Court Opinion

ID: 9549323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:16:14.732803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:08.603522
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting):
In my opinion, the majority opinion is an astonishing performance.
Indeed, it sparks the recall of Humpty Dumpty’s rejoinder to Alice, when she questioned his definition of a term:
‘When I use a word, ’Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master — that’s all.’
[Carroll, Lewis, ‘Through the Looking Glass’]
All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, unless otherwise noted.
The majority opinion challenges the foundation upon which this government of laws is based, viz., the fundamental law (the Constitution of Utah) cannot be ignored or distorted by the Legislature, under the guise the popular will so desires such abrogation; and that such action is merely a matter of policy, a.nd beyond the power of the judicial branch. Furthermore, the majority fails to perceive a unique characteristic of Article XIII, Section 3, that it includes a purpose or objective clause, a fact this Court in State v. Armstrong1 had the perspicacity to discern and utilize as a key to the interpretation of the entire provision. Thus, the dominant theme of Armstrong was the constitutionality of an enactment must be determined by its objective or pur*250pose, in relation to the expressed objective set forth in Article XIII, Section 3; and not the method utilized in the statute; for the interdiction applies to acts which undertake to do indirectly that which cannot be accomplished directly.
The obvious intent of the Legislature to secure by indirection that which it was prohibited to do directly is clearly illustrated in the majority opinion, in its attempt to justify the legislative classifications.
The purpose clause of Article XII, Section 3, focuses on the taxpayer to assure compliance with the provision’s basic objective that “every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, hers, or its tangible property, . . . .” Under this concept each taxpayer is to share proportionately the economic burden. The framers of the Constitution were conscious of the power which could be exerted by special interest groups on the legislative branch to secure a special economic advantage, such as, being relieved of their proportionate share of the economic burden.
In recognition of the multifarious methods which might be utilized to achieve a special advantage, the provision was designed in terms of the ultimate objective so as to encompass any method, which directly or indirectly conferred an economic advantage on one group of taxpayers. Insofar as a tax upon tangible personal property is-involved, the Constitution commands, in mandatory terms, equality among taxpayers (proportionate to the value of their property); unless an express exception is set forth in that instrument. Thus, the general principle recited in the majority opinion, viz., the Legislature is presumed to have acted within their constitutional authority, even though inequality results, is inapplicable and antithetical to the explicit mandate of Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3.
The majority opinion, in addition, to nullifying the purpose clause of Article 13, Section 3, further averts attention from the method aspect as discussed in Armstrong, by the diversionary tactic of attributing the challenged statute to the spending power father than the taxing power.
The whole field of powers exercisable by the Legislature is divided for convenience into police, revenue, and powers of eminent domain. And what does not fall within the realm of revenue and eminent domain is usually classified as police power. . . .2
If one may assume the majority’s reference to the great fundamental power to spend was, in fact, intended to identify the police power, yet the basic issue is not resolved. The challenged statute in Armstrong, which provided for an abatement or remittance of the taxes of insane, idiotic, infirm, or indigent persons, under the line of reasoning pursued in the majority opinion, could have been similarly identified as an exercise of the police power. However, this Court in Armstrong, although recognizing the Legislature had a legitimate interest and power to render assistance to the helpless, ruled the method adopted in its effect and operation violated the mandate of the fundamental law. The facile effort of the majority opinion to frame the issue in such a manner cannot be condoned. The alleged spending power characterization is but a straw man to divert attention from patent in-validity of the statute. Significantly, the Legislature also deemed the statute a revenue measure and assigned its administration to the Tax Commission, Section 59-26-l(3)(c), rather than a welfare measure to be administered by the Department of Social Services. The compiler of the Utah Code similarly misapprehended the nature of the legislation and placed it in the Revenue and Taxation Title, 59.
The basic issue is whether the refund provisions of the statute have the effect of relieving a favored class of taxpayers, who pay taxes on tangible property (including in that class, no less, taxpayers who do not pay taxes on tangible property), of their requisite, proportional burden; while at the same time excluding from such relief other taxpayers who pay tax on tangible property.
The majority opinion takes judicial notice of Form TC-40 G.P., “Utah General Home*251owner’s Tax Refund.” This form is indeed enlightening and further is consonant with the express provisions of the statute. The following are some of the significant provisions:
You qualify for the general homeowner’s tax refund if you own your home and can answer yes to the following questions:
1. Will you be a legal resident of Utah for the entire year 1979?
2. Did you own and occupy the home as your principal residence on January 1, 1979?
3. Did you furnish your own chief support so that you are not claimed as a dependent on someone else’s income tax return?
4. Was your residence subject to property tax ?
NOTE: If you answer yes to all of the above questions compute your refund on the following Schedule. (See the instructions on the reverse side for information on completing this form).
COMPUTATION OF REFUND
You must answer the following questions:
A. Does the property on which your home is located exceed 1 acre?
B. Do your rent out a portion of your home?
C. Do you use a portion of your home for business? (If you answer yes to any of the above questions, you must complete Line 2 below. See instructions on reverse side.)
1. Utah property tax assessed in 1979 on your personal residence reduced by any Circuit Breaker or County Abatements. $_
2. Less: deduction of property tax not qualifying for a refund (must be completed by individuals who checked yes to Questions A, B, or C above. See instructions on reverse side.). . . _
3. Balance of your 1979 property tax subject to a refund. (Line 1 less Line 2). .
4. Percentage of property tax on line 3 allowed as a refund (27%) . X .27
5. Refund allowed (Line 3 multiplied by the percentage on Line 4 but not less than $100.00 or more than $400.00) . $_
******
You must attach a copy of your 1979 property tax notice to this form and mail it by December 31, 1979.
Do not send your original notice. It must be returned to your county treasurer with your property tax payment by November 30, 1979.
I declare under the penalties provided by law that I qualify for the general homeowner’s tax refund and that this claim has been examined by me and to the best of my knowledge and belief is a true, correct and complete claim. I further certify that my property taxes have been or will be paid and there are no delinquent property taxes on my residence. [Emphasis supplied]
The instructions on the obverse side of the form further illustrate the issue in this case; it is provided:
How is the refund figured?
You must first answer the four questions on the reverse side. You qualify for the refund if you can answer yes to each question. You should next determine your 1979 property tax subject to a refund.

After you, have determined your property tax subject to refund, you are entitled to a refund of 27% of your property tax, but not less than $100.00 nor more than $400.00. [Emphasis supplied]
The correlation between the payment of property taxes and eligibility for a refund is further substantiated in the instructions for Form TC-40-R.P. It provides, in part:
Housing not subject to property tax does not qualify for the refund. Students in university housing do not qualify. If you reside in exempt housing less than 3 months, you can qualify for the refund, but only the rent paid while in housing subject to property tax will qualify. [Emphasis supplied]
*252It would appear, there are only three people in the State of Utah, who do not know the measure under consideration is a tax relief measure.
The majority’s analysis of the Armstrong case is incomplete and concentrates its attention on this Court’s description and comments on the particular method involved in the legislative enactment challenged therein. The majority then focuses on the tax collector and concludes the constitutional proscription is not violated if the property taxes collected by the taxing entity are not reduced. The majority refuses to acknowledge the basic economic consequences that the legislature, by manipulation of its overall revenue power, has devised a scheme to relieve some property taxpayers of their proportionate economic burden in violation of Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3. If the legislature desires to grant property tax relief, it has the power to reduce the levies the local authorities may assess and collect. If the legislature determines the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry are jeopardized by the deleterious effects of inflation, it can, under the police power, grant welfare payments to every household in the state. The legislature even has the option of reducing or repealing taxes. The legislature may not classify taxpayers (of tangible property), and devise a method to relieve one group of its proportionate burden, at the expense of others.
I. The Tax Article
The issue then realistically formulated is whether 59-26-1, as enacted 1979 is unconstitutional. It is, in several particulars.
First, the provisions violate Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3, Constitution of Utah.
Section 2 provides:
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law .
Section 3, provides:
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all tangible property in the state according to its value in money, and shall prescribe by law such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, . . [Emphasis supplied]
By these provisions, the framers of the Constitution intended that no property taxpayer should be relieved from the burden of taxation, .except as set forth in the specified exemptions. In particular, Section 3 makes it incumbent upon the legislature to provide a uniform system by which all tangible property within the State, not exempt by the organic law, would equally and ratably bear its due proportion of the public burden. The legislature has no power to exempt property not exempt under the Constitution. The intention manifest from the several provisions of the Constitution, respecting revenue and taxation, is “that no power should exist in the state government to grant exemptions other than those mentioned in the Constitution.” 3
In State v. Armstrong4 the issue was whether a statute providing for the partial abatement or remittance of the taxes of insane, idiotic, infirm, or indigent persons was prohibited by the constitution, as being in effect an exemption of property from taxation, which was not included within the list of exemptions contained in the fundamental law.
This Court acknowledged the terms “exemption” and “abatement,” in their literal sense, have different shades of meaning. This Court continued:
. The difference in the sense of these terms therefore relates to the method, rather than the effect; for the ultimate result, whether by exemption or abatement, is precisely the same. In either case the property is relieved from the burden of taxation. Now it is ap*253prehended that the intention of the framers of the constitution, by exempting certain property, was not so much to prevent an assessment and levy of tax thereon as to free it from the burden of maintaining the government. When the tax is abated or remitted after it has been levied, the same object is accomplished; and therefore the mandates of the constitution, that such burdens ‘shall be equal and uniform’ on all property within the state, except such as is exempt by the fundamental law, and that ‘every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property’ may be violated by either method.5 This Court further explained:
. The meaning and intent manifest from the constitution are that no property shall be relieved from the burden of maintaining the government, except such as was defined and specified for exemption by that instrument. No one would contend for a moment that the legislature of this state has power in express terms to exempt property from taxation, other than that enumerated for exemption in the constitution; and yet in the enactment of the statute in question the legislature has undertaken to indirectly exempt property not so enumerated. This is an attempt to do indirectly that which could not be done directly, and the statute therefore is in violation of the constitution, and is void, as in excess of legislative authority. To prevent the legislature from exempting property not included within the exemptions of the constitution, express words of inhibition were not necessary. The positive direction that ‘all property not exempt under the laws of the United States or under this constitution shall be taxed,’ and that the rate of assessment and taxation shall be ‘uniform and equal’ so that ‘every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property,’ with the enumeration of
the property exempted, contains an implication against an exemption of any other property by the legislature. That direction itself operates as a restraint upon the legislative power. [Citations]6
Certain principles emerge from the line of cases cited: Under sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII, all tangible property should equally and ratably bear its due proportion of the public burden unless it is specifically exempted by the Constitution. The legislature has no power or authority to relieve property from the burden of maintaining the government beyond that expressly granted in the Constitution. In assessing a legislative enactment, it is the effect or ultimate result which determines its constitutionality and not the method, for the legislature may not do indirectly that which it is prohibited from doing directly. Thus, if the enactment has the effect of relieving the property taxpayer from its proportionate share of the burden of taxation, it constitutes a proscribed exemption.
59-26-l(l)(b) provides, that the purpose of the act is to provide a refund on an equitable basis to those individual households, who have experienced the primary impact of the increases in the property taxes and increased living costs. The equitable basis for the refund is set forth in subsections (3)(a) and (b) and is directly correlated with the property tax on the dwelling of the claimant. Thus, the statute confers direct relief from the consequences of property taxes by relieving the claimant of part of the burden of taxation.
The statute must be assessed in light of its economic realities, it utilizes a method of granting an exemption indirectly to a certain class of owners of property. The owners of the other classes of property are compelled to bear a disproportionate share of the tax burden. If the legislature had attempted to grant a partial exemption to the favored owners, it would clearly fall-within the constitutional proscription, even *254though the legislature had appropriated the funds to local government to compensate for the decreased revenue. The present statutory scheme is merely an alternative design to relieve indirectly some of the property taxpayers of their proportionate share of the tax burden. The ultimate result of the statute is to create two classes of property taxpayers, and relieve only one class of its ratable share of the tax burden; such an enactment is unconstitutional.
II. The Non-resident
The statute further excludes a taxpayer, who is not a resident of the state, who would otherwise qualify under the terms of the act. See, subsection (2)(a). This provision violates the constitutional interdiction of Article III, Second, Constitution of Utah:
. The lands belonging to citizens of the United States, residing without this State shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the lands belonging to residents of this State; .
III. Equal Protection
The equal protection analysis of the majority opinion is not consonant with Utah case law. The federal standard for judging the constitutionality of a legislative classification, in the area of economics and social welfare, is inadequate for the more stringent standards expressed in Article I, Section 24, Constitution of Utah. Furthermore, even under the relaxed federal standard, the majority’s sole justification for the arbitrary classifications is predicated on ipse dixit statements.
I cannot agree with the premise of the majority opinion that for the purposes of this opinion exactly the same requirements are imposed for both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 24, Constitution of Utah, and that Utah law, in essential respects, is in accord with federal law.
The current Utah standards in assessing a legislative classification were set forth in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. The Utah Insurance Guaranty Association:7
A classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so long as there is some basis for the differentiation between classes or subject matters included as compared to those excluded from its operation, provided the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to .be accomplished by the act. .
In order to see whether the excluded classes or transactions are on a different basis than those included, we must look at the purpose of the act. The objects and purposes of a law present the touchstone for determining proper and improper classifications. .
It is only where some persons or transactions excluded from the operation of the law are as to the subject matter of the law in no differentiable class from those included in its operation that the law is discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional. If a reasonable basis to differentiate those included from those excluded from its operation can be found, it must be held constitutional.
The inception of this Utah standard was in State v. Packer,8 wherein this Court ruled that a classification to be valid, must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, to the end that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. The authority cited for this standard was Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920). These requirements, along with the refinements developed in State v. Mason9 coincided precisely with Article I, Section 24,10 and also Article I, Section 2.11
*255The pertinent language of State v. Mason is as follows:
A denial of the law’s equal protection presupposes an unreasonable discrimination between those included and those excluded from the act whether the act confers a privilege or a right or imposes a duty or an obligation. .
. to be unconstitutional the discrimination must be unreasonable or arbitrary. A classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so long as there is some basis for the differentiation between classes or subject matters included as compared to those excluded from its operation, provided the differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act.12 [Emphasis supplied]
* * * * * *
. In order to see whether the excluded classes or transactions are on a different basis than those included, we must look at the purpose of the act. The objects and purposes of a law present the touchstone for determining proper and improper classifications.13 [Emphasis supplied]
* * * * * *
It is only where some persons or transactions excluded from the operation of the law are as to the subject matter of the law in no differentiable class from those included in its operation that the law is discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional. If a reasonable basis to differentiate those included from those excluded from its operation can be found, it must be held constitutional .14
This Court has consistently adhered to the Mason standards.15 Although it must be conceded that in application of these standards, there has not always been a uniform result.
The majority opinion refers to State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc.16 as an example of application of the equal protection standards. Significantly, the classification found valid in the Walker case was subsequently found by this Court tó be arbitrary and with no reasonable justification, in fact, and unconstitutional in Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Company.17 Stanton v. Stanton18 was overruled by the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the challenged classification, in the context of its purpose, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 In the Walker and Stanton cases, this Court, in application of the Mason standards, in fact, deviated therefrom by its emphasis on conceiving a state of facts which would justify the legislative classification. Such an analysis departs from the matrix of the Mason test, viz., the classification must bear a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act, for the objects and purposes of a law present the touchstone *256for determining the propriety of the classification. In my opinion, the majority here again deviates from Mason, and thus strays into error.
The Utah analysis is illustrated in Carter v. State Tax Commission,20 wherein a classification of motor vehicles was based on the fuel used in the engines. The purpose of the legislation was regulatory in nature, an exercise of the police power. This Court ruled the classification did not bear a reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation. This Court stated, if the purpose of the legislation had been to raise revenue, the distinction might have been valid, but such was not the intent of the Legislature. .Thus, the Utah standard concentrates on the purpose or objective of the legislation as the focal point in assessing a classification.
In application of the rational basis test to noneconomic matters the United States Supreme Court has adhered to the standards of Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia21 as is illustrated in Reed v. Reed:22
. The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia . . ,23
A subtle but important distinction has developed in application of the rational basis test by the United States Supreme Court in the area of economics and social welfare. In Dandridge v. Williams24 the court stated:
. In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ [Citation] ‘The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific.’ [Citation] ‘A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ [Citation]
* * * * * *
But the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. [Citation] It is enough that the State’s action be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination . ,25
*257Mr. Justice Marshall in a dissenting opinion in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia26 pointed out the dichotomy in the articulated application of the rational basis test in economic and welfare matters. He asserted that when the mere rationality test is applied as articulated, there is little doubt in the outcome; the challenged legislation is always upheld. He states:
It cannot be gainsaid that there remain rights, not now classified as ‘fundamental,’ that remain vital to the flourishing of a free society, and classes, not now classified as ‘suspect,’ that are unfairly burdened by invidious discrimination unrelated to the individual worth of their members. Whatever we call these rights and classes, we simply cannot forgo all judicial protection against discriminatory legislation bearing upon them, but for the rare instances when the legislative choice can be termed ‘wholly irrelevant’ to the legislative goal. [Citation]
While the Court’s traditional articulation of the rational-basis test does suggest just such an abdication, happily the Court’s deeds have not matched its words. Time and again, met with cases touching upon the prized rights and burdened classes of our society, the Court has acted only after a reasonably probing look at the legislative goals and means, and at the significance of the personal rights and interests invaded . . .27
Mr. Justice Marshall cited a line of cases, including Stanton v. Stanton 28 and Reed v. Reed.29 He stated:
. These cases make clear that the Court has rejected, albeit sub silentio, its most deferential statements of the rationality standard in assessing the validity under the Equal Protection Clause of much noneconomic legislation.30
Mr. Justice Marshall advocates a standard similar to that applied in Reed v. Reed,31 viz., to sustain the classification, the state must show a reasonably substantial interest and a scheme reasonably closely tailored to achieving that interest.32 The Reed standard was derived from Royster Guano, the source of the Utah standard and the one consistent with express provisions of Article I, Section 24, Constitution of Utah. This Court should continue its traditional adherence to these requirements in applying this state constitutional provision.
The majority opinion cites and relies on Weinberger v. Salfi33 as an interpretive standard for both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Utah Constitution. In that case, the Court, through Mr. Justice Rehnquist, stated that the standard for testing the validity of a legislative classification concerning the withholding of a noncontrac-tual benefit, under a social welfare program, is whether the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.34 The legislative action is not deemed arbitrary, if the goals sought are legitimate, and the classification adopted is rationally related to the achievement of those goals. This less stringent standard neither comports with the requirements established over a period of forty eight years in Utah case law nor does it coincide with Article I, Section 24. It does not because it fails to focus clearly on the expressed legislative purposes and the relationship thereto of the selected criteria constituting the basis for the classification.
Even under the standards of the United States Supreme Court, the challenged statute falls within the ambit of United States *258Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,35 wherein a statutory classification of households was held not only imprecise but wholly without any rational basis. In the Moreno case, the classification of households under the food stamp program was challenged under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Eligibility for the program was limited to households, where all members thereof were related. The declared purpose of the food stamp program was to alleviate hunger and malnutrition among the more needy persons in the society.
The Court applied the traditional equal protection analysis. A legislative classification must be sustained if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.36 The Court observed that the challenged statutory classification of households was clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the act. The relationships, among persons constituting one economic unit and sharing cooking facilities, had nothing to do with their personal requirements. The Court further explored whether the challenged classification might be sustained on the ground it rationally furthered some legitimate governmental interest other than those specifically stated in the congressional declaration of policy. The legislative history indicated a purpose to prevent “hippie communes” from participating in the food stamp program. A purpose to harm a politically unpopular group did not constitute a legitimate government interest and thus did not justify the classification.
As in Moreno, the classification of households in the instant case, is not only imprecise, it is wholly without any rational basis. Under the classification, those who are excluded from receiving a refund, as well as the amount of the refund of those who are eligible, is not rationally related to the purpose of the act, viz., to refund revenues on an equitable basis to those households which have been subject to extreme economic hardship experienced as a result of increases in property taxes and living costs.
The attempted justification of this classification by the majority opinion should be scrutinized. The arbitrariness of the formula is deemed immaterial and justified by the statement the Legislature was entitled to spend the money for that portion of society which it deemed had the greater need for assistance, given the financial resources available. The formula, in fact, accomplishes the opposite result — those who have the financial resources to pay higher property taxes or rents are refunded larger sums, unless the majority intends to imply that this group was deemed by the Legislature to be in greater need of assistance.
Nevertheless, from whatever aspect the matter is approached, the classification under the statutory formula for refunds does not bear a reasonable relation to the expressed purposes to be accomplished by the act, viz., the formula establishes a criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute.
The justification of the majority for the exclusion contained in subjection (5) must be characterized strictly as an ipse dixit statement, viz., those excluded “would be cushioned, at least to some extent, from the effects of inflation in housing costs and would probably not have as great a need for assistance as those not receiving such aid.” In fact, these ineligible people do live in separate households and must pay rent or property taxes. It defies logic to assert that those, who are dependent on another individual for support, are cushioned from the effects of inflation and economic hardship. Obvious members of this ineligible class are students, who due to the tax laws may be taken as dependents on their parents’ income tax, and the elderly, whose separate households must be partially maintained by private assistance.
A similar infirmity infects the justification of the majority opinion as to the exclusion in subsection (6). The majority states such persons would not be as directly and *259severely affected, if at all, by increased costs of housing as those who receive no such governmental subsidies. This statement ignores the purpose provision of the act and further fails to acknowledge the nature of the economic circumstances of those who must seek government assistance to survive.
The statute through its exceptions in subsections (5) and (6) constitutes a denial of equal protection in violation of Article I, Sections 2 and 24, Constitution of Utah and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. If the argument were tenable that the statute did not create an impermissible exemption and the reference to property taxes was merely a convenient yardstick to apportion the excess general funds, then the classification established must be deemed purely arbitrary.
A legislative classification is never arbitrary or unreasonable so long as the basis for differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the purposes or objectives to be accomplished by the act. If some persons or transactions, excluded from the operation of the law, were as to the subject matter of the law in no differentiable class from those included within its operation, the law is discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional . . .37
The expressed legislative intent was to distribute excess funds on an equitable basis to individual households, which had been subjected to extreme economic hardship by the recent increases in taxation and the cost of living in the state, subsection (l)(b). The statute then creates a classification, unrelated to the magnitude of the economic impact on the claimant caused by increased cost of living, and specifically excludes some of those with the least economic resources, viz., those who receive some form of public assistance from the state, and some of those who receive support from another individual. Since the refund is geared to the amount of property tax or rent paid by the claimant, those with the greatest economic resources receive the largest refund. It should not be overlooked that the statute establishes no limitation on the amount a renter may receive as refund. Some of those at the bottom of the economic scale, whose existence is dependent on public or private assistance, are 'entirely excluded.
The purpose of the statute is to relieve “extreme economic hardship” by distributing the funds on an equitable basis. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable, for the basis of differentiation, between those who are and those who are not eligible to receive the refund as well as the amount to which they are entitled, does not bear a reasonable relation to the avowed purpose to be accomplished by the statute. In fact, those who are excluded from receiving a refund were in no differentiable class from those who are entitled to a refund and are perhaps in greater economic need as a consequence of the recent increases in the cost of living. Furthermore, the basis of allocation of the funds constitutes a criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute, viz., an equitable distribution to households who have experienced “extreme economic hardship.” The plan of distribution is arbitrary for the refund is not correlated with the degree of economic hardship experienced by the individual household but rather is weighted to refund greater sums to those with greater economic resources.
IV. Public Debt
Subsections (3)(a) and (b) of the statute provide for a refund commencing with the calendar year of 1979 and “each calendar year thereafter.” The authorization of such an expenditure by the Legislature violates Article XIII, Section 9, and Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution of Utah, for it requires future appropriations to meet this binding statutory obligation.38 The effect of the statute is to create a state indebtedness in contravention of Article XIV, Section 1, for it places a duty upon the *260state to pay out state funds to be obtained from future tax levies. In State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland,39 this Court stated:
. in order to constitute an indebtedness within the provisions of the constitutional limitation it is not necessary that the debt be evidenced by bonds, notes, or other usual evidences of indebtedness, but it is sufficient if in order to discharge the debt the state is obligated to pay it at some future time, and that it casts a future burden upon the taxpayer to the extent of a debt or obligation which must be paid by the state of Utah with funds derived from general taxation. .
By its express provisions the statute recites there is an excess of free funds within the general fund. The term “excess” connotes something that exceeds what is usual; yet the statute authorizes future expenditures when the status of the general fund will be unknown. There is a certain irony that a statute designed to grant relief from economic hardship creates a binding obligation for the state, which might in the future compel a tax increase.
V. Conclusion
The motives of the legislature for enacting 59-26-1 are commendable and reflect a sensitivity to the needs of the citizens of this state ensnared in an inflationary spiral. However, such motives are not sufficient to sustain an abrogation of Article XIII, Constitution of Utah.
The words of Justice Bartch in State v. Armstrong40 are most appropriate:
. the question whether an enactment of the legislature is void because of its repugnancy to the constitution is always one of much delicacy, and in a doubtful case should seldom, if ever, be decided in the affirmative. Where, however, the mind is convinced of the unconstitutionality of the law, the duty which devolves upon the court to declare it so is imperative, even where as in this case, the statute appears to be in consonance with justice and humanity. That the law itself would be beneficent can be of no avail in this case, because its effect and operation would be to exempt property, against the mandate of the fundamental law. . . .41
Other issues were raised. I do not reach them, because I have dealt with the primary ones, and they are dispositive.

. 17 Utah 166, 53 P. 981, 41 L.R.A. 407 (1898).

. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 513-514, 78 P.2d 920, 925, 117 A.L.R. 330 (1938).

. Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 245-246, 48 P. 1097 (1897).

. Note 1 supra.

. at p. 172 of 17 Utah, at p. 982, of 53 P.

. at pp. 172-173 of 17 Utah, at p. 983 of 53 P.; also see State v. Salt Lake County, 96 Utah 464, 85 P.2d 851 (1938); Moon Lake Electric Association, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 384, 345 P.2d 612 (1959).

. 564 P.2d 751, 755-756 (1977).

. 77 Utah 500, 516-517, 297 P. 1013 (1931).

. 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, 117 A.L.R. 330 (1938).

. “All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.”

. “All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments are founded on *255their authority for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public welfare may require.” [Emphasis supplied]

. 94 Utah 507, 78 P.2d 922-23.

. 94 Utah 508, 78 P.2d 923.

. 94 Utah 510, 78 P.2d 924.

. Carter v. State Tax Comm., 98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727 (1939); State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941); Slater v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153 (1949); Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 591 (1952); Justice v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 12 Utah 2d 357, 366 P.2d 974 (1961); Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974); Leetham v. McGinn, Utah, 524 P.2d 323 (1974); Child v. City of Spanish Fork, Utah, 538 P.2d 184 (1975); Bryson v. Utah State Retirement Office, Utah, 573 P.2d 1280 (1978).

. See note 15, supra.

. See note 15, supra.

. See note 15, supra.

. 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1974).

. 98 Utah 96, 109, 96 P.2d 727 (1939).

. 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920).

. 404 U.S. 71, 75-76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 253-54, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971).

. Also see Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1974), wherein the Court held § 15-2-1, U.C.A.1953, imposed criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.

. 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).

. 397 U.S. 486-487, 90 S.Ct. 1161-62. Also see Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972); United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976); Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 97 S.Ct. 431, 50 L.Ed.2d 389 (1976); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Idaho Department of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 98 S.Ct. 327, 54 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977).

. 427 U.S. 307, 318-327, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2569-2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976).

. 427 U.S. 320, 96 S.Ct. 2570.

. See note 19, supra.

. Note 22, supra.

. 427 U.S. 321, 96 S.Ct. 2570.

. Note 22, supra.

. 427 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 2572.

. 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975).

. 422 U.S. 768, 95 S.Ct. 2468.

. 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973).

. 413 U.S. 533, 93 S.Ct. 2825.

. Leetham v. McGinn, Utah, 524 P.2d 323, 325 (1974).

. Utah Housing Finance Agency v. Smart, Utah, 561 P.2d 1052, 1056 (1977).

. 36 Utah 406, 424, 104 P. 285, 292 (1909).

. Note 1, supra.

. at p. 174 of 17 Utah, at p. 983 of 53 P.