Court Opinion

ID: 9771409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:42:33.705849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:40:59.791125
License: Public Domain

MEYEES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The supreme court in Williams sets out the guidelines to be applied when a release sets out a bargain which was never made. Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex.1990). The court held that whether the parties to the release intended to cover an unknown injury cannot always be determined exclusively by reference to the language of the release itself. Id. at 264. The question of mutual mistake is determined not by self-serving subjective statements of the parties’ intent, which would necessitate trial to a jury in all such cases, but rather solely by objective circumstances surrounding execution of the release, such as the knowledge of the parties at the time of signing concerning the injury, the amount of consideration paid, the extent of negotiations and discussions as to personal injuries, and the haste or lack thereof in obtaining the release. Id.
In Williams the court found: 1) that Williams had never discussed nor bargained for settlement of a personal injury claim, and the amount of consideration was for the property damage to her car; 2) that she had no knowledge of the injury at the time of signing the release; and 3) State Farm had no knowledge of the injury. Id. And further, the release language was never explained nor discussed with her or her husband.
I find the facts in this case when applied to the test set out in Williams to raise a material issue of fact as to the enforceability of the release.
Here, Sweeney was represented by counsel when he signed the agreement for the court to enter final judgment in conformity with its terms. No testimony was taken at the hearing, and the only evidence before the court are the pleadings and the affidavits stating that Sweeney and his attorney never discussed the possibility of a wrongful termination suit with Taco Bell or the defense attorney. Applying the factors in Williams, first there was no evidence before the trial court that Sweeney had discussed or bargained for settlement of his claim for wrongful termination; the release language is couched in the middle of the agreement and appears only once; additionally, the judgment does not contain wrongful termination language at all. Secondly, the amount of consideration must be considered, and in the present case it was $8,000.00, of which $7,844.95 was for Sweeney’s worker’s compensation claim, thus, leaving little consideration if any for a *294wrongful termination claim. Thirdly, there was no evidence before the trial court that Sweeney or Taco Bell had knowledge of the wrongful termination suit at the time of signing the release.
Further, Torchia which is cited by the court is not dispositive of the present case because the plaintiff in that case released a claim for the tort of bad faith rather than personal injuries which were unknown at the time of the release as in Williams and in the present case. See Torchia v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 804 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.App.— El Paso 1991, writ denied).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sweeney and applying the test in Williams, I find this evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the release was signed by mutual mistake.