Court Opinion

ID: 9542128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:31:20.857858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:03.978489
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice:
This is a disciplinary proceeding relating to allegations of unprofessional conduct by *806Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of the State of Utah. After due investigation and the holding of hearings by its disciplinary committee, the Utah State Bar Commission adopted the findings and recommended to this Court that the respondent attorney be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
The findings of the Bar as to conduct which did not meet the required professional standards are two types: one related to delays and delinquencies in collecting and remitting money to his clients; the other related to activities in connection with the prosecution of Salt Lake City v. Piepenburg wherein the charge was showing a pornographic movie.1
It appears that prior to being elected as Attorney General, the respondent was involved in the operation of a collection agency which handled a large number of accounts. One finding is that with respect to one of these accounts he failed to maintain adequate records of the funds collected, permitted the money collected to be commingled with his own funds, did not render prompt and sufficient accounting to his clients and make prompt remittance of funds, failed to reasonably cooperate and communicate with his clients or with their subsequently engaged counsel, and that remittance to his client was not made until collateral pressures were applied to respondent.
Another matter of similar character related to the handling of a divorce and the collection of child support, in which comparable findings were made.
The charge of misconduct in connection with the case of Salt Lake City v. Piepenburg is of a different character. It is that, as Deputy Attorney General, he associated himself as counsel for the prosecution and in connection therewith caused an investigation to be made of prospective jurors, which included the interviewing of their neighbors, friends and church officials. Concerning this the Bar found that there was no violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, with respect to another aspect of that same case, the complaint is that the respondent, in an interview with a television reporter, made statements concerning the strength of the prosecution’s case and the likelihood of its outcome. The statements were reported on pubiic television, all of which was found to be a violation of Rule IV, Canon 7, DR 7-107(B)(6).
In preface to considering the findings just recited and what should be done about them, there are certain foundational principles to be had in mind. It is not to be questioned that the licensing of an attorney permits him to hold himself out to the public as one learned and skilled in handling legal problems and procedures, that he will become identified with and take care of his clients interests with reasonable diligence and a high degree of fidelity. Neither is it to be questioned that in this instance there has been failure to some extent to measure up to that high standard. Accepting the foregoing as a premise, the question of critical concern is as to what is the just and appropriate corrective penalty or sanction to be imposed. In assuming the responsibility of this Court to make that determination, we think it is both wise and desirable to consider all relevant factors.
Speaking in generality, it is to be realized that the attainment of a profession usually represents, in addition to the years of education devoted to that purpose, the commitment of a lifetime to a man’s career and that therefore, the deprivation of that privilege is something which should not be done lightly, nor at all unless the attorney is guilty of some culpable wrong or there is some other serious matter to justify that kind of surgery on his means of livelihood. This has special application in the instant case because Mr. Hansen has been elected by the people of this state as its Attorney General and thus has various important responsibilities to fulfill in which he would be hampered, at least to some extent, by his suspension from practice. This is said without intending any disparagement of the *807principle that the holding of public office should not exempt one from being held accountable for any misdoings, nor from just and proper penalties therefor. On the other hand, in matters such as we are concerned with here, which occurred before respondent’s election as Attorney General, and do not pertain to his public duties, he should not be held more accountable nor dealt with more harshly than others would be.
Without condoning the respondent’s conduct as found by the Bar, it is appropriate for us to note that his evidence disputes those findings; and also to set forth his explanation in excuse of such failures as occurred. He avers that they were due in part to the necessity of entrusting to others some of his responsibilities incident to his transition from private practice into the political field. Other matters stated in amelioration include the facts that, although it is true that the complainants were put to considerable delay and inconvenience in respect to their business, their money was in fact collected and finally remitted to them. Also to be considered in the composite of this situation is the fact that, due in part to his being a public official, the respondent has been put to a great amount of time, effort and expense and subjected to a great amount of adverse publicity and criticism in relation to these proceedings.
Finally, and most important, is the fact that the Commission made no finding imputing to the respondent any dishonesty, or any willful or intentional wrongdoing. In stating that it had taken into account the claims of mitigation, the Commission properly characterized its position in its own brief in its statements that: “. . . if fraudulent or evil intent had been present . ” and further that, “if any of the violations had been found to be the result of willful and deliberate misconduct . the attorney should have received a more severe penalty.
We have reviewed the foregoing matter in awareness of our previous declarations of this Court that, though it is the prerogative and responsibility of the court to make the findings and orders in such matters,2 we will nevertheless regard the findings and recommendation of the Commission as advisory, and will accord them some degree of indulgence, and be inclined to act in accordance therewith unless it appears that the Commission has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably.3
In recognition thereof, upon our consideration of all of the factors involved in this situation, particularly the fact that there is no finding of any dishonesty or willful misdoing, but the derelictions complained of appear to be matters of neglect and indiscretion, it is our opinion that the ends of justice and the purposes of this proceeding will best be served by our declaration that the improprieties wherein respondent failed to conform to the high standard of diligence and fidelity which should be measured up to by members of the Bar render him subject to censure and a reprimand. Further, he is ordered to reimburse the Utah State Bar for the actual and necessary expenses incurred by it in connection with this disciplinary proceeding.
No court costs are awarded.

. Utah, 571 P.2d 1299 (1977).

. In re Fullmer, 17 Utah 2d 121, 405 P.2d 343 (1965); In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 474 P.2d 116 (1970); State ex rel. Schwab v. Slate Bar Association, 80 Wash.2d 266, 493 P.2d 1237 (1972).

. In re Fullmer, supra note 2.