Court Opinion

ID: 9889248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-07 00:00:35.639184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:39.302462
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20430     Document: 00516923819         Page: 1   Date Filed: 10/06/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                FILED
                                                                      October 6, 2023
                                 No. 22-20430                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                Clerk

   In the Matter of Imperial Petroleum Recovery
   Corporation,

                                                                      Debtor,

   Don B. Carmichael; KK & PK Family, L.P.; Barry D.
   Winston; Gary Emmott,

                                                                   Appellants,

                                       versus

   Thomas Balke; TEBJES, Incorporated; Ultrawave
   Technology for Emulsion Control,

                                                                    Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:21-CV-2904
                  ______________________________

   Before Ho, Oldham, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
          This appeal arises from an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy. We
   affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Case: 22-20430        Document: 00516923819              Page: 2      Date Filed: 10/06/2023

                                         No. 22-20430

                                               I.
           This litigation stems from the bankruptcy of Imperial Petroleum
   Recovery Corporation (“IPRC”). IPRC once marketed microwave
   separation technology (“MST”) machines, which purported to recover
   usable oil from various emulsions. The Carmichael parties1 held security
   interests in IPRC’s assets—including its MST units.
           In January 2013, the Carmichaels filed an involuntary Chapter 7
   liquidation proceeding against IPRC. In July 2014, the Chapter 7 trustee
   assigned IPRC’s assets to the Carmichaels. In August 2014, the Carmichaels
   sought physical possession of the assigned assets.
           The Carmichaels expected to recover, among other things, two
   “MST-1000” units. The “MST-1000” was a large, skid-mounted machine.
   IPRC had previously manufactured and sold at least one of them. And in
   2011, Thomas Balke and his company Basic Equipment2 signed a
   memorandum of understanding with IPRC to make additional MST units.
           But the Carmichaels did not receive two MST-1000s. Instead, the
   Balke parties sent them a single, partially disassembled, and damaged MST
   unit and some spare parts. The Carmichaels suspected the Balke parties of
   bad faith.
           In December 2014, the Carmichaels filed this adversary proceeding
   against the Balkes in the bankruptcy court. They alleged the Balkes had
   converted IPRC’s physical assets and pilfered its intellectual property, all in
   violation of the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (providing that an
           _____________________
           1
           Unless context indicates otherwise, we refer to the appellants collectively as “the
   Carmichael parties” or “the Carmichaels.”
           2
            Unless context indicates otherwise, we refer to the appellees collectively as “the
   Balke parties” or “the Balkes.”

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   individual injured by willful violation of an automatic stay may seek
   damages).
          In September 2017, after three years of litigation, Bankruptcy Judge
   Bohm issued an 82-page memorandum opinion delivering a near-complete
   victory to the Carmichaels. He found that Balke had stolen one MST unit
   and largely destroyed another. He also determined that Balke had founded a
   competitor to IPRC, “Ultratec,” using technology looted from IPRC, and
   that Balke lied on the stand. So Judge Bohm awarded the Carmichaels $1.958
   million in actual damages and $326,000 in attorneys’ fees and other costs and
   ordered that post-judgment interest accrue on these amounts until paid. And
   he ordered the Balke parties to turn over to the Carmichael parties the
   missing (and allegedly converted) IPRC property.
          The Balkes filed various post-trial motions and eventually appealed to
   the district court. While the appeal was pending, Judge Bohm retired, so the
   case was reassigned to Bankruptcy Judge Isgur. In a post-trial hearing, Judge
   Isgur commented that the Balke parties raised a “substantial issue” within
   the meaning of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8008(a). Judge
   Isgur’s remark prompted the district court to remand the case. See Balke v.
   Carmichael, 2020 WL 10897509 (S.D. Tex. Jun. 24, 2020).
          In 2021, on remand, Judge Isgur issued a memorandum opinion with
   new findings. After additional motion practice and still more litigation, he
   issued a final opinion and an amended judgment. The amended judgment cut
   the actual damages owed to the Carmichaels to $4,000, cut the fee and cost
   award to around $92,000, and made no provision for post-judgment interest.
   All told, the sum due to the Carmichael parties declined roughly 96%, from
   over $2.3 million to approximately $96,000. The Carmichaels appealed to
   the district court. The district court affirmed.

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          The Carmichaels timely appealed to us. We have jurisdiction to hear
   the Carmichaels’ continuing appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). The
   object of our review is not the district court’s opinion, but rather the
   bankruptcy court’s judgment. We review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions
   of law de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See In re Pratt, 524 F.3d
   580, 584 (5th Cir. 2008). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
   there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
   left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
   United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
                                          III.
          The Carmichaels raise a host of issues. We deal with them as follows:
   (A) We explain that the bankruptcy court’s factual findings related to the
   assigned assets were not clearly erroneous. (B) We explain that the district
   court’s damages award nevertheless rested on clearly erroneous factual
   findings. (C) We explain that the Carmichaels are entitled to post-judgment
   interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. (D) We dispose of the Carmichaels’
   contention that the bankruptcy court’s judgment did not provide adequate
   declaratory relief.
                                          A.
          The Carmichaels argue that because Judge Bohm did not make
   manifest errors of fact, Judge Isgur erred in reaching a different factual
   conclusion. We disagree.
          Judge Bohm found that IPRC possessed two MST units and delivered
   them to Balke for refurbishment. The Carmichaels later received only one
   dilapidated MST-1000 unit, partially disassembled by Balke, instead of two
   renovated ones as expected.

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          Judge Isgur did not disturb that factual finding. Rather, Judge Isgur
   found that IPRC delivered two different MST units to Balke. The first was
   an MST-1000; the second was a less-capable MST-150, which the parties call
   “the Brazil Unit,” and which IPRC cannibalized to maintain its only MST-
   1000 unit. In reaching this conclusion, he relied on the transcribed testimony
   of Ryan Boulware, IPRC’s only employee during the relevant period.
   Boulware discussed the Brazil Unit in an examination that occurred in
   November 2013, earlier in IPRC’s bankruptcy proceedings and before the
   onset of this adversary matter. We do not have a definite and firm conviction
   that Judge Isgur misread the evidence, including the Boulware transcript.
          The Carmichaels also contend that Judge Isgur erred in considering
   Boulware’s testimony at all because it was inadmissible. Judge Isgur admitted
   the evidence pursuant to the residual exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed.
   R. Evid. 807. Evidence can be admitted under the residual exception if it
   has adequate “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,” and our review
   is for abuse of discretion. United States v. Walker, 410 F.3d 754, 758 (5th Cir.
   2005). The Boulware examination was treated as a deposition, and the
   Carmichaels do not point to anything that might undermine the examination
   transcript’s reliability. On these facts, we cannot say Judge Isgur abused his
   discretion by admitting the transcript.
                                         B.
          Judge Isgur reduced the Carmichaels’ damages award because he
   found the Carmichaels had already received all that the Balke parties had to
   give them. On his account, the Carmichaels were entitled only to the cost of
   reassembly of the single, aging MST unit that Balke dismantled in violation
   of the automatic stay. The Carmichaels have failed to demonstrate that this
   premise was clearly erroneous, so we accept it.

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          But Judge Isgur did clearly err in his calculation of the cost of
   reassembly. He accepted Balke’s estimate that the cost of reassembly was
   two men working one day, and he accordingly awarded a commensurate
   amount—$4,000. Four years earlier, though, Balke contended the cost of
   reassembly was actually two men working two days. Moreover, the
   Carmichaels submitted photographic evidence demonstrating that the MST
   Balke returned to them suffered significant wear during disassembly. And
   emails from Ryan Boulware, the same individual that the Balkes relied on
   elsewhere in this proceeding, indicate that assembly of an MST unit might
   require a “forklift and operator,” an electrician, an engineer, a “refrigeration
   tech” and an “automation tech.” So the Carmichaels proffered evidence
   demonstrating that the cost of reassembly was significantly more than
   $4,000.
          Judge Isgur accepted the Balkes’ contention because he found that the
   Carmichaels’ estimates were not supported by a “sufficient factual
   foundation.” But it appears the bankruptcy court’s “sufficient factual
   foundation” standard elevated the burden of proof beyond preponderance.
   And preponderance is the correct standard for disputes over money in
   bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284–86
   (1991); In re Briscoe Enterprises II, 994 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1993); In re
   Johnson, 501 F.3d 1163, 1170−71 (10th Cir. 2007); In re Steed, 2023 WL
   3719006 (11th Cir. 2023) (per curiam).
          Applying a preponderance standard and viewing the record
   holistically, we are persuaded that the Carmichaels’ damages for reassembly
   exceed $4,000. But we do not attempt to specify the Carmichaels’
   reassembly damages here. Instead, we remand so that the bankruptcy court
   may consider the Carmichaels’ asserted damages under the correct standard
   of proof.

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                                          C.
          The Carmichaels next argue that bankruptcy court’s amended
   judgment should have provided for post-judgment interest, as the original
   judgment did. The amended judgment made no mention of interest at all. It
   simply stated that “all other relief is denied.” We hold that (1) post-judgment
   interest applies in bankruptcy adversary proceedings and (2) that interest
   accrues from the bankruptcy court’s original judgment.
                                          1.
          We have not previously considered the applicability of federal post-
   judgment interest in bankruptcy adversary proceedings. So we start, as
   always, with statutory text. The relevant provision is 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a),
   which says “interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case
   recovered in a district court.” (emphasis added). The text prompts two
   questions: (1) does the term “district court” cover the bankruptcy court for
   the purposes of § 1961? And (2) does the term “civil case” include
   bankruptcy adversary proceedings?
          First, we hold that § 1961(c)(4) applies to bankruptcy courts.
   Although the statute says “district court” and specifies that it does not
   “affect the interest on any judgment of any court not specified in this
   section,” Title 28 makes clear that bankruptcy courts exercise jurisdiction as
   part of and at the sufferance of supervising district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 151
   (“In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service
   shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court
   for that district.” (emphasis added)); id. § 1334 (“the district courts shall
   have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11”); id.
   § 157(a) (permitting a district court to refer Title 11 cases to the bankruptcy
   court). Since bankruptcy courts operate as arms of district courts, statutes

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   governing district courts generally apply to bankruptcy courts, and
   § 1961(c)(4) follows this general rule.
          Second, we hold that bankruptcy adversary proceedings are “civil.”
   Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001’s description of “adversary
   proceeding” includes quintessential civil actions—to “recover money or
   property,” to “determine the validity . . . of a lien,” to “obtain an
   injunction,” to “obtain a declaratory judgment.” Likewise, Title 28 suggests
   bankruptcy cases are civil, at least sometimes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (“all
   civil proceedings arising under title 11”) (emphasis added); id. § 1452
   (permitting removal of claims “in a civil action”) (emphasis added). Title 11
   also suggests overlap between bankruptcy and civil actions. See 11 U.S.C.
   § 108(c) (referencing “civil action”); id. § 110(j) (same); id. § 526(c)(5)(B)
   (referencing “civil” penalties); id. § 707(b) (same). Moreover, in Grogan, the
   Supreme Court treated a Title 11 dispute as a “civil action[]” governed by
   ordinary civil rules. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286.
          So we think the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1961 compels the conclusion that
   post-judgment interest applies to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy,
   except in cases where more specific provisions of Title 11 may control. And
   we are assured by the holdings of our sister circuits. See In re Riebesell, 586
   F.3d 782, 794 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Because a bankruptcy court is part of the
   district court, [§ 1961] applies to bankruptcy proceedings.” (quoting In re
   Pester Refin. Co., 964 F.2d 842, 849 (8th Cir. 1992)); In re Resyn Corp., 945
   F.2d 1279, 1284 (3d. Cir. 1991) (similar); see also In re Williams, 11 F. App’x
   344, 347 n.8 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting § 1961 applied in an
   adversary proceeding); see also Ocasek v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease
   Comp. Fund, 956 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that § 1961 applies
   generally in bankruptcy court, but applying Title 11’s more specific provision
   to the case); In re Celotex Corp., 613 F.3d 1318, 1320−23, 1322 n.3 (11th Cir.

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   2010) (agreeing that 28 U.S.C. § 1961 applies in bankruptcy court, but
   applying 11 U.S.C. §§ 524 and 1141’s more specific provisions).
          The Carmichaels are accordingly entitled to post-judgment interest
   under § 1961.
                                         2.
          Because the Carmichaels are entitled to post-judgment interest, we
   must decide when that interest began to accrue. The Supreme Court has held
   that post-judgment interest ordinarily runs “from the date of the entry of the
   judgment.” Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835
   (1990). This case features an original judgment in 2018 and an amended
   judgment in 2021, but Kaiser nevertheless dictates that the Carmichaels are
   entitled to post-judgment interest from the date of Judge Bohm’s original
   2018 judgment.
          That is for two reasons. First, this case does not feature multiple
   judgments but rather a single judgment—Judge Bohm’s 2018 judgment—
   later amended by Judge Isgur in 2021. Since the amended judgment is a
   continuation of the original judgment, we view them as a single entity for
   purposes of post-judgment interest.
          Second, the amended judgment did not disturb many of the factual
   findings supporting the original judgment—including the finding that Balke
   violated the automatic stay. And as we have explained, we affirm those
   findings today. So if we awarded interest only from 2021, the Carmichaels
   would receive no compensation for the portion of Judge Bohm’s judgment
   that survived Judge Isgur’s amendment and this appeal. That would
   contradict the whole point of post-judgment interest—to compensate a
   successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for losses incurred
   between the ascertainment of damage and payment by the defendant.”
   Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 835–36 (alteration and citation omitted).

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                                        D.
          Finally, the Carmichaels contend that the amended judgment fails to
   provide adequate declaratory relief. The Carmichaels worry primarily about
   IPRC’s intellectual property—property that Balke allegedly and wrongfully
   expropriated. That concern is understandable because the record features
   testimony from a patent lawyer hired by Balke for the purposes of copying
   IPRC’s innovations.
          But the bankruptcy court’s amended judgment addresses the issue. It
   provides that the Carmichaels “own all property transferred to them by the
   Trustee’s execution of the 2014 Assignment Agreement.” The bankruptcy
   court was referring to IPRC’s trustee’s July 2014 assignment to the
   Carmichaels, which included all the Debtor’s “documents,” “general
   intangibles,” “patents,” “patent applications,” “trademarks,” “software,
   writings, plans, specifications and schematics,” and “all recorded data of any
   kind or nature.” So to the extent IPRC had assignable intellectual property,
   it was assigned to the Carmichaels in 2014, and the bankruptcy court’s
   judgment respects that assignment. The Carmichaels do not explain what
   else they wanted the bankruptcy court to do.
                                        IV.
          The Balkes raise two issues of their own on appeal. We (A) reject the
   Balkes’ estoppel argument and (B) decline the Balkes’ suggestion that we
   sanction the Carmichaels.
                                        A.
          The Balkes argue that the Carmichaels, as successors to IPRC’s
   property interests, are estopped from claiming that IPRC’s property was
   worth more than the value IPRC assigned to it in the bankruptcy petition.
   They rely primarily on In re Galaz, 841 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2016), where we

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   affirmed a lower court’s discretionary choice to apply judicial estoppel. Id. at
   326. The estopped party had taken over the litigation interest of another who
   had asserted something plainly inconsistent with the position the estopped
   party wished to assert. Ibid.
          But we have never held that estoppel is an inexorable command. And
   the Supreme Court has explained that the propriety of applying estoppel is
   dictated by the “specific factual context[].” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532
   U.S. 742, 751 (2001). That is because judicial estoppel exists to “protect the
   integrity of the judicial process” from the misbehavior of litigants. Id. at 749
   (quotation omitted). Misbehavior, though, is not always predictable, so the
   “circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked
   are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle.” Id. at 750
   (quotation omitted).
          In this factual context, estoppel is inappropriate. The Carmichaels
   were under-secured creditors of IPRC. Their claims summed to around $4
   million, so they were under-secured no matter whether IPRC’s property was
   worth $2 million or nothing at all. The Carmichaels accordingly had no
   reason to litigate the value of IPRC’s property during the primary bankruptcy
   proceeding—they were going to get it all regardless. Moreover, if we applied
   estoppel here, every future secured creditor would be forced to litigate the
   precise value of every asset on every debtor’s asset schedule. Failure to do so
   would leave those future secured creditors with no ability to recover full value
   should a third party (like Balke, here) violate the automatic stay. That makes
   no sense, and we therefore reject it.
          Of course, nothing disables the bankruptcy court from considering the
   value IPRC placed on its property. But the Balkes are wrong to claim that the
   Carmichaels, our court, or the bankruptcy court are bound by IPRC’s
   valuations.

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                                          B.
          The Balkes also suggest in their brief that we sanction the Carmichaels
   for filing a frivolous appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 38. But the Balkes have
   not moved for sanctions, and we decline to construe their counseled brief as
   a relevant motion.
          Even if the Balkes had properly moved for sanctions, we would deny
   the motion. Far from frivolous, the Carmichaels’ appeal has some merit. The
   Carmichaels can hardly be faulted for attempting to rehabilitate Judge
   Bohm’s award. And the Balkes, who violated the automatic stay, have far-
   from-clean hands.
                                  *        *         *
          The district court remarked that “This suit has, in course of time,
   become so complicated that no man alive knows what it means . . . Still it
   drags its dreary length before the court, perennially hopeless.” Carmichael v.
   Balke, 2022 WL 2806456, *1 n.1 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 18, 2022) (quoting Charles
   Dickens, Bleak House, in 1 Works of Charles Dickens 4−5 (1891))
   (quotation omitted). But even when fatigued, we must tirelessly discharge
   “the duty of the court to carry out the intention of the legislature.” Wash.
   Univ. v. Rouse, 75 U.S. 439, 440 (1869). Accordingly, this case must “go on
   till [we] come to the end.” Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
   94 (Donald J. Gray ed., W.W. Norton 1992).
          We remand so that the bankruptcy court may reconsider its damages
   award. It may also, in its discretion, reconsider its attorneys’ fees award. On
   remand, the bankruptcy court should apply post-judgment interest to any
   damages award as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1961, dating from the entry of
   Judge Bohm’s judgment in 2018. We affirm the bankruptcy court’s judgment
   in all other respects.

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         AFFIRMED       IN    PART;          VACATED       IN     PART;
   REMANDED.

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