Court Opinion

ID: 9523442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:42:10.048236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:39.728400
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McNAMARA, dissenting: I agree with the majority that the trial court correctly concluded that defendant waived the condition precedent by closing on the contract. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reduce the damages awarded to plaintiff based on its finding that plaintiff’s efforts to relet the premises were unreasonable. In 1984, Illinois enacted a statute requiring a landlord or his agent to take reasonable measures to mitigate the damages recoverable against a defaulting lessee. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 9—213.1.) Prior to that time, however, including the period governing the action in this case, if a lessee abandoned or vacated the premises, the landlord was not necessarily required to mitigate by reletting the premises, absent a lease or contract provision so requiring. (Harmon v. Callahan (1919), 214 Ill. App. 104.) The overall trend was that there was no general obligation to mitigate but only a duty to accept a suitable subtenant when offered. (Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Hedges Manufacturing Co. (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 173, 414 N.E.2d 232; In re Estate of Conklin (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 426, 451 N.E.2d 1382.) The sublease between the parties in the present case required that plaintiff use “reasonable efforts” to relet. It further provided that the reletting would be “for such term and upon such conditions as Lessor in Lessor’s sole discretion shall determine.” I disagree with the majority that plaintiff’s obligation to relet was determined by anything more than the language of the sublease. I believe that plaintiff’s obligation herein arose solely under the lease provision requiring that it use reasonable efforts to relet. Harmon, the case relied on by the majority, does not impose a general duty of reasonableness to relet abandoned or vacated premises. Harmon clearly held that the facts of that case distinguished it from the general rule of no duty to mitigate and it was the express terms of the contract which bound the landlord to exercise reasonable diligence to relet the premises. Notably, the contract at issue in Harmon contained language similar to the contract in the present case retaining for the plaintiff the discretion to determine the rent, terms and other conditions of any reletting. Harmon did not discuss the effect of this reservation of discretion. The court in Harmon remanded because the averments made therein created issues of fact. Therefore, I find the Harmon decision to be of little value as an analogous case which would aid this court in determining the reasonableness of plaintiff’s efforts based on its obligation under the contract. The majority acknowledges that a reviewing court should not disturb a trial court’s finding and substitute its own decision unless the trial court’s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The rule that the findings of a trial court sitting without a jury will not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous has been applied by our supreme court to the assessment of damages. Schatz v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 143, 281 N.E.2d 323. As its standard of review, the majority states that to uphold a decision as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, it must be found that the trial court ignored the evidence or that its measure of damages was erroneous as a matter of law. Notably, neither case cited by the majority found that the trial court ignored the evidence or error in the measure of damages as a matter of law. Vee See Construction Co. v. Luckett (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 444, 430 N.E.2d 91; ABC Trans National Transport, Inc. v. Aeronautics Forwarders, Inc. (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 817, 413 N.E.2d 1299. In the present case, I do not believe that the trial court ignored the evidence or that its measure of damages was erroneous as a matter of law. Conversely, I believe that the trial court’s award of damages is amply supported by the evidence. Plaintiff gained possession of the warehouses on July 2, 1980. Plaintiff began its efforts to relet in advance of possession. Plaintiff secured a broker and sought higher rental rates upon the recommendation and advice of this broker. The Kostner Avenue warehouse was relet to the first serious prospect at almost the identical rate defendant was to have paid. Plaintiff’s 73rd Street warehouse was partially rented two months after plaintiff regained possession of the building. Plaintiff ultimately negotiated a long-term lease for the 73rd Street warehouse with the first suitable prospective tenant it found. Plaintiff agreed to a rental rate for the first 11 months that was less than the rate defendant was to have paid. Furthermore, defendant never offered plaintiff a prospective sublessee, an alternative clearly contemplated by the sublease. Pursuant to its sublease with defendant, plaintiff was precluded from unreasonably refusing a sublessee offered by defendant. Defendant maintains that plaintiff’s failure to accept a proposal from Couzens for rental of the 73rd Street warehouse was a clear failure of plaintiff’s duty to mitigate. While the price per square foot offered by Couzens would have greatly reduced the damages available against defendant, plaintiff was not unreasonable in rejecting the proposal. The proposal from Couzens offered lower rates than defendant was to pay for the first two years of the sublease. The Couzens proposal also differed from defendant’s terms in respect to the duration of the lease, certain options and the assumption of obligations. While Couzens was never offered the exact terms of defendant’s lease, the lease which bound plaintiff to act reasonably also gave plaintiff discretion in determining terms and conditions of a sublease. The trial court was entitled to find that plaintiff’s decision not to accept Couzen’s proposal was a reasonable one. The majority relies on several cases from other jurisdictions where landlords’ efforts to mitigate were found unreasonable based upon attempts by these landlords to relet at rental rates higher than those to have been paid by the breaching tenants. In the present case, the rental rates sought by plaintiff after taking possession of the warehouses were based upon the recommendation of its real estate broker. Furthermore, the subleases actually acquired by plaintiff were for rates very close to the rates defendant was to have paid. Plaintiff sought the best rate in the shortest time possible and, as the trial court found, such efforts cannot be said to be unreasonable. I therefore find the cases relied upon by the majority to be unpersuasive. Based on the evidence, I cannot say that the trial court ignored the evidence or that its measure of damages was erroneous as a matter of law. Nor can I say that the decision of the trial court finding plaintiff’s efforts to relet were reasonable was against the manifest weight of the evidence. I would affirm the trial court’s award of damages.