Court Opinion

ID: 9537515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:19:26.409181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:44.490489
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice:
David S. Monson, Lieutenant Governor-Secretary of State, and the State of Utah (hereinafter designated “Defendants”), appeal from the judgment of the Third District Court which declared U.C.A., 1953, 20-3-14 unconstitutional. The statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
Any candidate filing a nomination paper or acceptance . . . shall pay to the filing officer a fee for such filing. The fee to be paid shall be one fourth of one per cent of the total salary for the full term legally or customarily paid by such office.
The record furnished in this matter is scant. It contains none of the pleadings, and, in essence, consists only of the trial court’s Memorandum Decision. It is from that source that we glean the following facts.
William C. Hoyle and Bruce Bangerter (hereinafter designated “Plaintiffs”), filed separate proceedings below,1 both alleging that they were without funds to pay the filing fee for their candidacy for the U.S. Congress as provided by the statute in question. Nevertheless, plaintiff Hoyle’s filing fee was paid. (He alleged it to have been paid with borrowed funds, for which he sought reimbursement.) Plaintiff Bangerter filed an affidavit of impecuniosity and sought placement of his name on the ballot without the payment of a filing fee.
At trial, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the filing fee requirement, only as it relates to impecunious candidates. The parties stipulated that, for the purposes of this action, the court should consider both plaintiffs as impecunious. However, it is evident from the following excerpt from its Memorandum Decision that the court declined to accept the stipulation and, in fact, concluded to the contrary:
After examining the statements submitted I cannot see that either *242petitioner is impecunious. It appears to be a matter of priority and each petitioner puts the payment of a filing fee as the lowest item on priority.
Notwithstanding the foregoing finding and conclusion, the court addressed the constitutionality of the statute in question and concluded that it violates the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 4, which prohibits the requirement of a property qualification of one holding office. Therein the court erred.
The right and power of the judiciary to declare whether legislative enactments exceed constitutional limitations is to be exercised with considerable restraint and in conformity with fundamental rules. One such fundamental rule of long-standing is that unnecessary decisions are to be avoided and that the courts should pass upon the constitutionality of a statute only when such a determination is essential to the decision in a case.2 A constitutional question does not arise merely because it is raised and a decision is sought thereon; rather, the constitutionality of a statute is to be considered in the light of the standing of the one who seeks to raise the question and of its particular application.3 An attack on the validity of a statute cannot be made by parties whose interests have not been, and are not about to be, prejudiced by the operation of the statute.4
A further fundamental rule is that the courts do not busy themselves with advisory opinions, nor is it within their province to exercise the delicate power of pronouncing a statute unconstitutional in abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases.5 It has been found to be far wiser, and it has become settled as a general principle, that a constitutional question is not to be reached if the merits of the case in hand may be fairly determined on other than constitutional issues.
In the instant case, plaintiffs concede that the validity of their challenge turns on their status as impecunious office seekers. Therefore, it was not necessary for the trial court nor is it now necessary for this Court to reach the question as to the constitutionality of the filing fee provision, for the plaintiffs lack standing to bring the action. Plaintiffs are without standing by virtue of their failure to demonstrate that the enforcement of the filing fee provision denied them a constitutionally guaranteed right. It is not sufficient that, at some future time, an application of the statute might infringe upon the constitutional rights of differently situated persons; such an eventuality is to be dealt with only if and when it arises, and then it must be upon petition of the injured party. In the absence of a showing of a denial of protected rights, there is no constitutional issue properly before us.6
As hereinabove observed, the stipulation of impecuniosity proffered by the parties was expressly rejected by the trial court. Of even greater consequence is the fact that the contrary conclusion reached by the trial court (that the plaintiffs were not impecunious) is not challenged on this appeal. Rather, the parties simply again proffer the same stipulation of impecuniosity.
A finding of the trier of fact is generally left undisturbed when met with no challenge on appeal, and we are not persuaded to ignore the finding made in this instance by reason of the stipulation in derogation thereof which accompanies this appeal. The far-reaching effect of a constitutional determination upon the rights of the general public negatives any consideration of a constitutional question presented by a friendly or fictitious suit or on admitted or agreed facts. Such questions are only to be *243reached after a full disclosure of all material facts. We therefore accept the trial court’s unassailed finding that neither of the plaintiffs are truly indigent.
The order of the trial court requiring a refund of plaintiff Hoyle’s filing fee and placement of plaintiff Bangerter’s name on the ballot is vacated and set aside and the proceedings herein are dismissed. No costs awarded.
STEWART, J., and ELLETT, Retired Justice Pro Tem, concur.

. The proceedings were consolidated for hearing and remain so for the purposes of this appeal.

. State v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 P. 285 (1909).

. Cavaness v. Cox, Utah, 598 P.2d 349 (1979).

. State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414 (1939), and the cases cited therein; see also, Sims v. Smith, Utah, 571 P.2d 586 (1977).

. Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978).

. Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241 (1917).