Court Opinion

ID: 9384887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 15:03:09.394188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.108161
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                                State of Florida

                           Opinion filed April 5, 2023.
        Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                             ________________

                               No. 3D22-378
                         Lower Tribunal No. 20-9173
                            ________________

                         Ravneet Chowdhury, etc.,
                                Appellant,

                                      vs.

                           BankUnited, N.A., etc.,
                                Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Alan Fine,
Judge.

      Coffey Burlington, P.L., and Kendall B. Coffey, Jeffrey B. Crockett and
Scott A. Hiaasen, for appellant.

     Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., and Craig
S. Barnett and Chelsea E. Koff (Fort Lauderdale), for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and SCALES and LOBREE, JJ.

     SCALES, J.
         Appellant Ravneet Chowdhury (“Chowdhury”), individually and in her

capacity as the personal representative for co-appellant Estate of Anand

Chowdhury (the “Estate”),1 defendants/counter-plaintiffs below (together

“Guarantors”), challenge a final summary judgment that: (i) found the Estate

liable to appellee BankUnited, N.A. (“Lender”), plaintiff/counter-defendant

below, on a June 28, 2012 personal guaranty executed by Anand

Chowdhury; (ii) found Ravneet Chowdhury liable to Lender on a July 31,

2019 personal guaranty executed by her; and (iii) found that Guarantors

were not entitled to relief on their counterclaim against Lender for breach of

fiduciary duty. Because the summary judgment record plainly and clearly

evidences that (i) Lender did not breach any fiduciary duty allegedly owed to

Guarantors, and (ii) Chowdhury’s personal guaranty was supported by

consideration, we affirm the challenged final summary judgment in all

respects.

    I.     Relevant Background

         In their personal guaranties, Guarantors unconditionally guaranteed

the loan obligations of several corporate borrowers. When the corporate

borrowers defaulted on these loan obligations, Lender brought suit against

1
 Anand Chowdhury, husband of Ravneet Chowdhury, passed away in
August 2020, during the pendency of the lower proceedings.

                                       2
the borrowers for breach of the promissory note and to foreclose its security

interest, and against Guarantors to enforce their personal guaranties.

      Both as a counterclaim and as an affirmative defense to Lender’s

action seeking enforcement of their personal guaranties, Guarantors alleged

that Lender had breached fiduciary duties owed to Guarantors by, among

other things, ignoring a “bona fide offer from another Bank customer . . . for

a wholesale purchase of the [corporate borrowers].” Chowdhury raised an

additional affirmative defense that was unique to the enforcement of her

personal guaranty – i.e., that her guaranty was not supported by

consideration.

      Lender moved for summary judgment both on its claim to enforce

Guarantors’ personal guaranties and on Guarantors’ counterclaim for breach

of fiduciary duty. After conducting a January 13, 2022 hearing, the trial court

entered the challenged final summary judgment. Chowdhury then moved for

rehearing, challenging only that aspect of the judgment that concluded

Chowdhury’s personal guaranty was supported by consideration. After

holding a February 24, 2022 hearing, the trial court denied Chowdhury’s

motion for rehearing. This appeal ensued.

                                      3
    II.     Analysis2

          On appeal, Guarantors assert that fact issues precluded the entry of

final summary judgment in Lender’s favor. We disagree.

2
  Because the summary judgment hearing was held after May 1, 2021, the
trial court applied Florida’s “new” summary judgment standard. See In re
Amendments to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 76 (Fla. 2021). Under
the new standard, the parties’ summary judgment burdens varied depending
on who bore the burden of persuasion at trial. See In re Amendments to Fla.
R. Civ. P. 1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 193 (Fla. 2020) (citing Salo v. Tyler, 417
P. 3d 581, 587 (Utah 2018)). To wit, Lender bore the burden of persuasion
at trial on its action to enforce the personal guaranties. In moving for
summary judgment, therefore, Lender was required to make an initial
showing that there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that
Lender was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.510(a). To meet this initial burden, Lender was required to cite to “particular
parts of materials in the record.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)(1)(A). Once Lender
satisfied this initial burden, the burden then shifted to Guarantors either to (i)
show that the particular materials cited by Lender did not establish the
absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact, or (ii) cite to other
materials in the record that established the presence of a genuine dispute as
to a material fact. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)(1)(A)-(B). Further, to the extent
that Guarantors relied on an affirmative defense to Lender’s claim,
Guarantors bore the burden of showing that the affirmative defense was
applicable and, therefore, precluded entry of summary judgment. See G & G
In-Between Bridge Club Corp. v. Palm Plaza Assocs., Ltd., 48 Fla. L. Weekly
D275, 2023 WL 1806108, at *5 (Fla. 2d DCA Feb. 8, 2023) (citing Office of
Thrift Supervision v. Paul, 985 F. Supp. 1465, 1470 (S.D. Fla. 1997)). Only
upon Guarantors’ showing that an affirmative defense was applicable did the
burden then shift back to Lender regarding that affirmative defense. Id. (citing
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1552 n.13 (11th
Cir. 1990)).

      As for Guarantors’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty, the
parties’ summary judgment burdens were switched because Guarantors
bore the burden of persuasion at trial on that claim.

                                        4
        As to Lender’s alleged breach of a fiduciary duty, the trial court

correctly concluded that even if we were to assume Lender owed some kind

of fiduciary duty to Guarantors, 3 Lender’s refusal to accept or negotiate an

unreasonable third-party offer to purchase the corporate borrowers’

business 4 did not constitute a breach of any fiduciary duty. See Capital Bank

v. MVB, Inc., 644 So. 2d 515, 518-19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (“Generally, the

relationship between a bank and its borrower is that of creditor to debtor, in

which parties engage in arms-length transactions, and the bank owes no

fiduciary responsibilities.”). To be clear, Guarantors failed to present any

evidence below that Lender breached a duty of care owed to them that

typically arises only in “special circumstances.” Id. at 520; Barnett Bank of

W. Fla. v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1986).

3
    Nothing herein should be construed as such a holding.
4
  Well after the corporate borrowers’ loan obligation was in default, a
competitor in the same line of business as the borrowers made an offer for
the wholesale purchase of the borrowers’ business. The competitor’s offer,
though, was for approximately half the outstanding debt and was conditioned
on Lender releasing Guarantors from their personal guaranties. We agree
with the trial court’s findings that because Guarantors failed to submit “record
evidence that a commercially reasonable offer was made or would have
been made if there had been a negotiation,” (i) “[i]t cannot seriously be
argued . . . that [Lender’s] failure to accept this offer constituted any kind of
breach,” and (ii) “the mere failure to negotiate a clearly unacceptable offer
cannot be a breach of fiduciary duty.”

                                       5
     As to Chowdhury’s affirmative defense that her personal guaranty

lacked consideration, the summary judgment record plainly evidences that:

(i) the corporate borrowers’ loan agreement required Lender’s written

consent to any change in the ownership or control of borrowers; (ii) as

consideration for Chowdhury executing her personal guaranty, Lender gave

its written consent allowing for Chowdhury to obtain a 50% ownership

interest in borrowers;5 and (iii) Chowdhury’s personal guaranty expressly

acknowledged both the receipt and legal sufficiency of this consideration. 6

5
  Lender’s July 31, 2019 e-mail to Chowdhury transmitting the personal
guaranty contained the following language expressly relating to the
consideration for Chowdhury executing the personal guaranty:

     Attached is a Guaranty for your review and signature which
     needs to be notarized. Please execute and send over notarized
     original copy as soon as you are able. As discussed the Bank
     consents to the 50% transfer of ownership for [the corporate
     borrowers’ business] to yourself from Anand Chowdhury,
     conditioned upon receipt of your original executed guaranty.
     Please deliver the signed original to me via fed ex. Please
     contact me as needed.

On receipt of the July 31, 2019 e-mail, Chowdhury executed her personal
guaranty and delivered it to Lender.
6
   Chowdhury’s personal guaranty contained a recital provision
acknowledging the receipt and legal sufficiency of other good and valuable
consideration:

          NOW, THEREFORE, as an inducement to Bank to
     consider further extensions of credit to Borrower, including,
     without limitation, further extension, renewal, modification,

                                      6
      Faced with this record evidence, Chowdhury submitted her own

declaration, attesting that “[Lender] did not advise or indicate that its consent

to the ownership transfer was conditional upon, or would be withheld without,

upon [sic] my guaranty of the Borrowers’ obligations, as [Lender] had already

agreed to such ownership transfer.” Under the new summary judgment

standard, though, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of

which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of

ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” In re Amendments to Fla. R. Civ.

P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d at 75-76 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380

(2007)). Our new summary judgment standard mirrors the standard for a

directed verdict such that the inquiry focuses on “whether the evidence

      substitution, and enlargement of the Loan, and to extend such
      additional credit as Bank may from time to time agree to extend
      under the Loan Documents, and for other good and valuable
      consideration, the receipt and legal sufficiency of which are
      hereby acknowledged, the parties do hereby agree as follows:

(Emphasis added).

      Further, section 6.8 of the personal guaranty provided:

            Recitals. The recital and introductory paragraphs hereof
      are a part hereof, form a basis for this Guaranty and shall be
      considered prima facie evidence of the facts and documents
      referred to therein.

                                       7
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether

it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” In re

Amendments to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510, 309 So. 3d at 192 (quoting Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). Because Lender’s

record evidence clearly contradicted Chowdhury’s attestations that were not

supported by any evidence of her own, we conclude that the trial court did

not err in finding that (i) Chowdhury’s declaration failed to raise a genuine

issue of material fact on the issue of consideration, and (ii) Chowdhury failed

to meet her burden to rebut the presumption that the consideration was

adequate. See Lakes of Meadow Vill. Homes Condo. Nos. One, Two, Three,

Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, & Nine Maint. Ass’ns, Inc. v. Arvida/JMB

Partners, L.P., 714 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

      Affirmed.

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