Court Opinion

ID: 9382479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 19:10:41.977146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.671289
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                 January 2023 Term                         FILED
                                                                    March 27, 2023
                            _____________________
                                                                        released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                 No. 21-0784                        SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                         OF WEST VIRGINIA
                            _____________________

            JODY OELSCHLAGER, D.V.M. and CHARLES WILSON
                       Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners,

                                        v.

      GAREN E. FRANCIS, DIANA L. FRANCIS, and DANIEL E. FRANCIS
                    Defendants Below, Respondents.

       ___________________________________________________________

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court of Marshall County
                    The Honorable Jeffrey D. Cramer, Judge
                           Civil Action No. 20-C-64(C)

                               AFFIRMED
        _________________________________________________________

                           Submitted: February 1, 2023
                             Filed: March 27, 2023

D. Kevin Coleman, Esq.                         Thomas E. White, Esq.
Farmer, Cline & Campbell, PLLC                 White Law Office
Morgantown, West Virginia                      Moundsville, West Virginia
Counsel for the Petitioners                    Counsel for the Respondents

JUSTICE WOOTON delivered the Opinion of the Court.
                             SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit

court made after a bench trial, a two-pronged deferential standard of review is applied. The

final order and the ultimate disposition are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard,

and the circuit court’s underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous

standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Pub. Citizen, Inc.

v. First Nat.’l Bank in Fairmont, 198 W. Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538 (1996).

              2.     “To reform a deed on the ground of mistake, the mistake must be

mutual (that is, participated in by both parties), and must be made out, by clear and

convincing proof, beyond reasonable controversy; and in no case will it be made to the

injury of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.” Syl. Pt. 2, Robinson v. Braiden,

44 W. Va. 183, 28 S.E. 798 (1897).

              3.     “A party is not entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser, without

notice, unless he looks to every part of the title he is purchasing, neglecting no source of

information respecting it which common prudence suggests.” Syl. Pt. 2, Pocahontas

Tanning Co. v. St. Lawrence Boom & Mfg. Co., 63 W. Va. 685, 60 S.E. 890 (1908).

                                             i
WOOTON, Justice:

              The Petitioners, Jody L. Oelschlager, D.V.M. and Charles K. Wilson, appeal

the circuit court’s final order entered September 1, 2021, denying them declaratory relief

in which they sought to reform a 2009 deed due to mutual mistake, and finding that the

respondents Garen E. Francis, Diana L. Francis and Daniel E. Francis were bona fide

purchasers of the subject property who did not have notice that there was a mistake in the

2009 deed. 1 The petitioners argue that the circuit court erred: 1) in determining that the

respondents were bona fide purchasers of the garage tract; and 2) in finding that the

petitioners’ burden required proof of actual bad faith (“mala fides”) by the respondents.

After considering the parties’ briefs, oral arguments, the appendix record, the applicable

law, and all other matters before the Court, we find that the circuit court committed no

error and affirm the court’s decision.

                          I. Facts and Procedural Background

              In 1997, the petitioners purchased property located at 2203 First Street in

Moundsville, West Virginia. Petitioner Oelschlager, a licensed veterinarian, maintained

her veterinary practice (The Family Pet Practice, also referred to as the “veterinary practice

property”) at this location from 1997 until 2016.

       1
        The circuit court held a bench trial on the issue of whether the respondents were
bona fide purchasers before making a decision in this case.
                                              1
              On June 24, 2002, the petitioners purchased property at 2205 First Street,

which was located next door to The Family Pet Practice. This property included a residence

fronting onto First Street and a detached two-car garage at the rear of the property that

faced a side alleyway. The petitioners used the detached garage as additional off-street

parking for the veterinary practice and a portion of the yard for dog walking and collection

of samples when needed. 2

              In 2009 the petitioners listed the 2205 First Street property with realtor

Denise Pavlik (“realtor Pavlik”), who worked for Paull Associates. The sales listing

provided that the “Garage on rear of property DOES NOT convey; owner will work with

any potential buyer for access to one side of the garage.” On September 4, 2009, the

petitioners entered into a “Real Estate Purchase Agreement” (“purchase agreement”) with

Thomas G. Hunt in which he agreed to purchase the 2205 First Street property for $62,500.

An addendum to the purchase agreement, executed the same day, provided: “Buyer is

aware that the garage DOES NOT convey with this property as stated on MLS sheet 11171.

Seller will obtain a survey with new boundaries lines.” Further, the appraisal of the

       2
         In December, 2007, the petitioners filed a petition with the Moundsville Planning
Commission (“the planning commission”) seeking to subdivide the 2205 First Street
property into two tracts, severing the rear garage and a small portion of the yard from the
house and remaining yard. In early 2008, the proposed subdivision was approved for the
2205 First Street property. The subdivision plat was recorded in the county clerk’s office
on April 1, 2008; however, the recorded plat was not indexed in the name of either of the
petitioners. It was undisputed that the respondents could not have discovered the
subdivision plat in a title examination.
                                             2
property commissioned by Mr. Hunt’s lender noted that the two-car garage was not

included in the valuation and sale of the property as it previously had been severed from

the property by the sellers, the petitioners herein.

               Despite the aforementioned facts, the petitioners’ deed transferring the 2205

First Street property to Mr. Hunt (also referred to as the “Hunt property”), dated November

10, 2009, and prepared by Attorney J. Thomas Madden (“Attorney Madden”) at the request

of realtor Pavlik, conveyed the entire property including the garage to Mr. Hunt. Both of

the petitioners executed the deed, which was then recorded in the county clerk’s office.

Thereupon Mr. Hunt moved into the 2205 First Street property, and resided there until his

death in 2016. 3 At the time of his death his deed of trust on the property remained

unsatisfied.

               Attorney Madden used the same description contained in the petitioners’

2002 deed as the description of the property being conveyed in the deed to Hunt, which

description did not exclude the garage. The petitioners claim that the conveyance of the

entire property was a mistake which resulted from realtor Pavlik’s failure to inform

Attorney Madden that the garage tract was excluded from the sale and was not to be

included in the description in the deed. Realtor Pavlik confirmed this mistake in her

       3
         During this time between the sale and Mr. Hunt’s death, the petitioners continued
to use and maintain the two-car garage and a portion of the yard for The Family Pet Practice
and its clients.
                                               3
testimony during the bench trial. She stated that she had the documents – the purchase

agreement and listing from the 2009 sale – that established the mistake. She further

testified that these documents were not public records and could not have been discovered

in any search.

                 In 2017, the petitioners listed the veterinary practice property located at 2203

First Street for sale with realtor Paull Associates. The listing for the veterinary practice

property provided that the “garage is part of the property.” A copy of the sales listing was

placed in the window of the veterinary practice building for public viewing.

                 On September 6th and 13th, 2019, the substitute trustee published a legal

advertisement for a foreclosure sale of the Hunt property to occur on September 16, 2019,

at the front door of the courthouse. The respondents decided to purchase the Hunt property

at the foreclosure sale.

                 On September 11, 2019, five days prior to the respondents’ purchase of the

Hunt property at the foreclosure sale, respondent Diana Francis called Paull Associates’

office and spoke with realtor Erin Fonner (“realtor Fonner”) about the general listing of the

veterinary practice property, which was next door to the Hunt property. Realtor Fonner

testified that Mrs. Francis specifically inquired whether the garage was being sold with the

veterinary practice and realtor Fonner told her that it was.

                                                 4
                Subsequently, on or about September 13, 2019, respondents Daniel Francis

and Garen Francis conducted a title examination on the Hunt property at the courthouse

and determined that Mr. Hunt owned the house and the garage; that the deed of trust was

on both the house and garage; and that the entire property, including the garage, was being

sold at foreclosure, as indicated in both the foreclosure advertisement and the trustee’s deed

to the respondents. There was no document of record indicating the petitioners still owned

the garage. 4

                Realtor Pavlik testified that on September 16, 2019 – the day the respondents

purchased the Hunt property at the foreclosure sale – respondent Garen Francis called her

to ask whether the garage was being sold by the petitioners with the sale of The Family Pet

Practice property. Ms. Pavlik confirmed that the garage was being sold with the property.

Garen Francis testified that after he purchased the Hunt property at the foreclosure sale he

“called the lawyer [who was the trustee] in Charleston that sold the house on foreclosure

and double checked with them, and they assured me that the garage went with the property

I purchased.” Thereafter, on September 24, 2019, respondent Daniel Francis called realtor

       4
         As previously mentioned, the respondents could not have located (and did not
locate) the subdivision plat because it was not indexed under the petitioners’ names. See
supra note 2.
                                              5
Pavlik and informed her that the petitioners did not own the garage and should remove the

garage from their real estate listing. 5

                Realtor Pavlik apprised the petitioners of the respondents’ claimed

ownership of the garage. A joint stipulation indicated that the petitioners had made no

inquiry of the foreclosure sale of the Hunt property and did not see the legal advertisement

for the sale.

                On May 14, 2020, the petitioners filed their “Complaint for Declaratory and

Other Relief” alleging that, due to a mutual mistake, the 2009 deed transferring the

petitioners’ entire property located at 2205 First Street to the respondents’ predecessor-in-

title, Mr. Hunt, contained an error; that the petitioners and Mr. Hunt each had agreed that

the petitioners would continue to own the rear half of the 2205 First Street property,

specifically including a two-car garage; and that neither the petitioners nor Mr. Hunt were

aware of the mistake in the deed description at the time of its execution or at any time

during Mr. Hunt’s ownership of the 2205 First Street residence. Further, they alleged that

the respondents had knowledge of the petitioners’ claim of ownership of the garage and

were thus precluded from claiming status as bona fide purchasers. The respondents

       5
         Both respondents Garen Francis and Diana Francis also testified that Mrs. Francis
called petitioner Oelschlager after realtor Pavlik gave Mrs. Francis the petitioner’s phone
number. Mrs. Francis stated that she left a voicemail message, but petitioner Oelschlager
did not return that call.
                                              6
answered the complaint, and subsequently the parties filed the joint stipulation of the

relevant facts with the court in support of their cross-motions for summary judgment.

              Following the filing of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the

circuit court conducted a bench trial on August 10, 2021, to hear testimony on the issue of

whether the respondents were bona fide purchasers. 6 By order entered on September 1,

2021, the court found that the respondents were bona fide purchasers and that the

petitioners had failed to prove their entitlement to declaratory judgment relief. This appeal

followed.

                                 II. Standard of Review

              Both of the petitioners’ alleged errors arise from the findings of fact and

conclusions of law made by the circuit court after conducting a bench trial. We have

previously held that

                     [i]n reviewing challenges to the findings and
              conclusions of the circuit court made after a bench trial, a two-
              pronged deferential standard of review is applied. The final
              order and the ultimate disposition are reviewed under an abuse
              of discretion standard, and the circuit court’s underlying
              factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
              standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.

       6
         As previously indicated, each of the respondents testified and the petitioners
presented the testimony of the two real estate agents involved, realtor Fonner and realtor
Pavlik; however, neither of the petitioners testified.
                                             7
Syl. Pt. 1, Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. First Nat.’l Bank in Fairmont, 198 W. Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d

538 (1996); see also Syl. Pt. 3, Cox v. Amick, 195 W. Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995) (“A

circuit court’s entry of a declaratory judgment is reviewed de novo.”). With these standards

in mind, we examine the issues before us.

                                      III. Discussion

               The petitioners first argue that the respondents had actual knowledge that the

petitioners were seeking to sell the subject garage located on the Hunt property as part of

the sale of the petitioners’ adjacent veterinary practice property. They contend that the

respondents “understood that Petitioners claimed ownership of the garage” prior to their

purchase of the subject property at the foreclosure sale. The petitioners’ claim of “actual

knowledge” is based on phone calls made by the respondents, Diana Francis and Garen

Francis, to the petitioners’ realtor concerning the real estate listing of the petitioners’

veterinary practice property. The petitioners contend that when the realtor told the

respondents that the petitioners’ listing included the garage, the respondents were on notice

of a “‘suspicious circumstance’” that placed them “‘upon inquiry.’” Stickley v. Thorn, 87

W. Va. 673, 678, 106 S.E. 240, 242 (“‘A bona fide pur[c]haser of land is one who purchases

for a valuable consideration, paid or parted with, without notice of any suspicious

circumstances to put him upon inquiry.’ [Syl. Pt. 2,] Carpenter Paper Co. v. Wilcox, 50

Neb. 659, 70 N. W. 228 [(1897)].”). Despite this “actual knowledge,” the petitioners

contend that

                                              8
              [t]he only action Respondents took subsequent to being
              advised of Petitioners[’] listing of the garage was to conduct a
              search of the County Clerk’s records which uncovered the
              2009 deed from Petitioners to Hunt. The deed to Hunt was
              clearly contrary to Petitioners[’] claim of ownership in the
              garage. Despite the clear conflict between the 2009 deed and
              Petitioners’ listing of the garage for sale in 2017, Respondents
              took no further action to investigate.

The petitioners argue that “[a] simple inquiry would have revealed to Respondents that Mr.

Hunt never owned the garage and that the garage was included in his deed by mistake.”

Further, the petitioners argue that

                     Respondents’ search of county land records did not
              make them bona fide purchasers. Respondents’ records search
              would have revealed one of two things - either Petitioners sold
              the garage to Hunt in 2009 and were now attempting to sell it
              again, or the 2009 deed to Hunt was in error. Respondents
              were free to take the chance that Hunt’s deed was correct but
              that did not insulate them from the consequences of a mutual
              mistake in the 2009 deed. They were not innocent purchasers
              and cannot now be heard to complain when a reasonable
              investigation would have revealed the mistake in the deed.

              This Court held in syllabus point two of Robinson v. Braiden, 44 W. Va. 183,

28 S.E. 798 (1897), that

                     [t]o reform a deed on the ground of mistake, the mistake
              must be mutual (that is, participated in by both parties), and
              must be made out, by clear and convincing proof, beyond
              reasonable controversy; and in no case will it be made to the
              injury of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

44 W. Va. at 183, 28 S.E. at 798, Syl. Pt. 2.

                                                9
              Relying heavily upon the following syllabus points enunciated in Pocahontas

Tanning Co. v. St. Lawrence Boom & Manufacturing Co., 63 W. Va. 685, 60 S.E. 890

(1908), the petitioners focus on notice and claim that the respondents had actual knowledge

of the petitioners’ ownership interest in the garage:

              1.     Whatever is sufficient to direct the attention of a
              purchaser to prior rights and equities of third parties, so as to
              put him on inquiry into ascertaining their nature, will operate
              as notice.

              2.      A party is not entitled to protection as a bona fide
              purchaser, without notice, unless he looks to every part of the
              title he is purchasing, neglecting no source of information
              respecting it which common prudence suggests.

              3.      That which fairly puts a party on inquiry is regarded as
              sufficient notice, if the means of knowledge are at hand; and a
              purchaser, having sufficient knowledge to put him on inquiry,
              or being informed of circumstances which ought to lead to such
              inquiry, is deemed to be sufficiently notified to deprive him of
              the character of an innocent purchaser.

              4.      If one has knowledge or information of facts sufficient
              to put a reasonable man on inquiry, as to the existence of some
              right or title in conflict with that which he is about to purchase,
              he is bound to prosecute the same; and, if he wholly neglects
              to make inquiry, the law will charge him with knowledge of all
              facts that such inquiry would have afforded.

Id., Syl. Pts. 1, 2, 3, & 4. (emphasis added); see also Goddard v. Hockman, 246 W. Va.

661, 874 S.E.2d 773 (2022) (applying third syllabus point of Pocahontas Tanning). Based

on the law set forth in Pocahontas Tanning, the petitioners contend the respondents’

contact with the petitioners’ realtor, which revealed that the petitioners had listed the

garage as part of their veterinary practice property, constituted sufficient notice to defeat

the respondents’ bona fide purchaser status.

                                               10
              However, a closer examination of the facts in Pocahontas Tanning 7 reveals

that the case fails to support the petitioners’ argument. Specifically, the disputed restriction

at issue in Pocahontas Tanning was present in the recorded deeds and would have been

revealed by a thorough title search. Indeed, syllabus point two of Pocahontas Tanning

specifically indicates that if a purchaser has “look[ed]to every part of the title he is

purchasing” and still does not have notice, then he is a bona fide purchaser. See 63 W. Va.

at 685, 60 S.E. at 890, Syl. Pt. 2. In this case the respondents “look[ed] to every part of the

title [they were] purchasing,” and still did not have notice, for the reason that there were

       7
          In Pocahontas Tanning, the issue before the Court concerned which party,
Pocahontas Tanning or St. Lawrence Boom & Manufacturing, had the rights to timber on
certain disputed property. 63 W. Va. at 686-87, 60 S.E. at 890. A prior deed conveying the
disputed property contained the following language: “But the pine and hemlock timber
which are or were on this land are now hereby conveyed, as they were sold many years ago
and were probably long since cut and removed.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court found
that there was a “clerical error” in the language, but in the context of the entire sentence,
the word should have been “not” instead of “now.” Thus, this reservation in the deed put
McGraw on notice that the timber was not conveyed to him despite its omission in other
deeds. Id. at 691-92, 60 S.E. at 892. The Court’s decision ultimately turned on whether
Pocahontas Tanning, as a purchaser from McGraw, also should have been on notice of
previous conveyances in McGraw’s chain of title. The Court found that the references in
the recorded deeds should have been sufficient to put McGraw on notice of timber rights
of others. Id. at 695, 60 S.E. at 894. Thus, the Court found that an inquiry conducted with
“common prudence” also would have put Pocahontas Tanning on notice that the timber
rights had been conveyed. Id. & Syl. Pt. 5 (“One who has taken deed for land, purporting
on its face to convey all interests therein, but with reservation of pine and hemlock timber,
and recital that such timber on the land has been sold, and afterwards acquires by deed
without such reservation outstanding interest found to exist in title to the land, not conveyed
by the former deed, is chargeable with notice of the rights of another, whom, by common
prudence, he would have found to be owner of such timber by purchase prior to the deed
containing such reservation and recital, and, as to that other, is not an innocent purchaser
of interest in such timber by said deed for the outstanding interest.”).
                                              11
no recorded deeds or other records which would have put the respondents on notice. 8 See

id.

              Moreover, the evidence herein demonstrates that the respondents had no

knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the sale of the 2205 First Street property to

Mr. Hunt in 2009, including the addendum to the sales contract with Mr. Hunt to the effect

that he was not purchasing the garage; no knowledge that the petitioners had the property

subdivided; no contact or conversation with Mr. Hunt prior to his death regarding the

garage; and no knowledge of the petitioners’ use or maintenance of the garage during Mr.

Hunt’s lifetime. To the contrary, all the respondents knew was that the petitioners signed

and recorded a deed conveying a house and garage to the mesne assignee, Mr. Hunt; that

there was a deed of trust on the house and garage; that the described property being sold at

the foreclosure sale included both the house and garage; and that the petitioners were

nevertheless purporting to include the garage in a sale of the adjacent veterinary practice

property.

       8
         The case of Harper v. Smith, 232 W. Va. 655, 753, S.E.2d 612 (2012), relied upon
by the petitioners, is also distinguishable. In Harper, a declaratory judgment case
involving dispute over ownership of a parcel of property in Mingo County, the Court
affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the respondent, Gavin
Smith. Id. at 656, 753 S.E.2d at 613. The issue before the Court was whether Mr. Smith
was a bona fide purchaser of the property. The Court ultimately decided the case by
determining that the petitioners, the Harpers, lacked standing to challenge Mr. Smith’s
bona fide purchaser status; nonetheless, the Court went on to determine that the circuit
court erred in finding that Mr. Smith was a bona fide purchaser where “he was on notice
of a potential defect in the tax deed received by Marquis because notice of the right to
redeem was not served upon the Bank of New York.” Id. at 660, 753 S.E.2d at 617.
                                            12
              The circuit court concluded that

              [t]he testimony of the defendants was clearly to the effect that
              they thought that the plaintiffs were just wrong about owning
              the garage, rather than having some suspicion that there was
              perhaps some ancient mistake that needed remedied. Such a
              belief would be reasonable based on the facts. Such reasonable
              belief makes them bona fide purchasers.

                     ....

              27.    The defendants could not possibly be on notice of
              whether any mistake was mutual between the plaintiffs and a
              deceased person they never met. To require purchasers to
              search for a mutual mistake between such remote conveyers to
              be bona fide purchasers will not be commissioned by this
              Court.

              28.    The plaintiffs signed the mistaken deed. Deeds are
              important documents. One is charged with knowing the
              contents thereof. Consequently, it was not just the realtor or the
              drafting attorney’s mistake. The plaintiffs joined in and
              approved the mistake. The mistake should be rested on the ones
              that make it, not someone ten years later who has no knowledge
              of the mistake and scant information to discover it.

Based upon our review of the appendix record, we cannot conclude that the court erred in

its determination that the respondents were bona fide purchasers. We therefore affirm the

court’s determination on this issue.

              The petitioners also argued that the circuit court erred in finding that they

had the burden to prove actual bad faith by the respondents. In support of this contention

the petitioners rely solely upon the following conclusion of law made by the court:

                                             13
                23.     Although the evidence shows the defendants did know
                that the plaintiffs were attempting to sell the garage with the
                veterinary property, the question is whether this knowledge, in
                the face of the mountain of public recordings to the contrary,
                was sufficient to assign them having acted in bad faith, or mala
                fides in continuing with their purchase. Were they suspicious
                enough to think the plaintiffs really owned the garage
                somehow despite public records, or did they just think the
                plaintiffs were wrong, and nothing needed to be remedied? The
                burden of proving mala fides is on the plaintiffs.

(Emphasis added). The petitioners contend that

                [u]nder the court’s view of Petitioners’ burden, it was
                insufficient for Petitioners to prove the Respondents had actual
                notice of Petitioners’ claim of ownership in the garage. The
                Court found that Petitioners had to prove both the
                Respondents’ knowledge of their claim but further that
                Respondents had a subjective belief that Petitioners[’] claim
                was legally correct - that “they really owned the garage
                somehow despite public records.”

                In contrast, the respondents argue that any issue as to the circuit court’s

reference to whether the evidence before it was sufficient to find the respondents had acted

in “bad faith” or “mala fides” in continuing with their purchase of the property is purely

semantic. They contend that the court’s use of the phrase “acted in bad faith” was simply

another way of saying that it was the petitioners’ burden to show the respondents lacked

“good faith” or “bona fide” purchaser status. See Bona Fide, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th

ed. 2019) (“Made in good faith[.]”); compare Mala Fide, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th

ed. 2019) (“In or with bad faith.”). 9 We agree with the respondents.

       9
           The petitioners did not dispute this position in their reply brief.
                                                14
                It is clear from the full text of the circuit court’s Conclusion of Law No. 23

that the court was simply stating the unexceptional proposition that it was the petitioners’

burden to establish that the respondents were not bona fide purchasers when they purchased

the disputed garage property at the foreclosure sale. As we have previously stated,

                [t]he rule is that ‘When a claim to protection as a bona fide
                purchaser for value and without notice is involved, the burden
                is on the party denying the validity of the purchase to prove
                notice of his equity, and upon the other party to prove good
                faith and payment of an adequate consideration.’ [Syl. Pt. 3,]
                Cassiday Fork Boom & Lumber Co. v. Terry, Trustee, 69
                W.Va. 572, 73 S.E. 278 [(1912)]. ‘He who avers that another
                purchased with notice of his superior right has the burden of
                proving such notice, either actual or constructive while such
                other must prove that he is a complete purchaser for a valuable
                consideration.’ [Syl. Pt. 5,] South Penn Oil Co. v. Blue Creek
                Development Co., 77 W.Va. 682, 88 S.E. 1029 [(1916)].

Johnston, 128 W. Va. at 107, 36 S.E.2d at 495. Succinctly stated, after considering all the

evidence the circuit court properly determined that the petitioners failed to present “clear

and convincing proof, beyond reasonable controversy” that the respondents had knowledge

of the mistake made in the petitioners’ prior deed. See Robinson, 44 W. Va. at 183, 28 S.E.

at 798, Syl. Pt. 2. 10

                                       IV. Conclusion

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s September 1, 2021, order.

        10
          The respondents also raise an issue as to the applicability of laches in this case;
however, because the respondents fail to assign error to the failure of the court to decide
the applicability of laches to preclude the petitioners’ request for the deed to be reformed,
we decline to address the issue. See W. Va. R. App. P. 10(f).
                                              15
     Affirmed.

16