Court Opinion

ID: 9565322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:19:16.127057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:33.546081
License: Public Domain

Banke, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Having apparently analyzed this as an ordinary “slip-and-fall” case, the majority has concluded that, because the presence of the mud was obvious, the plaintiff’s injuries cannot legally be attributed to the defendants’ alleged tortious misconduct in causing it to be present on her property but must instead be deemed the proximate result of her own failure to exercise ordinary care for her safety. However, it is not appropriate to treat this as an ordinary “slip-and-fall” case for the simple reason that the plaintiff did not encounter the hazard by entering voluntarily upon the defendants’ premises. Rather, the defendants are alleged to have sent the hazard to her as she was attempting to exercise quiet enjoyment of her own property. Indeed, her fall occurred just outside the door to her home. What was she required to do under these circumstances to demonstrate due care *289for her own safety? Remain a prisoner in her home? Move?
The “superior-knowledge” standard of liability normally applicable in “slip-and-fall” cases arises from practical necessity in that a lesser standard would, in effect, make the proprietor of a business establishment an absolute guarantor of the safety of customers entering upon the premises. See generally Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 622-624 (272 SE2d 327) (1980). Thus, it has long been the rule that “ ‘if [the] invitee knows of the condition or hazard, there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does and then by voluntarily acting in view of his knowledge assumes the risks and dangers incident to the known condition.’ ” Rogers v. Atlanta Enterprises, 89 Ga. App. 903, 906 (81 SE2d 721) (1954). See also Harris v. Star Svc., 170 Ga. App. 816, 817 (318 SE2d 239) (1984); McIntyre v. Corporate Property Investors, 160 Ga. App. 868 (288 SE2d 584) (1982).
While the “superior knowledge” standard is eminently reasonable and appropriate in those cases where the plaintiff has voluntarily elected to confront a known hazard by entering upon the defendant’s premises, it has no reasonable applicability to cases such as the one before us now. Indeed, even in “traditional” slip-and-fall cases, the standard has been held inapplicable where the plaintiff’s awareness of the danger is counterbalanced by other factors militating against a finding of voluntariness. For example, in Hull v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 142 Ga. App. 269 (235 SE2d 601) (1977), and Phelps v. Consolidated Equities Corp., 133 Ga. App. 189, 193 (210 SE2d 337) (1974), this court held that it was not appropriate to grant summary judgment to a landlord in an action by a tenant to recover for injuries attributable to a known hazard existing on the premises, where the tenant’s only alternatives to confronting the hazard were either to remain trapped in her apartment or be denied access thereto. See also Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204 (316 SE2d 770) (1984).
This is not to say that the defenses of voluntary assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not available to the defendants under the circumstances of the present case. However, I do not believe that either of these defenses operates to defeat the appellant’s claim as a matter of law. “ ‘Even where there is no dispute as to the facts, it is . . . usually for the jury to say whether the conduct in question met the standard of the reasonable man.’ ” Ellington v. Tolar Constr. Co., 237 Ga. 235, 237 (227 SE2d 336) (1976). Because I am unable to conclude as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s injuries resulted from a voluntary decision on her part to test a known danger, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment against her in her personal injury action.
*290Decided June 15, 1987.
Harold K. Corbin, Richard W. Wilson, Jr., for appellant.
J. M. Hudgins IV, Lance D. Lourie, Thomas F. Allgood, Jr., for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Judge Pope, and Judge Benham join in this dissent.