Court Opinion

ID: 9793795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:53:12.14174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:54.277735
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the judgment because the peculiar facts of this case afford no basis for concluding, either that the first industrial injury had produced a permanent disability at the time that the second injury occurred, or that such permanent disability would have occurred even in the absence of the second injury. The nature of these two injuries, their similarity in both cause and result, their proximity in time, and the lack of any medical evaluation as to the effect of the first injury alone, combine to render suspect any attempt at apportionment. Indeed, none of the examining physicians expressed any opinion as to whether, or how. the industrial injuries in this case should be apportioned. Our review of the board's apportionment of disability must, of course, be based upon the entire record. (Lab. Code. § 5952; LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627. 637 [83 Cal.Rptr. 208, 463 P.2d 432]; Hulbert v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 634. 640 [121 Cal.Rptr. 239].)
I do not concur, however, in any inference which may flow from a superficial reading of the majority opinion, and which may suggest that *503successive short-term, similar injuries in service to the same employer are to be considered simultaneously permanent as a matter of law, thereby creating any broad exception to the separate-award rule clearly enunciated by Labor Code section 4750. {Fuentes v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 1, 6 [128 Cal.Rptr. 673, 547 P.2d 449].) Such a conclusion is not dictated by the “Bauer doctrine” adopted by the majority. The board in Bauer recognized the applicability of section 4750 whenever there is a “pre-existing permanent disability,” even where incurred in service to the same employer. (See Dow Chemical Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 483, 492 [62 Cal.Rptr. 757, 432 P.2d 365].) It carefully noted that the disabilities in that case could be combined since “[w]e infer, and there is nothing in the record to contradict the inference, that . . . disability as caused by both injuries became permanent and stationary on the same date.” (First italics added.) {Bauer v. County of Los Angeles (1969) 34 Cal.Comp.Cases 594, 598.)
Where, however, in contrast, the record does reflect a “previous” disability, section 4750 manifestly requires separation of the applicable awards. The most obvious example arises when a disabling injury occurs after the employee has already received a permanent disability rating for a prior condition. I do not understand the majority position to be that an unapportioned award would be proper in such a situation, even though the successive disabilities had been produced by injuries alike in nature, close in time, and incurred in service to the same employer. Similarly, where no previous rating has occurred, but the record nonetheless supports the conclusion that separate injuries resulted in separate permanent disabilities at different times, section 4750 mandates apportionment. The foregoing result is consistent with a companion statute applicable to diseases, Labor Code section 4663, which provides: “In case of aggravation of any disease existing prior to a compensable injury, compensation shall be allowed only for the proportion of the disability due to the aggravation of such prior disease which is reasonably attributed to the injury.”
In the matter before us, therefore, apportionment would have been called for even though disability from both injuries became permanent at the same time, had the evidence indicated that the April injury would have progressed normally to permanent disability whether or not the June accident had occurred. {Zemke v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 794, 796 [69 Cal.Rptr. 88, 441 P.2d 928]; Berry v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd., 68 Cal.2d 786, 790 [69 Cal.Rptr. 68, 441 P.2d 908].)
*504As we observed in Fuentes, supra, the disparate awards for similar disabilities which may result when the apportionment requirements are applied to the recently enacted progressive-benefit scale (Lab. Code, § 4658) are “a consequence of the recent amendments to [the benefit scale] . . . and . . . consistent with the previously noted policy of encouraging employers to hire the disabled. There being no evidence to the contrary, this court must assume that such a result was contemplated by the Legislature.” (16 Cal.3d at p. 8.)
It is arguable that the policy considerations behind apportionment of successive disabilities are less relevant when those disabilities were all incurred in service to the same employer. In such cases, unlike those involving multiple employers or nonindustrial conditions, there is no danger of a disproportionate assessment upon the most recent employer. Indeed, when the separate-award rules interact with the progressive-benefit scale, a single employer actually receives a “windfall” in those cases in which a combined disability incurred in his service is produced in installments, when compared with the same disability arising from a single incident. Nonetheless, presumably the policy underlying sections 4663' and 4750 is to encourage employers to retain disabled workers as well as to employ them. We must assume that the Legislature intended these consequences when it amended the method of computing benefits while leaving intact the clear language of sections 4663 and 4750. (See Fuentes, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 8.)
Clark, J., concurred. ,
On June 23, 1977, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.