Court Opinion

ID: 9465990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:02:18.956055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:29.150994
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge, with whom BROWN, Chief Judge, GODBOLD and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges,
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority’s decision that a writ of mandamus should be issued here.1 But I believe that it is fairer and more decorous for us to direct that a different district judge, other than the one who imposed these illegal sentences, resentence the defendants. It is true that the government, despite ample opportunity, never asked us to direct that resentencing be done by a different judge. But resentencing by a different judge is not part of the “relief” we grant to a party in this case; it is not something we should do because we want to aid the government’s case or, for that matter, the defendants’ case. We should do it because the fairness and integrity of the sentencing process require it. The government has petitioned for our writ of mandamus, and we are entitled to grant that writ in the form that will best promote the interests of the judicial system. For these reasons I must, in part, dissent.
“It is difficult for a judge” — any judge— “having made up his mind, to resentence a *1150defendant” when the initial sentence is overturned. Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1972). When the district judge in this case resentences the defendants, it will inevitably be difficult for him, as it would for any person, to ignore the opinion he previously embraced. If, on reconsidering, he again believes that a lenient sentence is appropriate, he will naturally — and conscientiously — fear that he is defying the spirit of our order, and of the civil rights and probation statutes which do not permit the sentence he originally imposed.2 If, on the other hand, he is inclined to impose more severe sentences he will fear — again, naturally and conscientiously — that he is bending over backward, rejecting his prior view vigorously simply to avoid appearing unduly committed to it. It will be most difficult for him to take a fresh view of the problem.
But disciplining his own mind, and approaching the issue as if he had never passed judgment on it before, will be the least of the district judge’s problems. A judge has a duty not just to be impartial but to appear impartial. When this case comes up for resentencing, we will already have done our share to create unfortunate appearances. We will have sent the government back before a judge who has already declared that one year’s imprisonment is the appropriate sentence for these defendants, see United States v. Denson, 588 F.2d 1112, 1131 (5th Cir. 1979) (panel majority), and the government, if it requests a more severe sentence, will have to dissuade the judge from simply readopting a view he has previously taken. The defendants, meanwhile, will be before a judge whose leniency we have rejected. In this unwholesome situation, the district judge— even if this were an ordinary case — would have to be concerned not just with his own approach but with whether he appears to be either excessively committed to the views he has already expressed or excessively eager to prove his impartiality by rejecting them. And, of course, this is no ordinary case. When he imposed the sentences, the district judge said he was attempting “to depoliticize what has become an almost intolerable situation of attempts to interfere with the independence of the Court.” Having acknowledged that pressure, he will, as any judge would, want to avoid appearing to give in to it, an appearance he will create if he increases the defendants’ sentences. But as I said, like any conscientious judge, he will also want to follow — and to appear to be following — both the spirit and the letter of our decision in this case. We are presenting the district judge with an intractable problem;2a it demands an impossible balancing act. No judge should be placed in such a predicament.
Of course, it is possible that this district judge can overcome all of these difficulties. He may be able both to be uninfluenced by the views he has already expressed and to appear to be uninfluenced. There is a chance that, through extraordinary efforts, he will be able to banish from his resentencing decision all the intense, conflicting pressures that inevitably result when a judge has already expressed a considered view about the proper sentence. But I see no reason for us to take this chance. Directing that a different judge resentence the defendants is the simple and obvious way to remove the danger. It is not improper or unseemly. It does not insult the original judge. Even if it were a novel measure, it would be appropriate, for nothing in this case calls for judicial restraint. There are no issues of federalism, no concerns about the separation of powers, no danger that we will be insufficiently deferential to the decisions of the elected branches of the government. The case is entirely within our domain. We are granting our writ, correcting *1151the illegal action of a district court under our supervisory jurisdiction. See LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60, 77 S.Ct. 309, 1 L.Ed.2d 290 (1957). Every issue on which we are divided concerns judge-made law about the scope of our discretion to grant and shape a remedy which Congress has given us wide authority to provide. This is an unusually appropriate case for us to be flexible and, if necessary, creative.
In fact, of course, resentencing by a different judge is not at all novel. Time and again the Supreme Court, our sister circuits, and we ourselves have ordered that a different judge resentence defendants whose original sentences were vacated. In most of these cases there is no indication that one party requested the case to be remanded to a different judge; rather, courts of appeals have ordered resentencing by a different judge in order to “preserve the appearance of justice,” United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977), and to protect “the integrity and dignity of the judicial process.” United States v. CBS, 497 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1974). The most conspicuous example is Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). There the Supreme Court vacated a sentence because the prosecutor violated his plea bargain by making a recommendation to the judge; the Court held that the defendant was to be resentenced by a different judge. Id. at 263, 92 S.Ct. 495. Since judges are routinely expected to ignore improper arguments or inadmissible evidence, the Court must have been concerned primarily with the judge’s inability to discard an opinion he had previously formed. The Supreme Court “emphasize[d] that this is in no sense to question the fairness of the sentencing judge.” Id. at 263, 92 S.Ct. 495. We have followed Santobello many times. See, e. g. United States v. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Vale, 496 F.2d 365, 367 (5th Cir. 1976).
Broken plea bargains are not the only precedent, however. In United States v. C. B. S., 497 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1974), we reversed a contempt conviction for violating the lower court’s order banning courtroom sketches, and we remanded for retrial before a different judge from the one who had issued the order. We explicitly held that our supervisory power entitled us to remand to a different judge. We emphasized that we intended no insult to the original judge. We wrote:
The trial judge in this case may well have had the unique ability to be an impartial judge in the circumstances, but regardless of that fact, such a trial does little to protect the judicial process from any possible suspicion of bias.
Id. at 109. This reasoning applies equally to the case before us.
Other circuits have been no less emphatic. In Mawson v. United States, 463 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1972), the defense attorney had had insufficient time to investigate and rebut statements in a presentence report upon which the sentencing judge relied. The First Circuit vacated the sentence and, noting that it intended no comment on the ability or partiality of the original judge, remanded to another judge for resentencing. Obviously, the pressures on the judge in that situation, and the danger of unfortunate appearances, are far less than in the case before us. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit ordered resentencing by a different judge after the original sentencing judge improperly considered the out of state residence of the defendants. United States v. Diamond, 561 F.2d 557 (4th Cir. 1977). The Ninth Circuit held that a different judge should resentence the defendant when the record showed that the original judge may have relied on an invalid prior conviction. Leano v. United States, 592 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1979). The Tenth Circuit, in a somewhat analogous case, ordered a new trial before a different judge after the original judge committed an error under “strain and emotional distress.” United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 859 (10th Cir. 1976). The Tenth Circuit emphasized that it did not “challenge or question the integrity of the judge.” Id. at 860. In the Seventh Circuit, a local rule provides that any case remanded for retrial shall be retried before a dif*1152ferent judge. Local Rule 18. The Eastern District of New York has the same rule, Local Rule 2(d)(2), and the District of Connecticut has an official policy to the same effect. See United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc). The Second Circuit has specified certain conditions under which a case would be sent back to a different judge. For example, “[w]here a judge has made detailed findings based on factors erroneously considered, the circumstances sometimes are such that upon remand he or she either cannot reasonably be expected to erase the earlier impressions from his or her mind or may tend to lean over backwards or overreact in an effort to be fair and impartial.” Id. at 10. More generally, the Second Circuit said, a case should be reassigned on remand if “reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice.” Id. Personal bias, the court noted, was irrelevant, id. and remanding the case to a different judge “does not imply any personal criticism of the [original] judge”. Id. Plainly there is nothing unusual about directing a different judge to do the resentencing.3
The majority’s inflexibility about resentencing has, I believe, distorted our view of our role in this case in two important ways. First, it has distorted our view of the district court’s sentencing discretion. The panel majority, in its opinion, engaged in what I thought was improper speculation about what the district judge might do on resentencing. Compare 588 F.2d at 1131 with id. at 1133. The en banc majority counsels, in my view correctly, that “[s]peculation about what a federal judge who by statute is granted the sole power to impose a sentence will do in pursuance of his constitutional duty ... is inappropriate, for it would not only involve conjecture but it would threaten arrogation of the very sentencing review authority that Congress has denied federal appellate courts.” Ante, 603 F.2d at 1149. But it is precisely the majority’s disposition — allowing the same judge to resentence — that invites such speculation. It forces us to search our opinions for any passages that might appear to give the district judge 'hints about the sentence we want him to impose. The way to prevent this sort of speculation is, of course, to have a different judge resentence the defendants. More generally, resentencing by a different judge is the only way fully to protect the sentencing discretion of the district judge, by ensuring that that discretion will be free of the influence of past views, commitments, and controversies.
Finally, the majority seems to overlook the unique role we ourselves must play in this difficult and poignant case. We are dealing with the rights of criminal defendants, a subject with which I, like all my colleagues, am deeply concerned. But we are also dealing with lawless behavior by the police. The victims of ordinary crimes, however unhappy their plight, can at least look to the authorities for protection. When the authorities themselves break the law, as they did in this case, their victims have nowhere to turn — nowhere, that is, except to our courts. The proceedings in this case have raised doubts, in many minds, about whether the lives of all our citizens *1153will be equally respected. However unwarranted those doubts are, we will not dispel them until we remove every suggestion of unfairness from the procedures we supervise. I would direct that a different judge resentence these defendants.

. I appreciate the majority’s careful efforts to decide the case narrowly by holding, as I read its opinion that if we have any discretion at all to decline to issue the writ, we have very little; and that we need not decide whether we have that small amount of discretion, since there is no sufficient reason to exercise it. But as I said in my dissent from the panel’s decision, I think it is our duty to issue a writ of mandamus in a case like this. United States v. Denson, 588 F.2d 1112, 1133 (5th Cir. 1979). Since mandamus is an equitable remedy, the usual equitable defenses are available. See, e. g. United States v. Carter, 270 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1959) (laches); Laycock v. Hidalgo County Water Control Dist. No. 12, 142 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 731, 65 S.Ct. 68, 89 L.Ed. 587 (1944) (clean hands). And a court of equity has the power to shape its remedy to make it more just or effective, see Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 53-54, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916); indeed I suggest that we shape our writ to require a different district judge to re-sentence the defendants. But although the question is one of degree, these equitable powers do not amount to a broad discretion to refuse to grant relief entirely.

. It was only recently — in 1968 — that Congress increased the penalty for crimes like the defendants’ to life imprisonment, thus making those convicted ineligible for probation. At the time, several members of Congress suggested that the increased penalties were needed to deter violent breaches of the civil rights laws. See, e. g., 114 Cong.Rec. 318 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Ryan); id. at 669 (Sen. Scott).

. Of course, we do not imply that the Judge is not free to recuse himself.

. The majority cites several cases in which a writ of mandamus was issued to correct an illegal sentence. Ante, 603 F.2d at 1147-1148. In all but three of these cases, the writ required only that the district judge vacate or otherwise nullify some order he had entered, such as an order suspending or reducing a sentence. There the district judge had only to carry out the task mandated; he did not have to exercise his discretion. Sending the case to a different judge would have been pointless.
In one of the other three cases, United States v. Jackson, 550 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977), the court evidently viewed the district judge’s error as a purely technical mistake. It even wrote a footnote, id. at 832 n. 5, suggesting ways in which the district judge, on resentencing, might legally achieve the same effects he attempted to reach with his illegal sentence. Obviously there was no need to direct a different judge to resentence. No one views the district judge’s error in this case as a mere technicality; such a footnote here would be inconceivable. In the other two cases, United States v. McGarr, 461 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972), and United States v. Pregerson, 448 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1971), the possibility of sending the case to a different judge was never canvassed; certainly it was not considered and rejected.