Court Opinion

ID: 9759589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:20:37.140518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:03.041165
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because there has been no showing of any abuse of discretion by the trial judge in admitting evidence of Gray’s prior acts of sexual abuse.
The majority assertion that the prejudicial effect of the testimony of the three witnesses who were earlier victims outweighs its probative value is a subjective substitution for the discretion usually afforded to the trial judge. There is no showing of any abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Ordinarily the trial judge is given wide latitude in the introduction of evidence. Walker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 476 S.W.2d 630 (1972). O’Bryan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 153 (1982) is not properly applied here.
Phillips v. Commonwealth, Ky., 679 S.W.2d 235 (1984) held that where evidence of other crimes is admitted into evidence, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence to determine if the accused has been unduly prejudiced.
The determination of whether an act is too remote should remain in the sound discretion of the trial judge and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court in the ab*898sence of a showing of an abuse of discretion.
Here, Gray committed very similar acts with the three witnesses who testified against him. The three witnesses and the victim in this case were all nieces of Gray.
In regard to the use of KRE 404(c), it should be noted that this case was tried in 1988 which was approximately four years prior to the adoption of the rule now cited.
REYNOLDS and SPAIN, JJ„ join.