Court Opinion

ID: 9851818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:20:13.313196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:16.081012
License: Public Domain

ROVIRA, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that coeaine seized from the defendant’s backpack during the course of a routine inventory search of his automobile incident to his lawful arrest violates the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution. In my opinion, this holding does not conform with recent pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court, beginning with South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), and culminating with Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983).
Opperman held, for the first time, that a warrantless search of an automobile’s unlocked glove compartment was valid under an inventory exception to the warrant requirement. Less rigorous warrant requirements were permitted in Opperman, in part, because the Court had traditionally drawn a distinction between automobiles and homes or offices in relation to the fourth amendment. 428 U.S. at 367, 96 S.Ct. at 3096. In addition to the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern an automobile because the expectation of privacy is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367, 96 S.Ct. at 3096. See also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2469, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974).
Opperman, however, left open the question of whether law enforcement officers, in the course of an inventory search, could open and examine closed containers found in vehicles. The scope of such searches was uncertain due to the differing expectations of privacy associated with containers as opposed to automobiles.
The majority now attempts to answer the container question by relying mainly on two cases decided after Opperman: United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979). Majority op. at 414. These cases are cited for the proposition that evidence discovered as a result of searching a backpack in the course of an inventory search of an impounded vehicle should be excluded. However, Chadwick and Sanders lend only minimal, if any, support to the majority’s position. Neither case involved an inventory search. Rather, both involved warrantless searches of luggage, suspected of containing marijuana, located in the trunks of automobiles.
*420Chadwick held that the seized marijuana must be excluded because the search was not justified under either the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement or as a search incident to lawful arrest. In Chadwick, the government did not even attempt to characterize the search as an inventory search. Similarly, Sanders, decided four years before Lafayette, involved a warrantless search of an unlocked suitcase found in the trunk of a taxicab. The cab was not impounded at the time of the search, but had been stopped shortly after leaving an airport.
Almost five months after Opperman was decided, this court decided People v. Counterman, 192 Colo. 152, 556 P.2d 481 (1976). There, we affirmed a trial court’s suppression of cocaine discovered in a closed knapsack during an inventory search of an automobile. We found a greater expectation of privacy in containers and held the search violated both the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution for two reasons. First, its contents were not in plain view nor did the knapsack give any indication that its contents were dangerous or particularly valuable and in need of special inventory. Second, the legitimate purposes of the search could have been fully accomplished by merely noting the item as a sealed knapsack. 192 Colo, at 157-58, 556 P.2d at 485.
Counterman thus attempted to discern a hierarchy for inventorying containers based on their characteristics. Only those containers which gave an indication that their contents were dangerous or particularly valuable could be inventoried. Since the knapsack in Counterman was found not to have given any indication that its contents were dangerous or valuable, the scope of the inventory search was found to be constitutionally unreasonable. 192 Colo, at 158, 556 P.2d at 485.
The second basis for the court’s holding in Counterman was that the existence of less intrusive alternatives is of greater significance in the context of container searches than automobile searches. We found it significant in Counterman that “the legitimate purposes of the inventory search could have been fully accomplished by merely noting the item as a sealed knapsack” or “[t]he defendant could have been offered the choice of a full inventory of the contents at the police station.” 192 Colo, at 158, 556 P.2d at 485.
Contrary to the opinion of the majority, I am convinced that the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983), now rejects the two bases of the holding in Counterman and therefore compels an opposite result in this case. Under Lafayette, it is plain that neither the characteristics of the container nor the existence of less intrusive alternatives plays a material role in determining the constitutionality of inventory searches of containers.
In Lafayette, a unanimous Court held that it was not “unreasonable” under the fourth amendment for police, as part of routine police procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person, to search in accordance with established inventory procedures any container or article in his possession. 462 U.S. at 648, 103 S.Ct. at 2611. See also Avalos v. People, 179 Colo. 88, 498 P.2d 1141 (1972) (search of purse); People v. Glaubman, 175 Colo. 41, 485 P.2d 711 (1971) (search of pouch).
The Lafayette Court refused an opportunity to distinguish Opperman on the basis that there is a greater expectation of privacy in a purse-type shoulder bag than in an automobile, and that the legitimate governmental interests supporting an inventory search could have been met in a less intrusive manner by sealing the shoulder bag within a plastic bag or box and placing it in a secured locker. The Court did note the greater expectation of privacy in containers, but reaffirmed its position in Chadwick that probable cause to search is irrelevant in inventory searches, and that the salutary functions of a warrant simply have no application in the context of such searches. 462 U.S. at 643-44, 103 S.Ct. at 2608 quoting United States v. Chadwick, *421433 U.S. 1, 10 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2482 n. 5, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977).
Rejecting the argument that the shoulder bag could have been secured in a less intrusive manner, the Court stated:
[T]he real question is not what ‘could have been achieved,’ but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps; it is not our function to write a manual on administering routine, neutral procedures of the stationhouse. Our role is to assure against violations of the Constitution.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 647, 103 S.Ct. at 2610 (emphasis in original). The Court further explained why the existence of a less intrusive alternative, one factor relied upon in Counterman, did not compel a different result:
We are hardly in a position to second-guess police departments as to what practical administrative method will best deter theft by and false claims against its employees and preserve the security of the stationhouse. It is evident that a stationhouse search of every item carried on or by a person who has lawfully been taken into custody by the police will amply serve the important and legitimate governmental interests involved.
Even if less intrusive means existed of protecting some particular types of property, it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the everyday course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or items may be searched and which must be sealed as a unit.
462 U.S. at 648, 103 S.Ct. at 2611.
In opting for a single familiar standard for inventory searches of containers, the Court continued on the course charted in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), and United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), that a constitutional distinction cannot be made between containers on the basis of differing characteristics in the context of fourth amendment analysis. As Justice Stevens stated in Ross:
When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.
... A constitutional distinction between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers would be improper. Even though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series of cases in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were placed on one side of the line or the other, the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction.
456 U.S. at 821-22, 102 S.Ct. at 2170-71 (footnotes omitted). Therefore, the attempt in Counterman to distinguish between containers on the basis of their characteristics, whether they give an indication that their contents are “dangerous or particularly valuable,” like the existence of less intrusive alternatives, was displaced by Lafayette for the purpose of inventory searches.
New York v. Belton is also germane to this case because it signaled the Court’s willingness, in certain instances, to elevate legitimate law enforcement concerns over the individual’s expectation of privacy in containers located within an automobile. Belton involved a search of the pockets of a coat found inside a vehicle which had been stopped for traveling at an excessive rate of speed. The Court held that a policeman who has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile may contemporaneously search the passenger compartment of that automobile and containers located therein. 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864.
The Belton Court, while recognizing the privacy interest one has in such containers, nevertheless opted to subordinate that interest to the overriding governmental interest of providing for the safety of police *422officers conducting lawful custodial arrests. The Court stated: “Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the ar-restee may have.” Id. at 461, 101 S.Ct. at 2864.
The competing interests present in Bel-ton are similar to those in this case. On one hand is the admittedly strong privacy interest one has in a backpack containing personal belongings, on the other, the strong governmental interest in protecting the property of the arrestee, protecting police officers from false claims, and protecting persons from dangerous instrumentalities and illicit substances. In this case, after balancing the competing interests as the Court did in Belton, I find that the Opperman factors, when combined with the compelling need for a comprehensible and workable rule governing inventory searches, tip the scale in favor of the governmental interests.
Therefore, I believe the trial court in the instant case correctly concluded that Lafayette is not limited to inventory searches at the stationhouse incident to preincarcer-ation of an arrestee, but also extends to inventory searches of automobiles. The same governmental interests of protecting the defendant’s property, the police against false claims, and the police and the public against the potential danger or hazards posed by the impounded property are at work in both the stationhouse and the automobile, foreclosing any principled distinction between preincarceration inventory searches and inventory searches of automobiles.1
The majority nevertheless asserts that “this eourt has implicitly recognized that the governmental interests served by a preincarceration inventory search are invariably greater than the governmental interests advanced by the search of an impounded vehicle.” Majority op. at 416. In an attempt to apply the third Opperman factor, the majority reasons that there is a more compelling need to search for weapons in the stationhouse than there is when searching an impounded vehicle. Although this reasoning is sound when searching the actual person of an arrestee, it makes absolutely no sense when applied to searches of containers within the detainee’s possession. The police can just as easily note, seal, and store a backpack found on the person of an arrestee as it can a knapsack found in the back seat of an automobile. In both cases, once the container is removed from the reach of the arrestee, the threat of weapons or contrband being introduced to the jailhouse no longer exists. In both instances, sealing and storing the container is a viable means of avoiding a search of the container. Yet, Lafayette declined to impose on law enforcement agencies such a duty to seal and store.
The remaining two prongs of Opperman also apply no more convincingly in the context of a stationhouse search of an arrestee than in the context of an inventory search of an automobile. In regard to the goal of protecting the owner’s property while it remains in police custody,2 there is no con*423vincing distinction which would support a search of a container in the precustodial stationhouse situation while not in the impounded vehicle situation. Equally strained is the argument that the goal of protecting the police against false claims is somehow served by a full search of containers in the stationhouse but not those in an impounded automobile.
In sum, I believe that the compelling governmental interests that justify broad searches in the stationhouse do indeed extend to inventory searches of impounded vehicles. Cf majority op. at 417. The governmental interests served by a complete preincarceration stationhouse search are no greater than those served by a complete inventory search of an impounded vehicle. In light of Lafayette, Counterman should be overruled.
The majority opinion also fails to recognize that several courts have concluded that the principles enunciated in Lafayette are not limited to containers in the possession of arrestees at the stationhouse but apply with equal force to containers found in inventoried vehicles. United States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.1984) (wrapped package in car), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 117, 83 L.Ed.2d 60 (1984); People v. Braasch, 122 Ill.App.3d 747, 78 Ill.Dec. 67, 461 N.E.2d 651 (1984) (paper bag in trunk whether open or closed); State v. Bronaugh, 16 Ohio App.3d 237, 475 N.E.2d 171 (1984) (brown paper bag and suitcase in trunk). In fact, the only authorities cited by the majority which appear' to be directly on point are cases which were decided prior to Lafayette. Majority op. at 415.
Since Lafayette rejected the notion that a container carried by an arrestee should be sealed rather than searched, one commentator predicts it is “[djoubtless the Court would reach precisely the same conclusion as to containers within inventoried vehicles.” 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.4 at 262 (1984 Supp.) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, I agree with the trial court that the inventory search, conducted pursuant to standard procedure, of the backpack located in the automobile was not unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
While the trial court correctly realized that Lafayette has displaced our fourth amendment analysis in Counterman, and that the search did not violate the defendant’s rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, I believe it erred in finding that Lafayette did not overrule this court’s “interpretation” of article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution set forth in Counterman. On that basis alone, the trial court suppressed the contents of the backpack. Contrary to the trial court’s analysis, Counterman did not purport to establish adequate and independent state constitutional grounds to justify the suppression of the contents of the container inventoried there. Rather, article II, section 7, of the Colorado Constitution was simply cited and interpreted coextensively with the fourth amendment. Because the fourth amendment was found to have been violated, article II, section 7, was necessarily found to have been violated as well. In short, nothing in Counterman suggested that state and federal constitutional analysis should diverge in the context of inventory searches. The mere citation to article II, section 7, cannot be summarily interpreted as a departure from federal law in the area of an inventory search and seizure.
I would accordingly reverse the order of the district court suppressing the cocaine and remand the case for further proceedings.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice QUINN joins in this dissent.

. In some instances, the governmental interests supporting inventory searches may weigh more heavily to justify an automobile search than a search at the stationhouse. For example, a dangerous instrumentality located in an automobile may pose a greater threat to the public than it would if it were in police custody. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) (revolver removed from trunk for safety of general public).

. The majority assigns particular importance to the fact that the police searched not only the backpack but also the sealed tin cans within the backpack. The court reasons that once the backpack was searched, there was “little justification ... for further intrusion into the sealed cans" because “an inventory search must be limited to those areas where valuables or weapons may 'reasonably' be found.” Majority op. at 418, citing People v. Rutovic, 193 Colo. 397, 566 P.2d 705 (1977); People v. Grana, 185 Colo. 126, 527 P.2d 543 (1974). I think it may fairly be contended that it is not unusual for persons to keep valuables in their backpacks. Additionally, it was not unreasonable to think that the cans contained within the knapsack could have contained jewels *423or currency. Indeed, the third tin can contained $700 in cash. Majority op. at 413.