Court Opinion

ID: 9756364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:25:46.852642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:49.647903
License: Public Domain

*90RAKER, Judge,
with whom WILNER, Judge, joins, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority explicitly overrules Richwind v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994)—a case that, until today, had never had any doubt east upon it by this Court or any other — and holds that by enacting the Baltimore ■ City Housing Code, the City Council intended to abolish the element of notice in a common law negligence action for injuries resulting from flaking, loose or peeling paint. In the process of overruling Richwind, the majority also reads into the Code an ongoing, affirmative duty by landlords to inspect periodically each of their housing units for loose or flaking paint for as long as they retain ownership of the premises. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the ordinance does away with the traditional, common law notice requirement to the landlord as a. precursor to liability for negligence. I would not overrule Richwind in this regard.1
I.
It is helpful to understand first what the majority’s holding actually means and its implications for landlords and tenants in Baltimore. A violation of Baltimore’s Housing Code occurs when the landlord does not comply with § 703, which mandates, in relevant part, that “[a]ll walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors and windows shall be kept clean and free of any flaking, loose or peeling paint....” Housing Code, Baltimore City Code (2000 Supp.) Art. 13, § 703(b)(3). The majority asserts that “if the plaintiffs can establish a violation of the Housing Code which proximately caused [their] injuries, then the plaintiffs are entitled to have ... their complaint submitted to the trier of facts.” Maj. op. at 81. Read together, the result of the majority’s holding is astounding: Any flaking, loose or peeling paint in a leased premises, combined with an injury from lead paint, automatically gives rise to a cognizable action, *91worthy of a jury trial. The majority admits as much in summarizing its holding:
“In sum, the presence of flaking, loose, or peeling paint is a violation of the Housing Code. As earlier pointed out, certain provisions of the Housing Code were clearly enacted to prevent lead poisoning in children. Therefore, the plaintiff Sean is in the class of people intended to be protected by the Housing Code, and his injury, lead poisoning, is the kind of injury intended to be prevented by the Code. This is all the plaintiffs must show to establish a prima facie case sounding in negligence.”
Id. at 89. (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted). The majority’s new rule means that the landlord will be forced to defend the case in court even if the plaintiff concedes that the landlord behaved reasonably in not knowing about a Code violation. Without any express instruction, the majority reads into the statute the dramatic institution of a wholly new regulatory scheme that essentially imposes strict liability upon landlords and makes landlords the insurers of litigants for injuries sustained by a minor plaintiff due to exposure to lead-based paint. See Richwind, 335 Md. at 674-75, 645 A.2d at 1153 (noting that lack of a notice requirement to the landlord could impose a standard amounting to strict liability for any defect arising on the premises during the term of the lease); Benik v. Hatcher, 358 Md. 507, 750 A.2d 10 (2000) (reaffirming the Richwind holding that there is no duty to inspect premises during the tenancy). Furthermore, the majority’s new rule means that plaintiff tenants will no longer be required to notify landlords of hazards in their dwelling home, hazards that they, not the landlord, are in the best position to identify.
The common law used to deal with such unfairness by providing that a landlord who had a valid excuse, such as lack of notice, for not remedying the violation would not be held liable, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288A(2)(b) (1965) (excusing liability for violation of a legislative enactment or administrative regulation when defendant neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance). But under the majority’s new rule, no such excuse is relevant.
*92II.
It is axiomatic that statutes are presumed not to make any alterations or innovations in the common law further than is expressly declared, and that when a statute does expressly revise the common law, it should be strictly construed. Zetty v. Piatt, 365 Md. 141, 153, 776 A.2d 631, 638 (2001) (noting that absent a clear indication to the contrary, we assume that a statute or ordinance did not intend to amend, nullify, or supersede the common law); see also Bruce v. Dyer, 309 Md. 421, 431-32, 524 A.2d 777, 782 (1987); MacBride v. Gulbro, 247 Md. 727, 729, 234 A.2d 586, 588 (1967); 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 50.05 (4th ed.1984).
In this case, we have a well-settled principle in Maryland common law that an element of a prima facie case for negligence for injuries resulting from lead-based paint is that the landlord knew or had reason to know of flaking paint on the premises. Although we articulated this rule in Richwind, its principles and origins had been well-established and thoroughly developed in this State’s common law. See Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d 548, 554 (1976); Ramsey v. D.P.A. Associates, 265 Md. 319, 322, 289 A.2d 321, 323 (1972); Katz v. Holsinger, 264 Md. 307, 312, 286 A.2d 115, 118 (1972); Pinehurst Co. v. Phelps, 163 Md. 68, 73, 160 A. 736, 738 (1932). Moreover, it has been followed since Richwind by this Court without disapproval. See, e.g., Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding, 362 Md. 661, 766 A.2d 617 (2001); Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 744 A.2d 47 (2000). Thus, when we decided Richwind, we confirmed only what the common law clearly mandated, particularly in light of the City Council’s lack of an express intent to abolish or modify this rule.
Furthermore, although the majority refers to § 17.6 of the Restatement (Second) of Property in support of its holding, in actuality, when one examines the official commentary to that section, it is obvious that the Restatement affirms the common law requirement of notice, even in view of a statute that *93imposes a duty on the landlord to maintain safely the premises. The commentary reads as follows:
“a. Rationale. Insofar as a duty created by a statute or administrative regulation is concerned, the rule of this section is based on the assumption that the statute or regulation represents a legislative determination of the standard of conduct required of the landlord, so that the violation constitutes negligence per se. ...
“c. Landlord’s knowledge of the condition. The landlord is subject to liability under the rules of this section only for conditions of which he is aware, or of which he could have known in the exercise of reasonable care.... Where the condition arises after the tenant takes possession, the landlord may not be able, in the exercise of reasonable care, to discover the condition, in which case the landlord will not be liable under the rules of this section until he has had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition after the tenant notifies him of it. Where the landlord is able to discover the condition by the exercise of reasonable care, he is subject to liability after he has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and to remedy it.”
Restatement (Second) of Property: Landlord & Tenant § 17.6 cmt. a-c (1977) (emphasis added). The Restatement here assumes that if the landlord violates a standard which constitutes negligence per se,2 no liability ordinarily attaches for injuries stemming from the violation unless the landlord had actual or constructive notice prior to the violation. Therefore, not only does § 17.6 not support the majority’s view that notice is not required, but even in light of an applicable statutory provision that creates a duty upon the landlord, the *94Restatement contemplates retention of the notice element in a prima facie case sounding in negligence.
There is a plethora of support in the common law of Maryland and other jurisdictions in this country for the proposition that a notice requirement is relevant to the plaintiffs’ prima facie case for negligence, applicable to the Housing Code violation unless the City Council had expressly removed notice considerations from the action. See, e.g., Juarez v. Wavecrest Management Team Ltd., 88 N.Y.2d 628, 649 N.Y.S.2d 115, 672 N.E.2d 135 (1996) (holding that to be liable for injuries sustained by lead paint, a landlord must have actual or constructive notice of both the hazardous condition and the residency of a child six years-old or younger); Gore v. People’s Sav. Bank, 235 Conn. 360, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995) (violation of a state statute prohibiting flaking paint constitutes negligence per se, but defendant may avoid liability by showing that he neither knows nor should know of occasion for compliance); Winston Properties v. Sanders, 57 Ohio App.3d 28, 565 N.E.2d 1280 (1989) (assuming arguendo that the landlord was negligent per se under city regulations, tenant was still required to show that the landlord had notice of the defective condition).
But there is no support, much less express support, for an intent by the Baltimore City Council to remove entirely the notice element from these types of negligence actions. The City Council did not intend, by setting general standards for repairs and safety for all rental units, to nullify years of common law precedent. Quite to the contrary, the City Council followed the common law in passing the Housing Code. See Richwind, 335 Md. at 674-675, 645 A.2d at 1153-1154. As the majority notes, § 301 of the Code mandates that “whenever the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development determines that a violation of the Housing Code has taken place, the Commissioner must give notice of the violation [to the landlord].” Maj. op. at 87. Emphasizing that the Richwind Court’s reliance on this provision was its key “flaw,” the majority baldly asserts that somehow the requirements of notice for the Commissioner are different and shed *95no light on notice considerations in private actions. Id. at 88. It seems to me that the same fundamental notions of fair play and substantial justice that underlie notice requirements for the Commissioner ought to weigh heavily against an interpretation of the statute that repudiates these wise and longstanding principles in our law.
This Court restated the standard for liability recently in Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 744 A.2d 47. Chief Judge Bell, writing for the Court, stated as follows:
“[T]o survive summary judgment, a plaintiff alleging lead paint poisoning caused by a landlord’s negligence in failing to correct a defective condition in a leased dwelling must first meet the ‘reason to know’ test. Under this test, a plaintiff must present evidence that establishes that the landlord knew or had reason to know of a condition on the premises posing an unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons in the premises. The fact that a defendant is a landlord or engages in a certain trade is not enough to meet the reason to know standard. Some evidence that, by virtue of those facts, the defendant has knowledge sufficient to support an inference of knowledge of the condition is required.”
357 Md. at 361-362, 744 A.2d at 57 (citations omitted). We should not overrule this case or the other progeny of Rich-wind.
III.
Realizing that its ruling necessarily entails landlords periodically inspecting the homes of tenants, the majority is forced to read such a duty into the ordinance. The majority reasons that because § 909 of the Housing Code gives the landlord the right to intrude into the tenant’s property to make repairs, it also imposes upon the landlord an affirmative duty to inspect the premises from time to time. (How often? Every day? Every week? Once a month? Every few months? The majority does not specify this crucial issue.) A duty and a right obviously are not equivalent, and § 909’s grant of a right *96to enter implies nothing about whether the landlord retains that right when the tenant has or has not given notice of a dangerous condition.
Even were I to accept the majority’s imposition of a duty from a patch-work of various provisions pulled together to imply a duty where none exists, the logical implications of the majority’s reading of the statute are untenable. For example, the majority finds that “[although [§ 909] may not explicitly require the landlord to perform periodic inspections, it grants such right to the landlord and shows that the City anticipated that periodic inspections might be necessary to comply with the Code.” Maj. op. at 84. Here, when the majority says “the Code,” it refers to §§ 702, 703, and 706 of the Code. But there is no reason why the majority’s reasoning should be limited to those provisions. For example, under the majority’s reasoning, periodic inspections by landlords would also be required for § 503 (requiring each unit to maintain a toilet in good working order); § 504 (requiring the same for bathtubs); and § 612 (requiring heating facilities be properly designed, installed and balanced or adjusted, and maintained in good and safe working condition).
Indeed, even if the majority could limit its holding to §§ 702, 703, and 706 of the Code (which the majority cannot), the implications of its holding remain illogical. Section 703, in addition to requiring the apartment be free of flaking paint, also mandates: every “facility, piece of equipment, or utility which is required under this Code shall be ... constructed or installed to function safely and effectively and shall be maintained in good working condition”; all ceilings, walls, and floors must be free from holes, large cracks, or loose and deteriorated materials; and all doors must fit into the openings for which they are hung. Must the landlord now do periodic inspections to check for each and every one of these violations as well? The majority provides no rational basis for distinguishing flaking paint from these other requirements of § 703.
*97IV.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in considering the same issue, found that notice to the landlord was necessary before liability upon the landlord may be imposed. Relying heavily upon our reasoning in Richwind, that court concluded:
“We agree that the language and histories of these sections indicate the legislature’s intent to prohibit the use of lead-based paints and to prevent the existence of chipped or otherwise dilapidated paint for the protection of children, but the plaintiffs have shown us nothing to indicate that the legislature intended the extraordinary result of holding a landlord liable for injuries sustained by a minor due to exposure to lead-based paint regardless of a valid excuse or justification, such as lack of notice, for the violation.
“As in Richwind, the common law in Connecticut has always included a notice requirement as part of a tenant’s cause of action. Furthermore, as in Richwind, the statutory scheme at issue in this case does not eliminate that requirement. Indeed, the statutory framework evinces a legislative intent to afford landlords the opportunity to remedy violations of housing standards after receipt of notice.”
Gore v. People’s Sav. Bank, 665 A.2d. at 1352-54.
In sum, I believe that absent notice, actual or constructive, the landlord has no duty, even under the Housing Code, to inspect the demised premises during the tenancy. The tenant is in a superior position to detect chipping or peeling paint and should therefore notify the landlord of the hazard. Nor does the landlord have a duty to continuously inspect premises under the tenant’s control to see if there is chipping or peeling paint; that duty to inspect arises at the inception of the tenancy. This is so under the common law, and under the City Code. Accordingly, I dissent.
Judge WILNER has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissent.

. In addition, under principles of stare decisis, the Court should not overrule Richwind.

. In Maryland, violation of a statute is not negligence per se but rather constitutes evidence of negligence. The rationale requiring notice where the statutory violation is negligence per se applies with equal force to Maryland where the violation may be evidence of negligence.