Court Opinion

ID: 9367955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 17:00:31.718274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:04.681351
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-6094            Document: 010110807177   Date Filed: 02/02/2023   Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       Tenth Circuit

                                 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        February 2, 2023
                             _________________________________
                                                                            Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                Clerk of Court
  STEPHEN JONES,

         Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                            No. 22-6094
                                                        (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00278-HE)
  J. KEVIN STITT; PAUL ZIRIAX,                                  (W.D. Okla.)

         Defendants - Appellees.

  ------------------------------

  THE OKLAHOMA HOUSE OF
  REPRESENTATIVES; THE
  OKLAHOMA SENATE,

         Amici Curiae.
                             _________________________________

                                 ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                             _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
 But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R.
 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 22-6094    Document: 010110807177        Date Filed: 02/02/2023     Page: 2

       Stephen Jones challenges the district court’s order dismissing his Seventeenth

 Amendment claims for lack of standing and alternatively rejecting such claims on

 their merits. For the reasons explained below, we dismiss Jones’s appeal as moot.

                                      Background

       In late February 2022, Oklahoma’s U.S. Senator James Inhofe announced in a

 letter to Oklahoma’s secretary of state that he would retire on January 3, 2023, rather

 than serve out the remainder of his term, which runs until January 2027. In the letter,

 Inhofe invoked an Oklahoma procedure that permits a U.S. senator to file an

 irrevocable resignation letter before the actual resignation date, thereby allowing

 Oklahoma to conduct the necessary special elections to fill the anticipated vacancy

 ahead of time. See Okla. Stat. tit. 26, §§ 12-101, -119. On March 1, 2022, in response

 to Inhofe’s letter, Oklahoma’s governor issued a proclamation setting the special-

 election dates for Inhofe’s replacement: a special primary election on June 28, 2022;

 a special runoff primary election, if necessary, on August 23, 2022; and special

 general election on November 8, 2022.

       A month after the proclamation, Jones filed this action against Oklahoma’s

 governor and the secretary of the state election board (together, defendants),

 challenging Oklahoma’s vacancy procedures.1 Jones invoked the Seventeenth

 Amendment, which provides for replacement elections “[w]hen vacancies happen” in

 the Senate. Specifically, his complaint asserted that Oklahoma’s 2022 special

       1
       He first attempted to challenge the vacancy procedures at the Oklahoma
 Supreme Court, but that court declined jurisdiction.
                                            2
Appellate Case: 22-6094     Document: 010110807177        Date Filed: 02/02/2023     Page: 3

 elections were unconstitutionally premature because Inhofe’s letter created only an

 anticipated vacancy, not an actual vacancy. An actual vacancy would not happen,

 according to Jones, until the date Inhofe actually resigned. Jones contended that upon

 such date, the governor should appoint a temporary replacement until the next

 appropriate election cycle under Oklahoma law, which Jones reasoned would be

 2024. Jones also attached to his complaint a letter asking the governor to appoint him

 to Inhofe’s vacant seat pending that anticipated 2024 election cycle. As relief, Jones

 asked the district court to enter an order (1) preventing the 2022 special elections and

 (2) directing the governor to set the 2024 special elections and to appoint an interim

 senator to fill the gap.

        Defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that Jones lacked standing and failed

 to state a claim. On June 1, 2022, the district court concluded that Jones lacked

 standing and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. In the alternative, it rejected

 Jones’s claims on the merits.

        Jones appealed on June 9. After he filed his optional reply brief on September

 23, his appeal was placed on our January 2023 oral-argument calendar (though

 submitted on the briefs). On November 23, 2022, because the special elections Jones

 sought to prevent had already occurred, we ordered supplemental briefing on

 mootness.2

        2
          Jones did not seek to expedite this appeal until December 14, 2022—well
 after the November 8, 2022 special general election that he sought to prevent and a
 week after he filed his supplemental brief arguing against mootness. And he only
 sought to expedite in the alternative; his motion primarily sought an injunction
                                             3
Appellate Case: 22-6094    Document: 010110807177         Date Filed: 02/02/2023      Page: 4

                                         Analysis

       We review mootness de novo.3 WildEarth Guardians v. Pub. Serv. Co. of

 Colo., 690 F.3d 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 2012). Mootness is a “jurisdictional doctrine

 originating in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language.”4 Id. at 1182; see also

 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “In considering mootness, we ask ‘whether granting a

 present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real world.’”

 Fleming v. Gutierrez, 785 F.3d 442, 444–45 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted)

 (quoting Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1110

 (10th Cir. 2010)). Accordingly, “if an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal

 that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a

 prevailing party, we must dismiss the case[] rather than issue an advisory opinion.”

 Id. at 445 (quoting Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 762 F.3d 765, 768 (8th

 Cir. 2014)). We “must decide whether a case is moot as to ‘each form of relief

 sought.’” Prison Legal News v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868, 880 (10th Cir.

 2019) (quoting Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 2019)).

 prohibiting Oklahoma’s governor from certifying the election results pending the
 outcome of his appeal. We denied that motion on December 29.
        3
          We choose to begin with mootness even though the district court dismissed
 Jones’s claims for lack of standing because “[t]here is no mandatory ‘sequencing of
 nonmerits issues’” like these. Citizen Ctr. v. Gessler, 770 F.3d 900, 906 (10th Cir.
 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping
 Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007)).
        4
          Mootness also has prudential element that can come into play “if events so
 overtake a lawsuit that the anticipated benefits of a remedial decree no longer justify
 the trouble of deciding the case on the merits.” Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A.,
 Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2012). We need not decide whether prudential
 mootness is also at issue here.
                                             4
Appellate Case: 22-6094    Document: 010110807177        Date Filed: 02/02/2023    Page: 5

       Here, Jones seeks to prevent the special election and to impose his preferred

 procedure: He requests an injunction ordering defendants to cancel the November

 2022 election, to hold a special election in 2024 following Inhofe’s actual

 resignation, and to appoint a temporary replacement pending the results of the 2024

 election. The mootness of Jones’s attempt to prevent the November 2022 special

 election is obvious—such election has already taken place. See Fleming, 785 F.3d at

 445 (finding appeal challenging election moot “because the election ha[d] passed and

 we c[ould not] grant any effective relief”). Moreover, Inhofe resigned as planned on

 January 3, 2023, and Markwayne Mullin (the winner of the 2022 special general

 election) was sworn in the same day.5 Thus, we cannot effectively order defendants

 to appoint a temporary replacement for Inhofe or to hold another special election to

 fill that seat; such order would have no effect in the real world. See Rio Grande, 601

 F.3d at 1110. And to the extent that Jones seeks a declaration that the 2022 special

 election violated his right to vote or his right to seek a temporary appointment, such

 declaration would not “affect[] the behavior of the defendant[s] toward the

 plaintiff”—the election has occurred and there is no vacancy to be filled by

 temporary appointment. Id. at 1109–10 (quoting Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 43 F.3d

 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1994)).

       Jones offers no meaningful response to these conclusions; nor does he invoke

       5
         We take judicial notice of these facts. See Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878,
 885 n.8 (10th Cir. 2001) (taking judicial notice of election results); 169 Cong. Rec.
 S3, S5 (Jan. 3, 2023) (noting Inhofe’s resignation, certification of Mullin’s election,
 and Mullin’s swearing in).
                                            5
Appellate Case: 22-6094    Document: 010110807177        Date Filed: 02/02/2023     Page: 6

 any exceptions to mootness. On the contrary, he effectively conceded mootness in his

 belated December 14, 2022 motion, acknowledging that after Mullin’s swearing in

 “on January 3, 202[3], . . . the issues underlying this appeal will effectively evade

 judicial review.” Emergency Mot. 8. Likewise, Jones’s supplemental mootness brief

 implicitly makes the same concession by asserting that we could grant relief despite

 Mullin’s election because Mullin would not formally replace Inhofe until January 3,

 2023. Given that both November 8, 2022, and January 3, 2023, have come and gone,

 Jones’s appeal is moot.

                                       Conclusion

       Because none of the relief Jones seeks would have any effect in the real world,

 we dismiss Jones’s appeal as moot. See Fleming, 785 F.3d at 444–45. We do so

 without vacating the judgment below because the mootness here is the result of

 Jones’s failure to expedite his appeal. See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d

 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[v]acatur is generally not appropriate

 when mootness is a result of a voluntary act of a nonprevailing party”).

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Nancy L. Moritz
                                             Circuit Judge

                                             6