Court Opinion

ID: 9378255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 20:03:42.826161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:19.870268
License: Public Domain

*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

                                                            Electronically Filed
                                                            Supreme Court
                                                            SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                            09-MAR-2023
                                                            08:30 AM
                                                            Dkt. 11 OP

         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

                              ---o0o---

     DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY AS TRUSTEE FOR
      MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL I INC. TRUST 2006-NC4,
               Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                  vs.

                         BLAINE T. YATA,
                 Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant,

                                  and

   BROOKE J.C. RIOPTA; AMBER M. RIOPTA; CASIE A. RIOPTA,
   and COUNTY OF KAUAI WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT, Defendants.

                          SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

       CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
          (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CIV. NO. 5CC141000185)

                            MARCH 9, 2023

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.

              OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
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                            I.    INTRODUCTION1

           This case arises from a foreclosure proceeding.             On

August 10, 2022, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Blaine T. Yata

(Yata) filed an application for writ of certiorari challenging

the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (ICA) July 11, 2022 Judgment

on Appeal entered pursuant to its June 9, 2022 Summary

Disposition Order.      The ICA affirmed the Circuit Court of the

Fifth Circuit’s (circuit court) July 19, 2018 Order Granting

Motion for Summary Judgment and November 1, 2018 Order Denying

Motion for Reconsideration.

           On or about March 24, 2006, Yata executed a note and

mortgage to New Century Mortgage Corporation, and the mortgage

was later assigned to Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee Deutsche

Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley ABS

Capital I Inc. Trust 2006-NC4 (Deutsche Bank).2           After Yata

defaulted on the note, Deutsche Bank filed a complaint to

foreclose the mortgage.       Deutsche Bank asserted that it was

entitled to possession of the note, which was endorsed in blank.

           Deutsche Bank subsequently filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment, arguing it established all material allegations in the

1     This opinion was originally filed as a memorandum opinion on
February 22, 2023. Pursuant to this court’s March 9, 2023 Order Granting
Yata’s Motion for Publication, the memorandum opinion is filed as a published
opinion.

2    Deutsche Bank’s parent company is Deutsche Bank National Trust Company.

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complaint and there were no genuine issues of any material fact.

Attached to Deutsche Bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment was a

declaration, along with exhibits, purporting to demonstrate

Deutsche Bank’s possession of the note when the complaint was

filed.   The circuit court granted Deutsche Bank’s Motion for

Summary Judgment.    Yata filed a Motion for Reconsideration,

arguing that Deutsche Bank failed to establish its standing to

foreclose as required by this court’s decision in Bank of Am.,

N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaiʻi 361, 390 P.3d 1248 (2017).

Deutsche Bank opposed Yata’s Motion for Reconsideration by

filing another declaration purporting to establish Deutsche

Bank’s possession of the note when the complaint was filed.             The

circuit court denied Yata’s Motion for Reconsideration.

          Yata appealed and the ICA affirmed the circuit court’s

Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment and Order Denying

Motion for Reconsideration.      The ICA determined that, pursuant

to this court’s decision in U.S. Bank Tr., N.A. as Tr. for LSF9

Master Participation Tr. v. Verhagen, 149 Hawaiʻi 315, 489 P.3d

at 419 (2021), as amended (July 6, 2021), reconsideration

denied, No. SCWC-17-000746, 2021 WL 2948836 (Haw. July 9, 2021),

Deutsche Bank produced sufficient evidence to establish its

standing to foreclose.

          On certiorari, Yata asserts that the ICA grievously

erred by misinterpreting Verhagen.        Yata argues that there was

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no “admissible documentary evidence” demonstrating Deutsche Bank

had possession of the note when it filed the complaint.              Yata’s

argument appears to have merit because the ICA misapplied

Verhagen in determining that Deutsche Bank’s documents were

admissible.     Moreover, even if the documents were admissible,

those documents did not establish that Deutsche Bank had

possession of the note when it filed the complaint.             Thus,

Deutsche Bank did not establish it had standing to foreclose.

            Accordingly, we vacate the ICA’s July 11, 2022

Judgment on Appeal, which affirmed the circuit court’s Order

Granting Motion for Summary Judgment and Order Denying Motion

for Reconsideration.

                              II.   BACKGROUND

A.    Factual Background

            On or about March 24, 2006, Yata executed an

“Adjustable Rate Balloon Note” (the Note) to New Century

Mortgage Corporation.       That same day, to secure the Note, Yata

signed and delivered a mortgage (the Mortgage), which encumbered

property located on the Island of Kauaʻi (the mortgaged

property), to New Century Mortgage Corporation.            On August 25,

2008, the Mortgage was assigned to Deutsche Bank (the

Assignment).

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B.    Circuit Court Proceedings3

      1.    Deutsche Bank’s Complaint

            On September 10, 2014, Deutsche Bank filed a

“Complaint to Foreclose Mortgage” (the Complaint).4             Deutsche

Bank alleged that it had standing to bring the Complaint as the

current holder of the Note, that it was entitled to possession

of the Note, and that the Note was endorsed in blank.              Deutsche

Bank maintained that Yata defaulted on the payment of the

principal and interest on the Note as of March 1, 2010.

Deutsche Bank asserted that it was entitled to foreclosure on

the Mortgage and to a sale of the mortgaged property.

            On November 24, 2014, Yata filed a pro se answer to

the Complaint and requested that the Complaint be dismissed with

prejudice.

      2.    Deutsche Bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment

            Nearly four years later, on April 17, 2018, Deutsche

Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and for Interlocutory

Decree of Foreclosure (Motion for Summary Judgment).              Deutsche

Bank argued that it was entitled to foreclose the Mortgage

because it established all material allegations in the Complaint

and there was no genuine issue of any material fact.              Deutsche

3     The Honorable Randal G.B. Valenciano presided.

4     Deutsche Bank attached as exhibits to its Complaint, inter alia, a copy
of the Note, a copy of the Mortgage, and a copy of the Assignment.

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Bank attached a declaration from Matthew Mountes (Mountes

Declaration) to its Motion for Summary Judgment.5           As relevant

here, the Mountes Declaration provided:

                 1.    I am authorized to sign this declaration on
           behalf of [Deutsche Bank], as an officer or employee of
           Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (“SLS”), which is [Deutsche
           Bank]’s loan servicing agent (“servicer”) for the subject
           loan (“the Loan”).
                 2.    The information in this declaration is taken
           from SLS’s business records. I have personal knowledge of
           SLS’s procedures for creating these records. They are:
           (a) made at or near the time of the occurrence of the
           matters recorded by persons with personal knowledge of the
           information in the business record, or from information
           transmitted by persons with personal knowledge; (b) kept in
           the course of SLS’s regularly conducted business
           activities; and (c) it is the regular practice of SLS to
           make such records.
                 3.    The owner of the Note and Mortgage for a
           particular a [sic] mortgage loan is commonly referred to in
           the loan servicing industry as the Investor. The Investor
           for this mortgage loan is [Deutsche Bank].
                 4.    SLS maintains all the day to day loan
           documents, records and accounting of payments on the Loan
           being foreclosed in this action including all documents and
           business records acquired by [Deutsche Bank] when it
           purchased the subject mortgage loan.
                 5.    Under the terms of SLS’s servicing arrangement,
           [Deutsche Bank] does not participate in, keep and maintain
           any of the day to day loan documents, inputting of
           accounting data, saving of business records and all
           communications with borrowers.
                 6.    [Deutsche Bank] as the Investor, has a passive
           role with the primary emphasis on tracking its return on
           investment. In terms of routine business records on the
           Loan, SLS acts as the sole custodian of [Deutsche Bank]’s
           records.
                 7.    Based upon my occupational experience, I know
           that loan servicers follow an industry wide standard on how
           to keep and maintain business records on the loan services
           performed in their portfolio which recordkeeping is part of
           the regularly conducted activity of loan servicers. The
           type of and regular maintenance of loan information
           including the accounting under generally accepted

5     Attached to the Mountes Declaration were true and correct copies of:
(1) the Note and the Allonges; (2) the Mortgage; (3) the Loan Modification
Agreement; (4) the Assignment; (5) the notice sent to Yata regarding the
default; (6) the Payment History for the Loan; (7) a printout that shows Yata
defaulted on the Loan, the default has was not cured, and the amount owed;
and (8) a Certification of Possession of Original Promissory Note.

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            principles for each mortgage loan is standard and
            computerized.
                  . . . .
                  11.   Finally, the loan servicer records, maintains
            and takes custody of all such daily business records and
            all loan documents, including taking possession of the note
            and mortgage records on behalf of the Investor.
                  12.   A portion of the business records for the loan
            in this matter were created by a prior servicer, the prior
            servicer’s records for the loan were integrated and boarded
            into SLS’s systems, such that the prior servicer’s records
            concerning the Loan are now part of SLS’s business records.
            SLS maintains quality control and verification procedures
            as part of the boarding process to ensure the accuracy of
            the boarded records. It is the regular business practice
            of SLS to integrate prior servicers’ records into SLS’s
            business records, and to rely upon the accuracy of those
            boarded records in providing its loan servicing functions.
            These prior servicer records are integrated and relied upon
            by SLS as part of SLS’s business records. True and correct
            copies of records I have reviewed and relied upon in
            executing this affidavit are attached to this affidavit and
            incorporated herein.
                  13.   SLS became [Deutsche Bank]’s loan servicer for
            the Loan being foreclosed in this action on November 1,
            2016. The prior loan servicers for this mortgage loan were
            America’s Servicing Company and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
                  . . . .
                  15.   [Deutsche Bank], directly or through an agent,
            has possession of the Note. The Note has been duly
            endorsed in blank. [Deutsche Bank] is the assignee of the
            security instrument for the subject loan. [Deutsche Bank]
            has the right to foreclose the subject note and mortgage.
                  . . . .
                  28.   At the time the foreclosure Complaint was filed
            in this case, [Deutsche Bank], directly or through an
            agent, was in possession of the Note. A true and correct
            copy of the “Certification of Possession of Original
            Promissory Note” is attached hereto as Exhibit “8”.

            The circuit court orally granted Deutsche Bank’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, which was unopposed, at a hearing

on June 26, 2018.6

6     Yata’s counsel appeared at a previous hearing on the Motion for Summary
Judgment on May 24, 2018, noted “he was retained last Friday,” and requested
“a continuance to file an opposition.” The circuit court set a continued
hearing for June 26, 2018. Yata’s counsel did not file an opposition or
appear at the June 26, 2018 continued hearing.

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     3.    The Circuit Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions
           of Law and Judgment

           On July 19, 2018, the circuit court issued “Findings

of Fact; Conclusions of Law; Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment as Against All Defendants and for

Interlocutory Decree of Foreclosure” (Order Granting Motion for

Summary Judgment).7     The circuit court noted that Deutsche Bank

appeared at the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, and

Yata did not appear.

           The circuit court found, inter alia, that (1) the

Mortgage was assigned to Deutsche Bank on August 25, 2008,

(2) Yata defaulted on the Note, and (3) Deutsche Bank was the

owner and holder of the Note and Mortgage.          The circuit court

granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that

Deutsche Bank was entitled to a foreclosure on the Mortgage and

to a judgment as a matter of law on the Complaint.

     4.    Yata’s Motion for Reconsideration

           Yata had previously filed a “Motion for Rehearing

and/or Reconsideration of this Court’s Decision Granting

‘Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as Against All

Defendants and for Interlocutory Decree of Foreclosure’” (Motion

for Reconsideration) on July 3, 2018.

7    That same day, the circuit court issued its corresponding Judgment.

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           Citing to Reyes-Toledo and Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes

(HRS) §§ 490:3-201 and 490:3-301, Yata maintained that Deutsche

Bank did not offer admissible evidence that it possessed the

Note when the Complaint was filed.8         Yata contended that the

Mountes Declaration, which was attached to Deutsche Bank’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, contained inadmissible hearsay and

did not establish Deutsche Bank’s standing.           Citing to Hawaiʻi

Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 602 and U.S. Bank N.A. v. Mattos,

140 Hawaiʻi 26, 398 P.3d 615 (2017), Yata maintained that

Mountes’ testimony was based on his review of SLS’s business

records, which failed to demonstrate “the requisite element of

personal knowledge with respect to Wells Fargo’s business

records, especially [Deutsche Bank]’s purported possession of

the original note at the time the Complaint was filed, or ever.”

Yata asserted that Mountes never saw the original Note or

witnessed the Note in Deutsche Bank’s possession.            Yata

maintained that Mountes instead relied on “his review of a copy

of an unverified ‘certificate’ (Exhibit 8 to [the Motion for

Summary Judgment]), wherein an individual named Patrick A.

Timmers alleges that Wells Fargo had possession of the original

note on December 18, 2013.”       Yata argued that Deutsche Bank did

8     Yata pointed out that Deutsche Bank presented the circuit court with a
purported copy of the Note and an allonge stamped with an endorsement.

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not demonstrate who possessed the Note when the Complaint was

filed on September 10, 2014.

           In addition, Yata noted that Mountes stated he

reviewed Deutsche Bank’s “business records and files related to

the mortgage loan herein, including the purported copy of the

‘Certification of Possession of Original Promissory Note’ signed

by Timmers on December 18, 2013” (the Certification).             According

to Yata, Mountes’ review of the Certification from a prior loan

servicer did not establish Mountes’ personal knowledge that

Deutsche Bank possessed the original Note.          Yata thus argued

that Mountes’ testimony was inadmissible double hearsay.

           Yata asserted that Mountes’ statement and the

Certification were “not admissible under the business records

exception to the hearsay rule,” which can only be satisfied if

“the business record referred to by the testifying witness was

produced, is offered as evidence, and meets the necessary

criteria under HRE Rule 803(b)(6),[9] and is authenticated by a

9    Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence Rule 803(b)(6) (2002) provides:

                 The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule,
           even though the declarant is available as a witness:

                 . . . .

                 (b) Other exceptions.

                 . . . .

                 (6) Records of regularly conduced activity. A
           memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
           form, acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses,

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qualified witness in accordance with HRE Rule 901 or 902(11).”

Yata also contended that Mountes’ statement, based on his review

of the Certification, was not a business record.           Yata

maintained that even if Mountes could properly authenticate

business records from the prior servicer, Wells Fargo, the

business records did not demonstrate that Deutsche Bank

possessed the Note when it filed the Complaint.

          According to Yata, Deutsche Bank only produced a copy

of the purported Note and the Certification, which was signed by

Timmers before the Complaint was filed in 2013.          Yata maintained

that HRE Rule 803(b)(6) only admits records of regularly

conducted activity and the Certification was “not a verified and

trustworthy record of regularly conducted activity.”            Yata

argued that the Certification was “clearly a document that was

prepared in anticipation of litigation, which is inadmissible.”

Yata maintained that Deutsche Bank “failed to produce any

admissible evidence demonstrating” it possessed or was entitled

to enforce the Note when the Complaint was filed, and thus

          made in the course of a regularly conducted activity, at or
          near the time of the acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
          diagnoses, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
          other qualified witness, or by certification that complies
          with rule 902(11) or a statute permitting certification,
          unless the sources of information or other circumstances
          indicate lack of trustworthiness.

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Deutsche Bank did not establish its standing to foreclose the

Mortgage.

            a.    Deutsche Bank’s Supplemental Opposition

            On September 21, 2018, Deutsche Bank filed a

supplemental memorandum in opposition to Yata’s Motion for

Reconsideration.10      Attached to Deutsche Bank’s supplemental

memorandum was a “Declaration Regarding Location of the Note”

from Mark McCloskey (the McCloskey Declaration).11            As relevant

here, the McCloskey Declaration provided:

                  1.    I am authorized to sign this declaration on
            behalf of [Deutsche Bank], as an officer or employee of
            Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (“SLS”), which is [Deutsche
            Bank]’s loan servicing agent (“servicer”) for the subject
            loan (“the Loan”).
                  2.    The information in this declaration is taken
            from SLS’s business records. I have personal knowledge of
            SLS’s procedures for creating these records. They are:
            (a) made at or near the time of the occurrence of the
            matters recorded by persons with personal knowledge of the
            information in the business record, or from information
            transmitted by persons with personal knowledge; (b) kept in
            the course of SLS’s regularly conducted business
            activities; and (c) it is the regular practice of SLS to
            make such records. I am familiar with SLS’s record-keeping
            system.
                  3.    The owner of the Note and Mortgage for a
            particular a [sic] mortgage loan is commonly referred to in
            the loan servicing industry as the Investor. The Investor
            for this mortgage loan is [Deutsche Bank].

10    Deutsche Bank previously filed a memorandum in opposition to Yata’s
Motion for Reconsideration on July 27, 2018. Deutsche Bank contended that
the Motion for Reconsideration should be denied because Yata did not “present
new evidence or arguments that could not have been presented during the
earlier adjudicated” Motion for Summary Judgment. In support of this
argument, Deutsche Bank noted that Yata’s counsel appeared at the May 24,
2018 Motion for Summary Judgment hearing and requested a continuance to file
an opposition, but at the June 26, 2018 continued hearing, Yata or his
counsel did not appear and no opposition had been filed.
11    Deutsche Bank’s counsel also submitted a declaration which stated that
counsel would bring the original endorsed Note to the October 2, 2018 Motion
for Reconsideration hearing. It appears Deutsche Bank’s counsel did not
bring the original endorsed Note to the hearing.

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             4.    SLS maintains all the day to day loan
       documents, records and accounting of payments on the Loan
       being foreclosed in this action including all documents and
       business records acquired by [Deutsche Bank] when it
       purchased the subject loan.
             5.    Under the terms of SLS’s servicing arrangement,
       [Deutsche Bank] does not participate in, keep and maintain
       any of the day to day loan documents, inputting of
       accounting data, saving of business records and all
       communications with borrowers.
             6.    [Deutsche Bank], as the Investor, has a passive
       role with the primary emphasis on tracking its return on
       investment. In terms of routine business records on the
       Loan, SLS acts as the sole custodian of [Deutsche Bank]’s
       records. [Deutsche Bank]’s records were received by SLS
       and incorporated into SLS’s records. SLS relies upon the
       accuracy of these records in providing its loan servicing
       functions. [Deutsche Bank]’s records are relied upon by
       SLS as part of SLS’s business records. I am familiar with
       the record-keeping system of [Deutsche Bank].
             7.    Based upon my occupational experience, I know
       that loan servicers follow an industry wide standard on how
       to keep and maintain business records on the loan services
       performed in their portfolio which record-keeping is part
       of the regularly conducted activity of loan servicers. The
       type of and regular maintenance of loan information
       including the accounting under generally accepted
       principles for each mortgage loan is standard and
       computerized.
             . . . .
             11.   Finally, the loan servicer records, maintains
       and takes custody of all such daily business records and
       all loan documents, including taking possession of the note
       and mortgage records on behalf of the Investor.
             12.   A portion of the business records for the loan
       in this matter were created by a prior servicer, the prior
       servicer’s records for the loan were integrated and boarded
       into SLS’s systems, such that the prior servicer’s records
       concerning the Loan are now part of SLS’s business records.
       SLS maintains quality control and verification procedures
       as part of the boarding process to ensure the accuracy of
       the boarded records. It is the regular business practice
       of SLS to integrate prior servicers’ records into SLS’s
       business records, and to rely upon the accuracy of those
       boarded records in providing its loan servicing functions.
       These prior servicer records are integrated and relied upon
       by SLS as part of SLS’s business records. I am familiar
       with the record-keeping systems that prior servicers used
       to create and record information related to residential
       mortgage loans that it serviced, including the process by
       which information was entered into those systems and how
       those records were maintained. True and correct copies of
       records I have reviewed and relied upon in executing this
       affidavit are attached to this affidavit and incorporated
       herein.

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                13.   On or about March 24, 2006, Defendant BLAINE T.
          YATA executed a promissory note (“Note”) in the amount of
          $420,000.00. A true and correct copy of the endorsed Note
          and the Allonges are attached hereto as Exhibit “1”.
                14.   At the time the foreclosure Complaint was filed
          on September 10, 2014, [Deutsche Bank], through its
          custodian Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, was in
          possession of the Note. The Note was kept by the custodian
          at 1761 E. St. Andrew Place, Santa Ana, CA 92705 on behalf
          of [Deutsche Bank]. The original date of possession of the
          Note by the custodian was April 4, 2006. The Note had been
          returned to the custodian on December 27, 2013. The
          custodian maintained possession of the Note until May 8,
          2015. A true and correct copy of the documentation
          supporting Note possession at the time of the filing of the
          Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit “2”.
                15.   The Note, which is endorsed in blank, is
          currently being held by Law Offices of Marvin S.C. Dang,
          LLLC for [Deutsche Bank].

          b.    Yata’s Reply

          On September 27, 2018, Yata filed a reply to Deutsche

Bank’s supplemental memorandum in opposition to the Motion for

Reconsideration.    Yata noted the McCloskey Declaration claimed

that Deutsche Bank was in possession of the Note when the

Complaint was filed on September 10, 2014.         Yata argued that

such statement was inadmissible hearsay.         Yata contended that

even if Deutsche Bank possessed the Note when the Complaint was

filed, the McCloskey Declaration did not offer evidence

demonstrating that the Note was endorsed at that time.

          Yata argued that Deutsche Bank attempted “to invoke

the business records exception to the hearsay rule” by

presenting “a document marked as Exhibit 2,” which were

screenshots allegedly demonstrating Deutsche Bank’s possession

of the Note when the Complaint was filed.

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            Yata contended that the McCloskey Declaration lacked

the necessary foundation to admit Exhibit 2 into evidence.                Yata

further contended that

            Although [McCloskey] claims that Exhibit “2” is the record
            he relied upon to determine that [Deutsche Bank] was the
            holder of the note at the time the complaint was filed, it
            is impossible for any reasonable person viewing the
            document to reach the same conclusion. McCloskey offers no
            explanation as to what any of the items of that document
            mean, or when, where, why, and how those alleged entries
            were made. McClosk[e]y does not even point to a single
            entry on that document that purports to evidence [Deutsche
            Bank]’s possession of the indorsed promissory note.
            Without any such foundational testimony from McClsok[e]y,
            Exhibit “2” offered as a business record for the purpose of
            demonstrating [Deutsche Bank]’s possession of the note at
            the time the Complaint was filed, lacks trustworthiness.
            Nowhere does that document even reference the subject
            mortgage note. Nor is there any testimony as to when
            Exhibit “2” was generated. The document itself is dated
            August 29, 2018, long after the Complaint was filed herein.
            As such, Exhibit “2”, lacking foundation and
            trustworthiness, is not admissible under the business
            records exception to the hearsay rule.

Thus, Yata maintained that his Motion for Reconsideration should

be granted because Deutsche Bank did not establish its standing.

            c.    The Circuit Court’s Order

            On November 1, 2018, the circuit court issued an Order

Denying Motion for Reconsideration, concluding that Deutsche

Bank possessed the Note when the Complaint was filed.

C.    ICA Proceedings

      1.    Opening Brief

            On November 30, 2018, Yata filed a notice of appeal.

Yata filed an opening brief on April 10, 2019.            Yata raised one

point of error on appeal, arguing that Deutsche Bank did not

establish its standing to foreclose and thus the circuit court

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erroneously granted Deutsche Bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment

and erroneously denied Yata’s Motion for Reconsideration.                Yata

repeated the arguments he made before the circuit court in his

Motion for Reconsideration and reply to Deutsche Bank’s

supplemental memorandum in opposition to Yata’s Motion for

Reconsideration.

      2.    Answering Brief

            Deutsche Bank filed an answering brief on June 19,

2019.    Deutsche Bank contended that the circuit court properly

granted “the Motion for Summary Judgment because the Note was

endorsed prior to the filing of the Complaint and Plaintiff was

in possession.”12

            Deutsche Bank pointed out that the Mountes Declaration

was signed by Mountes, a Second Assistant Vice President at SLS,

Deutsche Bank’s loan servicer.         Deutsche Bank noted that the

Mountes Declaration states that Deutsche Bank, directly or

through an agent, possessed the Note when the Complaint was

filed.

            According to Deutsche Bank, the instant case is

distinguishable from Reyes-Toledo.          Deutsche Bank argued that in

this case, “the blank indorsement of the Note occurred prior to

the initiation of the suit.”        Deutsche Bank noted that “[t]he

12    Deutsche Bank also argued that Yata’s appeal should be dismissed
pursuant to Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate Procedure Rules 28 and 30.

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endorsed Note was attached to the Complaint.”          Deutsche Bank

asserted that it possessed the Note, “through its custodian

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,” when it filed the

Complaint.   Deutsche Bank thus contended that it had standing to

foreclose when the Complaint was filed.

          Deutsche Bank further argued that the circuit court

properly denied Yata’s Motion for Reconsideration.           Deutsche

Bank repeated the arguments it made in the memorandum in

opposition to Yata’s Motion for Reconsideration.           In addition,

Deutsche Bank noted that the McCloskey Declaration stated:

          14.   At the time the foreclosure Complaint was filed on
          September 10, 2014, [Deutsche Bank], through its custodian
          Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, was in possession of
          the Note. The Note was kept by the custodian at 1761 E.
          St. Andrew Place, Santa Ana, CA 92705 on behalf of
          Plaintiff. The original date of possession of the Note by
          the custodian was April 4, 2006. The Note had been
          returned to the custodian on December 27, 2013. The
          custodian maintained possession of the Note until May 8,
          2015. A true and correct copy of the documentation
          supporting Note possession at the time of the filing of the
          Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit “2.”

According to Deutsche Bank, Exhibit 2 supports the information

in paragraph 14 of the McCloskey Declaration.          Deutsche Bank

asserted that its custodian, Deutsche Bank National Trust

Company, possessed “the Note from December 27, 2013 until May 8,

2015” and thus Deutsche Bank possessed the Note when the

Complaint was filed.

          Citing to State v. Fitzwater, 122 Hawaiʻi 354, 365-68,

227 P.3d 520, 531-34 (2010), as amended (Apr. 5 2010), Deutsche

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Bank maintained that the McCloskey Declaration laid a sufficient

foundation and the business records attached to the McCloskey

Declaration were admissible under HRE Rule 803(b)(6).              Deutsche

Bank also contended that Yata did not “provide any specific

facts showing that the records in question are unreliable and

untrustworthy.”

      3.    ICA Summary Disposition Order

            The ICA issued a Summary Disposition Order on June 9,

2022.    As an initial matter, the ICA pointed out that a hearing

on the Motion for Summary Judgment was set for May 24, 2018,

where Yata’s counsel requested a continuance to file an

opposition.     The ICA noted that no opposition to the Motion for

Summary Judgment was filed, and neither Yata nor his counsel

appeared at the June 26, 2018 continued hearing.             The ICA

determined that “to the extent that Yata contends – based on

hearsay objections that were not raised in response to the

Motion for Summary Judgment – that the Circuit Court erred in

entering the [Order Granting Motion for Summary

Judgment] . . . , Yata’s arguments are without merit” because

those objections were waived.13

13    Although the ICA did not err when it concluded that Yata’s argument was
meritless based on waiver, this court will address Yata’s arguments on
certiorari because Deutsche Bank did not raise a waiver argument, the circuit
court addressed the Motion for Reconsideration’s substantive issues, and the
ICA discussed U.S. Bank Tr., N.A. as Tr. for LSF9 Master Participation Tr. v.
Verhagen, 149 Hawaiʻi 315, 489 P.3d 419 (2021), as amended (July 6, 2021),

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           The ICA went on to note that the circuit court

considered the issue of standing at the Motion for

Reconsideration stage.      Citing to this court’s decision in

Verhagen, the ICA determined that

                 Here, with the Motion for Summary Judgment, Deutsche
           Bank submitted, inter alia, a declaration of Matthew
           Mountes (Mountes), Second Assistant Vice President of
           Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS), loan servicer for
           Deutsche Bank; and in conjunction with its response to the
           Motion for Reconsideration, Deutsche Bank submitted, inter
           alia, a declaration of Mark McCloskey (McCloskey),
           Assistant Vice President of SLS, both attesting to their
           personal review and knowledge of SLS’s records, including
           incorporated records. With careful consideration of the
           supreme court’s directives in Verhagen, and upon review of
           the evidence presented by Deutsche Bank, we conclude that
           Mountes and McCloskey were qualified witnesses with
           personal knowledge of SLS’s procedures for creating its
           records, including its procedures for incorporation of
           records of other businesses into SLS’s records, and SLS’s
           reliance on those records and maintenance of those records
           in the course of its regularly-conducted business
           activities, after a pre-incorporation process of quality
           control and verification procedures. Although indicia of
           trustworthiness are not profuse, we conclude that the
           record provides sufficient indicia of trustworthiness,
           including with respect to the evidence that the Note was in
           the possession of Deutsche Bank, through its custodian
           Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, at the time the
           foreclosure complaint was filed. Thus, we conclude that
           the Circuit Court did not err or abuse its discretion in
           denying the Motion for Reconsideration and rejecting Yata’s
           argument that Deutsche Bank did not have standing to
           foreclose on the subject property.

Thus, the ICA affirmed the circuit court’s Order Granting Motion

for Summary Judgment and Order Denying Motion for

Reconsideration.     The ICA issued its corresponding Judgment on

Appeal on July 11, 2022.

reconsideration denied, No. SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX, 2021 WL 2948836 (Haw. July 9,
2021) when affirming the circuit court.

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D.    Application for Writ of Certiorari

            Yata filed a timely application for writ of certiorari

on August 10, 2022.       Yata asserts that the ICA erroneously

interpreted this court’s decision in Verhagen for two reasons.

            First, Yata argues that the ICA erroneously held that

Deutsche Bank established it had possession of the Note when the

Complaint was filed because (a) there was no “admissible

documentary evidence” of possession, and (b) Deutsche Bank did

not demonstrate how it was connected to the custodian, Deutsche

Bank National Trust Company.14

            Yata argues that the instant case is distinguishable

from Verhagen.      Yata contends that the Mountes and McCloskey

Declarations contain conclusory statements regarding possession

of the Note at the time the Complaint was filed.             According to

Yata, the only documentary evidence that Deutsche Bank possessed

the Note was Exhibit 2 to the McCloskey Declaration.              Yata

maintains that Exhibit 2 is an inadmissible screenshot.              Citing

to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fong, 149 Hawaiʻi 249, 488 P.3d 1228

(2021), Yata asserts that “the screenshot is not self-

explanatory and McCloskey’s statements about what this shows are

conclusory.”     Yata maintains that the McCloskey Declaration does

14    Yata maintains that “a parent corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiary are separate and distinct legal entities” and standing must be
proven by Deutsche Bank rather than Deutsche Bank’s parent company.

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not state “what entity the screenshot belongs to, and whether

[McCloskey] is familiar with the record-keeping of the entity.”

Yata contends that Exhibit 2 refers to a custodian “but does not

state where the Note is.”      Yata asserts that the screenshots

were not admissible documentary evidence pursuant to Verhagen.

          Second, Yata maintains that the ICA erroneously held

that the “qualified witness” doctrine applied to the screenshots

because “(a) Deutsche Bank National Trust Company was not the

lender or a prior loan servicer, and (b) it was not shown what

entity created or maintained the screenshot.”

          Yata argues that the ICA did not analyze the three

factors, which were set forth in Verhagen and Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A. v. Behrendt, 142 Hawaiʻi 37, 414 P.3d 89 (2018), to

determine “whether [Mountes and McCloskey] were qualified

witnesses.”   Yata contends that although McCloskey states that

SLS received and incorporated business records into SLS’s

records, McCloskey “does not make this statement for the

screenshot attached as Exhibit 2 to his declaration.”            Yata

maintains that “stating what a screenshot is without

authenticating the screenshot does not meet the admissibility

requirements for such evidence.”

          Citing to Verhagen, Yata contends that the McCloskey

Declaration does not explain McCloskey’s familiarity “with the

record-keeping system that produced the screenshot” or “state

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how an SLS employee would have knowledge of the records of

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company.”           According to Yata,

Deutsche Bank’s only evidence of possession of the Note was “a

screenshot that purports to show that Deutsche Bank National

Trust Company had possession of the Note” when the Complaint was

filed.    Yata reiterates that Deutsche Bank did not explain how

it was related to Deutsche Bank National Trust Company and the

only documentary evidence showing Deutsche Bank possessed the

Note when the Complaint was filed was an inadmissible

screenshot.15

                              III.   DISCUSSION

A.    Yata correctly argues that Deutsche Bank failed to
      establish standing.

            Yata largely cites to this court’s decision in

Verhagen16 in support of his argument that Deutsche Bank lacked

standing because Deutsche Bank did not prove it had possession

of the Note at the time it filed the Complaint.            Specifically,

Yata maintains that Deutsche Bank did not produce “admissible

documentary evidence” that it had possession of the Note when

the Complaint was filed, and that screenshots submitted by

15    Deutsche Bank did not file a response.
16    The briefing in this appeal was completed in 2019 and this court’s
decision in Verhagen was published in 2021. Consequently, the parties did
not cite to Verhagen in the briefings before the ICA. However, the ICA
relied on Verhagen in its Summary Disposition Order to affirm the circuit
court’s Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment and Order Denying Motion
for Reconsideration. Thus, Verhagen is relevant to the instant application
for writ of certiorari.

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Deutsche Bank were inadmissible under the “qualified witness”

doctrine.

            In Verhagen, Patrick Verhagen (Verhagen) owned real

estate (the Property) and executed a note, secured by a mortgage

on the Property, in favor of Washington Mutual.           Verhagen, 149

Hawaiʻi at 317, 489 P.3d at 421.          The mortgage was assigned to

U.S. Bank.    Id.   Caliber Home Loans, Inc. (Caliber) was U.S.

Bank’s loan servicer, and JPMorgan Chase previously serviced the

loan.   Id. at 317-18, 489 P.3d at 421-22.

            After Verhagen defaulted on the note, U.S Bank filed a

foreclosure complaint in the Circuit Court of the Second

Circuit, and attached a Verification by Caliber employee Julia

Jackson.    Id. at 318, 489 P.3d at 422.        Jackson was familiar

with Caliber’s records and how those records were maintained,

and verified U.S. Bank possessed the original note.            Id.

            U.S. Bank subsequently filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment and Interlocutory Decree of Foreclosure (MSJ).              Id.

U.S. Bank supported its MSJ with a declaration from Alyssa

Salyers, a foreclosure document specialist at Caliber (Salyers

Declaration).     Id.   In the Salyers Declaration,

                  Salyers declared she was familiar with both Caliber’s
            business records concerning the Note and the manner in
            which Caliber maintains those records. Salyers also
            declared she had inspected a copy of the Note maintained by
            Caliber. She attached a “true and correct” copy of the
            Note to her declaration. She further declared that
            Caliber’s records concerning the Note include records
            incorporated from the prior loan servicer, JPMorgan Chase.

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             The records obtained from JPMorgan Chase, Salyers,
             declared, are “kept and maintained by Caliber in the
             ordinary course of its business for the purpose of
             maintaining an accounting of payments received, expenses
             incurred, and amounts advanced with regard to the Subject
             Loan, and such records are relied upon by Caliber in the
             regular course of its business.”

Id.    Verhagen filed an opposition to U.S. Bank’s MSJ, contending

that “U.S. Bank could not establish standing under [Reyes-

Toledo].”      Id.   The circuit court disagreed and granted U.S.

Bank’s MSJ.      Id.

             After Verhagen appealed, the ICA remanded the case so

U.S. Bank could “supplement the record in light of Reyes-Toledo

and [Mattos].”       Id. (footnote omitted).       Then, “[o]n remand, U.S

Bank moved for ratification of the circuit court’s prior

judgment.”      Id. at 319, 489 P.3d at 423.        Verhagen raised

jurisdictional objections “but did not substantively oppose the

motion to ratify.”       Id.   U.S. Bank’s motion to ratify was

accompanied by a supplemental declaration from Melinda

Patterson, a Caliber employee (Patterson Declaration).               Id.

Patterson stated she “was familiar with both Caliber’s books and

records concerning the Note and the manner in which Caliber

maintains its books and records.”           Id.   The Patterson

Declaration further provided:

                   Caliber’s records include and incorporate records for
             the Loan obtained from [JPMorgan Chase] (“Prior Servicer”),
             the prior loan servicer for the Loan. The records obtained
             by Caliber from the Prior Servicer are kept and maintained
             by Caliber in the ordinary course of its business for the
             purpose of maintaining an accounting of payment received,
             expenses incurred, and amounts advanced with regard to the
             Loan, and such records are relied upon by Caliber in the

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          regular course of its business. The information regarding
          the Loan transferred to Caliber from the Prior Servicer has
          been validated in many ways, including but not limited to,
          going through a due diligence phase, review of hard copy
          documents, and review of the payment history and accounting
          of other fees, costs, and expenses charged to the Loan by
          Prior Servicer. It is Caliber’s regular practice, after
          these phases are complete, to receive records from prior
          servicers and integrate these records into Caliber’s
          business records at the time of acquisition. Once
          integrated, Caliber maintains and relies on these business
          records in the ordinary course of its mortgage loan
          servicing business.

Id. (brackets in original).

          Patterson also declared that U.S. Bank possessed the

note when it filed its complaint against Verhagen:

                Plaintiff, or its agent on Plaintiff’s behalf, was in
          possession of the original wet-ink, indorsed in blank Note
          when the above-captioned foreclosure action was commenced
          on March 23, 2016 and since [that time] . . . .
                My personal knowledge of these statements is derived
          from my having inspected Caliber’s business records.
          Specifically, I researched Calber’s business records, which
          includes “Certification” [sic] executed by Caliber
          employee, Jennifer Martin. The “Certification” contained
          in Caliber’s business records evidence [sic] that the
          original wet ink, indorsed in blank Note was in Caliber’s
          possession on Plaintiff’s behalf on February 9, 2016.
          Further, the “Certification” contained in Caliber’s
          business records indicates that the original wet-ink Note
          was indorsed in blank no later than February 9, 2016, as
          the original wet-ink Note was electronically scanned and
          uploaded to Caliber’s business records on or before
          February 9, 2016, and the scanned copy of the original wet-
          ink Note that was uploaded to Caliber’s business records on
          or before February 9, 2016 contains a blank indorsement on
          page 6 of the Note.

Id. (brackets in original).      Jennifer Martin’s certification was

attached to the Patterson Declaration.         Id.   In addition,

Patterson declared that there was a December 9, 2016 attorney’s

bailee letter agreement in Caliber’s business records, and “that

Caliber sent the letter to U.S. Bank’s legal counsel on or

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around that date along with the wet-ink indorsed-in-blank Note.”

Id. at 319-20, 489 P.3d at 423-24 (footnote omitted).

          The circuit court issued amended findings of fact and

conclusions of law, finding that U.S. Bank possessed the note

when it filed the complaint.      Id. at 320, 489 P.3d at 424.

However, the ICA issued an amended summary disposition order

vacating the circuit court’s amended findings of fact and

conclusions of law.     Id. at 321, 489 P.3d at 425.        The ICA

determined U.S. Bank did not demonstrate it possessed the note

when the complaint was filed and thus lacked standing.            Id.

(citation omitted).     U.S. Bank filed an application for writ of

certiorari.    Id. at 323, 489 P.3d at 427.       This court concluded

that U.S. Bank had standing as required by Reyes-Toledo, vacated

the ICA’s amended summary disposition order, and affirmed the

circuit court’s granting of U.S. Bank’s MSJ.          Id. at 328, 489

P.3d at 432.

          As discussed below, the instant case is

distinguishable from Verhagen, and Deutsche Bank did not

demonstrate it had possession of the Note when it filed the

Complaint.

    1.    Deutsche Bank’s documentary evidence was inadmissible
          because there was insufficient testimony regarding
          circumstances of trustworthiness.

          Yata correctly argues that Deutsche Bank’s documentary

evidence that it possessed the Note was inadmissible.            Unlike

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the records in Verhagen, Deutsche Bank’s records were

inadmissible under HRE Rule 803(b)(6) because the Mountes and

McCloskey Declarations did not sufficiently demonstrate

circumstances of trustworthiness.

          In Verhagen, this court pointed out that “HRE Rule

803(b)(6) establishes a hearsay exception for ‘records of

regularly conducted activity.’”       Id. at 325, 489 P.3d at 429

(quoting HRE Rule 803(b)(6)).       This court stated that “when an

entity incorporates records prepared by another entity into its

own records, they are admissible as business records of the

incorporating entity provided that it relies on the records,

there are other indicia of reliability, and the requirements of

HRE Rule 803(b)(6) are otherwise satisfied.”          Id. (quoting

Fitzwater, 122 Hawaiʻi 354, 367-68, 227 P.3d 520, 533-34).

          This court noted when “it is appropriate to treat an

incorporated record as ‘created’ by the receiving business:”

                Incorporated records are admissible under HRE Rule
          803(b)(6) when a custodian or qualified witness testifies
          that [1] the documents were incorporated and kept in the
          normal course of business, [2] that the incorporating
          business typically relies upon the accuracy of the contents
          of the documents, and [3] the circumstances otherwise
          indicate the trustworthiness of the document.

Id. at 325-26, 489 P.3d at 429-30 (quoting Behrendt, 142 Hawaiʻi

at 45, 414 P.3d at 97) (brackets in original).          This court

further noted that an incorporated record is admissible even

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without testimony concerning its actual creation if the three

conditions are satisfied.         Id. at 326, 489 P.3d at 430.

             As applied to the facts in Verhagen, this court

determined that the first two requirements were satisfied:

                   Patterson and Salyers both testified that JPMorgan
             Chase’s records were incorporated into Caliber’s own and
             kept and maintained by Caliber in the ordinary course of
             its business. They both further testified that Caliber
             used and relied on the incorporated records in the regular
             course of its loan servicing business. The first two
             requirements for the admission of incorporated records are
             thus satisfied.

Id. (footnote omitted).

             With respect to the third requirement, this court

noted that Salyers did not testify about circumstances

indicating “the trustworthiness of the documents Caliber

incorporated from JPMorgan Chase” but Patterson did because

“Patterson declared that:”

                   The information regarding the Loan transferred to
             Caliber from the Prior Servicer has been validated in many
             ways, including, but not limited to, going through a due
             diligence phase, review of hard copy documents, and review
             of the payment history and accounting of other fees, costs,
             and expenses charged to the Loan by Prior Servicer.

Id.    This court determined that:

                   Though scant, this testimony establishes
             circumstances indicating the trustworthiness of Caliber’s
             incorporated records. It is evidence that before
             incorporating JPMorgan Chase’s documents, Caliber reviewed
             hard copies of the documents, engaged in a “due diligence”
             process, and reviewed the payment history and accounting
             associated with the loan. JPMorgan Chase’s documents were
             not, in other words, uncritically incorporated into
             Caliber’s own. They were vetted by Caliber. This pre-
             incorporation vetting, however nebulously described by
             Patterson’s testimony, is a circumstance that indicates the
             trustworthiness of the documents.

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Id.    This court concluded that Patterson’s testimony satisfied

the three Behrendt requirements and “[t]he ICA should have held

that Caliber’s incorporated records, as authenticated by Salyers

and Patterson’s testimony, were admissible under HRE Rule

803(b)(6).”      Id. at 327, 489 P.3d at 431 (footnote omitted).

             Here, like the declarations in Verhagen, the Mountes

and McCloskey Declarations satisfy the first two Behrendt

requirements.17      Both declarations stated that some of the

business records regarding Yata’s loan were “created by a prior

servicer” and “were integrated and boarded into SLS’s systems,

such that the prior servicer’s records concerning the Loan are

now part of SLS’s records.”         Both declarations further stated

that

             It is the regular business practice of SLS to integrate
             prior servicers’ records into SLS’s business records, and
             to rely upon the accuracy of those boarded records in
             providing its loan servicing functions. These prior
             servicer records are integrated and relied upon by SLS as
             part of SLS’s business records.

In addition, McCloskey stated he was “familiar with the record-

keeping systems that prior servicers used to create and record

information related to residential mortgage loans that it

17    In addition, Mountes and McCloskey were qualified witnesses because
they had knowledge of SLS’s record-keeping system and described SLS’s
incorporation of prior loan servicer’s documents. See Verhagen, 149 Hawaiʻi
at 327 n.8, 489 P.3d at 430 n.8 (citing State v. Fitzwater, 122 Hawaiʻi 354,
366, 227 P.3d 520, 532 (2010), as amended (Apr. 5, 2010) (“The phrase ‘other
qualified witness’ is given a very broad interpretation. The witness need
only have enough familiarity with the record-keeping system of the business
in question to explain how the record came into existence in the ordinary
course of business.”) (cleaned up)).

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serviced, including the process by which information was entered

into those systems and how those records were maintained.”             The

Mountes and McCloskey Declarations demonstrate that SLS

“incorporated and kept the documents in the normal course of

business” and “typically relies upon the accuracy of the

contents of the documents,” and “[t]he first two requirements

for admission of incorporated records are thus satisfied.”             Id.

at 326, 489 P.3d at 430 (citing Behrendt, 142 Hawaiʻi at 45, 414

P.3d at 97).

          However, the Mountes and McCloskey Declarations do not

provide sufficient “circumstances [that] indicate the

trustworthiness of the documents.”        Id.   With regard to

circumstances indicating trustworthiness, the Mountes and

McCloskey Declarations state that “SLS maintains quality control

and verification procedures as part of the boarding process to

ensure the accuracy of the boarded records.”          The declarations

in Verhagen provided specific methods of validation of documents

from the prior loan servicer, “including, but not limited to,

going through a due diligence phase, review of hard copy

documents, and review of the payment history and account of

other fees, costs, and expenses charged to the Loan by Prior

Servicer.”   Id.   The Mountes and McCloskey Declarations merely

assert that SLS has “quality control and verification

procedures” to ensure the accuracy of incorporated records

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without stating what those procedures are.           This court noted

that the testimony indicating circumstances of trustworthiness

in Verhagen was “scant” and “nebulously described” circumstances

of trustworthiness.       Id.    Here, there is even less testimony

describing circumstances of trustworthiness.            Thus, it appears

that the third Behrendt requirement was not satisfied, and the

documents attached to the Mountes and McCloskey Declarations

were not admissible.       See id. at 327, 489 P.3d at 431.

      2.    Even if Deutsche Bank’s documentary evidence was
            admissible, that documentary evidence was insufficient
            to establish Deutsche Bank’s possession of the Note
            when it filed the Complaint.

            In Verhagen, this court determined that “[t]he

evidence, taken together, shows U.S. Bank had standing at the

time it filed suit.”       Id.   This court noted that “a foreclosing

plaintiff must establish its standing to bring a lawsuit at the

commencement of the proceeding, not merely at the summary

judgment stage.”18      Id. (citing Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaiʻi at 369,

390 P.3d at 1256).      This court pointed out that:

18    This court pointed out that “the requirement of standing overlaps with
a plaintiff’s burden of proving its entitlement to enforce the subject
promissory note. Verhagen, 149 Hawaiʻi at 327, 489 P.3d at 431 (citing Bank
of Am., N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaiʻi 361, 367, 390 P.3d 1248, 1254
(2017)). This court noted that “[w]hether a party is entitled to enforce a
promissory note is determined by application of [Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes]
§ 490:3-301, which provides:

                  “Person entitled to enforce” an instrument means
            (i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in
            possession of the instrument who has the rights of a
            holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the
            instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument

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                 U.S. Bank maintains that, at the time it initiated
           suit, it was entitled to enforce the Note because it held
           the indorsed-in-blank Note. U.S. Bank supports this claim
           with the following evidence: (1) Jennifer Martin’s February
           9, 2016, certification certifying, under penalty of
           perjury, that at 12:51 p.m. on February 9, 2016, she
           personally verified Caliber’s possession of the original
           Note and attaching an indorsed-in-blank copy of the Note;
           (2) a bailee letter dated December 9, 2016, establishing
           that Caliber sent the Note to U.S. Bank’s counsel at that
           time; and (3) Patterson’s sworn testimony that, based on
           her review of Caliber’s records, and her knowledge of how
           those records are made and maintained in the ordinary
           course of business, “Plaintiff, or its agent on Plaintiff’s
           behalf, was in possession of the original wet-ink, indorsed
           in blank Note when the [Verhagen] foreclosure action was
           commenced on March 23, 2016, and since.”

Id. (bracketing in original) (emphasis added).           This court then

determined:

                 . . . Patterson testified that based on her knowledge
           of Caliber’s records and record-keeping practices, U.S.
           Bank had actual or constructive possession of the Note at
           the time it filed the complaint. Such testimony, standing
           alone and uncorroborated by documentary evidence, would be
           insufficient to establish U.S. Bank possessed the Note when
           it filed the complaint. Here, however, there is admissible
           documentary evidence showing that U.S. Bank possessed the
           Note both a mere six weeks before the filing of the
           complaint and at the time of summary judgment.
           Collectively, the evidence presented by U.S. Bank thus
           establishes the bank’s possession of the Note on the day
           the complaint was filed.[19]

           pursuant to section 490:3-309 or 490:3-418(d). A person
           may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even
           though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is
           in wrongful possession of the instrument.

Id. at 327, 489 P.3d at 431.
19    This court went on to note that “a defendant may counter this inference
of possession at the time of filing with evidence setting forth ‘specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue’ as to whether the plaintiff
actually possessed the subject note at the time it filed suit.” Verhagen,
149 Hawaiʻi at 328, 489 P.3d at 432 (citation omitted). However, Yata did not
need to counter an inference of possession because Deutsche Bank failed to
produce sufficient evidence of possession of the Note when it filed the
Complaint.

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Id. at 327-28, 489 P.3d at 431-32 (footnote omitted) (emphasis

added).

           Here, in contrast to Verhagen, the Certification

attached as Exhibit 8 to the Mountes Declaration was dated

December 18, 2013, nearly nine months before the Complaint was

filed on September 10, 2014.      The Verhagen court concluded that

U.S. Bank established possession of the note on the day the

complaint was filed partly because the certification in that

case “predates the filing of the complaint by less than two

months.”   Id. at 328 n.10, 489 P.3d at 432 n.10.          This court

further noted that “[a]n older certification, and a

correspondingly larger gap between the certification’s date and

that of the complaint, would leave more room for a ‘genuine

issue’ as to whether U.S. Bank actually possessed the Note when

it sued Verhagen.”    Id.   As discussed above, the Certification

in this case predates the filing of the complaint by nearly nine

months, which is significantly more than two months.            Thus,

there is more potential for a “genuine issue” as to whether

Deutsche Bank possessed the Note when it filed the Complaint

against Yata.   See id.

           In addition, Yata correctly contends that the

screenshots attached as Exhibit 2 to the McCloskey Declaration

are unclear and do not establish Deutsche Bank’s possession of

the Note when it filed the Complaint.        The McCloskey Declaration

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does not explain where the screenshots came from or how to

interpret the screenshots.      Without such an explanation, it is

unclear how the screenshots demonstrate that Deutsche Bank had

possession of the Note when it filed the Complaint.

          Furthermore, in Verhagen, this court took into

consideration U.S. Bank’s possession of the note at the time of

summary judgment when determining if U.S. Bank had standing.

Id. at 328, 489 P.3d at 432.      Here, the only evidence Deutsche

Bank possessed the Note at the time of or after summary judgment

was a declaration from Deutsche Bank’s counsel, which stated

that “[t]he Note, which is endorsed in blank, is currently being

held by Law Offices of Marvin S.C. Dang, LLLC for Plaintiff.”

This declaration further stated that Deutsche Bank’s counsel

would “bring the original endorsed Note to the hearing on

October 2, 2018.”    Deutsche Bank’s counsel did not bring the

original endorsed Note to the hearing.         In contrast to Verhagen,

there was no bailee letter demonstrating SLS sent the Note to

Deutsche Bank’s counsel after Deutsche Bank filed its Complaint,

see id. at 327, 489 P.3d at 431, and there was no documentary

evidence demonstrating Deutsche Bank had possession of the Note

after it filed the Complaint.

          In sum, there was more potential for a genuine issue

regarding whether Deutsche Bank had possession of the Note when

it filed the Complaint because the Certification predates the

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filing of the Complaint by more than two months, the screenshot

was unclear and did not establish Deutsche Bank’s possession of

the Note before or after it filed the Complaint, and the only

evidence Deutsche Bank possessed the Note after the Complaint

was filed was Deutsche Bank’s counsel’s conclusory declaration.

Even if Deutsche Bank’s documents were admissible, there is less

evidence in this case demonstrating Deutsche Bank’s possession

of the Note when it filed the Complaint than in Verhagen.             Thus,

it appears that Deutsche Bank lacked standing to foreclose

against Yata because Deutsche Bank did not establish it

possessed the Note when it filed the Complaint.

                            IV.   CONCLUSION

           For the foregoing reasons, Deutsche Bank failed to

establish standing when it filed the Complaint.          Thus, we vacate

the ICA’s July 11, 2022 Judgment on Appeal, which affirmed the

circuit court’s Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment and

Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration.         The case is remanded

to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

Keith M. Kiuchi                          /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
                                         /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Marvin S.C. Dang
and Amy Jackson                          /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for respondent
                                         /s/ Michael D. Wilson

                                         /s/ Todd W. Eddins

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