Court Opinion

ID: 9827279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:22:14.524707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:28.178316
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On a former day we dismissed the appeal herein because we thought the appeal was taken from a judgment not appealable. We refer to our original opinion, supra, for the particulars of the suit and reasons for dismissal.
Appellant has filed'a motion for rehearing in which it asserts that we erroneously assumed that notice of appeal was not given until ten days after entry of the final judgment, whereas in fact, it insists, that the notice of appeal was given on the day of and at the time of the rendition of the final judgment, and was a notice of appeal as to the rendition of the final judgment, and from the entire judgment.
We stated in our opinion, supra, that final judgment was entered on April 16, 1929. In this we may have been in error. The final judgment, as it appears in the transcript, does not bear any special date. It recites that the cause was called for trial April 11, 1929; that ail parties appeared and announced ready for trial; that a jury was duly impaneled, and that on April 13, 1929, they returned into court their verdict, and then proceeds to declare judgment for the plaintiff. There is no exception to, or notice of appeal from, this judgment noted in this record.
*443Both parties filed motion for judgment on the jury’s verdict on April 15, 1929.
On April 15, 1929, the same day that motion for judgment had been filed, plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which motion prayed the court to set aside the “verdict of the jury and judgment of the court herein rendered.” We naturally supposed that the judgment must have been rendered before the filing of a motion to set same aside and grant a new trial.
The record shows that the motions of the parties for judgment on the jury’s verdict came on for hearing on April 26, 1929, and that appellant’s motion was denied and that of appellee granted, to which action of the court appellant excepted, but did not give notice of appeal. On this same day appellant filed a motion for the court to reconsider its action and ruling on the motions for judgment. It was styled “Motion to Reconsider Rulings on Motion to Enter Judgment.” This motion is set out in our original opinion, supra. The judgment of the court in overruling this motion to reconsider reads:
“This 26th day of April, 1929, came on to be heard motion of the defendant to reconsider rulings on the several motions to enter judgment based on the verdict.
“The court, having considered said motion, is of the opinion that the law is against same, for which reason same should be overruled. To this ruling of the court, defendant, Postal . Telegraph Cable Company, excepts and gives notice of appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals of the Ninth Supreme Judicial District of Texas at Beaumont.
“Defendant is hereby given such time as the statute permits the court to give for the filing of its statement of facts and bills of exception.”
We have given this full statement of what the record discloses, in order that the reason for our stating, in our original opinion, that the final judgment was rendered before the action of the court, in refusing to reconsider its ruling on the appellant’s motion for judgment might be seen, and to show that the judgment appealed from was that. of the court’s ruling on the motion to reconsider, and not that of the final judgment.
We are of the opinion that, if the record be strictly construed, our judgment of dismissal was correct and that the judgment appealed from was not appealable. However, a majority of the court think that under the confused state of the record as to when the final judgment was, in fact, rendered, that the record should be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the right of appeal, and that it should be held that the intention of appellant was to appeal from the final judgment awarding plaintiff damages and, therefore, that the judgment of dismissal should be set aside and the appeal determined on its merits, which is accordingly done.
On the Merits.
Appellant’s first three propositions' assert that the court erred in not granting its motion for judgment on the verdict of the jury finding, as it contends, that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence.
The question of contributory negligence was submitted to the jury, as special issue No. 10, in these words: “Was the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence in failing to hear, if he did fail to hear, Goolsby’s calls to him?”
The jury answered: “Yes.”
Appellant, in its answer, pleaded contributory negligence on the part of appellee. Issue No. 10 was based upon the allegations of appellant that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence in “carelessly disregarding cries of warning sufficient to prevent his colliding with it; and that but for the neglect and failure of plaintiff to exert ordinary care, in looking ahead or in disregarding cries of warning, or in both respects, no injury would have occurred, to him, of any nature whatsoever.” We do not believe that said pleading raised the issue as submitted in special issue No. 10. But if so, then we say that the jury’s answer to said issue amounts, to no finding at all. The jury answered “yes.” Yes, what? Did they find that appellee heard Goolsby’s calls to him? Or did they find that appellee failed to hear Goolsby’s calls? In what particular, under the jury’s finding, was appellee guilty of negligence? The issue as •submitted, and the jury’s answer thereto, were wholly immaterial, amounted to the finding of no fact, and it was not error for the court to ignore same and render judgment for plaintiff on the jury’s other findings.
We have carefully considered all of appellant’s other assignments, and, none of them showing error, the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
Affirmed.