Court Opinion

ID: 9794591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:08:18.172026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:01.689880
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(dissenting) — The majority asserts that a reasonably prudent and disinterested observer would not be left with the feeling that a fair and neutral hearing is denied when, as here, the same tribunal combines investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. Majority opinion, at 481.1 disagree. I believe the unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals correctly found an appearance of fairness violation. For the reasons set out in the lower court opinion, as well as those discussed below, I would therefore affirm.
The appearance of fairness doctrine was first enunciated in Smith v. Skagit Cy., 75 Wn.2d 715, 741, 453 P.2d 832 (1969). The principles embodied in the doctrine, however, date back to our earliest reported cases. The passage cited by the Court of Appeals demonstrates this point and is worth repeating here. Justice Dunbar, writing in 1898, comments on the importance of the appearance of fairness.
The principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge is as old as the history of *486courts; in fact, the administration of justice through the mediation of courts is based upon this principle. It is a fundamental idea, running through and pervading the whole system of judicature, and it is the popular acknowledgment of the inviolability of this principle which gives credit, or even toleration, to decrees of judicial tribunals. Actions of courts which disregard this safeguard to litigants would more appropriately be termed the administration of injustice, and their proceedings would be as shocking to our private sense of justice as they would be injurious to the public interest.
State ex rel. Barnard v. Board of Educ., 19 Wash. 8, 17-18, 52 P. 317 (1898).
In State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler, 76 Wn.2d 313, 456 P.2d 322 (1969), the court applied these principles. In that case, like here, the same board performed investigatory, prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. The court observed:
It is clear from the recited background facts that four of the five members of the civil service commission which, by virtue of charter provisions constitute the appellate tribunal before which respondent's appeal would normally be heard, personally investigated respondent's administration of his office, formed their conclusions, promulgated the charges against him, transmitted these accusations over their signatures to the city manager, and recommended his discharge. Inescapably the commission members became the investigators, the accusers, the prosecutors, mayhaps the witnesses, and if allowed to sit as an appellate tribunal, the judges upon the merits of the charges. Despite the integrity of the respective members of the commission, and their undoubted desire to be objective in their appellate disposition of the matter, it is highly unlikely, under the unusual circumstances prevailing, that the respondent or anyone in a like situation could approach or leave a hearing presided over by a tribunal so composed with any feeling that fairness and impartiality inhered in the procedure.
(Italics mine.) Beam, at 315-16. Relying on Beam, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was "compelled" to hold that a disinterested person would be reasonably justified in *487thinking that partiality may have existed. State Med. Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 29 Wn. App. 613, 625-26, 630 P.2d 1354 (1981). I agree. The same procedures disapproved in Beam exist here. The majority attempts to distinguish Beam by urging that that case involved "not merely a combination of functions, but also prejudgment bias, since several members of the tribunal had taken a public stance on the case beforehand." Majority opinion, at 479. The majority's analysis, however, undercuts the appearance of fairness doctrine. If, as the majority asserts, Beam can be read as a prejudgment bias case, the court objections could and should be couched in terms of a due process analysis. If prejudgment bias is a necessary element of an appearance of fairness violation, no need exists for a doctrine separate and distinct from due process analysis. We, as a court, should then adopt the concurrence and abolish the doctrine. The majority has not done so, however, nor should it.
The appearance of fairness doctrine fills a void between actual bias and total impartiality. That intermediate position, I suggest, is critical to our maintaining public confidence in the fairness of adjudicatory functions. As noted in the passage quoted from Barnard, it is the popular acknowledgment of the inviolability of this principle which gives credit or even tolerance to our system of justice. Thus, '"[n]ext in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment, is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.'" (Italics mine.) Barnard, at 18.
The majority ignores the strong language of our cases and asserts that "the mere combination of adjudicative and investigative powers in one agency, without more, would not be viewed by a reasonably prudent and disinterested observer as denying ... a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing." Majority opinion, at 479-80. I disagree. The majority neglects to point out that the Court of Appeals relied on the combination of three functions, not two. The board here serves not only investigative and adjudicatory func*488tions, it also performs the duties of prosecutor. For instance, RCW 18.72.170 provides that the board shall cause a statement of charges to be prepared. Thus the decision to prosecute rests with the very board which will decide the case on the merits. Even if the combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions does not violate the appearance of fairness doctrine, the addition of prose-cutorial functions surely taints that proceeding. The majority ignores this fact, but a disinterested observer would not.
Factors such as the issuing of formal charges against Johnston over the name of the secretary of the board who then sat in judgment of Johnston also cannot be ignored. When this identity of functions is added to the use of the same attorney general as prosecutor and advisor, one cannot doubt the truth of the Court of Appeals statement that the "specter of unfairness" is raised. Johnston, at 626. Regardless of the integrity of the board members or attorney general, the confidential relationship of the board and its legal advisor cannot be reconciled with that same legal advisor also serving as prosecutor. This is what motivated three Court of Appeals judges to find an appearance of fairness violation. Likewise, these factors convince me that we must affirm that decision.
Dore, J., concurs with Rosellini, J.