Court Opinion

ID: 9945736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:05:50.438277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.039504
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

     HERITAGE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
                         Appellant,

                                      v.

      BROOKS KILLMEYER and MARY MARGARET KILLMEYER,
                         Appellees.

                             No. 4D2022-1298

                            [February 28, 2024]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Michael A. Robinson, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE19-
008990.

   Daniel M. Schwarz and Kara Rockenbach Link of Link & Rockenbach,
P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Earl I. Higgs, Jr. of Higgs Law, P.A., Orlando, for appellees.

CONNER, J.

    The insurer, Heritage Property & Casualty Insurance Company,
appeals a final judgment in favor of the insureds, arguing that under
Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981), the trial court
erred at trial by allowing: (1) a surprise fact witness to testify that a sworn
proof of loss was sent to the insurer when neither the witness nor the proof
of loss was disclosed as required by the order setting trial; and (2) the
insureds’ expert witness to testify about an undisclosed opinion on
damages. We agree with the first argument and reverse for a new trial.
We decline to address the second argument because we are remanding for
a new trial, and we are confident that on retrial the issue is not likely to
reoccur.

                                 Background

    After their home was damaged by a bathroom water supply line which
failed, the insureds filed a claim with the insurer. The insureds also filed
a separate claim concerning hurricane damage to their home. The water
supply line damage claim is the subject of this appeal.
   The insurer’s desk adjuster sent a letter to the insureds and emailed a
copy to the insureds’ attorneys, requesting a sworn proof of loss for the
water supply line loss and a loss repair cost estimate. The insurer later
sent a second letter with the same request.

    The insureds contend that on March 22, 2019, they signed a sworn
proof of loss stating the net amount which they claimed was owed under
the policy. They further contend a paralegal working for their attorneys
emailed the proof of loss to the desk adjuster on April 3, 2019, along with
a loss repair estimate prepared by their public adjuster.

   The insurer did not respond to the email sending the proof of loss and
contends it has no knowledge that the email was received.

   Three years after the insureds filed the bathroom water supply line
claim, the insureds sued the insurer for breach of contract. The insurer
answered raising affirmative defenses. The fifth and sixth affirmative
defenses alleged the insureds failed to provide a proof of loss as requested
and required by the policy.

   In a request for admissions, the insurer asked the insureds to admit or
deny that prior to filing the complaint, the insureds did not respond to
correspondence requesting a sworn proof of loss and loss repair estimate.
The insureds denied that request for admission.

   The trial court issued an order setting jury trial and establishing
deadlines for the parties to file and serve lists identifying fact, expert, and
rebuttal witnesses, as well as trial exhibits. Pertinent to this appeal, the
insureds’ exhibit list included: “Any and all correspondence” between the
insureds or their attorneys and the insurer, its agents, or attorneys. The
insureds’ exhibit list did not specifically list the April 3, 2019 email
transmitting the proof of loss and loss repair estimate, nor did the
insureds’ witness list include the paralegal who sent the email. 1

    Upon reviewing the insurer’s proposed verdict form shortly before the
trial began, the insureds’ counsel realized the insurer was requesting a
specific instruction as to whether the insureds provided a proof of loss to

1 The record indicates the insurer received the two attachments to the email—the

proof of loss and loss repair estimate—earlier in litigation, but not the email itself.
The loss repair estimate was specifically listed in the insurer’s pretrial exhibit list,
and the insurer’s corporate representative testified during trial that the insurer
received the proof of loss during discovery.

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the insurer. To provide evidence on that issue, the insureds served a last-
minute trial subpoena on the insurer’s desk adjuster, but the trial court
quashed the subpoena as the desk adjuster was not specifically named as
a witness by either party prior to trial.

   The insureds called the insurer’s corporate representative as a witness.
The representative testified if the insurer had received an email containing
the proof of loss and loss repair estimate, it would have sent a letter
acknowledging receipt.

    The insureds then requested to call the paralegal who had emailed the
proof of loss and loss repair estimate to the insurer. The trial court, after
initially denying the request because the paralegal had not been listed as
a witness, eventually was persuaded to allow the paralegal to testify.

   The paralegal then testified regarding his April 3, 2019 email to the
insurer’s desk adjuster attaching the proof of loss and loss repair estimate.
The trial court permitted this testimony even though the insurer’s counsel
was not shown a printed copy of the email until immediately before the
paralegal testified. In addition, from the record before us, it appears the
insurer was never provided a full digital copy of the email.

   The jury returned a verdict in the insureds’ favor for an amount that
was a few thousand dollars more than the public adjuster’s initial loss
repair estimate, but substantially less than the amount sought by the
insureds. The jury specifically found the insurer failed to prove the
insureds did not provide a sworn proof of loss for the claim.

   After denying a motion for new trial raising the two grounds now raised
on appeal, the trial court entered a final judgment in the insureds’ favor.
The insurer gave notice of appeal.

                             Appellate Analysis

    “A trial court’s decision to admit evidence, including a decision to admit
allegedly new or surprise testimony, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,
as limited by the rules of evidence.” Gurin Gold, LLC v. Dixon, 277 So. 3d
600, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).

   The insurer argues the trial court erred by allowing the insureds to call
their attorney’s paralegal to testify that he sent the email containing the
proof of loss and loss repair estimate required by the insurance policy.
More specifically, the insurer claims it was surprised and therefore
prejudiced by the paralegal’s testimony, because the paralegal and the

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documents about which he testified were not identified on the insureds’
witness and exhibit lists in compliance with the order setting trial. The
insurer seeks a new trial on appeal.

Applicable Legal Principles

    To avoid trial by ambush and promote the “spirit” of the Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure regarding discovery, our supreme court in Binger held
that “a pretrial order directing the parties to exchange the names of
witnesses requires a listing or notification of all witnesses that the parties
reasonably foresee will be called to testify, whether for substantive,
corroborative, impeachment or rebuttal purposes.” 401 So. 2d at 1313.
The court additionally held that “a trial court can properly exclude the
testimony of a witness whose name has not been disclosed in accordance
with a pretrial order.” Id. The supreme court “vest[ed] in the trial judge
the interpretation and enforcement of any pretrial order mandating
witness disclosure, and limit[ed] reviewing courts to reversals only in cases
of a clear showing of abuse prejudicial to the affected party.” Id. In other
words, the supreme court made clear the trial court has the discretion to
interpret and enforce its pretrial orders; however, trial by ambush is not
permitted.

   In assessing whether an undisclosed witness should be permitted to
testify at trial, the focus is on the potential prejudice to the objecting party.
Gurin Gold, 277 So. 3d at 603 (citing Binger, 401 So. 2d at 1314). The
standard for prejudice is “surprise in fact.” Id.

   “Binger provides the standard a court must follow when deciding
whether to exclude the testimony of witnesses who were not disclosed
according to a pretrial order.” Fritz v. Tower Hill Signature Ins. Co., 363
So. 3d 1111, 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). Regarding the discretion given to
the trial court to admit or deny testimony from an undisclosed witness,
the supreme court said:

      The discretion to do so must not be exercised blindly, however,
      and should be guided largely by a determination as to whether
      use of the undisclosed witness will prejudice the objecting
      party. Prejudice in this sense refers to the surprise in fact of
      the objecting party, and it is not dependent on the adverse
      nature of the testimony. Other factors which may enter into
      the trial court’s exercise of discretion are: (i) the objecting
      party’s ability to cure the prejudice or, similarly, his
      independent knowledge of the existence of the witness; (ii) the
      calling party’s possible intentional, or bad faith,

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      noncompliance with the pretrial order; and (iii) the possible
      disruption of the orderly and efficient trial of the case (or other
      cases).

Binger, 401 So. 2d at 1314 (footnotes omitted). The listed prejudice factors
relevant to this appeal are the insurer’s ability to cure the prejudice and
the insurer’s independent knowledge of the existence of the witness.

   In applying Binger, this Court has explained:

      Once the trial starts the lawyers are engaged in the unfolding
      of the evidence they have already collected. That is why there
      are discovery cutoffs. All the discovery rules and the extensive
      efforts of parties to discover the other party’s case would be
      for naught if one side were able to wait until after the trial
      started to establish key pieces of evidence . . . .

Menard v. Univ. Radiation Oncology Assocs., LLP, 976 So. 2d 69, 72 (Fla.
4th DCA 2008) (citation omitted); Krysiak v. Dawson, 301 So. 3d 259, 264
(Fla. 4th DCA 2020). Thus, the principles of Binger apply not only to the
listing of witnesses, but also changes to expert testimony and listing of
exhibits. Krysiak, 301 So. 3d at 265 (citing Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Clark,
676 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), and Colonnell v. Mitchels, 317 So. 2d
799, 800-01 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)). “As such, it is incumbent upon the trial
court to analyze the[] Binger factors before exercising its discretion to
admit or exclude late-disclosed exhibits or witness testimony.” Montero v.
Corzo, 320 So. 3d 976, 980 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).

   “[F]ailure to disclose the subject of witness testimony and documents
that will be introduced into evidence in violation of discovery rules and
court orders amounts to trial by ambush [and is] another way of saying a
denial of due process.” J.S.L. Constr. Co. v. Levy, 994 So. 2d 394, 399–
400 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (citation omitted); see also Reive v. Deutsche Bank
Nat’l Tr. Co., 190 So. 3d 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (same). Moreover, mere
reference to “any and all necessary” is insufficient for appropriate
disclosure. Binger, 401 So. 2d 1313; Montero, 320 So. 3d at 979, n.9.

                                      5
Application of Legal Principles to This Case

   The insurer argues it suffered unfair prejudice from the paralegal’s
surprise testimony because the insurer had not seen the paralegal’s email
or known that the paralegal was going to be called to testify, and the
insurer had no ability to cure the prejudice. The insurer contends the
paralegal’s testimony was powerful corroboration that a sworn proof of loss
had been sent on this claim. The insurer further argues the insureds
should have anticipated their need for the paralegal’s rebuttal testimony
and therefore should have listed him as a rebuttal witness. Additionally,
the insurer argues unfair prejudice from surprise because the April 3,
2019 email was not disclosed as a trial exhibit.

   The trial court, prior to allowing the paralegal to testify, noted the
insureds had presented no admissible evidence that the sworn proof of
loss and loss repair estimate were sent to the insurer. The insureds’
counsel agreed.

   The jury was tasked with determining whether the insureds failed to
provide a sworn proof of loss. Thus, the question of whether the sworn
proof of loss was sent to the insurer was included as a verdict form
interrogatory.

   We agree that allowing the paralegal to testify prejudiced the insurer as
defined by Binger. When evaluating whether a party is surprised in fact,
the Binger court looked to whether the identity of witness was known and
then to whether the substance of the testimony was known. 401 So. 2d
at 1314 (evaluating whether the objecting party “knew, of course, who he
was and what he would say” (emphasis added)).

    The insureds had not listed the paralegal as a witness as required by
the order setting trial, and we conclude from our review of the trial
transcript that neither party knew in advance that he would be testifying
at trial. Thus, the identity of the paralegal as a witness was a surprise in
fact to the insurer. Indeed, the insureds’ attorney admitted that the
paralegal’s testimony “was unexpected” and was in rebuttal 2 to the
testimony of the insurer’s corporate representative.

2 As noted earlier, and as discussed in Binger, the parties are required to list “all

witnesses that the parties reasonably foresee will be called to testify, whether for
substantive, corroborative, impeachment or rebuttal purposes.” 401 So. 2d at
1313 (emphasis added).

                                         6
    The substance of the paralegal’s testimony (i.e., the transmission of the
email to the desk adjuster attaching the proof of loss and loss repair
estimate) was also a surprise and prejudiced the insurer. As the insurer’s
counsel argued at trial, the insurer had never seen the email prior to trial,
and it had not been provided in discovery. If the email had been turned
over in discovery, the insurer would have been able to address the email
at trial. 3

   Apart from the paralegal’s testimony, the insureds presented no
evidence that they had sent the proof of loss and loss repair estimate, or
that the paralegal’s April 3, 2019 email was sent or received. The insurer’s
corporate representative testified the email containing the proof of loss and
loss repair estimate was not received because the email was not in the
claims file. The representative further testified that if the insurer had
received an email containing the proof of loss, the insurer would have sent
a response letter, which would also be in the claims file but was not.
Notably, the paralegal affirmatively testified he did not receive a response
to his email.

   The ability of the objecting party to cure is evaluated at the time of the
surprise testimony. See, e.g., Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. J.B. by &
through Spivak, 675 So. 2d 241, 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“HRS had no
opportunity to obtain information or expert opinion to rebut the testimony
of the witness and thereby cure the prejudice.”). Presented with new
evidence and testimony mid-trial, the insurer had no ability to cure. The
insurer did not receive a copy of the email prior to trial. During trial, while
the insureds’ counsel may have shown a printed copy of the email to the
insurer’s corporate representative during his testimony, the email was not
admitted into evidence. The insurer’s counsel did not receive a copy of the
email until the day after the insurer’s objection to the paralegal’s testimony
and directly before the paralegal was to testify. It does not appear the
insurer ever received a complete electronic copy of the email. Thus, the
insurer was prejudiced because it was unable to examine the email to
confirm its validity, much less locate an opposing witness prior to the
paralegal’s testimony.

                                 Conclusion

    Because the insurer was prejudiced—surprised in fact—by the identity
of the paralegal as a witness and the substance of his testimony, without
the ability to cure, and the prejudice was the result of the insureds’

3We note that although the insurer apparently received a printed copy of the
email mid-trial, the appellate record does not contain a copy of the email.

                                      7
actions, the trial court’s decision permitting the paralegal to testify was
harmful error. Thus, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

   Reversed and remanded for new trial.

KUNTZ and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

                           *         *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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