Court Opinion

ID: 9372071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 18:02:31.13023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:32.551217
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/16/23 P. v. Upshaw CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

    THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                   A163622
    v.
    DARRIUS DEJAUN UPSHAW,                                         (Humboldt County Super. Ct.
                                                                   No. CR2002120)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Darrius Dejaun Upshaw appeals after a court trial in which
he was found guilty of sex offenses against John Doe 1 (Doe 1) and John Doe
2 (Doe 2). On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to
support the two convictions involving Doe 2; (2) the court imposed a
restitution fine and parole revocation restitution fine exceeding the statutory
maximum; and (3) clerical errors in the abstract of judgment need to be
corrected. We agree the restitution fine and the abstract should be modified.
In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         As relevant here, the trial court found defendant guilty of oral
copulation of an unconscious person—Doe 1 (Pen. Code, § 287, subd. (f),1
count 2), and oral copulation by intoxication—Doe 2 (§ 287, subd. (i), counts 3

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
and 52). The court sentenced defendant to a total of 10 years in prison: six
years for count 2, and consecutive 2-year terms for counts 3 and 5.
       At the time of the incidents, Doe 1, Doe 2, and defendant belonged to
the same fraternity. The evidence at trial included the testimony of both
victims, which established the following.
       At a fraternity party on May 18, 2020, Doe 1 drank three to four
glasses of wine, became intoxicated, and fell asleep on a couch. He later
awoke with his pants and underwear down, and someone orally copulating
him. He pretended to be asleep and the oral copulation went on for about 40
minutes. The perpetrator eventually stopped, watched pornography on a
cellphone, masturbated, ejaculated on Doe 1’s face, then wiped it off with a
blanket. Doe 1 recognized the perpetrator as defendant. Doe 1 reported the
incident to a fraternity brother that evening, and to the police the following
day.
       On March 7, 2020, Doe 2 arrived at a fraternity party around 8:30 p.m.,
had more than five drinks, smoked marijuana, then blacked out by around
9:30 p.m. He was “really heavily intoxicated” and was not conscious, but he
was still moving around. He could recall, however, vomiting all over himself
while lying on a couch and aspirating on his own vomit.3 He could also recall
defendant picking him up, stripping him of his soiled clothing, carrying him
to defendant’s bedroom, laying him down, and orally copulating him. Doe 2
pretended to be asleep and did not move during the sexual act, then he fell
asleep when defendant was done even though he wanted to leave.

2     As discussed, post, the abstract refers to counts 3 and 5 as oral
copulation by anesthesia or controlled substance.
3     Doe 2 told the police that defendant saved his life when he was
aspirating on his own vomit.
                                       2
      On April 19, 2020, defendant drove Doe 2 to a “movie night” with some
fraternity brothers and others. Defendant gave Doe 2 multiple drinks, which
he drank. Doe 2’s last memory of the movie night was vomiting with his head
hanging outside the window of defendant’s car. His next memory was being
on a couch at the fraternity house, with defendant orally copulating him and
subsequently ejaculating on his face and wiping it off. During this second
incident, Doe 2 was “somewhat awake” or “somewhat aware.”
      In both incidents, Doe 2 pretended to be asleep and did not object
because he was “too intoxicated and scared about [defendant’s] military
background.” Doe 2 did not tell anyone about either incident until Doe 1
reported what defendant did to him.
      R.B., a fraternity brother, testified that after learning about the
incident between defendant and Doe 1, he mentioned the subject of sexual
assault to Doe 2. R.B. suspected something might have happened to Doe 2
because defendant said that he took off Doe 2’s clothes to wash them, which
was unusual. At that point, Doe 2 told R.B. that defendant sexually
assaulted him three times.4
      In his defense, defendant testified that he engaged in consensual sexual
activity with Doe 1, who was not intoxicated. Doe 1 watched heterosexual
pornography while defendant orally copulated him. Defendant did not
masturbate or ejaculate during this encounter. Moreover, in March 2020,
defendant and Doe 2 engaged in consensual sexual activity before Doe 2
vomited on himself. Defendant acknowledged Doe 2 would have been too

4     Doe 2 testified he told R.B. that defendant sexually assaulted him
twice. He had told the police that defendant sexually assaulted him three
times, but later made clear there were only two sexual assaults and the third
incident was a “traumatic nightmare.”
                                       3
intoxicated to consent to sex at the point when defendant found him vomiting
on the couch.
      Defendant denied having sexual contact with Doe 2 on the night in
question in April 2020, and he acknowledged that Doe 2 would have been too
intoxicated to consent to sex that night. Defendant had regular, friendly
contact with Doe 2 after both of the alleged incidents.
                                  DISCUSSION
      A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
      Defendant argues his convictions for oral copulation of an intoxicated
person—counts 3 and 5 involving Doe 2—must be reversed due to insufficient
evidence. As to both of these counts, defendant acknowledges there was
substantial evidence that he orally copulated Doe 2 and that Doe 2 was
heavily intoxicated. But in urging reversal, he claims the evidence was
insufficient to prove Doe 2 was so intoxicated that he was “ ‘prevented from
resisting,’ ” i.e., that he lacked the legal capacity to give consent. Defendant
further contends there was insufficient evidence that he knew or reasonably
should have known Doe 2 was legally incapable of giving consent. We are
unpersuaded.
      “In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citations.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears
‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
      Oral copulation by intoxication is “an act of oral copulation, where the
victim is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or anesthetic substance,

                                        4
or any controlled substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably
should have been known by the accused.” (§ 287, subd. (i), italics added.)
“[T]he statutory requirement that the victim was prevented from resisting by
the intoxicating or anesthetic or controlled substance has been interpreted to
mean that the victim was ‘not capable of giving legal consent because of
intoxication.’ ” (People v. Lujano (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 187, 193.) “Legal
capacity is the ability to exercise reasonable judgment, i.e., to understand
and weigh not only the physical nature of the act, but also its moral character
and probable consequences.” (People v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454,
466 (Giardino).) “It is not enough that the victim was intoxicated to some
degree, or that the intoxication reduced the victim’s sexual inhibitions. . . .
Instead, the level of intoxication and the resulting mental impairment must
have been so great that the victim could no longer exercise reasonable
judgment concerning that issue.” (Id. at pp. 466–467.) Whether or not the
level of the victim’s intoxication deprived the victim of legal capacity is a
question of fact to be decided after considering all of the circumstances. (Id.
at pp. 466, 470.)
      In this case, the evidence amply supports the conclusion that Doe 2 was
so intoxicated that he was incapable of exercising reasonable judgment
during the March 2020 incident. As recounted above, Doe 2 had consumed
more than five drinks, smoked marijuana, and blacked out. After vomiting
profusely and aspirating on his own vomit, he recalled defendant picking him
up, stripping him, carrying him to his bedroom, laying him down, and orally
copulating him. Doe 2 pretended to be asleep, and though he was conscious
“to an extent,” he was “heavily intoxicated” and unable to move. He did not
say or do anything to stop defendant because he was “too intoxicated to
move.” While Doe 2’s testimony established he had some degree of

                                        5
consciousness that a physical act was being performed on him and that he
feared defendant, the trial court could reasonably find that Doe 2 lacked the
ability to exercise reasonable judgment due to his intoxication. (Giardino,
supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.)
      Much of the same evidence—particularly Doe 2’s testimony that he was
vomiting profusely, had to be stripped of his soiled clothing and physically
carried to defendant’s bedroom, then had his eyes closed throughout the
sexual act—also amply supports the conclusion that defendant knew or
should have known Doe 2 was so intoxicated that he could not legally consent
to the sexual act. Indeed, though defendant claimed his sexual activity with
Doe 2 occurred before Doe 2 vomited on himself, defendant acknowledged
that, in the state Doe 2 was in when he vomited on himself, Doe 2 was too
intoxicated to consent to sex. Whether or not the sexual activity occurred
before or after Doe 2 vomited was a question of fact, and the trial court
evidently credited the testimony of Doe 2. As a reviewing court, we cannot
reweigh the evidence. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
      As for the April 2020 incident, the evidence also amply established that
Doe 2 was so intoxicated that he was prevented from resisting. After the
movie night, Doe 2 vomited while in defendant’s car. When they got to the
fraternity house, defendant laid Doe 2 down on a couch and orally copulated
him. Again, Doe 2 testified he pretended to be asleep and did not object in
part because he was “too intoxicated to say anything.” Doe 2 indicated he
was “somewhat awake” and had thoughts while lying there about his physical
safety, but when asked if he was “calculating in [his] mind what might
happen if [he] said no,” Doe 2 replied, “No, because I was heavily intoxicated.”
Indeed, defendant acknowledged that Doe 2 was blackout drunk, did not
appear conscious at the fraternity house, and “would have been too

                                       6
intoxicated to consent.” Though defendant denied engaging in any sexual
activity that night, the trial court could properly credit Doe 2’s testimony that
an assault occurred.
      Defendant next contends reversal is warranted because there was “no
medical or psychological evidence presented to prove that the amount of
alcohol and/or drugs ingested by [Doe 2] on the two evenings in question
would have rendered [Doe 2’s] brain incapable of understanding what was
happening with [defendant].” But no such medical or psychological evidence
was necessary to establish Doe 2’s lack of legal capacity to consent to the
sexual acts due to his level of intoxication. (Cf. People v. Bloom (1989) 48
Cal.3d 1194, 1208 [state of mind evidence “is almost inevitably
circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence
to support a conviction”].)
      Defendant further contends Doe 2 did not act in a way that “indicated
an inability to understand” at the time of the alleged assaults. We disagree.
His profuse vomiting, his laying in and aspirating on his vomit, his passing
out in the movie night host’s bathroom, his need to be assisted (even carried)
by defendant to the places where these sexual acts ultimately took place,
were all evidence of John Doe 2’s inability to exercise reasonable judgment.
      B. The Restitution Fine
      Defendant next contends the trial court erred in imposing a $15,000
restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b). Because the
maximum allowable fine is $10,000, he argues the court wrongly ordered a
$5,000 restitution fine for each conviction. He asks us to remand the matter
so that the court can redetermine the amount of the restitution fine and
attendant parole revocation restitution fine. The People concede the claimed
error, but argue remand is unnecessary “because this court can modify the

                                       7
judgment to reduce the restitution and parole revocation fines to the
statutorily authorized maximum amounts of $10,000.”
      We accept the People’s concession that the trial court erred. (People v.
Sencion (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 480, 483; People v. Blackburn (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 1520, 1534.) But we agree with the People that no remand is
necessary. Though the court erred in going beyond the statutory maximum,
the record reflects the court would have imposed the maximum allowable fine
of $10,000. As such, we modify the judgment to reduce the restitution fine
imposed and attendant parole revocation restitution fine to $10,000.
      C. Abstract of Judgment
      Finally, defendant requests that we correct the abstract of judgment.
He contends the abstract wrongly labels his convictions of counts 3 and 5 as “
‘Oral Cop. by Anesthesia or Controlled Sub.’ ” rather than oral copulation of
an intoxicated person. Moreover, he claims, the abstract incorrectly reflects a
$15,000 fine under item number 13’s space for “ ‘Other orders,’ ” because that
restitution fine was already reflected in item number 9’s space for “ ‘Financial
Obligations.’ ” The People do not object to either modification, noting the first
requested modification correctly identifies the applicable Penal Code section
that defendant was convicted of violating. Seeing no objection or reason to
deny the requests, we will order the abstract modified as requested.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is modified so as to reduce the restitution fine and
attendant parole revocation restitution fine to $10,000. The trial court is
directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect this modification under
item number 9, and to remove it from item number 13. The court is also
directed to correct the name of the crimes in counts 3 and 5 in the abstract to
“Oral Copulation of an Intoxicated Person” (the court may abbreviate this as

                                        8
necessary to fit the form). The court shall forward a certified copy of the
amended abstract to the Department of Corrections. In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed.

                                     FUJISAKI, J.

WE CONCUR:

TUCHER, P.J.

RODRÍGUEZ, J.

People v. Upshaw (A163622)

                                       9