Court Opinion

ID: 9845746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:27:19.575014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:20.909077
License: Public Domain

Lovins, Judge,
dissenting:
The first, second, third and fourth points of the syllabus correctly state the applicable principles of law, but I *270do not agree that the fifth point of the syllabus is sound in statement or correct in application, and, therefore, the action of the trial court in giving State’s Instruction No. 3, in my opinion, constitutes reversible error and for that reason, I dissent. .
State’s Instruction No. 3 reads as follows: “The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, the prisoner, James Harlow, shot and killed Carl Compton, and that he, the said James Harlow, shot and killed Carl Compton, [sic] and that he, the said James Harlow, relies upon self-defense to excuse him from such act, the burden of showing such excuse is on the defendant, and to avail him, such defense must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponderance of the evidence, and it must appear from all the evidence and circumstances in the case that, at the time he shot and killed the said Carl Compton, he believed and had reasonable grounds to believe, that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of the said Carl Compton and that he shot and killed the said Carl Compton for the purpose of protecting himself from such apparent danger, believing and having reasonable grounds- to believe,, at the time he shot and killed the said Carl Compton that said shooting was necessary in order to protect himself from death or great bodily harm at the hands of the said Carl Compton, but. the Court instruct the-jury that the prisoner acted at his peril, as the jury must pass ..upon- all his -actions in the premises and. from all the facts and circumstances in the case.”
An analysis of -that instruction clearly shows that it is in two parts, first, the statement of the facts submitted to the jury for their belief or disbelief, and second, a statement of applicable law. The characterization of that instruction as an incomplete instruction will not bear analysis and the fallacy of such characterization-appears upon examination of the record in this case.
Throughout the-entire record--it is undoubtedly shown *271that the decedent, Compton, and his companion, Stover, were actuated by anger against Harlow, the defendant, and that Compton and Stover were acting in concert. Just before and at the time of the fatal encounter, Compton and Stover were hostile to defendant and were threatening him. It is true, as stated in the opinion of the court, that the giving of an incomplete instruction is not “ordinarily” grounds for reversal if the point was correctly covered by another instruction.
The case of State v. DeBoard, 119 W. Va. 396, 194 S. E. 349, is authority for that holding. But is the instruction here considered incomplete or erroneous?
If you start from the premise that it is an erroneous instruction, there is ample authority that the error arising from the giving of such erroneous instruction is not cured by the court giving another instruction which is correct. State v. Garner, 97 W. Va. 222, 124 S. E. 681; State v. Ringer, 84 W. Va. 546, 100 S. E. 413; Cobb v. Dunlevie, 63 W. Va. 398, 60 S. E. 384.
My views differ for the reason that I think the instruction here considered is erroneous. Certainly it is contrary to the evidence in the record which shows that Compton, the decedent, was not alone in making the attack upon the defendant. Therefore the factual statement in the instruction is erroneous.
It is reasonable to assume that a person who is attacked by two' or more persons bent on inflicting death or great bodily harm on him would be in greater fear than" when he is attacked by one person only.
State’s Instruction No. 3 above quoted and the defendant’s Instruction No. 21, in my opinion, are contradictory. Defendant’s Instruction No. 21 presents a clear statement of the correct factual hypothesis and the principles of law applicable thereto. On ther contrary, State’s Instruction No. 3 presents a false factual hypothesis. .
Moreover, in my opinion, the opinion of this court in State v. DeBoard, supra, is subject to criticism. In the case of State v. Manns, 48 W. Va. 480, 37 S. E. 613, this *272court held in point 3 of the syllabus as follows: “Instructions not justified by the evidence and tending to mislead the jury should not be given”; and in syllabus 4, as follows: “Instructions which do not fully state the law on a given point are erroneous and should not be given, as they tend to mislead the jury.” So far as I have been able to ascertain the foregoing points of the syllabus in the Manns case have not been disapproved, modified or overruled. See State v. Shamblin, 105 W. Va. 520, 143 S. E. 230; State v. Dickey, 46 W. Va. 319, 33 S. E. 231.
The case of State v. DeBoard, supra, may be authority for the holding of this court, but it is to be noted that the opinion in that case on the point here discussed cites no authority and seems to be in conflict with the holding of this court in the Manns case.
If the State’s Instruction No. '3 is incomplete as to a statement of law as distinguished from a statement of fact, I think it is the law that an incomplete statement of law may be corrected by a correct statement contained in another instruction, but State’s Instruction No. 3 does not state the facts correctly. If the facts stated in that instruction were borne out by the record, and it were established that only one person, to-wit, Compton, assailed Harlow, then the State’s Instruction No. 3 would be a full, complete and correct instruction.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent and would reverse the judgment of the Intermediate and Circuit Courts of Kanawha County.