Court Opinion

ID: 9675152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:43:28.746043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:24.051904
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear.
HICKERSON, J.
General Motors has filed an earnest petition to rehear. Want of privity of plaintiffs and General Motors is the basis of the petition.
That same defense was made on the regular hearing, and we thought we had responded to that defense in our original opinion, at page 660 of 338 S. W. (2d). However, out of deference to the apparently sincere desire of Counsel for General Motors to be helpful to this Court and to properly represent General Motors, as set out in the petition to rehear, we shall respond to the petition on the merits.
Petitioner has cited only one case in support of its petition: Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S. W. 421, 422. On pages eight and nine of its petition, General Motors states:
"It is believed that the proper answer to the court’s opinion is the unequivocal language of the Supreme Court of Tennessee to the effect that the law is clear that ‘a manufacturer is not liable to a *458third person who buys his goods from an intermediate dealer, because of the want of any privity between the parties’. Burkett vs. Studebaker, 126 Tenn. 467 [150 S. W. 421].”
This sentence lifted from the paragraph and out of context does not show what the Court held in Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. We here quote the entire paragraph from which petitioner quoted only one sentence. The paragraph provides:
“The general rule is that a manufacturer is not liable to a third person, who buys his goods from an intermediate dealer, because of the want of any privity between the parties. The rule is different, however, if the manufacturer had knowledge of the defect and put it upon the market in that condition. In such case he is guilty of fraud, a/nd is liable to any one mto ivhose hands the article falls, and who is injured while using it properly. He is also liable to such third person, tohere the article sold is of such kind as to be imminently dangerous to human life or health; also, when the article, although not apparently dangerous, is known by him to be such, and he gives no notice of its qualities when he puts it upon the market.” (Emphasis added.)
Petitioner did know the Oldsmobile bought by plaintiffs was dangerously defective in its braking system and it put the automobile on the- general market in that condition. Furthermore, the automobile, in its defective condition, was imminently dangerous to human life from its use for the purpose for which plaintiffs bought it. The automobile was not apparently dangerous so plaintiffs could see the danger and be warned thereof *459by looking at it. Petitioner bad actual knowledge that it was dangerous in its defective condition, but failed to warn plaintiffs of tbe danger.
So, under tbe Burkett case, tbe facts of tbe case on trial make out a case for plaintiffs against General Motors if there be a want of privity between them.
In Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co., 38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S. W. (2d) 479, 481, in an opinion by Judge Felts, now Mr. Justice Felts of tbe Supreme Court, this Court specifically by name overruled Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., supra. In tbe Dunn case, Judge Felts said:
“These facts, we think, were sufficient to put a duty of care upon tbe Company toward plaintiff. It is true there was no such duty on a manufacturer, in tbe absence of privity, under the so-called general rule of non-liability which was applied in Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S. W. 421, and like cases.
“But it can hardly be said that such a general rule any longer exists. It has been discarded in England (Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85, 105 A. L. R. 1483), and in the United States tbe exceptions have swallowed up tbe rule. Carter v. Yardley Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N. E. (2d) 693, 164 A. L. R. 559, 568; Wagoner v. Ford Motor Co., Tenn. Ct. of App., July 28, 1945, unreported, noted in 19 Tenn. L. Rev. 800, reversed on another ground 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S. W. (2d) 840, 164 A. L. R. 364; Aurex Corp. v. Blair, Tenn. Ct. of App., Jan. 7, 1947, unreported, noted in 20 Tenn. L. Rev. 193; Wade, Book Review, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 444, 447.
*460“The rule now, in our opinion, is that where a product is such that, if negligently made, it may reasonably be expected to injure the person or property of an ultimate user of it, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer is under a duty to such user to make it carefully. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, supra, 105 A. L. R. 1494; Carter v. Yardley Co., supra, 319 Mass. 92, 64 N. E. (2d) 693, 164 A. L. R. 563; Prosser on Torts, 673-678; Noel, Products Liability of a Manufacturer in Tennessee, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 958, 988-89.”
Petitioner, through radio, television, and advertisements in magazines and newspapers, extols the virtues of its products. Surely it would not be contended that such advertisements and praise of General Motors’ products were made for the benefit of its authorized dealers. These advertisements are made for the ultimate purchasers of General Motors’ products who will use and drive them. They form a part of the warranty which General Motors gives the ultimate consumers.
Under Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S. W. 421, the express warranty made by General Motors through its authorized dealer to plaintiffs, the ultimate purchasers and users of the automobile; and the Uniform Sales Act, T. C. A. sec. 47-1215; we hold there is no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court of Giles County.
The petition to rehear is denied at petitioner’s cost. The judgment of this Court heretofore entered on the minutes of this Court will stand as entered.
Shriver, J., concurs.
Humphreys and Felts, JJ., not participating.