Court Opinion

ID: 9764620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:32:48.607586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:58.844046
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur fully with the majority opinion. I write in regard to the State’s argument, which we did not have to reach due to the individual appellants’ default, see Majority Opinion, Division 5, that the State can still pursue so-called “civil” in personam RICO charges against non-corporate individuals notwithstanding our holding in Cisco v. State of Ga., 285 Ga. 656 (680 SE2d 831) (2009) (civil in personam provisions of the RICO statute are unconstitutional). Contrary to the State’s misreading of our discussion of OCGA § 16-14-6 in Cisco, supra at 660, nothing in that statute authorizes an “end run” around our holding in Cisco. OCGA § 16-14-7 (m), which is the statutory source for “civil” in personam RICO proceedings in Georgia, is so woefully lacking in mandatory constitutional protections that, until those constitutional deficiencies are corrected by the Legislature, it must be clearly understood that there can be no constitutional “civil” in personam RICO proceedings in our state courts.
*595Bryant & Cook, Malcolm F. Bryant, Jr., for appellants.
Hayward Altman, District Attorney, Hall, Bloch, Garland & Meyer, John F. Kennedy, Michael G. Lambros, Andrew Ekonomou, for appellee.