Court Opinion

ID: 9850051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:51:33.719174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:30.981617
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. 1. The action here is predicated on the theory that the plaintiff’s offer was accepted by the contractor and that the two documents constitute the contract which was breached. The contractor’s order which the plaintiff contends was an acceptance of its bid, as it appears as an exhibit to the petition, was not marked “accepted” by the plaintiff. The original order as introduced in evidence showed that it was not construed by plaintiff as an acceptance but as a counter-order or proposal which was accepted in writing by the plaintiff. Thus, the cause of action pleaded was not supported by the evidence. A good case was not made by the. introduction in evidence of the accepted order because it was admissible to prove the defendant’s defense that there was no such contract as the one sued on. The order placed by the contractor with the plaintiff was materially different in its content from the original proposal made by the plaintiff especially in that it did not state the exact number of lockers, and constituted a counter-offer, which, when accepted by the plaintiff, constituted the contract between the parties. Estes Lumber Co. v. Palmyra Yellow Pine Co., 29 Ga. App. 15 (1) (113 S. E. 821); B. L. Montague Co., Inc. v. Somers, 94 Ga. App. 860 (96 S. E. 2d 629) and cases cited; Gray v. Lynn, 139 Ga. 294 (77 S. E. 156); Milner Hotels, Inc. v. Black, 196 Ga. 686 (27 S. E. 2d 402); Monk v. McDaniel, 116 Ga. 108 (42 S. E. 360); Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Mangham, 32 Ga. App. 152 (123 S. E. 159); Bailey Co. v. West Lumber Co., 1 Ga. App. 398 (58 S. E. 120); Dunn v. Freeman, 24 Ga. App. 504 (101 S. E. 393). If Bryan knew or thought that the plaintiff intended to bid on equipment for one bathhouse the plaintiff cannot attack the agreement for fraud because it was the negligence of the plaintiff that caused his *853injury, negligence in not checking with the architect to ascertain that the addenda to the plans and specifications called for two bathhouses. Marietta Fertilizer Co. v. Beckwith, 4 Ga. App. 245, 249 (61 S. E. 149) and cases cited. The contract in this case is what is stated in the order of the contractor and the acceptance by the plaintiff, and not what each secretly intended. If the secret intentions of parties were allowed to alter solemn written agreements they would not be worth the paper they are written on. If in this case the plaintiff had made a proposal for equipment for four bathhouses and the contractor had sent an order identical with the one in this case, if it was accepted, the contractor would be bound by the price quoted if, without his knowledge, the number of bathhouses had been reduced by addenda to the plans and specifications from four to two. He would have had to pay the price for his negligence, nothing else appearing to relieve him, and this would be true if the plaintiff knew that the contractor did not know of the reduction in the number of bathhouses from four to two.
2. “The testimony of a party as to transactions with a deceased person, if not objected to, will be considered, and will be given such weight as his interest and other surrounding circumstances will allow. . . The incompetency of a witness may be waived.” Berry v. Brunson, 166 Ga. 523 (4) (143 S. E. 761) and cases cited. Peacon v. Peacon, 197 Ga. 748 (30 S. E. 2d 640); Cooper v. Reeves, 161 Ga. 232 (2) (131 S. E. 63); Hobbs v. Houston, 195 Ga. 571 (10) (24 S. E. 2d 884); Lydia Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gibbs, 108 Ga. 138 (2) (33 S. E. 945); Crozier v. Goldman, 153 Ga. 162 (3) (111 S. E. 666); 58 Am. Jur. 209, “Witnesses”, § 356; 97 C. J. S. 526, “Witnesses”, § 118a. While a number of recent Supreme Court decisions seem to have held to the contrary, the older cases have not been expressly overruled and are binding on us. See Dye v. Richards, 210 Ga. 601 (81 S. E. 2d 820) and cases cited.