Court Opinion

ID: 9550305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:33:47.196778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:22.376951
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
specially concurring.
The majority opinion resolves this case pursuant to the holding in Knobel v. State, Wyo., 576 P.2d 941 (1978), and I find no fault with either the reasoning or the result reached in the Knobel case or in the majority opinion. I believe that the language of both could result in a misinterpretation of the holdings with reference to preliminary hearings in that they do not note that a prompt preliminary hearing may be necessary after an arrest, even if the arrest were made pursuant to a bench warrant for the purpose of establishing identity.
Prior to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), probationers and parolees were often arrested and placed in confinement to serve previously imposed sentences without a hearing of any kind. The Morrissey and Gagnon cases recognized the parole and probation status as “liberty and property” rights under the constitution, and they held that deprivation thereof could be accomplished only by virtue of due process. In the Morrissey case the Court noted at page 2600 of 92 S.Ct. that revocation of parole (and in the Gag-non case, of probation)
“is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to * * * revocations. * * *”
The purposes of the hearings immediately subsequent to an arrest are to insure against detention of a person (1) without probable cause; (2) without opportunity for bail; and (3) through mistaken identity. Such has long been the law; and without detailing the history of it, suffice it to say that the Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth the procedures for these protections in present activities.1 The minimal requirements relative thereto are those referred to in the Morrissey and Gagnon cases.
*1325The probable cause aspect of this case is adequately covered by the majority opinion. But, with reference to identity, supposing that the person arrested was actually John Smith instead of appellant, and supposing that the ultimately held revocation hearing was delayed for six months. The first opportunity for John Smith to present the identity issue would have been after he spent six months of his life improperly incarcerated. The potential for such in this case is with reference to a constitutional due process error and would warrant inquiry by us as plain error pursuant to Rule 7.05, W.R.A.P.2, regardless of whether or not it was raised in the district court. Hays v. State, Wyo., 522 P.2d 1004 (1974).
However, error does not exist in this case in this respect because appellant acknowledged his identity and signed an extradition waiver prior to being taken into custody under the probation violation warrant. He also subsequently acknowledged his identity at the revocation hearing.
In summary, I concur with the majority of the court that appellant’s constitutional right relative to the establishment of probable cause for arrest was not violated, but I go further to determine if his constitutional right relative to the establishment of identity was violated and find that it was not.

. Rule 5, W.R.Cr.P. requires the taking of the arrested person “without unnecessary delay” before the nearest available commissioner, who must inform him of his constitutional rights and admit him to bail. Rule 8, W.R.Cr.P. sets forth bail requirements. Rule 7, W.R.Cr.P. provides for a preliminary examination to determine if there is “probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.’’ (Emphasis supplied).

. Rule 7.05, W.R.A.P. provides:
“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”