Court Opinion

ID: 9663927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:55:11.341464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:59.197751
License: Public Domain

NETTESHEIM, P.J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority opinion in all respects. I write separately to more fiilly address Eileen's claim that the trial court's use of a computer program in determining the tax consequences of the maintenance and support awards constituted the use of facts not in evidence.
This case represents the first appellate statement concerning trial court use of a computer program in the decisional process. It is important therefore that the bench and bar understand both the reach and limits of this decision.
*125FACTS AND PROCEDURE
I first recite in some detail the procedural history of this case which led to the trial court's use of its computer program.
The parties stipulated only to the joint custody of the parties' four minor children with primary physical placement to Eileen. All other issues — maintenance, child support, property division and attorney's fees — went to trial. During the trial, Eileen sought to introduce certain tax tables as factual evidence. The trial court rejected this information, concluding that it represented legal — not factual — material. The court indicated, however, that Eileen could use the tax tables in her final arguments as relevant legal/tax information.
As the majority opinion notes, after the close of the evidence but before counsel presented their final arguments, the trial court alerted counsel that it previously had inputted relevant tax law and codes into its computer and that the court would be considering such data on the maintenance and support questions. The court also told counsel that if they had made their own tax calculations, they were free to argue from such data. The court concluded by saying:
[B]ut I want you both to be aware that that's how I'm going to proceed on tax treatment and disposable income in considering maintenance and child support.
As the majority correctly notes, neither Eileen nor Dennis objected to the court's stated intention to use its computer program.
The parties then made their final arguments. Eileen stated her calculations of the parties' respective net dis*126posable incomes using her own tax calculations.1
The trial court then rendered a thorough bench decision. In making its findings as to the parties' respective net disposable incomes, the court adopted its own calculations and expressly explained why it was rejecting Eileen's.
After the court had completed its bench decision, an ensuing discussion revealed that Dennis was paid twice a month, not biweekly as the evidence had led the court to believe. Since the court's computer computations were premised upon a biweekly payment schedule, the court briefly adjourned to input this new and corrected information into its computer. The court then reconvened and recited its modified findings and conclusions based upon this corrected information. In so doing, the court provided counsel with printouts of this latest computer calculation so that counsel could follow along with the court as it explained its modified findings and conclusions.
ANALYSIS
Eileen contends that the trial court's use of its computer program constituted the impermissible use of facts not in evidence. This argument misperceives both the trial court's computer program and the court's use of the program. The court's computer program is built upon existing tax law. This material, as the trial court appropriately noted during the trial, is "law," not "fact." As the majority correctly holds, Eileen has failed to demonstrate that any of this legal/tax information inputted into the trial court's computer program was incorrect.
*127Armed with this legal/tax information, the trial court's computer program is then readied to receive factual information concerning a given case and to produce resultant calculations. Here again, Eileen makes no claim that any factual determination concerning this case which the trial court inputted into its computer was incorrect or clearly erroneous. See sec. 805.17(2), Stats.
Thus, as the majority correctly concludes, the trial court's use of its computer program in this case produced nothing more or different than if the court had performed the same calculations by other more conventional, time-consuming or outmoded methods.
It is important to add, however, that our holding in this case should not be read to give carte blanche approval to a trial court's use of computer programs and the results generated thereby. This case stands only for the proposition that a trial court's use of a computer program is permitted where: (1) the inputted legal data is in accord with the law; (2) the inputted factual findings are not clearly erroneous; and (3) the parties have otherwise had sufficient and fair opportunity to challenge such inputted data.
While we must encourage trial court use of computer technology, we must also assure that litigants and the bar have fair opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the court's computer inputted data. We should bear in mind that a computer generated result is only as valid as the inputted data. In a different case, it may be that a trial court's inputted legal data may be incorrect or the inputted factual data may be clearly erroneous or outside the evidentiary record. We will deal with those problems as they arrive in this court. As the majority correctly holds, this case does not present those troubling issues.
The trial court's procedure in this case, however, offers some guidance on avoiding these potential *128problems. Here the trial court notified counsel in advance of final argument that it intended to use its computer program to assist in its consideration of the tax consequences of its decision. I recommend such a procedure — perhaps at an even earlier stage in the proceedings — so that counsel will understand early on that they must be prepared to address not only the tax position of the adversary but also of the court.
I also recommend the procedure used here by the trial court of providing counsel with a copy of the computer printout of the calculations before the court makes its ultimate rulings. This procedure affords counsel yet another opportunity to challenge the trial court's underlying data.
My final observation about the trial court's procedure in this case is perhaps the most important. Although the trial court ultimately adopted its own computer generated tax calculations, the court did not exhibit a closed mind to the alternative tax computations offered by Eileen. Indeed, the court spoke directly to Eileen's calculations in its bench decision. Thus, the trial court considered not only its own computer results but also all arguments on the question.2
CONCLUSION
The trial courts of this state are now fully computerized. Wisconsin's judicial education programs encourage and teach the use of computers, particularly in the area *129of family law. The trial court in this case is to be commended for its leadership role in this area. This case demonstrates that while the arrival of the computer brings new efficiency to litigation and decision making, it also creates the need for new or adjusted procedures.
With these additional remarks, I concur.

Dennis did not address the tax consequences of the maintenance and support questions in his final argument.

This procedure also avoids the prospect of reversal where a party's tax computations are supported by uncontradicted evidence. Before the court may reject such evidence, the court must explain why the evidence is improbable or the witness discredited. Ashraf v. Ashraf, 134 Wis. 2d 336, 346, 397 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Ct. App. 1986).