Court Opinion

ID: 9822120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 08:47:44.250864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:01.827467
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶20] I would affirm the judgment.1 Therefore, I respectfully dissent. The United States ' Supreme Court decisions provide that the trial court may take judicial notice that an offense is a subsequent offense even if it increases the level of the crime. Our state law provides that the trial court shall take judicial notice that an offense is a subsequent offense. Our own case law does not hold that a prior offense constitutes an essential element merely because it elevates the level of the offense of a given crime. Here the district court correctly applied the statutory and case law and should be affirmed.
[¶ 21] The majority says it is interpreting a statutory provision — N.D.C.C. ,§ 39-08-01(3). The majority says, at ¶ 11, that the statutory provision must be read as a whole — without ever setting forth the pro*717vision. Here is the whole of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(3): ■ -
An individual violating this section or equivalent ordinance is guilty of a class B misdemeanor for the first or second offense in a seven-year period, of a class A misdemeanor for a third offense in a seven-year period, and of a class C felony for any fourth or subsequent offense within a fifteen-year period.. The minimum penalty for violating this section is as provided in subsection 5.-The Court shall take judicial notice of the fact that an offense would be a subsequent offense if indicated by the records of the' director or may make a subsequent offense finding based on other evidence.
(Emphasis added.) When read as a whole, there is nothing in the language to suggest that the judicial notice is limited, as the majority claims. The majority also says this statute must be “harmonized with other applicable statutes,” but it does not set forth those provisions either. The majority cites to N.D.C.C. §. 29-16-02, which provides for a jury trial in a case of a felony or misdemeanor, unless waived by the defendant and the state’s attorney:
In any case, whether a misdemeanor or felony, a trial jury may be waived by the consent of the defendant and the state’s attorney expressed in open court and entered on the minutes of the court. Otherwise, the issues of fact must be tried by the jury.
And the majority cites to N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-03, which requires “each element of the offense” be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An accused is presumed inno- • cent until proven guilty. The' fact that the accused has been arrested, confined, or charged with the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at the accused’s trial. “Element of an offense” means:
a. The forbidden conduct;
b. The attendant. circumstances specified, in the definition and grading of the offense;
c. The required culpability;
d. Any required result; and
e. The nonexistence of. a defense as to which there is evidence in the ■ case sufficient to give rise to a reasonable doubt on the issue.
[¶ 22] This provision Is part of the “new criminal code,” which became effective July 1, 1975. See N.D. Sess. Laws 1973, ch. Í16, § 1. The language was taken from the Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. The Final Report § 103 reflects that this language follows the existing federal law, including United States Súpreme Court opinion's. See also the Working Papers there annotated. That an offense is a subsequent offense is not an attendant circumstance'and, as discussed below, not an element of the offense.
[¶ 23] Nothing in the “other applicable statutes” leads. to the majority’s result.
[¶24] Note that we are not discussing here one offense predicated on conviction of a different prior crime (e.g., possession of the firearm by a.convicted felon). We áre discussing here only prior offenses in the sense of recidivism (even if prior convictions increase the grading of the offense).
[¶ 25] The-majority heavily relies on and ultimately misstates the holding in State v. Tutt, 2007 ND 77, 732 N.W.2d 382. It is important to note that no party cited or argued Tutt in its brief. The case was never discussed at oral argument.
*718[¶26] Tutt was a case in which the defendant on appeal complained he' had been unfairly prejudiced by his prior offenses being submitted to the jury. Id. at ¶ 3. And contrary to the apparent misper-ception of the majority, the United States Supreme Court decisions do not require a jury to find the previous offenses, even if the offenses raise the level of the offense. This Court held in Tutt that putting the evidence of the prior convictions before the jury was prejudicial error requiring reversal of the conviction. Id. at ¶ 13. See also State v. Gahner, 413 N.W.2d 359, 361-62 (N.D.1987) (“Charging the more serious offense, without stating the prior, convictions, may be the more desirable, alternative. It can avoid the prejudicial effect that proof of prior convictions may exert on a jury.”).
[¶ 27] Tutt states, at ¶ 7:
Standing alone, a statutory minimum sentence is hot an “element” of the offense, and the United States Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the fact of a prior conviction must be found by a jury. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239-247, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Almendarez-Torres’ “prior conviction” exception has been built into the' Sixth Amendment’s application of jury trial to sentence enhancements in subsequent United States Supreme Court cases (although each deals with upward departures from statutory maximum sentences as opposed to the application of statutory minimum sentences). Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). BothAp-prendi and Blakely state that the Al-mendarez-Torres rule requiring sentence-enhancing facts to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or. admitted to by the defendant only applies to facts “other than the fact of a prior conviction.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at-490, 120 S.Ct. 2348; Blakely, 542 U.S, at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531.
(Emphasis added.) The “rule requiring sentence-enhancing facts to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted to by'the defendant only applies to facts ‘other than the fact of a prior conviction.’ ” That is unambiguous.
[¶ 28] The United States Supreme Court- explained in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998):
First, the sentencing factor at issue here — recidivism—is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court’s increasing an offender’s sentence. See, e.g., Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26, 113 S.Ct. 517, 521-522, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (Recidivism laws “have a long tradition in this countoy that dates back to colonial times” and currently are in effect in all 50 States); U.S. Dept, of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Statutes Requiring the Use of Criminal History Record Information 17-41 - (June 1991) (50-state survey); USSG §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2 (Nov. 1997) (requiring sentencing court to consider defendant’s prior record in every' case). Consistent with this tradition, the Court said long ago that a State need not allege a defendant’s prior conviction in the indictment or information that alleges the elements of an underlying crime, even though the conviction was “necessary to bring the case unthin the statute.” Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 624, 32 S.Ct. 583, 585-86, 56 L.Ed. 917 .(1912). That conclusion followed, the Court said, from “the distinct nature of the issue,” and the fact that recidivism “does not relate to the commission of the offense, but goes to the *719punishment only, and therefore ... may be subsequently decided.” Id., at 629, 32 S.Ct. at 588 (emphasis added). The Court has not deviated from this view. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452, 82 S.Ct. 501, 503-504, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (due process does not require advance notice that trial for substantive offense will be followed by accusation that the defendant is a habitual offender); Parke, supra, at 27, 113 S.Ct. at 522 (“[A] charge under a recidivism statute does not state a separate offense, but goes to punishment only ”), And, as we said before, supra, at 230, Congress, reflecting this tradition, has never, to our knowledge, made a defendant’s recidivism an element of an offense where the conduct proscribed is otherwise unlawful. See United States v. Jackson, 824 F.2d 21, 25, and n. 6 (C.A.D.C.1987) (opinion of R. Ginsburg, J.) (referring to fact that few, if any, federal statutes make “prior criminal convictions ... elements of another criminal offense to be proved before the jury”). Although these precedents do not foreclose petitioner’s claim (because, for example, the state statute at issue in Graham and Oyler provided for a jury determination of disputed prior convictions), to hold that the Constitution requires that recidivism be deemed an “element” of petitioner’s offense would mark an abrupt departure from a longstanding tradition of treating recidivism as “go[ingJ to the punishment only.” Graham, supra, at 629, 32 S.Ct. at 587-588.
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243-244 118 S.Ct. 1219 (emphasis added). Thus the United States Supreme Court, whose decisions our “new criminal code” follows, makes clear: to hold that the Constitution requires that recidivism be deemed an “element” of petitioner’s offense would mark an abrupt departure from a longstanding tradition of treating recidivism as going to the punishment only. Id. And as the high Court says above, this is so “even though the conviction was ‘necessary to bring the case within the statute.’ ” Id. at 243, 118 S.Ct. 1219.
[¶29] Turning to the majority’s misstatement of Tutt, the majority says, at ¶ 9:
A prior offense constitutes an essential element if it elevates the offense of a given crime. State v. Tutt, 2007 ND 77, ¶ 8, 732 N.W.2d 382.
That, however, is not what Tutt says. Tutt says, at ¶ 8:
Under N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-23(l)(a)(l), one prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver enhances a defendant’s sentence, but it does not enhance the offense from a class A felony to a more serious class. “A prior conviction that enhances a sentence, but not the seriousness of the offense, is generally not regarded as an element of the offense.” City of Fargo v. Cossette, 512 N.W.2d 459, 462 (N.D. 1994); see also State v. Saul, 434 N.W.2d 572, 574 (N.D.1989); State v. Gahner, 413 N.W.2d 359, 362 (N.D. 1987); State v. Edinger, 331 N.W.2d 553, 554 (N.D.1983).
Tutt correctly says, “A prior conviction that enhances a sentence, but not the seriousness of the offense, is generally not regarded as an element of the offense.” That is a true statement. The majority turns it around to say what Tutt does not say: “A prior offense constitutes an essential element if it elevates the offense of a given crime.” Turning it around does not give a true statement. What the majority has done would be similar to this false logic: “An animal that is a brown dog with three legs is not a horse; therefore, any animal that is not a brown dog with three legs is a horse.”
*720[¶ 30] The district court followed the law, and I would affirm-.
[¶ 31] DALE V. SANDSTROM

. Contrary to the framing of the majority opinion, it is the judgment that was appealed. While the denial of the pretrial motion to dismiss may be reviewable in the context of the appeal, it is not itself appealable, and it was not appealed. See-N.D.C.C. § 29-28-06.