Court Opinion

ID: 9739525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:16:53.131154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.820429
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I
I concur in Part I, Standing.
II
I concur in result with respect to Part II, Notice. The majority opinion implies that the giving of notice pursuant to IC 8-1-2-59 and 8-1-1-8 are condition precedents to the acquisition of subject matter jurisdiction. I respectfully disagree. See L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. (1976) 2d Dist. Ind.App., 169 Ind. App. 652, 351 N.E.2d 814, 846 (Sullivan, J. concurring). But because HBAI did attend the hearing and participated therein, at least to a limited degree, any notice defect attributible to the scheduling of the hearing has not been shown, of itself, to have caused prejudice.
III
I respectfully dissent from the majority decision under Issue IIH, Pre-Filing.
The Commission Order of April 21, 1987, which set the May 13 hearing date and which established the procedural rules to govern the matter, clearly provided for and contemplated that intervenors as well as respondent utilities should be permitted to submit direct evidence. Record at 28. The order, however, stated that "parties [presumably including intervenors] desiring to submit evidence ... must prefile such evidence ... by May 4, 1987." Record at 24.
HBAI's Petition to Intervene asserted that no party of record could represent its interests. The order granting intervention placed no restrictions or limitations upon the right of HBAI to present its position.
170 IAC 1-1-17(j) (1984 Ed.) does not authorize the Commission to restrict the *188submission of evidence to that which is prefiled. To be sure, the Rule requires parties to prefile prepared testimony and exhibits but if the period for the preparation and filing of such evidence is so short as to effectively deny the right to present evidence, it is contrary to law.
Furthermore, 170 IAC 1-1-17(d) contemplates the submission of evidence at the hearing in addition to any pre-filed evidence:
"The Presiding Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or Examiner shall determine the order in which intervenors shall introduce their evidence."
As stated by the majority in L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., supra, 351 N.E.2d at 826:
"Prefiled testimony and exhibits do not preclude or restrict the presentation of live testimony. The purpose of the pre-filing practice is to save hearing time and to assure accuracy. Hearings before the Commission necessarily require considerable expert testimony and complex accounting exhibits."
Here, however, HBAI was denied the opportunity to submit any testimony or evidence at the hearing. It was afforded only an opportunity to submit a post-hearing "statement [of its] interests ... as supported by the record." Record at 816. Quite clearly, since HBAI did not have an opportunity to prefile testimony or exhibits and since it did not have an opportunity to submit live testimony at the hearing, its position or interest was not likely to be supported by the record of evidence submitted by other entities.
The rulings which effectively denied HBAI the right to submit direct evidence, coupled with the extremely limited period for the prefiling of prepared testimony and exhibits, demonstrate sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal.
Although the Commission may have, in its discretion, denied intervention to HBAl, it did not do so. Having granted intervention the Commission was obligated to afford the intervenor, along with other participants, a meaningful opportunity to present its position. The Commission did not do so in this instance. I would reverse and remand upon this issue.
IV
I further dissent with respect to the basic decision of the Commission as set forth in its order of June 1, 1987. To the extent that it gives the wtilities the option to utilize the "gross-up" method of tax re-coupment, it is invalid. It is tantamount to putting the fox in charge of the henhouse.
It may be that the attack in this regard is directed against the "gross-up" method utilized by the utilities as a method of recovering taxes which the utilities construe as another cost of construction covered by 170 IAC 6-1-25 (1984 Ed.). In any event, to the extent that the June 1 order gives the Commission approval to this tax recovery method, it should be overturned.
I have not retreated from the position stated in City of Evansville v. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co. (1975) 2d Dist. Ind.App., 167 Ind.App. 472, 339 N.E.2d 562, 598, that a utility should not use consumer contributions as a cost of construction and to include that amount as part of the rate base, le., as a part of the utility's net investment, unless that contribution is entirely refunded to the applicant-consumer. Therefore, I also conclude that the second alternative authorized by the Commission, the Partial Tax Expense, is contrary to law.
The third option provided by the Commission order gives to the applicant (here the developer) a Hobson's Choice. Either the applicant must subject itself to the invalid gross-up collection method or must forego the refund now provided for applicants to recoup that portion of CIAC which represents three times the annual estimated revenue anticipated by virtue of the extension.
There is an additional reason why the alternatives authorized by the Commission are erroneous. In contemplating recovery of the tax upon contributions to costs of construction, the Commission authorizes charging the customer at the maximum tax rate of 34% whereas the utility might well pay the tax at a lesser rate. This eventual *189ity constitutes an unjustified windfall to the utility.
I would reverse and remand to the Commission with instructions to vacate its June 1, 1987 order.