Court Opinion

ID: 9728147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:59:49.370025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:46.205764
License: Public Domain

WHELAN, J.
I dissent respectfully and only as to the existence of any ground for reversal, and address myself to the questions whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order the prosecution to disclose the name or names of one or more fingerprint identification experts who examined the palm print or a photograph thereof and who took the position the print was not clear enough to make any identification at all; and if there were an abuse of discretion, whether the judgment must be reversed for such error.
It appears defense counsel did not at any time tell the court he intended or desired to call any such expert to testify that in his opinion the print was unidentifiable. The matter was discussed on four different days, after the People had rested and defense counsel had made his opening statement on December 2; first on Monday, December 6, 1971, when defense counsel stated to the court: “There will be additional witnesses involved under Brady vs. Maryland, witnesses questioned by the prosecution, whom the prosecution has approached. I was told over the weekend by a reliable source—whether this is one hundred percent accurate or not I can’t say— other than the fact on information and belief I was told that they approached the LAPD to see if they would back them up on the print and the Los Angeles Police Department declined. I want to make a motion under Brady vs. Maryland for the names of the individuals they have approached who *243won’t back them up so that I have an opportunity to approach the same people.”1
Thereafter the defense presented the testimony of three fingerprint identification experts, that of Meyers on December 6, that of Stahl and Smith on December 7. Each testified the palm print had been made by someone other than defendant. Meyers testified also he would not “rely on that print for a positive identification of anyone,” in response to a question put to him by defense counsel in which that exact language was used. When he questioned his two other experts later, defense counsel did not pose that question to either of them.
After the jury was excused on December 7 until Friday, December 10, defense counsel informed the court he desired the name of any expert consulted by the prosecution “who states that either the print is not identifiable at all or that there are not sufficient characteristics to positively identify it as the Defendant’s” so he could “personally talk with them to determine whether . . . they may fall in category number one; whether further examination would be material.” Category number one was that of a positive opinion the print was not defendant’s.
This exchange follows; “The Court: If they are going to come in and testify it is inconclusive, I want you to understand I, at this point, would not allow such testimony. [Italics added.]
“Mr. Walsh [defense counsel]: I would represent to the Court I don’t have any intention of calling such witnesses. My position is I am entitled, under Brady, to be given the names of those individuals in category number two, that include those individuals who have examined the print and not been able to conclusively establish it as having been made by the Defendant. In other words, they are people who feel the print itself isn’t identifiable at all, or there are some points but not a sufficient number, and all I am saying that I want is the names of those people so I can approach them and see whether or not that they considered what I believe is clear evidence positively excluding the Defendant. That is all I am saying.
“Mr. Walsh: I am only talking about evidence in category two. I have *244already made myself clear. I don’t intend to introduce inconclusive evidence.”
The matter was discussed further the following morning, December 8, when defense counsel urged his right to the name or names he sought based upon an earlier order reflected in the minutes of June 2, 1971, which recite: “The court grants a motion for continuing order of discovery for items previously ordered discovered and falling within categories authorized for discovery.” The order seems to have been made as the result of a motion of which notice was filed May 21, 1971, for discovery of: “. . . [a]ll information in the possession of the prosecution or any law enforcement authorities which is conceivably favorable to the defense.”
On December 8, counsel stated: “[M]y position is, as I said yesterday, your Honor, that under Brady and under the theory of similar cases I have the right to just know who that is, so I can go to see him. I would say, ‘Sir, did you, in making your examination consider this fact, this fact and this fact that may tend to establish that it could not have been made by the Defendant?’
“I made very clear yesterday I had no intention—I don’t think the law permits me to call an individual who says he doesn’t know.”
The subject was mentioned finally on December 17. The trial had been recessed from December 10 to December 17, except for a brief session on December 13 when a judge other than the trial judge made an order of continuance until December 17. The defense rested its case on December 17. Thereafter defense counsel made this statement: “Mr. Walsh: There’s one other matter I would want to bring to the Court’s attention, your Honor. Last week when we were talking about the motion under Brady against Maryland, and the similar California cases, for the names of any experts whom the print was shown, who took the position that it was not identifiable one way or the other, and counsel indicated there were some people in that category, I stated and I read in the record, and I want to say now I did not mean to say this, so I want to correct the record. In other words, I stated I didn’t feel that evidence standing in that posture was permissible, that is, a witness taking the stand and saying there’s not enough here to identify it one way or the other. I simply stated that by error.
“I was thinking back to the question we had discussed at length earlier in chambers, that is, where a witness would take the stand and say, ‘Well, it was similar,’ but he couldn’t say it was identical. I have taken the position consistently that it was not admissible, but I did not mean to state *245in making the Brady motion that testimony, that there is insufficient detail to make any identification of anybody, that that was inadmissible. I read that in the record over the weekend break and I want to make it clear that I simply misstated myself.
“When I read the record over the weekend I thought I had made the argument, but I intended to make it, that we have the right to the names of those people to see if with further discussion they might become ex-cluders, but I stated on the record that I didn’t feel if they stayed in the middle their testimony would be admissible. That was a misstatement on my part.”
Further justification for the belief defense counsel did not wish to call witnesses to testify the print was unidentifiable could have been found in the fact that, having elicited such an opinion from Meyers, he had refrained from that tactic in his subsequent examination of Stahl and Smith, all before he made his representations to the trial court.
Later, in his argument to the jury he relied heavily upon the positive nature of his expert testimony and the skill and experience of the men who gave it.2 In support of the standing and importance of his expert witnesses, he also emphasized that the prosecution had first sought to consult Meyers to see if he could identify the print as that of defendant.
On the other hand, defense counsel ridiculed what he considered an attempt by the prosecution to escape the force of the defense testimony by questioning the quality of the print for identification purposes.3
*246A further circumstance bearing on the question is that there was no claim there had been error in that ruling of the court in either of two motions for new trial made and argued by defendant.4
If it be granted the court erroneously stated evidence the palm print was unidentifiable was inadmissible, the trial judge was entitled, in the context in which the defense request was presented to him, to believe the statement of counsel he did not intend to present such evidence and wanted the name or names of the expert or experts to see if they could not, as the result of further study, come to an opinion positively excluding defendant as the maker of the print. When on December 17 defense counsel corrected his earlier view evidence was inadmissible that the print was unidentifiable, he still did not say he desired to present such evidence.
The judgment should not be reversed because of an erroneous view of the law on the part of the trial judge when the point was not necessary to the court’s ruling on the request for discovery. It must first appear that the court abused its discretion. (Hall v. Superior Court [L. A. No. 31072—Feb. 25, 1974].)
The question presented was whether defendánt was entitled to have fed to him the names of experts who might possibly arrive at a positive excluding opinion, and that for the sole reason they had already examined the exemplars. While that might make it more convenient for counsel, the refusal of the court to grant the request was not a denial of due process or a fair trial. In the setting in which the request was made it must have been evident that defense counsel had ready access to the names of experts in the field: Meyers had been in charge of fingerprints at the San Diego Police Department for 15 years; Stahl, until he retired in 1963, had for 22 years been head of the latent fingerprint section of the Los Angeles Police Department; Smith had been in that same department for 15 years until August 1970. It was in the Los Angeles Police Department that defense counsel said the unnamed expert or experts were who had been consulted by the prosecution. The witnesses Stahl and Smith would have been acquainted with the names of experts in that field in the Los Angeles Police Department; and, in general, although the art itself may be esoteric, knowledge of the names of its practitioners is by no means so.
*247If defendant’s request or motion sought discovery for the purpose stated to the court, there was no prejudice in the denial. If defense counsel did not know the names of experts in the Los Angeles Police Department who might have been interviewed by the prosecution, the names of all experts in that department were ascertainable, and those experts could have been interviewed by him. Between the time the court ruled on defendant’s motion (Dec. 8), the trial was not in: progress until December 17, with the exception of December 10. That unforeseen interval in the course of a trial should have afforded defense counsel sufficient opportunity, by his own efforts, to get in touch with any experts in the Los Angeles Police Department who had examined the exemplars. He had in fact, by December 20, obtained a fourth expert opinion that the print was not defendant’s. So far as we know, that expert, Norman Readdy, may have been one of those from the Los Angeles Police Department whom the prosecution had interviewed earlier.
Defendant must show prejudice. (Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 [49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838, 18 A.L.R.3d 1416].)
In a case in which the defendant sought discovery of 13 named persons interviewed by the prosecution, of whom only three were called as witnesses, the reviewing court said: “Only three of the named persons whose statements were demanded were called by the prosecution as witnesses, and defendant was furnished copies of the statements of all three. The names of all were known to defendant and the record is silent as to whether he interviewed or attempted to interview any or all of them. ‘Although the defendant does not have to show . . . that the evidence which he seeks to have produced would be admissible at the trial [citations], he does have to show some better cause for inspection than a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime.’ (People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.2d 755, 770 . . . .)” (People v. Lane 56 Cal.2d 773, 786 [16 Cal.Rptr. 801, 366 P.2d 57].)
In California there is no statutory scheme for discovery in criminal cases, except the requirement that the names of witnesses before the grand jury and a transcript of their testimony be furnished. Where the process does not arise by indictment, a preliminary hearing may serve the same purpose.
In the absence of express legislation on the subject, the courts have deemed it appropriate to develop rules governing discovery (Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56 [22 Cal.Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 96 A.L.R. 2d 1213]).
*248It has resulted that many cases involving the right to discovery have been decided on an ad hoc basis. While there are well-defined areas where discovery is compellable, there remain areas where the question is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The area of discretion is that in which reasonable minds might differ.
That is true in the federal courts working under rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which declares a right of discovery of: “. . . results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government . . . .”
Those rules have been one of the bases of the “Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial” approved by the American Bar Association; and the following cases, decided under the federal rules, throw some light on the problem.
Rule 16(b) of the federal rules permits discovery more broadly than due process requires. (United States v. White (5th Cir.) 450 F.2d 264, 268-269; United States v. Conder (6th Cir.) 423 F.2d 904, 911.)
In Link v. United States (8th Cir.) 352 F.2d 207, 212, the defense claimed the government had failed to disclose that it had unsuccessfully sought to find burglar’s tools which government witnesses had testified they had dumped into the Mississippi River at a certain point, and that testimony the tools had not been found there would impeach those witnesses in material matters. Of that claim, the court said: “[T]he Government’s failure to have advised appellant of its attempted search cannot be claimed to be such a suppression of evidence as would violate due process by having deprived him of the fundamental character of a fair trial.
“Of course, any suppression of evidence favorable to an accused, ‘where the evidence is material ... to guilt,’ can constitute a violation of due process. Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. Evidence material to guilt is, we think, evidence which is of probative character on that question. As to evidence not of that character and having admissibility only for the purpose of impeachment or credibility attack, nondisclosure or suppression, to be violative of due process, would in our opinion, unless the situation is otherwise tainted, have to be of such inherent significance as to represent fundamental unfairness.”
*249In United States v. Cole (8th Cir.) 453 F.2d 902, 904, the court stated: “ ‘An application for relief under the discovery rules ... is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion.’ [Citations]; and an error in administering the discovery rules is not reversible absent a showing that the error was prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant.”
United States v. Conder, supra (6th Cir.) 423 F.2d 904, 911, held: “Since we have already determined that the denial of the discovery motions was not an abuse of discretion granted to the District Court under Rule 16, and since the appellants have not offered the slightest hint that the government actually suppressed any exculpatory evidence at the trial, we hold that the denial of the broad discovery motions for all evidence favorable to the appellants was not a denial of due process.”
In United States v. Jordan (2d Cir.) 399 F.2d 610, 615, the court said: “Brady v. State of Maryland merely holds that due process requires the government to produce upon request ‘evidence favorable to an accused’ which is ‘material either to guilt or to punishment.’ 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197. It does not require the government to disclose the myriad immaterial statements and names and addresses which any extended investigation is bound to produce. Stokes contends that it is for defense counsel to determine what evidence is favorable to his client. We hold that the decision is one for the trial court, subject to appellate review.”
Although the commentary on the American Bar Association Approved Standards states pretrial discovery is required of reports of experts whether the result is “positive” or “negative” or “abortive,” that must be viewed in the light of the purposes declared in paragraph 1.1 of the Standards: “(i) to promote an expeditious as well as fair determination of the charges, whether by plea or trial;
“(ii) to provide the accused sufficient information to make an informed plea;
“(iii) to permit thorough preparation for trial and minimize surprise at trial . . . .”5
*250Service of those purposes would require that if there were no report other than an abortive one, that should be disclosed. If there has been disclosure of a positive report on a fingerprint, and there is also a report that is “abortive” from the prosecution point of view, it may be doubted that the service of those purposes would require routine disclosure of the latter, although disclosure of a negative report as well as of a positive one would be required.
In Keith v. United States (9th Cir.) 421 F.2d 1295, 1296, the court said: “This is a case where defendant made a pretrial discovery motion and elected to rest on the adverse ruling as a technical basis for reviewable error without making a record to show prejudice or an error of substance.”
In the case at bench, defendant failed to show prejudice or to take any procedural steps, short of a reversal on appeal, to overcome the effect of the trial court’s error, if there were error.
I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 15, 1974, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 26, 1974. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

At oral argument counsel stated that while at the Sacramento airport on a Saturday during the trial he was told by a man whom he had arranged to meet there for a conference that the prosecution had consulted experts in the CII who were unable to arrive at any positive opinion with regard to the print. That must have been a lapse of memory; the statement made during trial is the more likely.

The following are a few excerpts from that part of the argument dealing with the palm print evidence: “We have, in fact, produced positive evidence, positive evidence that Nealy Aubrey Johnson did not commit the crime in question. By the testimony of four distinguished fingerprint experts you have heard that that bloody print on the bed sheet positively could not have been made by Nealy Aubrey Johnson.”
“. . . the positive exclusion by four competent experts ...”
“[W]hat more positive evidence could a defendant produce than fingerprint evidence excluding him . . . .”
“[Tjhere are four considerations I want you to go into that jury room with; there are four things that I just suggest you can’t get away from in this case.
“The first are those four eminent fingerprint experts who positively exclude Nealy Aubrey Johnson as the man who made those prints.”

“They introduce that print to ask you to convict Nealy Johnson of the most serious crime that exists on the statutes of this country. They weren’t worried at that point about whether it was a poor print. They weren’t worried about whether it was difficult to work with. They weren’t worried about whether the prints were indistinct, they were worried about recording differences or about whether blood was a poor recording medium. It is kind of curious.
“When competent witnesses took the stand and positively excluded Nealy John*246son, the prosecution turned on its own print. How do you feel about that? It was good enough to ask you to convict a man of murder without any of those qualifications, but when it positively excludes the man on trial, it is suddenly not a reliable piece of evidence.”

The first motion was made before the trial as to penalty, so as to make that phase of the trial unnecessary; the second, after the penalty phase.

Among the Approved Standards of the American Bar Association are:
“2.1 Prosecutor’s obligations.
"
“(a) Except as is otherwise provided as to matters not subject to disclosure (section 2.6) and protective orders (section 4.4), the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defense counsel the following material and information within his possession or control:
" “(iv) any reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the par*250ticular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons; [p. 13]
"
“4.2 Continuing duty to disclose.
“If, subsequent to compliance with these standards or orders pursuant thereto, a party discovers additional material or information which is subject to disclosure, he shall promptly notify the other party or his counsel of the existence of such additional material, and if the additional material or information is discovered during trial, the court shall also be notified.” (P. 99.)
The commentary on the Standards observes: “This subsection makes clear that reports of experts and results of tests must be disclosed whether the report or result is ‘positive,’ or ‘negative,’ or abortive (from the prosecutor’s standpoint), and whether or not the prosecution intends to use the expert at a hearing or trial. It may well be that many ‘negative’ reports will have to be disclosed at some time in any event, under the constitutional requirements of Brady v. Maryland. . . .
“Discoverable under this section would be . . . fingerprint comparisons, . . . and the like. . . . (P. 67.)
“Two basic categories of exculpatory material and information seem to have been delineated by the courts: (1) that which tends to show the accused not guilty of the offense charged; (2) that which indicates that he should be subject under law (as distinguished from the court’s sentencing discretion) to a lesser penalty than would otherwise be indicated.” (P. 75.)
"
“Difficult questions remain to be solved. For instance, must defense counsel be informed of names and statements of witnesses whom the prosecution has decided not to use at the trial? . . . Mr. Justice Fortas indicates that certainly the prosecution has no obligation ‘to communicate preliminary, challenged, or speculative information.’ Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (concurring opinion). But should such memoranda contain information about evidence tending to negate guilt of the accused, that information must be disclosed.” (Pp. 77-78.)