Court Opinion

ID: 9741885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:03:32.586199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:27.018317
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the trial court. The majority speaks of measuring needs “by the standard of living the party seeking maintenance enjoyed during the marriage.” 351 Ill. App. 3d at 620. The majority speaks of Pamela’s “lifestyle deficit.” 351 Ill. App. 3d at 621. In reality, what the majority is concerned about is that Thomas will have greater disposable income than Pamela. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 621. The majority does not actually compare Pamela’s lifestyle with her previous lifestyle, although it concedes that she has a good job with a decent income. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 620. The majority has come up with a rule, that in long-term marriages, not only should the property of the parties be divided equally, the future income of the ex-husband should be divided equally, for the rest of the parties’ lives. If the ex-husband can pay more, he should be required to do so. (Apparently this rule would work only one way; I see no indication in the cases that it would be applied where the ex-wife is the primary income earner.) The difficulty with adopting such a rule that the legislature, which is charged with that responsibility, has not done so. According to the majority, permanent maintenance should be the rule, not the exception. “Spouses with disparate earning potentials warrant an award of permanent maintenance.” 351 Ill. App. 3d at 618. It makes no difference whether each spouse has a decent income; disparity requires permanent maintenance. The maintenance award must be set at the maximum possible. The majority cites Dunlap, where “the ex-husband’s monthly excess of income over expenses would allow him to contribute more than originally granted by the trial court.” 351 Ill. App. 3d at 620. Even if we were the legislature, reasons militate against adopting such a rule. There is an advantage, in dissolution of marriage cases, to orders that provide for a “clean break.” Should these parties really be examining each other’s income and expenses for the rest of their lives and complaining that the other is not working hard enough and about how the other is spending his or her income? The majority in effect is refusing to dissolve the marriage of these parties, ordering that they be tied to each other for the rest of their lives. The trial court provided some future protection for Pamela when it awarded her half of Thomas’s retirement accounts and pension benefits. The majority’s rule is at odds with the Dissolution Act. The Dissolution Act recognizes that one spouse may have better income abilities than the other spouse. That is why the spouse with superior income may be required to turn over more than 50% of the assets or pay some child support expenses in their entirety, as here. That is why the spouse with lesser income may be allowed to remain in the house until it is sold. That is why the spouse with superior income may be required to pay the other’s attorney fees. Why isn’t the trial court allowed to focus on the present and require the spouse with the superior income to pay more now? Why is the trial court required to give the spouse with lesser income an equal share of uncertain future income? The majority speaks of Pamela’s contribution to Thomas’s income potential and how it was her “deferral of her working life [that has] led Pamela to have a vastly disparate earning potential compared to that of Thomas.” 351 Ill. App. 3d at 617. How can we be sure of that? If the parties had remained single all their lives, would Pamela’s income have equaled Thomas’s? This marriage was not a one-way street. Pamela’s earning potential was enhanced by the education and training she was able to attain during the marriage. 351 Ill. App. 3d at 617. Is it not possible that the trial court took all of this into consideration in giving Pamela half of the marital assets? How can we say the trial court erred if it concluded that Thomas’s contribution to those assets was greater than Pamela’s? The majority may be attempting to cure a disparity in income which exists generally in our society (despite recent advances, men generally receive more income than women), not a disparity related to marriage. The idea that the trial court has any discretion at all is certainly called into question by the court’s decision today. It appears that the trial court’s only discretion is to come up with a maintenance award acceptable to us. We do not identify any particular error committed by the trial court. We are not complaining about any mistakes made by the trial court; we are complaining simply about the result it reached. Finally, I disagree with the majority’s decision to make its increase in maintenance retroactive. The trial court’s maintenance order was effective immediately after it was entered, and the payments have been made. See 750 ILCS 5/413(a) (West 2002) (judgment final when entered, subject to right of appeal; “An order directing payment of money for support or maintenance *** shall not be suspended or the enforcement thereof stayed pending the appeal”). Past-due installments of child support or maintenance are a vested right, and a court has no authority to modify them, either by increasing or decreasing them. In re Marriage of Burbridge, 317 Ill. App. 3d 190, 193, 738 N.E.2d 979, 982 (2000) (child support); In re Marriage of Frasco, 265 Ill. App. 3d 171, 179, 638 N.E.2d 655, 661 (1994) (maintenance); In re Marriage of Ingram, 259 Ill. App. 3d 685, 691, 631 N.E.2d 386, 391 (1994) (child support). The provisions of any judgment respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to subsequent installments. 750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 2002). The only exception is that where a petition to modify is filed, the court may modify “installments accruing subsequent to due notice by the moving party of the filing of the motion for modification.” 750 ILCS 5/510(a) (West 2002). Even if we had the power to retroactively increase past-due installments of maintenance, it would be a mistake to do so. Both child support and maintenance look to a particular period. The recipient has needs during a particular period, and it does not help meet those needs for a retroactive award to be made after the period has ended. Likewise, it is a real burden for the payor, who has made regular payments, to suddenly be ordered to pay a lump sum.