Court Opinion

ID: 9966178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 12:01:51.931588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:40.627369
License: Public Domain

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                            Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

          PAUL DAVIS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
                           (AC 46237)
                               Moll, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.

                                            Syllabus

         The petitioner, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of various
             crimes in connection with a drive-by shooting, sought a writ of habeas
             corpus, claiming a violation of his right to due process and the ineffective
             assistance of his trial and appellate counsel. During the petitioner’s
             criminal trial, the jury heard testimony from, inter alia, B, a convicted
             felon who was incarcerated and facing additional charges at that time
             and who claimed to have witnessed certain events surrounding the
             shooting. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner
             claimed, inter alia, that the state had violated his constitutional rights
             to due process and a fair trial by failing to disclose that it had offered
             consideration to B for his cooperation in the petitioner’s criminal case
             and to correct B’s false or misleading testimony that he had received
             no consideration for his cooperation and that the petitioner’s trial coun-
             sel, M, had provided ineffective assistance in failing to challenge B’s
             testimony adequately and to investigate and to present evidence of B’s
             cooperation with the state for favorable consideration. On the first day of
             the petitioner’s habeas trial, the habeas court noted that the petitioner’s
             habeas counsel had been unable to subpoena B and directed the parties
             to agree on an additional trial date to accommodate another attempt
             to subpoena him. At the continued trial date, almost two months later,
             the petitioner’s habeas counsel indicated that he had served multiple
             subpoenas at B’s abode and that B was aware of the proceedings but
             had not appeared in court, and the court issued a capias and set an
             additional trial date for a month later. B was again absent on the final
             trial date, and the court denied the petitioner’s motion for a continuance
             to procure B’s attendance at the proceedings. The habeas court heard
             testimony from the petitioner, M, and several attorneys who previously
             had either represented or prosecuted criminal charges against B. The
             petitioner did not present B as a witness. The court rendered judgment
             denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and, on the granting
             of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held:
         1. The petitioner could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the habeas
             court’s denial of his motion for a continuance violated his constitutional
             right to present evidence and his right to due process under the United
             States and Connecticut constitutions: the petitioner was able to offer
             numerous exhibits and the testimony of several witnesses over the
             course of his three day habeas trial, and he failed to cite any cases that
             supported his assertion that a habeas court violates a petitioner’s right
             to present evidence by imposing reasonable limits on the number of
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                          Davis v. Commissioner of Correction
           delays in habeas proceedings; moreover, the habeas court granted him
           a continuance for the purpose of serving a subpoena on B and had
           issued a capias for B; accordingly, the petitioner’s claim did not satisfy
           the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) as no constitutional
           violation existed.
       2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner’s
           motion for a continuance: the court’s denial was not arbitrary, as it
           considered the presence of one of the victims’ families at the trial, the
           continuance it had previously granted and the capias it had issued for
           B; moreover, the petitioner did not specify the length of the continuance
           he requested or make a showing of his ability to achieve the purpose
           of the continuance were the court to grant it.

                   Argued February 1—officially released May 7, 2024

                                   Procedural History

         Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
       brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
       of Tolland and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment
       denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the
       granting of certification, appealed to this court.
       Affirmed.
         Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant
       (petitioner).
         Meryl Gersz, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
       on the brief, were Sharmese L. Hodge, state’s attorney,
       and Angela R. Macchiarulo, supervisory assistant
       state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
                                         Opinion

          CRADLE, J. The petitioner, Paul Davis, appeals fol-
       lowing the granting of his petition for certification to
       appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying
       his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he
       alleged a due process violation and ineffective assis-
       tance of his trial and appellate counsel. On appeal,
       the petitioner claims that the habeas court violated
       his constitutional right to due process and abused its
       discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance
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                       Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

         to afford him additional time to secure the testimony of
         a witness. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
            The following facts, as set forth by this court in the
         petitioner’s direct appeal from his criminal conviction,
         and procedural history are relevant to the petitioner’s
         claims on appeal. ‘‘[The petitioner] was a member of a
         gang in Hartford. On May 28, 2006, in retaliation for a
         shooting that occurred earlier that day in which another
         member of [the petitioner’s] gang was shot, [the peti-
         tioner], Ackeem Riley and Dominique Mack discussed
         conducting a drive-by shooting in the Nelton Court area
         of Hartford. The trio had no specific victim intended.
            ‘‘[The petitioner] drove himself, Riley and Mack
         toward the Nelton Court area in a car he had borrowed.
         Riley was armed with a nine millimeter Glock handgun.
         Mack was armed with a nine millimeter Taurus. As [the
         petitioner] drove, he, Riley and Mack saw a group of
         children at the corner of Elmer and Clark Streets. Riley
         and Mack fired at lease seventeen shots from their
         handguns at the group, striking two boys. One of the
         victims . . . a fifteen year old boy, was hit by five bul-
         lets, resulting in his death. The other victim . . . a four-
         teen year old boy, was hit by three bullets, resulting in
         serious injury.
            ‘‘After the shooting, [the petitioner], Riley and Mack
         fled the scene and left the car on Guilford Street. From
         there, they summoned a cab to take them to 140 Oakland
         Terrace. Riley, Mack and another man later returned
         to the vehicle and set it on fire.
           ‘‘On June 7, 2006, [the petitioner] agreed to speak
         with members of the Hartford Police Department, and
         he provided them with information about the shooting.
         He told the officers about the planning of the shooting,
         the types of firearms used and where they could be
         found. He also told them how the vehicle used in the
         shooting later was set on fire. [The petitioner], however,
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                          Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

       did not disclose his involvement in the shooting until
       almost three years later, in May, 2009, when he again
       spoke to the police and provided a written statement.’’
       State v. Davis, 163 Conn. App. 458, 460–61, 136 A.3d
       257 (2016), cert. granted, remanded for reconsideration,
       325 Conn. 918, 163 A.3d 618 (2017), aff’d, 178 Conn.
       App. 324, 175 A.3d 71 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn.
       1001, 176 A.3d 1194 (2018).
          Following the disclosure of his involvement in the
       May 28, 2006 shooting, the petitioner was charged with
       accessory to capital felony in violation of General Stat-
       utes § 53a-8 (a) and General Statutes (Rev. to 2005)
       § 53a-54b (8),1 accessory to murder in violation of Gen-
       eral Statutes §§ 53a-8 (a) and 53a-54a (a), conspiracy
       to commit murder in violation of General Statutes
       §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-54a (a), and attempt to commit
       murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a)
       (2) and 53a-54a (a). After a jury trial—during which
       the prosecution admitted into evidence, inter alia, the
       petitioner’s confession and the testimony of Lamel
       Brooks and Nikkia Parks, who implicated the petitioner
       in the shooting, the petitioner was convicted of all the
       charges except accessory to capital felony. The court,
       Dewey, J., sentenced him to 100 years of incarceration.
         This court affirmed the petitioner’s judgment of con-
       viction on direct appeal. State v. Davis, supra, 163 Conn.
       App. 460. Our Supreme Court granted certification and
       remanded the case to this court for consideration of a
       plain error claim.2 State v. Davis, 325 Conn. 918, 918,
          1
            This statute was amended, effective April 25, 2012, by the substitution
       of ‘‘murder with special circumstances’’ for ‘‘capital felony.’’ See Public Acts
       2012, No. 12-5, § 1.
          2
            Specifically, this case was remanded with direction to consider the peti-
       tioner’s claim that the court committed plain error by improperly instructing
       the jury that it was not necessary for the state to prove that the petitioner
       intended to kill the victim to find him guilty of accessory to murder. See
       State v. Davis, supra, 163 Conn. App. 477–79.
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                             Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

         163 A.3d 618 (2017). On remand to this court, that claim
         was denied. State v. Davis, 178 Conn. App. 324, 326,
         175 A.3d 71 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 1001, 176
         A.3d 1194 (2018).
            The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
         corpus in 2018. On September 15, 2021, the petitioner
         filed an amended three count petition alleging (1) viola-
         tions of his due process rights, (2) ineffective assistance
         of his trial counsel, Dennis McMahon, and (3) ineffec-
         tive assistance of his direct appellate counsel, Mary
         Beattie.3 At his habeas trial, which took place on Sep-
         tember 15, November 9 and December 8, 2022, the peti-
         tioner withdrew all but his claims alleging that (1) the
             3
              In count one, the petitioner alleged that the state violated his due process
         rights during his criminal trial by failing (1) to disclose that it had offered
         consideration to Brooks for his cooperation during the petitioner’s criminal
         trial, (2) to correct Brooks’ false testimony at the petitioner’s criminal trial
         that he received no consideration, (3) to disclose that it had offered consider-
         ation to Parks for her testimony during the petitioner’s criminal trial, (4)
         to timely disclose Parks’ complete criminal history, and (5) to timely disclose
         Parks’ prior history as a police informant.
            In count two, the petitioner alleged that McMahon was ineffective for
         failure (1) to ‘‘adequately cross-examine, impeach, and otherwise challenge
         the testimony of . . . Brooks,’’ (2) to ‘‘adequately cross-examine, impeach,
         and otherwise challenge the testimony of . . . Parks,’’ (3) to ‘‘adequately
         cross-examine, impeach, and otherwise challenge the testimony of [another
         witness] Edward Jachimowicz,’’ (4) to ‘‘adequately investigate and present
         evidence of . . . Brooks’ cooperation with the state for favorable consider-
         ation in exchange for his cooperation,’’ (5) to ‘‘adequately investigate and
         present evidence of . . . Parks’ cooperation with the state for favorable
         consideration in exchange for her cooperation,’’ (6) to ‘‘adequately move
         to exclude evidence of the petitioner’s purported gang involvement from
         evidence,’’ (7) to ‘‘present mitigation evidence in support of a lesser sentence
         at the petitioner’s sentencing, including the [petitioner’s] institutional
         records from the Department of Correction and mitigating information from
         members of the [petitioner’s] family,’’ and (8) to ‘‘adequately investigate and
         present an alibi defense that the [petitioner] was with Shareece Watkins at
         or about the time of the offense.’’
            In count three, the petitioner alleged that Beattie was ineffective for failure
         ‘‘to adequately investigate, raise and litigate the claim that the [petitioner’s]
         right to due process and a fair trial were violated by the state’s failure to
         preserve evidence, to wit a [nine millimeter] Glock and three associated
         shell casings, that had been associated with the shooting in this matter.’’
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                     Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

       state had violated his constitutional right to due process
       and a fair trial in failing (a) to ‘‘disclose that it had
       offered consideration to . . . Brooks for his coopera-
       tion in the petitioner’s case’’ and (b) to ‘‘correct . . .
       Brooks’ false or substantially misleading testimony that
       he received no consideration for his cooperation with
       the state during the petitioner’s criminal trial, which
       the state knew, or should have known to be false or
       misleading,’’ and (2) McMahon was ineffective in failing
       (a) to ‘‘adequately cross-examine, impeach, and other-
       wise challenge the testimony of . . . Brooks’’ and (b)
       to ‘‘adequately investigate and present evidence of . . .
       Brooks’ cooperation with the state for favorable consid-
       eration in exchange for his cooperation.’’
          At the petitioner’s habeas trial, he presented his own
       testimony and the testimony of McMahon; Attorney
       John Fahey, who prosecuted the petitioner; Attorney
       Keith Dubay, who represented Brooks between 2011
       and 2013; Attorney Richard Rubino, who prosecuted
       Brooks in 2012; and Attorney Michael Weber, who pros-
       ecuted Brooks in 2013, directly after the petitioner’s
       criminal trial. Although the petitioner successfully
       offered into evidence, inter alia, two letters written by
       Brooks; court documents related to Brooks’ criminal
       cases that resulted in convictions in 2007, 2012, and
       2013; transcripts related to Brooks’ 2012 and 2013 con-
       victions; and transcripts of his testimony at the petition-
       er’s criminal trial, the petitioner did not present Brooks
       as a witness.
          At a pretrial conference prior to the petitioner’s
       habeas trial, the petitioner’s habeas attorney, James
       Mortimer, indicated that he thought there would be
       ‘‘some issues with respect to at least one witness.’’ On
       September 15, 2022, the first day of the petitioner’s
       habeas trial, the court, Bhatt, J., noted for the record
       that Mortimer had been unable to subpoena Brooks and
       Parks, whose testimony was essential to the petitioner’s
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                           Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

         claims. The court suggested that the parties agree on an
         additional trial date in order to accommodate another
         attempt to subpoena those witnesses.
            The trial continued on November 9, 2022, and Morti-
         mer was still unable to secure the presence of Brooks
         and Parks. Mortimer stated that he had served a number
         of subpoenas at Brooks’ abode and had engaged Brooks’
         parole officer, who indicated that Brooks was aware
         of the proceedings.4 Mortimer requested that the court
         issue a capias and offered into evidence three subpoe-
         nas that had been served at Brooks’ abode and testi-
         mony from Ana Cantanhede, a private investigator who
         had located Brooks and served the subpoenas. The
         court found that ‘‘Brooks knows of today’s proceeding.
         He knows it’s in the afternoon. He’s been properly
         served, and he’s received the subpoena.’’ The court then
         issued a capias and set the next trial date for December
         8, 2022.
            On December 8, 2022, Brooks was again absent
         despite the capias. Mortimer indicated that he had spo-
         ken to Brooks’ parole officer, who informed him that
         Brooks ‘‘was aware that a capias had been issued’’ and
         that Brooks would try to avoid appearing in court. Mor-
         timer requested a continuance ‘‘to afford additional time
         to gain custody of [Brooks] and bring him in to testify
         . . . .’’ The court, Bhatt, J., denied the continuance,
         stating, ‘‘I understand that he’s a necessary witness to
         your claims, but we’ve issued a subpoena. I’ve issued
         a capias. I don’t know how much longer I can allow
         this to proceed in the . . . hope that, maybe, someday
         he’ll agree to show up. I don’t know that that’s some-
         thing that the court can agree to. So, I’ll deny the motion
         for continuance.’’
            Mortimer indicated to the court that he was unable to demonstrate that
             4

         Parks knew of the proceeding. We note, however, that the petitioner, at his
         habeas trial, withdrew his claims as to Parks and, therefore, does not raise
         on appeal any claims relating to Parks.
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                     Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

          Following trial, the habeas court, Bhatt, J., issued a
       memorandum of decision, dated December 15, 2022, in
       which it denied the petition, holding that ‘‘[the peti-
       tioner] has not proven his claims . . . .’’
          In its memorandum, the habeas court noted that ‘‘the
       following evidence was presented to the court. . . .
       On March 14, 2007, Brooks pleaded guilty to one count
       of conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of General
       Statutes § 53a-134. He received a sentence of fifty
       months to serve. On March 9, 2008, while incarcerated,
       he wrote a letter to the Hartford Police Department,
       offering information about unsolved crimes, including
       the one that [the petitioner] was eventually convicted
       of. Not receiving a response, he then wrote a letter to
       the [office of the state’s attorney for Hartford] on April
       2, 2008, reiterating that he had information about
       unsolved homicides including the one that [the peti-
       tioner] was eventually convicted of. In that letter he
       indicated that he was serving a sentence and stated,
       ‘I’m bringing this to the [state’s] attention because I
       need your help and I will gladly help the [office of the
       state’s attorney] if they please help me.’ Brooks then
       gave a statement to police on April 16, 2008. In that
       statement, he stated that he saw [the petitioner] driving
       a red Ford Explorer with . . . Riley in the passenger
       seat. He then heard gunshots within seconds of the car
       driving past and, although he did not see who did the
       shooting, he knew the shots came from that car.
          ‘‘In April, 2012, Brooks had two matters pending:
       one involved an alleged robbery and the other involved
       narcotics. On April 9, 2012, Brooks and his attorney
       . . . Dubay, appeared before Judge Alexander, and
       Brooks entered a plea of guilty to one count of posses-
       sion of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-
       279 (a). At the same time, the state declined to prosecute
       the robbery charge. [Prosecutor] Rubino explained on
       the record that the state ‘couldn’t determine [Brooks’]
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                       Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

         role in that particular robbery.’ . . . [Dubay] added
         that . . . ‘[t]here was really nothing to tie him to the
         robbery in any fashion.’ Brooks was then sentenced to
         three years’ incarceration, execution suspended, fol-
         lowed by three years’ probation. Subsequently, he was
         arrested on May 30, 2012, for further narcotics offenses
         and was also charged with violating his probation.
         [Dubay] once again represented him on that matter.
            ‘‘On March 5, 2013, Brooks testified at [the petition-
         er’s criminal] trial. The first questions asked by [Prose-
         cutor] Fahey, on direct [examination], were whether
         Brooks had felony convictions and whether he had
         pending cases. He answered those questions truthfully.
         [Fahey] then asked whether he had written letters to
         the police department and the [office of the state’s
         attorney] offering information, which he again
         answered truthfully. While his recollection had to be
         refreshed with his statement to police, he ultimately
         testified consistently with his statement and identified
         [the petitioner] as the driver of the vehicle from which
         shots were fired. His testimony on direct examination
         was very brief. [McMahon] then cross-examined Brooks
         at length about his drug use and how that affected his
         memory and his ability to recall. . . . [McMahon] also
         cross-examined Brooks about the circumstances of his
         statement to police and his motivations for contacting
         them from jail two years after the incident. Brooks
         maintained that he did so because it was the right thing
         to do. He was also asked if he hoped for or expected
         anything in exchange for the information he provided
         to police, and he answered no.
            ‘‘On March 27, 2013, Brooks pleaded guilty to one
         count of possession of narcotics in violation of . . .
         § 21a-279 (a) and admitted that he violated his proba-
         tion. The agreement was for a sentence of three years’
         incarceration, execution suspended, followed by three
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                     Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

       years’ probation. In support of the agreement, [Prosecu-
       tor] Weber stated that [Dubay] had ‘provided documen-
       tation [that led] the state to believe that [Brooks] should
       be given an additional opportunity to complete proba-
       tion.’ When given the opportunity, [Dubay] stated that
       he thought it was ‘a fair disposition [because Brooks
       had] been . . . enrolled in drug treatment [and had]
       been coming up with negative urines and [was] on the
       right path . . . .’ ’’
          The habeas court recounted that Dubay, in fact, had
       not been ‘‘aware [at the time] that Brooks was a witness
       to a homicide’’ or ‘‘that Brooks had cooperated. Thus,
       he would not have been able to fashion an agreement
       for Brooks that took into account cooperation.’’ Simi-
       larly, the habeas court noted that Fahey, who called
       Brooks as a witness in the petitioner’s criminal trial,
       had not had ‘‘any conversations with the prosecutor
       prosecuting Brooks prior to Brooks’ testimony’’ and
       ‘‘was clear that he did not give Brooks any consider-
       ation, was not approached by anyone to give Brooks
       consideration and did not instruct anyone to give
       Brooks consideration.’’ The habeas court further noted
       that McMahon, during his representation of the peti-
       tioner, had ‘‘raised the issue’’ and had been ‘‘told [that]
       there was no . . . benefit promised’’ for Brooks’ coop-
       eration. The habeas court, therefore, found that the
       petitioner had ‘‘presented absolutely no evidence of
       any cooperation agreement with or promised benefit to
       Brooks’’ in exchange for his testimony at the petitioner’s
       criminal trial. ‘‘Without such evidence,’’ the habeas
       court reasoned, ‘‘there is no due process violation and
       . . . McMahon cannot have performed deficiently.
       . . . The petition is denied.’’ Thereafter, the court
       granted the petition for certification to appeal, and this
       appeal followed.
         On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas
       court’s denial of his motion for a continuance to secure
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                             Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

          Brooks’ testimony was both a violation of his due pro-
          cess rights and an abuse of the court’s discretion.5 We
          disagree.
            ‘‘The determination of whether to grant a request for
          a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court
          and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
          discretion. . . .
             ‘‘A reviewing court is bound by the principle that
          [e]very reasonable presumption in favor of the proper
          exercise of the trial court’s discretion will be made.
          . . . To prove an abuse of discretion, an appellant must
          show that the trial court’s denial of a request for a
          continuance was arbitrary. . . . There are no mechani-
          cal tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance
          is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer
          must be found in the circumstances present in every
          case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial
          judge at the time the request is denied. . . . In the
          event that the trial court acted unreasonably in denying
          a continuance, the reviewing court must also engage
          in harmless error analysis.’’ (Internal quotation marks
          omitted.) State v. Godbolt, 161 Conn. App. 367, 374–75,
          127 A.3d 1139 (2015), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 931, 134
          A.3d 621 (2016).
             Although ‘‘[a] reviewing court ordinarily analyzes a
          denial of a continuance in terms of whether the court
          has abused its discretion . . . [t]his is so where the
          denial is not directly linked to a specific constitutional
          right. . . . If . . . the denial of a continuance is
             5
               The petitioner also argues that the court violated his right to due process
          and abused its discretion when it issued a capias that did not require Brooks
          to be taken into custody overnight. Beyond this bald assertion, the petitioner
          has failed to brief his due process claim as it relates to the capias and we
          therefore decline to review it. Furthermore, because the petitioner did not
          ask the court to issue a capias that provided for Brooks’ overnight incarcera-
          tion, or take exception to the court’s order, his claim that the court abused
          its discretion is unpreserved.
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                     Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

       directly linked to the deprivation of a specific constitu-
       tional right, some courts analyze the denial in terms of
       whether there has been a denial of [such right].’’ (Inter-
       nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 195 Conn.
       App. 244, 258, 224 A.3d 905, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 902,
       225 A.3d 685 (2020). ‘‘Even if the denial of a motion for
       a continuance on the ground of lack of due process
       can be directly linked to a claim of a denial of a specific
       constitutional right, if the reasons given for the continu-
       ance do not support any interference with the specific
       constitutional right, the court’s analysis will revolve
       around whether the trial court abused its discretion.
       . . . In other words, the constitutional right alleged to
       have been violated must be shown, not merely alleged.’’
       (Citation omitted.) In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn. App.
       592, 602–603, 767 A.2d 155 (2001). ‘‘A denial of constitu-
       tional due process, when shown by the particular facts,
       does not involve discretion because due process is an
       absolute right guaranteed by the constitution and allows
       the court no choice. ‘Due process’ may be a phrase
       impossible of precise definition, but when an act is
       shown by reliable facts to affect a specific constitutional
       right . . . the analysis should turn on whether a due
       process violation exists rather than whether there has
       been an abuse of discretion. A discretionary act and
       an act requiring due process are mutually exclusive.’’
       Id., 604.
          ‘‘In connection with [the] inquiry into harmless error,
       [w]e distinguish between [these] two types of cases:
       those in which a constitutional right has been impli-
       cated by a denial of a continuance, and those of a
       nonconstitutional nature. . . . Although prejudice is
       presumed in instances in which a defendant has suf-
       fered a deprivation of a constitutional right, in order
       to establish reversible error in nonconstitutional claims,
       the defendant must prove both an abuse of discretion
       and harm. . . . In this evaluation as to whether the
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                              Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

          party denied a continuance has been harmed, we have
          found prejudice when the denial of a continuance pre-
          cluded a defendant from obtaining the testimony of a
          witness known to possess exculpatory information.
          . . . We have declined, however, to find prejudice in
          instances in which a defendant can do no more than
          offer mere conjecture or rank speculation as to the
          harm flowing from a denial of a continuance.’’ (Citations
          omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
          Coney, 266 Conn. 787, 802, 835 A.2d 977 (2003).
             As to the petitioner’s claim on appeal that the habeas
          court’s denial of his motion for a continuance violated
          his due process rights, he argues that the court denied
          him the ‘‘right to present evidence in support of his
          habeas petition in violation of . . . article first, §§ 8,
          10, and 12, of the [Connecticut] constitution and the
          fifth and fourteenth amendments to the [United States]
          constitution.’’6 Because the petitioner did not assert this
          constitutional claim before the trial court, it is unpre-
          served. Thus, the petitioner seeks review of this unpre-
          served claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn.
            6
              The fifth amendment to the United States constitution provides in rele-
          vant part that ‘‘[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property
          without due process of law . . . .’’
             The fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides in
          relevant part that no state shall ‘‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or
          property, without due process of law . . . .’’
             Article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution provides in relevant part
          that, ‘‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be
          heard . . . to be confronted by the witnesses against him; [and] to have
          compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his behalf . . . . No person
          shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
          law . . . .’’
             Article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution provides that ‘‘[a]ll courts
          shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
          property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right
          and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.’’
             Article first, § 12, of the Connecticut constitution provides that ‘‘[t]he
          privileges of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, when
          in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it; nor in any
          case, but by the legislature.’’
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                     Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

       233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re
       Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).
       ‘‘Pursuant to the Golding doctrine, we may review an
       unpreserved claim only if all of the following conditions
       are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged
       claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magni-
       tude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3)
       the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and
       . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if
       subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to
       demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional
       violation beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The first two
       Golding requirements involve whether the claim is
       reviewable, and the second two involve whether there
       was constitutional error requiring a new trial.’’ (Empha-
       sis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
       Na-Ki J., 222 Conn. App. 1, 7, 303 A.3d 1206, cert.
       denied, 348 Conn. 929, 304 A.3d 860 (2023). Assuming,
       without deciding, that this claim is reviewable under
       the first two prongs of Golding, we nevertheless con-
       clude that the petitioner’s claim fails under the third
       prong of Golding.
          The petitioner asserts that the habeas court’s denial
       of his motion for a continuance violates his constitu-
       tional right to present evidence and his rights under
       article first, §§ 8, 10, or 12, of the Connecticut constitu-
       tion and the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
       teenth amendments to the United States constitution.
       We conclude that no constitutional violation exists. The
       petitioner does not cite any case that supports his asser-
       tion that a habeas court violates a petitioner’s due pro-
       cess right to present evidence by imposing reasonable
       limits on the number of delays in the habeas proceed-
       ings. To the contrary, ‘‘[t]he trial court has the responsi-
       bility to avoid unnecessary interruptions, to maintain
       the orderly procedure of the court docket, and to pre-
       vent any interference with the fair administration of
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                             Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

          justice. . . . Once a trial has begun . . . a defendant’s
          right to due process . . . [does not entitle] him to a
          continuance upon demand.’’ (Internal quotation marks
          omitted.) State v. Godbolt, supra, 161 Conn. App. 376.
          Three of the cases the petitioner cites to support his
          assertion concern a court’s denial of any opportunity
          to be heard. See Bloom v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
          233 Conn. 198, 205, 658 A.2d 559 (1995); Sassone v.
          Lepore, 226 Conn. 773, 777, 629 A.2d 357 (1993); Stan-
          dard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 55, 459 A.2d
          503 (1983). The other two cases the petitioner cites
          involved administrative hearings that provided little or
          no opportunity for the accused to present evidence.
          See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, 94 S. Ct. 2963,
          41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974) (discussing prison disciplinary
          proceedings that did not provide inmates with opportu-
          nity to present evidence);7 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395
          U.S. 411, 428–29, 89 S. Ct. 1843, 23 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1969)
          (finding that Louisiana law establishing labor commis-
          sion procedures violated due process by ‘‘drastically
          limit[ing]’’ right of persons investigated to present evi-
          dence). Here, in contrast, the petitioner was able to
          offer numerous exhibits and the testimony of several
          witnesses over three days of trial. Further, the court
          granted an earlier motion for a continuance, after trial
          had commenced, to afford the petitioner additional
          time—nearly two months—to secure Brooks’ appear-
          ance, and it later issued a capias for Brooks at the
          petitioner’s request. We, therefore, conclude that the
          court provided the petitioner with ample opportunity
             7
               We further note that, even if the habeas court in the present case had
          severely restricted the petitioner’s ability to present evidence, Wolff v.
          McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. 539, is not particularly supportive of the petition-
          er’s claim. In Wolff, the United States Supreme Court expressed support for
          limits on the right to present evidence in the context of that particular case,
          which involved the right to call witnesses from the prison population and
          to present documentary evidence during inmate disciplinary proceedings.
          Id., 566.
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                     Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

       to present evidence at his habeas trial. For the foregoing
       reasons, the petitioner’s claim fails under Golding’s
       third prong.
          The petitioner also claims that the habeas court’s
       denial of his motion for a continuance was an abuse
       of its discretion. He argues that the denial was improper
       because Mortimer did everything in his power to secure
       Brooks’ testimony, the delay associated with the contin-
       uance is not likely to have been lengthy, and the incon-
       venience to the court would have been minimal. Fur-
       ther, the petitioner contends that the improper denial
       harmed him because the habeas court ultimately found,
       after declining to issue the orders necessary to secure
       Brooks’ testimony, that the petitioner failed to prove
       the existence of an agreement for Brooks’ cooperation
       with his criminal trial. We are not persuaded.
          ‘‘Among the factors that may enter into the court’s
       exercise of discretion in considering a request for a
       continuance are the timeliness of the request for contin-
       uance; the likely length of the delay; the age and com-
       plexity of the case; the granting of other continuances in
       the past; the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses,
       opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legiti-
       macy of the reasons proffered in support of the request;
       the [petitioner’s] personal responsibility for the timing
       of the request; [and, if relevant] the likelihood that the
       denial would substantially impair the defendant’s ability
       to defend himself. . . . We are especially hesitant to
       find an abuse of discretion where the court has denied
       a motion for continuance made on the day of the
       trial. . . .
          ‘‘Lastly, we emphasize that an appellate court should
       limit its assessment of the reasonableness of the trial
       court’s exercise of its discretion to a consideration of
       those factors, on the record, that were presented to the
       trial court, or of which that court was aware, at the
       time of its ruling on the motion for a continuance.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown,
       supra, 195 Conn. App. 259.
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                             Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

             In the present case, the habeas court, in denying
          the motion for a continuance, properly considered the
          continuance it previously granted and the capias it
          issued. The court was also aware that the victim’s family
          was present in the courtroom, because counsel for the
          respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, argued,
          in response to the petitioner’s motion for a continuance,
          that she had ‘‘[the victim’s] father and his sister here
          and they deserve closure.’’ Moreover, the petitioner’s
          proffered reasons for requesting the continuance gave
          the court no assurances that Brooks would appear if the
          court granted the continuance.8 In light of the habeas
          court’s previous actions, and notwithstanding its
          acknowledgement of the importance of Brooks to the
          petitioner’s case, the court expressed concern about
          ‘‘[allowing] this to proceed’’ on the basis of ‘‘the hope
          that, maybe, someday, [Brooks will] agree to show up.’’
          (Emphasis added.) In the past, our courts have held
          that a denial of a motion for a continuance was not an
          abuse of discretion when, as in the present case, the
          length of the continuance was unspecified and the mov-
          ant did not make a showing of his ability to achieve the
          purpose of the continuance. See, e.g., State v. Hamilton,
          228 Conn. 234, 247–48, 636 A.2d 760 (1994); State v.
          Godbolt, supra, 161 Conn. App. 376–77. Making every
          reasonable presumption in favor of the proper exercise
          of the habeas court’s discretion, we conclude that the
          petitioner failed to sustain his burden of showing that
          the habeas court’s denial of his motion for a continu-
          ance was arbitrary. Therefore, we hold that the court
          did not abuse its discretion.9
             The judgment is affirmed.
             In this opinion the other judges concurred.

            8
              In requesting the continuance, Mortimer argued that Brooks is ‘‘an
          important witness in this case . . . and, perhaps, with additional time,
          knowing his location, he will return home and be able to be picked up by
          the marshals. [That] would be our hope.’’
            9
              Even if we were to find an abuse of the court’s discretion, the petitioner’s
          claim is still unavailing because he failed to demonstrate harm stemming
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                          Davis v. Commissioner of Correction

       from the alleged abuse of discretion. McMahon, Fahey, and Dubay consis-
       tently and unequivocally testified that they had no knowledge of any agree-
       ment to provide consideration to Brooks for his cooperation in the petition-
       er’s criminal case. Furthermore, Brooks’ previous testimony reveals his
       repeated insistence that he had not received or been offered consideration
       for his testimony during the petitioner’s criminal trial. The petitioner pro-
       vided no argument as to how Brooks’ testimony at the habeas trial would
       have differed from his previous testimony or how that testimony could have
       overcome other evidence in the record. See State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351,
       380–81, 844 A.2d 191 (2004) (upholding court’s denial of defendant’s motion
       for continuance to rehabilitate absent alibi witness because ‘‘the defendant
       failed to establish that any further testimony provided by [the absent witness]
       upon redirect examination would have been anything other than cumulative
       of her previous testimony’’ or would provide ‘‘any further explanations . . .
       other than those that had already been heard by the jury’’).