Court Opinion

ID: 9927535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-28 19:54:33.228823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:16.949394
License: Public Domain

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                          Reporter of Decisions
Decision:  2023 ME 70
Docket:    Ken-23-21
Argued:    September 13, 2023
Decided:   November 9, 2023

Panel:        STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

                                  STATE OF MAINE

                                            v.

                                  JARAE LIPSCOMBE

HORTON, J.

         [¶1] Jarae Lipscombe appeals from a judgment of conviction of hindering

apprehension or prosecution (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 753(1-B)(B)(1) (2023),

entered by the trial court (Kennebec County, Stokes, J.) after a jury trial. He

argues that (A) the court committed obvious error in allowing prosecutorial

argument about the lack of evidence of certain witnesses’ motives to lie and in

instructing jurors that they could consider whether there was evidence that a

witness had a motive to lie, and (B) the court abused its discretion in denying

Lipscombe’s motion to voir dire the jurors after learning that one witness said,

“[G]ood luck,” to the jurors while leaving the courtroom. We affirm the

judgment.
2

                              I. BACKGROUND

      [¶2] On October 5, 2021, the State of Maine charged Lipscombe by

complaint with hindering apprehension or prosecution (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.

§ 753(1-B)(B)(1), based on allegations that he used deception to prevent or

delay the discovery or apprehension of his brother in connection with the

killing of a man in Waterville. A grand jury indicted him on that charge on

February 24, 2022.

      [¶3] After Lipscombe pleaded not guilty, the court held a jury trial on

October 31 and November 1 and 2, 2022. The State offered evidence that on

June 6, 2020, Lipscombe had given the police a false description of a person

running out of an apartment where a man had been shot and killed. There was

also testimony that when Lipscombe gave the description, he knew that the

police investigating the crime were seeking that person.       Two witnesses

authenticated, and the State played, video footage from security cameras in the

vicinity of the crime shortly after it occurred showing a man who looked like

Lipscombe’s brother and did not fit the description Lipscombe had given. An

officer testified that he had encountered a man who was in the vicinity of the

crime but did not detain him because he did not match the description that
                                                                                3

Lipscombe had provided. That man did match the later-obtained description

of Lipscombe’s brother.

      [¶4]   Another witness testified that a man he later learned was

Lipscombe’s brother approached him in the same vicinity, gave a false name,

asked to use his phone for an emergency, and rode off in a vehicle with someone

who had come to get him. A friend of Lipscombe’s then testified that at

Lipscombe’s request, he had picked up Lipscombe’s brother and allowed the

brother to stay with him overnight on the night of June 6, 2020. The State’s final

witness testified that Lipscombe had told her that his brother had shot a person

and that Lipscombe had given the police a false description of the man who had

fled the scene of the shooting.

      [¶5] After the State rested, Lipscombe unsuccessfully moved for a

judgment of acquittal and presented no evidence. During the State’s closing

argument, the prosecutor argued as follows:

             So, the Court is going to give you some suggestions about
      how you can evaluate different witnesses that you heard testify.
      You can consider all or none of them, that will be part of the jury
      instructions, but when it comes to [the witness who allowed
      Lipscombe’s brother to use his phone] you might consider this.
      Whether a witness, or whether there has been any evidence to
      suggest that a witness had motive, or lack of motive to exaggerate
      or lie. There is no such evidence for [this witness]. He is a true
      interloper in these events, just like [the witnesses who
      authenticated the video footage], he had no possible motive to try
4

      to deceive you here, but [Lipscombe’s brother] never would have
      made it past Columbia Road if [Lipscombe] hadn’t misdescribed
      him delaying his apprehension.

Lipscombe raised no objection. The court later instructed the jury about how

to consider witnesses’ credibility:

             You may consider whether the witnesses[’] testimony was
      corroborated, which means supported, or contradicted by other
      testimony or by the exhibits. You may consider how well each
      witness has remembered what took place during the time periods
      in question. You may consider whether a witness had a good
      opportunity to make the observations he or she says were made.
      You may consider whether a witness appeared to be biased in favor
      of or against the State or the defendant. You may consider whether
      there has been any evidence introduced of any motive or lack of
      motive for a witness to exaggerate or lie.

(Emphasis added.) Lipscombe again raised no objection. The court also

instructed, “The law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the

burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence

whatsoever. . . . [T]he burden of proof in this case is entirely on the State. The

defendant does not have to prove anything. . . . Throughout the trial the

defendant is favored with a presumption of innocence . . . .”

      [¶6]   The jury returned a verdict finding Lipscombe guilty.          After

discharging the jury, the court went to the jury room, in keeping with its usual

practice, to thank the jurors off the record for their service and to accept

questions and feedback about the trial. While speaking with jurors, the court
                                                                               5

learned that several jurors had heard one of the State’s witnesses—the friend

of Lipscombe who had sheltered Lipscombe’s brother on the night of the

killing—mutter, “[G]ood luck,” after his testimony as he was leaving the witness

stand. The court promptly met with counsel in chambers on the record and

disclosed what it had learned, indicating that the foreperson had said, “[I]t was

insubstantial to us, so that’s why I didn’t mention anything.”        The court

indicated that “not everyone heard it, pretty much the foreperson, the person

next to him, I think maybe the one next to her, the first three in the row there,

he muttered something under his breath, they thought it was good luck.” When

asked by defense counsel, the court confirmed that the jurors “thought it was

being directed at them.” The court said, “I know who [the jurors] are, we have

the list of jurors if we ever—if there is anything you wanted to pursue.” Defense

counsel said he would “need to think about it,” and when the court replied, “I

don’t know what that means, frankly,” counsel said, “I can’t imagine the voir

dire would go anywhere.”

      [¶7] Three days later, Lipscombe filed a motion to voir dire the jurors to

“determine the impact of this comment on [the jury’s] verdict and

deliberations.” He filed an additional motion on December 14, 2022, seeking to

“determine the impact” of the witness’s comment. He argued that the statement
6

was extraneous information that would be prejudicial to the extent that the jury

considered it in its deliberations. The State then moved to preclude juror

testimony under Rule 606(b) of the Maine Rules of Evidence on the ground that

the in-court utterance did not convey “information” within the meaning of the

rule’s narrow exception and that the jurors had merely observed a witness in

court.

         [¶8] Before Lipscombe’s sentencing hearing on January 12, 2023, the

court announced its ruling on Lipscombe’s two motions and the motion filed by

the State. The court denied Lipscombe’s motion for voir dire of the jurors and

granted the State’s motion to preclude juror testimony. The court reasoned

that it would not speculate what muttering “good luck” meant, and determined

that the witness did not, through his comment, convey extraneous, prejudicial

information to the jurors.

         [¶9] The court then held the sentencing hearing and entered a judgment

sentencing Lipscombe to five years in prison, with all but three years

suspended and with three years of probation. The order also made him

responsible for paying thirty-five dollars to the Victims’ Compensation Fund.

Lipscombe timely appealed. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2023); M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).
                                                                                    7

                                  II. DISCUSSION

      [¶10]    Lipscombe challenges (A) the court’s inaction regarding the

prosecutor’s argument and its jury instructions about witnesses’ motives to lie,

and (B) the court’s denial of Lipscombe’s motion to voir dire the jurors after

they delivered their verdict. We consider each of his arguments in turn.

A.    Closing Argument and Jury Instruction Regarding Evidence of a
      Motive to Lie

      [¶11] Lipscombe argues that the court committed obvious error in

allowing a closing argument that implied that Lipscombe had a burden of

proving that the State’s witnesses had a motive to lie and delivering jury

instructions that made the same implication.            As Lipscombe recognizes,

because Lipscombe did not object to the prosecutor’s argument or the court’s

instruction during trial, we review for obvious error. See State v. Warner, 2023

ME 55, ¶ 13, 301 A.3d 763; M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b). “To show obvious error, there

must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). “[E]ven if those three conditions are met, we will

set aside a jury’s verdict only if we conclude that (4) the error seriously affects

the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). A statement that does not prompt an objection will

rarely be found to have affected substantial rights because there is seldom, in
8

such circumstances, “a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of

the proceeding.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

      1.      Prosecutorial Error

      [¶12]    We refer to “prosecutorial error” rather than “prosecutorial

misconduct” because our “review focuses not on the prosecutor’s subjective

intent but on the due process rights of the defendant.” State v. White, 2022 ME

54, ¶ 19 & n.9, 285 A.3d 262. To decide whether a judgment should be vacated

due to prosecutorial error, we first determine “whether error occurred, and, if

there was error, we will then review the State’s comments as a whole,

examining the incidents of error both alone and cumulatively.” Warner, 2023

ME 55, ¶ 14, 301 A.3d 763 (quotation marks omitted).

      [¶13] Although a prosecutor may “forcefully argue to the jury that the

evidence does not support or is not consistent with the defendant’s theory of

the case,” State v. Cheney, 2012 ME 119, ¶ 35, 55 A.3d 473, “[s]hifting the burden

of proof to the defendant or suggesting that the defendant must present

evidence in a criminal trial is improper closing argument,” Warner, 2023 ME

55, ¶ 14, 301 A.3d 763 (quotation marks omitted).

      [¶14] Contrary to Lipscombe’s contention, a prosecutor’s reference to

the lack or absence of evidence of a motive for a witness to testify falsely does
                                                                                    9

not inherently imply that the defendant has a duty or obligation to present

evidence of motive. See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 2023 ME 35, ¶¶ 23-25, 295 A.3d

1227. Moreover, the court’s instructions that the State has the burden of proof

and the defendant is not required to present any evidence to negate any such

implication. See Warner, 2023 ME 55, ¶ 17, 301 A.3d 763. Accordingly, like

other courts, we do not consider a prosecutor’s comment on the lack of

evidence of a witness’s motive to lie to be error. See, e.g., United States v. Gracia,

522 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2008) (“A prosecutor may argue fair inferences from

the evidence that a witness has no motive to lie . . . .”); State v. Burton, 778 A.2d

955, 967 (Conn. 2001) (“[T]he state may properly argue that the witnesses had

no apparent motive to lie.”); cf. United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 540

(9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he argument that witnesses had no motive to lie is a

permissible response to . . . attacks on the witnesses’[] credibility.”).

      [¶15] We have held that there was no prosecutorial error when the

prosecutor asked, “What motive would there possibly be for [the victim] to

recite to you anything other than what actually happened to her?” Cummings,

2023 ME 35, ¶¶ 23-25, 295 A.3d 1227 (quotation marks omitted). We held that

the prosecutor could argue that the witness “did not testify to anything that

suggested a motive for her to lie.” Id. ¶ 25. On the other hand, in Cheney, we
10

held that it was improper for the prosecutor in closing argument to say that the

defendant “d[id]n’t have any evidence” to support his theory and that “they

desperately want you to believe that somebody else hit [the victim] . . . . Yet,

they have no evidence of it.” 2012 ME 119, ¶¶ 16-17, 35, 55 A.3d 473

(quotation marks omitted). The statements in Cheney specifically linked the

lack of evidence to the defendant and therefore violated the requirement “that

the State avoid making any statement suggesting that a criminal defendant has

any burden to disprove the charges against him or her.” Id. ¶ 35.

      [¶16] The prosecutor’s argument here was similar to that in Cummings.

The State elicited evidence that certain witnesses did not know anything about

Lipscombe’s brother before the events at issue but that they either encountered

a man meeting his description on the day of the murder or had cameras that

recorded footage of a man meeting his description near the scene.           The

prosecutor did not err in arguing that there was no evidence that these

witnesses had a motive to lie, and the court did not commit obvious error in

allowing that argument.

      2.    Jury Instructions on Witness Credibility

      [¶17] Similarly, the court did not commit obvious error in instructing the

jury that it could “consider whether there has been any evidence introduced of
                                                                            11

any motive or lack of motive for a witness to exaggerate or lie.” We considered

this very issue in Warner and concluded that there was no obvious error in the

court’s delivery of the challenged instruction when it was delivered along with

instructions that the State had the burden of proof, the defendant was

presumed innocent, and the defendant did not have to prove anything or

present any evidence. 2023 ME 55, ¶¶ 18-21, 301 A.3d 763. We reach the same

conclusion here.

B.    Denial of Motion for Voir Dire of Jurors

      [¶18] Lipscombe argues that voir dire was necessary to ensure that the

off-the-record statement made to jurors by Lipscombe’s friend as he was

leaving the witness stand did not undermine the jurors’ impartiality.

Lipscombe further contends that the court improperly gathered information

from jurors outside his presence and relied on juror representations not made

under oath about how the comment, “good luck,” affected them without

allowing Lipscombe to voir dire the jurors. As a remedy, he seeks a remand for

an evidentiary hearing. He contends that he preserved the claim of error by

indicating that he would “think about it” and then moving to allow post-verdict

voir dire.
12

         [¶19] We agree that Lipscombe preserved his argument by indicating

that he would have to consider what the judge had told him and then filing a

post-verdict motion, and we therefore review for an abuse of discretion the trial

court’s denial of Lipscombe’s request for post-verdict voir dire.1 See State v.

St. Pierre, 1997 ME 107, ¶ 10, 693 A.2d 1137.

         [¶20] We have long adhered to “the general rule . . . that the testimony of

a juror is not available to impeach a verdict in which [that juror] participated.”

Patterson v. Rossignol, 245 A.2d 852, 856 (Me. 1968). This rule—now codified

in Maine Rule of Evidence 606(b)—is grounded in policy considerations that

include

         (1) the need for stability of verdicts; (2) the need to conclude
         litigation and desire to prevent any prolongation thereof; (3) the
         need to protect jurors in their communications to fellow jurors
         made in the confidence of secrecy of the jury room; (4) the need to
         save jurors harmless from tampering and harassment by
         disappointed litigants; [and] (5) the need to foreclose jurors from
         abetting the setting aside of verdicts to which they may have
         agreed reluctantly in the first place or about which they may in the
         light of subsequent developments have doubts or a change of
         attitude.

State v. Leon, 2018 ME 70, ¶ 8, 186 A.3d 129 (quotation marks omitted).

     Although the exception based on outside influence, M.R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(B), was not explicitly
     1

argued in the written motions before the trial court, the court referenced the exception in its ruling,
and Lipscombe challenges that ruling on appeal.
                                                                                                 13

       [¶21] As it pertains here, Rule 606(b) of the Maine Rules of Evidence

provides that “[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a

juror may not testify about . . . [t]he effect of anything on that juror’s or another

juror’s vote; or [a]ny juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or

indictment.” M.R. Evid. 606(b)(1)(B), (C). There are two exceptions to this rule;

these exceptions permit a juror to “testify about whether . . . (A) Extraneous

prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; or

(B) An outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.”

M.R. Evid. 606(b)(2).         These provisions are “substantially similar” to the

corresponding federal rule, Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). M.R. Evid. 606 Maine Restyling

Note [November 2014].2 The federal rule included the exceptions to allow

jurors “to testify as to matters other than their own inner reactions” because

testimony about what happened—as opposed to jurors’ internal thought

processes—would “involve[] no particular hazard to the values sought to be

protected” by Rule 606. Fed. R. Evid. 606 advisory committee notes to 1972

proposed rules.

   2 The Maine rule further narrows the circumstances in which a juror may be called as a witness
because Maine has not adopted the federal “exception . . . for testimony about a mistake in entering
the verdict on a verdict form.” M.R. Evid. 606 Maine Restyling Note [November 2014].
14

      [¶22] As we have stated, Rule 606 embodies the law’s strong disfavor for

“inquiry into the deliberations of juries.” State v. Watts, 2006 ME 109, ¶ 15, 907

A.2d 147. “Courts should inquire into the validity of a jury verdict only in very

limited circumstances and should be very cautious in overturning jury

verdicts.” Id. ¶ 17 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Only in the most

extraordinary circumstances would a court inquire of a juror regarding

deliberations.” State v. Robinson, 2019 ME 46, ¶ 7 n.4, 205 A.3d 893.

      [¶23] Such voir dire would be allowed only as an exception to the general

prohibition against a juror testifying about “[t]he effect of anything on that

juror’s or another juror’s vote” or the “juror’s mental processes concerning the

verdict or indictment.” M.R. Evid. 606(b)(1)(B), (C). Exceptions to the rule

against inquiring into a jury’s deliberations are narrowly drawn, for instance to

allow inquiry into “serious allegations of juror bias in the context of juror

dishonesty or inaccuracy in answering a voir dire questionnaire.” Ma v. Bryan,

2010 ME 55, ¶ 9, 997 A.2d 755 (quotation marks omitted); see Watts, 2006 ME

109, ¶ 17, 907 A.2d 147; see also State v. Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶¶ 43-47, 211 A.3d

205 (identifying the importance of the exceptions to safeguard “[t]he Maine and

federal constitutions[’] guarantee that criminal defendants shall have the right

to an impartial jury trial”).
                                                                                15

      [¶24] If the court engages in voir dire of the jury, the purpose is

objective—to determine whether the jury was presented with improper

extraneous prejudicial information or an improper outside influence—to

enable the court to determine whether the probability of a prejudicial effect is

sufficient to warrant setting aside the verdict. See M.R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(A)-(B).

The purpose is not to probe the actual, subjective effect of the extraneous

information or outside influence on jurors; “[t]he judge is limited to deciding

the probability of a prejudicial effect” because Rule 606 “prohibits inquiry in the

actual effect of . . . irregularities on the minds of the jurors.” Field & Murray,

Maine Evidence § 606.2 at 279 (6th ed. 2007) (emphasis added); see M.R. Evid.

606(b)(1)(B), (C).

      [¶25] If “[t]he record is entirely devoid of any indication that the jury

reached its verdict on any improper basis” and there are no “verifiable external

manifestations of such impropriety, we must accept the verdict as is.” Ma, 2010

ME 55, ¶ 10, 997 A.2d 755 (quotation marks omitted). We will generally accept

the verdict when

      (1) there is no evidence in the record of any juror bias, prejudice,
      or misconduct; (2) there is no evidence to support a suggestion that
      the jurors failed to follow the law; and (3) the trial court, which saw
      the witnesses at the same time and place as the jurors, concluded
      that the verdict was supportable.
16

Id. ¶ 11.

      [¶26]    Lipscombe argues in his brief that the court violated Rule

606(b)(1)(B) and (C) by “receiving a juror’s testimony about ‘[t]he effect of

anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote’ or ‘[a]ny juror’s mental

processes concerning the verdict . . . .’” We reject that contention outright—the

record makes it clear that there was no juror “testimony” and that a juror

volunteered the information when the court was thanking jurors for their

service. Thus, the court did not improperly inquire “into the validity of a verdict

or indictment” in violation of Rule 606(b)(1).         The court instead acted

appropriately by sharing the unsolicited disclosure with counsel immediately

after receiving it.

      [¶27] Lipscombe’s contention that the court should have conducted an

evidentiary hearing after the disclosure calls for a more nuanced analysis. He

makes an argument under Rule 606 that the “good luck” comment was

“[e]xtraneous prejudicial information,” an improper “outside influence,” or

both. M.R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(A), (B).

      [¶28] His primary argument, however, is that the comment generated a

“colorable or plausible claim of juror partiality” that the court had an absolute

duty to investigate. Federal precedent holds that a defendant need only present
                                                                                17

a “colorable or plausible claim” to trigger the trial court’s “unflagging duty” to

investigate.   United States v. French, 904 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 2018)

(quotation marks omitted). Even after a colorable or plausible claim has been

presented, however, “[t]he type of investigation the [trial] court chooses to

conduct is within the [trial] court’s discretion; it may hold a formal evidentiary

hearing, but depending on the circumstances, such a hearing may not be

required.” Id. “[T]he procedures used to investigate allegations of juror

misconduct and the decision as to whether to hold an evidentiary hearing are

matters which rest solely within the sound discretion of the [trial] court.”

United States v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046, 1058 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks

omitted). A trial court has “wide latitude in choosing appropriate means of

investigating claims of juror bias,” and the court should consider as a factor “the

strength and seriousness of the allegations.” United States v. Gibson, 353 F.3d

21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted) (holding that there was “no

basis on which to second-guess the decision that observing the juror, rather

than interrogating her, was an appropriate way to investigate [a]

generalized . . . claim of bias” arising from the defendant’s opinion about a

juror’s facial expressions). Thus, we will review the two exceptions at issue to

determine whether there is, under either, a colorable claim that the “good luck”
18

comment deprived Lipscombe of an unbiased jury and whether the court

abused its discretion in denying Lipscombe’s request to voir dire the jurors.

         1.      Exception for Extraneous Prejudicial Information

         [¶29]    “A juror may testify about whether [e]xtraneous prejudicial

information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention.”                            M.R. Evid.

606(b)(2)(A). “When a defendant demonstrates that a juror was subjected to

extraneous information and that the information is sufficiently related to the

issues presented at trial, a presumption of prejudice is established, and the

burden of proof shifts to the State to demonstrate by clear and convincing

evidence that the information did not cause prejudice to the defendant.” State

v. Coburn, 1999 ME 28, ¶ 7, 724 A.2d 1239. Information is extraneous if it is

“information introduced to the jury from outside the normal deliberative

process.”3 State v. Fuller, 660 A.2d 915, 917 (Me. 1994) (quotation marks

omitted). “[T]o raise a presumption of prejudice to impose a burden of proof

on the State, the extraneous information communicated to the juror must relate

to the law or facts of the case.” Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶ 47, 211 A.3d 205

(alteration and quotation marks omitted).

     3 “Information communicated among jurors during the deliberation process, however, is not
considered to be extraneous, and may not be inquired into even if the information is improper. “ State
v. Fuller, 660 A.2d 915, 918 (Me. 1994).
                                                                                19

      [¶30] The exception for extraneous prejudicial information was crafted

in response to events such as

      the introduction into the jury room by a juror of a pamphlet
      containing the evidence given at a former trial; an independent
      probe by a juror of a defective road condition; a personal
      examination by a juror of a party’s wool shop in relation to its
      location as to a stream and the possible pollution of the waters
      thereof; the secret investigation by a juror culminating in a private
      view of a cow and calf for purposes of comparison; [and] the use in
      the jury room of a book on principles of real estate appraising
      brought in by a juror.

Patterson, 245 A.2d at 856 (citations omitted); see also Coburn, 1999 ME 28,

¶ 16, 724 A.2d 1239 (holding that the presumption of prejudice had not been

rebutted when a juror “went to an intersection and gathered additional facts

about the scene of the events” at issue in the case and then shared the

information with other jurors).

      [¶31] Here, the witness’s comment was made in open court, but it was

extraneous in that it was not noticed by the court or counsel and was therefore

outside the ordinary trial process. See Gov’t of V.I. v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 138

(3d Cir. 1987) (“A criminal defendant is entitled to a determination of his or her

guilt by an unbiased jury based solely upon evidence properly admitted against

him or her in court.”); Fuller, 660 A.2d at 917-18. However, the comment did

not convey any information about the facts or law at issue in the case. See Scott,
20

2019 ME 105, ¶ 47, 211 A.3d 205; see also St. Pierre, 1997 ME 107, ¶¶ 11, 14,

693 A.2d 1137 (affirming a judgment of conviction where “the record

reveal[ed] no evidence that any extraneous information reached the jury”

(emphasis added)); cf. People v. Rodriguez, No. A128678, 2012 WL 4815082, at

*5-7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2012) (holding that further inquiry of jurors was not

required when one juror had expressed concerns about seeing a co-defendant

glare at and mouth words to a witness, but the juror said she had not discussed

the matter with other jurors).

      [¶32] Here, even though the court considered the witness’s comment not

to be extraneous, it still determined that the statement did not convey any

information that would prejudice the jurors. Moreover, what the court heard

during its meeting with jurors was sufficient to inform the court of what the

witness said, making further inquiry into the content of the communication

unnecessary, and there was no “colorable or plausible claim” that the comment

contained extraneous information resulting in juror bias or other serious

prejudice to Lipscombe. French, 904 F.3d at 117 (quotation marks omitted);

see Gibson, 353 F.3d at 26; Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶ 47, 211 A.3d 205. Voir dire

would have not served any further purpose in any case, given that the only

remaining questions were ones that the court could not ask: what subjective
                                                                                21

reaction the comment produced in the jurors who heard it and whether it

affected their mental processes in deliberations. See M.R. Evid. 606(b)(1)(B),

(C); Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 606.2 at 279. See also Wilson v. Vt.

Castings, Inc., 170 F.3d 391, 394 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The scope of the court’s inquiry

under Rule 606(b) is limited: the court may inquire only into the existence of

the extraneous information. Once the existence of extraneous information has

been established, the court may not inquire into the subjective effect of such

information on the particular jurors.”).

      2.    Exception for Improper Outside Influence

      [¶33] “A juror may testify about whether . . . [a]n outside influence was

improperly brought to bear on any juror.” M.R. Evid. 606(b)(2)(B). Unlike the

Rule 606(b)(2)(A) exception for extraneous prejudicial information, an outside

influence need not incorporate information about the facts or law involved in

the case. A threat that contains no information about the case but that is

intended to intimidate jurors can constitute improper outside influence, for

example. See United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 245 (5th Cir. 1998) (“An

‘outside influence’ refers to a factor originating outside of normal courtroom

proceedings which influences jury deliberations, such as . . . a threat against a

juror.”), aff’d, 527 U.S. 373 (1999). Contact between a witness and a juror
22

outside the courtroom may also involve improper outside influence.

See 3 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 6:19

(4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2023).

         [¶34] Although the comment at issue occurred inside the courtroom, it

can be likened to contact outside the courtroom because the comment did not

come to the attention of the court or the parties until after the verdict. “‘In a

criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or

indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury

is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in

pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of

the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties.’” Scott, 2019

ME 105, ¶ 45, 211 A.3d 205 (quoting Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229

(1954)). “‘The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily

upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant,

that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.’”4 Id. (quoting

Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229). To determine whether such contact is harmless, the

     4 As we acknowledged in State v. Scott, “‘[t]he continuing validity of the presumption of prejudice

standard articulated in Remmer, placing a special burden of persuasion on the prosecution, has been
subject to question for some time.’” 2019 ME 105, ¶ 46, 211 A.3d 205 (quoting State v. Cheney, 2012
ME 119, ¶ 27, 55 A.3d 473, and citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-16 (1982) (addressing the
opportunity to prove actual juror bias)). Because we conclude in this case that no hearing was
required, we do not opine on the parties’ respective burdens if a hearing were held.
                                                                                23

court must ascertain the content of the contact. See id. ¶ 49 (affirming the

denial of a motion to voir dire a juror when the “misconduct had already come

to light and was not shown to have affected the jury’s verdict”).

      [¶35] Applying these standards, a federal court held—before the Rules

of Evidence were in place—that a reported conversation between a witness and

a juror did create a presumption of prejudice when the trial court had not

inquired to determine the nature and content of that conversation. Richardson

v. United States, 360 F.2d 366, 368-69 (5th Cir. 1966). As with extraneous

prejudicial information, once the court has determined what occurred, the

court’s determination of whether juror contact amounts to an improper outside

influence is objective. See Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139, 1142–43 (Colo. 1987)

(adopting an “objective test of whether there is a reasonable possibility that

extraneous information or influence affected the verdict,” consistent with the

purposes of Rule 606(b) to protect juror privacy and “enhance the stability of

jury verdicts”). Rather than probing the jury’s subjective thoughts and feelings,

the court “evaluat[es] the contact in light of logic and experience, and the likely

reaction of a typical or reasonable juror.” 3 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal

Evidence § 6:19.
24

      [¶36] In Scott, we held that no presumption of prejudice arose when a

juror made comments to a family member of the accused and to a court officer

“alluding to hoping to make the right decision, praying to make the right

decision, et cetera,” and acknowledging “the difficulty that the circumstances

may have with various family members.” 2019 ME 105, ¶¶ 41, 48, 211 A.3d

205 (quotation marks omitted); cf. State v. Allard, 557 A.2d 960, 961-62

(Me. 1989) (affirming the denial of a motion for a mistrial when the court’s

questioning of a juror in chambers revealed that “contact between the [witness]

and the juror was brief and not concerned with the substance of the case”).

      [¶37] Here, the court had no need to voir dire the jury to learn of the

content of the communication—“good luck”—and nothing in the record

suggests that the comment exerted any improper influence, or threatened the

jurors. The inquiry that Lipscombe requests would probe the jurors’ “mental

processes concerning the verdict”—the very thing that Rule 606 prohibits.

M.R. Evid. 606(b)(1)(C); cf. 3 Mueller & Kirkpatrick § 6:19 (“While juror

testimony or statements can prove external contacts and can describe their

nature, such evidence cannot be used to prove their effect . . . .”). Based on the

objectively innocuous nature of the comment, Lipscombe has no “colorable”

claim that the words “good luck” amounted to juror tampering or improper
                                                                                 25

influence that required voir dire examination of the jurors. See French, 904 F.3d

at 117; Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶¶ 41, 48, 211 A.3d 205.

        [¶38] We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Lipscombe’s motion to voir dire the jurors after it made an objective

determination that the witness’s stray, innocuous, two-word comment having

nothing to do with the facts of the case or applicable law did not affect the jury’s

ability to render a fair and impartial verdict.

        The entry is:

                           Judgment affirmed.

Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant Jarae
Lipscombe

Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, Michael H. Madigan, Asst. Dist. Atty.
(orally), and Mariah Wood, Stud. Atty., Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for
appellee State of Maine

Kennebec County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2021-20533
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY