Court Opinion

ID: 9567724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:57:08.511316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:32.793499
License: Public Domain

*89Stolz, Judge,
dissenting.
An option for the purchase of land is required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing. Florence v. Rankin-Whitten Realty Co., 101 Ga. App. 333 (114 SE2d 70); Code § 20-401 (4).
The part performance provided by Code § 20-403 (3) to make an exception to the Statute of Frauds, must be part performance of the contract — something substantial, generally essential to the performance of the contract, and such that it would render it a fraud of the party refusing to comply if the court did not compel a performance — not merely an independent act, not a part of the contract, which the doer was led to perform by his belief or understanding that the parol contract would be performed by the other party. Hotel Candler, Inc. v. Candler, 198 Ga. 339 (31 SE2d 693). The plaintiff’s having the land surveyed and the title investigated, and transferring to the defendant possession of but not title to a 1967 model wrecker truck which was claimed by the plaintiff to be the consideration of the alleged option contract — while possibly induced by a belief or understanding that the alleged parol contract would be performed by the defendant, were not acts which were substantial or generally essential to the performance of the contract, etc., as required by Florence, supra.
Even if there was such part performance as to constitute an exception to the Statute of Frauds, moreover, the direction of the verdict was proper. "The rules governing other contracts apply to an option and before it can be regarded as a contract there must be an agreement on its terms and conditions.” Smith v. Wheeler, 233 Ga. 166, 169 (210 SE2d 702) and cit.; Bowles v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 209 Ga. 858 (1) (76 SE2d 703). See also Code §§ 20-107, 20-108. The evidence shows that there was no agreement as to the interest rate, how interest was to be computed and the payments allocated, whether the payments were payable monthly or annually, the value of the wrecker as a credit on the purchase price, or the terms of the release provisions from the deed to secure debt.
"To constitute a valid contract, there must be ... a consideration moving to the contract,. . .” Code § 20-107. "A consideration is essential to a contract which the law *90will enforce.” Code § 20-301. The consideration for the alleged option contract was the plaintiffs 1967-model wrecker truck. Although the evidence showed that the plaintiff delivered the mere possession of the vehicle to the defendant and gave his own attorney the documents of title, the title was never conveyed to the defendant. Thus, there was a lack of consideration, hence no valid contract for this additional reason.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judge Clark concur in this dissent.