Court Opinion

ID: 9844926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:11:48.077319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:47.314212
License: Public Domain

DeNNY, J.,
Concurring: Prior to 1941 a verdict of guilty of any of the four capital crimes — murder, rape, burglary or arson — meant a mandatory death sentence, except in first degree burglary.
Chapter 434, Laws of North Carolina, Session of 1889, section 3 thereof, codified later as CS 4641, now G.S. 15-171, provided: “That when the crime charged in the bill of indictment is burglary in the first degree, the jury may render a verdict of guilty of burglary in the second degree if they deem it proper so to do.”
In the case of S. v. Johnson, 218 N.C. 604, 12 S.E. 2d 278, decided at the Fall Term 1940 and filed 20 December 1940, this Court held that CS 4641 did not authorize an instruction that the jury might render a verdict of burglary in the second degree in its discretion, irrespective of the evidence. Stacy, C. J., Barnhill, J., later C. J., and Winborne, J., now C. J., each wrote vigorous dissenting opinions. *281Stacy, C. J., said: “Our previous decisions are to the effect, that on an indictment for burglary in the first degree, the defendant is not entitled as a matter of right to have the case submitted to the jury on ¡the charge of burglary in the second degree unless there is evidence to support the milder verdict. CS 4640 S. v. Johnston, 119 N.C. 883, 26 S.E. 163; S. v. Cox, 201 N.C. 357, 160 S.E. 358; S. v. Morris, 215 N.C. 552, 2 S.E. 2d 554. This is far from saying, however, that in such a case, the jury may not render a verdict of burglary in the second degree ‘if they deem it proper so to do.’ Both the legislative will as expressed in the statute, CS 4641, and the pertinent decisions on the subject are to the contrary. S. v. Alston, 113 N.C. 666, 18 S.E. 692; S. v. Fleming, 107 N.C. 905, 12 S.E. 131.”
The General Assembly of North Carolina at its very first opportunity enacted Chapter 215 of the Public Laws of 1941. This act added the following provisos to CS 4233, the burglary statute, and CS 4238, the arson statute: “Provided, if the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State’s Prison.”
At the same session, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 7 of the Public Laws of 1941, amending CS 4641 to read as follows: “When t'he crime charged in the bill of indictment is burglary in the first degree the jury, upon the finding of facts sufficient to constitute burglary in the first degree as defined by statute, may elect to render a verdict of guilty of burglary in the second degree if they deem it proper so to do. The judge in his charge shall so instruct the jury.”
In 1943, CS 4233 became G.S. 14-52, and CS 4238 became G.S. 14-58, the language including the provisos remaining the same, and CS 4641 became G.S. 15-171.
At the Spring Term 1949 of this Court S. v. Mathis, 230 N.C. 508, 53 S.E. 2d 666, was decided. The defendant had been convicted of first degree burglary and sentenced to death. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial judge erred in not instructing the jury in respect to the right of the jury under G.S. 14-52 to return a verdict of guilty of burglary in the first degree and to recommend in connection therewith that punishment therefor shall be imprisonment for life in the State’s Prison. Winborne, J., now C.J., in speaking for the Court said: “The proviso in the statute was added by the General Assembly of 1941 (P.L. 1941, Ch. 215). Before the enactment of it, a verdict of guilty of burglary in the first degree made death sentence mandatory. But since the enactment of it, when a jury in returning a verdict of guilty of burglary in the first degree recommends imprisonment for life, the death penalty is thereby eliminated, and sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory. Thus a substantial right *282is created by «the proviso in G.S. 14-52 in favor of one charged with burglary in the first degree. And in such case, it is the duty of the trial judge under tire provisions of G.S. 1-180 'to declare and explain the law arising thereon.’
“Moreover, G.S. 15-171 provides that ‘where the crime charged in the bill of indictment is burglary in 'the first degree the jury, up'on the finding of facts sufficient to constitute 'burglary in the first degree as defined by statute, miay elect to render a verdict of guilty of burglary in the second degree if they deem it proper so to do,’ and ‘the judge in his charge shall so instruct the jury.’ See S. v. Surles, ante, 272.
“Therefore, taking the two statutes together, G.S. 14-52 and G.S. 15-171, when in a case in which the charge is burglary in the first degree the jury finds from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt facts constituting burglary in the first degree, one of three verdicts may be returned. (1) Guilty of burglary in the first degree, which carries a mandatory death sentence; (2) Guilty of burglary in the first degree, with recommendation of imprisonment for life, which calls for a sentence to life imprisonment; and (3) if the jury ‘deem it proper so to do,’ Guilty of burglary in -the second degree, for which the sentence may be life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a term of years in the discretion of the judge, all in accordance with the statutes.”
In 1947 the General Assembly of North Carolina created a study commission for the purpose of making a study and submitting recommendations to the 1949 Session of the General Assembly for the improvement of the administration of justice in the State of North Carolina. Among the recommendations made pursuant to this study was the following: “We propose that a recommendation of mercy by the jury in capital cases automatically carry with it a life sentence. Only three other states now have the mandatory death penalty and we believe its retention will be definitely harmful. Quite frequently, juries refuse to convict for rape or first degree murder because, from all the circumstances, they do not believe the defendant, although guilty, should suffer death. The result is that verdicts are returned hardly in harmony with evidence. Our proposal is already in effect in respect to the crimes of burglary and arson. There is much testimony that it has proved beneficial in such eases. We think the law can now be broadened to include all capital crimes.” Popular Government, published by the Institute of Government, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, January issue 1949.
The General Assembly in 1949, following the recommendation of the study commission, enacted Chapter 299 of the Session Laws of *2831949, providing that in all capital oases it should be in the discretion of the jury to recommend life imprisonment. The proviso reads as follows: “Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in 'Open court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in 'the State’s prison, and the court 'shall so instruct the jury.”
The identical proviso was enacted as a part of G.S. 14-17, relating ■to murder in the first degree; of G.S. 14-21, relating to rape or the carnal knowledge of any female child under the age of twelve years; of G.S. 14-52, relating to 'burglary in the first degree; and of G.S. 14-58, relating to arson. G.S. 15-171 was repealed by Ch. 100, Session Laws of 1953.
Consequently, at the present time, in any capital case the jury has the “unbridled discretion” to recommend that the punishment be imprisonment for life in the State’s Prison, “.and the court shall so instruct the jury.”
The 1949 proviso has been construed in the following cases in the manner hereinafter indicated.
In S. v. McMillan, 233 N.C. 630, 65 S.E. 2d 212, the trial judge instructed the jury to the effect that they might recommend life imprisonment if the jury felt “under the facts and circumstances of the crime alleged to have been committed by the defendant, they are warranted and justified in making that recommendation.” Winborne, J., now C.J., in speaking for the Court said: “It -is patent that the sole puipose of the act is ,to give to the jury in all cases where a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree shall have been reached, the right to recommend that the punishment for the crime shall be imprisonment for life in the State’s prison. (Compare S. v. Shackleford, 232 N.C. 299, 59 S.E. 2d 825.) No conditions .are attached to, and no qualifications or limitations are imposed, upon, the right of the jury to .so recommend. It is an unbridled discretionary right. And it is incumbent upon the court to so instruct the jury. In this, the defendant has -a substantive right. Therefore, any instruction, charge or suggestion as to the causes for which the jury could or ought to recommend is error sufficient to set -aside a verdict where no recommendation is made.”
In the case of S. v. Marsh, 234 N.C. 101, 66 S.E. 2d 684, among other things, the court below charged: “You may, for any reason and within your discretion add to that the recommendation, if you desire to do so, that he be imprisoned for life, in which event that disposition will be made of the case.” This Court upheld the charge.
In S. v. Simmons, 234 N.C. 290, 66 S.E. 2d 897, the court instructed *284the jury: “ * * * if you should return -a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, it would be your duty to consider whether or not under the 'statute, you desire 'and feel that it is your duty to recommend th)at the punishment of the defendant shall be imprisonment for life in the State’s prison.” A new (ferial was granted. In the same case, 236 N.C. 340, 72 S.E. 2d 743, the charge with respect to life imprisonment was again held to be erroneous.
In the ease of S. v. Dockery, 238 N.C. 222, 77 S.E. 2d 664, a private prosecutor, in making his argument to the jury, said: “There is no such thing as life imprisonment in North Carolina.” This argument was made as a part of counsel’s plea for a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree without recommendation that punishment be life imprisonment. The reason advanced by counsel in support of this argument was that, in cases where sentences are for life imprisonment, petitions 'are filed for commutation; that the commutations are allowedi and persons thus sentenced to life imprisonment are finally paroled and allowed to go free. This Court ordered a new trial.
This Court has consistently and without exception adhered to its decisions with respect to the “unbridled discretion” of the jury to make recommendations for life imprisonment in the State’s Prison in cases where a defendant was found guilty of a capital offense, as laid down in S. v. McMillan, supra. See S. v. Conner, 241 N.C. 468, 85 S.E. 2d 584; S. v. Carter, 243 N.C. 106, 89 S.E. 2d 789; S. v. Adams, 243 N.C. 290, 90 S.E. 2d 383; S. v. Cook, 245 N.C. 610, 96 S.E. 2d 842; S. v. McAfee, 247 N.C. 98, 100 S.E. 2d 249; S. v. Bunton, 247 N.C. 510, 101 S.E. 2d 454; S. v. Denny, 249 N.C. 113, 105 S.E. 2d 446; S. v. Oakes, 249 N.C. 282, 106 S.E. 2d 206.
As this question has been involved in twelve previous appeals since the statute was enacted in 1949, it has been my impression that it has been the consensus of the members of the Court that neither a solicitor nor a private prosecutor has any right to argue or contend that a jury should not, under the facts and circumstances in a capital case, withhold and refuse to exercise that “unbridled discretion” expressly granted to them by the General Assembly. In the exercise of such discretion they may recommend life imprisonment for any reason or for no reason at /all. It follows, therefore, that it is error for the trial judge to give as a contention of the State that the verdict of the jury should be guilty of -murder in the first degree without 'any recommendation that the punishment shall be life imprisonment in the State’s Prison. Why is this so? It must be conceded «that in any capital case if the evidence is -sufficient to justify the jury in finding *285beyond a -reasonable doubt .that .the defendant is guilty o-f the -crime charged, and the jury so finds, then he must suffer death unless in the discretion of the jury it makes the recommendation for life imprisonment >as authorized by law. From the defendant’s standpoint, such recommendation is not a matter of right -in .any sense, but on exercise of grace, -placed exclusively -and unconditionally within the discretion of the jury and no one else.
A solicitor or a private prosecutor has as much latitude as he has ever had in making a legitimate .argument for a conviction in a capital case, but when he has tried his .case and made his argument to the jury, -and properly developed his evidence, tending to show the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt of the capital offense charged, it is no official concern -or responsibility of his whether or not the jury exercises the right of discretion to recommend life imprisonment in the State’s Prison.
In view of the history of the legislation involved and the recommendations of the -study commission in 1949, it is apparent that juries were bringing -in -verdicts of murder in the second degree in too many oases in which the evidence warranted a conviction of first degree. In an effort to improve the administration o-f justice in that respect, the unconditional right to recommend life imprisonment in the -State’s Prison was granted to the jury, -although the evidence warranted -a conviction that had theretofore carried a mandatory -sentence of -death. In fact, it all comes to this: The jury in such cases has -been entrusted with the State’s conscience -or power to extend grace with respecibto the punishment to be meted out as between life and death in capital cases. -— not the judge nor the solicitor.
There are other reasons why this Court should adhere to its former decisions on the questions now before us. It is -said in 14 Am. Jur., Courts, section 66, page 287, et seq.: “ * * * It has been said that the court of last resort of a state will not overrule -one of its prior decisions construing -a statute where the legislature has held several sessions since such -decision without modifying or amending the statute because it may be claimed justly that the legislature has acquiesced in the decision, and therefore .a fair case is presented for the application of the doctrine of stare decisis.”
In Gill v. Commissioners, 160 N.C. 176, 76 S.E. 203, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 293, the question before the Court was whether or not the statutory phrase “freeholders within the proposed special school district” embraced female as well -as male freeholders in voting for a proposed school tax. The lower court held that it did. On appeal this Court reversed and said: “The Legislature has never, -as yet, en*286dowed women with the right to participate in governmental affairs, for reasons satisfactory to itself. * * We must accept it and enforce it as we find it, and not as we may think it should be, as we do not make the law, but merely declare what it is. * * * (A)ny such * * * change * * should originate in the Legislature. * * *
“It is inconceivable that a consistent and persistent construction given to similar statutes by the Superintendent of Public Instruction and his legal adviser, the Attorney General, for so long a time, should have escaped the attention of the Legislature, and its silence may be safely construed as an assent to their interpretation of the word. * * * It is easy for the Legislature to change that meaning if, in its wisdom, a different policy should be inaugurated. Until that is done, we will stand by the ancient and settled rule of interpretation-. ‘A contemporary exposition, practiced and -acquiesced in for a period of years, fixes the construction, unless contrary to the obvious meaning of the words.’ ”
In Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N. C. 302, 98 S. E. 820, we find: “The doctrine of stare decisis or the principle of adherence to judicial precedents is fully established in this State, and in proper instances will continue to be steadfastly upheld. * * * While a single decision may become a precedent sufficiently authoritative to protect rights acquired during its continuance, such a case more frequently occurs in the construction of statutes applicable, in which case an authoritative interpretation, formally -made by -a court of last resort, is thereafter considered a -part of the law itself * *
In 21 C.J.S., Courts, section 214, page 388, et seq., we find this statement: “The doctrine of stare decisis applies with full force to decisions construing statutes or ordinances. In fact, when a statute has been judicially construed by the highest court having jurisdiction to pas-s on it, such construction is as much a part of the statute as if plainly written into it originally.”
It would seem, therefore, that a uniform interpretation placed upon a proviso in a statute in a dozen cases over a period of approximately eight years is sufficient to establish the doctrine of stare decisis, and if the meaning of the statute has been misinterpreted by the Court, the Legislature ought to say so and not the Court.
I vote for a new -trial.