Court Opinion

ID: 9961623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 14:06:42.606935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:12.430998
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                     No. 23–0560

                  Submitted March 21, 2024—Filed April 19, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellee,

vs.

CHRISTOPHER JAMES WILSON,

      Appellant.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel,

Judge.

      The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence of two counts of inde-

cent exposure, arguing that the unit of prosecution is per exposure, not per

viewer; therefore, there was insufficient evidence to convict him on two separate

counts of indecent exposure. AFFIRMED.

      Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

      Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ashley Stewart, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.
                                          2

CHRISTENSEN, Justice.
      After masturbating in public within the view of two women, the defendant

was charged with two counts of indecent exposure under Iowa Code sec-

tion 709.9 (2022). On appeal, the defendant asserts the unit of prosecution for

indecent exposure is per exposure, not per viewer. As a result, the defendant

argues there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on two counts of

indecent exposure, thereby rendering the imposed sentence illegal. Finally, the

defendant argues that the district court did not state sufficient reasons for im-

posing a consecutive sentence under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d)

(2022).

      We hold that the unit of prosecution for indecent exposure is one count

per viewer, not one count per exposure. Thus, we affirm the defendant’s convic-

tion of two counts of indecent exposure. Additionally, the district court provided

sufficient reasoning for imposing a consecutive sentence; therefore, we affirm the

sentencing order of the district court.

      I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      On the evening of November 28, 2022, E.H. and T.A. arrived at a Hy-Vee

gas station at approximately 9:30 p.m. E.H. parked her vehicle by the front doors
of the gas station and attempted to go inside. The gas station was closed but

E.H. briefly spoke with the store attendant. When E.H. began to walk back to

her vehicle, T.A. told her to get into the car. E.H. and T.A. then saw the defend-

ant, Christopher James Wilson, approximately six feet away from the vehicle.

While making eye contact with E.H. and T.A., the defendant openly masturbated

with his penis pulled through a hole in his pants.

      E.H. and T.A. called 911. The two women remained on the line with the

dispatcher and moved their car to a nearby Hobby Lobby parking lot on the other
side of the gas station. After relocating, E.H. and T.A. could not see the defendant
                                         3

for a period of time. However, the defendant had followed them to the other side

of the gas station. He weaved in and around cars and continued walking toward

E.H. and T.A.’s vehicle. He eventually became visible, and the defendant again

openly masturbated while directly making eye contact with E.H. and T.A.

      The police arrived shortly thereafter. The two responding officers noted a

hole in the defendant’s pants that went from underneath the crotch area toward

the inner part of his right knee. The defendant was ultimately arrested and

charged with two counts of indecent exposure. After a jury trial, he was convicted

as charged on both counts. The defendant was sentenced to an enhanced sen-

tence under Iowa Code section 901A.2(1) to an indeterminate prison term of two

years for the first count and an indeterminate prison term of two years for the

second count. A special sentence was imposed under Iowa Code section 903B.2

for a period of ten years. The sentence for count one was ordered to run consec-

utive to the sentence for count two. The defendant timely appealed.

      II. Standards of Review.

      We review rulings on questions of statutory interpretation for correction of

errors at law. State v. Copenhaver, 844 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Iowa 2014). We will

uphold a verdict if there is substantial evidence in the record to support it.
State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180, 216 (Iowa 2013). Evidence is substantial

if, “when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can convince a rational

jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting State v.

Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012)).

      We are permitted to review a challenge that a sentence is illegal at any

time, and such a challenge is generally reviewed for correction of errors at law.

Jefferson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 926 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Iowa 2019). “An illegal sentence

is a sentence that is not permitted by statute.” Copenhaver, 844 N.W.2d at 447.
“It is well established in Iowa law that a single course of conduct can give rise to
                                        4

multiple charges and convictions.” State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572, 584 (Iowa

2013). If the legislature has criminalized “two separate and distinct acts, sepa-

rate sentences on each act are not illegal.” Copenhaver, 844 N.W.2d at 447.

Therefore, to determine what conduct the legislature has criminalized, we must

“ask what unit of prosecution the legislature intended in enacting the statute.”

Id.

      “We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion when the sen-

tence is within the statutory limits.” State v. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa

2018). A district court abuses its discretion if it “exercises its discretion on

grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Id. (quoting

State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa 2014)). “Grounds or reasons are

untenable if they are ‘based on an erroneous application of the law or not sup-

ported by substantial evidence.’ ” State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Iowa

2017) (quoting State v. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 675 (Iowa 2014)).

      III. Analysis.

      On appeal, the defendant argues that the unit of prosecution for indecent

exposure is one count per exposure, not one count per viewer. Thus, the defend-

ant argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of two counts of inde-
cent exposure, and therefore, the resulting sentence is illegal. The defendant also

contends that the district court abused its discretion by not properly stating its

reasons for ordering his sentences to run consecutively under Iowa Rule of Crim-

inal Procedure 2.23(3)(d). For the reasons expressed below, we hold that the unit

of prosecution for indecent exposure is per viewer and that the district court did

sufficiently state its reasoning for ordering the defendant’s sentences to run con-

secutively.

      A. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The defendant first argues that the unit
of prosecution for indecent exposure is one count per exposure, not one count
                                          5

per viewer. Thus, the defendant contends that the State did not present sufficient

evidence to sustain a conviction on two counts of indecent exposure under Iowa

Code section 709.9.

         1. Whether the unit of prosecution for indecent exposure is per exposure or

per viewer. To determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support the ver-

dict, we must determine what act Iowa Code section 709.9 criminalizes. Cf.

State v. Ross, 845 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Iowa 2014). Iowa Code section 709.9 pro-

vides:

               1. A person who exposes the person’s genitals or pubic area
         to another not the person’s spouse, or who commits a sex act in the
         presence of or view of a third person, commits a serious misde-
         meanor if all of the following apply:

                a. The person does so to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires
         of either party.

                b. The person knows or reasonably should know that the act
         is offensive to the viewer.

              2. a. A person who masturbates in public in the presence of
         another, not a child, commits a serious misdemeanor.

                b. A person who masturbates in public in the presence of a
         child commits an aggravated misdemeanor.

               c. For the purpose of this subsection, “masturbate” means
         physical stimulation of a person’s own genitals or pubic area for the
         purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the person, regardless
         of whether the genitals or pubic area is exposed or covered.

         We first “look to statutory language to determine what the legislature in-

tended as a ‘unit of prosecution’ for a particular crime.” Velez, 829 N.W.2d at 579

(collecting cases). A plain reading of the statute indicates the legislature intended

to criminalize three alternative acts that would constitute indecent exposure. The

first act is when a person exposes their genitals or pubic area to another who is

not the person’s spouse, with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires
of either party, and the person knew or reasonably should have known the act
                                        6

was offensive to the viewer. Id. § 709.9(1). The second act is when a person com-

mits a sex act in the presence or view of a third person with the intent to arouse

or satisfy the sexual desires of either party, and the person knew or reasonably

should have known the act was offensive to the viewer. Id. The third act is when

a person masturbates in the public presence of another. Id. § 709.9(2).

      We note that for all versions of the crime, it consists of the defendant ex-

posing themselves “to another” or masturbating “in the presence of another.”

Thus, we have previously held that indecent exposure is “essentially a visual

assault crime,” and to successfully convict a defendant, the state must produce

a victim who saw the exposure. State v. Isaac, 756 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 2008)

(quoting State v. Bauer, 337 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 1983) (en banc)). This is

because the legislature criminalized “only visual sexual assaults upon unwilling

viewers.” Bauer, 337 N.W.2d at 211. In addition, the unit of prosecution for this

visual assault crime is the act of doing something “to another,” not to “the world

generally,” “a person or persons,” “one or more persons,” or “any number of per-

sons.” This indicates each person—i.e., each “another”—who is a victim of the

indecent exposure amounts to a separate offense that can be prosecuted. There-

fore, we hold that the unit of prosecution for indecent exposure under Iowa Code
section 709.9(2)(a) is per viewer, not per exposure.

      Our holding is consistent with other jurisdictions that require a third per-

son to have witnessed the defendant’s exposure. See United States v. Lacy, 53

M.J. 509, 510 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (adopting a “different victims” standard

as the unit of prosecution for indecent exposure); cf. State v. Sandoval, 857 P.2d

395, 398–400 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (determining the allegation that a defendant

exposed his genitals in the presence of two minor females was sufficient to permit

a conviction of two counts of indecent exposure); Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz,
911 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (upholding a conviction on two counts
                                          7

of indecent exposure when the record showed two minor children observed the

defendant masturbating).

      There are many states that have defined the unit of prosecution for inde-

cent exposure as per exposure, not per viewer; however, unlike Iowa, these ju-

risdictions do not require a third person to view the exposure. See People v.

Smith, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 314, 317 (Ct. App. 2012) (“The language of the statute

prohibits the exposure itself and not the specific exposure to a person.”); Peo-

ple v. Vronko, 579 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam) (“For these

reasons, we hold that there is no requirement that the defendant’s exposure ac-

tually be witnessed by another person in order to constitute ‘open or indecent

exposure’. . . .”); Ebeling v. State, 91 P.3d 599, 601–02 (Nev. 2004) (per curiam)

(“A violation of NRS 201.220(1) does not require that the indecent exposure be

witnessed. . . . Since Ebeling committed only one act of indecent exposure, NRS

201.220(1) only provides for one charge of indecent exposure, regardless of the

number of witnesses.”); State v. King, 151 S.E.2d 566, 567 (N.C. 1966) (per cu-

riam) (“ ‘It is not essential to the crime of indecent exposure that someone shall

have seen the exposure . . . .’ ‘[T]he offense does not depend on the number of

people present . . . .’ ” (alteration in original) (first quoting 33 Am. Jur. 19; then
quoting 67 C.J.S. Obscenity § 5, at 26); Harris v. State, 359 S.W.3d 625, 631

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). (“After considering all of these factors, we believe that

the clear language of Section 21.11(a)(2)(A) indicates that the exposure, not the

number of children present, constitutes the unit of prosecution.”). As a result,

we do not find these jurisdictions to be influential to our analysis.

      2. Whether the resulting sentence was illegal. Because the legislature de-

fined the unit of prosecution for indecent exposure as per viewer, not per expo-

sure, there is sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction on two
counts of indecent exposure. On the 911 call, E.H. indicated she and T.A. had
                                         8

seen the defendant masturbating while looking at them in the Hy-Vee gas station

parking lot. After moving their vehicle to the Hobby Lobby parking lot, they both

screamed on the call as the defendant came back into their view and again mas-

turbated while looking at them. Such testimony was further corroborated when

both E.H. and T.A. reiterated during trial that they witnessed the defendant mas-

turbating in the Hy-Vee gas station parking lot and in the Hobby Lobby parking

lot. Based on this evidence, it is clear that there were two individuals who viewed

the defendant’s exposure. Therefore, we find the evidence was sufficient to con-

vince a rational jury that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

on both counts of indecent exposure. Thus, the defendant’s sentence was not

illegal.

       B. Whether the District Court Properly Stated its Reasons for Impos-

ing a Consecutive Sentence. The defendant’s final argument on appeal is that

the district court failed to provide adequate reasoning for ordering his sentences

to run consecutively as required under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure

2.23(3)(d). Rule 2.23(3)(d) states:

       If no sufficient cause is shown why judgment should not be pro-
       nounced, and none appears to the court upon the record, judgment
       shall be rendered. Prior to such rendition, counsel for the defendant,
       and the defendant personally, shall be allowed to address the court
       where either wishes to make a statement in mitigation of punish-
       ment. In every case the court shall include in the judgment entry
       the number of the particular section of the Code under which the
       defendant is sentenced. The court shall state on the record its rea-
       son for selecting the particular sentence.

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d); see also State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa

2016) (“Rule 2.23(3)(d) applies to the district court’s decision to impose consec-

utive sentences.”). “Without such a record, there would be nothing from which

we could discern any abuse of sentencing discretion.” State v. Luedtke, 279
N.W.2d 7, 8 (Iowa 1979). A terse and succinct statement is sufficient provided
                                          9

that the brevity of the court’s statement does not prevent appellate review of the

exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion. State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d

402, 408 (Iowa 2015). Additionally, the reasoning for imposing consecutive sen-

tences may be the same reasons the district court relied on for the imposition of

incarceration. Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 275.

      Here, the district court’s statements during sentencing were as follows:

      Well, Mr. Wilson, the purpose of sentencing is to do two things. It’s
      meant to rehabilitate you and to protect our community from further
      offenses from you. The record shows that you have a relatively long
      prior criminal record. Most disturbingly, you have prior convictions
      for this very same offense, including one that you were sentenced on
      just before you committed these two offenses.
               Mr. Wilson, at this point in time, I think really the only appro-
      priate sentence here is to send you to prison for as long of a period
      of time as I can, which still won’t be all that long. But hopefully it’s
      enough time that’ll give you an opportunity to get some treatment.
      It’ll give you an opportunity to take a step back and look at yourself,
      look at your life, make some decisions about what kind of a future
      you want to be and what kind of a person you want to be.
            And if you use that time productively, Mr. Wilson, then there’s
      no reason why, when you get out of prison, you can’t go out there
      and work towards accomplishing your goals. But that’s obviously
      only going to happen if you change the way you make decisions.

             And hopefully when you’re in prison, you can do that. You can
      change the way you make decisions and you can get appropriate
      treatment. But I think at this stage, you just need to go to prison for
      the maximum penalty, because I don’t think you’ll stop committing
      this offense until you serve a significant amount of time in custody.

             So, Mr. Wilson, you are adjudged guilty of two counts of inde-
      cent exposure, masturbating in public, in violation of Section 709.9
      and Section 709.9(2)(a) of the Iowa Code, and Section 903B.2 of the
      Iowa Code. In each case, pursuant to Chapter 901A.2(1), you are
      sentenced to serve -- you are committed to the custody of the Direc-
      tor of the Iowa Department of Corrections for an indeterminate term
      not to exceed two years, with credit for time served.

             These sentences shall be served consecutively and consecu-
      tively to any other sentence you’re serving here in Iowa. You shall
      pay a $430 fine on each case, a 15 percent surcharge, court costs,
      court-appointed attorney fees. The State has 30 days to file a
                                        10

      statement of pecuniary damages. I find that you do not have the
      reasonable ability to pay category “B” restitution.

            On each case you do have a right to appeal your judgment and
      conviction. If you wish to appeal, you must do so by filing a written
      notice of appeal with the clerk within 30 days. If you cannot afford
      the cost of an appeal, those will be provided for you at the public
      expense. Bond on appeal is $2,000 per charge. You shall also comply
      with the sex offender registry requirements pursuant to
      Chapter 692A of the Iowa Code.

      Based on the record, we can discern that the district court sentenced the

defendant to a term of incarceration due to his extensive criminal record that

included convictions for the same offenses at issue here, one of which occurred

just before he committed these two acts of indecent exposure, and the fear that

the defendant would continue to commit this type of offense unless he was

incarcerated. The district court also stated that the most appropriate sentence

was the sentence that would result in the longest period of incarceration to allow

the defendant the opportunity to receive treatment and evaluate how to best

move forward with his life upon being released. While the district court did not

expressly state this was its reason for imposing consecutive sentences, it was

saying virtually the same thing because, in its own words, it was explaining that

“the only appropriate sentence here is to send you to prison for as long of a period
of time as I can.” That means consecutive sentences. As a result, we find this to

be a sufficient statement of the district court’s reasoning for ordering the

sentences to run consecutively. However, in the future, we encourage sentencing

courts to explicitly state that it is referring to the subject matter of consecutive

sentencing. See Hill, 878 N.W.2d at 275.

      IV. Conclusion.

      For these reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence for two counts of

indecent exposure.
      AFFIRMED.