Court Opinion

ID: 9733038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:50:55.873319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:01.843005
License: Public Domain

Neff, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the trial court to suppress the evidence.
After the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, the trial court stated in pertinent part:
All right. Well, I think the problem is, I think even though it’s not technically a Shabazz [sic] issue [People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42; 378 NW2d 451 (1985)], I think that everything that took place —he was told that he was going to be — that his property was going to be searched whether he wanted it to be searched or not, so then he denied that those were his two pieces. But there was no question in anybody’s mind those were the same kinds of pieces that he — the same ticket numbers that he had.
Did the actions of the police cause this alleged abandonment, and even if not that, were they in fact going to search it? I think it was clear they were going to search it based upon the initial stop *520they had, even though their first interrogation with him really took away from their so-called profile when they found that one of the things that they would highly rely on in the school they go to down in Ohio is that he’s travelling light with only carry-on luggage, and they find out he’s got two more pieces of luggage.
I think that under the cases cited in both counsels’ brief, actually, that the subsequent intrusion, the subsequent search has to be all related to the first actions taken by the police in this case. I think that if there was any abandonment, it was done as a result of the police telling them [sic] that they were detaining his luggage, period. And at the time they said they were seizing his luggage, they had no probable cause to do so.
There was nothing in there even to indicate a Terry-type intrusion [Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968)] for a pat-down or for any kind of a thing for their own safety or anything else, or anything to give rise to any reasonable suspicion that any crime had been committed at that stage. There was nothing here other than the suspicions of the police officer which turned out in fact to be true, because there were in fact some drugs.
I don’t know what he expected. He found some marijuana. But the fact that the — the subsequent fact does not justify the initial intrusion.
I think that it was all done illegally and unconstitutionally, and I’m going to suppress the evidence.
A trial court’s decision to suppress evidence will be reversed by this Court only if that decision is clearly erroneous. People v Good, 186 Mich App 180, 185; 463 NW2d 213 (1990). A decision is clearly erroneous when this Court is firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Id. The trial court in this case did not clearly err in suppressing the evidence.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by both the United States *521and Michigan Constitutions. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. When there is a compelling reason to do so, Const 1963, art 1, § 11 may be construed in a manner that results in greater rights than those given by the federal constitution. People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 28; 475 NW2d 684 (1991). However, the final sentence of this section of the Michigan Constitution precludes a higher standard of reasonableness for searches that uncover narcotics or firearms than the standard imposed by federal law. People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 214; 341 NW2d 439 (1983); People v Moore, 391 Mich 426, 435; 216 NW2d 770 (1974). Under the facts here, the Michigan constitutional standard is no higher than the federal standard. Therefore, federal cases are applicable.
The majority correctly cites United States v Place, 462 US 696; 103 S Ct 2637; 77 L Ed 2d 110 (1983), for the proposition that a reasonable belief by an officer that a traveler’s luggage contains narcotics may support a brief detention of the luggage for investigative purposes. However, I depart from the majority’s analysis of the effect of the principle announced in Place on the facts of this case and in particular on the determination whether Officer Taleb’s suspicion was reasonable.
In my view, none of the facts articulated by Officer Taleb that led him to inform defendant that he would detain his bags individually, and no combination of them collectively, provided the officer with the requisite reasonable and articulable suspicion sufficient to outweigh defendant’s Fourth Amendment interests.
At the preliminary examination, Taleb stated that he became suspicious of defendant because defendant had been on a plane coming from a "source” city, he looked over his shoulder, and the bag he was carrying appeared to be lightweight, which would indicate to Taleb that the person *522carrying it would not be staying in the area long.1 Taleb also became more suspicious when defendant’s name was different than the name on his airline ticket and when he determined that the ticket had been paid for in cash. These facts are all neutral at best, and at that point defendant had fully cooperated with Taleb to the extent of allowing Taleb to search his person and personal, carry-on luggage, which disclosed nothing suspicious. On these facts, I cannot find that Taleb had a "reasonable, articulable suspicion, premised on objective facts, that the luggage contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” Place, supra, p 702. (Emphasis added.) The trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence was proper. I would affirm.

 This latter fact, in particular, defies reason. Most people intending to stay any length of time at their destination would check their luggage and carry as little as possible in their hands. The fact that defendant had only a lightweight carry-on bag and checked luggage would seem to negate Taleb’s suspicion that defendant was not planning to stay long.