Court Opinion

ID: 9854501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:08:25.754619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:07.033594
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
On March 5, 1987, the trial court entered an order in which appellants’ counsel was disqualified and appellants were ordered to obtain new counsel if they so desired. The order was issued by the court sua sponte without a hearing. Appellants moved for reconsideration and a hearing was held upon the disqualification issue. Thereafter, on May 29,1987, the trial court issued a lengthy (15 page) order in which it made findings of fact and conclusions of law based, in part, upon *527the evidence adduced at the hearing. In its order, the trial court again ruled that appellants’ counsel was disqualified and that appellants should obtain new counsel. A ruling upon the motion for reconsideration, however, was not made. The trial court stated that appellants’ present counsel was to be “withdrawn by this order and judgment.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court also advised appellants that the burden was upon them to keep the court apprised of their mailing addresses; that the burden was upon them to prepare for trial; and that they could suffer adverse consequences if they failed to heed the trial court’s instructions. Finally, the trial court imposed a fine upon appellants’ counsel pursuant to OCGA § 15-19-9. Appellants appealed from the May 29, 1987, order on June 25, 1987.
In my view, the appeal is not from an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Rather, it is a timely appeal from a substantive order in which the merits of the issue on appeal were decided. Compare Morton v. Morton, 163 Ga. App. 830 (296 SE2d 362), with Gordon v. Weldon, 154 Ga. App. 531 (268 SE2d 796). Accordingly, we can and should consider appellants’ appeal.
It could be argued that an order disqualifying counsel is not final and that, therefore, it is not directly appealable. See OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1). See 5 ALR4th 1251-1265 as to appealability and nonappealability in other jurisdictions. In Stoddard v. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 173 Ga. App. 467 (326 SE2d 827), the trial court granted a motion to disqualify counsel and we granted an interlocutory appeal. In that case, however, we did not directly rule upon the appropriate appellate procedure.
I am of the opinion that an order disqualifying counsel is appeal-able directly. A disqualifying order necessarily impinges upon a party’s legitimate right to employ counsel of his choice. And such an order can cause irreparable and immeasurable harm if an appeal must await the entry of final judgment. See generally Hubbard v. State, 254 Ga. 694 (333 SE2d 827). If appellants are denied their choice of counsel “at this stage, a situation is created which cannot be completely rectified. If [appellants] should lose on the merits, [they] would have an almost insurmountable burden to show [their] loss was due to the change of counsel. If [they] should prevail on the merits, the disqualified attorney has no remedy for his loss of reputation and fees.” Skahan v. Powell, 653 P2d 1192, 1195 (Kan. App. 1982). See also Russell v. Mercy Hosp., 472 NE2d 695 (Ohio 1984).
In sum, appellants’ appeal was not untimely filed and it is appealable directly. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of dismissal.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Judge Pope and Judge Benham join in this dissent.