Court Opinion

ID: 9570043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:19:37.549793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:44.292037
License: Public Domain

*902BROWN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent, reaffirming that which is said in my dissenting opinion in Long v. State, Wyo., 745 P.2d 547 (1987). In addition to what I said in Long, I note that the petition for post-conviction relief in this case is barred by the statute of limitations. § 7-14-101, W.S.1977, last line.1 That little dereliction is perhaps of small moment. Since the days of Earl Warren, felons have not been bound by the same laws and rules as the rest of us.
CARDINE, Justice.
I dissent, reaffirming that which is said in my dissenting opinion filed in Long v. State, Wyo., 745 P.2d 547 (1987) There is not a mandatory duty to appoint counsel. Sections 7-14-104 and 7-1-110, W.S.1977, when read in pari materia and giving effect to the intention of the legislature, require that the trial court “shall” appoint an attorney, at public expense, for a “needy” post-conviction relief applicant if a “reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring [the proceeding] at his own expense.”
I would acknowledge and give effect to §§ 7-14-101 and 7-1-110 permitting courts to determine, after appropriate inquiry, when an attorney should be appointed in post-conviction relief. I would reverse and remand for the development of a proper record and trial court determination.

. By court order appellant was given time, beyond the statute of limitations, in which to file his petition. He still did not file it within the additional time allowed by the court.