Court Opinion

ID: 9543713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:48:31.013657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:59.580187
License: Public Domain

PORTER, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the holding in the majority opinion. The assignment by Barr to the Welches of the original conditional contract of sale, the deed by Barr and wife to the Welches placed in escrow, the consents to such assignment by Charpentier and his wife, the lease by Barr to Charpentier and the assignment thereof to the Welches were all part of the same transaction. The two-year lease at $850 per month was a material part of the consideration passing from the Barrs to the Welches, If such lease is void then there is a partial failure of consideration for which the Barrs would be liable. The Charpentiers by signing the lease made possible the transaction and thereby gained the personal liability of the Welches for the amount of the purchase price under the contract, and are now attempting to realize thereon.
*250The Charpentiers are attempting to take advantage of section 32-912 I.C. to the detriment of Barr and wife and Welch and wife, although' the Charpentiers have received substantial and material advantage under the lease and the transaction of which it was a part. In Karlson v. Hanson & Karlson, etc., Co., 10 Idaho 361, at page 365, 78 P. 1080, at page 1081, this court held that such statute has for its primary object the protection of the wife and the marital community of which she is a member, and was not intended as a shield for the defense of those who would cheat and swindle her; and further said:
“This contract has been fully performed on the part of the plaintiff, and nothing remains to be done but the payment of the purchase price by the defendants. If the contract were wholly executory, and either party were seeking to enforce it, then we would be confronted by the provisions of this statute. But here the defendants invoke the protection of a statute which was enacted for the protection of the plaintiff, and in such a case the defendants, as a matter of right and justice, ought to be estopped and precluded from questioning the manner or method of entering into the contract in the first instance.”
The foregoing quotation from Karlson v. Hanson & Karlson, etc., Co., supra, was used with approval in Farrar v. Parrish, 42 Idaho 451, 245 P. 934. The same principle was followed in Quayle v. Stone, 43 Idaho 306, at page 309, 251 P. 630, at page 630, where the court said:
“This statute is for the protection of the community, and, having enjoyed the benefits of the lease, the tenant cannot use the statute to defeat the payment of the balance of the rent which he agreed to pay.”
In Mitchell v. Atwood, 55 Idaho 772, at page 776, 47 P.2d 680, at page 681, we said:
“It must also be remembered that ‘the statute here invoked is one enacted for the protection of the community’ and one dealing with the community may not invoke the statute to obtain an advantage over the community.”
In Finlayson v. Waller, 64 Idaho 618, at page 626, 134 P.2d 1069, at page 1072, this language was used:
“Section 31-913 I.C.A. [32-912 I.C.], is for the protection of the community and one who has substantially profited by such a contract as we have here cannot use a statute to defeat payments to which he has agreed.”
I am of the opinion that the Charpentiers as a matter of right and justice under the admitted facts ought to be and are estopped to deny the validity of the lease in question.
I cannot agree that the Welches would not be likewise estopped to deny the validity *251of the lease and that the estoppel would not be reciprocal. If the defect in the assignment of the conditional sales contract arising from the failure of Mrs. Barr to sign the same was cured by the warranty deed bearing her signature which was placed in escrow, then likewise the same defect in the assignment of the lease was cured. All of the rights of Mrs. Barr in the property, including all rights under the lease, were transferred to the Welches. Thereafter she had no further community property interest to be protected by invocation of the statute. The Welches took the property subject to the lease and have enjoyed benefits thereunder. They are not in position to question the initial execution of the lease. Estoppel may be imposed in cases wherein the rights of married women are involved as against the invocation of statutes enacted for their protection. Grice v. Woodworth, 10 Idaho 459, 80 P. 912, 69 L.R.A. 584, 109 Am.St. 214; Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Harroun, 44 Idaho 643, 258 P. 929.
The case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to determine the cause on the holding that the Charpentiers are estopped to deny the validity of the lease; and to take additional evidence if deemed necessary to determine the respective rights of the parties.
THOMAS, J., concurs in the above dissent.