Court Opinion

ID: 9850696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:01:43.182669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:41.842638
License: Public Domain

STRUTZ, Judge
(dissenting).
I must dissent from the opinion of the majority in this case. It reverses the district court and orders a new trial on the ground that an instruction given on the matter of the family-car doctrine was erroneous and prejudicial. I believe that when the entire instruction, as given, is read and construed, it is very apparent that the instruction as a whole was correct and proper. It must be remembered that error never will be presumed, but must be affirmatively shown by the record. The burden of showing error is on the party claiming it. Zarak v. Hjelle, 156 N.W.2d 815 (N.D.1968). The jury found for the respondent in this case, and there is no showing that, under the evidence, a different result would probably have resulted if the instruction complained of had not been given. One who seeks to set aside a jury’s verdict in a civil action because of error in the instructions has the duty of showing that, under the evidence, the jury would probably have reached a different verdict if the instruction had not been given. Moe v. Kettwig, 68 N.W.2d 853 (N.D.1955).
We would also point out that instructions to a jury must be considered and construed as a whole, and that error cannot be assigned upon mere portions of an instruction; that if the instruction as a whole, as given by the court, states the law correctly, there can be no reversible error, even though a part of the instruction, standing alone, might be erroneous. Froh v. Hein, 76 N.D. 701, 39 N.W.2d 11 (1949); Ferderer v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 77 N.D. 169, 42 N.W.2d 216 (1950); Moe v. Kettwig, 68 N.W.2d 853 (N.D.1955); Sather v. Bigger, 107 N.W.2d 38 (N.D.1961); Spalding v. Loyland, 132 N.W.2d 914 (N.D.1964); Larson v. Meyer, 135 N.W.2d 145 (N.D.1965); Kuntz v. Stelmachuk, 136 N.W.2d 810 (N.D.1965); Jasper v. Freitag, 145 N.W.2d 879 (N.D.1966); Bartholomay v. St. Thomas Lumber Co., 148 N.W.2d 278 (N.D.1967).
That is exactly what happened in this case. The portion of the instruction complained of might be erroneous if the court had given only what the majority quotes in the first paragraph of the syllabus of its opinion. But the trial court went on to instruct the jury: “The test is * * * *812whether he was using the car for a purpose for which the parent provided it, with authority, expressed or implied.”
Thus the instruction was not error when considered as a whole.
However, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the majority is correct in its conclusion that the instruction complained of was erroneous. Even if that were true, I do not believe that such error was prejudicial. The undisputed facts which the jury had before it for consideration showed that the family-car doctrine would not be applicable in this case in any event. Here, the son was more than twenty-four years of age. It is true that where the son is an adult, that in itself does not mean that he ceases to be a member of his father’s family. But the record in this case discloses that the son, for many years, had been working away from home for other people. When so working, he lived away from his father’s home. Being unmarried, he came to his father’s home during periods when he was unemployed.
The important fact, and the circumstance which completely destroys any chance that the father’s car could be considered a family car in this case, it that at the time the father purchased this automobile, some eight years prior to the accident, it was not purchased as a family car. At that time, and at all times since, the son has had his own automobile. He never has used the father’s automobile except on special occasions, and then only with special permission. The automobile was not maintained by the father for the use and convenience of the son as a member of his family because the son always had had his own car during all the years that the father owned the car in question.
At the time of the accident out of which this action arose, the son was employed on a construction crew erecting buildings in Hope, North Dakota. This was within driving distance of his parents’ home. So, being unmarried, he stayed at his parents’ home during his employment on this particular job. While engaged on this job, his own car broke down. To enable him to get to work, the father permitted him to use the father’s automobile on the day in question and for several days prior to the accident. It was used purely for the son’s own business, and not for the business of the family or the father nor for the convenience of either. The son’s automobile was in a garage being repaired, and work on it had not yet been completed on the morning of the accident, so the father permitted his son, at the son’s express request, to use the automobile that day to go to work. Thus, when the son’s car had to be put in the garage for repair, he did not get blanket permission to use the father’s car while his own car was being repaired. He asked for and he received permission on each occasion when he used the car.
Therefore, even if the instruction which was given on the matter of the family-car doctrine was erroneous, as asserted by the majority, it was error without prejudice because, under the record in this case, the father’s automobile was not a family car. Had the jury found against the father on the record it had before it, we would — or, under the law, we should — set aside such verdict.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
TEIGEN, Chief Justice.
I concur in the dissent insofar as it discusses the law. I feel that the instruction considered as a whole is not erroneous.