Court Opinion

ID: 9716628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:46:13.857214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.346374
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
(dissenting). Because I do not agree that the trial court was authorized under the Criminal Procedure Law to order disclosure of the Grand Jury minutes to defendants under the circumstances presented, I dissent and vote to affirm the order of the Appellate Division. Because there (1) was no motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment pending before the court at the time disclosure was ordered, and (2) CPL 210.30 (3) does not permit the release of Grand Jury minutes as an aid to counsel in the preparation of such a motion, court-ordered release of the Grand Jury minutes to defendants was unauthorized.
The facts may be succinctly stated. On October 30, 1997, appellant, an acting Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, arraigned the two defendants in the criminal action underlying this appeal on charges that they had stolen large sums of money from a number of wealthy nursing home patients. Respondent Attorney General charged defendants with grand larceny in the first degree (Penal Law § 155.42), alleging that, in addition to stealing from the nursing home patients, defendants defrauded the New York State Medical Assistance Program (Medicaid) into paying for the victims’ care by misrepresenting the victims’ remaining assets. Although defendants’ attorneys did not file a motion to dismiss at the arraignment, they did indicate to the court their doubts regarding whether respondent had presented sufficient evidence to the Grand Jury to support the full 30-count indictment. In response, the court told both parties that, in accordance with its usual practice, it would sua sponte review the Grand Jury minutes for facial legal sufficiency. Without objection, respondent produced the Grand Jury minutes for purposes of the court’s inspection.
*486Over the next three months, culminating on or about February 4, 1998, the court examined the voluminous Grand Jury minutes and, at an off-the-record bench conference, informed the respective counsels that after a preliminary examination of the minutes, it believed that there had probably been enough evidence before the Grand Jury to support the indictment. Appellant Justice made no stenographic record of this assessment of the evidence and issued no written order encompassing his assessment.
At a subsequent off-the-record conference in appellant’s chambers on March 20, 1998, defense counsel orally requested production of the minutes of the Grand Jury charge underlying count two of the indictment, accusing defendants of grand larceny in the first degree, to aid in the preparation of defendants’ upcoming motions to dismiss. Respondent released the minutes to defense counsel.
During yet another off-the-record conference in appellant’s chambers on May 8, 1998, defense counsel again orally challenged the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at the Grand Jury, particularly with respect to the charge of grand larceny in the first degree. Specifically, the defense questioned respondent’s legal theory supporting the monetary threshold necessary to sustain the first degree grand larceny charge: that defendants’ alleged thefts from the individual patients could be aggregated with the sums billed to Medicaid to arrive at the $1 million threshold amount (see, Penal Law § 155.42). In order to properly address the issue in their upcoming pretrial motions to dismiss, defense counsel requested the relevant testimony in the Grand Jury minutes. Respondent objected and the court reserved its decision. When the parties failed to reach a compromise after several adjournments, the court, on the record (see, CPL 210.30 [5]), and later in writing, directed that respondent provide defendants with the requested portions of the Grand Jury testimony, subject only to his allowing for a request by respondent that any “sensitive information” first be redacted.
Respondent then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division seeking a writ of prohibition to bar enforcement of the court’s order. In its petition, respondent argued (1) that once the court rendered its “preliminary determination” regarding facial legal sufficiency, it no longer had statutory authority to order disclosure of the Grand Jury minutes to defendants, and (2) that the court could order release of the Grand Jury minutes only to assist the court in *487determining if the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient. The Appellate Division, over one dissent, granted the petition, holding that the court’s initial assessment of legal sufficiency was a “determination” within the meaning of CPL 210.30 (3) and, therefore, the court lacked authority to subsequently order disclosure of the Grand Jury minutes to defendants. The Appellate Division majority additionally concluded that disclosure here was not authorized because defendants had not made a written motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment at the time disclosure was ordered. We granted appellant Justice leave to appeal (93 NY2d 813).
In this Court, appellant Justice argues that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that (1) he made a final and binding determination within the meaning of CPL 210.30 that the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient, and (2) a written motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment is required prior to court-ordered disclosure. In order to properly address these arguments, the relevant history of CPL 210.30 must be examined. That examination leads to the conclusion that a defendant’s motion to inspect the Grand Jury minutes, as opposed to a defendant’s motion for the court to make the inspection itself, can be granted only upon a motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment pending before the court. That motion must be in writing (CPL 210.45 [1]).
CPL 210.30 (3) was amended in 1980 (see, L 1980, ch 842, § 1), overruling this Court’s decision in Matter of Jaffe v Scheinman (47 NY2d 188), to create a presumption in favor of granting a defendant’s motion to inspect the Grand Jury minutes of the proceeding which resulted in the indictment. Prior to the amendment of CPL 210.30 (3), courts of this State had, on occasion, granted the accused access to the minutes of the Grand Jury proceeding for the purpose of arguing a motion to dismiss or to reduce the indictment (see, Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 11 A, CPL 210.30, at 64Í). That practice was brought to a halt by the decision of this Court in Matter of Jaffe v Scheinman (47 NY2d 188, supra, affg 66 AD2d 321), which held that a court could not grant a defendant access to the minutes of the Grand Jury proceeding.
Prior to the present subdivision (2), CPL 210.30 (2) authorized only the court to inspect the minutes of the Grand Jury for legal sufficiency. Specifically, that section authorized a defendant to make a motion “requesting the court to examine” the Grand Jury minutes for legal sufficiency. The motion to inspect had to be in writing with the moving papers alleging *488“reasonable cause to believe that the Grand Jury evidence was not legally sufficient.” Subdivision (3) then provided that if the court determined that the evidence may not have been legally sufficient, the court was required to grant the motion to inspect and then determine the motion to dismiss. Chapter 841 of the Laws of 1980 amended CPL 210.30 (2) to permit the defendant (in addition to the court) to examine the minutes. The requirement that the defendant show reasonable cause to believe that the Grand Jury evidence was not legally sufficient was maintained.
Chapter 841 also maintained the requirement that the court make a determination that the evidence before the Grand Jury may have been legally insufficient and, following that determination, grant the motion to inspect the Grand Jury minutes. Chapter 841 also amended CPL 210.30 (3) to provide for disclosure of the Grand Jury minutes to the accused, subject to the prosecutor’s request to deny inspection for good cause.
Chapter 842 of the Laws of 1980 eliminated the requirement of CPL 210.30 (2) that a defendant allege in writing reasonable cause to believe that the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally insufficient. Consistent with this change, CPL 210.30 (3) was also amended to eliminate the requirement that the court determine whether reasonable cause existed to believe that the Grand Jury evidence was insufficient prior to granting a motion to inspect the minutes. The requirement that the court examine the minutes before determining that they should be released to the defendant was maintained, however, as was the ability of the prosecutor to oppose disclosure.
As amended, CPL 210.30 (3) now provides as follows:
“Unless good cause exists to deny the motion to inspect the grand jury minutes, the court must grant the motion. It must then proceed to examine the minutes and to determine the motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment. If the court, after examining the minutes, finds that release of the minutes, or certain portions thereof, to the parties is necessary to assist the court in making its determination on the motion, it may release the minutes or such portions thereof to the parties. Provided, however, such release shall be limited to that grand jury testimony which is relevant to a determination of whether the evidence before the grand jury was legally sufficient to support a charge or charges *489contained in such indictment. Prior to such release the district attorney shall be given an opportunity to present argument to the court that the release of the minutes, or any portion thereof, would not be in the public interest.”
Thus, CPL 210.30 (3) requires a court to grant the motion to inspect unless good cause exists to deny it. However, under the statute, only the court is obligated to review the minutes of the Grand Jury proceeding. The statute reads “it” (the court) must make the examination (CPL 210.30 [3]).
A motion to dismiss or reduce an indictment pursuant to CPL 210.20 “must be made in writing and upon reasonable notice to the people” (CPL 210.45 [1]). There is no authority vested in a trial court to order disclosure of Grand Jury minutes to aid a defendant in determining whether a motion to dismiss should be made and on What grounds. Here, because no written motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment was ever pending before the court, no statutory authority existed to compel disclosure. Although CPL 210.30 (2) defines a motion to inspect as “a motion by a defendant requesting an examination by the court and the defendant,” CPL 210.30 (3), as amended, makes it unambiguously clear that court-ordered release of the Grand Jury minutes is authorized only when a motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment is pending before the court. Only then can release of the Grand Jury minutes to the parties, upon the requisite finding of necessity by the court, accomplish the statutorily prescribed purpose of “assist [ing] the court in making its determination on the motion [to dismiss or reduce the indictment]” (CPL 210.30 [3]). Here, without a motion to dismiss or reduce pending, no finding of necessity could have been made by the court to support court-ordered disclosure. Thus, under the circumstances presented, pursuant to CPL 210.30 (3), the court was authorized only to examine the minutes itself.
This view of the case is further bolstered by the final sentence of CPL 210.30 (3), which provides that “[p]rior to such release [of the Grand Jury minutes] the district attorney shall be given an opportunity to present argument to the court that the release of the minutes, or any portion thereof, would not be in the public interest.” Even more supportive of the conclusion here is the sentence preceding the final sentence, which provides that “such release [of the Grand Jury minutes] shall be limited to that grand jury testimony which is relevant to a determination of whether the evidence before the grand jury *490was legally sufficient” (CPL 210.30 [3]). Without a motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment pending before the court (see, CPL 210.45 [1]), the District Attorney cannot properly argue that release of the Grand Jury minutes, or any portion thereof, is not in the public interest. Moreover, the court cannot properly determine and limit the scope of the release to that portion of the Grand Jury testimony which is relevant to the determination, pursuant to the defendant’s motion, of whether the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient.
Appellate review is made all the more difficult here by the lack of formality, statutory and otherwise, exercised by the court and the parties. Where motions are largely made and decided, and objections lodged thereto, in chambers and off the record, appellate review becomes a most formidable task. At a minimum, the informality exercised here does not comport with the legislatively calibrated scheme of CPL 210.30. Moreover, such informality is particularly misplaced where, as here, the internal secrecy of a Grand Jury proceeding is at stake (see generally, CPL 190.25 [4] [a]; Matter of District Attorney of Suffolk County, 58 NY2d 436, 443 [noting that secrecy has been an integral feature of Grand Jury proceedings since well before the founding of our Nation]). While it may be true that an informal practice has developed in this State with regard to this area of the law where there is no dispute concerning access to the Grand Jury minutes, courts should be vigilant to demand adherence to the formal requirements where the informal practice is opposed. Here, because respondent openly opposed production of the Grand Jury minutes at issue, and thereafter commenced this proceeding to enjoin enforcement of the court-ordered disclosure, defendants should be required to demonstrate their strict compliance with the commands of the Criminal Procedure Law.
This Court has repeatedly held that where the Criminal Procedure Law requires that a motion be made in writing, a failure to move in writing is a waiver of the right (see, People v Lawrence, 64 NY2d 200, 203-204 [defendant waived dismissal on speedy trial grounds by his failure to make a timely, written motion]). Appellant Justice’s argument that a court must be allowed to control its own calendar under the circumstances existing here has been cogently answered by this Court in People v Mezon (80 NY2d 155). There, we stated:
“Contrary to defendant’s present contention, the trial courts are not empowered to dispense with *491CPL 710.60 (l)’s written notice requirement in the exercise of their ‘inherent authority’ to control their own calendars. To the extent that the courts may have some discretion to adjust their procedures in areas involving the ‘inherent nature of the judicial function,’ the courts may not exercise that discretion in a manner that conflicts with existing legislative command. Indeed, we have already held that the trial courts’ inherent power to control their own calendars does not include the power to ‘depart from the clear wording of CPL 170.30.’
“Similarly, whatever ‘inherent authority’ the trial courts may have to regulate motion practice cannot be extended to encompass a judicial decision to abrogate the written notice requirement of CPL 710.60 (1). Accordingly, its prescriptions must be obeyed, and the courts have no authority to vary or override them” (id., at 158-159 [internal citations omitted]).
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, respondent did preserve its argument, made before this Court, that a written motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment is required prior to court-ordered release of the Grand Jury minutes to the accused. This proceeding was brought in the Appellate Division, sitting as a court of original jurisdiction. Respondent’s verified petition and verified reply as filed in the Appellate Division indicate that respondent argued that the court failed to comply with CPL 210.30 (3) and that defendant never filed or served a written motion (see, verified petition ¶¶ 21, 26, 27 [appendix, at 6-7]; verified reply ¶¶ 7 and 9 [appendix, at 70]).* The Appellate Division made a determination of this issue and this Court should not refuse to address it on preservation grounds.
*492In People v Jennings (69 NY2d 103, 113), this Court stated that “under CPL 210.45 (1) a defendant must provide [the People] with written notice of and a reasonable opportunity to respond to a motion to inspect and dismiss an indictment made under CPL 210.20.” This requirement was again stated by this Court in People v Mezon (80 NY2d 155, 160-161, supra). While the Court in People v Jennings did state that, under certain circumstances, the People might waive the written notice requirement, the People assert that they have argued from the beginning against disclosure of the Grand Jury minutes to defendants. The trial court’s initial request to turn over to the court the Grand Jury minutes cannot serve as an over-all waiver of the written notice requirement which is applicable to defendants.
In summary, because there was no written motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment pending before the court at the time disclosure was ordered, and CPL 210.30 (3) does not permit the court-ordered release of Grand Jury minutes as an aid to counsel in the preparation of such a motion, I dissent and vote *493to affirm the order of the Appellate Division insofar as it so held.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Levine, Ciparick, Wesley and Rosenblatt concur with Judge Bellacosa; Judge Smith dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion.
Judgment reversed, etc.

 Because the prior proceedings were held off the record, there is no record indication of what arguments were made before the trial court. However, respondent’s papers assert that, throughout the trial court proceedings, it repeatedly objected to the disclosure of Grand Jury minutes to defendant. The October 15, 1998 written order of the trial court also states, “The Attorney General’s Office strongly opposed any release of the minutes to defense counsel.”
Paragraphs 21, 26, and 27 of the petition read as follows:
“21. In reviewing the issue today it is important to note that the Legislature amended CPL § 210.30 in 1980 (L. 1980, c. 842). This amendment provides for inspection of Grand Jury minutes by defense counsel, but in one circumstance only: ‘If the court, after examining the minutes, finds that release of the minutes, or certain portions thereof, to the parties is necessary to assist the court in making its determination on the [sufficiency] mo*492tion, it may release the minutes or such portions thereof to the parties.’ CPL § 210.30, subd. (3) (emphasis supplied).”
“26. A trial court lacks power to order disclosure of the Grand Jury minutes to defense counsel, unless authorized to do so by the sole exception contained within subdivision (3) of CPL Section 210.30.”
“27. It is the position of the Attorney General that the order of respondent Justice Firetog herein falls outside the limited exception authorized by § 210.30.”
Paragraphs 7 and 9 of the verified reply read as follows:
“7. Respondent states that when the issue of releasing Grand Jury testimony to defense counsel was first discussed petitioner ‘did not indicate that [his] office had any problems with disclosure’ (Firetog Aif. At par. 4) and it was only from spring to fall 1998 that petitioner ‘bee [a] me increasingly resistant to the notion of any disclosure of the [Grand Jury] testimony.’ Id. At par. 5. Quite to the contrary, from the first time the subject was discussed Mr. Dublirer has consistently opposed such release, and stated that such release is against the policy of petitioner’s office.”
“9. Finally, respondent apparently misperceives certain statements contained in petitioner’s verified petition. Respondent denies the allegation (Ver. Ans. T par. 9) or denies knowledge (id. at par. 10) whether the criminal case (Indictment No. 10813/97) was adjourned over petitioner’s objection. Petitioner’s objection was not to the adjournment; it was to respondent Justice Firetog’s decision each time to permit counsel for respondents D’Ambrosio and Mignola additional time in which to prepare and file motions. See Ver. Pet. at par. 9 and 10. The need for setting a time limitation for pretrial motions in the underlying criminal case becomes apparent when one realizes that more than thirteen months after arraignment no written motion of any kind has yet been served or filed on behalf of respondents D’Ambrosio and Mignola.”