Court Opinion

ID: 9849970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:50:20.849263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:29.868161
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 79. (concurring). I agree with the analysis of the majority concerning territorial jurisdiction and venue. I write separately, however, because of the majority's unnecessary reliance on one of the residual hearsay exceptions. Majority op., *151¶ 3. Unlike the majority, I believe that the evidence at the preliminary hearing established probable cause that Allen Krnak was killed in Jefferson County, even without Patricia Ellifson's testimony.
¶ 80. As noted by the majority opinion, the circuit court excluded the testimony of Patricia Ellifson only for purposes of the preliminary hearing, leaving open the possibility that it could be used at trial. Id., ¶ 54. The court determined that the State had put forth sufficient evidence to establish venue without the testimony. In its brief, the State agreed with the decision for bindover, submitting that, "even without Patricia Ellifson's testimony, the preliminary hearing established probable cause that Allen Krnak was killed in Wisconsin."
¶ 81. From the facts of this case, there are two principal reasons to support the circuit court's decision. First, a plausible explanation from the evidence is that Allen Krnak (as well as his wife and son) made it home from work on July 2, 1998, but never left for the family's cabin in Waushara County, despite plans to spend the Fourth of July weekend there. This inference is supported by the discovery of their empty pickup truck in Wisconsin, which contained no personal effects or belongings other than a notebook. Thus, it is plausible that all three Krnaks were killed on that day, after which Anderson dumped his father's body in North Carolina.
¶ 82. Second, the explanation advanced by Anderson — that his father was killed in North Carolina — is also plausible but it relies upon two unlikely sets of circumstances. One is that Allen Krnak voluntarily accompanied Anderson to North Carolina instead of going on vacation with his wife and son. The other is that Anderson kidnapped his father from *152Wisconsin, kept him alive until they reached North Carolina, where he then decided to kill him. As the State recognizes, both scenarios conveniently fail to account for the contemporaneous disappearance of Krnak's wife and son.
¶ 83. Two standards of preliminary hearing jurisprudence should guide this analysis. First, if conflicting inferences are equally plausible from undisputed facts, then probable cause for purposes of the preliminary hearing is satisfied. State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389,400, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984). Second, as the majority acknowledges, this court will "search the record for any substantial ground based on competent evidence to support the circuit court's bindover decision." Majority op., ¶ 26 (quoting State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 704, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993)).
¶ 84. If the majority truly employed these standards here, it would not have reached the issue of whether the circuit court erred in striking Patricia Ellifson's testimony. Consequently, it would not have needed to rely on the residual hearsay exception to make that testimony admissible.
¶ 85. The residual hearsay exception should be sparingly used. The necessary indicia of reliability, which is the hallmark of hearsay exceptions, is often more attenuated with the residual exception than with other well-established exceptions. Indeed, unbridled use of the residual hearsay exception may swallow the need for other hearsay exceptions.1
¶ 86. Accordingly, I would not have relied upon the residual hearsay exception. Rather, I conclude that *153even without the testimony of Patricia Ellifson, the evidence at the preliminary hearing established probable cause that Allen Krnak was killed in Jefferson County. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
¶ 87. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this concurring opinion.

 For further discussion of the perils of the residual hearsay exception, see James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Reconsidered, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 787 (1993).