Court Opinion

ID: 9421279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:57:44.143079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:29.457153
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins,
dissenting.
The petitioner here was convicted on three counts under an indictment charging that he “did willfully and knowingly attempt to evade and defeat a large part of the income tax due and owing by him and his wife . . . by filing ... a false and fraudulent joint income tax *136return .... In violation of Section 145 (b), Title 26, United States Code.” Section 145 (b) provides that:
“any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this chapter .. . shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.” (Emphasis added.)1
The offense charged in the indictment, filing a fraudulent return, could be held to be proscribed by § 145 (b) because of the phrase “in any manner.” But certainly it falls squarely within the specific language of 26 U. S. C. § 3616 (a), which provides that any person who
“Delivers or discloses to the collector or deputy any false or fraudulent list, return, account, or statement, with intent to defeat or evade the . . . assessment intended to be made . . . shall be fined not exceeding $1,000, or be imprisoned not exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the court, with costs of prosecution.” (Emphasis added.)2
At an appropriate time the petitioner asked the trial judge to charge the jury that if the allegations of the indictment had been proven they should find the petitioner guilty of a misdemeanor under § 3616 (a). Although § 3616 (a) unambiguously makes the conduct charged a misdemeanor punishable by no more than one year in prison, the trial judge apparently felt that he was compelled to treat the offense as a felony because of the statement in the indictment that the conduct charged *137was “In violation of Section 145 (b) . . . .”3 The judge not only refused the requested instruction, but after the jury returned a verdict of guilty, he sentenced petitioner to serve four years in prison on each of the three counts, the sentences to run concurrently.
Regardless of whether it was error to refuse the requested instruction, the record raises a serious question as to whether the four-year sentence on each count was lawfully imposed. The Court’s opinion takes the position that no proper challenges to the sentence under the felony statute were raised below and hence that “No such questions are presented here.” 4 In my judgment the requested instruction was adequate to call the trial judge’s attention to petitioner’s contention that the offense charged was not a felony but a misdemeanor. But even if the question should have been raised again when the judge announced the sentence, “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., 52 (b). See also Wiborg v. United States, 163 U. S. 632, 658. Since I think petitioner is right in saying the offense charged was only a misde*138meanor, I think we should correct the plain error of the trial judge in sentencing petitioner under the felony statute.
The Government admits here and the Court assumes that filing a false and fraudulent income tax return is both a misdemeanor under § 3616 (a) and a felony under § 145 (b). The Government argues that the action of the trial judge must be upheld because “the Government may choose to invoke either applicable law,” and “the prosecution may be for a felony even though the Government could have elected to prosecute for a misdemeanor.” Election by the Government of course means election by a prosecuting attorney or the Attorney General.5 I object to any such interpretation of §§ 145 and 3616. I think we should construe these sections so as not to place control over the liberty of citizens in the unreviewable discretion of one individual — a result which seems to me to be wholly incompatible with our system of justicé. Since Congress has specifically made the conduct charged in the indictment a misdemeanor, I would not permit prosecution for a felony under the broad language of § 145 (b). Criminal statutes, which forfeit life, liberty or property, should be construed narrowly, not broadly.
So far as I know, this Court has never approved the argument the Government makes here. It certainly did not do so in United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U. S. *13943, upon which the Government seems to rely. In that case the Court said:
“We have before us two statutes, each of which proscribes conduct not covered by the other, but which overlap in a narrow area illustrated by the instant case. At least where different proof is required for each offense, a single act or transaction may violate more than one criminal statute. . . 344 U. S., at 45.
Here, however, under the Court’s opinion and the Government’s argument, two statutes proscribe identical conduct and no “different proof” was required to convict petitioner of the felony than would have been required to convict him of the misdemeanor. The Government’s whole argument rests on the stark premise that Congress has left to the district attorney or the Attorney General the power to say whether the judge and jury must punish identical conduct as a felony or as a misdemeanor.
A basic principle of our criminal law is that the Government only prosecutes people for crimes under statutes passed by Congress which fairly and clearly define the conduct made criminal and the punishment which can be administered.6 This basic principle is flouted if either of these statutes can be selected as the controlling law at the whim of the prosecuting attorney or the Attorney General. “For, the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370.
*140A congressional delegation of such vast power to the prosecuting department would raise serious constitutional questions. Of course it is true that under our system Congress may vest the judge and jury with broad power to say how much punishment shall be imposed for a particular offense. But it is quite different to vest such powers in a prosecuting attorney. A judge and jury act under procedural rules carefully prescribed to protect the liberty of the individual. Their judgments and verdicts are reached after a public trial in which a defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney. No such protections are thrown around decisions by a prosecuting attorney. Substitution of the prosecutor’s caprice for the adjudicatory process is an action I am not willing to attribute to Congress in the absence of clear command. Our system of justice rests on the conception of impersonality in the criminal law. This great protection to freedom is lost if the Government is right in its contention here. See dissenting opinion in Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U. S. 273, 306.
The Government’s contention here also challenges our concept that all people must be treated alike under the law. This principle means that no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than upon another if the offense and the circumstances are the same. It is true that there may be differences due to different appraisals given the circumstances of different cases by different judges and juries. But in these cases the discretion in regard to conviction and punishment for crime is exercised by. the judge and jury in their constitutional capacities in the administration of justice.
I would reverse this case or at least remand for resentencing under the misdemeanor statute, § 3616 (a).

 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 63. Cf. § 7201, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 851.

 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 440. Cf. §§7206 (1), 7207, Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

 But see Williams v. United States, 168 U. S. 382, 389; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 229; Fed. Rules Grim. Proc., 7 (c), which provides in part that: “The indictment . . . shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute . . . which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated. Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment ... or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.” Cf. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196.

 Apparently the Court means by this to leave open to petitioner the opportunity to challenge his sentence by a motion to correct it under 28 TJ. S. C. § 2255. Of course I agree that a motion under that section would be appropriate, but I think petitioner is entitled to have it settled now.

 This would always follow where an information is used. And where there is an indictment by grand jury of course the indictment is drawn by the prosecuting attorney, since grand juries normally are not familiar with the applicable statutes. Thus where a prosecuting officer seeks an indictment under a statute making an attempt to evade taxes in any manner a felony, it would be a rare grand juror indeed who would be sufficiently familiar with the Internal Revenue Code to suggest that it might be better to bring the indictment under § 3616 (a).

 See, e. g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391-392.