Court Opinion

ID: 9657933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:41:34.100798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:49.659822
License: Public Domain

LARSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority that here probable cause was not sufficiently shown for the issuance of a search warrant by the magistrate. It is my view that this record satisfactorily disclosed to the trial court that compliance with the law was substantially met as we have indicated in prior decisions, and that the magistrate substantially performed his duties as required by the state and federal constitutions. Unless we are to alter our past views and require the same quantity and quality of proof of guilt as in a full scale trial, I cannot see how we can do otherwise than uphold the decision of the learned trial court. I find no constitutional violations involved.
The pertinent provisions of Amendment 4 of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of Iowa, are identical and in part provide: “The right of the people to be secure * * against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but on probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly, describing the place to be searched, and the persons and things to be seized.” (Emphasis supplied.) Unless there was no probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, which is not the case before us, and the search was unreasonable, which is not the case at bar, I would find no constitutional violation shown herein.
The duties of the magistrate and the information which is required in this jurisdiction are set forth in chapter 751, Code of Iowa, 1966. Section 751.4 prior to the Acts of the 63rd General Assembly provided: “Any credible resident of this state may make application for the issuance of a search warrant by filing before any magistrate, except a judge of the supreme court, a written information, supported by his oath or affirmation, and alleging thereon the existence of any ground or grounds specified in this chapter as ground for the issuance of a search warrant and that he believes and has substantial reason to believe that said ground or grounds exist in fact. Said information shall describe with reasonable certainty the person or premises, or both, to be searched, the property to be seized, and the person, if known, in possession of said premises and property.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This warrant was issued August 9, 1968, and although we must decide this matter on the law as it then stood, we note an amendment to this section by chapter 306, Acts of the 63rd General Assembly, effective in June 1969, apparently for clarification of the magistrate’s duties in connection with his procedure at the time of issuing the warrant. It provides: “If the magistrate thereafter issues the search warrant, he shall endorse on the application the name and address of all persons upon whose sworn testimony he relied to issue such warrant together with an abstract of such witness’ testimony. However, if the grounds for issuance is supplied by an informant, the magistrate shall only identify the peace officer to whom the information was given and that he finds that such informant had previously given reliable information.”
*864As is usual in such cases, much of the controversy involving the issue of search warrants by a magistrate revolves around what information under oath was submitted to the magistrate, and its sufficiency. Section 751.5 provides: “If the magistrate is satisfied from his examination of the applicant, and of the other witnesses, if any, and of the allegations of the information, of the existence of the grounds of the application, or that there is probable cause to believe their .existence, he shall issue a search warrant, signed by him with his name of office, directed to any peace officer in the county, commanding him forthwith to search the person or place named for the property specified, and bring said property before him.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In other words, the magistrate is required to perform his prescribed duties and issue a warrant when he is convinced from the application and the supporting information before him, as á man of reasonable caution, that a crime is being or has been committed.
From the record it appears at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence that the magistrate testified he was informed by Narcotics Agent McGill that “there was reason to believe there was narcotics there (in the identified automobile)”, that he could not recall whether he had also been advised by McGill as to his informant’s reliability, but did recall that the suspect was named and the car to be searched was described, including its license number.
Officer McGill testified at the hearing that he had advised the magistrate that he had reliable information from Narcotics Agent McCloskey that there was narcotics in the possession of Gary Lee Spier, and that he did tell the magistrate that the information relayed to him was from a reliable source, but admitted he did not tell the magistrate what that source was.
Reviewing this testimony in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination, I am satisfied it did appear that the magistrate had substantially complied with the law in this jurisdiction, and had been furnished sufficient supporting information under oath to find probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant herein. I would, therefore, affirm the trial court’s ruling thereon.
Numerous times in recent years this court has had occasion to pass upon the question of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the latest being State v. Oliveri, Iowa, 156 N.W.2d 688, cert. denied 393 U.S. 1030, 89 S.Ct. 640, 21 L.Ed.2d 573. See also State v. Lampson, 260 Iowa 806, 149 N.W.2d 116; State v. Hall, 259 Iowa 147, 143 N.W.2d 318. In Oliveri, we reviewed the applicable law to similar facts and stated at page 690 of 156 N.W.2d: “Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable cause to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. (Citations)” We also said on page 692: “ * * * when a magistrate has found probable cause, reviewing courts are slow to invalidate the warrant by interpreting an affidavit or other information under oath furnished the magistrate in a hypertechnical rather than a realistic and common-sense manner. Doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by preference to be accorded warrants. Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U.S. at 270, 80 S.Ct. 725. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. United States v. Ventresca, supra, 380 U.S. at 108, 85 S.Ct. 741.”
Under the recent amendment to section 751.4, disputes as to what information and by whom presented to the magistrate will be hopefully eliminated, for it will now be necessary for the magistrate to reduce to writing a brief abstract of the testimony of the witness. This factual aid will help cure the problem of dimming memories and, in review proceedings, will present a *865legal question as to the sufficiency of the grounds for the issuance of a warrant. In Oliveri, supra, we recognized this area of trouble and said on page 693 of 156 N.W. 2d: “Unfortunately, additional information given (in support of the application) by an officer under oath is usually not recorded and, after a lapse of time, memory often dims. When these circumstances are coupled with some confusion in the mind of a magistrate as to what the law considered adequate or ‘official information’ under oath sufficient to permit the issuance of a search warrant, we are not surprised at appellant’s contention. As pointed out, we, as other courts, must indulge in the presumption that the magistrate did perform' his functions as required by law, and in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, must conclude from the sworn affidavits and the testimony of the officers that probable cause existed and was properly communicated to the magistrate.” That pronouncement is applicable here.
The majority does not consider or even mention any of our past decisions in this area of the law. Apparently it chose to ignore them and overlook the significance of the recent clarifying amendment to section 751.4. I have difficulty following generously-quoted excerpts from decisions from other jurisdictions and applying them to the facts before us. In citing from those cases the majority does not discuss the factual situations involved therein, nor the provisions of the applicable statutes. It is far from clear that those decisions were rendered under comparable statutory requirements and under similar factual disputes. For example, there is considerable discussion in the majority opinion as to what is mandated under Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637, and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, but nowhere does the majority attempt to review the factual matters presented or compare them with the past pronouncements of this court in State v. Lampson, supra, State v. Hall, supra, and State v. Oliveri, supra. Nevertheless, the majority states: “There is no escape from the conclusion, we have before us an affidavit which does not in any degree measure up to that rejected in Spinelli v. United States, supra.” It is, therefore, my belief that these cases are not applicable to the matter before us now.
On the other hand, it seems significant that in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726, the court held that, although the standard of reasonableness for obtaining a search warrant is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, different jurisdictions are still permitted latitude in determining how these rights are guaranteed. See Gaston v. Texas, Tex.Cr.App., 440 S.W.2d 297, which dealt with the precise problem of a proper showing that must be made in the ex parte proceeding before the magistrate to justify the issuance of a search warrant, especially where the probable cause is based solely upon hearsay and independent corroboration. On page 302 of 440 S.W.2d the Texas court recognized a difference between their rule and the Iowa rule as to what must appear on the application for a search warrant, but does not criticize the Iowa rule where everything brought to the magistrate’s attention need not be contained in the written application. In fact, our law would not permit us to require that all information relied upon in support of the application for a search warrant be placed in the affidavit and that no consideration be given oral information produced under oath to the magistrate. See section 751.5, Code 1966.
I feel we should not depart from the past pronouncements of this court, but should carry out the mandate of the constitution and comply with the spirit and the language of our statutes. I am certain, if the majority’s view is adopted, it will go far in hampering effective law enforcement. It requires far too much be shown to obtain a search warrant, almost a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has been or is being committed. Obviously, this is beyond the constitutional or stat*866utory requirements heretofore recognized in Iowa.
I prefer a holding as to the sufficiency of a showing of probable cause in line with our past decisions, perhaps modified by the record requirements of the 63rd General Assembly. To reverse trial courts who have tried to follow those directives is wrong when not absolutely necessary. That is not the case here. Our position has encouraged police to use restraint in their actions when it reasonably appears a crime is being committed, and not disregard the desirable practice of seeking judicial approval. I think we will not aid in the protection of citizen liberty and freedom by making the procedure so complicated and difficult that few, if any, officers will resort to that manner of exercising the State’s right of reasonable search and seizure.
MOORE, C. J., and SNELL, J., join in this dissent.