Court Opinion

ID: 9661771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:48:40.153478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:33.338878
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge
(dissenting).
Before placing the appellant on the stand, counsel made a motion for the trial court to prevent cross-examination concerning prior convictions because she contended that she did not have counsel when she was tried.
*517In support of the motion, she testified before the court that a lawyer was appointed for her in the Alabama case and she “took him” rather than defend herself. She then entered a plea of guilty. She also testified that she gave notice of appeal but did not have sufficient funds to hire a lawyer and she “dropped” the appeal and went to prison.
The question concerning these convictions will be considered.
In the present case, she testified that she had counsel during the trial in Alabama where she was convicted. She now attempts to attack the adequacy of her attorney. There is nothing in the record other than her testimony concerning adequacy of counsel. The court did not have to believe her testimony or take her opinion on adequacy of counsel. In a case against this appellant we overruled a similar contention concerning the Alabama conviction against her. See Wood v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 440 S.W.2d 640.
The trial court did not err in overruling her objection to this conviction.
She testified during the hearing outside the presence of the jury concerning the Louisiana conviction that she did not have counsel. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319, is distinguishable because there the sentences showed that Burgett did not have counsel in the cases when he had been previously convicted. The State in that case attempted (without success) to show waiver of counsel.
The appellant was also impeached by the prior conviction for passing as true a forged instrument in Dallas County. She testified that she was convicted there under the name of Willodean Carolyn Wood. See Wood v. State, supra.
In addition to the prior convictions, the State also introduced a forged check in the sum of $40.00 which was passed to another Buddie’s in Fort Worth on June 25, 1967, along with appellant’s photograph which was taken at the time of that offense. The address on this check was 3740 Stadium Drive (the same as the address of the purported maker of the check upon which the prosecution in the present case is based). There was no such address in Fort Worth. She was identified by an eyewitness as the person passing the check. The purported maker was Mary Ellen Sanders.
Another check dated March 12, 1967, in the sum of $40.00, payable to Buddie’s, was introduced. This check was purportedly signed by Doris Harper. Appellant’s photograph taken at the time this check was passed at another Buddie’s was also introduced. She was identified by an eyewitness as the person passing this forged check.
In the present case what more evidence could be offered to show her guilt? There was eyewitness testimony that the appellant passed the check in question. A photograph of her and the check at the time it was passed was introduced. The jury had the opportunity to observe her and the photographs and to see and hear the witnesses.
Was the failure on the part of the State to show that she had counsel at a previous trial reversible error? Arguments have been made that where a constitutional right has been violated, any error cannot be harmless. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, a comment was made that Chapman did not testify. This was a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion by Justice William O. Douglas held such a comment to be harmless error.
In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284, a confession of a non-testifying defendant was introduced against the accused who was not confronted with the witness. The constitutional right of confrontation was violated. Again the Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas held this constitutional error to be harmless.
In Loper v. Beto, 440 F.2d 934 (5th Cir.1971), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals *518held in an appeal from the denial of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding that where there was a possibility of lack of counsel in a prior conviction which was used for impeachment purposes that reversible error was not shown.
There the Court noted, “Except for the assertions of Loper, the record fails to furnish any conclusive information as to the facts and circumstances surrounding his former convictions.”
In the present case the appellant admitted two prior felony convictions, one for forgery and one for “false pretenses.” She denied that she was present when the three forged checks were passed in Fort Worth even though her photograph was taken at each store at the time and was identified by eyewitnesses. There has been no showing but only her assertion that she did not have counsel at the Louisiana conviction.
In Loper v. Beto, supra, the Court quoted from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705:
“We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring automatic reversal of the conviction.”
That Court also cited Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213.
The State should have introduced the records in the Louisiana conviction (at least before the judge). The questions of the prosecutor indicated that the judgment recited that she had counsel. Assuming that error is shown, I would hold it harmless and would affirm the conviction.
Since this opinion was prepared, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. —, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972).
In reviewing the Fifth Circuit opinion, four of the Justices held no error. Four Justices in the plurality opinion held reversible error was committed. Mr. Justice White, who concurred in the reversal, noted:
“ . . . There remain issues, unresolved by the Court of Appeals, as to whether the challenged prior convictions were legally infirm: was Loper represented by counsel at the time of the earlier convictions; if not, did he waive counsel ?”
and that these matters are best addressed in the first instance by the Court of Appeals and, “ . . . I do not understand our prior decisions to hold that there is no room in cases such as this for a finding of harmless error; and if this case is ultimately to turn on whether there was harmless error or not, I would prefer to have the initial judgment of the lower court.” (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the four Justices holding no error plus Mr. Justice White holding that there could be harmless error does not require a reversal of the present case.
I would still hold that if error was committed, it was harmless.
ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissent.