Court Opinion

ID: 9630364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:09:33.134767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:37.727552
License: Public Domain

Daley, J.
(dissenting). While I fully concur with the view of the majority that under the statute the knowledge of the actor as to the loaded or unloaded nature of the firearm is an irrelevancy, I cannot subscribe to my associates’ further conclusion that the question of whether the gun is actually loaded or unloaded is similarly nongermane.
In my opinion, one cannot be placed in an objective state of danger when an unloaded gun is pointed at him. He may well be “in fear”, but he is not, as I see it, “in danger”. In cases of this nature I would recognize the presumption of danger (loaded gun) from the act of pointing, but permit the defendant to present evidence that the gun was not, in fact, *126loaded. The ultimate determination as to whether the gun was loaded, and thus whether the victim was placed in danger, would then properly rest with the jury.
Defendant in the case before us testified at trial that the gun was not loaded, and I feel that the trial court committed reversible error in instructing the jury that “the fact that a firearm is or is not loaded is of no importance.” The jury was thereby prevented from considering an important factor bearing on the essential element of danger.
I would reverse.