Court Opinion

ID: 9552925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:19:20.410721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:23.251402
License: Public Domain

BALLIF, District Judge:
(concurring with comments).
I concur in the foregoing opinion resolving the question of public access to the hearings in this matter, and in narrowing their scope to alleged past disclosures that may have violated the order of secrecy entered by the district court. The following remarks deal with what I perceive to be procedural problems which may arise as this matter goes forward — assuming that they have not surfaced already and been resolved by the trial court.1
As authorized by the Mini-Grand Jury Act,2 the district court entered an order of secrecy in a criminal investigation directed against Creer by Cannon.3 Creer then filed a civil proceeding alleging that Cannon had violated that order, and that at the time of the entry of the temporary restraining order he (Creer) was in the process of presenting his proof inter alia to the district court in support of that allegation to obtain a preliminary injunction.4 Creer has not, however, chosen to ask the court to find Cannon guilty of contempt for allegedly violating the court’s secrecy order, which the district court is clearly empowered to do,5 but instead has alleged not only a secrecy-order violation but also a violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the Utah State Bar,6 and that Cannon has engaged in a “pattern of prosecutorial abuse and misconduct,” 7 which Creer seeks to prove with the stated aim of bringing about recusal of Cannon as unfit to continue this investigation.8
It is my opinion that the proceedings thus far and as hereinafter restricted by the majority opinion should be construed as a contempt proceeding whose aim is to protect the district court’s secrecy order by means of that court’s power to punish as contempt any violation of its orders.9 That, however, would appear to me to be the extent of the district court’s power over Cannon should it determine that he has in fact violated the order.
If the proceeding is not restricted to this narrow issue, the relief sought by Creer could lead the district court into a judicial inquiry into the fitness of the County At*416torney to perform his statutory duties. There is no authority, constitutionally, by statute, or through inherent power of the court, for such a judicial proceeding.10 Moreover, the court’s responsibilities in the area of removing an elected official from office is set forth by statute11 and is limited to adjudicating whether the alleged proscribed conduct has in fact occurred, and, if such is proved by criminal jury trial, then removal can be judicially ordered.12
Also, a violation of Disciplinary Rule 7-107, its proof and penalty, is the subject of procedures carefully laid out by this Court and the State Bar Association.13 Nothing in those rules authorizes the district court to conduct inquiry into such violation or to impose disciplinary or punitive action based thereon.14
Care to confine any judicial process to its authorized area and to enforce orders issued within those bounds is essential to the proper functioning of the judicial system.
In summary, it appears to me that the main opinion, in preserving First Amend*417ment rights and the integrity of the Mini-Grand Jury Act, has properly drawn limits to the proceedings that are to go forward in the district court — viz., to determine only whether Cannon has violated the secrecy order of the district court. If that question is decided affirmatively, the district court has the authority to punish him through its contempt powers. Whether it can properly do anything beyond that is a matter which I think must be carefully considered, and the district court’s authority to take further action against him, as prayed for in the complaint, must be precisely identified and found to be authorized before it is pursued.

. This Court has not had before it a complete record of the proceedings in the district court. Both this proceeding and the one filed by Cannon on June 15, 1981, to vacate the temporary restraining order were petitions to this Court for an extraordinary writ. The trial court record containing the pleadings in this case were not part of the pleadings here and we have no knowledge of what preliminary motions and their dispositions may have been before that court — such as motions to dismiss, for summary judgment, or to strike, etc.

. U.C.A., 1953, 77-22-1, et seq.

. The initial order of the district court signed by Judge Homer Wilkinson on October 29, 1980, required secrecy of proceedings, as well as the testimony and items obtained.

. Rule 65A(e)(l), U.R.C.P., provides that a preliminary injunction may be granted “when it appears by the pleadings ... that a party is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of some act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.” (Emphasis added.)

. U.C.A., 1953, 78-32-1.

. Adopted May 28, 1936, and approved by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, March 1, 1937.

. As phrased in petitioner’s brief.

. Id. Also see majority opinion, p. 413.

. Supra, footnote 2. See also, U.C.A., 1953, 78-32-10, which empowers the court on a finding of contempt to impose a fine not exceeding $200 and/or 30 days’ imprisonment. Again, the record before this Court is not complete as to the proceedings in the district court. The matter may be proceeding as a contempt, or could be so amended at that level. See Rule 15, U.R.C.P.

. Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah provides that all persons have access to the courts for the redress of injury to their persons, property or reputations, and that no person be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal of this state. In the case of Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366 (1915), this Court held that the above constitutional provision does not create any new rights or remedies, but leaves that function to the Legislature, or as provided by the common law where not so changed. At p. 38 of the Utah Reports, 151 P. 366, after noting that 28 states have a similar constitutional provision, this Court said: “Where no right of action is given ... or no remedy exists, under either the Common Law or some statute, those constitutional provisions create none.”
The Common Law Writs have been abolished and replaced by Court rule, but the remedies they provided have been established by Rule 65B, U.R.C.P. Of these Extraordinary Writs, Rule 65B(a), (b)(1) provides that where no other “plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists,” relief may be granted as against one who unlawfully holds public office or does an act which by law works a forfeiture thereof. The condition of the Writ, however, is that there is no other “plain, speedy and adequate remedy.” If, in the Creer action, removal from office were being sought, then there would be such an existing remedy (U.C.A., 1953, 77-6-1, et seq.-, see also, State v. Guerts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961)). Such removal is not being sought, however, and no remedy for the type of recusal requested in the present proceedings has been established by legislative action.

. The legislative authorization for the removal of public officials not subject to impeachment includes county attorneys (U.C.A., 1953, 77-6-1). Commencement of such proceedings is by a sworn written accusation, filed in the district court (U.C.A., 1953, 77-6-2), to which the defendant is ordered to appear and answer (U.C.A., 1953, 77-6-6 through 8). If the accusation is denied, the case proceeds the same as any civil proceeding.
It is noted that one of the offenses for which removal can be ordered is “malfeasance in office.” This offense is not defined by statute, but in the Guerts case (supra) the Supreme Court upheld the statute against claims of ambiguity because “by usage the phrase ‘malfeasance in office’ has acquired a commonly understood meaning” (q.v. p. 348, 359 P.2d 12). If Creer proves his allegations, removal might be available unless the determination of malfeasance in office must be made in a criminal proceeding — which appears to be the case.
This is borne out by the case of Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971), where this Court held that a civil action seeking money damages and removal from office of a sheriff for failure to properly investigate an alleged burglary was properly dismissed by the district court, “since such removal is based on legislation which plaintiff did not pursue.” In answer to the claims of the plaintiff that the defendants’ actions were tortious and actionable as such by the plaintiff, the Court said “that failure by a public sheriff (sic) to investigate a crime ... ordinarily is a matter of judgment and discretion, not actionable or compensable, and not pursuable by an individual since the public official’s duty is to the public, — he being accountable to and removable in a proper proceeding, by the public.”

. U.C.A., 1953, 77-7-13, provides that upon admitting the accusation or conviction and assigning the cause thereof, removal is to be ordered by the court.

. Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, as amended by the Supreme Court of Utah, October 11, 1979.

. Id. See specifically Rule VII, which provides the penalties available to this Court in disciplining a violator, which include disbarment, suspension, temporary suspension, public and private reprimand, private admonition, costs and restitution.