Court Opinion

ID: 9424470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:11:42.337272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:50.430378
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Harlan,
with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins, concurring in the result.
My review of the record in this case has left me with the firm conviction that the trial judge rejected Hazel-tine’s proffered defenses of release and the statute of limitations on the ground that they were too belatedly raised. I agree with the Court that such a course was within the trial judge’s sound discretion. I therefore find it unnecessary to express any view on the remaining, difficult issues which the Court discusses.
A consideration of the posture of the case at the time of the trial judge’s ruling facilitates an understanding of the record. Two years after the filing of Zenith’s counterclaim, one year after the close of evidence, nine months after the filing of Hazeltine’s post-trial brief, and two months after the trial judge had made preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law, Hazeltine, represented by new counsel, raised for the first time its defenses of release and the statute of limitations. It also sought to dispute the quality and the sufficiency of the proof of damages with respect to the Canadian market, and it raised the issue of governmental embargoes in the English and Australian markets.
The District Judge heard two days of argument, covering nearly 200 pages of the Appendix, on both the merits of the contentions and the equity of allowing Hazeltine to raise them so belatedly. There were three main links in the chain of Hazeltine’s reasoning in support of its contention that it should be allowed the benefit of the release and the statute of limitations. First, the defenses were meritorious and would bar a large portion of the enormous potential recovery. Second, Hazeltine’s late*350ness in raising the defenses should be excused because Zenith's counterclaim and supporting affidavit gave no notice that Zenith intended to rely on any activities occurring before the filing of the answer in 1961, which was well within the limitation period under any theory. Third, Hazeltine should be excused for failing to spot the alleged shift in Zenith’s theory of recovery during the course of the trial because Hazeltine’s trial counsel was primarily a patent lawyer who was not completely at home in the antitrust field. App. 68-69, 72-74, 156—162.
The District Judge on at least three occasions observed that Hazeltine had been put on notice of Zenith’s theory by the allegations of the counterclaim itself and by the pretrial briefs.1 He repeatedly commented on trial counsel’s failure to raise the defenses of release and the statute of limitations,2 and in the course of colloquy more *351directly addressed to Hazeltine’s other contentions he emphasized the necessity for trial counsel to prepare his case if the client was not to suffer.3 After counsel for *352Zenith had presented his argument,4 the District Judge heard Hazeltine’s rebuttal, App. 223-250, with only one substantive question: “You do agree that the statute of limitations can be waived. You agree to that, don’t you?” App. 237.
At the conclusion of his rebuttal argument, Hazeltine’s attorney moved for leave to file “our affirmative defenses as a formal pleading of release and statute of limitations,” and also moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis of those defenses. App. 250. The following colloquy then occurred:
“The Court: Mr. McConnell [Zenith’s counsel], do you care to address yourself very briefly to those two motions he just made? You will be limited to that.
“Mr. Kayser: Sir?
*353“The Court: Mr. McConnell — the ones that have to do with seeking to file these new pleadings on the statute of limitations.
“Mr. McConnell: Well, the statute of limitations — this case is clearly distinguishable from the Emich case-
“The Court: All he is doing is asking leave to file, and that is the only thing I wish to have you address yourself to.
“Mr. McConnell: I think it’s too late. He can make it for the record, but to actually file them in this case, the record is made. The case has been closed.
“The Court: Well, the record will show that leave is given to file them at this time, after proofs are closed and after findings have been made.”
[The District Judge then stated how much he had enjoyed the argument of the past two days and complimented counsel on their presentations.]
“The Court at this time is prepared to enter the final judgment and decree offered with the exception of . . . [the damages allegedly suffered in England and Australia.]” App. 250-251.
The judge then indicated that he would reopen the record to receive additional evidence with regard to the embargoes in England and Australia, but that the scope of the inquiry would be narrowly limited, and in particular no relitigation of facts adduced at trial would be permitted. The judge explained, “I do feel that in order to satisfy myself, in order to do equity in this matter, that I would like, to the limited extent expressed, a reopening in regard to the matters that I have indicated that do trouble me by virtue of the offers of proof that have been made and the statements that have been made in regard solely to Australia and England.” App. 252-253. Except for giving Hazeltine’s counsel five days *354in which to file his affirmative defenses, the judge made no other relevant comments in ruling on the motions.
I find it impossible to believe that the judge ruled thus summarily on the merits of the complicated issues of antitrust law to which this Court devotes 15 printed pages. I also find it highly unlikely that, without a word of explanation for departing from the sentiments he expressed during argument, the judge intended to forgive Hazeltine’s failure to raise the defenses earlier. To be sure, he must have considered the merits sufficiently to satisfy himself that refusal to allow Hazeltine to raise these defenses worked no gross inequity. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15 (a). I remain convinced, however, that he rejected the defenses only as untimely raised.
Believing that the Court of Appeals clearly erred in reaching the opposite conclusion,5 I concur in the judgment of the Court on that ground.

 For example: “Mr. Kayser [Hazeltine’s counsel]: ... it was not until during the trial, after we had the long Dodds affidavit and all of this testimony that suddenly, gradually this new theory starts to creep in, this new theory where we go back and try to recover again based on these allegedly wrongful acts many, many years ago.
“The Court: I must assume, to go along with that, that counsel at that time didn’t read the pretrial brief which clearly set out, prior to the trial, this theory that you were taken by surprise by during the course of the trial.” App. 158. See also App. 87, 144.

 For example: “The Court: . . . [Reads from Hazeltine’s post-trial brief.]
“Do you differ with counsel’s statement, your prior counsel’s statement 90 days after proofs were closed?
“Mr. Kayser: As to what the issues were that were presented in this case, yes, your Honor, I do. I most definitely do.
“The Court: Of course, you know by now that this is a new theory on your behalf.
“Mr. Kayser: Your Honor, I don’t think it is a new theory. I think that-
“The Court: I mean, at least it wasn’t advanced in this brief filed June 8, 90 days after the proofs closed.
“Mr. Kayser: Your Honor, we fully recognize the fact that the *351trial counsel did not realize what was happening to him. We fully realize that fact. If we had realized it-
“The Court: I mean, he didn’t even realize it 90 days after the proofs were over.
“Mr. Kayser: Yes, your Honor. I quite agree.” App. 72. Later the following colloquy occurred:
“The Court: Do you agree with the theory that sometime litigation must end?
“Mr. Kayser: Yes, your Honor.
“The Court: And these offers of proof [with respect to embargoes by the English and Australian Governments] are now being made more than one year after the proof closed on this case?
“Mr. Kayser: Your Honor, this I think is one of the most unusual cases that will come into a Courtroom, in that we have here, as I think we can demonstrate — without basis we have here the danger of a judgment of almost forty-nine million dollars which will spell corporate death, which is subject to the affirmative defenses of limitations and of releases. . . .
“The Court: I just got through instructing a jury that in deliberating on their verdict, they should not take into consideration either sympathy or prejudice.
“Mr. Kayser: I submit most respectfully to this court that this court should take into account equity. This is not a matter of sympathy. This is a matter of equity and a matter of justice; that this judgment, which will spell the death of this corporation, has had absolutely no basis whatsoever. It is subject to affirmative defenses. It was accomplished by a subtle switch in theory. Maybe it should have been caught; maybe it shouldn’t. But is your Honor going to penalize this corporation-
“The Court: I mean, it wasn’t even caught 90 days after the proofs closed.
“Mr. Kayser: I agree, that’s true. I agree. This is a very unusual case; we recognize that.
“The Court: You may proceed.” App. 108-109. See also App. 71-76 passim, 158-161.

 For example: “The Court: . . . underlying what you are saying [with respect to the embargoes] is what is said so frequently in *352appeals in criminal cases, that they are where they are by virtue of incompetence of counsel.
“Now, there a person’s liberty is involved, and what do the courts say in regard to this plea of incompetency of counsel?
“They say, first, was he counsel of your choice rather than appointed counsel? And if he was, the courts say, in regard to keeping men incarcerated and depriving them of their liberty, that unless the trial conducted by counsel of the prisoner’s choice was such a farce, such a fraud that justice would be horrified by the result, that since you are represented by counsel of your choice, why, agreed that he might not be the greatest in the world, but he was your lawyer and you picked him out. You are going to have to remain incarcerated for the balance of your term.
“Now, how do we get around that analogy in this case?” App. 140-141.
Hazeltine’s attorney responded in terms of his theory of surprise, whereupon the District Judge answered that federal procedure was based on notice pleading and in his opinion Hazeltine had been put on notice. App. 141-144.
See also, e. g., App. 116, 121-123, 146, 155.

 App. 169-223. The District Judge asked for Zenith’s views on the merits of the proposed defenses, but he did not press counsel on his reply. App. 186, 189, 193.

 The opinion of the Court of Appeals gives no indication that its attention was drawn to the remarks of the District Judge during Hazeltine’s argument in chief, which cast light on his ruling on the motion for leave to file. Its entire discussion of the basis for the District Court’s action reads as follows:
“Zenith’s counsel objected to the filing of the defenses on the ground that they came too late and were waived. The district court, however, permitted the defenses to be filed and thereafter denied HRI’s motion for judgment based on the defenses. . . . [The Supreme Court left open the question whether this ruling was on the merits.] It is our view that the court’s ruling was not on the basis of waiver, but because the defenses on their merits did not bar Zenith’s recovery.” 418 F. 2d, at 23-24.