Court Opinion

ID: 9410564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 19:05:40.499608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.596274
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/21/23 Monti v. Pantoja CA4/1
                    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 NANNETTE MONTI,                                                      D080253

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
                                                                      00003296-CU-HR-NC)
 EDELMIRA PANTOJA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kelly Mertsoc, Commissioner. Dismissed.
         Edelmira Pantoja, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

         Edelmira Pantoja appeals from a civil harassment restraining order
that for six months prevented her from contacting and/or harassing her prior
tenant, Nannette Monti. The restraining order expired by its own terms in
August 2022. Because the order is no longer in effect and no exception to the
mootness doctrine applies, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Monti rented property from Pantoja until approximately October 2020.
At some point after that, Monti’s daughter and her daughter’s fiancé began
renting the same property from Pantoja.
      On January 5, 2022, Pantoja filed a petition under Code of Civil
Procedure section 527.61 seeking a restraining order against Monti. She
alleged that Monti had verbally threatened her.2 A few weeks later, on
January 27, 2022, Monti filed her own petition under section 527.6 seeking a
restraining order against Pantoja and alleging various forms of harassment.3
      On February 14, 2022, the court held a hearing on Monti’s restraining
order petition. Monti appeared, but Pantoja did not. After finding that
Pantoja had been properly served and listening to argument, the court
granted Monti’s petition for a restraining order against Pantoja to expire
after six months on August 14, 2022. Less than one month later, Pantoja
filed a notice of appeal.4

1     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise indicated.

2     An ex parte temporary restraining order was issued and a hearing
scheduled for January 21, 2022. The record does not indicate whether that
hearing went forward or its outcome.

3    Monti’s filed proof of service indicated that a process server had
personally served Pantoja with the restraining order petition at 9703
Antwerp Street in Los Angeles on February 9, 2022.

4     At the same time as her notice of appeal was filed, Pantoja also
submitted a request to terminate the February 14, 2022 restraining order,
claiming she has not lived at 9703 Antwerp Street since 1988 and was never
served with Monti’s petition for the restraining order. In support of that
request, she submitted a declaration from another individual stating that the
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                                  DISCUSSION
      Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides that a “person who has
suffered harassment” may seek a temporary restraining order and an
injunction after a hearing. Pantoja contends the February 14, 2022
restraining order against her must be reversed because there was insufficient
evidence of “harassment” and because Pantoja was never properly served
with notice of the hearing. We need not address these arguments, however,
because we conclude the appeal is moot.5
      It is well settled that courts decide actual controversies and generally
do not render opinions that are merely advisory. (Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v.
Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178-1179.) An appeal is moot
where, through no fault of the respondent, an event occurs that renders it
impossible for the reviewing court to provide the appellant with effective
relief. (Ibid.) “If relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief
granted expires before an appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse
party is moot.” (Environmental Charter High School v. Centinela Valley
Union High School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 139, 144.)
      Here, it is undisputed that the civil harassment restraining order
against Pantoja expired by its own terms on August 14, 2022—more than a
month before Pantoja filed her opening brief in this appeal. And nothing in
the record shows that the civil harassment restraining order has been
renewed. Thus, there is no effective relief we can grant Pantoja on appeal.
(Cf. Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495-496 [appeal from

sheriff had attempted to serve Pantoja at his address, 9703 Antwerp Street,
but that he did not know her and had lived at this address for five years.

5    Although we asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on
mootness, neither filed any response.
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expired civil harassment restraining order is not moot if the order has been
renewed].) Although an appellate court may exercise its discretion to hear an
otherwise moot case, the circumstances warranting such review are
extremely limited and do not exist here. (See Malatka v. Helm (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1088 [outlining exceptions to mootness doctrine as
(1) the case raises an issue of broad public interest, (2) the conduct leading to
the underlying action is likely to recur, or (3) a material question remains for
the court to decide].) Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed. Each party shall bear her own costs.

                                                           DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

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