Court Opinion

ID: 9826176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:29:08.306155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:55.012273
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Woods.
I concur in the result and in the views expressed in the opinion, except as to the exclusion of evidence of the confession of the negro, Agnew, that he broke the lock and turned the switch. On the issue whether the wreck of the train was caused by the negligence of the *294defendants’ agents in the management of their trains, lights, and switches, or by the criminal act of a third party, there cannot be doubt that such confession of Agnew was against his interest, and his conviction of murder disqualified him and made him unavailable to the defendants as a witness just as if he had been dead. The admissions or confessions of one who dies after making them are held admissible because of their- manifest probative value, and because it is impossible to obtain the direct evidence of such person. Coleman v. Fraser, 4 Rich. 146. The same reasoning applies as to the admissions and confessions of persons whose direct evidence has become unavailable by causes other than death, such as insanity or conviction of an offense which renders them incompetent as witnesses. Where the confession of a convict was made before conviction, the principle seems clearly applicable. The principle is well illustrated in Griffith v. Sauls, 77 Tex. 630, 14 S. W. 230, where the declarations of one Avery were received because he was rendered incompetent to testify by the loss of the power of speech and other infirmaties of age.
The Supreme Court of Texas in holding the declarations competent said: “If Avery had been dead there could be no question as to the admissibility of his statements about which the witnesses testified, and this would be so because of the inability to produce the witness. If the party whose statements would be admissible if he was dead, from advanced age, or other irremediable cause, has lost the power of speech, and the ability to testify either orally or by deposition, what good would it do to produce him? In what would he be better than a dead man, in so far as the production of his testimony is concerned? We think the circumstances and condition of Avery, as shown by the record, furnish as satisfactory reason for admitting his statements as proof of his death would afford.”
I agree, however, that the exclusion of this evidence is not sufficient ground for reversal, because the record shows that *295the breaking of the lock and interference with the switch by Agnew was proved beyond doubt by other evidence, and was assumed as a fact by the Circuit Judge in his charge to the jury. The real issue was whether there was negligence of the defendants in not properly safeguarding their trains by placing their lights and switches,, and on the trial of that issue I agree that there was no error.
Messrs. Justices Watts and Fraser did not participate in this hearing.
4 Petition for rehearing refused by formal order filed on December 16, 1912.