Court Opinion

ID: 9548596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:05:57.063379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:11.285785
License: Public Domain

Justice MULLARKEY
concurring in part ' and dissenting in part.
While I join the majority’s holding in part III of its opinion, I dissent from the majority’s holding in part IV of its opinion. Thus, I agree with the majority that section 18-8-204, 6 C.R.S. (1997) (the Second-Degree Contraband statute), is not an impermissible delegation of the legislature’s authority and therefore is not unconstitutional on its face. See maj. op. at 412.
I do not join, however, the majority’s holding in part IV of its opinion. The majority holds that the notice provided by the Mesa County Detention Facility (MCDF) was not sufficient under the Second-Degree Contraband statute. See id. at 418. In my view, this conclusion departs from the plain language of the statute. In addition, the majority creates a notice standard that is inconsistent with due process jurisprudence and, as a result, injects uncertainty into our prior ease law.
I.
Before discussing the majority’s conclusion that the notice here was not sufficient, it is necessary to address the majority’s treatment of certain facts and arguments in this case. The majority determines that Holmes lacked actual knowledge in this case, refers to an argument that is not necessary to its resolution of the notice issue, and does not discuss the security risks that cigarettes and matches pose at the MCDF, as indicated by the testimony of the past and current administrative heads of the MCDF. I address each of these points in turn.
A.
The majority indicates that Holmes did not have actual notice of the reason behind the MCDF’s prohibition of cigarettes and matches. See maj. op. at 408-409. The majority explains that on July 11,1996, the date on which the People allege that Holmes first brought cigarettes and matches to the MCDF, an MCDF employee found these items in Holmes’s briefcase and temporarily confiscated them. See id. The majority then states, “The MCDF employee did not provide Holmes with the reason behind the MCDF’s prohibition of the items.” Id. at 408.
This conclusion is not apparent from the record. At the hearing on Holmes’s motion *419to dismiss, the MCDF employee testified about the July 11, 1996 incident. The MCDF employee stated:
I pulled them out and I asked him what he was doing with these, and he said, I smoke, it’s a bad habit.1 I said, Well, you’re not allowed to take these in the jail so I’ll hold them up here for you, but next time just so you know, you’re not allowed to take these in the jail. He said, I didn’t know, thank you.
The People did not ask the MCDF employee directly whether or not she provided Holmes with the reason for the prohibition and Holmes’s counsel did not cross-examine the MCDF employee. Moreover, the trial court did not make any factual finding as to Holmes’s actual knowledge (as opposed to constructive knowledge via the MCDF’s signs) of the “reason behind the MCDF’s prohibition of these items.” Maj. op. at 408.
Accordingly, we do not know whether or not Holmes had actual knowledge sufficient to warrant prosecution of the underlying charge. This is a factual matter which was not decided by the trial Court. If it is potentially dispositive, as the majority opinion implies, this ease should be remanded to determine that question.
B.
In reviewing Holmes’s argument that the MCDF’s notice in this case was inadequate, the majority makes reference to Holmes’s assertion that the administrative head of the MCDF failed to determine that cigarettes or matches pose or may pose a security threat prior to the charge against Holmes. See id. at 413. The majority states:
The parties presented the trial court with conflicting evidence on this issue, and the trial court did not resolve this conflict. Because our analysis below concerns the notice of the contraband determination, regardless of when it was made, our ultimate decision does not depend upon the resolution of this factual dispute, and we express no opinion on this dispute.
Id. The majority’s discussion of Holmes’s assertion that the MCDF simply developed post-hoe rationalizations for the cigarette and matches prohibition is, as the majority recognizes, unrelated to its analysis. However, because the majority refers to this “factual dispute” and a reading of the majority’s opinion does not provide context for this alleged dispute, it is important to explain the nature of the parties’ arguments based on the record before this court.
At the motion to dismiss hearing, the current and past administrative heads of the MCDF testified as to the security threats that matches and cigarettes posed to the facility. David Wooley, the current administrative head of the MCDF, testified that past inmates have attempted to “are” electrical wires in the facility to light a cigarette or some other smokeable item, and such arcing can cause power outages in the facility. Dennis Berry, the first administrative head of the MCDF, testified that a lit cigarette can be used to start fires in remote areas of the facility and to set off fire alarms, which in turn creates safety and security concerns when inmates are moved out of the facility. Additionally, both Berry and Wooley testified that inmates may treat cigarettes as a commodity, which according to Berry, can lead to gambling, bartering, assaults, and sexual assaults. Inmates may also use cigarettes to short-circuit electrical systems and to hide or conceal other items, such as razor blade pieces. As for matches, Berry testified that inmates may use matches to make a simple explosive device by “cut[ing] off their heads, puffing] them together, usually wrap[ing] them with some kind of a foil ... [and] build[ing] a fuse to them.”
The People presented testimony that the administrative heads of the MCDF made the determination that cigarettes and matches posed a security threat long before the date of the charge against Holmes. Berry testified that prior to opening the facility in 1992, he and a team of staff members surveyed other facilities across the country regarding the problems created by cigarettes in deten*420tion facilities. Berry also testified that the signs expressly prohibiting cigarettes and matches were in place shortly after the facility opened in 1992, approximately four years before the date of the charge at issue here. The record also indicates that an MCDF detention officer was dismissed and prosecuted for introducing cigarettes into the facility prior to the Holmes incident. Additionally, in their brief in opposition to Holmes’s motion to dismiss, the People point to a letter from Wooley to a deputy sheriff, which specifically included Wooley’s view that:
[Ujnder no circumstances are inmates ever allowed to have cigarettes while confined in the Mesa County Detention Facility. Fires, damage to,the facility, assaults, disturbances and inmates gaining control over inmates may all pose a threat to the security of the detention facility. Many of those incarcerated in the Mesa County Detention Facility are tobacco users; therefore, any inmate with access to tobacco gains a degree of control over tobacco using inmates who have no access. Such access by one inmate and not another is also likely to cause disturbances and or assaults within the housing area.
The letter also expressed security concerns about matches and lighters. Wooley explained:
Obviously to smoke a cigarette it must be lit. In the MCDF, matches and lighters are contraband because they can be used to set fires.
This letter pre-dates the July 22, 1996 incident by several months.
Notwithstanding this testimony and evidence, Holmes argues that the administrative head of the MCDF did not make a determination that cigarettes and matches posed or may have posed a threat to the security at the MCDF. In making this assertion, Holmes points to the MCDF’s inmate handbook, which states that an inmate possessing tobacco and matches commits a Class II disciplinary violation, which is a violation that “do[es] not necessarily constitute a present and immediate threat to the security of the Detention Facility.” Holmes also highlights testimony from William Kain, who was Holmes’s expert witness at the motion to dismiss hearing and who is now Holmes’s counsel on appeal. At the hearing, Kain testified that he asked Wooley about the MCDF’s determination regarding tobacco and matches and that Wooley said, “What, do you mean, up front?” According to Holmes, Wooley’s response demonstrates that the MCDF never made a determination prior to the charge against Holmes.
Viewing the above assertions together shows that the alleged factual dispute has no substance. First, the standard contained in the inmate handbook is different from the statutory standard. The inmate handbook deals with inmate possession of contraband, a class 1 misdemeanor, see § 18-8-204.2(2), 6 C.R.S. (1997), as opposed to the introduction of contraband into a facility, a class 6 felony, see § 18-8-204(3), 6 C.R.S. (1997). Second, Wooley testified that he didn’t understand that Kain’s question had anything to do with Holmes’s case and that he believed that Kain was asking him whether or not the MCDF provided policies and procedures to lawyers specifically. Third, as summarized above, the record contains the cumulative testimony from both Wooley and Berry in which they discussed the substance and timing of their determinations regarding the risks of cigarettes and matches, Wooley’s letter describing the security risks posed by these items, and reference to a prior prosecution involving similar actions as those alleged against Holmes. While it is true that the trial court is the proper forum for resolving factual disputes, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the MCDF determined long prior to the charges in this case that matches and cigarettes posed or had a reasonable probability of posing a threat to the MCDF’s security.
C.
While the majority generally notes that “[cjigarettes and matches may be prohibited for any number of reasons, some of which may be unrelated to security,” maj. op. at 416 (emphasis added), the majority does not discuss the risks that cigarettes and matches pose to the MCDF, as indicated by Wooley and Berry. To support the non-security purposes of such a prohibition, the majority cites *421a different trial court’s order in an unrelated case involving a different facility where a trial court concluded that the different facility’s ban was based on concerns about the health risks of tobacco. See id. at 416 n. 9 (citing People v. Harold Davis, No. 95M162). In my view, we should focus on the evidence presented about the serious security concerns that the MCDF administrative heads had regarding tobacco products and matches rather than focus on an unrelated case about which this court knows nothing other than what Holmes has presented from a transcript of another trial court’s oral ruling.
On a related point, the majority properly acknowledges that “the General Assembly may allow each detention facility to prescribe rules tailored to the individual needs of the facility,” maj. op. at 412, but then later explains that the fact that facilities may vary as to prohibited items alters the required statutory notice. See id. at 416-417. In its non-delegation discussion, the majority states:
Therefore, provided that each detention facility complies with the standards found in the [Second-Degree] Contraband Statute, particularly the notice requirement of section 18-8-204(2)(1), the General Assembly’s policy to prohibit the introduction of certain items into detention facilities is properly implemented.
Id. at 412 (emphasis added). In discussing the adequacy of the MCDF’s statutory notice in this ease, however, the majority explains:
[T]he fact that different detention facilities throughout the state may treat cigarettes differently jfurther complicates the issue. For example, Holmes presented evidence at the hearing below that at least thirty-one counties prohibit cigarettes in their detention facilities. According to Holmes, fifteen of these facilities treat cigarettes as contraband within the meaning of the [Second-Degree] Contraband Statute, while the rest treat the introduction of cigarettes as merely a violation of administrative rules. Without commenting upon the accuracy of this evidence, we note that the [Second-Degree] Contraband Statute does allow such different treatment of the same item by different facilities.
Id. at 416 (emphasis added). Although the majority states that it is not evaluating the evidence about inter-county differences, the majority appears to view the evidence as support for its conclusion that the notice here was not adequate. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile the majority’s conclusion that the General Assembly may delegate authority to local penal institutions to develop rules regarding what items should be prohibited with its simultaneous conclusion that the fact that facilities may vary as to what items pose or reasonably pose a security threat alters the required statutory notice. A plain reading of the Second-Degree Contraband statute contains no such heightened notice requirement.
II.
The more problematic portion of the majority’s opinion is its analysis concluding that the notice in this case was inadequate. It is this part of the majority’s opinion which I now address.
The relevant part of the Second-Degree Contraband statute defines contraband as follows:
Any article or thing that poses or may pose a threat to the security of the detention facility as determined by the administrative head of the detention facility if reasonable notice is given that such article or thing is contraband.
18-8-204(2)©, 6 C.R.S. (1997). Having concluded that the language “may pose a threat to the security” must be construed to mean “a reasonable probability” of posing a threat to the facility’s security, maj. op. at 411, the relevant questions for this court should be: (1) what is contraband? and (2) what is reasonable notice that an item or article is contraband? The answers to these questions indicate that the MCDF’s notice here was sufficient.
A.
The term “contraband” as used in section 18-8-204(2)© is unambiguous. Contraband simply means that an item is prohibited or illegal. See Webster’s Third New Interna*422tional Dictionary 494 (3d ed.1986).2 Thus, an item that is declared prohibited falls squarely within the definition of contraband.
There is no dispute in this ease that the MCDF clearly prohibited cigarettes and matches. Upon entering the MCDF, visitors are exposed to three large signs located next to each other. The first sign states in relevant part:
INFORMATION CENTER, IMPORTANT INFORMATION — PLEASE READ, GENERAL INFORMATION
1. NO SMOKING IS ALLOWED IN THE PUBLIC AREA OF THIS BUILDING.
2. The Detention Facility is a tobacco free facility. No tobacco products or flame producing devices of any kind are allowed inside the secured perimeter.
(Capitalization in original, emphasis added.) A second sign states in relevant part:
LEGAL/ PROFESSIONAL CONTACT VISITS
Legal and professional contact visits include visits from attorneys, social services workers, religious or mental health counselors or bonding company representatives, that take place within the secure perimeter of the detention facility. All professional visitors must adhere to the following guidelines in addition to the general rules and procedures of the facility.
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5. Visitors are not allowed to give the inmate anything without prior notification and authorization of the detention staff. Some of the items not allowed include, but are not limited to: tobacco products, magic markers, matches, lighters, food items in-eluding gum, nail files or clippers, pens, paper clips, white out, spiral note books, thumb tacks, and keys or any medication.
(Capitalization in original, emphasis added.) The third sign, entitled “VISITATION RULES,” does not mention tobacco or matches, although the sign indicates that visitors are not allowed to take personal items into the visiting area.
For the purposes of this case, the first and second signs clearly indicate that tobacco and matches are prohibited in the facility. The “LEGAL VISITS” sign expressly indicates that an attorney is prohibited from bringing tobacco or matches into the facility. The “GENERAL INFORMATION” sign indicates that tobacco products and flame producing devices are not allowed within the secured perimeter of the facility. I conclude that the signs plainly and more than adequately inform a visitor, such as Holmes, that one cannot bring cigarettes and matches into the MCDF.
B.
Recognizing that the MCDF’s signs clearly prohibited matches and cigarettes, the next question logically becomes, “Did the MCDF’s signs provide the reasonable notice required by statute?” I would hold that the signs provided reasonable notice.
Although the majority does not hold that a facility’s notice must indicate that prohibited items are contraband per se, the majority explains that it agrees with Holmes, who “contends that the [Second-Degree] Contraband Statute demands notice that introducing specific items into the facility is criminal conduct.” Maj. op. at 414 (emphasis added).3 The majority supports this conclusion by em*423barking on a three-fold inquiry. By the end of its analysis, the majority establishes a notice requirement that is not mandated under either the statute or due process.
1.
The majority indicates that it “first [must] determine what notice is sufficient to warn visitors to a detention facility that the introduction of an item is a criminal offense pursuant to the [Second-Degree] Contraband Statute.” Maj. op. at 415 (emphasis added). If the majority has properly framed the question, there is no doubt that Holmes must prevail because the MCDF’s signs in themselves do not indicate that violating the MCDF’s posted prohibitions constitutes a criminal offense. In my view, however, the question posed by the majority is improper. Neither the statute nor relevant ease law mandates that the administrative notice itself must indicate that violation of an administrative rule promulgated pursuant to a statute subjects the violator to criminal penalties. Thus, the fact that the signs did not indicate that the introduction of cigarettes and matches is a criminal offense is not a flaw.
In considering the sufficiency of the notice provided in this case, I rely on two of our prior opinions that considered administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to a statutory scheme which provided criminal penalties for violation of the regulations. In People v. Lowrie, 761 P.2d 778, 782-84 (Colo.1988), we explicitly discussed the requirement of notice when the General Assembly enacts a statute delegating rulemaking authority to an administrative agency and providing that the violation of an agency rule constitutes criminal conduct. There, we considered the provisions in the Colorado Liquor Code whereby the General Assembly 1) delegated rulemaking power to the Director of the Department of Revenue (Director) to promulgate rules and regulations governing the sale of alcoholic beverages and 2) made the violation of any rule or regulation authorized and adopted by the Director a criminal offense. See Lowrie, 761 P.2d at 782-88. In focusing on the notice requirement, we first reviewed the statute’s authorization to the Director to promulgate rules necessary for regulating alcoholic beverage sales. See id. at 783. We then explained:
In addition, the General Assembly has provided the public with express notice that any person violating any rule or regulation authorized and adopted pursuant to the Colorado Liquor Code is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be punished by a five thousand dollar ■ fine and/or a one year sentence to the county jail.
Id. In analyzing the sufficiency of the notice, we did not impose a requirement that the regulations at issue must state that the violation of the regulations constituted criminal conduct. See id. at 779-80 (reviewing the relevant regulations, none of which referred to criminal sanctions). Rather, we considered the statute and regulations in tandem. We concluded that “[g]iven the varied and complex nature of the problems associated with the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages, we are satisfied that the rulemak-ing standards set forth in section 12-47-105 adequately delineate the permissible areas of regulation delegated to the Director and provide a prospective violator with adequate notice of the penalty.” Id. at 784. Thus, under Lowrie, it is not necessary that air administrative regulation specifically indicate that violating the regulation subjects the violator to criminal penalties. The statute itself gives such notice.
In Citizens for Free Enterprise v. Department of Revenue, 649 P.2d 1054 (Colo.1982), we considered constitutional challenges to the same regulatory scheme we addressed in Lowrie. The plaintiffs in Citizens for Free Enterprise sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment that the regulations were unconstitutional. See Citizens for Free Enterprise, 649 P.2d at 1058. We considered two regulations. First, we disagreed with the plaintiffs that the “conduct regulation,” which governed certain activities at establishments licensed to sell alcoholic beverages, was unconstitutional and thus we upheld it. See id. at 1056-66. Second, we agreed with the plaintiffs that the “consumption regulation,” which prohibited certain activities that were “unduly designed to increase the consumption of alcoholic beverages,” id. at 1068, *424was unconstitutionally vague and thus we held that the second regulation was invalid. See id. at 1068-69. The relevant point from Citizens for Free Enterprise is this: it is possible for a reviewing court to find part of a regulatory scheme constitutional while striking another part of that scheme because it is not consistent with constitutional principles. When that happens, clearly no criminal penalties could lie for violating the portion of a regulation that is found invalid.
Applying the relevant principles from Low-rie and Citizens for Free Enterprise establishes the following. First, it may well be that the MCDF’s prohibition of certain items is not consistent with the “reasonable probability” standard. However, those items are not before us. Even if the prohibitions against the other items were before us, under Citizens for Free Enterprise we could still uphold the cigarettes and matches ban while rejecting the MCDF’s treatment of the other items as contraband. Second, under Lowrie, we must examine the Second-Degree Contraband statute and the MCDF’s signs together. The Second-Degree Contraband statute tells the reader that introducing an item which the facility prohibits (i.e., contraband) is criminal conduct. Reading the MCDF’s signs informs a visitor such as Holmes that cigarettes and matches are prohibited. Thus, the statute and signs, taken together, adequately inform a visitor about the criminal consequences that follow from introducing cigarettes and matches into the MCDF. By accepting Holmes’s argument that the administrative notice must indicate that violation of the rules contained in the notice subjects the person to criminal sanctions, the majority establishes a bad precedent which may jeopardize other regulations such as the Liquor Code regulations at issue in Lowrie and Citizens for Free Enterprise.
2.
The majority states that its second task is to “construe the ‘reasonable notice’ provision in the [Second-Degree] Contraband statute to require this constitutionally sufficient notice.” Maj. op. at 415. The majority’s conclusion that the notice here was inadequate is not, however, supported by the relevant due process ease law.
I agree with the majority that due process requires that laws must “give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,” maj. op. at 414 (quotations omitted), and must “supply explicit standards for those who apply them in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id. However, I do not agree that the MCDF violated these principles as a result of the notice it provided to visitors.
The only relevant case cited by the majority which bears on the issue before us, i.e., what notice must be provided in an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to a statute which makes the violation of the regulation a crime, does not support the majority’s holding. See United States v. Hall, 742 F.2d 1153, 1154-55 (9th Cir.1984). In Hall, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendants’ convictions for violating a federal statute which prohibited going upon a military reservation for any purpose prohibited by law or lawful regulation. See id. at 1154-55. The air force base in that case enacted a regulation which prohibited entry onto the base “without the consent of the Installation Commander.” Id. at 1155. The Hall court stated that “it is not necessary that the regulation prohibiting entry be published in the Federal Register so long as appellants had actual and timely notice of its terms.” Id. In affirming the convictions, the Hall court explained that the defendants had sufficient notice because security officers informed the defendants that entry was prohibited without the consent of the commander, there were signs that carried the same message, security personnel warned the defendants to stay out, and the defendants acted deliberately in entering the base. See id.
The Hall court’s reasoning does not support the majority’s argument that the notice here was insufficient. In this case, the People allege that on an earlier occasion, Holmes was told by a security guard that he could not bring cigarettes and matches into the MCDF. According to the People, Holmes entered the facility a second time and, in spite of the previous warning, deliberately *425gave an inmate cigarettes and matches. Moreover, the MCDF’s signs clearly indicated that a visitor could not bring these items into the facility. Absent from the Hall court’s discussion is any requirement that the notice must indicate the “reasons” behind the regulation or that the notice the base gave the defendants had to- inform them that violating the regulation was a crime. Under Hall, Holmes had adequate notice of the prohibition.
3.
.The majority states that its third task is to “decide whether the notice provided by the MCDF conforms with the statutory notice requirement.” Maj. op. at 415. In concluding that the MCDF’s notice did not conform with the statute, the majority converts the statute’s requirement of “reasonable notice” to a requirement of “notice of the reasons.” See maj. op. at 416 (“[T]he reason for the prohibition is of paramount importance.”). As discussed, the majority’s conversion to a “notice of the reasons” is inconsistent with this court’s precedent, as well as related ease law from other courts.
In State v. Long, 315 Or. 95, 843 P.2d 420, 421-24 (1992), a county jail in Oregon promulgated and implemented a rule that prohibited inmates from possessing tobacco, matches, and rolling papers. The county jail passed the rule pursuant to an Oregon statute, similar to section 18-8-204, which included in the definition of contraband “[a]ny article or thing which a person confined in a correctional facility, ... is prohibited by statute, rule or order from obtaining or possessing, and whose use would endanger the safety or security of such institution or any person therein.” Long, 843 P.2d at 421 (omission in original). In affirming the defendant’s conviction, the Oregon Supreme Court explained that this scheme was constitutional. See id. at 424. There,are no significant differences between the constructive notice provided under the Oregon statute and the Second-Degree Contraband statute.
In Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir.1989), the Tenth Circuit described the analysis that should govern our review of the MCDF’s regulation here: The Flanagan court explained:
A regulation is vague on its face when it “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” The rule should comport with a “rough idea of fairness ... and provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.”
Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1569 (emphasis added) (omission in original) (quoting Connolly v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926) and. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). Here, the MCDF signs more than adequately comported with these principles. Penal institutions are unique environments that are inherently dangerous. Visitations between inmates and visitors, whether professional or social, are heavily regulated and monitored. A person of average intelligence knows that the regulations governing a penal institution, including visitation rules, are serious matters. A sign that unequivocally indicates that one is prohibited from bringing into the institution specific enumerated items, when viewed in conjunction with a statute that makes introducing prohibited items a crime, comports with the reasonable notice requirement in the Second-Degree Contraband statute and due process principles.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, I do not agree with the majority that the MCDF did not provide reasonable notice of the cigarette and matches prohibition. The majority’s holding departs from our prior case law which, in my view, requires this court to find that the MCDF’s notice was reasonable. While the majority concludes that due process requires a more detailed notice than what the statute requires, the relevant case law does not support this conclusion. As a result, detention facilities in this state must provide notice that is not based on either the statute or constitutional principles. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*426I am authorized to say that Chief Justice VOLLACK and Justice SCOTT join in this concurrence and dissent.

. The People allege that during an investigation following the July 22, 1996 incident, the date on which the People assert that Holmes brought cigarettes and matches into the MCDF a second time, Holmes told the investigating officer that he did not smoke cigarettes.

. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the noun contraband as follows:
1: illegal or prohibited traffic: smuggling 2: goods or merchandise the importation, exportation, or sometimes possession of which is forbidden; also: smuggled goods.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 494 (3d ed.1986) (examples omitted).

. The majority indicates that both Holmes and the trial court "expressed a similar concern” that the MCDF's notice did not indicate that introducing cigarettes and matches was a felony. Maj. op. at 413. The trial court also found, however, that the signs indicated that matches and cigarettes were contraband. The trial court's order states:
It is also significant that though there are signs as one enters the lobby area of the Detention Facility that cigarettes and matches are prohibited and are contraband, there is no notice that their introduction would be considered to be a felony offense.
(Emphasis added.) In my view, the trial court was correct in concluding that the signs indicate that cigarettes and matches are prohibited and are contraband.