Court Opinion

ID: 9671265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:33:46.765218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.109279
License: Public Domain

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, dissenting in part, concurring in part. I agree with the majority that the trial court erroneously construed the simultaneous-possession statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-74-106(a), to require proof of gang or other organized criminal activity, a nonexistent element of the offense. However, I depart from the majority’s analysis that simply because the judge committed “trial error,” the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a remand of the present case. Instead, Justices Newbern and Thornton frame the correct inquiry — whether the trial court’s ruling acquitted Zawodniak on the simultaneous-possession charge. If in fact Zawodniak was acquitted, then the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). Unlike Justice Newbern, my reading of the guiding cases suggests that the trial court’s ruling was an acquittal on the simultaneous-possession charge. In United States v. Scott, supra, the defendant moved to dismiss a count due to preindictment delay, which the trial court granted. While the Fifth Circuit held that double jeopardy prevented retrial, the United States Supreme Court “granted certiorari to give further consideration to the applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause to Government appeals from orders granting defense motions to terminate a trial before verdict.” United States v. Scott, supra. The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, recognizing that two separate lines of cases had developed concerning trials where no final determination of guilt or innocence had been made: i) where the trial court declares a mistrial and ii) where “the trial judge terminates the proceedings favorably to the defendant on a basis not related to factual guilt or innocence.” United States v. Scott, supra. The defendant’s case fell into the latter category. The dismissal of the first count was based on preindictment delay and not on the sufficiency of the evidence to establish his guilt. The defendant had voluntarily elected to seek termination of his trial on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence. Fie had not been acquitted on the first count because “a defendant is acquitted only when ‘the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution [in the defendant’s favor], correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.’” United States v. Scott, supra (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977)). In contrast to an acquittal, the dismissal of the charge for preindictment delay merely represented a legal judgment that the defendant, although potentially criminally hable, could not be punished for a supposed constitutional violation. The Scott Court thus concluded that where a “defendant himself seeks to have the trial terminated without any submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, an appeal by the Government from his successful effort to do so is not barred. ...” United States v. Scott, supra. The Court reached an opposite result in Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978), handed down the same day as Scott. In Sanabria, the trial court erroneously excluded evidence, leading to a judgment of acquittal on a count due to insufficiency of the evidence. The Sanabria Court held that double jeopardy barred a retrial. While the Government argued that the trial court had merely dismissed a portion of the charge (thus permitting a retrial of that portion) while actually acquitting only on a separate theory of liability, the Court found it impossible to accept this characterization. The Court stated that the “the judgment of acquittal was entered on the entire count and found [defendant] not guilty of the crime. . . without specifying that it did so only with respect to one theory of liability.” The Court instead characterized the trial court’s action as an “erroneous evidentiary ruling,” which led to an acquittal based on insufficient evidence — due to the fact that the trial court found that the indictment’s description of the offense was too narrow to justify the admission of certain evidence. Sanabria v. United States, supra. This judgment of acquittal, “however erroneous,” barred further prosecution on any aspect of the count, given that “when a defendant has been acquitted at trial he may not be retried on the same offense, even if the legal rulings underlying the acquittal were erroneous.” Sanabria v. United States, supra (emphasis added). In the present case, the trial court concluded that the State’s case was factually insufficient to convict Zawodniak, albeit premised on an erroneous legal ruling. Defense counsel moved for a “directed verdict,” arguing that “the [SJtate has failed to prove that element [of gang or organized criminal activity] and it is required by law to be proven.” The trial court “grant[ed] [Zawodniak’s] motion to reduce this to possession of methamphetamine. And I do so because of the language in what I consider to be a preamble to that whole area passed by the Legislature, looking to their intent, as to deal with gang activity. ...” While the State argued that gang activity was not an element required by the statute, it did address the sufficiency issue as framed by Zawodniak: [A]lso with this defendant, we have a statement written by him, although there’s — other than that statement, we did not have anyone here as far as what organizations or who else he’s involved. He states in his written statement that he is part of the life and he’s part of this whole particular life-style, the power, the money, the drags, everything. So, I don’t believe this is — if he wanted to fit it into here, we don’t have any idea who else he is, I guess, organizing with. But apparently as far as his statement states he is part of this whole life-style that includes possession and use of methamphetamine and, I guess, carrying of weapons and everything. The trial court responded to the State’s argument, “as you say, those witnesses are not here today. And the Court still looks then at the particular areas of this case.” In sum, the trial court applied the State’s proof to the simultaneous possession statute, erroneously “added” a non-existent element, and concluded that the State’s evidence was insufficient to convict, resulting in a final determination that the defendant was innocent of the crime charged. At the very least this involved a factual determination, and was more than a purely legal ruling. It was certainly qualitatively different than a defendant “seeking] to have the trial terminated without any submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence,” as was the dismissal for preindictment delay in Scott. Instead, Zawodniak argued that he was innocent of the crime charged, due to a failure of proof in the State’s case. As such, the present case is far more like the situation presented in Sanabria, where the trial court entered a judgment of acquittal based on an erroneous legal ruling. Moreover, this court has established a precedent directly on point. In Brooks v. State, 308 Ark. 660, 827 S.W.2d 119 (1992), the trial court granted the appellant’s directed verdict motion on an aggravated robbery charge, on the mistaken assumption that aggravated robbery required that something be taken from the victim. After the close of all evidence, the trial court reversed itself, explaining that its prior ruling was an “error of law.” The reinstated aggravated robbery charge was then submitted to the jury, resulting in a conviction. Relying on Sanabria, this court reversed the conviction on double jeopardy grounds, holding that the trial court’s dismissal based on insufficient evidence was an acquittal on the aggravated robbery charge. This was true even though the trial court made an erroneous legal ruling effectively “adding” an element to the aggravated robbery statute that did not exist. Brooks is therefore indistinguishable from the present case. As in Brooks, Zawodniak submitted to the trial court’s final determination as to his guilt or innocence, which was ultimately resolved in favor of the defendant, based on the trial court’s erroneous legal conclusion. That the acquittal was founded on an erroneous legal ruling — that the simultaneous-possession statute required proof of gang activity — is irrelevant for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. See Sanabria v. United States, supra; State v. Johnson, 317 Ark. 226, 876 S.W.2d 577 (1994); State v. Young, 315 Ark. 656, 869 S.W.2d 691 (1994); Brooks v. State, supra; State v. Joshua, 307 Ark. 79, 818 S.W.2d 249 (1991), overruled on other grounds, 310 Ark. 244, 835 S.W.2d 869 (1992). The trial court’s judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence, however erroneous, bars any further prosecution on any aspect of the simultaneous-possession charge. For these reasons, I concur with the majority to reverse the trial court’s ruling that the State was required to prove gang activity under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-74-106(a); however, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s remand for further proceedings. I would reverse and declare error. Brown and Thornton, JJ., join.