Court Opinion

ID: 9852762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:36:20.559944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:34.181718
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from that part of the majority opinion which holds that the trial court did not err in finding that the present recall statute does not violate the provisions of the Georgia Constitution, Art. Ill, Sec. VII, Par. IV (Code Ann. § 2-1915) which provides in part as follows: "No office to which a person has been elected shall be abolished, nor the term of the office shortened or lengthened by local or special bill during the term for which such person was elected unless the same be approved by the people of the jurisdiction affected in a referendum. . .”
*751In my opinion this provision was inserted in the 1945 Constitution to qualify the ruling in Wilson v. Harris, 170 Ga. 800 (154 SE 388) (1930) which laid down the broad ruling that the General Assembly may abolish an office created by it before the term of the incumbent expires, may modify its duties, may shorten or lengthen the term, and increase or diminish the salary or change the mode of compensation. This of course is still the law with regard to an office which is created by the General Assembly, with the important proviso as set forth in the 1945 Constitution that it may be done only upon approval by referendum of the people of the jurisdiction affected. The recall statute involved here has not been approved by the people of Douglas County in a referendum.
The majority opinion skirts this constitutional referendum requirement by saying that the present recall statute does not affect the term of office of county commissioner and that it merely provides for an election mechanism for removing a particular person from office. This election mechanism was certainly used to shorten the term of the incumbent appellant and this affected the term "for which such person was elected.”
In Webb v. Echols, 211 Ga. 724 (88 SE2d 625) (1955) the General Assembly passed an Act without a referendum which created a three-member Board of Commissioners of Clayton County but continued the existing sole commissioner in office as one of the three-member board until the end of his term of office. A majority of this court held that such Act did not violate the referendum provisions of Code Ann. § 2-1915, clearly indicating that a contrary result would have been reached had the sole commissioner’s term of office and compensation been effected. In a strong dissent three Justices of the court were of the opinion that even under these conditions the referendum provision was violated.
Even assuming that the referendum was not required in this case it is my opinion that the Act is prospective only and applicable only to "persons elected to a term of office” after its effective date.
I respectfully dissent.