Court Opinion

ID: 9428465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:54.531937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:13.559445
License: Public Domain

Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens join,
dissenting.
In Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575 (1978), this Court held that an employee who brings an action against his private employer under § 7 (c) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA or Act), 29 U. S. C. § 626 (c), is entitled to trial by jury. The question presented in this case is whether a plaintiff has a right to trial by jury in an action against the Federal Government under § 15 (c) of the ADEA, 29 U. S. C. § 633a (c). The Court today holds that a jury trial is not available in such actions. Because I believe that Congress unmistakably manifested its intention to accord a jury trial right, I dissent.
I
Respondent brought this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Navy, alleging violations of the ADEA. She demanded a jury trial, and the Secretary moved to strike that demand. The District Court denied the motion to strike, but certified for interlocutory appeal the question whether a jury trial is available in an ADEA action against the Federal Government. See 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b). The Court of Appeals granted the Secretary’s petition for interlocutory review and affirmed the ruling of the District Court that respondent is entitled to a jury trial. Nakshian v. Claytor, 202 U. S. App. D. C. 59, 628 F. 2d 59 (1980). Relying principally on the fact that Congress vested jurisdiction over ADEA suits against the Federal Government in the federal district courts rather than in the Court of Claims and on the authorization in § 15 *170(c) of the Act for the award of "legal and equitable relief,” the Court of Appeals construed the statute to accord a jury-trial.
II
It is well settled that the “United States, as sovereign, 'is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.’ ” United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399 (1976), quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941). Consent to suit by the United States must be “unequivocally expressed.” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 538 (1980); United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969). In the ADEA, the United States has expressly waived its immunity, 29 U. S. C. § 633a (1976 ed. and Supp. III), so that there can be no doubt of its consent to be sued. The requirement that a waiver of immunity be unequivocally expressed, however, does not, as the Court suggests, carry with it a presumption against jury trial in cases where the United States has waived its immunity. Indeed, we have previously declined to adopt such a presumption. See Law v. United States, 266 U. S. 494 (1925); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U. S. 547 (1921).1 *171Moreover, the Court’s view that there is a presumption against jury trials in suits against the Federal Government is belied by the very statutes that it cites to indicate that Congress has often “conditioned [the] waiver [of immunity] upon a plaintiff’s relinquishing any claim to a jury trial.” Ante, at 161. The fact that Congress has found it necessary to state expressly that there is no jury trial right in a broad range of cases against the Government, see 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2402, demonstrates that Congress does not legislate against the backdrop of any presumption against a jury trial right in suits against the United States. I believe, therefore, that once the Government unequivocally waives its immunity from suit, the plaintiff’s right to jury trial is a question of statutory construction.2 The proper inquiry is whether the statute expressly or by fair implication provides for a jury trial.3 See Law v. United States, supra; United States v. *172Pfitsch, supra; 5 J. Moore, J. Lucas, & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 38-31 [2], p. 38-237 (1981); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2314, p. 69 (1971). I turn, therefore, to the statute itself.
Congress passed the ADEA in 1967 to protect older workers against discrimination in the workplace on the basis of age. See 29 U. S. C. §§ 621 (b), 623; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 756 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S., at 577. See generally Note, Age Discrimination in Employment, 50 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 924, 945 (1975). The Act’s protection was originally limited to employees in the private sector, see Pub. L. 90-202, § 11, 81 Stat. 605, 29 U. S. C. § 630 (b) (1970 ed.),4 but Congress amended the Act in 1974 by adding § 15, which extended protection to federal employees as well. 29 U. S. C. § 633a. Section 15 (a) provides that personnel actions affecting federal employees “shall be made free from any discrimination based on age,” while § 15 (b) grants the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission authority to enforce the statutory provisions.5 Although there *173is no provision which expressly grants or precludes a jury trial, Congress provided in § 15 (c), 88 Stat. 75, that “[a]ny [federal employee] aggrieved may bring a civil action in any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this Act.” 29 U. S. C. § 633a (c) (emphasis added). It is this provision that I believe demonstrates congressional intent to allow a jury trial in ADEA suits against the Federal Government.
In Lorillard v. Pons, supra, the Court construed § 7 (b) and § 7 (c)6 — a provision identical to § 15 (c) in all relevant respects — to afford age discrimination plaintiffs the right to a jury trial against private employers.7 The Court reached this result for two reasons. First, the Court found that the language in § 7 (b), 29 U. S. C. § 626 (b), that “[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures” of certain provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), suggested that Congress intended to grant a jury trial right because “[l]ong before Congress enacted the ADEA, it was well established that there was a right to a jury trial in private actions pursuant to the FLSA.” 434 U. S., at 580. Second, and more significant for this case, the Court found that § 7 (c)’s authorization of the courts to grant and individuals to seek “legal or equitable relief,” 29 U. S. C. § 626 (c) (emphasis added), strongly suggested that Congress intended to grant a jury trial right. 434 U. S., at 583. Thus, the Court held, as a *174matter of statutory construction, that the ADEA allows jury trials in actions against private employers.
In the instant case, Congress similarly authorized aggrieved persons to seek and district courts to grant “such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter,” 29 U. S. C. § 633a (c) (emphasis added), thereby suggesting that federal employees are entitled to a jury trial under the ADEA. As a unanimous Court emphasized in Lorillard:
“The word ‘legal’ is a term of art: In cases in which legal relief is available and legal rights are determined, the Seventh Amendment provides a right to jury trial. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 195-196 (1974). ‘[W]here words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.’ Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 59 (1911). See Gilbert v. United States, 370 U. S. 650, 655 (1962); Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883). We can infer, therefore, that by providing specifically for ‘legal’ relief, Congress knew the significance of the term ‘legal,’ and intended that there would be a jury trial on demand . . . .” 434 U. S., at 583.8
*175Although the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in suits at common law does not extend to civil actions against the Federal Government, Congress may extend the jury trial right by legislation. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S. 372, 388-389 (1943). Congress’ provision for “legal and equitable relief” suggests, therefore, that it intended to allow jury trials in ADEA actions against the Federal Government.
This strong inference that Congress intended to legislate a jury trial right is reinforced by Congress’ decision to vest jurisdiction in the District Courts, rather than the Court of Claims, to decide ADEA suits brought against the Federal Government. This Court has previously observed that vesting jurisdiction in the district courts rather than the Court of Claims supports an inference of a right to jury trial. In United States v. Pfitsch, the Court stated that “the right to a jury trial is an incident” of the grant of “exclusive jurisdiction in the District Courts.” 256 U. S., at 552. Similarly, in Law v. United States, the Court held that the District Court erred in denying a right to a jury trial under the War Risk Insurance Act, when the court concluded that its jurisdiction “was the exceptional jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Claims,” rather than that “exercised in accordance with the laws governing the usual procedure of the court in actions at law for money compensation.” 266 U. S., at 496.9 *176Congress’ vesting of jurisdiction in the federal district courts under § 15 (c) of the ADEA suggests, therefore, that it intended to provide a jury trial right to federal ADEA plaintiffs.10
The legislative history of the 1974 ADEA amendments, extending protection to federal employees, is consistent with *177the conclusion that Congress intended to allow jury trials. Congress’ failure to include federal employees under the ADEA when the Act was first passed
“did not represent a conscious decision by the Congress to limit the ADEA to employment in the private sector. It reflects the fact, that in 1967, when ADEA was enacted, most government employees were outside the scope of the FLSA and the Wage Hour and Public Contracts Divisions of the Department of Labor, which enforces the Fair Labor Standards Act, were assigned responsibility for enforcing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.” S. Rep. No. 93-690, p. 56 (1974).
When the Act was amended in 1974, Congress intended that “Government employees ... be subject to the same protections against arbitrary employment based on age as are employees in the private sector.” 120 Cong. Rec. 8768 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen, principal proponent of ADEA extension to federal employees) (emphasis added).11 To be sure, Congress did not provide for identical enforcement schemes for private-sector and federal-sector age discrimination complaints. But when Congress departed from the “same protections” for federal employees, ibid., that it had granted private-sector employees, it did so expressly. Not only did Congress in § 15 not expressly disallow jury trials where the Federal Government is the defendant, but Congress used the same language in § 15 (c) that it had used in § 7 (c) in authorizing suits in the district courts for legal or equitable relief against private parties. This strongly sug*178gests that it intended to .make the jury trial right it approved against private employers equally applicable to ADEA suits against the Federal Government.
The strong manifestation of congressional intent from both the language and the legislative history of the 1974 amendments is enhanced by the total absence of any persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent. The Court argues, nonetheless, that Congress’ decision in 1978 to amend the ADEA to provide explicitly for jury trials in private employer cases brought under § 7,12 without also amending § 15 (c), demonstrates an intention to preclude jury trials against the Government. I am completely unpersuaded.
The bill which led to codification of a jury trial right in § 7 (c) (2) was introduced by Senator Kennedy before this *179Court decided Lorillard. In order to settle a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the availability of jury trials in ADEA suits against private employers,13 Senator Kennedy proposed an amendment to the ADEA which would state in haec verba that jury trials are allowed. 123 Cong. Rec. 34317-34318 (1977).14 Senator Kennedy’s amendment was adopted by the Senate without debate. Lorillard was subsequently decided. Thereafter, Congress passed the Kennedy amendment, with a modification proposed by the House at Conference extending the jury trial right beyond that proposed by Senator Kennedy and passed by the Senate to include claims for liquidated damages. I can discern no congressional intent to preclude the right to a jury trial in ADEA actions against the Federal Government from this sequence of events. The more plausible explanation, and the one with textual support in the relevant legislative history, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-950, pp. 13-14 (1978), is that Congress understood from the Lorillard opinion that conferring the power to award legal relief suggested a jury trial right15 and that the reason Congress proceeded with the Kennedy amendment was to make clear not only that suits for wages *180could be tried before a jury, but also that suits for liquidated damages could be tried before a jury, an issue explicitly left unresolved in Lorillard, 434 U. S., at 577, n. 2.16 Moreover, that Congress did not add the same provision to § 15 that it added to § 7 is not indicative of an intent to prohibit jury trials for the additional reason that it was the conflict in the Courts of Appeals over whether employees could have a jury trial against private employers which prompted Senator Kennedy to introduce his bill. There had been no parallel development in the courts interpreting § 15. This legislative history, therefore, does not support the conclusion that the Court seeks to draw from it.
The Court also argues that the absence of any reference in § 15 to the FLSA “powers, remedies, and procedures” to which § 7 refers and upon which Lorillard partially relied suggests that Congress did not intend to allow jury trials against the Federal Government. But our decision in Lorillard rested equally on the provision in § 7 (c) for “legal or equitable relief” as a strong and independent indication of congressional intent to allow jury trials. In addition, the more likely explanation for the absence of any reference in § 15 to the FLSA sections referred to in § 7 (b) is that Congress intended to use existing administrative procedures “to enforce the provisions of [§ 15 (a)] through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without backpay.” 29 U. S. C. § 633a (b) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Prior to the 1974 amendments extending ADEA coverage to federal employees, employment discrimination complaints by federal employees were processed by the Civil Service Commission, so that it is not surprising that Congress decided to use existing administrative machinery in § 15 (b) to enforce ADEA provisions protecting federal employees. *181See 39 Fed. Reg. 24351 (1974), reprinted as amended at 29 CFR §§ 1613.501-1613.521 (1980).17 The failure to refer to FLSA procedures in § 15 apparently derives, not from a desire to limit jury trials, but from an intention to employ different administrative procedures for age discrimination complaints brought against the Federal Government.18 Seen in this light, the Court’s strained interpretation of the failure to refer to FLSA procedures in § 15 is totally unpersuasive.
III
Based on the language of § 15 (c) and on the legislative history, which is consistent with my interpretation of that language, I would hold that Congress intended to allow jury trials in ADEA suits against the Federal Government.

 As the Court of Appeals correctly noted:
“Since sovereign immunity bars all actions against the Government— actions tried to the court as well as those tried to a jury — it is difficult to see why this doctrine should create a presumption against any particular method of trial. . . . [O]nee Congress has waived the Government’s immunity, and where it has not explicitly specified the trial procedure to be followed, sovereign immunity drops out of the picture. Courts must then scrutinize the available indicia of legislative intent to see what trial procedure Congress authorized.” Nakshian v. Claytor, 202 U. S. App. D. C. 59, 63, n. 4, 628 F. 2d 59, 63, n. 4 (1980).
The Court’s reliance on Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957), is misplaced. See ante, at 160-161. There, the Court held that the statute of limitations prescribed by Congress barred petitioner’s claim against the United States, because the “disability” asserted by petitioner to toll the limitations period was not one of the disabilities enumerated in the statute. In this context, the Court, therefore, concluded that “limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly *171observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.” 352 U. S., at 276. That is, where Congress has expressly provided for limitations on the waiver of immunity, “exceptions [to the limitations] are not to be implied.” Ibid. That is not this case.

 There is of course no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial against the Federal Government. Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S. 372, 388-389 (1943); McElrath v. United States, 102 U. S. 426, 440 (1880).

 Rule 38 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not to the contrary. It provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.” There is no requirement in Rule 38 that Congress make its intent to authorize jury trials express, provided Congress otherwise makes its intent known. Indeed, Rule 38 was fully applicable at the time of Lorillard v. Pons, where this Court found a jury trial right even though the words “trial by jury,” did not appear in the statute. The Court does not argue otherwise in stating that Rule 38 requires “an affirmative statutory grant” of the jury trial right. Ante, at 165. The Court does not argue that Rule 38 requires a jury trial right to be express. Obviously, that argument would be frivolous since Lorillard found a jury trial right in the absence of an express provision conferring the right. Either Rule 38 does not require that the grant *172be express, as I suggest, or the unanimous holding of the Court in Lorillard was wrong.
Still, the Court misapprehends the thrust of my argument when it states that Rule 38 “hardly states a general rule that jury trials are to be presumed whenever Congress provides for cases to be brought in federal district courts." Ante, at 165. I have simply argued that conferral of jurisdiction on the district courts raises an inference of a jury trial right in suits against the United States, because the Court of Claims, where there is no jury trial right, is an available alternative forum for such cases. Here,
Congress chose for § 15 (c) cases the federal district courts, not the Court of Claims, as the appropriate forum.

 As originally passed, the definition of the term “employer” expressly excluded the United States, States, and political subdivisions from ADEA coverage. Pub. L. 90-202, § 11, 81 Stat. 605, 29 U. S. C. § 630 (b) (1970 ed.).

 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission assumed enforcement authority from the Civil Service Commission in 1978 pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, §2. 3 CFR 321 (1979), 5 U. S. C. App. p. 354 (1976 ed., Supp. III).

 Section 7 (c) of the ADEA, 29 U. S. C. § 626 (c), as it read when Lorillard was decided, stated in full:
“Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter: Provided, That the right of any person to bring such action shall terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Secretary to enforce the right of such employee under this chapter.”

 By construing the statute to allow a jury trial, the Court did not have to decide whether “the Seventh Amendment requires that in a private action for lost wages under the ADEA, the parties must be given the option of having the case heard by a jury.” 434 U. S., at 577.

 The Court’s statement that “[i]n Lorillard, the authorization for the award of ‘legal’ relief was significant largely because of the presence of a constitutional question” is not correct. Ante, at 163. To be sure, a constitutional question was present in Lorillard, but the Court specifically declined to ground its decision on the Seventh Amendment. See n. 7, supra. Rather, it construed the language “legal or equitable relief” in § 7 (c) of the ADEA. The Court concluded that when Congress used the words “legal . . . relief,” which are equally present in § 15 (c), it intended that a jury trial right be available. That Congress used the words “legal . . . relief” in § 7 (c) differently from the way it used the same words in § 15 (c) is implausible.
Moreover, the Court erroneously suggests that §§ 15 (a) and (b) are identical to §§ 717 (a) and (b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of *1751964, ante, at 163-164, for it fails to note that Title VII does not authorize the courts to award “legal relief,” as §15 (c) does.

 In United States v. Pfitsch, the Court construed § 10 of the Lever Act which conferred exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts to hear lawsuits brought by persons dissatisfied with the President's award of compensation for supplies requisitioned by the Federal Government. In deciding that a judgment rendered under § 10 is not reviewable in this Court by direct writ of error, the Court stated that Congress “had the issue clearly drawn between granting for the adjudication of cases arising under [§ 10] concurrent jurisdiction in the Court of Claims and the District Courts without a trial by jury, or of establishing an exclusive *176jurisdiction in the District Courts of which the right to a jury trial is an incident.” 256 U. S., at 552 (emphasis added).
That Congress did not, so far as the legislative history indicates, expressly debate vesting concurrent jurisdiction in the Court of Claims over ADEA suits against the Federal Government does not weaken the force of United States v. Pfitsch, despite the Court’s protestations to the contrary. Indeed, in Law v. United States, an important case that the Court virtually ignores, see ante, at 165, n. 13, it was of no significance whether Congress specifically considered vesting jurisdiction in the Court of Claims in order to conclude that the War Risk Insurance Act authorized a jury trial in a suit against the Federal Government. What is significant in the instant case is that, in allowing suits against the Government under the ADEA, Congress expressly opted for jurisdiction in the district courts and not the Court of Claims, which in lawsuits against the Government is a self-evident, alternative forum of which Congress was undoubtedly aware.

 One leading commentator has concluded:
“Congress may confer jurisdiction of actions against the United States upon a district court sitting as a court at law (or equity), as a court of claims, and as a court of admiralty. And the particular grant of jurisdiction will determine the method of trial, court or jury, in the absence of some express provision dealing with the method of trial. Thus, absent a provision as to the method of trial, a grant of jurisdiction to a district court as a court at law carries with it a right of jury trial.” 5 J. Moore, J. Lucas, & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 38.31 [2], p. 38-239 (1981) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
The Court rejects the force of the statute’s language. It suggests that, because of similarities between § 15 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress may simply have wished to. provide for federal-court jurisdiction because Title YII had. It argues further that Congress may also have thought that district court jurisdiction was appropriate since the statute provided for grant of equitable as well as legal relief, and that district courts, unlike the Court of Claims, are accustomed to awarding equitable relief. Ante, at 164, n. 12. These explanations are purely speculative. There is no basis in the legislative history for them and they are counter to the logical inferences from the language of the statute.

 Senator Bentsen also stated:
“There is no reason why private enterprise should be subject to restrictions that are not applicable to the Federal Government.
“What this legislation does is to give these workers coverage under the age discrimination law and to give them a procedure to pursue their complaints.” 120 Cong. Rec. 5741 (1974).

 Section 7 (c) of the ADEA, 29 U. S. C. §626 (e) (1976 ed., Supp. III), now provides:
“(1) Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter: Provided, That the right of any person to bring such action shall terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Secretary to enforce the right of such employee under this chapter.
“(2) In an action brought under paragraph (1), a person shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of fact in any such action for recovery of amounts owing as a result of a violation of this chapter, regardless of whether equitable relief is sought by any party in such action.”
The Court contends that the presence of express language granting a jury trial right in § 7 (c) in contrast to the absence of such express language in § 15 demonstrates that Congress “knew how to provide a statutory right to a jury trial when it wished to do so.” Ante, at 162. I find this argument hard to fathom. The Court recognizes, as it must, that there was no such express language in § 7 (c) when this Court decided in Lorillard that Congress intended ADEA actions against private employers to include a jury trial right, and that the express language relied on by the Court was added two months after Lorillard was decided and four years after the identical language which was construed in Lorillard was added to the ADEA in § 15(c). Therefore, unless the Court is suggesting that the unanimous holding in Lorillard was wrong, the Court is bound to apply the same analysis to this case.

 Compare Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550 F. 2d 834 (CA3 1977) (right to jury trial), cert, denied, 434 U. S. 1022 (1978), and Pons v. Lorillard, 549 F. 2d 950 (CA4 1977) (same), aff’d, 434 U. S. 575 (1978), with Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F. 2d 682 (CA6 1976) (no right to jury trial), vacated and remanded, 435 U. S. 911 (1978).

 Senator Kennedy further explained: “[J]uries are more likely to be open to the issues which have been raised by the plaintiffs. Sometimes, a judge may be slightly callous, perhaps because he himself is protected by life tenure, or because he is somewhat removed from the usual employer-employee relationship. The jury may be more neutral in such circumstances.” 123 Cong. Rec. 34318 (1977).

 Indeed, the Conference Report specifically noted that the Court had recently decided Lorillard v. Pons, and went on to state: “Because liquidated damages are in the nature of legal relief, it is manifest that a party is entitled to have the factual issues underlying such a claim decided by jury.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-950, p. 14 (1978).

 “The Supreme Court recently ruled that a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial in ADEA actions for lost wages, but it did not decide whether there is a right to jury trial on a claim for liquidated damages.” Id., at 13.

 The Court further suggests that, because the ADEA was patterned in significant respects after Title VII, and since Title VII has been held by lower federal courts not to allow a jury trial right, it follows that § 15 does not contemplate such a right. I find this argument unpersuasive, as the Court did in Lorillard. The Court has previously said that, despite important similarities between Title VII and the ADEA, “it is the remedial and procedural provisions of the two laws that are crucial and there we find significant differences.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S., at 584. “Congress specifically provided for both ‘legal or equitable relief’ in the ADEA, but did not authorize ‘legal’ relief in so many words under Title VII.” Ibid.

 This interpretation is supported by Congress’ extension of ADEA protection to employees of state and local governments, which occurred at the same time that Congress extended coverage to federal employees. Because the definitional section of the Act was amended to include state and local governments within the definition of “employer,” 29 U. S. C. § 630 (b), age discrimination complaints against state and local governments can be tried to a jury for the same reason that complaints against private entities can be. Nowhere in the legislative history did Congress evince a desire to allow state and local government employees a jury trial right, while withholding the same right from federal employees. Rather, federal employees were covered in a separate section of the Act, apparently so that existing administrative machinery could be used.