Court Opinion

ID: 9926916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 21:10:32.21022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:05.615209
License: Public Domain

01/25/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT KNOXVILLE
                        Assigned on Briefs December 19, 2023

                STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROBERT WINTERS

                Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County
                        No. 231247 Amanda B. Dunn, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. E2023-00705-CCA-R3-CD
                       ___________________________________

Robert Winters, Defendant, appeals from the dismissal of a motion filed under Rule 36.1
of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the motion, he challenged his sentence
for aggravated robbery, stemming from State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 22, 2004). After a thorough review, we
determine that Defendant failed to state a colorable claim for relief, attempted to challenge
a sentence that was already expired, and raised claims that were previously determined.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE AYERS
and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Robert Michael Winters, Pikeville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Raymond J. Lepone, Assistant
Attorney General; Coty G. Wamp, District Attorney General; and Tom Landis, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

       Defendant was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of first degree murder and
aggravated robbery for events that gave rise to the April 28, 1997 death of Vernise Sheffield
by a single gunshot wound to the head. Winters, 137 S.W.3d at 646. The victim owned
and lived in an apartment complex and rented an efficiency apartment to Defendant and
his wife. The jury convicted Defendant of first degree murder, felony murder, and
especially aggravated robbery. Id. at 653. The judgment form, however, reflects that the
especially aggravated robbery conviction was amended to aggravated robbery by
agreement of the parties. Id. at 653 n.2. On direct appeal to this Court, Defendant’s first
degree murder conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial. The convictions for
felony murder and aggravated robbery were affirmed. Defendant did not challenge the
indictment on direct appeal. Id. at 665.

       In 2005, Defendant began a long-running series of appeals to his convictions. First,
he sought post-conviction relief by filing an untimely petition for relief. Winters v. State,
No. E2005-01349-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 3479506, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10,
2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 1, 2006), reh’g denied (June 8, 2006). This Court
affirmed the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. Id. at *4.

       In 2008, Defendant filed his first petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Winters v.
Lindamood, No. M2007-02699-CCA-R3-HC, 2009 WL 774479, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Mar. 25, 2009). In the petition, he alleged that his convictions were void based on faulty
indictments. Specifically, Defendant complained that count three of the indictment listed
especially aggravated robbery but the actual language of count three charged him with only
aggravated robbery and cited the aggravated robbery statute. Id. Defendant also claimed
that his counsel was ineffective. The petition was summarily dismissed by the habeas
corpus court on the basis that Defendant failed to allege any grounds on which habeas relief
could be granted. On appeal, this Court agreed, noting that Defendant and the State agreed
to amend the conviction to the offense “that was charged in the indictment” rendering the
conviction voidable rather than void. Id. at *3.

       Defendant continued to challenge his convictions by filing another petition for
habeas corpus relief in May of 2009. See Winters v. Morrow, No. E2009-01334-CCA-R3-
HC, 2010 WL 2265441, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
Oct. 12, 2010). In this petition, “the same claims regarding the insufficiency of the
indictment” were raised as in the first petition. Id. The habeas corpus court summarily
dismissed this petition on the basis that Defendant’s issues had already been “raised” and
“determined in a prior suit for habeas corpus.” Id. at *2.

       Perhaps frustrated by his unsuccessful attempts to secure habeas relief in state court,
Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Winters v. Morrow, No. 1:11-cv-
10, 2012 WL 966179, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 2012). In the petition filed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254, Defendant again argued that the indictment failed to cite the pertinent
statute and language, failed to allege the essential elements of especially aggravated
robbery and the use of a deadly weapon, and the State and the trial court constructively
amended the aggravated robbery charge to especially aggravated robbery. Id. The petition
was dismissed as time-barred. Id.

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        In January 2015, Defendant sought yet another avenue to challenge his convictions,
this time utilizing Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 as the vehicle. He claimed,
instead of challenging the indictment, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. See
Winters v. State, No. E2015-00268-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5692145, at *1 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Sept. 29, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 14, 2016). The trial court summarily
dismissed his motion on the basis that he failed to state a colorable claim. This Court
agreed on appeal and our supreme court denied review. Id.

       In November of 2022, Defendant initiated his most recent attempt to challenge his
nearly twenty-year old convictions by filing yet another motion under Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 36.1. Defendant utilized arguments presented in previous habeas
corpus petitions concerning the indictment. The trial court entered an order denying the
motion, noting that Defendant’s motion was not filed before the twelve-year sentence for
aggravated robbery expired and that Defendant failed to attach a copy of the judgment at
issue and failed to state whether it was the first motion for relief pursuant to Rule 36.1.

       Defendant appealed.

                                          Analysis

       On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his motion to
correct an illegal sentence. From what we can surmise, he insists that the twelve-year
sentence for aggravated robbery is illegal because Count Three of the indictment listed the
charged offense as especially aggravated robbery but the body of the indictment described
aggravated robbery. The State argues that the trial court properly dismissed the motion
because the sentence has expired, the issue has been previously determined, and
Defendant’s motion does not set forth a colorable claim.

        Rule 36.1 provides a defendant and the State an avenue to “seek to correct an illegal
sentence,” defined as a sentence “that is not authorized by the applicable statutes or that
directly contravenes an applicable statute.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1; see also State v.
Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 594-95 (Tenn. 2015) (holding that “the definition of ‘illegal
sentence’ in Rule 36.1 is coextensive with, and not broader than, the definition of the term
in the habeas corpus context”). To avoid summary denial of an illegal sentence claim
brought under Rule 36.1, a defendant must “state with particularity the factual allegations,”
Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at 594, establishing “a colorable claim that the unexpired sentence is
illegal.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b). “[F]or purposes of Rule 36.1 . . . ‘colorable claim’
means a claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the moving
party, would entitle the moving party to relief under Rule 36.1.” Wooden, 478 S.W.3d at
593. The court then reviewed the three categories of sentencing errors: clerical errors
(those arising from a clerical mistake in the judgment sheet), appealable errors (those for
                                            -3-
which the Sentencing Act specifically provides a right of direct appeal), and fatal errors
(those so profound as to render a sentence illegal and void). Id. Commenting on appealable
errors, the court stated that those “generally involve attacks on the correctness of the
methodology by which a trial court imposed sentence.” Id. In contrast, fatal errors include
“sentences imposed pursuant to an inapplicable statutory scheme, sentences designating
release eligibility dates where early release is statutorily prohibited, sentences that are
ordered to be served concurrently where statutorily required to be served consecutively,
and sentences not authorized by any statute for the offenses.” Id. The court held that only
fatal errors render sentences illegal. Id. The determination whether a “[Rule 36.1] motion
states a colorable claim for correction of an illegal sentence under Rule 36.1 is a question
of law, to which de novo review applies.” Id. at 589 (citing Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d
251, 255 (Tenn. 2007)).

        Here, the trial court found that Defendant was not entitled to relief because his
aggravated robbery sentence expired on April 16, 2013, even “without any consideration
of his pretrial credit.” We agree. Defendant was sentenced on April 16, 2001, to a twelve-
year sentence to be served at 30%. Over twenty-one years have elapsed since the
sentencing date. In State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2015), our supreme court
addressed the issue of whether Rule 36.1 may be used to correct illegal sentences that have
expired. The Court in Brown stated:

       Rather than adopt an interpretation of Rule 36.1 that is not supported by the
       expressed purpose or language of Rule 36.1, that is not consistent with the
       jurisprudential context from which Rule 36.1 developed, and that has the
       potential to result in unconstitutional applications of Rule 36.1, we hold that
       Rule 36.1 does not expand the scope of relief and does not authorize the
       correction of expired illegal sentences. Therefore, a Rule 36.1 motion may
       be summarily dismissed for failure to state a colorable claim if the alleged
       illegal sentence has expired.

Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 211.

        Moreover, this Court has previously determined on at least two other occasions that
Defendant is not entitled to relief on his claims related to Count Three of the indictment,
albeit via the lens of habeas corpus rather than Rule 36.1. We are cognizant that “an ‘illegal
sentence’ in Rule 36.1 ‘mirrors’ the definition of an illegal sentence that courts have
applied in the habeas corpus context . . . [a] petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule
36.1 for claims that he previously raised and this [C]ourt rejected as not cognizable in
habeas corpus proceedings.” State v. Durell, No. E2022-01800-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL
6060574, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2023) (quoting Brown, 479 S.W.3d at 209), no
perm. app. filed.
                                            -4-
       Finally, to the extent that Defendant is arguing that the indictment is defective, that
claim is not cognizable under Rule 36.1. See State v. Kolb, No. W2019-01075-CCA-R3-
CD, 2020 WL 2563472, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 20, 2020) (citing State v. Sargent,
No. W2018-00517-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 1952881, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30,
2019), no perm. app. filed; State v. Hall, No. W2016-00915-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL
1093991, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2017), no perm. app. filed (stating that Rule
36.1 is not a proper vehicle for defective indictment challenges)), no perm. app. filed.

        Despite dressing his claim in new clothing, Defendant is merely attempting to
relitigate the same issues. The trial court properly dismissed the motion.

                                      CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                              ____________________________________
                                              TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE

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