Court Opinion

ID: 9551091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:47:36.392694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:03.072587
License: Public Domain

ALMA WILSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The appellee, Dean Ann Davis, the mother of the child in this case, brought this action for termination of the appellant-father’s parental rights subsequent to the appellant’s complete failure to contribute to the support of Brandy Michelle Davis, as provided in the parties decree of divorce, from September 8, 1980 until March 2, 1982.1 The record reveals that while appellant withheld his court decreed support from the child, appellant was earning between $9.00 and $10.00 per hour. The only explanation given by appellant for not supporting Brandy Michelle was, “I didn’t get visitation rights, so I didn’t feel it was right to pay; ...”2 However, at no time did appellant file pleadings to enforce the visitation rights which he claimed had been violated. Moreover, he did not testify that he had even demanded or made arrangements to enforce the visitation and/or custody rights provided in the original order decreeing “reasonable visitation” and the court’s subsequent modification order of December 5, 1979, which provided:
“That the Plaintiff should be entitled to remove the minor child of the parties, Brandy Michelle Davis, from the Continental United States during such period of time as the husband of the Plaintiff is stationed [in the United States Army] overseas; that during such period [as the husband of the Plaintiff is stationed overseas] of time the Defendant shall be granted custody of Brandy Michelle Davis for a period of 3 weeks per year, said time to be arranged during the period that Plaintiff returns to the United States each year; and that during such 3 week period of custody, child support for ¾ of the month shall be waived.”
During the period the appellee’s military husband was stationed in the United States Army in Germany, the child was twice brought back to the United States. On these two occasions, appellant was granted, and apparently acquiesced in, visitation arrangements with Brandy Michelle (age one year in 1980; age two years in 1981) in the home of the appellant-father’s own mother. These two occasions in 1980 and 1981 which occurred during the period appellee’s husband was stationed overseas, however, do not form the basis of the current controversy. The subsequent order modifying the original decree did not extend beyond the period of time that the appellee’s husband was stationed in Germany. See order, quoted supra. At the conclusion of her husband’s military tour, appellee returned to the United States with Brandy Michelle on January 6, 1982, at which time the original decree providing for “reasonable visitation” was effective. Thereafter, appellee testified that the appellant-father was granted the opportunity for visitation with Brandy Michelle at the appellant-father’s own parents’ house on Saturday and Sunday when Brandy Michelle (then age 3) was there. Whether or not this constituted “reasonable visitation” is not now before us. Rather, this appeal concerns the appel*1115lant-father’s utter failure, for a period of seventeen months, to pay the support due the child as set forth by court order and the consequences therefor under 10 O.S. 1981 § 1130(A)(4), which states most clearly:
A. The finding that a child is delinquent in need of supervision or deprived shall not deprive the parents of the child of their parental rights, but a court may terminate the rights of a parent to the child in the following situations:
4. A finding that a parent who does not have custody of the child has wilfully failed to contribute to the support of the child as provided in a decree of divorce or in some other court order during the preceding year or, in the absence of such order, consistent with the parents’ means and earning capacity; ... [Emphasis mine.]
Only when a case is not governed by a statute is this Court free to work out its own solution. Yet, here, 10 O.S.1981 § 1130, above, exists and is of the greatest relevance. Under this section, our State Legislature has authorized termination of the parental rights of a parent who does not have custody of the child and wilfully fails to contribute to the support of the child as provided in a decree of divorce. Inasmuch as child support payments are for the benefit of the child, rather than for the benefit of the custodial parent, I cannot agree with the majority’s rationale which holds to the idea that the entire Juvenile Code is intended to serve only the public rights of the state. While the state may proceed, under proper circumstances, on behalf of the public to enforce the remedies under the Act, still the main thrust of the Act establishes the parameters of rights enforceable by, or on behalf of children, and of the correlative obligations imposed upon parents. I find nothing in the Act which evinces an intent by the Legislature to relegate complete and total enforcement of the private support rights of children exclusively to the state in all eases under all circumstances. Such a welfare state of affairs, to my view, remains irreconcilably antithetical to fundamental notions of free and open access to the courts. To this end, the minor child herein (through her custodial parent) seeks legislatively ordained remedial redress of the child’s individual right to the support set forth in the original decree of divorce. The legal contest is not, in substance, between the child’s parents; but is rather between the child and the non-supporting parent. As in tort actions, excepting legal disability of minority, the child could bring the action against the non-supporting parent in her individual capacity. The state in such instance is not a necessary party to the action. As the majority points out, state-action issues are triggered when evidence is adduced that a child is deprived, as defined by statute. No such finding was required nor made in this case.3 Were such a finding required, a support order in favor of a child would never be amenable to remedial redress under § 1130 outside of deprived eases. I do not believe the Legislature intended a law without remedy, where as here, the child’s custodial parent, whose own interests are not at issue, performed those duties the state could otherwise perform as a surrogate parent. State governmental intervention in family matters based upon the doctrine of parens patriae should not be invo-cable under all circumstances. The doctrine has been traditionally invoked only where the necessity of the situation warranted state-governmental intervention for the protection of a child, as for example in deprived child actions brought against abusive parents. In such cases, the interests of the alleged abusive parents are diametrically opposed to those of the helpless child; and the child is in need of a parental surrogate to advocate his or her interest. Accordingly, the state may, as surrogate parent, then intervene as advocate for the child. A surrogate parent is, however, unnecessary where the child’s own custodial *1116parent’s interest is not at issue with the interest of the child, whose right is sought to be redressed. It is only where the evidence in such actions indicates that a child is deprived or in need of supervision, that the issues become appropriate for transfer to the so-called juvenile docket, after proper notice. See f.n. 20, majority opinion. The conflict of interest between parent and child manifested in deprived and in need of supervision issues, then, requires state advocacy in the form of state appointed counsel. There are no conflict of interest issues in the present action to resolve against the parents. Absent the element of harm to the child, intervention by the state is impermissible. The majority concedes that the record here is devoid of any evidence of harm sufficient for invocation of governmental intervention. However, I cannot agree that recourse to § 1130(A)(4) is barred by reason thereof. As previously stated by this Court:
“A child may be receiving excellent care from the custodial parent, while the noncustodial parent refuses to obey a court order to contribute to the child’s support. It would be ludicrous and perhaps impossible to require a determination of deprivation or delinquency under these circumstances, and the irresponsible parent would not only be able to escape his responsibilities, but continue to enjoy the benefits of parenthood, including visitation, rights of inheritance and rights to the childrens’ earnings. Such a result would not only be inequitable and unconscionable, it would violate the statute.”4
Nor can I agree with an interpretation which renders the statutes contained in Title 10, entitled “Children”, procedurally irreconcilable. Statutes addressing the same subject matter are to be construed in a manner which reconciles differing provisions and renders an intelligent effect to each statute.5 The majority’s construction virtually repeals § 1130(A)(4). Legislative repeal, however, can never be presumed but must be accomplished expressly.6 I believe this Court is bound to construe the statutes of Title 10, entitled “Children”, in conjunction, one with the other, giving force and effect to each (as prior case law has done) and thereby facilitate the substantive legislative intent irrespective of judicially imposed procedural dichotomies.
In the present case, I do agree that reversal is appropriate since the trial court apparently thought it had no discretion and that termination was mandated. The trial court in pronouncing judgment stated:
“The statute [10 O.S.1981, § 1130(A)(4)] appears to be a rather harsh remedy, but I don’t see anything in the statute that shouldn’t be followed. It’s very clear that a father or parent who fails to contribute to the support of the child for a period of over one year, or during the preceding year, has their rights terminated. So, I don’t see that the Court has any choice under the statute but to terminate parental rights.” [Emphasis added.]
The only evidence presented in support of termination was failure to pay support, which coupled with the trial court’s observations in its judgment, indicates the decision was based on a misconstruction of the law. The word “may” in 10 O.S.1981 § 1130(A)(4), is permissive not mandatory. Thus, the wilful failure of a noncustodial parent to contribute to the support of his or her child for a year preceding judgment does not ipso facto operate to forfeit parental rights or require their termination. The statute rather vests the trial court with discretion to terminate upon consideration of all the circumstances; it does not mandate termination.
Additionally, the appellant-father in this case ultimately attempted to comply with the support order by tendering child support arrearage into court prior to the trial court’s rendition of judgment. Unlike *1117§ 60.6 which authorizes adoption without parental consent upon a showing of nonsupport for a year preceding the filing of the adoption petition, § 1130(A)(4) provides for termination of parental rights for wilful failure to contribute to the support of the child during the preceding year. Absent the qualifying language specifying the applicable period of non-support as being measured by the filing of the petition, the period may reasonably be calculated as ascertainable on the date the trial court renders its final judgment. An erring parent is thus accorded every reasonable opportunity to comply with the duty to support his or her minor child before termination of parental rights. Absent unexcusable compliance, as determined by the trial court under all the circumstances, an irresponsible parent’s wilful refusal to support his or her minor child may result in termination of parental rights under § 1130(A)(4).
DOOLIN, V.C.J., and HODGES, and KAUGER, JJ., join in the views expressed herein.

. Payment was only then made the day before the original setting for the hearing and after service of the petition for termination of parental rights.

. The child’s entitlement to child support is not contingent upon visitation. The duty to support one’s minor child is a continuing obligation; child support payments may not be used as a weapon to force visitation and vice versa. Other legal remedies exist which can be pursued to enforce compliance with custodial or visitation order. Hester v. Hester, 663 P.2d 727, 728 (Okl.1983).

. Mullins v. Mullins, 606 P.2d 573 (Okl.1980), addressed and settled the precise issue presented in this case and should now be followed.

. Id.

. Eason Oil Company v. Corporation Commission, 535 P.2d 283 (Okl.1975).

. Beavin v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 662 P.2d 299 (Okl.1983).