Court Opinion

ID: 9890752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-15 07:15:15.146099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:12.183517
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 10, 2023

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-22-00512-CR

                  DEVON GRANT MCCORKLE, Appellant
                                       V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 355th District Court
                            Hood County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. CR12602

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Devon McCorkle appeals the trial court’s judgment and life
sentence following the State’s Motion to Proceed with Adjudication of Guilt. He
contends the trial court twice abused its discretion and violated his Due Process
rights: first, when it admitted evidence of his confession obtained by law
enforcement following an alleged illegal polygraph, and second, when as he
alleges it failed to consider the underlying facts and rationale that led to his
“unsuccessful discharge” from the psychological counseling for sex offenders (and
thus violated a term of his probation). We affirm.

                   I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      On October 2, 2013, appellant was indicted in Hood County for the first-
degree felony offense of sexual assault of a child. Tex. Pen. Code § 22.021.
Specifically, he was charged with causing the penetration of the sexual female
organ of “PG13” (a pseudonym), a child younger than seventeen (17) years of age.
Later that month, appellant entered a written plea deal, which included his sworn
judicial confession of guilt to the charge of sexual assault of a child, and in return,
appellant received 8 years deferred adjudication community supervision.

      Appellant’s deferred adjudication community supervision agreement
included standard conditions over appellant’s conduct for the duration of the term,
including the condition that he not commit any new offenses (Condition One), and
the condition that he participate in and complete psychological counseling for sex
offenders (Condition Eighteen). The judgment challenged on appeal follows from
the hearing on State’s motion to adjudicate wherein the State alleged that appellant
violated these two conditions.

      In its June 3, 2021, amended motion, the State alleged first that “on or about
April 16, 2021”, appellant “intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of
the sexual organ of ‘NS11’ (pseudonym), a child who was then younger than the
age of 14 by [appellant’s] finger, a violation of condition number one of this
Court’s order.”1 The State also alleged that, “on or about May 15, 2021” appellant
“was unsuccessfully discharged from psychological counseling for sex
offenders. . .a violation of condition number eighteen of this court’s order.”

      1
       Appellant was indicted for this new allegation under State of Texas v. Devon Grant
McCorkle, CR15097, Hood County, District Court for the 355th Judicial District.

                                           2
       Appellant sought to suppress a polygraph he had consented to take regarding
the allegations pertaining to NS11 as well as an interview he consented to that
followed.      The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and the hearing on the
motion to adjudicate immediately followed. Appellant pled “Not True” to the
allegations.

       The outcry witness, NS11’s fifth grade teacher, testified about the outcry at
the hearing, and that NS11 reported two instances of appellant’s (NS11’s uncle)
inappropriate touching of her vagina, once over the past Thanksgiving holiday, and
a more recent instance when appellant had inappropriately touched NS11’s
“swimsuit area,” which her teacher understood to “mean her female sexual organ.”
The teacher reported the outcry to the police and then a forensic interviewer spoke
with NS11 about the incident.

       Neither NS11 nor the forensic interviewer testified at the hearing, but
Investigator Robert “Dan” Bradshaw, who observed the interview, testified,
without objection, that NS11 told the interviewer that when she “was young,
[appellant] would pull down her pants and lick it” and that appellant touched her
“swimsuit area with his finger, and she said he would try and push it inside.”
Bradshaw’s testimony at the hearing also included the details of appellant’s
confession.

       After the contested hearing2 on the State’s amended motion, the Court found

       2
          Appellant’s probation officer also testified, principally about the State’s allegation that
appellant violated the eighteenth condition of his community supervision agreement—for being
unsuccessfully discharged from psychological counseling for sex offenders. Though appellant
had been discharged under the program’s rules for missing three sessions and not turning in
certain assignments due, she admitted the only missed sessions occurred when appellant was in
jail (and thus physically unable to attend) and that the assignments not turned in could have been
due during the period in which the pandemic made it impracticable. However, because of the
disposition of this appeal, it is not necessary to determine if the trial court committed error in
determining that appellant violated Condition Eighteen of the order.

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the allegations of appellant’s violations of the two conditions to be true,
adjudicated the appellant guilty, and sentenced him to life in prison. Appellant
timely appealed.

                              II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

      We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);
Guerrero v. State, 554 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018,
no pet.). A revocation hearing is not a criminal prosecution, and the degree of
proof required to establish the truth of the allegation in a motion to adjudicate guilt
and revoke community supervision is not the same. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d
860, 864–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The State must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant committed at least one violation of the conditions
of his community supervision. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763–64; Guerrero, 554
S.W.3d at 273. The State satisfies its burden when the greater weight of the
credible evidence before the trial court creates a reasonable belief that it is more
probable than not that the defendant violated a condition of his community
supervision as alleged in the State’s motion. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc). The trial court abuses its discretion in revoking
community supervision when the State fails to meet this burden. Guerrero, 554
S.W.3d at 273–74 (citing Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984)).

      When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we afford
almost total deference to determinations of historical facts, especially when those
determinations involve assessment of witness credibility and demeanor. See
Masterson v. State, 155 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We review the
trial court’s ruling on an application of law to facts de novo. Herrera v. State, 194

                                          4
S.W.3d 656, 658 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d).

       In his first issue, appellant contends that “the Trial Court improperly relied
on illegally obtained facts and testimonial evidence from an unlicensed
polygrapher in the State of Texas who was also committing a Class B
Misdemeanor charge by conducting the polygraph of Appellant.” Appellant
complains that the test and resulting confession should have been suppressed (1)
because the examiner was neither properly licensed by the State of Texas to
conduct polygraph examinations nor did he have a waiver of the required license,
and (2) because he was not provided a complete record of the polygraph test as
conducted by the examiner. 3

       Indeed, appellant presented evidence showing that the federal agent (secured
by state law enforcement officials) who took the polygraph exam was not licensed
by the State of Texas to conduct polygraph examinations, that then-existing
proscribed procedures under the Texas Administrative Code were not observed,
and that he did not obtain a waiver to conduct such a polygraph examination. We
presume for the sake of argument, that the polygraph and the results should have
been suppressed, that the trial court erred in admitting the polygraph and any

3
  Unlike in an ordinary criminal proceeding, in the context of a trial court’s decision to
adjudicate guilt, polygraph examinations and their results are not prohibited evidence, but use of
such evidence is controlled by statute, such that courts are prohibited to proceed if the State
presents nothing more than “uncorroborated results of a polygraph examination”. Compare
Jasso v. State, 112 S.W.3d 805, 813 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
ref’d)(explaining in context of a trial on felony charges “[b]ecause of their inherent unreliability
and tendency to be unduly persuasive, the existence and results of polygraph examinations are
inadmissible for any purpose in a criminal proceeding on proper objection”) with Tex. Code
Crim. Pro. art. 42A.108(b) (“The court may not proceed with an adjudication of guilt on the
original charge if the court finds that the only evidence supporting the alleged violation of a
condition of deferred adjudication community supervision is the uncorroborated results of a
polygraph examination.”). Accordingly, appellant did not seek to suppress the polygraph as
categorically inadmissible evidence, but challenged the polygraph procedure.

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testimony about the results of the polygraph.

      As part of the motion to suppress, appellant contends that his confession
provided in his post-polygraph interview should also have been excluded.
Evidence that is the fruit of unlawful government conduct is subject to suppression,
Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64
L.Ed. 319 (1920), as is evidence resulting from exploitation of the tainted source.
United States v. Namer, 835 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1988).

      Appellant has not provided any authority on point, nor after reasonable
research have we found any, to supporting his contention that the inadmissibility of
the polygraph test taints, or implicates the inadmissibility of, his confession given
after the exam. There are, however, decisions of Texas courts stating the reverse
proposition. Collins v. State, 352 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961) (“The
fact that appellant was given a lie detector test prior to making the confession did
not render the same inadmissible.”); Black v. State, 677 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) (“[P]romises made to the appellant to induce him
to take his polygraph examination did not “taint” nor render the appellant’s
confession inadmissible.”), rev’d on other grounds (“pretext” arrest), 739 S.W.2d
240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).           Appellant has provided no evidence
demonstrating any connection between the alleged violations in polygraph
procedure and his subsequent confession.          In this case we are unconvinced
appellant’s confession was tainted by the polygraph.

      Appellant also contends that he suffered a Due Process violation. However,
absent police misconduct causally related to the confession, there is “simply no
basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due
process of law.” Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 169–70 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008).

                                         6
        During the suppression hearing, the trial court heard testimony that before
the federal agent performed the polygraph examination, the following occurred:
appellant was provided a “Voluntary Polygraph Examination Statement of
Consent”; appellant initialed that he understood the examination would regard his
alleged sexual contact with NS11; appellant then certified that he was in good
mental and physical condition, and was able to complete a polygraph examination;
and appellant attested that he understood that he did not have to take the
examination and that he had the right to terminate the test and interview at any
time.    Appellant presented no factual support to prevent the trial court from
concluding that no police misconduct causally related to the confession occurred,
that appellant suffered no coercion by virtue of the polygraph, or that he lacked
volition in any manner in providing a detailed confession.

        We therefore consider whether the court’s presumed error—its admission of
the fact the polygraph was taken, any evidence of the examination and the agent’s
conclusion that appellant had been untruthful—was harmless.              Error in the
admission of evidence constitutes non-constitutional error. Goudeau v. State, 209
S.W.3d 713, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Only an error
that affects a substantial right of the defendant constitutes reversible error. See Tex.
R. App. P. 44.2(b).    Evidence of a defendant’s guilt is a factor to consider in a
harm analysis. Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002);
Richard v. State, No. 14-19-00592-CR, 2022 WL 252094, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 27, 2022, no pet.)(considering evidence of guilt while
reviewing harm in a court’s evidentiary decision on motion to adjudicate).

        Evidence of appellant’s guilt with respect to the offense supporting the
alleged violation of the first condition was overwhelming. During the hearing,
Bradshaw testified about what appellant told Bradshaw and other law enforcement

                                           7
officers, including appellant’s confession:

      Q. Well, when asked when he first touched S -- or NS11, what was his
      answer?
      A. Well, the first time according to his statements, he was -- he stated
      that, “We were on the porch and I was sitting on a chair and she was
      just on the porch. And it was just me and her and, you know, I called
      her over and I just, you know, rubbed her vagina.”
      Q. What did he tell you about the second time?
      A. The second time he stated -- the second time was skin-on-skin. I
      believe that was at her house.
      Q. What did he tell you about that?
      A. It was on Yana Court, that it was on the couch. “I put my hand
      down her pants and I was just like rubbing her vagina on the outside,
      but I was rubbing like basically the whole vagina.”
      Q. Did he tell you about a time after that?
      A. Yes, sir.
      Q. And tell me about that.
      A. He stated, “I got drunk probably a couple of weeks later, and we
      were like -- it wasn’t just us in the room either. I forgot what we were
      doing, if we were watching a movie or playing games or something,
      but I don’t really even remember like the lead-up to me licking her
      vagina. All I remember is me just pulling her pants down and licking
      it.”
      Q. Did you ask him if he penetrated her vagina?
      A. Yes, sir.
      Q. And what did he say?
      A. At -- for the most part, he said, “My hand was down her pants, and
      so I was like rubbing like the whole -- in between her lips. Like I
      wasn’t trying to penetrate her. I was between her lips, you know, but I
      wasn’t trying to like go inside of her or anything like that.”
      Q. So he told you that he was rubbing with his hands in between her
      lips. Is that what he told you?
      A. Yes, sir.

                                          8
      Q. And was that her -- of her female sexual organ?
      A. Yes.
      Q. And at this time NS11, as it’s said in her pseudonym, was 11 years
      of age?
      A. At the time of the outcry.
      Q. Okay. So at the time of the offense, she would have to have been
      less than 14 years of age?
      A. Yes, sir.
      Q. And this Defendant told you that he caused the penetration of her
      female sexual organ by his finger?
      A. Yes, sir.
      Q. And that that happened before the 16th day of April, 2021?
      A. Yes, sir.
      Q. And it happened in Hood County, Texas?
      A. Yes, sir.
      In a revocation hearing, such a confession can alone serve as a basis for the
court’s revocation. See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 866 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). Yet, in addition to the confession, the trial court heard testimony from
Bradshaw about NS11’s statements to the forensic investigator, as well as
testimony from the State’s outcry witness.

      Applying the applicable standard of review, and in light of the various
sources of proof substantiating the elements of sexual assault of a child offense and
thus violation of Condition One of his community supervision, we cannot find that
appellant’s substantial rights were affected by the trial court’s presumed-erroneous
admission of the polygraph results. See Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 721
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.)(harmless error where other
evidence standing alone would be sufficient to support finding).

      Appellant’s first issue is overruled.

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                                III. CONCLUSION

      Because we overrule appellant’s first issue which pertains to the violation of
Condition One, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and conviction.

                                      /s/    Randy Wilson
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Zimmerer, and Wilson.

Do not publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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