Court Opinion

ID: 9469256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:36:03.173959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:18.224029
License: Public Domain

EDWARD R. BECKER, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
The majority holds that the trial court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4) when it admitted Mancuso’s prior testimony, and does not reach Faison’s assertion that the trial court’s action infringed rights secured to him by the Sixth Amendment. While I endorse the majority’s discussion of the abuse of discretion question,1 I write separately because I disagree with the conceptual framework of that discussion. I believe that this case presents not Federal Rules of Evidence but Confrontation Clause issues.
My disagreement is based on my understanding that Rule 804(a)(4) requires a more exacting showing of unavailability when testimony is offered against the accused in a criminal prosecution precisely because the Confrontation Clause demands it. As Professors Saltzburg and Redden observe:
It is very likely that the confrontation clause will be read to require that the defense be granted a reasonable postponement when a witness is ill and unable to testify for the prosecution and the alternative to a postponement is introduction of hearsay.... Such confrontation rulings could be made even if Rule 804 is satisfied, since the Constitution may be more protective than the Rule.
S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 600 (2d ed. 1977). Other commentators are in accord. See E. Cleary, McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 253, at 610 (2d ed. 1972); 11 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore’s Federal Practice § 804.03[4] (2d ed. 1976); 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence If 804(a)[01], at 804-39 (1979).2
*299The factors that the majority articulates for consideration by the trial court emanate from the Confrontation Clause and must be considered in light of its purposes. The Supreme Court has said that the Confrontation Clause expresses “a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). The primary interest which it secures is the defendant’s right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, but the opportunity for the jury to evaluate the demeanor of the witness is also an important interest. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895) (importance of “compelling [the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demean- or ... whether he is worthy of belief”); Government of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (3d Cir. 1967) (“Demeanor is of the utmost importance in the determination of the credibility of a witness.”)
It is not that Rule 804(a)(4) rejects these values; rather it is that Rule 804(a)(4) is strengthened by them in a criminal case. The Federal Rules of Evidence apply in civil as well as criminal cases, and, in criminal cases, to the evidence presented by the accused as well as the prosecution. It seems to me that the Rules of Evidence require flexibility, and that they must be read to afford the trial court more discretion than does the Confrontation Clause. What is at issue in this case is the more confining but less widely applicable dictate of the Constitution. Certainly considerable deference must be given to the trial court’s determination of unavailability even under the Confrontation Clause. I would hold, however, that it is the Confrontation Clause and not Rule 804(a)(4) that requires the trial court to make specific findings about all relevant circumstances, see slip op. at 7, and that it is the Confrontation Clause that requires this Court to vacate and remand for abuse of discretion.3

. I also agree with the Court’s disposition of the Archer and illegal search claims.

. I note in this regard that the cases cited by the majority to support the proposition that trial court determinations of unavailability are subject to review for abuse of discretion, typescript op. at 6, are cases dealing with witness unavailability under the Confrontation Clause and not under the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Amaya, 533 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Flores-Amaya v. United States, 429 U.S. 1101, 97 S.Ct. 1125, 51 L.Ed.2d 551 (1977), held that Confrontation Clause rights were not violated by the admission of the prior testimony of a witness who had lost his memory. The Fifth Circuit in Amaya reaffirmed its earlier ruling in Peterson v. United States, 344 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1965), that the Confrontation Clause requires more than a showing of mere temporary unavailability but demands a showing that it is reasonably likely that the witness “will never be able to attend the trial.” Id. at 425. Similarly, United States v. Bell, 500 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1974), involved a Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of prior testimony of an identifying witness against the accused. Though the Second Circuit disagreed with some of the implications of Peterson and found that the trial court had not abused its discretion, the court did not suggest that it was not considering a constitutional question. Finally, Howard v. Sigler, 454 F.2d 115 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854, 93 S.Ct. 188, 34 L.Ed.2d 98 (1972), decided that the Confrontation Clause was not violated where the accused was not afforded the right to cross-examine an ill witness’s doctor.

. The majority obviously believes it improvident to base its decision on constitutional grounds and emphasizes the nonconstitutional basis of its holding. But because abuse of discretion analysis is appropriate under both Rule 804(a)(4) and the Confrontation Clause, see note 2 supra, I do not believe that the constitutional approach requires a different result in this case. Accordingly, I join the majority’s decision to vacate the judgment and to remand for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.