Court Opinion

ID: 9957289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 00:00:43.479954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:13.555618
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50305           Document: 72-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                                  ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                  April 3, 2024
                                   No. 23-50305                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                  ____________                                         Clerk

Camilo Ramirez,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

Plains All American GP, L.L.C.,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                             USDC No. 4:21-CV-70
                  ______________________________

Before King, Ho, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
      This appeal arises out of a jury verdict finding the defendant-employer
not liable for age discrimination against its former employee. The former
employee asserts that the district court erred in (1) denying his Batson
challenge and (2) rejecting his proposed cat’s paw jury instruction. For the
following reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
          I.    Factual and Procedural Background

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                 No. 23-50305

       Camilo Ramirez worked as a driver for Plains All American GP, L.L.C.
(“Plains”) beginning in approximately 1996. Plains is a crude oil transporter
that relies on its trucking department to transport the oil from lease sites to
refineries and truck facilities. Other than a short period when he worked for
a competitor, Ramirez drove trucks for Plains for almost twenty-five years.
       On August 30, 2020, Plains terminated Ramirez following a series of
workplace violations. In July 2018, Ramirez received a corrective action
report—designated “Warning #1”—for failing to properly haul a load of oil.
In April 2019, Ramirez received another corrective action report—
designated “Warning #2 Final”—after an accident caused by his failure to
properly conduct a pre-trip inspection. In November 2019, Ramirez received
a corrective action report for failing to properly work and treat a load of oil.
Because warnings are only in effect for twelve months, this warning was also
designated “Warning #2 Final” based on the timing of the previous
violations. In August 2020, Ramirez received another corrective action
report for his failure to stay within twenty-five feet of his vehicle during the
pumping process. Again, this was designated “Warning #2 Final” because of
the violation’s timing. Finally, two days after the August 2020 incident,
Ramirez argued with one of Plains’ customers, left the lease location without
ensuring his vehicle’s vent was closed, exceeded the speed limit, and
damaged his vehicle while driving. Shortly thereafter, Plains’ Managing
Director of Trucking, David Danielson, reviewed all relevant incident
reports and the recommendations made by Ramirez’s immediate
supervisors. Based on this information, Danielson decided to terminate
Ramirez.
       Ramirez filed suit against Plains in August 2021, alleging that Plains
discriminated against him on the basis of age and national origin when they
fired him. Ramirez alleged that, in the Pecos District where he worked, only
three drivers were terminated from January 2015 to the end of 2022, and two

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of those drivers—including himself at age sixty-four—were the oldest in the
district. Ramirez alleged that his immediate supervisor, Wayland Gene
Durham, a forty-five-year-old man, talked to Ramirez about the possibility of
retiring in exchange for a severance package. Ramirez further alleged that
other, younger drivers committed the same or similar workplace violations,
yet were not fired. According to Ramirez, when he was ultimately
terminated, he was replaced with a younger driver who was forty years old at
the time. Finally, Ramirez alleged that Danielson “rubberstamped” the
termination without interviewing Ramirez or conducting his own
investigation into the corrective action reports.
       The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plains on
Ramirez’s claim for national origin discrimination. The case then proceeded
to trial on Ramirez’s age discrimination claim. The jury found that Plains did
not discriminate against Ramirez based on his age, and final judgment was
entered in favor of Plains on March 27, 2023. Ramirez timely appealed.
        II.   Standards of Review
          a. Batson challenges
       The Supreme Court describes the appellate standard of review for a
trial court’s factual determinations during a Batson challenge as “highly
deferential.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 479 (2008). “On appeal, a
trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained
unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. at 477. “The district court’s decision is
clear error ‘only if it is implausible in light of the record considered as a
whole.’” United States v. Thomas, 847 F.3d 193, 208 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Brumfield v. Cain, 808 F.3d 1041, 1057 (5th Cir. 2015)).
          b. Jury instructions
       “We review challenges to jury instructions for abuse of discretion and
afford the trial court great latitude in the framing and structure of jury

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instructions.” Eastman Chem. Co. v. Plastipure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 240 (5th
Cir. 2014). “In order to demonstrate reversible error, the party challenging
the instruction must show that the charge ‘creates substantial and
ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its
deliberations.’” Id. (quoting Taita Chem. Co. v. Westlake Styrene, LP, 351
F.3d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 2003)). “The instructions need not be perfect in every
respect provided that the [charge] in general correctly instructs the jury, and
any injury resulting from the erroneous instruction is harmless.” Rogers v.
Eagle Offshore Drilling Servs., Inc., 764 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1985). “We do
not reverse on the grounds of an erroneous instruction if the error ‘could not
have affected the outcome of the case.’” Eastman Chem. Co., 775 F.3d at 240
(quoting F.D.I.C. v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1318 (5th Cir. 1994)).
       III.    Analysis
       Ramirez raises two arguments on appeal: (1) the district court erred in
denying Ramirez’s Batson challenge to the exercise of Plains’ peremptory
strikes; and (2) the district court erred in refusing to give a cat’s paw
instruction to the jury. We address each argument in turn.
           a. Batson challenge
       Ramirez first argues that the district court erred in denying his Batson
challenge after Plains exercised “all three of its strikes against potential jurors
of Hispanic national origin.” Ramirez argues that Plains’ stated reasons for
striking the potential jurors were pretext for discrimination, and the district
court should have reinstated the jurors. Thus, Ramirez asks this Court to
reverse and remand for a new trial.
       In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the discriminatory
striking of potential jurors by the Government based on the individuals’
race—there, African American—violates the Constitution. 476 U.S. 79
(1986), holding modified by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). This

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prohibition on the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes has since been
extended to the civil context, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614
(1991), and to include other ethnicities, United States v. Munoz, 15 F.3d 395,
399 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Striking a juror on the basis of race, including Hispanic
ethnicity, clearly violates Batson.”). See also Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct.
2228, 2243 (2019) (“A defendant of any race may raise a Batson claim, and a
defendant may raise a Batson claim even if the defendant and the excluded
juror are of different races.”).
       The Supreme Court has “outlined a three-step process for evaluating
claims that a [party] has used peremptory challenges in a manner violating
the Equal Protection Clause.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358
(1991). First, the party making the Batson challenge must make a prima facie
showing that the striking party exercised its peremptory challenge on the
basis of race (or other protected characteristic). Id. “Second, if the requisite
showing has been made, the burden shifts to the [striking party] to articulate
a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question.” Id. at 358–59.
“Finally, the trial court must determine whether the [challenging party] has
carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 359.
       “The trial court’s decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory
intent is a finding of fact usually accorded great deference on appeal because
of the inherent credibility assessment.” Moore v. Keller Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d
199, 201 (5th Cir. 1991). “The district court has the discretion to fashion the
procedure necessary to evaluate counsel’s race-neutral explanation.” Id.
“Once counsel has offered a race-neutral explanation and the trial court has
ruled on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, we need consider
only the sufficiency of the race-neutral reasons articulated by” the striking
party. Id. This is because “the job of enforcing Batson rests first and foremost
with trial judges.” Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2243.

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       Here, Ramirez raised a prima facie valid Batson challenge with the
district court when Plains used all of its peremptory strikes on three Hispanic
potential jurors. See Thomas, 847 F.3d at 208 (challenging party makes out
prima facie case where striking party used all of its strikes on White jurors
only). Thus, the burden shifted to Plains to provide race-neutral explanations
for striking these potential jurors.
       In Hernandez v. New York, the Supreme Court explained that a race-
neutral explanation is based upon something other than the juror’s race. 500
U.S. at 360. This second step of the Batson process “does not demand an
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S.
765, 768 (1995). Instead, the question here is the “facial validity” of the
striking party’s explanation. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. “Unless a
discriminatory intent is inherent in the [striking party’s] explanation, the
reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Id. The striking party’s
“explanation for a peremptory strike need not rise to the level of a challenge
for cause; rather, it merely must contain a clear and reasonably specific
articulation of legitimate reasons for the challenge.” United States v. Clemons,
941 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211,
214 (5th Cir. 1990)). Further, this Court has noted that a party’s race-neutral
explanation “need not be quantifiable and may include intuitive assumptions
upon confronting a potential juror.” Id. Ultimately, the district court must
consider a race-neutral explanation “in light of all of the relevant facts and
circumstances, and in light of the arguments of the parties.” Flowers, 139 S.
Ct. at 2243.
       We agree with the district court that counsel for Plains gave sufficient
race-neutral explanations for striking each potential juror. First, Ramirez
concedes that Plains provided a race-neutral reason for striking the first
Hispanic individual, Juror Number 7, who worked in the U.S. Attorney’s
Office as an administrative assistant.

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       For the second Hispanic individual, Juror Number 15, Plains’ counsel
stated that the potential juror knew one of the other prospective jurors, that
he was “wishy washy” in his responses, and that Plains “wanted someone
who would do a better job on the jury.” Ramirez responded that the other
juror that Juror Number 15 allegedly knew had already been struck from the
panel and that Juror Number 15 had “self-rehabilitated.” The district court
ultimately concluded that Plains’ counsel asserted “arguable reasons why
that individual would be struck” and that at least two other Hispanic
potential jurors were not struck, demonstrating a lack of bias.
       The district court’s decision to deny this Batson challenge was not
clearly erroneous where Plains’ counsel provided a race-neutral explanation
that Plains was not satisfied with Juror Number 15’s “ability to calmly,
clearly, and confidently express his opinions during voir dire.” This
explanation is facially valid, reflecting the kind of “intuitive assumption”
about a potential juror’s demeanor and attitude that is permitted during voir
dire. See Clemons, 941 F.2d at 325. Ramirez has failed to show clear error
where Plains’ counsel demonstrated plausible reasons for striking Juror
Number 15.
       For the third Hispanic individual, Juror Number 17, Plains’ counsel
asserted that the potential juror’s lack of a job and her husband’s job as a lease
operator (a position that Ramirez had allegedly had a conflict with in the past)
were cause for concern. Ramirez responded that other potential jurors held
similar roles as Juror Number 17’s husband, yet were not struck. Further,
Ramirez argued that Juror Number 17’s questionnaire was simply blank with
respect to her occupation, and Plains’ counsel did not question her about
employment at all. However, as both Plains’ counsel and the district court
pointed out, each party had access to a plethora of information provided by
the court, which included employment information. The district court

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denied the Batson challenge, stating that Plains’ counsel provided an
adequate, race-neutral reason for the strike.
       We again conclude that the district court’s denial of the Batson
challenge was not clearly erroneous where Plains provided a race-neutral
explanation that it sought employed jurors who “would have a better general
understanding of employment and how poor work performance leads to
termination.” While Ramirez is correct that a striking party’s “failure to
question a potential juror about a characteristic that the [party] asserts is
important” may be evidence of pretext, a lack of questions alone is not
determinative. Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 377 (5th Cir. 2009). Where
“employment and prior jury service questions [are] on the juror
questionnaire . . . it does not automatically follow that absence of the
questions in voir dire is indicative of pretext.” Woodward v. Epps, 580 F.3d
318, 340 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, Plains had the relevant employment
information before voir dire began, so the lack of questioning does not
indicate pretext for striking Juror Number 17. Combined with the additional
factor of Juror Number 17’s husband’s occupation, her own lack of
employment provides an adequate race-neutral reason for the strike. Ramirez
has failed to demonstrate that the district court’s denial of the Batson
challenge was clearly erroneous.
          b. Cat’s paw jury instruction
       Ramirez next argues that the district court erred in denying his request
for a cat’s paw jury instruction. Plains responds that, whether or not such an
instruction would have been permissible, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by omitting Ramirez’s proposed instruction.
       We review a challenge to jury instructions under a two-prong inquiry.
Puga v. RCX Sols., Inc., 922 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 2019). “First, the
challenger must demonstrate that the charge as a whole creates substantial

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and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its
deliberations.” Pelt v. U.S. Bank Tr. Na’l Ass’n, 359 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir.
2004) (quoting Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1315 (5th Cir. 1997)).
“Second, even if the jury instructions were erroneous, we will not reverse if
we determine, based upon the entire record, that the challenged instruction
could not have affected the outcome of the case.” Id.
       Here, Ramirez sought to include the cat’s paw theory in the jury
instructions. Plaintiffs use this theory of liability “when they cannot show the
decisionmaker—the person who took the adverse employment action—
harbored any retaliatory animus.” Zamora v. City of Houston, 798 F.3d 326,
331 (5th Cir. 2015). “Under this theory, a plaintiff must establish that the
person with a retaliatory motive somehow influenced the decisionmaker to
take the retaliatory action.” Id. “Put another way, a plaintiff must show that
the person with retaliatory animus used the decisionmaker to bring about the
intended retaliatory action.” Id.
       Plains directs the Court’s attention to our decision in Wantou v. Wal-
Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., where we held that the district court’s refusal to
include a cat’s paw jury instruction was not an abuse of discretion. 23 F.4th
422, 436 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 745 (2023), reh’g denied
Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 143 S. Ct. 1049 (2023). There, we
noted that “[i]f we were to consider the question in the first instance, we
might find no harm in providing a Cat’s Paw instruction.” Id. However, we
held that the plaintiff’s proposed instructions were confusing, if not
internally inconsistent. Id. Further, we held that the plaintiff “was able to
provide his full story in closing and present all of his arguments to the jury
without objection.” Id. The general description of the defendant as
“Defendant Wal-Mart” could include, we held, each co-worker or
supervisor in the plaintiff’s requested instruction because the final
instruction did not identify specific decisionmakers. Id. Thus, we found no

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error in the district court’s rejection of the specific cat’s paw instruction that
the plaintiff requested. Id.
        Similarly, here, Ramirez’s requested instruction specifically listed
Gene Durham, Lee Oliver, and Pierce Broach as supervisors who may have
discriminated against him because Danielson, as the final decisionmaker,
explicitly testified that he did not consider Ramirez’s age in the termination
process. However, on the district court’s verdict form and instructions, the
questions referred simply to “Defendant” and included an “Agency”
instruction explaining that a corporation can only act through natural persons
such as agents or employees. Much like Wantou, then, the jury was not
directed to a specific employee by name on the verdict form, and Ramirez
was permitted to freely argue the roles of various actors in his claim. We find
Wantou instructive here, and come to the same result: the district court did
not abuse its discretion in rejecting the requested cat’s paw jury instruction.
        Plains also points out that Ramirez failed to identify any specific
evidence of discriminatory animus at the charge conference in support of the
cat’s paw instruction. Other than a comment regarding retirement and
severance packages, Ramirez did not put forth evidence that would tend to
show the animus required to succeed on his claim. See Pelt, 359 F.3d at 767.
Thus, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in concluding
that Ramirez did not provide the requisite evidence to justify the cat’s paw
instruction, where such instruction likely would not affect the outcome of his
case.
        IV.   Conclusion
        For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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