Court Opinion

ID: 9881028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 15:01:25.478255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:52.778340
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-139     Document: 15     Page: 1    Filed: 09/29/2023

           NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

               In re: RINGCENTRAL, INC.,
                          Petitioner
                   ______________________

                         2023-139
                  ______________________

    On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas in No. 6:22-
cv-00259-ADA, Judge Alan D. Albright.
                  ______________________

                      ON PETITION
                  ______________________

   Before DYK, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
                         ORDER
     RingCentral, Inc. petitions this court for a writ of man-
damus directing the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas to either dismiss this case for im-
proper venue or transfer this case to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California. Marble
VOIP Partners LLC opposes the petition. For the following
reasons, we deny the petition.
Case: 23-139    Document: 15      Page: 2   Filed: 09/29/2023

2                                   IN RE: RINGCENTRAL, INC.

                             I.
    Marble filed its complaint alleging patent infringement
against RingCentral in the Western District of Texas.
RingCentral moved to dismiss for improper venue pursu-
ant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) or alterna-
tively to transfer to the Northern District of California for
convenience pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Following
venue discovery, Marble filed an amended complaint alleg-
ing for the first time that venue was proper based on an in-
district office leased by RingCentral, and RingCentral re-
newed its motion to dismiss or alternatively transfer.
     The district court denied RingCentral’s motion. In con-
cluding that venue was proper, the district court acknowl-
edged that the in-district office space was leased after the
date of the original complaint; the initial term was only for
six months; and it was “not listed on RingCentral’s website,
in a telephone directory, or identified by a RingCentral sign
at the location.” App. 6–12. However, the district court
concluded that the space nevertheless constituted
RingCentral’s “regular and established place of business”
in the district, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), reasoning “the agree-
ment leases a particular office suite for RingCentral’s use;”
the lease “continues indefinitely until” terminated by a
party; RingCentral “has control over whether the office
space continues to be leased;” and RingCentral “uses the
office space to engage in its business.” App. 9, 11–12.
    In denying RingCentral’s request to transfer for con-
venience, the district court considered various factors bear-
ing on the analysis. See App. 12–27. It held that
RingCentral had failed to demonstrate that the Northern
District of California was clearly more convenient than the
Western District of Texas. App. 27. RingCentral then filed
this petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
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IN RE: RINGCENTRAL, INC.                                        3

                               II.
     For RingCentral to establish entitlement to the “ex-
traordinary remedy” of a writ of mandamus, it must show
that: (1) it has “no other adequate means to attain the re-
lief [it] desires;” (2) the right to the writ is “clear and indis-
putable;” and (3) “the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S.
367, 380–81 (2004) (citations omitted). RingCentral’s peti-
tion has not met that demanding standard.
                               A.
    RingCentral primarily challenges the venue ruling, but
RingCentral has another adequate, alternative means to
raise this challenge. It can seek to overturn the venue rul-
ing on appeal after final judgment. See In re Monolithic
Power Sys., Inc. 50 F.4th 157, 159 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“[O]rdi-
narily, mandamus relief is not available for” these types of
rulings “because post-judgment appeal is often an ade-
quate alternative means for attaining relief.” (citation
omitted)). RingCentral does not point to irreparable harm
that will go unaddressed if we do not grant mandamus or
some important need for judicial administration that might
warrant the extraordinary step of immediate review here.
See In re Canon Inc., No. 2022-130, 2022 WL 1197337, at
*2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 22, 2022) (“At most, [petitioner’s] argu-
ments suggest that the district court’s decision is an outlier
capable of postjudgment review.”).
    Nor has RingCentral’s petition shown a clear and in-
disputable right to dismissal. In particular, RingCentral
has not shown that the district court clearly abused its dis-
cretion in resting its venue determination on the in-district
leased office space identified in Marble’s amended com-
plaint despite the lease not existing at the time of the orig-
inal complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), (d); Prasco, LLC
v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (explaining that “the proper focus” is generally on
“the facts existing at the time the complaint under
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4                                   IN RE: RINGCENTRAL, INC.

consideration was filed” (citations omitted)); In re Samsung
Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2 F.4th 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“We
are unaware of any instance, and none has been called to
our attention, in which a court has denied transfer based
on the original complaint despite an amended complaint
establishing proper venue.”); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 75 (1976) (indicating that even jurisdictional de-
fects can be cured through post-complaint pleadings); Cor-
tés-Ramos v. Martin-Morales, 956 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir.
2020) (same); Woods v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. at Indian-
apolis, 996 F.2d 880, 884 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that cor-
rected pleadings under Rule 15 have been uniformly
applied to allow parties to “cure defective statements of ju-
risdiction or venue.”).
    RingCentral relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). But
unlike here, Hoffman concerned forum manipulation from
a defendant’s unilateral, post-suit consent to suit else-
where. Id. at 344. Moreover, Hoffman “did not involve or
address the filing of an amended complaint.” Samsung, 2
F.4th at 1376. For these reasons, we deny mandamus
based on RingCentral’s main argument. We will also not
grant mandamus based on RingCentral’s other argument
that the leased space does not constitute a “regular and es-
tablished” place of business within the meaning of
§ 1400(b).
                             B.
     RingCentral also challenges the district court’s deci-
sion to deny transfer under § 1404(a), which we review un-
der regional circuit law, here the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Samsung, 2 F.4th at 1375
(citation omitted). We review such denial of transfer rul-
ings on mandamus only to see if there was such a clear
abuse of discretion that refusing transfer amounted to a
patently erroneous result. See id. (citation omitted); In re
TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
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IN RE: RINGCENTRAL, INC.                                    5

(citation omitted). We cannot say that such a clear abuse
of discretion occurred here.
     The district court weighed the relevant factors based
on the record and concluded that RingCentral had not
shown that the transferee venue was clearly more conven-
ient. See App. 12–27. It explained, among other things,
that more RingCentral employees residing in the Western
District of Texas have relevant and material information
compared to the transferee venue; that the Western Dis-
trict of Texas has subpoena power over at least one third-
party potential witness (the president of RingCentral’s dis-
tributor); and that judicial economy considerations
weighed at least slightly in favor of keeping this case in the
Western District of Texas because of related pending liti-
gation. See id. We are not prepared based on the argu-
ments raised in the papers here to say that the district
court’s conclusion that the transferee venue is not clearly
more convenient is “so unreasonable” as to warrant man-
damus relief. In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
    Accordingly,
    IT IS ORDERED THAT:
    The petition is denied.
                                        FOR THE COURT

September 29, 2023                      /s/ Jarrett B. Perlow
      Date                              Jarrett B. Perlow
                                        Clerk of Court