Court Opinion

ID: 9902438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:06:48.131626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:51.394919
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2200-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BERNARD HUGHIE, a/k/a
ISAIAH GIBBONS, and ISSAI
GIBBONS,

     Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________

                   Argued September 27, 2023 – Decided November 27, 2023

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 19-01-
                   0146.

                   Alecia N. Woodard, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
                   cause for appellant (Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth
                   County Prosecutor, attorney; Alecia N. Woodard, of
                   counsel and on the brief).

                   Zachary G. Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public
                   Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E.
            Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Elizabeth C. Jarit,
            Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      The State appeals from the February 23, 2022, Law Division order

granting defendant's motion for admission to Recovery Court, notwithstanding

the State's legal rejection, and thereafter sentencing defendant to Recovery

Court Probation under Track Two for a term of five years by way of a March

23, 2022, judgment of conviction (JOC).1       The State argues that because

defendant was facing discretionary extended term sentencing as a persistent

offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), a presumption of imprisonment applied,

rendering defendant ineligible for sentencing as a Track Two applicant and

resulting in the imposition of an illegal sentence. We hold that defendant's

sentence is not illegal and "[b]ecause the State has no authority to appeal from

a legal third-degree sentence, we dismiss the appeal." State v. Thomas, 459 N.J.

Super. 426, 430 (App. Div. 2019).

1
   Effective January 1, 2022, the Drug Court Program was renamed the New
Jersey Recovery Court Program to better reflect the primary goal of the program.
Admin. Off. of the Cts., Notice: Drug Court Name Change to New Jersey
Recovery Court (December 28, 2021). For clarity, throughout this opinion, we
refer only to Recovery Court despite various references to Drug Court in the
record.

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      In January 2019, defendant was indicted on one count of third-degree theft

by deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4, and convicted following a jury trial. The

conviction stemmed from evidence that in July 2018, defendant duped a

vulnerable resident of a residential healthcare facility into giving him rent

totaling $5,380 withdrawn from the resident's bank account. Prior to sentencing,

the State filed a motion for an extended term, asserting that defendant qualified

as a persistent offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). While the State's

motion was pending, defendant submitted an application to Recovery Court,

which the State opposed on the ground that it was seeking an extended term

sentence that would render defendant ineligible under Track Two and defendant

was not legally eligible as a Track One applicant.

      In an order entered on March 26, 2021, the trial judge granted the State's

motion. In an oral opinion, the judge found that defendant qualified as a

persistent offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) based on his "criminal history

dating back to 1996." Specifically, the judge stated:

                  [Defendant's] list of convictions are as follows.
            On January [10], 1996, defendant pled guilty to the
            second[-]degree crime of aggravated assault and was
            ultimately sentenced on a violation of probation to
            seven years New Jersey State Prison on February [27],
            1998[,] to run concurrent to his Passaic County robbery
            conviction.

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                    On December [8], 1997[,] in Passaic County,
              defendant pled guilty to the second[-]degree crime of
              robbery and was subsequently sentenced to seven years
              in New Jersey State Prison on February [13], 1998.
              Again, these matters ran concurrent to each other.

                     On March [28], 2005, defendant pled guilty to
              [thirteen] counts of the . . . crime of burglary,
              third[-]degree offenses, and one count of third[-]degree
              criminal attempted burglary. On July [8], 2005,
              defendant was sentenced to a five-year term of
              incarceration with an [eighteen]-month period of parole
              ineligibility.

                      On August [27], 2012, defendant pled guilty to a
              third[-]degree crime of burglary and a third[-]degree
              crime of receiving stolen property and was
              subsequently sentenced to three years in prison
              on . . . those two offenses.            He had two
              different . . . crime dates, but sentenced on the same
              day to three years in state prison on October [19], 2012.

                    At the time of the commission of . . . this crime,
              defendant was [twenty-one] years of age or older, had
              been previously convicted on at least two separate
              occasions of two crimes, committed at different times
              when he was at least [eighteen] years of age. . . . [2]

                    Further, because of the date of defendant's last
              release from confinement, it's within ten years of the
              date of the crime for which defendant is being
              sentenced. All of the requirements of [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
              3(a)] have been met.

2
    Defendant was then fifty-five years old.
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                                         4
      Although the judge granted the State's motion, he made no determination

on whether defendant would be sentenced in the extended term range because

defendant's Recovery Court appeal was still pending. In fact, the judge noted

he could grant the State's motion for extended term sentencing "and then not

apply it" depending on the court's evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating

factors. The judge stressed the determination that defendant "[met] the statutory

requirements" did not mean that defendant had to be sentenced in the extended

term range. "It also [did] not mean that . . . defendant would not get [into

Recovery Court]."

      On February 23, 2022, the Recovery Court judge granted defendant's

motion to be admitted to Recovery Court notwithstanding the State's legal

rejection. See State v. Figaro, 462 N.J. Super. 564, 577 (App. Div. 2020) ("A

drug court prosecutor can recommend a legal rejection based on N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

14 and whether the applicant is a potential danger to the community." (emphasis

omitted) (quoting Admin. Off. of the Cts., Admin. Directive #2-02, Manual for

Operation of Adult Drug Courts in New Jersey (July 22, 2002))). On March 17,

2022, over the State's objection, the judge sentenced defendant to Recovery

Court Probation under Track Two for five years. The judge found aggravating

factors three, six, and nine based on defendant's high risk of re-offense,

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                                       5
extensive prior criminal record, and need for deterrence, and mitigating factor

ten based on defendant's likelihood to respond affirmatively to probationary

treatment. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), (9), (b)(10). A conforming JOC was

entered on March 23, 2022, and this appeal followed.

      On appeal, the State raises the following single point for our

consideration:

             THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FINDING
             THAT DEFENDANT IS A TRACK TWO DRUG
             APPLICANT.

      "Because the appealability of a sentence is a question of law, our review

is de novo." State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 143 (2019) (citing Manalapan

Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). It is well

settled that "the State's right to appeal in a criminal proceeding is limited." Ibid.;

see R. 2:3-1(b) (delineating six circumstances in which the State may lodge an

appeal). "In the context of sentencing," the State "may appeal where there is

'express statutory authority' to do so," Hyland, 238 N.J. at 143 (quoting State v.

Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 343 (1984)), or "if the sentence imposed is illegal ," ibid.

(citing State v. Ciancaglini, 204 N.J. 597, 605 (2011)); see also R. 3:21-10(b)(5)

("A motion may be filed and an order may be entered at any time . . . correcting

a sentence not authorized by law including the Code of Criminal Justice.").

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      The issue here is whether the sentence imposed is illegal, thereby allowing

the State's appeal.

                    There are two categories of illegal sentences:
            those that exceed the penalties authorized for a
            particular offense, and those that are not authorized by
            law. State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 308 (2012).
            Those two categories of illegal sentences have been
            "defined narrowly." State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246
            (2000). For example, while a sentence may be illegal
            if "it fails to satisfy required presentencing conditions,"
            id. at 247, it is not illegal if the sentencing judge fails
            to state the reasons for imposition of a sentence on the
            record as is required by case law, but otherwise imposes
            an authorized sentence, [State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40,
            47 (2011)]. In other words, even sentences that
            disregard controlling case law or rest on an abuse of
            discretion by the sentencing court are legal so long as
            they impose penalties authorized by statute for a
            particular offense and include a disposition that is
            authorized by law.

            [Hyland, 238 N.J. at 145-146.]

      The sentence at issue falls under the purview of Recovery Court. By way

of background, "there are two separate and distinct 'tracks' for admission to

[Recovery] Court." State v. Harris, 466 N.J. Super. 502, 523 (2021) (quoting

Figaro, 462 N.J. Super. at 566). "Track One is available to those eligible for

special probation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a), and who otherwise satisfy

the statutory criteria." Figaro, 462 N.J. Super. at 566. To satisfy the statutory

criteria, offenders must be "ineligible for probation due to a conviction for a

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                                        7
crime which is subject to a presumption of incarceration or a mandatory

minimum period of parole ineligibility" and cannot have been previously

convicted of certain disqualifying offenses. Id. at 572 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

14(a)).

      "Track Two 'permits applicants to be admitted into [Recovery] Court

"under the general sentencing provisions of the Code of Criminal Justice."'" Id.

at 566 (quoting State v. Clarke, 203 N.J. 166, 175 (2010)). Specifically, those

defendants may be admitted "pursuant to the statutory authority of the court to

impose a probationary sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1." Harris, 466 N.J.

Super. at 525. "N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1 is sometimes referred to as 'regular' probation

as distinct from 'special probation' authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14." Ibid.

"Eligibility for entry into [Recovery] Court via Track Two thus does not hinge

on satisfying the nine specified prerequisites for special probation enumerated

in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14." Ibid.

      Defendant is ineligible for Recovery Court under Track One, having been

previously convicted of a disqualifying crime—second-degree aggravated

assault. See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a)(7) (making ineligible for Recovery Court an

offender "previously convicted . . . for . . . murder, aggravated manslaughter,

manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault or

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                                       8
sexual assault"). The State asserts defendant is also ineligible for sentencing

under Track Two and that his sentence is thereby illegal because defendant "was

facing a presumption of imprisonment as a result of an extended term" and was

therefore not eligible for regular probation under N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1. However,

a person's mere eligibility for a discretionary extended term sentence on a third-

degree offense does not trigger the presumption of imprisonment to render an

offender ineligible for regular probation under Track Two.

      So long as the Code authorizes the imposition of a probationary sentence,

a judge may sentence an offender to Recovery Court under Track Two pursuant

to N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1. State v. Meyer, 192 N.J. 421, 433 (2007).

            The [Penal Code] gives a court various options in
            sentencing an offender, which include the imposition of
            a term of imprisonment or probation. See N.J.S.A.
            2C:43-2. If an offender has been convicted of a first-
            or second-degree crime, he is subject to a presumption
            of incarceration, which may only be overcome if the
            court "is of the opinion that . . . imprisonment would be
            a serious injustice which overrides the need to deter
            such conduct by others."            N.J.S.A. [2C:44-1(d)].
            Conversely, if a first-time offender is convicted of a
            crime other than one of the first or second degree, he is
            subject to a presumption of non-incarceration. N.J.S.A.
            [2C:44-1(e)]. If, as in this case, a defendant is
            convicted of third- and fourth-degree crimes, but has a
            prior record, he is not subject to either presumption.
            See State v. Pineda, 119 N.J. 621, 622-23 (1990).
            When that occurs, the sentencing court "must weigh the
            aggravating and mitigating factors" enumerated in

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                                        9
            N.J.S.A. [2C:44-1(a) and (b)] "to determine whether a
            probationary or custodial sentence is appropriate."
            State v. Baylass, 114 N.J. 169, 173 (1989).

            [Meyer, 192 N.J. at 433 n.5.]

      "A defendant is not subject to the presumption of imprisonment because

he or she was previously convicted of a first or second-degree crime." Harris,

466 N.J. Super. at 534-35 (emphasis omitted). "[T]he Legislature knew how to

use prior convictions as a trigger for the presumption but did so only with respect

to repeat automobile theft offenders." Id. at 535.

            We recognize that as a practical matter, a defendant's
            prior convictions or past incarceration in state prison
            may make it unlikely that a court in the exercise of its
            discretion would sentence him to probation after
            applying the pertinent aggravating and mitigating
            factors . . . . We emphasize, however, that it would put
            the cart before the horse to suggest that the practical
            likelihood of a prison sentence triggers the presumption
            of imprisonment defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) and
            incorporated by reference in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(a).

            [Id. at 535-536.]

      N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) applies the presumption of incarceration based upon

the degree of the crime for which the defendant stands convicted. Indeed, "[t]he

plain language" of the provision indicates that the presumption "is to be

determined not by the sentence imposed but by the offense for which a defendant

is convicted." State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 404-05 (1987); see State v.

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                                       10
Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 388 (2003) (quoting O'Connor, 105 N.J. at 404-05). That

said, contrary to the State's contention, the mere prospect of a discretionary

extended term sentence based on the offender's eligibility does not trigger the

presumption of imprisonment. No provision in the Code dictates such a result.

Instead, it is the degree of the underlying offense, rather than the alteration t o

the sentencing range, that controls whether the presumption of imprisonment

attaches.

      In fact,

            the range of sentences, available for imposition, starts
            at the minimum of the ordinary-term range and ends at
            the maximum of the extended-term range.              By
            recognizing that the top of the extended-term range is
            the "top" applicable to a persistent offender, we do not
            make mandatory a defendant's sentencing within the
            enhanced range. Rather, we merely acknowledge that
            the permissible range has expanded so that it reaches
            from the bottom of the original-term range to the top of
            the extended-term range. Where, within that range of
            sentences, the court chooses to sentence a defendant
            remains in the sound judgment of the court—subject to
            reasonableness and the existence of credible evidence
            in the record to support the court's finding of
            aggravating and mitigating factors and the court's
            weighing and balancing of those factors found.

            [State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 169 (2006).]

      It is undisputed that defendant was convicted of a third-degree offense and

his eligibility for extended term sentencing does not alter that fact. It merely

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                                       11
signifies that his permissible sentencing range is from three to ten years'

imprisonment.    See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(3), -7(a)(4).      Although his prior

criminal record makes him ineligible for the presumption of non-incarceration,

it does not make him subject to the presumption of incarceration. Instead, he is

subject to neither presumption. Nonetheless, subject to the weighing of the

aggravating and mitigating factors, the Code authorizes the imposition of a

probationary sentence on a third-degree conviction, as occurred here.        See

N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1, :43-2(b)(2).     "In general terms, a regular probationary

sentence is typically imposed for third- or fourth-degree offenses, which do not

contain a specific provision requiring a state prison sentence." State v. Maurer,

438 N.J. Super. 402, 411 (App. Div. 2014). Defendant's enhanced sentencing

range permitted a state prison sentence, it did not require it.     Because the

sentence to Recovery Court Probation under Track Two is an authorized

disposition under the Code, it is not an illegal sentence. Thus, "we have no

jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal of defendant's . . . [Recovery] Court

sentence." Hyland, 238 N.J. at 148.

      The appeal is dismissed.

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