Court Opinion

ID: 9615516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:37:51.998847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:48.769528
License: Public Domain

Ringold, J.
(dissenting)—In my view, neither the warrantless seizure of Reid's keys nor the warrantless search of Reid's residence were permissible under Const. art. 1, § 7. The shotgun shells and photograph seized pursuant to the search warrant were products of this prior illegality and should have been suppressed. Because this evidence tied Reid to the murder weapon, providing a crucial link in the State's case, its admission cannot be deemed harmless *214beyond a reasonable doubt. I would reverse and remand for a new trial at which this evidence would be excluded.
Article 1, section 7 of our state constitution provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." In State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983), our State Supreme Court engaged in an extensive analysis of the historical roots of this constitutional guaranty and concluded that it "poses an almost absolute bar to warrantless arrests, searches, and seizures, with only limited exceptions ..." Ringer, at 690. The majority offers several reasons why the warrantless seizure of Reid's keys was permissible under article 1, section 7, none of which are persuasive.
First, contrary to the majority's suggestion, the fact that the keys were not contraband or evidence of a crime does not justify their seizure. See Ringer, at 699. Moreover, the majority distorts the facts in stating that police seized the keys in order to secure the automobile. The car was parked and surrounded by police cars. Reid had been arrested, handcuffed and placed in the patrol car. There is no suggestion in the record, and the State has never claimed, that the keys were seized for any other purpose than to identify and/or to gain access to the Reid residence.
The majority also concludes that the seizure of the keys was justified by exigent circumstances. The parameters of this exception to the warrant requirement were set forth in Ringer as follows:
[Wjhere police have probable cause to conduct a search, they may do so without a warrant when "they are confronted by emergencies and exigencies which do not permit reasonable time and delay for a judicial officer to evaluate and act upon probable cause applications for warrants by police officers."... Under the doctrine of exigent circumstances, the totality of circumstances said to justify a warrantless search will be closely scrutinized. . . . The burden is on those seeking the exemption to show that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.
*215. . . [T]he availability of a telephone warrant must ... be considered in determining whether exigent circumstances exist.
(Citations omitted.) Ringer, at 701-02.
The State has not met its burden of showing that the warrantless seizure of the keys was imperative. Reid was in custody and the car was parked and secured. Police had probable cause to search the car from the time it was placed under surveillance. The State makes no showing that a telephone warrant could not have been obtained during that time or immediately following Reid's arrest. The warrantless seizure of the keys violated Const. art. 1, § 7.
Alternatively, the majority holds that if the seizure of the keys was unconstitutional, the illegality did not lead to the seizure of the photograph and shotgun shells because the police did not use the keys to identify Reid's residence. This may be a legitimate and reasonable inference from the facts,8 but, if true, it totally undercuts the majority's reasoning that the warrantless search of Reid's residence was permissible under Const. art. 1, § 7.
If exigencies permit, police may make a warrantless search of a private residence to make an arrest or seize evidence which may be destroyed before a warrant can be obtained. Again, however, the State has failed to show that the exigencies of the situation mandated a warrantless search of Reid's residence. If, as the majority suggests, police knew from questioning neighbors which duplex unit belonged to Reid, there is nothing supporting the failure to seek a search warrant. Probable cause to obtain a search warrant existed from the time the duplex was placed under surveillance. The State makes no showing that a telephone *216warrant could not have been obtained during this time.9 The exigencies, if any, which were present following Reid's arrest were created by police inaction during surveillance. The police cannot remain idle until the situation deteriorates to the point where their failure to obtain a warrant is excused by police-created exigent circumstances. The warrantless search of Reid's residence violated Const. art. 1, § 7.
The question then presented is whether the evidence seized under the subsequently obtained search warrant must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree. The police affidavit for the search warrant included the information that the female suspect was arrested inside the duplex and that ammunition was seen on the premises. Police cannot use illegally obtained information to obtain a search warrant. State v. Moore, 29 Wn. App. 354, 628 P.2d 522 (1981). Although probable cause existed without this information, "the existence of probable cause to search prior to an unlawful search is insufficient to sustain a subsequent search pursuant to a warrant where the affiant participated in or knew of the illegal search." Moore, at 360. The evidence seized under the search warrant should have been suppressed; its admission at trial was constitutional error.10
Harmless error is the majority's final refuge. Though constitutional error does not require reversal if the reviewing court determines it is harmless beyond a reasonable *217doubt, State v. Evans, 96 Wn.2d 1, 4, 633 P.2d 83 (1981), the methodology to be used in resolving the question of harmless constitutional error is unclear. See State v. Vargas, 25 Wn. App. 809, 610 P.2d 1 (1980); State v. Evans, supra at 6 (Brachtenbach, C.J., concurring). The courts have vacillated between two different approaches: the "contribution test" and the "overwhelming evidence test."
Under the first approach, the appellate court looks only at the tainted evidence and asks if it might have played a part in {i.e., "contributed to") the fact finder's determination of guilt. The amount and persuasiveness of the untainted evidence is not considered. If the tainted evidence could plausibly have played a part in the conviction, reversal is required.
(Citations omitted.) Evans, at 6-7. Under the second approach,
[t]he appellate court examines the untainted evidence alone and finds the error harmless if the untainted evidence is so overwhelming that it necessarily leads to a finding of guilt. If the untainted evidence is merely sufficient to support the conviction, reversal is required. In effect, a conviction will be allowed to stand, although a constitutional error did, or could have, played a part in it, if there was other untainted overwhelming evidence which necessarily supported the conviction.
(Citations omitted.) Evans, at 7.
We have yet to choose between these approaches because resolution of the harmless error question has been the same in the cases considered by our Supreme Court, regardless of which test was used. See State v. Johnson, 100 Wn.2d 607, 674 P.2d 145 (1983) (harmless under either test); State v. Belmarez, 101 Wn.2d 212, 676 P.2d 492 (1984) (not harmless under either test). In the case sub judice, however, the choice of methodology determines the outcome. I agree with the majority that, under the overwhelming evidence test, the error in admitting the shotgun shells and photograph was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, because the evidence tied Reid to the murder weapon, it "could plausibly have played a part in the con*218viction, ..." Evans, at 7, and cannot be deemed harmless under the contribution test.
Although the case law can be read to support either approach, I believe it would be preferable to eliminate the overwhelming evidence test and assess harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt by evaluating the impact of the erroneously admitted evidence. There are two important reasons why the "contribution test" is preferable:
1. An appellate court using the overwhelming evidence test usurps the jury's function far more significantly than an appellate court limiting its inquiry to an examination of the error.
2. The overwhelming evidence test disparages the notion that constitutional protection is due all citizens, the guilty as well as the innocent.
Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error—A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 15, 33 (1976).
The first of these reasons is by far the most significant. Any determination of harmless error requires weighing the evidence to some degree and thus, usurping the jury's function. However, the appellate court's intrusion into the fact-finding process is more limited under the contribution test.
The crucial difference between the appellate reviews under the tests is that a court that makes a finding of harmlessness under the overwhelming evidence test is not finding that the erroneously admitted evidence did not in fact affect the verdict. It may have been the erroneously admitted evidence and not the untainted evidence that persuaded the jury of the defendant's guilt, and yet the conviction may be allowed to stand. The court's affirmance simply indicates its opinion that the untainted evidence is so overwhelming that if the jury had been compelled to rely on it alone, it would have convicted. In so holding, the court is not passing upon what the jury did; it is not determining the propriety of the evidence on which the jury relied. Because it is ruling instead upon what the jury would do if forced to rely on different evidence, it is substituting itself for the jury as fact-finder. Such a practice is difficult to reconcile with the accepted rule that a trial judge may not direct a ver*219diet against a defendant in a criminal case, regardless of the strength of the evidence against him.
The [contribution test] is significantly less vulnerable in this respect. Under th[is] approach, the court rules that the nature of the erroneously admitted evidence is such that it could not have affected the jury, so the jury must have relied on other (sufficient if not overwhelming) evidence in the first instance, the same evidence it would rely on again were there a retrial. It rules that a remand would result in a conviction of defendant on the same evidence on which he has already been convicted. This is unlike the overwhelming evidence test, under which the court denies that the error affected the verdict, but only because of its view of what the jury would do in an essentially different situation than the one that was presented to it.
(Footnote omitted.) Field, at 34-35.
The overwhelming evidence test is also inconsistent with the principle that every accused individual is constitutionally entitled to a fair trial. In effect, damaging constitutional errors are acceptable under the overwhelming evidence test, when the reviewing court determines the defendant is guilty. Under the contribution test, the reviewing court must determine whether the trial was essentially fair and that the conviction was not based on constitutional error. The contribution test also limits the possibility of recalcitrant courts evading full compliance with constitutional requirements by calling infractions harmless. See Field, at 35-36.
Justice Brachtenbach's scholarly and thorough analysis of the differing harmless error tests in Evans suggests another reason why the contribution test should be adopted as our sole test. He points out that cases in numerous jurisdictions are marked by confusing inconsistency. Evans, at 10. This inconsistency is due to the greater subjectivity of the overwhelming evidence test. The contribution test is more objective; we can readily apply a standard of analysis by looking only at the "tainted evidence and ask[ing] if it might have played a part in (i.e., "contributed to") the fact finder's determination of guilt." Evans, at 6-7. "Over*220whelming evidence" is akin to the definition of "beauty": it depends on the eye of the beholder.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
Review denied by Supreme Court November 2, 1984.

Reid did not live in a large apartment complex, but in a split-level duplex. The two units had separate entrances and different street addresses, 1802 25th Avenue South and 2502 South Holgate. Reid lived at 2502 South Holgate. The police testified that they staked out 2502 South Holgate.

The sole reason given by police for failing to secure the building while a warrant was obtained was that the building was bordered on one side by blackberry bushes. This is a frivolous excuse. If the density of the vegetation prevented police from securing the building, it also would have prevented the suspect from escaping through it.

The majority's reliance on the recently recognized doctrine of inevitable discovery, Nix v. Williams, - U.S -, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), is misplaced. It is undisputed that the police had probable cause to obtain a warrant. Application of the inevitable discovery rule under these circumstances vitiates the warrant requirement and extends the scope of the inevitable discovery rule far beyond the holding in Nix.