Court Opinion

ID: 9476422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:55:46.663938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:18.783952
License: Public Domain

BALDWIN, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority on the question of whether there is substantial evidence to support the board’s finding that removal as a collateral consequence of a conviction pursuant to an Alford plea, in this instance, bears a nexus to the efficiency of the service. Substantial evidence requires a factual basis, supported by relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Hayes v. Department of the Navy, 727 F.2d 1535, 1537 (Fed.Cir. 1984). On this record, I would not determine that there is substantial evidence to support the finding of a nexus.
The majority has affirmed a board finding that the conviction, itself, was notoriously disgraceful conduct which caused the agency a loss of confidence and trust in petitioner’s work as a photo composition keyboard operator for the agency. On the basis of the conviction alone (not upon any specific evidence of misconduct), a nexus was found between removal and the efficiency of the service.
Because petitioner was convicted in a circuit which requires that the court find a “high probability” that the underlying offense was committed before it may accept an Alford plea, the majority concludes that the conviction could reasonably cause the agency to lose confidence in petitioner’s trustworthiness. In my view this is a procedural inference, not substantial evidence which could form the basis for a conclusion that petitioner’s removal would promote the efficiency of the federal service. The record simply does not provide us with a factual basis upon which to relate the conviction to mistrust in the nature of petitioner’s performance of his duties as a photo composition keyboard operator.
Likewise, I disagree with the finding of a nexus between petitioner’s return to work and the agency’s desire to deter fraudulent workmen’s compensation claims. There is testimony which establishes knowledge in the agency of petitioner’s Alford conviction. The agency supposes that, because of such knowledge, petitioner’s mere presence on the job will encourage future false claims. The agency’s supposition, however, is not substantial evidence of a nexus linking petitioner’s removal to the agency goal.
We have stated that there is no presumption of a nexus in this case. Crofoot v. United States, 761 F.2d 661, 664 (Fed.Cir.1985). The burden is therefore upon the agency to demonstrate that such a nexus exists. See Graybill v. United States, 782 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed.Cir.1986). This is not an instance of conduct so egregious that “it speaks for itself.” See Allred v. Depart*500ment of Health and Human Services, 786 F.2d 1128, 1130 (Fed.Cir.1986).
The nexus requirement should be particularly strict in light of the dearth of case law which delineates collateral consequences of a conviction from an Alford plea. From that standpoint, the agency has failed to carry the burden and the board’s opinion lacks the requisite substantial evidentiary support. I would reverse the finding of a nexus and vacate the agency removal action: