Court Opinion

ID: 9848472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:20:22.117461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:19.968749
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority’s holding that the Supreme Court of Alaska lacks jurisdiction to review criminal sentences.1 I reach this conclusion on the basis of this court’s own prior precedents and upon analysis of the policy considerations inherent in the question.
The issue of appellate review of criminal sentences was first presented to this court in State v. Pete.2 There the appellee-defendant contended that his imprisonment for two years was “unduly harsh and that the sentence should be reduced.”3 We modified the sentence which had been imposed to the term of imprisonment already served.4 In my separate opinion in the Pete case, I voiced the view that before concluding that this court had authority to review criminal .sentences, we should have clearly articulated “the basis for, and instances when, review of criminal sentences is obtainable in our court system.”5 This suggestion was passed over sub silentio.
In the past year this court was again presented with a question involving its authority to review criminal sentences. In Battese v. State6 appellant contended that the three-year sentence he received was in excess of the two-year minimum for the crime of burglary not in a dwelling and therefore was “an abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing court.” In *438ruling-' on the merits of this contention, we said:
In sentencing appellant the court required him to serve only 60 days in jail. The execution of the balance of the three year sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for that period. Such an arrangement is not unduly oppressive or harsh — there was no abuse of discretion."7 (emphasis added)
Last year’s decision in Thompson v. State8 is also of significance. There appellant questioned in part the contents of a presentence report which had been furnished to the trial judge prior to imposition of sentence. We held that “nothing which occurred during the presentence investigation, nor any portion of the text of the presentence report which was filed” required “the setting aside of appellant’s sentence.”9 In our very recent decision of Egelak v. State,10 appellant contended that because of procedural irregularities which occurred concerning his sentence we should either remand his case to the superior court for resentencing, or alternatively reduce the sentence at the appellate level by an appropriate term of years. In determining the merits adversely to appellant, we place strong emphasis on the broad discretion which must necessarily be granted the trial judge in sentencing. In Egelak we concluded that, “Review of the record * * * fails to disclose that the sentencing judge in fact became prejudiced against appellant subsequent to his viewing the pictures of appellant’s deceased wife.” In regard to another point in the appeal in that case, we further held that, “We cannot find that the district attorney’s remarks concerning an allegedly similar incident prejudiced the trial judge-to the extent that he imposed an excessive-sentence.”
Thus, without any real discussion of our own precedents, the majority has abruptly shunted aside any considerations of stare-decisis and now holds that the Supreme-Court of Alaska lacks jurisdiction to review criminal sentences.11 When experience and compelling reasons require the-overruling of explicit precedent, I would, agree that this court is not inhibited by the rule of stare decisis from taking such, action.12 Here I can perceive no compelling policy considerations, or history of adverse experience under our prior decisions, which call for today’s refusal to review the sentence which was imposed upon appellant William Clark Bear-
Appellate review of criminal sentences has been undertaken and is generally available in approximately fifteen states.13 In. *439thirteen of these states authority .to review sentences is derived from statutes.14 It is true that the weight of precedent is in favor of those courts which have concluded they lacked the authority to review criminal sentences.15 Despite the foregoing, I believe that our court rightly held in the Pete16 and Batiese17 cases that it did possess the authority to review criminal sentences.
Pursuant to article IV, section 2 of the Alaska constitution, this court is vested with “final appellate jurisdiction.” I interpret the phrase “final appellate jurisdiction” as embodying the power to review the merits of a criminal sentence. The courts in State v. Johnson18 and State v. Tuttle 19 construed their respective general grants of appellate authority as encompassing jurisdiction to review criminal sentences.20 To me it is an indefensible *440anomaly that in the carrying out of our obligation to supervise the administration of criminal justice in our courts, we have the appellate authority to review questions pertaining to pre-arrest matters,21 (i. e., search warrants, admissions, confessions, et cetera) complaints,22 preliminary hearings,23 bail,24 grand jury proceedings,25 indictments,26 composition of petit juries,27 errors occurring during the trial itself,28 deliberations of the petit jury,29 sentencing procedures,30 legality of the sentence,31 but are powerless to review the actual sentence which is imposed by the trial judge. This hiatus in our review jurisdiction is illogical and in my view cannot be defended on the traditional grounds that appellate review would interfere with exercise of executive clemency. Sentencing is a discretionary judicial function and the judiciary itself should have the power to correct abuses of such discretion.32 The alternative course, and the one which has been adopted by the majority, is to, abdicate review of judicial discretion. In my view the more reasonable and logical construction of our constitutional grant of final appellate jurisdiction is to hold that this provision authorizes appellate review of criminal sentences.
Today’s ruling results in the unsatisfactory situation that this court will now-review all facets of criminal proceedings to insure the integrity of the fact-finding-process, to zealously protect the rights of the accused and the public in the administration of criminal justice, and to insure adherence to our constitutional mandate that penal administration “shall be based' on the principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public,” 33 but will refuse to review the merits of the sentence which the trial judge has determined. Based on this court’s own prior decisions, the decisions I have referred to in this separate opinion, and the absence of any persuasive reasons for holding that an exception for review of criminal sentences should be carved out of our general appellate jurisdiction, I conclude that this court possesses jurisdiction to review criminal sentences.34
Of all the stages in a criminal proceeding, sentencing is one area in which there is a most compelling need for the development of appropriate criteria. Having had the privilege of serving as a trial judge in the superior court of this state, I am fully cognizant of the uncertainties and extraordinary responsibilities which *441-confront the sentencing judge in his quest -to determine a just sentence. This same ■experience has convinced me of the need for appellate review of the sentencing judge’s discretion and the formulation of ■ appropriate sentencing standards.
Now that it has been determined that ■the problem is one which must be answered 'by our legislature, it is my hope that .Alaska’s Legislature will resolve the issue ⅛ favor of empowering the Supreme Court -of Alaska to exercise appellate review of (Criminal sentences.35

.In the court’s opinion the issue before us for decision has been characterized alternatively as whether we “may review a criminal sentence for abuse of discretion” or whether we have “jurisdiction to review a legal criminal sentence.”

. 420 P.2d 338 (Alaska 1966).

. Id. at 342.

. Prior to our 1966 decision in the Pete ease, we had modified an illegal sentence for contempt in Jefferson v. City of Anchorage, 374 P.2d 241, 244 (Alaska 1962). See also Knudsen v. City of Anchorage, 358 P.2d 375, 384-386 (Alaska 1960), where an illegal sentence was set aside.

. State v. Pete, 420 P.2d 338, 344 (Alaska 1966). In this separate opinion, I alluded to the fact that there was extant considerable precedent foreclosing appellate review of criminal sentences citing United States v. Pruitt, 341 P.2d 700, 703 (4th Cir. 1965), as typifying these authorities.

. 425 P.2d 606, 611 (Alaska 1967).

. Battese v. State, 425 P.2d 606, 611 (Alaska 1967).

. 426 P.2d 995, 999 (Alaska 1967).

. Id.

. 438 P.2d 712. (Alaska, March 21, 1968).

. I do not believe that this reversal can be explained in light of any of the arguments presented in the briefs in this appeal. If anything, the parties’ respective arguments are extremely cursory and incomplete concerning the question of whether this court is vested with the jurisdiction to review criminal sentences.

. In Alyeska Ski Corp. v. Holdsworth, 426 P.2d 1006, 1012 (Alaska 1967), we alluded to our continuing obligation of assuring the development of our common law. See also Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967) ; Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963) ; City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1982).

. G. Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive-Sentences, 15 Vand.L.Rev. 671, 688-97 (1962). See State v. Valenzuela, 101 Ariz. 230, 418 P.2d 386, 389 (1966) ; People v. Morales, 60 Cal.Rptr. 671 (Cal.App.1967) ; State v. Dunn, 434 P.2d 88, 94 (Idaho 1967) ; People v. Taylor, 33 Ill.2d 417, 211 N.E.2d 673, 677 (1965) ; State v. Cupples, 152 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Iowa 1967) ; State v. Caffey, 365 S.W. 2d 607, 610 (Mo.1963) (limited situations) ; State v. Ransom, 182 Neb. 243, 153 N.W.2d 916, 920 (1967) ; State v. Ford, 92 N.J.Super. 356, 223 A.2d 502, 505 (1966) ; People v. Napoli, 28 A.D. 2d 555, 280 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1967) ; Car-*439bray v. State, 435 P.2d 188, 190 (Okl.Crim.App.1967) ; State v. Shannon, 242 Or. 404, 409 P.2d 911 (1966) ; Commonwealth v. Howard, 426 Pa. 305, 231 A.2d 860, 865 (1967) (may be limited to capital punishment cases) ; and Nelson v. State. 35 Wis.2d 797, 151 N.W.2d 094, 705-706 (1967).

. Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-1717 (1956) ; Con.Gen.Stat.Ann. §§ 51-194, 195, 198 (Supp.1965) ; Fla.Stat.Ann. § 932.52 (Supp.1966) ; Hawaii Rev.Laws § 212-14 (Supp.1965) ; Ill.Ann.Stat. c. 38, § 117-3(e) (Smith-Hurd 1964) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 793.18 (1950) ; Maine Pub.Laws 1965. c. 419: Md.Ann.Code art. 26, §§ 132-138 (1966) : Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. c. 278, §§ 28A-28D (1959) ; Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2308 (1934) ; N.Y.Code Crim.Proc. §§ 543, 764; Ore.Rev.Stat. §§ 138.050, 168.090 (1963 Repl.Part) ; Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-2711 (1955).

. On the other hand, note the following cases under the well established federal rule denying review authority: Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583, 586 (1st Cir. 1967), where the court said:
The question of sentence is normally within the exclusive determination of the district court. In the exceptional situation, where it is evident that the district court has given substantial consideration to legally impermissible factors, correction must be possible.
See also Welch v. United States, 371 F.2d 287, 294 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957, 87 S.Ct. 395, 17 L.Ed.2d 303 (1966), the court will refrain from review “absent most unusual circumstances” ; Hoard v. Dutton, 360 F.2d 673, 674 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881, 87 S.Ct. 166, 17 L.Ed.2d 108, rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 943, 87 S.Ct. 300, 17 L.Ed.2d 223 (1966), stated, “Appellate courts do not revise sentences within the limits set by statute, except in the most exceptional circumstances”; United States v. Hetherington, 279 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908, 81 S.Ct. 271, 5 L.Ed.2d 224 (1960). Legal sentences are not subject to review “except possibly for manifest abuse of discretion”; Livers v. United States, 185 F.2d 807, 809 (6th Cir. 1950), sentencing judge’s discretion will not be disturbed on appeal “except upon a plain showing of gross abuse”; Tincher v. United States, 11 F.2d 18, 21 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 664, 46 S. Ct. 475, 70 L.Ed. 1139 (1926) “except in case of gross or palpable abuse.”
See also Judge Frank’s illuminating discussion of this question in United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604-607, (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, 73 S.Ct. 20, 21, 97 L.Ed. 652 (Black, J. dissenting), order denying cert, withheld pending disposition of motion for rehearing, 344 U.S. 850, 73 S.Ct. 66, 97 L.Ed. 661, rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 889, 73 S.Ct. 180, 97 L.Ed. 687 (separate opinion by Frankfurter, J.), motion to vacate a stay of execution of a death sentence granted by Douglas, Jr. vacated, 346 U.S. 273, 73 S.Ct. 1152, 97 L.Ed. 1607 (1953).

. State v. Pete, 420 P.2d 338 (Alaska 1966).

. Battese v. State, 425 P.2d 606, 611 (Alaska 1967).

. 67 N.J.Super. 414, 170 A.2d 830, 836-840 (1961).

. 21 Wis.2d 147, 124 N.W.2d 9, 10 (1963).

. In State v. Tuttle, 21 Wis.2d 147, 124 N.W.2d 9, 11 (1963), the court said:
Wo consider that we have the power to review sentences to determine whether an abuse of discretion clearly appears, and to remand for resentencing or to modify a sentence. We withdraw all past statements indicating that the court lacks power to do so, although it will be a rare case where the power will be used.

. Martinez v. State, 423 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1967).

. State v. Smith, 417 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1966).

. Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686 (Alaska 1967).

. Reeves v. State, 411 P.2d 212 (Alaska 1966).

. State v. Parks, 437 P.2d 642 (Alaska, February 21, 1968).

. Marrone v. State, 359 P.2d 969 (Alaska 1901).

. West v. State, 409 P.2d 847 (Alaska 1966).

. Pederson v. State, 420 P.2d 327 (Alaska 1966).

. Noffke v. State, 422 P.2d 102 (Alaska 1967).

. Thompson v. State, 426 P.2d 995, 999 (Alaska 1967) ; Egelak v. State, 438 P.2d 712 (Alaska, March 21, 1968).

. Jefferson v. City of Anchorage, 374 P.2d 241, 244 (Alaska 1962) ; Knudsen v. City of Anchorage, 358 P.2d 375, 384-86 (Alaska 1960).

. G. Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 Vand.Law Rev. 671, 684 (1962). In this article the author states:
With due respect, the executive pardon, not being subject to any legal restraint, has abolutely nothing to do with the problem at hand. Sentencing is a Judicial problem, and as long as the judiciary is vested with a discretionary range of sentences, there must be some guard against a possible abuse of such discretion, just as there is appellate supervision over every other exercise of judicial discretion.

. Alaska const. art. I, § 12.

. See, Note, Statutory Structure for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 Col.L.Rev. 1134, 1162-07 (1960).

. See, American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Jus-tice, Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences, § 3.4, at 55 (Tent. Draft 1967), where it is stated :
Perhaps the most controversial question involved in the decision to provide for sentence review is whether the reviewing court should bo authorized to in-•erease the penalty imposed by the sentencing court. The question can arise in two forms: whether the state should bo allowed to take an appeal seeking an increase; and if not, whether the appellate court should be authorized to 'increase the sentence when the defendant appeals.
Existing sentence review statutes in ■this country are unanimous to the effect that the state cannot take an appeal against sentence and thereby se•cure an increase. See Appendix A, infra. The English agree. See Meador Report, Appendix G, pp. 141-42, infra.

Opinion is more evenly divided on the question of whether an increase should be permitted when the defendant has taken the appeal. Most of the states in this country which now afford review do not allow such an increase. See, e. g., the statutes in Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, and Nebraska, Appendix A, infra. The sentence review which follows a general court martial likewise is limited to approval or reduction of the imposed sentence. See Appendix A, infra; United States v. Christensen, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 393, 30 C.M.R. 393 (1961). Eour states, on the other hand, do permit an increase if the defendant appeals. See statutes in Connecticut, Maine, Maryland and Massachusetts, Appendix A, infra.