Court Opinion

ID: 9954194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 20:03:11.82005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:52.844597
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                          DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                             B322561

         Plaintiff and Respondent,       (Los Angeles County
                                         Super. Ct. No. BA050222)
         v.

 BRIAN TERRELL HILL et al.,

         Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEALS from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County. Victor D. Martinez and Juan Carlos
Dominguez, Judges. Affirmed.
      Steven A. Brody, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Brian Terrell Hill.
      Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Clifford Jenkins.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and
Amanda V. Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
               _________________________________
       Brian Terrell Hill and Clifford Jenkins appeal the denial of
their petitions for resentencing under Penal Code 1 section 1172.6
(former § 1170.95). 2 Appellants contend the denial of their
petitions in reliance on a theory of felony murder based on
kidnapping violates ex post facto principles because, at the time
of the offense, kidnapping was not an enumerated felony under
section 189, subdivision (a) to which felony-murder liability could
attach. In the event this court concludes appellants may be
guilty under a theory of felony murder based on robbery,
appellant Jenkins asserts that remand is required to allow the
superior court to conduct a new evidentiary hearing at which the
People must prove appellants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
felony murder based on robbery. 3 Appellants further contend
that substantial evidence does not support the superior courts’
findings. We reject appellants’ contentions and affirm the denial
of their petitions under section 1172.6.

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

      2 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)
      3 Because we decide that the superior court properly denied
appellant Jenkins’s petition on the ground that he could be
convicted of felony murder on the basis of the kidnappings, we do
not address this claim.

                                 2
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A. The murder of Randy Burge and attempted murder of
       Kevin Thomas 4
       On February 22, 1990, approximately 2:00 in the afternoon,
Kevin Thomas was stopped in traffic in his car on 67th Street
between Kansas Street and Vermont Avenue in Los Angeles,
when Ernest Simms approached on foot. Placing a .25- or .32-
caliber revolver against the back of Thomas’s head, Simms
ordered Thomas out of the car. Simms forced Thomas at
gunpoint to walk up a driveway to the back of a house where
Jenkins was waiting at the back door. Jenkins was also armed
with a .25- or .32-caliber revolver.
       Putting his gun to the back of Thomas’s head, Jenkins
forced Thomas through the kitchen into the living room of the
house, where he made Thomas lie down on the floor. While
Simms stood over Thomas with his gun trained on his head,
Jenkins put his knee in Thomas’s back, handcuffed him, and
placed duct tape over his mouth. As he restrained Thomas,
Jenkins said, “ ‘This is for when I seen you the other day and you
pointed your finger at me.’ ”
       Jenkins then left the house and returned with Randy
Burge. Burge held his hands up as Jenkins forced him into the
living room with his gun pressed into Burge’s back. Simms said
to Burge, who had been standing on the street corner when
Thomas was abducted, “ ‘[Y]ou at the wrong place at the wrong
time.’ ” Burge was forced to the floor, and as Jenkins stood over
Burge pointing his gun at him, Simms put Burge in handcuffs,

      4 The following statement of facts is drawn from the record
of appellants’ trial.

                                3
tied his ankles, and stuffed a white T-shirt or cloth into Burge’s
mouth. The T-shirt was replaced with duct tape, but the T-shirt
was later put back in Burge’s mouth.
       After Burge had been brought into the house, Freddie Doss
entered, followed shortly thereafter by appellant Hill. Hill was
armed with a .25- or .32-caliber revolver, and Doss had a slightly
larger guna .38-caliber revolver. When Hill saw Thomas on the
couch in handcuffs, he said to Thomas, “ ‘Yeah, we got you.’ ”
Pointing his gun at Thomas and Burge, Hill repeatedly told them
“to keep the noise down.”
       Burge kept making noise and asking why they were doing
this to him. Simms responded, “ ‘Shut up, man, I’m not
playing.’ ” When Burge persisted, Simms shot him in the foot.
       At some point, Simms demanded $10,000 from Thomas.
With their guns on Thomas’s head, Simms and Jenkins put the
phone to Thomas’s ear and made him call his mother for the
money. They told Thomas to say “a girl” would come over to pick
up the money. Jenkins wrote down Ms. Thomas’s address. Later
Jenkins took Thomas’s keys, $30 in cash, and a ring from
Thomas’s finger. Thomas’s handcuffs and the tape had been
removed to allow Thomas to call his mother. After the call,
Jenkins replaced both.
       About an hour and a half to two hours into the kidnapping,
and about 10 to 15 minutes after the ransom call, Jenkins and
Simms left the house. Hill and Doss remained guarding Thomas
and Burge with their guns. The tape was removed and the
victims were given beer and cigarettes, but when they asked why
this was happening, Hill and Doss just told them to “ ‘shut up.’ ”
       Around 5:00 p.m., Lucille Thomas received a phone call
from her son. He said, “ ‘A girl named Donna is coming by to pick

                                4
up $10,000. Give it, give it to her.’ ” Then the line went dead.
Ms. Thomas was able to pull together the $10,000, and about 45
minutes after the phone call, a woman calling herself Donna
came to the door demanding the money. Ms. Thomas gave Donna
the money and saw her walk across the street toward a purple
van Ms. Thomas had never seen before.
       Jenkins and Simms returned to the house about an hour
and a half to two hours after they had left. Thomas asked if they
had collected the money from his mother. Simms told Thomas
his mother was not home and said, “ ‘No, we didn’t get [the
money] and your mama don’t care about you.’ ” Apparently
looking for a specific key, Jenkins took Thomas’s sock off. Then
Jenkins and Simms left the house again, leaving Hill and Doss to
stand guard with guns pointed at the captives.
       After being held for about five hours, Thomas came to
believe that he had to escape or he would be killed. Still
handcuffed, he bolted from the couch and threw himself through
a closed glass window, landing on his back in the driveway about
five feet below the window. The handcuffs broke apart on impact.
He got up and began running as Hill and Doss came out of the
house. Hill and Doss pursued Thomas, firing five to six shots at
Thomas. Thomas first sought safety in nearby apartments, but
no one would let him in. Finally, approximately 8:00 p.m. he ran
into a liquor store at 67th and Vermont, and one of the employees
called the police.
       When the police arrived, Thomas told them what had
happened, and the officers took Thomas back to the location
where he had been held. Around 9:50 p.m., as the police car
turned the corner just past the house, the officers and Thomas
saw a burgundy or purple van. Thomas spotted Jenkins and

                               5
Simms in the van and alerted the police. As the police siren was
activated, the van sped away and pulled into a driveway.
Jenkins and Simms exited the vehicle and fled on foot. Simms
was apprehended a short time later, and Jenkins was found
hiding in the residence of Simms’s mother. Police recovered two
handcuff keys from a toilet bowl where Jenkins was
apprehended.
       Hill, Doss, and Burge were gone when Thomas and police
officers entered the house where the victims had been held.
       Around 9:00 p.m. on February 22, 1990, a witness heard a
single gunshot coming from the playground area of Centinela
Park in Inglewood, approximately 3.9 miles from the house where
Burge and Thomas had been held. The next morning around 6:35
a.m., a jogger discovered a body in Centinela Park. Police arrived
to find Burge’s body facedown in the park, his hands handcuffed
behind his back. He had a white T-shirt rolled up in his mouth
as a gag and tied behind his neck. He had two visible gunshot
wounds: a bullet wound behind his right ear, and a bullet hole in
the top of his right shoe. There was a pool of blood around the
head on the ground, and blood coming out of the ears, mouth, and
nose. The condition of the body and pool of blood at the head
suggested Burge had been killed at the site where he was found.
       The autopsy revealed that Burge had died from a single
gunshot wound to the head, fired from a .38-caliber revolver in
contact with the skin. Time of death was estimated between 8:00
and 9:00 p.m. on February 22, 1990. The gunshot wound to the
foot had come from a .22-caliber handgun.
    B. Conviction and sentencing
       On November 17, 1992, a jury convicted appellants as
charged of the first degree murder of Burge (§ 187, subd. (a);

                                6
count 1), and the attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder of Thomas (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 6). 5
       At sentencing, the trial court struck the special
circumstance findings as to appellant Hill, and sentenced both
appellants to a term of 25 years to life for the first degree murder
of Burge (count 1), plus a consecutive term of four years for the
personal gun use enhancement on count 1. The court further
imposed a subordinate consecutive term of life with parole for the
attempted murder of Thomas (count 6). 6
       This court affirmed the judgment in an unpublished
opinion in case number B074209, filed January 11, 1996. (People
v. Clifford Jenkins et al. (Jan. 11, 1996, B074209) [nonpub. opn.].)

      5 The jury also convicted appellants as charged of the
kidnapping of Burge for robbery (§ 209, subd. (b); count 2), the
kidnapping of Thomas for ransom (§ 209, subd. (a); count 3),
conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom
(§§ 182/209, subd. (a); count 4), and the robbery of Thomas (§ 211,
subd. (a); count 5). The jury found the personal use of a firearm
enhancement true as to both appellants on counts 1 through 6.
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) In addition, as to appellant Hill, the jury
found the special circumstance true that he committed the
murder during the commission of a robbery and a kidnapping.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court
found appellant Jenkins guilty of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (former § 12021.1; count 11), and also found three
alleged prison priors true.
      6 The trial court stayed the sentences on the remaining
counts and struck the personal gun use enhancements for
purposes of sentencing on counts 2 through 6. Appellant Jenkins
was sentenced to an additional concurrent term of two years for
the felon in possession charge (count 11).

                                 7
    C. The Section 1172.6 Proceedings
       In March and August 2019, respectively, appellants Hill
and Jenkins filed petitions for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6. Both petitions were denied for failure to make a prima
facie showing for relief. Both appellants appealed. In each case,
this court reversed the order denying the petition and remanded
the matter with directions to issue orders to show cause and
further proceedings in accordance with section 1172.6,
subdivision (d). (People v. Ernest Simms et al. (July 2, 2021,
B304577) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Clifford Jenkins (Feb. 4, 2022,
B312226) [nonpub. opn.].)
       Following remand, orders to show cause issued, and
appellants’ section 1172.6 petitions came on for evidentiary
hearing. The evidentiary hearings were conducted by two
different superior court judges in separate proceedings.
       1. The evidentiary hearing on appellant Hill’s petition 7
       At the start of the evidentiary hearing, the superior court
announced it had reviewed the abstract of judgment, the
charging documents, the trial transcripts, jury instructions,
verdict forms, and the procedural portions of the Court of Appeal
opinion. The parties did not present any additional evidence, but
relied on the trial record.
       Following argument by the parties, the superior court
found appellant Hill guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the

      7 On January 7, 2022, appellant Hill filed a second section
1172.6 petition in which he sought resentencing on his conviction
for attempted murder. At the evidentiary hearing, counsel for
Hill argued for section 1172.6 relief as to both the murder and
attempted murder convictions, and in denying the petition, the
superior court addressed both.

                                8
attempted murder of Thomas. Declaring that malice “was very
easily found,” the court explained that “[f]iring a weapon directly
at an individual, even if you miss him, clearly shows [the intent]
to kill that person.” The court further noted that Hill and Doss
were attempting to kill Thomas because he was a potential
witness.
       Next, the superior court found Hill guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the murder of Burge on two theories. First,
the court determined that Hill was a direct aider and abettor in
the killing who acted with malice. The court found that Hill
assisted Doss in transporting Burge to the park and killing him.
The court explained, “[T]he idea that Doss on his own, . . . bound
and gagged this person [who had been] shot in the foot and took
him to the park by himself and executed him by himself is not
reasonable to this court.” The court further found that Hill and
Doss’s attempt to kill Thomas established a willingness to kill to
eliminate witnesses, and thus showed malice, planning, and
deliberation in the killing of Burge. The court observed, even “if
there’s some argument that Hill didn’t go, his participation
throughout the entire incident . . . [makes] very clear that Hill
was part of the whole planning of this.” The court concluded that
Hill “is not eligible for relief [under section 1172.6] because the
People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [Hill] could
be convicted of murder under the current state of the law,
specifically the defendant was not the actual killer, but with
intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested or assisted . . . the actual killer in committing
the murder.”
       The superior court also found Hill guilty of murder beyond
a reasonable doubt on a theory of felony murder based on the

                                  9
kidnapping. It specifically found Hill was a major participant in
the kidnapping who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. The court explained that “Hill was an active participant in
the kidnapping of the victims and involved in the planning and
was present when the ransom call was made. Doss and Hill held
the two kidnapped individuals for more than five hours, and
again was actively involved with his gun and in controlling the
two individuals.” The court reiterated its finding that Hill had
fired his gun at Thomas as Thomas tried to escape.
       2. The evidentiary hearing on appellant Jenkins’s petition
       At the hearing on appellant Jenkins’s petition, the parties
submitted on the record of conviction, including the clerk’s and
reporter’s transcripts, procedural portions of the prior appellate
opinions, and all prior submissions by the parties. No additional
evidence or arguments were presented, and the superior court
took the matter under submission.
       On July 13, 2022, the superior court issued a memorandum
of decision denying the petition. In it, the court noted it had
previously taken judicial notice of the trial court’s file and the
appellate record in the case. The court ruled Jenkins ineligible
for section 1172.6 relief based on its finding, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Jenkins is guilty of felony murder under current law.
In support of its ruling, the court found that Jenkins “assumed a
leadership role in the kidnapping of the two victims” and “was
armed throughout the incident, pointing his gun at Thomas’ head
on two occasions.” The court also noted that it was Jenkins who
put duct tape over Thomas’s mouth, Jenkins who forced Thomas
to call his mother for the ransom money and wrote down
Thomas’s home address, and Jenkins who robbed Thomas of his

                                10
ring and $30 cash. And after his arrest, Jenkins offered to pay
Thomas $5,000 to recant his preliminary hearing testimony.
        Based on these facts, the superior court found Jenkins’s
“actions during the incident” satisfied the requirements of both
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). Jenkins was a “ ‘major
participant in the incident who acted with reckless indifference to
human life,’ ” and thus guilty of first degree murder and
ineligible for resentencing.
                            DISCUSSION
  I. Appellants Are Ineligible for Section 1172.6
        Relief Based on a Kidnapping-Felony-Murder
        Theory that Is Valid Under Current Law
    A. Section 1172.6
        Enacted in 2018 and effective January 1, 2019, the
Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 “ ‘to amend the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) In addition to
substantively amending sections 188 and 189 of the Penal Code,
Senate Bill [No.] 1437 added section [1172.6], which provides a
procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted
under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) Effective January 1,
2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1172.6 to expand its
coverage to individuals convicted of “attempted murder under the

                                11
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a); People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 747.)
       Upon the filing of a facially sufficient resentencing petition
under section 1172.6, the superior court must conduct a prima
facie analysis with briefing to determine the petitioner’s
eligibility for relief, and, if the requisite prima facie showing is
made, issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v.
Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869; People v. Nieber (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 458, 469–470.) At the evidentiary hearing following
issuance of an order to show cause, the superior court acts as an
independent fact finder, and the prosecution bears the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder under California law following
Senate Bill No. 1437’s amendments. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3);
Wilson, at p. 869.) The petitioner and the prosecutor may offer
new or additional evidence, and the court may consider evidence
“previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); Wilson, at p. 869.)
       On appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition after
an evidentiary hearing, we review the superior court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence and the court’s application of
the law to those facts de novo. (People v. Wilson (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 903, 916.) In conducting our review, we consider the
whole record in the light most favorable to the superior court’s
findings (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 323), and we
presume “ ‘every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact
could have reasonably deduced from the evidence.’ ” (Id. at
p. 331.) We ask “whether substantial evidence, defined as
reasonable and credible evidence of solid value, has been

                                 12
disclosed, permitting the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820.)
And based on this whole record review, we “ ‘determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v.
Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 270.) Finally, our Supreme
Court has held that whether the prosecutor relied upon direct or
circumstantial evidence, if the trier of fact’s determination is
supported, reversal is not warranted, even where “ ‘ “the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.” ’ ” (Vargas, at p. 820, quoting Rivera, at
p. 331.)
    B. The application of a kidnapping-felony-murder
theory to appellants’ section 1172.6 petitions did not violate
ex post facto principles
       At the time of the kidnappings and murder on February 22,
1990, in this case, kidnapping was not an underlying felony for
first degree felony murder liability. That changed in June 1990,
when the voters approved Proposition 115, which amended
section 189, subdivision (a) to add kidnapping as an enumerated
offense on which a conviction for felony murder could be based.
(People v. Ordonez (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1207, 1217, fn. 1.)
       Section 189, subdivision (e) allows a conviction based on
felony murder for a “participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death
occurs” if the person was (1) the actual killer, (2) a direct aider
and abettor who acted with the intent to kill, or (3) a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)–(3).) Currently,
section 189, subdivision (a) includes both kidnapping and robbery

                                13
among the offenses upon which a felony-murder conviction may
be based.
       Appellants contend that the denial of their section 1172.6
petitions in reliance on a theory of felony murder based on the
kidnapping violates ex post facto principles because at the time of
the offense, kidnapping was not an enumerated offense to which
first degree felony-murder liability could attach. This argument
fails.
       Section 1172.6 does not fall into any of the four traditional
categories of ex post facto laws established by the United States
Supreme Court: (1) It does not impose punishment for an act
which was not punishable at the time it was committed; (2) It
does not aggravate a crime or make it greater than it was when
committed; (3) It does not impose a greater punishment for a
crime than when the crime was committed; and (4) It does not
“ ‘alter[ ] the legal rules of evidence, [or] receive[ ] less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.’ ”
(Stogner v. California (2003) 539 U.S. 607, 612, italics omitted;
Weaver v. Graham (1981) 450 U.S. 24, 28 [“The ex post facto
prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law
‘which imposes a punishment for an act which was not
punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional
punishment to that then prescribed’ ”]; People v. Gonzales (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 1167, 1172–1173.) Indeed, as our Supreme Court
has observed, preventing unforeseeable punishment is “one of the
primary purposes of the ex post facto clause.” (People v. Snook
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1221.)
       Section 1172.6 does not apply any new law retroactively to
make formerly innocent conduct criminal. Rather, it looks to

                                14
whether a defendant could be convicted under current law
despite the elimination of certain theories of murder that were
available to the prosecution when the defendant was convicted
before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437. Accordingly, the
denial of a section 1172.6 petition in reliance on a theory of felony
murder based on current law does not implicate ex post facto
principles.
       Moreover, courts have uniformly held the sentence
modification procedure under section 1172.6 to constitute an act
of legislative lenity, not a new criminal prosecution. (Estrada v.
Superior Court (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 915, 925 (Estrada) [“The
retroactive relief provided by Penal Code section 1172.6 ‘ “is a
legislative ‘act of lenity’ intended to give defendants serving
otherwise final sentences the benefit of ameliorative changes to
applicable criminal laws and does not result in a new trial or
increased punishment” ’ ”]; People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
27, 45 (Njoku); People v. Flint (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 607, 618;
People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 704 (Myles); People v.
James (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 604, 610–611 (James); People v.
Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94, 111 (Hernandez).)
       Resentencing under section 1172.6 is a completely
voluntary process initiated by the petitioner, which cannot result
in additional punishment. (Estrada, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 925.) It therefore does not implicate double jeopardy concerns,
and there is no Sixth Amendment right to a jury. (People v.
Duran (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 920, 931 [no right to jury or
protection against double jeopardy]; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 575, 589 [same]; Hernandez, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th
at p. 111 [double jeopardy concerns not implicated]; James,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 611 [no right to jury].) Indeed, “[a]

                                 15
petitioner under section 1172.6 does not possess many of the
constitutional rights afforded to a criminal defendant at trial.”
(Njoku, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 44–45; Duran, at p. 931
[“the panoply of rights that attach at trial do not apply during a
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing”]; Mitchell, at p. 588 [“Many
constitutional protections that characterize burdensome criminal
prosecutions thus do not apply in this ameliorative process”]; see
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 973 [right to counsel in § 1172.6
proceeding is statutory, not constitutional]; Myles, supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 706 [“Because a sentence modification under
section [1172.6] is an act of lenity and not a criminal trial, the
wrongful admission of evidence does not implicate defendant’s
constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment”].)
       In People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, the court
held that “[i]nterpreting section 1172.6 to allow the prosecution
to present different theories of guilt at the evidentiary hearing
does not implicate constitutional concerns.” 8 (Id. at p. 444.) The
court explained, “As the People aptly put it, ‘[B]ecause a section
[1172.6] evidentiary hearing does not subject a defendant to the
risk of additional punishment, is not a trial, permits both parties
to present new evidence, and merely considers whether the
defendant’s request for leniency meets the necessary criteria,
there is no constitutional problem in allowing new theories of
murder liability at that hearing.’ ” (Id. at pp. 444–445; see also

      8 The Schell court’s interpretation remains subject to
validation by our Supreme Court, which has stated, “[W]e
express no view on whether a court may deny a section 1172.6
resentencing petition based on a theory of murder not argued by
the prosecution at trial.” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
987.)

                                16
People v. Gonzales, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174 [“when a
murder conviction is vacated under section [1172.6], it does not
violate ex post facto or due process principles for the court to
retroactively apply a sentencing provision that is supported by
the record of conviction when resentencing the defendant, as long
as the new sentence is no more severe than the punishment
assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred, and is not
greater than the defendant’s original sentence”].)
       In Hernandez, the defendant was charged and convicted by
jury of felony murder based on the 1988 killing of a police officer
during a commercial burglary. (Hernandez, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at pp. 100, 101–102.) Although the trial court had
instructed only on a theory of first degree felony murder, the
court did not require the jury to make a finding on the degree of
the murder. (Id. at pp. 101–102.) The trial court sentenced
defendant to 25 years to life on the first degree felony-murder
conviction. (Id. at p. 102.) But because the verdict form did not
specify the degree of felony murder, on appeal from the judgment
the appellate court modified the sentence to second degree
murder under section 1157, and defendant was resentenced to a
term of 15 years to life for the second degree murder. (Ibid.)
       Following an evidentiary hearing on Hernandez’s section
1172.6 resentencing petition, the superior court applied current
law and ruled that Hernandez was ineligible for relief because he
could still be convicted of first degree murder under section 189,
subdivision (f). (Hernandez, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.) On
appeal from the denial of his petition, Hernandez argued:
   (1) Because the appellate court had ruled Hernandez’s
conviction was for second degree murder, he could not now be

                                17
tried or convicted of first degree murder. (Hernandez, supra, 60
Cal.App.5th at p. 109.)
   (2) Because second degree felony murder has been eliminated,
and section 189, subdivisions (e) and (f) do not apply to his
conviction, Hernandez was entitled to relief under section 1172.6.
(Hernandez, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 110.)
       The court rejected Hernandez’s arguments, 9 explaining,
“an inmate’s petition under section [1172.6] ‘express[es] the
hypothetical situation’ of ‘what would happen today if he or she
were tried under the new provisions of the Penal Code?’
[Citation.] Once a petitioner establishes a prima facie case of
eligibility, the prosecutor must prove under amended sections
188 and 189 the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing ‘under
current law.’ ” (Hernandez, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 110,
italics added.) Thus, the court concluded, “[I]f prosecuted today,
under current law, Hernandez could be convicted of first degree
murder under section 189, subdivision (f). [Citation.] What this
court decided in 1990, and whether that decision is law of the
case, is not relevant to the analysis.” (Ibid.)
       The same reasoning applies to the instant case.
Resentencing under section 1172.6 requires that “[t]he petitioner
could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) At the
evidentiary hearing under subdivision (d)(3), the prosecution

      9 The court also rejected Hernandez’s third argument, that
the law of the case doctrine precluded conviction today of first
degree felony murder. (Hernandez, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at
p. 110.)

                                18
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the petitioner is guilty of
murder under current law notwithstanding the amendments to
sections 188 and 189. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
943, 952.) The trial court thus does not determine guilt, but
rather, the petitioner’s eligibility for relief under a retroactive
sentencing law based on a reasonable doubt standard. (Njoku,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 45.)
       Finally, appellants’ ex post facto argument amounts to
nothing more than a “heads I win, tails you lose” proposition.
There is no dispute that appellants were validly convicted in 1992
under the law as it stood in 1992. There is also no question they
can be validly convicted under current law in 2024. But
appellants claim they are entitled to acquittals by applying
current law to invalidate the 1992 theory of conviction, while
reserving the right to apply 1992 law to avoid upholding their
convictions under current law. There is nothing in the text,
legislative history, or stated intent of Senate Bill No. 1437 to
support application of section 1172.6 in this manner.
       In short, ex post facto principles have no application here.
The superior court properly could and did deny appellants’
resentencing petitions on the ground that they could be convicted
under current law on a theory of first degree felony murder based
on the kidnappings.
  II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Superior
       Courts’ Findings
    A. Substantial evidence supports the superior court’s
determination that appellant Hill intended to kill Thomas
and is therefore guilty of attempted murder
       Attempted murder consists of two elements: the specific
intent to kill coupled with a direct but ineffectual act to

                                19
accomplish the intended killing. (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1
Cal.5th 838, 890; People v. Gaines (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 91, 131.)
Although evidence of motive is not required to establish intent to
kill, such evidence is often probative of intent. (People v. Smith
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741 (Smith).) And “[b]ecause direct
evidence of a defendant’s intent rarely exists, intent may be
inferred from the circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s
acts.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 457.)
       Here, substantial evidence supports the superior court’s
determination that appellant Hill fired at Thomas with the intent
to kill him. The evidence established that Hill was a key player
in an elaborate plan to obtain $10,000 in ransom money from
Thomas’s mother without getting caught. Burge, who might have
witnessed Thomas’s abduction, was also kidnapped for being “ ‘at
the wrong place at the wrong time.’ ” After Thomas had been
taken to the house and handcuffed, Hill came in carrying a gun
and said to Thomas, “ ‘Yeah, we got you.’ ” Apparently wanting
to avoid detection, Hill pointed his gun at both Thomas and
Burge, repeatedly telling them to be quiet and warning Burge to
“[s]hut up. We’re not playing. Keep the noise down.”
       After the ransom call to Thomas’s mother, when Simms
and appellant Jenkins left the house, appellant Hill and Doss
guarded Thomas and Burge at gunpoint to prevent their escape.
Thomas was handcuffed with tape over his mouth. When Simms
and Jenkins returned, they falsely told Thomas his mother was
not home and the ransom money had not been collected. Still,
Hill and his cohorts did not release their captives, and showed no
inclination to do so. Indeed, when Simms and Jenkins again left
the house, Hill and Doss continued to guard Thomas and Burge
at gunpoint.

                               20
       After being held captive at gunpoint for about five hours
and believing that he would be killed if he did not escape,
Thomas threw himself out a closed window. Immediately after
Thomas jumped out the window, appellant Hill came out of the
house with Doss, firing five or six shots at Thomas as they chased
him down the street.
       All of these circumstances surrounding the kidnappings,
which culminated in Hill’s act of firing multiple shots at Thomas
while actively pursuing him to stop his escape, constitute
substantial evidence of Hill’s intent to kill Thomas. Indeed,
“ ‘[t]he act of firing toward a victim at a close, but not point-
blank, range “in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal
wound had the bullet been on target is sufficient to support an
inference of intent to kill.” ’ ” (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at
p. 741.) The fact that Hill gave up the chase and stopped
shooting at Thomas without succeeding in killing him does not
establish that he lacked the intent to kill. As our Supreme Court
has observed, “ ‘ “The fact that the shooter may have fired only
once and then abandoned his efforts out of necessity or fear does
not compel the conclusion that he lacked the animus to kill in the
first instance. Nor does the fact that the victim may have
escaped death because of the shooter’s poor marksmanship
necessarily establish a less culpable state of mind.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

                               21
   B. Substantial evidence supports the superior courts’
findings that appellants Hill and Jenkins are guilty of
felony murder as major participants in the kidnapping
who acted with reckless indifference to human life
       1. Applying the factors identified in Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th 788, substantial evidence supports the superior courts’
findings that both appellants Hill and Jenkins were major
participants in the kidnappings
       In Banks, our Supreme Court identified a number of factors
to be considered “in determining the ultimate question, whether
the defendant’s participation ‘in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death’ [citation] was sufficiently significant
to be considered ‘major.’ ” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
Those factors include: “What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?
What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal
weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular
dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the
defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did
the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Ibid.) The court
emphasized, however, that while all of these factors may be
weighed in determining the extent of a defendant’s participation
in the criminal enterprise that resulted in death, “[n]o one of
these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them
necessarily sufficient.” (Ibid.)

                                22
      Nearly all of the Banks factors support the superior courts’
findings that Hill and Jenkins were both major participants in
the kidnappings.
      There was substantial evidence that both Hill and Jenkins
played major roles in planning the kidnapping of Thomas, which
led directly to Burge’s kidnapping and death. (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 803 [“What role did the defendant have in planning
the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?”].) The
kidnapping required significant planning and coordination:
handcuffs and duct tape were at the ready to restrain the victims,
the timing of Thomas’s abduction had been set, all of the
perpetrators had guns, and the cooperation of “Donna” had been
arranged to collect the ransom money from Ms. Thomas.
       Jenkins was waiting at the back door as Simms walked up
to the house holding Thomas at gunpoint. Jenkins then put his
gun to Thomas’s head as he forced him into the living room where
he put Thomas in handcuffs and taped his mouth. As he
handcuffed Thomas, Jenkins said, “This is for when I seen you
the other day and you pointed your finger at me.” It was then
Jenkins who went out and returned holding Burge at gunpoint.
And as Simms handcuffed, tied and gagged Burge, Jenkins stood
with his gun trained on Burge.
       Although Hill did not arrive at the house until shortly after
Thomas and Burge had been taken captive, he showed no
surprise at finding the two men bound and gagged in the living
room. Rather, he said to Thomas, “Yeah, we got you.”
      Hill and Jenkins used lethal weapons throughout the
kidnapping, and both men repeatedly threatened Thomas and
Burge with their guns. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803
[“What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal

                                23
weapons?”].) Jenkins used his gun to force both victims to enter
the house against their will. He held his gun against Thomas’s
head to make him call his mother for the $10,000 ransom. Hill
also repeatedly pointed his gun at Thomas and Burge, telling
them to “keep the noise down.” When Jenkins and Simms left
the house, Hill stayed behind to guard the captives at gunpoint,
and Hill actually fired his weapon at Thomas after Thomas had
thrown himself through a closed window to escape.
       The evidence also showed Hill and Jenkins were aware of
the dangers posed by the nature of the crime. (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 803 [“What awareness did the defendant have of
particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants?”].)
Not only were Hill, Jenkins, and the rest of the cohorts armed,
but neither Hill nor Jenkins gave any indication that the
circumstances surrounding the kidnappings, the restraint of
Thomas and Burge, or the close watch over the captives to
prevent escape were outside of the scope of their plan. There was
no evidence of any reaction by Hill or Jenkins when Simms shot
Burge in the foot for complaining and making too much noise.
(See People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 [“Missing from
Douglas’s description of the robbery and murder and its
aftermath are signs the shooting surprised him”].) By pressing
his gun into Burge’s back as he forced him into the house,
Jenkins showed a clear awareness of the risk, indeed the
likelihood, that this witness to the Thomas kidnapping and
robbery would be killed. For his part, Hill did not hesitate to fire
on Thomas when he tried to escape.
       Evidence that both Jenkins and Hill were in a position to
prevent Burge’s murder and that their actions played an

                                24
important role in Burge’s death establishes both as major
participants. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803 [“Was the
defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death?”].) Jenkins
went out and kidnapped Burge because he was “ ‘at the wrong
place at the wrong time,’ ” having witnessed Thomas’s abduction.
Jenkins was thus directly responsible for setting the events in
motion that led to Burge’s death. Jenkins then left his two
armed cohorts to guard Thomas and Burge when he left the
house, knowing that lethal force might be used. And lethal force
was used. After chasing and shooting at Thomas, Hill and Doss
were left alone with Burge. Because Burge had a gunshot wound
to his foot, the superior court reasonably found that Doss did not
take him to the park by himself, but was assisted by Hill. Hill
thus had two opportunities to facilitate or prevent Burge’s
murder, and his actions ultimately played a decisive role in
Burge’s death.
       Finally, Hill did not call for help after lethal force was used.
For his part, Jenkins offered Thomas $5,000 to say that he had
lied in his preliminary hearing testimony. (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 803 [“What did the defendant do after lethal force
was used?”].)
       2. Applying the factors identified in Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th 522, substantial evidence supports the superior courts’
findings that appellants Hill and Jenkins both acted with reckless
indifference to human life
       Our Supreme Court has explained that “[r]eckless
indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective
element. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) As to the

                                  25
subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and
willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular
offense is committed,’ and he or she must consciously disregard
‘the significant risk of death his or her actions create.’ (Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801; see Clark, at p. 617.) As to the
objective element, ‘ “[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature
and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the
actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.” ’ (Clark, at p. 617, quoting Model Pen. Code, § 2.02,
subd. (2)(c).)” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677.)
       In Clark, our Supreme Court handed down a list of factors
to consider in determining whether a defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life: (1) The defendant’s use of, or
awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons; (2) The
defendant’s physical presence at the crime, and the opportunities
to limit it and/or to aid the victim(s); (3) The duration of the
felony and restraint of the victim(s); (4) The defendant’s
awareness that an associate is likely to kill; and (5) The
defendant’s efforts to minimize the risk of violence during the
course of the felony. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–623.)
As it had in Banks, the court emphasized that “ ‘[n]o one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.’ ” (Id. at p. 618, quoting Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 803.) And “[b]ecause the major participant and reckless
indifference elements often ‘ “significantly overlap” ’ [citations],
this list of factors also overlap[s] with those . . . identified in
connection with the major participation inquiry in Banks.”
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 706.)

                                 26
       Applying those factors to the case at bar, we conclude
substantial evidence supports the superior courts’ findings that
Hill and Jenkins both acted with reckless indifference to human
life in carrying out the kidnappings.
       Both Hill and Jenkins were present at the scene of the
kidnappings, both were armed, and both used their guns
repeatedly to intimidate and threaten Thomas and Burge. It is
also apparent from the circumstances of the kidnappings that all
four perpetrators were involved in the planning of the crime, and
neither Hill nor Jenkins attempted to restrain their compatriots
or aid the victims in any way. The kidnapping extended over five
hours, during which time Thomas and Burge were held at
gunpoint, handcuffed, tied up, and had duct tape placed over
their mouths. In addition, a T-shirt was stuffed into Burge’s
mouth, and Simms shot Burge in the foot. Jenkins had
numerous opportunities to restrain the other gunmen and/or aid
the victims; instead, he robbed Thomas, while Hill stood by. And
even when Jenkins left the house, he left armed guards to
prevent the captives’ escape. After Hill fired his gun at Thomas
to stop him from fleeing, he did not help Burge to escape, nor did
he call for help at any time before or after Burge’s murder.
       There was also substantial evidence that Jenkins knew his
cohorts might kill Burge. Jenkins personally kidnapped Burge at
gunpoint because he happened to be “in the wrong place at the
wrong time.” When Jenkins left two armed associates to guard
Thomas and Burge, Simms had already fired his gun and shot
Burge in the footproviding evidence that Jenkins had
contemplated that Hill and Doss might use deadly force.
       Jenkins argues that the robbery of Thomas was completed
by the time Burge was killed, and there was no evidence Jenkins

                               27
was present at the scene of the murder. Our Supreme Court has
rejected this argument, “holding that felony murder applies when
the killing and the felony are part of one continuous transaction,
including a defendant’s flight after the felony to a place of
temporary safety.” (People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
1126, 1146, citing People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 207.) As
the Cavitt court explained, “Our reliance on the continuous-
transaction doctrine is consistent with the purpose of the felony-
murder statute, which ‘was adopted for the protection of the
community and its residents, not for the benefit of the
lawbreaker, and this court has viewed it as obviating the
necessity for, rather than requiring, any technical inquiry
concerning whether there has been a completion, abandonment,
or desistence of the [felony] before the homicide was completed.’ ”
(Cavitt, at p. 207.)
       Here, there is no separating the kidnappings from the
robbery or the murder: The robbery of Thomas occurred as part
of the kidnapping for ransom, which led to the kidnapping of the
witness, Burge, to avoid detection. It was reasonable to infer that
the murder of Burge was motivated by the same impulse: To
eliminate a witness to the original crimes. And by the time
Burge was killed, none of the perpetrators had reached a place of
temporary safety following the robbery or the kidnappings. Thus,
even if the robbery could be said to have been completed before
the murder, the kidnapping continued, for “[a] kidnapping
‘continues until . . . the kidnapper releases or otherwise disposes
of the victim and has reached a place of temporary safety.’ ”
(People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1121, quoting People v.
Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1159.)

                                28
       In sum, applying the factors identified in Banks and Clark
to determine if a defendant was a major participant in the felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life, we conclude
substantial evidence supports the superior courts’ findings that
appellants Hill and Jenkins are guilty of felony murder based on
kidnapping. Accordingly, they are therefore ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6.
                         DISPOSITION
       The orders denying appellant Hill’s and appellant Jenkins’s
petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 are
affirmed.
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                    LUI, P. J.
We concur:

      CHAVEZ, J.

      HOFFSTADT, J.

                               29