Court Opinion

ID: 9639237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:09:01.171111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:29.682261
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
Three appeals are before the court. The principal issue is whether the legislative veto provided by 42 Pa.C.S. § 2155(b) is constitutional. On Appeal Nos. 2803 and 2804 Philadelphia 1983, Judge WICKERSHAM, joined by Judges CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY, and JOHNSON, would hold that the legislative veto is not unconstitutional and would affirm. President Judge SPAETH, joined by Judges OLSZEWSKI, MONTEMURO and TAMILIA, would hold that the legislative veto is unconstitutional and would vacate the judgments of sentence. Judge BECK would hold that the *574legislative veto is unconstitutional but would further hold that the provision providing for the veto is severable; she therefore joins the judges who would affirm. The judgments of sentence on Appeal No. 2803 and 2804 Philadelphia 1983 are therefore affirmed. Appeal No. 2802 Philadelphia 1983 presents only the issue of whether the trial court in imposing sentence abused its discretion. On that appeal, all of the judges agree that the judgment of sentence should be, and it therefore is, affirmed. The several opinions follow.
WICKERSHAM, Judge:
On June 20, 1983, appellant Douglas Kuphal entered guilty pleas in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County to three separate informations, charging him with robbery, theft, receiving stolen property, assault, terroristic threats, criminal mischief, and driving under the influence. Following a presentence investigation, appellant was sentenced to concurrent terms of state imprisonment of twelve (12) to thirty-six (36) months and six (6) to twelve (12) months. These sentences were to run consecutively from a county sentence appellant was serving at the time. Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration of sentence, appellant filed these timely appeals.
On appeal, appellant questions the validity of Pennsylvania’s sentencing guidelines, 204 Pa.Code § 303.1 et seq. As in its companion cases,1 the principal issue in this case is whether section 3 of the Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1316, No. 319, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1321(b); transferred by Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142, to 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 2151-2155, 9721 is unconstitutional. Section 3 of the Act provides for the creation of the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and the adoption of sentencing guidelines by the Commission. Appellant argues that section 3 is unconstitu*575tional and that, therefore, the sentencing guidelines under which he was sentenced, are invalid. We disagree.
The above Act provides that the Sentencing Commission should adopt sentencing guidelines and then publish them in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. After the Commission adopts and publishes the guidelines, “[t]he General Assembly may by concurrent resolution reject [the guidelines] in their entirety ... within 90 days of their publication.” If not so rejected, the guidelines become effective 180 days after publication.
In January 1981, the Commission adopted and published proposed guidelines; these were rejected, however, by a concurrent resolution. In January 1982, the Commission presented a new set of guidelines to the General Assembly. The Senate expressly approved the new guidelines; the House, however, took no action on them within the 90 day period specified by the Act. In May 1982, the Sentencing Commission announced that the General Assembly had “adopted” the revised guidelines. They became effective July 22, 1982.
President Judge Spaeth’s dissenting opinion notes that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that the legislative power of the Commonwealth, which is vested in both Houses of the General Assembly, may be exercised only with the concurrence of both Houses and after presentment to the Governor. Pa. Const. art. II, § 1; art. III, §§ 1, 4, 5, and 9; art. IV, § 15. The Act under consideration provides thatf the General Assembly, by concurrent resolution, may reject the sentencing guidelines adopted by the Sentencing Commission. President Judge Spaeth argues that such a rejection is an exercise of legislative power and can only be made after presentment to the Governor and that since the Act does not provide for presentment to the Governor, it is unconstitutional.
We do not believe that the General Assembly’s rejection of the guidelines was an “exercise of legislative power”. An “exercise of legislative power” is an act that is *576legislative in purpose and effect. President Judge Spaeth says that the rejection was legislative in effect because it changed the procedure which sentencing judges would follow. We disagree. Since the guidelines were not in effect at the time of the rejection, the rejection did not change the procedure sentencing judges would follow, but merely maintained the status quo. Thus, we do not see how this can be considered an exercise of legislative power.
We believe that the “legislative power” with respect to the sentencing guidelines was exercised not when the General Assembly rejected the first set of guidelines, but when it passed the Act which created this procedure for adopting the guidelines. The Act itself was passed by both Houses and signed by the Governor. This was the “presentment” required by our Constitution. The rejection of the guidelines was not an “exercise of legislative power” such that it also required presentment to the Governor; hence the sentencing guidelines are not invalid on that ground. We hold that section 3 of the Act is constitutional. Finding no merit to the other constitutional challenges presented by appellant, we, therefore, affirm the judgments of sentence.2
Judgments of sentence affirmed.
BECK, J., files a concurring opinion.
SPAETH, President Judge, files a dissenting opinion joined by OLSZEWSKI, MONTEMURO and TAMILIA, JJ.

. The companion cases are: Commonwealth v. Mourar, 03076 Philadelphia 1983; Commonwealth v. Bates, 02941 Philadelphia 1983; and Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 01999 Philadelphia 1983.

. Appellant’s statement of questions involved were:
A. Do the sentencing guidelines, 204 Pa.Code § 303.1, result from an invalid delegation of legislative authority by the general assembly in violation of article II, § 1 of the Pennsylvania constitution?
B. Are the sentencing guidelines, 204 Pa.Code § 303.1, null and void because they were not enacted by a bill by the general assembly in violation of article III, § 1 of the Pennsylvania constitution?
C. Are all sentences imposed in Pennsylvania necessarily the product of the sentencing guidelines?
Brief for Appellant at 3,