Court Opinion

ID: 9687369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:26:25.979427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:26.772637
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
I dissent. The majority adequately pinpoints the issue as being whether the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the applicable standard of care in stray voltage cases. Ante, p 3. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “the obligation to inspect and repair that was articulated in Schultz [v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445, 449; 506 NW2d 175 (1993),] is inapplicable in stray-voltage cases.” Ante, p 9. I further disagree that a remand for a new trial is warranted. All the critical issues in this case were presented to and properly decided by the jury. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
*12The disputed jury instructions in this case sprang from Schultz. In Schultz, a man was electrocuted while painting a house. He and his companion were moving a metal ladder toward the house when it came close to an uninsulated power line hanging near the house. The proximity of the ladder to the uninsulated wire created an arc of electricity that sent a current of electricity down the ladder and into the men. This Court held that, because of the special relationship between the decedent and the power provider, the power company had an affirmative duty to “reasonably inspect and repair wires and other instrumentalities in order to discover and remedy hazards and defects.” Id. at 451. The special relationship arose out of the fact that electricity has inherently dangerous properties, and that special expertise is required to deal with electrical phenomena and the delivery of electricity. Id.1
*13The majority finds Schultz inapplicable to stray voltage cases partially on the basis that “the dangers of high-voltage electricity (fire, electrocution, and death among them) are different in kind, and more severe, than the dangers of stray voltage.” Ante, p 9. As such, the majority argues, stray voltage cases should not receive the “unusual treatment” accorded to cases involving high-voltage electricity. Id. Although I agree with the majority that the nature of the danger presented by stray voltage is different than the nature of the danger presented by high-voltage electricity, I disagree that a difference in the type of damage caused justifies a departure from the Schultz standard.
Stray voltage cases, like cases involving high-voltage electricity, involve harms caused by the properties of electricity. The appellant’s own brief demonstrates this point. According to the appellant, “[a]ll utilities, Consumers included, operate grounded power distribution systems, principally for safety reasons.” Electricity must always return to its source to complete its circuit. If the “hot” wire breaks, the current will flow down the nearest ground line into the *14earth, bypassing the break until it can reconnect with the neutral at some other point. The ground wire also provides a path to earth for excessive voltage surges from lightning strikes and other accidents.
Because of the inherently dangerous properties of electricity, these ground wires are provided, and must be reasonably maintained and inspected. But for the safety measure of the ground wires, events such as line breaks and lightning strikes would have catastrophic consequences.
Therefore, maintaining and inspecting the neutral ground wires is inextricably bound with those properties of electricity causing fires and electrocution, even though, ordinarily, the neutral wires only carry neutral-to-earth voltage (nev) that is beneath the level of human detection.
Regardless of whether the distribution of high currents of electricity through uninsulated wires in residential neighborhoods might cause death, while the low currents involved in stray voltage cases causes a lesser degree of harm, the level of harm caused does not alter the properties of the electricity itself. The distribution of electricity still requires special knowledge about how to direct and control a dangerous commodity.2 For example, if a utility worker were injured while climbing up a utility pole, it might be appropriate to apply a different standard than in Schultz because the injury would be unrelated to the properties of electricity. Conversely, the properties of electricity itself give rise to stray voltage injuries. Here, the jury found that the Cases suffered the loss of an entire dairy herd and nearly two million dollars *15in damages because of defendant’s negligence in dealing with the inherently dangerous properties of electricity. I cannot agree with the majority’s attempt to distinguish Schultz. Rather, the trial court appropriately applied Schultz to this stray voltage action.
Schultz’s requirement that providers of electricity “reasonably inspect and repair wires and other instru-mentalities in order to discover and remedy hazards and defects” can fairly be applied in stray voltage cases. Id. at 451. While reasonable inspection might include detecting frayed wires or uninsulated wires in residential neighborhoods, reasonableness might not encompass detecting stray voltage. Similarly, power providers could also argue that stray voltage is neither a hazard nor a defect. The questions of reasonableness, of what it means to “inspect and repair,” and what constitutes “a hazard or defect” leave room for interpretation by a jury.
The defendant argues that its liability should be proportioned according to the degree of risk involved. While I agree with the majority that the concerns are different in stray voltage cases than in electrocution cases, I disagree that those differences render a Schultz-based jury instruction inadequate. Under the majority’s approach, trial courts will be left to determine when electricity acquires “dangerous” properties. Schultz, on the other hand takes note of the fact that electricity has “inherently dangerous” properties, and allows the jury to determine when inspection and repair is reasonable. I would apply the Schultz test, and would uphold the jury’s decision.
The defendant also asserts that it was unable to fully present its arguments. The majority agrees. Ante, pp 10-11. Even if I were to agree with the majority *16that Schultz creates too high a standard for stray voltage cases, I would disagree with the majority’s harmlessness assessment. The defendant had a fair opportunity to present its arguments. As the majority acknowledges, the defendant’s primary argument is that it need only act with reasonable care under the circumstances, and that it had no duty to inspect and repair its wires. Under the Schultz instructions given, the jury could have concluded that the stray voltage detection required an unreasonable level of inspecting and repairing, or that inspecting and repairing would not serve the purpose of remedying hazards and defects. Thus, the jury had the opportunity to conclude that the defendant was not required to inspect and repair its wires under the circumstances. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.
Corrigan, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 As Schultz explained:
Clearly, the relationship between the utility company and the decedent was sufficient to impose a duty under the circumstances. It is well established that those who undertake particular activities or enter into special relationships assume a distinctive duty to procure knowledge and experience regarding that activity, person, or thing. For example, a landlord must inspect a premises to keep it in a reasonably safe condition. Samson [v Saginaw Professional Bldg, Inc, 393 Mich 393; 224 NW2d 843 (1975)]; Lipsitz v Schechter, 377 Mich 685; 142 NW2d 1 (1966); 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 360, p 250. Physicians must keep reasonably abreast of current advances in their field. Koch v Gorrilla, 552 F2d 1170 (CA 6, 1977). Manufacturers must diligently inspect their products to discover lurking dangers. Livesley v Continental Motors Corp, 331 Mich 434; 49 NW2d 365 (1951); 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, comment, § 395, pp 326-332. Lastly, a carrier owes to its passengers the duty of discovering all detectable defects. Trent v Pontiac Transportation Co, Inc, 281 Mich 586; 275 NW 501 (1937).
Similarly, compelling reasons mandate that a company that maintains and employs energized power lines must exercise reasonable care to reduce potential hazards as far as practicable. First, electri*13cal energy possesses inherently dangerous properties. Second, electric utility companies possess expertise in dealing with electrical phenomena and delivering electricity. Lastly, although a reasonable person can be charged with the knowledge of certain fundamental facts and laws of nature that are part of the universal human experience, such as the dangerous properties of electricity, Koehler v Detroit Edison Co, 383 Mich 224, 231; 174 NW2d 827 (1970); Pros-ser & Keeton [Torts (5th ed)], § 32, pp 182-184; 3 Harper, James & Gray, Torts (2d ed), § 16.5, pp 405408, it is well settled that electricity possesses inherently dangerous properties requiring expertise in dealing with its phenomena. Therefore, pursuant to its duty, a power company has an obligation to reasonably inspect and repair wires and other instrumentalities in order to discover and remedy hazards and defects. [Schultz at 450451.]

 See n 1.