Court Opinion

ID: 9962071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 16:13:02.351545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:47.903756
License: Public Domain

J-A27025-23

                                   2024 PA Super 79

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CYNTHIA LYNN POLLICK                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 626 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 6, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-SA-0000014-2022

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.:                                 FILED: APRIL 22, 2024

       Appellant Cynthia Lynn Pollick appeals pro se from the judgment of

sentence imposed for exceeding the maximum speed limit1 following a

summary appeal. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting the

Commonwealth’s motion for a continuance and raises a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this matter as follows:

       [Appellant] appealed her summary conviction [for speeding] to
       the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas.

       A summary appeal de novo trial was scheduled for February 8,
       2022. On February 7, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a motion for
       a continuance, which was granted on the same day by the
       Honorable David W. Lupus, and the trial was rescheduled for April
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S § 3362(a)(2).
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       6, 2022. On February 8, 2022, [Appellant] appeared before the
       undersigned [(the Honorable Joseph F. Sklarosky, Jr.)] at the time
       and date of the originally scheduled summary trial and made a
       motion to dismiss the citation. [Appellant] argued that she did
       not receive notice of the Commonwealth’s intention to present the
       motion for continuance. [Judge Sklarosky] denied [Appellant’s]
       motion.

       After a summary trial was held on April 6, 2022, before the
       Honorable Michael T. Vough, [Appellant] was found guilty of
       violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362(a)(2), exceeding the maximum speed
       limit of 55 miles per hour by 23 miles per hour [on January 27,
       2021].

Judge Sklarosky Opinion,2 5/17/22, at 1. Following the summary appeal, the

trial court imposed a fine of $71.00, plus costs. See Judge Vough Opinion,

5/10/22, at 1 (unpaginated); see also N.T., 4/6/22, at 14. Appellant filed a

timely notice of appeal, and both the trial court and Appellant complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant argues the following issues on appeal:

       1. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a continuance since
          motions court at Luzerne County does not occur at 11:20 a.m.,
          but rather 8:30 to 9:15 a.m. daily and the court administration
          never accepted the 2/7/22 11:20 am Order and changed the
          date of the trial from 2/8/22 10:30 am; and therefore, the trial
          court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss charges at
          the de novo trial on 2/8/22[.]

____________________________________________

2 We note that there were two Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinions filed in this matter.

The first opinion was filed on May 10, 2022, by the Honorable Michael T.
Vough, which addressed the April 6, 2022 de novo trial and conviction (Judge
Vough Opinion), and the second opinion was filed on May 17, 2022, by the
Honorable Joseph F. Sklarosky, Jr., which addressed the pretrial proceedings
(Judge Sklarosky Opinion).

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       2. The Commonwealth should not receive preferential treatment
          since it cannot judge shop outside the time for motions court
          and select a judge who was a former District Attorney[.]

       3. Alternatively, the trial court erred in finding [Appellant] guilty
          since there was no testimony about the model of the police
          vehicle and the tire size in compliance with 75 Pa.C.S. §
          3368(b)[.]

Appellant’s Brief at 14, 16, 17 (some formatting altered).3

       “Where the trial court has heard a case de novo, we must determine

whether the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence or any error

of law has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Kaufman, 849 A.2d 1258, 1259

(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

                              Motion for Continuance

       Appellant first challenges the order granting the Commonwealth’s

motion for a continuance. See Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant asserts that

she was not given proper notice, and that the motion was a nullity and the

trial court lacked jurisdiction because the motion was not filed at the

designated time of day. See id. at 14-15.

____________________________________________

3 Any issues identified in Appellant’s statement of questions presented that
were not set forth in the argument section of Appellant’s brief are deemed
abandoned and, therefore, waived on appeal. Commonwealth v. Heggins,
809 A.2d 908, 912 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2002). We note that despite identifying
seven issues in her statement of questions presented, Appellant included only
three issues in the argument section of her brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)
(stating that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are
questions to be argued”). Although we do not condone Appellant’s failure to
comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, we will address
the three issues presented in the argument section.

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       In his opinion, Judge Sklarosky explained that the Commonwealth

presented its motion for a continuance to Judge David Lupas on February 7,

2022, and that Judge Lupas granted the Commonwealth’s motion and

rescheduled the trial for April 6, 2022. Appellant was not present. See Judge

Sklarosky Opinion at 1-2; see also N.T., 2/8/22, at 3-5. However, the next

day, on February 8, 2022, at the originally scheduled time for the de novo

trial, Appellant appeared before Judge Sklarosky, and Appellant moved to

dismiss the citation and argued that she did not receive notice of the

Commonwealth’s motion to continue the summary trial. N.T., 2/8/22, at 3.

Judge Sklarosky noted that Judge Lupas granted the continuance, and that

Judge Sklarosky was bound by the coordinate jurisdiction rule and would not

disturb the order.4       See Judge Sklarosky Opinion at 1-2; see also N.T.,

2/8/22, at 4.5

____________________________________________

4 Under the “coordinate jurisdiction rule, . . . judges of coordinate jurisdiction

should not overrule each other’s decisions.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 305
A.3d 1, 8 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).            Although there are
circumstances where courts may deviate from this rule, Appellant has not
argued that any of those circumstances are present in this case. See id.
(stating departure from the coordinate jurisdiction rule has been permitted “in
exceptional circumstances such as where there has been an intervening
change in the controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence
giving rise to the dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly
erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed” (citation omitted
and formatting altered)).

5 Appellant provides no argument that the trial court erred in its application of

the coordinate jurisdiction rule.         Accordingly, the issue is waived.   See
Heggins, 809 A.2d at 912 n.2.

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       Appellant purports to argue that she was not given notice of the motion

for a continuance.       Appellant’s Brief at 14.   However, Appellant does not

develop any legal argument             concerning the lack of notice    for the

Commonwealth’s continuance request in her brief, and therefore, we conclude

that this claim is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(b); Commonwealth v.

Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 379 (Pa. 2023) (stating that “mere issue spotting

without sufficient analysis or legal support precludes appellate review”

(citation omitted)); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915,

924 (Pa. 2009) (stating that “where an appellate brief fails to provide any

discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the

issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived”

(citations omitted)).

       Additionally, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth should have

been precluded from seeking a continuance at 11:20 a.m., because a

summary appeal form stated that motions must be presented between 8:30

and 9:15 a.m. Appellant’s Brief at 14-15. However, aside from a summary

appeal form, Appellant cites no binding or relevant authority supporting the

assertion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the Commonwealth was

not permitted to make its motion before the trial court.6         Therefore, we

____________________________________________

6 We note that in the notes of testimony, Appellant asserted that the
Commonwealth was precluded from filing a motion outside the times stated
on the summary appeal form, and therefore the Commonwealth’s motion was
not valid. See N.T., 2/8/22, at 5. Judge Sklarosky asked Appellant what
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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conclude that this issue is waived. See Armolt, 294 A.3d at 379; Johnson,

985 A.2d at 924. For these reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief on her

challenge    to   the   order    granting      the   Commonwealth’s motion for     a

continuance.7

                              Preferential Treatment

       Appellant next contends that the Commonwealth sought a continuance

from a judge who had been a Luzerne County District Attorney, and therefore,

the   Commonwealth was “judge               shopping”    and   received “preferential

treatment.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant argues “judge shopping cannot

be tolerated in the judicial system at any stage.” Id.

       Upon review, we conclude that Appellant has failed to develop this

argument or provide relevant legal authority supporting her position.

Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth

engaged in judge shopping or that it sought or received preferential treatment

is waived. See Armolt, 294 A.3d at 379; Johnson, 985 A.2d at 924.

____________________________________________

authority she had for her argument, and Appellant was unable to state any
binding authority. Appellant said: “I’m sure there’s a local rule that governs.”
See id. at 6. However, Appellant has failed to cite any legal authority or
develop any argument to support her position.

7 Appellant also briefly mentions that because the Commonwealth failed to
introduce any evidence at the original time scheduled for the summary trial
on February 8, 2022, the trial court erred when it failed to grant Appellant’s
motion to dismiss. See Appellant’s Brief at 15. We conclude that this claim
is undeveloped and waived. See Armolt, 294 A.3d at 379; Johnson, 985
A.2d at 924. In any event, this claim is meritless. As discussed above, we
discern no error in the trial court granting the continuance.

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                          Sufficiency of Evidence

      Finally, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

her speeding conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 17-19. Appellant contends that

the Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden and argues that the trial court

erred in finding Appellant guilty because there was no testimony about the

make and model of the police vehicle and its tire size. Id. at 17-18. Appellant

claims that testimony regarding the testing and calibration of the speedometer

was required pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(b). See id. at 18-19.

      Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

is as follows:

      When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
      this court must view the evidence presented in a light most
      favorable to the Commonwealth, the verdict winner, and draw all
      reasonable inferences therefrom.      We must then determine
      whether the evidence was sufficient to permit the fact-finder to
      conclude that each and every element of the crimes charged was
      proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Any question of doubt is for
      the fact-finder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
      that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from
      the combined circumstances.

      To sustain a conviction for speeding, the Commonwealth must
      show beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) an accused was driving
      in excess of the speed limit; (2) the speed timing device used by
      the officer was approved by the Department of Transportation;
      and (3) the device was calibrated and tested for accuracy within
      the prescribed time period by a station which has been approved
      by the department. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3362(a) and § 3368(a)-(e);
      Commonwealth v. Kittelberger, 616 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Super.
      1992).

Kaufman, 849 A.2d at 1259 (some citations omitted and formatting altered).

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      Regarding the use of speedometers and the calibration and testing of

speed timing devices, Section 3368 provides:

      (a) Speedometers authorized.—The rate of speed of any
      vehicle may be timed on any highway by a police officer using a
      motor vehicle equipped with a speedometer. In ascertaining the
      speed of a vehicle by the use of a speedometer, the speed shall
      be timed for a distance of not less than three-tenths of a mile.

      (b) Testing of speedometers.—The department may appoint
      stations for testing speedometers and may prescribe regulations
      as to the manner in which the test shall be made. Speedometers
      shall have been tested for accuracy within a period of one year
      prior to the alleged violation and immediately upon change of tire
      size. A certificate from the station showing that the test was
      made, the date of the test and the degree of accuracy of the
      speedometer shall be competent and prima facie evidence of
      those facts in every proceeding in which a violation of this title is
      charged.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(a)-(b).

      In Kittleberger, this Court held that the Commonwealth may establish

that the speed timing device was approved by PennDOT pursuant to Section

3368(b) by asking the trial court to take judicial notice that the approval was

published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin.     See Kittelberger, 616 A.2d at 3.

Further, once the Commonwealth provides this prima facie evidence of

accuracy pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(b), the burden shifts to Appellant to

prove that the device was inaccurate. Commonwealth v. Smolow, 527 A.2d

131, 134 (Pa. Super. 1987).

      After review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove

Appellant was guilty of speeding beyond a reasonable doubt. See Kaufman,

849 A.2d at 1259. The record reflects that Trooper Kyle Gruber testified that

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he utilized his speedometer for three-tenths of a mile and determined that

Appellant was travelling at 78 miles an hour, in excess of the speed limit of

55 miles an hour. See N.T., 4/6/22, at 6. The Commonwealth also asked the

trial court to take judicial notice of the approval of the trooper’s speedometer

as a speed timing device, and the testing station’s certificate of the

speedometer’s accuracy and calibration was admitted into evidence. See id.

at 7-9; Judge Vough Opinion at 2 (unpaginated). The record reflects that the

certificate of accuracy was from an approved testing station, and the

speedometer in the trooper’s vehicle had been tested for accuracy less than

six months prior to Appellant’s speeding violation. See N.T., 4/6/22, at 9;

see also Judge Vough Opinion at 2-3 (unpaginated).           Further, once the

burden shifted to Appellant concerning the prima facie evidence of the

accuracy of the speedometer pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(b), Appellant did

not provide any evidence that the speedometer was inaccurate.              See

Smolow, 527 A.2d at 134.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as verdict winner, we conclude that the Commonwealth’s evidence was

sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for speeding in violation of 75

Pa.C.S § 3362(a). See Kaufman, 849 A.2d at 1259; Kittelberger, 616 A.2d

at 3. For these reasons, we affirm.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/22/2024

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