Court Opinion

ID: 9946117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 14:10:16.028144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.318178
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Norman L. Scott,                      :
                        Appellant     :
                                      :
           v.                         :               No. 1026 C.D. 2022
                                      :               Submitted: May 19, 2023
Bureau of Administrative Adjudication :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS                                                 FILED: February 29, 2024

               Norman L. Scott (Appellant) pro se appeals from an order entered by
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) on April 19, 2022,
which denied his appeal from a decision of the City of Philadelphia’s (City) Bureau
of Administrative Adjudication (BAA), finding him liable for a parking violation.
Upon review, we affirm.
                                       I. BACKGROUND1
               On February 8, 2020, the City issued a citation to Appellant for illegally
parking his truck in a no-stopping zone, a violation of Section 12-903(1) of the
Philadelphia Traffic Code.2 Appellant filed an administrative appeal and submitted
photographic evidence, but his appeal was denied by a hearing examiner and the

       1
          Unless otherwise stated, we adopt this background from the trial court’s opinion, which
reflects substantial evidence of record. See Trial Ct. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Op., 7/27/22, at 1-6.
        2
          Phila., Pa., Code Title 12 (1958) (Traffic Code). Section 12-903(1) of the Traffic Code
provides: “The Department [of Streets] shall erect and maintain appropriate signs to give notice
whenever an ordinance or regulation prohibits stopping, standing and parking on any street, or
portion thereof, and no person shall stop, stand or park a vehicle in violation of such ordinances or
regulations.” Traffic Code, § 12-903(1).
BAA appeal panel. During his administrative appeal, Appellant requested a live
hearing, but his request was denied.3
               Appellant then appealed to the trial court. Noting that the photographic
evidence submitted by Appellant documented that Appellant had parked illegally,
the trial court affirmed. Appellant now appeals to this Court.4
                                           II. ISSUES
               Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, Appellant asserts that the
BAA denied him due process.5 See Appellant’s Br. at 5 (unpaginated). Second,
according to Appellant, the BAA’s factual error warrants a new trial.6 See id.

       3
          At the time, no in-person hearings were being held. See BAA Certified Record (C.R.),
1/10/22, at 1 (unpaginated), Info. for Parking Ticket # 824068951 (Ticket Info.). An adjudication
may be conducted by submission of written testimony or other evidence. See Traffic Code, § 12-
2806(d).
        4
          Appellant initially appealed to the Superior Court. By Order dated 8/26/22, the Superior
Court transferred the matter to the Commonwealth Court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(4)(ii).
        5
          It is unclear whether Appellant brings this challenge pursuant to the United States or
Pennsylvania Constitutions. The provisions are coextensive, and our analysis is the same. See
Kovler v. Bureau of Admin. Adjudication, 6 A.3d 1060, 1062 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
        6
          In response, the City argues that this appeal should be dismissed because Appellant has
failed to develop legal arguments in support of these issues. See City’s Br. at 4-8. Rule 2119(a)
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure requires, in pertinent part, that an appellate brief
include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
Here, Appellant’s brief remarks lack supporting analysis or citation to legal authority. See
generally Appellant’s Br. (unpaginated). Thus, Appellant risks waiver. See, e.g., Skytop Meadow
Cmty. Ass’n v. Paige, 177 A.3d 377, 384 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (finding waiver because pro se
appellants’ presentation of issues was “so inadequate that this Court [could not] conduct
meaningful appellate review”). Nevertheless, we decline to find waiver in this case because review
is possible. See, e.g., Russell v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 812 A.2d 780, 783 n.3 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2002) (addressing merits despite under-developed argument “where defects in the brief
did not preclude meaningful appellate review”).
                                                 2
                                      III. DISCUSSION7
                         A. Appellant was not denied due process
              In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the BAA denied him due
process. Appellant’s Br. at 5. According to Appellant, “[t]he hearing was conducted
without a proper hearing and live testimony in which questions can be raised.” Id.
We infer from these brief remarks that Appellant wanted to cross-examine the
ticketing officer. See Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 5/18/22 (“Your
[A]ppellant was not able to question the issuing officer who observed the violation
which is an error of law section 12-2807.”).
              The BAA must act in accordance with Local Agency Law.8 Smith v.
City of Phila., 147 A.3d 25, 31 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). The basic tenets of due process
are applicable. “No adjudication of a local agency shall be valid as to any party
unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity
to be heard.” 2 Pa.C.S. § 553. The opportunity must be provided “at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.” Smith, 147 A.3d at 33. The “key factor” in
evaluating a due process claim is whether the claimant “suffered demonstrable
prejudice.” City of Phila. v. Urban Mkt. Dev., Inc., 48 A.3d 520, 522 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2012) (Urban Market) (rejecting due process claim asserting lack of notice where
the city misidentified the defendant, yet the defendant appeared and testified).
              Per the Traffic Code, the ticketing officer is not required to attend a
hearing “unless the respondent has denied liability and the [p]arking [h]earing

       7
          Where the trial court does not take additional evidence, our review of a local agency
decision is “limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error
of law was committed, whether the procedure before the local agency was contrary to statute, and
whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Kovler, 6 A.3d at 1062
n.1; 2 Pa.C.S. § 754(b).
        8
          2 Pa.C.S. §§ 551-555, 751-754.
                                               3
[e]xaminer determines that the officer’s participation is required.” Traffic Code, §
12-2807(4). A respondent’s inability to question the ticketing officer is not a denial
of due process. Kovler, 6 A.3d at 1063-64.
             Kovler is instructive. In that case, the appellant asserted that the
ticketing officer’s absence from the hearing deprived the appellant of an opportunity
to cross-examine the officer, thus violating the appellant’s right to due process. Id.
at 1063. Perceiving no absolute right of confrontation in civil cases, the Kovler
Court approved the BAA’s procedures, which afford the hearing examiner discretion
to compel the officer’s appearance when necessary. Id. at 1063-64. The Kovler
Court noted that the appellant had not requested the ticketing officer’s presence, nor
had he challenged “the date and time, location, or stated reason for the citation, nor
any other information provided by the ticket[ing officer].” Id. at 1063. Thus, the
Court concluded there was no violation of due process. Id. at 1064.
             Similar to Kovler, nothing in the record establishes that Appellant
requested an opportunity to cross-examine the ticketing officer, nor does Appellant
identify any particular reason why he should be permitted an opportunity to cross-
examine the ticketing officer.    See, e.g., BAA C.R. at 7-10, Correspondence,
11/27/20 (Correspondence) (challenging the examiner’s decision, requesting live
testimony, but not specifically requesting to question the ticketing officer); see
generally Appellant’s Br.; but see Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement.
Moreover, the photographic evidence submitted by Appellant obviated any need to
question the ticketing officer because the evidence clearly depicted Appellant’s
violation.   See BAA C.R. at 3-5, Photographs (Photographs).          Therefore, we

                                          4
conclude that Appellant suffered no demonstrable prejudice, and his claim is without
merit.9 See Kovler, 6 A.3d at 1064; Urban Mkt., 48 A.3d at 522.
                     B. Substantial evidence supports the decision
               In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the hearing examiner “made
an error of facts” that “warrants a new trial.” Appellant’s Br. at 5. Appellant does
not identify a factual error but nevertheless maintains that the decision reveals a
biased and one-sided hearing. See id.
               From these brief statements, Appellant’s precise challenge is unclear.
Nevertheless, a review of the record confirms that there is substantial evidence to
support the BAA’s decision. See Kovler, 6 A.3d at 1062 n.1. Substantial evidence
is “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might consider adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 1065 n.7.
               Again, we find Kovler instructive. In that case, the appellant sought to
refute the City’s prima facie evidence with photographic evidence.10 Id. at 1066.
Apparently, the appellant believed the evidence was exculpatory because it showed
that another vehicle had encroached into the space chosen by the appellant, and this
encroachment left insufficient space for the appellant to park. See id. Thus, this
evidence showed the appellant’s vehicle “partially parked” in a no-stopping zone.

       9
          In this section of his argument, Appellant also asserts that “[t]he evidence presented by
[] Appellant wasn't considered which is a violation [of the right] to a fair trial.” Appellant’s Br. at
5. The record does not support this assertion. See Photographs (documenting illegal parking);
BAA C.R. at 6, Notice of Decision, 10/30/20 (Decision) (“After review of the City’s prima facie
evidence and careful evaluation of the evidence/testimony you submitted, it was found that there
was insufficient basis for dismissal.”) (emphasis added).
        10
           When a person challenges a parking violation, the Traffic Code requires that the City
submit “[1.] the parking ticket and [2.] information from a state department of motor vehicles
identifying the owner of the vehicle.” Traffic Code, § 12-2807(2). This documentation will
constitute “prima facie evidence that the registered owner of the vehicle was the person who
committed the parking violation.” Id.
                                                  5
Id. at 1067. The Kovler Court concluded that the hearing examiner’s decision,
upholding the ticket, was supported by substantial evidence. Id.
             Here, Appellant disputed the ticket, commenting, “My vehicle and
handicap placard were displayed according to the posted sign. My meter was paid
in full. A vehicle made it impossible for me to move further into the parking sign
[sic].” Ticket Info. In support of his dispute, Appellant submitted photographic
evidence. See Photographs. As in Kovler, this photographic evidence confirmed
that Appellant had partially parked his truck in a no-stopping zone. See id.; see also
Ticket Info (“[Appellant] photo clearly confirms [Appellant] was in violation of
impeding in stop proh[ibited] zone.”); Trial Ct.’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Op. at 3
(“[Appellant] does not dispute that his truck was parked as set forth in the
photographs: approximately 60% of the truck was parked in the handicap parking
space and 40% of the truck was in the no[-]stopping zone.”). Thus, we conclude
that the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Kovler, 6 A.3d at 1067.
                                IV. CONCLUSION
             Appellant committed a parking violation by parking his truck in a no-
stopping zone. Appellant disputed the ticket and offered photographic evidence, but
this evidence confirmed the violation. Upon review, the BAA did not violate
Appellant’s right to due process when its hearing examiner did not offer Appellant
an opportunity to cross-examine the ticketing officer. See Kovler, 6 A.3d at 1064;
Urban Mkt., 48 A.3d at 522. Further, the photographic evidence submitted by
Appellant is substantial evidence supporting the BAA’s decision. See Kovler, 6
A.3d at 1067. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                              LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

                                          6
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Norman L. Scott,                      :
                        Appellant     :
                                      :
           v.                         :     No. 1026 C.D. 2022
                                      :
Bureau of Administrative Adjudication :

                                 ORDER

     AND NOW, this 29th day of February, 2024, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered on April 19, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

                                          LORI A. DUMAS, Judge