Court Opinion

ID: 9468197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:07:43.679112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:44.738771
License: Public Domain

CANBY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Federal courts have consistently held that a criminal conviction is final for immigration purposes only when direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived. Hernandez-Almanza v. United States Department of Justice, 547 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1976); Marino v. INS, 537 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1976); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S.Ct. 776, 46 L.Ed.2d 638 (1976); Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 1971). While the majority correctly notes that this prior authority does not address the precise question before us, I would adhere to the language of these cases and draw the line of finality at the point where all direct appeals, whether of right or discretionary, have been exhausted or waived. The common distinction made in the past has been that between direct appeals and collateral attacks. I see no sufficient reason to erode that distinction by ascribing to discretionary appeals the characteristics of a collateral attack. Perhaps the most important difference between the two categories of attack is that direct appeals, whether of right or discretionary, must be pursued within a clearly limited period of time. Collateral attack is often subject to no such restriction, and for that reason it would be unreasonable to permit the availability of a collateral attack to render a conviction non-final.
It is understandable that an application for discretionary appellate review of a conviction may be viewed as a mere delaying tactic, particularly in cases of deportation. But that limited delay avoids grave injus*176tice in those cases in which discretionary review is granted, and the alien’s conviction is reversed. A reopening of the deportation proceedings after deportation has occurred, see Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977), does not undo the hardship caused by that drastic procedure. I would therefore hold that this appeal is not moot, and would address the substantive issues raised by petitioner.