Court Opinion

ID: 9405483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 17:06:58.748489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.381540
License: Public Domain

Elwood Charles Calloway, III v. State of Maryland, No. 202, September Term, 2022.
Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J.

MARYLAND RULE 5-616(a)(4) - - IMPEACHMENT OF COMPLAINING
WITNESS IN CRIMINAL TRIAL BY SHOWING MOTIVE TO TESTIFY
FALSELY - - FINANCIAL GAIN AS MOTIVE - - WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
CLAIM BY COMPLAINING WITNESS IN CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST
DEFENDANT FOR BATTERY WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THIS FORM OF
IMPEACHMENT.

        The appellant was charged with second-degree assault of the battery type for hitting
the complaining witness with his truck after the witness, who was working loading vehicles
on a ferry, refused to allow the appellant’s truck to board the ferry. The witness testified
that he was injured when the truck hit him and, after work the next day, went to the hospital
for treatment. On cross-examination, the court sustained an objection to a question seeking
to elicit whether the witness’s hospital visit was paid by workers’ compensation or private
insurance, for lack of relevance. On appeal, the appellant challenged that ruling, arguing
that the question sought to elicit information about a workers’ compensation claim by the
witness, which would tend to show that he had a financial motive to testify falsely.

        Held: Judgment affirmed. This Court and the Supreme Court of Maryland
recognize that, ordinarily, evidence that the complaining witness in a criminal trial brought,
has pending, or is contemplating bringing a tort action or claim before the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board based on the same events underlying the criminal charge is relevant
to show that the witness has a financial motive to testify falsely against the defendant. See
Martin v. State, 364 Md. 692 (2001); Taylor v. State, 226 Md. App. 317 (2016); Maslin v.
State, 124 Md. App. 535 (1999); Hopper v. State, 64 Md. App. 97 (1985). In these cases,
the complaining witness had a personal financial interest in those claims that was tied to
the events in the underlying criminal case and would be advanced or protected by giving
testimony against the defendant sufficient to result in a conviction.

        In the case at bar, to convict the appellant of criminal battery the State was required
to prove that he engaged in offensive physical contact or harm to the complaining witness
and that the contact was the result of an intentional or reckless act and was not accidental.
To prevail in a workers’ compensation claim based on the same events, however, the
complaining witness merely had to show that he sustained an injury caused by the willful
or negligent act of a third party directed against him in the course of his employment. Labor
and Employment Article, § 9-101(b)(2). Unlike the cases in which there was a financial
motive for the complaining witness to testify against the defendant, here the complaining
witness would be entitled to workers’ compensation benefits even if the appellant did not
act intentionally or recklessly, but only negligently; and regardless of whether the appellant
was convicted. In addition, there was no basis for the appellant’s argument below, that
evidence that the witness’s hospital visit was paid by workers’ compensation was relevant
to impeachment because it could show that he was feigning an injury. The evidence would
tend to show the opposite: that he was injured, not that he was feigning injury.
Circuit Court for Wicomico County
Case No. No. C-22-CR-21-000340

                                                                               REPORTED

                                                                      IN THE APPELLATE COURT

                                                                            OF MARYLAND*

                                                                                 No. 202

                                                                          September Term, 2022
                                                                ______________________________________

                                                                  ELWOOD CHARLES CALLOWAY, III

                                                                                     v.

                                                                         STATE OF MARYLAND
                                                                ______________________________________

                                                                     Beachley,
                                                                     Shaw,
                                                                     Eyler, Deborah S.
                                                                        (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

                                                                                  JJ.
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this   ______________________________________
document is authentic.

                  2023-06-28 12:29-04:00                              Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J.
                                                                ______________________________________

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
                                                                     Filed: June 28, 2023

* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional
amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to the
Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.
       This appeal stems from an incident that occurred on April 11, 2021, when Raymond

Hoffman, an employee of the Wicomico County Department of Public Works, was loading

vehicles on the “Upper Ferry” at the Wicomico River. Mr. Hoffman refused to permit

Elwood Charles Calloway, III, the appellant, to board his pickup truck on the ferry. An

altercation ensued. Ultimately, a jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County found the

appellant guilty of second-degree assault, of the battery type, against Mr. Hoffman. The

court sentenced him to 18 months, all but four months suspended, to be served on home

detention, in favor of two years’ probation.

       The appellant asks whether “the trial court err[ed] and/or abuse[d] its discretion in

preventing defense counsel from questioning Mr. Hoffman about his worker’s [sic]

compensation claim?” We shall affirm the judgment.

                             FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

       A one-day trial was held on March 30, 2022. The State called Mr. Hoffman and

Travis Waters, an independent witness.

       Mr. Hoffman testified that on the day in question he was loading vehicles on the

Upper Ferry, which has a weight limit of 10,000 pounds. The ferry was docked, and

vehicles entered on it from a ramp. After Mr. Hoffman loaded Mr. Waters’s Volkswagen,

the appellant drove his pickup truck up to the stop sign at the edge of the ramp. When Mr.

Hoffman told the appellant he could not board his truck on the ferry because it was
overweight, the appellant became “irate.”1 A shouting match followed during which Mr.

Hoffman rejected a weight ticket for the truck and told the appellant that before the truck

would be allowed on the ferry, he would have to have it weighed, suggesting the County

dump, which is free.2

       Mr. Hoffman walked down the ramp toward the inside of the ferry. When he “got

halfway between the ramp and … the pilot house[,]” he heard the appellant “rev his engine

up” and start to drive his pickup truck onto the ferry. He “heard the concrete” and felt the

ferry “jump up and down[.]” When he turned around, the appellant “was right there on”

him and “hit” him with the front of the truck. He was forced backwards 1 or 1 1/2 steps

and then the defendant “threw on [the] brakes.” Mr. Hoffman “backed off and went

towards the ferry house[.]” At that point, Mr. Waters, who had been waiting in his

Volkswagen on the ferry, “got out of his vehicle[,]” approached the appellant, and “asked

him to get off the ferry.”

       Mr. Waters testified that his Volkswagen had been loaded on the ferry and he was

sitting inside it with his two children, ages 12 and 10. When he heard words being

exchanged, he looked in his rearview mirror. He saw the appellant’s pickup truck “move

forward” and Mr. Hoffman “kind of come back a little bit, and then he had his hand on the

hood.” From this, Mr. Waters deduced that the appellant had hit Mr. Hoffman with the

       1
          Mr. Hoffman could tell from the make, model, year, and size of the pickup truck
that it exceeded the 10,000-pound weight limit.
       2
       Mr. Hoffman rejected the weight ticket because it was from Salisbury Steel, a
company he knew had been closed for four or five years.
                                             2
front of his truck, causing him to move backward. Mr. Waters exited his Volkswagen and

walked up to the two men. The appellant was saying that Mr. Hoffman “had banged his

hood[.]” In Mr. Waters’s view, that version of events did not “correlate to” what he had

seen in his rearview mirror. The appellant did not want to leave and kept insisting that his

truck be allowed on the ferry. Mr. Waters made clear that his children were waiting, and

he wanted the ferry to leave.

       The appellant testified on his own behalf. He agreed that he had become upset when

Mr. Hoffman refused to allow his truck on the ferry. After they “argued” for a while, Mr.

Hoffman “started walking back to the ferry booth[,]” which is inside the ferry. When Mr.

Hoffman got to the ferry booth, the appellant “pulled [his] front wheels onto the ferry[.]”

Mr. Hoffman came “back out of the booth and put his hand on [the appellant’s] truck and

said stop, you can’t get on.” The appellant got out of his truck, and he and Mr. Hoffman

resumed arguing. At that point, Mr. Waters approached and said he was “trying to get

somewhere[,]” so the appellant drove off. The appellant denied striking Mr. Hoffman with

his vehicle and insisted that the sole contact between his truck and Mr. Hoffman was Mr.

Hoffman’s putting his hand on the truck’s hood.

       The jury deliberated for 48 minutes and returned a guilty verdict.

                                      DISCUSSION

                                Facts Related to the Issue

       On direct examination, Mr. Hoffman testified that the front of the appellant’s truck

hit him in the chest, knee, and lower abdomen. The incident happened late in the day, and

he continued working for a short time until closing. After work the next day, he went to

                                             3
the emergency room and underwent tests. His chest was bruised internally, and he was

referred to an orthopedic surgeon for what turned out to be a torn ligament in his right knee.

       The State moved Mr. Hoffman’s medical records from the emergency room visit

into evidence.3     The first page bears an entry identifying Mr. Hoffman’s “primary

insurance” as “workers compensation” and his “secondary insurance” as Blue Cross Blue

Shield. Two additional entries state that Mr. Hoffman’s primary insurance coverage was

“workers compensation.” Mr. Hoffman testified that he expected to have surgery on his

right knee in May or June 2022.

       On cross-examination, defense counsel reestablished that Mr. Hoffman had visited

the emergency room the day after the incident, and then asked:

              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: … Okay. Do you remember if you were
       claiming this as a workmen’s [sic] compensation issue or you were using
       your own insurance or?

                [MR. HOFFMAN]: It’s a workmen’s [sic] - -

                [PROSECUTOR]: Objection, Your Honor.

                THE COURT: Approach.

At the bench, the prosecutor argued that whether Mr. Hoffman had filed a claim for

workers’ compensation was not relevant. When the court asked defense counsel to

respond, he said:

             I would argue it’s very relevant, seeking, if he got benefits as a result
       of making a workmen’s [sic] compensation report, I would argue that creates
       evidence of a motive to lie, making up going to the hospital and things like
       that.

       3
           No other medical records were admitted in evidence.
                                              4
The court sustained the objection, granted a motion to strike, and instructed the jury to

“disregard the last question and any potential answer to it.”

                                        Contentions

       The appellant contends defense counsel’s question about workers’ compensation to

Mr. Hoffman was relevant to whether Mr. Hoffman had a motive to testify falsely. He

analogizes to four Maryland cases holding that in a criminal trial, evidence of a related

civil action by the complaining witness against the defendant, or of a claim by that witness

before the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (“CICB”), tends to show the witness has

a pecuniary interest that furnishes a motive to lie. He maintains that the court’s ruling

violated his constitutional right of confrontation and Rule 5-616(a)(4), and that the error

was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because Mr. Hoffman’s credibility was the

central issue in the case.4

       The State counters that a claim for workers’ compensation is not a tort action, and

any recovery of workers’ compensation benefits would not depend upon proof of a criminal

act. It asserts that the appellant has not shown how the verdict against him bore any relation

to Mr. Hoffman’s pursuit of workers’ compensation benefits, nor has he shown that Mr.

Hoffman’s filing a workers’ compensation claim would motivate him to “falsely implicate

[the appellant] in a criminal assault.” It argues that the four cases the appellant relies upon

are distinguishable and cites several out-of-state cases to support its position. Finally, in

       4
         Rule 5-616(a)(4) provides that “[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked
through questions asked of the witness, including questions that are directed at … (4)
[p]roving that the witness is biased, prejudiced, interested in the outcome of the proceeding,
or has a motive to testify falsely[.]”
                                              5
answer to the appellant, the State asserts that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.

                   Relevant Maryland Workers’ Compensation Law

         Some provisions of the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”), Title 9

of the Labor & Employment Article (“LE”) of the Maryland Code (1999, 2016 Repl. Vol.),

bear on our analysis. The well-established purpose of the Act is “to protect workers and

their families from the hardships inflicted by work-related injuries.” Edgewood Nursing

Home v. Maxwell, 282 Md. 422, 426 (1978).

         The Act affords workers’ compensation to a claimant employee “for an accidental

personal injury” sustained by the employee “regardless of fault, as to a cause of the

accidental personal injury.”5 LE § 9-501(a)(1), (b). Most commonly, an “accidental

personal injury” is one that “arises out of and in the course of employment[.]”

LE § 9-101(b)(1). To prevail, the claimant must show the injury 1) resulted from engaging

in work required by or incidental to the employment, see Livering v. Richardson’s Rest.,

374 Md. 566, 574 (2003), and 2) was sustained in the course of the employment, which

concerns “the time, place, and circumstances of the accident in relation to the

employment.” Montgomery Cnty. v. Wade, 345 Md. 1, 11 (1997). Less commonly, but

applicable here, the accidental personal injury can be “an injury caused by a willful or

        The employee must be a “covered employee,” which “means an individual listed
         5

in Subtitle 2 of this title for whom a person, a governmental unit, or a quasi-public
corporation is required by law to provide coverage under this title.” LE § 9-101(f). The
Act also provides compensation to survivors for work-related deaths. LE § 9-501(a)(2).
For ease of discussion, we shall refer to covered employees as employees.

                                            6
negligent act of a third person directed against” the employee “in the course of” his

employment. LE § 9-101(b)(2).6 In that situation, the claimant need not prove that the

injury arose out of the employment but must show that it happened in the course of the

employment. For example, in Edgewood Nursing Home, supra, the Court held that

workers’ compensation applied when an employee was killed at work by her paramour.

Even though the death was motivated by personal reasons “not attributable to the working

environment,” it occurred “within the course of employment on the employer’s premises”

when the employee was required to be there. 282 Md. at 430.

       The various types of workers’ compensation benefits an employee may receive are

enumerated in Subtitle 6 of the Act. Some benefits take the form of compensation paid to

the employee for periods and levels of disability, including temporary partial, temporary

total, permanent partial, and permanent total. See LE §§ 9-614 – 9-642. The Act also

requires the employer to provide “medical services and treatment[,]” including medical and

surgical attendance and treatment, hospital and nursing services, and medications, all for

the period required by the nature of the accidental personal injury. LE § 9-660(a), (b). The

payments for those medical services and treatment are remitted directly to the billing health

care providers by the employer (or the employer’s insurer). LE § 9-660(d).

       An employee who is injured by a third person’s willful or negligent act “for which

compensation is payable[,]” may file a workers’ compensation claim against the employer

or bring a tort action for damages against the third party. LE § 9-901(1), (2). If the

       6
        An “accidental personal injury” also can be a statutorily identified occupational
disease or condition. See LE § 9-101(b)(3).
                                             7
employee files a workers’ compensation claim and compensation either is awarded or paid,

for two months thereafter the employer has the exclusive right to sue the third-party

tortfeasor for damages. LE § 9-902(a), (c). After two months, the employee and employer

have the concurrent right to bring such an action. See Anne Arundel Cnty. v. McCormick,

323 Md. 688, 692 (1991). The Act controls how damages recovered in such a tort action

are to be distributed, but the recovery first must be applied to reimburse the employer for

any workers’ compensation paid or awarded. See LE § 9-902(b), (e)-(g); see also Bd. of

Educ. of Prince George’s Cnty. v. Marks-Sloan, 428 Md. 1, 48 (2012).

                                     Maryland Cases

       As noted, the appellant argues that four Maryland cases are sufficiently analogous

to the case at bar to support his position on appeal.

       In Hopper v. State, 64 Md. App. 97 (1985), the complaining witness at the

defendant’s trial for assault with intent to murder testified that he and the defendant had a

one-night sexual encounter, for which he paid the defendant. He then agreed to allow the

defendant to stay with him an additional night if there were no sexual activity. When,

during that night, he refused to have sexual relations with the defendant, the defendant

became angry and cut him with a knife. The defendant testified, to the contrary, that the

two men spent three days at the witness’s apartment engaging in sexual activity, for which

the witness had agreed to pay; and when the witness reneged, they wound up in a tussle

during which he accidentally cut the witness with his knife. Before trial, the complaining

witness filed a claim with the CICB that was denied under the “family crime” exclusion,

which made a victim of a crime committed by a “family member” ineligible for

                                              8
compensation. The definition of “family” included “any person maintaining a sexual

relationship” with the perpetrator. Md. Code (1957, 1984 Cum. Supp.), Article 26A,

§§ 2(d)(2), 5(b).7 The witness wrote to the CICB, denying that he had been maintaining a

sexual relationship with the defendant. On that basis, the CICB reconsidered its decision

and granted the witness an award of $2,698.19.

       On cross-examination of the complaining witness, defense counsel established that,

in the witness’s letter to the CICB, he described the defendant as an “overnight guest” and

suggested that he only stayed at his apartment for one night. 64 Md. App. at 102. When

defense counsel started to ask “were you told that you would not be entitled to receive

benefits if your injury –” the court sustained an objection. Id. at 103. Defense counsel

argued that the witness had a financial interest that would motivate him to testify falsely:

“If he were to testify that [the defendant] had been over there and had sex more than once,

he is imperiling his award.” Id. at 102. He proffered the contents of two exhibits that

showed that the witness’s claim before the CICB was granted “on the basis that he ‘was

the victim of a set up by a psychotic killer … and that the limited sexual encounter did not

cause nor contribute to the infliction of the [witness’s] injury.’” Id. at 103 n.3. On appeal,

we vacated and remanded, concluding that the trial court had erred by curtailing the

cross-examination because the facts defense counsel was seeking to elicit from the witness

were relevant to “the witness’ possible motivation to fabricate his testimony.” Id. at 106.

       7
          The present statute, Md. Code (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Procedure
Article, § 11-808, does not include such an exclusion.
                                              9
       In Maslin v. State, 124 Md. App. 535 (1999), we held that in a trial on charges of

child sexual abuse, the court erred by not permitting cross-examination of the complaining

witness about his pending tort action against the defendant. The witness told the police the

defendant had sexually abused him when he was a child. At their request, he participated

in a sting operation, during which the defendant hugged him. That hug became the basis

of the witness’s civil suit for battery against the defendant.8 We observed that, at the

criminal trial, “the evidence of the civil lawsuit was relevant to establish a potential source

of bias, as well as a motive to testify falsely[,]” and “a jury could consider the pending …

lawsuit as evidence that [the witness] had a significant financial stake in the outcome of

the criminal proceedings.” Id. at 541. To make out a case for civil battery, the witness

would have to prove that the touching was an “offensive contact.” Ordinarily, a hug would

not suffice but if the defendant had sexually abused the witness when he was a child, a

factfinder reasonably could find that a hug from him was offensive. Because testimony by

the complaining witness that the defendant had committed acts of child sexual abuse

against him would make it more likely that he would prevail in his civil action against the

defendant, information about the civil case would reveal that the witness had a financial

motive to testify falsely that could be important to the jury in assessing his credibility.

       In Martin v. State, 364 Md. 692 (2001), the Court extended our holding in Maslin

to a circumstance in which the complaining witness was contemplating filing a civil action

against the defendant but had not yet done so. The defendant, a former police officer, was

       8
         The statute of limitations had run on any civil actions arising out of the child sexual
abuse itself. Maslin, 124 Md. App. at 541-42.
                                              10
on trial for stealing cash from the witness while on duty. The trial court barred defense

counsel from cross-examining the witness about whether he had hired a lawyer to sue the

police department that had employed the defendant. The Court held that the ruling was an

abuse of discretion because evidence that the witness was looking into bringing a civil suit

based on the same events was just as relevant to his credibility as evidence that a suit was

pending.

       Finally, in Taylor v. State, 226 Md. App. 317 (2016), in the defendant’s trial for

sexually abusing several children, the trial court precluded defense counsel from

cross-examining the children’s mothers about whether they had spoken to an attorney about

bringing civil actions based on the incidents. The ruling was not based on relevancy but

on the subject of the question being beyond the scope of direct examination. We reversed

on other grounds but addressed the court’s preclusion ruling for guidance on remand. We

observed: “From the mere pursuit of a lawsuit, jurors may infer that the witness has

‘feelings of animosity’ towards the accused or that the witness has ‘a significant financial

stake in the outcome of the criminal proceedings.’” Id. at 378 (quoting Maslin, 124 Md.

App. at 541). We concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by adopting an

inflexible rule that would not permit cross-examination on an issue affecting the credibility

of the child victims.

                                    Out-of-State Cases

       The State maintains that the cases the appellant relies upon are distinguishable and

brings our attention to cases from Texas, Alabama, and Virginia.

                                             11
       In Deloney v. State, 734 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), at the defendant’s trial for

aggravated robbery, defense counsel sought to ask the complaining witness whether a

photograph depicting injuries he sustained during the robbery had been taken to support “a

workers’ compensation claim allegedly filed by [the witness].” Id. at 9. The court granted

the prosecutor’s objection based on relevance. On appeal, the court acknowledged that

“[g]enerally, a defendant is permitted to show that the complaining witness has brought a

civil suit for damages based on the same occurrence for which the defendant is being

prosecuted.” Id. It distinguished that from a workers’ compensation claim, emphasizing

that it is not a civil action or an action by the witness against the defendant and that the

defendant’s “guilt or innocence [in the criminal case] is wholly unrelated to the success of”

the complaining witness’s workers’ compensation claim. Id. Because “the mere existence

of the collateral [workers’ compensation] action did not indicate any improper motive, bias,

or prejudice on the part of the [witness] in testifying against” the defendant, the trial court’s

ruling was not an abuse of discretion. Id.

       In Stokes v. State, 612 So. 2d 1330 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), the defendant was on

trial for attempted rape of the complaining witness, a housekeeper, at the motel where she

worked. After evidence was elicited, without objection, that the witness had filed a

workers’ compensation claim, the trial court precluded defense counsel from

cross-examining her about the specifics of the claim. The defendant challenged that ruling

on appeal, arguing that details of the workers’ compensation claim were relevant to show

bias. Upholding the trial court’s ruling, the court stated: “Whether the [defendant] was

found guilty or not guilty of attempted rape would not affect the victim’s claim for benefits

                                               12
under worker’s compensation.” Id. at 1333. Recognizing that what is relevant may vary

with the circumstances, the court admonished that its opinion “should not be construed to

limit the admissibility in all situations where a witness is cross-examined concerning filing

a worker’s compensation claim.” Id.

       The State contrasts these cases with Barker v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 729 (Va.

1985), where the defendant was charged with raping the complaining witness inside her

apartment. The trial court precluded defense counsel from questioning the witness about

“her worker’s compensation claim which was based on the theory that she met [the

defendant] in the course of her employment as a credit manager.” Id. at 733. Reversing,

the Supreme Court of Virginia explained that the proposed cross-examination was relevant

to motive to fabricate. Under Virginia law, because the rape was committed in the

witness’s apartment, the complaining witness needed to tie the crime to her employment

to receive workers’ compensation benefits. By accusing someone like the defendant,

whom she had met through her employment, she could attempt to do so. Barker differed

from Deloney and Stokes, where there was no dispute that the complaining witnesses

suffered their injuries at their places of work and therefore the same motive to testify falsely

did not exist.

                                           Analysis

       The right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the federal

constitution serves ‘“[t]he main and essential purpose … to secure for the opponent the

opportunity of cross-examination.”’       Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974)

                                              13
(quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, at 123 (3d ed. 1940)) (emphasis in original).9

“Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the

truth of his testimony are tested.” Id. at 316. “[T]he exposure of a witness’ motivation in

testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-

examination.” Id. at 316-17. “The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial,

and is ‘always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his

testimony.’” Id. at 316 (quoting 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 940, at 775 (Chadbourn rev.

1970)).

       “Compliance with our federal and state constitutions requires the trial judge to allow

the defense a ‘threshold level of inquiry’ that puts before the jury ‘facts from which jurors,

as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the

reliability of the witness.’” Manchame-Guerra v. State, 457 Md. 300, 309 (2018) (quoting

Martinez v. State, 416 Md. 418, 428 (2010)). To “ensure the right of confrontation, defense

counsel must be afforded ‘wide latitude to cross-examine a witness as to bias or

prejudices.’” Id. (quoting Martinez, 416 Md. at 428). Nevertheless, “trial judges retain

wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits

on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,

prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or

only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).

       9
        The confrontation right (with an exception not applicable here, see Leidig v. State,
475 Md. 181, 234-41 (2021)) afforded by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
has been interpreted to be coextensive with the federal right. See, e.g., Smallwood v. State,
320 Md. 300, 306 (1990).
                                              14
       It follows that the Confrontation Clause does not alter the general rule that “[a] trial

court does not abuse [its] discretion when it excludes cross-examination that is irrelevant.”

Simmons v. State, 392 Md. 279, 296 (2006) (citing Md. Rule 5-402). “‘Relevant evidence’

means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would

be without the evidence.”        Md. Rule 5-401.        “Except as otherwise provided by

constitutions, statutes, or these rules, or by decisional law not inconsistent with these rules,

all relevant evidence is admissible[,]” but “[e]vidence that is not relevant is not

admissible.” Md. Rule 5-402. “While trial judges are vested with discretion in weighing

relevancy in light of unfairness or efficiency considerations, trial judges do not have

discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.” State v. Simms, 420 Md. 705, 724 (2011).

       The threshold question, therefore, is “whether the evidence is legally relevant,” that

is, does it have any probative value within the meaning of Rule 5-401. Id. at 725. We

review that question de novo. See Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1, 49 (2020) (reviewing

“without deference a trial court’s restriction of cross-examination where that restriction is

based on the trial court’s ‘understanding of the legal rules that may limit particular

questions or areas of inquiry’” (quoting Peterson v. State, 444 Md. 105, 124 (2015)). See

State v. Robertson, 463 Md. 342, 353 (2019) (noting that relevance is a legal question

reviewed under a de novo standard); Fuentes v. State, 454 Md. 296, 325 (2017) (same). If

in addition to that threshold question, the court made “a variety of judgment calls under

Maryland Rule 5-611 as to whether particular questions [on cross-examination] are

repetitive, probative, harassing, confusing, or the like[,]” we review those decisions for

                                              15
abuse of discretion. Peterson, 444 Md. at 124.10 As to the Confrontation Clause, we “must

consider whether the cumulative result of those decisions, some of which are judgment

calls and some of which are legal decisions, denied the appellant the opportunity to reach

the ‘threshold level of inquiry’” that is constitutionally guaranteed. Id.

       As noted, Rule 5-616(a)(4) permits a witness’s credibility to be attacked through

questions to the witness, “including questions that are directed at . . . [p]roving that the

witness is biased, prejudiced, interested in the outcome of the proceeding, or has a motive

       10
            Rule 5-611 states:

       (a) Control by court. – The court shall exercise reasonable control over the
       mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to
       (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of
       the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses
       from harassment or undue embarrassment.

                                           * * *

       (b) Scope of cross-examination. –
       (1) Except as provided in subsection (b)(2), cross-examination should be
       limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting
       the credibility of the witness. Except for the cross-examination of an accused
       who testifies on a preliminary matter, the court may, in the exercise of
       discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.
       (2) An accused who testifies on a non-preliminary matter may be
       cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the action.

       (c) Leading questions. – The allowance of leading questions rests in the
       discretion of the trial court. Ordinarily, leading questions should not be
       allowed on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary
       to develop the witness’s testimony. Ordinarily, leading questions should be
       allowed (1) on cross-examination or (2) on the direct examination of a hostile
       witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party.

                                             16
to testify falsely[.]” The impeachment genre in the case at bar is motive to testify falsely.

In a jury trial, questions designed to elicit this type of impeachment evidence should be

permitted unless they lack a factual foundation, or their probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice or confusion of the jury. Calloway v. State,

414 Md. 616, 623, 639 (2010); Leeks v. State, 110 Md. App. 543, 557-58 (1996).

Nevertheless, if the evidence sought to be admitted is not relevant to the witness’s

credibility, i.e., it lacks probative value for impeachment, it should not be admitted. Simms,

420 Md. at 724 (observing that, “[w]hile trial judges are vested with discretion in weighing

relevancy in light of unfairness or efficiency considerations, trial judges do not have

discretion to admit irrelevant evidence”).

       We agree with the State that the cases the appellant relies upon are distinguishable.

In all four, the complaining witnesses (or their mothers, for those who were minors) either

had brought or were considering bringing claims that would benefit them financially only

if their testimony in the related criminal trials incriminated the defendant. The witness in

Hopper would keep his financial award from the CICB if he testified that the defendant cut

him intentionally, not accidentally, and spent just one night with him. If he testified

otherwise, he risked losing the award. In Maslin, to be awarded damages in his pending

civil action for battery against the defendant, the complaining witness needed to testify, in

the criminal case, that the defendant had sexually abused him when he was a child. He

could not testify to the contrary in the criminal case and hope to prevail in the civil case.

Likewise, for the complaining witnesses in Martin and Taylor to succeed in future civil

actions against the defendant’s former employer or the defendant, they needed to testify

                                             17
that the defendants committed the wrongs at the heart of the charges against them—stealing

cash and committing acts of sexual abuse. In all the cases, the testimony the defense was

seeking to elicit would show that the complaining witness had a personal financial interest

tied to the events underlying the charges that would be advanced or protected by giving

incriminating testimony against the defendant. The financial interest of each complaining

witness served as a motive to testify falsely against the defendant, making it highly relevant

to the witness’s credibility.

       In Deloney, Stokes, and Barker, the appellate courts’ decisions also were driven by

whether there was an interdependency between the complaining witness’s workers’

compensation claim and the criminal case against the defendant that would motivate the

witness to testify falsely. Those courts recognized that if factual linkage between the

complaining witness’s workers’ compensation claim and the crime the defendant was being

tried for supplied a financial motive for the witness to testify falsely, evidence about the

claim was relevant to credibility. That was the case in Barker, where the witness could

prevail in her workers’ compensation claim only by showing that the crime was committed

by someone she knew through her work. Given that the defendant fit that bill, the witness

had a financial motive to testify that he was the person who committed the criminal acts

against her, even if he was not. In Deloney and Stokes, where the complaining witnesses

would receive workers’ compensation benefits regardless of the substance of his testimony

in the criminal case, the existence and/or details of their workers’ compensation claims

were not relevant impeachment evidence. In those cases, the complaining witnesses had

                                             18
no need to falsely incriminate the defendants to succeed in their workers’ compensation

claims and therefore their testimony would not be motivated by a financial interest.

       We return to the case at bar. The sole question posed by defense counsel, made in

reference to Mr. Hoffman’s emergency room visit, was whether he was “claiming this as a

work[ers’] compensation issue” or was “using [his] own insurance …?” Defense counsel

did not proffer what he expected Mr. Hoffman to say in response. Nevertheless, it was

apparent from the context of the question, together with the already-admitted hospital

record documenting that his primary insurance was workers’ compensation and his

secondary insurance was Blue Cross Blue Shield, that Mr. Hoffman would have answered

that he had made a claim for workers’ compensation to cover his medical expenses,

including the emergency room visit. See Md. Rule 5-103(a)(2).

       That claim depended upon proof that Mr. Hoffman had sustained an “accidental

personal injury” under LE § 9-101(b)(2), that is, an injury caused by a willful or negligent

act directed against him by the appellant and occurring in the course of his employment.

As to the latter, the evidence was undisputed that the injuries for which Mr. Hoffman

sought treatment the day after the incident were sustained, if at all, while he was in the

process of performing his job, at his place of work, during work hours, i.e., in the course

of his employment.     As to the causation element, it would not matter whether the

appellant’s actions against Mr. Hoffman were willful or merely negligent. Either way, he

would have suffered an “accidental personal injury” within the meaning of the Act, and

that would entitle him to workers’ compensation benefits.

                                            19
       By contrast, in the appellant’s criminal trial, to prevail on the charge of

second-degree assault, of the battery type, the State was required to show that the appellant

“caused offensive physical contact with, or harm to” Mr. Hoffman and that “the contact

was the result of an intentional or reckless act of the [appellant] and was not accidental[.]”

Nicolas v. State, 426 Md. 385, 403-04 (2012) (emphasis added). Thus, while testimony by

Mr. Hoffman showing an intentional or reckless act by the appellant was essential to

establish criminal liability for battery, testimony that the appellant acted negligently would

suffice to establish that Mr. Hoffman sustained an “accidental personal injury” for purposes

of a workers’ compensation claim. Because Mr. Hoffman could prevail in a workers’

compensation claim if the appellant acted negligently and irrespective of whether the

appellant acted intentionally, he would not have a financial motive to testify that the

appellant intentionally hit him with his pickup truck.11 The complaining witnesses in the

cases the appellant relies upon, and in Barker, all had financial motives to testify falsely;

Mr. Hoffman did not.

       As mentioned, defense counsel’s only argument on relevancy was that if Mr.

Hoffman either had received or were to receive “benefits” from making a workers’

       11
         It was not necessary for the appellant to be found guilty in the case at bar for Mr.
Hoffman to prevail in a workers’ compensation case arising out of the same incident. It
only was necessary, as a practical matter, for Mr. Hoffman’s testimony in this case to be
consistent with his testimony in his workers’ compensation case. For that reason, the
impeachment genre of “interest in the outcome of the case” was involved only indirectly.
Also, the burden of proof in a workers’ compensation case is preponderance of the
evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Baltimore Cnty. v. Kelly, 391 Md. 64,
76 (2006). Therefore, on the same evidence, Mr. Hoffman could prevail in a workers’
compensation claim even if the appellant had prevailed in the case at bar.
                                             20
compensation “report,” “that creates evidence of a motive to lie” by “making up going to

the hospital and things like that.” Mr. Hoffman’s testimony that he sustained injuries in

the altercation, for which he went to the emergency room the next day, was supported by

the hospital records.   To be sure, the jury could have disbelieved his testimony,

notwithstanding those records. Evidence that the cost of the hospital visit would be paid

by workers’ compensation insurance would not have had any tendency to show that he was

feigning injury, however. It would have tended to show just the opposite: that he suffered

injuries for which he was examined and worked up, and further treatment was advised.

      As the hospital records show, Mr. Hoffman had his own health insurance through

Blue Cross Blue Shield. It is conceivable that, had Mr. Hoffman not succeeded in obtaining

workers’ compensation to cover his medical costs, he would have incurred expenses such

as deductibles and co-pays by using his own health insurance. But no evidence was

introduced or proffered to show that. And even if it were, Mr. Hoffman’s trial testimony

against the appellant would not influence that. A conviction for second-degree assault of

the battery type did not require evidence that Mr. Hoffman suffered any physical injury at

all. The State had to prove that the appellant “caused offensive physical contact with, or

harm to” Mr. Hoffman. Nicolas, 426 Md. at 403 (emphasis added). Physical injury may

be evidence of harm, but offensive physical contact can occur without physical injury.

      As noted above, under the Act, payments for medical services are made to the health

care providers rendering the care and treatment, not to the claimant. Defense counsel made

no proffer that would support a follow-up line of questions about compensation benefits

that might be payable to Mr. Hoffman. Nor was there evidence adduced that Mr. Hoffman

                                           21
had missed time from work that would make him eligible for benefits payable to him.

(Indeed, he made clear in his testimony that he completed his work at the end of his shift

on the day of the incident and went to the hospital after work the next day.) There was no

evidence proffered about whether Mr. Hoffman intended to file a civil action against the

appellant, which he would be permitted to do under the Act. Defense counsel did not seek

to examine Mr. Hoffman on any of these topics outside the presence of the jury. To be

sure, “[w]hile counsel need not—and may not be able to—detail the evidence expected to

be elicited on cross-examination, when challenged, counsel must be able to describe the

relevance of, and factual foundation for, a line of questioning.” Peterson, supra, 444 Md.

at 125 (citation omitted).

       In short, while there was a factual foundation for the single question at issue in this

appeal, there was no foundation for any follow up questions. See People v. Jones, 608

N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (defense could not question the complaining witness

about the details of his workers’ compensation claim based on the underlying altercation

because defense counsel “made no attempt to explain to the trial judge the impeaching

evidence he expected to elicit from [the witness] with respect to” the workers’

compensation claim and there was no offer of proof “demonstrat[ing] that the excluded

evidence [was] positive and direct on the issue of bias or motive to testify falsely, rather

than remote or uncertain”);12 Smith v. State, 545 S.E.2d 89, 90-91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)

       12
           The Jones court commented nevertheless that it “fail[ed] to see how [the
witness’s] claim for workers’ compensation benefits demonstrated his bias or motive to
testify falsely against [the] defendant, particularly since such benefits would be available
                                                                              (continued…)
                                             22
(although it was possible the ex-girlfriend complaining witness was motivated to testify

falsely that the defendant committed armed robbery, instead of shooting her for “personal

reasons,” given that Georgia law would not have allowed workers’ compensation under the

latter circumstance, defense counsel “never articulated this reasoning to the trial court, and

thus never gave the court the opportunity to adequately consider whether the line of

questioning would have been admissible to show bias in this regard”); State v. Leandry,

127 A.3d 1115, 1128, 1130 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015) (trial court properly precluded defense

counsel from asking the complaining witness “who paid [his] medical expenses and …

whether he had filed a workers’ compensation claim,” because the witness “did not testify

to missing work, to filing a workers’ compensation claim, or to needing assistance paying

any expenses in connection with this incident[,]” and no proffer was made that a workers’

compensation claim had been filed or what evidence defense counsel expected to elicit

from the witness in response to the proposed line of questioning).

       Finally, even if the trial court’s ruling was legally incorrect or an abuse of discretion,

which it was not, the error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Dorsey v.

State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976). The hospital record from the emergency room visit

showed, in several locations, that Mr. Hoffman’s insurance was through workers’

compensation. And the appellant’s guilt vel non bore no relation to whether Mr. Hoffman

could receive workers’ compensation benefits related to injuries he sustained.               See

to him regardless of who injured him, so long as he was injured within the scope of
employment”—which was undisputed. Jones, 608 N.E.2d at 26. In any event, “any
possible bias or motive to testify falsely was revealed by [the witness’s] admission” that
he had filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Id. (emphasis added).
                                              23
Deloney, 734 S.W.2d at 9. To the extent that “the jury’s behavior during deliberations”

can be a factor in assessing whether error was harmless, see Dionas v. State, 436 Md. 97,

113 (2013), the jurors in this case deliberated for less than an hour before reaching a guilty

verdict and did not ask any questions about a workers’ compensation claim.13 For all these

reasons we are confident that the court’s ruling sustaining the prosecutor’s objection to the

single question at issue did not have any effect on the jury’s verdict.

                                           JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
                                           FOR WICOMICO COUNTY AFFIRMED.
                                           COSTS ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.

       13
         The jury sent one note, asking to “see Mr. Waters’ testimony[,]” but before a
response could be formulated it announced that it had reached a verdict.
                                             24