Court Opinion

ID: 9919026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 14:02:32.777648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:56.223431
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: January 17, 2024

                          S23A1207. ADAMS v. THE STATE.

        ELLINGTON, Justice.

        A Fulton County jury found Isaiah Adams (“Isaiah”) guilty of

malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting

death of Laron Lowe and the aggravated assault of Ronda Dobson.1

        1On November 22, 2016, a Fulton County grand jury returned an
indictment charging Isaiah and his co-defendants Leon Adams and Malcom
Pitts with murder, felony murder (three counts), aggravated assault (two
counts), criminal damage to property in the first degree, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony. Leon and Isaiah were tried on June
11, 2018; Pitts was tried separately. On June 15, 2018, the jury found the
Adams brothers guilty on all counts. On June 25, 2018, the trial court
sentenced Isaiah to life in prison for malice murder, a consecutive 10-year
sentence for the aggravated assault against Dobson, a concurrent 10-year
sentence for first degree criminal damage to property, and a consecutive 5-year
sentence for possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. The three
counts of felony murder were vacated, and a count of aggravated assault
against Lowe merged at sentencing. The Adams brothers’ trial counsel timely
filed a motion for a new trial. New appellate counsel for Isaiah amended the
motion. After hearings held on the motion for a new trial on September 9 and
21, 2021, the trial court entered an order denying the motion on April 24, 2023.
A notice of appeal was timely filed on May 22, 2023, and the case was docketed
in this Court for the August 2023 term and submitted for decision on the briefs.
We note that Leon’s appeal was docketed to the April 2023 term of court, and
we affirmed his conviction in Adams v. State, 317 Ga. 342 (893 SE2d 95) (2023).
Isaiah contends that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support

his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt and that the verdicts were

contrary to the “law and evidence” as well as “contrary to the

principles of justice, fairness, and equity.” He also contends that the

trial court erred in admitting certain evidence, and that trial counsel

was constitutionally ineffective. For the reasons explained below, we

affirm the trial court’s order denying his motion for a new trial.

     The evidence presented at trial showed the following.           On

August 21, 2016, Lowe, who was sitting in the passenger seat of a

car driven by his fiancée, Dobson, was killed when shots were fired

from a white car that had followed the couple from the 29 Degrees

nightclub, an after-hours club in Fulton County where they both

worked. The prosecution presented video evidence, witness

testimony, and the defendants’ own admissions to show that Leon

Adams (“Leon”), Isaiah, and Malcolm Pitts were in the white car.

The State also presented evidence from which the jury could infer

that the shooting may have been motivated by an argument that

occurred earlier in the nightclub. The nightclub’s general manager,

                                  2
Omari Ward, testified that around 6:00 a.m., as he began ushering

people out of the nightclub, a server came up to him and told him

that Leon and Isaiah were arguing with a bartender over who could

drink the most. Ward – who is Isaiah’s cousin – approached the men

and asked them to leave. Ward assumed the argument was not

serious. Other witnesses testified, however, that the argument had

gotten “heated” and “there was some pushing and shoving.”

     Ward testified that he escorted the Adams brothers outside at

about 6:45 a.m. and then went back inside to work. A video recording

from a security camera outside the club showed Ward stepping

outside briefly with the brothers, talking with them, and then going

back inside the club at 6:52 a.m. At trial, Ward identified the

brothers from the video recording, which was played for the jury. He

also pointed out the brothers’ friend, Pitts, who was wearing a white

shirt. Lowe is also visible on the video recording, but Ward testified

that he did not witness any interaction between Lowe, Pitts, and the

Adams brothers. Lowe, who was Ward’s best friend, worked as a

parking lot attendant.

                                  3
     Dobson worked at the nightclub as a security guard. After the

nightclub closed, Dobson picked up her pay, left the building, and

walked toward her black Chevy Tahoe. She testified that she

stopped in the parking lot to talk to Lowe and told him she would

wait for him to get off work. At about 6:55 a.m., Lowe got in the front

passenger seat of Dobson’s car, and the two drove off. Dobson

testified that she saw a white car idling nearby, but she thought the

driver was just letting her leave the parking area ahead of them.

Dobson said that, as she turned left out of the parking area, she did

not notice anyone behind her. Video surveillance, however, showed

that the white car – later identified as a white Ford Escape – also

turned left, following her. After driving a few blocks away from the

club, Dobson noticed the white car pulling up along the left side of

her car. She testified that, because she was driving slowly, she

assumed the driver was passing her. The driver, however, pulled

parallel to her car and matched her speed. Then she saw an arm

extending from the open front, passenger-side window. The person

wore a long-sleeved, white or light-colored shirt and held a gun in

                                  4
his hand. And then she heard the first gunshot.

     Dobson immediately turned and yelled to Lowe: “Baby, they

are shooting at us.” But Lowe was unresponsive, having been shot

in the left temple. Dobson testified that she heard approximately

four to six gunshots thereafter. The bullets shattered the driver’s

side windows and punctured holes in the driver’s side quarter panel

and the hood of the car. The driver’s-side, rear caution light was also

damaged by the gunfire. Dobson slowed down and stopped, but the

shooting continued. When she saw the white car’s brake lights come

on as it slowed and then stopped, she feared the driver would turn

around to come after her. She quickly backed up, turned around,

and drove back to the nightclub to get help. When she arrived at the

nightclub and saw that people were still outside, including Ward,

she honked her car’s horn and began screaming for help. Dobson got

out of her car and fell to the ground, shouting: “Please don’t let him

be dead.” Ward ran to help Lowe, but there was nothing he could do.

Lowe died in the parking lot.

     When the police arrived at the nightclub, Ward showed them

                                  5
the video recordings from the nightclub’s security cameras. As Ward

looked at the recordings with the officers, he identified Pitts and the

Adams brothers getting into a white Ford Escape that matched the

description of the car Dobson said had followed her and Lowe. Isaiah

got into the driver’s seat, Pitts got into the front passenger seat, and

Leon got into the back passenger seat. Ward told the police that,

during the weekend before the shooting, he had seen Isaiah with a

.380-caliber handgun and Leon with a pink revolver. He also

testified that Pitts was known to carry a firearm, though he did not

see him with one that night. After reviewing the nightclub’s video

recordings, Ward got into a patrol car with officers and directed

them to the Adams brothers’ home. When they arrived, they saw a

white Ford Escape in the driveway. An officer testified that the car

matched the car seen in the nightclub’s security video recordings.

     While Ward showed the officers where the Adams brothers

lived, other officers found and gathered evidence from the roadway

where Dobson said the shooting had occurred. The police recovered

11 shell casings from the roadway. They recovered five 9mm shell

                                   6
casings, four .40-caliber shell casings, and two .380-caliber shell

casings.

     On August 22, 2016, the police went to the Adams home to

execute an arrest warrant for Leon, who, unrelated to the shooting,

had violated the terms of his probation. Officers knocked at the front

door, and a woman permitted them to enter. When they showed the

woman the warrant, she claimed nobody else was in the residence.

But then Xavier Adams – Isaiah’s twin brother – walked out and

stood next to her. A detective testified that they searched the house

for Leon, checking places where it was common for people to hide.

The officers found Isaiah hiding on the floor in a bedroom and

detained him there. They found Leon in the closet of another room,

curled up inside a large storage bin. During their search for the

brothers, the officers saw two handguns. They saw one of the

weapons in Isaiah’s room when they lifted a mattress to look under

it; the other was in an open backpack on the floor of Leon’s room.

Upon seeing the weapons, the officers secured the residence. A few

hours later, the officers obtained a search warrant for the residence.

                                  7
During the search that followed, officers found several more

firearms (including handguns, long guns, and semi-automatic

rifles), as well as various types of ammunition. They recovered

clothing that appeared to match clothing worn by the brothers on

the day of the shooting as well as a paper copy of Pitts’s driver’s

license.

     The firearms recovered included a SAR Arms 9mm handgun.

Further investigation revealed that this gun had been stolen from

its owner a few days before the shooting. The owner testified that he

kept the gun in the door panel of his truck. The last time he saw the

gun was during a lunch break, when he was accompanied in his car

by his coworker, Xavier Adams. The officers also recovered several

cell phones during the search of the Adams home. One of those

phones, which was found in Isaiah’s room, had been used on the

evening after the shooting to conduct over three dozen Internet

browser searches for information regarding the shooting and Lowe’s

death.

     Pursuant to a search warrant, a GBI crime scene investigator

                                 8
processed the white Ford Escape for evidence. The investigator

recovered an extended handgun magazine in the pocket on the back

of the driver’s seat. The magazine contained 13 .380-caliber bullets.

The investigator recovered a 9mm shell casing from beneath the

driver’s seat and cut a piece of cloth from the interior of the car. The

cloth tested positive for gunshot residue.

     After Pitts was arrested, the police secured a search warrant

for his residence. During the search, the police found a white hoodie

matching what Pitts was seen wearing on the night of the shooting.

The hoodie tested positive for gunshot residue.

     The medical examiner who performed Lowe’s autopsy testified

that Lowe had a gunshot entrance wound to the left side of his head.

The bullet traveled through his brain and came to rest against the

right side of his skull. The medical examiner determined that the

gunshot wound to Lowe’s head was the cause of his death. The

medical examiner recovered the bullet and turned it over to the GBI.

     A GBI firearms examiner analyzed the ballistics evidence

collected from the scene of the shooting, from the medical examiner,

                                   9
and from the Adams home. The examiner determined that the 9mm

shell casing recovered from beneath the driver’s seat of the Ford

Escape, along with three of the 9mm shell casings recovered from

the scene of the shooting, were all fired from the 9mm SAR Arms

pistol recovered from the Adams residence. The firearms examiner

determined that the bullet recovered from Lowe’s head was a .380

metal-jacketed bullet. He was unable to match that bullet to a

specific firearm, however, as no comparable weapon had been

recovered for testing. The examiner opined that, given the many

different types of ammunition found at the scene of the shooting, it

was possible that six to eight different firearms had been fired there;

however, at a minimum, two different firearms were confirmed as

having been used in the shooting: a 9mm and a .380-caliber weapon.

He further testified that “[t]he typical firearm is going to be about

the same sound [level] as a jackhammer, slightly less than the speed

of sound but still loud enough to impair your hearing without

hearing protection.”

     Before trial, Leon and Isaiah both gave recorded statements to

                                  10
the police. The prosecution did not play Leon’s recorded statement

for the jury. Instead, a detective testified that, after waiving his

rights, Leon told him that Isaiah was driving the car. Leon said that,

when he got into the back seat of the car, he was drunk and tired

and immediately fell asleep. He claimed he slept through the

shooting. In Isaiah’s statement, which was played for the jury, he

confirmed that he was driving, that Pitts was in the passenger seat,

and that Leon was in the back seat. Isaiah said that he, too, was

drunk that night and that he was surprised when Pitts, without

warning, began shooting two guns out of the passenger side window

at another vehicle. Isaiah believed he heard his brother yelling

something, but it was hard to tell over the gunfire.

     On November 12, 2016, Leon called his mother from jail. The

call, which was recorded, was played for the jury. Leon asked his

mother if anyone in the home had “protection,” and she confirmed

that Xavier did. He asked his mother if law enforcement had

obtained two items (which he did not identify directly), one of which

was on top of the refrigerator and one of which was in a cabinet

                                 11
above the refrigerator. His mother said that Xavier had removed

them from the house. Leon then directed his mother to look for a

folder in a filing cabinet where he hid his things. He told her to be

careful where she puts her finger and not to “pull the trigger.” The

mother can be heard on the recording opening the cabinet drawer,

laughing, and then asking Leon if the object had been there the

whole time. Leon told his mother to give the object to a person named

Shonda. The mother said that Shonda was there, and she put her on

the phone. Leon told Shonda that the gun his mother had just found

was the gun he always kept on his hip, even when he was sleeping,

but that on the night before the search (which was the night

following the shooting), he took the gun off his hip and put it in the

cabinet. Leon commented that, had he not done so, law enforcement

would have found the gun during the search. This gun was not

recovered by the police.

     The State also presented evidence that neither Dobson nor

Lowe carried firearms with them on the night of the shooting.

Dobson’s car was in the body shop for almost a month, and she spent

                                 12
approximately $4,500 to repair the damage done to her car by the

shooters.

     1. Isaiah argues that the evidence presented at trial and

summarized in part above was not sufficient to support beyond a

reasonable doubt his convictions for malice murder, aggravated

assault, criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm

during the commission of a felony. He contends that the State failed

to prove that he had any motive for shooting at Lowe and Dobson.

He also argues that the evidence was entirely circumstantial and

that the State failed to disprove the reasonable hypothesis that Pitts

acted alone, firing two handguns from the car as he drove past

Dobson and Lowe. These claims fail.

     When evaluating the constitutional sufficiency of evidence, the

proper standard of review is whether a rational trier of fact could

have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61

LE2d 560) (1979). This Court views the evidence in the “light most

favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury’s assessment of

                                 13
the weight and credibility of the evidence.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d

313) (2013). Under Georgia law, a person who “[i]ntentionally aids

or abets in the commission of the crime” may be convicted as a party

to the crime. OCGA § 16-2-20 (a), (b) (3). “Although mere presence

at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove that one was a party

to the crime, presence, companionship, and conduct before and after

the offense are circumstances from which one’s participation in the

criminal intent may be inferred.” (Citation and punctuation

omitted.) Powell v. State, 291 Ga. 743, 744-745 (1) (733 SE2d 294)

(2012).

     Additionally, under Georgia statutory law, “[t]o warrant a

conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only

be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every

other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”

OCGA § 24-14-6. However, “not every hypothesis is a reasonable

one, and the evidence need not exclude every conceivable inference

or hypothesis – only those that are reasonable.” (Citation and

                                  14
punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). Graves v. State, 306 Ga.

485, 487 (1) (831 SE2d 747) (2019). “Whether alternative hypotheses

are reasonable . . . is principally a question for the jury, and this

Court will not disturb the jury’s finding unless it is insupportable as

a matter of law.” Robinson v. State, 309 Ga. 729, 731 (1) (a) (848

SE2d 441) (2020).

     The evidence was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due

process for the jury to infer that Isaiah participated in the crimes

and shared Pitts’ and Leon’s criminal intent. The Adams brothers

were involved in a “heated” argument about who could drink the

most inside the nightclub shortly before the shooting. The jury could

infer from that argument that the brothers were intoxicated and

angry after being kicked out of the club and that the argument may

have motivated their actions. The jury could infer that both brothers

were armed, given Ward’s testimony that they had been seen just

days before the shooting carrying firearms. Leon even said in a

recorded jail call that he always kept a gun on his hip, even when

sleeping. The jury could have inferred that the gun was the very gun

                                  15
he asked his friend to remove from his house.

     The brothers and Pitts left the club at the same time, waited

together in an idling car, and then followed Dobson and Lowe from

the club. Dobson testified that the driver of the car pulled his car

alongside hers, matching her speed, as the shooting occurred. Isaiah

stopped his car moments after Dobson stopped hers, causing Dobson

to fear that the shooters would pursue her. The jury could infer from

these events that Isaiah facilitated the shooting by intentionally

maneuvering his car close to Dobson’s. Also, given the short period

of time between when the three men got into the car and when

Isaiah drove the car alongside Dobson’s car, the jury could infer that

it was unlikely that Leon was, as he claimed, merely present, drunk,

and asleep in the back seat of the car when the shooting occurred.

And, given that at least two weapons were used in the shooting, the

jury could infer that Leon and Pitts were the shooters.

     Police recovered from the back pocket of the driver’s seat,

accessible to where Leon had been sitting in the back seat, an

extended magazine for a .380-caliber handgun. The fatal bullet

                                 16
removed from Lowe’s head was a .380-caliber bullet. Although

Isaiah was known to carry a .380-caliber handgun, and Leon may

have had his own weapon strapped to his hip, the jury could have

inferred that Leon fired Isaiah’s gun, if not his own, because Isaiah

was driving. The jury could also infer from the conversation that

Leon had with his mother that Leon knew which gun was the

murder weapon because he was relieved that it had not been

recovered and wanted it removed from his home.

     The State also proved that, in addition to the .380-caliber

handgun used to shoot Lowe, a 9mm handgun was fired into

Dobson’s car. That handgun was discovered in the Adams home in

Isaiah’s room the day following the murder. Further, a cell phone

seized from the Adams home following the brothers’ arrests

contained evidence that the phone’s user had, immediately after the

shooting, conducted more than three dozen Internet searches for

news about the shooting. And, when the police came to the Adams

home, they found Isaiah lying on the floor of his room and Leon

hiding in a storage bin in a closet – facts from which the jury could

                                 17
infer consciousness of guilt. See Rush v. State, 294 Ga. 388, 390 (2)

(a) (754 SE2d 63) (2014) (evidence showing a defendant attempted

to evade arrest is admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt);

Michael v. State, 335 Ga. App. 579, 585 (1) (782 SE2d 479) (2016)

(attempt to hide from or elude police constitutes circumstantial

evidence of consciousness of guilt).

     With respect to Isaiah’s assertion that he had no motive to

shoot at Lowe or Dobson, the State need not introduce evidence of

motive in order to support a guilty verdict on the charge of malice

murder. Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 341 (745 SE2d 637) (2013)

(“[W]hile evidence of motive for the homicide is always relevant in a

murder trial, the State is not required to prove the defendant’s

motive for killing the victim to sustain a murder conviction, since

motive is not an essential element of the crime.” (citations omitted;

emphasis in original)). Nevertheless, the State did present some

evidence of a possible motive. A witness testified that Isaiah and

Leon were involved in a heated, drunken argument in the bar

shortly before the shooting. Although there was no evidence that

                                  18
Lowe or Dobson were involved in the argument, the jury could still

have inferred, for example, that Isaiah and his passengers were

angry and drunk, that they intended to retaliate against the

bartender with whom they had argued, and that they mistakenly

retaliated against Lowe and Dobson. A motive is simply “the reason

that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal

intent.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brooks v. State, 298 Ga.

722, 726 (2) (783 SE2d 895) (2016). It was for the jury to decide what

weight, if any, to give to evidence bearing on Isaiah’s possible

motive. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 668, 671 (653 SE2d 28)

(2007) (Although conflicts in the evidence could have been resolved

differently, the jury was authorized to accept a version of events in

which the robbery was the initial motive for the crimes committed.).

     The evidence here was sufficient as a matter of constitutional

due process to support the jury’s finding that Isaiah, acting in

concert with Leon and Pitts, was a party to the crimes of malice

murder, aggravated assault, and criminal damage to property, and

that he was in possession of a firearm during the commission of a

                                 19
felony. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B); Meadows

v. State, 316 Ga. 22, 24-25 (2) (885 SE2d 780) (2023); Williams v.

State, 313 Ga. 325, 328 (1) (869 SE2d 389) (2022). See also OCGA §

16-2-20 (a) (“Every person concerned in the commission of a crime is

a party thereto and may be . . . convicted of commission of the

crime.”).

     With respect to Isaiah’s argument pursuant to OCGA § 24-14-

6, even assuming that the evidence against Isaiah was entirely

circumstantial, the jury was authorized to reject as unreasonable

Isaiah’s hypothesis that Pitts alone was responsible for the shooting,

given the evidence adduced. Indeed, the more reasonable hypothesis

that the jury was allowed to credit was that Pitts and Leon were the

shooters and that they fired on Dobson and Lowe when Isaiah

intentionally pulled his car alongside Dobson’s after following them

from the nightclub. See Lowe v. State, 295 Ga. 623, 625 (1) (759 SE2d

841) (2014) (“[Q]uestions as to the reasonableness of hypotheses

other than the guilt of the defendant are generally for the jury to

decide, and this Court will not disturb a finding of guilt unless the

                                 20
evidence is insupportable as a matter of law.”).

     2. Isaiah also contends that the weight of the evidence

presented at his trial does not support his convictions, and that the

trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial based on the grounds

set forth in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. Specifically, Isaiah contends

that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion as a “thirteenth

juror.”

      As we have stated,

     [e]ven when the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a
     conviction, a trial judge may grant a new trial if the
     verdict of the jury is “contrary to [evidence and] the
     principles of justice and equity,” OCGA § 5-5-20, or if the
     verdict is “decidedly and strongly against the weight of
     the evidence.” OCGA § 5-5-21. When properly raised in a
     timely motion, these grounds for a new trial — commonly
     known as the “general grounds” — require the trial judge
     to exercise a broad discretion to sit as a “thirteenth juror.”
     In exercising that discretion, the trial judge must consider
     some of the things that she cannot when assessing the
     legal sufficiency of the evidence, including any conflicts in
     the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight
     of the evidence.

(Citation omitted.) Wilkerson v. State, 307 Ga. 574, 574-575 (837

SE2d 300) (2019). Though broad, the trial court’s discretion is not

                                  21
boundless; it “should be exercised with caution [and] invoked only in

exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily

against the verdict,” but “it nevertheless is, generally speaking, a

substantial discretion.” State v. Hamilton, 306 Ga. 678, 684 (2) (832

SE2d 836) (2019).

     The court’s order denying Isaiah’s motion for a new trial shows

that the court exercised its discretion, considered each of Isaiah’s

arguments under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21, and found them

wanting. The record, therefore, refutes Isaiah’s contention that the

court failed to fulfill its role as the thirteenth juror. See Strother v.

State, 305 Ga. 838, 843 (3) (828 SE2d 327) (2019). Having exercised

that discretion, the “trial court’s decision on the general grounds are

not subject to our review: this Court does not sit as an arbiter of the

general grounds, which are solely within the discretion of the trial

court.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ridley v. State, 315 Ga.

452, 456 (3) (883 SE2d 357) (2023). Accordingly, this claim of error

is without merit.

     3. Isaiah contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

                                   22
“committing errors of law warranting a new trial.” More specifically,

he argues that three of the court’s evidentiary rulings either

misstated or misapplied the relevant law or lacked a factual basis to

support the court’s ruling. For the following reasons, we disagree.

      (a) Isaiah contends that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress evidence seized from the Adams home pursuant

to a search warrant. Specifically, he argues that the trial court

should have suppressed evidence that the officers saw when they

exceeded the scope of the search for Leon.2 Isaiah does not specify in

      2 In the two short paragraphs dedicated to this claim of error, Isaiah

argues that the affidavit supporting the application for the search warrant,
which was based in part on what officers had seen while executing the arrest
warrant for Leon, lacked “credibility.” “Although the officers technically had
authority to enter the home,” Isaiah argues, “the evidence was not credible that
firearms were lawfully found in plain view or that the discovery of the evidence
was inadvertent[.]” Isaiah appears at first blush to be challenging the
truthfulness of the affidavit testimony supporting the warrant application, as
well as the magistrate’s decision to issue the search warrant. However, the gist
of his argument, both in the trial court and on appeal, is that the evidence the
officers said they saw in plain sight was only visible to them because they
exceeded the permissible scope of the search for Leon pursuant to the arrest
warrant.
       Additionally, Isaiah does not contend that the affidavit supporting the
search warrant contains a material and false representation – a claim that
would trigger an analysis under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (98 SCt
2674, 57 LE2d 667) (1978). In this case, Isaiah made no such argument below
or in his appellate brief. In fact, when asked during the hearing on the motion

                                      23
his appellate brief exactly what evidence should have been

suppressed. In his pre-trial motion to suppress, he asserted that all

the evidence seized from the home should have been suppressed,

including the 9mm handgun used in the shooting and found beneath

his mattress, the cellphone containing multiple searches for

information about the murder of Lowe, Isaiah’s identification cards,

and other guns and ammunition.

      In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress,

      an appellate court must construe the evidentiary record
      in the light most favorable to the trial court’s factual
      findings and judgment. Moreover, an appellate court
      generally must accept the trial court’s factual findings
      unless they are clearly erroneous, and also generally must
      limit its consideration of the disputed facts to those
      expressly found by the trial court. Although we owe
      substantial deference to the way in which the trial court
      resolved disputed questions of material fact, we owe no
      deference at all to the trial court with respect to questions
      of law, and instead, we must apply the law ourselves to
      the material facts.

to suppress whether Isaiah was challenging the validity or propriety of the
warrant or the affidavit supporting the warrant, defense counsel stated:
“That’s not our contention judge[.] . . . I don’t have any problems with the
warrant itself.” Rather, counsel was concerned that “these officers searched the
home before that [search] warrant was issued.
                                      24
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Westbrook v. State, 308 Ga. 92,

96 (2) (839 SE2d 620) (2020).

     Viewed in the appropriate light, the transcript of the motion-

to-suppress hearing shows that Isaiah conceded that the initial

entry into the Adams residence was authorized by an arrest warrant

for Leon. He argued, however, that the officers went beyond the

scope of a search permitted pursuant to Leon’s arrest warrant and

searched the residence for evidence of a crime before obtaining a

warrant authorizing the search of his home. Specifically, trial

counsel argued that firearms and ammunition found in the

residence were not in plain view during the execution of the arrest

warrant. The record, however, does not support that claim.

     During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Lieutenant

Derek Leader, who oversaw Clayton County’s fugitive squad,

testified that he was asked to assist in the execution of Leon’s arrest

warrant for a felony probation violation. When Leader knocked on

the door, a woman answered, and Leader told her they had an arrest

warrant for Leon. The woman denied anyone was home, but then

                                  25
Xavier Adams appeared. As Leader and his squad entered the home,

he saw a “pair of feet in the back bedroom on the left.” The feet

belonged to Isaiah, who was lying on the floor. After detaining

Isaiah, the officers lifted the mattress in Isaiah’s room to see if Leon

was hiding beneath it. There, they saw several firearms.           The

detective testified that, in his experience, fugitives often hide in

spaces between the mattress, box springs, and floor. Sometimes they

even bring food and water into spaces they created while they wait

for the police to leave. Leader and his squad continued their search

for Leon in the next bedroom. There, they opened a closet door to

find Leon in a fetal position inside a “big Tupperware container.”

While in Leon’s room, they saw a firearm in an open backpack in the

corner of the room. Upon finding Leon, the search of the home ended.

     Detective Helio Garcia also testified at the hearing. He said he

saw several firearms in plain view as he assisted in the search for

Leon. The detective testified that, based in part on what he and

other investigators had seen during their search for Leon, he

immediately applied for a warrant to search the Adams home for

                                  26
evidence related to the shooting. In his affidavit in support of the

search warrant, Garcia asserted that Leon and Isaiah Adams were

suspects in the shooting death of Lowe. He averred that, shortly

after    the   shooting,   Ward   provided   the   investigators   with

surveillance video that showed the brothers, whom Ward had

identified by name, get into a white Ford Escape that matched the

vehicle described by Dobson as the one used in the shooting.

Investigators then went to the Adams residence to arrest Leon on a

probation violation warrant. The white Ford Escape seen in the

surveillance video was parked in the driveway. When they searched

for Leon to arrest him, they also found Isaiah, who had been

identified as the driver of the Ford Escape. The investigators also

saw several firearms in plain view when they executed the arrest

warrant. Based on the facts in Garcia’s affidavit, a magistrate judge

issued a search warrant.

        Sergeant Tiffany Thomas testified that she secured the Adams

home while Garcia obtained the search warrant. Once the search

warrant was returned, she assisted Garcia in executing it. She

                                   27
testified that she also saw firearms and other evidence, including

drugs and cell phones, in plain view.

     During the hearing on his motion to suppress, defense counsel

argued that investigators had no reason to turn over Isaiah’s

mattress. Counsel concluded: “It’s my position that they were

looking for evidence from the get-go, and because of that, I’m asking

the court to suppress what was found inside of the home.” The court

denied the motion from the bench and later issued a written order

summarily denying the motion to suppress.

     Isaiah argues that it was unreasonable for the investigators to

turn over his mattress while searching for Leon. Leader’s testimony,

however, supports the trial court’s implicit finding that a fugitive

might hide beneath a mattress. And if a person could reasonably

hide in such a space, officers can search there. See Maryland v. Buie,

494 U.S. 325, 332-333 (III) (110 SCt 1093, 108 LE2d 276) (1990)

(police can legally enter a person’s home to execute an arrest

warrant for that individual, who they reasonably believe is home at

the time, and they can search any area of the home in which the

                                 28
person might be found); State v. Harris, 246 Ga. 759, 760-761 (4)(272

SE2d 719) (1980) (The trial court did not clearly err in denying a

motion to suppress drug paraphernalia found beneath a bed by

officers executing an arrest warrant, given that the search was

confined to places where a person could hide, and in the officers’

experience, “persons hide under beds.”). Isaiah has failed to show

that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. See

Westbrook, 308 Ga. at 96 (2).

     (b) Isaiah contends that the trial court erred in allowing the

prosecutor to elicit testimony concerning Isaiah’s bad character. The

trial transcript shows that Ward testified that he had seen Pitts and

the Adams brothers in possession of firearms in the days prior to the

shooting. Following this testimony, the prosecutor asked: “And as

you are looking at these guns, in what context, why were these guns

out essentially?” and Ward responded, “It’s like some people live that

way of life.” Trial counsel said “objection,” and the court responded

by instructing the prosecutor to move on. The prosecutor complied.

Trial counsel did not seek any additional relief. Isaiah asserts that

                                 29
the trial court thereafter erred by failing, on its own motion, to give

a curative instruction, to strike Ward’s statement, or to order a

mistrial on the ground that Ward’s statement was “irrelevant and

extremely prejudicial” bad character evidence that was inadmissible

under OCGA §§ 24-4-403 and 24-4-404. 3

      Because defense counsel did not object at trial on the specific

grounds now raised on appeal, nor did he move to strike the

testimony or ask for a curative instruction this claim of trial court

error may only be reviewed for plain error. 4 See Payne v. State, 313

      3 OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) provides that “[e]vidence of a person’s character

or a trait of character shall not be admissible for the purpose of proving action
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,” with certain exceptions not
applicable here. Moreover, relevant evidence may be excluded under OCGA §
24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.”
       4 As this Court has previously explained:

       The standard for a plain error review of rulings on evidence is that
       there must be an error or defect that has not been affirmatively
       waived by the appellant, the legal error is clear or obvious, the
       error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, and if
       the aforementioned three requirements are satisfied, the appellate
       court has the discretion to remedy the found error but should do so
       only if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public
       reputation of the judicial proceedings; consequently, beyond
       showing a clear or obvious error, the appellant must affirmatively

                                       30
Ga. 218, 221-222 (1) (869 SE2d 395) (2022). Isaiah did not make a

plain error argument on appeal. However, based on our review of

Ward’s statements, we see nothing that would support a conclusion

that those statements constituted bad character evidence the

admission of which was obvious error that would have affected

Isaiah’s substantial rights or affected the outcome of the trial, given

that “[g]un ownership and the custom of carrying a gun do not, by

themselves, impute bad character.” (Footnote omitted.) Davis v.

State, 272 Ga. 327, 329 (2) (528 SE2d 800) (2000). See also

Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 543 (III) (B) (807 SE2d 899) (2017)

(same).

     Because Isaiah has failed to carry his burden of showing

obvious error in the trial court’s failure to sua sponte remedy the

alleged error of the admission of Ward’s statement, this claim of

error fails. See State v. Herrera-Bustamante, 304 Ga. 259, 264 (2) (b)

(818 SE2d 552) (2018) (“We need not analyze all of the elements of

     show that the error probably did affect the outcome below.
Davis v. State, 302 Ga. 576, 581 (2) n.5 (805 SE2d 859) (2017).
                                    31
[the plain error] test when, as in this case, the defendant has failed

to establish one of them.”). See also Bamberg v. State, 308 Ga. 340,

352 (5) n.11 (839 SE2d 640) (2020) (“We have observed that, while

an appellant need not specifically cast the alleged infirmity as plain

error, parties should be advised that the hurdle to establishing plain

error is high and therefore that the failure to specifically articulate

how the alleged error satisfies this high standard increases the

likelihood that their claims in this regard will be rejected.” (citation

and punctuation omitted)).

     (c) Isaiah contends the trial court erred in admitting, over

objection, the testimony of the witness who said that his 9mm pistol

had been stolen from his truck and that Isaiah’s brother, Xavier, was

with him in the truck when he last saw the gun. Isaiah argues that

the witness’s testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial, and the trial

court should have sustained counsel’s objection and excluded it from

the jury’s consideration under OCGA §§ 24-4-403 and 24-4-404.

Isaiah contends that the testimony had no bearing on the crimes for

which he had been charged and was offered only to cast him in a bad

                                  32
light by implying that he was part of a “crime family.”

     Pretermitting whether the trial court correctly determined

that the testimony was admissible, any error in its admission was

harmless because it is highly probable that it did not contribute to

the verdicts.5 Although the jury could infer that Xavier had stolen

the gun and had thereafter given Isaiah or Leon access to it, the

witness did not expressly accuse Xavier of stealing his gun, and the

State never argued that Isaiah played any role in the theft of the

weapon or was even aware that it had been stolen. To the extent

that the witness’s testimony impugns anyone’s character, it

impugns Xavier’s, and he was not charged in this case. Further, the

prosecution linked the gun to the shooting and to Isaiah and Leon

     5 It is fundamental that harm as well as error must be shown for

      reversal. The test for determining nonconstitutional harmless
      error is whether it is highly probable that the error did not
      contribute to the verdict. In determining whether trial court error
      was harmless, we review the record de novo, and we weigh the
      evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so as
      opposed to viewing it all in the light most favorable to the jury's
      verdict.
Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708, 713 (3) (854 SE2d 523) (2021) (citations and
punctuation omitted); see also OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (“Error shall not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected[.]”).
                                     33
through other evidence admitted at trial, including ballistics

evidence and the testimony of witnesses who had recovered the gun

from its hiding place beneath Isaiah’s mattress. Thus, weighing the

evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done so, we

conclude that any error by the trial court in admitting the witness’s

testimony was harmless, as it is highly probable that any such error

did not contribute to the verdicts. See McCalop v. State, 316 Ga. 363,

377 (5) (887 SE2d 292) (2023) (Any error in admitting evidence of

the defendant’s bad character was harmless, given, inter alia, the

nature of the alleged incidents, other cumulative evidence, and the

strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt.).

     4. Isaiah contends that the trial court erred in denying his

motion for a new trial on the basis that his trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance at trial. He argues that trial

counsel’s joint representation of Leon and Isaiah gave rise to an

actual conflict of interest that prejudiced Isaiah’s defense and that

the joint-representation agreement they allegedly signed was

insufficient to waive any conflict. He also argues that counsel’s

                                  34
performance was deficient in other respects and that the resulting

prejudice required that his convictions be reversed.

      (a) Isaiah argues that, because of his trial counsel’s joint

representation of him and his brother, he received constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel based on an actual conflict of

interests at trial. Assuming, arguendo, that the written waiver that

Isaiah executed was legally insufficient to waive an actual conflict,

we see no merit to his contention that his trial counsel was laboring

under an actual conflict of interest. 6 Consequently, Isaiah’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

            The Sixth Amendment to the United States
       Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
       prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
       the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” “It is well
       established that the right to counsel protected by the
       Sixth Amendment . . . is the right to the effective
       assistance of counsel.” (Citations and punctuation
       omitted.) Edwards v. Lewis, 283 Ga. 345, 348 (2) (658
       SE2d 116) (2008).
           “One component of the right to the effective

      6 In assuming, for purposes of evaluating this claim of error, that the

waiver executed by defense counsel and the Adams brothers was invalid, we
do not pretermit or assume the existence of an actual conflict of interest. See
Woods v. State, 275 Ga. 844, 845 (2) (573 SE2d 394) (2002) (addressing question
of actual conflict after assuming waiver invalid).
                                      35
     assistance of counsel is the right to representation that is
     free of actual conflicts of interest.” (Emphasis supplied.)
     Edwards, 283 Ga. at 348 (2). Joint representation alone
     does not amount to an actual conflict of interest. See
     Burns v. State, 281 Ga. 338, 340 (638 SE2d 229) (2006).
     Rather, for purposes of evaluating an ineffective
     assistance claim, “‘an actual conflict of interest’ mean[s]
     precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance –
     as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.”
     (Emphasis in original.) Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U. S. 162,
     171 (II) (122 SCt 1237, 152 LE2d 291) (2002). See also
     Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349 (IV) (B) (100 SCt
     1708, 64 LE2d 333) (1980) (An actual conflict of interest
     is a conflict that “actually affected the adequacy of
     [counsel’s representation.]”).

(Footnote omitted.) Adams v. State, 317 Ga. 342, 351 (2) (893
SE2d 95) (2023). Further,

     [t]o carry his burden of proving that his appellate counsel
     provided ineffective assistance because counsel had a
     conflict of interest, the defendant must show that an
     actual conflict of interest significantly and adversely
     affected counsel’s representation of the defendant. The
     defendant need not show actual prejudice, that is, a
     reasonable probability that the outcome of his motion for
     new trial or direct appeal would have been more favorable
     to him if counsel had not labored under a conflict of
     interest. Instead, prejudice is presumed if the defendant
     demonstrates that the conflict of interest existed and that
     it significantly affected counsel’s performance. In order to
     establish ineffective assistance arising from a conflict of
     interest, a defendant must show the existence of an actual
     conflict that adversely affected counsel’s performance. . . .
     Further, the alleged actual conflict of interest must not be

                                  36
     “theoretical or speculative”; rather, it must be “palpable
     and have a substantial basis in fact.
           As we review the decision of the trial court, we owe
     no deference to its application of the law to the facts of
     this case. We owe substantial deference, however, to the
     way in which the trial court assessed the credibility of
     witnesses and found the relevant facts. To that end, we
     must accept the factual findings of the trial court unless
     they are clearly erroneous, and we must view the
     evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the
     findings and judgment of the trial court.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 352 (2).

     After hearing testimony and argument at the motion for a new

trial hearing on Isaiah’s contentions that his trial counsel’s

performance was adversely affected by the joint representation, the

trial court concluded that Isaiah had shown “neither an actual

conflict nor a performance deficiency caused by any such conflict.”

The court concluded that the brothers’ defenses were not

antagonistic. Their lawyer was never faced with a fundamental

division of loyalties, either due to a plea opportunity for one brother

but not the other or the need to pit one brother against the other.

Because Isaiah failed to prove an actual conflict, that is, a conflict

that adversely affected counsel’s representation of him, the trial

                                  37
court found that Isaiah had not carried his burden of proving his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel predicated on an actual

conflict of interest. For the reasons set forth below, Isaiah has not

shown that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous.

      Isaiah contends that his trial counsel knew that the State’s

evidence incriminated him much more than it incriminated his

brother, implying that their defenses were antagonistic. He also

argues that, as a result of the joint representation, counsel refrained

from making decisions and pursuing trial strategies that might have

benefitted him, that is, seeking a plea deal for Isaiah in exchange for

his testimony against Pitts and his brother, using the brothers’

“conflicting” statements and varying levels of cooperation with the

police to Isaiah’s benefit, and crafting a closing argument that

emphasized Isaiah’s mere presence during the shooting.

     However, at the motion for a new trial hearing, defense counsel

testified that, given the evidence in this case, especially the brothers’

statements to the police, he believed that Isaiah’s only plausible

defense was mere presence. According to counsel, Isaiah made it

                                   38
very clear that he was not going to testify against Leon, and he

would not authorize a defense that painted Leon as Pitts’

accomplice. The brothers steadfastly refused to incriminate each

other, and they were adamant that they would not testify against

each other. Further, as counsel explained, the brothers’ defenses

could be presented in a way that was not antagonistic: Leon was

drunk and asleep in the back seat when Isaiah, the driver, was

unwittingly made a participant in the shooting when Pitts fired at

Lowe as Isaiah passed Dobson’s car.

     Additionally, neither brother expressed a desire to seek a plea

deal. Nevertheless, counsel inquired whether the prosecution had

any plea offers. Counsel testified that he dealt with two different

prosecutors, both of whom informed him that they would only accept

guilty pleas if the brothers agreed to sentences of life in prison.

Neither prosecutor expressed interest in allowing either brother to

plead to a lesser charge in exchange for testimony against the other

defendants. Consequently, a plea deal was unavailable, even if one

of the brothers had been interested in a deal and was represented

                                39
by his own attorney.

     With respect to the brothers’ statements, the record shows

that, although they were not entirely consistent, they were not

contradictory. Isaiah said he thought he heard Leon shouting over

the gunfire; Leon claimed he was drunk and fell asleep in the back

seat of the car. Trial counsel explained that, even if the brothers

were tried separately, their respective attorneys would still have to

find a way to explain Leon’s statement denying any awareness of

the shooting while Isaiah said that he thought he heard Leon

shouting. Counsel’s closing argument shows that he attempted to

harmonize the statements, focusing on their consistencies, and

blamed Pitts entirely for the shooting.

     Given the evidence in this case, Isaiah has not shown that any

of the trial court’s factual findings were erroneous or that the joint

representation adversely affected counsel’s representation of him

and, therefore, constituted an actual conflict of interest. At best,

Isaiah has only speculated that counsel’s efforts and strategic

choices were the result of a potential conflict of interest inherent in

                                  40
joint representation. Consequently, the trial court did not err in

denying Isaiah’s motion for a new trial on his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel predicated on an actual conflict of interest

arising from his joint representation. See, e.g., Mahdi, 312 Ga. at

470 (3) (The defendant’s claim of a conflict of interest was “at best a

matter of theory or speculation” insufficient to show an actual

conflict and support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.);

Woods, 275 Ga. at 846 (2) (no actual conflict shown where the record

fails to establish that, but for the alleged conflict, counsel “would

have done something differently” (punctuation omitted)); Henry v.

State, 269 Ga. 851, 854 (3) (507 SE2d 419) (1998) (For a criminal

defendant to show counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of

interest, “[t]he conflict of interest must be palpable and have a

substantial basis in fact. A theoretical or speculative conflict will not

impugn a conviction . . . which is supported by competent evidence.”

(citation and punctuation omitted)).

     (b) Isaiah argues that his trial counsel was deficient for failing

to investigate the possibility that a variety of different bullet

                                   41
fragments and shell casings were “habitually found at the stretch of

Sullivan Road where the shooting took place.” He contends that the

presence of such evidence would have been strategic to his defense,

arguing that the “unexplained origin of certain shell casings” would

support an inference that the shell casings recovered “came from an

unrelated third party; that he was not involved, and did not shoot a

gun at the other car.” He argues that no reasonable trial strategy

excuses counsel’s failure to investigate or use this evidence at trial.

Isaiah, however, has not proven what further investigation into that

stretch of roadway would have revealed or how it would have helped

his defense.

     To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, Isaiah must prove both that counsel’s performance was

professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficient

performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (104

SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Terry v. State, 284 Ga. 119, 120 (2)

(663 SE2d 704) (2008). To prove deficient performance, he must

show that trial counsel performed in an “objectively unreasonable

                                  42
way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms.” Romer, 293 Ga. at 344 (3). “[R]easonable trial

strategy and tactics do not amount to ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 787, 791 (2) (692 SE2d 575)

(2010). To prove prejudice, Isaiah “must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694 (III) (B). “This burden is a

heavy one[.]” Young v. State, 305 Ga. 92, 97 (5) (823 SE2d 774)

(2019). If Isaiah fails to show either deficiency or prejudice, this

Court need not examine the other prong of the Strickland test. See

Palmer v. State, 303 Ga. 810, 816 (IV) (814 SE2d 718) (2018).

     During his closing argument, trial counsel discussed that a

variety of shell casings had been found along the 1000-foot stretch

of Sullivan Road. He argued that it was “illogical” to infer from that

evidence that six to eight guns had been fired from a car with three

people in it, one of whom was driving. “What I would submit to you,”

                                 43
counsel argued, is that it was “not unusual” to find shell casings

along that stretch of road. Counsel emphasized that, given the result

of the State’s ballistic testing, “the only thing they can conclude is

that [Pitts] had” fired two weapons at Dobson’s vehicle. Indeed, the

trial transcript shows that the State was only able to link the shell

casings found on the roadway to two weapons used in the shooting,

a 9mm and a .380-caliber handgun. Trial counsel testified at the

motion for new trial hearing that he did not believe another credible

explanation existed for the shell casings found on the roadway, that

his decision not to further investigate that evidence was strategic,

and that arguing that some other, unknown party was the shooter

based on shell casings found along the road would be a “last resort.”

Counsel consistently argued that Pitts fired two guns and that

Isaiah and Leon were not involved. Under these circumstances,

counsel’s decision not to further investigate the presence of shell

casings along Sullivan Road was a reasonable strategic decision, and

such decisions do not amount to deficient performance under

Strickland. See Johnson, 286 Ga. at 791 (2).

                                 44
     (c) Isaiah argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the introduction of evidence seized from the

Adams home pursuant to a search warrant, including firearms,

ammunition, cell phones, and other items. He also contends that

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of

photographs taken of his home during the execution of the warrant

because the photographs “unfairly associated Isaiah Adams with a

‘lifestyle’ of guns, crime, and violence and served as inadmissible

character and other bad acts evidence that would have been

inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-403 and 24-4-404[.]”

     The record shows that trial counsel renewed his objection at

trial to the introduction of evidence seized pursuant to the warrant,

although he was not required to. See Kilgore v. State, 247 Ga. 70, 70

(274 SE2d 332) (1981) (defendant need not object to the admission

of evidence at trial to preserve the issue for appellate review where

motion to suppress has been overruled.). However, he did not

specifically object to the introduction of photographs depicting

where evidence was found in the Adams home. In its order denying

                                 45
Isaiah’s motion for a new trial, the trial court correctly found that

counsel’s failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance

“because the small handful of photos admitted – images of guns

(including a gun used in the shooting) and ammunition, along with

cell phones and ID cards – were all arguably relevant to the State’s

case and, even if that relevance was slight, the prejudice was

similarly slight.”

     We agree with the trial court that the probative value of the

photographs, which showed the location of some of the evidence

ultimately linked to the crimes charged, was not substantially

outweighed by any unfair prejudice attributable to the other guns

and ammunition depicted in the photographs, given that evidence

that Isaiah possessed guns and ammunition “does not impute to him

generally bad character.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lyons

v. State, 309 Ga. 15, 23 (5) (843 SE2d 825) (2020). See also Harris v.

State, 313 Ga. 225, 233 (4) (869 SE2d 461) (2022) (The trial court did

not err by admitting photographic evidence of weapons and

ammunition officers found when defendant was arrested because

                                 46
the evidence was relevant to the crimes committed, probative of

defendant’s state of mind, and was not outweighed by any unfair

prejudice.). Thus, even if we were to assume that counsel’s failure to

object to the admission of the crime scene photographs was

objectively unreasonable, Isaiah has failed to show prejudice under

the facts of this case. See Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 361-362 (6)

(a) (846 SE2d 57) (2020) (Pretermitting whether counsel’s failure to

object to the admission of photographs showing the defendant’s

Facebook username, “Rayray da Shoota,” was unreasonable,

defendant failed to show prejudice given the defendant was an avid

basketball player as well as the defendant’s guilt as a party to felony

murder was strong.).

     (d) Finally, Isaiah contends that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to seek additional relief after the trial court

denied counsel’s objections to Ward’s statement referencing a gun-

owning “way of life,” see Division 3 (b), and witness testimony

implying that Xavier stole a 9mm handgun, see Division 3 (c).

     The record shows that counsel did impose objections to the

                                  47
witnesses’ testimony but that the trial court either expressly

overruled him or told the State to “move on” to another topic. Isaiah

has not presented any legal argument showing that the trial court

would have struck the challenged testimony or granted a mistrial

had counsel sought such relief. Nor has Isaiah carried his burden of

showing that the testimony, even if it was admitted in error,

resulted in any prejudice to him. He has not demonstrated a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been

different had the trial court excluded the testimony of either or both

witnesses. Consequently, Isaiah has failed to overcome the strong

presumption that his trial counsel performed reasonably and has

failed to carry the heavy burden of proving ineffective assistance of

counsel. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694 (III) (B); Young, 305

Ga. at 97-98 (5).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                 48