Court Opinion

ID: 9952644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 15:01:39.610315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:01.866578
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
         For the Eighth Circuit
     ___________________________

             No. 23-1847
     ___________________________

         United States of America

                   Plaintiff - Appellant

                     v.

           Jason Robert Wesely

               Defendant - Appellee
     ___________________________

             No. 23-1854
     ___________________________

         United States of America

                   Plaintiff - Appellant

                     v.

        Jesus Rafael Diaz-Figueroa

                 Defendant - Appellee
              ____________

 Appeals from United States District Court
 for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
               ____________

      Submitted: December 11, 2023
         Filed: March 20, 2024
             ____________
Before ERICKSON, MELLOY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

STRAS, Circuit Judge.

      The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act provides that district courts “shall
assess an amount of $5,000 on any non-indigent person” convicted of sexual
exploitation of a child. 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a)(3). Both Jason Wesely and Jesus
Diaz-Figueroa had qualifying convictions, but findings of indigency meant that
neither had to pay the assessment. We reverse and remand in Diaz-Figueroa’s case.

                                           I.

       Unless a defendant is indigent, a district court has no choice but to impose the
special assessment. 1 See id. § 3014(a); United States v. Kelley, 861 F.3d 790, 801
(8th Cir. 2017) (“exclud[ing] discretionary decisions by the court once
non-indigence has been determined”). As we have explained, indigency depends on
“a defendant’s current financial situation and his ability to pay in the future.” Kelley,
861 F.3d at 801 (emphasis added). What matters, in other words, is a defendant’s
ability to pay, now or later. See id.; cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3014(g), 3613(b) (imposing a
20-year collection period).

      An appreciable net worth at the time of sentencing generally requires the
special assessment, regardless of future earning power. See United States v. Mung,
989 F.3d 639, 645 (8th Cir. 2021). Alternatively, defendants who have future
“earning[] capacity” because of their young age, good health, “education, skills, [or]
work experience” are also eligible for it. United States v. Otradovec, 72 F.4th 794,
797 (7th Cir. 2023); see also United States v. Meek, 32 F.4th 576, 581 (6th Cir. 2022)

      1
       In addition to imposing a special assessment, the statute specifies where to
deposit the funds: the Domestic Trafficking Victims’ Fund. 18 U.S.C. § 3014(d).
From there, it directs the Attorney General and Secretary of Health and Human
Services “to award grants or enhance victims’ programming.” Id. § 3014(e).
                                        -2-
(reasoning that a defendant was not indigent because he was “a college graduate who
ha[d] worked in a number of fields” and would likely “resume th[o]se efforts” after
release). Either way, the burden to establish otherwise rests with the defendant. See
Kelley, 861 F.3d at 800 n.5.

                                           II.

       Overturning a finding of indigence on appeal requires a showing of clear
error.2 See id. at 801. It is a steep hill to climb. We will reverse only if we are
“definite[ly] and firm[ly]” convinced that the district court made “a mistake,” Oden
v. Share Smith Enters., Inc., 27 F.4th 631, 633 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted), not
just that we would have “weighed the evidence differently,” Anderson v. Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

                                           A.

      At the time of sentencing, Wesely was a few months short of his fortieth
birthday with a single asset to his name: a savings account with a balance of $24.12.
He had sold his other assets for the benefit of his two children. As he noted during
allocution, he owed state-ordered spousal and child support in the amount of $2,500
per month, which he could not afford given his lack of assets or employment.

      His future earning capacity looked equally bleak. It is true that he had once
earned $65,000 per year in the Iowa National Guard. But prison likely put an end to
his military career. And his military disability benefits remained in limbo.

      2
        Wesely’s position is that plain-error review applies. The government,
however, specifically asked the district court to impose the special assessment at
sentencing, which preserved the issue for appeal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b); see
also United States v. Poitra, 648 F.3d 884, 892 (8th Cir. 2011) (explaining that
plain-error review incentivizes “timely objections that allow the district court . . .
[to] adjudicate the dispute . . . [and] resolve any alleged errors” (citations omitted)).
                                            -3-
      To sum up, he had one asset, but it was not enough to pay the special
assessment. The district court also could not count on future income, given that
Wesely was facing a possible suspension of his disability benefits and had uncertain
post-prison job prospects. We cannot overturn a finding of indigence on mere
guesswork. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.

                                         B.

      But there is more than guesswork available in Diaz-Figueroa’s case. At the
time of sentencing, he had a net worth of approximately $120,000, split between
$90,000 in home equity and almost $30,000 in a joint checking account. He also
had a car and some debt, but they largely canceled each other out.

       Even discounting his future job prospects, Diaz-Figueroa’s current assets left
plenty of room to pay the $5,000 special assessment. After all, a positive net worth
“at the time of sentencing,” Mung, 989 F.3d at 645 (involving “$8,000 in [a] bank
account and no debt or liabilities”), can “preclude[] a finding of indigence” under
§ 3014, Kelley, 861 F.3d at 802. Cf. United States v. Barthman, 983 F.3d 318,
322–23 (8th Cir. 2020) (reversing because the defendant “ha[d] a negative net worth
of $166,903” and would be “nearly 80 years old, if not older, when . . . released from
custody”).

       It makes no difference that the district court had already ordered $48,000 in
restitution. Even if we assume that court-ordered restitution is a relevant
consideration under § 3014, subtracting the award still left Diaz-Figueroa with a
positive net worth of over $70,000, even if much of it was in home equity. Cf. 18
U.S.C. § 3014(b) (prioritizing the payment of all “court-ordered fines, . . .
restitution,” and other “victim-compensation” obligations before the payment of the
$5,000 special assessment). A net worth that high, while hardly a fortune, does not
make someone indigent either. The district court’s finding to the contrary was
clearly erroneous. See Kelley, 861 F.3d at 801.

                                         -4-
                                III.

      We accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings for
Diaz-Figueroa, but otherwise affirm.
                      ______________________________

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