Court Opinion

ID: 9592999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:18:35.989591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:18.156175
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
concurring.
The majority holds that the trial court’s ruling excluding the challenged evidence under ORS 810.410 was error because of the retroactive effect of Senate Bill 936. I agree with that holding. However, the majority does not decide whether SB 936 is in contravention of Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution, which requires that the unifying principle in the body of the act be expressed in the title and that there be a connecting relationship between the body and the title. It takes the position that defendant has not raised those issues on appeal. In my view, defendant has properly raised the issues that the majority refuses to consider, and I would resolve them by holding SB 936 constitutional.
The “title” issues are properly before us on appeal, because defendant argues, in part:
“Article IV, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution prohibits more than one subject from being embraced by a particular legislative enactment. Section 20 provides:
“ ‘Every Act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title.’
“In McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or 426, 443-44, 909 P2d 846 (1996), the supreme court announced the analysis of the one-subject challenge to the body of a legislative act under Article IV, section 20. The analysis should proceed in these steps:
*660“ ‘(1) Examine the body of the act to determine whether (without regard to an examination of the title) the court can identify a unifying principle logically connecting all provisions in the act, such that it can be said that the act ‘embrace[s] but one subject.
“ ‘(2) If the court has not identified a unifying principle logically connecting all provisions in the act, examine the title of the act with reference to the body of the act. In a one-subject challenge to the body of an act, the purpose of that examination is to determine whether the legislature nonetheless has identified, and expressed in the title, such a unifying principle logically connecting all provisions in the act, thereby demonstrating that the act, in fact, “embrace[s] but one subject.’ * * *
$ * * *
“Similarly, SB 936 relates to more than ‘victims’ rights.’ The relating clause states:
“ ‘Relating to implementation of victims’ rights initiative; creating new provisions; amending ORS 10.030, 10.050, 40.170, 40.175, 131.007, 135.230, 135.240, 135.245, 135.432, 135.970, 136.001, 136.450, 136.619, 137-106, 137.281, 137.540, 137.550, 144.108, 144.343, 419C.270, 419C.450, 421.508 and 423.478; repealing ORS 133.585 and 133.683; and declaring an emergency.’
“There is no unifying principle logically connecting all 39 provision of this act. Only a few provisions relate to victims’ rights (sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, and 20). Other provisions seem only to relate to the global topic of ‘criminal law.’ * * *
“In McIntire, the supreme court found the act at issue ‘so global that it does little more than define the universe with respect to which the legislature is empowered to act.’ 322 Or at 445. The same is true here. The one subject of criminal law, or even ‘victims’ rights,’ does not identify a unifying principle logically connecting all the provisions in SB 936. The subject is too broad and general.
«* * * * *
“The single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 20, is designed to prohibit the practice of combining multiple subjects into one proposed piece of legislation in order to *661unite members of the legislature who favor certain provisions, but perhaps not others, so that they will support all of them. McIntire, 322 Or at 439. SB 936 contains many controversial provisions, some related to the passage of Ballot Measure 40 and other simply expanding the zealous prosecution of criminal offenders. It does not embrace only one subject. This court should declare it void.” (Emphasis in original.)
Defendant’s argument, as quoted above, encompasses more than a challenge to the body of the act under section 20. Defendant first quotes the relating clause of SB 936 and argues that “[tjhere is no unifying principle logically connecting all 39 provisions [listed in the relating clause] of this act.” That argument directly addresses the issue that there must be a unifying principle in the body of the act that is expressed in the title. Defendant also contends that “[t]he one subject of criminal law, or even ‘victims’ rights’ does not identify a unifying principle logically connecting all the provisions in SB 936.” (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase “victims’ rights” is a phrase that appears in the relating clause of the act. Thus, his argument arguably addresses the issue that there must be a connecting relationship between the title and the body in order for SB 936 to pass muster under Article IV, section 20.
Even if defendant does not expressly argue regarding the title of SB 936, the majority’s refusal to consider a challenge on the grounds that the unifying principle in the body of the act is not expressed in the title of the act and that there is no relationship connecting the title and the body is inconsistent with the court’s holding in State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 766 P2d 373 (1988). In that case, the court held that where a potential constitutional violation is involved, the defendant’s omission of a possible dispositive source of argument or law will not prevent the court from reaching the issue. The court explained:
“In petitioning this court, defendant understandably feels compelled to argue that a conviction without evidence on an element of the offense is unconstitutional and that the appellate courts have the authority to recognize plain error on the face of the record, both of which propositions are true but unnecessary here. We have previously drawn *662attention to the distinction between raising an issue at trial, identifying a source for a claimed position, and making a particular argument. See Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist, No. 4J, 301 Or 358, 369 n 12, 723 P2d 298 (1986). The first ordinarily is essential, the second less so, the third least. Thus, when a potential constitutional violation is involved, the parties’ omission of a dispositive source or argument of ordinary law cannot compel a court to a needless constitutional decision.” 307 Or at 188. (Emphasis in original.)
In this case, a potential constitutional violation is at stake. The majority’s decision not to consider the challenge to SB 936 under the last phrase of the first sentence of section 20 could mean that defendant (assuming the validity of his argument) could be deprived of his liberty unlawfully if he is convicted. Regarding precedential value, we do a disservice to all the courts of the state when we bake only “half a cake” in response to defendant’s broad challenge that SB 936 is in violation of Article IV, section 20. He quotes the pertinent language from section 20 that requires an examination of whether the unifying subject of the title is expressed in the title and whether there is a relationship between the body of the act and the title and concludes that this court should declare SB 936 “void.” As is evident from the above quotations from defendant’s brief, he has identified the issue (whether SB 936 is constitutional under section 20) for determination on appeal and the source (the language of section 20) of his position regarding that issue. Under Hitz, the fact that he does not make the specific argument in the language that the majority would require of him is immaterial. The issue of the constitutionality of SB 936 under the first sentence of section 20 is squarely before us, and we should decide it.1
*663If we were to decide all of the issues presented by defendant, the following analysis would apply. The principal purpose for section 20’s title requirement is to provide notice to legislators and others of the contents of the bill so that those who cannot examine the body of the act for themselves can be assured that the body of the act does not deal with more than the title discloses. Mclntire, 322 Or at 438-39. The title clause of SB 936 states, “Relating to implementation of victims’ rights initiative.” Measure 40 was adopted by the people in the general election on November 5,1996. SB 936 was introduced during the 1997 legislative session and, as the majority points out, the relationship between Measure 40 and SB 936 was addressed in committee. In context, the phrase “victims’ rights initiative” is an obvious reference to the subject matter of Measure 40 and puts the reader on notice as to that fact. It presumes that the reader is aware of or can become aware of the subject matter of Measure 40 and informs the reader that SB 936 deals with the same subject matter.
The preamble to Measure 40 says:
“This initiative is designed to preserve and protect crime victims’ rights to justice and due process and to ensure the prosecution and convictions of persons who have committed criminal acts. It shall be interpreted to accomplish these ends.”
Although the provisions of SB 936 and Measure 40 are not identical, they are substantively similar. Their commonality is that they relate to the prosecution and conviction of persons who have committed criminal acts. There are no hidden subjects in SB 936 that are not encompassed by its title referring to Measure 40. What Measure 40’s preamble and its provisions characterize as “crime victims’ rights” and what SB 936’s title incorporates by reference are in substance changes in the law that facilitate the prosecution and conviction of persons who have committed crimes. As the majority notes, “[a]ll of the substantive provisions of SB 936 relate to some aspect of the prosecution of crimes.” 154 Or App at 654. These changes involve such diverse subjects as the qualification of jurors in criminal cases, pretrial release provisions, sentencing provisions and the use of certain kinds *664of evidence at trial. They also provide procedures whereby the voices of victims can be heard through the criminal proceeding. To the legislator or other interested person who would have read the title of SB 936 and its reference to Measure 40 while it was pending, that title would have alerted them to the fact that the common theme of SB 936 was to facilitate the convictions of criminals. Consequently, I would hold that the title of SB 936 meets the requisites of section 20 because it accurately notifies legislators and others as to the contents of the bill.
I would add one additional observation about the resolution of this case. Because of its ruling under ÓRS 810.410, the trial court made no findings or rulings regarding the actions taken by the officer after he arrested the passenger. Those subsequent actions included the seizure of the pouch, the opening of it, the ordering of defendant out of the car and the administration of the HGN and the field sobriety tests. The evidence in the record about the surrounding circumstances is conflicting, and it is possible that the trial court could make findings on remand that could dictate alternative conclusions about whether the officer’s actions were constitutional under other provisions of the Oregon and federal constitutions. Thus, the lack of findings and the conflicts in the record make it impossible for us to otherwise adjudicate the lawfulness of the officer’s actions under our standard of review as expressed in Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487-88, 443 P2d 621 (1968). As a result, this case cannot be resolved on this record, even though we have rejected defendant’s constitutional challenges against SB 936.
Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s ruling under ORS 810.410(3)(b) and to remand for further proceedings.
Deits, C. J., joins in this concurrence.

 The majority makes much of the fact that defendant relies heavily on McIntire. In McIntire, the court did not examine whether a single unifying subject in the body of the act in issue in that case was also expressed in the title. There, the court could not find an unifying subject in the body by an examination of the body of the act or by reference to the title in light of the body. In other words, the McIntire court never got to the second requirement of section 20. Nonetheless, defendant’s reliance on McIntire as authority for his attack on the body of SB 936 should not prevent us from considering his general challenge to its constitutionality based on the language of the constitution, particularly in light of the court’s guidelines in Hitz.