Court Opinion

ID: 9593217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:20:37.18381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:18.821940
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(concurring). I concur in the judgment. I write separately to emphasize the limited scope of our affirmance.
The other no-fault jurisdictions that have considered the issue whether a specially equipped van is a reasonably necessary medical expense under their no-fault acts have done so with mixed results. In Stewart v Allstate Ins Co, 103 NJ 139; 510 A2d 1131 (1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the cost of a specially modified van is a medical expense covered by the personal injury protection provisions of the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act. However, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Langan v Harleysville Ins Co, 376 Pa Super 372; 546 A2d 75 (1988), refused to follow Stewart and construed its former no-fault act much more restrictively. The majority of the Pennsylvania appellate court held that a specially equipped van is an allowable medical expense under the Pennsylvania no-fault act only if it is proved that "such a vehicle is the most economical and only feasible method of transporting the injured person 'to secure medical and vocational rehabilitation services’ and that the vehicle will be used solely for this purpose.” Id. at 378. Emphasis added. Both cases involved rulings on motions for summary judgment.
In the present case, Branch Circuit Judge Michael H. Cherry refused to grant summary disposition to either party on the basis that the issue was one for the trier of fact. At the conclusion of a nonjury trial, Judge Cherry found the van at issue to be a reasonable medical transportation expense *331necessary to accommodate plaintiffs accident-related handicap. On appeal, defendant argues that Judge Cherry erred in finding the public transportation system in Branch County to be inadequate to serve the plaintiffs medical needs. I join the majority in affirming because I cannot conclude that the trial court’s finding of fact was clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C). As noted by the trial court, the Branch County Transportation Service is limited geographically to Branch County. Plaintiffs doctors, however, practice in neighboring Kalamazoo County. Defendant’s position that plaintiff should utilize an ambulance service to be transported out of the county was determined to be unreasonable by the lower court. This finding is not clearly erroneous and therefore must be affirmed.
An important but unpreserved issue is the measure of plaintiffs damages. At trial and on appeal, defendant simply argued that it was not responsible for a specially equipped van or, in the alternative, that it was liable only for the cost of converting a van to special paraplegic use. Defendant apparently overlooks the fact that before the accident, plaintiff and her husband owned two vehicles. The van at issue replaced a vehicle that plaintiff operated before the accident. In my view, the lower court erred in requiring defendant to bear one hundred percent of the initial purchase price of the van. Rather, when the necessary product is a replacement, the measure of damages should be the difference between the cost of the new product and the value of the previously owned product. Additionally, defendant should be afforded a lien on the van and, before its purchase, be given an option to lease such a vehicle or to purchase it in monthly installments. Under appropriate circumstances, an insurer should have the *332alternative to contract with a transportation authority to provide for all of its insured’s medical transportation needs on a twenty-four hour basis.
While Manley v DAIIE, 127 Mich App 444; 339 NW2d 205 (1983), rev’d 425 Mich 140; 388 NW2d 216 (1986), may have construed the no-fault act too restrictively, Sharp v Preferred Risk Mutual Ins Co, 142 Mich App 499; 370 NW2d 619 (1985), appears to construe it too broadly. Surely, if the plaintiff in Sharp had owned a condominium or a home before his injury, this Court would not require a defendant no-fault insurer to bear the full cost of purchasing a new residence without a deduction or setoff of the plaintiff’s previous home ownership interest. The goal of the no-fault act is "to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic losses.” Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). Reparation for actual damages is provided; windfalls are not. See, e.g., Thompson v DAIIE, 418 Mich 610, 619; 344 NW2d 764 (1984) (opinion by Levin, J.), and MacDonald v State Farm Mutual Ins Co, 419 Mich 146; 350 NW2d 233 (1984).
In my view, plaintiff’s transportation damages caused by the accident are in part the difference between the cost of the specially equipped van and the value of plaintiff’s previous vehicle. However, because this measure of damages was neither argued nor preserved by defendant, I concur with the majority.
I join in Judge Holbrook’s opinion with respect to the other issues.