Court Opinion

ID: 9545764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:19:23.74783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:31.961418
License: Public Domain

Grosse, J.
(concurring)—While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I cannot agree with its treatment of the statute, RCW 9.94A.125. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that absent "an indication from the Legislature of an intention to overrule the common law, new legislation will be presumed consistent with prior judicial decisions." State v. Bushnell, 38 Wn. App. 809, 811, 690 P.2d 601 (1984). This court cannot "assume that the Legislature would effect a significant change in legislative policy by mere implication." State v. Calderon, 102 Wn.2d *785348, 351, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984). Thus, the first question we must answer is broader than that posited by the majority which focuses on the words alone. We must determine if those words manifest an unambiguous intent to overrule prior judicial decisions on the subject.
The majority correctly points out that the signal case, State v. McKim, 98 Wn.2d 111, 653 P.2d 1040 (1982), involved construction of an entirely different statute that contained no reference to accomplices. However, in State v. Davis, 101 Wn.2d 654, 682 P.2d 883 (1984), the Washington Supreme Court made it clear that the McKim case stands for a much broader proposition. In Davis the lookout was charged as an accomplice to armed robbery. The jury was instructed that '"when one or more persons act as accomplices ... all of them may be deemed armed, even though only one ... in fact had a gun."' Davis, at 656-57. The jury found Davis guilty of first degree robbery but answered the deadly weapon interrogatory in the negative. In affirming the conviction and holding that complicity to an armed robbery does not depend upon knowledge of the coparticipant's weapon, the Supreme Court specifically discussed and reaffirmed McKim:
Our conclusion in McKim rested in part upon our recognition of the differences between accomplice liability for a substantive crime and accomplice liability for enhancement statutes. We reasoned that the new complicity statute, unlike the old one, made an accomplice equally liable only for the substantive crime. McKim, at 117. We reaffirm this distinction.
Davis, at 658. Accord, State v. Brown, 36 Wn. App. 549, 676 P.2d 525, review denied, 101 Wn.2d 1024 (1984). I cannot agree that by adding the words "or an accomplice" in the SRA provision for deadly weapon sentence enhancement, the Legislature clearly and unambiguously manifested an intent to abolish the distinction between the principles of accomplice liability for substantive crimes and accomplice liability for sentence enhancement purposes. *786Therefore, I believe a further search for legislative intent is required.
In 1986, 3 years after RCW 9.94A.125 was enacted, the Legislature amended RCW 9.95.015 to apply to persons convicted after July 1, 1986, for crimes committed before July 1, 1984. The Legislature did not change the wording relied upon by the McKirn court and left intact the phrase "whether or not the accused was armed with a deadly weapon". This action is ambiguous. If the Legislature had clearly intended to change the rule to allow sentence enhancement on a strict liability basis it would not have left the crucial wording of RCW 9.95.015 intact but would have amended that wording to conform to RCW 9.94A.125.
Where, as here, the intent of the Legislature is not clear from the language of the statute, we may consider legislative history. Bellevue Fire Fighters Local 1604 v. Bellevue, 100 Wn.2d 748, 751, 675 P.2d 592 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985). RCW 9.94A.125 was enacted in 1983. The reports of the Senate Judiciary Committee state that the purpose of the enactment was to establish a definition for deadly weapons along with a legal procedure for establishing whether the defendant or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. Senate Report 3416 (Feb. 4, 1983); House Report ESB 3416 (Apr. 1, 1983). The reports do not mention any intention to change the case law which had developed with regard to the then existing deadly weapons statutes, RCW 9.95.015 and RCW 9.95.040.
The language that was employed in the bill originated with the Sentencing Guidelines Commission. Motion 83-296, Minutes of Sentencing Guidelines Commission (Jan. 3, 1983). During discussions of the motion, and during other meetings of the Commission, members, in particular the King County Prosecuting Attorney, stated that the proposed deadly weapon language reflected existing law. There were no statements to the effect that the rule in McKim was to be changed. In fact the Sentencing Guidelines *787Implementation Manual issued by the Sentencing Guidelines Commission states the opposite: "The definition and procedural requirements for the deadly weapon allegation and finding are carried over from existing law." Washington Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual pt. II, § 9.94A.125 comment, at 11-25 (1988).
Requiring the State to prove a higher state of culpability than strict liability in order to enhance a defendant's sentence, is consistent with the policy premises of the SRA. As noted in Boerner's treatise on the SRA:
The reference in RCW 9.94A.125 and RCW 9.94A.810 to "or an accomplice" will certainly be construed in light of the accomplice definition in RCW 9A.08.020, which is bottomed on the accomplice's "own mental culpability," a condition established only by actual possession or knowledge. This construction will not render the phrase "or an accomplice" superfluous, since it is common for an accomplice to have knowledge that the principal was so armed. It would insure that the enhancement provision would not apply absent such knowledge. Such a result is consistent with the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act in that it is likely to "ensure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense," and with the Criminal Code in that it will "differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and prescribe proportionate [penalties] for each." Distinctions based on difference of individual culpability are wholly consistent with, if not compelled by, the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act.
(Footnotes omitted.) D. Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 5.19, at 5-29 (1985).1
I conclude that the statute is ambiguous; that there is no indication of a legislative intent to overrule prior case law; that prior and present case law recognizes a distinction between accomplice liability for the substantive crime and *788accomplice liability for purposes of sentence enhancement; and that this distinction is consistent with the policies and purposes of the SRA. I would hold that the trial court erred in giving instruction 15 which did not require the State to prove, for purposes of sentence enhancement, beyond a reasonable doubt that Dean had knowledge that the copar-ticipant was armed. However, for the reasons set forth in the majority opinion, I would hold that the error was harmless.
Review denied at 113 Wn.2d 1020 (1989).

Although I agree with Dean Boerner's policy analysis, I cannot accept his application of the complicity statute, RCW 9A.08.020, because McKim and State v. Davis, 101 Wn.2d 654, 682 P.2d 883 (1984), specifically limited that statute's application to the substantive crime.