Court Opinion

ID: 9648121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:03:51.220003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:56.595602
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Burnett
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Tennessee, through the Commissioner of Highways, brought this proceeding seeking to condemn certain lands belonging to the petitioners for highway purposes under Chapter 216, Public Acts of 1959. Codified in the Supplement to the Code as Section 23-1528 through 23-1541, inclusive.
The contest before us does not question the right of the condemner to take, but the method of the payment for the land by the condemner as provided by Chapter 216 of the Public Acts of 1969 is questioned by the landowners’ demurrer, alleging the unconstitutionality of this Act. The trial judge held the Act constitutional, and we granted certiorari to review this action of the trial *5judge in overruling the demurrer as to the constitutionality of the Act. City of Nashville v. Dad’s Auto Accessories, Inc., 154 Tenn. 194, 285 S.W. 52.
The prime and major insistence under this demurrer is that the Chapter is broader than its caption, violating Article II, Section 17 of the Constitution; and that it is likewise in violation of Article I, Section 17 of our Constitution, which Article provides:
“That all courts shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due courts of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or delay. Suits may be brought against the State in such a manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct.”
The basis of argument in each instance is that Section 5 of the Act (codified as Section 23-1532, T.C.A.), which provides in the latter part of said Section:
“* * * but no trial shall be had until six (6) months have expired after the completion of said street, road, highway, freeway or parkway; provided, however, that if the same has not been completed within twenty-four (24) months from the filing of said condemnation petition, said case shall be tried. ’ ’
is violative of each Section of the Constitution for obvious reasons.
We find that Kentucky in Commonwealth ex rel. Tinder v. Werner, 1955, 280 S.W.2d 214, 216, under a very similar constitutional provision to that above quoted held that a provision in an Act similar to that above quoted was unconstitutional, as violating the provision of *6their Constitution. That court said that in so long as the Kentucky Act “provides for an unusual and unnatural delay it is unconstitutional. ’ ’ The basis of the Kentucky decision was on some old cases of theirs which are almost identical with one cited by the plaintiff in error of this Court (Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. 1) as holding that an Act of the Legislature of 1861, which directed that an execution should not issue until two years after a rendition of the judgment unless certain things were done, was unconstitutional. We think that this Kentucky opinion is indeed very persuasive and should he followed by us as to the provision of the Act hereinabove quoted.
In Nashville Housing Authority v. Doyle, 197 Tenn. 555, 276 S.W.2d 722, 724, this Court had under consideration a different act entirely from what we have here, but as to this question of delay without immediate payment, had this to say:
“Under this Act if we should hold that The Housing-Authority could take the property of the land owner without the latter being paid immediately this would offend Article 1, Section 21, of the Constitution of Tennessee, and would render the Act invalid. ’ ’
This holding, last quoted, implements and makes it almost essential that we hold that the provision of the Act above quoted is unconstitutional. We so hold as to the language quoted, but no further.
We find that in the last Section of the Act there is a separability clause applying to any Section, sentence, word or whatnot in the Act. This evidences an intent on the part of the Legislature to have the valid parts of the statute in force if some be declared unconstitutional. Of *7course, the applicable rule is that if a portion of the legislative act is unconstitutional, and it can he separated from other portions of the act, and the latter enforced independent of the former, and it further appears that the unconstitutional part did not constitute such an inducement to the passage of the other parts of the law that they would not have been passed without it, the former may be rejected and latter upheld. In our opinion, a workable plan remains after the invalid portions are stricken out. We thus strike from the Act the portion of Section 5 (23-1532, T.C.A.) above quoted.
What we have said above is supported by the West Virginia Court in McGibson v. County Court of Roane County, 95 W.Va. 338, 121 S.E. 99, which was quoted and relied upon by this Court in Maury County v. Porter, 195 Tenn. 116, 257 S W.2d 16. That court held that it is a denial of due process if the compensation is not to be determined and paid until after the work has been completed, as well as holding that it was proper to have a reasonable delay, but that the Act in that case did not provide for payment within a reasonable time (60 days) of the compensation due the landowner, and that the landowner in that case was not provided with a remedy to institute proceedings. Later the West Virginia Court had before it the case of Simms v. Dillon, 119 W.Va. 284, 193 S.E. 331, 335, 113 A.L.R. 787, wherein that court held that an Act providing for a reasonable delay was not unconstitutional and was valid. That court in the later ease, in discussing the McGribson case, expressly affirmed it and held that the Act as amended now did not have the vice in it of having a specified period of delay, the court saying:
*8“* * * Of course, under such, statute, (that is referring to the statute as applied in the McG-ibson case) the state might take its own time and permit years to elapse before the compensation due would be payable.”
The same argument is made by the plaintiff in error as to this Section of the statute here in question, which we have held unconstitutional and elided from the Act. That court further said:
“* * * The present act has no such vice, and if the State Road Commission should attempt to permit an unreasonable length of time to elapse and not pursue the work efficiently to completion, the court would on proper motion of the landowner, require that the proceedings progress to final award or judgment.”
We thus think on the basis of common sense and justice and under the constitutional provision in question that a reasonable delay in allowing the landowner his full right in court as to compensation is perfectly satisfactory, but to delay it years or months without having any factual situation to support whether or not such a delay is reasonable, such an act, or portion thereof, stating this is invalid. What constitutes a reasonable time, of course, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case, and is to be decided in each case as a question of fact as these things arise. The trial court who tries these cases can and will adopt such a rule in allowing trial hereinafter to be referred to.
The Act under consideration provides that the condemner shall determine the amount of damages to which the landowner is entitled and deposit this amount with the Clerk of the court in which the proceeding is filed. Complaint is made, and very able argument made, *9against this language of the Act that the condemner will determine the amount of the damages to which the landowner is entitled for various obvious reasons, that is, that the condemner makes this determination entirely too low and not based on a fair valuation as to the fair cash market value plus incidental damages, after deducting incidental benefits. This argument though loses its force and effect when we come to Section 10 (sec. 23-1537, T.C.A.) of the Act which provides that the owner is entitled to an amount of damages ascertainable in this way,- that is, taking the fair cash market value at the time the petition is filed, plus his incidental damages at that time, after deducting his incidental benefits. This Section of the Act (Section 10) could have almost been lifted from a charge that the writer of this opinion gave a quarter of century ago as a trial judge in these condemnation suits to a petit jury as to how to determine the damages the landowner was entitled to against the condemner. We think thus that it is absolutely necessary to not take each of these said Sections of the Act separately, but they must all be read together and treated together in pari materia. Brooksbank v. Leech (Johnston v. Leach), 206 Tenn. 176, 332 S.W.2d 210, and authorities there cited.
Then the Act provides that this amount which is deposited with the Clerk, if acceptable to the landowner, may be taken down by him and a decree entered divesting title. The Act on the other hand provides that if the amount deposited is unacceptable, the landowner may except to this allowance and have a trial before a petit-jury as to the damages he is entitled to for the taking of this land on the basis of Section 10 of the Act above referred to. If the landowner does take this sum down and *10on appeal the amount of damages awarded him by the jury is less than this amount, the landowner is liable for the difference back to the condemner plus interest. A like situation is also in the Act if he is awarded a greater amount by the jury than that deposited in court by the condemner, he is entitled to this plus interest from the date of the taking. Clearly under such a situation due process is complied with and the landowner gets what he is entitled to according to the view of a trial jury.
Of course, the amount deposited by the condemner is an amount that is judged by his appraisers as to the value under the formula set forth in Section 10, above referred to. When this comes to trial before the jury, naturally the condemner is going to use appraisers to try to establish that value at less value while the property owner or landowner is going to use various appraisers to try to show an increased valuation. All this amounts to is purely a question of evidence. What the condemner deposits in court does not fix the damages in any way in the world. It is purely what his side of the lawsuit testifies as to what they think the land is worth. This is rebutted, or just the other way around because, of course, the burden is always on the landowner to prove the damages he is entitled to for the taking of his property, which is to be rebutted by the condemner. Town of Erin v. Brooks, 190 Tenn. 407, 230 S.W.2d 397.
This Act is cumulative, or supplementary, to other statutes relating to eminent domain, and as said above all of these eminent domain statutes are construed in pari materia.
This Act has a deposit feature which we do not have in our normal eminent domain statutes. It is similar to *11a feature in the Federal Act and that was applied under the statute in National Housing Authority v. Hoyle, supra. Clearly this is an added feature to our eminent domain statutes for the benefit of the landowner. It permits him immediately to take down this sum of money without losing any rights whatsoever to appeal and attempt to establish a greater valuation, or he may accept this amount if he is satisfied with it. We think it an excellent provision in the Act, and can in no way see where it injures the landowner, hut on the contrary is to his benefit.
After reading and re-reading, several times, the Act in question and giving it considerable thought and study, we have reached the conclusions hereinabove expressed. We think that the Act is constitutional when the language quoted from Section 5 above is elided. Thus, we hold the Act constitutional with this exception. This exception was the primary meat in the coconut, so to speak, in the appeal, and for this reason, we tax the costs of this appeal against the condemner. Thus it is that the decree below as modified herein will be affirmed.