Court Opinion

ID: 9720327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:26:23.574912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:16.076766
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring: I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the circuit court in this case. However, I must respectfully dissent from the portion of this opinion that follows People v. Catron, 285 Ill. App. 3d 36 (1996). I believe Catron impermissibly expands the holding in the recent Illinois Supreme Court case People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 673 N.E.2d 244 (1996). Therefore, I find that the majority erred in failing to address the merits of the defendant’s excessive sentence claim. Catron held that a defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a range of potential sentences cannot succeed on appeal in arguing only that his sentence was excessive. Under Catron, in order to obtain relief, the defendant must first: (1) file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea with the trial court; and (2) show that the granting of the motion is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. As support for that holding, Catron relied on People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 673 N.E.2d 244 (1996). Evans held that a defendant who enters into a fully negotiated guilty plea must move to withdraw his plea and prove manifest injustice before he can obtain relief from an allegedly excessive sentence. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 334, 673 N.E.2d at 251. Catron incorrectly applied the rationale in Evans to cases in which the defendant pied guilty in exchange for a range of potential sentences. In Evans, the supreme court applied contract principles to the defendant’s fully negotiated plea. It found that because the defendant had received the sentence that he bargained for, it would be unfair to the State to allow the defendant to attack his sentence as excessive without having to first move to withdraw his guilty plea. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332, 673 N.E.2d at 250. To do so, it noted, would be to "encourage gamesmanship of a most offensive nature.” Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327, 673 N.E.2d at 248. Evans did note, however, that the application of contract law principles to guilty pleas may require tempering in some instances. According to Evans, an open guilty plea is a type of plea that may require such tempering. Following the acceptance of an open plea, the trial court is not limited to imposing a sentence previously agreed on by the parties. Instead, the court has discretion to choose from a wide range of possible sentences. The sentence it chooses may or may not be a proper exercise of its discretion. Thus, Evans stated that "[b]oth good public policy and common sense dictate that defendants who enter open guilty pleas be allowed to challenge only their sentences without being required to withdraw their guilty pleas.” Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332, 673 N.E.2d at 250. In my opinion, the plea at issue in this case is more analogous to an open plea than to a fully negotiated plea. Where a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a sentencing cap, the trial court will choose from a range of potential sentences. As with an open plea, there is always the danger that the court will not properly exercise its discretion. To prohibit such a defendant from appealing an excessive sentence simply because he "bargained for” that range is, in my opinion, fundamentally unfair. For these reasons, I will address the merits of the defendant’s claim of excessive sentence. Here, the defendant claims that, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court did not give sufficient weight to such mitigating factors as his youth, his remorse, and his prospects for rehabilitation. It is well settled that a trial judge’s sentencing decision is entitled to great weight, and a sentence will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 566 N.E.2d 1351 (1991). Further, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of a sentencing judge simply because it might have balanced the sentencing factors differently. People v. Pittman, 93 Ill. 2d 169, 442 N.E.2d 836 (1982). After a careful review of the record, I find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant to 45 years’ imprisonment. The trial court properly reviewed the aggravating and mitigating factors and found the most important factors in sentencing to be the nature and circumstances of the murder as well as the defendant’s prior adjudication as a delinquent. Under these circumstances, I see no reason to disturb the sentence imposed by the trial court.