Court Opinion

ID: 9609154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:23:13.409001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:12.956638
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — The majority holds that the LaMons have not established a prima facie case of negligence with respect to this defamation action, and therefore uphold a summary judgment motion dismissing the case. I believe that whether or not such negligence was present is a question of fact, which cannot be resolved by summary judgment. I dissent, as I would remand this case for trial to decide whether or not Butler and The Daily World were negligent when publishing the false and defamatory statement in their newspaper.
Proper Standard of Review
The majority opinion implicitly supports a position that "a defamation plaintiff's standard of proof depends on the status of the defendant." Majority, at 220. The majority holds that a plaintiff must present a prima facie case with "clear and convincing" evidence against a media defendant, but only by a "preponderance of the evidence" against nonmedia defendants. While admittedly the majority states that the LaMons cannot even meet the preponderance of evidence standard of proof — a result I believe is clearly *238wrong — its failure to clarify this issue of the proper standard of review is inexcusable considering the recent United States Supreme Court case in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). In Dun & Bradstreet, five justices explicitly held that any distinction between media and nonmedia defendants violated the First Amendment. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 765, 773 (White, J., concurring), 472 U.S. at 774, 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Subsequent federal courts, following the decision in Dun & Bradstreet, have rejected this media/nonmedia distinction. See Garcia v. Board of Educ., 777 F.2d 1403, 1409-10 (10th Cir. 1985); In re IBP Confidential Business Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 642 (8th Cir. 1986).
Therefore, if the evidence presented by the LaMons, and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from that evidence, establishes a prima facie case of defamation by a preponderance of the evidence, the motion for summary judgment should be denied. I believe that in this case such a prima facie cause of action has been established.
Negligent Conduct
The majority concludes that the LaMons have not established that Butler acted negligently. I disagree. Butler asserts that after she was read the superior court order, she did not know its effect on Lorraine LaMon's municipal court assault conviction. She further asserts that she then contacted the Westport City Attorney's Office, which supposedly informed her that the Superior Court's dismissal did not affect the original assault conviction. I find this explanation strains credulity, and I believe that a trial is required to determine whether Butler was negligent.
The superior court order dismissing the municipal court action read as follows:
This cause coming on for hearing on motion of the defendants by and through their attorney of record, . . . to dismiss the action and the same being stipulated by counsel, [attorneys] for plaintiff, and the Court being *239fully advised in the premises, it is ordered that the said motion be and the same is hereby granted: It is ordered that the above action be dismissed with prejudice. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the defendants pay all costs in the matter.
Clerk's Papers, at 66.1 do not believe that any lawyer could read this order and not conclude that the original conviction was reversed. Either Butler has fabricated the results of her conversation with the Westport City Attorney's Office, or she mischaracterized the order when she talked with that office. In either event, a fact finder could certainly find her actions negligent, and this case should therefore not be disposed of by summary judgment.
Conclusion
I dissent to the majority opinion. I believe the majority fails to clarify the proper standard of proof which the LaMons must meet to resist the motion for summary judgment. I would hold that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Butler's conduct was negligent. I would remand for trial.
Reconsideration granted July 6, 1988.