Court Opinion

ID: 9574117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:02:28.26527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:07.281701
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Judge,
concurring in part/dissenting in part.
I agree that if the statutory enactments violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws the Petitioner is “entitled to the credits allotted under the statute effective on the date [his] crime was committed”. However, it does not appear certain that the revisions of 57 O.S.Supp, § 138 and § 224 are the same type of changes in the granting of credits to prisoners as the U.S. Supreme Court sought to address in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981); nor that the revisions violate the ex post facto criteria set forth in Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. *962446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987), Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), or Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 57 S.Ct. 797, 81 L.Ed. 1182 (1937).
The Court states that the determination of “[wjhether a retrospective state criminal statute ameliorates or worsens conditions imposed by its predecessors is a federal question” citing Weaver v. Graham as authority. However, Article 2, Section 15, of the Oklahoma Constitution also provides “[n]o bill of attainder, ex post facto law, ... shall ever be passed”.
I must dissent to the Court’s determination that the Oklahoma “earned credit” system of providing inmates with the opportunity to earn additional time reductions from their sentences if they qualify for the program is the same type of system addressed in Weaver. In fact, Weaver has previously been applied to the Oklahoma statutes when the Legislature changed the system from an automatic “good time” credit system to an “earned credit” system which requires inmates to earn credits which will reduce their sentence. See Spradling v. Maynard, 527 F.Supp. 398 (W.D.Okl.1981). In the present case we are asked to address a change in the statutes which continues the “earned credit” system but changes the manner in which an inmate qualifies for the program and the number of credits which can be earned. This is where the distinction between the Oklahoma statutes and the system discussed in Weaver must be addressed.
In Weaver the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with a system in Florida where inmates were given a certain number of “gain time for good conduct” credits on a monthly basis. These credits were given to each inmate merely for following the rules. Oklahoma, as the Court in Spradling recognized, prior to 1976 had this same type of system. Since 1976 the Legislature has provided an “earned credit” system which allows each inmate who qualifies and completes the work or other prerequisites to then receive the credits earned. Prior to performing the acts required the inmate only has an expectation that the credit can be earned. The process is two-fold: First, the inmate must be admitted to the program set forth in the statute, and second, the work or act must be completed to qualify for the credits. When an inmate enters the corrections system he or she merely has an opportunity or expectation to be able to qualify and earn the credits. It is not the same type of system which was in place prior to 1976 in Oklahoma or which was addressed in Weaver. In Weaver, inmates were guaranteed certain monthly credits by statute at the time they entered the system if they followed the rules. It was not merely an opportunity to earn credits by future acts.
It is interesting that in Weaver the U.S. Supreme Court extended ex post facto prohibitions beyond substantive criminal law applications. In Portley v. Grossman, 444 U.S. 1311, 100 S.Ct. 714, 62 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980), Mr. Justice Rehnquist quoted from Dobbert the holding that “this Court held that the prohibition of ex post facto laws does not extend to every change of law that ‘may work to the disadvantage of a defendant.’ It is intended to secure ‘substantial personal rights’ from retroactive deprivation and does not ‘limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance.’ Ibid.” Id. 100 S.Ct. at 715. In applying these standards to federal parole guidelines and denying the application of ex post facto to those guidelines he then stated “[tjhe terms of the sentence originally imposed have in no way been altered. Applicant cannot be held in confinement beyond the term imposed by the judge, and at the time of his sentence he knew that parole violations would put him at risk of serving the balance of his sentence in federal custody. The guidelines, therefore, neither deprive applicant of any pre-exist-ing right nor enhance the punishment imposed.” Id. 100 S.Ct. at 715. I submit that the perameters established in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), for the application of ex post facto prohibitions have been exceeded in Weaver. However, even in the application of stare decisis the Court should ensure the systems of credit being analyzed are of the *97same type to which the prohibition has been applied.
I must also disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the amended statutes are disadvantageous to the Petitioner. If the Petitioner is disadvantaged it will be due to the Petitioners inaction in taking advantage of the opportunities provided to earn credits to reduce his sentence. Just as Petitioner, prior to the amendment, was required to earn the credits, the current statutes still allows him that opportunity. The opportunity to earn has not been changed. Since 1976 inmates in the custody of the Department of Corrections have merely been provided the opportunity to earn credits, those credits have not been guaranteed to the inmates at the time of their sentence. This opportunity to earn credits does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest under either Article 1, § 10, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution or Article 2, § 15, of the Oklahoma Constitution. Under each statute notice is given prior to the performance of the acts which give right to claim the credits earned. The right to the credit does not accrue until the acts are performed.
While I concur in the denial of the writ, I do not agree with the analysis of our statutory provisions.