Court Opinion

ID: 6411878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 11:53:18.33759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:24.050814
License: Public Domain

Shaw, C. J.*
This is an action for breaking and entering the plaintiff’s shop, and destroying various articles of property.
The defendants, denying the facts, and putting the plaintiff to proof, insist that if it is proved that they were chargeable with the breaking and entering, it was justifiable by law, on the ground that the shop was a place used for the sale of spirituous liquors, and so was declared to be a nuisance; that they had a right to abate the nuisance, and for that purpose to break and enter the shop, as the proof shows- that it was done; that the shop contained spirituous liquors kept for sale; that the so keeping them was a nuisance by statute; that they had a right to enter by force and destroy them ; that they entered for that purpose and destroyed such articles, and did no more damage than was necessary for that purpose.
A great many points were raised in the report, and argued, upon which the court have not passed ; they are all passed over now for the purpose of coming to the main points which are decisive of the case.
The judge who sat at the trial stated that he ruled the law and directed the jury as stated in the report, subject to the opinion of the whole court, and when many other points were raised, he stated that it might be more convenient to report the whole case, so far as controverted points were presented, for the consideration of the whole court; and this, it was understood, was assented to by counsel.
Passing over all questions as to the plaintiff’s case, and coming to the justification set forth in the answer, the court are of opinion, after argument, that the ruling and instructions to the jury were not correct in matter of law.
1. The court are of opinion that spirituous liquors are not, of themselves, a common nuisance, but the act of keeping them for sale by statute creates a nuisance; and the only mode in *101which they can be lawfully destroyed is the one directed by statute, for the seizure by warrant, bringing them before a magistrate, and giving the owner of the property an opportunity to defend his right to it. Therefore it is not lawful for any person to destroy them by way of abatement of a common nuisance, and a fortiori not lawful to use force for that purpose.
2. It is not lawful by the common law for any and all persons to abate a common nuisance, merely because it is a common nuisance, though the doctrine may have been sometimes stated in terms so general as to give countenance to this supposition. This right and power is never entrusted to individuals in general, without process of law, by way of vindicating the public right, but solely for the relief of a party whose right is ob structed by such nuisance.
3. If such were intended to be made the law by force of the statute, it would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, which directs that no man’s property can be taken from him without compensation, except by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land; and no person can be twice punished for the same offence. And it is clear that under the statutes spirituous liquors are property, and entitled to protection as such. The power of abatement of a public or common nuisance does not place the penal law of the Commonwealth in private hands. , (
4. The true theory of abatement of nuisance is that an individual citizen may abate a private nuisance injurious to him, when he could also bring an action ; and also, when a common nuisance obsiructs his individual right, he may remove it to enable him to enjoy that right, and he cannot be called in question for so doing. As in the case of the obstruction across a highway, and an unauthorized bridge over a navigable watercourse, if he has occasion to use it, he may remove it by way of abatement. But this would not justify strangers, being-inhabitants of other parts of the Commonwealth, having no such occasion to use it, to do the same. Some of the earlier cases, perhaps, in laying down the general proposition that private subjects may abate a common nuisance, did not expressly *102mark this distinction ; but we think, upon the authority of modern cases, where the distinctions are more accurately made, and upon principle, this is the true rule of law. Lonsdale v. Nelson, 2 B. & C. 311, 312, and 3 D. & R. 566, 567. Mayor &c. of Colchester v. Brooke, 7 Ad. & El. N. R. 376, 377. Gray v. Ayres, 7 Dana, 375. State v. Paul, 5 R. I. 185.
5. As it is the use of a building, or the keeping of spirituous liquors in it, which in general constitutes the nuisance, the abatement consists in putting a stop to such use.
6. The keeping of a building for the sale of intoxicating liquors, if a nuisance at all, is exclusively a common nuisance; and the fact that the husbands, wives, children or servants -of any person do frequent such a place and get intoxicating liquor there, does not make it a special nuisance or injury to their private rights, so as to authorize and justify such persons in breaking into the shop or building where it is thus sold, and destroying the liquor there found, and the vessels in which it may be kept; but it can only be prosecuted as a public or common nuisance in the mode prescribed by law.
Upon these grounds, without reference to others, which may be reported in detail hereafter, the court are of opinion that the verdict for the defendants must be set aside and a

New trial had.

 This statement of the decision was drawn up by the chief justice to guide the new trial. His death prevented the writing out of a fuller opinion.