Court Opinion

ID: 9945366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 19:01:46.969725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:27.595325
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-9514            Document: 010111006052   Date Filed: 02/27/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                     FILED
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                             PUBLISH                             Tenth Circuit

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      February 27, 2024
                                                                            Christopher M. Wolpert
                                 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                             _________________________________

  STATE OF OKLAHOMA, by and through
  its Attorney General; GENTNER F
  DRUMMOND; OKLAHOMA
  DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
  QUALITY,

         Petitioners,

  v.                                                             No. 23-9514

  U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
  AGENCY; MICHAEL S. REGAN,
  Administrator, United States
  Environmental Protection Agency,

         Respondents.

  ------------------------------

  SIERRA CLUB; HEALTHY
  ENVIRONMENT ALLIANCE OF UTAH;
  CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
  DIVERSITY; DOWNWINDERS AT
  RISK; UTAH PHYSICIANS FOR A
  HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT;
  SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS
  ALLIANCE; CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,

         Amici Curiae.

  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

  OKLAHOMA GAS & ELECTRIC
  COMPANY,

         Petitioner,
Appellate Case: 23-9514            Document: 010111006052   Date Filed: 02/27/2024   Page: 2

  v.                                                             No. 23-9521

  UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
  PROTECTION AGENCY; MICHAEL S.
  REGAN, Administrator, United States
  Environmental Protection Agency,

         Respondents.

  ------------------------------

  SIERRA CLUB; HEALTHY
  ENVIRONMENT ALLIANCE OF UTAH;
  CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
  DIVERSITY; DOWNWINDERS AT
  RISK; UTAH PHYSICIANS FOR A
  HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT;
  SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS
  ALLIANCE; CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,

         Amici Curiae.

  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

  TULSA CEMENT LLC, d/b/a Central
  Plains Cement Company LLC; REPUBLIC
  PAPERBOARD COMPANY LLC,

         Petitioners,

  v.                                                             No. 23-9533

  UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
  PROTECTION AGENCY; MICHAEL S.
  REGAN, Administrator, United States
  Environmental Protection Agency,

         Respondent.

  ------------------------------

  SIERRA CLUB; HEALTHY

                                                 2
Appellate Case: 23-9514            Document: 010111006052   Date Filed: 02/27/2024   Page: 3

  ENVIRONMENT ALLIANCE OF UTAH;
  CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
  DIVERSITY; DOWNWINDERS AT
  RISK; UTAH PHYSICIANS FOR A
  HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT;
  SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS
  ALLIANCE; CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,

         Amici Curiae.

  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

  WESTERN FARMERS ELECTRIC
  COOPERATIVE,

         Petitioner,

  v.                                                             No. 23-9534

  UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
  PROTECTION AGENCY; MICHAEL S.
  REGAN, Administrator, United States
  Environmental Protection Agency,

         Respondents.

  ------------------------------

  SIERRA CLUB; HEALTHY
  ENVIRONMENT ALLIANCE OF UTAH;
  CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
  DIVERSITY; DOWNWINDERS AT
  RISK; UTAH PHYSICIANS FOR A
  HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT;
  SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS
  ALLIANCE; CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,

         Amici Curiae.

  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

  STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
  Governor, Spencer J. Cox, and its Attorney

                                                 3
Appellate Case: 23-9514            Document: 010111006052   Date Filed: 02/27/2024   Page: 4

  General, Sean D. Reyes,

         Petitioner,

  v.                                                             No. 23-9509

  UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
  PROTECTION AGENCY; MICHAEL S.
  REGAN, Administrator, United States
  Environmental Protection Agency,

          Respondents.

  ------------------------------

  SIERRA CLUB; HEALTHY
  ENVIRONMENT ALLIANCE OF UTAH;
  CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
  DIVERSITY; DOWNWINDERS AT
  RISK; UTAH PHYSICIANS FOR A
  HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT;
  SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS
  ALLIANCE; CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,

         Amici Curiae.

  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

  PACIFICORP; DESERET GENERATION
  & TRANSMISSION CO-OPERATIVE;
  UTAH MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY,

         Petitioners,

  v.                                                             No. 23-9512

  UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
  PROTECTION AGENCY; MICHAEL S.
  REGAN, Administrator, United States
  Environmental Protection Agency,

         Respondents.

                                                 4
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  ------------------------------

  SIERRA CLUB; HEALTHY
  ENVIRONMENT ALLIANCE OF UTAH;
  CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
  DIVERSITY; DOWNWINDERS AT
  RISK; UTAH PHYSICIANS FOR A
  HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT;
  SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS
  ALLIANCE; CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,

         Amici Curiae.

  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

  UTAH ASSOCIATED MUNICIPAL
  POWER SYSTEMS,

         Petitioner,

  v.                                                             No. 23-9520

  UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
  PROTECTION AGENCY; MICHAEL S.
  REGAN, Administrator, United States
  Environmental Protection Agency,

         Respondents.

  ------------------------------

  SIERRA CLUB; HEALTHY
  ENVIRONMENT ALLIANCE OF UTAH;
  CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
  DIVERSITY; DOWNWINDERS AT
  RISK; UTAH PHYSICIANS FOR A
  HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT;
  SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS
  ALLIANCE; CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE,

         Amici Curiae.

                                                 5
Appellate Case: 23-9514     Document: 010111006052        Date Filed: 02/27/2024     Page: 6

                          _________________________________

                        Petitions for Review of Orders From the
                           Environmental Protection Agency
                         (EPA Nos. EPA-R08-OAR-2022-315 &
                              EPA-R06-OAR-2021-0801 &
                               EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0663)
                         _________________________________

 Submitted without oral argument: *

 Gentner F. Drummond, Attorney General, Garry M. Gaskins II, Solicitor General, Zach
 West, Director of Special Litigation, Jennifer L. Lewis, Assistant Attorney General,
 Office of the Attorney General, State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for
 Petitioners State of Oklahoma, Gentner F. Drummond, and Oklahoma Department of
 Environmental Quality.

 Megan H. Berge, Sarah Douglas, Baker Botts L.L.P., Michael B. Schon, Lehotsky Keller
 LLP, Washington, D.C.; J. Mark Little, Baker Botts L.L.P., Houston, Texas, for
 Petitioner Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company.

 Emily C. Schilling, Holland & Hart LLP, Salt Lake City, Utah; Kristina R. Van Bockern,
 Aaron B. Tucker, Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, Colorado; Sean D. Reyes, Attorney
 General of Utah, Melissa Holyoak, Solicitor General, Salt Lake City, Utah; William L.
 Wehrum, Wehrum Environmental Law LLC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner State of
 Utah.

 Misha Tseytlin, Kevin M. LeRoy, Emily A. O’Brien, Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders
 LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Carroll Wade McGuffey III, Melissa Horne, Troutman Pepper
 Hamilton Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia; Marie Bradshaw Durrant, Christian C.
 Stephens, PacifiCorp, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Petitioner PacifiCorp.

 Steven J. Christiansen, David C. Reymann, Parr Brown Gee & Loveless, Salt Lake City,
 Utah, for Petitioner Deseret Generation & Transmission Cooperative.

 Alan I. Robbins, Debra D. Roby, Thomas B. Steiger III, Washington Energy Law LLP,
 Washington, D.C., for Petitioner Utah Municipal Power Agency.

       *
          After examining the motions, responses, replies, and supplemental authority, this
 panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the
 determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case
 is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
                                             6
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 H. Michael Keller, Artemis D. Vamianakis, Fabian VanCott; Emily L. Wegener, Utah
 Associated Municipal Power Systems, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Petitioner Utah
 Associated Municipal Power Systems.

 Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General, Alexandra L. St. Romain, Attorney, U.S.
 Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division; Rosemary
 Hambright Kaban, Daniel P. Schramm, Office of the General Counsel, U.S.
 Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.
                         _________________________________

 Before MORITZ, EBEL, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 MORITZ, Circuit Judge.
                     _________________________________

           In a February 2023 final rule, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

 disapproved state implementation plans (SIPs) from 21 states across the country because

 those states all failed to adequately address their contributions to air-quality problems in

 downwind states. These seven petitions seek review of that final rule: Oklahoma and

 various industry groups challenge the EPA’s decision to disapprove Oklahoma’s SIP;

 Utah and other industry groups challenge the disapproval of Utah’s SIP. But the EPA has

 moved to dismiss or transfer the petitions to the D.C. Circuit under the Clean Air Act’s

 judicial-review provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), which assigns to the D.C. Circuit any

 petition seeking review of a “nationally applicable” agency action. And because we agree

 with the EPA that the challenged rule is nationally applicable, we grant the EPA’s

 motions in part, to transfer the petitions to the D.C. Circuit, and thus do not reach the

 merits.

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                                        Background

        The Clean Air Act establishes “a cooperative-federalism approach to regulate air

 quality.” U.S. Magnesium, LLC v. EPA, 690 F.3d 1157, 1159 (10th Cir. 2012). The Act

 directs the EPA to establish and periodically revise National Ambient Air Quality

 Standards (NAAQS), which represent “the maximum airborne concentration[s] of

 [certain air] pollutant[s] that the public health can tolerate.” West Virginia v. EPA, 597

 U.S. 697, 707 (2022) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465

 (2001)). After the EPA revises or sets a new air-quality standard, the agency must

 designate geographic regions around the country as areas of “attainment” or

 “nonattainment” (or label them “unclassifiable”). 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1); see also EPA v.

 EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 498 (2014). The burden then shifts to

 the states to each adopt and submit for the EPA’s approval a SIP that will implement,

 maintain, and enforce the NAAQS within its boundaries. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1);

 EME Homer City, 572 U.S. at 498. But because air pollutants travel with the wind,

 “heedless of state boundaries,” emissions in upwind states can threaten a downwind

 state’s ability to attain and maintain the NAAQS. EME Homer City, 572 U.S. at 496. To

 tackle this complex interstate pollution problem, the Act includes a good-neighbor

 provision requiring each SIP to prohibit emissions that will “contribute significantly to

 nonattainment” or “interfere with maintenance” in any other state. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i).

        In 2015, the EPA tightened the NAAQS for ozone. See National Ambient Air

 Quality Standards for Ozone, 80 Fed. Reg. 65292 (Oct. 26, 2015). This revision triggered

 each state’s duty to submit a SIP to implement the 2015 ozone NAAQS. See

                                               8
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 § 7410(a)(1). In February 2023, the EPA issued a final rule disapproving SIPs submitted

 by 21 states because those states all failed to meet their good-neighbor obligations. See

 Air Plan Disapprovals; Interstate Transport of Air Pollution for the 2015 8-Hour Ozone

 National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 88 Fed. Reg. 9336 (Feb. 13, 2023) [hereinafter

 Air Plan Disapprovals]. 2 In evaluating these SIPs, the EPA applied a four-step framework

 it developed to implement the good-neighbor provision. See id. at 9338. Under this

 framework, the EPA (1) identifies downwind areas expected to have problems attaining

 or maintaining the relevant NAAQS; (2) determines which upwind states contribute to

 these identified problems in amounts sufficient to link them to the downwind air-quality

 problems; (3) identifies the emissions reductions necessary to eliminate each linked

 upwind state’s significant contribution to downwind nonattainment through a multifactor

 analysis; and (4) adopts enforceable control measures to achieve those reductions. Id. In

 applying the framework, the EPA also considered any alternative approach states

 proposed in their SIPs “with an eye to ensuring national consistency.” Id. at 9338, 9381.

        Here, two such states—Oklahoma and Utah, joined by various industry groups—

 have petitioned for review of the final rule, challenging the EPA’s decision to disapprove

 their SIPs. The EPA responded by moving to dismiss or transfer the petitions to the D.C.

 Circuit under § 7607(b)(1). 3 We stayed the Oklahoma and Utah SIP disapprovals pending

        2
           We note that as to two of these 21 states, Minnesota and Wisconsin, the EPA
 partially approved and partially disapproved the proposed SIPs. See Air Plan
 Disapprovals, 88 Fed. Reg. at 9336, 9354.
         3
           Utah and its industry groups suggest in a footnote that the EPA’s motion to
 dismiss their petitions is untimely. In support, they note that under Tenth Circuit Rule
 27.3(A)(3)(a), a motion to dismiss “should be filed within 14 days after the notice of
                                              9
Appellate Case: 23-9514       Document: 010111006052          Date Filed: 02/27/2024      Page: 10

  our review and referred the EPA’s motions to the panel assigned to hear these cases on

  their merits.

                                             Analysis

         The EPA argues that we must dismiss or transfer the petitions to the D.C. Circuit

  under the Clean Air Act’s judicial-review provision, which divides reviewable EPA

  actions into three categories and designates the proper forum for each. 4 See § 7607(b)(1).

  It provides that a petition for review of a “nationally applicable” final action “may be

  filed only in [the D.C. Circuit].” Id. By contrast, a petition for review of a “locally or

  regionally applicable” final action “may be filed only in the . . . appropriate [regional]

  circuit.” 5 Id. But if that “locally or regionally applicable” action “is based on a

  determination of nationwide scope or effect” and if the EPA, in taking that action, “finds

  appeal is filed, unless good cause is shown.” But we agree with the EPA that it has shown
  good cause for filing its March 16, 2023 motion slightly more than 14 days after Utah
  and its industry groups petitioned for review on February 13 and 23, 2023: various
  petitioners have sought review of the same final rule in regional circuit courts across the
  country, and the “EPA has acted as expeditiously as practicable in moving to [dismiss or]
  transfer these cases [to the D.C. Circuit] in a coordinated fashion.” EPA Utah Mot. 2 n.1.
          4
            We need not decide whether § 7607(b)(1) is a jurisdictional or venue provision.
  See ATK Launch Sys., Inc. v. EPA, 651 F.3d 1194, 1196 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011). For our
  purposes, it is enough that the provision is mandatory and that the EPA invokes it here.
  See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (explaining that nonjurisdictional
  claim-processing rules “assure relief to a party properly raising them”).
          5
            We reject petitioners’ cursory suggestion that § 7607(b)(1), by its text, assigns all
  petitions challenging a SIP disapproval to the regional circuits. The statute merely
  provides that “[a] petition for review of the [EPA]’s action in approving or promulgating
  any implementation plan . . . or any other final action . . . (including any denial or
  disapproval . . .) which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the . . .
  appropriate [regional] circuit.” § 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). It does not, as petitioners
  assert, say that any such approval, promulgation, denial, or disapproval is locally or
  regionally applicable.
                                                10
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  and publishes that such action is based on such a determination,” then the petition “may

  be filed only in the [D.C. Circuit].” Id.

         Under the statute’s plain text, then, whether a petition for review belongs in the

  D.C. Circuit turns exclusively on the nature of the challenged agency action. See ATK

  Launch Sys., 651 F.3d at 1197. We must therefore ask whether the action itself is

  “nationally applicable” or “locally or regionally applicable.” Id. (quoting § 7607(b)(1)).

  And in answering that question, we look only to the face of the action, not its practical

  effects or the scope of the petitioner’s challenge. Id.

         On its face, the final EPA action being challenged here is nationally applicable.

  Petitioners seek review of a final rule disapproving SIPs from 21 states across the

  country—spanning eight EPA regions and ten federal judicial circuits—because those

  states all failed to comply with the good-neighbor provision. See Air Plan Disapprovals,

  88 Fed. Reg. at 9380. And in promulgating that rule, the EPA applied a uniform statutory

  interpretation and common analytical methods, which required the agency to examine the

  overlapping and interwoven linkages between upwind and downwind states in a

  consistent manner. Id. Because a final action with these features is “nationally

  applicable” under § 7607(b)(1), judicial review is proper only in the D.C. Circuit. See

  ATK Launch Sys., 651 F.3d at 1197.

         Seeking to avoid this conclusion, petitioners urge us to view the 21 SIP

  disapprovals in the final rule as separate, locally or regionally applicable agency actions.

  They maintain that each of their seven petitions challenges just one such action: either the

  Oklahoma SIP disapproval or Utah SIP disapproval. Those final SIP disapprovals,

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  petitioners say, turned on state-specific facts and grew out of several proposed rules

  signed by regional administrators. And in petitioners’ view, the EPA cannot transform a

  locally or regionally applicable SIP disapproval into a nationally applicable action by

  deciding to “packag[e] it together with 20 other SIP disapprovals” in a single final rule.

  Utah Resp. 13.

         But petitioners’ arguments collide with § 7607(b)(1)’s plain text, which directs

  courts to consider only the face of the “final action,” establishing an action-focused

  method for determining the proper forum for judicial review. It is simply not material to

  the analysis that the EPA issued several proposed rules or that it could have chosen to

  issue standalone final SIP disapprovals. What matters is the nature of the agency’s final

  action. See ATK Launch Sys., 651 F.3d at 1197. And here, that action is a nationally

  applicable final rule, signed by the EPA administrator, disapproving SIPs from 21 states

  across the country—not just one—because those states failed to meet their good-neighbor

  obligations.

         Nor is it material that petitioners each purport to challenge only one such SIP

  disapproval. By its terms, § 7607(b)(1) “assigns to the D.C. Circuit all challenges to

  ‘nationally applicable [final actions],’ not, for instance, all national challenges or all

  challenges that will have a national effect.” Id. (quoting § 7607(b)(1)). Thus, we have

  made clear that “the manner in which a petitioner frames [their] challenge” does not

  “alter the court in which the [petition] belongs”; “[t]he nature of the [agency action], not

  the challenge, controls.” Id. And we are not alone in making this unremarkable

  observation. See, e.g., Hunt Refin. Co. v. EPA, 90 F.4th 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2024)

                                                12
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  (“When deciding whether a final action is ‘nationally applicable,’ we begin by ‘analyzing

  the nature of the EPA’s action, not the specifics of the petitioner’s grievance.” (quoting

  RMS of Ga., LLC v. EPA, 64 F.4th 1368, 1372 (11th Cir. 2023))); S. Ill. Power Coop. v.

  EPA, 863 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Under the straightforward (if wordy) statutory

  text [of § 7607(b)(1)], venue depends entirely on—and is fixed by—the nature of the

  agency’s action; the scope of the petitioner’s challenge has no role to play in determining

  venue.”); Sierra Club v. EPA, 926 F.3d 844, 849 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“The court need look

  only to the face of the agency action, not its practical effects, to determine whether an

  action is nationally applicable.”).

         We applied this action-focused approach in ATK Launch Systems. There, the

  petitioners sought review of a final EPA rule listing attainment and nonattainment

  designations for the NAAQS for fine particulate matter. 651 F.3d at 1195. Although the

  petitions challenged the nonattainment designations of only two counties in Utah, the rule

  “enumerate[d] designations for areas across the country.” Id. at 1195–96. The EPA

  moved to dismiss or transfer the petitions under § 7607(b)(1), arguing that they belonged

  in the D.C. Circuit because the rule was nationally applicable. Id. at 1196–97. We agreed,

  explaining the statute “makes clear that this court must analyze whether the [final action]

  itself is nationally applicable, not whether the effects complained of or the petitioner’s

  challenge to that [action] is nationally applicable.” Id. at 1197. Because the rule there

  applied “a uniform process and standard across the country” and “reache[d] geographic

  areas from coast to coast,” we held that it was nationally applicable and therefore

  transferred the petitions to the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 1197–98, 1200; see also Hunt, 90 F.4th

                                               13
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  at 1110-11 (holding that two EPA final actions were “nationally applicable” because they

  denied 105 small-refinery exemptions to refineries across the nation and because EPA

  applied “new statutory interpretation and analytical framework that is applicable to all

  small refineries no matter their location or market”); S. Ill. Power Coop., 863 F.3d at 671

  (holding that similar air-quality designation rule was “nationally applicable” because it

  was “a final rule of broad geographic scope” and “promulgated pursuant to a common,

  nationwide analytical method,” even though petitioners challenged only EPA’s

  designation of one Illinois county as nonattainment area). Here, too, the final rule is

  nationally applicable: it applies a consistent statutory interpretation and uniform

  analytical methods to disapprove SIPs from 21 states around the country. 6 See Air Plan

         6
           Petitioners attempt to distinguish ATK Launch Systems and Southern Illinois
  Power Cooperative by focusing on the nature of the statutory authority under which the
  EPA took the challenged actions. They highlight that the Clean Air Act assigns to the
  EPA the responsibility to make air-quality designations, and the states merely offer
  recommendations on how to designate areas within their boundaries. See
  § 7407(d)(1)(A)–(B). By contrast, petitioners note, the statute delegates to the states the
  responsibility to craft SIPs, and the EPA must approve such a plan if the agency
  determines that it is complete and meets all applicable requirements. See § 7410(a), (k).
  So according to petitioners, the EPA’s authority “differ[s] significantly” when the agency
  makes air-quality designations than when it approves or disapproves SIPs, with the EPA
  taking a more back-seat role when reviewing SIPs. Utah Resp. 19. But we discern no
  material distinction here. Whether an EPA action is nationally applicable does not turn on
  the “type” of statutory authority delegated to the agency, id. at 22; again, it depends
  entirely on the nature of the agency’s action, ATK Launch Sys., 651 F.3d at 1197. Thus,
  as the EPA points out, it is appropriate to challenge in a regional circuit court even a final
  action that sets air-quality designations if that action applies only locally or regionally.
  See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 983 F.3d 826, 832 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that final rule
  establishing attainment and nonattainment designations for counties in Texas was
  “‘locally or regionally applicable’ because it [wa]s directed only at . . . contiguous Texas
  counties” (quoting § 7607(b)(1))). But when a final action concerns states around the
  country and applies a common analytical method—as in ATK Launch Systems, Southern
  Illinois Power Cooperative, and this case—then the action is nationally applicable.
                                               14
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  Disapprovals, 88 Fed. Reg. at 9380. So any challenge to that rule belongs in the D.C.

  Circuit. See § 7607(b)(1).

         We recognize that the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits recently reached the

  contrary conclusion: each denied the EPA’s motions to transfer petitions challenging the

  same final rule at issue here. 7 See Texas v. EPA, No. 23-60069, 2023 WL 7204840, at *1

  (5th Cir. May 1, 2023) (unpublished); Kentucky v. EPA, No. 23-3216, slip op. at 6 (6th

  Cir. July 25, 2023); West Virginia v. EPA, 90 F.4th 323, 331 (4th Cir. 2024). But in our

  view, all three courts strayed from § 7607(b)(1)’s text and instead applied a petition-

  focused approach that we and other circuits have rejected. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit

  conceded that its own precedent recognizes “§ 7607(b)(1)’s use of ‘action’ means ‘the

  rule or other final action taken by the agency that the petitioner seeks to prevent or

  overturn.’” Texas, 2023 WL 7204840, at *3–4 (quoting Texas v. EPA, 829 F.3d 405, 419

  (5th Cir. 2016)). Nevertheless, rather than focusing its analysis on the face of the rule as

  is required, the Fifth Circuit focused on the nature of the petitions before it—which each

  challenged a single SIP disapproval contained in the final rule—to conclude that “the

  relevant unit of administrative action” was each individual SIP disapproval and that such

  disapprovals were “locally or regionally applicable.” Id. at *4. The Fourth and Sixth

  Circuits followed suit. See Kentucky, slip op. at 4 (following Texas and wrongly

  characterizing “EPA’s [disapproval] of Kentucky’s SIP,” not the final rule itself, as the

         7
          The Eighth Circuit also denied the EPA’s transfer motions, but it simply issued
  summary orders containing no analysis. See, e.g., Arkansas v. EPA, No. 23-1320 (8th Cir.
  Apr. 25, 2023).
                                               15
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  relevant “final action”); West Virginia, 90 F.4th at 330–31 (joining Texas and West

  Virginia and improperly framing “the relevant agency action” as “EPA’s disapproval of

  West Virginia’s SIP”).

         All three decisions generated strong dissents highlighting critical flaws in the

  majority opinions. In West Virginia, for example, the dissent sharply criticized the

  majority opinion for “jettison[ing the well-established] analysis altogether and instead

  look[ing] to the nature of West Virginia’s challenge to hold that the [f]inal [r]ule is

  locally applicable.” 90 F.4th at 334 (Thacker, J., dissenting). The dissent further pointed

  out that the decisions from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits likewise “depart[ed] from all

  relevant precedent,” including our decision in ATK Launch Systems, “without adequate

  justification or explanation.” Id. at 333–35; see also Kentucky, slip op. at 11–12 (Cole, J.,

  dissenting) (relying on ATK Launch Systems and other cases to explain that majority’s

  “limiting [of] the ‘action’ to Kentucky’s state-specific challenge is inappropriate” when

  “the ‘scope of the [final rule]’ is much broader” (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v.

  Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1988))); Texas, 2023 WL 7204840, at *11–12

  (Douglas, J., dissenting) (same). Moreover, this misdirected approach may well result in

  ten regional circuit courts ruling on issues arising from the same nationwide EPA rule,

  thereby defeating the statute’s purpose to centralize judicial review of nationally

  applicable actions in the D.C. Circuit. See Texas, 2023 WL 7204840, at *13 (Douglas, J.,

  dissenting); Kentucky, slip op. at 21 (Cole, J., dissenting).

         In short, because the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuit decisions denying the EPA’s

  transfer motions all depart from § 7607(b)(1)’s plain text and our binding precedent, we

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Appellate Case: 23-9514      Document: 010111006052         Date Filed: 02/27/2024     Page: 17

  decline to follow them. See Hunt, 90 F.4th at 1111-13 (distinguishing Texas and

  Kentucky and further disagreeing with Calumet Shreveport Refining, LLC v. EPA, 86

  F.4th 1121 (5th Cir. 2023), in which the Fifth Circuit held that two EPA final actions

  denying 105 small-refinery exemptions were locally or regionally applicable). And

  applying § 7607(b)(1) as written, we readily conclude that these petitions belong in the

  D.C. Circuit because they seek review of a nationally applicable final rule. 8

                                          Conclusion

         Because petitioners seek review of a nationally applicable final rule, we grant the

  EPA’s motions to dismiss or transfer in part and transfer the petitions to the D.C. Circuit.

         8
           Given this conclusion, we need not address the EPA’s alternative argument that
  the petitions belong in the D.C. Circuit even if the final action is “locally or regionally
  applicable” because it “is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” made
  and published by the EPA. § 7607(b)(1).
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