Court Opinion

ID: 9630912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:24:00.033463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:46.079022
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice SCOTT.
I respectfully dissent. Although the trial judge erred by engaging in an ex parte communication with the jury during the guilt phase deliberations, it was harmless error. Thus, Robert Welch’s conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
In dissenting, I concede that the ex parte communication was improper, but such errors are subject to harmless error analysis. See RCr 9.24. Under such analysis, we must therefore disregard the error if it does not affect the substantial rights of Appellant; see id., meaning “that if upon a consideration of the whole case this court does not believe there is a substantial possibility that the result would have been any different, the irregularity will be held nonprejudicial.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 313, 324 (Ky.2006), citing Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 27 (Ky.2005).
In finding reversible error, the majority relies in part on Mills v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 366 (Ky.2001), where this Court found a serious constitutional violation when the trial judge provided taped statements to a jury that had not been admitted into evidence. We reasoned that the trial judge committed an “error of serious constitutional magnitude” because the jury had not heard the tapes during the trial, and thus the statements were not subject to adversarial testing. Id. at 372. That is not the case here.
In this matter, after a discussion with the trial judge requesting a review of Allen’s testimony, the jury indicated it was seeking an answer to a specific factual question disclosed in that testimony. The trial judge simply provided the answer— which the jury had already heard when Allen testified under direct and cross-examination at trial.
*562The majority incorrectly characterizes the ex parte communication as a judicial finding on a central issue in the case. According to the first notes between the judge and jury,1 it was understood that the jury had inquired about Allen’s testimony, not the trial judge’s personal opinion. Thus, the trial judge’s response was nothing more than a repeat of that previously admitted testimonial evidence. Moreover, the error was not prejudicial to Welch because the trial judge’s response was correct as is demonstrated by Allen’s testimony.
In sum, the technical error committed here is not sufficiently serious to warrant vacating his conviction. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 104 S.Ct. 458, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1988) (holding that an ex parte communication between trial judge and jury can be harmless error). Accordingly, I dissent.

. The jury sent the trial judge a note that said, "Willie Allen's testimony regarding their activity when they left White Castle.” The trial judge's written response was "[w]e are finding the tape and the portion of the testimony after they left White Castle. Is there a particular statement you are looking for? S/Gary Payne.”