Court Opinion

ID: 9522128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:18:17.612397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:19.176721
License: Public Domain

*184Dooley, J.,
¶ 37. dissenting. I concur with the majority’s conclusion that respondent engaged in deceit and violated Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, given the level of deceit involved, I cannot agree that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction. I believe the suspension imposed by the Panel is more fitting. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 38. The majority correctly identifies the ethical problem caused by respondent’s conduct but inaccurately downplays the harm caused by her actions. By carrying on a romantic relationship with the client’s husband, respondent clearly created a conflict of interest that was imputed to her entire firm, causing it and its members to violate Rule 1.7(a)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. She did this knowingly and intentionally — she did it surreptitiously after promising to terminate the relationship.
¶ 39. The majority seeks to justify its decision to impose a public reprimand instead of a suspension by minimizing the seriousness of respondent’s conduct, concluding that respondent only “briefly exposed the firm to a potential ethical violation, but . . . that potential was soon extinguished.” Ante, ¶ 36. While it is true the firm’s exposure to potential ethical violations was short, that is because the senior attorney learned of respondent’s actions independently and terminated her. Had the client’s family not informed the senior attorney about respondent’s overnight visit, there is no indication respondent would have taken any action on her own to end the firm’s exposure to the ethical violation.
¶ 40. The misconduct in this case involved deceit, and the impropriety of the behavior was obvious. After definitively being told that she could not maintain both her position at the firm and her relationship with the opponent of the firm’s divorce client, respondent chose to continue or restart relations with the opponent-husband, while failing to disclose the ongoing relationship and the conflict of interest it created. The senior attorney relied upon respondent’s promise to terminate the relationship with the husband and continued to employ respondent and to represent the client, unaware of the renewed conflict of interest. Respondent understood the conflict of interest that was created by her conduct as shown by her misguided request for a “conflict wall.” As the Panel found, and the majority recognized, respondent’s actions damaged not only the client, but also damaged the firm and the *185senior attorney’s relationship with the client. Respondent’s behavior illustrates a serious lack of judgment and lack of moral character that reflects adversely on her fitness to practice law.
¶ 41. As the majority recognizes, we give deference to the Panel’s decision. In giving deference, I concur with the Panel’s decision that a reprimand is too lenient a sanction, given the level of deceit and the severity of the potential ethics violation here. Although I agree with the majority that the ABA Standards are broad and subjective and do not lead conclusively to any one sanction in this case, I believe they support a suspension. See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986) (amended 1992). ABA Standard 5.1 is the most applicable standard as it deals with conduct “involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” As the majority notes, the parties point to different subsections of Standard 5.1. Disciplinary counsel advocates for ABA Standard 5.11(b),. which states disbarment is generally appropriate for “intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.” ABA Standard 5.13, for which respondent advocates, states that a reprimand is “generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.” The majority correctly acknowledges that whether or not the seriousness of an attorney’s actions rises to the level covered by Standard 5.11(b) is an extremely subjective determination. Because this ABA Standard does not provide for suspension, the severity of the sanction varies tremendously based on the difference in the degree of conduct.
¶ 42. I agree with respondent and the majority that Standard 5.13 is more appropriate than 5.11(b); however, as the majority notes, the standards are intended to leave “room for flexibility and creativity” in imposing sanctions. ABA Standards, Preface at 2. Taking into account the aggravating factors present in this case, I believe a suspension is more appropriate than a reprimand under the ABA Standards. Respondent’s deceit was intentional, and it compromised the position of her firm and the senior attorney. Adding to the seriousness of this underlying offense are the following aggravating factors: (1) respondent appeared to have little remorse; (2) the motive behind respondent’s behavior was selfish; (3) the client harmed in this case was a vulnerable victim; *186and (4) respondent’s answers to questions were vague and non-responsive.* Given the severity of the underlying offense and the added aggravating factors, a suspension is appropriate.
¶ 43. The imposition of a suspension is also most consistent with prior precedent from this Court, which suggests a public reprimand would be too lenient. In general, meaningful comparisons of attorney sanction cases are difficult as the behavior that leads to sanctions varies so widely between cases. That said, because respondent’s conduct involved obvious deceit and she knowingly put all members of her firm in violation of ethical standards, the conduct at issue here is more serious than behavior for which we have issued reprimands.
¶ 44. The majority tries to liken respondent’s actions to the behavior that resulted in a public reprimand in In re Warren, 167 Vt. 259, 704 A.2d 789 (1997) (per curiam). In that case, the respondent sent three letters to the wife of the man with whom his estranged wife was living. These letters asked the wife repeatedly to contact the respondent and offered the wife help in getting a divorce from her husband “at no cost to you but at great expense to him.” Id. at 260, 704 A.2d at 790. We found the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility in Warren because the content of his letters made sense only as an offer to use his knowledge of the law and legal experience in an unethical manner, id. at 262, 704 A.2d at 791; however, we also noted there was little actual injury as a result of the respondent’s conduct. Id. at 262, 704 A.2d at 792. The majority suggests that this case is controlled by Warren because the respondent in Warren “had a selfish motive for revenge,” and “respondent had a selfish motive for romance.” Ante, ¶ 35. While the subject matter and motives involved in the two cases might be similar, the actions taken by respondent here were significantly more egregious. In Warren, the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, and he alone risked suffering any consequences. He allowed his emotions to drag him into a violation of the Code, as opposed to respondent in this case, who allowed her emotions to *187drag her entire firm into a serious ethical violation. Furthermore, while evidence from his -letters suggested the respondent in Warren knew his conduct was improper, he did not act with the same level of deceit as respondent here. Here, respondent was told, point blank, that she must end her relationship, and she assured the senior attorney that she had done so. Realizing that the senior attorney had relied on her representation that the relationship had ended, respondent then recommenced relations with the husband without making any effort to inform the senior attorney or her firm.
¶ 45. Other cases from this Court have also imposed reprimands for less serious behavior than the conduct at issue here. See, e.g., In re Sinnott, 2004 VT 16, ¶ 10, 176 Vt. 596, 845 A.2d 373 (mem.) (assigning sanction of public reprimand and restitution when “the panel concluded that respondent had violated Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5 by charging an unreasonable fee which it labeled as a ‘nonrefundable retainer’ ”); Farrar, 2008 VT 31, ¶¶ 3, 12 (concluding public reprimand appropriate where attorney’s bookkeeper transferred money each month from firm’s business account to client trust account and then back to business account to ensure there would be sufficient funds in business account each month to meet payroll — bookkeeper reconciled trust account monthly and respondent had no selfish or dishonest motive for commingling money with clients’ property).
¶ 46. I agree that there are some cases in which this Court has ordered suspension for more egregious behavior than the actions in this case. See, e.g., In re Hongisto, 2010 VT 51, ¶¶ 11-12, 188 Vt. 553, 998 A.2d 1065 (mem.); In re Neisner, 2010 VT 102, ¶ 13, 189 Vt. 145, 16 A.3d 587. However, respondent’s behavior is on a par with other behavior that has resulted in the imposition of a suspension. For example, in In re Taylor, this Court considered a recommendation from the Professional Conduct Board that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months based on his conduct before the family court, which included his failure to pay spousal maintenance and child support and his failure to comply with related family court orders. 171 Vt. 640, 640-41, 768 A.2d 1273, 1274 (2000) (mem.). We imposed a six-month suspension in Taylor based on a determination that the respondent’s behavior demonstrated conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law, and a disregard of court orders. Id. I believe the *188conduct at issue here is comparable to that in Taylor. While respondent here did not openly violate court orders, she acted deceitfully and violated the agreement she made with her senior attorney. I again emphasize that an important factor in this case is that respondent knowingly put her entire firm into an ethical violation. Other cases from this Court have also imposed suspensions for behavior that calls into question an attorney’s fitness to practice to the same degree as respondent’s conduct here. See, e.g., In re Free, 159 Vt. 625, 625-26, 616 A.2d 1140, 1140-41 (1992) (mem.) (suspending respondent for six months for three counts of knowingly failing to file Vermont income tax returns where respondent provided full and free disclosure to bar counsel and exhibited cooperative attitude in proceedings, where penalties for criminal conduct were also imposed, but where respondent had a disciplinary record, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in practice of law).
¶ 47. The Panel imposed a suspension in this case, and we must give deference to that decision. The seriousness of respondent’s actions, combined with aggravating factors, make a period of suspension the most appropriate sanction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶48. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Reiber joins this dissent.

 I accept the Panel’s analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors as supported by the evidence. The majority ignores the standard of review and does not provide sufficient support to suggest that these findings were clearly erroneous. See A.O. 9, Rule 11(E); In re Farrar, 2008 VT 31, ¶ 5, 183 Vt. 592, 949 A.2d 438 (mem.). The Panel was in a much better position than this Court to determine whether respondent showed remorse or whether her answers were evasive.