Court Opinion

ID: 9706398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:42:43.63116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:22.517605
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REID, dissenting: I dissent. Proof of the corpus delicti may not depend exclusively on a defendant’s extrajudicial confession, admission, or other statement. The defendant’s statement must be corroborated with independent evidence which tends to show that the offense occurred. People v. Wright, 286 Ill. App. 3d 456, 460 (1996). Proof of an offense requires proof of two concepts: first, that a crime occurred, or the corpus delicti, and second, that it was committed by the person charged. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 503 (1993), citing People v. Lambert, 104 Ill. 2d 375, 378 (1984). The corpus delicti of a crime has two components: (1) proof of the occurrence of the injury or loss, and (2) its causation by criminal conduct. People v. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d 434, 446 (1990). As stated in Furby, “the prosecution must present evidence aliunde the defendant’s confession that tends to show the commission of the offense and is corroborative of the circumstances related in the statement.” (Emphasis added.) Furby, 138 Ill. 2d at 446, citing People v. Lambert, 104 Ill. 2d 375, 378-79 (1984), and People v. Dalton, 91 Ill. 2d 22, 29 (1982). The majority plays with words in an attempt to bolster its opinion. To show the corpus delicti, the majority mistakenly maintains that the independent evidence need only prove that a crime occurred and not the crime for which the defendant was specifically convicted. If that is true, then the majority seems to be suggesting and contending that the corpus delicti in this matter could be proved if it could be shown that Salinas, say for instance, violated a traffic law. People v. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d 1 (1995), is very instructive on this issue. In Bounds, the victim was abducted while she was walking to catch a bus that would take her to work. She was then taken to a nearby building where she was sexually assaulted and later murdered. The defendant argued that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of the offenses of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping at trial. The Bounds court determined that the State adequately proved the corpus delicti for both offenses. Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d at 43-46. The Bounds court did not, as the majority here suggests, determine that the corpus delicti was satisfied with independent evidence of a crime occurring. Instead, the Bounds court determined that the corpus delicti was satisfied with independent evidence that showed that the defendant committed each of the specific crimes for which he was convicted. The Bounds court held as follows: “The evidence independent of the defendant’s confession was, we believe, sufficient proof of the corpus delicti of the offenses of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping. Considering first the charge of aggravated criminal sexual assault, we find that the independent evidence adequately corroborated the details of the defendant’s confession and tended to show the occurrence of the offense. *** The defendant also contends that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti of aggravated kidnapping. We must reject this argument as well. The evidence here, apart from the defendant’s confession, corroborated the details of the defendant’s confession and tended to show the commission of this additional offense. *** We believe that the preceding evidence adequately corroborated the defendant’s confession and tended to show the occurrence of the crime of aggravated kidnapping. This evidence indicated that the victim was abducted while on her way to work and was taken to a nearby building, where she was sexually assaulted and later murdered. On this record, we find adequate evidence of the corpus delicti of aggravated kidnapping.” Bounds, 171 Ill. 2d at 43-46. In this matter, Salinas was convicted on two counts of solicitation of murder for hire. In order to prove that a defendant committed the offense of solicitation of murder for hire, the State must establish that the defendant procured another to commit a murder with the intent that the offense of first-degree murder be committed. People v. Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d 475, 488 (1995), citing 720 ILCS 5/8 — 1.2 (West 1992). Here, during the trial, there was substantial evidence which showed that Mireles was murdered. Therefore the only real issue that must be determined is whether Salinas procured someone to kill Mireles. The State has failed to present sufficient corroborating evidence to satisfy the corpus delicti in this matter. The People may have sufficiently shown that Salinas had a motive to murder Mireles. However, this is insufficient to establish the corpus delicti. See People v. Hougas, 91 Ill. App. 2d 246, 250 (1968) (motive insufficient to prove corpus delicti of arson). In this matter, it is important and must not be forgotten that Salinas was found not guilty of first-degree murder. “The offense of solicitation is complete when the principal offense is commanded, encouraged or requested with the intent that it be committed. People v. Edwards, 243 Ill. App. 3d 280, 289, 611 N.E.2d 1196, 1202 (1993) (discussing solicitation to commit murder); see also People v. Schnurr, 206 Ill. App. 3d 522, 533, 564 N.E.2d 1336, 1344 (1990). ‘Whether or not the actual crime took place is meaningless under the applicable statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 8 — 1 [now 720 ILCS 5/8 — 1 (West 2000)]). Defendant’s offense was complete when the words at issue were spoken ***.’ Edwards, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 289, 611 N.E.2d at 1202.” People v. Ruppenthal, 331 Ill. App. 3d 916, 920 (2002). Again, the State and the majority lose sight of the fact that the crime of solicitation of murder for hire is complete at the moment of the solicitation. Ruppenthal, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 920. Here, it is the State’s burden to show that Salinas solicited his codefendants to kill Mireles for money. In other words, in order to satisfy the corpus delicti in this matter, the State must introduce corroborating evidence that a communication occurred between Salinas and his codefendants wherein Salinas requested that they kill Mireles for money. Here, the State has completely failed to do so. There is no independent evidence in this record which establishes that Salinas procured his codefendants to kill Mireles. The record is devoid of any evidence which shows that Salinas made a statement to either Martinez or Alvarez in which he requested that they kill Mireles for money. Better yet, there is no evidence in the record that shows that Salinas even knew Alvarez. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record which shows that Salinas paid or attempted to pay Martinez or Alvarez for Mireles’ murder. Instead, the People and the majority suggest that the requisite corroborating evidence to satisfy the corpus delicti in this matter can be found in the following circuitous reasoning: Salinas knew Martinez; Salinas and Martinez had a good relationship; Martinez and Alvarez had an extremely close friendship which is evidenced by Alvarez living with Martinez and the two referring to each other as cousins; since Safinas and Martinez were close friends, it is only natural, therefore, that Salinas would have also known Alvarez; Salinas disliked Mireles because of the problems that he was causing him; as a result of Salinas’ relationship with Martinez, Salinas informed Martinez and Alvarez that he disliked Mireles; Martinez in turn, only naturally, offered to help Salinas; Salinas then hired Martinez and Alvarez to kill Mireles. The problem with the State’s and majority’s reasoning, however, is that this argument is completely based on speculation and not corroborating evidence that is found in the record. This does not satisfy the corpus delicti. People v. Richmond, 341 Ill. App. 3d 39 (2003), is also instructive. There, the defendant was convicted of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a six-year-old female pursuant to section 12— 14.1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12 — 14.1(a)(1) (West 1998)). The first count charged contact between the defendant’s penis and the victim’s anus. The second count charged contact between the defendant’s penis and the victim’s vagina. At trial, the victim testified that while she and the defendant were alone, he pulled her shorts down, “ ‘pulled his thing out,’ ” and “ ‘freaked her.’ ” Richmond, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 43. The doctor who examined the victim after the occurrence testified that the victim had a half-moon-shaped tear of her anus which was dilated and consistent with an unlubricated male penis entering her anus. After the defendant was arrested he gave a statement to the police which was consistent with the victim’s account in nearly all respects, except for one significant difference. In his statement, the defendant said that before he penetrated the victim’s anus, he placed his penis on her vagina and tried to insert it but could not. On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction on the penis-to-vagina count because the only evidence of that crime came from his statement. In finding that the corpus delicti had not been satisfied with regards to the penis-to-vagina count, the Richmond court stated: “Evidence of contact between [defendant’s] penis and [the victim’s] vagina came entirely from [defendant’s] statement. In fact, the statement’s reference to vaginal contact was brief and nonspecific. All the other evidence provided by the State at trial proved only anal penetration. Nothing in the record corroborated the penis-to-vagina portion of [defendant’s] statement. We also reject the State’s contention that mere proximity between [the victim’s] vagina and anus tended to prove his penis also came into contact with her vagina. That is pure speculation.” Richmond, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 46. Additionally, the State argues that two statements made by Alvarez and admitted into evidence in Salinas’ case establish that there was an agreement between Salinas and his codefendants to kill Mireles. Shortly after Míreles was murdered, Alvarez and Martinez returned to Martinez’ home. At that time, one of the women who was staying with Martinez accused Alvarez of shooting Míreles. In response, Alvarez told her to “shut the fuck up.” The second statement occurred when Alvarez asked Rowans to look for a shell casing in his gangway. Alvarez explained to Rowans that after he shot Míreles, he ran through his gangway and while he was there, he unjammed the gun he allegedly used to kill Míreles and a shell casing fell to the ground which he was unable to find at that time. Alvarez’s statements do not satisfy the corpus delicti in this matter. Alvarez’s statements do not corroborate Salinas’ statement in any way or form. The People insist that Alvarez’s statements establish the fact that he and Martinez were waiting for payment from Salinas, but conveniently fail to point out where in the record such support can be found. Alvarez’s statements fail to mention Salinas, an agreement between him and anyone for that matter to murder Míreles for money, an expectation of payment, an exchange of money, or a promise to pay. Furthermore, the fact that Salinas was out of town when the murder occurred does not satisfy the corpus delicti. Salinas never explicitly said in his confession that he wanted Martinez and Alvarez to kill Míreles during the time that he was out of town. To suggest this as the State does is to broaden the agreement that Salinas gave in his confession. No independent evidence in this record corroborates Salinas’ confession that he procured Alvarez and Martinez to murder Míreles for money. As such, the State has failed to carry its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Lee, 151 Ill. App. 3d 510, 531-32 (1986) (no corroborating evidence that defendant committed an armed robbery attempt); People v. Lesure, 271 Ill. App. 3d 679, 684 (1995) (no corroborating evidence that defendant who was charged with unlawful use of a weapon by a felon actually possessed a firearm where the trial court suppressed the rifle he confessed to possessing); People v. Harris, 333 Ill. App. 3d 741, 751-53 (2002) (no corroborating evidence that defendant who was a convicted sex offender failed to notify police of his change in address within 10 days of moving).