Court Opinion

ID: 9829316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:11:52.255604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:59.834602
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[7] As stated in our original opinion, no attack was made by appellant upon the amount of the verdict and judgment in this case, but appellant now very earnestly insists that the verdict was excessive, and contends that the error in this respect is a fundamental one requiring determination on our part without an assignment of error.
Rule 29 (142 S. W. xiii), promulgated by the Supreme Court as our guide, confines us to a distinct specification of error and “to such fundamental errors of law as are apparent upon the record.” We know of no definition of error “apparent of record” applicable to all cases. But it was said by our Supreme Court in the case of Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94, 122 S. W. 533, that—
“This does not mean that an error which can be ascertained by looking into the record and considering the evidence may be considered *723without an assignment, for that would include every error which can be considered at all. Nothing can be considered as an error which cannot be made apparent by an examination of the record. Therefore the language of the statute must be given that construction which will make it consistent with its requirements in other respects. The language ‘apparent upon the face of the record’ indicates that it is to be seen upon looking at the face of the record (that is, the assignment itself), the fact pointed out by it must show a good and sufficient ground for the court to interfere to prevent injustice being done to one' of the parties. Perhaps the best expression is that it must be a fundamental error — such error as being readily seen lies at the base and foundation of the proceeding and affects the judgment necessarily.”
The contention that mere excessiveness in a verdict for damages, based upon negligence and mental pain, is fundamental or error apparent of the record, runs counter to our conception of the subject. Appellant cites Railway Co. v. Turner, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 532, 94 S. W. 214, in aid of its contention. But it does not affirmatively appear from the opinion in that case that there was no assignment of error pointing out the difficulty. Besides, in that case it appeared that the damages sought to be recovered were made up of separable items of elements, and the court found that there was no evidence beyond two of the items aggregating $20, and the announcement in the opinion that error in assessing damages for those items or elements to which no evidence had been adduced constituted fundamental error was probably induced by analogy from those of our eases holding that a verdict with no evidence to support it is fundamentally wrong. But in this case it cannot be so said. The damages sought was for mental pain — not made up of separable items. The relation of the plaintiff and the deceased and other circumstances are shown from which a jury could infer that pain was caused by the defaults of .appellant, and the amount of compensation for mental pain re-' suiting therefrom was in a peculiar sense for the determination of the jury. See Railway Co. v. McNamara, 59 Tex. 255, and Ward v. Cathey, 210 S. W. 289, by this court not yet officially reported.
No circumstance indicating passion or prejudice on the part of the jury has been pointed out either originally or on motion for rehearing, and the courts have more than once affirmed judgments of similar sums in like cases. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. McDavid, 121 S. W. 894; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rabon, 60 Tex. Civ. App. 88, 127 S. W. 580; Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S. W. 351, 59 Am. St. Rep. 639.
Under such circumstances and in the absence of an assignment of error in the brief, we do not understand that our duty requires us to search the evidence and exercise the necessary discrimination and judgment in order to determine that the verdict and judgment in this case is excessive in a specified sum.
On other questions presented in the motion for rehearing we retain the views originally expressed. The motion will accordingly be overruled.