Court Opinion

ID: 9755461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:38:59.943211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:07.721054
License: Public Domain

COHEN, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion states that the trial judge erred “by certifying the class on the basis that each of the leases contains a covenant to reasonably market the gas.... ” It holds that none of the leases contains that implied covenant because, as a matter of law, that implied covenant does not exist. If so, appellants’ remedy is not to decertify the class; it is to move for summary judgment. I dissent because the majority opinion seems to grant a summary judgment on that basis, even though appellants never requested it, the trial judge never granted it, and that issue is therefore not before us for review.
The Supreme Court, this Court, and most other Texas appellate courts have stated that, in deciding whether class certification is appropriate, a court should not “decide,” “examine,” “determine,” “consider,” or “evaluate” the merits of the underlying claims and defenses. See Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex.2000) (“Deciding the merits of the suit in order to determine its maintainability as a class action is not appropriate.”); Union Pac. Resources Group v. Hankins, 51 S.W.3d 741, 747 (Tex.App. — El Paso 2001, no pet. h.) (designated for publication) (court should not “examine” merits of *285claims or defenses); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 45 S.W.3d 182, 191 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 2001, pet. filed June 18, 2001) (rejecting the argument that S.W. Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex.2000), “requires the trial court to examine the merits of the case before granting certification, and requires the reviewing court to make the same analysis,” stating that courts are “[n]ot to determine the merits of the suit,” and stating that Bernal did not change that rule); Peltier Enters, v. Hilton, 51 S.W.3d 616, 621 (Tex.App. —Tyler 2000, pet. denied, rehearing on pet. filed Aug. 20, 2001) (designated for publication) (appellate courts “may not consider the substantive merits of the case.... ”); W. Teleservices, Inc. v. Carney, 37 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Tex.App. —San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (“class proponents ... are not required to prove a prima facie case ... in support of a motion for class certification.”); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 28 S.W.3d 196, 210 (Tex.App.—Austin 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (refusing to “[cjonsider the merits of appellees’ claims, as well as the merits of [appellants’] defenses to appellees’ claims.”); Charlie Thomas Courtesy Leasing, Inc. v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 684, 687, 689 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (“[c]lass certification is not the appropriate stage of litigation for evaluating the substantive merits of each class member’s claim.... ”); Grizzle v. Texas Commerce Bank, N. A., 38 S.W.3d 265, 274 n. 8 (Tex.App. — Dallas, 2001, pet.filed) (“Certification of a class action ... does not depend on the merits of the litigation.”); Graebel/Houston Movers, Inc. v. Chastain, 26 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. dism’d) (“Trial courts ... may not consider the substantive merits of the class claims in making a determination.”). These courts have stated this principle both in cases granting and in cases denying class certification. See Lopez, 45 S.W.3d at 191 (granting); Peltier, 51 S.W.3d at 621 (denying).
The standard of review for class action certification is abuse of discretion. S.W. Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 439 (Tex.2000). That standard obviously favors a trial judge’s ruling. Yet, by this appeal, appellants have not only surmounted all hurdles posed by this once formidable standard of review, they have gone on to seek and apparently to win an appellate summary judgment on the merits against appellees’ implied covenant claim, relief they never sought in the court below. If Yzaguirre1 requires that ruling, we should make it after appellants have moved for it, appellees have responded to it, and the trial judge has ruled on it, not before.
I respectfully dissent.

. Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368 (Tex.2001).