Court Opinion

ID: 9481647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:27:10.228968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:29.091333
License: Public Domain

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. In my view the district court’s actions here violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in at least two respects. The majority upholds this conduct by engaging in circular reasoning under which the lack of compliance with one rule is somehow excused by noncompliance with another.
First, the grant of judgment n.o.v. in this case was a clear abuse of discretion under the ease law of this and other circuits. The district court based its judgment on Anderson’s failure to establish a prior criminal conviction for blacklisting, an element that the court viewed as a prerequisite for civil liability under the Kansas statute. The majority agrees with the district court’s construction of this statute, stating that the statute’s plain language requires proof of a criminal conviction. Notwithstanding this plain language, defendant did not originally move for either a directed verdict or j.n.o.v. on this ground. Indeed the district court raised the issue sua sponte after the jury had returned a verdict and after defendant had filed its post-trial motions on other grounds.
*1506In accordance with settled authority, this court has clearly held that “[o]nly questions raised in a prior motion for directed verdict may be pursued in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” Dow Chemical Corp. v. Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 481, 486 (10th Cir.1990); see Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1455 n. 2 (10th Cir.1987); 5A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice 11 50.08 (2d ed. 1990). Here, of course, the ground upon which the district court granted j.n.o.v. was not raised by defendant in either its motion for directed verdict or its motion for j.n.o.v. Two other circuits have reversed a district court’s grant of j.n.o.v. under similar circumstances. See Kutner Buick, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 868 F.2d 614, 617 (3d Cir.1989); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 171-72 (5th Cir.1985). If, as the majority asserts, the statute plainly requires a prior conviction, defendant has no excuse for not asserting the requirement in a timely fashion.
The majority seeks to avoid the fact that the court’s grant of j.n.o.v. here clearly contravened governing authority by attempting to bring this case within a line of opinions excusing lack of technical compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. In so doing the majority is wrong on the record and the law. The cases upon which it relies that do not require technical compliance, see Maj. op. at 8, are readily distinguishable because they involve circumstances where the parties and the district court had adequate actual notice that the issue was in the case prior to jury deliberation. It is undisputed on this record that the need for a prior criminal blacklisting conviction was not anticipated or addressed by either party until the court raised it sua sponte after defendant’s post-trial motion had been filed.1 The alleged requirement was simply not an issue in the case until that point.
Indeed, defendant’s motion for directed verdict and its original motion for j.n.o.v. made only general allegations that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the blacklisting claim. Neither motion specifically raised the lack of evidence of a prior blacklisting conviction. “A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefore.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) (emphasis added). In the face of Rule 50(a), the majority would hold that a general assertion of insufficient evidence preserves an argument that the evidence is insufficient in a particular respect. However, the law is clear that a general allegation of insufficiency does not preserve un-articulated specific arguments which might support that general assertion. See, e.g., SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275, 1279 (8th Cir.1981); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2533, at 579 (1971) (“A request for an instruction that ‘on the basis of the evidence and the applicable law, you are directed to find a verdict for the plaintiff’ is not sufficient compliance with [Rule 50(a)].”); cf. Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 357 (1st Cir.1989) (“A general defense that the complaint fails to state a claim ordinarily will not preserve unarticulated arguments in support of that defense.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3217, 110 L.Ed.2d 664 (1990); Brooks v. Monroe Sys. for Business, Inc., 873 F.2d 202, 205 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 154, 107 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989).
While technical compliance with Rule 50(a) may not be necessary in some circumstances, the majority’s position here relieves a party from any compliance at all. Under the majority’s holding, a defendant who moves for a directed verdict by merely asserting generally that the evidence is insufficient is thereafter free to raise any more specific argument for the first time after trial. The majority's *1507broad view of “lack of technical compliance” thus simply swallows up the Rule itself.
Nor can I agree with the majority’s conclusion that affirming the district court is justified because Anderson will have suffered no prejudice. It is true that whether a prior conviction is an element of Anderson’s claim is a legal issue that would not have gone to the jury in any event. Thus Anderson has suffered no prejudice to his right to a jury trial. See Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 273-74 (7th Cir.1986). Moreover, it is undisputed that Anderson cannot establish a prior criminal conviction, so his lack of notice before the verdict was returned did not prejudice his ability to remedy the deficiency prior to jury deliberation. Id. at 273-75. Nevertheless, it is not accurate to state, as the majority does, that Anderson was therefore not prejudiced in any way. The “failure to raise the claim in a timely fashion obliged [Anderson] to expend the effort and expense of a trial and numerous post-trial motions which might have been avoided had the claim” been timely raised and decided favorably to defendant. Weaver v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1356, 1362 (3d Cir.1981) (en banc). As a practical matter, such prejudice is real and substantial, and of the type that the waiver principles embodied in the Rules were designed to prevent.
Finally, the majority acknowledges that the district court labeled the requirement a condition precedent and that defendant did not comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(c), which requires that the “denial of performance or occurrence [of conditions precedent] shall be made specifically and with particularity.” Defendant here, of course, did not raise the lack of a criminal conviction as the omission of a required condition precedent. This court has specifically held that when a defendant does not plead nonperformance of a condition specifically and with particularity as required by Rule 9(c), the failure of the condition is not an issue in the case and will not be addressed by the court on appeal. See Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 313 F.2d 381, 387 (10th Cir.1963); see also Brooks v. Monroe Sys. for Business, Inc., 873 F.2d 202, 205 (8th Cir.1989); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1001, 1009 (11th Cir.1982); McKee-Berger-Mansueto v. Board of Educ., 626 F.2d 559, 562-63 (7th Cir.1980); Ginsburg v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 427 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (6th Cir.1970).
The majority seeks to avoid the import of these cases by concluding that “the requirement of criminal liability is simply a statutory element that does not implicate Rule 9(c).” Maj. op. at 1505. Even if I were to agree with the above statement, it does not support the majority’s conclusion that the lack of the requirement may be raised for the first time after trial. If, as the majority asserts, a prior conviction is an element of Anderson’s claim, the district court’s ruling is necessarily grounded on Anderson’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(h)(2), however, provides that “[a] defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ... may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits.” (Emphasis added). The failure to state a claim for relief cannot be raised for the first time after trial on the merits. Weatherhead v. Globe Int’l., Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir.1987) (“[A] defense of dismissal is waived ... when presented after trial.”); see also Brown, 891 F.2d at 356-57 (citing cases); Brooks, 873 F.2d at 205.
“According to the plain language of Rule 12(h)(2), the [defense of failure to state a claim is] waived if [it is] not presented before the close of trial. Thus, for example, [it] may not be asserted for the first time on appeal. Nor can [this defense] be asserted through any type of post-trial motion."
5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1392, at 763 (2d ed. 1990) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly, whether considered a condition precedent or an element of the cause of action, the issue cannot be raised for the first time post-trial. See Brooks, 873 F.2d at 204-05.
*1511A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from any person who is not party to a settlement [with the United States or a State].
Id. Finally, the New Owners asserted an unjust enrichment claim against Tinney under Oklahoma law.
After extensive discovery, Tinney filed a motion for summary judgment as to each of the New Owners’ three claims. The district court granted this motion and entered judgment for Tinney on June 30, 1989.

Discussion

The New Owners challenge the district court’s entry of summary judgment on each of its three claims. We review the district court’s decision on each claim de novo under the standard prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c). Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir.1990). We will affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on each only if we find “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When applying this standard, we examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Abercrombie, 896 F.2d at 1230. The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of identifying for the trial court the absence of genuine issues of fact, but once this burden is satisfied, summary judgment is mandated if the nonmov-ant fails to come forward with specific evidence demonstrating a triable issue of fact as to each essential element of his case. See Celotex Comp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
A. Private cost recovery under CERCLA section 107
The district court entered summary judgment on the New Owners’ section 107 claim upon finding that the undisputed evidence established that their costs in investigating and closing the Landfill were not incurred “consistent with the national contingency plan.” The national contingency plan (NCP) is a set of regulations promulgated by EPA that “establishes] procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances.” 42 U.S.C. § 9605; see 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1988). The version of the NCP in effect during the New Owners’ investigation and closure of the Landfill5 stated that:
(a)(1) Any person may undertake a response action to reduce or eliminate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, or pollutants or contaminants. Section 107 of CERCLA authorizes persons to recover certain response costs consistent with this Plan from responsible parties.
(2) For purposes of cost recovery under section 107 ... a response action will be consistent with the NCP ... if the person taking the response action:
(ii) Where the action is a remedial action:
(A) Provides for appropriate site investigation and analysis of remedial alternatives as required under § 300.68;
(B) Complies with the provisions of paragraphs (e) through (i) of § 300.68 [establishing standards and procedures for choosing a site remedy];
(C) Selects a cost-effective response; and
(D) Provides an opportunity for appropriate public comment concerning the selection of a remedial action consistent with paragraph (d) of § 300.67 [requiring a study outlining alternative remedial measures to be provided to the public for at least a twenty-one day *1512review and comment period] unless compliance with ... State and local requirements ... provides a substantially equivalent opportunity for public involvement in the choice of remedy.
*1508In sum, I cannot concur in an opinion under which district courts are free to raise unpled issues sua sponte and out of time, in derogation of the pleading requirements of the federal rules. This case is like any other in which a party’s failure to comply with the rules renders unavailable an issue that might otherwise be dispositive. The majority’s approval of the district court’s action resolving the case on what the district court believed ought to have been pled, rather than on the issues actually raised at trial, renders meaningless the rules meant to govern the orderly administration of justice.

. The majority states that "[t]he defendant here raised the defense of failure to state a claim for blacklisting at the first opportunity in the answer to the complaint.” Maj. op. at 1504. Of course, all defendant asserted was "[tjhat Count V of plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted against this defendant.” Separate Answer of Defendant United Telephone Company of Kansas at 17. Defendant did not specify any failure it might have had in mind. The undeniable fact is that defendant never raised the issue on which the majority grants relief. The district court itself raised it post-trial.

. This version of the NCP, which became effective in 1985, see 50 Fed.Reg. 47,951 (codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1988)) [hereinafter 1985 NCP], was revised pursuant to final regulations issued March 8, 1990, effective April 9, 1990. 55 Fed.Reg. 8666 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 NCP],