Court Opinion

ID: 9678403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:18:47.476996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:04.209136
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting in part.
While I concur in the judgment of the court, I do not concur in that part of the opinion which attempts to restate the circumstantial evidence rule.
There is no burden upon the State to disprove any hypothesis of nonguilt. The burden upon the State is to prove the defendant guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. When the State relies upon circumstantial evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt, a determination must be made whether the inferences which can be drawn by the trier of fact from that evidence, together with all the other evidence, are sufficient to permit a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the inferences to be drawn from particular facts are equally consistent with guilt or innocence, then it should be clear that those facts alone are not sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is only when the inference of guilt is stronger than any reasonable inference of nonguilt that the evidence presents a question for the trier of fact and will sustain a finding of guilt.
It seems to me a statement that an accused may be convicted “on the basis of circumstantial evidence if, taken as a whole, the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” is incomplete and misleading unless it is accompanied by a statement which incorporates the requirement that, among permissible inferences, the inference of guilt must be stronger than any reasonable inference of nonguilt.