Court Opinion

ID: 9917319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 22:07:25.443337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:21.943656
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Ware v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2024-Ohio-47.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Kimani Ware,                              :

                 Relator,                               :                        No. 23AP-18

v.                                                      :                     (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation                       :
and Correction,
                                                        :
                 Respondent.
                                                        :

                                              DECISION

                                     Rendered on January 9, 2024

                 On brief: Kimani E. Ware, pro se.

                 On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and George Horvath,
                 for respondent.

                                   IN MANDAMUS
                    ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

BEATTY BLUNT, J.
        {¶ 1} Relator, Kimani E. Ware, filed this original action on January 10, 2023,
seeking a writ of mandamus to compel respondent, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction (“ODRC”), to respond to his public records request made pursuant to R.C.
149.43(B). This matter was referred to a magistrate of this court pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and
Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. On February 6, 2023, ODRC filed a
motion to dismiss for failing to adhere to the filing requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A).
        {¶ 2} The magistrate considered the matter and issued a decision, appended
hereto, recommending that we dismiss relator’s action because relator failed to include
State v. Ware, Lucas C.P. No. CR-2003-11-3491, 2018 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 6377 (July 18,
No. 23AP-18                                                                                  2

2018) and its appeal on his R.C. 2969.25 affidavit. More specifically, the magistrate
concluded the post-conviction motions seeking public records filed in the foregoing case
were required to be included in Ware’s affidavit, and because they were omitted, the
affidavit was deficient for this reason.
       {¶ 3} Ware filed timely objections to the magistrate’s decision on April 18, 2023.
Because he has filed objections, we must make an independent review of the record “to
ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately
applied the law.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). Having reviewed the record and the magistrate’s
decision pertaining to same and finding no error in his determinations of the facts, we agree
with the magistrate that the matter should be dismissed, but for a different reason than that
found by the magistrate.
       {¶ 4} R.C. 2969.25(A) states: “At the time that an inmate commences a civil action
or appeal against a government entity or employee, the inmate shall file with the court an
affidavit that contains a description of each civil action or appeal of a civil action that the
inmate has filed in the previous five years in any state or federal court.” The affidavit must
include the following:
              (1) A brief description of the nature of the civil action or
              appeal;

              (2) The case name, case number, and the court in which the
              civil action or appeal was brought;

              (3) The name of each party to the civil action or appeal;

              (4) The outcome of the civil action or appeal, including
              whether the court dismissed the civil action or appeal as
              frivolous or malicious under state or federal law or rule of
              court, whether the court made an award against the inmate or
              the inmate’s counsel of record for frivolous conduct under
              section 2323.51 of the Revised Code, another statute, or a rule
              of court, and, if the court so dismissed the action or appeal or
              made an award of that nature, the date of the final order
              affirming the dismissal or award.

R.C. 2969.25(A)(1) through (4).
       {¶ 5} The Supreme Court of Ohio has consistently held that R.C. 2969.25 requires
strict compliance. State ex rel. Ware v. Walsh, 159 Ohio St.3d 120, 2020-Ohio-769, ¶ 2,
No. 23AP-18                                                                                  3

citing State ex rel. Swanson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 156 Ohio St.3d 408, 2019-
Ohio-1271, ¶ 6; State ex rel. Washington v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 87 Ohio St.3d 258
(1999); State ex rel. Zanders v. Ohio Parole Bd., 82 Ohio St.3d 421 (1998); State ex rel.
Alford v. Winters, 80 Ohio St.3d 285 (1997). Nothing in R.C. 2969.25 permits substantial
compliance. State ex rel. Manns v. Henson, 119 Ohio St.3d 348, 2008-Ohio-4478, ¶ 4,
citing Martin v. Ghee, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1380, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1568 *3 (Apr. 9,
2002). Rather, “ ‘[t]he requirements of R.C. 2969.25 are mandatory, and failure to comply
with them subjects an inmate’s action to dismissal.’ ” State ex rel. Ridenour v. Brunsman,
117 Ohio St.3d 260, 2008-Ohio-854, ¶ 5, quoting State ex rel. White v. Bechtel, 99 Ohio
St.3d 11, 2003-Ohio-2262, ¶ 5; State ex rel. McGlown v. Mohr, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-478,
2015-Ohio-1554, ¶ 9. Nor can failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25 be cured at a later
date. State ex rel. Young v. Clipper, 142 Ohio St.3d 318, 2015-Ohio-1351, ¶ 9; Fuqua v.
Williams, 100 Ohio St.3d 211, 2003-Ohio-5533, ¶ 9; State ex rel. Armengau v. Ohio Dept.
of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-1070, 2017-Ohio-368, ¶ 12. Failure to strictly
comply with the requirements of R.C. 2969.25 deprives the court of jurisdiction over the
matter. See Armengau at ¶ 13.
       {¶ 6} A review of Ware’s affidavit submitted pursuant to R.C. 2969.25 shows he has
listed two cases that are deficient in the required information. The first of these is State ex
rel. Ware v. Rhodes, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-59, 2023-Ohio-2400, for which Ware identifies
the type of action as an “original action in mandamus” but fails to describe the nature of the
action. This court has held that an R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit that merely stated that the
case was an “original action in mandamus,” “does not actually describe the nature of the
action,” and is not a sufficient description of the civil action, subjecting the matter to
dismissal. (Emphasis sic.) State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Ohio Bur. of Sentence Computation,
10th Dist. No. 19AP-46, 2021-Ohio-70, ¶ 10, aff’d, 166 Ohio St.3d 497, 2022-Ohio-236;
State ex rel. Kimbro v. Glavas, 97 Ohio St.3d 197, 2002-Ohio-5808.
       {¶ 7} The second case is State ex rel. Ware v. Byrd, 8th Dist. No. 110865, 2022-
Ohio-1175. Ware was sanctioned double court costs in this case, yet he did not include the
required information regarding “the date of the final order affirming the dismissal or
award.” R.C. 2969.25(A)(4). Dismissal is proper if an affidavit “does not provide any
No. 23AP-18                                                                                  4

information describing the outcome of the actions as required under R.C. 2969.25(A)(4).”
State ex rel. Ware v. Walsh, 159 Ohio St.3d 120, 2020-Ohio-769, ¶ 3.
       {¶ 8} After conducting a review of the magistrate’s decision and an independent
review of the record, we find the magistrate has set forth correct findings of fact, but we
reject the conclusions of law. Ware failed to strictly comply with the affidavit requirements
of R.C. 2969.25(A), and this warrants dismissal of the action. Accordingly, there is no need
to address whether a postconviction motion for public records is required to be included in
a R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit.
       {¶ 9} Accordingly, we overrule Ware’s fourth objection and find his first, second,
and third objections moot, adopt the magistrate’s findings of fact, but reject the magistrate’s
conclusions of law. Substituting our own legal analysis set forth above, we find that Ware’s
R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit is deficient, and grant ODRC’s motion to dismiss. Ware’s petition
for writ of mandamus is hereby dismissed.
                                                         Relator’s fourth objection overruled;
                                       relator’s first, second, and third objection are moot;
                                                    respondent’s motion to dismiss granted;
                                                                             action dismissed.

                            DORRIAN and BOGGS, JJ., concur.
No. 23AP-18                                                                            5

                                       APPENDIX

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Kimani Ware,                    :

              Relator,                        :

v.                                            :                     No. 23AP-18

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation             :              (REGULAR CALENDAR)
and Correction,
                                              :
              Respondent.
                                             :

                           M A G I S T R A T E 'S D E C I S I O N

                               Rendered on March 16, 2023

              Kimani Ware, pro se.

              Dave Yost, Attorney General, and George Horvath, for
              respondent.

                                   IN MANDAMUS
                         ON RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

      {¶ 10} Relator, Kimani Ware, an inmate in the custody of respondent, the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), commenced this original action
seeking a writ of mandamus ordering ODRC to provide relator with certain contracts
requested by relator pursuant to his public records request under R.C. 149.43(B)(1). ODRC
has filed a motion to dismiss relator’s complaint for failure to comply with the filing
requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A).
No. 23AP-18                                                                                  6

Findings of Fact:
       {¶ 11} 1. At the time of the filing of his complaint, relator was an inmate incarcerated
at Richland Correctional Institution.
       {¶ 12} 2. ODRC is a public office responsible for, among other things, operating the
Ohio prison system.
       {¶ 13} 3. According to relator’s complaint, on October 4, 2021, relator sent a public
records request by certified mail to ODRC, requesting a copy of the contract between ODRC
and Global Link telephone company, a company that provides telephone services to ODRC
inmates. The request also asked for the receipts for commissions paid for services to ODRC
from January 1, 2019, through January 1, 2021. ODRC signed the certified mail receipt but
did not respond to his public requests request.
       {¶ 14} 4. According to relator’s complaint, on November 15, 2021, relator mailed by
regular U.S. Mail a letter to ODRC regarding his October 4, 2021, public records request.
ODRC did not respond to the letter.
       {¶ 15} 5. According to relator’s complaint, on December 6, 2021, relator mailed by
regular U.S. Mail a second letter to ODRC regarding his October 4, 2021, public records
request. ODRC did not respond to the letter.
       {¶ 16} 6. On January 10, 2023, relator filed the current petition for writ of
mandamus in this court, seeking a writ of mandamus ordering ODRC to provide relator
with the contract information requested by relator on October 4, 2021, pursuant to his
public records request under R.C. 149.43(B)(1).
       {¶ 17} 7. On February 6, 2023, ODRC filed a motion to dismiss relator’s complaint
based upon his failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A).
       {¶ 18} 8. On February 21, 2023, relator filed a reply to ODRC’s motion to dismiss.

Conclusions of Law:
       {¶ 19} The magistrate recommends this court grant ODRC’s motion to dismiss
relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.
       {¶ 20} Civ.R. 12(B)(1) provides a party may seek to dismiss a cause of action based
on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation. When reviewing a judgment
No. 23AP-18                                                                                 7

on a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(1), a court must determine whether the
complaint alleges any cause of action cognizable to the forum. T & M Machines, LLC v. Yost,
10th Dist. No. 19AP-124, 2020-Ohio-551, ¶ 9. “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction involves ‘a
court’s power to hear and decide a case on the merits and does not relate to the rights of the
parties.’ “ Lowery v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-730, 2015-Ohio-
869, ¶ 6, quoting Vedder v. Warrensville Hts., 8th Dist. No. 81005, 2002-Ohio-5567, ¶ 14.
       {¶ 21} A motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) tests the sufficiency of the
complaint. “In order for a court to dismiss a case pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) ‘it must appear
beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him
to recovery.’ “ T & M Machines, LLC at ¶ 10, quoting O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants
Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975), syllabus. In construing a complaint upon a Civ.R.
12(B)(6) motion, a court must presume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true
and make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek &
Merklin, 114 Ohio St.3d 323, 2007-Ohio-3608, ¶ 14.
       {¶ 22} The magistrate may take judicial notice of the pleadings and orders in related
cases when these are not subject to reasonable dispute, at least insofar as they affect the
present original action. State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-199,
2020-Ohio-2690, ¶ 33, citing Evid.R. 201(B); State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v.
Fitzgerald, 145 Ohio St.3d 92, 2015-Ohio-5056, ¶ 18; and State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh,
128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, ¶ 8. Furthermore, a court may take judicial notice of
pleadings that are readily accessible on the internet. See Draughon v. Jenkins, 4th Dist. No.
16CA3528, 2016-Ohio-5364, ¶ 26, citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d
195, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 8, 10 (a court may take judicial notice of appropriate matters,
including judicial opinions and public records accessible from the internet, in determining
a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion); and Giannelli, 1 Baldwin’s Ohio Practice Evidence, Section 201.6
(3d Ed.2015) (noting that the rule generally precluding a court from taking judicial notice
of other cases has been relaxed if the record is accessible on the internet).
       {¶ 23} R.C. 2969.25(A) requires an inmate to file, at the time he commences a civil
action against a governmental entity or employee, an affidavit listing each civil action or
appeal of a civil action that he filed in the past five years. R.C. 2969.25(A) provides:
              At the time that an inmate commences a civil action or appeal
              against a government entity or employee, the inmate shall file
No. 23AP-18                                                                                8

              with the court an affidavit that contains a description of each
              civil action or appeal of a civil action that the inmate has filed
              in the previous five years in any state or federal court. The
              affidavit shall include all of the following for each of those civil
              actions or appeals:

              (1) A brief description of the nature of the civil action or
              appeal;

              (2) The case name, case number, and the court in which the
              civil action or appeal was brought;

              (3) The name of each party to the civil action or appeal;

              (4) The outcome of the civil action or appeal, including
              whether the court dismissed the civil action or appeal as
              frivolous or malicious under state or federal law or rule of
              court, whether the court made an award against the inmate or
              the inmate’s counsel of record for frivolous conduct under
              section 2323.51 of the Revised Code, another statute, or a rule
              of court, and, if the court so dismissed the action or appeal or
              made an award of that nature, the date of the final order
              affirming the dismissal or award.

R.C. 2969.25 (A)(1) through (4).

       {¶ 24} R.C. 2969.25 requires strict compliance. State ex rel. Swanson v. Ohio Dept.
of Rehab. & Corr., 156 Ohio St.3d 408, 2019-Ohio-1271, ¶ 6. Compliance with the provisions
of R.C. 2969.25 is mandatory and the failure to satisfy the statutory requirements is
grounds for dismissal of the action. State ex rel. Washington v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.,
87 Ohio St.3d 258 (1999); State ex rel. Zanders v. Ohio Parole Bd., 82 Ohio St.3d 421
(1998). Nothing in R.C. 2969.25 permits substantial compliance. State ex rel. Manns v.
Henson, 119 Ohio St.3d 348, 2008-Ohio-4478, ¶ 4, citing Martin v. Ghee, 10th Dist. No.
01AP-1380, 2002-Ohio-1621. Furthermore, the failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25 cannot
be cured at a later date by belatedly attempting to file a complaint affidavit. State ex rel.
Young v. Clipper, 142 Ohio St.3d 318, 2015-Ohio-1351, ¶ 9.
       {¶ 25} In the present case, ODRC contends relator did not comply with
R.C. 2969.25(A) in two respects: (1) relator failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A) because
his descriptions of prior actions do not include all of the required information; and
(2) relator omitted State v. Ware, Lucas C.P. No. CR-2003-11-3491, 2018 Ohio Misc. LEXIS
No. 23AP-18                                                                                   9

6377 (July 18, 2018), wherein relator sought public records as part of his post-conviction
relief, and such actions are subject to R.C. 2969.25, citing DeVore v. Black, 166 Ohio St.3d
311, 2021-Ohio-3153 (“DeVore”).
       {¶ 26} With regard to the first argument, ODRC asserts that relator failed to comply
with R.C. 2969.25(A) because the listed cases do not comply with the requirements of that
section. ODRC’s argument takes a shotgun approach, citing case law relevant to each of the
requirements in R.C. 2969.25(A)(1 through 4) but failing to correlate them with any specific
deficiencies in relator’s affidavit.
       {¶ 27} The magistrate’s review of the list of prior civil actions and appeals reveals
that, although relator’s condensed format in listing and describing the prior actions makes
the list somewhat difficult to read, relator appears to have included all of the information
required by R.C. 2969.25(A)(1 through 4) for each of the stated prior civil actions and
appeals. Absent some specific argument pointing to a particular deficiency in the long list,
the magistrate finds the affidavit complies with R.C. 2969.25(A). Therefore, this argument
is without merit.
       {¶ 28} ODRC’s second argument, that relator omitted Ware in his affidavit of prior
civil actions, raises a thorny legal issue. In Ware, relator in the present case filed a “Motion
for Access to Court Records Pursuant to Sup.R. 44 through 47” and a “Motion for Access to
Public Records Under R.C. 149.43(G)” in his closed criminal case. Id. The trial court found
that relator brought these postconviction motions as public-records requests pursuant to
R.C. 149.43(B)(8), and denied the motions. Upon appeal in State v. Ware, 9th Dist. No.
29133, 2020-Ohio-3542 (“Ware appeal”), the appellate court overruled relator’s
assignments of error.
       {¶ 29} So the question now before the magistrate is: Are relator’s “Motion for Access
to Court Records Pursuant to Sup.R. 44 through 47” and “Motion for Access to Public
Records Under R.C. 149.43(G)” filed in Ware, and the subsequent appeal of the denial of
those motions in the Ware appeal, the type of “civil action” and appeal of a civil action that
are required to be included in an R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit?
       {¶ 30} ODRC cites DeVore to support its proposition that relator here sought public
records as part of his postconviction relief motions in Ware, and these postconviction
motions are “civil actions” that must be included in an affidavit of prior civil actions
No. 23AP-18                                                                                 10

pursuant to R.C. 2969.25. In DeVore, the court of appeals denied the appellant’s application
to reopen his appeal, determining that his appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing
to raise an allied-offenses argument. See DeVore v. Black, 5th Dist. No. 2020 CA 0074,
2021-Ohio-198. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. Thereafter, the
appellant filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus in the appellate court. The court of
appeals granted the appellee’s motion to dismiss, holding that the appellant had failed to
comply with R.C. 2969.25(A) and also that his complaint failed to state a cognizable claim
for relief in habeas corpus. With regard to R.C. 2969.25(A), the appellate court held that
the appellant’s affidavit of prior actions should have included the appeal of the denial of his
application for reopening, because an application for reopening is a “civil action” for
purposes of the statute. The appellate court reasoned that an application to reopen filed in
an appellate court is a civil action because an application to reopen is civil in nature and
affords a civil remedy.
       {¶ 31} Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, that court held in DeVore that
the court of appeals was correct to dismiss the appellant’s habeas complaint because it
failed to state a valid claim for relief. However, the court did not first address whether the
appellant failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A).
       {¶ 32} Concurring in judgment only, Justice Kennedy wrote that because an
application to reopen a direct appeal under App.R. 26(B) is not a civil action, the appellate
court erred in dismissing appellant’s complaint for failure to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A).
Justice Kennedy found that contrary to the majority’s position, whether an inmate has
complied with R.C. 2969.25 is a threshold question that the court must answer before
considering the merits of the inmate’s claim, and she would not let the court of appeals’
error go uncorrected. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy found that the court of appeals
assumed incorrectly that if a matter, remedy, or proceeding is civil in nature, then it must
be a “civil action” under R.C. 2969.25. Justice Kennedy explained that this “hasty
generalization—that all proceedings that are civil in nature are civil actions—caused the
court of appeals to jump to the conclusion that a person filing an App.R. 26(B) application
to reopen commences a civil action for purposes of R.C. 2969.25(A), without ever
considering what the term ‘civil action’ actually means.” DeVore at ¶ 16.
No. 23AP-18                                                                                 11

       {¶ 33} Justice Kennedy went on to further explain that a “civil action” (1) embraces
those actions that, prior to the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1853 abolishing
the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, were denoted as actions at law or
suits in equity, and other court proceedings of a civil nature come, generally at least, within
the classification of special proceedings; and (2) is defined by R.C. 2307.01 as an ordinary
proceeding in a court of justice, involving process, pleadings, and ending in a judgment or
decree, by which a party prosecutes another for the redress of a legal wrong, enforcement
of a legal right, or the punishment of a public offense. Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded: (1)
an App.R. 26(B) application for reopening is not a “civil action,” as traditionally understood
because: (a) its remedy did not exist at common law or in equity, but, rather, was
established by the court in 1992 by case law and adopted the next year by App.R. 26(B); (b)
an App.R. 26(B) proceeding does not fit within the common-law and statutory definition of
“action,” as it does not involve the service of a summons and the filing of pleadings; rather,
it provides for the submission of only the application to reopen and a memorandum in
opposition; (c) “application” is another word for a motion, and it is not synonymous with
the word “pleading”; (d) the applicant does not “prosecute” another party in seeking to
reopen the appeal; (e) a decision on the application does not result in a civil judgment; (f)
the appellate court initially enters only an order granting or denying reopening; and (g) the
case proceeds as an appellate proceeding that has the ultimate result of the appellate court’s
reviewing a trial-court judgment. Thus, Justice Kennedy opined, an App.R. 26(B)
proceeding is not a civil action within the meaning of R.C. 2969.25(A). Id. at ¶ 22.
       {¶ 34} Justice Kennedy found that the majority ignored the court of appeals’ error
and left standing its conclusion that an application to reopen is a civil action against the
state subjecting an inmate to the requirements of R.C. 2969.25. Justice Kennedy continued
that the logical consequence of the court of appeals’ holding is that an inmate must also
submit an affidavit of prior civil actions at the time that he or she files an application for
reopening in the court of appeals, which is not a requirement included in App.R. 26(B) and
is not treated as such by any courts of appeals. Justice Kennedy further explained that the
fallout from leaving the court of appeals’ erroneous holding in place as good law is the
application of this rule to other proceedings that are civil in nature in which the state or a
political subdivision is the party opposing an inmate; for example, a postconviction-relief
No. 23AP-18                                                                                      12

proceeding, citing this court’s holding in State ex rel. McGlown v. Mohr, 10th Dist. No.
14AP-478, 2015-Ohio-1554, ¶ 9. Justice Kennedy expressed concern that “it will not require
much imagination for a prosecutor to seek the dismissal of a petition for postconviction
relief on the basis that the inmate who filed it failed to also file an affidavit listing his or her
prior civil actions.” DeVore at ¶ 25. Justice Kennedy urged that the term “civil action”
should be accorded its established meaning, and that meaning is not synonymous with any
proceeding that happens to be civil in nature.
       {¶ 35} It is clear that the majority in DeVore failed to directly address the application
of R.C. 2969.25. However, by doing so, as Justice Kennedy acknowledged, the majority left
standing as good law the court of appeals’ finding with respect to R.C. 2969.25. In addition,
as Justice Kennedy mentioned, this court in McGlown concluded that a relator’s omission
of appeals of judgments denying postconviction motions from an R.C. 2969.25 affidavit
subjects the mandamus action to dismissal. This court ruled the same in State ex rel. Jones
v. McIntosh, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-269, 2023-Ohio-496 (finding relator failed to include in
his affidavit an appellate case affirming the denial of a successive motion for postconviction
relief; and relator also failed to include the associated case names, case numbers, court
names, and party names for the postconviction motions listed in his affidavit; therefore, his
affidavit did not comply with R.C. 2969.25(A)). In addition, it has been held that a
defendant’s postconviction public-records request is civil in nature. See Ferrero v. Staats,
5th Dist. No. 2018CA00016, 2018-Ohio-3235, ¶ 13 (finding that the trial court correctly
found postconviction public-records requests are civil in nature for purposes of the
vexatious-litigator statute).
       {¶ 36} In the present case, based upon DeVore, McGlown, and Jones, the magistrate
finds that relator’s failure to list Ware and the Ware appeal in his R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit
requires dismissal of his petition for writ of mandamus.
       {¶ 37} Accordingly, it is the magistrate’s decision that, based upon relator’s failure
to comply with the mandatory filing requirements of R.C. 2969.25, this court should grant
ODRC’s motion to dismiss relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.

                                                  /S/ MAGISTRATE
                                                  THOMAS W. SCHOLL III
No. 23AP-18                                                                        13

                               NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

              Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
              error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or
              legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
              finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii),
              unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual
              finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).