Court Opinion

ID: 9594925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:33:59.704144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:43:06.634017
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Presiding Judge.
This is a direct appeal from the order of the probate court in an estate administration, to the extent that it denied in part a motion for summary judgment. See OCGA §§ 15-9-120 to 15-9-123.
Appellant, Emory McClinton, the temporary administrator of the estate of his deceased daughter, Lita Sullivan, filed a petition seeking permanent letters of administration. The mother and two siblings of Lita Sullivan concurred in his appointment. Appellee, James Sullivan, the decedent’s widower, filed a caveat objecting to McClinton’s appointment and seeking his own appointment as administrator. McClinton moved for summary judgment.
The probate court granted that portion of McClinton’s motion seeking to prevent Sullivan’s appointment, denied that portion of the motion seeking McClinton’s appointment, and appointed the county administrator. It did so by applying OCGA § 53-6-24, which sets forth the rules to be observed in granting letters of administration. Factually, it is undisputed that Lita Sullivan died intestate, survived by her estranged husband, against whom she had filed a complaint for divorce, her father, mother, two siblings, and no children. Statutory construction is the key to resolution of this case.
1. The trial court ruled that Sullivan was not entitled to serve as administrator because OCGA § 53-6-24 (a) (1) provides: “The surviving spouse . . . shall be first entitled, unless an action for divorce or separate maintenance was pending between the deceased and the surviving spouse at the time of the death.” The exception was added in 1986. Ga. L. 1986, p. 200, § 1. This was done “to reflect the reality of broken domestic tranquility.” Simpson v. King, 259 Ga. 420, 422, fn. 2 (383 SE2d 120) (1989). Sullivan did not appeal from the partial grant of summary judgment against him. Moreover, as indicated in the Simpson footnote, he would not be entitled to serve.
2. McClinton asserts that he, his wife, and two children are the “next of kin” within the meaning of subsection (a) (2), and that his wife and children properly selected him as administrator under subsection (a) (3). We cannot agree with either contention. Subsections (a) (2) and (3) of the statute provide as follows: “(2) The next of kin, at the time of death, according to the law declaring relationship and distribution, shall be next entitled; (3) If there are several of the next of kin equally near in degree, the person selected in writing by a majority in interest of those interested as distributees of the estate, who are capable of expressing a choice, shall be appointed.”
(a) In all statutory interpretation, it is our obligation to seek the legislature’s intention, OCGA § 1-3-1 (a), and to attempt to effectuate the legislature’s purpose. Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 (279 *412SE2d 430) (1981). It is clear from the overall scheme of OCGA § 53-6-24, and particularly from the language in subsection (a) (9), that the legislature favored the administration of estates by those having the right to inherit them. Subsection (a) (9) provides: “As a general rule, to cover all cases not specially provided for, the person having the right to the estate shall be appointed administrator; . . .” This was more completely explained in Simpson, supra at 422: “The general rule is: ‘ “Both by common law and by statute, the person entitled to the estate of a decedent is entitled to the administration.” The reason usually given for this rule is that the person having title to the estate is most interested and will take best care of it. The administrator holds the estate for the purpose of paying debts and distribution. . . . The rule that the administration should go to the person having the greatest interest in the estate is generally recognized.’ Roe v. Pitts, 82 Ga. App. 770, 773-774 (62 SE2d 387) (1950). See also Redfern, Wills and Administration in Georgia, § 261 (S. Love, 5th ed. 1988).”
This court has ruled that “construing [the predecessor subsections of (a) (2) and (a) (3)] together, it is obvious that the next of kin referred to [in (a) (2)] are ‘next of kin . . . interested as distributees of the estate.’ [Cit.]” Smith v. Goodwin, 84 Ga. App. 319, 322-323 (2) (a) (66 SE2d 169) (1951). Those portions of the predecessor subsections referred to are identical to the current ones, so the construction is still valid. This construction is explained by referring to subsection (a) (3), which applies when there is more than one next of kin and no qualified surviving spouse: “[A] majority in interest of those interested as distributees of the estate, who are capable of expressing a choice” are to select the administrator. It is reinforced by acknowledging that subsection (a) (2)’s reference is not to “next of kin” in a vacuum, but rather to “next of kin . . . according to the law declaring relationship and distribution.”
Although Sullivan is disqualified from serving as administrator under subsection (1) by reason of the divorce action pending at the time of his wife’s death, he nonetheless remains the sole heir and distributee of the estate under the rules of inheritance. OCGA § 53-4-2 (1). See generally Knowles v. Knowles, 125 Ga. App. 642, 648 (5) (188 SE2d 800) (1972). McClinton cites no applicable law to the contrary and we have found none, nor does the evidence show otherwise.1 The *413McClintons, not being interested as distributees of the estate, cannot be the “next of kin” referred to in subsections (a) (2) and (3), and they are not entitled to serve or choose. The 1986 amendment to subsection (a) (1) has created this anomaly, disqualifying all survivors whenever the married decedent is childless and divorce or separate maintenance is pending. Of course, if there are lineal descendants, the estranged surviving spouse would not be the sole heir, OCGA § 53-4-2 (1) and (2), and one of the children would be qualified to serve.
(b) Subsection (a) (6) provides that “ [t] he persons entitled to serve or select among themselves . . . may select a disinterested person as administrator and, if otherwise qualified, he shall be appointed.” Since none of the survivors was entitled to serve or select, this subsection did not apply.
Subsection (a) (4) provides: “If no such preference [as provided in subsection (a) (3)] is expressed, the judge of the probate court may exercise his discretion in selecting the one best qualified for the office.” This does not apply either, as no survivor was qualified to express preference and none of them could be selected by the court as “best qualified.”
At the hearing on the motion, Sullivan expressed his desire that a neutral third party such as the county administrator be appointed. Although the court took this into consideration, it is clear that the probate court’s appointment of the county administrator was based on its own discretion. This was authorized because the statutory scheme did not provide an express rule to cover the situation here, which was created by the 1986 amendment to subsection (a) (1). Yet it did, in the one instance where others who ordinarily would choose the administrator did not do so, authorize the court to appoint the administrator. Subsection (a) (4). Also, it provided that, in the instance where persons qualified to serve or select chose not to serve, “a disinterested person” be selected by them. Subsection (a) (6). Taking these two elements, i.e., court appointment and the necessity of “a disinterested person,” together, we perceive the intent of the legislature to be that the court appoint a disinterested, qualified person in the circumstances presented here. Otherwise, there could be no grant of letters of administration to anyone, despite the fact that it was desired by all survivors.
The rules require that the one appointed “be of sound mind” and “laboring under no disability.” They seek to have one appointed who has an interest in the estate either as distributor or creditor or as a disinterested person selected by the interested person or persons. The court appointed a qualified, disinterested person.
*414We find no error.

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J., Andrews and Johnson, JJ., concur. Justice George H. Carley concurs. Pope, C. J., Birdsong, P. J., Cooper and Blackburn, JJ., dissent.

 Although the record contains copies of the alleged prenuptial and postnuptial agreements entered into by Lita and James Sullivan under the terms of which James Sullivan renounced his right under the laws of intestacy to inherit from his wife’s estate, the documents were never authenticated and never properly offered as evidence for the purpose of summary judgment. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Emory McClinton, not a party or subscribing witness to either of them, swore they were entered into. He was not a competent witness to authenticate them. OCGA § 24-7-4. The postnuptial document is not even dated or signed. Their validity and effect on the appointment of an administrator is therefore not drawn in *413question. OCGA § 9-11-56 (e).