Court Opinion

ID: 9964353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 18:12:27.452323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:20.174440
License: Public Domain

J-A06026-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 SEAN W. HEFFLEY                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 TERRA L. HEFFLEY                          :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 977 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered August 16, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                   Family Court at No(s): FD19-009308-015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                          FILED: April 29, 2024

      Appellant, Terra L. Heffley (“Mother”), appeals from the August 16, 2023

order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, that

granted the petition for modification of the existing custody order filed by Sean

W. Heffley (“Father”) with respect to the parties’ children, Z.H., born in

October 2010; S.H., born in January 2013; B.H., born in May 2014; and A.H.,

born in April 2016 (collectively, “the Children”). Upon careful review, we

affirm.

      We gather the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter

from the certified record. Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) married

in June 2009. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 12. During their marriage, Parents resided

together in Allison Park, Pennsylvania, until they separated in 2018. See id.

at 23. Following their separation, Parents continued to reside, separately, in
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the same geographic area. Mother returned to work as a healthcare concierge

sometime in 2022.1 See id. at 7. She works remotely and has flexible hours.

See id. Father is a principal sales engineer for a cyber security company. See

N.T., 5/26/22, at 179. He travels approximately two nights a month for his

job, but he recently obtained a new position where he believes he will be

required to travel less. See id. at 179-80.

       For approximately one year following their 2018 separation, Mother had

an “open-door policy” for Father to see the Children at her home. See id. at

8; see also N.T., 7/22/22, at 220-21. Father initiated the instant custody

action on November 26, 2019. The same day, Mother initiated a protection

from abuse (“PFA”) action and a child custody action. The trial court granted

Mother a temporary PFA order on behalf of her and the Children. Following a

hearing on December 6, 2019, the trial court entered a final PFA order, and

an interim custody order awarding Parents shared legal custody, Mother

primary physical custody, and Father partial physical custody.2, 3 See Interim

____________________________________________

1 Mother had stopped working upon the birth of their first child in 2010.   See
N.T., 7/22/22, at 15.

2 Mother alleged that Father engaged in a repeated pattern of abuse, stalking,

and harassment, and she ultimately filed for a PFA following an alleged
incident wherein Father “stuck his hand up my shorts.” See N.T., 7/22/23, at
77-80. Father denied grabbing Mother but stated that he reached towards her.
See N.T., 5/26/23, at 213.

3 The Honorable Eleanor Bush presided over the PFA hearing and crafted
Parents’ custody order. Thereafter, the case has been handled by various
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Order, 12/6/19. The court awarded Father seven dates of custody through

December 2019, including one overnight visit. See id. Thereafter, starting in

January 2020, the court ordered Parents to operate on a two-week rotating

schedule.4 See id.

       Ultimately, following various petitions filed by Parents in 2020, the court

entered an agreed-upon final custody order dated October 23, 2020 (“existing

custody order”). The order awarded, inter alia, Parents shared legal custody

and Mother primary physical custody subject to Father’s partial physical

custody. The court again devised a two-week rotating schedule wherein Father

had physical custody of the Children on four days of the first week and three

days of the second week. See id.

       On February 16, 2021, Father filed a petition to modify the existing

custody order based on his belief that Mother was alienating the Children from

him. The trial court held hearings on May 26 and 27, 2022, and July 22, 2022,

at which time the Children were eleven, nine, eight, and six years old,

respectively. Therein, Father testified and adduced the testimony of Bruce

Chambers, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist whom the court appointed to

____________________________________________

judges. Ultimately, the Honorable Dwayne D. Woodruff presided over the
custody trial that led to the August 16, 2023 custody order that Mother
appeals from.

4 The first week Father had physical custody on Wednesdays from 4:30 p.m.

until 7:00 p.m., and during the second week Father had physical custody of
the Children on Wednesdays from 4:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. and Friday at 5:00
p.m. until Sunday at 12:00 p.m. See Interim Order, 12/6/2019.

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conduct a psychological evaluation of the family; Carla Hudson, principal at

the Children’s elementary school; James Patrick Heffley, Jr., the Children’s

paternal grandfather; and Anna Meighan, the Children’s therapist. Mother

testified and presented the testimony of Shannon Edwards, Psy.D., a licensed

psychologist and Parents’ former co-parenting counselor; and Roseanne

Naviglia, maternal grandmother. The parties’ counsel and the court

interviewed the two older children, Z.H. and S.H., in camera.5

       Dr. Chambers testified that he met with Mother in August 2021, Father

in September 2021, and interviewed the three oldest Children in September

2021. See N.T., 5/26/22, at 5, 12. Following these meetings, Dr. Chambers

prepared a written report for the court. See id. He emphasized that there

was no indication from his interviews with Mother or the Children that Father

was perpetrating abuse against the Children. See id. at 7, 11. Dr. Chambers

also determined that “[b]oth [Z.H.] and [S.H.] similarly had responses which

suggested [over]-enmeshment” with Mother. Id. at 11-12. It is undisputed

____________________________________________

5 Aside from the testimonial evidence, the court admitted numerous exhibits

proffered by Mother and Father. While the exhibits are not included with the
certified record, we do not find this omission detrimental to our review given
the testimony related thereto. We, however, remind counsel, “Appellant has
the responsibility to make sure that the record forwarded to an appellate court
contains those documents necessary to allow a complete and judicious
assessment of the issues raised on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Wint, 730
A.2d 965 (Pa. Super. 1999); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1921 Note (stating, “Ultimate
responsibility for a complete record rests with the party raising an issue that
requires appellate court access to record materials.”) (citation omitted).

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that the Children have an ongoing fear of COVID-19 which Dr. Chambers

posits is “irrational” and has been “perpetuated” by Mother. Id. at 15-16. He

also spoke with the Children’s former principal and the Children’s former

counselor, both of whom related concerns about the Children’s psychological

well-being. See id..

      Dr. Chambers further testified he was concerned that the Children had

a “disturbed” relationship with Father and recommended that Mother attend

individual therapy and the family attend family therapy. Dr. Chambers

testified about his concern that Mother has caused the Children to have an

unrealistic fear of Father, despite there being no evidence of any abuse or

mistreatment by him, and that Mother is the only person who can undo this

damage. See id. at 17-18. Ultimately, Dr. Chambers recommended a shared

custody schedule. See id. at 18.

      Carla Hudson, the Children’s school principal, testified that the Children

refused to attend in-person school at the beginning of the 2021-2022 school

year due to their concerns regarding COVID. See id. at 73, 84. Eventually,

the three older children were enrolled in the North Allegheny Cyber Academy,

while the youngest, A.H., attended school in person. See id. at 94.

      Testimony from Parents revealed the contentious nature of their

relationship. Father testified that he is hesitant to reach out to Mother due to

the PFA order and that he is “fearful of everything I do and say to the

[C]hildren, because of all of the [] CYS reports in the last two years.” Id. at

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130, 137. Despite the various reports, CYS has never determined any of the

accusations to be founded. See id. at 131. Father testified that Mother does

not support his relationship with the Children and that she is largely

responsible for the Children’s irrational fear of COVID. See id. at 229-33, 246.

Father emphasized that it has been a struggle to get the Children to listen to

him. See id. at 139.

      Mother testified that the Children’s view of COVID is “cautious, but

manageable.” See N.T., 7/22/22, at 44. She alleged that Father has not

respected the Children’s feelings regarding COVID and that he has taken the

Children on trips when there were “no travel” policies in place. See id. at 44-

48. She further stated that she wants the Children to attend school in-person,

but she does not believe the three older children are ready. See id. at 53-54.

Mother also raised concerns with Father’s care, alleging that the Children come

back to her unbathed, or not fed. See id. at 63-64.

      Dr. Edwards testified that in July 2020, Parents commenced co-parent

counseling. See N.T., 5/27/22, at 95. Dr. Edwards conducted an individual

session with each Parent separately, held a session with the Children together,

and performed three joint sessions with Parents. See id. During this time,

Mother alleged that Father had inappropriately touched A.H. See id. at 95-

96. Dr. Edwards spoke with A.H. and informed Mother that she should obtain

a forensic interview of Child. See id. at 100. Ultimately, after consulting with

a colleague, Dr. Edwards did not report the allegation. See id. at 99.

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       On August 16, 2023, approximately thirteen months after the final

hearing date, the court awarded Parents shared legal and physical custody of

the Children on an alternating weekly basis. The court further made

determinations regarding, inter alia, the Children’s summer vacation and

holiday schedule.

       Mother timely filed a notice of appeal along with a concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.6

       On appeal, Mother raises the following issues which we have reordered

for ease of disposition:

       1. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
          granting shared physical and legal custody?

       2. Whether the trial court erred by issuing a final order of court
          that contained provisions neither party requested and are not
          in the Children’s best interests?

       3. Whether the trial court erred and committed reversible error in
          failing to address the 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a) custody factors,
          including its failure to provide any basis for the final custody
          order of court?

       4. Whether the trial court erred and violated Pennsylvania Rule of
          Civil Procedure 1915.4, regarding the prompt disposition of
          custody cases, by failing to list the matter for trial within 180
          days, failing to commence trial timely, and taking more than
          one year to issue its final custody order?

____________________________________________

6 The trial court’s Rule 1925(a) statement was untimely, and we remind the

court of its duty to file a Rule 1925(a) statement within thirty days of its
receipt of the notice of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (a)(2)(ii).

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Mother’s Brief, at 5 (cleaned up).

      Our standard of review over a custody order is for a gross abuse of

discretion. Such an abuse of discretion will only be found if the trial court, in

reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment

which is manifestly unreasonable, or reaches a conclusion that is the result of

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will as shown by the evidence of record. See

Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 60-61 (Pa. Super. 2023)

      In reviewing a custody order

      [w]e must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by
      competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making
      independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to
      issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to
      the [trial court] who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-
      hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions
      or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is
      whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown
      by the evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the
      trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable
      in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

A.L.B., 239 A.3d 142, 147-148 (Pa. Super. 2020).

      As with all custody-related matters, this Court’s “paramount concern is

the best interest of the child involved.” Rogowski, 291 A.3d at 61. (internal

citation and quotation omitted). Pennsylvania law provides that the court is

only empowered to change an existing custody order if the modification will

“serve the best interest of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5338(a). To that end, the

Child Custody Act sets forth sixteen factors at § 5328(a) that a court must

consider prior to modifying an existing custody order. See E.B. v. D.B., 209

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A.3d 451, 460 (Pa. Super. 2019). While a court’s consideration of these factors

is mandatory, “it is within the trial court’s purview as the finder of fact to

determine which factors are most salient and critical in each particular case.”

Id. (cleaned up).

      These factors provide as follows:

      (a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
      determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
      factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which
      affect the safety of the child, including the following:

         (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
         frequent and continuing contact between the child and
         another party.

         (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
         member of the party's household, whether there is a
         continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
         which party can better provide adequate physical
         safeguards and supervision of the child.

         (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating
         to consideration of child abuse and involvement with
         protective services).

         (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf
         of the child.

         (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child's
         education, family life and community life.

         (5) The availability of extended family.

         (6) The child's sibling relationships.

         (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
         child's maturity and judgment.

         (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
         other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where

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         reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
         child from harm.

         (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
         consistent and nurturing relationship with the child
         adequate for the child's emotional needs.

         (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
         physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
         needs of the child.

         (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

         (12) Each party's availability to care for the child or ability
         to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

         (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
         willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
         another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
         another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
         cooperate with that party.

         (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
         member of a party's household.

         (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
         member of a party’s household.

         (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

      In order to evidence its consideration of these required elements,

custody courts must set forth a discussion of these best-interest factors “prior

to the deadline by which a litigant must file a notice of appeal.” A.V. v. S.T.,

87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa. Super. 2014). This Court has emphasized that the trial

court, as the finder of fact, determines “which factors are most salient and

critical in each particular case.” M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa.

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Super. 2013) (citation omitted). In expressing the reasons for its decision,

“there is no required amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation; all that

is required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that the custody

decision is based on those considerations.” Id. at 336.

      Although Mother addresses her first and second issues collectively, we

discern that they are distinct arguments. As such, we will address them

separately.

      In Mother’s first issue, she argues the trial court erred in ordering shared

physical and legal custody. See Mother’s Brief, at 22. She asserts the trial

court failed to appreciate the factual complexity of these matters, which

involve contested allegations of abuse and parental alienation. See id. at 23.

Mother further contends two forensic psychologists, Dr. Chambers and Dr.

Edwards, testified at trial and Dr. Chambers did not consider collateral data.

See id. at 24. Mother further argues the trial court nearly exclusively referred

to Dr. Chambers in its opinion. See id. Mother concludes the court did not

demonstrate the attention necessary to enter a custody order. See id.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed the Section

5328(a) custody factors wherein it weighted Section 5328(a)(1), (4), (5), (7),

(8), and (13) equally between the parties. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/23,

at 7-9. The court attributed minimal weight to factors (2), (3), (6), (9), (10),

(11), (12), (14), (15), and (16) as it determined them to be neutral between

the parties or not applicable. See id.

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       Ultimately, the court summarized its conclusions as follows:

       Based upon the evidence presented, Father’s relationships with
       each of the children and the children’s relationships with Father
       will improve with additional time spent with each other. Further,
       a co-parenting situation seems to allow for both parents to
       adequately and appropriately interact with the children and their
       school activities as well as being involved with the therapy
       sessions for the children. It is clear that a 50/50 award of both
       physical and legal custody of the children would benefit the
       children and improve their lives with Mother and Father. It is
       clearly in the best interests of the children to allow them to
       interact with both Mother and Father equally in family situations,
       school activities, and therapeutic situations.

Id. at 9.

       To the extent Mother argues the trial court did not demonstrate the

attention necessary to enter a custody order, we find this argument waived.

Mother completely fails to develop this argument as she does not cite to any

law nor are we aware of any that provides a standard for the amount of

attention a court must demonstrate to enter a custody order. See In re W.H.,

25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 336

(stating “there is no required amount of detail for the trial court’s

explanation.”).7

       Regarding Mother’s related contention that the trial court afforded too

much weight to Dr. Chambers’ testimony, these arguments amount to nothing

____________________________________________

7 We agree with Mother that the court’s mention of 23 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 2511-

(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and §2511(b), was careless. However, this appears to
merely be a typographical error, not an indication that the trial court failed to
consider the custody factors. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/8/23, at 1; Mother’s
Brief, at 17-18.

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more than a bald attack upon the credibility and weight determinations made

by the trial court. As related supra, “we must defer to the trial court who

viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.” Rogowski, 291 A.3d at 60-

61. The court was well within its discretion to rely on Dr. Chambers, who met

with both parties, the Children, and various collateral sources. Although

Mother offered the testimony of Dr. Edwards, Dr. Edwards was the co-

parenting counselor for a limited time, approximately six sessions, before she

was removed from the case. Dr. Edwards testified that Mother alleged Father

inappropriately touched A.H., however, after speaking with A.H. and a

colleague, Dr. Edwards did not report the allegation. See N.T., 5/27/22, at

95-100.

      As related supra, Dr. Chambers emphasized the need for a shared

custody schedule. See id. at 18. He further emphasized that Mother needs to

show the Children that she supports Father to foster a better relationship

between Father and the Children. See id. at 17-18. The court was well within

its discretion to rely on the court-appointed, neutral third party that conducted

a custody evaluation when crafting its custody order.

      Further, regarding Mother’s allegations of Father’s abuse allegedly

perpetrated against the Children, the court determined that it “does not find

that there has been abuse, present or past by either party or any member of

either party’s household. The court finds that both parties are equally situated

to provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision for the [C]hildren.”

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Id. at 7. As related supra, Dr. Chambers determined Father was not physically

abusive with the Children. Mother did not provide him with any information

indicating abuse and Dr. Chambers’ interviews with the Children did not

evidence any abuse had occurred in Father’s home. See id. at 7, 11. Further,

despite Mother’s allegations, she consented to the October 2020 custody order

that provided Father with additional physical custody rights. See id. at 162-

63. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion when it found that,

based on the evidence presented, Father has not perpetrated abuse against

the Children.

      Regarding her second issue, Mother contends the subject order does not

include agreements the parties made, namely, the removal of birthdays from

the order and that neither party has physical custody for an entire school

break. See Mother’s Brief, at 23. Mother acknowledges that an agreement

between the parties does not bind the court but posits that it is atypical for a

court to disregard parties’ agreements. See id.

      In its opinion, the trial court stated that it based the custody order on

the best interest factors of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), giving weighted

consideration to those factors that affected the Children’s safety. See Trial

Court Opinion, 11/8/23, at 1. This was not an abuse of discretion.

      Pursuant to Section 5328(a), “[i]n ordering any form of custody, the

court shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant

factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the safety

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of the child. . . .” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a); see also Rogowski, 291 A.3d at

60-61 (“the paramount concern is the best interest of the child involved.”). In

fact Mother herself acknowledges that the court was not required to follow any

alleged agreements between the parties when it fashioned the August 16,

2023 custody order. See Mother’s Brief, at 23. Accordingly, the court did not

abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in crafting the custody award

based on the best interest factors of Section 5328(a), rather than Parents’

prior agreements.

      In her third issue, Mother argues the trial court erred when it failed to

address the Section 5328(a) custody factors prior to the deadline for Mother

to appeal the August 16, 2023 custody order. See id. at 15-16.

      It is unquestionable that, although the trial court analyzed the Section

5328(a) custody factors in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court failed to provide

an analysis of the factors in open court or in a written opinion accompanying

the August 16, 2023 custody order. Nevertheless, we discern no prejudice,

and Mother does not claim any. The issues Mother presented in her concise

statement are identical to the claims presented in her brief. See id. at 5; Rule

1925(b) Statement. Accordingly, as Mother had a full opportunity to present

a comprehensive argument for appellate review, we decline to vacate the trial

court’s August 16, 2023 custody order.

      In her fourth and final issue, Mother argues the trial court erred when it

violated Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(b), (c), and (d). Mother asserts the trial court (1)

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failed to timely schedule the trial on Father’s February 16, 2021 petition for

modification; (2) failed to enter a scheduling order for the trial; and (3) failed

to promptly issue a decision. See Mother’s Brief, at 19-21. No relief is due.

      Rule 1915.4 provides, in pertinent part, “within 180 days of the filing of

the complaint either the court shall automatically enter an order scheduling a

trial before a judge or a party shall file a praecipe, motion or request for trial.”

Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(b). “If it is not the practice of the court to automatically

schedule trials and neither party files a praecipe, motion or request for trial

within 180 days of filing of the pleading, the court shall, sua sponte or on

motion of a party, dismiss the matter[.]” Id. “[T]rial shall commence within

90 days of the date the scheduling order is entered [and ] . . . conclude[] not

later than 45 days from commencement.” Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(c). “The judge's

decision shall be entered and filed within 15 days of the date upon which the

trial is concluded unless … the court extends the date for such decision [for

good cause].” Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(d).

      As a preliminary matter, this claim is waived because Mother failed to

preserve these issues as she did not “make a timely and specific objection at

the appropriate stage of the proceedings before the trial court.” In re S.C.B.,

990 A.2d 762, 767 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“In order to preserve an issue for

appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection at the

appropriate stage of the proceedings before the trial court. Failure to timely

object to a basic and fundamental error will result in waiver of that issue.”);

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see also Nelson v Kresge, 1417 EDA 2021 at 19 (Pa. Super., filed February

23, 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (holding that the father due no relief

where he failed to raise any prior objection as to timing and/or scheduling or

make any requests for earlier dates during disposition of the petitions for

modification and contempt) (citing Fillmore v. Hill, 665 A.2d 514, 515-516

(Pa. Super (1995) (“On appeal, the Superior Court will not consider a claim

which was not called to the trial court’s attention at a time when any error

committed could have been corrected.”)).

      Mother did not move to schedule trial when the court failed to do so;

nor did she file a motion to dismiss when trial was not timely commenced.

See Pa.R.C.P. Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(b). Instead, Mother raised these timeliness

issues for the first time in her appeal after the trial court awarded Parents

shared physical and legal custody. Moreover, regarding Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(c)

and (d), even if Mother’s timeliness challenges were not waived, we would

decline to vacate the order because these subsections do not provide a remedy

or any other sanction if the trial court does not comply with the time limits.

See E.B. v. M.B., 3 WDA 2023 at *6 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 15, 2023)

(unpublished memorandum) (declining to vacate a custody order due to a

violation of Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(d) because it does not provide a remedy).

Accordingly, Mother’s fourth claim does not merit relief.

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       Based on the foregoing, we conclude that none of Mother’s contentions

entitle her to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court. 8

       Order affirmed.

DATE: 04/29/2024

____________________________________________

8 Although we affirm the trial court’s decision, we note our displeasure with

the trial court’s handling of this case. The amount of time it took to litigate
the custody modification order and for the court to file its opinion was clearly
unreasonable and in violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Similarly, we
must again remind the court that, in child custody matters, it is obligated to
“set forth its mandatory assessment of the sixteen factors prior to the deadline
by which a litigant must file a notice of appeal.” C.B. v. J.B., 65 A.3d 946,
955 (Pa. Super. 2013).

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