Court Opinion

ID: 9882636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:17:47.938883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:38.233542
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Harding v. Ohio Real Estate Comm., 2023-Ohio-3138.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    LUCAS COUNTY

Angela Harding                                           Court of Appeals No. L-23-1010

        Appellant                                        Trial Court No. CI0202203138

v.

Ohio Real Estate Commission                              DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellee                                         Decided: September 1, 2023

                                                *****

        David L. Petitjean, for appellant

        David Yost, Ohio Attorney General and
        Elizabeth S. Fligner, Senior Assistant Attorney
        General, for appellant.

                                                *****
        MAYLE, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Angela F. Harding, appeals from a judgment of the Lucas County

Court of Common Pleas affirming an adjudication order by appellee, the Ohio Real

Estate Commission (“OREC”), that found Harding violated Chapter 4735 of the Ohio

Revised Code. We affirm.
                                      I. Background

       {¶ 2} Harding holds a real estate broker’s license with the Ohio Department of

Commerce, Division of Real Estate and Professional Licensing (“the Division”).

       {¶ 3} In October of 2013, Harding entered into a land contract with Breck

Properties Ltd. for the purchase of property located at 5012 Maryhill Road in Sylvania,

Ohio. Kathryn Long is the sole shareholder of Breck Properties. The property was

intended to serve as Harding’s primary residence.

       {¶ 4} The purchase price of the property was $113,900, and Harding paid Long an

initial down payment of $7,500. Under the terms of the land contract, Harding was

required to pay the balance of $106,400 at seven percent interest over 30 years, through a

monthly payment of $707.88. Upon payment in full of all sums owed, Long, acting on

behalf of Breck Properties, agreed to deliver to Harding “a good and sufficient warranty

deed conveying title to the land.”

       {¶ 5} On November 7, 2016, Long filed a complaint against Harding with the

Division. Long alleged that Harding had listed the property for sale without her consent,

in violation of real estate licensing laws and the land contract.

       {¶ 6} Following an investigation, the Division sent Harding a notification that it

had found “reasonable and substantial evidence of acts” in violation of R.C. 4735.18

(“Grounds for suspension or revocation of license”) and that, if the violations were

proven, disciplinary action could be taken against Harding’s license. Specifically, the

complaint alleged that,

2.
             You, Angela Faye Harding, a licensed principal real estate broker *

      * * did the following sometime between on or about June 26, 2016 and on

      or about July 11, 2016, involving the property at 5012 Maryhill Road,

      Sylvania, Ohio (subject property):

             Despite entering into a land contract for the subject property, dated

      October 25, 2013 (land contract), as a buyer, which specifically prohibited

      the transfer of your interest in the land contract to another party without

      prior written consent by Breck Properties, Ltd. (seller), you attempted to

      sell the subject property with a sign in the subject property’s yard or

      through an advertisement in the multiple listing service with [listing agent]

      * * *, without prior written consent of the seller. This conduct constitutes a

      violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 4735.18(A)(17) or Ohio Revised

      Code Section 4735.18(A)(6), misconduct as that section incorporates

      Section, Article I of the Canons of Ethics for the Real Estate Industry, a

      failure to maintain high standards of conduct in a licensee’s personal

      affairs.

      {¶ 7} A hearing was held before a hearing examiner on July 30, 2021. Three

witnesses testified: Investigator George Burton, Long, and Harding.

      {¶ 8} According to Long, Harding asked her, in June of 2016, if she (Harding)

could “list the property and sell it.” When asked what she would do with any profits

from the sale, Harding said that she would pay off the remaining balance owed to Long

3.
and “keep” the rest. Long told Harding that she could “[a]bsolutely not” list the property

because “[i]t wasn’t hers to sell.”

       {¶ 9} The conversation caused Long to “wonder * * * what [Harding] was up to.”

And so, about a week later, in July, “[Long] drove past the house” and saw a real estate

sign in the yard. Long’s testimony on this point conflicted with her previous claim,

made in her “Real Estate Complaint Form,” in which she specified that she “looked up

[the] property on line and found [that Harding had] listed it.” According to the

complaint, Long “sent [her] husband to the property to verify if there was a sign in the

yard and he took a picture.” (Emphasis added.)

       {¶ 10} In any event, the listing agent identified on the yard sign was Sarah Ford of

Key Realty. Long went “directly to the real estate agen[cy]” and told someone there, “I

own [the property] myself.” Long was told that Harding had taken the property “off the

market as of June 29th,” notwithstanding that the sign remained in the yard. Long

demanded that the agency “get that sign out of my yard” and gave them “til noon.” Later

that day, a broker with Key Realty called Long to apologize and reported that “they were

duped as well.”

       {¶ 11} During Harding’s testimony, she denied having a conversation with Long,

or asking for permission from her to list the property. Harding testified that, before

listing it, she consulted with her attorney, who explained that she had an “equitable

interest” in the property and “because [she] had an equitable interest,” she did not need

Long’s permission to list it. Harding also understood that her right to “transfer interest”

4.
in the property to a third party was subject to Long being “paid off [first] * * * which

would be done at closing.” Before listing the property, Key Realty “review[ed] all the

documentation.”

       {¶ 12} The listing with Key was in effect from June 28, 2016 until July 11, 2016,

when Harding “pull[ed] the listing.” Harding explained that she pulled the listing

because it was “an overwhelming time” in her life. “Shortly after” that, Harding learned

from Key Realty that Long had complained about the sign, but Long never personally

contacted her to discuss it. Harding testified that she believes she “acted with full ethics

from the beginning of this transaction to the end, including [when she] list[ed] the

property.”

       {¶ 13} Harding and her husband decided to terminate the land contract and return

the property to Long. On November 2, 2016, the parties executed a “Cancelation of Land

Contract” and a mutual release. Five days later, on November 7, 2016, Long filed a

complaint against Harding, giving rise to the instant case.

             II. The Report and Recommendation of the Hearing Officer

       {¶ 14} The hearing examiner issued a Report and Recommendation on October

13, 2021, which included the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

              Both Harding and Long had an ownership interest in the property,

       Harding as “equitable owner” and Long as “legal owner.”

5.
            Harding entered into a listing agreement with Realtor Sarah Ford, of

     Key Realty, to sell the Maryhill property, and a “for sale” sign was placed

     on the property. The listing date was June 28, 2016.

            Harding, as an equitable owner, did not transfer any interest or title in

     the subject property by entering into the listing agreement with Key Realty.

     The listing agreement gave no equitable interest in the land contract or the

     property. “The act of entering into [the Exclusive Right to Sell Listing]

     Agreement to list the property for sale was within the ownership rights of

     [Harding].”

            Harding was represented by legal counsel “at all stages during this

     process and received legal advice regarding her equitable interest.” Based

     upon her attorney’s advice, Harding believed that she “was able to list and

     attempt to sell” the property to satisfy the amount owed under the land

     contract.

            Long, whose “credibility [was] questionable,” withheld her consent

     for the sale of the property, “at least in part” because Harding “would be

     able to keep the excess profits” if the property was sold.

            Harding, “whose testimony was credible, was represented by an

     attorney and decided to sell the property to satisfy the balloon payments she

     owed to complete the land contract.”

6.
            “Based on the facts of this case and the rights of both parties under

     the Land Contract, the State has provided no evidence that [Harding]

     engaged in dishonest or illegal dealings gross negligence, or incompetency”

     as require to establish a violation under R.C. 4735.18(A)(6).

            Additionally, Harding, as equitable owner, had “actual control of the

     subject property” and was “within her rights to place a ‘For Sale’ sign in the

     yard of the subject property and list the property in the MLS database. As

     such, Respondent did not violate [R.C.] 4735.18(A)(17) when she did not

     received [sic] written consent by [Long].”

            The hearing examiner’s report includes the following

     “Recommendation:”

            [T]he state failed to provided sufficient, reliable, and probative

     evidence that Ms. Harding was guilty of the alleged violations of Ohio law.

     Ms. Harding (1) had equitable ownership rights under the Land Contract,

     which included a right to list the subject property for sale and to enter into

     an Exclusive Right to Sell Listing Agreement; and (2) did not transfer any of

     her interest or title in the subject property without the written consent of

     [Long]. Furthermore, if the Land Contract were completed and a transfer of

     the legal title had to occur, the requirement for written consent for [Harding]

     to transfer the legal title to the subject property would have no longer

     existed. It is, therefore, recommended to [OREC] that Ms. Harding is found

7.
       not guilty of violating [R.C. 4735.18(A)(17) and (A)(6)], which incorporates

       Article I, Section I of the Canons of Ethics for the Real Estate Industry.

       {¶ 15} The hearing examiner’s report went before OREC for a review hearing on

July 6, 2022. The hearing was limited to arguments made by the parties’ respective

counsel. No additional evidence or testimony was presented.

       {¶ 16} By Adjudication Order dated July 13, 2022, OREC adopted the hearing

officer’s findings of fact but rejected her conclusions of law, “specifically [with respect to

R.C.] 4735.18(A)(17).” It imposed a penalty of $500 and ordered Harding to complete

three hours of additional education. OREC made no mention, or any finding, with

respect to Harding’s alleged violation of R.C. 4735.18(A)(6).

       {¶ 17} Harding appealed to the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, pursuant to

R.C. 119.12. Upon review of the record, the trial court found that the OREC ’s

Adjudication Order, as to the R.C. 4735.18(A)(17) violation, was “supported by reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence and [was] in accordance with the law.”

       {¶ 18} Harding appealed and raises four assignments of error for our review:

              1. The Trial Court Decision Does Not Provide A Legal Basis

       Establishing That The OREC’s Adjudication Order Was In Accordance

       with Ohio Law.

              2. The Trial Court’s Decision And The OREC’s Adjudication Order

       Are Contrary To Ohio Law.

8.
              3. The Trial Court’s Decision and The OREC’s Adjudication Order

       Provide No Legal Basis for the Decisions.

              4. The Trial Court’s Decision Affirming the OREC’s Adjudication

       Order Creates A New Standard for Licensed Real Estate Brokers And The

       OREC Has Not Provided Licensed Real Estate Brokers With Any Prior

       Notice of This New Standard And Violated Plaintiff-Appellant’s Right to

       Due Process.

                                 III. Standard of Review

       {¶ 19} The standard of review in an administrative appeal under R.C. 119.12 is

“well-established.” Bartchy v. State Bd. of Edn., 120 Ohio St.3d 205, 2008-Ohio-4826,

897 N.E.2d 1096, ¶ 34.

       {¶ 20} R.C. 119.12(M) sets forth the standard of review employed by the common

pleas court. It provides,

              The court may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the

       appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record and any additional

       evidence the court has admitted, that the order is supported by reliable,

       probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. In the

       absence of this finding, it may reverse, vacate, or modify the order or make

       such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial

       evidence and is in accordance with law.

9.
       {¶ 21} As explained by the Ohio Supreme Court in Bartchy, the common pleas

court conducts two inquiries: a hybrid factual/legal inquiry and a purely legal inquiry:

              As to the first inquiry, * * * [a]n agency’s findings of fact are

       presumed to be correct and must be deferred to by a reviewing court unless

       that court determines that the agency’s findings are internally inconsistent,

       impeached by evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, rest upon

       improper inferences, or are otherwise unsupportable. * * *

              As to the second, legal part of the common pleas court’s inquiry, an

       agency adjudication is like a trial, and while the reviewing court must defer

       to the lower tribunal’s findings of fact, it must construe the law on its own.

       (Quotation omitted.)

Id. at ¶ 37–38, citing Ohio Historical Soc. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 66 Ohio

St.3d 466, 470–471, 613 N.E.2d 591 (1993).

       {¶ 22} An appellate court’s role is more limited. Under R.C. 119.12(N),

              [E]ither * * * the party or the agency may appeal. * * * An appeal by

       the agency shall be taken on questions of law relating to the

       constitutionality, construction, or interpretation of statutes and rules of the

       agency, and, in the appeal, the court may also review and determine the

       correctness of the judgment of the court of common pleas that the order of

       the agency is not supported by any reliable, probative, and substantial

       evidence in the entire record.

10.
While the trial court examines the evidence, the appellate court is “to determine only if

the trial court has abused its discretion in its examination of the record for reliable,

probative, and substantial evidence.” Bartchy at ¶ 41. “On review of purely legal

questions, however, an appellate court has de novo review.” Dep’t of Youth Servs. v.

Grimsley, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-546, 2019-Ohio-888, ¶ 10. Indeed, in our

constitutional system, it is exclusively “the province and duty of the judicial department

to say what the law is.” TWISM Enterprises, L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Pro.

Engineers & Surveyors, Slip Opinion 2022-Ohio-4677, ¶ 42, quoting Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (“[I]t is never mandatory for a court to defer

to the judgment of an administrative agency.”).

    IV. OREC’s adjudication order provided sufficient reasons in support of its
  decision under R.C. 119.09, and therefore, the common pleas court did not err in
                                    affirming it.

       {¶ 23} We consider Harding’s first and third assignments of error together. In the

first, Harding claims that the trial court and OREC both failed to “provide a legal

analysis” to support a finding that Harding violated R.C. 4735.18(A)(17).       In her third

assignment of error, Harding again complains that the tribunals “provide[d] no legal

analysis.” More specifically, Harding alleges that OREC failed to “include in the record

of its proceedings the reasons for [its] modification or disapproval” of the hearing

examiner’s determination, as required by R.C. 119.09, and that the trial court erred by

affirming OREC’s decision for this reason. We disagree.

       {¶ 24} R.C. 119.09 (“Adjudication hearing”) provides, in relevant part,

11.
              In any adjudication hearing required by sections 119.01 to 119.13 of

       the Revised Code, the agency may appoint a referee or examiner to conduct

       the hearing. * * * The referee or examiner shall submit to the agency a

       written report setting forth the referee’s or examiner’s findings of fact and

       conclusions of law and a recommendation of the action to be taken by the

       agency. * * * The recommendation of the referee or examiner may be

       approved, modified, or disapproved by the agency, and the order of the

       agency based on such report, recommendation, transcript of testimony and

       evidence, or objections of the parties, and additional testimony and

       evidence shall have the same effect as if such hearing had been conducted

       by the agency. * * * [I]f the agency modifies or disapproves the

       recommendations of the referee or examiner it shall include in the record of

       its proceedings the reasons for such modification or disapproval.

       (Emphasis added.)

       {¶ 25} Here, the hearing officer concluded that Harding did not violate R.C.

4735.18(A)(17)—which prohibits offering any property for sale “without the consent of

the owner”—because Harding “was an equitable owner.” OREC “reject[ed] the

Conclusions of Law of the hearing examiner,” finding instead that Harding “violated her

duties * * * as a real estate licensee, specifically [R.C.] 4735.18(A)(17).” On appeal,

Harding complains that OREC failed to provide any “reasons” for that decision, in

violation of R.C. 119.09.

12.
       {¶ 26} R.C. 119.09’s “requirement”—that a board provide reasons when

modifying or disapproving a hearing examiner’s recommendation—is “mandatory.”

Bennett v. State Medical Board of Ohio, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-833, 2011-Ohio-

3158, ¶ 16. And, where a board fails to do so, the resulting order “is not in accordance

with [the] law and must be overturned on that basis. (Quotation omitted.) Lucas v. Ohio

State Bd. of Educ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-463, 2020-Ohio-2738, ¶ 31 (Finding an

order—that failed to identify “specific grounds” for the board’s disapproval of the

hearing officer’s recommendation—did not meet the “minimal threshold for satisfying

the R.C. 119.09 requirement.”); see also Zingale v. Ohio Casino Control Comm., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101381, 2014-Ohio-4937, ¶ 66. However, it has also been held that

the “‘barest of explanations’ [will] suffice to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 119.09.”

Snyder v. Ohio Real Estate Appraiser Board, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2016AP0058,

2017-Ohio-5790, ¶ 37, quoting Matter of Euclid, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-138, 1993

WL 317239 (Aug. 19, 1993). “All that is required is that the board include within the

record of its proceedings its reasons for rejecting the referee’s recommendation.” Id. For

example, when reviewing a board’s decision for compliance with R.C. 119.09, a common

pleas court may consider “meeting minutes, together with the Board’s actions” and any

“objections in the record.” Bennett at ¶ 18-19 and Snyder at ¶ 37. In Bennett, the court

found that “member comments” set forth in the hearing transcript, the state’s objection to

the report, and “the absence of any comments supporting the hearing examiner’s legal

conclusion” all combined to demonstrate compliance with R.C. 119.09.

13.
       {¶ 27} In this case, the record includes the 32-page transcript from the review

hearing before OREC. Following arguments by counsel, OREC recessed and entered

into off-the-record deliberations. When the hearing resumed, the president of OREC

offered the following:

              Based on our review of the record and the Hearing Officer’s

       Recommendation to us, we’ve had quite a lengthy discussion of ownership

       and what it provides under R.C. 4735.18.

              I am of the opinion that although the vendee [Harding] did have a

       right to exercise [her right] to sell her interest in the Land Contract, I do

       believe * * * the vendor [Long] still had rights as an owner, and therefore,

       under 4735.18(A)(17), the vendee could not advertise or place a sign on the

       property for sale or rent without the consent of the vendor * * *. So I am of

       the opinion to * * * to adopt the finding of facts, but reject the conclusions

       of law of the Hearing Officer.

       {¶ 28} A similar opinion was offered by another OREC member. Following a

motion, the commissioners voted in favor of finding that Harding violated Section

(A)(17), by a four-to-one vote. The written Adjudication Order followed.

       {¶ 29} We find that OREC clearly satisfied the requirement that it provide reasons

in support of its decision to “modify or disapprove” of the hearing officer’s

recommendation, in compliance with R.C. 119.09.

14.
       {¶ 30} As for Harding’s claim that the trial court also failed to provide a “legal

basis” or “legal analysis” in support of its decision, we note that the common pleas court,

unlike OREC, was under no obligation to make any particular findings or provide

“reasons” for its decision. In its 14-page Opinion and Judgment Entry, the common pleas

court found that the adjudication order was supported by “reliable, probative, and

substantial evidence and [was] in accordance with the law,” which was exactly its

mandate under R.C. 119.12(M). Accordingly, we find that Harding’s first assignment of

error (that the trial court erred by failing to “provide a legal analysis”) and her the third

assignment of error (that the tribunals erred by “provid[ing] no legal basis for the[ir]

decisions”) are not well-taken.

  V. The lower court’s determination that Harding violated R.C. 4735.18(A)(17) is
                               not contrary to law.

       {¶ 31} In her second assignment of error, Harding claims that the lower court’s

determination is contrary to law. The lower court found that OREC’s conclusion that

Harding violated R.C. 4735.18(A)(17) is supported by “reliable, probative, and

substantial evidence and [was] in accordance with the law.”

       {¶ 32} Under R.C. 4735.18(A)(17), a real estate licensee may be sanctioned if

“found guilty of * * * [h]aving advertised or placed a sign on any property offering it for

sale or for rent without the consent of the owner or the owner’s authorized agent.”

(Emphasis added). Harding argues that because she is an equitable owner of the property

pursuant to the parties’ land contract, she is an “owner” under R.C. 4735.18(A)(17) and

therefore did not violate the statute.

15.
       {¶ 33} Under Ohio law, a land contract is defined as “an executory agreement * *

* under which the vendor agrees to convey title in real property located in this state to the

vendee and the vendee agrees to pay the purchase price in installment payments, while

the vendor retains title to the property as security for the vendee’s obligation.” R.C.

5313.01. Here, there is no dispute that the vendor— Long, acting on behalf of Breck

Properties— was the title owner of the property. Similarly, there is no dispute that

Harding, as vendee, had an “equitable interest in the property,” which included a right to

possess the property and a corresponding obligation to pay, for example, the property

taxes and insurance. See, e.g., Bradford v. B & P Wrecking Co., 171 Ohio App.3d 616,

2007-Ohio-1732, 872 N.E.2d 331, ¶ 28 (6th Dist.), quoting Lee v. Sanders, 11th Dist.

Trumbull No. 2004–T–0024, 2005-Ohio-2091, ¶ 12 (“[V]endees [to a land contract] do

not obtain legal title to the premises immediately; instead, they have only ‘a possessory

equitable interest relative to the amount of the purchase money that has been paid.’”).

Thus, there is no disagreement that Long, in her representative capacity, was “the

nominal or legal owner” and Harding was the “beneficial or equitable owner.” Ohio Div.

of Real Est. v. Vantell, 128 Ohio App.3d 410, 416, 715 N.E.2d 217 (7th Dist.1998),

quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5 Ed.1979) 996 (“There may therefore be two ‘owners’

in respect of the same property, one the nominal or legal owner, the other the beneficial

or equitable owner.”). The legal issue before us is whether Harding’s equitable interest in

the property qualified her as “the owner” under R.C. 4735.18(A)(17). We find that it

does not.

16.
      {¶ 34} The term “owner” is not defined in the statute. See R.C. 4735.01

(“Definitions”). When a statutory term is undefined, we apply a “plain and ordinary

meaning.” (Quotations omitted.) Great Lakes Bar Control, Inc. v. Testa, 156 Ohio St.3d

199, 2018-Ohio-5207, 124 N.E.3d 803, ¶ 8. “Interpretation of an undefined statutory

term—and whether something meets the definition of that term—is a matter of law, not a

question of fact.” King v. Buildtech Ltd. Constr. Dev., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-1088,

2023-Ohio-1092, ¶ 40. Again, our standard of review, as to “purely legal questions,” is

de novo.

      {¶ 35} Black’s Law Dictionary contains the following definitions:

             Owner: Someone who has the right to possess, use, and convey

      something; a person in whom one or more interests are vested. An owner

      may have complete property in the thing or may have parted with some

      interests in it (as by granting an easement or making a lease).

             Legal owner: One recognized by law as the owner of something;

      esp., one who holds legal title to property for the benefit of another.

             Equitable owner: 1. One recognized in equity as the owner of

      something because use and title belong to that person, even though legal title

      may belong to someone else; esp., one for whom property is held in trust. —

      Also termed beneficial owner. * * *

17.
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.2019); see also Vantell at 416 quoting Blue Ash Bldg. &

Loan Co. v. Hahn, 20 Ohio App.3d 21, 24, 484 N.E.2d 186 (1st Dist.1984) (Using similar

definition of “owner” and quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5 Ed.1979) 996.

       {¶ 36} Applying the definitions set forth above, Long (acting on behalf of Breck

Properties) qualified as the “owner” because she had a vested right to “possess, use, and

convey” the property. And, she retained that designation, even after she “parted with”

some (i.e. her right to possess and use) but not all (i.e. her right to convey) her interest in

the property. And because she maintained legal title to the property, Long also qualified

as the “legal owner,” and is “recognized by law as the owner of” the property. Id. But,

Harding qualified as an “equitable owner” of the property because “use and title

belong[ed] to [her], even though legal title * * * belong[ed] to [Long].” Id.

       {¶ 37} Applying those definitions to R.C. 4735.18(A)(17) we find that although

Harding’s equitable ownership of the property made her “an owner” of some rights to the

property—i.e., an equitable owner—she was not “the owner” under R.C. 4735.18(A)(17).

That designation belonged to Long, acting on behalf of Breck Properties. And, because

only “the owner” (or the owner’s agent) could consent to the placement of a sign on the

property, Harding, who was not the owner, violated Section (A)(17) in doing so.

       {¶ 38} We find that OREC’s conclusion—that Harding was not “the owner” of the

property—was not “contrary to law.” Therefore, the common pleas court did not err in

affirming OREC’s decision on this issue, and Harding’s second assignment of error is not

well-taken.

18.
      VI. OREC did not “create a new standard” for imposing liability under R.C.
                                   4735.18(A)(17)

        {¶ 39} Finally, in her fourth assignment of error, Harding claims that OREC—by

excluding a “vendee” to a land contract from R.C. 4735.18(A)(17)’s definition of

“owner”—has “establish[ed] a new standard for licensed real estate brokers, which did

not exist before.” Again, we disagree.

        {¶ 40} OREC had jurisdiction over this case because Harding is a licensed real

estate broker. R.C. 4735.18 authorizes OREC to impose discipline “upon any licensee

who, whether or not acting in the licensee’s capacity as a real estate broker or

salesperson, or in handling the licensee’s own property.” (Emphasis added.) In this case,

Harding was acting in her personal capacity. The type of financing she arranged was by

way of a land contract, which is governed by an entirely different chapter of the Ohio

Revised Code. See Chapter 5313 (“Land Installment Contracts”).

        {¶ 41} Harding claims that there is no legal authority to support the conclusion that

“a vendee to a land contract has no legal right to list the property.” But this case does not

consider whether Harding had a legal right to list the property; the relevant issue in this

case is whether Harding’s real estate license may be suspended or revoked because she

violated a statutory provision, unique to real-estate agents, that prohibits agents from listing

a property “without the consent of the owner.”

        {¶ 42} OREC concluded, as a matter of law, that Harding, as vendee, did not

qualify as “the owner,” under R.C. 4735.18(A)(17), and, as we found in response to

Harding’s second assignment of error, the agency’s decision is not “contrary to law.”

19.
R.C. 5313.01(D) defines a “[v]endee” as a “person who acquires an interest in property

pursuant to a land installment contract, or any legal successor in interest to that person.”

This is consistent with Harding having been found to have an “equitable interest” in the

property. That is, while she had “an interest” in the property, it was inferior to the rights

of “the owner.”

       {¶ 43} Simply put, there is no authority to support the position that a “vendee”

must be considered “the owner” for purposes of R.C. 4735.18(A)(17) in all

circumstances. We specifically reject the argument that OREC’s adjudication order

“created a new standard” for licensed real estate brokers, and therefore find Harding’s

fourth assignment of error not well-taken.

                                       VII. Conclusion

       {¶ 44} Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the lower

court abused its discretion in finding that OREC’s adjudication order was supported by

reliable, probative and substantial evidence that Harding offered property for sale,

without the consent of the owner. We also find the trial court’s conclusion, that by her

actions Harding violated R.C. 4735.18(A)(17), was not contrary to law. Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of the Lucas Count Court of Common Pleas and find Harding’s

assignments of error not well-taken.

       {¶ 45} Pursuant to App.R. 24, Harding is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal.

                                                                         Judgment affirmed.

20.
                                                                     Harding v. Ohio Real
                                                                       Estate Commission
                                                                      C.A. No. L-23-1010

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
                                               ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                  JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

21.