Court Opinion

ID: 9778332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:00:50.262408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:07.619369
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ODOM, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for rape of a child; punishment was assessed by the jury at ten years.
In his third ground of error appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error by refusing his requested charge on the defensive issue of mistaken identification. The State argues the issue was not preserved at trial and the evidence did not raise the issue.
Although the requested charge submitted by appellant was no model, we conclude it was sufficient to call the court’s attention to the issue he sought to have submitted. It began:
“You are instructed that the State has the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that the witness be free from doubt as to the correctness of his statement. However, you, the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the Defendant before you may convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must find the Defendant not guilty.”
Although other portions of the lengthy requested instruction would have been improper comments on the weight of the evidence had the court included them in the charge, the part quoted here was sufficient to put the court on notice of appellant’s request, and to preserve the issue for review. See Sledge v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 507 S.W.2d 726; Art. 36.15, V.A.C.C.P.
We must therefore decide whether it was error to deny appellant a jury charge on mistaken identification. The offense was committed on December 1, 1975. Richard Bennett testified that on December 26 he, appellant, and two other persons were displayed before the complaining witness for possible identification as one of the three persons who had raped her, and that she said neither appellant nor either of the others had committed the rape. Although this testimony was contradicted by the State’s evidence, the issue before this Court is not the truth or falsity of the defensive evidence. The issue on appeal is whether that evidence raised the defensive issue of mistaken identification.1
In Wheeler v. State, 56 Tex.Cr.R. 547, 121 S.W. 166, Presiding Judge Davidson wrote for the Court:
“It has been, as before stated, the universal rule in Texas to hold that wherever a defensive matter is set up, and supported by facts, the accused is entitled to an affirmative charge on that defensive matter. The law is not satisfied with a negative presentation, and it has been held directly that where there is evidence that another, or others, may have committed the crime, and not the accused, the court must submit this issue to the jury, [citations omitted].”
*663This rule applies as well to the defensive issue of mistaken identity. In Briscoe v. State, 106 Tex.Cr.R. 478, 293 S.W. 573, the Court approved the affirmative submission of an identity charge:
“On identification of the accused, the court gave the usual charge that the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that on a date named the accused committed the offense of rape upon prosecu-trix. In addition, he gave a special charge asked by appellant, to the effect that the burden was on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the party who committed the crime, and that unless they so found beyond a reasonable doubt they should acquit.”
Although some cases indicate that the defensive issue of mistaken identification can be raised by evidence that someone other than the accused committed the offense, e. g. Florio v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 532 S.W .2d 614, that does not mean such evidence is the only way to raise the issue. We hold the defensive issue of mistaken identification is also raised by evidence that someone other than the accused had been identified as the perpetrator of the crime or by evidence that the identifying witness had on a prior occasion failed to identify the accused when given an opportunity to do so. In this case such evidence was presented, and the failure of the trial court to submit an affirmative jury charge on this defensive issue when requested to do so by appellant presents reversible error.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

. The State points out that an alibi charge was given. An alibi charge would not dispense with the necessity of an affirmative charge on identity if raised by the evidence. See Fite v. State, 139 Tex.Cr.R. 592, 140 S.W.2d 848, 853.