Court Opinion

ID: 9408714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 15:10:06.866645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:45.576914
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Borough of Brookhaven                      :
                                           :
      v.                                   : No. 761 C.D. 2022
                                           :
Maria Carman and Bohdan Carman             :
                                           :
Appeal of: George John Carman              : Submitted: April 6, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE CEISLER                                                   FILED: July 13, 2023

      Appellant George John Carman (George Carman) appeals from the Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County’s (Common Pleas) April 18, 2022 order
(Order), through which Common Pleas denied George Carman’s Petition to
Intervene Nunc Pro Tunc (Petition to Intervene). After thorough review, we vacate
Common Pleas’ Order and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
                                      I. Background
      On September 17, 2019, Appellee Borough of Brookhaven (Borough), acting
pursuant to the Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship Act (Blight Act),1
filed a Petition to Appoint a Conservator (Conservatorship Petition) regarding a
property located at 4209-4213 Edgmont Avenue in the Borough (Carman Property),
on the professed basis that the Carman Property had not been properly maintained
and had become blighted as a result. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a-47a. Therein,

      1
          Act of November 26, 2008, P.L. 1672, as amended, 68 P.S. §§ 1101-1111.
the Borough claimed that the Carman Property was owned by Maria Carman and
Bohdan Carman.2 Id. at 5a. Among other items, the Conservatorship Petition
contains a deed, dated April 6, 1990, which conveyed a property from “Simon
Carman and Maria Carman, his wife[;] Bohdan Carman[;] and George Carman” to
Maria and Bohdan. See id. at 15a-21a. Maria and Simon were married, but are now
deceased. See R.R. at 15a; Common Pleas Order, 4/18/22, at 7-8. Bohdan and
George are their sons. See R.R. at 15a.
       This deed does not offer an address for the property to which it relates, but
contains the following description of that property’s metes and bounds, as well as of
its ownership history:
               ALL THAT CERTAIN parcel of ground, SITUATE in the
               Borough . . . , County of Delaware and Commonwealth of
               Pennsylvania, described according to a Plan of property of
               Simon Carman, prepared by G.D. Houtman & Son, Civil
               Engineers and Land Surveyors, dated December 8th,
               1960, and last revised August 10th, 1978, as follows, to
               wit:
               BEGINNING at a point in the title line at or near the center
               line of Brookhaven Road (Thirty-three feet wide) the said
               point being Two Hundred Sixty-Five and Thirty-One
               hundredths feet North Forty-four degrees Thirty-nine
               minutes Forty seconds East from the point of intersection
               of the center line of Brookhaven Road with the centerline
               of Edgemont Avenue; thence from the said point of
               beginning and along the title line at or near the centerline
               of Brookhaven Road North Forty-four degrees Thirty-nine
               minutes Forty seconds East Seventy and Seventy-eight
               One-hundredths feet to a point; thence leaving
               Brookhaven Road and along Lot No. 2 South Forty-three
               degrees Thirty-seven minutes Forty-four seconds East

       2
         Bohdan and Maria Carman neglected to file a brief in this matter, in contravention of the
briefing schedule, as well as of this Court’s February 1, 2023 order that directed them to correct
this oversight no later than February 15, 2023. As a consequence, we precluded them from doing
so on March 21, 2023.

                                                2
             Three Hundred Fifty-one and Eighty-three One-
             hundredths feet to a point; thence South Fifty-two degrees
             Thirty-five minutes Forty seconds West Fifty-four and
             Eighty One-hundredths feet to a pipe; thence North Forty-
             six degrees Twenty minutes Twenty seconds West Three
             Hundred Forty-four and Sixteen One-hundredths feet to
             the first mentioned point and place of beginning.
             BEING FOLIO NO.: 05-00-00099-01
             BEING the same premises which James E. Cooke and
             Christine Carman, by deed dated January 2, 1981[,] and
             recorded in Delaware County in the Office for the
             Recording of Deeds, in Deed Book #2769 page 295 &c.,
             granted and conveyed unto Simon Carman, Maria
             Carman, Bohdan Carman[,] and George Carman, as joint
             tenants with the right of survivorship, in fee.
             AND the said George Carman is also known as George
             John Carman.
See id. at 16a. Also attached thereto is a title search report, dated August 16, 2019.
Id. at 22a. This report includes the following relevant information:
             Property Owned By: Simon Carman and Maria Carman,
             his wife; George John Carman; and Bohdan Carman
             Description: 4209-4213 Edgemont Avenue, . . . Borough,
             Delaware County, PA
             Date of Deed: 7/11/1975         Recorded: 1/12/1976
             Grantor: Simon Carman and Maria Carman, his wife
             Book: 2558               Page: 991
             ....
             Parcel Number: 05-00-00377-00
             ....
             Notes: Plan of Edgmont Villas, recorded in book 398 page
             624
             Chain of Title: Simon Carman and Maria Carman, his
             wife[,] and Bohdan Carman[,] to Simon Carman and
             Maria Carman, his wife, recorded 12/19/1975 in book
             2557 page 452 for $1.00.[]

                                          3
             George Hionis and Irene Hionis, his wife[,] to Simon
             Carman and Maria Carman, his wife, recorded 6/20/1974
             in book 2506 page 344 for $1.00.
             Robert A. Platt, widower[,] to George Hionis and Irene
             Hionis, his wife, recorded 1/14/1971 in book 2389 page
             984 for $35,000.00.
             Robert A. Platt[,] also known as Robert Ammon Platt, and
             Cecilia R. Platt, his wife[,] to Robert A. Platt and Cecilia
             R. Platt, his wife, recorded 5/19/1958 in book 1905 page
             526 [f]or $1.00.
             Cover Date: 4/24/1958 to 7/15/2019
Id. at 22a (emphasis added). The attached deed’s folio/parcel number, as well as its
book and page numbers, do not match those contained in the title report for the
Carman Property. Compare id., with id. at 16a. Thus, the attached deed does not
pertain to the Carman Property, but rather to another, entirely separate parcel of land.
However, the title report establishes that, as of July 15, 2019, the Carman Property
was jointly owned by all of the Carmans. See id. at 15a-22a. Despite this clear
discrepancy, the Borough subsequently served Maria and Bohdan with the
Conservatorship Petition and posted notices at the Carman Property, but did not
serve George or Simon. See Common Pleas Order, 4/18/22, at 2, n.3.
      Common Pleas then held a hearing on October 9, 2019, and, acting that same
day, issued an order through which it both granted the Conservatorship Petition and
appointed Bastogne Development Partners, LLC (Bastogne) as the Property’s
conservator. R.R. at 59a-60a. On November 12, 2019, Common Pleas approved
Bastogne’s blight abatement plan for the Carman Property. Id. at 68a. Thereafter, on
February 12, 2020, Bastogne filed an additional motion, through which it requested
that Common Pleas permit it to list the Carman Property for sale through a private
real estate broker (Sale Motion). Id. at 69a-91a. Common Pleas then held a second
hearing on March 2, 2020, at which Bohdan Carman appeared pro se in opposition

                                           4
to the Sale Motion. Id. at 95a. On May 8, 2020, Common Pleas granted the Sale
Motion. Id. at 93a-100a. Bastogne subsequently sold the Carman Property and, on
October 23, 2020, Common Pleas granted Bastogne’s Motion to Terminate
Conservatorship. See id. at 102a-117a. The matter was then administratively marked
as closed. See Common Pleas Order, 4/18/22, at 1.
      Nearly a year later, George Carman filed his Petition to Intervene. Therein, he
claimed that the deed that the Borough had included with its Conservatorship
Petition was for a different property and that the Carman Property had, in actuality,
been jointly owned by him, along with his parents Maria and Simon and brother
Bohdan, without interruption, starting in 1975. See R.R. at 122a-23a, 132a-35a. In
support of this claim, George Carman provided a property deed, dated July 11, 1975,
which memorialized the transfer on that date of a property from “Simon Carman and
Maria Carman, his wife” to Bohdan, George, Maria, and Simon. See id. at 132a.
Additionally, this deed contains the following metes-and-bounds description and
ownership history:
             ALL THOSE TWO CERTAIN lots or pieces of land with
             the buildings and improvements thereon erected,
             SITUATE in the Borough . . . , County of Delaware and
             State [sic] of Pennsylvania; and designated as Lots Nos.
             13 and 14, in Block “A,” on Plan of Edgmont Villas, as
             recorded in the Office for the Recording of Deeds in and
             for the County of Delaware, State [sic] of Pennsylvania, in
             Deed Book No. 398 page 624, and bounded and described
             as follows:
             BEGINNING at a point on the Northeasterly side of
             Edgmont Avenue Northwestwardly from Ridge
             Boulevard, CONTAINING in front measured
             Northwestwardly along Edgmont Avenue 40 feet and
             extending in length or depth Northeastwardly between
             parallel lines at right angles to said Edgmont Avenue 110
             feet to lands now or late of Charles McCall and on the
             Southeast by lands now or late of Jennie DeAugustire.

                                         5
             ALSO ALL THAT CERTAIN lot or piece of land
             SITUATE in the Borough . . . , County of Delaware and
             State [sic] of Pennsylvania; and designated as Lots 10, 11,
             and 12, in Block “A,” Edgmont Villas, as recorded in Deed
             Book No. 398 page 624. Being at a point on the Northwest
             side of Edgmont Avenue Northwest from Ridge
             Boulevard, a corner of lands of Delaware County Trust
             Company.
             CONTAINING in front along the Northeast side of
             Edgmont Avenue Northwest 60 feet and extending in
             depth Northeast between parallel lines 110 feet to lands
             now or late of Conrad Matern, et al. Bounded on the
             Northwest by lands of Morris Schwartz.
             BEING the same premises which Simon Carman and
             Maria Carman, his wife, and Bohdan Carman, by Deed
             date July __, 1975[,] and intended to be forthwith recorded
             in Delaware County, conveyed until Simon Carman and
             Maria Carman, his wife.
Id. at 132a-33a. This description is entirely different than the one contained in the
deed attached to the Conservatorship Petition. Compare id., with id. at 16a.
Furthermore, although this deed does not offer an address for the property to which
it pertains, the information contained therein matches the description of the Carman
Property provided in the Conservatorship Petition’s title report. Compare id. at 22a,
with id. at 132a-33a. George Carman alleged that the Borough had failed to
recognize that it had mistakenly relied upon the wrong deed and, as a consequence,
had neglected to serve him with the Conservatorship Petition or otherwise notify him
regarding the attendant proceedings, in contravention of the Blight Act’s
requirements. Id. at 123a-24a. This left him in the dark until he realized what had
transpired “upon a search of the public tax records in late April 2021.” Id. at 126a.
He maintained that the Borough’s failure to provide him with notice prevented him
from involving himself in the proceedings, seeking to terminate Bastogne’s
conservatorship, and retaining control of the Carman Property. Id. at 123a-25a. As

                                         6
such, he requested that Common Pleas act pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 5505 to “rescind
[the] final orders”3 that it had issued and, in addition, allow him to intervene in the
matter nunc pro tunc, so that he could “avail himself of all the statutory remedies to
terminate the conservatorship and retain his interest in the [Carman] Property.” Id.
at 126a-30a. Common Pleas elected not to hold oral argument regarding George
Carman’s Petition to Intervene and instead denied it outright on April 18, 2022,
prompting him to appeal that ruling shortly thereafter.
                                         II. Discussion
       On appeal,4 George Carman asserts what amounts to a single argument,
namely that Common Pleas erred and abused its discretion by denying his Petition
to Intervene, because it is apparent on the face of the record that he was deprived of
his interest in the Carman Property without being afforded legally adequate notice.
George Carman’s Br. at 9-18. We agree.
       Section 4(d) of the Blight Act imposes the following notice-related duties
upon any party who seeks the appointment of a conservator for an allegedly blighted
property:
               (1) Upon filing the petition with the court, the petitioner
               shall notify the current owner of the property, all political
               subdivisions in which the property is located, all municipal
       3
         Specifically, he sought rescission of the orders that granted the Conservatorship Petition
and appointed Bastogne as conservator of the Carman Property, as well as those approving
Bastogne’s blight abatement plan, Sale Motion, and Motion to Terminate Conservatorship. See
R.R. at 119a.

       4
          Our standard of review regarding conservatorship petitions is limited to determining
whether a court of common pleas abused its discretion or committed an error of law necessary to
the outcome of the case. In re Conservatorship Proceeding In Rem by Germantown Conservancy,
Inc., 995 A.2d 451, 459 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Similarly, we review a lower tribunal’s
disposition of a petition to intervene only for abuses of discretion or errors of law. Wexford Sci. &
Tech., LLC v. City of Pittsburgh Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 260 A.3d 316, 320 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2021).

                                                 7
               authorities known to have provided service to the property
               and all lienholders of the filing by registered or certified
               mail to the last known address of each and by posting a
               copy of the notice on the building.
               (2) In the event the registered or certified mail is returned
               with notation by the postal authorities that the recipient
               refused to accept the mail, the petitioner may mail a copy
               to the recipient at the same address by ordinary mail with
               the return address of the petitioner appearing thereon.
               (3) Service by ordinary mail shall be presumed complete
               if the mail is not returned to the petitioner within 30 days
               after mailing.
               (4) In the event that the registered or certified mail is
               returned with the notation by the postal authorities that it
               was unclaimed, the notice shall be personally served.
               (5) In the event that the personal service is not able to be
               made after two such attempts, then the petitioner shall mail
               the petition to the recipient at the same address by ordinary
               mail with the return address of the petitioner appearing
               thereon with service by ordinary mail deemed complete if
               the mail is not returned to the petitioner within 15 days
               after the mailing.
               (6) The petitioner shall also notify the owner and each
               lienholder of the hearing date and provide notice that the
               owner and lienholders may petition to intervene in the
               action.
68 P.S. § 1104(d).5 Continuing on, Section 5 of the Blight Act provides additional
guidance regarding adjudication of such a petition, providing, in relevant part:
               (a) General rule.--The court shall act upon a petition
               submitted by holding a hearing within 60 days of receipt
               of the petition and by rendering a decision no later than 30
               days after completion of the hearing.

       5
         Section 3 of the Blight Act defines “Owner” as “[t]he holder or holders of title to, or of a
legal or equitable interest in, a residential, commercial or industrial building. The term shall
include an heir, assignee, trustee, beneficiary and lessee provided the ownership interest is a matter
of public record.” 68 P.S. § 1103. It also states that the phrase “Party in interest,” as used in the
Blight Act, includes “[t]he owner.” Id.

                                                  8
               (b) Intervention.--A party in interest may intervene in the
               proceeding and be heard with respect to the petition, the
               requested relief or any other matter which may come
               before the court in connection with the proceeding.
               (c) Hearing.--At the hearing, any party in interest shall be
               permitted to present evidence to support or contest the
               petition, including, but not limited to, the schedule of
               encumbrances.
Id. § 1105(a)-(c).6
         The Blight Act’s intervention provisions dovetail with those of Pennsylvania
Rule of Civil Procedure 2327, which pertinently states:
               At any time during the pendency of an action, a person not
               a party thereto shall be permitted to intervene therein,
               subject to these rules if
               ....
               (4) the determination of such action may affect any legally
               enforceable interest of such person whether or not such
               person may be bound by a judgment in the action.
Pa. R.Civ.P. 2327. A person who wishes to intervene must do so by petitioning the
court:
               (a) Application for leave to intervene shall be made by a
               petition in the form of and verified in the manner of a
               plaintiff’s initial pleading in a civil action, setting forth the
               ground on which intervention is sought and a statement of

         6
          Also of note are several other requirements imposed by the Blight Act. The conservator
of a blighted property is obligated to create a final abatement plan, submit it for the court’s
consideration, and serve it upon “all parties to the action.” Section 6(b)(3), (c)(2) of the Blight Act,
68 P.S. § 1106(b)(3), (c)(2). The court must then consider the final abatement plan at a hearing
and allow “all parties” to appear and offer comments and critiques, which the court must “take . .
. into consideration when assessing the feasibility of the plan and the proposed financing.” Id. §
1106(c)(1)-(c)(5). Thereafter, the court may only grant the conservator’s request to sell the
property if it concludes, in relevant part, that “[n]otice and an opportunity to provide comment to
the court was given to each record owner of the property and each lienholder.” Section 9(b)-(b)(1)
of the Blight Act, 68 P.S. § 1109(b)-(b)(1). Finally, the court may terminate the conservatorship
only “[u]pon request of a party in interest or the conservator.” Section 10 of the Blight Act, 68 P.S.
§ 1110.

                                                   9
             the relief or the defense which the petitioner desires to
             demand or assert. The petitioner shall attach to the petition
             a copy of any pleading which the petitioner will file in the
             action if permitted to intervene or shall state in the petition
             that the petitioner adopts by reference in whole or in part
             certain named pleadings or parts of pleadings already filed
             in the action.
             (b) A copy of the petition shall be served upon each party
             to the action.
Pa. R.Civ.P. 2328.
      In most situations, the court must then hold a hearing in order to determine
whether it is proper to allow intervention to occur. Pa. R.Civ.P. 2329.
             [A] petition to intervene cannot properly be denied
             without a hearing. Phila[. Facs. Mgmt.] Corp. v. Beister, .
             . . 408 A.2d 1095 ([Pa.] 1979); Hayes v. [Sch. Dist.] of
             Pittsburgh, . . . 381 A.2d 193 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1977). The
             reason for requiring a hearing is clear: to give the
             petitioner the opportunity to establish, factually, “that he
             comes within one of the four categories of persons who are
             entitled to intervene under Pa. [R.Civ.P.] 2327.” Hayes;
             see Philadelphia [Facs. Mgmt.] Corp. However, the
             question of whether a person comes within one of those
             categories is irrelevant, if the action in which he seeks to
             intervene ceased to be pending prior to the filing of his
             petition. Pa. [R.Civ.P.] 2327 permits intervention only
             “during the pendency of an action.” Robinson [Twp. Sch.
             Dist.] v. Houghton, . . . 128 A.2d 58 ([Pa.] 1956); Groff v.
             [Twp.] of Ulster, . . . 442 A.2d 1255 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1982).
             Therefore, if an action is no longer pending, a court [has]
             no power to permit intervention[,] and[] a hearing on the
             petition would be a futile exercise.
Santangelo Hauling, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., 479 A.2d 88, 89 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).
The general rule is thus that a court may permit intervention only in those cases
which are still active.

                                           10
       In a similar vein, Section 5505 of the Judicial Code7 “restricts the power of
the courts to amend, modify[,] or vacate final orders to 30 days from the date the
order is entered.” Ainsworth v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 807
A.2d 933, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Once a court issues a final order in a given case,
and the appeal window then closes without further challenge, that court lacks
jurisdiction to revisit any of the decisions it had made in that matter. 42 Pa. C.S. §
5505. In other words, a final order, combined with the absence of a timely appeal,
closes the metaphorical book on the overarching case.
       These rules are not ironclad, however, as they “may be disregarded . . . if fraud
or other equitable considerations require[] the granting of such relief.” Gasbarini’s
Est. v. Med. Ctr. of Beaver Cnty., Inc., Rochester Div., 409 A.2d 343, 345 (Pa. 1979);
42 Pa. C.S. § 5504 (the jurisdictional 30-day window may be extended in civil
matters where necessary “to relieve fraud or its equivalent”). Such equitable
considerations exist only where the “circumstance[s] [are] so grave or compelling as
to constitute ‘extraordinary cause’ which justifies court intervention.” Lowery v. E.
Pikeland Twp., 599 A.2d 271, 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991); accord M.J.M. Fin. Servs.,
Inc. v. Burgess by Dignazio, 533 A.2d 1092, 1094 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (“A [petition]
to intervene after entry of a decree should be denied except in extraordinary
circumstances.”).
               “Extraordinary cause [or circumstances]” refers to an
               oversight or action on the part of the court or the judicial
               process which operates to deny the losing party knowledge
               of the entry of final judgment so that the commencement
               of the running of the appeal time is not known to the losing
               party.
       7
         Per Section 5505 of the Judicial Code: “Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by
law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its
entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such order has
been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 5505.

                                                11
Pendle Hill v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Nether Providence Twp., 134 A.3d 1187, 1202
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co. v. Greenville
Gastroenterology, SC, 108 A.3d 913, 919 (Pa. Super. 2015)). “[T]he extraordinary
circumstances to be reviewed cannot pertain to the merits or the substantive defense
the intervenor seeks to litigate. . . . Rather, it is the circumstances proffered to excuse
the untimely filing that must be scrutinized.” Id. at 1197 (internal citation omitted).
Where such extraordinary circumstances are found to exist, a court may “rescind or
modify its order beyond the generally applicable 30-day period.” Id. at 1203.
       In this instance, Common Pleas made several errors along the way to denying
the Petition to Intervene. First, it concluded that there was no proof that “an oversight
or action on the part of the court or judicial process” had deprived George Carman
of notice regarding the conservatorship proceedings and, thus, that the requisite
extraordinary circumstances did not exist. Common Pleas Order, 4/18/22, at 10-11.
This is manifestly incorrect. As recounted above, the Borough did not serve George
Carman with the Conservatorship Petition, or consider him to be a party in interest,
despite the fact that the evidence attached thereto showed both that he was an owner
of the Carman Property and that the deed proffered by the Borough was for a separate
parcel of land. See R.R. at 15a-22a. This oversight was compounded by Common
Pleas’ failure to recognize the Borough’s error. We agree with Common Pleas that
it had no responsibility to “don[] a deerstalker hat when the initial [Conservatorship]
Petition was filed to suss out whether the parties named therein were the correct
parties to the action.” See Common Pleas Order, 4/18/22, at 6. Indeed, as Common
Pleas intimates through this reference, the lower tribunal was not required to act like
one of English literature’s most famous detectives when determining which
individuals held an interest in the Carman Property. However, one need not possess

                                            12
Holmesian powers of deductive reasoning, or his signature headgear, to figure out
that the Conservatorship Petition’s deed and title report do not pertain to the same
property, or that George Carman was a joint owner of the Carman Property at the
time of the Conservatorship Petition’s filing. Second, Common Pleas maintained
that “counsel’s errors,” insofar as they allegedly deprived George Carman of notice
about the conservatorship proceedings, would not qualify under the law as
extraordinary circumstances that would justify revisiting its rulings in this matter.
See id. at 11. Common Pleas, however, did not identify the specific “counsel” to
which it imputed those errors. See id. Regardless, our case law makes clear that only
“[t]he mistake or neglect of the attorney for the party [who claims that extraordinary
circumstances exist cannot constitute] sufficient ground[s] for relief.” Wise v.
Borough of Cambridge Springs, 104 A. 863, 864 (Pa. 1918) (quoting Singer v. Del.,
Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 98 A. 1059, 1060 (Pa. 1916)); accord Gasbarini’s Est.,
409 A.2d at 345. Given that George Carman was wholly uninvolved in this matter
until he filed his Petition to Intervene, any of the “counsel’s errors” to which
Common Pleas may have been referring cannot constitute an impediment to the
relief he now seeks. Finally, Common Pleas took issue with George Carman’s desire
“to undo the entire proceeding,” apparently reasoning that even if extraordinary
circumstances existed, they would only enable him to appeal Common Pleas’ orders
nunc pro tunc, or have Common Pleas reconsider its order terminating the
conservatorship, rather than have Common Pleas revisit all of the rulings he wishes
to challenge. See id. at 5-6. This is a fundamental misinterpretation of the law, for,
as already noted, courts retain jurisdiction to “rescind or modify [a final] order
beyond the generally applicable 30-day period” where extraordinary circumstances
justify taking such action. Pendle Hill, 134 A.3d at 1202. To the extent that such

                                         13
rescission or modification eliminates such an order’s finality, it would open a path
for a court to take a second look at any other order it issued in that matter. As we
have explained in the past:
              A trial court possesses the inherent power to reconsider its
              own rulings. D’Elia v. Folino, 933 A.2d 117 (Pa. Super.
              2007). Section 5505 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §
              5505, provides a court may modify or rescind any order
              within 30 days after its entry if no appeal from such order
              has been taken or allowed. However, this restriction
              pertains to final, appealable orders, not interlocutory
              orders. Com[.] v. James, 69 A.3d 180 (Pa. Super. 2013).
              Although a trial court’s authority to amend a final order
              expires 30 days after its entry, a trial court may modify an
              interlocutory order after the expiration of 30 days. Id.;
              Fernandez v. City of Pittsburgh, 643 A.2d 1176 (Pa.
              Cmwlth. 1994) (trial court empowered to grant
              reconsideration of an interlocutory order at any time prior
              to its final disposition of the matter).
              “Where an order does not effectively place the litigant out
              of court or end the lawsuit, it is within the trial court’s
              discretion to entertain a motion to reconsider the
              interlocutory order outside the 30-day time limit. . . .”
              Hutchison v. Luddy, 611 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. Super.
              1992).
Mustafa v. Riscigno (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 76 C.D. 2013, filed Dec. 19, 2013), slip op.
at 8-9, 2013 WL 6730779, at *4 (emphasis in original).8 Consequently, it is
unmistakably evident that Common Pleas abused its discretion and committed errors
of law when it denied George Carman’s Petition to Intervene.
       That having been said, we are not certain at this point that the Petition to
Intervene must instead be granted. It is well settled that:
              [T]he [trial] court may deny intervention if, inter alia, “the
              petitioner has unduly delayed in making application for
       8
          Unreported Commonwealth Court opinions issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited
for their persuasive value. See Internal Operating Procedures of the Commonwealth Court Section
414(a), 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a); Pa. R.A.P 126(b).

                                              14
                intervention or the intervention will unduly delay,
                embarrass or prejudice the trial or the adjudication of the
                rights of the parties.” [Pa. R.Civ.P.] 2329(3); Wilson v.
                State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., . . . 517 A.2d 944 ([Pa.]
                1986). . . .
                The question of the timeliness of a petition to intervene is
                one exclusively within the exercise of the trial court’s
                discretion. Templeton Appeal, . . . 159 A.2d 725 ([Pa.]
                1960).
Chairge v. Exeter Borough Zoning Hearing Bd., 616 A.2d 1057, 1059 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1992). In this instance, George Carman admitted that he learned of the Carman
Property’s sale in April 2021, but did not file his Petition to Intervene until roughly
six months later. See R.R. at 126a. This presents a factual issue regarding the
timeliness of the Petition to Intervene, which must be resolved by Common Pleas.
See In re Rowan, 763 A.2d 958, 961 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).
                                     III. Conclusion
          In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we vacate Common Pleas’ April
18, 2022 order and remand this matter to the lower tribunal, with instructions that it
convene a hearing within 30 days, at which time the parties shall be afforded an
opportunity to present evidence and testimony regarding the timeliness of George
Carman’s Petition to Intervene. Common Pleas shall then issue an order adjudicating
the Petition to Intervene, in which it shall make sufficiently detailed factual findings
and legal conclusions, including ones that address the aforementioned timeliness
issue.9

                                       ____________________________
                                       ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this case.

          9
         George Carman may use this opportunity to seek leave from Common Pleas to file an
amended Petition to Intervene that satisfies the requirements imposed upon him by Pennsylvania
Rule of Civil Procedure 2328.
                                             15
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Borough of Brookhaven                 :
                                      :
      v.                              : No. 761 C.D. 2022
                                      :
Maria Carman and Bohdan Carman        :
                                      :
Appeal of: George John Carman         :

                                   ORDER

      AND NOW, this 13th day of July, 2023, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court
of Common Pleas of Delaware County’s (Common Pleas) April 18, 2022 order is
VACATED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is REMANDED to
Common Pleas, with instructions that it convene an evidentiary hearing within 30
days, at which time it shall consider the timeliness of Appellant George John
Carman’s Petition to Intervene, and after which time it shall issue an order
adjudicating the Petition to Intervene, complete with sufficiently detailed factual
findings and legal conclusions.
      Jurisdiction relinquished.

                                        ____________________________
                                        ELLEN CEISLER, Judge