Court Opinion

ID: 9906374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 21:02:22.921876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:20.448695
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/1/23 Ranjbari v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

ROYA RANJBARI,                                               B321595

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                  19STCV35158)

LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,

     Defendant and
Respondent.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los Angeles, Robert B. Broadbelt, Judge. Affirmed.
      Heidari Law Group, Saman Ryan Heidari and Giorgio
Cassandra, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Colman Perkins Law Group, James J. Perkins and Chloe P.
Graham, for Defendant and Respondent.
                     I.    INTRODUCTION

      Plaintiff Roya Ranjbari appeals from the trial court’s denial
of her petition to vacate an arbitration award in favor of
defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. She contends the
arbitrator committed misconduct warranting vacatur under Code
of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5)1 when he
excluded expert testimony, refused to postpone the hearing to
resolve critical evidentiary issues, and denied her right to a court
reporter. We affirm.

            II.    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    Uninsured Motorist Claim Investigation

      Plaintiff was insured under an auto insurance policy issued
by defendant that included uninsured motorist coverage with a
$100,000 limit and an arbitration agreement.
      On February 2, 2019, plaintiff made a letter demand on
defendant on a claim arising from an auto collision that she
stated occurred on August 7, 2018. According to plaintiff, as she
entered the 101 freeway, attempting to merge into the westbound
lanes at 20 to 30 miles per hour, a white vehicle traveling 60
miles per hour struck her 2018 Kia on the left side.2 The impact

1     All further references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise indicated.

2     The facts of the accident and plaintiff’s injuries are taken
from the independent medical examination (IME) report by
Dr. Richard C. Rosenberg dated November 7, 2020, and the

                                 2
propelled plaintiff’s car into the guardrail on the right. Plaintiff
did not hit any other vehicles. The white vehicle did not stop.
      Plaintiff did not call for medical assistance at the scene or
report the accident, but instead drove home and sought medical
treatment at an emergency room the next day. That visit was
followed by various medical examinations, chiropractic therapy,
and pain management services.
      On March 4, 2019, defendant’s counsel responded to the
demand by scheduling plaintiff for an examination under oath
before a certified shorthand court reporter pursuant to the terms
of her policy. Counsel also requested that plaintiff produce
certain documents and bring her car to the examination so that
defendant’s expert could download its event data recorder (EDR).
      On May 8, 2019, defendant sent plaintiff a copy of “the
EDR download” obtained from plaintiff’s car by defendant’s
expert.
      On May 15, 2019, plaintiff acknowledged that she received
and executed the transcript of her examination under oath.

B.    Arbitration Proceedings

      Pursuant to the arbitration agreement in plaintiff’s policy,
the parties submitted her uninsured motorist claim to binding
arbitration administered by Judicate West, a dispute resolution
provider.

arbitrator’s July 22, 2021, findings and award. Plaintiff provided
varying versions of the accident to insurance investigators,
healthcare providers, and at the arbitration. The arbitrator
ultimately found her testimony about the event not credible.

                                 3
       On October 2, 2020, plaintiff appeared for an IME at the
office of Dr. Rosenberg. On November 5, 2020, Dr. Rosenberg
forwarded his report on the IME to defendant’s counsel, who in
turn forwarded a copy to plaintiff’s counsel.
       On March 4, 2021, Judicate West served notice that the
arbitration hearing would take place on July 12 and 13, 2021,
before retired Superior Court Judge Christopher J. Warner.
       On May 26, 2021, defendant served a deposition subpoena
on one of plaintiff’s health care providers seeking production of
her medical records.
       On June 18, 2021, plaintiff served a demand to exchange
expert information pursuant to section 2034 requesting a
response by June 25, 2021. No other expert demands were
served by either party.
       On June 22, 2021, defendant served an amended notice of
intent to introduce documents at the arbitration hearing
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.823,3 including the
IME report of Dr. Rosenberg and the EDR download report for
plaintiff’s car.
      On Friday morning, July 9, 2021, the arbitrator held a
conference with the parties in advance of the hearings set to
begin the following Monday. Following the conference, plaintiff
e-mailed a letter to the arbitrator raising certain evidentiary
issues and requesting a hearing on those matters.4 Defendant

3    All further rules references are to the California Rules of
Court.

4      In addition to her July 9, 2021, letter, plaintiff served and
lodged with the arbitrator that day an exhibit list with copies of
the listed exhibits.

                                  4
responded by e-mail on July 11, 2021, suggesting, among other
things, that certain of the evidentiary matters could be handled
during the course of the scheduled hearings.
      The arbitration began on the morning of July 12, 2021, and
concluded on the evening of July 13, 2021. Plaintiff testified for
two hours and submitted photographs of her car and repair
estimates. Her treating physicians and chiropractor also testified
on her behalf, opining on her injuries. One of her witnesses, Dr.
Larry Miller, testified that his opinions about plaintiff’s injuries
were based on plaintiff’s statements about the accident, including
her reporting of an impact that caused her car’s airbags to deploy.
      Defendant submitted exhibits including the transcript of
plaintiff’s examination under oath and Dr. Rosenberg’s IME
report. Defendant also called two forensic experts. Timothy
Staab testified about his examination of the EDR, the mechanism
that activates a vehicle’s airbag. The EDR, which activates when
there is a rapid change in velocity of five miles per hour or more,
did not record an event on the day of the purported accident or
any other time. Based on his examination of the EDR, Staab
opined that if there was an impact to plaintiff’s vehicle, it did not
cause plaintiff’s car to change velocity five miles per hour or
more. Donald Miller testified about the nature of the damages to
plaintiff’s car and his opinions about plaintiff’s body movements
within the car, assuming that an accident occurred.
      On July 22, 2021, the arbitrator issued his findings and
award. He noted that plaintiff’s testimony was “quite vague”
regarding various aspects of the accident and that she “was
impeached several times regarding the alleged accident with
testimony from [her] Examination Under Oath taken
April 10, 2019.” The arbitrator found that: “The testimony of

                                 5
[plaintiff’s own witness] Dr. Miller was devastating to [plaintiff’s]
credibility . . . . Airbag deployment and a collision with the sound
wall simply did not happen, assuming arguendo that a collision
occurred at all. [¶] Setting aside [plaintiff’s] lack of credibility,
[defendant’s] forensic evidence preponderates. The EDR data
and photographs disprove this claim. [¶] AWARD: [¶]
[Plaintiff] is to take nothing. Each [p]arty bears their own costs,
fees and expenses.”

C.    Petition to Vacate Award

       On November 12, 2021, plaintiff filed a petition to vacate
the award. According to plaintiff, her rights were prejudiced by
the arbitrator’s misconduct in (1) denying plaintiff the right to a
court reporter; (2) “permitting [defendant] greater leeway with
evidentiary issues relative” to plaintiff; (3) refusing to postpone
the arbitration hearing pending a determination of evidentiary
issues raised at the pre-arbitration conference; (4) and refusing to
allow plaintiff to submit evidence and testimony. Plaintiff
supported her petition with the declarations of her counsel and
her two proposed rebuttal witnesses, as well as copies of the
arbitration agreement and her July 9, 2021, letter to the
arbitrator.
       On November 22, 2021, defendant filed its opposition to the
petition. The opposition was supported by the declaration of
defendant’s counsel describing, among other things, the
July 9, 2021, pre-arbitration conference and the circumstances
surrounding the exclusion of the two rebuttal witnesses, as well
as 11 exhibits, including Dr. Rosenberg’s IME report and
counsel’s letter transmitting the EDR download taken by Staab.

                                  6
       Plaintiff did not file a reply brief or any other papers in
support of her petition.
       On May 10, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on
plaintiff’s petition. Following the hearing, the court took the
matter under submission and subsequently issued an order
denying the petition.
       On plaintiff’s claim that the arbitrator prevented her from
submitting evidence on a material issue in violation of section
1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), the trial court found that “[t]he
evidence presented to the court makes clear that [p]laintiff is
actually seeking to vacate the arbitration award based on the
alleged erroneous sustaining of [d]efendant’s objections to her
rebuttal witnesses. . . . [¶] The court declines to review the
arbitrator’s decision based on an allegedly erroneous evidentiary
ruling.”
       On her assertion that the arbitrator failed to postpone the
hearing to resolve certain issues raised in her July 9, 2021, letter,
the trial court found that “[t]here is evidence that some
evidentiary concerns were resolved at the final hearing on
July 9, 2021, and defense counsel also indicates that the
arbitrator made other evidentiary rulings at the hearing.”
       And, on the arbitrator’s refusal to allow a court reporter to
transcribe the hearings, the trial court concluded that “[p]laintiff
has not shown that her rights were substantial[ly] prejudiced [by]
that ruling. Moreover, that the arbitrator recorded the
proceedings himself does not appear to be improper,” citing rule
3.824, subdivision (b)(1).

                                 7
                       III.   DISCUSSION

A.    Standard of Review

       Arbitration awards are generally not subject to judicial
review. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 11
(Moncharsh).) “[B]ecause it vindicates the intentions of the
parties that the award be final, and because an arbitrator is not
ordinarily constrained to decide according to the rule of law, it is
the general rule that, ‘The merits of the controversy between the
parties are not subject to judicial review.’ [Citations.] More
specifically, courts will not review the validity of the arbitrator’s
reasoning. [Citations.] Further, a court may not review the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting an arbitrator’s award.
[Citations.] [¶] Thus, it is the general rule that, with narrow
exceptions, an arbitrator’s decision cannot be reviewed for errors
of fact or law.” (Id. at p. 11.)
       We subject a trial court’s ruling on a petition to vacate an
arbitration award “to a different standard of review than the
underlying arbitration award. [Citation.] We apply the
substantial evidence test to the trial court’s determination of
disputed factual issues. [Citation.] ‘Issues of statutory
interpretation and the application of that interpretation to a set
of undisputed facts are questions of law subject to independent
review by this court. [Citation.]’” (Soni v. SimpleLayers, Inc.
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1087.)

                                  8
B.    Exclusion of Rebuttal Witnesses

      Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by failing to
vacate the arbitration award pursuant to section 1286.2,
subdivision (a)(5), based upon the arbitrator’s refusal to hear
testimony from her proffered rebuttal witnesses.

      1.    Background

         Near the close of the arbitration hearing, after plaintiff had
rested her case and defendant’s forensic experts had testified,
plaintiff’s attorney stated that he wanted to call two witnesses on
rebuttal, Robert A. Kilroy and David J. King. Neither had
testified during plaintiff’s case-in-chief. Defendant objected and
requested an offer of proof. Plaintiff proffered “that [Kilroy and
King] had different opinions than those of [defendant’s] experts.”
The arbitrator sustained defendant’s objection and did not allow
Kilroy and King to testify.
         In support of her petition to vacate, plaintiff submitted
Kilroy’s declaration, in which he explained that he was a licensed
chiropractor who was a percipient witness to the examination of
plaintiff by Dr. Rosenberg. Kilroy stated that he had been
prepared to testify during the arbitration as a rebuttal witness
about “the specific things [he] observed regarding what took place
. . . .” Kilroy did not, however, state that he disagreed with any
part of Dr. Rosenberg’s testimony or opinion.
         Plaintiff also submitted King’s declaration in which he
explained that he was a registered mechanical engineer who had
been prepared to testify at the arbitration as “a rebuttal witness
to the testimony proffered by other experts . . . regarding accident

                                  9
reconstruction, [EDR] accuracy, and the location and function of
the entire [EDR] and [a]irbag systems in as installed in
[plaintiff’s] vehicle.” King, however, did not explain the
substance of his proffered testimony, did not provide his opinion
about the accident, and did not state that he disagreed with any
portions of the testimony of defendant’s experts.

      2.    Legal Principles

       “[V]acation of an award for ‘refusal . . . to hear evidence
material to the controversy’ (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(5)) must rest on
more than a simple error in applying the rules of evidence. . . .
[S]ection 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), ‘if not properly limited, could
swallow the rule that arbitration awards are generally not
reviewable on the merits.’ The provision is not ‘a back door to
Moncharsh[, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1] through which parties may
routinely test the validity of legal theories of arbitrators.’
[Citation.] Instead, it was designed as a ‘safety valve in private
arbitration that permits a court to intercede when an arbitrator
has prevented a party from fairly presenting its case.’ [Citation.]
It comes into play, for example, when an arbitrator, without
justification, permits only one side to present evidence on a
disputed material issue. [Citation.] The Arbitration Act codifies
‘the fundamental principle that “[a]rbitration should give both
parties an opportunity to be heard.” [Citation.] . . . [T]he
opportunity to be heard must be extended to all parties
equitably.’ [Citation.] To conduct an arbitration without abiding
by that principle evinces bias, constituting misconduct.”
(Heimlich v. Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 368–369.)

                                 10
      3.    Analysis

       The record does not support plaintiff’s assertion of
misconduct under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5). Plaintiff’s
evidence in the trial court consisted of declarations from the two
excluded witnesses, stating only that they were prepared to
testify in rebuttal at the arbitration hearings and generally
describing the topics of their proposed testimony. Further, the
record of the arbitration proceedings demonstrated that, even
though plaintiff was well aware of the EDR data and the identity
of the expert who downloaded it, she did not conduct any expert
discovery on the issue. Nor did she call an accident
reconstruction expert during her case-in-chief, choosing instead
to rely on her own testimony about the accident, photographs of
her car, and repair estimates. Accordingly, and contrary to
plaintiff’s assertion, the evidence did not demonstrate that the
arbitrator prevented her from presenting crucial accident
reconstruction evidence. Instead, it described, at best, a disputed
evidentiary issue concerning the proper scope of expert rebuttal
testimony, the resolution of which was within the sound
discretion of the arbitrator as the trier of fact. (See Diamond
Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructors (1971)16
Cal.App.3d 581, 604 [trial court has discretionary authority over
the scope of rebuttal testimony].)

C.    Denial of Postponement

      Plaintiff next contends that she was substantially
prejudiced by the arbitrator’s purported refusal to postpone the
arbitration to address her evidentiary concerns. According to

                                11
plaintiff, she established sufficient cause for a continuance of the
arbitration hearings and therefore was entitled to an order
vacating the arbitration award pursuant to section 1286.2,
subdivision (a)(5).

      1.    Background

       As noted, following the July 9, 2021, pre-arbitration
conference, plaintiff’s counsel e-mailed a letter to the arbitrator
expressing “concerns” and seeking “guidance and clarification . . .
in order to be able to fairly present [plaintiff’s] claim at time of
arbitration.” Specifically, counsel queried why defendant was
being allowed to call “two undisclosed forensic experts (who ha[d]
not so much as had their specialty identified)” and “one
undisclosed medical expert (who similarly ha[d] not been
identified in any capacity).” Counsel noted that defendant had
not responded to plaintiff’s request for exchange of expert
information and argued that defendant should not be permitted
to introduce its experts without plaintiff “having had an
opportunity to depose the same.” Counsel also requested a
hearing to determine the admissibility of the EDR data report
from her car, claiming that she had no opportunity to conduct
discovery concerning the report and arguing that it was therefore
subject to exclusion.
       Plaintiff’s counsel concluded the letter by requesting that
the arbitrator “hold a hearing as to the admissibility of any
documentary evidence . . . [and] to determine the appropriateness
of [defendant’s] undisclosed witnesses . . . .” Plaintiff did not,
however, request a continuance or postponement of the hearings

                                 12
set for July 12 and 13, 2021, or otherwise suggest that she was
unable to proceed on the scheduled dates.
       Defendant’s counsel responded to plaintiff’s letter in a
July 11, 2021, e-mail arguing, among other things, that (1) the
arbitrator ruled that “issues surrounding the EDR evidence
would be resolved during the hearing itself;” (2) plaintiff’s
demand for exchange of expert information was untimely and
there was no agreement concerning the exchange of expert
information; and (3) plaintiff was well aware of the identity of
two of defendant’s expert’s, namely, Dr. Rosenberg and Staab,
and the identity of its third expert, Miller, had not been disclosed
because plaintiff had refused to disclose at the pre-arbitration
conference the witnesses she intended to call.
       The arbitration hearing went forward as scheduled on
July 12, 2021, and the record contains no further information
concerning the evidentiary issues raised by plaintiff on
July 9, 2021.

      2.    Legal Principles

       “[S]ection 1286.2 . . . , subdivision (a), which sets forth
grounds for vacating an arbitration award, is an exception to the
general rule precluding judicial review. Section 1286.2,
subdivision (a)(5) requires a court to vacate an arbitration award
when a postponement request supported by sufficient cause is
refused and the moving party suffers substantial prejudice.
Section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), states, ‘[T]he court shall vacate
the award if the court determines any of the following: [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by
the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon

                                 13
sufficient cause being shown therefor . . . .’ The Courts of Appeal
have held, ‘[Section 1268.2, subdivision (a)(5), is] a safety valve in
private arbitration that permits a court to intercede when an
arbitrator has prevented a party from fairly presenting its case.’
[Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶]
       “[T]he decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the
first instance with the arbitrator. . . . [S]ection 1282.2 provides,
‘Unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides, or unless
the parties to the arbitration otherwise provide by an agreement
which is not contrary to the arbitration agreement as made or as
modified by all the parties thereto: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) The neutral
arbitrator may adjourn the hearing from time to time as
necessary. On request of a party to the arbitration for good
cause, or upon his own determination, the neutral arbitrator may
postpone the hearing to a time not later than the date fixed by
the agreement for making the award, or to a later date if the
parties to the arbitration consent thereto.’ (Italics added.) The
word ‘may’ is permissive rather than mandatory. [Citations.]”
(SWAB Financial, LLC v. E*Trade Securities, LLC (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1196–1197.)

      3.    Analysis

       Plaintiff’s contention that she demonstrated sufficient
cause for a postponement of the hearings is unsupported by the
record. As she concedes, “the [trial] court was limited in its
ability to evaluate [the sufficient cause] issues . . . .” Although
she attributes the problems with the evidentiary record to the
lack of a reporter, she ignores that her own evidence suggests
that she did not request a postponement of the hearings

                                 14
scheduled to commence on July12, 2021. Instead, in plaintiff’s
letter, she requested “guidance” and a “preliminary hearing” on
evidentiary issues initially raised at the July 9 pre-arbitration
conference. She did not state or imply that she was not prepared
to proceed on July 12, or otherwise request a postponement of the
proceedings pending the outcome of the requested evidentiary
hearing. And, as the trial court found, the arbitrator ruled on
some, if not all, of her issues, either at the pre-arbitration
conference or during the hearings. That he may have ruled
against her on some issues, such as the exclusion of defendant’s
forensic experts and the introduction of the EDR data, was not
sufficient cause to continue the hearings.
       Moreover, to the extent her July 9, 2021, letter could be
construed as a request for a continuance to take the depositions
of plaintiff’s experts and conduct other accident reconstruction
discovery,5 she failed to explain why the need for such
depositions and other discovery had not been addressed earlier in
the proceedings. As defendant’s evidence showed, plaintiff
received the EDR report in May 2019, and she was thus aware of
Staab’s identity since at least that time. Similarly, she received
Dr. Rosenberg’s IME report in November 2020 and therefore had
adequate time prior to the July hearing dates to conduct
discovery on any issues raised by the facts or conclusions stated
in his report. And, it was undisputed that her request to

5      In her letter, plaintiff requested an evidentiary hearing on
the admissibility of the EDR data and stated that “[the] report
was generated by a person, and cannot be used in lieu of that
person, if at all qualified, to testify to the same. This is especially
true if [plaintiff] ha[d] no opportunity to depose such person with
sufficient time for the presentation of her [a]rbitration claim.”

                                  15
exchange expert information was sent less than a month prior to
the scheduled hearing dates, making it untimely under section
2034. Yet she provided no explanation for the tardiness of her
request, much less one that would have excused her failure to
discover the defense experts’ identities earlier.
      The trial court therefore did not err in concluding that the
arbitrator had adequately addressed plaintiff’s evidentiary
concerns.

D.    Denial of Court Reporter

       Plaintiff contends, as a preliminary matter, that the
arbitrator erred by relying on rule 3.824 in support of his refusal
to allow a court reporter, as that rule applies only in judicially
mandated arbitrations. She also contends that she had a right to
a reporter under section 1282.5 and that the arbitrator’s denial of
that right “reflected [his] failure to conduct a fair and impartial
hearing” in violation of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5).

      1.    Background

      At the outset of the arbitration hearings,6 the arbitrator
denied plaintiff’s request to have a certified shorthand reporter
transcribe the proceedings and “ordered that no recordings be

6     Plaintiff asserts, without citation to evidence, that the
arbitrator’s decision to deny her a court reporter was made at the
July 9, 2021, pre-arbitration conference. Her letter to the
arbitrator that day, however, fails to mention any request for a
court reporter or ruling on the issue.

                                 16
made other than by him at his option[,] . . . cit[ing] . . . rule
3.284(b)(3) as support.”

      2.     Legal Principles

       The arbitration proceeding here was commenced pursuant
to the agreement of the parties. Such contract-based arbitrations
are governed by the contractual arbitration law, section 1280 et
seq. (Mercury Ins. Group v. Superior Court (1998) 19 Cal.4th
332, 342 (Mercury).) The right to a court reporter in those types
of arbitrations is delineated in section 1282.5, which provides, in
pertinent part: “(a) [¶] (1) A party to an arbitration has the
right to have a certified shorthand reporter transcribe any
deposition, proceeding, or hearing. The transcript shall be the
official record of the deposition, proceeding, or hearing. [¶]
(2) A party requesting a certified shorthand reporter shall make
his or her request in or at either of the following: [¶] . . . [¶]
(B) A pre-hearing scheduling conference at which a deposition,
proceeding, or hearing is being calendared. [¶] (b) If an
arbitration agreement does not provide for a certified shorthand
reporter, the party requesting the transcript shall incur the
expense of the certified shorthand reporter. . . . . [¶] (c) If an
arbitrator refuses to allow a party to have a certified shorthand
reporter transcribe any deposition, proceeding, or hearing
pursuant to this section, the party may petition the court for an
order to compel the arbitrator to grant the party’s request. The
petition may include a request for an order to stay any
deposition, proceeding, or hearing related to the arbitration
pending the court’s determination of the petition. [¶] (d) This
section does not add grounds for vacating an arbitration award

                                   17
pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1286.2 or for correcting an
arbitration award pursuant to Section 1286.6.”

      3.    Analysis

      To the extent the arbitrator relied on rule 3.824 as
authority for his refusal to allow a court reporter to transcribe
the proceedings, he erred as that rule applies only to judicial
arbitrations.7 But such erroneous legal decisions by arbitrator’s
are generally not reviewable on a petition to vacate. (Moncharsh,
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11.)
      Moreover, although the trial court mentioned rule 3.824 in
denying the petition on the court reporter issue, it did not base its
decision on that rule. Instead, it concluded that plaintiff had not
demonstrated substantial prejudice from the arbitrator’s ruling;

7      In judicial arbitrations—governed by section 1141.10 et
seq., as implemented by rule 3.810 et seq. (see Mercury, supra, 19
Cal.4th at p. 343)—the right to a court reporter is set forth in
rule 3.824(b), which provides: “(b) Record of proceedings [¶]
(1) Arbitrator’s record The arbitrator may, but is not required
to, make a record of the proceedings. [¶] (2) Record not
subject to discovery Any records of the proceedings made by
or at the direction of the arbitrator are deemed the arbitrator’s
personal notes and are not subject to discovery, and the
arbitrator must not deliver them to any party to the case or to
any other person, except to an employee using the records under
the arbitrator’s supervision or pursuant to a subpoena issued in a
criminal investigation or prosecution for perjury. [¶]
(3) No other record No other record may be made, and the
arbitrator must not permit the presence of a stenographer or
court reporter or the use of any recording device at the hearing,
except as expressly permitted by (1).”

                                 18
it cited rule 3.824 on the separate issue of whether the arbitrator
committed misconduct by making an audio recording of the
proceeding.
        To the extent plaintiff maintains that the refusal to allow a
court reporter demonstrated arbitrator bias sufficient to warrant
vacatur under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), her challenge is
unavailing. As explained in subdivision (d) of section 1282.5, an
arbitrator’s violation of that section does not create an additional
ground for vacating the award under section 1286.2. Instead, the
remedy for an arbitrator’s refusal to allow a court reporter is the
right to seek a court order under subdivision (d) staying the
arbitration and compelling the arbitrator to grant the request, an
order that plaintiff failed to seek here. Moreover, plaintiff did not
submit any evidence in the trial court to suggest that the
recitation of the arbitration proceedings in the award was
inaccurate, one-sided, or otherwise deviated substantially from
what actually transpired during those proceedings. Thus, the
denial of a reporter did not, by itself, show bias sufficient to
warrant vacating the award under section 1286.2, subdivision
(a)(5).

                                 19
                      IV.   DISPOSITION

     The order denying the petition to vacate the arbitration
award is affirmed. Defendant is awarded costs on appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                         KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             BAKER, J.

                               20