Court Opinion

ID: 9379715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 14:02:39.923431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.387436
License: Public Domain

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic
and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of
any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go
to press.

             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 22-BG-0629

IN RE TERRY LEE WIKE, ESQUIRE,
                                                    DDN:2020-D077
A Member of the Bar of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Bar Registration No. 1003642

BEFORE: Easterly and Howard, Associate Judges, and Thompson, Senior Judge.

                                   ORDER
                             (FILED—March 16, 2023)

       On consideration of the certified order from the state of Nevada suspending
respondent for six months and one day for misappropriating and commingling client
funds; this court’s August 23, 2022, order suspending respondent pending final
disposition of this proceeding and directing him to show cause why reciprocal
discipline should not be imposed; respondent’s response agreeing to reciprocal
discipline and requesting immediate reinstatement; the statement of Disciplinary
Counsel requesting the imposition of substantially different discipline in the form of
disbarment; respondent’s lodged late reply opposing substantially different
discipline and reiterating his request for immediate reinstatement; and respondent’s
D.C. Bar XI, § 14(g) affidavit filed on September 27, 2022, it is

      ORDERED that respondent’s lodged late reply is filed. It is

       FURTHER ORDERED that Terry Lee Wike is hereby disbarred from the
practice of law in the District of Columbia, nunc pro tunc to September 27, 2022.
“Disbarment is the presumptive sanction for intentional misappropriation of client
funds,” In re O’Neill, 276 A.3d 492, 503 (D.C. 2022), and a lesser sanction than
disbarment in cases of misappropriation is appropriate only in extraordinary
circumstances. See In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 191 (D.C. 1990) (en banc); see
also In re Sibley, 990 A.2d 483, 487-88 (D.C. 2010) (explaining that there is a
rebuttable presumption in favor of imposition of identical discipline and exceptions
No. 22-BG-0629

to this presumption should be rare); In re Jacoby, 945 A.2d 1193, 1199-1200 (D.C.
2008) (describing the two-step inquiry for concluding whether the “substantially
different discipline” exception applies as determining whether the misconduct would
have resulted in the same punishment and if the discipline would be different,
whether the difference is “substantial”). Although respondent asserts that he was
not found to have intentionally misappropriated client funds, the Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed the disciplinary panel’s findings that he “knowingly converted client
funds to benefit himself.” The court’s determination that respondent had that state
of mind precludes a determination that disbarment is unwarranted because the
misappropriation “was inadvertent or the result of simple negligence.” See In re
Pierson, 690 A.2d 941, 949 (D.C. 1997); see also In re Addams, 579 A.2d at 191
(“reaffirm[ing] that in virtually all cases of misappropriation, disbarment will be the
only appropriate action unless it appears that the misconduct resulted from nothing
more than simple negligence”). Lastly, while there is no dispute that respondent
paid his clients and their lienholders, this mitigating factor “of the usual sort” is not
“especially strong” nor does it “substantially outweigh any aggravating factors,”
namely respondent’s prior discipline in Nevada for the same misconduct and
commitment of the underlying acts during the earlier disciplinary investigation. See
In re Pierson, 690 A.2d at 950 (quoting In re Addams, 579 A.2d at 191).

                                   PER CURIAM