Court Opinion

ID: 9698785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:59:52.790928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:43.326442
License: Public Domain

TAMILIA, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent to the Opinion of the majority which reverses the trial court decision and remands for further proceedings.
*424This is an appeal from the. March 29, 1989 Order of court sustaining appellee’s preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissing the complaint as to appellee Harleysville Insurance Company only. Appellant was involved in an automobile accident on October 21, 1981 while driving a vehicle owned by Verrena Buick-Olds. She had borrowed the car while her car was being serviced. At the time of the collision, appellant was insured up to $100,000 under a policy issued to her father by Allstate Insurance Company. Harleysville Insurance Company had $500,000 of coverage on insured vehicles owned by Verrena, and a dispute arose over which company was the primary insurer.
Appellant filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to prove Harleysville is the primary insurer and is obligated to defend her in the underlying action. Harleysville filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer; the court sustained the objections and dismissed appellant’s complaint as to Harleysville only.
In Pennsylvania, the proper standards for sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are clear. In reviewing an Order sustaining a demurrer, the appellate court must accept as true all averments of material fact in the challenged pleading together with all inferences that can reasonably be deduced from those averments. Gentile v. West American Insurance Exchange, 367 Pa.Super. 99, 532 A.2d 472 (1987). A demurrer can be sustained only if it is certain no recovery is permitted. Douglas v. Schwenk, 330 Pa.Super. 392, 479 A.2d 608 (1984). I believe thorough examination of the pleadings coupled with a conclusive review of the pertinent provisions of the Harleysville insurance policy, applied subject to these standards, reveal appellant is not an insured under the Harleysville policy, and therefore, she should not recover against Harleysville.
The Harleysville insurance policy provides:
D. WHO IS AN INSURED.
1. For Covered Autos,
a. You are an insured for any covered auto.
*425b. Anyone else is an insured while using with your permission a covered auto except:
(3) Your customers, if your business is shown in ITEM ONE of the declarations as an auto dealership. However, if a customer of yours:
(a) Has no other available insurance (whether primary, excess or contingent), he or she is an insured but only up to the compulsory or financial responsibility law limits where the covered auto is principally garaged.
(b) Has other available insurance (whether primary, excess or contingent) less than the compulsory or financial responsibility law limits where the covered auto is principally garaged, he or she is an insured only for the amount by which the compulsory or financial responsibility law limits exceed the limits of his or her other insurance.
(Plaintiffs Complaint, Exhibit A, pp. 2-3.)
The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law properly decided by the court. Young v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States, 350 Pa.Super. 247, 504 A.2d 339 (1986). An insurance policy must be read in its entirety, and its words must be given their plain and proper meanings. Monti v. Rockwood Insurance Co., 303 Pa.Super. 473, 450 A.2d 24 (1982). A court may not rewrite an insurance contract, under the guise of judicial interpretation, to expand coverage beyond that provided in the policy. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America v. Zerance, 505 Pa. 345, 479 A.2d 949 (1984).
The Harleysville policy itself defines who is an insured under the policy. A customer of Verrena’s is also an insured only if the customer does not have other available insurance or if such insurance is less than the legal requirements. Appellant admits, in her answer to Harleysville’s preliminary objections, she was a customer of Yerrena’s. In addition, appellant admits she was covered as an insured under the Allstate policy beyond state requirements, and Allstate has admitted coverage (Plaintiffs Complaint, p. 3). *426Hence, appellant is not an insured under the terms of the Harleysville policy.
However, appellant contends the Harleysville policy provision specifically outlining who is an insured is an invalid escape clause. An escape clause is one that purports to relieve the insurer of an obligation to the insured if other coverage is available. Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Cordasco, 369 Pa.Super. 439, 535 A.2d 631 (1987), In my opinion, appellant mischaracterizes the “Who is an Insured” provision, which simply defines an insured under the policy, as an escape clause. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the provision does not purport to relieve Harleysville of an obligation to her as an insured. As indicated above, I do not believe appellant is an insured under the Harleysville policy. Harleysville is, therefore, not escaping any obligation to appellant because it never had an obligation to her as she is not an insured. Moreover, appellant has mistakenly relied on Connecticut Indemnity Co. Id.; Grasberger v. Liebert & Obert, Inc., 335 Pa. 491, 6 A.2d 925 (1939) and Insurance Co. of North America v. Continental Casualty Co., 575 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir.1978), all of which involve an insurance company’s attempt to escape an obligation to its own insured. In the instant case, appellant is only an insured under the Allstate policy, and its provisions are not at issue. Unlike these cases, appellant, as an insured, is not disputing her insurer’s attempt to escape coverage but is instead trying to claim coverage under a policy whose definition of an insured does not include her. The reasoning of these cases does not extend that far.
I also find no merit to appellant’s second argument the clause violates the Pennsylvania No-Fault Insurance Act, 40 P.S. 1009.104, repealed, P.L. 26 No. 11, § 8(a), 2/12/84. The Act provides:
Security Covering a Motor Vehicle. — Every owner of a motor vehicle which is registered or which is operated in this Commonwealth by the owner or with his permission, shall continuously provide security covering such motor vehicle when such vehicle is either present or registered *427in the Commonwealth. Security shall be provided for the payment of basic loss benefits, and for the payment of sums up to a total limit of thirty thousand dollars ($30,-000) which the owner or any person operating the vehicle with the express or implied permission of the owner may become liable to pay as damages because of bodily injury or death arising out of any one accident (subject to a sub-limit of fifteen thousand dollars [$15,000] for damages arising out of the bodily injury or death of any one person) and for the payment of damages for injury or to destruction of property in any one accident of amounts up to a total limit of five thousand dollars ($5,000). The owner or any other person may provide security covering a motor vehicle by a contract of insurance with an insurer or by qualifying as a self-insurer or as an obligated government.
The Harleysville policy provides coverage to its insured’s vehicles in the amount of $15,000/$30,000, and as such, it conforms to the No-Fault Act. Hence, I see no valid basis for relief.
For these reasons, I agree with the trial court’s decision to sustain appellee’s preliminary objections and dismiss the complaint as to Harleysville.