Court Opinion

ID: 9889242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-07 00:00:30.077531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:39.408794
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20450         Document: 00516923125             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/06/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                    Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                FILED
                                                                            October 6, 2023
                                       No. 21-20450                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                Clerk

   James Richards,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Marsha McLane; Harris County, Texas; Judge Natalie
   C. Fleming,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:18-CV-4109
                      ______________________________

   Before Jones, Dennis, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          James Richards was adjudicated a sexually violent predator and civilly
   committed to outpatient treatment. When the Texas Legislature later
   amended its civil commitment law to create a tiered program that allowed for
   transfer of civil committees from an outpatient setting to total confinement,
   Richards consented to join the new program. He continued to live in the

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                         No. 21-20450

   community as an outpatient for some time but eventually was arrested and
   charged with indecent exposure. The county judge released him to a state
   agency that transferred him to a civil commitment center. Richards brought
   due process claims under § 1983 against the county and the executive director
   of the state agency. The district court denied his claims at the summary
   judgment stage. We AFFIRM.
                                               I
           Richards was adjudicated a sexually violent predator by a
   Montgomery County jury in 2003. Under Texas’s Sexually Violent Predator
   Act (SVPA),1 the court civilly committed him for outpatient treatment and
   supervision “until [his] behavioral abnormality has changed to the extent that
   [he] is no longer likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” After
   his commitment, Richards resided for ten years at the Southeast Texas
   Transitional Center, a residential facility. In 2015, Richards transitioned to
   his private residence in Harris County and continued to receive treatment as
   an outpatient.
           Also in 2015, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 746, which
   amended the SVPA.2 Whereas the prior version of the Act provided
   exclusively for outpatient treatment, S.B. 746 instructed the newly created
   Texas Civil Commitment Office (TCCO) to develop a tiered program
   “provid[ing] for the seamless transition of a committed person from a total
           _____________________
           1
            Before the amendments in 2015, the Sexually Violent Predator Act required civilly
   committed persons to “reside in a particular location” and undergo “outpatient treatment
   and supervision” coordinated by the Texas Office of Violent Sex Offender Management.
   Sexually Violent Predator Act, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1188, § 4.01, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
   (West) (amended 2003) (version previously at Tex. Health & Safety Code
   §§ 841.081, 841.082).
           2
             Act of May 21, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 845, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West)
   (codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.001, et seq.).

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   confinement facility to less restrictive housing and supervision and
   eventually to release from civil commitment, based on the person’s behavior
   and progress in treatment.”3 The Act provided that adjudicated sexually
   violent predators must “reside where instructed by the [TCCO].”4 And it
   gave the TCCO authority to place committed persons in more or less
   restrictive settings based on the need to protect the community and the
   person’s needs for treatment and supervision.5
           S.B. 746 also directed courts with jurisdiction over committed
   sexually violent predators, after providing notice and a hearing, to amend
   civil commitment orders to conform with the legislative changes.6 As a result,
   the Montgomery County court with jurisdiction over Richards’s case sent
   him a description of the changes to the program and notified him of his right
   to a hearing before transfer into the tiered program. Richards waived his right
   to a hearing and consented to join the new civil commitment program. The
   court entered an order placing Richards in the tiered program, along with an
   amended order of civil commitment, which included a provision that
   Richards “shall reside where instructed by the TCCO.”
           After entry of these orders, Richards continued to live and work in the
   community as an outpatient. But in 2018, he was charged with a
   misdemeanor offense for indecent exposure after a complainant alleged that
   he exposed himself and masturbated on a public train. Richards was arrested
   and confined in the Harris County Jail. That same day, the TCCO issued an

           _____________________
           3
               Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.0831(b).
           4
               Id. § 841.082(a)(1).
           5
           Act of May 21, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 845, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West)
   (amended 2023) (current version at Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.0834).
           6
            Act of May 18, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 845, § 40(b), 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
   Ch. 845 (West).

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   emergency detention order requiring Richards to be returned to a more
   restrictive setting and directing the Harris County Sheriff to release Richards
   only to an official authorized by the TCCO.
          Richards attended his 24-hour bail/bond hearing, where bail was
   initially set at $5,000. But a few days later, Harris County Judge Natalie
   Fleming set Richards’s bail/bond to $0 and ordered him to be released to the
   TCCO under the emergency detention order. Harris County released
   Richards to the TCCO, which transferred him to the Texas Civil
   Commitment Center (TCCC), an inpatient civil confinement center in
   Littlefield, Texas. Upon arrival, Richards was placed in the TCCC special
   management unit due to his pending criminal charge.
          On the afternoon of his transfer, Richards received a violation notice
   of his right to request a hearing with his committing court to contest the
   transfer. The violation notice also gave details of Richards’s violation. It
   indicated that Richards lied to his TCCO case manager about the train
   incident, allegedly telling his case manager that he was detained and
   questioned by the Houston Metro Police about a problem with his Metro fare
   but leaving out that he had been questioned about a sexual offense. The
   notice also indicated that Richards “[had] recently been impatient and [had]
   been pushing the boundaries of treatment.”
          Richards chose not to request a hearing to contest his transfer to
   TCCC. And for the next two years, while he remained at TCCC and while
   this lawsuit was pending, he signed off that he was placed in the appropriate
   treatment tier during annual reviews of his tier level.
          In 2018, Richards filed this pro se lawsuit in federal court against
   numerous defendants, including Harris County and Executive Director of
   the TCCO Marsha McLane. He brought several state and federal claims.
   Relevant here, he brought substantive and procedural due process claims

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   under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
   damages.
           Harris County moved for summary judgment, and Richards filed a
   cross-motion for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment
   to Harris County and denied Richards’s cross-motion. Executive Director
   McLane also moved for summary judgment, which the court granted. The
   court dismissed the claims against various other defendants as well.7 Richards
   timely appealed.
                                              II
           “We review rulings on motions for summary judgment de novo,
   applying the same standards prescribed for use by the district court.” Shaw
   Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng’rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538 (5th Cir. 2004)
   (italics omitted). Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that
   there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
   to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Where, as here,
   parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, each motion must be
   considered separately because each movant bears the burden of showing that
   no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as
   a matter of law.” Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Rentech Steel, L.L.C., 620
   F.3d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 2010). Pro se briefs are liberally construed. See Haines
   v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).

           _____________________
           7
            Richards also sued Judge Fleming for injunctive relief and damages. The district
   court dismissed the claims with prejudice because Judge Fleming was no longer serving as
   a judge, so she could not grant Richards injunctive relief, and the doctrine of judicial
   immunity protected her from liability for Richards’s claims for damages.

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                                          III
           On appeal, Richards challenges the district court’s grants of summary
   judgment to Harris County and McLane on his § 1983 due process claims.
   We address each in turn.
                                           A
           We start with Harris County. The district court granted summary
   judgment to Harris County and denied Richards’s cross-motion for summary
   judgment on the ground that Richards failed to establish municipal liability.
   On appeal, Richards argues: (1) the district court failed to adequately
   consider his cross-motion; and (2) the district court substantively erred in
   granting summary judgment to Harris County.
                                           1
           Richards first argues that the district court erred by failing to consider
   his cross-motion for summary judgment against Harris County separately
   from Harris County’s motion for summary judgment. In fact, Richards
   argues, “[I]t appears that [the court] didn’t consider [his cross-motion] at
   all.”
           We disagree. The district court indicated that its opinion granting
   summary judgment to Harris County was based on both motions. It
   acknowledged that “Richards filed a cross-motion for summary judgment”
   and explicitly denied that cross-motion. The court also addressed many of
   Richards’s summary judgment arguments throughout its opinion. The mere
   fact that the court considered and decided both motions in the same opinion
   does not mean they were not considered separately. See Greer v. Richardson
   Indep. Sch. Dist., 472 F. App’x 287, 297 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Although the

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   district court announced its decision on each party’s respective motion in a
   single paragraph, the motions were considered separately.”). 8
           Richards’s confusion may stem from the fact that the district court did
   not explicitly address all of his summary judgment arguments. For instance,
   the court declined to address Richards’s arguments on the merits of his
   substantive due process claim. But the court was not required to address
   these arguments because it had already held that there was no Harris County
   policy, practice, or custom that infringed Richards’s constitutional rights. 9
   Without a policy, practice, or custom, Harris County cannot be liable for
   substantive due process violations under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
   of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978). Thus, the court was not
   required to further address Richards’s arguments when those arguments
   could not create a dispute of material fact. Accordingly, the district court
   fulfilled its duty to consider the cross-motions separately.
                                                 2
           Richards next argues that the district court substantively erred by
   granting summary judgment to Harris County. We disagree. Summary
   judgment was proper because Richards failed to identify a policymaker or an
   official policy to establish municipal liability.
           A municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the
   municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. Monell, 436

           _____________________
           8
             Greer is “not controlling precedent,” but we cite it as “persuasive authority.”
   Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4).
           9
             Richards argues that the district court failed to address his argument that Judge
   Fleming was a final policymaker whose single decision qualified as an official policy.
   However, the district court reasoned that Judge Fleming’s decision to cancel bail was not
   a county policy but a reaction to an order from a state agency. This was sufficient to address
   and resolve Richards’s argument.

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   U.S. at 694–95. “To establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff
   must show that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal
   policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional
   right.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009). “[A]
   single decision may create municipal liability if that decision were made by a
   final policymaker responsible for that activity.” Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d
   348, 352 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brown v. Bryan Cnty., 67 F.3d 1174, 1183
   (5th Cir. 1995)). A county judge can be a policymaker when acting “pursuant
   to his or her administrative role” but not when “acting in his or her judicial
   capacity to enforce state law.” Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.
   1992). A judge acts in a judicial capacity when her actions are “the
   effectuation of the policy of the [state] . . . for which the citizens of a
   particular county should not bear singular responsibility.” Carbalan v.
   Vaughn, 760 F.2d 662, 665 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Familias Unidas v. Briscoe,
   619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 1980)). “A judge’s setting an arrestee’s bail . . . is
   part of the state adversary proceedings and a judicial function.” Daves v.
   Dallas Cnty., 22 F.4th 522, 539–40 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc), followed by
   Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 64 F.4th 616 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (remanding with
   instructions to dismiss).
          Richards’s due process claims focus on Judge Fleming’s elimination
   of bail. He argued below that Judge Fleming was a final policymaker whose
   single decision to cancel bail qualified as an official municipal policy that
   violated his substantive and procedural due process rights. The district court
   held that Richards failed to establish a Harris County policy, practice, or
   custom to establish municipal liability under Monell, explaining that “the
   decision by the Criminal Court judge to eliminate Richards’s bond was not
   the result of any Harris County policy, practice, or custom, but was a direct
   response to the TCCO’s Emergency Detention Order.”

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             We agree with the district court. Richards has not shown that Judge
   Fleming was acting as a county policymaker or that cancellation of bail was a
   municipal policy. He does not contend that Judge Fleming was promulgating
   countywide rules or acting in an administrative role when she canceled his
   bail. On the contrary, Judge Fleming’s cancellation of bail was part of state
   adversary proceedings and constituted a judicial function. Daves, 22 F.4th at
   539. And as the district court pointed out, when Judge Fleming canceled bail
   and released Richards to the TCCO, she was acting under an emergency
   detention order from a state agency rather than effectuating a county policy.
   Richards has failed to create a factual dispute on the policymaker and policy
   issues.
             We hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment
   to Harris County.
                                            B
             We turn to Richards’s argument that the district court erred when it
   granted summary judgment to Executive Director of the TCCO Marsha
   McLane on his due process claims. We start with the preliminary issue of
   qualified immunity and then consider Richards’s substantive and procedural
   due process claims.
                                            1
             First, qualified immunity. Richards seeks injunctive relief from
   McLane in her official capacity and damages in her personal capacity. “[A]
   state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, [is]
   a person under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 because official-capacity actions for
   prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.” Will v. Mich.
   Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (internal quotation marks
   omitted). Likewise, plaintiffs can sue state officials in their personal
   capacities for damages under § 1983. But those officials are shielded by

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   qualified immunity in certain instances. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658,
   664–70 (2012).
          McLane asserts a qualified immunity defense in response to
   Richards’s personal-capacity suit. To assess a qualified immunity defense, a
   court must decide: “(1) whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out
   a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the right at issue was
   clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Rivera v.
   Bonner, 952 F.3d 560, 564 (5th Cir. 2017) (alteration omitted) (internal
   quotation marks omitted). However, Richards’s claims fail because the facts
   alleged do not make out a constitutional violation. Thus, our qualified
   immunity analysis ends here.
                                         2
          Next, substantive due process. Richards argues that McLane violated
   his substantive due process rights by: (1) retroactively applying S.B. 746 to
   him; (2) placing him in isolation; and (3) acting under a court order that was
   void for lack of jurisdiction. He emphasizes that his due process arguments
   are as-applied arguments rather than arguments about the facial
   constitutionality of S.B. 746. Each of Richards’s arguments fails upon
   inspection.
          “[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that
   bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions ‘regardless of the
   fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’” Zinermon v. Burch, 494
   U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
   “Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty
   protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”
   Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
          The district court denied Richards’s substantive due process
   argument on the ground that “a person who was civilly committed under the

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   earlier statute [that is, the pre-2015 version of SVPA that required outpatient
   treatment] does not have a vested liberty interest in outpatient treatment.”
   We reached a similar conclusion on similar facts in our unpublished decision
   in Martinez v. McLane. 792 F. App’x 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
   In Martinez, we held that a civil committee had no liberty interest in
   outpatient treatment because (1) he had violated the conditions of his order
   of commitment, and (2) he had consented to enter the tiered program created
   by S.B. 746. Id. at 286.
          Richards thus has no vested liberty interest in outpatient treatment.
   But Richards does have a liberty interest in remaining in the community. See
   Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (holding that a parolee has a
   liberty interest in not having conditional freedom revoked); In re State, 556
   S.W.3d 821, 830 (Tex. 2018) (holding that civilly committed persons have “a
   liberty interest in being free from inpatient treatment”). This liberty interest
   exists even though Richards’s freedom was contingent on certain conditions
   imposed by his order of commitment. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 (holding
   that a parolee possesses a liberty interest even “[t]hough the State properly
   subjects him to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens”).
          Concluding that Richards possesses a liberty interest, we turn to his
   specific arguments, beginning with retroactivity. To determine whether a
   statute is applied retroactively, we ask “whether the new provision attaches
   new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” Lopez
   Ventura v. Sessions, 907 F.3d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
   Retroactive application of laws can violate substantive due process because
   “[t]he Due Process Clause . . . protects the interests in fair notice and repose
   that may be compromised by retroactive legislation.” Landgraf v. USI Film
   Products, 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994). Thus, a justification sufficient for a
   statute’s prospective application under the Clause “may not suffice” for its
   retroactive application. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17

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   (1976). “[T]hat burden is met simply by showing that the retroactive
   application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative
   purpose.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730
   (1984).
          Richards argues that McLane applied the 2015 amendments to him
   retroactively when she put him in the tiered program. Even spotting Richards
   the proposition that the statute was applied retroactively to him, his
   argument fails. The retroactive application of S.B. 746 to Richards does not
   implicate the interests in “fair notice and repose” that due process protects.
   See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266. Before transfer into the tiered program, the
   TCCO gave notice and an opportunity for a hearing, but Richards waived
   his rights and consented to enter the program. By the time Richards
   transferred to inpatient treatment, his expectation would have been that he
   was to “reside where instructed by TCCO,” as stated in his amended court
   order. Richards does not identify any authority holding that this
   circumstance or one like it, where an individual has consented to be subject to
   a new law, constitutes a retroactive application of a law in violation of
   substantive due process. Furthermore, the Texas Legislature and the TCCO
   had a rational basis for applying the law retroactively. The State’s interest in
   uniformity in the civil commitment program and keeping the community safe
   by transferring committees to higher levels of care as necessary justified
   retroactive application.
          Richards next argues that his placement in the TCCC secure
   management unit, which he contends was like solitary confinement, was
   impermissible punishment of a pretrial detainee and civil committee, in
   violation of substantive due process. The purpose of civil commitment “is to
   treat the individual’s mental illness and protect him and society from his
   potential dangerousness.” Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
   Civilly committed persons are “entitled to more considerate treatment and

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   conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement
   are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982).
   Additionally, “due process requires that the conditions and duration of
   confinement . . . bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which
   persons are committed.” Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001).
          Richards’s placement in the secure management unit was consistent
   with TCCO standard operating practice for civil committees with outside
   pending charges. This policy is not punishment and bears a reasonable
   relationship to the purpose for which Richards was committed. In her brief,
   McLane explains that “temporary placement in [the secure management
   unit] is for the safety and security of the clients and furthers the purpose of
   the facility by protecting all clients and limiting disruption of treatment.”
   This explanation is reasonable and not clearly “a sham or mere pretext”
   adopted to conceal “the forbidden purpose to punish.” Kansas v. Hendricks,
   521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
          Finally, Richards argues that McLane violated his substantive due
   process rights because the court order placing him in the new treatment
   program and the amended order of commitment are void for lack of
   jurisdiction. Richards was originally committed in the 221st District Court of
   Montgomery County, and his case was later transferred to the 435th District
   Court. Richards argues that the 435th District Court did not have jurisdiction
   to enter the commitment order because it was not the original committing
   court. For support, he cites a provision in the SVPA, which says, “The
   committing court retains jurisdiction of the case.” 10 However, nowhere does
   the Act say that the committing court cannot transfer a case to another court
   within the county of proper jurisdiction. Indeed, when the administrative

          _____________________
          10
               Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.082(d).

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   judge transferred Richards’s case, the 435th District Court of Montgomery
   County became the committing court.11
            We hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment
   to McLane on Richards’s substantive due process claim.
                                                3
            Finally, Richards argues that McLane violated his procedural due
   process rights by confining him in an inpatient facility in 2018 without a
   predeprivation hearing. The district court granted summary judgment to
   McLane on this claim, holding that “[b]ecause Richards both waived his right
   to a hearing on the change to his tier assignment, and chose not to seek a
   hearing following the change in his tier assignment, he fails to identify a
   violation of his right to procedural due process.” We agree with the district
   court.
            “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects
   persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who would
   seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these
   interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
   Procedural due process claims are subject to a two-step inquiry: “The first
   question asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has
   been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the
   procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally
   sufficient.” Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal
   quotation marks omitted). Procedural due process is “a flexible concept,”

            _____________________
            11
              See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.093(d) (“When a case is transferred from one
   court to another as provided under this section, all processes, writs, bonds, recognizances,
   or other obligations issued from the transferring court are returnable to the court to which
   the case is transferred as if originally issued by that court.”).

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   and the procedural protections due under the Fourteenth Amendment vary
   depending on the circumstances. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127.
          To discern what process is due, courts apply the Mathews v. Eldridge
   balancing test, which weighs several factors:
          First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
          action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
          interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
          if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
          finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
          involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
          additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.12
          In most cases, the Mathews test will weigh in favor of notice and an
   opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of a protected interest. See
   Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2012). However, in
   some cases, such as “where a State must act quickly, or where it would be
   impractical to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation process
   satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Gilbert v. Homar, 520
   U.S. 924, 930 (1997). “In particular, where the State acts to abate an
   emergent threat to public safety, postdeprivation process satisfies the
   Constitution’s procedural due process requirement.” RBIII, L.P. v. City of
   San Antonio, 713 F.3d 840, 844 (5th Cir. 2013). Additionally, “where the
   potential length or severity of the deprivation does not indicate a likelihood
   of serious loss and where the procedures underlying the decision to act are
   sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk of erroneous determination,
   government may act without providing additional ‘advance procedural
   safeguards.’” Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978)
   (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977)).

          _____________________
          12
               424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

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           Having already concluded that Richards possesses a liberty interest in
   remaining in the community, we undertake the Mathews balancing test to
   determine whether the procedures provided were constitutionally sufficient.
           We start with the private interest. Richards undoubtedly possesses an
   interest in remaining in the community. Although he was subject to “many
   restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482,
   while living in his private residence as an outpatient, he enjoyed significant
   freedoms that were taken from him in inpatient confinement. He was able to
   work, move freely in the community, and see family and friends. However,
   Richards’s interest is tempered in some important ways. First, the “length
   or severity of the deprivation.” Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 19. Although
   Richards’s civil confinement has lasted years, Richards was given the
   opportunity to request a hearing on the day of his transfer to the TCCC. But
   he did not request one. Thus, Richards faced only a short period of
   confinement without the opportunity for a hearing, which lessens the severity
   of the deprivation. Second and critically, Richards consented to joining the
   tiered program. He was thus aware, from his amended court order, that he
   was to reside where instructed by the TCCO and that he could be moved to
   a more restrictive tier.
           Next, the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional
   procedures. Consider the robust procedures used by the State. At the outset,
   Richards was adjudicated to be a sexually violent predatory beyond a
   reasonable doubt by a jury of his peers.13 When S.B. 746 was passed, Richards
   was given notice of the changes and the right to request a hearing with his
   committing court. He waived his right to a hearing and consented to the new

           _____________________
           13
             Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.062 (“The judge or jury shall
   determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator.”).

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                                    No. 21-20450

   tiered civil commitment program. When Richards was arrested for public
   masturbation, his arrest was subject to the usual probable cause requirement
   and protections. On the afternoon of his transfer to the TCCC, he received
   a violation notice of his right to request a hearing with his committing court
   to contest the transfer. He chose not to request a hearing. Finally, during his
   confinement, Richards received annual reviews of his tier level during which
   he signed off that he was at the appropriate tier. While there is of course a
   risk of erroneous deprivation when a predeprivation hearing is not held, the
   process that Richards had already received before his transfer to TCCC
   lessened the risk sufficiently. And the prompt annual reports gave Richards
   postdeprivation process, further reducing the risk of long-term erroneous
   deprivation.
          Finally, the State’s interest. The TCCO had a very strong interest in
   acting quickly to protect the community and in providing treatment and
   supervision to Richards, as quick action is necessary when a civilly committed
   person has regressed in treatment or violated a civil commitment rule.
   Because Richards was offered bail, the TCCO had to act quickly to make
   sure he was not released into the community.
          Richards points us to a lower court case, Hitt v. McLane, No. AU-17-
   CA-00289-SS, 2019 WL 13080577 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2019), in which a
   civil committee violated a condition of his outpatient treatment by failing to
   tell the TCCO about his relationship with his coworker. The district court
   concluded that he was entitled to the same due process given in the context
   of parole revocation, as outlined by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer,
   408 U.S. 471 (1972). Id. at *8. Accordingly, the district court held that the
   TCCO violated procedural due process by failing to provide a
   predeprivation hearing. Id. However, we cannot rely on Morrissey on the facts
   before us today. Important differences exist between Richards and a parolee.
   First, the State has a greater interest here than in Morrissey in acting quickly

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                                       No. 21-20450

   to protect the community. Unlike Richards, the parolee in Morrissey was
   already incarcerated while he awaited a decision on revocation. See 408 U.S.
   at 472–73. Richards, in contrast, was about to be granted bail and potentially
   released when the TCCO issued its emergency detention order. Thus, the
   State here has an interest in acting quickly to prevent Richards’s release to
   protect the community. Second, unlike a parolee, Richards consented to join
   a tiered program in which he was directed to reside where instructed by the
   TCCO. There was no analogous consent in Morrissey. Because of these
   factors, the Mathews calculus comes out differently in this case and does not
   require a predeprivation hearing.
            In light of Richards’s consent to enter the tiered program, the
   promptness of postdeprivation procedures, and the need for quick action to
   protect the public, we think the Mathews balancing test weighs in favor of the
   State.
            Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to
   McLane on the procedural due process issue.
                                   *        *         *
            We AFFIRM.

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