Court Opinion

ID: 9701981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:47:53.479301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:31.767059
License: Public Domain

*610ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
With the exception of footnote 2 and the reference therein to Kiley v. City of Philadelphia, 537 Pa. 502, 645 A.2d 184 (1994), a case in which I joined the majority and which I believe is distinguishable from the present case, I join in Justice Cappy’s Dissenting Opinion.
I also note that the majority’s interpretation of this language is apparently at odds with the understanding expressed in the May 1978 Report of the Joint State Government Commission Task Force on Sovereign Immunity, proposing the legislation which, after revision not relevant in this context, became 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501 et seq. The Report’s discussion of the waiver of sovereign immunity1 in the area of liability related to “Commonwealth Real Estate, Highways and Sidewalks” states, “this area of waiver is intended to impose liability as it would exist if the owner or lessee were a private person.” Id. at 13.
Because I find the majority’s interpretation to be strained, illogical, contrary to the intention of the General Assembly, and apt to foster absurd results, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the Order of the Commonwealth Court.

. As the majority notes, we have held "that the two statutes dealing with governmental and sovereign immunities, viz., the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and the Sovereign Immunity Act, are to be interpreted consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject matter.” Maj. Opinion at 601, citing Kiley, 537 Pa. at 507, 645 A.2d at 186; Crowell v. City of Philadelphia, 531 Pa. 400, 410 n. 8, 613 A.2d 1178, 1182 n. 8; and Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424, 435 n. 7, 562 A.2d 307, 312 n. 7.