Court Opinion

ID: 9525756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:07:19.327433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:56.343779
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: The trial court erred when it stated the “motion to reconsider the sentence must be stricken, because it is untimely filed.” The notice of appeal and the motion to reconsider sentence were filed within 30 days of sentencing. On March 31, 1992, the notice of appeal was filed by the Champaign County circuit clerk on defendant’s behalf. On April 3, 1992, the motion to reconsider the sentence was filed. On April 23, 1992, a hearing was conducted on the motion to reconsider the sentence at which the trial judge determined that, once the notice of appeal was filed, the circuit court was divested of jurisdiction and the motion to reconsider the sentence must be stricken. At the hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence on April 23, 1992, prior to proceeding, the State suggested to the court that the motion was not properly before the court “given the notice of appeal that was filed.” The trial court then in reviewing the prior hearing indicated, “Even though you have a right to file a motion to reconsider, that would be a useless act on your part, because based upon the evidence before me, I would reimpose the same sentence ***. I am not sure, with me having said that, that a motion to reconsider is a condition precedent.” The court then said, “However, I am convinced beyond any doubt that once the notice of appeal has been filed and the Appellate Defender has been appointed as counsel in this court, that the Court has lost jurisdiction and that your motion to reconsider the sentence must be stricken, because it’s untimely filed. *** The Court finds that the motion to reconsider sentence filed by the defendant is untimely and because the Court has lost jurisdiction since the filing of the notice of appeal on March 31st, 1992.” The trial court in the exercise of its discretion could have dismissed the appeal. Its response, however, was to the effect that it could do nothing. In civil cases, if a post-trial motion is timely filed, even if it is preceded by the filing of a notice of appeal, the filing of the post-trial motion tolls the time for filing the notice of appeal and requires the withdrawal of the notice of appeal. (134 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2).) The corresponding rule in criminal cases has not been so amended (134 Ill. 2d R. 606) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) has not been made to apply to appeals in criminal cases. (See 134 Ill. 2d R. 612.) However, dismissal of an appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 309 is appropriate where both a notice of appeal and a timely post-trial motion are on file. (134 Ill. 2d R. 309.) Supreme Court Rule 309 applies to criminal proceedings. (134 Ill. 2d R. 612(a).) The rule available in civil cases should also be applied here. Although defendant did not specifically ask leave to dismiss the appeal, the trial court erred when it stated it had lost jurisdiction— without exercising its discretion to dismiss the appeal and allow 'a hearing on the motion to reconsider the sentence — due to an incorrect belief that it had no discretion. (134 Ill. 2d Rules 309, 612(a); People v. Queen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 560, 310 N.E.2d 166; see also Mizell v. Passo (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 420, 428, 590 N.E.2d 449, 452.) Defendant’s counsel sufficiently brought it to the court’s attention, “I also believe that the appeal has not been perfected in some way. If there is error and it can be corrected, I would like to do that.” The record is clear that the trial court found it had lost jurisdiction and had no discretion to grant any relief. As in Queen, it had discretion but refused to exercise it.