Court Opinion

ID: 2964359
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:24:33.998727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:24.163870
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1472

                                 GEORGE M. BUCUVALAS,

                               Petitioner - Appellant,

                                          v.

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                Respondent - Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                             and Tauro,* District Judge.
                                         ______________

                                _____________________

               Valeriano Diviacchi for appellant.
               ___________________
               Carole S. Schwartz,  Assistant United States Attorney,  with
               __________________
          whom  Donald K. Stern, United  States Attorney, was  on brief for
                _______________
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                   October 28, 1996
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

          *    Chief Judge  of the  District  of Massachusetts,  sitting by
          designation.

                    TAURO,   Chief  District   Judge.     Appellant  George
                    TAURO,   Chief  District   Judge.
                             _______________________

          Bucuvalas appeals the District Court's  denial of his petition to

          vacate   his  sentence  made  pursuant  to   28  U.S.C.     2255.

          Essentially, Bucuvalas asserts that  his Sixth Amendment right to

          effective  assistance   of  counsel  was   violated  because  his

          attorney's fees  were paid by  his co-defendants and  because his

          attorney advised him not to testify on his own behalf.

                                          I.
                                          I.

                                      Background
                                      Background
                                      __________

                    On February 15, 1989,  George Bucuvalas was indicted in

          the   District  of  Massachusetts   for  participating   in,  and

          conspiring to participate in,  a pattern of racketeering activity

          in  violation   of   the   Racketeer   Influenced   and   Corrupt

          Organizations  Act, 18 U.S.C.    1962(c)-(d),  for mail  fraud in

          violation  of 18 U.S.C.    1341  and 1342, and  for conspiracy to

          commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.   371.  His employers

          -- Arthur Venios, Christy Venios, and Bel-Art Realty, Inc. ("Bel-

          Art") -- were indicted for the same offenses.

                    The   Venios'  and  Bel-Art  retained  attorney  Morris

          Goldings  to represent  them  at trial.   Bucuvalas  subsequently

          sought to retain  Goldings as  well.  Goldings  was not  willing,

          however, to represent  both Bucuvalas and his co-defendants.  He,

          therefore,  referred  Bucuvalas  to Attorney  Terry  Segal,  whom

          Bucuvalas  had retained  on  past occasions.   Segal  represented

          Bucuvalas in a criminal tax investigation which did not result in

          an  indictment and  in a  trial for bribery  which resulted  in a

                                         -2-

          split   verdict.     Apparently  satisfied   with  Segal's   past

          representation,  Bucuvalas  took  Goldings'  advice  and retained

          Segal to represent him with respect to the present charges.

                    On  prior  occasions,  Bucuvalas'   co-defendants,  the

          Venios'  and Bel-Art, had paid Bucuvalas' legal fees.  In keeping

          with this  practice, Bucuvalas arranged  for them to  pay Segal's

          fee  in  the current  matter.   Upon  retaining  Segal, Bucuvalas

          apprised Segal that he would be paid by Bucuvalas' co-defendants.

          Goldings was also aware of the payment plan.  Judge Woodlock, the

          district  judge to whom the case was assigned, was never informed

          of the arrangement.

                    Segal took the case to trial.  He adopted a strategy in

          which  he sought to portray Bucuvalas as a low-level employee who

          was  merely  following  his  employers'  orders  and  who  lacked

          knowledge of any wrongdoing.

                    As  part  of  his   strategy,  Segal  recommended  that

          Bucuvalas  not  testify   at  trial.    Segal  feared   that  the

          government's  cross-examination  of  Bucuvalas   would  undermine

          Bucuvalas'  defense.    In  particular,  Segal  feared  that  the

          government's cross-examination would reveal a prior conviction on

          similar charges  and would elicit  admissions to  several of  the

          current charges.    Segal  was concerned  that  this  would  draw

          attention away from weaknesses in the government's case and focus

          it  instead on  Bucuvalas'  credibility.   Bucuvalas agreed  with

          Segal's analysis and chose not to testify.

                                         -3-

                    On  August 16,  1990, Bucuvalas  and his  co-defendants

          were convicted on all  counts of the indictment.   Judge Woodlock

          sentenced  Bucuvalas to  fifty-one months  in prison  followed by

          three  years  of supervised  release.    This  court  upheld  his

          conviction on appeal.   United States v. Bucuvalas, 970  F.2d 937
                                  _____________    _________

          (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 959 (1993).
                           _____ ______

                    On  November 25,  1994, Bucuvalas  moved to  vacate his

          sentence, pursuant to  28 U.S.C.   2255, asserting  violations of

          his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.  He

          claimed that his rights were violated in two respects.  First, he

          argued  that  the  payment of  his  attorney's  fees  by his  co-

          defendants created an unconstitutional conflict of interest under

          Cuyler  v.  Sullivan,  446  U.S.  335  (1980).    In  particular,
          ______      ________

          Bucuvalas  claimed that  the fee  arrangement  influenced Segal's

          recommendation  that Bucuvalas  not  testify, because  Bucuvalas'

          testimony would  have shown  that his  co-defendants orchestrated

          the  wrongdoing  and would  have  thereby  incriminated the  very

          persons paying Segal's fees.

                    Second,   Bucuvalas   claimed   that    Segal's   trial

          performance was  deficient under  Strickland  v. Washington,  466
                                            __________     __________

          U.S. 668 (1984).  Bucuvalas alleged that Segal's treatment of the

          fee  arrangement   was  deficient,  because  he   neither  warned

          Bucuvalas  of  the  risks  inherent in  the  payment  scheme, nor

          disclosed  the arrangement  to the  trial court.   Bucuvalas also

          argued  that  Segal's advice  that he  not testify  was deficient

          because  his testimony  would have  been exculpatory.   Bucuvalas

                                         -4-

          claims  that  it  would  have  demonstrated  that  he  was merely

          following orders and that he lacked knowledge of any wrongdoing.

                    On March  4, 1996,  Judge Woodlock held  an evidentiary

          hearing.   He found that  the fee arrangement  did not create  an

          unconstitutional   conflict   of   interest   and   that  Segal's

          performance was  not, in any  respect, deficient under  the Sixth

          Amendment.  Bucuvalas' petition, therefore, was denied.

                                         II.
                                         II.

                                       Analysis
                                       Analysis
                                       ________

                    Bucuvalas   appeals   the   district  court's   rulings

          regarding both his Cuyler and Strickland claims.  We examine each
                             ______     __________

          seriatim.
          ________

          A.  The Cuyler Claim
          A.  The Cuyler Claim
              ________________

                    Bucuvalas  claims that  the payment  of his  attorney's

          fees by his co-defendants created an unconstitutional conflict of

          interest.   As a threshold  matter, he asserts  that under United
                                                                     ______

          States  v. Foster,  469 F.2d  1 (1st  Cir. 1972),  the government
          ______     ______

          bears  the burden of persuasion on the issue, because the alleged

          conflict of interest was never addressed at trial by the district

          court.

                    1.  Foster and the Burden of Persuasion
                    1.  Foster and the Burden of Persuasion
                        ___________________________________

                    When  the  defendant  fails  to object  to  an  alleged

          conflict of interest, the  defendant bears the burden of  proving

          that the alleged conflict  violates the Sixth Amendment.   United
                                                                     ______

                                         -5-

          States  v.  Soldevila-L pez, 17  F.3d  480, 486  (1st  Cir. 1994)
          ______      _______________

          (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348).
           ______ ______

                    Pursuant  to  our supervisory  powers,  this  court has

          carved out a limited exception to this rule.  Foster, 469 F.2d at
                                                        ______

          4.   In  Foster, we  held that  district courts  are required  to
                   ______

          intervene, sua  sponte, when  one lawyer represents  multiple co-
                     ___  ______

          defendants.  Id.   In particular,  Foster requires that  district
                       ___                   ______

          courts apprise  defendants of the risks  associated with multiple

          representation and  of their right to  a court-appointed attorney

          if necessary to avoid the multiple representation.  Id. at 5.  If
                                                              ___

          a court  fails to conduct  an adequate inquiry,  Foster instructs
                                                           ______

          that  the  burden  of  persuasion  shifts  to  the government  to

          disprove  an alleged  conflict of  interest, given  an  appeal or

          collateral  attack.    Id.    This  rule  seeks  to  address  the
                                 ___

          heightened   danger    of   prejudice   inherent    in   multiple

          representation.  Id. at 4.
                           ___

                    Bucuvalas  argues  that he  was  entitled  to a  Foster
                                                                     ______

          hearing.   Though he  did  not share  an  attorney with  his  co-

          defendants, Bucuvalas claims that the fee arrangement  indirectly

          implicated  the same concerns as multiple representation, because

          it subjected his attorney to the influence of  his co-defendants.

          Since  the district court did not inquire into his attorney's fee

          arrangement, Bucuvalas  argues that  Foster shifts the  burden to
                                               ______

          the government.

                    We reject  Bucuvalas'  argument and  decline to  extend

          Foster to these facts.  The Foster  rule is narrow.  See Brien v.
          ______                      ______                   ___ _____

                                         -6-

          United  States,  695 F.2d  10, 14  (1st  Cir. 1982)  (refusing to
          ______________

          extend  Foster and impose broader  duty on district  courts).  By
                  ______

          its  own terms,  Foster  only applies  to "criminal  prosecutions
                           ______

          where one attorney speaks for two or more defendants."  Id.  This
                                                                  ___

          case,  therefore,  does  not  come within  the  scope  of Foster,
                                                                    ______

          because there was no  multiple representation.  Segal represented

          Bucuvalas and no one else.

                    Moreover, Segal's  fee arrangement does not  foster the

          same risks as  multiple representation.  While  we recognize "the

          inherent  dangers  that  arise   when  a  criminal  defendant  is

          represented by a lawyer hired and paid by a third party," Wood v.
                                                                    ____

          Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1981), these dangers are different
          _______

          from  those  arising  in  multiple  representation  cases.    The

          existence  of separate  counsel interposes  a buffer  between the

          interests of co-defendants which  does not exist when counsel  is

          shared.    In this  vein, this  court has  distinguished multiple

          representation  from  independent  representation,  holding  that

          "where dual  representation is involved, the  danger of conflicts

          is not  so great."  United  States v. DiCarlo, 575  F.2d 952, 957
                              ______________    _______

          (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978).
                      _____ ______

                    As   here,    DiCarlo   did   not    involve   multiple
                                  _______

          representation.  It concerned  allegations that counsel abandoned

          a defense strategy, because  it would have implicated prospective

          clients of his law partner.   Id. at 955-57.  Rejecting the Sixth
                                        ___

          Amendment  claim, we  held there  to be  a presumption  that "the

          lawyer  will subordinate  his pecuniary  interests and  honor his

                                         -7-

          primary professional responsibility to  his clients in the matter

          at hand."  Id. at 957.  Here, the same presumption applies.
                     ___

                    It  would  be inappropriate  and impractical  to extend

          Foster to the facts of this case.  To  do so would be to impose a
          ______

          duty  on district courts  to inquire into  potential conflicts of

          interest when  they have no  reason to know or  suspect that such

          conflicts might exist.   District judges  do not ordinarily  have

          reason to know  who is paying an attorney's fees  and we question

          whether  it would  be appropriate  to require  them to  routinely

          inquire into such matters without any cause to do so.

                    Here,  Bucuvalas never brought  the alleged conflict of

          interest to  Judge Woodlock's attention.   Indeed, Judge Woodlock

          did not learn  of the contested  fee arrangement until  Bucuvalas

          filed this petition, four years after the fact.

                    We  hold that,  where an  alleged conflict  of interest

          does not  involve multiple representation, where  no party raises

          the   issue  before  the  court,  and  where  the  court  has  no

          independent  reason to  know  of the  alleged conflict,  district

          courts  have no  duty  to  inquire  into potential  conflicts  of

          interest.  In  such circumstances, a district  court's failure to

          inquire does not shift  the burden of persuasion on  a subsequent

          Sixth Amendment claim  to the  government.  It  follows that,  in

          this case,  the district  court had no  duty to  inquire and  the

          burden of persuasion did not shift to the government.  The burden

          remained  on Bucuvalas to  establish an unconstitutional conflict

          of interest.

                                         -8-

                    2.  Conflict of Interest Analysis
                    2.  Conflict of Interest Analysis
                        _____________________________

                    The Sixth  Amendment right  to effective  assistance of

          counsel is violated when an actual conflict of interest adversely

          affects counsel's representation.   Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.   To
                                              ______

          meet this standard, the defendant must show that (1) the attorney

          could have pursued a  plausible alternative defense strategy, and

          (2) the alternative strategy  was inherently in conflict  with or

          not  undertaken   due  to  the  attorney's   other  interests  or

          loyalties.   United States v.  Soldevila-L pez, 17 F.3d  480, 486
                       _____________     _______________

          (1st  Cir. 1994).   When  an alleged  conflict of interest  is at

          issue, actual  prejudice need not  be established.   Id.; Cuyler,
                                                               ___  ______

          446 U.S. at 349-50.

                    No  unconstitutional  conflict of  interest  existed in

          this case.  Bucuvalas claims that a plausible alternative defense

          strategy  existed in  that he  should have  testified on  his own

          behalf to explain  that he was merely carrying out  the orders of

          his co-defendants.   According to Bucuvalas,  Segal's advice that

          he  not  testify  was  impermissibly  tainted because  Bucuvalas'

          testimony would  have incriminated the  very persons  responsible

          for Segal's fees.

                    The flaw in Bucuvalas'  argument is that his testifying

          was not a  plausible alternative defense strategy.  Had Bucuvalas

          testified,  a prior  conviction  on a  remarkably similar  charge

          would have been introduced into evidence.  One of the allegations

          at  trial was that Bucuvalas  had bribed a  police detective; the

          prior  conviction was  for bribing  an  I.R.S. agent.   Moreover,

                                         -9-

          according to  Bucuvalas' own testimony during  the district court

          hearing on  his Sixth  Amendment claims,  his testimony  at trial

          would have resulted in an  admission to the current charges.   We

          agree with Judge  Woodlock, who found  that Bucuvalas would  have

          "offered  himself up  to  a cross-examinational  meat-grinder  on

          virtually  every  relevant issue,  effectively  admitting to  the

          elements  of the offenses against  him and calling  to the jury's

          attention in a very specific way his role in this offense."1

                    Even if Bucuvalas had put forth a plausible alternative

          strategy,   his  claim   would  still   fail  because   there  is

          insufficient  evidence that  Segal's  advice was  tainted by  his

          relationship  with Bucuvalas'  co-defendants.   A  defendant must

          show   that   his  counsel   "actively   represented  conflicting

          interests."  Cuyler, 446 U.S.  at 350.  See also Carey  v. United
                       ______                     ________ _____     ______

          States, 50 F.3d 1097,  1100 (1st Cir. 1995) ("the  defendant must
          ______

          demonstrate  that  the  alleged   conflict  is  more  than  'some

          attenuated hypothesis having  little consequence to the  adequacy

          of representation'") (citing Brien v. United States, 695 F.2d 10,
                                       _____    _____________

          15   (1st  Cir.   1982));   Soldevila-L pez,  17   F.3d  at   487
                                      _______________

          ("theoretical  or merely  speculative conflict of  interest" does

          not  constitute  Sixth  Amendment  violation).    In  Carey,  for
                                                                _____
                              
          ____________________

          1   The  standard  by which  this court  reviews findings  of the
          district court in ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised
          on collateral attack is  not clear. United States v.  Raineri, 42
                                              _____________     _______
          F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2286 (1995)
                                       _____ ______
          (standard of  review is uncertain);  United States v.  McGill, 11
                                               _____________     ______
          F.3d 223, 226 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993) (same).  But see Lema v. United
                                                     ___ ___ ____    ______
          States, 987 F.2d 48,  53 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying  "clear error"
          ______
          standard).   We refrain  from choosing a  standard here, however,
          because Bucuvalas' claims fail under any standard.

                                         -10-

          instance,  counsel  simultaneously represented  co-defendants and

          advised one  not to divulge  any information regarding  the other

          when  cooperating with the government.   Carey, 50  F.3d at 1099-
                                                   _____

          1100.    The  cooperating  defendant  alleged  that  this  advice

          precluded  him from obtaining a sentence reduction.  Id. at 1101.
                                                               ___

          The  court held  that  the  link  between  counsel's  advice  and

          counsel's  interest  in  protecting  his  other  client  was  too

          speculative  to establish an actual conflict of interest.  Id. at
                                                                     ___

          1100.

                    Bucuvalas argues that  an actual  conflict of  interest

          can  be inferred from Segal's fee arrangement.  The facts alleged

          by  Bucuvalas, however, are even less  suspect than those alleged

          in  Carey.  Bucuvalas had his own attorney, whereas the defendant
              _____

          in  Carey shared counsel  with a  co-defendant. See  DiCarlo, 575
              _____                                       ___  _______

          F.2d at  957 (individual representation less  risky than multiple

          representation).  Moreover, Bucuvalas  offers no additional facts

          to show that Segal had conflicting interests.

                    Significantly, Judge Woodlock,  who observed  firsthand

          the  dynamics  of  the  trial  below,  explicitly  found  that no

          conflict existed,  stating, "I do not find  that Mr. Segal in any

          fashion permitted himself to be directed by any other person  . .

          .  in his  professional judgment  with respect  to  the strategic

          dimensions  of this  case."   Bucuvalas has  failed to  show that

          Segal's  representation  was tainted  by  an  actual conflict  of

          interest.

                                         -11-

                    The Eleventh  Circuit addressed a similar  set of facts

          in Danner v. United States, 820 F.2d 1166 (11th Cir. 1987), cert.
             ______    _____________                                  _____

          denied, 484 U.S. 1012 (1988), and arrived at the same conclusion.
          ______

          In  Danner,  counsel's  fees  were  paid  through  co-defendant's
              ______

          counsel.  Id. at  1168-69.  Like Bucuvalas, the defendant alleged
                    ___

          that counsel's  advice not  to testify conflicted  with counsel's

          interest in receiving his fees because  such testimony would have

          incriminated  his co-defendants.   Id.   The  court held  that no
                                             ___

          conflict of interest existed.  Id.
                                         ___

                    For all  of these  reasons, we conclude  that Bucuvalas

          has not met his burden of demonstrating that his attorney, Segal,

          labored under an unconstitutional conflict of interest.

          B.  The Strickland Claim
          B.  The Strickland Claim
              ____________________

                    Bucuvalas alternatively claims that his Sixth Amendment

          right  to counsel was violated by strategic errors made by Segal.

          Under  Strickland  v.  Washington,  a Sixth  Amendment  violation
                 __________      __________

          occurs when (1) counsel's performance  was deficient, and (2) the

          deficient performance  prejudiced the defense.   Strickland,  466
                                                           __________

          U.S.  at 687.   The defendant  bears the  burden of  proving both

          prongs of this test.  Id.   This burden is heavy.   Argencourt v.
                                ___                           __________

          United States, 78 F.3d  14, 16 (1st Cir. 1996); United  States v.
          _____________                                   ______________

          Lema, 987 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1993).
          ____

                    Counsel's performance is  deficient under  Strickland's
                                                               __________

          first  prong when  it  is  "so  inferior  as  to  be  objectively

          unreasonable."   United States v.  McGill, 11 F.3d  223, 226 (1st
                           _____________     ______

                                         -12-

          Cir. 1993).  In making this determination, "judicial scrutiny  of

          counsel's  performance must  be highly  deferential." Strickland,
                                                                __________

          466 U.S. at 689.  "A court must indulge a strong presumption that

          counsel's  conduct  falls within  the  wide  range of  reasonable

          professional assistance."  Id.
                                     ___

                    Bucuvalas   suggests   that  Segal's   performance  was

          deficient in two  respects.  First,  Bucuvalas claims that  Segal

          should  have discussed the  potential risks presented  by the fee

          arrangement  with Bucuvalas  and  should have  disclosed the  fee

          arrangement  to  the  court.    Segal's  failure  to  take  these

          measures,   however,  was  not   unreasonable.     An  attorney's

          obligation in such circumstances is encapsulated by Massachusetts

          Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07, DR 5-107.  It states, "[e]xcept

          with  the consent of his  client after full  disclosure, a lawyer

          shall not . .  . accept compensation for his  legal services from

          one other than his client."  Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

          Rule 3:07, DR 5-107 (West 1996).  Segal fulfilled his obligations

          under this  rule.   Bucuvalas' consent  was evident,  and further

          disclosure was  not necessary because  Bucuvalas orchestrated the

          fee arrangement.   Judge Woodlock, in fact,  found that Bucuvalas

          "was  fully  aware  of  the relationships  that  are  necessarily

          involved in  this  case  and, consequently,  made  his  own  good

          judgments or, at least, fair judgments about how to proceed . . .

          ."

                    We agree  that Segal's handling of  the fee arrangement

          did not constitute deficient performance.

                                         -13-

                    Bucuvalas  also claims  that  Segal's  performance  was

          deficient, because he should have advised Bucuvalas to testify on

          his  own behalf.    In  Lema,  however,  this  court  found  that
                                  ____

          counsel's  advice that his client  not testify did not constitute

          deficient performance  when such testimony would  have divulged a

          prior conviction.   Lema, 987  F.2d at  50-53.   Lema held  that,
                              ____                         ____

          "[u]naccompanied by coercion, legal advice concerning exercise of

          the right to testify infringes no  right."  Id. at 52.   See also
                                                      ___          ________

          United States v. Teague,  953 F.2d 1525, 1534-35 (11th  Cir.) (en
          _____________    ______                                        __

          banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 842 (1992).
          ____   _____ ______

                    Bucuvalas makes no allegations  of coercion.  This case

          is,  therefore, analogous  to  Lema because  Bucuvalas' testimony
                                         ____

          would  have  divulged a  prior  conviction  for similar  charges.

          Here, in fact,  there was  an additional reason  not to  testify.

          His testimony at trial  would likely have led to  an admission of

          several of the charges.  Judge Woodlock commented that "[p]utting

          Mr.  Bucuvalas on  the stand  in  these circumstances  would have

          opened  him up to a  scorching cross examination,"  and that "Mr.

          Segal  gave  the  recommendation  which,  frankly,  any competent

          criminal  defense   attorney  would   have   given  under   these

          circumstances, that  Mr. Bucuvalas not  take the witness  stand."

          We agree.   Segal gave Bucuvalas the  best possible advice.   His

          performance was  not constitutionally  deficient in  any respect.

          Bucuvalas has,  therefore, failed to  satisfy the first  prong of

          Strickland.
          __________

                                         -14-

                    Even   if  Bucuvalas   had  established   that  Segal's

          performance was deficient,  his claim still fails  because he has

          not satisfied  the second prong  of Strickland, which  requires a
                                              __________

          showing  of prejudice.  To  establish prejudice, a defendant must

          show  that  "there  is  a reasonable  probability  that,  but for

          counsel's unprofessional  errors, the  result  of the  proceeding

          would  have  been  different."    Strickland, 466  U.S.  at  694;
                                            __________

          Argencourt, 78 F.3d  at 16.   Bucuvalas claims  that, absent  the
          __________

          alleged errors,  he would have taken the  stand on his own behalf

          and, as a result, he would not have been convicted.  We disagree.

          Had Bucuvalas  testified, the likelihood of  his conviction would

          have  been increased by the introduction  of the prior conviction

          and by Bucuvalas'  inevitable admissions.  We find that Bucuvalas

          has  failed  to  establish   prejudice  and  cannot,   therefore,

          establish a Sixth Amendment violation under Strickland.
                                                      __________

                                         III.
                                         III.

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion

                    For the  reasons discussed above, we  find that neither

          counsel's fee arrangement nor counsel's advice that Appellant not

          testify violated Appellant's  Sixth Amendment right  to effective

          assistance of counsel.

                    AFFIRMED.

                                         -15-