Court Opinion

ID: 9622597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:20:32.042031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:28:09.992406
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
For the following reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
1. It is axiomatic that “[n]o verdict or judgment by default shall be taken in any [divorce] case.” OCGA § 19-5-8. Rather, regardless of whether the defendant files an answer or otherwise litigates the case, “the judge shall determine that the asserted grounds for divorce are legal and sustained by proof.” OCGA § 19-5-10 (a). Indeed, “even though notice of the hearing on the final decree is waived by failure to file responsive pleadings, the allegations of the petition must still be established by evidence. [Cit.]” Youmans v. Youmans, 247 Ga. 529, 530, n. 1 (276 SE2d 837) (1981). Accord Harris v. Harris, 228 Ga. 562, 563 (2) (187 SE2d 139) (1972) (even where no defensive pleadings filed, trial court must “hear evidence . . . and make an affirmative finding therefrom that the grounds are legal and are sustained by proof’).
Satisfactory proof of the allegations of the divorce complaint *630may consist of verified pleadings, live testimony, affidavits, or similar evidentiary forms. OCGA §§ 19-5-8, 19-5-10 (a). Here, the trial court, on Husband’s motion, entered judgment without holding an evidentiary hearing. The evidence in the record thus consisted solely of Husband’s two-page verified complaint and accompanying domestic relations financial affidavit. Regarding the division of property, the complaint avers only that “the parties have acquired certain property, to which [Husband] is entitled to an equitable distribution.” The domestic relations financial affidavit yields little additional information about the parties’ property, as it includes only assets designated as Husband’s separate property. Thus, there is no evidence of record regarding the type or value of the parties’ marital property — of which there must have existed some, given the parties’ approximately 14-year marriage — or of any separate property owned by Wife.5
Notwithstanding this dearth of evidence, the trial court, apparently of the belief that Wife’s failure to file responsive pleadings entitled Husband to decide how the parties’ property should be divided, unquestioningly approved the divorce decree drafted by Husband’s attorney. Not surprisingly, the decree awarded Husband essentially the entire marital estate, excluding only personal property then in Wife’s possession and any cash Wife had withdrawn from the parties’ joint accounts prior to the filing of the divorce complaint. Simply stated, the trial court gave Husband everything he wanted, without any evidence to support a finding that such division was equitable. Doing so was clear error. OCGA §§ 19-5-8, 19-5-10 (a); Youmans, supra, 247 Ga. at 530; Harris, supra, 228 Ga. at 563 (2).
None of the cases cited in the majority opinion militate otherwise, as there is no indication that any of those cases involved the entry of judgment without evidence-, rather, those cases addressed only the propriety of entering judgment without notice. See James v. James, 275 Ga. 165 (562 SE2d 506) (2002) (wife granted divorce following trial); Lucas v. Lucas, 273 Ga. 240 (539 SE2d 807) (2000) (no indication judgment granted without hearing or other evidence); Hardwick v. Hardwick, 245 Ga. 570 (266 SE2d 184) (1980) (same). Likewise, the majority opinion itself examines only the propriety of entering judgment without notice to Wife, without considering the appropriateness of entering judgment in the absence of evidence *631supporting the disposition. In so doing, it merely perpetuates the error in this case, to Wife’s severe detriment.
The statutory prohibition on default judgments in divorce cases attests to the legislature’s recognition that divorce, which necessarily involves issues of substantial importance to the fundamental well-being of the parties involved, is simply different than other civil actions. See generally Jolley v. Jolley, 216 Ga. 51, 53 (114 SE2d 534) (1960) (state and public have particular interest in institution of marriage). Permitting the issuance of a divorce without evidence to justify the manner in which the decree reorders the parties’ basic affairs trivializes the stakes involved. Moreover, without evidence, a trial court simply cannot fulfill its prescribed duties in adjudicating the issues before it. For example, where children are involved, a trial court simply cannot fulfill its duty to promote the children’s best interests without evidence regarding the relationships between the parties and their children, the particular needs of the children, and the circumstances in which each of the parties will be left post-divorce. See OCGA § 19-9-3 (a). Likewise, without evidence, a determination as to appropriate child support is impossible. See OCGA § 19-6-15 (b) (calculation of child support requires evidence of parties’ gross income and expenses). Even where the parties have no children, as in this case, the equitable division of property necessarily requires evidence to support the conclusion that the division made is, in fact, equitable. See generally Stokes v. Stokes, 246 Ga. 765 (3) (273 SE2d 169) (1980). For these reasons, it is of the utmost importance that this Court defend and preserve the statutory prohibition on default judgments in divorce cases.
2. Even if the trial court had properly considered evidence that supported the findings in the divorce decree, I would still find the manner in which this case was brought to final disposition to have been patently unfair under the circumstances. The undisputed evidence establishes that Wife’s counsel, Hammond Law, received express assurances from Husband’s first counsel, Brett Turner, that Turner would give Law notice of any final hearing scheduled in the matter notwithstanding Wife’s failure to file an answer to Husband’s complaint for divorce. Law testified at the motion for new trial hearing that, given his client’s limited resources, he endeavored to avoid the costs of preparing and filing what he considered would be a “pro forma” answer by securing Turner’s agreement that Wife’s failure to file an answer would not obviate Husband’s obligation to notify Wife regarding any final hearing. Husband has adduced no evidence to dispute the existence of such an agreement,6 which was *632implicitly corroborated by ongoing correspondence between Law and Turner regarding mediation and deposition scheduling and the exchange of interrogatories and responses, evidencing Wife’s intent to contest the divorce and Turner’s acknowledgment thereof.
We have previously recognized that an assurance of notice made by a trial judge to a party who failed to file responsive pleadings is sufficient to justify avoidance of the waiver of notice provision in OCGA § 9-11-5 (a). Anderson v. Anderson, 264 Ga. 88 (441 SE2d 240) (1994). It eludes my understanding why the same agreement made by an attorney should be treated any differently; an attorney is, after all, an officer of the court. See generally In re Burton, 271 Ga. 491 (2) (521 SE2d 568) (1999). The fact that Husband hired a second attorney, Carol Sheppard, who claims she had no knowledge of the agreement should not justify Husband’s failure to honor the agreement made by his first attorney. This is particularly true in circumstances like those presented here, where Sheppard’s swift efforts to obtain a final judgment without notice to Wife or her counsel — quite apart from the existence of any agreement between counsel or Sheppard’s knowledge thereof — appear alarmingly calculated, if not deliberately blind-siding. The record reflects that, a mere seven days after entering her appearance in the case, Sheppard filed Husband’s motion seeking a final decree of divorce without an evidentiary hearing and the very next day presented ex parte a final judgment and decree of divorce for the trial court’s signature; these acts were taken without any attempt to communicate with Law despite the paper trail of recent correspondence between Law and Turner, to which Sheppard must have been privy, regarding deposition scheduling and settlement, clearly evidencing Wife’s active litigation of the matter. These circumstances clearly warrant relaxation of the harsh consequences of OCGA § 9-11-5 (a). See Melcher v. Melcher, 274 Ga. 711 (559 SE2d 468) (2002) (trial court properly granted new trial despite defendant’s failure to file answer where plaintiffs counsel scheduled final hearing without notice amidst parties’ active settlement negotiations); Green v. Green, 263 Ga. 551 (437 SE2d 457) (1993) (trial court abused discretion in failing to set aside judgment entered without notice where evidence reflected counsel’s active efforts to ensure case tried in opponent’s absence). Compare Hardwick v. Hardwick, 245 Ga. 570 (266 SE2d 184) (1980) (defendant’s failure to file answer reflected that divorce was uncontested).
In sum, because the divorce decree is unsupported by evidence, *633and because the manner of resolution of this case violated basic notions of fairness and professionalism, I must respectfully dissent.
Decided February 1, 2010
Reconsideration denied March 15, 2010.
Whitmer & Law, George H. Law III, for appellant.
Carol S. Sheppard, Vic B. Hill, Brad E. MacDonald, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Carley and Justice Benham join in this dissent.

 While the record does include Husband’s responses to Wife’s interrogatories, which reference real property in Georgia and Florida and a construction company in which Husband claims an ownership interest, these responses are not verified and thus do not constitute evidence. See Traditional Properties, Inc. v. Performance Food Group of Georgia, LLC, 291 Ga. App. 442 (662 SE2d 250) (2008) (unverified answer and discovery responses not evidence).

 Though it was expressly recognized by the parties and the trial court that Turner’s *632testimony as to this issue would be significant, Husband’s second counsel, Carol Sheppard, did not secure Turner’s attendance at the motion for new trial hearing and expressly consented on the record to the trial court’s making a decision without the benefit of his testimony.