Court Opinion

ID: 9909161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 17:09:37.361051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:09.847657
License: Public Domain

J-S17044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellee               :
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
 MATTHEW SHELTON PARKER                    :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :        No. 1424 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 1, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-10-CR-0000052-2017

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                          FILED: DECEMBER 12, 2023

      Appellant, Matthew Shelton Parker, appeals from the order entered in

the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition for

collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

      The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Over several years, Appellant repeatedly propositioned and sexually abused

his minor daughter (“Victim”). Appellant raped Victim twice around the time

of her sixteenth birthday. Victim ultimately revealed the abuse to her school

guidance counselor, who reported the abuse to the Department of Human

Services. The Commonwealth subsequently charged Appellant with multiple

crimes for sex abuse against Victim.

      On February 28, 2018, a jury convicted Appellant of two counts of rape,
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aggravated indecent assault, corruption of minors, endangering the welfare of

a child, and three counts of indecent assault. On July 31, 2018, the court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 148 to 296 months’

incarceration, plus 60 months’ probation. The court also gave Appellant notice

of his sex offender reporting requirements. This Court affirmed the judgment

of sentence on May 8, 2019, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of

appeal on February 8, 2021. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 217 A.3d 381

(Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (“Parker I”), appeal denied,

___ Pa. ___, 244 A.3d 1224 (2021).

       Appellant filed his first, counseled PCRA petition on March 1, 2021,

asserting claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.1 Following a PCRA hearing,

on May 6, 2021, the court entered an order finding that Appellant’s failure to

call trial counsel to testify at the evidentiary hearing precluded Appellant from

establishing that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for his actions at trial.

Therefore, the PCRA court denied relief. Appellant filed a notice of appeal to

this Court.     While the appeal was pending, however, Appellant filed an

application for relief, requesting that this Court remand the case to the PCRA

court for the appointment of new counsel.

       On January 18, 2022, this Court granted Appellant’s request and

____________________________________________

1 We refer to the attorney who filed Appellant’s original PCRA petition as “first

PCRA counsel.”

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remanded the case to the PCRA court for appointment of new PCRA counsel.2

We retained jurisdiction and directed that second PCRA counsel file either a

supplemental brief or a Turner/Finley3 “no merit” letter with this Court. The

PCRA court appointed second PCRA counsel, who filed a “no merit” letter and

application to withdraw with this Court on April 18, 2022.

       On May 26, 2022, this Court issued an order denying second PCRA

counsel’s request to withdraw and directing second PCRA counsel to address

Appellant’s assertion of ineffective assistance of first PCRA counsel for failing

to present trial counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Second PCRA

counsel then filed a brief on Appellant’s behalf asserting one issue—whether

first PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to call trial counsel as a witness

at the PCRA evidentiary hearing. This Court agreed that first PCRA counsel

was ineffective for failing to call trial counsel as a witness, and, on July 1,

2022, this Court vacated the order denying PCRA relief and remanded the

matter for a supplemental hearing to address Appellant’s claims of ineffective

assistance of trial and first PCRA counsel. See Commonwealth v. Parker,

283 A.3d 337 (Pa.Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (“Parker II”).

       On remand, the PCRA court scheduled a hearing and granted Appellant

____________________________________________

2We refer to this attorney, who represented Appellant on appeal from the
denial of PCRA relief, as “second PCRA counsel.”

3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

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leave to file a supplemental petition. Appellant filed a counseled supplemental

petition on September 6, 2022. On October 25, 2022, the court conducted a

PCRA hearing. Appellant called trial counsel as a witness, and trial counsel

explained his reasoning for his actions at trial. By order docketed November

1, 2022, the PCRA court denied relief. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on

December 2, 2022.4        Pursuant to the PCRA court’s order, Appellant filed a

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on December 28, 2022.

       As a preliminary matter, second PCRA counsel has filed a motion to

withdraw in this Court and a Turner/Finley brief.       Before counsel can be

permitted to withdraw from representing a petitioner under the PCRA,

Pennsylvania law requires counsel to file a “no-merit” brief or letter pursuant

to Turner and Finley.          Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940

(Pa.Super. 2003).

          [C]ounsel must…submit a “no-merit” letter to the [PCRA]
          court, or brief on appeal to this Court, detailing the nature
____________________________________________

4 Appellant filed his notice of appeal one day beyond the 30-day appeal period.

However, at the conclusion of the PCRA hearing, the court advised Appellant
that the record would be transmitted back to this Court. Further, the PCRA
court’s order denying relief did not provide any instructions to Appellant
regarding his appellate rights. Appellant filed the notice of appeal only after
reviewing the docket and discovering that the record had been returned from
this Court because no appeal was pending. Under these circumstances, we
discern a breakdown in the operations of the court, where Appellant was not
advised of his appeal rights, and we may excuse the untimely notice of appeal.
See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa.Super. 2007)
(stating: “The courts of this Commonwealth have held that a court breakdown
occurred in instances where the trial court, at the time of sentencing, either
failed to advise [appellants] of [their] post-sentence and appellate rights or
misadvised [them]”).

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          and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing
          the issues which the petitioner wants to have reviewed,
          explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and
          requesting permission to withdraw.

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007). Counsel

must also send to the petitioner a copy of the “no-merit” letter or brief and

motion to withdraw and advise petitioner of his right to proceed pro se or with

privately retained counsel.           Id.      “Substantial compliance with these

requirements will satisfy the criteria.” Karanicolas, supra at 947.

       Instantly, second PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel

and a Turner/Finley brief detailing the nature of counsel’s review and

explaining    why    Appellant’s     issues    lack   merit.   Counsel’s   brief   also

demonstrates that counsel reviewed the certified record and found no

meritorious issues for appeal. Counsel notified Appellant of the request to

withdraw and advised Appellant regarding his rights.5                 Thus, counsel

substantially complied with the Turner/Finley requirements. See Wrecks,

supra; Karanicolas, supra.             We turn next to the issues raised in the

Turner/Finley brief.

____________________________________________

5 Counsel’s initial letter advising Appellant of his right to proceed pro se
improperly framed his ability to respond as contingent on this Court’s ruling
on the motion to withdraw. Nevertheless, counsel filed a copy of the revised
and corrected letter sent to Appellant that correctly instructed Appellant that
he had the immediate right to respond pro se or to retain private counsel to
respond to the motion to withdraw.

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       Counsel raises the following issues on Appellant’s behalf:6

          1. Direct appeal counsel failed to file a Petition for Allowance
          of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on Appellant’s
          behalf.

          2. Initial PCRA counsel failed to raise an issue concerning
          trial counsel’s failure to file a Franks[7] motion.

          3. Appellant’s arrest lacked probable cause.

          4. Because the Commonwealth relied solely upon hearsay
          at his preliminary hearing, McClelland[8] requires dismissal
          of his charges.

          5. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
          validity of the CYS determination that the allegations were
          “founded,” and to contest the fact that police filed charges
          based upon a “video made by CYS with no corroboration.”

          6. The evidence was insufficient to support his convictions
          because the Commonwealth did not sufficiently establish the
          date of the offense.

          7. A Brady[9] violation occurred concerning a statement by
          Appellant’s ex-wife that Appellant alleges should have been
          produced sooner.

          8. The trial court erred in reading instruction 4.13(b) to the
          jury.

          9. [Trial c]ounsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
          weight and sufficiency of evidence in post-sentence
____________________________________________

6 The Turner/Finley brief does not include a separate section listing the
questions presented. However, the argument section is divided into separate
sections by issue. We have listed the issues raised in those arguments.

7 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).

8 Commonwealth v. McClelland, 660 Pa. 81, 233 A.3d 717 (2020).

9 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

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          motions.

          10. The trial court erred in impeding cross examination of
          the alleged victim and, in doing so, denied Appellant his
          right to confrontation of his accuser.

          11. The court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts,
          and trial counsel’s failure to seek a cautionary instruction for
          this evidence amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

(Turner/Finley Brief, at 5-21).10

       This Court has explained:

          Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is
          limited to examining whether the evidence of record
          supports the court’s determination and whether its decision
          is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d
          101 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d
          795 (2011). This Court grants great deference to the
          findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support
          for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513
          (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74
          (2007). We do not give the same deference, however, to
          the court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Ford, 44
          A.3d 1190 (Pa.Super. 2012). “A PCRA court passes on
          witness credibility at PCRA hearings, and its credibility
          determinations should be provided great deference by
          reviewing courts.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa.
          329, 356, 966 A.2d 523, 539 (2009).

Commonwealth v. Mullen, 267 A.3d 507, 511 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 275 A.3d 488 (2022).

____________________________________________

10 Appellant filed a pro se response to the no-merit brief. (See Itemized List
of Errors from Counsel’s Brief, filed 4/3/23, at 1-3). In this response,
Appellant provided more detailed argument on the issues raised in the
Turner/Finley Brief. Although he has not drafted a separate brief or
argument section discussing those issues, we have considered the arguments
he raised together with that of counsel’s discussion of those particular points.

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     As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether Appellant’s claims

are cognizable under the PCRA. The PCRA provides the following:

        § 9543. Eligibility for relief

        (a) General rule.—To be eligible for relief under this
        subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove by a
        preponderance of the evidence all of the following:

                                 *    *    *

        (2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from one or
        more of the following:

           (i) A violation of the Constitution of this
           Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the
           United States which, in the circumstances of the
           particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
           process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
           innocence could have taken place.

           (ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
           circumstances of the particular case, so undermined
           the truth-determining process that no reliable
           adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
           place.

           (iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the
           circumstances make it likely that the inducement
           caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner
           is innocent.

           (iv) The improper obstruction by government officials
           of the petitioner’s right of appeal where a meritorious
           appealable issue existed and was properly preserved
           in the trial court.

           (v) Deleted.

           (vi) The unavailability at the time of trial of
           exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become
           available and would have changed the outcome of the
           trial if it had been introduced.

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            (vii) The imposition of a sentence greater than the
            lawful maximum.

            (viii) A proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.

         (3) That the allegation of error has not been previously
         litigated or waived.

         (4) That the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during
         trial, during unitary review or on direct appeal could not
         have been the result of any rational, strategic or tactical
         decision by counsel.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2-4). “For purposes of this subchapter, an issue is

waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial,

during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b).

      Furthermore, as our Supreme Court has explained:

         PCRA claims are not merely direct appeal claims that are
         made at a later stage of the proceedings, cloaked in a
         boilerplate assertion of counsel’s ineffectiveness.            In
         essence, they are extraordinary assertions that the system
         broke down. To establish claims of constitutional error or
         ineffectiveness of counsel, the petitioner must plead and
         prove by a preponderance of evidence that the system failed
         (i.e., for an ineffectiveness or constitutional error claim, that
         in the circumstances of his case, including the facts
         established at trial, guilt or innocence could not have been
         adjudicated reliably), that his claim has not been previously
         litigated or waived, and where a claim was not raised at an
         earlier stage of the proceedings, that counsel could not have
         had a rational strategic or tactical reason for failing to
         litigate these claims earlier.

Commonwealth v. Rivers, 567 Pa. 239, 249, 786 A.2d 923, 929 (2001). In

addition, our Supreme Court has explained:

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          [R]eview of the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel is
          merely a component of the claim at issue—that challenging
          the effectiveness of appellate counsel.        Therefore, to
          demonstrate that a “layered” claim of appellate counsel’s
          ineffectiveness has arguable merit, the petitioner must
          develop all three prongs of the Pierce[11] test as to the
          ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Stated differently, if the
          petitioner fails to develop any of the three Pierce prongs
          regarding the       underlying issue      of trial counsel
          ineffectiveness, he or she will have failed to establish the
          arguable merit prong of the claim of appellate counsel’s
          ineffectiveness. Only when the petitioner has adequately
          pled and presented the ineffectiveness of trial counsel
          pursuant to the Pierce test will this Court proceed to review
          the layered claim to determine whether he or she has
          proven appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 582 Pa. 461, 474, 872 A.2d 1139, 1146 (2005)

(citations and footnotes omitted).

       Instantly, Appellant’s third, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth and tenth

issues are not cognizable under the PCRA. Specifically, these are all issues

that Appellant could have raised on direct appeal, but he failed to do so. 12

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9544(b); 9543(a)(3).           Although Appellant generally

asserted that counsel was ineffective, he does not plead any prong of the

____________________________________________

11 Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987).

12 Appellant’s tenth issue was raised on direct appeal.See Parker I, supra
(alleging on direct appeal that court erred when it impeded impeachment
during cross-examination of alleged victim). On direct appeal, this Court
found the issue waived for trial counsel’s failure to object at trial to the
Commonwealth’s use of the audio tape of Victim’s forensic statement.
Moreover, this Court decided the issues merited no relief in any event where
the trial court did not instruct the Commonwealth to use any particular
procedure regarding the forensic interview. See id.

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ineffective test for trial or appellate counsel concerning these claims.               See

Rivers, supra at 250 n.3, 786 A.2d at 929 n.3 (observing that “boilerplate

assertion that any waiver is overcome by ineffectiveness of counsel in not

raising the claim earlier is insufficient”). Therefore, we agree with counsel

that these issues are frivolous.

      Similarly,   Appellant   fails   to    develop   the     three    prongs    of   the

ineffectiveness test for his second, fifth, and ninth issues, which purport to

challenge trial counsel and appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Brown,

supra; Rivers, supra. Thus, these issues are also frivolous.

      Next, we address the remaining two issues in the Turner/Finley brief

and Appellant’s pro se response. In the first of these (Appellant’s first issue

on   appeal),   Appellant   purports    to    challenge      direct    appeal    counsel’s

ineffectiveness for failing to file a petition for allowance of appeal following

Appellant’s direct appeal.     Nevertheless, as counsel notes, and Appellant

agrees, although direct appeal counsel had originally failed to file a petition

for allowance of appeal, the right to do so was later restored nunc pro tunc

and Appellant ultimately filed a petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc,

which the Supreme Court denied. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief on

this ground.

      In Appellant’s final issue (his eleventh issue on appeal), Appellant claims

first PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness for failing to object to the introduction of prior bad acts

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evidence and failing to seek a cautionary instruction concerning its admission.

      Pennsylvania law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294 (2008). To obtain

relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must rebut

that presumption and demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient,

and that such performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

         To plead and prove ineffective assistance of counsel a
         petitioner must establish: (1) that the underlying issue has
         arguable merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective
         reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice resulted from
         counsel's act or failure to act. Commonwealth v. Chmiel,
         612 Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (2011). Where the
         defendant asserts a layered ineffectiveness claim he must
         properly    argue     each    prong   of  the   three-prong
         ineffectiveness test for each separate attorney. Id. at
         1128; see also Commonwealth v. Reyes, 582 Pa. 317,
         870 A.2d 888 (2005); Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa.
         574, 832 A.2d 1014 (2003).

         Layered claims of ineffectiveness “are not wholly distinct
         from the underlying claims[,]” because “proof of the
         underlying claim is an essential element of the derivative
         ineffectiveness claim[.]” [Commonwealth v. Collins, 585
         Pa. 45, 78, 888 A.2d 564, 584 (2005)] (Saylor, J.
         concurring); Reyes, supra at 896 (proving three prong
         ineffectiveness test for trial counsel establishes arguable
         merit to appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness). “In
         determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical
         inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant
         asserts was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective
         assistance of counsel. If that attorney was effective, then
         subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing
         to raise the underlying issue.”       [Commonwealth v.
         Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2010)].

Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1189–90 (Pa.Super. 2012),

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appeal denied, 619 Pa. 714, 64 A.3d 631 (2013).

      Our Supreme Court has explained that the introduction of prior bad acts

creates the “potential for misunderstanding on the part of the jury,” and often

gives rise to a cautionary instruction explaining the limited purpose for which

the evidence has been admitted. Commonwealth v. Weiss, 622 Pa. 663,

716, 81 A.3d 767, 798 (2013), abrogated in part by Commonwealth v. Yale,

___ Pa. ___, 249 A.3d 1001 (2021).

            In the context of an ineffectiveness claim, counsel’s failure
            to request a cautionary instruction regarding evidence of
            other crimes or prior bad acts does not constitute per se
            ineffectiveness; “[r]ather, in order to obtain relief under
            such a claim, a defendant must still satisfy each of the three
            prongs of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel.”
            Commonwealth v. Buehl, 540 Pa. 493, 658 A.2d 771, 778
            (1995) (plurality). With regard to the reasonable basis
            prong of this test, it is incumbent on the petitioner to
            demonstrate that counsel’s chosen course of action had no
            reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s
            interests. See, e.g., [Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 585 Pa.
            547, 624, 889 A.2d 501, 547 (2005)] (holding that based
            on trial counsel’s PCRA testimony, counsel had a reasonable
            basis for declining to request a limiting instruction). When
            the petitioner is granted a PCRA hearing, it is his burden to
            satisfy this aspect of the test with direct questioning of trial
            counsel. See Commonwealth v. Koehler, 614 Pa. 159,
            36 A.3d 121, 146 (2012) (faulting a PCRA petitioner for
            declining to question trial counsel at the PCRA hearing about
            the lack of a strategic basis for failing to object).

Id. at 716, 81 A.3d at 798–99. “It is well-settled law that the decision whether

to   seek     a   jury   instruction   implicates   a   matter   of   trial   strategy.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1119 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citing

Commonwealth v. Lesko, 609 Pa. 128, 221, 15 A.3d 345, 401 (2011)).

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      Instantly, we initially note that Appellant raised on direct appeal a

challenge to admission of the prior bad acts evidence. See Parker I, supra

(in which Appellant raised as first issue on direct appeal whether court erred

by admitting prior bad acts and by failure to offer curative instruction and/or

jury charge). In disposing of this claim, this Court held that the evidentiary

issue was waived for trial counsel’s failure to object to admission of the

evidence. Nevertheless, this Court explained that the claim would merit no

relief in any event where the challenged evidence was admissible under the

res gestae exception.    See id.   Consequently, Appellant cannot establish

prejudice concerning his claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to

challenge admission of the prior bad acts evidence, and Appellant’s layered

claim of ineffectiveness would likewise fail. See Rykard, supra.

      Regarding the failure to request a cautionary instruction, this Court on

appeal deemed any challenge to the court’s failure to issue a cautionary

instruction waived for trial counsel’s failure to request one. See Parker I,

supra.    At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that Appellant’s trial

strategy included using the bad acts evidence as a way to impeach Victim’s

credibility.   Specifically, Appellant planned on countering the bad acts

evidence—Victim’s testimony that he had sexually abused her on a trip to

Florida—with photographs from the trip that he argued showed them happy

together. Appellant intended to show that the Florida abuse was fabricated,

and therefore, convince the jury that the abuse underlying the instant charges

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must have been fabricated as well. (See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 10/25/22, at 5-

9). Accordingly, trial counsel did not want to limit use of the evidence because

he would be using it to form the basis of his defense. The PCRA court found

that trial counsel’s choice not to request the cautionary instruction was a

matter of trial strategy, and counsel had a reasonable basis for the decision

to forego seeking the instruction. The record supports the court’s finding that

trial counsel had a reasonable strategy for counsel’s actions. See Rykard,

supra. Thus, Appellant’s layered claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness

also fails. See id.

      Following our independent review of the record, we agree with counsel

that the appeal is frivolous. See Rykard, supra (explaining that in ruling on

whether counsel may withdraw, court must conduct its own independent

evaluation of record and agree with counsel that petition is without merit).

Accordingly, we affirm the order denying PCRA relief and grant counsel’s

petition to withdraw.

      Order affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw is granted.

DATE: 12/12/2023

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