Court Opinion

ID: 9609116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:22:40.186719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:49.014917
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Justice, joined by BURKE, Justice,
dissenting.
Assuming that the superior court erred in permitting the prosecution to impeach Murray’s testimony with 1970, 1972, and 1976 crimes involving dishonesty, I disagree with the majority’s holding that this ruling constituted prejudicial error.
The superior court instructed the jury that in judging the credibility and weight to be given a witness’s testimony they were to consider in part “any motive of the witness not to tell the truth” as well as “any bias of the witness.” In regard to impeachment of a witness by prior conviction of a crime involving dishonesty the jury was instructed as follows:
The testimony of a witness may be discredited or impeached by showing that the witness has been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty. Such prior conviction does not render a witness incompetent to testify, but is merely a circumstance which you may consider in determining the credibility of the witness. It is the province of the jury to determine the weight to be given to any such prior conviction as impeachment.
Study of the record reveals that the prosecutor never referred to Murray’s prior convictions in the course of his final arguments to the jury. What was emphasized by the prosecution in final argument was Murray’s bias and motive for testifying as he did in favor of Clifton. As the majority of the court notes, “the State had a strong case even without the stale convictions.” Additionally, I think it of significance that the jury had before it evidence of Murray's evasive conduct immediately after the shooting, evidence of Murray’s inconsistent explanations of the shooting, and some indication that Murray had attempted to coerce one of the State’s potential witnesses.
Given the foregoing, I would hold that the admission of Murray’s past crimes in the context of this record was harmless error and thus would not mandate the setting aside of Clifton’s first degree murder conviction.