Court Opinion

ID: 9681234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:46:22.008653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:32.823860
License: Public Domain

GARY M. GAERTNER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
*400The majority opinion grants the defendant a new trial based upon the prejudice perceived from the State’s violation of a discovery rule. The State failed to disclose that Mike Taylor would testify at trial regarding statements made by defendant. The trial court ruled that the State was not required to disclose the fact that Taylor would testify because his testimony was being presented on rebuttal. I would adopt the Western District’s position that such a witness need not be disclosed unless the defendant asserts an alibi defense. See State v. Burton, 721 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Mo.App., W.D.1986); State v. Lutjen, 661 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Mo.App., W.D.1983). Nevertheless, assuming the trial court erred in its ruling, I disagree with the majority for another reason.
The trial court possesses broad discretion in ruling on discovery violations. State v. Johnson, 702 S.W.2d 65, 73 (Mo. banc 1985); State v. Cotton, 724 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Mo.App., E.D.1986). An appellate court will find an abuse of that discretion only when the evidence is admitted and results in fundamental unfairness to the defendant. State v. Keeven, 728 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Mo.App., E.D.1987). The majority states that “fundamental unfairness or prejudice is to be measured by whether the evidence requested in discovery would have affected the result of the trial.” State v. Estes, 631 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Mo.App., S.D.1982). The court in Estes more fully stated, “fundamental unfairness is to be measured by whether the evidence or the discovery thereof would have affected the result of the trial.” Estes, 631 S.W.2d at 122 (emphasis added). The court in State v. Couch,1 more fully elaborated the factors to be considered in determining whether or not a defendant was prejudiced:
The prejudice in turn depends upon the nature of the charge, the evidence presented, and the role the undisclosed testimony would likely have played in the preparation of a defense. If the evidence was not of such a character as to raise a reasonable likelihood that its pri- or discovery would have affected the result of the trial, there is no error in failing to impose sanctions for its nondisclosure.
State v. Couch, 569 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Mo.App., W.D.1978). I believe the majority’s focus on the effect that the evidence requested had on the outcome of the trial is misplaced. The probative inquiry is “whether the State’s discovery violation resulted in fundamental unfairness or substantively altered the outcome of the case.” Johnson, 702 S.W.2d at 73 (emphasis added). Our inquiry should focus on the effect of the discovery violation on the outcome of the trial, not the effect that the evidence had on the trial. Undoubtedly, Taylor’s testimony had an effect on the jury.
Defendant does argue that his trial strategy, consideration of alternative defenses and ability to thoroughly cross-examine had been harmed by the discovery violation. But defendant fails to elaborate as to how trial strategy would have changed or what alternative defense would have been offered.2 And, as will be set forth below, the record reveals that defense counsel appears more than ready to attack Taylor on cross-examination.
Defense counsel extensively cross-examined Taylor revealing that counsel anticipated and was prepared to vigorously impeach Taylor’s testimony. Defense counsel cross-examined Taylor regarding whether or not he was sober the night of the shooting. Defense counsel next produced a transcript of a tape recorded telephone conversation between Taylor and defendant’s fiancee, Tina Gellhausen, in which Taylor stated that he was drunk and high the night of the shooting. Defense counsel then cross-examined Taylor regarding Taylor’s alleged attempts to convince Gellhau-sen to have sex with him. Defense counsel *401sought to prove that Taylor had threatened Gellhausen that he would provide the State with unfavorable testimony if she did not have sex with him. Counsel again provided a transcript of a taped conversation in which Taylor made the alleged “threats.”3 Counsel also attempted to impeach Taylor with information regarding unrelated criminal matters in which defense counsel alleged that the prosecutor had promised leniency in exchange for Taylor’s testimony. Defense counsel also questioned Taylor regarding his use of valium and alleged use of cocaine. Defense counsel further impeached Taylor’s testimony with Taylor’s prior testimony from defendant’s bond hearing.
On surrebuttal, defense counsel presented the testimony of Carla Herder who was living with Taylor at the time of the shooting. She testified that Taylor was “intoxicated to the max” on the night of the shooting. Herder also contradicted Taylor’s testimony regarding whether or not he received the murder weapon from Gell-hausen the night of the shooting in order to dispose of it. Gellhausen also testified on surrebuttal that “[Taylor] said that he had something that could bum John, if I wouldn’t sleep with him.” Defense counsel’s extensive cross-examination, presentation of surrebuttal testimony, and obvious preparation, ie. the tapes and transcripts, makes it more than clear to me that defense counsel anticipated unfavorable testimony from Taylor.
Further supporting the State’s argument that defense counsel was previously aware of Taylor’s damaging testimony is revealed during an exchange on Taylor’s cross-examination:
[Defense Counsel]: I called you, Mr. Taylor, did I not?
[Taylor]: I called you.
[Defense Counsel]: Did you tell me that you didn’t know anything about this case and couldn’t help anybody?
[Taylor]: No, I told you that — that what I knew would probably cause your case a great deal of problems, and you said: Well, just forget it, then, and I said I did not want to lie and perjure myself and you said: Well, just forget it; don’t worry about it.
Defense counsel then went on to question Taylor on another topic.
Therefore, even if the trial court erred in ruling the State had not violated a discovery rule, I do not believe that the discovery violation so prejudiced defendant to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Having also reviewed defendant’s other points of error, I would affirm defendant’s conviction.

. The majority cites State v. Estes to support its prejudice analysis. State v. Estes, 631 S.W.2d 121 (Mo.App., S.D.1982). The court in Estes relied on State v. Royal, which in turn relied on State v. Couch. See Estes, 631 S.W.2d at 122; State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Mo. banc 1981). State v. Couch, 569 S.W.2d 789 (Mo.App., K.C.D.1978). I believe Couch more precisely states the operative principles than Estes or Royal.

. I find it interesting that defendant asserts that his defense may have changed. He offered the defense of self-defense at the first trial.

. Although the conversation contained language that could be construed as sexual advances, the transcript did not support defense counsel's characterization as "threats."