Court Opinion

ID: 9632879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:26:46.524007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:23.678259
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Justice CUNNINGHAM.
I concur in result only with the well-written majority opinion, and disagree as to the reasoning. In my opinion, this case involved a clearly “nontestimonial” statement made by the witness, and it is easily distinguishable from Davis v. Washington1 and Hammon v. Indiana, decided with Davis.
Under the facts of this case, the declar-ant had been the subject of serious physical abuse, and was clearly injured when the officer arrived on the scene. The perpetrator was no where in sight, nor did the officer have any idea exactly what he was confronting. When he asked her what had happened, he was obviously attempting to meet an ongoing emergency.
I also believe that the majority misconstrues the guidance given in the cases of Davis and Hammon. An assessment as to whether the declarant is speaking about events as they actually happen, or events that have already happened, is simply one factor to be considered in determining if the statements are testimonial. In the Davis case, the Court was simply pointing out that this was one distinction between it and the Crawford2 case.
As stated in Crawford, and basically followed in Davis and Hammon, there are “various formulations” of circumstances causing statements to either qualify as testimonial or nontestimonial. The clear standard given in these cases is not a bright line rule as to whether the statements are in the present tense or past tense, but is as follows: “Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emer*133gency.” 126 S.Ct. at 2273. In this case, it was clearly the purpose of the police officer to assess the situation and to deal with what was, in fact, an ongoing emergency.
In my opinion, the statements made in this case were clearly nontestimonial. Therefore, the district judge was right in addressing whether the statement fell under any exception to the hearsay rule. The district judge found that the statement made by the declarant did not qualify as an excited utterance. While judges might differ as to this finding, I do not believe the trial judge abused his discretion, and therefore his finding should stand. On this basis, and not on the basis of the statement being testimonial, I would concur in reversing the circuit court and reinstating the order and judgment of the district judge.
SCOTT, J., joins.

. 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006).

. 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).