Court Opinion

ID: 9751092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:04:01.857937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:34.889768
License: Public Domain

Underwood, J.,
dissenting. I concede that the defendant’s blood-alcohol test of 0.21% is relevant, but without first laying a proper foundation for its admission into evidence its propensity for prejudice far outweighs its probative value. It is well recognized that otherwise admissible evidence may become inadmissible where its probative value is overwhelmed by its improper prejudicial effect. Quazzo v. Quazzo, 136 Vt. 107, 110, 386 A.2d 638, 640 (1978). We recently stated in State v. Bevins, 140 Vt. 415, 419, 439 A.2d 271, 277 (1981): “Even though relevant, evidence is still not admissible if its probative value is outweighed by such considerations as ‘the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ....’”
Here “the danger of unfair prejudice” or of “misleading the jury” is too real a threat to ignore. Even though the trial court admitted defendant’s blood-alcohol test result for the limited purpose of corroborating the testimony of the police officer who stopped her, the real danger is that the jury may unwittingly overrun that limitation and as uninformed laypersons treat the blood-alcohol test result as substantive evidence *594of the factum probandum. Thus, the State’s burden of proving that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under' the influence of intoxicating liquor will be subliminally eased.
When we weigh the slight probative value of this bit of evidence against the real possibility that some juror will draw an improper inference from the unexplained numbers, comprising the test results of a highly technical chemical analysis of the defendant’s breath, the opportunity for prejudice to permeate the case is great. This is especially true in the light of the widespread media coverage of the subject.
In the case at bar the State called a chemist from the Department of Health to lay the preliminary foundation for the introduction into evidence of defendant’s blood-alcohol test result. The chemist described how he used gas-chromatography to analyze the defendant’s breath sample in order to determine the blood-alcohol content of his blood at the time the breath sample was taken by the police officer 45 minutes after the initial stop.
It is apparent from the record that the court qualified the chemist as an expert to testify only as to his ability to chemically analyze the percentage of alcohol by weight in a person’s blood from a sample of his breath. He did just that in the defendant’s case. He explained for the jury the process of collecting the breath sample in the crimper box, the accuracy of the procedure and the skill required to properly gather the sample. Then he submitted his laboratory analysis of the sample by the gas-chromatography process.
The chemist himself succinctly stated his role and the limits of his expertise: “My role is to analyze the incapsulated breath sample, and determine if alcohol is present, and if so how much.” He was not qualified to explain the significance of defendant’s 0.21 % test or describe the physical or mental characteristics manifested by a person with a 0.21% test, nor was he qualified to give an expert opinion as to whether her ability to drive would be impaired with a 0.21 % test.
Absent testimony by a fully qualified expert witness who could interpret for the jury the significance of a blood-alcohol test of 0.21%, the evidence should not have been admitted. The admission of the unexplained test result is an invitation to the *595jury to speculate on its gravity. Compare State v. Canerdy, 132 Vt. 181, 315 A.2d 237 (1974); State v. Levesque, 132 Vt. 585, 326 A.2d 174 (1974).
For these reasons I would reverse and remand for a new trial.