Court Opinion

ID: 9647694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:47:24.701334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:52.166707
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
HUGHES, Justice.
Being convinced that both in equity and in law, Mr. Joseph is entitled to indemnity or judgment over against Gilson Bros. I, in this respect only, respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The portion of such opinion with which I disagree is the following:
“Joseph insists that Gilson Bros, owed Joseph the same duty owed the general public to guard adequately the chain and sprocket on the rear exle of the power mower and therefore Joseph is entitled to indemnity. We believe this duty does not meet the test of Austin Road Co. v. Pope, supra. We fail to see in this record a breach by Gilson Bros, of any duty owing by it to Joseph except the general duty owed Mike Thomison and all others lawfully in vicinity of the power mower while it was being operated. It appears to us that both Joseph and Gilson Bros, owed a duty to exercise a care, one in the operation and the other in the design, of the power mower for the safety of Mike Thomison and all others in the vicinity of the machine while it was being used as it was designed and intended to be used. Both Joseph and Gilson Bros, breached their duty, and each was guilty of the same quality of negligence toward Mike.”
In my opinion, Gilson owed Joseph the duty of designing a safe lawn mower which the employee of Joseph might safely use in mowing grass. In other words, Gilson had an affirmative duty to this employee as being in a class who might be reasonably expected to use this mower. Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, Tex.Sup.Ct., 1962. This duty inures to the benefit of Joseph because Joseph stands in the shoes *956of his employee insofar as liability for his negligent acts committed wihin the scope of his employment is concerned.
If Gilson owed this duty to Joseph, he breached it.
Joseph owed no duty to Gilson which he breached. He is not charged with knowingly or carelessly employing a reckless employee. Joseph did owe a duty, imposed by law, to the injured boy that his employee would not in the course of his employment negligently injure him. This duty, or the liability created by a breach of it, has been given various names. It has been called a vicarious liability, constructive liability, derivative liability or has been given other similar connotations.
It is liability without personal fault and due solely to the relationship existing between the parties, i. e. master and servant.
Joseph did nothing wrong. He, personally, has committed no negligent act. He did not buy the mower or furnish it to his employee. He did not personally supervise its operation.
On the other hand, Gilson, not its employees, committed the wrongful act of designing and placing upon the market an unsafe mower. While, of course, a corporation can only act through its officers and agents there is a distinction between a corporate act and the mere act of an employee. Corporate liability for the negligent acts of its employees rests upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. The liability of the master for the negligent acts of his vice principal is placed upon very different grounds, namely, that the negligent acts of the vice principal are the very acts of the corporation itself. A vice principal, is, among others, any agent of the corporation engaged in the performance, nondele-gable or absolute duties of the master. Fort Worth Elevators v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397.
The designing of the mower and the decision to market it were corporate acts and were nondelegable absolute duties of the master, Gilson Bros.
The result of this reasoning, if sound, is that Joseph having personally committed no wrong and whose liability is vicarious or constructive only should have indemnity against Gilson Bros, who, corporately, did perpetrate a wrongful act.
The trial court and the majority opinion recognize the validity of the principle involved when they grant Joseph indemnity against his employee.1 There are many other instances in which this same principle is applied. See Contribution, Sec. 39, 18 Am.Jur.2d, where many cases are cited to support the text that, “The party whose liability is constructive or derivative merely, who has been forced to respond in damages, may obtain redress against the actual wrongdoer.” By “redress” is meant indemnity. Among the cases there cited are Kampmann v. Rothwell, 101 Tex. 535, 109 S.W. 1089 and Westheimer Transfer and Storage Co. v. Houston Bldg. Co., 198 S.W.2d 465, Tex.Civ.App., Galveston, writ ref. n. r. e. (1946).
In Rothwell it was held that an owner was entitled to judgment over against an an independent contractor who committed a negligent act on his property causing injury to a third person.
In Westheimer the Court approved this statement of the law, “where one party (ICotrla) commits a tort, and another party (Joseph) is liable to the person injured by virtue of a rule of law, indemnity is allowed” to the latter.
*957Cities which have a duty to maintain their streets in good repair are entitled to indemnity against those who caused the condition resulting in injury to third persons. City of San Antonio v. Talerico, 98 Tex. 151, 81 S.W. 518.
Similarly as to the liability of a city for the existence of a nuisance, it is entitled to judgment over against the ones who created the nuisance. City of San Antonio v. Smith, 94 Tex. 266, 59 S.W. 1109.
In Strakos, supra, the Court clearly recognizes the principle I believe applicable here when it said:
“These cases illustrate three approaches used to establish a common-law right of indemnity. One involves the concept of ‘different qualities’ of negligence; another involves a breach of duty as between tortfeasors; the third gives indemnity to the tortfeasor who is only vicariously liable by operation of law.”
Finally, there is the case of Otis Elevator Company v. Cameron, 205 S.W. 852, 857, Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, writ ref., heavily relied upon by Joseph but only mentioned, not discussed, by the majority.
In that case the Court allowed indemnity in favor of an employer whose employee was killed in an elevator accident against the manufacturer of the elevator which was defective even though the employer and the deceased employee were both found to be guilty of negligence. The negligence of the employer was in failing to inspect the elevator and in not furnishing his employee a safe place for work.
In its opinion, the Court cited some of the cases cited herein. It also cited a Massachusetts case, its observations concerning which, I quote:
“The case of Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657, 51 L.R.A. 781, 86 Am.St.Rep. 478, decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Chief Justice Holmes writing the opinion, seems to be directly in point. That was an action to recover damages which the plaintiff had to pay to its employés for personal injuries caused by an explosion of a boiler made by the defendants. The defendants, who were first-class boilermakers, undertook to make for the plaintiff a boiler which would stand a pressure of 100 pounds, and understood that the boiler was to be used to contain naphtha vapor for experiments, in de-vulcanizing india rubber. An experiment was tried, and at a pressure of less than 100 pounds, the naphtha vapor blew out the packing between the door and the end of the boiler by the side of the hinge, escaped into the air, ignited, and caused the damage for which the plaintiff had to pay. The court held that, the plaintiff’s misconduct in failing to discover by inspection the defect in the boiler having rendered him liable for damages for the injuries received by his employés, he was entitled to recover over against the defendant, the party who made and furnished the defective boiler. In discussing the case the court said, among other things:
‘If indemnity ever is to be recovered, short of an express contract of insurance, for what is in form the result of a tort on the plaintiff’s part, this case belongs to that class in which it should be allowed.’ ”
The feeling expressed by Justice Holmes is felt by me here. Indemnity should be allowed Joseph who personally committed no actionable wrong. His liability is due solely to his relationship with Kotrla, a vicarious, constructive liability. The wrong committed by Gilson Bros, was in the performance of a corporate action and not committed through the negligence of its employees.
If there is no precedent for this ruling, now is the time to establish one.

. The majority says, “We believe that the negligence of Joseph, although constructive, but one upon which the injured party may recover, places Joseph in pari delicto with Gilson Bros.” The signifi-canee of this statement is obscure. Of course, if the constructive negligence of Joseph did not render him liable to Mike, there would be no judgment against him and no question of indemnity presented.