Court Opinion

ID: 9773374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:43:38.049638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:44.783629
License: Public Domain

KELTNER, Justice,
dissenting.
I reluctantly dissent from that part of the majority’s opinion which rules that the State need not plead its intention to seek an affirmative finding that Kirkpatrick’s hands were used as deadly weapons in the commission of the offense. I believe this ruling misinterprets our court of criminal appeals’ opinion in Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d 766, 776 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).
Here, Kirkpatrick complains that the trial court erred in submitting an issue on the use of her hands as deadly weapons in the commission of the offense. Specifically, Kirkpatrick claims that the issue should not have been submitted because she was not given “notice” that the State intended to obtain an affirmative finding that her hands were used as a deadly weapon.
Recently, the court of criminal appeals ruled that due process of law requires that pre-trial notice be given that the State intends to seek a finding that the offense was committed with a deadly weapon. Id. at 776. Unfortunately, this case was tried before the court of criminal appeals’ decision in Patterson. As a result, the State was not aware of the necessity to give formal notice in the pleadings.
However, the State argues that it did give oral notice to Kirkpatrick’s counsel of its intention to pursue the finding. As stated in the majority opinion, we abated the appeal and remanded the case for a hearing to determine what notice was given. The record from that hearing reflects that the prosecutor did give oral notice of its intention to seek the finding of “deadly weapon.” Specifically, notice was given to two court-appointed attorneys during plea bargain negotiations. There is no evidence to suggest that the notice was given in pleading form.
As a result of this evidence, the trial court found that the due process requirements of notice were satisfied.
I do not agree. I interpret the majority opinion in Patterson as requiring some formal notice. In this regard, Judge Clinton, speaking for the majority, repeatedly holds that the State must “plead” its intention to obtain the finding of deadly weapon. For example, Judge Clinton ruled that the State need not allege deadly weapon as a count in the indictment, but instead stated, “[w]e hold only that the State must plead it.” Id. at 776 (emphasis added). In another portion of the opinion, Judge Clinton wrote:
We have already found, in effect, that the trial court committed egregious error in submitting the special issue of use or exhibition of a deadly weapon in the absence of a pleading by the State.
Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
I have grave reservations as to whether an oral notification can ever be sufficient. However, at the very least, notice of the State’s intention to seek a finding of a deadly weapon must be in a formal proceeding. If the notice is not contained in a written pleading, it should be presented in a formal oral pleading made in open court so that it is readily apparent from the record.
As a result, I would reform the judgment to eliminate the affirmative finding as to Kirkpatrick’s use or exhibition of a deadly weapon during the commission of the charged offense. Otherwise, I would af*526firm the judgment of the trial court.1

. I reluctantly reach this conclusion because the State is caught in a time trap. At the time the case was tried, there was no case requiring the State to "plead” the use of hands as a deadly weapon. As a result, the conduct of the State in giving even oral notice is commendable.