Court Opinion

ID: 9468950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:27:42.941565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:07.979390
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
The majority opinion is based fundamentally on premises which may well be quite valid. My objection is to the majority’s disposition of the case without, I think, adequate exploration of these premises and their ramifications.
The majority concludes that the Illinois trial court deprived Parisie of his right to present competent and relevant testimony in his defense, and, therefore, deprived him of due process, by excluding the testimony of three witnesses concerning the alleged homosexual proclivities of the victim. Because the federal district court apparently failed to consider the issue of homosexuality at all and because the proffered testimony was apparently rejected by the Illinois trial court for procedural reasons, I would remand the case to the district court for further proceedings before now reaching the constitutional issue as the majority perceives it.1 The majority concedes that remand would ordinarily be the better practice, but concludes that “judicial expediency” and the “furtherance of justice” suggest disposition without remand.
I.
The majority contends that “[t]he State does not dispute that the proffered testimony of the three witnesses was relevant, material and crucial to Parisie’s defense. Rather, it attempts to justify the exclusionary ruling on the ground that the form of Parisie’s offer of proof was defective. ...” Ante, at 1014. To the contrary, the State objected to Parisie’s offer of proof presumably because the offer arguably failed to demonstrate the reliability (as well as the relevancy) of this evidence in establishing the victim’s reputation as a homosexual.2 *1018Relevant evidence is evidence that tends to prove a fact or matter in controversy more or less probable as tested in the light of accepted assumptions about human behavior. Marut v. Costello, 34 Ill.2d 125, 214 N.E.2d 768 (1965). Illinois traditionally has accorded its courts broad discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence. See Foss Park District v. First National Bank of Waukegan, 125 Ill.App.2d 276, 260 N.E.2d 474 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907, 91 S.Ct. 1379, 28 L.Ed.2d 648 (1971). In this case, the trial court apparently determined that the offer of proof did not establish the relevancy of the proffered evidence since, inter alia, the proffered evidence seemingly did not clearly relate to homosexual reputation.
Parisie’s contention was also considered by the Illinois Appellate Court upon the direct appeal of his conviction. The Appellate Court determined, as a matter of state law, that Parisie’s proffer failed to demonstrate the relevancy of the proffered evidence to the victim’s homosexual reputation:
The “offer of proof” regarding all three of these witnesses is patently inadequate. They amount to nothing more than conclusionary, broad-sweeping statements of defense counsel and offer no acceptable foundation for admission as reputation evidence. “This court, on numerous occasions, has held that reputation witnesses must be shown to have adequate knowledge of the person queried about and that evidence of reputation, to be admissible, must be based upon contact with the subject’s neighbors and associates rather than' upon the personal opinion of the witness.” People v. Moretti, 6 Ill.2d 494, 129 N.E.2d 709, 725. Obviously, the form in which this offer of proof comes to us is insufficient to accommodate the well settled state of the law in this area.
People v. Parisie, 5 Ill.App.3d 1009, 287 N.E.2d 310, 325 (1972). The majority, however, would discard Illinois’ purported application of its own law governing the procedure for admission of evidence because “[t]he showing made [by defendant] simply does not warrant such a low assessment of probative value,” ante, at 1014, and the ruling excluding the evidence was “abusive and arbitrary.” Ante, at 1015. Although I share the view of the majority that the alleged homosexuality of the victim was in all likelihood a material issue in the case, which the defendant may have been denied an opportunity to pursue, I think we should not so summarily override the state’s procedural determination as to the relevancy and competency of evidence.
II.
The appropriate analysis for determining the validity of a state procedural rule which, when applied, precludes the admission of evidence necessary for a defense is set out in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973).3 Sec McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981). In Chambers, the defendant had called to the stand a witness who had admitted in an out-of-court confession that he, not the defendant, committed the murder. After the state elicited a repudiation of the confession on cross-examination, the trial court, by applying the state’s rules on voucher (or “party witness”) and hearsay evidence, refused to allow the defendant to question this witness adversely (or to call certain other witnesses). On appeal, the defendant alleged that the state’s application of these evidentiary rules denied him his right of confrontation and precluded a fair trial. The Court did not, however, summarily conclude that the state’s application of these rules violated the defendant’s rights. The Court instead said that the *1019defendant’s rights may “bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal process.” 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. at 1045. In applying this principle, the Chambers Court closely examined the competing interests underlying the state rules and the constitutional policies, and eventually concluded that “where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, [a state evidentiary rule] may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049.
In the instant case, the majority has not attempted to analyze whether the policies underlying Illinois’ requirements (as to offers of proof of reputation) for appraising the relevancy of evidence are outweighed in this case by Parisie’s Sixth Amendment right, through the evidence available, to present a defense of homosexual panic. The majority merely notes that in its opinion, the proffered evidence was relevant to establish the victim’s homosexuality.4 This does not, however, seem to be the analysis mandated by Chambers.5 6Moreover, the majority reaches its conclusion notwithstanding that the district court, whether “through oversight or other reasons,” failed entirely to address the homosexuality issue. Ante, at 1014.6
I believe the factual record before us is inadequate to assess the precise nature of the proffered testimony and the policies supporting the state’s procedural rules governing offers of proof and the need for showing reputation. I would, therefore, remand this case to the district court for an expeditious but detailed review of the state court record and for an evidentiary hearing consistent with Chambers and with this court’s recent opinion in McMorris v. Israel, *1020643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981).7 On remand I think Circuit Rule 18 should apply.

. I limit my comments to the alleged due process violation since the majority finds this issue dispositive of this appeal.

. The majority may be disputing this thesis, arguing that the proffered testimony “involved a great deal more than mere reputation evidence” because the witnesses allegedly would testify about “actual homosexual acts and manifestations" attributed to the victim. Ante, at 1014. But I think under Illinois law evidence of prior homosexual acts may not be admitted to prove reputation. See People v. Moretti, 6 Ill.2d 494, 129 N.E.2d 709, 725-26 (1955), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 947, 78 S.Ct. 785, 2 L.Ed.2d 822 (1958). The defendant apparently did not articulate at trial or on this or prior appeals any basis other than reputation upon which the *1018state trial judge could have admitted evidence of prior acts by the victim. Rather than joining the majority in merely asserting that the proffered evidence “involved a great deal more than reputation evidence,” I believe that we should remand to the district court for a determination of the purpose for which this evidence was proffered and the state law evidentiary rules governing its admission.

. This analysis was most recently applied in Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979).

. I note too that the trial court was aware that of the three witnesses Parisie wished to call to the stand, one would admit to having homosexual relations with the victim for pay, while the other two would testify to observing the victim evincing manifestations of homosexuality at various homosexual “hangouts.”

. The majority cites Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801, 99 S.Ct. 43, 58 L.Ed.2d 94 (1978), apparently for the proposition that the state trial court's ruling was arbitrary and thus, constitutionally infirm. Hughes, however, is not on all fours with the instant case, In Hughes, this court invalidated a state rule excluding relevant and competent evidence because of its facial unconstitutionality. The instant case does not involve a challenge to facial constitutionality but instead raises the question whether the Illinois rule, as applied to the facts of this case, deprived Parisie of his constitutional rights by excluding this testimony. See McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 461 n.5 (7th Cir. 1981). The most appropriate analysis in the latter type of case is provided by Chambers.
The majority also relies on Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967), a case similar to Hughes. In Washington, the Court invalidated a Texas statute as arbitrary and irrational on its face. That decision did not, as the language quoted by the majority might seem to imply, establish an unconditional right to present evidence without regard to state procedural rules.

. The majority justifies its result in part by asserting that the technical deficiency of the offer of proof was never raised during the trial. But this contention is misleading. The purpose of an offer of proof is to provide the court with sufficient information upon which to evaluate the relevancy and competency of evidence. Ante, at 1015-1016.
During the trial, the defendant called the three witnesses to testify about the victim’s prior homosexual acts and manifestations, ostensibly to prove reputation. The state objected on grounds of relevancy to permitting the witnesses to testify, and the court sustained the state’s objections. The defendant thereafter made the offers of proof which are at issue here. The defendant, however, never again renewed his request to the trial court to permit the witnesses to testify. But on appeal, in the Illinois Appellate Court, the defendant challenged the trial court’s ruling excluding this evidence. I believe that the appellate court was entitled, as had been the trial court, to evaluate the offers of proof to determine their sufficiency to demonstrate the relevancy of the evidence. The trial court was not delinquent in apparently failing to decide the precise question of sufficiency of the offers of proof since this precise issue was not pressed before it. Nor was the state delinquent in failing to press this precise question. Moreover, the arguable relevancy of the proffered evidence may not have been obvious to the trial court, as the majority seems to assert. The trial court record, at least up to and at the time these offers of proof were made, reflects some confusion about the theory of “homosexual panic,” upon which the defendant claims to rely; and it was not clear whether it was this theory or a more *1020general claim of insanity, upon which the defendant relied.

. The majority also notes that the trial court’s ruling excluding defendant’s evidence “was a carryover of the ill-advised orders on the motion in limine and the voir dire restriction.” Although I also have difficulty understanding why the trial court restricted voir dire and am in doubt as to the propriety of the in limine motion, 1 find that again the district court and the majority have failed to consider these rulings under a Chambers-type analysis. Thus, on remand the district court should assess these issues under Illinois law as well as under the Constitution to determine if the voir dire ruling and motion in limine deprived the defendant of due process.
One facet of the voir dire analysis might involve whether the defendant would have been prejudiced by inclusion on the jury of persons antagonistic to homosexuals (in light of the victim’s alleged proclivities).