Court Opinion

ID: 9529944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:46.920076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:57.586550
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
dissenting in part, concurring in part.
I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of my colleagues with regard to the trial court's failure to modify the custody arrangement. In all other respects, I concur with the majority.
The majority correctly asserts our traditional review in custody modification cases: "A court may not modify a child eustody order unless (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child and (2) there is a substantial change in one or more of the factors, set forth in Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8, that a court may consider when it originally determines custody." Op. at 221. Conversely, a trial court should modify a custody order if it is in the best interests of the children to do so, provided that there is a substantial change in one of the factors cited in section 81-17-2-8. Both of those prerequisites are met here, *225and a modification is in order for the well being of the Van Wieren children.
The majority admits that "[tlhere can be no debate that little about this [current custody] situation is in the best interests of the children," and I agree whole-heartedly with its statement. Further, the second factor listed in Indiana Code § 81-17-2-8 is "the wishes of the child's parent or parents." It is irrefutable that the wishes of these parents have changed, given that both parties filed petitions seeking modification of the joint physical custody arrangement. Furthermore, there is not one iota of evidence in the record suggesting that the present arrangement is workable. Both the custody evaluator and the guardian ad litem had contact with all members of this family, and each indicates that these parents are unable to cooperate with a joint physical custody order and that James was more likely the appropriate choice for sole custody. All other witnesses, as the majority noted, took the side of the party calling them, but all of them agreed that joint physical custody is wrong for this family. This custody arrangement, then, is ripe for modification.
We held in Aylward that "a trial court abuses its discretion when it awards joint custody to parents who have made child rearing a battleground." 592 N.E.2d at 1252. The Aylward court noted that in such a case, a joint legal custody arrangement "may simply provide a framework for the parents to continue the conflict which brought them to divorcee in the first place. The conflict would just be focused solely on the children." Id. (quotation omitted).
The Van Wieren children are ensnared in just such a conflict, and we should not affirm a decision that flies in the face of their best interests and maintains an environment that is so clearly poisoned with their parents' discord. I believe the majority's hesitance to extend the principles behind Aylward to a situation involving joint physical custody ignores the reality of any physical custody arrangement providing parenting time that approaches an equal division of time between parents. This is especially true where, as here, the parents exchange the children several times a week. These parents are required to maintain significant, ongoing communication, and they each have unlimited opportunities to influence their children. And sadly, every bit as much as in Ayl-ward, this arrangement has become a battleground to the detriment of these children. I believe that this case makes it clear that we should extend Aylward to cases involving joint physical custody.
The majority rests its decision on its claim that "no court can be present behind closed doors," op. at 222, and that "there is little that can be done by a court to solve [this] problem," id. at 222. I cannot support this reasoning. A trial court has a duty to determine whether a custody arrangement-legal or physical-is in the best interests of the children before it. See In re Paternity of T.G.T., 803 N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Every day in our State, trial courts engage in the fact-finding process of determining which of two parents-oftentimes, both parents who have behaved poorly-is the better choice to serve as a primary physical custodian. All too often, this involves determining who between two parents is the lesser of two evils-which parent is least likely to poison the children and alienate them from their other parent. The majority's opinion permits sidestepping this process and allows the trial court to "split the baby." I would reverse on this issue and remand to the trial court with instructions that it award sole legal and physical custody of the children either to James or Jane and grant the other parent parenting time scheduled *226in a manner that is conducive to the best interests of the children.