Court Opinion

ID: 9917362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 06:04:55.959926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:35.843958
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    January 11, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 360906
                                                                    Charlevoix Circuit Court
MARK ALLEN INGERSOLL, JR.,                                          LC No. 21-016514-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial convictions of two counts of delivery of less than
50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession with the intent to deliver less than 50
grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession of a controlled substance analogue,
MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(ii), and maintaining a drug house, MCL 333.7405(1)(d). The trial court
sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms
of 46 months to 40 years for each delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine conviction, 46 months
to 40 years for the possession with the intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine conviction,
36 months to 15 years for the possession of a controlled substance analogue conviction, and 36
months to 15 years for the maintaining a drug house conviction. We affirm.

                   I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        Defendant was arrested after officers with the Michigan State Police Department’s Straits
Area Narcotic Enforcement (“SANE”) team conducted two controlled purchases of cocaine using
a confidential informant. Detective Jeremiah Roberts of SANE testified that in January 2020, he
and another officer were contacted by a confidential informant (CI), who informed them that she
was able to purchase cocaine from defendant with her friend, SH. SH had previously purchased
cocaine from defendant. The SANE detectives provided CI and SH with funds to purchase the
cocaine, and the two went to defendant’s residence and purchased 3.5 grams of cocaine that they
then turned over to the SANE detectives. After the first controlled purchase, CI set up the second
controlled purchase by texting defendant’s girlfriend. The SANE detectives provided CI with

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funds, and she purchased one gram of cocaine from defendant at the same location where the first
controlled purchase had occurred.

        Once the second controlled purchase was completed, Detective Roberts used the
information provided by CI and SH to obtain a search warrant, which was executed at the house
where the controlled purchases had occurred. During the search, defendant was found in the
kitchen, his girlfriend was found in the living room, and a child was found upstairs. After
defendant and his girlfriend were escorted out of the house, officers searched the residence and
found Suboxone1 pills on the TV stand, three bags of cocaine in a kitchen drawer, and a wallet that
contained money that matched the serial numbers of the money given to CI to carry out the
controlled purchases.

        At trial, SH testified regarding the controlled purchases. SH stated that she “knew that
[defendant and his girlfriend] were selling drugs in a house with a baby,” that defendant’s girlfriend
was pregnant and that there was a “a little baby running with a coke bag in the house” during the
first controlled purchase, and that CI “grabbed [the bag of cocaine] from the baby.” Defense
counsel objected to SH’s testimony on various grounds, including that it was non-responsive,
hearsay, and lacked a foundation, and the trial court sustained the objection and struck the
testimony, instructing the jury to disregard it.

       During her testimony, SH made the following interjection:

       SH: I—hold on, can I say something?

       The Court: No.

                                               * * *

       SH: No, I need to say something though. This girl that’s in this courtroom I do not
       want her in here. She has been threatening me, she’s been trying to have people set
       me up and I do not want her in here.

The trial court admonished SH and instructed her to only answer questions. Nonetheless, and
despite the trial court’s repeated admonishments, SH made several additional nonresponsive
statements, including “And, you know, I don’t feel bad about this. For the record, I don’t feel bad
about this.” SH additionally testified that defendant’s girlfriend’s mother had been harassing her
and trying to intimidate her regarding her testimony, and she identified her by her full name and
indicated that she was present in the courtroom. SH also said, “I just said that [defendant] was
guilty,” and she stated repeatedly that she didn’t “want to be here.” The trial court ordered SH’s
statement regarding defendant’s guilt stricken and instructed the jury to disregard it. The trial
court then removed the jury. Outside the presence of the jury, SH made additional statements
about defendant and his family, stating that “they will come for me and my three children.” SH
also admitted to having consumed alcohol that day and taken prescribed medication, including

1
  Suboxone is the brand name for buprenorphine, a Schedule III controlled substance that is used
for the treatment of substance use disorders. See MCL 333.7333a(11).

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Suboxone. After SH refused to submit to a preliminary breath test, the trial court excused her,
struck her entire testimony from the record, and instructed the jury not to consider it. Defense
counsel moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.

        Defendant’s girlfriend, Bailey Falting, testified that defendant was her boyfriend and that
they had a child together. She denied seeing CI or SH purchase cocaine from defendant on the
date of the first controlled buy, despite being in the house. Falting testified that CI had reached
out to her to purchase cocaine, but denied that defendant sold CI cocaine at the second controlled
buy. She denied any knowledge of defendant’s alleged drug sales. The prosecution impeached
Falting with her statements made during a police interview regarding her going to Detroit with
defendant to purchase cocaine. Falting denied the truth of those earlier statements, stating that the
interviewing deputy had threatened to take her children away and lock her up. Falting also testified
that CI had “previously set up” her mother, and admitted that she had accused CI of being a
“snitch.” During the prosecution’s examination of Falting, the trial court admitted into evidence
photographs of strips of Suboxone located on the TV stand in the home, and a photograph of
Falting and her child that had been found in the home.

       The trial court also admitted into evidence a recording of defendant’s interview with a
SANE detective following his arrest. In the recording of defendant’s interview, defendant stated
that he was “the biggest drug dealer in Northern Michigan” and that he traveled to Detroit to
purchase cocaine to sell.

       Defendant was convicted as described. At sentencing, the trial court assessed defendant
10 points for Offense Variable (OV) 14, finding that defendant was the leader in a multiple
offender situation. The trial court also assessed defendant 10 points for OV 15, related to the
commission of an aggravated controlled substance offense. This appeal followed.

                                      II. SH’S TESTIMONY

        Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on
SH’s stricken testimony. Defendant further argues that the trial court violated his constitutional
right to confrontation, and that he was prejudiced by the violation. We disagree with both
arguments.

                                    A. DENIAL OF MISTRIAL

        Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a
mistrial after SH’s testimony. We disagree. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s
decision on a motion for mistrial. People v Schaw, 288 Mich App 231, 236; 791 NW2d 743
(2010). “The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled
outcomes.” People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 60; 862 NW2d 446 (2014); People v Babcock, 469
Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).

        “A mistrial should be granted only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the
defendant and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.” People v Ortiz-Kehoe, 237 Mich App 508,
513-514; 603 NW2d 802 (1999). “A trial court should only grant a mistrial when the prejudicial
effect of the error cannot be removed in any other way.” People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 36;

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755 NW2d 212 (2008). However, generally, when a trial court provides “a comprehensive curative
instruction to the jury” following nonresponsive, volunteered testimony, any possible prejudice to
a defendant is alleviated because jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given. People v
Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 710; 780 NW2d 321 (2009).

        During the prosecutor’s direct examination, SH made nonresponsive statements indicating
that defendant’s girlfriend’s mother had threatened her and that she saw a baby with cocaine in its
hands at defendant’s house, and she opined that defendant was guilty. Defense counsel promptly
objected to SH’s testimony. After SH admitted that she had consumed alcohol that day and had
refused to submit to a preliminary breath test, the trial court agreed to stop the prosecution’s direct
examination of SH, and the court struck SH’s entire testimony from the record. The trial court
denied defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial, opining that the jury was not going to have a
difficult time disregarding SH’s testimony.

        After the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the trial court instructed the jurors that
SH’s testimony had been stricken, and the court ordered them to not consider the testimony when
determining whether defendant was guilty of the charged offenses. During the trial court’s final
instructions to the jury, the court told the jurors that they should consider only properly admitted
evidence and could not consider excluded or stricken evidence. The court also reaffirmed that
SH’s testimony was not evidence, was stricken from the record, and should not be considered.

        “Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and jury instructions are presumed to
cure most errors.” People v Zitka, 335 Mich App 324, 348; 966 NW2d 786 (2020). Defendant
contends that the jury instructions were insufficient to cure the prejudicial effect of SH’s testimony,
but has not provided this Court with relevant authority to support his argument. Further, defendant
has failed to explain why the curative instruction in this case was insufficient to cure the prejudicial
effect of SH’s testimony. “An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this
Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment
with little or no citation of supporting authority.” People v Kroll, 341 Mich App 217, 236 n 15;
989 NW2d 822 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In light of the trial court’s
comprehensive curative instruction, Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 710, defendant has not shown
that the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial was outside the range of principled
outcomes. Lane, 308 Mich App at 60.

                                 B. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

        Defendant also argues that he was denied the right to confrontation when SH was excused
before his counsel could cross-examine her. While defendant is factually correct that he was
unable to cross-examine SH, we conclude that no constitutional error occurred. “Whether a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation has been violated is a question of
constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Bruner, 501 Mich 220, 226; 912
NW2d 514 (2018).

         A criminal defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him or her. US Const,
Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; MCL 763.1. “The right of confrontation insures that the witness
testifies under oath at trial, is available for cross-examination, and allows the jury to observe the
demeanor of the witness.” People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 370; 749 NW2d 753 (2008)

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(quotation marks and citations omitted). “By its straightforward terms, the Confrontation Clause
directs inquiry into two questions: (1) Does the person in controversy comprise a ‘witness against’
the accused under the Confrontation Clause; and (2) if so, has the accused been afforded an
opportunity to ‘confront’ that witness under the Confrontation Clause?” People v Fackelman, 489
Mich 515, 562; 802 NW2d 552 (2011). “[T]he Confrontation Clause applies only to statements
used as substantive evidence.” Id. at 528.

        In this case, the trial court excused SH before defense counsel had a chance to perform
cross-examination. However, the trial court also struck the entirety of SH’s testimony on direct
examination. As noted, defendant has not overcome the presumption that the jury followed its
instructions to disregard her testimony. Zitka, 335 Mich App at 348. None of SH’s testimony,
therefore, was employed as substantive evidence against defendant, and SH was, ultimately, not a
“witness against” defendant under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 562.

        Further, even if defendant’s right to confrontation was violated, defendant has failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his inability to cross-examine SH. As noted, the jury was
instructed to disregard the entirety of SH’s testimony. Neither party has challenged the trial court’s
decision to strike SH’s testimony. Defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that
the outcome of his trial would have been different if SH had been subject to both direct and cross-
examination, rather than merely direct examination, before being excused and having her
testimony stricken from the record.

                                III. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

        Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by admitting statements defendant made in
his police interview, as well as portions of Falting’s testimony and photographs of defendant’s
home. We disagree. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to admit or deny
evidence. People v Smith, 336 Mich App 79, 105; 969 NW2d 548 (2021). We review de novo
questions of law concerning the admissibility of that evidence. People v Hill, 335 Mich App 1, 5;
966 NW2d 156 (2020).

        To the extent defendant’s arguments are unpreserved, we review them for plain error
affecting substantial rights. Solloway, 316 Mich App at 197. “To obtain relief, it must be found
that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected the
defendant’s substantial rights. The defendant bears the burden of establishing that his substantial
rights were affected.” Id. (citation omitted); see also People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597
NW2d 130 (1999).

                               A. DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS

        The prosecution introduced an audio recording of defendant’s interview with a SANE
deputy. In the recording of defendant’s interview, defendant admitted that he was the biggest drug
dealer in Northern Michigan and that he traveled to Detroit to purchase cocaine to sell. Defendant
argues that these statements constituted other-acts evidence, see MRE 404(b), that was admitted
without a proper purpose and that was more prejudicial than probative. We disagree.

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        Defendant’s admissions that he was a high-level drug dealer and that he traveled to Detroit
to pick up cocaine were not admitted as other-acts evidence. Rather, this evidence was admitted
as an admission by a party under the hearsay rules. Before jury deliberations, the trial court noted
that “[t]he prosecutor has introduced evidence of a statement that it claims the defendant made,”
and the court instructed the jury, in relevant part, that:

       Before you may consider such an out of court statement against the defendant you
       must first find that the defendant actually made the statement as given to you.

             If you find the defendant did make the statement you may give the statement
       whatever weight you think it deserves.

“MRE 404(b) does not apply to a defendant’s prior statements of intent. Rather, the appropriate
analysis is whether the prior statement is relevant, and if so whether its probative value outweighs
its potential prejudicial effect.” People v Goddard, 429 Mich 505, 518; 418 NW2d 881 (1988).

       Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” MRE 401. “Evidence that reflects a defendant’s consciousness of guilt is
relevant.” People v Parrott, 335 Mich App 648, 680; 968 NW2d 548 (2021). Defendant’s
admissions that he was a drug dealer and that he traveled to Detroit to purchase cocaine were
highly probative of defendant’s consciousness of his guilt in maintaining a drug house, possessing
cocaine with the intent to deliver, and delivering cocaine. Parrott, 335 Mich App at 680.

        Additionally, the probative value of defendant’s admissions was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403 states that relevant evidence may be
excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” Unfairly prejudicial evidence is more than
evidence that is damaging to a defendant’s case. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909
(1995). Any relevant evidence will be damaging to a party’s case to some extent; unfair prejudice
exists when there is a risk that minimally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive
weight by the jury, People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998), or that the
evidence might “stir the jurors to such passion that they would be swept beyond rational
consideration of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 503; 577
NW2d 673 (1998).

         Defendant’s admissions provided the jury with highly relevant evidence concerning his
sales of cocaine out of his home and his state of mind at the time of his arrest. The trial court
properly instructed the jury to consider defendant’s statements only if the jury found “that the
defendant actually made the statement as given.” Because the evidence was relevant to
“defendant’s consciousness of guilt,” Parrott, 335 Mich App at 680, and because the jury is
presumed to have followed the court’s instructions, People v Mahone, 294 Mich App 208, 212;
816 NW2d 436 (2011), and the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to introduce defendant’s admissions during his interview
with the SANE deputy. Smith, 336 Mich App at 105.

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                                  B. FALTING’S TESTIMONY

        Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by admitting testimony from Falting related
to “snitches” and threats toward witnesses. Additionally, defendant argues that the prosecutor
impermissibly played the recording of his girlfriend’s interview with the SANE deputy to impeach
her testimony. We disagree.

        “Witness credibility is a matter for the jury to decide.” People v Hieu Van Hoang, 328
Mich App 45, 68; 935 NW2d 396 (2019). Evidence of threats against a witness may be useful to
a jury when determining the credibility of that witness. M Crim JI 3.6(1)(f). “If a witness is
offering relevant testimony, whether that witness is truthfully and accurately testifying is itself
relevant because it affects the probability of the existence of a consequential fact.” People v Mills,
450 Mich 61, 72; 537 NW2d 909 (1995). “A witness can be impeached at trial, and the jury can
consider whether a witness was lying in making its credibility determinations.” Swain v Morse,
332 Mich App 510, 524; 957 NW2d 396 (2020).

         In this case, Falting’s testimony that CI had “previously set up her mother” was probative
of Falting’s credibility and her bias against CI. The admission of Falting’s statements in her police
interview was proper in light of Falting’s inconsistent statements. See MRE 613; see also People
v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 34; 650 NW2d 96 (2002) (“Under MRE 613, subject to certain
restrictions, a witness may be examined concerning a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment
purposes.”). The challenged evidence bore directly on her credibility as a witness. “[I]t is the role
of the jury, not this Court, to determine the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses.”
People v Eisen, 296 Mich App 326, 331; 820 NW2d 229 (2012) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

        Moreover, even though Falting’s interview with the SANE deputy may have implicated
defendant in the charged offenses, the interview was admitted to impeach her testimony and to
question her credibility. “[E]vidence of a prior inconsistent statement of the witness may be
admitted to impeach a witness even though the statement tends directly to inculpate the defendant.”
People v Kilbourn, 454 Mich 677, 682; 563 NW2d 669 (1997). The jury was instructed to consider
Falting’s “inconsistent statement made before the trial only to help . . . decide how believable the
witness’ testimony was when testifying here in court.” “Jurors are presumed to follow their
instructions, and jury instructions are presumed to cure most errors.” Zitka, 335 Mich App at 348.
Defendant has failed to establish that the trial court erred by admitting this evidence. Smith, 336
Mich App at 105.

              C. USE OF PHOTOGRAPHS DURING FALTING’S TESTIMONY

        Finally, defendant argues that the prosecution impermissibly reminded the jury of SH’s
improper and stricken testimony when the prosecution asked Falting whether she lived in
defendant’s home with her children and asked Falting questions regarding certain photographs of
the interior of the home taken by the police officers. We disagree.

        The prosecution asked Falting who was living with defendant when the controlled
purchases occurred, and also asked Falting the age of her children. Falting testified that she and
several other adults were living with defendant the time, but did not state that her children were

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living with her in the home at the time of the charged offense. Moreover, Falting testified that she
did not see defendant sell either CI or SH cocaine in the home, despite being present at the home
with her child that day. We see no error in the prosecution questioning Falting about what she
might have witnessed on the day of the controlled purchase, merely because her answers indicated
that she had one of her children with her that day.

        Defendant also argues that the introduction of the photographs of Suboxone on the TV
stand and the photograph of Falting with her child reinforced SH’s improper testimony in the jury’s
mind and made it impossible for the jury to disregard it. We disagree. Defendant has failed to
demonstrate that it was plain error to admit the photographs during defendant’s girlfriend’s
testimony. In the photograph depicting the child, the child is on Falting’s lap in the living room.
No cocaine or other drugs appear in the picture. The record demonstrates that the cocaine was in
the kitchen, not in the living room. Moreover, the photograph of the Suboxone found on the TV
stand does not depict Falting or her child, nor did any witness, including SH, testify that Falting’s
child had access to Suboxone. Defendant has not demonstrated that an error occurred or that his
substantial rights were affected. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.

                                        IV. SENTENCING

       Defendant argues that the trial court erred in the scoring of OVs 14 and 15, requiring
resentencing. We agree that the trial court erred in part in scoring OV 15, but conclude that
resentencing is not required.

       “This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s findings in support of particular score
under the sentencing guidelines but reviews de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted
and applied the sentencing guidelines to the findings.” People v McFarlane, 325 Mich App 507,
531-532; 926 NW2d 339 (2018). Clear error exists when this Court is “left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake was made.” People v Abbott, 330 Mich App 648, 654; 950 NW2d
478 (2019). “Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit court’s factual determinations . . . must
be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835
NW2d 340 (2013), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated by People v Rodriguez, 327
Mich App 573, 579 n 3; 935 NW2d 51 (2019).

                                             A. OV 14

       Defendant argues that trial court erred by assessing 10 points for OV 14 for each of his
convictions. We disagree.

        OV 14 addresses “the offender’s role.” MCL 777.44(1). A sentencing court is required to
assess 10 points for OV 14 when “[t]he offender was a leader in a multiple offender situation.”
MCL 777.41(1)(a). “The entire criminal transaction should be considered when scoring this
variable.” MCL 777.44(2)(a). “[T]he plain meaning of ‘multiple offender situation’ as used in
OV 14 is a situation consisting of more than one person violating the law while part of a group.”
People v Dickinson, 321 Mich App 1, 22; 909 NW2d 24 (2017) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). A defendant can be involved in a multiple-offender situation even if the defendant is
“accompanied by only one other person and even though the other person was not charged in
connection with the crime for which the defendant was convicted.” Id. at 23.

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        The evidence supports the trial court’s determination that defendant was the leader in a
multiple-offender situation. During defendant’s initial interview with the SANE deputy, defendant
stated that Falting had possession of the money from the drug sales. Defendant acknowledged that
Falting knew he was selling cocaine, but defendant took full responsibility. Falting was subject to
criminal liability because of her role in the controlled purchases, but charges were not pursued by
the prosecutor’s office. Even though at trial Falting denied knowing that defendant was selling
cocaine, she acknowledged that CI had contacted her to purchase cocaine. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err by assessing 10 points for OV 14. McFarlane, 325 Mich App at 531-532.

                                             B. OV 15

        Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by scoring ten points for OV 15 for his
delivery and possession with the intent to deliver convictions, and five points for his possession of
a controlled substance analogue (Suboxone) and maintaining a drug house convictions. We agree
that the scoring of OV 15 was erroneous for all of defendant’s convictions except maintaining a
drug house.

     OV 15 addresses “aggravated controlled substance offenses.” MCL 777.45(1). Under
MCL 777.45(1)(g), a sentencing court is required to assess ten points for OV 15 when:

       The offense is a violation of section 7401(2)(a)(i) to (iii) pertaining to a controlled
       substance classified in schedule 1 or 2 that is a narcotic drug or a drug described in
       section 7214(a)(iv) and was committed in a minor’s abode, settled home, or
       domicile, regardless of whether the minor was present.

       Five points are assessed for OV 15 when “[t]he offense involved the delivery or possession
with intent to deliver marihuana or any other controlled substance or a counterfeit controlled
substance or possession of controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances having a
value or under such circumstances as to indicate trafficking.” MCL 777.45(1)(h).

       Defendant argues that the trial court erred by assessing 10 points for OV 15 for his delivery
and possession with the intent to deliver convictions because he was not convicted of an offense
under MCL 333.7401(a)(i) to (iii). We agree.

        Contrary to the prosecutor’s assertion, defendant had to be convicted of an offense under
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i) to (iii) for the trial court to assess 10 points for OV 15. See People v Gray,
297 Mich App 22, 31-32; 824 NW2d 213 (2012). Defendant was not convicted under
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii); instead, defendant was convicted of delivery of less than 50
grams of cocaine and possession with the intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine under
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). Therefore, the trial court clearly erred by assessing ten points for OV 15
for these convictions. McFarlane, 325 Mich App at 531-532.

       The prosecution concedes that the trial court erred by assessing five points for OV 15 for
defendant’s possession of Suboxone conviction. We agree. As used in MCL 777.45, “ ‘[d]eliver’
means the actual or constructive transfer of a controlled substance from 1 individual to another
regardless of remuneration,” see MCL 777.45(2)(a), while “ ‘[t]rafficking’ means the sale or
delivery of controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances on a continuing basis to 1 or
more other individuals for further distribution,” see MCL 777.45(2)(c). The offense for which

                                                -9-
defendant was convicted did not involve delivery or intent to deliver Suboxone, and there was no
record evidence that defendant engaged in trafficking Suboxone. Therefore, the trial court erred
by assessing five points for OV 15 for defendant’s possession of Suboxone conviction.
McFarlane, 325 Mich App at 531-532.

       Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by assessing five points for OV 15 for
defendant’s maintaining a drug house conviction. We disagree.

       In People v Jackson, 497 Mich 857, 858; 852 NW2d 897 (2014), our Supreme Court
explained, in relevant part, that

       [a] proper reading of MCL 777.45(1)(h) reveals two alternative bases for scoring
       that OV at five points: (1) when the offense involved the delivery or possession
       with intent to deliver marihuana or any other controlled substance or counterfeit
       controlled substance; and (2) when the offense involved possession of controlled
       substances or counterfeit controlled substances having a value or under such
       circumstances as to indicate trafficking.

       Defendant’s conviction for maintaining a drug house was based on his use of the home as
a location to deliver cocaine. Cocaine is a schedule 2 controlled substance pursuant to
MCL 333.7214(a)(iv). Therefore, the record supports by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant’s maintaining a drug house conviction “involved the delivery . . . [of a] controlled
substance.” MCL 777.45(1)(g), regardless of “trafficking.” Accordingly, the trial court did not
err by assessing five points for OV 15 for defendant’s maintaining a drug house conviction.
McFarlane, 325 Mich App at 531-532.

        Although defendant has established error in the scoring of OV 15, he has not established
entitlement to resentencing. Although the trial court erred in its scoring of OV 15 for defendant’s
delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine, possession with the intent to deliver, and possession of
Suboxone convictions, the subtraction of ten points for defendant’s delivery and possession with
the intent to deliver convictions, or the subtraction of five points for defendant’s possession of
Suboxone conviction, would not change defendant’s OV level or his defendant’s recommended
guidelines ranges. MCL 777.65. Therefore, resentencing is not required. See People v Francisco,
474 Mich 82, 89-90; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                            /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                            /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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