Court Opinion

ID: 9952607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 14:04:20.317337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:23.503459
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

                          ALEXANDRE TALUY,

                               Appellant,

                                    v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                Appellee.

                             No. 2D23-1213

                             March 20, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for DeSoto County; Hunter W. Carroll,
Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Susan M. Shanahan,
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alicia M. Winterkorn,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

SILBERMAN, Judge.
     Alexandre Taluy appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for
postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. We affirm because
Taluy has not demonstrated any reversible error.
     Following a jury trial, Taluy was convicted of four counts of sexual
battery upon a person twelve or older but less than eighteen by a person
in familial/custodial authority. We affirmed his judgment and sentences.
See Taluy v. State, 272 So. 3d 1246 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (table decision).
Taluy then moved for postconviction relief, alleging multiple grounds. In
this appeal, he only challenges the denial of ground Two-B.
      In that ground, Taluy argued that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to impeach the victim, B.M., during her trial testimony. He
contended that B.M.'s testimony was inconsistent with her earlier
statements as to the time Taluy drove her to school the morning a sexual
battery allegedly occurred. He claimed that B.M. gave different times in
her initial statement to law enforcement, at her deposition, and at trial.
The postconviction court granted Taluy a limited evidentiary hearing on
this ground.
      During the hearing, several transcripts were admitted into evidence
including B.M.'s initial statement to law enforcement, her deposition, her
trial testimony, and Taluy's post-Miranda1 statement to law enforcement.
Taluy testified as to what he thought were inconsistencies in B.M.'s trial
testimony and her prior statements. But he conceded that during a
controlled call, he admitted performing oral sex on B.M. and engaging in
sexual intercourse with her. He also acknowledged that there was a cell
phone recording of he and B.M. engaging in sexual activity on the
morning in question.
      Taluy's trial counsel also testified at the hearing. He did not believe
that the time B.M. left for school on the morning of the sexual battery
was a material, pertinent issue but was instead a minor detail. He added
that B.M. had not testified at trial as to the time she left for school or
arrived at school, and, therefore, he could not impeach her as to the time
frame.
      In the thorough order denying relief, the postconviction court
summarized the transcripts and testimony. The court found that there

      1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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were no inconsistencies in B.M.'s trial testimony and her prior
statements. The court noted Taluy's admissions to at least one instance
of sexual intercourse with B.M., numerous instances in which he and
B.M. kissed and touched each other in a sexual manner, and one
occasion in which he and B.M. had engaged "in a '69' sexual act." The
court concluded that any inconsistency as to the time frame would be
immaterial. The court added that even if the times that B.M. left for
school and arrived at school were material, there were no inconsistencies
in B.M.'s initial statement to law enforcement, her deposition testimony,
and her trial testimony.
     "Postconviction courts hold a superior vantage point with respect to
questions of fact, evidentiary weight, and observations of the demeanor
and credibility of witnesses." Lebron v. State, 135 So. 3d 1040, 1052
(Fla. 2014). Thus, when reviewing a postconviction court's denial of relief
after an evidentiary hearing, "we defer to the postconviction court's
factual findings that are supported by competent substantial evidence
but we review de novo the court's legal conclusions." Campbell v. State,
247 So. 3d 102, 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (citing Light v. State, 796 So. 2d
610, 615 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)).
     To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
must satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Jackson v. State, 353 So. 3d 666, 667 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2022). First, the defendant must demonstrate counsel's deficient
performance. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). This requires the
defendant to show that counsel's "errors [were] so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment." Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 345 (Fla. 2004)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Second, the defendant must

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establish prejudice by showing "that 'there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.' " Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
     Competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction
court's findings that Taluy failed to prove that the victim's testimony was
inconsistent or that his trial counsel was ineffective. Because Taluy
failed to establish any error in the postconviction court's findings or
conclusions, we affirm the denial of relief.
     Affirmed.

BLACK and SMITH, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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