Court Opinion

ID: 9452489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:42:07.807917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:14.106776
License: Public Domain

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
During a union organizational campaign at respondent company’s plant, the union sent a letter enclosing a union representation authorization card to 300-350 employees of the company. The letter pledged that secrecy would be maintained in relation to the employee’s signature on the card — particularly from the employer.
To this the company responded by a letter addressed to the home of each of its 600 employees. This letter included the following paragraph:
“Don’t be fooled into signing misleading cards that are mailed in secrecy. It is said that when you sign such a card, no one other than a Union Representative or a representative of the National Labor Relations Board will ever see this card. This is not the truth. In many instances the signed card is disclosed to the Company by the Union, the NLRB, or both of them. Be careful about what you sign — don’t sign ANYTHING unless you KNOW what you are signing and what it might mean to you, your family, or your fellow employees.”
When an unfair labor practice complaint was filed, the Trial Examiner (and the National Labor Relations Board, by its affirmance) found as follows concerning the disputed paragraph:
“Under such circumstances the statement of Respondent in the last paragraph of its January 3, 1964, letter set out above, in my opinion, was reasonably calculated to convey to the employees that their signing of union cards would not be kept secret or confidential, that the Respondent probably would acquire knowledge of their signing cards and that Respondent would *208engage in reprisals against them if they signed union cards. Such a threat constitutes a violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. I so conclude and find.”
My colleagues find the company’s words noncoercive in themselves and hold that the NLRB did not have authority under this record and under the statute (even presumably taking into account its expertise in such matters) to infer that this language constituted a threat of economic discrimination in violation of the National Labor Relations Act.
I regret having to dissent. But it seems to me that if the rule established here ultimately prevails, it will allow great discriminatory use of employer economic power to prevent voluntary choice by employees pertaining to union membership. It was this specific evil which the NLRA was designed to eliminate.
Section 8(a) (3) (61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964)) of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits discriminatory discharge.
Section 8(a) (1) (which the Board found was violated by this letter) provides :
“Sec. 8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; * 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
Section 7, of course, is the statutory grant of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining through representatives of the employee’s “own choosing.”
And when Congress decided to add to the NLRA a section defining the employer free speech rights, it specifically excluded from that definition the use of language which threatened the employee’s freedom of choice by the employer’s threat (or promise) of use of his economic power.
Section 8(c) provides:
“The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subehapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
The threat which the Board found in the language quoted from respondent's letter, of course, was not an explicit one. The last sentence, if taken out of context, could be regarded as noncoercive, sound advice to anyone. But this language was not viewed by the Trial Examiner or the Board without the critical surrounding circumstances.
The letter was written to employees who had just received a union authorization card and a solicitation from the union to sign and return same. It was signed by the President of the company. It followed a specific assertion that the union’s pledge of secrecy was not valid, and, in effect, that the company probably would know which of its employees actually signed the union authorization cards. Most important of all, it was a communication from an employer in a plant without a labor-management contract, where the employer had the immediate power to discharge the employee and great control over his future with the company. The letter was delivered to the employee’s home at the point when he was engaged in making — for him — a crucial decision as to whether or not to join the union. The letter contained no assurance of the company’s intent not to discriminate against those who signed union cards. Read in the context of these critical facts, it is impossible for me to say that the Board lacked substantial evidence from which to infer that the letter constituted a threat under Section 8(a) (1) of the NLRA.
What legitimate company purpose could conceivably be served by its disputing the union’s pledge of secrecy of the employee’s signature? The Board found, and I think common sense tells us rightly, that the purpose of the company letter was to tell its employees that fear of *209economic reprisal was a realistic one, and, hence, they should “be careful” about what they signed unless they knew what it meant to themselves and their families.
Such threats of reprisal do not have to be couched in explicit language in order to constitute an unfair labor practice. N. L. R. B. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 162 F.2d 340 (C.A. 6, 1947); N. L. R. B. v. Peterson, 157 F.2d 514 (C.A. 6, 1946), cert, denied, 330 U.S. 838, 67 S.Ct. 979, 91 L.Ed. 1285 (1947); N. L. R. B. v. Zimnox Coal Co., 336 F.2d 516 (C.A. 6, 1964).
This court and other Courts of Appeal upheld the Board in its inference of threat of reprisal by the use of language at least as general (if taken out of context!) as that employed here. In a discussion of union membership by company supervisors, such phrases as: “Your wife and children will suffer”;1 “[T]hey and their families might be sorry”; 2 “[Employees] were ‘sticking their necks out’”;3 “‘[D]on’t get (yourself) into trouble’ ”; 4 “ ‘[T]he girls would be sorry if they got the union in the plant,’ ” 5 have all been recognized as conveying threats of reprisal when viewed against the background facts of each case.
My colleagues cite as support for their holding N. L. R. B. v. Sparton Mfg. Co., 355 F.2d 523 (C.A. 7, 1966). The opinion in that case quotes from the disputed language there employed by a company manager in a speech to a meeting of employees as follows:
“Be careful about what you sign— don’t sign anything unless you know what you are signing and what it might mean to you, your family, or your fellow employees.” N. L. R. B. v. Sparton Mfg. Co., supra at 524.
While these exact words were employed by Hobart in this case, there is no reference in the Sparton opinion to any preceding language designed to tell the employees that the company would find out who signed. Actually the Trial Examiner’s opinion in the NLRB proceeding in the Sparton case shows that there was a sentence which somewhat less explicitly did seek to convey this same suggestion. It also indicates that both the company attorney and the Trial Examiner in the Sparton case were the same persons who performed the same roles in this case.
But if the Seventh Circuit was aware of the preceding sentence to the two they quoted, they neither saw fit to mention it nor sought to deal with the additionally threatening inference which it afforded.
Assuming, however, that the Sparton case is precedent for the view expressed here by our majority, I would have to regard it as inadequately reasoned and contrary to the weight of authority already set out above. And, of course, it is not precedent which is binding upon this Circuit.
Surprenant Manufacturing Co. v. N. L. R. B., 341 F.2d 756 (C.A. 6, 1965), is, however, another matter. It seems to me that the opinion therein by Judge Miller accurately defines the distinction between the company’s right to express an opinion (even in strong language!) and the legal prohibition upon its employing even very general language to convey a threat of economic reprisal.
The opinion language which we held permissible in Surprenant was:
“ ‘Our sincere belief is that if a union were to represent you in our plant, it would not work to your benefit but to your serious harm.
“ ‘(2) We sincerely believe that the introduction of a union into our plant is not necessary or beneficial to your welfare and growth with this Company. We, therefore, propose to use *210every proper means to prevent a union from becoming established here.' ” Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., supra at 758.
The material as to which the court in Surprenant upheld the NLRB’s finding of an illegal threat of economic reprisal was set forth in the following paragraphs of Judge Miller’s opinion:
“In his talks Gordon discussed the question of overtime and the possible loss of overtime opportunities if the union got in. He pointed out that unions do not create overtime, that overtime was completely dependent on the volume of business, and that the employees would not keep the overtime they had under existing arrangements because men would be sent home after 40 hours of work in order to avoid the 50% premium on top of the union wage scale, which Gordon referred to in his speeches as being higher than Surpre-nant’s, but lacking Surprenant’s security. The Trial Examiner found under these facts that Gordon threatened the loss of overtime if the union came in and thereby transcended legitimate persuasive efforts and engaged in interference as defined in Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. The Board concurred in this finding.
-X- * -X- -X- * ■X’
“The finding of the Trial examiner, which was approved by the Board, was a permissible one under the circumstances under which the remarks were made, and the Board’s ruling is affirmed. Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456.” Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., supra at 760.
The first language recited above from Surprenant was a plain and outspoken company expression of adverse opinion concerning labor organization, but it referred to nothing which concerned the economic power of the company nor made any threat expressed or implied of hostile use of that power. In the second quote from the Surprenant opinion, however, the company spokesman predicted loss of overtime, a subject clearly within its economic discretionary control and this court upheld the Board’s finding that the language there employed was an implied threat and hence illegal.
In Surprenant this court also set forth its standard for review of such an inference:
“In such cases, if the inference or conclusion found by the Board that the statements constituted a threat is a reasonable one, which it was permissible for the Board to make, its conclusion will not be set aside on review, even though a different inference or conclusion may seem more plausible and reasonable to us. N. L. R. B. v. Superex Drugs, Inc., 341 F.2d [747,] 748, C.A. 6th, January 21, 1965. N. L. R. B. v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc., supra, 327 F.2d 109, 111, C.A. 7th, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 944, 84 S.Ct. 1351 [12 L.Ed.2d 307]; Hendrix Manufacturing Co. v. N. L. R. B., 321 F.2d 100, 105, C.A. 5th; N. L. R. B. v. Ford, 170 F.2d 735, 738-739, C.A. 6th.” Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., supra at 760.
Finally, I do not agree with the majority in our instant case that we review this case de novo because the claimed threats were written ones. The NLRB has a special knowledge and expertise in such matters which warrants our according its inferences the deference set forth above.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963), the Supreme Court said:
“Here, as in other cases, we must recognize the Board’s special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life. Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U.S. 793, 798 [65 S.Ct. 982, 985, 89 L. Ed. 1372]; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra [313 U.S. 177] at 194 [61 S.Ct. 845, at 852, 85 L.Ed. 1271] and of ‘[appraising] carefully the interest of both sides of any labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particu*211lar cases’ from its special understanding of ‘the actualities of industrial relations.’ National Labor Relations Board v. United Steelworkers, supra [357 U.S. 357] at 362-363 [78 S.Ct. 1268] at 1271, [2 L.Ed.2d 1383. ‘The ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.’ National Labor Relations Board v. Truck Drivers Local Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 [77 S.Ct. 643, 648, 1 L.Ed.2d 676].” National Labor Relations Board v. Erie Resistor Corp., supra at 236, 83 S.Ct. at 1150.
See also Republic Aviation Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 324 U.S. 793, 800, 65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945).
To me the disputed language employed in our present case was such as to make the NLRB finding of an illegal threat of economic reprisal a wholly permissible inference.
Enforcement should be granted.

. N.L.R.B. v. Zimnox Coal, supra, enforcing in pertinent part, 140 N.L.R.B. 1229, 1232 (1963).

. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 222 F.2d 938, 941 (C.A. 1, 1955).

. N.L.R.B. v. Peterson, supra, 157 F.2d at 515.

. N.L.R.B. v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 229 F.2d 816, 818 (C.A. 5, 1956).

. N.L.R.B. v. Dixie Shirt Co., 176 F.2d 969, 972 (C.A. 4, 1949).