Court Opinion

ID: 9537355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:16:35.282542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:30.260318
License: Public Domain

Ott, J.
(dissenting) — This appeal involves the law of this state applicable to the arraignment of a person accused of crime. The majority hold that, at the time a person charged with a criminal offense is brought before the bar of the court for the purpose of arraignment, a judge exercises judicial discretion in granting such a person his constitutional rights. I do not agree for the following reasons:
(1) Art I, § 22, of our state constitution, as amended by amendment 10, provides:
“In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to meet the witnesses against him face to face, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed. . . . In no instance shall any accused person before final judgment be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.”
As I read this section, an accused person is unconditionally guaranteed the following rights:
*390(A) To appear and defend against the charges;
(B) To be represented by an attorney;
(C) To demand the nature of the accusations and to receive a written copy thereof;
(D) To be permitted to testify in his own behalf;
(E) To meet the witnesses against him face to face;
(F) To have witnesses in his behalf;
(G) To have a speedy trial by an impartial court or jury.
The constitution does not grant to any judge the power to deny an accused person these guarantees. In my opinion, at the time of arraignment, there is no judicial discretion involved in- granting an accused person his constitutional rights.
(2) The majority hold that, in the few minutes the accused stood before the bar of the court and orally entered a plea of guilty and the court orally pronounced the sentence it would impose based upon the plea, the status of the defendant immediately changed from that of an accused person to that of a convicted person, and that, even though a formal judgment of conviction had not been entered, it was “too late” for the appellant to then withdraw his plea and enter a plea of not guilty. I do not agree that the accused’s request was “too late” for the following reasons:
(A) An accused person’s status does not change by his plea of guilty. It changes only upon the entry of “final judgment.” In interpreting the meaning of the word “accused,” as it is used in this section of the constitution, we said in In re McClintock v. Rhay, 52 Wn. (2d) 615, 328 P. (2d) 369 (1958):
“Under the constitution, a defendant in a criminal proceeding is an accused person until formal judgment and sentence have been entered.”
In the cited case, the accused, prior to “final judgment,” requested permission to withdraw his plea of guilty and have counsel appointed to act in his behalf. The request was refused by the trial court. In reversing the trial court, we held that, even though a plea of guilty had been entered, there had been no “final judgment,” and defendant’s status *391was still that of an accused person, and that he was entitled to his constitutional rights as such.
In the instant case the status of the appellant was still that of an accused person standing before the bar of the court for the purpose of arraignment, and, as such, he was entitled to exercise his constitutional guarantees.
(B) The defendant immediately informed the court that the plea of guilty was not voluntarily made because he had been promised that the prosecuting attorney would recommend a minimum sentence. The promise was not fulfilled.
(C) The accused further asserted that he was not guilty of the crime of escape because he was taken as a hostage by the other escapees. He asserts he was not one of them.
Whether the plea of guilty, which is tantamount to a confession, was voluntarily made or whether the appellant was a hostage, are facts which are not determined by a judge at the time of arraignment. They are determined only at the trial, which is guaranteed an accused person by our constitution.
(3) The majority rely upon RCW 10.40.175 which provides:
“At any time before judgment, the court may permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn, and other plea or pleas substituted.”
This section of the statute is cited in support of the majority’s contention that the court may exercise its discretion in permitting an accused to withdraw his plea. RCW 10.40.175 is § 1057 of the territorial Code of 1881. Art. XXVII, § 2, of the constitution, provides in part:
“All laws now in force in the Territory of Washington, which are not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force . . . ” (Italics mine.)
The interpretation which the majority have placed upon the cited statute is repugnant to and in direct conflict with the constitutional guarantees afforded an accused person by Art. I, § 22.
In my opinion, RCW 10.40.175, given its proper construction, is not repugnant to the constitution. In order to
*392give the statute a constitutional construction, the word “may” is construed as “must” or “shall.” Giving the word such a construction in Buell v. Toppenish, 174 Wash. 79, 24 P. (2d) 431 (1933), we said:
“Appellants rely upon certain well known texts and decisions to the effect that the word ‘may’ is to be construed as meaning ‘must’ or ‘shall’ when public interests or rights are concerned, and when the public or third persons have a de jure right which can only be protected and enforced by such a construction. [Citing case and authorities.]
“We accept these authorities as stating the well settled rule of law, and we are heartily in accord therewith, . . . ” (Italics mine.)
See, also, Spokane County ex rel. Sullivan v. Glover, 2 Wn. (2d) 162, 97 P. (2d) 628 (1940).
The court erred in failing to give the statute its constitutional construction and in denying the accused the right to withdraw his plea, when, as here, the request was timely made. The majority, by affirmance, perpetuate the error.
The majority cite State v. Jessing, 44 Wn. (2d) 458, 268 P. (2d) 639 (1954). In the cited case, the issue that the accused’s constitutional guarantees were denied him was not raised. The only issue raised was the competency of the accused’s waiver of his right to counsel. Nowhere in that opinion is there any reference to Art. I, § 22, or amendment 10, of our state constitution. The court, in its review of the Jessing case, decided the issues as the parties had framed them. The decision stands as the law of that case, but is not controlling here.
For the reasons stated, the judgment and sentence should be vacated, the appellant restored to the status of an accused person and afforded his constitutional rights.
Hunter, J., concurs with Ott, J.