Court Opinion

ID: 9678106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:11:54.495357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:01.961163
License: Public Domain

VICTOR C. HOWARD, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Livingston registers disagreement with only one of the four Batson rulings. The record does not support the majority’s belief that the trial court’s ruling was based upon an “unsupported justification” and “misrepresentations by the State.” The trial judge saw and heard firsthand everything that occurred during voir dire. And, far from exposing a detached and misled trial court, the transcript reflects one that is knowledgeable and engaged. With a considerable degree of detail, the trial court cited and explained relevant case law and applied that law to the facts of the case. Furthermore, the majority’s perceived inconsistency in the State’s explanation for the strike is given far more weight than it can bear.
The majority’s opinion smacks of de novo review and drifts far from the standard we use to review Batson rulings. The trial court’s ruling “is entitled to great deference on appeal” and will be reversed only if “clearly erroneous” leaving “the definite and firm impression that a mistake was made.” State v. Cole, 71 S.W.3d 163, 172 (Mo. banc 2002). Appropriate deference is given because “a finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (citation omitted). Because weighing the legitimacy of the State’s explanation for a peremptory strike is, by nature, a subjective exercise, “we place great reliance in the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100,114 (Mo. banc 1998) (citing State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 65 (Mo. banc 1987)). Deference is given to the trial court’s decision because the “evaluation of the prosecutor’s ... credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’ ” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (citations omitted). Credibility determinations involve intuition and the consideration of intangibles such as demeanor. Accordingly, it is much more difficult to determine whether a prosecutor purposefully engaged in racial discrimination with only the black and white pages of the appellate record before us. The urge to *792second-guess should not be indulged lightly-
As pointed out by the majority, once a Batson challenge is lodged (step one), the State must promote a race-neutral explanation for the strike (step two). In the third step, the defendant carries the burden to prove that the explanation was pre-textual and, in fact, the true reason for the strike was purposeful racial discrimination. “The second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). “At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (citations omitted). “It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant — the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Id. Livingston agrees that the State’s explanation was race-neutral and not inherently discriminatory. The focus of the inquiry, therefore, shifts to whether Livingston carried his burden to prove purposeful discrimination.
The majority uses three main bases to conclude that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination: the State’s attempt to strike all African-Americans from the venire panel; white panel members similarly situated to Ms. Fisher were not struck; and there was a low degree of logical relevance between the explanation and the case to be tried.
The majority notes that the State attempted to strike all four African-Americans and emphasizes, “[m]ost significantly” the trial court made a finding that one of the strikes “was racially motivated.” However, the trial court never made that explicit finding and sustained the challenge without comment.1 The transcript demonstrates that the trial court spent significant time and attention evaluating and ruling on the four challenges. Livingston agrees with three of the four Batson rulings. Viewed either individually or as a whole, the process employed reflects a careful exercise to weigh the motive and intent of the prosecutor.
A second basis the majority employs to find purposeful discrimination is the “existence of similarly situated white jurors who were not struck.” While other jurors said they visited the Premier Bowl, only Ms. Fisher indicated that she had bowled at the alley on Sunday nights. The majority acknowledges this is “technically correct” but considers the distinction “clearly pretextual” because Ms. Fisher did not indicate a familiarity with all-you-can-bowl nights. However, that misses the point of the strike — that the current Sunday night all-you-can-bowl atmosphere would be different from Ms. Fisher’s independent knowledge of the Sunday night procedures when she used to bowl at the alley.
The prosecutor clearly delineated the importance the State placed on the difference in several portions of the transcript. For example:
The State’s reason for striking Venire-person No. 2 is that she was the only venire panel member who said that not only was she familiar with Premier Bowl but that she had bowled there on Sunday nights. There’s going to be a great deal of testimony in this case regarding *793what happens at the Premier Bowling Alley on Sunday night. The reason for striking her is the fear that she may hear something that is different from her recollection of how things are on Sunday nights at Premier Bowl. (Emphasis added.)
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That’s when this crime occurred. And as the Court will recall from the last trial, and as will come in in this trial, Sunday nights are — it’s—something unusual happens on Sunday nights at Premier Bowl. They let, you know, everybody in. All you can bowl for $8, and they lock all the doors but the front door, and people notoriously sneak in the side door.
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And I made that distinction when I first said why we struck her, that she was the only juror who said she had bowled on Sunday nights. I did not say it was because she had been in Premier Bowl.
The majority’s quarrel speaks more to its perception of the tactical effectiveness of the prosecutor’s explanation than its genuineness. Even assuming a legitimate disagreement over tactics and the impact of certain evidence, that certainly does not establish that the prosecutor was racially motivated to discriminate. As long as the prosecutor’s explanation is racially neutral, “past experience, ‘hunches,’ or ‘horse sense,’ ” are legitimate justifications. State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 912 (Mo. banc 1997) (citing State v. Kempker, 824 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Mo. banc 1992)). Furthermore, “the prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 97,106 S.Ct. 1712.
The majority also finds that there “is a low degree of logical relevance between the State’s explanation for its peremptory strike of venireperson Fisher and the case to be tried.” The trial court, which was very familiar with the case, clearly found relevance in the State’s reason for the strike. The trial court stated:
Well, I’ll tell you my thinking on Venire-person No. 2. And in part it is based on my recollection from the last trial of this case — -I wouldn’t say the first trial since it was actually the second trial — but my recollection is that there was considerable testimony about how Sunday nights differed from other nights at Premier Bowl the procedures that were used. And somebody who is in a position to maybe have independent knowledge of those procedures other than what they hear on the witness stand I think bears a reasonable relationship to how the evidence may be judged by people who are on the jury.
It is certainly possible to second-guess counsel and the trial court regarding the relevance of Ms. Fisher’s prior knowledge. But we are not evaluating counsel’s competence or the validity of trial strategy. Instead, at issue is the motive and intent of the prosecutor.
Perhaps, had we been there, we would have decided differently. But, we do not review de novo. Instead, trial judges are “vested with considerable discretion in determining whether the defendant established purposeful discrimination.” State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Mo. banc 1992). In this instance, the high ground of the appellate court does not yield a view superior to that of the trial court’s.

. The State’s reason for striking was that the venireperson wanted to hear the defendant testify.