Court Opinion

ID: 9372890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:22.739855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.596192
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DORED SHIBA,                                    DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  CH-1221-16-0285-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: February 8, 2023
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Christina Abraham, Esquire, Chicago, Illinois, for the appellant.

           Lynn N. Donley, Chicago, Illinois, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                                Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                             Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                 2

     REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance
     with this Remand Order.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        In 2003, the appellant voluntarily resigned from his Federal employment
     with the Social Security Administration for medical reasons and began receiving
     a Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) disability retirement annuity in
     2004. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 11, Tab 7 at 2; Shiba v. Department of
     Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-10-0761-I-1, Initial Appeal File
     (0761 IAF), Tab 7 at 21. In 2007, he was hired by the Department of Homela nd
     Security (the agency) but, 2 months later, filed a claim for a workplace injury.
     0761 IAF, Tab 6 at 10, Tab 7 at 21.      The Office of Workers’ Compensation
     Programs (OWCP) accepted his injury as compensable, and the agency placed
     him in a leave without pay (LWOP) status. Id.
¶3        After 3years of being in an LWOP status, the agency removed him based on
     his unavailability for work.   0761 IAF, Tab 7 at 22, Tab 14, Initial Decision
     (0761 ID) at 2. He appealed to the Board, and an administrative judge issued an
     initial decision reversing the appellant’s removal after he produced new medical
     documents suggesting that he could return to work.    0761 ID at 2, 4. Neither
     party appealed, and the initial decision became the Board’s final decision.
     Following his reinstatement in November 2010, the appellant filed a notice of
     recurrence with OWCP. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 3 at 13.
     It appears that, in response to OWCP’s inquiry regarding why he believed his
     prior injury had recurred, the appellant admitted that he had never recovered.
     PFR File, Tab 3 at 15. Instead, he “pressure[d] [his] physicians into releasing
     [him] to work” so that he could keep his job. Id. He stated that he had obtained
     the medical documentation that he submitted in his prior appeal in order to have
     the Board reverse his termination. Id.
                                                                                  3

¶4         The appellant alleges that OWCP accepted the recurrence as compensable,
     and he again went on LWOP. Id. In September 2011, the agency’s Office of
     Inspector General (OIG) commenced an investigation regarding the appellant.
     IAF, Tab 8 at 7-8. In August 2014, the agency terminated the appellant, treating
     him as an at-will reemployed annuitant.     IAF, Tab 1 at 7-8.   The termination
     decision was made by a District Director who assumed his position 2 weeks prior
     to the termination.   IAF, Tab 1 at 9; PFR File, Tab 3 at 7, Tab 4 at 6-7.    The
     appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) alleging
     reprisal for his workplace injury, his prior Board appeal, a statement he made to
     his direct supervisor about agency employees being rude to the public, and
     disclosures he made to his second-line supervisor and a city mayor. IAF, Tab 1
     at 4, 22, Tab 7 at 3-5. After the OSC issued a close-out letter, he filed this IRA
     appeal alleging reprisal for protected activity and disclosures.      IAF, Tab 1
     at 4, 25.
¶5         The administrative judge notified the appellant of his jurisdictional burden
     and ordered him to submit evidence and argument on the jurisdictional issue.
     IAF, Tab 3.      After the appellant responded and the agency replied, the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction.   IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 10.    She found that the
     appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that he engaged in protected
     activity or that he made protected disclosures that were a contributing factor in
     the OIG investigation or his termination. ID at 1, 4-8. Specifically, she found
     that his alleged workplace injury and statements regarding rude employees
     were not protected disclosures, and that his prior Board appeal was not a
     protected activity. ID at 4-8. She found that he nonfrivolously alleged that his
     disclosures of his ill treatment to a city mayor, and to his supervisor of bribes
     accepted by agency employees, were protected. ID at 7-8. However, she found
     that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that the agency officials who
                                                                                            4

     initiated the investigation or his termination were aware of his protected
     disclosures. ID at 9.
¶6          The appellant has petitioned for review. PFR File, Tab 1. He argues that
     the administrative judge erred in finding that he did not engage in protected
     activity when he filed his prior Board appeal. Id. at 6-8. Further, he disagrees
     with her finding that he failed to nonfrivolously allege that the OIG investigation
     was the result of his protected activities and disclosures.           Id. at 9.    He also
     presents new evidence and argument pertaining to Board jurisdiction over his
     claim that his termination was in reprisal for a protected disclosure. PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 9, 28, Tab 4 at 8-10.         The agency has responded to the petition for
     review, and the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.
¶7          To establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal based on whistleblower
     reprisal, the appellant must exhaust his administrative remedies before OSC 2 and
     make    nonfrivolous     allegations     of   the   following:     (1) he    engaged       in
     whistleblowing activity by making a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8), or engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),(B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity
     was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take, fail to take, or threaten
     to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).                      Bishop v.
     Department of Agriculture, 2022 MSPB 28, ¶ 13. A nonfrivolous allegation is an
     assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue.                   5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.4(s); 3 see also Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362,
     1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 4

     2
       The administrative judge found that the appellant duly exhausted his claims before the
     OSC, ID at 2-4, and the parties do not challenge this finding. We decline to disturb this
     finding on review.
     3
       The regulation further provides that an allegation generally will be considered
     nonfrivolous when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an allegation
     that: (1) is more than conclusory; (2) is plausible on its face; and (3) is material to the
     legal issues in the appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). Pro forma allegations are insufficient
                                                                                         5

¶8         On review, the appellant disagrees with the administrative judge’s finding
     that his prior Board appeal could not qualify as protected activity because it was:
     (1) adjudicated prior to the effective date of the Whistleblower Protection
     Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 202, 126 Stat. 1465,
     1476; and (2) outside the scope of the predecessor statute. 5          ID at 4-5.   The
     appellant argues that his prior Board appeal constitutes protected activity under
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), regardless of when it was adjudicated, because the
     District Director’s termination decision was made after the effective date of the
     WPEA. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-8, Tab 4 at 7-8. We need not reach this issue, given
     that section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) applies only to claims that seek to remedy
     whistleblowing reprisal, Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R.
     365, ¶ 7 (2013), and the appellant’s prior Board appeal contained no
     whistleblowing reprisal claim, 0761 IAF, Tab 1 at 5; 0761 ID.            Therefore, the
     administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s prior Board appeal was not
     protected activity is correct regardless of whether it is assessed under the WPEA
     or the predecessor statute. 6

     to meet the nonfrivolous standard. Clark v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 6
     (2016), aff’d, 679 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and overruled on other grounds by
     Cronin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20 n.11.
     4
       Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
     for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to
     the All Circuit Review Act Pub. L. No. 115 195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file
     petitions for judicial review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any
     circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
     Therefore, we must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek
     review of this decision before any appropriate court of appeal.
     5
      The WPEA, which became effective on December 27, 2012, expanded the grounds on
     which an appellant may file an IRA appeal with the Board. WPEA § 101(b)(1)(A);
     Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 629, ¶ 9 (2014). Under the
     WPEA, an appellant may file an IRA appeal concerning reprisal based on certain
     additional classes of protected activity, as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
     (C), and (D). See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a); Hooker, 120 M.S.P.R. 629, ¶ 9.
     6
      On review, the appellant also alleges that he was denied accommodation for his
     medical restrictions immediately after he was returned to work as a result of his success
                                                                                         6

¶9          The appellant also reiterates that the OIG investigated him in retaliation for
      a protected disclosure.    PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 7, 9.      One way of proving the
      contributing factor element is the knowledge/timing test.        Pridgen v. Office of
      Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 63. To satisfy the knowledge/timing
      test, the employee submits evidence showing that the official taking the personnel
      action knew of the disclosure or activity and that the personnel action occurred
      within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the
      disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action.      Id. We
      agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to make a
      nonfrivolous allegation under the knowledge/timing test that a protected
      disclosure was a contributing factor in the investigation because he merely stated
      that “someone” in the agency referred him to the OIG for an investigation but
      did not identify or connect this individual to his protected disclosure. ID at 9;
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 7, 9; IAF, Tab 1 at 22, Tab 7 at 4-5.          As noted, in the
      context of whistleblowing, the Board has found that an appellant must make
      specific and detailed allegations; vague, conclusory, unsupported, and pro forma
      allegations of alleged wrongdoing do not meet the nonfrivolous pleading
      standard. El v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6 (2015), aff’d per
      curiam, 663 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
¶10         If the appellant fails to satisfy the knowledge/timing test, the Board
      considers other evidence, such as that pertaining to the strength or weakness of
      the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel action, whether the whistleblowin g

      in his prior Board appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. However, because the alleged denial of
      accommodation predates the appellant’s protected discl osure regarding bribery, he
      cannot meet his burden to nonfrivolously allege jurisdiction. Rumsey v. Department of
      Justice, 120 M.S.P.R. 259, ¶ 27 (2013) (observing that, when alleged personnel actions
      predate an appellant’s disclosures, the appellant cannot prove contributing factor under
      any theory). In addition, it does not appear that the appellant exhausted this claim or
      raised it below. IAF, Tab 7 at 4-5 & Exhibit B at 6; ID at 4; Chambers v. Department
      of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10 (the Board’s jurisdiction in an IRA appeal is
      limited to issues previously raised before OSC, although an appellant may give a more
      detailed account of their whistleblowing before the Board than they did to OSC ).
                                                                                         7

      was personally directed at the proposing or deciding officials, and whether those
      individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant.        Pridgen,
      2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 65.        The administrative judge did not analyze those other
      considerations in determining whether the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that
      he was subjected to an OIG investigation in reprisal for his pro tected disclosure.
      Nonetheless, having considered this alternative method of proving contributing
      factor, we find no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the
      Board lacks jurisdiction over this alleged personnel action. The appellant h as
      failed to allege that any agency official with knowledge of a protected disclosure
      referred him to the OIG.       PFR File, Tab 1 at 5.      Without knowledge of the
      disclosures, the unidentified person who the appellant alleges contacted the OIG
      cannot have relied on a protected disclosure in doing so, and could not have a
      desire or motive to retaliate based on a protected disclosure.
¶11         Nevertheless, we find it appropriate to remand this matter, given that the
      appellant offers new argument and evidence in support of his allegation that the
      District Director was influenced by the appellant’s second -line supervisor, to
      whom the appellant alleged he made a protected disclosure regarding bribery. 7
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 9, 17, 28. The agency argues that the evidence of fered by the
      appellant is not new within the meaning of 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d) because it was
      available to him months before the issuance of the initial decision and could have
      been raised below. PFR File, Tab 3 at 8. The agency is correct that the Board
      generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petiti on for
      review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not
      previously available despite the party’s due diligence. Banks v. Department of
      the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). However, because the evidence is

      7
        Specifically, he points to the District Director’s response to an interrogatory served
      during the appellant’s equal employment opportunity proceeding, in which the District
      Director stated that he “consulted” with the second-line supervisor in connection with
      the appellant’s termination. PFR File, Tab 1 at 28.
                                                                                           8

      material to the issue of Board jurisdiction, a matter that can be raised at any time
      during the Board’s proceedings, we will consider the appellant’s new argument
      and evidence on review. Pirkkala v. Department of Justice, 123 M.S.P.R. 288,
      ¶ 5 (2016).
¶12         As pertinent here, an appellant may establish an official’s constructive
      knowledge of his disclosure by demonstrating that an individual with actual
      knowledge of the disclosure influenced the official accused of taking the
      retaliatory action.     Bradley v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R.
      547, ¶ 15 (2016). The appellant has offered evidence of, and asserted that, his
      protected disclosure regarding bribery was a contributing factor because the
      deciding official taking the action might have had constructive knowledge of the
      disclosure.   Therefore, we find that he has made a nonfrivolous allegation of
      Board jurisdiction, id., ¶ 16, and we remand this appeal for adjudication on the
      merits of that issue.
¶13         Should the appellant prevail on remand, however, it appears that he may not
      be entitled to back pay or reinstatement. His employment status as a reemployed
      annuitant and, consequently, an at-will employee, was neither litigated below nor
      raised in his prior Board appeal, in which his removal was reversed. 8 0761 ID;
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 5; 5 U.S.C. § 3323(b)(1). If the appellant was a reemployed
      annuitant at the time of his prior separation, the Board did not have jurisdiction to
      order his reinstatement in his earlier chapter 75 appeal. See McDonald v. Mabee,
      243 U.S. 90 (1917) (finding that a civil judgment issued by a court that lacked
      personal jurisdiction over the defendant was void); Garza v. Department of the
      Navy, 119 M.S.P.R. 91, ¶ 9 (2012) (finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over

      8
        The appellant alleges for the first time on review that he stopped being a reemployed
      annuitant in 2009. Compare PFR File, Tab 4 at 5 (arguing that, once the appellant
      cancelled his disability retirement benefits, he was no longer an at -will employee), with
      IAF, Tab 1 at 25, Tab 7 at 2 (alleging below and in his OSC complaint that the
      appellant has remained a reemployed annuitant throughout his employment with
      the agency).
                                                                                         9

      the separation of a FERS reemployed annuitant). Further, the initial decision in
      the prior Board appeal might be invalid as having been obtained by fraud on the
      Board, given that the administrative judge in that appeal premised her
      determination on medical documents that the appellant may have k nown falsely
      stated he could return to work as perhaps evidenced by his acknowledgment that
      he “pressure[d] [his] physicians into releasing [him] to work.” 0761 ID at 2; PFR
      File, Tab 3 at 13-15; see Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(d)(3) (empowering Federal courts to
      “set aside” judgments “for fraud on the court”); see also Sabio v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 124 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶ 27 (2017) (observing that the Board may
      look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as nonbinding guidance).
¶14         Because the issues of jurisdiction and fraud on the Board in the prior Board
      appeal may affect whether the appellant is eligible for reinstatement or back pa y
      in this IRA appeal, the administrative judge should develop the record as needed
      to determine the appropriate scope of corrective action in the event that the
      appellant prevails.

                                             ORDER
¶15         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. 9

      FOR THE BOARD:                                     /s/ for
                                                 Jennifer Everling
                                                 Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      9
       The remand initial decision will incorporate the findings from this order and include a
      notice of appeal rights for all claims raised by the appellant.