Court Opinion

ID: 9669521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:58:07.16692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:57.605653
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), the Court reversed a conviction and suppressed evidence obtained by a search warrant based upon the affidavit of two officers saying:
“Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that [drugs and] paraphernalia are being kept at ... described premises for *841the purpose of sale and use contrary to ... law.”
In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414, 89 S.Ct. 584, 588, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), the Court reversed a conviction and suppressed evidence obtained by a search warrant based upon an affidavit by an FBI agent saying that the FBI “has been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating” an illegal gambling business. In each case, the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge was uncorroborated. The affidavits were unsupported and conclusory. That is true here, too.
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Court reinstated a drug conviction resulting from evidence obtained by a search warrant based upon an affidavit of an officer that the police had received an anonymous letter that accused the defendants of illicit drug transportation and that predicted a specific drug-running trip by the defendants from Illinois to Florida by car, airplane, and return to Illinois, each on specific days. The Court declared that the prior independent, Aguilar-Spinelli prongs of “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” were still relevant but that they should be considered together as circumstances whose totality must be appraised. “[A] deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.” 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2329. The Court concluded that police “corroboration of major portions of the [anonymous] letter’s predictions provides just this probability.” 462 U.S. at 246, 103 S.Ct. at 2336. (Emphasis supplied). In Gates, additional police surveillance of the predicted activities of the defendants supplied the corroborative indi-cia of reliability. Here, there was no contemporary police surveillance.
In State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207 (N.D.1988), we adopted and applied the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances standard to uphold a drug conviction resulting from evidence secured by a search warrant based upon an affidavit that the officer received information from an anonymous informant, whose reliability was corroborated by following police surveillance and by information from two demonstrably reliable and known confidential informants. I joined in that result.
In State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830, 835 (N.D.1989), we reversed a conviction and suppressed evidence secured by a warrant based on information that
represents only unsupported conclusions and statements about his reputation of being “suspected of trafficking narcotics” which, without some elaboration of the underlying circumstances for those conclusions and statements, are insufficient to support a determination that probable cause existed.
See State v. Mische, 448 N.W.2d 415 (N.D.1989) (affirming suppression); State v. Schroeder, 450 N.W.2d 423 (N.D.1990) (affirming suppression). Compare State v. Dahl, 440 N.W.2d 716, 718 (N.D.1989) (“There is no presumption of reliability for [a confidential] informant as compared to information given by an upstanding citizen of the community. That reliability must be established.”).
Today, the majority affirms a drug conviction resulting from evidence secured by a search warrant based upon the affidavit of an officer who received anonymous information, unverified by anything except secondhand rumors spliced with the suspect’s unsavory reputation and disreputable associations. To me, this does not corroborate the reliability of either the veracity or the basis of knowledge of the unknown informant.
Because I believe today’s decision goes too far in allowing a warrant to be issued upon conclusory and unsupported information, without a satisfactory showing of reliability, I respectfully dissent.