Court Opinion

ID: 9797290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:17:45.450811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:50.160562
License: Public Domain

WINFREE, Justice,
dissenting.
1. Overview
I am unable to agree with the court's disposition of Jack Beltz's privacy claim under the Alaska Constitution. If our only choices for a rule about warrantless seizures and searches of garbage left for collection in the normal course were the federal rule or today's new Alaska rule, I would join the court's decision without hesitation. But our choices are not so limited. Although the rule adopted by the court lies somewhat closer to the protections embodied in the Alaska Constitution than the federal rule, its constitutional protections are mostly illusory. I would instead adopt the rule Chief Justice Rabinowitz advocated in his dissent in Smith v. State.1
As the court notes, Smith v. State was decided in 1978, but the case actually arose in 1970. The parties submitted appellate briefs before Alaska voters adopted article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution in 1972.2 In his briefs Smith relied only on article I, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution.3 Implicitly acknowledging that the addition of the article I, section 22 privacy clause would change the legal landscape, the Smith court: (1) expressly limited its holding to the specific facts of that case; (2) found no reason to interpret article I, section 14 of the state constitution more broadly than the federal constitution; and (8) declined "to announce a general rule sanctioning official gathering and analysis of an individual's refuse."4 The court today aptly describes the subsequent effect of article I, section 22 on our article I, section 14 jurisprudence, demonstrating the wisdom of Smith's self-imposed limitations.
In my view Smith has no precedential value and neither controls nor contributes to the resolution of cases involving police seizures and searches of garbage placed for collection in the normal course.5 Working with a clean slate, I would adopt Chief Justice Rabinowitz's approach in his Smith dis*340sent, which expressly took into account the new article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution: courts should look to an individual's behavior to determine objectively "whether the person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy" 6 or instead has exhibited an intent "to knowingly disclose to the public, publicly communicate, or publicize the contents of her garbage" left for collection.7 If the expectation of privacy is reasonable, it is protected by sections 14 and 22 of article I of the Alaska Constitution and may not be abrogated without a search warrant.8
Responding directly to some of the same arguments about diminished expectations of privacy that the court makes today, Chief Justice Rabinowitz referred to "differential expectations of privacy" and noted that "citizens might expect a few, infrequent invasions of their privacy interests by third persons, but might simultaneously expect their privacy to remain immune from governmental intrusions."9 I agree. Chief Justice Rabinow-itz asserted that "a free and open society cannot exist without the right of the people to be immune from unreasonable interference by representatives of their government."10 I agree. Chief Justice Rabinowitz concluded that a warrantless seizure and search of household garbage left for collection falls within the category of unreasonable interference.11 I agree.
Today the court correctly holds that under article I, sections 14 and 22 of the Alaska Constitution "a person who sets out garbage for routine collection on or adjacent to a public street (or a public area) has some objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in that garbage."12 But it is error for the court to then: rely on technical notions about location and abandonment of property while ignoring the practical realities of (1) why garbage is placed curbside for routine collection and (2) the communal nature of residential garbage; apply privacy considerations to things and places rather than people; ignore Chief Justice Rabinowitz's concept of differential expectations of privacy; and conclude that the objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage set out for routine collection is significantly lessened because the person "not only intends to expose the garbage to routine pickup, but also risks potential intrusions by intermeddling humans (even garbage collectors), and the possibility that animals, snow plows, and wind may reveal the contents of the garbage containers."
2. Practical Realities, Misplaced Reliance, and Differential Expectations of Privacy
In Alaska we have a system of government-run garbage landfills, government-per*341formed garbage collection (or governmental regulation of private collectors), and government-imposed rules and regulations about how residents must store garbage on their property and where they must place it for collection.13 Some communities make the use of their municipal garbage collection services mandatory.14 Those municipalities not mandating use of municipal collection services still extensively regulate garbage disposal.15
Aside from surreptitious video or audio recordings, garbage may provide the best evidence of what people do in the privacy of their homes.16 As the court acknowledges, it is now possible to analyze a person's garbage and learn a great deal about the person's activities and associations, even to obtain "DNA for testing and for investigation." Yet the government generally controls how its citizens may store and dispose of their garbage, and a citizen generally has no choice but to participate in the government's collection and disposal system, including following the rules about where to place garbage for collection. Therefore, to the extent the court relies on the specific location of garbage set out for collection to show a lessened expectation of privacy, that reliance is misplaced-the constitutional right of privacy protects people, not places,17 and for most Alaskans the residential garbage collection place is controlled by municipal ordinances having nothing to do with the individual's objective expectation of privacy.
The court's reliance on its conception of abandonment is similarly misplaced. It is, as the court suggests, entirely possible that despite comprehensive regulation of the storage and presentation of garbage for collection, individuals are at some risk of children or dogs or snowplows making mischief and scattering the contents of their garbage containers. But this neither constitutes abandonment nor justifies the government's war-rantless seizures and searches of garbage that has not been scattered by such mischief. Chief Justice Rabinowitz's concept of differential expectations of privacy makes abundant sense in this context, leading me to conclude that today's new rule provides insufficient protection to Alaska residents.
*342What is-or should be-the only relevant factor is an individual's objective intent when placing containerized garbage in the required location for collection. The key question is whether the individual intends to disclose the contents to the world at large, or to unobtrusively dispose of the contents in accordance with custom or rules and regulations imposed for the health and safety of the community.18
The court finds fault with Chief Justice Rabinowitz's standard using a "slippery slope" analysis, suggesting it "would seem to foreclose warrantless searches of garbage even after the garbage bags have reached a landfill." It would be easy to follow the court's convention and simply say that specific issue is not before us, but in any event the court's concern is misplaced. Chief Justice Rabinowitz's standard focuses on an individual's intent, discerned by examining the individual's behavior. That behavior generally involves the placement of garbage in a bag and the placement of that bag for collection (usually in accordance with a local ordinance). That behavior does not demonstrate an intent mever to disclose the contents of the garbage. But neither does it demonstrate an intent to "abandon" the garbage to any passer-by-whether it be a child, animal, or police officer-onee it is placed for collection. It generally demonstrates an intent that the garbage not be disclosed except in the normal course when it reaches its final destination and is commingled with the rest of the community's garbage by someone specifically tasked with collecting and handling garbage. This case is illustrative of that point: Beltz placed his garbage in a bag, placed the bag in a garbage container in a garbage cart, and placed the garbage cart near the edge of the Beltz property so the garbage collector could collect and dispose of the garbage in the normal course. This behavior objectively manifested an intent that the garbage remain undisclosed until the garbage collector disposed of it in the normal course.
3. Collateral Consequences
The court's new rule produces two noteworthy collateral consequences demonstrating the constitutional privacy right announced today is mostly illusory.
First, despite a laudable admonition that police may not institute "garbage sweeps," some garbage sweeps are in fact allowable under the new rule. It should come as no surprise that most residences have multiple occupants, each of whom has a constitutionally protected right of privacy in his or her garbage. Here the court notes that Beltz lived with his father and that the garbage cart, bin, and lid belonged "to the Beltz household." The testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that the residential property was owned by Beltz's father. The police admitted that they seized and searched the garbage bags from the Beltz household without any specific information about who: (1) actually produced the garbage; (2) placed the garbage in those bags; or (8) placed those bags of garbage in and on the garbage bins.
Under today's rule the police may seize and search an entire household's garbage without a warrant based on a reasonable suspicion that one member of the household is engaging in a serious crime and evidence of that crime may be somewhere in the household garbage. By extension, if the police had a reasonable suspicion that Belts was disposing of crime-related evidence in the next-door-neighbor's garbage, they could have made a warrantless seizure and search of that garbage as well. And nothing in today's rule prevents the police from seizing and searching all of the contents of an apartment complex garbage receptacle when focused on the conduct of one individual resident.19 These are garbage sweeps that *343should be allowed only with a search warrant, especially considering that nothing in today's rule appears to prevent the police from analyzing the garbage of people other than the target of the original investigation, compiling information about them, or charging them with crimes based on information found in their garbage. It would be naive to believe DNA data compilations and registries created from police seizures and searches of garbage are not in Alaska's future.
Second, despite today's holding that an individual has a constitutional right of privacy in garbage left in the normal course for routine collection, the natural corollary of allowing garbage sweeps is that the constitutional right is illusory for most of the people whose garbage will be seized and searched. It will be the exception, rather than the rule, when the police can limit their seizure and search to garbage of the individual under suspicion for a serious crime.
Consider, for example, the newly announced constitutional right of privacy as afforded to Beltz's father.
Suppose that Beltz's father had committed some unrelated crime, serious or otherwise, and that the police had found evidence of that crime in their sweep of the Beltz household garbage. Could the police have used that evidence in a prosecution of Beltz's father? He had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his garbage and the police had no suspicion about him, let alone an articulable and individualized reasonable suspicion that he was engaging in a serious crime. Would his article I, sections 14 and 22 rights mandate suppression of the evidence? Or would suppression be denied because under the rule announced today the police otherwise had legal authority to seize and search the garbage and therefore to act on the evidence that came into plain view?20 The court finds the latter result acceptable, comparing it to what can occur during a police search of a home occupied by multiple residents. But to initially enter that hypothetical home, the police would have needed a warrant, consent, or the presence of exigent cireumstances, none of which are necessary for the seizure and search of the garbage. The constitutional privacy right is illusory in this context.
Here, of course, there is no indication whatsoever that Beltz's father was suspected of committing a crime. The police nonetheless seized his garbage cans from his garbage cart and searched his garbage, and he has no information about what the police did with his garbage or what data about him the police have compiled from that garbage. The constitutional privacy right is thus equally illusory in this context.
Consider yet another context. After today, police are on notice of an individual's constitutional privacy rights in garbage set out for routine collection. If the facts of this case took place tomorrow, given that the residence, the garbage cart, and the garbage cans all belonged to Beltz's father, the seizure and search of the contents of the garbage cans might be considered a deliberate violation of Beltg's father's constitutional rights for the express purpose of obtaining incriminating evidence against his son. If so, then Beltz might have vicarious standing to raise the constitutional violation and seek *344suppression of the incriminating evidence.21 But given the tenor of today's decision, it appears more likely the court would conclude Beltz's father's constitutional privacy rights were not violated, further demonstrating the rather illusory nature of the constitutional privacy right announced today.
4. Ironies
Finally, I note two ironies arising from this case.
First, the court suggests that a search warrant might have been required after the first seizures and searches of the Beltz household garbage gave the police "the first incriminating evidence" that a crime had been committed. If this is so, a warrantless seizure and search of garbage is acceptable when the police have merely a reasonable suspicion that the garbage may contain evidence of a serious crime, but a warrant is required when the police clearly have probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and further evidence may be found in the accused's garbage. This does little to honor either the constitutional right of privacy or the necessity of search warrants.
Nothing in today's rule prevents continual warrantless seizures and searches of garbage regardless of what the police actually find on any given occasion; today's rule is just an evidence-gathering rule obviating the need for a search warrant. Here the police continued to seize and search garbage from the Beltz household for several weeks even though they had no new information from any source about additional purchases of methamphetamine material. This and other long-term targeted garbage seizures and searches based on single suspicious incidents appear legitimate under today's rule, despite the historical premise that warrantless searches based on reasonable suspicion are necessary to avoid imminent public danger.22
Second, the police actually had probable cause to obtain a search warrant for Beltg's residence and his garbage based on the information provided by the store personnel, even before the seizures and searches of the Beltz household garbage. The police had ample time to obtain a search warrant in this case but, in light of the federal rule and Smith, they chose not to do so. Adopting Chief Justice Rabinowitz's standard would thus not have prevented the police from obtaining the evidence they sought in this case; it would merely have ensured that they went through proper procedures to obtain it-procedures that reflect our prioritization of individual rights. If the police had lacked time to obtain a search warrant, existing search and seizure law provided an exigency exception: "Exigent cireumstances justifying a warrant-less search or seizure may be established by the existence of probable cause, coupled with a 'compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant'"23 Today's rule simply enables police to sidestep the procedural protections offered by the warrant requirement.
5. Conclusion
When otherwise faced with the federal rule, transplanting the reasonable suspicion framework from investigatory stops to seizures and searches of garbage left for collection might at first blush seem a reasonable and adequate check on police conduct. But Chief Justice Rabinowitz again had the correct response over thirty-five years ago:
In my judgment, it is preferable to entrust the decision to invade citizens' privacy to the serutiny of neutral judicial officials rather than police officers-even police officers operating under great self-restraint.
*345As the United States Supreme Court noted in McDonald v. United States:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield eriminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.24
To the extent today's rule affords Alaskans any protection, it is better than the federal rule. But a far better course would be to apply the rule proposed by Chief Justice Rabinowitz. The people of Alaska deserve a rule that jealously protects their constitutional right of privacy, and I would adopt a rule requiring police to obtain a warrant to seize and search garbage that is left for collection in the normal course. I would therefore reverse the court of appeals's decision and reinstate the trial court's suppression ruling.

. 510 P.2d 793, 799-805 (Alaska 1973) (Rabi-nowitz, C.J., dissenting).

. Article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution provides in relevant part: ''The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed."

. 510 P.2d at 794. Article I, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

. 510 P.2d at 795.

. I refer to "normal course" as the routine placement of household garbage, in closed bags or boxes or inside garbage cans, at curbside for collection, usually in accordance with local ordinances.

. Smith, 510 P.2d at 801 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Edwards, 71 Cal.2d 1096, 80 Cal.Rptr. 633, 458 P2d 713, 715 (1969)).

. Id. at 803.

. Id.

. Id. Chief Justice Rabinowitz gave the example of a telephone caller on a "party line" who might reasonably expect others on the party line to overhear conversations but still would not expect the government to conduct full-scale warrantless taps of telephone conversations. Id. That example seems quaint today, but the same might now be said of mobile phone users: they understand that when they talk in public areas others will overhear at least one end of their conversations. Mobile phone users may therefore have a diminished expectation of privacy, but they do not expect the government to conduct full-scale war-rantless interceptions of their conversations. Similarly, those who access the internet recognize the possibility that hackers may successfully penetrate their computers and obtain personal information; despite this diminished expectation of privacy, those individuals do not expect the government to do the same without a search warrant. Chief Justice Rabinowitz also noted that a "hotel guest may reasonably expect a maid to enter his room to clean up, but absent unusual circumstances he should not be held to expect that a hotel clerk will lead the police on a search of his room." Id. (quoting People v. Krivda, 5 Cal.3d 357, 96 Cal.Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262, 1269 (1971) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted)). Similarly, just because a person has a cleaning service come into the home, there is no expectation that the police will search the home without a warrant.

. Id. at 799.

. Id. at 800, 804-05.

. I interpret "on or adjacent to a public street (or a public area)" to be essentially the same as "curbside" and assume any difference is immaterial in light of the condition that the garbage be set out for routine collection.

. For example, in Seward those who use their own garbage containers must place them for collection "abutting a dedicated public right-of-way," but those who use the city's garbage containers may place them for collection "upon the public right-of-way." Seward Mun.Code 14.05.025(b). In Sitka individuals must place garbage receptacles for collection in convenient locations "designated by the director of public works." Sitka Mun.Code 15.06.015. Anchorage Municipal Ordinances differentiate between residents whose houses abut alleys and those who live in "areas without alleys"; the former are required to leave containers "in the alley," but the latter are required merely to leave receptacles "at the street." Anchorage Mun.Code 26.70.050(D)-(E). In both Wrangell and Cordova individuals must leave garbage containers for collection ""in plain view in an accessible location at the ground level or on an open platform or open porch not more than four feet above the adjacent roadway and so placed that they may be reached from the ground by the collector." Wrangell Mun.Code 15.18.040(A); Cordova Mun. Code 08.12.110. The Kodiak Island Borough requires that "liltems to be collected ... be placed within five feet of the route of the collection vehicle and shall be placed loose on the ground"-unless the property owner installs racks for the placement of garbage containers, in which case they "may not be placed or located on the traveled right-of-way." Kodiak Island Borough Mun.Code 08.25.080. In Kenai containers may not be placed "within the traversed right-of-way of a street or alley" but may be placed "off the traveled portion" of the right-of-way if "necessary for expeditious collection." Kenai Mun.Code 09.10.030. Fairbanksans must place their garbage containers "at curbside or at the edge of the alley" but not "within the street or alley right-of-way." Fairbanks Mun.Code 66-68.

. See, e.g., Anchorage Mun.Code 26.70.030; Cordova Mun.Code 8.12.130(A); Fairbanks Mun. Code 66-2; Kodiak Island Borough Code 08.25.030; Palmer Mun.Code 08.20.0110; Sitka Mun.Code 09.08.025(A); Valdez Mun.Code 08.08.040(c); Wrangell Mun.Code 15.18.070(A).

. See, e.g., Dillingham Mun.Code 08.04.030-08.04.110 (governing size of garbage containers, structure of garbage containers, vehicles used to transport waste, placement of containers, requirements for landlords, frequency of disposal, and fees for use of the city's solid waste disposal facility).

. The court has zealously guarded Alaskans' personal privacy in their homes. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 503-04 (Alaska 1975) (discussing constitutional right of privacy in the home).

. Smith, 510 P.2d at 800 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).

. An example of the former may be when a person places uncovered or un-coniainerized items in open display at curbside, perhaps for people to take for re-use, in which case no search warrant would be required to seize and search the items left in plain view. Here a police officer testified that nothing incriminating was in plain view before the garbage was seized and searched.

. The court makes light of this concern, again emphasizing the supposed narrowness of its decision by stating it does not decide "whether reasonable suspicion as to one resident of an apartment building would justify a search of the entire building's garbage left on or near the street for collection." But the court's decision is subject to the same "slippery slope" analysis it applies to Chief Justice Rabinowitz's privacy standard. If *343the police can seize and search an entire household's garbage left at curbside based on a reasonable suspicion about one person in the household, what distinction prevents the police from seizing and searching all of the garbage placed in the street in front of a duplex or small apartment building based on a reasonable suspicion about one resident? And because the court has not repudiated Smith, what part of today's decision suggests any limitation on seizing and searching garbage from a larger apartment complex receptacle on the apartment grounds based on reasonable suspicion about one resident? "Carried to its logical conclusion," the court's new standard may allow the seizure and search of all residential garbage on a street or in a neighborhood based on the reasonable suspicion that a specific individual is engaging in a serious crime somewhere along the street or in the neighborhood and that evidence can be found somewhere in the garbage.

. See, e.g., Newhall v. State, 843 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Alaska App.1992) (describing " 'three basic requirements for a valid 'plain view' seizure of evidence: (1) the initial intrusion which afforded the view must have been lawful; (2) the discovery of the evidence must have been inadvertent; and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence must have been immediately apparent' " (quoting Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 738 (Alaska 1979))).

. See Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 360-63 (Alaska 1983) (defendant has vicarious standing to assert deliberate violation of co-defendant's Fourth Amendment rights); Fraiman v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 49 P.3d 241, 245 n. 18 (Alaska 2002) (noting that vicarious standing under Waring appears to apply to the deliberate violation of any third-party's constitutional rights, not just those of a co-defendant).

. I acknowledge the dangers involved in methamphetamine production. Yet the conduct of the police in this case precludes any suggestion that they believed Beltz's conduct created imminent public danger.

. Ingram v. State, 703 P.2d 415, 422 (Alaska App.1985) (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978)).

. Smith, 510 P.2d at 800 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948)) (internal citations omitted).