Court Opinion

ID: 9769732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:00:43.276318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:48.594813
License: Public Domain

AMIDE I, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The purpose of controlling rule Tex. Loc. Govt.Code Ann. § 143.015(a) (Vernon 1988) is to give 10 days notice to the policeman in order that he will have time to prepare an appeal if he so desires. The majority opinion would give Morris only two days to appeal as time would have expired on September 12, 1993, two days after he received the Decision. This would be unfair, unreasonable and absurd. This is not what is intended by the statute. It would violate Morris’ right to due process under the 14th Amendment. *480Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). Statutes giving and regulating the right to appeal should be liberally construed in favor of the right. Government Code § 312.006; Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 134 Tex. 377, 110 S.W.2d 561 (1937); Lawyers Lloyds of Texas v. Webb, 137 Tex. 107, 152 S.W.2d 1096, 1098 (1941); W.C. Turnbow Petroleum Corp. v. Fulton, 145 Tex. 56, 194 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex.1946); Pratley v. Sherwin-Williams Co. of Texas, 36 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Comm’n App.1931, holding approved); Harding v. Raymond-ville, 58 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Tex.Com.App.1933); Consolidated Furniture Co. v. Kelly, 366 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex.1963);. Perry v. Venable, 112 S.W.2d 1069 (Tex.Civ.App.1938, writ dism woj); Walker Ave. Realty Co. v. Alaskan Fur Co., 123 S.W.2d 999, 1001 (Tex.Civ. App.1938); Atkins v. Graves, 367 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Civ.App.1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Bailey, 175 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tex.Civ.App.1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (Right of Appeal should not be defeated by doubtful or technically ingenious construction and should have doubts resolved in its favor); Smelcher v. Ingram, 294 S.W.2d 180, 182 (Tex.Civ.App.1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Within the limitations imposed by law, the reviewing court is obliged to liberally construe the rules and statutes in favor of the right of appeal). The right of judicial review of an administration order is implied where demanded by the constitutional guaranties of due process. English Freight Co. v. Knox, 180 S.W.2d 633, 640 (Tex.Civ.App. 1944, writ ref'd, w.o.m.); Lee v. Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civil Service Com., 526 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fire Dept. of Ft. Worth v. Ft. Worth, 147 Tex. 505, 217 S.W.2d 664 (1949); Board of Ins. Com’rs v. Title Ins. Ass’n, 153 Tex. 574, 272 S.W.2d 95, 97 (1954).
It would make the intent of the legislature more manifest1 to construe the word between Subsections (1) and (2) to be “and” instead of “or”. That is, the final commission decision (1) is sent to the fire fighter or police officer by certified mail; and (2) is personally received by the firefighter or police officer. This would give the policeman 10 full days to file an appeal. I would construe it that way because to not do so could result in an absurdity and the context favors the conversion. This I believe ascertains the true meaning of this statute consistent with the purposes to be accomplished.
There is ample authority for the rule of construction to construe “or” as meaning “and” and again “and” as meaning “or” as the sense may require where strict grammatical construction will frustrate clear legislative intent. Peacock v. Lubbock Compress Co., 252 F.2d 892, 893 (5th Cir.1958); Bruce v. First Federal Savings & Loan Asso. of Conroe, Inc., 837 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.1988); see generally 67 Tex. Jr.3d, Statutes § 101.
I would affirm the trial court.

. Government Code § 312.005.