Court Opinion

ID: 9576040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:20:03.398038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:28.047916
License: Public Domain

GIBSON, C. J.,
Dissenting. — I dissent. The judgment in this case awards damages based upon non-compensable elements of injury and it should therefore be reversed for a new trial.
The principles of law upon which the court is in agreement may be stated as follows:
1. Article I, section 14, of the California Constitution is self-executing, and a cause of action may be stated under it without the necessity of express legislative sanction therefor.
2. An action may be maintained under article I, section 14, by the owner of property abutting upon a public highway for any substantial impairment of his easement of access to and from the highway caused by a public improvement.
3. Where the evidence shows, as in the present case, that the construction of a public improvement in the highway, although not immediately adjacent to the property line, interferes substantially with the landowner’s means of ingress and egress, he is entitled to damages therefor.
4. The damages recoverable in such an action are those which flow from the impairment of the landowner’s easement of access, and the evidence concerning the damage should be confined to matters bearing upon such impairment.
5. In this action the trial court committed error in permitting witnesses to base their testimony upon non-compensable items of damage, such as the diversion of public traffic from *745the highway upon which the property abutted. (The concurring opinion of Justice Houser indicates that he disagrees with this conclusion.)
The majority opinion, however, goes on to hold that the trial court’s refusal to strike testimony based upon improper elements of damage was not error, or if it was error, was not prejudicial. I do not agree with this conclusion.
In California, and in certain other states, a liberal policy has been adopted in the admission of opinion evidence concerning damage to real property. In part, this policy has been justified on the ground that the basis for the opinion of the witness can be explored upon cross-examination. (Razzo v. Varni, 81 Cal. 289 [22 Pac. 848]; 86 A. L. R. 1449, 1450, 1459, 1460; 20 Am. Jur. 1001.) As held by the majority opinion, the testimony of witnesses concerning damage to property in cases such as this must be confined to the diminution in value resulting from lawful elements of damage. (City of Chicago v. Spoor, 190 Ill. 340 [60 N. E. 540]; City of Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal. App. 760 [31 Pac. (2d) 467].) Where cross-examination indicates that the opinion of a witness as to diminution in the value of property is based partially upon non-compensable items of damage which he is unable to segregate from the lawful elements of damage, a motion to strike his testimony should be granted. (City of Chicago v. Spoor, supra; Hohmann v. Chicago, 140 Ill. 226 [29 N. E. 671]; Illinois L. & P. Corp. v. Talbott, 321 Ill. 538 [152 N. E. 486]; City of Kankakee v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 263 Ill. 589 [105 N. E. 731]; cf. San Diego Land etc. Co. v. Neale, 88 Cal. 50, 63 [25 Pac. 977, 11 L. R. A. 604]; City of Stockton v. Ellingwood, 96 Cal. App. 708, 716 [275 Pac. 228].) Under these cases the opinion of such a witness should be stricken because if he is unable to segregate the proper from the improper elements involved in his estimate of damage, it is impossible for anyone to determine what part of his estimate is based upon proper elements. Since the opposing party is entitled to a proper estimate, the erroneous opinion should be stricken from the record to be replaced, if possible, with an estimate based upon lawful elements of damage. It is, of course, the general rule that a motion to strike should be directed specifically to the objectionable portion of a witness’ testimony. But here the testimony was in the form of the witness’ opinion which cross-examination disclosed to be based upon improper elements of damage. The witness was unable to state what *746part of Ms estimate rested upon the non-compensable items which he acknowledged formed part of the basis for his opinion. Since the foundation of his testimony was in part erroneous and since that part of his opinion which was due to improper elements could not be ascertained, the erroneous estimate of damage was unquestionably the proper subject of a motion to strike. If the erroneous estimate is stricken, nothing of value remains in his testimony. The grounds for the motion were clearly stated and are supported by the rules of law announced in the majority opinion. The trial court erred therefore in denying the motion to strike the testimony of the witness Woodward.
The mere presence of error does not authorize a reversal of the judgment below unless it appears that a miscarriage of justice has resulted. (Constitution, art. VI, sec. 4%; Etienne v. Kendall, 202 Cal. 251, 257 [259 Pac. 752].) It has been held in an action tried without a jury that the admission of erroneous opinion testimony as to value does not require a reversal of the judgment where the court fixed its award below the estimates of damage given by the witnesses and where it does not appear that the trial judge was influenced by the opinion evidence erroneously admitted. (Joint Highway Dist. No. 9 v. Ocean Shore R. R. Co., 128 Cal. App. 743, 765 [18 Pac. (2d) 413].) In the present case, however, the record shows clearly that the trial judge did not realize that it would be improper for him to consider the testimony challenged by defendant’s motion to strike. The motion was twice presented by defendant and denied by the trial court with the comment that the use of non-compensable items by the witness in reaching his estimate of the damage went only to the weight to be given his testimony. It is apparent, therefore, that the trial court did not apply the correct principles of law in assessing the damages which plaintiffs were entitled to recover. The majority opinion states there was other proper evidence which furnishes support for the award of damages made by the trial court, and that any error with regard to- Woodward’s testimony cannot be held prejudicial. It does not appear that the testimony of the plaintiffs’ other two witnesses was challenged by a motion to strike upon the ground that they considered improper elements of damage in reaching their estimates. The record indicates, however, that these witnesses also used noncompensable factors as the basis for their opinions.
The witness Andrade in his testimony as to the inaccessi*747bility of the property, stated that he meant “being deprived of one of the main highways.” He also considered the fact that, in proceeding in a southerly direction after leaving the Rose premises, it is now necessary to go a block to the north in order to turn and go south. A similar situation results when a highway is divided by a center island to prevent traffic accidents, and it certainly cannot be said that an abutting landowner’s easement of access has thereby been impaired. At most, it is a matter of inconvenience. The witness also took into consideration as an element of damage the difficulty in gaining access, not to the highway, but to the existing spur-track of the intersecting railroad which is located on private property across the highway from the Rose property. Plaintiffs’ easement, however, is one of access to the highway itself and the damages must be limited to the impairment thereof. Similarly, the plaintiffs’ third witness, Leidig, said that whatever value the property had for industrial purposes, upon which he based his estimate, resulted from the possibility of combining highway and railroad accessibility. The major damage caused by the subway construction, however, appears from his testimony to have resulted from the difficulty in gaining access to the railroad’s existing spur track.
Considering the complete intermingling by all witnesses of the damages caused by non-compensable elements with those caused by the impairment of the plaintiffs’ easement of access, and the indications that the trial judge had an erroneous view of what evidence was to be considered in awarding the damages, it is apparent that the judgment necessarily rests upon a misapplication of the law and awards substantial damages thereunder. This is reversible error under any theory.
The judgment should therefore be reversed for a new trial upon the issue of damages in accord with the principles which have been stated.
Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 1942. Gibson, O. J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.