Court Opinion

ID: 9750889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:45:00.149073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:27.428406
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. I believe it was reversible error to exclude the testimony of Dr. George Woody, appellant’s psychiatric expert surrebuttal witness. The proffered testimony, while it would have overlapped other testimony, was not merely cumulative of other evidence. Furthermore, we cannot assume that the excluded testimony, if Dr. Woody had presented it to the jury, would not have led to a different verdict. Thus, I would reverse and remand for a new trial pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)(i).
Dr. Berman, a psychiatrist, testified during the defense case-in-chief, expressing his opinion that appellant suffered *86from toxic psychosis at the time of the crime, preventing him from forming a specific intent to kill. He also testified that toxic psychosis was not dosage-related.
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented Dr. Richard Cohn, an expert in the areas of forensic toxicology and pharmacology but not a medical doctor. Dr. Cohn stated, contrary to Dr. Berman, that toxic psychosis was in fact dosage-related, that chronic drug abuse would create a tolerance to the psychosis, and that, in Dr. Cohn’s opinion, appellant was not acting under a toxic psychosis at the time of the murder. The latter opinion was based partly on Dr. Cohn’s observation that appellant appeared to be quite capable in his physical and mental capabilities around the time of the crime.
The defense then proffered the testimony of Dr. Woody, another psychiatrist, in surrebuttal, representing: “[T]he testimony that Dr. Woody will be presenting is almost, if not, entirely in response to testimony presented by Dr. [Cohn] in Commonwealth’s rebuttal. So I think it is proper surrebuttal. He’ll be commenting on Dr. [Cohn’s] account of the state of scientific knowledge.” N.T., 5/18/95, at 6.
I believe it was erroneous to reject Dr. Woody’s testimony when it was offered to rebut the testimony of Dr. Cohn. Dr. Cohn was not a psychiatrist but a forensic toxicologist. His expertise was in relating quantitative dosages of drugs and alcohol to their effects on the human body. Dr. Woody’s testimony would have directly refuted Dr. Cohn’s contention that a correlation exists between cocaine levels and toxic psychosis. Dr. Woody would also have testified that the psychotic disorder induced by cocaine would not manifest itself in any physical manner. This would have been a direct contradiction of Dr. Cohn’s statement that appellant’s lack of physical impairment was a basis for concluding that he did not suffer from toxic psychosis. Thus Dr. Woody, appellant’s psychiatric expert, would have testified that the testimony of Dr. Cohn, the Commonwealth’s expert, was arguably incorrect in terms of the state of scientific knowledge in the field.
*87It would have been proper surrebuttal to present the testimony of Dr. Woody in contradiction of Dr. Cohn’s testimony. See Commonwealth v. Ragan, 538 Pa. 2, 21, 645 A.2d 811, 820 (1994); Hoffman v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 265 Pa. 476, 485, 109 A. 234, 238 (1920); Remy v. Michael D’s Carpet Outlets, 391 Pa.Super. 436, 443-44, 571 A.2d 446, 450 (1990).
The core issue during the guilt phase of the trial was whether appellant had formed the specific intent to murder the victim. The proffered testimony of Dr. Woody had a direct bearing on that issue. The significance of the issue was manifested by a question sent out by the jury during its deliberations: “Did Dr. Cohn say a toxic psychosis could have been possible in Wayne Smith’s case?” The question struck directly to the heart of the issue of appellant’s level of culpability in the murder. In this trial there was no dispute that toxic psychosis would negate the ability to form a specific intent to kill; the only debate was whether or not appellant was suffering toxic psychosis at the time of the killing. The information which Dr. Woody should have been permitted to present in surrebuttal was crucial to appellant’s defense and integral to the concerns of the jury reflected in the question submitted during deliberations.
I therefore conclude that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to permit Dr. Woody to testify in surrebuttal during the guilt phase of appellant’s trial. I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
ZAPPALA, J., joins this dissenting opinion.