Court Opinion

ID: 9948293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 20:00:56.363442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:26.496293
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11580    Document: 26-1     Date Filed: 03/06/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11580
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       RECO MAREESE DANIELS,
       a.k.a. Main,
       a.k.a. Bo-Gator,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Alabama
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11580

                  D.C. Docket No. 3:11-cr-00008-WKW-CSC-1
                          ____________________

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Reco Mareese Daniels appeals his 900-month total sentence
       imposed at his third sentencing hearing. A jury previously found
       him guilty of conspiracy, carjacking, armed robbery, and various
       firearms offenses. See United States v. Wilson, 634 F. App’x 718, 721
       & n.2, 728 (11th Cir. 2015). On appeal, he argues that the district
       court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of
       justice, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and that his sentence is substantively
       unreasonable.
             For the following reasons, we affirm. For ease of reference,
       we will address each of his challenges in turn.
                                          I.
              Ordinarily, when a district court imposes an enhancement
       for obstruction of justice, we review the district court’s factual find-
       ings for clear error and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines
       to those facts de novo. United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 818 (11th
       Cir. 2006). However, under the law-of-the-case doctrine,
              a legal decision made at one stage of the litigation, un-
              challenged in a subsequent appeal when the oppor-
              tunity existed, becomes the law of the case for future
              stages of the same litigation, and the parties are
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       23-11580               Opinion of the Court                         3

              deemed to have waived the right to challenge that de-
              cision at a later time.
       United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1997)
       (quoting Williamburg Wax Museum v. Historic Figures, 810 F.2d 243,
       250 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). There are three narrow exceptions to the
       law-of-the-case doctrine. See id. at 1561. A court is not bound by a
       prior ruling if (1) “new evidence” is presented, (2) there is an “in-
       tervening change” in the controlling law, or (3) the prior ruling, “if
       implemented, would cause manifest injustice because it is clearly
       erroneous.” United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir.
       1996); see also Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d at 1561.
               We have applied the law-of-the-case doctrine in the context
       of a defendant’s appeal following resentencing. See United States v.
       Stein, 964 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2020). In Stein, we explained that, on
       appeal from resentencing, the defendant could not challenge for
       the first time the forfeiture order, explaining that “[n]othing pre-
       vented [the defendant] from raising this claim in the district court
       at his original sentencing.” Id. at 1324. We further noted that the
       defendant could have raised the issue during his first appeal for
       plain error review. Id. at 1324–25; see also United States v. Fiallo-
       Jacome, 874 F.2d 1479, 1480-83 (11th Cir. 1989) (determining that
       the defendant had waived his right to raise a number of alleged er-
       rors in his second direct appeal following his resentencing where
       he could have raised those errors in his first direct appeal and not-
       ing that he should not get “two bites at the appellate apple”).
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                23-11580

               In United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), the Supreme
       Court held that a sentencing court may consider a defendant’s con-
       duct of any acquitted charge, provided that the government estab-
       lishes that conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at
       156. Subsequently, in Nelson v. Colorado, 581 U.S. 128 (2017), the
       Supreme Court determined the applicable standard for a post-ac-
       quittal motion for a refund in state court and held that the state’s
       Exoneration Act requiring a petitioner to prove their innocence by
       clear and convincing evidence violated the Fourteenth Amend-
       ment. See id. at 134–39.
               Here, Daniels failed to challenge his obstruction of justice
       enhancement when the opportunity to do so existed during his in-
       itial appeal. Therefore, under our precedent, he has waived the
       right to challenge the enhancement now under the law-of-the-case
       doctrine. See Stein, 964 F.3d at 1324–25. Moreover, none of the
       exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine apply, see Tamayo, 80
       F.3d at 1520, and Watts remains good law, contrary to Daniels’s
       argument, because Nelson does not conflict with Watts nor is it
       clearly on point.
             Accordingly, we affirm in this respect.
                                        II.
              When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sen-
       tence, we apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
       United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The party challenging the sen-
       tence bears the burden of proving that it is unreasonable based on
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       23-11580               Opinion of the Court                         5

       the facts of the case and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United
       States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
              The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circum-
       stances of the offense conduct and the history and characteristics of
       the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
       seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
       provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the sen-
       tence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to pro-
       tect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educa-
       tional or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sen-
       tences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the perti-
       nent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need
       to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to pro-
       vide restitution to victims. § 3553(a).
              A district court must consider all § 3553(a) factors, but it is
       not required to give all factors equal weight. United States v.
       Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). The district
       court is permitted to attach “great weight” to one factor over the
       others. Id. (quoting United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th
       Cir. 2009)). “The decision about how much weight to assign a par-
       ticular sentencing factor is ‘committed to the sound discretion of
       the district court.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d
       1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008)).
              We will consider a sentence substantively unreasonable
       only if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the dis-
       trict court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11580

       § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range
       of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. United
       States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). A dis-
       trict court abuses its discretion when it: (1) “fails to afford consid-
       eration to relevant factors that were due significant weight”; (2)
       “gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor”; or (3)
       “commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper fac-
       tors.” Id. at 1189 (quoting United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121,
       1174 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). “A district court’s failure to discuss
       mitigating evidence does not indicate that the court ‘erroneously
       “ignored” or failed to consider the evidence.’” United States v. But-
       ler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2022) (alteration adopted) (quot-
       ing United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007)).
               Additionally, although we do not presume that a sentence
       falling within the guideline range is reasonable, we ordinarily ex-
       pect it to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746
       (11th Cir. 2008). Finally, “[a] sentence imposed well below the stat-
       utory maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sen-
       tence.” United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir.
       2014).
              Here, Daniels fails to meet his burden to show that his 900-
       month sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court
       stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, as required. Ad-
       ditionally, the court’s failure to discuss Daniels’s mitigating evi-
       dence does not show that it ignored the evidence. Butler, 39 F.4th
       at 1356. The district court was within its discretion to weigh the
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       23-11580              Opinion of the Court                        7

       factors of deterrence and protection of the public more seriously
       than any mitigating factors. The court was also permitted to con-
       sider the seriousness of the offense conduct and obstruction of jus-
       tice conduct, including the conduct that went beyond the charged
       or convicted conduct, as detailed in the presentence investigation
       report, at trial, and at the sentencing hearings. Further, Daniels’s
       sentence fell within the guideline range and below the statutory
       maximum penalty.
             Accordingly, we affirm in this respect as well.
                                       III.
             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Daniels’s sentence.
             AFFIRMED.