Court Opinion

ID: 9386199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 17:08:41.67366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:00.904768
License: Public Domain

J-A04013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    MICHELE MARIE MILLS                        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    LEE YOM                                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 947 MDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered June 14, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Civil Division at
                              No(s): S-222-22

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                     FILED: APRIL 11, 2023

       Appellant, Lee Yom, appeals pro se from the June 14, 2022 order of

partition pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1557.1 We affirm.

       Appellant and Appellee, Michele Marie Mills, were divorced by final

decree of December 16, 2021. Appellee commenced this partition action with

a complaint filed February 16, 2022 and served on Appellant on March 1,

2022. On March 21, 2022, after Appellant failed to respond, Appellee served

on Appellant a notice of intent to take a default judgment. On April 4, 2022,

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1 Rule 1557 permits entry of an order directing partition where, as here, the
defending party defaults. Pa.R.C.P. 1557. The order before us is appealable
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(7); Zablocki v. Beining, 155 A.3d 1116, 1118
n.4 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 172 A.3d 1121 (Pa. 2017). A
subsequent appeal is allowed from an order resolving the economic phase of
the partition, such as an order distributing the proceeds of a sale. Id.; see
also, Kapcsos v. Benshoff, 194 A.3d 139 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).
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after more than ten days had passed, default judgment was entered against

Appellant. One day later, on April 5, 2022, Appellant filed an answer, new

matter, and counterclaim, but did not petition to open the default judgment.

Appellee filed preliminary objections2 thereto on April 20, 2022. On June 14,

2022, the trial court entered two orders; one sustaining Appellee’s preliminary

objections and dismissing Appellant’s answer, new matter, and counterclaim

with prejudice; and another directing partition based on Appellant’s default,

as per Pa.R.C.P. 1557.

       Appellant filed this timely pro se appeal seemingly challenging both

orders.   In response to this Court’s August 15, 2022, rule to show cause,

Appellant clarified that he wished to proceed with his appeal from the order

directing partition and withdraw his appeal from the order sustaining

Appellee’s preliminary objections to Appellant’s late-filed answer. Thus, the

only argument before us is that the trial court committed an error of law or

abuse of discretion in entering an order directing partition.3 Appellant’s Pro

Se Brief at 4.

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2 See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(2), permitting a preliminary objection to a pleading
that fails to conform to law or rule of court.

3   Partition is an equitable remedy.

              Trial courts have broad equitable powers to effectuate
       justice and we will find an abuse of discretion only if the trial court
       has misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedures.
       The finder of fact is entitled to weigh the evidence presented and
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Appellant does not assert any procedural irregularities leading up to the

default judgment. The record reflects that the complaint contained a notice

to plead, and that both the complaint and the notice of intent to take a default

judgment were served on Appellant. The proper procedure for obtaining relief

from a default judgment is set forth in Rule 237.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules

of Civil Procedure.

            (2) If the petition is filed within ten days after the entry of
       a default judgment on the docket, the court shall open the
       judgment if one or more of the proposed preliminary objections
       has merit or the proposed answer states a meritorious defense.

Pa. R.C.P. No. 237.3(b)(2).4 Appellant, as noted above, filed his answer, new

matter, and counterclaim on April 5, 2022, one day after entry of the default

judgment. He did not style it as a petition to open under Rule 237.3 and, in

any event, he does not appeal from the order sustaining Appellee’s preliminary

objections.

       Thus, our only task is to discern whether Appellant, in his pro se brief,

has articulated any grounds upon which he can obtain relief from the default

judgment that led to the order directing partition under Rule 1557. As noted

____________________________________________

       access its credibility. The fact finder is free to believe all, part, or
       none of the evidence and the Superior Court will not disturb the
       credibility determinations of the court below.

Nicholson v. Johnston, 855 A.2d 97, 102 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal
denied, 868 A.2d 453 (Pa. 2005).

4  As per Rule 1551, partition actions are governed by the rules applicable to
civil actions except as provided otherwise in the rules specific to partition
actions. Pa.R.C.P. 1551.

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above, Appellant did not proceed under Rule 237.3. Nonetheless, petitions to

open judgment are permissible under our case law (see Pa.R.C.P. 237.3,

Explanatory Comment 1994, Illustration 5):

             A petition to open a default judgment is addressed to the
       equitable powers of the court and the trial court has discretion to
       grant or deny such a petition. The party seeking to open the
       default judgment must establish three elements: (1) the petition
       to open or strike was promptly filed;[5] (2) the default can be
       reasonably explained or excused; and (3) there is a meritorious
       defense to the underlying claim. The court's refusal to open a
       default judgment will not be reversed on appeal unless the trial
       court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. An abuse
       of discretion is not merely an error in judgment; rather it occurs
       when the law is overridden or misapplied, or when the judgment
       exercised is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality,
       prejudice, bias or ill-will. Moreover, this Court must determine
       whether there are equitable considerations that weigh in favor of
       opening the default judgment and allowing the defendant to
       defend the case on the merits. Where the equities warrant
       opening a default judgment, this Court will not hesitate to find an
       abuse of discretion.

Scalla v. KWS, Inc., 240 A.3d 131, 135-36 (Pa. Super. 2020), appeal

denied, 253 A.3d 680 (Pa. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 242 (2021).

       Appellant does not directly address the law governing petitions to open.

He cites Rule 126, which promotes liberal construction of the rules to “secure

the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding

to which they are applicable.” Pa.R.C.P. 126. Along with Rule 126, Appellant

____________________________________________

5  This first prong is in place of the ten-day deadline of Rule 237.3. Thus,
there is no deadline for filing a petition to open under Scalla and similar case
law. The analysis of timeliness of any such petition rests within the trial court’s
equitable discretion.

                                           -4-
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relies on Francisco v. Ford Motor Co., 580 A.2d 374 (Pa. Super. 1990),

appeal denied, 592 A.2d 1301 (Pa. 1991), for the proposition that the 20-

day filing period under Rule 10266 is merely permissive.             Indeed, the

Francisco Court stated that “the twenty day filing rule [Rule 1026] is said to

be permissive rather than mandatory.” Id. at 376. Francisco is inapposite

however, because the plaintiffs did not seek entry of a default judgment and

the appellant in that case was not seeking relief therefrom. Thus, there was

no need for the defendants to establish a meritorious defense before the court

accepted their answer. Appellant also relies on Paulish v. Bakaitis, 275 A.2d

318 (Pa. 1971), for the proposition that “late pleadings may be filed if the

opposite party is not prejudiced and justice requires.” Id. at 322 (quoting

Fisher v. Hill, 81 A.2d 860 (Pa. 1951)). In both Paulish and Fisher, the

latter of which Appellant also cites, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

addressed the trial courts’ discretion in accepting or rejecting late pleadings.

Neither case involved a default judgment and subsequent petition to open.

       In summary, Appellant has not filed a petition to open the default

judgment. Therefore, the trial court had no occasion to analyze a petition to

open in the first instance.        Further, Appellant has failed to articulate any

grounds on which he is entitled to relief from the order on appeal. We are

cognizant of Appellant’s plea for liberal construction of the procedural rules,

____________________________________________

6  Rule 1026(a) provides that all pleadings after the complaint shall be filed
within 20 days of the previous pleading. Pa.R.C.P. 1026(a).

                                           -5-
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pursuant to Rule 126, but we also are cognizant that pro se litigants proceed

at the risk that their lack of training and experience will prove costly.

            While this court is willing to liberally construe materials filed
      by a pro se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any
      particular advantage because she lacks legal training. As our
      supreme court has explained, any layperson choosing to represent
      himself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent,
      assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal training will
      prove his undoing.

Branch Banking & Tr. v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa. Super.

1996)). Because Appellant failed to follow the procedure for obtaining relief

from a default judgment, and because he has failed to articulate any valid

grounds for appellate relief, we affirm the order directing partition.

      Appellant’s application for emergency relief filed on March 22, 2023 is

denied as moot. Given our disposition of this appeal, the parties and the trial

court are free to proceed with the partition action in accordance with this

memorandum.

      Order affirmed. Application for relief denied.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/11/2023

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