Court Opinion

ID: 9470493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:07:35.864909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:55.943032
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As the majority observes, probable cause is a practical nontechnical concept, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). It rests on the cumulative effect of the facts, in the totality of the circumstances, confronting a reasonably cautious and prudent police officer. United States v. McGlynn, 671 F.2d 1140, 1143 (8th Cir.1982). Here after the earlier purchase of cocaine from LaMasters, Bragg talked to Agent Carter about another purchase of marijuana and cocaine. Surveillance of the residence of Wenthe resulted in observation there of a blue Datsun 280-Z. Carter called Bragg at the Wenthe residence to confirm their meeting shortly after the Datsun was driven away. Bragg, a little later, was driving his Toronado with a passenger later identified as Everroad. The Toronado was driven to the Regency Motel, and after Everroad went into the motel and returned, it was parked next to Everroad’s blue Datsun 280-Z. Both men went into the motel and came back to the cars for further conversations. Bragg then met Carter and told him that the first transaction was to be for the ten pounds of marijuana and about one-half hour later the cocaine would be delivered. Bragg was arrested when he removed the marijuana from the trunk of his car, and no cocaine was found in the car or on his person.
The district court found at that point that probable cause and exigent circumstances existed. Considering the cumulative effect of the facts set forth above in the totality of the circumstances, I cannot find that the district court was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction.