Court Opinion

ID: 9371912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 06:05:21.651318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:31.052242
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      February 16, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                     No. 355976
                                                                      Montcalm Circuit Court
BRIAN LEE STAPP,                                                      LC No. 2020-026524-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MARKEY and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        A jury convicted defendant of assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83;
third-degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 257.602a(3)(a); and five counts of resisting and obstructing
a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual
offender, MCL 769.12, to 50 to 75 years’ imprisonment for the AWIM conviction, 6 to 20 years’
imprisonment for the fleeing-and-eluding conviction, and 46 months to 15 years’ imprisonment
for each conviction of resisting and obstructing an officer. The sentences are to be served
concurrently. Defendant appeals by right. We affirm.

                       I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         The charges in this case arise from the efforts of several law enforcement officers to arrest
defendant for domestic violence on February 22, 2020. Defendant’s girlfriend at the time, KB,
testified that she and defendant had an argument that night, and that during this argument,
defendant punched her multiple times in the eye. KB called the police, and defendant fled. At
approximately 11:30 p.m., Michigan State Police Troopers responded to KB’s call. KB told them
about the assault, and she showed her injuries to the troopers. She also gave them a description of
defendant’s vehicle, a black Jeep, and she identified three locations—including a two-track trail
near Briggs Road—where they might find defendant. Several law enforcement officers joined in
the search for defendant.

       Trooper Jennifer Alway eventually located defendant on the two-track road. After
following the track into the woods, she found defendant in a black Jeep. Trooper Alway was in a
fully-marked police vehicle. She activated her lights, and, using her “PA system,” she instructed

                                                 -1-
defendant to “[s]tay where you are.” Rather than obeying the order, defendant drove the Jeep
directly toward the patrol car. Trooper Alway—who was dressed in full police uniform—exited
the patrol car with her firearm drawn. She yelled at defendant to “stop.” Defendant did not stop;
he looked at Trooper Alway and laughed. He continued driving, turning his wheels to drive around
the patrol car. Trooper Alway holstered her weapon and got back in her patrol car to follow
defendant.

         After traveling on the two-track for a few minutes, defendant crashed his vehicle into a
tree. He then jumped out of the Jeep and started to run. Again using her PA system, Trooper
Alway ordered defendant to get on the ground. When he did not comply, she exited her patrol car
to chase him, identified herself as a state police officer, and ordered defendant to get on the ground.
Defendant continued to run, but because of icy conditions, he slipped. Trooper Alway caught him
by the wrist and used an “arm bar take down” to bring him to the ground. Once on the ground,
defendant struggled, ignored the trooper’s commands, and tried to pull away from her. At one
point in the struggle, Trooper Alway’s right shoulder popped, and she described it as “immensely
painful.” As the struggle continued, defendant managed to get on top of Trooper Alway. As she
lay on her back, defendant pinned her to the ground with his body and grabbed her wrists. He then
tried to grab the trooper’s Taser from her belt, but he was unable to get it released from the belt.

        While still pinning Trooper Alway to the ground, defendant grabbed her throat with his
hand and strangled her. During this time, Trooper Alway was “scared,” and she had “a lot of
troubling breathing.” Defendant choked her for approximately five seconds, showing no signs that
he was going to stop strangling her. Defendant only stopped choking the trooper because she
punched the inside of his left elbow, causing him to release his grip. Throughout the assault,
defendant laughed at her and told her that she was not tough. He stated several times that he was
going to “punch” Trooper Alway “in the mouth.” Defendant ordered her to “let [him] go.” He
also told the trooper that he was “gonna fuck [her] up.” And he asked her, “Do you want to die
here bitch?”

        Still pinning her to the ground, defendant then punched Trooper Alway repeatedly in the
face, near her eye. After the third punch, the vision in her left eye began to blur. As he punched
her, defendant “appeared to be enjoying himself.” Trooper Alway stated that she feared for her
life. She did not believe that she would be able to get away from defendant on her own or that he
would stop punching her. As defendant hit her, Trooper Alway could see headlights approaching,
leading her to believe that other officers were coming to the scene.1 Knowing that back-up would
arrive shortly, Trooper Alway tried to restrain defendant—as she was being punched—by
wrapping her legs around his back to hold him.

1
  When she initially found defendant on the two-track, Trooper Alway notified the other officers
that she had located him, and when he tried to drive away from her, she told them to cut defendant
off where the two-track met Briggs Road. Not having heard from Trooper Alway in a while and
concerned that she was not responding to communications, other officers headed toward Trooper
Alway’s location.

                                                 -2-
       The first back-up officer to arrive was Trooper Austin Brown. Trooper Brown arrived to
find defendant repeatedly striking Trooper Alway in the head, using what Trooper Brown
characterized as “haymaker” punches. After ordering defendant to “get off her,” Trooper Brown
used his Taser on defendant, and he also inadvertently tased Trooper Alway in the process.
Trooper Brown then physically pulled defendant off Trooper Alway.

        The two troopers then attempted to take defendant into custody. Defendant, however,
refused to cooperate. He would not follow orders; he hid his hands to prevent himself from being
handcuffed, and he tried to get up from the ground, despite orders to stay down. A third trooper,
Trooper Paul Fry, arrived to assist. Both Trooper Brown and Trooper Fry struck defendant, using
closed-hand and knee strikes. Trooper Brown also again used his Taser to “dry stun” defendant.
After some struggle, the three troopers managed to handcuff defendant.

        Once defendant was handcuffed, the troopers attempted to place him in Trooper Brown’s
police cruiser for transport. The car—and the other State Police vehicles at the scene—did not
have a cage in the back. Protocol would have been to transport defendant in the front passenger
seat. But when the troopers attempted to put defendant in the front seat, he thrashed and kicked at
them. To stop defendant from kicking, Trooper Fry used a “Welch hitch” and handcuffs on
defendant’s ankles to secure defendant’s legs. Defendant also had blood on his face, and as a
precaution, Trooper Fry placed a spit mask on defendant. Throughout the incident, defendant
taunted the officers with expletives and name calling.

        Realizing that they were not going to be able to get defendant into the vehicle or to safely
drive with defendant in the passenger seat, the troopers called for a Montcalm County Sheriff’s
car, which have cages in the backseat. Deputy Prescott Ingraham responded to the scene. When
Deputy Ingraham arrived, he helped Troopers Brown and Fry get defendant into the backseat of
the county vehicle. Defendant had gone “limp,” and defendant had to be “pretty much carried” to
the car by Trooper Brown and Deputy Ingraham. Trooper Fry went to the driver’s side of the
backseat to pull defendant into the vehicle, as Trooper Brown and Deputy Ingraham remained on
the other side of the vehicle to push defendant inside. During the process, defendant kicked at
Trooper Brown and Deputy Ingraham. A fourth state trooper, Trooper Austin Wolven, arrived at
the scene and defendant also kicked him. Eventually, with four2 law enforcement officers
assisting, defendant was secured into the back seat of the county police car.

       Once defendant was in the county vehicle, Deputy Ingraham transported defendant to jail.
On the way to jail, defendant continued to kick; he kicked the cage and the back window of the
county car. The officers had to stop to secure defendant’s legs to prevent him from breaking the
window. During the drive, defendant also yelled and called Deputy Ingraham names.

       At trial, the five officers involved in defendant’s arrest testified about the events in
question. The various patrol cars were equipped with in-car videos, and several videos of the
incident were admitted into evidence and played for the jury. The jury was also presented with

2
 By this time, Trooper Alway had stepped back and was no longer participating in trying to place
defendant into a vehicle.

                                                -3-
photos of Trooper Alway’s and defendant’s injuries. And the prosecutor offered expert medical
testimony from Dr. Andrew Robin Freeth, who treated Trooper Alway in the emergency room.
Dr. Freeth described Trooper Alway’s injuries, which included red marks around her neck,
swelling and a small laceration over her left eyebrow, and other minor abrasions. Dr. Freeth
diagnosed Trooper Alway with a closed-head injury. He also opined at trial that a longer period
of strangulation or additional blows to the head could have led to more serious injuries or even
death.

        The jury convicted defendant of AWIM for his assault on Trooper Alway, five counts of
resisting and obstructing arrest, one count for each officer involved in his arrest, and one count of
third-degree fleeing and eluding. On October 29, 2020, the trial court sentenced defendant as
noted earlier. Defendant appeared at the sentencing hearing remotely via ZOOM. Defendant now
appeals by right.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

         On appeal, defendant first contends that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence to
support his AWIM conviction. Specifically, defendant contends that the evidence did not
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the actual intent to kill Trooper Alway. To
establish the crime of AWIM, the prosecutor must prove “(1) an assault, (2) with an actual intent
to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Brown, 267 Mich App
141, 147-148; 703 NW2d 230 (2005).

        In People v Kenny, 332 Mich App 394, 402-403; 956 NW2d 562 (2020), this Court recited
the principles applicable to reviewing a sufficiency claim:

               This Court reviews de novo whether there was sufficient evidence to
       support a conviction. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must
       view the evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—in a light most favorable to
       the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
       essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury, and
       not an appellate court, observes the witnesses and listens to their testimony;
       therefore, an appellate court must not interfere with the jury’s role in assessing the
       weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Circumstantial evidence
       and any reasonable inferences that arise from such evidence can constitute
       satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime. The prosecution need not negate every
       reasonable theory of innocence; it need only prove the elements of the crime in the
       face of whatever contradictory evidence is provided by the defendant. All conflicts
       in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution.

               The element of intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.
       Because it can be difficult to prove a defendant’s state of mind on issues such as
       intent, minimal circumstantial evidence suffices to establish a defendant’s state of
       mind. A defendant’s intent can be gleaned or inferred from his or her actions.
       [Quotation marks and citations omitted.]

                                                -4-
        In People v Taylor, 422 Mich 554, 568; 375 NW2d 1 (1985), our Supreme Court discussed
the evidentiary aspects of proving an intent to kill:

               By saying [that] . . . the intent to kill must be proved, we do not intend to
       say it must be proved by direct, positive, or independent evidence; . . . the jury may
       draw the inference, as they draw all other inferences, from any facts in evidence
       which to their minds fairly prove its existence. And in considering the question they
       may, and should take into consideration the nature of the defendant’s acts
       constituting the assault; the temper or disposition of mind with which they were
       apparently performed, whether the instrument and means used were naturally
       adapted to produce death, his conduct and declarations prior to, at the time, and
       after the assault, and all other circumstances calculated to throw light upon the
       intention with which the assault was made. [Quotation marks and citations
       omitted.]

        Taking into consideration these guiding principles and the evidence (1) that defendant
strangled Trooper Alway, leaving red marks around her neck and making it difficult for her to
breathe, (2) that he only stopped when the trooper punched him, causing him to release his grip,
(3) that defendant repeatedly punched the trooper in the head with haymaker punches that only
ceased when Trooper Brown interceded, (4) that the trooper suffered a closed-head injury, (5) that
Dr. Freeth opined that Trooper Alway could have died had the assault continued, (6) that defendant
told her that he was “gonna fuck [her] up,” and (7) that he asked the trooper whether she “want[ed]
to die,” we conclude that there was more than sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant assaulted the trooper with an intent to kill her.3

       Next, defendant presents a cursory argument that his AWIM conviction was against the
great weight of the evidence. This issue is unpreserved because defendant failed to move for a

3
  In the context of his sufficiency argument, defendant briefly asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion by allowing the prosecutor to amend the information to include the AWIM charge after
the district court declined to bind defendant over on the AWIM charge and instead bound him over
on a lesser charge of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH). This
issue does not appear in defendant’s statement of questions presented, meaning that it has not been
properly presented for this Court’s review and that it need not be considered. See People v Albers,
258 Mich App 578, 584; 672 NW2d 336 (2003). It is also insufficiently briefed insofar as
defendant fails to address the standards for a bindover or the standards for a circuit court’s
amendment of the information. By failing to adequately brief the issue, defendant has abandoned
it. See People v Iannucci, 314 Mich App 542, 545; 887 NW2d 817 (2016). In any event, at this
stage, defendant has been convicted by a jury of AWIM, and as discussed, the proofs presented at
trial supported that conviction. An appeal following a conviction at trial cannot be used to argue
that the proofs at the preliminary examination did not support an AWIM charge, see People v
Wilson, 469 Mich 1018 (2004), and any potential error by a circuit court in amending an
information is otherwise harmless when a defendant has not shown that his trial was unfair or that
the verdict was unreliable as a result of the amended information, see MCL 769.26; People v
McGee, 258 Mich App 683, 697; 672 NW2d 191 (2003).

                                                 -5-
new trial before appealing. See People v Lopez, 305 Mich App 686, 695; 854 NW2d 205 (2014).
Moreover, defendant does not develop a separate argument regarding the great weight of the
evidence: he simply asserts at the end of his sufficiency argument that, in the alternative, the
AWIM conviction was against the great weight of the evidence. See People v Brown, 239 Mich
App 735, 746 & n 6; 610 NW2d 234 (2000) (recognizing sufficiency and great-weight arguments
as “two separate questions” and rejecting a great-weight challenge that merely paralleled the
defendant’s flawed sufficiency argument). This argument lacks merit.

        Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the above-cited evidence showing that he intended
to kill Trooper Alway contradicted indisputable physical facts or law, was patently incredible,
defied physical realities, was so inherently implausible that a reasonable juror could not believe
the evidence, or was so seriously impeached that it was deprived of all probative value. People v
Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643-644; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). Because there were no exceptional
circumstances as necessary to support a great-weight argument, and because any issues regarding
the credibility of witnesses and the resolution of conflicting testimony were for the jury to
determine and not this Court, reversal for a new trial is unwarranted. Id. at 642-643. The evidence
did not preponderate so heavily against the AWIM verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice
to allow the verdict to stand. People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215, 218-219; 673 NW2d 800
(2003). As indicated earlier, there was evidence that plainly supported a conclusion by reasonable
jurors that defendant intended to kill Trooper Alway. Accordingly, we rule that the verdict was
not against the great weight of the evidence.

       Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing KB to testify about
defendant’s acts of domestic violence on the night in question because this testimony constituted
other-acts evidence and the prosecutor failed to provide the notice required by MRE 404(b)(2).
Defendant also maintains that the evidence was irrelevant and not substantively admissible under
MRE 404(b) and that the trial court erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction.

        First, setting aside for the moment the notice issue under MRE 404(b)(2), we find that the
evidence was relevant and admissible. Both third-degree fleeing and eluding and obstructing and
resisting a police officer require that the officer’s actions be lawful. See People v Vandenberg,
307 Mich App 57, 68-69; 859 NW2d 229 (2014); People v Grayer, 235 Mich App 737, 741; 599
NW2d 527 (1999). Consistent with these elements and as part of the jury instructions given in this
case, the jurors were instructed that fleeing and eluding required Trooper Alway to be “performing
her lawful duties,” and similarly, regarding resisting and obstructing, the jury was instructed that
the troopers had to be giving “a lawful command,” making a “lawful arrest,” or “otherwise
performing a lawful act.” Relevance and materiality are governed by the elements of the charges,
the theories of admissibility, and the defenses asserted. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 75;
508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended by 445 Mich 1205 (1994).4 By pleading not guilty to resisting

4
    The framework for admitting evidence under MRE 404(b) is as follows:

                 First, the prosecutor must offer the other acts evidence under something
         other than a character to conduct or propensity theory. MRE 404(b). Second, the
         evidence must be relevant under MRE 402, as enforced through MRE 104(b), to an

                                                -6-
and obstructing a police officer and third-degree fleeing and eluding, defendant put the prosecution
to its proofs on all the elements of those offenses. See id. at 78 (“In Michigan, as in the federal
courts, a plea of not guilty puts the prosecution to its proofs regarding all elements of the crime
charged.”).

        In this case, whether the troopers had a lawful basis for their pursuit and arrest of defendant
was at issue, and testimony regarding defendant’s domestic assault on KB—as the basis for the
troopers’ pursuit and arrest of defendant—was relevant and material to the question.5 Moreover,
the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice under MRE 403. “Unfair prejudice may exist where there is a danger that the evidence
will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury or where it would be inequitable to allow
use of the evidence.” People v Blackston, 481 Mich 451, 462; 751 NW2d 408 (2008). The
evidence related to the domestic-violence incident involving KB was relatively brief and not
particularly graphic. In contrast, the jury was presented with ample testimony regarding the assault
on Trooper Alway, which included strangulation and haymaker punches, as well as video of the
assault and photographs of her injuries. In this context, it does not appear that the jury would have
given undue weight to evidence relating to the domestic-violence incident, and the probative value
of this evidence—as relevant to the lawfulness of the troopers’ actions—was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See MRE 403. A limiting instruction was not given
on the use of the other-acts evidence; however, that does not alter the evidence’s admissibility. In
the absence of a request for a limiting instruction, a trial court has no duty to sua sponte provide a
limiting instruction. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 444; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).6

       issue of fact of consequence at trial. Third, under MRE 403, a determination must
       be made whether the danger of undue prejudice [substantially] outweighs the
       probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof
       and other facts appropriate for making decision of this kind under Rule
       403. Finally, the trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting instruction under
       MRE 105. [People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 55-56; 614 NW2d 888
       (2000) (quotation marks and some citations omitted; alteration in original).]

5
 Defendant maintains that he did not dispute the lawfulness of the troopers’ actions. There was,
however, no stipulation that the troopers acted lawfully. In any event, the prosecutor must prove
every element beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless whether defendant specifically disputes or
offers to stipulate to an element. See People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 69-70; 537 NW2d 909 (1995),
mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995).
6
  Indeed, to the extent that defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to provide a
limiting instruction on the use of other-acts evidence, we conclude that this issue was waived
because defendant did not request a limiting instruction, and with the exception of issues unrelated
to the other-acts evidence, defendant approved the jury instructions as given. See People v Miller,
326 Mich App 719, 726; 929 NW2d 821 (2019).

                                                 -7-
In sum, contrary to defendant’s arguments, the evidence was substantively admissible under MRE
404(b).7

       With respect to the lack of notice under MRE 404(b)(2), because the evidence of the assault
on KB was substantively admissible and because, despite a remand for an evidentiary hearing on
the subject, defendant failed to indicate or show that he would have proceeded differently had he
received the required notice, we hold that the notice error was not outcome-determinative, i.e., it
was harmless, and that reversal is unwarranted. See People v Jackson, 498 Mich 246, 278-279;
869 NW2d 253 (2015); People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 453-455; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).8

        Defendant next contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by impermissibly
arguing during closing that defendant “likes to hit women” and trying to paint defendant as a
misogynist by emphasizing testimony that defendant called Trooper Alway a “bitch.”
“Prosecutors are typically afforded great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct at trial.
They are generally free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as it
relates to their theory of the case.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 236; 749 NW2d 272
(2008) (citations omitted). And “prosecutors may use ‘hard language’ when it is supported by
evidence and are not required to phrase arguments in the blandest of all possible terms.” People v
Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 678-679; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). There was testimony by Trooper
Alway that defendant called her a “bitch,” that he laughed at her during the assault, that defendant
essentially taunted her, and that he “appeared to be enjoying himself” as he punched the female
trooper in the face. The prosecutor’s “hard” and not-so-bland comments were based on the
evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence. Therefore, on this unpreserved
issue, we discern no plain error, and assuming error to the extent that propensity was being asserted
in connection with the assault on KB, we find that defendant has failed to demonstrate the requisite
prejudice, i.e., that the presumed error affected the outcome of the proceedings. People v Carines,

7
  Aside from his assault on KB, defendant contends that evidence of his previous interactions with
law enforcement was put before the jury when Trooper Fry testified that KB told the troopers that
defendant “typically” went to one of three places when law enforcement were called regarding “an
incident” involving defendant. Even assuming error, this sort of vague, isolated, and seemingly
inadvertent reference does not warrant relief on appeal. See People v Wallen, 47 Mich App 612,
613; 209 NW2d 608 (1973) (“[A]n isolated or inadvertent reference to a defendant’s prior criminal
activities will not result in reversible prejudice.”).
8
  Further, the record is also clear that despite the lack of notice under MRE 404(b)(2), defendant
knew KB was a potential witness before trial. She was listed on the Information as a witness, and
she was included on defendant’s own witness list. During the preliminary examination, testimony
was presented—by Trooper Alway—that KB called 911, which prompted a domestic-violence
investigation with defendant as the suspect. At the evidentiary hearing on remand, defense counsel
confirmed that she knew of KB and that KB could testify that the police had been “called out for
a domestic regarding her” and defendant. Thus, there was no “unfair surprise” with respect to KB
or her potential testimony in this case. Jackson, 498 Mich at 278-279.

                                                -8-
460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). The evidence of defendant’s guilt on all the
charges was overwhelming.

        Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the other-
acts evidence under MRE 403 and MRE 404(b), by failing to request a limiting instruction on the
use of this evidence, and by failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper closing remarks. With
respect to the admissibility of the other-acts evidence and the alleged prosecutorial misconduct,
there was no error or impropriety; therefore, we conclude that counsel was not ineffective given
that failing to raise a meritless or futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. People v Putman, 309 Mich App 240, 245; 870 NW2d 593 (2015). In contrast, defense
counsel could have succeeded on a request for a limiting instruction on the use of the other-acts
evidence. See Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App at 443-444. But during the evidentiary hearing
on remand in this case, defense counsel indicated that she did not request an instruction because
she did not want to highlight or reemphasize the other-acts evidence to the jury. The decision not
to request an instruction can be a matter of trial strategy, and counsel has wide discretion in matters
involving trial strategy. People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 584; 831 NW2d 243 (2013).
Indeed, failing to request a limiting instruction on other-acts evidence may be a strategic decision
to attempt to downplay the other-acts conduct. See Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App at 445. We
have no basis or reason to second-guess defense counsel’s strategic decision on this matter.

       Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by raising political topics like “Blue Lives
Matter” during voir dire. In People v Sawyer, 215 Mich App 183, 186-187; 545 NW2d 6 (1996),
this Court observed:

               A defendant who chooses to be tried by a jury has a right to a fair and
       impartial trial. The function of voir dire is to elicit sufficient information from
       prospective jurors to enable the trial court and counsel to determine who should be
       disqualified from service on the basis of an inability to render decisions impartially.
       In ensuring that voir dire effectively serves this function, the trial court has
       considerable discretion in both the scope and conduct of voir dire. What constitutes
       acceptable and unacceptable voir dire practice does not lend itself to hard and fast
       rules. Rather, trial courts must be allowed wide discretion in the manner they
       employ to achieve the goal of an impartial jury. [Quotation marks, citations, and
       emphasis omitted.]

        In this case, among numerous other questions, the jurors were asked about issues related
to their feelings and opinions about the police. During voir dire, the trial court noted that almost
all the witnesses were police officers, and the court instructed the prospective jurors that testimony
from police officers could not be given any additional weight or credibility and must instead be
judged “in the same manner as anybody else.” The trial court then asked whether prospective
jurors would be able to judge a police officer’s testimony in this manner. In response, one
prospective juror indicated that he would “probably lean” toward giving an officer’s testimony a
little more weight in light of “recent events.” This juror then indicated, however, that he could
abide by an instruction not to give a police officer’s testimony greater weight.

       Following the mention of “recent events,” the trial court noted that the prospective juror
had “raised a good point here,” and the court asked whether anyone thought the police should be

                                                 -9-
defunded. Two jurors responded that they believed more training for police was warranted, and
one of those jurors also suggested implementing additional social services to take the pressure off
police; both prospective jurors were later peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor and dismissed.
The trial court also asked if the jurors believed that police officers should not be allowed to use
force to protect themselves or to arrest someone and whether they were comfortable deciding what
constituted an appropriate use of force. The trial court also asked whether anyone had heard of,
or was involved with, either Blue Lives Matter or Black Lives Matter, and whether that would
affect their decision in this case.9

        Overall, in a case involving charges of resisting and obstructing a police officer, fleeing
and eluding, and AWIM with a police officer as the victim, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by inquiring about the prospective jurors’ feelings about police officers and the use of
force in the context of an arrest. The trial court’s inquiry was a balanced one, aimed at discovering
whether prospective jurors had a bias against or in favor of the police. The trial court has wide
discretion concerning the scope of voir dire, and it clearly did not exceed that discretion in this
case. Indeed, defendant’s claim is unpreserved, but defendant has not identified any clear or
obvious error by the trial court, and he has not established plain error affecting his substantial
rights. See Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764.

        Next, defendant raises numerous evidentiary issues related to photographs, video footage,
and testimony from the troopers about their use of force and restraints and about defendant’s
injuries. Defendant contends that the evidence was far more prejudicial than probative. According
to defendant, the evidence was shocking and so dehumanizing that it deprived defendant of the
presumption of innocence. These arguments—the majority of which are unpreserved—lack merit.
We review unpreserved evidentiary issues for plain error affecting substantial rights, Carines, 460
Mich at 763-764, while preserved evidentiary issues are reviewed for an abuse of discretion,
keeping in mind that preliminary questions of law affecting admissibility are reviewed de novo,
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).

        “Under the presumption of innocence, guilt must be determined solely on the basis of the
evidence introduced at trial rather than on official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or
other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.” People v Rose, 289 Mich App 499, 517; 808
NW2d 301 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

                Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible at trial. Evidence is relevant
       if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the
       action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Under
       this broad definition, evidence is admissible if it is helpful in throwing light on any
       material point. However, even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
       value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
       the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation

9
 One prospective juror stated that she supported “the blue.” This same juror also indicated that
she had doubts whether someone would be brought to court if they had not done something illegal.
The defense challenged her for cause, and she was dismissed from the jury.

                                                -10-
       of cumulative evidence. [People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 114; 631 NW2d 67
       (2001) (citations omitted).]

        “All evidence offered by the parties is ‘prejudicial’ to some extent, but the fear of prejudice
does not generally render the evidence inadmissible. It is only when the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice that evidence is excluded.” People v
Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995).

        Defendant challenges testimony about the troopers’ use of force and their use of restraints
such as the Welch hitch and handcuffs, along with the officers’ employment of a spit mask.
Defendant also contends that Trooper Brown should not have been allowed to testify that he could
have potentially used lethal force against defendant under the circumstances. Defendant further
argues that the troopers should not have been permitted to testify that they were not disciplined for
their actions. In this regard, during redirect, the prosecutor asked Trooper Fry whether “any
disciplinary action” resulted from the incident. Similar to his challenge regarding the troopers’
testimonies, defendant maintains that video of the incident should not have been admitted because
it showed the troopers’ use of force and dehumanizing measures like the Welch hitch and spit
mask. Defendant additionally argues that the videos and photos of defendant, which were taken
the day after the incident, marked him as guilty and that their admission violated the presumption
of innocence.

        Defendant was charged, in part, with five counts of resisting and obstructing a police
officer. With respect to those charges, the jury was instructed that the prosecution had the burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted,
obstructed, opposed, or endangered the officers. The jury was also instructed that obstruction
included the use or threatened use of physical force or interference or a knowing failure to comply
with a lawful command. The jury was further instructed that defendant “must have actually
resisted by what he said or did.” We find that the evidence of which defendant complains in the
form of testimony, video footage, and photographs, was directly relevant to establishing the
offense of resisting and obstructing the five officers. Presenting evidence showing that a defendant
is guilty of the charged offense does not deprive the defendant of the presumption of evidence;
rather, it is submitted in an effort to overcome the presumption of innocence. The extent of the
officers’ actions in subduing defendant, i.e., using the Welch hitch, handcuffs, spit mask, etc.,
demonstrated that defendant was violently and aggressively resisting the officers’ efforts to
apprehend defendant, necessitating extraordinary measures to gain control of the out-of-control
defendant. The degree of force required to restrain defendant was relevant to the jury’s assessment
of whether defendant resisted and obstructed the police officers. And defendant’s criminal acts
occurred before he was placed in the patrol vehicle, as he was being put in the cruiser, and while
he was being transported. The probative value of the evidence was great, and it was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403; Mills, 450 Mich at 75.

                                                 -11-
Defendant essentially seeks to exclude damning evidence of guilt because it overwhelmingly
established his guilt.10

        Moreover, with respect to the testimony by Trooper Brown about lethal force, we note that
he actually testified, in response to a juror’s question, that he did not “perceive taking out [his]
firearm as the appropriate action” when encountering the assault against Trooper Alway. Trooper
Brown later added that he did not use his firearm because of the risk of striking Trooper Alway.
Defendant effectively acquiesced to the juror’s question, and his counsel then used Trooper
Brown’s response to argue in closing that defendant was not actually attempting to kill Trooper
Alway. We thus conclude that the issue was waived. See People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-
215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000) (“Counsel may not harbor error as an appellate parachute.”). In regard
to defendant’s challenge of the testimony that the troopers were not disciplined, defendant opened
the door to this testimony by first asking the troopers about their training regarding lethal force
and whether they had complied with their training. See People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192,
201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010) (“defendant opened the door to the question when he attempted to
undermine his companion’s credibility by pointing out that his statements to police were not
consistent”). Defendant then argued in closing that the troopers had not complied with their
training. See Carter, 462 Mich at 214-215 (discussing waiver). Testimony that there were no
disciplinary measures taken against the officers directly countered the claims of noncompliance
with the troopers’ training. With respect to photos and videos of defendant taken the day after the
offenses were committed, we find that his injuries were relevant to the jury’s assessment of the
troopers’ use of force against defendant. And, further, some of defendant’s specific injuries—like
his noticeably swollen hand—were relevant to the force with which defendant struck Trooper
Alway. Indeed, the prosecutor referred to the injury to defendant’s hand during closing argument,

10
   Furthermore, a defendant cannot claim error on appeal on the basis of error to which he
contributed by plan or negligence. People v Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 224; 663 NW2d 499
(2003), disapproved of on other grounds by 469 Mich 967 (2003). In this case, defendant
contributed to the admission of evidence and argument regarding the propriety of the troopers’
actions, their use of force, and the injuries defendant sustained as a result. Beginning in opening
statements, defense counsel asserted that the troopers needlessly responded en masse in an effort
“to line up as many officers as they can and wrap up as many charges as they can” against
defendant. During trial, defense counsel cross-examined the troopers about their use of force and
restraints during the incident and questioned them about their training on the use of such measures.
During closing arguments, defense counsel then used this evidence to argue that the troopers
violated their training. For example, she maintained that Trooper Brown should not have punched
defendant in the face. Defense counsel also argued that the troopers should have deescalated the
situation, but they failed to do so. She asserted that they instead escalated the situation—even after
defendant had calmed down somewhat—by using ankle cuffs, the Welch hitch, and the spit mask.
Having contributed to any error in the presentation of this evidence—and in fact having
endeavored to use this evidence for his own benefit—defendant cannot now be heard to complain
on appeal that the introduction of this evidence deprived him of a fair trial. See id.

                                                -12-
urging the jury to look at the picture of his right hand and to consider the force with which he
struck Trooper Alway “to end up with a hand like that.” In short, the evidence was relevant and
generally admissible. 11

         Next, defendant argues that the best-evidence rule should have precluded trooper
testimony, particularly any inconsistent testimony, about events depicted in the video footage
because the videos constituted the “best evidence.” Defendant also argues that prohibitions on
invading the province of the jury should have prevented Trooper Alway from answering questions
or offering opinions about the video from her in-car camera.

        Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the best-evidence rule did not preclude the troopers
from testifying about the events on the night in question. Under MRE 1002, to prove the content
of a recording, the original recording is required, “except as otherwise provided in these rules or
by statute.” In this case, to the extent that the prosecutor sought to prove the contents of the videos,
those videos were presented in compliance with the best-evidence rule. Defendant, in comparison,
appears to assert that the best-evidence rule functions to preclude all other evidence about any fact
that may be evinced by an original writing or recording. Under defendant’s interpretation of the
best-evidence rule, the troopers should not have been allowed to testify about the events on the
night in question because there was video available.

        Defendant cites no authority for this proposition, and it is without merit. Witnesses with
independent knowledge of substantive facts may be called to answer questions about facts within
their knowledge, notwithstanding that such information might also be evidenced by a writing or
recording. See Lund v Starz, 355 Mich 497, 501-502; 94 NW2d 912 (1959); see also New Jersey

11
   Related to the photos and videos, defendant makes the cursory assertion that he was prejudiced
by the admission of these materials because they showed his face bruised and bloody and—as a
result of having to wear a mask during trial as a COVID precaution—this was the only time that
the jury saw his face. The prosecutor has responded to defendant’s mention of masks and COVID
with a rationale-basis scrutiny analysis of Michigan’s masking mandate. But defendant does not
actually raise a constitutional challenge to the masking mandate. To the extent that defendant’s
argument can be read to incidentally challenge the masking requirements in place during trial, we
consider the issue abandoned because it has not been sufficiently briefed by defendant. See People
v Iannucci, 314 Mich App 542, 545; 887 NW2d 817 (2016). Indeed, in granting defendant’s
request for a remand, this Court allowed him the opportunity to develop an evidentiary record on
the masking requirements and other COVID precautionary measures. That evidentiary hearing
established nothing more than that—like everyone else in the courtroom—defendant wore a mask
during trial because of the masking mandates in effect at the time of trial in September 2020. His
trial attorney testified at the evidentiary hearing that she discussed the COVID measures with
defendant before trial, that she did not object to the COVID procedures, and that they went forward
with the trial knowing of these procedures because defendant had been “sitting” in jail and he
wanted to go to trial. Following the remand, defendant has not sought to file supplemental briefing
on the masking mandate, and it remains unclear on what basis, if any, he objects to the masking
requirement or any other COVID measure. We consider any COVID issue in this regard to be
abandoned, and we will not address this matter further. See id.

                                                 -13-
Title Guarantee & Trust Co v McGrath, 239 Mich 404, 408; 214 NW 195 (1927) (“The mere fact
that the information was also contained in plaintiff’s books of account would not bar the right of
the witness to testify to facts which he knew of his own knowledge.”). The troopers were of course
present during their interactions with defendant, and the best-evidence rule and the existence of
the videos did not preclude the officers from testifying about facts within their knowledge based
on their interactions with defendant. In fact, multiple forms of evidence might be used for
corroboration purposes, see Mills, 450 Mich at 76, and conversely, discrepancies between a
witness’s testimony and a video of an event may cast doubt on a witness’s credibility, see People
v Kavanaugh, 320 Mich App 293, 304 n 12; 907 NW2d 845 (2017). In short, we conclude that
the best-evidence rule did not preclude the troopers from testifying about the events on the night
in question, and any discrepancies between their testimonies and the videos merely raised
credibility issues for the jury. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

       With regard to the video footage, defendant also argues that Trooper Alway should not
have been allowed to answer questions or offer opinions about events shown in a video because
doing so invaded the province of the jury. This argument also lacks merit. MRE 701 allows lay
opinion testimony as follows:

               If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the
       form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
       (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
       understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

        If a witness is in no better position than the jury in regard to drawing conclusions from a
video, it is error for that witness to invade the jury’s province by offering opinion testimony about
the video. See People v Fomby, 300 Mich App 46, 51-52; 831 NW2d 887 (2013). But if there is
some reason—such an officer’s extensive review of a detailed video—that a witness’s opinion
testimony “could help the jury discern correctly and efficiently the events depicted in the
videotape,” it is not improper to allow opinion testimony to provide the jury a clearer
understanding of the video. See id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also United States
v Torralba-Mendia, 784 F3d 652, 659 (CA 9, 2015) (“[A]n officer who has extensively reviewed
a video may offer a narration, pointing out particulars that a casual observer might not see.”).

        In this case, defendant contends that Trooper Alway improperly invaded the jury’s
province by offering opinions on matters seen in the video. Contrary to defendant’s framing of
the issue, the questions about which defendant complains largely did not ask for Trooper Alway’s
opinion about the video. Instead, she was asked, as a witness to the events in question, about her
personal recollection. See MRE 602. There was nothing improper in questioning Trooper Alway
regarding how her memory compared to the video; such a comparison was in fact relevant to an
assessment of her credibility. See Kavanaugh, 320 Mich App at 304 n 12. For example, defendant
emphasizes that Trooper Alway recalled defendant saying something about wanting to kill her, but
she conceded that defendant did not use the word “kill” in the video footage but instead asked her
if she wanted “to die here, bitch?” Again, presentation of the video as a comparison to Trooper

                                                -14-
Alway’s testimony, as relevant to an assessment of the credibility of her testimony, was not
improper. See id.12

         Defendant next argues that Trooper Alway offered improper opinion testimony when she
testified that she did not think that defendant would have stopped punching her if Trooper Brown
had not arrived. A witness may not offer an opinion on an accused’s guilt or innocence, nor may
a witness tell a jury how to decide a case. People v Drossart, 99 Mich App 66, 79; 297 NW2d 863
(1980). Under MRE 701, witnesses may, however, offer testimony concerning their physical
observations and their opinions formed as a result of those observations. People v Oliver, 170
Mich App 38, 50; 427 NW2d 898 (1988), mod in part on other grounds 433 Mich 862 (1989).
Provided that a lay witness’s opinions are based on facts and circumstances within his or her
knowledge, a lay witness may express opinions on an actor’s state of mind. Drossart, 99 Mich
App at 73.

         In this case, insofar as she opined that defendant would not have stopped hitting her had
Trooper Brown not arrived when he did, Trooper Alway rationally offered this opinion on the basis
of her personal perceptions, as an individual involved with the altercation with defendant. See
MRE 701. She had already described how defendant pinned her to the ground, how he laughed at
her, how he made no “effort to get off her” but instead strangled her and punched her in the face,
and how he continued to assault her until Trooper Brown arrived and used his Taser. Overall, as
the victim of defendant’s assault, Trooper Alway was uniquely situated to rationally opine, on the
basis of her perceptions, whether defendant appeared to be enjoying the assault and whether he
would have continued to assault her if Trooper Brown had not arrived. Given defendant’s assertion
that he simply wanted to escape arrest, and given the prosecutor’s obligation to prove that
defendant had the intent to kill, this opinion testimony was helpful to the jury’s determination of
facts at issue. See MRE 701.

        Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Freeth to
offer opinions regarding whether Trooper Alway would have suffered more serious injury or even
death had defendant not been stopped from strangling her and punching her in the head. Initially,
we note that defendant provides no supporting authority for his assertion that Dr. Freeth’s expert
testimony in this regard was improper. By failing to adequately brief the issue on appeal, defendant
has abandoned his challenge to Dr. Freeth’s testimony. See People v Iannucci, 314 Mich App
542, 545; 887 NW2d 817 (2016). In any event, the argument lacks merit.

      Defendant’s argument appears to be that Dr. Freeth’s testimony regarding whether Trooper
Alway could have sustained more serious injuries, or even died, was irrelevant because defendant
was unsuccessful in strangling Trooper Alway for a prolonged period and because he only

12
  Moreover, to the extent that Trooper Alway offered opinions about things seen or heard on the
video, we note that the audio in the video from Trooper Alway’s car is not the best quality, and
because the video was taken at night, the images during the struggle are not the clearest, meaning
that lay opinion testimony was potentially helpful to the jury. MRE 701.

                                               -15-
succeeded in punching her approximately five times before he was tased. As noted earlier,
evidence is relevant and generally admissible “if it has any tendency to make the existence of a
fact that is of consequence to the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence. Under this broad definition, evidence is admissible if it is helpful in throwing light
on any material point.” Aldrich, 246 Mich App at 114 (citations omitted). In this case, whether
defendant intended to kill Trooper Alway was clearly at issue—indeed, it was the primary issue at
trial. Relevant to this question was whether the “instrument and means” used by defendant “were
naturally adapted to produce death.” Taylor, 422 Mich at 568. And Dr. Freeth’s testimony about
whether prolonged strangulation and additional blows to the head could have produced death was
helpful to shedding light on this material point, particularly given the evidence that defendant only
stopped strangling Trooper Alway because she broke his hold on her neck and that he only stopped
punching her because Trooper Brown forced him to stop. The evidence was relevant.

        Defendant also appears to contend that Dr. Freeth’s opinion testimony was confusing
because the jury may have been misled about what actually happened. That is, defendant asserts
that he was “convicted of a crime he did not commit due to the erroneous admission of acts not
based in reality.” This argument lacks merit. The basic facts in this case were not particularly
complex. Trooper Alway provided clear testimony about the exact nature of the assault, i.e., the
length of strangulation and the number of punches, and the jury saw video footage of the assault.
Dr. Freeth also clearly testified about the injuries that Trooper Alway actually suffered, and the
jury was presented with photos of her injuries. In this context, there was no meaningful risk that
the jury would be confused by questions to Dr. Freeth about the injuries, or even death, that
Trooper Alway could have suffered had she, and later Trooper Brown, not succeeded in stopping
defendant’s efforts to strangle and punch her. In sum, the probative of value of Dr. Freeth’s
testimony was not substantially outweighed by the risk of confusing or misleading the jury. See
MRE 403; Aldrich, 246 Mich App at 114 (citations omitted). We conclude that defendant has not
demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Dr. Freeth’s opinion testimony.

       Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on mitigating
circumstances in relation to AWIM under M Crim JI 17.4. Defendant preserved this issue by
requesting a mitigating-circumstances instruction during trial. See People v Everett, 318 Mich
App 511, 526; 899 NW2d 94 (2017).

               We review a claim of instructional error involving a question of law de
       novo, but we review the trial court’s determination that a jury instruction applies to
       the facts of the case for an abuse of discretion. Even when instructional error occurs,
       reversal is warranted only if after an examination of the entire cause, it shall
       affirmatively appear that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome
       determinative. The defendant bears the burden of establishing that the error
       undermined the reliability of the verdict. [Id. at 528-529 (quotation marks,
       citations, and brackets omitted).]

        “A criminal defendant is entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence
against him. Accordingly, jury instructions must include all the elements of the charged offenses
and any material issues, defenses, and theories that are supported by the evidence.” Id. at 527
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Additionally, a trial court must instruct the jury using the
Michigan Model Criminal Jury Instructions when “ ’(a) they are applicable, (b) they accurately

                                                 -16-
state the applicable law, and (c) they are requested by a party.’ ” People v Rosa, 322 Mich App
726, 739; 913 NW2d 392 (2018), quoting MCR 2.512(D)(2). In this case, with regard to the
AWIM charge, defendant requested an instruction on mitigating circumstances under M Crim JI
17.4, which provides:

              (1) The defendant can only be guilty of the crime of assault with intent to
       commit murder if [he / she] would have been guilty of murder had the person [he /
       she] assaulted actually died. If the assault took place under circumstances that
       would have reduced the charge to manslaughter if the person had died, the
       defendant is not guilty of assault with intent to commit murder.

             (2) Voluntary manslaughter is different from murder in that for
       manslaughter, the following things must be true:

              (3) First, when the defendant acted, [his / her] thinking must have been
       disturbed by emotional excitement to the point that an ordinary person might have
       acted on impulse, without thinking twice, from passion instead of judgment. This
       emotional excitement must have been caused by something that would cause an
       ordinary person to act rashly or on impulse. The law does not say what things are
       enough to do this. That is for you to decide. . . . .

              (4) Second, the killing itself must have resulted from this emotional
       excitement. The defendant must have acted before a reasonable time had passed to
       calm down and before reason took over again. The law does not say how much time
       is needed. That is for you to decide. The test is whether a reasonable time passed
       under the circumstances of this case.

               (5) If you find that the crime would have been manslaughter had the person
       died, then you must find the defendant not guilty of assault with intent to murder
       [and decide whether (he / she) is guilty of any lesser offense].

        The trial court denied the request for the instruction, reasoning that the instruction was
unwarranted because (1) defendant had time to cool off after his altercation with [KB] and was not
in the heat of passion when he first encountered Trooper Alway, (2) defendant had additional time
to reflect between his first encounter with Trooper Alway and when she again confronted him after
he crashed his car into a tree, and (3) the facts showed that the arrest was lawful and Trooper
Alway acted “entirely within her authority” during the incident. We hold that the trial court
correctly recognized that as a matter of law, a police officer’s performance of her duty in a lawful
manner cannot provide provocation that would mitigate a killing to manslaughter or constitute
mitigating circumstances in the context of AWIM charge.

        More than 100 years ago, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized that individuals have a
“duty to submit” to a lawful arrest and that the law will protect officers lawfully making that arrest.
See People v Durfee, 62 Mich 487, 495; 29 NW 109 (1886), superseded by statute on other grounds
as recognized in People v Carpenter, 464 Mich 223, 234 n 7; 627 NW2d 276 (2001). In this
context, an individual who is aware of an officer’s authority and intentions and who kills the officer
lawfully carrying out his or her duty will be guilty of murder, not manslaughter, because the

                                                 -17-
individual has a duty to submit to the arrest. See Durfee, 62 Mich at 494-496. Persuasive authority
also more specifically recognizes that

       [a] lawful arrest or detention in a lawful manner[13] by an officer or private person
       will not constitute an adequate provocation for heat of passion reducing the grade
       of the homicide to manslaughter, and the same is true of other lawful acts of officers
       while in the discharge of their duties. [40 CJS, Homicide, § 120.]

See also 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, § 15.2(b)(4) (3d ed) (“[A] lawful arrest cannot
constitute sufficient provocation.”).14 Defendant has identified no pertinent authority—nor are we
aware of any authority—to support the proposition that a lawful arrest carried out in a lawful
manner can provide adequate provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter or, by analogy, to
mitigate an AWIM charge to a lesser assault charge.

        Turning to the facts of this case, we find that defendant appears to concede the lawfulness
of the arrest and the lawfulness of Trooper Alway’s conduct during the arrest.15 He urges this
Court to ignore the lawfulness of her conduct, asserting that “the lawfulness of Alway’s actions
and the lawlessness of [defendant’s] were not relevant to [defendant’s] right to have malice
mitigated.” Defendant is mistaken in this regard. As recognized by the trial court and supported
by Durfee and the persuasive authorities cited above, Trooper Alway’s lawful arrest of defendant
in a lawful manner could not constitute adequate provocation to mitigate his AWIM charge to a
lesser assault charge. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its legal analysis of
mitigating circumstances and that it did not abuse its discretion by ruling that M Crim JI 17.4 did
not apply to the facts of this case.

        Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing on three grounds. First, he
asserts that resentencing is warranted because he was denied the right to be physically present for
sentencing. Second, he contends that the trial court improperly sentenced him pursuant to a local
sentencing policy rather than sentencing him individually based on a consideration of the
recommended minimum guidelines range as a whole, thereby violating the principle of
proportionality and the Sixth Amendment. Third, he maintains that resentencing is required with
regard to his fleeing-and-eluding conviction because the trial court improperly scored offense
variables (OV) for fleeing and eluding on the basis of facts related to his AWIM conviction.

13
  “The killing may be only manslaughter where a legal arrest is attempted in an unlawful manner,
as where the passion of the accused is aroused by the employment of unnecessary violence.” 40
CJS, Homicide, § 120.
14
  In contrast, an unlawful arrest may, depending on the specific facts of a case, provide provocation
to mitigate murder to manslaughter. See People v Eisenberg, 72 Mich App 106, 116-117; 249
NW2d 313 (1976).
15
   On appeal, as discussed earlier in this opinion, defendant has characterized actions by other
troopers as involving excessive force and violating the officers’ training. None of defendant’s
complaints, however, relate to Trooper Alway and her conduct leading up to, and during,
defendant’s assault on her.

                                                -18-
        Defendant failed to raise his physical-presence argument in the trial court; therefore, this
issue is unpreserved and reviewed for plain error. See People v Anderson, ___ Mich App ___,
___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022); slip op at 4. Although defendant is correct that he had the right to be
physically present at sentencing, he has not shown that the plain error in conducting his sentencing
by virtual appearance via Zoom affected his substantial rights. Accordingly, defendant is not
entitled to relief on this basis.

        A defendant has a constitutional right to be physically present during sentencing for a
felony conviction. See People v Heller, 316 Mich App 314, 318; 891 NW2d 541 (2016). Recently,
in Anderson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4-8, this Court addressed the right to be physically
present in the context of a defendant’s virtual appearance at sentencing during the COVID-19
pandemic. Recognizing that the defendant neither waived his right to be present nor objected to
holding the proceedings by way of Zoom video conferencing, this Court concluded that the issue
was unpreserved and that the defendant had established a plain, constitutional error in the
deprivation of his right to appear at sentencing. See id. at ___; slip op at 6. But this Court also
determined that the defendant had not shown that the plain error affected his substantial rights
where (1) the defendant did not assert that the virtual proceedings affected the trial court’s
determination of an appropriate sentence; (2) the defendant’s “actual participation in the
sentencing” via Zoom did not restrict the defendant’s ability to put forth evidence and argument
regarding sentencing, and (3) the remote participation did not “affect the composition of the record,
or otherwise undermine the fairness of the criminal proceeding as a whole.” Id. at ___; slip op
at 6-7.16

        Applying Anderson in this case, there is similarly no evidence, inference, or indication to
find that defendant’s treatment would likely have been different had he appeared in-person for
sentencing. As in Anderson, defendant appeared virtually at sentencing; his attorney was present
in the courtroom. Neither defendant nor his attorney expressly waived defendant’s right to
physically appear in the courtroom; however, they also failed to object to the use of virtual

16
   For example, in Anderson, this Court noted that the defendant had the opportunity to allocute
during sentencing; his counsel was in the courtroom to address inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report (PSIR), and the trial court “fully explained” its sentence. Id. at ___; slip op
at 8. There were also no technological issues affecting communication, i.e., “the trial court
appeared to have no difficulty listening” to the defendant. Id. The judge who sentenced defendant
was the judge who presided over the trial, and the record showed that “the trial court dealt with
defendant in a thoughtful, humane, and respectful way” throughout the case. Id. at ___; slip op
at 7. In a footnote, this Court also observed that the process was designed to ensure “the fairness
and integrity of defendant’s sentencing proceeding particularly in light of the circumstances of the
global pandemic.” Id. at ___ n 4; slip op at 8 n 4. Given all these circumstances, the Anderson
panel concluded that there was “no evidence, inference, nor indication that defendant’s treatment
likely would have been different had he been face-to-face with the sentencing judge.” Id. at ___;
slip op at 8.

                                                -19-
proceedings. The virtual sentencing was held during the global COVID-19 pandemic and
appeared to have been conducted with fairness and integrity in light of the circumstances created
by the pandemic. As in Anderson, defendant had the opportunity to allocute. His attorney also
advocated on his behalf, pointing out potential inaccuracies in the PSIR and asking the trial court
to consider a lesser sentence. There are no indications that there were any technological difficulties
or anything else that impacted communications during the hearing. The trial court fully explained
the reason for the sentence that it imposed, and the trial judge, who was the same judge who
presided over the trial, treated defendant with respect throughout the proceedings.17 Overall, there
is no evidence and no inference to be drawn to support that defendant’s treatment likely would
have been different with a face-to-face sentencing. Consequently, defendant has not shown that
the error in his physical absence from sentencing affected his substantial rights, and he has not
demonstrated that he is entitled to relief on this argument.18 Moreover, in light of the facts
regarding the sentencing procedure alluded to above that fully protected defendant’s rights during
the pandemic, we conclude that even if the forfeited error constituted a structural error, the
prosecution overcame the presumption that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the proceedings. See People v Davis, 509 Mich 52, 75; ___ NW2d ___
(2022).19

        Defendant’s local-sentencing-policy argument also lacks merit. A sentence will be held
invalid “when it is beyond statutory limits, when it is based upon constitutionally impermissible
grounds, improper assumptions of guilt, a misconception of law, or when it conforms to local
sentencing policy rather than individualized facts.” People v Miles, 454 Mich 90, 96; 559 NW2d

17
  Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court’s comments during sentencing suggest that the
court lost sight of defendant’s “personhood.” Specifically, defendant notes that the trial court
characterized defendant as a danger to the community and a “sick individual.” In context,
however, the trial court plainly expressed its opinions of defendant based on the videos of the
assaults, the other evidence produced at trial, and defendant’s lengthy criminal record. These kinds
of opinions—formed by the trial court as a result of the judicial process—do not demonstrate that
the court failed to exercise fair judgment during sentencing or to treat defendant with respect. See
generally People v Johnson, 315 Mich App 163, 196; 889 NW2d 513 (2016).
18
  We note that in his motion to remand, defendant included the physical-presence issue as a matter
on which he wanted to develop a further evidentiary record. This Court denied the request to
remand on this issue without prejudice to the case call panel’s determining that a remand is
necessary. See People v Stapp, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 22,
2021 (Docket No. 355976). Considering defendant’s offer of proof, we note that he does not allege
that he could present facts of the kind that would support the position that his physical absence
affected the sentencing outcome as required by Anderson. In these circumstances, we see no need
for a remand for further factual development on this issue. Defendant’s request for a remand on
this issue is again denied. See MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a).
19
  On January 12, 2023, our Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the issue regarding whether
denial of a defendant’s right to be physically present at sentencing constitutes a structural error.
People v Enciso, 509 Mich 937 (2022) (ordering oral argument on the matter relative to an
application for leave).

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299 (1997). In People v Chapa, 407 Mich 309, 310-311; 284 NW2d 340 (1979), our Supreme
Court held that the sentencing judge erred in limiting his sentencing discretion in accordance with
a stated local “policy of mandatory prison terms for heroin dealers despite . . . personal
qualifications for probation or leniency.” More recently, in People v Pennington, 323 Mich App
452, 466; 917 NW2d 720 (2018), this Court concluded that a trial judge’s “policy of sentencing
all defendants who go to trial to the top of the sentencing guidelines range is fundamentally
inconsistent with the principle of individualized sentences.”

        When considering whether a trial court has abdicated its sentencing discretion in favor of
a local policy, the trial court’s remarks and the sentencing proceedings should be reviewed as a
whole, considering all the factors and circumstances on which the trial court relied in crafting a
sentence. See People v Munson, 109 Mich App 39, 41; 310 NW2d 810 (1981); People v Hooks,
101 Mich App 673, 682; 300 NW2d 677 (1980). In Munson, 109 Mich App at 41, the sentencing
judge stated “ ‘that any involvement with drugs earns either time in jail or in prison[.]’ ” The
Munson panel ruled:

               [W]e disagree with the defendant’s application of the above stated law
       [under Chapa] to the instant case. We do not find that the one statement, albeit ill-
       advised, so overrode all other valid sentencing considerations as to void the
       sentencing on that basis. The record clearly demonstrates that the judge carefully
       pointed out different facets of the crimes and defendant’s record so as to render
       individualized sentences. Defendant was permitted to allocute at length concerning
       his own rehabilitation; the court considered a presentence report; the court on the
       record considered sentencing factors and mitigating circumstances; and the
       resultant sentences were well below the maximum sentences allowed by the law.
       When the judge’s comment is viewed in light of the totality of the sentencing
       proceedings, we are convinced that the judge did not base his decision solely on the
       above comment so as to evidence lack of exercise of discretion in individualizing
       defendant’s sentences. [Id. at 41-42 (citation omitted).]

        In this case, defendant contends that the trial court improperly followed a local sentencing
policy that involves looking to the middle of the guidelines range. This purported practice was
first mentioned by the prosecutor, who argued, in part, as follows:

               And it’s our position, Judge, and this Court has said it on a number of
       occasions that, you know, look at the guideline range. I mean, he’s [a fourth-offense
       habitual offender], which he’s been obviously convicted of now, so the guideline
       range is quite significant. And this Court has always said we look—we start in the
       middle and go up or down depending on the facts. If this case doesn’t warrant an
       upward, you know, upward of the middle of the guidelines, which is what the
       recommendation of 50 years on the minimum is, I don’t know what does. We’re
       asking that you follow that recommendation. We believe it is time that the
       defendant be incarcerated for a long period of time to ensure the safety of the
       community.

       The trial court later mentioned this begin-in-the-middle-of-the-guidelines approach when
sentencing defendant. But contrary to defendant’s argument, a review of the trial court’s

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sentencing explanation—as a whole and in the context of the totality of the proceedings—reveals
that the court did not abdicate its sentencing discretion in favor of a mandatory local sentencing
policy. Instead, the trial court exercised its discretion to tailor a proportionate, individualized
AWIM sentence. When imposing the sentence, the trial court reasoned as follows:

               Okay. Mr. Stapp, I think the parties have covered much of what the Court
       has already noted from the PSI. Sir, you stand before the Court this morning with
       four prior felonies, 18 prior misdemeanors. And really, what you—what you as a
       person, I think, boil down to in a presentence report in black and white writing here
       I think can be summarized from your history. I’m gonna read from the report here.
       It dates back to 1991 back when you were still a juvenile. You’ve got breaking and
       entering. And then, as an adult you have convictions that are replete with assaultive
       crimes. Domestic violence three different times. [Resisting and obstructing] of a
       police officer three different times. [Criminal sexual conduct] in the first degree,
       which you were sent to prison. You’re now on the registry for, which was a violent
       crime.

                Sir, you just continue to demonstrate that you are a threat to the community.
       You’re a threat to law enforcement. Your history suggests that, and this conviction
       is no different. And you’re a danger to the community. And it’s accurate that you
       shouldn’t have the opportunity to continue to be a danger to the community. And I
       don’t know how else to put it, I’ve said it to other people before you, you are what
       your record says you are. I don’t know which football coach said that. But when
       the Court receives a [presentence investigation report], you’re one of those guys
       that it’s very accurate, you are what your record says you are, and you are a danger
       to the community.

                And I don’t also want to lose sight of the fact that thankfully Trooper Alway
       is recovered but it doesn’t minimize what you did that night. The fact of the matter
       is if she hadn’t received help, who knows where this would be today. If she hadn’t,
       what I would characterize fought you with just great courage and bravery, who
       knows where we would be today.

               And the other thing that I can take from having sat through the trial is you
       seem to take great pleasure in assaulting people, and that was clear from the video.
       You’re a sick individual, sir, and I don’t know that I’ve ever seen a video that would
       suggest somebody enjoyed so much what they were engaged with at the time. You
       just simply can’t be in the community. I’m gonna follow this recommendation, sir.
       It’s appropriate. [The prosecutor] is correct when we talk about the middle of the
       guidelines. Even the recommendation is for more of the middle of the guidelines
       and that is clearly appropriate. You’ve earned this sentence.

        In contrast to Chapa, the trial court did not treat a middle-of-the-range minimum sentence
as mandatory, nor did the court abdicate its discretion to tailor a sentence specific to defendant and
his crimes. Instead, the record shows that the trial court took into consideration specific factors
related to the offenses, such as the severity of defendant’s actions and the apparent enjoyment of
his assaultive behavior, as well as information related to defendant as an individual, including his

                                                -22-
long history of violent crimes. From this, the trial court determined that defendant posed a danger
to the community. And ultimately the trial court tailored an individualized sentence to defendant,
making clear that the specific sentence imposed was proportionate to defendant and his offenses.
In sum, considering the trial court’s remarks in their totality and in context, we hold that the AWIM
sentence imposed by the court was valid and not the product of a local sentencing policy.

        Moreover, contrary to defendant’s arguments on appeal, there was no Sixth Amendment
violation, and the trial court fulfilled its obligation under People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392;
870 NW2d 502 (2015), to consult the guidelines range and to take it into account when sentencing
defendant. Indeed, the trial court sentenced defendant within the recommended minimum sentence
range under the legislative guidelines. Defendant presents a cursory assertion that the AWIM
sentence was disproportionate, but a sentence within the guidelines range is presumed to be
proportionate. People v Odom, 327 Mich App 297, 315; 933 NW2d 719 (2019). And absent a
scoring error or reliance on inaccurate information, we must affirm defendant’s sentence without
further consideration of its reasonableness. See MCL 769.34(10); People v Anderson, 322 Mich
App 622, 636; 912 NW2d 607 (2018).

       Finally, defendant argues that the trial court improperly assessed points for OVs 3, 4, 9,
and 13 with respect to defendant’s fleeing-and-eluding conviction on the basis of facts related to
defendant’s AWIM conviction. But even assuming error in the scoring of these OVs, the presumed
errors were harmless, and defendant is not entitled to resentencing on his fleeing-and-eluding
conviction.

         AWIM is a Class A offense. MCL 777.16d. In comparison, third-degree fleeing and
eluding is a Class E felony. MCL 777.12e. When, as in this case, offenses are of a different crime
class and the sentences are concurrent, the trial court need only score the guidelines for the offenses
in the highest crime class. People v Lopez, 305 Mich App 686, 690-691; 854 NW2d 205 (2014).
In other words, a trial court is “not required to independently score the guidelines for and sentence
the defendant on each of his concurrent convictions if the court properly scored and sentenced the
defendant on the conviction with the highest crime classification.” Id. at 690. See also MCL
771.14(2)(e). As a matter of law, only the higher-level offense needs to be scored, and
resentencing related to lower-level offenses is not required “because a shorter concurrent sentence
for the lower-level offense would expire before the longer concurrent sentence for the higher-level
offense.” People v Reynolds, 508 Mich 388, 394-395; 975 NW2d 821 (2021).

       In this case, defendant does not dispute that the trial court properly scored and sentenced
defendant on the AWIM conviction, a Class A offense. Consequently, the trial court was not even
required to independently score the guidelines for a lower-level Class E felony, such as third-

                                                 -23-
degree fleeing and eluding. Given that the sentences are concurrent, the guidelines range for the
Class A offense subsumes the guidelines range for the Class E offense, and there is no tangible
benefit or reason to reconsider the Class E guidelines. In fact, defendant’s shorter, concurrent
sentence for fleeing and eluding—6 to 20 years—will expire long before his 50- to 75-year
sentence for AWIM. See Reynolds, 508 Mich at 394-395. We conclude that in these
circumstances resentencing is not required even assuming scoring errors in relation to third-degree
fleeing an eluding because any errors were harmless. Id.

       We affirm.

                                                            /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                            /s/ Jane E. Markey
                                                            /s/ James Robert Redford

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