Court Opinion

ID: 9594098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:27:15.665343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:48.258951
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority because I find that Rice, as a pro se litigant, was entitled to notice of the November 8, 2005 hearing. From the moment that attorney Tullís was suspended by this Court, Rice acted pro se.6 See Rule 30(a), Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (recognizing a suspended lawyer’s “inability to act as an attorney”). As a pro se litigant, Rice was entitled by procedural due process to notice of the November 8, 2005 hearing before Judge Few. See Moore v. Moore, 376 S.C. 467, 657 S.E.2d 743 (2008). Rice argued in both her Motion for Reconsideration and appellate briefs that she was personally entitled to notice based on due process. Rice was not afforded such notice and, consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. Because Rice was not represented by Tullís at the time notice was provided by the Respondents, I would find the discussion in the Court of Appeals opinion as to whether Tullis’s negligence should be imputed to Rice irrelevant.7 Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.

. This Court may take judicial notice of the fact that Tullís remained suspended until he was disbarred in 2007.

. Moreover, in my view, Tullis’s actions in this matter go well beyond mere negligence.