Court Opinion

ID: 9841165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 15:09:02.899156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:39:43.040152
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The County of Luzerne,                      :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania                :
                                            :
               v.                           :
                                            :
Thomas Perrone,                             :   Nos. 1018-1024 C.D. 2021
                      Appellant             :   Submitted: May 26, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                         FILED: September 21, 2023

               Thomas Perrone (Appellant) appeals the May 4, 2021 orders (Trial
Court Orders) of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (Trial Court)
finding Appellant guilty of seven summary offenses for violating Section 302.8 of
the 2015 International Property Maintenance Code (PMC),1 which the Municipality
of Kingston, Luzerne County (Municipality), has adopted. Upon review, we affirm.

                                       I. Background
               Appellant owns a parcel of property on Cuba Street in a residential
section of Municipality (Property), at which he keeps seven automobiles outside in

      1
          PMC, chapter 3, § 302.8 (2105).
various stages of disrepair (collectively, the Offending Vehicles). See Trial Court
Opinion at 2. On February 21, 2020, Municipality’s code enforcement officer sent
Appellant a letter (Violation Letter) notifying Appellant that the Offending Vehicles
violated the PMC. See id. at 3. The Violation Letter provided Appellant with 30
days in which to remedy the PMC violations before facing further legal action. See
id.
               Appellant did not remove the Offending Vehicles from the Property as
directed by the Violation Letter. See Trial Court Opinion at 3. As a result, on July
17, 2020, the Municipality issued seven PMC violation citations, one citation for
each of the Offending Vehicles (collectively, the Citations). See id. Appellant
appealed the Citations to the Trial Court. See id. at 1. Following a summary trial
conducted on May 4, 2021, the Trial Court entered the Trial Court Orders, finding
Appellant guilty of the seven charged PMC violations.2 See id. at 1. Appellant
appealed.3

       2
          The Trial Court imposed costs and a $300 fine for each PMC violation, for a total fine of
$2,100, but further provided that, if Appellant removed the Offending Vehicles within 30 days,
the total fine would be reduced to $300. See Trial Court Opinion at 5-6.
       3
         Appellant originally appealed the seven separate summary convictions to the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania, which transferred the appeals to this Court by order dated September 20,
2021. This Court consolidated the matters by order dated June 21, 2022.

                                                2
                                               II. Issues
                 On appeal,4 Appellant asserts various errors by the Trial Court.5 See
Appellant’s Br. at 7, 14-16. Appellant claims that res judicata/collateral estoppel

       4
          “In reviewing a summary conviction, where the trial court has taken additional evidence
in de novo review, our standard of review is limited to considering whether the trial court abused
its discretion or committed an error of law.” City of Williamsport Bureau of Codes v. DeRaffele,
170 A.3d 1270, 1273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

                 [I]n summary offense cases, the Commonwealth is required to
                 establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In reviewing a
                 conviction, therefore, this Court views all of the evidence admitted
                 at trial, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light
                 most favorable to the Commonwealth. The test of sufficiency of the
                 evidence is whether the trial court, as trier of fact, could have found
                 that each element of the offenses charged was supported by evidence
                 and inferences sufficient in law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
                 doubt.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
       5
           Appellant states the questions involved in the instant appeal as follows:

                 A. Does a violation of PA. MPC Art. 3 Section 304 (1,2,3)
                 invalidate the attempted re-zoning of a parcel, allowing the parcel’s
                 previous zoning to continue?

                 B. Do the previous’ cases presented contain the necessary elements
                 of the identity of the thing sued upon or for, the identity in the cause
                 of action, identity of the persons’ and parties to the actions, identity
                 of the quality or capacity of the parties being sued, which are
                 necessary elements for a defense of res judicata?

                 C. Have the previous attached cases decided the ultimate and
                 controlling issues in a prior proceeding in which the parties actually
                 had an opportunity to appeal and assert their rights?

                 D. Does the outcome of prior proceedings which found the
                 appellant not guilty of illegal storage of automobiles, have bearing
                 on the present, same charge, of illegal storage?

                                                    3
resulting from previous proceedings involving the Property entitles him to continue
to store the Offending Vehicles outside at the Property. See id. Appellant claims
error based on various zoning arguments, including the improper zoning of the
Property and his alleged preexisting use of the Property. See id. Appellant is not
entitled to relief.

                                       III. Discussion
               The PMC provides, in pertinent part:

               302.8 Motor vehicles. Except as provided for in other
               regulations, no inoperative or unlicensed motor vehicle
               shall be parked, kept[,] or stored on any premises, and no
               vehicle shall at any time be in a state of major disassembly,
               disrepair, or in the process of being stripped or dismantled.
               Painting of vehicles is prohibited unless conducted inside
               an approved spray booth.

Section 302.8 of the PMC (emphasis in original). Therefore, to prove a violation of
PMC Section 302.8, the evidence must illustrate that (1) an inoperative or unlicensed
motor vehicle (2) is parked, kept, or stored (3) on a premises in a state of major
disassembly, disrepair, or in the process of being stripped or dismantled. Section
302.8 of the PMC; see also Commonwealth v. Nicely, 988 A.2d 799, 805 (Pa.

               E. Does the 20 years of successful defense against multiple suits for
               the same violation meet the burden of the moving party for
               establishing substantial evidence?

               F. Does unrefuted witness testimony establish the appellant’s
               restoration activities having commenced prior to the enactment of
               borough zoning preserve the right of the appellant to legally
               continue that use?

Appellant’s Br. at 7-8 (verbatim).

                                                4
Cmwlth. 2010) (noting that proof of violation of PMC Section 302.8 requires proof,
beyond a reasonable doubt, of an unlicensed, unregistered vehicle parked, kept, or
stored on a premises). PMC Section 302.8 provides an express exception that allows
vehicles to undergo overhaul, including body work, “provided that such work is
performed inside a structure or similarly enclosed area designed and approved for
such purposes.” Section 302.8 of the PMC (emphasis in original).
               Robert Suchoski (Suchoski), the Municipality’s code enforcement
officer,6 testified at the summary trial before the Trial Court.                  See Notes of
Testimony, May 4, 2021 (N.T.) at 11-25. Suchoski testified that he visited the
Property on January 23, 2020, and took pictures of the Offending Vehicles, which
he described as “junk vehicles” in various “states of disrepair, disassembl[y].” N.T.
at 11. Suchoski further explained that he visited the Property again on February 20,
2020, taking a second set of photographs depicting the Offending Vehicles, none of
which had moved, but which had instead simply deteriorated further into disrepair.
See id. Suchoski sent Appellant the Violation Letter the next day, February 21, 2020.
See id. Suchoski further explained that, because Appellant did not remove the
Offending Vehicles after receiving the Violation Letter, on July 17, 2020, Suchoski
issued the Citations. See id. at 17. He testified that, in August of 2020, he took a
third set of photographs that again revealed that the Offending Vehicles remained
untouched in the same location on the Property at that time. See id. at 20. The Trial
Court found Suchoski’s testimony to be credible. See Trial Court Opinion at 3.
Additionally, the Trial Court admitted all the photographs taken by Suchoski into
evidence. See N.T. at 2-3, n.3, n.4 & n.5.

       6
          Suchoski testified that determining PMC violations within the Municipality is part of his
duties as the Municipality’s code enforcement officer. See Notes of Testimony, May 4, 2021
(N.T.) at 11.

                                                5
              Appellant testified on his own behalf at the summary trial and made
several arguments to support his claim that he should be entitled to continue to store
the Offending Vehicles on the Property.7 See N.T. at 24-41. Appellant argued that
on multiple occasions since 2000, different courts have allowed Appellant to
continue to store the Offending Vehicles at the Property; he entered into evidence
various documentation he claimed supported his argument.                   See id. at 27-30.
Appellant also made certain zoning-related arguments, including that his storage of
the Offending Vehicles represented a preexisting nonconforming use on the Property
and that the Municipality had previously improperly enacted the zoning laws and
then improperly rezoned the Property. See id. at 31-33, 39, 49-53. Additionally,
Appellant testified that he had been restoring vehicles on the Property since 1971
with the full knowledge of the Municipality’s various administrations for the past 27
years. See id. at 31-32. Appellant also presented the testimony of James Edwards,
a friend and vehicle restorer who testified that he recalled coming to the Property to
drop off car parts with Appellant and Appellant’s father as far back as the 1970s.
See id. at 41-46.
              This evidence was sufficient for the Trial Court to find that the
Commonwealth satisfied each element of the charge of violation of PMC Section
302.8 beyond a reasonable doubt as to each of the Offending Vehicles. Suchoski’s
testimony and the photographs he took proved that the Offending Vehicles, which
are parked on the Property, are inoperative, arguably junk vehicles in varying stages
of disrepair. The Offending Vehicles have not been moved from the Property despite
warnings to do so from the Municipality. Further, as the Trial Court noted, Appellant

       7
         Appellant first argued that the Offending Vehicles have value. See N.T. at 24. The Trial
Court readily acknowledged that the Offending Vehicles “may have historic value and/or may be
valuable to certain car enthusiasts, you know, and certainly capable of restoration.” Id.

                                               6
did not dispute that the Offending Vehicles were inoperative, in a state of major
disassembly or disrepair, and have not been moved after the Citations were issued.
See Trial Court Opinion at 12. Moreover, no argument was made, nor evidence put
forth, that the Property is a structure or similarly enclosed area designed and
approved for vehicle overhaul or body work. Accordingly, the Trial Court neither
abused its discretion nor committed an error of law in finding Appellant guilty of the
Citations.
               Further, Appellant’s purported defenses are inapposite and/or irrelevant
to Appellant’s summary convictions.
               First, Appellant is incorrect that res judicata8 prevents the Municipality
from enforcing the Citations. “Generally, causes of action are identical when the
subject matter and the ultimate issues are the same in both the old and the new
proceedings.” Henion v. W.C.A.B. (Firpo & Sons, Inc.), 776 A.2d 362, 366 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2001). Notably, this Court has specifically determined, for double jeopardy
purposes, that res judicata does not apply to new or continuing violations of the

       8
          We observe that “[t]echnical res judicata and collateral estoppel are both encompassed
within the parent doctrine of res judicata, which ‘prevents the relitigation of claims and issues in
subsequent proceedings.’” Bd. of Supervisors of Willistown Twp. v. Main Line Gardens, Inc., 184
A.3d 615, 625 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (quoting Weney v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mac Sprinkler
Sys., Inc.), 960 A.2d 949, 954 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008)). Technical res judicata, or claim preclusion,
“provides that when a final judgment on the merits exists, a future suit between the parties on the
same cause of action is precluded.” Henion v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Firpo & Sons, Inc.),
776 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). In such cases, a party is prohibited from asserting claims
that were raised or that could have been raised in the previous adjudication. Wilkes ex rel. Mason
v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 902 A.2d 366, 376 (Pa. 2006) (internal citation omitted); see
also Henion, 776 A.2d at 365-66 (noting that the doctrine of res judicata “applies to claims that
were actually litigated as well as those matters that should have been litigated”). Technical res
judicata operates to preclude a claim where both the previous action and the present action involve:
(1) identity of the thing sued upon or for, (2) identity of the cause of action, (3) identity of the
persons and parties to the action, and (4) identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or
sued. Henion, 776 A.2d at 365-66.

                                                  7
PMC. See Borough of Walnutport v. Dennis, 114 A.3d 11, 19-20 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2015); see also Commonwealth v. Anderson (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 301 C.D. 2016, filed
Dec. 20, 2016),9 slip op. at 6-8 (finding property owner not put into double jeopardy
based on continuing violation of PMC); Commonwealth v. Comensky (Pa. Cmwlth.,
No. 28 C.D. 2016, filed Oct. 31, 2016), slip op. at 5-6 (finding that subsequent
violations of municipal ordinances constitute new violations for double jeopardy
purposes).
              Here, the Trial Court concluded that “the ultimate and controlling issue
was not previously decided” in the previous cases referenced by Appellant’s
testimony or documentation. Trial Court Opinion at 7. The Trial Court explained
that

              [t]he outcome of any prior hearings does not have any
              bearing on the question of whether [Appellant] is currently
              storing unlicensed or inoperative motor vehicles on his
              premises in violation of [Section] 302.8. . . . [T]he nature
              of both his argument and the documents presented were
              very speculative, and [the Trial Court] remains unaware of
              what, if any, documents, evidence, and witnesses were
              presented at the prior hearings. As a result, [the Trial
              Court] was unable to base its decision on the outcomes of
              any prior proceedings. To the contrary, [the Trial Court]
              based [its] decision on the law currently in effect and the
              evidence that was presented at the trial before [the Trial
              Court], which established that [Appellant] was in violation
              of [Section] 302.8 of the PMC.

Trial Court Opinion at 7-8 (emphasis in original).

       9
          Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure Section 414(a), 210 Pa.
Code § 69.414(a), unreported panel decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be
cited for their persuasive value.

                                               8
             We observe that the documentation entered by Appellant into evidence
to support his res judicata claim included: (1) a disposition sheet dated February 19,
2003, from a summary appeal wherein Appellant was found guilty of an unlawful
storage violation; (2) an April 19, 2006 letter from the Municipality’s code officer
indicating the Municipality had received complaints regarding junked vehicles on
the Property and ordering him to remove such vehicles within 30 days; (3) a
disposition sheet dated October 13, 2010, from a summary appeal wherein Appellant
was found not guilty of an unlawful storage violation; and (4) a December 2, 2016,
Magisterial District Judge Citation and Summons for violation of PMC Section
302.8. See Trial Court Opinion at 4, n.6. As the Trial Court noted, in addition to
the specifics of these previous matters being unknown, none of these documents
have any bearing on whether Appellant violated PMC Section 302.8 in reference to
the Citations issued in the instant case, which represent new and/or continuing PMC
violations subject to subsequent prosecution. Accordingly, we find no error in the
Trial Court’s conclusion regarding the inapplicability of res judicata to the instant
matter. See Henion; Anderson; Comensky.

                                          9
               Appellant’s zoning arguments based on the concepts of preexisting and
continued use, variance by estoppel,10 and laches,11 are likewise inapposite to the
Trial Court’s guilty determinations on the Citations.                 These equitable zoning
arguments, while appropriately raised in actions or claims before zoning hearing
boards, are inapposite to the prosecution of a violation of PMC Section 302.8, which
considers only the condition of a property and the zoning applicable to that property
at the time of the violation.12 See Commonwealth v. Brandon (Pa. Cmwlth., No.
1674 C.D. 2017, filed Nov. 26, 2018) (finding zoning ordinance inapposite where

       10
           In the absence of relief granted by a relevant zoning authority, individuals in the
Commonwealth may acquire a right to continue an otherwise not permitted use under several
different, equity-based legal theories including equitable estoppel. See Lamar Advantage GP Co.
v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 997 A.2d 423, 441 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
Equitable estoppel is an unusual remedy granted only in extraordinary circumstances. Id. To
establish equitable estoppel, a landowner must prove that “the municipality intentionally or
negligently misrepresented its position with reason to know that the landowner would rely upon
the misrepresentation.” Id. Additionally, the landowner must establish the following elements of
good faith action on his part: “‘1) that he relies to his detriment, such as making substantial
expenditures, 2) based upon an innocent belief that the use is permitted, and 3) [the] enforcement
of the ordinance would result in hardship, ordinarily that the value of the expenditures would be
lost.’” Id. (quoting Vaughn v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Twp. of Shaler, 947 A.2d 218, 224–225 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2008)) (internal brackets omitted). A landowner must prove these essential factors by
clear, precise, and unequivocal evidence. See Pietropaolo v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Lower Merion
Twp., 979 A.2d 969, 980 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
       11
           “[T]he doctrine of laches [is] an equitable bar to the prosecution of stale claims and is
the practical application of the maxim that those who sleep on their rights must awaken to the
consequence that they have disappeared.” In re Wilkinsburg Taxpayers & Residents Interest in
Green St. Park Sale to a Private Developer & Other Park-Sys. Conditions, 200 A.3d 634, 642 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim is barred by laches where the party
failed to exercise due diligence, which resulted in prejudice to the opposing party.” Id. “The test
for due diligence is not what a party knows, but what he might have known by the use of
information within his reach. Prejudice may be found where there has been some change in the
condition or relations of the parties which occurs during the period the complainant failed to act.”
Id. (quoting White v. Township of Upper St. Clair, 968 A.2d 806, 811 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)).
       12
         We further observe that the Trial Court noted that Appellant’s zoning-based claims were
completely unsupported by competent evidence. See Trial Court Opinion at 8-9.
                                                10
property owner charged with violating the PMC). We find no error in the Trial
Court’s dismissal of these arguments.

                                IV. Conclusion
            For these reasons, we affirm the Trial Court Order.

                                        __________________________________
                                        CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                         11
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The County of Luzerne,              :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania        :
                                    :
           v.                       :
                                    :
Thomas Perrone,                     :   Nos. 1018-1024 C.D. 2021
                  Appellant         :

                                ORDER

           AND NOW, this 21st day of September, 2023, the May 4, 2021 orders
of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County are AFFIRMED.

                                  __________________________________
                                  CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge