Court Opinion

ID: 9568309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:02:30.289516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:35.014451
License: Public Domain

HORTON, Judge.
In 1893 our General Assembly codified the common law offense of murder and divided it into first and second degrees. State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 422, 290 S.E.2d 574, 588 (1982). The killings considered to be the most heinous were classified as first-degree murder and then subdivided into three classes: “(1) murders perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or torture, (2) premeditated murder, and (3) killings occurring in the commission of’ any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or other felony. Id. at 423, 290 S.E.2d at 588. This third class of first-degree murder is commonly referred to as felony murder.
In 1977, the General Assembly amended the definition of felony murder to its present form. It is now defined as a killing “committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon . . . .’’N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1998). Therefore, for a defendant to be found guilty of felony murder, the State must prove that another person was killed while defendant was committing or attempting to commit any felony in which a deadly weapon was involved. State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 51, 436 S.E.2d 321, 350 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1994). In the instant case, the defendant was charged with the underlying felony of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, which is comprised of the following elements: (1) an assault; (2) with a deadly weapon; (3) inflicting serious injury; and (4) not resulting in death. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32(b) (1993).
An assault is defined as an overt act or attempt, or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with force and violence, to do some immediate physical injury to another person. State v. Roberts, 270 N.C. 655, 658, 155 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1967). This show of force or vio*454lence must be sufficient to place a person of reasonable firmness in fear of immediate bodily harm. Id. A deadly weapon has been defined by our Supreme Court as any “ ‘article, instrument or substance which is likely to produce death or great bodily harm.’ ” State v. Torain, 316 N.C. 111, 120, 340 S.E.2d 465, 470 (quoting State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 301, 283 S.E.2d 719, 725 (1981)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 836, 93 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1986). An automobile which is driven in a dangerous manner can be a deadly weapon. See State v. Sudderth, 184 N.C. 753, 755, 114 S.E. 828, 829-30 (1922); State v. Eason, 242 N.C. 59, 65, 86 S.E.2d 774, 778 (1955); State v. McBride, 118 N.C. App. 316, 318-19, 454 S.E.2d 840, 841-42 (1995).
A driver who operates an automobile in such a manner that it is a deadly weapon can be convicted of the felony of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury if the driver has either “(1) an actual intent to inflict injury, or (2) [commits a] culpabl[y] or criminally] negligent] [act] from which such intent may be implied.” Eason, 242 N.C. at 65, 86 S.E.2d at 778. Culpable or criminal negligence, in turn, has been defined as “such recklessness or carelessness, proximately resulting in injury or death, as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others.” State v. Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 30, 167 S.E. 456, 458 (1933). In State v. Hancock, 248 N.C. 432, 435, 103 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1958), our Supreme Court stated that “[t]he violation of a safety statute which results in injury or death will constitute culpable negligence if the violation is wilful, wanton, or intentional.” If, however, the statute is unintentionally or inadvertently violated, culpable negligence exists if the violation is “accompanied by recklessness of probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision, amounting altogether to a thoughtless disregard of consequences or of a heedless indifference to the safety of others.” Id.
In this case, all the elements to sustain a conviction of first-degree murder by application of the felony murder rule are present. Two people were killed while defendant was perpetrating the felony of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Defendant committed the assault with his automobile by driving it in a reckless manner, oblivious to the safety of others. Although the evidence supports defendant’s conviction for felony murder because the elements of the underlying felony were met, defendant nonetheless contends that his conviction should be overturned because: (I) the felony murder statute is unconstitutionally vague in that it does not define *455“deadly weapon”; (II) application of the felony murder rule against defendant is an ex post facto violation; and (III) defendant’s conviction is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. We disagree with defendant on all of these contentions and with (IV) the dissent’s opinion that it was not the legislature’s intent for the felony murder rule to apply to the facts of this case.
Defendant also presents the following evidentiary and instructional error arguments: (V) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of a pending DWI charge, a 1992 conviction for DWI, and evidence of defendant’s driving prior to the offense in question; (VI) that the trial court (A) erred in failing to instruct the jury about proximate cause and insulating acts of negligence, and (B) should not have instructed the jury that driving left of the center line and exceeding the speed limit were culpable negligence; (VII) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence; (VIII) the district courts were without jurisdiction to enter orders to allow the State access to defendant’s medical orders and these orders allowed the State improper ex parte contact with defendant’s physicians; (IX) the trial court erred in allowing testimony by Dr. Mason in giving his opinion about defendant’s level of impairment and by Dr. Stuart about the effects of barbiturates on the human body; and (X) the trial court erred in submitting the felony murder charges because the underlying felonies of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury merged with the offense of felony murder.
I
Defendant first contends that the failure of North Carolina’s General Assembly to define the term “deadly weapon” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 necessarily results in the statute being unconstitutionally vague as applied to this defendant. We disagree.
It is well settled in North Carolina that a statute may be void for vagueness and uncertainty. “ ‘A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.’ ” State v. Green, 348 N.C. 588, 597, 502 S.E.2d 819, 824 (1998) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1111, 142 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1999). A deadly weapon, however, has been defined by our case law to include a variety of different instruments, including automobiles. As we stated earlier, a “deadly weapon is any article, instrument, or substance that is *456likely to produce great bodily harm or death.” State v. Hales, 344 N.C. 419, 426, 474 S.E.2d 328, 332 (1996) (emphasis added).
A variety of items have been held to be deadly weapons. See State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 527, 308 S.E.2d 317, 325 (1983) (hands, fists or feet can be deadly weapons); State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 64-65, 243 S.E.2d 367, 373-74 (1978) (Pepsi-Cola bottle could be deadly weapon); State v. Strickland, 290 N.C. 169, 178, 225 S.E.2d 531, 538 (1976) (plastic bag can be a deadly weapon). The determinative inquiry is “the destructive capabilities of the weapon or device.” State v. Moose, 310 N.C. 482, 497, 313 S.E.2d 507, 517 (1984). Indeed, this Court has specifically held that an automobile can be a deadly weapon within the meaning of the felony of assault with a deadly weapon. Eason, 242 N.C. at 65, 86 S.E.2d at 778. Because North Carolina cases provide adequate notice of what constitutes a deadly weapon, defendant has not been deprived of due process. His argument, therefore, that the lack of a specific definition of “deadly weapon” necessarily makes the felony murder statute unconstitutional in this case, is unpersuasive.
II
Defendant next contends that the application of the felony murder rule in this case would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. We disagree.
Both the North Carolina and United States Constitutions forbid the enactment of ex post facto laws. U.S. Const, art. I, § 10; N.C. Const, art. I, § 16. From the beginning of American jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has defined an ex post facto law to be a law that “(1) makes an action criminal which was done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done, (2) aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed, (3) allows imposition of a different or greater punishment than was permitted when the crime was committed, or (4) alters the legal rules of evidence to permit different or less testimony to convict the offender than was required at the time the offense was committed.” State v. Vance, 328 N.C. 613, 620, 403 S.E.2d 495, 500 (1991). See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L. Ed. 648, 650 (1798). In other words, in order for a criminal law to be an ex post facto violation, it must be both retrospective by applying to events which occurred “ ‘before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.’ ” Id. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 23 (1981)).
*457Although ex post facto laws have traditionally been directed specifically at legislative actions, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution “forbid retroactive application of an unforeseeable judicial modification of criminal law, to the disadvantage of the defendant.” Id. In this case, however, there is no judicial modification of any criminal law. The felony murder rule has existed in its present form since 1977 and automobiles were treated as deadly weapons well before the date of the offense in this case. Although a felony perpetrated by an automobile has apparently not been used to support a felony murder conviction in the past, there is nothing to preclude its use for that purpose, nor does it expand the statute in any manner. Indeed, our Supreme Court has allowed human hands to be considered as deadly weapons to sustain an underlying felony in order to convict a defendant of felony murder. See State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 493, 488 S.E.2d 576, 589 (1997). We therefore hold this argument to be unpersuasive.
Defendant argues that he was not fairly placed on notice that his conduct might result in a capital prosecution under the felony murder rule. Prior to this tragic incident, defendant had been convicted of driving while impaired on an earlier occasion. Further, about a month before this incident, defendant, while under the influence of drugs and alcohol, drove his automobile into the opposite lane, and ran another motorist off the road. Defendant was awaiting trial for that second incident at the time of the collision in this case.
An automobile has been recognized as a deadly weapon in North Carolina since 1922. See Sudderth, 184 N.C. 753, 114 S.E. 828. At least since 1925 motorists have been prosecuted for murder arising out of automobile accidents caused by their operation of their vehicles while under the influence. See State v. Trott, 190 N.C. 674, 130 S.E. 627 (1925), in which both the owner and the operator of an automobile were jointly indicted for first-degree murder and convicted of second-degree murder arising out of the tragic death of a fifteen-year-old girl in a traffic accident. Both defendants were under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. The driver did not appeal the conviction; the owner’s conviction was affirmed by our Supreme Court. Id. In recent years, defendants have been frequently prosecuted and convicted of second-degree murder arising out of automobile accidents. See, e.g., State v. Snyder, 311 N.C. 391, 317 S.E.2d 394 (1984); State v. Byers, 105 N.C. App. 377, 413 S.E.2d 586 (1992); State v. McBride, 109 N.C. App. 64, 425 S.E.2d 731 (1993). Defendant in the *458case before us can hardly complain that he was not on notice that he was taking serious risks — and facing serious consequences — when he continued to operate his automobile under the influence of drugs and alcohol. This assignment of error is overruled.
III
Defendant next contends that the application of the felony murder rule to him violates his right to equal protection under the law. We again disagree.
The Equal Protection Clause of both the U.S. and North Carolina Constitutions requires that all persons similarly situated be treated in the same manner. Richardson v. N.C. Dept. of Correction, 345 N.C. 128, 134, 478 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996). “If the statute does not impact upon a suspect class or a fundamental right, it is necessary to show only that the classification created by the statute bears a rational relationship to some legitimate state interest.” Id.
In this case, defendant does not state the suspect class to which he belongs that has been discriminated against, nor does he show us which fundamental right will be affected. He merely contends that, if a similar accident had occurred and there were not multiple injuries, the felony murder rule could not be applied. This argument is unpersuasive in that it does not make out a prima facie case for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, see Green, 348 N.C. at 602, 502 S.E.2d at 827, and because it is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause to punish a defendant more severely because more victims have been harmed. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1340.16(d)(8) and 15A-2000(e)(ll) (1997). This assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
IV
We next address an issue not specifically discussed by defendant in his brief, but clearly presented by the dissent. The dissent states that our legislature did not intend for the felony murder rule to be used in situations such as the present one. Specifically, the dissent opines that when the General Assembly modified the felony murder rule in 1977 and defined it as a killing “committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon[,]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17, it limited the coverage of the rule by limiting the felonies which would sustain a felony murder charge.
*459Although we agree that the General Assembly did make the rule more specific as to the type of underlying felony necessary to sustain a felony murder conviction, it specifically denoted felonies perpetrated with the use of a “deadly weapon.” As discussed above, a variety of items have been held to be deadly weapons within the meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Pierce, 346 N.C. at 493, 488 S.E.2d at 589. Indeed, the General Assembly did not exclude automobiles from the definition of “deadly weapons” in this statute, although automobiles had often been treated as “deadly weapons” prior to the 1977 amendment.
The dissent further supports its conclusion by stating that when a specific statute addresses an issue, that specific statute prevails over a more general statute, “ ‘unless it clearly appears that the General Assembly intended to make the general act controlling in regard thereto ....’” Utilities Comm. v. Electric Membership Corp., 3 N.C. App. 309, 314, 164 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1968) (citation omitted). Indeed, in State v. Beale, 324 N.C. 87, 376 S.E.2d 1 (1989), our Supreme Court did apply a more specific statute dealing with abortion and similar offenses rather than the felony murder rule.
This idea that the felony murder rule cannot be used in this context because the General Assembly has enacted the more specific statutes of felony death by vehicle and misdemeanor death by vehicle (N.C. Gen. Stat §§ 20-141.4(al) and 20-141.4(a2) (1993)), however, is not well grounded. Although these statutes do exist, they have not preempted all other statutes when a death occurs when a defendant has been driving while impaired. Indeed, there is abundant case law to support convictions for second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter in DWI cases, even after the enactment of the felony and misdemeanor death by vehicle statutes. See, e.g., State v. Grice, 131 N.C. App. 48, 505 S.E.2d 166 (1998), disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 102, — S.E.2d — (1999); McBride, 109 N.C. App. 64, 425 S.E.2d 731; Byers, 105 N.C. App. 377, 413 S.E.2d 586. Logically, therefore, there is no reason why the felony murder statute cannot be used in this context if an underlying felony was also committed.
Despite our conclusion, we are mindful of the core concern expressed in the dissent. We perceive that our duty as an intermediate appellate court is to apply existing law to the facts of the case before us, and that duty inevitably compels the result we reach here. Novel or imaginative uses of existing statutes and case law are the stock in trade of capable attorneys, and a prosecutor may properly weigh the harm resulting from a defendant’s actions in determining *460the charges he will pursue against a defendant. Such an evaluation undoubtedly took place here. Few traffic fatalities involve actions as flagrant as those before us. We expect district attorneys to continue to be mindful of the gravity of first-degree murder prosecutions in such cases. Both the verdict and sentence imposed are appropriate under the facts of this case, and our decision is grounded on those facts. This assignment of error is overruled.
V
We now turn to defendant’s assignments of error concerning instructional and evidentiary errors. Defendant contends that the trial court should not have allowed evidence about a pending DWI charge, defendant’s 1992 conviction for DWI, and evidence of defendant’s conduct just before the offense in question. We disagree with defendant on all of these arguments.
Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence allows evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts by a defendant if it is used to show a mental state such as malice. Byers, 105 N.C. App. at 383, 413 S.E.2d at 589. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts cannot, however, be used to prove a defendant’s propensity to commit a crime. Id.
In this case, evidence of defendant’s pending DWI charge and his 1992 conviction for DWI was used to show that defendant had the requisite mental state of malice, one of the elements of the charge of second-degree murder which was submitted to the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in that the danger of undue prejudice did not outweigh any probative value of the evidence. Furthermore, evidence of defendant’s conduct immediately prior to the offense in question was also properly admitted. Defendant bumped another automobile stopped at a traffic light, yelled obscenities and then sped off without acknowledging any damage which occurred. This evidence tended to show malice on the part of defendant and was proper under Rule 404(b).
VI
Defendant next contends that the trial court (A) erred in failing to instruct the jury about proximate cause and insulating acts of negligence and (B) should not have instructed the jury that driving left of the center line and exceeding the speed limit were culpable negligence. We disagree with these arguments.
*461A
Defendant argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury that in order to find him guilty of first-degree felony murder, the jury must find that “the defendant’s actions were the sole and only proximate cause of the death of the victim. The State must prove that there was no other proximate cause of the death of the victim.” Although the trial court must give an instruction to the jury if the requested instruction is correct in itself and is supported by evidence, see State v. Harvell, 334 N.C. 356, 364, 432 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1993), the requested instruction in this case was not correct. If a defendant’s culpable negligence is “a” proximate cause of the death, that is sufficient to find him criminally liable. State v. Hollingsworth, 77 N.C. App. 36, 39, 334 S.E.2d 463, 465 (1985). Indeed, there may be more than one proximate cause, but criminal responsibility arises when the offense committed is one of the proximate causes. Id. As a result, defendant’s requested instruction was a misstatement of the law and did not have to be given to the jury.
As to the instruction for insulating acts of negligence, the trial court was correct in not submitting the charge. “In order for [the] negligence of another to insulate defendant from criminal liability, that negligence must be such as to break the causal chain of defendant’s negligence; otherwise, defendant’s culpable negligence remains a proximate cause, sufficient to find him criminally liable.” Id. In this case, there was no evidence of any negligence on the part of Margaret while driving her automobile. Defendant was in her lane of travel and she was forced to swerve into the left lane in an effort to avoid a collision. Defendant’s argument that Margaret should have swerved to the right and hit a telephone pole and mailbox is completely unpersuasive and is, accordingly, overruled.
B
The trial court gave the jury the following instruction on culpable negligence.
Under the law of this state, culpable negligence is such recklessness or carelessness proximately resulting in injury or death as imports a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others. An intentional, willful or wanton violation of the statute designed for the protection of human life or limb which proximately results in injury or death such as driving on the left half of the roadway or exceeding the posted speed limit is culpable negligence.
*462Where there is an unintentional or inadvertent violation of the law, such violation standing alone does not constitute culpable negligence. To constitute culpable negligence, the inadvertent or unintentional violation of the law must be accompanied by recklessness of probable consequences of a dangerous nature when tested by the rule of reasonable foresight amounting all together to a thoughtless disregard of consequences or heedless indifference to the safety of others.
This language of the instruction tracks the language set forth by the Supreme Court in State v. Sealy, 253 N.C. 802, 804,117 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1961) and was correct. Defendant complains that the trial court mischaracterized the law when it stated that “driving on the left half of the roadway or exceeding the posted speed limit is culpable negligence.” This argument, however, is without merit. Our cases have held that an individual may be culpably or criminally negligent when traveling at excessive rates of speed. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 769, 12 S.E.2d 654 (1941); State v. Steelman, 228 N.C. 634, 46 S.E.2d 845 (1948); State v. Floyd, 15 N.C. App. 438, 190 S.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 760, 191 S.E.2d 363 (1972); State v. Grissom, 17 N.C. App. 374, 194 S.E.2d 227, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 258, 195 S.E.2d 691 (1973). Our cases have also held that driving on the wrong side of the road can be culpable negligence. See State v. Hefler, 60 N.C. App. 466, 299 S.E.2d 456 (1983), aff'd, 310 N.C. 135, 310 S.E.2d 310 (1984); State v. Atkins, 58 N.C. App. 146, 292 S.E.2d 744, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 744, 295 S.E.2d 480 (1982).
VII
A trial court correctly denies a motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence if there is substantial evidence to support each essential element of the offense charged and that defendant committed the offense. State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Morgan, 111 N.C. App. 662, 664-65, 432 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1993). The trial court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference which can be drawn from the evidence. Id. In this case, there was substantial evidence to warrant submission of the charges to the jury and the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss.
*463VIII
Defendant’s next argument concerns orders entered by the district court for the production of his medical records for the State. Although the case law prohibits ex parte communications with a party’s health care provider in civil cases absent the party-patient’s express consent, see Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990), defendant has cited no authority to extend this rule to criminal defendants. Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that defendant objected to the orders at trial or moved to suppress the information. As a result, any error which occurred has been waived by defendant. N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1).
Defendant’s contention that the district court judges who signed two of the orders lacked jurisdiction because the case was to be tried in superior court is likewise without merit. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-272(b) (Cum. Supp. 1997) states that a “district court has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary examinations and to bind the accused over for trial upon waiver of preliminary examination or upon a finding of probable cause . . . .” Until a case is “bound over” to the superior court, or indictments are returned by the Grand Jury, jurisdiction is in the district court. In this case, the two orders signed by the district court were entered on 6 September 1996 and 20 September 1996, while the first indictments against defendant were not returned until 21 October 1996. Since the indictments had not been returned, nor the cases bound over to the superior court when the orders in question were signed, the district court retained jurisdiction of these preliminary matters.
IX
 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of two of the State’s expert witnesses. Again, we disagree with defendant’s contentions and hold that the trial court was correct in allowing the testimony.
Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence will allow an expert witness to testify to a scientific opinion if it will “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue ....” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702 (Cum. Supp. 1997). In this case, defendant objects to testimony by Dr. Mason that, in his opinion, defendant was appreciably impaired when his blood alcohol level reached .046. This testimony, however, was appropriately admitted because Dr. Mason was qualified as an expert in the field of forensic toxicology and had *464examined a sample of defendant’s blood and therefore could give his opinion as to the effects of the various impairing substances in defendant’s body.
This same rationale applies to the testimony of Dr. Stuart. Dr. Stuart was accepted by the trial court as an expert in trauma surgery and medicine. Defendant contends that Dr. Stuart should not have been allowed to testify about the effects of combining alcohol and Xanax because it was outside of his field of knowledge. We reject this argument, however, because in North Carolina, “the opinion testimony of an expert witness is competent if there is evidence to show that, through study or experience, or both, the witness has acquired such skill that he is better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on the particular subject of his testimony.” Maloney v. Hospital Systems, 45 N.C. App. 172, 177, 262 S.E.2d 680, 683, disc. review denied, 300 N.C. 375, 267 S.E.2d 676 (1980). In this case, Dr. Stuart was an expert in the field of medicine and was better qualified than the jury to offer an opinion about the effects of combining alcohol and Xanax. Any problems in the testimony go to the weight it is given by the jury, not to its admissibility.
X
In his final argument, defendant contends that the trial court erred in submitting the felony murder charge because the underlying felony of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury merged with the homicide. Specifically, defendant is asking this Court to reexamine our Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 451 S.E.2d 131 (1994), and hold that the offenses must be merged if the victims are different persons. This Court is bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court, and therefore we are unable to accept defendant’s argument. See State v. Coria, 131 N.C. App. 449, 508 S.E.2d 1 (1998).
In conclusion, we hold that no prejudicial error was committed at defendant’s trial. We are aware that the felony murder rule has been criticized in some jurisdictions, and we understand the dissent’s concern that harsh results could result from the application of the felony murder rule to other fatal automobile accidents regardless of the circumstances surrounding them. We- are bound, however, by the plain language of the statute and earlier appellate decisions, and do not find on the facts of this case that application of the felony murder rule resulted in a fundamentally unfair result. Any modifications of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 to yield a different result in situations similar *465to the hypothetical case set out in the dissent must be left to our General Assembly.
No error.
Judge EDMUNDS concurs.
Judge WYNN concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.