Court Opinion

ID: 9527640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:32:06.914806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:59.949923
License: Public Domain

CATES, Judge,
concurring specially (as to the exception to the charge on voluntary manslaughter).
The expression used in the first sentence of the language excepted to, viz.
“Intention to take life is not necessarily an ingredient of manslaughter, even in the first degree,”
may contain sophisticated nuances easily discernible by lawyers and judges. Paraphrased it could read:
“Manslaughter need not in every case embrace an intention to take life.” 1
But when this thought is coupled with the requirement of either (1) a positive intention to kill or (2) an intention to do an act of violence from which etc., then there is sufficient explanation to make the two sentences merge into a composite, rounded definition. See Kitchens v. State, 31 Ala.App. 239, 14 So.2d 739.
However, while the quoted first sentence is not incorrect, we think that it is superfluous for a lay group such as a jury. We cannot overemphasize that jury charges should not be taken merely from court opinions but from charges actually approved (not merely mentioned) in court opinions. Furthermore, in no field is it more important to use Shepard’s Citator. Jones, Alabama Jury Instructions is useful but every charge therein should be Shepardized and otherwise researched before being used.
PRICE, P. J., and ALMON and TYSON, JJ., concur.

. Clayton v. State, 36 Ala.App. 175, 54 So.2d 719 (3).