Court Opinion

ID: 9352327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 19:01:08.055856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:08.204585
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60889      Document: 00516598730          Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/05/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                                                                 FILED
                                                                           January 5, 2023
                                    No. 21-60889                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                 Clerk

   Shrimpers and Fishermen of the RGV; Sierra Club; Save
   RGV from LNG,

                                                                        Petitioners,

                                        versus

   United States Army Corps of Engineers; Colonel
   Timothy R. Vail, in his official capacity as Galveston District
   Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Robert W. Heinly, in his
   official capacity as Deputy Chief, Regulatory Division, Galveston District, U.S.
   Army Corps of Engineers,

                                                                      Respondents.

                         Petition for Review of an Order of
                    the United States Army Corps of Engineers
                          Agency No. SWG-2015-00114

   Before King, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   King, Circuit Judge:
          Petitioners challenge a Clean Water Act permit issued by the U.S.
   Army Corps of Engineers authorizing the development of a natural gas
   pipeline and export facility in south Texas. Because the Corps approved the
   least environmentally damaging practicable alternative presented before it
   during the permitting process and did not act arbitrarily in its evaluation of
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   pipeline construction impacts and mitigation efforts, the petition for review
   is DENIED.
                                          I.
          Petitioners Shrimpers and Fishermen of the RGV, Sierra Club, and
   Save RGV from LNG (collectively, “Petitioners”) challenge the issuance of
   a Clean Water Act (“CWA”) permit by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
   (the “Corps”).
          In 2016, Rio Grande LNG and Rio Bravo Pipeline Company (the
   “Developers”) filed an application proposing to build a natural gas pipeline
   system and liquified natural gas (“LNG”) export facility in south Texas,
   partially upon wetland terrain. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
   (“FERC”) approved the project in 2019 after preparing an environmental
   impact statement (“EIS”) examining alternative terminal placement and
   pipeline configurations and soliciting public comment. The Corps then
   issued a CWA permit to the Developers in 2020 following an evaluation of
   the FERC EIS, its own environmental assessment, and other relevant
   information.
          The Developers’ proposal contemplated the creation of an LNG
   terminal with six liquefaction “trains,” which are equipment systems that
   cool and liquify natural gas, to produce a nominal capacity of approximately
   27 million tons per annum of LNG. Under this proposal, the trains would be
   located sequentially, with Train 1 located on the eastern side of the terminal
   and Train 6 located on its west. Ground flares, used in emergency scenarios
   to safely depressurize LNG trains, would be positioned between Trains 2 and
   3. The terminal would receive natural gas via a pipeline system comprising
   two parallel pipelines with capacity to provide about 4.5 billion cubic feet per
   day (Bcf/d) of gas. Other onsite facilities were to include four LNG storage

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   tanks, docking and truck loading facilities, and one of three required
   compressor stations. 1
           Petitioners challenged the Corps’ issuance of the permit in this court,
   see Shrimpers & Fishermen of the RGV v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 849 F.
   App’x 459 (5th Cir. 2021), but we held their petition in abeyance because the
   Developers had changed the project design and the Corps had suspended the
   permit for reconsideration. 2 The Developers had modified their project
   proposal in April 2020 to eliminate two compressor stations, increase the
   length and operating conditions of the pipelines, and use five liquefaction
   trains instead of six, among other changes not relevant here. Id. at 461. The
   modified design requires the Developers to permanently dredge or fill 149.7
   acres of special aquatic sites and to temporarily impact another 122.7 acres of
   special aquatic sites during pipeline construction.
           The FERC approved the terminal changes, including the elimination
   of Train 6, and denied rehearing. The Corps considered the Developers’
   materials, public comments, and the FERC’s assessment of the proposed
   changes before issuing a modified CWA permit in 2021, which Petitioners
   now challenge.
                                              II.
           Petitioners allege that the Corps’ permit issuance violated the CWA
   and its implementing regulations by, first, failing to show that the approved

           1
            The application located the other two compressor stations upland and beyond the
   terminal’s boundaries.
           2
             Petitioners Sierra Club and Save RGV from LNG also challenged the FERC’s
   original 2019 authorization in the D.C. Circuit, which held that the FERC’s analyses of
   greenhouse gas emissions and environmental justice were deficient. Vecinos para el
   Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Those claims are
   not before us and do not impact the issues presented here.

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   project was the least environmentally damaging practicable alternative
   (“LEDPA”) as required under 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) and, second, concluding
   that the wetland impacts caused by pipeline construction did not necessitate
   compensatory mitigation.
          The CWA generally prohibits the discharge of pollutants, such as
   sand, dirt, and rock, into waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a),
   1362(6). This includes wetlands. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(b). However, section 404
   of the CWA allows the Corps to issue permits for the discharge of dredged
   or fill material into United States waters, subject to guidelines developed by
   the Environmental Protection Agency. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. These guidelines
   provide a three-step framework that the Corps must follow when issuing
   permits. First, “no discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted if
   there is a practicable alternative . . . which would have less adverse impact on
   the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other
   significant adverse environmental consequences.” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a). An
   alternative is “practicable” if it is “available and capable of being done after
   taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of
   overall project purposes” and may include “area[s] not presently owned by
   the applicant which could reasonably be obtained, utilized, expanded or
   managed in order to fulfill the basic purpose of the proposed activity.” Id.
   § 230.10(a)(2). Second, no permits shall issue “unless appropriate and
   practicable steps have been taken which will minimize potential adverse
   impacts.” Id. § 230.10(d). Third, compensatory mitigation is required for
   unavoidable environmental losses, based on a determination regarding what
   is practicable and capable of compensating for lost aquatic resource
   functions. 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(a)(1).
          A court must set aside the Corps’ permit if its issuance was “arbitrary,
   capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
   5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1183 (5th Cir.

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   1982). Provided that the Corps “examine[d] the relevant data and
   articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action” such that its “decision
   was based on a consideration of the relevant factors,” this requirement is
   satisfied. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. EPA, 920 F.3d 999, 1013 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (quoting 10 Ring Precision, Inc. v. Jones, 722 F.3d 711, 723 (5th Cir. 2013)). In
   other words, the petition should be denied if the Corps’ path to permit
   approval “may reasonably be discerned.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S.,
   Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal
   quotations omitted).
                                         III.
          Petitioners put forward several alternative proposals for the terminal
   layout and the pipeline system, arguing that the Corps failed to clearly
   demonstrate that the approved project—and not one or more of these
   alternatives—is the LEDPA required under the first step of the CWA
   framework.
          With respect to the terminal layout, at issue is whether the twenty-
   acre space previously designated for westernmost Train 6, which the
   Developers now intend to use for storage and other construction purposes,
   could instead be utilized to reconfigure the terminal layout in ways that are
   both less environmentally damaging and practicable. The first alternative
   Petitioners offer contemplates shifting the ground flares and Trains 3, 4, and
   5 west, such that Train 5 would occupy the footprint previously occupied by
   Train 6, and the ground flares would no longer sit upon five acres of wetlands.
   During the permitting process, the Corps considered and rejected this
   alternative as neither practicable nor less environmentally damaging than the
   proposed project. Petitioners assert that the permitted project results in the
   total loss of five acres of wetlands, whereas their proposed alternative only
   impairs those five acres—a less environmentally damaging result. They also

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   contend that this alternative, which requires their proposed Train 5 location
   to be used as a temporary storage and preservation area prior to the
   installation of Train 5, is practicable.
          This alternative fails, however, because the Corps sufficiently
   explained that it would result in the same functional impairment of wetlands
   as the permitted design and thus was not the LEDPA. There is no dispute
   that this alternative would shift the ground flares westward such that
   approximately five acres of wetlands could be avoided; rather, the parties
   dispute how those five acres would be affected by the rest of the project under
   the alternative design. As the Corps explained in an addendum to its
   environmental assessment of the Developers’ proposal, the rest of the
   wetlands would remain permanently filled such that the unfilled five acres of
   wetlands would become isolated. Moreover, the Corps found that the
   construction surrounding these five acres would adversely impact the
   hydrology of the area severely enough that the remaining wetlands would
   experience loss of function and degradation. Petitioners contend that this loss
   of function is partial, not total, but the record suggests otherwise. After
   evaluating “whether shifting of the remaining trains could increase
   avoidance of impacts to wetlands” under Petitioners’ proposed alternative,
   the Corps determined that “potential shifting of the remaining trains [3, 4,
   and 5] and ground flares would not result in the avoidance of wetland
   function losses” compared to the permitted project. Because an alternative
   must both be practicable and less environmentally damaging, the failure of
   this alternative to satisfy the latter requirement was sufficient reason alone
   for the Corps to reject it.
          Lacking evidence to support their view of the record, Petitioners argue
   that the Corps has not undergone satisfactory analysis regarding the degree
   of wetland impairment under their alternative. They argue the Corps is
   required to rebut the “very strong” presumption that impaired wetlands are

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   preferable to no wetlands and has not done so. Buttrey, 690 F.2d at 1180. But
   the law only requires that the Corps begins its analysis with a very strong
   presumption that “unnecessary alteration or destruction of [wetlands]
   should be discouraged as contrary to the public interest.” Id. (quoting 33
   C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(1)). Neither Petitioners nor the record suggest that the
   Corps did not start the permitting process with this in mind—in fact, the
   record suggests the opposite—and we therefore discard this argument.
   Accordingly, Petitioners’ first proposed alternative is not the LEDPA.
          Petitioners present a second alternative to the terminal design:
   shifting all trains west, with Train 5 again occupying the Train 6 footprint,
   and moving terminal support infrastructure to the Train 1 footprint.
   However, it is not clear that Petitioners ever proposed this alternative during
   the permitting process. Where, as here, the parties challenge the Corps’
   adequate consideration of alternatives, they “must structure their
   participation to alert the agency to their position in order ‘to allow the agency
   to give the issue meaningful consideration,’ unless a flaw is so obvious that
   there is no need to point out the shortcoming.” Gulf Coast Rod, Reel & Gun
   Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 676 F. App’x 245, 251 (5th Cir. 2017)
   (quoting Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764–65 (2004)).
   Generally, this means raising the alternative in the comments addressed to
   the agency. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 764–65.
          Petitioners direct us toward two comments submitted to the Corps
   that supposedly should have alerted the Corps of this alternative. As an initial
   matter, these comments were submitted in response to the originally
   permitted design, not the design at issue in this case. More importantly, they
   do not recommend this second alternative Petitioners now suggest. They
   propose generally “reduc[ing] the terminal footprint” by “omit[ting] one of
   the six planned liquefaction trains” (which the Developers have done),
   “adopt[ing] a more compact design with the same capacity and number of

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   trains” (i.e., six trains), and “mov[ing] the six liquefaction trains and
   associated equipment to a different and upland site.” None of these
   proposals is sufficiently similar to Petitioners’ proposed alternative to allow
   the Corps to give the issue meaningful consideration, and the supposed flaw
   in the permitted project is not so obvious that there is no need to point it out.
   Rather, Petitioners now propose a significant project redesign without
   providing the Corps an earlier opportunity to meaningfully consider it. We
   need not evaluate it now, and we choose not to do so.
          Petitioners also propose an alternative configuration for the pipeline
   system, stating that the Developers should substitute the existing Valley
   Crossing Pipeline (“VCP”) for the second proposed Rio Bravo Pipeline
   (“Pipeline 2”). The VCP is an existing pipeline designed to transport 2.6
   Bcf/d of gas, and it follows a similar route as the permitted first Rio Bravo
   Pipeline (“Pipeline 1”) and Pipeline 2. Several years ago, there were plans to
   modify the VCP to increase its capacity by at least 0.9 Bcf/d, but that project
   was withdrawn in March 2021 before any modifications occurred. Petitioners
   claim that the Developers could now meet their project purpose with only a
   single Rio Bravo Pipeline, utilizing the previously planned—but not
   realized—additional VCP capacity to provide 0.9 Bcf/d of gas and supplying
   the remaining 3.6 Bcf/d using Pipeline 1.
          The Corps considered and rejected this alternative on the merits, but
   Petitioners dispute the Corps’ finding that the VCP is impracticable. The
   practicability inquiry concerns “cost, existing technology, and logistics in
   light of overall project purposes,” 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2), all of which the
   Corps explained make the VCP an impracticable alternative. Most of the
   issues with this alternative stem from the inability of the VCP, even assuming
   an expansion, to supply the 1.9 Bcf/d of gas Pipeline 2 is designed to provide.
   Absent such an expansion, the VCP’s current capacity is fully subscribed to
   end users in Mexico, so any gas it could provide to the permitted project

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   would be on an interruptible basis only. This alone frustrates the project’s
   purpose, which presumes a consistent supply of gas. Importantly, the
   supposed expansion does not currently exist and would require the VCP
   system itself to be redesigned, including the construction of a second pipeline
   to supply the necessary capacity. This redesign would result in a
   transportation service rate that is more than forty percent more expensive
   than under the permitted Pipeline 2.
          Assuming the 0.9 Bcf/d expansion occurs, problems remain. To meet
   the pipelines’ purpose of delivering 4.5 Bcf/d of gas to the terminal, Pipeline
   1’s capacity would have to be expanded, and compression and booster
   stations would have to be added to the project design. Moreover, removing
   Pipeline 2 would create significant logistical problems regarding
   maintenance, reliability, and safety. As the FERC explained, a dual pipeline
   system allows natural gas to be transported “reliably and safely” and in a way
   that supports “flexible operation to adapt to” unforeseen circumstances. Rio
   Grande LNG, LLC & Rio Bravo Pipeline Company, LLC, 170 FERC ¶ 61,046,
   ¶ 25 (Jan. 23, 2020) (order on rehearing and stay). The current dual pipeline
   will supply, at a minimum, two liquefaction trains when one pipeline is shut
   down, enabling flexible operation and safe, reliable transportation. Under
   Petitioners’ proposal, that becomes one train, which the Corps states will
   impair terminal operations when Pipeline 1 is offline for any reason.
          In addition to these problems, the VCP alternative is impracticable
   because it is not available. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(2) (“An alternative is
   practicable if it is available . . . .”). The VCP and Rio Bravo are owned by
   different companies, albeit both companies are wholly owned subsidiaries of
   Enbridge Inc. Neither Rio Bravo nor Enbridge has any contracted-for
   capacity on the VCP, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the
   Developers can demand that the VCP become a project applicant and expand
   the pipeline as Petitioners propose. While “an area not presently owned by

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   the applicant which could reasonably be obtained, utilized, expanded or
   managed in order to fulfill the basic purpose of the proposed activity may be
   considered,” id. § 230.10(a)(2), “[a] mere, unsupported theoretical
   possibility of acquiring the alternative site . . . does not constitute a showing
   that the alternative site is reasonably obtainable,” City of Shoreacres v.
   Waterworth, 420 F.3d 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2005). During the comment period
   and now, Petitioners wholly fail to substantiate their argument that the VCP
   could be acquired by the Developers, and the Corps reasonably determined
   that it was not readily obtainable. Taken together, these factors are sufficient
   to support the Corps’ decision to discard this alternative.
          The Corps has satisfactorily explained its reasons for rejecting the
   alternatives previously presented to it and more than met the “minimal
   standards of rationality” required of our review. Waterworth, 420 F.3d at 445
   (quoting Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 905 (5th
   Cir. 1983)). Accordingly, the permitted project is the LEDPA.
                                         IV.
          Petitioners argue that the Corps acted arbitrarily when it determined
   that impacts to wetlands caused by pipeline construction were temporary and
   did not necessitate compensatory mitigation under the third step of the CWA
   framework. Specifically, they assert that the Corps failed to provide a
   factually supported estimate of the duration of wetland disruption and did
   not analyze the consequences of such disruption, each of which makes its
   decision not to require mitigation for pipeline construction impacts arbitrary.
          CWA regulations require compensatory mitigation to “offset
   environmental losses resulting from unavoidable impacts” to wetlands
   authorized by the Corps’ permits. 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(a)(1). However, not all
   wetland impacts automatically require compensatory mitigation. With
   respect to temporary impacts, the Corps’ “[d]istrict engineers will determine

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   appropriate compensatory mitigation requirements for temporary impacts.”
   Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594,
   19,638 (Apr. 10, 2008). “What constitutes a temporary impact, and the need
   for compensatory mitigation, is determined on a case-by-case basis,
   depending on the specific circumstances of the project. The district engineer
   will determine the appropriate time interval for distinguishing between
   temporary and permanent impacts.” Id. at 19,607.
          Here, the Corps determined that the pipeline construction impacts
   would be temporary and did not require compensatory mitigation. Under the
   project design, the pipelines will be constructed in sequence and part-by-part,
   with an eighteen-month gap between the completion of Pipeline 1 and the
   beginning of construction of Pipeline 2. In addition, the permit imposes
   significant requirements on the Developers to avoid and minimize wetland
   impacts, such as the requirement to use horizontal drilling to avoid impacts
   to major waterbody crossings and other wetland areas. The permit also
   provides for short construction periods. Pipeline installation activities on
   wetlands or water crossings are estimated to take three months at most, with
   many shorter crossings being completed more quickly. Other construction
   activities require even less time. The Corps determined that these permit
   conditions would result in the restoration of hydric soil and wetland
   hydrology functions within thirty days of work completion for each
   waterbody crossing. The Corps further determined, based on myriad
   scientific evidence, including microbial activity, flooding and soil saturation
   duration, and soil temperature, that vegetation would be restored within one
   growing season from the time of restoration. Given its estimation that it
   would take only one growing season to revegetate the restored areas, the
   Corps—in accordance with its typical policy—found the impacts temporary
   and determined compensatory mitigation was not required.

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          Petitioners’ first set of arguments centers on the Corps’ estimation
   that restoration will occur within one year. They state that the Corps did not
   consider the full construction period when quantifying the duration of
   impacts, which they allege is improper. However, they supply no evidence
   that the construction period must be, or even that it typically is, included
   when assessing whether impacts are temporary. The only evidence we have
   is the regulation itself, which provides that the Corps’ engineer
   “determine[s] the appropriate time interval for distinguishing between
   temporary and permanent impacts.” Id. Petitioners suggest the Corps’
   approach could lead to absurd results in other situations, but the Corps is not
   bound to this approach in all instances. It is merely its typical policy, one that
   it chose to apply based on the “specific circumstances of the project.” Id.
   Given the minimal construction period at each waterbody crossing, the
   Corps’ decision to evaluate project impacts from the point of restoration was
   not improper.
          Petitioners also allege that the Corps failed to demonstrate that
   restoration would be complete within one year and that it contradicted the
   conclusion reached by the EIS and endorsed by the EPA and the U.S. Fish
   and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) that herbaceous vegetation would regenerate
   within one to three years. 3 These arguments are not persuasive. Based on
   studies showing that herbaceous wetlands restored to pre-construction
   contours usually revegetate within one growing season, and the fact that the
   project location’s growing season is year-round, the Corps concluded that
   the project’s favorable conditions would ensure successful revegetation

          3
             Petitioners briefly suggest that the Corps failed to consider the cumulative
   disruption that occurs from building two pipelines in sequence. However, the Corps
   evaluated this disruption and determined that such impacts would be temporary regardless
   of consecutive pipeline construction because of the special conditions included in the
   permit requiring extensive restoration activities.

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   within one year after restoration is completed. Further, the EPA’s feedback
   cited by Petitioners was premised on an outdated version of the proposed
   project prior to the modified proposal in 2020 and before the Corps had
   approved the compensatory mitigation plan or established the permit special
   conditions to avoid and minimize wetland impacts. It is not inconsistent with
   the Corps’ ultimate conclusion. The EPA agrees that activities are typically
   temporary if they last “less than 12 months or a single growing season,” and
   nowhere in the record do the EPA or the FWS state a belief that revegetation
   will take longer than a year. The Corps’ analysis also comports with the EIS,
   which estimates that herbaceous vegetation will regenerate “within 1 to 3
   years.” The EIS estimation necessarily includes the finding that vegetation
   may revegetate in one year, as the Corps concluded. This court “must be
   ‘most deferential’ to the agency where, as here, its decision is based upon its
   evaluation of complex scientific data within its technical expertise.” Sierra
   Club v. EPA, 939 F.3d 649, 680 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting BCCA Appeal Grp.
   v. EPA, 355 F.3d 817, 824 (5th Cir. 2003)). The Corps has satisfied our
   deferential review of this issue.
          Lastly, Petitioners argue that the Corps failed to address whether
   these temporary impacts require compensatory mitigation, staking their
   claim primarily upon EPA comments suggesting that additional mitigation
   was needed. 4 However, the EPA feedback Petitioners rely upon does not
   consider the approved compensatory mitigation plan or the special
   conditions of the permit because the comments are from 2015 and 2018—

          4
             Petitioners contend that the FWS also asserted that the pipeline construction
   impacts warranted compensatory mitigation but only point to notes from a 2018
   interagency meeting between the FERC, the Corps, and the FWS stating, without
   attribution to the FWS, that mitigation “may be required.” This does not undermine the
   Corps’ more recent conclusion that additional mitigation is not warranted, given the
   conditions embedded in the permit.

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   well before the current permit (and even the original permit) was approved.
   The Corps considered this feedback and aligned its ultimate approach with
   the EPA’s recommendations. Notably, special condition nine facilitates the
   Corps’ monitoring of restoration efforts by requiring the Developers to
   submit monitoring reports within sixty days of completing construction at
   each crossing, and special condition ten requires the Developers to undertake
   additional restoration or compensatory mitigation if the Corps determines
   that wetlands have not been successfully restored to pre-construction
   conditions. Given these requirements, the Corps reasonably determined that
   these temporary impacts do not require compensatory mitigation. We defer
   to the Corps’ judgment in these matters, id., and we are satisfied that its
   decision was rational, see Waterworth, 420 F.3d at 445. Accordingly, we find
   that the Corps did not act arbitrarily in its consideration of and conclusions
   regarding the impacts of pipeline construction and the need for
   compensatory mitigation.
                                        V.
          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

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