Court Opinion

ID: 9542983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:40:58.433672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:24.118934
License: Public Domain

CARSON, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
To quote Justice Felix Frankfurter in Greenwood v. United States, 350 US 366, 374, 76 S Ct 410, 100 L Ed 412, (1956), “this is a case for applying the canon of construction of the wag who said, when the legislative history is doubtful, go to the statute.” Here, the legislative history not only is doubtful — it is nonexistent. So much the more reason to go directly to the statute to answer the two questions asked. The majority does so to answer the first question regarding the authority of the sentencing judge, and I concur in that part of the majority opinion. The majority fails to do so regarding the second question — computation of credit for time served under ORS 137.320(4) — and so I must, respectfully, dissent from that part of the majority opinion.
The meaning of ORS 137.3201 is clear: ORS *111137.320(1) requires the sheriff, upon delivering a prisoner to the Department of Corrections, to state the number of days the prisoner was imprisoned before delivery. The Department then computes the prisoner’s sentence according to the provisions of ORS 137.370. ORS 137.320(3). When a prisoner is imprisoned in the county jail, the sheriff computes the number of days the prisoner was imprisoned after arrest and before commencement of the sentence. ORS 137.320(4). ORS 137.320(4) then requires that “[s]uch time shall be credited towards the term of the sentence.”
Taken together, these provisions entitle plaintiff to credit for time served on each sentence. Plaintiff apparently was held simultaneously for 120 days on each of the charges against him and, ultimately, was sentenced upon conviction for each charge. For his state prison sentence, plaintiff was entitled to credit for time served under the provisions of ORS 137.320(1) and (3) and 137.370. Then, when plaintiff was turned over to county authorities to serve his sentence in the county jail, he was entitled to credit for time served towards the jail term. ORS 137.320(4).
To reach a different conclusion, the majority takes another tack. The majority amasses cases from other states in attempting to demonstrate that the legislature could not have meant what it said, i.e., that credit for time served be granted plaintiff on both his state prison and county jail terms. These cases amount to a sideshow — a diversion from the fact that the statute means what it says and that the majority cannot marshall a single shred of legislative history to demonstrate the contrary. That other jurisdictions have reached the same result as has the majority is, of course, instructive. But it is not *112conclusive as to what the Oregon legislature intended, particularly where the language of the statutes from other jurisdictions does not track the language of ORS 137.320.
Moreover, the majority rejects construing ORS 137.320(4) to entitle plaintiff to credit for time served on his county jail term lest he be granted “compound credit time for consecutive sentences.” We were not asked to decide that question — the wisdom of granting credit for time served on consecutive sentences. We were asked to decide a far narrower question — whether, plaintiff was entitled under ORS 137.320(4) to credit for time served on his county jail term. The two are not the same. But even beyond what we were or were not asked to decide, the majority’s statement betrays a fundamental flaw.
The majority apparently believes that it somehow is unfair to grant a person credit for time served on two charges when those charges ultimately result in consecutive sentences. The majority apparently believes that granting the credit in that situation gives a person something he or she did not earn. But when a person is taken into custody and held on two or more criminal charges, that person’s liberty is restrained on each charge for which the person is held. The person is incarcerated (serving time) on each of those charges. It follows that it deprives a person of credit for time served not to grant the credit against all charges for which the person is held in custody and their concomitant sentences. See State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 630 P2d 143 (1981) (Bistline, J., dissenting).
Campbell, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

 ORS 137.320 provides, in part:
“(1) When a judgment includes commitment to the legal and physical custody of the Department of Corrections, the sheriff shall deliver the defendant, together with a copy of the entry of judgment and a statement signed by the sheriff *111of the number of days the defendant was imprisoned prior to delivery, to the superintendent of the Department of Corrections institution to which the defendant is initially assigned pursuant to ORS 137.124.
u* * * * *
“(3) Upon receipt of the information described in subsection (1) * * * the Department of Corrections shall establish a case file and compute the defendant’s sentence in accordance with the provisions of ORS 137.370.
“(4) When the judgment is imprisonment in the county jail or a fine and that the defendant be imprisoned until it is paid, the judgment shall be executed by the sheriff of the county. The sheriff shall compute the time the defendant was imprisoned after arrest and prior to the commencement of the term specified in the judgment. Such time shall be credited towards the term of the sentence.”