Court Opinion

ID: 9656360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:47:08.685836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:32.066344
License: Public Domain

*184WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s determination that the arbitrators’ decision to conduct a de novo hearing as to whether the Board had just cause was within the scope of the arbitrators’ authority. Because I believe the only reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes with the collective bargaining agreement limits the arbitrators’ review to that record before the Board, I dissent.
Article X, sec. 1, of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that “[t]he supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state superintendent and such other officers as the legislature shall direct; and their qualifications, powers, duties and compensation shall be prescribed by law.” This section is implemented in part by sec. 118.22 (2), Stats., which provides: “No teacher may be employed or dismissed except by a majority vote of the full membership of the [school] board.”
The parties agree that the collective bargaining agreement: (1) preserves the statutory right of the Board; (2) declares the arbitrators are without power to render a decision which calls upon the arbitrators to commit an act which is prohibited by law; and (3) limits the Board’s actions by prescribing that “a teacher will not be ‘disciplined’ without ‘just cause and the approval of the administration.’ ” Supra, at 177.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that “harmonizing the collective bargaining agreement provisions with the Board’s power to discharge set forth in sec. 118.22 (2), Stats., leaves the Board with the exclusive right to discharge an employe, but requires that just cause exist for the discharge.” Supra, 179 (emphasis added). I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that “the arbitrators, under the terms of the agreement, may make an independent determination of whether there was just cause for the discharge, relying on whatever procedures they deem necessary to reach that deter-*185initiation.” Id. In my opinion, such a construction of the collective bargaining agreement impermissibly substitutes the arbitrators for the Board rather than having the arbitrators review the sufficiency of just cause within the Board’s exclusive power to discharge an employee on a finding of just cause.
The majority emphasizes the broad powers of contract interpretation vested in the arbitrators, id., at the expense of the broad control reserved by the School Board. See Hortonville Education Asso. v. Joint School District No. 1, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 498, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975), rev’d., 426 U.S. 482, 496 (1976). The majority believes its decision recognizes and furthers the Board’s control by giving effect to the collective bargaining agreement “voluntarily negotiated and agreed to by the Board.” Supra, 181. The majority then concludes “[o]bvi-ously, in the future, the Board may seek to modify the provisions at issue here through the collective bargaining process.” Id. I submit that the majority incorrectly infers that the Board waived any limitation on the scope of the arbitrators’ review by failing to specifically provide that the arbitrators’ review was limited to an evaluation of the record considered by the school board. The Board, as an elected public body, is entitled to have its findings and actions viewed in light of a presumption of regularity and propriety. By deciding to determine the facts de novo, the arbitrators ignored this presumption and forced the Board to prove to the arbitrators that which should have been presumed.
The majority’s approval of the arbitrators’ de novo hearing severely undercuts the Board’s exclusive power to discharge an employee and essentially turns over the Board’s authority to the arbitrators. As the trial judge determined: “[The arbitrators] substituted [their] decision for that of the Board. This court finds such sub*186stitution to be improper and constitutes a manifest disregard of the law.”
The trial court drew a pertinent analogy to administrative law and the scope of judicial review of decisions of state administrative agencies:
“This court’s finding regarding the proper function of the arbitrations herein is supported by the law governing review of decisions of state administrative agencies. That law clearly states that it is the public policy of this state that review of any agency’s decision should not be a de novo review, but rather a review to determine whether the agency had a reasonable basis for finding as it did. The law also states that a court is not to substitute its opinion for that of the agency. Hence, review must be in a certiorari posture.
“Although this court is not here dealing with an agency of the state, this court believes that the laws stated above express the same public policy which should apply in this case. That policy, as expressed by the Legislature, is that courts should only have limited review of agency decisions. Similarly, arbitrators should have only limited review of the decisions of a school board.”
The trial court then drew an analogy between the scope of the arbitrators’ review of the Board’s decision and the appellate review process with persuasive policy reasons for construing the processes the same:
“This Court is of the opinion that one rule that is adhered to regularly by appellate bodies, provides that the trial strategy chosen by counsel, whether in a civil or criminal case, is binding. When the counsel chooses to call or not call a witness, chooses to cross-examine or not cross-examine a witness, chooses to introduce an exhibit or not introduce an exhibit, he chooses a trial strategy. An appellate court will not remand a case for a trial de novo, and allow the counsel a new kick at the cat, when the reason for reversal is a choice of strategy. The attorney in such a case is stuck with his record and so it is here. There is no doubt that both parties to litigation would be better prepared to present their cases after re*187ceiving an appellate decision on their initial efforts. It would be horrendous if in every appeal, the appellate court held a trial de novo and reconsidered the entire case to arrive at a new decision. In the instant case, counsel for the parties presented certain evidence to the fact-finder, Attorney John Langer, and in so doing, chose a trial strategy. This court will not look beyond the record there made and the strategy there chosen and consider evidence which was not presented to the fact-finder but which was subsequently presented to the arbitration panel.”
The Wisconsin Association of School Boards, Inc., in its amicus curiae brief, persuasively argues that a de novo fact finding arbitration hearing increases the possibility of protracted litigation and unnecessary expense. Providing for de novo review reduces the grievant’s incentive to fully present his case to the Board which, of course, reduces the integrity of the proceedings before the school board.
The parties agree that the school board acted impartially and preserved all statutory rights. Any review of whether the Board had just cause to discharge Mr. Fort-ney must, of necessity, be based upon that evidence which was before the Board in its record. It is inconceivable to me how one can evaluate whether the Board acted with just cause if evidence and testimony not known by the Board is used to make that determination. While post-hearing testimony may tend to support or contravene whether Mr. Fortney should have been discharged, this is something quite different from whether the Board’s actions were taken with just cause. It is only the latter which is before the arbitrators on review.
Allowing, as was done in the instant case, posthearing submission of evidence defeats the very purpose of the original hearing and denies the Board an opportunity to reach a decision on a complete record. Expanding review of the Board’s determination of just cause beyond the *188parameters of that record which was before it contravenes notions of fundamental fairness to all parties involved. The majority’s decision renders the Board’s hearing a nullity. The arbitrators have been given more and broader powers than a circuit court, a clearly anomalous result.
The Wisconsin constitution and statutes clearly set forth a recognition of the importance attached to the authority of a school board to determine who shall teach our children. The importance of the Municipal Employment Relations Act, sec. 111.70, Stats., is also significant. Harmonizing the two statutes leads to the obvious conclusion that the Board and the Union have bargained for an arbitration review of the adequacy of the just cause for discharge determination made by the Board on the record before the Board. The majority opinion frustrates the Board’s authority by permitting the arbitrators to decide the just cause issue on a record different from that available to and used by the Board in reaching its decision. Therefore, the arbitrators replace rather than review the Board. Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Louis J. Ceci joins in this dissenting opinion.