Court Opinion

ID: 9707274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:07:29.998707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:30.366463
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge PELLEGRINI.
Because I disagree with the majority that a property owner may be punished with the forfeiture of his property despite being acquitted of the underlying criminal offense without violating the Excessive Fines Clause, I respectfully dissent.
Freddie Bias is the owner of property at 542 Ontario Street in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (Property). In 2005, Bethlehem police executed a search warrant on the property and found Stephen Rodriguez with controlled substances valued at $180. The police arrested Bias and charged him with possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, conspiracy to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Commonwealth filed a petition for forfeiture of the Property.
Bias was acquitted on all four criminal charges. Thereafter, the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (trial court) conducted a jury trial on the forfeiture petition. The jury found that: (1) a nexus existed between the Property and unlawful drug activity; (2) the Property was unlawfully used or possessed by a person other than Bias; and (3) Bias knew of or consented to the person’s unlawful use or possession of the Property. The jury determined that forfeiture of the Property was warranted.
Bias argued before the trial eourt that forfeiture of the Property was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of his offense and, thus, was an excessive fíne. In finding that the forfeiture of Bias’ property was not an excessive fine, the trial court compared the value of the Property ($65,-000) to the maximum fíne for the charges filed against Bias ($100,000), despite the acquittals, and concluded that the amount of the forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. The trial court also concluded that the violations of law occurring on the Property were part of a pattern of behavior and caused widespread harm.
On appeal, Bias argues that the forfeiture of his Property was an excessive fine under the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998). In that case, the Supreme Court held that a forfeiture of $357,144 for violation of a statute that criminalizes the knowing transportation of more than $10,000 cash out of the country without reporting it was an excessive fine because the penalty was grossly disproportionate to the offense committed, a mere reporting offense. The Court held that “[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle *421of proportionality. The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028. The Court found two considerations particularly important in determining if a fine is excessive. First, judgments about the appropriate punishment belong to the legislature. Second, “any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise.” Id. at 336, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (emphasis added). It is thus clear that the United States Supreme Court contemplated that its analysis would apply in the context of an underlying criminal offense.
Our Supreme Court adopted the Bajakajian standard in Commonwealth v. Real Property and Improvements Commonly Known as Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA, 574 Pa. 423, 832 A.2d 396 (2003). Spruce Street, like Bajakajian, involved the seizure of property following a guilty plea to an underlying criminal offense. Our Supreme Court listed various factors to consider when determining whether a fine is excessive: “the penalty imposed as compared to the maximum penalty available; whether the violation was isolated or part of a pattern of misbehavior; and, the harm resulting from the crime charged.” Spruce Street, 574 Pa. at 433, 832 A.2d at 402 (emphasis added).
These factors show that our Supreme Court only contemplated performing an excessive fines analysis when there was an underlying criminal conviction. When the owner of the forfeited property was not charged with a crime or, as here, is acquitted, there is no “maximum penalty available;” legally, there has been no “misbe-' havior”; and there is no “crime.” These factors are simply irrelevant to cases, such as the present one, where there is no underlying criminal conviction. In short, both the United States and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts presupposed that their standards would only apply when there was an underlying criminal conviction, which the present case lacks.
In fact, I have been able to discover only one case nationwide since Bajakaji-an similar to the facts before us, quite possibly because of the inherent incongruity between an acquittal in a criminal case followed by a civil forfeiture of the instrumentality of the “crime” that had not occurred. In Galloway v. City of New Albany, 735 So.2d 407 (Miss.1999), the Supreme Court of Mississippi squarely held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Mississippi Constitution, which is identical to the Excessive Fines Clause of the United States Constitution (and hence identical to the Pennsylvania Constitution as well), prohibits the forfeiture of a vehicle whose owner was acquitted of drug charges.
In Galloway, Galloway drove his wife in his truck to a rendezvous with his wife’s ex-husband, who was not paying his child support to Galloway’s wife. In fact, Galloway’s wife and her ex-husband had agreed that he would pay part of his delinquent child support in exchange for prescription narcotics that Galloway’s wife possessed as a result of a recent surgery. However, the ex-husband was a police informant and was accompanied by an undercover officer. When they reached their rendezvous point, Galloway’s wife exited his vehicle, entered the vehicle containing her ex-husband and the undercover officer, and sold the prescription medication for the child support. All the evidence at trial showed that Galloway had no knowledge of the drug dealing and thought he was merely driving his wife to meet her ex-husband to receive the child support payment. As a result, the trial court directed a verdict in Galloway’s *422favor. His wife, who was a co-defendant, was acquitted by the jury.
Meanwhile, a civil forfeiture case against Galloway had been stayed until the criminal proceedings ended. After Galloway was acquitted by directed verdict, he filed for summary judgment in the forfeiture case, which was denied. Following a non-jury trial, the forfeiture of Galloway’s truck was granted. Galloway appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, alleging various constitutional violations, including a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi used a four-part test to determine whether a fine is excessive that is substantially identical to the Pennsylvania test.1 It summarized its test by explaining that “the forfeited property must have a sufficiently close relationship to the illegal activity [and] must not impose upon the owner a penalty grossly disproportionate to his offense.” Galloway, 735 So.2d at 413. The Court held that the forfeiture of Galloway’s truck was disproportionate — and, thus, in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause — because he was acquitted of the drug charges and that there was not a close relationship between the truck and any illegal activity.
In this case, as in Galloway, it is clear that the forfeiture was grossly disproportionate to the offense allegedly committed. The first factor to determine whether a fine is grossly disproportionate is whether the penalty imposed is excessive compared to the maximum penalty available. Spruce Street, 574 Pa. at 433, 832 A.2d at 402. The majority erroneously used the maximum penalty available for the violation of the underlying criminal statute, which is $100,000, to determine the maximum penalty available. The correct measure is the maximum penalty available to that particular person. Here, the defendant was acquitted, so the maximum penalty available to him, like the maximum penalty available to all those acquitted of criminal offenses, is a fine of $0. The forfeiture of his house, which had a value of $65,000, is grossly disproportionate to a maximum penalty available of $0.2
The second factor is whether the violation was isolated or part of a pattern of misbehavior. Id. Because the defendant was acquitted, it is legally conclusive that there was no violation or misbehavior. Something that has not occurred cannot have occurred in a pattern. Finally, this Court must consider the harm resulting from the crime charged. Id. Again, because the defendant was acquitted, there was no “crime” from which harm could have resulted, making the forfeiture of the defendant’s house grossly disproportionate.
*423For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Judges COHN JUBELIRER and BUTLER join.

. Specifically, the four factors are:
(1) the nexus between the offense and the property and the extent of the property's role in tire offense;
(2) the role and culpability of the owner;
(3) the possibility of separating the offending property from the remainder; and
(4) whether, after a review of all relevant facts, the forfeiture divests the owner of property which has a value that is grossly disproportionate to the crime or grossly disproportionate to the culpability of the owner.
Galloway, 735 So.2d at 412.

. Even if the majority is correct that the maximum penalty available was $100,000, this factor still is not met. The worst that can be said about Bias’ behavior is that he failed to do all that could be reasonably expected in preventing his house from being used for criminal activity. No penalty was imposed on Bias for his alleged criminal conduct. Thus, the gravity of Bias' “offense” is necessarily at the lowest possible level, especially considering the enormity of the penalty that could have been imposed. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that a trial court would impose a $100,000 fine when the value of the illegal substances was only $180.