Court Opinion

ID: 9954270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 21:03:29.58376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:00.102242
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 Urrutia v. Wallens CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 IDOYA URRUTIA,                                                 B319415

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BD604471)
           v.

 ASHLEY JORDAN WALLENS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Mark A. Juhas, Judge. Affirmed.
     Ashley Jordan Wallens, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Pamela Rae Tripp for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 _________________________________
                        INTRODUCTION
      Appellant Ashley Jordan Wallens appeals from a domestic
violence restraining order issued against him under the Domestic
Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code,1 § 6200 et seq.) to
protect his former wife, respondent Idoya Urrutia, their minor
son, and Urrutia’s current husband. Among other arguments,
Wallens asserts the order must be reversed because the trial
court denied his right to competent counsel and a fair trial, made
erroneous evidentiary rulings, and punitively included his minor
son as a protected person. Urrutia argues Wallens’s appeal is
moot, and even if not moot, his claims lack merit. We conclude
the appeal is not moot; however, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting the restraining order, and Wallens has not
demonstrated any reversible error. We accordingly affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    The parties
      Wallens and Urrutia were married and have one child
together, X.W. The parties separated in 2014, and divorced in
2015. Wallens later married Devrie DeMarco, and Urrutia
married Philip Pearson.
      In 2021, Wallens and DeMarco divorced following a series
of domestic violence incidents between them. They obtained
domestic violence restraining orders against one another in July
2021, and X.W. was included as a protected person in the order
issued against DeMarco.

1     Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references
are to the Family Code.

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II.    The events leading to Urrutia’s request for a
       domestic violence restraining order
       As of November 2021, Wallens and Urrutia shared joint
custody of X.W., who was then 12 years old. Wallens had custody
from Thursday afternoons through Sunday afternoons, and
Urrutia had custody the rest of the week plus one weekend per
month. Wallens also had a scheduled Zoom call with X.W. on
Wednesday afternoons to assist the child with his schoolwork.
       On November 10, 2021, X.W. missed his Zoom call with
Wallens. At that time, X.W.’s stepfather, Pearson, who is a
physician, needed to use the study where the computer was
located for a telehealth appointment with a patient. When X.W.
failed to attend the call, Wallens sent the child a series of e-mails,
which culminated in Wallens cancelling any future study sessions
with X.W. The e-mails caused X.W. to cry and to express to
Urrutia that he felt afraid of his father. That same day, Wallens
also sent a series of text messages to both Urrutia and Pearson in
which he called them vulgar and derogatory names, and made
comments about contacting the hospital where Pearson worked.
Urrutia responded to Wallens in a message through the Our
Family Wizard (OFW) platform, which stated, “Your harassing
texts and messages need to stop now.”
       The following day, after consulting with X.W.’s therapist,
Urrutia advised Wallens in another OFW message that X.W. was
scared and wanted a break from seeing him that weekend.
In response, Wallens sent Urrutia a series of text messages in
which he accused her of kidnapping X.W. and threatened to call
the police. Wallens also made reference to contacting the
employers of both Urrutia and Pearson. After receiving the texts,
Urrutia decided to stay overnight at a hotel with Pearson and

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X.W. X.W. contacted Wallens by phone later that night, and after
the call, Urrutia observed that X.W. was distraught and appeared
to be scared. A week later, on November 17, 2021, Wallens again
sent Urrutia a number of texts that she perceived as threatening
in nature.
       On November 22, 2021, Urrutia filed a request for a
domestic violence restraining order against Wallens. On that
date, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
against Wallens that named Urrutia, Pearson, and X.W. as the
protected persons. After Wallens was served with the TRO, he
did not have contact with Urrutia or Pearson. Wallens did,
however, leave a voicemail message for Urrutia’s parents in
which he stated that he could not talk to Urrutia and Pearson
directly, but that he intended to call the police if they did not
return X.W. to him. Wallens also sent text messages to Urrutia’s
brother in which he warned that law enforcement and the
employers of Urrutia and Pearson would be contacted about the
kidnapping of X.W.
III. The trial court’s ruling on the request for a domestic
       violence restraining order
       In January 2022, the trial court held a three-day hearing
on Urrutia’s request for a domestic violence restraining order.
Both Urrutia and Wallens attended the hearing and were
represented by counsel. At the start of the third day, however,
Wallens decided to relieve his counsel and represent himself.
       A total of four witnesses—Wallens, Urrutia, Pearson, and
the process server for the TRO—testified at the hearing. The
trial court took judicial notice of the domestic violence restraining
orders and related pleadings that were filed in the proceeding
between Wallens and his second wife, DeMarco. The court also

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admitted into evidence Wallens’s various written communications
with Urrutia, Pearson, and X.W. in November 2021 following the
missed Zoom call. However, none of the exhibits admitted into
evidence at the hearing are included in the record on appeal.
       In his testimony, Wallens acknowledged that he and
DeMarco had a history of domestic violence that resulted in the
issuance of mutual restraining orders in July 2021, but he denied
that he was ever the aggressor or that X.W. witnessed any of the
abuse. Wallens also admitted that he sent a number of angry
messages to Urrutia and Pearson in November 2021 after X.W.
missed their Zoom call, and that he tried to contact Urrutia’s
family after being served with the TRO. He maintained,
however, that none of these communications were intended to be
threats. Wallens testified, “I felt bad for my words. I’m not
proud of them. I’m not going to lie. I genuinely believed that
I did not threaten anyone, and I did not repeat or escalate
anything.”
       At the hearing, both Urrutia and Pearson testified that
they felt threatened by Wallens’s communications. According to
Pearson, after receiving the November 10, 2021 text messages, he
feared for his safety. He also was concerned Wallens would
follow through on his threat to contact Pearson’s employer in an
effort to defame him. Urrutia likewise testified that Wallens’s
various text messages to her in November 2021 caused her to feel
afraid for herself and her family. Based on the erratic nature of
the messages, Urrutia believed Wallens was “out of control” and
was “coming after [her] family.” She also feared Wallens would
contact her employer because she was aware that he engaged in
similar conduct with DeMarco. Urrutia further testified that
X.W. expressed that he felt scared of Wallens after receiving his

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e-mail messages and speaking to him on the phone. According to
Urrutia, immediately following the November 11, 2021 telephone
conversation with Wallens, X.W. “crumpled in [her] arms” and
was “emotionally distraught and just so scared.” In addition,
Urrutia testified that, during the last year of the marriage, there
were times when she feared for her safety because Wallens was a
heavy drinker, had anger issues, and tended to act erratically.
      The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence
that Wallens was a perpetrator of domestic violence. The court
noted that it had “significant concerns about Mr. Wallens’s
credibility,” that there was an existing restraining order against
Wallens based on domestic violence with DeMarco, and that
Wallens had shown himself to be “entirely unpredictable,” both in
how he handled the missed call with X.W. and comported himself
in the courtroom. The court issued a five-year domestic violence
restraining order against Wallens with Urrutia, Pearson, and
X.W. as the protected persons. The order prohibited Wallens
from having any contact with Urrutia and Pearson except for the
purpose of communicating about court-ordered visitation for X.W.
and exchanging the child for the visits. The order restricted
Wallens’s contact with X.W. to supervised visits on two
Saturdays per month from 4:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m.
      As the court was announcing the terms of the restraining
order, Wallens attempted to ask a question. The court instructed
Wallens to hold any questions until it finished setting forth its
ruling. However, Wallens became increasingly disruptive during
the hearing and was ordered by the bailiff to quiet down. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court stated that, although it had
promised to answer his questions, Wallens “makes it impossible

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for me to do that because I continuously get interrupted.”
The court then adjourned the proceedings.
       Wallens timely appealed. While the appeal was pending,
Urrutia filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot.
                             DISCUSSION
I.     Urrutia’s motion to dismiss the appeal
       We first address Urrutia’s motion to dismiss the appeal.
Urrutia argues the appeal has been rendered moot by subsequent
orders that restrict Wallens from having any contact with X.W. or
Urrutia. Those subsequent orders consist of (1) a July 26, 2022
order terminating visitation between Wallens and X.W.; and
(2) a July 28, 2022 criminal protective order prohibiting Wallens
from contacting Urrutia for a three-year period. Because Wallens
did not file an appeal from those orders, Urrutia asserts this
court cannot provide him with any effective relief from the
domestic violence restraining order even if we were to find
reversible error.
       “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to
grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 276.) In this case, the January 13, 2022 domestic violence
restraining order at issue on appeal includes Urrutia, Pearson,
and X.W. as protected persons, and is in effect for a five-year
period until January 13, 2027. In contrast, the July 26, 2022
family law order only applies to visitation with X.W., and the
July 28, 2022 criminal protective order only applies to contact
with Urrutia for a period of three years. Because the domestic
violence restraining order is broader in scope and/or longer in
duration than the subsequent orders, a decision in favor of
Wallens could provide him with some effective relief. Under

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these circumstances, Wallens’s appeal is not moot, and we
therefore deny Urrutia’s motion to dismiss the appeal.
II.     Wallens’s challenge to the domestic violence
        restraining order
        Wallens raises several claims regarding the domestic
violence restraining order. He contends the order must be
reversed because the trial court (1) denied his right to competent
counsel after his attorney resigned; (2) denied his right to a fair
trial by refusing to answer any questions at the conclusion of the
hearing; (3) denied his right to cross-examine his second wife,
DeMarco; (4) improperly allowed evidence of his alleged conduct
during his marriage to Urrutia; (5) improperly credited Urrutia’s
testimony even though new evidence shows she lied about a
certain telephone call; and (6) effectively ended his relationship
with X.W. by including the child as a protected person in the
restraining order. We conclude Wallens’s claims lack merit.
        A.    Governing law on the DVPA
        The DVPA authorizes the court to issue a protective order
“ ‘ “to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a
recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of
separation of the persons involved,” upon “reasonable proof of a
past act or acts of abuse.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M.
(2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 115.) The DVPA defines “domestic
violence” as “abuse perpetrated against,” among others, a spouse
or former spouse. (§ 6211, subd. (a).) “Abuse is not limited to the
actual infliction of physical injury or assault” (§ 6203, subd. (b)),
but also extends to “behavior that has been or could be enjoined
pursuant to Section 6320” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4)). Section 6320, in
turn, includes within conduct that may be enjoined, “threatening,
. . . harassing, . . . contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail

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or otherwise, . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party, and
. . . other named family or household members.” (Id., subd. (a).)
Under the DVPA, “ ‘[a]nnoying and harassing an individual is
protected in the same way as physical abuse.’ ” (In re Marriage of
Brubaker & Strum (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 525, 536.)
        We review the grant or denial of a domestic violence
restraining order for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of D.S.
& A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 933; Herriott v. Herriott (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 212, 223.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S., at p. 933.) “ ‘ “So long
as the court exercised its discretion along legal lines, its decision
will not be reversed on appeal if there is substantial evidence to
support it.” ’ [Citation.] We resolve all conflicts in the evidence
in favor of . . . the prevailing party, and indulge all legitimate and
reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the trial court’s
findings.” (Herriott v. Herriott, at p. 223.)
        B.     The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
               issuing the domestic violence restraining order
        It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that an
appealed order is presumed to be correct. (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) To overcome this presumption,
the appellant must provide an adequate record demonstrating
error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140–1141.)
“ ‘ “[A] record is inadequate . . . if the appellant predicates error
only on the part of the record he [or she] provides the trial court,
but ignores or does not present to the appellate court portions of
the proceedings below which may provide grounds upon which
the decision of the trial court could be affirmed.” ’ ” (Jade
Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries, Inc. (2014)

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229 Cal.App.4th 635, 644.) “Where the appellant fails to provide
an adequate record of the challenged proceedings, we must
presume that the appealed . . . order is correct, and on that basis,
affirm.” (Ibid.) Additionally, “ ‘ “the party asserting trial court
error may not . . . rest on the bare assertion of error but must
present argument and legal authority on each point raised.
[Citation.]” [Citations.] When an appellant raises an issue “but
fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority, we treat the point as waived.” ’ ” (Hernandez v. First
Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.)
       Here, Wallens claims the trial court committed errors in
granting a domestic violence restraining order. Wallens does not,
however, support his claims of error with any citations to legal
authority or to the record on appeal. Moreover, Wallens has
failed to provide an adequate record to show there was reversible
error. The record does not include Urrutia’s application for a
restraining order or any supporting documentation, or any of the
exhibits admitted into evidence at the hearing before the trial
court. Most notably, the record fails to include any of the text, e-
mail, or other written communications that Wallens had with
Urrutia, Pearson, and X.W. in November 2021, which gave rise to
Urrutia’s request for a restraining order against Wallens.
Despite the significance of those writings to the trial court
proceedings, the only evidence in the appellate record regarding
their content is the witnesses’ testimony confirming certain
excerpts and describing their effect on the recipients.
Nevertheless, based on the limited record that Wallens has
provided, we conclude the trial court acted within its broad
discretion in issuing the restraining order.

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       The testimony at the hearing supported a finding that,
when X.W. missed a single Zoom call, Wallens responded by
sending a number of threatening and harassing communications
to Urrutia and her family. In his text messages to Urrutia and
Pearson, Wallens called them offensive names, accused them of
kidnapping X.W., and threatened to report them to the police and
their places of employment. Both Urrutia and Pearson testified
that Wallens’s texts caused them to feel threatened and afraid for
their safety. Urrutia also testified that, after receiving Wallens’s
e-mail messages and speaking to him on the telephone, X.W. was
emotionally distraught and expressed that he feared his father.
Although Wallens stopped communicating with Urrutia and
Pearson after being served with the TRO, he left messages for
Urrutia’s parents and sibling in which he again claimed that
Urrutia and Pearson kidnapped X.W. and threatened to call their
employers. In addition, at the time of the hearing, there were
mutual domestic violence restraining orders in place to protect
Wallens and his second wife, DeMarco, from one another.
       In his testimony, Wallens denied that he intended for any
of his communications to be perceived as threats. He also denied
that he engaged in domestic violence against DeMarco or anyone
else, and testified that X.W. was never exposed to any domestic
violence in his home. In granting the request for a restraining
order, however, the trial court expressed that it had “significant
concerns about . . . Wallens’s credibility” based on his testimony.
As this court has explained, “[i]t was for the trial court to weigh
the evidence and consider the demeanor and credibility of the
witness[es].” (Herriott v. Herriott, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at
p. 223.) On this record, the testimony elicited at the hearing
supported the trial court’s ruling.

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       While Wallens asserts several claims of error on appeal,
none have merit. With respect to his claim that he was denied
his right to competent counsel, “the general rule is that there is
no due process right to counsel in civil cases.” (Walker v. State
Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1107, 1116.) The record further shows that,
on the third and final day of the hearing, Wallens chose to relieve
his counsel and represent himself. With respect to his claim that
he was denied the right to a fair trial because the trial court
refused to answer his questions, the record reflects that, by the
conclusion of the hearing, the court determined it was no longer
feasible to try to respond to Wallens’s questions given his
increasingly disruptive behavior.
       With respect to his claims of evidentiary error, Wallens
contends the trial court precluded him from cross-examining
DeMarco. However, neither party called DeMarco to testify at
the hearing. Wallens also argues the trial court erred in allowing
Urrutia to testify about his alleged abusive conduct during their
marriage, which ended in 2014. This argument fails because the
testimony in question was limited in scope and was relevant to
explaining why Urrutia felt threatened by Wallens’s similarly
erratic conduct in 2021. Wallens further asserts the trial court
improperly credited Urrutia’s testimony about a November 11,
2021 telephone call between X.W. and Wallens, even though new
evidence in the form of cell phone records shows that such call
never took place. As Wallens acknowledges, this evidence was
not presented to the trial court during the January 2022 hearing.
Thus, it is not relevant to the current appeal.
       Finally, Wallens claims the trial court acted in a punitive
manner by naming X.W. as a protected person in the restraining
order. Wallens contends this ruling had the effect of ending his

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parental relationship with X.W. We disagree. In ruling on a
request for a domestic violence restraining order, the court also
has broad discretion to “make an order for the custody of a child
. . . that seems necessary or proper.” (§ 3022; see Celia S. v. Hugo
H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 655, 661.) “The guiding principle for the
court in making any custody or visitation order is that the order
must be in the child’s best interest.” (Celia S. v. Hugo H., at
p. 661.) Here, the record reflects that, in granting the restraining
order against Wallens, the trial court limited Wallens’s contact
with X.W. to supervised visits twice per month for three hours
per visit. Given Urrutia’s testimony about Wallens’s erratic and
harassing behavior and the severe emotional impact it had on
X.W., the trial court reasonably could conclude that an order for
supervised visitation was in the child’s best interest. On this
record, the trial court’s issuance of the domestic violence
restraining order was not an abuse of discretion.
                            DISPOSITION
        The domestic violence restraining order issued against
Wallens is affirmed. Urrutia shall recover her costs on appeal.

                                           VIRAMONTES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                        GRIMES, J.

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