Court Opinion

ID: 9353008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 18:03:05.067751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:30.247227
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/10/23 Czodor v. Luo CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

 TOMAS CZODOR,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G060756

                     v.                                                (Super. Ct. No. 18V002374)

 XINGFEI LUO,                                                          OPI N ION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Michael E.
Perez, Judge. Affirmed. Appellant’s Motions for Judicial Notice. Denied. Appellant’s
Motion to Take Additional Evidence. Denied. Respondent’s Motion to Strike. Granted
in part. Respondent’s Motion for Judicial Notice. Denied.
                   Xingfei Luo, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
                   Law Offices of Larry R. Glazer and Nicolette Glazer, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                             *               *               *
                                    INTRODUCTION
              Tomas Czodor obtained a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO)
under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et. seq.; DVPA) against
Xingfei Luo, with whom he had had a brief relationship. A panel of this court affirmed
the DVRO. Ever since then, Luo has been on a mission to prove she never had a dating
relationship with Czodor. She brought a request for an order ending the DVRO based on
her declaration and exhibits which, she claimed, proved she never had a dating
relationship with Czodor. The trial court denied the request to end the DVRO and
entered a first amended domestic violence restraining order (the Amended DVRO), from
which Luo appeals.
              In this appeal, Luo continues her mission to prove she never had a dating
relationship with Czodor. Not only does she argue the trial court erred by denying her
request for an order ending the DVRO and should not have issued the DVRO in the first
place, but she also attached more evidence to her opening brief, not presented to the trial
court, which she contends disproves there was ever a dating relationship. She also filed
two requests for judicial notice and a motion to take additional evidence by which she
seeks to have us consider yet more evidence which she contends proves she never had a
dating relationship with Czodor.
              We affirm the Amended DVRO. Luo’s mission to prove she never had a
dating relationship with Czodor, though pursued tenaciously, was doomed from the
get-go because the issue of a dating relationship was fully adjudicated against her by
issuance of the DVRO. After an evidentiary hearing, at which Luo cross-examined
Czodor, the trial court found that Luo had perpetrated acts of domestic violence against
Czodor and, by issuing the DVRO, determined that Czodor and Luo had had a dating
relationship within the meaning of the DVPA. New evidence regarding the relationship
between Luo and Czodor, even if it tended to show they did not have a dating
relationship, was not a change of facts that would support ending the DVRO.

                                             2
               Luo also contends a provision of the Amended DVRO enjoining her from
posting abusive photographs and comments about Czodor on social media and Web sites
is unconstitutional. We reject that argument and conclude that provision is not a prior
restraint, is not unconstitutionally overbroad, and is not unconstitutionally vague.

                                          FACTS

I. Conduct Leading to Czodor’s Request for a DVRO
               Czodor and Luo met through a dating app. They went on one or two dates
and had a relationship for a few weeks. Czodor believed the relationship ended; Luo
apparently did not. She called and texted him numerous times using several different
phone numbers. Czodor blocked those phone numbers in an effort to stop her from
calling him.
               Czodor sent a message to Luo through the dating Web site to ask her to
stop contacting him. Luo continued to call Czodor despite the request. Luo created fake
Facebook, Instagram, and Yelp accounts with Czodor’s name and uploaded naked
pictures of him along with “shaming comments.” Luo sent those pictures to Czodor’s
various friends and business acquaintances. She also created a video recording with
naked pictures of Czodor and uploaded it onto YouTube. Luo obtained contact
information for Czodor’s friends and customers and sent them messages defaming him.
She posted defamatory statements about Czodor on five Web sites (all having the word
“cheater” in the Web site name) and on the Web site for Czodor’s business.
               One evening Luo appeared at Czodor’s residence unannounced and
knocked and scratched his door for about 20 minutes. She claimed she wanted to talk
and refused to leave when Czodor asked her to do so. Czodor called a friend and asked
him to come over and witness what Luo was doing. The friend arrived at Czodor’s home,
and, after confronting Luo, suggested Czodor call 911, which he did. When police
arrived, they suggested that Czodor obtain a restraining order.

                                             3
II. The DVRO
              Czodor followed the suggestion and in September 2018 filed a request for a
domestic violence restraining order against Luo. In the request, he sought to prevent Luo
from contacting, harassing, threatening, stalking, or impersonating him on the Internet,
electronically, or otherwise; to require Luo to stay 100 yards away from him, including
on Facebook, online, or at his place of business; prevent Luo from bullying him online,
contacting family and friends, sending inappropriate pictures, blogs, and videos; and to
require removal of Internet content created by Luo to “destroy [Czodor’s] online
reputation.” In the section of the request concerning the nature of the relationship,
Czodor checked the box stating, “We are dating or used to date, or we are or used to be
engaged to be married.”
              Luo filed a response opposing the issuance of a domestic violence
restraining order. On the response she checked the box to indicate she agreed to having
had the relationship which Czodor indicated on request for a domestic violence
restraining order, that is, they dated or used to date.
              The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Czodor’s request for a
domestic violence restraining order. Both Czodor and Luo were sworn to testify, and
Luo cross-examined Czodor. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found Luo had
perpetrated acts of domestic violence on Czodor and issued the DVRO, which was set to
expire in October 2023. The DVRO included as “Item 23, Other Orders” an attachment
stating: “Respondent [Luo] is ordered to cease posting the picture or likeness of the
Moving Party [Czodor] or refer to him by name on any social media website or blog.
Responding Party is further ordered to remove any picture or reference of the Moving
Party from any social media website or blog she may have posted.”
              Luo appealed from the DVRO. A panel of this court affirmed the DVRO.
(Czodor v. Luo (Aug. 29, 2019, G056955 [nonpub. opn.].)

                                               4
III. Luo’s Request for Order Ending the DVRO; The Amended DVRO
              In August 2021 Luo filed a request for an order ending the DVRO. She
alleged that she and Czodor had never had a dating relationship within the meaning of the
DVPA and that item 23 of the DVRO was “overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and
unlawful due to the infringement on my First Amendment rights.” Attached to the
request were a declaration from Luo and exhibits, including a few pages from the
reporter’s transcript of the hearing on Czodor’s request for a domestic violence
restraining order. The declaration and exhibits all concerned events which had occurred
on or before the date of issuance of the DVRO and which, Luo claimed, showed she had
never had a dating relationship with Czodor.
              On October 1, 2021, a hearing was conducted on Luo’s request for order
ending the DVRO. Czodor appeared and opposed the request. He asserted that Luo had
not complied with both item 23 of the DVRO and a recently issued criminal protective
order because she had not removed the offending photographs and materials she posted
on social media Web sites and blogs. Luo continued to insist she had never had a dating
relationship with Czodor.
                                                                                   1
              The trial court denied Luo’s request for an order to end the DVRO because
Luo had not satisfied any of the criteria under Code of Civil Procedure section 533 for
terminating injunctions. Based on Molinaro v. Molinaro (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 824
(Molinaro), the court modified item 23 of the DVRO to read as follows: “Restrained
Party [Luo] is further ordered to remove any pictures or references of the Protected Party
[Czodor] from any social media websites or blogs she may have posted. [¶] Restrained
Party shall not post any pictures or likeness of the Protected Party or refer to him by
name on any social media or website or blog that would be abusive pursuant to [Family
Code] § 6203 and [Family Code] § 6320.”

              1
                 The court referred to two requests for an order but only one request
appears in the clerk’s transcript.

                                             5
                  The Amended DVRO, which incorporated modified Item 23, was issued on
October 1, 2021. Luo filed a notice of appeal on the same day. The issuance of a DVRO
is appealable as an order granting an injunction. (Molinaro, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at
p. 831, fn. 6.)

                                          MOTIONS
                  Luo filed three motions and Czodor filed two motions with this court. We
address the motions in the order in which they were filed. We deny all but one.
                  1. Luo’s Motion for Judicial Notice No. 1. In this motion, Luo requests we
                                                                                          2
take judicial notice of (1) five pages of the reporter’s transcript of Luo’s criminal trial in
Orange County Superior Case No. 19CM06724 and (2) the record for Case No. G061132.
We deny this motion. The passages from the reporter’s transcript, which are attached to
Luo’s exhibit to the motion for judicial notice, cover Czodor’s trial testimony concerning
the nature of his relationship with Luo. The reporter’s transcript was not presented to the
trial court in the present case. Absent exceptional circumstances not present here, the
appellate court does not take judicial notice of matters that were not before the trial court.
(Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 379, fn. 2 (Haworth); Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.) When
reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, we only consider matters that were
part of the record at the time the court entered the judgment. “‘This rule preserves an
orderly system of [litigation] by preventing litigants from circumventing the normal
sequence of litigation.’” (Haworth, at p. 379, fn. 2.) In addition, evidence of the nature
of the relationship between Czodor and Luo is irrelevant to the appeal because that issue

                  2
                 As a result of her conduct at Czodor’s home, Luo was charged with and
convicted of three misdemeanor counts: (1) vandalism causing damage under $400 (Pen.
Code, § 594, subds. (a)-(b)(2)(A)); (2) violation of a protective order (Pen. Code, § 273.6,
subd. (a)); and disorderly conduct — dissemination of private videos and recordings
(Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (j)(4)(A)).

                                               6
was fully adjudicated when the trial court granted Czodor’s request for a domestic
violence restraining order.
                 Luo has provided no information about case No. G061132 (other than the
case number) or explained how the record in that matter is relevant to this appeal. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(A) [movant must explain why matter to be noticed is
                        3
relevant to appeal].) Case No. G061132 appears to be Luo’s habeas corpus proceeding
in this court.
                 2. Luo’s Motion to Take Additional Evidence. In this motion, Luo requests
that we accept as additional evidence the five pages of reporter’s transcript that are an
object of her motion for judicial notice No. 1. We deny this motion. Code of Civil
Procedure section 909 grants the Court of Appeal authority to take additional evidence,
however, that authority must be used sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, and
only to affirm. (Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc. (2017) 16
Cal.App.5th 1190, 1213; City of Petaluma v. Cohen (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1438
fn. 7.) Luo’s request to take additional evidence in this case does not meet that standard.
Further, as we shall explain, evidence of the nature of the relationship between Czodor
and Luo is irrelevant to this appeal.
                 3. Czodor’s Motion to Strike Luo’s Declaration and References to the
Declaration in the Appellant’s Opening Brief. We grant this motion in part. Attached to
Luo’s opening brief are two items: (1) a declaration from Luo regarding a transcript of a
recorded telephone conversation she had with Czodor and (2) the purported transcript of
that conversation. Luo offered the transcript of the conversation to the court at the
hearing on her request for an order ending the DVRO, but the court declined to receive
the transcript into evidence because Luo could have testified about the conversation at the
hearing on Czodor’s request for a domestic violence restraining order but did not do so.

                 3
                     Further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

                                                  7
              “A party filing a brief may attach copies of exhibits or other materials in the
appellate record.” (Rule 8.204(d), italics added.) Luo’s declaration postdates the
Amended DVRO and therefore was not presented to the trial court and is not part of the
appellate record. “‘An appellate court’s review is limited to consideration of the matters
contained in the appellate record.’” (Sannmann v. Department of Justice (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 676, 684.) “‘Appellate review is generally limited to matters contained in
the record. Factual matters that are not part of the appellate record will not be considered
on appeal and such matters should not be referred to in the briefs.’” (In re Bailey (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 837, 860.) It therefore was improper for Luo to attach her declaration to
her opening brief.
              The transcript of the telephone conversation is deemed to be part of the
appellate record because it is an exhibit that was “admitted in evidence, refused, or
lodged.” (Rule 8.122(a)(3), italics added.) However, Luo was required to “specify that
exhibit by number or letter in the notice of designation” and to comply with the rules for
securing transmission of the exhibits to the reviewing court that are set out in rule 8.224.
She did not so specify the transcript in her designation of record and did not comply with
rule 8.224. The transcript of the telephone conversation therefore is not properly before
us, cannot be attached to a brief, and must be stricken from Luo’s opening brief.
              As we are striking Luo’s declaration and the transcript of the telephone
conversation, they cannot be used as support for any factual assertions made in Luo’s
appellate briefs. Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) requires that any “reference to a matter in the
record” must be supported by “a citation to the volume and page number of the record
where the matter appears.” (See Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 657, 684 [appellant “must provide citations to the appellate record directing
the court to the evidence supporting each factual assertion”].) Factual assertions in Luo’s
opening brief that are supported only by citations to the Luo declaration and the transcript
of the telephone conversation therefore do not comply with rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).

                                              8
              We have the discretion to strike Luo’s opening brief with leave to file a
new brief, or to strike or disregard passages of the brief that do not comply with rule
8.204(a)(1)(C). (Rule 8.204(e)(2).) Rather than strike the entire appellant’s opening
brief or passages from it, we exercise our discretion to disregard those parts of the brief
that mention or are supported only by citations to the Luo declaration or the telephone
conversation transcript. We also exercise our discretion to disregard all other passages in
the opening brief that do not comply with rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). (Ragland v. U.S. Bank
National Assn. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 195; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 967, 990.)
              4. Czodor’s Request for Judicial Notice. Czodor requests we take judicial
notice of the Orange County Superior Court Appellate Division opinion filed in Case No.
30-2021-01216615 on April 27, 2022 which affirmed Luo’s conviction for misdemeanor
vandalism, violation of a protective order, and disorderly conduct. We deny this motion.
Although we may take judicial notice of this opinion as a record of a court of this state
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)), Czodor does not offer any explanation for why this
opinion is relevant, other than to say the trial court took judicial notice of Luo’s trial and
conviction. (See Rule 8.252(a)(A) [movant must explain why matter to be noticed is
relevant to appeal].) We see no relevance to the opinion, which was issued after issuance
of the Amended DVRO, to any issue raised by this appeal. Further, we have explained
that absent exceptional circumstances we do not take judicial notice of matters that were
not before the trial court, and, in reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, we
only consider matters that were part of the record at the time the court entered the
judgment. (Haworth, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 379, fn. 2.)
              5. Luo’s Motion for Judicial Notice No. 2. By this motion, Luo requests
we take judicial notice of her request for an order terminating the Amended DVRO that
she filed in the trial court on June 14, 2022. We deny this motion. Luo contends this
request for an order is relevant because her declaration attached to the request shows she

                                               9
never had a dating relationship with Czodor. This request for an order is not the proper
subject of a request for judicial notice because it was not and could not have been
presented to the trial court in connection with Luo’s request for an order that is the
subject of the appeal. (Haworth, 50 Cal.4th at p. 379, fn. 2; Vons Companies, Inc. v.
Seabest Foods, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 444, fn. 3.)
              In addition, Luo’s most recent request for an order ending the Amended
DVRO is irrelevant to the issues raised by this appeal because the nature of the
relationship between Czodor and Luo was fully adjudicated when the trial court granted
Czodor’s request for a domestic violence restraining order. While we have discretion to
take judicial notice of the request for order as a court record (Evid. Code, 452, subd. (d)),
we may not take judicial notice of the truth of any facts alleged in it or in Luo’s
declaration (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 280; Espinosa v. Calva (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1396).

                                       DISCUSSION

I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Luo’s Motion to Dissolve the DVRO
              A. Standard of Review
              Luo’s appeal, though taken from the Amended DVRO, challenges the trial
court’s order denying Luo’s request for an order ending the DVRO. We review an order
denying a request to end a domestic violence restraining order under the abuse of
discretion standard. (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505 (Loeffler).)
“To the extent that we are called upon to review the trial court’s factual findings, we
apply a substantial evidence standard of review.” (Ibid.) Whether the trial court applied
the correct legal standard to a particular issue is a question of law subject to de novo
review. (Ashby v. Ashby (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 491, 509.)

                                             10
              B. Luo Did Not Make the Requisite Showing to End the DVRO
              A DVRO is a type of injunction because it is an “order requiring a person
to refrain from a particular act.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 525 [defining “injunction”];
Loeffler, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1503-1504.) By requesting an order ending the
DVRO, Luo was seeking to dissolve an injunction. (Loeffler, at p. 1504.)
              Code of Civil Procedure section 533 sets forth the grounds on which a court
may dissolve an injunction: “In any action, the court may on notice modify or dissolve
an injunction or temporary restraining order upon a showing that there has been a
material change in the facts upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was
granted, that the law upon which the injunction or temporary restraining order was
granted has changed, or that the ends of justice would be served by the modification or
dissolution of the injunction or temporary restraining order.”(Ibid.) In short, an
injunction may be dissolved upon a showing of (1) a material change in facts, (2) a
change in the law, or (3) the ends of justice would be served. (Loeffler, supra, 174
Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) The restrained party bears the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that one of the three circumstances is present and justifies
a termination of the restraining order. (Ibid.)
              Luo insists the original DVRO, and by extension the Amended DVRO,
were unlawful and should not have been issued because she never had a dating
relationship with Czodor that would make her subject to the DVPA. The issue whether
Czodor and Luo once had a dating relationship was fully adjudicated by issuance of the
DVRO. Czodor alleged in his request for a domestic violence restraining order that he
and Luo once had a dating relationship, and, in her response, Luo agreed they had had a
dating relationship. An evidentiary hearing was conducted, both Czodor and Luo were
sworn to testify, and Luo cross-examined Czodor. The trial court, when granting
Czodor’s request for a domestic violence restraining order, found that “acts of domestic
violence have occurred and that [Luo] is the perpetrator, and [Czodor] is the victim.” As

                                             11
relevant here, Family Code section 6211 defines “domestic violence” as “abuse
perpetrated” against any person “with whom the [perpetrator] is having or has had a
dating or engagement relationship.” (Id., subd. (c).) Thus, by finding that Luo had
committed acts of domestic violence, the trial court of necessity also found that Czodor
and Luo had or once had a dating relationship.
              Accordingly, whether Czodor and Luo ever had a dating relationship was
not a change in facts that would permit termination of the DVRO. Luo has not attempted
to show a change in facts after issuance of the DVRO, rather, she presented what she
claimed was new evidence pertaining to a fact adjudicated by the trial court in issuing the
DVRO. New evidence about facts adjudicated by issuance of the DVRO is not a change
in facts permitting its dissolution. Luo has not shown the ends of justice would be served
by dissolving the DVRO. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Luo’s
request for an order terminating the DVRO.

II. Item 23 of the Amended DVRO Does not Violate Luo’s Right to Free Speech
              A. Standard of Review
              Luo argues item 23 of both the DVRO and Amended DVRO are
unconstitutional prior restraints of speech and are unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. We need not address item 23 of the DVRO because it has been superseded by
item 23 of the Amended DVRO.
              The grant or denial of a restraining order under the DVPA is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. (N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, 601.) We review any
factual findings under the substantial evidence standard of review. (M.S. v. A.S. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1143.) We accept as true all facts supporting the trial court’s
findings and resolve all conflicts in the evidence in support of the trial court’s decision.
(Id. at p. 1144.) Whether a restraining order infringes constitutional rights of speech and
expression is a question of law subject to de novo review, and facts relevant to the

                                              12
constitutional analysis likewise must be reviewed de novo, independent of the trial
court’s findings. (DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 889-
890; Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1166.)

              B. Item 23 of the Amended DVRO Is Not an Unconstitutional Prior
              Restraint
              Item 23 of the Amended DVRO states that Luo “shall not post any pictures
or likeness of the Protected Party or refer to him by name on any social media or website
or blog that would be abusive pursuant to [Family Code] § 6203 and [Family Code]
§ 6320.”
              Under the DVPA, a court may issue a restraining order to prevent domestic
violence or abuse if the party seeking the order “shows, to the satisfaction of the court,
reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (Fam. Code, § 6300; see Fam. Code,
§ 6220.) As relevant here, “abuse” under the DVPA means “[t]o place a person in
reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another,”
and “[t]o engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to [Family
Code] Section 6320.” (Fam. Code, § 6203, subd. (a)(3) & (4).) A court may issue a
restraining order “described in Family Code section 6320 enjoining specific acts of
abuse.” (Fam. Code, § 6218, subd. (a)). Family Code section 6320, in turn, identifies
specific acts of abuse to include “disturbing the peace of the other party.” (Id., subd. (a).)
The phrase “disturbing the peace of the other party” in section 6320 means “conduct that,
based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the
other party.” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c); see In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1424 (Evilsizor & Sweeney); In re Marriage of Nadkarni
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497.)

                                              13
              The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment (Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U.S. 697, 732),
declares that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” (U.S.
Const., 1st Amend.) A prior restraint is an administrative or judicial order that forbids
certain speech in advance of it being made. (Alexander v. United States (1993) 509 U.S.
544, 550.) “Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions—i.e., court orders
that actually forbid speech activities—are classic examples of prior restraints.” (Ibid.)
Prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se. (Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad
(1975) 420 U.S. 546, 558.) “Any system of prior restraint, however, ‘comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’” (Ibid.)
              The doctrine of prior restraints applies only to speech and expressive
conduct that is protected by the First Amendment. “‘[T]here are categories of
communication and certain special utterances to which the majestic protection of the First
Amendment does not extend because they “are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”’”
(Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1147, quoting Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 503.) An injunction
prohibiting the repetition of expression that has been adjudicated to be unlawful does not
constitute a prohibited prior restraint of speech. (Lemen, at p. 1153.) “‘Once specific
expressional acts are properly determined to be unprotected by the first amendment, there
can be no objection to their subsequent suppression or prosecution.’” (Id. at p. 1156.)
              The Court of Appeal in Evilsizor & Sweeney held that conduct adjudicated
to constitute abuse under the DVPA is not constitutionally protected. (Evilsizor &
Sweeney, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1427-1428.) In that case, husband downloaded
the contents of wife’s cell phones. (Id. at p. 1419.) When dissolution proceedings were
instituted a few months later, husband filed with the court copies of some downloaded

                                             14
text messages. (Ibid.) Wife sought, and the trial court granted, a restraining order under
the DVPA enjoining husband from further disseminating the downloaded information.
(Ibid.) On appeal, husband argued the restraining order constituted an unconstitutional
prior restraint of his right of free speech. (Id. at p. 1427.) The court concluded the
restraining order was not a prior restraint because husband’s conduct in disseminating
material downloaded from wife’s cell phones had been determined to constitute abuse
under the DVPA. (Id. at p. 1428; see Phillips v. Campbell (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 844,
853-854 [if First Amendment claim had been preserved, court would conclude speech
that constitutes abuse under DVPA is not protected].)
              Item 23 of the Amended DVRO is not a prior restraint because it does not
prohibit Luo from engaging in expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.
Item 23 enjoins Luo from posting pictures or likenesses of, or references to Czodor that
constitute abuse under Family Code section 6203 or 6230. Conduct that is abusive under
the DVPA is not protected by the First Amendment. The trial court, when issuing the
DVRO, found that Luo had engaged in abusive conduct by, among things, posting
photographs and nasty comments about Czodor on social media, blogs, and Web site.
Item 23 of the Amended DVRO simply enjoins Luo from engaging in conduct which the
court had earlier determined to be abusive.

C. Item 23 of the Amended DVRO Is Not Overbroad or Unconstitutionally Vague
              Luo argues item 23 of the Amended DVRO is overbroad. We disagree.
Luo argues item 23 imposes “a blanket prohibition of speech on all contents, subjects,
viewpoints, and images related to [Czodor] or his online reputation.” But that is simply
untrue. Item 23 of the Amended DVRO was drafted to specifically refer to Family Code
sections 6203 and 6320 and to enjoin Luo from posting material about Czodor that would
constitute abuse under those code sections.

                                              15
              Molinaro, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 824, illustrates what is — and what is not
— an overbroad restraining order under the DVPA. The Court of Appeal struck down as
overbroad and constituting impermissible prior restraint of speech, a restraining order
prohibiting husband from posting anything on Facebook about his pend ing divorce case.
(Id. at p. 829.) The restraining order was not necessary to protect the minor children
because husband’s Facebook posts were not specifically directed to them and husband’s
earlier posts had not directly disparaged wife or tried to alienate her from the children.
(Id. at p. 833.) Unlike the restraining order in Molinaro, item 23 of the Amended DVRO
does prohibit all social postings about Czodor, but only those that are abusive under the
DVPA.
              Luo argues item 23 of the Amended DVRO is unconstitutionally vague
because the term “disturbing the peace” is itself vague. We disagree. To withstand a
constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness, an order must be sufficiently
definite to inform the person subject to the order of what conduct is required or
prohibited. (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500 [probation conditions].) The
vagueness doctrine demands “‘no more than a reasonable degree of certainty.’” (Id. at
p. 503.) The meaning of the phrase “disturbing the peace” can be ascertained with
relative ease and to a reasonable degree of certainty by reference to Family Code section
6320, subdivision (c), which both defines the phrase “disturbing the peace” and describes
                                         4
conduct falling within the definition.

              4
                  In part, Family Code section 6320 subdivision (c) reads: “As used in this
subdivision (a), ‘disturbing the peace of the other party’ refers to conduct that, based on
the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.
This conduct may be committed directly or indirectly, including through the use of a third
party, and by any method or through any means including, but not limited to, telephone,
online accounts, text messages, internet-connected devices, or other electronic
technologies. This conduct includes, but is not limited to, coercive control, which is a
pattern of behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free
will and personal liberty.”

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                                   DISPOSITION
             The Amended DVRO and the order denying Luo’s request for an order
ending the DVRO are affirmed. Czodor shall recover costs on appeal.

                                              SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

GOETHALS, J.

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