Court Opinion

ID: 9687115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:16:23.455375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:24.350527
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(dissenting). These consolidated appeals present the question whether certain interim disability and wage-replacement benefits, paid or caused to be paid by an employer to a disabled employee while his claim for workers’ compensation is pending, may be credited against the employer’s obligation when workers’ compensation is later awarded.
Today our Court answers this question in peremptory fashion by adopting an opinion of a special panel of the Court of Appeals that provides little in the way of analysis or reasoning except to assert that the controlling provision, § 811 of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.811; MSA 17.237(811), is written in "clear language” and, presumably, is therefore unambig*624uous. 196 Mich App 470, 489; 493 NW2d 909 (1992). Because the language of §811 is ambiguous, and I am concerned that the interpretation adopted by the Court today may undercut important public policy goals of the wdca,* I must dissent. I would grant leave to appeal.
Where, as here, the Legislature’s intent is in doubt,-this Court should at least consider a construction of the statute that encourages employers to help workers "weather the storm” while their compensation claims are pending, rather than a construction that penalizes and discourages employer-financed wage replacement programs. See Gilroy v General Motors Corp (After Remand), 438 Mich 330, 337; 475 NW2d 271 (1991).
Moreover, as Justice Williams stated in Stanley v Hinchliffe & Kenner, 395 Mich 645, 657, n 15; 238 NW2d 13 (1976), "[djouble recovery is repugnant to the very principles of workmen’s compensation.” There he quoted with approval:
"To allow double recovery is contrary to one of the fundamental principles of workmen’s compensation, in that if the employee were to receive more compensation while disabled than while working, the temptation to malinger and prolong his period of disability would be unwisely increased.” 1 Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation, § 160, p 470.
See also Thick v Lapeer Metal Products, 419 Mich 342, 347; 353 NW2d 464 (1984). In Stanley, this Court not only found § 811 to be ambiguous, but we rejected an interpretation that would have resulted in double recovery.
"Peremptory disposition, without plenary consideration, full briefing, oral argument, and an oppor*625tunity for the profession to file briefs as amici curiae, should be reserved for cases in which the law is settled and factual assessment is not required.” People v Hunt, 442 Mich 359, 366; 501 NW2d 151 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting).
Riley, J., concurred with Griffin, J.

 1969 PA 317, as amended, MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq.