Court Opinion

ID: 9907748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 20:08:06.778325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:26.752607
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Douglas v. Lakemore, 2023-Ohio-4399.]

STATE OF OHIO                   )                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                )ss:                  NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                )

TRACY DOUGLAS                                         C.A. No.    30770

        Appellee

        v.                                            APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                      ENTERED IN THE
VILLAGE OF LAKEMORE                                   COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                      COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellant                                     CASE No.   CV-2021-07-2297

                                DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 6, 2023

        SUTTON, Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}     Defendant-Appellant, Village of Lakemore, appeals from the judgment of the

Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court reverses.

                                                 I.

                                        Relevant Background

       {¶2}     This appeal arises from the Village of Lakemore’s censuring of Mr. Douglas, an

elected council member, at a regularly held meeting of Village Council through Resolution No.

7083-2021. The resolution was presented at a Village Council meeting and immediately voted

upon as an emergency measure. Resolution No. 7083-2021 states, in relevant part:

        A RESOLUTION CENSURING COUNCILMEMBER TRACY DOUGLAS
        FOR INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT AND EXPLICITLY STATING THAT
        HE LACKS AUTHORITY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF OR BIND THE
        VILLAGE OF LAKEMORE.

Resolution No. 7083-2021 indicated Mr. Douglas made statements regarding a pending lawsuit

involving a Village police officer and the measures he could or would take to address the matter
                                                  2

in his official capacity as a member of Village Council. Resolution No. 7083-2021 further placed

the Village on notice that Mr. Douglas’ “views are purely his own, he does not speak for the Village

of Lakemore, and he has no authority to bind, negotiate, or otherwise take any action on behalf of

the Village of Lakemore as a political subdivision.”

       {¶3}     Pursuant to R.C. 2506.01, Mr. Douglas appealed the passage of Resolution No.

7083-2021 to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. The Village of Lakemore filed a motion

to dismiss, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1), alleging the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

because the passage of Resolution No. 7083-2021 was not an administrative decision from a quasi-

judicial proceeding. Mr. Douglas opposed the motion to dismiss and the Village replied in support

of dismissal. The trial court denied the Village’s motion to dismiss. In so doing, the trial court

reasoned:

        In this case, [the Village] claims it was not a quasi-judicial hearing. This [c]ourt
        does not agree. The resolution specifically states, in bold lettering, that Mr.
        Douglas was being “censured” for his “inappropriate conduct[.]” It also states that
        Mr. Douglas engaged in specific conduct and sought to censure him publicly for
        that alleged conduct. Based upon the Complaint and the [r]esolution attached
        thereto, on its face and considering the matter in the light most favorable to [Mr.
        Douglas], it appears the council engaged in some sort of proceedings wherein Mr.
        Douglas and his alleged actions were discussed and a decision was made to censure
        him.

       {¶4}     The Village then moved for reconsideration arguing it was not required, pursuant

to R.C. 731.45, to provide Mr. Douglas with notice and an opportunity to be heard with regard to a

censure. The Village further argued because there was no legal requirement for a quasi-judicial

proceeding, and a quasi-judicial proceeding was not had, the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over this matter. The trial court denied the Village’s motion and set a briefing schedule

for Mr. Douglas’ administrative appeal.
                                                   3

       {¶5}     Upon review of the parties’ arguments, the trial court issued a decision vacating

Resolution No. 7083-2021 because R.C. 731.45 did not give the Village Council free reign to

“censure” Mr. Douglas[.]”

       {¶6}     The Village now appeals raising one assignment of error for our review.

                                                  II.

                                   ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

        THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN EXERCISING SUBJECT
        MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE PURPORTED R.C. CHAPTER
        2506 APPEAL FILED BY [MR.] DOUGLAS AND FAILED TO GRANT THE
        VILLAGE’S MOTION TO DISMISS.

       {¶7}     In its sole assignment of error, the Village argues the trial court erred in denying its

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Chapter 2506 appeals may only be

taken from a final decision made during a quasi-judicial proceeding.

       {¶8}     “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to hear and decide a case

on the merits.” Pugh v. Cap. One Bank (USA) NA, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 20CA011643, 2021-Ohio-

994, ¶ 10, citing State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75 (1998), citing Morrison

v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus. “A complaint may only be

dismissed under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) when it raises no cause of action that is cognizable by the forum.”

Id. quoting Jones v. Summit Cty. Job & Family Servs., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27708, 2016-Ohio-

4940, ¶ 5, citing State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1989). See also Bringheli v.

Parma City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91064, 2009-Ohio-3077, ¶ 10 (“The

standard of review for a dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) * * * is whether the plaintiff has

alleged any cause of action over which the court has authority to decide.”).

       {¶9}     R.C. 2506.01 states:
                                                 4

       (A) Except as otherwise provided in sections 2506.05 to 2506.08 of the Revised
       Code, and except as modified by this section and sections 2506.02 to 2506.04 of
       the Revised Code, every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer,
       tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other division of any
       political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of
       the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is located as
       provided in Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.

       (B) The appeal provided in this section is in addition to any other remedy of appeal
       provided by law.

       (C) As used in this chapter, “final order, adjudication, or decision” means an
       order, adjudication, or decision that determines rights, duties, privileges, benefits,
       or legal relationships of a person, but does not include any order, adjudication, or
       decision from which an appeal is granted by rule, ordinance, or statute to a higher
       administrative authority if a right to a hearing on such appeal is provided, or any
       order, adjudication, or decision that is issued preliminary to or as a result of a
       criminal proceeding.

(Emphasis added.) “R.C. 2506.01 permits parties to appeal the final decisions of political

subdivisions ‘that result from a quasi-judicial proceeding in which notice, a hearing, and the

opportunity for the introduction of evidence have been given.” State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip.

Operators’ Lab. Council v. Cleveland, 141 Ohio St.3d 113, 2014-Ohio-4364, ¶ 33, quoting AT &

T Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Lynch, 132 Ohio St.3d 92, 2012-Ohio-1975, ¶ 8. Additionally,

“whether a proceeding is a quasi-judicial one from which an R.C. 2506.01 appeal may be taken

depends upon what the law requires the agency to do, not what the agency actually does.” Id. ¶

36. Further, “[w]hen there is no requirement for notice, hearing, or an opportunity to present

evidence, the proceedings are not quasi-judicial.” Id., citing M.J. Kelley Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Ohio

St.2d 150 (1972), paragraph two of the syllabus. “Despite the broad language of Section 2506.01,

the Ohio Supreme Court [] held that the jurisdiction granted by that section does not include

jurisdiction to review actions of legislative bodies: ‘The Administrative Appeals Act (Chapter

2506, Revised Code), providing for appeals from actions of administrative officers, tribunals and

commissions, does not permit appeals from acts of legislative bodies.’” Shaheen v. Cuyahoga Falls
                                                   5

 City Council, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24472, 2010-Ohio-640, ¶ 15, quoting Berg v. City of Struthers,

 176 Ohio St. 146, 146-47 (1964).

       {¶10}     In the present matter, the record reveals Lakemore Village Council passed

Resolution No. 7083-2021 to censure Mr. Douglas for speaking in his official capacity, as a council

member, regarding a pending lawsuit involving a Village police officer. Resolution No. 7083-2021

advised the public that Mr. Douglas’ personal opinion does not reflect the collective opinion of the

public body and Mr. Douglas does not have the authority to act on behalf of the Village Council.

Further, Lakemore Village Council did not engage in a quasi-judicial proceeding, nor was it

required to do so under Ohio law, prior to passing Resolution No. 7083-2021.

       {¶11}     Indeed, “[a] legislative act is presumed in law to be within the constitutional power

of the body making it, whether that body be a municipal or a state legislative body.” City of Xenia

v. Schmidt, 101 Ohio St. 437 (1920). Further, Resolution No. 7083-2021 is not “a regulation of a

general and permanent nature [] enforceable as a local law as it represents little more than the

[Village] Council’s opinion regarding the propriety of [Mr. Douglas’] activities.” (Internal citations

and quotations omitted.) Little v. City of N. Miami, 805 F.2d 962, 966 (11th Cir.1986).

       {¶12}     Therefore, because Lakemore Village Council’s passage of Resolution No. 7083-

2021 is a legislative act, and not a quasi-judicial proceeding, the trial court did not have subject

matter jurisdiction over Mr. Douglas’ R.C. 2506.01 administrative appeal.

       {¶13}     Accordingly, the Village of Lakemore’s assignment of error is sustained.

                                                  III.

       {¶14}     The Village of Lakemore’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the

Summit County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with

this decision.
                                                 6

                                                                                Judgment reversed;
                                                                                   cause remanded.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellee.

                                                     BETTY SUTTON
                                                     FOR THE COURT

CARR, J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

JOHN D. LATCHNEY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

JOHN CHAPMAN, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.