Court Opinion

ID: 9775829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:10:26.875847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:31.284823
License: Public Domain

*441Korsmo, A.C.J.
¶21 (dissenting) — This appeal should present two issues. First, did Javier Chavez Jr. present his argument for withdrawing his guilty plea to the trial court? The answer is yes, he did. Second, did the trial court correctly determine that no manifest necessity existed for withdrawing the guilty plea? Again, the answer is yes. Accordingly, the judgment should be affirmed.
DISCUSSION
¶22 Unfortunately, the majority gets sidetracked by a third issue that cannot be resolved on this record and then uses that issue to bootstrap error into the other issues. The third issue is the contention that Larry Ziegler had a conflict of interest that impacted the guilty plea. We do not have a sufficient factual record to determine that issue. Moreover, the majority mistakenly applies an outmoded analysis that has been rejected by both the United States Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court in its review of the issue. The basic problem is that the majority combines a claim that attorney Ziegler had a conflict with the separate argument that attorney Salvador Mendoza Jr. performed ineffectively in presenting his client’s motion. I will address the two problems separately.

Conflict of Interest

¶23 Stepping onto the sidetrack first, we must look at whether Mr. Chavez can bring his Sixth Amendment conflict of interest claim initially in this appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3). As a general rule, Washington appellate courts will not consider an argument that was not first presented to the trial court. RAP 2.5(a). One exception to that rule is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right.” RAP 2.5(a)(3). However, an alleged error is not manifest if there are insufficient facts in the record to evaluate the contention. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
¶24 Whether there is a sufficient record for us to review is dependent upon what one needs to show to establish a *442conflict of interest that infringes upon the Sixth Amendment guaranty of effective counsel. Washington once read controlling United States Supreme Court precedent to mean that there were two circumstances in which a conflict of interest violated the Sixth Amendment: (1) counsel acted under an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s performance or (2) there was an apparent conflict of interest and the trial court failed to inquire into the possible conflict. In re Pers. Restraint of Richardson, 100 Wn.2d 669, 677, 675 P.2d 209 (1983), abrogated by State v. Dhaliwal, 150 Wn.2d 559, 79 P.3d 432 (2003).2 The United States Supreme Court subsequently clarified that only an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s performance violates the Sixth Amendment. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002). Washington recognized that rule, and the abrogation of the second Richardson test, in Dhaliwal, 150 Wn.2d at 568-571. ‘We agree that under Mickens reversal is not mandated when a trial court knows of a potential conflict but fails to inquire.” Id. at 571.
¶25 Properly viewed, the question here then is whether Mr. Chavez has shown both that Mr. Ziegler had an actual conflict of interest and that it did adversely affect his performance. This record does not show an actual conflict of interest. Mr. Chavez speculates that Mr. Ziegler may have feared prosecution and, hence, tried to save himself by convincing his client to plead guilty. However, speculation is not fact. We have no information about whether Mr. Ziegler actually feared he might be prosecuted. We have no information about what advice Mr. Ziegler gave Mr. Chavez. We have no information about what motivated Mr. Ziegler to advise Mr. Chavez to plead guilty, if he even did so. For all we know, Mr. Chavez decided to plead guilty against Mr. Ziegler’s advice. In other words, even if there were a conflict *443of interest, we also do not know that it adversely affected the guilty plea decision. Because we lack any information necessary to adjudge the claim that there was an actual conflict of interest, there is no manifest error permitting review in this proceeding. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 333.
¶26 The majority agrees that Mr. Chavez has not shown that a conflict of interest exists. Majority at 438-39. That should result in either outright rejection of the claim due to failure to establish manifest constitutional error, RAP 2.5(a)(3), or we should recognize that Mr. Chavez might have an argument if he develops the facts and, thus, decline to consider the issue. His remedy then would be to file a personal restraint petition. E.g., State v. Norman, 61 Wn. App. 16, 27-28, 808 P.2d 1159, review denied, 117 Wn.2d 1018 (1991). Instead, the majority follows a third path that I think is not well taken. I know of no authority that resolves the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis, discussed infra, by looking to the possible failures of a different attorney than the one who allegedly erred.
¶27 Appellate courts do no favors to criminal defendants when they consider and reject arguments on appeal when the facts are insufficiently developed. An adverse ruling on appeal has nearly preclusive effect on a subsequent attempt to relitigate the issue in a personal restraint petition. In re Pers. Restraint of Taylor, 105 Wn.2d 683, 688, 717 P.2d 755 (1986). It is fairer to the defendant to decline to consider a claim where the facts are not well developed. That is the course I would follow here.
¶28 If we must address the conflict issue, I agree with the majority that Mr. Chavez did not show that a conflict existed. Mr. Chavez apparently agrees because he never alleged that the guilty plea should be withdrawn because of a conflict of interest. The same can be said for Mr. Ziegler, who never contended he had a conflict of interest on the no-contact order violation counts until Mr. Chavez alleged *444that Mr. Ziegler had not fully advised him.3 Mr. Mendoza never claimed there was a conflict of interest. Attorney William McCool never claimed there was a conflict of interest. Indeed, the trial court never sua sponte suggested the possibility. In short, it appears that there is near unanimity on the topic.
¶29 Ordinarily, the failure of an appellant to establish error precludes relief. The majority has not suggested why a new course of action is appropriate (or even possible) in this case.
¶30 The conflict of interest argument does not entitle Mr. Chavez to relief in this proceeding.

Ineffective Assistance

¶31 The other issue presented is whether Mr. Mendoza rendered ineffective assistance when he filed his client’s desired motion and called it an “Anders”4 type of pleading. Mr. Chavez has not shown that Mr. Mendoza erred or that he was harmed by the filing.
¶32 Long-settled precedent addresses appellate review of Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. An attorney must perform to the standards of the profession; the failure to live up to those standards will require a new trial when the client has been prejudiced by counsel’s failure. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 334-335. In evaluating ineffectiveness claims, courts must be highly deferential to counsel’s decisions. A strategic or tactical decision is not a basis for finding error. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-691, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Thus, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, the defendant must show both that his counsel erred and that the error was so significant, in light of the entire trial record, that it deprived *445him of a fair trial. Id. at 690-692. When a claim can be disposed of on one ground, a reviewing court need not consider both Strickland prongs. Id. at 697; State v. Foster, 140 Wn. App. 266, 273, 166 P.3d 726, review denied, 162 Wn.2d 1007 (2007).
¶33 The majority correctly cites to the fact that no one has produced any authority in which an appellate court has had to consider an Anders brief that had been filed in the trial court. From that undisputed premise, the majority then concludes that Mr. Mendoza erred in filing one here. That conclusion does not follow from the premise. Typically one shows that counsel erred by establishing he or she failed to follow precedent or otherwise did something that previously has been adjudged to be erroneous. Here, Mr. Chavez argues that because such briefs are typically filed in appeals, it must be error to do so in the trial court. I think the opposite conclusion must be drawn. It is Mr. Chavez’s burden to prove that Mr. Mendoza erred in filing this type of pleading. The simple fact is that no trial attorney has before been faulted in the appellate courts for filing such a pleading. The absence of any precedent on this point strongly suggests there was no error at all.
¶34 Mr. Chavez argues that counsel’s actions amounted to a failure to act on his client’s behalf, resulting in a complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. This certainly overstates the fact of the matter since Mr. Mendoza did present the arguments to the court. More critically, the argument is implicitly founded upon two propositions that do not support it.
¶35 The first implicit proposition is that while an attorney who files an appellate brief identifying issues that could be raised but lack merit is not ineffective (even though, unlike here, counsel then seeks to withdraw from further representation), a trial attorney who shows similar candor to the tribunal is ineffective (even though not seeking to withdraw). The right to counsel on appeal, *446although based on the Fourteenth5 Amendment instead of the Sixth Amendment, to my knowledge has not been interpreted as encompassing a lesser duty of representation than that at trial. That seems to be what Mr. Chavez’s argument suggests; otherwise, there is no basis for finding that a trial attorney errs by filing an Anders brief while an appellate attorney does not err.
¶36 The second implicit proposition is derived from RPC 3.1 cmt. 3, which recognizes that counsel for a criminal defendant can present an otherwise meritless (or frivolous) argument on behalf of the client without running afoul of the ethical rules. The proposition seems to be that because an attorney can file a frivolous claim on behalf of a criminal defendant, the attorney must do so upon request. While the ethical question of what arguments an attorney must make for a criminal defendant is fascinating, it is beyond the scope of this case. The question here is whether an attorney must put his or her personal imprimatur on argument filed at the client’s request. No authority has been presented that requires counsel to personally endorse an argument. Accordingly, an attorney who presents an argument along the lines of “my client wants to argue” or “this is in the nature of an Anders brief” does not necessarily err.
¶37 Mr. Chavez has not established that Mr. Mendoza erred by filing the pleading. On that basis alone the ineffective assistance claim should be rejected. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Foster, 140 Wn.2d at 273.
¶38 There also is the question of prejudice. In other words, how was Mr. Chavez harmed by the Anders-type brief filed in the trial court? He wanted to argue that his guilty pleas should be withdrawn because he did not understand the relevant case law and he did not have the order in hand at the time he violated it. An experienced criminal practitioner looked into the topic and could find no other grounds for withdrawal, so he filed his client’s arguments. The judge looked at the arguments and decided they *447did not merit relief under our court rules. There simply was no prejudice here. Mr. Chavez got his arguments in front of the trial court. They were without merit. No amount of sincere argument from his counsel would have changed that fact.
¶39 No one disputes that Mr. Mendoza and the trial judge both correctly assessed the merits of the claim. Mr. McCool did not present those arguments in his reconsideration motion. Mr. Chavez does not argue them on appeal. The majority does not seek to defend them. Instead, the prejudice seems to be that Mr. Ziegler’s possible conflict of interest went unargued, so there must be prejudice. The prejudice from whatever stylistic error Mr. Mendoza may have committed in presenting his client’s motion simply is not measured by whether another attorney might have done something wrong.
¶40 Mr. Chavez established neither error nor prejudice from the pleading in question. He needed to establish both. His claim of ineffective assistance failed.

Withdrawal Motion

¶41 The true issues in this appeal involve the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The law governing guilty plea challenges is also well settled. CrR 4.2(f) permits a guilty plea to be withdrawn whenever “necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” The appropriate standard for applying this rule was set out in State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596, 521 P.2d 699 (1974), as follows:
Under CrR 4.2(f), adopted by this court, the trial court shall allow a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty whenever it appears that withdrawal is (1) necessary to correct a (2) manifest injustice, i.e., an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1966). Without question, this imposes upon the defendant a demanding standard.
The written statement form itself is sufficient to establish that the plea was voluntary. State v. Lujan, 38 Wn. App. 735, 688 P.2d 548 (1984), review denied, 103 Wn.2d 1014 (1985).
*448¶42 A trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Olmsted, 70 Wn.2d 116, 118, 422 P.2d 312 (1966). Discretion is abused when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
¶43 The trial court did consider Mr. Chavez’s claims, forwarded by Mr. Mendoza, that his plea was invalid due to insufficient information and a concern that the law did not apply to him. The trial court ruled upon the motion, and this appeal followed. The remaining question should then be whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. There can be only one answer on that point since no one argues that the trial court reached the wrong conclusion. There was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw.
¶44 It makes no sense to reverse the trial court for not deciding an issue that has not been, and perhaps may never be, presented to it. The appropriate course of action would be to affirm the trial court and leave Mr. Chavez’s fourth argument for withdrawing his guilty plea to the personal restraint petition process. Since the majority decides otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

 State v. White, 80 Wn. App. 406, 907 P.2d 310 (1995), review denied, 129 Wn.2d 1012 (1996), cited by the majority, simply involved review of a claim presented under the then-prevailing Richardson standard. To the extent that it can be read as supporting two different tests for conflict of interest, it has been superseded.

 There is no mystery here. Once the claim was raised, Mr. Ziegler realized he now could be a witness against his client on the no-contact order violation charges since the nature of his advice was in question. An attorney cannot be both advocate and witness. RPC 3.7(a).

 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).

 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963).