Court Opinion

ID: 9403642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 15:07:49.924379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:08.449629
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 23-0578
                               Filed June 21, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF T.N.,
Minor Child,

D.N., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, Rose Anne

Mefford, District Associate Judge.

      A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

      Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant mother.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Misty White, Sigourney, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
                                         2

GREER, Judge.

       In 2021, months after the mother’s rights to an older child—H.G.—were

terminated following a two-and-a-half-year child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA)

proceeding, the mother gave birth to T.N. The mother’s rights to H.G. were

terminated after both she and H.G. tested positive for methamphetamine and due

to the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services’ concerns about the

condition of the family home. For similar reasons, the mother’s rights to T.N. were

terminated in 2023, which the mother appeals—she argues the juvenile court

should have granted her an extension and that termination is not in the child’s best

interests partly because of the bond between the mother and the child. Because

an extension would be inappropriate and termination serves the child’s best

interests, we affirm.

       In February 2022, the department went to the family’s home and found

“mouse droppings, cockroaches, a sink full of dirty dishes, garbage on the floor,

and a mouse running across the home.” There were also mice in the child’s play

pen. A founded child-abuse assessment was completed, and the mother agreed

to a safety plan with the child residing in a family friend’s home while the mother

addressed the home’s conditions. The child returned to the mother’s home in

March. But, by June, the home’s conditions had deteriorated once more, and the

child’s crib was full of food and clothing; so, another safety plan was developed.

When it was determined the mother was not following the safety plan, the child

was adjudicated CINA1 and placed with fictive kin or in foster care.

1 The father’s parental rights were also terminated. He has been incarcerated
since the child’s CINA adjudication and does not appeal.
                                         3

       In December 2022, the mother and her paramour moved into a two-

bedroom house. When service providers conducted a scheduled home visit in

January 2023 ahead of the February termination hearing, they noted the mother

and her paramour lived in one room and the family dog lived in the other. The

dog’s room, which was used in lieu of a kennel, was where the dog relieved itself

during the day and it smelled strongly of urine and feces. The mother testified that

this second room is where the child would sleep if returned to her care, though she

did not have a bed for the child. The home’s furnace was not working, and they

were using baseboard heaters as a short-term solution.2 There were piles of

clothes and empty alcohol bottles on the floor, and the bathroom’s toilet “had feces

all over the rim . . . [and] was extremely dirty and needed disinfected.”       The

department also raised concerns about the mother’s paramour, who had

previously pled guilty to two-counts of child endangerment. Service providers

repeatedly requested the mother fill out a background check form for the paramour,

which she did not do. Providers asked for the paramour to be present during their

scheduled home visit before the termination hearing so they could go over the

background check forms, but he was not there when they arrived. To the mother’s

credit, she was employed, participated in visitation,3 and had no continued

substance-use concerns.

       At the termination hearing, service providers reported the child was bonded

with and attached to the foster family. For her part, the mother asked for six

2 Service providers reported it was sixty-five degrees in the home.
3 Early on in the case, the mother struggled to engage with visitation and would
often leave early. But, by December 2022, visitation was more consistent. All
visitation was supervised.
                                          4

additional months to work toward reunification. The juvenile court terminated the

mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2023).

We review the termination of parental rights de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33,

40 (Iowa 2010).

       The mother first argues the juvenile court should have granted her

additional time to work toward reunification.       In order to grant a six-month

extension, the juvenile court must be able to “enumerate the specific factors,

conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the

determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no

longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.”             Iowa Code

§ 232.104(2)(b). The juvenile court could not do that in this case—the mother had

received services from 2018 and the condition of her home has been a persistent

issue across multiple homes. According to her psychological evaluation completed

in January 2023, she “ha[d] learned little from her social services contact” and

“without continuing supervision, is apt to allow her home environment to deteriorate

to its former state.” The evaluation went on to state “[the mother’s] history suggests

an ability to conform for short periods of time followed by a more consistent pattern

of lack of motivation.” We cannot say, based on this record, that six months would

be enough time for the mother to not only sanitize the conditions of the home, but

to show the ability to maintain those conditions, especially given the length of time

she has already had to do so without sustained improvement. See In re C.B., 611

N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (“Once the limitation period lapses, termination

proceedings must be viewed with a sense of urgency. Insight for the determination

of the child’s long-range best interests can be gleaned from ‘evidence of the
                                          5

parent’s past performance for that performance may be indicative of the quality of

the future care that parent is capable of providing.’” (citations omitted)); P.L., 778

N.W.2d at 41 (“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency

after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by

hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable

home for the child.”). So, we uphold the juvenile court’s decision not to grant

additional time toward reunification.

       We turn to the child’s best interests, which we feel are served by

termination. Courts “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the

physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2). In this case, the mother has not demonstrated the ability to maintain

sanitary housing. Moreover, the mother has not ensured that the individuals in her

home are safe for her child to be around; while “we do not require compliance for

compliance’s sake” from parents seeking reunification, In re G.B., No. 22-0439,

2022 WL 1657190, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2022), the mother’s failure to

comply with providing the necessary paperwork for her paramour’s background

check or recognize the issue his criminal past poses makes us question her

protective capacity. And, though the mother points to her positive visitation history,

this does not outweigh the danger of placing a toddler back into an unsuitable

home. The child, however, has bonded with the foster home and is receiving the

care necessary to ensure his future development. Termination is in the child’s best

interests.
                                            6

       The mother makes reference to the bond between her and the child. Insofar

as she is referencing the permissive exception to termination in Iowa Code

section 232.116(3)(c), which allows the court not to terminate parental rights if

“[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental

to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship,” she

bears the burden to establish an exception to termination. See In re A.S., 906

N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). And while the record mentions a bond between the

mother and the child, she has provided no evidence that their bond overcomes the

need for termination.

       Because a six-month extension would not be appropriate and termination is

in the child’s best interests, we affirm.

       AFFIRMED.