Court Opinion

ID: 9894909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 16:09:10.399843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:57.531892
License: Public Domain

J-S26042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 VICTOR RODRIGUEZ-GONZALEZ               :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 2130 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 23, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0001953-2018

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 VICTOR RODRIGUEZ-GONZALEZ               :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 2131 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 23, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0001954-2018

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                   FILED NOVEMBER 3, 2023

     Victor Rodriguez-Gonzalez appeals from the judgments of sentence at

two trial court dockets for his convictions for numerous crimes: attempted

murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm prohibited, conspiracy,

firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying a firearm in public in
J-S26042-23

Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of crime;1 and recklessly

endangering another person (“REAP”) and conspiracy – REAP.2, 3 Rodriguez-

Gonzalez challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence and the

admission of testimony. He also alleges prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm.

       Rodriguez-Gonzalez was arrested and charged in 2018 following a

shooting outside two bars. At his jury trial, the Commonwealth presented the

testimony of several people present at the scene. It first called one of the

victims, Wilman Gonzalez, to testify. He stated that on March 12, 2014, at a

little before 3:00 a.m., he was in Marmeliz Bar with friends. N.T., Nov. 20,

2019, at 52. He heard “two shots and then somebody came to the bar

knocking on the door and broke the glass.” Id. at 53. He testified the security

person exited the bar, and he and others followed. Id. at 54. He said that

when he walked outside, he was shot in the left shoulder and the bullet came

out his right side. Id. at 55-56. He stated that police officers put him in a

patrol car and took him to the hospital. Id. at 57. He further testified that

another person was shot in the foot. Id. Gonzalez testified that he was at

Temple for a month and ten days and that he will never be able to walk again.

Id. at 58. Gonzalez testified that he did not see who shot him. Id. at 63.

____________________________________________

1 Docket CP-51-CR-0001952.

2 Docket CP-51-CR-0001954-2018.

318 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), 6105(a)(1), 903, 6106(a)(1), 6108,
907, 2705, and 903, respectively.

                                           -2-
J-S26042-23

      Gorav Vij testified next. He stated that on the night of the shooting he

was at Tamborita Bar with his friends Samuel (also known as Rubio), Manny,

and Bud. Id. at 72, 74. While there, Samuel introduced Vij to Rodriguez-

Gonzalez, who went by Prieto. Id. at 76-77. Vij testified that he sat next to

Rodriguez-Gonzalez for two hours, Rodriguez-Gonzalez was wearing jeans and

a short-sleeve shirt with a sign on it, and had tattoos on both of his arms and

the back of his neck, and a mole on his face. Id. at 79-80.

      Vij testified that Tamborita Bar closed at 2:00 a.m., but they were

allowed to stay until 3:00 a.m. Id. at 81. When the group – including

Rodriguez-Gonzalez - left, they went across the street to Marmeliz Bar. Id. at

84. Its door was locked, and Samuel punched and kicked the door, and it

cracked. Id. at 85. The people in the Marmeliz Bar came out and the two

groups started fighting. Id. at 86. Vij testified that Rodriguez-Gonzalez said

that he was going to get his gun. Id. at 87.

      Vij said that when he saw Rodriguez-Gonzalez come back, Vij yelled,

“Come over here, come over here. Rubio [i.e., Samuel] is getting beat up.”

Id. 89. Vij stated he yelled that because Rodriguez-Gonzalez had a gun in his

hand. Id. Vij and Rodriguez-Gonzalez met, and Vij said, “Rubio is getting

fucked up.” Id. at 91. Vij testified that Rodriguez-Gonzalez said, “Fuck them,”

raised his arm, and shot at the Marmeliz Bar. Id. at 91-92.

      Vij testified that he then saw the individual who had beat up Samuel

(Rubio) run down D Street, and he asked Rodriguez-Gonzalez for the gun. Id.

at 97. Vij stated he took the gun and shot twice down D Street. Id. at 98. Vij

                                     -3-
J-S26042-23

then returned the gun to Rodriguez-Gonzalez, who put it “back behind his

belt.” Id. at 100. Vij stated that he, Rodriguez-Gonzalez, Samuel, and Manny

met later at Samuel’s house. Id. He testified that Rodriguez-Gonzalez stated

that he was going to destroy the gun. Id. Vij testified that he did not see

anyone else with a weapon during the fight. Id. at 101. The Commonwealth

showed video surveillance, and Vij identified individuals in the video, including

himself and Rodriguez-Gonzalez. Id. at 102. Vij testified that the video

showed the gunshots, and that Rodriguez-Gonzalez “shot twice.” Id. at 122.

      Vij testified that he cooperated with the Commonwealth and testified at

a grand jury investigation. Id. at 136-37. He said that he had entered an open

guilty plea, and that the Commonwealth had not made any promises about a

sentence. Id. at 157.

      On cross-examination, Vij admitted that he had not told the grand jury

that the group met at Samuel’s house after the shooting, and had not included

that fact in his statement to the police. Id. at 180-82. He also conceded that

after the police released a video of the shooting, he shaved his goatee to

change his appearance. Id. at 193-94. He further conceded that he was

arrested in 2019 for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 207. He

stated that the charge was dismissed because he was not drunk and that the

Commonwealth did not cancel his agreement due to the arrest. Id. at 207-

08. Vij also agreed that although he was arrested in the instant incident in

2014, he did not speak with police until 2017. Id. at 199-201. He admitted

                                      -4-
J-S26042-23

that he had pleaded guilty to lesser charges for the subject incident than those

with which he initially was charged. Id. at 204.

      On re-direct, the following exchange occurred regarding Rodriguez-

Gonzalez’s arrest:

         BY [THE ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY (“ADA”)]:

            Q Was Prieto ever arrested before you provided his name
            to the Commonwealth?

            A Yes.

            Q Was he?

            A Yes.

                    [DEFENSE    COUNSEL]:    Objection.   Asked   and
                    answered.

         BY [THE ADA]:

            Q He was arrested beforehand?

            A Yes.

                    THE COURT: Overruled.

                    THE WITNESS: Oh, no. He was not.

         BY [THE ADA]:

            Q Before you provided his name, had you heard he had
            been arrested?

            A No.

            Q Okay. Do you remember when it was that you were
            told that he had been arrested based on what you had
            told us?

            A Yeah, they said he got arrested for a DUI before that
            and then --

            Q I’m talking about --

                                     -5-
J-S26042-23

                   [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m going to object and ask
                   for a mistrial.

Id. at 224-25. Following an off-the-record discussion, the trial court instructed

the jury to disregard Vij’s last statement, which it struck from the record. Id.

at 225.

      At the end of Vij’s testimony, Rodriguez-Gonzalez’s counsel again

requested a mistrial based on Vij’s statement that Rodriguez-Gonzalez had

been arrested for a DUI. Id. at 233. The court denied the motion, noting that

Rodriguez-Gonzalez had declined a curative instruction. Id. at 234.

      The prosecution also presented the testimony of investigating police

officers. Detective Larry Aitkin testified that he responded to the crime scene

following the shooting. N.T., Nov. 21, 2019, at 5. He identified various

photographs he took that evening, including photographs of the four .40

caliber fired cartridge casings (“FCC”). Id. at 12. He testified he recovered

two FCCs on the sidewalk in front of D Street and two “a little bit further west

on Wyoming Avenue.” Id. at 14. On cross-examination, the following

exchange occurred:

          Q And FCCs, when you fire a semi-automatic weapon, it
          kicks out usually about 12 to 24 inches, something like that,
          from the weapon, correct?

          A I would say it could vary.

          Q Well, it goes up to, what, two feet; is this the generally-
          accepted provision?

          A I would say roughly. Yeah, I would say, yeah, probably
          somewhere around there.

                                         -6-
J-S26042-23

         Q In other words, you’re not going to fire a firearm over
         here and the FCCs are going to be across the two-lane
         street, correct?

         A No, it’s unlikely.

         Q Right. Someone would have to be on this corner, in this
         particular area, generally, firing for the FCCs to be there; is
         that correct?

         A That would be the assumption I would work on.

         Q Very well. These are found inside of the street and they’re
         .40 caliber, as well; is that right?

         A That’s right, sir.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And when I say “these,” I’m sorry,
            Your Honor, that would be the 2 Xs on the bottom of C-
            20 for purposes of this record.

            THE COURT: Thank you.

         BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

         Q Do you know the distance between where these two FCCs
         -- and they’re .40 caliber, too, right?

         A Yes, sir.

         Q And I’m referring to the ones on the corner here. And the
         distance between those two would be?

         A I don’t have the exact distance, sir.

Id. at 29-31.

      On re-direct, the ADA asked about the Detective’s experience with

shooting firearms. Detective Aitken replied he had fired a gun thousands of

times, and, in his experience, with the gun in front of him, the “ejection pull

would be on the right side of the gun” and the fired cartridge casing would go

back two to three feet and to the right, so that the casing “would land behind

a person’s right shoulder if they’re right-handed.” Id. at 39.

                                      -7-
J-S26042-23

     The Commonwealth then asked him hypothetical questions. For

example, it asked:

        Q Okay. And I want to show you 20-A. I want to ask you a
        couple questions about this. 20-A would be the chart.

        Detective, [defense counsel] was asking you some
        questions, and I’m going to ask you similar questions. If
        someone were facing down D Street and shot twice at D
        Street, there’s a chance that those two fired cartridge would
        be exactly where you have them marked, correct?

           [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

        BY [ADA]:

        Q Well, if you’re shooting in this direction, is it possible,
        hypothetically, since you said to the right and back three
        feet, that those -- someone would be shooting here down D
        Street, they would end up there?

           [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection to that hypothetical.
           He’s not been qualified as an expert.

           THE COURT: I’m going to sustain that.

                                    ...

        Q All right. Detective, how about these two? Would they
        follow the same trajectory that we’re talking about? In fact,
        if someone fired those, would they follow the same physics,
        to the right and back?

        A That’s the most likely scenario, correct.

        Q But when [defense counsel] pointed you here, did you
        need to find a fired cartridge casing to have the blood here
        or this victim here?

        A I think -- yeah, I understand where you’re coming from.
        And I think the issue is where did the shooting happen and
        where was the victim when the shooting happened, so –

        Q But my question is this, you framed it perfectly.

                                    -8-
J-S26042-23

          Do you need, if, in fact, someone was shooting either here
          or from here, and we have video – you’re not privy to the
          video, but if somebody were shooting and this man ended
          up getting shot in the back, would that person need to be
          standing here where the shell would only go there?[4]

                                           ...

          Q Would you agree with me that the victim was in front of
          Marmeliz?

          A Yes, sir.

          Q Would you agree with me that you found no fired cartridge
          casings, as [Defense Counsel] asked you, in front of
          Marmeliz?

          A That’s right.

          Q Does that mean that the shooter or the shooting could not
          have taken place from here?

              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

                                           ...

              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would object to the speculative
              nature of the shooting could not have taken place here.
              That calls for speculation.

              [ADA]: Judge, I don’t think based on his experience --

              THE COURT: All right. Brief sidebar, Counselors.

Id. at 42-46.

       After the sidebar discussion, which was held off the record, the court

permitted the Commonwealth to ask its questions:

          Q Detective, hypothetically, okay, you said that you found
          the fired cartridge casing at what address here, the ones on
          Wyoming?

____________________________________________

4 At this time, defense counsel objected because it was a compound question,

and the trial court sustained the objection.

                                           -9-
J-S26042-23

         A 444 East Wyoming in the street.

         Q Okay. And this is 458, correct?

         A That’s correct.

         Q Okay. The difference between that is how many
         properties; do you remember?

         A Twelve.

         Q Twelve properties.

         If you are -- if the victim has fallen here and the victim is in
         front of 458, sir, again, you don’t have video, you didn’t see
         video, you have a fired cartridge casing here, if the person
         is standing anywhere here back and through three feet,
         could he have made that shot?

         A Yes.

         Q And if a person were standing here at the corner, and,
         again, you don’t have video, and the person were shooting
         that way and, according to you, you say when you shoot
         your gun it goes back and three feet, would it be possible
         for you to have recovered these two fired cartridge casings
         from there if a person was shooting down that street?

         A If a person was standing on or near the sidewalk at D and
         Wyoming, yes.

Id. at 46-48.

      Another detective, Detective Thorsten Lucke, testified as an expert in

the recovery and analysis of digital surveillance video. Id. at 81. He testified

that there were surveillance videos from the bars, which were compiled

together into one video to show a timeline of the night. Id. at 82-83. During

his testimony, he drew the jurors’ attention to certain individuals in the video

or certain parts of the screen. See, e.g., id. at 90, 92, 93. Detective Lucke

pointed out a flash of light in the video, which was being played in slow motion,

                                     - 10 -
J-S26042-23

and he testified the flash was “consistent with the muzzle flash from a

firearm.” Id. at 96. Rodriguez-Gonzalez objected to Detective Lucke pointing

anything out in the video, a side-bar conference was held mid-testimony, and

he objected to the testimony regarding the muzzle flash. Id. at 89, 95, and

98.

      A third detective, Detective James Perfidio, testified that he was

assigned to investigate the shooting, and compiled a YouTube video from the

surveillance footage to circulate on social media. Id. at 115. Based on the

video, another police officer identified Vij. Id. at 115-16. He also testified

regarding the remaining investigation.

      Police Officer Raymond Andrejzcak, a ballistics expert, and Detective

Samuel Gonzalez, who identified Vij from the YouTube video, also testified.

      During defense counsel’s closing argument, he referenced Vij’s

cooperation with the Commonwealth, arguing Vij’s sentencing was postponed

until after his testimony and he was “going to get a hell of a deal”:

         You could read [Vij’s] agreement [with the Commonwealth].
         It’s right here. It says, Gorav Vij waives any rights to a
         prompt sentencing – it’s right here – and requests and
         agrees that the sentence be postponed until the District
         Attorney determines that his cooperation has been
         completed.

         Stop it. Don’t fool us. Now you know. It’s right here. Don’t
         be fooled with his nonsense, we’re busy. This is his duty.
         Self-preservation and freedom. We’re going to postpone this
         sentencing until [Vij’s] cooperation is done. Get [Rodriguez-
         Gonzalez] found guilty and [Vij is] going to get a hell of a
         deal.

N.T., 11/22/19, at 70-71.

                                    - 11 -
J-S26042-23

      During its closing, the Commonwealth responded to the attack on Vij’s

credibility:

          Let me tell you something about a little word called bias, B-
          I-A-S, because you’re going to hear a lot about it. You’re
          going to wonder and you’ve got to match the strength of a
          human being. And by the way, it’s disgusting when someone
          says to you, you got to win this case because if we win this
          case – there’s nothing in that language that says that. We
          would never do that. And you would read about it in the
          newspaper. I would never tell someone --

               [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

               [ADA]: -- that the basis of winning or losing --

               [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

               THE COURT: Your objection is noted.

               [ADA]: Thank you.

              So let’s go on to the bias and what this man had to face,
          what the deal says. And what that says is you had better
          tell the truth. And if you tell something other than the truth
          -- first of all, you are going to go to jail for many years. And
          guess what? He’s given the best confession ever. He’s
          confessed over and over and over again. And that’s what
          that young man sat with. When he was giving these
          answers, when he was doing just the simplest thing of
          saying, if you look at the Instagram, it’s there. That would
          be him.

Id. at 95-97.

      The jury found Rodriguez-Gonzalez guilty of attempted murder,

aggravated assault-causing serious bodily injury, conspiracy, firearms not to

be carried without a license, carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia,

possessing an instrument of crime, REAP, and conspiracy.

                                       - 12 -
J-S26042-23

      In June 2022, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 20 to 40

years’ incarceration followed by seven years’ probation. At sentencing

Rodriguez-Gonzalez made an oral motion for extraordinary relief. In that

motion, as well as in a post-sentence motion to compel, Rodriguez-Gonzalez

challenged Vij’s credibility and asked the court to order the Commonwealth to

produce documents from Vij’s criminal case. The documents he sought

included the transcript of Vij’s sentencing, Vij’s judgment of sentence, and any

sentencing memoranda filed in Vij’s case. See Defendant’s Motion to Compel,

filed July 5, 2022; N.T., June 23, 2022, at 4-12. Rodriguez-Gonzalez also filed

a post-sentence motion, wherein he requested a judgment of acquittal, sought

a new trial for various alleged trial court errors, and requested modification of

his sentence. The trial court denied the motion. Rodriguez-Gonzalez appealed.

      He raises the following issues:

         A. Were the guilty verdicts against the weight of the
         evidence for attempted murder, aggravated assault,
         conspiracy to commit murder, REAP and the firearms
         charges, as the only evidence tying [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] to
         the shooting was the corrupt, polluted and self-interested
         testimony of cooperating codefendant Gorav Vij, who was
         seen on video possessing and shooting a firearm. Moreover,
         complainant Wilman Gonzalez never testified that
         [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] was the shooter. There was no
         evidence that [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] even possessed a
         firearm and none was recovered?

         B. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict
         for attempted murder as the evidence did not establish that
         [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] had the specific intent to kill Wilman
         Gonzalez?

         C. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict
         for conspiracy to commit murder, as there was no evidence

                                     - 13 -
J-S26042-23

       of any agreement between [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] and
       another person to murder Wilman Gonzalez?

       D. Did the trial court err when it denied [Rodriguez-
       Gonzalez’s] motion for a mistrial after the prosecution
       recklessly elicited testimony from cooperating codefendant
       Gorav Vij that [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] had an arrest record,
       as this was unfairly prejudicial to [Rodriguez-Gonzalez], and
       violated his due process right to a fair trial? (N.T., 11/20/19,
       p. 225)

       Moreover, the prosecutor acted intentionally or with a
       conscious disregard that such prosecutorial overreaching
       would create a substantial risk that [Rodriguez-Gonzalez]
       would be deprived of a fair trial and violate [Rodriguez-
       Gonzalez’s] substantive and procedural due process rights.
       Accordingly, the convictions should be reversed and the
       Commonwealth barred from retrying [Rodriguez-Gonzalez],
       pursuant to the Pennsylvania and United States
       Constitutions.

       (Commonwealth v. Johnson, 231 A.3d 807, 826 (Pa.
       2020); Pa. Const. art. I, § 10; U.S. Const. amend. V) (Id.)

       E. During closing argument, did the trial court err in
       overruling    [Rodriguez-Gonzalez’s] objection to   the
       prosecutor’s improper personal vouching on behalf of its
       own case and witnesses’ credibility, which was unfairly
       prejudicial? (N.T., 11/22/19, p. 96)

       F. Did the trial court err in allowing Detective Larry Aitken
       to improperly answer various hypotheticals and provide
       expert-type testimony as to where the shooter could have
       been standing based on the location of FCCs? (N.T.,
       11/21/19, pp. 45-48)

       G. Did the trial court err in allowing improper testimony from
       Commonwealth witness Detective Thorsten Lucke, who was
       qualified as an expert in the recovery and analysis of digital
       surveillance video. Detective Lucke’s testimony exceeded
       the narrow scope of his expertise and was used to
       improperly instruct the jury as to what factual conclusions
       to draw and was done in a play-by-play fashion that was not
       only cumulative, but riddled with unfairly prejudicial
       commentary. Detective Lucke’s testimony exceeded the
       scope of his expertise, commenting on people’s

                                   - 14 -
J-S26042-23

         mannerisms, for instance, drawing the jury’s attention to
         aspects he thought interesting but that had nothing to do
         with his expertise in recovery and analysis of digital
         surveillance video? (N.T., 11/21/19, pp. 83-110)

Rodriguez-Gonzalez’s Br. at 9-10.

      Rodriguez-Gonzalez first argues the verdicts were against the weight of

the evidence, claiming the only evidence tying him to the shooting was the

“self-interested and polluted source of the cooperating co-defendant . . . Vij.”

Id. at 25. He points out that only Vij was seen on video shooting a firearm

and emphasizes that the victim did not identify the shooter. He notes that

there were many men on the street at the time of the shooting and that Vij

had been drinking prior to the fight. He argues that Vij lacked credibility,

noting   that   he   “received   extremely    favorable   treatment   from   the

Commonwealth,” as the serious charges were reduced to misdemeanors and

all charges as to Gonzalez were withdrawn and that he faced no consequences

even though he was arrested for a DUI after signing the agreement. Id. He

argues that Vij “ha[d] every reason to fabricate and implicate another, and

provided testimony of such questionable credibility, that the verdicts were

against the weight of the evidence as the verdicts were shocking to one’s

sense of justice.” Id. at 26.

      A challenge to the weight of the evidence must be presented to the trial

court, usually in a post-sentence motion, to preserve it for appellate review.

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 (providing “[a] claim that the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a

new trial[.]”). “[T]he purpose of [Rule 607] is to make it clear that a challenge

                                     - 15 -
J-S26042-23

to the weight of the evidence must be raised with the trial judge or it will be

waived.” Commonwealth v. Gillard, 850 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(citation omitted). An appellant’s failure to avail himself of any of the methods

for presenting a weight of the evidence issue to the trial court constitutes

waiver of that claim, even if the trial court responds to the claim in its Rule

1925(a) opinion. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 830 A.2d 1034, 1037 n.3

(Pa.Super. 2003).

      Here, Rodriguez-Gonzalez did not present his weight claim to the trial

court and therefore waived it. Although he challenged Vij’s credibility in his

motion for extraordinary relief and his motion to compel, he did not claim the

verdict was against the weight of the evidence in those motions. Further, he

did not raise a weight claim in his post-sentence motion. Because he did not

challenge the weight of the evidence before the trial court, we cannot address

it now. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607; Gillard, 850 A.2d at 1277.

      Rodriguez-Gonzalez’s next two issues argue that the Commonwealth

failed to present sufficient evidence to support the attempted murder and

conspiracy convictions. He first argues there was insufficient evidence to

support a finding that he had the specific intent to kill the victim. He claims

the evidence at most established aggravated assault. In his view, it shows

only that he shot twice at a group of people. He maintains there was no

evidence the shots were “fired intentionally at any vital part of any person’s

body.” Rodriguez-Gonzalez’s Br. at 29. He maintains the victim was a

bystander, not an intended victim. He acknowledges the law of transferred

                                     - 16 -
J-S26042-23

intent, but argues the transferred intent applies to aggravated assault, not

attempted murder. He claims there is no evidence he was trying to murder

anyone.

       He also claims there was insufficient evidence to support the conspiracy

conviction. He argues there was no evidence he agreed with another to murder

anyone. He argues that accepting the evidence as admitted, it shows that he

acted alone, that is, that he “alone – retrieved his own firearm and then he –

alone – discharged the firearm at the front door of the bar.” Id. at 31.

       When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine

whether the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient “to enable the fact-finder

to   find   every   element   of   the    crime   beyond   a     reasonable   doubt.”

Commonwealth v. Barnes, 871 A.2d 812, 819 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation

omitted). “[O]ur scope of review is limited to considering the evidence of

record, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, viewed in the light

most    favorable    to   the      Commonwealth      as    the     verdict    winner.”

Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d 416, 420–21 (Pa. 2014). Our standard

of review is de novo. Id. at 420.

       Criminal attempt occurs when, with intent to commit a specific crime, a

person commits any act that constitutes a substantial step toward the

commission of that crime. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). Under this standard, to

establish attempted murder, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant took “a substantial step toward the

commission of a killing, with the specific intent in mind to commit such an

                                         - 17 -
J-S26042-23

act.” Commonwealth v. Dale, 836 A.2d 150, 153 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation

omitted). Specific intent to kill may be inferred from evidence that the

defendant used a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body. Id.

      The evidence here was sufficient to prove attempted murder. The

testimony was that Rodriguez-Gonzalez left the fight and returned with a gun,

said, “Fuck them,” and fired it at the assailants. That was enough for the jury

to find specific intent to kill.

      The evidence was likewise sufficient to prove conspiracy. “To convict a

defendant of conspiracy, the trier of fact must find that: (1) the defendant

intended to commit or aid in the commission of the criminal act; (2) the

defendant entered into an agreement with another (a ‘co-conspirator’) to

engage in the crime; and (3) the defendant or one or more of the other co-

conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the agreed upon crime.”

Barnes, 871 A.2d at 819 (citation omitted). “The essence of a criminal

conspiracy, which is what distinguishes this crime from accomplice liability, is

the agreement made between the co-conspirators.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Direct evidence of the defendant’s criminal intent or the conspiratorial

agreement “is rarely available.” Id. at 820 (citation omitted). The

Commonwealth may prove the defendant’s intent and the agreement “through

circumstantial evidence, such as by the relations, conduct or circumstances of

the parties or overt acts on the part of the co-conspirators.” Id. (citation

omitted). If the trier of fact finds an agreement existed, and that the

defendant intentionally entered into it, the defendant “may be liable for the

                                     - 18 -
J-S26042-23

overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of which co-

conspirator committed the act.” Id. (citation omitted).

      The court found sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy conviction:

         Here, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence of
         an agreement between [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] and Vij to
         murder Wilman Gonzalez. [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] and Vij had
         an agreement and understanding that [Rodriguez-Gonzalez]
         would fire his weapon at the group outside of the Marmeliz
         Bar. Vij testified that during the fight he heard [Rodriguez-
         Gonzalez] yell “I’m getting my gun.” N.T. 11/20/19 at 87.

         [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] ran down the street and returned to
         the fight with his gun. Id. at 88. Knowing [Rodriguez-
         Gonzalez] had a gun, Vij signaled for [Rodriguez-Gonzalez]
         to “come over here” because “[Samuel] is getting beat up.”
         Id. at 89. Both [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] and Vij returned to
         the fight, and [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] lifted his gun, pointed
         at the group, said “fuck them,” and fired into the group. Id.
         at 91. These facts clearly establish that [Rodriguez-
         Gonzalez] and Vij both had a common plan for [Rodriguez-
         Gonzalez] to shoot at the group that had beaten [Samuel].

Trial Court Opinion (“1925(a) Op.”), filed Dec. 20, 2022, at 14.

      We agree that sufficient evidence supported the conspiracy conviction.

Rodriguez-Gonzalez stated that he was going to get his gun. When he

returned, Vij, who knew Rodriguez-Gonzalez had retrieved a gun, informed

him that their friend was getting beaten up. Rodriguez-Gonzalez then fired at

the group of people. The evidence of their concerted actions was sufficient to

prove a tacit agreement.

      In his next issue, Rodriguez-Gonzalez argues the trial court erred when

it denied his motion for a mistrial after the ADA “repeatedly asked reckless

questions about [Rodriguez-Gonzalez] being previously arrested.” Rodriguez-

                                    - 19 -
J-S26042-23

Gonzalez’s Br. at 33. He argues the misconduct was unfairly prejudicial and

violated his due process right to a fair trial. Id. He contends that “the vague

and imprecise series of questions eventually elicited unfairly prejudicial

information dealing with another arrest.” Id. He therefore claims that because

the ADA acted recklessly, that is, with a conscious disregard for a substantial

risk that he would be deprived of a fair trial, the verdicts should be reversed

and the Commonwealth barred from retrying him. Id. at 34. In support, he

cites Commonwealth v. Johnson, 231 A.3d 807 (Pa. 2020) (concluding

double jeopardy bars retrial where there is prosecutorial misconduct

undertaken with a conscious disregard for a substantial risk that the defendant

will be deprived of the right to a fair trial).

      “Prosecutorial misconduct occurs where the ‘unavoidable effect’ of the

prosecutor’s actions is to ‘prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias

and hostility towards the accused so as to hinder an objective weighing of the

evidence and impede the rendering of a true verdict.’” Commonwealth v.

Graham, 109 A.3d 733, 736 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Chmiel, 777 A.2d 459, 464 (Pa.Super. 2001)). When we review a claim of

improper prosecutorial comments, we determine whether the court abused its

discretion. Commonwealth v. Noel, 53 A.3d 848, 858 (Pa.Super. 2012). We

focus “on whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial, not a perfect

one[.]” Id.

      In Graham, the defendant was tried for sexual assault crimes against

his daughter. 109 A.3d at 735. During the trial, the defendant’s wife

                                       - 20 -
J-S26042-23

volunteered during her testimony that her son was also a victim. Id. The

following exchange occurred during the Commonwealth’s questioning of the

wife:

           Q. Why did he offer to call?

           A. To apologize. That’s—

           Q. Did he say that?

           A. Yes, more or less tell them I’m sorry.

           Q. When you say them, who?

           A. My son was also involved.

           Q. That’s not what we’re here about today.

           A. No.

Id. at 737 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

        We concluded the exchange did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.

We pointed out the prosecutor did not “ask, directly or indirectly, about any

unrelated criminal conduct,” and the line of questioning pertained only to

daughter. Id. at 737. We noted that although the “prosecutor could have

worded his final question to Wife more carefully, the fact remains that he

never prompted Wife to begin referring to more than one victim.” Id. at 738.

We concluded the exchange, “considered by itself,” did not “evince[]

prosecutorial misconduct, much less an intent to provoke a mistrial or deprive

[the defendant] of a fair trial.” Id.

        Similarly, here, the prosecutor did not ask about unrelated criminal

conduct.     As     Rodriguez-Gonzalez     acknowledges,   the   prosecutor   was

attempting to elicit information about the arrest in the current case, not other

                                         - 21 -
J-S26042-23

arrests. Rodriguez-Gonzalez’s Br. at 33. We cannot find that the “unavoidable

effect” of this brief exchange, formed in the jurors’ minds a “fixed bias and

hostility towards the accused so as to hinder an objective weighing of the

evidence and impede the rendering of a true verdict.” Graham, 109 A.3d at

736. The court therefore did not err in denying the motion for a new trial.

Because we find the court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial,

we need not determine whether any re-trial is barred by double jeopardy

principles.

      Rodriguez-Gonzalez next argues the trial court erred in overruling his

objection to the ADA’s improper personal vouching for its case and the

witnesses. He argues the ADA personally vouched for all the witnesses, which

had a prejudicial effect on the jury. He references the ADA’s comments during

closing regarding Vij’s testimony. Rodriguez-Gonzalez’s Br. at 36. He notes a

question by the jury asking to see “two portions of the video in order to better

see the individual identified by the ADA as the defendant.” Id. at 36-37

(quoting N.T., Nov. 25, 2019, at 3). Rodriguez-Gonzalez claims the question

shows the jury was deferring to what the ADA said the facts should be.

      “[V]ouching is a form of prosecutorial misconduct, occurring when a

prosecutor ‘places the government’s prestige behind a witness through

personal assurances as to the witness’s truthfulness, and when it suggests

that information not before the jury supports the witness’s testimony.”

Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 165 A.3d 34, 42 (Pa.Super. 2017) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427, 447 (Pa. 2014)). “Improper bolstering

                                     - 22 -
J-S26042-23

or vouching for a government witness occurs where the prosecutor assures

the jury that the witness is credible, and such assurance is based on either

the prosecutor's personal knowledge or other information not contained in the

record.” Id. at 42-43 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111,

1180 (Pa. 2011)).

      Although “it is improper for a prosecutor to express a personal belief as

to the credibility of the defendant or other witnesses,” the prosecutor “may

comment on the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 43 (quoting Commonwealth

v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1020 (Pa.Super. 2009)). Moreover, “a prosecutor is

allowed to respond to defense arguments with logical force and vigor” and

“[i]f defense counsel has attacked the credibility of witnesses in closing, the

prosecutor may present argument addressing the witnesses’ credibility.” Id.

(quoting Judy, 978 A.2d at 1020).

      Here, the trial court found the Commonwealth did not engage in

improper bolstering or vouching. It found the ADA’s comments were a

response   to   defense   counsel’s   closing   argument,   which   focused   on

undermining Vij’s credibility and highlighted his potential bias because of his

cooperation. 1925(a) Op. at 19. The court found the Commonwealth’s rebuttal

was appropriate because “it was in fair response to points made in [Rodriguez-

Gonzalez’s] closing.” Id. It further noted the Commonwealth’s comments

were based on Vij’s agreement, which was in evidence.

      We agree with the trial court and conclude the Commonwealth did not

engage in improper bolstering or vouching. Rather, it responded to Rodriguez-

                                      - 23 -
J-S26042-23

Gonzalez’s arguments attacking Vij’s credibility and in support, it relied on

evidence admitted at trial. To the extent Rodriguez-Gonzalez claims the

Commonwealth also bolstered the testimony of other witnesses, he does not

specify where in the record such bolstering occurred, other than “right before”

the quoted section. We do not see any comments that improperly vouched for

witnesses prior to the comments regarding Vij.

      Rodriguez-Gonzalez’s final two issues challenge evidentiary rulings.

This Court will reverse an evidentiary ruling only for an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 230 A.3d 480, 489 (Pa.Super. 2020). An

abuse of discretion is “not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the

overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality,

as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d

736, 749 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 A.2d

1182, 1188-89 (Pa.Super. 2009)).

      First, Rodriguez-Gonzalez argues the court erred in allowing Detective

Aitken to give improper opinion testimony. He argues the ADA’s hypothetical

questions about the shooter’s location elicited testimony that required

scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge. Because Officer Aitken was not

qualified as an expert, Rodriguez-Gonzalez maintains the testimony was

improper.

      Lay opinion testimony is governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence

701, which provides that:

                                     - 24 -
J-S26042-23

         If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the
         form of an opinion is limited to one that is:

         (a) rationally based on the witness[’] perception;

         (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness[’] testimony
         or to determining a fact in issue; and

         (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
         knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

Pa.R.Evid. 701.

      The trial court concluded the testimony was permissible lay opinion:

         [B]ased on his perception of the crime scene and his twenty-
         nine years of experience as a police officer, Detective Aitken
         testified to two possible locations of the shooter based on
         the location of the four fired cartridge cases. The crime
         scene reflected two sets of fired cartridge cases: one set
         located in front of 458 East Wyoming Avenue and the other
         set located on D Street. N.T. 11/21/19 at 16. Detective
         Aitken formed his opinion based on his extensive experience
         with how guns function, noting that he shot a gun
         “thousands” of times, and further testified that in his
         experience with most guns, the fire cartridge casings project
         from the gun and land “two to three feet” behind the
         shooter’s back. Id. at 39. Based on his perception of the
         crime scene, Detective Aitken provided testimony of
         possible locations of the shooter. This was permissible lay
         opinion testimony and did not require the specialized
         knowledge of an expert. Therefore, this court did not err in
         permitting Detective Aitken to answer the Commonwealth’s
         hypotheticals about the shooter’s location based off the
         location of the cartridge casings.

1925(a) Op. at 20.

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The testimony was

permissible lay opinion testimony, for the reasons outlined by the trial court.

Further, we point out that Rodriguez-Gonzalez asked about the location of the

                                     - 25 -
J-S26042-23

casings on cross-examination, and the Commonwealth’s re-direct regarding

the location of the casings was permissible in response.

      Second, Rodriguez-Gonzalez argues that Detective Lucke’s testimony

regarding the video exceeded the scope of his expertise and was improper

and unfairly prejudicial. He argues the testimony went beyond the technical

aspects of the Detective Lucke’s expertise when he testified in a play-by-play

fashion that was cumulative and “direct[ed] the jury what factual conclusions

to draw beyond the technical aspect of the surveillance videos.” Rodriguez-

Gonzalez’s Br. at 41. Rodriguez-Gonzalez pointed out that the Detective

“repeatedly told the jury to ‘draw’ their ‘attention’ to things such as people’s

mannerisms, what he believed was interesting, and what he believed to be a

‘muzzle’ flash, etc.” which was outside the scope of his expertise and purpose

for testifying. Id. He claimed that Detective Lucke “told the jury what they

ought to believe they saw and implicitly what weight to give certain things,

instead of proffering testimony regarding the recovery and analysis of

surveillance video.” Id. He argues the court abused its discretion in admitting

the testimony over an objection. He argues the testimony was cumulative and

outside the scope of the Detective’s expertise and should have been

suppressed.

      In Commonwealth v. Cole, 135 A.3d 191 (Pa.Super. 2016), a police

detective narrated video footage from security cameras that showed three

individuals leave an apartment and walk out of view, the victim then

                                     - 26 -
J-S26042-23

staggering and falling to the ground, and the same three individuals running

away and fleeing in a vehicle. Id. at 192. The detective

         pointed out the time stamp at various points in the video;
         he described the location of the cameras to the scene, the
         physical relationships between people and buildings, and
         the movements of a vehicle; he identified three men leaving
         an apartment and running along the fence line and the
         victim staggering and falling down. Using measurements he
         and his colleague took, the video footage, and the time
         stamps, [the detective] calculated the direction, distance,
         and time covered by the three individuals.

Id. at 196 (internal citations to record omitted).

      We concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

narration. We reasoned the testimony was based on the detective’s

experience, perceptions, and his personal knowledge of the scene, and the

testimony was relevant to the jury’s understanding of the timing, the actors,

and the location of the events depicted. We further concluded that his

testimony did not cause unfair prejudice or undue delay, confuse the issues,

mislead the jury, or needlessly present cumulative evidence. Id.; see also

Commonwealth v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097, 1106 (Pa.Super. 2016) (finding

court did not err in allowing detective to describe images in video and call

attention to specific portions of video); Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d

85, 101 (Pa.Super. 2018) (court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

detective’s identification of shooter from video, which was based on his

perception of the video and placed his action in context, and noting the jury

watched the video and was free to reach a different conclusion).

                                     - 27 -
J-S26042-23

     Like the testimony in Cole, Detective Lucke’s testimony here was based

on his experience, perception and knowledge of the scene, and the testimony

was relevant to the jury’s understanding of the actors and location of the

events depicted. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

testimony.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 11/03/2023

                                  - 28 -