Court Opinion

ID: 9883330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:40:27.196757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:17.715783
License: Public Domain

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.
¶ 59. (concurring). I write separately because this is not a case that involves juror bias. Standing apart, neither the judge nor the juror was biased. However, the combination of having the judge preside over a case in which he may be called upon to rule on a matter involving his mother as a juror is a problem waiting to happen. The *713judge here was first confronted with this issue when he was called upon to decide whether his mother should be stricken for cause.
¶ 60. Judges face tough calls in the courtroom each day. Judges are charged with administering justice and have a concurrent goal of avoiding unnecessary appellate issues. To avoid these appellate issues the judge could have either removed himself from the case or replaced the juror. However, the circuit court judge stated that he did not think there was "any legal basis for excusing" his mother from the panel. I disagree because the circuit court judge has broad inherent authority and thus the discretion and authority to administer justice. Under his inherent authority, the judge should have either stricken his mother from the jury or recused himself from the case. The juror, however, could sit on another case so long as her son was not the presiding judge. Consequently, it is unnecessary for this court to manipulate this case to fit the law of objective bias. Because I do not agree that this case involves juror bias, I respectfully concur in the lead opinion's decision to grant a new trial.
I
¶ 61. I disagree with the lead opinion's determination that this juror was objectively biased. The lead opinion weaves an analysis in order to obtain a result. I do not join in that confusion of case law involving juror bias. Instead, I would call upon judges to use their sound discretion and inherent authority to avoid such situations where the recipe for disaster is right before their eyes. The judge could not rule on a motion which directly involved his mother as a juror. He did, however, rule on a motion that concerned striking her as a juror. If this were a matter where his mother was a witness, *714he would not preside over that hearing. See SCR 60.04(4)(e)4. Judges have broad discretion and employ a wide variety of methods when selecting a jury. Instead of calling upon judges to do what they do every day in running efficient and fair courtrooms and employing procedures to effectively select juries, the lead opinion instead attempts to label this as a case of objective bias. In so doing, the lead opinion unravels the concept of objective bias.
¶ 62. A circuit court judge possesses broad inherent powers that provide him or her with the tools to fairly, efficiently, and effectively administer justice. See City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 738, 749-50, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999) (citing to a number of cases and stating "the court exercises inherent authority i[n] ensuring that the court functions efficiently and effectively to provide the fair administration of justice"); State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 44, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) (discussing inherent powers, which are " 'those powers which must necessarily be used by the various departments of government in order that they may efficiently perform the functions imposed upon them by the people'").
¶ 63. "This court has been very clear about the circuit court's role in jury selection." State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶ 109, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223. "The appearance of bias should be avoided." Id. (citations omitted). "Circuit courts are advised to err on the side of striking jurors who appear to be biased" because " '[sjuch action will avoid the appearance of bias, and may save judicial time and resources in the long run.'" Id. (citations omitted). Even if the judge did not think his mother appeared to be biased, our directives are not so inflexible as to prevent a judge from eliminating the obvious problems that could occur in having his mother *715sit on the jury. This judge could have been called to rule upon an issue involving the jury wherein his mother could have been a witness or the subject of inquiry. See SCR 60.04(4)(e)4. The judge recognized that he could not sit on such matters, but he believed he lacked authority to remove his mother from the panel.
¶ 64. In Lindell, "[w]e recognize[d] that circuit judges must deal with a diverse group of prospective jurors, some of whom are eager to serve even when they should not, others of whom will offer any excuse to escape from their civic duty." Id., ¶ 98. We should acknowledge that a circuit court judge has the discretion to employ any number of tools to address the unexpected situations that may arise during selection of a jury and subsequent trial. A judge should make every attempt to avoid foreseeable problems.
¶ 65. Instead of recognizing that a judge possesses the authority to avoid appellate issues, the lead opinion attempts to fit this into the body of case law that involves objective bias of a juror.
¶ 66. However, the combination of these two people and the concern it produces does not square with objective juror bias as the lead opinion would have us believe. There is no reason to believe that a reasonable person in the juror's position was partial and unable to base her decision on the evidence presented and the law as instructed. It is counterproductive to pigeonhole this case into the category of objective bias, and it certainly makes no sense that we forever alter and further confuse the law of objective bias. This juror exhibited no bias or prejudice so as to disqualify her on the basis of bias. In point of fact, the objective bias cases relied on by the lead opinion involve situations that directly impact a juror's ability to be fair and impartial. For example, in the cases cited by the lead opinion, the *716prospective juror's brother was to testify for the State in State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 667-68, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992); the prospective juror had a "close personal relationship with the victim" in Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶ 42; and the prospective juror was a neighbor to one of the State's witnesses in State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 732-33, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999). However, none of those concerns, are present here. No objective bias exists here.
II
¶ 67. I concur because I believe the judge should have either stricken his mother from the jury or recused himself from the case. I recognize that recusal may be time-consuming and inefficient, and as a result striking the juror was more likely the practical result. Nonetheless, I would continue to call upon judges to do what they do every day when administering justice in courtrooms around this state. Here, selecting a jury that was fair and also appeared fair was critical. I would recognize that the front-line judges have the ability to use their discretion to dispense with a juror since allowing the juror to remain on the case would quite obviously create these types of issues. Within their inherent authority, I would merely call upon our judges to select a fair and impartial jury and avoid such foreseeable appellate issues.
¶ 68. For the foregoing reasons I respectfully concur.
¶ 69. I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this concurrence.