Court Opinion

ID: 9610024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:35:34.493998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:55.815490
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
WAKATSUKI, J.
I respectfully dissent from Part III of the majority’s opinion.
A.
In State v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 686 P.2d 1379 (1984), this court held that a warrantless search of a probationer’s person, property, and place of residence for illicit drugs is constitutionally *74valid in limited circumstances. One, the search must be initiated by a probation officer pursuant to a program of rehabilitation. Two, the search must “be justified by a reasonable suspicion supportable by specific and articulable facts that dangerous drugs and substances are being secreted by the probationer.” Id. at 283, 686 P.2d at 1390.
Fully recognizing that probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy, and that there is substantial governmental interest in programs designed for the rehabilitation of probationers, this court nonetheless stated that a probationer’s “interest in privacy is [not] insignificant... that she may be subjected to searches at the supervisor’s caprice or fancy.” Id. at 283, 686 P.2d at 1390.
The State concedes in this case that it had no reasonable suspicion that Morris had ingested any illegal drug or substance. Pursuant to Fields, the search, i.e., the urinalysis, was then constitutionally invalid. Therefore, the fruits of that search should have been suppressed. Otherwise, any warrantless taking of urine from a probationer for analysis opens the door to harassment of the probationer at the whim of the probation officer.
B.
The majority attempts to distinguish this case from Fields by holding that urinalyses of probationers are reasonable searches not proscribed by the Constitution.
Recently, this court held that the urinalysis program conducted by the Honolulu Police Department on its own police officers constituted reasonable searches not proscribed by the constitution. McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dep’t, 71 Haw. 568, 799 P.2d 953 (1990). In reaching that determination, this court stated:
“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for *75the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 481 (1979).
Id. at 578, 799 P.2d at 958.
Relying on extensive evidence presented to the trial court, this court upheld warrantless urinalyses of police officers based on considerations that police carry firearms, that their duties place them in life-threatening situations requiring split-second judgment in use of firearms, and that police officers are often in use and control of motor vehicles. Furthermore, the integrity of the police department and public trust and confidence in police officers are legitimate state interests which weighed in the balance of requiring urinalyses of police officers. This court also considered the diminished expectation of privacy one has when employed as a police officer, the fact that the testing program was no more intrusive than needed and that the police department had no other practical and available means of responding to concerns of drug use in the department.
The same considerations which led this court in McCloskey to conclude that a urinalysis of a police officer is a reasonable search are not present in this case. Nonetheless, the majority perfunctorily states that “the testing is carried out in a reasonable manner and is no more intrusive than needed.”1 This statement is unexplained in the majority opinion and unsupported by the record in this case.
*76C.
The majority also claims that Fields is distinguishable because “at the time Fields was decided, HRS § 706-624 did not contain a specific condition authorizing the court to impose drug testing, as HRS § 706-624(2)(m) now does[.]”
Fields held that a warrantless search of a probationerwithout reasonable suspicion runs afoul of our constitution. A legislative enactment purporting to authorize that which is unconstitutional cannot stand. “An unconstitutional act is not a law; it binds no one, and protects no one.” Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1887).
HRS § 706-624(2)(m) cannot be read as authorizing warrant-less urinalysis of a probationer absent reasonable suspicion. Fields is not distinguishable.
D.
I would hold that the urinalysis conducted in this case was constitutionally invalid, and therefore, any evidence obtained therefrom should have been suppressed. The order revoking Morris’ probation should be reversed.

 In McCloskey, this court deemed it important enough to note that the police officer was permitted to provide a urine sample in the privacy of an enclosed toilet stall without visual observation of a moniter. Conversely, in this case there was evidence that Morris had to produce his urine sample while under the direct visual observation of a probation official.