Court Opinion

ID: 9689759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:45:54.62574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:51.940789
License: Public Domain

On The Merits
There are four assignments of error. Assignment of error No. 1 complains of the court’s action in denying appellant’s motion to strike the amendment to the bill of complaint.
As we view the amendment, it is not a departure from the original bill, but is merely an allegation of a continuation of the offensive and obnoxious conditions brought about by the feeding of cattle instead of hogs. It seems to us that the conditions brought about by feeding and housing a large number of hogs would be, for all practical purposes, the same as from feeding and housing a large number of cows. There is no merit in this insistence.
The second assignment of error is based on the overruling of respondents’ demurrer refiled to the amended bill.
In the case of Kyser v. Hertzler, 188 Ala. 658, 65 So. 967, this court said, as follows:
“It is recognized as the rule that a private stable is not per se a nuisance. St. James Church v. Arrington, 36 Ala. 546, 76 Am.Dec. 332; 29 Cyc. 1181. It is also well understood, however, that: It may ‘become a nuisance by reason of the manner in which it is constructed, kept, or used, or by reason of the location being improper or necessarily injurious to a neighbor.’ 29 Cyc. 1182, and authorities there cited.
“The law may be regarded as settled that where a business, although lawful in itself, becomes obnoxious to neighboring dwellings and renders their enjoyment uncomfortable whether by smoke, cinders, noise, offensive odors, noxious gases, or otherwise the carrying on of such business is a nuisance which equity will restrain. Nor is it necessary that the nuisance be injurious to health to warrant the interference.’ 1 High on Inj. § 772.
“In Grady v. Wolsner, 46 Ala. 381, 7 Am.Rep. 593, it was said: ‘Anything constructed on a person’s premises which, of itself, or by its intended use, directly injures a neighbor in the proper use and enjoyment of his property is a nuisance.’
“The following from Wood on Nuisances (volume 2, § 597) is also in 5 point: ‘Not only may a livery stable become a nuisance by improper location and offensive or annoying results, but it is held that any private stable or barn may be so located with reference to the dwellings or places of business of others, and be so improperly kept and conducted, as to become an actionable nuisance. Even in the ordinary use of property, in its use for purposes that are regarded as incident thereto, a person is bound to prevent such use from becoming a nuisance to others if possible. A man has no right to erect a barn for the keeping of horses and cattle so near to his neighbor’s dwelling as to disturb the rest of those residing there by the noises produced by the animals kept there at night, or to manage it in such a way as to permit offensive stenches to emanate therefrom and float over his neighbor’s premises, to his serious annoyance and discomfort.’
“While ordinarily it is, of course, recognized that a man may do an act on his own place that is not unlawful, yet he is not permitted to use his own property to the injury of another. As quoted in the case of Hundley v. Harrison, 123 Ala. [292,] 297, 26 South. 294: ‘When he sends onto the lands of *163his neighbor noxious smells, smoke, etc., then he is not doing an act on his own property only, but he is doing an act on his neighbor’s property also, because every man has a right, by the common law, to the pure air, and to have no noxious smells sent on his lands, unless by a period of time a man has, by what is called prescriptive right, obtained the power of throwing a burden on his neighbor’s property.’
“We have statutory definitions of nuisance, as in section 5193,, Code of 1907, wherein it is said: ‘A nuisance is anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damage to another; and the fact that the act done may otherwise be lawful does not keep it from being a nuisance.’
“And again, as in section 5198, as follows:
“ ‘A private nuisance may injure either the person or property, or both, and in either case a right of action accrues.’
“Speaking to the right of the owner of land to the flow of pure air, this court, in Romano v. Birmingham Railway, Light & Power Co., [182 Ala. 335,] 62 South. 677, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) - 642,, said: ‘The right is incident to the ownership of land, and must be protected as well as any other valuable right. “No man has a right to interfere with the supply of pure air that flows over another’s land any more than he has to interfere with the soil itself.” ’ ”
We have set out, substantially, enough of the bill of complaint to indicate clearly that the demurrers were properly overruled.
Assignment of error No. 3 is as follows:
“It was error for the Court in its final decree to deny the motion to dismiss the bill of complaint as originally filed and as amended.”
The argument of appellant to support this assignment, of error is to the effect that because the original bill charged that appellant, Dr. Ray Evers, and Elbert Williams did all the acts complained of, whereas the proof showed absolutely no connection between Elbert Williams and any of the actual things averred in the bill of complaint as amended, therefore, there is a variance between the allegations and proof, which is fatal to the whole bill. We cannot agree.
The case cited in support of this proposition, Tedescki v. Burger et al., 62 Ala. 534, 50 So. 150, is evidently in error (the correct citation is 162 Ala. 534, 50 So. 150) and does not in any way sustain the view of appellant. While the evidence in the instant case does not support a finding against Elbert Williams,, and the trial court correctly so held, the trial court nevertheless could find the issues against Dr. Ray Evers, and there is no fatal variance between the allegations and the proof.
Assignment of error No. 4:
“It was error for the Court in its final decree to grant the relief to the appellees and complainants below therein awarded.”
As we view it, this assignment of error only questions the sufficiency of the evidence.
The evidence was taken ore tenus before the trial court, and in addition, the trial court viewed the premises before rendering his decree. In such a case, the findings of the trial court are like unto a jury’s verdict and will not be here disturbed unless plainly and palpably wrong.
We have examined the entire record and are clear to the conclusion that the decree of the trial court must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
LAWSON, STAKELY, and MERRILL, JJ., concur.