Court Opinion

ID: 9740256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:31:01.217548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:17.116151
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, P.J.
(dissenting). Condition 4 of the insurance policy unambiguously provides that with respect to all benefit provisions of the policy, except those pertaining to uninsured motor vehicles, the terms of the policy shall apply separately to each of two or more automobiles that may be insured thereunder. The majority finds it "anomalous” to say, on one hand, that Condition 4 is not applicable to the uninsured motorist provision of the policy and, on the other hand, to say that all provisions of the policy apply separately to each automobile that may be insured thereunder except the uninsured motorist provision. Quite the opposite of being "anomalous”, this is exactly what Condition 4 states.
If, under the terms of Condition 4, all provisions of the policy are to be applied separately, i.e., not stacked, except those pertaining to uninsured motorist benefits, what is the meaning of the language used in the limits of liability clause in the uninsured motorist section of the policy that provides:
"Regardless of the number of automobiles to which this policy applies the limit of bodily injury liability stated in the declarations as applicable to 'each person’ is the limit of Safeco’s liability.”
The obvious intent of this clause was to prevent stacking of uninsured motorist benefits. As is clear, it is in conflict with the provisions of Condition 4; the insurance contract cannot both prohibit and authorize the stacking of uninsured motorist benefits. Inasmuch as I cannot say that the lower court’s interpretation of these provisions of the policy was unreasonable or its holding that they *297created an ambiguity in the policy clearly erroneous, I believe that the lower court must be affirmed. Any doubt as to the meaning of a provision in an insurance policy must be resolved against the insurer. Zurich Ins Co v Rombough, 384 Mich 228; 180 NW2d 775 (1970), Weaver v Michigan Mutual Liability Co, 32 Mich App 605; 189 NW2d 116 (1971).
I also take issue with the majority’s holding that there is no evidence in the record to support plaintiffs’ contention that they twice paid premiums for the same uninsured motorist coverage. Despite the finding of the lower court that insurance policy contracts "similar to those of the instant case” enable "the insurer to charge two premiums for the Uninsured Motorist Coverage but to limit its liability to indemnify its insured to that corresponding to but a single premium”, a finding that defendant does not contest in this appeal and one that the majority does not criticize as being clearly erroneous, the majority holds that it "lacks adequate information to make a determination of unconscionability”.
In Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange v Curl, 82 Mich App 140; 266 NW2d 479 (1978), a panel of this Court held that the reasonable expectations of an insured were of primary consideration when interpreting contract language. I agree with Judge Kaufman in his dissent in Kozak v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 79 Mich App 777, 783; 262 NW2d 904 (1977), and would hold that it is unreasonable to limit plaintiffs’ recovery to the policy limits on only one of their automobiles where their injuries have far exceeded those policy limits and where plaintiffs have twice purchased uninsured motorist protection under an ambiguous insurance policy written by defendant. *298Defendant has received twice as much in uninsured motorist protection premiums as it would be entitled to under its own interpretation of the contract; simple justice requires that it pay twice as much in benefits.
I would affirm.