Court Opinion

ID: 9604925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:28:23.715678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:29.364603
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with Judges Coats and Singleton in rejecting Vaden’s assertion that his conviction was barred because no offense was actually committed. I would, however, find that Snell’s conduct in this case “[fell] below an acceptable standard for the fair and honorable administration of justice.” Pascu v. State, 577 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Alaska 1978). Vaden’s conviction should therefore be reversed.
The state’s effort to ferret out crime consisted of Snell’s shooting foxes as a means of convicting Vaden vicariously for the shooting of those very same foxes. All of Vaden’s convictions stemmed directly from the shooting of foxes by Snell. The evil committed by the state’s agent was thus plainly equivalent to, or greater than, the evil for which Vaden was convicted. Under these peculiar circumstances, I do not believe Vaden’s conviction can properly stand.
The state, of course, attempts to characterize Snell’s conduct as being necessary in order to secure evidence of Vaden’s participation in an ongoing pattern of more serious fish and game offenses. This explanation would, in my view, be persuasive with respect to charges involving additional, more serious crimes; in my view Pascu would not have precluded Vaden’s conviction for any such additional charges.1 In fact, however, Vaden was acquitted of all charges except those stemming directly *790from Snell’s shooting of the foxes. This outcome precludes Snell’s conduct from being regarded as a lesser evil that was necessary to accomplish some greater good.
I therefore dissent.

. Similarly, I would not have precluded the state from prosecuting and convicting Vaden for the crime of solicitation, the commission of which would not have been dependent upon Snell’s shooting of the foxes.