Court Opinion

ID: 9925939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 15:09:43.089531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:51.026431
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dwayne Hill,                                    :
                              Petitioner        :
                                                :
                      v.                        :    No. 311 M.D. 2022
                                                :    Submitted: December 4, 2023
Governor of the Commonwealth                    :
of Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania’s             :
Board of Probation and Parole,                  :
                        Respondents             :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                      FILED: January 23, 2024

       Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections
(POs) of the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole (Board)1 (collectively, Respondents), to the petition
for review in the nature of a complaint titled “Complaint in Equity” (Petition) filed
by Dwayne Hill (Petitioner), a pro se inmate currently incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution at Phoenix and serving a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment without parole (LWOP) for second degree murder.2                         Although
Petitioner admittedly was 20 years old when he committed this crime, he avers in

       1
         The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole was renamed the Pennsylvania Parole
Board. See Sections 15, 16, and 16.1 of the Act of December 18, 2019, P.L. 776, No. 115 (effective
February 18, 2020); see also Sections 6101 and 6111(a) of the Prisons and Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S.
§§ 6101, 6111(a).
       2
         See Section 2502(b) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b) (murder of the second
degree); Section 1102(b) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b) (setting penalty for second
degree murder as “a term of life imprisonment”).
his Petition that he should have been viewed as a juvenile for whom the United States
Supreme Court has deemed a LWOP sentence unconstitutional. See Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). He also claims that Section 6137(a)(1) of the Prisons
and Parole Code (the Code) providing, in pertinent part, that “[t]he [B]oard may
parole . . . any offender to whom the power to parole is granted to the [B]oard . . . ,
except an offender condemned to death or serving life imprisonment[,]” 61 Pa.C.S.
§ 6137(a)(1), is unconstitutional. Petitioner further reasons that when he was
sentenced to LWOP, he received an implied minimum sentence of one day of
confinement and asks this Court to direct the Board to review him for parole. In
their POs, Respondents allege lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, improper parties,
and failure to exhaust a statutory remedy, and assert a demurrer.3 Upon our review,
we sustain Respondents’ POs asserting this Court’s lack of jurisdiction and dismiss
the Petition.

I.    PETITION

      The pertinent facts as asserted in the Petition are as follows. In October 1991,
a jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder and related charges for which
Petitioner was sentenced to LWOP on the second degree murder conviction along
with concurrent sentences on the related charges. (Petition ¶¶ 5-7.) Petitioner
maintains that Section 6137 of the Code is unconstitutional as violating his right to

      3
         See Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(1), (4), (7), (8), Pa.R.Civ.P.
1028(a)(1), (4), (7), (8).

                                           2
equal protection,4 to due process,5 to be protected from cruel and unusual
punishments,6 and to protection under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165.7 In reliance on the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Miller, wherein the Supreme Court held that “the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders,” 567 U.S. at 479, Petitioner reasons that
his sentence does not “bar him from review” as he had just turned 20 years old at the
time of his arrest. (Petition ¶¶ 8-11, 15.) Petitioner states his history of mental and

       4
            The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. Article 1, section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that “[n]either the
Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of
any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right.” Pa. Const.
art. I, § 26.
          5
            The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State . . .
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. Article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states, in relevant part, that
“the accused . . . cannot . . . be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of
his peers or the law of the land.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 9.
          6
            The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. Article I, section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is nearly identical,
stating: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments
inflicted.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 13.
          7
            Section 202 of the ADA, relating to public services, provides, in relevant part, that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A “disability,” with
respect to an individual, is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of such individual”; “a record of such an impairment”; or “being
regarded as having such an impairment . . . .” Section 3(1) of the ADA 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). A
“public entity” includes “any State or local government” as well as “any department . . . of a State
. . . or local government.” Section 201(1)(A)-(B) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)-(B). The
United States Supreme Court has held that prisons are included under the definition of a “public
entity,” and inmates may bring ADA claims against state prisons. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey,
524 U.S. 206, 208-12 (1998).

                                                   3
emotional disorders, low intelligence quotient, and scientific research showing one’s
brain continues to develop through early adulthood, qualify him as a “child” under
a “strict . . . reading of the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act” (Juvenile Act)8 because he
was under the age of 21 when he was convicted of second degree murder and had
committed a delinquent act before he was 18 years old. Petitioner contends that
considering him a “child” under the Juvenile Act would further the
Commonwealth’s goal of reforming and rehabilitating offenders and would be in
line with other states wherein a sentence of LWOP is not imposed on those convicted

       8
           Under the Juvenile Act, a “[c]hild” is defined as one who:

       (1) is under the age of 18 years;

       (2) is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before
           reaching the age of 18 years; or

       (3) is under the age of 21 years and was adjudicated dependent before reaching the
           age of 18 years, who has requested the court to retain jurisdiction and who
           remains under the jurisdiction of the court as a dependent child because the
           court has determined that the child is:

               (i)     completing secondary education or an equivalent credential;

               (ii)    enrolled in an institution which provides postsecondary or
                       vocational education;

               (iii)   participating in a program actively designed to promote or
                       remove barriers to employment;

               (iv)    employed for at least 80 hours per month; or

               (v)     incapable of doing any of the activities described in
                       subparagraph (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) due to a medical or behavioral
                       health condition, which is supported by regularly updated
                       information in the permanency plan of the child.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6302.

                                                    4
of second degree murder. (Id. ¶¶ 15-19.) Petitioner also argues that, in light of
Commonwealth v. Ulbrick, 341 A.2d 68 (Pa. 1975) (per curiam), holding that an
inmate had a presumed minimum sentence of one day of confinement where the
sentencing court imposed a “flat sentence” of 20 years but failed to include a
minimum sentence as required by law, id. at 69, “[b]ecause the [] sentencing [c]ourt
failed to impose a minimum sentence, there should have been an implied minimum
sentence of [one] day, making [Petitioner] eligible for parole as well.” (Petition ¶
13.)   Petitioner asks this Court to hold that Section 6137 of the Code is
unconstitutional and to declare that he is eligible for consideration for parole by the
Board. (Petition, Wherefore Clause.)
II.    POs
       Respondents filed their POs asking this Court to dismiss the Petition with
prejudice, or in the alternative transfer it to common pleas, asserting this Court “lacks
jurisdiction over Petitioner’s collateral attack on his sentence for murder via a
strained argument about the constitutionality of 61 Pa.[C.S.] § 6137.” (POs ¶ 5.)
Respondents maintain Petitioner’s claims sound in the nature of an application for
post-conviction relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),9 over which
this Court lacks jurisdiction. See Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code, 42
Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i) (excluding from this Court’s original jurisdiction “actions or
proceedings in the nature of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-
conviction relief not ancillary to proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of the
[C]ourt”). (POs ¶¶ 5-11.) In addition, Respondents argue the claims brought against
them in the Petition should be dismissed, as they are not proper parties to the Petition
because Petitioner presents a direct challenge to his LWOP sentence and alleges no

       9
           42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

                                           5
adverse actions on the part of Respondents. (Id. ¶¶ 12-16.) Also, Respondents allege
that Petitioner, who challenges the constitutionality of a LWOP sentence for second
degree murder under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b), failed to exhaust his statutory remedies
under the PCRA, which is the sole means through which an individual convicted of
a crime may seek collateral relief. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.) Finally, Respondents posit that
even if this Court was to reach the merits of Petitioner’s claims, Petitioner has not
stated a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, as the United States Supreme
Court determined a sentence of LWOP does not constitute a cruel and unusual
punishment for an adult offender. (Id. ¶¶ 20-22.) Respondents also point out that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently rejected a claim that “the General
Assembly intended for second degree murder convictions to be parole eligible.” (Id.
¶ 23 (citing Hudson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 204 A.3d 392 (Pa. 2019)).)

III.   DISCUSSION
       Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1516(b) authorizes the filing of
POs to an original jurisdiction petition for review in this Court. Pa.R.A.P. 1516(b).
In ruling on Respondents’ POs, we are mindful that

       [this Court] must accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations in
       the [Petition], as well as all inferences reasonably deduced therefrom.
       The Court need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted
       inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of
       opinion. In order to sustain [POs], it must appear with certainty that the
       law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be resolved by a
       refusal to sustain them. A [PO] in the nature of a demurrer admits every
       well-pleaded fact in the [Petition] and all inferences reasonably
       deducible therefrom. It tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged
       pleadings and will be sustained only in cases where the pleader has
       clearly failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When
       ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to the [Petition].

                                           6
McNew v. East Marlborough Township, 295 A.3d 1, 8-9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)
(citations omitted).

       A.      Objection for Lack of Jurisdiction
       In their first PO, Respondents contend this Court lacks jurisdiction over the
Petition. In support of this contention, Respondents cite Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the
Judicial Code which states, in pertinent part:

       a) General rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have original
          jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

       (1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer
       thereof, acting in his official capacity, except:

               (i) actions or proceedings in the nature of applications for a
               writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief not ancillary to
               proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of the [C]ourt[.][10]

42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i) (second emphasis added). The PCRA grants jurisdiction
to the courts of common pleas over “action[s] by which persons convicted of crimes
they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral
relief.” Section 9542 of the PCRA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Moreover, the PCRA is “the
sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and
statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist[ed] when [the PCRA took] effect,
including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” Id. (emphasis added). In determining
whether the Petition presents claims “in the nature of applications for a writ of
habeas corpus or post-conviction relief,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i), not within our
original jurisdiction, we are guided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which has
explained that

       10
           Petitioner nowhere states that the Petition is ancillary to a matter pending in our appellate
jurisdiction.

                                                   7
      the starting point for determining the “nature” of a given claim requires
      an examination of what effect the requested relief would have in light
      of the legal theories offered in support. In short, if the necessary
      consequence of granting relief based on the supplied arguments is
      that the conviction or sentence is undone or otherwise modified,
      then the claim is in the “nature of . . . a writ of habeas corpus or
      post-conviction relief[.]”

Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 284 A.3d 178, 189 (Pa. 2022) (Scott II) (emphasis
added).
      Herein, Petitioner initially makes bald assertions that his sentence of LWOP
is unconstitutional under multiple grounds. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held that similar arguments constitute collateral attacks on one’s criminal
sentence and eligibility for parole; therefore, they are subsumed under the umbrella
of the PCRA. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990, 997-98 (Pa.
2021), the Supreme Court determined that a “void for vagueness” challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 1102(a) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a), as
well as a sentencing court’s authority to impose a sentence of LWOP, is an illegal
sentence claim cognizable under the PCRA and must be brought in accordance
therewith. Also, in Scott II the Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s previous
holding in Scott v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 256 A.3d 483 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2021) (Scott I), that we lacked jurisdiction over petitions for review
brought by individuals convicted of second degree murder seeking a declaration that
Section 6137(a)(1) of the Code was unconstitutional as applied to them on the
grounds that depriving them of the ability to be granted parole violated the state and
federal constitutions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that if this Court had
“credited the legal theories argued in support of the parole eligibility claims, it would

                                           8
necessarily invalidate the criminal punishment imposed by our ‘sentencing
practices.’” Scott II, 284 A.3d at 198.
       Upon finding that a petitioner had presented similar claims and arguments in
his petition for review as had been presented in Scott I, this Court thereafter
determined we did not have original jurisdiction over the constitutional challenges
to his sentence that the petitioner had raised in his petition for review. Freeman v.
Pa. Parole Bd. of Prob. & Parole (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 238 M.D. 2021, filed Dec. 7,
2022), slip op. at 11-12.11 Therein, we observed the petitioner’s “proper recourse
was to pursue post-conviction relief in accordance with the requirements of the
PCRA” and that the petitioner “may not collaterally attack [his] sentence [] by using
a civil action in this Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.” Id. (citations
omitted) (brackets in original).
       Most recently, in Mines v. Wolf (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 102 M.D. 2022, filed
September 8, 2023), slip op. at 2-3, this Court considered preliminary objections to
pro se petitioners’ petition for review in this Court’s original jurisdiction seeking
declarations that a sentence of LWOP is unconstitutional under both the federal and
state constitutions as violative of their equal protection and due process rights, their
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and as subjecting them to ex post
facto punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9; Pa. Const. art. I, § 17. Citing
Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code, the respondents argued this Court lacked
jurisdiction over the petition as it, in essence, was a challenge to the constitutionality

       11
           Unreported memorandum opinions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008 may be
cited for their persuasive value. See Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures
210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                                9
of the petitioners’ sentences and sounded in the nature of an application for relief
under the PCRA. Mines, slip op. at 6-7. Relying on, inter alia, our decision in Scott
I, we found that based upon the claims they presented and the relief they were
seeking, the petitioners were “squarely challenging the constitutionality of their
LWOP sentences and parole eligibility.” Mines, slip op. at 8 (citing Scott I, 256
A.3d at 492). We stressed that the petitioners’

      requested relief is a declaration that LWOP is unconstitutional as
      applied to individuals sentenced based upon convictions for murder,
      and that such individuals should be eligible for meaningful parole
      review. The only way [the p]etitioners can be eligible for parole is if
      their LWOP sentences are altered, which necessitates post-conviction
      relief.

Id.
      Petitioner also maintains that due to his intellectual shortcomings and
“scientific data” that one’s brain is not fully developed until the age of 21, he should
be considered a “child” under the Juvenile Act and entitled to relief under Miller. In
Commonwealth v. Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 372 (Pa. 2023), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court determined that the protections of the Juvenile Act extend only to those who
commit certain criminal offenses prior to the time they turned 18 years of age and
are prosecuted before they reach age 21. Also, our Superior Court repeatedly has
held that Miller is inapplicable to those who were 18 years of age or older when they
committed murder and to those 18 years of age or older on the basis that their brains
were not fully developed at the time they committed murder.                  See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 174 A.3d 1130, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2017) (rejecting
argument that the trial court erred when imposing a sentence of LWOP on the basis
that Miller should be extended to those 18 or older whose brains are not fully
developed); Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating

                                          10
Miller applies only to defendants “under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes”
and rejecting the argument that the holding of Miller should be extended to persons
convicted of murder who were older than 18 at the time of their crimes but who were
“technical juveniles” because their brains had not been fully developed at the
relevant time).12
       Finally, with regard to Petitioner’s argument that he must be presumed to have
a minimum sentence of one day and, therefore, should be reviewed for parole, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found no merit to this type of claim. In Hudson,
the petitioner who had been convicted of second degree murder did not dispute that
pursuant to Section 1102(b) of the Crimes Code he was subject to a sentence of
LWOP. However, relying on Ulbrick, the petitioner argued that a life sentence for
second degree murder constitutes a maximum sentence that should be imposed along
with a minimum sentence, and since his sentencing order did not specify a minimum
sentence, he should be presumed to have received a minimum sentence of one day.
Hudson, 204 A.3d at 396. The Supreme Court found Ulbrick distinguishable, for
unlike a flat sentence of 20 years with no specified minimum sentence, “[a] life
sentence is qualitatively different in that it expires when the prisoner dies, not after
a specified number of years.” Id. Following its analysis of Section 1102(b) of the
Crimes Code and of Section 9756 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756
(pertaining to sentences of total confinement), the Supreme Court considered
whether parole eligibility could attach to a LWOP sentence for second degree
murder. The Supreme Court ultimately held that “the Legislature did not intend for
Section 9756(b)’s minimum-sentence provision to apply to mandatory life sentences
for second degree murder” and that “the [Board] lacks the power to release on parole

       12
      It is well settled that this Court may cite Superior Court cases for their persuasive value.
Commonwealth v. Monsanto Co., 269 A.3d 623, 653 n. 20 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).

                                               11
an inmate serving a mandatory life sentence for second degree murder.” Hudson,
204 A.3d at 398-99.
      In light of the foregoing, we agree with Respondents that this Court lacks
original jurisdiction over the Petition, and we sustain Respondents’ first PO for lack
of jurisdiction. We next turn to a consideration of whether this matter should be
dismissed or transferred to the proper tribunal, common pleas.

      B.     Disposition upon Finding of Lack of Jurisdiction
      As noted in Scott I, Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a),
states that, generally, this Court “shall not dismiss an erroneously filed matter for
lack of jurisdiction, but shall transfer the case to the proper tribunal.” Scott I, 256
A.3d at 495 n.14. Notwithstanding this general provision, we find that transferring
this matter to common pleas would not be appropriate for the reasons Respondents
set forth in their POs. Specifically, Respondents are not proper parties to this action,
as the Commonwealth participates in proceedings under the PCRA. Id. (citing Pa.R.
Crim.P. 902(A)) (“A petition for post-conviction collateral relief shall bear the
caption, number, and court term of the case or cases in which relief is
requested . . . .”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(A)-(B) (explaining that, upon receipt of PCRA
petition, a clerk of court shall “make a docket entry, at the same term and number as
the underlying conviction and sentence . . . and . . . place the petition in the criminal
case file,” then “transmit a copy of the petition to the attorney for the
Commonwealth”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 906(A) (providing, generally, that attorney for
Commonwealth may elect to file answer or must do so if ordered by court).

                                           12
Petitioner’s proper recourse would be to pursue relief under the requirements of the
PCRA. Mines, slip op. at 8.13

IV.    CONCLUSION
       In light of the claims Petitioner raises and the relief he seeks, we interpret the
Petition as one “in the nature of [an] application[ ] for ... post-conviction relief.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i). Given that the action is not ancillary to any proceedings
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court, we lack jurisdiction over the Petition.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain Respondents’ PO asserting lack of jurisdiction.
As transfer to common pleas would be inappropriate and result in an unjustifiable
expenditure of judicial resources, we dismiss the Petition.

                                              __________________________________________
                                              RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

       13
          Since the aforementioned determination regarding Respondents’ POs asserting this
Court’s lack of jurisdiction is dispositive of Petitioner’s action, we need not address the remaining
POs.

                                                13
       IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dwayne Hill,                            :
                       Petitioner       :
                                        :
                 v.                     :   No. 311 M.D. 2022
                                        :
Governor of the Commonwealth            :
of Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania’s     :
Board of Probation and Parole,          :
                        Respondents     :

                                    ORDER

     NOW, January 23, 2024, the preliminary objection filed by Respondents
asserting lack of jurisdiction is SUSTAINED, and this matter is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.

                                      __________________________________________
                                      RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge