Court Opinion

ID: 9945932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 20:02:51.710741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:24:12.043191
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24 Rivas v. Artisan Glass & Design CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                              SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                             DIVISION FIVE

DORA RIVAS,                                                                  B326870

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                            (Los Angeles
                                                                             County Super.
         v.                                                                  Ct. No.
                                                                             22AHCV00547)
ARTISAN GLASS & DESIGN, INC. et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Colin P. Leis, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Philip P. DeLuca and Philip P. DeLuca, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Buus Law Group and William L. Buus, for Defendants and
Respondents.
                                       ___________________
      Plaintiff and appellant Dora Rivas (Rivas) appeals the trial
court’s order granting defendants and respondents Artisan Glass
Design, Inc., Renee Heston, and Tom Garlock’s (collectively
Defendants) special motion to strike her causes of action for
breach of contract, common counts, and fraud pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure1 section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion).
      We affirm the trial court’s order granting Defendants’ Anti-
SLAPP motion and the trial court’s judgment dismissing the case
with prejudice.2

            FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Settlement Negotiations in the Prior Employment
Discrimination Case

      Prior to the present litigation, Rivas filed a complaint
against Defendants, who were her former employers, alleging
multiple causes of action relating to discrimination and
harassment in the workplace.
      On June 10, 2022, the parties participated in a mandatory
settlement conference (MSC) held remotely before Judge Pro
Tempore L. Eugene Hallsted (Temporary Judge Hallsted). Philip
DeLuca (DeLuca) represented Rivas, and Angela Serranzana
(Serranzana) represented Defendants.

      1 All future statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

      2 We construe Rivas’s appeal to include an appeal from the
judgment.

                                    2
      Immediately following the MSC, Temporary Judge Hallsted
sent an e-mail to the parties stating that in his opinion the
current value of the settlement was $125,000.00, which the
parties could accept before 11:30 a.m. that day. At 10:51 a.m.,
DeLuca e-mailed Temporary Judge Hallsted, “I hereby accept the
Mediator’s proposal of $125,000 on behalf of Plaintiff, Dora Rivas.
Thank you.” At 11:31 a.m., Serranzana e-mailed Temporary
Judge Hallsted, “We’ll accept the offer.”3 At 12:06 p.m.,
Temporary Judge Hallsted e-mailed the parties and informed
them that both sides had accepted his proposal to settle all claims
for payment of $125,000.00 in exchange for full release of all of
Rivas’s claims including attorney fees and costs, and dismissal of
the case with prejudice. The e-mail instructed Rivas to prepare
and file a notice of settlement of the entire action and to request
that that the court set a hearing to show cause regarding
dismissal within 30 days. DeLuca filed a notice of unconditional
settlement on the same day. The notice stated that Rivas would
file a request for dismissal within 45 days of June 10, 2022.
       On June 14, after considering the notice of unconditional
settlement of the entire case, the trial court issued an order to
show cause regarding dismissal and set a hearing on the matter
for August 15.
       On June 24, DeLuca sent an e-mail to Serranzana
regarding the status of the settlement check. Serranzana
responded that she sent a draft agreement to DeLuca on June 13,
but had not received his response or any proposed revisions.
DeLuca stated that he had not received the draft agreement.
Serranzana e-mailed DeLuca the draft agreement on June 28.

      3 Neither party copied the other on their e-mail response to
Temporary Judge Hallsted.

                                    3
The draft agreement included a provision for Defendants to pay
Rivas $125,000.00 in 12 monthly installments. That same day,
DeLuca e-mailed Serranzana and informed her that Rivas
rejected the proposed payment plan, which was not contemplated
in the course of the settlement agreement. DeLuca stated that if
Defendants did not tender payment of $125,000.00 in a single
lump sum, Rivas would file a motion to enforce the settlement
pursuant to section 664.6.
       On July 26, Rivas filed a motion to enforce the settlement.
Rivas asserted that the parties had reached a settlement—they
“agreed to a specific sum, with no other terms outlined in the
record” and counsel filed a notice of unconditional settlement of
the entire case without objection from Defendants. Rivas claimed
Defendants were “delaying the completion of the settlement by
intentionally and purposefully attempting to add new terms to
the settlement agreement”—specifically, a 12-month payment
plan that the parties had not previously discussed. The proposed
payment plan was a change of a material term to which Rivas
had not agreed.
       The court set a hearing on the motion to enforce the
settlement for October 3, vacated the order to show cause
regarding dismissal, and continued the jury trial to January 30,
2023.
       Defendants opposed the motion to enforce settlement on
the basis that there was no underlying settlement agreement to
enforce. Section 664.6 requires a stipulation in writing outside
the court or an oral stipulation before the court. The parties had
not executed a written agreement setting forth material terms of
the settlement and had not orally stipulated to material terms of
a settlement agreement before the court. The only term

                                   4
discussed at the MSC was the total amount to be paid to Rivas.
At best, the parties had a tentative agreement.
      The court denied the motion to enforce the settlement,
stating: “[T]hese emails indicate the Mandatory Settlement
Conference was concluded. The temporary judge tried to get
resolution by suggesting his thoughts on settlement value at
$125,000. Although the defense responded after the prescribed
time, neither side disputes that the parties agreed to the
$125,000 figure. What is unstated thereafter is whether other
terms were involved—and if so, what they were . . . . It is clear
the positions advanced by counsel from both sides that each
disagrees as to what the deal was.” The court stated that nothing
was placed on the record or in a signed writing executed by the
parties as to the key terms of the agreement. The court could not
create the terms of the settlement under section 664.6. Absent
definite terms and a showing that the parties met the
requirements of section 664.6, there was no enforceable contract.
The court denied the motion.

The Complaint

      Allegations

     On August 4, 2022, Rivas filed a form complaint (the
complaint), which alleged causes of action for (1) breach of
contract, (2) common counts, and (3) fraud.4 Attached forms
relating to the individual causes of action included:

      4 Serranzana was a named defendant.     She is not a party to
this appeal.

                                    5
      “FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION—Breach of Contract,” which
alleged that, on June 10, 2022, the parties entered into an oral
agreement memorialized by a court order dated June 10, 2022.
The form reflected that the essential terms of the agreement
were: “That Defendant Artisan Glass & Design, Inc. would pay
Plaintiff Dora Rivas in the matter to Rivas v. Artisan Glass &
Design, Inc.” On or about June 27, 2022, Defendants breached
the agreement by “Refusing to pay the lump sum unconditional
settlement that was judicially supervised by temporary Judge
Eugene Hallsted and agreed to by all parties at the June 10, 2022
Mandatory Settlement with all obligations to be completed within
thirty (30) days.” Rivas claimed she was harmed by Defendants’
attempt “to unilaterally change the [unconditional settlement] to
a conditional settlement predicated upon a payment plan that
was not part of the acceptance of the mediator’s (temporary
Judge’s) proposal.”
      “SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION—Common Counts” alleged
that Defendants became indebted to Rivas “[o]n June 10, 2022[,]
for the agreed sum of $125,000.00 in a judicially supervised
settlement in the matter of Rivas v. Artisan Glass & Design,
Orange County Superior Court Case No.: 30-2021-01181131.”
The space on the form where the plaintiff is to allege the amount
unpaid and owing was left blank.
      “THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION—Fraud” alleged Defendants
“accepted an unconditional settlement in the matter of Rivas v.
Artisan Glass & Design, Orange County Superior Court, Case
No. 30-2021-01181131 for the gross sum of $125,000.00 with all
terms to be complete within 30, but no later than 45 days.”
Defendants “fraudulent[ly] induced plaintiff to enter into the
agreement for an unconditional settlement with the intent to

                                  6
make it conditional, predicated upon a 12[-] month payment
plan.” Defendants knew their statements were false and
concealed their true intentions. Rivas justifiably relied on
Defendants’ statements, and was damaged by Defendants’ failure
to pay the lump sum settlement of $125,000.00 within 30 to 45
days of June 10, 2022, as agreed.

      Attachments

       The following documents were attached to the complaint:
       Exhibit 1, Temporary Judge Hallsted’s e-mail to counsel
regarding his valuation of the settlement, dated June 10, 2022,
which states:
       “The MSC has ended. The mediator’s opinion of the
present value for settlement at this time of the case of Rivas v.
Artisan Glass OCSC Case #30-2021-001181131 [sic] is
$125,000.00 which is open for acceptance by both parties by 11:30
a.m. today; Otherwise it is rejected. The MSC is off calendar and
the presently set trial date is to remain.”
       Exhibit 2, Temporary Judge Hallsted’s e-mail to counsel
regarding acceptance of the proposal, dated June 10, 2022, which
states:
       “I understand all the participants have accepted the
mediator’s proposal to settlement [sic] all claims of plaintiff for
payment of $125,000.00 in return for execution by all parties of a
full release of all claims of plaintiff, including attorney fees and
costs of suit and a dismissal with prejudice of OCSC Case #30-
2021-01181131. Plaintiff will prepare and file a notice of
settlement of the entire action with a request to set an OSC re:
dismissal within 30 days.”

                                    7
      Exhibit 3, minute order of the Orange County Superior
Court, Central Justice Center, Dept. C15, dated June 10, 2022,
which states: “Case is settled. Plaintiff to file a Notice of
Settlement and Request for Dismissal with prejudice. [¶] All
dates to remain as set until the Notice of Settlement is filed. [¶]
Court orders Clerk to give notice.”
      Exhibit 4, a form entitled “NOTICE OF THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE ENTIRE CASE” dated June 10, 2022,
which indicates that the June 10, 2022 settlement was
unconditional, and that a request for dismissal would be filed
within 45 days of the settlement. The form reflects that the trial
date was set for October 31, 2022. DeLuca executed the
document.

Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion

       Defendants filed a motion to strike the complaint under the
Anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that Rivas’s claims were based
solely on communications between the parties during settlement
negotiations in the employment discrimination case, which were
protected activity. Moreover, Rivas could not demonstrate a
probability of prevailing on her claims because the parties did not
enter into a settlement agreement, and all of Rivas’s claims were
based on confidential settlement communications that were
privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), and under
the mediation privilege set forth in Evidence Code sections 1119
and 1154.
       Defendants attached the face page of the complaint in the
employment discrimination case, Rivas’s motion to enforce the
settlement agreement in the employment discrimination case

                                    8
pursuant to section 664.6, Rivas’s ex parte application to advance
and shorten time on the hearing on the motion to enforce the
settlement, Rivas’s motion to reconsider the court’s denial of her
application to advance or shorten time on the hearing on the
motion to enforce the settlement, and the complaint in the
instant case.
      Defendants filed Serranzana’s declaration in support of the
motion, and later filed Serranzana’s corrected declaration with
exhibits, and a notice of errata regarding exhibits attached to
Serranzana’s Declaration.

Opposition

      Rivas filed an opposition to Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP
motion. She argued that Defendants had not shown that
engaging in settlement agreements was protected activity under
the Anti-SLAPP statute, because the settlement communications
were not privileged under Evidence Code sections 1119 and 1154.
Rivas further argued that she had met the burden of showing a
probability of success on her claims. Rivas claimed that eight
written communications between counsel for the parties,
Temporary Judge Hallsted, and the court demonstrated that a
contract existed between the parties and that the contract had
been breached. Rivas stated that she “performed under the
conditions of the contract by filing a Notice of Settlement with a
request for dismissal within thirty (30) days, by identifying the
Settlement as ‘Unconditional’ . . . and any further performance, to
wit, Release of All Claims, including attorney fees and costs, has
been excused due to Defendant’s breach of the contract, to wit,
‘payment of $125,000.00’ within thirty (30) days to permit a

                                   9
Dismissal of the action.” “Plaintiff has been harmed, to wit, she
has not received her payment of $125,000.00 and the Orange
County action has not been dismissed, but rather it has been
scheduled for Jury Trial on January 30, 2022.” Defendants knew
they wanted an installment plan, but concealed this fact to
fraudulently induce Rivas to enter into the settlement agreement
so that they could avoid preparing for trial.
      Rivas filed DeLuca’s declaration in support of the
opposition, and attached the documents Rivas previously filed
with the complaint (Exhibits 1-4), as well as an e-mail from
Serranzana to Temporary Judge Hallsted on June 10, 2022,
stating “We’ll accept the offer.” (added to Exhibit 2); the court’s
June 14, 2022 minute order issuing the order to show cause
(Exhibit 5); e-mails between counsel regarding the draft
agreement and payment dispute, with the draft settlement
agreement attached (Exhibits 6-9); Defendants’ opposition to
Rivas’s ex parte application to shorten time for the motion to the
enforce settlement (Exhibit 10); a minute order reflecting the
court’s order, dated August 3, 2022, denying Rivas’s ex parte
application to shorten time for the motion to enforce the
settlement (Exhibit 11); a minute order reflecting the court’s
order, dated August 10, 2022, granting in part Rivas’s ex parte
application for reconsidering and revoking the court’s order
denying Rivas’s ex parte application to shorten time for the
motion to enforce the settlement (Exhibit 12); Defendants’
opposition to the motion to enforce the settlement (Exhibit 13);
and a minute order reflecting the court’s order denying the
motion to enforce the settlement (Exhibit 14).

                                   10
Trial Court’s Ruling

      On December 6, 2022, following a hearing on the matter,
the court granted Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motion. The court
found that because the judge in the employment discrimination
case ruled under section 664.6 that there was no enforceable
settlement agreement, Rivas’s causes of action were necessarily
based solely on Defendants’ statements during the MSC.
Statements made in the course of a settlement conference are
protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1). Rivas could
not show a probability of prevailing on her causes of action for
breach of contract and fraudulent inducement5 because there was
no underlying contract to support her claims. The court awarded
Defendants attorney fees and costs.
     Rivas timely appealed the trial court’s order granting
Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motion.
     A judgment of dismissal was entered on February 2, 2023.

                          DISCUSSION

Statutory Scheme and Standard of Review

      The Legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute to protect
defendants from meritless lawsuits brought primarily to
discourage the defendants from exercising their constitutional

      5 Neither the parties nor the trial court separately
addressed Rivas’s cause of action for common counts. Although
Rivas lists common counts among her causes of action, she
provides no argument with respect to that cause of action in her
briefing to this court.

                                   11
rights to speak and petition on matters of public significance.
(§ 425.16, subd. (a); Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11
Cal.5th 995, 1008–1009.) To accomplish this purpose, the statute
authorizes a special motion to strike “[a] cause of action against a
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue . . . unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
       “ ‘ “Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.
First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim
arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.]” ’
[Citation.] The court considers the elements of the claim and the
acts of the defendant satisfying those elements that form the
basis for liability. [Citation.] ‘The defendant’s burden is to
identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show
how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category
of protected activity. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] . . . The moving party
may argue that the allegations arise from protected activity, even
when the party disputes the truth of the allegations. [Citation.]”
(Pech v. Doniger (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 443, 456.)
       “ ‘ “If the defendant makes the required showing, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the
claim by establishing a probability of success. We have described
this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’
[Citation.] The court does not weigh evidence or resolve
conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the
plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima
facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.

                                    12
It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the
defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s
claim as a matter of law. [Citation.] ‘[C]laims with the requisite
minimal merit may proceed.’ ” [Citation.] The grant or denial of
an anti-SLAPP motion is reviewed de novo.’ ” (Pech v. Doniger,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 456–457.)
       “In making its determination, the court considers the
pleadings and the evidence submitted in connection with the
proceeding to provide the facts supporting the liability or defense.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)” (Pech v. Doniger, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.)

First Prong: Activity Protected Under the Anti-SLAPP
Statute

       We reject Rivas’s argument that the allegations of the
complaint are not based on protected petitioning activity because
the parties’ settlement communications are not privileged under
Evidence Code sections 1119 and 1154. Whether the settlement
communications are privileged is not the relevant inquiry. Even
if we assume for the sake of argument that the parties’
communications are not privileged, they are communications
made for the purpose of resolving the litigation and were made
while the litigation was pending.
       “ ‘The anti-SLAPP protection for petitioning activities
applies not only to the filing of lawsuits, but extends to conduct
that relates to such litigation, including statements made in
connection with or in preparation of litigation. [Citation.]
Indeed, courts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what
constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section

                                    13
425.16.” ’ ” (Alfaro v. Waterhouse Management Corp. (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 26, 33.) “ ‘ “Under the plain language of section
425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (2), as well as the case law
interpreting those provisions, all communicative acts performed
by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a
judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se
protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute.” ’
[Citation.] Cases construing the anti-SLAPP statute hold that ‘a
statement is “in connection with” litigation under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2), if it relates to the substantive issues in the
litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the
litigation.’ [Citation.] Consequently, because settlement
negotiations are regarded as an exercise of the right to petition,
communications during such negotiations are regarded as having
been made in connection with the underlying lawsuit for
purposes of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). [Citation.] The
protection of the anti-SLAPP statute applies ‘even against
allegations of fraudulent promises made during the settlement
process.’ [Citation.]”6 (Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump
Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 113–114.)

      6 Section 425.16, subdivision (e) provides:   “As used in this
section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law . . . .”

                                    14
      The statements at issue concerned the valuation of Rivas’s
employment discrimination claims, and were therefore clearly
related to substantive issues in the litigation. Moreover, they
were made by and to the parties and their counsel, who were
unquestionably interested in the litigation. Defendants have met
their burden of demonstrating that the conduct upon which the
allegations of the complaint are based is protected under section
425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

Second Prong: Probability of Success on the Merits

      Because Defendants have demonstrated that the
settlement communications are protected activity under the Anti-
SLAPP statute, the burden shifts to Rivas to show that her
claims have “ ‘ “ ‘the requisite minimal merit [to] proceed.’ ” ’ ”
(Pech v. Doniger, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 456.)
      As to Rivas’s first cause of action, breach of contract
requires “the existence of a contract, plaintiff’s performance (or
excuse for nonperformance), defendant’s breach, and resulting
damages.” (Professional Collection Consultants v. Lujan (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 685, 690.) Initially, we note that Rivas contends
in her complaint that she had a contract for payment of a lump
sum. However, there is no evidence to support that there was
such a payment term; indeed, the court that oversaw the case in
which the settlement agreement was drafted concluded that the
evidence showed that the parties failed to reach a meeting of the
minds on that issue. Further, applying general principles of
contract law, we conclude that Rivas has failed to provide
evidence that a contract exists. “In order for acceptance of a
proposal to result in the formation of a contract, the proposal

                                   15
‘must be sufficiently definite, or must call for such definite terms
in the acceptance, that the performance promised is reasonably
certain.’ [Citation.] A proposal ‘ “cannot be accepted so as to
form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably
certain.” ’ ” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60
Cal.App.4th 793, 811.) Here, the parties agreed to an overall
sum, and nothing more. There was no agreement as to when the
amount to be paid was due, nor whether the amount was to be
paid as a lump sum or in installments. The timing of payment
was clearly a material term—it is the sole object of the instant
lawsuit. Moreover, although Temporary Judge Hallsted sent an
e-mail to the parties indicating that there would be a “ ‘full
release of all claims of plaintiff’ ” and a waiver of attorney fees
and costs, no specific details were agreed upon as to those terms,
either. Because the terms are not definite there can be no
contract, and thus no possibility that Rivas could prevail on her
first cause of action.
       As to her second cause of action, Rivas does not set forth
the elements of a cause of action of common counts or discuss
common counts in her briefing with this court. She has therefore
waived any argument regarding the probability of success on that
claim. (See People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9 [“the
claim is omitted from the opening brief and thus waived”].)
       Finally, Rivas has not demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on her third cause of action for fraud. “ ‘The elements
of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation,
concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its
falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and
(e) resulting damage. [Citations.] Fraud in the inducement is a
subset of the tort of fraud. It “occurs when ‘ “the promisor knows

                                    16
what he is signing but his consent is induced by fraud, mutual
assent is present and a contract is formed, which, by reason of
the fraud, is voidable.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Dhital v. Nissan North
America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 838–839.) Here, there is
no contract between the parties; Rivas cannot have been induced
to enter into a contract that does not exist.

                         DISPOSITION

      We affirm the trial court’s order granting Defendants’
motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16 and the trial court’s judgment dismissing the case with
prejudice. Respondents Artisan Glass Design, Inc., Renee
Heston, and Tom Garlock are awarded their costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                                 MOOR, J.

      I concur:

            KIM, J.

                                   17
Dora Rivas v. Artisan Glass & Design, Inc., et al.
B326870

BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

       I agree that all of plaintiff and appellant Dora Rivas’s
(plaintiff’s) causes of action against defendants and respondents
Artisan Glass & Design, Inc., Renee Heston, and Tom Garlock
arise from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute (Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16). I also agree plaintiff made no “minimal
merit” showing of a probability of success (see generally Bonni v.
St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009) on her
cause of action for common counts. That is where the agreement
ends.
       I would reverse the trial court’s determination that plaintiff
made no showing of a probability of success on her breach of
contract and fraud claims. As to the former, the majority
concludes she has no probability of prevailing because the
agreement between her and defendants was too indefinite; in the
majority’s words, “[t]here was no agreement as to when the
amount . . . to be paid was due, nor whether the amount was to
be paid as a lump sum or in installments.” But this sees a flaw
where none exists. Contract law permits implying the term that
the majority thinks is missing. (Civ. Code, § 1657 [“If no time is
specified for the performance of an act required to be performed,
a reasonable time is allowed. If the act is in its nature capable of
being done instantly—as, for example, if it consists in the
payment of money only—it must be performed immediately upon
the thing to be done being exactly ascertained”].) As to the latter
(the fraud claims), the majority just reads plaintiff’s complaint
too narrowly. Plaintiff’s theory of fraud is not just that
defendants induced her to enter the settlement agreement.
Plaintiff also alleges a theory of promissory fraud, the success of
which does not depend on whether a valid contract was formed.
(See generally Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638
[“‘Promissory fraud’ is a subspecies of the action for fraud and
deceit. A promise to do something necessarily implies the
intention to perform; hence, where a promise is made without
such intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that
may be actionable fraud”].)

                       BAKER, Acting P. J.

                                    2