Court Opinion

ID: 2963622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:07.551914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:29.594001
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1278

                                    MARY OSBORNE,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                               SANDOZ NUTRITION CORP.,

                                Defendant - Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                 [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                      Aldrich and Coffin, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                          _____________________

                                _____________________

               Kevin M. Walkowski, with whom Matthew J. Ryan, Jr.,  Michael
               __________________            ____________________   _______
          K.  Callan and Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, P.C. were on
          __________     __________________________________________
          brief for appellant.
               Thomas  J. Scannell, with whom Bowditch & Dewey was on brief
               ___________________            ________________
          for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                   October 6, 1995
                                 ____________________

                    Per   Curiam.      Plaintiff-Appellant,  Mary   Osborne
                    Per   Curiam.
                    ____________

          ("Osborne"),  appeals  the  district  court's  dismissal  of  her

          complaint  for insufficient service of process.   For the reasons

          stated below, we affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    Osborne brought  a  personal  injury  suit  in  Hampden

          County Superior  Court for  the Commonwealth of  Massachusetts on

          August  30,  1994  against  defendant-appellee,  Sandoz Nutrition

          Corporation   ("Sandoz").     Osborne  failed   to  comply   with

          Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j), which required her to

          effect service of her  complaint within 90 days from the  date of

          filing  (i.e., on  or  before November  28,  1994), and  mandated

          dismissal  unless she showed good cause for untimely service.  On

          November  30,  1994,  Osborne  filed  with  the  state  court  an

          Emergency  Motion to  Extend Tracking  Order to Allow  Service of

          Process ("Emergency  Motion"), which defendant opposed.   Osborne

          completed  service of process on Sandoz on December 29, 1994, one

          month  after the  deadline and  with the  Emergency Motion  still

          pending.   On  January  13, 1995,  the  action was  removed  upon

          Sandoz'  motion, pursuant  to 28 U.S.C.    1332  and 28  U.S.C.  

          1441, to the  United States  District Court for  the District  of

          Massachusetts.   On January  23, 1995,  Sandoz moved to  dismiss,

          asserting   insufficient   service   of   process   pursuant   to

          Massachusetts law.

                    The  district court granted  Sandoz' motion to dismiss.

          The district  court reasoned  that, under Federal  Rule of  Civil

                                         -2-

          Procedure  81(c),  Massachusetts  Rule of  Civil  Procedure  4(j)

          applies relative  to the time  frame for effectuating  service of

          process, and  that, under Massachusetts case  law, Osborne failed

          to show  good cause  for failure  to  serve process  in a  timely

          manner.  Final judgment was entered on March 6, 1995, and Osborne

          filed this appeal on March 9, 1995.

                    On  appeal,  Osborne contends  that  28  U.S.C.    1448

          mandates  application of  Federal  Rule of  Civil Procedure  4(m)

          (which  provides  Osborne with  120  days  to effect  service  of

          process from the date of removal) and that, even if Massachusetts

          Rule  of Civil  Procedure 4(j)  applies, Osborne  can demonstrate

          good cause for the delay in service of process.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

                    The district  court's decision  as to which  procedural

          rule applies is a question of law subject to plenary review.  See
                                                                        ___

          New  Hampshire Ball Bearings v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 43
          ____________________________    _____________________________

          F.3d  749, 752 (1st Cir. 1995);  LoVuolo v. Gunning, 925 F.2d 22,
                                           _______    _______

          25  (1st Cir.  1991).    We view  this  appeal as  involving  the

          straightforward  application  of state  procedural  law regarding

          service  of process  prior  to removal  to  federal court.    The

          district court  correctly applied  state procedural law  prior to

          removal because state law governs the service of process prior to

          removal  to the  district court.   Fed.  R. Civ.  P. 81(c).   See
                                                                        ___

          Winkels v.  George A. Hormel &  Co., 874 F.2d 567,  570 (8th Cir.
          _______     _______________________

          1989); Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 168
                 ________    ___________________________

                                         -3-

          (3d  Cir. 1976).  See also Garden  Homes, Inc. v. Mason, 238 F.2d
                            ________ ___________________    _____

          651, 653 (1st Cir. 1956).

                    In this respect, we reject Osborne's contention that 28

          U.S.C.    1448,  which governs  procedure only  after  removal to

          federal  court, mandates  application  of Federal  Rule of  Civil

          Procedure 4(m).   Osborne  asserts that  service  of process  was

          "unperfected" or "defective"  within the meaning  of 28 U.S.C.   

          1448 as of  the date of removal because her  Emergency Motion was

          still pending before the state court when the action was removed.

          We reject Osborne's argument because the district court, pursuant

          to the general rule that state law governs sufficiency of process

          prior  to  removal and  should be  applied  by federal  courts in

          determining whether there  were procedural deficiencies  prior to

          removal,  applied the same test  that the state  court would have

          applied in deciding the Emergency Motion; that is, whether, under

          Massachusetts Rule  of Civil  Procedure 4(j) and  applicable case

          law, Osborne demonstrated good cause for failure to serve process

          in a timely manner.   Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c); Winkels, 874 F.2d at
                                                       _______

          570.   Osborne had the same opportunity before the district court

          to demonstrate  good cause  for failure  to timely  serve process

          that she would  have had before the state court  had the case not

          been removed to district court.

                    Furthermore,   we  agree  with   the  district  court's

          conclusion that  the doctrine enunciated in Hanna v. Plummer, 380
                                                      _____    _______

          U.S. 460  (1965), and the provisions  of 28 U.S.C.    1448 do not

          apply.   Applying Section 1448 would  ignore Osborne's procedural

                                         -4-

          deficiency in  state court,  and effectively penalize  Sandoz for

          exercising its removal right.  We decline to use Section 1448, as

          the  district court  noted, to  "breathe jurisprudential  life in

          federal  court to a case legally dead in state court."  Witherow,
                                                                  ________

          530 F.2d at 168.

                    We  turn  to   the  district  court's   application  of

          Massachusetts precedent (as opposed  to federal precedent) in its

          determination of whether Osborne  demonstrated good cause for her

          failure  to  timely  serve  process.      Contrary  to  Osborne's

          contentions,  we  note that  once  the  district court  correctly

          decided to apply  Massachusetts Rule of Civil  Procedure 4(j), it

          correctly applied  Massachusetts precedent construing  good cause

          under Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j).

                    The district court's finding that Osborne failed, under

          Massachusetts Rule  of Civil  Procedure 4(j) and  applicable case

          law, to show good cause for her failure to make timely service is

          reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Benjamin v. Grosnick, 999 F.2d
                                             ________    ________

          590,  591 (1st  Cir. 1993).  Based on  our  review of  the record

          below, we  find no abuse of  discretion by the district  court in

          its finding  that Osborne  failed to  demonstrate good  cause for

          failure to timely serve  process.  See Hull v.  Attleboro Savings
                                             ___ ____     _________________

          Bank, 33 Mass.  App. Ct.  18, 26  (1992); Shuman  v. The  Stanley
          ____                                      ______     ____________

          Works, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 951 (1991).
          _____

                    In  sum, we  find that  the district court  applied the

          correct  legal  standards and  did  not abuse  its  discretion in

                                         -5-

          dismissing   Osborne's  complaint  for  insufficient  service  of

          process.  Affirmed.
                    ________

                                         -6-