Court Opinion

ID: 9498328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:14:42.503677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:45.915236
License: Public Domain

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in that portion of the opinion concluding that the district court had jurisdiction to revoke the supervised release term. I respectfully dissent, however, from that portion of the opinion concluding that Ortuño-Higareda was not adequately apprised of the standard condition that he “not commit another federal, state or local crime.” As the majority opinion acknowledges, we have ruled that notice of a supervised release condition is adequate if the defendant received actual notice of that condition. See United States v. Ortega-Brito, 311 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir.2002).
As the majority opinion noted, at the time of sentencing the district court advised the defendant of the imposition of
... supervised release with the standard conditions plus the special condition that the defendant is not to enter the United States without proper documentation.
... if you reenter the United States, you’re going to be — within three years ... you will be violating your conditions of probation, you will be brought before the Court for violation of supervised release, and you could do another three yeas for entering illegally.
The majority opinion proposes to vacate the revocation because Ortuño was advised of Special Condition One, that he not “reenter the United States without legal authorization,” but was not advised of Standard Condition One, that he “not commit another federal, state or local crime.” The majority opinion reasons that because the revocation petition charged a violation of Standard Condition One and not Special Condition One, a violation of Standard Condition One “could not serve as the basis for revocation of his supervised release.” However, I am not convinced that invalidation of the revocation is consistent with Ortegar-BHto.
The supervised release advisement in Ortegar-BHto was not markedly different from the advisement in this case. In Ortega-Brito, the releasee was advised that supervised release was “like a parole. If you do something wrong, you go back to jail.” Ortegar-BHto, 311 F.3d at 1138. The district court judge informed the re-leasee of the conditions of supervised release by stating:
The usual terms and conditions will apply, together with the special terms and conditions: that under no circumstances is he ever again, as long as he lives, to reenter or attempt to reenter the United States without being properly and legally documented to do so and having legal permission from the United States government to do so.
Id. at 1139 (alteration omitted).
We interpreted the advisement given by the district court as giving Ortega-Brito
actual notice that his release was conditioned upon compliance with at least two restrictions: he may not (1) commit any crimes, and (2) reenter the United States without proper documentation.
Id. (emphasis added).
The majority opinion concludes that “[i]t is insufficient that Ortuño was verbally *926advised that he would violate a condition of his supervised release if he illegally reentered the United States.” Yet that is precisely what we approved in Ortega-Brito. Although, Ortega-Brito, like Ortu-ño, was not expressly advised that his supervised release was conditioned on his refraining from committing crimes, we nevertheless ruled that Ortega-Brito “received actual notice” that “he may not ... commit any crimes.” Id. There is no principled basis upon which Ortega-Brito can be distinguished. That is especially true in this case, because the petition to revoke supervised release, although referencing Standard Condition One (commission of a crime), described the violation as the illegal re-entry that the district court expressly advised Ortuño would constitute a violation. If the advisement was adequate in Ortega-Brito to convey actual notice, it was equally adequate in this case. Because I am convinced that Ortega-Brito controls, I would affirm the revocation. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion concluding otherwise.