Court Opinion

ID: 9761041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:29:59.869625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:19.821661
License: Public Domain

BLOOM, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree with most of the majority opinion, I dissent from that part thereof that affirms the denial to Mrs. Keys of what are now termed Crawford contributions for mortgage payments she made between September 1988 and March 1990. I believe that the majority, as well as the chancellor, have simply misconstrued the facts and misinterpreted the law relating to contributions between co-tenants.
Contrary to what the . majority opinion states, a co-tenant who has laid out money to make mortgage payments, including principal and interest, taxes, and insurance, or for necessary repairs, and thus has benefitted the other co-tenant by preserving and protecting their property, is entitled to contribution. Crawford v. Crawford, 293 Md. 307, 443 A.2d 599 (1982); Aiello v. Aiello, 268 Md. 513, 302 A.2d 189 (1973); Colburn v. Colburn, 265 Md. 468, 290 A.2d 480 (1972); Schilbach v. Schilbach, 171 Md. 405, 189 A. 432 (1937); Hogan v. McMahon, 115 Md. 195, 80 A. 695 (1911). The majority opinion cites Broseus v. Broseus, 82 Md.App. 183, 192, 570 A.2d 874 (1990); Wassif v. Wassif, 77 Md.App. 750, 551 A.2d 935 (1989); and Spessard v. Spessard, 64 Md.App. 83, 494 A.2d 701 (1985) as support for its state*691ment that a claim for Crawford contributions is not a matter of right but is an equitable remedy awarded within the discretion of the court. These cases do not hold what the majority opinion suggests they hold. “Between tenants by the entireties \i.e., between husband and wife prior to the passage of a divorce decree] the entitlement to contribution is an equitable matter and not a matter of right and is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Broseus, 82 Md.App. at 192, 570 A.2d 874. As we pointed out in Kline v. Kline, 85 Md.App. 28, 48-49, 581 A.2d 1300 (1990), although the right of a co-tenant to contribution for mortgage payments is well established, by virtue of Maryland’s Property Disposition in Annulment and Divorce Act, Md. Code (1984) Family Law, §§ 8-201 through 8-213, a chancellor is not obliged to award such contributions between husband and wife at the time of a divorce. We explained that payments of money by one co-tenant to protect the common property against loss or to enhance its value gives rise to an implied or quasi contract, which entitles that co-tenant to contribution from the other co-tenant, who would otherwise be unjustly enriched.
Generally, claims between co-tenants for contribution are asserted in partition or mortgage foreclosure proceedings and are recognized as equitable claims, enforceable as equitable liens. And to the extent that one co-tenant pays the mortgage debt, he may obtain an assignment of the mortgage or at least assert a right of subrogation. See Aiello, supra, 268 Md. at 513, 302 A.2d 189.
Some states, however, recognize the existence of a common law action for contribution, in the nature of an action in indebitatus assumpsit — being indebted, he undertook (or promised). See, e.g., Fowler v. Fowler, 50 Conn. 256 (1882). Whether enforceable at law or in equity, it is clear that the payment by one co-tenant of more than his or her share of charges that had to be paid in order to preserve the property creates a debt, the ultimate payment of which by those who in equity and good conscience ought to pay it will be compelled by the court. Id. [268 Md.] at 519, 802 A.2d 189.
*692I do not believe that a court of equity has any authority to deprive the payor co-tenant of the right to collect such a debt except upon, sound legal or equitable principles. One may not be denied contribution to which he or she is entitled merely because the chancellor disapproves of his or her conduct. “[CJourts of equity ‘do not sit, or effect to sit, in judgment upon cases as custodes morum enforcing the strict rules of morality.’ ” Myers v. Myers, 185 Md. 210, 44 A.2d 455 (1945), quoting 1 Story Equity Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. 308. Putting on his chancellor’s hat, i.e., presiding over a traditional equity proceeding, does not entitle a judge to ignore existing legal principles or invent new ones in order to arrive at what he thinks is an equitable result.
Law, without equity, though hard and disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public good than equity without law.[1]
Because this debt or obligation and its corresponding right or entitlement are founded on principles of equity, in a divorce proceeding the claim for contribution may be subsumed in or offset by the authority of the chancellor to achieve a more complete equity between the parties by granting (or declining to grant) a monetary award. By the time the chancellor was called upon to do equity in these proceedings, however, the parties had long ceased to be husband and wife and tenants by the entirety. Mrs. Keys was a tenant in common and, as such, lawfully entitled to Crawford contributions, provided she had not ousted her co-tenant.
Where there has been an ouster, the co-tenant in possession forfeits any right of contribution. Spessard, 64 Md. App. at 88, 494 A.2d 701.
“Ouster is the actual turning out or keeping excluded the party entitled to the possession of any real property.” ... The exclusion does not require physical eviction, so
*693long as “the act or declaration constituting the ouster [is] unequivocal and notorious.” ... To prove ouster, one must show “actual intent to exclude the co-tenant permanently from his rights” in the property----(“where one co-tenant ... remains in possession ... and refuses to accede to plaintiffs demands for access to the property, such conduct clearly constitutes an ouster.”). For example, possession under circumstances which evince “a claim of exclusive right and title” and which deny “the right of the other tenants to participate in the profits” may constitute an ouster.
Id. at 88-89, 494 A.2d 701 (citations omitted).
To the extent that Mrs. Keys, in seeking contribution, was invoking the aid of equity, she may be subject to the equity principle known as the “clean hands” doctrine. The maxim, “he who comes into equity must come with clean hands” is based on public policy and means that “courts of equity will not lend their aid to anyone seeking their active interposition, who has been guilty of fraudulent, illegal, or inequitable conduct in the matter in relation to which he seeks assistance.” Hlista v. Altevogt, 239 Md. 43, 49, 210 A.2d 153 (1965). In applying the maxim, however, equity courts do not require litigants to have led faultless lives in dealings on all matters, but confine themselves to the effect that the alleged fraudulent, illegal, or inequitable conduct has upon the request for relief then under consideration. Id. See also, Niner v. Hanson, 217 Md. 298, 142 A.2d 798 (1958); Brown v. Brown, 199 Md. 585, 87 A.2d 626 (1952).
The meager record in this case contains not one shred of evidence that would support a conclusion that Mrs. Keys ousted Mr. Keys from use and enjoyment of the property or otherwise engaged in any fraudulent, illegal, or Unconscionable conduct detrimental to Mr. Keys until March 1990, after the court appointed trustees had executed a contract of sale. Then, according to the evidence, she denied, or at least impaired, efforts by the trustees to gain access to the *694property and thus delayed consummation of the sale.2 I am willing to concede that obstructing the court-appointed trustees may be considered to be illegal or inequitable conduct detrimental to Mr. Keys. It might even reasonably be deemed to constitute an ouster of the co-tenant, whose right of enjoyment of the property, i.e., to receive his share of the sales proceeds, was frustrated and delayed by Mrs. Keys’s conduct. But from September 1988, when the use and possession order expired, until March 1990 when the trustees had reason to complain that they were prevented from doing their duty, Mrs. Keys did nothing that she was not absolutely entitled by law to do and she did not fail or refuse to do anything that she was obliged by law to do. There is simply nothing in the record to support the chancellor’s finding, echoed by the panel majority, “that by various means Mrs. Keys obstructed and delayed the sale of the home,” until March 1990. Indeed, the very idea that any conduct by Mrs. Keys could have obstructed or delayed a sale of the house at any time prior to the appointment of trustees to sell is based upon some misconception by the chancellor, adopted by my brethren, that between the time the use and possession order expired and trustees were appointed to sell the property Mrs. Keys was somehow obligated to take some action to sell or to cooperate in Mr. Keys’s schemes to sell the house.
The divorce decree awarded Mrs. Keys use and possession of the marital home for a period of three years from September 10, 1985. It also stated that “[i]n September 1988, the marital home shall be sold and the proceeds divided ...,” but that is a far cry from a “court ordered sale,” as the majority terms it. Op. at 680. The divorce *695decree did not order a sale; it was silent as to how the property was to be sold, and it imposed no duty on either party to do anything about selling the house. The provision that the house “shall be sold” was obviously not self-executing; it was merely a recognition that after the use and possession order expired there was no judicial impediment to a sale. Consequently, as of September 10, 1988, the parties were in a situation fairly common among divorced couples: they were equal tenants in common of real property; one of them was in possession; both had an equal right of possession. Mr. Keys, being out of possession and obviously in no position to assert his own right to resume living in the house, had certain options open to him: (1) negotiate a purchase of Mrs. Keys’s half interest in the property or a sale of his half interest in it to her; (2) negotiate an agreement with Mrs. Keys about making a private sale of the property to a third party; or (3) petition the court to order a sale in lieu of partition. He opted to negotiate. He made offers and/or submitted proposals that were either ignored or rejected. In return, Mrs. Keys made an offer to purchase his interest for the amount of his outstanding indebtedness to her. He rejected that offer. It eventually dawned on Mr. Keys that continued negotiations with his former wife would be fruitless, and he did what he could have done on September 11, 1988 — he petitioned the court to appoint trustees to sell the property.
The termination of the use and possession order on September 11, 1988, did not require Mrs. Keys to vacate the premises. She was certainly not obliged to accept Mr. Keys’s offers or accede to his proposals. It is preposterous to suggest that by remaining on the premises and continuing to pay the mortgage for the benefit of both parties until the house was sold Mrs. Keys ousted Mr. Keys or deprived him of any of his rights in or to the property. It is equally preposterous to suggest that, by ignoring or rejecting Mr. Keys’s proposals for selling the house, Mrs. Keys ousted her former husband or deprived him of any right or, in the language of the court, “obstructed and delayed the sale of *696the house.” Before the trustees were appointed, there was no sale to obstruct or delay.
I would reverse the trial court’s denial of Mrs. Keys’s claims for Crawford, contributions, at least for mortgage payments she made from September 1988 to March 1990, while affirming the other provisions of the judgment.
Judge WENNER joins in these views.

. Wm. Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1, 1765.

. At oral argument we were told that Mrs. Keys had been uncooperative with the trustees while they were trying to sell the property by making it difficult for them to show the property to prospective purchasers and by making disparaging comments about the condition of the property. There is nothing in the record, and thus no evidence before the chancellor, to support those assertions.