Court Opinion

ID: 9410587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 22:01:14.685682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.829605
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

  BRANDON MONTGOMERY, as personal
  representative for the estate of Gary
  Montgomery,
            Plaintiff,
                   v.                                               Civil Action No. 18-1928 (JDB)
  DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
            Defendant.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Before the Court is a motion by defendant District of Columbia (the “District”) seeking

partial reconsideration of the Court’s May 23, 2022 Memorandum Opinion. This case arises out

of the District’s prosecution of Gary Montgomery (“Montgomery”), a mentally disabled man, for

murder, of which he was ultimately acquitted. This § 1983 lawsuit was brought by plaintiff

Brandon Montgomery in his capacity as a personal representative for Montgomery’s estate.1 It

alleges, among other things, that the District violated Montgomery’s rights under Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when it failed to accommodate him during his post-

arrest interrogation in which he gave inculpatory statements while he was suffering a mental health

episode due to his schizophrenia. In a previous Opinion, the Court denied the District’s motion

for summary judgment on this claim. The District now asks the Court to reconsider its conclusion

that a reasonable jury could find that had the District accommodated Montgomery during the

interrogation, he would not have been prosecuted and confined. For the reasons explained below,

the Court will deny the motion.

        1
          When this Opinion refers to “Montgomery,” it is either referring to Gary Montgomery or his estate,
depending on the context.

                                                     1
                                                  Background

  I.    Factual Background2

        On February 2, 2012, Deoni Jones was fatally stabbed at a bus stop in Washington, D.C.

Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Statement of Undisputed Material Facts & Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of

Materially Disputed Facts [ECF No. 60-2] (“Reply ISO SUF”) ¶ 1.                            Metropolitan Police

Department (“MPD”) Detectives Brian Wise and Hosam Nasr investigated the murder. Id. ¶ 2.

Attalah Gabriel, a bystander who left the bus stop shortly before Jones was murdered, reported

that she had noticed a man staring at Jones while Gabriel sat at the bus stop. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. Video

surveillance reveals that, shortly after Gabriel left the bus stop, Jones did as well, and the man

Gabriel had identified followed Jones. Id. ¶ 5. A few minutes later, Jones and the man (or someone

who looked similar) returned to the bus stop, at which point the man stabbed Jones in the head.

Id. Gabriel was later presented with a nine-person photo array, pointed to Montgomery’s photo,

and said that he “look[ed] like” the man at the bus stop. Id. ¶ 4.

        Sakeithia Taylor and Jermaine Jackson, who were in a car stopped at a nearby traffic light,

exited their vehicle upon witnessing the man attack Jones. Reply ISO SUF ¶¶ 6–7; Ex. 4 to

District’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Mot. for Summ. J.”) [ECF No. 53-4] (“Jackson

Incident/Investigation Report”). Taylor tended to Jones while Jackson chased the perpetrator,

eventually caught up to him, punched him hard enough that the perpetrator fell to the ground, and

kicked the perpetrator multiple times, including in the head. Jackson Incident/Investigation

Report; Ex. 13 to Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Recons. (“Opp’n”) [ECF No. 68-13] (“Jackson

Interview”) 25:19–21. The perpetrator managed to escape, and Jackson chased after him but could

        2
         The Court assumes familiarity with the extensive factual history detailed in its previous Opinion, see
Montgomery v. Dist. of Columbia (“Montgomery II”), Civ. A. No. 18-1928 (JDB), 2022 WL 1618741, at *1–6
(D.D.C. May 23, 2022), and will accordingly only recite the facts necessary to resolve the instant motion.

                                                         2
not catch up with him. Jackson Incident/Investigation Report. Jackson later described the killer

as a “Black Male, 5’9-5’11, 150-160lbs, medium complexion, between 33-40 years old, wearing

blue jeans, a black quilted jacket, and a gray hooded sweat shirt underneath the jacket with the

hood pulled up,” and as possibly having a beard. Id. Taylor described the perpetrator as a Black

man “with big wide eyes” and “wearing a black and white knit hat” and “a black jacket.” Ex. 3 to

Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 53-3] (“Taylor Witness Statement”) at 1.

       MPD publicly released a video of a man crossing the street near the bus stop near the time

of the murder, and two tipsters identified Montgomery as the man in the video. Reply ISO SUF

¶¶ 10–11. A third tipster, Michael Harris, initially identified the man as a different man named

Mark Johnson. Ex. 7 to Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 53-7] (“Harris Incident/Investigation

Report”) at 1. Wise then showed Harris a photo of Montgomery, to which Harris responded,

“[Y]ou might be on to something[,] but I don’t think [Montgomery] walks that fast.” Id. at 2. A

few days later, Harris called the detectives to tell them that he believed Montgomery was the man

in the video. Id.

       Wise and Nasr first interrogated Montgomery on February 4, two days after the murder.

Reply ISO SUF ¶ 17. Montgomery was wearing a brown jacket, white shoes, and tan pants at that

time, which he told detectives he had been wearing for the past four days (which would have

included the day Jones was murdered).3              Ex. 12 to Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 53-12]

(“Preliminary Hr’g Tr.”) 47:14–49:16; Ex. 1 to Opp’n [ECF No. 68-1] (“Wise Dep. Tr.”) 246:2–

5; Ex. 3 to Opp’n [ECF No. 68-3] (“Montgomery Statement”) 10:3–6. Montgomery did not

present obvious signs of bruising on his face. Wise Dep. Tr. 238:1–4. Montgomery stated he was

“55 years young,” 6’0” to 6’2”, 157 to 158 pounds, and that he had a significant limp caused by

       3
           Montgomery was homeless in February 2012. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 56] at 1.

                                                       3
falling off a ladder one year prior to the interrogation. Ex. 19 to Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 53-

19] (“Montgomery Statement II”) 6:3–7:2, 7:10–22.

       Montgomery had a history of mental health issues, including schizophrenia. Reply ISO

SUF ¶¶ 22, 24. Wise and Nasr found it difficult to communicate with Montgomery during the

February 4 interrogation and found that many of his answers were nonsensical or incoherent. See

Ex. 8 to Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 53-8] (“Wise Dep. Tr. II”) 207:14–17; Ex. 2 to Opp’n to

Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 56-4] (“Nasr Dep. Tr. II”) 151:4–152:8. The District does not dispute

that Wise and Nasr suspected Montgomery might have been mentally ill at the time of the February

4 interrogation and that they did not offer Montgomery any accommodation. Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s

Statement of Materially Disputed Facts [ECF No. 60-3] (“Resp. to SDF”) ¶¶ 53–54, 56.

Montgomery made the following inculpatory statements during that interrogation:

       •   Montgomery identified himself as a man crossing the street near where the murder

           occurred, putting himself at the scene of the crime. Montgomery Statement 10:12–21;

           Wise Dep. Tr. 231:14–232:10.

       •   Montgomery said he was at the bus stop on the night of the murder. Montgomery

           Statement 10:22–11:4; Wise Dep. Tr. 231:14–232:10; Ex. 2 to Opp’n [ECF No. 68-2]

           (“Nasr Dep. Tr.”) 153:7–9.

       •   Montgomery described how the victim looked and was dressed as well as the victim’s

           physical characteristics. Nasr Dep. Tr. 153:10–154:1.

       •   Montgomery gave statements that the detectives interpreted to mean the victim rejected

           his sexual advances while they were together at the bus stop. Id. 157:7–162:13.

                                                4
       •   Montgomery said he “crushed” the “pretty lady,” which detectives interpreted to mean

           he had murdered Jones. Montgomery Statement 200:7–16; see Nasr Dep. Tr. 154:12–

           22.

       •   When the detectives asked Montgomery to act out what he did to the “pretty lady,” he

           made a motion that detectives interpreted as further confirmation that he was guilty of

           murder. Wise Dep. Tr. 226:4–228:15.

       •   Montgomery gave a description of a knife he previously owned that was similar to the

           description of the murder weapon. Reply ISO SUF ¶ 18.

       •   The detectives interpreted Montgomery’s mental illness as evidence of his guilt

           because he gave erratic answers. See Nasr Dep. Tr. II 151:8–152:20; Nasr Dep. Tr.

           153:1–154:22.

       The District does not dispute that Montgomery’s “mental illness and psychotic symptoms

made him more susceptible to coercive or deceptive interview tactics and more likely to acquiesce

and agree to whatever the detectives said.” Resp. to SDF ¶ 89. The detectives then took

Montgomery to the bus stop, and he admitted to seeing the victim there the night of her murder.

Ex. 9 to Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 53-9] (“Montgomery Incident/Investigation Report”).

       Following this interview, the District sought a warrant for Montgomery’s arrest. Reply

ISO SUF ¶ 15. The affidavit the District submitted in support of the warrant did not include the

inculpatory statements Montgomery made during the interrogation and later at the bus stop. Id.

¶ 20; see also Ex. 1 to Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 53-1] (“Aff. in Supp. of Arrest Warrant”). A

D.C. Superior Court judge approved the application for the warrant on February 10, 2012. Reply

ISO SUF ¶ 16. The next day, Montgomery was charged with second-degree murder. Id. ¶ 21.

                                                5
       On February 23, the Superior Court held a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause

for the murder charge.     Reply ISO SUF ¶ 25.         During the hearing, Nasr testified about

Montgomery’s inculpatory statements, and the court referenced those inculpatory statements in

support of its finding of probable cause for the murder charge; however, the court also said that

these statements were not critical to its decision. Preliminary Hr’g Tr. 10:25–13:2, 68:10–17.

       Over the next five years, Montgomery was confined at a mental institution, and there was

ongoing dispute about whether he was competent to stand trial. Reply ISO SUF ¶ 30. During this

period, several pieces of exculpatory evidence and other circumstances came to light that called

Montgomery’s guilt or the integrity of the investigation into question:

       •   After the interrogation, Wise took a sample of Montgomery’s DNA and compared it to

           that found at the crime scene, and the samples did not match. Wise Dep Tr. 254:13–

           18. The detectives did not put the DNA sample from the crime scene on the DNA

           database known as CODIS to see if it matched any known individuals. Id. 254:19–21.

           It is common practice to run DNA in CODIS. Ex. 4 to Opp’n [ECF No. 68-4] (“Parker

           Dep. Tr.”) 45:17–47:3; Ex. 12 to Opp’n [ECF No. 68-12] (“Rice Dep. Tr.”) 158:16–

           160:1.

       •   The only two witnesses who observed the murder itself—Taylor and Jackson—were

           not shown any photo arrays to identify the perpetrator. Wise Dep. Tr. 239:9–16. The

           only eye-witness identification was from Gabriel, who had left the bus stop before the

           murder. It is common practice to show eye witnesses a photo array to aid in identifying

           the suspect. See Rice Dep. Tr. 58:7–11.

       •   MPD did not fully investigate Mark Johnson, a suspect initially identified by one tipster

           as the man in the publicly released video. Johnson was near the crime scene on the

                                                 6
           night of Jones’s murder. Wise Dep. Tr. 248:17–249:5. The detectives interviewed

           Johnson, and he offered an alibi, but detectives never tried to confirm the truth of the

           alibi. Id. 249:6–250:5; Nasr Dep. Tr. 192:7–22.

       In late 2016, Montgomery was found competent to stand trial in Superior Court. See

Montgomery v. Dist. of Columbia (“Montgomery I”), Civ. A. No. 18-1928 (JDB), 2019 WL

3557369, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2019). During the two-week trial in July 2017, the District

introduced into evidence Montgomery’s inculpatory statements from the interrogation. Resp. to

SDF ¶¶ 98–101. The District also played hours of video from the interrogation. Id. ¶ 101; see also

Ex. 8 to Opp’n [ECF No. 68-8] (“Aug. 8, 2017 Trial Tr.”) 4:24–5:20. At the close of trial,

Montgomery was acquitted by the jury. Reply ISO SUF ¶ 30.

 II.   Procedural Background

       Brandon Montgomery, in his capacity as the personal representative of Gary

Montgomery’s estate, filed this suit against the District, Wise, Nasr, and unnamed officers in

August 2018. See Compl. & Jury Demand [ECF No. 1]. After the Court granted the District’s

motion to dismiss two of the counts in that complaint, see Montgomery I, 2019 WL 3557369, at

*10, Montgomery filed an amended complaint, Am. Compl. & Jury Demand [ECF No. 48]

(“Compl.”). The amended complaint claims that the District violated Montgomery’s rights under

Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to accommodate his

disability during two interrogations. Id. ¶¶ 127–55.

       The District moved for summary judgment on both claims in September 2021. See Mot.

for Summ. J. [ECF No. 53]. The Court denied the motion. See Montgomery II, 2022 WL 1618741,

at *29. Relevant here, the Court held that Montgomery “produced sufficient evidence for a

reasonable jury to conclude that his prosecution and confinement would not have occurred had the

                                                7
District reasonably accommodated his disability,” which is required to show the requisite

proximate cause of his injury. Id. at *28. The Court first observed that proximate cause is typically

a “fact-sensitive question” that is best left for the jury. Id. It then acknowledged that the arrest

warrant supporting Montgomery’s arrest “did not mention his [inculpatory] statements” and that

the Superior Court did “not rely[] on them to establish probable cause” for the murder charge. Id.

Nevertheless, it noted that “the fact that the District could have prosecuted Montgomery had his

interrogations not occurred does not mean that the District would have prosecuted him had he been

able to meaningfully access and participate in his interrogations.” Id. The Court took notice of

the pieces of exonerating evidence the District “ignored” and concluded that “when viewed in

[Montgomery’s] favor, [the evidence] supports the conclusion that—had the District not become

convinced during [his] interrogations that he was the murderer—it would not have moved forward

with [his] prosecution.” Id. Ultimately, the Court held that

        [w]hether offering Montgomery a reasonable accommodation—such as conducting
        his interrogations in the presence of an officer trained in crisis intervention—would
        have resulted in a “successful” interrogation is, admittedly, speculative. But the
        claim is not so implausible as to warrant the entry of summary judgment at this
        time.

Id. (citation omitted).

        The District filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Court’s holding on proximate

cause in August 2022. See Def.’s Mot. for Recons. of the Court’s May 23, 2022 Mem. Op. &

Order [ECF No. 66] (“Mot.”). Montgomery filed an opposition to the motion, see Opp’n [ECF

No. 68], and the District replied in support of its motion, see Reply in Supp. of Mot. [ECF No. 69]

(“Reply”). The motion is now ripe for decision.

                                                 8
                                            Legal Standard

        “[A]ny order or other decision . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights

and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a

judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(b). Reconsideration of such a decision “is available under the standard ‘as justice requires.’”

Mahoney v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 566 F. Supp. 3d 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Judicial Watch

v. Dep’t of Army, 466 F. Supp. 2d 112, 123 (D.D.C. 2006)). A court’s discretion to grant

reconsideration under Rule 54(b) is “subject to the caveat that where litigants have once battled

for the court’s decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to

battle for it again.” Singh v. George Wash. Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal

quotation marks omitted); accord Mahoney, 566 F. Supp. 3d at 25 (“The ‘as justice requires’

standard is hardly a free pass . . . .”).

        When deciding whether justice requires granting a motion for reconsideration, a court

considers whether it “‘has patently misunderstood a party,’ ‘has made a decision outside the

adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties,’ ‘has made an error not of reasoning but

of apprehension,’” or whether there has been “a controlling or significant change in the law or

facts . . . since the submission of the issue to the Court.” Cobell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D. 266, 272

(D.D.C. 2004) (citation omitted); accord United States v. Sutton, Crim. No. 21-0598 (PLF),

2021 WL 5999407, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021). “[A]rguments that could have been, but were

not, raised previously and arguments that the court has already rejected are not appropriately raised

in a motion for reconsideration.” United States v. Sullivan, Crim. A. No. 21-78 (EGS), 2022 WL

3027007, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2022) (quoting United States v. Booker, 613 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34

(D.D.C. 2009)); accord Terrell v. Mr. Cooper Grp., Inc., Civ. A. No. 20-0496 (CKK), 2021 WL

                                                  9
2778542, at *3 (D.D.C. July 2, 2021) (“A Rule 54(b) motion ‘cannot be used to reargue facts and

theories upon which a court has already ruled or to present theories or arguments that could have

been advanced earlier.’” (citation omitted)). “In order to promote finality, predictability and

economy of judicial resources, ‘as a rule a court should be loathe to revisit its own prior decisions

in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was clearly

erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’” Pueschel v. Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers’ Ass’n,

606 F. Supp. 2d 82, 85 (D.D.C. 2009) (cleaned up) (quoting Lederman v. United States, 539 F.

Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2008)).

                                              Analysis

       The District argues that the Court erred in holding that Montgomery’s evidentiary showing

on proximate cause was sufficient to defeat the District’s summary judgment motion. First, it

argues that the Court “incorrectly relied on the allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, not

upon record evidence proffered by Plaintiff in his Opposition to summary judgment.” Mot. at 4–

5. Second, it argues that “plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that the failure to accommodate was

the but for cause of Montgomery’s prosecution.” Id. at 7 (capitalization omitted). Montgomery

disagrees, primarily arguing that he has carried his evidentiary burden at this stage to show

proximate cause because (1) “MPD detectives and prosecutors believed the interrogations yielded

material evidence, and they relied on that evidence at a probable cause hearing and at trial,” Opp’n

at 3 (capitalization omitted), and (2) “the district’s unlawful actions denied [him] the chance to

clear his name,” id. at 9 (capitalization omitted).

  I.   The Appropriate Legal Standard

       The District first contends that “[i]n holding that a reasonable jury could find that

Montgomery’s prosecution and detention were proximately caused by the failure to accommodate,

                                                  10
the Court incorrectly relied on the allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, not upon record

evidence proffered by Plaintiff in his Opposition to summary judgment.” Mot. at 4–5. In this

respect, the District primarily takes issue with this section of the Court’s opinion:

       [b]ut the fact that the District could have prosecuted Montgomery had his
       interrogations not occurred does not mean that the District would have prosecuted
       him had he been able to meaningfully access and participate in his interrogations.
       Arguably the heart of Montgomery’s amended complaint is that “[t]he [District]
       never looked beyond the ‘ready-made’ suspect, despite compelling evidence that
       [he] was not the person responsible for Ms. Jones’ murder.” Am. Compl. ¶ 12.
       Montgomery supports this claim by alleging that the District ignored many pieces
       of exonerating evidence in its possession, including DNA evidence, video footage,
       and eyewitness testimony. See id. ¶¶ 10–12, 74 (DNA from crime scene not
       matching Montgomery or Jones); id. ¶¶ 35–41, 59–71 (eyewitness testimony
       indicating that the murderer was wearing different clothes than Montgomery, was
       able to run faster than Montgomery’s limp would allow, and would have had
       significant bruises at the time of Montgomery’s interrogations); id. ¶¶ 46–48 (video
       footage showing Montgomery leaving crime scene before the murder), id. ¶¶ 52–
       57, 73 (video footage depicting alleged killer fleeing crime scene). The District
       does not challenge the accuracy of Montgomery's description of this evidence, and
       when viewed in his favor, it supports the conclusion that—had the District not
       become convinced during Montgomery's interrogations that he was the murderer—
       it would not have moved forward with Montgomery’s prosecution.

Montgomery II, 2022 WL 1618741, at *28 (all but first alteration in original). The District notes

that the Court’s citation in this paragraph to the pleadings rather than to the record evidence is

problematic because “allegations in a complaint . . . may not be relied upon” in resolving a motion

for summary judgment. Mot. at 5.

       The District’s concern is well-taken.       The Court acknowledges that reliance on the

allegations in the complaint is inappropriate in resolving a summary judgment motion. However,

as set forth below, all of the allegations the Court cited are borne out as facts in the record:

                    Allegation                                Factual Support in Record

 “DNA testing was conducted on clothes MPD          After the interrogation, Wise took a sample of
 recovered from the crime scene—clothes             Montgomery’s DNA and compared it to that
 MPD believed were left by the murderer—            found at the crime scene; the samples did not
 and Defendants obtained a full male DNA            match. Wise Dep Tr. 254:13–18.

                                                  11
profile. This full male DNA profile did not
match the decedent or Mr. Montgomery and
the results excluded Mr. Montgomery as the
murderer.” Compl. ¶ 10; see also id. ¶ 74.

“The Defendants, in 2012 and at no time           A tipster identified Mark Johnson as the man
thereafter made any attempts to compare the       in the publicly released video, and Johnson
DNA profile obtained from the clothing to the     was near the crime scene on the night of
DNA profile of another suspect who two            Jones’s murder. Harris Incident/Investigation
callers/tipsters identified and which suspect     Report at 1; Wise Dep. Tr. 248:17–249:5.
Detective Brian Wise interviewed five days        The detectives interviewed Johnson, and he
after the murder, who placed himself on the       offered an alibi, but detectives never tried to
scene of the murder during that interview.”       confirm the truth of the alibi. Id. 249:6–
Compl. ¶ 11. “Defendants also failed to enter     250:5; Nasr Dep. Tr. 192:7–22. The
the DNA profile from the clothing found at        detectives did not put the DNA sample from
the murder scene into CODIS. The                  the crime scene on the DNA database known
Defendants never looked beyond the ‘ready-        as CODIS to see if it matched any known
made’ suspect, despite compelling evidence        individuals. Wise Dep. Tr. 254:19–21.
that Mr. Montgomery was not the person
responsible for Ms. Jones’ murder.” Id. ¶ 12.

“Seconds after the murder occurred, Mr.           Jackson chased the perpetrator, eventually
Jackson physically fought with the                catching up to him, punching him hard
murderer . . . , but the killer eventually        enough that the perpetrator fell to the ground,
escaped running on foot . . . .” Compl. ¶ 35;     and kicked the perpetrator multiple times,
see also id. ¶¶ 36, 38–41.                        including in the head. Jackson
                                                  Incident/Investigation Report; Jackson
                                                  Interview 25:18–21. The perpetrator
                                                  managed to escape, and Jackson could not
                                                  catch up with him. Jackson
                                                  Incident/Investigation Report.

“Mr. Jackson described the man who killed         Jackson later described the killer as a “Black
Ms. Parker as 5’9”-5’11” or 6’0 roughly, 30-      Male, 5’9-5’11, 150-160lbs, medium
40 years old, wearing a gray hoodie under a       complexion, between 33-40 years old,
black puffy jacket with raised quilted squares    wearing blue jeans, a black quilted jacket, and
and he thought the killer had a full beard.”      a gray hooded sweat shirt underneath the
Compl. ¶ 37.                                      jacket with the hood pulled up,” and as
                                                  possibly having a beard. Jackson
                                                  Incident/Investigation Report.

 “Mr. Montgomery walked with a prominent          Montgomery stated he had a significant limp
limp because he had a chronic right leg           caused by falling off a ladder one year prior to
injury.” Compl. ¶ 60; see also id. ¶ 59.          the interrogation. Montgomery Statement II
                                                  7:10–22.

                                                 12
 “The February 4, 2012 photos and video of          Montgomery was wearing a brown jacket,
 Mr. Montgomery showed him wearing a light          white shoes, and tan pants at that time, which
 camel/brown colored jacket and khaki pants         he told detectives he had been wearing for the
 and white tennis shoes.” Compl. ¶ 68. “The         past four days (which would have included
 clothing Mr. Montgomery was wearing at the         the day Jones was murdered). Preliminary
 time of his arrest on February 4, 2012 was the     Hr’g Tr. 47:14–49:16; Wise Dep. Tr. 246:2–
 same clothing he had on the night Ms. Jones        5; Montgomery Statement 10:3–6.
 was murdered.” Id. ¶ 69.

 “Additional video footage collected by the         Gabriel, a bystander who left the bus stop
 MPD taken from a camera directly across            shortly before Jones was murdered, reported
 from the bus stop showed Mr. Montgomery            noticing a man who was staring at Jones.
 leave the bus stop before the murder of Ms.        Reply ISO SUF ¶¶ 3–4. Video surveillance
 Jones and walk across a nearby street behind       reveals that, shortly after Gabriel left the bus
 the bus stop, leaving the area entirely.”          stop, Jones did as well, and the man followed
 Compl. ¶ 46. “[N]o video footage showed            her. Id. ¶ 5. A few minutes later, Jones and
 Mr. Montgomery return to the bus stop prior        the man (or someone who looked similar)
 to the time Ms. Jones was murdered.” Id.           returned to the bus stop, at which point the
 ¶ 47.                                              man stabbed Jones in the head. Id. Gabriel
                                                    was presented with a nine-person photo array,
                                                    pointed to Montgomery’s photo, and said that
                                                    he “look[ed] like” the man at the bus stop. Id.
                                                    ¶ 4. Three others identified Montgomery as
                                                    the man in the publicly released video
                                                    depicting a man crossing the street near the
                                                    bus stop, id. ¶¶ 10–11; Harris
                                                    Incident/Investigation Report at 2. No one
                                                    identified Montgomery as the man who killed
                                                    Jones.

 “The person who fled down the southeast side       A portion of the video MPD did not release to
 of East Capitol within five minutes of the         the public showed the murderer fleeing the
 murder of Ms. Jones was the killer. This           bus stop at a fast pace. Wise Dep. Tr.
 person was running at a very fast clip . . . .”    158:22–159:5.
 Compl. ¶ 53.

Thus, because the allegations cited by the Court in its Opinion are supported by evidence in the

record, any error the Court made by referencing the complaint rather than the record is

inconsequential.

                                                   13
       The District also takes issue with the phrasing of the Court’s conclusion: “[w]hether

offering Montgomery a reasonable accommodation—such as conducting his interrogations in the

presence of an officer trained in crisis intervention—would have resulted in a ‘successful’

interrogation is, admittedly, speculative. But the claim is not so implausible as to warrant the entry

of summary judgment at this time,” Montgomery II, 2022 WL 1618741, at *28 (citation omitted).

Mot. at 5–6. The District mainly disputes the Court’s use of the words “speculative” and

“implausible”—words commonly associated with the motion to dismiss standard rather than the

summary judgment standard. See id. at 6. It then claims that “[t]o survive a motion for summary

judgment based on insufficient damages, a plaintiff must show that damages exist and are not

speculative,” and cites several cases it claims supports that proposition. Id. at 6 (collecting cases).

       As an initial matter, the District improperly characterizes its motion for summary judgment

as one “based on insufficient damages.” Mot. for Reconsideration at 6. The issue here is not

damages but rather proximate cause, which is a related yet distinct concept. Hence, the paragraph

in the District’s brief devoted to damages, see id., is inapposite. Further, the District’s assertion

that Montgomery’s theory—that had he been accommodated, he would not have been

prosecuted—is too speculative to survive summary judgment, see Mot. at 5–6, is incorrect. The

proximate cause inquiry is inherently speculative as it necessarily deals in counterfactuals—it

requires the fact finder to draw inferences about what would have happened given a different set

of circumstances.

       It cannot be the case that every plaintiff bringing a claim like Montgomery’s—or any claim

requiring a showing of proximate cause—could never succeed because the finder of fact is

prohibited from making any inferences based on the existing evidence. So long as they are

supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the record, a fact finder can certainly make

                                                  14
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Indeed, the District itself asks the Court to conclude

that its own proposed inferential chain and subsequent conclusion would have been more likely

than not—it argues that had Montgomery been accommodated, he still would have been

prosecuted. That conclusion is one that depends on speculation and deals in counterfactuals—

something the District claims is impermissible at the summary judgment stage. As discussed

further below, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence in the record to support Montgomery’s

theory of proximate cause and, hence, to preclude summary judgment for the District.

 II.   Proximate Cause

       The District also argues that Montgomery “failed to adduce evidence that the failure to

accommodate was the but for cause of [his] prosecution.” Mot. at 7 (cleaned up). Montgomery

disagrees, arguing that he has met his evidentiary burden on proximate cause because he has shown

that (1) the District believed his inculpatory statements were material to his guilt, and (2) the

District’s failure to accommodate during his interrogation denied him the opportunity to make

exculpatory statements and resulted in the District ignoring another suspect as well as other

evidence that pointed away from Montgomery. See Opp’n at 3–14.

       “[T]he mere violation of the ADA alone does not establish injury. Rather, the plaintiff is

obligated to show . . . that the defendant’s violation of the ADA proximately caused her actual

injury before she can recover.” DeLeon v. City of Alvin Police Dep’t, Civ. A. No. H–09–1022,

2010 WL 4942648, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2010) (citing Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc.,

141 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 1998)). A defendant may be entitled to summary judgment if the

plaintiff fails to make this showing. See Baker v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. Hous., Civ. A.

No. H-08-1908, 2011 WL 1549263, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2011); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (g).

Whether one event can be described as the cause of another is an intensely fact-sensitive question

                                                 15
and “ordinarily is one for the jury.” Colonial Parking, Inc. v. Morley, 391 F.2d 989, 990 (D.C.

Cir. 1968); accord Seed Co. Ltd. v. Westerman, Hattori, Daniels & Adrian, LLP, 961 F.3d 1190,

1197 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

       A. Probable Cause

       The District’s primary argument is that Montgomery cannot show that he would not have

been prosecuted had he been accommodated during the interrogation because “even without

considering any of the statements Montgomery made during the investigation, probable cause

supported his arrest and prosecution.” Mot. at 7–8. The District cites several out-of-circuit cases

for the proposition that “probable cause supporting police action precludes finding that the police

action at issue was proximately caused by a plaintiff’s disability.” Id. at 7–8 & n.2 (collecting

cases). Upon review of these cases, that assertion is incorrect as applied in this context.

       The first case the District cites in support of this proposition is Patrice v. Murphy, 43 F.

Supp. 2d 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1999). Mot. at 7–8. The plaintiff in Patrice, a deaf woman, brought

an ADA claim based on a discriminatory arrest. See 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1157. Police were called

to her home for a domestic violence incident, she was not accommodated with an American Sign

Language (“ASL”) interpreter during her interaction with the responding officers but rather was

told to write down her statement, and she was ultimately arrested for domestic violence. See id.

at 1157–58. She claimed that “with the help of an ASL interpreter, she could have talked her way

out of the seemingly damning evidence and avoided arrest.” Id. at 1162. The court first found

that plaintiff’s claim did not fall within the scope of the ADA. Id. at 1160. Then, in dictum, it

noted that the officers did adequately accommodate plaintiff’s disability “through the use of

written materials.” Id. at 1161. It went on to observe that even if her claim was cognizable under

the ADA, she had not demonstrated the requisite proximate cause because she “was arrested

                                                 16
because probable cause existed, . . . not because she is disabled.” Id. The court found that

probable cause existed for her arrest because plaintiff (through her written statement) and her

husband both stated that “(1) [plaintiff’s husband] thought plaintiff was going to use the knife to

kill him and (2) plaintiff was the initial aggressor.” Id. at 1162. Thus, the arresting officers

“obtained information from plaintiff which, on its face, established and/or confirmed the existence

of probable cause.” Id. at 1162–63.

       Patrice is distinguishable from the case at bar in many material respects. First, the court in

Patrice held that the plaintiff’s claim was not cognizable under the ADA and, even if it were,

plaintiff was adequately accommodated. That is very different from the instant case, where the

Court, in denying the District’s motion for summary judgment, held that Montgomery has met his

burden at this stage of showing a cognizable ADA claim based on the detectives’ failure to

accommodate him during his interrogation. See Montgomery II, 2022 WL 1618741, at *7–12.

Second, the Patrice court’s reasoning on the proximate cause point is entirely dicta, as it had

already held that the plaintiff did not allege a cognizable ADA claim. Last—and most critically—

the injury alleged in Patrice was her arrest, not her subsequent prosecution and detention, as in this

case. Thus, the independent existence of probable cause in Patrice is much more probative of the

fact that the plaintiff there would have been arrested even if she had been provided her desired

accommodation. In the instant case, the relevant harm is the prosecution, not the arrest. The

existence of probable cause is only one factor in the decision to charge and subsequently continue

to prosecute a defendant all the way through to trial—prosecutors often decline to pursue charges

against individuals whose arrests were supported by probable cause. As this Court noted in its

Opinion denying summary judgment, “the fact that the District could have prosecuted

Montgomery had his interrogations not occurred does not mean that the District would have

                                                 17
prosecuted him had he been able to meaningfully access and participate in his interrogations.” Id.

at *28. Patrice thus has limited applicability to the current case.

        The other cases the District cites on this point are unpersuasive for similar reasons. In J.H.

ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo County, 806 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2015), the plaintiff claimed that an

officer who arrested her minor child (J.P.) with a learning disability violated the ADA when he

“discriminated against J.P. by (1) making the arrest based on actions that manifested J.P.’s

disability and (2) failing to make reasonable accommodations during the arrest.” 806 F.3d at 1260.

The court held that “[t]hese claims are invalid as a matter of law . . . . [because the arresting officer]

could make the arrest based on probable cause, and there is no evidence indicating that he was

aware of a need to accommodate J.P.’s alleged disability.” Id. The officer arrested J.P. because

he witnessed her “commit a battery by kicking her teacher.” Id. Thus, her alleged learning

disability had nothing to do with the circumstances that led to her arrest. See id. The court

accordingly held that the plaintiff did not meet her burden to demonstrate that there was an ADA

violation or a lack of reasonable accommodation, so it did not even reach the issue of proximate

cause. Hence, that case is very different from the case at bar for many of the same reasons that

Patrice is distinguishable—any discussion of proximate cause in J.P. is dicta; the Court has already

determined here that Montgomery has met his burden at this stage of showing that he was

discriminated against and was not adequately accommodated during his interrogation; and, most

critically, in J.P. the alleged injury is the arrest itself, unlike in this case, where the alleged injury

is Montgomery’s subsequent prosecution and detention.

        In Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 410 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1285 (S.D. Fla. 2006), the

plaintiff, who is deaf, sued officers who arrested him for driving under the influence, alleging that

they violated his rights under the ADA. 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1281. “Plaintiff allege[d] that

                                                   18
throughout the arrest process, [the arresting officers] failed to establish effective communication

because [they] did not provide Plaintiff with any auxiliary aids as are required by the ADA . . . .”

Id. The arresting officers witnessed the plaintiff “commit several traffic infractions[,] . . . smelled

the odor of alcohol on Plaintiff’s breath[,] and saw that Plaintiff had red and watery eyes.” Id. at

1282. “[T]he officer [then] asked Plaintiff to perform a roadside sobriety test. The officer and

Plaintiff communicated verbally during the test though Plaintiff allege[d] that he could not

understand the officer. At the conclusion of the test, the officer found that Plaintiff was too

impaired to drive.” Id. The court first held that “Plaintiff’s arrest and the events arising from the

arrest do not fall within the protections of the ADA.” Id. at 1285. When discussing the plaintiff’s

claim under the relevant state discrimination law, which applies ADA principles, the court

determined that plaintiff was not entitled to his requested accommodation. Id. Then, the court

noted that “[t]he arrest was not based on Plaintiff’s disability and there is no causal connection

between Plaintiff’s disability and the arrest,” and that “[t]o have a cause of action for

discrimination under the ADA, there must be a causal link between a plaintiff’s disability and the

wrongful arrest; i.e., no other probable cause for the arrest exists.” Id. For the same reasons as

discussed previously in relation to the other two cited cases, the analysis in Bircoll is not persuasive

in this case, most importantly because the alleged harm in Bircoll was the arrest rather than

subsequent prosecution and detention.

       The same is true of Trujillo v. Rio Arriba County ex rel. Rio Arriba County Sheriff’s

Department, 319 F.R.D. 571 (D.N.M. 2016), another case cited by the District that focused on the

arrest as the injury, not the subsequent prosecution. See 319 F.R.D. at 579.

       The circumstances presented in the District’s final case, Gorrell v. Delaware State Police,

No. 98-649-SLR, 1999 WL 1893142 (D. Del. Oct. 20, 1999), are more similar to Montgomery’s

                                                  19
but are nevertheless distinguishable. The plaintiff in Gorrell, who was deaf, alleged an ADA

violation based on the police officer’s failure to provide him an interpreter during an interview that

led to his arrest and ultimate conviction at trial. Id. at *1. Instead of providing the plaintiff with

an ASL interpreter, “the officer conducted the interview by way of written questions and answers

as well as sign language interpretation by plaintiff’s wife and seven-year-old daughter.” Id. The

plaintiff argued that the state’s failure to provide him with a copy of the written interview violated

his ADA rights. Id. at *2. The court first observed that “it is questionable whether plaintiff, in

fact, suffered any injury that would suffice to invoke the ADA’s protections.” Id. at *4. It then

noted, “assuming arguendo that plaintiff, in fact, was injured,” “[p]laintiff does not explain how

having a copy of the written interview would have changed the outcome of the trial.” Id. at *5.

Specifically, the court reasoned that “[s]ince the notes were never introduced at trial and the officer

never testified as to their content, it is difficult to discern how the officer’s failure to provide

plaintiff a copy of the written interview was detrimental to his case.” Id. The court also held that

“plaintiff was provided all the accommodation required under the ADA.” Id.

       Gorrell’s circumstances are distinguishable in critical ways.             Unlike in Gorrell,

Montgomery alleges that his injury—prosecution and detention for murder—would not have

occurred had he been accommodated during his interrogation in which he made inculpatory

statements. And, unlike in Gorrell, the District did rely heavily on Montgomery’s inculpatory

statements at trial, further bolstering the claim that his prosecution would not have occurred but-

for those statements. Further, and importantly, this Court has already held that there is a triable

issue as to whether Montgomery was provided adequate ADA accommodations.

                                                  20
       Hence, none of the cases the District cites in support are persuasive on this issue, and the

Court rejects the District’s proposition that “probable cause defeat[s] proximate cause,” Reply at

7–8, as a matter of law.

       B. Montgomery’s Evidence

       The District contends that “Plaintiff offered no evidence . . . that Montgomery’s

prosecution was caused by the District’s failure to accommodate him during his interviews.” Mot.

at 8. That is not true. There are several pieces of evidence that support Montgomery’s theory of

proximate cause sufficient to create a triable issue.

          i.   Interrogation

       First, there is evidence indicating that had Montgomery been accommodated during the

interrogation, he would not have made inculpatory statements, would have made exonerating

statements, or would have provided information that would have pointed away from him as the

suspect. The expert report and testimony by Dr. Kenneth Stefano, a psychologist, supports this

inference. He testified that Montgomery’s mental health episode during the interrogation caused

him to “respond[], often, in tangential and non-sensible ways that . . . the detectives interpreted

through a particular lens of presumed guilt[].” Ex. 5 to Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 56-

7] (“Stefano Dep. Tr.”) 57:12– 21; see also id. 57:22–58:12; Ex. 5 to Mot. [ECF No. 68-5]

(“Stefano Dep. Tr. II”) 101:20–102:6.           He further testified that the officers “ignored

[Montgomery’s] statement that, what he meant by crushing the pretty lady was that he had

intercourse with her,” not that he murdered her. Stefano Dep. Tr. II 101:9–14. Dr. Stefano

concluded that, in his expert opinion, Montgomery’s inculpatory statements were a “result[]” of

being denied accommodations. Ex. 6 to Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. [ECF No. 56-8] (“Stefano

Expert Report”) ¶ 30. Moreover, the fact that Montgomery was ultimately acquitted of the murder

                                                 21
charge supports the inference that he is factually innocent and thus would have provided

exculpatory information if properly accommodated.

       The District argues that “Dr. Stefano is a psychologist, not a prosecutor; he has no expertise

in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and cannot therefore provide expert testimony about how

a prosecutor would react to different evidence.” Mot. at 9–10. The Court agrees. But that is not

the inference for which Dr. Stefano’s opinion is relevant. Rather, it is relevant for the first link in

the inferential chain—that, had Montgomery been accommodated for his disability, he likely

would not have made inculpatory statements or would have made exculpatory statements or

provided information that would tend to exonerate him. As a psychologist, Dr. Stefano’s opinion

as to what Montgomery would have done had his psychotic mental health crisis been

accommodated is appropriate. Any disagreement the District has regarding the weight that Dr.

Stefano’s opinion should be accorded can be argued at trial, but it is not an appropriate basis for

granting summary judgment to the District.

       The District further urges that “Plaintiff must prove how Montgomery’s responses—had

he been accommodated—would have caused the prosecutor to change course.” Mot. at 10. But

that is exactly what the expert report and testimony purport to do. Dr. Stefano opines that

Montgomery’s mental illness caused him to answer questions in an evasive and erratic way, which

detectives could reasonably perceive as a sign of guilt. See Stefano Dep. Tr. II 89:16–90:15.

Moreover, he notes that the detectives failed to follow up on Montgomery’s statement that he

“crushed” the victim.      Id. 101:9–14.     If followed up on properly with accommodation,

Montgomery might have been able to explain what he meant by that statement. And Dr. Stefano

concluded that an adequate accommodation would have made Montgomery more likely to offer

exculpatory information, Stefano Expert Report ¶ 29, which is further corroborated by the fact that

                                                  22
Montgomery was acquitted of murder and that there is physical evidence that points away from

his guilt. Last—and critically—the District does not dispute that Montgomery’s “mental illness

and psychotic symptoms made him more susceptible to coercive or deceptive interview tactics and

more likely to acquiesce and agree to whatever the detectives said.” Resp. to SDF ¶ 89.

       Hence, the Court declines to alter its conclusion that Montgomery has provided sufficient

evidence at this stage to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that, had he been accommodated

during the interrogation, he would have either not made inculpatory statements or would have

made exculpatory statements or provided other exonerating information.

         ii.   Prosecution

       The second link in the inferential chain that Montgomery must prove to establish proximate

cause is that, had he not given inculpatory statements during the interrogation, he would not have

been prosecuted. The District claims Montgomery has also not met his burden of production as to

this link in the chain: “no reasonable juror could conclude that the failure to accommodate

Montgomery caused the prosecution.” Mot. at 11. The Court disagrees.

       Montgomery has furnished sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could

infer that the District would not have chosen to pursue its case against him if it had not extracted

the inculpatory statements from him during the interrogation. The unique facts of this case suggest

that Montgomery’s inculpatory statements did more than just tip the evidentiary burden scales in

favor of continuing prosecution—they caused the detectives to fixate and remain hyper-focused

on Montgomery as a suspect at the expense of investigating other viable suspects, such as Mark

Johnson. A jury could reasonably infer that investigation into the existence of the other viable

suspect, paired with the other weaknesses of the case against Montgomery, would have made the

District less likely to take its case against Montgomery all the way to trial.

                                                 23
       First, a reasonable jury could infer that, had detectives not extracted inculpatory statements

from Montgomery, the prosecutors would have dropped the charges against him based on lack of

evidence sometime in the litigation timeline before trial. The most probative evidence on this

point is the extent to which the District relied on Montgomery’s inculpatory statements at trial.

The District played hours of video of Montgomery’s interrogation. Resp. to SDF ¶¶ 98, 101; see

also Aug. 8, 2017 Trial Tr. 4:24–5:20.        They used that video to introduce Montgomery’s

inculpatory statements as evidence of his guilt. Ex. 10 to Opp’n [ECF No. 68-10] (“Aug. 14, 2017

Trial Tr.”) 125:7–23, 172:5–24. The District also argued that it should be able to use the video

recording of the interrogation as evidence that Montgomery has a capacity for violence. See Ex.

9 to Opp’n [ECF No. 68-9] (“Aug. 9, 2017 Trial Tr.”) 106:20–107:3, 109:23–110:5, 116:1–10; see

also Ex. 11 to Opp’n [ECF No. 68-11] (“July 31, 2017 Trial Tr.”) 74:10–75:4, 76:19–78:1.

Importantly, the District cited the inculpatory statements in its closing, urging the jury to

       [l]isten to those statements. When you listen to those statements, when you watch
       the videotape, you will understand and you know that it was the defendant who
       killed her. . . . You cannot ignore the questions from the detectives and you cannot
       ignore the answers by Mr. Montgomery. . . . [D]uring examination and questioning
       by the police, he told them exactly that that was him. He told . . . the detective what
       happened. He talked about the pretty lady and that she did not give him the time
       of day and that he crushed the pretty lady.

Aug. 14, 2017 Trial Tr. 127:17–19, 167:10–12, 172:4–11. This excerpt supports a reasonable

inference that the inculpatory statements made during the interrogation were central to the

District’s case and, accordingly, that when deciding whether to pursue the charges against

Montgomery all the way to trial, it considered these statements a centerpiece of the case against

him. As discussed above, the fact that independent probable cause existed supporting the arrest

and the charge is necessary but not sufficient to show that the District would have continued to

prosecute him without the inculpatory statements. Charges may be dropped even if probable cause

                                                 24
exists when the prosecutors do not believe the case is strong enough to win, largely because the

government’s evidentiary burden to establish probable cause is much lower than its evidentiary

burden to prove guilt at a criminal trial.

       Second, a reasonable jury could also infer from the record that Montgomery’s inculpatory

statements caused detectives to become so fixated on him as the primary suspect that they did not

fully investigate other suspects and ignored other evidence that pointed away from Montgomery.

In other words, had the detectives not extracted the inculpatory statements during Montgomery’s

first interview, it is likely that they would not have focused in on him as the murderer at the expense

of a more fulsome investigation that could have uncovered other suspects and led to other arrests.

       Montgomery has raised numerous facts that show that detectives were fixated on him

despite strong exculpatory evidence and did not complete a well-rounded investigation as a result:

(1) Montgomery’s DNA was not a match for the DNA recovered at the crime scene; (2) there was

another suspect identified by a tipster who was never fully investigated and whose DNA was not

sampled; (3) MPD never uploaded the DNA from the crime scene to CODIS to look for matches

on the database; (4) Montgomery did not match some of the eye witnesses’ descriptions of the

murderer; (5) Montgomery had no visible bruising or defensive wounds despite testimony that the

perpetrator was beaten up the night of the murder; (6) Montgomery had a significant limp limiting

his ability to walk, yet the murderer ran away from the crime scene at a fast pace; (7) the only two

eyewitnesses to the murder were never presented with a photo array; and (8) MPD ended its

investigation only ten days after its interrogation of Montgomery. All of these facts support the

reasonable inference that, without the inculpatory statements obtained during an interrogation

without accommodation, the MPD detectives would not have been so fixated on Montgomery

given this other exculpatory evidence. They also support the inference that, had Montgomery not

                                                  25
given inculpatory statements, the detectives would have more fully investigated other leads, which

might well have led to a different charging decision. And this is all underpinned by the fact that

Montgomery was ultimately acquitted of the crime, which, while not dispositive, is an important

fact that makes his factual innocence significantly more likely.

       Hence, the Court declines to alter its prior determination that Montgomery has adduced

sufficient evidence at this stage supporting the inference that, had he been accommodated for his

disability during his interrogation, he would not have been prosecuted, precluding the entry of

summary judgment for the District on the issue of probable cause.

                                          *       *        *

       At bottom, the District’s argument is premised on the notion that Montgomery’s theory is

supported by merely speculative inferences rather than by evidence in the record on which a

reasonable fact finder could rely to draw such inferences. The Court disagrees. All proximate

cause assessments are speculative to some degree. Here, Montgomery moved beyond mere

speculation by pointing to sufficient facts in the record that support the inferences a reasonable

jury could draw that would show that the District’s failure to accommodate was the proximate

cause of his prosecution and detention.

                                              Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny the District’s motion for reconsideration.

Accordingly, the Court orders the parties to meet and confer to discuss the next steps in this

litigation and to file a joint status report outlining a schedule for further proceedings by not later

than August 15, 2023. The Court also orders the parties to appear for a status conference on August

16, 2023 to discuss the status of the litigation and the proposed schedule. A separate accompanying

Order will issue on this date.

                                                 26
                                        /s/
                                 JOHN D. BATES
                            United States District Judge

Dated: July 21, 2023

                       27