Court Opinion

ID: 9852967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:40:11.084792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:38.616738
License: Public Domain

Gardner, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. Under the South Carolina statue, it is not necessary that there be a contract of hire. Our statute provides “the term employee” means every person engaged in an employment under any appointment, contract of hire, or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written. S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-130 (1976). [Emphasis mine.]
The majority opinion cites IB ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION § 47.10, at 8-302 (1992). This section includes footnote 59.2 which provides:
The definitions in a particular statute must always be consulted on this point, since some of them also recognize persons in service under ‘appointment’ or ‘apprenticeship.’ The rules discussed in this section, which assume a ‘contract’ requirement, may in some circumstances be found inapplicable to an ‘appointment’ type of statute. [Emphasis mine.]
For obvious reasons, I disagree with the majority’s holding, that “only the term ‘contract of hire’ is pertinent here.” I find no authority which would justify the complete disregard of the clear wording of the statute.
*260The case of Stegeman v. St. Francise Xavier Parish, 611 S.W. (2d) 204 (Mo. 1981) (en banc) is pertinent to this case. There the claimant, a volunteer worker, was injured on his first day of work on the construction of a private school gymnasium. He was held to be an employee “under any appointment,” as provided by the Missouri definition. The court held that even though the claimant was an “uncompensated worker,” he was entitled to benefits based on the average annual earnings of an adult in the same class of employment. We quote from Stegeman:
(1) Section 287.020 defines an employee as any ‘person in the service of any employer... under any contract of hire ... or under any appointment.’ Respondent contends that he was an employee under appointment. In Missouri, an uncompensated worker is an employee by appointment if he is in the service of an employer and that employer exercises control, or has the right of control, over the worker. Fielder v. Production Credit Association, 429 S.W. (2d) 307 (Mo. App. 1968); Lawson v. Lawson, 415 S.W. (2d) 313 (Mo. App. 1967). It is necessary, therefore, to determine whether there was sufficient competent evidence before the Commission to establish whether the church had the right of control or did control the work of respondent. Id. at 206. [Emphasis mine.]
In viewing the relationship of employment, I would hold that the preponderance of evidence supports the findings below. See McLeod v. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co., 280 S.C. 466, 313 S.E. (2d) 38 (Ct. App. 1984). The Commission and the trial judge found that there was no necessity of pay. Additionally, there is a total absence of proof for the proposition that Cecil Scurlock did not exercise control over the work of Vivian Foster. She was appointed to keep the books and she did this. She was appointed to run a vegetable stand and she did this. The entire record establishes the fact that Cecil Scurlock drove his daughter to work, directed the work that she was supposed to do and in general exercised the right of control.
For the above reasons, I would affirm.