Court Opinion

ID: 9797341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:18:45.588368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:28.330303
License: Public Domain

CHAPEL, Judge,
Dissenting:
11 1 I respectfully dissent.1I agree with the majority that through 47 Ok1. St. Ann. § 10-104(B), Oklahoma law mandates that a driver who could be cited for any fatality-related traffic offense submit to drug and aleohol testing as soon as practicable after the accident. I also agree that under § 10-104(B), a traffic violation establishes probable cause for the purpose of testing, and that "the procedures found in § 752 shall be followed" to determine the presence of alcohol or controlled dangerous substances within the driver's blood system.) I part company with the majority, however, when it determines that the irrefutably directive language of § 10-104 highlighted above does not really require compliance with the blood withdrawal procedures listed in § 752, and that § 752 is merely a statement of how blood withdrawers can avoid civil liability.
T2 Section 752 has ten subsections (A J). Sub-section B has four subparts (1-4). Section 752(B)(4) states that if a person statutorily authorized to withdraw blood is presented with a statement "[in the form of an order from a district court that blood be withdrawn," then
[that person] and the hospital or other health care facility where the withdrawal occurs may rely on such a statement or order as evidence that the [patient] has consented to or has been required to submit to the clinical procedure and shall not require the [patient] to sign any additional consent or waiver form. In such a case, the person authorized to perform the procedure, the employer of such person, and the hospital or other health care facility shall not be liable in any action alleging lack of consent or lack of informed consent.
47 Ok. St. Ann. § 752(B)(4).
T3 The last sentence of § 752(B)(4) limits individual and institutional civil liability for an action premised on the patient's alleged lack of consent to the blood withdrawal under one circumstance: where the withdrawal was premised upon a written judicial order. Seeking to uphold the legality of the blood test in this case, the majority extracted that one sentence from subsection B(4) and washed it over the entire statute to justify its result stating that § 752(B) 2simply sets forth four cireumstances under which the persons who withdraw blood cannot be held civilly liable" for their acts The majority misreads the statute. Section 752(B), which deals with actual or substituted consent, does far more than that.
14 First, if the limitation of liability was intended to cover all four methods by which *292blood withdrawal was authorized, it would not have been embedded solely within the text of subsection (B)(4)-the lone provision discussing a judicial order. Second, reading the limitation of liability in § 752(B)(4) into §§ T52(B)(1)-(8) as well renders § 752(C) (a broader limitation that specifically covers all four methods 3) superfluous. While I suppose it is possible that the legislature stated the limitation twice to assure the health care industry that it could not be held civilly liable, I believe that the legislature had something more in mind when it enacted § 752(B) and demanded its compliance in § 10-104(B): a requirement that law enforcement comply with its provisions. Thus, blood should not be withdrawn under § 752(B) unless the withdrawing entity acts only after being presented with a proper written statement, including, inter alia, a judicial order4 - Further, evidence from blood that is improperly drawn should be inadmissible.
T5 Section 10-104(B) plainly states that "the procedures found in Section 752[ ] shall be followed" when obtaining a blood sample. The legislature's intent was to require the State to obtain a blood sample and in one of the four enumerated ways. Thus, law enforcement must either have the consent of the "patient," an effectuated arrest based upon probable cause that the person caused death while operating a motor vehicle under the influence, or a judicial order.5 The ree-ord reflects that law enforcement failed to comply.
16 At the request of Trooper Sosbee, a nurse drew Guest's blood approximately one hour after the fatal accident. Trooper Sos-bee testified that he neither arrested Guest nor obtained his consent before the blood draw. There is no evidence that any judicial order directed the action. Moreover, the State's brief effectively concedes that the statutory requirements were not followed. As a result, the blood evidence should have been suppressed.
T7 With the blood evidence suppressed, not much evidence exists that Guest was under the influence of a controlled substance at the time of the accident. The blood evidence indicated that methamphetamine was present in Guest's blood about an hour after the accident. Although the forensic chemist testified to the general effects of methamphetamine, including its potential effect on a person for a couple of days, he did not quantify the amount. As a result, the chemist could not testify to whether and/or how much this particular defendant, Guest, was affected by the methamphetamine. Guest testified that he had ingested a quarter gram of methamphetamine approximately 48 hours before the accident. However, he also testified that he was not under the influence when the accident occurred, and that the accident was caused because he fell asleep. Had the motion to suppress been granted, Guest undoubtedly would not have testified at all, leaving the State with no evidence of intoxication.
T8 The blood evidence was crucial to the State's manslaughter conviction. Without it, assuming Guest had testified, it would have been left with only a negligent homicide case supported, if at all, by mere guesswork as to *293the effect of a 4 gram of methamphetamine on Guest forty-eight hours post-ingestion. As a result, this Court should reverse and remand for a new trial or modify the judgments and sentences to negligent homicide.

. - Majority Opinion at 290 (emphasis added).

. Majority Opinion at 291.

. Section 752(C) states: No person specified is subsection A of this section, no employer of such person, and no hospital or other health care facility where blood is withdrawn shall incur any civil or criminal liability as a result of the proper withdrawal of blood when acting at the request of a law enforcement officer by the provisions of Section 741 or 753 of this title, or when acting in reliance upon a signed statement or court order as provided in this section, if the act is per- ' formed in a reasonable manner according to generally accepted clinical practice. No person specified in subsection A of this section shall incur any civil or criminal liability as a result of the proper collection of breath, saliva, or urine when acting at the request of a law enforcement officer under the provisions of Section 751 or 753 of this title or when acting pursuant to a court order.

. I also note that the majority's opinion causes me to question the constitutionality of § 10-104. As interpreted by the majority, § 10-104 becomes a legislative mandate to obtain a blood sample from the driver of a vehicle who could be cited for a traffic offense involved in a fatality accident without any restrictions, such as consent or an arrest, on how the officers obtain blood from the individual. I believe that similar legislative concerns prompted the requirement that the blood sample be obtained in accordance with § 752.

. 21 0.S8.§ 752.