Court Opinion

ID: 9607678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:01:18.218663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:59.329817
License: Public Domain

HOLOHAN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In Noble v. National American Life Insurance Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 624 P.2d 866 *164(1981), and in Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 490, 74 L.Ed.2d 632 (1982), this court set forth the elements of the tort of “bad faith.” Whatever wrong the insurance company committed in this case, it is not the tort of “bad faith.”
The rights and obligations of the parties in this case were established by the contract of insurance. The record is clear that the insurance company paid the insured’s claim timely and in the amount required by the policy. The majority opinion has yet to demonstrate that there is any provision in the insurance policy which required the insurer to do more than it did. Even applying the so-called “expectations” concept to the insurance contract, there is nothing presented which would indicate that the insured had any belief that the insurance contract required the insurance company to do anything more than pay the amount of the claim.
What the facts of the case demonstrate is that there were representations and promises by the insurance company to the insured which were independent and unrelated to the obligations of the insurance contract. The conduct of the insurer in failing to furnish the report of its investigation, as promised, or otherwise assisting the insured in proving a claim against a third party may be actionable, but not under the tort of “bad faith.” There is no Arizona authority which supports the majority’s position that this course of dealing is a part of the contract of insurance.
The Court of Appeals, in my judgment, was correct when it stated:
Assuming, without deciding, that the action of the insurer in the case at bench may have been actionable under another theory, such as fraud or misrepresentation, we do not find that it comes within the limited definition of the tort of “bad faith” as defined in Noble and subsequent cases. Nor do we find it appropriate to extend the tort of “bad faith” to fit this situation.
Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 180, 188, 726 P.2d 596, 604 (App.1986). I agree with the reasoning in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and I, therefore, dissent from the opinion of this court.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
FELDMAN, Justice.
Defendants-appellants call our attention to a technical error. The court of appeals ruled upon several issues other than that pertaining to bad faith. We accepted review only on the bad faith question. Thus, although differing with the court of appeals on that issue, we should not have vacated the other portions of its opinion.
Therefore, our previous opinion is modified so that we vacate only that portion of the court of appeals’ opinion which deals with the issue of bad faith. In all other respects the motion for reconsideration is denied.
GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS and CAMERON, JJ., concur.
HOLOHAN, C.J., voted to grant reconsideration.