Court Opinion

ID: 9672314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:52:35.096853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:39.600970
License: Public Domain

FINCH, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion herein and concur in the dissenting opinion of Judge Holman.
The majority opinion holds that evidence of the price paid in 1954 by Esses for the property being condemned was admissible as some evidence of value as of the date of taking. This is done on the authority of State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Rauscher Chevrolet Co., Mo., 291 S.W.2d 89. In my judgment, the opinion in the Rauscher case would make “this evidence inadmissible. It holds, l.c. 92, that the general rule that the price-the owner paid for property being condemned is admissible as some evidence of its value at the time of appropriation, is subject to certain provisos. Some of those, l.c. 92, are that “the purchase must have been recent and not remote in point of time. Marked changes in conditions or values must not have occurred since the sale.” The majority opinion recognizes and enumerates marked changes and improvements in the area, including the start of the Gateway Arch and the development of the riverfront area, and also recognizes that the purchase had been made nine years before. These conceded changes in the neighborhood, together with the lapse of time, made this evidence inadmissible under the Rauscher rule.
On reason and logic, this testimony of the 1954 purchase should not be admissible in ■ this case. The sole and only purpose of the trial was to arrive at the fair market value of the property condemned as of the date of taking, which was 1963. Evidence is admitted for the purpose of determining that question and that question only. What the market value was at another date is wholly immaterial except that if there has been no material change in character of the neighborhood and property values have remained relatively constant, the amount of the purchase price paid becomes material because it is evidence of the fair market value at the time of taking.
Under the facts as recognized and enumerated in the majority opinion, the neigh*391borhood where this property was located had changed. The Rauscher opinion refers to “marked changes.” It would be fair to say in this instance that there had been radical changes. The construction of the Gateway Arch and the entire riverfront renovation project revolutionized the situation in that area. The situation in 1963 was not the same as in 19S4. The two experts on value who testified for the Authority fixed the value of the property condemned at the time of taking at $49,000 and $50,000, respectively. Hence, they did not fix a value substantially the same as the purchase price paid in 1954. In fact, no one did. Under those circumstances, evidence of what Esses paid in 1954 was evidence only of what the fair market value was in 1954, not what it was in 1963. It was not corroborative of any other evidence as to value in 1963 and should not have been admitted.
There is a further reason why the evidence was not admissible. When Esses acquired this property in 1954 for $40,000, the transaction also involved the cancellation of a five-year lease on the property held by Esses. No evidence was offered to show whether this was advantageous to Esses or to the seller, or how the cancellation of that lease affected the purchase price paid by Esses. There was no evidence to show whether the amount paid was higher or lower than it would have been if the lease had not been in existence and had not been can-celled. If the transaction in 1954 had included the purchase of a second tract and the $40,000 purchase price had been a lump sum payment for both, it is obvious that the sale price would not have been admissible unless broken down between the two tracts so that the evidence pertained only to the purchase price of the tract being condemned. For the same reason, evidence as to the purchase price paid in the transaction when it covered not only real estate purchased but the cancellation of a five-year lease was not admissible.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.