Court Opinion

ID: 9499308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:44:13.357574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:24.815353
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion in all respects save its importation (in dicta) into the Immigration and Nationality Act of concepts having their basis in the First Amendment jurisprudence applicable to public employees. Thus, the majority cites dicta in Musabelliu v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 991 (7th Cir.2006), for the proposition that political opinions expressed in the course of an alien’s official duties are not to be considered in connection with persecution and *1092hence eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal under the Act. See Majority Op. at 1089, citing Musabelliu, 442 F.3d at 996. The Musabelliu court noted that it was an “open question” whether the First Amendment protects public employees in the United States when they speak as part of their duties — a question since closed in part by Garcetti v. Ceballos, — U.S.-, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006)— and found it “implausible” to grant asylum to aliens persecuted for speech “near the outer limit of the first amendment’s coverage.” Musabelliu, 442 F.3d at 996 (citing to and discussing Garcetti, then awaiting decision by the Supreme Court).
It seems to me that this importation of our First Amendment’s “extra-employment” condition for protection of speech into the Immigration and Nationality Act’s conditions for asylum and withholding of removal ignores the plain language of the Act’s relevant provisions, which require only that “the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened ... because of the alien’s political opinion,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding of removal), or that the alien face “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of ... political opinion,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (asylum). This language does not require any expression of opinion, only the holding of one, and it certainly does not exclude from the Attorney General’s consideration any specific type of expression, such as speech pursuant to a public employee’s official duties.
Besides these plain statutory requirements, the concerns shaping the First Amendment rights of public employees are unlike the policies underlying asylum and withholding of removal. The First Amendment attempts to balance the societal value of a government employee’s speech on matters of public concern against the government’s interest in controlling the conduct of its employees. Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960. The Immigration and Nationality Act’s asylum provisions, by contrast, are designed to protect aliens against not just any sanction, but persecution on account of their political opinions, a sanction more severe than any public employee is likely to face in the United States. See, e.g., Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573-74 (7th Cir.2003) (upholding a Board determination that detaining a person for three days without food and beating him until his face swelled was not severe enough to constitute persecution). The Act is not motivated by a desire to fine-tune the balance between informed public debate and the efficient provision of public services in foreign nations, but by the belief that severe persecution on account of a political opinion is wrong and that those unfortunate enough to be subjected to it should be sheltered. Given the difference in goal, it is not surprising that the statute should protect some individuals who express their political opinions in ways that would not be protected by the First Amendment if performed in the United States. Even within our borders, a “powerful network of legislative enactments” extends the Constitution’s minimum protection of politically charged speech. Garcetti 126 S.Ct. at 1962. The Immigration Act’s political asylum provisions similarly extend that protection.
It is true that, in general, asylum applicants who have not expressed their political opinions in classically political activities, such as public political campaigns or newspaper articles, may find it more difficult as a practical evidentiary matter to prove that any persecution directed at them was motivated by their political opinions. See Majority Op. at 1089, citing *1093Musabelliu, 442 F.3d at 995; see also Marquez v. INS, 105 F.3d 374, 381 (7th Cir.1997). But in some situations, an applicant’s conduct of her public duties may carry an obvious political implication that invites persecution. See, e.g., Bace v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that persecution of an election commissioner for failure to certify an election was on account of a political opinion); Chouchkov v. INS, 220 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that persecution of a Russian atomic energy agency employee for objecting within the agency to the agency’s sale of materials to Iran was on account of a political opinion); Reyes-Guerrero v. INS, 192 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that persecution of a public prosecutor for investigating corruption by members of a rival political party was on account of a political opinion).
For these reasons, as to Pavlyk’s political opinion claim, I would rely only on the Board’s factual determination that Pavlyk was not threatened because of his political opinion — a finding that is supported by substantial evidence.