Court Opinion

ID: 9744372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:01:34.411006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.836384
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
Although he acknowledged being in the presence of Heather, Winebrenner did not, as stated by the majority, “[acknowledge] to Officer Keger that he was violating the protective order.” Slip op. at 6. To the contrary, Winebrenner stated that Heather was simply in the vehicle driven by Ms. Chester when it arrived to assist Wine-brenner. There is no reasonable inference that the contact between Winebrenner and Heather was such as to constitute abuse, harassment, or disturbing of Heather’s peace.
One may speculate that under the circumstances, Heather was a willing participant in the contact with Winebrenner but the evidence does not reflect such as a fact. Nevertheless, although the potential of the contact might have led to a violation of the order, the mere fact of an inadvertent and unintended contact does not, in my view, give rise to probable cause for an arrest for a violation of the protective order.
The statute in effect at the time in question, I.C. § 34-26-2-12, recognized that the prohibited abuse, harassment, or dis*1042turbing the peace of the protected person could be accomplished by direct or indirect contact, but it did not contemplate prohibition of contact in and of itself.
The protective order in question might properly have restricted Winebrenner from being 'within the physical presence or proximity of Heather but it did not do so. Appendix at 14. See Gordon v. Gordon, 733 N.E.2d 468 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). A broadly stated protective order, as here involved, is not overly vague if it requires the person targeted by the order “to refrain from those activities that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand as constituting abuse, harassment, and disturbing the peace.” Id. at 473 (emphasis supplied). As I view the facts, a person of ordinary intelligence would not consider Winebrenner’s conduct as abusive, harassing, or as disturbing Heather’s peace and privacy.
Furthermore, the arrest of Winebrenner was made for the offense of invasion of privacy, a Class B misdemeanor under I.C. § 35-46-l-15.1(a) which requires that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally” violate the protective order. There is absolutely no evidence that Winebrenner knowingly or intentionally engaged in conduct which might be reasonably believed to be abusive, harassing, or disturbing of Heather’s peace and privacy. Nor is there any evidence that Deputy Keger reasonably believed Winebrenner’s actions to be in violation of the prohibitions of the protective order. To the contrary as indicated by Deputy Keger, he believed the protective order had been obtained by Heather’s parents because they wished “Winebren-ner to stay away from Heather Herron and other immediate family.” Tr. at 8.
Deputy Keger’s perception of why Heather’s parents sought the protective order does not translate into the prohibitions of the order itself. Nor does it give rise to probable cause to believe that Win-ebrenner was in violation of the order itself, as issued.6
I would reverse and remand with instructions to grant the Motion to Suppress.

. Neither does the fact that Winebrenner may have thought that he was not supposed to be with Heather alter the prohibitions of the order itself.