Court Opinion

ID: 9530207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:58:16.679296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:01.872396
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I am unable to agree with the remand of this case. It seems to be based upon what I regard as an unjustified conjecture that the plaintiff Michael D. Muir may have been confused as to his rights when he refused to take the chemical test requested. The main opinion itself correctly states that the question as to whether he was confused and so manifested his confusion to the arresting officer was for the trial court to determine.
It is submitted that any confusion that the plaintiff claims is of his own invention. Moreover, with due deference to the contrary views of my colleagues, it is my considered judgment that the basis for any such confusion (or claim of confusion) and any need for further hearing can only be justified on the view taken by the majority in the recent case of Holman v. Cox.1
In order to spare burdening the printed page with repetition, I refer to and reaffirm my views as set forth in that case as equally applicable to this one in all particulars. My conviction of mind compels me to observe that the results in such cases derive from what I regard as a wholly impractical and unrealistic assumption that any arresting officer and any arrestee for drunk driving must arrive at a clear understanding *387that the arrestee (who likely is drunk) was not confused. It is further my opinion that allowing such defensive machinations to be indulged in by arrestees in these drunk driving cases presents a substantial obstacle to policing drunk driving on our highways and thus adds to the constantly increasing hazards to public safety.2
The significant aspect of this case is the candid and correct acknowledgement in the majority opinion (Paragraph 4 thereof) that:
The court found that the officer had grounds to make the arrest, that the request for submission to a chemical test was properly made, and that it was knowingly refused. [Emphasis added.]
There is competent and credible evidence to support that finding. The arresting officer, Ross Hunt, testified that he explained to plaintiff Muir the difference between the criminal charge, to which the Miranda warning and the rights stated therein applies, as compared to the implied consent law which is civil in nature, with respect to which he did not have the right to remain silent nor to have his lawyer in attendance.
If the prerogative of the trial judge is respected, as it should be, including that he is not obliged to believe the self-serving assertions of the plaintiff, there is ample basis to support his finding that the plaintiff knowingly refused to take the test. Wherefore, this Court should affirm the findings and judgment.

. Utah, 598 P.2d 1331 (1979), which, notwithstanding my dissent therein, in accordance with my judicial duty, I recognize is presently the law of this state.

. Id.; and see e.g. Gassman v. Dorius, Utah, 543 P.2d 197 (1975); Peterson v. Dorius, Utah, 547 P.2d 693 (1976); Hyde v. Dorius, Utah, 549 P.2d 451 (1976).