Court Opinion

ID: 9619508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:28:55.520471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:51.988884
License: Public Domain

Undercofler, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent for three reasons:
1. Under the single publication rule there is only one tort of libel — the first publication. Additional circulations are ignored. That one tort is recognized for all purposes, including venue. I find, no jurisdiction which fragments the rule as the majority opinion does here. "The majority *763of the American courts, however, have developed, in cases involving venue or the statute of limitations, a single publication rule, under which an entire edition of a newspaper, magazine or book is treated as only one publication, and the plaintiff is permitted to plead and prove merely a general distribution of the libel and show the extent of the circulation as evidence bearing on the damages.” Prosser, The Law of Torts (4th Ed.), p. 769. Accord, 1 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (4th Ed.), p. 394, § 5.16.
2. Rives v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 220 Ga. 485 (139 SE2d 395) (1964), established the single publication rule in Georgia. It cannot be distinguished as the majority has done. If it is not to be followed, the majority should overrule it.
3. I would follow the single publication rule announced in Rives. It provides a simple and equitable resolution to complex problems of venue, multiplicity of suits, apportionment of damages, statute of limitations, res judicata, and conflict of laws arising in an era of almost instantaneous mass communications. "In addition to considerations of convenience and administration, the rule has been justified, particularly as to magazines and newspapers, on the ground that they are of passing interest and unlikely to cause substantial harm after their initial impact upon the reading public.” Harper & James, supra, at 395.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hall joins in this dissent.