Court Opinion

ID: 9925763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 22:00:35.546231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.809804
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 22-1823

                    ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                               v.

  SMITH & WESSON BRANDS, INC.; BARRETT FIREARMS MANUFACTURING,
INC.; BERETTA U.S.A. CORP.; GLOCK, INC.; STURM, RUGER & COMPANY,
 INC.; WITMER PUBLIC SAFETY GROUP, INC., d/b/a Interstate Arms;
 CENTURY INTERNATIONAL ARMS, INC.; BARETTA HOLDINGS SPA; GLOCK
         GES.M.B.H.; COLT'S MANUFACTURING COMPANY, LLC,

                     Defendants, Appellees.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

        [Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                 Kayatta, Gelpí, and Montecalvo,
                         Circuit Judges.

     Steve D. Shadowen and Jonathan E. Lowy, with whom Richard M.
Brunell, Nicholas W. Shadowen, Shadowen PLLC, and Global Action on
Gun Violence were on brief, for appellant.
     Sameer Advani, James C. Dugan, Gabrielle K. Antonello,
Ferdinand G. Suba, Jr., Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Zainab Ali,
and Benita Yu on brief for Jorge Sánchez Cordero Dávila and Raúl
Contreras Bustamante, amici curiae.
     Thomas M. Sobol and Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP on brief
for Scholars of International Law, amici curiae.
     Lawson E. Fite, Michael B. Smith, and Marten Law LLP on brief
for Gun Violence Prevention Groups, amici curiae.
     Roberta L. Horton, Lucy S. McMillan, and Arnold & Porter Kaye
Scholer LLP on brief for Mexican Activists, Scholars, and Victims,
amici curiae.
     Donna M. Evans, Julie G. Reiser, Molly J. Bowen, Zachary R.
Glubiak, and Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC on brief for Law
Enforcement Officers, amici curiae.
     Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General of Massachusetts,
Elizabeth N. Dewar, State Solicitor, Rob Bonta, Attorney General
of California, William Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut,
Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb,
Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Anne E. Lopez,
Attorney General of Hawai'i, Kwame Raoul, Attorney General of
Illinois, Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General of Maryland, Dana
Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, Keith Ellison, Attorney
General of Minnesota, Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General of New
Jersey, Raúl Torrez, Attorney General of New Mexico, Letitia James,
Attorney General of New York, Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General
of Oregon, Michelle A. Henry, Attorney General of Pennsylvania,
Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and Charity R.
Clark, Attorney General of Vermont, on brief for Massachusetts,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Hawai'i, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont,
amici curiae.
     Roberto J. Gonzalez, Jacob A. Braly, and Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison LLP on brief for Latin American and Caribbean
Nations and NGO, amici curiae.
     Ellen V. Leonida, Matthew Borden, Kory J. DeClark, and
Braunhagey & Borden LLP on brief for District Attorneys, amici
curiae.
     Edward V. Colbert III, Scott Harshbarger, and Casner &
Edwards, LLP on brief for Professors of Transnational Litigation,
amici curiae.
     Noel J. Francisco, with whom Anthony J. Dick, Harry S. Graver,
Andrew E. Lelling, Jones Day, James M. Campbell, Campbell Conroy
& O'Neil, P.C., James W. Porter, II, Porter & Hassinger, P.C.,
Mark D. Sheridan, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Patricia A.
Hartnett, Peter M. Durney, Smith Duggan Cornell & Gollub,
Christopher Renzulli, Jeffrey Malsch, Renzulli Law Firm LLC,
Jonathan I. Handler, Day Pitney LLP, James Vogts, Andrew A.
Lothson, Swanson, Martin & Bell LLP, Nora R. Adukonis, S. Jan
Hueber, Litchfield Cavo LLP, Joseph G. Yannetti, Morrison Mahoney
LLP, Anthony M. Pisciotti, Danny C. Lallis, Ryan L. Erdreich,
Pisciotti Lallis Erdreich, John G. O'Neill, Sugarman, Rogers,
Barshak & Cohen, P.C., Michael L. Rice, Katie J. Colopy, and
Harrison Law LLC were on brief, for appellees.
     Peter M. Torstensen, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General, Austin
Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Christian B. Corrigan,
Solicitor General, Brent Mead, Deputy Solicitor General, Tanner
Baird, Solicitor's Fellow, Steve Marshall, Attorney General of
Alabama, Treg Taylor, Attorney General of Alaska, Tim Griffin,
Attorney General of Arkansas, Ashley Moody, Attorney General of
Florida, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General of Georgia,
Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Brenna Bird,
Attorney General of Iowa, Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of
Kentucky, Jeff Landry, Attorney General of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch,
Attorney General of Mississippi, Andrew Bailey, Attorney General
of Missouri, John M. Formella, Attorney General of New Hampshire,
Alan Wilson, Attorney General of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley,
Attorney General of South Dakota, Ken Paxton, Attorney General of
Texas, Sean D. Reyes, Attorney General of Utah, Jason Miyares,
Attorney General of Virginia, Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General
of West Virginia, and Bridget Hill, Attorney General of Wyoming,
on brief for State of Montana and 19 Other States, amici curiae.
     H. Christopher Bartolomucci, Kenneth A. Klukowski, and
Schaerr Jaffe LLP on brief for U.S. Senator Ted Cruz, U.S.
Representative Mike Johnson, and 37 other members of Congress,
amici curiae.
     Christopher A. Kenney, Kenney & Sams, P.C., and Paul B.
Stephan on brief for National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc.,
amicus curiae.

                        January 22, 2024
          KAYATTA, Circuit Judge.    The government of Mexico brings

this lawsuit against seven U.S. gun manufacturers and one gun

distributor.1    The district court dismissed Mexico's complaint

because it concluded that Mexico's common law claims were barred

by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).      That

act prohibits the bringing of certain types of lawsuits against

manufacturers and sellers of firearms in federal and state courts.

We agree that the PLCAA's limitations on the types of lawsuits

that may be maintained in the United States apply to lawsuits

initiated by foreign governments for harm suffered outside the

United States.    However, we also hold that Mexico's complaint

plausibly alleges a type of claim that is statutorily exempt from

the PLCAA's general prohibition. We therefore reverse the district

court's holding that the PLCAA bars Mexico's common law claims,

and we remand for further proceedings.    Our reasoning follows.

                                I.

          "Because this appeal flows from the district court's

order granting a motion to dismiss, we draw the relevant facts

from the complaint, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations

     1  Defendants are Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc.; Barrett
Firearms Manufacturing, Inc.; Beretta U.S.A. Corp.; Century
International Arms, Inc.; Colt's Manufacturing Company, LLC;
Glock, Inc.; and Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. and Witmer Public Safety
Group, Inc., doing business as Interstate Arms.       Mexico also
initially named two foreign holding companies as defendants, but
later voluntarily dismissed its claims against those companies.

                              - 4 -
as true."    Foisie v. Worcester Polytechnic Inst., 967 F.3d 27, 32

(1st Cir. 2020).

            Mexico has strict gun laws that make it "virtually

impossible" for criminals to obtain firearms legally sourced in

the country.    It has one gun store in the entire nation and issues

fewer than fifty gun permits a year. Despite these strong domestic

regulations, Mexico has the third-most gun-related deaths in the

world.     The number of gun-related homicides in Mexico grew from

fewer than 2,500 in 2003 to approximately 23,000 in 2019.       The

percentage of homicides committed with a gun similarly rose from

fifteen percent in 1997 to sixty-nine percent in 2021.

            The increase in gun violence in Mexico correlates with

the increase of gun production in the United States, beginning

with the end of the United States' assault-weapon ban in 2004.2

The complaint details a steady and growing stream of illegal gun

trafficking from the United States into Mexico, motivated in large

part by the demand of the Mexican drug cartels for military-style

weapons.     For example, Mexico claims that between seventy and

ninety percent of the guns recovered at crime scenes in Mexico

were trafficked into the country from the United States.

            Mexico's government has borne a variety of harms as a

result of this gun-violence epidemic, including but not limited

     2  Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-222, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996-1998(expired 2004).

                                - 5 -
to: costs of additional medical, mental-health, and other services

for victims and their families; costs of increased law enforcement,

including specialized training for military and police; costs of

the   increased   burden   on   Mexico's   judicial   system;   diminished

property values; and decreased revenues from business investment

and economic activity.

           In an attempt to redress these harms, Mexico brought

this lawsuit in federal district court in Massachusetts, seeking

both damages and injunctive relief.        Combined, defendants produce

more than sixty-eight percent of the U.S. guns trafficked into

Mexico, which comes out to between 342,000 and 597,000 guns each

year.    Mexico alleges that defendants know that their guns are

trafficked into Mexico and make deliberate design, marketing, and

distribution choices to retain and grow that illegal market and

the substantial profits that it produces.

           Mexico alleges       that one way    defendants deliberately

facilitate gun trafficking into Mexico is by designing their guns

as    military-style   weapons,     knowing    that   such   weapons   are

particularly sought after by the drug cartels in Mexico.               For

instance, defendants make assault rifles with high rates of fire,

low recoil, and the capacity to hold large amounts of ammunition.

The guns can be easily converted into fully automatic weapons.

Some of defendants' guns are "weapons of war," such as the "armor-

penetrating" Barrett .50 caliber sniper rifle, which can be (and

                                   - 6 -
has been) used to take down aircrafts and armored vehicles.                      Such

weapons are especially attractive to Mexican drug cartels, which

frequently       engage    in     military-style      combat    against    Mexican

military and police personnel.            Defendants also choose to forego

safety features (such as allowing only recognized users to fire

the   weapon)     that    might    decrease    the   guns'     attractiveness     to

wrongdoers      without     diminishing   their      utility    for    law-abiding

citizens.      Similarly, Mexico alleges that defendants intentionally

design their guns to have easily removable serial numbers, making

them much more attractive to criminals both in the United States

and abroad.

               Mexico alleges that defendants not only design their

guns as military-grade weapons; they also market them as such.

Defendants' marketing materials depict their weapons in use by or

in proximity to military and law enforcement personnel and contain

other references to military and law enforcement.                    Advertisements

include     statements      like    "authentic       Military    &    Police . . .

design," "battle proven," and "transforms the military platform to

fit civilian precision shooters."             Mexico alleges that defendants

engage    in    these     marketing   techniques      knowing    that     they   are

disproportionately likely to attract groups harboring militaristic

ambitions, like the Mexican cartels.

               Mexico also alleges that defendants' distribution system

facilitates illegal trafficking to Mexico.                Defendants generally

                                       - 7 -
use   a   three-tier     distribution    system.      Manufacturers        (most

defendants) sell to distributors; distributors (one defendant)

sell to dealers; and dealers sell to consumers.               Guns flow from

this distribution system into Mexico in multiple ways.                The most

common method of trafficking is through "straw sales" -- sales

made to a buyer purchasing on behalf of somebody else who is not

lawfully permitted to buy a gun.           Often, straw sales occur in

circumstances     that   clearly   indicate    to    the    dealer    that   the

transaction is a straw sale and could be prevented if defendants

required their dealers to be well-trained and follow the law.

            Other types of transactions that pose a particularly

high risk of trafficking include sales of multiple guns to the

same buyer over a limited period of time; sales by "kitchen-table"

dealers who deal online or in locations that make it easy to avoid

regulations; and sales by non-licensed sellers at gun shows without

background checks.       In addition, many guns are stolen or simply

"lost"    from    firearm    companies'     inventory,       and     frequently

thereafter end up in Mexico.       According to the complaint, some of

these "lost" guns are actually sold off the books, with dealers

choosing not to implement anti-theft measures to allow them to

falsely claim the guns were stolen.

            Mexico   alleges    that    defendants    are    aware    of   these

practices and the resulting trafficking of guns into Mexico, yet

deliberately     maintain   a   distribution   system       that   facilitates

                                   - 8 -
illegal sales, resisting calls for reform by the U.S. government

and prominent gun industry insiders, among others.               Not only that,

but defendants are aware that specific distributor and dealer

networks are disproportionately associated with gun trafficking

into Mexico.       Mexico alleges that defendants are on notice as to

which    dealers    are    responsible      for   the   lion's   share    of   gun

trafficking.       Mexico points to data collected by the U.S. Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and a 2010 news

article naming twelve dealers that sold the most guns recovered in

Mexico.    Despite having access to this information, defendants

continue supplying guns to those same dealers.

            Importantly, according to the complaint, the aspects of

defendants'      businesses      that     facilitate    trafficking      are   not

unfortunate and unintended byproducts of a lawful enterprise.

Rather,   they     are    the    result   of    defendants'   affirmative      and

deliberate efforts to create and maintain an illegal market for

their weapons in Mexico.             Says Mexico, supplying guns to the

illegal market in Mexico is "a feature, not a bug," of defendants'

businesses.        And the motivation behind this feature is money.

Mexico    estimates       that    defendants      collectively   receive       over

$170 million a year from sales of guns trafficked into Mexico.                  As

a result of the profit potential of the Mexican market, gun dealers

along the border have proliferated while elsewhere in the nation

their numbers have decreased.             Gun dealers in border states now

                                        - 9 -
sell twice as many guns as dealers in other parts of the country.

As stated succinctly by Mexico, defendants "are not accidental or

unintentional players in this tragedy; they are deliberate and

willing participants, reaping profits from the criminal market

they knowingly supply -- heedless of the shattering consequences

to [Mexico] and its citizens."

                                 II.

          Defendants filed multiple motions to dismiss Mexico's

complaint. All defendants moved to dismiss for lack of Article III

standing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).       Some defendants

also moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under

Rule 12(b)(2). The district court held that Mexico had Article III

standing, but it dismissed two counts for failure to state a claim

on which relief could be granted.3     It also found that litigation

of the remaining counts was barred by the PLCAA, which prohibits

the filing of a "qualified civil liability action" -- defined as

"a civil action or proceeding . . . against a manufacturer or

seller of a qualified product . . . for damages . . . resulting

from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the

person or a third party" -- in "any Federal or State court."

     3  The two counts were state statutory claims under the
Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and the Massachusetts
Consumer Protection Act, respectively. Mexico does not, on appeal,
challenge the dismissal of those counts.

                             - 10 -
15 U.S.C. §§ 7902(a), 7903(5)(A).      It therefore dismissed the

complaint without addressing the motions to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction.   Mexico timely appealed, raising multiple

challenges to the district court's application of the PLCAA to

this lawsuit.

                               III.

          Mexico first contends that the PLCAA does not apply to

lawsuits brought by foreign governments for harm suffered outside

the United States.   It raises three arguments in support of this

contention: first, that applying the PLCAA to such a lawsuit is an

impermissible extraterritorial application of the statute; second,

that the PLCAA's substantive terms must be interpreted to have

only domestic scope; and third, that principles of international

comity support Mexico's reading of the statute.   We address these

arguments in turn, finding them ultimately unavailing.

                                A.

          "Courts presume that federal statutes 'apply only within

the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'"     WesternGeco

LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136 (2018) (quoting

Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).       This rule,

commonly called the presumption against extraterritoriality, is a

"canon of construction" that guides our interpretation of federal

statutes. Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, 599 U.S. 533, 541 (2023) (quoting

Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).

                              - 11 -
Under the presumption, we construe federal laws "to have only

domestic     application"     unless      we     find       "clearly      expressed

congressional intent to the contrary."               Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco,

Inc. v. European Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 335 (2016)). The presumption

"reflects concerns of international comity insofar as it 'serves

to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those

of other nations which could result in international discord.'"

Id. (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108,

115 (2013)).      And it also embodies "the commonsense notion that

Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind."

Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)).

            A     two-step    framework        applies       to    questions     of

extraterritoriality.      RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 337.             "At the first

step, we ask whether the presumption against extraterritoriality

has been rebutted -- that is, whether the statute gives a clear,

affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially."                      Id.

If so, then an extraterritorial application of the statute is

permissible.      Id.   If not, we proceed to the second step and ask

if   the   statute's    application    in      the   case    at    hand   is   truly

extraterritorial or if, instead, "the case involves a domestic

application of the statute."       Id.

            The    district    court      concluded         that    the    PLCAA's

prohibition of lawsuits by "any governmental entity" and various

references to "foreign commerce" fell short of a clear expression

                                  - 12 -
of     congressional       intent       that     the      statute         applies

extraterritorially.        It   therefore      held   that    the     presumption

against extraterritoriality had not been overcome at step one.

Defendants do not object to this holding on appeal.                 Nor do we see

any need to question it, given that we agree with the district

court's conclusion at step two: that the application of the PLCAA

in    this    case   is    permissibly      domestic,     not     impermissibly

extraterritorial.

             Determining    whether    an   application      of   a   statute   is

domestic or extraterritorial requires us to

             look[] to the statute's "focus."      If the
             conduct relevant to the statute's focus
             occurred in the United States, then the case
             involves a permissible domestic application
             even if other conduct occurred abroad; but if
             the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in
             a foreign country, then the case involves an
             impermissible extraterritorial application
             regardless of any other conduct that occurred
             in U.S. territory.

Id.     "The    ultimate    question     regarding     permissible       domestic

application turns on the location of the conduct relevant to the

focus."      Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int'l, Inc., 600 U.S.

412, 422 (2023).      We therefore first ascertain the focus of the

PLCAA and then determine where the conduct relevant to that focus

occurred.

             "The focus of a statute is the object of its solicitude,

which can include the conduct it seeks to regulate, as well as the

                                    - 13 -
parties and interests it seeks to protect or vindicate."                       Id. at

418 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WesternGeco, 138

S. Ct. at 2136).      The "conduct" that the PLCAA "seeks to regulate"

is the filing and adjudication of certain lawsuits in domestic

courts.    See 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1), (4) (stated purposes include

"prohibit[ing] causes of action" and "prevent[ing] the use of such

lawsuits to impose unreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign

commerce").       Its operative provision states that "[a] qualified

civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State

court," and that any such pending actions "shall be immediately

dismissed by the court."         Id. § 7902.        That is the only "conduct"

that the statute "regulate[s]."

            The     PLCAA   is   also    explicit    about       "the    parties   and

interests it seeks to protect."            Its stated "purposes" are, among

other     things,     "[t]o      prohibit        causes     of     action     against

manufacturers,        distributors,         dealers,        and     importers        of

firearms . . . for the harm solely caused by the criminal or

unlawful    misuse    of    firearm     products,"        and    "[t]o    preserve    a

citizen's access to a supply of firearms and ammunition for all

lawful     purposes."         Id.   § 7901(b)(1),          (2);    see      also   id.

§ 7901(a)(5)–(8) (finding that the firearm industry should not be

liable for third parties' unlawful acts and that lawsuits seeking

to   impose    such     liability        abuse     the     legal     system);      id.

§ 7901(a)(1)-(2) (invoking the Second Amendment).                        In short, it

                                        - 14 -
seeks to protect (1) U.S. firearm companies and their interests in

manufacturing, marketing, and selling guns to the public; and

(2) U.S. citizens and their interests in having access to guns.

           We therefore agree with the district court's conclusion

that the PLCAA's focus is "regulat[ing] the types of claims that

can be asserted against firearm manufacturers and sellers . . . to

protect the interests of the United States firearms industry and

the rights of gun owners."            Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith &

Wesson Brands, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 3d 425, 444 (D. Mass. 2022).

           Mexico resists this conclusion by proposing a different

focus of the PLCAA: "gun misuse and the resulting injury."                    It

argues that the district court erred by looking only at the PLCAA's

operative provision -- which prohibits "qualified civil liability

action[s],"     15    U.S.C.      § 7902    --   and    not   its   definitions

section -- which defines such actions as "civil action[s] or

proceeding[s]    or . . .        administrative    proceeding[s]"     for   harm

"resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified

product by the person or a third party," id. § 7903(5)(A).

           We agree that statutory provisions do not exist "in a

vacuum"   and   "must       be   assessed   in    concert     with . . .    other

provisions."     WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2137.              In WesternGeco,

for example, the Supreme Court determined that the focus of a

statute   providing     a    remedy   for   patent     infringement   was   "the

infringement."       Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284).            But because the

                                      - 15 -
statute identified several types of infringement, the Court looked

to a separate provision to determine what "the infringement" was

in the case at hand.           Id.     That provision "provide[d] that a

company 'shall be liable as an infringer' if it 'supplies' certain

components of a patented invention 'in or from the United States'

with the intent that they 'will be combined outside of the United

States    in    a   manner   that    would   infringe       the    patent     if   such

combination occurred within the United States.'"                       Id. at 2137–38

(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2)).             From this definition, the Court

gleaned    that       the    regulated       conduct        --    that      is,    "the

infringement" -- was "the domestic act of 'suppl[ying] in or from

the United States.'" Id. at 2138 (alteration in original) (quoting

35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2)). So, because it was that domestic act "that

infringed [the] patents," the "conduct . . . relevant to [the]

focus clearly occurred in the United States."                    Id.

               Mexico contends that we should follow what it sees as a

similar approach: treat the command of section 7902(a) (precluding

"qualified      civil   liability     action[s]"       in   any    U.S.     court)   as

insufficient to determine the focus; look at the definition of

"qualified      civil   liability     action"    in     section 7903(5)(A)           (as

meaning    suits     against   defendants      for     damages         resulting   from

unlawful use of certain firearms); and then declare that the

statute's focus is actually on certain elements of that definition

(damages and misuse).

                                      - 16 -
           But while WesternGeco makes clear that it is sometimes

necessary to turn to a secondary provision to help give meaning to

the statute's focus, it does not stand for the proposition that

whenever a term is defined in a separate provision, all parts of

that definition become the focus of the statute.            In WesternGeco,

the   portion   of   the    secondary    provision   on    which   the    Court

concentrated was the very "infringement" that was the focus of the

primary provision.      Other parts of the definition -- such as the

requirement that the components be "especially made or especially

adapted for use in the invention," id. at 2135 (quoting 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(f)(2)) -- were not the statute's focus because they did not

constitute the act of infringement, which was the focus of the

primary provision.         Here, "qualified civil liability action[s]"

are the focus and we look to section 7903(5)(A) simply to define

the scope of that term, not to find in the elements of that

definition some other focus.

           To drive this point home, imagine a law stating that "a

qualified shirt may not be worn in any Federal or State court" and

defining   "qualified      shirt"   as   "a   collarless   shirt   made    from

cotton."   Under Mexico's logic, a focus of that statute would be

the cotton industry.       And therefore the law would not prohibit the

wearing of collarless shirts made from cotton grown outside the

United States.       But no reasonable person would think that the

statute would not apply with equal force regardless of the origin

                                    - 17 -
of the cotton in a court attendee's shirt.                  So too, here; Mexico

cannot shift the focus of the PLCAA from "qualified civil liability

action[s]" to something else merely because that term -- which

Mexico    concedes      is   the    focus      of     the      PLCAA's         operative

provision -- is defined in a separate provision.

            At a more fundamental level, Mexico's argument that the

statute's focus is "gun misuse and the resulting injury" has too

little    connection    to   the   PLCAA's     purpose         or    effect.       While

curtailing gun misuse is a laudable goal (and one that may be the

focus of other statutes), it is not the goal of the PLCAA.                             That

statute's purpose, and effect, is to insulate U.S. gun industry

actors from certain types of lawsuits in domestic courts.                              And

that conduct is inherently domestic.

            Mexico also argues that to say that the focus of the

PLCAA is on regulating the types of claims that can be brought

against    U.S.   gun    industry     actors        "is   so        broad    as   to    be

tautological"     because    "[a]ll    statutes       'regulate        the     type'     of

activity to which they are directed, and all such 'regulat[ion]'

by definition occurs in the United States -- in the U.S. Courts

that apply the statutes."          But this argument confuses the effect

of a regulation with its focus; not all statutes are directed

toward regulating lawsuits in the way the PLCAA is.                         For example,

the statute in WesternGeco in some sense "regulated" the conduct

of U.S. courts by creating a cause of action that those courts can

                                      - 18 -
adjudicate.        But    the     focus    of    that     statute      was   clearly   on

regulating patent infringement, e.g., infringement said to occur

by shipping components overseas for assembly.                       138 S. Ct. at 2137–

38.     Here, by contrast, the PLCAA seeks to regulate the lawsuits

themselves.

            Having thus determined the PLCAA's focus, we find it

evident     that    the     conduct       relevant        to    that      focus   occurs

domestically.        Both       the   conduct      that       the   statute   seeks    to

regulate -- the filing and adjudication of lawsuits -- as well as

the conduct that it seeks to protect -- defendants' manufacturing,

marketing, and selling of guns -- take place entirely within the

United States.

            Mexico       argues    finally,       and   mostly       in   passing,   that

defendants "engage in conduct in Mexico when they aid and abet

trafficking guns into Mexico."                  The Supreme Court has held that

"suppl[ying] in or from the United States" components of a patented

invention with the intent that they be assembled abroad is a

"domestic act."      Id. (alteration in original).                  Mexico develops no

reason why selling guns in the United States with the intent that

they be resold to persons in Mexico should not similarly be

considered a domestic act.

            For    all      these     reasons,          the     presumption       against

extraterritoriality does not bar application of the PLCAA to this

case.

                                          - 19 -
                                      B.

           We   now    turn   to    Mexico's   argument   that    the   PLCAA

nonetheless by its terms does not apply to a lawsuit brought by a

foreign government based on damages occurring outside the United

States caused by misuse outside the United States.               Recall that

the PLCAA prohibits lawsuits "brought by any person" (including

"any governmental entity") "against a manufacturer or seller of a

[firearm] . . . for damages . . . or other relief, resulting from

the criminal or unlawful misuse of a [firearm] by the person or a

third party."     15 U.S.C. § 7903(3), (5)(A).        Mexico argues that

(1) "criminal or unlawful misuse" means only misuse that occurs in

the   United    States        and   is     unlawful   under      U.S.   law;

(2) "damages . . . or other relief" covers only injury incurred in

the United States; and (3) "any governmental entity" encompasses

only domestic governmental entities.

           The Supreme Court recently rejected a similar contention

in Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, which involved a

section of the U.S. Criminal Code granting federal district courts

exclusive jurisdiction over "all offenses against the laws of the

United States."       598 U.S. 264, 268-69 (2023) (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 3231).   The defendant, a bank owned by the Turkish government,

argued that because the statute "refers generically to 'all'

federal criminal offenses without specifically mentioning foreign

states or their instrumentalities, . . . foreign states and their

                                    - 20 -
instrumentalities do not fall within [the statute's] scope."                     Id.

at 269.    The Court observed that the "text as written" "plainly

encompasses"      the    defendant's       offenses.          Id.     It   therefore

"decline[d] to graft an atextual limitation onto [the statute's]

broad jurisdictional grant over 'all offenses,'" or to "create a

new clear-statement rule requiring Congress to 'clearly indicat[e]

its     intent'         to    include       foreign          states    and     their

instrumentalities."          Id.

            Similarly, in Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, the

Supreme Court considered a provision of the Clayton Act allowing

"any person" injured by a violation of U.S. antitrust laws to sue

in U.S. district court.            434 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1978) (quoting 15

U.S.C. § 15(a)). The Court held that "any person" includes foreign

governments, in part because that interpretation furthered the

"two purposes" of the provision: "to deter violators and deprive

them of 'the fruits of their illegality,' and 'to compensate

victims of antitrust violations for their injuries.'"                      Id. at 314

(quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977)).

The Court reasoned that "[t]o deny a foreign plaintiff injured by

an    antitrust   violation        the   right    to   sue    would   defeat   these

purposes" because "[i]t would permit a price fixer or a monopolist

to escape full liability for his illegal actions and would deny

compensation to certain of his victims, merely because he happens

to deal with foreign customers."             Id. at 314–15.

                                         - 21 -
           Taken together, Turkiye and Pfizer guide our approach to

interpreting the PLCAA. Here, as in Turkiye, the "text as written"

does not contain the exceptions Mexico proposes.                Nothing in the

text of the PLCAA limits its scope to misuse or injury that occurs

in the United States, or to U.S. plaintiffs.               And, as in Pfizer,

the   context   and   purpose   of    the     PLCAA    weigh   against   such   a

limitation.     Congress quite clearly enacted the PLCAA to insulate

the U.S. gun industry from certain lawsuits.                    See 15 U.S.C.

§ 7901(a)(5)–(8); id. § 7901(b)(1), (4).              Limiting that protection

to lawsuits brought for harm occurring in the United States,

thereby exposing the U.S. gun industry to identical lawsuits for

harm suffered abroad, would run directly contrary to that purpose.

We also think it unlikely that Congress intended to allow recovery

for victims of gun violence occurring abroad but preclude that

same recovery for victims of gun violence occurring within U.S.

borders.

           Nevertheless, Mexico urges us to read into the PLCAA an

implicit domestic restriction on the statute's scope.                It likens

this case to Small v. United States, which involved a statute

criminalizing possession of a firearm by "any person . . . who has

been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year."        544 U.S. 385, 387 (2005) (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).         There the Supreme Court held that the

phrase "convicted in any court" encompasses only domestic, not

                                     - 22 -
foreign, convictions.       Id.   But at the same time the Court made

clear that its conclusion would be different "should statutory

language, context, history, or purpose show the contrary."               Id. at

391.   Finding "no convincing indication to the contrary" in the

statute,   the   Court     applied    an   assumption      "similar"   to   the

presumption      against     extraterritoriality        because    "Congress

generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind."             Id. at 388,

391 (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)).

           The holding in Small provides no succor to Mexico.               As

we have explained, the PLCAA was also undoubtedly enacted with

domestic concerns in mind; i.e., the impact of certain types of

lawsuits   filed   in    domestic     courts     against   domestic    firearm

companies.    So prohibiting all such lawsuits regardless of who

brings them perfectly aligns with that domestic concern.               The fact

that a statute is focused on domestic concerns (here, lawsuits in

U.S. courts) does not mean that every term in the statute need be

read as somehow domestically limited.              See, e.g., Turkiye, 598

U.S. at 269; Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314–15.            And that is especially

so where, as here, limiting the statute in this way would run

directly contrary to its stated purposes.

           Mexico begs to differ.          It points to four "clues" that

the PLCAA does not apply to lawsuits arising out of the use of

guns in violation of foreign laws.            We address each in turn.

                                     - 23 -
               First, Mexico points out that the definition of the term

"seller" in the PLCAA explicitly includes "importer[s]" but does

not    explicitly      mention    "exporters."            15   U.S.C.      § 7903(6)(A).

Similarly, "importers," but not "exporters," are specifically

identified as a category of business that the PLCAA seeks to

protect.       Id. § 7901(b)(1).           Mexico argues that this "confirms"

that Congress only intended the PLCAA to be domestic in scope.

But    this     is   too    slender    a    reed     on    which      to   support     the

interpretation Mexico seeks to advance.                    Even assuming Congress

intended to exclude from the PLCAA's coverage the export of guns

(an    issue    we   do    not   decide     here),    that     does     not   alter   our

conclusion that Congress certainly intended to include all lawful

domestic sales of guns -- even when those domestically sold guns

end up causing harm abroad.                 There are plausible reasons why

Congress might have wanted to protect domestic sellers more than

exporters, including Congress's stated purpose of "preserv[ing] a

citizen's access to a supply of firearms and ammunition for all

lawful purposes."          15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(2) (emphasis added).                   If a

domestic seller goes out of business, that hampers U.S. citizens'

access to guns more than if an exporter goes out of business.

Thus, the lack of any express mention of "exporters" does not mean

that    the    PLCAA      does   not   apply    to    actions      against     domestic

manufacturers and sellers for harm suffered in another country.

                                        - 24 -
            Second, Mexico points out that the PLCAA applies only to

actions "resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse" of a

firearm, and excludes any action in which the manufacturer or

seller knowingly violated a "State or Federal statute" applicable

to gun sales or marketing.           Mexico argues that "criminal or

unlawful misuse" should be read as referring only to violations of

domestic laws, just as "convicted in any court" was read to

encompass only domestic convictions in Small.            Otherwise, Mexico

says, the exception for knowing violations of law would presumably

not be limited to state and federal statutes.           We disagree.     Given

the basic concern motivating Congress, it makes perfect sense to

read   "criminal   or   unlawful   misuse"    broadly    as   including   the

violation of any law.       Otherwise, Congress would have favored

foreign plaintiffs over domestic plaintiffs and left a gaping hole

in the shield that was the object of the legislation.

            Mexico replies that Congress would not have required

U.S. courts   to   interpret   foreign      criminal   law    in   determining

whether the use of a gun was "criminal or unlawful."                Again, we

disagree.   Courts in the United States are capable of interpreting

foreign law, and commonly do so.      See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v.

Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 245 (1981) ("[T]he mere fact that the court

is called upon to determine and apply foreign law does not present

a legal problem of the sort which would justify the dismissal of

a case otherwise properly before the court." (internal quotations

                                   - 25 -
omitted)).   Indeed, Mexico asks the court to interpret foreign law

in this very case by arguing that Mexican law applies.         To the

extent Mexico is concerned that incorporating foreign law into the

meaning of "criminal or unlawful use" will introduce "extreme"

variations, the phrase already reflects the varied laws of fifty

different states.   See, e.g., Cynthia V. Ward, "Stand Your Ground"

and Self-Defense, 42 Am. J. Crim. L. 89, 90 (2015) (describing

contrasting state approaches to "stand your ground" laws).        The

PLCAA   precludes   certain   lawsuits   against   firearm   companies

premised only on others' unlawful use of firearms -- regardless of

which jurisdiction's law determines that the use was unlawful.

          It also makes perfect sense that in crafting a specific

and defined exception for knowing violations of law by a defendant,

Congress would limit the exception to instances in which the

defendant knowingly violated a "State or Federal statute."       To do

otherwise and except from the limitations of the PLCAA cases in

which a manufacturer violated a law of a foreign country would

grant foreign governments the ability to define the scope of that

exception.   See Small, 544 U.S. at 389–90 (finding Congress not to

have granted foreign governments the ability to determine who could

not own a gun in the United States).       The PLCAA is designed to

protect domestic firearm companies that operate lawfully in the

United States under the numerous federal and state laws regulating

their operations.   See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(4) (finding that

                                - 26 -
the U.S. gun industry is "heavily regulated by Federal, State, and

local    laws").     That   goal   would    be   hampered    if   the   PLCAA's

protections fell away whenever a plaintiff alleged a violation of

only foreign laws -- which may be significantly more restrictive

than domestic regulations.

            Third, Mexico argues that RJR Nabisco supports its claim

that "damages . . . or other relief" covers only injury in the

United States.      RJR Nabisco involved the private right of action

for "[a]ny person injured . . . by reason of a violation of" the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).                  579

U.S. at 346 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).          The Supreme Court held

that the presumption against extraterritoriality precluded RICO's

private right of action from applying to injuries suffered abroad.

Id.     But here, as discussed above, the focus of the PLCAA is not

on redressing injury but rather on preventing certain lawsuits

against U.S. firearm companies.        So it is not an extraterritorial

application of the PLCAA to bar a lawsuit in a U.S. court against

a U.S. company for harm suffered abroad.             See also WesternGeco,

138   S. Ct.   at   2138    (distinguishing      "injury,"   a    "substantive

element of a cause of action" in RJR Nabisco, from "damages -- a

separate legal concept").

            Finally, Mexico argues that the term "any governmental

entity" excludes foreign governmental entities because the PLCAA's

factual findings refer to actions "commenced or contemplated by

                                   - 27 -
the Federal Government, States, municipalities, private interest

groups    and     others,"     and     do    not   expressly    mention    foreign

governments.        15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(8); id. § 7901(a)(7).                 This

argument stumbles at the starting line.                  The statements in the

findings of fact merely reflect that Congress enacted the PLCAA in

response to actions that had been "commenced or contemplated" by

the listed entities.          They do not suggest that Congress did not

intend for the PLCAA to apply to identical lawsuits by others that

would have the same impact on the U.S. firearm industry.

            In sum, the text, context, and purpose of the PLCAA all

point    toward    a    conclusion     that      "[q]ualified   civil     liability

action[s]" include those filed in United States' federal and state

courts by foreign governments for injury incurred abroad.

                                            C.

            The        foregoing       brings       us     to   Mexico's      last

extraterritoriality argument:               Its contention that our reading of

the statute should give way to Mexico's invocation of international

comity.    Mexico argues that it is for Congress, not the courts, to

decide    whether      to   preclude    a    foreign-law    claim   for   injuries

incurred abroad -- especially when the plaintiff is a foreign

sovereign.      It therefore urges application of a clear-statement

rule before reading a statute like the PLCAA to bar such lawsuits.

            In making its comity argument, Mexico turns again to RJR

Nabisco and its holding that RICO did not create a private cause

                                        - 28 -
of action for injuries suffered abroad.              579 U.S. at 346.      In so

holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that "providing a private civil

remedy for foreign conduct creates a potential for international

friction" because it risks "upsetting a balance of competing

considerations that [foreign countries'] own . . . laws embody."

Id. at 346–47 (quoting F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,

542 U.S. 155, 167 (2004)).          Mexico contends that this case is the

"mirror image" of         RJR Nabisco:          "[P]recluding a claim under

[foreign]    law    for   injury    incurred      [abroad]"   interferes    with

foreign sovereigns' application of their laws just as much as

"granting a claim under U.S. law for injury incurred abroad."                Cf.

Nestlé    USA,     Inc.   v.    Doe,      141   S. Ct.    1931,   1948    (2021)

(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)

("Closing the courthouse doors . . . gives rise to foreign-policy

concerns just as invariably as leaving them open." (cleaned up)).

Therefore, Mexico argues, absent a clear statement from Congress,

courts should not apply the PLCAA to claims arising under foreign

law for conduct that occurs in the United States but causes

injuries abroad.

            We decline to adopt this clear-statement rule for the

PLCAA.    As should be abundantly clear by now, the PLCAA's focus is

on protecting U.S. firearm companies from certain costly lawsuits,

thereby    also    preserving      U.S.    citizens'     access   to   firearms.

Creating an atextual exception for lawsuits by foreign governments

                                       - 29 -
would expose U.S. firearm companies to the very type of lawsuit

the PLCAA seeks to prohibit, thereby running contrary to its stated

goals.     In at least this respect, this case is different from RJR

Nabisco, in which limiting RICO's private cause of action to

exclude injuries suffered abroad did not undermine any stated

purposes of the statute.

            The practical consequence of applying the PLCAA to this

case is not lost on us.       It may be that Mexico, as it claims, would

be unable to pursue its lawsuit in the only forum that could

provide effective injunctive relief.                But that is a necessary

consequence of Congress's decision to protect the U.S. firearm

industry    by   regulating    the    types    of    lawsuits    that   can    be

adjudicated by U.S.       courts.      And the prohibition applies to

lawsuits filed by domestic entities and individuals on an equal

basis.     Cf. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 318–19 ("[A] foreign nation is

generally entitled to prosecute any civil claim in the courts of

the United States upon the same basis as a domestic corporation or

individual might do.").

            In sum, we hold that the PLCAA applies to lawsuits by

foreign    governmental   entities     for    harm    suffered   outside      this

country, just as it applies to lawsuits by domestic governmental

entities for harm suffered in this country.                 We turn next to

Mexico's contention that, even if the PLCAA applies generally to

                                     - 30 -
suits by foreign governments for foreign harms, it also excepts

from its ban claims of the type presented in Mexico's complaint.

                                           IV.

             As the title of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in

Arms Act suggests, the statute is designed to protect only "lawful"

commerce in arms.          It contains various exceptions to ensure that

it does not insulate firearm companies against lawsuits resulting

from their unlawful behavior.              One of those exceptions, known as

the predicate exception, exempts from the PLCAA's clutches "an

action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product

knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the

sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate

cause   of   the    harm    for    which    relief   is   sought."      15   U.S.C.

§ 7903(5)(A)(iii).          Mexico contends that its lawsuit meets this

description.

             Defendants      advance       three     arguments    for   rejecting

Mexico's contention: first, defendants say that Mexico's claims

are not for violations of "statute[s]"; second, they contend that

Mexico's     complaint      does    not    adequately     plead   violations    of

predicate statutes; and third, they assert that Mexico has not

adequately alleged proximate cause.                  We conclude that Mexico

survives each of these threshold challenges at this stage of the

litigation.        We therefore hold that the PLCAA does not prevent

this case from moving forward.             Our reasoning follows.

                                       - 31 -
                                       A.

               The district court held that Mexico's common law claims

did not qualify for the predicate exception because, it thought,

the exception applies only to "statutory claims," not "common-law

causes of action."          Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 633 F. Supp. 3d at

446.       Said differently, the district court thought that the "State

or Federal statute" that the defendant violated, rather than the

common law, must also provide the private right of action under

which the plaintiff sues.

               Mexico tells us that no other court has construed the

PLCAA this way, and points to a variety of decisions applying the

predicate       exception    to   common    law   claims   alleging   knowing

violations of statutes.4 Defendants do not contest this assertion,

nor do they cite any cases construing the PLCAA as the district

court did in this case.

       4See, e.g., Brady v. Walmart Inc., No. 8:21-cv-1412-AAQ,
2022 WL 2987078, at *6–10 (D. Md. July 28, 2022); Prescott v. Slide
Fire Sols., LP, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1139–40 & 1139 n.9 (D. Nev.
2019); Corporan v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 16-2305-JWL, 2016
WL 3881341, at *3–4 & *4 n.4 (D. Kan. July 18, 2016); City of New
York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 296, 353 (E.D.N.Y.
2007); King v. Klocek, 187 A.D.3d 1614, 1616 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020);
Englund v. World Pawn Exch., LLC, No. 16CV00598, 2017 WL 7518923,
at *4 (Or. Cir. Ct. June 30, 2017); Chiapperini v. Gander Mountain
Co., 13 N.Y.S.3d 777, 787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014); Williams v.
Beemiller, Inc., 100 A.D.3d 143, 150–51 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012),
amended by 103 A.D.3d 1191 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); Smith & Wesson
Corp. v. City of Gary, 875 N.E.2d 422, 434–35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

                                     - 32 -
              We,   too,    conclude    that      the    predicate      exception

encompasses common law claims in addition to statutory claims, as

long as there is a predicate statutory violation that proximately

causes the harm.       The text of the PLCAA compels this conclusion.

While other PLCAA exceptions exempt suits "for" specific causes of

action, 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(ii), (iv), (v) ("an action . . .

for negligent entrustment or negligence per se"; "an action for

breach of contract or warranty"; "an action for [harm arising from

a product defect]"), the predicate exception more broadly exempts

actions "in which" the manufacturer or seller violated a statute,

id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).         If    Congress     had   wanted   to    limit   the

predicate exception to claims for violating a predicate statute,

it could have simply phrased this exception the same as the others.

See   Keene    Corp.   v.   United   States,    508     U.S.   200,    208   (1993)

("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of

a statute but omits it in another . . ., it is generally presumed

that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate

inclusion or exclusion." (omission in original) (quoting Russello

v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))).

              Defendants    reply    that   "in    which"      means    that    the

statutory violation must be contained "in" the cause of action,

such that it must be an element of the claim.             Certainly to prevail

Mexico would need to prove a manufacturer or seller liable for the

knowing violation of a statute applicable to the sale or marketing

                                     - 33 -
of a qualified product.    So proof of a statutory violation is a

condition to prevailing on, for example, a cause of action for

negligence.   But that does not mean that a lawsuit for negligence

cannot be "an action in which . . . a seller . . . knowingly

violated" a requisite statute.

           The predicate exception's proximate cause requirement

harmonizes well with this understanding.     The requisite proximate

cause serves as a nexus between the predicate statutory violation

and common law claims that otherwise might bear no relation to a

seller's   transgression   of   firearm   statutes.   This   ensures

that -- contrary to defendants' protestations -- our reading of

the predicate exception does not allow any claim at all to proceed

merely because it is alleged in the same case as an unrelated

statutory violation.

           The proximate cause requirement makes less sense under

the district court's reading.     Courts "generally presume that a

statutory cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries

are proximately caused by violations of the statute."        Lexmark

Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 132

(2014).    And for any statutory cause of action containing a

proximate cause requirement (as most do), the district court's

reading would render the identical requirement of the predicate

exception entirely superfluous.    See Consumer Data Indus. Ass'n v.

Frey, 26 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2022) ("A statute . . . ought to be

                                - 34 -
construed in a way that 'no clause, sentence, or word shall be

superfluous, void, or insignificant.'" (quoting Duncan v. Walker,

533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))).         Of course, as defendants point out,

not all statutory causes of action have a built-in proximate cause

requirement.      But even with this caveat, proximate cause makes far

more sense as a nexus between a predicate statutory violation and

other causes of action than as a catchall designed to graft a

proximate cause requirement onto rare statutory causes of action

with alternative causation frameworks.

            The examples Congress provided of lawsuits that fit

within the exception dispel any doubt that the exception allows

for more than purely statutory causes of action.                  The predicate

exception    expressly    encompasses,       as   an   example      of   allowed

lawsuits, "any case in which the manufacturer or seller aided,

abetted, or conspired with any other person to sell or otherwise

dispose of a qualified product, knowing, or having reasonable cause

to believe, that the actual buyer of the qualified product was

prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm or ammunition

under subsection (g) or (n) of section 922 of title 18, United

States Code" -- conduct made unlawful by the Gun Control Act, 18

U.S.C. § 922(d).      15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii)(II).             Yet, nothing

in section 922 seems to create any private right of action.                   Nor

does any party suggest that it does.         To the contrary, Mexico cites

various   cases    holding   that   the   Gun     Control   Act    contains    no

                                    - 35 -
statutory private right of action, and defendants do not dispute

this characterization.5       And given that agreed-upon reading, it

would make no sense for Congress to have listed such a case as an

example if only statutory actions could survive under the predicate

exception.

              Defendants argue that, read to include non-statutory

causes of action, the predicate exception would "wholly subsume"

a different exception in the PLCAA for "action[s] brought against

a seller for . . . negligence per se." 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(ii).

Generally speaking, negligence per se requires violation of "a

statute   that      is designed     to   protect    against    the   type   of

accident the actor's conduct causes" and that the "victim is within

the   class    of   persons   the   statute    is   designed   to    protect."

Restatement (Third) of Torts § 14.            Defendants complain that our

reading of the predicate exception would allow plaintiffs to bring

any common law claim based on any statutory violation, thereby

rendering these restrictions superfluous.

      5 The cases that Mexico cites are not from this circuit. See
Bannerman v. Mountain State Pawn, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-46, 2010 WL
9103469 (N.D. W. Va. Nov. 5, 2010), aff'd, 436 F. App'x 151 (4th
Cir. 2011); Est. of Pemberton v. John's Sports Ctr., Inc., 135
P.3d 174 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006); T & M Jewelry, Inc. v. Hicks ex
rel. Hicks, 189 S.W.3d 526 (Ky. 2006).      We do not decide here
whether the Gun Control Act provides a private right of action.
For purposes of the present case, we merely accept the parties'
apparent agreement that it does not.

                                    - 36 -
          Defendants' argument glosses over the heightened mens

rea requirement in the predicate exception, which applies only

when the defendant "knowingly" violates a statute.            So there are

statutory violations -- i.e., those that are not "knowing" -- that

may be actionable under the doctrine of negligence per se but do

not serve as predicate violations. So, there is no superfluousness

in our reading of the statute.       And it is perfectly sensible for

Congress to allow claims satisfying the negligence per se standard

to proceed, while at the same time creating a separate exception

for knowing violations of statutes regulating the sale or marketing

of firearms.6

          For   these   reasons,    we    conclude    that   the   predicate

exception allows common law claims for injury proximately caused

by a defendant's knowing violation of a predicate statute.                We

turn next to defendants' contention that Mexico has not adequately

alleged such a violation.

                                    B.

          Mexico   alleges   that        defendants   knowingly     violated

predicate statutes in two ways: by aiding and abetting illegal

downstream sales, and by selling unlawful "machineguns."

     6  In fact, the district court in this very case found the
negligence per se exception inapplicable because Massachusetts
does not recognize the negligence per se doctrine. See Estados
Unidos Mexicanos, F. Supp. 3d at 449.

                               - 37 -
                                            1.

              First, Mexico reasons that by deliberately facilitating

the unlawful trafficking of their guns into Mexico, defendants aid

and abet violations of various federal statutes that prohibit

selling guns without a license, exporting guns without a license,

and selling to straw purchasers.                 Resting on their position that

the predicate exception is limited to statutory causes of action

(which we have rejected), defendants do not contend that the

complaint fails to allege widespread sales of firearms by dealers

in knowing violation of several state and federal statutes.                         Nor

do    defendants       dispute       that        the     predicate     exception     of

section 7903(5)(A)(iii) would apply if Mexico were to prove that

a defendant aided and abetted any such violation.                           Instead,

defendants contend that even for pleading purposes the complaint

fails    to   allege    facts    plausibly         supporting    the    theory     that

defendants have aided and abetted such unlawful sales.

              We disagree, finding instead that Mexico's complaint

adequately alleges that defendants have been aiding and abetting

the sale of firearms by dealers in knowing violation of relevant

state and federal laws.          "[T]he essence of aiding and abetting" is

"participation in another's wrongdoing that is both significant

and     culpable   enough       to   justify           attributing   the   principal

wrongdoing to the aider and abettor."                    Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh,

598 U.S. 471, 504 (2023).

                                       - 38 -
            Reduced to its essence, aiding-and-abetting liability

rests on "twin requirements" that the assistance provided to the

principal wrong-doer be both (1) "knowing" and (2) "substantial."

Id. at 491-92. These requirements "work[] in tandem, with a lesser

showing of one demanding a greater showing of the other."                      Id.

They "'should be considered relative to one another' as part of a

single   inquiry    designed     to     capture     conscious      and    culpable

conduct."     Id. at 504 (quoting Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 459

(8th Cir. 1991)).

            Defendants   argue    that     Mexico     has     at   best    alleged

defendants'    knowing   indifference          to   the    downstream      illegal

trafficking of their guns into Mexico.              They argue that "because

Defendants themselves are not alleged to 'participate' in this

wrongful conduct at all, much less with any plausible intent of

facilitating it, they cannot be deemed accomplices."

            This argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of

the complaint.     Fairly read, the complaint alleges that defendants

are aware of the significant demand for their guns among the

Mexican drug cartels, that they can identify which of their dealers

are responsible for the illegal sales that give the cartels the

guns, and that they know the unlawful sales practices those dealers

engage in to get the guns to the cartels.                 The complaint further

alleges that even with all this knowledge, and even after warnings

from the U.S. government, defendants continue to supply the very

                                      - 39 -
dealers that they know engage in straw sales and large-volume sales

to traffic guns into Mexico, that they design military-style

weapons and market them as such knowing that this makes them more

desirable to the cartels, and that they place serial numbers on

their weapons in a manner that facilitates their removal, as is

preferred by cartels.   And the complaint alleges that as a result

of this conduct, defendants collectively reap $170 million per

year in revenue from this illegal market.           It is therefore not

implausible that, as the complaint alleges, defendants engage in

all this conduct in order to maintain the unlawful market in

Mexico, and not merely in spite of it.

          Notionally,   imagine   a   dealer,   a   distributor,   and   a

manufacturer standing abreast of one another at the border.          The

manufacturer hands the distributor ten guns, the distributor hands

them to the dealer, and the dealer then hands them to a group of

ten customers, among whom there are eight well-known agents of the

cartel acting as straw purchasers.      Rather than refusing to fill

an order for ten more guns by that dealer, the manufacturer tweaks

its advertisements to better appeal to the cartel, supplies them

more guns, and so on over and over again.       We think it clear that

by passing along guns knowing that the purchasers include unlawful

buyers, and making design and marketing decisions targeted towards

those exact individuals, the manufacturer is aiding and abetting

                              - 40 -
illegal   sales.        And    this   scenario,    in   substance,    is    fairly

analogous to what Mexico alleges.

              The allegations here are also remarkably analogous to

the facts in Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703

(1943).       In that case, the defendant company conducted from New

York a business providing mail-order prescription drugs to doctors

around the country.        Id. at 704–06.        One customer was a doctor in

South   Carolina     who      was   illegally    reselling   morphine      sulfate

supplied to him by the defendant.           Id. at 704.      The defendant was

convicted of criminally conspiring with the doctor. Id. at 704-05.

In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court pointed to evidence

that    the    doctor   was    ordering    the    product    in   large    volumes

incompatible with lawful use by legitimate patients, that the

defendant facilitated this behavior through mass advertising and

offering bulk sales at steep discounts (even after the U.S.

government warned it that it was a source of supply for an illegal

market), and that the company had a "stake in the venture" in the

form of profits from the illegally sold drugs.                    Id. at 706–07,

712–13.       From this evidence, the Court concluded, the jury could

have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant supplier

"not only kn[ew] and acquiesce[d]" in the illegal enterprise, but

also "join[ed] both mind and hand . . . to make its accomplishment

possible."      Id. at 713.

                                       - 41 -
           Here, similarly, the complaint alleges that defendants

have resisted taking measures that would make it more difficult

for their firearms to fall into the cartels' hands                 (despite

warnings from the U.S. government), that they design and market

their guns in such a way as to make them attractive to the illegal

market, and that they benefit financially as a result.            And unlike

in Direct Sales, the defendants here are alleged to know that they

supply dealers who sell illegally, making the inference that they

are working in concert with these unlawful actors even stronger.

Neither must we determine whether there is evidence of these facts

sufficient to support a criminal conviction as in Direct Sales; we

ask only whether the facts alleged in the complaint plausibly

support an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability in this civil

case.   Direct Sales strongly supports our conclusion that they do.

           Defendants    attempt      to   distinguish   Direct   Sales   by

relying on the Court's observation that given the quantities sold

the drugs could not have all been used for any lawful purpose.

Id. at 710–12.    In contrast, they assert, the "vast majority of

retailers" are law-abiding and "only 2%" of U.S. firearms end up

in   Mexico.     But    in   Direct    Sales   the   Court   distinguished

morphine -- a product "incapable of further legal use except by

compliance with rigid regulations" -- from other commodities "not

restricted as to sale by order form, registration, or other

requirements."    Id. at 710.         The defendant's sales methods and

                                   - 42 -
volumes, which might be perfectly innocuous for everyday items,

were evidence of illicit intent when employed to sell a dangerous

item whose legitimate market is highly restricted.             Id. at 711-12.

"The difference," the Court said, "is like that between toy pistols

or hunting rifles and machine guns."          Id. at 710.

           And so in Direct Sales the defendant must have known

that the sales volume meant there were likely illegal sales, and

by encouraging volume sales, the defendant could have been found

to have intended to supply the products for the illegal sales.

Here we also have a highly regulated product7 allegedly being sold

in an illegal manner, and an allegation that defendants know what

is going on and take steps to facilitate it.                In this important

respect, Direct Sales again provides a close and instructive

analogy.

           Defendants also point out that Direct Sales rejected the

proposition that a seller could be held liable for a buyer's

illegal acts based merely on their knowledge or lack of concern as

to the buyer's unlawful plans.        But for all the reasons described

above,   the   complaint      adequately   alleges   that    defendants    make

deliberate     design   and   distribution   choices   to     facilitate   the

illegal trafficking of their guns to Mexico.            Thus they are not

     7  As Congress observed in enacting the PLCAA, "[t]he
manufacture, importation, possession, sale, and use of firearms
and ammunition in the United States are heavily regulated." 15
U.S.C. § 7901(a)(4).

                                    - 43 -
mere passive observers of the buyer's illegal activity, but more

akin to a calculated and willing participant in the supply chain

that ends with a profitable illegal firearm market in Mexico.

            Defendants argue that the Supreme Court's recent opinion

in Twitter calls for a different result.          We disagree.   In Twitter,

the Supreme Court held that major social media platforms used by

ISIS to enlist recruits and raise funds were not liable under the

Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act for aiding and abetting

an ISIS terrorist attack on a nightclub in Turkey.               598 U.S. at

505-07.     The defendants in Twitter had no meaningful stake in

ISIS's use of their platforms and had an undisputed lack of intent

to support ISIS.      Id.    The only affirmative conduct that the

defendants engaged in was creating their platforms and making them

available to the public, which was not alleged to have been done

with ISIS in mind or to support terrorism.          Id. at 498.    There was

also no allegation that ISIS even used the platforms to plan or

coordinate the attack.      Id.

            Here, by contrast, Mexico alleges that defendants engage

in conduct -- design decisions, marketing tactics, and repeated

supplying    of   dealers   known   to     sell    guns   that    cross   the

border -- with the intent of growing and maintaining an illegal

market in Mexico from which they receive substantial revenues.

And for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes we assume that defendants' conduct

in fact helped incite the unlawful sales. See, e.g., SBT Holdings,

                                  - 44 -
LLC v. Town of Westminster, 547 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[W]e

draw all rational inferences from the facts alleged in favor of

the plaintiffs.").     Defendants are therefore alleged to be much

more active participants in the alleged activity than were the

Twitter defendants, and the holding in that case does not compel

a different result in this one.

          Of course, the complaint does not allege defendants'

awareness of any particular unlawful sale.            But neither did the

convicted mail-order company in Direct Sales have such specific

knowledge.     The Supreme Court clarified in Twitter that such a

"strict nexus" is not always required.           598 U.S. at 497.        "[I]n

appropriate circumstances, a secondary defendant's role in an

illicit enterprise can be so systemic that the secondary defendant

is aiding and abetting every wrongful act committed by that

enterprise."    Id. at 496.    Here, defendants operate at a systemic

level, allegedly designing, marketing, and distributing their guns

so that demand by the cartels continues to boost sales.               In these

circumstances,   defendants    need    not    know   about   any    particular

unlawful sale that funnels their guns into Mexico.

          In    sum,   we   conclude   that    the   complaint      adequately

alleges that defendants aided and abetted the knowingly unlawful

downstream trafficking of their guns into Mexico.                  Defendants'

arguments to the contrary are premised either on an inaccurate

reading of the complaint or on a misapplication of the standard of

                                 - 45 -
review on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).               Whether

plaintiffs will be able to support those allegations with evidence

at summary judgment or at trial remains to be seen.       At this stage,

though, we must "accept all well-pleaded allegations of [Mexico]

as true and afford all inferences in [Mexico's] favor."         Vázquez-

Ramos v. Triple-S Salud, Inc., 55 F.4th 286, 291 (1st Cir. 2022)

(cleaned up) (quoting Arroyo-Melecio v. P.R. Am. Ins. Co., 398

F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2005)).

                                    2.

          Mexico's     argument   that     defendants   unlawfully   sold

"machineguns" fares less well.           The Gun Control Act prohibits

selling a "machinegun" without specific authorization.         18 U.S.C.

§ 922(b)(4).   "Machinegun" is defined as follows:

          The term "machinegun" means any weapon which
          shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be
          readily restored to shoot, automatically more
          than one shot, without manual reloading, by a
          single function of the trigger.     The term
          shall also include the frame or receiver of
          any such weapon, any part designed and
          intended   solely    and   exclusively,    or
          combination of parts designed and intended,
          for use in converting a weapon into a
          machinegun, and any combination of parts from
          which a machinegun can be assembled if such
          parts are in the possession or under the
          control of a person.

26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).

          Mexico claims that defendants' semiautomatic weapons

meet this definition because they can easily be modified to fire

                                  - 46 -
automatically.      It cites a 1982 ATF administrative ruling stating

that   this    definition   "includes    those   weapons    which   have   not

previously functioned as machineguns but possess design features

which facilitate full automatic fire by a simple modification or

elimination of existing component parts."           ATF Rul. 82-8, 1982-2

A.T.F.Q.B. 49 (1982).

              Binding precedent from the Supreme Court and this court

forecloses Mexico's interpretation.         In Staples v. United States,

the Supreme Court held that the National Firearms Act -- which

prohibits possession of an unregistered "machinegun" (as defined

above) -- requires that the defendant knew that the possessed

weapon    "had   the   characteristics    that    brought   it    within   the

statutory definition of a machinegun."           511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994).

The defendant in that case possessed an AR-15 rifle, in which

certain components had been swapped out or filed down to enable

automatic firing.      Id. at 603.     The Supreme Court held that to be

properly convicted the defendant must have known that his rifle

had been so modified.       Id. at 619.    It rejected a reading of the

statute under which "any person who has purchased what he believes

to be a semiautomatic rifle or handgun . . . can be subject to

imprisonment,     despite   absolute    ignorance   of   the     gun's   firing

capabilities, if the gun turns out to be an automatic."                    Id.

at 615.    And the majority also rejected the dissent's argument

based on a class of "readily convertible semiautomatics" because

                                  - 47 -
"that class bears no relation to the definitions in the Act."                        Id.

at 612 n.6.

          Similarly,         in     United    States     v.    Nieves-Castaño,        we

reversed the conviction of a defendant who knew that she possessed

an AK-47 but did not know that it had been modified to allow

automatic firing.        480 F.3d 597, 602 (1st Cir. 2007).                    We stated

that "[w]hile an automatic weapon meets the definition of a machine

gun, a semi-automatic weapon does not."                        Id. at 600 (citing

Staples, 511 U.S. at 602 & n.1).

          Mexico        argues      that     Staples    and    Nieves-Castaño        are

inapposite because those cases were about the mens rea requirement

for a possession crime, not the definition of "machinegun."                          It

cites a district court case from Nevada distinguishing Staples on

this basis.     See Parsons v. Colt's Mfg. Co., No. 19-cv-01189, 2020

WL   1821306,      at   *5    (D.     Nev.     Apr. 10,       2020),    modified      on

reconsideration, No. 19-cv-01189, 2020 WL 2309259 (D. Nev. May 8,

2020).   But critical to the holdings of both Staples and Nieves-

Castaño was that knowing possession of a readily convertible

semiautomatic      weapon     does     not     constitute       de     facto     knowing

possession    of    a   "machinegun."           In     other    words,     a     readily

convertible semiautomatic weapon is not, without more, the same as

an   automatic      weapon.          Mexico's     reading       would    erase      this

distinction -- creating an equivalency that the holdings of Staples

and Nieves-Castaño do not allow.              It would also effectively outlaw

                                       - 48 -
the   knowing    possession      of    any     semiautomatic       weapon,       since

"virtually any semiautomatic weapon may be converted . . . into a

machinegun within the meaning of the Act."              See Staples, 511 U.S.

at 615.      Whether convertible semiautomatic weapons are to be

prohibited in their entirety is not an issue presented by this

appeal.

                                        C.

            The final hurdle that Mexico must clear is the predicate

exception's     proximate   cause      requirement.         A    violation       of   a

predicate    statute   allows    a    lawsuit     to   proceed     only     if    "the

violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is

sought."    15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).

            Proximate cause "demand[s] 'some direct relation between

the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.'"                      United

States v. Kilmartin, 944 F.3d 315, 330 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting

Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014)).                     "Proximate

cause is commonly understood as a function of the foreseeability

of    the   harm,"   id.    at   331,    although      in       certain    contexts

foreseeability alone may be insufficient, see, e.g., Bank of Am.

Corp. v. City of Miami, 581 U.S. 189, 202 (2017) (Fair Housing

Act).8

      8 Neither party proposes a definition of proximate cause
specific to the predicate exception of the PLCAA. In the absence
of any such suggestions, we apply traditional understandings of
proximate cause.

                                      - 49 -
           Mexico's claim of proximate cause is straightforward:

defendants aid and abet the trafficking of guns to the Mexican

drug cartels, and this trafficking has foreseeably required the

Mexican government to incur significant costs in response to the

increased threats and violence accompanying drug cartels armed

with an arsenal of military-grade weapons.

           Defendants attempt to complicate this causal theory.

They maintain that the chain of causation actually has eight steps:

(1) manufacturers sell guns to distributors; (2) distributors sell

the guns to dealers; (3) dealers sell the guns to buyers with

illegal intentions; (4) those buyers sell the guns to smugglers or

smuggle them into Mexico themselves; (5) the cartels buy the guns;

(6) the cartels use the guns; (7) the cartels' use of the guns

injures   people   and   property    in   Mexico;   and   (8) the   Mexican

government suffers derivative financial harm from those injuries.

There are at least two fatal flaws in this argument.

           First, the starting point for the predicate exception's

causation analysis is the "violation" of "a State or Federal

statute applicable to the sale or marketing" of firearms.            We ask

whether "the violation" proximately caused the plaintiff's harm.

15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).        Here, the violation that defendants

allegedly aid and abet occurs when a dealer knowingly violates the

law in selling guns intended for cartels.           Viewed in this light,

the relevant chain of causation starts at step 3 of the defendants'

                                - 50 -
list.     And from that point, the Mexican government's expenditure

of   funds   to   parry    the   cartels   is    a   foreseeable   and   direct

consequence.

             Second, the fact that one can fashion a multi-step

description of the causal chain does not mean that the injurious

conduct    and    the   injury   alleged   are   insufficiently     connected.

Consider a defendant who falls asleep at the helm of a large ship,

leaning on the helm, so as to move the tiller, which turns the

rudder, which then turns the ship off course, hitting and weakening

a dike, and thereby causing a reasonably cautious downstream farmer

to build a levee.         Surely the ability to describe this causation

in multiple steps would not mean that, as a matter of law, the

negligent    helmsperson      did   not    foreseeably    cause    the   farmer

compensable harm.         Rather, one would more reasonably say that

negligently steering the ship foreseeably caused the need to shore-

up flood defenses.        So, too, here, the complaint plausibly alleges

that aiding and abetting the illegal sale of a large volume of

assault weapons to the cartels foreseeably caused the Mexican

government to shore-up its defenses.

             Defendants nevertheless claim that the Third Circuit

adopted their view of proximate cause in City of Philadelphia v.

                                    - 51 -
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 423–24 (3d Cir. 2002).9               In

that case, though, Philadelphia alleged "[a]t most . . . awareness

of the means by which prohibited purchasers end up possessing

handguns."     Id. at 424 & n.14.       The "trace request information"

available at that time "d[id] not put a gun manufacturer on notice

that a specific distributor or dealer [wa]s engaged in unlawful

firearm trafficking." Id. at 424 n.14. Thus all gun manufacturers

knew was that "some handguns reach prohibited purchasers."              Id.

And without more, the plaintiffs could not show "intent on the

part of the gun manufacturers."         Id.     Here, by contrast, Mexico

expressly alleges that the defendants did know which dealers were

making illegal sales.

             Defendants further contend that there is no proximate

cause because the causal chain contains multiple criminal acts by

third parties.     They argue that "an 'intervening criminal act of

a third party' is the textbook intervening act," Copithorne v.

Framingham Union Hosp., 520 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Mass. 1988).          But the

complete   sentence   in   Copithorne    from    which   defendants'   brief

cherry-picks actually states:     "The intervening criminal act of a

third party is a superseding cause which breaks the chain of

proximate causation only where the original wrongdoer reasonably

     9  The Third Circuit decided City of Philadelphia before
Congress enacted the PLCAA, so it analyzed proximate cause under
negligence law, not the PLCAA. 277 F.3d at 422–26.

                                 - 52 -
could   not    have    foreseen     such      act."      Id.;    see     also,     e.g.,

Restatement      (Second)     of    Torts      § 448     (intervening       crime    is

superseding cause "unless the actor at the time of his negligent

conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood . . . that

a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit

such a . . . crime"); id. § 449 ("If the likelihood that a third

person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the

hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether

innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not

prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.").

Here, the complaint alleges not only that it was foreseeable that

defendants' guns would end up in the hands of Mexican cartels, but

also that defendants actually intended to bring about that result.

And it is certainly foreseeable that Mexican drug cartels -- armed

with defendants' weapons -- would use those weapons to commit

violent crimes.        The acts of these third parties are therefore

properly considered as part of the proximate causation chain.

              Defendants'      superseding-criminal-act                 argument      is

especially     unconvincing        in   the    context    of     the    PLCAA,     which

precludes     only    those   claims     "resulting       from    the    criminal     or

unlawful misuse of a qualified product" by someone other than the

defendant.      15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A).           If a third party's unlawful

act always undercuts proximate cause, the predicate exception

would be meaningless.         See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S.

                                        - 53 -
169, 183 n.8 (2014) (rejecting an interpretation of a gun-control

statute that "would render the statute all but useless").

             Defendants then shift focus from the conduct to the

injury.     They argue that the Mexican government's alleged harms

are wholly derivative of injuries suffered by the direct victims

of cartel violence, citing a "general tendency of the law" not to

stretch proximate causation "beyond [its] first step" to reach

indirect victims.        Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258,

271 (1992) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983)).                Under this

principle, "a plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from

the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant's

acts was generally said to stand at too remote a distance to

recover."    Id. at 268–69; see also Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133.

             Some courts have applied this principle to bar similar

lawsuits by cities against gun manufacturers.           For example, the

Third Circuit held that Philadelphia had not alleged proximate

cause because it sought "reimbursement for expenses that arise

only because of the use of firearms to injure or threaten City

residents," even though some of the alleged damages were "different

from   the     damages      suffered    by   direct    victims     of   gun

violence"    --   like    costs   to   "investigate   and   prosecute   gun

trafficking[ and] to patrol gun infested neighborhoods."            City of

                                   - 54 -
Philadelphia, 277 F.3d at 425; see also Ganim v. Smith & Wesson

Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 124 (Conn. 2001) (applying similar reasoning).

           On the other hand, some courts have recognized that

selling guns into an illegal market may cause direct harm to a

governmental   entity   that    is     not    derivative    of    harm    to   its

residents.   A court in Massachusetts allowed the city of Boston to

proceed in its lawsuit against firearm companies where the city

alleged   various   direct   harms     resulting    from    the     defendants'

"fueling an illicit market" of guns.            City of Boston v. Smith &

Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000 WL 1473568, at *6 (Mass. Super.

July 13, 2000).     Such harms included costs of increased security

at public schools, costs of increased law enforcement, lower

property values, and diminished tax revenues.               Id.    The Supreme

Court of Ohio adopted this reasoning, finding direct injuries in

the form of "significant expenses for police, emergency, health,

prosecution,   corrections     and    other    services."        Cincinnati     v.

Beretta   U.S.A.    Corp.,   768     N.E.2d     1136,   1148      (Ohio   2002).

Similarly, a New Jersey court rejected a remoteness argument with

respect to expenditures associated with "deterrence, investigation

of gun crimes, and other related services."             James v. Arms Tech.,

Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); see also

In re JUUL Labs, Inc., Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.

Litig., 497 F. Supp. 3d 552, 664-65 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (finding

                                     - 55 -
proximate cause where government entities "do not seek to recover

costs expended by . . . any other third party").

           We find the reasoning of the latter cases persuasive.

When faced with an epidemic of unlawful gun trafficking into its

country,     a     government        will      foreseeably      --     indeed

inexorably -- incur costs of its own that are not merely derivative

of those borne by the direct victims of gun violence.            One obvious

example is the cost of increased law enforcement personnel and

training to mitigate the flow of illegal weapons and to combat

drug   cartels   that   --   armed    with    defendants'    weapons   --   are

essentially hostile military operations.           The government directly

and uniquely bears these costs as a direct result of defendants'

alleged facilitation of gun trafficking to the Mexican cartels.

           Imagine that a U.S. company sent a mercenary unit of

combat troops to attack people in Mexico City.               Such an attack

would directly cause Mexico itself the expense of paying soldiers

to defend the city.      Proximate cause would be quite clear.              So,

too, here, where the defendants are alleged to have armed the

attackers for their continuing assaults.

           Mexico may also be able to show that other of its alleged

harms are proximately caused by defendants' actions, and not merely

derivative of harms to its citizens.           For example, if Mexico can

prove that it had to proactively spend more funds to bolster its

healthcare facilities, social services, and judicial system in

                                     - 56 -
response to the cartels' accumulation of defendants' guns, these

expenses might also not be merely derivative of the injuries

suffered by individual victims.           On the other hand, other alleged

harms, such as lower economic efficiency due to the decreased size

of the working population, are derivative because the harm to the

government flows only from prior harm inflicted upon its citizens.

The bottom line is that Mexico has plausibly alleged at least some

injuries that it has suffered directly from the illegal trafficking

of guns into Mexico, and that are not merely derivative of the

harm suffered by the victims of gun violence.

            This   conclusion      is   consistent    with     Supreme      Court

precedent.    In Holmes (a RICO case), the Court held that there was

no proximate cause linking the defendants' manipulation of stock

prices, which caused broker-dealers who purchased the stock to

experience financial distress, to the harm suffered by the broker-

dealers' customers when the broker-dealers could not pay the

customers' claims.      503 U.S. at 271–74.         In that case, the only

path from the stock manipulation to the customers' harm was through

the broker-dealers' harm.          Id. at 271 ("[T]he conspirators have

allegedly    injured    these   customers    only    insofar    as   the    stock

manipulation    first    injured    the    broker-dealers      and   left    them

without the wherewithal to pay customers' claims.").

            Contrast the situation in Holmes from one contemplated

by the Court in Lexmark:

                                    - 57 -
          Consider two rival carmakers who purchase
          airbags for their cars from different third-
          party manufacturers. If the first carmaker,
          hoping to divert sales from the second,
          falsely proclaims that the airbags used by the
          second carmaker are defective, both the second
          carmaker and its airbag supplier may suffer
          reputational injury, and their sales may
          decline as a result. In those circumstances,
          there is no reason to regard either party's
          injury as derivative of the other's; each is
          directly and independently harmed by the
          attack on its merchandise.

572 U.S. at 138–39.

          This case is more like the airbag example in Lexmark

than the stock manipulation in Holmes.              Unlike in Holmes, the

causal path from the gun trafficking to the Mexican government's

expenditures does not flow solely through the harm suffered by

victims of gun violence.      Rather, like in the airbag example, the

harm caused by the trafficking goes in multiple directions -- both

directly to the victims of gun violence and directly to the Mexican

government.        Admittedly,     the   government's     expenditures     are

presumably    in   large   part    for   the   purpose   of   preventing   and

mitigating the harm from gun violence to its citizens.              But that

does not make it "purely derivative" in the sense that sometimes

defeats proximate cause.      See id. at 133.

          Defendants'      final    attack     on   proximate   cause    is   a

pragmatic one.     Defendants point to two "functional factors" that

courts apply while analyzing proximate cause under RICO: the

feasibility of "ascertain[ing] the amount of a plaintiff's damages

                                    - 58 -
attributable    to     the   violation,      as     distinct     from    other,

independent, factors"; and the "administrability" of apportioning

damages    without     "multiple    recoveries."           Sterling      Suffolk

Racecourse, LLC v. Wynn Resorts, Ltd., 990 F.3d 31, 35-36 (1st

Cir. 2021) (quoting In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig.,

712 F.3d 21, 35–36 (1st Cir. 2013)).

            Assuming these considerations apply outside of the RICO

context, they would not require the dismissal of the complaint in

this case.     The foregoing discussion concerning Mexico's non-

derivative harm disposes of defendants' concern about multiple

recoveries. We are also not persuaded that determining the damages

attributable to each defendant will be as difficult as defendants

suggest.   And in this case any such difficulties are best resolved

once Mexico has had an opportunity to engage in discovery and

submit expert reports bearing on damages.            Accord City of Boston,

2000 WL 1473568, at *7 n.33 ("The difficulty in ascertaining

damages in this case is best assessed when the case has gone beyond

the pleading stage.").         In any event, Mexico seeks injunctive

relief in addition to damages, and defendants' concerns about

double    recoveries   and   apportioning        damages   do   not    apply   to

injunctive relief.      Cf. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 135 ("Even when a

plaintiff cannot quantify its losses with sufficient certainty to

recover    damages,    it    may   still    be    entitled      to    injunctive

relief . . . .").

                                   - 59 -
          We conclude that Mexico has adequately alleged proximate

causation, thereby satisfying the final demand of the predicate

exception.    Of course, our holding at this stage is based on the

allegations   in   the   complaint,    construed   favorably   to   Mexico.

Mexico will have to support its theory of proximate causation with

evidence later in the proceedings.

                                      V.

          The parties' briefing touches on certain issues beyond

the PLCAA, including which jurisdiction's law governs Mexico's

tort claims and whether defendants owe a duty to Mexico under

whichever tort law does apply.         The district court did not reach

these issues because it found the PLCAA dispositive.                 Having

concluded that the PLCAA does not bar Mexico's lawsuit at this

stage of the proceedings, we think it prudent to allow the district

court to address the remaining issues in the first instance, rather

than deciding them ourselves without the benefit of the district

court's analysis or focused briefing from the parties.

                                   VI.

          For   the   foregoing   reasons,    we   reverse   the    district

court's conclusion that the PLCAA bars Mexico's tort claims and

remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

                                  - 60 -