Court Opinion

ID: 9958804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 21:00:38.199784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:36.229534
License: Public Domain

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                                           UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4673

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff – Appellee,

                     v.

        JESSE KENDALL GRIFFIN,

                            Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:20-cr-00340-WO-4)

        Submitted: December 4, 2023                                       Decided: April 8, 2024

        Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge, and Roderick C. YOUNG,
        United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Eugene Ernest Lester III, LESTER LAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
        Appellant. Kenneth A. Polite, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Lisa H. Miller, Deputy
        Assistant Attorney General, Allaya Lloyd, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, Jeremy
        R. Sanders, Assistant Chief, Jennifer L. Bilinkas, Fraud Section, UNITED STATES
        DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Sandra J. Hairston, United States
        Attorney, Nicole R. DuPre, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
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        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               Jesse Kendall Griffin pleaded guilty to a fraud charge arising from his involvement

        in an enterprise to defraud two federal COVID-19 financial relief programs. The district

        court sentenced Griffin to a below-Guidelines term of 66 months’ imprisonment. Griffin

        now appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in several respects in

        calculating his Guidelines range. The district court gave thorough and serious consideration

        to his objections, and largely for the reasons given by the district court, we affirm.

                                                      I.

               This case involves a scheme to defraud two federal COVID-19 relief programs

        aimed at providing loans to small businesses affected by the coronavirus pandemic: the

        Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) and the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”)

        Program. Six people participated in the scheme: James Stote led the enterprise; he and an

        associate recruited four others—including Defendant Jesse Kendall Griffin—to apply for

        fraudulent loans.

               A panel of this Court has already decided an appeal from two of Griffin’s co-recruits

        and outlined how this scheme operated. See United States v. Redfern, No. 22-4196, 2023

        WL 2823064, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 2023). We thus need not rehash all the particulars, but

        we note some of Griffin’s specifics. As a part of this scheme, Griffin unsuccessfully applied

        for a PPP loan of $465,902.85 and submitted five EIDL applications. J.A. 55–58. All of

        Griffin’s EIDL applications were ultimately denied, but he did receive a $3,000 advance

        for one. J.A. 57–58. During the scheme, two of Griffin’s co-recruits attempted to transfer

        money to accounts controlled by Griffin. J.A. 70; J.A. 75–76; J.A. 80; J.A. 101.

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               A federal grand jury charged Griffin and his three co-recruits with conspiracy and

        fraud charges. J.A. 12–42; J.A. 180. Griffin pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea

        agreement to one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2. J.A. 43–52;

        J.A. 180.

               The Probation Office prepared a presentence report, see J.A. 177–202, to which

        Griffin and the Government lodged various objections, see J.A. 161–62; J.A. 165–67; J.A.

        208. The district court resolved these objections over the course of a two-part sentencing

        hearing and in a written opinion. See J.A. 60–144; J.A. 216–39. Ultimately, the district

        court calculated Griffin’s advisory sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines as 77

        to 96 months. J.A. 117. The court varied downward from the guideline range and sentenced

        Griffin to 66 months of imprisonment. J.A. 135–36. The court also found Griffin jointly

        and severally liable for restitution in the amount of the total actual loss, $498,657.37. J.A.

        140; J.A. 159–60.

               Griffin timely appealed.

                                                     II.

               On this appeal, Griffin renews the objections he made below, arguing that the

        district court erred in multiple respects in calculating his advisory Sentencing Guidelines

        range. In Redfern, a panel of this Court heard—and rejected—the same arguments from

        two of Griffin’s co-recruits. 2023 WL 2823064, at *2–4. In Griffin’s case, the district

        court’s thorough explanation of the factual predicate and legal reasoning behind its

        determinations are nigh-on identical to that it provided—and which this Court affirmed—

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        in Redfern. Finding no material distinctions in Griffin’s case, we track Redfern and affirm

        the district court.

                                                      A.

               First, Griffin argues that the district court erred in calculating the loss amount

        attributable to him for Guideline purposes. The district court attributed to Griffin the

        aggregate loss intended by all four co-defendants—including the fraudulent loans sought

        under both the PPP and EIDL programs—for a total of $2,778,474.85. Under the

        Guidelines, that led to a 16-level enhancement to Griffin’s offense level. See U.S.S.G.

        § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I) (specifying a 16-level increase for losses exceeding $1,500,000). On

        appeal, Griffin contends that the district court misapplied the “relevant conduct” Guideline,

        see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), improperly holding him accountable for the intended losses

        of his co-defendants. 1

               We review only for clear error the district court’s calculation of the loss amount, see

        United States v. Otuya, 720 F.3d 183, 191 (4th Cir. 2013), and its application of the

        relevant-conduct standard to the factual circumstances before it, see United States v.

        McVey, 752 F.3d 606, 610 (4th Cir. 2014). 2

               1
                 The government agreed below that Griffin should not be held accountable for the
        intended losses of his co-recruits, see J.A. 161–62, but changed its position on appeal.
        Griffin is incorrect that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars the government from doing
        so. That doctrine is inapplicable here. See King v. Herbert J. Thomas Mem’l Hosp., 159
        F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining the doctrine and the three elements required for
        it to apply).
               2
                 Like his co-recruits did in Redfern, Griffin argues, for the first time on appeal, that
        the district court was required to make particularized findings as to the scope of the joint
        (Continued)
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               We discern no clear error. Griffin’s co-recruits raised the same arguments in Redfern

        without avail. The district court’s findings as to Griffin’s jointly undertaken criminal

        activity consisted of the exact same evidence relied upon by the district court and deemed

        sufficient by this Court in Redfern. Compare, e.g., J.A. 68–71 (listing as facts supporting

        its relevant-conduct determination the similar timing of the creation of the co-recruits’

        corporations, the similar timing of the submissions of their EIDL and PPP loan

        applications, and the co-recruits’ attempts to share profits), and J.A. 100–01 (highlighting

        the similarity in the false bank statements and information used to create both the PPP and

        EIDL applications), and J.A. 111–13 (finding that Griffin authored and submitted his own

        EIDL applications), and J.A. 114 (noting the “striking” similarities between the co-

        recruits’ fraudulent loan applications), with Redfern, 2023 WL 2823064, at *2 (finding that

        the similar timing of the submissions of loan applications and the co-recruits’ attempts to

        share profits supported the district court’s relevant-conduct determination).

               The Redfern panel concluded that “the evidence before the district court amply

        support[ed] its relevant-conduct determination, establishing by a preponderance of the

        evidence—at the least—that the four recruits were working together in furtherance of their

        criminal activity to which he agreed. See United States v. Flores-Alvarado, 779 F.3d 250,
        255–56 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e require sentencing courts to make particularized findings
        with respect to both the scope of the defendant’s agreement and the foreseeability of [the
        conduct at issue].” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Redfern, 2023 WL
        2823064, at *2 n.1. We review this unpreserved procedural claim for plain error. See, e.g.,
        Redfern, 2023 WL 2823064, at *2 n.1. Griffin has not convinced us that the district court’s
        findings with respect to § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) were insufficient, let alone that any such
        insufficiency would warrant relief for plain error. See United States v. Oceanic Illsabe Ltd.,
        889 F.3d 178, 200 (4th Cir. 2018) (applying plain error standard).

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        joint scheme and that their individual acts were reasonably foreseeable, if not actually

        known, to each other.” Redfern, 2023 WL 2823064, at *2 (emphasis added); see also

        United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1316 (4th Cir. 1994) (government must establish

        relevant conduct by preponderance of the evidence).

               The district court heard Griffin’s arguments as to why his situation might be

        distinguishable from his co-recruits’. See J.A. 81–83, 85; J.A. 217. Griffin argued that he

        played a lesser role in the scheme, did not stand to benefit as much from the intended fraud,

        and was not aware of the others’ activities. J.A. 104–09. But even accepting these

        arguments as true, they did not change the district court’s analysis. J.A. 110–15. Griffin

        knew Redfern and was thus “well aware” of Redfern’s involvement with the others.

        Therefore, the others’ activity was reasonably foreseeable, and Griffin’s conduct furthered

        the joint scheme. J.A. 114–16.

               For the reasons given by the district court and this Court in Redfern, we affirm the

        district court’s loss calculation as it applies to Griffin.

                                                        B.

               Next, Griffin challenges the district court’s imposition of the two-level increase in

        offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) for offenses that “involved sophisticated

        means.” We review this “essentially factual” determination for clear error. See United

        States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2014). Again, we find no clear error. 3

               3
                To the extent Griffin argues that the district court erred in basing its sophisticated-
        means determination on his co-recruits’ conduct, we disagree. The guidelines require that
        any adjustments based on “specific offense characteristics . . . shall be determined” by the
        (Continued)
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               The Redfern panel considered this exact argument and concluded that the district

        court did not clearly err in determining that this scheme was “unusually complex” “[i]n its

        totality” and, accordingly, in applying the enhancement. Redfern, 2023 WL 2823064, at

        *3; see also Adepoju, 756 F.3d at 257 (citing United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 486

        (4th Cir. 2012)) (“The enhancement applies where the entirety of a scheme constitutes

        sophisticated means, even if every individual action is not sophisticated.” (emphasis

        added)). The district court in Griffin’s case considered the exact same evidence it did in

        Redfern to find this scheme “especially complex” and that the sophisticated-means

        enhancement applied. See J.A. 233–35; see also U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B)

        (enhancement applies to “especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct

        pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense”). Compare J.A. 233–35

        (considering scheme’s reliance on out-of-state recruits, sophisticated understanding of the

        complicated PPP and EIDL programs, and creation of false bank statements and IRS forms

        “sufficient to survive minimal scrutiny”), with Redfern, 2023 WL 2823064, at *3 (same).

               Like the Redfern panel, we can discern no clear error in the district court’s

        sophisticated-means determination.

                                                      C.

               Lastly, Griffin argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level

        district court’s relevant-conduct determination. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The
        sophisticated-means enhancement is a specific offense characteristic. See U.S.S.G.
        § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). And we’ve already concluded that the district court’s relevant-conduct
        determination correctly considered the activity of all co-recruits. So the district court could
        consider both Griffin’s and his co-recruits’ use of sophisticated means.
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        enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(12) of the Sentencing Guidelines. 4 The ultimate

        legal question as to whether this enhancement applies is whether loans under the PPP and

        EIDL programs were “authorized” or “paid” “in connection with” the President’s March

        13, 2020, Stafford Act emergency declaration in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

        Redfern, 2023 WL 2823064, at *3. The district court in Griffin’s case, as it did in the cases

        of his two co-recruits in Redfern, concluded that the EIDL benefits (but not the PPP

        benefits) were authorized “in connection with” a Stafford Act declaration, and accordingly

        applied the enhancement. Compare J.A. 222–30, with Redfern, 2023 WL 2823064, at *3.

               “[W]e have no reason to doubt the district court’s analysis,” but “we also have no

        need to pass on it here.” Redfern, 2023 WL 2823064, at *4. Assuming arguendo that the

        district court erred in applying § 2B1.1(b)(12), that error is clearly harmless because even

        if the court had decided the issue the other way, it would have imposed the same sentence,

        and that sentence would have remained reasonable. See United States v. Gomez-Jimenez,

        750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[R]ather than review the merits of . . . th[is] challenge[],

        we may proceed directly to an assumed error harmlessness inquiry.”).

               First, the district court here made it “abundantly clear,” id., that even if the

        § 2B1.1(b)(12) enhancement was not properly applied to Griffin, the court still would have

        imposed the same sentence to appropriately account for “the nature and circumstances of

               4
                That provision mandates an upward adjustment for offenses that involve “conduct
        described in 18 U.S.C. § 1040.” See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(12). In turn, § 1040 prohibits
        fraud “involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, disbursed, or paid in
        connection with a major disaster declaration . . . or an emergency declaration under . . . the
        Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1040(a).

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        the offense and the seriousness of the offense” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), see J.A. 230–

        31; see also Redfern, 2023 WL 2823064, at *4 (finding explanation for alternative

        sentences—matching almost verbatim the one here—to sufficiently establish that the

        application of the § 2B1.1(b)(12) enhancement, even if in error, “was clearly harmless”

        under the circumstances).

              Second, even if the district court did not apply the enhancement, Griffin’s sentence

        would have remained reasonable. Without the two-level § 2B1.1(b)(12) enhancement,

        Griffin’s advisory Guidelines range would have dropped from 77 to 96 months’

        imprisonment to 63 to 78 months. Griffin’s 66-month sentence would be presumptively

        reasonable as within this hypothetical Guidelines range. See United States v. White, 850

        F.3d 667, 674 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir.

        2012)) (“A within-Guidelines range sentence is presumptively reasonable.”).

                                                  III.

              We affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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