Court Opinion

ID: 9709731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:53:44.499771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.633141
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
This case raises two distinct issues: whether Mr. Levinson’s law firm as a whole should be disqualified from representing District Council 33 in an action against the City of Philadelphia, and whether Mr. Levinson should be disqualified from participation in the litigation.
I would agree with Mr. Justice Nix that the firm’s representation of the union in this litigation does not implicate the type of appearance of impropriety which requires its disqualification if, after a further evidentiary hearing, it is found that Mr. Levinson has not participated in the litigation thus far. However, I concur with that part of the majority’s opinion holding that Mr. Levinson himself should be disqualified from any involvement in the litigation 1 even though the action in controversy is not over a contract which Levinson negotiated.2
Since the construction of that language will be the significant issue in the litigation, there would be an appearance of impropriety if Mr. Levinson was in any way involved in litigating the language in a contract which he once played a significant role in negotiating. The appearance of impropriety would disappear with Mr. Levinson out of the picture, *506and the union would not be prejudiced by having to seek new counsel.
Further, Mr. Levinson should be carefully shielded from any participation in the matter. This means that he be denied access to all relevant files and related documents, that he be excluded from receiving any fees derived from the case, that attorneys in the firm refrain from discussing the litigation in his presence, and that he not disclose any information regarding the negotiations of 1975 to members of his law firm. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 442-443 (2d Cir.1980), vac. on other grounds, McAlpin v. Armstrong, 449 U.S. 1106, 101 S.Ct. 911, 66 L.Ed.2d 835 (1981).
The practice of screening former government attorneys from cases in which they played a role while in the government has been used previously. In Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 214 Ct.Cl. 124 (1977), the law firm of a former general counsel of the Federal Housing Administration was not disqualified from a case brought against the FHA by the firm; rather, he was screened from participation in the litigation and would not collect any fees derived from the case. The Court stated that the “inexorable disqualification of an entire firm for the disqualification of a single member or associate, is entirely too harsh and should be mitigated by appropriate screening....” id. 555 F.2d at 793. See also, Armstrong v. McAlpin, supra., Kadish v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 553 F.Supp. 660 (N.D.Ill.1982); Central Milk Producers Co-Op v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.1978).
My view is fully consistent with the disciplinary rule governing such a situation. Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) provides:
A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.
Ethical Consideration 9-3 further provides:
After a lawyer leaves judicial office or other public employment, he should not accept employment in connection *507with any matter in which he had substantial responsibility prior to his leaving, since to accept employment would give the appearance of impropriety even if none exists.
The clear language of the Rule and the Ethical Consideration uses the word “lawyer,” and does not mandate that the law firm of a lawyer, who had a substantial role in a matter while a public employee, be disqualified in every case. The extension of DR 9-101(B) proposed by the majority goes too far. A per se rule requiring the disqualification of an entire law firm when an individual lawyer of that law firm is disqualified is not mandated by DR 9-101(B). Such a per se rule is unfair to litigants, and is impractical, considering the great degree of interchange of lawyers from the public to the private sector. Rather, case-by-case analysis is required to examine whether an entire law firm need be disqualified to remove any appearance of impropriety under Canon 9.
The holding of the majority requiring the disqualification of the law firm is also contrary to the way in which Rule 1.11(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, addresses such a situation. The rule, recently proposed by the American Bar Association and under consideration by this Court, speaks in terms of individual attorneys, like DR 9-101(B), and provides:
RULE 1.11 Successive Government and Private Employment
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
*508(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.
The proposed rule, and the rule I urge in this opinion provides a rational balance allowing a litigant the freedom to choose counsel as he wishes, while, at the same time, avoiding the appearance of impropriety.
Thus, I would remand this proceeding for further hearings to inquire whether Mr. Levinson has been involved in the litigation of this case and if he has, his firm should be disqualified as well in order to dispel any appearance of impropriety. If, on the other hand, Mr. Levinson has not been involved in the case, his firm could continue to represent the union, with Mr. Levinson screened from participation in the case.

. I also agree with the majority that this case is properly within our jurisdiction. Considering the important public nature of this issue, this Court may exercise its plenary jurisdiction. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 726. Further, an interlocutory appeal may be taken by permission under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b), Pa.R.App.P. 1311.

. The contract which is in dispute was negotiated in 1982 after Mr. Levinson left office. However, the language in controversy is identical to language in a contract which was negotiated by Mr. Levinson by virtue of a continuity clause in the 1982 contract.