Court Opinion

ID: 9863070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:03:05.571008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:48.573221
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority vacates the judgment of the Court of Appeals based upon that court’s harmless error analysis under Tex.RApp.P. 81(b)(2). Because the majority remands this case instead of clarifying a confusing area of our jurisprudence, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Our principal role as the Court of last resort is to
... dispel any confusion generated in the past by our own case law, to reconcile settled differences between the various courts of appeals, and to promote the fair administration of justice by trial and appellate courts throughout Texas.
Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). Unless we grant review in these circumstances we fail to fulfill our duty as the Court of last resort in criminal cases. See, Mireles v. State, 901 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex.Cr.App.1995); and, Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 957 (Tex.Cr.App.1994). For the following reasons, I believe the instant case presents such circumstances.
*315II.
In Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), we noted our past failure to articulate a coherent standard for determining when an error is harmless. To remedy this the Court attempted to establish a method for performing a proper harmless error analysis. In so doing, we stated that the reviewing court should focus primarily on the integrity of the process leading to the conviction or punishment as opposed to focusing on the outcome of those proceedings. Id., 790 S.W.2d at 587. To properly conduct a harm analysis the reviewing court should
... examine [1] the source of the error, [2] the nature of the error, [3] whether or to what extent it was emphasized by the State, and [4] its probable collateral implications. Further, [5] the court should consider how much weight a juror would probably place upon the error. In addition, the Court must also determine [6] whether declaring the error harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity. In summary, the reviewing court should focus not on the weight of the other evidence of guilt [or punishment], but rather on whether the error at issue might possibly have prejudiced the jurors’ decision-making; it should ask not whether the jury reached the correct result, but rather whether the jurors were able properly to apply law to facts in order to reach a verdict. Consequently, the reviewing court must focus upon the process and not on the result. In other words, a reviewing court must always examine whether the trial was an essentially fair one. If the error was of a magnitude that it disrupted the juror’s orderly evaluation of the evidence, no matter how overwhelming it might have been, the conviction is tainted. Again, it is the effect of the error and not the other evidence that must dictate the reviewing court’s judgment.
Id., 790 S.W.2d at 587-588.1 In conducting this analysis the reviewing court should first isolate the error and all its effects, using the aforementioned considerations and any other considerations suggested by the facts of the individual case. Id., 790 S.W.2d at 588. Secondly, the court should ask whether a rational trier of fact might have reached a different result if the error had not occurred and its effects had not resulted. Ibid. In this context, the Harris Court stated that an appellate court should not determine the harmfulness of an error simply by examining whether there exists overwhelming evidence to support the defendant’s guilt or punishment because such an analysis is not finding whether the error affected the verdict. Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 587.
While apparently forbidding a reviewing court from determining harm simply from examining whether there exists overwhelming evidence, the Court nevertheless stated:
[T]he appellate court should calculate as much as possible the probable impact of the error on the jury in light of the existence of the other evidence. As a practical matter, this is a distinction without a difference. In both instances the presence of overwhelming evidence of guilt plays a determinative role in resolving the issue. Nevertheless, in making the analysis the predominant concern must be the eiror.
Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 587. Therefore, Harris is internally inconsistent: on the one hand it requires isolating the error and all its effects and, on the other hand, considering the presence of overwhelming evidence as determinative when deciding whether the error was harmless.2
In Orona v. State, 791 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), the Court attempted to clarify Harris and stated:
... To determine whether the error is harmless, we must calculate as much as possible the probable impact of the error *316on the jury in light of the existence of the other evidence. In the context of a harmless error analysis, it is important to note that “other evidence” is the entire record.
Orona, 791 S.W.2d at 130 (internal citations omitted). When conducting a harmless error analysis “[i]t is the effect of the error and not the existence of overwhelming evidence or the lack thereof that dictates our judgment.” Ibid. Whether the evidence is overwhelming is only a factor to be considered in the Harris test and is not dispositive. Ibid. Yet Orona created more problems than it solved, because while paying “lip service” to Harris, the Court concluded the error was harmless after applying the Harris factors and recognizing overwhelming evidence of guilt. In short, Orona suffered from the same malady as Harris: while decrying the reliance on overwhelming evidence the court utilized that factor in holding the error harmless. Therefore, Orona created the impression that overwhelming evidence is the only factor that need be applied in conducting a harmless error analysis. This, most certainly, was not the holding of Harris.
While both Harris and Orona attempted to clarify the application of the harmless error rule, they only succeeded in creating confusion and inconsistencies which are exemplified by the opinions from this Court and the courts of appeals.
A.
In Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (op’n on reh’g), the defendant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, the defendant contended the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of a prior deferred adjudication for aggravated assault. We held the error was harmless due to the admission of the defendant’s prior criminal record for sexual assault. Hughes, 878 S.W.2d at 156. In reaching this conclusion we did not conduct a Harris analysis, but instead stated:
... However, the incremental harm of the admission of the defendant’s deferred adjudication for the aggravated assault is negligible when compared to the admission of the defendant’s deferred adjudication for aggravated sexual assault with a child.
Ibid. In short, the Court while purporting to perform a harmless error analysis considered only the overwhelming evidence factor to hold that the error was harmless. However, in Garcia v. State, 919 S.W.2d 370 (Tex.Cr.App.1994), another capital murder case, we did not limit our analysis to the overwhelming evidence factor but instead examined each Harris factor. Garcia, 919 S.W.2d at 378-379.
B.
In Cuba v. State, 905 S.W.2d 729 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1995, no pet.), the Court of Appeals applied a harmless error analysis to review the introduction of impeachment evidence. The Cuba court, while acknowledging Harris, based its analysis on the existence of overwhelming evidence.
... Although a correct result is not proof of harmless error, the error can be harmless if overwhelming evidence dissipates its effect on the jury function in determining the facts so that it did not contribute to the verdict.
Cuba, 905 S.W.2d at 734. The court held:
... We conclude that the overwhelming evidence supports the conviction and would have dissipated the effects of any error with respect to the impeachment evidence.

Ibid.

In Kelly v. State, 903 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1995), the Court of Appeals applied a harmless error analysis in reviewing improper jury argument. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Harris factors considering “the source of the error, the nature of the error, whether or to what extent it was emphasized by the State, and its probable collateral implications.” Kelly, 903 S.W.2d at 812. The court further considered the weight each juror might place on the error as well as “whether declaring the error harmless will encourage the State to repeat it with impunity.” Ibid. The court determined that the error was not harmless, holding that the State had repeated the error with impunity because other courts have declared it harmless. Ibid.
*317c.
The instant ease exemplifies the confusion which dominates this area of the law. Denton v. State, 896 S.W.2d 580, 586 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995). The majority of the Court of Appeals conducted a Harris analysis and reviewed the source of the error, the nature of the error, whether or to what extent it was emphasized by the State, its probable collateral consequences, how much weight a juror would probably place upon the error, as well as whether declaring the error to be harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity. Id., 896 S.W.2d at 585. The majority held:
... we believe it cannot be determined beyond a reasonable doubt the jurors were not swayed by the State’s argument. We admit the defense presented was weak; however, we are not persuaded that had the errors not occurred, every rational juror would necessarily reject the defense and return a verdict of “guilty”.
Id., 896 S.W.2d at 586.3 The majority concluded the error was not harmless.
The dissent utilized the overwhelming evidence factor in declaring the error harmless, stating: “... there is more than sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of intent.” Denton, 896 S.W.2d at 586. The dissent argued:
... Given the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt, no rational juror would have accepted the appellant’s “weak” defense of accident and returned a “not guilty” verdict in the absence of the comments.

Ibid.

III.
From this discussion, it is readily apparent that there exists a great deal of confusion and inconsistency in both this Court and in the courts of appeals as to how to apply the harmless error analysis required by Rule 81(b)(2). As the Court of last resort in this state it is our duty to dispel that confusion and to reconcile those inconsistencies. Accordingly, I would seize this opportunity to discharge that duty. Unfortunately, the majority is unwilling to assume its leadership role and squanders this excellent opportunity to clarify this important area of jurisprudence. The result of this lack of will is to force the Court of Appeals to wallow in a swamp of confusing and conflicting jurisprudence. Surely we can do better; certainly the Court of Appeals deserves better.

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. Perhaps this internal inconsistency explains why Harris garnered only a bare majority. The precedential value of Harris is further undermined when we consider that two members of the majority later indicated a lack of confidence that the overwhelming evidence/outcome determinative approach to harmless error jurisprudence had been abandoned by the United States Supreme Court. Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Campbell and White, JJ., concurring).

. Both Judges McCormick and Overstreet criticize the majority’s use of this language. It is readily apparent the majority carefully chose this language in their attempt to follow the Harris methodology which asks “whether a rational trier of fact might have reached a different result if the error and its effects had not resulted.” 790 S.W.2d at 588. The Court of Appeals’ majority should not be criticized for making every effort to apply our precedent.