Court Opinion

ID: 9928178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:30.061291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:26.263376
License: Public Domain

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JESSICA ROMAN v. A&S INNERSPRINGS USA, LLC
                 (AC 46206)
                       Alvord, Elgo and Prescott, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the alleged wrongful termination
    of her employment by the defendant, which she claimed was the result
    of pregnancy discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employ-
    ment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.). The plaintiff, who previously had
    worked for the defendant, was rehired in November, 2017, in a quality
    assurance position that required her to work on the defendant’s manufac-
    turing floor. In January, 2018, the plaintiff notified the defendant that
    she was pregnant and, consequently, could no longer work in a manufac-
    turing position. Pursuant to the defendant’s policy, as set forth in its
    employee handbook, any employee who was disabled as a result of
    pregnancy was entitled to an unpaid leave of absence and the defendant
    was required to make a reasonable effort to transfer the employee to
    any suitable temporary position that was available at the time it received
    notice of the employee’s pregnancy. The plaintiff signed paperwork to
    take maternity leave on January 25, 2018. She alleged that, although there
    was an open administrative position in February, 2018, the defendant
    told her that no such position was available and encouraged her to ‘‘stay
    home and take care of the baby.’’ Between October, 2017, and October,
    2018, the defendant experienced a significant downsizing of its business,
    reducing its workforce from approximately thirty-three employees to
    fourteen. In September and October, 2018, the plaintiff reached out to
    M, the defendant’s chief executive officer, asking for a status update.
    M informed the plaintiff that the defendant was planning to hire a new
    administrative worker and that she could apply for the position, however,
    it was not yet being advertised. He encouraged her to reach out to her
    former supervisor, S, for additional information. In November, 2018, the
    plaintiff contacted S, who informed her that she could not return to her
    prior position, as the department it was in had closed and the position
    no longer existed. He noted, however, that an administrative position
    was available and that she could apply for it or meet with him to discuss
    it further. There was no evidence in the record indicating that the
    plaintiff thereafter applied to the position or contacted S for additional
    information. On May 31, 2019, the plaintiff filed an employment discrimi-
    nation complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportuni-
    ties. Thereafter, the commission issued a release of jurisdiction over
    the complaint, and the plaintiff commenced the present action against
    the defendant, claiming that it had discriminated against her by failing
    to transfer her to an administrative position in February, 2018, by termi-
    nating her employment effective October 30, 2018, and by failing to
    rehire her. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
    that the complaint was untimely pursuant to the applicable statute ((Rev.
    to 2017) § 46a-82 (f)) because none of the alleged acts of discrimination
    occurred within 180 days of the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint with
    the commission. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, and
    the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held:
1. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendant
    because it did not err in determining that the plaintiff’s claims of three
    distinct acts of pregnancy discrimination failed: the plaintiff’s claims
    that the defendant discriminated against her by failing to transfer her
    to an open administrative position in February, 2018, and by terminating
    her employment effective as of October 30, 2018, were barred by the
    statute of limitations because they were outside of the 180 day limitation
    period contained in (Rev. to 2017) § 46a-82 (f), as they occurred prior
    to December 2, 2018; moreover, although any claim that the defendant
    engaged in pregnancy discrimination by failing to rehire the plaintiff on
    or after December 2, 2018, was not barred by the statute of limitations,
    the trial court properly found that no genuine issue of material fact
    existed as to whether the plaintiff had met her burden of establishing
    a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to such failure in
    accordance with the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
    v. Green (411 U.S. 792), because, even when viewed in the light most
    favorable to the plaintiff, nothing in her email exchange with M, which
    she relied on to support her claim, demonstrated that she suffered an
    adverse employment action on or after December 2, 2018, as there was
    no evidence in the emails that the defendant had any open positions in
    January or February, 2019, or that the plaintiff had applied for any open
    positions with the defendant, and the plaintiff admitted that she had
    never asked M if she could return to work for the defendant nor did
    she apply for a job with any employer between October 30, 2018, and
    June, 2019, when she returned to school.
2. Contrary to the plaintiff’s claim, the continuing course of conduct doctrine
    did not operate to toll the limitation period set forth in (Rev. to 2017)
    § 46a-82 (f) for the acts of discrimination that allegedly occurred prior
    to December 2, 2018: the doctrine did not apply to the plaintiff’s claims
    that the defendant improperly failed to transfer her to an administrative
    position that was open in February, 2018, and terminated her employ-
    ment effective October, 2018, because that doctrine does not recognize
    an act or omission that is discrete and attributable to a fixed point in
    time and, accordingly, the plaintiff was required to file a complaint with
    the commission within the statutory limitation period that commenced
    after each act occurred; moreover, the doctrine did not apply to the
    plaintiff’s failure to rehire claim, even though her pleadings relating
    to that claim were general in nature and, when broadly construed,
    encompassed conduct that transpired before and after December 2,
    2018, because the failure to rehire was not a continuing violation and
    the plaintiff failed to establish that an adverse employment action
    occurred on or after December 2, 2018.
     Argued November 6, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024

                             Procedural History

   Action to recover damages for alleged employment
discrimination, and for other relief, brought to the Supe-
rior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the
court, Sicilian, J., granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon,
from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
   James V. Sabatini, for the appellant (plaintiff).
   Melinda B. Kaufmann, for the appellee (defendant).
                           Opinion

   ELGO, J. In this employment discrimination action,
the plaintiff, Jessica Roman, appeals from the summary
judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the
defendant, A&S Innersprings USA, LLC. On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined
that (1) no genuine issue of material fact existed as
to whether certain claims of pregnancy discrimination
were time barred, as they occurred outside the 180 day
limitation period contained in General Statutes (Rev.
to 2017) § 46a-82 (f),1 (2) the plaintiff failed to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination on her claim that
the defendant failed to rehire her on or after December
2, 2018, and (3) the continuing course of conduct doc-
trine did not toll the statute of limitations contained in
§ 46a-82 (f) with respect to any untimely claims. We
disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
   The following facts, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff, and procedural history are relevant
to this appeal. The defendant is a small business located
in Windsor Locks that manufactures innersprings for
mattresses. It employed the plaintiff as an office assis-
tant from April, 2016, to June, 2017, when she was
dismissed for cause.2 The defendant rehired the plaintiff
in November, 2017, for a quality assurance position.
That position involved various responsibilities on the
manufacturing floor, including quality inspection.
   On January 23, 2018, the plaintiff notified the defen-
dant that she was pregnant. Her pregnancy disabled her
from working in a manufacturing position. Per company
policy, as documented in the defendant’s employee
handbook, ‘‘[a]ny employee who is disabled [as] a result
of pregnancy is entitled to an unpaid leave of absence
of a reasonable duration. . . . In addition, the [defen-
dant] will make a reasonable effort to transfer a preg-
nant employee to any suitable temporary position which
may be available when the employee gives written
notice of her pregnancy . . . .’’ In her complaint filed
in this action, the plaintiff alleged that, although the
defendant had an open administrative position in Febru-
ary, 2018, it told her that no such position was available
and encouraged her to ‘‘stay home and take care of
the baby.’’3 The plaintiff signed paperwork to take a
maternity leave of absence on January 25, 2018.
  It is undisputed that, at the time of the plaintiff’s
pregnancy, the defendant experienced a significant
downsizing of its business. As the defendant’s plant
manager, Hernando Calle, stated in a sworn affidavit
dated January 31, 2022, the defendant ‘‘reduced its
workforce from approximately 33 employees in Octo-
ber 2017 to 14 employees in October 2018.’’
  On September 5, 2018, the plaintiff sent an email to
Dominik Meyer, the defendant’s chief executive officer,
in which she stated: ‘‘Hello, Hope all is well. Hope you
guys didn’t forget about me? What’s going on these
days?’’ In his September 7, 2018 email reply, Meyer
stated that he was ‘‘on vacation right now. Let us have
a chat end of September. How is everything at your side?
Hopefully you and your little one are doing [good].’’
The plaintiff sent another email to Meyer on September
17, 2018, in which she informed him that she gave birth
to her child on September 14, 2018, and that ‘‘she and
I are great . . . . I had [a] cesarean section done and
need time to recover . . . but yes I’ll be looking for-
ward to speaking with you and I’m glad you are doing
well yourself.’’
   On October 30, 2018, the plaintiff again emailed Meyer
and asked: ‘‘Can I please get an update of what’s going
on?’’ By email dated November 1, 2018, Meyer replied
in relevant part: ‘‘[F]irst of all congratulations and thank
you [for] still remembering [the defendant] . . . .
Hopefully you all are doing great. . . . We do intend
to hire a new employee for office stuff and customer
relations. But part of this job will be [Q]uick [B]ooks
work and a lot of [E]xcel tasks. In addition the new
employee needs to be present (8 hours a day and this
[is a] very constant and stable [position]). I am not sure
if you could [fulfill] the [E]xcel tasks and if you are
able to be in . . . [this] very stable [position]. Maybe
much more difficult for you with your newborn. But of
course you could send an application to [the defendant]
and [I] am sure that they will consider you. I will be
more and more out of [the defendant] so this is the
best information [I] could give to you at this time. Job
offer is not on [the Indeed website] right now [as] we
are in a very early stage.’’4 (Emphasis added.) Meyer
also encouraged the plaintiff to contact Max Schreiner,
an employee of the defendant who previously was her
quality assurance supervisor, if she had any further
questions. The plaintiff then visited the Indeed website
and found no job posting by the defendant.
  On November 14, 2018, the plaintiff sent a text mes-
sage to Schreiner and the following exchange ensued:
  ‘‘[The Plaintiff]: . . . I emailed [Meyer] and I was
told to apply for an office position that’s coming up
. . . but I told him I was confused, wondering why
would I need to apply if I was on leave of absence?
  ‘‘[Schreiner]: That sounds good. [The defendant does]
not have a quality assurance position any more. The
department has been closed. Yes. Correct. You would
have to apply for the administrative position, it is a full
time job and posted on [the Indeed website].
  ‘‘[The Plaintiff]: . . . [S]o I no longer have a job?
  ‘‘[Schreiner]: . . . [The defendant] can not offer the
same job to you as already informed, this position/
department has been cancelled/closed. I am sure you
remember the [defendant’s] situation. We only have one
position at the moment and it would be a job, 5 days
a week 8 hours each day. If you want to apply or come
and visit to talk about this position it is arrangeable.’’
  There is nothing in the record before us indicating
that the plaintiff further contacted Schreiner regarding
that position or filed an application with the defendant.
In fact, the plaintiff testified at her deposition that,
following that text message exchange with Schreiner
on November 14, 2018, she neither contacted the defen-
dant, submitted an application, nor visited the defen-
dant’s office to discuss that position. The plaintiff also
has not alleged or provided any evidence that she visited
the Indeed website at any time following that November
14, 2018 exchange.
   On May 31, 2019, the plaintiff filed an employment
discrimination complaint with the Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities (commission), in
which she alleged three distinct acts of pregnancy dis-
crimination stemming from (1) the defendant’s pur-
ported failure to transfer her to an open administrative
position in February, 2018, (2) its termination of her
employment ‘‘effective October 30, 2018,’’ and (3) its
failure to rehire her. On October 16, 2019, the commis-
sion issued a release of jurisdiction over that complaint.
   On January 14, 2020, the plaintiff commenced the
present action against the defendant. Her complaint
contains one count alleging pregnancy discrimination
in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60 (b) (7), a provi-
sion of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act
(act), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq. The allegations
of that complaint mirror those set forth in the complaint
that the plaintiff filed with the commission and aver
that the defendant failed to transfer her to an open
administrative position in February, 2018, and that it
‘‘terminated [her] employment effective October 30,
2018.’’ The plaintiff also broadly alleged that the defen-
dant ‘‘failed to rehire [her].’’ In response, the defendant
filed an answer and several special defenses. In its first
special defense, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s
complaint to the commission ‘‘was not timely filed as
required under [§] 46a-82 (f) as it does not allege action-
able conduct occurring within the 180 days preceding
the filing of the complaint with the [commission]
. . . .’’
   On January 31, 2022, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment. In its accompanying memorandum
of law, the defendant argued, inter alia, that ‘‘not a
single alleged act of discrimination occurred within 180
days’’ of the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint with the
commission, rendering it untimely. Appended to that
memorandum were several exhibits, including copies
of (1) the complaint and corresponding affidavit that
the plaintiff filed with the commission, (2) portions of
the plaintiff’s December 23, 2021 deposition testimony,
(3) portions of the defendant’s employee handbook,
(4) the sworn affidavit of Calle, (5) a series of emails
between the plaintiff and Meyer, and (6) the November
14, 2018 text message exchange between the plaintiff
and Schreiner.
   The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for sum-
mary judgment, as well as a memorandum of law and
exhibits that included portions of her deposition testi-
mony, the November 14, 2018 text message exchange
with Schreiner, and a series of emails between the plain-
tiff and Meyer. The defendant filed a reply to that objec-
tion on June 3, 2022.
   After hearing argument from the parties, the court
issued a memorandum of decision in which it concluded
that the plaintiff had not filed a timely complaint with
the commission regarding her claims that the defendant
improperly failed to transfer her to an open administra-
tive position in February, 2018, and that it improperly
terminated her employment on October 30, 2018. The
court further concluded that the plaintiff had failed to
meet her burden under the framework established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–
804, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), to make
out a prima facie case of discrimination with respect
to her claim that the defendant failed to rehire her
on or after December 2, 2018.5 Accordingly, the court
rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
and this appeal followed.
   As a preliminary matter, we note the well established
standard that governs our review of a trial court’s deci-
sion to grant a motion for summary judgment. ‘‘Practice
Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any
other proof submitted show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding
a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. . . . [T]he moving party . . . has
the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue
as to all the material facts . . . . When documents sub-
mitted in support of a motion for summary judgment
fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit
documents establishing the existence of such an issue.
. . . Once the moving party has met its burden, how-
ever, the [nonmoving] party must present evidence that
demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual
issue. . . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to
grant the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Lucenti v. Laviero, 327 Conn. 764, 772–73,
176 A.3d 1 (2018).
   Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46a-82
(f), any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged
discriminatory practice is required to file a complaint
with the commission ‘‘within one hundred and eighty
days after the alleged act of discrimination . . . .’’ As
our Supreme Court has held, compliance with that time
limit is mandatory unless ‘‘waiver, consent, or some
other compelling equitable tolling doctrine applies.’’
Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportu-
nities, 257 Conn. 258, 284, 777 A.2d 645 (2001). In the
present case, the plaintiff filed her complaint with the
commission on May 31, 2019. She concedes that, for
purposes of calculating the limitation period contained
in § 46a-82 (f), the operative date is December 2, 2018.
   Our analysis, therefore, is twofold in nature. We first
determine whether any of the acts of discrimination
alleged by the plaintiff occurred within the limitation
period circumscribed by § 46a-82 (f) and, if so, whether
the plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. We then consider the plaintiff’s claim that the
continuing course of conduct doctrine operated to toll
that statute of limitations with respect to any acts that
occurred outside that limitation period.6
                             I
  We begin with the material allegations asserted by
the plaintiff. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged three
distinct acts of pregnancy discrimination on the part
of the defendant: (1) its failure to transfer her to an
administrative position that ‘‘was open’’ in February,
2018; (2) its termination of her employment ‘‘effective
October 30, 2018’’; and (3) its failure to ‘‘rehire’’ her.
                             A
   The first two alleged acts of discrimination occurred
prior to December 2, 2018, and, thus, plainly are outside
the time limitation of § 46a-82 (f). The plaintiff does
not argue otherwise in this appeal. Accordingly, her
claims with respect to the defendant’s failure to transfer
her to an open administrative position in February,
2018, and its termination of her employment ‘‘effective
October 30, 2018,’’ are barred by that statute of limita-
tions.
                             B
  More nuanced is our analysis of the third act of dis-
crimination alleged by the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not
specify any date on which that act allegedly occurred
but, rather, simply stated in paragraph 27 of her com-
plaint: ‘‘The defendant failed to rehire the plaintiff.’’7
To the extent that the defendant’s purported failure to
rehire the plaintiff occurred prior to December 2, 2018,
the plaintiff’s claim is time barred.
  At the same time, we are mindful that ‘‘a court, in
deciding a motion for summary judgment, must view
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party . . . .’’ Peek v. Manchester Memorial Hospital,
342 Conn. 103, 114, 269 A.3d 24 (2022). We therefore
cannot presume that the plaintiff intended to confine
her failure to rehire allegation to events occurring prior
to December 2, 2018, but, rather, must construe her
allegation broadly to also encompass events occurring
on or after that date. To the extent that the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant failed to rehire her on or
after December 2, 2018, we conclude that her claim is
not barred by the statute of limitations contained in
§ 46a-82 (f).
                             C
  The question, then, is whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether the plaintiff met her
burden under the framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. 802–804, to
make out a prima facie case of discrimination with
respect to her claim that the defendant failed to rehire
her on or after December 2, 2018. We conclude that
the trial court properly answered that question in the
negative.
   ‘‘The framework this court employs in assessing . . .
discrimination claims under Connecticut law was
adapted from the United States Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, [supra] 411
U.S. 792 . . . . Under the McDonnell Douglas Corp.
burden shifting analysis, the employee must first make
a prima facie case of discrimination. . . . The
employer may then rebut the prima facie case by stating
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for the
employment decision in question. . . . The employee
then must demonstrate that the reason proffered by
the employer is merely a pretext and that the decision
actually was motivated by illegal discriminatory bias.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Rossova v. Charter Communications, LLC, 211 Conn.
App. 676, 684–85, 273 A.3d 697 (2022).
   With respect to the initial burden under that frame-
work, ‘‘a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of inten-
tional discrimination by showing that (1) [she] is a mem-
ber of a protected class; (2) [she] was qualified for
the position [she] held; (3) [she] suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) the adverse action took
place under circumstances giving rise to [an] inference
of discrimination.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir. 2012);
see also Sosa v. Robinson, 200 Conn. App. 264, 290, 239
A.3d 1228 (2020). We focus our attention on the question
of whether the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment
action on or after December 2, 2018.
   In her objection to the motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff argued that, although the defendant had
‘‘terminated [her] employment effective October 30,
2018,’’ she ‘‘continued to communicate with the defen-
dant about being brought to work following her mater-
nity leave of absence. In January, 2019, [she] was com-
municating with the defendant about returning to work.
. . . The communication continued into February,
2019.’’ (Citation omitted.) As evidence of that communi-
cation, the plaintiff attached a series of emails between
her and Meyer as an exhibit to her objection. As the
court noted in its memorandum of decision, ‘‘[d]uring
oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that the only evidence
the plaintiff claims to give rise to a disputed issue of
fact as to the plaintiff’s claim that she continued to seek
employment through February, 2019, is a series of email
communications contained in [an exhibit] attached to
the plaintiff’s objection to the motion for summary judg-
ment. Counsel acknowledged that there is no deposition
testimony, affidavit, or other evidence relevant to that
issue.’’ Those emails, therefore, require close scrutiny.
    The email exchange between the plaintiff and Meyer
began when Meyer reached out to the plaintiff on Janu-
ary 24, 2019, to inquire on her ‘‘status right now.’’8 When
she responded on January 28, 2019, the plaintiff stated:
‘‘I am very well recovered from the cesarean section,
[my daughter] and I are doing great, thanks for asking.
Nothing happened between [Schreiner] and I? My status
lately is that I am currently seeking employment and
considering going back to school. Congratulations!
That’s exciting. . . . Costa Rica huh, nice choice. I will
definitely consider it.’’
  Meyer replied to that email the next morning and the
following exchange transpired:
  ‘‘[Meyer]: . . . [Y]ou did not speak with [Schreiner]?
Why not? But nevertheless: What are you looking for?
Full-Time, Halftime, Working times? Maybe [I] can
help. . . .
  ‘‘[The Plaintiff]: . . . Are you currently in the [United
States]? I’m looking for full time but, I would like to
speak with you in person. . . .
  ‘‘[Meyer]: . . . [I] will be in the [United States] in
two weeks . . . . Of course we can speak in person -
as always [I] am quite sure that we will figure out some-
thing . . . . You said back to school. What in specific
you were thinking of? . . .
   ‘‘[The Plaintiff]: I actually wanted to move towards
growing on the experience I already have, I was looking
into bookkeeping because I would train in administra-
tive work and also accounting. What do you think? . . .
   ‘‘[Meyer]: . . . [L]et’s speak in detail about this when
[I] am back . . . . Maybe you can prepare something
and [I] can give you feedback. Until then keep [your]
head high and all the best for your kids and especially
the newborn.’’
  On February 12, 2019, Meyer again reached out to
the plaintiff and stated: ‘‘I am here this week. So if good
for you to meet. Let’s discuss.’’ The plaintiff and Meyer
then agreed to meet on Friday, February 15, 2019. On
that date, the plaintiff emailed Meyer and stated: ‘‘I will
not be able to see you today, would Monday be okay
to meet?’’ The following exchange then occurred
through email:
  ‘‘[Meyer]: . . . [I] have an appointment on [M]onday
and fly out on [Monday] as well. Will be back in [M]arch
otherwise. . . .
  ‘‘[The Plaintiff]: . . . Until what time will you be
there today? . . .
  ‘‘[Meyer]: 16:30 approximately.
  ‘‘[The Plaintiff]: Okay.
  ‘‘[Meyer]: [O]therwise Sunday. Nobody is working
today (in production) anyhow.’’
  The plaintiff did not respond further to Meyer that Fri-
day.
   On the afternoon of Saturday, February 16, 2019, the
plaintiff emailed Meyer and stated: ‘‘I’ll meet you tomor-
row, what time works for you?’’ In an email sent at 5:44
p.m. the next day, Meyer stated: ‘‘[I] was in Boston
today. So not in the office. I was waiting on Friday as
I expected you to come in. What happened?’’ No further
correspondence between the plaintiff and Meyer is
included in the materials submitted by the plaintiff.
   Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, nothing in the foregoing email exchange dem-
onstrates that she suffered an adverse employment
action on or after December 2, 2018. In those emails,
the plaintiff indicated that she was contemplating both
a return to work and ‘‘going back to school’’ and that
she would welcome Meyer’s feedback in this regard.
In his responses, Meyer expressed a willingness to meet
with the plaintiff and confirmed a date on which to do
so. Those emails further indicate that the plaintiff did
not attend the meeting scheduled on Friday, February
15, 2019, and did not respond to Meyer when he asked
‘‘[w]hat happened?’’
  There also is no indication in those emails—or any
of the materials submitted in connection with the
motion for summary judgment—that the defendant had
any open positions in January or February, 2019, or
that the plaintiff applied for any positions with the
defendant. To the contrary, the plaintiff admitted, in
her December 23, 2021 deposition, that she never asked
Meyer if she could come back to work for the defendant
and that she did not apply for a job with any employer
between October 30, 2018, and June, 2019, when she
returned to school.
   In light of the foregoing, we conclude that no genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether the plaintiff
met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that she suffered an adverse
employment action with respect to the defendant’s fail-
ure to rehire her on or after December 2, 2018.
                            II
  The plaintiff also claims that the continuing course
of conduct doctrine applies in the present case and
operates to toll the statute of limitations contained in
§ 46a-82 (f) for acts of discrimination that occurred
outside its limitation period. We do not agree.
   Our decisional law recognizes that ‘‘[t]he question
of whether a party’s claim is barred by the statute of
limitations is a question of law, which this court reviews
de novo. . . . The issue, however, of whether a party
engaged in a continuing course of conduct that tolled
the running of the statute of limitations is a mixed
question of law and fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon,
207 Conn. App. 707, 754–55, 264 A.3d 130, cert. denied,
340 Conn. 911, 264 A.3d 94 (2021). Whether the continu-
ing course of conduct doctrine properly may be applied
in a given context is a legal question distinct from the
factual question of whether a party engaged in such
conduct in a particular instance. Our review of that
question of law is plenary. See, e.g., State v. Campbell,
328 Conn. 444, 477 n.11, 180 A.3d 882 (2018).
   ‘‘The continuing course of conduct doctrine operates
to delay the commencement of the running of an other-
wise applicable statute of limitations.’’ Tunick v.
Tunick, 201 Conn. App. 512, 535, 242 A.3d 1011 (2020),
cert. denied, 336 Conn. 910, 244 A.3d 561 (2021); see
also Handler v. Remington Arms Co., 144 Conn. 316,
321, 130 A.2d 793 (1957) (‘‘[w]hen the wrong sued upon
consists of a continuing course of conduct, the statute
does not begin to run until that course of conduct is
completed’’). The doctrine ‘‘reflects the policy that, dur-
ing an ongoing relationship, lawsuits are premature
because specific tortious acts or omissions may be diffi-
cult to identify and may yet be remedied.’’9 (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Martinelli v. Fusi, 290 Conn.
347, 356, 963 A.2d 640 (2009).
   As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘‘the continuing
course of conduct doctrine recognizes that the act or
omission that commences the limitation period may not
be discrete and attributable to a fixed point in time.
[T]he doctrine is generally applicable under circum-
stances where [i]t may be impossible to pinpoint the
exact date of a particular negligent act or omission that
caused injury or where the negligence consists of a
series of acts or omissions and it is appropriate to allow
the course of [action] to terminate before allowing the
repose section of the [limitation period] to run . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Essex Ins. Co. v.
William Kramer & Associates, LLC, 331 Conn. 493,
503, 205 A.3d 534 (2019); cf. Watts v. Chittenden, 301
Conn. 575, 588–89, 22 A.3d 1214 (2011) (alleged violation
‘‘would not be deemed continuing’’ when acts of dis-
crimination are discrete and ‘‘readily calculable without
waiting for the entire series of acts to end’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
   ‘‘Connecticut antidiscrimination statutes should be
interpreted in accordance with federal antidiscrimina-
tion laws.’’ Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn.
390, 407, 944 A.2d 925 (2008). The courts of this state
thus ‘‘look to federal law for guidance in interpreting
state employment discrimination law, and analyze
claims under [the act, the state counterpart to Title VII]
in the same manner as federal courts evaluate federal
discrimination claims.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc., 335 Conn. 426,
438 n.5, 238 A.3d 716 (2020); see also Commission on
Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambu-
lance, 322 Conn. 154, 160, 140 A.3d 190 (2016) (‘‘[w]e
. . . have recognized that our legislature’s intent, in
general, was to make [the act] complement the provi-
sions of Title VII’’); Pik-Kwik Stores, Inc. v. Commis-
sion on Human Rights & Opportunities, 170 Conn.
327, 331, 365 A.2d 1210 (1976) (‘‘[a]lthough the language
of [Title VII] and that of the [act] differ slightly, it is
clear that the intent of the legislature . . . was to make
the Connecticut statute coextensive with the federal’’).
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has held
that federal law ‘‘precludes recovery for discrete acts
of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the
statutory time period.’’ National Railroad Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 153
L. Ed. 2d 106 (2002); see also Jackson v. Water Pollution
Control Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 706 n.12, 900 A.2d
498 (2006) (quoting National Railroad Passenger Corp.
v. Morgan, supra, 114, for proposition that each discrete
incident of discrimination constitutes separate unlawful
employment practice).
    The United States Supreme Court has further
explained that a discrete discriminatory act is one that
‘‘ ‘occurred’ on the day that it ‘happened.’ A party, there-
fore, must file a [complaint] within [the statutory limita-
tion period] or lose the ability to recover for it.’’
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, supra,
536 U.S. 110. Accordingly, ‘‘discrete discriminatory acts
are not actionable if time barred, even when they are
related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each
discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing
charges alleging that act. The [complaint], therefore,
must be filed within the [statutory limitation] period
after the discrete discriminatory act occurred.’’ Id., 113.
Discrete acts in the employment discrimination context
include ‘‘termination, failure to promote, denial of trans-
fer, or refusal to hire . . . .’’ Id., 114; accord Hurley v.
Naugatuck Board of Education, Superior Court, judi-
cial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-
S (July 22, 2016) (‘‘Discrete acts such as termination,
failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire
are individual acts that occur at a fixed time . . . .
Accordingly, plaintiffs alleging such discriminatory
action must exhaust the administrative process regard-
less of any relationship that may exist between those
discrete claims and any others.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)).
   In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged two discrete
discriminatory acts with specificity—that the defendant
failed to transfer her to an administrative position that
‘‘was open’’ in February, 2018, and that it terminated
her employment ‘‘effective October 30, 2018.’’ Those
pleadings demonstrate that, with respect to both acts,
it was not ‘‘impossible to pinpoint the exact date of a
particular negligent act or omission that caused injury
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Essex Ins.
Co. v. William Kramer & Associates, LLC, supra, 331
Conn. 503. Accordingly, to properly exhaust her admin-
istrative remedies, the plaintiff was obligated to file a
complaint with the commission within the statutory
limitation period after each of those discrete discrimina-
tory acts occurred. See National Railroad Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, supra, 536 U.S. 113. We therefore
conclude that the continuing course of conduct doctrine
has no application with respect to those discrete acts.
   The continuing course of conduct doctrine likewise
does not apply to the plaintiff’s failure to rehire claim.
We recognize that her pleadings as to that alleged act
of discrimination are general in nature and, broadly
construed, encompass conduct that transpired both
before and after December 2, 2018. See part I B of this
opinion. While an employer’s failure to rehire a plaintiff
can constitute an adverse employment action, it ‘‘does
not constitute a continuing violation . . . . Each
alleged discriminatory [act] constitutes a separate and
completed act by the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Jackson v. Water Pollution Control
Authority, supra, 278 Conn. 706 n.12; see also Morris
v. Cabela’s Wholesale, Inc., 486 Fed. Appx. 701, 704
(10th Cir. 2012) (concluding that ‘‘[the defendant’s]
alleged retaliatory failure to rehire [the plaintiff] was a
discrete act’’); Boge v. Ringland-Johnson-Crowley Co.,
976 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 1992) (‘‘[A]n employer’s fail-
ure to recall or rehire does not constitute a continuing
violation . . . . Each alleged discriminatory recall
constitutes a separate and completed act by the defen-
dant, which triggers a new [statutory limitation]
period.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Berry v.
Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 980 (5th
Cir. 1983) (defendant’s ‘‘failure to rehire was a discrete
act which was not part of a continuing violation’’); Ever-
ett v. 357 Corp., 453 Mass. 585, 606–607, 904 N.E.2d
733 (2009) (‘‘the failure to rehire an employee is consid-
ered a discrete, separate act that does not draw other
allegedly discriminatory acts into its scope’’).
  As the United States Supreme Court has held, ‘‘dis-
crete acts that fall within the statutory time period do
not make timely [those] acts that fall outside the time
period.’’ National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
supra, 536 U.S. 112. In applying the continuing course
of conduct doctrine, the Connecticut Supreme Court
likewise has held that ‘‘at some point there must be a
limitation on the ability to file an action to recover for
such conduct. Therefore, in such cases, if no conduct
has occurred within the [statutory limitation period],
the plaintiff will be barred from recovering for the prior
actions . . . .’’ Watts v. Chittenden, supra, 301 Conn.
596; see also Burnam v. Amoco Container Co., 755 F.2d
893, 894 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (‘‘a failure to
rehire subsequent to an allegedly discriminatory firing,
absent a new and discrete act of discrimination in the
refusal to rehire itself, cannot resurrect the old discrimi-
natory act’’). For that reason, the plaintiff’s invocation
of the continuing course of conduct doctrine is unavail-
ing with respect to her failure to rehire claim, as she
has not established that an adverse employment action
occurred on or after December 2, 2018. See part I C of
this opinion.
   We conclude that the continuing course of conduct
doctrine does not operate to toll the statutory limitation
period of § 46a-82 (f) for acts of discrimination that
allegedly occurred prior to December 2, 2018. The court,
therefore, properly rendered summary judgment in
favor of the defendant.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 46a-82 (f) provides in relevant part
that ‘‘[a]ny complaint filed pursuant to this section must be filed within one
hundred and eighty days after the alleged act of discrimination . . . .’’
Hereinafter, all references in this opinion are to the 2017 revision of the stat-
ute.
   2
     Appended to the defendant’s memorandum of law in support of its
motion for summary judgment were a disciplinary report dated June 27,
2017, regarding a written warning that the defendant issued to the plaintiff
for insubordination, poor attitude, and ‘‘not performing assigned duties,’’
and a document memorializing the plaintiff’s termination of employment
with the defendant as of June 29, 2017.
   3
     The defendant submitted portions of the plaintiff’s December 23, 2021
deposition testimony in support of its motion for summary judgment. In
that testimony, the plaintiff stated that, at the time that she informed the
defendant of her pregnancy, there were no administrative positions available
with the defendant. She further conceded that, although an office manager
position opened in February, 2018, she was not fully qualified for that posi-
tion.
   4
     ‘‘Indeed.com is a website designed to be a resource for job seekers. It
includes job postings, salary averages, and a forum where employees and
applicants can discuss a company’s work environment.’’ Alaska Structures,
Inc. v. Hedlund, 180 Wn. App. 591, 595, 323 P.3d 1082 (2014), review denied,
184 Wn. 2d 1026, 364 P.3d 119 (2016).
   5
     December 2, 2018, was 180 days before May 31, 2019, the date the plaintiff
filed her complaint with the commission. In the absence of any tolling, her
complaint, therefore, would be untimely as to any acts of discrimination
that occurred prior to December 2, 2018.
   6
     At no time has the plaintiff alleged that waiver, consent, or some other
equitable tolling applies in the present case. Rather, her claim is that the
continuing course of conduct doctrine applies.
   7
     In paragraphs 22 and 23 of her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that she
‘‘contacted the defendant in October, 2018, about returning to work’’ and
that, ‘‘[i]n October, 2018, the defendant told [her] that she could apply for
a job.’’
   8
     The full email from Meyer states: ‘‘[H]ow is everything and how is your
little baby girl doing? Hopefully everything is fine and you recovered well
from your cesarean section. As [I] have written [Schreiner] left [the defen-
dant] end of December. Did you [speak] together or did something happened
between you two before he left? [Calle] could not tell me, as he seems to
have not been in contact. For your information: I will (need to) take over
again the operations in [the defendant] from now on. So please keep me
updated what is the / your status right now? Btw.: I have been married in
August and was on honeymoon in December 2018 to Costa Rica. If you ever
have the chance to go to Costa Rica - you should. Lovely country.’’
   9
     As this court has observed, ‘‘the continuing course of conduct doctrine
is one classically applicable to causes of action in tort . . . .’’ Fradianni
v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 145 Conn. App. 90, 100 n.9, 73 A.3d 896, cert.
denied, 310 Conn. 934, 79 A.3d 888 (2013). Our Supreme Court likewise
has ‘‘recognized the continuing course of conduct doctrine in many cases
involving claims sounding in negligence. For instance, we have recognized
the continuing course of conduct doctrine in claims of medical malpractice.
. . . [It] has also been applied to other claims of professional negligence
in this state.’’ (Citations omitted.) Watts v. Chittenden, 301 Conn. 575, 583–84,
22 A.3d 1214 (2011); see also id., 596 (holding that continuing course of
conduct doctrine applies to intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim).
   In addition, our Supreme Court has explained that, when a plaintiff’s
complaint adequately apprises a defendant that the plaintiff is alleging a
theory of ‘‘continued discrimination’’ on the part of the defendant, ‘‘discrete
incidents occurring during a continuum of discriminatory employment prac-
tices may constitute fresh violations’’ of the act. (Emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Commission on Human Rights & Oppor-
tunities, 211 Conn. 464, 473, 559 A.2d 1120 (1989). In this appeal, the defen-
dant has not argued that the continuing course of conduct doctrine does
not apply to employment discrimination claims pursuant to § 46a-60 or
that the plaintiff’s complaint did not provide adequate notice that she was
pursuing a continuing course of conduct claim.