Court Opinion

ID: 9516937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:56:52.220806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:33.603603
License: Public Domain

JACK CARTER, Justice,
concurring.
It appears to me that the error in excluding Dr. Ondrovik’s testimony was preserved for appellate review. After qualifying the psychologist concerning her education and experience as one who has worked with over 1,000 sexual offenders, the defense attorney established that On-drovik had assessed and evaluated the defendant. She explained the tests used for the evaluation and then the defense attorney asked: “Did you evaluate Mr. Alberts as to whether or not he’d be a good candidate for probation? She answered that she did. The next, interrupted question, was, “What was your — .”
At that time the State began a series of objections, interruptions, and colloquy with the trial court that continued for several typewritten pages in the record. The State objected that it was not the expert’s decision whether or not probation was proper and that she had a financial interest in supervising sexual offenders. The defense attorney stated to the court that he was trying to elicit testimony from the witness revealing the result of her evaluation of Alberts for probation. At that time the trial court stated the testimony would be allowed, whereupon the State told to the court, “we’re going to — can I take this witness on voir dire?”
During the voir dire examination the State continually suggested the witness could not ethically testify whether or not a sex offender would reoffend. At the end of this voir dire the State requested the trial court exclude Ondrovik’s testimony “that this person is not at risk to reof-fend.” Once again the defense attorney asked that the expert witness be allowed to “finish her testimony she started, as it relates to her evaluation of him and whether or not he would be a good candidate for probation.” Apparently changing its mind, the trial court agreed with the State and ruled “her testimony on this matter will not go any further than what — where we are right now.” The defense attorney objected to the ruling.
A party whose evidence has been excluded must make an offer of proof at which time the substance of the evidence was made known to the court, or was apparent from the context within the questions asked. Tex.R. Evid. 103(2).
The record demonstrates, despite the continued interruptions, that defense counsel presented to the trial court the substance of the evidence the expert would offer- — she had evaluated Alberts and was prepared to present evidence of whether he would be a suitable candidate for probation. Even if the offer had not explicitly apprised the court of the substance of the testimony, the questions asked and the sequence of events left nothing to the imagination — the evidence sought to be presented was readily apparent within the questions asked.
The State’s brief cites this Court’s opinion in Hardin v. State, 20 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. refd), which held testimony concerning a defendant’s “suitability for probation” is generally in*511admissible, but was proper to rebut the defendant’s evidence. Id. at 90. But the State failed to acknowledge the more recent Texas Court of Criminal Appeals opinion which specifically held that properly qualified witnesses may offer evidence of a defendant’s suitability for probation (community supervision). Ellison v. State, 201 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (allowing a probation officer to testify to the defendant’s suitability for probation (community supervision)).8
The expert witness was in court prepared to testify; her qualifications were not challenged; she had examined Alberts to determine if he would be a candidate for probation (community supervision); the trial attorney explained several times that was the subject of her testimony; the trial court clearly understood the issue presented and excluded the evidence. The fact that she did not utter the words that she thought he was either a good or a bad candidate is, in this context, irrelevant; whatever her expert opinion, whether he was a suitable candidate for community supervision or not, the evidence was admissible. (“Today’s decision gives equal opportunity to the State and a defendant to put on testimony of the defendant’s suitability for community supervision.” Id. at 722.) I believe the issue was preserved, and the trial court erred in excluding the testimony.
Was the error harmful and reversible? What is the likelihood that the jury would have granted Alberts community supervision if the expert’s testimony had been properly allowed? An examination of the entire record reveals very damning evidence. Alberts was found guilty by this jury of committing several acts of sexual assault on young children in his family. With or without expert testimony, convincing a jury, which has found a defendant guilty of numerous acts of sexual assault on children, to release him on community supervision is a daunting task. While I believe the evidence was admissible, I would further find that its exclusion had no substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 592 (Tex.Crim.App.2008). Consequently, it is not a reversible error.
I concur with the judgment reached in the majority opinion.

. The Texas Rules of Professional Conduct establish that a lawyer has a duty of candor toward the tribunal. Tex.R. Prof'l Conduct 3.03, reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 2005).
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
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(4) fail to disclose to the tribunal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.