Court Opinion

ID: 6326570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-03-24 17:06:25.505964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.959682
License: Public Domain

138 Nev.., Advance Opinion I I
                           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                    MICHAEL PHILLIP ANSELMO,                              No. 81382
                    Appellant,
                    vs.
                    THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                                                                            FLÍ
                    Respondent.

                                                                             EF DEPUTY CLERK

                               Appeal from a district court order dismissing a postconviction
                    petition for genetic marker analysis. Second Judicial District Court,
                    Washoe County; Lynne K. Simons, Judge.
                               Reversed and remanded with instructions.

                    Holland & Hart LLP and Sydney R. Gambee, J. Robert Smith, and Jessica
                    E. Whelan, Las Vegas; Rocky Mountain Innocence Center and Jennifer
                    Springer, Salt Lake City, Utah,
                    for Appellant.

                    Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks,
                    District Attorney, and Marilee Cate, Appellate Deputy District Attorney,
                    Washoe County,
                    for Respondent.

                    BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, CADISH, PICKERING, and
                    HERNDON, JJ.

                                                  OPINION

                    By the Court, CADISH, J.:
                               This appeal presents issues concerning Nevada's statutory
                    scheme governing postconviction petitions for genetic marker analysis. A
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                       jury convicted appellant of first-degree murder in 1972. In 2018, he filed a
                       postconviction petition for genetic marker analysis, seeking to examine the
                       DNA found on various pieces of evidence under a procedure that was not
                       available at the time of his trial. The district court concluded that appellant
                       failed to show a reasonable possibility that the State would not have tried
                       him, or the jury would not have convicted him, had he obtained exculpatory
                       evidence through the testing because the jury heard similar exculpatory
                       evidence but nevertheless convicted him.
                                   Under NRS 176.09183(1), the district court must assume that
                       the requested genetic marker analysis will produce exculpatory DNA
                       evidence and order such analysis if a reasonable possibility exists that the
                       petitioner would not have faced prosecution or conviction had the
                       exculpatory results been obtained before trial. Applying that statute to the
                       facts here, we conclude that the district court acted outside the bounds of
                       its discretion in denying appellant's petition, as the State tried appellant on
                       a felony-murder theory based on rape and DNA evidence that would have
                       excluded appellant as the perpetrator necessarily creates a reasonable
                       possibility that he would not have faced prosecution or conviction for felony-
                       murder.
                                   Additionally, the existence or nonexistence of evidence relevant
                       to the claims in the petition for genetic marker analysis necessarily impacts
                       the district court's resolution of the petition. Thus, to the extent the
                       custodian's inventory of evidence merely described the packaging holding
                       the evidence in the State's possession, rather than the items of evidence
                       contained therein, we agree with appellant that the inventory lacked
                       sufficient detail for the district court to determine whether the evidence on
                       which appellant sought testing existed. Consequently, appellant's motion

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                  for relief as to the inventory should have been granted. Accordingly, we
                  reverse the district court's order and remand for further proceedings.
                                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                              The female victim disappeared from a hotel employee parking
                  lot near the Cal-Neva Lodge at Lake Tahoe on July 15, 1971. Two days
                  later, appellant Michael Anselmo found the victim's body and reported it to
                  the police. The responding officers noted that the victim was nude. Several
                  days later, Anselmo told the police where they could find the victim's jacket
                  and keys, which the police recovered.
                              After conducting an autopsy, the coroner concluded that the
                  victim died from strangulation. He further concluded that the perpetrator
                  manually strangled the victim with his right hand. The perpetrator also
                  stabbed the victim 15 times, which the coroner concluded was a contributing
                  cause of death. The autopsy revealed evidence of sexual assault, and the
                  coroner recovered semen from the victim. The semen did not contain any
                  sperm, which indicated that either the male supplier was sterile or had a
                  vasectomy, or the sperm degenerated before the victim's body was found.
                              Several officers interviewed Anselmo at different times.
                  Throughout those interrogations, Anselmo asserted that another
                  individual, John Soares, killed the victim. During an interview on July 18,
                  Anselmo went into a comatose state and law enforcement transported him
                  to the hospital. After the hospital discharged Anselmo, Detective Gordon
                  Jenkins interrogated him. While AnseImo initially reaffirmed that Soares
                  committed the murder, he eventually confessed to the crime. The State
                  charged Anselmo with first-degree murder.
                              At trial, the State argued that Anselmo committed first-degree
                  murder under the felony-murder rule. Specifically, the State introduced
                  evidence that the victim had sexual intercourse between 12 and 24 hours
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(0) 1947A 132 Nev. 655, 660,
                 376 P.3d 802, 806 (2016). When interpreting a statute, we look to the
                 statutes plain language. Id. If a statutes plain language is unambiguous,
                 we enforce the statute as written. Id.
                              As relevant here, a court must order a genetic marker analysis
                 if it finds that
                                    (a) The evidence to be analyzed exists;
                                    (b) Except as otherwise provided in
                              subsection 2, the evidence was not previously
                              subjected to a genetic marker analysis, including,
                              without limitation, because such an analysis was
                              not available at the time of trial; and
                                    (c) One or more of the following situations
                              applies:
                                         (1) A reasonable possibility exists that
                                    the petitioner would not have been
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                                    prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results
                                    had been obtained through a genetic marker
                                    analysis of the evidence identified in the
                                    petition . . .
                 NRS 176.09183(1) (emphasis added). The plain language of the statute
                 requires the district court first to assume that the genetic marker evidence
                 would be exculpatory and then ask whether there is a "reasonable
                 possibility" that the petitioner would not have been convicted or prosecuted
                 in light of the exculpatory genetic marker evidence.] Such an interpretation
                 is consistent with the statutory scheme, as the results of the genetic marker
                 testing must be "favorable to the petitionee for the petitioner to then move
                 for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, NRS 176.09187, and is
                 consistent with other jurisdictions interpretations of analogous statutes,
                 see, e.g., Lambert v. State, 435 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018)
                 ("Importantly, the defendant need not show any likelihood that the DNA
                 results will actually be favorable to his claim of innocence. Instead, he need
                 only show that, assuming the results are as favorable as the defendant has
                 shown they could be, these favorable results would raise a reasonable
                 probability that the outcome of the defendanes trial would be different."
                 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)).
                              The "reasonable possibilitf standard is satisfied if there is "a
                 real possibility that the [exculpatory] evidence would have affected the

                       1The   governing statute does not require the petitioner to show, or
                 even assert, that he is actually innocent of the crime. Instead, the petition
                 need only explain " [t]he rationale for why a reasonable possibility exists
                 that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if
                 exculpatory results had been obtained through a genetic marker analysis
                 of' the identified evidence. NRS 176.0918(3)(b).
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                 result."2 Roberts v. State, 110 Nev. 1121, 1132, 881 P.2d 1, 8 (1994)
                 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other
                 grounds by Foster v. State, 116 Nev. 1088, 13 P.3d 61 (2000); cf James v.
                 State, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 38, 492 P.3d 1, 5 (2021) (concluding that a
                 reasonable possibility does not exist "[w]hen the results of the analysis
                 would be irrelevant to the States theory of the crime or the defendant's
                 defense). The first theory the State proposed in closing arguments was
                 felony murder based on rape. While the State also presented a willful,
                 deliberate, and premeditated theory as an alternative, the jury returned a
                 general guilty verdict. Thus, the jury could have convicted Anselmo on the
                 felony-murder theory based on the rape of the victim. Therefore, genetic
                 marker evidence that definitively excludes Anselmo as the supplier of the
                 semen recovered from the victim creates a reasonable possibility that the
                 jury would not have convicted Anselmo because it directly contradicts the
                 States felony-murder theory. Moreover, as Anselmo points out, genetic
                 material recovered from under the victim's fingernails would allow a jury to
                 infer that the victim fought back against the perpetrator and, if analyzed
                 and shown to be exculpatory, would create a reasonable possibility that the
                 jury would not have convicted Anselmo, as it supports the defense theory
                 that another individual assaulted the victim.
                            The States contrary arguments are not persuasive. While the
                 State asserts that the jury considered and rejected similarly exculpatory
                 evidence, the evidence it identifies is not the same as the presumed

                      2 1n analyzing whether this standard is met, we look at the actual
                 charge of which the petitioner stands convicted, which is first-degree
                 murder. No party has argued that we should look at whether Anselmo
                 would have been prosecuted or convicted of any crime as opposed to the
                 crime the State chose to prosecute and of which the jury convicted him.
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                       exculpatory evidence the genetic marker analysis would produce. For
                       example, the State points out that the pathologist testified that the semen
                       may not have been AnseImes due to the lack of sperm. But that testimony
                       still allowed the jury to conclude that Anselmo may have provided the DNA,
                       and indeed, the State argued that Anselmo was the source of the semen and
                       that the sperm had simply degenerated. NRS 176.091.83, however, requires
                       the district court to assume that the DNA evidence would exclude Anselmo,
                       and thus, the jury would have received evidence that the semen was not
                       from Anselmo. Moreover, the fact that the State had other circumstantial
                       evidence of Anselmes guilt does not preclude a reasonable-possibility
                       finding because the district court must ask only whether there is a real
                       possibility that the jury would not have convicted Anselmo if it had
                       exculpatory genetic marker testing results.3

                             3The   State argues that the principle of judicial estoppel provides
                       additional support for the district court's dismissal of Anselmes petition
                       because Anselmo allegedly took an inconsistent position in a Pardons Board
                       hearing. judicial estoppel applies if, among other things, the same party
                       takes two different positions in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative
                       proceedings. Marcuse v. Del Webb Cmtys., Inc., 123 Nev. 278, 287, 163 P.3d
                       462, 468-69 (2007). However, the State provides no authority or analysis to
                       support the proposition that a Pardons Board hearing is a quasi-judicial
                       proceeding for purposes of applying judicial estoppel and instead assumes
                       that it is. Because not every administrative hearing is quasi-judicial, see
                       State ex rel. Bd. of Parole Comrn'rs v. Morrow, 127 Nev. 265, 273-74, 255
                       P.3d 224, 229-30 (2011) (adopting the judicial functions test to determine
                       when an administrative hearing is a quasi-judicial hearing), and it is not
                       obvious that a Pardons Board hearing would qualify, we conclude that the
                       State's argument is not cogent, and thus, we need not consider it, Maresca
                       v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (concluding that this court
                       need not address issues not cogently argued and supported by relevant
                       authority).
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                  The district court abused its discretion when it concluded that the State's
                  inventory was sufficient
                              Anselmo argues that the States inventory of the evidence was
                  insufficient because it lacked sufficient detail to identify the evidence
                  remaining in the State's custody. We agree to the extent that the inventory
                  described the packaging of some of the items of evidence as opposed to the
                  actual evidence contained within it.4
                              Reviewing the district court's interpretation of NRS
                  176.0918(4) de novo, Washington, 132 Nev. at 660, 376 P.3d at 806, we
                  conclude that an inventory that describes only the packaging in which the
                  evidence is contained, as opposed to the actual evidence, is insufficient. The
                  purpose of making postconviction genetic testing available to a convicted
                  felon is to evaluate evidence that may contain genetic marker information
                  pertinent to the investigation and prosecution that led to the conviction,
                  NRS 176.0918(1), and to that end, NRS 176.0918(4)(c)(2) requires the State
                  to provide a detailed list "of all evidence relevant to the claims in the

                        4The State argues that we lack jurisdiction to review the district court
                  order denying Anselmo's motion regarding the sufficiency of the inventory
                  because (1) the inventory order is not a final judgment and (2) the evidence
                  custodians are not parties to this appeal. Neither argument is persuasive.
                  While the inventory order is not a final judgment, we may review "any
                  decision of the [district] court in an intermediate order or proceeding,
                  forming a part of the record." NRS 177.045. Further, because we have the
                  statutory authority to review an order denying a petition for genetic marker
                  testing, NRS 176.09183(6), we may likewise review this intermediate
                  decision pertaining to the allegedly insufficient evidence inventory.
                  Moreover, NRS 176.0918(4)(c) gives the district court the authority to order
                  each evidence custodian to provide an inventory of all relevant evidence.
                  Thus, should we conclude that the evidence inventories are insufficient, we
                  can instruct the district court to exercise its authority over the evidence
                  custodians to require that the custodians provide sufficiently detailed
                  inventories of the evidence.
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                       petition . . . that may be subjected to genetic marker analysis." Here, the
                       inventory, while sufficiently detailed regarding some pieces of evidence,
                       described the containers of other pieces of evidence as opposed to the
                       evidence itself. For example, the inventory described some pieces of
                       evidence as "small paper canister," "film canister," and "one cardboard
                       'FONDA ONE PINT U.S. LIQUID MEASURE canister." The inventory as
                       to those pieces of evidence does not satisfy the statutory directive to produce
                       an inventory of relevant evidence that may be tested because the district
                       court cannot determine what evidence is inside a "small paper canister" or
                       "film canistee for purposes of evaluating its relevancy or whether it should
                       be tested. Accordingly, the district court improperly denied Anselrno's
                       motion for an order to show cause related to the insufficient evidence
                       inventory. See Club Vista Fin. Servs., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
                       128 Nev. 224, 228, 276 P.3d 246, 249 (2012) (noting that discovery orders
                       are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion); cf State v. Nye, 136 Nev.
                       421, 423-25, 468 P.3d 369, 371-72 (2020) (holding, in the context of an
                       inventory search, that an inventory was insufficient because it did not detail
                       all the contents of the defendant's bag).
                                   The States contrary arguments are not persuasive. First, the
                       crux of the States argument is that there is no statutory requirement that
                       evidence custodians must open or manipulate sealed containers until the
                       district court orders testing of an item in that container. However, the
                       district court can only order testing if it finds "Mlle evidence to be analyzed
                       exists." NRS 176.09183(1)(a). The district court cannot determine whether
                       relevant evidence exists if the inventory merely describes the evidence

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container, e.g., "film canister," as opposed to the evidence itse1f.5 Similarly,
the State's argument that it need not open a sealed container until the court
orders that item to be tested lacks merit, as such an interpretation would
frustrate the detailed statutory scheme that requires the inventory after
the petition meets the requirements and then allows a hearing for the court
to determine exactly which, if any, pieces of evidence it should order to be
tested. See NRS 176.0918(4)(c); NRS 176.09183(1)(a).
                               CONCLUSION
            When determining whether to grant a petition for genetic
marker analysis under NRS 176.09183(1)(a), the district court must assume
that the analysis will produce exculpatory evidence and then ask whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the petitioner would not have been
tried or convicted due to that exculpatory evidence. Further, an. evidence
custodian's inventory of evidence is insufficient if it merely describes the
packaging in which evidence is contained as opposed to the evidence within.
On the record before us, the district court abused its discretion by denying
Anselmo's petition for genetic marker analysis because he showed a

      5At   oral argument before this court, the State expressed concern that
 opening the sealed items may affect the chain of custody. However, opening
 and testing of evidence in sealed containers does not break the chain of
 custody as long as the evidence custodians follow their established
•procedures for handling evidence. See Burns v. Sheriff, 92 Nev. 533, 534-
 35, 554 P.2d 257, 258 (1976) (concluding that the chain of custody was
 established when the arresting officer testified that he placed the evidence
 in a sealed and initialed envelope in the evidence locker, and the chemist
 testified that she retrieved the sealed envelope from the evidence locker,
 opened the envelope and tested the evidence within it, and then placed the
 evidence back in the evidence vault in a newly resealed and initialed
 envelope).

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reasonable possibility that, assuming exculpatory results, the jury would
not have convicted him. The district court also abused its discretion when
it concluded the inventory was sufficient as to the items that were identified
only by their packaging because such a description does not satisfy the
statutory requirement for an evidence inventory. Accordingly, we reverse
the district court's order and remand for further proceedings. Upon
remand, the district court must instruct the evidence custodians to submit
a new evidence inventory that details the evidence within the containers it
previously identified but did not open. After the district court receives and
reviews the new evidence inventories, it must order genetic marker analysis
of any relevant evidence it concludes exists.

                                           Ce4*
                                     Cadish

We concur:

      (411.
                                J.
Herndon

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