Court Opinion

ID: 9540148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:13:06.168055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:39.810559
License: Public Domain

J-S09040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TROY EUGENE ANDERSON                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 999 WDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 9, 2022
                  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000525-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                            FILED: AUGUST 7, 2023

       Troy Eugene Anderson (“Anderson”) appeals from the order denying his

first petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

       The PCRA court provided the following factual and procedural history:

              [Anderson] incurred charges of obscene and other sexual
       materials and performances . . . [and, inter alia,] stalking . . ..
       The charges stemmed from [allegations that Anderson] . . .
       distributed a sexually explicit video and picture of the victim, K.L.,
       [Anderson’s] former girlfriend, to at least two other persons via
       the social media platform, Facebook Messenger . . ..

             [Anderson was also alleged to have] engaged in stalking
       through a course of conduct or through repeated communications
       to another person under circumstances which demonstrated or
       communicated either an intent to place the victim in reasonable
       fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to
       the victim, in that [Anderson] repeatedly attempted to contact
       K.L. by telephone calls and/or text messaging and/or social media,
____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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      and/or contacted K.L.’s friends through Facebook Messenger[,]
      indicating he ha[d] been watching her house and/or repeatedly
      drove past her residence and/or distributed sexually explicit
      images and/or videos of K.L. to numerous third parties.

                                  ****

             On October 27, 2021, [Anderson] entered a negotiated
      guilty plea whereby he pled guilty to . . . obscene and other sexual
      materials and performances . . ., and he pled guilty to . . . stalking.
      In exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to nolle pros [a count of]
      obscene and other sexual materials and performances [and a
      count of] harassment, with costs on [Anderson]. . . ..

            On January 19, 2022, [Anderson] was sentenced to an
      aggregate of sixty [] months of probation with restrictive
      conditions . . .. The [c]ourt directed [Anderson] to pay costs. No
      fines were imposed . . ..

           No post-sentence motion or direct appeal was filed.           On
      January 28, 2022, [Anderson] filed a pro se [PCRA petition.]

           On February 3, 2022, the [PCRA c]ourt appointed PCRA
      counsel . . ..

             On June 3, 2022, PCRA counsel filed a [“supplemental”
      petition asserting that the sentencing order erroneously directed
      Anderson to pay costs, when the sentencing court had not
      imposed costs, and asserting that plea- and sentencing-counsel
      was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating
      evidence or pursue defenses and for failing to present character
      reference letters].

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 6/29/22, at 3-4 (footnote and unnecessary

capitalization omitted).

      Following issuance of the Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss Anderson’s

PCRA petition without a hearing, to which Anderson filed no response, the

PCRA court dismissed the petition.       See Order, 8/9/22.      Anderson timely

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appealed. See Notice of Appeal, 9/1/22. Both Anderson and the PCRA court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

       Anderson raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Whether the lower [c]ourt committed legal error and abused
          its discretion in failing to grant PCRA relief in that the
          sentencing record reflected the sentencing [c]ourt’s intention
          not to impose any fines or costs upon [Anderson,] yet that
          representation of record has not been complied with in that the
          Probation Department is now seeking to impose a financial
          obligation upon [Anderson] in contravention of the sentencing
          intent of the [c]ourt?

       2. Whether the lower [c]ourt committed legal error and abused
          its discretion in failing to grant PCRA relief in that [Anderson]
          was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel in that defense
          counsel induced and pressured him into entering guilty pleas
          by relinquishing and waiving all available defenses and legal
          challenges to the criminal charges that would have been
          evident and available upon reasonable investigation?

Anderson’s Brief at 2.

       Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-

settled:

              Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining
       whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the
       record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
       error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the
       prevailing party in the PCRA court. We are bound by any
       credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are
       supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court’s
       legal conclusions de novo.

____________________________________________

2 In lieu of an opinion explaining its reasoning, the PCRA court directed this

Court to its June 29, 2022 Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss Anderson’s
petition without a hearing. See 1925(a) Opinion, 10/7/22, at 2.

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Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (internal citation

and quotations omitted). The PCRA petitioner “has the burden to persuade

this Court that the PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief.”

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144–45 (Pa. 2018) (internal

citations omitted).

       In his first issue, Anderson argues that the PCRA court erred in

dismissing his first claim in which he asserted the sentencing order incorrectly

memorialized the sentencing court’s statements on the record about the

imposition of costs. While this issue is not cognizable under the PCRA,3 we

note that a trial court has an inherent power to correct patent errors in the

record, and therefore the lower court could consider this claim insofar as it

was a motion to correct a patent error in the record. See Commonwealth

v. Hoover, 231 A.3d 785, 792 (Pa. 2020) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment

of the Court) (noting that, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d

57, 67 (Pa. 2007), “a trial court’s inherent power of correction encompasses

patent and obvious errors that appear on the face of an order, [and] it also

extends to such errors that emerge upon consideration of information in the

____________________________________________

3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A.  § 9543(a)(2)(i)-(viii) (providing claims eligible for relief
must arise from constitutional violations, ineffective assistance of counsel,
unlawfully induced guilty pleas, governmental obstruction of appellate rights,
newly-discovered evidence, a sentence exceeding the lawful maximum, or
proceedings that occurred in a tribunal without jurisdiction).

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contemporaneous record”); see also Commonwealth v. Borrin, 80 A.3d

1219, 1228 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating the same).

       Here, Anderson argues the lower court erred in denying him relief based

on his assertion that the sentencing order conflicted with the sentencing

court’s statements on the record at sentencing. See Anderson’s Brief at 4.

According to Anderson, “the statement made by the [c]ourt at the time of

sentencing evidenced the intent of the [c]ourt . . . to forego[] the imposition

of costs or fines in this case . . .” Id. Anderson maintains the court erred in

declining to correct the sentencing order so as to reflect the court’s statements

at sentencing.4

       The PCRA court, in concluding Anderson’s issue is meritless, explained,

that the sentencing order is consistent with its directives at sentencing, at

which time it had “expressly stated” that “costs are assessed.” Pa.R.Crim.P.

Notice, 6/29/22, at 6 (citing N.T., 1/19/22, at 9). The PCRA court additionally

notes that Anderson agreed to pay costs as part of his plea agreement. See

id. (citing N.T., 10/27/21, at 10).

____________________________________________

4 Anderson’s argument for this issue includes no citations to the record or
applicable law, and he has therefore arguably waived his issue on this basis.
See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 870 A.2d 336, 346 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(stating that “fail[ure] to discuss the issue in any substantive, meaningful
way” merits a finding of waiver). However, as the deficiencies in Anderson’s
brief have not hindered our review, we decline to find waiver.               See
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 141 A.3d 523, 525 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(concluding that “although Appellant did not comply with our appellate rules,
we find that it has not inhibited our ability to review his claim, and decline to
find waiver on that basis”).

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      Following our review, we discern no error by the PCRA court. Anderson

agreed to pay costs as part of his plea agreement. See N.T., 10/27/21, at

10. The sentencing court, per the agreement, expressly stated at sentencing,

“Costs are assessed.” N.T., 1/19/22, at 9. The sentencing order is consistent

with this. Anderson’s argument is thus meritless, and he is due no relief.

      In his second issue Anderson maintains he entered an invalid guilty plea

due to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Anderson’s Brief at 5. Generally,

to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner

must demonstrate:

      (1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) that no
      reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and
      (3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s
      error.    To prove that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a
      reasonable basis, a petitioner must prove that an alternative not
      chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than
      the course actually pursued. Regarding the prejudice prong, a
      petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
      that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different
      but for counsel’s action or inaction. Counsel is presumed to be
      effective; accordingly, to succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness[,]
      the petitioner must advance sufficient evidence to overcome this
      presumption.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). Additionally,

      [a]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a
      guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness
      caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.
      Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the
      voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice
      was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
      criminal cases. Thus, to establish prejudice, the defendant must
      show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

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      errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
      on going to trial.

Commonwealth v. Pier, 182 A.3d 476, 478–79 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal

citations, quotations, and footnote omitted).        Following successful plea

negotiations and a plea of guilty, a defendant is bound by his statements made

during the plea colloquy. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 783

(Pa. Super. 2015). “The law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased

with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required

is that his decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently

made.” Commonwealth. v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 770 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(internal citation, quotations, and brackets).    Lastly, for ineffective claims

arising from a failure to obtain character witnesses, where the PCRA petitioner

fails to identify or present any potential character witnesses, this alone is

grounds to deny relief. See Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 464

(Pa. 2015).

      The gravamen of Anderson’s second issue is that his plea- and

sentencing-counsel was ineffective “in investigating or presenting any

mitigative [sic] evidence or pursu[ing] all available defenses to challenge the

credibility of the accused [sic] and present an absolute defense to the criminal

charges.” Anderson’s Brief at 6. Anderson asserts the victim had made similar

claims against him before and withdrew them; and that the victim gave

testimony at Anderson’s preliminary hearing which contradicted her prior

messages to Anderson and prior statements to police. See id. at 7. Anderson

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further argues that counsel was ineffective for “failing to present the [c]ourt

with character reference letters provided by [Anderson] for purposes of

establishing his innocence and/or for purposes of sentencing.”              Id.

Essentially, Anderson argues that “instead of considering the viability of a

complete defense to the criminal allegations . . . defense counsel insisted upon

and advocated and facilitated his entry of guilty pleas.” Id. at 7. In sum,

according to Anderson, his guilty pleas were involuntary because they

stemmed from his attorney’s disinterest in investigating his case. Additionally,

he asserts prejudice arising from his sentencing hearing because counsel,

owing to his ineffectiveness, failed to present mitigating evidence in the form

of favorable letters from character references.

      The PCRA court considered this issue and determined it was meritless.

The PCRA court observed that Anderson was properly colloquied as to, inter

alia, the nature of the offenses, the factual basis, the permissible sentencing

ranges, his right to a trial by jury and his presumption of innocence, and that

the court would only be bound by the terms of the agreement if it accepted

the agreement. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 6/29/22, at 6-7. The PCRA

court also noted Anderson admitted culpability and filled out a written

colloquy. See id. at 7.

      Following our review, we conclude the PCRA’s decision is supported by

the record and free from legal error. Anderson affirmed in his written colloquy

that his “plea is made voluntarily . . . without any pressure . . ..” Colloquy,

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10/27/21. Anderson also stated that he understood the nature of the offenses

and that his “attorney has reviewed the charge(s) with [him] as well as the

elements of each particular crime.” Id. at ¶ 1. We also observe that in his

pro se PCRA petition, Anderson asserted that he had been aware of the

victim’s allegedly contradictory statements at the preliminary hearing and had

in fact asked plea counsel to investigate them. See Pro Se PCRA Petition,

1/28/22, at unnumbered 5. Notwithstanding his knowledge at the time of the

victim’s allegedly false and contradictory statements, Anderson pleaded guilty,

stated he had reviewed the charges with his attorney, and that he was

pleading guilty voluntarily. Anderson is bound by these statements now. See

Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 783.       Additionally, while Anderson faults plea- and

sentencing- counsel for failing to obtain favorable character reference letters,

he did not specify in his petition, or in his appellate brief, who would have

provided the letters. Accordingly, Anderson has failed to adequately plead

counsel’s ineffectiveness on these grounds, and he is due no relief.       See

Treiber, 121 A.3d at 464.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/2023

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