Court Opinion

ID: 9740312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:32:18.011944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:17.402172
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). In People v Lemmons, 384 Mich 1, 2 (1970), the defendant’s conviction of armed robbery was reversed by the Michigan Supreme Court because the trial court had instructed the jury as follows:
"There are only two possible verdicts as to each defendant. You may find the defendant, naming them individually, guilty of robbery armed or not guilty. There are no included offenses. "(Emphasis supplied.)
Lemmons’ conviction was reversed even though, and I quote from the Supreme Court’s opinion, Lemmons "made no request at trial that the lesser included offenses be included in the charge”. The Court relied on its earlier decision in People v Jones, 273 Mich 430, 432 (1935), where it had said:
"Here the court did more than fail to charge upon the included offenses. It affirmatively excluded them from the consideration of the jury.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority distinguish Lemmons on the authority of the second clause of the following passage from People v Membres, 34 Mich App 224, 232 (1971):
"that Lemmons requires a reversal only where: (1) there is no request for an instruction on lesser offenses; (2) there is evidence on the record to support a conviction on a lesser offense so that, if requested, it would have been error to refuse to instruct on it; and, (3) the *295court affirmatively excludes the jury from considering lesser offenses.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The clause (2) Membres limitation makes good sense. As we said in People v Gregory Thomas, 38 Mich App 777, 779 (1972):
"The rule is that entitlement to a charge on a lesser included offense largely turns on whether, on view of the evidence favorable to the defendant, there is evidence which would justify the jury in concluding that the greater offense was not committed and a lesser included offense was committed.”
I dissent because we are not at liberty to inject reason or cognate principles in the application of the Lemmons rule. We are duty-bound to apply this rule as the Supreme Court of Michigan applies it whether or not we believe the rule to be sound.
An examination of our Court’s opinion in Lem-mons (People v Lemmons, 13 Mich App 268, 269 [1968]) and the records and briefs filed in the Supreme Court in that case reveals that in Lem-mons, as in this case of Henry, there was no evidence that a lesser offense had been committed. The defense in Lemmons, as stated by our Court, was that Lemmons "was not one of those present at the scene who perpetrated the crime”. Lem-mons’ brief filed with the Supreme Court is even more explicit: "We submit that it was erroneous for the court to instruct the jury that there are no included offenses, even though the facts in this case may not have supported any”.
It is apparent that under Lemmons it is reversible error for a judge to instruct a jury that there are no included offenses even though there is no evidence which would justify the jury in bringing in a verdict for a lesser included offense and even *296though there was no objection voiced by the defendant’s trial lawyer to the charge as given.
In this case the judge charged the jury:
"There are no included offenses in this case * * * ” (see majority opinion for full text)
and, therefore, even though the defendant’s lawyer failed to object and there was no evidence which would support a verdict convicting the defendant of a lesser offense, we are obliged to reverse.