Court Opinion

ID: 9770811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:22:13.620873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:21.023329
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the per curiam opinion, but feel that some additional observations are in order.

1. Mandatory Sentence

It is my opinion that the circumstance that a sentence is within the statutory limits should not foreclose judicial scrutiny for compliance with the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. I, § 21 of the Missouri Constitution. I agree with Justice Kennedy that “extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime” may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Harmelin v. Michigan, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct, 2680, 2705, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For the reasons stated in the per curiam opinion, neither the authorized range of sentencing nor the sentence pronounced in this particular case is extreme or grossly disproportionate.
The stipulation that the sentence be served without probation or parole does not render it cruel or unusual. This provision simply eliminates one possibility for early release. The governor’s power to grant “reprieves, commutations and pardons,” Mo. Const, art. IV, § 7, remains, and is appropriate for consideration in the total equation. Harmelin, 111 S.Ct. at 2702.

2. Witherspoon-Witt

The prosecutor questioned members of the venire as to whether they would consid*200er a sentence of life imprisonment if the defendant were convicted. Several said that they would be willing to consider life imprisonment after hearing the evidence. The prosecutor sought to exclude these jurors or to get them to make a further commitment, saying that jurors had to be willing to consider the range of punishment “up front.” The assertion is strange, and I find no support for the prosecutor’s statement that “this is the law of Missouri.” Jurors should not consider any issue until they have heard the evidence. Those jurors who indicated unwillingness to make a decision until hearing the evidence simply expressed a requirement that all jurors should impose.
The prosecutor’s suggestions might present dangers in a case governed by Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Even though we conclude that there is no With-erspoon-Witt problem in this case, I believe that it is appropriate to comment on a matter which came up in the course of the trial and which, if carelessly applied in a capital case, might result in an unnecessary reversal.
With these observations, I concur.