Court Opinion

ID: 9553256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:26:45.039339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:32.149331
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, Justice,
concurring in result:
I agree with the Court’s adoption of retro-activity as the general rule for jurisprudential application based on Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).1 However, I *923write separately to emphasize that this practical, predictable and equitable approach could have been adopted six years ago when Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum Corp., 732 P.2d 438, 450 (Okla.1987), cert, denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3232, 3265, 97 L.Ed.2d 738, 764 (1987) was promulgated. Because the only viable issue addressed concerns retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision, today’s opinion would have been unnecessary had the issue been resolved in favor of retroactivity in Cotton Petroleum. In Cotton Petroleum, I dissented to the majority’s adoption of a completely prospective application of the opinion. I was joined by my colleague, Justice Summers, in my concern that consistency and predictability be accorded our rulings. Today’s adoption of the general rule of retroactive application will accomplish that goal.
*922"The constitutional sufficiency of any remedy thus turns (at least initially on whether Virginia law ’provide[s] a[n] [adequate] form of ‘predeprivation process,’ for example, by authorizing taxpayers to bring suit to enjoin imposition of a tax prior to its payment, or by allowing taxpayers to withhold payment and then interpose their objections as defenses in a tax enforcement proceeding.’ ... Because this *923issue has not been properly presented, we leave to Virginia courts this question of state law and the performance of other tasks pertaining to the crafting of any appropriate remedy. Virginia 'is free to choose which form of relief it will provide, so long as that relief satisfies the minimum federal requirements we have outlined.' ... State law may provide relief beyond the demands of federal due process ... but under no circumstances .may it confine petitioners to a lesser remedy ...” (Citations omitted.)
Just as there was no justification in 1987, to withhold the benefits of a new rule from the prevailing party or those similarly situated litigants who properly preserve the issue on appeal, there is none in 1993. Application of the pipeline doctrine to only those cases considered direct appeals creates an unnecessary distinction without a difference.2 Parties, whether on direct appeal or in a collateral proceeding, seek to enforce individual rights. Litigants should not be treated disparately. When litigants begin in the same starting blocks, have vision enough to foresee the change, timely assert and protest their rights, and establish their legal position in the appellate pipeline, all should be entitled to share in the fruits of victory of a favorable judicial decision.
CORRECTED ORDER OF CLARIFICATION
HODGES, Chief Justice.
Appellee’s petition for rehearing is granted for the limited purpose of clarifying the applicability of our opinion herein published at 64 O.B.J. 2885 (10/2/93). In all other respects, rehearing is denied. Appellee’s motion for oral argument is denied.
The OTC asks us to clarify whether our opinion determines the rights and remedies of the parties to this appeal or of all taxpayers who, on or before April 15, 1989, filed claims for refund of income taxes voluntarily paid on their civil service or military income for the 1985 and/or subsequent tax years. The OTC stipulated, as recited in Part I of our opinion, that the final determination of the legal issues presented by these claims would govern all similarly situated taxpayers who have timely sought a refund and represented to this Court that the OTC had administratively consolidated the cases of more than 30,000 taxpayers, apparently through a procedure similar to the agreement to abide in 68 O.S. 1991, § 226(d).
In the last paragraph of Part V, D. of our opinion, we concluded that “§ 2373 does not bar refund to taxpayers who voluntarily overpaid under presumptively valid statutes and then timely made refund claims after a judicial pronouncement of the statute’s infirmity. To hold otherwise would violate the anti-discrimination component of our state constitution’s due process clause.” Stated another way, for purposes of clarification, § 2373 of Title 68 of the Oklahoma Statutes permits an income taxpayer to give notice of an overpayment and claim a refund of any portion of income taxes voluntarily reported and paid during the three years immediately preceding the date of notice to the Oklahoma Tax Commission of the overpayment and refund claim.
The legal conclusion as to § 2373 in Part V, D. of our opinion is binding on the appel-lee in other proceedings on refund claims of *924taxpayers who gave notice of an overpayment and claim for refund of income taxes reported and paid during the three years immediately preceding the date of the notice thereof to the OTC. Kay Electric Cooperative v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 815 P.2d 175 (Okla.1991). That is, the refund provisions of § 2373 provide a remedy for the six taxpayers who are parties hereto and to any other taxpayer who reported and paid income taxes on federal civil service and military retirement income for the 1985 tax year and gave notice of the overpayment and claim for refund before the expiration of three years from the report date for the 1985 tax year or three years from April 15, 1986; for the 1986 tax year if the notice of claim was submitted on or before April 15, 1990; and for the 1987 tax year if the notice of claim was submitted on or before April 15, 1991.
As stated in the Summary to our opinion, the timeliness and mathematical correctness of the overpayments and refunds claimed by the six taxpayers who are parties hereto were agreed to by stipulation. Our opinion determines that the six taxpayer/parties have a right to the refund of the stipulated amounts of overpayments. The timeliness and mathematical correctness of the overpayments and refunds claimed by similarly situated taxpayers who are not parties hereto have not been determined by the OTC and are not before us. Neither our opinion nor this order determines the right of any taxpayer other than the six taxpayer/parties to a refund. Because we have determined that the refund remedy provided in § 2373 is available to all similarly situated taxpayers, the OTC is directed to proceed to process the refund claims submitted by similarly situated taxpayers and determine the timeliness of the notices of claim and mathematical correctness of the claimed overpayments.
In light of our clarified conclusion that the' Legislature has provided a refund mechanism to all taxpayers timely submitting claims under § 2373 of Title 68, it is unnecessary to determine the adequacy of other taxpayer remedies under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
DONE BY ORDER OF THE COURT IN CONFERENCE this 17th day of March, 1994.
HODGES, C.J., and SIMMS, HARGRAVE, OPALA and WILSON, JJ., concur.
LAVENDER, V.C.J., and KAUGER, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.

. In announcing the rule in Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), the Supreme Court provided the parameters for a state court's retroactive application of a rule. The opinion provides in pertinent part:

. Because the judgment under review was void ab initio, it was unnecessary to address this issue in Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum Corp., 732 P.2d 438, 450 (Okla.1987), cert, denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3232, 3265, 97 L.Ed.2d 738, 764 (1987).