Court Opinion

ID: 9728919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:19:05.85803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:52.127994
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
concurring.
I join with the majority that the sentences for aggravated assault1 and attempted murder2 merge for sentencing pur*584poses; however, I write separately only to further expand upon the majority’s holding and to highlight the curious impact the majority’s ruling may have upon resentencing.
The issue is simply whether the intent required for aggravated assault (i.e., the intent to inflict serious bodily injury), is necessarily subsumed by the intent required for attempted murder (i.e., the intent to kill) so as to require a merger of the sentences. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) provides:
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
Serious bodily injury is defined as “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301 (emphasis added). When § 2702(a)(1) and § 2301 are read together, it means that a defendant is guilty of aggravated assault under section 2702(a)(1) if he causes injury which creates a substantial risk of death. A person is guilty of attempted murder, if with a specific intent to kill another, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step towards the killing of another. 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). Obviously, the attempt to kill necessarily means that the actor intended to cause or did cause serious bodily injury that carried with it a substantial risk of death or substantial injury to the function of a bodily member or organ.
We have previously held that aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of murder for purposes of merger. In Commonwealth v. Musselman, 483 Pa. 245, 248, n. 1, 396 A.2d 625, 625-626, n. 1 (1979), the defendant fatally shot his victim. This Court explained that the offenses of aggravated assault3 and reckless endangerment of another4 resulting from the shooting death of defendant’s victim were lesser included *585offenses of murder. “The elements required to be proved on both charges are all necessary, though not sufficient, to establish the elements of murder.” (citations omitted). In Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 498 Pa. 112, 119, 445 A.2d 92, 96 (1981), this Court further explained that “[i]t is clear that assault is a constituent element of all of the grades of homicide and does not require the proof of a fact that the various grades of homicide do not.”
Here, appellant shot the victim in the back of the neck. The victim testified that immediately before she was shot, appellant told her he was going to shoot her. When appellant pointed the gun at the victim’s neck, after manifesting his intent to kill her, he necessarily intended to create a substantial risk of death, serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of a bodily function or organ. Accordingly, when appellant attempted to murder the victim, he necessarily also intended to cause serious bodily injury to her.
The Fifth Amendment forbids successive prosecutions and cumulative punishment for greater and lesser included offenses. Commonwealth v. Tarver, 493 Pa. 320, 426 A.2d 569 (1981); U.S. Const, amend. 5, 14. That is, Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protections prohibit “multiple punishment for the same offense at one trial.” Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 169, 286 A.2d 638, 641 (1971). The applicable test in a double jeopardy context for determining whether two charges constitute the “same offense” is:
... where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not....
Commonwealth v. Tarver, 493 Pa. 320, 325, 426 A.2d 569, 571 (1981), quoting, Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). In the case sub judice, the identical proof was required for both crimes. Once the Commonwealth established guilt of attempted murder, no additional evidence was required to secure appellant’s convic*586tion for the aggravated assault. Appellant’s act of shooting the victim in the back of the neck constituted both aggravated assault and attempted murder.
As this Court explained in Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 498 Pa. 112, 445 A.2d 92 (1981):
As is invariably true of a greater and lesser included offense, the lesser offense ... requires no proof beyond that which is required for conviction of the greater.... The greater offense is therefore by definition the “same” for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it.
Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 498 Pa. at 119, 445 A.2d at 96, quoting, Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2226, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). Consequently, aggravated assault under section 2702(a)(1) must be found to be a lesser included offense of attempted murder where the same act is used to satisfy virtually identical elements of the two offenses. Therefore, appellant cannot be sentenced separately for both the greater offense and the lesser included offense. As aggravated assault consists of some, but not all the elements of attempted murder, the two offenses must merge for purposes of sentencing.
Accordingly, the Court properly reversed the decision of the Superior Court en banc and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. The trial court may now resentence appellant so long as it does not impose a sentence on both aggravated assault and attempted murder. Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 512 Pa. 587, 517 A.2d 1280 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 950, 107 S.Ct. 1613, 94 L.Ed.2d 798 (1987) (upon remand, the trial court may reconsider the entire sentence where the appellate court’s ruling altered the trial court’s sentencing scheme for protection of society and rehabilitation of the criminal). Furthermore, having found a merger of the offenses, it is important to note that the majority’s decision leads to the anomaly of a first degree felony, aggravated assault, merging into the lesser graded offense of attempted murder, a second degree felony. The trial court now apparently has the discretion to sentence the accused on the lesser *587graded offense of attempted murder only, and, therefore, give the accused a lesser maximum sentence even though the accused was convicted of a higher graded crime which permits a higher maximum sentence.5

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a) and 2502(a).

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(2) and (4).

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.

. Such resentencing is of course subject to any applicable mandatory sentences. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712(a) (mandatory five year minimum sentence for aggravated assault committed with a firearm).