Court Opinion

ID: 9486252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:42:13.608218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:36.199469
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
In this insurance case, the district court expressed difficulty with a number of concepts. I believe these troublesome issues require the attention of the Ohio Supreme Court. The first of these concerns is the operation and effect of the presumption of prejudice that arises when an insured fails to give the insurer timely notice of the event giving rise to the insurance claim.
I perceive two schools of thought in Ohio regarding the effect of late notice in an insurance contract. One school treats timely notice as a condition precedent to coverage where the insurance carrier is relieved of the duty to insure if the insured violates the notice provision. See, e.g., Kornhauser v. National Surety Co., 114 Ohio St. 24, 150 N.E. 921 (1926); Krasny v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 284, 28 O.O. 199, 54 N.E.2d 952, 955 (1944); Heller v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 118 Ohio St. 237, 242, 160 N.E. 707, 708 (1928); Patrick v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 5 Ohio App.3d *599118, 119, 449 N.E.2d 790, 791 (Warren Cty. 1982) (timely notice “is of the essence of the contract of insurance”). The other school adheres to the position that “late notice re-heves the insurer of its obligations under the policy only if the insurer demonstrates prejudice as a result of the delay.” West Am. Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 59 Ohio App.3d 71, 73, 571 N.E.2d 449, 452 (Montgomery Cty.), mot. overr’d, 42 Ohio St.3d 714, 538 N.E.2d 1065 (1989). Following Hardin, the district court in this case adopted the later view. I believe that the Supreme Court of Ohio should decide whether the position adopted by the district court was the correct one under Ohio law to resolve this case properly.
Citing Ruby v. Midwestern Indemnity Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 159, 161, 532 N.E.2d 730, 732 (1988), and Patrick, 5 Ohio App.3d at 119, 449 N.E.2d at 791, the district court relied on .the following statement of the law in Ohio: “[ujnreasonable delay in the giving of notice may be presumed prejudicial to the insurer absent evidence to the contrary.”
It remains unclear to me whether the re-buttable presumption of prejudice shifts the ultimate burden of showing prejudice from the insurer to the insured -in Ohio. The controversy is fueled by an apparent ambiguity in Hardin. After the holding, above quoted, that the insured must prove prejudice, the court stated that “prejudice to the insurer is presumed from unreasonable delay in giving the required notice of loss under the policy, and the burden rests upon the claimant to show absence of prejudice.” Hardin, 571 N.E.2d at 452 (citing Zurich Ins. Co. v. Valley Steel Erectors, 13 Ohio App.2d 41, 233 N.E.2d 597 (Turnbull Cty. 1968), and Security Ins. Co. v. Snyder-Lynch Motor, Inc., 183 Cal.App.2d 574, 7 Cal.Rptr. 28 (1960)). Both Ohio Rule of Evidence 301 and a recent Ohio appellate decision support Metro’s contention,1 and the district court in this case adopted that view.2
Because of my uncertainty and the at least limited deference I would give to the Ohio district judge, I would prefer in this case to certify these unsettled questions to the Ohio Supreme Court. The majority concedes, moreover, that “it is not possible to reconcile ... all of the Ohio opinions we have mentioned.”
Despite my preference to certify the unsettled questions to the Ohio Supreme Court, I would agree with the majority “that Metro’s delay in giving notice was unreasonable as a matter of law” for the reasons stated by Judge Nelson.
Despite my reservations, I concur in the result.

. Ohio Rule of Evidence 301 provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute enacted by the General Assembly or by- these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
In Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Joseph Sylvester Constr. Co., No. 90-T-4439, 1991 WL 206628 (Turnbull Cty. App. Sept. 30, 1991), jurisdictional mot. overr'd, 63 Ohio St.3d 1411, 585 N.E.2d 835 (1992), the court held that "[i]t is now well settled that untimely notice is rebuttably presumed to be prejudicial to the insurer, and the insured bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption.”

. The district court stated, among other things:
The court believes that the Ohio Supreme Court would decide the issue presented as did the court in Hardin [, 59 Ohio App.3d 71, 571 N.E.2d 449 (Montgomery Cly. 1989) (first syllabus)]. First, it must be pointed out that Hardin, ‘ in actuality, represents the majority view among the courts in Ohio.