Court Opinion

ID: 9603373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:05:28.212483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:10.971453
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
specially concurring:
The dismissal of the indictment in this case prior to trial on the grounds that court-appointed counsel for the indigent defendant would not be adequately compensated was, at best, courageous because, to the best of our knowledge, dismissal is not supported by precedent from any court in any jurisdiction. The trial court concluded, after reviewing defense motions, that the limitation on fees paid to court-appointed counsel would cause a denial of effective assistance of counsel and a denial of equal protection of the law that required dismissal of the criminal charges. As a result, the record which is before us is limited and contains only the hearing on the defense motions and the briefs and documents submitted in support of this original proceeding. I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the sixth amendment issue of ineffective assistance of counsel has been raised prematurely and cannot be properly addressed in this original proceeding. I also agree with the majority’s analysis of the equal protection issue. I specially concur because I believe that the ethical obligations of a lawyer to competently represent an indigent defendant after he accepted appointment is at issue. Defense counsel asserts that the limitation of legal fees that can be paid with public funds for the defense of an indigent accused will affect the quality of the legal services provided. I am shocked by a declaration that the quality of a lawyer’s work depends upon the amount of the fee he is paid. I have always believed that every lawyer endeavors to provide the best representation that he can offer when he is either employed or accepts an appointment from the court, regardless of the fee involved.
C.R.C.P. 201.14 provides that no applicant for admission to the bar may be admitted until that person has taken the oath of admission prescribed by the supreme court. The oath requires compliance with the Code of Professional Responsibility and contains this pledge, “I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, nor will I delay any man’s cause for greed or malice.” Canon 2 of the Colorado Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available. Ethical Consideration 2-26 declares that the need for legal services by those unable to pay reasonable fees has been met in part by lawyers who donated their services or accepted court appointments on behalf of such individuals.
*212For many years, lawyers who practiced in the federal courts accepted, as part, of their obligation as officers of the court, appointments to defend the indigent without the payment of fees as officers of the court. Lawyers who are appointed to defend the indigent in our state courts have never been compensated as well as some lawyers in the private sector. Such service has been recognized by most lawyers as part of their pro bono publico duties that arise out of the legal profession’s obligations to the court. See Rule 6.1-6.2, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has set a standard for compensating court-appointed counsel that requires a comparison of compensation paid for comparable public service. Thus, the compensation of public defenders and district attorneys provides a guideline to measure the compensation which establishes the proper fee for the services of court-appointed counsel. The fee for court-appointed counsel under the New Jersey standard “should be somewhat more than a mere token or honorarium, but considerably less than full compensation were the accused able to pay.” State v. Loray, 87 N.J.Super. 119, 208 A.2d 183 (1965), (quoting State v. Horton, 34 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1 (1961)).
The General Assembly has addressed the issue of fees for court-appointed lawyers by enacting section 21-1-105, 8B C.R.S. (1986), which provides:
Appointment of other attorney in place of public defender. For cause, the court may, on its own motion or upon the application of the state public defender or the indigent person, appoint an attorney other than the state public defender to represent the indigent person at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. The attorney shall be awarded reasonable compensation and reimbursement for expenses necessarily incurred, to be fixed and paid by the court from state funds appropriated therefor.
In Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953 (Colo.1984), we stated that we have “adopted the general rule that the judicial branch of government possesses the inherent power to determine and compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its-mandated responsibilities.” Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d at 956. One of our mandated responsibilities is to appoint attorneys to represent indigent defendants when the public defender, because of a conflict or other impediment, is unable to do so. See § 21-1-105, 8B C.R.S. (1986).
We recognized in Bye v. District Court, 701 P.2d 56 (Colo.1985), that an original proceeding is a proper method for reviewing an award of attorney’s fees and addressed the Chief Justice Directives relating to the payment of fees. Since we decided Bye, a new Chief Justice Directive, Directive 85-24 (1985), was promulgated which established fees that meet the basis for court-appointed attorney’s fees set out in Loray, 87 N.J.Super. 119, 208 A.2d 183. In my view, the appropriate time to review the sufficiency of the fee awarded is after the case is tried and not in an original proceeding before the trial is held. At this stage of the proceedings the value of the services rendered by appointed counsel cannot be determined.
Accordingly, since there has been no showing of ineffective assistance counsel or any demonstration of a denial of equal protection of the law, the rule to show cause should be made absolute.