Court Opinion

ID: 9472206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:52:38.655853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:48.007465
License: Public Domain

LUMBARD, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Although I concur in affirmance of the convictions, I would rest the decision on somewhat different grounds.
I agree that the AUSA should have refrained from questioning Edler at the pre-arraignment interview once he knew that the Legal Aid assigned counsel had requested that there be no questioning. But I cannot agree that the introduction at trial of the statements obtained during the interview was harmless. Nonetheless I would hold that the evidence was properly admitted on cross-examination under Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971).
Two statements are at issue here. First, Edler testified at trial that when the customs officers stopped him on the pier holding a duffel bag full of cheese, the bag had just fallen off the truck; He stated that he picked it up with no idea of its contents, and carried it three or four feet from the truck to determine if it was garbage to be thrown out, or goods to be placed on the ship. On cross-examination, that testimony was impeached with Edler’s pre-arraignment statement to AUSA Sobol that he had carried the duffel bag thirty feet from where it lay when he found it. Second, Edler testified at trial that at about 5 P.M. on the day in question, he drove his own car onto the pier and left it there, returning later that night to drive Foley’s ear home for him, as Foley was too drunk to drive it himself. On cross-examination, that testimony was impeached with Edler’s pre-ar-raignment statement to AUSA Sobol, in response to the question how his car came to be on the pier that night, that “probably Abie the Jew brought it on.”
My colleagues conclude that any error in introducing those statements on cross-examination of Edler was harmless, because all the other evidence against both defendants was strong, and the statements themselves were “relatively innocuous.” As to the testimony concerning the distance *50Edler carried the bag containing the cheese, I agree, as the fact itself is too insignificant to infer any intentional misrepresentation from the inconsistency. But as to the question of how Edler’s car came to be on the pier that night, I respectfully disagree. The introduction of the pri- or inconsistent statement on that question made Edler out to be an egregious liar on an important matter relevant to his guilt. Even if neither of the accounts is particularly more incriminating than the other, the inconsistency could only be construed as intentional, and strongly suggests Edler’s own perception that he had something to hide.
Consequently, in my opinion it would have been reversible error had the government been permitted to use the statement in its direct case. However, as the government used the statements only on cross-examination, I would conclude that under Harris v. New York, supra, such use was not reversible error, and would affirm the conviction on that basis.1
In addition, I think the court should refrain from comment on the general propriety of pre-arraignment interviews. The United States Attorney is undoubtedly aware that where, as in this case, the interview is conducted in an improper manner or occasions too long a delay in arraignment, the use of any fruits of that interview may be jeopardized. As individual allegations of impropriety come before us, we act on the facts of the case, in accordance with applicable law, and that should be enough. Unless we are prepared to hold that pre-arraignment interviews are categorically barred — which on at least four occasions we have stopped short of doing, see majority opinion, supra; United States v. Perez, 733 F.2d 1026, 1036 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1150-51 (1980); United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15, 23, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 3173, 49 L.Ed.2d 1188 (1976) — I think little is to be gained by general exhortations in that direction.
Furthermore, I do not believe any sweeping prohibition is justified or is wise. Not infrequently, a pre-arraignment interview results in a modification of the charge to be filed or even some arrangement to postpone or forego charges entirely in return for cooperation with the government. Such a development may well be to the advantage of the detainee as well as to the government. The mere fact that some prospective defendants may in the course of the interview make damaging statements or commit themselves to a story that restricts their options at trial hardly seems to me a persuasive counterargument, as long as other procedural safeguards — e.g., administering & Miranda warning and respecting the requests of counsel to stop questioning the detainee — are followed.

. Had AUSA Sobol's interrogation of Edler taken place after arraignment, his failure to cease the interrogation after counsel had so requested would have violated Edler’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and any evidence obtained would have been inadmissible on cross-examination, as well as in the government’s case in chief. See United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 588-91 (2d Cir.1983); cf. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 1297, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979) (evidence obtained in violation of defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination inadmissible on cross-examination). But as formal charges had not yet been filed, Edler’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached. See United States v. Kirby, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.1980).
However, the interrogation of Edler in contravention of counsel’s specific request did violate the right to counsel created by the Court in Miranda, “not to vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, but * * * ‘to guarantee full effectuation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination * * *’ Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 1779, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966).” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). This conclusion presumes that counsel as an agent of the defendant may assert defendant's Miranda rights to have counsel present, at least until that assertion is knowingly and directly repudiated by defendant. However, I think that presumption is implicit in cases holding that pre-arraignment interrogation of a defendant without counsel present, despite counsel’s specific request to be present, is a violation of defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, even when defendant has himself knowingly waived his right to counsel. See United States v. Miller, 432 F.Supp. 382 (W.D.N.Y.1977); United States v. Howard, 426 F.Supp. 1067, 1071 (W.D.N.Y.1977); cf. United States v. Wedra, 343 F.Supp. 1183, 1185 (S.D.N.Y.1972); United States ex rel. Magoon v. Reincke, 304 F.Supp. 1014, 1019 (D.Conn.1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.1969) (same with regard to defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel). But as evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's Miranda rights is admissible on cross-examination under Harris v. New York, supra, such use here was not reversible error.