Court Opinion

ID: 9914782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 01:01:39.868374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:28.741827
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/2/24
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION THREE

                                     B320383
 Estate of ROBERT ALLEN
 FLORES, Deceased.                   (Los Angeles County
                                     Super. Ct. No. 18STPB08481)

 BRENDA DEPEW, as
 Administrator, etc.,

          Petitioner,

          v.

 DONALD CARMODY,

          Objector and Appellant;

 AMERICAN RESEARCH
 BUREAU, INC.,

          Claimant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ana Maria Luna, Judge. Affirmed.
     Jeff Klink for Objector and Appellant.
     Augustine and Seymour and Michael Augustine for
Claimant and Respondent.
                   ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

      When an heir-hunter firm informed appellant Donald
Carmody he was the heir of a nephew he never knew existed, he
thought it was a scam. He assigned any rights he might have in
the nephew’s estate to his brother, John Carmody, believing any
such rights were worthless.1 However, the estate had value.
John filed a petition under Probate Code section 11700 for
determination of entitlement to distribution of the nephew’s
estate.2 He obtained a determination that he and Donald were
the nephew’s heirs, each entitled to a 50 percent share of the
estate. John died before the request for a final distribution order
was submitted to the court. When the administrator of the
nephew’s estate sought a final distribution order that would take
into account Donald’s assignment of his rights to John, Donald
objected, claiming the prior order determining entitlement to
distribution was final, binding, and prohibited the court from
recognizing his prior assignment of his interest to John. The
court rejected this claim.
      We conclude the trial court properly gave effect to Donald’s
assignment of his interest in the estate to John. John’s rights as
an assignee were not raised or litigated in the section 11700
proceeding, which was limited to a determination of heirship.
John did not forfeit or waive his rights as an assignee by failing
to assert those rights in the section 11700 proceeding, or by

1   For the sake of clarity, we refer to John and Donald
Carmody by their first names only. No disrespect is intended.

2       All undesignated statutory references are to the Probate
Code.

                                  2
failing to file a statement of interest. We therefore affirm the
trial court judgment.
         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         On September 2, 2012, Robert Allen Flores (Decedent) died
intestate. He was not survived by a spouse, registered domestic
partner, children, parents, or siblings.
         In September 2018, American Research Bureau, Inc.
(ARB), an “heir-hunter” firm, contacted brothers John and
Donald to inform them that they were Decedent’s maternal
uncles. John and Donald were therefore Decedent’s heirs, and
ARB offered to work with them in seeking a portion of the estate.
ARB sent Donald a copy of a 1930 federal census record reflecting
that John and Donald’s father had a first wife prior to marrying
their mother. ARB informed Donald that his father’s first wife
was the Decedent’s grandmother. Donald was skeptical. Neither
John nor Donald ever knew that they had a half sister—
Decedent’s mother. Donald told John he thought they were being
“ ‘scammed.’ ” In e-mail correspondence, ARB assured Donald
that ARB was “not a scam,” and added: “If you are still not
interested in receiving your portion of the estate, we can work
with you so that you can assign your share to your brother if you
wish.”
         In October 2018, John told Donald that he planned to “ ‘put
in’ . . . for the estate of robert flores” because he “could use some
pesos.” That month, John signed an agreement assigning to ARB
one-fourth of any interest he might have in Decedent’s estate. In
November 2018, ARB e-mailed Donald again to inform him that
it was “moving forward in this matter on behalf of your brother
John,” and asked if Donald wanted to be included in the
proceeding with ARB’s assistance. Donald reiterated that he

                                  3
believed ARB might be “running a scam” and that “time will tell.”
However, he also had “no problem assigning [his] share of this
‘estate’ to [his] brother.” ARB’s attorney prepared an assignment
and sent it to Donald. In December 2018, Donald signed an
“Assignment of Interest in Estate” stating: “I, DONALD D.
CARMODY, hereby grant, transfer and assign all of my right,
title, and interest in the above referenced estate to John L.
Carmody, and hereby authorize and direct the Administrator of
said estate to give my share and make payment to John L.
Carmody of any interest I may have in said estate.”
Petitions for probate of Decedent’s estate
        Meanwhile, in September 2018, Patricia McCluskey filed a
petition requesting that the probate court appoint her as
administrator of Decedent’s estate. McCluskey alleged she was
Decedent’s first cousin, once removed, and that she and four
alleged second cousins were Decedent’s heirs-at-law and
therefore entitled to the estate. McCluskey did not identify John
or Donald as potential heirs.
        In January 2019, John filed objections to McCluskey’s
petition on the basis that he, as a maternal uncle, was more
closely related to Decedent and was entitled to inherit Decedent’s
estate to the exclusion of McCluskey and the alleged second
cousins listed in her petition. Around the same time, John filed a
competing petition for letters of administration nominating
Brenda Depew as the administrator of Decedent’s estate. His
petition identified Donald as Decedent’s other living maternal
uncle.
        In February 2019, the court denied McCluskey’s petition
and granted John’s petition. The court issued letters of

                                4
administration appointing Depew as the administrator of
Decedent’s estate.
       In July 2019, John filed a “Petition to Determine
Entitlement to Estate Distribution [Probate Code § 11700].” He
listed himself and Donald as Decedent’s sole heirs-at-law and
asserted they were each entitled to half of the estate. The
petition did not reference the assignment from Donald to John or
the assignment from John to ARB. No other person filed a
statement of interest asserting entitlement to distribution of
Decedent’s estate or objecting to John’s petition. The court
granted the petition and, in October 2019, entered an “Order
Determining Entitlement to Estate Distribution.” The order
found that “[a]ll notices have been duly given as required by law,”
declared that John and Donald were the “heirs-at-law of the
decedent,” and found each was entitled to a 50 percent interest in
the estate.
       In January 2021, Depew filed a “First and Final Account
and Report of Administrator; Petition for Statutory Commissions;
for Statutory and Extraordinary Attorneys’ Fees; and for Final
Distribution.” Depew proposed a distribution of the balance of
the estate, after payment of all outstanding fees and claims, to
John and Donald, “each as to a 50% interest.”
John’s estate
       John died in August 2020. In his will, he named his
stepdaughters Kara Masteller and Dawn Bailey as beneficiaries
of his estate, and Masteller as the executor.
       In April 2021, Donald’s attorney contacted Masteller and
Bailey by letter, “for the purpose of facilitating distribution
directly to Don of his 50% interest in the [Decedent’s estate].”
Counsel indicated Donald had advised him of “his agreement

                                5
with [John], . . . whereby John was to receive both John’s and
Don’s interest in [Decedent’s estate], and then pay over Don’s
interest when [Don] arrived back from Thailand and was thus in
a better position to receive the funds and deposit those to his
bank.” The letter stated it appeared the administrator of
Decedent’s estate had not been informed of John’s death, or that
“John had undertaken to receive Don’s interest as a voluntary
trustee.”
       Donald’s attorney proposed that Masteller, Bailey, and
Donald sign and submit declarations pursuant to section 13107,
seeking an order from the probate court that it “pay directly to
each of [them] the share otherwise due John . . . . And Don will
also receive his share directly, as requested in the Petition
already filed . . . .” The letter advised that regardless of whether
Masteller and Bailey accepted counsel’s suggestion, “Don has
directed me to ensure that he receives distribution of his share
directly from [Decedent’s estate].”
       In May 2021, Masteller filed a notice of “Assignment of
Interest in Estate.” She attached copies of Donald’s assignment
of his interest in Decedent’s estate to John and John’s will. Soon
after, the Superior Court for Yolo County issued letters
testamentary appointing Masteller the executor of John’s estate.
       In May 2021, Depew filed a “Supplement to First and Final
Account and Report of Administrator; Petition For Statutory
Commissions; For Statutory and Extraordinary Attorneys’ Fees;
and For Final Distribution.” The supplement indicated that
subsequent to filing the initial “First and Final Account,” Depew
learned that Donald had assigned his interest in Decedent’s
estate to John; John had post-deceased Decedent; and John left
his entire estate to Masteller and Bailey. Depew therefore

                                 6
stated: “Since Donald D. Carmody has assigned his entire
interest in the estate to his brother John L. Carmody, and since
John L. Carmody left a Will leaving his entire estate to Kara
Masteller and Dawn Bailey, Petitioner proposes that 100% of the
estate residue should be distributed” to Masteller.3
Donald’s objections
      Donald objected to Depew’s supplemental filing. Donald
primarily argued that the court’s October 2019 order was
conclusive as to the persons entitled to distribution of Decedent’s
estate, therefore he was entitled to half the estate. Donald
further argued his assignment to John was a conveyance in trust,
because John told Donald by phone in July 2020 that he never
intended to keep all of the money, and John had reassured
Donald that he would split the funds equally with Donald if they
were all distributed to John. Finally, Donald contended John
waived the assignment by not identifying it in his July 2019
section 11700 petition.4
      In a reply to Donald’s objection, Masteller argued Donald’s
assignment of his interest in the estate to John was valid and
was not waived because it was not before the court in the prior
proceeding. She further argued the October 2019 order was only
conclusive and binding “as to any claims of other heirs,” and did
not prevent the court from subsequently determining that “the
validly executed assignments . . . determine the final distribution

3     Depew later filed two additional supplements to account for
escrow funds that had been restored to Decedent’s estate,
additional interest, and John’s assignment to ARB.

4    Donald also asserted objections related to bond issues and
monies previously withheld from Decedent’s mother’s estate.
Those issues are not before us on appeal.

                                 7
of each party’s share” of the estate. Masteller pointed out that
Donald, through his attorney, had confirmed that the brothers
arranged for John to receive both shares, and neither brother had
rescinded the assignment. Masteller further asserted that if
there was evidence John made an oral promise to Donald, the
appropriate forum for litigating that claim would be in
proceedings related to John’s estate.
       ARB also filed a reply to Donald’s objection, arguing that
Donald “erroneously conflated the concept of a determination of
heirship with the Assignment.” According to ARB, the October
2019 order “simply clarified” the heirs of Decedent’s estate but
had “absolutely no impact on the effect of the Assignment” to
ARB. ARB further asserted Donald’s arguments that the
assignment was a conveyance in trust, or that the assignment
was waived, were inequitable and barred by the doctrine of
laches.
       The court scheduled an accounting hearing for February
2022. It instructed the parties to submit a summary of filings
they wished the court to consider. In his summary, Donald
framed the main issue as “[w]hether enforcement of the
[December] 2018 Assignment by Donald Carmody is precluded by
Probate Code § 11705, the statutory application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel that applies following a proceeding to
determine entitlement to distribution under Probate Code
§ 11700?” He also contended the court should consider several
“sub-issues,” such as whether John waived or rescinded the
assignment, and whether the assignment was invalid because it
was obtained by duress or lacked consideration.

                                8
Trial court ruling
       In April 2022, the trial court overruled Donald’s objections
and approved Depew’s supplemental first and final account. The
court concluded the issues presented in the “heirship petition”
were “to determine who the heirs of the estate were and their
respective percentage of interests in the estate.” The October
2019 order “decided which individuals were statutorily entitled to
inherit from the decedent but did not decide the distribution of
those interests . . . .” The court reasoned Donald could not invoke
collateral estoppel because “the issues in the heirship petition
and petition for distribution are not identical and the validity of
the challenged assignment was not presented to the court for
determination in the heirship petition.” The court rejected
Donald’s waiver argument, noting John had not sought such
relief in the prior petition and instead had only requested that
the court “determine conclusively, against any claims by any
other potential heirs, who was entitled to inherit the estate of a
decedent who died without a will.”
       The court further indicated it gave “very little weight” to
Donald’s “one-sided recitation” of a phone call during which John
allegedly rescinded Donald’s assignment to him, and it found
John had not waived or rescinded the assignment. Finally, the
court determined Donald freely assigned his interest in the estate
to John without duress. The assignment was enforceable despite
the lack of consideration because Donald “believed nothing would
come of ARB’s efforts and . . . valued his own interest in the
estate at zero.”
       The court accordingly ordered “[d]istribution of balance of
estate assets to Kara Mastellar [sic], Executor of the Estate of

                                9
John L. Carmody, less ¼ assignment to American Research
Bureau by John L. Carmody.”
       Donald timely appealed. ARB filed a responsive brief.
Neither Depew nor Masteller has appeared on appeal.5
                           DISCUSSION
       Donald argues the trial court’s October 2019 order was
binding and conclusive as to the distribution of Decedent’s estate,
thus the trial court erred in subsequently issuing an order that
gave effect to Donald’s assignment of his share in the estate to
John. Donald further contends the court erred in rejecting his
arguments that John waived or rescinded the assignment. We
find no error.
I.     The Trial Court’s October 2019 Order Did Not
       Prevent the Court From Giving Effect to Donald’s
       Assignment in the Final Distribution Order
       Donald’s arguments regarding the scope and conclusive
effect of the October 2019 order raise questions of law we review
de novo. (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142.)

5      Although some of Donald’s arguments on appeal appear to
be directed to the trial court’s order enforcing both assignments,
Donald concedes that he is not prejudiced by any trial court error
enforcing John’s assignment to ARB. “As a general rule, where
only one of several parties appeals from a judgment, the appeal
includes only that portion of the judgment adverse to the
appealing party’s interest, and the judgment is considered final
as to the nonappealing parties.” (Estate of McDill (1975) 14
Cal.3d 831, 840.) Masteller has not appealed from the trial court
order giving effect to John’s assignment to ARB. We further note
that no party challenged the assignment to ARB below. We
therefore limit our review to only the portion of the trial court
order giving effect to Donald’s assignment to John.

                                10
        A.     Section 11700 et seq.
        Under section 11700, “[a]t any time after letters are first
issued to a general personal representative and before an order
for final distribution is made, the personal representative, or any
person claiming to be a beneficiary or otherwise entitled to
distribution of a share of the estate, may file a petition for a court
determination of the persons entitled to distribution of the
decedent’s estate.” This proceeding is permissive. If no petition
is filed under section 11700, the court may determine who is
entitled to distribution in a final distribution order. (Estate of
Simmons (1966) 64 Cal.2d 217, 220.) Notice of the proceeding
must be given to each known heir and devisee whose interest
would be affected by the petition, the Attorney General in some
cases, the personal representative of the estate, and all persons
who have requested special notice in the estate proceeding.
(§§ 1220, 11701.)
        Section 11702 allows “[a]ny interested person” to appear
and to file a written statement of the person’s interest in the
estate in advance of the hearing. (§ 11702, subd. (a).) If an
interested person fails to timely file a written statement, the case
is still at issue and may proceed. The interested person “may not
participate further in the proceeding for determination of persons
entitled to distribution, but the person’s interest in the estate is
not otherwise affected.” (§ 11702, subd. (b)(2).) In addition,
“[t]he person is bound by the decision in the proceeding.”
(§ 11702, subd. (b)(3).)
        Section 11705, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide that the
trial court “shall make an order that determines the persons
entitled to distribution of the decedent’s estate and specifies their

                                 11
shares,” and “[w]hen the court order becomes final it binds and is
conclusive as to the rights of all interested persons.”
       B.    The October 2019 order did not determine
             John’s rights as an assignee
       On appeal, Donald contends that John’s section 11700
petition “to [d]etermine [e]ntitlement [t]o [e]state [d]istribution”
was necessarily a request that the trial court conclusively
adjudicate the rights of any and all persons “interested” in the
distribution of Decedent’s estate, including assignees, and the
resulting order bound all such interested persons. He asserts
that while the portion of John’s section 11700 petition discussing
entitlement to distribution was “narrowly directed to the claims
of heirship under Section 6402,” this was merely to satisfy
pleading requirements and did not limit the “interests” to be
conclusively determined in the proceeding. Donald urges that
since John failed to file a statement of interest as an assignee
prior to the court’s resolution of the section 11700 petition, those
assignee rights were lost, and the court had no jurisdiction to
consider them later.
       Our analysis of these arguments begins with the plain
language of the statute. (Estate of Bartsch (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 885, 892.) While section 11700 allows any person
claiming to be a beneficiary or otherwise entitled to distribution
of a share of a decedent’s estate to file a petition, section 11702
concerns any other persons with an interest in the estate. As
noted above, under section 11702, any interested person may
appear in a section 11700 proceeding and file a statement of
interest. An interested person who fails to file a statement of
interest may not participate further in the proceeding, “but the
person’s interest in the estate is not otherwise affected.” (§ 11702,

                                 12
subd. (b)(2), italics added.) On its face, this language indicates
that the failure to file a statement of interest does not amount to
an automatic forfeiture of the interested person’s rights.
       As a result, the effect of the proceeding on a person’s
interest in the estate must depend on what is litigated and
decided in the section 11700 proceeding. In this case, the
section 11700 proceeding determined only the identity of
Decedent’s heirs and their respective shares of the estate. John’s
interest as an assignee was contingent on Donald first being
determined to be an heir of Decedent. Even as an assignee, John
was bound by the determination that Donald was Decedent’s heir
and was entitled to a one-half share of the estate. John could not
have subsequently argued that Donald was entitled to a greater
or lesser share, for example. (William Hill Co. v. Lawler (1897)
116 Cal. 359, 362 [any person who claims under an heir or
devisee “is bound by the decree as fully as would be the heir or
devisee himself if he had not made the conveyance”].) Yet to
conclude, as Donald contends, that John’s rights as an assignee to
Donald’s share of the estate were eviscerated because he failed to
file a statement of interest, we would have to ignore the express
language of section 11702, subdivision (b)(2).
       Indeed, Donald ignores section 11702, subdivision (b)(2)
altogether. He makes no attempt to explain how his argument
that John’s failure to file a statement of interest waived his
assignee interest for all time can be squared with section 11702,
subdivision (b)(2)’s provision that, other than preventing an
interested person from participating further in the proceedings,
the failure to file a statement of interest does not otherwise affect
that person’s interest in the estate.

                                 13
       Donald’s arguments are also inconsistent with caselaw
which has long drawn a distinction between heirs, devisees, and
legatees, who have a direct entitlement to a share of a decedent’s
estate, and persons whose only interest in the estate is derivative
of the rights of an heir, devisee, or legatee. In many early cases,
such as Chever v. Ching Hong Poy (1889) 82 Cal. 68, 71 (Chever),
California courts rejected the argument that a probate court
distribution decree determined or eliminated the rights an
assignee or grantee held pursuant to an heir’s assignment or
conveyance of the heir’s interest in an estate. Many of these
courts reasoned that the probate court had no jurisdiction to
consider the claims of assignees or grantees for direct distribution
of estate property. Thus, a distribution order could not be
deemed to have determined an assignee’s or grantee’s rights
under an assignment or other instrument.
       In Chever, for example, the plaintiff executed a deed
conveying his interest in real property in his father’s estate to his
mother. The probate court issued a distribution decree
distributing the property to the mother during her widowhood,
and subsequently to the plaintiff and his four brothers. (Chever,
supra, 82 Cal. at p. 70.) When the mother died, the plaintiff
claimed in a later proceeding that the probate court’s distribution
decree “destroyed the effect” of the deed he had previously
executed in favor of the mother, and conclusively established he
was entitled to a share of the property. (Id. at p. 71.) The Chever
court rejected this argument, affirming the trial court finding
that title to the property vested in the plaintiff upon the father’s
death and passed by the previously executed deed to the mother.
(Ibid.)

                                 14
       The Chever court held the probate court’s determination of
legal heirs did not create any new title and had “nothing to do
with contracts or conveyances which may have been made by
heirs, devisees, or legatees of or about their shares of the estate,
either among themselves or with others; such matters are not
before the probate court, and over them it has no jurisdiction.”
(Chever, supra, 82 Cal. at p. 71; Barnard v. Wilson (1888) 74 Cal.
512, 517 [third party’s claim to title to estate property through
heir not barred for failure to assert claim before probate court;
judgment in rem and final distribution decree did not settle third
party’s claim; probate court had no jurisdiction to determine
dispute between heirs and third persons].) The distribution
decree thus did not invalidate the previously executed deed.
       In In re Estate of Burton (1892) 93 Cal. 459 (Burton), the
court held that the enactment of former Code of Civil Procedure
section 1664, a predecessor to section 11700, was an express
authorization and requirement that the probate court determine
the interest of persons with an indirect claim to ownership of the
estate. (Id. at pp. 461, 464; Stats. 1885, ch. 160, § 1, p. 208.) In
Burton, the petitioner seeking a determination of entitlement to
distribution was not an heir or direct beneficiary of the estate.
Instead, she was the executor of the estate of the heirs’ grantee.
(Id. at p. 460.) The Burton court rejected the heirs’ argument
that “one who has purchased the interest of an heir or devisee in
the property of an estate . . . has no right [under former Code of
Civil Procedure section 1664], to have the interest thus
purchased ascertained, declared, or directly distributed to him”
by the probate court. (Id. at pp. 460–461.)
       The Burton court distinguished Chever as relating to a
“ordinary decree of distribution,” rather than an order

                                 15
adjudicating a petition to determine entitlement to distribution.
(Burton, supra, 93 Cal. at p. 461.) The court explained that “in
the ordinary mode of distribution [as in Chever,] the grantee of
the heir is not a party to the proceeding, and there is no issue as
to his title presented for determination.” (Id. at pp. 461–462.) In
Burton, the executor of the grantee’s estate was a party to the
proceeding, as she had filed the petition to seek a determination
of her entitlement to distribution of estate property.
       However, Burton did not address the conclusive effect, if
any, of a decree determining entitlement to distribution on
persons whose indirect claims were not presented. In fact, the
court explained the entitlement to distribution proceeding as one
in which “all persons who claim ownership of or an interest in the
property of an estate of a testator or an intestate, whether
directly, as heirs and devisees, or indirectly, through the heirs or
devisees, may have their respective rights and interests in and to
such property conclusively ascertained, determined, and
declared, so far at least as the parties before the court are
concerned, before distribution is decreed, to the end that the final
distribution of the property may be made directly to the persons
respectively entitled thereto . . . . But the provisions of the
section are carefully limited to the ascertainment and
determination of rights and interests claimed in privity with the
estates, and are not applicable to rights or titles claimed
adversely to such estates.”6 (Burton, supra, 93 Cal. at p. 461,
second italics added.)

6     A leading treatise explains the historical distinction
between claims adverse to the estate and claims in privity with
the estate in relation to section 850: “Historically, superior courts

                                 16
       The Burton court thus did not consider whether an order
determining only the heirs’ entitlement to distribution foreclosed
the claims of persons with an indirect interest in estate property
when those claims were not presented in the proceeding. In
contrast, in several subsequent cases concerning final
distribution orders, the California Supreme Court continued to
hold that while the order is conclusive and binding on those with
direct claims on the estate such as heirs, it does not invalidate an
heir’s contract or arrangement to assign or convey the heir’s
interest in the estate to another person.
       For example, in Parr v. Reyman (1932) 215 Cal. 616 (Parr),
after the death of his mother and pending the administration of
her estate, the plaintiff conveyed all of his interest in the
mother’s estate to his brother. A decree of distribution
accordingly ordered the plaintiff’s interest in the estate to be

sitting in probate had no jurisdiction to try title disputes; probate
jurisdiction could only be exercised over assets unqualifiedly
belonging to decedent or their estate. In no event could a third
party claimant be brought into the proceedings, because such a
claimant lacked ‘privity’ with the estate. [¶] In time, exceptions
arose, whereby one claiming to be ‘in privity’ with the estate (i.e.,
an heir, beneficiary or appointed representative claiming through
the estate) could litigate their title claim in the probate
proceeding. [Citations.] [¶] Recognizing that it is more
expeditious to resolve the entire controversy in a single
proceeding, the Legislature ultimately broadened these
exceptions to the point that the historical limitations have
disappeared. All title disputes and adverse claims—including
those involving strangers to the estate—are now resolvable in the
probate proceeding under Prob.C. § 850(a)(2) . . . .” (Ross &
Cohen, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2023)
¶ 15:555.)

                                 17
distributed to his brother. (Id. at p. 617.) After the brother died,
the plaintiff asserted a creditor’s claim against the brother’s
estate, asserting he and the brother had an oral agreement that
the brother would only hold the property conveyed from the
mother’s estate until the plaintiff required it back. (Id. at p. 618.)
The probate court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, finding the
terms and conditions of any agreements between the plaintiff and
his brother “ ‘merged’ ” in the distribution decree of the mother’s
estate, and the decree was final and conclusive. (Ibid.)
       Our high court disagreed. Relying on prior decisions such
as Chever and Martinovich v. Marsicano (1902) 137 Cal. 354
(Martinovich), the court re-stated the principle that a decree of
distribution “ ‘ “is conclusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees, or
devisees”; but it is conclusive against them as heirs, legatees, or
devisees—only so far as they claim in such capacities. . . . An
heir may contract about or convey the title which the law had
cast upon him on the death of his ancestor; and the validity or
force of such contract is not affected by the fact that a probate
court afterwards, by its decree of distribution, declares his
asserted heirship and title to be valid.’ ” (Parr, supra, 215 Cal. at
pp. 619–620, citing Chever, supra, 82 Cal. at p. 71.)
       With respect to heirs’ assignments of their interest in
estate property to third parties, prior to the enactment of
section 11604 (former section 1020.1), many courts concluded the
probate court had no jurisdiction to determine the validity of such
agreements. (In re Estate of Howe (1911) 161 Cal. 152, 156
[concluding when “the fact of conveyance is in dispute or where
its validity or effect is an issue upon the distribution, the
determination of that question is not a matter within the probate
jurisdiction of the court”]; see Estate of Cazaurang (1946) 75

                                  18
Cal.App.2d 217, 222 [1939 amendments to the Probate Code
expressly gave probate court jurisdiction to determine the
validity of assignments].) Yet, even after statutory amendments
expressly provided probate courts with jurisdiction to address the
validity of a beneficiary’s assignment of his or her interest in an
estate to a third party, courts continued to distinguish between
those entitled to distribution based on a testamentary document
or the laws of succession, and assignees or other third parties,
when evaluating whether a distribution order is conclusive or
forecloses additional litigation over distribution of estate
property.7
      Thus, in Fount-Wip, Inc. v. Golstein (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d
751 (Fount-Wip), the court considered the conclusive nature of a
preliminary distribution order which ordered distribution of a

7      Donald additionally argues that since no statement of
interest was filed in the 2019 proceeding, the trial court had no
jurisdiction to consider the validity of the assignments under
section 11604. Section 11604 expressly permits the trial court to
consider, on its own motion, or on the motion of any other
interested person, distributions that are to be made to the
transferee of a beneficiary or “[a]ny person other than a
beneficiary under an agreement, request, or instructions of a
beneficiary or the attorney in fact of a beneficiary.” (§ 11604,
subd. (a)(2).) We note that the statute includes no language to
suggest that if a section 11700 proceeding is initiated, the trial
court may only consider the validity of an assignment within that
proceeding. Donald cites no legal authority to support his
argument, nor does he assert any other arguments related to the
trial court’s findings under section 11604. To the extent that
Donald contends the trial court erred under section 11604, he has
forfeited the argument. (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075.)

                                19
legatee’s interest in the decedent’s estate to the sheriff, subject to
the levy of the plaintiff who was the legatee’s judgment creditor.
(Id. at p. 754.) The legatee’s wife subsequently claimed a
superior right to the interest, based on the legatee’s assignment
of his interest to her. (Id. at pp. 754–755.) The plaintiff asserted
the trial court erred in recognizing the wife assignee’s claim
because the probate court’s prior distribution order conclusively
established the plaintiff’s right to the property. (Id. at p. 755.)
       The Fount-Wip court rejected this claim, explaining: “There
is no question that an order of preliminary distribution is
conclusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees and devisees
claiming under the will. [Citations.] However, neither the
judgment creditor nor the third party claimant were claiming
ownership based upon testamentary rights. It has been held that
an assignee can establish the right to title in property held by an
heir, devisee or legatee in an independent proceeding; as to the
assignee, the probate court order of preliminary distribution is
not conclusive. [Citation.] The order of distribution in the
[decedent’s estate] conclusively determined that [the legatee] was
entitled to a certain share of the [decedent’s estate]. What it did
not determine was the status of other persons claiming title.”
(Fount-Wip, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 755.)
       The court further rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
wife’s claim “represented a collateral attack on the decree of
distribution. . . . The argument rests upon plaintiff’s erroneous
misconception of the nature of the decree of distribution made by
the probate court. It conclusively determined that [the legatee]
was entitled to a certain share of the [decedent’s] estate. . . . It
did not determine whether the judgment creditor or the third
party claimant was the owner of [the legatee’s] share, but left the

                                 20
parties to litigate their claims elsewhere.” (Fount-Wip, supra, 29
Cal.App.3d at p. 757.)
       The Fount-Wip court’s reasoning applies equally here.
Although the October 2019 order was not a preliminary
distribution order, it was equally true that the decree of
entitlement to distribution conclusively determined that John
and Donald were entitled to equal shares of Decedent’s estate. It
did not determine whether John, as an assignee, was the owner
of Donald’s share.
       C.     The in rem nature of a section 11700
              proceeding
       Donald relies on the principle that proceedings to
determine entitlement to distribution of an estate are in rem.
Yet, this fundamental concept does not support Donald’s ultimate
argument. An examination of the cases Donald cites to support
his argument makes this plain. For example, Donald cites Estate
of Wise (1949) 34 Cal.2d 376 (Wise), for the proposition that the
court’s order in a section 11700 proceeding is “a decree in rem,”
and is “res judicata as to the whole world.” (Id. at p. 381.) Yet,
the Wise court did not consider the claims of persons with only
derivative or indirect rights to a share of the decedent’s estate.
In Wise, the probate court had resolved two heirship petitions,
filed by two potential sets of heirs who each claimed to be entitled
to distribution of the estate by the rules of intestacy. The court
determined the rights of heirship, found only one set of relatives
had a right of heirship, and issued a corresponding decree.
Subsequently, the administrator of the estate of one of the
persons already found to have no heirship rights in the decedent’s
estate (appellant) attempted to attack the prior heirship decree

                                21
on the ground that no one had represented her interest in the
prior proceeding. (Id. at pp. 379, 381.)
       Our high court rejected the appellant’s argument. The
court restated the principle that an “heirship ‘decree [is]
conclusive against all persons’ as the ‘basis for the decree of
distribution which [is] to follow’ [citation]; it settles ‘the rights of
all persons claiming as heirs of the decedent, whether or not they
are named in the complaint or personally served with summons’
[citation] . . . . The decree is not one ‘in personam in favor of one
of the parties against another.’ [Citation.] Rather, as founded in
a specialized proceeding in rem—‘not against persons as such,
but against or upon the thing or subject matter itself’—the
decree, when rendered, ‘is a solemn declaration of the status of
the thing, and ipso facto renders it what the [decree] declares it
to be.’ [Citation.]” (Wise, supra, 34 Cal.2d at p. 385.)
       The Wise court’s analysis was specifically directed to the
determination of heirs, persons with a direct right to a share of
the estate. As explained above, courts had long distinguished
between heirs and others, such as assignees. The Wise court’s
statement that an heirship decree settles the “rights of all
persons claiming as heirs” therefore cannot be interpreted as
necessarily applying to any person who might receive a
distribution only through the enforcement of a contract with an
heir.
       Donald does not acknowledge the historical distinction
courts have drawn between those with direct claims to an estate,
such as heirs, and those with only indirect claims, such as the
assignees of heirs. Instead, he contends that because
section 11700 concerns distribution, and allows for the
participation of any interested person, the October 2019 order

                                   22
must be understood as finally adjudicating—and in this case
eliminating—the rights of all other interested persons. Yet, he
fails to cite a single legal authority holding that where the claims
of an heir’s assignee are not raised in a petition to determine
entitlement to distribution, the court’s resulting order
determining the identity or respective interests of the heirs
moots, eliminates, or otherwise precludes those unadjudicated
assignee claims.
       The nature of the assignee claim John possessed in this
case was a claim of one party against another, not a claim of a
direct entitlement to distribution from the estate. In cases in
which an heir conveyed his or her share in an estate before the
decree of distribution, the California Supreme Court’s reasoning
was different than in Wise. As explained in In re Estate of Loring
(1946) 29 Cal.2d 423 (Loring), in those cases, courts held that a
decree of distribution adjudicating the rights of heirs, legatees, or
devisees “is not conclusive as between such heir, devisee or
legatee and his assignee and with respect to the rights arising
under the assignment, even though the assignee is also an heir,
devisee[,] or legatee of the decedent. It is settled, however, that
the assignee is bound by the decree insofar as it determines the
rights his assignor would have in the estate had no assignment
been made.” (Id. at pp. 429–430; cf. Estate of Schmelz (1968) 259
Cal.App.2d 440, 448 [probate court properly considered petition
for homestead although not filed until after heirship petition had
been adjudicated; “The heirship petition determination is
‘binding on the whole world’ once it becomes final [citation], but
this does not circumscribe the probate court from imposing liens
or other burdens on distributive property”].)

                                 23
       Loring described a final distribution order, and we
acknowledge that Burton distinguished the entitlement to
distribution proceeding in its analysis of the probate court’s
ability to consider grantee claims for distribution. However, both
a section 11700 proceeding and a final distribution order are
binding and conclusive on “all interested persons.” (§§ 11605,
11705.) And the Burton court’s analysis involved the claims of an
interested person that were expressly presented to the court.
Together, the cases described above explain that the probate
court has jurisdiction to consider the claims of assignees in a
proceeding to determine entitlement to distribution. If those
claims are presented, the court’s decree is binding and conclusive.
But neither the caselaw nor the statute indicates that an
assignee’s failure to seek validation or enforcement of the heir’s
assignment in a section 11700 proceeding voids the assignee’s
unadjudicated rights under the assignment, or precludes the
probate court from subsequently giving effect to the assignment
in a final distribution order.
       The underlying rights of the heir, devisee, or legatee to a
share of the estate are conclusively determined in a section 11700
proceeding. But the rights of the assignee against the heir,
devisee, or legatee arise by contract. (Martinovich, supra, 137
Cal. at p. 359 [expression in some cases that under notice for
distribution the “whole world is brought before the court” and
every person entitled to assert claim must present it or lose any
rights must be construed in context; final distribution order was
not determination of claims against the heir or devisee for their
portion of the estate].) If not raised in the section 11700
proceeding, the assignee’s rights against the heir, devisee, or
legatee are not barred by the court’s order determining the

                                24
persons entitled to a direct distribution of the estate. This is the
meaning of section 11702, subdivision (b)(2): an interested
person’s failure to file a timely statement of interest bars their
participation in the proceeding but does not in itself affect their
interest in the estate.
       D.     The authorities Donald relies upon do not
              support his arguments
       Other authorities Donald relies upon are inapposite as they
merely recite the general principle that an heirship decree is
conclusive and binding, but do not concern the rights of an
assignee of an heir, devisee, or legatee to have the assignment
recognized in a subsequent proceeding. (See, e.g., Estate of
Kampen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 971 [final order for distribution
conclusive as to rights of all interested persons, but court did not
err in vacating void final order]; Estate of Herzog (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 894 (Herzog) [court expressly assumed but did not
decide whether probate court erred in failing to determine status
of all heirs in a single in rem proceeding; any error was
harmless]; Bodine v. Superior Court (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 354
[addressing propriety of severing proceedings to determine
multiple heirs]; Estate of Radovich (1957) 48 Cal.2d 116
[addressing whether probate court’s decision that respondent
could inherit from the decedent as an adopted son was a
conclusive characterization for inheritance tax purposes].)
       Estate of Ward (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 207 (Ward), is also
distinguishable. In Ward, the sole heir to the Ward estate
purported to assign his interest in the estate to two different
parties. One of the assignees (the appellant) filed a petition for
determination of heirship. The other assignee (the respondent)
did not file a statement of interest but appeared at the hearing

                                25
and asked to be heard. The court allowed the respondent to be
heard over the petitioner’s objection, and ultimately ordered the
estate to be distributed to the respondent. (Id. at pp. 208–209.)
The appellate court concluded the trial court erred in considering
the respondent’s claim because he failed to file a written
statement of interest. (Id. at p. 209.) The court reviewed
authorities considering claims to heirship and held that “one
seeking to establish claim to heirship” under former section 1080
must file a written statement of interest to have “standing”
before the probate court to be heard. (Id. at p. 211.) The
appellate court also rejected the argument that the proceeding
was not actually to determine heirship, but was instead a request
to recognize the validity of an assignment. (Id. at pp. 211–212.)
The court reasoned the analysis in Burton foreclosed the
argument.
       Ward was decided prior to the addition of section 11702 to
the Probate Code. At the time, former section 1080 provided for
the filing of a statement of interest, but did not specify, as
section 11702 now does, that the failure to file a statement of
interest bars an interested person from participating further in
the section 11700 proceeding but does not otherwise affect that
person’s interest. (Stats. 1953, ch. 349, § 1, p. 1621.) The Ward
court’s reasoning is of only limited applicability in light of this
change in the statutory language. To the extent the Ward court
concluded an assignee’s interest is automatically forfeited by the
failure to file a statement of interest, we disagree that the same
conclusion could be reached under the current version of the
statute. (Cf. Estate of Torrance (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 350, 357
[following 1953 amendments to the statute no need to file
statement of interest if administrator sets forth theory of manner

                                26
in which estate should be distributed and interests of heirs are
represented in the petition].)
       Moreover, Ward is distinguishable from this case on its
facts. In Ward, an assignee filed the petition to determine
“heirship,” but the identity of the decedent’s heirs was
undisputed and not at issue. (Ward, supra, 127 Cal.App.2d at
p. 212.) While the appellate court rejected the argument that the
proceeding was one to establish the validity of an assignment
rather than a proceeding to determine heirship, the facts before
the trial court concerned only the derivative rights to distribution
of the estate resulting from the heir’s assignment of the same
interest to two different parties. In this sense, Ward is consistent
with Burton and other cases that concluded the probate court has
jurisdiction to consider the rights of assignees as part of a
binding and conclusive heirship determination proceeding. (See,
e.g., Estate of Baglione (1966) 65 Cal.2d 192, 195–196 [probate
court erred in refusing to determine heir’s separate contractual
interests in decedent’s estate, however error harmless because
court properly adjudicated the contract claim in a separate
action].)
       Here, however, John’s section 11700 petition sought a
determination of heirship, not his rights as an assignee. Indeed,
John’s rights as an assignee could not be perfected until the
probate court first determined the identity of Decedent’s heirs
and their respective interests in the estate. Under sections 11702
and 11705, the October 2019 order prevented John from
challenging Donald’s entitlement to a portion of the estate as an
heir, but it did not affect his contractual rights as Donald’s
assignee, which were only derivative of and contingent upon
Donald’s rights as an heir. For these reasons, we also reject

                                27
Donald’s argument that John’s act of filing a petition seeking an
order that he and Donald were each entitled to a one-half share
of the estate as heirs effectively waived his rights under Donald’s
assignment. The two issues were distinct and, under
section 11702, John’s failure to assert an assignee interest in the
section 11700 proceeding did not waive those rights.8 Donald
presented no other evidence of waiver.
       Herzog, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 894, likewise fails to support
Donald’s arguments. Donald cites Herzog for the proposition that
it is improper for the trial court to bifurcate a section 11700
proceeding. Herzog concerned a section 11700 proceeding to
determine the identity of the decedent’s heirs. The nephew of the
decedent’s husband filed an amended first and final accounting
for settlement of the account and distribution of the estate which
claimed the decedent’s only heirs were her late husband’s nieces
and nephews. Prior to the issuance of a final distribution order,
an heir-finding firm (Kemp), acting under a power of attorney,
filed a section 11700 petition claiming the decedent had a half
sister who was the decedent’s sole heir. (Id. at pp. 897–898.)
Rather than determining the status of all purported heirs in one

8       We similarly reject Donald’s argument that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to enforce the assignment in the final
distribution order because the October 2019 order deprived John,
the executor of John’s estate, and the administrator of Decedent’s
estate of standing to bring the assignment to the court’s
attention. To the extent Ward can be read as holding the failure
to file a statement of interest deprives an assignee of standing to
assert that interest in a subsequent proceeding, even when the
issue of assignments is not raised or adjudicated in the
section 11700 proceeding, we disagree.

                                28
proceeding, the probate court first considered, and rejected, the
purported half sister’s claim of heirship. (Id. at pp. 901–902.)
       On appeal, Kemp argued the probate court erred by failing
to determine the status of all the heirs in the same proceeding.
(Herzog, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 902.) The reviewing court
did not decide whether bifurcating the proceeding was error.
Instead, the court assumed, “for the sake of judicial efficiency,”
that the status of all alleged heirs must be determined in a single
hearing because the proceeding is in rem. (Id. at p. 903.)
Donald’s reliance on Herzog for the proposition that bifurcation of
a section 11700 proceeding is error is, at best, overstated, as the
court expressly did not decide the issue. (California Building
Industry Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4
Cal.5th 1032, 1043 [axiomatic that cases are not authority for
propositions not considered].) Moreover, Herzog concerned
competing heirship claims, not the claims of an assignee whose
entitlement to distribution arises only out of a contract with an
heir.
       Even ignoring these distinctions, Herzog ultimately fails to
provide support for Donald’s arguments. In Herzog, the court
concluded any error in bifurcating the section 11700 proceeding
was harmless and did not warrant reversal. Because Kemp did
not provide sufficient evidence to establish the purported half
sister’s heirship claim, it could not show it was reasonably
probable the purported half sister would have obtained a more
favorable result in a single proceeding in which the other alleged
heirs offered evidence to prove their own status as heirs.
(Herzog, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 903–904.)
       Likewise, in this case, John’s rights as an heir were
different from his contractual rights as Donald’s assignee. The

                                29
trial court could not order distribution consistent with the
assignment until it had first determined the identity and shares
of the heirs. As explained above, under section 11702, the lack of
a statement of interest did not affect John’s rights as an assignee.
Donald was afforded an opportunity to contest the validity of the
assignment prior to the issuance of the final distribution order.
Even if the record could be construed as reflecting a bifurcation of
the section 11700 proceeding, we would find any error harmless.
       In sum, neither John’s petition nor any other filing in the
section 11700 proceeding raised the issue of Donald’s assignment
to John. There was no request for distribution based on the
assignment or challenge to the assignment. No interested party
filed a statement of interest. The trial court’s October 2019 order
determined heirship. John’s contractual rights as an assignee
remained unaffected. We reject Donald’s argument that John’s
rights as an assignee were forfeited. Those assignee rights were
not adjudicated, and Donald has failed to establish that under
sections 11700, 11702, or 11705, John’s assignee rights had to be
asserted in the proceedings to determine heirship or otherwise be
waived or rendered moot by the order determining the heirs.
       E.     Issue preclusion did not bar the trial court
              from considering Donald’s assignment in the
              final distribution order
       For similar reasons, we reject Donald’s argument that res
judicata in the form of issue preclusion barred the probate court
from issuing a final distribution order consistent with Donald’s
assignment of his interest to John. “[I]ssue preclusion applies
(1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually
litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted
against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity

                                30
with that party.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61
Cal.4th 813, 825.)
       “ ‘[A]n issue was actually litigated in a prior proceeding if it
was properly raised, submitted for determination, and
determined in that proceeding.’ [Citations.] ‘ “The ‘identical
issue’ requirement addresses whether ‘identical factual
allegations’ are at stake in the two proceedings, not whether the
ultimate issues or dispositions are the same.” ’ [Citations.] ‘And
the “ ‘necessarily decided’ ” prong means only that “the issue not
have been ‘entirely unnecessary’ to the judgment in the initial
proceeding.” ’ [Citations.] ‘In considering whether these criteria
have been met, courts look carefully at the entire record from the
prior proceeding, including the pleadings, the evidence, the jury
instructions, and any special jury findings or verdicts.’
[Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶] The party asserting issue preclusion has
the burden of establishing the requirements to apply that
doctrine. [Citations.] Whether to apply the doctrine of issue
preclusion is a question of law that we review de novo.” (In re
Marriage of Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 537–
538.)
       Here, the issue of the rights of any assignee to distribution
of a portion of Decedent’s estate was not raised, submitted for
determination, or decided in the section 11700 proceeding. Nor
was it necessary to the October 2019 order. John’s petition to
determine entitlement to estate distribution sought only a
determination of heirs, not the rights of any person that were
contingent on those of the heirs, or a finding as to all persons who
may at some point be able to make a claim for distribution.
While the probate court would have had jurisdiction to consider
broader claims than heirship alone, no such claims were made,

                                  31
and they were not necessary to the court’s order determining the
heirs and the percentages of interest based on intestate
succession. “[P]robate orders are conclusive only as to matters
‘actually passed upon by the probate court.’ [Citations.]” (David
v. Hermann (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 672, 683.) Issue preclusion
did not bar the probate court from giving effect to Donald’s
assignment to John in the final distribution order. (Miller v.
Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1342 [collateral estoppel
inapplicable where probate court did not decide the issue in prior
proceeding].)
II.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding Donald
       Failed to Establish John Rescinded the Assignment
       We additionally reject Donald’s argument that the trial
court erred in concluding the evidence did not establish John
rescinded the assignment.
       In general, “[t]he question of whether a contract has been
cancelled, rescinded or abandoned is a mixed question of law and
fact [citations,] which is addressed to the trial court [citations,]
and the finding of the trial court will be upheld if it is supported
by substantial evidence.” (Ross v. Frank W. Dunne Co. (1953) 119
Cal.App.2d 690, 698–699 (Ross).) However, as “the party
opposing enforcement of a contract,” Donald had the burden of
establishing the assignment was rescinded. (Saheli v. White
Memorial Medical Center (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 308, 324; Evid.
Code, § 500.) Here, the trial court concluded Donald did not meet
that burden. Thus, we must determine whether the evidence
compelled a finding in Donald’s favor as a matter of law.
“ ‘Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s
evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of

                                32
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’
[Citation.]” (Herzog, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 904.)
       Donald fails to show that the evidence of rescission
compelled a finding in his favor as a matter of law. Indeed, the
only evidence that could support a finding of rescission was the
factual recitation in Donald’s verified objection to the
administrator’s supplemental first and final account. The
objection asserted that in July 2020, during a telephone call,
“Donald brought up the Assignment providing for distribution of
his share to John. John responded, ‘Don’t be ridiculous. I was
never planning to keep it all knowing we were equal beneficiaries
of our rich nephew,’ or words to that effect. John reassured
Donald he would split the money 50-50 if funds were distributed
all to him.”
       The trial court evaluated this evidence and gave it “very
little weight.” Although there was no evidence directly
contradicting Donald’s account of the call with John, the trial
court noted the recitation was inconsistent and out of character
with the other evidence of the brothers’ communications. The
court further reasoned that if John wished to rescind the
assignment, he most likely would have conveyed that intent to
ARB and the administrator of Decedent’s estate. On appeal, we
defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations and we do not
reweigh the evidence. (Orange Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 283, 292; Ross, supra, 119 Cal.App.2d at
p. 699.)
       Further, the trial court could properly consider the
ambiguous nature of John’s alleged statements in concluding
Donald failed to establish evidence of rescission. Mutual

                                33
rescission “requires an intent to rescind on the part of both
parties.” (Pennel v. Pond Union School Dist. (1973) 29
Cal.App.3d 832, 838.) Even crediting Donald’s recitation of his
conversation with John, neither Donald nor John expressed
intent to rescind. During the call, Donald “brought up” the
assignment, but did not indicate he wished to rescind it. Further,
John’s purported statements about splitting the money with
Donald if it was all distributed to him did not reflect John’s
“express consent” to rescind the assignment, and further
presupposed that he would receive “all” of the estate in the first
instance. This evidence does not compel a finding as a matter of
law that John rescinded the assignment.

                               34
                         DISPOSITION
      The trial court order is affirmed. The parties are to bear
their own costs on appeal.
      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                          ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                  LAVIN, Acting P. J.

                  EGERTON, J.

                                35