Court Opinion

ID: 9909850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 16:00:52.444937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:59.809334
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2004     Document: 010110968546   Date Filed: 12/14/2023      Page: 1
                                                                FILED
                                                    United States Court of Appeals
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit

                             FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                    December 14, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                     Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                         Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

           Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                     No. 23-2004
                                               (D.C. No. 1:17-CR-02380-JCH-1)
  GWENDOLYN ALCAZAR,                                       (D.N.M.)

           Defendant - Appellant.
                        _________________________________

                             ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Gwendolyn Alcazar appeals the district court’s denial of her request for a

 sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), commonly known as

 compassionate release. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we

 affirm.

                                   BACKGROUND

       In September 2017, a federal grand jury indicted Alcazar for possession

 of “500 grams and more” of a substance containing methamphetamine with

 intent to distribute, and with aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

       *
         This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
 doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be
 cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-2004   Document: 010110968546     Date Filed: 12/14/2023     Page: 2

 § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. App. vol. 1, at 8. In November 2018,

 Alcazar pleaded guilty to the charge. The district court sentenced Alcazar

 within the applicable guideline range to the minimum mandatory sentence of

 120 months’ imprisonment, plus five years of supervised release.

       On August 18, 2020, Alcazar submitted a request for compassionate

 release to the prison’s warden. As extraordinary and compelling reasons for

 release, Alcazar cited the COVID-19 pandemic, her medical conditions, her

 father’s declining health, and an “ongoing court battle” involving her five

 children “regarding a sexual abuse case with a family member.” App. vol. 2, at

 55. 1 Alcazar also noted that she has worked a job and completed classes while

 incarcerated. If released, Alcazar promised, among other commitments, to

 attend college, enroll in an out-patient program, continue her sobriety, and

 obtain employment.

       On September 1, 2020, the warden denied Alcazar’s request, noting that

 she “may commence an appeal of th[e] decision via the administrative remedy

 process by submitting [her] concerns on the appropriate form (BP-9) within 20

       1
         To the extent we quote from sealed volumes, we have determined that
 the quoted material either appears in Alcazar’s brief or in the district court’s
 order attached to Alcazar’s brief (which was not filed under seal), or isn't
 sensitive. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(h) (stating party waives privacy protection for
 own information by filing not under seal).

                                         2
Appellate Case: 23-2004   Document: 010110968546     Date Filed: 12/14/2023   Page: 3

 days.” Id. at 65. Two days later, Alcazar submitted a request using the BP-9

 form. 2

       On October 6, 2020, the warden denied Alcazar’s second request,

 explaining that if she was not “satisfied with this decision, [she could] appeal

 to the Regional Director at Bureau of Prisons” and indicating that her “appeal

 must be received in the Western Regional Office within (20) days.” Id. at

 66–67 (emphasis added). This instruction complied with the applicable

 regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a), which states:

       An inmate who is not satisfied with the Warden’s response may
       submit an appeal on the appropriate form (BP-10) to the appropriate
       Regional Director within 20 calendar days of the date the Warden
       signed the response. An inmate who is not satisfied with the
       Regional Director’s response may submit an Appeal on the
       appropriate form (BP-11) to the General Counsel within 30 calendar
       days of the date the Regional Director signed the response.

       Next, according to Alcazar, she tried to appeal the warden’s second

 denial to the Bureau of Prisons Office of General Counsel (OGC), but the

 prison did not give her the proper paperwork and ultimately “told [her] it was

 too late to appeal.” Op. Br. at 10. Even so, Alcazar asserts that she completed

 and sent the new forms to the OGC but did not receive a response. As the

 district court observed, Alcazar’s remedy-history form includes a

 compassionate release entry with a “status date” of October 13, 2020, with

       2
          Alcazar’s September 3, 2020 request is on a BP-229(13) form but the
 district court noted that this is often called a BP-9 form.
                                         3
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 “CLD” 3 listed as the status, but without any further detail. App. vol. 2, at 123.

 In the proceedings before the district court, the government asserted that

 Alcazar had not appealed the warden’s second denial, as she had claimed.

       In the district court, Alcazar then moved for compassionate release under

 § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Her bases for release mirrored those provided in her initial

 letter to the warden: her health conditions, her severe obesity, the prison’s

 policies making her obesity less manageable, her heightened susceptibility to

 COVID-19, her history of self-harm, her good behavior in prison, and her need

 to care for her father and children. Id. at 123, 129. The government did not

 challenge the legitimacy of Alcazar’s diagnoses or medical conditions which

 include: “obesity, chronic hepatitis C, bipolar disorder, PTSD, amphetamine

 related use, major depressive disorder, anxiety, and borderline personality

 disorder.” Id. at 123.

       In its sealed order, the district court dismissed without prejudice

 Alcazar’s motion for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court

 explained, “Even if appealing to the OGC before the regional director was not

 an issue, the record does not contain evidence of Ms. Alcazar’s appeal to the

 OGC.” Id. at 126; see also 28 C.F.R. § 571.63(b) (categorizing the General

 Counsel’s denial of an inmate’s request under § 3582(c)(1)(A) as “a final

       3
         This acronym appears on Alcazar’s remedy-history form, but neither the
 record, the parties’ briefs, nor the district court’s order indicate what “CLD”
 represents.
                                          4
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 administrative decision”). Because Alcazar had the burden to show exhaustion

 and failed to explain the significance of the October 13, 2020 entry on her

 remedy history form, the district court ruled that the “record’s silence on the

 alleged OGC appeal comes at Ms. Alcazar’s expense.” App. vol. 2, at 126.

       The district court also declined Alcazar’s request for an evidentiary

 hearing on exhaustion, explaining that “the resolution of that hearing would

 probably take longer than the dismissal without prejudice and Ms. Alcazar

 completing, with documentation, the BOP’s administrative remedy procedure.”

 Id. at 127 n.1.

       In the alternative, the district court concluded that Alcazar’s motion

 failed on the merits because Alcazar had not established extraordinary reasons

 warranting a sentence reduction. Specifically, the court explained that medical

 conditions rarely meet the extraordinary requirement. In support, the court

 noted that courts routinely deny relief: based on COVID-19 to vaccinated

 incarcerated persons; and to individuals, like Alcazar, who are classified at

 Care Level 1 or 2 on the BOP’s four-level medical classification scale. The

 court also found that the record did not show that Alcazar’s release was

 necessary to preserve the life of her elderly father or to protect her children

 from alleged abuse.

       Alcazar timely appealed.

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                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We review a district court’s order denying a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for

 abuse of discretion. United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th

 Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect

 conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (quoting United

 States v. Battle, 706 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 2013)).

                                   DISCUSSION

       Alcazar challenges the district court’s order dismissing her motion on

 two grounds: (1) that the district court erred in concluding that she had failed to

 exhaust her administrative remedies and (2) that the district court erred in

 concluding that her motion failed to establish extraordinary and compelling

 reasons for her early release.

       Because the government has withdrawn its argument that Alcazar failed

 to exhaust her administrative remedies, we will assume for purposes of this

 appeal that she adequately exhausted those remedies. 4 Our inquiry thus focuses

 on the district court’s merits determination.

       4
           In withdrawing its exhaustion argument, the government explained:

       In preparing for oral argument, . . . the undersigned learned that the
       Department of Justice has taken the position that the ‘lapse’
       provision of § 3582(c)(1)(A) allows a defendant to file a motion for
       compassionate release once thirty days have passed after the warden
       receives a request, regardless of whether the warden acts on the
       request or not, and without requiring the defendant to exhaust the
       BOP’s administrative process.
                                                               (footnote continued)
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       Federal courts are generally forbidden from modifying a term of

 imprisonment after it has been imposed. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S.

 522, 526 (2011) (quoting § 3582(c)). But this “rule of finality is subject to a

 few narrow exceptions,” including when a defendant moves for a sentence

 reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 830

 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Freeman, 564 U.S. at 526).

       District courts follow a three-step test in evaluating § 3582(c)(1)(A)

 compassionate-release motions. Id. at 831. First, the court “must find whether

 extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction.” Id.

 (cleaned up). Second, the court “must find whether such reduction is consistent

 with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id.

 (cleaned up). And third, the court must “consider any applicable [18 U.S.C.]

 § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction

 authorized by steps one and two is warranted in whole or in part under the

 particular circumstances of the case.” Id. (cleaned up). District courts may deny

 a compassionate-release motion on any of the three steps without addressing

 the others. United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 942–43 (10th Cir. 2021). Only

 the first requirement—extraordinary and compelling reasons—is at issue on

 appeal.

 Appellee’s letter to the court at 2, ECF No. 11044695 (Nov. 14, 2023).
                                         7
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       First, Alcazar asserts that the district court disregarded her high

 susceptibility to severe illness or death from another COVID-19 infection based

 on her medical conditions: obesity, high blood pressure, anemia, hepatitis C,

 post-traumatic-stress disorder, borderline diabetes, borderline personality

 disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, amphetamine-related

 disorder, and “long Covid.” Op. Br. at 33–34. 5 She also notes that she “ha[s]

 attempted suicide and was placed on suicide watch.” Id. at 34. But the district

 court did address the risks associated with COVID-19 along with all of

 Alcazar’s medical conditions. The district court first cited several cases in

 which courts in this circuit have denied compassionate release to incarcerated

 persons (1) who have contracted COVID-19, (2) “with comorbidities who have

 contracted and recovered from COVID-19,” (3) “who suffer from similar

 conditions and diagnoses” as Alcazar, and (4) “who are classified at Care Level

 1 or 2 on the BOP’s four-level medical classification scale.” App. vol. 2, at

 128–29 (collecting cases).

       Applying these principles, the district court concluded that because

 Alcazar is vaccinated, has recovered from COVID-19, and is classified at

 health Care Level 1 and mental health Care Level 2, that her diagnoses and

 conditions do not “go beyond what is usual, regular, or common.” Id. at 129.

       5
         We can’t tell from Alcazar’s brief how many times she has been
 infected with COVID-19. Compare Op. Br. at 14 (three times) with Op. Br. at
 33 (two times).
                                         8
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 Thus, the court ruled, she did not meet the extraordinary and compelling

 standard. Id. Alcazar does not challenge the court’s factual findings or the

 cases that the district court relied on in so ruling. Nor does Alcazar cite any

 case in which a court has found, under circumstances much like her own, that

 extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist. Accordingly, we see no

 abuse of discretion.

       Second, Alcazar asserts that the district court should have granted her

 motion based on her allegation that her prison facility had a forced “herd

 immunity” policy. Op. Br. at 34. Because Alcazar did not provide the district

 court with any evidence of this accusation, the district court did not abuse its

 discretion in declining to grant Alcazar compassionate release on this basis.

       Third, Alcazar states, “[i]n light of all of the factors that she informed

 the district court, which are stated above in the fact section of this brief, it was

 arbitrary and capricious for the district court to refuse to release her to serve

 the remainder of her sentence outside the BOP facility that was unable to

 protect her” from COVID-19. Id. Aside from her health concerns, these

 “factors” included unsupported allegations that the BOP provided her

 inadequate medical care (related to COVID-19 and an injury she received from

 falling out of a top bunk) and unsupported claims that she is the only person

 who can protect her children from alleged abuse by a family member. But

 Alcazar cited no evidence supporting these allegations. App vol. 2, at 129. Nor

 does she cite any caselaw indicating that a court has ever granted

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Appellate Case: 23-2004   Document: 010110968546     Date Filed: 12/14/2023     Page: 10

  compassionate release under similar circumstances. Alcazar also does not

  indicate how the district court erred in concluding that the record did not

  support these allegations. Thus, we see no abuse of discretion.

                                  CONCLUSION

        For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Alcazar’s

  motion for compassionate release.

                                           Entered for the Court

                                           Gregory A. Phillips
                                           Circuit Judge

                                          10