Court Opinion

ID: 9586006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:06:14.406159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:18.641666
License: Public Domain

KITTREDGE, J.:
Willie Cochran and Reggie James were convicted by a jury of first-degree burglary and sentenced. Reggie James was also convicted and sentenced for assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature.1 They appeal from the trial court’s granting of the State’s Batson motion and quashing the first jury selected. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We reverse because the trial court failed to adhere to the mandated process for the handling of a Batson motion, and the jury that convicted Appellants was comprised of jurors whom the trial court erroneously prohibited Appellants from striking.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the typical appeal.from the granting or denial of a Batson motion, the appellate courts give deference to the findings of the trial court and apply a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 615, 545 S.E.2d 805, 810 (2001). This standard of review, however, is premised on the trial court following the mandated procedure for a Batson hearing. Here, where the assignment of error is the failure to follow the Batson hearing procedure, we must answer a question of law. When a question of law is presented, our *313standard of review is plenary. See S.C. Const. art. V, 5 and 9; S.C.Code Ann. 14-3-320 and -330 (Supp.2005); S.C.Code Ann. 14-8-200 (Supp.2005) (Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to correct errors of law).
DISCUSSION
I.
We begin our discussion mindful of the difficult task our trial judges encounter in evaluating the propriety of the wide-ranging reasons given for the exercise of peremptory challenges. At the appellate level, we view issues like a Batson challenge through the lens of hindsight, and from that perspective, we must remain sensitive to the vagaries and burdens facing trial judges. Accordingly, we are not easily persuaded to second-guess a trial court’s discretionary calls. By design, the clearly erroneous standard of review (applicable in the typical Batson appellate setting) follows suit by placing constraints on the appellate court. The reversal here comes not from second-guessing, but as a result of a legal error in not adhering to the mandated Batson procedure, specifically the failure to require the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful discrimination. Even so, we recognize the experienced and able trial judge was presented with a problematic Batson motion. We now proceed to the case at hand.’
II.
During jury selection, Appellants, who are black, exercised ten of their twenty peremptory challenges, striking two black women, three white men, and five white women.2 The State opposed Appellants’ strikes and requested a Batson hearing.
In Batson, the Supreme Court held the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the prosecution from striking potential jurors on the basis of race. 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712. In Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 *314L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), the Supreme Court expanded Batson, holding “the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges.” Thus, during jury selection, either the defendant or the State may oppose the peremptory challenge of a juror who is a member of a cognizable racial group.3 Once a peremptory challenge is opposed, the trial court must, upon request, conduct a Batson hearing and adhere to the procedures set forth in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), and adopted by our supreme court in State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 124, 470 S.E.2d 366, 372 (1996).
In Purkett, the Supreme Court announced:
Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.
514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769. The Supreme Court observed “[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.” Id. at 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769. At step two, therefore, the proponent of the strike does not carry “any burden of presenting reasonably specific, legitimate explanations for the strikes.” Adams, 322 S.C. at 123, 470 S.E.2d at 371. Therefore, “[ujnless a discriminatory intent is inherent” in the explanation provided by the proponent of the strike, “the reason offered will be deemed race neutral” and the trial court must proceed to the third step of the Batson process. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769; see e.g., Payton v. Kearse, 329 S.C. 51, 56, 495 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1998) (striking a juror because she was a “redneck” evinces a discriminatory intent and is therefore not facially race-neutral).
*315At step three, the opponent of the strike must show the reason offered, though facially race-neutral, was actually mere pretext to engage in purposeful racial discrimination. Adams, 322 S.C. at 124, 470 S.E.2d at 372. The opponent of the strike carries “the ultimate burden of showing purposeful discrimination” and must demonstrate the pretextual nature of the stated reason for the strike. Id. This burden is generally established by showing similarly situated members of another race were seated on the jury. Id. at 123, 470 S.E.2d at 371.
As our case law illustrates, unless the discriminatory intent is inherent in a fundamentally implausible explanation, the opponent of the strike must make a bona fide showing that the proponent of the strike seated a juror who shared nearly every quality with the struck juror other than race to establish pretext. When the opponent of the strike proves the proponent of the strike practiced purposeful racial discrimination, the trial court must quash the entire jury panel and initiate another jury selection de novo. See State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 58, 358 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1987), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302, 306, 454 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1995); see also State v. Heyward, 357 S.C. 577, 580, 594 S.E.2d 168, 169 (Ct.App.2004).
III.
We now turn to the first jury selection and ensuing Batson motion. Initially, we note the first jury was diverse. It was comprised of one white woman, three black men, four white men, and four black women. Thus, the composition of the first jury does not indicate Appellants engaged in purposeful racial discrimination. See State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 621, 545 S.E.2d 805, 813 (2001) (“[T]he composition of the jury panel is a factor that may be considered when determining whether a party engaged in purposeful discrimination pursuant to a Batson challenge”).
Additionally, we disagree with the State’s argument that Appellants embarked on a “pattern” of striking jurors because of their race. Appellants did not use their peremptory challenges solely on jurors from a single racial group. They selected a white male as their first juror, and first struck a black female. Further, although Appellants ultimately struck *316five white women, they also struck two black women, and seated one white woman and four white men. See State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 59, 66, 512 S.E.2d 500, 504 (1999) (“Although appellant exercised most of his strikes against white jurors, he did not strike ¿very white juror...-. [T]he fact that appellant used most of his challenges to strike white jurors is not sufficient, in itself, to establish purposeful discrimination.”). Appellants used only ten of their twenty allotted peremptory challenges. If they intended to discriminate against white jurors, they certainly would have exercised their peremptory challenges more liberally. Instead, Appellants seated five white jurors.
Despite the diversity of the first jury and the fact that Appellants did not appear to engage in a pattern of purposeful racial discrimination, the State opposed Appellants’ strikes and requested a Batson hearing. We now examine the first Batson hearing, which in our view demonstrates the trial court’s failure to follow the mandated Batson procedure.
Appellants’ counsel first explained that he struck Juror 87, a black woman, because she gave an indignant and outraged expression. The record reveals that the State had no interest in challenging the striking of black jurors, and the matter was not pursued.
Appellants’ counsel next explained that he struck Juror 63, a white woman, because she shared the last name of a local Deputy Sheriff. Because this reason was facially race-neutral, Appellants satisfied step two, and the State was required to prove Appellants engaged in purposeful racial discrimination to satisfy step three. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (holding that at the second step of the Batson process the proponent of the strike does not have to present a persuasive or even a plausible reason, only a race-neutral one). The State, merely countered that neither Appellants nor their counsel knew for sure whether' Juror 63 was related to the Deputy Sheriff with the same last name. The trial court was persuaded by the State’s argument and found pretext. This was error. The reason for striking Juror 63 was race-neutral, and the State failed to carry its burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
*317Appellants’ counsel next explained that he struck Juror 52, a white woman, because she gave an “indignant” and “shocked” look. The trial judge preempted the State’s response, noting that he did not observe any such indignant or shocked expression from Juror 52. The trial court pronounced Appellants’ reason as pretextual. The demeanor of a prospective juror is generally a race-neutral reason for employing a peremptory challenge. State v. Tucker, 334 S.C. 1, 8, 512 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1999) (“[C]ounsel may strike venire persons based on their demeanor and disposition.”). We hold, however, that where a strike is based solely on a purported specific demeanor and disposition, and the trial judge makes an express and contrary finding, the deferential clearly erroneous standard of review applies.
An express finding by the trial court will, unless clearly erroneous, trump counsel’s stated perception of a prospective juror’s demeanor and disposition. In this situation, the trial court determines counsel's credibility. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“Deference is necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations.”); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-66, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (holding that evaluation of a prosecutor’s credibility “lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province’ ”); State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 615-16, 545 S.E.2d 805, 810-11 (2001) (“Often the demeanor of the challenged attorney will be the best and only evidence of discrimination, and ‘evaluation of the prosecutor’s mind lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’ ”) (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364-66, 111 S.Ct. 1859); State v. Casey, 325 S.C. 447, 454, 481 S.E.2d 169, 173 (Ct.App.1997) (“The trial court must often base its decision on credibility determinations, and its rulings on discrimination are accorded great deference on appeal.”); State v. Guess, 318 S.C. 269, 272-73, 457 S.E.2d 6, 8 (Ct.App.1995) (“Typically, the decisive question becomes whether [counsel’s] race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed____ [T]here is seldom much evidence in the record bearing on that issue, and the trial court’s findings regarding purposeful discrimination necessarily will rest largely on the evaluation of demeanor and *318credibility of counsel. Therefore, those findings are given great deference and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”) (citations omitted).
The rule — extending considerable deference to a trial judge’s credibility determinations — could not be otherwise without undermining the remaining remnants of Batson. For example, if a party were able to overcome every Batson challenge by merely claiming that a prospective juror’s demeanor and disposition were somehow inappropriate, the equal protection principles underlying Batson would be weakened. The trial court serves an important gatekeeping role in this regard. Our decision today in no manner diminishes the continuing critical role of counsel’s (or a party’s) perception of a prospective juror’s demeanor and disposition in the exercise of peremptory challenges. In the absence of an express and contrary finding by the trial court, a party’s striking of a juror based on demeanor and disposition should be upheld by the trial court. As for Juror 52, because of the express findings of the trial court, the finding of pretext is not clearly erroneous.
Appellants’ counsel then explained he struck Juror 78, a white woman, because she is the wife and office manager of a prominent dentist in the community. The employment status of a prospective juror is a race-neutral reason for using a peremptory challenge. State v. Haigler, 334 S.C. 623, 632, 515 S.E.2d 88, 92 (1999) (unemployment is a race-neutral reason for strike); Ford, 334 S.C. at 65, 512 S.E.2d at 504 (place of employment is a race-neutral reason for strike); see Adams, 322 S.C. at 125, 470 S.E.2d at 372 (type of employment is a race-neutral reason for strike); State v. Flynn, 368 S.C. 83, 85, 627 S.E.2d 763, 765 (Ct.App.2006) (State’s categorization of a Head Start director as “a very liberal job” was a race-neutral reason for striking the juror). Because Appellants offered a race-neutral reason for striking Juror 78, the burden shifted to the State to show purposeful racial discrimination. Before the State had an opportunity to carry its burden, the trial court asked Appellants’ counsel if he knew Juror 78.
Counsel responded that he did not know Juror 78 but that he knew her husband. The court responded:
*319The Court: Well, ... my thinking is if you try to prejudice somebody by their position, I mean as long as it’s not law enforcement or something like that, I think that you don’t know what her thinking is if you don’t know her.
The trial court then found the striking of Juror 78 violated Batson. As noted, unless discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation provided by the proponent of the strike, the standard announced in Purkett and Adams does not require the proponent of the strike to carry any burden once a race-neutral reason is offered for the strike. The burden is on the opponent of the strike to show purposeful racial discrimination. The trial court erred when it, in effect, placed the burden on Appellants to disprove racial discrimination.
Counsel for Appellants next explained that he struck Juror 90, a white man, because he was a retired farmer. The employment status of a prospective juror is a race-neutral reason for using a peremptory challenge. Ford, 334 S.C. at 65, 512 S.E.2d at 504. Here again, the trial court found Appellants’ counsel’s reason for striking Juror 90 pretextual without requiring the State to say a word, much less prove purposeful racial discrimination.
Appellants’ counsel next explained he struck Juror 15, a black woman. No reason for the strike was sought, as neither the court nor the State was concerned with the Appellants’ striking of black jurors.
Appellants’ counsel then stated he struck Juror 25, a white woman, because she worked as a magistrate judge’s secretary. The trial court found this reáson was not pretextual, presumably because her employment was law-related.
Appellants’ counsel then explained he struck Juror 41, a white man, because he gave “a more outraged look than the others.” The trial court, without hearing from the State and without making a finding on the juror’s demeanor, simply declared the reason pretextual:
The Court: Okay. I find that that’s pretextual. The next one.
The trial court failed to follow the proper Batson procedure, and this was error.
*320Appellants? counsel next explained that Juror 7, a white man, was struck, because “[h]e’s an insurance agent and his wife is a bank teller.” Counsel also informed the court that the juror “said something about working for the sheriffs department.” The trial court found the strike proper and not pretextual because counsel “thought that [Juror 7] was doing work for the sheriffs department.”
Appellants’ counsel shared with the court his concern and experience with jurors (or spouses of jurors) employed in certain jobs, such as insurance agents:
Counsel for Appellants: Your Honor, I never put the relatives [sic] bank tellers and insurance agents[][o]n my juries[.] ... If you’re an insurance agent. Or if you’re married to an insurance agent. Or if they’re a bank teller or married to a bank teller. These are the most straight-laced, conservation [sic] people that, that you could find, in my opinion. And they will ... always convict your. client.
Finally, Appellants’s counsel explained he struck Juror 93, a white woman, for two reasons. First, according to counsel, Juror 93 taught at a school that used to segregate students on the basis of race. Second, the juror’s husband is an insurance agent. As the following exchange reveals, the trial court did not consult the State before finding Appellants’ reason was pretextual:
Counsel for Appellants: ,[Juror 93 is] a teacher at Patrick Henry [School], Your Honor, which was predominately — I think they allow black people to go there now but it was started as a racist response to desegregation, Patrick Henry was. It was an all white school which has recently — [t]hey allow black students there now. But it’s generally not something — somebody I want. And on top of that, they have—
The Court: That’s pretextual. Go ahead and put your record on, though. Go ahead.
Counsel for Appellants: Your Honor, I just don’t think that somebody that works for a racist institution that’s white should.be judging my client. I think that’s just fraught with problems, Judge. And her husband’s an insurance agent, one, one of the' most conservative class of people that I — that I could think of, Judge.
*321The Court: Okay. Well, every one of those reasons is a stereotype. And I think if it’s a stereotype it’s pretextual.... I find that that was [ ] pretextual.
The reason Appellants’ counsel offered to strike Juror 93 was in part race-neutral. Moreover, it would seem plausible for a black defendant to strike a potential juror who worked at a school that was perceived to be founded in response to desegregation. Although the juror’s race is tangentially at issue, it is important to realize that the juror was struck, not because of her race, but because of her association with an organization which counsel perceived as having a history of practicing racial discrimination.
Racial prejudice has long been held to be a valid basis for striking a juror for cause. See S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1020 (Supp.2005) (requiring the trial judge to ask jurors whether they are related to either party, have any interest in the cause, have expressed or formed an opinion, or know of any bias or prejudice to either party). Beyond a challenge for cause, this court has held that “[t]he principal function of the peremptory strike is to allow for the removal of a juror in •whom the challenging party perceives bias or prejudice, even where the juror is not challengeable for cause.” State v. Short, 327 S.C. 329, 335, 489 S.E.2d 209, 212 (Ct.App.1997), aff'd, 333 S.C. 473, 511 S.E.2d 358 (1999). It follows, then, that perceived prejudice may serve as a basis for exercising a peremptory challenge. Because a juror’s perceived bias (for whatever reason) lies at the core of virtually every peremptory challenge, courts should intervene only when it is demonstrated that the strike runs afoul of the Constitution.
In our judgment, neither of Appellants’ explanations here was pretextual. Moreover, after counsel offered seemingly valid reasons for striking Juror 93, the trial court did not require the State to prove purposeful racial discrimination. Rather, the trial court required Appellants’ counsel to prove that he did not purposefully discriminate on the basis of race. This was error.4 Furthermore, just because the reason given *322for striking a juror may fit a stereotype does not necessarily mean the reason is pretextual.
In granting the State’s Batson motion and quashing the first jury, the trial court erred.
IV.
Early on, the trial court abandoned the Purkett-Adams procedure for a Batson motion. The trial court failed to require the State to carry its burden of establishing purposeful racial discrimination in the third step of the Batson procedure. The State urges us to excuse noncompliance with the third step of the Batson procedure because of Appellants’ “pattern” of striking white jurors. As noted, we find no such pattern, and the trial court made no such finding.
Appellants exercised only half of their allotted strikes. Appellants’ first and sixth strikes were exercised against black women. In any event, the mere presence of a pattern would not justify a departure from the Purkett-Adams procedure. See State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 59, 66, 512 S.E.2d 500, 504 (1999) (“Although appellant exercised most of his strikes against white jurors, he did not strike every white juror.... [T]he fact that appellant used most of his challenges to strike white jurors is not sufficient, in itself, to establish purposeful discrimination.”). Even 'the trial court acknowledged as much midway through the process. When the State argued that a strike by defense counsel was “in that same class of white persons who have been struck,” the trial court correctly observed that a juror “can be in that class ... and [Appellants can] still have a valid reason for striking [that juror].” Nevertheless, the trial court found many race-neutral reasons advanced by Appellants pretextual without resorting to the third and final step where the ultimate burden of persuasion would have been imposed on the State.
*323To be sure, a trial court’s finding of a suspect pattern of peremptory challenges may carry weight in the ultimate disposition of a Batson motion. But the mere claim or appearance that peremptory challenges fit into a pattern does not excuse the failure to follow the mandated three-step PurkettAdams procedure.
This is illustrated by the State’s use of peremptory challenges in the selection of the second jury. The State used four strikes, all against blacks. Appellants moved under Batson to quash the jury. Under the State’s “pattern” theory, the trial court presumably would have been justified in dispensing with the third and final step (requiring Appellants to prove purposeful discrimination) and allowing the mere pattern of striking blacks to establish pretext and carry the motion in Appellants’ favor. The State, however, provided specific race-neutral reasons for its strikes, and the trial court proceeded to the final step, requiring Appellants to prove purposeful discrimination.
For a Batson motion, the trial court must follow the procedure outlined in Purkett and Adams. We find our opinion in State v. Smalls, 336 S.C. 301, 307, 519 S.E.2d 793, 796 (Ct.App.1999) instructive. In Smalls, the defendant used nine of his ten peremptory challenges on white jurors. The State opposed these strikes and requested a Batson hearing. At the Batson hearing, the defendant argued he struck the white jurors because they looked at him in a mean, stern, and accusatory manner. Although the trial court admitted these reasons might be reasonable, it nevertheless determined they were pretextual. Importantly, it made this determination without requiring the State to prove the defendant engaged in purposeful racial discrimination. This court reversed the trial court’s finding because it failed “to require the State to carry its burden to present evidence of pretext as prescribed by step three of the Adams/Purkett analysis.” Id. at 309, 519 S.E.2d at 797. We similarly conclude the trial court erred when it abandoned the process mandated by Purkett and Adams and effectively placed a burden of disproving pretext and purposeful discrimination on Appellants.
V.
The second jury was comprised of two black men, two white men, three black women, and five white women. Appellants *324did not use any of their peremptory challenges, and the court forbade Appellants from striking those jurors it determined were improperly struck during the first jury selection. Conversely, the State used four peremptory challenges, all on black jurors. Appellants opposed the State’s strikes and requested a Batson hearing. At the second Batson hearing, the trial court scrupulously adhered to the mandated Batson process and required Appellants to show purposeful racial discrimination after the State offered race-neutral explanations.
For example, the State stated it struck Juror 76, a black woman, because she has a brother who served time in prison. After hearing this explanation, which was race-neutral, the trial court followed the Batson process and required Appellants to show purposeful racial discrimination. Yet the strike was nothing more than a stereotype that those with family members who have served prison sentences are also unsavory — a guilt-by-association stereotype. Had the trial court held to the approach it took during the first Batson hearing, the State’s strike would have been decreed “pretextual” and that would have been the end of it.
VI.
We now address whether the error is reversible. Our case law dictates that even if the trial court commits error in granting the State’s Batson motion, the error is reversible only if the second jury is comprised of jurors whom the trial' court erroneously prohibited the defendant from striking based on Batson. Adams, 322 S.C. at 126, 470 S.E.2d at 373; State v. Rayfield, 357 S.C. 497, 504, 593 S.E.2d 486, 490 (Ct.App.2004), cert. granted (Mar. 3, 2005). A defendant has no right to a particular jury. Adams, 322 S.C. at 126, 470. S.E.2d at 373.
In State v. Short, 333 S.C. 473, 511 S.E.2d 358 (1999), our supreme court held that no actual prejudice need be shown to establish reversible error for the deprivation of a peremptory strike where properly struck jurors are seated on the second jury. See also Ford, 334 S.C. at 66, 512 S.E.2d at 504 (holding that reversal and granting of a new trial is a proper remedy where the trial court erred in finding defendant violated *325Batson in striking certain jurors and any challenged juror was seated on the second jury).
Three of the six jurors Appellants properly struck from the first jury were seated on the second jury. Appellants should have been permitted to strike all three of these jurors. One of these three served as an alternate and did not participate in the deliberations. Any error with regard to this juror was harmless. State v. Ford, 334 S.C. 444, 449, 513 S.E.2d 385, 387 (Ct.App.1999) (“Any Batson violation in regards to a possible alternate juror is harmless where an alternate was not needed for deliberations.”). The remaining jurors, Jurors 78 and 93, were seated as regular members on the second jury. Because both jurors were seated on the second jury and participated in the deliberations that determined Appellants’ guilt, the error is reversible.5
CONCLUSION
We hold the trial court committed legal error. The trial court’s handling of the first Batson hearing in effect placed the burden on Appellants to prove, the absence of purposeful discrimination even after Appellants articulated race-neutral reasons for their strikes. Because jurors properly struck were seated on the second jury, which found Appellants guilty, the error is reversible.
REVERSED.
HEARN, C.J., concurs.
ANDERSON, J., concurring in result only in a separate opinion.

. Appellant Reggie James was also found guilty of malicious injury to personal property; however, after the verdict, and despite appropriate motions made during the course of the trial, the trial court decided to revisit this issue and found "no testimony” of vandalism. Accordingly, the court directed a verdict of acquittal as to this charge.

. A defendant charged with burglary is entitled to ten peremptory challenges and the State is entitled to five. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1110 (Supp.2005). Codefendants, tried jointly, are entitled to twenty peremptory challenges. Id.

. See also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 146, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (recognizing the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the striking of a juror on the basis of gender).

. We do not suggest that counsel's perception of the Patrick Henry School has any validity. Perceptions and perceived biases — whether true or not — are at the heart of virtually every peremptory challenge. The striking of a juror based on perceptions of bias will generally be *322upheld unless it is established that the reason for the strike is impermissibly based on race or gender. The Batson burden of proof framework as set forth in Purkett-Adams seeks to achieve a proper balance between a party's ability to peremptorily strike a potential juror while allowing the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful racial or gender discrimination.

. Although we need not find prejudice to reverse this error, prejudice may be found in jury's guilty verdict against Appellant James for the offense of malicious injury to personal property. The trial court set aside the guilty verdict, finding "no testimony” of vandalism.