Court Opinion

ID: 9660175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:07:03.931011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:16.261839
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
In one sense the dispute between the parties is reminiscent of the conflicting views expressed in Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158 (Tex.Cr.App.1980-1981). However, reflection on, and subsequent determinations of, similar issues have proved enlightening, and the opinion of the Court today fairly resolves the disagreement over whether certain decisions may be happily reconciled. I join that opinion and write only to focus additional light on our resolution of the contentions made by the State.
Research reveals that the unique character of “possessory” offenses has always plagued and confounded the bench and bar, for it defies analysis by the general methodology of viewing the major components of offenses as “conduct” distinct from “intent.” Under the 1974 Penal Code, however, culpable “conduct” can be either an “omission” or an “act.”1 In turn, a culpa*686ble “act” must be either a voluntary bodily movement,2 voluntary speech,3 or voluntary “possession,” the latter of which in turn means “actual care, custody, control, or management,” of a prohibited substance or object.4
But, as the words “actual care, custody, control or management,” indicate, the “voluntary act ” of “possession” necessarily presupposes that “the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.” V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 6.01(b).5 Thus myriad possession cases allude to the quite distinct6 requirement that the actor “know of the whereabouts” of the contraband. In sum, an awareness of the whereabouts of the contraband is an essential ingredient of the culpable act of “possession;” that is, the state of having “care,” “control,” “management” or “custody” under our law.7 Clearly, it was a recognition of this novel character of possesso-ry “conduct” which led a panel of the Court recently to conclude that one accused of a possessory offense is not entitled to have the accusatory pleading specify “what type of possession” the State would rely on to prove the offense.8 Phelps v. State, 623 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); see also Knab v. State, 626 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). In Phelps, supra, the panel observed that “care,” “custody,” “control” and “management” simply cannot be reduced to specific “bodily movement” conduct.
Contrastively here, theft by appropriating property is definitely conduct—an act that is a bodily movement and may include speech—and, like “delivery” in Ferguson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.Cr.App.1980-1981), the definition of “appropriate” in V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 31.01(5) allows “different and distinct ways of establishing the accused’s criminal conduct,” Ferguson, at 850. Thus, the error in denying the motion to quash.
With these additional observations and comments I join in the opinion and judgment of the Court.

. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 1.07(8).

. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 1.07(1); and V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 6.01(a).

. Id.

. Id.; V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 6.01(b); and V.T. C.A. Penal Code, § 1.07(28). (All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.)

. Indeed, the dictionary definitions of “care,” “custody,” “control” and “management” all reflect that such are “states of being” which involve an awareness of the “state,” instead of identifiable “bodily movements.”
“Care” is defined as “a burdensome sense of responsibility;” “charge, supervision;” “a disquieted state of blended uncertainty, apprehension, and responsibility;” “watchful attention.”
“Control” means “to exercise restraining or directing infíuence over: regulate;” “to have power over: rule.”
“Custody” is “immediate charge and control exercised by a person or an authority;” “safekeeping.”
“Management” means “the act or art of managing: control, direction;” “the conducting or supervising of something.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (1977); Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1969).

. Distinct, that is, from the required “culpable mental state” that the actor know the forbidden character of the object or substance which is in his custody. See n. 7, post.

. Of course, a culpable act must be coupled with a culpable mental state before an offense is committed. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 6.02(a). See § 6.03(a) and (b) for constitution of culpable mental states generally required for “possession” offenses, viz; “intentionally” and “knowingly.” See also n. 6, ante.

. A review of the ordinary meanings of “care,” “custody,” “control” and “management” reveal that the words are synonyms; Roget’s International Thesaurus 3rd ed. (1962); requiring the State to select in a charging instrument a nuance of one over the others would be a meaningless exercise, since they all describe a “state” or “condition of fact” rather than a “bodily movement.” See Draper v. State, 513 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); and see generally n. 5, ante. Clearly, then, from the standpoint of an accused, his “notice” of the offense charged would in no way be improved by such delineation upon his exception. See Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).