Court Opinion

ID: 9446255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:50:06.978313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:34.964901
License: Public Domain

POPE, Circuit Judge.
I dissent. I think the part of the pretrial Order designated under heading I. B., although poorly drawn,1 did raise the question whether there was liability under the Safety Appliance Act. If there was any ambiguity about it, the Judge understood it to mean what I have in*603dicated, for his findings recite, in the second introductory paragraph, that “the issues of plaintiff’s right to maintain this action under the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act was segregated for separate trial by the Court. * * * ” plainly this Judge understood there were two claims, else why segregate one ?
The orderly thing would have been to decide that issue first as it was segregated, and later get around to consideration of the Safety Appliance Act issues. Apparently through oversight the conclusions and the judgment directed that the action be dismissed. If, as I think it was fairly a two-claim action, the judgment should have been limited to dismissal of one claim only. Then Rule 54(b) would have come into action.
However, the judgment dismissed the action in its entirety. So framed, it was appealable. Appellant specified as error: “The U. S. District Court erred in entering its judgment order, to-wit: Adjudged that plaintiff take nothing by reason of this action, that this action be and the same is hereby dismissed.” And the point that there was involved a clear claim under the Safety Appliance Act, and that it was error to dismiss the action was argued in part IY of appellant’s brief, quoting decisions that “the law is clear that non-employees within the circle of risk are also covered by the Act.” This court understood this point was being made, but mistakenly said: “Another theory of action he might have had as a non-employee may not be urged here since it was not advanced in the trial court.” As I have shown, I think it was so advanced, though ineptly, but the ineptness did no harm since the trial court plainly understood there were two claims for segregation.
Appellant has both appealed from the denial by the district court of relief under Rule 60, and tas moved here for correction and amendment of our mandate.
In my view thé case comes within the rule applied in Cahill v. New York, N. H. and H. R. Co., 351 U.S. 183, 76 S.Ct. 758, 100 L.Ed. 1075. As there, our original order was erroneous and we should “recall it in the interest of fairness.”
Rehearing denied: POPE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

. The paragraph read in full as follows:
“1. If plaintiff has a right of action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act against defendant herein, is defendant liable under that Act (a) for negligence in the operation of the facilities used to repair and recondition the roadbed and right of way in question, or (b) in the active or permissive use of equipment in violation of the Safety Appliance Act; and (c) was defendant’s alleged conduct a cause, in whole or in part, of plaintiff’s damages?”
The trouble arises from the use of the “if” clause with which the statement begins. I think it possible to construe the clause as applying only to (a), and not to (b), particularly in view of the trial court’s plain understanding.