Court Opinion

ID: 9963358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 09:12:41.365735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:47.613766
License: Public Domain

In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                        Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                        No. 07-23-00271-CV

          MAURO E. GARZA, AND EVERETT HOLDINGS, LLC, APPELLANTS

                                                  V.

                                    JULIA PEREZ, APPELLEE

                             On Appeal from the 57th District Court
                                     Bexar County, Texas1
                Trial Court No. 2023-CI-08559, Honorable Tina Torres, Presiding

                                           April 23, 2024
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
                        Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

       After we issued our February 27, 2024 opinion in this case, Mauro E. Garza and

Everett Holdings, LLC (collectively, “Appellants”), moved for rehearing and en banc

reconsideration. We deny Appellants’ motions. We withdraw our opinion and judgment

of February 27 and substitute the following in its place.

       1 Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts, this case was transferred to this

Court from the Fourth Court of Appeals. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. In the event of any conflict,
we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
        In this interlocutory appeal, Appellants challenge the trial court’s denial of their

motion, pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”), to dismiss Julia Perez’s

claims under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”).2 Appellants contend

that Perez’s TUFTA claims are “based on or . . . in response to [Appellants’] exercise of

the right . . . to petition,” namely, a Rule 11 agreement made in open court, Garza’s

testimony at the March 15, 2023 hearing, and discussions between Appellants and

Anderson Business Advisors (“ABA”) concerning Perez’s default judgment. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.003(a), .005(b)(1)(B).3 Because we conclude that Perez’s

claims are not based on or in response to Appellants’ exercise of the right to petition, we

affirm the trial court’s order.

                                            BACKGROUND4

        Perez sued Everett related to a fall she sustained at a bar. Garza was not named

as a defendant in this suit. In September of 2022, after Everett failed to answer, Perez

took a default judgment. Subsequently, Perez obtained a turnover order that appointed

a receiver and authorized execution on the default judgment. The order required Everett

to turn over assets, including its real property, to the receiver to satisfy the judgment.

        2 As part of her TUFTA claims, Perez also applied for temporary equitable relief, including a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and temporary injunction. The trial court granted her TRO and
temporary injunction, which froze substantial assets of Garza and Everett. This Court previously held that,
under the case law of the Fourth Court of Appeals, the temporary injunction was void. Garza v. Perez, No.
07-23-00240-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 6475, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 23, 2023, no pet.) (mem.
op.). As such, we reversed the order of the trial court, dissolved the temporary injunction, and remanded
the cause to the trial court. Id. at *5.
        3 Further references to provisions of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code will be by
reference to “section __” or “§ __.”
        4 Because this case is being reviewed in relation to a TCPA motion to dismiss, the facts are based

on allegations in Perez’s pleadings.

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Garza was served with the turnover order in January of 2023.5 Garza subsequently

confirmed his receipt of this order at a hearing in March.

        Garza, acting as corporate representative of Everett, contacted ABA seeking

advice about how to avoid execution of the default judgment.                       Subsequently, and

apparently on the advice of ABA, Garza began having ABA transfer assets of Everett to

himself.6 As a result of these assets being transferred from Everett to Garza in a manner

that was calculated to avoid Perez’s execution efforts on the default judgment, Perez filed

suit in May of 2023, asserting claims under TUFTA and seeking a temporary restraining

order to protect assets that had been previously transferred from Everett. In response to

Perez’s suit, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss under the TCPA. By their motion,

Appellants contend that Perez’s claims are “based on or . . . in response to” their exercise

of the right to petition.7 After holding a hearing on Appellants’ motion to dismiss, the trial

court denied the same.              Appellants timely filed this interlocutory appeal.                See

§ 51.014(a)(12).

        Appellants present ten issues for our review. Their fourth through ninth issues

address whether the TCPA applies to Perez’s claims. Their first three issues challenge

whether Perez has met her burden to prove each essential element of her TUFTA claims

        5 According to Appellants, Garza is the “principal” of Everett.

        6 Appellants contend that these transfers were made subject to all recorded encumbrances and,

therefore, Perez’s judgment lien was protected. We express no opinion on this matter as it goes to the
merits of Perez’s TUFTA claims.
        7 Perez filed a motion seeking sanctions against Appellants for attorney’s fees, which was denied

by the trial court. She attempted to appeal this ruling, but this Court dismissed her cross-appeal for want
of jurisdiction. See Garza v. Perez, Nos. 07-23-00271-CV, 07-23-00328-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 7565,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 2, 2023, no pet.) (order) (per curiam).

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by clear and specific evidence.      Finally, Appellants contend that, if the trial court

considered the default judgment as evidence of Perez’s premises liability claim, it erred

in doing so. Because the issues in this case are resolved by our determination that the

TCPA does not apply to the claims asserted by Perez, we will only address this dispositive

issue.

                        STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

         The TCPA’s purpose is “to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of

persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in

government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the

rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” § 27.002. The

statute fulfills this purpose by authorizing a motion to dismiss early in the covered

proceedings, subject to expedited interlocutory review. McLane Champions, LLC v.

Hous. Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907, 914 (Tex. 2023). “[W]e must construe

[the TCPA’s] individual words and provisions in the context of the statute as a whole.”

Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680–81 (Tex. 2018).

         We review a ruling on a TCPA motion to dismiss utilizing a three-step, burden-

shifting process: (1) the movant seeking dismissal must demonstrate that a “legal action”

has been brought against it and that the action is “based on or is in response to” an

exercise of a protected constitutional right; (2) if the movant succeeds in making this

demonstration, the burden shifts to the party bringing the legal action to avoid dismissal

by establishing, by clear and specific evidence, a prima facie case for each essential

element of the claim in question; (3) if the nonmovant meets this burden, the burden shifts

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back to the movant to justify dismissal by establishing an affirmative defense or other

ground on which it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Newstream Roanoke 6.125,

LLC v. Shore, No. 02-22-00506-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 6958, at *8–9 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). If the movant fails to meet this initial

burden, the motion to dismiss fails. Id. at *9.

       We review a trial court’s denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss de novo. Landry’s,

Inc. v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 45–46 (Tex. 2021). We consider the

pleadings, evidence a court could consider under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a,

and supporting and opposing affidavits stating facts on which liability or the defense is

based. § 27.006(a). “The basis of a legal action is not determined by the defendant’s

admissions or denials but by the plaintiff’s allegations.” Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462,

467 (Tex. 2017). We are to view the pleadings and evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmovant. Kassab v. Pohl, 612 S.W.3d 571, 577 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2020, pet. denied). Whether the TCPA applies is an issue of statutory construction, which

we also review de novo. S&S Emergency Training Sols., Inc. v. Elliott, 564 S.W.3d 843,

847 (Tex. 2018).

                                         ANALYSIS

       We begin and end our analysis with the first step of the three-step process under

the TCPA: whether Appellants established that the TCPA applies to Perez’s claims. See

McLane Champions, LLC, 671 S.W.3d at 914. As its initial burden under the TCPA,

Appellants were required to establish a nexus between the rights protected by the statute

and Perez’s claims. See Apache Corp. v. Apollo Expl., LLC, No. 11-21-00295-CV, 2023

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Tex. App. LEXIS 3381, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 18, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing Grant v. Pivot Tech. Sols., Ltd., 556 S.W.3d 865, 879 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018,

pet. denied)). To establish this nexus, Appellants must have shown that Perez’s claims

are “factually predicated on the alleged conduct that falls within the scope of [the] TCPA’s

definition of ‘exercise of the right of free speech,’ petition or association.” Id. at *7 (citing

Grant, 556 S.W.3d at 879). In the present case, Appellants had to prove that Perez’s

action is either “based on” or is “in response to” an exercise of Appellants’ right to petition.8

Newstream Roanoke 6.125, LLC, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 6958, at *10.

        The right to petition is defined by the TCPA to include a communication in or

pertaining to a judicial proceeding. § 27.001(4)(A)(i). A communication “includes the

making or submitting of a statement or document in any form or medium, including oral,

visual, written, audiovisual, or electronic.” § 27.001(1). A judicial proceeding refers to a

pending action before a court. Dyer v. Medoc Health Servs., LLC, 573 S.W.3d 418, 429

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied).

        8   After the TCPA was enacted, “[a] TCPA docket quickly developed with defendants (and,
increasingly, plaintiffs) making novel arguments about how the TCPA might support the dismissal of
unwanted claims and procedural actions.” ML Dev, LP v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 623, 626
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied). In response, the legislature amended the TCPA in 2019
in an effort to tighten its language “so that it could no longer be used improperly as a litigation tactic to
thwart its purpose.” Apache Corp., 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 3381, at *7 (quoting Laura Lee Prather & Robert
T. Sherwin, The Changing Landscape of the Texas Citizens Participation Act, 52 TEX. TECH L. REV. 163,
165 (2020)). By this amendment, the legislature narrowed “the categories of connections that must be
demonstrated in order to meet the nexus requirement.” Id. The amendment accomplished this by removing
language allowing a movant to show that the action in question “relates to” the movant’s exercise of a
protected right, which was the most expansive of the three categories of connections. Compare § 27.005(b)
(current version) to § 27.005(b) (prior version); ML Dev, LP, 649 S.W.3d at 626; see Robert B. James, DDS,
Inc. v. Elkins, 553 S.W.3d 596, 604 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. denied) (characterizing “relates to”
as a “broader qualifying phrase”). Consequently, the amendment now requires TCPA movants “to establish
a closer nexus between the claims against them and the communications they point to as their exercise of
protected rights.” ML Dev, LP, 649 S.W.3d at 629.

                                                     6
       “The ordinary meaning of the ‘is based on’ component denotes a legal action that

has the relevant TCPA-protected activity ‘as a main ingredient’ or ‘fundamental part’ of

the challenged legal action.” Ernst & Young, LLP v. Ryan, LLC, No. 01-21-00603-CV,

2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 4631, at *22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2023, pet.

denied) (mem. op.). The “in response to” component “denotes some sort of answer or

other act in return.” Id.

       In the present case, Appellants contend that all of their “filings, arguments,

testimony, and other opposition to Perez’s illegal enforcement of the interlocutory default

judgment were all communications ‘in . . . a judicial proceeding’ and constituted the

‘exercise of the right to petition’ under the TCPA.” Specifically, Appellants identify a March

1, 2023 Rule 11 agreement that Garza made in open court, Garza’s in-court testimony on

March 15, 2023, and Appellants’ communications about Perez’s default judgment with

ABA. Perez responds contending that her claims challenge the actions of Appellants in

transferring Everett’s assets to Garza in an effort to avoid Perez’s enforcement of the

default judgment.

       In determining whether Appellants satisfied their burden of proving that Perez’s

claims fall within the scope of the TCPA, we consider Perez’s pleadings. See § 27.006(a).

Specifically, Appellants cite to Perez’s allegations that (1) Garza, as corporate

representative of Everett, contacted ABA about “secreting away his assets and avoiding

[Perez’s] . . . judgment;” (2) Appellants entered into a Rule 11 agreement, which was read

into the record, that Appellants would not secret any properties of Everett; and (3) Garza

testified falsely at a March 15, 2023 hearing regarding whether Everett properties had

been transferred. A claim under TUFTA requires proof that (1) plaintiff is a creditor; (2)
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defendant is a debtor; (3) the debtor transferred assets shortly before or after the

creditor’s claim arose; and (4) debtor did so with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud

any of the debtor’s creditors. Plan B Holdings, LLC v. RSLLP, No. 03-21-00260-CV, 2023

Tex. App. LEXIS 7666, at *41–42 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 6, 2023, no pet.) (summarizing

elements of TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005). Perez’s claims are not “factually

predicated” on the alleged conduct that constitutes Appellants’ exercise of the right to

petition. Apache Corp., 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 3381, at *7. Rather, Perez’s claims are

based on Appellants’ actions in transferring assets of Everett to Garza to prevent Perez’s

ability to execute the default judgment against these assets. While we acknowledge that

Perez’s pleadings reference communications made in and about a judicial proceeding,

Perez’s claims could be asserted without reference to these communications and, as

such, these communications are merely some evidence in support of Perez’s claims.

Newstream Roanoke 6.125, LLC, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 6958, at *18; Apache Corp.,

2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 3381, at *10–11; see Harrell v. Smith, No. 05-22-00242-CV, 2022

Tex. App. LEXIS 8735, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“Simply alleging conduct that has a communication embedded within it does not create

the relationship between the claim and the communication necessary to invoke the

TCPA.”). The gravamen of Perez’s claims is not Appellants’ exercise of their right to

petition but, rather, Appellants’ actions in attempting to shield assets of Everett from

Perez’s execution by transferring them to Garza.

       Our resolution of this appeal is consistent with the precedent of the transferor court.

In Shopoff Advisors, L.P. v. Atrium Circle, GP, No. 04-20-00310-CV, 2021 Tex. App.

LEXIS 5184 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.), the court

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distinguished between a reference to a communication in a pleading and the conduct that

formed the basis of the party’s claims. Id. at *9 (“Atrium’s pleadings refer to the filing of

the notices of lis pendens, but it is not the basis of its claims.”). In its analysis, the court

quotes Kawcak v. Antero Res. Corp., 582 S.W.3d 566, 587 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019,

pet. denied), as “hold[ing] that simply alleging conduct that has a communication

embedded within it does not create the relationship between the claim and the

communication necessary to invoke the TCPA.” Shopoff Advisors, L.P., 2021 Tex. App.

LEXIS 5184, at *9. The court also quotes Pacheco v. Rodriguez, 600 S.W.3d 401, 410

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.), as providing, “[W]hen a claim does not allege a

communication, and is instead based on a defendant’s conduct, the TCPA is not

implicated.” Shopoff Advisors, L.P., 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 5184, at *10. As applicable

to the present case, Perez’s claims are based on the conduct of the Appellants

transferring assets to avoid execution of Perez’s default judgment, rather than to any

judicial communication made by Appellants. Likewise, we conclude that Perez’s claims

were not in response to Appellants’ TCPA-protected communication9 but, rather, were

based on the actions of the Appellants to avoid execution of Perez’s default judgment. 10

        9 Such communications can, however, constitute evidence in support of Perez’s claims without

implicating the TCPA. See Newstream Roanoke 6.125, LLC, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 6958, at *18 (reference
to Rule 11 agreement is “merely” some evidence of breach of fiduciary duty claim); Apache Corp., 2023
Tex. App. LEXIS 3381, at *11 (“[T]here is a difference between communication that is part of the claim itself
and communication which merely serves as evidence in support of a claim.”); see Harrell, 2022 Tex. App.
LEXIS 8735, at *12 (“Simply alleging conduct that has a communication embedded within it does not create
the relationship between the claim and the communication necessary to invoke the TCPA.”).
        10 In recent years, the transferor court has found instances in which the nonmovant’s legal action

was based on or in response to the movant’s exercise of the right to petition. However, in each of these
instances, the court found that the actions were directly based on movant’s exercise of their right to petition.
See Doe v. Cruz, No. 04-21-00582-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 8866, at *16–17 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Nov. 29, 2023, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (“revenge porn” and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
premised on photograph included in publicly available pleading, while motion for sanctions was based on
                                                       9
        Appellants contend that the transferor court’s opinion in Whataburger supports

their theory that Perez’s claims are “in response to” TCPA-protected communications.

Whataburger Rests. LLC v. Ferchichi, No. 04-22-00020-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 9451

(Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 28, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.). In Whataburger, the

transferor court stated that, “the TCPA’s required nexus is satisfied at a minimum for legal

actions that ‘are factually predicated on’ allegations of conduct that fall within one of the

TCPA’s protected rights.” Id. at *8 (quoting Baylor Scott & White v. Project Rose MSO,

LLC, 633 S.W.3d 263, 276 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2021, pet. denied). The court goes on to

state that “[a] plaintiff’s claims are ‘in response to’ a protected activity when they react to

or are asserted subsequently to the communication.” Id. However, based on a holistic

review of the pleadings, Perez’s claims do not implicate Appellants’ TCPA-protected

activity but, rather, are premised on allegedly fraudulent actions taken by Appellants.

        Under a de novo standard of review, we cannot conclude that Appellants have met

their burden to show that the communications of Appellants cited by Perez in her petition

are the “main ingredient” or “fundamental part” of her claims. Ernst & Young, LLP, 2023

Tex. App. LEXIS 4631, at *25. Likewise, Appellants have not shown how Perez’s claims

are an “answer or other act in return” to Appellants’ TCPA-protected activity. Id. at *22.

As such, we conclude that Appellants have failed to meet their burden to show that the

TCPA applied to Perez’s claims. See McLane Champions, LLC, 671 S.W.3d at 914

the claim that the nonmovant’s pleading was frivolous); Nec Networks, LLC v. Gilmartin, No. 04-23-00109-
CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 8874, at *7–8, *12 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 29, 2023, pet. filed) (mem.
op.) (intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on filing of the lawsuit, and sanctions sought
based on suit being brought in bad faith); Whataburger Rests. LLC v. Ferchichi, No. 04-22-00020-CV, 2022
Tex. App. LEXIS 9451, at * 8–9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 28, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (motion for
sanctions was premised on communications made by movant during mediation).

                                                    10
(moving party must initially show that TCPA applies to legal action). As such, it is

unnecessary for us to address Appellants’ remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                     CONCLUSION

      Having concluded that Appellants failed to meet their burden to show that the

TCPA applies to Perez’s claims, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Appellants’

motion to dismiss.

                                                     Judy C. Parker
                                                        Justice

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