Court Opinion

ID: 9765695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:14:20.979018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:14.890613
License: Public Domain

HornEy, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion, in which Prescott, C. J., and Sybert, J., concurred.
The majority, by applying a rule of construction rather than the process of interpretation in construing the last will and testament of Matilda Held, deceased, and the codicils thereto, have, in my opinion, unwittingly rewritten the testamentary disposition of a one-half interest in the home of the testatrix. To use as apt colloquialism, they have put the cart before the horse.
The interpretation of a will involves the process of ascertaining, from a reading of all the testamentary writings and, if necessary, a consideration of extrinsic evidence pertinent thereto, the meaning or intention of the testator as expressed in the will and codicils. And where, as here, an interpretation of the will as a whole fully discloses the clear intent of the testator, further inquiry is not necessary. A rule of construction, on the other hand, since it seeks to assign an intent to the words used, necessarily involves an attempt to formulate a permissible intent for the testator by the use of presumptions. This process should not be resorted to, however, unless the intention of the testator as to a particular devise or bequest is doubtful or uncertain and therefore inconclusive. Davis v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit Co., 235 Md. 266, 201 A. 2d 373 (1964); Judik v. Travers, 184 Md. 215, 40 A. 2d 306 (1944). See also Page on Wills (Bowe-Parker Rev.), § 30.3; 20 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 104.
The distinction between the two processes was set forth in Davis (at p. 269), in this way:
*451“It is axiomatic that the ascertainment of the intention of the testator is the controlling factor in construing a will. * * * If the intention can be satisfactorily ascertained from a reading of the will, further inquiry is not necessary. * * * If it cannot, the rules of construction may be invoked to ascertain the meaning or intention of the testator as expressed in the will.” (Emphasis added.)
In Judik, it was said (at p. 221), “it is only when the verbal expressions are of doubtful meaning that the rules or canons of construction may be invoked, and even these rules have no binding force, being mere guides to aid in the discovery of this all important element of intention.” (Emphasis added.)
It seems clear to me, from a reading of the will and codicils, that the testatrix never had any intention of revoking the first item of the second codicil by which she devised to her niece, Marie Veditz, “to be hers absolutely provided she survives me,” whatever interest the testatrix had at the time of her death in the property known as 411 Laurel Road in Severna Park. On the contrary, it is apparent that the execution of the second codicil was the expression of an unequivocal intention to vest the niece with a fee in the whole property upon the death of the testatrix1 and that the execution of the third codicil, instead of expressing an intention to revoke the devise, was in fact the expression of an intention to substitute Marie Veditz (an adoptive niece) for Rosa Fenner (a natural niece) as the recipient of all the personal and household effects (not otherwise specifically bequeathed) located in the home of the testatrix.
Along with numerous gifts of cash, shares of stock, jewelry and personal effects made to relatives and friends in other items of the original will (dated May 23, 1955), including a cash bequest to the adoptive niece, the testatrix, by the second item thereof bequeathed to the natural niece, all of her personal and' *452household effects except such articles as were therein specifically bequeathed to other relatives and friends.
Subsequently (on July 12, 1955), the testatrix added other specific bequests of household furnishings to the third item of the original will, bequeathed the adoptive niece all cut glass and china in the dining room and other specified household effects, and in all other respects, except as to certain modifications with respect to the bequest of the shares of stock, ratified and confirmed the provisions of the will.
Sometime thereafter (on May 8, 1958), having acquired the property which is the subject of this litigation in the meantime, the testatrix executed the second codicil. Therein she modified the second item of the will (bequeathing personal and household effects to the natural niece), by adding the sentence devising her interest in the subject property to the adoptive niece. And, after also adding a new subparagraph to the provisions of the third item of the will as modified by the first codicil (giving gifts and bequests to friends), the testatrix left her cemetery lot to the cemetery company in trust, and' then ratified and confirmed the provisions of the will as modified by the first codicil.
On August 6, 1958, the testatrix executed the third and last codicil, the relevant parts of which read as follows:
“I, Matilda Held, * * * do hereby make, publish and' declare this to be a Third Codicil to my Last Will and Testament executed on May 23, 1955, a First Codicil thereto executed on July 12, 1955, and a Second Codicil thereto executed on May 8, 1958.
First: I revoke Item Second of my Last Will and Testament and substitute in place thereof the following:
T give and bequeath unto my niece, Marie Veditz, all of my furniture, silverware, china, jewelry, linens and other personal and household effects located in my home, * * * with the exception of those articles specifically described and bequeathed' in my Last Will and Testament or Codicil thereto, to be hers absolutely.’
Second: Item Third, sub-paragraph (a) of my Last *453Will and Testament is hereby modified to read as follows :
‘(a) Unto Henry Wright, * * * the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) to be his absolutely, provided that he survives me, in appreciation of his kindness.’
Finally: In all other respects, I do hereby ratify and confirm the provisions of my said East Will and Testament executed on May 23, 1955, as modified by the First Codicil thereto executed on July 12, 1955, the Second Codicil executed on May 8, 1958, and by this Codicil.
Signed, Sealed, Published and Declared by the above-named Testatrix, Matilda Held, as and for a Third Codicil to her Last Will and Testament executed on May 23, 1955, in the presence of [John H. Somerville and James P. Walsh], who, at her request, in her presence, and in the presence of each other, have hereunto subscribed our names as witness thereto.”
John H. Somerville, Esq., prepared the codicil in the absence of the attorney who had prepared the original will and the first and second codicils. Until the day on which the third codicil was executed he knew nothing about the contents of the previous testamentary writings. Although he was not certain, his recollection of the circumstances led him to believe that he must have had knowledge of the contents of the second codicil (devising the interest of the testatrix in the subject property to1 the adoptive niece) at that time. He also recalled that the testatrix related to him the changes she wanted made in her last will and testament and that he dictated the third codicil to a secretary in the presence of the testatrix. It is not disputed that the testatrix knew exactly what she wanted to do and it is conceded that the draftsman was a capable and experienced attorney.
While the testatrix, by the first item of the third codicil, revoked the second item of her last will and testament (bequeathing her personal and household effects to the natural niece) and *454substituted the adoptive niece as the donee of such personal and household effects, she did not in terms revoke the first item of the second codicil by which her interest in the subject property had been devised to the adoptive niece.
That neither the testatrix nor the attorney had the devise in mind when the third codicil was drafted and1 executed is apparent from the words used to effectuate the substitution of one niece for the other as donee of the personal and household effects and the absence of words to bring about the revocation of the devise of the only real property the testatrix had. That the testatrix had no intention of revoking the devise is clearly demonstrated by the significant fact that the testatrix, in revoking the bequest of certain personal and household effects to the natural niece and, in substituting the adoptive niece in place thereof as the donee of such personal and household effects, carefully excepted the articles specifically described and bequeathed to others in the last will and testament or the codicils thereto, but made no mention of the interest of the testatrix in the real property devised to the adoptive niece by the second codicil; and then, besides ratifying and confirming the provisions of the last will and testament as modified by the first and third codicils, also ratified and confirmed' the second codicil without excepting the devise of her interest in the real property to the adoptive niece.
It is also important to observe that the testatrix did not consistently use the words “last will and testament” as meaning both the original will and a codicil or codicils. On the one hand, the reference to the last will and testament in the publishing clause, the ratification clause and the attestation clause of the third codicil was to the testamentary writing executed May 23, 1955 only. On the other hand, the testatrix referred to the same testamentary writing in the first item of the third codicil (substituting the adoptive niece for the natural niece as the donee of the personal and household effects) without any mention of the fact that the second item of the last will and testament had been enlarged by the first item of the second codicil (devising the interest of the testatrix in her home to the adoptive niece). Likewise, in the second item of the third codicil, the testatrix modified subparagraph (a) of the third item of the last will and *455testament by increasing a bequest to a friend without referring to the fact that the last will and testament had been previously modified in both the first and second codicils, when in the second codicil, executed less than three months before, the testatrix, in modifying the last will and testatment, stated that the third item of the original will had been modified by the first codicil. Moreover, if the testatrix had actually changed her mind with respect to the disposition of her interest in the only real property she owned, it is not likely that her capable and experienced scrivener would have overlooked providing for the specific disposition of the one-half interest instead of using the words he did to express the intention of the testatrix, which at most permit only an inference that the words “last will and testament” were meant to include the devise made by the second codicil.
In addition to these manifestations of intention gathered from the four corners of the will as a whole, the provisions thereof clearly indicate a progressive intention to prefer the adoptive niece in some respects over the relatives and friends rather than an intention to take away anything that had been previously given to her. Not to the point of depriving the natural niece and the grandnephews of the bulk of the estate which she wanted them to have, in order to provide for the adoptive niece, but certainly to the extent of providing the latter a furnished home in which to live, if she wanted to, after the death of the testatrix. By the original will, the testatrix, other than providing that her executors were to consult the adoptive niece with respect to the funeral arrangements, bequeathed her only $500. By the first codicil, the testatrix bequeathed the adoptive niece all cut glass and china and certain other specified household effects. By the second codicil, the testatrix not only devised the one-half interest in the home that she had retained when she granted the adoptive niece the other one-half interest in fee, but, in bequeathing the cemetery lot in trust, further provided that no interments, other than those of herself and the adoptive niece, should be permitted therein. And, by the third codicil, the testatrix bequeathed to the adoptive niece all of the personal and household effects she had previously bequeathed to her natural niece by the second item of the will. Moreover, *456the record further shows that sometime before her death, apparently during her last illness, the testatrix had given her adoptive niece a power of attorney.
In my opinion, the manifestations of intention expressed in the testamentary writings, coupled with the evident intention of the testatrix to prefer the adoptive niece in a manner somewhat different from other beneficiaries, was more than enough to so interpret the will and codicils as to preclude a finding that the testatrix intended to revoke the devise of her interest in the home to the adoptive niece. On this point, the will as a whole is as susceptible of an interpretation that the devise was not revoked as it was that there was a revocation of it. Moreover, there was no reason why the second and third codicils should not have been reconciled, as would be done with a will and a codicil, where, as here, the two codicils are not inconsistent and the subsequently executed one does not expressly revoke the first. See Wiesenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 170 Md. 63, 183 Atl. 250 (1936); Thomas v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 73 Md. 451, 21 Atl. 367 (1891). If the intent of the testatrix was free from doubt (as it seems to me it was), the devise should be given effect, and if there was doubt as to the intent, extrinsic evidence was admissible to clarify the intention. Shellady, Inc. v. Herlihy, 236 Md. 461, 204 A. 2d 504 (1964); Lee v. Estate of Davis, 226 Md. 416, 174 A. 2d 79 (1961).
The suggestion at the outset of this dissent that the majority had stated their theory of the effect of the words used by the testatrix to cancel a bequest of personal property rather than her motive or reason for limiting the language she used for that purpose, was based, of course, on my belief that what the majority did, in spite of their disclaimer that a doubt existed as to the meaning of the revocatory words, was to invoke a rule of construction instead of first interpreting the will (with or without resorting to extrinsic evidence) in contravention of the holdings of Davis (235 Md.) and lucHk (184 Md.), both supra. The majority by the expedient of declaring that the use of the words “last will and testament” in the first item of the third codicil expressly revoked the second item of the will as enlarged by the first item of the second codicil; that there was no doubt as to the meaning of the revocation; and that any other con*457elusion would be contrary to the established principles of testamentary construction, held that the “intention of the testatrix was expressed in apt and certain terms.” No authority was cited for the propositions of law assumed by them and none has been found by me. While it was said in Syfer v. Dolby, 182 Md. 139, 32 A. 2d 529 (1943),2 that the word “will” in the statute comprehends a codicil and that a second codicil which is so inconsistent with the first one that the two could not stand together would be tantamount to an express revocation of the first, it was also said that a subsequent codicil does not revoke a prior codicil in the absence of an express revocation to that effect.
Furthermore, the general rule is that the revocation of a clear devise (as was the case here) requires an intention to revoke as clear as the devise. Miller, Construction of Wills, § 62. And see Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Pinckney, 55 Md. 365 (1881). It is also important to observe that words having a particular legal sense (such as “revoke”) should be given a meaning commensurate with the context in which they are used when, as here, the technical import of such words might defeat the manifest intention of the testatrix. Albert v. Albert, 68 Md. 352, 12 Atl. 11 (1888).
If the meaning of the revocation is ambiguous or otherwise doubtful (as the majority necessarily had to presume in order to invoke the rule of construction they applied in reaching their decision), then the proffered extrinsic testimony should have been considered in order to determine whether or not the testatrix intended to revoke the devise. Had this been done, there would be little room for doubt as to the intention of the testatrix.
The decree in my opinion should be reversed. Prescott, C. J., and SyberT, J., concur.

. Shortly after acquiring the property the testatrix caused the execution of strawman deeds by which she retained a one-half interest in fee and vested the other one-half interest in herself for life with remainder to her niece in fee subject to certain powers which were never exercised.

. See also Code (1964 Cum. Supp.), Art. 93, § 351.