Court Opinion

ID: 9466563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:19:48.053899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:48.533524
License: Public Domain

WINTER, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I think that the district court was correct in ruling that “the time from the date of [the district court’s] judgment of June 20, 1977 and the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals, September 21, 1978 would not be counted against the five-year probationary period because the defendant was not under probation at that time . . ” As a consequence, I think that under 18 U.S.C. § 3651, the district court had authority to modify defendant’s probation. I respectfully dissent from the contrary holding.
In agreement with the majority (albeit for a different reason), I think that the district court had authority to reinstate the fine.
I.
Workman was initially placed on probation on a number of special and general conditions.1 When his probation was revoked by the district court and he pursued his successful appeal to us,2 those conditions were superseded by a jail sentence; but service of the sentence was stayed, pending appeal. The sole condition of the stay was the posting of a bond for $15,000 secured by a pledge of Workman’s property. Manifestly, this was less onerous than compliance with the special and general conditions of probation previously imposed.
The issue in this case is the meaning of the sentence in § 3651 that “[t]he period of probation . . shall not exceed five years.” At the outset, I find some significance in the fact that the temporal limitation in § 3651 is not related to the date on which a defendant is placed on probation, but is related to the “period” of probation. I think, therefore, that in computing the period of probation, we should look to the time that the conditions of probation were in effect, rather than the date on which probation was imposed. In this case, the conditions were not in effect from June 20, 1977 to September 21, 1978, so that I would not treat the passage of time between those dates as part of “the period of probation.”
I disagree that in computing the probationary period there should be excluded only those periods during which a convicted defendant was removed from probation by reason of his own wrongful acts. The purpose of probation is, by the use of supervision and restrictions other than incarceration, to encourage the probationer to conform his conduct to socially accepted norms. Therefore I think that only the period during which the restrictions were applicable *53should be counted as part of the maximum “period of probation,” unless the probationer can show that they were rendered inapplicable by the capricious and arbitrary act of another, or unless they were supplanted by more rigorous conditions such as confinement as a result of the imposition of another sentence. See United States v. Pisano, 266 F.Supp. 913 (E.D.Pa.1967).
Of course, the equitable principle that a probationer cannot obtain credit against the maximum period of probation for any period of time that he was removed from probationary supervision by his own wrongful acts is frequently invoked. The cases in which it is invoked are all ones in which the probationer in fact removed himself from supervision by his own wrongful act. Where the majority, in my view, goes astray is reading these cases to hold that only where the probationer removed himself from supervision by his own wrongful act may a period of time be excluded from the maximum period of probation. This I do not conceive to be the law.
Support for this view is found in Rule 38(a)(4), F.R.Crim.P. That rule deals with the situation when a convicted defendant is placed on probation but nevertheless appeals. The rule permits the district court to stay an order placing a defendant on probation if he appeals. Certainly the authority to extend the beginning of probation is inconsistent with a reading of the statute that the five year limitation must always be computed from the date on which probation was imposed except for wrongful conduct on the part of the probationer. Significantly, also, in connection with the rationale articulated by the majority, the application for a stay pending appeal could hardly be deemed a “wrongful” act on the part of the defendant seeking the stay.
While it is true that Workman was not removed from probation for reasons bearing a close analogy to the usual “wrongful act” cases, I cannot treat him as totally blameless. The revocation of his parole was upset in the previous appeal because two illegal stills were discovered without compliance with the fourth amendment, and we concluded that the exclusionary rule should be extended to parole revocation hearings. The revocation of Workman’s probation was not reversed because he was exonerated. Indeed, for a convicted bootlegger, the presence of an unlicensed still in his cellar and another in a separate building on his property shows that the probation officer did not act without factual basis in seeking revocation of probation. Since our decision was the first to apply the exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings,3 there is no basis on which to doubt the bona fides of the probation officer seeking revocation. Thus, I have no fear that undue advantage was sought to be taken of Workman. In short, I cannot subscribe to the characterization that this is a case in which the district court sought to extend its probationary power by invoking a constitutionally void revocation proceeding, or that the probation expiration time is never tolled pending appeal when the probationer is successful in overturning revocation of his probation on appeal.
Finally, I think that this case was decided sub silentio in the previous appeal. In reversing the order revoking Workman’s probation, we returned the case to the district court for a determination of whether Workman’s probation should be continued or revoked without reliance on unconstitutionally seized evidence. 585 F.2d 1211. That decision was rendered September 21, 1978 and rehearing was denied on December 4, 1978. Thus, our mandate did not issue until approximately seven months after the expiration of five years from the date that Workman was placed on probation. The district court was faithful to our direction.
II.
Since I conclude that the maximum period of probation had not expired when the district court ordered Workman to pay the *54balance of his fine, I think that under § 3651, the district court had authority to enter the order irrespective of Poletti v. C. I. R., 351 F.2d 345 (8 Cir. 1965).

. The special conditions were:
1. Remain gainfully employed when physically able to do so and support his dependents.
2. Pay fine of $4,000.00. Fine is in lieu of any taxes assessed or to be assessed in this violation.
3. That he not possess, manufacture, sell or buy any non-tax paid whiskey during probation.
4. That he not violate any of the laws of the United States or North Carolina.
The general conditions were:
1. You shall refrain from violation of any law (federal, state and local). You shall get in touch immediately with your probation officer if arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer.
2. You shall associate only with law-abiding persons and maintain reasonable hours.
3. You shall work regularly at a lawful occupation and support your legal dependents, if any, to the best of your ability. When out of work you shall notify your probation officer at once. You shall consult him prior to job changes.
4. You shall not leave the judicial district without permission of the probation officer.
5. You shall notify your probation officer immediately of any change in your place of residence.
6. You shall follow the probation officer’s instructions.
7. You shall report to the probation officer as directed.

. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4 Cir. 1978).

. Indeed, we recognized that our decision was contrary to the then decided cases. See 585 F.2d 1208, n.4.