Court Opinion

ID: 9630859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:22:56.751383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:45.346259
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the Physical Therapy Act, 63 P.S. § 1304(a), (b.l), prohibits chiropractors from advertising that they perform physical therapy. Commercial speech is entitled to greater protection than that accorded by the majority under both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996); Insurance Adjustment Bureau v. Insurance Commissioner, 518 Pa. 210, 542 A.2d 1317 (1988).
A statutory limitation on commercial speech can be upheld only if the challenged statute directly advances a substantial governmental interest in a way that is no more restrictive than necessary to achieve the objective. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. *277at 500, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980)). Here, the governmental interest cited is ostensibly to protect the public from being misled that chiropractors and physical therapists render the same services. The fallacy inherent in this governmental interest is twofold: (1) chiropractors do, in fact, perform some of the same services as physical therapists; and (2) appellants clearly stated in their advertisements that they were chiropractors.
Chiropractors can be certified under the Chiropractic Act, 63 P.S. § 625.102, to perform “adjunctive procedures” which include “[pjhysical measures such as mechanical stimulation, heat, cold, light, air, water, electricity, sound, massage and mobilization.” This list of procedures is in direct accord with the Physical Therapy Act’s definition of “physical therapy” as quoted by the majority. Notwithstanding that the definition of “adjunctive procedures” and “physical therapy” are substantially identical, the majority nevertheless concludes that while there is some overlap in procedures, chiropractors are not the equivalent of physical therapists. There is no question that the two professions are separate and distinct; however, the fact remains that the members of those distinct professions do provide some of the same services. Appellants are certified to perform “adjunctive procedures;” therefore, they perform some physical therapy. Thus, because appellants are certified to provide the services which they advertised, and because they did not hold themselves out as physical therapists, but rather clearly identified themselves as chiropractors, no substantial government interest exists to support the statutory ban on advertising by chiropractors providing physical therapy services.
As the United States Supreme Court stated in 44 Liquormart:
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with *278the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict review. However, when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands.
Sound reasons justify reviewing the latter type of commercial speech regulation more carefully. Most obviously, complete speech bans, unlike content-neutral restrictions on time, place or manner of expression, are particularly dangerous because they all but foreclose alternative means of disseminating certain information, (citations omitted).
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501, 116 S.Ct. 1495.
The Physical Therapy Act ban on advertising of physical therapy services by anyone other than a licensed physical therapist is precisely the type of ban contemplated by the United States Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart. It effectively prevents chiropractors from advertising certain services that they are certified to provide simply because they are not licensed under the Physical Therapy Act. Because appellants’ are certified to perform the advertised services, it defies logic that their advertisements could be considered misleading. This is a clear violation of appellants’ free speech rights that is not justified by any governmental interest in the protection of consumers. Accordingly, the decision of the Commonwealth Court should be reversed and the dismissal of the charges against appellants reinstated.
Justice CAPPY joins this dissenting opinion.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.
AND NOW, this 17th day of June 1999, the application for reargument is denied.