Court Opinion

ID: 9767987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:37:48.582538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:35.384564
License: Public Domain

HOWERTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Except for the statement of the issues and the presentation of the facts, I find little to agree with in the majority opinion. I believe the result is wrong and the precedent it sets invites disaster. The opinion is not based on clear law or sound logic, and I must therefore vigorously dissent.
As to the first issue concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, the majority correctly concluded that the challenge was untimely. It should be noted, however, that the evidence was clearly sufficient to uphold the validity of the deed. If there was any deficiency, it was in the appellants’ lack of proof. The testimony of Bryant Milby’s doctor, his sister, and the attorney who prepared the deed supported his mental capacity. The only evidence to prove his incapacity was the testimony that Bryant Milby “just wasn’t himself.” I do not propose to resolve the jury selection issue on the basis of the harmless error rule; but it is difficult to see, in the light of the total record, how the verdict in this case would have been any different with any jury.
There are several reasons why the trial court should be affirmed on the problem involving the selection of the jury panel. Although I conclude that the issue was not properly preserved for our review, I can not be satisfied with that comment or mere basis. This dissent must present an alternative to the majority opinion and address the problems and questions which justify further discussion.
*877The majority opinion quoted from KRS 29A.060, which sets forth the method for selecting jurors. Clearly, the method of selection constituted a substantial deviation, but the following questions remain: (1) when must one object, and (2) can a substantial deviation be waived without or before having specific knowledge of it? To present an alternative, to answer the questions and to discuss the appellants’ allegation of error, I would have the majority opinion read as follows, beginning at the point where the majority cites the Robertson and Allen cases.
The appellants cite Robertson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 597 S.W.2d 864 (1980), and Allen v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 596 S.W.2d 21 (1979), in support of a reversal. Although these cases stand for the proposition that no substantial deviation may be allowed in the selection of jurors, regardless of a showing of prejudice, each case is nevertheless distinguishable in that there were timely objections. Bartley and Milby made no objection to the selection of the jury until they filed their request for a new trial. A timely objection is necessary, and I must conclude that an objection following a trial is not timely. In Robertson, supra, the opinion reads:
[I]t is important that the prescribed method of jury selection be followed substantially by the trial court. We are of the opinion that where the error is preserved and there is substantial deviation in the jury selection from the rule and the statute a reversal is required. We would not consider minor errors in jury selection reversible in the absence of a showing of prejudice. (Emphasis added.) Id., at 865.
Our procedural rules require that, “[a] motion raising an irregularity in the selection or summons of the jurors or formation of the jury must precede the examination of the jurors.” 8 Fitzgerald, Kentucky Practice, AD PRO II, (1978), at 655. See also, RCr 9.34. The quotation is from the section entitled “Challenge to Panel.” It was argued that this rule applies only to the selection and summoning of jurors for the master panel called to serve for a term of court, but I do not agree. AD PRO II, § 1(4) provides that “ ‘Qjury panel’ means the group of prospective jurors who are summoned to appear on a stated day and from which a grand jury or petit jury will be chosen.” 8 Fitzgerald, supra, at 641. This is verbatim to the definition of “jury panel” as is found in Black’s Law Dictionary, 769 (5th ed. 1979). The term “panel” is defined as “[a] list of jurors to serve in a particular court, or for the trial of a particular action.” Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1000. The jury selected for this trial constituted a panel, § 30 applied, and the required objection was not timely made.
In summary, the exercise of due diligence by an attorney requires that any deviation from the prescribed method for selecting jurors for a panel be discovered and challenged prior to voir dire. When a proper objection is made, substantial deviations must be corrected, even without a showing of prejudice. Minor deviations need not be corrected unless prejudice can be shown. As a general rule, the law does not apply a waiver when one has no knowledge of a defective situation. However, since the exercise of due diligence requires an attorney to discover deviations in proper jury selection prior to examining the jurors, any defect is waived when no timely objection is offered.
Perhaps it is unfortunate that attorneys are required to examine clerks about their method of jury selection before trying a case, but this is the only way the system can properly work. In balancing all of the interests involved in this situation, it is necessary to require attorneys to investigate and question the selection methods prior to trial, or else force a waiver of their right to object to subsequently discovered irregularities. To allow challenges subsequent to trial invites attorneys to suspect error but wait until a case is lost before objecting. Such late challenges would also leave the door open for never-ending litigation. If a new trial is allowed in this case, a new trial will be appropriate in any other ease in the Green Circuit Court, or elsewhere, wherein *878jury panels were improperly selected. Each side which lost may demand a new trial.
In actuality, few clerks will be questioned. There should be no need for examination unless there is something suspicious or possibly prejudicial about a panel. Generally, with proper preparation for a jury trial, an attorney will have some suspicion of impropriety, if a panel appears to be “stacked.”
Litigants who have been prejudiced by irregularities in jury panel selection are not totally without a remedy. They may seek post-judgment relief under CR 60.02.
The judgment of the Green Circuit Court should be affirmed.