Court Opinion

ID: 9809258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:05:38.782319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:42.147427
License: Public Domain

ClaRK, O. J.,
dissenting: The charge called in question was an instruction to the jury that they could “consider the changed conditions as to the greatly 'increased value of timber and timber lands in proportion to cleared or farm lands in arriving at a conclusion as to the necessity for clearing any part of the premises. The jury should also consider the growing scarcity of timber and its increasing value; also the improved methods of farming, the improved methods of improving the fertility of ‘old field’ and land depleted of fertility by long cultivation, ’in arriving at a conclusion as to what was a proper use of the premises; also,' in arriving at a conclusion, the character of the cultivation of said lands since the life estate of the feme defendant vested in her, and whether the same was such as an ordinarily prudent owner of the fee would have used in its cultivation.”
It is difficult to see how the judge erred in so charging. He did not assume any facts in regard to which there was conflicting *608evidence, nor did be make tbe reasonable enjoyment of tbe life estate “depend solely” upon tbe relative value of timbered and arable land. Tbe learned judge simply placed before tbe jury for tbem-to “consider” tbe surrounding and attendant circumstances as tbe jury might find tbem to be,'with tbe object in view of finding whether or not tbe conduct of tbe life tenant was “such as an ordinarily prudent owner of tbe fee would have used.” This conforms to tbe rule laid down in Sherrill v. Connor, 101 N. C., 630. "What in one age or community, under tbe recognized conditions of agriculture, would not be waste, because such as a prudent owner would do with bis own, might be waste in another age or in another community, under changed conditions, because no. ordinarily prudent owner would so act. Tbe fact is eminently one for a jury to pass uj>on.
It would seem that tbe charge was unobjectionable and there was no error for which-a new trial should be awarded.
Hoke, J., concurs in this dissent.