Court Opinion

ID: 9728433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:07:47.142892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:46.227347
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, Justice
(dissenting).
It appears from the uncontroverted evidence that in the fall of 1964, the decedent handed a deed to Lester Nelson stating: “I have drawn this document for you and your brothers and sisters and want you to have it.” That was an unconditional expression of intent which could hardly be stated in more certain terms. The law indulges in a presumption of acceptance of deeds when the grant creates no obligation or burden upon the grantee and is beneficial to him. Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N.D. 475, 75 *468N.W. 797 (1898); 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 132 (1965). Manual transfer is the simplest mode of delivering a deed, and if the grant- or hands the deed to the grantee personally, without saying or doing anything to qualify the significance of such act, an effective delivery is made. Such direct change of physical custody with intent to deliver has been called “absolute delivery.” 23 Am. Jur.2d Deeds § 91 (1965). The delivery being absolute, the instrument took effect pursuant to SDCL 43-4-8.* Due to an interruption, the deed was left on the table at the grantor’s residence and was retained by him. In Birchard v. Simons, 59 S.D. 422, 240 N.W. 490 (1932), however, we held that a completed delivery is not subsequently invalidated by the fact that the grantee returns the deed to the grantor. See also: In re Estate of Bright, 215 N.W.2d 253, 87 A.L.R.2d 787 (Iowa 1974); Parceluk v. Knudtson, 139 N.W.2d 864 (N.D.1966); Hilliard v. Hilliard, 240 Iowa 1394, 39 N.W.2d 624 (1949); Estate of Lintner v. Meier, 344 Mich. 119, 73 N.W.2d 205 (1955); McMillen v. Chamberland, 71 N.D. 65, 298 N.W. 767 (1941).
The delivery of a deed to one of the grantees named therein, who receives the deed from the grantor, is generally regarded, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, as a delivery in favor of all the grantees. Hitz v. National Metropolitan Bank, 111 U.S. 722, 4 S.Ct. 613, 28 L.Ed. 577 (1884); Pass v. Stephens, 22 Ariz. 461, 198 P. 712 (1921); Sanders v. Crabtree, 44 Cal. App.2d 602, 112 P.2d 923 (1941); Creighton v. Elgin, 387 Ill. 592, 56 N.E.2d 825, 162 A.L.R. 883 (1944); Hild v. Hild, 129 Iowa 649, 106 N.W. 159 (1906); White v. Hogge, 291 S.W.2d 22 (Ky.1956); Ritchie v. Davis, 26 Wis.2d 636, 133 N.W.2d 312 (1965).
The conclusion that there was a valid delivery of the deed in the fall of 1964 is not eroded by the fact that grantor retained control of the land pursuant to a recitation in the deed that “Grantor retains life interest.” It is settled law that if the instrument passes a present interest or right, even though the enjoyment thereof be postponed until the death of the grantor, it is nevertheless a valid deed. Trumbauer v. Rust, 36 S.D. 301, 154 N.W. 801 (1915).

 SDCL 43-4-8 provides:
A grant cannot be delivered to the grantee conditionally. Delivery to him or to his agent as such is necessarily absolute; and the instrument takes effect thereupon discharged of any condition on which the delivery was made.