Court Opinion

ID: 9629252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:39:34.190012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:17.189053
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (concurring in result). I concur in the result. Defendant’s only contention on appeal as stated in the Docketing Statement is: Defendant contends that the State failed to meet its burden sufficiently distinguishing the later statements from the earlier to purge them of the taint of the earlier, illegally taken statements. The earlier illegally taken statements suppressed were: She stated that she did shoot the victim, and that the victim had robbed her of five hundred dollars. She changed the amount several times, the amount of money that was supposed to have been robbed from her. Over objection, Marable testified: [Sjomething about -he had taken some money from her and she came down there to find him or to get her money back some money had been taken from the house, and that the victim had gone to the address where the shooting occurred to pick up some beer for the party and had been gone for quite sometime, that he [victim] had gone down there or was already down there, that he walked toward her and she fired at him. [Emphasis added by defendant.] Well, the first time . . she made two or three different amounts, one time it was five hundred dollars and then I think the next time she mentioned it was four hundred dollars. ... It was her car or her sister’s car, that he had been driving it — she didn’t give him the car to go to the above address on Riverside. She went to see if he was down there, or if she could locate the vehicle. Defendant believes that the “details,” inherently untrustworthy because of the condition under which they were adduced, supplied the basis for showing a wilful killing without sufficient provocation (second degree murder). What defendant does not point out is the testimony of Marable that is tainted by the prior suppressed statements. Marable did not testify that defendant shot the victim. She only fired at him. He did not testify that the victim had robbed her. The only “tainted” testimony was the different amounts of money the victim had taken from her. I think the testimony is sufficiently distinguishable to purge it of the taint of the suppressed statements. Nevertheless, defendant’s contention on appeal applies to only one of a two-pronged test as to the admissibility of “tainted” testimony. A second test is that the later statement was not the exploitation of the earlier illegally obtained incriminating statements. “To keep the pot a-boiling,” I should like to point out that State v. Dickson, 82 N.M. 408, 482 P.2d 916 (Ct.App. 1971) and State v. Austin, 91 N.M. 586, 577 P.2d 894 (Ct.App. 1978), upon both of which defendant relies, do not establish a proper rule of law. These eases stand for the proposition that: Even though a defendant has been given the required warning of his constitutional rights, the later incriminating statement may not be used unless it is established that the later statement was not the exploitation of the earlier illegally obtained incriminating statements, and unless the later statement was obtained under circumstances sufficiently distinguishable to purge it from the taint of the earlier illegal statements. The Dickson — Austin rule was taken from Commonwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa. 53, 239 A.2d 416 (1969). In Banks, the rule was adopted “absent a required warning of constitutional rights.” [239 A.2d at 419.] Under Banks, if the later statement is obtained after defendant has been given the Miranda warnings, the later statement may be used as evidence if the statement was freely and voluntarily given. If not voluntarily given, the incriminating statement may be inadmissible and insubmissible. Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1967). Upon arrest of defendant, Marable read the Miranda warnings to defendant. Thereafter, he never questioned her. Defendant voluntarily talked all of the time. She was taken to sheriff’s headquarters. There Marable read to her the rights from the “Interrogation of Advice of Rights” form. Defendant also read it, understood it, signed it, and, for 30 or 40 minutes, kept talking spontaneously while in the office. She asked Marable to call an attorney. He did. Defendant talked to the attorney and then indicated that she did not want to answer questions. Thereafter, no attempt was made to interrogate her. Defendant was advised of her constitutional rights to protect her against self-incrimination on two occasions and yet made voluntary statements that were admissible and submissible in evidence. Defendant’s claim for a new trial was foreclosed. Judge Hendley says: The State must meet its burden of proving that the third statements were free from the taint of the second statement. See State v. Austin, 91 N.M. 586, 577 P.2d 894 (Ct.App. 1978); State v. Greene, 91 N.M. 207, 572 P.2d 935 (1977). In Austin, Judge Wood said: The State had the burden of proving the second and third inculpatory statements were voluntary. . The State also had the burden of persuading the trial court that the inculpatory statements were voluntary. [Emphasis added.] [91 N.M. at 587, 577 P.2d at 895.] What is meant by “persuading the trial court”? Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1301 (4th Ed. 1968) says, “persuade” means: To induce one by argument, entreaty, or expostulation into a determination, decision, conclusion, belief, or the like . The State did “persuade” the trial court that the inculpatory statements were voluntary. Yet, the trial court was reversed. To avoid any misunderstanding, I think Judge Wood intended to say: The State also had the burden of persuasion' by a preponderance of the evidence, that the inculpatory statements were voluntary. In State v. Santillanes, 91 N.M. 721, 580 P.2d 489 (Ct.App. 1978), where presumptions were involved and the burden of proof shifted from the defendant to the State, Judge Wood said: This shifted burden of proof is the burden of persuasion. ... [91 N.M. at 724, 580 P.2d at 492.] The meaning of the phrase is not explained. The “burden of persuasion” never shifts at any stage of the proceedings. It is the burden of going forward with the evidence that shifts back and forth as the trial progresses. Ambrose v. Wheatley, 321 F.Supp. 1220 (D. Del. 1971). See also, Commonwealth v. Walker, 370 Mass. 548, 350 N.E.2d 678 (1976); In re Swan’s Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d 682 (1956). The “burden or persuasion” is commonly referred to as the “burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” It is the preponderance of the evidence that must make the trier of the fact believe the facts asserted by a party. People v. Valverde, 246 Cal.App.2d 318, 54 Cal.Rptr. 528 (1967). In Austin, the trier of the fact was the trial court because the appeal was interlocutory. On whether the inculpatory statements were voluntary, the trial court had to be convinced by the State’s evidence that the existing facts were in favor of the State who had this burden. See, Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P.2d 642 (1956). To me, Austin stands for this proposition: The State had the burden of proving that the second and third inculpatory statements were voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court so found and this was assumed to be correct. Upon what grounds, then, did Judge Wood reverse the trial court? (1) The trial court said: . The defendant had the burden of going forward with evidence rebutting the prima facie showing, which burden defendant did not carry. Judge Wood said: “This finding is incorrect.” I disagree. If the prima facie case of the State stands unrebutted, then the inculpatory statements of defendant were voluntary as a matter of law. When the trial court found that defendant’s statements were voluntary, the conviction should have been sustained. (2) The trial court also said: . Any taint, inducement or involuntariness which may have been involved in the defendant’s statements to Jay J. . Armes was renewed. Judge Wood said: “This finding is incorrect.” I disagree. Judge Wood said: The fact that defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and understood them, and the fact that defendant viewed the third confession as voluntary, does not show the third statement was not the exploitation of the first, illegally obtained statement. . This quotation is supported by Judge Wood’s opinion in State v. Dickson, supra. This is not a correct statement of the law. In the event the Supreme Court should agree with the Dickson — Austin rule, it is essential to explain what the State’s burden is to avoid an “exploitation” of a prior illegally obtained statement. I think it means an injust or improper use of a prior illegally obtained statement. This explanation was set forth in Bunting v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 309, 157 S.E.2d 204 (1967) cited in Dickson. The court said: The influences which induced the original confession made by defendant to detective Allen are presumed to have continued when the subsequent confession was made to detective Fitzsimons in the absence of evidence to the contrary. . The narrative of the evidence does not show that defendant was advised that any statement made to Fitzsimons must be made freely and voluntarily on his part, without any promise of reward, and that what he said could and probably would be used against him at his trial. [A Miranda warning.] Nor can it even be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the confession made to Fitzsimons that defendant’s mind was free of the earlier influences which induced the involuntary written confession. [Emphasis added.] [157 S.E.2d at 207.] These requirements exceed the Miranda warnings. In addition to the Miranda warnings, the State must prove that the police officer did not promise or reward defendant, and that defendant’s mind was. free of earlier influences. In the instant case, these requirements were not met. Under the Dickson — Austin rule, if properly raised, defendant is entitled to a new trial. The third statements were an exploitation of the second illegally obtained statement, even though voluntarily made. Judge Hendley states that “The trial court then held that the statements made to Marable were ‘not the result of an exploitation of her prior statement to Officer Gomez.’ ” This was not an issue in the case. Nevertheless, the trial court did not state in its Order the facts found and the conclusions reached for its denial of defendant’s motion to suppress statements made by defendant to Marable. This was done by letter to both counsel. In my opinion, inasmuch as this procedure appears to be a common practice, the letter and the Order can be read together as one instrument. However, the trial court did not make such findings that supported the conclusion reached. Based upon this fact, if properly raised, defendant was entitled to a new trial. The State’s response is that the admission of Marable’s testimony resides within the sound exercise of discretion by the trial court and there was not abuse of discretion. This point is of some importance. However, the State escaped from the Dickson— Austin rule by silence. This convinces me the State agrees that the Dickson — Austin rule applies and sustains defendant’s contention on appeal. Under this rule, the admission of “tainted” testimony would be an abuse of discretion because it would deny the defendant a fair trial. The trial court would act beyond the bounds of reason unless an effective reason was given for admitting the evidence — such as, this testimony is not “tainted.”