Court Opinion

ID: 9487635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:22:42.938684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:24.301063
License: Public Domain

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
As to Hamrick’s convictions' on Counts I, II, III, VI, and VIII, the en banc court affirms these convictions by an equally divided court. In my view, the destructive device convictions having been affirmed by an equally divided court, the sentence enhancement is likewise sustained by an equally divided court.1 I also agree with the apparent consensus of the entire en banc court that Hamrick’s attacks as to his convictions on Counts IV and V have no merit. In addition, I would affirm Hamrick’s conviction on Count VII on the sole basis that under the Supreme Court’s decision in McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 106 S.Ct. 1677, 90 L.Ed.2d 15 (1986), the bomb in question constitutes a deadly or dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) because a bomb (though dysfunctional) is “typically and characteristically dangerous” and “instills fear in the average citizen.” Id. at 17-18, 106 S.Ct. at 1678.2 Finally, I add this cautionary note. To the extent that Judge Luttig’s plurality and concurring opinions may be construed to mean that the bomb in question was a destructive device under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(4) *891and 924(e)(1) and 26 U.S.C. §§ 6845(f) and 5861, see plurality op. at 881-82 (citing destructive device eases and testimony of government experts), plurality op. at 13 (discussing procedural history of destructive device convictions), and plurality op. at 885-86 (discussing the § 924(c) sentencing enhancement for use of a destructive device), and concurring op. at 886-89 (discussing the testimony of the government experts and the sufficiency of the evidence of the destructive device convictions), such a construction is pure dicta of no precedential value.3

. No member of this court apparently takes issue with the fact that if the bomb in question was a destructive device, the enhancement should apply.

. I cannot join the plurality opinion of Judge Luttig addressing this point because of its unnecessary and unfortunate reliance on cases involving destructive devices and the testimony of the government’s experts regarding whether the bomb in question was capable of detonation. Citation to the destructive device cases is inappropriate for several reasons. First, as this case pellucidly illustrates, our destructive device jurisprudence (namely/ what constitutes a destructive device) is unsettled. Second, these cases offer no guidance whatsoever as to what constitutes a deadly or dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b). Third, citation to these cases may be construed as an endorsement that the bomb in question was a destructive device, a matter that the court is evenly divided on. Citation to the testimony of the government’s experts regarding the bomb in question's capability of detonation is also, in my view, inappropriate. As the plurality opinion recognizes when it states "the presumption that the bomb sent by Hamrick was dangerous was fully warranted, even though the bomb appears to have been dysfunctional,” plurality op. at 881, the issue under the first two of McLaughlin's three independent rationales is *891not whether the bomb in question was capable or incapable of detonation. Rather, under the first independent rationale, the questions are whether a bomb in general is typically and characteristically dangerous and the use for which a bomb is manufactured is a dangerous one. Pure common sense tells us that the answer to these inquiries is yes, and, therefore, McLaughlin's first independent rationale is met. As to McLaughlin 's second independent rationale, no showing of capability'of detonation is necessary here because even a dysfunctional bomb, upon display, instills fear in the average citizen. Therefore, this testimony is irrelevant to the dangerous weapon inquiry.

. Of course, any view (including my own) that the bomb in question was or was not a destructive device bears no precedential weight because the court affirms the destructive device convictions by an equally divided court. See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 n. 7, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1730 n. 7, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987).