Court Opinion

ID: 9937287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 19:01:05.304834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:00.785513
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 24a0061n.06

                                           No. 23-3409
                                                                                      FILED
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            Feb 09, 2024
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                                                            KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

                                                  )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                  )
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )        ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                  )        UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v.                                                )        COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
                                                  )        DISTRICT OF OHIO
RICHODE MEREDITH-HILL,                            )
        Defendant-Appellant.                      )
                                                                                    OPINION
                                                  )

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; CLAY and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

       CLAY, Circuit Judge. Following the district court’s vacatur of Defendant Richode

Meredith-Hill’s original sentence, Meredith-Hill appeals the judgment of the district court upon

resentencing, arguing that his new sentence is procedurally unreasonable. For the reasons set forth

below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                       I. BACKGROUND
                              A. Meredith-Hill’s Underlying Offense

       Meredith-Hill was part of a large, organized group called the “Rack Gang,” which

perpetrated a series of credit union robberies throughout 2017. On April 3, 2017, Meredith-Hill

participated in two armed robberies at two different credit unions. First, Meredith-Hill and three

others tried to rob the Buckeye State Credit Union in Shaker Heights, Ohio, but the group was

unsuccessful in obtaining any money. Second, the four men robbed over $10,000 from the

Cardinal Community Credit Union in Willoughby, Ohio. The Cardinal Community robbery

culminated in a perilous high-speed chase, during which the group successfully fled and evaded
No. 23-3409, United States v. Meredith-Hill

the local police in a stolen vehicle. Both robberies were committed with firearms and involved

serious threats of physical violence.

       During the FBI’s subsequent investigation, Meredith-Hill admitted his involvement and

claimed that he drove the getaway vehicle for both robberies. In contrast, one of the other

participants in the robberies, Lashawn Davis, told the police that Meredith-Hill played a more

active role by entering the credit unions with a firearm. The investigation determined that

Meredith-Hill likely entered and robbed the Buckeye State Credit Union because his DNA

matched the DNA found on the black gloves used during the crime. As for the Cardinal

Community Credit Union robbery, the investigation found it likely that Meredith-Hill did serve as

the getaway driver and fled at recklessly high speeds from police. Based on the conflicting

evidence and confessions, the investigation was ultimately inconclusive as to Meredith-Hill’s

exact role in the two robberies. When Meredith-Hill was subsequently arrested, he recanted his

prior confession.

       Following a jury trial in October 2019, the jury found Meredith-Hill guilty of aiding and

abetting the following counts: (1) attempted interference with commerce by means of robbery in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 [Buckeye Credit Union]; (2) carrying a firearm in relation to a crime

of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) [Buckeye Credit Union]; (3) interference with

commerce by means of robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 [Cardinal Credit Union]; and (4)

carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) [Cardinal

Credit Union].1 To summarize, Meredith-Hill was convicted of two counts related to the robberies,

and two accompanying counts related to the firearms brandished during the robberies.

       1
         The jury acquitted Meredith-Hill of a fifth count related to the alleged attempted robbery
of the Eaton Family Credit Union.

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No. 23-3409, United States v. Meredith-Hill

                             B. Meredith-Hill’s Original Sentence

       During Meredith-Hill’s initial sentencing on January 10, 2020, the district court adopted

the calculation within the presentence report, which set Meredith-Hill’s total offense level at 28

and his criminal history category at II, corresponding to a Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months’

imprisonment for the robbery and attempted robbery counts (Counts 1 and 3). The court also

recognized that Counts 2 and 4 carried mandatory seven-year minimum sentences to be served

consecutively. Therefore, assuming the court chose the mandatory minimum, Meredith-Hill’s

aggregate advisory range was 255 to 276 months’ imprisonment.

       Following its thorough consideration of the factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and

arguments from both sides, the district court imposed an 87-month sentence for Counts 1 and 3 to

run concurrently. Then, with respect to the § 924(c) charges in Counts 2 and 4, the district

court imposed the minimum seven-year sentence for each to be served consecutively, totaling

168 months of imprisonment. In the aggregate, the district court initially imposed a 255-month

sentence. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed Meredith-Hill’s conviction and sentence. See United

States v. Meredith-Hill, No. 20-3083, 2021 WL 3079695, at *9 (6th Cir. July 21, 2021).

                               C. Meredith-Hill’s Resentencing

       Following the Supreme Court’s holding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery cannot

constitute a crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c), see United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845,

860 (2022), Meredith-Hill filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction on Count 2.

Based on the newly disqualified predicate crime in Count 1—attempted Hobbs Act robbery—the

corresponding § 924(c) firearm charge in Count 2 could no longer stand. The government filed a

response in agreement, and the district court accordingly vacated Meredith-Hill’s conviction on

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No. 23-3409, United States v. Meredith-Hill

Count 2 and scheduled a de novo resentencing hearing. Count 4—with the predicate offense of

completed Hobbs Act robbery—was not affected by the holding in Taylor.

       Upon resentencing, although the seven-year minimum sentence under Count 2 was

vacated, the presentence report calculated a higher total offense level of 31 for Counts 1 and 3.

This change stemmed from a corresponding five-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C)

to Count 1 for brandishing a firearm during the attempted robbery of Buckeye State Credit Union.2

Combined with his unchanged criminal history category of II, the advisory Guidelines range for

Counts 1 and 3 became 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment, and Count 4 still carried a seven-year

mandatory minimum to be imposed consecutively. Therefore, adding in the seven-year mandatory

minimum, the presentence report recommended a total range of 205 to 235 months’ imprisonment.

During the resentencing hearing, Meredith-Hill did not object to the presentence report and agreed

that its calculation was accurate.

       After explaining the applicable Guidelines range, the district court carefully considered

each of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). First, the court recognized that the nature and

circumstances of the instant offense were particularly egregious, endangering multiple employees

during the armed robberies as well as multiple individuals during the subsequent high-speed chase

       2
          Because § 924(c) precludes the application of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, the vacatur of the
§ 924(c) charge may validly result in the five-level enhancement upon a de novo resentencing.
See, e.g., United States v. Pembrook, 79 F.4th 720, 724 (6th Cir. 2023) (explaining that the
defendants’ Guidelines range increased from their original sentencing “because the new PSRs
added a five-level enhancement for brandishing a firearm, which applied only after the second
§ 924(c) charge was excluded”); United States v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 2011)
(explaining that, because a § 924(c) conviction and the underlying conviction are interdependent,
de novo sentencing is appropriate to consider newly applicable enhancements). Meredith-Hill did
not object to this five-level enhancement and agreed that he (or those he jointly engaged in criminal
activity with) brandished firearms during the robbery.

                                                 4
No. 23-3409, United States v. Meredith-Hill

through highway traffic. Based on the violent nature of the crimes and the reckless disregard for

public safety when Meredith-Hill fled law enforcement, the court found that he presented a risk of

danger to the community. Next, the district court weighed these factors against Meredith-Hill’s

difficult history and childhood, as well as his mental health and substance abuse issues.

Additionally, despite his traumatic upbringing and hardships, Meredith-Hill clearly took advantage

of the rehabilitative programming available during incarceration, and the district court highlighted

his commendable recent educational efforts.

       Turning to the arguments from the parties, Meredith-Hill’s attorney argued for a downward

variance, encouraging the district court to reference “[Meredith-Hill’s] original 87 to 108

guidelines” for Counts 1 and 3, and to impose a total of 144 months’ imprisonment. Apr. 25, 2023,

Tr. Sent’g Hr’g, R. 127, Page ID #2068. In further support of the downward variance request,

defense counsel pointed to Meredith-Hill’s young age at the time of the conviction, limited role in

the perpetration of the armed robberies, extremely difficult childhood, and recent strides in

education and maturity. In contrast, the government argued for a sentence towards the higher end

of the advisory Guidelines, noting that the original sentence adequately accounted for the severity

of the crime and contending that the court should not significantly stray from its initial sentence.

After hearing arguments from both sides, the district court acknowledged each argument and noted

that, despite the seriousness of Meredith-Hill’s violent and aggressive crimes, his youth and

impoverished upbringing influenced its calculations.

       In selecting its ultimate sentence, the district court noted that it “still believe[d]” that the

initial sentence “was sufficient but not greater than necessary to affect the purposes of sentencing.”

Id. at Page ID #2092. However, the district court recognized that it must operate from a different

Guidelines sentencing range due to its vacatur of Count 2. Ultimately, the district court imposed

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No. 23-3409, United States v. Meredith-Hill

a 205-month term of imprisonment, specifically “find[ing] that the reduced sentence [was]

appropriate in this case because of the strides that Mr. Meredith-Hill is making.” Id. at Page ID

#2093. The court stated that, “[h]ad [Meredith-Hill] not made any progress, the sentence would

have been the same [as his original sentence],”3 because its considerations revolving around his

criminal history, the seriousness of the instant offense, and other § 3553(a) factors remained

largely identical. Id.

       The district court concluded the sentencing hearing by inquiring whether there were “any

objections or [] any reason[s] why the sentence as stated by the Court should not be imposed.” Id.

at Page ID #2100. In response, Meredith-Hill objected to the denial of a downward variance

because the new sentence did “not adequately account for his post sentencing conduct.” Id. at

Page ID #2101. This timely appeal followed.

                                         II. DISCUSSION

                                      A. Standard of Review

       We generally review the district court’s sentencing decisions under a deferential abuse of

discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). While legal conclusions

are reviewed de novo, factual conclusions are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Parrish,

915 F.3d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 2019). Further, we review a criminal sentence for both procedural

and substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Morgan, 687 F.3d 688, 693 (6th Cir. 2012)

(citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). However, the parties in this case agree that plain error review applies

because Meredith-Hill did not raise any procedural reasonableness objection in front of the district

       3
         The district court later stated that the original sentence “or something close to the original
sentence, and that was closer to what the government was asking” would have been appropriate
without Meredith-Hill’s significant growth and progress. Id. at Page ID #2101.

                                                  6
No. 23-3409, United States v. Meredith-Hill

court. Cf. United States v. Sherrill, 972 F.3d 752, 768–69 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v.

Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2009)). Even if Meredith-Hill had successfully

shown that the issue was preserved and that an abuse of discretion standard should apply, the

outcome in this case would remain the same because his sentence was procedurally reasonable.

       Plain error review requires the Court to consider whether there is: “(1) error (2) that was

‘obvious or clear,’ (3) that ‘affected [the] defendant’s substantial rights’ and (4) that ‘affected the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Donadeo,

910 F.3d 886, 893 (6th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Vonner,

516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Several circumstances may illustrate that the district

court erred by imposing a procedurally unreasonable sentence under this standard, including if the

court “failed to calculate the Guidelines range properly; treated the Guidelines as mandatory; failed

to consider the factors prescribed at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); based the sentence on clearly erroneous

facts; or failed to adequately explain the sentence.” United States v. Coppenger, 775 F.3d 799,

803 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Johnson, 680 F. App’x 451, 455

(6th Cir. 2017).

                                            B. Analysis

       Meredith-Hill argues that his sentence “is procedurally unreasonable, because instead of

using the applicable advisory guidelines range as the starting point and benchmark for his sentence,

the lower court used his prior sentence as the reference point for choosing his new sentence.”

Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 15, 10. Due to the district court’s repeated references to his prior sentencing,

Meredith-Hill contends that the court cast his new Guidelines range to the side, instead opting to

impermissibly tether the new sentence to the length of his original sentence. Further, Meredith-

Hill argues that this error affected his substantial rights because he could have received a more

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No. 23-3409, United States v. Meredith-Hill

favorable sentence. Finally, Meredith-Hill underscores the long-established principle that the

district court must use the Guidelines as a starting point as evidence that the error affected the

fairness and integrity of the proceedings.

       At the very least, Meredith-Hill is correct that the district court repeatedly mentioned his

prior sentence and prior sentencing range. For example, the district court stated that it “still

believe[d] that [the] initial sentence at the time [the court] imposed it was sufficient but not greater

than necessary to affect the purposes of sentencing.” Apr. 25, 2023, Tr. Sent’g Hr’g, R. 127,

Page ID #2092. The court explained that its reduction was appropriate due to the “strides that Mr.

Meredith-Hill [made]” and noted that “[h]ad he not made any progress, the sentence would have

been the same.” Id. at Page ID #2093. Instead of a sentence “close to the original sentence,” the

court recognized that his new sentence was “50 months shorter . . . in recognition of

[Meredith-Hill’s] progress.” Id. at Page ID #2101.

       However, Meredith-Hill’s arguments nonetheless fall short. The district court started the

hearing by properly calculating and explaining the newly applicable Guidelines range of 121 to

151 months’ imprisonment. And the district court did not initially discuss the original sentence,

nor was the court the impetus behind the continued references to the original sentence. Meredith-

Hill fails to recognize that the parties themselves focused on the original sentence as a frame of

reference for selecting the proper new sentence.

       In fact, Meredith-Hill asked the district court to impose a downward variance by

disregarding the new, higher Guidelines range attributed to Counts 1 and 3. In other words, instead

of using the newly calculated range of 121 to 151 months, Meredith-Hill contended that the

“original 87 to 108 guidelines” were the proper benchmark due to his young age and other

mitigating circumstances. Id. at Page ID #2068. Then, the government asked for a sentence “as

                                                   8
No. 23-3409, United States v. Meredith-Hill

similar as possible to what [the court] originally imposed” because, other than pursuing

commendable educational efforts while incarcerated, no factual circumstances had changed from

the district court’s original sentencing analysis. Id. at Page ID #2086. As evidenced by both

parties’ reliance upon the original sentence in framing their respective resentencing arguments, the

unique circumstances of this resentencing made it nearly impossible to completely disregard the

analysis that the district court undertook in imposing its original sentence. Therefore, as opposed

to Defendant’s argument that the district court used his prior sentence as an anchor, the record

reflects that the court referenced its originally imposed sentence towards the end of the

resentencing hearing to adequately respond to the arguments that the parties themselves made.

       Further, there is no blanket “prohibition in the guidelines, or in the case law interpreting

the guidelines, keeping a district judge from revisiting the entire sentencing procedure unless

restricted by the remand order,” provided that the district court does not act vindictively. United

States v. Duso, 42 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Washington, No.

20-2333, 2023 WL 2945902, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 14, 2023) (ordering a de novo resentencing in

similar circumstances for the district court to “revisit its ‘overall plan’”). No such prohibition

existed in the instant case, as the district court required a de novo sentencing hearing under the

sentencing package doctrine. This doctrine recognizes that “when a defendant is found guilty on

a multicount indictment, there is a strong likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition

in which the sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan, and that if some counts

are vacated, the judge should be free to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original

plan.” United States v. Mainville, 9 F. App’x 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting

United States v. Townsend, 178 F.3d 558, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).

                                                  9
No. 23-3409, United States v. Meredith-Hill

       Therefore, the district court in this case did not err in considering the efficacy of the new

Guidelines range “in light of [its] original plan.” Id. Indeed, noting the original sentence is exactly

what the sentencing package doctrine contemplates.4 See Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d

1220, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[Section] 2255 gives the [district] court jurisdiction and authority to

reevaluate the entire aggregate sentence to ensure that the defendant receives the appropriate

sentence on the remaining count.”); United States v. Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573, 591 (6th Cir.

2010) (vacating all of defendant’s sentences, instead of solely vacating the one invalid sentence,

because “[h]ad the district court known that [certain convictions] were invalid, it might have

chosen to make some of the other sentences consecutive rather than concurrent”).

       Accordingly, although the district court clearly took note of its previously imposed

sentence, the record does not indicate that it improperly used the original sentence, as opposed to

the undisputed Guidelines range, as a starting point or benchmark to guide its de novo analysis.

One of the very first items that the district court covered during resentencing was the new

Guidelines range. Further, towards the end of the resentencing hearing, the court’s present-tense

language, “I still believe that the initial sentence [was sufficient],” indicates a new decision as to

fairness in light of the new Guidelines range—indeed, because the Guidelines are discretionary,

the district court could have opted to impose the exact same sentence, so long as it provided

adequate explanation. Apr. 25, 2023, Tr. Sent’g Hr’g, R. 127, Page ID #2092 (emphasis added);

see, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 326 F. App’x 308, 309 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district

court’s upward variance and reinstatement of the original sentence); United States v. Obi, 542 F.3d

       4
         Of course, the sentencing package doctrine does not allow a district court to anchor its
analysis at the prior Guidelines range or completely disregard the newly calculated Guidelines
range. And the district court in this case engaged in neither of these impermissible actions.

                                                  10
No. 23-3409, United States v. Meredith-Hill

148, 155–56 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding same sentence on resentencing). Moreover, this statement

is immediately followed by the recognition of the new Guidelines range and the elimination of one

of the seven-year mandatory minimum sentences, as well as a reiteration of the parties’ respective

positions, which were each anchored to the new Guidelines range.

       Overall, the district court meticulously considered each factor delineated in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) and Meredith-Hill’s arguments for a lower sentence, as required to impose a

procedurally reasonable sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–52; United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d

243, 251 (6th Cir. 2007). The district court did not eschew proper procedures in an attempt to

evade the correct Guidelines range or reverse-engineer a sentence similar to the original; instead,

it started fresh with the new Guidelines as its starting point and merely recognized the differences

between Meredith-Hill’s original sentencing and his resentencing. For these reasons, the district

court did not plainly err in imposing a sentence at the bottom of Meredith-Hill’s newly calculated

Guidelines range. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                                11