Court Opinion

ID: 9685465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:39:29.679406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:06.095476
License: Public Domain

*205SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 59. (dissenting). I agree with Part I of the majority opinion, the order of the circuit court, and the decision of the court of appeals. All impose liability on Kreuser for failing to keep his promise to drive an intoxicated driver home. However, I disagree with Parts II and III of the majority opinion, which relieve Kreuser of liability for breaking his promise.
HH
¶ 60. This is the case of a good Samaritan gone bad. The majority opinion imposes liability on Kreuser because he "gratuitously undertook to drive Devine home ... for the protection of other persons or property. When Kreuser decided not to drive Devine home, a reasonable jury could have found that Kreuser failed to exercise reasonable care, and that such a failure increased the risk of harm to other persons and property." Majority op. at ¶¶ 19 and 24.1 agree with the majority opinion on this issue. Kreuser is liable for breaking his promise. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1967).
¶ 61. I disagree with the majority opinion that Kreuser is immune from liability under Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2) as a procurer of alcoholic beverages for Devine. Wisconsin Stat. § 125.035(2) immunizes against the "civil liability arising out of the act of procuring alcohol."
¶ 62. This case is about Kreuser's failure to keep a promise to drive Devine home, a promise to keep this dangerous intoxicated person off the road. Kreuser's negligence in failing to keep the promise increased the risk of an immediate and foreseeable harm.
*206¶ 63. Kreuser cannot be immunized from liability for his broken promise by Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2), which immunizes a person against civil liability for procuring alcoholic beverages for another. By using Wis. Stat. § 125.035(2) in the present case to immunize Kreuser for liability arising out of his broken promise to be the designated driver, the majority opinion expands the immunity statute far beyond its clear and unambiguous scope. The immunity statute does not apply in the present case because imposing liability on Kreuser for breaking his promise is unrelated to and outside of the clear and unambiguous scope of this immunization statute.
I — I HH I — I
¶ 64. I also disagree with the majority opinion's application of public policy considerations to relieve Kreuser of liability.
¶ 65. I conclude that relieving a person of liability to a victim when the person deliberately fails to keep his or her promise to be a designated driver is contrary to this state's public policy. Our public policy is that people who deliberately fail to keep their promises are liable, when the failure to keep a promise has such foreseeable, immediate, and tragic consequences. Furthermore, this state's public policy is to reduce death and injury on our roads caused by drunk drivers by encouraging people not to drink and drive, by imposing stringent criminal penalties on people who do drink and drive, by imposing civil liability on those whose negligence is a substantial factor in causing injury, and by encouraging the use of designated drivers.
¶ 66. The majority opinion appears to conclude that of the six public policy factors to be considered, three factors point to imposing liability on Kreuser. In *207contrast, I apply the same six public policy considerations to the facts of the present case and conclude that none of them points to relieving Kreuser of liability in this case.
¶ 67. (1) The majority opinion does not discuss whether the injury was directly caused by Kreuser's negligence. Legal responsibility is limited to those causes that are closely connected with the result and of such significance that liability is justified.1 Conduct is causal if it is "a substantial factor in producing the injury."2 A substantial factor is conduct that "has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead the trier of fact... to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense."3 Several substantial factors can exist, all contributing to the same result.4
¶ 68. Kreuser's negligence may not have been the sole factor or even the primary factor in causing the injury, but under the law it need only be a substantial factor. Kreuser's negligence was in fact a substantial factor in causing the injury. The negligence of others also contributed to causing the injury, and these persons have been named as co-defendants in this lawsuit. That others might have contributed to the injury does not absolve Kreuser of liability for the injury directly caused by his negligence.5
*208¶ 69. Because I conclude that Kreuser's negligence was a direct and substantial factor in causing the injury, I further conclude that this policy consideration points to imposing liability on Kreuser.
¶ 70. (2) The majority opinion concludes that the injury is too wholly out of proportion to Kreuser's culpability in deliberately failing to keep the promise to drive an intoxicated person home. Majority op. at ¶¶ 44 and 45. I disagree.
¶ 71. The concurrence asserts that it is disproportionate and unduly burdensome to hold a designated driver liable when those who procure the alcoholic beverages are immune from liability. The concurrence then concludes that only the intoxicated driver should be held liable to the victim. The concurrence mistakenly attributes causal negligence solely to the intoxicated driver, "irrespective of the other causes which necessarily contributed to the result."6
¶ 72. Wisconsin's comparative negligence rules are designed to impose liability in relation to each party's causal negligence in bringing about the injury.7 The relative culpability of each person is weighed against the relative culpability of the others, including the accident-causing tortfeasor, here the intoxicated driver.8 The trier of fact, the judge or jury, allocates responsibility among those who caused the injury. That the legislature has immunized the procurer of alcoholic beverages from liability and that the intoxicated driver is causally negligent and liable do not, and should not, absolve Kreuser of liability for his culpability in break*209ing his promise. Such absolution is inconsistent with a liability system based upon the idea of comparative fault.
¶ 73. The issue in the present case is who should bear the risk of loss, the innocent victim injured by the intoxicated driver, or the designated driver who broke his promise to drive the intoxicated driver home? As between these two parties, I conclude that the risk of loss should be on the person who broke his promise and whose negligence was a substantial factor in causing the victim's injury.
¶ 74. In the present case, Kreuser's culpability for failing to keep his promise is significant. Kreuser could have reasonably foreseen that his failure to keep his promise could result in death or serious injury. Kreuser's liability is not disproportionate to his culpability. Thus, this policy consideration also points to imposing liability on Kreuser.
¶ 75. (3) The majority opinion does not discuss whether in retrospect it is highly extraordinary to conclude that the negligence of allowing an intoxicated driver to drive would bring about the harm of the intoxicated driver killing or injuring another driver, a passenger, or a pedestrian. I conclude that it is not highly extraordinary to reach this conclusion and that this policy consideration again points to imposing liability on Kreuser.
¶ 76. (4) The majority opinion states that allowing recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on Kreuser. Majority op. at ¶ 46. The majority parades its "horribles": an alleged promisor who may have merely nodded his head in agreement to take an intoxicated driver home but who may not have intended to assume such a responsibility; an alleged promisor who might not be able to stop the intoxicated driver from leaving *210alone. But the facts of the present case are not one of the horribles posed. Kreuser expressly promised to drive Devine home and then deliberately failed to keep the promise. Majority op. at ¶ 6 n.2, ¶ 8 n.3. Imposing liability on Kreuser does not mean liability would be imposed under the very different fact situations proffered by the majority opinion's horribles.
¶ 77. The horribles seem to raise issues of proof and the availability of defenses. Courts know how to deal with disputes about whether a promise was made, and courts can determine the validity of defenses on a case-by-case basis. Thus, I again conclude that this policy consideration points to imposing liability on Kreuser.
¶ 78. (5) The majority opinion does not discuss whether allowing recovery would be likely to open the way to fraudulent claims. Fraudulent claims are not likely if the present claim is recognized. Thus, I once again conclude that this policy consideration points to imposing liability on Kreuser.
¶ 79. (6) The majority opinion concludes that allowing recovery under the circumstances of this case potentially allows the law of negligence to enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point. Again the majority opinion engages in a parade of horribles: an alleged promisor who may have nodded his head in agreement to take an intoxicated driver home; an alleged promisor who could not stop the intoxicated driver from leaving on his own; a taxi company that fails to keep a promise; and multiple promisors, none of whom keeps the promise.
¶ 80. Once again, these horribles are not represented by the facts of the present case. The facts of this case offer a good place to start imposing liability on a designated driver who deliberately breaks his promise. *211This case may also turn out to provide a sensible and just stopping point for imposing liability on a designated driver.
¶ 81. When other distinguishable fact situations arise such as those the majority opinion poses, the court can determine whether liability is appropriate under those circumstances. Thus, I conclude once more that this policy consideration points to imposing liability on Kreuser.
¶ 82. The majority opinion ultimately falls back on the argument that allowing recovery in the present case contravenes the legislature's prerogative to determine who shall be held accountable for the distribution, vending, or consumption of alcoholic beverages. Majority op. at ¶ 51. This argument is unpersuasive because, as I stated previously, this case does not involve liability for the distribution, vending, or consumption of alcoholic beverages. This case involves liability when a promisor fails to keep a promise to drive an intoxicated driver home.
¶ 83. For the reasons set forth, I do not join Parts II and III of the majority opinion relieving Kreuser of liability arising out of his broken promise.
¶ 84. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 W Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 264 (5th ed. 1984).

 Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 607, 617, 292 N.W.2d 630 (1980).

 Id. at 617-18.

Id. at 618.

 Wis JI — Civil 1500 and comments (1999); W Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 268 (5th ed. 1984).

 Michael K. McChrystal, Seat Belt Negligence: The Ambivalent Wisconsin Rules, 68 Marq. L. Rev. 539, 547 (1985).

 Id. at 547-48.

 Id. at 547-48.