Court Opinion

ID: 9906984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 17:25:25.388519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:17.438205
License: Public Domain

J-S41044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                 :
                 v.                              :
                                                 :
                                                 :
  BLAKE T. TRUVER                                :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :   No. 716 WDA 2023

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 1, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-33-CR-0000092-2021

BEFORE:        PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                           FILED: December 5, 2023

       Blake T. Truver appeals from the June 1, 2023 order dismissing his

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.1

       This matter stems from Appellant’s aggregate judgment of sentence of

19 to 58 years’ imprisonment imposed following his open guilty plea to five

counts    of    recklessly   endangering       another   person,   burglary,   criminal

conspiracy, robbery, simple assault, six counts of theft by unlawful taking,

aggravated assault by vehicle, fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, two

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Commonwealth has indicated it will not be filing a brief in this matter

and relies on the reasoning set forth in the PCRA court’s June 1, 2023 opinion.
J-S41044-23

counts of possession of a controlled substance, and use or possession of drug

paraphernalia.2

       The underlying facts of this case were summarized by a prior panel of

this Court as follows:

              On January 25, 2021, Appellant and another individual
              pushed their way into a home, beat the resident who
              was present at the time, and stole firearms, guitars,
              and amplifiers. The second resident arrived home
              during the incident and recognized Appellant as a
              childhood friend. Appellant and the other assailant,
              brandishing knives, chased the second resident from
              the home before jumping in Appellant’s car and
              driving away. A high-speed, seventeen-mile chase
              with police officers ensued. The chase ended when
              Appellant lost control of the vehicle which caused it to
              rollover several times. Appellant and his co-
              conspirator were airlifted to a hospital. Police officers
              observed    stolen    property,    drugs    and     drug
              paraphernalia, and cash strewn inside and outside the
              crashed vehicle.

Commonwealth v. Truver, 285 A.3d 953 (Pa.Super. 2022) (unpublished

memorandum at *1).

       The PCRA court summarized the relevant procedural history of this case

as follows:

              At a pretrial conference held April 26, 2021, the Court
              established June 2, 2021 as [Appellant’s] last day to
              enter a negotiated plea and, commensurate with his
              case tracking sheet, June 9, 2021 as his jury selection
              date. There was no plea offer on the table at the time,
              and when [District Attorney Jeffrey D. Burkett (“D.A.
____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2705, 3502(a)(1)(i), 903, 3701(a)(1)(i), 2701(a)(3), and

3921(a); 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3732.1 and 3733(a); and 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16)
and (a)(32), respectively.

                                           -2-
J-S41044-23

          Burkett”)] and [John M. Ingros, Esq. (hereinafter
          “plea counsel”)] met for a second criminal conference
          on May 19, 2021, the former again deferred, saying
          that he wanted more time to think about it. [Plea
          counsel] did not rejoin with his own proposal.
          Subsequently, with little time remaining before
          [Appellant] would have to decide whether to accept a
          plea offer or go to trial, [plea counsel] received an e-
          mail from the district attorney saying that he was
          willing to nolle prosse some of [Appellant’s] charges
          if he entered open pleas of guilty to the rest.

          As he sat in a cell at the Jefferson County Courthouse
          the morning of June 2, [Appellant] did not know where
          his case stood and was surprised when [plea counsel]
          said he only had two options: plead guilty that day or
          go to trial. An open plea, he explained, would leave
          sentencing at the Court’s discretion but would limit
          [Appellant’s] exposure since the charges would be
          fewer in number, whereas a jury trial would
          encompass all the charges and would likely feature his
          codefendant as a witness for the Commonwealth.
          Having been advised that the Court could exercise its
          discretion to run his individual sentences consecutive
          to one another, and told specifically what the
          aggregated maximum could be, he ultimately decided
          to plead guilty [on June 2, 2021].

          When it sentenced [Appellant] two weeks later, the
          Court had in its a possession a [pre-sentence
          investigation report (“PSI”)] that employed the wrong
          OGS for Count 4, criminal conspiracy/burglary. As a
          result, it errantly identified the applicable standard
          range as “42-54,” when it should have been “24-36.”
          The attendant mitigated ranged was “-12” in either
          case, and the Court, after noting that it would be
          imposing a mix of standard[] and mitigated-range
          sentences, imposed “a consecutive mitigated
          sentence of no less than two and a half nor more than
          ten years” relative to Count 4. One year longer than
          his co-defendant’s, the aggregated sentence was 19-
          58 years, which the Court deemed to be “the
          appropriate sentence” under the circumstances.

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J-S41044-23

          [Plea counsel] did not realize at the time of sentencing
          that the PSI recited the wrong OGS and guideline
          ranges for criminal conspiracy/burglary. They were,
          after all, the same numbers he had ascribed on the
          plea colloquy two weeks earlier. He thus did not raise
          contemporaneous objection at the hearing or plead
          the error in post-sentence motions.           Less than
          confident that a timely objection would have altered
          [Appellant’s] sentence, however, “one could always
          hope” was the best he was willing to offer when PCRA
          counsel asked whether he thought the Court would
          have imposed a lower minimum had he recognized
          and brought the error to its attention.

          Although the OGS error was not among his
          arguments, [plea counsel] appealed the judgment of
          sentence on the basis that the Court had abused its
          sentencing discretion. [This panel of Court ultimately
          affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on
          September 27, 2022, and Appellant did not seek
          allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court. See
          Commonwealth v. Truver, 285 A.3d 953 (Pa.Super.
          2022).] He later explained the nature of his argument
          in a letter to [Appellant] and gave his honest
          assessment that it would likely fail. Thence offering
          his client hope, however, he proceeded to suggest a
          post-appeal PCRA petition, outlining both the issue he
          thought [Appellant] should explore and the testimony
          he could provide to support it. His testimony on March
          14, 2023 was consistent with that correspondence.

          In [plea counsel’s] estimation, [Appellant’s] case was
          rushed for two reasons: the Commonwealth wanted
          to resolve his and his co-defendant's charges
          simultaneously if both were going to plead guilty,
          while the Court, on account of substantial medical and
          transport costs accruing to the county, wanted to get
          his co-defendant sentenced and out of the Jail as soon
          as possible. He believed that [D.A.] Burkett, if given
          more time, would have made an offer that
          encompassed fewer charges and/or a lesser sentence
          than the Court imposed, though. He was likewise
          confident that the district attorney would have
          “jumped at” a proposal from [Appellant] that entailed

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              a 15-year minimum and may have even assented to
              a 7½ or 10-year minimum.       [Plea counsel’s]
              confidence was misplaced.

              As he credibly testified, the district attorney never
              intended to make a term-of-years offer in this case.
              Backed by what he believed were an egregious set of
              facts and a strong case to present to a jury, he was
              certain he could prove the charges beyond a
              reasonable doubt. He also expected that the
              acceptable minimum sentence in his head would
              garner an immediate rejection. Thus, a charge-based,
              open plea was all he was ever going to offer.

              Notwithstanding his conviction that a delay would
              have benefited his client, [plea counsel] did not
              request a continuance. None was yet due for Rule 600
              purposes, he knew, and having gotten the impression
              that the Court would not sanction a delay under the
              circumstances, he did not consider asking it to
              continue [Appellant’s] last day to plea. He thus did not
              test the accuracy of his impression or preserve for
              appeal the sustainability of an adverse ruling.

PCRA court opinion, 6/1/23 at 2-3 (citations omitted).

       On November 18, 2022, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.

George L. Daghir, Esq. (“PCRA counsel”) was appointed to represent Appellant

and filed an amended PCRA petition on his behalf on January 9, 2023. The

PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on this matter on March 14,

2023. Following this hearing, the PCRA court entered an order and opinion

denying Appellant’s PCRA petition on June 1, 2023.           On June 21, 2023,

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.3

____________________________________________

3 Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

                                           -5-
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      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

            1.     Was [plea] counsel ineffective in failing to object
                   to the improper minimum sentencing guideline
                   range being listed on the [PSI] that was utilized
                   by the sentencing court at time of sentencing,
                   leading to an illegal sentence being entered,
                   when the correct standard minimum sentencing
                   guideline range for Count 4 (criminal conspiracy
                   to commit burglary) was “24-36” months and
                   not the standard range listed in the PSI as “42-
                   54” months[?]

            2.     Was [plea] counsel ineffective in failing,
                   between February 9, 2021 (date preliminary
                   hearing waived) and June 2, 2021 (date guilty
                   pleas    entered),   to   engage   with   the
                   Commonwealth in entering a more favorable
                   plea agreement and/or filing a motion
                   requesting a continuance of the June 2, 2021,
                   plea date in order to give [plea] counsel
                   sufficient time to negotiate a more favorable
                   plea agreement with the Commonwealth[?]

Appellant’s brief at 2.

      Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller,

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s

findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the

certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the

PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record

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could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d

136, 140 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

      Both of Appellant’s claims concern the purported ineffectiveness of his

plea counsel. Specifically, Appellant first argues that his plea counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the incorrect offense gravity score (“OGS”)

for criminal conspiracy to commit burglary that was listed in the PSI.

Appellant’s brief at 9-12. For the following reasons, we disagree.

      To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the PCRA,

a petitioner must establish the following three factors: “first[,] the underlying

claim has arguable merit; second, that counsel had no reasonable basis for

his   action    or   inaction;   and   third,     that   Appellant   was   prejudiced.”

Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1020 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 523 (Pa. 2014).

               [A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he
               proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his
               conviction or sentence resulted from the [i]neffective
               assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
               the    particular   case,     so    undermined        the
               truth-determining     process     that     no    reliable
               adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
               place.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation

marks    omitted;      some      brackets    in    original),   citing   42   Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9543(a)(2)(ii).

      “[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of demonstrating

ineffectiveness rests on appellant.”         Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d

                                            -7-
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1238, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 30 A.3d 487

(Pa. 2011). “If a petitioner fails to prove any of these prongs, his claim fails.”

Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 260 (Pa. 2013).

      Upon review, we find that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim fails because

he failed to satisfy the third prong of the aforementioned test; namely, that

he suffered actual prejudice as a result of plea counsel’s inaction.

      Here, as recognized by the PCRA court, Appellant presented “no credible

evidence that [the sentencing court] would have imposed a lesser minimum

[sentence] had [plea counsel] objected to the OGS error at Count 4. See

PCRA court opinion, 6/1/23 at 4. The record reflects that the sentencing court

explicitly noted during Appellant’s sentencing hearing that it considered all of

his charges separate from that of his co-defendant and combined his individual

sentences to result in an aggregate term of 19 to 58 years’ imprisonment.

Notes of testimony, 6/16/21 at 7-8, 16. The court deemed this aggregate

sentence “appropriate” given the serious nature of his crimes. Id. The record

further reflects that regardless of the incorrect OGS, Appellant was still

sentenced to 2½ to 10 years’ imprisonment for the crime criminal conspiracy

to commit burglary (Count 4), which was well within the standard range of

the Sentencing Guidelines, and a fact that Appellant acknowledges in his brief.

See id. at 12; see also Appellant’s brief at 12-13

      “In order to meet the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness standard, a

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for

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counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Commonwealth v. Reed, 42 A.3d 314, 319 (Pa.Super. 2012)

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 114 A.3d 416 (Pa. 2015). Appellant has

failed to demonstrate that he would have received a lesser sentence from the

court, but for plea counsel’s inaction. Accordingly, we find no error in the

PCRA court’s disposition of this claim.

      Appellant next argues that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to

engage with the Commonwealth to negotiate a more favorable plea deal and

for not filing a motion for continuance in order to give himself more time to

negotiate. Appellant’s brief at 13-18.

      Upon review, we find that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim fails because

he failed to establish that plea counsel had no reasonable basis for his decision

to forgo further plea negotiations. The record reveals that Jefferson County

D.A. Burkett testified at great length at the March 14, 2023 PCRA hearing,

noting his reluctance to make an “exact time offer” or reduce the charges to

the extent that Appellant’s sentence would have been less than the aggregate

19 to 58 year term-of-imprisonment imposed:

            Q.    Do you recall speaking with [plea counsel]
                  regarding this particular case?

            A.    I remember the case really well and I remember
                  [plea counsel] represented [Appellant]     But
                  there was never going to be an exact time offer
                  made on the case from my perspective and I
                  can explain why.

            Q.    Okay.

                                      -9-
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          A.   In cases where I think somebody deserve a
               really harsh sentence, a lot of times what I
               would do it I know that the numbers will shock
               them and that they would most likely not take
               the offer. I’d make a charge bargain. I’ve done
               that – I’ve done that a lot of times over the
               years.

               I’ll make a charge bargain and say I want pleas
               to this set of charges. And the reason I do that
               is, you know it gives them hope that [they] have
               something that they could talk about at
               sentencing and possibility after [the] Judge be
               more lenient on them that I would have been on
               an offer.

               But when I did that I generally thin[k] that the
               charges and the allegations really justify a really
               harsh offer.

               ....

               And the same thing happened here in this case.
               I thought we had a really good case. This was
               a really serious crime. It was a big city crime
               in my view. And you know, I thought it was
               probably drug motivated probably but that it
               was a really violent robbery, home invasion.
               You know where they – they really caused some
               pretty good injuries to the victim and then they
               took off on a really, really high speed car
               c[h]ase. . . . I thought we had a really good
               case so I made the charge bargain offer.
               Thinking slightly that the Court would see it the
               way we did and impose a pretty harsh sentence.
               But I was committed to doing it that way instead
               of making an exact offer for time.

          Q.   So, there was never going to be any other
               opportunity for [plea counsel] to negotiate or
               renegotiate? Is that correct?

                                  - 10 -
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            A.     Yeah. There was no – I’ve used that as a charge
                   bargain from the get go….

Notes of testimony, 3/14/23 at 35-38.

      Plea counsel, it turn, testified during the hearing that he elected not to

request a continuance to continue plea negotiations with the Commonwealth

“[b]because it was made clear to me – I felt that we were picking [a] jury or

we were pleading that day[,]” and that any effort to the contrary would have

been fruitless. Id. at 12.

      Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant's claim fails on the

reasonable basis prong, as it is clear plea counsel made a strategic decision

to forgo further plea negotiations. Accordingly, we find no error in the PCRA

court’s disposition of this claim.

      For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the PCRA court

properly dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition and affirm its June 1, 2023 order.

      Order affirmed.

DATE: 12/5/2023

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