Court Opinion

ID: 9792218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:25:15.914975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:41.203359
License: Public Domain

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON:
I dissent.
By the agreed statement of facts the plaintiff, at the time of his arrest, was charged with a misdemeanor, that of being in possession of an untagged deer carcass. Under the provisions of chapter 142, Laws of 1951, as epitomized in the majority opinion, for one to legally possess and transport a deer carcass it must be tagged as required by statute. Admittedly the plaintiff never did tag the deer carcass.
The pertinent portion of section 26-110, R.C.M. 1947, as quoted in the majority opinion to my mind authorizes game wardens to confiscate game possessed in violation of law, and in fact said section contains this further provision:
“No deputy or special deputy fish and game warden shall *371have authority to compromise or settle out of court, any violations of the state fish and game laws.”
By virtue of these provisions of our law it is my belief that a game warden has authority to confiscate game possessed in violation of law. In referring to this section, this court held in Rosenfield v. Jakways, 67 Mont. 558, 564, 216 Pac. 776, 778: “Section 3659 [Rev. Codes 1921, now R.C.M. 1947, section 26-110] makes it the duty of the game warden to seize wild animals or any parts thereof possessed in violation of the laws, or showing evidence of illegal taking, and section 10606 [Rev. Codes of 1921, now R.C.M. 1947, section 93-1301-7] declares the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.”
R.C.M. 1947, section 26-506, provides the manner of sale of confiscated game, and section 26-508 provides for the disposition of the proceeds of any such sale, and further provides: “No officer shall be liable for any damage on account of any search, examination, seizure, or sale as herein provided.”
In my opinion, no officer under this section may be held liable for damages by virtue of any seizure made by him in the performance of his duties as a game warden.
The lower court, as a basis for its judgment for the plaintiff herein, concluded that he was lawfully in possession of the deer; that the defendant went outside the scope of his authority as such officer in confiscating the carcass; and that the defendant was acting in his individual capacity.
The agreed statement of facts, prepared under provisions of R.C.M. 1947, section 93-5308, becomes the trial court’s findings of fact, and has the effect of a special verdict. In pronouncing judgment the trial court is bound by the stipulation of the parties. McCarthy v. Employers’ Fire Ins. Co., 97 Mont. 540, 37 Pac. (2d) 579, 97 A.L.R. 292.
As stated in Warren v. Chouteau County, 82 Mont. 115, 265 Pac. 676, 679: “* * * our office on this appeal goes no further than to ascertain and determine whether the trial court drew the correct inference from the facts stipulated and rendered the proper judgment (Read v. Lewis & Clark County, 55 *372Mont. 412, 178 Pac. 177). A conclusion of law contradictory of the agreed statement is sufficient to vitiate the judgment. (Birney v. Warren, 28 Mont. 64, 72 Pac. 293).”
The agreed statement being to the effect that the deer was never tagged as required by law by the plaintiff, he was never legally in possession of the carcass. There are no facts in the agreed statement upon which the trial court’s conclusion that defendant went outside the scope of his duty and authority as a _ deputy game warden could be based, since it was agreed that defendant was acting in his capacity as such deputy game warden of the State of Montana.
In my opinion, since the court’s conclusions of law are contrary to the agreed facts they should not stand.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the district court of Madison County with directions to dismiss the action.