Court Opinion

ID: 9483938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:36:12.51132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:55.903311
License: Public Domain

*1020SILER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the disposition of this case by the majority opinion, but I write separately because my reasoning for the affirmation on Part I is distinct from that related in the majority opinion.
I believe that the district court erred when it admitted the evidence from Niswonger’s written statement under Fed. R.Evid. 803(5), because the rule requires that the memorandum has “to reflect that knowledge [about the matter] correctly.” Although Niswonger admitted making the statement shortly after the events related in the statement, she indicated that she did not know whether the statement given to the FBI agent was truthful. In fact, the following questions and answers were made:
Q ... when you talked to Mr. Hawser and made that statement that you signed, were those statements that you made then the truth to the best of your ability?
A I don’t know, because I was so confused then, I—
Q Were you trying to lie to him then?
A No, I wasn’t lying to him but I lied a lot because I was really screwed up then, I mean it was before I went to rehab and all that.
Q Were you trying to lie to Mr. Hawser when you talked to him?
A No, I lied about—I lied about everything then.
This is unlike the situation which occurred in United States v. Williams, 571 F.2d 344 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841, 99 S.Ct. 131, 58 L.Ed.2d 139 (1978), where the witness admitted that the prior statement was true and accurate both at the time it was made and during the trial. However, the court here admitted the prior statement under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, Fed.R.Evid. 803(24), finding that the statement met the requirements set out under the rule. However, it did not make a finding under the requirement of the rule which provides:
[A] statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
As no issue was raised about that on appeal, it must not have been an issue at trial. Therefore, because the district court found under Rule 803(24) that it was admissible under this alternative provision, I would affirm the district court, as it did not abuse its discretion in finding that rule applicable and admitting the evidence.