Court Opinion

ID: 9806884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 19:33:08.420032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:14:34.049235
License: Public Domain

EDMONDSON, J.,
Concurring Specially, joined by COMBS, V.C.J., WATT, J.
1 1 I write separately to explain that 1) the husband's physical presence at a hearing constituted a pro se general appearance in the District Court and he was entitled to a Rule 10 notice of the opposing party's motion seeking a default judgment, and 2) on remand the District Court should consider the wife's claim that the divorced status of the parties should not be vacated.
12 A general appearance is made when a named party participates in a legal proceeding by his or her physical presence at that proceeding without preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction.1 Justice Opala's published separate writing thirty-five years ago explained that the common-law requirement of physical presence combined with a formal entry, or plea, or motion of record as necessary for a legal appearance was an "early view" that is now firmly superseded by modern views of procedure.2 He observed that "a writing 'spread upon the record is no longer the required abracadabra of appearance" because modern views regard voluntary appearance as no more than knowledge of the pending proceedings coupled with acts from which intention to submit to the jurisdiction may be inferred.3 Husband's physical presence at the trial court hearing where he appeared pro se without preserving any objection to personal jurisdiction showed his knowledge of the pending proceedings coupled with acts from which his intention to submit to the jurisdiction of the District Court may be inferred. I agree with the Court's opinion that husband's physical appearance at the trial court hearing was a pro se general appearance and he was entitled to a Rule 10 notice of the wife's subsequent motion for a default decree.4
T3 The Court's opinion requires the District Court to revisit the husband's motion to vacate. The opinion declines to adjudicate on appeal the merits of the wife's claim that due to her remarriage and additional children and the alleged remarriage of the husband 5 a hardship would be created if the divorce decree is vacated. I view her claim as remaining for the District Court to examine when it revisits the husband's motion to vacate.
T4 Wife alleges that 1) husband was at a court hearing in June 2010, 2) he did not provide a formal appearance with an address as required by 12 0.8.2011 § 2005.2,63) he *703waited until more than three years later, in July 2018 to file a motion to vacate, and 4) she was unaware of husband's residence at the time of her motion to vacate.
15 This Court has recognized a public policy that a party's marital status should not be held hostage by an unreasonably delayed appellate correction of matrimonial property and custody rights. For example, in 2001, we explained that the Court had "treated marital status different from other claims in matrimonial litigation."7 Where both parties sought a divorcee the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court except as to the parties' status as being divorced.8 Similar public policies are expressed via no-fault divoree statutes which show that an individual's litigation to change his or her marital status is not something that may be prevented by his or her spouse 9 and an individual's litigation to change marital status involves a bundle of personal constitutional rights that receive constitutional protection.10 Further, these policies appear to be consistent with those opinions recognizing that one spouse may obtain a judicially-approved change of his of her marital status even in the absence of a court's in personam jurisdiction over the non-appearing spouse.11
1 6 Wife's claim is not clearly presented on appeal with a supporting appellate record, but her appellate argument appears to focus on marital status. We need not analyze whether wife's claim is pressed as an equitable defense to a mandatory procedural requirement,12 or if her claim is that notice is not required to adjudicate solely her marital status, or if her claim is a third alternative. Her claim should be addressed by the District Court in the context of addressing the husband's motion to vacate, and not here for the first time on appeal.13

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Mothershed, 2011 OK 84, ¶ 43, 264 P.3d 1197, 1214.

. ABC Drilling Co., Inc. v. Hughes Group, 1980 OK 39, 609 P.2d 763, 770 (Opala, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The separate opinion relies, in part, on Rand v. Nash, 1935 OK 1086, 174 Okla. 525, 51 P.2d 296. Therein, Rand, appeared at a hearing and followed his appearance with a filed objection two months later; and on appeal the Court noted that Rand had "appeared generally at the hearing." Id., 51 P.2d at 297.

. ABC Drilling Co., Inc. v. Hughes Group, 1980 OK 39, 609 P.2d at 770 (Opala, J., concurring in ~ part and dissenting in part).

. At the time of wife's motion for default, August 2011, the version of Rule 10 in effect was found at 12 0.S.2011, Ch. 2, App. Rules for the District Courts of Oklahoma, (eff. Jan. 1, 1982) Rule 10, Notice of Taking Default Judgment, which states that "In matters in default in which an appearance, general or special has been made or a motion or pleading has been filed, default shall not be taken until ... five (5) days notice of the date of the hearing is mailed or delivered to the attorney of record ... or to the party in default if he is unrepresented...." Similar language is found in the current version of Rule 10 fund at 12 0.$.Supp.2014 (Rule 10, amended by order of the Supreme Court, 2013 OK 68, -- P.3d --, eff. Aug. 1, 2013).

. Husband's appellate reply brief contains a statement by counsel that husband has not remarried, and an assertion that common-law marriage is not recognized in the state where husband resides. The brief does not cite the trial court record in support of the statement.

. 12 0.S.2011 § 2005.2, states in part: "Every party to any civil proceeding in the district courts shall file an entry of appearance by counsel or personally as an unrepresented party...." Further, this appearance requires an "address of record" be provided for service of notice. Id. § 2005.2(D).

. Pierce v. Pierce, 2001 OK 97, ¶ 23, 39 P.3d 791, 800, citing Harmon v. Harmon, 1997 OK 91, 943 P.2d 599.

. Pierce v. Pierce, 2001 OK 97, ¶ 23, 39 P.3d at 800.

. See, e.g., Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think about Marriage, 40 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 145, 164-165 (1998) ("... no-fault divorce has given the parties to a marriage substantial power to end the legal relationship if they so choose, to the point that in many states the current rules, as applied, give each spouse more or less a right to divorce upon demand.").

. Divorce is a statutory proceeding. McDonald v. Wrigley, 1994 OK 25, 870 P.2d 777, 779. One modern view of marital status is that it is a fundamental and personal associational activity that receives constitutional protection for the individual's efforts when utilizing a governmental entity for either establishing or dissolving the status-based relationship. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-445, 93 S.Ct. 631, 34 L.Ed.2d 626 (1973) (''The denial of access to the judicial forum in Boddie [Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971)] touched directly, as has been noted, on the marital relationship and on the associational interests that surround the establishment and dissolution of that relationship. On many occasions we have recognized the fundamental importance of these interests under our Constitution ... The Boddie appellants' inability to dissolve their marriages seriously impaired their freedom to pursue other protected associational activities."); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1080 (10th Cir.2014) (recognizing a "fundamental right to marry"). Of course, a state may possess interests that may , constitutionally place a burden on an individual's exercise of a right to marry or divorce. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406-409, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975) (Iowa's statutory residency requirement for seeking a divorce did not violate the Due process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

. Powers v. District Court of Tulsa County, 2009 OK 91, n. 46, 227 P.3d 1060, 1075 ("In the absence of in personam jurisdiction over one spouse an ex parte divisible divorce decree may change the marital status of appearing and non-appearing spouses, but a divisible divorce is ineffectual to alter economic interests and certain other legal interests of the spouses.").

. Of course, equitable defenses are recognized in matrimonial litigation. Merritt v. Merritt, 2003 OK 68, ¶ 13, 73 P.3d 878, 883. However, equity must follow the law and a legal requirement may not be abridged "unless there are equitable considerations of a compelling nature." Id., Merritt, at 1 13, citing Hedges v. Hedges, 2002 OK 92, ¶ 8, 66 P.3d 364, 370.

. This Court, as an appellate tribunal, does not make first-instance rulings. Tucker v. Cochran Firm-Criminal Defense Birmingham, L.L.C., 2014 OK 112, n. 52, 341 P.3d 673, 686.