Court Opinion

ID: 9598360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:08:11.048194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:12.797439
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the decision of the panel, and agree the evidence discovered during the search of Romo-Corrales’ home was admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine.
I write separately to express my concern over the kind of search at issue here. Putting aside momentarily the issue of inevitable discovery, this case presents a difficult issue: whether the government may, in the course of hunting for a fugitive, search the home of a third party not only for the fugitive himself, but also for indicia of occupancy linking the fugitive to the home.
The relationship between an arrest warrant and a search warrant has been explored in numerous cases. For example, police acting on a valid arrest warrant may not enter the home of a third party without a valid search warrant — a requirement *921met by law enforcement here. United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 215 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215-16, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981)). However, “an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Once inside the home, the Fourth Amendment continues to govern the scope of searches in seizure conducted contemporaneous to arrest. For example, officers “[possessing an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe [the suspect is] in his home [are] entitled to enter and to search anywhere in the house in which [the suspect] might be found.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332-33, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990). In addition, once in the home, to protect officer safety and preserve evidence, officers may search the person of an arrestee and the area within his immediate control. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
My concern in this case stems from the fact that by granting law enforcement the authority to search not only for the fugitive himself, but also for indicia of occupancy by the fugitive, we risk infringing more than necessary upon the privacy of innocent third parties. The scope of the search in this case illustrates these concerns. In executing the warrant, officers searched under a mattress, behind a night stand, within a hamper of dirty clothing, inside a cooler, and, by removing a bathroom mirror from the wall, inside a wall. Quite obviously, most of these locations could not have hidden a fugitive. But because law enforcement officers were additionally searching for indicia of occupancy, including “[documentation, receipts, or items of venue which show Fidel E. Martinez’ possession or domain of the residence,” officers acted within the scope of the warrant when executing the search. See United States v. Montgomery, 527 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir.2008) (“Police may lawfully search all buildings, containers, and vehicles on the property to be searched in which the contraband sought might be found.”).
We have cautioned that “a waxrant authorizing officers to seize anything related to indicia of occupancy is quite broad.” United States v. Timley, 443 F.3d 615, 623 (8th Cir.2006). We have also stated that probable cause, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, means a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. See United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir.1999) (emphasis added). In most cases, searching for indicia of occupancy is justified by a need to gather evidence linking particular persons to a crime scene. See, e.g., United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 805 (8th Cir.2006). Here, by contrast, it is far from clear why the government needed to link Martinez to the place to be searched. The government had an interest in arresting Martinez, but doing so was not contingent on finding him in any particular place. And while the government’s interest in connecting Martinez to the home to be searched was slight, the intrusiveness of the search to third parties was substantial.
Fortunately, we need not resolve the thorny issue of whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause to search for indicia of occupancy. For the reasons stated in the majority opinion, suppression of the evidence was not necessary in this case because law enforcement officers would have inevitably discovered the drug contraband during the execution of the second warrant.
*922I therefore concur in the court’s judgment.