Court Opinion

ID: 9958436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 14:05:40.658869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:22.179243
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1020

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                              KEITH D. CORREIA.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant

 was convicted of larceny of a motor vehicle, negligent operation

 of a motor vehicle, and leaving the scene of property damage.

 On appeal, the defendant maintains that (1) identification

 testimony from eyewitnesses violated Commonwealth v. Crayton,

 470 Mass. 228, 237, 242-243 (2014); (2) his trial counsel was

 ineffective; and (3) the evidence against him was insufficient.

 We affirm.

       Background.     The jury could have found that, on the evening

 of February 19, 2019, a couple leaving a restaurant saw the

 defendant checking the door handles of cars parked on the

 street, apparently to see if they were unlocked.              After getting

 into their own car, the couple drove to a nearby parking lot,

 where they saw what appeared to be the same person "rummaging
through a car."    The wife called the police to report what they

saw, and the couple then saw the defendant move to a different

car, a gray Nissan Pathfinder.     The defendant got into the

Pathfinder and drove it out of the lot.        The couple started to

follow behind in their own car.        They saw the Pathfinder almost

hit another vehicle, accelerate through an intersection, and hit

two other vehicles along the street, which caused one of the

Pathfinder's tires to pop and the rim of the wheel to spark.

There was a trail of "either oil or coolant" which the couple

followed, eventually finding the Pathfinder "smashed" into

another vehicle, with the same man they witnessed on the street

and in the parking lot earlier (the defendant) walking away from

the accident.    Both members of the couple testified that they

recognized the man by his jacket and hat, though the wife

testified that the two had disagreed on the color of the man's

jacket.     The wife had been on the phone with the police while

the couple was following the Pathfinder.        When police arrived at

the scene, the husband directed the police to the defendant, who

was then walking away from the car, and he was arrested.

    The defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent in-court

identifications at trial.     The judge took no action on the

motion, reserving a ruling until in-court identifications

occurred.    The couple had differing initial accounts of the

defendant's appearance -- they disagreed about the color of his

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jacket, and while the husband thought the defendant was white,

the wife thought he had dark skin.

    During the husband's testimony, he was asked about his

ability to recognize the person he had seen and said that he had

recognized the defendant "as soon as he walked through the

courtroom doors this morning."    The defendant objected to the

statement as impermissibly suggestive but did not move to strike

the identification or ask for a curative jury instruction.         The

judge instructed the Commonwealth to lay a foundation before

prompting an in-court identification of the defendant but did

not sustain the objection or (sua sponte) strike the statement.

The husband then testified that he did not get a good look at

the person's face, and the Commonwealth did not pursue the

issue.

    The wife also testified that she had not gotten a good look

at the driver's facial features and that she had recognized him

by his clothing, but she was nonetheless confident in her

ability to identify the driver.       The judge overruled the

defendant's objection to the identification.       The wife then

identified the defendant.

    The arresting officer testified and identified the

defendant at trial as well.   That officer had also taken some

items from the defendant's person after detaining him, including

a Nissan car key with a broken loop.       Over the defendant's

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objections, photos of the key and booking photos were entered

into evidence.

    Discussion.   1.   In-court identifications.      The defendant

maintains that both the husband's and wife's in-court

identifications were Crayton errors.       Under Crayton, 470 Mass.

at 237, 242-243, if there was no prior out-of-court

identification, an in-court identification is only allowed if

there is a "good reason."   "Good reasons" include "where the

eyewitness was familiar with the defendant before the commission

of the crime," and "where the witness is an arresting officer

who was also an eyewitness to the commission of the crime, and

the identification merely confirms that the defendant is the

person who was arrested for the charged crime."       Id. at 242.

"In both of these circumstances, the in-court [identification]

is understood by the jury as confirmation that the defendant

sitting in the court room is the person whose conduct is at

issue rather than as identification evidence."       Id.

    The Commonwealth bears the burden of showing good reason

for the in-court identification.       See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 243.

Here, with respect to the identifications by the couple, the

Commonwealth asserted that the couple had directed the police to

the scene.   There had been no out-of-court identification

procedure like a "showup" or a photo array.       The couple was not

previously familiar with the defendant.       See id. at 242.

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Because there was no good reason for the judge to allow in-court

identifications from the couple, the trial judge erred by

denying the defendant's motion in limine to prevent such

identifications, and by overruling the defendant's objections to

the wife's in-court identification.      However, these errors did

not prejudice the defendant.    See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 487

Mass. 602, 610-611 (2021).     Given the strength of the other

evidence presented to the jury, including an arresting officer's

in-court identification of the defendant,1 the errors "did not

influence the jury, or had but very slight effect."       Id. at 610,

quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 456 Mass. 708, 725 (2010), S.C.,

466 Mass. 1007 (2013).

     The husband's in-court identification stands on slightly

different footing from the wife's; it was not responsive to the

Commonwealth's questioning but was instead spontaneous.       The

defendant objected, which resulted in the judge's instructing

the Commonwealth to lay the foundation for an identification.

After failing to do so, the Commonwealth did not pursue an

identification from the husband.       The defendant did not move to

strike the husband's unprompted statement or request a

corrective jury instruction.    We cannot say that the trial judge

     1 While the defendant also challenges the arresting
officer's identification, that identification was permissible
under Crayton, 470 Mass. at 242.

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abused his discretion by not taking up those tasks sua sponte.

Further, as discussed above, even if the judge had erred, it

would not have prejudiced the defendant.2    See Ortiz, 487 Mass.

at 610-611.

     2.   Ineffective assistance.    The defendant claims, for the

first time on appeal, that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by not moving to suppress the car key

with the broken loop.3   Absent exceptional circumstances, we do

not review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for the

first time on appeal.    Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807,

809 n.2 (2006), and cases cited therein.     Because the factual

basis for the defendant's claim does not "appear[] indisputably

on the trial record," Commonwealth v. Adamides, 37 Mass. App.

     2 The judge also did not err by admitting photographs of the
defendant from after his arrest, as it was reasonable for him to
conclude that any risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially
outweigh their probative value. See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249
n.27, citing Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2014).

     3 The defendant also appears to raise, for the first time,
arguments related to whether there was probable cause to stop
and arrest him, and appears to suggest that an arrest warrant
was required, that the seizure of the key with the broken loop
was unlawful, and that the stop was racially discriminatory.
Because these issues were not raised below, we ask whether the
record is "adequate to permit review on the merits" and, if so,
review to determine whether there was an error and, if any,
whether it created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of
justice. Commonwealth v. Santos, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 795
(2019). The record, including the trial transcript, is
inadequate to permit review of the defendant's claims under the
United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. See id. at 797-798.

                                 6
Ct. 339, 344 (1994), it does not fall "within that narrow

category of claims that an appellate court can resolve on the

trial record," Zinser, supra at 811.     Even if this claim were

properly before us, it would fail, because counsel's conduct did

not fall "measurably below that which might be expected from an

ordinary fallible lawyer."    See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366

Mass. 89, 96 (1974).    Further, "to prevail on an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim on the ground of failing to file a

motion to suppress, the defendant has to demonstrate a

likelihood that the motion to suppress would have been

successful."   Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 Mass. 86, 91 (2004).

The defendant has not done so here.     See note 3, supra.

    3.   Sufficiency of the evidence.     The defendant maintains

that the trial judge should have granted his motions for

required findings of not guilty because the evidence against him

was insufficient.    "In reviewing a denial of a motion for a

required finding of not guilty, our inquiry is whether the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, was sufficient to satisfy a rational trier of fact

that the essential elements of the crime have been proven beyond

a reasonable doubt."    Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 69 Mass. App. Ct.

622, 626 (2007).    "[W]e keep in mind that the evidence relied on

to establish a defendant's guilt may be entirely circumstantial,

. . . and that the inferences a jury may draw from the evidence

                                  7
'need only be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary

or inescapable.'"   Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 544

(2010), S.C., 483 Mass. 227 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Lao,

443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005).   "[F]indings drawn partly or wholly

from testimonial evidence are accorded deference and not set

aside unless clearly erroneous," Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480

Mass. 645, 655 (2018), but where factual findings are

"predicated not on the assessment of witness credibility but

rather, on documentary materials," Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462

Mass. 482, 495 (2012), we review the evidence de novo.   See

Tremblay, supra at 656.

    Here, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the

defendant stole and negligently operated the Pathfinder and left

the scene of the accident.   Testifying witnesses, including an

arresting officer, placed the defendant at the scene of the car

theft and the accident, saw the Pathfinder dangerously and

illegally cross multiple intersections, and witnessed it

crashing into parked vehicles.   When the defendant was arrested

a block away from the accident, a Nissan car key was in his

                                 8
pocket.    From the evidence, a jury could reasonably have

concluded that the defendant committed the charged crimes.4

                                      Judgments affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Hand,
                                        Hershfang & Brennan, JJ.5),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    April 9, 2024.

     4 To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of
the defendant's arguments, we have considered them and do not
find them worthy of discussion. See Commonwealth v. Domanski,
332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
     5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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