Court Opinion

ID: 9746242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:09:48.513893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:45.526926
License: Public Domain

*1291WALLIN, J.
Reluctantly, I concur in the majority opinion. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that a criminal defendant cannot waive the statute of limitations on a criminal offense. (People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 757 [170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837].) Furthermore, California and United States Supreme Court authorities support the majority’s conclusion that a trial court need not instruct the jury on a lesser offense which is time-barred. (Spaziano v. Florida (1984) 468 U.S. 447, 456 [82 L.Ed.2d 340, 349-350, 104 S.Ct. 3154]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 283 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].) Nonetheless, I write separately to express my dissatisfaction with this result.
As stated by Justice Brauer in his concurring opinion in People v. Brice (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 111 [253 Cal.Rptr. 370], to the extent Diedrich prohibits instructions on time-barred offenses, it invidiously discriminates “against a defendant who is in an ‘all or nothing’ position because the lesser included or lesser related offenses, otherwise available to him, are time-barred.” (People v. Brice, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 117.)
People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510 [199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303] establishes that a court must grant a defendant’s request for an instruction on a lesser related offense if there is evidence which would support a conviction of that offense. (Id. at p. 531.) The purpose of this requirement is to avoid the risk that a jury, convinced that the defendant’s conduct was unlawful but not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that all the elements of the greater offense are present, convicts simply because its only choice is conviction or acquittal. The state has no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of a greater offense than that established by the evidence. (Ibid.; see also People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 533 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390].) I see no reason why this concern is obliterated when the lesser offense is time-barred.
The request that a jury be instructed on a time-barred lesser offense is analogous to a request for a pinpoint instruction. It is well established that upon request a defendant is entitled to an instruction which directs the jury’s attention to evidence from which a reasonable doubt of his guilt could be engendered. (People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847]; see also People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885 [123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247]; People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 335, 339 [185 Cal.Rptr. 506].) A defendant’s request for an instruction on a lesser related offense, time-barred or not, is like a request for an instruction *1292that relates the particular facts of the case to the law. It is an instruction which tells the jury if the facts fit the lesser crime, then there may be a reasonable doubt as to whether the greater crime has been committed. Had the trial court given the instruction Ognibene requested on tampering with an odometer it would have, in essence, been telling the jury that if it concluded Ognibene was guilty of tampering with an odometer, it might have a reasonable doubt on the greater offense of theft by false pretenses.
The jury was instructed that to find Ognibene guilty of theft by false pretenses it had to find he (1) had the intent to defraud; (2) knowingly made false representations regarding certain facts; and (3) induced the victim to part with something of value. Ognibene’s defense was there was no reliance and he did not intend to defraud. It was apparent to the jury that Ognibene had tampered with the cars’ odometers, itself a criminal act. If the jury had a reasonable doubt as to intent it should have acquitted even in the face of his obviously wrongful conduct. But the risk that the jury would convict on the greater offense in the face of admittedly wrongful conduct rather than acquit a wrongdoer, is precisely the reason for the rule requiring instructions on lesser offenses. It makes no sense to discriminate against this defendant because the offense is time-barred.
Ognibene had a right to have the jury determine all material issues presented by the facts. Here, that included the right to have the jury determine that his crime was no greater than tampering with an odometer. If that were the jury’s decision, he would have been entitled to an acquittal.
The majority echoes the concern articulated in Spaziano, supra, 468 U.S. 447, regarding the impact on the credibility of the judicial system if a defendant was allowed an instruction on a time-barred offense, for which he or she could not be convicted. While I share that concern, the problem is created by the prosecution’s failure to commence prosecution on the time-barred offense before the expiration of the statute of limitations, not by any conduct of the defendant. I am more concerned about the potential for a defendant being convicted of a crime greater than that shown by the evidence because the crime which he or she committed is time-barred.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 27, 1993.