Court Opinion

ID: 7820862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:54:20.605647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:44.135233
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent because I do not think the rigid due process requirements insisted upon by the majority are appropriate in this case or mandated by the due process clauses of the Constitution of Arkansas and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In none of the cases cited by the majority is there the combination of factors presented here. The governmental interest in the prompt and effective abatement of public nuisances is one important factor. In addition, the proceedings are conducted in accordance with procedures in chancery courts, and all courts before which such proceedings are brought have all the jurisdiction and powers of equity courts. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-116 (Repl. 1962). Chancery court procedure with reference to injunctions is governed by Rule 65, Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 65 (b), upon application of the party against whom a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order has been issued without notice, the court shall as expeditiously as possible, hold a hearing to determine whether it should be dissolved. Due process requirements of notice and hearing are not absolute. A great deal of flexibility exists in the requirements of due process of law, which calls only for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972). Where there is an important government interest involved, the requirements are much less strict than when only private interests are involved. The availability of a prompt hearing at the instance of the party against whom the governmental action is directed is an important factor in determining whether process is due. In my opinion, the fundamental right to due process is fully recognized and protected by this statute. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972), relied upon by the majority, the United States Supreme Court held the statutory procedures violative of due process only because debtors were deprived of their property without provision for hearings at a meaningful time, but the court fully recognized that, in limited circumstances, immediate seizure of a property interest, without an opportunity for a prior hearing, is constitutionally permissible. Those circumstances are those in which: 1.The seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest; 2. There has been a special need for very prompt action; and 3. The state has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force; the person initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in this instance. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 94 S. Ct. 2080, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1974), where specific instances were mentioned, viz: Thus, for example, due process is not denied when postponement of notice and hearing is necessary to protect the public from contaminated food, North American Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); from a bank failure, Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); from misbranded drugs, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); to aid the collection of taxes, Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); or to aid the war effort, United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921). Even if the holding in Vandergriff v. State, 239 Ark. 1119, 396 S.W. 2d 818 is now taken to be dictum, I submit that it is sound and correct and that it should be followed, not overruled. It may well be that the statute was unconstitutionally applied in this case, but, for some reason, appellants narrowed their attack to the facial constitutionality of the statute. It seems to me that the majority, however, is taking the wholly unwarranted step of holding the statute unconstitutional on its face. As a result, it seems that, until the General Assembly can act, there will be no means of abating a public nuisance of the nature covered by the existing statute, however great that nuisance may be. See The Rendezvous Club v. State, 247 Ark. 670, 447 S.W. 2d 842.