Court Opinion

ID: 9404231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 16:09:47.716662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:12.627154
License: Public Domain

J-S09013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 CAROL MCNABB                              :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 1378 WDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 1, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
                    at No(s): CP-65-CR-0002714-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                        FILED: JUNE 22, 2023

      Appellant, Carol McNabb, appeals from the judgment of sentence of six

months’ probation, imposed after she was convicted, following a non-jury trial,

of driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), and

one summary traffic offense. Appellant solely challenges the weight of the

evidence to sustain her conviction. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

      The trial court set forth a detailed summary of the facts and procedural

history of Appellant’s case, as follows:

                                Factual History

      The instant case arises out of a traffic stop and subsequent
      investigation of [Appellant’s] vehicle on June 5, 2021[,] in
      Greensburg, Westmoreland County. The evidence presented at a
      non-jury trial established that, while patrolling in a marked police
      cruiser in the early morning hours on the date of the incident,
      Police Officer Jonathan Murphy, of the City of Greensburg Police
      Department, observed a silver Ford Escape in the right lane make
      an illegal left-hand turn onto Bell Way in Greensburg. Officer
      Murphy followed the vehicle and observed it pull past the white
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     stop line at a red traffic light before making a “relatively wide”
     turn, in which the tires of the right side of the car crossed over
     the parking stalls on the right-hand side. Officer Murphy also
     observed the vehicle swerve slightly into the left lane and then
     jerk back into the right lane and “fade slightly over into the left-
     hand lane” with the driver’s side tires on the yellow center line.
     Officer Murphy indicated that he activated his lights and sirens
     and initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. At this time, Officer
     Murphy testified that the driver of the vehicle got out of her car
     and attempted to walk towards his patrol vehicle; however, he
     instructed the driver to remain in her vehicle. Upon approach of
     the vehicle, Officer Murphy stated that [Appellant] was a little
     confused, and he observed her fumble her keys before turning the
     vehicle on to put down her window. Officer Murphy identified the
     driver of the vehicle as [Appellant]. He indicated that [Appellant]
     could not really give an explanation as to where she was coming
     from other than saying she was coming from stores. While
     speaking with her, Officer Murphy detected [Appellant’s] speech
     to be a little slowed and slurred, and he observed [Appellant] to
     have glassy, bloodshot eyes. Officer Murphy testified that he
     requested [Appellant] to perform standardized field sobriety tests
     and when she consented, Officer Murphy conducted the horizontal
     gaze nystagmus (HGN), the walk and turn, and the one[-]leg
     stand tests.

     During the HGN test, Officer Murphy … detected some indicators
     of impairment.      During the walk and turn test, which was
     conducted in a flat and well-lit parking lot, Officer Murphy stated
     that [Appellant] appeared confused with his instructions, and she
     was unable to get into the starting position, even after removing
     her shoes. Officer Murphy testified that [Appellant] started the
     test before he instructed her to do so, and he observed more
     indictors [sic] of impairment throughout the test where
     [Appellant] took too many steps and turned improperly. During
     the one[-]leg stand test, Officer Murphy indicated that [Appellant]
     attempted to lift her foot off the ground twice and stated to Officer
     Murphy that she could not do the test. According to Officer
     Murphy, [Appellant] submitted to a portable breath test (PBT) and
     after several error readings where [Appellant] was not adequately
     blowing into the device, [Appellant] produced a sample, which
     indicated a presence of alcohol. Based on Officer Murphy’s
     observations, he opined that “she was too impaired to be behind
     the wheel of a vehicle[] … []due to alcohol[.”] After handcuffing
     [Appellant] and placing her under arrest in the rear of his patrol

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     vehicle and informing her of her rights, Officer Murphy testified
     that [Appellant] indicated she was getting a lawyer and he
     transported [her] to City Hall for processing. At this time, Officer
     Murphy indicated that he smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming
     from [Appellant’s] person within his patrol vehicle. Officer Murphy
     indicated that on a scale of zero to a hundred, he was “a hundred”
     percent sure that [Appellant] was impaired at this time. Officer
     Murphy’s testimony reflected that he has served as a police officer
     since 2015; he confirmed he is familiar with the Motor Vehicle
     Code and violations of the Crimes Code; and he indicated that he
     has effected “between 10, 20, maybe a little more” DUI arrests in
     his career.

     [Appellant] also elected to testify during the non-jury trial.
     [Appellant] testified that she was driving on the Ohio and
     Pennsylvania turnpikes and intended to take the Greensburg exit;
     however, she missed the exit and got off at a New Stanton exit
     instead. [Appellant] testified that she was lost, very tired, and
     very upset. [She] stated that she was driving the entire time, and
     she denied consuming any alcoholic beverages. [Appellant]
     denied performing the walk and turn test because she said she
     had a blister from wearing her new high heels, and she allegedly
     stepped on a rock when she exited her vehicle.

                            Procedural History

     On August 10, 2021, a criminal complaint was filed against
     [Appellant,] charging her with [DUI (count one)] and four related
     summary offenses. On May 12, 2022, [Appellant] proceeded to a
     non-jury trial before this court.       During trial, [Appellant]
     represented herself pro se. At the conclusion of the non-jury trial,
     the court found [Appellant] guilty of counts one and three[.]1
     [Appellant] was found not guilty of the remaining charges.
     Sentencing was deferred pending a limited pre-sentence
     investigation. Sentencing was initially scheduled for August 5,
     2022; however, the matter was continued thirty (30) days on
     motion of [Appellant]. Additionally, the court appointed Attorney
     Kenneth Noga to represent [Appellant] in this matter.           On
     September 1, 2022, [Appellant] was sentenced at count one to
     serve six (6) months[’] probation with thirty (30) days home
     electronic monitoring and costs and fees. She was sentenced to
     a twelve (12) month license suspension.          At count [three,
     Appellant] was ordered to pay a fine and costs and fees. The
     Commonwealth moved to amend count one to an ungraded
     misdemeanor and to strike the language of refusal. Additionally,

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      [Appellant] was granted windows for her husband’s medical
      needs.
         1 [Appellant] was found guilty of count three, improper left
         turn, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.[] § 3331(b).

      On September 7, 2022, [Appellant] filed a post-sentence motion
      before this court. Prior to conducting a hearing on the matter, the
      court denied the post-sentence motion by order of court dated
      November 21, 2022. On November 22, 2022, [Appellant] filed a
      timely notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On
      November 29, 2022, this court ordered [Appellant] to file a
      [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] concise statement of errors complained of on
      appeal. On November 30, 2022, [Appellant] filed said statement.

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 12/9/22, at 1-5 (citations to record and

unnecessary capitalization omitted).     The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a)

opinion on December 9, 2022.

      Herein, Appellant presents a single issue for our review: “Whether …

Appellant’s conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence when …

Appellant’s testimony presents an equally plausible explanation for her

behavior – being lost, tired, and upset – as opposed to intoxication?”

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

      Our standard of review for a challenge to the weight of the evidence is

well-established:

      A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
      is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an
      appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial court’s discretion;
      it does not answer for itself whether the verdict was against the
      weight of the evidence. It is well settled that the jury is free to
      believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the
      credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight of
      the evidence claim is only warranted where the jury’s verdict is so
      contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of justice. In
      determining whether this standard has been met, appellate review
      is limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion was properly

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      exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and
      inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135-36 (Pa. 2021) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

      Instantly, Appellant claims that there were “two equally plausible

explanations for [her] behavior during and following her operation of a motor

vehicle – intoxication and being tired, lost, and upset.” Appellant’s Brief at 6.

She avers that the Commonwealth has failed to conclusively demonstrate her

behavior was “the result of intoxication and not her flustered nature;” thus,

the trial court’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Id. Appellant

argues:

      For each indicator of “intoxication” observed by law enforcement,
      being upset, lost, and extremely tired is a plausible cause of the
      same symptom. Although Officer Murphy testified … Appellant’s
      breath was positive for alcohol, she denied consuming any alcohol
      that evening. Indeed, there is no evidence any bottles of alcohol
      – empty or otherwise – were observed or seized from the vehicle.
      In addition, there is no evidence … Appellant stopped anywhere to
      consume alcohol.

      Officer Murphy’s observations of … Appellant, including her
      bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and her failure to complete the
      field sobriety tests to satisfaction are all equally explainable by
      both alcohol intoxication and extreme tiredness in conjunction
      with being upset. Indeed, even her refusal of chemical testing is
      understandable given her being lost and upset prior to the motor
      vehicle stop.

Id. at 10-11 (citations to record omitted). Noting that “a guilty verdict cannot

be based on surmise or conjecture[,]” id. at 11 (citing Commonwealth v.

Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167, 1170 (Pa. 1993)), Appellant concludes:

      When both theories are viewed together, it is difficult to determine
      which is truth. As this difficulty appears to have been resolved in

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      favor of the speculative conclusion that … Appellant was
      intoxicated to such a degree that she could not operate the
      vehicle[,] the guilty verdict is not supported by the weight of the
      evidence. To accept one speculative conclusion and ignore the
      other essential facts before the [c]ourt is a miscarriage of justice
      that should shock the conscience of the Court.

Id. Accordingly, Appellant maintains that her conviction should be vacated.

      We disagree. The trial court had the opportunity to hear and see the

evidence presented and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. TCO at 5.

It “afforded great weight to Officer Murphy’s testimony because he was a

credible witness.” Id. at 6. To the contrary, the trial court found Appellant’s

testimony to be “incredible and self-serving[,]” noting that her behavior during

the non-jury trial “was at times rude and disrespectful.” Id. It opined:

      [T]he entirety of the evidence presented at trial convinces the
      [c]ourt that the evidence was in support of the verdict rendered.
      Through the duration of the non-jury trial, the [c]ourt considered
      the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, namely the
      testimony of Officer Murphy, who testified that he observed
      [Appellant] commit multiple traffic infractions while driving her
      vehicle. Officer Murphy’s testimony established that [Appellant]
      displayed indicia of intoxication.     Officer Murphy observed
      [Appellant] with glassy, bloodshot eyes; slowed, slurred speech;
      a strong odor of alcohol coming from [Appellant’s] person; a
      positive breath sample on the PBT; and further indicators of
      impairment while performing all three standardized field sobriety
      tests. Based upon Officer Murphy’s training, experience, and
      observations, Officer Murphy opined that on a scale of one to one
      hundred, he was one hundred percent sure [Appellant] was
      impaired and that she was too impaired to be behind the wheel
      of a vehicle due to alcohol.

Id. at 5-6 (emphasis in original). The trial court disagreed with Appellant’s

contention that her inability to operate a motor vehicle in a safe manner may

have been due to her tiredness rather than the consumption of alcohol, and it

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found that the Commonwealth established proof of Appellant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id. at 6. Based on its review of the entire record, the trial

court did “not find that the verdict is inconsistent or so contrary to the

evidence as to shock this court’s sense of justice.” Id.

      Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s

decision is supported by the evidence, and we discern no abuse of discretion.

Appellant essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence in her favor, substituting

our judgment for that of the trial court, which we cannot do. See Houser,

supra. Accordingly, no relief is warranted on Appellant’s claim.

      Nevertheless, in reviewing Appellant’s claim, we note the sentence

imposed by the trial court included a 12-month driver’s license suspension.

See Sentencing Order, 9/1/22, at 2. In imposing the suspension, the court

acted outside its authority; hence, that aspect of the sentence is illegal.

Although Appellant did not raise this issue on appeal, we may raise the issue

of sentence legality sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d

358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013).       “If no statutory authorization exists for a

particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction.     An

illegal sentence must be vacated.” Id. (citation omitted).

      As our Supreme Court has aptly explained,

      Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Code [(75 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9805
      (“Vehicle Code”))] sets forth a statutory scheme which requires
      the executive branch of government to issue and regulate motor
      vehicle licenses. The legislature has directed the Pennsylvania
      Department of Transportation (an executive agency) to issue
      driver’s licenses…, maintain records regarding driver’s licenses…,
      accept surrender of a license…, and complete various other

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       functions relative to driver’s licenses within Pennsylvania. In fact,
       section 1531 of the Vehicle Code specifically states: “The
       department shall administer an integrated system limited to the
       authority granted to the department in this title for revocation and
       suspension of operating privileges and for driver education,
       testing and control….” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1531.

       Within this statutory scheme, the courts play a relatively minor
       role. Of course, the judiciary of this Commonwealth determines
       whether an individual commits one of the offenses which may
       have subsequent license implications. However, the court’s role
       is limited to determining guilt. Thereafter, “license suspensions
       are collateral civil consequences rather than criminal penalties.”
       Commonwealth v. Duffey, … 639 A.2d 1174[, 1176] ([Pa.]
       1994). Under our statutory scheme, actual imposition of a license
       suspension “has been vested in an administrative agency over
       which the criminal judge has no control and for which he has no
       responsibility.” PennDOT v. McCafferty, … 758 A.2d 1155, 1162
       ([Pa.] 2000) [(]citing Duffey, … 639 A.2d at 1177[)].

Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 834 A.2d 488, 500-01 (Pa. 2003) (citation

omitted).

       Following Mockaitis, our legislature passed section 3804, which grants

the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation the exclusive authority to

impose license suspensions.             See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(1)(i) (“The

department shall suspend the operating privilege of an individual … upon

receiving a certified record of the individual’s conviction of … an offense under

section 3802 [relating to DUI offenses.]”).1

       Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Pennsylvania law grants the

Department of Transportation, not the courts, the authority to suspend a

____________________________________________

1 We note that section 3804(e)(2)(iii) provides an exception to the license
suspension requirement for defendants convicted of a first offense under
section 3802(a). See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(2)(iii).

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license. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court in this case lacked the

authority to suspend Appellant’s license and, in that respect, the sentence is

illegal.    Accordingly, we vacate the license suspension aspects of the

September 1, 2022 sentence. We affirm all other aspects of her judgment of

sentence.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/22/2023

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