Court Opinion

ID: 9543332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:44:28.464591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:10.151655
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join in the court’s opinion and add the following observations.
The hearing examiner found, on the basis of Ms. Sturgis’ demeanor and “the rational*555ity and consistency of her testimony as it relates to the evidence in the record,” that her testimony was credible. This “credible” (and presumably credited) evidence included, inter alia, the following:
1.Ms. Sturgis completed four years of college;
2. she was basically in good health when she started the job;
3. in spite of her educational qualifications, she was put under the supervision of an eighteen-year-old student;
4. she had to run errands, Xerox, get coffee, and do other menial jobs;
5. when she protested, the person for whom she did some work “talked to me like you’re talking to a dog”; and
6. one of the employer’s representatives yelled at her while she was sick.
Having ostensibly believed all of this testimony, the hearing examiner then found that “there was nothing unusual or uncommon about claimant’s work conditions which would cause a person not predisposed to become stressed.”
I question the assertion that there was “nothing unusual” about a middle-aged college graduate (or near-graduate) receiving the treatment described above, especially the alleged humiliations catalogued in items 3-4. Indeed, common sense suggests that a normal individual would find such experiences somewhat stressful. The examiner could reasonably find, however, that such a normal person would not have suffered the kinds of sequelae which Ms. Sturgis claims to have endured.
The latter point is doubtless the one which the hearing examiner intended to convey. Ms. Sturgis would not be entitled to any relief if a person of normal sensibilities would not have become emotionally impaired as a result of the events in question, and a remand for clarification of the findings would therefore serve no useful purpose. Cf. In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 907-08 (D.C.1991) (en banc).