Court Opinion

ID: 9548546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:05:11.747345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:06.310865
License: Public Domain

BENDER, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority reinstates Swain’s conviction, holding that the trial court’s jury instruction defining “driving” as the “actual physical control of a vehicle” was appropriate. In my view, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “driving” connotes movement, thus, the act of “driving” is not the same as being in “actual physical control of a vehicle.” I would affirm the district court’s holding that the conviction must be reversed. Hence, I respectfully dissent.
*432I.
Swain was charged with driving under the influence (DUI), and was convicted of the lesser included offense of driving while ability impaired (DWAI). Both of these crimes require the element of “driving a vehicle.”1 The question presented in this case is the meaning of “driving” in the context of these statutes.
For guidance, I turn to established principles of statutory construction. Our primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. We first look to the statutory language and give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. See People v. Shinaut, 940 P.2d 380, 382 (Colo.1997). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to use other principles of statutory construction. See People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986).
When a statute is ambiguous, the court must look beyond the plain language of the statute. See Mason v. People, 932 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Colo.1997). However, interpretations that render statutory provisions superfluous should be avoided. See Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212, 221 (Colo.1994); see also 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.02 (5th ed.1992). The court should adopt an interpretation that gives consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of the statute’s provisions. See Adams County Sch. Dist. v. Dickey, 791 P.2d 688, 691 (Colo.1990). In addition, the court must be mindful of the effects of its interpretation, see People v. Schuett, 833 P.2d 44, 48 (Colo.1992), and should avoid statutory constructions that lead to absurd results, see Regional Transp. Dist. v. Lopez, 916 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Colo.1996).
When interpreting an ambiguous statute concerning a criminal offense, the rule of lenity requires that the statute be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. See People v. Forgey, 770 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo.1989). In addition, the judiciary must defer to the legislature’s exclusive authority to define criminal conduct. See People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 287 (Colo.1996).
II.
Applying these principles to this case, Title 42 does not define the word “driving.” Thus, we look to the word’s plain and ordinary meaning. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 692 (1986) defines “drive” as follows: “To set and keep in motion or in action through application of some amount of force: ... to guide a vehicle along or through.” “Driving” is commonly understood to involve movement. Other jurisdictions have adopted this definition. For example, in Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 53 Cal.3d 753, 280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404, 410 (1991), the court stated:
In everyday usage the phrase, “to drive a vehicle,” is understood as requiring evidence of volitional movement of a vehicle. Numerous dictionary definitions ... support a definition of “drive” that includes movement.... We believe these definitions are consistent with the usual and ordinary understanding of that term.
The familiar and generally accepted meaning of the word “driving” requires movement, hence, I believe that this court should require movement in the legal definition of this word. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “driving” does not require movement and only requires “actual physical control” of the vehicle.
Because I would hold that the word “driving” as it appears in section 42-4-1301(1) is *433not ambiguous, I believe that it is unnecessary to engage in further statutory interpretation and analysis. Since the majority concludes that the word “driving” is susceptible to another interpretation, one that would require only the “actual physical control” of the vehicle, I proceed under the assumption that such an ambiguity exists, for purposes of addressing the majority’s analysis.
Although Title 42 does not define “driving,” Article 1, Part 1, which contains general definitions for Title 42, defines the word “driver” as follows:
“ Driver” means every person ... who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.
§ 42-1-102(27), 11 C.R.S. (1997) (emphasis added). The majority interprets the word “drives” in this statute as a synonym of “actual physical control,” and concludes that these concepts are the same. The problem with the majority’s interpretation is that it renders the word “drives” superfluous. It is well-settled that courts must presume that the legislature inserted every part of a statute for a purpose and intended every part to be given effect. See Colorado Dep’t of Revenue v. Borquez, 751 P.2d 639, 643 (Colo.1988); Dawson, 872 P.2d at 221; Adams County Sch. Dist., 791 P.2d at 691. As the South Carolina Supreme Court stated in interpreting a similar provision:
“[Djriving” and “being in actual physical control” can describe the same activity only if we treat the phrase “or is in actual physical control” as useless baggage. Such a construction would run counter to the principle that “a statute should be so construed that no word, clause, sentence, provision or part shall be rendered sur-plusage or superfluous.”
State v. Graves, 269 S.C. 356, 237 S.E.2d 584, 588 (1977). Giving proper effect to all of the provisions in section 42-4-1301(1), it appears that the act of “driving” a vehicle is not the same as being in “actual physical control” of a vehicle.
There is an additional reason why the definition of “driver” supports my position that “driving” requires movement. The General Assembly’s inclusion of the two concepts— “driving” and “actual physical control” of a vehicle — in the definition of “driver” suggests that the legislature’s omission of the language, “actual physical control” of a vehicle from the elements of DUI and DWAI was intentional. If the legislature intended these statutes to be so broad as to include acts other than movement of a vehicle, it would have included the language, “actual physical control” in the elements of these crimes. It is not the province of this court to define criminal conduct. See Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 287. In my view, the authority to determine this policy issue rests with the General Assembly.
The majority also relies on this court’s holding in Brewer v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564, 567 (Colo.1986), in which we held that proof of‘actual physical control of a vehicle was sufficient to establish that the defendant “drove” a vehicle' within the meaning of Colorado’s express consent statute. Reliance on Brewer, however, is misplaced because Brewer involved a civil driver’s license revocation proceeding. By contrast, Swain was convicted of a criminal offense. Because this case involves a criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires this court to strictly construe any ambiguity in favor of the defendant. See People v. Hale, 654 P.2d 849, 850 (Colo.1982).
The majority notes that after this court’s decision in Brewer, the legislature declined to amend the DUI and DWAI statutes despite opportunities to do so. I agree with the majority that, the legislature’s silence gives rise to a presumption that the legislature ratified Brewer’s interpretation of “driving.” However, the legislature’s approval of this definition only extends to civil administrative proceedings like the one involved in Brewer. The legislature has never approved of the use of Brewer’s definition of “driving” in the context of a criminal proceeding.
Criminalizing activities that involve the use of á vehicle but do not involve moving the vehicle does nothing to further the goal of discouraging driving under the influence. Under the majority’s rationale, a citizen might be guilty of driving under the influence without ever having driven. Suppose, for example, Swain had never driven the car but *434merely used the car as a place to lie down and sleep. As Justice Erickson stated in his special concurrence in Brewer:
[0]ne can easily imagine other factual scenarios in which a person might reasonably be considered to be a “driver” when, under the circumstances, he could not be said to have driven the motor vehicle. Had Brewer been parked on the side of the street with the engine off, he would have been in actual physical control of the car. But I would be reluctant to conclude that he “drove a vehicle” under such circumstances.
Brewer, 720 P.2d at 571 (Erickson, J., concurring). Broadening the definition of “driving” to encompass “actual physical control” may discourage motorists who believe their driving may be impaired from making the responsible decision to pull off the road until they feel that they can safely proceed:
When the facts would just as easily permit the inference that defendant stopped his car to avoid a DWI violation that could result had he continued to drive, it is inconsistent, as well as bad law, to signal intoxicated persons that they might just as well continue driving because they will be arrested for DWI whether they stop or not.
Boone v. State, 105 N.M. 223, 731 P.2d 366, 371 (1986) (Walters, J., dissenting). This court must be mindful of the effects of a particular construction of a statute. See Schuett, 833 P.2d at 48. The expansive interpretation of “driving” adopted by the majority provides individuals in Swain’s position no incentive to leave the road so as not to endanger others. In my view, expanding the definition of driving to mean something other than its plain meaning is an issue of public policy that should be left to the General Assembly.
III.
I disagree with the majority’s determination that the word “driving” is interchangeable with “actual physical control” of a vehicle. In my view, neither the plain language of the statute, the definition of “driver” in Title 42, nor our decision in Brewer support the majority’s broad interpretation of the DUI and DWAI provisions contained in section 42-4-1301(1). I believe that the majority expands the definition of “driving” beyond that intended by the General Assembly as evidenced by the plain language of the statute. Hence, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice SCOTT joins in this dissent.

. The DUI statute, section 42-4-1301(1)®, 11 C.R.S. (1997), provides in pertinent part:
"Driving under the influence” means driving a vehicle when a person has consumed alcohol or one or more drugs ... which ... affects the person to a degree that the person is substantially incapable ... to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control or due care in the safe operation of a vehicle.
The DWAI statute, section 42-4 — 1301(l)(g), 11 C.R.S. (1997), provides in pertinent part:
"Driving while ability impaired” means driving a vehicle when a person has consumed alcohol or one or more drugs ... which ... affects the person to the slightest degree so that the person is less able than the person ordinarily would have been ... to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the safe operation of a vehicle.