Court Opinion

ID: 6891602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-23 21:42:50.022156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:05:51.191333
License: Public Domain

KERNER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The law is now firmly settled that where a right oí review is conferred by a statute the aggrieved party or litigant must invoke and exhaust the administrative remedy provided by the statute before he may resort to the courts. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 57 S.Ct. 816, 81 L.Ed. 1143; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638; and Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834.
Section 8c(15) (A) of the Act provides a method or machinery for review whereby any handler subject to an order may file a petition with the Secretary of Agriculture stating that any obligation imposed in connection with an order is not in accordance with law, and pray for a modification thereof.
As I interpret this section of the Act, it prescribes an exclusive procedure for the determination of such issues; consequently, if the Market Administrator erred as to the defendants’ obligations under the milk order to the producer-settlement, administrative expense and marketing service funds, then it was an “obligation imposed * * * not in accordance with law” within the terms of the statute, and defendants are put to their statutory remedy. I believe that Congress intended the Secretary of Agriculture and not the courts to determine what sum, if any, is owing by a handler to the Milk Fund established by the Market Administrator, and provision was made for a review of the Secretary’s action. See § 8c(l5) (B).