA argued that Walker did not designate that deposition
        testimony for purposes of trial and did not question the representa-
        tive on the calculation of interest at trial. LINA’s motion to strike
        also requested that that pre-judgment interest be calculated as sim-
        ple interest.
               The district court granted in part and denied in part LINA’s
        motion to strike. First, the district court ruled that that, under Al-
        abama law, the disability policy provides for simple interest. In so
        ruling, the district court rejected the suggestion that LINA was
        bound to pay compound interest simply because it did so in other
        cases. Second, the district court granted LINA’s request to strike
        the excerpt because it was not properly authenticated under
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12493

        Federal Rule of Evidence 901, and, even if it had been properly au-
        thenticated, there is no indication that the excerpt applies to Ala-
        bama insurance policies. Third, the district court denied LINA’s
        request to strike Lodi’s deposition testimony but still determined
        the disability policy provides for simple interest.
               Ultimately, the district court determined that Walker was
        entitled to simple pre-judgment interest at a rate of 1.5 percent
        from December 2014 through June 11, 2021, totaling $94,602.11,
        and simple post-judgment interest at a rate of 1.5 percent from June
        11, 2021, onward. The district court contemporaneously entered a
        corresponding final judgment.
               Walker moved to amend the final judgment to (1) calculate
        pre-judgment interest through June 24, 2021 (the date of the final
        judgment) rather than June 11, 2021, and (2) recognize May 21,
        2021 (the date of the jury verdict) as the effective reinstatement
        date for Walker’s disability benefits under the disability policy.
        LINA did not oppose either of Walker’s requests but did request
        that the post-judgment interest rate be changed from 1.5 percent
        to 0.08 percent because post-judgment interest is governed by the
        federal interest statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961, and the disability policy
        does not “contain an express provision” overriding the statute.
        Walker opposed LINA’s request.
               The district court entered an amended final judgment that
        incorporated both parties’ requests. The amended final judgment
        thus recognizes a simple pre-judgment interest rate of 1.5 percent,
        consistent with the district court’s earlier ruling, and a simple post-
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        21-12493                  Opinion of the Court                    15

        judgment interest rate of 0.08 percent, consistent with LINA’s re-
        quest.
              Walker filed a timely notice of appeal.
                        II.      STANDARDS OF REVIEW
                We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judg-
        ment. Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019).
        In doing so, we “view all the evidence and draw all reasonable in-
        ferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
        Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir.
        2014). Summary judgment is proper when the evidence, viewed in
        this light, “presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels
        judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party.” Id.
        (quoting Owusu-Ansah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1307 (11th
        Cir. 2013)).
               We also review de novo “a district court’s determination
        and application of state law in a diversity case.” Pendergast v.
        Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1132 n.11 (11th Cir. 2010). “In
        Alabama, the interpretation of a contract, including an insurance
        contract, is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Twin City Fire
        Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2007).
                We review evidentiary rulings, including rulings on motions
        to strike, for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d
        1257, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2005); Benson v. Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d
        1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997). Under the abuse of discretion standard,
        we affirm unless the district court has either made a clear error of
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  21-12493

        judgment or applied the wrong legal standard. United States v.
        Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004). Moreover, even when
        a district court has abused its discretion in making an evidentiary
        ruling, we will not reverse the district court if the ruling constitutes
        harmless error. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Swann, 27 F.3d 1539, 1543
        (11th Cir. 1994).
                                  III.   ANALYSIS
                On appeal, Walker’s arguments concern three main topics:
        (1) the dismissal of her bad-faith claim on summary judgment; (2)
        the availability of mental anguish damages for her breach of con-
        tract claim under Alabama law; and (3) the calculation of pre- and
        post-judgment interest. We begin with the district court’s sum-
        mary judgment ruling as to the bad-faith claim.
             A. The Dismissal of Walker’s Bad-Faith Claim on Summary
                                      Judgment
               Walker argues that the district court erred by granting sum-
        mary judgment in LINA’s favor on the bad-faith claim. We disa-
        gree. The evidence establishes that LINA had an arguable reason
        for determining that Walker did not qualify for disability benefits
        under the disability policy.
               The Supreme Court of Alabama first recognized the tort of
        bad faith in the insurance context in Chavers v. National Security
        Fire & Casualty Co., 405 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1981). In Chavers, the Su-
        preme Court of Alabama held that an actionable tort arises for an
        insurer’s conduct where there is either (1) no lawful basis for the
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        21-12493                Opinion of the Court                        17

        refusal to pay or (2) an intentional failure to determine whether or
        not there is any lawful basis for the refusal to pay. Id. at 7. Alabama
        courts often refer to refusal-to-pay claims as “normal” bad-faith
        claims and to failure-to-investigate claims as “abnormal” bad-faith
        claims. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Brechbill, 144 So. 3d 248,
        256–58 (Ala. 2013). However, the Supreme Court of Alabama has
        emphasized that, although there are two “methods” of establishing
        bad faith, “there is only one tort of bad-faith refusal to pay.” Id. at
        257–58 (emphasis in original).
               The tort of bad faith consists of the following essential ele-
        ments: (1) a breach of an insurance contract; (2) a refusal to pay the
        claim; (3) the absence of an arguable reason for failing to pay; and
        (4) the insurer’s knowledge of such an absence. Id. at 258. If a
        plaintiff is traveling under the failure-to-investigate theory—and
        thus is bringing an “abnormal” bad-faith claim—there is another
        essential element: (5) “the insurer’s intentional failure to determine
        whether there is a legitimate or arguable reason to refuse to pay
        the claim.” Id. (quoting Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 417
        So. 2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982)).
               To be clear, “[r]egardless of whether the claim is a bad-faith
        refusal to pay or a bad-faith refusal to investigate, the tort of bad
        faith requires proof of the third element[:] absence of a legitimate
        reason for denial.” Id. at 258; see also McLaughlin v. Alabama
        Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 437 So. 2d 86, 91 (Ala. 1983) (“If
        any one of the reasons for denial of coverage is at least ‘arguable,’
        this Court need not look any further.”). In other words, a plaintiff
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  21-12493

        traveling under either theory of bad faith “must go beyond a mere
        showing of nonpayment and prove a bad faith nonpayment, a non-
        payment without any reasonable ground for dispute,” otherwise
        the claim fails. Bowen, 417 So. 2d at 183 (emphasis in original); see
        also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Balmer, 891 F.2d 874, 877 (11th
        Cir. 1990) (“[R]egardless of the imperfections of [an insurer’s] in-
        vestigation, the existence of a debatable reason for denying the
        claim at the time the claim was denied defeats a bad faith failure to
        pay claim.”).
                 Although Alabama law historically treated the two theories
        of bad faith differently on summary judgment, more recent prece-
        dent suggests a convergence of the two theories at summary judg-
        ment. “Normal” bad-faith claims, i.e., claims of refusal to pay, fail
        as a matter of law on summary judgment if the insured is not enti-
        tled to a directed verdict on the related breach of contract claim. In
        the past, “abnormal” bad-faith claims, i.e., claims of failure to in-
        vestigate, however, could survive summary judgment even if the
        insured is not entitled to a directed verdict on the related breach of
        contract claim. E.g., White v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 953 So.
        2d 340, 348 (Ala. 2006). More recent precedent, however, suggests
        that where a “normal” bad-faith claims fails under the directed ver-
        dict standard so does an “abnormal” bad-faith claim. See Brechbill,
        144 So. 3d at 258 (“Because the trial court’s ruling [that the plaintiff
        was not entitled to a pre-verdict judgment on the contract claim]
        eliminated the third element of bad-faith refusal to pay, [the plain-
        tiff’s ‘abnormal’ bad-faith claim] must fail.”). To decide this case,
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        21-12493                   Opinion of the Court                               19

        we do not have to resolve this uncertainty about the applicability
        of the directed verdict standard to “abnormal” bad-faith claims. Re-
        gardless of the merits of a related contract claim, all bad-faith claims
        fail on summary judgment “where the trial court . . . expressly
        [finds] as a matter of law that the insurer had a reasonably legiti-
        mate or arguable reason for refusing to pay the claim at the time
        the claim was denied.” Id. at 260. 6
                 In this case, Walker brought an “abnormal” bad-faith claim,
        which the district court disposed of via summary judgment. At
        first, there was some confusion regarding which theory of bad-faith
        Walker was traveling under and therefore whether the district
        court erroneously applied the directed verdict rule to the bad-faith
        claim. But as the district court’s order denying reconsideration
        clarified, the district court’s summary judgment ruling ultimately
        rested on a determination that LINA had an arguable reason for
        terminating Walker’s disability benefits under the disability policy.
        We affirm that finding on appeal.
              LINA’s initial, June 10, 2014, determination that Walker did
        not qualify as “disabled” for purposes of receiving benefits beyond
        twenty-four months was supported by Dr. Lundquist’s report and

        6 To the extent Walker suggests that the question of whether an arguable rea-
        son for denial exists necessarily “is a question of fact for the jury,” such sug-
        gestion is incorrect. When the insurer had an arguable reason for its denial
        decision and there is no genuine issue of material fact on that point, summary
        judgment is warranted. Weaver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 574 So. 2d 771, 774 (Ala.
        1990).
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                      21-12493

        the Transferable Skills Analysis completed by Colin Loris. 7 Like-
        wise, LINA’s January 26, 2015, decision to affirm the initial denial
        was supported by the same two opinions as well as the new, De-
        cember 8, 2014, report by Dr. Knapp.
               Walker generally contends that, when viewed along with
        the rest of the available information, the opinions of Dr. Lundquist,
        Colin Loris, and Dr. Knapp do not provide an arguable reason for
        denying benefits. Walker argues, for instance, that LINA did not
        afford sufficient weight to the SSA’s favorable determination or to
        the opinions of Walker’s treating physicians. But LINA expressly
        acknowledged the SSA’s favorable determination in both of its de-
        cisions to deny Walker long-term disability benefits. And both of
        LINA’s decisions were based on reports that specifically engaged
        with information provided by Walker’s treating physicians. Thus,
        the record evidence indicates that that there is no genuine issue of
        material fact as to whether LINA considered the full range of avail-
        able information.
               Walker further attacks the propriety of LINA’s denial deci-
        sions by highlighting a June 3, 2019, report by John W. McKinney,

        7 Walker argues that LINA’s June 10, 2014, decision necessarily constituted bad

        faith because it “speculated” about what Walker’s physical condition would
        be five months later. That argument is meritless. The November 2014 cutoff
        was a function of the disability policy’s twenty-four-month initial coverage pe-
        riod, and there is no authority that suggests that LINA acted in bad faith by
        determining, based on Walker’s physical condition at the time, that Walker
        would not qualify for an extension of coverage and by providing Walker with
        notice five months in advance of that cutoff.
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        21-12493               Opinion of the Court                        21

        a rehabilitation counselor. McKinney’s report criticizes the analy-
        sis of the reports relied upon by LINA and concludes that Walker
        has qualified as “disabled” since October 2012. But McKinney’s re-
        port was unavailable to LINA at the time of its decisions; even if
        the report had been available, the existence of another conflicting
        professional opinion would not have meant that LINA lacked an
        arguable reason for deciding as it did under Alabama law. See
        Brechbill, 144 So. 3d at 258–60 (concluding that the genuine dispute
        between the parties’ experts was sufficient to defeat the insured’s
        “abnormal” bad-faith claim on summary judgment); McLaughlin,
        437 So. 2d at 91 (affirming the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment in favor of the insurer on a bad-faith claim when the par-
        ties presented conflicting evidence and thus it could not be said that
        “there was no arguable reason for denial of coverage”) (emphasis
        in original)).
                Ultimately, the evidence establishes that LINA was at least
        arguably justified in determining that Walker did not qualify as
        “disabled” under the disability policy for purposes of receiving ben-
        efits beyond twenty-four months based on the opinions of Dr.
        Lundquist, Colin Loris, and Dr. Knapp. The record evidence
        shows that LINA considered the full range of information available
        to it, including information that was contrary to the reports on
        which it ultimately based its determinations. Even when read in
        the light most favorable to Walker, the record does not indicate a
        genuine issue of material fact over whether those reports were so
        obviously deficient, incomplete, or outweighed by conflicting
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                 21-12493

        evidence that LINA acted in bad faith by relying on them. Because
        the record demonstrates that there was no genuine issue of mate-
        rial fact relating to this issue, Walker cannot, as a matter of law,
        establish the third element of bad faith, and the district court did
        not err by recognizing that. We affirm the summary judgment or-
        der.
                         B.     Mental Anguish Damages
                Walker’s second main argument on appeal is that the district
        court erred by excluding evidence of mental anguish damages be-
        cause such damages are unavailable under Alabama law. In the
        alternative, Walker argues that we should certify the question of
        the availability of mental anguish damages to the Supreme Court
        of Alabama. Neither of these arguments is persuasive. The Su-
        preme Court of Alabama has made clear that mental anguish dam-
        ages are unavailable for breach of contract claims related to long-
        term disability insurance policies, like Walker’s, and no further
        clarification on this point of state law is needed.
               In general, Alabama law does not permit the recovery of
        mental anguish damages for breach of contract claims, see Bir-
        mingham Waterworks Co. v. Vinter, 51 So. 356, 356 (Ala. 1910),
        including claims that concern insurance contracts, see Vincent v.
        Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 373 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Ala.
        1979). The rationale underlying this rule is that, ordinarily, mental
        anguish damages are “too remote,” “not within the contemplation
        of the parties,” and not “naturally cause[d]” by a breach of contract.
        F. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Murphy, 141 So. 630, 631 (Ala.
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        21-12493                     Opinion of the Court                              23

        1932). But Alabama law recognizes an exception to this general
        rule “where the contractual duty or obligation is so coupled with
        matters of mental concern or solicitude, or with the feelings of the
        party to whom the duty is owed, that a breach of duty will neces-
        sarily or reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering.” Id. (cit-
        ing S. Ry. Co. v. Rowe, 73 So. 634, 638 (Ala. 1916)). The Supreme
        Court of Alabama has applied this exception to breaches of contrac-
        tual duties concerning the habitability of one’s house or dwelling,8
        the health of pregnant women and their unborn children,9 the
        safety of women during night-time travel,10 and the safety and

        8 See Indep. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lunsford, 621 So. 2d 977, 979 (Ala. 1993) (finding
        the jury’s award of mental anguish damages to be proper and supported when
        the defendant breached a contract to insure the plaintiff’s mobile home, which
        was damaged in a windstorm); Liberty Homes, Inc. v. Epperson, 581 So. 2d
        449, 454 (Ala. 1991), as modified on denial of reh’g , (May 24, 1991) (holding
        that mental anguish damages were available when the defendant failed to
        properly construct the electrical system of plaintiff’s home and where there
        was evidence of the plaintiff suffering mental anguish due to electrical prob-
        lems); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Donavan, 519 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Ala. 1988)
        (holding that mental anguish damages were available for a breach of contract
        claim against an exterminator who failed to protect the plaintiff’s house
        against termites).
        9 See Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374–75 (Ala. 1981) (hold-

        ing that mental anguish damages were available where a hospital breached a
        contract by failing to provide adequate medical care to a woman in labor,
        which resulted in the death of the child).
        10 See   Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Campbell, 101 So. 615, 617–18 (Ala. 1924)
        (allowing mental anguish damages when the defendant carrier failed to stop
        its train at a certain station and knowingly caused a female passenger to have
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        24                         Opinion of the Court                      21-12493

        operating conditions of automobiles. 11 Based on those decisions,
        we have understood the mental anguish damages exception to be
        “narrow” and applicable only where there are “especially sensitive
        contractual duties.” Ruiz de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins.
        Agency, Inc., 207 F.3d 1351, 1359–61 (11th Cir. 2000).
                 Walker argues that the disability policy falls under this ex-
        ception because long-term disability insurance is “so coupled with
        matters of mental concern” that a breach of the contractual duty
        could “reasonably result in mental anguish.” In support of this ar-
        gument, Walker points out that, in advertising its policies, LINA
        emphasizes the “peace of mind” that its policies can offer. Walker
        also points to the email sent by Sabrina Weaver on February 26,
        2013, which refers to Walker suffering an adrenal crash from stress
        over resolution of her disability claims, as evidence that Walker in
        fact experienced mental anguish as a result of LINA’s overall con-
        duct. 12

        to wait at another station, located in a remote area without any nearby build-
        ings or accommodations, for five to ten minutes at night).
        11See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So. 2d 1301, 1303, 1306–07 (Ala.
        1991) (holding that mental anguish damages were available for the plaintiff’s
        breach of warranty claim where his new automobile’s conditions put him in
        physical danger and once left him without a working vehicle at night about
        three hours from home).
        12 Walker  contends, in a footnote, that LINA “arguably waived” the right to
        challenge the availability of mental anguish damages by failing to raise the is-
        sue in its motion for summary judgment. Walker made the same contention
        below, but the district court implicitly rejected that argument. We defer to
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        21-12493                  Opinion of the Court                             25

               The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, has made clear
        that the ordinary relationship between long-term disability insur-
        ance and mental well-being is not sufficient to trigger the mental
        anguish damages exception. In Sanford v. Western Life Insurance
        Co., 368 So. 2d 260 (Ala. 1979), the plaintiff, as the executor of the
        decedent’s estate, sued the decedent’s insurer for breaching a long-
        term disability insurance policy that, like the disability policy here,
        provided for monthly payments in the event of disability. Id. at
        261. On appeal, after discussing the general rule on mental anguish
        damages and the exception to it, the Supreme Court of Alabama
        concluded that the case “[did] not fall within [the] exception to the
        general rule.” Id. at 264.
               Despite Sanford’s clear implications for this matter, Walker
        challenges Sanford’s applicability and significance on multiple
        fronts. These challenges fail.
               First, Walker contends that Sanford is factually distinguisha-
        ble because, in that case, the insured employee had retired before
        claiming disability and died before the lawsuit commenced. But
        those factual distinctions bear no relevance to the question of
        whether a contract itself concerns “especially sensitive duties” that
        are sufficiently coupled with matters of mental concern to permit
        recovery of mental anguish damages.

        the district court’s discretion to entertain LINA’s mental anguish damages ar-
        gument in a motion in limine after summary judgment and thus reject
        Walker’s waiver argument.
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                  21-12493

               Next, Walker questions the precedential value of Sanford by
        suggesting that it was decided before a major change in the law
        occurred. That change, according to Walker, was the Supreme
        Court of Alabama’s decision in Independent Fire Insurance Co. v.
        Lunsford, 621 So. 2d 977 (Ala. 1993). There, the Supreme Court of
        Alabama affirmed a jury award for breach of an insurance contract
        that included damages for mental anguish. Id. at 979. Critically,
        however, the policy at issue in Lunsford covered a mobile home
        that was damaged in a windstorm. Id. at 978–79. Thus, rather than
        represent a pivotal change in the law, Lunsford is properly under-
        stood as one of the several instances when the Supreme Court of
        Alabama has applied the mental anguish damages exception to a
        contract concerning the habitability of a dwelling. See, e.g., Liberty
        Homes, Inc. v. Epperson, 581 So. 2d 449 (Ala. 1991); Orkin Exter-
        minating Co. v. Donavan, 519 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Ala. 1988).
               Lastly, Walker contends that Pate v. Rollison Logging
        Equipment, Inc., 628 So. 2d 337 (Ala. 1993), is most applicable to
        the instant case and indicates that the mental anguish damages ex-
        ception applies here. Pate concerned a credit insurance policy—a
        type of policy under which the insurer makes payments on the in-
        sured’s existing debt if a certain event (e.g., death or disability) oc-
        curs. Id. at 339–40. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama
        held that mental anguishes damages were available for the insurer’s
        failure to make the contemplated payments after the insured be-
        came disabled. Id. at 345–46. The Pate decision is expressly predi-
        cated on “the special nature of credit disability insurance,” which,
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        21-12493               Opinion of the Court                        27

        unlike long-term disability insurance, contemplates the possibility
        that an insured will be unable to repay a specific debt. Id. at 345.
        While Pate certainly reinforces the notion that the mental anguish
        damages exception may apply to certain insurance policies, for or-
        dinary long-term disability insurance policies, like the policy at is-
        sue, Sanford controls.
                In sum, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that the plain-
        tiff in Sanford could not recover mental anguish damages for the
        insurer’s breach of a long-term disability insurance policy, and nei-
        ther Walker’s personal circumstances nor the terms of the disabil-
        ity policy meaningfully distinguish this matter from Sanford. Ala-
        bama law therefore calls for the same outcome here.
               In the alternative, Walker proposes that we certify the ques-
        tion of the availability of mental anguish damages to the Supreme
        Court of Alabama. Pursuant to Rule 18(a) of the Alabama Rules of
        Appellate Procedures, certification is appropriate only where the
        question of law is “determinative of [the] cause” and “there are no
        clear controlling precedents” of the Supreme Court of Alabama.
        The availability of mental anguish damages is not determinative of
        any cause, see Thai Meditation Ass’n of Ala., Inc. v. City of Mobile,
        980 F.3d 821, 838 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining that a question is “de-
        terminative of [a] cause” when it resolves either the entire case or
        a claim and not simply a “key issue”), and Sanford represents a clear
        controlling precedent for the reasons discussed above, see WM
        Mobile Bay Env’t Ctr., Inc. v. City of Mobile Solid Waste Auth.,
        972 F.3d 1240, 1251 (11th Cir. 2020) (indicating that there must be
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        28                     Opinion of the Court                 21-12493

        “substantial doubt” to warrant certification). Thus, certification is
        neither necessary nor appropriate, as Alabama law already answers
        the question presented.
              For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s exclusion of
        evidence of mental anguish damages in connection with Walker’s
        breach of contract claim.
                      C.     Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest
               Walker’s final argument is that the district court erred in its
        interpretation of the disability policy as to pre- and post-judgment
        interest. As for pre-judgment interest, Walker challenges the dis-
        trict court’s determination that the disability policy provides for
        simple, rather than compound, interest and the district court’s re-
        lated decision to strike the excerpt of LINA’s claims manual. As for
        post-judgment interest, Walker challenges the district court’s de-
        termination that the disability policy does not contract around the
        default post-judgment interest rate set by 28 U.S.C. § 1961. As dis-
        cussed below, we affirm the district court’s rulings.
               Before turning to Walker’s specific pre- and post-judgment
        interest arguments, we review the relevant policy language, which
        provides:
               Time of Payment
               Disability Benefits will be paid within 45 days, upon
               receipt of due written proof of loss, at regular inter-
               vals of not more than one month. Disability Benefits
               not paid within 45 days of receipt of due written proof
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        21-12493               Opinion of the Court                       29

              of loss shall be considered overdue. The Insurance
              Company will pay the insured one and one-half per-
              cent per month on the amount of any claim which is
              considered overdue until it is finally settled and adju-
              dicated.
              Any balance unpaid at the end of any period for which
              the Insurance Company is liable will be paid at that
              time.
                              1. Pre-Judgment Interest
                Walker contends that the Time of Payment Provision pro-
        vides for compound pre-judgment interest at a rate of 1.5 percent.
        LINA, on the other hand, maintains that the district court correctly
        interpreted the Time of Payment Provision to provide for simple
        pre-judgment interest at a rate of 1.5 percent. This dispute boils
        down to a disagreement over the meaning of the phrase “any claim
        which is considered overdue.” According to Walker, that phrase
        broadly includes the full overdue balance owed to a claimant, in-
        cluding any unpaid interest. In LINA’s view, the phrase refers only
        to overdue claims for disability benefits and not to any unpaid in-
        terest.
               In federal diversity actions, pre-judgment interest is gov-
        erned by state law, see Venn v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 99
        F.3d 1058, 1066 (11th Cir. 1996), and Alabama law allows litigants
        to recover pre-judgment interest at a contractually specified rate
        for breach of contract claims, see Burgess Min. & Constr. Corp. v.
        Lees, 440 So. 2d 321, 338 (Ala. 1983).
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        30                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12493

               In general, Alabama law requires courts “to enforce an un-
        ambiguous, lawful contract, as it is written.” Ex parte Dan Tucker
        Auto Sales, Inc., 718 So. 2d 33, 35 (Ala. 1998). “Where words used
        in a contract are susceptible of more than one meaning, [courts
        should], if possible, ascertain from all the provisions of the contract
        the sense in which the words were used by the parties.” Id. at 36.
               For contracts of insurance specifically, Alabama recognizes
        another rule: “ambiguities in the language of an insurance policy
        are construed in favor of the insured, rather than the insurer.”
        Blackburn v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 667 So. 2d 661, 669 (Ala.
        1995). But “ambiguities are not to be inserted by strained or
        twisted reasoning,” and “[t]he fact that the parties interpret [an] in-
        surance policy differently does not make the insurance policy am-
        biguous.” Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 817 So. 2d
        687, 692 (Ala. 2001). “Where the parties disagree on whether the
        language in an insurance contract is ambiguous, a court should
        construe language according to the meaning that a person of ordi-
        nary intelligence would reasonably give it.” Id.
               A plain and full reading of the disability policy confirms that
        Walker is entitled to simple pre-judgment interest. The Time of
        Payment Provision provides for 1.5 percent interest on “any claim
        which is considered overdue,” and that phrase cannot properly be
        read to include unpaid interest (and therefore to allow for interest-
        on-interest). The term “claim” is used throughout the disability
        policy exclusively in the sense of “claim[s] for Disability.” Moreo-
        ver, other than in the phrase at issue, the disability policy uses the
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        21-12493                    Opinion of the Court                                31

        term “overdue” only one other time: in the previous sentence, re-
        ferring to disability benefits. As a final point, the phrase “any claim
        which is considered overdue” stands in contrast to the broad lan-
        guage in the very next sentence of the Time of Payment Provision:
        “Any balance unpaid at the end of any period for which the Insur-
        ance Company is liable will be paid at that time.” For these rea-
        sons, the Time of Payment Provision unambiguously provides for
        1.5 percent pre-judgment interest on overdue disability benefits
        and does not provide for any interest-on-interest (i.e., compound
        interest). 13
               Notwithstanding the plain text of the Time of Payment Pro-
        vision, Walker argues that the district court failed to properly

        13 LINA   submits that this interpretation, besides simply being a more accurate
        reading of the text, better aligns with Alabama’s “presumption in favor of sim-
        ple interest.” Certainly, the Supreme Court of Alabama has recognized, in the
        context of statutory interpretation, the “general American rule that when in-
        terest is allowable, it is to be computed on a simple rather than compound
        basis in the absence of express authorization otherwise.” Burlington N. R. Co.
        v. Whitt, 611 So. 2d 219, 224 (Ala. 1992) (quoting Stovall v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R.,
        772 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1984)). It makes sense that the same presumption
        would apply in the context of contractual interpretation, see Am. Mill. Co. v.
        Brennan Marine, Inc., 623 F.3d 1221, 1227 (8th Cir. 2010) (discussing the “com-
        mon law presumption against compound interest” for both contractual inter-
        pretation and statutory interpretation), but the Supreme Court of Alabama
        has not expressly confirmed that. Assuming Alabama indeed applies the com-
        mon law presumption against compound interest to contracts and does so
        much the same as the State of Georgia, then our decision in Caradigm USA
        LLC v. PruittHealth, Inc., 964 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2020), indicates that the
        disability policy’s language is not sufficient to overcome that presumption.
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        32                     Opinion of the Court                21-12493

        consider the deposition testimony of LINA’s corporate representa-
        tive and other district court cases in which LINA paid compound
        interest under substantially similar policies. We disagree. The dep-
        osition testimony cited by Walker consists of LINA’s corporate rep-
        resentative stating that it “seems reasonable” to interpret the disa-
        bility policy as providing for interest compounded monthly. That
        testimony does not displace the plain reading of the policy or “rep-
        resent a commitment by LINA to a compound interest calcula-
        tion.” Likewise, the district court cases cited by Walker are of
        limited relevance, given that they neither involve Alabama law nor
        could alter or modify the plain meaning of the disability policy’s
        text. The district court expressly considered both the deposition
        testimony and the other district court cases, but ultimately relied
        on to the plain language of the disability policy. We affirm that
        decision.
               Walker also argues that the district court erred by striking
        the excerpt of LINA’s claims manual, which, according to Walker,
        confirms that the disability policy is meant to provide for com-
        pound interest. But Walker does not explain why the district court
        was wrong to strike the excerpt on authenticity grounds. Rule
        901(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence imposes a duty on the pro-
        ponent of an item of evidence to “produce evidence sufficient to
        support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is,”
        and Walker entirely failed to do so. Thus, the district court did not
        abuse its discretion in striking the excerpt.
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        21-12493                    Opinion of the Court                      33

                Moreover, as the district court pointed out, even assuming
        the excerpt were properly authenticated, it does not support
        Walker’s view that the disability policy provides for compound in-
        terest. The excerpt does state that “[a]ll interest paid is com-
        pounded interest” unless the given contract specifies otherwise.
        But the excerpt purports to provide guidance for “state statutes
        which require interest to be paid on insurance claim[s]” and then
        lists the relevant states. Alabama does not appear on that list. Nor
        has Walker established that the excerpt was in effect during the rel-
        evant period with regard to the disability policy.14 As a result, there
        is absolutely “no indication” that the excerpt applies to the disabil-
        ity policy. Therefore, even if the district court erred in striking the
        document, that decision constituted harmless error.
                                   2. Post-Judgment Interest
               Walker contends that the district court erred by concluding
        that the disability policy does not displace the default post-judg-
        ment interest rate set by federal statute.
              Unlike pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest is gov-
        erned by federal law in diversity cases. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
        Lexow, 937 F.2d 569, 572 n.4 (11th Cir. 1991). The federal post-
        judgment interest statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), provides:
                  Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in
                  a civil case recovered in a district court. Execution
                  therefor may be levied by the marshal, in any case

        14   The excerpt is dated “February 2, 2001 (Revised 8/9/02).”
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        34                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12493

               where, by the law of the State in which such court is
               held, execution may be levied for interest on judg-
               ments recovered in the courts of the State. Such in-
               terest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of
               the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-
               year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published
               by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
               tem, for the calendar week preceding the date of the
               judgment. The Director of the Administrative Office
               of the United States Courts shall distribute notice of
               that rate and any changes in it to all Federal judges.
               The parties do not dispute that, given the date of judgment,
        the applicable statutory interest rate under § 1961 is 0.08 percent.
        Walker asserts, however, that the disability policy contracts around
        § 1961 and sets the post-judgment interest rate at 1.5 percent.
               As a preliminary matter, we recognize that this Court has
        not yet weighed in on the question of whether parties may contract
        around 28 U.S.C. § 1961. The consensus among our sister circuits
        that have addressed the issue, however, is that parties indeed are
        free to displace the default federal post-judgment interest rate. See
        Sovereign Bank v. REMI Cap., Inc, 49 F.4th 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2022);
        FCS Advisors, Inc. v. Fair Fin. Co., 605 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2010);
        In re Riebesell, 586 F.3d 782, 794–95 (10th Cir. 2009); Cent. States,
        Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Bomar Nat’l, Inc., 253 F.3d 1011,
        1020 (7th Cir. 2001); Citicorp Real Est., Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097,
        1107–08 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Lift & Equip. Serv., Inc., 816 F.2d
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        21-12493                   Opinion of the Court                               35

        1013, 1018 (5th Cir.), opinion modified on reh’g, 819 F.2d 546 (5th
        Cir. 1987). 15 We follow suit.
                Although § 1961 speaks of post-judgment interest in manda-
        tory terms, e.g., “[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judg-
        ment in a civil case” and “shall be calculated [in the prescribed man-
        ner],” the statute “does not expressly limit parties’ ability to agree
        to a different post[-]judgment interest rate” or otherwise “indicate[]
        that Congress sought to limit freedom of contract.” Jack Henry &
        Assocs., Inc. v. BSC, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668 (E.D. Ky.
        2010), aff’d, 487 F. App’x 246 (6th Cir. 2012). We find the freedom
        of contract principles articulated in Jack Henry persuasive. With
        some exceptions,16 parties can agree to almost anything via con-
        tract. “But unless some law or readily identifiable public policy re-
        moves an area from freedom of contract’s realm, courts will en-
        force an agreement between parties.” Id. at 668. Here, there is
        nothing in the text of § 1961 that abrogates the parties’ freedom of

        15 Inits only published opinion addressing the question of whether parties can
        contract around § 1961, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the consensus among
        other circuit courts but left the issue “for another day” because it was not nec-
        essary to resolve that issue. See Linneman v. Vita-Mix Corp., 970 F.3d 621,
        636 (6th Cir. 2020).
        16  For example, parties cannot create federal subject matter jurisdiction by
        contract. Tamiami Partners ex rel. Tamiami Dev. Corp. v. Miccosukee Tribe
        of Indians of Fla., 177 F.3d 1212, 1222 (11th Cir. 1999). And courts “may refuse
        to enforce contracts that violate law or public policy.” See United Paperwork-
        ers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987) (citations omit-
        ted).
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        36                         Opinion of the Court                      21-12493

        contract. See Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Urso, 371 F.3d 96,
        101 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that the mandatory language of 28
        U.S.C. § 1961 is aimed at “precluding district courts from exercising
        discretion over the rate of interest or adopting an interest rate set
        by arbitrators” rather than “limiting the ability of private parties to
        set their own rates”). Nor is an agreement to set post-judgment
        interest violative of a readily identifiable public policy. Certainly,
        the parties to a lawsuit “are usually in the best position to deter-
        mine the amount of compensation appropriate in [the] case of de-
        layed satisfaction,” D’Urso, 371 F.3d at 102, and we do not read
        § 1961 to prevent the parties from doing so. We therefore hold that
        parties can contract around § 1961.
                Having determined that parties can contract around § 1961,
        we next must determine what standard parties must satisfy in order
        to do so. The majority approach is to require that parties use
        “clear, unambiguous and unequivocal” contractual language to dis-
        place § 1961 and specify some other post-judgment interest rate.
        See Sovereign Bank, 49 F.4th at 368; Tricon Energy Ltd. v. Vinmar
        Int’l, Ltd., 718 F.3d 448, 458–59 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Riebesell, 586
        F.3d at 794; D’Urso, 371 F.3d at 102. 17 This requirement is rooted

        17Although the Ninth Circuit has not expressly adopted the “clear, unambig-
        uous and unequivocal” language requirement, it has imposed its own “specific
        agreement” requirement for overriding § 1961. See Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v.
        Durga Ma Corp., 387 F.3d 1021, 1023 (9th Cir. 2004); Citicorp, 155 F.3d at
        1108–09. To satisfy that requirement, parties must specifically manifest an in-
        tent to contract around the default federal post-judgment interest rate, such as
        by agreeing in writing that the contractual rate will apply “after judgment.”
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        21-12493                  Opinion of the Court                              37

        in the notion that when a judgment is entered on a contract, any
        claim under the contract instantly “merges” into the judgment and
        loses its distinct character and identity. See FCS Advisors, 605 F.3d
        at 148; Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 1004 (10th Cir.
        2005). Thus, absent clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal lan-
        guage to the contrary, the terms of a contract should govern only
        the original contract claim and not any successive judgment claim.
        Satisfied with that reasoning, and out of respect for the default rule
        established by § 1961, we apply the “clear, unambiguous and une-
        quivocal” language requirement to the matter at hand.
                Under the “clear, unambiguous and unequivocal” standard,
        the disability policy fails to displace § 1961. As relevant here, the
        Time of Payment Provision simply states that “[t]he Insurance
        Company will pay the insured one and one-half percent per month
        on the amount of any claim which is considered overdue until it is
        finally settled and adjudicated.” Walker contends that, in the con-
        text of insurance claims, the phrase “finally settled and adjudicated”
        means “finally paid and resolved” and, based on that interpretation,
        concludes that the Time of Payment Provision provides for post-
        judgment interest in the event that judgment predates payment.
        But even assuming that “finally settled and adjudicated” means “fi-
        nally paid and resolved,” this language would not satisfy the “clear,
        unambiguous and unequivocal” requirement. See D’Urso, 371

        See, e.g., Citicorp, 155 F.3d at 1108. As to the Seventh Circuit, it is unclear
        whether that court used any heightened requirement for contracting around
        § 1961 in Bomar National.
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        38                         Opinion of the Court                       21-12493

        F.3d at 102 (finding that the parties’ agreement to pay 15.5 percent
        interest “from the date payment was due to the date payment is
        made” does not sufficiently establish a post-judgment interest rate
        of 15.5 percent); In re Riebesell, 586 F.3d at 794 (determining that
        the parties’ contract providing for the accrual of interest “until pay-
        ment” at the rate of 24 percent did not displace § 1961 as to post-
        judgment interest). Thus, we affirm the district court’s ruling that
        § 1961 controls the post-judgment interest rate here. 18
                                  IV.     CONCLUSION
                For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
        the bad-faith claim on summary judgment, exclusion of evidence
        of mental anguish damages in connection with the breach of con-
        tract claim, and calculation of pre- and post-judgment interest.
                AFFIRMED.

        18 LINA insists that Walker cannot recover post-judgment interest because she

        “did not sue for [such] interest under the disability policy.” We are satisfied
        that Walker may recover post-judgment interest given that the operative com-
        plaint seeks “interest . . . and such other relief as is just and appropriate” in
        connection with the relevant breach of contract claim.