Court Opinion

ID: 9710118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:02:25.351014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.365045
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JOHNSON, specially concurring: I agree with the majority that defendant’s convictions should be affirmed. I write separately, however, to address defendant’s sentence, which I consider to be both undeniably excessive and unjustified by any reasonable view which might be taken of the record. The Illinois Constitution dictates that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11.) Both this constitutional mandate and our State’s fundamental law require a trial court to consider a defendant’s rehabilitative potential when imposing a sentence, and to act on it as an objective of his sentence. (People v. Treadway (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904.) Therefore, I submit that trial courts must consider a defendant’s rehabilitative potential and make it an objective of the sentence to be imposed even in cases where, as here, consecutive sentences are required. In the present case, I am persuaded by the cumulative effect of defendant’s sentence that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to comply with the constitutional mandate. I acknowledge that a trial court’s determination concerning sentencing matters is entitled to great weight. (See People v. Wesley (1993), 250 Ill. App. 3d 245, 264.) However, the presumption that a sentence is proper may be overcome by an affirmative showing that the sentence imposed greatly departs from the spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly contrary to constitutional guidelines. People v. Boclair (1992), 225 Ill. App. 3d 331, 335. After reviewing the record in this case, I am strongly convinced that the cumulative effect of defendant’s sentence manifests the trial court’s obvious indifference to his rehabilitative potential. As the majority notes, defendant was 34 years old at the time of the offense, was employed, and had no prior convictions. Given this evidence, I believe that the trial court’s impermissible apathy toward defendant’s rehabilitative potential was made manifest by the imposition of a virtual life sentence. Consequently, the trial court’s imposition of a 100-year prison term ran afoul of the constitutional directive that rehabilitation be an actual objective of the sentence. In People v. Harris (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 832, this court vacated the defendant’s 25-year sentence in an aggravated criminal sexual assault case, reasoning that a reduced sentence would "allow defendant at least the possibility of being restored to a meaningful, productive life, and at the same time will be adequate retribution for his offenses, provide protection for society, and serve as a deterrent.” (Harris, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 847.) Just as a trial court must consider the seriousness of the crime when imposing a sentence, the defendant’s rehabilitative potential is a significant factor and it must also be given adequate consideration. (See People v. Donald (1991), 222 Ill. App. 3d 794.) Therefore, without any reservation, I agree with the majority that the cause be remanded for resentencing.