Court Opinion

ID: 2963824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:15:44.122834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:46.589490
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          December 26, 1995
                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                           

                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1188

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  JOSE REYES MUNOZ,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
                                                ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Jose A. Reyes Munoz on brief pro se.
            ___________________
            Guillermo  Gil,  United   States  Attorney,  Miguel  A.   Pereira,
            ______________                               ____________________
        Assistant United States Attorney,  and Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior
                                               _______________________
        Litigation Counsel, on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                 Per Curiam.   We affirm  the district  court's order  of
                 __________

            December 21, 1994, denying appellant's motion  filed pursuant

            to 28 U.S.C.    2255.   Appellant has  failed to  demonstrate

            cause for failing to pursue his timely filed direct  criminal

            appeal, which was  dismissed for lack of  prosecution.  Since

            we conclude  that appellant  lacked cause for  his procedural

            default, we  need not address whether  he suffered prejudice.

            See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43 (1982).
            ___ _____    _____

                 Appellant's  contention  that  he need  not  demonstrate

            cause  and prejudice for his  default is erroneous  as it has

            long been established that "a collateral challenge may not do

            service for an  appeal."   United States v.  Frady, 456  U.S.
                                       _____________     _____

            152,  165 (1982); see also  Knight v. United  States, 37 F.3d
                              ________  ______    ______________

            769, 772-74 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying the cause and prejudice

            standard to collateral claims of  constitutional error, apart

            from ineffective  assistance of counsel claim,  not raised on

            direct review); Suveges v.  United States, 7 F.3d 6,  10 (1st
                            _______     _____________

            Cir.  1993)  (applying   cause  and  prejudice   standard  to

            collateral  claim of  jurisdictional error  in case  where no

            direct  appeal was taken).  Nor has appellant come within the

            narrow exception  to the  cause and prejudice  requirement by

            proffering a  claim of  a fundamental miscarriage  of justice

            tied  to a colorable showing of factual innocence.  See Burks
                                                                ___ _____

            v. Dubois, 55 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir. 1995).
               ______

                                         -2-

                 Appellant's claim  that he  let his direct  appeal lapse

            due  to his  lack of  resources and  his movement  within the

            prison system  is belied by the  evidence.  In his  series of

            filings  in this  court, appellant informed  us of  his ever-

            changing desires.  First, he  expressed his intent to proceed

            pro se.  Ten days later,  he moved for appointed counsel.  We

            informed him of the  need to file,  in the district court,  a

            financial affidavit  and  a motion  for leave  to proceed  in

            forma pauperis (IFP)  on appeal.   Rather than  file for  IFP

            status in the district court, appellant next informed us that

            he  wanted  to  withdraw  his appeal  voluntarily.    Shortly

            thereafter, appellant  stated that he wanted  to continue his

            appeal and  again requested  appointed counsel.   We reminded

            appellant that, in order for us to appoint counsel, he needed

            to  file  his  IFP  motion  and  financial  affidavit in  the

            district  court.   He  never did.    Rather, in  the district

            court, he  was  exhorting that  court  to decide  some  post-

            conviction motions  he had filed there because if he obtained

            the  requested relief, he would not need to pursue his direct

            appeal.  District Court docket #187a.

                 Appellant was aware of what he had to do in order to get

            appointed  counsel, but never did it.  Moreover, he also knew

            that he could proceed pro  se, if he chose.  The  pendency of

            his direct appeal was  marked by his own inability  to decide

            what he  wanted  to  do: proceed  pro  se,  obtain  appointed

                                         -3-

            counsel, or withdraw his  appeal.  All of these  options were

            first proffered as his choice, then aborted by his own action

            or inaction.  His final choice  was to do nothing and let the

            appeal be dismissed for lack of prosecution.

                 Nor  was  his procedural  default  due  to his  movement

            within  the prison system.   His movement did  not impair his

            ability to  correspond with  this court  (or for that  matter

            with  the district  court).   Each time  appellant complained

            that  his  mail  from this  court  had  been  delayed and  he

            requested an enlargement  of time  to file  his statement  of

            issues and/or his  brief, he  received one.   And, while  his

            direct appeal was pending,  appellant filed numerous  motions

            and  requests in  the district  court, including  six motions

            seeking  reconsideration of  his sentence  and an  additional

            motion asking  that  the  time  he spent  on  release  before

            sentencing   be  credited  towards  his  incarceration  time.

            Clearly, appellant's procedural default of his direct  appeal

            was a conscious choice that was not due either to his lack of

            resources or his movement among prisons.

                 On appeal, appellant raises,  for the first time, claims

            of ineffective assistance of counsel.  A claim neither raised

            in the    2255 motion nor  argued in the district  court will

            not  be reviewed on appeal.   Singleton v.  United States, 26
                                          _________     _____________

            F.3d  233, 240  (1st  Cir.), cert.  denied,  115 S.  Ct.  517
                                         _____________

            (1994).

                                         -4-

                 The order of the district court is affirmed.
                                                    _________

                                         -5-