Court Opinion

ID: 9371980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 15:04:17.22756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:31.543695
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 10, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                            Court of Appeals

                               NO. 2021-CA-0672-MR

GARLAND L. MASDEN                                                        APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM HARDIN FAMILY COURT
v.             HONORABLE PAMELA K. ADDINGTON, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 20-CI-01443

MARY JAMES MASDEN                                                          APPELLEE

                                      OPINION
                                     AFFIRMING

                                    ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Garland Masden (“Garland”) and Mary Masden (“Mary”)

were married on October 14, 1982. Garland filed a divorce action in the Hardin

Family Court on October 15, 2020. The briefs indicate that they had previously

filed for divorce in another county and then reunited at some point. However, that

is not alleged in this divorce petition itself. Regardless, the parties agree that they

had marital problems throughout this long-term marriage, and on January 14, 2020,
each executed a post-nuptial agreement. The stated intent of the agreement was to

establish ownership and division of property in the event of any divorce or the

death of either party, specifically:

             The Parties each acknowledge and confirm that we have
             both been advised to obtain separate counsel for purposes
             of reviewing and advising us on the terms of this
             agreement. We have [had] sufficient time and
             opportunity for each of us to obtain our own separate
             counsel and have declined to do so. We have read,
             understand and agree to the terms of this Post-nuptial
             Agreement, and that the same is fair and conscionable.
             We waive any right to challenge the conscionability of
             the agreement at a later date, regardless of any change in
             circumstances.

             Eight months later, Garland filed a petition for divorce asking for the

family court to “abide by the agreement of the parties in regard to the distribution

of property and find it not unconscionable.” In her response, Mary asserted that

the parties had a post-nuptial agreement dated January 14, 2020 and asked that the

family court “abide by the agreement in regard to the distribution of the property

and find it not unconscionable.”

             On December 11, 2020, Mary filed a motion asking the family court

to adopt the post-nuptial agreement as the agreement of the parties; incorporate it

into a decree; and waive mediation. Garland objected to this. The crux of his

objection seemed to be that he did not fully understand the nature of the document

he had signed due to diminished mental capacity. Both parties are in their 80s. He

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further argued, through his attorney, that the list of property attached to the

agreement signed by both parties was not part of the agreement when he signed it

and that the attorney who drafted the agreement was related to Mary.

                Based upon these filings, the family court conducted a full hearing in

April of 2021, with testimony from the parties, family members, and a friend of

Garland’s. In its order of May 13, 2021, the family court held that the agreement

did constitute a binding agreement of the parties and should be incorporated into

any final decree of dissolution subsequently entered. The order further contained

the CR1 54.02 recitation that this was a final and appealable order and there was no

reason for delay. This appeal followed.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                The findings of fact by the family court following a bench trial “shall

not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the

opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”

CR 52.01; Patmon v. Hobbs, 280 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Ky. App. 2009). We review

the family court’s findings with regard to issues of law de novo. Carroll v.

Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 489 (Ky. App. 2001).

1
    Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.

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                                 LEGAL ANALYSIS

                By agreement, husbands and wives in Kentucky may define their

rights in each other’s property, regardless of any right that would otherwise be

excluded or conferred by KRS2 403.190. Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky.

1990). The first limitation upon parties who propose or sign an ante-nuptial or

post-nuptial agreement is a requirement of full disclosure. Before parties may be

bound by agreements which affect their substantial rights upon dissolution of

marriage, it should appear that the agreement was free of any material omission or

misrepresentation. Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990). The

allegations by Garland as to any material omission or misrepresentation were

basically that the list of assets was in a different font from the agreement itself and

that the document was not page-numbered. Counsel also argued that the document

was drafted by an attorney related to Mary.

                The family court considered both of these allegations, and questioned

Garland as to the items on the list of which he was clearly familiar, and which he

confirmed were each person’s separate property. The family court further noted

that none of the pages were numbered or initialed, but confirmed that both parties

had signed the agreement in the presence of a notary and that there were other

documents throughout the marriage prepared by the same attorney. As was the

2
    Kentucky Revised Statute.

                                           -4-
case in Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585 (Ky. App. 2001), the appellant herein asserts

general irregularities, but did not present any evidence to amount to fraud, duress,

or misrepresentation. Id. at 588.

             The family court did not find any evidence that there was any material

omission or fraud in the agreement and specifically noted that Garland had sold

many of “his” assets since entering into the agreement. Garland did not seem to

think that was inconsistent with his assertion that the agreement should not be

enforced as to the items on Mary’s list. At no time during the testimony of

Garland did he state that he was not aware of the contents or intent of the

agreement or that the agreement was obtained by fraud.

             The second limitation to be observed is that the agreement must not

be unconscionable at the time enforcement is sought. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d at

945. As the appellate courts have often noted, the family courts are familiar with

the concept of unconscionability by virtue of KRS 403.180 and KRS 403.250. Id.

at 945 n.2. It is clear that the Hardin Family Court properly followed the law and

reviewed the post-nuptial agreement to determine whether it was unconscionable at

the time it was entered into and found no basis to so hold.

             The law promotes the settlement of disputes by agreement, and the

law favors the stability in such agreements. Peterson v. Peterson, 583 S.W.2d 707

(Ky. App. 1979). The parties entered into this agreement less than one year prior

                                         -5-
to the filing of the petition for dissolution. The family court looked at the facts and

circumstances to see if they had changed since the agreement was executed so as to

make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable. The opponent of the agreement has

the burden of proving the agreement is invalid. Blue, 60 S.W.3d at 589 (citing

Rupley v. Rupley, 776 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. App. 1989)). Finally, it is well established

that the family court is in the best position to judge the circumstances surrounding

the agreement, and we give deference to its exercise of its discretion, unless those

findings are clearly erroneous. Shraberg v. Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Ky.

1997).

             The basis for the contention that the agreement was unconscionable

was that Garland had suffered cognitive decline in recent years and did not

understand the ramifications of the agreement when he signed it. However, at the

lengthy hearing in this matter, Garland testified that he did sign the agreement and

he clearly exhibited knowledge of the ramifications of same. He acknowledged

that he went to the bank where his accounts were maintained with Mary to have the

agreement notarized. He responded to the questions of the family court as to the

assets listed in his column and Mary’s column, confirming that those were each

separate assets of the parties. He admitted that he had already sold most of the

items listed in his column. While there was testimony from his daughter and a

sister that “he had good days and bad days,” there was no testimony from any

                                          -6-
expert that he had a neurological, mental, or cognitive decline at the time that he

signed the agreement. Moreover, there is no suggestion that he was not in

command of his full faculties at the time he filed the petition for dissolution, a few

months later. In fact, his own testimony at the hearing confirmed that he did

understand the nature and intent of the document he had signed. He simply did not

believe it was fair, although he had acted consistent with that agreement himself.

Garland also testified that the real estate assigned to Mary by the agreement was in

fact her non-marital property, confirming his knowledge of the extent of the

parties’ assets.

              The family court also heard testimony from Garland’s close friend and

business partner, David Allgood (“Allgood”). Allgood testified that Garland had

shared with him the fact that the couple had signed a post-nuptial agreement. He

had even shown it to Allgood shortly after he signed it, stating that “what was his,

was his, and what was hers, was hers.” While there was testimony that Garland’s

cognitive capabilities had declined in recent years, both parties were in their 80s,

and both parties were continuing to drive, conduct business, execute legal

documents, and sell properties at the time of the agreement. Again, the family

court was in the best position to judge all the circumstances of this agreement and

did so. Giving due regard to the family court’s opportunity to examine and judge

                                          -7-
the credibility of all of the witnesses, we do not find that the ruling was clearly

erroneous. We therefore affirm the order of the Hardin Family Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Phyllis K. Lonneman                        Nick L. Pearl
 Elizabethtown, Kentucky                    Elizabethtown, Kentucky

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