Court Opinion

ID: 9379443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 18:02:55.595932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:03.585791
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                            B312062

        Plaintiff and Respondent,      (Los Angeles County
                                       Super. Ct. No. MA046882)
        v.

EDGAR RUIZ,

        Defendant and Appellant.

In re                                  B317270

        EDGAR RUIZ

        on

        Habeas Corpus.

       Petition for writ of habeas corpus and appeal from an order
of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Shannon Knight,
Judge. Relief on habeas corpus granted; appeal denied as moot.
       Miriam K. Billington, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant and for Petitioner.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       In 2010, Edgar Ruiz was convicted of carjacking, attempted
robbery and arson, all committed shortly after he turned 19 years
old. Gang allegations connected to each of the three counts were
found true as were allegations that a principal personally used a
firearm in committing the carjacking and attempted second
degree robbery. Ruiz was sentenced to a total term of 26 years
four months in state prison; the sentence included consecutive
terms for several of the gun and gang allegations. In 2018, the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
sent a recall letter to the trial court, seeking to have the court
correct an error it made in sentencing Ruiz in 2010 to one-third
the mid-term for his conviction for attempted robbery. When
CDCR notifies a trial court that one part of a sentence is
unauthorized, the resentencing court is entitled to reconsider all
sentencing choices. (People v. Hill (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
831, 834.)
       The resentencing judge was not the judge who presided
over Ruiz’s trial. At the April 2018 resentencing, Ruiz was
represented by Larry Baker, the same attorney who had
represented him at trial. Baker did not remember Ruiz or the
trial, did not file any documents in connection with the
resentencing hearing, and spoke less than 50 words during the
entire proceeding. The resentencing judge stated she had
reviewed the case file, including the probation report and the
transcript of the original sentencing. She stated her indicated
sentence, which reflected her intention to keep the new sentence
as close to the original sentence as possible, merely correcting the
error in the attempted robbery conviction and striking a
previously stayed gang enhancement for the arson conviction.
She did not otherwise modify the sentence. The error correction

                                 2
increased Ruiz’s sentence from 26 years four months to life to 27
years eight months to life. Although eight years had passed since
Ruiz had been sentenced, Baker, when asked, declined to speak
on Ruiz’s behalf. The court asked Ruiz if he wished to be heard
and Ruiz expressed his remorse and indicated that he had
graduated high school in prison and was enrolled in college
classes. The judge commended Ruiz, pointed out she had not
heard the evidence at trial and orally reviewed the facts of the
offenses she had gleaned from the probation report. She stated
she would have given Ruiz a harsher sentence had she been the
original sentencing judge. Baker again said nothing.
      At the conclusion of the hearing, Baker said that he would
prepare a notice of appeal. He never did so. As it turns out,
Baker had a brain tumor which was diagnosed five months after
the hearing. He died in the hospital later that same year.
      In May 2021, we granted Ruiz relief from default and
permitted him to file the current appeal claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel at the resentencing hearing. On appeal,
Ruiz contends Baker did nothing to assist him at the
resentencing hearing and had no tactical reason for his inaction.
      Ruiz also filed this related habeas corpus petition claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel. Baker’s inaction is clear from
the appellate record, specifically the reporter’s transcript of the
resentencing hearing. Ruiz also provided his own declaration
and the Declaration of Marion Wickerd, Baker’s secretary, to
establish Baker had no tactical reason for his inaction and was
suffering from significant memory difficulties impairing his
personal and professional functioning.

                                 3
       We indicated we would consider the appeal and habeas
petition together. We then took judicial notice of the appellate
record in this habeas proceeding and issued an order to show
cause why the relief sought by Ruiz in his petition should not be
granted. We directed counsel to address whether Baker’s
performance at the April 2, 2018 resentencing hearing amounted
to a complete denial of counsel within the meaning of United
States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 (Cronic) and Bell v.
Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 687 (Cone). We now conclude it does.
                           DISCUSSION
       In issuing the order to show cause, we made an implicit
preliminary determination that Ruiz had carried his burden of
allegation, that is, he made a “ ‘prima facie statement of specific
facts which, if established, entitle [petitioner] to habeas corpus
relief under existing law.’ ” (In re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th
447, 455.) As a practical matter, the issuance of the order to
show cause creates a “cause” giving the People a right to reply to
the petition by a return and to otherwise participate in the
court's decision-making process. (Ibid.) When the respondent
elects to file a return, it must allege facts establishing the legality
of the petitioner’s confinement. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th
464, 476.) “The factual allegations of a return must also respond
to the allegations of the petition that form the basis of the
petitioner’s claim that the confinement is unlawful. [Citations.]
In addition to stating facts, the return should also, ‘where
appropriate, . . . provide such documentary evidence, affidavits,
or other materials as will enable the court to determine which
issues are truly disputed.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, respondent has not
alleged any additional facts responding to Ruiz’s allegations,
although respondent does propose a different reading of the

                                  4
Declaration of Marion Wickerd than does Ruiz. (Ibid.) Thus, no
evidentiary hearing is necessary to decide this petition. In sum,
the order to show cause represents our preliminary
determination that Ruiz has stated facts, which, if established,
show a complete denial of counsel within the meaning of Cronic
and Cone.

A.    Complete Denial of Counsel Requires No Showing of
      Prejudice
      Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show both that his counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome
in the absence of the deficient performance. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 (Strickland).) We always
start with a presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. (Id. at p. 689.)
      However, there are three situations in which a defendant
need not show prejudice to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 658–659.)
The United States Supreme Court later summarized these
exceptions in Cone: “First and ‘[m]ost obvious’ was the ‘complete
denial of counsel.’ [(Cronic, at p. 659.)] A trial would be
presumptively unfair, we said, where the accused is denied the
presence of counsel at ‘a critical stage,’ [(ibid.)], a phrase we used
in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed. 2d
114 (1961), and White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 83 S.Ct.
1050, 10 L.Ed. 2d 193(1963) (per curiam), to denote a step of a
criminal proceeding, such as arraignment, that held significant
consequences for the accused.” (Cone, supra, 535 U.S. at
pp. 695-696.)

                                  5
       Second, the Court “posited that a similar presumption was
warranted if ‘counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s
case to meaningful adversarial testing.’ [(Cronic, supra, 466 U.S.
at p. 659.)] Finally, . . . where counsel is called upon to render
assistance under circumstances where competent counsel very
likely could not, the defendant need not show that the
proceedings were affected. [(Cronic, at pp. 659–662.)]” (Cone,
supra, 535 U.S. at p. 696.)
       As is relevant here, the Court elaborated on the second
circumstance: “When we spoke in Cronic of the possibility of
presuming prejudice based on an attorney’s failure to test the
prosecutor’s case, we indicated that the attorney’s failure must be
complete. We said ‘if counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.’ [(Cronic, at
p. 659, italics added.)] Here, respondent's argument is not that
his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the
sentencing proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to
do so at specific points. For purposes of distinguishing between
the rule of Strickland and that of Cronic, this difference is not of
degree but of kind.” (Cone, supra, 535 U.S. at pp. 696–697.)1

1     At oral argument, respondent suggested that this exception
requires a complete failure of counsel throughout the entire trial,
and not merely at the (re)sentencing hearing. As the quote above
indicates, the claim in Cone involved counsel’s failure only at the
sentencing hearing. Respondent did not address Cone or provide
any rationale for this court to disallow what the United States
Supreme Court has permitted.

                                 6
      Cronic and Cone provide a narrow exception to Strickland’s
prejudice requirement. As the California Supreme Court
recognized long ago, “notwithstanding the broad language in the
Cronic opinion [(Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659)] to the effect
that when ‘counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case
to meaningful adversarial testing,’ the right to competent counsel
has been denied and the result of the trial is presumptively
unreliable, the actual application of Cronic has been much more
limited. Defendants have been relieved of the obligation to show
prejudice only where counsel was either totally absent or was
prevented from assisting the defendant at a critical stage.” (In re
Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 353.) Almost all instances in
which a defendant claims that his counsel completely failed to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing
turn out not to involve a complete failure, but rather a failure
consisting of specific errors and omissions, that is, the
defendant’s “ ‘argument [was] not that his counsel failed to
oppose the prosecution throughout the . . . proceeding as a whole,
but that his counsel failed to do so at specific points.’ ” (People v.
Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1170 (Banks) abrogated by People
v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 391 & fn. 3.)

B.    Cronic Is Still Good Law
      Respondent first argues that Banks and People v. Brown
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, decided two months before Banks,
eliminated the second exception in Cronic, that is, the complete
failure to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial
testing. The Court in Banks did not reject defendant’s claim
because defendant relied on the second ground in Cronic. Rather
the Court analyzed the substance of the claim and found that
“defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be

                                  7
analyzed under Strickland because his ‘argument is not that his
counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the . . .
proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so at
specific points.’ (Bell v. Cone, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 697; see In re
Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 727–728 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909
P.2d 1017].)” (Banks, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 1170.) As for
Brown, which quoted Visciotti, we think a more reasonable
reading of Brown is that it simply acknowledged that the second
exception in Cronic occurs so rarely as to be almost non-existent.
We therefore do not agree that Cronic has in any way been
overruled.

C.    Ruiz Suffered a Complete Absence of the Assistance of
      Counsel.
      Respondent next denies that the performance of Ruiz’s
attorney amounted to a complete absence of the assistance of
counsel. Respondent contends Cronic does not apply to situations
where counsel has an illness because a lawyer is presumed
competent and the burden is on the accused to overcome this
presumption. (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 658.) Respondent
claims Ruiz has not offered any evidence that Baker’s
performance was affected by his medical condition at the time of
the resentencing hearing, and that “[t]he mere fact that counsel
may have suffered from some mental illness at the time of [the
relevant proceedings] has never been recognized by the Supreme
Court as grounds to automatically presume prejudice.” (See, e.g.
Dows v. Wood (9th Cir. 2000) 211 F.3d 480, 485.) Respondent
notes state and federal courts have also refused to presume
prejudice from mental illness (Smith v. Ylst (9th Cir. 1987)
826 F.2d 872, 876 [“mental illness is too varied in its symptoms
and effects to justify a per se reversal rule”]) or incompetency

                                  8
from alcoholism (People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 786 [“a
per se rule of deficiency for alcoholic attorneys is contrary to
settled law”]). Rather, according to respondent, courts have
consistently applied the Strickland standard “where counsel’s
illness may have affected his or her performance.”
       Ruiz is not asking us to presume Baker was incompetent at
the resentencing hearing due to his subsequently diagnosed brain
tumor, or to presume prejudice based solely on Baker’s illness.
Rather, Ruiz has provided facts about his own pre-hearing
interaction with Baker and Baker’s performance at the hearing to
show that in addition to suffering from significant memory issues
at the time of the hearing, Baker did nothing before, during, or
after the hearing to assist Ruiz. Ruiz’s account of Baker’s
behavior is illuminated and corroborated by Marion Wickerd’s
account of her employer’s mental deterioration beginning in the
spring of 2018, about six months before he entered the hospital in
September 2018. It is Baker’s complete inaction in April 2018,
reasonably attributable to his brain tumor, from which Ruiz
seeks to have prejudice presumed.
       These facts are compelling. Ruiz filed a declaration stating
that when he met with Baker right before the resentencing,
Baker was slouched in his chair with his eyes almost closed. He
acted “slow, tired and sluggish.” Baker did not recognize Ruiz or
remember his name. Baker told Ruiz he did not remember him
and said to Ruiz “ ‘that’s crazy that I can’t remember
representing you.’ ” According to Ruiz, Baker did not ask him
any questions about his case. Ruiz asked if he could say
something to the judge or show proof that he was going to school
and “doing good things” with his life. Baker said no. In the
declaration Ruiz explained that he did, in fact, end up speaking

                                9
to the judge when the judge asked him if he wanted to speak to
the court, but Baker did not advise Ruiz what to say or back him
up in court. In other words, Baker did not “provide the guiding
hand that [every] defendant needs.” (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 658.)
       There is nothing in the record before us or in the transcript
of the resentencing hearing to indicate that Baker filed any
documents with the court. The transcript of the hearing shows
Baker made no argument at all in support of reducing Ruiz’s
sentence. He made only nine brief statements, few of them full
sentences and most in response to questions from the court: (1) “I
would.”; (2) “Therefore, not 654.”; (3) “That is, I’m informed and
believe.”; (4) “No, ma’am.”; (5) “That’s it. And I will prepare the
appeal.”; (6) “I have no recollection of that.”; (7) “With the proviso
he becomes eligible—.”; (8) “Under 3051.”; and (9) “If I may be
excused, they want me downstairs.” When the judge announced
her indicated sentence and expressed her intention to adhere as
closely as possible to the sentence imposed by the original trial
judge, Baker said nothing on behalf of his client. He remained
silent. The court specifically asked him if he wished to be heard;
Baker replied “No, ma’am.”
       Although Ruiz spoke to the court when invited to do so, he
did not testify under oath, and it does not appear he provided the
court with any of the documentary proof of his rehabilitative
efforts that Baker told him he could not show the court. Thus,
even viewing events at the resentencing hearing as broadly as
possible, Baker did not identify or provide any evidence to the
trial court for the resentencing. Nor did he argue against the
trial court’s intention to rely solely on the circumstances of the
offense as the prosecutor advocated. And although Baker told the

                                 10
court that he would file an appeal, he did not do even that. In
other words, Baker failed to “ ‘act[] in the role of an advocate’ ” as
the Sixth Amendment requires. (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 656.)
       Additional evidence provided by Marion Wickerd, Baker’s
secretary, corroborated Ruiz’s recollection of his interaction with
Baker. She described Baker’s cognitive issues, which she stated
began in March 2018 (about six months before his brain surgery
in September 2018). In spring 2018, she noticed Baker stopped
giving her the weekly reports she used for billing, and when she
asked for them he would reply that he forgot. By the middle of
2018, Baker was confiding in Wickerd that he was worried about
his memory. He told her he was having trouble remembering
information about his cases and his clients, and even details in
his personal daily life. He told Wickerd he would leave a room
and immediately forget where he was going or what he was going
to do next, and the problem was getting worse. At some point in
2018, Baker started calling Wickerd to ask her if she knew the
name of a case or what courtroom it was in or what calendar days
the cases were to be heard. He stopped looking at his files to get
information. Wickerd’s declaration strongly indicates there was
no tactical reason for Baker’s non-existent advocacy on behalf of
the client he could not remember other than his cognitive decline.
       Respondent characterizes Baker’s performance as a simple
waiver of argument at resentencing. Relying on People v. Snow
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, respondent argues this waiver does not
amount to a complete denial of counsel or a complete failure to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.

                                 11
       We find Snow inapposite. Snow was a direct appeal in a
capital case where counsel waived argument at the sentencing
hearing. However, as our Supreme Court pointed out, “by the
time of the capital sentencing hearing in that case, counsel had
already put considerable mitigating evidence before the jury in
connection with the guilt and sanity phases of trial, and in his
opening penalty phase statement had brought that evidence to
the jury’s attention, urging them to consider it in determining the
appropriate penalty.” (People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at
p. 117.) The Court had no evidence before it to explain counsel’s
decision to waive argument at sentencing and simply concluded
that it would be more appropriate to consider the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a habeas
proceeding. Significantly, relevant to analysis under Cronic and
Cone, the Court discussed in detail what counsel in Snow did do
on behalf of the defendant, pointing out that the waived closing
argument was a small part of the overall trial. (Snow, at p. 117.)
The Court’s approach indicated it did not apply the Cronic
standard because there was not a total breakdown of advocacy on
behalf of the defendant.
       Here, unlike Snow, counsel’s failure went to the entirety of
the proceedings. The prosecutor had filed a sentencing
memorandum for the original sentencing, and the resentencing
court read the file from that trial, including the probation report.
Baker did not challenge the earlier arguments supporting the
sentence, did not present mitigating evidence on behalf of Ruiz
such as his documented prison programming, and did not make
any argument at all on behalf of Ruiz concerning his youth or his
self-improvement while in prison. Baker did nothing.

                                12
        The trial court had imposed, but stayed, the gang
enhancement for the arson conviction and referred to the 15-year
to life term for the carjacking conviction which resulted from the
gang enhancement as “prescribed by law.” The resentencing
court indicated it wished to stay as close to the trial court’s
sentence as possible. Still Baker did not argue. He failed to
point out that the law on gang enhancements had been clarified
since the time of the original sentencing. (People v. Fuentes
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 218, 231 (Fuentes) [“We therefore conclude that
trial courts possess the section 1385 discretion to strike a gang-
related enhancement alleged under section 186.22(b).”].)2 Baker
simply did not act in any way as Ruiz’s advocate. When Ruiz had
asked if he could speak for himself, Baker told him he could not
and completely failed to provide a guiding hand.
        Here, the available evidence from Ruiz and Wickerd
supports Ruiz’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This is
not a case where counsel was silent because there was nothing to
say. There was no tactical reason to say or do nothing. In
addition to the declarations described above, Ruiz possessed
documentation of his programming in prison, demonstrating that

2      Before Fuentes, at least one appellate court had held that
trial courts could not strike gang enhancements or refuse to
impose gang alternate penalties such as the 15 years to life
imposed on Ruiz for carjacking. (People v. Campos (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 438, 451–452, overruled by Fuentes, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 229, fn. 8.) At most, according to the Campos
court, a trial court could stay the punishment for the gang
enhancement attached to an offense with a determinate term; it
could not do so for enhancements which resulted in “an alternate
sentence” such as the one imposed in this case. Fuentes opened
up resentencing possibilities for Ruiz. Baker still did nothing.

                                13
Baker would have had a basis to argue that Ruiz had in fact been
rehabilitating himself. And, as we have explained, Baker had a
legal argument to make to strike the gang enhancement. Ruiz
had a right to the effective assistance of counsel at his
resentencing hearing. As a result of Baker’s total inaction on
every front, Ruiz was on his own.
                          DISPOSITION
       Relief on habeas corpus is granted. The matter is
remanded to the trial court for a new resentencing hearing. In
light of our ruling on the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the
appeal is dismissed as moot.

      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                            STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

                                 14