Court Opinion

ID: 9645697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:33:05.686082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:30.577589
License: Public Domain

GALLAGHER, Associate Judge,
Retired, with whom KERN, NEBEKER, and HARRIS, Associate Judges, join, dissenting:
If the people of this city think that just because their Charter gives them the right to vote by initiative on legislation properly proposed by the citizenry1 this right will be enforced by this court, they will now know better. In a touch of irony, the majority today votes for a voteless District of Columbia — on this major question of public policy. A group of 15,000 petitioners has been trying since October, 1978 to exercise their Charter given right and now, almost three years later, in opinions resting on convoluted reasoning which can only be described as resentful of the attempt, the citizenry now learns the voting right they thought they had under the Charter was only an illusion. In an unsuccessful effort to ward off this illiberal decision, two Councilmembers — one represented by the American Civil Liberties Union 2 — entered the case as amicus curiae at the en banc stage to warn against this denial of civil rights by the court. Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union told the court the issue
goes to the integrity of our government because it involves the right of the citizens to vote on a major question of public policy .... At stake ... is an essential part of the self-government that was restored to residents of this city in the last few years after a century of disenfranchisement.
I agree with that assessment. We should enforce the Home Rule Charter as it is plainly written. I do not subscribe to the sophomoric view that whenever the prestige of the new Home Rule government is perceived to be at stake this court should abdicate its rightful judicial function and somehow find a way to support City Hall — -no matter how far-fetched the reasoning. That is not the stuff that strong and enduring governments are made of in this country. It is one thing for a fledgling government to falter and deprive fundamental Charter rights in the process of finding its way toward political maturity.3 It is quite *922another matter for this court to do so, being an institution tempered by forty years of decision-making, with every reason to be free from political pressures, and with the judicial traditions and experience of two centuries at our elbow to consult continually. For the court, there is no excuse. We are expected to be enlightened, dispassionate, and guided by reason and experience.
Instead, what we have here is a decision by the court fashioned entirely to support the other branches of government. In doing so, the majority has lost sight of the judicial function, with the result that it has dealt a gratuitous blow to true Home Rule government.
II
The two opinions for the majority take different courses to reach the same result. Chief Judge Newman’s opinion reaches its conclusion by vesting rather alarming legislative powers in the Mayor.4 Judge Fer-ren’s plurality opinion,5 on the other hand, disputes rather vigorously that approach6 and instead finds another avenue to decision.
I agree with Part III of Judge Ferren’s opinion where, in net effect, he concludes that a law is a law — including the one before us. But that is the limited extent of my agreement with his opinion.7
Ill
Before commencing a discussion on the merits of the issues, I would like to make a few preliminary comments.
There is an undercurrent to both majority opinions that initiatives (or referenda) interfere with the executive and legislative branches of government and, consequently, should be restricted as much as possible. The majority seems not to appreciate the history and purposes of initiative and refer-enda in this country. The fact is, initiatives and referenda are by their nature intended *923to interfere with elected officials on specific public issues. The right to do so was reserved to the people precisely for the reason that they might on occasion conflict with decisions taken (or not taken) by government. See generally Munro, The Initiative, Referendum and Recall. Needless to say, it is not permissible for the electorate to abuse this reserved power — such as by harassing the two branches of government or impeding the orderly general administration of government. See, e. g., State ex rel. Ballantyne v. Leeman, 149 Neb. 847, 858, 32 N.W.2d 918, 923 (1948); Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash.2d 820, 823, 505 P.2d 447, 449 (1973) (en banc).
I scarcely need to say that this case has nothing to do with whether a Convention Center in this city is desirable. It probably is a very worthwhile endeavor. But this is not for the court to consider. The sole question before us relating to a Convention Center is whether three years ago, before construction was started, the voters should have been accorded their right to vote — as expressly granted in the Charter — on whether the Center should be constructed. At this late date the Convention Center is well on its way to completion with construction funds appropriated or otherwise raised. Consequently, in one sense we are now talking about a moot topic. Few people would vote to tear down the structure. But we are by no means talking about a moot subject when we discuss whether this court will guard voting rights expressly granted to the citizenry of the capital of the country in their Charter. This is the underlying issue of the case.
Concluding these preliminary observations, I might comment that almost every informed person in local affairs knows the purpose of the initiative was to repeal the legislative decision to construct the Convention Center. The Convention Center Referendum Committee (CCRC) has been trying persistently for several years to take this issue to the people, but it has been thwarted at every turn. The group was first told it was too early — the governing laws were not yet in place.8 Now it is told it was too late.
Senator Leahy, then in the highly authoritative position of Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, had this to say during a hearing on the unfortunate history of the attempts to obtain this initiative on the Convention Center:

I have had a large number of Senators express to me that they were surprised to see the initiatives get blocked.... [A] lot of Senators were quite surprised that this happened. These were Senators strongly in favor of home rule, and they indicated they were surprised that one of the biggest aspects of home rule, the initiative aspect, was blocked.

I make this point for whatever it is worth, I was surprised, too.

* * * * * *
* * * I wjsjj (-foey ¡m(¡ done otherwise, and allowed the referendum to go forward. But that is a decision they have made, and ... I don’t think this committee could or should reverse, but rather simply watch what happens next in the court procedures. [District of Columbia Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm, on Appropriations, Pt. II, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 959-60 (1979) (emphasis added).]
Turning from this unpleasant bit of history, and focusing on the plurality opinion, it says the effort of the voters for an initiative must fail for these reasons:
1. The Charter expressly creates an exception to the initiative right, i. e., electors may not propose “laws appropriating funds.” D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § l-181(a).
2. The so-called Dixon Amendment (D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § l-1116(k)(7)) validly prohibits the proposed initiative.
I will devote myself to the two prongs of the plurality opinion and, most of all, to the result being reached by the court.
*924IV
The principal question raised by the plurality opinion revolves around the meaning of familiar English words constituting a single phrase, “laws appropriating funds.” We all seem in agreement that if the so-called Dixon Amendment, which states that an initiative may not “negate or limit” a budget request act, is not a valid implementation of this Charter Amendment language, then the Dixon Amendment is void. It is not necessary to reiterate that a statute cannot materially amend a constitution. Little need be said at this juncture about the intent of the Dixon Amendment itself, for that intent is clear. Our first task is to explain what the Charter language, “laws appropriating funds,” means.
We ought to be guided by two “first principles.” The first is ostensibly recognized by the plurality: charter grants of authority for the exercise of the initiative and referendum are to be liberally construed. Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal.2d 804, 809-10, 270 P.2d 481, 484 (1954) (en banc); State ex rel. Boyer v. Grady, 201 Neb. 360, 364, 269 N.W.2d 73, 76 (1978); 5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 16.51 at 203-04 (3d rev.ed.1979). Being reservations of power to the people, the court should strive to effectuate, not thwart, their purpose. Citizens Against a New Jail v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal.App.3d 559, 561,134 Cal.Rptr. 36, 37 (1977); Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal.App.3d 463, 468, 102 Cal.Rptr. 647, 649 (1972); Klosterman v. Marsh, 180 Neb. 506, 512-13, 143 N.W.2d 744, 749 (1966). The plurality opinion gives a passing nod to the doctrine that the initiative provisions of the Charter must be liberally construed and that is the end of it. The opinion then goes on to discuss the attempt to exercise the right of initiative — while conjuring procedural obstacles to deny it. A case on voting rights is no place for technicalities.
The second starting principle is that the first step in construing any document of legal import is to look at the plain meaning of the words. See Davis v. United States, D.C.App., 397 A.2d 951, 956 (1979); United States v. Young, D.C.App., 376 A.2d 809, 813 (1977). See also Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330, 98 S.Ct. 2370, 2375, 57 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978). This is especially true when what is being construed is a charter (/. e., constitutional) amendment which is of force today only because the people approved it, as written, in a popular referendum.
The provision in question states:
The term “initiative” means the process by which the electors of the District of Columbia may propose laws (except laws appropriating funds) and present such proposed laws directly to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia for their approval or disapproval. [D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § l-181(a).]
Now that seems plain enough. The electors may propose laws, except that they may not propose laws appropriating funds. The electors here did not propose an appropriation law. They proposed that a Convention Center be not constructed. This is the opposite of enacting an appropriations law. Only one bent on some other mission would find this to be a proposal for an appropriation of funds. Does it have an impact on a prior appropriation? Everything in government costs money and all legislation has some sort of an impact on the budget, including the recent gambling initiatives which have sailed through to a vote, unmolested.
The plurality avoids the plain meaning of “laws appropriating funds” by asserting, with seeming despair, that the phrase is too ambiguous for the unassisted mind to comprehend. The only question identified by the plurality, however, arises from the fact that, under the Home Rule scheme, the Council passes only “budget request acts,” not “laws appropriating funds.” If we simply translate “laws appropriating funds” as “budget request acts,” the only sensible thing to do, then the Charter language says only that the people may not, by initiative, themselves propose a budget request act. The unmistakable meaning of the term is that the people may not by initiative enact an appropriations law (or transmit a budget request to Congress). It can hardly be stated any simpler.
*925Numerous states have similar provisions prohibiting “laws appropriating funds” in relation to initiatives9 — for the same reason our Charter contains this exception. The reason is voters are not immersed in day-today government so as to be able to make reasoned judgments on the complex financial management of government, e. g., the interplay of various appropriations on a budget. The voters do not qualify as comptrollers. Apparently, when the exception was being drafted in this jurisdiction the drafter — as is commonplace in legislative drafting — simply borrowed the phrase from the laws of one of these states and omitted to adapt the phrase to the unusual legislative situation in the District of Columbia. By this I mean, the phrase was not translated further into the “budget request act” terminology of the appropriations process in the District of Columbia. But the meaning of the term “laws appropriating funds,” as applied in this jurisdiction, is perfectly plain. This is especially true if one sets out with an open heart and a generous spirit to construe the Charter.
In an Appendix to my dissent, however, I set forth as a matter of interest the legislative history of the statute. This will demonstrate the circumlocutions engaged in by the plurality opinion in construing it. A thorough-going analysis of the Council’s deliberations shows that the sole intent of the “laws appropriating funds” exception was to make clear that the electorate may not by initiative, itself propose an actual budget request act in order to execute its wishes. The power to pass budget requests (and supplemental budget requests) and transmit them to Congress remains exclusively with the D.C. Council and the Mayor.
The plurality opinion states this:
The Council, we note, did not specifically consider the converse situation presented in this case: an effort by the electorate to repeal or amend the substantive authorization for a funded project, to block the expenditure of previously appropriated funds, and to prevent future requests for appropriations. Nonetheless, in light of the Council’s substantive concern about the fiscal effects of initiatives, in view of the language used by proponents to describe the broad impact of the “laws appropriating funds” amendment, and especially because the appropriations process is necessary to accomplish rescis-sions as well as affirmative acts of funding, we do not believe the Council’s failure to discuss the potential use of the initiative to halt a funded program is conclusive. We are bound to interpret the statute in the way most consonant with the overall intent of the legislature even if the precise problem before the court was not expressly contemplated by the legislative body. See Breen v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 400 A.2d 1058, 1061 (1979); Eastern Airlines, Inc., v. C.A.B., 122 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 379, 354 F.2d 507, 511 (1965).
In construing the amendment, we must weigh two major public interest concerns of the Council reflected in the Charter Amendments — the elector’s right of the initiative and reasonable fiscal management — with a view to enhancing the value of each without undue intrusion on the other. [Emphasis added.]
By this device, the plurality sets itself up as the super-legislature. Among other things, it would establish the court as the self-appointed decider of “reasonable fiscal *926management.”10 This is a giant leap into a judicial morass — to say nothing of an invasion of the legislative function of government. It is judicial activism run amok.11
Contrary to the plurality’s “impressionistic” construction, the “laws appropriating funds” exception was designed not to prohibit fiscally irresponsible initiatives but to assure that the Council retained the ultimate fiscal responsibility. The Council’s deliberations show it accepted the fact that the new Charter rights might at times complicate its budgetary decisions. The Council was insistent, however, that those budgetary tasks should remain exclusively its own.
The plurality’s conclusion is that the “laws appropriating funds” exception prevents the electorate from using an initiative to block the spending of money already requested or appropriated. The purpose of statutory construction is to make sense of the provision being interpreted. See United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357, 46 S.Ct. 513, 514, 70 L.Ed. 986 (1926). The plurality violates this. Cf. Rick v. United States, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 101, 103, 161 F.2d 897, 899 (1947) (“[It is a] well-established rule of construction [that a court may not] construe a statute in such manner as to make, it patently ridiculous.”) They agree, as they must, that an initiative may effect a repeal of legislation. But the plurality, in its new and dubious role as the guardian of “fiscal responsibility” in the government, will permit an initiative which is intended to stop construction of a building to take effect only after funds already requested or appropriated for the building have already been spent. This is hardly fiscal responsibility. Needless to say this rationale prevents the present initiative. But it presents a poor case for statutory construction based on common sense.
The plurality would permit a repealer initiative to deauthorize a program, but only before the Council has adopted a budget request act or as of the expiration of funds appropriated for it; or it may prohibit future budget requests. When this is translated into the real world of government, it is unacceptable. We should not enter into a “dreamed up” interpretation of a voting rights statute whereby, if a capital project has been approved and the appropriations process is underway, an initiative to repeal the legislation must await the pouring down the drain of millions of dollars before becoming effective. Not only is this unfortunate bit of judicial legislation not compelled, it is unwarranted.12
All that the “laws appropriating funds” exception actually means, in the concrete, is that the people may not seek, through the initiative, to propose and pass an actual budget request act. The reasons for that prohibition are sensible and obvious. The electorate should scarcely be permitted to function as surrogate comptrollers. Thus, as the Council’s deliberations on the Charter Amendments make clear, the people may, by initiative, authorize a capital project and even direct the Council to request the necessary funding from Congress. The electorate may not, however, take the step of passing and transmitting its own budget request act to Congress. Similarly, the vot*927ers may seek, by initiative, to deauthorize a capital project and, in substance, direct the government to take steps to wind it up. This is exactly what the petitioners did here. Their petition was not a supplemental budget request act. This interpretation of “laws appropriating funds” seems simple enough. Constitutions (charters) are not meant for the niggling reading given by the plurality. They do not endure well if, when interpreted, they are overwhelmed with suffocating semantics.

Dixon Amendment

The Dixon Amendment was prompted by the existing threat of a vote by initiative on whether the Convention Center should be constructed. The Amendment was intended to foreclose an initiative on this project. The legislative history makes this clear. At the first reading of the Initiative Referendum and Recall Procedures Bill — one week before Dixon introduced his amendment— Councilmember Hilda Mason offered an amendment specifically designed to exempt the Convention Center petition from certain of the formal and procedural requirements set up by the bill. [R. CA 8368-79 at 39, Pl.Ex.E at 18-21.] Despite Chairman Dixon’s opposition to the amendment,13 it passed by a vote of seven to five. At the Council’s next meeting, and while the Convention Center Citizens Committee was trying to move forward on the initiative vote, Chairman Dixon offered his so-called Dixon amendment:
MR. DIXON: * * *
I would like to, at this time, introduce another amendment, which I would like to be circulated. I would offer an amendment to the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Procedures Act. This particular amendment does deal with the concern for the approval of capital projects. It is our feeling that the intent of the legislation from the Corporation Counsel is that the initiative, referendum and recall language was not designed to deal with capital or approved budget items.
I would move the amendment at this time. Could we circulate them, please.
*928MS. MASON: Mr. Chairman, are you going to read your amendment into the record?
CHAIRMAN DIXON: Yes, it will be read into the record. The amendment reads as follows. [Dixon then read the text of his amendment.]
As I said, this is consistent with direction from the Corporation Counsel dealing with the budget process, and I would move it at this time. Is there discussion?
Several members of the Council immediately protested that the proposed amendment was inconsistent with the language and intent of the Charter Amendments. More importantly, however, is that when the opinion of the General Counsel of the Council was solicited, he considered it to be a substantive amendment and agreed with this conclusion:
MR. CHRISTIAN: In the opinion of the General Counsel, in my office, the legislation here, in effect, goes beyond that which would be normally included in the implementing piece and also, in effect, constitutes substantively an amendment of the Charter amendment previously approved.
MR. CLARKE: You are saying, then, that effectively this constitutes a Charter amendment and, therefore, this will have to go to referenda and to Congress as a Charter amendment?
MR. CHRISTIAN: Arguably—
MR. CLARKE: I’m asking your opinion.
MR. CHRISTIAN: My opinion is that you are correct, Mr. Clarke.
MR. CLARKE: So, this is inappropriate for a normal bill, it would be your opinion?
MR. CHRISTIAN: You are correct. [R. CA 8368-79 at 40, Pl.Ex.F at 15-16 (emphasis added).]
Nevertheless, Chairman Dixon ignored the advice of the Council’s legislative counsel that the Dixon amendment conflicted with the Charter and was therefore invalid and ruled that the amendment was nonsubstan-tive, and therefore not subject to a third reading by the Council. Further discussion was prevented by the chair:
MR. CLARKE: Mr. Chairman, I call a point of order on your amendments.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: Mr. Clarke, we are opening discussions that have been dealing with a number of items in this bill before. The Council has already spoken its policy decision that we feel that we need to exercise our opinion as to what would be appropriate for this initiative language. There is, in fact, this initiative enabling legislation. Therefore, the Chair would argue that this particular item is not unlike other portions of the legislation, which does reflect policy statements of this Body, in fact, going forth legislatively with enabling legislation.
I would call for the question based on that.
All in favor, indicate by saying aye.
(A chorus of ayes.)
CHAIRMAN DIXON: Opposed?
(A chorus of nays.)
CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Chair rules that the motion carries.
MS. MASON: Division of the House.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Chair rules that the motion carries.
MS. MASON: Division of the House.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: If there is an appeal to the ruling of the Chair, then I would recognize that motion.
MS. MASON: I appeal, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Chair has ruled that the motion carries. I have indicated that if there is an appeal to that, then that would be accepted to the ruling of the Chair that the motion carries. Then, we could have a division of the House.
MS. KANE: I request a division of the House.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: The division has been requested. The Chair will recognize the division. Would the Secretary, please, call the roll.
MS. ROBINSON: Councilmember Clarke.
*929MR. CLARKE: No.
MS. ROBINSON: Chairman Dixon.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: Yes.
MS. ROBINSON: Councilmember Hardy-
MS. HARDY: Yes.
MS. ROBINSON: Councilmember Kane.
MS. KANE: No.
MS. ROBINSON: Councilmember Mason.
MS. MASON: No.
MS. ROBINSON: Councilmember Moore.
REV. J. MOORE: Yes.
MS. ROBINSON: Councilmember Ro-larle.
MS. ROLARK: Yes.
MS. ROBINSON: Councilmember Shackleton.
MS. SHACKLETON: No.
MS. ROBINSON: Mr. Spaulding.
MR. SPAULDING: Yes.
MS. ROBINSON: Councilmember Wilson.
MR. WILSON: Yes.
MS. ROBINSON: Councilmember Winter.
MS. WINTER: Present.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: The motion carries. Now, I move the bill as amended.
MS. MASON: Mr. Chairman, personal privilege, please. I would like to ask the Counsel a question to this matter.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: I think that is not an appropriate personal privilege comment, Ms. Mason.
MS. MASON: I think this is appropriate. I would like to ask the General Counsel, what is the authorizing legislation and powers in the District of Columbia to construct or operate the Convention Center?
CHAIRMAN DIXON: That is a substantive question, not a personal privilege question.
MS. MASON: Who is going to answer it for me?
CHAIRMAN DIXON: The question is out of order.
MS. MASON: It is out of order because you don’t want it to get out to the public that we don’t have a law to run it.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: It is in the public now. It’s not an appropriate question for personal privilege, Mrs. Winter.
MS. WINTER: Mr. Chairman, I voted “present.” I wish we would get our amendment out prior to the Legislative Session. I have not seen it. My aide just brought the Charter to me. Mrs. Kane discussed the Charter, and I think we need an opportunity. I voted “present,” because I didn’t want to vote against something, and I don’t know what I am doing.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: The bill is properly before us. All in favor, indicate by saying aye.
(A chorus of ayes.)
CHAIRMAN DIXON: Opposed? Abstentions?
The motion carries.
MR. CLARKE: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask your ruling on whether the amendment was substantive.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: It was moved as a conforming amendment to our understanding of the Charter, and it is not substantive. Mrs. Mason.
MS. MASON: Mr. Chairman, your attorney has ruled that that does change the Charter, so that means it is substantive, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: The Chair has already ruled and the bill has been passed. [R. CA 8368-79 at 40, Pl.Ex.F at 16-20 (emphasis added).]
This reveals how the Dixon Amendment was enacted. The Council was correctly forewarned by their counsel that it was an effort at a Charter Amendment and was therefore invalid. The amendment was pinpointed at the then-existing proposal for a voter initiative on the Convention Center project and the immediate purpose was to thwart it.14
*930The Dixon Amendment bars any initiative that “would negate or limit [a budget request] act of the Council.” The plurality concludes the Dixon Amendment is “congruent” with its interpretation of the Charter and, therefore, the Dixon Amendment is not invalid for failure to comport with the Charter Amendment exception.15 This is not surprising, as the plurality — in a farfetched interpretation — had previously construed the Charter exception to fit right into the terms of the Dixon Amendment, so as to validate the amendment.
As I have shown earlier, the Charter Amendment exception does not mean at all what the plurality has said. The Dixon Amendment is unmistakably an attempt to substantially amend the Charter and, consequently, is void by definition.
The plurality opinion says (at 915):
We hold that the Dixon Amendment . . . prevents CCRC’s initiative from reaching the ballot.
The plurality is there saying the Dixon Amendment is determinative of the issue. But if it had this much significance it would manifestly be an invalid Charter Amendment because it is beyond serious dispute that legislation may not amend a constitution (the Charter).

Conclusion

It would be most unfortunate if there were to develop a continuing pattern of governmental impairment of any vote by initiative or referendum that is governmen-tally considered an undesirable legislative proposal notwithstanding the Charter provisions enabling it.16 At a Senate Hearing, the Chairman put this question to the May- or:
Mr. Mayor, do you feel at all that the series of steps in turning down the attempt of some citizens groups under the Home Rule Charter to have a convention referendum, do you feel that might in any way be going against the type of home rule that the citizens say they want?
MR. BARRY: Mr. Chairman, I don’t think so .... I have made probably a 180-degree turn on this whole question of referendums.... [As] Mayor, and having the lack of restraint for full budgetary authority, I don’t think we get the full weight of it .... As citizens go to referendums and turn these things down, I don’t think citizens of the Nation’s Capital can stand that sort of pressure.
MR. LEAHY: Do you think citizens in the District of Columbia should have a right to a referendum on capital projects?
MR. BARRY: I don’t think so, which is a 180-degree change in my position. [District of Columbia Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980: Hearings before a Sub-comm. of the Senate on Appropriations, Pt. II, 96th Cong., 1st sess. 19 (1979) (emphasis added).]
The court majority is now assuming the role of effectively implementing the unfortunate purpose of the other two branches of government. It is small wonder that at a late stage the American Civil Liberties Union found its way into this case to warn against the impairment of voting rights that is now taking place. Just as we must protect “expression and association without regard to the ... truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered,” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S 415, 445, 83 S.Ct. 328, 344, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), so must the right to vote equally be protected no matter that there may be official apprehension as to the outcome.17 The vitality of the government depends upon *931this. “Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964) (voting apportionment). Instead, we have today two opinions for the majority denying the right which defy acceptable translation into the real world of government.18 This right does not — of all things — depend upon exquisite timing.
Only in bygone years has political expression by vote been subjected to so many prior restraints as those laid down here. The plurality opinion, in particular, is cleverly crafted so as to stop the voters at almost every turn, as a practical matter. I make the dire prediction that in the early future there will be a judicial effort to apply the plurality opinion so as to deny future attempts to exercise the voting initiative franchise on proposals considered “unpopular” in government circles.
The court and the bar will be years untangling this case. This is what happens when the judiciary forsakes its true role. I do not have the slightest hesitation in saying this decision diminishes the court.
I dissent.
APPENDIX

Legislative History

As originally introduced by the late Councilmember Julius Hobson, the Charter Amendments bill contained a provision for the right to referendum which remained substantially unchanged through its final passage and approval by the electorate. The initiative right, however, originally contained no exception for “laws appropriating funds.” Section 101 of Bill 2-2 read simply:
The initiative is the power of the electors of the District of Columbia to propose legislation and refer such legislation directly to the electorate to pass or reject the same.
It was at the full Council’s first reading of Bill 2-2 on April 5,1977 that then Coucil-member Arrington Dixon first introduced the “laws appropriating funds” exception as an amendment to the bill’s definition of initiative. Some of the concerns and misgivings which ultimately led to this amendment were first articulated, however, at a March 16, 1977 meeting of the Council’s Government Operations Committee, chaired by member Dixon and called to consider and report the bill. Accordingly, before recounting the discussion immediately surrounding introduction of the amendment, I shall briefly describe the Committee’s earlier deliberations.
A. D.C. Council Government Operations Committee Meeting of March 16, 1977
After some initial extended discussion of matters not here material, then-Council-member (now Mayor) Marion Barry broached the subject of the bill’s treatment of the “fiscal implications” of an initiative. His clearly expressed concern was that the people might propose a project and the Charter would require the Council to find money for it in the budget or request further funds from Congress.1 Bruce French, *932the Committee Clerk and apparently the chief draftsman of the bill, responded that, consonant with the general structure of the Home Rule regime, an initiative could authorize but not appropriate, since the latter process is one ultimately resting with the Congress.2 And in a subsequent exchange between then Councilmembers Barry and Hobson, the former reiterated his belief that the public ought to be made aware that while it could authorize a project by initiative, the inherent structure of Home Rule required that the funds for it be separately requested by the Council and appropriated by Congress.3 Committee Chairman Dixon himself apparently joined in then Councilmember Barry’s concern that the public somehow be informed that an initiative would not automatically trigger a flow of federal funds for the project proposed.4
Councilmember Barry did, however, express a separate concern with other fiscal implications of the bill later in the meeting. He spoke strongly in favor of the language in Councilmember Hobson’s bill which would preclude referenda on such potentially unpopular matters as tax measures and bond issues for school renovation. Barry’s view was that the proper running of government would become impossible if the people were permitted to challenge the very lifeblood of essential government programs in this way.
But Barry took care to state for the record that he was not “for excluding capital projects from referendum.” [R. CA 8368-79 at 37, Pl.Ex.B at 25.] In moving that the bill as written be reported to the full Council, Barry reiterated:
* * * Again I want to make it clear that my argument was not on the capital part *933of the budget. I think that the citizens ought to have a right to vote on these huge expenditures of money in that regard. But I do think that as we go forward we have to protect those institutions that sometimes cannot protect themselves. And certainly the public schools are one. If we put the referendum tomorrow for a $221 million budget for that school system, ... I think we will get zero because that is the nature of where we are. [R. CA 8368-79 at 37, Pl.Ex.B at 26.]
The report issued by the Committee endorsed Barry’s view, stating: “It was the Committee’s intent that capital construction projects would be available to referendum.” Committee on Government Operations of the District of Columbia Council, Committee Report No. 1, at 18 (March 16, 1977) R. CA 8368-79 at 38, Pl.Ex.C at 18.
In summary, two narrowly framed and clearly expressed concerns were made known during this first phase of Council consideration of the Charter Amendments bill. First, Councilmembers Barry and Dixon and Committee Clerk French stated that the electorate ought to be made aware that the proposed right of initiative included the right to authorize projects and programs, but not the separate and distinct power to appropriate funds for those projects and programs — a power not fully exercisable by even the District of Columbia Council itself under Home Rule. I would suggest that the clearest and most effective way to so inform the public would be to include in the language of the Charter provision itself an exception for “laws appropriating funds.” If the legislative history had ended with the bare proposal of the exception, the necessary inference would be that it was intended to make explicit only that the initiative right did not include the right to request appropriations from the Congress.
Second, then-Councilmember Barry stressed the practical wisdom of not permitting referenda on emergency, tax, and general appropriation legislation, but emphasized that this bar ought not to extend to capital projects — an interpretation later adopted by the Committee Report. To be sure, it can be argued that the availability of referenda to challenge capital expenditures is nothing more than a recognition that capital appropriations are clearly not within the exception to the referendum right for “acts appropriating funds for the general operation budget.” It is evident, however, that Barry’s and the Report’s statements regarding capital projects should be construed more broadly, as indicative of an implicit legislative intent that capital projects be subject to challenge via the initiative also. Several facts strongly support this interpretation. First, it is clear (as recognized by the plurality at n.38) that the initiative may be used, like the referendum, to repeal acts of the Council.5 It follows — and there was at this point no indication otherwise — that the initiative could also be used to stop a capital project. Second, at this stage in the legislative history, the “laws appropriating funds” exception, whatever its significance, was absent from the definition of initiative. The right to initiative was, accordingly, subject to no special restrictions as to subject matter. It went without saying that the initiative, as well as the referendum, could be used against a capital project. Finally, it seems clear that when Councilmember Barry spoke in favor of barring referenda against tax and general appropriation statutes — but not referenda against capital projects — he intended his comments to apply to repealer initiatives as well.6 That Barry explicitly focused on the “referendum” seems attrib*934utable to his use of that term — in this context at least — as encompassing all popular repealers. Thus, it seems abundantly clear that the firm sense of the Committee which first considered the Charter Amendments bill was that the people’s right to vote a halt to capital projects was unencumbered by any language then in the bill.
B. District of Columbia Council Meeting of April 5, 1977
It was at this, the Council’s first reading of the Charter Amendments bill, that Coun-cilmember Dixon proposed the addition of the “laws appropriating funds” exception to the definition of initiative. In introducing the amendment, Dixon stated, as the plurality notes, that the exception would “prohibit initiativefs] used against or as related to7 appropriated funds which go to tax levying and other forms of operating budget or appropriated fund actions.” (Plur.Op. at 911 (emphasis added).) What this indistinct comment actually meant is something only for speculation.
Councilmember Dixon was immediately asked by Councilmember William Spaulding to state again what the effect of the exception would be. R. CA 3868-79 at 132, Def.Ex. 1 — 1 at 19. Dixon answered:
It would not be used for taxes but only for appropriated — but not for tax purposes. You could not kill a tax measure with the initiative. You could, in fact, deal with the appropriation only. [R. CA 8368-79 at 134, Def.Ex. L-l at 19.]
Perhaps sensing that he was not being fully responsive to Councilmember Spaulding’s question, Dixon deferred to Bruce French, Committee Clerk, who explained:
This amendment provide[s] that you cannot initiate or state appropriated measures either for general operating Budgets or capital budgets. It does not affect the tax measure at all. This is because of the delay in the appropriation process. [R. CA 8368-79 at 132, Def.Ex. L-l at 19 (emphasis added).]
While French, the apparent draftsman of the amendment, thus seems to have contradicted Dixon’s assertion that the “laws appropriating funds” exception was intended to address the question of the use of the initiative against tax measures, his initial remark is to the effect that the exception was only intended to prohibit the electorate from affirmatively requesting appropriations via the initiative.
The correctness of this interpretation is borne out by the entire course of the subsequent discussion of the amendment. Coun-cilmember Spaulding began the discussion by asking whether the exceptions to either the initiative or the referendum right were designed to prohibit popular measures with a “fiscal impact.” It was Councilmember Dixon himself who responded that it was not the intent of the exceptions to proscribe initiatives or referenda with fiscal impact, noting that the people could, by initiative, authorize a capital project — a matter of obvious fiscal impact — just as the Council could.8
*935Spaulding then made clear his concern— later echoed by Councilmembers John A. Wilson and David Clarke — that the proposed Charter Amendments might permit an imbalance of the budget.9 R. CA 8368-79 at 134, Def.Ex. L-l at 21. Though there was some discussion of requiring those proposing an initiative measure to propose in addition a special tax levy to raise funds for the project or program proposed, the Council ultimately rejected this idea and opted to preserve the people’s right, unfettered by prior fiscal constraints, to themselves authorize projects and programs.10 Dixon noted, however, that two facets of the bill lessened the likelihood that the proposed Charter rights would lead to budget deficiencies. First, the exception to the referendum right for tax acts proscribes popular challenge to the government’s attempts to raise necessary revenue. R. CA 8368-79 at 132, Def.Ex. L-l at 21. Second — and perhaps more significantly — the initiative right does not include the power to initiate the appropriations process: this power remains exclusively with the Mayor and the Council.11 Thus, a final check on the budgetary effects of voter initiated legislation is retained by the District government, which must act separately to secure appropriations for programs or projects authorized by the people.12 An exchange between Coun-cilmembers Barry and Dixon highlighted this:
MR. BARRY: * * * This Council can place legislation authorizing the establishment of entities. We established the *936Office of Latino Affairs. We have also put into our budgetary process that to put in that measure some $50,000.
My interpretation is that is authorizing legislation and it is not appropriating] legislation. That is, the Council in its budgetary process will decide to exclude the $5 million health center that the community had authorized us to build and operate, if during the budgetary process the Council voted against it. That was my understanding in the Committee. That was my understanding from the staff, that authorizing legislation as we do but it wasn’t appropriating legislation.
[[Image here]]
MR. DIXON: It is correct on the initiative section. We passed it. The electorate can initiate a tax if they want to, but they cannot appropriate that money. They can initiate any measure they want to initiate but they cannot initiate the spending of that money. That is not in their power to do. * * * [R. CA 8368-79 at 134, Def.Ex. L-l at 24-25 (emphasis added).] 023
The clear import of this discussion as the plurality concedes, is that “[t]he Council was particularly concerned ... that the electorate not use the initiative to launch the appropriations process.” (Plur.Op. at 912 (emphasis added).) That is the plain meaning of the term and that is the sense of the legislative history. Normally, that should have ended the matter and there would have been agreement on a construction of the legislative history. But that would have led to a different result — the result now reached by the dissent in this case. But this was unacceptable for the plurality. Instead, the plurality decided to legislate its own way to the result desired.

. Except the people may not legislate appropriations, for obvious reasons. I later discuss this.

. The American Civil Liberties Union is appearing here in the role of counsel for Councilmem-ber Mason.

. An informed commentator on the local scene astutely observed recently:
The elections board must be careful about undoing the will of voters who petition to place an issue on the ballot, especially when elected city officials — including the mayor who appointed the members of the elections board — have publicly promised to oppose the initiative. The referendum process was designed to give voters some mechanism for creating law without interference from elected officials. The election board’s decision to take the tax initiative off the ballot therefore comes close in appearance to being a political decision.
[[Image here]]
*922A clear line of sufficient cause is a must if the board is to avoid the suspicion that it is subject to political pressure on initiatives that do not please the powers-that-be in the District Building. [Editorial], The Washington Post, Aug. 5, 1981, § A at 22.

.That the Mayor has no such powers as bestowed upon him in Chief Judge Newman’s opinion was previously made clear in this colloquy at a Senate hearing, at which then Chairman Leahy stated:
Congress, of course, did not mandate a convention center, but rather authorized a convention center, and authorized the city, if they determined this is what they wanted to do, to do it within certain budgetary limits. But I think Congress made itself dear that its involvement was solely on the upside budgetary limit, design and location. Whether to go forward with it was entirely up to the dty. That was certainly my understanding. [District of Columbia Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980; Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm, on Appropriations, Pt. II, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 959 (1979) (emphasis added).]
Senator Leahy was also informed by counsel for the CCRC of the argument that
the District[’s] hands were tied, even if the City Council changed its mind on the convention center, they would argue they would have no authority to implement that change of mind. They are arguing that they are required to borrow and spend the money and go through with the project including requesting future appropriations. [Id. (emphasis added).]
To this, Chairman Leahy commented:
This is an interesting argument, but I doubt any of the 535 Members of Congress would agree. [Id. (emphasis added).]

. Judge Ferren is joined by Judges Kelly and Mack, which constitutes a plurality of the five judges favoring affirmance.

. Chief Judge Newman’s panel opinion led Councilmember Betty Ann Kane to appear before the en banc court as amicus curiae because of the denigration of the Council’s legislative authority present in that opinion, which incidentally is now abandoned by the plurality.

. In the “Response to Dissent,” the plurality sets forth what it deems to be areas of agreement between the plurality and dissenting judges. The dissenters find those particular statements either confusing or contrary to the views of the dissenting judges. Consequently, it is only accurate to say that the dissent’s area of agreement with the plurality is as I have stated. As I read the “Response to Dissent,” it amounts to a series of “cieverisms” about a basic Charter right, which does not permit of this. Contrary to the plurality, for exercise of the right it does not matter what month it is, nor what season it is, nor at what stage is the budget or appropriations process. It is a right for all seasons.

. Convention Center Referendum Committee v. Board of Elections and Ethics, D.C.App., 399 A.2d 550 (1979).

. E. g., Alaska Const, art. XI, § 7 (“The initiative shall not be used to ... make or repeal appropriations....”); Mass.Const. amend., art. 48, Init., pt. 2, § 1 (“No measure that ... makes a specific appropriation of money from the treasury of the commonwealth, shall be proposed by an initiative petition.... ”); Mo. Const, art. 3, § 51 (“The initiative shall not be used for the appropriation of money other than of new revenues created and provided for thereby....”); Mont.Const. art. 3, § 4 (“The people may enact laws by initiative on all matters except appropriations of money .... ”); Nev.Const. art. XIX, § 6 (“This article does not permit the proposal of any statute or statutory amendment which makes an appropriation or otherwise requires the expenditure of money, unless such statute or amendment also ... provides for raising the necessary revenue.”); Wyo.Const. art. 3 § 52(g) (“The initiative shall not be used to ... make or repeal appropriations. ...”).

. One may wonder how the plurality would have the court go about deciding in the future the “fiscal responsibility” of such political issues as “deficit spending,” issuance of municipal bonds, etc., in determining whether they would conform with “responsible fiscal management.” The plurality view would be a judicial boomerang. This is not the court’s business. It has all it can manage to decide litiga-ble issues before it on the factual records presented.

. I find it curious that in commenting on this dissent, the plurality opinion states:
By focusing almost entirely on [the issue of this case] ... our dissenting colleagues oversimplify this case and mislead the public.
We are obviously at odds on this point, but I am under the impression that the first duty of any court is to decide the issue being litigated before it.

.To get there, the plurality engages in a bit of legerdemain so as to reach the conclusion that “opposing” a law appropriating funds is the same as “proposing” one. This feat is necessary so as to bring the instant initiative, which seeks to deauthorize a project, into the plurality interpretation of the “laws appropriating funds” exception.

. Interestingly, at no time in his statement opposing the Mason Amendment [R. CA 8368-79 at 39, Pl.Ex.E at 31-35] did Chairman Dixon even suggest that he viewed the Convention Center initiative as contrary to the Charter Amendments because it proposed a “law appropriating funds.” Rather, Dixon’s only complaint was that the Mason Amendment operated in an ex post facto manner by excusing the Convention Center petition’s failure to comport strictly with the procedures to be set up by the Initiative Referendum and Recall Procedures Act. He also made no secret of his view that the Convention Center initiative was an attempt by a minority to subvert the will of the people as expressed in the Council’s decision to build the Convention Center.
CHAIRMAN DIXON: * * * [I]t should also be pointed out that this Council has acted in this area of the Convention Center. It has acted in the area of the Convention Center. It took a stand and a position with community involvement. I think that, again, to go back and to open this up now through this process without full participation of other groups in the community in terms of the whole initiative, referendum, and recall process isn’t appropriate at this time, and this amendment would allow that to occur. [R. CA 8368-79 at 39, Pl.Ex.E at 34-35 (emphasis added).]
Councilmember John Ray pointed out the obvious discrepancy between Dixon’s view and the purpose of the Charter Amendments:
MR. RAY: Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say, I think there is no better way to have full community -participation than allowing the citizens to vote on the matter. I think I agree, the issue has been discussed a lot and I certainly have given it a lot of consideration. I think that we all would have to admit that it has been handled in somewhat of a shoddy way.
We talk about cost and what may happen, but suppose we got along to where we were half finished on the Convention Center in 1980 and it did go to referendum [sic] and the voters decided that [they] didn’t want a Convention Center? Then, we would be in a fix.
It seems to me that we have sort of reached a point in this issue that the best way for all of us to go forward and have peace is to let the voters tell us whether they want this or not. And, I think there is no better way, no better way than to let the voters ... say “yea” or “nay.”
I support the amendment, and I hope my colleagues will also vote for it. [R. CA 8368-79 at 39, Pl.Ex.E at 35-36 (emphasis added).]
I think it is interesting to note that no one attempted to disabuse Councilmember Ray of his notion that the Charter Amendments would permit the voters to challenge the Convention Center even when it was half finished.

. See statement of Senator Leahy, supra at 921-922.

. A Council enactment concededly cannot repeal or substantially amend a Charter (constitutional) provision.

. See editorial at note 3, supra.

. In a similar context a local commentator recently had this to say:
The only argument .... is that D.C. Citizens shouldn’t have the right to vote because of [what] they might vote for .... But that’s an immoral argument, and everybody using it knows it is immoral to deny the franchise because of how it might be exercised. Besides, it is unconstitutional.... ” [Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., The D.C. Amendment Can Be Saved, The Washington Post, Aug. 22, 1980, § A, at 23.]

. Neither opinion has precedential authority. These two opinions follow different courses and agree only on a judgment of affirmance.

. MR. BARRY: Mr. Chairman, what happens if it happens — if the initiative has fiscal implications? Suppose that someone wants to draw up a bill which provides for the hiring of the unemployed or say two thousand of them or three thousand of them and it has a fiscal implication of four or $5 million? How is that handled in this bill?
I’ve been reading it and 1 can’t figure out how the fiscal impact is handled, particularly, since the committees which would review the initiative are not the Appropriations Committee, but I assume it would be the House District Committee and the Senate District Committee.
How then would the fiscal process be handled? I mean, would the District government be compelled to spend $10 million or $5 million on a measure just as when we bring a bill to the floor of the Council we have to, at least, estimate what the fiscal impact will be or try to figure out what it will not be. Is that answered in this legislation? [R. CA 8368-79 at 37, Pl.Ex.B at 9010.]

. MR. FRENCH: Yes, to this extent, the act as a normal Council act would be used as an authorization act.
It seems to me there are some serious public education problems involved on this precise issue. But if there are no funds — in other words, it’s not an appropriation act, obviously.
So if it’s, just for example, the Latino Community Development Act of this committee recommended with a figure of $200,000 in it, when it got to the Hill, the Hill said, “Good Luck, because we’re only going to get $50,-000 in terms of the actual appropriation.” That would be the same case here. In other words, this is just like the Council saying that we direct that all x, y and z be done. But there is not money to do it — x, y and z are not done.
The problem is that there are serious public education problems here because it seems to me in terms of — a proponent of an initiative measure may very well believe that the measure will, in fact, provide, kind of ipso facto, the funding for it. But that requires an appropriation act, which under the Charter requires a different process. [R. CA 8368-79 at 37, Pl.Ex.B at 10-11.]

. MR. BARRY: Mr. Chairman, I’m for the initiative — you know, the bill here, but I want to make sure that persons who would initiate this situation, once it’s passed, don’t then think, automatically, if there is a fiscal impact, that there is money ready and then they blame us or somebody for not providing the money. I mean, I could be, for what they want.
MR. HOBSON: One thing about that, Marion, anybody providing an initiative or referendum, they write that in just like we do on the Council. In other words, they have to take into consideration the fiscal impact. And it becomes law just like if the City Council passes it.
MR. BARRY: I was just saying, with us, even if we put some money in a bill authorizing it, if it is not a part of the regular budget, then it just doesn’t get funded. And I could give several examples.
And I just wanted to make sure we knew that there is another process which has to be followed. That doesn’t mean that you can’t eventually get the money, either through reprogramming or through it being included in the regular budget someway or another. But that was my concern. [R. CA 8368-79 at 37, Pl.Ex.B at 11.]

.MR. DIXON: Plus, if you put a dollar impact on the referendum, the vote — the ballot, you’re going to end up making people think they are tying into a money figure when they really aren’t. It’s still up to the Congress to appropriate and the Council to set aside.
I think it is going to require some rather sophisticated information out in the community. I think it’s a useful piece in that regard, in that it would allow the electorate to become a lot more sophisticated, particularly if they use the vehicle in terms of what goes on — what goes on downtown and what goes on in the legislative process. [R. CA 8368-79 at 37, Pl.Ex.B at 12-13.]

. The precise effects of a repealer initiative and a referendum are, of course, not the same. The mere proposal of a referendum measure acts to suspend the targeted act of the Council before implementation; if the Council action is disapproved by the electorate upon referral, it will never be enacted. An initiative, on the other hand, may repeal an already operable statute only from the time of approval of the initiative proposal. Where it is a capital project being attacked, however, the practical effects of the two modes of attack are the same: the project does not go forward. See discussion infra.

. Notwithstanding Barry’s comments, I think only a tortured reading would lead to a conclusion that the initiative may not be used to enact changes in tax and general appropriation stat*934utes, subject matters expressly excepted only from the referendum right. This problem has been addressed by other jurisdictions, see, e.g., State ex rel. Boyer v. Grady, 201 Neb. 360, 269 N.W.2d 73 (1978) and cases cited therein, but is not before us today.

. I question whether the plurality’s emphasis at page 911 on the phrase “or as related to” in Dixon’s statement, and the phrase “relating to” • in District Delegate Fauntroy’s statement, proves much of anything. It seems to me this language is as likely attributable to an unintentional imprecision as to the intentional description of the exception’s “effect in broad terms” argued for by the plurality, see Plur. Op. at 911 and is of no significance. The relevance of Delegate Fauntroy’s total remarks is dubious inasmuch as he was not a member of the Council at any time here material and accordingly cannot be regarded as expressing legislative intent.

. MR. SPAULDING: Question. Is this amendment intended to deal with the fiscal impact of a particular piece of legislation that is offered to referendum?
MR. DIXON: No, it is not.
MR. SPAULDING: Well then, at some point in the Bill do you address whether or not it can be a fiscal impact or whether that is a consideration or not under the provisions of the Legislation.
*935MR. DIXON: It is possible, for example, that the initiative could put in place a structure or could cause an action by the government that would have fiscal impact, just like we as Councilmembers can introduce legislation to establish structures — [R. CA 8368-79 at 134, Def.Ex. L-l at 20-21.]

. Councilmember Wilson made clear that he was directly concerned with the requirements of the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1976). See also D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 47-228.

. MR. CLARKE: * * * [I]s there any way to require that if there be a fiscal effect, because it appears there is capability for the public to force the expenditure by mandatory language, that they also have in it a piece which is revenue raising sufficient to meet the expenditure?
MR. DIXON: In the initiative they could, in fact, include—
MR. CLARKE: Is there any reason to require it?
MR. DIXON: This is consistent with the legislation all over the country. There is no neutral official that we can look to to make the determination of the cost of a measure.
MR. CLARKE: Is there any way the court could do it?
MR. DIXON: I am sure the court could, but there is no neutral official to make the determination as to what the cost of the measure would be prior to coming to the Council. ■
MR. CLARKE: May I proceed? If a bill was put through and it cost $1 million and a piece were put through to raise the sales tax by half a percent and it only raised $500— and then the city didn’t do whatever the bill required to be used, couldn’t that be a judicial issue in the court? Could the court be in a process to determine the adequacy of the taxing portion of the bill that was passed?
MR. DIXON: The answer is yes. Just like they can do now. They can take us to the court now.
They [can] set up things that they don’t have any money for. [R. CA 8368-79 at 134, Def.Ex. L-l at 28-29.]

. MR. TUCKER: * * * The question is really one of are there any limits — to what they might offer in terms of fiscal impact? If the electorate decides they thought their actions were such that they don’t care what it cost and they so voted, then that becomes law.
MR. DIXON: It is the same process, Mr. Chairman. If we were to put in place a massive structure to establish an agency that was a massive structure and it would have had an impact on us fiscally, then we would have to fund this process and we would have to fund half the legislation we put in place during the normal taxation and funding process.
The community can do the same thing, if they felt they wanted a structure. They would set it in motion and put it in place. We would have to vote for tax and money for that. [R. CA 8369-79 at 134, Def.Ex. L-l at 22-22.]

. The Council recognized, however, that the exercise of its power to forestall the actual implementation of an initiative measure in this way would not be immune from popular challenge. The Council was sensitive to the possible political repercussions which a decision not to appropriate would have, for the Charter Amendments gave the electorate the right, not only to make law themselves, but to recall their elected lawmakers. [R. CA 8368-79 at 134; Def.Ex. L-l at 32-33.]