Court Opinion

ID: 9889710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 13:04:10.449215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:18.809500
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: October 11, 2023

                      S23A0728. PRIESTER v. THE STATE.

        WARREN, Justice.

        In March 2020, Darnell Priester was convicted of malice

murder, aggravated battery, and other crimes in connection with the

shooting death of Thomas Robinson and the non-fatal shooting of

Timothy Nelson. He appeals those convictions, arguing that the

evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support them, the

trial court erred by denying him a new trial on the general grounds,

and the trial court committed plain error by not giving jury

instructions related to justification and perjury.                                        Priester also

argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by

failing to object to the lack of jury instructions related to justification

and perjury; failing to object to testimony that implicated Priester’s

right to remain silent; failing to cross-examine Shane Godsey;
requesting an instruction on the necessity of corroboration of

accomplice testimony; failing to file a pretrial motion for immunity;

and failing to object to narrative testimony, to “asked and answered”

testimony, and to the prosecutor “testifying.”

      As explained below, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient to support Priester’s convictions; his thirteenth juror claim

presents nothing further for this Court to review; Priester has not

shown plain error related to the jury instructions; and Priester has

failed to prove that counsel’s assistance was ineffective in any of the

ways alleged. Thus, we affirm Priester’s convictions.1

      1 The shooting occurred in August 2017.     In October 2017, a Paulding
County grand jury indicted Priester for malice murder, felony murder, five
counts of aggravated assault (against Robinson, Nelson, Shakeemia Bedford,
Te’Ara Starks, and Marquis Lewis), aggravated battery against Nelson, and
two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (for the
murder of Robinson and aggravated assault of Nelson). At a trial in February
2020, a jury found Priester guilty of all counts. In March 2020, the court
sentenced him to serve life in prison without parole for malice murder, 20
concurrent years in prison for aggravated battery, 20 concurrent years in
prison for each of three aggravated assault counts, and 5 consecutive years in
prison for one of the firearm possession counts. The remaining counts were
merged or vacated by operation of law. Priester timely moved for a new trial,
amending it twice with new counsel. In January 2023, after an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied Priester’s amended motion. He filed a timely
notice of appeal. The case was docketed to the April 2023 term of this Court
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
                                       2
      1.    The evidence presented at trial showed the following.2 On

August 18, 2017, Priester, his brother Josh, and their friend

Makaylen Sullivan went to a football game at their high school. Also

at the game was a second group of teenagers, which included

Robinson, Nelson, Shakeemia Bedford, Te’Ara Starks, and Marquis

Lewis.     Robinson’s group and Priester’s group had a history of

conflict, including a fight at a gas station in July 2017 between

Nelson and Priester.3 Sullivan testified that at the game, Robinson

and his friends were “acting like they want[ed] to fight, bothering

us.”4 Nelson testified that Priester “bumped into” him at the game.

      2 Because this case requires an assessment of the harmful or prejudicial

effect of one alleged trial court error and one alleged deficiency of trial counsel,
“we lay out the evidence in detail and not only in the light most favorable to
the verdicts.” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 424 (883 SE2d 317) (2023) (citation
and punctuation omitted).

      3 Additionally, a police officer, who testified that he believed there was

“an ongoing dispute between the parties,” “remember[ed] an incident where
someone had shot at [the Priesters’] home,” and an incident in May 2015 when
“15 or so people” gathered around the Priesters’ house “screaming and cursing
at them and threatening [Ms. Priester] and her boys.” He believed that this
incident was linked to conflict between the Priesters and someone who was
friends with Robinson’s group.

      4Before testifying, Sullivan invoked his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent, and the State granted him use immunity for his testimony.
                                         3
     After leaving the football game, Priester’s group went to Shane

Godsey’s house. Later that night, Lewis, from Robinson’s group,

went to Godsey’s house to buy marijuana. Lewis testified that at the

house, Priester “came to me and started cursing me out and calling

me out . . . and telling me to tell my friends to pull up,” meaning “to

come to them.” Sullivan, on the other hand, testified that when

Lewis saw one or both of the Priester brothers at the house, Lewis

started cursing and said, “Oh, that’s your b**ch a**”; Lewis left after

about five minutes, but said, “we finna pull back up.”

     Lewis and the rest of Robinson’s group then decided to drive to

Godsey’s house in Starks’s car. At some point, either before they

began driving or on the drive there, Bedford told the group that the

Priester brothers owed her $20, and she said, “I want his head.”

Bedford testified that the group was not “attempting to go get the

$20, but their intentions were to fight,” and Nelson told a police

officer after the shooting that the group went to fight the Priester

brothers. At trial, however, Nelson testified that they were going to

the house “to retrieve [Bedford]’s money,” and Lewis testified that

                                  4
the “whole car” agreed that they were going to retrieve Bedford’s $20

or two grams of marijuana. There was no evidence presented that

anyone in this group had a gun.

     The group arrived at Godsey’s house around 11:30 p.m., and

Bedford yelled at people inside the house about her $20. Robinson,

Nelson, and Lewis got out of the car.5 Lewis walked around the

house, and Nelson went to the front door. Nelson testified that he

“calmly” “knocked on the door three times” using a “normal knock,”

and Lewis testified that Nelson used a “simple knock” and was “very

calm.” Sullivan, on the other hand, testified that when the group

arrived, “they got out the car and started beating on the door, like

bring your b**ch a** outside,” and they continued to “beat on the

door” for five to ten minutes. Godsey similarly testified that Nelson

knocked “very loudly” on the door, was “in a bit of a rage” and “very

hostile,” and told the Priester brothers to “get the ‘F’ out here now.”

     Godsey testified that he answered the door and told Nelson to

     5 Sullivan, who was in the house, testified that the group that drove up

was “3 cars deep full of people.” However, Nelson, Bedford, Starks, and Lewis
testified that they all arrived in one car.
                                     5
leave or he would “call the authority.” Godsey then went back in the

house and closed and locked the door. Nelson testified that he

walked away from the house and stood in the street for two or three

minutes, waiting for someone to come out of the house. Starks

testified that Robinson, Nelson, and Lewis were “walking back to

[her] car” and “arguing with Josh and [Priester].” Then, someone

fired a gun three to five times from one of the upstairs windows in

the house. Robinson was hit once in the chest, Nelson was hit once

in the leg, and the car that Bedford and Starks were in was hit twice,

with one bullet going through the bumper and one bullet grazing the

trunk.6 Robinson died from his injury, and Nelson testified that he

had a scar and permanent nerve damage in his leg and that the

injury “kind of affects the way I walk at times.”

      Nelson testified that when the shooter in the window was

illuminated by the flash of the gun, he “saw a white shirt.” Lewis

      6 Witnesses testified that they heard three or four shots.
                                                               Priester said in
his police interview that he heard five shots. Two bullets were recovered: one
from Robinson’s body and one in the street.

                                       6
similarly testified that when he saw someone “raise the window,” he

saw a “white shirt” that looked like the white shirt he had seen

Priester wearing at the football game.7 Surveillance video from the

entrance to the football game showed someone—who was identified

as Priester by Nelson at trial—entering and leaving the football

game earlier that evening wearing a white shirt.8 Godsey testified

that Priester was wearing a white shirt and Josh was wearing a

black shirt that night.

      Six days after the shooting, Sullivan wrote in a statement to

police that after Robinson and Nelson “tried to lure” the Priester

brothers outside Godsey’s house, Priester “opened a window and

shot at the crowd.”9 Godsey testified that after the shots were fired,

      7 On cross-examination at trial, Lewis acknowledged that he had not

mentioned the white shirt in his statement to police.

      8 Priester was walking with two other people, who were wearing black

shirts.

      9 At trial, Sullivan testified that he heard the gunshots but did not know

where they came from. He further testified that he did not remember writing
that he saw Priester shoot out of the window, that his statement was
“fabricated,” and the officer taking his statement was “basically giving [him]
information to write down.”
                                       7
he looked for “a slight second” in the room the shots came from, and

“thought” he saw the Priester brothers on the floor “covering their

heads.” However, the Priester brothers were not in the room when

he returned to it soon after, and he then found them in the

basement, lying on the ground “with their hands over their heads,

scared, saying they were going to die. They’re trying to kill us.”

     On the night of the shooting, Priester was interviewed by Chief

Bill Gorman, the lead detective on the case, and another officer from

the Dallas Police Department. A video recording of the interview

was played for the jury. Priester, who was wearing a white shirt,

admitted that he was at Godsey’s house at the time of the shooting,

but said that he “wasn’t in the room when it was happening,” that

he ducked down when the shots were fired, and that “Brandon

Glenn,” who was wearing a red shirt, was the shooter. Priester said

that he did not know Glenn, but Glenn had approached his group at

the football game and gone back to Godsey’s house with them.

Priester “d[id]n’t know” why Glenn shot at Robinson’s group.

Priester said that Glenn was 17 years old and attended Hiram High

                                  8
School. A Dallas police officer testified that no one with that name

could be found as ever having attended that school or any other

school in the county.

     Priester did not testify at trial. His defense was that he was

not the shooter and he did not identify the real shooter because he

was protecting that person. Priester also emphasized in closing

argument the ongoing dispute between the two groups and the

evidence showing that Robinson’s group came to Godsey’s house to

fight. Priester was convicted of malice murder, aggravated battery,

three counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm

during the commission of a felony.

     2.    Priester challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions in several ways.

     (a) He argues that the evidence presented at trial was not

sufficient to support his convictions as a matter of constitutional due

process. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61

LE2d 560) (1979). “In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence as

a matter of constitutional due process, we view all of the evidence

                                  9
presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict and ask

whether any rational juror could have found the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of which he was convicted.”

Perez v. State, 316 Ga. 433, 437 (888 SE2d 526) (2023). See also

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

     As discussed above, the evidence presented at trial included

undisputed evidence that Priester was at Godsey’s house. Sullivan

told police that he saw Priester open the window and shoot into the

crowd. Two other witnesses testified that the person in the window

from where the shots came was wearing a white shirt, and video

from the football game and testimony showed that Priester was

wearing a white shirt that night. People from Robinson’s group

testified that they were outside walking away from the house when

shots were fired, and there was no evidence that any of them had a

weapon. Thus, the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the

light most favorable to the convictions, was sufficient to support

Priester’s convictions. See Bullard v. State, 307 Ga. 482, 483 (837

SE2d 348) (2019) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to

                                 10
support Bullard’s convictions for murder and other crimes where

two witnesses told police that they saw Bullard shoot at the victim,

although they recanted at trial); Jackson v. State, 315 Ga. 543, 551

(883 SE2d 815) (2023) (holding that the evidence was sufficient for

the jury to reject Jackson’s claim of self-defense when the victim was

“not within close range” of Jackson and was “walking back toward

his car”).

     (b) Priester further argues that the trial court erred by denying

his motion for a directed verdict as to the charge of aggravated

battery against Nelson. In considering this claim, we apply the

same standard used to determine if the evidence is constitutionally

sufficient. See Lumpkin v. State, 310 Ga. 139, 144 n.4 (849 SE2d

175) (2020). “A person commits the offense of aggravated battery

when he or she maliciously causes bodily harm to another by

depriving him or her of a member of his or her body, by rendering a

member of his or her body useless, or by seriously disfiguring his or

her body or a member thereof.” OCGA § 16-5-24 (a).

     Priester argues that the evidence supporting the aggravated

                                 11
battery conviction was not sufficient because there was no “medical

testimony” about Nelson’s wound and Chief Gorman testified that

Nelson suffered a “minor gunshot injury.”10             However, Nelson

testified that his leg was scarred, he suffered permanent nerve

damage, and the injury “kind of affects the way [he] walk[s] at

times.”   This alone was sufficient evidence to support Priester’s

conviction for aggravated battery. See Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga.

364, 366 (711 SE2d 660) (2011) (“The evidence regarding Colbert’s

rehabilitation and his ongoing gait impairment was sufficient to

allow the jury to conclude that Colbert’s legs were rendered

useless.”). See also OCGA § 24-14-8 (“The testimony of a single

witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.”).            And the

resolution of any discrepancies between Nelson’s testimony and

Chief Gorman’s testimony was up to the jury. See Perez v. State,

316 Ga. 433, 437 (888 SE2d 526) (2023) (“We leave to the jury the

resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility

     10 Chief Gorman testified that on the night of the shooting, he went to

the hospital to speak to Nelson and observed that Nelson “had a minor gunshot
injury to the back of his left calf up near the knee.”
                                     12
of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be derived from the

facts.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

         (c) Priester contends that the evidence did not support his

convictions under OCGA § 24-14-6, which says: “To warrant a

conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only

be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every

other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”

“However, this doctrine applies only where the State’s case against

the defendant was wholly circumstantial.” Jackson v. State, 310 Ga.

224, 228 (850 SE2d 131) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

         Here, the State did not rely solely on circumstantial evidence.

The State presented direct evidence of Priester’s guilt in the form of

Sullivan’s written statement that Priester “shot at the crowd.” See

Willis v. State, 315 Ga. 19, 24 (880 SE2d 158) (2022) (explaining that

eyewitness testimony identifying the shooter is direct evidence of

guilt). This is true even though Sullivan recanted his statement at

trial.     See Jackson, 310 Ga. at 228 (“[D]irect evidence is not

converted into circumstantial evidence by a witness’ lack of

                                    13
credibility.”). Thus, Priester’s statutory challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence fails.

     3. Priester next argues that the trial court should have granted

him a new trial because the verdicts were “contrary to the law and

evidence” and “to the principles of justice, fairness, and equity.” This

argument implicates the “general grounds” for obtaining a new trial

under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 & 5-5-21.11

     When these so-called “general grounds” are properly
     raised in a timely motion for new trial, the trial judge
     must exercise a broad discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth
     juror. . . . [T]he merits of the trial court’s decision on the
     general grounds are not subject to our review, and the
     decision to grant a new trial on the general grounds is
     vested solely in the trial court.

King v. State, 316 Ga. 611, 616 (889 SE2d 851) (2023) (citations and

punctuation omitted).

     To the extent Priester argues the trial court failed to exercise

     11 OCGA § 5-5-20 says: “In any case when the verdict of a jury is found

contrary to evidence and the principles of justice and equity, the judge
presiding may grant a new trial before another jury.” OCGA § 5-5-21 says:
“The presiding judge may exercise a sound discretion in granting or refusing
new trials in cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against
the weight of the evidence even though there may appear to be some slight
evidence in favor of the finding.”
                                    14
its discretion as the thirteenth juror, we disagree.            In its order

denying Priester’s motion for new trial, the court set forth the

general grounds standards and expressly stated that it “has

considered but declines to grant a new trial under the forgoing

general grounds.”12 Thus, this claim fails. See King, 316 Ga. at 616.

      To the extent this claim can be construed as a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting Priester’s convictions, this

claim fails for the reasons discussed in Division 2 above.13

      4. Priester complains that the trial court did not give the jury

instructions he requested related to justification and perjury.

      12 As part of this enumeration of error, Priester asserts that the trial

court should have considered a number of points in ruling on this claim,
including allegedly false testimony and allegedly improper closing argument.
The trial court expressly considered these points in rejecting Priester’s
thirteenth juror claim.

      13 We note that although we have often reviewed the sufficiency of the

evidence as a matter of constitutional due process when an appellant raises a
general grounds claim on appeal, many of us have begun to question that
approach. See King, 316 Ga. at 616 n.8 (“[M]any of us question whether it is
proper for this Court to import Jackson into an appellate review of the general
grounds (or to otherwise rely on Jackson as part of that analysis).”) However,
like in King, we need not determine the propriety of that practice today,
because the evidence against Priester was constitutionally sufficient to affirm
his convictions.

                                      15
Because Priester failed to raise these objections after the jury was

charged, we review Priester’s claims only for plain error. See OCGA

§ 17-8-58. See also Reese v. State, ___ Ga. ___, 2023 WL 5338589, at

*5 (Aug. 21, 2023).

     To succeed on his claims, Priester must prove that all four

prongs of the plain error test are met.

     First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of
     deviation from a legal rule—that has not been
     intentionally    relinquished    or    abandoned,     i.e.,
     affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal
     error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to
     reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected
     the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary
     case means he must demonstrate that it affected the
     outcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and
     finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
     appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error—
     discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error
     seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
     reputation of judicial proceedings.

Id. (citations and punctuation omitted). “To authorize a requested

jury instruction, there need only be slight evidence to support the

theory of the charge.” Collins v. State, 308 Ga. 515, 519 (842 SE2d

275) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

                                 16
     (a)   Priester first argues that the trial court should have

instructed the jury on justification, self-defense, “stand your

ground,” and defense of habitation. See OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) (“A

person is justified in . . . using force against another when . . .

necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person”)14; OCGA

§ 16-3-23.1 (providing that a person who used force “in defense of

self or others” or “in defense of a habitation . . . has no duty to retreat

and has the right to stand his or her ground”)15; OCGA § 16-3-23 (“A

     14 OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) says in full:

     A person is justified in threatening or using force against another
     when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such
     threat or force is necessary to defend himself or herself or a third
     person against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force;
     however, except as provided in Code Section 16-3-23, a person is
     justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death
     or great bodily harm only if he or she reasonably believes that such
     force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself
     or herself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a
     forcible felony.

     15 OCGA § 16-3-23.1 says in full:

     A person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section
     16-3-21, relating to the use of force in defense of self or others, Code
     Section 16-3-23, relating to the use of force in defense of a
     habitation, or Code Section 16-3-24, relating to the use of force in
     defense of property other than a habitation, has no duty to retreat
     and has the right to stand his or her ground and use force as
     provided in said Code sections, including deadly force.

                                       17
person is justified in . . . using force against another when . . .

necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s unlawful entry into

or attack upon a habitation”).16 Priester argues that, whoever the

shooter was, there was evidence that the shooter’s actions were

justified because Robinson’s group came to the house to fight and

created a “threatening environment” to make it clear that Priester

and his friends were not safe in their own home.

     16 OCGA § 16-3-23 says in full:

            A person is justified in threatening or using force against
     another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes
     that such threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such
     other’s unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation; however,
     such person is justified in the use of force which is intended or
     likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if:
            (1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent and
     tumultuous manner and he or she reasonably believes that the
     entry is attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering
     personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein and that
     such force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal
     violence;
            (2) That force is used against another person who is not a
     member of the family or household and who unlawfully and
     forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence
     and the person using such force knew or had reason to believe that
     an unlawful and forcible entry occurred; or
            (3) The person using such force reasonably believes that the
     entry is made or attempted for the purpose of committing a felony
     therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the commission
     of the felony.
                                       18
     Even assuming for purposes of argument that there was slight

evidence of justification and the trial court committed a clear and

obvious error by declining to give the requested justification-related

instructions, Priester has failed to show that the lack of these

instructions affected the outcome of his trial.      Even crediting

accounts from Sullivan and Godsey that Robinson’s group was

highly aggressive when it arrived, there was no evidence that

anyone in the group had a weapon or was attacking the house when

the shots were fired. On the contrary, the evidence indicated that

the victims were standing in the street when shots were fired at

them. Moreover, in his interview with police after the shooting,

Priester identified Glenn (whose identity could not be corroborated

and who could not be found) as the shooter but never said Glenn was

acting in defense of himself, others, or the house. In light of this

evidence, the jury was unlikely to believe that shooting at the crowd

outside was “necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury,”

OCGA § 16-3-21, or “to prevent or terminate . . . unlawful entry into

or attack” on the house, OCGA § 16-3-23. Thus, Priester has failed

                                 19
to show that any error in the trial court’s failure to give the

requested instructions affected his substantial rights. See Reese,

2023 WL 5338589, at *6 (“Because the evidence supporting Reese’s

self-defense theory was weak, we cannot say that the trial court

omitting jury instructions on justification likely affected the trial’s

outcome.”).

        (b) Priester also argues that the trial court erred when it

declined to instruct the jury on perjury, because Nelson, Starks,

Sullivan, Bedford, and Lewis provided certain testimony at trial

that was inconsistent with statements those witnesses gave to law

enforcement before trial.       Notably, however, Priester does not

specify which of the statements—the unsworn ones the witnesses

named above gave to law enforcement before trial or the testimony

offered at trial under oath—he believes were false.

             (i) At trial, Priester requested that the court instruct the

jury:

        [Y]ou can not base a conviction upon perjured testimony.
        A witness gives perjured testimony when his or her
        testimony at trial materially contradicts the statement

                                    20
     that he or she made to a police officer. Whether a witness
     has given perjured testimony is [a] matter for you to
     decide.

Priester has failed to show that the trial court committed a clear or

obvious error by declining to give the requested instruction.

     “A requested ‘jury instruction must be adjusted to the evidence

and embody a correct, applicable, and complete statement of law.’”

Tepanca v. State, 297 Ga. 47, 49 (771 SE2d 879) (2015) (citation

omitted). At the time of Priester’s trial, OCGA § 16-10-70 (a) defined

perjury in this way: “A person to whom a lawful oath or affirmation

has been administered commits the offense of perjury when, in a

judicial proceeding, he knowingly and willfully makes a false

statement material to the issue or point in question.”17 Priester’s

requested instruction on perjury—which did not match this

definition—was not a correct statement of law. Thus, the trial court

did not err, let alone clearly or obviously err, by declining to instruct

the jury with an incorrect statement of law. See Alexis v. State, 273

     17 The statute was amended in 2023 to address unsworn declarations

made under the penalty of perjury. See Ga. L. 2023, Act 59, § 2.
                                     21
Ga. 423, 426 (541 SE2d 636) (2001) (holding that the trial court was

not required to give the requested charge because it “was not a

correct statement of law”).

           (ii) To the extent Priester is now arguing that the trial

court committed plain error by failing to give the pattern jury

instruction on perjury, which he cites in his brief, he has again failed

to show error, let alone clear or obvious error. Priester argues that

a charge on perjury was warranted to address the discrepancies

between trial testimony and statements given to law enforcement by

Nelson, Starks, Sullivan, Bedford, and Lewis. However, as noted

above, Priester does not specify whether his contention is that the

unsworn statements to police were false or that the sworn trial

testimony was false. And he has pointed to no cases, nor have we

found any, holding that a perjury instruction should be given under

these circumstances. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jurors

that it was their duty to “determine the credibility of the witnesses,”

and explained:

     Your assessment of a trial witness’s credibility may be

                                  22
     affected by comparing or contrasting that testimony to
     statements or testimony of that same witness before the
     trial started. It is for you to decide whether there is a
     reasonable explanation for any inconsistency in a
     witness’s pretrial statements and testimony when
     compared to the same witness’s trial testimony. As with
     all issues of witness credibility, you the jury must apply
     your common sense and reason to decide what testimony
     you believe or do not believe.

Thus, to the extent that Priester is arguing that an instruction on

perjury is required to highlight inconsistencies between the pre-trial

statements and trial testimony, the instructions as given covered

that concept. See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 737 (883 SE2d 802)

(2023) (“We see no error [in the court’s failure to give the requested

instruction] because the points of law in Wilson’s requested

instruction were covered in the court’s other instructions.”).

     5. Priester argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance in multiple ways. To prevail on these claims, Priester

must show that his lawyer’s performance was constitutionally

deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984). See also Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 442 (883 SE2d 317)

                                  23
(2023). To prove deficient performance, Priester must demonstrate

that his counsel “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable

way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms.”       Clark, 315 Ga. at 442 (citation and

punctuation omitted). To establish prejudice, Priester must show a

reasonable probability that, “but for counsel’s deficient performance,

the result of the trial would have been different.” Id. We need not

address both components of this test if Priester makes an

insufficient showing on one. See id. See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697.

       (a) Priester argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to object after the trial court refused to give the

justification-related instructions discussed in Division 4 (a) above.

Even assuming that counsel was deficient in this respect, for the

reasons discussed in Division 4 (a), Priester has failed to show that

there is a reasonable probability he would have achieved a different

result at trial if counsel had objected. See Clark, 315 Ga. at 442

(“[T]he test for prejudice in the ineffective assistance analysis is

                                   24
equivalent to the test for harm in plain error review.”) (citation and

punctuation omitted). See also Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 420, 427 (811

SE2d 392) (2018) (“We need not decide whether trial counsel’s

failure to preserve Appellant’s claims of instructional error

amounted to deficient performance, because . . . Appellant has not

shown a reasonable probability that his trial would have ended more

favorably for him had his counsel preserved his claims of

instructional error.”).

     Priester also argues that counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to object to the court’s failure to instruct the

jury on perjury.    This claim fails for the reasons discussed in

Division 4 (b). Because the trial court did not err by declining to give

the requested instruction, counsel was not deficient in failing to

object to the lack of that instruction. See King, 316 Ga. at 625

(“[F]ailing to make a meritless objection is not constitutionally

deficient.”).

     (b) Priester argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance

by failing to object to Chief Gorman’s testimony that—according to

                                  25
Priester—violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution by commenting on

Prieter’s “post-Miranda silence.” At trial, before Priester’s interview

was played for the jury, Chief Gorman explained that Priester was

read his rights under Miranda,18 agreed to answer questions without

an attorney, and never invoked his right to remain silent. Then the

following exchange occurred:

      PROSECUTOR: Did the Defendant ever refuse to answer
      any further questions throughout the course of the
      interview?
      GORMAN: No. He was very cooperative.
      PROSECUTOR: Is the time that you are referring to the
      only time the Defendant was interviewed by you or in
      your presence?
      GORMAN: Yes. After the interview I never spoke to him
      again.

At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel explained that he

did not object to this testimony because counsel did not see this

statement as implicating Priester’s right to remain silent, although

he noted, “[i]n hindsight, I can see the implication.”

      18 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694)

(1966).
                                   26
     However, when viewed in context, Chief Gorman’s testimony

was not an improper comment on Priester’s silence. He clearly

testified that Priester never invoked his right to remain silent, and

the complained-of statement was merely an explanation that the

custodial interview was the only time he talked to Priester. Thus,

Priester’s counsel was not deficient for failing to object to the

testimony. See Clark v. State, 299 Ga. 552, 554-555 (787 SE2d 212)

(2016) (“[T]he prosecutor’s comments, when viewed in their full

context, were not comments on Clark’s pre-arrest silence. . . . [H]is

trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to make

this meritless objection to the comments.”).

     (c)   Priester argues that his counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to cross-examine Godsey and not asking Godsey

if it was possible that the members of the group outside the house

were going back to their car for guns. At trial, counsel did not ask

Godsey any questions on cross-examination, and at the motion-for-

new-trial hearing, counsel testified that he did not cross-examine

Godsey because the defense team had spoken with Godsey before

                                 27
trial and “there was some reason based upon our interview with him

and his testimony that we decided that it would be best not to cross-

examine him.” Godsey did not testify at the motion-for-new-trial

hearing.

     “The scope of cross-examination is grounded in trial tactics and

strategy, and will rarely constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”

Bonner v. State, 314 Ga. 472, 476 (877 SE2d 588) (2022) (citation

and punctuation omitted). Priester has not shown that his counsel’s

decision—based on counsel’s conversation with Godsey and Godsey’s

testimony—was deficient, particularly in light of Priester’s failure

to demonstrate that Godsey would have given a response helpful to

Priester if he had been asked if it was possible that Robinson’s group

was going to retrieve guns from the car. See Bonner, 314 Ga. at 476

(holding that Bonner failed to show that counsel’s performance was

deficient in failing to cross-examine several witnesses, where

counsel explained at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that he would

usually cross-examine witnesses if he “ha[d] something to cross[-

]examine” them about and Bonner did not “demonstrate how cross-

                                  28
examination of these witnesses would have been helpful to him”).

     (d) Priester argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance

by requesting an instruction on accomplice corroboration. At trial,

Priester’s   counsel   requested        an   accomplice   corroboration

instruction, arguing that Sullivan, who was in the house with

Priester, “c[ould] be an accomplice, because he could be the shooter.”

The trial court agreed to give the requested instruction. In closing

argument, trial counsel reminded the jury that the State gave

Sullivan, whom counsel described as “the only eyewitness,” use

immunity for his testimony.     Counsel argued: “one of the other

things that the Judge is going to tell you about Mr. Sullivan is about

an accomplice” and explained that an accomplice’s testimony “must

be supported by . . . some other evidence.” Later in his argument,

counsel said, “Remember Makaylen Sullivan is an accomplice and

you can’t take the word of an accomplice on its own without some

other supporting evidence.”

     “Decisions on requests to charge involve trial tactics to which

we must afford substantial latitude, and they provide no grounds for

                                   29
reversal unless such tactical decisions are so patently unreasonable

that no competent attorney would have chosen them.” Moulder v.

State, ___ Ga. ___, 2023 WL 5338774, at *9 (Aug. 21, 2023). It was

not patently unreasonable for Priester’s counsel to request an

instruction explaining the need for corroboration of accomplice

testimony in support of the argument that the jury should not credit

Sullivan’s account of the shooting, which included identifying

Priester as the shooter. See id. (holding that counsel’s performance

was not deficient where he reasonably requested a specific jury

instruction in support of an argument he made in closing attempting

to undermine the thoroughness of the State’s investigation). Thus,

Priester has failed to show that his counsel’s performance was

deficient.

     (e) Priester argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance

by failing to file a motion for immunity from prosecution under

OCGA § 16-3-24.2.19 At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, counsel

     19 OCGA § 16-3-24.2 says: “A person who uses threats or force in
accordance with Code Section 16-3-21, 16-3-23, 16-3-23.1, or 16-3-24 shall be

                                     30
testified that he did not file a pre-trial motion for immunity because

the defense team did not feel “comfort” in Priester testifying.

Priester has not shown that this was unreasonable trial strategy,

particularly in light of the weakness of his self-defense argument

discussed in Division 4 above. See Tabor v. State, 315 Ga. 240, 249

(882 SE2d 329) (2022) (“It may be reasonable for trial counsel to

forgo a pre-trial immunity motion so as to avoid subjecting his client

to pre-trial cross-examination, or for counsel to elect to demonstrate

self-defense to the jury, rather than to the judge.”) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

     (f)     Finally, Priester argues that trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to object to narrative testimony, to

“asked and answered” testimony, and to the prosecutor “testifying”

by repeating testimony given by a witness or asking leading

questions.     At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, trial counsel

testified that deciding whether to raise these kinds of objections was

immune from criminal prosecution therefor unless in the use of deadly force,
such person utilizes a weapon the carrying or possession of which is unlawful
by such person under Part 2 of Article 4 of Chapter 11 of this title.”
                                     31
an “on the spot” or “instinctive” decision that he made, considering

factors such as whether the testimony was prejudicial and whether

objecting would be “disruptive” or “rub the jury the wrong way.”

     In raising this claim, Priester does not specifically discuss any

of the allegedly improper questions or answers. Instead, he has

included a string cite of transcript pages and argues generally that

every instance of narrative testimony, “asked and answered”

testimony, and the prosecutor “testifying” was prejudicial to him.

These string cites—which fail to highlight any question or answer

that was particularly prejudicial to Priester—do not suffice to show

that counsel made a patently unreasonable decision by choosing not

to object to each instance of allegedly objectionable questions or

answers and choosing instead to consider factors such as the

potential prejudice from the testimony or potential disruption from

the objection.    Thus, Priester has failed to demonstrate that

counsel’s performance was deficient. See Moulder, S23A0508, 2023

WL 5338774, at *6 (“[R]easonable decisions as to whether to raise a

specific objection are ordinarily matters of trial strategy and provide

                                  32
no ground for reversal.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).20

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

      20 Citing State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020), Priester argues

that all of the claims he has raised resulted in cumulative prejudice affecting
the outcome of his trial. Even assuming that this cumulative error analysis
applies to a trial court’s failure to give specific jury instructions, Priester’s
claim fails. See Park v. State, 314 Ga. 733, 745 (879 SE2d 400) (2022)
(assuming without deciding that two instances of counsel’s deficient
performance should be considered cumulatively with an assumed trial court
error for failing to give a jury instruction). We have assumed only one trial
court error—the failure to give justification-related instructions—and only one
deficiency by trial counsel—the failure to object to the lack of these
instructions. Because the harm from this assumed error and assumed
deficiency is the same—the jury was not given the requested instruction—and
we have concluded that the lack of these instructions did not likely affect the
outcome of the trial, Priester’s cumulative error claim fails. See Harris v.
State, 313 Ga. 872, 885 n.11 (874 SE2d 73) (2022) (“Of the claims of trial court
error at trial that he raises, we conclude that only one of those has any possible
merit, and any error was harmless. That possible error involves the same
evidence—text messages—as to which we pretermitted the issue of deficient
performance in our prior opinion in this case. Thus, there is nothing to
consider cumulatively with the harm from the text messages, and this claim
fails.”).
                                       33