Court Opinion

ID: 9890572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 16:11:28.026622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:43.157941
License: Public Domain

J-S22020-23

                                2023 PA Super 201

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 HAROLD WALKER                            :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 376 WDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 11, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0007381-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

OPINION BY STABILE, J.:                          FILED: October 13, 2023

      Appellant, Harold Walker, appeals from his judgment of sentence of

30½-61 years’ imprisonment for rape of a child and related offenses.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by asking prospective jurors during

voir dire whether they could follow the principle that the testimony of the

alleged victim standing alone, if believed, could constitute sufficient proof

upon which to find the defendant guilty of sexual assault beyond a reasonable

doubt. We conclude that this inquiry was proper, and we affirm.

      The trial court accurately summarized the evidence adduced as follows:

      At trial, the victim in this case, eighteen-year-old M.W., testified
      that in 2013, she lived at home with her mother and her infant
      sister. She testified that Appellant [] was her mother’s boyfriend
      at the time and would sometimes babysit them. M.W. testified
      that when her mother was at work, Appellant would enter her
      bedroom, take off her underwear, and put his penis into her
      vagina. She testified that Appellant first did this to her when she
      was ten years old and it would happen approximately every other
      day.     When M.W. was twelve, she told her mother and
      grandmothers what Appellant was doing to her. She also told her
J-S22020-23

     doctor, who then tested her for a sexually transmitted infection
     (“STI”). M.W. testified that her mother did not believe her and
     became angry with her. M.W. stated that she started to punch
     walls, break things, and cut herself to deal with her trauma. When
     M.W. was sixteen years old, she disclosed to one of her teachers,
     Kimberly Dunbar.

     M.W. remembered having a forensic interview and testified that
     she believed that she disclosed the incidents to the interviewer.
     The forensic interview was recorded and played at trial. M.W., her
     recollection refreshed by the playing of the interview, was asked
     why she didn’t disclose to the interviewer, and she responded that
     she was scared of what would happen if she did.

     Dr. Jennifer Clarke of the Child Advocacy Center at Children’s
     Hospital of Pittsburgh, testified as an expert witness in pediatrics
     and the diagnosis of child abuse. Dr. Clark reviewed M.W.’s
     medical records and observed that M.W. had been diagnosed with
     trichomoniasis, an STI, when she was eleven years old. The
     records indicate a concern for sexual abuse; however, the child
     did not disclose and the physical examination was normal. Dr.
     Clarke testified that a normal physical examination does not
     preclude the occurrence of sexual abuse. On September 9, 2015,
     Dr. Clarke interviewed M.W. as part of a follow-up from the
     physical examination. Dr. Clarke testified that M.W. disclosed
     sexual abuse by her mother’s boyfriend. M.W. said that she
     wanted it to stop, but also stated that if Dr. Clarke told anyone,
     M.W. would lie and say that she had a boyfriend who gave her the
     STI. Based on the disclosure and the STI, Dr. Clarke diagnosed
     M.W. with sexual abuse. Dr. Clarke further stated that M.W.
     would not have been able to contract trichomoniasis from wearing
     another person’s underwear.

     Anna Henderson, M.W.’s maternal grandmother, and Kimberly
     Dunbar, M.W.’s former teacher, both testified that M.W. disclosed
     that Appellant had sexually abused her.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Opinion (“Opinion”), 9/23/22, at 3-4.

     On August 8, 2019, Appellant was charged with multiple sexual

offenses. On August 9, 2021, Appellant was convicted on all counts following

a jury trial. On February 11, 2022, the court imposed sentence. Appellant

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filed timely post-sentence motions, which the court denied, and a timely notice

of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant raises two issues in this appeal:

       1. Did the trial court err by permitting the Commonwealth to ask
       prospective jurors during voir dire whether they could follow the
       legal principle that an alleged victim’s testimony, standing alone,
       [was] sufficient proof upon which to find [Appellant] guilty, as that
       question did not meet the purposes of jury selection and misstated
       the burden of proof?

       2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by committing two errors
       in the course of imposing a manifestly excessive aggregate
       sentence: (a) it focused inordinately on the gravity of the offense
       and the victim impact at the expense of [Appellant’s] character
       and rehabilitative needs; and (b) it considered improper factors?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       In his first argument, Appellant contends that the court erred by

allowing the Commonwealth to ask the following question to prospective jurors

during voir dire:

       Under Pennsylvania law, the testimony of the alleged victim
       standing alone, if believed by you, is sufficient proof upon which
       to find the defendant guilty in a sexual assault case. Thus, you
       may find the defendant guilty if the testimony of the alleged victim
       convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
       guilty. Would you be able to follow this principle of law? 1

____________________________________________

1 Although the transcript of voir dire proceedings is not in the certified record,

the Commonwealth admits that it has “no reason not to believe” that the court
asked this question during voir dire. Commonwealth’s Brief at 7 n.1.
Accordingly, we will assume both that the court asked this question and that
Appellant raised a timely objection.

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Commonwealth’s Proposed Voir Dire Questions, at ¶ 1.          We hold that this

question was proper.

      The scope of voir dire rests within the sound discretion of the trial court,

and we will not reverse the court’s decisions on voir dire absent a palpable

abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Mattison, 82 A.3d 386, 397 (Pa.

2014). The sole purpose of voir dire is the “empaneling of a competent, fair,

impartial, and unprejudiced jury capable of following the instructions of the

trial court.” Commonwealth v. Delmonico, 251 A.3d 829, 832 (Pa. Super.

2021).   Neither party is “permitted to ask direct or hypothetical questions

designed to disclose what a juror’s present impression or opinion as to what

his decision will likely be under certain facts which may be developed in the

trial of a case.” Commonwealth v. Knight, 241 A.3d 620, 640 (Pa. 2020).

Voir dire “is not to be utilized as a tool for the attorneys to ascertain the

effectiveness of potential trial strategies.” Id.

      Additionally, a court will not be found to abuse its discretion during voir

dire examination by refusing to permit questions whose subject matter falls

within the province of the court to address in its instructions to the jury.

Commonwealth v. Perea, 381 A.2d 494, 497 (Pa. Super. 1977);

Commonwealth v. Ritter, 615 A.2d 442, 446-447 (Pa. Super. 1992).

Questions however that seek a prospective juror's opinion about a principle of

law are not permissible under voir dire examination.        Commonwealth v.

Bright, 420 A.2d 714, 717 (Pa. Super. 1980).

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      Appellant claims that the Commonwealth asked its voir dire question for

the improper purpose of determining what the prospective jurors’ attitudes

would be when “asked to pass upon the guilt of [Appellant] after having been

presented with nothing more than [the victim’s] uncorroborated allegations.”

Appellant’s Brief at 35.   Relatedly, Appellant insists that the question was

improper because it “was in the nature of a jury instruction” and it inquired

“into each prospective juror’s understanding and opinion of specific principles

of law and their ability to accept and act upon them....” Id. at 32-33. We

disagree.

      The voir dire question was derived from a standard jury instruction,

which reads:

      The testimony of [name of victim] standing alone, if believed by
      you, is sufficient proof upon which to find the defendant guilty in
      this case. The testimony of the victim in a case such as this need
      not be supported by other evidence to sustain a conviction. Thus
      you may find the defendant guilty if the testimony of [name of
      victim] convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the
      defendant is guilty.

Pa. SSJI (Crim) 4.13B. In turn, this jury instruction came from 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 3106, a statute pertaining to sexual assault cases, which provides:

      The credibility of a complainant of an offense under this chapter
      shall be determined by the same standard as is the credibility of
      a complainant of any other crime. The testimony of a complainant
      need not be corroborated in prosecutions under this chapter. No
      instructions shall be given cautioning the jury to view the
      complainant’s testimony in any other way than that in which all
      complainants’ testimony is viewed.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3106.

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       The Commonwealth had a proper purpose for asking the voir dire

question. Its purpose was to identify jurors who hold fixed beliefs that are

untenable under Section 3106—specifically, the belief that a defendant’s guilt

cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt in a rape case (1) without

DNA or other forensic evidence or (2) when the case boils down to the word

of the complainant versus the word of the defendant (a so-called “he said, she

said” case). Any prospective juror holding either of these fixed beliefs had to

be questioned further and had to be excused for cause if he could not set aside

those beliefs. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 134 A.3d 59, 60 (Pa. Super.

2016) (it is appropriate to use voir dire examination to disclose fixed opinions

or expose other reasons for disqualification of prospective jurors).

       Two recent unpublished decisions provide persuasive authority for

finding the voir dire question proper: Commonwealth v. Antill, 2019 WL

2950181 (Pa. Super., Jul. 9, 2019), and Commonwealth v. Wilson, 2020

WL 5423952 (Pa. Super., Sep. 10, 2020), vacated on different grounds, 272

A.3d 446 (Pa. 2022).2 In both cases, we held that voir dire questions identical

in substance to the question herein were asked for a proper purpose.         In

Antill, the Commonwealth asked prospective jurors, “Under Pennsylvania law,

the testimony of the victim standing alone, if believed by you, is sufficient

proof upon which to find the defendant guilty if the testimony of the victim

____________________________________________

2 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (non-precedential memoranda of Superior Court filed

after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their persuasive value).

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convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. Would

you be able to follow this principle of law?”3 Antill, 2019 WL 2950181, *1. A

panel of this Court explained:

       Antill argues that “questions which are in the nature of jury
       instructions are wholly inappropriate for voir dire examination.”
       In support of this proposition, Antill cites to ... Bright.... Upon
       reviewing Bright, we conclude Antill’s argument stretches the
       language of that opinion beyond the breaking point.

       In Bright, the defendant sought to ask prospective jurors
       regarding their ability to dissent from the views of the majority of
       their fellow jurors. [See Bright, 420 A.2d at 717]. The trial court
       refused the defendant’s request. See id. Importantly, this Court
       held that “the question was in the nature of a jury instruction and
       that, since the court gave proper instructions, no error occurred
       from the refusal to allow the question.” Id. After examining the
       trial court’s instructions to the jury, the Bright panel concluded
       “the [trial] court’s opening remarks and closing instructions ...
       clearly demonstrate the trial court adequately and correctly
       instructed the jury.” Id.

       As a result, the Bright Court did not affirmatively hold that the
       proposed instruction should be excluded due to its similarity to a
       jury instruction. Instead, the Court merely found that the trial
       court did not err in excluding the question since the trial court
       properly instructed the jury on the relevant points of law.

       Here, Antill is attempting to turn Bright into a bright-line rule that
       would effectively eviscerate our standard of review. We decline
       to accept Antill’s invitation to create a new standard for voir dire
       proceedings.[2]
              [2]Antill also cited Commonwealth v. Perea, 381 A.2d 494 (Pa.

              Super. 1977), Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 398 A.2d 658 (Pa.
              Super. 1979), and Commonwealth v. Ritter, 615 A.2d 442 (Pa.
              Super. 1992), for the same proposition as Bright. Each of these
              precedents are similar to Bright, in that this Court reviewed a
              trial court ruling denying a requested jury instruction. See
              Perea, [381 A.2d] at 496; Hoffman, [398 A.2d] at 660; Ritter,

____________________________________________

3 The question in Antill had one sentence. The question in the present case
has two sentences but expresses precisely the same concepts.

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            [615 A.2d] at 446-447. None of them created the bright line rule
            sought by Antill here.

      Turning to the circumstances at hand, the Commonwealth’s case
      was based almost entirely on the victim’s testimony. Pursuant to
      this state of affairs, we cannot conclude the court abused its
      discretion when it permitted a question designed to expose any
      fixed opinions of the jurors regarding the lack of physical or
      corroborating evidence. As such, the question was used to
      “secure a competent, fair, impartial and unprejudiced jury” and
      was not used to ascertain the effectiveness of a potential trial
      strategy. See [Commonwealth v.] Ellison, 902 A.2d [419,]
      423-24 [(Pa. 2006)].

Id. at *1-2 (some citations omitted); see also Wilson, 2020 WL 5423952,

at *5-7 (citing above passage in Antill). This analysis provides persuasive

support for our conclusion that the Commonwealth had a proper purpose for

asking the voir dire question in the present case.

      Appellant also contends that the voir dire question incorrectly states the

law, since it did not instruct that the victim’s testimony must be believed

beyond a reasonable doubt and be sufficient to establish each element of the

crimes with which Appellant was charged. Appellant’s Brief at 42. We hold

that the voir dire question was legally valid. Its first sentence states that the

testimony of the alleged victim, standing alone, is sufficient proof upon which

to find the defendant guilty. This precept is correct under both the text in 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 3106 that “the testimony of a complainant [in a sexual assault

prosecution] need not be corroborated” and the many decisions that follow

this precept. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 721

(Pa. Super. 2015).     The second sentence of this question states that the

defendant may be found guilty if the alleged victim’s testimony convinces the

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jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. This sentence

accurately states that the Commonwealth’s burden of proof is beyond a

reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (Due Process

Clause of Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against conviction

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged”).

      Appellant contends that the voir dire question is invalid because its first

sentence does not state that an accuser’s testimony standing alone, must be

believed by the jury “beyond a reasonable doubt” in order to find the

defendant guilty in a sexual assault case. Appellant’s Brief at 27. Appellant

ignores the fact that the second sentence includes the phrase “beyond a

reasonable doubt.” There is no requirement that each sentence of the voir

dire question include the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt.”           Appellant

further complains that the second sentence is defective because it lacks the

following italicized phrase, “You may find the defendant guilty if the testimony

of the alleged victim establishes each element of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Appellant’s Brief at 27. Appellant fails to cite any decision

that requires this level of detail in a voir dire question; nor do we know of any.

Even assuming that the voir dire question lacked sufficient detail, the court

corrected this omission by charging the jury in its closing instructions that the

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Commonwealth had the burden of proving “each and every element of the

crimes charged” beyond a reasonable doubt. Tr. at 619-20.4

       For these reasons, Appellant’s first argument does not require relief.

       In his second argument, Appellant asserts that his sentence constitutes

an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, because (1) the court gave inordinate

weight to aggravating sentencing evidence and not enough weight to

mitigating evidence, and (2) the court erred by considering improper factors,

namely evidence that the victim’s relationship with her mother became

strained because her mother refused to believe her claim that Appellant

sexually abused her.

       The right to appeal the discretionary aspects of one’s sentence is not

absolute, and the jurisdiction of this Court must be properly invoked. To raise

a substantial question, an appellant must satisfy the following four-part test:

       (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
       Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
       preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
       sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has
       a fatal defect, see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
       substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
       appropriate under the Sentencing Code. The determination of
       whether a particular issue raises a substantial question is to be
       evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Generally, however, in order
____________________________________________

4 We note that Antill claimed, without any supporting analysis, that the voir

dire question in that case “[did] not accurately state the law.” Id., 2019 WL
2950181, at *3. We do not consider this point persuasive due to Antill’s
failure to provide supporting analysis. Moreover, in our view, the voir dire
question in Antill was entirely valid, since it was substantively identical to the
voir dire question in the present case, which we have found valid for the
reasons given above.

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        to establish a substantial question, the appellant must show
        actions by the sentencing court inconsistent with the Sentencing
        Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the
        sentencing process.

Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220-21 (Pa. Super. 2011)).

        With regard to Appellant’s first claim, the record confirms that Appellant

filed a timely notice of appeal and properly preserved the issue in a post-

sentence motion. He also included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate

brief   filed.     Finally,   Appellant    has     raised   a   substantial   question.

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“an

excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court

failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question”).

        Turning to the substance of this issue, our well-settled standard of

review concerning the discretionary aspects of sentencing is as follows:

        [T]he proper standard of review when considering whether to
        affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse of
        discretion.... [A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error
        of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its
        discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised
        was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
        bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our Court recently
        offered: An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because
        an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but
        requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
        prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
        erroneous.

        The rationale behind such broad discretion and the concomitantly
        deferential standard of appellate review is that the sentencing
        court [is] in the best position to determine the proper penalty for
        a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual
        circumstances before it.

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1231-32 (Pa. Super. 2018).

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     The trial court reasoned:

     This Court reviewed the presentence report and the sentencing
     guidelines prior to imposing sentence. (Sentencing hearing, Feb.
     11, 2022 (hereinafter “ST”) at 4). The Pennsylvania Supreme
     Court has held:

           Where pre-sentence reports exist, we shall continue
           to presume that the sentencing judge was aware of
           relevant information regarding the defendant’s
           character and weighed those considerations along
           with mitigating statutory factors Having been
           informed by the pre-sentence report, the sentencing
           court’s discretion should not be disturbed.

     Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa.Super. 1988).

     In imposing its sentence on Appellant, this Court considered the
     sentencing factors listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (the protection
     of the public, the gravity of the offense in relation to the impact
     on the victim and the community, and the rehabilitative needs of
     the defendant), in addition to the Pre-Sentence Report. This Court
     considered Appellant’s age and the letters written on his behalf
     regarding his character. ST 37. In addition, the Court considered
     as a mitigating factor in sentencing Appellant that he had a stale
     prior record score, indicating that his previous crimes occurred
     several years ago. ST 36.

     However, this Court must also consider the gravity of the offense
     and its impact on the victim. Although Appellant was charged with
     only one count of Rape of a Child, the evidence established that
     he repeatedly raped a young girl from the time she was ten years
     old until she was twelve years old. Id. Appellant gave her a
     sexually transmitted infection when she was eleven years old. Id.
     Moreover, he was not a stranger, but a person who was placed in
     a position of trust by the victim’s mother. Id. The violation of
     that trust caused a rift between mother and daughter that remains
     to this day. Id. Although Appellant is not responsible for repairing
     this relationship, he bears a substantial portion of the blame for
     creating the circumstances which damaged it.            This Court
     considered Appellant’s substantial need for rehabilitation and risk
     to the community, and the serious nature of the crimes and the
     impact of those crimes on the victim and her family in imposing
     sentences that were within or below the standard range of the
     Sentencing Guidelines. Since this Court appropriately considered

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      both the aggravating and mitigating factors in fashioning its
      sentence, no error occurred and this issue is without merit.

Opinion at 9-10. Based on this cogent analysis, we conclude that Appellant’s

claim of abuse of discretion lacks merit.

      Appellant has waived his second claim of sentencing error, an argument

that the court considered improper sentencing factors (the strain in the

victim’s relationship with her mother), because Appellant failed to raise this

objection at sentencing or in his post-sentence motion.           Dunphy, supra.

Even if he had preserved this issue, it would not have required relief.          At

sentencing, the court may take into account a victim impact statement

detailing   the   harm   caused    to     the    victim   by   Appellant’s   crimes.

Commonwealth v. Smithton, 631 A.2d 1053, 1057 (Pa. Super. 1993); 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (sentencing court may consider the “gravity of the offense

as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim”). Here, the victim impact

statement was read into the record during sentencing. The victim asserted

that when she disclosed Appellant’s abuse to her mother, her mother called

her a liar and sided with Appellant, causing the victim serious emotional harm.

ST at 27-29. Because the rupture in the victim’s relationship with her mother,

and the resulting emotional trauma, was a direct result of Appellant’s crimes,

the court properly took this evidence into account when considering the

“gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim.” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).

      Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 10/13/2023

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