Court Opinion

ID: 9700273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:18:02.094734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:06.240467
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The government contends that Erik Jones engaged in two discrete actions which are supposed to have constituted accessoryship after the fact (AAF) to murder. First, Jones is alleged to have shot at and attempted to intimidate Rogest Webb while Webb was running through the “cut” and away from the scene of Steven Dunbar’s murder. Second, Jones fled from the area a few minutes later in the company of the actual shooter, Arthur Rice.
In my opinion, Jones’ AAF conviction cannot fairly be sustained on either of the government’s theories. Webb’s own admissions on the witness stand about what he saw and did not see in the cut raised a reasonable doubt, as a matter of law, as to that aspect of the prosecution’s ease; moreover, the jury acquitted Jones of all of the charges which were based exclusively on Jones’ alleged encounter with Webb. The prosecution’s second theory fares no better, for, notwithstanding the majority’s ingeniously creative characterization of Jones’ alleged conduct as “escorting” the murderer, see pp. [166], infra, what Jones actually did — specifically, he ran away, with Rice at his side — cannot reasonably be classified as accessoryship after the fact.
Taken as a whole, the evidence might perhaps support a suspicion that Jones committed the charged offense, but it falls eonsider-*168ably short of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The government’s first theory falters on the facts, while the second fails on the law. Accordingly, I would reverse Jones’ conviction for being an accessory after the fact.1
I.
The standard of review is not in doubt. We may set aside Jones’ AAF conviction for evidentiary insufficiency only if, after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that there was no evidence upon which an impartial jury could fairly find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jones committed the offense. See maj. op. at 162; Harris v. United States, 668 A.2d 839, 841 (D.C.1995). Our review is necessarily deferential, for it is up to the jury, and not to an appellate tribunal, to assess credibility and to draw reasonable inferences.
But as Judge (now Justice) Thomas stated for the court in United States v. Long, 284 U.S.App. D.C. 405, 409, 905 F.2d 1572, 1576, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 948, 111 S.Ct. 365, 112 L.Ed.2d 328 (1990), “[w]e do not ... fulfill our duty through rote incantation of these principles followed by summary affirmance.” Our review, in other words, is not “entirely toothless.” United States v. Salamanca, 300 U.S.App. D.C. 384, 392-93, 990 F.2d 629, 637-38, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928, 114 S.Ct. 337, 126 L.Ed.2d 281 (1993); see also Roy v. United States, 652 A.2d 1098, 1103 (D.C.1995). On the contrary, a motion for a judgment of acquittal is “an important safeguard to the defendant,” for it “tests the sufficiency of the evidence against him, and avoids the risk that a jury may capriciously find him guilty [even] though there is no legally sufficient' evidence of his guilt.” Crawley v. United States, 320 A.2d 309, 311 (D.C.1974) (quoting Wright, Federal Praotioe AND Prooedure: Criminal § 461 (1969)).
Although appellate judges are limited to a cold record in assessing the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence, they too have a significant role to play. As this court stated in Crawley, supra, it is
proper — and indeed necessary — for [members of this court] to draw upon our own experience, value judgments, and common sense in determining whether the verdict reached was in keeping with the facts.
Id. at 312 (citing 8 Moore’s Federal Prao-TICE § 29.06).
Moreover, as the court stated in Salaman-ca in a passage that might easily have been written with Erik Jones in mind,
[t]he sufficiency of the evidence warrants particular scrutiny when the evidence strongly indicates that a defendant is guilty of a crime other than that for which he was convicted, but for which he was not charged. Under such circumstances, a trier of fact, particularly a jury, may convict a defendant of a crime for which there is insufficient evidence to vindicate its judgment that the defendant is blameworthy.
Salamanca, supra, 300 U.S.App. D.C. at 393, 990 F.2d at 638. Finally, our obligation to assure ourselves that an impartial jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is especially compelling where, as in this case, the jury, in disposing of other counts of the indictment, appears to have squarely rejected one of the two theories — probably the main one — upon which Jones’ AAF conviction is supposed to rest.
II.
The government claims that by firing at Webb, or by threatening him, Jones attempted to prevent Webb from pursuing Rice, and *169that Jones also tried to intimidate Webb so that Webb would not report Rice’s crime to the authorities. If such conduct had been proved, it would undoubtedly have constituted aeeessoryship after the fact. Outlaw v. United States, 632 A2d 408, 411 (D.C.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1205, 114 S.Ct. 1326, 127 L.Ed.2d 674 (1994); Butler v. United States, 481 A.2d 431, 442-43 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029, 105 S.Ct. 1398, 84 L.Ed.2d 786 (1985). But the record, fairly viewed, demonstrates, that the AAF conviction cannot be sustained on this theory. Moreover, in its disposition of all those charges which were based entirely on Jones’ alleged encounter with Webb, the jury squarely rejected the government’s version of what took place.
The only witness to the alleged shooting was Rogest Webb. No other witness corroborated Webb’s assertion that Jones shot at him. The police recovered no used shells from the scene of the alleged shooting. The prosecution produced no physical evidence in support of its theory. The government’s ease with regard to the incident at the cut must therefore stand or fall on Webb’s testimony.
In my opinion, no impartial jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt, on the basis of Webb’s account, that Jones fired at Webb. This is so because it is obvious from Webb’s testimony that the witness himself entertained considerable doubt about the accuracy of the allegation. On the present record, Webb’s own reservations must surely translate into a reasonable doubt as a matter of law.
First, Webb admitted that he never saw a weapon in Jones’ hand. He explained that he was “too busy running.” This acknowledgment is especially remarkable in light of Webb’s testimony that he was about fourteen feet from Jones, and that he recognized Jones as “Erky-Berk” from Jones’ clothing, including his yellow boots. Webb testified that “[t]he lighting, it was okay, because the light from the street light was shining in the cut a little bit.” Unless the streetlight provided more illumination to the ground than to Jones’ arm at shoulder level — a distinctly dubious scenario — it is. difficult to understand how Webb could have missed seeing a weapon in Jones’ hand if indeed there was one.
Moreover, Webb was not at all sure that the firing that he allegedly heard came from Jones. Webb’s testimony concluded as follows:
BY MR. JOHNSON (counsel for Jones):
Q You say he was the only one back there at the time. The person who you allege shot at you that you did not see with a gun was the only person you saw. You don’t know whether somebody else was standing back there in the dark shooting at you, do you?
A You’re right.
(Emphasis added.) Webb thus admitted not only that he saw no weapon in Jones’ hand, but also that the shooter might very well have been someone other than Jones.
With due respect to the majority, I suggest that the protection afforded to a defendant by the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt becomes illusory if Jones can be convicted on the basis of the testimony of a witness who admits as much as Webb has admitted. I am astonished that my colleagues detect proof beyond a reasonable doubt where the sole witness was himself so unsure, and where so much is at stake. We are, after all, dealing here with an offense for which Jones could lawfully be sentenced to imprisonment for a maximum term of fifteen years, and for which he was actually but erroneously sentenced to serve fifteen years to life. See maj. op. at 166.
But that is not all. The government’s claim that Jones shot at Webb gave rise to five separate charges: assault with intent to kill while armed (AWIKWA); assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW, as a lesser included offense of AWIKWA); possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence (PFCV); carrying a pistol without a license (CPWOL); and one count of obstruction of justice. The trial judge granted Jones’ motion for judgment of acquittal as to AWIKWA and CPWOL. The jury acquitted Jones of ADW, PFCV, and the first obstruction of justice charge. Jones was thus cleared of all of the charges which were *170based exclusively on his alleged encounter with Webb. There is only one plausible explanation of the disposition of these counts: the prosecution failed to prove, to the jury’s satisfaction, that Jones fired at Webb, or that Jones had a pistol, or that Jones attempted to coerce or intimidate Webb at all.
The majority argues that even if Jones did not have a pistol, and even if he did not shoot at Webb, then the judgment should be affirmed anyway, because “even a similitude of such an action by appellant in the cut would suffice to support the conviction.” Maj. op. at 165 n. 7. I am baffled by this assertion. Webb never claimed that Jones attempted to intimidate him in any way other than by shooting at him. There was no allegation of verbal threats, or even of threatening gestures. If Jones had no pistol, and if he did not fire — possibilities2 that Webb acknowledged — then the record is barren of any coercive conduct by Jones against Webb. Surely holding one’s hand up with no weapon in it, standing alone, does not constitute ae-cessoryship after the fact to murder!3
The majority points out, quite, correctly, that inconsistent verdicts are tolerated in criminal cases, and that a conviction may not be set aside for evidentiary insufficiency solely because it is logically inconsistent with the jury’s verdict on another count. See, e.g., United States v. Dobyns, 679 A.2d 487, 490 (D.C.1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1859, 137 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1997); cf. Whitaker v. United States, 617 A.2d 499, 502-03 (D.C.1992). I am not suggesting, however, that Jones’ AAF conviction should be reversed solely on account of such inconsistency. In my opinion, Webb’s testimony in itself is replete with reasonable doubt. The jury’s disposition of all of the charges arising out of events in the cut provides dramatic corroboration for my assessment, and strongly suggests that Jones’ AAF conviction was not based on those events.4 To ignore this reality on the strength of the rule tolerating inconsistent verdicts is to exalt a doctrine of questionable applicability here over that most precious judicial commodity of all: common sense.
III.
The government’s second theory is that Jones became an accessory after the fact by fleeing with Rice. I quote in its entirety the government’s argument on this point in its brief on appeal:
Appellant also assisted Rice in order to prevent his apprehension when he ran with him as Rice fled the murder scene. Indeed, as the trial court noted, appellant’s actions in fleeing with Rice were analogous to those of a lookout who stands guard to ensure that the principal is not eaught. Likewise, by accompanying Rice as he fled the area, appellant provided additional protection against anyone who might have tried to apprehend Rice as he tried to effectuate his escape.
The government has cited no authority for the proposition that one becomes an accesso*171ry after the fact solely by running from the scene with the principal. So far as I am aware, there is no such authority.5
Under the AAF statute, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones took some action to assist Rice with the specific intent to prevent Rice’s arrest, trial, or punishment. See Butler, supra, 481 A.2d at 442-43. The record is devoid of such proof. It is true, as the trial judge wrote, that by running away with Rice, Jones made himself available to assist Rice to escape apprehension in the event that such assistance was necessary. A showing of physical availability, however, is a far cry indeed from proof that Jones actually acted as an accessory. Accessoryship after the fact is not a mere state of mind — the government must show that Jones performed an accessorial act. The prosecution presented evidence that Jones ran away along with Rice, and nothing more.6
There was no proof that Jones’ conduct in this ease corresponded to that of a lookout in a robbery. In the hypothetical case posited by the government, each member of the robbery team has a separate assignment. The principal’s job is to take the money. The lookout’s function is to keep his eyes open lest the police or other unwanted “intruders” come upon the scene, and he must warn the principal of any danger. The protection of the principal from apprehension, in other words, is the essence of the lookout’s job. His specific intent to do that job may therefore be readily inferred. Indeed, if the lookout did not have the required intent, he would not be a lookout.
In the present case, on the other hand, Rice and Jones fled from the scene together. There was nothing about their joint flight to suggest a division of functions such as that between principal robber and lookout. If anything, Rice was more likely than Jones was to have been “looking out” for, or protecting, his companion, for Rice had already used a handgun, while the evidence that Jones was armed was dubious at best.
Apparently recognizing that the government’s “lookout” analogy is inapposite, my colleagues have come up with a new characterization of Jones’ conduct, namely, that Jones “escort[edJ Rice through two cuts, into K Street, and off into the distance....” (Emphasis added.) “Escorting” Rice certainly sounds more like accessoryship after the fact than “running with” Rice does, but an evidentiary void cannot be filled by resort to creative characterization which has no foundation whatever in the record. The testimony that Jones and Rice ran off together was provided by Janice Dudley, who stated that Jones and Rice “ran out of the cut and they almost bumped into the guy who was running into the cut, so I looked up there and I saw them, they turned around and ran back through the cut....”
In other words, the two men left together. That is all. Just as there is nothing in the record to support the notion that Jones was acting as a lookout, so there is no evidence that he was doing any escorting. On the contrary, as I have noted, Rice not only had a pistol, but had used it to shoot a man to death. His need for an “escort,” and especially one whom nobody had seen with a weapon,7 was illusory. The theory that *172Jones was escorting or guarding Rice is thus not only entirely speculative, but also quite improbable.
Many years ago, Sir William Blackstone provided the following illustrations of acces-soryship after the fact:
[F]urnishing [the principal] with a horse to escape his pursuers, money or victuals to support him, a house or other shelter to conceal him, or open force and violence to rescue or protect him. So likewise to convey instruments to a felon to enable him to break gaol, or to bribe the gaoler to let him escape, make a man an accessory to the felony.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE Laws of England 37-38 (Chitty. ed. 1826), quoted in Outlaw, supra, 632 A.2d at 411. A more recent and more detailed enumeration appears in McClain v. State, 10 Md.App. 106, 268 A.2d 572 (1970):
[A]ny assistance given to one known to be a felon in order to hinder his apprehension, trial or punishment, is sufficient to make a man an accessory after the fact; as that he concealed him in the house,.or shut the door against the pursuers, until he should have an opportunity to escape; or took money from him to allow him to escape; or supplied him with money, a horse or other necessities, in order to enable him to escape; or that the principal was in prison, and the jailer was bribed to let him escape; or conveyed instruments to him to enable him to break prison and escape. This and such like assistance to one known to be a felon, would constitute a man accessory after the fact.
Id. 268 A.2d at 576-77 (quoting Perkins on Criminal Law at 668 (2d ed.)).
These illustrations are not exclusive but, viewed collectively, they furnish a striking contrast to the skimpiness of the evidence in this record. If there were proof, for example, that someone had made an effort to apprehend Rice as Rice and Jones were fleeing, and that Jones had intervened and thwarted the attempted apprehension, then we would, of course, have a different case. As it stands, however, the record shows only that Jones might (or might not) have become an accessory after the fact if the occasion had subsequently arisen. A defendant’s hypothesized readiness to engage in accessorial activities in the future will not support a conviction before such conduct has actually occurred. .
In Outlaw, supra, this court reversed for evidentiary insufficiency the conviction of a defendant for, inter alia, directing his younger brother, who had just shot a man to death, to proceed to their aunt’s house. Outlaw, 632 A.2d at 412-13. The defendant in Outlaw also reproved his brother for not having killed the decedent with the first shot, and he remained in the area during the police investigation, thus allegedly intimidating potential witnesses with his presence. All of this was held to be insufficient as a matter of law. In my view, the proof in Outlaw was significantly more incriminating in terms of AAF than the “joint flight” evidence in this case.
IY.
According to the majority, the “Dear But-chie” letter provides further evidence of Jones’ guilt of the offense of accessoryship after the fact. This contention does not withstand scrutiny.
The grand jury charged in the indictment that the “Dear Butchie” letter was written some time between December 22, 1994 and May 10,1995. Jones thus composed this less than sagacious communication at least eight months, and possibly more than a year, after running from the scene of Steven Dunbar’s murder on April 9,1994. A letter that Jones apparently wrote in prison in order to beat the case against himself and Rice provides scant insight as to his state of mind, many months earlier, when he was leaving the area with Arthur Rice.
My colleagues also assert that the “Dear Butchie” letter reflects Jones’ consciousness of his own guilt, and that the jury could legitimately so conclude. I cannot disagree. See, e.g., Mills v. United States, 599 A.2d 775, 783-84 (D.C.1991) (citations omitted). But consciousness of guilt of what? It takes a considerable stretch, in my opinion, to conclude that Jones was trying in the letter to conceal his guilt of accessoryship after the *173fact. On the contrary, the subject matter of Jones’ concern was clearly stated in the letter; Jones wanted a witness to say that “Erik and Arthur [were] standing across the street in the [court] when the shooting started." (Emphasis added.) Jones was thus obviously trying to avoid being charged with involvement in the murder itself, and he wrote nothing about covering up any alleged accessorial acts thereafter.
I have no doubt that the government could legitimately have prosecuted Jones for acees-soryship after the fact on account of his attempt, in the “Dear Butchie” letter, to “program” a witness to testify falsely regarding Rice’s murderous activities. An AAF conviction may legitimately be based on a defendant’s “giving false information to the police in order to divert suspicion away from the felon.” 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 6.9 at 169 (1986). Indeed, it is not clear to me how Jones could have mounted any credible defense to an aecessoryship charge arising from the letter.
The government, however, charged Jones only with obstruction of justice, and not with aecessoryship after the fact, for what he wrote to “Butchie.” In the only count in the indictment which alleges an AAF offense, the grand jury charged that Jones was an accessory after the fact to murder on or about April 9, 199U, long before the “Dear Butchie” letter was written.
Perhaps Jones was guilty of an uncharged crime — aecessoryship after the fact between December 1994 and May 1995. As the court explained in Salamanca, 300 U.S.App.D.C. at 392-93, 990 F.2d at 637-38, however, it is in just such a case that the sufficiency of the evidence of the charged offense warrants “particular scrutiny.” Because, in my view, Jones’ AAF conviction cannot withstand such scrutiny, I must dissent from its affirmance.

. I join the majority in holding that there was sufficient evidence to support Jones’ conviction of obstruction of justice in connection with the "Dear Butchie” letter. Jones claims that the government did not prove that he wrote the letter during the period specified in the indictment. The date on which the letter was written, however, is not an element of the offense. See United States v. Nunez, 668 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir.1981). There is no claim, nor could there be, that Jones' prosecution for writing the letter is barred by the six-year statute of limitations. See D.C.Code § 23-113(a)(2) (1996).
Even if we were to perceive a variance between the indictment and the proof at trial as to when the letter was written — and I agree with the majority that there was no such variance— reversal would be appropriate only if Jones had demonstrated prejudice; and he has not done so. See Robinson v. United States, 697 A.2d 787, 789 (D.C.1997).

. My colleagues downgrade these possibilities as merely "theoretical.” Maj. op. at 165 n. 7. The use of a dismissive adjective, however, cannot alter the eminently practical reality that Webb saw no weapon in Jones' hand, nor does it conjure away Webb’s acknowledgment that someone other than Jones might have fired the shots that allegedly came in his direction.

. It is worth noting that the jury also acquitted Jones of obstruction of justice in connection with the events that transpired in the cut. If Jones had threatened Webb, even without a pistol, that too would have constituted obstruction of justice.

. The majority asserts that Jones’ conviction, if based on events at the cut, is "not necessarily inconsistent” with the jury’s disposition of the other charges. This assertion is not grounded in reality. Although, as the majority points out. ”[t]he government was not able to introduce a working pistol or discarded shell fragments,” this does not rationally account for the relevant acquittals. The use of an imitation pistol would have sufficed to convict Jones of ADW, and no weapon at all was required to render his alleged conduct obstruction of justice. Nevertheless, the jury acquitted Jones both of ADW and of the obstruction of justice charge arising from Webb’s testimony.
Even if we assume that there is some hypothetical way in which the majority's defense of the verdict may be reconciled with the jury's disposition of all of the charges based on Webb's account — and I discern no basis for such an assumption — I believe that we should avoid engaging in speculative exercises regarding the theoretically conceivable, and should instead confine ourselves to reasonable probabilities.

. The majority cites Prophet v. United States, 602 A.2d 1087 (D.C.1992), in which the defendant, inter alia, "followed behind [the principal], looking in all directions as a lookout might do.” Id. at 1092-93. Prophet has no application here. First, the defendant in Prophet was tried as an aider and abettor, not as an accessory after the fact. Second, the record in the present case is barren of any information that Jones "looked in all directions as a lookout might do,” or that he did anything at all other than run from the scene with Rice.

. It is, of course, possible that if Jones had seen a policeman or some other source of danger, he would have warned Rice. But assuming that this is true, Jones could not become an accessory until after an occasion for a warning had arisen and after Jones had provided the warning. Even if the government is accurately assessing Jones’ hypothetical state of mind, then, in the words of the song from a musical of the fifties, "The Most Happy Fella,” "you can't go to jail for what you’re thinking."

.According to the majority, "Appellant might be presumed to have carried the same weapon Webb thought he had brandished in the cut, and to have remained available to scare off or eliminate any others he and Rice might encounter during their flight.” The use of the words "might be presumed to have" and "thought he had brandished” betrays the speculative nature of the majority’s reliance on the unseen weapon.