Court Opinion

ID: 9776203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:24:14.386615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:06.262273
License: Public Domain

VOIGT, Justice,
dissenting, with whom BURKE, Justice, joins.
[T10] I dissent because I cannot find a statute or court rule that authorizes the district court to sentence the appellant in the manner that it did. This is what the record reveals: At his arraignment on September 4, 2008, the appellant pled no contest to aggravated assault and battery, a felony. Judgment of conviction was entered orally on the same date, and a written judgment was entered on September 283, 2008. Sentencing took place on November 4, 2008. The district court imposed a sentence of 36 to 80 months, and gave the appellant credit for 107 days served. The district court then stayed execution of the sentence, with the following *967conditions: (1) the appellant was not remanded to the Department of Corrections; (2) the appellant was to be transported to and from WYSTAR by "law enforcement"; (8) successful completion of the WYSTAR program would lead to a hearing and the possibility of the appellant being allowed to participate in an adult community corrections program; (4) failure to complete the WYSTAR program would lead to immediate arrest, execution of the sentence, and transfer to the Department of Corrections, without a hearing; (5) no credit for time served would be allowed for attendance at WYSTAR; (6) unauthorized absence from WYSTAR would constitute escape.
[T11]} A written sentence was filed on November 24, 2008, in which the district court stated that "execution of this sentence and the accompanying order for Mittimus is stayed pending the Defendant's admission to WYSTAR." The written sentence, while containing provisions similar to those stated orally at the sentencing hearing, also provided that "the Defendant shall be granted a furlough to inpatient treatment at WYS-TAR...." (Emphasis added.) The rest is history; upon the appellant's failure to complete the WYSTAR program, he was discharged, arrested, and transported to the Wyoming State Penitentiary without hearing.1
[T12] The district court purportedly suspended the execution of sentence in this case. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-802(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2009) provides as follows:
(a) After conviction or plea of guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, and following entry of the judgment of conviction, the court may:
(1) Suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation.]
(Emphasis added.)2 Revocation of probation requires a hearing. W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(1). Perhaps because the district court contemplated the appellant's delivery to the Department of Corrections without a hearing in the event of a failure at WYSTAR, the district court did not place the appellant on probation, even though that seems to be the procedure mandated by the statute. Instead, in the written Sentence, the district court characterized the appellant's post-sentencing release as a "furlough." I find no statute, however, that allows a district court to furlough a felon onee that felon has been sentenced. Rather, it appears that the only "furlough" program is the one established by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-701 (LexisNexis 2009), which grants such authority only to the Department of Corrections.
[T13] In short, I have been unable to locate in statute or court rule authority for a district court to impose a prison sentence, stay execution of that sentence, release the defendant with conditions, but not on probation, have that release revoked without a hearing, and not give credit for time served at a facility where the defendant was subject to a charge of escape. "A sentence that imposes a punishment not authorized by the legislature ... is illegal." Endris v. State, 2010 WY 73, ¶15, 233 P.3d 578, 581 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Apodaca v. State, 891 P.2d 83, 85 (Wyo.1995)). See also Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 247 (Wyo.1984) ("The legislature is the body empowered to determine what crimes are punishable and prescribe punishment for those acts."), overruled in parton other grounds by Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 926 (Wyo.1999). This was an illegal sentence.

 ._ The Mittimus is in the court file, attached to the Sentence, and without a separate file stamp, so it appears to have been filed along with the Sentence.

. W.R.Cr.P. 38, entitled "Stay of execution of sentence," does not appear to modify the statutory scheme for such a stay.