Court Opinion

ID: 9683111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:22:40.445742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:45.012038
License: Public Domain

ODOM, Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion of the majority, but take exception to the closing assertion in footnote 6 of that opinion. It is true that a statutory requirement, such as that of Article 40.09(4), V.A.C.C.P., relied upon in this case, should be interpreted with uniform consistency. See the dissenting opinions in Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 496 S.W.2d 566. Nevertheless, the meaning of a statute of diverse parts detailing various requirements in different terms, such as Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P., both before and after amendment by the 64th Legislature, cannot be stated so simply. Had the Legislature intended but a single standard or requirement in such a statute, it would have used uniform language or parallel construction throughout. Instead, by enumerating different standards in different terminology, it obviously intended a difference in the requirements, justifying a difference in interpretation from one part to the next. See my concurring opinion in Cameron v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 508 S.W.2d 618, 619.