Court Opinion

ID: 9826035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:14:57.357704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:48.146037
License: Public Domain

Petition for a rehearing denied by the following Per Curiam order, filed March 18, 1904:
5 None of the appellants’ exceptions were overlooked in the decision of this cause, and, therefore, the petition for a rehearing is refused.
*2426 *241The 15th exception assigns error to the Circuit Judge, “in *242not holding that, under the laws of this State, when a member of a building and loan association borrows money from the association, and pledges his stock as security for the loan, he thereby ceases practically to> be a member of the association, and his relation theretoi becomes that of borrower to lender; and in not finding under this rule, that if the contract is not usurious, the association can recover only the balance of the principal, with legal interest; and that if the contract is usurious, it can recover only the balance of principal due, without interest, cost or attorneys’ fees.”
No special allusion was made to this exception, because it seemed to be covered by tire principle controlling the opinion. It is not denied that in ascertaining the amount due, the Circuit Judg'e followed precisely the terms of the contract made by the parties themselves. The Court held that the law of Virginia was to be applied to the contract, and that the law of Virginia was presumed toi be the common law. Under the common law, a contract must be enforced according to its terms.
The defendants expressly agreed in the bond and mortgage that they would pay the amount found by the Circuit Judge, and that they would remain members of the association, as well as borrowers from it. The Court could not substitute another contract, making them liable for the amount they received, and interest on it at the South Carolina rate.
In Association v. Holland, 65 S. C., 448, upon which defendants rely, it does not appear that the contract was made with reference to the laws of another State. In Bird v. Kendall, 62 S. C., 178, 40 S. E., 142, which was held to be a Georgia contract, the contract was enforced according to its terms. See McIlwaine v. Ellington, 55 L. R. A., 933, and notes.
*2437 *242The 16th exception charges that the Circuit Judge “erred in allowing ten per cent, attorneys’ fees, for the reason that the contract, being usurious, attorneys’ fees cannot be col*243lected.” As to the application for a rehearing on this exception, it is only necessary to say that by the terms of the bond and mortgage, the mortgagors obligated to well and truly pay “all fees, costs, and expenses to or for which said association may become subject or liable by reason of any litigation touching this transaction.” This exception was based on the charge of usury, and fell with it. When it was held that there was no usury in this contract, it seemed to the Court to follow, without special allusion to the subject, that the attorneys’ fees growing out of this litigation must be paid. The Circuit Judge, with all the pleadings, testimony and facts before him, fixed the attorneys’ fee, .and there was no exception as to the reasonableness of the amount allowed.
It is manifest that the Court could not admit such part of the testimony as to the law of Virginia as would be favorable to the appellant and exclude the remainder. It must all be admitted or all excluded. The defendants’ exceptions can bear no other interpretation than that they urged upon this Court the entire statute law of Virginia upon this subject should be excluded, and the defendants cannot complain that this position was sustained.
It is ordered, that this petition be dismissed, and that the stay of the remittitur heretofore granted be revoked.