Court Opinion

ID: 9702610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:18:41.286677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:39.740524
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). The meritorious question concerns the extent that the joint and several *88liability of tortfeasors was modified by the 1986 tort reform act.1
Section 6304 of the Revised Judicature Act,2 *89added by the 1986 legislation, provides only for findings by the jury or the court of the percentages of fault of each plaintiff, defendant, and third-party defendant who is a "party” to the action. Section 6304 does not provide for findings by the jury or the court of the percentages of fault of tortfeasors who may have settled with injured persons.
We conclude that the Department of Transportation is not entitled to a determination by the jury or the court of its percentage of the fault made after taking into consideration not only the percentage of fault of the plaintiff but also the percentages of fault of the tortfeasors who settled with the plaintiff.
i
This action for a declaratory judgment was commenced by the mdot against the owners3 and driver4 of, and parents5 of two children who were passengers in, a pickup truck that collided with a truck driven by an mdot employee. The parents had filed an action in the Court of Claims against the mdot in January, 1989, which was consolidated with this action for a declaratory judgment some time after this action was commenced in October, 1989. The owners and driver settled with the parents without suit by paying insurance limits of $50,000 to one child and $4,000 to the other child.
The mdot seeks a declaration in this action determining the percentages of fault of the owners
*90and driver "in causing the accident and any damages which may be awarded in the Court of Claims, and limiting the liability” of the mdot for damages to the parents in the Court of Claims action to that percentage authorized by § 6304.
The circuit court granted summary disposition, dismissing this action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The mdot argued that it, the nonsettling tortfeasor, is entitled under § 6304 to have the percentages of fault of the owners and driver, the settling tortfeasors, determined by the trier of fact, with the nonsettling tortfeasors’ liability limited to its "calculated percentage of fault.” The Court of Appeals ruled against the mdot, stating that § 6304 "does not require the trier of fact to ascertain the percentages of fault of joint tortfeasors who have settled with the injured party and are not parties to a lawsuit between the injured party and the remaining tortfeasor.”6
The Court of Appeals focused on the language of § 6304, which it said "provides that in a personal injury action 'involving fault of more than 1 party to the action,’ the trier of fact shall determine the 'percentage of the total fault of all the parties regarding each , claim as to each plaintiff, defendant, and third-party defendant.’ ”7
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the "plain language” of § 6304 "refers to 'parties’ to the action,”8 that the owners and driver were not parties to this action, and concluded that the circuit court was not required to determine their percentages of fault. The Court of Appeals observed that an earlier version of the 1986 tort reform act provided that "a percentage of the total fault would be made not only among parties to the *91action, but also among persons who had been released from liability,” but that language was deleted from the final version of the act. The Court of Appeals said that this change in the bill was "persuasive evidence that the Legislature did not intend the result argued by the mdot.”9
We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals.
ii
Subsection (1) of § 6304, by its terms, applies only to a personal injury action "involving fault of more than 1 party to the action.” Subsection (1) further provides that the judge shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories or, if there is no jury, the judge shall make findings concerning the "percentage of the total fault of all of the parties regarding each claim as to each plaintiff, defendant, and third-party defendant.” (Emphasis added.)
Subsection (2) provides that in making that determination, the trier of fact shall consider "the conduct of each party at fault.” (Emphasis added.)
Subsection (5) provides that the court shall determine the award of damages to each plaintiff "in accordance with the findings under subsection (1),” and enter judgment against "each party, including a third-party defendant.” (Emphasis added.)
Although an earlier version of the 1986 tort reform act would have provided, as observed by the Court of Appeals, that a percentage of the total fault would be allocated not only among "parties” to the action, but also among "persons” who had been released from liability, and the language adverting to such "persons” was removed *92before the bill was enacted, subsection (5) continues to refer to "person[s],” stating "that judgment shall not be entered against a person who has been released from liability pursuant to section 2925d. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (6), a person shall not be required to pay damages in an amount greater than his or her percentage of fault.” (Emphasis added.)
Subsection (6) provides for reallocation of any uncollectible amount of the judgment "among the other parties” according to their percentage of fault as determined under subsection (1), and subsection (7) provides that a governmental agency, other than a governmental hospital, "shall not be required to pay a percentage of any uncollectible amount which exceeds the governmental agency’s percentage of fault as determined under subsection (1).” (Emphasis added.)
A
The mdot argues that the retention of the word "person” in the last clauses of subsection (5) and the language of subsection (7) limiting the liability of an agency other than a governmental hospital to the "percentage of fault as determined under subsection (1),” indicates a legislative purpose to limit the mdot’s liability to its percentage of fault determined after taking into consideration the percentages of fault of the tortfeasors who settled.
The apparent reason for retention of the word "person,” rather than "party,” in the penultimate sentence of subsection (5) is that the apparent purpose was to provide that a judgment shall not be entered against either a party or a person who had not been a party released from liability pursuant to § 2925d. Similarly, in stating in the very next sentence that "a person shall not be required *93to pay damages in an amount greater than his or her percentage of fault” (emphasis added), the Legislature, in all likelihood, was simply continuing the idiom of the immediately preceding clause.
The term "person” means and includes, in this context, a party to the action. The use of the word "person” rather than "party” in this one sentence of subsection (5) cannot reasonably be read to have changed all the preceding references to "party” or "parties” to mean "party/parties” and "other persons” who are tortfeasors although not a party/ parties.
B
The statement in subsection (7) that an agency other than a governmental hospital "shall not be required to pay a percentage of any uncollectible amount which exceeds the governmental agency’s percentage of fault as determined under subsection (1)” (emphasis added), cannot properly be read as stating also that such an agency’s percentage of fault shall be determined under subsection (1) after taking into consideration the percentage of fault of settling tortfeasors.
The limitation set forth in subsection (7) bars only efforts to collect "any uncollectible amount” from an agency other than a governmental hospital. Rather than stating, as the mdot urges, that the agency’s percentage of fault shall be determined after taking into consideration the percentages fault of settling tortfeasors, subsection (7) says only that the agency’s percentage of fault shall be "as determined under subsection (1).” Subsection (1) provides for jury and judge findings concerning only the percentages of fault of parties to the action.
*94C
Returning to the mdot’s argument based on the last sentence of subsection (5), it is especially noteworthy that subsection (5) "does not apply” if it is determined, under subsections (1) and (2), that the plaintiff is not at fault. The plaintiffs in the instant underlying action are the parents of minor children who were riding as passengers in the pickup truck. It is unlikely that any percentage of fault would be allocated by a jury or judge to the child passengers. If the jury finds that neither child passenger was at fault, subsection (5) — stating that "a person shall not be required to pay damages in an amount greater than his or her percentage of fault” — "shall not apply.” In such event, the mdot’s argument based on that sentence would "not apply.”
The mdot’s argument might indeed "apply” if the .jury or a judge finds that a percentage of the total fault should be allocated to the plaintiff. Under the circumstance that § 6304 so clearly states that the sentence in subsection (5) so heavily relied on the mdot "does not apply” if the trier of fact finds that the plaintiff is not at fault, we do not think that the Legislature contemplated that the trier of fact would, in a case in which it decided that some percentage of fault should be allocated to the plaintiff, then be asked to reconsider the percentages of fault allocated to the plaintiff and the other nonsettling defendant or defendants after taking into consideration the percentages of fault of settling tortfeasors.
We have considered the other arguments advanced by the mdot, but they do not persuade us to reach a different conclusion.10
*95Ill
The Court of Appeals concluded its opinion with the following statement:
We believe the trial court properly dismissed the mdot’s action for a declaratory judgment. The mdot is not entitled to contribution from Thrasher and the Bergdolls; therefore, there exists no "actual controversy” sufficient to maintain an action for a declaratory judgment pursuant to MCR 2.605. [196 Mich App 320, 324-325; 493 NW2d 457 (1992).]
The circuit judge dismissed this action for a declaratory judgment for the same reason, namely, the mdot is not entitled to contribution from Thrasher and the Bergdolls. The circuit judge and *96the Court of Appeals were both right in concluding that there was no actual controversy between the mdot and Thrasher and the Bergdolls, but they were also both wrong in concluding that this action for a declaratory judgment should be dismissed because there was no actual controversy.
There was and is an actual controversy between the mdot and the Johnstons. Paragraph 9 of the complaint11 sufficiently states the mdot’s claim that it is entitled to a determination under § 6304 of Thrasher’s and Bergdolls’ fault in order to apply the provisions of § 6304 to any judgment that might be rendered against the mdot in favor of the Johnstons.
The relief sought, entry of a declaratory judgment limiting the liability of the mdot for damages to the Johnstons in the Court of Claims action to the "percentage authorized by MCLA 600.6304,” is the relief that the mdot sought by bringing the declaratory judgment action, and that *97it has asserted it is entitled to at a trial of the Court of Claims action.12
The circuit court had jurisdiction under the pleadings framed by the mdot to enter a declaratory judgment deciding the actual controversy between the mdot and the Johnstons. Although there was no "actual controversy” between the mdot and Thrasher/Bergdolls, there was and is manifestly an "actual controversy” between the mdot and the Johnstons. The Johnstons have the requisite adverse interest. There is nothing "hypothetical” about the controversy between the mdot and the Johnstons.
There is no reason, the matter having been fully briefed and argued in the Court of Appeals, with decision adverse to the mdot in a reported opinion, with briefs on the meritorious question from the Attorney General in behalf of the mdot and from counsel for the Johnstons, and an amicus curiae brief in support of the position of the mdot, with full argument in this Court, to say to the parties that they should go through this drill again before the Court of Appeals or the circuit court.
While the Court of Appeals might be seen as having erred in opining with regard to the meaning of § 6304, after it had decided that the circuit judge correctly dismissed the action because of the absence of an actual controversy, since it is clear that the Court of Appeals also erred in concluding that there was no actual controversy, its error was "harmless” — a concept with which this Court is familiar, and applies with great regularity.
It is clear that while, as set forth in Hayes, supra, p 74, the determination whether to enter a declaratory judgment "is ordinarily a matter en*98trusted to the sound discretion of the court,” neither the circuit court nor the Court of Appeals has discretion to decline to enter a declaratory judgment where the need therefor, as in Hayes and here, is apparent. This Court, in Comm’r of Revenue v Grand Trunk W R Co, 326 Mich 371, 375; 40 NW2d 188 (1949), said that a circuit judge does not have discretion to refuse to adjudicate a controversy concerning the interpretation of a state tax statute brought in good faith by a state official in the public interest:
The declaration of rights statute [1929 PA 36], permits the exercise of judicial discretion in determining the existence of an "actual controversy.” Such discretion, however, does not extend to refusal to adjudicate a controversy concerning the interpretation of a State tax statute brought in good faith by a State official in the public interest. The declaratory judgment statute is "remedial, and is to be liberally construed and liberally administered with a view of making the courts more serviceable to the people.” See section 7 thereof. As said in City of Muskegon Heights v Danigelis, 253 Mich 260, 265 (73 ALR 696) [235 NW 83 (1931)]: "If the act is to serve at all, it must be permitted to serve in this instance.” [Comm’r of Revenue, supra.]
The mdot similarly sought an interpretation of § 6304 in the public interest.
We join in affirmance of the Court of Appeals.
Cavanagh, C.J., and Brickley, J., concurred with Levin, J.

 1986 PA 178.

 (1) In a personal injury action involving fault of more than 1 party to the action, including third-party defendants, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties to the action, shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings indicating both of the following:
(a) The total amount of each plaintiff’s damages.
(b) The percentage of the total fault' of all of the parties regarding each claim as to each plaintiff, defendant, and third-party defendant.
(2) In determining the percentages of fault under subsection (l)(b), the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.
(3) If it is determined under subsections (1) and (2) that a plaintiff is not at fault, subsections (5) and (6) shall not apply.
(4) Subsections (5) and (6) shall not apply to a products liability action, as defined in section 2945.
(5) The court shall determine the award of damages to each plaintiff in accordance with the findings under subsection (1), subject to any reduction under sections 2925d and 6303, and enter judgment against each party, including a third-party defendant, except that judgment shall not be entered against a person who has been released from liability pursuant to section 2925d. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (6), a person shall not be required to pay damages in an amount greater than his or her percentage of fault.
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and subsection (7), upon motion made not later than 6 months after a final judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a party’s share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties according to their respective percentages of fault as determined under subsection (1). A party shall not be required to pay a percentage of any uncollectible amount which exceeds that party’s percentage of fault as determined under subsection (1). The party whose liability is reallocated shall continue to be subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to the plaintiff on the judgment.
(7) Notwithstanding subsection (3), a governmental agency, other than a governmental hospital or medical care facility, shall not be required to pay a percentage of, any uncollectible amount which exceeds the governmental agency’s percentage of fault as determined under subsection (1). [MCL 600.6304; MSA 27A.6304.]

 The owners were Randall and Charlene Bergdoll, individually, and doing business as B & H Towing & Recovery.

 The driver was Leroy E. Thrasher.

 The parents were Robert and Vallerie Johnston, individually, and as guardians and conservators of the estates of Shyrle James Johnston and John Daniel Johnston.

 196 Mich App 320, 322-323; 493 NW2d 457 (1992).

 Id., pp 323-324.

 Id., p 324.

 Id.

 We acknowledge that § 6304 does not specifically require that the *95allocation of percentages of fault among nonsettling parties must total one hundred percent of the fault. But that is surely the import of subsection (l)(b), stating that the court or jury shall determine "[t]he percentage of the total fault of all the parties regarding each claim as to each plaintiff, defendant, and third-party defendant.”
We note in this connection that the mdot acknowledges that to the extent the conduct of all the tortfeasors, nonsettling and settling, may be considered by the trier of fact "100% of the fault will be allocable . . . .”
The decision of the Court of Appeals does not nullify the very reform the Legislature sought to achieve when it enacted § 6304 to make damages proportionate to degree of fault. Section 6304, as construed by the Court of Appeals and now by this Court, provides for a limitation of the joint and several liability of a defendant or third-party defendant where there is more than one party aligned on the defendant’s side of the case. That, as so construed, it does not provide for consideration of the liability of settling tortfeasors does not mean that § 6304 is chopped liver.
Nor do we agree that the decision of the Court of Appeals "judicially repealed the tort reform mandate that damage assessment be commensurate with percentage of fault” or that the Court of Appeals decision "revives the very common law doctrine of joint and several liability the legislature sought to eliminate in unmistakable terms.” The Court of Appeals did not judicially repeal the tort reform mandate; rather, it was the Legislature that decided not to include nonsettling tortfeasors in the allocation of percentages of fault. The Legislature did speak in unmistakable terms when it chose to limit the scope of § 6304 to "parties” and not to include other "persons” who were tortfeasors.

 The complaint states:
9. Under MCLA 600.6304 [MSA 27A.6304], plaintiff [mdot] is entitled to a determination of defendants Thrasher and Berg-dolls’ fault in order to apply the provisions of that act to any judgment which may be rendered against it in favor of the Johnstons and is also entitled, under the Michigan Contribution Act, to contribution from defendants Thrasher and Berg-doll in the event that plaintiff is obliged to pay more than its legal share of damages to the Johnstons.
Wherefore, plaintiff prays for entry of a judgment for contribution in such sum as is legally authorized against defendants Thrasher and Bergdoll, jointly and severally, and
For entry of a declaratory judgment determining the percentage of fault of defendants Thrasher and Bergdoll in causing the accident and any damages which may be awarded in the Court of Claims, and limiting the liability of plaintiff for damages to the Johnstons in the Court of Claims action to that percentage authorized by MCLA 600.6304 [MSA 27A.6304]. [Emphasis added.]

 It is noteworthy that consolidation of the Court of Claims action and the circuit court action was granted by a March 5, 1990, order entered by the Court of Claims.