Court Opinion

ID: 9853136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:43:06.047399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:41.238000
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.,
dissenting: While I agree with the decision of the court upholding the constitutionality of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, I do not think it necessary to a decision in the instant case.
It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. That is, where ambiguity or uncertainty exists, they must be construed against the state.
The provisions of K. S. A. 8-761 are ambiguous in that they fail to specifically denounce those acts which are made punishable by its provisions. An example of a penalty section in a Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act which is clear with respect to the facts in this case is Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, Volume 14, § 85.09 (32), quoted in the court’s opinion.
First, the provisions of 8-761, supra, state that any person who shall violate any provision of this act for which no other penalty is provided shall be fined, etc. The term “penalty” has been used in America in various senses. In one sense the term “penalty” denotes money recoverable by virtue of a statute imposing a payment by way of punishment. (United States v. Four Hundred And Twenty Dollars, 162 Fed. 803, 805 [S. D. Ala. 1908], citing Black’s Law Dictionary.)
The provisions of K. S. A. 8-760a provide for an additional payment of $25 to the Motor Vehicle Department for one who fails to immediately return his license and registration to the Department upon receiving notice of an order that his license or registration has been suspended in accordance with the provisions of K. S. A. 8-760. Section 8-760a, supra, specifically states, in view of its enactment after the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, that the section shall be construed as a part of and supplemental to the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.
It is improper to emphasize the expression “supplemental to” and ignore the expression “as a part of.” Again, keeping in mind *603that a criminal statute must be strictly construed, the appellant is entitled to have 8-760a, supra, construed as a part of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act and not as supplemental to it insofar as the instant action is concerned.
The $25 additional fee falls within the definition of penalty used in 8-761, supra. This is fortified by the fact that the legislature specifically provided in 8-760a, supra, that “All fees collected by the motor vehicle department under the provisions of this section shall be paid into the state treasury and the state treasurer shall credit the same to the state highway fund.” Customarily, when fines and penalties are collected by an agency of the state or a court, the legislature prescribes what shall be done with the money. If this were actually an administrative fee for the additional expense of administering the act, the legislature would have made no provision for the disposition of the $25 collected.
The only apparent reason the legislature could have had for enacting 8-760a, supra, was to impose a penalty of $25 upon a person failing to comply with 8-760, supra. This subsequent section of the act retains the same number as 8-760, to which it refers, with an "a” added. (8-760a, supra.)
The argument that the appellant could avoid the $25 penalty by refusing to reapply for a license is pure sophistry. If this were the appellants choice, it would be tantamount to a permanent revocation of his driver’s license by the Department, which in modern times can be ignored as an alternative choice. The driving of motor vehicles as a means of transportation in our modern economy, particularly one who resides in a rural area such as the appellant, is a necessity of life.
Second, there is no language in 8-760, supra, which makes the failure to immediately return a license and registration to the Department, where an order of suspension has been issued, unlawful. Furthermore, nowhere in either 8-760, supra, or 8-761, supra, does it require that the failure to surrender be a willful act on the part of one whose driver’s license has been suspended. Thus, a criminal charge that the appellant unlawfully and willfully failed to surrender his operator’s license and motor vehicle registration receipt would require the addition of these words to the sections of the statute.
From the language in 8-760, supra, it would appear that one who fails to immediately return his license and registration to the De*604partment, upon receiving notice of an order of suspension, would be subjected to a demand from a peace officer as a condition precedent to any prosecution under 8-761, supra, in the absence of more specific language as found in the Wisconsin statute. This conclusion is compelled by a strict construction of the statute imposing criminal liability.
In the instant case the Motor Vehicle Department failed to comply with 8-760, supra, in that no peace officer was ever sent to secure possession of the appellant’s driver’s license or automobile registration receipt and return the same to the Department.
It is respectfully submitted the conviction of the appellant should be set aside as invalid under the facts of this case. Strictly construing 8-761, supra, on the facts in this case, the appellant was not subject to criminal prosecution under this section of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.
Kaul and Fromme, JJ., join in the foregoing dissent.