Court Opinion

ID: 9783549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:48:55.067365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:25.623606
License: Public Domain

PAUL E. DANIELSON, Justice, dissenting. The circuit court clearly erred. Both the circuit court and the majority of this court err in the conclusion that the circuit court’s February 6, 2002 order was not a judgment. In that order, the circuit court found that a change of circumstance required an increase in child support, determined Mr. McWhorter’s yearly income, and ordered child support paid for the past years of 1997-2001. Of important note is the fact that these amounts were not for future child-support obligations, but for past child-support obligations, as the children had already reached majority at the time of the circuit court’s order. Accordingly, the circuit court’s order was a final judgment of arrearages. Whether or not an order of arrearages is a final judgment is governed by Arkansas |1sCode Annotated § 9-14-234 (Repl. 2008). The majority relies on subsection (j) of that statute as support for its conclusion that the circuit court’s order of 2002 had to be “reduced to judgment” before it constituted a judgment. However, the majority’s quotation of that subsection omits the very language specifically referring to the definition of a final judgment. The entirety of that subsection provides: Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the jurisdiction of the court to proceed to enforce a decree, judgment, or order for the support of a minor child or children through contempt proceedings when the arrearage is reduced to judgment under subsection (b) of this section. Ark.Code Ann. § 9 — 14—234(j) (emphasis added). Thus, to determine whether an arrearage has been “reduced to judgment,” one must look to subsection (b) of the statute, which provides: (b) Any decree, judgment, or order that contains a provision for the payment of money for the support and care of any child or children through the registry of the court or the Arkansas child support clearinghouse shall be final judgment subject to writ of garnishment or execution as to any installment or payment of money that has accrued until the time either party moves through proper motion filed with the court and served on the other party to set aside, alter, or modify the decree, judgment, or order. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-14-234(b). According to the plain language of subsection (b), the circuit court’s order of 2002 was a final judgment, as it clearly contained a provision for the payment of money for the support and care of Mr. McWhorter’s children that had accrued.1 117Because the circuit court’s 2002 order was a final judgment, the circuit court clearly erred in concluding that “the child support arrear-ages owed by this Defendant ha[d] not been reduced to Judgment.” Moreover, because the circuit court’s order was a final judgment, the circuit court erred in modifying it and providing Mr. McWhorter credit for payments claimed to have been made during the past periods at issue. Subsection (c) of section 9-14-234 specifically precludes a circuit court from setting aside, altering, or modifying a judgment that has accrued unpaid support prior to the filing of the motion. Because the amounts determined by the circuit court in its 2002 order had already accrued, the circuit court was precluded from modifying those amounts. But in addition, the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded the circuit court’s recognition of Mr. McWhorter’s claim for credits. The doctrine of law of the case prohibits a court from reconsidering issues of law and fact that have already been decided on appeal. See Jones v. Double “D” Props., 857 Ark. 148, 161 S.W.3d 839 (2004). The doctrine provides that a decision of an appellate court establishes the law of the case for the circuit court upon remand and for the appellate court itself upon subsequent review. See id. The doctrine serves to effectuate efficiency and finality in the judicial process and its purpose is to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single, continuing lawsuit. See id. It further provides that the decision of the first appeal | lsbecomes the law of the case, and is conclusive of every question of law or fact decided in the former appeal, and also of those which might have been, but were not, presented. See Slaton v. Slaton, 336 Ark. 211, 983 S.W.2d 951 (1999). While there was no remand in this case following our decision in McWhorter v. McWhorter, 351 Ark. 622, 97 S.W.3d 408 (2003) (McWhorter III), we did affirm the circuit court’s 2002 order. Part of that order, as already noted above, set forth the circuit court’s determination of Mr. McWhorter’s arrearages for the years 1997-2001, which Mr. McWhorter failed to challenge on appeal. Because it was at the hearing prior to that order that Mr. McWhorter could have, and should have, requested any credits for amounts of child support already paid during the periods at issue, because he did not, and because he failed to challenge that portion of the circuit court’s order on appeal in McWhorter III, he was precluded from doing so before the circuit court during the hearing on Ms. McWhorter’s motion for contempt under the law-of-the-case doctrine. It is for these reasons that the circuit court clearly erred in issuing the order that is the subject of this appeal. Because I would reverse and remand this matter, I respectfully dissent. CORBIN and IMBER, JJ., join.  . Indeed, the finality of the judgment was recognized by the Phillips County Circuit Court Clerk, who issued a writ of garnishment in this matter on April 12, 2004, based upon the circuit court’s judgment of February 6, 2002.