Court Opinion

ID: 9625078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:27:16.181144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:00.380125
License: Public Domain

Eather, J.,
dissenting:
I dissent. I would hold that suit had been commenced within the statutory period; that summary judgment should be set aside and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
As was recently stated in Lewis v. Neblett, ....Cal. App.2d...., 302 P.2d 859, 863, “Statutes of limitation are ‘intended to run against those who are neglectful of their rights, and who fail to use reasonable and proper diligence in the enforcement thereof’.” (Citing Neff v. New York Life Insurance Co., 30 Cal.2d. 165, 180 P.2d 900, 171 A.L.R. 563.)
In the case at bar it cannot be said that appellant has been neglectful of his rights or failed to use reasonable or proper diligence. On the contrary, as concerns service of process, the record demonstrates the utmost good faith in attempts to make prompt service. After receiving summons from the clerk, appellant’s counsel (1) conferred with the sheriff with reference to service and did not deliver summons to the sheriff for the reason that counsel did not know where the defendant might be served; (2) checked the Reno police department report of the collision out of which the caúse of action arose; (3) made further inquiry at the Reno police station as to the address or whereabouts of the defendant; (4) checked the records of the safety responsibility division of the Nevada Public Service Commission; (5) checked the Reno telephone directory; (6) checked the Reno city directory; (7) made inquiry from the defendant’s attorney; (8) when the defendant’s whereabouts were learned, accomplished service forthwith.
*324iAll that precludes recognition of this diligence is the rule, announced by this court in Nevada Cornell Silver Mines, Inc. v. Hankins, 51 Nev. 420, 279 P. 27, 32, to the effect that the attorney for the plaintiff is not a person authorized to make service of process. This court was divided in that case, Mr. Justice Ducker dissenting from the majority opinion. In his dissenting opinion he emphasized that the applicable section of the civil practice act made no prohibition against service of process by counsel; that such prohibition must be found in the common law. He referred to First National Bank of Whitewater v. Estenson, 68 Minn. 28, 70 N.W. 775, stating, “The court pointed out that the same reasons of public policy which moved the legislature to deny such authority to a party to an action do not apply to the same extent to an attorney who is an officer of the court, and answerable to it for fraud or misconduct in the premises.”
It is my opinion that the majority of this court in that case was in error and that such error should now be corrected and the dissenting opinion recognized to be the rule of this state.
In the case at bar, delivery of summons to the attorney for the plaintiff should be held to constitute effective delivery to a person authorized to make service and thus complete the requirement of issuance of summons under Woodstock v. Whitaker.