Court Opinion

ID: 9393801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 15:00:33.834483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:55.163434
License: Public Domain

22-1192-cv (L)
     Atkins v. Walmart, Inc.

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1              At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
 2   Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40
 3   Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of May, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                    GUIDO CALABRESI,
 8                    MICHAEL H. PARK,
 9                    STEVEN J. MENASHI,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   Ngcoba Atkins,
14
15                             Plaintiff-Appellant,
16
17                    v.                                         22-1192 (L)
18                                                               22-1193 (Con)
19   Walmart, Inc.,
20
21                    Defendant-Appellee.
22   _____________________________________
 1
 2
 3   FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                   Ngcoba Atkins, pro se,
 4                                                              Utica, NY.
 5
 6   FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:                                    Daniel J. Moore,
 7                                                              Svetlana K. Ivy, Harris
 8                                                              Beach PLLC, Pittsford,
 9                                                              NY.
10

11         Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern

12   District of New York (Andrew T. Baxter, M.J.).

13         UPON     DUE     CONSIDERATION,            IT   IS   HEREBY       ORDERED,

14   ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

15   AFFIRMED and the appeals from the recusal and reconsideration orders are

16   DISMISSED.

17         Plaintiff-Appellant Ngcoba Atkins, proceeding pro se, appeals the district

18   court’s grant of summary judgment to Walmart, his former employer. Atkins

19   alleged employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the

20   Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the

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 1   Americans with Disabilities Act.     We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

 2   underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

 3         Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo, construing facts in

 4   the light most favorable to Atkins and resolving all ambiguities and drawing all

 5   reasonable inferences against Walmart as the moving party. Kee v. City of New

 6   York, 12 F.4th 150, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2021). Summary judgment should be granted

 7   only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

 8   and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

 9   A genuine dispute exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

10   decide in the non-movant’s favor.” Kee, 12 F.4th at 158 (citation omitted). Atkins

11   is pro se, so we liberally construe his filings “to raise the strongest arguments they

12   suggest.” Publicola v. Lomenzo, 54 F.4th 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2022).

13         In his brief, Atkins focuses mostly on procedural issues in lieu of challenging

14   the substantive grounds of the district court’s decision. Extending the requisite

15   liberal construction and having independently reviewed the record, we conclude

16   that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Walmart and

17   applied the appropriate legal standards. See Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch.

                                               3
 1   Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 82–83, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2015); Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d

 2   Cir. 2010). The district court determined that Atkins had failed to offer sufficient

 3   evidence of retaliation. Walmart offered evidence of legitimate, non-retaliatory

 4   reasons for every adverse employment action, including Atkins’s eventual

 5   termination.    Therefore, we affirm for substantially the same reasons as the

 6   district court. See Atkins v. Walmart, Inc., No. 20-CV-1217, 2022 WL 1320300, at *6–

 7   27 (N.D.N.Y. May 2, 2022).

 8         Atkins’s remaining arguments on appeal are also meritless. First, Atkins

 9   contends that the district court issued erroneous discovery orders. We review

10   those for abuse of discretion. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76,

11   102 (2d Cir. 2008). Atkins provides no legal support for his challenges and merely

12   asserts that the court abused its discretion. We disagree. The district court’s

13   “thorough and well-reasoned discovery orders throughout litigation” do not

14   constitute an abuse of discretion. In re Mirena IUS Levonorgestrel-Related Prods.

15   Liab. Litig. (No. II), 982 F.3d 113, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2020).

16         Second, Atkins asserts that the district court violated N.D.N.Y. Local Rule

17   7.1(c) by refusing to construe Walmart’s motion for summary judgment as a cross-

                                                 4
 1   motion and by failing to issue separate opinions dealing with Atkins’s and

 2   Walmart’s summary-judgment motions.          Local Rule 7.1(c) provides that “[a]

 3   party may file and serve a cross-motion . . . at the time it files and serves its

 4   opposition papers to the original motion.”        N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(c) (emphasis

 5   added).    Contrary to Atkins’s contentions, the Local Rule is permissive, so

 6   Walmart was free either to cross-move for summary judgment or to file its own

 7   summary-judgment motion, the latter of which it did before the deadline for initial

 8   dispositive motions. Furthermore, the district court was not required to issue two

 9   separate opinions.    The district court enjoys broad discretion in managing its

10   docket, and factual and legal contentions overlapped substantially between the

11   two competing summary-judgment motions. Cf. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.

12   Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 n.23 (1983) (noting the district court’s

13   “discretion to control its docket”).

14         Finally, Atkins argues that the district court erred when it terminated his

15   post-judgment motions for recusal and reconsideration as moot on the basis that

16   Atkins’s notice of appeal divested the court of jurisdiction.         But we lack

17   jurisdiction to review and thus dismiss those orders. First, Atkins failed to file a

                                              5
 1   new or amended notice of appeal after the district court terminated his motions.

 2   See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) (“A party intending to challenge an order

 3   disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A) . . . must file a notice of appeal,

 4   or an amended notice of appeal.”). Second, even extending liberal construction,

 5   Atkins’s notice of appeal predates the post-judgment motions, so the notice of

 6   appeal cannot be construed as “bring[ing] up for review” the motions that did not

 7   “produce[] the judgment” from which Atkins appeals. SongByrd, Inc. v. Est. of

 8   Grossman, 206 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2000) (cleaned up).

 9         We have considered Atkins’s remaining arguments and find them to be

10   without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and

11   DISMISS the appeals from the recusal and reconsideration orders.

12                                          FOR THE COURT:
13                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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