Court Opinion

ID: 9469906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:51:49.618924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:37.419569
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part:
I agree with the result reached by the majority that the record conclusively shows that the indictment was not defective for duplicity and that the district court, without ordering an evidentiary hearing, properly rejected this claim on the merits.
I concur in Section IV of the majority’s opinion, which reverses summary dismissal of that portion of the Section 2255 petition relating to the government’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
Section V of the majority’s opinion covers certain claims of error asserted before the district court by Baumann with respect to his sentencing. One claim involves a writ*582ten communication made by an Assistant U. S. Attorney to the U. S. Parole Commission. This communication, which was not disclosed to the trial judge before sentencing, is clearly not a report prepared by the court’s probation service to which Fed.R. Crim.P. 32(c) applies. Baumann’s claim concerning this communication is patently frivolous and was properly subjected to summary dismissal by the district court.
Baumann also argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were abridged by the manner in which his presentence interview was conducted. He contends that the interview with the court’s probation officer constituted custodial interrogation and that before the interview the probation officer should have given Baumann the warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He also asserts that the absence of his attorney at the interview violated his right to the assistance of counsel.
Contrary to the majority’s view, as expressed in Section V, I believe that the sentencing judge should be asked to reconsider these Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims in light of Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), decided while the instant case was on appeal to our court. Therefore, I would not actively reach for these constitutional issues but would reverse and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings.
The Supreme Court in Estelle stressed these factors in holding that respondent’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination was violated:
1. When the trial court ordered a psychiatric interview and examination of Smith to determine his competency to stand trial, he was in custody in the Dallas County Jail. Id. at 467, 101 S.Ct. at 1875.
2. When he talked to the psychiatrist, Smith was unaware that his words could be used to assist the prosecution. Id. at 466, 101 S.Ct. at 1874.
3. When testifying for the prosecution at the penalty phase on the crucial issue of Smith’s future dangerousness, the psychiatrist became “an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a post-arrest custodial setting.” Id. at 467, 101 S.Ct. at 1875.
Whether these factors or others indicating custodial interrogation existed during Baumann’s post-conviction interview by the court’s probation officer should await the results of the district court's determination based on an adequate record.
The majority recognizes that the existence of custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes depends on the totality of circumstances involved in a given case. Maj. Op. at n.5. It is for this very reason that the majority’s formulation of a perse rule, Maj. Op., at 575-576, is inappropriate and ill-advised.
The Court in Estelle additionally held that respondent Smith was denied his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel before submitting to a pretrial psychiatric interview. The Court emphasized that Smith’s lawyers were unaware, until after the interview, that the trial judge had appointed a psychiatrist to examine their client and determine his competency. Id. at 458 n.5, 101 S.Ct. at 1871 n.5.
In the instant case, the trial transcript does not show whether defense counsel was present when the trial judge fixed the time for a probation and sentence hearing and directed Baumann to report to the probation officer. Nor does the transcript indicate what legal advice, if any, Baumann may have received from his counsel in anticipation of the presentence interview by the probation officer, or whether his counsel was present during the interview.
In the past, when faced with similar Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues on a record inadequate for a proper legal decision, instead of announcing a per se rule, we have remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to develop a “complete and enlightening ... factual background.” Jones v. Cardwell, 588 F.2d 279, 281 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965, 99 *583S.Ct. 1513, 59 L.Ed.2d 780 (1979).1 I think we should follow this prudent course relative to the Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues presented in this case.2 I discern no compelling reason for us to expatiate on these constitutional issues before they are re-examined by the district judge on the basis of a complete record.
I also disapprove much of the dicta that pervades Section V of the majority’s opinion. For example, the majority says that as it reads Estelle, “the court’s fifth amendment holding is limited to the distinct circumstances of the bifurcated capital proceedings presented in that ease.” Maj. Op., at 576-577. But the Court did not place any such limitation on its decision when it said: “Of course, we do not hold that the same Fifth Amendment concerns are necessarily presented by all types of interviews and examinations that might be ordered or relied upon to inform a sentencing determination.” 451 U.S. at 469 n.13, 101 S.Ct. at 1876 n.13. The Court’s words could fairly be read to suggest that under certain circumstances Fifth Amendment concerns may indeed be implicated by a probation officer’s presentence interview of a defendant.
The majority seems to suggest that something more than custodial interrogation is necessary before Miranda warnings are required to protect a person’s Fifth Amendment privilege. Maj. Op., at 576-577. Miranda, to the contrary, clearly states that certain prescribed warnings should be given before custodial interrogation takes place. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612-1613, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
The majority also holds “that a routine presentence interview of an individual convicted of a noncapital federal offense is not ... a critical stage of the proceeding in which counsel’s presence, or advice, is necessary to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial” — which I assume includes fair sentencing procedures. Maj. Op., at 578. I disagree with this view. As a practical matter, the presentence interview with the probation officer is an important and critical stage of the proceedings. The results of the interview could have significant effects on the probation officer’s recommendations and on the ultimate sentence imposed on the defendant by the court. Defense attorneys worth their salt know the importance of a favorable presentencé’report and are aware of the necessity of advising and counselling their client before the interview, the results of which might settle the client’s fate. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1930, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1966).
Finally, I concur in the conclusions expressed in Section VI of the majority’s opinion. I agree that Baumann’s newly discovered evidence claim lacks merit because the underlying facts were within Baumann’s knowledge at the time of trial. I also agree that Baumann’s ineffective assistance of counsel allegations are not so patently frivolous or palpably incredible as to warrant summary dismissal.

. On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing. After finding that the state court had considered evidence obtained in violation of Jones’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the district court granted the petition for habeas corpus. This court agreed that the defendant was entitled to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege at the presentence interview and therefore affirmed the district court’s decision. Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1982).

. Several courts have considered the question of the admissibility of extrajudicial statements made by defendants under varying circumstances to their probation or parole officers. See, e.g., United States v. McKenzie, 601 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856, 93 S.Ct. 136, 34 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); People v. Harrington, 2 Cal.3d 991, 88 Cal.Rptr. 161, 471 P.2d 961 (1970). I would not invade this troublesome area until armed with a complete factual record.