Court Opinion

ID: 9941182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 00:02:04.086934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:19.624602
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/15/24 McGill v. Hearthstone CA Properties I CA6

                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
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                 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                           SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 LOWRI MCGILL,
                                                                             H050636
            Plaintiff and Appellant,                                        (Santa Clara County
                                                                             Super. Ct. No. 18CV338709)
            v.

 HEARTHSTONE CA PROPERTIES I,
 LLC,

            Defendant and Respondent.

          Appellant Lowri McGill filed a class action complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief against respondent Hearthstone CA Properties I, LLC (Hearthstone).
McGill, a former tenant in a residential property owned by Woodstone by Vintage LP
(Woodstone), alleges that a late rental fee payment in her lease agreement is illegal and
that Hearthstone, by virtue of its limited partnership agreement with Woodstone, is liable
to her and other tenants for that unlawful provision. The trial court entered judgment in
Hearthstone’s favor after granting its motion for summary adjudication and sustaining its
demurrer to McGill’s remaining cause of action.
          On appeal, McGill argues that the trial court erred in granting Hearthstone’s
motion for summary adjudication of her cause of action for violation of Business and
Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (also known as the Unfair Competition Law
(UCL)) because: (1) Hearthstone was a direct participant in the unlawful conduct
underlying her UCL claim, (2) Hearthstone was Woodstone’s agent or alter ego and
therefore liable under the UCL, and (3) Hearthstone could be liable for the acts and
omissions of the partnership under Corporations Code section 15904.04. McGill also
contends the trial court erred in sustaining Hearthstone’s demurrer to her negligence
cause of action, and not granting her leave to amend her third amended complaint to state
several new causes of action.
       As we explain below, we conclude that none of McGill’s arguments have merit.
We will affirm the judgment.
                   I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. The third amended complaint1
       In August 2017, McGill entered into a lease agreement for an apartment in a
complex owned by Woodstone, located in Lompoc, California. Among the terms of the
lease is a clause providing that any late payment of rent is subject to a $50 fee “as a
liquidated damage.” McGill paid late rent fees on several occasions when she lived at the
complex.
       In her third amended complaint, filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court,
McGill listed two causes of action, as follows: (1) violation of Business and Professions
Code section 17200 et seq., and (2) negligence. In support of her UCL cause of action,
McGill alleged that the late rent fee is illegal under Civil Code section 1671 and its

       1
         The procedural history of this case is somewhat unusual. Hearthstone moved for
summary adjudication of the UCL cause of action as stated in McGill’s second amended
complaint. However, prior to McGill filing her opposition to Hearthstone’s motion, the
parties stipulated to her filing a third amended complaint, with the proviso that it would
“not affect or impair” the pending summary adjudication motion. The stipulation also
provided that it was without prejudice to Hearthstone and Woodstone demurring to the
negligence cause of action set forth in the third amended complaint. In accordance with
the parties’ stipulation, the trial court granted McGill’s request for leave to file the third
amended complaint and deemed Hearthstone’s motion as being directed to the UCL
claim in the new pleading. Accordingly, in an effort to streamline the discussion, we will
limit our description to the allegations set forth in the third amended complaint.
                                              2
inclusion in her lease agreement is an unfair business practice. As to her negligence
cause of action, McGill alleged that Hearthstone had a duty to ensure that the terms of the
lease agreement were legal and the inclusion of the illegal late rent fee clause in her lease
agreement breached that duty of care.
       Specifically, McGill alleged that paragraph 5 of the lease agreement, which
imposes the $50 late rent fee, violates Civil Code sections 1671 and 1953. Paragraph 5 of
the lease, which was attached as an exhibit to the complaint, reads in pertinent part:
“Owner and Residents agree that it is and will be impracticable and extremely difficult to
fix the actual damages suffered by Owner in the event Residents make a late payment of
rent, or when Residents make a payment that is subsequently dishonored by the bank, and
that the below charges represent a reasonable approximation of the damages Owner is
likely to suffer from a late or dishonored payment. . . . [¶] . . . If Owner has not received
the full rent payment within 2 day(s) after it is due to be received under this Agreement,
Residents shall pay a sum of $50.00, as a liquidated damage.”
       B. Hearthstone’s motion for summary adjudication
       Hearthstone moved for summary adjudication of McGill’s first cause of action
under the UCL. In its separate statement, Hearthstone set forth the following three
undisputed material facts: (1) it “did not participate, directly or by aiding and abetting
another,” in charging the late rent fees set forth in the lease; (2) neither Woodstone nor
FPI Management, Inc. (FPI)2 were Hearthstone’s agents with respect to assessing or
collecting late rent fees; and (3) neither Woodstone nor FPI were alter egos of
Hearthstone.
       In support of its motion, Hearthstone submitted declarations from: (1) Socorro
Vasquez, executive director of Hearthstone Housing Foundation (HHF), a non-profit

       2
       FPI, which is not a party to this appeal, was the property manager for the
apartment complex at which McGill was a tenant.
                                              3
corporation as well as the sole member and manager of Hearthstone; and (2) Michael
Gancar, manager of Woodstone by Vintage Partners LLC, Woodstone’s general partner.3
In addition, Hearthstone submitted a copy of the First Amended and Restated Agreement
of Limited Partnership of Woodstone by Vintage, LP, dated March 1, 2017 (LPA); a
copy of the Partnership Management Summary “outlining the various requirements to
ensure that Woodstone … maintains its exemption as a low–income housing property[;]”
and copies of invoices for services rendered by Hearthstone to Woodstone.
              1. Evidence relating to the partnership
       According to Vasquez, Hearthstone works to “increase the availability of quality
affordable rental housing for low-income tenants.” To that end, Hearthstone assists the
owners of housing projects in “obtain[ing] and maintain[ing] an exemption from property
taxation” under applicable state law and regulations. In this case, Woodstone, as an
owner of rental property, contracted with Hearthstone to secure a low–income housing
tax exemption. The terms and conditions of the agreement between Woodstone and
Hearthstone were set forth in the LPA. However, Hearthstone did not review, edit, or
approve any of the language included in the lease agreements at the property, nor did it
provide any input as to what terms should be included in those agreements. Vasquez
stated that Hearthstone never exercised, or attempted to exercise, any control over
Woodstone or FPI regarding the lease agreements. With respect to the late rent fee

       3
         We are concerned here only with Hearthstone CA Properties I, LLC’s legal
obligations vis-à-vis McGill and other tenants. For the sake of simplicity, we will not
further reference either HHF or Woodstone by Vintage Partners LLC in this opinion,
instead treating them as part of Hearthstone and Woodstone, respectively. We recognize
they are all distinct and separate entities, but those distinctions are irrelevant to our
analysis.
                                                4
clause, no person or entity sought Hearthstone’s advice or opinions on that subject, nor
was Hearthstone involved in charging or collecting late rent fees.4
       Article 7 of the LPA specifies the scope of the parties’ managerial duties and their
allocation. Under section 7.1, the general partners “have full, exclusive and complete
charge of the management and control of” the partnership with their decisions “made by
majority vote.” The LPA provides that Woodstone, as administrative general partner
(AGP), has 90 votes and Hearthstone, as managing general partner (MGP), has 10 votes.
       Section 7.17, subdivision (a), describes Hearthstone’s “power and authority” as
MGP in pertinent part, as follows:“Except as otherwise set forth in this Agreement, the
[MGP], within the authority granted to it under this Agreement, shall have material
participation in the control, management and direction of the Partnership’s business for
the purposes stated in this Section 7.17, and shall manage and control the affairs of the
Partnership and use its commercially reasonable efforts to carry out the purpose of the
Partnership.[5] … The [MGP] shall apply for, use commercially reasonable efforts to
obtain and maintain the Property Tax Exemption for the Project.” Section 7.17,
subdivision (b) lists Hearthstone’s “substantial management duties” as MGP, including
“(i) monitor[ing] compliance with all governmental regulations …; [and] [¶] (ii)
participat[ing] in hiring and overseeing the work of all persons necessary to provide

       4
         In his declaration, Gancar (manager at Woodstone) also stated that Hearthstone
did not participate in either the decision to include a late rent fee clause in the lease
agreement or the collection of rents or late rent fees.
       5
         Section 2.4 of the LPA states that the “purpose of the Partnership” is to acquire
the land and improvements and “consistent with the charitable purposes of the [MGP], to
rehabilitate the Improvements, and maintain, own, operate, lease and otherwise deal with
the Project as a low–income rental housing project in accordance with the Project
Documents and the provisions of this Agreement.”
                                             5
services to the Partnership for the management and operation of [its] business.”6 The
LPA further provides that Hearthstone “may delegate all or any of its Substantial
Management Duties to the [AGP] … provided [] such delegation does not excuse the
[MGP] from overseeing and supervising on an ongoing basis the activities delegated.”
       The LPA describes Woodstone’s powers to include: (1) “sole authority” to make
“all property management decisions including, without limitation, hiring and firing” the
property manager (i.e., FPI); (2) execute all project documents “and any other
agreements or instruments of any nature whatsoever … without the signature of the
[MGP;]” and; (3) prepare the annual operating budget, file tax returns, and maintain
insurance on the project.
       According to Vasquez, Hearthstone performed three of the substantial
management duties under the LPA. Specifically, Hearthstone: (1) monitored compliance
with governmental requirements relating to the property tax exemption and low–income
housing tax credits, (2) signed the partnership documents related to the tax exemption,
and (3) ensured that charitable services or benefits, or information about such services or
benefits, were made available to the tenants. Hearthstone delegated the remaining
substantial management duties to Woodstone.
       Finally, pursuant to the LPA, Hearthstone was entitled to the following
compensation for its services as MGP: (1) a one–time payment of $10,000 upon
Woodstone’s acquisition of the property; (2) a one–time payment of $3,000 upon
Hearthstone filing the initial application for the property tax exemption; and (3) an
ongoing annual payment of $7,500 (increasing by 3% per year). As of the date

       6
        The LPA lists an additional four substantial management duties, including
executing and enforcing the Partnership’s contracts, executing and delivering Partnership
documents, preparing reports as required by the LPA, and providing “charitable services
or benefits” or information regarding same “to the low income housing tenants.”
(Section 7.17, subds. (b)(iii)–(vi).)
                                             6
Hearthstone’s summary adjudication motion was filed, it had received total compensation
of $44,477.20 under the LPA. Hearthstone also received a fractional ownership interest
of 0.001% in Woodstone but had not received any distributions in connection with this
interest.
              2. Evidence relating to agency and alter ego
       Vasquez declared that Woodstone “never represented Hearthstone [] in any
dealings with third persons [including the tenants at the property], nor has Hearthstone []
ever authorized any of them to do so.” In addition, Hearthstone and Woodstone are
separate and distinct entities, though Hearthstone has a 0.0001% equity interest in
Woodstone. The remaining equity in Woodstone is owned by other entities, but
Hearthstone owns no part of those entities. Hearthstone and Woodstone do not have
“common members, managers, shareholders, partners, directors, officers, employees,
parent companies, subsidiaries, or affiliated entities.” Hearthstone does not exercise
control over Woodstone, nor does Woodstone exercise control over Hearthstone.
       C. McGill’s opposition to the motion for summary adjudication
       In connection with her opposition, McGill submitted her counsel’s declaration,
which attached several exhibits. The trial court sustained Hearthstone’s objections to
various statements contained in counsel’s declaration, as well as two of the attached
exhibits (specifically, Exhibits A and F).7
       McGill’s remaining exhibits consisted of a copy of the lease agreement signed by
McGill (Exh. B), a ledger showing McGill paid late rent fees “on repeated occasion[,]
       7
        Exhibit A is a printout from a website showing various companies that share a
mailing address. Exhibit F is a document entitled “Agreement of Limited Partnership of
Woodstone by Vintage, LP, A California Limited Partnership,” dated September 15,
2016. In this appeal, McGill does not challenge the trial court’s rulings on Hearthstone’s
evidentiary objections and has therefore forfeited any claim that these rulings are
erroneous. (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
1171, 1177-1178.)
                                              7
[sic]” (Exh. C), the three day notice to pay rent or quit form notice produced “by
Woodstone/FPI when rent is late[,]” (Exh. D), “the FPI tracker” which Woodstone
produced to show how it determined the amount of the late rent fee (Exh. E), and a copy
of website pages, which appear to have been printed on March 18, 2022, from
www.vintagehousing.com and www.kennedywilson.com (Exh. G).
       D. Order granting summary adjudication
       Following a hearing, the trial court granted Hearthstone’s motion for summary
adjudication by written order dated June 21, 2022. The trial court concluded that
Hearthstone’s evidence met “its initial burden to show that it did not participate in or
have unbridled control over the alleged unlawful practice of charging late rent fees.” The
court found that McGill’s contentions that Hearthstone could be liable “for its failure to
act and exercise control over what terms were to be included in the tenant leases” and that
it “had an affirmative obligation under the law, and under the LPA, to stop the alleged
unlawful practice” were “contrary to the weight of legal authority.” In addition, the trial
court stated that McGill had failed to present evidence raising a triable issue of fact on the
question of whether Woodstone and FPI were Hearthstone’s agents. As to the issue of
alter ego liability, the trial court pointed out that the operative third amended complaint,
“filed pursuant to stipulation two months after this motion [for summary adjudication]
was filed—does not allege that Hearthstone [] is the alter ego of any other entity.”
(Italics in original.) Finally, the trial court rejected McGill’s contention that Hearthstone
is liable under Corporations Code section 15904.04, subdivision (a)8 because, as with her
alter ego claim, McGill had failed to allege such liability in her third amended complaint.

       8
        As the trial court correctly noted, that statute “imposes joint and several liability
on general partners of a limited partnership.”
                                              8
       E. Hearthstone demurs to the negligence cause of action
       Having obtained summary adjudication of McGill’s UCL cause of action in the
third amended complaint, Hearthstone subsequently demurred to her second cause of
action for negligence.
       In support of her negligence cause of action, McGill alleged that Hearthstone and
the other named defendants: (1) “as owners/operators/managers” of the rental property,
had “a duty to assure that the terms of their lease forms were legal[;]” and (2) breached
that duty by including a void late rent fee term in the lease forms. McGill further alleged
that, because the late rent fee term did not comply with Civil Code section 1671,
subdivision (d), it was therefore illegal and void and the defendants’ breach of duty
constituted “Negligence Per Se.” Finally, McGill alleged that she and the putative class
members suffered damages by paying the illegal late fees.
       In its demurrer, Hearthstone argued that McGill failed to allege sufficient facts to
state a cause of action for negligence, specifically to show that it owed her a statutory or
common law duty of care.
       In her opposition, McGill argued that pursuant to Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1383 (Beasley), a party may seek monetary relief from a void
liquidated damages clause under Civil Code section 1671 and therefore she should be
permitted to bring a negligence cause of action under this statute. In addition, McGill
argued that, as a result of the “special relationship” between a landlord and a tenant, a
tenant may bring a “negligence claim against landlords for the faults of its managers,”
such as Hearthstone.
       In the alternative, McGill requested leave to file a fourth amended complaint. Her
proposed pleading restated her UCL (only against Woodstone and HHF) and negligence
causes of action and added four new causes of action all of which were based on the
allegations regarding late rent fees. The new causes of action were, as follows: (1)
                                              9
violation of Civil Code section 1671; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) promissory
estoppel; and (4) breach of contract.9
       The trial court sustained Hearthstone’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding
that McGill had failed to allege facts to establish that Hearthstone owed a statutory or
common law duty of care “to assure that the terms of [the] lease are legal.” In addition,
the court concluded that McGill’s negligence cause of action was “barred by the
economic loss rule.”
       The court also denied McGill’s request to file a fourth amended complaint, noting
that, to the extent she was seeking leave to state new causes of action, she must file a
separate noticed motion.
       After McGill did not file a motion for leave to amend,10 the court entered a
judgment of dismissal in favor of Hearthstone on October 11, 2022. McGill timely
appealed.

       9
        This cause of action was premised on allegations that McGill and other tenants
were third–party beneficiaries of the LPA.
       10
           At oral argument, Hearthstone argued that McGill has forfeited any claim of
error relating to amendment of her pleading by failing to bring such a noticed motion.
Although we exercise our discretion to consider McGill’s contentions on the merits,
forfeiture is a colorable argument. “The general rule allowing a plaintiff to
request leave to amend for the first time on appeal does not apply [] if the trial court
sustains a demurrer with leave to amend and the plaintiff elects not to amend the
pleading. [Citation.]” (Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 837, 861.) Although here the trial court sustained Hearthstone’s demurrer
without leave to amend, the same exception applies where the trial court offers, and the
plaintiff “decline[s,] an opportunity to amend the pleading.” (Ibid.)

                                             10
                                      II.   DISCUSSION
       A. Request for judicial notice
       McGill requested that we take judicial notice of certain pleadings and an order
granting class certification filed in a federal action, Munguia-Brown, et al. v. Equity
Residential, et al., United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
Case No. 4:16-cv01225. Specifically, McGill has requested that this court take judicial
notice of: (1) the Third Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Relief,
and Restitution, filed November 16, 2011; (2) the federal court’s October 2, 2017 Order
Granting Motion for Class Certification; and (3) Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint, filed February 22, 2017. McGill explains that these
documents are relevant to counter the trial court’s decision in this case that “no cause of
action exists under Civil Code section 1671” by demonstrating “that such a[] [cause of]
action has previously been brought, answered and certified as a class action.”
       Hearthstone’s opposition to the request for judicial notice argues that the
documents in question are not relevant. In addition, Hearthstone notes that the request
fails to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.252 as McGill does not indicate
whether she asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the matter (and if so, whether
judicial notice was taken by the trial court) or whether the matter relates to proceedings
occurring after the order or judgment that is the subject of the appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.252(a)(2) (B) & (D).)
       By separate order dated May 16, 2023, we deferred ruling on this request for
consideration with the merits of the appeal.
       “Although a court may judicially notice a variety of matters (Evid. Code, § 450 et
seq.), only relevant material may be noticed.” (Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063.) “ ‘The court may in its discretion take judicial notice of
any court record in the United States. (Evid. Code, § 451.) This includes any orders,
                                               11
findings of facts and conclusions of law, and judgments within court records. [Citations.]
However, while courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document
in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of
the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files. [Citation.] Courts may not
take judicial notice of allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court
records because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require
formal proof.’ [Citation.]” (Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140,
145.)
        Although we have the discretion to take judicial notice of court records, including
those from federal courts, the truth of the matters set forth in those documents, i.e., as
alleged in the pleadings and as recited in the district court’s order on class certification, is
not the proper subject of judicial notice, and the existence of these documents alone is
irrelevant to our decision. Even assuming the district court’s order on class certification
had any bearing on whether or not an independent cause of action can be stated for an
alleged violation of Civil Code section 1671, that order would be persuasive authority at
best. “The [class] certification question is ‘essentially a procedural one that does not ask
whether an action is legally or factually meritorious.’ [Citation.]” (Sav-On Drug Stores,
Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326.)
        The request for judicial notice is denied.
        B. No error in granting summary adjudication of McGill’s UCL claim
        McGill raises several arguments to explain why, in her view, the trial court erred
in granting Hearthstone’s motion for summary adjudication of her UCL cause of action.
First, she contends Hearthstone was a direct participant in the unlawful conduct. Second,
if not a direct participant, Hearthstone is liable under the UCL as Woodstone’s agent or
alter ego. Third, pursuant to Corporations Code section 15904.04, Hearthstone is liable

                                              12
for the acts and omissions of the partnership that violate the UCL. As explained below,
we disagree.
               1. Standard of review
       “A motion for summary adjudication ‘proceed[s] in all procedural respects as a
motion for summary judgment.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (t)(5).) The moving
party ‘bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the
nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if [the movant] carries [this] burden of
production,’ the burden of production shifts to the opposing party ‘to make a prima facie
showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.’ [Citation.]” (Choochagi v.
Barracuda Networks, Inc. (2020) 60 Cal.App.5th 444, 453 (Choochagi).)
       “In determining whether the parties have met their respective burdens, ‘the court
must “consider all of the evidence” and “all” of the “inferences” reasonably drawn
therefrom [citation], and must view such evidence [citations] and such inferences
[citations], in the light most favorable to the opposing party.’ [Citation.]” (Choochagi,
supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 453.) “ ‘There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only
if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor
of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       “ ‘In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment [or summary
adjudication], … “ ‘[w]e take the facts from the record that was before the trial court
when it ruled on that motion’ ” and “ ‘ “ ‘review the trial court’s decision de novo … .’ ”
’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Choochagi, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 453.)

               2. Elements of a UCL cause of action
       “The purpose of the UCL ‘is to protect both consumers and competitors by
promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.’ ” (Solus
Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 316, 340.) To that end,
                                          13
the UCL “ ‘provides an equitable means through which both public prosecutors and
private individuals can bring suit to prevent unfair business practices and restore money
or property to victims of these practices.’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted.) The Business and
Professions Code section 17200 “defines ‘unfair competition’ to include ‘any unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’ ([Bus. & Prof. Code, ]§ 17200.) … By
proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200 “borrows” violations of
other laws and treats them as unlawful practices’ that the unfair competition law makes
independently actionable.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular
Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180, fn. omitted.)

              3. Hearthstone’s evidence met its initial burden of proof on its direct
                liability under the UCL
       In this case, Hearthstone’s motion for summary adjudication is supported by
evidence, specifically the declarations of Vasquez and Gancar, as well as the LPA,
demonstrating that it was not asked nor did it provide input on the terms of the lease
agreement, including the late rent fee, was not involved in enforcing or collecting the late
rent fee, and was not aware that late rent fees were imposed on tenants until McGill filed
her complaint. Hearthstone’s evidence further shows that its role in the partnership was
limited to: (1) securing and maintaining the low–income housing property tax exemption,
and (2) providing charitable services or information about such services to the property’s
tenants. This evidence is sufficient to meet Hearthstone’s initial burden of proof that it
was not engaged in the unlawful practice alleged by McGill.
       We are not persuaded by McGill’s assertion that the terms of the LPA mandated
Hearthstone’s involvement in including and enforcing the alleged illegal late rent fee.
McGill cites two cases, People v. JTH Tax (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219 (JTH Tax) and
Khan v. Medical Board (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1834 (Khan), to support her claim that

                                             14
Hearthstone’s obligations under the LPA are sufficient to impose liability under the UCL
for the late rent fee. These cases are distinguishable.
       In JTH Tax, the defendant franchisor (Liberty), a business providing “tax
preparation and related loan services,” was found liable under various consumer
protection laws including the UCL for, among other things, the false advertising of its
franchisees. (JTH Tax, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1223.) On appeal, the court
concluded that the evidence presented below demonstrated that Liberty had “essentially
complete control” over its franchisees. (Id. at pp.1239-1240.) Therefore, Liberty’s
franchisees were its agents, rather than independent contractors, and Liberty was
therefore liable under the UCL for their false advertising. (Id. at pp. 1242-1243.) Under
California law, “ ‘[t]he general rule is where a franchise agreement gives the franchisor
the right of complete or substantial control over the franchisee, an agency relationship
exists. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1242.)
       JTH Tax thus stands for the principle that, where a party can exercise unfettered
control over another, a principal-agency relationship will be found. In this case,
however, McGill offered no evidence to show that Hearthstone had any control over the
terms of the lease agreements or the amount charged for late rent by Woodstone.
       In Khan, the defendant physician was found to have engaged in false advertising
by placing the names of two people not licensed to practice medicine on the door to his
office. (Khan, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1838-1839.) On appeal, he argued the
finding must be reversed because the placement of names “was done out of a mistake of
fact, which disproves any criminal intent.” (Id. at pp. 1845-1846.) The Court of Appeal
rejected his argument, concluding that the statute at issue, Business and Professions Code
section 17500, is a public welfare offense which can be violated through negligence and
without criminal intent. (Id. at p. 1846.) The defendant “knew for a fact that Ms. Khan
[defendant’s sister] was not licensed, yet he permitted her name to be on his door and
                                              15
listed in the lobby as a doctor practicing in his clinic.” (Ibid.) As to the second
unlicensed individual, the defendant “had the responsibility to assure that Mr. Mar was
licensed” but failed to do so thereby breaching his duty of reasonable care. (Ibid.)
       Khan is inapposite because it would apply only if there were some evidence
Hearthstone had a duty to direct and control Woodstone’s operations and the terms of its
rental agreements. As discussed above, Hearthstone’s evidence demonstrates it did not
have such a duty or control. Considering all reasonable inferences to be drawn from all
the evidence and in the light most favorable to McGill, we conclude that Hearthstone has
made a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact
under the UCL cause of action. (Choochagi, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 453.)

              4. McGill’s evidence fails to raise a triable issue of fact on Hearthstone’s
                direct liability under the UCL
       McGill’s opposing evidence, at least that which was not ruled inadmissible, does
not raise a triable issue of fact as to Hearthstone’s direct culpability under the UCL. The
admissible evidence shows only that, pursuant to the lease agreement, Woodstone owned
the property McGill leased, FPI was Woodstone’s agent and the on-site property
manager, and late payment of rent would incur a $50 fee. According to Woodstone’s
discovery responses, FPI created a document entitled “Late Fee Tracker” and Woodstone
based the amount of the late rent fee on the information in that document. In addition,
McGill submitted evidence that she paid late rent fees on four separate occasions from
2017 to 2019. None of this evidence raises a triable issue of fact as to Hearthstone’s
liability under the UCL for late rent fees.
       We are also not persuaded by McGill’s argument that Hearthstone could be liable
as a direct participant under section 7.17, subdivision (b) of the LPA which requires that
it “monitor compliance with … governmental regulations” and “participate in …
overseeing” the work of management personnel. McGill cites no government regulation

                                              16
regarding late rent fees with which Woodstone or FPI were to comply under
Hearthstone’s watch. Further, assuming arguendo that Hearthstone breached its
contractual obligations under the LPA, those obligations were owed to the other
party(ies) to that contract, not McGill or any other tenant.11

              5. McGill’s evidence also fails to raise a triable issue of fact on
                Hearthstone’s liability as Woodstone’s agent
       McGill also argues Hearthstone is liable for its actions as Woodstone’s agent. She
relies on Civil Code section 2343, subdivision 3, which provides that “[o]ne who assumes
to act as an agent is responsible to third persons as a principal for his [her, or their] acts in
the course of his [her, or their] agency … [¶¶] [w]hen his [her, or their] acts are wrongful
in their nature.” McGill contends that Hearthstone “acted wrongfully in allowing the
improper late fee to be imposed” by failing to “assur[e] regulatory compliance” and “not
participating in the oversight of the property manager” as it was required to do under the
LPA.
       While Hearthstone does not dispute that it was Woodstone’s agent, its declarations
and the LPA established that it played no role in drafting lease agreements or enforcing
their terms and thus did not commit any wrongful acts such that it would be liable under
the UCL by way of Civil Code section 2343, subdivision 3. Furthermore, Civil Code
section 2343 “only makes an agent liable for affirmative misfeasance; it does not render
an agent liable to third parties for the failure to perform duties owed to his principal.
[Citation.] … [¶] … so long as that failure to perform did not breach a duty of care the
agent owed to the third parties.” (Peredia v. HR Mobile Services, Inc. (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th. 680, 694, italics in original.) Notwithstanding her arguments to the

       11
         In addition, it is well-settled that the UCL “is not an all-purpose substitute for a
… contract action.” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th
163, 173.)
                                               17
contrary, McGill has not presented any evidence that Hearthstone engaged in any
affirmative misfeasance or wrongful acts, failed to perform any duties owed to
Woodstone, or as discussed post, breached any duty of care owed to McGill.
       Because Hearthstone’s evidence met its initial burden of proving that it was not
liable either directly or as Woodstone’s agent under the UCL and McGill failed to present
evidence raising a triable issue of fact on the matter, the trial court properly granted
Hearthstone’s motion for summary adjudication of that cause of action.

              6. McGill cannot defeat summary adjudication through unpleaded
                theories of alter ego liability or liability under Corporations Code
                section 15904.04 and her lack of diligence in seeking leave to amend
                her pleading forecloses those theories
       Although McGill claims on appeal that Hearthstone is liable as an alter ego of
Woodstone or pursuant to Corporations Code section 15904.04,12 she concedes that she
did not allege these theories of liability in her pleadings. It is well-settled that “summary
[adjudication] cannot be denied on a ground not raised by the pleadings. [Citations.]”
(Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1662-1663, italics in
original.) “The counteraffidavits [sic] filed in response to a defendant’s motion for
summary [adjudication] may not create issues outside the pleadings; are not a substitute
for an amendment to the pleadings; and are an ineffective defense to the motion unless
they ‘set forth facts showing that . . . a good cause of action exists upon the merits.’
[Citations.]” (Craig v. Earl (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 652, 656.) As a result, McGill

       12
          Corporations Code section 15904.04 provides as follows: “(a) Except as
otherwise provided in subdivision (b), all general partners are liable jointly and severally
for all obligations of the limited partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or
provided by law. [¶] (b) A person that becomes a general partner of an existing limited
partnership is not personally liable for an obligation of a limited partnership incurred
before the person became a general partner.”
                                              18
cannot rely on either alter ego liability or Corporations Code section 15904.0413 as a
basis for defeating Hearthstone’s summary adjudication motion.
       McGill next argues that the trial court should have granted her leave to amend her
pleading to add alter ego allegations and allegations regarding Corporations Code section
15904.04 in the complaint.
       We agree with the trial court that McGill is precluded from seeking leave to
amend for this purpose. Her failure to include any such allegations in her third amended
complaint, “filed pursuant to stipulation two months after [Hearthstone’s] motion [for
summary adjudication] was filed” (italics in original) is dispositive. (See Melican v.
Regents of University of California (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 175 [no abuse of
discretion in denying leave to amend pleading where long unexplained delay or lack of
diligence in seeking leave to amend].)
       C. No abuse of discretion in sustaining demurrer
       We next examine whether the trial court erred in sustaining Hearthstone’s
demurrer to McGill’s negligence cause of action without leave to amend. As discussed
below, we conclude that there was no error.
              1. Applicable legal principles

       13
          McGill seeks to avoid her failure to refer to Corporations Code section 15904.04
by suggesting that Hearthstone’s moving papers and her opposition to the motion for
summary adjudication suffice to put the matter at issue. We reject her expansive
definition of what constitutes “the pleadings” for purposes of motions of summary
judgment/adjudication. “Code of Civil Procedure section 420 explains that pleadings
serve the function of setting forth ‘the formal allegations by the parties of their respective
claims and defenses, for the judgment of the Court.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 420.)” (Myers v.
Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 746 (Myers).) Code of Civil
Procedure section 422.10 provides that “[t]he pleadings allowed in civil actions are
complaints, demurrers, answers, and cross-complaints.” “[N]either a motion for
summary judgment nor its accompanying statement of undisputed facts constitutes
pleadings within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 422.10.” (Myers,
supra, at p. 747.)
                                               19
       We perform an independent review of a ruling on a demurrer and decide de novo
whether the challenged pleading states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
(Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48
Cal.4th 32, 42; McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.) “In
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by
long-settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly
pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We
also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.
[Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.]” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39
Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); see also Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist. (1997) 14
Cal.4th 1066, 1075.)
       A cause of action for negligence must allege the following elements: (1) a duty of
care owed by the defendant, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) that breach was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s resulting injury. (Nally v. Grace Community Church
(1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 292.) “ ‘A duty of care may arise through statute’ or by operation
of the common law. [Citation.]” (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th
905, 920 (Sheen).) The absence of a legal duty defeats any claim of negligence. (J.L. v.
Children's Institute, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 388, 396.) Furthermore, the existence
of a duty of care to support a negligence cause of action is a question of law to be decided
by the court. (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 770-771.)
              2. Analysis
       McGill’s second cause of action alleges that Hearthstone, along with HHF and
Woodstone, own, operate, and manage the property she formerly rented. The defendants
thus had a duty of care to ensure that the terms of her rental agreement, including the late
                                             20
rent fee term, complied with the law. Hearthstone and the other defendants breached
their duty of care because the late rent fee term violates Civil Code section 1671,
subdivision (d) and McGill suffered damages when she was compelled to pay such fees.
       As noted above, the existence of a duty of care is a question of law, so we are not
bound by McGill’s allegation that Hearthstone as “owner[]/operator[]/manager[] had a
duty to assure that the terms of their lease forms were legal.” The trial court, in
sustaining Hearthstone’s demurrer, correctly observed that McGill is mistaken in
asserting that a duty of care arises under Civil Code section 1671 because that statute
“does not require a defendant to engage in certain conduct or act in any particular
manner.” Civil Code section 1671, subdivision (d) provides a rubric for determining
whether “a provision in a contract liquidating damages” for breach of a contract is void.14
       Both parties cite Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d 1383
(Beasley) as supporting their respective positions. Beasley does state that Civil Code
“section 1671, subdivision (d) permits a consumer to seek monetary relief, both
offensively and defensively, from liquidated damages.” (Id. at p. 1401.) However, we do
not read this language to mean that the statute imposes a duty of care supporting a tort
cause of action. In fact, the Beasley court appeared to assume that the plaintiff’s action
sounded in contract, not tort. (See id. at p. 1402 [concluding that four-year statute of
limitations for action on a written contract applies to claim for recovery of void liquidated
damages.])15 Accordingly, we conclude that McGill cannot rely on Civil Code section
1671 to state a negligence cause of action.
       14
          Civil Code section 1671, subd. (d) provides in pertinent part: “[A] provision in a
contract liquidating damages for the breach of the contract is void except that the parties
to such a contract may agree therein upon an amount which shall be presumed to be the
amount of damage sustained by a breach thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it
would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage.”
       15
         As Hearthstone is not a party to the lease agreement, McGill cannot allege a
breach of contract claim against it without showing that she is a third–party beneficiary of
                                             21
       We also reject McGill’s argument that she may assert a negligence cause of action
against Hearthstone because a “special relationship” existed between herself, as a tenant,
and Hearthstone, as her landlord. “A special relationship between the defendant and the
victim is one that ‘gives the victim a right to expect’ protection from the defendant,” such
as the relationship “between parents and children, colleges and students, [or] employers
and employees.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 216.) McGill has
not alleged facts establishing the existence of any relationship, let alone a “special
relationship,” between herself and Hearthstone. The lease agreement attached to her third
amended complaint does not name Hearthstone at all. The only other entities named in
that agreement, aside from herself, are Woodstone (as owner) and FPI (as property
manager).
       As McGill failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Hearthstone owed her a
duty of care and there is no reasonable probability she could amend her complaint to state
a negligence cause of action, the trial court did not err in sustaining Hearthstone’s
demurrer to that cause of action without leave to amend.

       D. No abuse of discretion in not granting leave to further amend McGill’s
          pleading
       We now turn to whether the trial court properly denied McGill leave to file a
fourth amended complaint stating additional novel causes of action.
       McGill’s proposed fourth amended complaint, which she submitted to the court
with her opposition to Hearthstone’s demurrer, added four new causes of action, i.e.,
violation of Civil Code section 1671,16 promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation,

that contract. (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830 (Goonewardene).)
We explain in section II.D.4 why she cannot do so.
       16
         We have already explained why McGill cannot state a claim for relief against
Hearthstone pursuant to Civil Code section 1671 and will not repeat that discussion here.
                                             22
and breach of contract. Each of the new causes of action were premised on the allegedly
illegal late rental fee clause. McGill explained that she had not previously asserted these
causes of action because defendants had only recently cited to Sheen, supra, 12 Cal.5th
905, in connection with their demurrer to her third amended complaint.17
              1. Applicable legal principles
       A trial court may allow the amendment of a pleading at any time up to and
including trial. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473, subd. (a)(1), 576.) “ ‘ “[T]he trial court has
wide discretion in allowing the amendment of any pleading [citations], [and] as a matter
of policy the ruling of the trial court in such matters will be upheld unless a manifest or
gross abuse of discretion is shown. [Citations.]” ’ [Citations.] Courts must apply a
policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the
proceedings . . . when no prejudice is shown to the adverse party. [Citation.]” (Huff v.
Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 746 (Huff).)
       “ ‘When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend the petitioner may
advance on appeal a new legal theory why the allegations of the petition state a cause of
action.’ [Citation.] This is so because of the general rule that ‘ “a litigant may raise for
the first time on appeal a pure question of law which is presented by undisputed facts.” ’
[Citation.]” (Dudley v. Department of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 259.)
“The plaintiff has the burden of proving that an amendment would cure the defect [in the
pleading].” (Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311,
320.) Moreover, “[l]eave to amend is properly denied when the facts are undisputed and
as a substantive matter no liability exists under the plaintiff’s new theory.” (Huff, supra,
138 Cal.App.4th at p. 746.) Leave to amend is also properly denied where the proposed

       17
         Hearthstone points out that it filed its demurrer to McGill’s third amended
complaint four months after the California Supreme Court decided Sheen. Sheen was
filed on March 7, 2022, and Hearthstone’s demurrer was filed on July 6, 2022.
                                               23
amendment effects “a change … in the liability sought to be enforced against the
defendant.” (Klopstock v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1941) 17 Cal.2d 13, 20,
italics added.)
        The trial court’s ruling on a motion to amend a pleading is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. (Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118,
135.) Furthermore, we must “begin our analysis mindful that an ‘order of a lower court is
presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in
favor of its correctness.’ ” (In re Marriage of Grimes & Mou (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 406,
421.)

               2. McGill’s allegations do not state a claim for negligent
                 misrepresentation
        McGill asserts she can allege a claim for negligent misrepresentation by
Hearthstone because the lease agreement states that the fee “ ‘represent[s] a reasonable
approximation of the damages Owner is likely to suffer from a late . . . payment.’ ” We
disagree.
        The elements of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation are: (1) “a
misrepresentation of fact by a person who has no reasonable grounds for believing it to
be true,” (2) intent to induce the plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentation, (3) actual
and justifiable reliance by the plaintiff, and (4) resulting damage. (Chapman v. Skype
Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 230-231.) Because a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation sounds in fraud, each element must be pleaded with specificity. (Ibid.)
“The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when,
where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a
corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the
representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they

                                              24
spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made.” (West v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793.)
        McGill has set forth no specific allegations that Hearthstone negligently gave false
information to her in connection with the $50 late fee. McGill proffers no specific facts
to show that Hearthstone was involved in drafting the lease agreement and knew or
should have known that the “approximation of damages” language is inaccurate or false.
Furthermore, since Hearthstone is not even named in the lease agreement, it is not clear
how McGill could allege that it made any misrepresentations to her therein. As a result,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion since
McGill has failed to show a reasonable possibility she can amend her complaint to state a
claim for negligent misrepresentation against Hearthstone. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p.
318.)

               3. McGill’s allegations do not state a claim for promissory estoppel
        A claim for promissory estoppel consists of four elements: “ ‘[1] A promise [2]
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee or a third person [] [3] which does induce such action or forbearance . .
. [and 4] injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.’ ” (Kajima/Ray
Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th
305, 310.) The promise must be one that is “clear and unambiguous in its terms.” (Laks
v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 885, 890.) Claims for promissory
estoppel are “basically the same as contract actions, but only missing the consideration
element.” (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 903,
italics added.)
        Like her claim for negligent misrepresentation, McGill’s promissory estoppel
cause of action fails to allege facts showing that Hearthstone was involved in drafting the
lease agreement and thus made any sort of promise to her. Hearthstone is not named in
                                           25
or a party to the lease agreement and any promises contained therein cannot be ascribed
to it. The trial court did not abuse its discretion since McGill has failed to show a
reasonable possibility she can amend her complaint to state a promissory estoppel cause
of action against Hearthstone. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)

            4. McGill’s allegations do not establish she is a third party beneficiary of the
              contract between FPI and Woodstone
       Finally, McGill seeks to allege a breach of contract action against Hearthstone
because she and other class members are third party beneficiaries to the contract between
Hearthstone and Woodstone, i.e., the LPA. She avers that Hearthstone contracted to “ ‘
monitor compliance with all government regulations” and “ ‘participate in hiring and
overseeing the work of all persons necessary to provide services for the management and
operation of the Partnership.’ ” McGill alleges that the “purpose of these provisions was
to assure that tenants such as herself and others could rely upon and benefit from the
legality and enforceability of terms of the lease, that no illegal conduct would occur due
or through them and that said Defendants would assure this.” Again, we disagree.18
       The California Supreme Court has explained that the third party beneficiary
doctrine will be applied when, after “carefully examin[ing] the express provisions of the
contract at issue, as well as all of the relevant circumstances under which the contract was
agreed to,” it can be determined: “(1) whether the third party would in fact benefit from

       18
          McGill failed to attach a copy of the LPA to her proposed fourth amended
complaint, but Hearthstone submitted the document as evidence in support of its motion
for summary adjudication. McGill did not object to any of Hearthstone’s evidence and
specifically referenced the LPA in her opposition papers. Because the LPA is part of the
record on appeal, we will treat it as having been attached to the proposed fourth amended
complaint. In an action based on a written contract, a plaintiff may plead the legal effect
of the contract, plead its precise language, or attach a copy of the contract to the
complaint to be incorporated by reference. (See Construction Protective Services, Inc. v.
TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199; Miles v. Deutsche Bank National
Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 401-402.)
                                             26
the contract, but also (2) whether a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to
provide a benefit to the third party, and (3) whether permitting a third party to bring its
own breach of contract action against a contracting party is consistent with the objectives
of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties. All three
elements must be satisfied to permit the third party action to go forward.”
(Goonewardene, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 830.) The court clarified that as to the second
element, “the contracting parties must have a motivating purpose to benefit the third
party, and not simply knowledge that a benefit to the third party may follow from the
contract.” (Ibid.)
       In Goonewardene, the California Supreme Court found the “motivating purpose”
element of the third party beneficiary doctrine could not be met under the facts of that
case. “When an employer hires a payroll company, providing a benefit to employees
with regard to the wages they receive is ordinarily not a motivating purpose of the
transaction. Instead, the relevant motivating purpose is to provide a benefit to the
employer, with regard to the cost and efficiency of the tasks performed and the avoidance
of potential penalties. Although the employer intends that the payroll company will
accurately calculate the wages owed . . . under the applicable labor statutes and wage
orders, in situations in which it may be unclear or debatable as to how the applicable
rules should be interpreted or applied, the employer would reasonably expect the payroll
company to proceed with the employer’s interest in mind. In short, the relevant
motivating purpose of the contract is simply to assist the employer in the performance of
its required tasks, not to provide a benefit to its employees with regard to the amount of
wages they receive.” (Goonewardene, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 835.)
       The same analysis controls here. The “motivating purpose” of the LPA was to
secure the low–income housing tax exemption to benefit Woodstone, not to ensure that
the terms in the lease agreements between Woodstone and its tenants were legal.
                                             27
(Goonewardene, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 835.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion because McGill has not shown a reasonable possibility she can amend her
complaint to allege a claim for breach of contract as a third party beneficiary against
Hearthstone. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
                                   III.   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Hearthstone shall recover its costs on appeal.

                                             28
                                             ____________________________
                                             WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.

_____________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.

McGill v. Hearthstone CA Properties I, LLC
H050636