Court Opinion

ID: 9468169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:07:16.16411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:44.116119
License: Public Domain

*930DUMBAULD, Senior District Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the accurate and thorough exposition of the statutory provisions1 contained in Judge Garth’s scholarly opinion, and with the conclusion that the case must be remanded to the District Court for further consideration for the reasons that (1) the District Court did not make findings that the information given to the FBI was given under a promise of confidentiality; and (2) that the FBI did not furnish all the documents involved to the court for in camera examination.
What I disagree with is the specification of standards to be complied with on remand, both by the FBI and the District Court, which to me seem unduly and needlessly burdensome and impracticable.
According to Judge Garth’s opinion, the FBI in its affidavit and the District Court in its findings, must deal in detail with every document produced for in camera examination.2 The FBI and the District Court are also directed to consider in detail the impact of the subsequent disclosures (in trial testimony or plea-bargain discussions).
In my judgment, treating the second point first, once the finding of confidentiality has been duly made by the District Court, the status of the information so communicated is “fixed in concrete” once for all, and remains exempt from disclosure under FOIA whatever public proclamation of the identical material may be made thereafter. This is well elucidated in Judge Garth’s statement that “the subsequent disclosure of information originally given in confidence does not render non-confidential any of the information originally provided,” and by the quotation from Judge Swygert in Scherer v. Kelley, 584 F.2d 170, 176 n. 7 (C.A.7, 1978):
Because a person may have given testimony at a trial on a specific topic does not mean that all information offered by that source upon a guarantee of confidentiality automatically becomes available to the person to whom it relates. The non-testimonial information may be far more damaging than any testimony freely given and may place the source in great peril. A source would be unlikely to testify on any subject if he or she know that by so doing every transcription made by an investigative agent regarding their conversations could be released to the party about whom the source was informing.
To me the nature or extent of the disclosures at trial or plea is utterly irrelevant to the confidentiality vei non of communications previously made.
It is of course true that subsequent events may constitute evidence of prior conditions: for example, a later X-ray disclosing the existence of a slowly developing chronic disease may be evidence of the existence of the disease at an earlier time, namely the critical period for entitlement to “black lung” benefits.3
However, the likelihood that this rule would be applicable or helpful in determination of the issue of confidentiality vel non in the case at bar is extremely unlikely.
*931Hence the impact of trial testimony and plea discussions should not be singled out and emphasized as a significant and indispensable element to be considered by the District Court in making its determination on remand.
Of course, if a witness at the trial expressly stated that at no time had he requested or desired confidentiality, this testimony would be given due weight; or if it appeared that a deranged neighbor had gone to the FBI with the specific purpose and hope of spreading defamatory rumors about an acquaintance and exposing him to damaging publicity, the court would give appropriate consideration to that revelation. But in general there seems no justification for requiring particular consideration for trial testimony or plea discussions.
Such material should simply be taken into consideration along with all other circumstances surrounding the communication to the FBI, and the District Court should be free to make its determination of confidentiality vel non upon the totality of circumstances.
And, as previously stated, once such a determination of confidentiality at the time of communication has been duly made by the District Court,4 it is immaterial and irrelevant what publicity anyone may later give to the information thus communicated in confidence: all the information communicated by the “confidential source” remains exempt from disclosure under FOIA.
In examining the circumstances surrounding the communication of a public-spirited citizen with the FBI or any other law enforcement agency it should require very little evidence to establish in the ordinary case that the communication was indeed made with a justifiable expectation of confidentiality. A public policy akin to that underlying judicial and prosecutorial immunity 5 should encourage free communication of information helpful to law-enforcement authorities by according protection from annoying unexpected publicity to information thus communicated.6 Roviara v. U. S., 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957).
Reverting to my first point of disagreement. I believe it is unduly and unnecessarily burdensome and impracticable to trammel the due course of law enforcement and the administration of justice by imposing requirements that both the investigative agency and the reviewing court devote extensive time and effort to the detailed discussion of each document submitted for in camera examination.
The situation brings to mind the anecdote about a publisher (perhaps it was Walter Hines Page) to whom an aspiring author submitted a manuscript with a number of pages glued together. When in due time the manuscript was returned with a rejection slip, the author complained that his work had been rejected without a complete reading. The publisher replied: “I do not need to eat an entire egg to know that it is rotten.”
Similarly a judge examining in camera a mass of documents does not always need to peruse every one of them in its entirety word by word. Often the nature of an item saute aux yeux and is evident at a glance. That there has been an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” or that confidentiality is clearly intended or implied under the circumstances involved can be seen *932without elaborate evaluation. Frequently it should suffice for the FBI to state that a document is self-explanatory, without laboring an obvious point; and if a series of documents is infected by an identical ground mandating non-disclosure, it should suffice to list them in categories, without annotations and commentary on each one individually. The same is true of the degree of elaboration required in the District Judge’s findings.
Of course it bears repetition that all the documents involved must be available for examination by the judge in such detail as he deems necessary; and that he and not the FBI, must decide what degree of scrutiny is required in order to illuminate adequately the issues committed to his determination by the terms of the statute and to elucidate with sufficient clarity the grounds of his decision.
Where the enactments of Congress or precedents in the jurisprudence of this Court do not clearly command otherwise, the FBI should be permitted to fight crime by investigating violations of federal law rather than to serve as a librarian to furnish criminals a complete account of the evidence in the government’s possession demonstrating their criminality, or to conduct historical research for the benefit of journalists seeking to spread the slime of scandal and sensationalism throughout the land for monetary gain. Similarly the judiciary should be permitted to perform its normal task of adjudicating controversies of importance by the development and application of legal principles rather than to dissipate its energies in file searches through mountainous haystacks of triviality and in unproductive paperwork. These priorities are particularly important in the present era of budgetary constraint when all misspent resources diminish what is available for useful service to the public.
I therefore concur and dissent to the extent indicated above.

. In particular it should be noted that under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(D) if information is given by a “confidential source,” all the information from such source is exempt from disclosure (even if the same information is publicly available elsewhere). Moreover, a “confidential source” includes any person giving information in confidence and is not limited to the “informants” whose danger from criminals implicated by their “singing” has often been discussed. Roviaro v. U. S. 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957).

. “Each document and its asserted exemption must be individually explained in terms of privacy or confidentiality.... The government does not explain .. . why it has not analyzed every requested document and furnished the court with an explanation as to its purported exempt status.” Garth opinion, p. 928.

. Conversely, past events or misconduct may be evidence of future unfitness to exercise a profession or office of trust. “Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may have a reasonable relationship to present and future trust.” Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716, 720, 71 S.Ct. 909, 912, 95 L.Ed. 1317 (1951), and other cases cited in Dumbauld, The Constitution of the United States (1964) 199-200.

. It must be emphasized that in the case at bar the District Judge merely stated that “persons who cooperate with the FBI often do so with the expectation that their privacy will be respected” [Italics supplied]. This falls far short of finding that the persons interviewed in the case at bar expected confidentiality.

. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 1339, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), citing Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (C.A.2, 1949).

. While it may be going too far to accept the Bureau’s position that such interviews are always on a confidential basis, it seems clear that the average citizen would entertain a normal expectation of confidentiality. Perhaps to minimize controversy the Bureau might adopt a policy of reading to all persons interviewed a statement (and having them sign it) similar to the statements regarding Miranda rights. It would then be clear, without prolonged debate, whether confidentiality has been claimed or waived.