Court Opinion

ID: 9395304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 18:02:47.325733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:07.187172
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/17/23 P. v. Lopez CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B318338

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. MA062878)
         v.

ARTURO LOPEZ,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
      Alex Green, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  _____________________________
      A jury convicted Arturo Lopez of second degree murder and
found true the special firearm-use allegations. On appeal Lopez
contends defense counsel provided constitutionally ineffective
assistance by failing to object to certain testimony. We affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. The First Conviction and Reversal of the Judgment
      In 2016 a jury convicted Lopez of second degree murder,
conspiracy to destroy evidence, offering false evidence and three
counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal we
reversed the convictions for murder based on instructional error
and for offering false evidence for insufficient evidence. The
convictions on the remaining four charges were affirmed.
(See People v. Lopez (Nov. 13, 2018, B277127) [nonpub. opn.].)
      2. The Third Amended Information
      Following issuance of the remittitur on January 14, 2019,
Lopez was recharged in a third amended information with one
count of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).1 The third
amended information included special firearm-use enhancement
allegations pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c)
and (d).
      3. The Evidence at Trial
      On the afternoon of February 23, 2014 Stephen Finson left
his home in Lancaster to ride his all-terrain cycle (ATC) in the
desert. When he did not return home that evening, his wife
reported him missing. Finson’s body was found the next morning
in the desert. He had been shot in the back of the head through
his helmet. The autopsy showed the bullet had entered the back

1     Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
stated.

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of the helmet, travelled through Finson’s head and then through
the helmet’s right cheek pad. No bullet fragments were found in
the wound, and no bullets or shell casings were found at or near
the crime scene.
       Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputies were able to trace
the path of Finson’s ATC and determined Finson had been
heading southwest on a defined trail and then made an abrupt
turn to the north into the open desert. Based on the depth of the
tire tracks, deputies concluded Finson had been travelling at a
high rate of speed when he turned. Finson’s body was found
approximately 100 yards north of the turn, and the ATC was
found another 30 feet north of Finson’s body.
       Marco Iezza, a firearms examiner in the firearms
identification section of the sheriff’s department crime laboratory,
testified regarding his examination of Finson’s helmet. Iezza was
unable to determine the precise caliber of the bullet that killed
Finson; but based on the size of the entrance and exit paths in
the helmet, Iezza opined it was a medium or large caliber bullet,
such as a .30-caliber or .40-caliber. When given the hypothetical
that the fatal shot was fired from at least 100 yards away, Iezza
testified the bullet must have been fired from a rifle, not a
handgun, to have the high velocity needed to pierce the helmet
and go through Finson’s head without leaving bullet fragments.
However, Iezza stated, if a handgun had been used, the shot
must have been fired from within 25 yards.
       Two witnesses testified that, prior to his arrest, Lopez
made incriminating statements indicating he had shot Finson.
One of those individuals informed the Finson family, which led to
the investigation of Lopez as a suspect. Upon executing a search
warrant at Lopez’s home, sheriff’s deputies found a .22-caliber

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rifle and a .22-caliber revolver buried at the edge of the property.
They also observed a large number of spent rifle cartridges on the
ground in the backyard and in burn barrels, including many
.30-30-caliber rifle cartridges. While some of the spent cartridges
appeared to have been outside in the elements for an extended
time, the .30-30-caliber casings looked as if they had been
discarded more recently.
       The preliminary hearing testimony of Lopez’s friend
Gerardo Amaya was read to the jury due to Amaya’s
unavailability at trial. Amaya testified that on the day of
Finson’s murder Amaya and Lopez were driving in Lancaster,
heading west on a road to the south of where Finson’s body was
later found. Lopez, who was driving, stopped the car and told
Amaya he wanted to test fire a new handgun. Lopez got out of
the car and went to the rear of the car. Amaya remained in the
passenger seat. Amaya heard two gunshots a few seconds apart.
Amaya stated Lopez had fired the gun to the north, into the
desert. When Lopez returned to the driver’s seat, he was holding
a semiautomatic handgun, which he placed on the center console.
       Christine Banghart,2 Lopez’s girlfriend at the time of
Finson’s death, testified Lopez owned a .22-caliber rifle with a
scope and a .22-caliber handgun.
       Lopez was interviewed by sheriff’s deputies in April 2014
following his arrest. Recordings of portions of the interview were
played for the jury. Lopez said he had owned a .30-30-caliber
rifle but had destroyed it six months earlier because the pin was

2     By the time of the second trial Banghart had changed her
name to Christine Mangone. However, for the sake of
consistency with our prior opinion and references in the record,
we refer to her by her former name.

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misfiring. He used a grinder to cut it into pieces then took the
metal pieces to a recycling center. He burned the wooden parts.
      Lopez did not testify in his own defense. He presented the
testimony of an independent firearm examiner, William Moore,
who examined Finson’s helmet and conducted various tests to
determine what type of weapon could have killed Finson. Moore
concluded that, if Finson had been shot from 200 yards away,
Finson was likely killed by a .357 magnum bullet fired from a
handgun. However, it was also possible Finson’s killer used a
.38-caliber rifle or .357-caliber rifle. Moore did not believe a
.30-caliber bullet could have created the damage to Finson’s
helmet. He also stated it would take some level of proficiency to
shoot a moving target from 100 yards with a .30-30-caliber rifle.
      During her closing argument the prosecutor told the jury
Lopez stopped his car along the roadway south of where Finson
was riding his ATC and deliberately shot at Finson, likely with
the .30-30-caliber rifle that he later destroyed. Defense counsel
argued that, if the jury believed Lopez shot Finson, the evidence
supported a verdict of involuntary manslaughter rather than
murder, because Finson had been killed accidentally while Lopez
committed the misdemeanor of shooting a firearm from a public
road or shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent manner.
     4. The Verdict and Sentence
      The jury convicted Lopez of second degree murder and
found the special firearm-use enhancement allegations true. The
court sentenced him to an aggregate indeterminate state prison
term of 45 years to life.

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                          DISCUSSION
      1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
      To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Lopez must demonstrate his counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms and there exists a “reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694; accord, People v. Centeno
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674, 676.)
      When “there was no sound legal basis for objection,
counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the evidence cannot
establish ineffective assistance.” (People v. Cudjo (1993)
6 Cal.4th 585, 616.) “And, even when there was a basis for
objection, ‘“[w]hether to object to inadmissible evidence is a
tactical decision; because trial counsel’s tactical decisions are
accorded substantial deference [citations], failure to object seldom
establishes counsel’s incompetence.” [Citation.] “In order to
prevail on [an ineffective assistance of counsel] claim on direct
appeal, the record must affirmatively disclose the lack of a
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission.”’”
(People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 403; see also People v.
Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 674-675 [“‘[u]nless a defendant
establishes the contrary, we shall presume that “counsel’s
performance fell within the wide range of professional
competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be
explained as a matter of sound trial strategy”’”].)
      2. Testimony Regarding Lopez’s Firearm Use
      On direct examination the prosecutor asked Banghart how
often she had seen Lopez shoot guns on his property. Banghart

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responded that Lopez would shoot daily as long as he had
ammunition. He would shoot at “random stuff in the yard” or at
birds. The prosecutor clarified, “Defendant wouldn’t just shoot in
the air; he would be targeting something, correct?” Banghart
replied that was correct. During cross-examination defense
counsel asked Banghart whether she had seen Lopez shoot his
.22-caliber rifle in the backyard, to which she responded she had.
Counsel then asked whether that was “a common occurrence.”
Banghart replied it was. Defense counsel then inquired about
Lopez’s targets and where he stood while shooting.
      Additional testimony regarding Lopez’s gun use was
presented through the testimony of Vanessa Burkes, Lopez’s
former girlfriend. Due to her unavailability at trial, Burkes’s
preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. On direct
examination Burkes testified she knew Lopez owned guns and
had seen him with guns. On cross-examination defense counsel
asked how often Burkes had seen Lopez with guns. Burkes
replied, “When we lived together, he would be outside all the time
shooting rabbits and squirrels. It wasn’t anything unusual.” She
said Lopez shot rabbits and squirrels “just about every day.”
      During redirect Burkes stated that on more than one
occasion Lopez hid behind a door with a shotgun when she came
home and shot the gun in the house to scare her. She explained,
“Where we lived it was like a barn, so it didn’t matter if he shot
through the ceiling or not.” Burkes also recounted an incident
approximately five years earlier when she and Lopez were
fighting and she ran out of the house. As she ran down the road,
Lopez shot at her twice with his .22-caliber rifle. Burkes heard
the bullets go by her head, but she believed Lopez was trying to
scare her rather than hurt her.

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      3. Lopez Has Not Demonstrated His Trial Counsel Was
         Constitutionally Ineffective
       Lopez argues Banghart’s and Burkes’s testimony regarding
his firearm use should not have been admitted because it was
irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial and improper propensity evidence.
Lopez acknowledges his counsel failed to object to the testimony
and, therefore, frames the issue in terms of ineffective assistance
of counsel.
       Contrary to Lopez’s contention, any objection to the
testimony based on relevance would likely have been overruled.
The prosecution’s theory of the case was that Lopez purposefully
shot Finson, a moving target, from at least 100 yards away. As
defendant’s own expert acknowledged, such a shot would require
proficiency with firearms. Accordingly, Lopez’s almost daily
target practice, during which he often shot at small animals, was
relevant to his familiarity with firearms and his ability to hit a
moving target from a distance. Lopez’s experience with firearms
was likewise relevant to refute the defense argument that the
shooting was accidental. The testimony was also relevant to
undermine Amaya’s testimony that Lopez had stopped along the
road to test fire a handgun. Given the evidence that Lopez often
shot guns on his property—even multiple times inside his home—
there was no need for him to test fire a gun from the side of the
road. As the prosecutor stated during her closing argument, “If
he wanted to simply test fire a new pistol, he could have done it
at his home at any point in time.”
       Lopez’s argument the testimony was inadmissible due to
undue prejudice also fails. To be sure, evidence he had shot at
Burkes at least once and had often shot at small animals
damaged his defense, but it was not overly prejudicial in the

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sense contemplated by Evidence Code, section 352. “‘“The
‘prejudice’ referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to
evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against
. . . [one party] as an individual and which has very little effect on
the issues.”’” (People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 178.) “‘In
applying section 352, “prejudicial” is not synonymous with
“damaging.”’” (People v. Callahan (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 356,
371.) As discussed, the frequency and nature of Lopez’s prior
firearms experience was highly probative of his ability to shoot
Finson from a distance; and, while it could potentially evoke an
emotional bias in the jury, that bias did not substantially
outweigh the evidence’s probative value.
        Similarly, Lopez’s argument the evidence was improperly
admitted to show his “general criminal disposition and that he,
willy-nilly, shot his guns all the time at anything” is without
merit. To reiterate, the evidence was offered for the non-
propensity purpose of establishing Lopez’s proficiency with
firearms and his willingness to fire guns freely on his property.
Accordingly, any objection on those grounds would have been
properly overruled. (See Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b) [“[n]othing
in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to
prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . . )
other than his or her disposition to commit such an act”]; see also
People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 823.)
        For these reasons it was not reasonably probable the trial
court would have excluded Banghart’s and Burkes’s testimony.
Because any objection would have been unwarranted, there was
no ineffective assistance of counsel. (See People v. Thomas (1992)

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2 Cal.4th 489, 531 [failure to make meritless objection does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel]; see also People v.
Majors, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 403; People v. Cudjo, supra,
6 Cal.4th at p. 616.)
                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                     PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

             SEGAL, J.

             FEUER, J.

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