Court Opinion

ID: 9945171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 15:08:20.589846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:24.303453
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2180-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TIWAN FLAGLER, a/k/a
TUQAUN ASHLEY,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted January 9, 2024 – Decided February 27, 2024

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and Natali.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 13-01-0081.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Craig S. Leeds, Designated Counsel, on the
                   briefs).

                   Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for
                   respondent (Patrick Ryan McAvaddy, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Tiwan Flagler appeals from the December 11, 2020, and the

October 17, 2022, Law Division orders denying his petition for post-conviction

relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

                                    I.

      In 2013, a Hudson County grand jury indicted Flagler and his codefendant,

Darnell Wilson, for first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count one);

second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A.

2C:15-1 (count two); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-5(b) (count three); and second-degree possession of a handgun for an

unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count four). Flagler was also indicted

in two additional counts for second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count five); and second-degree possession of a handgun

for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count six). Following a 2014

joint jury trial, during which count six was dismissed on Flagler's motion for

judgment of acquittal, see R. 3:18-1, both defendants were convicted on all

remaining counts. After appropriate merger, Flagler was sentenced in 2015 to

an aggregate extended term of thirty years, subject to the eighty-five percent

parole ineligibility provisions of the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A.

2C:43-7.2.

                                                                         A-2180-20
                                         2
      In a consolidated unpublished opinion, we affirmed both defendants'

convictions and sentences, State v. Flagler, Nos. A-3357-14 and A-3395-14

(App. Div. May 11, 2018) (slip op. at 5), and the Supreme Court subsequently

denied certification, State v. Flagler, 236 N.J. 46 (2018); State v. Flagler, 236

N.J. 49 (2018).

      In our unpublished opinion, we detailed the facts as follows:

            On August 10, 2012, M.I. was in Jersey City selling
            home theater and stereo systems out of his truck. . . .
            Defendants were two of M.I.'s repeat customers, having
            previously purchased from M.I. on multiple occasions.
            On the evening of August 10, M.I. agreed to meet
            Wilson and Flagler at the Gulf gas station on Route 440
            and Duncan Avenue in Jersey City so that they could
            make a purchase. According to M.I., defendants
            arrived in a green Nissan Altima that was being driven
            by Wilson. Flagler was the front seat passenger.

                  After examining the goods in M.I.'s truck, Wilson
            offered to buy several items, and advised M.I. that a
            friend of his also wished to make a purchase. However,
            because Wilson's friend was supposedly still at work,
            M.I. agreed to follow Wilson to his friend's job. While
            enroute, they communicated by phone so that they
            would not get separated. When they arrived at a school
            parking lot, Wilson switched his story, explaining that
            his friend was now "at his house."             Although
            apprehensive, M.I. continued to follow defendants to a
            residence on Van Nostrand Avenue. Upon arrival, both
            cars parked in the adjacent driveway, but there was no
            sign of Wilson's friend.       Nonetheless, M.I. and
            defendants exited their respective vehicles and
            continued to negotiate prices for the goods.

                                                                           A-2180-20
                                       3
      Flagler then asked M.I. to show him "how to
connect a phone for your [MP3] to the back of the
receiver." M.I. reached through the passenger side
window of his truck to retrieve the MP3 wire to
demonstrate. When he turned around, Flagler was
pointing a gun in his face. Flagler slid the gun down
into M.I.'s mid-section, pinning M.I. against the truck,
and threatened M.I. stating, "[i]f you move . . . I don't
give a f***, I'll blow it." Meanwhile, Wilson removed
three home theater systems from M.I.'s truck and rifled
through M.I.'s pockets, removing his cell phone and
approximately twenty-one dollars in cash. When they
returned to their vehicle to flee, M.I. pleaded with
defendants to return his cell phone. Instead, Flagler
pointed the gun out of the passenger side window
towards M.I., prompting M.I. to duck behind his truck
as defendants drove off.

       After defendants left, M.I. drove to a gas station
to get directions to the closest police station because he
was unfamiliar with the area. M.I. was directed to the
Jersey City police station where he reported the robbery
to Officer Ryan Macaluso.            M.I. also provided
descriptions of defendants, their vehicle, a partial
license plate, and the gun used in the robbery. . . . Once
M.I.'s report was filed, Detective Michael Post was
assigned to investigate the case.

       Five days later, on August 15, 2012, Jersey City
Police Officer Joseph Seals conducted a motor vehicle
stop of a vehicle matching M.I.'s description being
driven by a woman . . . . Based on information obtained
during the stop, Post identified Wilson as a possible
suspect and a six-person photo array, including
Wilson's photograph, was prepared and presented to
M.I. in a photo line-up identification procedure. As a
result, M.I. positively identified Wilson as one of the

                                                             A-2180-20
                            4
            robbers and Post issued a warrant for Wilson's arrest.
            Five days later, on August 20, 2012, Seals observed the
            same vehicle occupied by two males matching M.I.'s
            descriptions traveling north on Bergen Avenue. Seals
            along with three other officers, including Officer Ed
            Redmond, conducted another motor vehicle stop. After
            the stop, Seals approached the Nissan on the driver side
            and identified Wilson as the driver. Upon confirming
            that the arrest warrant issued by Post was active, Seals
            placed Wilson under arrest.

                   Meanwhile, Redmond approached the Nissan
            from the passenger side and noted that both occupants
            were "breathing heavily," were "sweating" and
            "appeared nervous." Redmond observed a bulge on the
            left side of the passenger's waistline. Based on the
            location and the size of the bulge, Redmond suspected
            that it was a weapon and ordered the passenger, who
            was later identified as Flagler, out of the vehicle. After
            Flagler exited the vehicle, Redmond conducted a pat
            down and retrieved a loaded .380 caliber handgun . . .
            from Flagler's waistline. Flagler was then placed under
            arrest. . . . The following day, Post prepared a six-
            person photo array, including Flagler's photograph, and
            arranged for the array to be presented to M.I. in a photo
            line-up identification procedure. As a result, M.I.
            positively identified Flagler as the second robber. At
            trial, M.I. identified both defendants as the robbers and
            the handgun seized from Flagler as the gun used during
            the robbery.

            [Flagler, slip op. at 5-9 (alterations in original)
            (footnotes omitted).]

      In 2019, Flagler filed a timely pro se PCR petition, which was later

supplemented by his certification, his amended PCR petition, and his attorney's

                                                                         A-2180-20
                                        5
brief. PCR counsel also submitted Flagler's medical records to support the

petition. In his submissions, among other things, Flagler asserted his trial

attorney was ineffective by failing to: (1) file a Wade/Henderson 1 motion to

suppress the impermissibly suggestive identification procedure utilized to

identify defendant; (2) request a jury instruction on cross-racial identification

inasmuch as the victim was White and defendant was African-American; (3)

request an adverse inference jury instruction based on Seals's failure to preserve

photos of the suspect vehicle taken during the first motor vehicle stop; (4)

request that the trial judge voir dire the remaining jurors individually to assess

taint after one juror was excused for reading a newspaper article about the case;

(5) move to dismiss the indictment based on the prosecutor presenting half-

truths to the grand jury in connection with the victim's alleged contradictory

accounts; (6) request that counts three and five be severed for trial as they were

distinct from one another; (7) present medical records of defendant's foot injury

that purportedly rendered him temporarily disabled and physically incapable of

carrying out the robbery; and (8) advise defendant of the advantages and

disadvantages of testifying in his own defense. Defendant also argued the

1
  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208
(2011).
                                                                            A-2180-20
                                        6
cumulative impact of his attorney's failures deprived him of a fair trial.

Additionally, defendant argued his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing

to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel and challenge the warrantless

search and seizure on direct appeal.

      Following oral argument, the PCR judge entered an order on December

11, 2020, denying defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. In a

supporting oral decision placed on the record on the same date, the judge

reviewed the factual background and procedural history of the case, applied the

governing legal principles, and concluded defendant failed to establish a prima

facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC).            The judge also

determined defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Because the

judge failed to address all the issues raised by defendant, on July 5, 2022, we

granted defendant's motion for a limited remand for the judge to address the

omitted issues. In an October 17, 2022, order, with the exception of a sentencing

issue that is not part of this appeal, the judge denied the petition. In support, the

judge placed a comprehensive oral decision on the record rejecting the

remaining claims. This appeal followed. 2

2
  The judge subsequently addressed the sentencing issue in an April 27, 2023,
order and written decision, which are not the subject of this appeal.
                                                                               A-2180-20
                                         7
On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

      POINT I

      [DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
      ASSISTANCE   OF   TRIAL   COUNSEL    IN
      VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND NEW
      JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS AND THE [TRIAL]
      COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING OTHERWISE.

            A.    Trial Counsel Was Ineffective By Failing
                  To File A Wade/Henderson Motion To
                  Suppress The Identification Procedure
                  Used To Identify The Defendant.

            B.    Trial Counsel Was Ineffective By Failing
                  To Request An Adverse Inference Jury
                  Charge Based Upon The State's Loss
                  And/Or Destruction Of Evidence.

            C.    Trial Counsel Was Ineffective By Failing
                  To Request That The Trial Court Conduct
                  A Voir Dire Of The Jury After A Juror Was
                  Excused For Reading A Newspaper Article
                  About The Case.

            D.    Trial Counsel Was Ineffective By Failing
                  To Conduct Adequate Pretrial Preparation
                  And/Or Investigation And To Thereafter
                  Present A Defense On Behalf Of
                  [Defendant].

            E.    Trial Counsel Was Ineffective By Failing
                  To File A Motion To Dismiss The
                  Indictment Based [On] Grand Jury
                  Improprieties.

                                                                   A-2180-20
                                 8
                   F.     The Cumulative Effect Of The Errors
                          Complained Of Rendered The Trial Unfair.

            POINT II

            [DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL.

            POINT III

            DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE OF PCR COUNSEL.

            POINT IV

            THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN DENYING
            [DEFENDANT]'S   PETITION    FOR POST-
            CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING
            HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

            POINT [V 3]

            [DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE   OF   TRIAL   COUNSEL    IN
            VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND NEW
            JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS AND THE [TRIAL]
            COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING OTHERWISE.

                   A.     Trial Counsel Was Ineffective By Failing
                          To File A Wade/Henderson Motion To
                          Suppress The Identification Procedure
                          Used To Identify The Defendant.

                   B.     Trial Counsel Was Ineffective By Failing

3
    This point was presented in defendant's supplemental brief submitted
following the limited remand. Although there are redundancies, defendant relies
on both his original merits brief and his supplemental brief to support his appeal.
                                                                             A-2180-20
                                        9
                         To Request A Cross-Racial Identification
                         Jury Instruction.

                  C.     Trial Counsel Was Ineffective By Failing
                         To Request An Adverse Inference Jury
                         Charge Based Upon The State's Loss
                         And/Or Destruction Of Evidence.

                  D.     Trial Counsel Was Ineffective By Failing
                         To Request That Counts Three And Five
                         Be Severed At Trial.

                  E.     Trial Counsel Was Ineffective By Failing
                         To Adequately Advise [Defendant]
                         Regarding His Constitutional Right To
                         Testify On His Own Behalf.

                  F.     The Cumulative Effect Of The
                         Errors Complained Of Rendered The
                         Trial Unfair.

                                       II.

      We begin by setting out some guideposts that inform our review. "We

review the legal conclusions of a PCR judge de novo." State v. Reevey, 417

N.J. Super. 134, 146 (App. Div. 2010).       "[W]e review under the abuse of

discretion standard the PCR court's determination to proceed [with or] without

an evidentiary hearing." State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div.

2013). "If the court perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid

the court's analysis of whether the defendant is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an

evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158

                                                                           A-2180-20
                                      10
(1997) (citations omitted). "[W]here . . . no evidentiary hearing was conducted,"

as here, "we may review the factual inferences the [trial] court has drawn from

the documentary record de novo." State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294

(App. Div. 2016) (citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004)).

      An evidentiary hearing is only required when (1) a defendant establishes

"a prima facie case in support of [PCR]," (2) the court determines that there are

"material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the

existing record," and (3) the court determines that "an evidentiary hearing is

necessary to resolve the claims" asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354

(2013) (alteration in original) (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)). See R. 3:22-10(e)(2)

(providing "[a] court shall not grant an evidentiary hearing . . . if the defendant's

allegations are too vague, conclusory or speculative"). "To establish a prima

facie case, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her

claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will

ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-10(b).

      As to trial counsel, to establish a prima facie IAC claim, a defendant must

demonstrate "by a preponderance of the credible evidence," State v. Echols, 199

N.J. 344, 357 (2009), that his or her attorney's performance fell below the

objective standard of reasonableness set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466

                                                                               A-2180-20
                                        11
U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 49-58 (1987),

and that the outcome would have been different without the purported deficient

performance. Stated differently, a defendant must show that: (1) counsel's

performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.

      To satisfy the first prong, a defendant must "show[] that counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and "that counsel's representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

"[I]n making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance . . . ."   Id. at 689.   As such, a defendant "must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be

considered sound trial strategy.'" Ibid. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.

91, 101 (1955)).

      To satisfy the prejudice prong, "[t]he error committed must be so serious

as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or result reached."

State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

This prong generally requires that a defendant establish a "reasonable

                                                                            A-2180-20
                                       12
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

      The same Strickland/Fritz standard applies to claims of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel. State v. Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. 508, 513 (App.

Div. 2007). However, "a defendant does not have a constitutional right to have

appellate counsel raise every non-frivolous issue that defendant requests on

appeal." Id. at 515 (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1983)).

Instead, appellate counsel may "winnow[] out weaker arguments on appeal and

focus[] on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Jones,

463 U.S. at 751-52. Furthermore, appellate counsel must "examine the record

with a view to selecting the most promising issues for review." Id. at 752.

"Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented,

will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome." Smith v.

Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000) (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646

(7th Cir. 1986)).

      Failure to meet either prong of the two-pronged Strickland/Fritz test

results in the denial of a petition for PCR. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280

(2012) (citing Echols, 199 N.J. at 358). That said, "courts are permitted leeway

to choose to examine first whether a defendant has been prejudiced, and if not,

                                                                           A-2180-20
                                      13
to dismiss the claim without determining whether counsel's performance was

constitutionally deficient." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citation

omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

      Applying these principles, we reject defendant's contentions based solely

on defendant's inability to establish the prejudice prong. We therefore dismiss

the claims "without determining whether counsel's performance was

constitutionally deficient" in any respect. Ibid. First, as to trial counsel's failure

to file certain motions, "[i]t is not ineffective assistance of counsel for defense

counsel not to file a meritless motion[.]" State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619

(2007). Here, defendant argues his attorney's failure to file a Wade/Henderson

motion to suppress the identification procedure constituted IAC because there

was "no contemporaneous note of the identification" and the procedure was "not

electronically recorded" as currently required under State v. Anthony, 237 N.J.

213, 233-34 (2019).4 Defendant also argues his attorney's failure to file a motion

4
   In Anthony, our Supreme Court held that the failure to electronically record
an identification procedure or prepare a contemporaneous verbatim account of
the exchange automatically entitled a defendant "to a pretrial hearing on the
admissibility of identification evidence . . . ." 237 N.J. at 233-34. See also State
v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48, 51 (2009) (requiring "as a condition to the admissibility
of out-of-court identifications, that the police record, to the extent feasible, the
dialogue between witnesses and police during an identification procedure"); R.
3:11 (codifying Delgado). However, at the time this case was pending trial,

                                                                               A-2180-20
                                         14
to dismiss the indictment constituted IAC because the prosecutor failed to tell

the grand jury that the victim had provided differing accounts of the robbery and

had initially identified another individual as the robber.

      However, as we stated in rejecting similar claims raised by codefendant

Wilson in his unsuccessful appeal of the denial of his PCR petition:

             Regarding the Wade/Henderson motion, given the
             familiarity between defendant and the victim, such a
             motion would not have been meritorious. Likewise, a
             motion to dismiss the indictment would have been
             unsuccessful. Although the detective reported that the
             victim initially identified an individual named "Big
             Nate" as involved in the robbery, at trial, the victim
             clarified that it was a "[m]isunderstanding." The victim
             explained that he "could have mentioned [Big Nate's]
             name" but "did[ not] say he had anything to do with it."
             Instead, the victim said "[he] tried to tell [the detective]
             that [he] kn[ew] the[ robbers] from [Big Nate]." As
             such, the reported mistaken identification did not meet
             the standard of "clearly exculpatory" evidence

Henderson was the governing law and under Henderson, "to obtain a pretrial
hearing, a defendant ha[d] the initial burden of showing some evidence of
suggestiveness that could lead to a mistaken identification." 208 N.J. at 288.
"That evidence . . . must be tied to a system . . . variable," id. at 288-89, such as
whether the identification was "performed double-blind"; whether "neutral, pre-
identification instructions" were given to the witness; whether "the suspect
[stood] out from other members of the lineup"; whether "the witness received
any . . . feedback[] about the suspect or the crime"; and whether the administrator
"record[ed] the witness' statement of confidence immediately after the
identification," id. at 289-90. Here, defendant failed to identify any evidence of
suggestiveness based on system variables and no such evidence is apparent in
the record.

                                                                              A-2180-20
                                        15
            requiring disclosure by the prosecutor under [State v.
            Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 237 (1996)] (requiring
            prosecutors to disclose evidence to the grand jury only
            when the evidence "both directly negates the guilt of
            the accused and is clearly exculpatory"). [5]

                   As a result, defendant cannot establish the
            prejudice prong under Strickland because either motion
            would not have been meritorious. See State v. Roper,
            378 N.J. Super. 236, 237 (App. Div. 2005) (explaining
            "[i]f [a motion] had no merit, then [a] defendant would
            be unable to establish the 'prejudice prong' of the [IAC]
            standard established by Strickland"); see also State v.
            Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 501 (1998) (explaining that when
            the IAC claim is based on counsel's failure to file a
            motion, "the defendant not only must satisfy both parts
            of the Strickland test but also must prove that [the
            motion was] meritorious").

            [State v. Wilson, No. A-0393-21 (App. Div. May 17,
            2023) (slip op. at 19-20) (all but tenth and eleventh
            alterations in original).6]

      Equally unavailing is defendant's claim that his attorney was ineffective

by not moving to sever counts three and five, each charging unlawful possession

of a handgun. Because the State's position was that the handgun found on

5
   See also State v. Majewski, 450 N.J. Super. 353, 367 (App. Div. 2017)
("Contradictory eyewitness testimony . . . [is] not 'clearly exculpatory,' and need
not be revealed to the grand jury." (quoting Hogan, 144 N.J. at 238)).
6
  Given our decision, we reject as harmless defendant's newly minted claim that
PCR counsel was ineffective by failing to provide the grand jury transcript or
reference it in counsel's brief.
                                                                             A-2180-20
                                       16
defendant's person during the August 20, 2012, motor vehicle stop was the same

gun used to perpetrate the armed robbery on August 5, 2012, the offenses were

interrelated, and a severance motion would have proven futile. See State v.

Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 273 (1988) ("[W]here the evidence establishes that

multiple offenses are linked as part of the same transaction or series of

transactions, a court should grant a motion for severance only when defendant

has satisfied the court that prejudice would result."); see also State v. Chenique-

Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996) (explaining that if evidence would be admissible

at both trials, severance may be denied "because 'a defendant will not suffer any

more prejudice in a joint trial than he would in separate trials.'" (quoting State

v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 299 (App. Div. 1983))).

      Turning to defendant's claim that his attorney was ineffective by failing

to request certain jury charges, we reject out of hand defendant's contention that

his attorney was ineffective by not requesting a cross-racial identification jury

charge because, as we pointed out in affirming the denial of Wilson's PCR

petition, such a charge was provided sua sponte by the trial judge. See Wilson,

slip op. at 21. Regarding the adverse inference jury charge, defendant argues

his attorney was ineffective by failing to request the charge "based upon the

State's loss and/or destruction" of photographs of the suspect vehicle taken five

                                                                             A-2180-20
                                       17
days before defendant was apprehended in the same vehicle. According to

defendant, although "Seals took pictures of the vehicle" during the earlier motor

vehicle stop and "emailed them to himself so he could attach them to his police

report," during "his trial testimony, . . . Seals admitted that he no longer had

the[] pictures."

      Our Supreme Court held that upon a defendant's request, "an adverse

inference charge may be given when a police officer [loses or] destroys his or

her investigatory notes before trial." State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588, 597, 608-09

(2011). However, not every instance "when contemporaneous notes are lost or

destroyed" requires an adverse inference charge. Id. at 609 n.10. Here, as the

PCR judge found, defendant "has not shown how the failure to provide an

adverse jury instruction in this instance as to the lost photographs was

unreasonable based upon the[] circumstances. Nor has [defendant] shown how

he was prejudiced by the lack of an adverse jury instruction."

      Indeed, as we also noted in rejecting Wilson's identical claim in his PCR

appeal,

             it is unclear how the loss of the photographs of the
             suspect vehicle, taken "five days before [defendant]
             was arrested" during a traffic stop of a "person not
             connected to th[e] case," could prejudice defendant.
             Moreover, although the photographs could not be
             located, the officer documented and included in his

                                                                           A-2180-20
                                      18
            report the make, model, year, and registration number
            of the vehicle, which is essentially equivalent to the
            information the photographs would have revealed.

            [Wilson, slip op. at 22 (alterations in original).]

      Turning to defendant's claim that his attorney was ineffective by not

requesting that the trial judge voir dire the remaining jurors individually, instead

of as a group, to assess "the potential taint" stemming from one juror being

excused for reading a newspaper article about the case, in his direct appeal, we

determined there was no error in connection with this issue:

                   Here, there was no evidence that any of the
            remaining jurors had any knowledge of the newspaper
            articles. The judge polled the jury as a group and
            individually questioned the juror who admitted reading
            one of the articles before excusing her. Defendant
            never requested any further voir dire of the remaining
            jurors and raises the issue for the first time on appeal.
            Thus, at the very least, defendant must show it was
            plain error to forego a voir dire he never requested.
            State v. Winder, 200 N.J. 231, 252 (2009); see, e.g.,
            [State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 554 (2001)] (finding no
            plain error for not questioning a juror about extraneous
            knowledge). Based on this record, we find that the two-
            prong analysis articulated in [State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45,
            83-90 (1988)] was satisfied and the trial court acted
            within its discretion in questioning the jurors as a
            group. [State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 53-54 (1998)]. We
            find no error, much less plain error, warranting
            reversal.

            [Flagler, slip op. 40-41.]

                                                                              A-2180-20
                                         19
      If there was no error, then there can be no prejudice to satisfy the second

prong of the Strickland/Fritz test because "[t]hat second prong . . . is an exacting

standard" and "'[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the

court's confidence in the jury's verdict or the result reached.'" State v. Allegro,

193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v.

Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 315 (2006)).

      Defendant further claims that his attorney was ineffective by failing "to

fully investigate his case and present his medical records as evidence to support

his contention that due to the condition of his health at the time of the incident,

. . . it was impossible for him to have played a role in this crime." (Internal

quotation marks omitted). According to defendant, "he was on crutches, almost

unable to walk, suffering from a recent gunshot wound[]." The supporting

medical records submitted with his petition showed that defendant underwent

foot surgery on June 26, 2012, to remove "bullet fragments in the soft tissues of

[his right] foot." After the operation, during which the fragments were "removed

successfully," defendant had a follow-up appointment on July 9, 2012, and was

referred for physical therapy. The referral advised defendant of a "strict non[ -]

weight bearing" precaution.

                                                                              A-2180-20
                                        20
      However, nothing in defendant's proffered medical records indicates that

defendant would have been physically incapable of committing the robbery in

August, well over a month after the surgery. Notably, Wilson did the driving,

removed the home theater systems from the victim's truck, and rifled through

the victim's pockets. Moreover, defendant presented no evidence of his actual

physical condition at the time of the robbery. See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.

Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999) ("[W]hen a petitioner claims his trial attorney

inadequately investigated his case, he must assert the facts that an investigation

would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the

personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certificatio n.").

Without such evidence, defendant's claim amounts to a "bald assertion[]," which

does not constitute a prima facie case of IAC. Ibid. ("[A] petitioner must do

more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of

counsel.").

      Additionally, defendant claims his attorney was ineffective by failing to

"discuss with him either the advantages or disadvantages of testifying in his own

defense," thereby depriving him of "an opportunity to make an informed

decision."    Unquestionably, "[i]t is the responsibility of a defendant's

counsel . . . to advise defendant on whether to testify and to explain the tactical

                                                                             A-2180-20
                                       21
advantages or disadvantages of doing so or not doing so" and "counsel's failure

to do so will give rise to a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel." State v. Bey,

161 N.J. 233, 270 (1999) (quoting State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 630-31 (1990)).

      In rejecting defendant's claim, the PCR judge agreed with the State that

the record contained no evidence to support defendant's contention. The PCR

judge pointed out that defendant indicated to the trial judge when questioned

about his decision whether or not to testify that he understood his right. Indeed,

the record reveals that the trial judge emphasized to defendant the importance

of the decision whether "to testify or refrain from testifying," that defendant had

an "absolute [r]ight" to testify, and that his attorney could "give [him] advice"

to help him make the decision.

      The trial judge also stressed that although "[i]t would be prudent" to listen

to his attorney's advice, "[u]ltimately, the decision as to whether or not . . . [to]

testify [was his] and [his] alone." Defendant responded affirmatively when the

judge asked whether he understood. Further, the judge informed defendant that

if he elected not to testify, then he also had to decide "whether or not" he wanted

the judge to give a jury instruction "concerning [his] decision not to testify."

However, the judge again stressed that "the decision [was his] and [his] alone."

                                                                               A-2180-20
                                        22
      After reading the precise instruction so that defendant could make an

informed decision, the judge told defendant:

                  Now, there are a lot of different views as to
            whether that's beneficial or not beneficial, but
            ultimately, the decision as to whether or not that
            instruction is given to the jury is up to you.

                  You need to speak . . . about that with your
            attorney before you close your case so I know whether
            or not that instruction will be included or will not be.

                  Do you understand that, sir?

Defendant again answered in the affirmative, demonstrating that he understood.

      After the State rested its case, the judge asked defendant for his decision,

and defendant indicated he was electing not to testify. Defendant was also

present when Wilson's attorney confirmed on the record that he and Wilson had

discussed his right to testify "on multiple occasions" and he (Wilson's attorney)

had "given [Wilson his] best advice." Defendant did not indicate that he had not

had the benefit of similar discussions with his attorney.      Thus, the record

provides ample evidence that defendant understood his constitutional right to

testify and made an informed decision not to testify.        We therefore reject

defendant's unsupported claim to the contrary.

      Finally, defendant asserts his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing

"to argue ineffective assistance of trial counsel" on direct appeal. However,

                                                                            A-2180-20
                                      23
"[o]ur courts have expressed a general policy against entertaining [IAC] claims

on direct appeal because such claims involve allegations and evidence that lie

outside the trial record." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992). Defendant

also argues his appellate counsel should have challenged the trial court's denial

of the pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence seized during the warrantless

search that followed the second motor vehicle stop.          However, Wilson's

appellate counsel challenged the denial on direct appeal and we upheld the trial

judge's ruling in our consolidated opinion. See Flagler, slip op. 10-16. Thus,

defendant cannot show prejudice.

      To the extent we have not addressed a particular argument, it is because

either our disposition makes it unnecessary or the argument was without

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).7

      Affirmed.

7
  Because we conclude defendant was not prejudiced by any of his attorney's
purported deficiencies, his cumulative error argument also fails.
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                                      24