Court Opinion

ID: 9895759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 17:06:39.900225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:02.585445
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-0199
                            Filed November 8, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ABEL GOMEZ MEDINA,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott J. Beattie, Judge.

      The defendant appeals his convictions for second-degree sexual abuse,

third-degree sexual abuse, and indecent contact with a child. AFFIRMED.

      Benjamin D. Bergmann and Alexander Smith of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn

Gentry Brown Bergmann & Messamer L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
                                          2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

       Abel Gomez Medina appeals his convictions for second-degree sexual

abuse, third-degree sexual abuse, and indecent contact with a child. On appeal,

he argues that the district court improperly allowed testimony by the complaining

witness, K.D., via closed-circuit television, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct

by calling an exculpatory witness a liar during closing argument, and the district

court improperly excluded two 911 call logs that related to the victim’s credibility.

We find the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing K.D. to testify via

closed-circuit television under Iowa Code section 915.38(1)(a) (2021) when she

was seventeen and section 915.38(1)(c) when she was eighteen because

testifying in open court would impair K.D.’s ability to communicate and it was

necessary to protect her from further severe trauma. Likewise, under our de novo

review, we determine the State’s comments during closing argument were not

prosecutorial error and the district court did not abuse its discretion when

determining the 911 calls offered by Gomez Medina were irrelevant and

inadmissible. We affirm the convictions.

I. Backgrounds Facts and Prior Proceedings.

       K.D. lived in a small home with her stepfather, Gomez Medina; her mother;

and three siblings. For several years Gomez Medina’s father lived there as well.

K.D. shared a bedroom with her younger sister, A.S. K.D.’s two brothers also

shared a room, and Gomez Medina and K.D.’s mom shared the last bedroom. As

developed during the trial, starting in March 2015, when K.D. was eleven years

old, Gomez Medina began to touch K.D.’s breasts and vagina.                   As time

progressed—when K.D. was fifteen—Gomez Medina would react jealously when
                                          3

K.D. had contact with boys. By this time, Gomez Medina subjected K.D. to various

sex acts up to five times a week; including oral, vaginal, and anal sex. To keep

her from getting pregnant, Gomez Medina often required K.D. to take Plan B1 after

intercourse. K.D. disclosed Gomez Medina’s actions to one of her friends but did

not report it to her therapist or anyone else.

       In April 2019, Gomez Medina took away K.D.’s cell phone because she was

exchanging text messages with a boy and sending sexually-explicit images.

Feeling like she “was being controlled,” when K.D. got to school she decided to

disclose to her school guidance counselor that Gomez Medina had been having

sex with her for four years. That disclosure led to the involvement by the Iowa

Department of Human Services (DHS), followed by an extensive investigation. As

part of that investigation, K.D. participated in an interview with the Blank Children’s

Hospital STAR Center two days later and described specific details of the sexual

abuse by Gomez Medina. L.G.M., K.D.’s younger brother, was also interviewed

at the STAR Center in April 2019, during which he repeated disclosures he had

made to a mandatory reporter at his school. L.G.M. was ten years old at the time.

L.G.M. told the interviewer that Gomez Medina had been doing “inappropriate

stuff,” which involved “sex” between his father and K.D. and described one time

when L.G.M. saw K.D. on top of Gomez Medina while both were naked. L.G.M.

said that he was under the bed while this occurred and he saw Gomez Medina and

K.D. “doing it.” L.G.M. also said that he had told his mother what he had seen and

that K.D. had gotten in trouble for it. After the investigation was completed, Gomez

1 The Plan B pill, also referred to as a “morning-after pill,” is a contraceptive pill

taken after unprotected sex to prevent pregnancy.
                                          4

Medina was charged with one count of second-degree sexual abuse, in violation

of Iowa Code section 709.3(1)(b) (2015), a class “B” felony; four counts of third-

degree sexual abuse, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4(1)(a), 709.4(1)(b)(2),

and 709.4(1)(b)(3), a class “C” felony; and one count of indecent contact with a

child, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.12, an aggravated misdemeanor.2

       After charges were brought against Gomez Medina, K.D. was adjudicated

a child in need of assistance (CINA) in December 2019 and removed from the

family home. K.D.’s living situation was unstable; at various times she lived with

foster families, respite providers, and in a group home. At the time of trial, she had

moved into independent housing arranged by DHS. K.D. struggled with post-

traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), persistent depressive disorder, and generalized

anxiety disorder, and she was hospitalized twice for self-harm. Her therapist

reported that K.D. had significant difficulty with emotional regulation and angry

outbursts.

       In August 2021, the district court held a hearing on the State’s motion for

K.D. to testify via closed-circuit television at trial—K.D. was seventeen at the time.

Gomez Medina resisted the motion, arguing his right to confront the witness

required that K.D. testify in person. At the hearing, both K.D.’s guardian ad litem

(GAL) and her therapist testified. The GAL said she believed that requiring K.D.

to testify in front of Gomez Medina would traumatize K.D., in particular because of

her PTSD and that K.D. had been worried about making sure she did not run into

2 Although the acts occurred between 2015 and 2019, because there was no

change to the code during this time and for ease of reading, we are using the 2015
Iowa Code here.
                                           5

Gomez Medina outside of court either. When the therapist was called to testify,

she noted that given the trauma to K.D., she might experience a “fight or flight or

freeze” response impacting her ability to testify truthfully or verbalize issues in

Gomez Medina’s presence. The therapist stated that she believed the use of

closed-circuit television testimony would be necessary at trial to protect K.D. and

that seeing Gomez Medina would exacerbate K.D.’s PTSD, depression, and

anxiety. Finally, the therapist testified she believed that requiring K.D. to testify in

the same room as Gomez Medina would re-traumatize K.D., perhaps even

resulting in self-harm behaviors.

       The district court granted the motion for K.D. to testify via closed-circuit

television, finding that “pursuant to Iowa Code 915.38(1), the trauma caused by

[K.D.] testifying in the physical presence of [Gomez Medina] would impair her

ability to communicate, and the use of a closed-circuit equipment is necessary to

protect her from further trauma.”

       The case came to trial in October 2021.3 Prior to trial, the State moved in

limine to exclude two 911 call logs of requests for help made by K.D.’s mother as

well as any reference to the 911 call logs and the mental health of K.D. if not

testified to by K.D. first. The two 911 call logs were from May 2019 and June 2019,

seven weeks and nine weeks after K.D.’s report of the alleged assault. The first

3 Although depositions were conducted in December 2019, due to COVID-19 the

trial was not first set to take place until August 30, 2021. Gomez Medina moved
to continue trial from August 30, 2021, to September 20, 2021, and the district
court granted the motion. Next, the State moved for a continuance from
September 20, 2021, to October 4, 2021, and the district court granted the motion.
After voir dire on October 4, a juror reported that she had tested positive for
COVID-19, and the district court ordered a mistrial. Trial finally commenced on
October 25, 2021.
                                          6

call log contains the following notes: “Meet with [K.D.’s mother] . . . [K.D.] hit the

caller a couple of times . . . refused rescue.” The second call log contains these

notes: “Caller’s 15 y/o daughter has been banging her head on the wall and

actually knocked a hole in the wall for the last couple of hours . . . . [S]he did yell

at her mom when mom called 911.” The first came after K.D.’s mother asked K.D.

to clean the house and the second after K.D.’s mother asked her to clean her room.

The district court reserved ruling on those issues until the second day of trial. At

that time, the State argued that the 911 call logs were irrelevant, and the district

court agreed. Stating “[K.D.] already made the allegations, so to say that they’re

relevant as to why she made the allegations, I mean, is a little bit difficult because

they are after the fact. . . .    I think it’s not relevant under [Iowa Rule of

Evidence 5.403],” the district court sustained the motion and excluded the

evidence of the calls.

       During the presentation of the State’s case, L.G.M. and K.D. testified—

L.G.M. in person and K.D. by closed-circuit television. After L.G.M. repeatedly

answered that he could not remember ever discussing seeing anything

inappropriate at his house and did not remember participating in a STAR Center

interview or a deposition, the district court ruled that L.G.M. was unavailable and

allowed admission by the State of a recording of L.G.M.’s STAR Center interview.

Then, K.D. testified over two days of trial. The first day she was seventeen years

old. The second day was her eighteenth birthday. During her testimony, K.D.

described multiple specific instances of vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse between

herself and Gomez Medina. She described the location of the intercourse, what

she was wearing, and what happened afterwards. To avoid pregnancy, K.D.
                                               7

testified that Gomez Medina would watch her take the Plan B pill afterwards, and

that she developed a rash from taking it; she estimated that she took the pill every

two weeks or so.

       At the start of K.D.’s second day of testimony, Gomez Medina asserted

K.D., now eighteen and an adult, should now have to testify live. The district court

reviewed its previous ruling and questioned K.D.; it concluded that because K.D.

had been diagnosed with PTSD, anxiety, and depression, which led to two

inpatient hospitalizations, she could continue to testify via closed-circuit television.

In making its ruling, the district court stated, “[A]gain, as the court previously held

with her minor age, this is more than just discomfort that would come about

because of her presence with [Gomez Medina]. She, because of her previously

diagnosed condition would suffer, obviously, significant stress, and it would make

it difficult for her to communicate . . . .”

       During Gomez Medina’s presentation of evidence, he offered L.G.M.’s

deposition, in which the child said that he did not remember what happened

between K.D. and Gomez Medina, denied that anything happened, and did not

want to talk about it. Also in L.G.M.’s deposition, L.G.M. was questioned about the

veracity of K.D.’s claims:

               Q. Who told you that [K.D.] was lying? A. My mom told me that she
       was lying. And I kind of think about that, about it. And I think it was true.
               Q. Okay. Why do—did your mom say what the lies were? A. No.
               Q. Do you know what it was [K.D.] said about your dad? A. No,
       ‘cause I wasn’t there at the hospital when she went there.
               Q. Yeah. But you went to the hospital, too; right? A. Yeah. But she
       didn’t tell me what—
               Q. Yeah. So has your mom told you what the—what [K.D.] said?
       A. [L.G.M. indicated.]
               Q. She just said it’s lies? A. [L.G.M. indicated.]
                                            8

L.G.M. was also asked, “Did your mom say [K.D.]’s lying about inappropriate

things?” and L.G.M. answered yes.

          At the close of evidence, Gomez Medina moved for a judgment of acquittal,

which the district court overruled. During closing argument, the State offered an

explanation about L.G.M.’s inability to remember his STAR Center interview or

deposition, reminding the jury “[r]emember he specifically said ‘Mom said [K.D.]

lied.’ He had been told in those months over and over ‘don’t believe your sister.’”

After Gomez Medina objected and the district court overruled the objection, the

State continued, stating that L.G.M. “had been told by his mom that [K.D.] was

lying.”

          The jury returned verdicts of guilty as charged. The district court sentenced

Gomez Medina to the maximum sentence, a term of sixty-seven years: twenty-five

years on the conviction for second-degree sexual abuse, ten years for each

conviction for third-degree sexual abuse, and two years on the conviction for

indecent contact with a child all of which the court ordered Gomez Medina to serve

consecutively. Gomez Medina now appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

          Because Gomez Medina raises constitutional issues through his assertion

of a Confrontation Clause violation, our review is de novo, which means we

independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Rogerson,

855 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Iowa 2014). Under that standard, we examine all the

evidence anew without deference to the district court’s findings. State v. Williams,

972 N.W.2d 720, 723–24 (Iowa 2022). The burden is on the State to show

compliance with the Confrontation Clause. State v. Liggins, 978 N.W.2d 406, 419
                                         9

(Iowa 2022). A claim under the Confrontation Clause does not require reversal if

the defendant suffered no harm from the error.              State v. Brown, 656

N.W.2d 355, 361 (Iowa 2003). If there was a violation, the burden is on the State

to establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing

State v. Kite, 513 N.W.2d 720, 721 (Iowa 1994)).

       We review both claims of prosecutorial error and non-hearsay evidentiary

issues for abuse of discretion.      State v. Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d 518, 523

(Iowa 2011) (stating the standard of review for prosecutorial error claims); State v.

Buelow, 951 N.W. 879, 884 (Iowa 2020) (stating the standard of review for

evidentiary issues). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises

its discretion ‘on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly

unreasonable.’” State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001) (citation

omitted). “A ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial

evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law.” Id. (citation

omitted).

III. Analysis.

       Gomez Medina makes three arguments on appeal, asserting that the district

court improperly (1) allowed K.D.’s closed-circuit testimony because, while K.D.

was seventeen, the State failed to demonstrate that testifying in front of Gomez

Medina would cause sufficient trauma to K.D. and, thus, Iowa Code

section 915.38(1)(a) did not apply; likewise, after K.D. turned eighteen, the State

did not demonstrate sufficient necessity for section 915.1(c) to apply; (2) allowed

the State to comment during closing argument that K.D.’s mother told L.G.M. that

K.D. was lying, which amounts to prosecutorial error; and (3) excluded 911 call
                                           10

logs based on 911 calls made by K.D.’s mother, in which the mother was reported

as describing K.D. hitting her and hitting her own head against the wall, which

should have passed the rule 5.403 balancing test for relevance.

       A. Closed-circuit Testimony.

       K.D. testified via one-way closed-circuit television over Gomez Medina’s

objections. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that

“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.” See also Iowa Const. art. I, § 10.4 Iowa Code

section 915.38(1)(a) allows a minor to testify via closed-circuit television when

testifying in the presence of the defendant would cause trauma and would impair

the minor’s ability to communicate. Section 915.38(1)(c) allows the same for

minors or adults who have a mental illness, an intellectual disability, or other

developmental disability, as long as the court makes a finding of necessity.

Because K.D. was allowed to testify both as a minor under section 915.38(1)(a) on

her first day of testimony and as an adult with mental illness under section

915.38(1)(c) on her second day of testimony, we evaluate the admission of that

testimony under the tests for each corresponding section.

       Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), established a three-part test to

determine when alternate procedures are necessary to protect a child witness from

4 Gomez Medina does not argue that the analysis under the Iowa Constitution

would be different than under the Federal Constitution. “Where a party raises
issues under the Iowa Constitution and the Federal Constitution, but does not
suggest a different standard be applied under the Iowa Constitution, we generally
apply the federal standard.” State v. Edouard, 854 N.W.2d 421, 452 (Iowa 2014)
(Appel, J., concurring specially), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott
Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 (Iowa 2016).
                                          11

trauma when testifying in person in front of a defendant, which Iowa courts have

regularly applied:

       (1) The trial court must hear evidence and determine whether use of
       the closed-circuit television procedure is “necessary to protect the
       welfare of the particular child witness,” (2) the trial court must find
       that “the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom
       generally, but by the presence of the defendant,” and (3) “the trial
       court must find that the emotional distress suffered by the child
       witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis,
       i.e., more than ‘mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance
       to testify.’”

State v. Cuevas, No. 08-1344, 2009 WL 3337606, at *9 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App.

Oct. 7, 2009) (quoting Craig, 497 U.S. at 855–56). The critical inquiry is whether

the use of the procedure is necessary to further the important state interest of

protecting the child witness from additional trauma. Craig, 497 U.S. at 852; see

also State v. White, No. 22-0522, 2023 WL 5607148, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App.

Aug. 30, 2023) (holding that testimony by children’s therapist that they would suffer

trauma if forced to testify in open court justified allowing them to testify by closed-

circuit television).

       K.D.’s testimony via closed-circuit television meets these requirements for

her testimony while she was still seventeen years old. The district court heard

evidence at a pretrial hearing from the GAL and K.D.’s therapist and made several

findings. First, the district court determined that allowing K.D. to testify out of

Gomez Medina’s presence prevented her from suffering re-traumatization.

Second, this re-traumatization would stem not from testifying in general but from

testifying in front of Gomez Medina specifically. The court observed that K.D. had

not seen Gomez Medina since making the allegations, and K.D.’s therapist testified

that K.D. worried not only about testifying in front of him but of seeing him at his
                                          12

place of work or in the community in general. Third, the district court heard and

considered evidence that testifying in the courtroom would not just make K.D.

nervous or over-excited but would severely inflame her PTSD, depression, and

anxiety. Lastly, the district court heard and considered evidence that the trauma

caused by testifying in Gomez Medina’s presence would impair K.D.’s ability to

communicate. These findings were sufficient for the district court to properly allow

K.D. to testify via closed-circuit television while still a minor, and we find the same

on our de novo review.

       Regarding adult witnesses, Gomez Medina argues that because the United

States Supreme Court has not returned to the issue of closed-circuit testimony

since Craig, and Craig only applied to child witnesses, there should be no

possibility for closed-circuit testimony for adults. And Gomez Medina maintains

that it would be against public policy and “open the floodgates” to restrict “face-to-

face confrontation” simply because someone is diagnosed with a mental illness.

See Iowa Code § 915.38(1)(c). But, Gomez Medina overlooks our own state

precedent on remote testimony by adult witnesses, and our rule that: “before

permitting a witness to testify via two-way videoconference, the court must make

a case-specific determination that the denial of the defendant’s confrontation right

is necessary to further an important public interest. If the court finds such an

interest, it must assure the reliability of the remote testimony.” Rogerson, 855

N.W.2d at 505 (citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 851); see id. at 508 (Hecht, J., concurring

specially) (referring to the two prongs as the “necessity question” and the “reliability

question”); see also Iowa Code § 915.38(1)(c).
                                           13

         Applying the test in the case of an adult witness, the district court found

K.D.’s testimony via closed-circuit television on her eighteenth birthday also met

the requirements of necessity and reliability required. First, just like on the first day

of testimony, the use of closed-circuit television was reliable. The parties did not

make any objections to their ability to understand K.D. or to her testimony taking

place via the same procedures as in the courtroom but from a separate courtroom

from Gomez Medina. Second, K.D. had been diagnosed with PTSD, depression,

and anxiety; and, after a factual review, the district court determined that testifying

in open court while suffering from those mental illnesses specifically would cause

K.D. significant harm and affect her ability to testify. Thus, the district court ruled

it was necessary to allow K.D. to finish her testimony via closed-circuit television

on the morning of her eighteenth birthday. So, after our de novo review, we agree

with the district court’s findings and conclude the court correctly applied

section 915.38 and its requirements, and as such, there was no violation of Gomez

Medina’s constitutional right to confrontation.

         B. Prosecutorial Error.

         During closing argument, the State offered an explanation for L.G.M.’s

change in story in the months between the Star Center interview where he

described “inappropriate” behavior and his deposition where his memory was less

clear.    Gomez Medina objected to “improper argument” after the prosecutor

attributed to L.G.M. the statement, “Mom said [K.D.] lied” and surmised that L.G.M.

had been repeatedly told “don’t believe your sister.” Gomez Medina now asserts

that is in effect calling an exculpatory witness a “liar.” The Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
                                         14

section 9 of the Iowa Constitution provide protection from prosecutorial error.5 See

DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa 2002) (stating prosecutorial misconduct

that denies the defendant a fair trial is a violation of due process). To establish a

violation of the right to a fair trial by prosecutorial error, the defendant must

establish error on the part of the prosecutor and that the error resulted in prejudice

to such an extent that the defendant was denied a fair trial. State v. Plain, 898

N.W.2d 801, 818 (Iowa 2017).

       To determine whether the actions of the prosecutor rise to the level of

ordering a new trial, we look at “(1) [t]he severity and pervasiveness of the

misconduct; (2) the significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the case;

(3) the strength of the State’s evidence; (4) the use of cautionary instructions or

other curative measures; (5) the extent to which the defense invited the

misconduct.”    State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 140 (Iowa 2018) (citation

omitted). We consider the fairness to Gomez Medina in the context of the entire

trial. See State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 880 (Iowa 2003).

       Regarding the specific statements that Gomez Medina challenges, isolated

statements during closing argument are given additional latitude as, “[i]n closing

arguments, counsel . . . may draw conclusions and argue permissible inferences

which reasonably flow from the evidence presented.” State v. Thornton, 498

N.W.2d 670, 676 (Iowa 1993). We do not find the State’s comments made in the

closing amount to prosecutorial error. First, Gomez Medina placed into evidence

5 Gomez Medina specifies his argument is centered on prosecutorial error, not

prosecutorial misconduct. See State v. Schlitter, 881 N.W.2d 380, 393 (Iowa 2016)
(noting some prosecutorial conduct might be characterized as intentional, but other
prosecutorial conduct can result from an error or a mistake).
                                          15

L.G.M.’s statements from his deposition that his mother told him K.D. was lying.

The State could fairly comment on those statements to explain the change in the

child’s memory. Next, the statements of K.D.’s veracity were not the personal

opinions of the State but were from the mouth of the child. And as the prosecutor

argued:

       Your common sense and your experience. We heard about
       suggestibility from [the forensic interviewer]. We heard the difference
       but even still—even though he’d been told by his mom that [K.D.]
       was lying, ladies and gentlemen, he kept saying “I think the lies are
       true” or something. However you remember that exact wording, rely
       on your own memory, but he said “I think the lies are true.” What his
       mom was trying to tell him was a lie. He was seemingly at war with
       himself because he knows what his own eyes saw, and we heard he
       wants to be with his dad.

On this record, we find this to be a fair argument used merely to explain L.G.M.’s

reluctance to testify and eventual lack of memory about what was earlier reported.

Thus, this short reference to L.G.M.’s testimony is not improper commentary on

the credibility of an exculpatory witness, as Gomez Medina argues. Instead, it is

more a comment on testimony Gomez Medina introduced. Therefore, we find no

abuse of the district court’s discretion here.

       C. Exclusion of 911 Call Logs.

       After Gomez Medina made an offer of proof with K.D.’s mother explaining

the background of the 911 calls she made, the district court denied their admission

or any discussion about them in the presentation of evidence. The offer of proof

focused on K.D.’s assaultive behavior towards herself and against her mother, but

the mother confirmed that the acts were unrelated to the sexual abuse case

against Gomez Medina. To that point, the district court ruled the 911 calls “don’t

involve, specifically, the allegations made or any actions in relationship to the
                                          16

allegations made, as the witness has previously noted here this morning. It dealt

with other issues, cleaning a room, that were unrelated to the allegations.” And

the district court found the information constituted “improper character

impeachment.”      Arguing the actions surrounding the calls show the family

dynamics, Gomez Medina disputes these findings and asserts the district court

abused its discretion.

       Evidence of other acts by an alleged victim remains “subject to the

strictures” of Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403. See Thomas A. Mauet & Warren D.

Wolfson, Trial Evidence § 12.4 (7th ed. 2020) (discussing Federal Rule of

Evidence 403).     Rule 5.403 authorizes the district court to “exclude relevant

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair

prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”           Unfairly prejudicial evidence

“appeals to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct

to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action [that] may cause a jury to

base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the

case.” State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 1988) (citation omitted). This

balancing of probative value against competing dangers is a classic “judgment call

on the part of the trial court.” Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d at 240. Even more so,

“[a]nalyzing and weighing the pertinent costs and benefits [of admitting other acts

evidence] is no trivial task. . . . Accordingly, much leeway is given trial judges who

must fairly weigh probative value against probable dangers.” Id. (second alteration

in original) (quoting 1 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 647–48

(5th ed. 1999)).
                                         17

       Here, the district court properly exercised its broad discretion to exclude

admission of the two 911 call logs made following calls by K.D.’s mother weeks

after the report of sexual abuse by K.D. Despite the claims of Gomez Medina, if

the 911 call logs had any relevance, it was to improperly inform the jury about the

mental state of K.D. in the time after she revealed the alleged sexual abuse to her

school guidance counselor. Rather than helping the jury make a determination of

guilt, disclosure of the content of the 911 calls may have turned the trial into an

evaluation of the interactions of K.D. and her mother rather than K.D. and Gomez

Medina. Furthermore, as the district court noted, the underlying causes of K.D.’s

mom calling 911 are unrelated to the alleged sexual abuse. Instead, as the mother

characterized the calls, they arose from a dispute over K.D.’s mom requesting that

K.D. clean the house or her room and involved K.D. hitting her mom and hitting

her own head against the wall. Thus, their admission would not have assisted the

jury as they did not make a consequential, disputed fact more or less probable.

Given their limited probative value but their high likelihood of causing the jury to

make a decision on an improper basis, the district court did not abuse its discretion

in not admitting them.

IV. Conclusion.

       In this case, the complaining witness was properly allowed to testify via

closed-circuit television under Iowa Code section 915.38(1)(a) when she was

seventeen and section 915.38(1)(c) when she was eighteen because there was

sufficient evidence that testifying in open court would impair her ability to

communicate and was necessary.         In addition, the comments during closing

argument that K.D.’s mother told L.G.M. that K.D. was lying were not prosecutorial
                                          18

error, were introduced into evidence by Gomez Medina, and do not merit a new

trial. Lastly, the two 911 call logs were not relevant for any issues at trial and were

properly excluded. For these reasons, we affirm Gomez Medina’s convictions.

       AFFIRMED.