Court Opinion

ID: 9910152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 21:00:49.643674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:16.143762
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4235      Doc: 41         Filed: 12/13/2023     Pg: 1 of 9

                                              PUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4235

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        ERIC HENDERSON,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (3:20-cr-00288-KDB-DSC-1)

        Argued: October 26, 2023                                    Decided: December 13, 2023

        Before GREGORY and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and Robert S. BALLOU, United States
        District Judge for the Western District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

        Reversed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee
        and Judge Ballou joined.

        ARGUED: Chiege Ojugo Kalu Okwara, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
        Anthony Joseph Enright, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte,
        North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William T. Stetzer, Acting United States
        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina,
        for Appellee.
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        GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

               Eric Henderson appeals his sentence, which was imposed after he pleaded guilty to

        one count of possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony, in violation

        of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He contends that the district court erred in two ways when it

        calculated his sentencing guidelines range. First, it applied a four-level enhancement for

        possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense pursuant to

        § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Second, it applied a two-level

        enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight pursuant to § 3C1.2 of the Sentencing

        Guidelines. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

                                                      I.

               On June 5, 2020, police officers responded to a call in Charlotte, North Carolina, after

        the caller told them that Henderson was armed. J.A. 121. When officers arrived, they saw

        that Henderson was armed with a rifle and observed him shove a woman to the ground and

        point the firearm directly at her. Id. When law enforcement confronted Henderson, he fled.

        Id. Henderson was subsequently located hiding behind a shed a short distance away. Id.

        Officers later located a rifle hidden under a vehicle parked on the roadway. Id. At the time,

        Henderson was subject to an active Domestic Violence Protection Order (“DVPO”). Id.

               On August 18, 2020, Henderson was charged in the United States District Court for the

        Western District of North Carolina with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

        J.A. 24–36. He pleaded guilty to the charge without a written plea agreement. Id. During his

        guilty plea hearing, Henderson acknowledged that he had read and agreed with a factual basis

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        document filed by the government. The document outlined how Henderson’s conduct satisfied

        the elements of § 922(g)(1), establishing the basis for his guilty plea. J.A. 32.

               In preparation for Henderson’s sentencing, a probation officer prepared a draft

        Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). J.A. 85. The draft PSR calculated Henderson’s

        total offense level to be seventeen, based on the following factors: (1) a base level of

        fourteen; (2) a Specific Offense Characteristics adjustment for possession of a firearm in

        connection with another felony offense, which increased his offense level by four points;

        (3) an adjustment for reckless endangerment during flight, which increased his offense

        level by two points; and (4) adjustments for acceptance of responsibility, which collectively

        decreased his offense level by three points. J.A. 89–90. The draft PSR also assigned

        Henderson a criminal history category of IV. J.A. 101.

               The PSR’s Special Offense Characteristics adjustment was based on Henderson

        “us[ing] or possess[ing] any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony

        offense.”   J.A. 90.    The other felony cited in connection with this adjustment was

        possession of a firearm by a person who is subject to a Domestic Violence Protective Order

        (“DVPO”), in violation of § 922(g)(8). Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)). The

        second adjustment, reckless endangerment during flight, was based on “[t]he defendant

        recklessly creat[ing] a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person

        in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2).

               Henderson objected to the Special Offense Characteristics enhancement and the

        reckless-endangerment enhancement. Id. In response to Henderson’s objections, the

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        probation officer filed an addendum to the final PSR, but the addendum did not make any

        changes to the sentencing guideline calculations. J.A. 149–50.

               At sentencing, both parties stipulated that there was a basis for Henderson’s guilty

        plea and that the court could refer to the “Offense Conduct” outlined in the PSR to establish

        the basis for his guilty plea. J.A. 43. Henderson again raised objections to each of the

        sentencing enhancements included in the PSR. J.A. 44.

               The court overruled Henderson’s objections. J.A. 50. In imposing the sentence, the

        district court varied upward and sentenced Henderson to a term of sixty months. Id.

                                                      II.

               In reviewing whether a sentencing court properly applied the Guidelines, this Court

        “reviews the court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United

        States v. Allen, 446 F.3d 552, 527 (4th Cir. 2006). We therefore review the applicability of

        the two sentencing enhancements to which Henderson objected de novo.1 The government

        bears the burden of establishing the applicability of a sentencing enhancement by the

        preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Garnett, 243 F.3d. 824, 828 (4th Cir. 2001).

               1
                 On appeal, Henderson’s arguments against the two sentencing enhancements are
        different from the arguments he made below, but his objections to the enhancements during
        the sentencing were sufficient to preserve his challenge. See United States v. Robinson,
        744 F.3d 293, 300 n.6 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that even though a defendant did not make
        the same “precise argument before the district court, [the defendant] did challenge his
        criminal history score, and thus preserved his claim”).
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                                                    III.

                                                    A.

               The district court applied a four-level enhancement pursuant to Sentencing Guideline

        § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because, according to the PSR, Henderson possessed the firearm “in

        connection with” another felony: possessing a firearm while under a domestic violence

        protective order. J.A. 123. In other words, the court added a four-level enhancement because

        Henderson fell into an additional class of prohibited persons under § 922(g), and therefore

        possessed a firearm “in connection with another felony offense.” Id.

               This Court has previously rejected the notion that a person can be punished more

        severely for simultaneously violating multiple provisions of § 922(g) with the same act of

        possession. In United States v. Dunford, we held that “a person who is a member of more

        than one disqualifying class only violates § 922(g) once for each act of ‘possession.’” 148

        F.3d 385, 389 (4th Cir. 1998). In Dunford, the defendant was indicted on fourteen counts

        of firearms offenses: seven for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and seven for violation

        of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Id. at 387. All of the counts were based on a single act of

        possession of six firearms and ammunition. Id. We explained, “while a person must be a

        member of at least one of the nine classes prohibited from possessing guns under § 922(g),

        a person who is disqualified because of membership in multiple classes does not thereby

        commit separate and multiple offenses.” Id. at 389. 2

               2
                We also held that the defendant’s possession of the six firearms and ammunition,
        all of which were seized at the same time from his house, supported only one conviction
        under § 922(g). Dunford, 148 F.3d. at 389 (citing United States v. Mullins, 698 F.2d 686
        (Continued)
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               Although Dunford only explicitly addressed double counting in the context of a

        multiple-count indictment, its principles also apply to a sentencing enhancement for

        “prohibited persons” under § 922(g). We held in United States v. Blount that the purpose of a

        § 2K2.1 enhancement is to ensure that the severity of a defendant’s punishment increases if,

        “in addition to committing a firearms offense within the scope of § 2K2.1, he commits a

        separate felony offense that is rendered more dangerous by the presence of a firearm.” 337

        F.3d 404, 406 (4th Cir. 2003). In addition, Application Note 14(A) of the Sentencing

        guidelines defines “another felony offense” as an offense “other than the explosive or firearms

        possession or trafficking offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. N.14(C) (emphasis added).

               Under Dunford, a person who is both a felon and subject to a domestic violence

        protection order, like Henderson, does not violate the statute more than once or commit

        separate offenses for a single instance of possession. Dunford, 148 F.3d at 389. Dunford,

        combined with Blount’s holding about the purpose of § 2K2.1, means that if there is no

        separate felony offense, the enhancement is not appropriate. Blount, 337 F.3d at 406. To

        allow the government to increase the severity of a defendant’s punishment for violation of

        another subsection of § 922(g) for a single act of possession through a sentencing

        enhancement would be nothing more than a convenient method to sidestep Dunford. 3

        (4th Cir.1983)). We therefore affirmed only one of the defendant’s § 922(g) convictions
        and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 389.
               3
                 The government cites United States v. Shorter for the proposition that two
        convictions for violations of separate sections of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) based on one act of
        possession would be permissible, so long as a defendant did not receive concurrent or
        consecutive sentences for those two convictions. 328 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 2003). However,
        (Continued)
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               Henderson was not charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Under this

        Court’s precedent, he could not be convicted and sentenced for violations of both 18 U.S.C.

        § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) that stem from a single instance of possession. Dunford,

        148 F.3d at 389. He therefore cannot be subject to a sentencing enhancement based solely on

        the fact that he falls into more than one class of prohibited persons under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

                                                      B.

               The district court also applied a two-level enhancement, pursuant to Sentencing

        Guideline § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight because, according to the PSR,

        Henderson “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another

        person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” J.A. 123. The district

        court said that “running away from law enforcement with a loaded rife is reckless in and

        Shorter affirms our holding in Dunford, finding that a defendant who was charged with
        violations of § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(3) for the same act of possession only committed one
        offense. Id. at 173. In Shorter, the two § 922(g) counts were merged for sentencing
        purposes, and we held that the defendant stood “convicted of only one 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)
        offense.” Id. In other words, the sentence imposed in Shorter was permissible under
        Dunford because it amounted to only one punishment for one act of possession. Not so in
        the case of Henderson, who received a greater punishment on account of being a prohibited
        person under two subsections of § 922(g), despite there being only one act of possession.

               The government also argues that under Witte v. United States, enhancing a sentence
        for one offense based on another offense does not violate double jeopardy principles. 515
        U.S. 389 (1995). It is true that the Supreme Court held in Witte that the Sentencing
        Guidelines do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by permitting a more serious
        sentence for a particular offense if that offense was “accompanied by or preceded by
        additional criminal activity.” Id. at 403–404. However, here, there is no additional
        criminal conduct upon which to base the enhancement, because there is no “separate felony
        offense” upon which to base the enhancement. Dunford, 148 F.3d at 389.
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        of itself,” and that it disagreed with Henderson’s argument that hiding a gun was safer than

        running with it. J.A. 50.

               Henderson argues that his conduct does not meet the definition of recklessness. He

        cites United States v. Shivers for the proposition that flight with a loaded firearm, without

        more, is not sufficient to warrant application of the two-level enhancement. See United

        States v. Shivers, 56 F.4th 320, 326 (4th Cir. 2022). We agree. The district court erred in

        concluding that Henderson “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily

        injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” J.A. 123.

               In Shivers, decided after Henderson was sentenced, we stated that “we have never

        held in a published opinion that armed flight alone is enough to justify the application of

        the § 3C1.2 enhancement.” 56 F.4th at 326. Rather, to find that application of § 3C1.2 is

        warranted, we require “flight-plus-something more.” United States v. Dennings, 922 F.3d

        232, 237 (4th Cir. 2019).

               Several of our cases demonstrate what that “something more” is. For example, engaging

        in a struggle with police officers is sufficient. See United States v. Williams, 278 F. App’x 279,

        280 (4th Cir. 2008). Repeatedly attempting to remove an item from a pocket during armed

        flight or apprehension is, too. See United States v. Washington, 80 F. App’x 850, 850–51 (4th

        Cir. 2003). And so is running through a crowded parking lot and discarding a firearm in a

        heavily trafficked area. United States v. Grate, 81 F. App’x 451, 453 (4th Cir. 2003).

               Here, however, we do not have sufficient facts to warrant the application of § 3C1.2.

        At his plea hearing and at sentencing, Henderson stipulated only to the factual accuracy of

        two documents: the factual basis document filed by the government, which describes the

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        offense only in terms of the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the offense conduct

        portion of the PSR, which includes that same limited description. J.A. 32, 43.

               The government presented no evidence that could demonstrate that Henderson acted

        recklessly or that he created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. Not only

        is there no evidence as to who apprehended Henderson, but there is no evidence

        demonstrating how the firearm got to the vehicle, the conditions surrounding that

        discovery, or distances between the area of the offense, the shed, and the vehicle.

               On these limited facts, there is no evidence to suggest, as the government argues,

        that Henderson’s flight created a risk of accidental discharge of the weapon or a risk to the

        community had the firearm not been found. All we can reasonably conclude is that

        Henderson fled, and, at some point, someone found both Henderson and the firearm. This

        is an insufficient basis on which to apply the § 3C1.2 enhancement.

                                                    IV.

               The district court erred in applying a four-level sentencing enhancement pursuant

        to § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and a two-level reckless endangerment enhancement pursuant to

        § 3C1.2. We therefore reverse and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

                                                                    REVERSED AND REMANDED

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