Court Opinion

ID: 9539000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:45:15.159317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:22.742122
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s analysis and resolution of the procedural issues in this ease. The district court, in my opinion, erred in ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress prior to the preliminary hearing. The majority opinion properly addresses and reviews the scope of admissible evidence at the preliminary hearing. I differ with the majority, however, on the admissibility of the defendant’s spontaneous and unsolicited statements to Officer Anderson and dissent to the exclusion of that evidence and evidence derived from that statement.
The record shows that the defendant approached Officer Anderson and volunteered that “he had killed someone,” and wanted to tell the police about it. The defendant’s initial statement, which he volunteered pri- or to the Miranda warning, was completely spontaneous and was not elicited by police questioning of any kind. In my opinion, that statement, together with the evidence derived from the independent police investigation, is admissible at the defendant’s trial. Nix v. Williams, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).
It is axiomatic that a confession is admissible in evidence only if it is voluntarily given. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). To satisfy the test of voluntariness, a confession “must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor be obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); People v. Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230, 235 (Colo.1982); People v. Parada, 188 Colo. 230, 234, 533 P.2d 1121, 1123 (1975). In my view, a statement can be suppressed as involuntary only if it has been extracted by police questioning or obtained through improper external force. See B. George, Constitutional Limitations on Evidence in Criminal Cases 259-61 (1973). Statements which a defendant volunteers independent of police questioning or external force should not be subject to suppression under the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Pa. 253, 328 A.2d 507 (1974); Nevels v. State, 216 So.2d 529 *731(Miss.1968); People v. Savage, 102 Ill.App.2d 477, 242 N.E.2d 446 (1968); Crummel v. State, 46 Wis.2d 348, 174 N.W.2d 517 (1970) (the spontaneity of the declarations by defendant corroborates the volun-tariness of the statements).
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), supports my conclusion that the initial statement should be admitted into evidence. In In-nis, the defendant was in custody and reacted to a conversation between his two police custodians by volunteering information about the crime under investigation. The defendant’s statement to the police was found to be proper because it was not obtained by police interrogation. Here, the defendant was not in custody and spontaneously told Officer Anderson about the crime. The defendant was not questioned until after Miranda warnings were given.
The defendant’s motivation for confessing in this case was not tied to police questioning or external pressures of any kind. Compare Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Hunter v. People, 655 P.2d 374 (Colo.1982).1 The defendant’s statement demonstrated his desire to acknowledge his past crime so that he could purge himself of guilt. The “internal voices” that compelled his confession were part and parcel of his own psychological makeup. The defendant initiated the contact with Officer Anderson and his conduct and statement should be admissible at trial on the issue of his mental condition as well as his guilt.2 While the defendant’s mental condition may be introduced at trial to attack the credibility of his confession or to establish nonresponsibility for the crime committed, the defendant’s mental illness should not preclude a finding that his statement was voluntary for purposes of the fifth amendment. See State v. Boan, 235 Kan. 800, 686 P.2d 160 (1984); State v. Wright, 219 Kan. 808, 549 P.2d 958 (1976); State v. Ratow, 4 Wash.App. 321, 481 P.2d 20, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 944, 92 s. Ct. 296, 30 L.Ed.2d 259 (1971).
The majority opinion essentially requires police officers to close their eyes and ears when openly approached with evidence that a crime has been committed. I perceive no *732constitutional basis that would compel such a result. In my view, the defendant’s initial statement to the police is admissible evidence.
I am authorized to say that ROVIRA, J., joins in this concurrence and dissent.

. The majority cites Blackburn as holding that “[o]ne’s capacity for rational judgment and free choice may be overborne as much by certain forms of severe mental illness as by external pressure.” At 728. In my opinion, Blackburn does not stand for the proposition for which it is cited. In Blackburn, the police subjected the defendant, who had a long history of mental illness, to eight hours of sustained interrogation in a small office which was at times filled with police officers. Based on these facts, the Court concluded that Blackburn’s confession had not been voluntarily obtained. The defendant’s mental illness was but one factor relied on by the Court in reaching its decision. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, Blackburn does not hold that mental illness alone can render a statement involuntary for purposes of the fifth amendment.
. The majority’s reliance on Hunter v. People is equally misplaced. In Hunter, we suppressed a statement obtained by a security officer who had the defendant’s drivers license and refused to release the defendant or return the license until the statement was signed. Given these facts, we held that Hunter’s confession had obviously been coerced and could not be used by the prosecution at trial. The facts in this case are quite different. The only pressure was from within the defendant himself, and that is only demonstrated by the testimony of a psychiatrist who has given his opinion on what the defendant's mental condition was the time he made his statements to the police. The opinion of the psychiatrist was based solely on what the defendant told him. Other psychiatrists might well reach a different conclusion. In any event, the issue of competence and weight to be afforded the initial statement should be resolved at the time of trial.

. The procedure to be followed in cases where sanity is an issue is statutorily prescribed. The defense of insanity in a criminal case must be raised by a special plea. § 16-8-103, 8 C.R.S. (1978). In reviewing a defense in a criminal case predicated on lack of mental capacity two issues are paramount. First, whether the accused is competent to stand trial or proceed. See § 16-8-111, 8 C.R.S. (1978); ABA Mental Health Standards, 7-4.1. See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). The second issue is whether the accused by reason of his mental condition at the time of the alleged commission of the offense is responsible for his conduct. § 16-8-105, 8 C.R.S. (1978); ABA Mental Health Standards, 7-6.1.