Court Opinion

ID: 9488305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:41:44.326813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:48.945381
License: Public Domain

*251NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that there was no forcible entry in this ease, and that even if the entry were determined to be forcible, that the officers knocked and announced and then waited a reasonable length of time before entering the apartment. I disagree with both conclusions.
The majority concludes that the testimony of Quinton Campbell and Officer McCoy establishes that an occupant of the apartment opened the door, and thus there was no forcible entry. My review of the evidence and the findings of the district court, however, reveal that it was only clearly established that the door was unlocked by Campbell. Campbell testified that he unlocked the door but that he did not open the door. J.A. at 83-84.1 As indicated in the majority opinion, Officer McCoy responded affirmatively to questions of whether the door was “opened” by those inside. See Maj. Op. at 250. Nevertheless, the content of the officer’s answers indicates that he was testifying that the door was unlocked from the inside. See J.A. at 90-91, 94. Furthermore, the district court did not make a finding of fact that the door was opened from the inside. Instead, the district court found that one occupant “had time to go up to the door and apparently unlock the door, at which time it flew open.” J.A. at 99-100 (emphasis added). The district court reiterated this finding a few moments later, stating that “on the totality of the circumstances here it seems to the court that there was a knock, there was an interval of time, there was an opening of the latch from inside the door or the lock and then it was at that time that the door flew open.” See id. at 101. Where a door is unlocked but not opened by those inside, there is a forcible entry triggering knock and announce principles. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 590, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 1758-59, 20 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968) (“An unannounced intrusion into a dwelling — what § 3109 basically proscribes— is no less an unannounced intrusion whether officers break down a door, force open a chain lock on a partially open door, open a locked door by use of a passkey, or, as here, open a closed but unlocked door.”); United States v. Kemp, 12 F.3d 1140, 1141 (D.C.Cir.1994) (holding that “officer’s entry through a closed door is a ‘breaking’ within the meaning of § 3109, regardless whether the door was locked”); United States v. Tolliver, 665 F.2d 1005, 1008 (11th Cir.) (holding that where “door to the apartment was not fully opened by an occupant, the force used by the agents to gain admittance invoked § 3109”), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935, 102 S.Ct. 1991, 72 L.Ed.2d 455 (1982).
The majority also holds that even if there were a forcible entry, the officers knocked and announced and waited a reasonable amount of time before entering. Although I agree that the officers knocked and announced their presence, I do not believe that the officers waited a reasonable amount of time before entering the apartment. Three occupants of the apartment testified about the time between the officers’ first knock and their entry into the apartment. Sheila Susana testified that three to four minutes passed. J.A. at 62, 67. Robert Bell testified that it was about five seconds. J.A. at 76-77. Quinton Campbell testified that it was about 10 or 15 seconds. J.A. at 83-84. My own review of the videotape indicates that not more than seven seconds elapsed between the first knock and the officers’ entry into the apartment. I believe that under the facts of this case, this was an unreasonably short period for the officers to wait prior to forcibly entering the apartment.
This court has held
that law enforcement officers may not take lightly the requirement of § 3109 that bursting into apartments is permitted only “after notice of [the officers’] authority and purpose [and they are] refused admit-tance_” 18 U.S.C. § 3109. Cases in which officers make a forced entry seconds after announcing their authority and purpose will be carefully scrutinized in the *252future to determine whether there is compliance with the requirements of § 3109.
United States v. Nabors, 901 F.2d 1351, 1354-55 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871, 111 S.Ct. 192, 112 L.Ed.2d 154 (1990).2 Given the nature of this reasonableness inquiry, the length of time that officers must wait before forcing an entry necessarily varies with the circumstances of each case. United States v. Chambers, 382 F.2d 910, 916 (6th Cir.1967). Nevertheless, my review of authority on this issue indicates that where officers have waited less than ten seconds after knocking and announcing before forcibly entering the premises, and there are no exigent circumstances to justify such a rapid entry, courts have generally found that such action violates § 3109. See United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1218 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that officers violated § 3109 where officers entered less than five seconds after knocking and announcing and there were no exigent circumstances to excuse this misconduct); United States v. Rodriguez, 663 F.Supp. 585, 587-89 (D.D.C.1987) (noting that “this Court has been unable to uncover any reported case in this or any other circuit, upholding the legitimacy of a forcible entry when the officers waited less than 10 to 20 seconds,” listing cases, and holding that “3 to 5 seconds is insufficient time to constitute ‘refused admittance’ under [§ 3109]”).
In its arguments before this court, the government appears to suggest that exigent circumstances justified the rapid entry here, as the government points out that “[n]areot-ics are particularly susceptible to ready destruction, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), and any extended delay after officers announce their presence would only allow drug traffickers the opportunity to destroy their contraband.” Gov’t Br. at 8. While it is true that the destruction of narcotics evidence can create an exigent circumstance justifying rapid entry, it does not automatically generate such an exigency. See Rodriguez, 663 F.Supp. at 589 (holding that sole fact that narcotics are easily disposed of is not sufficient for creating exigent circumstance warranting rapid entry). Furthermore, in the instant case, I find the government’s suggestion of a destruction of narcotics evidence exigency unpersuasive because the cocaine had been removed from the package prior to the controlled delivery. See J.A. at 8. As such, no reasonable person could fear that such narcotics evidence would be destroyed. Furthermore, the record contains no assertion that the officers believed, or had any reasonable basis for believing that it was likely that other narcotics would be found in the apartment. Consequently, I conclude that the officers could have no reasonable belief that it was likely that any narcotics evidence would be destroyed in a manner warranting their extremely rapid entry into the apartment. Finally, the government has not argued that the safety of the officers justified their rapid entry. In sum, I believe that there were no exigent circumstances that justified the officers’ rapid entry into the apartment in this case.
Although the officers did knock and announce their presence, they waited less than seven seconds before forcibly entering the apartment in the absence of exigent circumstances. I conclude that the officers’ actions violated common-law knock and announce principles as embodied in § 3109, and thus violated Gatewood’s right to a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. I would thus reverse the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence and require that the evidence seized as a result of the unlawful search be suppressed. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion.

. Specifically Campbell testified as follows:
Q. You said unlocked, is there a dead bolt?
A. That is what I unlocked, the dead bolt. Q. Did you open the door?
A. No, no ma’am, I did not open it.
J.A. at 83-84.

. Technically, as the majority opinion notes, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 is not applicable in this case. The Supreme Court, however, has described § 3109 as a codification of the common law. See Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 589, 591 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. at 1757-58, 1759 n. 8; see also United States v. Finch, 998 F.2d 349, 353 (6th Cir.1993) (noting the Supreme Court's description of § 3109 as a codification of the common law). In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wilson v. Arkansas, - U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995), that the common law knock-and-announce principle is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment, I find caselaw interpreting application of the principles embodied in § 3109 to be instructive here.