Court Opinion

ID: 9526659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:21:52.753611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:03.070594
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: The majority opinion holds that there is in Illinois a common law lien which automatically attaches to a repaired automobile for the cost of repairs. The common law lien is said to be superior to all other perfected security liens, is limited to the right to retain possession, and is a possessory interest sufficient to defeat the so-called replevin action. The majority decision states that the common law lien has been consistently recognized by the courts of this State, and in support of that statement cites an 1860 Illinois Supreme Court decision, a 1916 appellate court decision, and a 1914 abstract appellate decision. It seems to me that the substantive effect of the majority opinion is one of keeping the barnacles and throwing away the boat. The obvious legislative intent, indicated by an examination of the statutory provisions referred to in the majority opinion, is to establish a statutory scheme for liens under the Commercial Code and to eliminate, although not expressly stated, any so-called common law lien. The result of the majority opinion is to hold that one who has done repairs on an automobile and does nothing to protect any lien or security interest except retain possession is in a superior position to one who complies with the statutory conditions for perfecting a lien. The common law lien gives a lienholder the right only to possession and nothing more. The majority opinion does not discuss, but necessarily stamps with approval, a lien that arises without reference to any notice requirement, substantive or procedural due process requirement. In Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co. (Md. 1976), 353 A.2d 222, the court of appeals of Maryland in discussing creditor remedies and due process requirements as announced in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 23 L. Ed. 2d 349, 89 S. Ct. 1820, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556, 92 S. Ct. 1983, Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 40 L. Ed. 2d 406, 94 S. Ct. 1895, and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751, 95 S. Ct. 719, observed: “What we glean from Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing is that, lacking extraordinary circumstances, statutory prejudgment creditor remedies which even temporarily deprive a debtor of a significant property interest without notice and an opportunity for a prior probable-cause-type hearing are, as held in Fuentes, unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause unless safeguards such as those mentioned in Mitchell and North Georgia Finishing are present and even then, although this is less clear, the law may be invalid if the issues underlying the seizure are not susceptible to uncomplicated documentary proof or if the creditor does not have a present interest in the property seized.” (353 A.2d 222, 231.) I agree with such observation and since deprivation of possession is obviously a significant property interest, the so-called common law lien cannot pass constitutional muster.