Court Opinion

ID: 9687474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:29:40.707059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:27.733482
License: Public Domain

*457ANDERSON, Paul H., Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The task of interpreting legislative enactments is one of the most common, yet most difficult, tasks performed by our court. To aid us in this task, we have, from the time Minnesota became a state, been developing and applying principles and rules of statutory interpretation. These principles and rules are now well established. When I apply them to the statute respondent Ted Harrison, Jr. seeks to use as the basis for his cause of action against his parents, I conclude that the district court erred when it did not grant summary judgment in favor of the parents.
As a court, our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2006). While we generally assume that words should be given their common meaning, technical words and phrases must be construed in accordance with their special meanings or definitions. Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2006). In addition, a word’s meaning depends on how it is used, so we examine the words of a statute in context rather than isolated from their setting. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn, v. Royal Ins. Co., 517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn.1994); Chiodo v. Bd. of Educ. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 298 Minn. 380, 382, 215 N.W.2d 806, 808 (1974).
Minnesota Statutes § 169.685, subd. 4 (2006) — the statute we must interpret in the case before us today — reads in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), proof of the use or failure to use seat belts or a child passenger restraint system as described in subdivision 5, or proof of the installation or failure of installation of seat belts or a child passenger restraint system as described in subdivision 5 shall not be admissible in evidence in any litigation involving personal injuries or property damage resulting from the use or operation of any motor vehicle.
(b) Paragraph (a) does not affect the right of a person to bring an action for damages arising out of an incident that involves a defectively designed, manufactured, installed, or operating seat belt or child passenger restraint system. Paragraph (a) does not prohibit the introduction of evidence pertaining to the use of a seat belt or child passenger restraint system in an action described in this paragraph.
(Emphasis added.) Applying our rules of statutory interpretation, I construe the key word in subdivision 4(b) — the word installed — to apply much more narrowly than does the majority.
Products-liability actions require proof of a product’s defective condition; thus, the basis for a products-liability action brought under section 169.685 is inseparable from the term “defectively,” as that term is used in subdivision 4(b). Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 1 (1998) (“One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to person or property caused by the defect.” (Emphasis added.)); cf. Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 623 n. 3 (Minn.1984). Subdivision 4(b) specifically applies to two products — seat belts and child passenger restraint systems — further linking that subdivision to products-liability actions. Moreover, defective design and defective manufacture are two specific varieties of products-liability claims. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 (1998).
I conclude that by placing the phrase “defectively installed” together with the *458more specific phrases “defectively designed” and “defectively manufactured,” the legislature directs us to invoke ejus-dem generis, a canon of statutory interpretation that holds that the meaning of general words may be restricted by association with more particular words. See State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Minn.2005). Accordingly, I conclude that when read in context, the word “installed” in Minn.Stat. § 169.685, subd. 4(b), should not be read to include the installation of a car seat or a seat belt into a car by an end-use consumer — in this case Ted Harrison, Jr.’s parents. Instead, I conclude that subdivision 4(b) applies only to products-liability actions and covers only a more limited class of potential commercial defendants. Therefore, because Ted Harrison, Jr.’s car seat was installed by his parents and not a commercial manufacturer or distributor, I conclude that subdivision 4(b) does not apply to this action against his parents. Accordingly, I would hold that Ted Harrison, Jr.’s action against his parents, Amy and Ted Harrison, Sr., is barred by subdivision 4(a), and the district court erred when it did not grant summary judgment in favor of the parents.