Court Opinion

ID: 9368746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-06 20:10:57.323232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:10.653988
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/6/23 In re D.C. CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 IN RE D.C., a Person Coming Under the                               H049939
 Juvenile Court Law.                                                (Santa Clara County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. 15JV41206B)

 THE PEOPLE,

             Plaintiff and Respondent,

             v.

 D.C.,

             Defendant and Appellant.

         D.C. appeals from the denial of his Welfare and Institutions Code section 7791
petition requesting that the juvenile court set aside his commitment to the Division of
Juvenile Justice (DJJ). The juvenile court denied the petition after concluding that D.C.
was committed to the DJJ pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, which it could not
change without the parties’ consent. D.C. argues that the juvenile court erred when it
declined to consider his petition on the merits because the parties’ agreement did not
preclude the court from exercising its authority under section 779. We agree and reverse
the juvenile court’s order.

         1   Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
                                   I. BACKGROUND
A.     The Section 602 Petition and the Negotiated Plea Agreement
       On June 27, 2019, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a juvenile
wardship petition under section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that D.C. came within the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction for committing four counts of lewd and lascivious acts by
force against a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1).)2 That same
day, the People filed a motion requesting that D.C.’s case be transferred to a court of
criminal jurisdiction under section 707, subdivision (a)(1), followed later by a written
motion disputing the constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 1391.
       On August 30, 2019, in lieu of setting a transfer hearing, the parties represented to
the juvenile court that they had reached an agreement. The prosecutor stated that the
parties had agreed that D.C., having previously admitted the four substantive counts in
criminal court, would further admit as to count 2 that he was 16 years old at the time of
the offense so that count 2 could be used as a strike against him should he commit future
offenses as an adult. The prosecutor also stated that she “agree[d] with the defense that

       2  This is the second section 602, subdivision (a) petition filed against D.C. arising
from the same operative facts. In 2015, on the first petition alleging 10 counts of
violating Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b)(1), the juvenile court transferred the
case to criminal court. Prior to the passage of Proposition 57, D.C. pleaded guilty to four
counts in exchange for a 40-year sentence. In 2019, this court concluded that the
criminal court erred in not transferring the case back to juvenile court for a post-
Proposition 57 transfer hearing, vacated the judgment, and ordered all counts of
conviction transferred to the juvenile court. In part, we conditionally reversed two of the
four convictions. We held that if those convictions were transferred back to adult
criminal court, the adult criminal court would be required to resentence D.C. on those
counts and would be unable to vacate the plea agreement, but if the juvenile court
declined to transfer those two convictions, the juvenile court should treat those
convictions as juvenile adjudications. As for the remaining two convictions, we
concluded that the juvenile court should treat the convictions as juvenile adjudications
and impose an appropriate disposition after a dispositional hearing.

                                              2
the minor will be committed to DJJ for a period of rehabilitation” and asked the juvenile
court to “set 731(c) time at 30 years to ensure that DJJ understands that [D.C.] may be
held until he is 25[]years[]old and to express to DJJ the People’s belief that he should be
held until he is 25 years old.” The prosecutor also agreed to withdraw the motion to
transfer the case to criminal court. Defense counsel confirmed the prosecutor’s recitation
of the plea agreement. D.C. thereafter admitted that he was 16 years old at the time of
count 2.
       At the dispositional hearing in September 2019, the juvenile court stated that it
was going to commit D.C. to the DJJ “specifically for sex offender rehabilitation.” The
juvenile court also stated that it was “going to follow the recommendations of the
probation department and sentence [D.C.] to the Department of Juvenile Justice and that
would be a 30-year commitment which tells them that he must stay until he’s at left [sic]
25 where he will be released at that time.” Defense counsel requested: “[G]iven that
[D.C.’s] going to be [in] DJJ for the four years [(until he reached age 25)] that the Court
consider not imposing the fines and fees that are discretionary.” Attached to the minute
order after the sentencing hearing was the probation report’s recommendations, which
included the recommendation that D.C. “be committed to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation-Division of Juvenile Justice for further care, training, and
treatment pending acceptance by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.”
B.     D.C.’s Section 779 Petition
       On February 7, 2022, D.C. petitioned the juvenile court to modify or set aside his
DJJ commitment under section 779, which authorizes the juvenile court to set aside or
modify a DJJ commitment “ ‘upon a showing of good cause that the Youth Authority is

                                             3
unable to, or failing to, provide treatment consistent with Section 734.’ ”3 (§ 779.) D.C.
argued that he had commenced an 18-to-24-month sexual behavioral treatment program
23 months earlier and had “excel[l]ed and flourished” at the DJJ.
       The People opposed D.C.’s petition, both on the merits and on the ground that the
parties’ negotiated plea bargain did not permit D.C. to ask the juvenile court to modify
his DJJ disposition.
       The juvenile court heard argument on the petition in February 2022 and issued a
written statement of decision the following April denying the petition. The juvenile court
determined that, in exchange for the People’s withdrawal of the transfer request to adult
criminal court, D.C. had agreed to be committed to the DJJ until he turned 25 years old in
August 2023. The juvenile court determined: “[A]ll parties understood that this was a
commitment to DJJ and that the commitment was through [D.C.’s] 25th birthday. At the
same time, all parties had to know that the DJJ parole board routinely releases young
people a few months before the 25th birthday. Therefore, the parties implicitly agreed to
leave [D.C.’s] release date up to the DJJ parole board.” The juvenile court thereafter
concluded that it did not have “the power or that it ought to change the plea bargain
agreement” entered between the parties.
                                    II. DISCUSSION
A.     Terms of the Plea Agreement
       D.C. argues that the juvenile court erroneously interpreted his plea agreement by
concluding that the agreement stripped the court of its authority to modify his DJJ
commitment pursuant to section 779. We agree that nothing in the plea agreement

       3In 2005, the correctional agency formerly known as the Youth Authority became
known as the Division of Juvenile Facilities, part of the Division of Juvenile Justice,
under the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (In re D.J. (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 278, 280, fn. 1.)

                                             4
restricted D.C. from filing a section 779 petition or precluded the juvenile court from
considering such a petition. The juvenile court therefore erred by declining to reach the
merits of D.C.’s petition.
         1.    Legal Principles
         At the time that D.C. was sentenced, section 607, subdivision (b) provided that
“[t]he [juvenile] court may retain jurisdiction over a person who is found to be a person
described in Section 602 by reason of a commission of an offense listed in subdivision
(b) of Section 707, until that person attains 25 years of age if the person was committed
to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities.”
(Former § 607, subd. (b); Stats. 2018, ch. 36, § 30.) Under section 731, when the
juvenile court commits a ward to the DJJ, it can also “set an earlier outside limit to the
indeterminate period of commitment.” (In re Sean W. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1177,
1188 (Sean W.); § 731.)
         At the time of D.C.’s sentencing hearing, former section 731, subdivision (c)
stated: “A ward committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice shall not be confined in
excess of the term of confinement set by the committing court. The court shall set a
maximum term based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that
brought or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed
appropriate to achieve rehabilitation. The court shall not commit a ward to the Division
of Juvenile Justice for a period that exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment that
could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense. This subdivision does not
limit the power of the Board of Juvenile Hearings to discharge a ward committed to the
Division of Juvenile Justice pursuant to Sections 1719 and 1769.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 766,
§ 1.)4

         4
       Section 731 has since been amended, effective July 1, 2021. Under the newly
amended version of section 731, the juvenile court now “shall not” set a maximum term
                                              5
       Within the limits of sections 607 and 731, however, a minor’s actual period of
commitment to the DJJ is determined by DJJ guidelines. (In re Carlos E. (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 1529, 1536 (Carlos E.).) Section 1719, subdivision (b) provides that the
Board of Juvenile Hearings has the power and duty to discharge ward’s commitment, and
subdivision (c) provides that the DJJ has the power and duty to “set[] . . . discharge
consideration dates” for wards in its custody. In other words, the minor’s actual length of
stay is based on the DJJ and the Board of Juvenile Hearing’s administrative decisions.
(Sean W., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188.)
       Accordingly, “[i]n practice, the maximum term of imprisonment rarely determines
the actual period of confinement of a ward committed to the DJJ. Rather, ‘[o]nce
committed to [DJJ], the minor’s actual term is governed by [DJJ] guidelines, within the
statutory maximum. “Minors most often do not serve their maximum terms, but the
statutory maximum may affect both parole eligibility and the extent to which actual
confinement maybe prolonged for disciplinary reasons.” ’ ” (In re A.G. (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 791, 800 (A.G.).) In fact, “[t]here is no [statutory] provision for the juvenile
court to make a ‘recommendation’ about the actual period of confinement.” (Ibid.)
       Here, the juvenile court committed D.C. to the DJJ based on a negotiated plea
agreement. “[A] negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract and is interpreted
according to general contract principles.” (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 69.)
“ ‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual
intention of the parties. [Citation.] If contractual language is clear and explicit, it
governs. [Citation.] On the other hand, “[i]f the terms of a promise are in any respect
ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor
believed, at the time of making it, that the promise understood it.” ’ ” (People v. Shelton

of confinement “that exceeds the middle term of imprisonment that could be imposed
upon an adult convicted of the same offense.” (§ 731, subd. (b); Stats. 2021, ch. 18, § 8.)
                                               6
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767 (Shelton).) “ ‘The mutual intention to which the courts give
effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties’ intent, including the words
used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the
surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the
contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct
of the parties. [Citations]’ ” (Ibid.)
       “ ‘[I]nterpretations of [a plea agreement] contract must be based on an objective
standard in which [the defendant’s] “reasonable beliefs” control. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]
‘[P]lea agreements are interpreted according to the general rule “that ambiguities are
construed in favor of the defendant. Focusing on the defendant’s reasonable
understanding also reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant
to plead guilty.” [Citation.]’ ” (In re Timothy N. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 725, 734
(Timothy N.).)
       “ ‘[T]he “interpretation of a contract is subject to de novo review where the
interpretation does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence.” [Citations.]’ ” (In
re Ricardo C. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 688, 696.) However, if there is admissible
competing parole evidence that requires the resolution of credibility issues, the
substantial evidence test applies. (People v. Paredes (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 496, 507.)
       2.     Analysis
       The first step of our analysis is to determine whether there is any ambiguity in the
terms of the plea agreement. Here, there was no written plea agreement; the terms of the
plea agreement were orally recited by the prosecutor before the juvenile court at the
August hearing. The prosecutor stated that the parties had “agree[d] . . . that the minor
will be committed to DJJ for a period of rehabilitation.” Neither party represented to the
court that the agreement included a minimum commitment term or a waiver of any
available statutory vehicle for early release.

                                                 7
       Although the parties did not define what a “period of rehabilitation” entails, such
an omission did not render the plea agreement ambiguous. Such specificity would likely
have been impossible to achieve, as the juvenile court cannot set the minor’s actual term
of confinement—the juvenile court can only set the maximum term under section 731,
and the minor’s actual term of confinement is limited by DJJ guidelines, within the
statutory maximum set forth in section 607. (Carlos E., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1536.)
       Based on the foregoing, we find the terms of the plea agreement to be clear and
unambiguous: the parties agreed that D.C. would be committed to the DJJ “for a period
of rehabilitation.” At no point did the parties agree to restrict D.C.’s ability to petition
the juvenile court to modify his commitment under section 779, nor did the parties
contemplate a provision that precluded the juvenile court from considering such a
petition. We must presume that the parties were aware of all applicable laws when the
plea agreement was entered, which would have included the juvenile court’s authority to
consider and rule upon a petition filed under section 779. (See Swenson v. File (1970) 3
Cal.3d 389, 393 [parties presumed to know and have in mind all applicable laws when an
agreement is made].) And here, waiver of statutory rights must be “ ‘ “a voluntary and
intelligent choice.” ’ ” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 361 [waiver of statutory
right to jury trial must be knowing and voluntary].) Moreover, we generally “ ‘ “cannot
insert in the contract language which one of the parties now wishes were there.” ’ ”
(People v. Rabanales (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 494, 504.) A contract term can only be
implied “ ‘ “upon grounds of obvious necessity,” ’ ” and a term restricting the juvenile
court from considering a section 779 petition is not a necessity in this case. (Ibid.)
       The juvenile court implicitly found there to be ambiguity in the plea agreement,
relying on extrinsic evidence as establishing an agreement that D.C. would be committed
until his 25th birthday, subject only to the DJJ’s guidelines. As we find the plea

                                               8
agreement to be clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to looking at extrinsic
sources. (Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 767.) However, even if we treat the plea
agreement as ambiguous, extrinsic evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
conclusion that the parties had agreed that the juvenile court could not modify or set aside
the commitment under section 779.
       When interpreting the terms of the plea agreement, we must focus on the parties’
mutual intent at the time the agreement was entered: “ ‘The fundamental rule is that
interpretation of . . . any contract . . . is governed by the mutual intent of the parties at the
time they form the contract.’ ” (Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207
Cal.App.4th 1115, 1129.) The parties’ statements at the dispositional hearing
demonstrate only a mutual intent that D.C. be committed to the DJJ. At the hearing, the
prosecutor requested that the juvenile court “set the 731(c) time”—the maximum term of
confinement—at 30 years— so that “DJJ understands that he may be held until he is
25[]years[]old and to express to DJJ the People’s belief that he should be held until he is
25 years old.” (Italics added.) The prosecutor’s statement does not reflect that the parties
agreed that D.C. would in fact serve a specified term of confinement at DJJ—the
statement conveyed that the prosecutor wanted the juvenile court to set an outer limit of
30 years under former section 731, subdivision (c) to convey to the DJJ the People’s view
that D.C. should remain in DJJ custody until he reached 25 years of age. Nothing in the
parties’ agreement or statements purports to usurp the DJJ’s authority to determine D.C.’s
actual term of confinement, nor did the parties expressly agree to a minimum term of
confinement.
       The Attorney General nonetheless argues that some of the prosecutor’s
unchallenged statements at the August hearing and the parties’ subsequent conduct reflect
an agreement to a 30-year commitment term. This argument, however, is in conflict with
both the function of the section 731 term where it exceeds the section 607 jurisdictional

                                                9
limit and also the record, which reflects the parties’ understanding that D.C., then 21,
would be released at the latest at age 25. First, as to the August hearing, the Attorney
General relies on the absence of objection by D.C.’s counsel to the prosecutor’s requested
maximum term under section 731. We note that the prosecutor characterized the section
731 term as the People’s request, as opposed to the parties’ agreement. And the
prosecutor’s earlier statement that it was “the People’s belief” (italics added) that D.C.
should remain confined with the DJJ until he was 25 years old appears to reflect the
prosecutor’s understanding that a minimum term was not a negotiated term of the plea
agreement. Moreover, even assuming that the requested section 731 term were a part of
the parties’ agreement, we fail to see how an agreement as to the maximum term of
confinement under former section 731, subdivision (c) demonstrates that the parties
mutually intended that D.C. would actually remain committed for the maximum term.5
       The Attorney General also relies on the express assent by D.C.’s counsel at the
September dispositional hearing to the prosecutor’s representation that “we’re going to
set 731(c) time at 30 years, but the actual maximum confinement time is 40 years.” But
we note that the context of this remark was in correcting the probation report, which had
mistakenly represented that the maximum term of confinement was 30 years. At the
August hearing, the prosecutor had explained that her request for a section 731 maximum
term of 30 years was to avoid having “to address credits for purposes of DJJ,” when the
“statutory time” applicable to an adult convicted of the same offenses “is 40” years.
       Next, the Attorney General argues that defense counsel requested at the sentencing
hearing that the juvenile court not impose certain discretionary fines and fees because

       5 Under the law in effect at the time of the dispositional hearing, juvenile wards
could not be confined for a period longer than that the maximum term applicable to an
adult criminal defendant convicted of the same charges. (Former § 731, subd. (c), Stats.
2018, ch. 766, § 1.)

                                             10
D.C. was “going to be [in] DJJ for the four years,” demonstrating an understanding that
D.C. would be at the DJJ for a 30-year commitment. Presumably, defense counsel was
aware that once committed to the DJJ, D.C.’s actual term of confinement would be
determined by DJJ guidelines, within the maximum confinement age of 25. Thus, an
equally reasonable interpretation of defense counsel’s statement is that she was referring
to the fact that D.C. could be confined for a maximum of four years—and would likely
remain in the DJJ until he neared age 25—so she was requesting that his fines and fees be
waived.6 Any ambiguity should be construed in D.C.’s favor. (Timothy N., supra, 216
Cal.App.4th at p. 734.) And even if defense counsel’s statement can be construed as her
understanding that D.C. would presumptively remain in DJJ until age 25, her statement is
nonetheless silent on whether D.C. could file a petition under section 779. Defense
counsel’s after-the-fact request that fines and fees should be waived is also not
dispositive of what D.C. understood the terms of the plea agreement to be at the time it
was made. (Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 767.)
       As noted by the Attorney General, D.C. did not object when the juvenile court
stated at the dispositional hearing that the 30-year maximum term of confinement “tells
[DJJ] that [D.C.] must stay until he’s at left [sic] 25 where he will be released at that
time.”7 But the court’s statement does not convey that the parties stipulated to a specific
term of actual commitment, when “[t]here is no [statutory] provision for the juvenile
court to make a ‘recommendation’ about the actual period of confinement.” (A.G., supra,

       6Moreover, D.C. will turn 25 years old in August 2023. Thus, even if the juvenile
court had modified his DJJ commitment, D.C. would not have been far off from his 25th
birthday.
       7 Notably, the juvenile court also specified at the sentencing hearing that it
intended to commit D.C. to the DJJ “specifically for sex offender rehabilitation” without
referencing a specific time frame.

                                              11
193 Cal.App.4th at p. 807.) 8 Rather, the only lawful interpretation of the juvenile court’s
statement is that the court understood by its section 731 finding that section 607’s
jurisdictional maximum of age 25 would control: D.C. would be released at the latest
when he is 25 years old. And importantly, the juvenile court’s statement does not purport
to preclude the juvenile court from considering a section 779 petition.
       Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court erred when it found that it lacked
the authority to consider D.C.’s section 779 petition absent the People’s consent, as filing
a section 779 petition was not precluded by the plea agreement.
B.     Section 779
       Alternatively, the Attorney General argues that even if the plea agreement did not
prevent the juvenile court from modifying D.C.’s DJJ commitment, the court was still
precluded from doing so because it lacked the authority to determine when D.C. should
be released. Relying on In re Owen E. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 398 (Owen E.), the Attorney
General claims that D.C.’s discharge is solely within the purview of the DJJ and the
juvenile cannot intervene unless the DJJ has failed to comply with the law or has abused
its discretion in dealing with D.C. The Attorney General’s argument, however, fails to
account for the amendment made to section 779 in the more than 40 years since Owen E.
       Owen E., decided 1979, contemplated the juvenile court’s ability to vacate a
juvenile’s commitment to what was then the Youth Authority. (Owen E., supra, 23
Cal.3d at pp. 402-403.) At the time, section 779 provided in pertinent part that: “the
court shall give due consideration to the effect thereof upon the discipline and parole
system of the Youth Authority or of the correctional school in which the ward may have
been placed by the Youth Authority. Except in this section provided, nothing in this

       8As the juvenile court was without authority to specify D.C.’s actual term of
confinement to the DJJ, if such a term were a part of the plea agreement, it would be
unenforceable. (See People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1224-1225 [specific
performance is not available remedy if negotiated sentence is unauthorized].)
                                             12
chapter shall be deemed to interfere with the system of parole and discharge now or
hereafter established by law, or by rule of the Youth Authority, for the parole and
discharge of wards of the juvenile court committed to the Youth authority, or with the
management of any school, institution, or facility under the jurisdiction of the Youth
Authority . . . .” (Former § 779; Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, p. 3492, § 2; Owen E., supra, p.
401, fn. 3.)
       Based on the foregoing language, the Owen E. court concluded that section 779
“does not constitute authority for a juvenile court to set aside an order committing a ward
to CYA merely because the court’s view of the rehabilitative progress and continuing
needs of the ward differ from CYA determinations on such matters arrived at in
accordance with law.” (Owen E., supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 405.) Thus, Owen E. held that “a
juvenile court may not act to vacate a proper commitment to CYA unless it appears CYA
has failed to comply with law or has abused its discretion in dealing with a ward in its
custody. Section 779 does not authorize judicial intervention into the routine parole
function of CYA.” (Ibid.)
       In 2003, however, the Legislature amended section 779 to add: “This section does
not limit the authority of the court to change, modify, or set aside an order of
commitment after a noticed hearing and upon a showing of good cause that the Youth
Authority is unable to, or failing to, provide treatment consistent with Section 734.”
(Stats. 2003, ch. 4, § 2 (Sen. Bill No. 459).) Section 734 provides that “[n]o ward of the
juvenile court shall be committed to the Youth Authority unless the judge of the court is
fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are
such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational
discipline or other treatment provided by the Youth Authority.”
       In sum, under the current version of section 779, the juvenile court is vested with
the authority to modify a ward’s commitment to DJJ if it finds that the DJJ is unable to

                                             13
provide treatment consistent with section 734. Thus, Owen E.’s holding no longer fully
describes the juvenile court’s authority to modify or vacate a ward’s commitment.
       Here, D.C. argued below in his section 779 petition that he should be released
from the DJJ because the DJJ’s “juvenile justice goals of rehabilitation and community
safety” would no longer be served by his continued commitment. D.C. also specifically
cited to the juvenile court’s authority to vacate his commitment if it found that the DJJ
was unable to or failing to provide treatment consistent with section 734. However, the
juvenile court in this case declined to reach the merits of D.C.’s arguments because it
operated under the assumption that it lacked the authority to change D.C.’s plea bargain.
As the juvenile court failed to consider the merits of D.C.’s petition, we conclude that the
appropriate remedy is to remand the matter so that it may consider whether to grant
D.C.’s section 779 petition in the first instance. (See, e.g., People v. McLernon (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 569, 577 [proper remedy when trial court failed to consider merits of
defendant’s motion to expunge record is to remand the matter for the trial court to
determine whether relief is warranted]; see also People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1354, 1391 [remand required if trial court was unaware of scope of discretionary powers
unless record clearly indicates that the same conclusion would have been reached].) In so
doing, we express no opinion on how the juvenile court should exercise its discretion on
remand.
                                    III. DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s order denying D.C.’s section 799 petition is reversed. On
remand, the juvenile court is directed to consider the petition on the merits.

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                                ____________________________
                                LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
GREENWOOD, P.J.

_____________________________
GROVER, J.

People v. D.C.
H049939