Court Opinion

ID: 9683433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:28:25.737684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:47.798095
License: Public Domain

ENOCH, Justice,
joined by CORNYN and BAKER Justices, concurring.
All of Smith’s various claims concern the same injury — exclusion from Lula Little’s estate. Her causes of action accrued when Dr. Little filed the affidavit closing the estate on December 31, 1983. Although each of her claims is'subject to either the two-year or the four-year statute of limitations, Smith did not sue until almost eight years after the accrual date. See Tex. Civ. Prao. & Rem.Code §§ 16.003, 16.004, 16.051. Thus, unless the accrual of her causes of action is somehow deferred, limitations bars all of Smith’s claims. I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the discovery rule does not defer the accrual of any of Smith’s causes of action and thus, join in the Court’s judgment. I do not join in the Court’s opinion, however, because I disagree that the decision to apply the discovery rule in any given case is simply the result of balancing policy considerations on an ad hoc basis.
The discovery rule defers the accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts giving rise to the cause of action. S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.1996); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex.1996). This judicially created exception to statutes of limitations prevents the preclusion of meritorious claims when the injured party cannot learn of the existence of a cause of action before the statutory limitations period has expired. Kelley v. Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tex.1976). However, courts must balance the purpose of the discovery rule against the equally laudable purpose of statutes of limitations—the quelling of stale or fraudulent claims. Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.1977).
Only one year ago, the Court moved away from diverse and disparate ad hoc determinations to glean from our case law a principled basis for deciding whether to apply the discovery rule in any given case. We found that our discovery rule eases were unified by a general principle that captured the proper balance between the purpose of the discovery rule and the underpinnings of limitations statutes. Altai, 918 S.W.2d at 456. Accrual of a cause of action is deferred, we held, in cases of fraud or in which the wrong-doing is fraudulently concealed, and in cases in which the alleged wrongful act and resulting injury were inherently undiseoverable when they occurred but may be objectively verified. Id. at 455-56. The Court reaffirmed this general principle in S.V. 933 S.W.2d at 6. The Court retreats today from the certainty of that principled analysis.
Under the general principle articulated in Altai and reaffirmed in S.V., the discovery rule does not defer the accrual of Smith’s claims. Smith’s alleged injury is her wrongful exclusion from the proceeds of Lula Little’s estate. Under Altai this exclusion must be inherently undiscoverable for the discovery rule to apply to Smith’s claims. 918 S.W.2d at 456. Exclusion from the proceeds of an estate is not inherently undiscoverable given the doctrine of constructive notice applicable in probate matters.
Texas law charges persons interested in an estate with notice of the contents of probate records. Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex.1981). This constructive notice creates an irrebuttable presumption of actual notice. Mooney, 622 S.W.2d at 85. Because parties interested in an estate are charged with notice of the contents of probate documents, there can be no doubt about whether a beneficiary has been wrongfully excluded from an estate. Id. Consequently, the pre*424sumption that beneficiaries have actual notice of the contents of probate records necessarily mandates that they also have notice of their exclusion from those records.
Despite the presumption that Smith had actual notice of her exclusion from the estate, Smith urges us to recognize that the circumstances of her ease distinguish it from a conventional wrongful exclusion case so as to avoid the constructive notice doctrine. Specifically, she argues that because her adoption records were sealed, she could not know the identity of her natural parents without obtaining a court order to open the records. See Tex. Fam.Code § 162.022. Without the knowledge of her parents’ identity, she contends, she could not know which probate documents were relevant. This hardship, Smith argues, excuses her from the presumption of actual notice of the contents of her natural ancestors’ probate records. I disagree.
In probate disputes, Texas courts have refused to look beyond the presumption of notice to defer accrual. See, e.g., Mooney, 622 S.W.2d at 85. The unusual circumstances of Smith’s claims do not merit a departure from this rule of law. I do not dispute that the sealing of Smith’s adoption records presented a potential barrier to her discovery of her inheritance rights in Lula Little’s estate. Nevertheless, the law charges Smith with the knowledge of her right to inherit from and through her natural parents without an executor having to so inform her. See Tex. Prob.Code § 40; see also Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 n. 3 (Tex.1990)(noting that “all persons are presumed to know the law”). Further, in 1973, the Legislature established a method for opening adoption records upon a showing of “good cause.” Act of June 15, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 543, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411, 1419 (amended 1975, 1983, 1995)(current version at Tex. Fam. Code § 162.022); see also Rucker, Comment, Texas Adoption Laws and Adoptees’ Rights of Access to Confidential Records, 15 St. Mary’s L.J. 153, 175-79 (1983). The law thus provided Smith with the means to discover her natural parents’ identity.
Indeed, with little difficulty and in just five weeks, Smith discovered the identity and deaths of her natural mother and grandmother. That Smith did in fact discover the identity of her natural parents in such a short period of time is strong evidence that her alleged injury was not inherently undis-coverable.
More to the point, I find no reason to create a separate probate system for adopted children who wish to inherit from their natural ancestors. Many heirs for any number of reasons may not know the identity of their ancestors. It is unwise for the Court to excuse an adopted child from the constraints of constructive notice simply because he or she may not have known the name of his or her ancestor. The doctrine of constructive notice applies to all probate proceedings to effectuate the compelling interest in the finality of estates. See Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855-56, 106 S.Ct. 2234, 2237-38, 90 L.Ed.2d 858 (1986); see also Turner v. Nesby, 848 S.W.2d 872, 877-78 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, no writ); Henson v. Jarmon, 758 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1988, no writ). Constructive notice allows for the prompt settlement of an estate without the threat of having the estate reopened years or even decades after the death of the parent or other biological relative. The Court’s decision today thwarts that interest in finality by treating adopted children as different from others who do not know the names of those from whom they might inherit.
Constructive notice also defeats Smith’s contention that fraud prevented the running of limitations until the fraud was discovered, or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered. Mooney, 622 S.W.2d at 85. In Mooney, the plaintiff sued an estate’s executor, claiming that she had been fraudulently excluded as a beneficiary. Id. at 84. The trial court granted the executor’s summary judgment motion on limitations grounds, and the court of appeals reversed. See Harlin v. Mooney, 604 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980), rev’d, 622 S.W.2d 83 (Tex.1981). This Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment, holding that because an examination of the probate records would have revealed to the *425plaintiff that she had been excluded from the estate, “the statute of limitations began to run when the will was admitted to probate.” Mooney, 622 S.W.2d at 85. We then applied limitations to bar her claim for fraud:
A person is charged with constructive notice of the actual knowledge that could have been acquired by examining public records. When evidence of fraud may be disclosed by examination of public records this court has held limitations will begin to run from the time the fraud could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary diligence.

Id.

We marked the admission of the will to probate as the point at which limitations began to run. Id. In this case, however, the admission of the will to probate would not have informed Smith of any fraud on Little’s part because the will did not on its face exclude Smith from the estate. It was not until Little distributed the estate’s proceeds pursuant to the anti-lapse statute that Smith was excluded. See Tex. Prob.Code § 68. I would hold, therefore, that limitations began to run upon Little’s filing of the affidavit closing the estate on December 31, 1983. Because Smith’s fraud claim is likewise predicated on her exclusion from the estate proceeds, constructive knowledge of the contents of the probate records prevents her from now claiming that she could not ascertain her injury with diligence within the limitations period. Mooney, 622 S.W.2d at 84-85. Accordingly, when Little closed the estate, Smith constructively knew that she had been excluded as a beneficiary.
As troubling as the Court’s dismissal of the constructive notice doctrine is the Court’s rejection of a fiduciary duty in these circumstances. Smith’s lack of a relationship with the executor and her lack of expectation that her inheritance right would be protected, the Court concludes, prevented a fiduciary duty from arising between the executor of Lula Little’s estate and Smith. But the only requirement that must exist before a fiduciary duty arises between an executor and a beneficiary of an estate is that a person or entity be an executor. See Humane Society v. Austin Nat’l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Tex.1975)(fiduciary duty of bank “arose by reason of its position as executor of the estate”); see also Slay v. Burnett Trust, 143 Tex. 621, 187 S.W.2d 377, 387 (1945)(“When persons enter fiduciary relations each consents, as a matter of law, to have his conduct towards the other measured by the standards of the finer loyalties exacted by courts of equity.”). Clearly, the law imposes no requirement of a close relationship between the executor and beneficiary for a fiduciary relationship to arise. See Humane Society, 531 S.W.2d at 577; Slay, 187 S.W.2d at 387.
Given the existence of a fiduciary duty owed by Little as executor, courts presume the nature of the injury to be inherently undiscoverable. Altai, 918 S.W.2d at 456. However, “a person owed a fiduciary duty has some responsibility to learn when he has been injured.” Id. That notion is particularly applicable to eases concerning probate disputes in light of the constructive notice doctrine. An executor’s fiduciary duty does not absolve beneficiaries from exercising some diligence in protecting their rights. The law of constructive notice prevents Smith or any other beneficiary from relying exclusively upon an executor or administrator to defend her interests. See Jennings v. Srp, 521 S.W.2d 326, 330 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
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I agree with the Court that limitations bars Smith’s various causes of action. But because I disagree with the Court’s retreat from the discovery rule principles enunciated just one year ago in Altai and reaffirmed in S.V., I cannot join the Court’s opinion. Rather, I would follow the reasoned unifying principles identified in Altai and hold that the discovery rule does not apply because Smith’s exclusion from Lula Little’s estate was not inherently undiscoverable. Accordingly, I concur in the Court’s judgment only.