Court Opinion

ID: 9642353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:55:43.202569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:46.506748
License: Public Domain

SHEA, Justice,
with whom MURRAY, Justice, joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with Mr. Justice Weisberger in his conclusion that no error was committed on the part of the police when they allegedly failed to preserve and to analyze certain tangible evidence, and that no prejudice inured to the defendant by the trial justice’s limitation of the defense counsel’s closing argument. However, I must respectfully dissent from his holding that incriminating statements made by the defendant when confronted with the victim at the police station only moments after he *938had made a coerced and inadmissible confession to police were not so tainted under the totality of the circumstances as to be inadmissible against him.
Initially, the trial justice was correct in suppressing defendant’s oral and written confession. He granted the suppression motion after finding that he could not “honestly find that the confession was freely and voluntarily given * * * under the circumstances of this case.”
Later, during the trial, the prosecutor attempted to present the oral statements made by defendant to the victim, Mrs. B., at the police station. The defendant’s timely objection asserted that the totality of the circumstances involving the earlier, improperly obtained confession required exclusion of the statements made to Mrs. B. The objection was overruled. An examination of the record reveals that the motion to suppress did not actually address the oral statements, but rather the written confession. However, the oral statements in question were so closely related to the suppressed confession that had resulted from impermissible police conduct that it was error to admit evidence of the oral statement. The trial justice at no time made a finding that the statements in question were voluntarily given. He ruled only that they were separate from the suppressed confession.
Let us examine the circumstances of the case which persuaded the trial justice that the confession was not voluntary, and consequently not admissible. The defendant had entered the police station in the company of his natural parents, who were divorced, and his stepmother and stepfather. The defendant’s mother and stepfather, with whom he lived, had been notified the night before that there was a warrant out for their son’s arrest. The stepfather, Mr. Marshall, was related to the chief of police, and he and the other parents were also friendly with members of the police department. All four had gone to the police station fully confident that Mr. Marshall had a good relationship with members of the department and that he and the other family members could believe and rely on what was said to them by the police. The trial justice so found in his decision on the motion to suppress. He also found it likely that this supposed good relationship with members of the police department was the reason why neither the parents nor the young defendant asked for an attorney to advise them.
Immediately upon arriving at the police station defendant was placed under arrest, advised of his constitutional rights, and separated from his parents. Then began a period of questioning that lasted two hours or more. The defendant was questioned principally by Detective Frederick Cavalla-ro but other members of the police department made appearances as well. At first, defendant denied all involvement in the crimes. He was questioned at length, and on more than one occasion he was told in graphic detail by members of the police department what they would do to a person who entered their homes and touched any female occupant. He was also told in brutal detail what happens to sex offenders when they are brought to the prison: how they themselves are made the victim of brutal sexual attacks that leave them disabled for long periods.
The trial justice said in his decision on the motion to suppress that he believed the young defendant gave a credible story. Part of that story was that defendant was told that if he gave a confession to some of the charges, other charges would probably be amended or reduced and that he would probably be given probation. During the interrogation, defendant’s parents could hear loud noises and yelling and screaming from the room in which defendant was being questioned. At certain points defendant was described by witnesses as crying and as so upset that he was hardly able to talk. After continually denying his involvement he was placed in a jail cell. Detective Cavallaro said to him at that time, “To hell *939with you; you can rot there; you will go to the ACI and never see light again,” among other statements which need not be repeated here. At some point during the interrogation, defendant asked for an opportunity to confront the victim stating that he was sure she would not accuse him face to face.
After leaving defendant in the jail cell, Detective Cavallaro spoke with the parents and told them the boy had not admitted to anything, but “we threw him into a cell to scare him.” Cavallaro suggested that the father and stepfather speak to the boy — if they could get him to confess, some of the charges would be dropped. The father and stepfather did talk to defendant in the cell as Cavallaro suggested. The stepfather told the boy that if he confessed to the theft of an automobile, which was also one of the alleged crimes, that charge would be dropped; and because of the stepfather’s friendship with Cavallaro, he believed the other charges would in fact also be dropped. After this talk with the father and stepfather, Cavallaro came to defendant’s cell and said, “[C]ome on, we’re going,” intimating he would be going to the ACI where he had been told some dreadful things would be done to him by the other prisoners. At this point defendant admitted taking the car and to breaking and entering, but he continued to insist that he had “touched no lady.” After admitting being involved in a car theft and breaking and entering, defendant was taken to a desk, where the confession was written out. During this procedure Cavallaro again assured defendant that he would talk to the judge and that the worst defendant would probably get would be probation. He was next photographed and fingerprinted, and then he confronted the victim in one of the offices. Mrs. B. herself described defendant at that point as distraught and crying. At that time he made statements to her asking her why she was accusing him, claiming that his life would be ruined, admitting that he had been in her room, but denying any sexual assault.
I believe it is clear from the record that at the time defendant had the confrontation with the victim, he was laboring under the same emotional and psychological pressures that required his written statement be suppressed. He was led to believe that charges would be dropped or amended, that probation would be recommended to the judge, and that he would receive favorable treats ment because of his stepfather’s relationship with certain police officers. Further, defendant was led to believe that if he failed to cooperate, he would be sent to prison and himself victimized. These facts convinced the trial justice that the written confession was involuntary, and convince me that the subsequent oral statements were also involuntary. There was no break in the stream of events to separate the suppressed confession from the oral statements. They are almost identical in content, virtually identical in time, and otherwise inseparable from the involuntary confession. The test in determining the volun-tariness of the [statements] is whether defendant’s statements were “the product of his free and rational choice” and not a product of coercion in any form. Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521, 88 S.Ct. 1152, 1154, 20 L.Ed.2d 77, 80 (1968); State v. Amado, R.I., 424 A.2d 1057, 1062 (1981). “If a confession is obtained by direct or implied promises or improper influence it will be deemed involuntary.” Id. at 424 A.2d at 1062 (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568, 573 (1897)); see United States v. Powe, 591 F.2d 833, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
The trial justice made no finding that the oral statements in issue were voluntarily made. He was never specifically asked to do so. The matter came up on objection of defense counsel. Nevertheless, permitting the jury to hear the evidence has the same result as a finding of voluntariness. When a reviewing court, relying on the entire evidence, is left with the firm conviction that the action below was clearly erroneous, relief should be granted. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 *940S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948); State v. Amado, supra; State v. LaRosa, 112 R.I. 571, 576, 313 A.2d 375, 377 (1974); State v. Leavitt, 103 R.I. 273, 290, 237 A.2d 309, 318, cert. denied 393 U.S. 881, 89 S.Ct. 185, 21 L.Ed.2d 155 (1968).
In conclusion, considering the totality of the circumstances, I believe the admission in evidence of the oral statements to Mrs. B. violated the defendant’s due-process rights. See Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967).
For these reasons I would reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.