Court Opinion

ID: 9430709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:23.253205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:25.906629
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring in the judgment.
When this Court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision that has been approved by both Houses of the Congress and signed by the President, particularly an Act of Congress that confronts a deeply vexing national problem, it should only do so for the most compelling constitutional reasons. I *737agree with the Court that the “Gramm-Rudman-Hollings” Act contains a constitutional infirmity so severe that the flawed provision may not stand. I disagree with the Court, however, on the reasons why the Constitution prohibits the Comptroller General from exercising the powers assigned to him by § 251(b) and § 251(c)(2) of the Act. It is not the dormant, carefully circumscribed congressional removal power that represents the primary constitutional evil. Nor do I agree with the conclusion of both the majority and the dissent that the analysis depends on a labeling of the functions assigned to the Comptroller General as “executive powers.” Ante, at 732-734; post, at 764-765. Rather, I am convinced that the Comptroller General must be characterized as an agent of Congress because of his longstanding statutory responsibilities; that the powers assigned to him under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act require him to make policy that will bind the Nation; and that, when Congress, or a component or an agent of Congress, seeks to make policy that will bind the Nation, it must follow the procedures mandated by Article I of the Constitution — through passage by both Houses and presentment to the President. In short, Congress may not exercise its fundamental power to formulate national policy by delegating that power to one of its two Houses, to a legislative committee, or to an individual agent of the Congress such as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, or the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983). That principle, I believe, is applicable to the Comptroller General.
I
The fact that Congress retained for itself the power to remove the Comptroller General is important evidence supporting the conclusion that he is a member of the Legislative Branch of the Government. Unlike the Court, however, I am not persuaded that the congressional removal power is either a necessary, or a sufficient, basis for concluding that his statutory assignment is invalid.
*738As Justice White explains, post, at 770-771, Congress does not have the power to remove the Comptroller General at will, or because of disagreement with any policy determination that he may be required to make in the administration of this, or any other, Act. The statute provides a term of 15 years for the Comptroller General; it further provides that he must retire upon becoming 70 years of age, and that he may be removed at any time by impeachment or by “joint resolution of Congress, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, only for — (i) permanent disability; (ii) inefficiency; (iii) neglect of duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude.” 31 U. S. C. § 703(e)(1)(B). Far from assuming that this provision creates a “ ‘here-and-now subservience’ ” respecting all of the Comptroller General’s actions, ante, at 727, n. 5 (quoting District Court), we should presume that Congress will adhere to the law — that it would only exercise its removal powers if the Comptroller General were found to be permanently disabled, inefficient, neglectful, or culpable of malfeasance, a felony, or conduct involving moral turpitude.1
*739The notion that the removal power at issue here automatically creates some kind of “here-and-now subservience” of the Comptroller General to Congress is belied by history. There is no evidence that Congress has ever removed, or threatened to remove, the Comptroller General for reasons of policy. Moreover, the President has long possessed a comparable power to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission, yet it is universally accepted that they are independent of, rather than subservient to, the President in performing their official duties. Thus, the statute that the Court construed in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), provided:
“Any commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 38 Stat. 718.
In upholding the congressional limitations on the President’s power of removal, the Court stressed the independence of the Commission from the President.2 There was no suggestion that the retained Presidential removal powers — similar to those at issue here — created a subservience to the President.3
*740To be sure, there may be a significant separation-of-powers difference between the President’s exercise of carefully circumscribed removal authority and Congress’ exercise of identically circumscribed removal authority. But the Humphrey’s Executor analysis at least demonstrates that it is entirely proper for Congress to specify the qualifications for an office that it has created, and that the prescription of what might be termed “dereliction-of-duty” removal standards does not itself impair the independence of the official subject to such standards.4
The fact that Congress retained for itself the power to remove the Comptroller General thus is not necessarily an adequate reason for concluding that his role in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget reduction process is unconstitutional. It is, however, a fact that lends support to my ulti*741mate conclusion that, in exercising his functions under this Act, he serves as an agent of the Congress.
I — I HH
In assessing the role of the Comptroller General, it is appropriate to consider his already existing statutory responsibilities. Those responsibilities leave little doubt that one of the identifying characteristics of the Comptroller General is his statutorily required relationship to the Legislative Branch.
In the statutory section that identifies the Comptroller General’s responsibilities for investigating the use of public money, four of the five enumerated duties specifically describe an obligation owed to Congress. The first is the only one that does not expressly refer to Congress: The Comptroller General shall “investigate all matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public money.” 31 U. S. C. §712(1). The other four clearly require the Comptroller General to work with Congress’ specific needs as his legal duty. Thus, the Comptroller General must “estimate the cost to the United States Government of complying with each restriction on expenditures of a specific appropriation in a general appropriation law and report each estimate to Congress with recommendations the Comptroller General considers desirable.” §712(2) (emphasis added). He must “analyze expenditures of each executive agency the Comptroller General believes will help Congress decide whether public money has been used and expended economically and efficiently.” § 712(3) (emphasis added). He must “make an investigation and report ordered by either House of Congress or a committee of Congresshaving jurisdiction over revenue, appropriations, or expenditures.” § 712(4) (emphasis added). Finally, he must “give a committee of Congress having jurisdiction over revenue, appropriations, or expenditures the help and information the committee requests.” § 712(5) (emphasis added).
*742The statutory provision detailing the Comptroller General’s role in evaluating programs and activities of the United States Government similarly leaves no doubt regarding the beneficiary of the Comptroller General’s labors. The Comptroller General may undertake such an evaluation for one of three specified reasons: (1) on his own initiative; (2) “when either House of Congress orders an evaluation”; or (3) “when a committee of Congress with jurisdiction over the program or activity requests the evaluation.” 31 U. S. C. § 717(b). In assessing a program or activity, moreover, the Comptroller General’s responsibility is to “develop and recommend to Congress ways to evaluate a program or activity the Government carries out under existing law.” § 717(c) (emphasis added).
The Comptroller General’s responsibilities are repeatedly framed in terms of his specific obligations to Congress. Thus, one provision specifies in some detail the obligations of the Comptroller General with respect to an individual committee’s request for a program evaluation:
“On request of a committee of Congress, the Comptroller General shall help the committee to—
“(A) develop a statement of legislative goals and ways to assess and report program performance related to the goals, including recommended ways to assess performance, information to be reported, responsibility for reporting, frequency of reports, and feasibility of pilot testing; and
“(B) assess program evaluations prepared by and for an agency.” § 717(d)(1).
Similarly, another provision requires that, on “request of a member of Congress, the Comptroller General shall give the member a copy of the material the Comptroller General compiles in carrying out this subsection that has been released by the committee for which the material was compiled.” § 717(d)(2).
*743Numerous other provisions strongly support the conclusion that one of the Comptroller General’s primary responsibilities is to work specifically on behalf of Congress. The Comptroller General must make annual reports on specified subjects to Congress, to the Senate Committee on Finance, to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, to the House Committee on Ways and Means, to the House Committee on Government Operations, and to the Joint Committee on Taxation. 31 U. S. C. §§ 719(a),(d). On request of a committee, the Comptroller General “shall explain to and discuss with the committee or committee staff a report the Comptroller General makes that would help the committee— (1) evaluate a program or activity of an agency within the jurisdiction of the committee; or (2) in its consideration of proposed legislation.” §719(i). Indeed, the relationship between the Comptroller General and Congress is so close that the “Comptroller General may assign or detail an officer or employee of the General Accounting Office to full-time continuous duty with a committee of Congress for not more than one year.” 31 U. S. C. § 734(a).
The Comptroller General’s current statutory responsibilities on behalf of Congress are fully consistent with the historic conception of the Comptroller General’s office. The statute that created the Comptroller General’s office — the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 — provided that four of the five statutory responsibilities given to the Comptroller General be exercised on behalf of Congress, three of them exclusively so.5 On at least three occasions since 1921, more*744over, in considering the structure of Government, Congress has defined the Comptroller General as being a part of the Legislative Branch. In the Reorganization Act of 1945, Congress specified that the Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office “are a part of the legislative branch of the Government.” 59 Stat. 616.6 In the Reorganization Act of 1949, Congress again confirmed that the Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office “are a part of the legislative branch of the Government.” 63 Stat. 205.7 Finally, in the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, Congress referred to the “auditing for the Government, con*745ducted by the Comptroller General of the United States as an agent of the Congress.” 64 Stat. 835. Like the already existing statutory responsibilities, then, the history of the Comptroller General statute confirms that the Comptroller General should be viewed as an agent of the Congress.
This is not to say, of course, that the Comptroller General has no obligations to the Executive Branch, or that he is an agent of the Congress in quite so clear a manner as the Doorkeeper of the House. For the current statutory responsibilities also envision a role for the Comptroller General with respect to the Executive Branch. The Comptroller General must “give the President information on expenditures and accounting the President requests.” 31 U. S. C. § 719(f). Although the Comptroller General is required to provide Congress with an annual report, he is also required to provide the President with the report if the President so requests. § 719(a). The Comptroller General is statutorily required to audit the Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (and provide congressional committees with information respecting the audits). § 713. In at least one respect, moreover, the Comptroller General is treated like an executive agency: “To the extent applicable, all laws generally related to administering an agency apply to the Comptroller General.” § 704(a). Historically, as well, the Comptroller General has had some relationship to the Executive Branch. As noted, n. 5, supra, in the 1921 Act, one of the Comptroller General’s specific responsibilities was to provide information to the Bureau of the Budget. In fact, when the Comptroller General’s office was created, its functions, personnel, records, and even furniture derived from a previous executive office.8
*746Thus, the Comptroller General retains certain obligations with respect to the Executive Branch.9 Obligations to two branches are not, however, impermissible and the presence of such dual obligations does not prevent the characterization of the official with the dual obligations as part of one branch.10 It is at least clear that, in most, if not all, of his statutory-responsibilities, the Comptroller General is properly characterized as an agent of the Congress.11
*747h — ( H-l H — I
Everyone agrees that the powers assigned to the Comptroller General by § 251(b) and § 251(c)(2) of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act are extremely important. They require him to exercise sophisticated economic judgment concerning anticipated trends in the Nation’s economy, pro*748jected levels of unemployment, interest rates, and the special problems that may be confronted by the many components of a vast federal bureaucracy. His duties are anything but ministerial — he is not merely a clerk wearing a “green eye-shade” as he undertakes these tasks. Rather, he is vested with the kind of responsibilities that Congress has elected to discharge itself under the fallback provision that will become effective if and when § 251(b) and § 251(c)(2) are held invalid. Unless we make the naive assumption that the economic destiny of the Nation could be safely entrusted to a mindless bank of computers, the powers that this Act vests in the Comptroller General must be recognized as having transcendent importance.12
The Court concludes that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act impermissibly assigns the Comptroller General “executive powers.” Ante, at 732. Justice White’s dissent agrees that “the powers exercised by the Comptroller under the Act may be characterized as ‘executive’ in that they involve the interpretation and carrying out of the Act’s mandate.” Post, at 765. This conclusion is not only far from obvious but also rests on the unstated and unsound premise that there is a definite line that distinguishes executive power from legislative power.
“The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white.” Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). “The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one an*749other would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 121 (1976). As Justice Brandéis explained in his dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 291 (1926): “The separation of the powers of government did not make each branch completely autonomous. It left each, in some measure, dependent upon the others, as it left to each power to exercise, in some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial.”
One reason that the exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial powers cannot be categorically distributed among three mutually exclusive branches of Government is that governmental power cannot always be readily characterized with only one of those three labels. On the contrary, as our cases demonstrate, a particular function, like a chameleon, will often take on the aspect of the office to which it is assigned. For this reason, “[w]hen any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it.” INS v. Ghadha, 462 U. S., at 951.13
The Chadha case itself illustrates this basic point. The governmental decision that was being made was whether a resident alien who had overstayed his student visa should be *750deported. From the point of view of the Administrative Law Judge who conducted a hearing on the issue — or as Justice Powell saw the issue in his concurrence14 — the decision took on a judicial coloring. From the point of view of the Attorney General of the United States to whom Congress had delegated the authority to suspend deportation of certain aliens, the decision appeared to have an executive character.15 But, as the Court held, when the House of Representatives finally decided that Chadha must be deported, its action “was essentially legislative in purpose and effect.” Id., at 952.
The powers delegated to the Comptroller General by § 251 of the Act before us today have a similar chameleon-like quality. The District Court persuasively explained why they may be appropriately characterized as executive powers.16 But, when that delegation is held invalid, the “fallback provision” provides that the report that would otherwise be issued by the Comptroller General shall be issued by Congress it*751self.17 In the everit that the resolution is enacted, the congressional report will have the same legal consequences as if it had been issued by the Comptroller General. In that event, moreover, surely no one would suggest that Congress had acted in any capacity other than “legislative.” Since the District Court expressly recognized the validity of what it described as the “‘fallback’ deficit reduction process,” Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (DC 1986), it obviously did not doubt the constitutionality of the performance by Congress of the functions delegated to the Comptroller General.
Under the District Court’s analysis, and the analysis adopted by the majority today, it would therefore appear that the function at issue is “executive” if performed by the Comptroller General but “legislative” if performed by the Congress. In my view, however, the function may appropri*752ately be labeled “legislative” even if performed by the Comptroller General or by an executive agency.
Despite the statement in Article I of the Constitution that “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,” it is far from novel to acknowledge that independent agencies do indeed exercise legislative powers. As Justice White explained in his Chadha dissent, after reviewing our cases upholding broad delegations of legislative power:
“[T]hese cases establish that by virtue of congressional delegation, legislative power can be exercised by independent agencies and Executive departments without the passage of new legislation. For some time, the sheer amount of law — the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the operation of government-made by the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional process. There is no question but that agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any functional or realistic sense of the term. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §551(4), provides that a ‘rule’ is an agency statement ‘designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.’ When agencies are authorized to prescribe law through substantive rulemaking, the administrator’s regulation is not only due deference, but is accorded ‘legislative effect.’ See, e. g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S. 34, 43-44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416 (1977). These regulations bind courts and officers of the Federal Government, may preempt state law, see, e. g., Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982), and grant rights to and impose obligations on the public. In sum, they have the force of law.” 462 U. S., at 985-986 (footnote omitted).
Thus, I do not agree that the Comptroller General’s responsibilities under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act must be *753termed “executive powers,” or even that our inquiry is much advanced by using that term. For, whatever the label given the functions to be performed by the Comptroller General under §251 — or by the Congress under §274 — the District Court had no difficulty in concluding that Congress could delegate the performance of those functions to another branch of the Government.18 If the delegation to a stranger is permissible, why may not Congress delegate the same responsibilities to one of its own agents? That is the central question before us today.
IV
Congress regularly delegates responsibility to a number of agents who provide important support for its legislative activities. Many perform functions that could be characterized as “executive” in most contexts — the Capitol Police can arrest and press charges against lawbreakers, the Sergeant at Arms manages the congressional payroll, the Capitol Architect maintains the buildings and grounds, and its Librarian has custody of a vast number of books and records. Moreover, the Members themselves necessarily engage in many activities that are merely ancillary to their primary lawmak*754ing responsibilities — they manage their separate offices, they communicate with their constituents, they conduct hearings, they inform themselves about the problems confronting the Nation, and they make rules for the governance of their own business. The responsibilities assigned to the Comptroller General in the case before us are, of course, quite different from these delegations and ancillary activities.
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act assigns to the Comptroller General the duty to make policy decisions that have the force of law. The Comptroller General’s report is, in the current statute, the engine that gives life to the ambitious budget reduction process. It is the Comptroller General’s report that “provide[s] for the determination of reductions” and that “contain[s] estimates, determinations, and specifications for all of the items contained in the report” submitted by the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office. § 251(b). It is the Comptroller General’s report that the President must follow and that will have conclusive effect. §252. It is, in short, the Comptroller General’s report that will have a profound, dramatic, and immediate impact on the Government and on the Nation at large.
Article I of the Constitution specifies the procedures that Congress must follow when it makes policy that binds the Nation: its legislation must be approved by both of its Houses and presented to the President. In holding that an attempt to legislate by means of a “one-House veto” violated the procedural mandate in Article I, we explained:
“We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions. The President’s participation in the legislative process was to protect the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws. The division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be exer*755cised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings. The President’s unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby precluding final arbitrary action of one person. ... It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S., at 951.
If Congress were free to delegate its policymaking authority to one of its components, or to one of its agents, it would be able to evade “the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.” Id., at 959.19 That danger — congressional action that evades constitutional restraints — is not present when Congress delegates lawmaking power to the executive or to an independent agency.20
The distinction between the kinds of action that Congress may delegate to its own components and agents and those that require either compliance with Article I procedures or delegation to another branch pursuant to defined standards is *756reflected in the practices that have developed over the years regarding congressional resolutions. The joint resolution, which is used for “special purposes and . . . incidental matters,” 7 Deschler’s Precedents of the House of Representatives 334 (1977), makes binding policy and “requires an affirmative vote by both Houses and submission to the President for approval” id., at 333 — the full Article I requirements. A concurrent resolution, in contrast, makes no binding policy; it is “a means of expressing fact, principles, opinions, and purposes of the two Houses,” Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives 176 (1983), and thus does not need to be presented to the President. It is settled, however, that if a resolution is intended to make policy that will bind the Nation and thus is “legislative in its character and effect,” S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897) — then the full Article I requirements must be observed. For “the nature or substance of the resolution, and not its form, controls the question of its disposition.” Ibid.
In my opinion, Congress itself could not exercise the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings functions through a concurrent resolution. The fact that the fallback provision in § 274 requires a joint resolution rather than a concurrent resolution indicates that Congress endorsed this view.21 I think it equally clear that Congress may not simply delegate those functions to an agent such as the Congressional Budget Office. Since I am persuaded that the Comptroller General is also fairly deemed to be an agent of Congress, he too cannot exercise such functions.22
*757As a result, to decide this case there is no need to consider the Decision of 1789, the President’s removal power, or the abstract nature of “executive powers.” Once it is clear that the Comptroller General, whose statutory duties define him as an agent of Congress, has been assigned the task of making policy determinations that will bind the Nation, the question is simply one of congressional process. There can be no doubt that the Comptroller General’s statutory duties under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings do not follow the constitutionally prescribed procedures for congressional lawmaking.23
In short, even though it is well settled that Congress may delegate legislative power to independent agencies or to the Executive, and thereby divest itself of a portion of its lawmaking power, when it elects to exercise such power itself, it may not authorize a lesser representative of the Legislative *758Branch to act on its behalf.24 It is for this reason that I believe § 251(b) and § 251(c)(2) of the Act are unconstitutional.25
Thus, the critical inquiry in this case concerns not the manner in which executive officials or agencies may act, but the manner in which Congress and its agents may act. As we emphasized in Chadha, when Congress legislates, when it makes binding policy, it must follow the procedures prescribed in Article I. Neither the unquestioned urgency of the national budget crisis nor the Comptroller General’s proud record of professionalism and dedication provides a justification for allowing a congressional agent to set policy that binds *759the Nation. Rather than turning the task over to its agent, if the Legislative Branch decides to act with conclusive effect, it must do so through a process akin to that specified in the fallback provision — through enactment by both Houses and presentment to the President.
I concur in the judgment.

 Just as it is “always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law,” Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696-697 (1979), so too is it appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, will respect the law. As the proceedings in the United States Senate resulting from the impeachment of Justice Chase demonstrate, moreover, if that body were willing to give only lipservice to the governing standard, political considerations rather than “good behavior” would determine the tenure of federal judges. See M. Elsmere, The Impeachment Trial of Justice Samuel Chase 205 (1962); 3 A. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 157-223 (1919). See also W. Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics 186-187 (Meridian Books ed., 1956) (quoted in Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 369, 380 (1976)):
“ ‘If there be one principle clearer than another, it is this: that in any business, whether of government or of mere merchandising, somebody must be trusted, in order that when things go wrong it may be quite plain who should be punished. . . . Power and strict accountability of its use are the essential constituents of good government.’” (Emphasis in original.)

 See Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U. S., at 625-626 (describing congressional intention to create “a body which shall be independent of executive authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the government”) (emphasis in original).

 The manner in which President Franklin Roosevelt exercised his removal power further underscores the propriety of presuming that Congress, and the President, will not use statutorily prescribed removal causes as pretexts for other removal reasons. President Roosevelt never claimed that his removal of Humphrey was for one of the statutorily prescribed reasons — inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. The President’s removal letter merely stated:
‘“Effective as of this date you are hereby removed from the office of Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission.’” See id., at 619.
Previously, the President had written to Commissioner Humphrey stating:
*740“ ‘You will, I know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and, frankly, I think it is best for the people of this country that I should have a full confidence.’ ” Ibid.

 Indeed, even in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), in its challenge to the provision requiring Senate approval of the removal of a postmaster, the Federal Government assumed that Congress had power to limit the terms of removal to reasons that relate to the office. Solicitor General Beck recognized “that the power of removal may be subject to such general laws as do not destroy the exercise by the President of his power of removal, and which leaves to him the exercise of the power subject to such general laws as may fairly measure the standard of public service.” Substitute Brief for United States on Reargument in No. 2, O. T. 1926, p. 9. At oral argument, the Solicitor General explained his position:
“Mr. Beck. . . . Suppose the Congress creates an office and says that it shall only be filled by a man learned in the law; and suppose it further provides that, if a man ceases to be member of the bar, he shall be removed. I am not prepared to say that such a law can not be reconciled with the Constitution. What I do say is that, when the condition imposed upon the creation of the office has no reasonable relation to the office; when it is not a legislative standard to be applied by the President, and is not the declaration of qualifications, but is the creation of an appointing power other than the President, then Congress has crossed the dead line, for it has usurped the prerogative of the President.” 272 U. S., at 96-97.

 In pertinent part, the 1921 Act provided:
“SEC. 312(a) The Comptroller General shall investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds, and shall make to the President when requested by him, and to Congress at the beginning of each regular session, a report in writing of the work of the General Accounting Office, containing recommendations concerning the legislation he may deem necessary to facilitate the prompt and accurate rendition and settlement of accounts and concerning such other matters relating to the receipt, dis*744bursement, and application of public funds as he may think advisable. In such regular report, or in special reports at any time when Congress is in session, he shall make recommendations looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures.
“(b) He shall make such investigations and reports as shall be ordered by either House of Congress or by any committee of either House having jurisdiction over revemie, appropriations, or expenditures. The Comptroller General shall also, at the request of any such committee, direct assistants from his office to furnish the committee such aid and information as it may request.
“(c) The Comptroller General shall specifically report to Congress every expenditure or contract made by any department or establishment in any year in violation of law.
“(d) He shall submit to Congress reports upon the adequacy and effectiveness of the administrative examination of accounts and claims in the respective departments and establishments and upon the adequacy and effectiveness of departmental inspection of the offices and accounts of fiscal officers.
“(e) He shall furnish such information relating to expenditures and accounting to the Bureau of the Budget as it may request from time to time.” 42 Stat. 25-26 (emphases added).

 See also H. R. Rep. No. 971, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1945) (“[T]he Comptroller General of the United States” and “the General Accounting Office . . . are declared by the bill to be a part of the legislative branch of the Government”).

 See also H. R. Rep. No. 23, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1949) (“[T]he Comptroller General of the United States” and “the General Accounting Office ... (as in the Reorganization Act of 1945) are declared by the bill to be a part of the legislative branch of the Government”).

 See 42 Stat. 23 (“The offices of Comptroller of the Treasury and Assistant Comptroller of the Treasury are abolished, to take effect July 21, 1921. . . . [A]ll books, records, documents, papers, furniture, office equipment and other property of the office of the Comptroller of the Treasury shall become the property of the General Accounting Office”).

 The Comptroller General, of course, is also appointed by the President. 31 U. S. C. § 703(a)(1). So too, however, are the Librarian of Congress, 2 U. S. C. § 136, the Architect of the Capitol, 40 U. S. C. § 162, and the Public Printer, 44 U. S. C. § 301.

 See Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U. S. 34, 36-37, and n. 1 (1985) (reviewing the Marshals’ statutory obligations to the Judiciary and the Executive Branch, but noting that the “Marshals are within the Executive Branch of the Federal Government”). Cf. Report by the Comptroller General, U. S. Marshals’ Dilemma: Serving Two Branches of Government 14 (1982) (“It is extremely difficult for one person to effectively serve two masters”). Surely no one would suggest that the fact that The Chief Justice performs executive functions for the Smithsonian Institution, 20 U. S. C. §42, affects his characterization as a member of the Judicial Branch of the Government. Nor does the performance of similar functions by three Members of the Senate and three Members of the House, ibid., affect their characterization as members of the Legislative Branch of the Government.

 Despite the suggestions of the dissents, post, at 773, n. 12 (White, J., dissenting); post, at 778-779, n. 1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), it is quite obvious that the Comptroller General, and the General Accounting Office, have a fundamentally different relationship with Congress than do independent agencies like the Federal Trade Commission. Rather than an independent agency, the Comptroller General and the GAO are functionally equivalent to congressional agents such as the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Technology Assessment, and the Library of Congress’ Congressional Research Service. As the statutory responsibilities make clear, like those congressional agents, the Comptroller General and the GAO function virtually as a permanent staff for Congress. Indeed, in creating the Congressional Budget Office, Congress explicitly required that the GAO provide extensive services for the CBO — a fact with some significance for this case. The CBO statute enumerates the three “congressional agencies” that must provide assistance to the CBO — “the General Account*747ing Office, the Library of Congress, and the Office of Technology Assessment.” 2 U. S. C. § 601(e). These “congressional agencies” are authorized to provide the CBO with “services, facilities, and personnel with or without reimbursement,” ibid,., as well as “information, data, estimates, and statistics.” Ibid. See also Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to Congress 555 (3d ed. 1982) (“In addition to their staffs, committees, facilities and privileges, members of Congress are backed by a number of other supporting organizations and activities that keep Capitol Hill running. Among the largest of these in size of staff are the General Accounting Office (GAO), with about 5,200 employees; the Library of Congress’ Congressional Research Service (CRS), with 856; the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), with 218; and the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), with 130. ... To an extent, each of the four legislative agencies has its own specialized functions.... Although each of the four agencies has been given its own task, their jobs overlap to some extent. This has led in some cases to duplication and waste and even to competition among the different groups. .' . . The General Accounting Office is an arm of the legislative branch that was created to oversee the expenditures of the executive branch”).
Thus, to contend that the Comptroller General’s numerous statutory responsibilities to serve Congress directly are somehow like an independent agency’s obligations to report to Congress and to implement legislatively mandated standards simply misconceives the actual duties of the Comptroller General and the GAO. It also ignores the clear import of the legislative history of these entities. See, e. g., Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F. 2d 875, 892-893 (CA3 1986) (Becker, J., concurring in part) (“Because the office of the Comptroller General is created by statute, the Comptroller General’s status within the government is a matter of statutory interpretation which, like all statutory interpretation, is controlled by legislative intent. . . . There is copious evidence in the legislative history that the GAO (and therefore the Comptroller General) was intended to be in the legislative branch. . . . Because there is no legislative intent to the contrary, I believe that it is incumbent upon us to hold that the Comptroller General is within the legislative branch of government, despite the inconveniences that may attend such a holding”).

 The element of judgment that the Comptroller General must exercise is evident by the congressional recognition that there may be “differences between the contents of [his] report and the report of the Directors” of the Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget. § 251(b)(2).

 “Perhaps as a matter of political science we could say that Congress should only concern itself with broad principles of policy and leave their application in particular eases to the executive branch. But no such rule can be found in the Constitution itself or in legislative practice. It is fruitless, therefore, to try to draw any sharp and logical line between legislative and executive functions. Characteristically, the draftsmen of 1787 did not even attempt doctrinaire definitions, but placed their reliance in the mechanics of the Constitution. One of their principal devices was to vest the legislative powers in the two Houses of Congress and to make the President a part of the legislative process by requiring that all bills passed by the two Houses be submitted to him for his approval or disapproval, his disapproval or veto to be overridden only by a two-thirds vote of each House. It is in such checks upon powers, rather than in the classifications of powers, that our governmental system finds equilibrium.” Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 569, 571 (1953) (footnote omitted).

 For Justice Powell the critical question in the Chadha case was “whether Congress impermissibly assumed a judicial function.” 462 U. S., at 963.

 “It is clear, therefore, that the Attorney General acts in his presumptively Art. II capacity when he administers the Immigration and Nationality Act.” Id., at 953, n. 16.

 “Under subsection 251(b)(1), the Comptroller General must specify levels of anticipated revenue and expenditure that determine the gross amount which must be sequestered; and he must specify which particular budget items are required to be reduced by the various provisions of the Act (which are not in all respects clear), and in what particular amounts. The first of these specifications requires the exercise of substantial judgment concerning present and future facts that affect the application of the law — the sort of power normally conferred upon the executive officer charged with implementing a statute. The second specification requires an interpretation of the law enacted by Congress, similarly a power normally committed initially to the Executive under the Constitution’s prescription that he ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’ Art. II, § 3.” Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1400 (DC 1986).

 Section 274(f) of the Act provides, in part:
“ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES FOR THE JOINT REPORTS OP THE DIRECTORS. —
“(1) In the event that any of the reporting procedures described in section 251 are invalidated, then any report of the Directors referred to in section 251(a) or (c)(1). . . shall be transmitted to the joint committee established under this subsection.
“(2) Upon the invalidation of any such procedure there is established a Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction, composed of the entire membership of the Budget Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate.... The purposes of the Joint Committee are to receive the reports of the Directors as described in paragraph (1), and to report (with respect to each such report of the Directors) a joint resolution as described in paragraph (3).
“(3) No later than 5 days after the receipt of a report of the Directors in accordance with paragraph (1), the Joint Committee shall report to the House of Representatives and the Senate a joint resolution setting forth the contents of the report of the Directors.
“(5) Upon its enactment, the joint resolution shall be deemed to be the report received by the President under section 251(b) or (c)(2) (whichever is applicable).” 99 Stat. 1100 (emphasis added).

 “All that has been left to administrative discretion is the estimation of the aggregate amount of reductions that will be necessary, in light of predicted revenues and expenditures, and we believe that the Act contains standards adequately confining administrative discretion in making that estimation. While this is assuredly an estimation that requires some judgment, and on which various individuals may disagree, we hardly think it is a distinctively political judgment, much less a political judgment of such scope that it must be made by Congress itself. Through specification of maximum deficit amounts, establishment of a detailed administrative mechanism, and determination of the standards governing administrative decisionmaking, Congress has made the policy decisions which constitute the essence of the legislative function.” 626 F. Supp., at 1391.
The District Court’s holding that the exercise of discretion was not the kind of political judgment that “must be made by Congress itself” is, of course, consistent with the view that it is a judgment that “may be made by Congress itself” pursuant to § 274.

 Even scholars who would have sustained the one-House veto appear to agree with this ultimate conclusion. See Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, The Legislative Veto, and the “Independent” Agencies, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1064, 1090 (1981) (“It is not a case where the Congress has delegated authority to one of its components to take affirmative steps to impose regulations upon private interests — an action which would, I assume, be unconstitutional”). Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 286 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (expressing the opinion that a one-House veto of agency regulations would be unobjectionable, but adding that it “would be considerably different if Congress itself purported to adopt and propound regulations by the action of both Houses”).

 As I have emphasized, in this case, the Comptroller General is assigned functions that require him to make policy determinations that bind the Nation. I note only that this analysis need not call into question the Comptroller General’s performance of numerous existing functions that may not rise to this level. See ante, at 734-735, n. 9.

 The fact that Congress specified a joint resolution as the fallback provision has another significance as well. For it reveals the congressional intent that, if the Comptroller General could not exercise the prescribed functions, Congress wished to perform them itself, rather than delegating them, for instance, to an independent agency or to an Executive Branch official. This choice shows that Congress intended that the important functions of the Act be no further from itself than the Comptroller General.

 In considering analogous problems, our state courts have consistently recognized the importance of strict adherence to constitutionally mandated *757procedures in the legislative process. See, e. g., State v. A. L. I. V. E. Voluntary, 606 P. 2d 769, 773, 777 (Alaska 1980) (“Of course, when the legislature wishes to act in an advisory capacity it may act by resolution. However, when it means to take action having a binding effect on those outside the legislature it may do so only by following the enactment procedures. Other state courts have so held with virtual unanimity. . . . The fact that it can delegate legislative power to others who are not bound by article II does not mean that it can delegate the same power to itself and, in the process, escape from the constraints under which it must operate”); People v. Tremaine, 252 N. Y. 27, 44 168 N. E. 817, 822 (1929) (“If the power to approve the segregation of lump sum appropriations may be delegated to any one, even to one or two members of the Legislature, it necessarily follows that the power to segregate such appropriations may also be conferred upon such delegates. ... To visualize an extreme case, one lump sum appropriation might be made to be segregated by the committee chairmen. Such a delegation of legislative power would be abhor[r]ent to all our notions of legislation on the matter of appropriations”).

 I have previously noted my concern about the need for a “due process of lawmaking” even when Congress has acted with bicameralism and presentment. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 549, and n. 24 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U. S. 73, 98, and n. 11 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). When a legislature’s agent is given powers to act without even the formalities of the legislative process, these concerns are especially prominent.

 See also Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 983, 1067, n. 430 (1975) (“A delegation which disperses power is not necessarily constitutionally equivalent to one which concentrates power in the hands of the delegating agency”); Ginnane, 66 Harv. L. Rev., at 595 (“It is a non sequitur to say that, since a statute can delegate a power to someone not bound by the procedure prescribed in the Constitution for Congress’ exercise of the power, it can therefore ‘delegate’ the power to Congress free of constitutional restrictions on the manner of its exercise”).

 Justice Blackmun suggests that Congress may delegate legislative power to one of its own agents as long as it does not retain “tight control” over that agent. Post, at 779, n. 1. His suggestion is not faithful to the rationale of Chadha because no component of Congress, not even one of its Houses, is subject to the “tight control” of the entire Congress. For instance, the Congressional Research Service, whose primary function is to respond to congressional research requests, 2 U. S. C. § 166, apparently would not fall within Justice Blackmun’s “tight control” test because Congress has guaranteed the Service “complete research independence and the maximum practicable administrative independence consistent with these objectives.” § 166(b)(2). I take it, however, that few would doubt the unconstitutionality of assigning the functions at issue in this case to the Congressional Research Service. Moreover, Chadha surely forecloses the suggestion that because delegation of legislative power to an independent agency is acceptable, such power may also be delegated to a component or an agent of Congress. Finally, with respect to Justice Blackmun’s emphasis on Presidential appointment of the Comptroller General, post, at 778,-779, n. 1, as I have previously pointed out, other obvious congressional agents, such as the Librarian of Congress, the Architect of the Capitol, and the Public Printer are also appointed by the President. See n. 9, supra.