Court Opinion

ID: 9896931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:04:11.816417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:53.396815
License: Public Domain

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

                                                                SUMMARY
                                                           November 2, 2023

                               2023COA101

No. 21CA1608, Colorado Sun v. Brubaker — Public Records —
Colorado Open Records Act; Children’s Code — Dependency
and Neglect Records and Information — Reports of Child Abuse
or Neglect — Identifying Information

     In this case brought under the Colorado Open Records Act,

§§ 24-70-201 to -230, C.R.S. 2023, several media organizations

sought records showing the total number of child abuse reports

received over a three-year period from certain residential care

facilities. The records custodian for the Colorado Department of

Human Services (DHS) denied the requests, citing a provision of the

Children’s Code that prohibits disclosure of child abuse reports as

well as “the name and address of any child, family, or informant or

any other identifying information contained in such reports.” § 19-

1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023. According to DHS, disclosure of the

requested aggregated information would necessarily reveal the
address of a child or informant contained in a child abuse report

because the requests were linked to specific addresses — the

addresses of the residential care facilities.

     The question on appeal is whether section 19-1-307(1)(a)

prohibits, under all circumstances, the disclosure of any address

contained in a child abuse report or whether the statute prohibits

disclosure of an address only when the address constitutes

“identifying information”— that is, information that could lead to

the identification of a particular child, family, or informant. After

considering the statutory language, the legislative history, and the

consequences of adopting either party’s construction, the majority

concludes that the statute prohibits the disclosure of an address

only if it constitutes identifying information. Accordingly, the

division reverses the judgment and remands the case to the district

court for a determination of whether the address in this case

constitutes identifying information.

     The dissent concludes that under the plain language of section

19-1-307(1)(a), the address of a child, family, or informant

contained in a child abuse report is always confidential and can

never be disclosed.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                        2023COA101

Court of Appeals No. 21CA1608
City and County of Denver District Court No. 21CV31379
Honorable Darryl F. Shockley, Judge

Colorado Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Amanda Brubaker, in her official capacity as the Records Custodian for the
Colorado Department of Human Services,

Defendant-Appellee.

                         JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
                          REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

                                   Division VII
                            Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
                                Gomez, J., concurs
                                Pawar, J., dissents

                           Announced November 2, 2023

Law Office of Steven D. Zansberg, LLC, Steven D. Zansberg, Denver, Colorado,
for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Ann H. Pogue, Second Assistant Attorney
General, Bianca E. Miyata, Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee
¶1    This case involves a dispute under the Colorado Open Records

 Act (CORA), §§ 24-70-201 to -230, C.R.S. 2023. Plaintiffs, Colorado

 Sun and Tegna, Inc., d/b/a KUSA-TV/9News (the media

 organizations), requested records under CORA from defendant,

 Amanda Brubaker, the records custodian for the Colorado

 Department of Human Services (DHS),1 showing the total number of

 child abuse reports received over a three-year period from certain

 residential child care facilities in Colorado. DHS denied the

 requests, citing a provision of the Colorado Children’s Code that

 prohibits disclosure, subject to statutorily enumerated exceptions,

 of child abuse reports as well as “the name and address of any

 child, family, or informant or any other identifying information

 contained in such reports.” § 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023.

 According to DHS, disclosure of the aggregated information would

 necessarily reveal the address of a child or informant contained in a

 child abuse report, as the requests were linked to specific addresses

 — the address of each residential care facility.

 1 For simplicity’s sake, we refer to the defendant as the Department

 of Human Services (DHS), not Amanda Brubaker, as Brubaker was
 acting on behalf of DHS.

                                    1
¶2    On judicial review of DHS’s denial, the district court entered

 judgment in favor of DHS, and the media organizations appeal.

¶3    The question is whether section 19-1-307(1)(a) prohibits,

 under all circumstances, the disclosure of any address contained in

 a child abuse report or whether the statute prohibits disclosure of

 an address only when the address constitutes “identifying

 information” — that is, information that could lead to the

 identification of a particular child, family, or informant.

¶4    We conclude that the statute is ambiguous. To break the

 impasse, we turn to the legislative history of section 19-1-307(1)(a)

 and the possible consequences of adopting either construction. In

 our view, the evolution of the statutory provision at issue

 demonstrates that the General Assembly intended to keep

 confidential only information that could reveal a person’s or family’s

 identity, and the possible consequences of adopting either

 interpretation reinforce this conclusion. We therefore adopt the

 media organizations’ interpretation of the statute.

¶5    As a result, we reverse the district court’s judgment and

 remand the case for further proceedings.

                                    2
                      I.   Factual Background2

¶6    Residential child care facilities (RCCFs) are licensed by DHS to

 “provide twenty-four-hour group care and treatment” for children,

 § 26-6-903(29), C.R.S. 2023, most of whom have “serious

 emotional, behavioral and/or developmental disorders,” Off. of

 Colo.’s Child Prot. Ombudsman (CPO), Investigation Report: CPO

 Case ID 2017-2736, at 3 (Aug. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/8RSS-

 RDKE (CPO Report).

¶7    In 2017, DHS revoked the license of an RCCF in Pueblo amidst

 allegations that staff members had abused and neglected the child

 residents. Id. The CPO investigated the circumstances

 surrounding the facility’s closure and issued the CPO Report. The

 CPO Report documented the total number of child abuse and

 neglect reports received by the county human services department

 in the year preceding the closure, as well as the number and

 percentage of reports “screened out” by the county (i.e., reports that

 2 In recounting the background, we, like the district court, accept

 all factual allegations in the complaint as true and may consider,
 along with the complaint, any documents attached to it or
 incorporated by reference. See Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d
 1083, 1088 (Colo. 2011).

                                   3
 are not assigned to a caseworker for further assessment). Id. at 10-

 11.

¶8     In March 2021, while DHS was allegedly scrutinizing its

 practices, a second RCCF closed. The CPO disclosed the number of

 complaints received by county human services officials about the

 RCCF in the preceding year.

¶9     Shortly thereafter, the media organizations sent the following

 requests to DHS for records concerning other RCCFs:

       • “[A]ny documents that show how many calls have been

         made to the child abuse hotline3 from Mount Saint

         Vincent (RCCF) and Cleo Wallace (RCCF) from

         1/1/2018 to 3/26/2021.”

       • “The number of hotline calls/abuse and neglect

         reports/runaways reports from Tennyson Center,

         Mount St. Vincent, and Cleo Wallace to local child

         welfare authorities in the last three years, and how

         many were screened in.”

 3 Reports of suspected child abuse or neglect may be made directly

 to the county department of human services or local law
 enforcement or through the child abuse reporting hotline system.
 See §§ 19-3-307(1), 26-5-111, C.R.S. 2023.

                                   4
  DHS denied the requests “pursuant to CRS 19-1-307(1)(a).” It

  explained that the responsive records would effectively disclose the

  address “of the child or informant associated with the hotline calls.”

  Instead, DHS offered to provide the media organizations with the

  aggregated number of child abuse hotline calls, including the

  number that were “screened in” (i.e., reports that were referred to a

  caseworker for further assessment), from all three RCCFs during

  the relevant period.

¶ 10   The media organizations sued DHS pursuant to section 24-72-

  204(5), C.R.S. 2023, seeking an order compelling it to produce the

  requested records. DHS moved to dismiss the complaint on the

  ground that an address is identifying information that must be kept

  confidential. The district court granted the motion, concluding that

  “the Defendant has properly withheld [the requested] information.”

                         II.   Statutory Background

                                 A.   CORA

¶ 11   “With the passage of CORA, the General Assembly declared it

  to be the public policy of Colorado that ‘all public records shall be

  open for inspection by any person, at reasonable times,’ except as

  otherwise provided by law.” Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d

                                      5
  1083, 1089 (Colo. 2011) (quoting § 24-72-201, C.R.S. 2023).

  “Public records” are “all writings made, maintained, or kept by the

  state [or] any agency . . . for use in the exercise of functions

  required or authorized by law or administrative rule or involving the

  receipt or expenditure of public funds.” § 24-72-202(6)(a)(I), C.R.S.

  2023.

¶ 12   DHS does not dispute that child abuse reports are “public

  records.” See § 19-1-302(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023 (“The general assembly

  declares that information obtained by public agencies in the course

  of performing their duties under this title [of the Children’s Code] is

  considered public information under [CORA].”). Still, while the

  general purpose of CORA is to provide open government through

  disclosure of public records, its purpose is not to disclose

  information that falls under an exception in the statute. See

  Mountain-Plains Inv. Corp. v. Parker Jordan Metro. Dist., 2013 COA

  123, ¶ 35. In light of the strong presumption in favor of disclosure,

  exceptions to disclosure are narrowly construed, and the record

  custodian bears the burden to prove that an exception applies. See

  Shook v. Pitkin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2015 COA 84, ¶ 6.

                                      6
¶ 13   One exception to the rule requiring disclosure is where

  “inspection would be contrary to any state statute.” § 24-72-

  204(1)(a). DHS relied on this exception in denying the media

  organizations’ requests, contending that section 19-1-307(1)(a)

  prohibited disclosure of the requested information.

                      B.    Section 19-1-307(1)(a)

¶ 14   Section 19-1-307(1)(a) provides as follows:

            Identifying information — confidential. Except
            as otherwise provided in this section and
            section 19-1-303, reports of child abuse or
            neglect and the name and address of any
            child, family, or informant or any other
            identifying information contained in such
            reports shall be confidential and shall not be
            public information.

¶ 15   The earliest iteration of the statute was enacted as part of the

  Colorado Child Protection Act of 1975 (the 1975 Act) and broadly

  prohibited disclosure of information in child abuse reports:

            Records confidential. (1) It is unlawful for any
            person or agency to solicit, encourage
            disclosure of, or disclose the contents of any
            record or report made under this article.

  Ch. 177, sec. 1, § 19-10-115, 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 654.

¶ 16   Shortly after passage of the 1975 Act, a lawsuit by journalists

  required a district court to determine whether the strict

                                    7
  confidentiality imposed by the statute ran afoul of Colorado’s Public

  Meetings Law (PML), section 29-9-101, C.R.S. 1975 (repealed 1991).

  See Gillies v. Schmidt, 38 Colo. App. 233, 234-35, 556 P.2d 82, 84

  (1976).

¶ 17   The district court determined that the PML and the records

  statute could be harmonized by distinguishing “between

  information which could lead to identification of the child, parents

  or informant” and “information in the reports which is

  ‘nonconfidential.’” Id. at 237, 556 P.2d at 86. Nonconfidential

  information could be discussed at public meetings, the district

  court ruled, while “identifying information” could only be discussed

  in nonpublic executive sessions. Id.

¶ 18   A division of the court of appeals rejected the district court’s

  reasoning. It concluded that the statute prohibited disclosure of

  the “entire contents” of a child abuse report and, therefore, the

  distinction between identifying information and nonconfidential

  information had no statutory basis. Id.

¶ 19   Within a year, the legislature amended the statute. The new

  act (the 1977 Act) included an amended legislative declaration (with

  the amended language marked in capital letters):

                                     8
            Legislative declaration. The general assembly
            hereby declares that the complete reporting of
            child abuse is a matter of public concern and
            that in enacting this article it is the intent of
            the general assembly to protect the best
            interests of children of this state and to offer
            protective services in order to prevent any
            further harm to a child suffering from abuse.
            IT IS ALSO THE INTENT OF THE GENERAL
            ASSEMBLY THAT CHILD PROTECTION
            TEAMS PUBLICLY DISCUSS PUBLIC
            AGENCIES’ RESPONSES TO CHILD-ABUSE
            AND NEGLECT REPORTS SO THAT THE
            PUBLIC AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY
            BE BETTER INFORMED CONCERNING THE
            OPERATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THIS
            ARTICLE.

  Ch. 246, sec. 1, § 19-10-102, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1020.

¶ 20   The 1977 Act also included an amended records provision.

  Section 19-10-115 (the predecessor to section 19-1-307(1)(a)) had

  previously prohibited disclosure, subject to certain exceptions, of

  any information in child abuse reports; now it generally prohibited

  disclosure of “reports of child abuse or neglect and the name and

  address of any child, family, or informant or any other identifying

  information contained in such reports,” id. at sec. 8, § 19-10-115,

  1977 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1023 — the current language of section

  19-1-307(a)(1).

                                    9
                         III.   Motion to Dismiss

¶ 21   The media organizations contend that the district court erred

  by dismissing their complaint. They say that section 19-1-307(1)(a)

  does not prohibit DHS from producing the requested records

  because they would not reveal “identifying information.”

                        A.      Standard of Review

¶ 22   We review de novo whether the district court properly

  dismissed a complaint for failure to state a claim. See Nieto v.

  Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 11.

¶ 23   Questions of statutory interpretation are also subject to de

  novo review. See id. at ¶ 12. In interpreting a statute, our primary

  goal is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent.

  See Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18. To accomplish this, we

  look first to the statute’s plain language, reading words and phrases

  in context and construing them according to rules of grammar and

  common usage. Broomfield Senior Living Owner, LLC v. R.G.

  Brinkmann Co., 2017 COA 31, ¶ 17. If the meaning of the statute is

  clear from the language alone, our analysis is complete, and we

  apply the statute as written. See OXY USA Inc. v. Mesa Cnty. Bd. of

  Comm’rs, 2017 CO 104, ¶ 16. But if the plain language of the

                                     10
  statute is “reasonably susceptible of multiple interpretations,” then

  it is ambiguous, Elder, ¶ 18. In that case, we may use other

  interpretative aids to discern the legislature’s intent, including

  consideration of the legislative history and the title of the statute, as

  well as “the consequences of a particular construction,” Broomfield

  Senior Living Owner, ¶ 17.

              B.      The Language of Section 19-1-307(1)(a)

¶ 24   As noted, the statute prohibits disclosure of “reports of child

  abuse or neglect,” as well as “the name and address of any child,

  family, or informant or any other identifying information contained

  in such reports.”     § 19-1-307(1)(a). The parties agree that the

  statute distinguishes between the “reports of child abuse or neglect”

  themselves, which are confidential, and certain information

  contained within “such reports,” only some of which is confidential.

  See Peck v. McCann, 43 F.4th 1116, 1125-26 (10th Cir. 2022)

  (interpreting this provision). But the parties dispute what

  information contained in reports of child abuse or neglect is

  confidential. The dispute focuses on the meaning of the phrase “the

  name and address of any child, family, or informant or any other

  identifying information.”

                                     11
¶ 25   As a matter of grammar, this phrase can be understood as a

  series — “a group of successive coordinate sentence elements joined

  together,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/D8C4-

  Y69 — consisting of the terms “name,” “address,” and “any other

  identifying information.”

¶ 26   DHS argues that each term in the series constitutes

  confidential “identifying information.” It says that the phrase “or

  any other” operates as a “catch all” for additional types of

  information that are not specifically enumerated. In other words,

  while “name and address” always qualify as “identifying

  information,” that list is not exhaustive and other terms might also

  qualify. This is a reasonable reading of the provision. See, e.g., Ali

  v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 218-19 (2008) (statute that

  precludes lawsuits against “any officer of customs or excise or any

  other law enforcement officer” precludes a suit against the

  enumerated officers and every other kind of law enforcement officer,

  even ones not acting in a customs or excise capacity (quoting 28

  U.S.C. § 2680(c))); Indus. Claim Appeals Off. v. Ray, 145 P.3d 661,

  664 (Colo. 2006) (where “wages” was defined as “board, rent,

  housing, lodging, or any other similar advantages,” the phrase “‘or

                                    12
  any other similar advantages’ provided a flexible means for

  including employment benefits not otherwise specified in the ‘wages’

  definition” (quoting § 8-47-101(2), C.R.S. 1988)).

¶ 27   But there is another reasonable reading of the provision.

  Under the media organizations’ construction, only addresses that

  constitute “identifying information” are confidential. The

  legislature’s choice to use the conjunctive “and” to connect “name

  and address” rather than the disjunctive “or” may signal that it did

  not intend for any address on its own to be confidential, but only

  addresses that are also disclosed with associated names. See West

  v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037, 1040 (Colo. 2006) (“Use of the word ‘or’

  in a statute is presumed to be disjunctive.”).

¶ 28   And the phrase “or any other identifying information,” even if a

  “catchall” of sorts, may limit and modify the other enumerated

  terms — here, “name and address.” Various courts, including our

  supreme court, have endorsed this rule of syntax. See United

  States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Mortg.

  Brokerage Co. v. Mills, 100 Colo. 267, 269, 67 P.2d 68, 69 (1937).

  Under the rule, which the Williams-Davis court described as a “sort

                                    13
  of reverse ejusdem generis,”4 the general catchall term, “or any

  other,” “reflects back on the more specific rather than the other way

  around.” Id. at 509. So, “the phrase ‘A, B, or any other C’ indicates

  that A is a subset of C.” Id.

¶ 29   At issue in Williams-Davis was a statute that defines when a

  person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. Id. at 508.

  To fall under the statute, the person must, among other things, act

  “in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom

  such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory

  position, or any other position of management.” Id. (emphasis

  omitted) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)). The court concluded (as the

  Ninth Circuit had previously) that the phrase “any other position of

  management” limited the preceding enumerated terms such that an

  4 “The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a general

  word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the
  general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons
  or things of the same type as those listed.” Mounkes v. Indus. Claim
  Appeals Off., 251 P.3d 485, 488 (Colo. App. 2010) (where statute
  allowed for disqualification of benefits based on the “intentional
  falsification of expense accounts, inventories, or other records or
  reports,” “other records and reports” had to be interpreted to
  comprise records and reports of the same type as expense accounts
  and inventories (quoting § 8-73-108(5)(e)(VII), C.R.S. 2023))).

                                   14
  “organizer” “must exercise some sort of managerial responsibility.”

  Id.

¶ 30    Our supreme court used this same rule of syntax to interpret

  an “or any other” phrase in Mortgage Brokerage Co., 100 Colo. 267,

  67 P.2d 68. In that case, an employee was required by the terms of

  a bond to reimburse his employer for losses caused by the employee

  “through larceny, theft, embezzlement, forgery, misappropriation,

  wrongful abstraction, willful misapplication, or any other act of

  fraud or dishonesty.” Id. at 268, 67 P.2d at 68. The court

  interpreted the phrase “or any other act of fraud or dishonesty” to

  modify or limit the enumerated terms. Thus, while the employee

  might have committed “wrongful abstraction” or “willful

  misapplication,” he could not be liable unless he acted fraudulently

  or dishonestly, as “it [was] clear that [those terms] were to be

  construed to indicate or denote acts of fraud or dishonesty.” Id. at

  269, 67 P.2d at 69; see also Jackson v. Commonwealth, 652 S.E.2d

  111, 112-13 (Va. 2007) (statute prohibiting, in relevant part, driving

  while “under the influence of any narcotic drug or any other self-

  administered intoxicant or drug” did not proscribe driving under the

                                    15
  influence of a narcotic drug that was not self-administered (quoting

  Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266 (West 2023))).

¶ 31    Thus, using this rule of syntax, the phrase “any other

  identifying information” can be read as modifying or limiting the

  enumerated terms “name” and “address,” such that disclosure of an

  address is prohibited only when it constitutes “identifying

  information.”

¶ 32    Accordingly, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous, so we

  turn to other interpretive aids to ascertain the legislature’s intent.

       C.   The Legislative History of Section 19-1-307(1)(a) and the
                Consequences of Adopting Either Construction

¶ 33    As we have explained, the initial iteration of the statute

  prohibited disclosure of the entire contents of a child abuse report.

  But after Gillies, the legislature amended the statute. The

  amendment indicates the “legislature’s desire to narrow the statute

  to cover only the reports themselves and identifying information

  therein.” Peck, 43 F.4th at 1126.

¶ 34    More specifically, the amended statutory language tracked the

  distinction the district court drew in Gillies between confidential

  “identifying” information and nonconfidential information. See 38

                                     16
  Colo. App. at 235-36, 556 P.2d at 85. In our view, by tracking that

  distinction, the legislature likely intended to also adopt the district

  court’s dividing line: confidential information is “any information

  which would identify the child, parents or informant,” and all other

  information is nonconfidential. Id. at 236, 556 P.2d at 85.

¶ 35   And in 1996 the legislature amended the title of the provision

  — from “Confidentiality of records” in the 1977 Act to “Identifying

  information — confidential.” Ch. 230, sec. 6, § 19-1-307(1)(a), 1996

  Colo. Sess. Law 1166. This amendment underscores the

  legislature’s focus on maintaining confidentiality of identifying

  information only.

¶ 36   In light of this history, reading the statute to make any

  “address of any child, family, or informant” confidential —

  regardless of whether disclosure of the address would, in fact,

  reveal the identity of a specific child, family, or informant — makes

  less sense than construing the language in accordance with the

  district court’s reasoning in Gillies.

¶ 37   An examination of the possible consequences of adopting one

  interpretation over the other further suggests that the media

  organizations’ interpretation more accurately reflects the General

                                     17
  Assembly’s intent. See § 2-4-203(1)(e), C.R.S. 2023 (noting that in

  construing an ambiguous statute, we may consider “[t]he

  consequences of a particular construction”).

¶ 38   DHS’s construction would require that some nonidentifying

  information is kept confidential, a result we cannot square with the

  legislative history or even with other sections of the Children’s

  Code, which themselves authorize the public disclosure of

  information from child abuse reports, so long as the information

  does not “identify individuals.” Peck, 43 F.4th at 1136. Indeed,

  DHS’s interpretation would prohibit the disclosure of the

  information in the CPO Report and potentially subject the CPO to

  prosecution. See § 19-1-307(1)(c) (violation of section 19-1-

  307(1)(a) is a petty offense, punishable by a fine).

¶ 39   DHS’s construction may also raise difficult constitutional

  problems. In Peck, the question presented was whether section 19-

  1-307(1)(c) and (4), which penalize the disclosure of information

  from child abuse records and reports, violate the First Amendment.

  See Peck, 43 F.4th at 1121-22. Because section 19-1-307(1)(c)

  punishes disclosures listed in subsection (1)(a) of that statute, the

  Tenth Circuit first determined that subsection (1)(a) “reach[es] only

                                     18
  identifying disclosures,” meaning that subsection (1)(c) does not

  “inhibit . . . disclos[ure] [of] non-identifying information.” Id. at

  1126. The plaintiff did not seek to disclose identifying information,

  however, so the court declined to reach the issue of subsection

  (1)(c)’s constitutionality. Id. But subsection (4) penalizes the

  disclosure of any data or information in a child abuse record or

  report, including nonidentifying information. Id. at 1127. The

  court concluded that subsection is unconstitutional because it is

  not narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling interest in

  protecting children, as the government could achieve that purpose

  by proscribing the disclosure only of identifying information. Id. at

  1135-37.

¶ 40   This reasoning suggests DHS’s interpretation — which could

  prohibit the disclosure even of some nonidentifying information

  (that is, information that would not identify a particular child,

  family, or informant) — could be an unconstitutional restriction on

  free speech. By contrast, adopting the media organizations’

  interpretation avoids this possible constitutional infirmity. See

  People v. Iannicelli, 2019 CO 80, ¶ 22 (noting that “statutory terms

  should be construed in a manner that avoids constitutional

                                      19
  infirmities” (quoting People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1240

  (Colo. 1994))).

¶ 41   In sum, we conclude that the legislature intended to prohibit

  disclosure of only information that would identify a particular child,

  family, or informant associated with a child abuse or neglect report.

¶ 42   Like the Tenth Circuit, we acknowledge that “separating

  identifying information from non-identifying information w[ill] often

  be a difficult task.” Peck, 43 F.4th at 1135. But as the Peck court

  pointed out, “[i]f Child Protection Teams” — and, we would add, the

  CPO — “are capable of distinguishing between identifying and non-

  identifying information, then so too” are others at DHS. Id. at 1136.

¶ 43   Finally, we note that the only CORA exception presented in

  this appeal was section 19-1-307(1)(a). We express no opinion on

  whether other exceptions might give DHS discretion to withhold

  records otherwise disclosable under section 19-1-307(1)(a),

  particularly in a close case.

                             IV.   Disposition

¶ 44   The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for

  further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the

  district court must determine whether, in light of our opinion, the

                                    20
requested records would disclose “identifying information” of a

child, family, or informant associated with a child abuse or neglect

report.

     JUDGE GOMEZ concurs.

     JUDGE PAWAR dissents.

                                 21
       JUDGE PAWAR, dissenting.

¶ 45   According to the majority, section 19-1-307(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023,

  is ambiguous because there are two reasonable ways to read it. I

  think there is only one. In my view, the only reasonable reading is

  that names and addresses in child abuse reports are always

  confidential and protected from disclosure. I would therefore affirm

  the district court’s ruling based on the plain language of the statute

  without resorting to additional aids of statutory interpretation.

¶ 46   As the majority explains, our primary goal when interpreting

  statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s

  intent. See Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18. We do this by first

  examining the language of the statute. Id. We give the words and

  phrases the General Assembly chose their plain and ordinary

  meanings. Id. And we read those words and phrases in the context

  of the entire statutory scheme, giving “consistent, harmonious, and

  sensible effect to all of its parts.” Id.

¶ 47   We look beyond the plain language of the statute only if that

  language is ambiguous — that is, only if the language is susceptible

  of multiple reasonable interpretations. Id. An alternate

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  interpretation is unreasonable and therefore creates no ambiguity if

  it “would lead to illogical or absurd results.” Id.

¶ 48   Section 19-1-307(1)(a) protects from disclosure child abuse

  reports and “the name and address of any child, family, or

  informant or any other identifying information contained in such

  reports.” The majority concludes that it is reasonable to read this

  language in two different ways to determine the rule for disclosing

  names or addresses in child abuse reports. First, the statute can

  be read to always protect names or addresses in child abuse

  reports from disclosure. Second, the majority employs a “sort of

  reverse ejusdem” rule of syntax, United States v. Williams-Davis, 90

  F.3d 490, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1996), to read the statute as protecting

  names or addresses from disclosure only if they constitute

  identifying information.

¶ 49   Even accepting the second interpretation as grammatically

  reasonable, I conclude it is unreasonable in substance. The

  suggestion that the General Assembly intended to protect the

  names and addresses of children in child abuse reports only in

  certain circumstances is absurd and illogical. The majority’s

  alternate interpretation would mean that a child abuse victim’s (or

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  the family’s or informant’s) name or address would be subject to

  disclosure unless the records custodian, or a court, determines that

  such information is identifying. This is unreasonable. The only

  reasonable interpretation is that the names and addresses of

  children, families, or informants in child abuse reports are always

  confidential, as is any additional information that is identifying.5

¶ 50   The media organizations seek information linking reports of

  child abuse to particular addresses. This is information that is

  always protected under the only reasonable interpretation of section

  19-1-307(1)(a). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary

  conclusion and would affirm the district court’s order.

  5 Because I conclude that names and addresses of children,

  families, and informants in child abuse reports are always
  identifying information for purposes of section 19-1-307(1)(a),
  C.R.S. 2023, I need not address the majority’s constitutional
  concerns about names and addresses that might not be identifying.

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