Court Opinion

ID: 9741973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:04:49.12648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:27.568543
License: Public Domain

Peterson, Justice.
Plaintiff, Shirley Y. Harder, appeals from an order denying her motion for an award of alimony. Plaintiff and defendant, William E. Harder, were divorced in 1971. The judgment and decree of divorce, based upon a stipulation of the parties, granted no alimony to plaintiff but reserved jurisdiction to consider that issue at some future time. Plaintiff filed the present motion for award of alimony in March 1975. The trial court denied alimony, ruling that plaintiff was required to show a substantial change in circumstances subsequent to the date of the divorce. The court additionally divested itself of jurisdiction to hear any subsequent applications for alimony.
The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court properly construed Minn. St. 518.55, in so far as that statute provides that the court “may reserve jurisdiction of the issue of alimony for determination at a later date.”1
*302We hold that by stipulating to the court’s reservation of jurisdiction over the issue of alimony, the parties preserved the court’s áuthority to do in the future what it could have done at the time of the divorce decree. When that authority is invoked by a subsequent application for alimony, the court must then make the initial determination of the propriety of an award and its amount. That determination must be based upon the facts and circumstances existing at the time the application is made, as if the entire action had been brought at the later date.2 It was reversible error to deny alimony on the ground that plaintiff must show a substantial change in circumstances subsequent to the date of the divorce. We reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
We allude briefly to corollary questions which surfaced in this case, without intimating any views as to whether or not a grant or denial of alimony would be appropriate upon remand. The factors relevant to a decision to award alimony have, of course, been the subject of numerous decisions. See, e. g., Vandewege v. Vandewege, 284 Minn. 330, 170 N. W. 2d 228 (1969). A wife in a divorce action has no absolute right to an award of alimony. Vandewege v. Vandewege, supra; Kelley v. Kelley, 261 Minn. 405, 112 N. W. 2d 798 (1962). We recently held in Peterson v. Peterson, 308 Minn. 365, 242 N. W. 2d 103 (1976), that the marital misconduct of the parties remains as one of several factors to be considered by the court in the exercise of its dis*303cretion in the division of property and the award of alimony notwithstanding the fact that a dissolution of marriage may now be granted in this state without regard to fault. If the court denies alimony without the reservation of continuing jurisdiction to award alimony at a future time, the court is divested of jurisdiction by operation of law.
Reversed and remanded.

 Minn. St. 518.55 provides: “Every award of alimony or support money in a judgment of dissolution shall clearly designate whether the same is alimony or support money, or what part of the award is alimony and what part thereof is support money. Any award of payments from future income or earnings of the custodial parent shall be pre*302sumed to be alimony. Any award of payments from the future income or earnings of the non-custodial parent shall be presumed to be support money unless otherwise designated by the court. In any judgment of dissolution the court may determine, as one of the issues of the case, whether or not either spouse is entitled to an award of alimony notwithstanding that no award is then made, or it may reserve jurisdiction of the issue of alimony for determination at a later date.”

 Our holding on this issue does not, of course, preclude parties to a divorce action from stipulating that, by reserving jurisdiction of alimony, something different is meant than the standard we here enunciate.