Court Opinion

ID: 9695443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:19:57.67943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:12.642585
License: Public Domain

GORDON, J.
(concurring). I agree that the judgment should be affirmed. However, I would do so for a reason different from that relied upon in the court’s opinion.
The contract requires three months of total disability as a condition for triggering the waiver of premium. This condition was not met, and, as a result, the policy expired for nonpayment of the premium.
*622I think the trial judge was correct when he concluded as follows:
“The contract by its terms is free from ambiguity; by its language the instrument must be understood to mean what it clearly expresses. Therefore the Court believes the benefit of the rider cannot be invoked until the condition precedent has occurred: The insured must become totally and permanently disabled and remain so disabled for at least three months.”
Does death during the three months’ period satisfy the requirement? Death is simply not the same as disability. Because of the comprehensiveness and finality of death, it may be tempting to regard it as encompassing total disability. Nevertheless, these words have separate meanings which, in my view, do not permit treating death as a form of disability under the insurance policy. The Illinois court phrased the matter in these terms: “Disability presupposes life. Death is the antithesis of life.” Ferguson v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1940), 305 Ill. App. 537, 542, 27 N. E. (2d) 548. See Hinkley v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. (D. C. Wash. 1941), 37 Fed. Supp. 1018, 1023.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice CuRRiE joins in this concurring opinion.