Court Opinion

ID: 9745439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:56:36.48104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:00.760282
License: Public Domain

RYLAARSDAM, J., Concurring and Dissenting.—
I concur that the demurrers of the Christian Science church and its representatives were properly sustained. However, I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ decision to affirm the summary judgment in favor of Ruth Wantland, Andrew’s grandmother. Mrs. Wantland assumed a duty of care towards Andrew when she undertook the role of babysitter and caretaker. Whether she breached this duty, that is whether she acted unreasonably in not seeking adequate medical care for him, is a question of fact which should not be decided by way of summary judgment.
Andrew died on December 20, 1992, a Sunday. Mrs. Wantland was solely responsible for his care for substantial periods during the preceding week. On December 14, she babysat Andrew after school. On December 16, Andrew did not go to school but spent the day at Mrs. Wantland’s house. On December 17 and 18, he again missed school and spent a substantial portion of each day with Mrs. Wantland; he also spent these nights at her house. On December 19, he spent the morning with Mrs. Wantland and apparently returned to his father’s house thereafter. Mrs. Wantland initiated contacts with representatives of the Christian Science church to make sure they knew Andrew needed help.
The lead opinion notes that “the fact that Andrew was active and appeared to be reasonably healthy on the Wednesday, Thursday and Friday Ruth took care of him strongly suggests she had no duty as a babysitter to seek medical care for him during that period.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 1040.) Justice *1045Sonenshine’s concurring opinion likewise stresses the allegations of Andrew’s apparent health on the days preceding his death. This may well be true, although the father’s decision to keep him out of school and Mrs. Wantland’s inquiries concerning Christian Science treatment three days before Andrew’s death do raise questions about the condition of his health. But whether these allegations are true or false merely raises questions of fact. As the child’s caregiver, Mrs. Wantland owed Andrew a duty of care. The next question is: Did she breach that duty? A jury might well conclude that while he was under his grandmother’s care, Andrew’s condition was such that a reasonable person would not seek medical attention or that, in view of the father’s decisions regarding Andrew’s health care, Mrs. Want-land acted reasonably in neither seeking adequate medical care for him nor reporting the father’s failure to obtain such care to the appropriate authorities. In the alternative, a jury might reach a contrary conclusion. In other words, whether Mrs. Wantland breached her duty of care, that is whether she acted reasonably under the circumstances, is a question of fact.
The Restatement Second of Torts provides guidance in determining Mrs. Wantland’s duty of care: “One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless adequately to aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm caused to him by [5Q . . . the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other while within the actor’s charge, . . .” (Rest.2d Torts, § 324.) The majority’s reliance on People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229], to conclude Mrs. Wantland did not owe a duty of care towards Andrew, is misplaced. Heitzman held Penal Code section 368, subdivision (a) could not constitutionally be construed to impose a generalized duty on a child towards a disabled elderly parent. But the case did not hold that one who assumes a duty of care, be it to a parent, a grandchild, or a stranger, is immune from liability. Quite to the contrary, the case recognized that one assuming a duty of care towards an elderly person, such as a caretaker or custodian, who breaches that duty by “causing] or permitting] injury or physical endangerment will incur criminal liability . . . .” (9 Cal.4th at p. 214.)
In a different factual context, Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18 [192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137] states the general rule governing the duty of care owed by one who “undertakes to come to the aid of another.” (Id. at p. 23.) The Good Samaritan “is under a duty to exercise due care in performance and is liable if . . . his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, . . .” (Ibid.) My colleagues are of course correct: A grandmother, by virtue of that status, does not owe a duty of care to her grandchild. However, any person, regardless of relationship, may *1046voluntarily assume such a duty and, if so, be liable for the negligent discharge of the duty.
Lundman v. McKown (Minn.Ct.App. 1995) 530 N.W.2d 807, is factually similar to the present case. There, a child named Ian died from juvenile-onset diabetes because his caretakers failed to obtain appropriate medical care. Ian’s natural father sued the mother, who had custody, and her husband. The husband argued, as does Mrs. Wantland, “that he owed no legal duty to Ian because he was a stepparent and because [the mother] was solely responsible for making decisions about Ian’s health care.” (Id. at p. 820.) The Court of Appeals of Minnesota rejected his argument: “Although we recognize that, as a stepparent, William McKown usually had no ‘final word’ control over Ian’s health care, we disagree that his relationship as a stepparent did not impose a duty of care.” (Ibid.) The court went on to describe the responsibilities the stepparent assumed, which were very similar to those Mrs. Wantland assumed, and concluded “[t]hese facts support the finding that [the stepfather] knew of Ian’s helplessness and the gravity of his situation, that he accepted a responsibility to protect Ian, and that a special relationship existed between the two.” (Ibid.)
Neither Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 936 P.2d 70] nor Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496] detract from the conclusion that Mrs. Wantland had assumed a duty of care towards Andrew. Parsons teaches that (1) “[a]s a general rule, each person has a duty to use ordinary care,” (2) it is a question of law, to be decided on a case-by-case basis “[w]hether a given case falls within an exception to this general rule,” and (3) this decision is “ ‘but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ ” (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 472, citing Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734 [69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316].)
In making this policy decision Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108 tells us we should consider “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Id. at p. 113.)
The lead opinion analyzes each of these factors premised on the assumption Andrew did not show symptoms of his fatal illness until the day he died. *1047In doing so, that opinion’s author improperly places himself in the position of fact finder. The legal issue to be addressed, considering the factors rioted in Rowland is not whether, under the specific facts of this case, as viewed most favorably for the defense, Mrs. Wantland owed a duty to obtain adequate medical care for Andrew. To so frame the issue is to invade the province of the fact finder.
The issue to be addressed is a more generic one: May a babysitter whose charge becomes ill be charged with a duty to obtain appropriate medical care? When the issue is thus framed an analysis of the Rowland factors leads to such an inescapable conclusion that the answer is in the affirmative that it is unnecessary to here review each of those factors. This answers the legal issue of duty. The rest is for the jury.
The summary judgment should be reversed and a jury should decide whether Mrs. Wantland breached the duty of care she assumed towards Andrew.