Court Opinion

ID: 9832008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:32:31.309696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:41.084194
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We adhere to the opinion that the court erred in overruling the special exceptions, but on reconsideration have reached the opinion that the error was harmless in view of the testimony. Appellant admitted receiving *371four certain carloads of bananas, and in a eross-action sought to recover freight charges on the cars, and the jury allowed the freight charges. The account for freight specifically named the rate of 56 cents a hundred, and claimed, at that rate, $414.40 freight, and proved that there were 74,000 pounds of bananas in the four cars. The evidence showed that the bananas were worth in Chicago, the point of destination, $1,182.-38, with $40 commissions added, making a total of $1,222.38. The jury found that the market value of the bananas in good condition was $1,214.48, which was $7.86 less than the testimony justified. If the lowest value a hundred pounds, $1.60, be taken as the basis of the market value of the bananas, we have $1,184, to which if the commissions are added we have $1,224. The bananas had no value when delivered in Chicago. Under the ruling in the cited case of Houston Packing Co. v. Dunn, the error in overruling the exceptions did not injure appellant, and such error cannot form the basis for a reversal.
The evidence as to the value of bananas in Galveston did not injure appellant, as it was fully shown what the market value of the bananas would have been in Chicago had they been delivered in good condition, and that they were valueless when delivered in Chicago. The jury was properly instructed as to the measure of damages and evidently followed the charge in rendering a verdict based on the market value in Chicago.
 The messenger endeavored to protect the bananas by having them “roundhoused” in St. Louis and East St. Louis, and he was justified in not asking that the bananas be protected in Chicago after they had been exposed to very low temperatures and were frozen. The requests made to appellant to protect the fruit was sufficient to arouse some consideration for the rights of the shipper, and, if it allowed the bananas to remain unprotected after they reached Chicago, it cannot escape liability on the ground that it was not requested to perform a duty it owed the shipper. The clause of the contract requiring the cars to be placed in a roundhouse if the temperature of the weather, in the opinion of the messenger, required it applied only while en route to Chicago. Appellant knew that it was the opinion of the messenger that the ears should be protected in St. Louis, and, as the weather was still extremely cold when the bananas reached Chicago, they knew his opinion could not have changed. Independent of the clause in the contract, the carrier owed the duty to preserve the property after it reached its destination until it was delivered. The evidence of Vaughan tended to show that the bananas were frozen before they reached Chicago.
No objection was made to Higgins’ testimony, because it gave the market value of bananas at Galveston. The evidence was not injurious.
The charge made the liability of appellant absolute under the contract if it failed to protect the bananas, and no complaint is made of the charge on that score. The charge having rendered the fact of the roundhouse of appellant being unable to accommodate the four cars of fruit not a valid defense, the testimony as to a roundhouse being at Rose-dale was of no consequence whatever.
There was no evidence of repudiation of the contract as to storage, but appellant ratified it by making some effort to perform the clause in the contract.
The motion for rehearing is granted, our former judgment set aside, and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.