Court Opinion

ID: 9398322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 20:08:27.800515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:32.808469
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                   2023 IL App (4th) 220096-U
                                                                                         FILED
This Order was filed under                                                             May 30, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                NO. 4-22-0096
                                                                                       Carla Bender
not precedent except in the                                                        4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed      IN THE APPELLATE COURT
                                                                                         Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                             OF ILLINOIS

                                         FOURTH DISTRICT

   THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                            )   Appeal from the
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   )   Circuit Court of
             v.                                                    )   Winnebago County
   CHRISTOPHER A. ROBINSON,                                        )   No. 03CF3197
             Defendant-Appellant.                                  )
                                                                   )   Honorable
                                                                   )   Joseph G. McGraw,
                                                                   )   Judge Presiding.

                 JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
                 Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

¶1       Held: (1) The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s third-stage denial of defendant’s
               amended postconviction petition.

                 (2) Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to base the pretrial
                 motion to suppress defendant’s confession on its alleged involuntariness, and
                 appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to raise this issue
                 on direct appeal.

                 (3) Defendant did not satisfy his burden of demonstrating a substantial
                 constitutional violation at the third-stage evidentiary hearing.

                 (4) Postconviction counsel did not provide unreasonable assistance at the
                 third-stage evidentiary hearing in attempting to demonstrate the claimed
                 ineffectiveness of trial and appellate counsel.

¶2               Following a jury trial, defendant, Christopher A. Robinson, was convicted of first

degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2002)) and sentenced to 50 years in prison. On direct

appeal, the appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. People v. Robinson, No.
2-07-0691 (April 20, 2009) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). In February

2010, defendant filed a pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS

5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010)). The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, but the appellate

court reversed and remanded for second-stage proceedings. People v. Robinson, 2012 IL App (2d)

100536-U. Thereafter, defendant, through counsel, filed an amended postconviction petition,

asserting both trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. On remand, a different

trial court judge granted the State’s motion to dismiss the postconviction petition. Defendant

appealed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded for third-stage proceedings. People v.

Robinson, No. 2-17-0561 (December 18, 2019) (unpublished summary order under Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). On remand, a different trial court judge denied defendant’s

postconviction petition following the third-stage evidentiary hearing.

¶3             Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying his amended

postconviction petition following the third-stage evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

¶4                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶5             On November 26, 2003, defendant was charged by indictment with one count of

first degree murder knowing such act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm

(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2002)) following the fatal shooting of Shontrelle Graham in October

2003. A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and the trial court sentenced him to 50

years’ imprisonment.

¶6             Defendant appealed, arguing the prosecutor’s improper remarks during closing

argument deprived defendant of a fair trial, and the appellate court affirmed. Robinson, No.

2-07-0691 (April 20, 2009) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶7             On February 1, 2010, defendant filed a pro se petition under the Act, arguing his

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trial counsel was ineffective in connection with a pretrial motion to suppress his confession where

he failed to present evidence of diminished mental capacity, purportedly establishing the

involuntariness of the confession. (This motion was instead grounded on the purported illegality

of defendant’s detention at the time of his confession.) More specifically, defendant alleged he had

informed trial counsel, inter alia, of having been (1) diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and

a learning disability, (2) previously hospitalized for mental health issues, and (3) physically abused

as a child. Defendant argued trial counsel’s failure to base the pretrial suppression motion on his

diminished mental capacity amounted to unreasonable performance and, but for this, there is a

reasonable probability he would not have been convicted. The trial court summarily dismissed the

petition, finding defendant’s contentions of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness to be “frivolous and

patently without merit.” The court found defendant’s claims of his appellate counsel’s

ineffectiveness “likewise frivolous and patently without merit.”

¶8             Defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for second-stage

proceedings, holding “the failure to base *** the motion to suppress on the defendant’s alleged

diminished mental capacity arguably fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and this

failure arguably prejudiced defendant as a motion to suppress grounded on his diminished mental

capacity and the alleged involuntariness of his confession arguably would have been granted.

Robinson, 2012 IL App (2d) 100536-U, ¶¶ 21-22. The appellate court noted, had the motion been

grounded on this basis and granted, “[t]he outcome of the trial arguably would have changed

because the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming.” Id. ¶ 22.

¶9             Following remand for second-stage proceedings, defendant, through counsel, filed

an amended postconviction petition. Defendant argued his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to present evidence at the hearing on the pretrial suppression motion regarding

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his alleged diminished mental capacity even though both defendant and his mother had informed

trial counsel of his condition. Defendant argued this amounted to unreasonable assistance which

prejudiced him at trial, as his purportedly involuntary confession was read to the jury. Defendant

additionally argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to have raised trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness. A different trial court judge presided over the second-stage evidentiary hearing

and granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The court found the pretrial suppression motion would

not have been granted even if the information as to defendant’s mental health issues was presented

and, therefore, he did not suffer prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to present that information.

¶ 10           Defendant appealed the trial court’s dismissal and the appellate court reversed and

remanded for third-stage proceedings. Robinson, No. 2-17-0561 (December 18, 2019)

(unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). Specifically, the appellate

court found the trial court engaged in improper fact-finding and credibility determinations where

the pertinent question at the second-stage evidentiary hearing is “whether the petition and

accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Id.

¶¶ 7-10. The appellate court also directed the case be assigned to a different judge for third-stage

proceedings. Id. ¶ 11.

¶ 11           Defendant was the only witness postconviction counsel called to testify at the

third-stage evidentiary hearing. Defendant testified about being interrogated by Rockford police

detectives and how Detective Mark Jimenez transcribed defendant’s verbal statements. Defendant

testified he was unable to read or understand the written transcript of his statements and Detective

Jimenez read the transcript aloud to him. Defendant explained he had been prescribed psychiatric

medication but was not taking it regularly prior to giving his statement. Defendant stated he had

also been previously hospitalized for depression. According to defendant, he informed his trial

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counsel of his mental health issues during their discussions at the jail. Defendant also testified to

receiving Social Security benefits for his mental health issues.

¶ 12           During closing argument, postconviction counsel emphasized the only issue trial

counsel raised in the pretrial suppression motion was the illegality of defendant’s detention. Trial

counsel did not raise any issue regarding defendant’s purported mental health issues; had he done

so, and had this suppression motion been granted, the outcome of the trial would likely have been

different given the conflicting eyewitness accounts as to the identity of the shooter. Postconviction

counsel noted affidavits and medical records were attached to the instant petition, and those were

the only evidence he had given the unavailability at that point of additional records. Postconviction

counsel requested the trial court grant the petition and grant defendant a new trial.

¶ 13           For its part, the State argued generally a defendant’s mental health issues do not by

themselves render a confession involuntary. The State pointed out defendant had an eleventh-grade

education at the time he gave his statements, he had been apprised of his Miranda rights (see

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) and signified his comprehension thereof, and there was

no allegation the police engaged in any mental or physical abuse of defendant which could

undermine the voluntariness of his confession. The State argued trial counsel could not have been

ineffective in failing to base the pretrial suppression motion on defendant’s mental health issues

and, derivatively, appellate counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to raise this issue.

Moreover, the State asserted the documents attached to the petition were inadmissible hearsay.

The State then referred to the trial testimony of various detectives pertaining to how defendant

acknowledged his understanding of his Miranda rights and agreed to speak, was able to read his

statements aloud, and was fit, alert, and responsive during the interrogations.

¶ 14           The trial court denied defendant’s petition, finding, “[t]he evidence presented by

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[defendant] in support of his amended petition for postconviction relief utterly fail[s] to establish

that [his] mental health issues, if any, rendered him incapable of understanding the statement

taking process.” Therefore, “trial counsel was not ineffective for not raising those issues.” The

court concluded, “[i]t is axiomatic that appellate counsel could not be ineffective [f]or failing to

raise matters outside the trial court record which are utterly unsubstantiated anyway.”

¶ 15           This appeal followed.

¶ 16                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17           On appeal, defendant argues his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable

assistance by presenting only defendant’s testimony at the hearing on the amended petition.

Defendant contends postconviction counsel did not “present” any of the available documentation

regarding defendant’s mental health issues at the hearing (despite it being attached to the petition).

According to defendant, had postconviction counsel done so, he would have established trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to present such evidence at the hearing on the pretrial

suppression motion purportedly showing the involuntariness of the confession.

¶ 18           In response, the State argues a pretrial suppression motion based on the involuntary

nature of defendant’s confession would have been meritless and, as a result, trial counsel would

not have been ineffective for failing to file such a motion. The State contends appellate counsel

would therefore not have been ineffective for failing to raise this alleged involuntariness on direct

appeal and postconviction counsel could not have provided unreasonable assistance in attempting

to demonstrate trial and appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness.

¶ 19           The Act sets forth three stages of review. At the first stage, the trial court may

summarily dismiss a postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit. 725 ILCS

5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020). If the petition is not dismissed, it advances to the second stage.

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¶ 20            At the second stage of postconviction proceedings, the State may move to dismiss

a petition or an amended petition pending before the court. Id. § 122-5. If the motion is denied, or

if no motion to dismiss is filed, the State must answer the petition. Id. At this stage, the trial court

must determine whether the petition and the accompanying documentation make a “ ‘substantial

showing of a constitutional violation.’ ” People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33, 967 N.E.2d

767 (quoting People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246, 757 N.E.2d 442, 446 (2001)). If the petition

satisfies this standard, the defendant is entitled to a third-stage evidentiary hearing at which the

trial court acts as the fact finder and determines whether the evidence introduced demonstrates the

defendant is entitled to relief. Id. ¶ 34.

¶ 21            At the third stage of a postconviction proceeding, the defendant bears the burden of

making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458,

473, 861 N.E.2d 999, 1008 (2006). When a petition is advanced to a third-stage evidentiary

hearing, where fact-finding and credibility determinations are involved, we will not reverse a trial

court’s decision unless it is manifestly erroneous. Id. “Manifest error is error that is ‘clearly

evident, plain, and indisputable.’ ” People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 73, 890 N.E.2d 500, 510

(2008) (quoting People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155, 817 N.E.2d 524, 528 (2004)). Because

the trial court heard testimonial evidence at the third-stage evidentiary hearing, its judgment will

not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous.

¶ 22            “The right to counsel in postconviction proceedings is wholly statutory.” People v.

Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 42, 890 N.E.2d 398, 402 (2007). As such “a petitioner is entitled only to

the level of assistance required by the Act.” Id. The Act requires “a ‘reasonable’ level of

assistance.” Id. By contrast, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under the

two-pronged performance-prejudice test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

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687 (1984). “Under this test, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness, and a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v.

Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 11, 989 N.E.2d 192. “A defendant’s failure to establish either prong

of the Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id.

¶ 23           Underlying     defendant’s contention his postconviction           counsel   provided

unreasonable assistance at the third-stage evidentiary hearing is the proposition his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to present evidence of defendant’s diminished mental capacity at the

hearing on the pretrial suppression motion. As the appellate court has explained:

               “the decision of whether to file a motion to suppress is generally a matter

               of trial strategy and not subject to a claim of ineffective assistance of

               counsel. [Citation]. In order to establish prejudice resulting from defense

               counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress, a defendant must show a

               reasonable probability that (1) the motion to suppress would have been

               granted and (2) the outcome of the trial would have been different had the

               evidence been suppressed. [Citation]. In other words, defense counsel’s

               failure to file a motion to suppress does not establish incompetent

               representation, if the motion would have been futile. [Citation]. Although

               the failure to file a motion to suppress is generally not a basis for an

               ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the failure to file a motion to

               suppress statements may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if there

               is some indication that the statements were truly involuntary. [Citation].”

                                                -8-
               (Emphasis added.) People v. Brickhouse, 2018 IL App (3d) 150807, ¶ 40,

               115 N.E.3d 248.

¶ 24           “The test of voluntariness is whether the defendant made the statement freely,

voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the defendant’s will

was overcome at the time he or she confessed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.

Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 253, 917 N.E.2d 501, 514 (2009). In determining whether a statement

is voluntary, “a court must consider the totality of the circumstances of the particular case; no

single factor is dispositive.” Id. Among the pertinent factors are “the defendant’s age, intelligence,

background, experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at the time of

questioning; the legality and duration of the detention; the presence of Miranda warnings; the

duration of the questioning; and any physical or mental abuse by police, including the existence

of threats or promises.” Id. at 253-54.

¶ 25           If the evidence as to defendant’s mental issues would not establish the

involuntariness of his confession, there is no reasonable probability a motion to suppress grounded

on such evidence would have been granted. Indeed, it would have been meritless to the point of

being “futile.” Brickhouse, 2018 IL App (3d) 150807, ¶ 40. Accordingly, trial counsel would not

have been ineffective for failing to have brought such a motion, and appellate counsel would not

have been ineffective for failing to raise this on direct appeal. See People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d

307, 329, 736 N.E.2d 975, 991 (2000) (noting “unless the underlying issues are meritorious,

defendant has suffered no prejudice from counsel’s failure to raise them on appeal”). There would

have been no constitutional impediment to the publication of defendant’s confession to the jury,

and he therefore would not be able to satisfy his burden at the third-stage evidentiary hearing of

making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. His postconviction counsel therefore

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would not have provided unreasonable assistance in his attempt to demonstrate the alleged

antecedent ineffectiveness of trial and appellate counsel. We will first take up the issue of trial

counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in relation to the pretrial suppression motion. To do so, we decide

whether there is any “indication that [defendant’s] statements [to police] were truly involuntary”

such that filing the suppression motion defendant envisions would not have been “futile.”

Brickhouse, 2018 IL App (3d) 150807, ¶ 40. Through doing so, we decide whether the trial court’s

denial of defendant’s amended postconviction petition, in which it held that the evidence “utterly

fail[s] to establish that [his] mental health issues, if any, rendered him incapable of understanding

the statement taking process,” is manifestly erroneous.

¶ 26           Detective Robert Veruchi testified at the pretrial suppression hearing. On October

27, 2003, before questioning defendant, Veruchi (joined by Detective Barry Cunningham) asked

defendant if he could read, write, and understand English. Defendant responded he could. Veruchi

recalled defendant stating he had completed eleventh grade. Defendant was not under the influence

of drugs or alcohol. Veruchi informed defendant of his Miranda rights through a “rights form”

prepared by the Rockford Police Department. Defendant, without difficulty, read aloud a sentence

reading, “Before we ask you any questions you must understand your rights.” Thereafter, Veruchi

read aloud to defendant four sentences from the rights form pertaining to his right to remain silent

and right to speak to a lawyer and/or have a lawyer present. Defendant responded he understood

these rights and initialed each of these sentences. Defendant then read aloud a sentence reading, “I

understand these rights,” stated he did in fact understand his rights and would speak with the

detectives, and signed the bottom of the rights form.

¶ 27           Over the next several hours of questioning, the detectives took breaks, gave

defendant soda, and allowed him to use the restroom and smoke. Eventually, Detective

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Cunningham told defendant they were done speaking to him and were tired of listening to his lies.

Defendant then stated he was going to tell the truth. He stated he was in the car during the shooting

of Shontrelle Graham and knew the location of the murder weapon. The detectives transported

defendant from the Public Safety Building to that location, discovered the weapon, and left the

location to travel back to the Public Safety Building. On the way, detectives bought food for

defendant. They returned to the Public Safety Building with defendant, allowed him to eat his

food, and then resumed their questioning. By then, it was approximately 12:30 a.m. on October

28, 2003. Approximately 10 minutes later, defendant stated he would be willing to provide a

written statement. Cunningham typed the statement as defendant spoke, read it aloud to defendant,

and asked defendant if he wanted any changes made. Cunningham printed out the statement and

gave it to defendant so he could read it and make any corrections. Defendant advised the statement

was true and signed it.

¶ 28           According to Veruchi, defendant never requested an attorney or asked to no longer

speak with the detectives. Defendant appeared physically alert and fit during questioning, gave

responsive answers, and was not threatened in any way or promised anything to speak with the

detectives. On cross-examination, Veruchi denied: (1) defendant asking if he could have a lawyer

before questioning began; (2) telling defendant the presence of a lawyer was “irrelevant”;

(3) Cunningham saying any such thing; (4) Cunningham poking defendant in the knee and chest,

pushing defendant up against the wall of the interview room, or making any other physical contact

with defendant during the questioning; (5) Cunningham telling defendant he could be allowed to

go home like another person involved in the case if he “gave an accounting”; and (6) Cunningham

telling defendant he would go to prison otherwise and he “would make sure that the charge stood

up.” Veruchi also denied grabbing defendant by the hood of his sweatshirt.

                                               - 11 -
¶ 29           Detective Mark Jimenez testified at trial. On October 30, 2003, Jimenez and

Detective Andre Brass went to the Winnebago County jail to speak with defendant. According to

Jimenez, defendant completed eleventh grade and was able to read and write English. Jimenez

provided defendant the Miranda rights forms. Defendant read aloud the first sentence, which reads,

“Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.” Defendant understood and

initialed after this sentence. Jimenez then read aloud the same four sentences pertaining to

defendant’s Miranda rights Veruchi read three days earlier. Defendant understood his rights and

initialed after each line on the form. Defendant read aloud the final sentence, which reads, “I

understand these rights,” initialed after that line, stated he understood his rights, and agreed to

speak with the detectives.

¶ 30           According to Jimenez, “the whole time” of the questioning, defendant “had his chin

in his chest.” Jimenez asked defendant if he shot Graham, and defendant responded first by

nodding his head and then, on Jimenez’s request for defendant to respond verbally, said he did.

Jimenez later asked defendant if he was willing to provide a written statement, and defendant said

he was. Detective Brass typed the statement based on the answers defendant gave to their

questions. The statement was printed and given to defendant. Defendant read the statement aloud

and made one correction to it. Defendant wrote his initials at the beginning and end of each

paragraph. Defendant, Brass, and Jimenez then signed the statement.

¶ 31           Following our review of the record, we hold the trial court’s finding trial counsel

was not ineffective in relation to the pretrial suppression motion was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Defendant was 18 years old, had completed eleventh grade, and was

physically fit and alert at the time of questioning. Defendant stated he was not under the influence

of alcohol or drugs during questioning. Defendant was apprised of his Miranda rights before the

                                               - 12 -
questioning began on both October 27, 2003, and October 30, 2003, and, on both dates, agreed to

speak with the detectives. No evidence was presented to show defendant invoked either his right

to remain silent or his right to an attorney at any time on either date. There was no evidence of any

physical or mental abuse, or threats or promises, by the police at any time on either date.

Additionally, on both dates, the detectives took breaks in the questioning, during which they

permitted defendant to eat, drink, smoke, and use the restroom. Thus, on this record, no reasonable

probability exists a pretrial suppression motion based on defendant’s purported mental health

issues at the time of his questioning would have been granted. Brickhouse, 2018 IL App (3d)

150807, ¶ 40.

¶ 32            Indeed, such a motion would have been “futile” under the circumstances. As there

was no evidence defendant’s confession was involuntary under the Richardson factors, “defense

counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress [on this basis] does not establish incompetent

representation.” Id.; see People v. Cooper, 2013 IL App (1st) 113030, ¶¶ 66-68, 991 N.E.2d 789

(holding the defendant could not “establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to focus on

his mental deficiencies” in that there was no “reasonable probability [the] defendant’s motion to

suppress would have been granted”).

¶ 33            As trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to base the pretrial suppression

motion on this alleged involuntariness, appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise this

nonmeritorious issue on direct appeal. See People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 175, 730 N.E.2d

32 (2000) (explaining “[c]laims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are measured against

the same standard as those dealing with ineffective assistance of trial counsel,” and “[u]nless the

underlying issue is meritorious, petitioner suffered no prejudice from counsel’s failure to raise it

on direct appeal”). Thus, the trial court’s finding “[t]he evidence presented by [defendant] in

                                                - 13 -
support of his amended petition for postconviction relief utterly fail[s] to establish that [his] mental

health issues, if any, rendered him incapable of understanding the statement taking process” was

not manifestly erroneous. As no constitutional impediment existed to the publication of his

statements to the police at trial, defendant cannot satisfy his burden at a third-stage evidentiary

hearing of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Nor can defendant establish

postconviction counsel’s unreasonable assistance in connection with these postconviction

proceedings.

¶ 34                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 35            For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s amended

postconviction petition.

¶ 36            Affirmed.

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