Court Opinion

ID: 9753716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:24:12.102141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:40.893963
License: Public Domain

Justice NEWMAN
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the decision reached by the majority today. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(d) differs markedly from 18 U.S.C. § 3731. Our rule provides that “the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (emphasis added). The federal statute explains that “[a]n appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence ... if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (emphasis added).
Application of the federal rule is expressly limited to situations where the district court rules in favor of the defense in response to a defense-initiated motion to preclude the government’s evidence. Rule 311(d) imposes no such constraint on the Commonwealth, providing instead that the Commonwealth may take an appeal from any adverse order that does not end the entire case, provided that the order terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution. In fact, our jurisprudence interpreting Rule 311 indicates that we have rejected the distinction that the federal rule makes plain.
*428In Commonwealth v. Gordon, 548 Pa. 513, 673 A.2d 866 (1996), the Commonwealth sought to introduce transcripts of a previous trial of Gordon, and filed a motion to allow this testimony, but the trial court denied the motion. The Commonwealth certified that the order denying its motion substantially handicapped the prosecution and took an appeal to the Superior Court. The Superior Court reversed, above the dissent of one judge, who would have quashed the appeal. Gordon appealed to this Court, contending that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to consider the Commonwealth’s appeal. Gordon argued, consistent with the position taken by the majority today, that allowing the Commonwealth to appeal from this adverse ruling would hinder his right to a speedy trial. We rejected this contention, concluding as follows:
There is no essential difference between suppression rulings and rulings on motions in limine to admit or exclude evidence. In both cases, a pretrial ruling is handed down which admits or excludes evidence at trial, and in both cases, once a jury' is sworn, the Commonwealth may not appeal from an adverse ruling.
Concerning speedy trial rights, while it is obvious that appeal of a pretrial order will cause a delay in the trial, the issue is not whether there is a delay, but the weight of the competing interests. Here, the competing interests are promptitude versus a considered determination of whether the Commonwealth has had a fair opportunity to put on its best case. In our view, to preclude an immediate review of a pretrial ruling that would terminate or substantially handicap the Commonwealth’s case would be a harm that far outweighs the benefit to the defendant of securing a more speedy trial.
Id. at 868 (emphasis added). By stating that the Commonwealth can appeal “rulings on motions in limine to admit ... evidence,” this Court in Gordon anticipated the instant situation — where the Commonwealth seeks to challenge a trial *429court ruling admitting evidence. We did not indicate in Gordon that the decision was limited to determinations adverse to the Commonwealth on motions filed by the defense.
In Commonwealth v. Matis, 551 Pa. 220, 710 A.2d 12 (1998), we reaffirmed that “the Commonwealth’s certification that a suppression order substantially handicapped the prosecution is not contestable. The certification, in and of itself, precipitates and authorizes the appeal.” Id. at 17.. Matis, when combined with Gordon, provides that the Commonwealth, if it certifies that an adverse ruling on a suppression order or a motion in limine terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution, can appeal such a ruling to the Superior Court, as of right.
This is not to say that the Commonwealth has an unfettered right to appeal any adverse pre-trial ruling. The Commonwealth must, in good faith, certify that the ruling terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution. Where the trial court ruling allows in defense evidence, rather than excluding Commonwealth evidence, it will be exceedingly rare for the Commonwealth to make a certification that prosecution of the case is so hampered. However, I can envision a set of circumstances where the defense seeks to introduce controversial and questionably relevant evidence of a perfect defense that, if allowed, would tie the hands of the Commonwealth to such an extent that disallowing an appeal at that time would foreclose the administration of justice. Therefore, I cannot sign on to the approach taken by the majority, which holds that, as a matter of law, the Commonwealth can never appeal as of right from a trial court ruling denying a Commonwealth motion in limine to exclude defense evidence.1 Accordingly, I would affirm the Opinion of the Superior Court.

. The majority points to Rule of Appellate Procedure 1311 and Section 702(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b), to demonstrate that the Commonwealth can request certification of an interlocutory appeal from an adverse pre-trial order or, where the trial court refuses to certify, file a Petition for Review in the intermediate appellate court. However, the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 311(d) obviates the need for the Commonwealth to jump through these hoops in appropriate cases.