Court Opinion

ID: 9721938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:13:00.23635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:26.933113
License: Public Domain

TODD, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion because, in my view, the portion of Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 which limits the sale of materials and collection of funds to a rented booth constitutes a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction which may constitutionally be applied to plaintiff International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON).
The majority recognizes that religious activity may be subject to reasonable and nondiscriminatory time, place, and manner restrictions. In evaluating the validity of this type of restriction, a court must determine whether the regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest which has no relation to the content of the first amendment expression involved. Additionally, the restriction on the first amendment activity must be no greater than is necessary to further that governmental interest. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). An application of this test requires the balancing of the competing interests involved and a consideration of the nature of the forum. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-303, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 2716, *8641 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974), Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). In his concurring opinion in the case of Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325, 95 L.Ed. 267 (1951), Mr. Justice Frankfurter summarized the four questions which have been considered by the United States Supreme Court in balancing competing governmental and first amendment interests. They are: (1) What is the interest deemed to require the regulation of speech (or other first amendment activity)? (2) What is the method used to achieve such ends as a consequence of which public speech is constrained or barred? (3) What mode of speech is regulated? and (4) Where does the speaking which is regulated take place? 340 U.S. at 282, 71 S.Ct. at 333; see also Intern. Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Evans, 440 F.Supp. 414 (S.D.Ohio 1977).
The restriction under consideration in this case, Rule 6.05, as applied, requires that the activities of distribution and sale of literature and the solicitation and accepting of donations be confined to a rented booth. The majority concludes that Rule 6.05, in its entirety, may not constitutionally be applied to the religious activities of members of ISKCON because a substantial governmental interest for the restriction has not been shown and/or because the governmental interests involved may be satisfied through less restrictive alternatives. However, in reaching this conclusion, the majority does not consider separately each activity which is restricted by the rule; namely, distribution, solicitation, sale, and collection of funds. Instead, the rule is analyzed as restricting a single form of activity. In my view, this constitutes an erroneous evaluation of the rule. Each activity which is sought to be regulated may serve a governmental interest to a greater or lesser degree and/or may serve a different governmental interest. Additionally, each component of the rule may have a different and/or greater or lesser impact on first amendment activity. Thus, in the balance, some of the restrictions may constitute reasonable time, place, and manner regulations while others may not.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the portions of the rule which serve to restrict the activities of solicitation and distribution of religious literature may not validly be applied to the members of ISKCON. As was noted by the majority, Rule 6.05 does not seek to regulate proselytism by ISKCON members. There is no basis in the record for distinguishing the effect of proselytism from that of solicitation and distribution of religious literature on the claimed governmental interests involved herein. The state contends that the limitation of solicitation and distribution of literature to a rented booth serves a substantial state interest in maintaining public order and minimizing crowd confusion. However, it would appear that the acts of solicitation and distribution have no greater impact on the public order than does the act of proselytism. All three acts merely involve the communication of ideas. In fact, solicitation may be viewed as one form of proselytism. Solicitation is an act, the purpose of which is to obtain support for the religion involved except that the solicitor urges financial support rather than support for religious beliefs. The distribution of religious literature also constitutes a form of proselytism through the spreading of religious beliefs by means of written words rather than oral communications. The distribution of literature may have a lesser impact on order than oral proselytism because it may take less time. Additionally, since large amounts of literature are already collected by Fair patrons, the distribution of religious literature by ISKCON members does not have any great impact on any state concern for litter and the like. Thus, since the state expresses no substantial interest in regulating proselytism, it cannot validly claim to have any greater interest in regulating solicitation and distribution.
Therefore, these restrictions may not be justified as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions since the acts of proselytism, solicitation, and distribution of religious literature are equally protected first amendment activities in this case. All three activities are religious activities which *87are required of ISKCON members. In fact, as plaintiffs urged at oral argument, these activities constitute the most important and central aspects of the Sankirtan ritual.
However, a different conclusion is required with respect to the regulation of the sales activities and the collection of funds by members of ISKCON. Again, the state claims that the restriction of these activities to a booth serves a legitimate state interest in minimizing crowd confusion. The regulation serves this interest in a different way and to a greater extent than does the regulation of solicitation and distribution. Sales and collection activities engender additional confusion beyond that caused by solicitation and distribution because they involve acts of exchanging articles for money, fumbling for and dropping money, making change, etc. See Intern. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979). While these activities are not incompatible with other ongoing activities at the fairgrounds, they do serve to augment an already existing crowd control problem. The substantiality of the state’s interest in this regard is obvious. The crowd at the fairgrounds is concentrated in about one third of the 125-acre fairgrounds. The average daily crowd is in excess of 150,000 people. Yet, the mere recitation of numbers from the stipulation does not portray the situation. Because of the large number of Fair patrons walking in the fairgrounds, there is confusion and congestion throughout the lanes of pedestrian traffic. Sales and collection can only serve to compound this problem. In determining that the state’s interest in this regard is not substantial, the majority appears only to focus on the impact of ISKCON’s activities on this problem. What the majority seems to forget is that its ruling today will allow for others engaged in first amendment activity to be excepted from the “booth rule.” As plaintiffs conceded at oral argument, they stand on equal footing with other religious and political groups entitled to first amendment protection. The effect of unrestricted sales and collection on the crowd control problem at the Minnesota State Fair may, thus, readily be seen.1
Specifically with respect to the activities of members of ISKCON, the restriction of its sales and collection activities to a booth also serves a substantial and legitimate state interest in protecting Fair patrons from fraud, misrepresentation, and other acts of misconduct. At the 1977 Minnesota State Fair, ISKCON members were permitted by court order to distribute materials and collect donations but were denied the right to sell items away from a booth. As a result of ISKCON activity at this Fair, the Fair Staff received 234 complaints, some of which indicated that ISKCON members violated the court order by selling items outside of a rental booth under the guise of collecting donations. These complaints also show that members of ISKCON misrepresented their identities and purposes when requesting funds 2 and also solicited minors. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the state submitted affidavits which verified this misconduct. By restricting the sales and collections activities of ISKCON members to a rented booth, the state’s interest in protecting fairgoers from such acts of misconduct would be served because such a rule would require ISKCON members to clearly identify themselves and their purpose and would enable the state to adequately police their activities to ensure that the members are not engaged in such acts of misconduct.3
*88The method of regulation in this case is impartial and nondiscriminatory. The rule is carefully drawn so that Fair officials can exercise no discretion when confining collection and sales activities to a booth. Fair officials cannot arbitrarily determine that some exhibitors are free to roam the fairgrounds while others are not. Nor is there any discretion given in the determination of who is entitled to rent booth space. Booths at the Fair are rented on a first-come, first-serve basis. Furthermore, the regulation is only minimally restrictive. It does not serve to prohibit any first amendment activity. The rule only limits that activity to a rented booth. Finally, the regulation of sales and collection only restricts non-communicative aspects of any exhibitor’s activity. It could not be more content neutral.
Thus, when the rule and the state’s substantial interests in its enforcement are weighed against ISKCON’s interests in this case, the reasonableness of the rule as a time, place, and manner regulation becomes apparent. Members of ISKCON have an undeniably protected interest in engaging in acts of sales and collection of funds since these are acts which are required as a part of the Sankirtan ritual. However, as plaintiffs stated at oral argument, these activities do not constitute the most central aspects of the ritual as do distribution of literature and proselytism. Thus, the regulation of sales and collection has a lesser impact on the religious activities of ISK-CON members than would the regulation of distribution, proselytism, etc. Furthermore, the impact of the regulation on ISK-CON’s activities is not great since the regulation is merely restrictive rather than prohibitive. Contrary to the statement in the majority opinion, there is nothing in the record which establishes that ISKCON members are required to perform any and all aspects of the Sankirtan ritual in a peripatetic manner. Therefore, although the regulation of sales and collection has some impact on ISKCON’s religious activities, the impact is not great when compared with the substantial state interests served by the rule.
The majority concludes that even if the state has a substantial interest in enforcing its rule against ISKCON members, these interests may be served through less restrictive alternatives and, thus, the rule may not be upheld as reasonable. The majority suggests that the state’s interests may be served through prohibitions of specific acts of misconduct, limitations on the numbers of those selling materials and collecting funds throughout the fairgrounds, requirements concerning identification of ISKCON members, and through the bringing of civil and criminal actions for fraud and battery. However, in the context of the State Fair, these suggested alternatives could not viably be implemented and would only serve to increase the existing crowd control problems. All of the suggested alternatives would require Fair officials to police, in an individualized manner, specific acts of misconduct. The ability to police such activities is severely restricted if not made impossible because the fairgrounds is a large, overly-crowded area. Furthermore, the enforcing of a partial ban would entail the checking of credentials and other similar acts which would increase crowd confusion and congestion rather than ameliorate it. Additionally, all of the less restrictive alternatives would only serve to frustrate the legitimate state interest of promulgating a rule which is effective and easily enforceable. Thus, I cannot conclude that the restriction of sales and collection to a rented booth is anything less than a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.
For the foregoing reasons, I would uphold Rule 6.05 to the extent that it restricts the sales of materials and the collection of funds to a rented booth.

. See Intern. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979); Edwards v. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, 476 F.Supp. 153 (D.Md.1979); Hynes v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 478 F.Supp. 9 (M.D.Tenn.1979); Int’l. Soc., Krishna Con., Inc. v. McAvey, 450 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y.1978); Inter. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Evans, 440 F.Supp. 414 (S.D.Ohio 1977).

. The complaints indicated that ISKCON members stated to fairgoers that they were representing the Department of Natural Resources or the State Fair or were collecting funds for needy children or agricultural schools.

. In footnote 8 of its opinion, the majority alludes to the claimed state interest in protecting the privacy of fairgoers and suggests that this interest is never relevant in the context of a state fair, citing Farmer v. Moses, 232 F.Supp.' *88154 (S.D.N.Y.1964). While I find that this claimed interest is not substantially served by the regulation of sales and collection in this case, I cannot agree that the privacy interests of fairgoers may never be balanced against the interests of those engaged in first amendment activities in determining the reasonableness of a time, place, and manner regulation. See Hynes v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 478 F.Supp. 9 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); Int’l. Soc., Krishna Con., Inc. v. McAvey, 450 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y.1978).