Court Opinion

ID: 9766397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:45:38.533065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:29.870057
License: Public Domain

SAYLOR, Justice,
dissenting:
As the majority emphasizes, Section 5313(b) of the Domestic Relations Code provides that “[a] grandparent has standing to bring a petition for physical and legal custody of a grandchild.” 23 Pa.C.S. 5313(b). Immediately following this con*628ferral of standing, the General Assembly set forth the substantive standard that must be satisfied in order for custody to be obtained: “If it is in the best interest of the child not to be in the custody of either parent and if it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the grandparent, the court may award physical and legal custody to the grandparent.” Id. In the same subsection, however, the General Assembly expressly qualified both the conferral of standing and the ability to invoke the substantive standard for obtaining custody as follows: “This subsection applies to a grandparent” who meets three specific threshold criteria (genuine care and concern; existing relationship pursuant to parental consent or court order; and 12 months in the role of a parent, or assumption of responsibility for a child deemed dependent or in danger). Id. The understanding that the legislative qualification serves as a limitation upon standing is supported by the heading of Section 5313, “When grandparents may petition,” id. 23 Pa.C.S. § 5313; see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1924 (prescribing that headings may be considered as aids in the construction of a statute); and by the application of the precept that courts are to give effect to all of the provisions of a statute, see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(a).
To the extent that there is any ambiguity, further support for the above can be found in the legislative history of Section 5313. Initial versions of legislation contained fewer restrictions on a grandparent’s right to seek custody than Section 5313(b).1 Various legislators, however, expressed concern that such proposals failed to impose adequate limitations upon interference by grandparents in a parent’s right to control his or her child’s upbringing. One Senator observed that the legislation:
*629establishes bases upon which grandparents could initiate custody litigation seeking custody of their grandchildren over and against the children’s parents under certain circumstances. I just want to note my concern that the potential is for litigation which will be too broad in nature. The bill, I think needs some further limiting and I am confident there will be further consideration of it in the House.
Statement of the Honorable David W. Heckler, Pa. Legis. Journal — Senate, p. 544 (May 23, 1995). A Representative stated:
We would not want grandparents disrupting or invading the privacy and home life of their children seeking custody of their grandchildren if in fact it was not absolutely necessary. The words “over an extended period of time” [indicate that] where a debilitating instance exists with the natural parents [it] might be appropriate to give them standing in court.
Statement of the Honorable Kevin Blaum, Pa. Legis. Journal — House, p.2033 (June 28, 1996) (emphasis added). These comments are clearly phrased in terms of imposing restrictions upon which grandparents may seek custody, as opposed to which grandparents may ultimately obtain custody; they plainly reflect the concern of at least two legislators that third-party challenges to parental rights should be closely regulated. The additional restrictions that were ultimately included in the final enactment as signed into law further support the conclusion that the General Assembly sought to carefully limit the situations in which a petition could be filed by grandparents.
The legislative history of the statute dovetails with the well-settled restrictions upon standing in the child custody arena. See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 453 Pa.Super. 78, 86-87, 682 A.2d 1314, 1318-19 (1996)(explaining that, in matters regarding child custody, standing requirements are designed not only to assure that actions are litigated by appropriate parties, but also to prevent interference with parental rights by outsiders). Both reinforce a restrictive conception of the circumstances in *630which parents will be haled into court to defend custody of their children. Both provide additional support for the conclusion that Section 5313, on its face, evidences a clear intention of the Legislature to balance the need to protect the right of parents to raise their children with a desire to afford grandparents a statutory basis upon which to seek custody in limited situations in which children are in special need and/or the grandparents have firmly established themselves in the role of primary caregiver.2
The majority’s conclusion that Section 5313 confers a general right of standing upon all grandparents, regardless of whether they satisfy any of the criteria of Section 5313(b), subjects parents to legal proceedings seeking to deprive them of custody of their children despite having done nothing to suggest that they are unfit. Although such an effort by grandparents who do not meet the statutory criteria must ultimately fail, according to such a construction, parents must nonetheless endure a full-blown custody proceeding. See Majority Op. at 451 (“the circumstances set forth in subsections (1), (2) and (3) are questions of fact to be resolved by the trial court after a hearing held to determine ‘[i]f it is in the best interests of the child not to be in the custody of either parent and if it is in the best interests of the child to be in the custody of the grandparent’ ” (citations omitted)). I find such a result inimical to the Legislature’s intent as conveyed by its choice of words and to application of principles of statutory construction.
It may be unfortunate (at least in some circumstances) that, in fashioning Section 5313(b), the General Assembly has not distinguished between situations in which a grandparent’s *631custody petition would challenge custody reposited in biological parents from those in which the state has undertaken the parental role. While the majority’s decision ameliorates the effects of any imprecision in legislative drafting as applied to the circumstances of this case, I would leave it to the General Assembly to make appropriate adjustments where it has evinced its intent to regulate challenges to custody by third parties, and the guiding policy considerations are at least mixed. In such circumstances, it is my view that the legislative branch represents the superior forum in which to perform the necessary balancing of relevant concerns.3
The remaining question is whether Grandmother can satisfy the statutory requirement that she is seeking to assume responsibility for a child who is “at risk.” See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5313(b)(3). Again, I believe that the plain language of the statute should control. Pursuant to the requirements of Section 5313(b)(3), a child who has been removed from a dangerous environment, placed in a secure situation, and whose parents’ rights have been terminated, cannot be considered at risk from parental abuse or neglect. Again, there may be a legitimate concern in the circumstances of the case regarding the best interests of the child as it relates to the environment established by a Children’s Services placement versus the grandparents’ claim to a superior bond based upon the familial relationship. Again, however, in terms of the conferral of third-party standing to challenge an established and ongoing caregiver relationship, I believe that the General Assembly is best suited to balance the salient policies and provide the necessary direction.
In this case, T.M. was no longer at risk at the time Grandmother sought custody; he had been living for well over *632a year with a stable foster family who wished to adopt him. I would therefore conclude that Grandmother lacks the requisite standing, as she has failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the requirements to seek custody of T.M. pursuant to Section 5313(b)(3). Hence this dissent.
CASTILLE, Justice, joins this dissenting opinion.

. For example, Section 5313(b)(3), as originally passed by the Senate, granted the right to seek custody to a grandparent:
(3) who has assumed the role and responsibilities of the child's parent, providing for the physical, emotional and social needs of the child, or who deems it is necessary to assume the role and responsibilities of the child's parent due to physical or sexual abuse or neglect, or parental dysfunction, such as drug or alcohol abuse or emotional or mental illness or instability.
Senate Bill 434 of 1995 (Printer's No. 453).

. It is questionable whether a statute granting to grandparents a general right to seek custody of their grandchildren would survive constitutional challenge. In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), a plurality of the United States Supreme Court invalidated a Washington statute granting a general right to petition for visitation regardless of the parents’ fitness, finding the sweeping breadth of the law violative of a parent’s fundamental right to care, custody, and control of his children as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See id. at 75, 120 S.Ct. at 2066.

. This would also avoid the creation of controlling authority elevating the substantive terms of a statute ("A grandparent has standing to bring a petition for physical and legal custody of a grandchild") over express qualifying provisions (“This section applies to a grandparent who....”). I strongly disfavor this sort of precedent, as I believe that its application to other instances of legislative drafting is bound to yield idiosyncratic results; further, I believe that it complicates the already difficult task of legislative drafting.