Court Opinion

ID: 9770364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:59:45.974399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:16.559542
License: Public Domain

O’CONNER, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the en banc opinion resolution of point of error one, and join in the dissenting opinion by Justice Mirabal.1 I also dissent from the en banc opinion on point of error three, in which appellant, Martin Kenny Berotte, contends the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a child who was incompetent to testify.
The Videotape
The dissenting opinion fails to mention a critical reason the videotape should have been given to the jury, and the reason the case should be reversed.
Appellant’s lawyer offered the video tape into evidence as defendant’s exhibit number two; the State objected, claiming it was irrelevant. Over the State’s objection, the trial court admitted the tape. The tape was not played for the judge or the jury at the time of its admission. During closing arguments, counsel for appellant referred several times to the tape, and asked the jury to look in particular at the kite-flying segment because “there are statements in there by T.B. when she’s not in a courtroom ... where she talks about her feelings about her father and her mother.”
The record shows that after the jury had retired to deliberate, the trial judge had second thoughts about the admissibility of the tape. At first, the trial judge told the lawyers he would permit the jury to see the tape but with the volume turned off. Defense counsel objected because he had argued to the jury that they should listen to T.B.’s statements on the tape. A short *21time later, the trial judge announced he would not permit the jury to see it at all. Defense counsel strenuously objected, reminding the court that in his final argument, defense counsel told the jury to look at the tape. The judge decided to watch the tape himself before making a final decision.
Early in their deliberations, the jury foreman sent a note to the judge asking to see “all” of the exhibits. The videotape was not given to the jury when the other exhibits were delivered to the jury room. The statement of facts does not include any other reference to defendant’s exhibit number two.
The transcript contains what appears to be a proposed supplemental charge to the jury advising them to view the tape only with the sound turned off. However, because the proposed charge was not shown to the lawyers for the State or for the defense, it was, at best, an ex parte communication by the judge with the jury.2 At the bottom of this charge is a handwritten entry, signed by the judge:
This document was offered along -with the videotape to the jury during its deliberation. Before accepting this document or the video, the bailiff was instructed by the jury that it did not want the video. Neither this instruction nor the video was seen by the jury.
Appellant contends he was not informed of the proposed charge, the jury’s decision not to view the tape, or the handwritten entry. He says he did not learn what had transpired between the trial judge and the jury until he filed his appeal and the ex parte communication was included in the transcript. Appellant contends he was deprived of an opportunity to question the bailiff or object on the record. The State does not rebut appellant’s contention.3
I would vote with Justice Mirabal to reverse on this point of error.
Competency of Child Witness
In point of error three, appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of N.F. because she was not competent to testify. N.F. was two-years old at the time of the alleged abuse; she was four-years old at trial.
We review the trial court’s decision on the competence of a child witness based on an abuse of discretion standard. Garcia v. State, 573 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex.Crim.App.1978); Coachman v. State, 692 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. refd). In such a review, we examine the child’s responses at the qualification hearing and the rest of the testimony. Fields v. State, 500 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Beavers v. State, 634 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, pet. refd).
The en banc opinion weighs N.F.’s accurate statements against her inaccurate statements and concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting her to testify. I disagree that this is the correct way to determine the child’s competence as a witness. N.F. was bound to answer some questions correctly during the qualifying hearing, e.g., she knew her *22name, the names of the adults with whom she lives, her brothers’ names, and she said liked to play with toys. These things had nothing to do with her understanding of her obligation to be truthful.
On the critical issues, N.F. failed the test of competence. When she was asked what it meant to tell the truth, she could not respond, nor could she explain what it meant to tell a lie. She said it would be “right” to say it was raining even though it was not. She shook her head when asked if she had ever made up a story. She nodded her head yes when asked if it would be true if she claimed she could drive a car. When asked if she had ever made up a story or been spanked for making one up, she shook her head no to both questions. When she was asked if she knew what “good” was, she shook her head no; when asked if she knew what “bad” was, she again indicated she did not. N.F. held up one finger when asked her age (although she is four).4
N.F. frequently nodded or shrugged in response to question and much of her testimony before the jury was contradictory and confusing. She was best able to respond verbally when asked leading questions. When she was asked what happened with Kenny, she was not able to relate the story without prompting. Based on a review of her entire testimony, I believe the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that four-year old N.F. was competent to testify about an event that happened to her when she was two years old.
Based on my review of N.F.’s entire testimony, I would hold the trial court abused its discretion when it determined the child was competent to testify.

. I do not join in footnote three to her opinion, which relates to point of error three.

. It is not certain what the supplemental charge was. The charge may or may not have been given to the jury; the note may reflect the trial judge’s thinking, without more. If it was not shown to the jury and only reflects the trial judge’s thoughts, it should not have been included in the official transcript because it was not shown to either lawyer.

. The State argues we should not conclude from the handwritten entry on the supplemental charge that the judge refused to supply the tape, but that the jury rescinded their request to see the videotape. I disagree. Simply because the supplemental charge was in the transcript does not mean we may consider it part of the record on appeal. See Jones v. State, 116 Tex.Crim. 88, 32 S.W.2d 464 (1930) (trial judge’s ex parte affidavit not part of record on appeal); accord Rodriguez v. State, 834 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet ref’d) (docket entries not part of record); Shields v. State, 820 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.App. — Waco 1991, no pet.) (unsworn testimony concerning jurors not part of record).

. In footnote three of Justice Mirabal’s dissenting opinion, she states that N.F. who was four at the time of the first trial, will be at least nine years old if the case is retried, and for that reason the point of error three is moot. I disagree. N.F. was two when the alleged sexual abuse occurred. Her ability to perceive and understand an event that happened when she was two-years old will not improve with age.