Court Opinion

ID: 9840406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 14:06:39.686809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:24.831987
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-13336

               IN THE MATTER OF A MOTION TO COMPEL.

       Worcester.      May 3, 2023. - September 18, 2023.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.

Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without a
     State in Criminal Proceedings. Privileged Communication.
     Practice, Criminal, Attendance of witnesses. Witness,
     Compelling giving of evidence, Privilege. Evidence,
     Privileged record. Statute, Construction. Public Policy.

     Motion to compel attendance filed in the Superior Court
Department on January 12, 2022.

     The motion was heard by J. Gavin Reardon, Jr., J.; a motion
for reconsideration was also heard by him; and the case was
reported by him to the Appeals Court.

     The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.

     Anthony J. Cichello (Allison Lennon also present) for the
respondent.
     Anthony Mirenda, Laura D. Gradel, & Adam Aguirre, for
Victim Rights Law Center & others, amici curiae, submitted a
brief.
     Andrea C. Kramer, Jamie Ann Sabino, Nicole R.G. Paquin,
Samantha Jandl, & Tara Thigpen, for Women's Bar Association of
Massachusetts & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
                                                                   2

     GEORGES, J.   This case concerns an order issued by a

Superior Court judge compelling the production of sexual assault

counselling records pursuant to a certificate issued by a

magistrate of the Rhode Island Superior Court (Rhode Island

court or Rhode Island magistrate) under the Uniform Law to

Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in

Criminal Proceedings, G. L. c. 233, §§ 13A-13D (Uniform Act).

The order is challenged by the record holder, the keeper of

records at a rape crisis center (center).   The essential

question is whether the Massachusetts judge erred in declining

to analyze the sexual assault counsellor's privilege, provided

in G. L. c. 233, § 20J, when conducting his analysis under the

Uniform Act.1   Relying on this court's decision in Matter of a

     1 In relevant part, the Uniform Act provides that when
presented with a complying certificate from an out-of-State
court, a Superior Court judge shall compel the designated
witness to attend the out-of-State proceeding. See G. L.
c. 233, § 13A. To comply with the Uniform Act, the certificate
must certify that the witness is material and that his or her
presence is required. See id.; Matter of a R.I. Grand Jury
Subpoena, 414 Mass. 104, 112 (1993). The Massachusetts judge
then determines (a) whether "the witness is material and
necessary," and (b) whether it will "cause undue hardship" to
compel the witness to attend and testify. G. L. c. 233, § 13A.
See Matter of a R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, supra.

     In the absence of a victim's "prior written consent," G. L.
c. 233, § 20J, prevents a "sexual assault counsellor" from
disclosing "information transmitted in confidence by and between
a victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault counsellor," and
further, it provides that such information "shall not be subject
                                                                   3

R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, 414 Mass. 104, 109 (1993) (R.I. Grand

Jury Subpoena), the Massachusetts judge concluded that the

privilege claim must instead be raised in Rhode Island.

     To best harmonize the Uniform Act with G. L. c. 233, § 20J,

we deem it necessary for either the requesting State or

Massachusetts to adjudicate a request for Massachusetts sexual

assault counselling records in accordance with the Lampron-Dwyer

protocol.2   See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 139-147

(2006); id. at 147-150 (Appendix); Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441

Mass. 265, 269-270 (2004).   The Superior Court judge reached

this same conclusion in his initial order, and but for his

reliance on the general rule articulated in R.I. Grand Jury

Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 109, he would have correctly applied the

Lampron-Dwyer protocol in ultimately deciding the issue.     On his

report of this issue of first impression, we clarify the

applicable standard.

     Specifically, we hold that this Commonwealth's strong and

clear public policy in favor of protecting victims of sexual

assault compels an exception to the otherwise applicable general

to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any criminal or civil
proceeding."

     2 We note that certain amendments to the Uniform Act and
G. L. c. 233, § 20J, took effect during the pendency of this
case. See St. 2022, c. 127, § 36; St. 2022, c. 175, §§ 48A, 55.
Those changes are not at issue here.
                                                                    4

rule of R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 109, that under

the Uniform Act, privilege claims should be litigated in the

requesting jurisdiction.    This exception is specific to records

or testimony presumptively privileged by § 20J, and it applies

only where an objecting party establishes a substantial

likelihood that the protections of the § 20J privilege, as

expressed in the Lampron-Dwyer protocol, will be abrogated in

the requesting State.    If such a substantial likelihood exists,

then a Massachusetts judge must ensure that records or testimony

presumptively privileged by § 20J will receive the protections

of the Lampron-Dwyer protocol before authorizing a subpoena

under the Uniform Act.     Applying this standard here, we vacate

the order of the Superior Court judge.3,4

     3 We are informed by the center in a postargument letter
that the underlying Rhode Island criminal case was dismissed
during the pendency of this appeal. The center concedes that
this development could be grounds to deem this matter moot.
Nevertheless, "[i]t is within the discretion of this court to
review a case regardless of its mootness." Commonwealth v.
McCulloch, 450 Mass. 483, 486 (2008). While it would appear
that this matter is moot, we exercise that discretion to decide
the issue presented by the judge's report because it is an issue
of significant public importance about which there is some
uncertainty. See id.; Brown v. Guerrier, 390 Mass. 631, 633
(1983) ("The fact that a judge has reported the case is entitled
to weight in deciding whether to exercise our discretion in
favor of answering substantive questions").

     4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Victim
Rights Law Center, Jane Doe, Inc., Boston Area Rape Crisis
Center, Center for Hope and Healing Inc., New Hope, Inc.,
Pathways for Change, Inc., Elizabeth Freeman Center, Inc.,
Independence House, Inc., and National Women's Law Center, as
                                                                   5

     Background.   The petitioner5 was charged by the State of

Rhode Island with child molestation.6   The center has represented

-- and the Superior Court judge assumed in reaching his

decision -- that the alleged victim, a minor, was receiving

counselling at the center, and that the alleged victim's

counsellor there was a sexual assault counsellor.   The center

states that this counselling is ongoing.

     A Rhode Island magistrate issued a certificate pursuant to

the Uniform Act seeking to obtain from the center the alleged

victim's medical records from a specific date to the present.

The certificate described the magistrate's conclusions that the

keeper of the records for the center was "a material witness" in

the Rhode Island criminal case and that "the documents that []he

will bring with h[im] are relevant to the trial . . . and

necessary for the presentation of a defense."   In particular,

the Rhode Island magistrate concluded that "upon information and

well as the amicus brief submitted by the Women's Bar
Association of Massachusetts and the Massachusetts Law Reform
Institute.

     5 We refer to the party who sought the records as the
petitioner, as that was the party's designation in the Superior
Court.

     6 Specifically, he was charged with one count of "first
degree child molestation sexual assault" pursuant to R.I. Gen.
Laws §§ 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2, as well as three counts of
"second degree child molestation sexual assault" pursuant to
R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-37-8.3 and 11-37-8.4.
                                                                    6

belief, said witness would give evidence and testimony relating

to an alibi," and further, that "the witness can provide

evidence and testimony that would be material and relevant to

the defenses of, inter alia, the alibi generally as well as

impeachment and exculpatory evidence."

    One month later, the petitioner filed the certificate along

with a motion to compel in the Superior Court.   A hearing was

then held at which the center appeared and opposed the motion to

compel.   After the hearing, the center filed a written

opposition and the petitioner filed a supplemental memorandum in

support of his motion to compel.   The Superior Court judge

issued an order denying the motion to compel without prejudice.

He noted the center's objections based on G. L. c. 233, § 20J,

and cited a lack of information as to whether Rhode Island would

afford protections similar to those provided in Massachusetts.

On that basis, he concluded that requiring the appearance of the

record-keeper would be an undue hardship.   The judge suggested

that his concerns would be satisfied by either a hearing

pursuant to the Lampron-Dwyer protocol in the Superior Court or

a showing that the equivalent was held in Rhode Island.

    One month later, a second magistrate of the Rhode Island

court issued an order that the records at issue "shall be viewed

in camera by the Judge/Magistrate before any documents are

turned over to counsel."   The petitioner presented this order to
                                                                    7

the Superior Court in a motion for reconsideration, urging that

it answered the Superior Court judge's concerns.     The center

opposed the motion for reconsideration, and a hearing was held,

at which the center argued that the Lampron-Dwyer protocol had

not been met, either in Rhode Island or before the Superior

Court.   The center emphasized, as it had in its prior

opposition, that it received no notice of the Rhode Island

proceedings.   The Superior Court judge noted his concern about

the lack of notice to the center and expressed reservations

about whether the requirements of Lampron-Dwyer had been met.

    Relying on this court's decision in R.I. Grand Jury

Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 109, however, the Superior Court judge

issued an order in which he concluded that the privilege issue

must be litigated in the requesting State, Rhode Island.

Consequently, he "limit[ed] [his] analysis to the considerations

set forth under" the Uniform Act.     Without analyzing the

privilege for sexual assault counselling records under § 20J,

the Superior Court judge concluded that the showings of

materiality and necessity as required by the Uniform Act were

established in the certificate and that compelling attendance

did not give rise to undue hardship.    See R.I. Grand Jury

Subpoena, supra at 108 n.4.   He allowed the motion to compel but

stayed his order for fourteen days.    The order subsequently was

stayed further on the center's motion.
                                                                   8

     The Superior Court judge again further stayed his order and

all proceedings, and he reported his order to the Appeals Court

pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 111, and Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as

amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), or, in the alternative, Mass. R.

Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004).    After the

appeal had been entered in the Appeals Court, this court granted

the center's application for direct appellate review.7

     Discussion.   1.   Standard of review.   Where a Superior

Court judge reports an interlocutory order for determination by

an appellate court, "the basic issue . . . is the correctness of

his [or her] finding or order" (citation omitted).    Graycor

Constr. Co. v. Pacific Theatres Exhibition Corp., 490 Mass. 636,

640 (2022).   The crux of the instant dispute is a question of

law, that is, whether and to what extent a Massachusetts court

must consider G. L. c. 233, § 20J, in analyzing a request made

under the Uniform Act for sexual assault counselling evidence

located in Massachusetts.    We review de novo such questions.

See Emma v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 488 Mass. 449, 453 (2021).

     2.   The Uniform Act.   We begin with the overarching

framework of the Uniform Act, which applies to requests for in-

person testimony as well as document requests.    See R.I. Grand

Jury Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 112.   In relevant part, the Uniform

     7 The petitioner did not file a brief or appear for oral
argument before this court.
                                                                      9

Act requires that when presented with a complying certificate

from an out-of-State court, a justice of the Superior Court in

Massachusetts shall compel the designated witness to attend the

out-of-State proceeding.     See G. L. c. 233, § 13A.     To comply

with the Uniform Act, the certificate must, inter alia, certify

that the witness is material and that his or her presence is

required.     See id.; R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, supra.     In

Massachusetts, the Superior Court judge receiving such a

certificate is directed to hold a hearing to "determine[]"

(a) whether "the witness is material and necessary," and

(b) whether it will "cause undue hardship" to compel the witness

to testify.    G. L. c. 233, § 13A.   See R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena,

supra.

     3.   G. L. c. 233, § 20J.    Massachusetts State law

privileges "information transmitted in confidence by and between

a victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault counsellor."8

G. L. c. 233, § 20J.    It provides in relevant part that "[a]

sexual assault counsellor shall not disclose such confidential

communication, without the prior written consent of the victim,"

and further, that "[s]uch confidential communications shall not

be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any

     8 General Laws c. 233, § 20J, further defines the terms
"victim" and "sexual assault counsellor." The center has
represented that those definitions are met in this case, and the
petitioner did not dispute that before the Superior Court.
                                                                   10

criminal or civil proceeding without the prior written consent

of the victim to whom the report, record, working paper or

memorandum relates."9   Id.

     a.   Interpretation.     The text of § 20J shows the

Legislature's intention that the sexual assault counselling

privilege have "the widest scope possible."      Commonwealth v.

Neumyer, 432 Mass. 23, 33 (2000).     See Commonwealth v. Two

Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 265-266 (1986).      The "demonstrated

legislative concern for the inviolability of the privilege"

corresponds to the importance of the public policy purposes that

it serves.   See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 423 Mass. 216, 225

(1996), overruled on other grounds by Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 139.

We have explained this "policy of the Commonwealth" in the

following terms:   "Because victims of sexual crimes are likely

to suffer a depth and range of emotional and psychological

disturbance . . . not felt by the victims of most other crimes,

the public interest lies in assisting victims of sexual crimes

to recover from injuries" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 409 Mass. 867, 884 (1991).      Cf.

G. L. c. 233, § 21B (rape shield statute); St. 1977, c. 110,

preamble (purpose of rape shield statute is "to protect . . .

     9 The center represented to the Superior Court judge that
the alleged victim objected to the request at issue.
                                                                    11

victims of rape and certain other related crimes"); Commonwealth

v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 723 (2005).

    Section 20J advances this policy.    It "reflects, among other

considerations, the personal and intimate nature that records of

sexual assault counselling will almost certainly possess."

Fuller, 423 Mass. at 221.    And it permits a sexual assault

victim to have "confidence and trust in the counsellor who hears

[his or her] disclosures."    Id. at 222 n.4.   Without this, a

victim "may not feel able to make full disclosure" or "may forgo

altogether the benefits of counselling."    Id. at 221.   By

privileging these communications and related records, § 20J

addresses these concerns, promoting aid to sexual assault

victims and encouraging the reporting of sexual assault crimes,

which otherwise might go unreported.    See id. at 221-222 & n.4.

    b.    Lampron-Dwyer protocol.   "With the existence and

strength of the privilege established by the Legislature, the

only issue left for judges" is whether a defendant's

constitutional rights are implicated.    Two Juveniles, 397 Mass.

at 266.   The Lampron-Dwyer protocol protects the constitutional

rights of defendants while preserving the strength of statutory

privileges.   It "represent[s] a careful balancing[,] . . .

establish[ing] not only that a statutory privilege sometimes

must yield to a defendant's need for information to mount a

defense and thus obtain a fair trial, but also that, in such
                                                                    12

circumstances, the intrusion must be made with great care and

pursuant to exacting procedures."    Matter of an Impounded Case,

491 Mass. 109, 118 (2022).

       Under the protocol, sexual assault counselling records are

presumptively privileged.    See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 143 n.25,

148.   To obtain access to such records,

       "[t]he party moving to [summons] documents . . . must
       establish good cause, satisfied by a showing '(1) that the
       documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are
       not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by
       exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot
       properly prepare for trial without such production and
       inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to
       obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the
       trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith
       and is not intended as a general "fishing expedition."'"

Id. at 140-141, quoting Lampron, 441 Mass. at 269.    The party

must first move the court, "describing, as precisely as

possible, the records sought," and detailing in an affidavit

"all facts relied upon in support of the motion."    Dwyer, supra

at 147 (Appendix); Mass. R. Crim. P. 13 (a) (2), as appearing in

442 Mass. 1516 (2004).    We emphasize that notice to the record

holder is an essential part of the Lampron-Dwyer protocol, and

this notice must be provided in advance of the Lampron hearing,

as the record holder is entitled to be heard before the issuance

of any summons not only on the question of privilege but also on

the question of relevance.   See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 145; id. at

148 (Appendix).
                                                                   13

     At the Lampron hearing, the judge "shall [then] hear from

all parties, the record holder, and the third-party subject, if

present."   Id. at 148 (Appendix).   After this hearing, the judge

will make oral or written findings as to whether the moving

party met its initial burden.   See id. at 148 & n.3 (Appendix).

Moreover, the judge will make oral or written findings as to

whether the records at issue are presumptively privileged, i.e.,

"prepared in circumstances suggesting that some or all of the

records sought are likely protected by a statutory privilege."

See id. at 148 (Appendix).10

     To the extent that the burden is met but "some or all of

the requested records are presumptively privileged," id. at 149

(Appendix), the moving party will obtain access to those records

subject to a number of procedural safeguards.   Any summons

issued pursuant to the Lampron-Dwyer protocol shall be limited

to the relevant portions of the records at issue.   See Lampron,

441 Mass. at 269 n.6.   And the presumptively privileged records

summonsed shall be kept by the clerk under seal.    Dwyer, 448

Mass. at 146; id. at 149 (Appendix).   Inspection is permitted

only by "counsel of record" for the moving party, who shall sign

a protective order "containing stringent nondisclosure

     10It is understood that the judge will not have reviewed
the records in camera before making those findings. See Dwyer,
448 Mass. at 148 n.3 (Appendix).
                                                                       14

provisions," the violation of which subjects the attorney to

disciplinary action.11      Id. at 146.    "Among other things, the

protective order shall prohibit counsel from copying any record

or disclosing or disseminating the contents of any record to any

person, including the defendant."         Id.   Disclosure is "permitted

if, and only if, a judge subsequently allows a motion for a

specific, need-based written modification of the protective

order."   Id.     The judge may modify the protective order only

after a motion and hearing and must make oral or written

findings that the copying or disclosure of presumptively

privileged records is "necessary for the defendant to prepare

adequately for trial."       Id. at 150 (Appendix).     Even so, the

judge must "consider alternatives to full disclosure."          Id.

Where the records are disclosed pursuant to a court order

following this procedure, any recipient of the information must

sign a copy of the order, which "shall clearly state that a

violation of its terms shall be punishable as criminal

contempt."      Id.   Such records may be introduced at trial only

after a motion in limine, which may be allowed after a finding

that introduction is "necessary for the moving defendant to

obtain a fair trial" and only after consideration of

     11Counsel can later bring a motion to challenge any such
privilege designation. See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 149-150
(Appendix).
                                                                    15

alternatives.    Id.   All copies of the records must be returned

to the court upon resolution of the case.    See id.

    4.   Application.    In R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, this court

explained that under the Uniform Act, privilege issues are "a

matter for the requesting jurisdiction to rule on and are not

appropriately addressed to the [S]tate court issuing the

subpoena."   R.I. Grand Jury Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 109, quoting

Tracy v. Superior Court, 168 Ariz. 23, 43 (1991).      Today, we

acknowledge the continuing validity of that general rule.

Nevertheless, we hold that this Commonwealth's strong and clear

public policy in favor of protecting victims of sexual assault

compels an exception to this rule.    This exception is specific

to records or testimony presumptively privileged by G. L.

c. 233, § 20J.   To receive the protection of the exception, the

burden is on an objecting party to establish a substantial

likelihood that the protections of the § 20J privilege, as

expressed in the Lampron-Dwyer protocol, will be abrogated in

the requesting State.    In determining whether this burden has

been met, the Massachusetts judge may look to the law of the

requesting State and may rely on representations in the

certificate from the out-of-State court as to the means by which

it will protect the information.

    If the objecting party's burden is met, the Massachusetts

judge must ensure that the records or testimony presumptively
                                                                    16

privileged by § 20J will receive the protections of the Lampron-

Dwyer protocol before authorizing a subpoena for such

information under the Uniform Act.   To accomplish this, a

Massachusetts judge may implement the full Lampron-Dwyer

protocol, or relying on the applicable law and representations

of the out-of-State court that certain parts of the Lampron-

Dwyer protocol will be fulfilled by the out-of-State

proceedings, the judge may implement the parts of the protocol

that will not otherwise be fulfilled.   See R.I. Grand Jury

Subpoena, 414 Mass. at 114.   Because notice to the record holder

is such an important part of the Lampron-Dwyer protocol,

however, we caution against reliance upon facts or conclusions

established without such notice.

    In reaching this decision, we are persuaded by the analysis

of the New York Court of Appeals in Holmes v. Winter, 22 N.Y.3d

300, 316 (2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1135 (2014).    In that

case, the court reaffirmed the principle that privilege issues

should be litigated in the requesting State but nevertheless

created an exception to that rule based on the strong and clear

public policy of the State of New York, embodied in an absolute

privilege protecting a journalist's confidential sources.     See

id. at 303, 313-320.   The requesting State, Colorado, did not

provide the same protection, and so in light of the public

policy, the court found that a journalist was entitled to have
                                                                     17

the privilege issue litigated in New York.     See id. at 305, 314-

316.    The Court of Appeals stressed, as we stress today, the

limited nature of the holding.    See id. at 318, 319.   The issue

we decide is "whether a [Massachusetts] court should issue a

subpoena compelling a [Massachusetts rape crisis center record

keeper] to appear as a witness in another [S]tate to give

testimony when such a result is inconsistent with the . . .

protection of [§ 20J].   Thus, the narrow exception we recognize

today . . . is not tantamount to giving a [Massachusetts] law

extraterritorial effect," and does not offend principles of

comity.   Id.   See People v. Marcy, 91 Mich. App. 399, 405, 407

(1979) (affirming denial of petition from out-of-State court

seeking testimony within Michigan's statutory polygrapher

privilege and attorney-client privilege).

       The State of Rhode Island does not specifically privilege

sexual assault counselling records.    Cf. Advisory Opinion to the

House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161, 1163, 1166 (R.I. 1983).

Rhode Island law protects against the disclosure of health care

records, but there are material differences between Rhode

Island's protections and those afforded under the Lampron-Dwyer

protocol.   See R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-6.1.

       First, the Rhode Island statute provides for advance notice

to the subject of the records and not to the record holder.      See

id.    In Massachusetts, by contrast, "[a]s keeper of the records,
                                                                    18

and the entity to whom the [request is] addressed, [a rape

crisis center] has the obligation to assert the privilege

provided by § 20J on behalf of its clients."    Fuller, 423 Mass.

at 220 n.3.    Here, the center represents that it received no

notice of any proceedings in Rhode Island, and the language of

R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-37.3-6.1 suggests that no such advance notice

is required.   The Superior Court judge initially expressed

specific concern about this lack of notice to the center.      As

described above, advance notice to the record holder is a

crucial part of the Lampron-Dwyer protocol.    Therefore, to the

extent that the center did not receive notice of the Rhode

Island proceedings, we would caution against using facts

determined therein to satisfy the Lampron-Dwyer protocol.

    Second, in camera review is not by itself sufficient

protection for information presumptively privileged under § 20J.

Here, a magistrate of the Rhode Island court ordered in camera

review by a judge or magistrate before any documents would be

turned over to counsel.    But disclosure even to a judge is

nevertheless a disclosure and one that our protocol strictly

limits.   See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 146; id. at 148-149 & n.3

(Appendix); Fuller, 423 Mass. at 225-226 ("disclosure, even in

the limited form of an in camera inspection, should not become

the general exception to the rule of confidentiality");

Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 178 (1993), overruled on
                                                                  19

other grounds by Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 139.   Therefore, the

magistrate's order providing for in camera review was not

sufficient in itself to cure any deficiency in the Lampron-Dwyer

protocol.

    Third and most important, Rhode Island law does not require

the stringent nondisclosure provisions of Lampron-Dwyer.     If the

Rhode Island court decided to release records subject to the

privilege, Rhode Island law would not require the clerk to

retain them under seal, would not require a protective order

prohibiting the copying or disclosure of their contents as

described above, and would not require that a violation be

reported to a disciplinary authority.   See Dwyer, 448 Mass. at

146; id. at 149 (Appendix).   Neither would Rhode Island law

impose the same prerequisites for further copying or disclosure,

including the requirement that such copying or disclosure be

found "necessary" for the defendant to prepare for trial or else

to preserve his right to a fair trial, and the requirement that

recipients of such further disclosures be subject to criminal

contempt penalties for any violation of the relevant order.     Id.

at 146; id. at 150 (Appendix).

    It does appear that a judge of the Rhode Island court has

discretion to impose such protections, but they are not required

as in Massachusetts.   Compare Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 139-150, with

DePina v. State, 79 A.3d 1284, 1289-1290 (R.I. 2013) (describing
                                                                   20

balancing test required on third-party subject's motion to

quash), and State v. Burnham, 58 A.3d 889, 892-893, 896-899 &

n.10 (R.I. 2013) (noting discretionary disclosure to parties'

attorneys of alleged victim's mental health records in child

molestation case).    See Holmes, 22 N.Y.3d at 315 (finding out-

of-State balancing test to provide insufficient protection).

     In sum, we conclude that the protections afforded by the

State of Rhode Island, while not insubstantial, do not ensure

the stringent nondisclosure protections of this State's Lampron-

Dwyer protocol.    Therefore, as there was a substantial

likelihood that the privilege would be abrogated in this respect

under Rhode Island law, a Superior Court judge needed to ensure

compliance with the Lampron-Dwyer protocol before ordering the

release of Massachusetts sexual assault counselling records to

the Rhode Island court.12

     Conclusion.   For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order

allowing the motion to compel.

                                     So ordered.

     12We note with appreciation the Rhode Island court's
willingness, expressed in the certificate, "to enter an Order
directing compliance with all reasonable terms and conditions
prescribed by a Court of record in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts having jurisdiction over[] [the witness] regarding
h[is] appearance."