Court Opinion

ID: 9363992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 01:00:55.644553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:35.271320
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10206         Document: 00516613085             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/17/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 22-10206
                                     Summary Calendar                                 FILED
                                                                                January 17, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Bryan David Edwards,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 1:20-CR-68-1

   Before Barksdale, Elrod, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Bryan David Edwards was charged with distribution and receipt of
   child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1), and
   possession of child pornography involving a prepubescent minor, in violation
   of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). Evidence leading to his indictment
   was seized during execution of a search warrant authorizing officers to enter

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10206        Document: 00516613085         Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/17/2023

                                     No. 22-10206

   a specified residence and “seize and forensically analyze property including
   but not limited to:       electronic devices, computers, tablets, cellular
   [tele]phones, laptop computers, desktop computers, and digital memory
   storage devices used in storage, dissemination or viewing of explicit images
   in violation [of] Texas Penal Code [§] 43.262”.
          Edwards moved to suppress evidence discovered during execution of
   the search warrant. The court denied his suppression motion; and he entered
   a conditional guilty plea to the possession count, reserving the right to appeal
   the adverse suppression ruling.
          Edwards asserts:     the search warrant was impermissibly general
   because it did not specify the parts of his cellular telephone that could be
   searched or limit the types of property that could be seized; and, because the
   warrant lacked precision, a reasonable officer would have known it was
   invalid, meaning the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should not
   have applied. Further, he contends the court erred by denying his request for
   a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); and maintains
   that, in addition to the requested Franks hearing, the court should have
   ordered sua sponte an evidentiary hearing for his suppression motion.
          When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, our court reviews
   “factual findings for clear error and the ultimate constitutionality of law
   enforcement action de novo”. United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 594
   (5th Cir. 2014). Generally, when the sufficiency of a search warrant is
   challenged, we first determine whether the good-faith exception to the
   exclusionary rule applies. E.g., United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853, 857
   (5th Cir. 2018).
          “For the good-faith exception to apply, the executing-officer’s
   reliance on the issuing-judge’s probable-cause determination and the
   technical sufficiency of the warrant must have been objectively reasonable.”

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                                    No. 22-10206

   United States v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2005). An officer’s reliance
   on a warrant is not objectively reasonable where, inter alia, the warrant
   authorizing the officer’s actions is so “facially deficient” in failing to
   particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized that the
   executing officers “cannot reasonably presume it to be valid”. United States
   v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 343 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
          Despite the “including but not limited to” language in the warrant, it
   provided a list of items usually expected to be used to view, store, or
   disseminate child pornography, therefore linking the items to be seized and
   searched with the suspected criminal offense. E.g., United States v. Layne, 43
   F.3d 127, 132–33 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding warrants directing seizure of
   “assorted pornographic videotapes; assorted pornographic magazines;
   assorted devices” and “[c]hild pornography; records of victims; drawings;
   pictures; computer disks, sexual devices; videotapes; child abuse books;
   magazines; audiotapes; and any other obscene or child pornographic
   material” were sufficiently particular).
          Moreover, the warrant explained these items were evidence of the
   commission of the offense of possession of child pornography as described in
   the accompanying affidavit. E.g., United States v. Triplett, 684 F.3d 500, 505
   (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding terms such as “electronic devices” or
   “electronic memory devices” were sufficiently particular where warrant also
   provided limiting guidance that items were relevant). That the warrant could
   have been more grammatically correct and specific did not render it so
   “facially deficient” that the officers could not reasonably presume it was
   valid. E.g., Mays, 466 F.3d at 343 (citation omitted). And because the court
   correctly determined the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
   applied, it is unnecessary to consider Edwards’ assertion the warrant was
   impermissibly general. E.g., Contreras, 905 F.3d at 857.

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                                    No. 22-10206

          To obtain a Franks hearing on a suppression motion, defendant
   challenging the validity of a warrant affidavit must make a “substantial
   preliminary showing” that: (1) affiant “knowingly and intentionally, or with
   reckless disregard for the truth”, made a false statement in the affidavit or
   omitted material information; and (2) the remaining portion of the affidavit,
   or the affidavit with the omitted information included, is insufficient to
   support a finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56, 171–72;
   United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1376–77 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying
   Franks to situations involving alleged omissions in a supporting affidavit).
          The court denied a Franks hearing on the grounds the alleged
   omissions were immaterial, meaning they did not affect the probable-cause
   determination. E.g., Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1377. Edwards contends the
   affidavit should have listed general information about Internet Protocol (IP)
   addresses, including that IP addresses do not specify a user or device, can be
   secured or open, and can be spoofed or copied. He also maintains the
   affidavit should have: mentioned whether he lived alone or with others; and
   included additional steps that law enforcement could have taken, such as
   subpoenaing the electronic-service provider for more information.
          The affidavit contained sufficient information giving rise to a fair
   probability that someone in Edwards’ household uploaded child
   pornography to Tumblr, the online blogging platform. E.g., Contreras, 905
   F.3d at 858 (“[P]robable cause does not demand more than a fair probability
   on which a reasonable person would act”. (citation omitted)). Although the
   omitted information may have introduced the possibility that someone other
   than Edwards could have committed the offense, it did not affect the
   connection between the Tumblr account that uploaded the child
   pornography, Edwards’ IP address, and his physical address. Cf. United
   States v. Perez, 484 F.3d 735, 740–42 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding probable cause
   existed based on connection between transmission of child pornography,

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                                    No. 22-10206

   defendant’s IP address, and defendant’s physical address). Accordingly, the
   court did not err by denying a Franks hearing on the basis that Edwards failed
   to make a preliminary showing the omitted information was material to the
   probable-cause determination. E.g., Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1376–77.
          Finally, regarding the claim that the court, in addition to the requested
   Franks hearing, should have ordered an evidentiary hearing on other points
   sua sponte, an evidentiary hearing is required “only when necessary to receive
   evidence on an issue of fact”. United States v. Harrelson, 705 F.2d 733, 737
   (5th Cir. 1983). Edwards contends an evidentiary hearing was necessary to
   determine whether: the detective who prepared the search-warrant affidavit
   knowingly and intentionally or recklessly omitted information; and the
   officers exceeded the scope of the warrant. Because the omitted information
   was immaterial, the legal issues could be resolved without answering these
   factual questions; therefore, the detective’s state of mind when allegedly
   omitting the information was irrelevant. E.g., Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1377.
   Further, Edwards failed to assert in his suppression motion that the officers
   exceeded the scope of the warrant, so it was unnecessary to order an
   evidentiary hearing to determine whether they did so.
          AFFIRMED.

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