Court Opinion

ID: 9625791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:51:18.9919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:15.412707
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. 1. The majority opinion upholds the trial court in permitting Dr. H. K. Heath to testify, over timely objection, in the affirmative to the following question: "Based on the hospital records and your personal knowledge of this case, what is your opinion as to whether or not the nurses and hospital personnel exercised such reasonable degree of care and skill as is ordinarily employed by hospitals in the area of Waycross in connection with the actual delivery and subsequent care of the patient, Mrs. Steverson?” (Emphasis supplied.)
The witness answered: "Oh yes, I can testify that in my opinion the hospital exercised a reasonable degree of care in this case. Yes, sir.” The plaintiffs objection was good and should have been sustained. The question is quite elementary. It was tantamount to allowing a patrolman or deputy sheriff, as an expert, to testify that in his opinion the driver of a motor vehicle was not negligent. This he cannot do. He is allowed to recite all of the facts, including his opinion as to how fast the driver was traveling, and whether he was on his own right-hand side of the road. But he cannot go that one step further and testify that the driver was not negligent! Cone v. Davis, 66 Ga. App. 229 (4) (17 SE2d 849); City of Milledgeville v. Wood, 114 Ga. 370 (2) (36 SE 924); Corley v. Russell, 92 Ga. App. 417 (2) (88 SE2d 470).
Further, the question and answer was objectionable because it was limited to the standard of reasonable care in the area of Waycross. In a well written opinion, Judge Deen, in Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517 (2) (145 SE2d 760), discusses this question as it relates to the practice of medicine, and succinctly holds that it is not as to the skill employed by the profession in the immediate *517locality, but is that employed by the profession generally. See the very thorough discussion and authorities cited on pp. 521, 522, where the term "medical standards” is employed, which term is broad enough to cover hospitals and doctors. Indeed, the standard of care to be exercised in the practice of medicine and the operation of hospitals are so intertwined that there is no reason for suggesting that a different standard should be applied to these fields wherein the object is to treat the sick. The standard is to be measured by that standard of care employed by physicians and hospitals generally, and not locally.
The defendant hospital in this case relies largely on only one Georgia authority in support of its position, to wit, Emory University v. Porter, 103 Ga. App. 752, 755 (120 SE2d 668). That case is not authority for the hospital’s position. It was a case involving a hospital sued for "failure to inspect or otherwise exercise control over equipment and facilities used by. . . independent practising physician[s] in performing services for a patient” (hn.la), without any allegation that the equipment was defective. The petition was dismissed for failure to set forth a cause of action. No evidence was introduced, and the question of whether the standard of care required was to be measured by the standard used locally, or generally, was in no wise involved. At page 755, in language that was not required by or necessary to the decision, and was, therefore, obiter dictum, the court stated: "A hospital owes to its patients only the duty of exercising ordinary care to furnish equipment and facilities reasonably suited to the uses intended and such as are in general use under the same, or similar, circumstances in hospitals in the area. See 41 CJS, Hospitals, § 8. ” (Emphasis supplied.) We have carefully studied the Corpus Juris Secundum reference, and not a word therein relates to "hospitals in the area.” Further, as there was nothing in the case vaguely relating to hospitals in any particular area, this language, being obiter dicta is decisive of nothing. See State Hwy. Dept. v. Cooper, 104 Ga. App. 130 (121 SE2d 258); State Hwy. Dept. v. Wilson, 98 Ga. App. 619 (2) (106 SE2d 544).
Finally, the majority opinion contends that similar evidence was admitted without objection, and makes reference to the transcript at pages 260 and 306-307.1 do not agree. At page 260, Dr. Calhoun testified that he didn’t see anything that implied any fault with the hospital. But on cross examination, beginning at page 265, this witness reversed himself and swore he did not contend the hospital did everything perfect, that he has not seen anything that "I could *518put my finger on” — and then as to whether giving the wrong blood type to the patient could be considered a minor problem, he replied, "no, sir” and then admitted that he was not a blood expert (Tr. 266). As the mismatching of blood was one of the principal issues in this case, it was simply beyond his competence as a witness on the material points about which he was being interrogated. Again, at page 306-307 of transcript, Dr. Davis, in a general way, suggested by his testimony that the hospital employees and nurses were not shown by the record to have violated the accepted standards in the Waycross area. But on cross examination, as to the failure of the nurses to communicate the fact of bleeding by the patient to the physician immediately when it became known, and as to whether such failure was consistent with the standards of nurses’ duty to patients in Ware County, he at first testified that such failure would be a breach of duty of care they owed their patient, and that this question "would be open for discussion” and then the following occurred: "Q. If it had been your patient and you had discovered that she failed to notify you of this bleeding at 8:30, you would have been upset with that nurse, would you not have? A. I probably would have let her have what I thought about it.” (Emphasis supplied.) From the foregoing, it is clear that the improper admission of the testimony of Dr. Heath over proper timely objection cannot be excused, as the majority seeks to do because of introduction of other testimony along the same line.
2. The trial court refused to allow Dr. Jonas to testify on behalf of plaintiff to the effect that the standard of care required of hospitals and doctors generally was not observed in this case. His testimony was rejected over objection that Dr. Jonas was unfamiliar with the standard of care observed and required in the area of Waycross, Georgia. This exclusion was error, but plaintiff failed to perfect the record by showing what answer was expected of this witness, and under the authorities cited by the majority opinion, this enumeration cannot be considered.
3. Plaintiff contends that one of counsel for defendants argued to the jury that a doctor who testified for plaintiff was "owned” by plaintiffs counsel, and plaintiffs counsel moved for a reprimand. This argument was highly improper, but it is not an official part of the record (though not denied by defendants). This enumeration of error cannot be considered under the status of the record.
I dissent from the majority opinion and would reverse the trial court in not excluding the testimony of Dr. Heath as . set forth in *519enumeration of error number 2.