Court Opinion

ID: 9849854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:47:50.174783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:27.376567
License: Public Domain

LEHMAN, Chief Justice,
concurring, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.
While I agree Hernandez’s conviction should be affirmed, I follow a different trail than the one blazed by the majority opinion. Therefore, with the following exceptions, I concur in the majority opinion.
My disagreement with the majority opinion surrounds two of Hernandez’s claims of evidentiary error. First, I do not agree that defense counsel opened the door to testimony from state witness Domson about his nightmares from the incident. “Succinctly stated, the ‘opening the door’ rule is that a party who in some way permits the trial judge to let down the gates to a field of inquiry that is not competent but relevant cannot complain if his adversary is also allowed to avail him*679self of the opening within its scope.” Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Wyo.1979). While this court has not had occasion to discuss the importance of a responsive answer in the context of the opening the door doctrine, we have addressed the problem under the related invited error doctrine. “A testimonial error is considered invited where the objectionable testimony is responsive to a question posed by the objecting party’s counsel.” McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 751 (Wyo.1993); see also, Pack v. State, 571 P.2d 241, 246-47 (Wyo.1977). The reason for such a limitation is simple, as expressed by this court: “Nevertheless, the above does not give license to law enforcement representatives to in bad faith volunteer seemingly prejudicial information.” McCone, 866 P.2d at 751.
Unlike the majority, I do not believe Dom-son’s assertion that the manner in which Hernandez held the knife was “flat frightening” was responsive to the cross-examination question by defense counsel of “how was he holding the knife?” I am afraid that, in the future, this court will have difficulty repairing the majority’s easily opened doors. Therefore, I would not rely on either the opening the door or invited error doctrine to sanction this field of inquiry. See Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1148-49 (Wyo.1992). Nevertheless, I would hold the error harmless under the circumstances of this case. During the four-day trial, Domson’s simple statement that “I have nightmares about it” was not sufficiently prejudicial that a reasonable probability exists that, but for the error, the verdict would have been more favorable to Hernandez. Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 641 (Wyo.1996).
My second disagreement with the majority opinion concerns the evidence of Hernandez’s drug dealing as it pertains to the “ongoing relationship” between Morgan and Hernandez. First, the majority neglects to mention that there was no objection to this testimony. Morgan testified that his sister introduced him to Hernandez because Hernandez sold drugs and she “felt [Morgan] might be interested in knowing him because of that.” Morgan went on to testify that Hernandez was a good supplier of drugs, and the prices were “really low.” All of this testimony was ad-’ mitted without objection. Defense counsel did object, however, when' the prosecutor asked what kinds of drugs Hernandez supplied. The objection was sustained, despite the prosecutor’s protests that “I’m establishing the relationship he had with Mr. Hernandez.” With this being the state of the record, Hernandez is confronted with the plain error standard.
Under this court’s plain error standard, “the accused may raise on appeal a claim of plain error in the admission of evidence of prior bad acts, but it will be incumbent upon the accused to offer case authority specifically foreclosing admission of the evidence under the circumstances of the case.” Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo.1996). Because Hernandez has not presented case authority specifically foreclosing admission of the evidence, he has failed to satisfy the plain error standard for making a claim under W.R.E. 404(b).
Even assuming that the introduction of the testimony violates W.R.E. 404(b), I do not believe that Hernandez has established prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal, especially when he does not protest other testimony relating to his involvement with drugs. Specifically, Hernandez does not complain about Morgan’s testimony that Hernandez supplied the marijuana cigarette the two shared before dinner. In addition, Hernandez does not protest the relevance of his unsuccessful attempt to obtain cocaine for Morgan the night of the stabbing. Perhaps most importantly, the district court sustained defense counsel’s objection before the challenged line of questioning got too far out of hand. Under these circumstances, rather than attempting to justify the admission of the drug dealing testimony, I would simply hold that Hernandez has not established plain error. With the foregoing exceptions, I concur in the majority opinion.