Court Opinion

ID: 9853864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:32.263274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:12.108501
License: Public Domain

*57BREWER, J.
Defendant was charged with hindering prosecution. ORS 162.325. The state appeals from an order suppressing evidence that defendant’s son, who was the subject of an arrest warrant, was found inside their common residence after the police entered the dwelling despite defendant’s objection. The issue on appeal is whether the police, in attempting to execute an arrest warrant at a dwelling shared by the arrestee and another person, must have probable cause to believe that the arrestee is within the residence before entering, over the coresident’s objection, without a search warrant or some other legally recognized authority. We review for errors of law, ORS 138.220, and affirm.
The facts are undisputed. For two to three weeks before February 20,1997, Officer Kolberstein received anonymous complaints of drug trafficking by defendant’s son, Getzelman, from the residence he shared with defendant. On February 20, Kolberstein and another police officer approached the residence in order to arrest Getzelman pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. Defendant answered the door when the officers arrived. Defendant admitted that Getzelman lived there but said that he was not at home and refused to permit the officers to enter the residence. Although they had no warrant to search the premises, the officers entered the dwelling over defendant’s objection and found Getzelman in one of the bedrooms. Getzelman surrendered and defendant was charged with hindering his prosecution.
Defendant moved to suppress evidence that the officers found Getzelman inside the residence. She argued that Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution required the officers to have probable cause to believe Getzelman was inside the residence before they made a non-consensual entry in order to execute the arrest warrant. The trial court agreed with defendant that probable cause was required in the absence of any other legal authority for entry and farther found that the officers merely had a reasonable belief that Getzelman was inside the house. The court granted defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed.
*58The state concedes that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that Getzelman was inside the residence when they entered it to search for him.1 In its sole assignment of error, the state argues that neither section 9 nor the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause and that reasonable suspicion that Getzelman was present justified the police entry.
We address the state’s Oregon constitutional argument first. State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 298, 977 P2d 379 (1999); State v. Maddux, 144 Or App 34, 38, 925 P2d 124 (1996). Section 9 protects a personal right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Wacker, 317 Or 419, 425 n 11, 856 P2d 1029 (1993) (a historical purpose of section 9 is to safeguard personal privacy rights); see also State v. Munro, 96 Or App 238, 243, 772 P2d 1353 (1989). In general, we presume that a warrantless entry and search of a private dwelling is unreasonable. State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 237, 666 P2d 802 (1983). We emphasize that the issue before us is not whether the police violated Getzelman’s rights but is, instead, whether, in the absence of any other legal authority, the entry was forbidden over the objection of defendant, for whom there was no arrest warrant.
The parties base their arguments on a series of search and seizure cases involving the propriety of warrant-less searches under both the state and federal constitutions. The first of those cases, and the one that is most similar factually to the instant case, is State v. Jordan, 288 Or 391, 605 P2d 646, cert den sub nom Jordan v. Oregon, 449 US 846 (1980). In Jordan, as in this case, the police had a valid arrest warrant. The defendant was charged with hindering prosecution after she gave the police a false name and refused to let them search her house for the arrestee, who also lived there.2 Id. at 393-94. Following a lengthy Fourth Amendment *59analysis, the court concluded that under either the Fourth Amendment or section 9 “constitutional rights will be protected as long as any arrest on private premises is supported by the judicial authorization of an arrest warrant and the police officer’s probable cause to believe that the arrestee is within the premises.” Id. at 401-02 (emphasis added). The court concluded that no search warrant was required in order to authorize police entry under such circumstances. Id. at 402.
Shortly after Jordan was decided, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires only that an officer, under the authority of an arrest warrant, have a reasonable belief that an arrestee is inside his or her dwelling before making a nonconsensual entry. Payton v. New York, 445 US 573, 603, 100 S Ct 1371, 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980) (“for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within”). The court’s statement in Payton is technically dictum, because the police in Payton did not have an arrest warrant. Nevertheless, the Court later cited Payton as controlling authority in a case in which the police did have an arrest warrant. Steagald v. United States, 451 US 204, 214 n 7, 101 S Ct 1642, 68 L Ed 2d 38 (1981). The state argues that Payton and Steagald portend a relaxation of the probable cause requirement under section 9. We disagree.
Jordan relied primarily on Fourth Amendment decisions for its constitutional analysis. More recently, however, the Oregon courts have eschewed the practice of primary reliance on federal authority to interpret section 9. State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 255, 834 P2d 1008 (1992) (Jordan’s “Oregon constitutional analysis discussed cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment rather more than has been our recent practice.”) (citation omitted). In Davis, the police entered the defendant’s mother’s residence without a search warrant but held a valid warrant for the defendant’s arrest and had probable cause to believe he was inside when they *60entered the residence. Although Payton and Steagald were decided before Davis, the Oregon Supreme Court nonetheless followed its holding in Jordan, concluding that:
“The arrest — the seizure of defendant’s person — was made pursuant to a valid arrest warrant for defendant and with probable cause to believe that defendant was on the premises. The arrest of defendant did not, therefore, violate Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.” 313 Or at 255-56 (emphasis added).
Contrary to the view of the dissent and the state, we understand Davis to confirm that, in the absence of a search warrant or other legal authority, probable cause to believe that the subject of an arrest warrant is within is not merely sufficient but is also necessary, to authorize police entry into a dwelling in which another person is a resident. Because Davis followed the “Jordan holding,” id. at 255, it is important to understand that holding in its proper context.
It is true that in Jordan, the Supreme Court concluded that police officers had probable cause to believe that the arrestee was inside the dwelling that was searched. Jordan, 288 Or at 402-03. Therefore, it was not necessary for the court to decide whether a lesser degree of belief or suspicion would suffice in order to authorize entry. However, the court left little doubt that probable cause was necessary to the result of that case. As noted, the court stated that constitutional rights will be protected as long as an arrest on private premises is supported by a valid arrest warrant and “probable cause to believe that the arrestee is within the premises.” Id. at 401-02.
Although the court’s statement was technically dictum, it does not follow that it is of no legal import. State v. Aguilar, 139 Or App 175, 180 n 2, 912 P2d 379, rev den 323 Or 265 (1996). Occasions on which this court has chosen to disregard dictum in Supreme Court decisions have generally been limited to circumstances in which we conclude that a statement is clearly incorrect. See, e.g., Norden v. Water Resources Dept., 158 Or App 127, 134, 973 P2d 910, rev allowed 328 Or 594 (1999); Turczynski v. Grill, 134 Or App 351, 355 n 5, 895 P2d 787 (1995). In this case, despite the dissent’s carefully reasoned reliance on federal authority, we *61cannot say that the Supreme Court’s statement in Jordan is clearly incorrect under the Oregon Constitution. Although the Supreme Court may or may not decide to retreat from its statements in Jordan and Davis, it is not our place to do so.
In this case, the state claims no authority for entry other than reasonable suspicion to believe that Getzelman was inside the residence. Because defendant, a co-resident of the premises, objected to police entry — that entry was forbidden under such circumstances. The evidence against defendant, namely, the presence of her son, would not have been discovered had the officers not violated section 9, and it was thus properly suppressed. State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Rogers, 314 Or 114, 119, 836 P2d 127 (1992). Because the Oregon Constitution requires that we affirm the trial court’s decision, we do not reach defendant’s alternative arguments for suppression.
Affirmed.

 Probable cause means that “the facts upon which the warrant is premised must lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched.” State v. Anspach, 298 Or 375, 380-81, 692 P2d 602 (1984) (emphasis added). The courts determine whether a belief is reasonable by reference to the “totality of the circumstances * * * at the time and place” in question. State v. Belt, 325 Or 6,10-11, 932 P2d 1177 (1997).

 The state contends that ‘Ttlhe court in Jordan did not consider whether [the arresteel resided in the residence.” That assertion is inaccurate. The court *59expressly noted that defendant and the arrestee resided in the house in which the challenged entry occurred. Id. at 393.