Court Opinion

ID: 9961669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 15:02:31.161728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:20.938830
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

RONNIE L. STEELE,                        §
                                         §
       Defendant Below,                  §     No. 234, 2023
       Appellant,                        §
                                         §     Court Below—Superior Court
       v.                                §     of the State of Delaware
                                         §
STATE OF DELAWARE,                       §     Cr. ID No. 2108000421(N)
                                         §
       Appellee.                         §

                          Submitted: February 28, 2024
                          Decided:   April 19, 2024

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

                                   ORDER

      This 19th day of April, 2024, after careful consideration of the parties’ briefs,

the record on appeal, and after oral argument, the Court finds as follows:

    (1)      A Superior Court jury found appellant, Ronnie L. Steele, guilty of

driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Steele appeals his conviction,

arguing that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty. He contends that

because his blood was not drawn, the State relied on circumstantial evidence that

was not adequate to convict him. We have concluded that Steele’s appeal is without

merit and, for the reasons stated below, affirm his conviction.

    (2)      Around 6:30 a.m. on August 2, 2021, a 911 caller found Steele

unconscious in the driver’s seat of his truck with the engine still running. He was
parked inside a car wash at a Shell gas station in Claymont, Delaware. The Delaware

State Police dispatched an officer, Corporal Michael Fiore, Jr., to the scene. Several

emergency medical service workers—including emergency medical technicians and

paramedics (“EMS workers”)—also responded to the scene and arrived at the gas

station nearly simultaneously with Corporal Fiore.

     (3)       Corporal Fiore testified that upon opening the door of Steele’s truck, he

and the paramedics found Steele “completely unresponsive, sweating profusely.”1

He observed that Steele had a “hypodermic syringe with a brown liquid substance

inside injected into his right hand.”2 And he also told the jury that it appeared that

Steele had urinated on himself and that the truck was giving off the “distinct odor of

[an] alcoholic beverage.”3 The EMS workers immediately began tending to Steele

given his condition.

     (4)       While Steele received medical treatment, Corporal Fiore briefly

searched Steele’s vehicle, looking for his insurance card and vehicle registration. He

testified that he did not observe any alcohol, empty containers, or drug paraphernalia

other than the needle that he had seen in Steele’s hand.4 In the meantime, the EMS

1
  App. to Opening Br. at A27; see also id. at A28.
2
  Id. at A27. He stated that “[h]e [knew] from [his] prior training and experience that this [was]
consistent with heroin.” Id.; see also id. at A38–39 (explaining that Steele’s profuse sweating and
the needle in his hand indicated “either Fentanyl or heroin” use).
3
  Id. at A28.
4
   He also testified that he did not observe any drug paraphernalia in the area immediately
surrounding Steele’s vehicle. See id. at A56. Corporal Fiore testified that the other officer on the

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workers moved Steele into the back of an ambulance and Corporal Fiore testified

that he watched outside of the ambulance as the EMS workers administered

intravenous drugs to resuscitate Steele. Once he was alert and responsive, Steele

asked the EMS workers to transport him to Saint Francis Hospital in Wilmington.

Corporal Fiore explained that he did not collect the syringe that was in Steele’s hand

as evidence because he assumed it was placed in a needle disposal container by the

EMS workers and that, for his own safety, he did not want to “stick [his] hand in a

sharps container containing various syringes with bodily fluids[] [and] potentially

unknown substances to recover a needle.”5

     (5)     Corporal Fiore spoke with Steele for the first time in a treatment room

in the emergency department at the hospital. He observed that Steele was “extremely

disorderly,” “argumentative,” “uncooperative with [himself and] hospital staff,” and

was generally behaving “belligerent[ly].”6      He told the jury that during their

conversation, he “detected the distinct odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from

his breath[,]” heard him slur his speech, and observed that Steele’s eyes were

bloodshot, watery, and glassy.7 He also testified that Steele told him that his “head

scene, Trooper Ruszkay—who was there to coordinate the towing of the vehicle—would have
written a report if he had found anything of import in Steele’s car. Id. at A52–A54.
5
  Id. at A50. The contents of the syringe were never tested. Id. at A51.
6
  Id. at A34.
7
  Id. at A33; see also id. at A63–A64.

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was spinning from the Narcan”8 and that he “had [consumed] some vodka a while

ago[,]” but he denied that the needle injected into his hand was his.9

     (6)       Corporal Fiore then tried to explain the process by which Steele’s blood

would be obtained and that he would need Steele’s consent to draw his blood on the

suspicion that Steele was driving under the influence. Steele refused, and according

to Corporal Fiore, “was not comprehending the process” and “[did not] understand

how he could be charged with [driving under the influence] if he refused the blood

draw.”10 He then read the implied consent form to Steele again.11 He told the jury

that Steele’s “response to all of it was ‘f[…] you.’”12 Given Steele’s “belligerent

and disorderly” behavior and the concerns Corporal Fiore had for his own safety, as

well as the safety of both the hospital personnel and Steele himself, he did not obtain

a warrant to conduct a blood draw and arrested Steele for driving under the

influence.13

8
   Narcan is a brand name for naloxone, which is a “medicine that rapidly reverses an opioid
overdose.” Naloxone DrugFacts, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (Jan. 2022),
https://nida.nih.gov/publications/drugfacts/naloxone; see also Narcan, DRUGS.COM (Aug. 22,
2023).
9
  Id. at A34; see also id. at A60.
10
   Id. at A34–A35, A37; see also id. at A58–A59.
11
   Id. at A36. The Delaware State Police utilize implied consent forms “when a person refuses to
take any of the chemical tests authorized under 21 Del. C. § 2740.” Hicks v. Shahan, 1994 WL
710881, at *1 (Del. Super. Nov. 14, 1994).
12
   App. to Opening Br. at A36.
13
   See id. at A36–37.

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     (7)      On March 28, 2022, Steele was indicted for driving under the influence,

driving without a valid license, and no proof of insurance. On January 24, 2023,

Steele filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to Corporal Fiore at the

hospital. On February 17, 2023, the court denied Steele’s motion to suppress and

amended his indictment to drop the charges of driving without a license and no proof

of insurance.14 On February 21, 2023, the Superior Court held a one-day trial. The

State’s only witness was Corporal Fiore. During the trial Steele did not move for

judgment of acquittal. Steele was found guilty and was sentenced to five years of

imprisonment at Level V, suspended after six months for one year of Level III

probation.15 On June 6, 2023, Steele filed the present appeal.

     (8)      On appeal, Steele contends that there was insufficient evidence to

support his conviction and that no rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond

a reasonable doubt that he was driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

Specifically, he argues that “the State relied solely on a [police officer’s]

unconfirmed suspicions, speculation, and observations made after Steele received

treatment[.]”16

14
   Id. at A3 (Superior Court Docket).
15
   See Opening Br., Ex. B (Sentencing Order).
16
   Id. at 2.

                                                5
     (9)       We review Steele’s claim for plain error, because he failed to raise the

issue below by way of a motion for judgment of acquittal.17 To find plain error, the

error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to a defendant’s substantial rights

that it jeopardizes the fairness and integrity of the trial process.18

     (10)      We find no plain error here. The State presented sufficient evidence

such that a reasonable trier of fact could convict Steele of driving under the influence

of drugs or alcohol. “An insufficiency of evidence claim must fail if ‘any rational

trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”19                    When making such a

determination, we do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.20

And when the determination hinges on witness credibility, we do not substitute our

opinion for that of the trier of fact.21

17
   See Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 342, 358 (Del. 2003), holding modified by Baker v. State, 906 A.2d
139 (Del. 2006) (citing Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 563 (Del. 1995)) (“In the absence of a
motion . . . for judgment of acquittal . . ., this Court reviews claims of insufficient evidence for
plain error.”); see also Williamson v. State, 113 A.3d 155, 157–58 (Del. 2015).
18
   See Kent v. State, 2021 WL 4393804, at *3 (Del. Sept. 24, 2021) (TABLE) (quoting Wainwright
v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)). “[T]he doctrine of plain error is limited to material
defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious[,] and fundamental
in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly
show manifest injustice.” Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100.
19
   Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730, 738 (Del. 2002) (quoting Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345,
1355 (Del. 1991)); see also Williams v. State, 2005 WL 2414375, at *2 (Del. Sept. 29, 2005).
20
    See Davis v. State, 706 A.2d 523, 525 (Del. 1998) (citations omitted) (“Evidence of a
defendant’s guilt may be proven exclusively through circumstantial evidence since this Court does
not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence in a conviction context.”)
21
   Dryden v. State, 945 A.2d 594, 2008 WL 555956, at *1 (Del. 2008) (TABLE) (citation omitted).

                                                 6
      (11)      Corporal Fiore’s testimony lays plain that Steele was exhibiting indicia

of alcohol or drug impairment throughout the entirety of their interaction. At the gas

station where Fiore and the EMS workers found Steele, he was unresponsive and

sweating profusely, had a syringe sticking out of his hand, was covered in what

appeared to be urine, and he smelled of alcohol—all common markers of

impairment.22 At the hospital, Corporal Fiore observed that Steele had the smell of

alcohol on his breath, was belligerent, disorderly, seemingly confused, admitted to

drinking vodka at some point before being found on the scene, and refused to consent

to blood tests. Corporal Fiore told the jury that, through his training and experience,

all these observations suggested to him that Steele was under the influence of alcohol

or drugs.23 It is of no moment that this evidence is circumstantial, testimonial in

nature, or not corroborated by physical evidence.24 It was admissible evidence on

which the jury was free to rely. Steele fails to explain how it was insufficient or how

the jury’s reliance on Corporal Fiore’s testimony constitutes error, let alone plain

error. We affirm.

22
    See, e.g., Bease v. State, 884 A.2d 495, 499–500 (Del. 2005) (describing common indicia of
alcohol impairment such as the admission of prior drinking, an odor of alcohol emanating from
someone’s person or vehicle, glassy and bloodshot eyes, disorientation).
23
    See App. to Opening Br. at A37–A38.
24
     See Hardin v. State, 840 A.2d 1217, 1224 (Del. 2003) (citation omitted) (“There is no
requirement that testimonial evidence be corroborated either by physical evidence or corroborating
testimony. . . . The testimony of a sole witness . . . [is] sufficient to form the basis for a conviction
if the testimony presented by that witness establishes every element of the offense and is found by
the jury to be credible.”).

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    BY THE COURT:

    /s/ N. Christopher Griffiths
              Justice

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