Court Opinion

ID: 2964364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:24:37.286582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:53.876304
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1577

                                     FRED DAVIS,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

             SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO-CLC, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                      [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                            Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                           ______________

                                 ____________________

            Fred Davis on brief pro se.
            __________
            Eunice  H.  Washington  on  Motion  for  Summary  Affirmance   and
            ______________________
        Memorandum of Law  in Support  of Motion for  Summary Affirmance,  for
        appellee Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC.

                                 ____________________

                                   October 23, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      Per Curiam.   Pro  se appellant Fred  Davis appeals
                      __________

            from  the   district  court's  dismissal  of   his  claim  of

            discrimination  on the  basis of  age and  religion and  from

            various interlocutory rulings.  We view the dismissal as  one

            for lack of prosecution  after Davis unjustifiably refused to

            be deposed over a period of nearly four months.  We affirm.

                      We note initially that Davis is unlikely to be able

            to refile  his Title  VII claim of  religious discrimination,

            since the 90-day  period after  receipt of his  right to  sue

            letter  has expired.  See  Wilson v. Grumman  Ohio Corp., 815
                                  ___  ______    ___________________

            F.2d 26, 27-28 (8th  Cir. 1987) (Title VII plaintiff  may not

            refile an action, which was dismissed without prejudice after

            being timely  filed, where the refiling did  not occur within

            90 days  after receipt of the  right to sue letter).   Hence,

            dismissal  of that  claim operated  with prejudice  to Davis.
                                                ____ _________

            Accordingly,  we  evaluate  the  dismissal  under   case  law

            considering dismissals with prejudice.

                      A district court may  dismiss a case with prejudice

            for lack of  prosecution where the  plaintiff has engaged  in

            "extreme misconduct."     See Figueroa v.  Alegria, 896  F.2d
                                      ___ ________     _______

            645, 647 (1st Cir. 1990).  Extreme misconduct may be shown by

            "extremely   protracted   inaction   (measured   in   years),

            disobedience   of  court   orders,  ignorance   of  warnings,

            contumacious  conduct  .  .   .  or  some  other  aggravating

            circumstance  such  as prejudice  to  the defendant,  glaring

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            weaknesses  in  the   plaintiff's  case,  and  the   wasteful

            expenditure of the district court's time."  Id.
                                                        ___

                      The district court did  not abuse its discretion in

            dismissing this  case.  Davis was  arguably "contumacious" in

            unjustifiably refusing to be  deposed.  Although he submitted

            his own affidavit and later a  note by a physician (but not a

            physician's affidavit,  as directed by the  court) in support

            of his alleged illness, both  documents spoke of his  illness

            in  conclusory  terms.   Neither  described  or documented  a

            specific medical condition or history of treatment that would

            show  that Davis  was  too  ill to  be  deposed.   Under  the

            circumstances, the court could reasonably have concluded that

            Davis's refusal to be deposed was willful.

                      There were additional aggravating  circumstances as

            well.   First, besides refusing to  be deposed, Davis impeded

            progress in  his case  in other ways.   He failed  to respond

            voluntarily and  completely  to defendants'  other  discovery

            requests.   In every instance, defendants had to apply to the

            court for an order  before Davis responded, and  his ultimate

            responses were incomplete or  inadequate.  Second, there were

            "glaring weaknesses" in his claim  of discrimination.  In his

            answers to interrogatories, he  implied, but did not directly

            state, that defendant Joseph Buckley had  made discriminatory

            comments  when  he  refused  to  grieve  Davis's   discharge.

            Davis's    simultaneous    characterization   of    Buckley's

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            explanation for not grieving his discharge  -- that Davis had

            not paid  his union dues --  as a "pretext"  suggests that no

            such  discriminatory comments  were  made.   Likewise,  while

            Davis's August 1994 letter to union president John Sweeney on

            the incident in question referred to Buckley's assertion that

            Davis had not  paid his union  dues, it  did not mention  any

            discriminatory comments  by Buckley.  Finally,  given Davis's

            inadequate  responses to  defendants' written  discovery, his

            unexcused   refusal  to   be   deposed  arguably   prejudiced

            defendants'  ability to  defend this  action, which  had been

            pending for over a year when it was dismissed.

                      Because the court properly dismissed the action for

            lack of prosecution, we  need not consider the merits  of the

            interlocutory  orders  challenged  on  appeal.   See  Ash  v.
                                                             ___  ___

            Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
            _______                                     ____________

            U.S. 1007 (1985) (interlocutory rulings do not merge into the

            final judgment in cases dismissed for lack of prosecution and

            so are not reviewable  on appeal); accord DuBose v.  State of
                                               ______ ______     ________

            Minnesota, 893 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1990).
            _________

                      Affirmed. 
                      _________

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