Court Opinion

ID: 9747234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:04:50.537742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:40.833228
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. The Commissioner’s policy carves out an exception to the furlough release program, rendering all offenders incarcerated for committing violent felonies ineligible for release on furlough until they have reached their minimum release date. Categorically denying furlough to a class of inmates is contrary to the intent of the Legislature in enacting 28 V.S.A. § 808(a). Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The Court holds that the language of § 808(a) allows the Commissioner to make this categorical exception. See 28 V.S.A. § 808(a) (“commissioner may extend the limits of the place of confinement of an inmate at any correctional facility if in the judgment of the commissioner the inmate will honor his trust”). The Court reads the word “may” to connote both discretion whether to invoke furlough and, if invoked, whether to perform an individualized assessment. In my view, such a reading is too broad a construction of the Commissioner’s authority, and one that disregards the statutory scheme governing the Department of Corrections. According to the Court, if the Commissioner is so disposed, he can withhold furlough from any “trustworthy” inmate, or any class of inmate for any or no reason whatsoever. This is obviously not what the Legislature had in mind. See Vincent v. Vermont State Retirement Bd., 148 Vt. 531, 535, 536 A.2d 925, 928 (1987) (discretion granted by Legislature to administrative agency must not be “unrestrained and arbitrary”) (citation omitted).
*279When words of common use are found in a statute, they are to be taken in their ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention is evident. See State v. Levine, 117 Vt. 320, 322, 91 A.2d 678, 679 (1952). Generally, in the construction of statutes, the plain, ordinary meaning of the word “may” indicates that it is discretionary and not mandatory. See In re D.L., 164 Vt. 223, 234, 669 A.2d 1172, 1180 (1995). Nevertheless, the context in which the word appears must be the controlling factor. See Black’s Law Dictionary 979 (6th ed. 1990) (noting the distinction between “may” and “shall”). In statutory construction, determining whether “may” is to be construed as imposing an absolute duty or merely a discretionary power, the true intent and purpose of the Legislature must be ascertained and given effect. See Levine, 117 Vt. at 323, 91 A.2d at 679-80. Thus, after examining legislative intent and purpose, in certain instances, the word “may” has the effect of “must.” See Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 102, 300 A.2d 637, 639 (1973) (although use of word “may” appears to be merely permissive, it would be inconsistent with spirit of act to construe it as permissive and not mandatory); see also 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57.03, at 7 (5th ed. 1992) (although form of verb used in statute is single most important textual consideration in determining whether statute is mandatory or directory, it is not sole determinant; other considerations, such as legislative intent, can overcome ordinary meaning).
The interpretation of 28 V.S.A. § 808(a) as conferring upon the Commissioner complete discretion whether to undertake an assessment of an inmate’s eligibility for furlough renders the statute superfluous. The Court finds no entitlement to individualized furlough assessment prior to their minimum release dates. The Court need not, however, find an “otherwise nonexistent statutory right,” 170 Vt. at 269, 744 A.2d at 414, to recognize that the exclusion of an entire class of inmates from furlough assessment exceeds the bounds of the Commissioner’s authority and shortchanges the Legislature’s intent implicit in § 808(a) and expressed in other statutory provisions.
First, the Legislature has mandated that the Department of Corrections shall not only “implement a comprehensive program which will provide necessary closed custodial confinement of frequent, dangerous offenders,” but also “establish as its primary objective the disciplined preparation of offenders for their responsible roles in the open community.” 28 V.S.A. § 1(b) (emphasis added). Absolute exclusion of any class of inmates from consideration for furlough before their minimum release date ignores this primary objective.
*280Second, the Court has failed to reconcile 28 V.S.A. § 808(a) with 13 V.S.A. § 11a. Section 11a establishes a mechanism through which the State may seek greater penalties for those persons convicted of a third “felony crime of violence.” Section lla(e) specifically provides: “No person who receives a minimum sentence under this section shall be eligible for early release or furlough until the expiration of the minimum sentence.” 13 V.S.A. § lla(e). Statutes are to be considered in relation to one another when they “deal with the same subject matter or have the same objective or purpose.” Board of Trustees of Kellogg-Hubbard Library, Inc. v. Labor Relations Bd., 162 Vt. 571, 574, 649 A.2d 784, 786 (1994). Since both § lla(e) and § 808(a) relate to the Commissioner’s discretionary authority to assess furlough eligibility, they should be construed with reference to each other. Read together, the statutes illustrate that the Legislature retained the prerogative to exclude certain classes of inmates from § 808(a). Therefore, the Commissioner’s challenged policy to exclude all inmates convicted of violent felonies from consideration under § 808(a) is an indisputable extension of his authority beyond the limits established in § 11a(e).
In addition to finding that the use of the word “may” does not entitle each inmate to a determination of furlough eligibility prior to his release date, the Court holds that any such determination undertaken by the Commissioner need not include an individual assessment of trustworthiness. Again, the Court focuses too narrowly on the word “may” to the exclusion of legislative intent. Under § 808(a), the Commissioner has discretion to grant a furlough to “an inmate” after determining that “the inmate” will be trustworthy. The use of the singular articles “an” and “the” prior to “inmate” by the Legislature denotes the individual significance of each inmate, plainly indicating the Commissioner’s obligation to individually assess the merits for granting furlough status.
In another statute, the Legislature provided the Commissioner with discretion for addressing medical furloughs. See 28 V.S.A. § 808(f) (“commissioner shall develop a policy regarding the application for, standards for eligibility of and supervision of persons on medical furlough”). Had the Legislature wanted to grant the Commissioner the authority to develop standards for inmate eligibility for general furloughs, it would have done so. It did not, and the class of inmates excluded in this case is entitled to the attention the Legislature asked the Commissioner to provide.
Finally, the Court overlooks the practical impact of the Commissioner’s policy. The Court acknowledges plaintiffs’ evidence indicating *281that prisoners who achieve furlough status are in a significantly better position to obtain parole compared to those who have not. Since furlough status may be granted during the three to six month period preceding a prisoner’s minimum release date, exclusion from furlough consideration prior to this date in effect operates to lengthen the prisoner’s sentence. In May 1995, the Commissioner had in his custody approximately 263 violent offenders who had not yet reached their minimum release dates. Lengthening sentences for a whole class of prisoners may result in significant costs. Such an effect begs the active involvement of both legislative and executive branches, rather than one branch to the exclusion of the other.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the superior court’s conclusion that the policy exceeds the Commissioner’s discretionary authority under 28 V.S.A. § 808(a). The Court further holds that the policy does not violate plaintiffs’ right to due process or equal protection under the Vermont Constitution. Since the policy exceeds, in my opinion, the authority vested in the Commissioner under § 808(a), this constitutional analysis is unnecessary. I am authorized to state that Justice Dooley joins in this dissent.