Court Opinion

ID: 9736743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:05:08.856786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:08.621375
License: Public Domain

*309Henderson, J.,
delivered the following dissenting opinion, in which Marbury, C. J., concurs.
There is virtually no dispute as to the facts in this case, but to understand the contentions made it is necessary to state them in some detail. The irregular lot in question is located between Third and Fourth streets immediately adjacent to and south of the right of way of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad running east and west, on which are three main tracks leading to the Fairfield Shipyard. There is no siding into the lot. On the north side of the railroad tracks the area is almost exclusively industrial, to the south, residential but largely undeveloped. The line of demarcation between the zones runs generally parallel to and about 50 feet south of the railroad right of way. There is a main street 100 feet wide, known as Maude Avenue, running northeast and southwest intersecting the railroad some distance to the west. Third Street and Fourth Street run at right angles to Maude Avenue. The lot in question contains one portion 180 feet deep, fronting 63 feet on Maude Avenue, with which we are not concerned since there is no request to change its residential classification. In the original zoning plan the line of demarcation mentioned above cuts through the remainder of the lot in question, but, about midway of the lot, is extended to meet Fourth Avenue at right angles. Thus the northerly portion of the lot containing about 32,000 square feet is zoned industrial; the southerly portion containing about 43,000 square feet is zoned residential. The present proceedings seek to have the latter portion re-zoned from residential to industrial or commercial, so as to permit its use for the storage of building materials. The appellant is engaged in the business of wrecking and demolishing buildings, salvaging and reselling the bricks, plumbing, lumber and steel. He has erected a one-story building, 60 feet by 40 feet, on the northerly portion of the lot fronting on Fourth Street, which he uses as an office. Pie stores materials on the industrial portion of the lot. This use he now desires to extend.
*310There are seven semi-detached dwellings fronting on Maude Avenue between Third and Fourth Streets and several vacant lots, shown by the photographs to be badly overgrown with weeds and brush. The rear of these lots abut on the property in question, separated by an alley. There are vacant lots, laid out for residences, on the southeast side of Fourth Street opposite the lot in question. The plat shows a machine shop, admittedly a non-conforming use, on the southeast side of Fourth Street adjoining the railroad right of way, and a “fertilizer store”, adjoining the railroad right of way on the northwest side of Third Street, which also appears to be a non-conforming use. The plat does not show any other industrial or commercial enterprise south of the tracks, but there is some reference in the record to storage yards beside the tracks between Fifth and Seventh Streets to the southeast.
It is not disputed that the portion of the lot now sought to be re-zoned has been zoned residential since the first comprehensive plan was adopted in 1931. The witness Cox, a real estate expert called by the appellant, testified: “The whole neighborhood, of which this is a part, tends generally in this immediate area to industrial uses in spite of the fact there are residential properties on Maude Avenue to the south and between Fourth and Fifth Streets, some of these properties are more or less in my judgment actually mis-located, so that already at present the industrial activities depreciate the residential desirability of those houses on Maude Avenue in the 300 block. That has happened already. It is because really of the railroad there. * * * of course, houses physically could be built, but I think no right minded speculative builder would dare build a house there because his market price would be less actually than his cost. He would immediately suffer what we call an economic depreciation right off on account of the location. No one would reasonably build a house on these 120 feet and I think the same thing applies on the vacant land to the east.” According to this witness, it would appear *311that the whole area south of the tracks, for an indeterminate distance, should not have been zoned residential in the first place. The witness Magee testified: “I wouldn’t say if there were no lumber yard at all, if there were no railroad there, these houses on Maude Avenue would not be worth more money. That is perfectly obvious. They are in a bad location to begin with”. There was testimony that rezoning would increase the value of the lot about $3,500, but in arriving at present value, the witnesses valued the lot at about $2,000 less than the price paid for it, $8,500. The office building was valued at $4,000.
There was testimony that when the appellant purchased the lot in 1948 he signed the contract and made a down payment “without examining the official zone maps which would have shown the exact line”, and was under the impression it was zoned industrial. However, it was admitted that “before settlement was consummated he realized part of it was in a residential zone”. He “went ahead with the purchase” and thereafter erected the building above mentioned. Subsequently, in 1949, he obtained permission to erect a six-food fence around the whole lot, but the Board disapproved use of the residential portion of the lot for storage of building materials. The present application was disapproved by the Building Engineer, the Board of Zoning Appeals, and the trial court on appeal. Three members of the Board voted to allow the rezoning, but this was less than the four votes required under paragraph 32 (i) of the Ordinance to reverse the action of the Zoning Commissioner.
It may be true that the extension of the industrial zone into the residential for a distance of 120 feet on Fourth Street, as sought, would probably not have a marked effect on the value of residential properties, which are already adversely affected by the location of the railroad and the existing permitted use. On the other hand, the extended use, as a storage yard for the salvage of a wrecker, is not a trivial matter and is ex*312pressly forbidden in a residential use district by paragraph 8 (27) of the Ordinance.
The appellant sought a special exception by the Board of Zoning Appeals relying upon paragraph 33(b) of the ordinance which authorizes the Board to “grant a permit where the use or change of use of land, buildings or structures proposed to be used is limited as to its location because of the size of buildings, size of yards, irregularity of shape of land or buildings, topography, grade or accessibility”. He also relied upon paragraph 12, but this contention seems to have been abandoned, as it is not mentioned in his brief. He now makes the broad contention that the continuance of the zoning restriction against the southern portion of the lot is arbitrary, unreasonable and beyond the police power, and that it deprives the appellant of a reasonable use of his property without due process of law.
In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Biermann, 187 Md. 514, 50 A. 2d 804, we indicated that there was a heavy burden upon the property owner to overcome the presumption of constitutionality and to set aside negative action of the Board, exercising a gmsi-legislative veto power in disallowing a filling station permit. In the instant case the Board had no discretion to disregard the established zone lines. It could only grant a special exception under 33(b) predicated upon some peculiarity in the size, irregularity or topography of the particular lot, not common to the neighborhood. Cf. Easter v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 395, 73 A. 2d 491 and Heath v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 49 A. 2d 799. The testimony shows no such peculiarities. What the appellant is really contending is that the existence of the railroad tracks, the permitted use on part of the lot and the general character of the neighborhood, demonstrate the unreasonableness of the restriction. In short, the contention is that the line of demarcation was erroneously drawn in the first place and time has confirmed the error.
*313I think the argument is untenable. Lines must be drawn somewhere. 'Wherever drawn, residence property on the border will be affected to some extent, and industrial users will be tempted to extend the zone as their business grows. But it is clear that nothing short of confiscation will justify judicial interference. If the question is “fairly debatable”, the courts will not hold the zoning to be unreasonable. Board of County Com’rs of Anne Arundel County v. Snyder, 186 Md. 342, 46 A. 2d 689; Francis v. MacGill, 196 Md. 77, 75 A. 2d 91. Since zoning looks to the future, it is immaterial that land is undeveloped when zoned or remains so thereafter. Nor is it material that the land zoned residential would be more valuable in another classification. Easter v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, supra. Where zoning is accomplished as a part of a comprehensive plan there is a strong presumption in its favor, not to be overthrown through piece-meal exceptions by administrative agencies or by the courts. If time brings changes in the character of an area, rezoning can best be accomplished by comprehensive study and reconsideration of the original plan. There is no evidence of a marked change in the instant case. The tracks were there in 1931. The testimony seems to be that it should never have been zoned residential. If a special exception is now granted, all of the arguments now advanced would support a further extension at other points.
I think the testimony does not show that the portion of the lot in question is wholly unsuitable for residential use. There are dwellings and residential lots on Maude Avenue adjoining one side of the lot in question. There are residential lots across Fourth Street. The third side of the lot, which is roughly triangular, abuts on the line of demarcation about 50 feet from the railroad right of way. The real estate experts admit that the residential portion of the lot in question is worth $1,200 in its present classification, although they say if would be worth $4,700 if reclassified. Their argument of unsuitability is based entirely on the existence of the *314railroad tracks and the existing permitted use. Such considerations were held not to be controlling in the recent case of Gleason v. Keswick Improv. Ass’n, 197 Md. 46, 78 A. 2d 164. In that case the effort was to extend the commercial zone along a railroad right of way, and it was shown that the property would have greater value and utility if the change were made. We reversed the Board’s action in granting an exception.
The appellant relies strongly upon Northwest Merchants Terminal v. O’Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 191, 60 A. 2d 743, 752. In that case land which had been in a second commercial district for fifteen years, and had been purchased for such use, was changed to a residential use district by ordinance. We found no basis for the change, except the desire of the neighbors to have the property remain vacant, and that the land was wholly unsuitable for residential use. We said that the presumption of reasonableness “applies to re-zoning, as well as to original zoning * * * but not with the same weight. Indeed it creates a counter-presumption that zones are ‘well planned and arranged’ and are to be ‘more or less permanent’ subject to change only to meet genuine change in conditions.” In the instant case, the effort is to change the zoning lines that were established as a result of a comprehensive study, have remained unchallenged for twenty years, and upon the faith of which a number of residences have been erected. The case is clearly distinguishable. I think the trial court was correct in holding that the appellant did not meet the burden of establishing that the original zoning was so unreasonable as to amount to confiscation.
Marbury, C. J., authorizes me to say that he concurs in this dissent.