Court Opinion

ID: 9544228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:53:26.417349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:27.805467
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
KOBAYASHI, J„
AND CIRCUIT JUDGE VITOUSEK
We dissent.
The basic fallacy of the opinion of the majority is that it goes on the assumption that unidentified, “hit and run” owners or operators of motor vehicles fall within the provisions of HRS § 431-448.
In addition, the opinion of the majority violates a fundamental rule of statutory construction. Though the language of the statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, the majority concludes ambiguity exists and for support of its conclusion utilizes a legislative committee report for “clarification’ ’ as to legislative intent.
Then the majority of the court plunges into a justification of why a “physical contact” is not necessary in a “hit and *530run” situation.
The opinion of the majority would be plausible if the opinion had addressed itself initially to the threshold questions, resolved same, and then dealt with the dispensation of “physical contact” in a “hit and run” case. However, we are of the opinion that if the majority had dealt with the basic threshold questions involved herein, the majority would have concluded that the defendant insurance company was not compelled to issue a coverage for “hit and run” or unidentified owners or operators of motor vehicles under the terms of HRS § 431-448, and that said coverage was strictly a voluntary agreement between plaintiff-insured and defendant insurance company. And in that context this court would then resolve the issue of whether the defendant insurance company could or could not impose the requirement of “physical contact” in a “hit and run” coverage.
In our opinion the terms of HRS § 431-448 are clear and unambiguous and need no construction as to their meaning. The provisions therein state clearly “to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Twentieth Century Furniture, Inc. v. Labor and Industrial Relations Appeal Board, 52 Haw. 577, 482 P.2d 151 (1971); Helvering v. City Bank Company, 296 U.S. 85, 89 (1935). The law does not require the defendant insurance company to provide “hit and run” or unidentified vehicle insurance coverage, and where the public policy does not forbid the imposition of a requirement of “physical contact” in a “hit and run” insurance coverage, both the plaintiff-insured and the defendant insurance company are bound by their voluntarily entered into agreement.1 Accordingly, we would enter judgment in favor of defendant insurance company.

 Accord, Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 170 N.W. 2d 813 (1969).