Court Opinion

ID: 9960489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 15:00:27.56531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:32.181951
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MELBERT J. PEREZ,                               DOCKET NUMBER
              Appellant,                        AT-1221-18-0211-W-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: April 15, 2024
  SECURITY,
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Melbert J. Perez , Carolina, Puerto Rico, pro se.

      Diana M. Espinosa , Esquire, San Juan, Puerto Rico, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal as withdrawn.           For the
reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and
REMAND the case to the Atlanta Regional Office for further adjudication in
accordance with this Remand Order.

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

                                   BACKGROUND
      The appellant is a GS-12 Customs and Border Protection Officer for the
agency. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 36. On January 3, 2018, the appellant
filed an IRA appeal, alleging that the agency had retaliated against him for a
protected disclosure. IAF, Tab 1. The parties engaged in settlement discussions,
agreeing that the appellant would withdraw his appeal in exchange for the agency
allowing him to attend a 2-week training course known as the Immigration
Advisory      Program/Joint      Security     Program/Police       Liaison     Program
Pre-Deployment Briefing (IAP Briefing). 2 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 6
at 4, Tab 8 at 4-6. It appears that the purpose of the IAP Briefing is to prepare
employees for overseas deployments, and that it is a prerequisite for foreign
deployments under the IAP. PFR File, Tab 6 at 6. The appellant attended the
IAP Briefing from April 9-19, 2018. Id. at 10.
      On April 26, 2018, the administrative judge held a status conference during
which the parties notified her of the settlement and that the appellant intended to
withdraw his appeal. IAF, Tab 6 at 4, Tab 8 at 6. On May 1, 2018, the appellant
filed a motion to withdraw his appeal with prejudice.             IAF, Tab 14.      The
administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal as
withdrawn. IAF, Tab 15.
      After receiving two extensions of time, on July 9, 2018, the appellant filed
a petition for review, asking the Board to remand his appeal for an adjudication of
the merits on the basis that the agency had not yet selected him for overseas
deployment. PFR File, Tab 6. He alleges that 24 other employees attended the
same IAP Briefing, and that of the 22 whom he was able to reach, all of them had
received offers of foreign deployment.         Id. at 15.    The agency has filed a
response, arguing that it satisfied its part of the agreement by sending the
appellant to the IAP Briefing, and that no more was required of it.          The agency

2
  The agreement itself was off the record. It is not clear whether the parties reduced it
to writing.
                                                                                  3

asserts that the appellant knew at the time that he withdrew the appeal that a
foreign deployment was not guaranteed. PFR File, Tab 8 at 6-7.

                                   ANALYSIS
      The agency argues that, under Lincoln v. U.S. Postal Service, 113 M.S.P.R.
486 (2010), the Board should treat the appellant’s petition for review as a request
to reopen. PFR File, Tab 8 at 5. We find that the agency’s argument is based on
an incomplete reading of Lincoln. Specifically, the Board in that case considered
the appellant’s petition for review as a request to reopen her withdrawn appeal
under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.118 only after determining that the petition did not meet
the review criteria of 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115. Lincoln, 113 M.S.P.R. 486, ¶¶ 1, 7-9.
Because we are granting the timely petition for review in this appeal, we do not
reach the issue of whether the Board should exercise its discretion to reopen
under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.118.
      Ordinarily, an appellant’s withdrawal of an appeal is an act of finality, and
in the absence of unusual circumstances such as misinformation or new and
material evidence, the Board will not reinstate an appeal once it has been
withdrawn merely because the appellant wishes to proceed before the Board or to
cure an untimely petition for review. Small v. Department of Homeland Security,
112 M.S.P.R. 191, ¶ 4 (2009); Rose v. U.S. Postal Service, 106 M.S.P.R. 611, ¶ 7
(2007). However, a relinquishment of one’s right to appeal to the Board must be
by clear, unequivocal, and decisive action. Rose, 106 M.S.P.R. 611, ¶ 7. Further,
the Board may relieve an appellant of the consequences of his decision to
withdraw an appeal when the decision was based on misleading or incorrect
information provided by the Board or the agency. Id.
      As explained above, it appears to be undisputed that agency induced the
appellant to withdraw his appeal with the promise of allowing him to attend the
IAP Briefing. Supra, ¶ 2. Although the agency asserts that that did not guarantee
the appellant a foreign deployment, the appellant asserts that the agency misled
                                                                                    4

him as it never intended to consider him for foreign deployment. PFR File, Tab 9
at 3.     Based on the current record, it appears to us that the only reason that
someone would attend an IAP Briefing is to become qualified for a foreign
deployment, and the agency knew full well that the prospect of a foreign
deployment was the only reason that the appellant agreed to withdraw his appeal.
PFR File, Tab 8 at 9, 16. Thus, it would appear that the agency led the appellant
to believe that it was offering him, if not a guarantee, at least a genuine chance at
a foreign deployment.        However, if what the appellant alleges on petition for
review is true, 3 this strongly suggests that the agency has not given the appellant
a genuine chance at foreign deployment and that it knew all along that allowing
him to attend the IAP Briefing was an empty gesture with no real value.
PFR File, Tab 6 at 15.
         It is possible that, by mere chance, the appellant was the only 1 of the 25
IAP Briefing attendees (with the possible exception of the 2 whom the appellant
could not reach) who did not receive an offer of foreign deployment within
3 months. However, as purely a statistical matter, this is highly unlikely. These
circumstances are all the more questionable in light of the appellant’s claim that
his second-line supervisor was the IAP Program Manager, and that she was aware
of his whistleblower appeal and the circumstances that led to his attendance at the
IAP Briefing. PFR File, Tab 6 at 5, Tab 9 at 3-4. Based on the specific facts
alleged by the appellant, which are supported in part by the record and are not in
any way contradicted by it, we find that there is a substantial factual question as
to whether the appellant withdrew his appeal because the agency misled him into
believing that he would have a fair chance at a foreign deployment. See James v.
U.S. Postal Service, 25 M.S.P.R. 647, 649 (1985). This issue is best addressed by
the administrative judge in the first instance. See id.
         For the reasons set forth above, we grant the petition for review and
remand this appeal for the administrative judge to determine whether the
3
    The agency has not denied the appellant’s allegations.
                                                                                  5

appellant’s withdrawal was based on misleading information about the possibility
that he could obtain a foreign deployment. To resolve this issue, it will likely be
important for the administrative judge to know whether the appellant still has not
been offered a foreign deployment, whether the appellant’s allegation that all or
nearly all of the other IAP Briefing attendees were offered foreign deployment is
true, how selections for foreign deployments are made, and whether the IAP
Program Manager has any role in the selection process.       If the administrative
judge finds that the appellant’s withdrawal was based on misleading information,
she shall adjudicate the appeal on the merits.

                                     ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Atlanta
Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                         ______________________________
                                       Gina K. Grippando
                                       Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.