Court Opinion

ID: 9465861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:57:37.950095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:24.404274
License: Public Domain

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Plaintiff raises issues questioning the timeliness of the appeal and the use by defendant of a Rule 60(b) motion. Although the majority does not directly address those preliminary issues, I have come to the conclusion, as is implied by the majority, that although the issues are not without some substance they are without merit.
*103However, I would not remand the issue of the attorney’s authority for further hearing. I view this ease only as one in which the defendants now seek to have this court relieve them from the burden of their own agreement, a burden which on second thought they decided was too much.
No one suggests that defendants’ counsel was not experienced and competent, nor that defendants were not knowledgeable and experienced businessmen. They were in communication with each other. The language' of this stipulation was plain, simple and understandable even by laymen. It provided that the defendants were to notify in writing “all persons” to whom they had sent the advertising material appropriated from plaintiff. Now defendants argue that they intended only to agree to notify those on the list who had responded and become “customers” of the defendants. “Customers” appears to be a new word. It does not appear in the stipulation. There is ample reason and justification for requiring defendants to notify all the people the second time that they did the first time whether the recipients of the misleading advertising responded or not. The effects of the misleading advertising could be lingering and harmful to plaintiff in its business and customer relations as plaintiff has alleged. It should be noted that defendants do not question the other provisions of the stipulation enjoining defendants from copying plaintiff’s logo and forms, or distributing any more misleading advertising, or the requirement that defendants destroy what they have left of it.
I do not find it so dubious, as does the majority, that defendants would have agreed to use the same list the second time that they did the first. Originally when defendants thought they could benefit from a large mailing of misleading advertising in search of customers they did not question the expense involved. It would be expensive both times, but although the second mailing would not generate profits, it could at least be expected to minimize any damages which might be found owing by defendants. Defendants apparently did not consider their first improper mailing to be onerous, so I would not find a mailing for a good purpose to be onerous the second time around.
I would not disturb the trial judge’s ruling and would affirm.