Court Opinion

ID: 9670704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:24:26.14016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:05.998737
License: Public Domain

Marilyn Kelly, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached in this case. However, in contrast to my colleagues, I am not persuaded that an attractive nuisance exception to a defense of governmental immunity can never exist in this state.
First, our Supreme Court has not ruled definitively that the doctrine of attractive nuisance does not constitute an exception to governmental immunity. See Taylor v Detroit, 182 Mich App 583, 589; 452 NW2d 826 (1989). Second, I believe the majority overstates the correct test for making such a determination when it says: "The question is whether the claimed exception was recognized clearly in authoritative Michigan case law,” ante, p 49, before July 1, 1965, citing Li v Feldt (After Second Remand), 439 Mich 457, 468; 487 NW2d 127 (1992) (Li II).
The historical analysis of common law causes preserved in the face of the governmental immunity statute was developed in Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139, 146-149; 422 NW2d 205 (1988). In Hadfield, six justices agreed that the Legislature intended to codify common law exceptions to governmental immunity. Li v Feldt (After Remand), 434 Mich 584, 591, n 7; 456 NW2d 55 (1990). However, a vast difference exists between conducting an historical analysis to deter*53mine which causes existed before July 1, 19651 and applying the absolute test articulated by the Li II plurality and adopted here.
In my estimation, an historical analysis of the cases dealing with the question of attractive nuisance does not conclude that an exception to governmental immunity could never exist. Admittedly, in the oldest case, our Supreme Court concluded that a swimming pond in a public park was not to be classed as a dangerous or attractive nuisance. Heino v Grand Rapids, 202 Mich 363, 370; 168 NW 512 (1918). However, the conclusion in Heino that the pond was not an attractive nuisance did not unequivocally rule out the possibility that attractive nuisances could exist on governmental property. Furthermore, in both Lyshak v Detroit2 and Swanson v Marquette,3 our Supreme Court did not specifically conclude that an attractive nuisance exception to governmental immunity could never be sustained.
Therefore, I do not believe that an attractive nuisance cause of action was as clearly rejected by our Courts before 1965 as the majority concludes. I think the correct analysis in cases such as this was aptly expressed by Justice Archer when he wrote:
[I]t is important to focus on the responsibility of government for its actions or omissions, not its immunity from liability. This requires the conclusion that the Legislature did intend that case law continue to be developed in this area to address policy-based governmental liability which may be at issue in future cases. [Hadfield, p 215, Archer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.]
While I agree that plaintiff has no attractive nuisance claim, I would not hold that a cause of *54action for attractive nuisance can never survive the defense of governmental immunity.

 The effective date of MCL 691.1407(1); MSA 3.996(107)(1).

 351 Mich 230; 88 NW2d 596 (1958).

 357 Mich 424; 98 NW2d 574 (1959).