Court Opinion

ID: 9834146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:20:10.998242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:12.054536
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Plaintiff (appellee) in its motion for rehearing, but without prejudice to its motion, requests that under operation of Rule 440, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, in ■view of the fact that we reversed the judgment of the court below solely because of excessive damages awarded, this court •state the amount of the excess to the end -.that plaintiff may be afforded an opportunity to exercise an option to file a remittitur {should same be deemed advisable), and another trial be avoided.
What is now Rule 440, but was then Art. 1029a, was first construed by the Supreme Court, we believe, in Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Syfan, 91 Tex. 562, 44 S.W. 1064, 1066. The Supreme Court there ruled that before said statute was enacted, the rule of practice in our Supreme Court ;had been that in actions for damages where the measure is not fixed by law, when a verdict was found to be excessive, -the plaintiff could not be allowed to renounce the excess by remittitur, and avoid .a new trial, but the judgment must be set aside and a new trial awarded. The .Court there held that the statute abrogated •.the former decisions by it at least so far ,-as concerned Courts of Civil Appeals. In said case the Court said: “It was the right of the railroad company (defendant in the cape), to jiave the court of civil appeals determine whether or not the verdict of ;the jury was excessive in amount, but, to determine that question the court must first arrive at a .conclusion as to what sum would be held -tQ be reasonable if it had been assessed by the jury, before it could be detemined that -the verdict was excessive in amount.” This -holding was followed in Wilson v. Freeman, Receiver, 108 Tex. 121, 185 S.W. 993, Ann.Cas.1918D, 1203, where the statute yyas .declared to be mandatory. In the last-mentioned case it was declared that the difficulty of ascertaining the amount of the excess would not relieve the Court from exercising such function for this difficulty lies in most cases of excessive verdicts. That all the Court of Civil Appeals can do, and all that is required of it to do, by said statute, is to exercise its sound judicial judgment and discretion in the ascertainment of what amount would be reasonable compensation for the injury sustained, and treat the balance as excess.
In our original opinion we held that the opinion-evidence, to the effect that the actual value of the old bridge at the time it was injured was the same sum as the cost of the new bridge, was clearly mistaken, and could not be allowed to support the verdict finding that such actual value of the old bridge at such time was $7,550. We did not hold that there was no evidence that the old bridge did not have actual value at the time it was injured, or that there was no evidence from which the actual value could have been assessed. Indeed, we held that the court did not abuse his discretion in admitting in evidence, as a circumstance to be considered by the jury in arriving at the actual value of the old bridge when injured, the cost of the new bridge.
It is true that the evidence introduced by plaintiff did not form a basis for calculating .such value to a mathematical nicety. The original cost of the old bridge in 1909-1910 was $2,890, and when completed it had a life expectancy of forty years. But it does not necessarily follow that, when it was injured in 1943, there then remained only the unexpired term of the forty years’ expectancy which it had when completed. Also, it is well known that labor and material costs have greatly increased since the time the old bridge was originally completed. Considering all the factors and circumstances that were in evidence (except, of course, the cost of the temporary bridge), we would not have considered a verdict for damages in the net sum of $2,825 as being so excessive as to require reversal. By the expression “net sum” we mean the sum after plaintiff is charged with the junk value of the old bridge in the sum of $375. Since we have reversed and rendered the judgment insofar as $150 was allowed as being the cost of the temporary bridge, said sum should not have been incorporated in the judgment. Eliminating said non-recover*275able item, and deducting the sum of $375 from $7,550, leaves the judgment for damages which the court would have rendered upon the jury’s verdict (except for erroneously including said $150) as being $7,-175. Accordingly we ascertain that the verdict was excessive in the sum of $7,175 less $2,825, or $4,350, and plaintiff is privileged to file among the papers in this cause, on or before February 20, 1946, a remittitur of such excess of $4,350 and the judgment of the trial court will be reformed so as to be for the principal sum of $2,825, and as so reformed it will be affirmed, otherwise the judgment will be reversed and remanded.
Plaintiff’s motion for rehearing will be granted upon the indicated terms; otherwise the motion will be refused.
Granted if remittitur is filed.