Court Opinion

ID: 5979195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-13 08:09:31.769963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:58.812616
License: Public Domain

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Phelan, J.), entered December 12, 2012, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, arid the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbosacral regions of the plaintiffs spine did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).
In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether he sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbosacral regions of his spine (see Ramkumar v Grand Style Transp. Enters. Inc., 22 NY3d 905, 906-907 [2013]; Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 215-218 [2011]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Dillon, J.E, Leventhal, Chambers and LaSalle, JJ., concur.