Court Opinion

ID: 9914995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 22:03:39.845772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:00.616957
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
     limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2023 IL App (3d) 230046-U

                                  Order filed January 3, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                       )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                        )       of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                       )       Will County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )
                                                       )       Appeal No. 3-23-0046
             v.                                        )       Circuit No. 09-CF-1559
                                                       )
      MATTHEW T. EDWARDS,                              )       Honorable
                                                       )       Amy M. Bertani-Tomczak,
             Defendant-Appellant.                      )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court complied with this court’s mandate on remand, and defendant’s
                  sentence was not excessive.

¶2          Defendant, Matthew T. Edwards, appeals a resentencing order from the Will County

     circuit court reimposing a 90-year sentence for first degree murder and attempted first degree

     murder. Defendant argues the court failed to comply with our directions for resentencing on

     remand by not properly considering his youth and its attendant characteristics pursuant to the
     statutory juvenile sentencing guidelines. Defendant further contends that his sentence is

     excessive. We affirm.

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4          After a stipulated bench trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced to consecutive

     terms of 50 years’ imprisonment for first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2008)) and

     40 years’ imprisonment for attempted first degree murder (id. § 8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1)). Defendant’s

     convictions stemmed from events that occurred during the early morning hours on July 7, 2009.

     On that date, defendant and his codefendant, Jason Orasco, were driven by two other

     accomplices to the apartment of Joshua Terdic and Lauren Vasilakis. Defendant and Orasco

     broke into the apartment looking for money and drugs. When they found only a small amount of

     both, they woke up the victims and demanded more. Terdic and Vasilakis were tied up, ordered

     to lie on their stomachs, and a pillow was placed over their heads. Defendant asked Orasco if

     they should use a baseball bat to knock them out. Orasco said “no” and that defendant should

     “just do it.” Defendant then shot both victims in the head. Terdic died as a result of the shooting.

     Vasilakis survived.

¶5          Defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that because he was 17 years old when the

     offenses were committed, his sentence was unconstitutional as a de facto life sentence under

     Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life sentences for offenders

     under the age of 18). We affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence but instructed the circuit

     court to grant defendant one additional day of presentence incarceration credit. People v.

     Edwards, 2015 IL App (3d) 130190. Our supreme court issued a supervisory order directing us

     to vacate and reconsider our judgment in light of People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271. People v.

     Edwards, No. 119332 (Ill. Nov. 23, 2016) (supervisory order). After doing so, we concluded that

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     Reyes did not warrant a different result and affirmed as modified. People v. Edwards, 2017 IL

     App (3d) 130190-B, ¶ 7. In a subsequent supervisory order, our supreme court directed us to

     vacate and reconsider our judgment in light of People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (holding

     juvenile prison sentences over 40 years constitute de facto life sentences and cannot be imposed

     without the court first considering a defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics). People

     v. Edwards, No. 122028 (Ill. Mar. 25, 2020) (supervisory order). After doing so, we held that

     Buffer required that defendant’s sentence be vacated and remanded the matter to the circuit court

     for resentencing. People v. Edwards, 2021 IL App (3d) 130190-C, ¶ 78. Specifically, we

     concluded that the circuit court did not consider defendant’s youth and its attendant

     characteristics in imposing a de facto life sentence. Id. We directed the circuit court to resentence

     defendant pursuant to section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS

     5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016)); Edwards, 2021 IL App (3d) 130190-C, ¶ 78.

¶6          The circuit court held a resentencing hearing on September 29, 2022. Defendant’s brother

     testified regarding the abuse and neglect defendant suffered as a child. He stated that defendant

     and his siblings were fed inedible canned food and were hit with a leather whip their mother had

     cut into a “v” shape to prevent leaving visible marks. On one occasion, their mother hit

     defendant with a bat so hard that it broke. When their mother consumed alcohol, she often

     threatened defendant and would tell him she wished he had never been born. Defendant and his

     siblings also witnessed physical abuse inflicted on their mother by her boyfriends. The family

     did not have a stable home and moved frequently. Defendant’s mother stopped providing

     housing for him when he was 16 years old. One of defendant’s friends, and defendant’s

     neighbor, Linda Vetor-Gaydos, also testified in mitigation that they had each allowed defendant

     to stay with them on separate occasions because he did not have adequate shelter and was living

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     in a tent. Defendant was staying in Vetor-Gaydos’s basement at the time of the offenses and her

     daughter was one of defendant’s accomplices.

¶7          Defendant gave a statement in allocution. He began by reiterating much of his brother’s

     testimony about the abuse he had been subjected to by their mother. Defendant added that he had

     been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and prescribed Ritalin in

     elementary school, but his mother stopped giving him the medication because she said it made

     him hyper. Defendant also spoke about attending the Lincoln’s Challenge Academy as a teenager

     and how he aspired to attend culinary school after graduation. After finishing the Lincoln’s

     Challenge program, defendant lived with his brother on a military base in Kansas but returned to

     Illinois homeless when his brother was deployed. Defendant acknowledged his difficult

     upbringing did not justify his conduct and recognized that he caused “harm and hurt to many

     including myself and my family too.” Defendant stated he deserved the 13 years in jail he had

     served thus far and noted he had obtained his general education diploma (GED) and attended

     drug counseling and anger management courses during that time. Defendant admitted he had

     been involved in several fights while incarcerated but had tried to help keep other inmates out of

     trouble. Defendant stated that if he were released, he planned to attend school to become a

     licensed barber.

¶8          The parties then presented their arguments. The State first briefly discussed the potential

     sentencing ranges with the court and confirmed that the firearm enhancements for both

     convictions were now discretionary. The State further advised that as long as the court

     considered the statutory factors under section 5-4.5-105 of the Code, it was not precluded from

     resentencing defendant to a de facto life sentence and asked that the original 90-year sentence be

     reimposed. The State emphasized that the crime was premeditated, noting steps defendant and

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       Orasco took to carry out their plan, such as cutting the phone lines to the apartment complex

       prior to the break-in. The State summarized Vasilakis’s testimony from Orasco’s trial, recounting

       that during the 45 minutes defendant held them at gunpoint he told her he had no remorse and

       had killed his own sister. Defendant said he would shoot both her and Terdic, walk away

       laughing, and never think of them again. The State also argued that there was no indication that

       defendant suffered from mental illness at the time of the offenses based on the psychological

       evaluation, although there was a history of behavioral problems consistent with conduct disorder,

       which included setting fire to his bed at age five and repeatedly abusing the family dog.

¶9            Defendant’s counsel argued defendant had no prior criminal history. Defendant’s updated

       presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated that in addition to ADHD, defendant had also

       been subsequently diagnosed with depression, bipolar disorder, and mood disorder. Additionally,

       defendant had been prescribed medication but was not taking it the day of the offenses because

       he could not afford it. Defense counsel asserted that although Orasco was an older negative

       influence who told defendant to shoot the victims, defendant had taken full responsibility for his

       actions. Counsel also stressed defendant’s potential for rehabilitation based on his youth and that

       he had obtained his GED, attended counseling, and learned re-entry and barber skills while

       incarcerated. The court adjourned at the close of arguments, taking the matter under advisement.

¶ 10          The court reconvened on October 24, 2022. The court began by stating that it had

       reviewed witness testimony, defendant’s psychological evaluation and PSI, activity logs from the

       jail, defendant’s GED, victim impact statements, and character letters submitted on defendant’s

       behalf. Additionally, the court had reviewed defendant’s statement in allocution, noting that

       “defendant did not present any evidence as to his good conduct while serving his sentence as far

       as any programs or anything like that.” The court then remarked that defendant’s initial sentence

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       included firearm enhancements based on defendant’s possession and use of a gun in committing

       the offenses.

¶ 11          After explaining that the cause had been remanded for resentencing for the court to

       consider defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics pursuant to section 5-4.5-105 of the

       Code, the court continued as follows:

                                 “As a Circuit Court Judge for 28 years it has been my practice then and

                       now and at the time of your first sentencing hearing to consider all of offender’s

                       views and attendant characteristics. It has been my practice to consider an

                       offender’s level of maturity, any cognitive or developmental disability, peer

                       pressure, background, education, neglect or abuse and rehabilitative potential.

                                 I also considered the circumstance of the offense, the dress of participation

                       and specific role of the offender and any prior criminal history.

                                 The Court was present when Lauren Vasilakas testified at the co-

                       defendant’s trial. Her account of what happened to her and Joshua Terdic was

                       horrific. Lauren Vasilakis testified that the defendant had the firearm; that you

                       shot Mr. Terdic in the head while he was bound on the bed on his stomach with a

                       pillowcase on his head. You just then shot Lauren Vasilakas while she was bound

                       on the bed, tied, bound with a pillowcase on her head as she lied next to Mr.

                       Terdic.

                                 Lauren Vasilakas testified that the gun the defendant used was misfired or

                       clicked one or two times, and then she heard another shot and realized she was

                       shot. This all happened in the middle of the night after you and your co-defendant

                       broke into their home to rob them.

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                             Ms. Vasilakas has survived, but Mr. Terdic did not.

                             I have considered the factors in aggravation and mitigation and the factors

                      set forth in Chapter 730 Section 5/5-4.5-105, I have considered your youth and its

                      attendant characteristics, and the original sentence imposed on February 27th,

                      2013, will stand.”

       Defendant filed a motion to reconsider. In denying defendant’s motion, the court stated that it

       had received no new information regarding defendant’s accomplishments in the Department of

       Corrections, noting “everything that was presented by you was presented at the original

       sentencing.” Defendant appealed.

¶ 12                                            II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13          Defendant first argues the circuit court failed to comply with our mandate for

       resentencing by not considering the statutory factors contained in section 5-4.5-105 of the Code.

       On remand, “a trial court must obey the clear and unambiguous directions in a mandate issued by

       a reviewing court.” People ex rel. Daley v. Schreier, 92 Ill. 2d 271, 276 (1982). Whether the

       court has complied with our mandate is a matter of law we review de novo. Clemons v.

       Mechanical Devices Co., 202 Ill. 2d 344, 351-52 (2002).

¶ 14          Our mandate directed the court to resentence defendant in accordance with section 5-4.5-

       105 of the Code. Under this statute, the court must consider youth-based factors in mitigation

       when sentencing juvenile offenders and the decision to impose firearm enhancements is

       discretionary. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2022). Established in Miller, the youth-based factors

       codified under section 5-4.5-105 include: (1) the age and maturity at the time of the offense;

       (2) familial pressure, peer pressure, or negative influences; (3) family and home environment,

       educational and social background, and history of abuse, neglect, or trauma; (4) rehabilitation

                                                        7
       evidence and potential; (5) the circumstances of the offense; (6) the degree of participation and

       role in the offense; (7) ability to meaningfully participate in their defense; (8) prior juvenile or

       criminal history; and (9) any other relevant and reliable information, including an expression of

       remorse. Id. § 5-4.5-105(a). Proper consideration of these nine factors does not require the court

       to analyze each factor on the record before imposing its sentence. People v. Jones, 2019 IL App

       (1st) 170478, ¶ 55. Moreover, we presume the court has considered the mitigating factors

       presented, unless the record reflects otherwise. Id. ¶ 54.

¶ 15          Reviewing the evidence and arguments presented at defendant’s resentencing hearing, we

       find the court followed our mandate by considering defendant’s youth and its attendant

       characteristics pursuant to section 5-4.5-105 of the Code. The record reflects that the court

       received significant evidence of defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics before it and

       there is nothing in the record to indicate the court did not consider the mitigating factors

       presented. That the court found defendant’s evidence in mitigation presented at resentencing to

       be largely the same in substance as the evidence presented at defendant’s initial sentencing does

       not demonstrate that the Miller factors were not considered. To the contrary, the court

       specifically stated on the record that in reaching its decision, it had reviewed all of the evidence

       presented and considered the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation, including the youth

       based factors under section 5-4.5-105 of the Code.

¶ 16          Defendant further contends that the court abused its discretion when it imposed the same

       90-year sentence on remand, arguing the sentence is excessive because it far exceeds the

       minimum sentence now that the firearm enhancements are discretionary. In asserting that the

       evidence of his mitigating circumstances outweighed the seriousness of the offense to the degree

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       that it warranted a lesser sentence on remand, defendant asks us to reweigh the sentencing

       factors, which we will not do. See People v. Hageman, 2020 IL App (3d) 170637, ¶ 20.

¶ 17          “If a sentence is within the statutory range, we presume it is not excessive.” People v.

       Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 27. A circuit court’s sentencing decision is given great

       deference and will not be altered by a reviewing court absent an abuse of discretion. People v.

       Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). A sentence is deemed excessive and an abuse of

       discretion where it is “greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly

       disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000).

¶ 18          Here, defendant’s first degree murder conviction carried a sentencing range of 20 to 60

       years’ imprisonment. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a)(1) (West 2022). Defendant’s attempted

       murder conviction carried a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment. See id. § 5-4.5-

       25(a). Additionally, each conviction was also subject to a discretionary firearm enhancement of

       25 years. In imposing defendant’s original 90-year term of imprisonment at resentencing, the

       court was well within the sentencing guidelines and well below the potential total maximum

       sentence of 140 years. Therefore, defendant’s sentence is presumptively valid. Moreover, in

       sentencing defendant, the court made it clear that it considered all the evidence before it. The

       most important factor in fashioning a sentence is the seriousness of the offense. People v. Willis,

       2013 IL App (1st) 110233, ¶ 123. When sentencing defendant, the court went into detail

       regarding the gruesome nature of the offense. While defendant may believe that his mitigating

       evidence and rehabilitative potential outweighed the seriousness of the offense and required a

       lower sentence, the court was not required to agree. We cannot say that defendant’s sentence was

       greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the

       nature of the offense, and the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him. Furthermore,

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       as we have determined the court properly considered defendant’s youth and its attendant

       characteristics at resentencing, the court was within its discretion to impose the same sentence on

       remand. See People v. Raya, 267 Ill. App. 3d 705, 709 (1994) (sentences vacated on appeal and

       remanded for resentencing should not be construed as a mandate for the circuit court to impose a

       lesser sentence).

¶ 19                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20          The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 21          Affirmed.

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