Court Opinion

ID: 9573803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:59:19.099674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:22.907303
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.,
dissenting: The rule is established in this jurisdiction that a general demurrer challenging the sufficiency of an entire petition to state a cause of action must be overruled if the pleading states a cause of action on any theory. (Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364 P. 2d 955.)
Liberally construed the petition in this case definitely alleges a cause of action on the theory of nuisance against each of the defendants. In paragraph six the floodlights are described in great detail as they affect the use of the highway described in the petition. The court is here confronted with the allegations of a petition on demurrer and not evidence produced at the trial. It is conceivable the plaintiff may not be able to prove a cause of action on the theory of nuisance at the trial, but in this connection see Voss v. Bridwell, supra. Certainly, a nuisance has been alleged *734by the factual allegations of the petition in this case. (Neiman v. Common School District, 171 Kan. 237, 232 P. 2d 422; Buckmaster v. Bourbon County Fair Ass’n, 174 Kan. 515, 256 P. 2d 878; Eble v. State, 77 Kan. 179, 93 Pac. 803; see, also, Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N. W. 2d 1; Gleason v. Hillcrest Golf Course, 265 N. Y. S. 886, 148 Misc. 246; Robb v. Milwaukee, 241 Wis. 432, 6 N. W. 2d 222; and Nat. Refining Co. v. Batte, 135 Miss. 819, 100 So. 388.) Floodlights can be so intense as to permeate an area and blind persons driving vehicles on a highway within such area, and constitute a nuisance just as effectively as permeating an area with noxious odors from a sewage disposal plant. (See Adams v. City of Arkansas City, 188 Kan. 391, 362 P. 2d 829.)
It is immaterial to a cause of action in nuisance that negligence may also be incidentally alleged or involved. In Adams v. City of Arkansas City, supra, this court said:
“The gravamen of the offense in actions of this nature is not necessarily negligence but nuisance, and is dealt with by the law of nuisance, whether the nuisance is negligently caused or otherwise. . . .” (p. 400.)
On this point see Lehmkuhl v. City of Junction City, 179 Kan. 389, 394, 295 P. 2d 621; Bailey v. Kelly, 93 Kan. 723, 727, 145 Pac. 556; 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances, § 4, p. 282; 66 C. J. S., Nuisances, § 11a, p. 751; Warren v. Bridgeport, 129 Conn. 355, 28 A. 2d 1; and Robinson v. Westman, supra.
Under the workmens compensation act a workman is entitled to compensation for injury occasioned by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Whether the accident is unavoidable or arises from negligence or a greater culpable act is immaterial, and contributory negligence on the part of the injured employee is of no consequence. It was on this theory of the workmen s compensation act that Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P. 2d 78, was decided, but this law is applicable only where the workman is injured on the premises or in the course of his employment. It has no application to a workman going to or from his place of employment. In this situation G. S. 1949, 44-508 (7c) has application. Clearly, this section of the act specifies only negligence. Furthermore, liability is imposed on the employer only if the injury occasioned is the proximate cause of the employer’s negligence, thus injecting the issue of the injured workman’s contributory negligence. An accidental injury, absent such negligence on the part of the employer, would not entitle the workman to compen*735sation under the act while enroute to his employment. (Madison v. Key Work Clothes, 182 Kan. 186, 318 P. 2d 991.)
For the same reason an act of the employer, other than negligence, such as a nuisance created and maintained by the employer, or a culpable act of greater magnitude than ordinary negligence, would not be within the compass of 44-508 (k), supra. Therefore, a workman who has a cause of action for an injury occasioned to him enroute to his place of work by a nuisance created and maintained by his employer should be free to assert his claim in a common law action against his employer.
Here the admitted facts on demurrer are that the defendant Boeing failed to assert any precautionary control or regulation over the crosswalk where the plaintiff was struck down, and thus hy the absence of control had permitted the dangerous lighting condition to exist as a nuisance at the very spot where the plaintiff was injured.
It is true that if negligence on the part of the employer were also present and proximately caused the workmans injury, the workman could assert his right under the workmens compensation act, but the workman is not required to invoke the provisions of the workmen’s compensation act.
Under these circumstances the workman should have an election whether to proceed under the act on the ground of negligence or in a common law action against his employer on the ground of nuisance.
An analogous situation was presented in Davis v. Reed, 188 Kan. 159, 360 P. 2d 847, where an employee was injured in an automobile accident caused by a third person while in the course of his employment. The court held that when the injury to a workman for which compensation is payable under the workmen’s compensation act is caused under circumstances creating a liability against some person other than the employer to pay damages, and the injured workman fails to assert the right to taire compensation under the act by filing the claim or accepting compensation, the provisions of G. S. 1959 Supp., 44-504 are not invoked, and the injured workman may assert his common law action against the third party wrongdoer in tort at any time within two years from the date the cause of action accrued under G. S. 1949, 60-306. In other words, the workman had an election of remedies.
Here the same principle should apply because the provisions of *736the workmens compensation act have not been invoked, and under the facts and circumstances of this case it should make no difference that the wrongdoer was the employer.
It is respectfully submitted the lower court should be affirmed.
Wertz, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.