Court Opinion

ID: 9770245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:55:33.391713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:15.925451
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. Callie Mae Williams, the insured, obtained no-fault coverage from Shelter General Insurance Company. Shelter and other insurers issuing automobile liability insurance policies are mandated by the General Assembly to provide such coverage which includes (1) medical and hospital benefits, (2) income disability benefits and (3) accidental death benefits. Ark. Code Ann. § 23-89-202 (1987). In enacting this law,, the General Assembly made clear this state’s policy that no-fault coverage protection within statutory limits must be offered the insured which covers the insured, members of the insured’s household family, passengers occupying the insured’s vehicle and persons occupying another vehicle struck by the insured’s vehicle. The statutory law further provides that any one or all of the three coverages provided in § 23-89-202 may be rejected by the named insured if done so in writing. Ark. Code Ann. § 23-89-203 (1987). Callie Williams did not reject any of the coverages in this case. Instead, Shelter issued its policy to Ms. Williams with an exclusion provision which provided that no insurance will be provided under the policy if Ms. Williams’s vehicle is driven by her daughter, Tracy. Ms. Williams approved this exclusion provision. Arkansas’s no-fault coverage law, however, specifically allows an insurer to exclude benefits to an insured only in the two following circumstances: (1) when the insured intentionally caused his own injury and (2) when the insured causes any injury while committing a felony or while seeking to elude lawful apprehension or arrest by a law enforcement officer. Ark. Code Ann. § 23-89-205 (1987). In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sims, 288 Ark. 541, 708 S.W.2d 72 (1986), this court, in construing § 23-89-202, clearly stated that separate protective coverage such as Arkansas’s no-fault coverage mav not be diminished or con-traded awav bv a provision in the insurance contract.1 Here, that is exactly what happened. Shelter’s exclusionary provision is neither authorized by statutory law nor has Arkansas’s Insurance Commissioner recognized the validity of this type of named-driver exclusion provision. More important, the exclusion is contrary to Arkansas law and declared public policy. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling that the named-driver exclusion provision contained in the Shelter policy is void as against public policy.   This court in Aetna Ins. Co. v. Smith, 263 Ark. 849, 568 S.W.2d 11 (1978), indicated it did not read § 23-89-205 to prohibit other exclusions, but that decision clearly stated, as well, that whatever agreement or exclusion the insurer and insured entered into must not be contrary to statute or public policy. There, the insurer’s policy excluded payment of benefits to the extent the insured had already been paid disability benefits under workers’ compensation law. Such exclusion of no-fault disability benefits was held not contrary to public policy because Arkansas, had statutes that eliminated double recovery for injuries. In the present case, no double recovery is involved and Arkansas’s no-fault statutory scheme is designed to protect the public by-availing injured persons at least some insurance coverage, albeit minimum.