Court Opinion

ID: 9955618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 20:17:19.336603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:08.430709
License: Public Domain

Vermont Superior Court
                                                                                                     Filed 01/2 24
                                                                                                    Washmgton mt

VERMONT SUPERIOR                                  £3:                          CIVIL DIVISION
COURT                                                   f1
Washington Unit                                                            Case No. 22-CV-01810
65 State Street
Montpelier VT 05602
802-828-2091
WWW.Vermontjudiciary.org

                                      Jill Tucker V. Dubois & King, Inc.

    Rulin     on Dubois & Kin ’s Motions for Summar Jud ment and a Protective Order
                      and Ms. Tucker’s Motion to Amend the Complaint

        In this action, Plaintiff Ms. Jill Tucker alleges that, once she was diagnosed With

cancer, her employer, Defendant Dubois & King, Inc. (D&K), began retaliating against

her by effectively demoting her, marginalizing her in the workplace, treating her

abrasively, and eventually revoking all accommodations and terminating her

employment. In the original complaint, she asserts two claims of disability

discrimination (retaliation and failure to accommodate) and one of age discrimination.

With discovery ongoing, D&K ﬁled a motion for summary judgment arguing that the

undisputed facts show that it tried many ways to accommodate Ms. Tucker, who

eventually quit through no fault of its own. It also ﬁled a motion for a protective order

asking the Court to suspend further discovery until it rules on its motion for summary

judgment, which, at a minimum, would prevent scheduled depositions of D&K

employees.

        Ms. Tucker has opposed both motions and filed a motion to amend the complaint.

The proposed amendment adds claims of “wrongful termination by constructive

discharge,” breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and intentional inﬂiction of

emotional distress. The breach of contract and, in the alternative, promissory estoppel

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22—CV-01810Jill Tucker v. Dubois 8c King, Inc.
claims appear to assert that, apart from accommodations warranted by limitations due to

disability, there was some kind of enforceable agreement permitting Ms. Tucker to work

5-hour workdays all from home but for once a week, and that D&K breached that

agreement by revoking it unilaterally and terminating her employment. D&K opposes

any amendment arguing that the new claims are futile, should have been raised long ago

if at all, and were filed in a bad faith effort to keep the case alive after D&K filed its

summary judgment motion.

        1.       Ms. Tucker’s Motion to Amend

        Vt. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend a complaint shall be freely given

by the court “when justice so requires.” In Vermont, this provision has been liberally

construed in favor of allowing parties to amend their pleadings. Lillicrap v. Martin, 156

Vt. 165, 170 (1991). The purpose is three-prong: (1) to provide the opportunity for each

claim to be decided on the merits rather than on a procedural technicality; (2) to give

notice of the nature of a claim or defense; and (3) to enable a party to assert matters that

were overlooked or unknown at an earlier stage in the proceeding. Colby v. Umbrella,

Inc., 2008 VT 20, ¶4, 184 Vt. 1, 5 (quoting Bevins v. King, 143 Vt. 252, 255 (1983)).

        Leave to amend is not always granted, however. It may be denied when the just

and expeditious disposition of the dispute between the parties will not be advanced via

the amendment. In making that determination, the Court analyzes whether the

proposed amendment: (1) would result in undue delay; (2) is brought in bad faith; (3)

would result in unfair prejudice to the opposing party; or (4) would be “futile” in that it

would fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the dismissal standard

under Rule 12(b)(6). Perkins v. Windsor Hosp. Corp., 142 Vt. 305, 313 (1982).

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22-CV-01810 Jill Tucker v. Dubois & King, Inc.
          Ms. Tucker’s motion is a very close call. D&K’s argument as to delay has force.

Ms. Tucker’s original complaint was filed in May 2022. In her motion to amend, she

asserts that the proposed claims only became apparent in the course of discovery. She

does not further explain that point. In fact, the proposed claims appear to address events

and issues that should have been fully apparent to Ms. Tucker in real time when they

happened to her, well before she ever filed this case. She offers no justification for

having overlooked these claims until now. Thus, her delay in raising them goes

essentially unexplained.

          D&K also argues that the claims, or most of them, are futile. Indeed, as to the

new claims, the allegations of the complaint are somewhat conclusory. As noted,

however, futility under Rule 15(a) is assessed under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. D&K’s

futility argument does not appear to apply that standard except perhaps with regard to

the wrongful termination claim. Instead, it essentially argues futility based on its view

of the true facts rather than the allegations of the complaint. The Court acknowledges

that the wrongful termination claim is not pleaded with clarity, and it may simply be

duplicative of Ms. Tucker’s discrimination claims. It is not clear, though, that it fails as a

matter of law to state a claim under the stringent test of Rule 12(b)(6). In short, the

Court cannot conclude without a developed factual record that the proposed claims are

futile.

          As to prejudice, delay can be its own form of prejudice and unnecessary costs can

be incurred by the opposing party. Otherwise, the prospect is that the parties may need

to redo certain discovery, such as Ms. Tucker’s deposition.

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22-CV-01810 Jill Tucker v. Dubois & King, Inc.
        Given the unexplained delay and potential for prejudice, balanced by the strong

policy in favor of addressing claims on their merits, the Court concludes that the just

approach in this case is to grant the motion to amend subject to a condition related to

costs. See 6 Mary Kay Kane, et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1486 (3d ed.) (“If the party

opposing the amendment can be protected by the use of conditions from any possible

prejudice that might result from the untimeliness of the amendment, there is no

justifiable reason for not allowing it.”). “The most common condition imposed on an

amending party is costs.” Id. Accordingly, Ms. Tucker’s motion to amend will be granted

subject to the proviso that D&K may file a future request for reasonable discovery

expenses, including attorney fees, if it can establish that they were incurred solely due to

the untimely amendment and the need to engage in wholly redundant discovery.1

        2.       D&K’s Motion for Summary Judgment

        Given the amendment, the Court declines to address the substance of D&K’s

summary judgment motion at this time. The breadth of the new claims clearly overlaps

with the alleged narrative underlying the original three claims, discovery is ongoing, and

the summary judgment record is not well developed. While Ms. Tucker has not expressly

sought relief under Vt. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (when facts are unavailable to the nonmovant),

she has argued, in substance, in opposition to D&K’s motion for a protective order that

allowing discovery to continue will help ensure that she has a fair chance to develop the

evidence as to the matters raised in D&K’s summary judgment motion. The Court is

persuaded that discovery, though not in its earliest stages, has also not concluded. Ms.

Tucker should be afforded some opportunity to develop evidence, particularly in light of

1
 To be clear, this condition does not apply to all subsequent discovery costs, only those
(hopefully few, if any) that meet the standard noted text.
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22-CV-01810 Jill Tucker v. Dubois & King, Inc.
her new claims, prior to the Court’s consideration of a motion for summary judgment.

D&K’s motion is denied without prejudice at this time.

        3.       D&K’s Motion for a Protective Order

        D&K’s Motion for a Protective Order presupposes that the Court would be

proceeding to rule on the substance of its Motion for Summary Judgment. As the Court

will not be doing that at this time, the issue of a protective order is moot.

                                                 Conclusion

        For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Tucker’s Motion to Amend is granted conditionally.

D&K’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied without prejudice, and its Motion for a

Protective Order is denied as moot.

        Electronically signed on Wednesday, January 24, 2024, per V.R.E.F. 9(d).

                                                      _______________________
                                                      Timothy B. Tomasi
                                                      Superior Court Judge

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22-CV-01810 Jill Tucker v. Dubois & King, Inc.