Court Opinion

ID: 9563798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:47:24.416736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:04.801013
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J.
I dissent. Rejecting the analysis and clear holding of a recent United States Supreme Court decision directly on point, the majority embarks on its own application and interpretation of federal precedent with barely a nod to the contrary approach taken by the high court in Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412 [89 L.Ed.2d 410, 106 S.Ct. 1135], There, *618the United States Supreme Court held that neither Fifth nor Sixth Amendment principles require suppression of confessions obtained after a valid voluntary waiver of Miranda rights by a defendant (see Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]), despite the fact that counsel for the defendant unsuccessfully sought access to his or her client during the course of the interrogation.
The majority reiterates the points urged by the Burbine dissenters and decides to “adhere in general” to their reasoning rather than to that of the majority. Acknowledging that normally this court does not “depart lightly from clear United States Supreme Court rulings,” my colleagues nonetheless determine that this is an “appropriate case” in which to do so. In adopting the arguments urged by the Burbine dissent on the ground that this best vindicates Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights “as they apply in California,” the majority here of necessity in large part rejects the United States Supreme Court majority’s interpretation of its own precedent. (See ante, at pp. 607-609 [majority’s recitation of Burbine dissenters’ views].) I find the majority’s asserted rationale unpersuasive.
The Burbine majority opinion sets forth the principles to which I believe we should adhere. I do not intend to review them here, but I wish to emphasize various points which I believe highlight the weaknesses in the views adopted by my colleagues.
In the present case, defendant was read his Miranda rights at least two or, according to some testimony, three times. The first reading was in a car en route to the police station immediately following defendant’s arrest. Thereafter, defendant was advised of his rights before interrogation at the police station. At the station, these rights were read to him as follows: “You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to answer my questions or talk to me. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you wish. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements.” In other words, defendant was clearly told he had a right to have counsel present and that he could exercise that right at any time.
Defendant confirmed his understanding of his rights and his desire to waive them. I agree that, as the trial judge found, “beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty” defendant’s subsequent confession was made freely and voluntarily. The invalidity of the confession found by my colleagues rests not upon any initial impropriety in obtaining defendant’s *619waiver, but rather upon the failure of the police to interrupt interrogation to reiterate defendant’s right to counsel and to inform him that an attorney was present who was willing to speak with him. Nothing further occurred in the interrogation room which enhanced or altered the “coercive” nature of the police interrogation.
Both federal and state Constitutions use strikingly similar language to provide that criminal defendants shall not be compelled to be witnesses against themselves. (U.S. Const., Amend. V; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) In Miranda, the court concluded that because custodial interrogations were inherently coercive (384 U.S. at p. 467 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 719]), if no attorney was present during interrogation, the prosecution bears the “heavy burden” of proving that a defendant’s waiver of his rights was knowing and intelligent (id. at p. 475 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 724]).
No precise line divides a voluntary statement from an involuntary one, or a knowing and intelligent waiver from one which is not. Of course, in certain instances all would agree that a statement was involuntary or a waiver was not knowing and intelligent. For example, if the police physically abuse a suspect to elicit a confession, that confession is undoubtedly involuntary, and its admission at trial would violate the Fifth Amendment. Whether a particular Miranda waiver is knowing and intelligent, however, must be based upon ‘“the particular facts and circumstances, surrounding [the] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ ” (North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 [60 L.Ed.2d 286, 293, 99 S.Ct. 1755], quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 [82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466, 58 S.Ct. 1019].)
The United States Supreme Court’s test for a knowing and intelligent waiver speaks to the subjective mental attitude of the suspect when he is deciding to waive his rights. Thus, if a suspect is young (see Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 724-726 [61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212-213, 99 S.Ct. 2560]), illiterate (see Tague v. Louisiana (1980) 444 U.S. 469 [62 L.Ed.2d 622, 100 S.Ct. 652], on remand 381 So.2d 507), or mentally deficient (see Henry v. Dees (5th Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 406, 409-410; Jurek v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1979) 593 F.2d 672, 677, rehg. en banc (1980) 623 F.2d 929, cert, den. (1981) 450 U.S. 1001 [68 L.Ed.2d 203, 101 S.Ct. 1709]), his Miranda waiver is more likely to be held invalid. Here, however, defendant was a 28-year-old businessman who apparently had regular dealings with lawyers. But for the subsequent appearance of an attorney, no one would have questioned his ability to fully comprehend and evaluate his rights and to waiver them.
Waivers have also been found invalid where the police used trickery to mislead the suspect about the meaning of the rights or the consequences of *620waiving them. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 476 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 725]; cf. Fuentes v. Moran (1st Cir. 1984) 733 F.2d 176, 181 [no trickery in failure to inform suspect being interrogated that attorney was asking to see him].) In such cases, the police, by distorting the meaning of the warnings, vitiate their ability to mitigate sufficiently the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation. As noted, there is no question here that defendant was fully and properly advised of his rights before his interrogation commenced.
What then was the supposedly critical factor here? An attorney appeared asking to speak with defendant, who had already knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to consult with counsel and to have counsel present during his interrogation. In my view, such an appearance is not so significant as to require termination of the interrogation. A suspect ideally may want to know many things before deciding whether to waive his rights, including the nature of the crime for which he is being investigated, the penalty for the offense, the strength of the People’s case against him, the presence of a lawyer in the stationhouse, and countless other matters.1 While a suspect armed with all this knowledge could make a more informed decision whether to waive his rights, Miranda simply does not require such disclosure. (See United States v. Dorsey (1978) 192 App.D.C. 313 [591 F.2d 922, 932] [valid waiver may occur even though suspect has less information than an attorney might require before offering a legal opinion]; Carter v. Garrison (4th Cir. 1981) 656 F.2d 68, 70, cert. den. 455 U.S. 952 [71 L.Ed.2d 668, 102 S.Ct. 1458] [“police have no duty, as part of the Miranda warnings, to inform a suspect of the crime which they are investigating”].) Miranda seeks to strike a reasonable balance between the rights of the suspect and the duties of the interrogator.
If the suspect understands his constitutional rights and the consequences of waiving them, and if the police have not heightened the inherently coercive nature of the custodial interrogation, then the suspect’s waiver is valid. As Professor Kamisar has observed, “It is hard to believe that in the course of writing a 60-page opinion based on the premise that police-issued warnings *621can adequately protect a suspect’s rights the [Miranda] court would [next maintain] that such warnings are insufficient when, but only when, a suspect’s lawyer is not allowed to consult with him—that even though a suspect has been emphatically and unequivocally advised of his rights and insists on talking, what he says is inadmissible when ... a lawyer whose services he has not required has, unbeknown to hint, entered the picture.” (Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions (1980) at p. 217, fn. 94.) This is precisely the result rejected in Burbine.
The appearance of a lawyer at the stationhouse does not increase a suspect’s need to invoke his rights. Neither does an attorney’s presence lessen the People’s need to gather the facts, a legitimate factor which should be weighed in the equation but which is essentially ignored by the majority. (See Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 477-478 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 725-726].) As Professor Kamisar maintains “There is not even a weak congruence—indeed, there is no congruence at all—between a defense lawyer’s entry into the proceeding and a suspect’s need for ‘a lawyer’s help’ or the government’s need for evidence. Whatever its symbolic value, a rule that turns on how soon a defense lawyer appears at the police station . . . hardly seems a rational way of reconciling the interests of the accused with those of society.” (Kamisar, supra, at p. 220, fn. omitted.)
The unfairness, illogic, and arbitrariness of the majority’s rule is demonstrated by the following hypothetical. Assume the police simultaneously arrest three suspects (A, B and C) of the same age, background and ability. Each is brought to the same police station and put in a separate identical interrogation room. Each is advised of his Miranda rights in the same terms and each understands and agrees to waive those rights. Each is specifically advised of his right to have an attorney present during interrogation, or to have one appointed before interrogation begins if he cannot afford an attorney. Further, each is advised he may exercise these rights and refuse to answer questions at any time during the interrogation. Let us assume at this point each of the suspects’ waivers is knowing and intelligent. As questioning commences, friends of suspect A retain an attorney for him. The attorney arrives at the station and asks to speak to A. Friends of suspect B retain an attorney for him, but are mistaken about where B is being held and the attorney goes to the wrong police station or decides to wait until the next day to investigate further. No attorney is retained for suspect C. Nothing inside any of the interrogation rooms changes. Should the mere appearance of an attorney retained by friends of suspect A change the way we view the validity of each of the suspects’ waivers? Are the waivers of suspects B and C more knowing and intelligent and hence more valid because no attorney has arrived to represent them?
*622Even if an attorney’s ready availability is the crucial fact the majority holds it to be, then a constitutional right to be advised of his presence should not depend on fortuity. If those suspects with retained counsel who appear in the course of interrogation cannot knowingly and intelligently waive their Miranda rights, then, a priori, those without the funds or sophistication or friends to retain counsel cannot knowingly and intelligently waive their rights. Presumably, one of the reasons behind Miranda was the egalitarian notion that all suspects should know of their rights, not only the sophisticated or intelligent suspect. The majority proposes a rule that is not only illogical, but also unduly favors the wealthy or sophisticated suspect over the poor or ignorant one, and in the final analysis a rule that is built on happenstance rather than equality.2
The analysis of the New Jersey Supreme Court regarding the effect of proper waivers is persuasive. “[I]f a defendant was given the Miranda warnings, if the coercion of custodial interrogation was thus dissipated, his ‘waiver’ was no less ‘voluntary’ and ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ because he misconceived the inculpatory thrust of the facts he admitted, or because he thought that what he said could not be used because it was only oral or because he had his fingers crossed, or because he could well have used a lawyer. A man need not have the understanding of a lawyer to waive one. Such matters, irrelevant when the defendant volunteers his confession to a friend or to a policeman passing on his beat, are equally irrelevant when the confession is made in custody after the coercion of custodial interrogation has been dispelled by the Miranda warnings. With such warnings, the essential fact remains that defendant understood he had the right to remain silent and thereby to avoid the risk of self-incrimination. ” (State v. McKnight (1968) 52 N.J. 35 [243 A.2d 240, 251-252].)
The right against self-incrimination is a personal right. To that end, Miranda and its progeny seek to avoid improper coercion which results in an individual giving up his right involuntarily and unknowingly. The majority rule here, however, focuses on the anteroom of the interrogation room and the activities of others outside the suspect’s purview, and effectively imports those extraneous activities into the interrogation room itself despite the *623individual suspect’s avowed desire to forego the assistance of those outside the room. What is next? Must suspects be warned when they are about to give a statement which conclusively incriminates them? Must a suspect in the interrogation room be informed that a key witness has suddenly died without making a formal statement implicating him?
Another cited basis for the majority’s holding is the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right which “is analytically distinct from the Fifth Amendment right created by Miranda. Rhode Island v. Innis [(1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300, fn. 4].” (United States v. Karr (9th Cir. 1984) 742 F.2d 493, 495.) Generally, the Sixth Amendment right attaches only “‘at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’ [Citation.]” (United States v. Gouveia (1984) 467 U.S. 180, 188 [81 L.Ed.2d 146, 154, 104 S.Ct. 2292].) In Gouveia, the court explained that both the language and purpose of the Sixth Amendment were served by attaching the right to counsel only when adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated. The language of the amendment requires both a “criminal prosecution” and an “accused.” Furthermore, the court stated, the “‘core purpose’ of the counsel guarantee is to assure aid at trial, ‘when the accused [is] confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 188-189 [81 L.Ed.2d at pp. 154-155].)
It follows, then, that custodial interrogation prior to initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings does not present the dangers against which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is aimed. It is true that custodial interrogation, even prior to charge, does present the danger that the defendant will feel compelled to incriminate himself. That, however, is a concern of the Fifth Amendment, not the Sixth.
The majority ignores not only Gouveia, but every relevant Supreme Court decision in at least a decade that interprets the Sixth Amendment. Instead, the majority invokes the outmoded holdings in Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], and People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338, 348 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361] (cert. den. 381 U.S. 937 [14 L.Ed.2d 702, 85 S.Ct. 1765]) to support the proposition that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies here. (See, e.g., ante, p. 610, fn. 14.) In Escobedo, the court found constitutional error when the police, during interrogation, refused a defendant’s repeated requests for assistance of counsel and neglected to advise him of his right to remain silent. Footnote 35 of Miranda described the police conduct in Escobedo as a Sixth Amendment violation. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 466, fn. 35 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 719].) As it had in prior cases, the court in Gouveia *624reiterated that, in retrospect, there were no Sixth Amendment interests at stake in either Escobedo or Miranda. In Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. 412, — [89 L.Ed.2d 410, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1145], the court made it crystal clear that “subsequent decisions foreclose any reliance on Escobedo and Miranda for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment right, in any of its manifestations, applies prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings.”
In face of this incontrovertible description by the United States Supreme Court of its own precedent, the majority inexplicably relies on now-rejected interpretations of the federal Sixth Amendment right and follows a similar course to that taken in People v. Bustamante (1981) 30 Cal.3d 88 [177 Cal.Rptr. 576, 634 P.2d 927]. There, this court declined to follow the holding of Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 406 U.S. 682 [32 L.Ed.2d 411, 92 S.Ct. 1877], in which a plurality of the high court held that counsel was not required until “the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings.” It therefore concluded there is no federal right to counsel at preindictment lineups. A majority of our court held, however, that such a right nonetheless existed independently under the California Constitution. (People v. Bustamante, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 98-99.)
As a general rule, I take exception to basing holdings such as this on independent state constitutional grounds where the language of the applicable provisions is almost identical to the federal Constitution, and without some greater showing of an independent state interest needing additional protection.3 Any argument for such holdings is further weakened in this case by the majority’s failure to realize that the guaranties of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which it invokes in its extension of rights here, protect the rights of individuals accused or suspected of crimes. They do not exist in the abstract to proscribe any police conduct of which the majority disapproves. In Bustamante, the defendant sought and was refused the right to counsel at the preindictment lineup. (Id. at p. 93.) Here, of course, defendant had waived his right to counsel; counsel would have been present had defendant requested such assistance. Nothing the police did after the initial valid waiver increased the coerciveness of the interrogation. Defendant’s Miranda waiver remained constant and valid throughout. Similarly, neither the retention nor the arrival of Attorney Gowdy magically trans*625formed the interrogation into a critical phase of an adversary judicial proceeding. Therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel never attached and, even if it had, it had been knowingly and intelligently and sufficiently waived.
The majority reasons backwards from the police conduct it wishes to proscribe to the constitutional justifications it declares proscribes that conduct. One consequence of this reasoning is to invest lawyers with an absolute right to see defendants and to interrupt an on-going interrogation. My colleagues argue, as did the Burbine dissent, that the conduct at issue here involved “‘information’ [withheld] by the police [which] bears directly on the right to counsel that police are asking the suspect to waive.” (Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at p. —, fn. 42 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 443, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1160]; ante, p. 612, fn. 18.) This view presupposes that counsel may affirmatively invoke the “right” to communicate with the suspect. It ignores the fact that in such instances the defendant has waived his right to speak with counsel and to have counsel present.
As noted, I fail to see the difference between a case where counsel has been retained but does not arrive at the police station while his client, who has validly waived his right to counsel, is being interrogated, and a case where the counsel does arrive, insisting on counsel’s “right” to speak to the suspect. The majority concludes that “If the lawyer comes to the station before interrogation begins or while it is still in progress, the suspect must promptly be told, and if he then wishes to see his counsel, he must be allowed to do so.” (Ante, p. 610.) I can think of no other instance where a constitutional right is dependent upon the arrival of a third person at a fortuitous moment. The right to counsel previously has equally attached for all defendants in the same manner at various critical stages of the adversary judicial process. Apparently now, however, the right to counsel as well as the right against self-incrimination take on new dimensions and afford additional protection to a select group of defendants for whom counsel, unbeknownst to and unsolicited by them, has arrived outside the interrogation room door.
As the court repeated in Burbine, “Custodial interrogations implicate two competing concerns. On the one hand, ‘the need for police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws’ cannot be doubted. [Citation.] Admissions of guilt are more than merely ‘desirable,’ [citation]; they are essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting and punishing those who violate the law. On the other hand, the Court has recognized that the interrogation process is ‘inherently coercive’ and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitutionally impermissible pompulsion. [Citation.]” (475 U.S. at *626p. — [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 424, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1144].) Justice Traynor explained the importance of these factors well in his concurring opinion in People v. Garner (1961) 57 Cal.2d 135, 162-164 [18 Cal.Rptr. 40, 367 P.2d 680]: “The perpetrator of a crime is normally the one who knows most about it, and his confession, voluntarily made, is often the best evidence of his guilt that can be obtained. [Citations.] Only overwhelming social policies can justify the exclusion of such vital evidence .... [1Í] So long as the methods used comply with due process standards, it is in the public interest for the police to encourage confessions and admissions during interrogation.” (Fn. omitted.)
The majority fails to accord any weight to that “public interest.” In reaching their goal, my colleagues cite no “overwhelming social policy” mandating their result, nor do they ever squarely confront the inherently uneven application of the “right” they now adopt. Rather than advancing the interests of suspects based on independent California constitutional grounds, I believe that the majority here diminishes those interests overall by affording different treatment to different suspects despite the fact that all affected suspects have knowingly and voluntarily waived their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The majority seemingly takes this route in an effort to regulate police conduct of which it disapproves. But the regulation of such conduct beyond that required by the federal and state Constitutions is an appropriate matter for the Legislature, not for the courts.
I find no basis in either the federal or state Constitutions for the rule adopted today and, therefore, I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 4, 1986. Panelli, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Defendant in the present case was in fact apprised of the charges against him, the penalty for the offense, and the evidence the police had to tie him to the crime. The majority relies on the Burbine dissent’s assertion that the failure there did not involve simply “useful” information, but rather amounted to “affirmative police interference in a communication between an attorney and a suspect.” (Burbine, 475 U.S. at p. —, fn. 42 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 443, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1160]; see ante, at p. 612, fn. 18.) This ignores the fact that the defendant in this case had already rejected the opportunity to communicate with and have counsel present; the “communication” involved thus was a one-way street, from an attorney seeking access to a suspect who had already waived his right to talk with him. The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is the individual suspect’s right, not his attorney’s.

The majority argues that I am using the doctrine of equal protection improperly; it is a shield against discriminatory treatment, not a sword with which to deprive an accused of his due. (See ante, p. 611, fn. omitted.) The point is, however, that equal protection must be afforded to all; every suspect is entitled to be advised of the same rights and to exercise or waive those rights as he sees fit. As discussed above, the majority’s rule places different suspects in different positions dependent upon whether a particular suspect has friends or relatives who, despite the suspect’s own waiver of counsel, decide to employ counsel who arrives at the police station before interrogation terminates. Woe to the suspect whose colleagues and friends respect his wishes or are unable to afford counsel willing to arrive at the police station in rapid fashion.

Despite the majority’s suggestion that this approach is “novel and ambiguous” (see ante, p. 609, fn. 13), the idea that this court should not easily depart from federal interpretation of similar constitutional language has frequently been suggested by others. (See, e.g., Allen v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 520, 537 [134 Cal.Rptr. 774, 557 P.2d 65] [dis. opn. by Clark, J.]; People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 118-121 [127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272] [dis. opn. by Richardson, J.].) It is the majority’s suggestion that adherence to federal precedent “puts the cart before the horse” that is contrary to long established procedure.