Court Opinion

ID: 9914972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 21:02:03.509182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:53.257363
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/3/24 P. v. Ortiz CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                                  D081499

          Plaintiff and Respondent,

          v.                                                                 (Super. Ct. No. SCD296094)

JESUS ANGEL ORTIZ,

          Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.
          Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
          Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Juliet W. Park, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
          After the jury found Jesus Angel Ortiz guilty of robbery, one juror
elected to speak with counsel for both parties. The juror expressed his belief
that several jurors misunderstood the burden of proof for various reasons.
On this basis, defense counsel moved for disclosure of the jurors’ personal
identifying information. The trial court denied the motion after finding “no
proof or any evidence of juror misconduct” and thus no good cause to release
the requested information.
      Ortiz appeals the denial of this motion. We affirm. As we resolve this
case by memorandum opinion, we do not elaborate on factual or procedural
background beyond what is required for our analysis. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851-854.)
                                        I.
      Ortiz argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to disclose
jurors’ personal identifying information. Reviewing under the deferential
abuse of discretion standard, we disagree. (People v. Johnson (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 486, 492 (Johnson).)
      A criminal defendant may request jurors’ personal identifying
information for any “lawful purpose,” including to develop a motion for new
trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 206, subd. (g).) The request “shall be supported by a
declaration that includes facts sufficient to establish good cause” for the
disclosure. (Id., § 237, subd. (b).) “[A]llegations of jury misconduct [that] are
speculative, conclusory, vague, or unsupported” cannot establish good cause.
(People v. Cook (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 341, 346.) Rather, the defendant
must show that “talking to the jurors is reasonably likely to produce
admissible evidence of juror misconduct.” (Johnson, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th
at p. 493.) If the defendant fails to make this prima facie showing, the court
may deny the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, as “the public
interest in the integrity of the jury system and the jurors’ right to privacy
outweighs the defendant’s interest in disclosure” absent good cause. (Code

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Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b); People v. McNally (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1419,
1430.)
      We consider only the facts asserted in defense counsel’s declaration.
The prosecutor described the juror’s comments in the opposition brief without
any supporting declaration, but “[a]rgument of counsel is not evidence.”
(Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1173.) At the motion hearing,
defense counsel raised Ortiz’s belief that a different juror told him “ ‘This is
our world,’ ” also without any supporting declaration. Thus, this evidence
does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 237, which requires the
facts showing good cause to be presented in a declaration.
      According to defense counsel’s declaration, the juror “believed” several
jurors “misunderstood the burden of proof for various reasons.” Noting that
the foreperson was a civil attorney, the juror shared that “many of the other
jurors seemed to think they had to decide the case by a preponderance of the
evidence.” In addition, “in [the juror’s] opinion,” the prosecutor’s hand
placement during closing argument “made it appear as though she was
inadvertently minimizing her burden” while describing reasonable doubt.
      Defense counsel failed to make a prima facie showing of good cause.
Missing here is the likelihood of admissible information. Only evidence of
“statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring” may be used to
impeach a verdict. (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).) The scope of admissible
evidence is limited to that which is “open to sight, hearing, and the other
senses and thus subject to corroboration.” (People v. Hutchinson (1969)
71 Cal.2d 342, 350.) In contrast, evidence about an overt event’s “effect” on a
juror or “the mental processes by which [the verdict] was determined” are
inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).) Such evidence is therefore “of

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no jural consequence” and is irrelevant. (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th
1230, 1264.)
      Here, the juror merely speculated about others’ thinking. What he
“believed” about what others “seemed to think” and “his opinion” about how
others might view the prosecutor’s hand gestures is neither relevant nor
admissible. And because the juror did not discuss any overt statements or
conduct to support his speculation, it is unlikely that speaking with the
jurors would produce admissible evidence. Therefore, the trial court properly
exercised its discretion when it denied the motion.
                                      II.
      We affirm.

                                                                CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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