Court Opinion

ID: 9711186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:26:03.402939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.650421
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(dissenting). Plaintiffs, on our grant of leave, appeal from the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the circuit judge’s judgment in favor of defendant parents non obstante veredicto. Plaintiffs’ case against defendant parents was submitted to the jury on two theories, (1) the parents’ vicarious liability imposed by CLS 1961, § 257.401 (Stat Ann 1960 Kev § 9.2101) for the damages caused by the negligence of their son while driving their automobile and, alternatively, (2) their primary liability for negligently leaving their 14-year-old son at home unsupervised over a three-day weekend during which he injured plaintiff minor while negligently driving defendants’ automobile. On this appeal plaintiffs raise no questions for appellate review relating to their claim based upon the cited statute and, therefore, we refrain from expressing any views thereon. Plaintiffs’ appellate assertion of error, instead, relates exclusively to their right to recover damages under their second theory of the case. It is their claim before this Court that their proofs were sufficient legally to support the jury’s verdict in their favor and that the circuit judge erred reversibly in granting defendant parents’ motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.
*648It is the law of this State that the owner of a chattel who permits an incompetent or inexperienced person to nse his chattel with knowledge that such use is likely to cause injuries to others is liable for the injuries resulting from its negligent use by such person. The basis for the owner’s liability in such circumstances is his own negligence in permitting the chattel’s use by an incompetent or inexperienced person with knowledge of the probable consequences. Haring v. Myrick (1962), 368 Mich 420, 423. Our acknowledgment of the applicability of this rule of law to the negligent use of motor vehicles by an inexperienced, incompetent or reckless driver can he found in Naudzius v. Lahr (1931), 253 Mich 216, 229 (74 ALR 1189, 30 NCCA 179); Tanis v. Eding (1933), 265 Mich 94, 96; and Elliott v. A. J. Smith Contracting Co. (1960), 358 Mich 398, 414, all cited in Haring, supra, and in Perin v. Peuler (on rehearing, 1964), 373 Mich 531, and Tortora v. General Motors Corporation (1964), 373 Mich 563.
- In each of the foregoing cases the owner of the automobile intentionally entrusted it to another whose negligent use resulted in injuries. However, there is no basis in logic to rule that an injured person’s right to recover damages from the owner depends upon whether the owner intentionally entrusted the motor vehicle to an incompetent driver or negligently made it accessible to him, provided that in either case the owner knew or should have known that the incompetent driver’s use of the vehicle likely would cause injuries to others. We know of no case in this jurisdiction or elsewhere in which such a distinction is drawn and we are not persuaded that it should be drawn in this case. In fact, in May v. Goulding (1961), 365 Mich 143, a case involving the liability of a parent of a mentally deficient child for *649injuries resulting from the child’s use of a firearm, Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, emphasized in the opening paragraph of his opinion that liability in such cases may be predicated upon the parent’s “having intrusted — or having made accessible — a firearm or other deadly weapon to his mentally deficient child.” 365 Mich 143, 144.
We do not read Mr. Justice O’Hara’s opinion in this case of Muma to conflict with the foregoing. While recognizing the rule of law, he states his judgment to be that plaintiffs’ proofs were inadequate to support the jury’s verdict for plaintiffs and, therefore, that the circuit judge’s entry, of a judgment for the defendant parents non obstante veredicto was not erroneous. We respectfully disagree, but we acknowledge that the question is a close one.
Here, the record discloses evidence from which the jury could have found that the parents knew their 14-year-old son had driven their ear on several prior occasions,* that he had requested permission to drive it on still other occasions and had been refused, that he was very interested in cars and other machinery, and that the car’s keys were left .by defendant parents in a place where they were accessible to their child. There was, in addition, evidence from which the jury could find that defendant parents knew or should have known that a 14-year-old child would be likely to cause injury to others if permitted to drive an automobile on the public highways without close supervision. Nonetheless, defendant parents left their son alone at home for a period of three days, their automobile in the garage and its keys in a cupboard in the kitchen. On such an evidentiary record, the jury was entitled to find, *650as it did, that the defendant parents were guilty of actionable negligence within the rule of law set forth above. It was, therefore, error for the circuit judge to set aside the verdict of the jury and to enter judgment for defendant parents non obstante veredicto.
Judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded. Plaintiffs may tax their costs.
T. M. Kavanagh and Adams, JJ., concurred with Somas, J.
1 Brennan, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 The circuit judge erred ■when he wrote in his opinion granting judgment non obstante veredicto, quoted in Justice O’Hara’s opinion, that there was no sueh evidence.