Court Opinion

ID: 9854841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:15:13.756627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:28.841523
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
dissenting.
The Supreme Court of the United States has just held that Georgia’s statutory provisions for the imposition of the death penalty in murder cases are not violative of the Constitution of the United States. Gregg v. Georgia, 44 USLW 5230, decided July 2, 1976. Although I disagree with the construction of the Federal Constitution as construed by seven members of the United States Supreme Court in Gregg, I am nevertheless, as a member of the Georgia Supreme Court, bound by that construction of federal law. However, the Gregg decision by the United States Supreme Court does not in any way prevent or bridle me as a member of the highest court of this state from construing the provisions of the Georgia Constitution.
Laying the Federal Constitution entirely aside, it is my view that Georgia’s current statutory provisions that permit the imposition of the death penalty in certain specified cases are unconstitutional; they violate the Georgia Constitution. I would therefore hold that the imposition of the death penalty in the instant case is constitutionally impermissible.
Cruel and unusual punishment
Georgia’s Constitution provides that "cruel and unusual punishment” shall not be inflicted upon a citizen convicted of a crime against the state.
Prior to 1972, no court in this nation to my knowledge had ruled that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense.1 On June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court of the United States said: "The Court *320holds that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238. Five members of that court filed concurring opinions, and as I interpreted those concurring opinions, the imposition of the death penalty under a "discretionary system” constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription, but the imposition of the death penalty under a "mandatory system” did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription. I said exactly that in the concurring part of my opinion in Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829 (204 SE2d 612) (1974): "I would therefore hold that the current Georgia statutes authorizing the imposition of the death penalty have created a 'discretionary system’ as opposed to a 'mandatory system’ for imposing this ultimate penalty, and these statutes are unconstitutional.” p. 841.
My interpretation of the concurring opinions in Furman was obviously wrong, because the Supreme Court of the United States on July 2, 1976, ruled in Woodson v. North Carolina, 44 USLW 5267, that a "mandatory death sentence statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” However, it is of some small consolation to me that many eminent lawyers and jurists interpreted the five concurring opinions iñ the same manner that I did, and even Mr. Justice Rehnquist has recently said that determining the meaning of the concerns expressed in Furman is "not an easy task considering the glossolalial manner in which those concerns were expressed.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 44 USLW 5267, 5278 (1976).
I think that I understand the constitutional positions on this subject enunciated by Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall; I also believe that I understand the constitutional positions enunciated by the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist; but I am wholly unable to understand the constitutional positions set forth by Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Stevens in their respective opinions in Furman, Gregg, and *321Woodson. I have therefore abandoned any attempt to establish my own personal position on this subject on a construction of the Federal Constitution as construed by the present membership of the Supreme Court of the United States. I hereby establish my position on this subject solely on provisions of the Constitution of Georgia.
As late as 1964 the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled in Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7 (136 SE2d 766) (1964), that the imposition of the penalty of death in a forcible rape case, homicide not being involved, was not "cruel and unusual punishment” as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment and its equivalent in the Georgia Constitution. This court said in that case: "So long as the legislature provides the death penalty for any crime, this court will uphold it for forcible rape, as there can be no more reprehensible crime. Accordingly the sentence of death violates neither of the Constitutions as contended.” p. 11.
Ten years later in Coley v. State, supra, a majority of the membership of this court held that the imposition of the death penalty in a forcible rape case was excessive even though the Georgia legislature had provided for such a penalty and even though the jury that heard the case had imposed the death penalty on the convicted rapist. In Coley the majority said: "We, therefore, conclude the death penalty here imposed is excessive and have no alternative, under the language of the statute itself, except to set aside the sentence of death in this case.” p. 835. Two members of this court held that the imposition of the death penalty in Coley was not excessive. I concurred in the setting aside of the death penalty in Coley on the ground that it was constitutionally impermissible under Georgia’s "discretionary system” to impose that penalty.
Because the legislature had authorized the death penalty under statutes held by the majority to be constitutional, and because the jury hearing the case had imposed the death penalty under statutes held by the majority to be constitutional, I can only conclude that the majority held the imposition of the penalty to be excessive and unconstitutional in that case for the simple reason that it constituted "cruel and unusual punishment” under either the Georgia Constitution or the United States *322Constitution or both.
A majority of the membership of this court has also held that the imposition of the death penalty in mere armed robbery cases, a homicide not being involved, is excessive and unconstitutional. Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 127 (210 SE2d 659) (1974).
This court has, therefore, held, as I read the majority decisions in Coley and Gregg, that the imposition of the death penalty in these two stated instances, although authorized by statute and imposed by a jury, is excessive and unconstitutional.
Because I am of the view that Georgia’s current system for imposing the death penalty is purely discretionary with the jury that votes to impose or not impose that penalty, the present system collides with the Georgia constitutional provision that prohibits the imposition of "cruel and unusual punishment” upon a convicted citizen. I realize that a plurality of the membership of the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the "discretion” of the jury in the Georgia system is channeled: "No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines. In addition, the review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here.” Gregg v. Georgia, 44 USLW 5246.
I respectfully disagree with Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Stevens. My experience in reviewing cases tried under the current Georgia system convinces me that a jury’s discretion is not channeled, and a Georgia jury can "at its whim” impose or not impose the death penalty in any case wherein the statutes say it can be imposed and where the statutory aggravating circumstances are found to be present and unrefuted. Furthermore, my experience also teaches me that a majority of the membership of this court can "at its whim” allow a death penalty to stand or set it aside as excessive and unconstitutional.
I am personally unable to subscribe to any such system myself on constitutional grounds. Prior to July 2, *3231976, I had thought that a "mandatory system” for the imposition of the death penalty, such as that conceived by North Carolina, Louisiana, and Oklahoma after Furman, would pass constitutional muster, both state and federal. However, a plurality of three members of the United States Supreme Court say that a "mandatory system” violates the Federal Constitution and two members of the United States Supreme Court hold that any system for imposing the death penalty violates the Federal Constitution. Therefore, the "mandatory system” that would receive my constitutional approval gets constitutionally convicted on federal grounds for differing reasons in the Supreme Court of the United States as that court is currently constituted.
I think Georgia’s current system for imposing the death penalty is unconstitutional, because it violates the Georgia Constitution. Code Ann. § 2-109.
Trial by an Impartial Jury
Georgia’s Constitution also provides that an accused citizen is entitled to "trial by an impartial jury.” Code Ann. § 2-105. Georgia law currently provides that a juror who is unalterably opposed to the imposition of the death penalty is ineligible to serve as a juror in a capital case. Such a juror is automatically excluded from the jury by the trial judge "for cause.” See Code Ann. § 59-806 (4) and Eberheart v. State, 232 Ga. 247 (206 SE2d 12) (1974).
In a "discretionary system,” such as I consider Georgia’s current system to be, the automatic exclusion of jurors from serving in the trial of a capital case deprives the accused citizen of an "impartial jury” as mandated by the Georgia Constitution.
In my separate opinion in E berheart, supra, I said that the "exclusion of the jurors for cause was erroneous, and such exclusion would require the grant of a new trial. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493 (92 SC 2163, 33 LE2d 83) (1972), and Prof. White’s law review article, The Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death-Qualified Juries, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 1176 (July, 1973).”
A juror who strongly and mightily believes in the imposition of the death penalty in capital cases is just as partial in a capital case as is a juror who is unalterably *324opposed to the imposition of the death penalty in a capital case. If one is automatically excluded by law from serving in such a case, it is my view that the other should also be automatically excluded. Georgia’s "discretionary system,” coupled with the automatic exclusion from jury service in capital cases of non-capital-punishment-oriented-jurors, guarantees that the state will have a jury partial to it during the guilty or not guilty phase of the trial and during the discretionary sentencing phase of the trial.
Georgia juries in capital cases, because of this mandatory and automatic exclusion from jury service, do not, in my opinion, reflect the conscience of the community, and such juries do not constitute a representative cross section of the community population that is constitutionally required for the determination of guilt or innocence and for determination of the sentence to be imposed in the event of conviction. I think the Georgia system with this built-in automatic exclusion of jurors violates the "impartial jury” provision of the Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-105) and the "due process” provision in the Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-103).
On December 22, 1975, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held a death penalty statute unconstitutional on state-law grounds without respect to federal constitutional law and the construction placed on the Federal Constitution by the Supreme Court of the United States. Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 339 NE2d 676 (Mass.) (1975). That court held that the statute under review violated the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and was unconstitutional.
For the reasons stated in this dissenting opinion, I would hold that the current Georgia system for imposing the death penalty violates three specific provisions of the Georgia Constitution, Code Ann. §§ 2-103, 2-105, and 2-109.
I respectfully dissent.

People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628 (493 P2d 880) (1972).