Court Opinion

ID: 9713336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:13:40.791337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:18.194364
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling defendant’s objection at trial to the admission of the DNÁ evidence. I find Watson persuasive, and I believe the NRC Report to be properly before us. The questions raised by Dr. Allen’s testimony regarding the acceptance by the scientific community of the product-rule method of determining the probability of a random match are serious enough, in my judgment, that the trial court should have excluded the DNA evidence. Assuming, arguendo, that defendant waived any challenge to the admission of the DNA evidence, I would find this issue reviewable under the plain-error doctrine. A defendant has the right to be tried on the basis of competent and reliable evidence. Watson and the authorities cited herein strongly suggest that the product rule does not meet the general-acceptance test under Frye, and therefore, the method cannot be deemed reliable. Finally, I would consider the case on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel was aware of the NRC Report, and its importance was readily apparent. Defendant’s pretrial motion for a Frye hearing alleged that forensic DNA typing was unreliable and not generally accepted in the scientific community. It did not specifically argue that the product rule was the subject of a controversy in the scientific community. Given this, along with the prior cases holding DNA evidence admissible, I agree that the trial court correctly denied defendant’s pretrial motion for a Frye hearing. At trial, however, when defendant renewed his pretrial objections to the admissibility of the evidence, he did so after cross-examining Dr. Allen with respect to the product rule. Although the NRC Report had not yet been issued when the hearing on defendant’s pretrial motion for a Frye hearing was held, it had been issued by the time of trial and it was discussed during Dr. Allen’s cross-examination. His testimony revealed that the thrust of the report was that the possible presence of subpopulations could result in inaccurate estimates of the probability of random matches. He acknowledged that many population geneticists were still raising questions regarding the product-rule method of calculating the probability of a random match. Given the persuasive power of DNA evidence and the particular importance of such evidence in this case, I believe the trial court abused its discretion in overruling defendant’s objection to the DNA evidence. With respect to the majority’s position that the NRC Report is not part of the record before us, I agree that Eyler stands for the proposition that the admission of expert testimony on the issue of whether a new scientific technique or procedure is generally accepted in the scientific community is a matter for the discretion of the trial court. The court in Watson likewise recognized this principle but also recognized that, because the formulation of law is an appellate function, a broad review of the trial court’s decision, encompassing not only the evidence before the trial court but also judicial opinions from other jurisdictions as well as pertinent legal and scientific commentaries, was warranted. (People v. Watson (1994), 257 Ill. App. 3d 915, 924, 629 N.E.2d 634, 640.) I would follow Watson in the present case. While Illinois courts have held that the six-step HELP procedure is admissible under Frye, these decisions were rendered without the benefit of the NRC Report. Defendant notes that the NRC Report treats the estimation of a random match as an integral part of the DNA analysis: "Interpreting a DNA typing analysis requires a valid scientific method for estimating the probability that a random person by chance matches the forensic sample at the sites of DNA variation examined. To say that two patterns match; without providing any scientifically valid estimate (or, at least, an upper bound) of the frequency with which such matches might occur by chance, is meaningless.” (NRC Report, at 74.) Significantly, I note that a recent Illinois case has relied on this language to hold that a reliable probability estimate is essential in order to give meaning to a "match” and, absent such an assessment, evidence of a "match” standing alone is inadmissible at trial. (People v. Watson (1994), 257 Ill. App. 3d 915, 929-30, 629 N.E.2d 634, 644.) Furthermore, as Miles recognized, Lipscomb implicitly held that the process of generating probability statistics is an integral part of the DNA identification process, which must meet the general acceptance test under Frye. See Miles, 217 Ill. App. 3d at 404-05, 577 N.E.2d at 485. Because DNA test results are contingent upon a valid estimate of a random match, the method used to generate that estimate must meet the test of general acceptance in the scientific community. The statistical method used should be treated as a novel scientific principle subject to the Frye test, and absent such consensus, the DNA evidence should be inadmissible. The NRC Report indicates that the multiplication or product rule is widely used in DNA analysis to determine the probability of a random match. The product rule is based on two assumptions: (1) the alleles at a given locus are inherited independently or are in "linkage equilibrium,” and (2) the population is in "Hardy-Weinberg equilibriurn,” that is, it mates randomly and therefore the gene pool is evenly distributed. If significant substructuring exists, then the underlying assumptions of the product rule fail. Therefore, the validity of the product rule depends on the absence of population substructure. The NRC Report indicates that the possibility of substructuring has provoked "considerable debate” among population geneticists: some believe the substructuring is significant, while others believe the degree of substructure will not significantly affect the probability estimate. The NRC Report characterizes this dispute as a "substantial controversy” concerning the methods for estimating the population frequencies of specific DNA typing patterns. Because the probability estimate is an integral part of the DNA analysis, without it, evidence of a "match” is meaningless. The publication of the NRC Report has had a profound effect on this area of the law. As one court noted: "Since the issuance of the DNA Committee Report [NRC Report], an overwhelming majority of courts have excluded the evidence of a match after finding the corresponding statistical calculation to be inadmissible because not scientifically reliable.” (Emphasis omitted.) (Nelson v. State (Del. 1993), 628 A.2d 69, 76; State v. Anderson (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), 115 N.M. 433, 853 P.2d 135; State v. Cauthron (1993), 120 Wash. 2d 879, 846 P.2d 502; People v. Barney (1992), 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731; Commonwealth v. Lanigan (1992), 413 Mass. 154, 596 N.E.2d 311; State v. Vandebogart (1992), 136 N.H. 365, 616 A.2d 483.) I agree with this line of authority and would find that there is a significant controversy in the scientific community over use of the product method and, therefore, the DNA evidence herein was inadmissible under Frye. I note that the NRC Report recommends the use of an alternative method of calculating the probability of a random match referred to as the modified-ceiling principle. I would remand with directions that the circuit court hold a Frye hearing to determine whether this method is generally accepted in the relevant scientific field. If the court determines that this principle meets the Frye test, it must then determine the appropriate probability estimate to be admitted at a new trial. (See Watson, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 935-36, 629 N.E.2d at 648; State v. Bloom (Minn. April 29, 1994), 55 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1168.) If the court determines that the modified-ceiling principle does not meet the Frye test, the DNA evidence must be excluded.