Court Opinion

ID: 9565715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:26:28.328757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:50.917653
License: Public Domain

ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Charles Dorn Smith, Jr., Bill Prince, and Carolyn S. Thompson and R. D. Thompson, Jr., as guardians ad litem for Robert D. Thompson, individually and d/b/a B. G. Farms, petition for a rehearing in this matter. They contend the Court failed to consider material facts or misapprehended the law relating to (1) the release executed by the parties on November 12,1982, and (2) the award of prejudgment interest.
The Release. On appeal the B. G. Farms partners argued that the case should have been withdrawn from the jury because the. release barred the action as a matter of law. We held there was evidence from which the jury could find the partners did not perform their part of the release agreement, i.e., they failed to make a valid tender to the Land Bank as the agreement obligated them to do. Consequently, they would not be entitled to enforce the release against Graham. See Pearson v. Easterling, 111 S. C. 124, 97 S. E. 238 (1918) (party to agreement must show performance before he can. claim rights under it).
In their petition for rehearing, the partners claim our holding overlooks the fact that thé release was executed and the attempt at payment made “at the request of Graham and in the manner requested by him.” This “fact” appears to be a naked assertion by counsel. The record contains no testimony that the transaction on November 12, 1982, was done at Graham’s request or in the manner requested by him. On the *401contrary, the evidence strongly suggests that the B. G. Farms partners had their own attorney draw the release, then induced Graham to sign it, then drove him to Sumter to offer a check to the Land Bank’s attorney. For the reasons given in our opinion, the partners’ purported offer of payment was not a good tender and thus did not constitute performance of the release agreement.
Prejudgment Interest. As an additional ground for rehearing, the partners suggest that in awarding prejudgment interest on the verdict of $234,000, we overlooked Anderson’s claim that the amount due was $296,312.37. The partners urge that this difference between the amount claimed and the verdict shows the sum due was not certain for the purpose of computing interest.
The mere fact that the parties disagree over the amount of the debt does not make a claim unliquidated so as to preclude an award of prejudgment interest. See Smith Construction Co., Inc. v. Wolman, Duberstein, and Thompson, 294 S. C. 140, 363 S. E. (2d) 115 (1987). It is undisputed that when B. G. Farms took assignment of Thompson’s lease, the partners assumed an obligation to pay the Land Bank or Graham $234,000 from the first proceeds of the 1982 crop. It is also undisputed that Prince gave Graham a postdated check for $234,000 to secure this payment. Obviously, $234,000 is a sum certain in money. The jury found the partners were liable by agreement to pay this amount. Therefore, a certain sum existed upon which to compute prejudgment interest.
The partners also assert there was no demand for prejudgment interest in the pleadings as required by Town of Bennettsville v. Bledsoe, 226 S. C. 214, 84 S. E. (2d) 554 (1954). This argument rests on a misapprehension of the law. The law allows prejudgment interest as a matter of course on an agreement to pay a sum certain. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 166 S. C. 408, 164 S. E. 916 (1932). Where the claimant is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of course, it is unnecessary to make demand for it in the pleadings. Sims v. Goudelock, 41 S.C.L. (7 Rich.) 9 (1853); Kincaid v. Neall, 14 S.C.L. (3 McC.) 81 (1825). Interest allowable as a matter of law may be requested by a post trial motion and nothing turns on the failure of the *402claimant to demand interest in the complaint or to request a jury charge on his right to interest. Flamm v. Noble, 296 N. Y. 262, 72 N.E. (2d) 886 (1947). The Bledsoe case was not an action on a promise to pay a sum certain, but an action for restitution of an overpayment made by mistake. It is distinguishable on its facts.
We have considered all the points raised by Petition for Rehearing. We are unable to discover that any material fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or disregarded, and hence, there is no ground for a rehearing. It is therefore ordered that the petition be denied.