Court Opinion

ID: 9548943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:10:55.081241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:39.479799
License: Public Domain

BERRY, Justice
(dissenting) :
I disagree with the majority opinion.
In my view where a city’s street improvements materially impair an abutting owner’s right of access to the street the abutting owner is entitled to compensation.
Art. II § 24, Okla.Const., provides:
“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. * * * ”
This section authorizes recovery for damages notwithstanding there is no physical invasion of plaintiff’s property if plaintiff suffers a special injury different in kind, and not in degree, from that suffered by the community in general. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Terminal Oil Mill Co., 180 Okl. 496, 71 P.2d 617; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 180 Okl. 604, 71 P.2d 693.
We have long recognized that a property owner has a right of access in the street upon which his property abuts, and whenever that right is cut off or materially impaired the abutting owner suffers an injury different in kind, and not merely in degree, from that suffered by the general public. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Terminal Oil Mill Co., supra; Grand River Dam Authority v. Misenhimer, 195 Okl. 682, 161 P.2d 757; Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Chandler, Okl., 316 P.2d 828.
In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Terminal Oil Mill Co., supra, we further stated :
“ * * * to recover damages for the obstruction of the street, it is not essential that the access to the property has been entirely cut off. * * * ”
The evidence indicates prior to the time the street improvements were made in this case plaintiff’s driveway was located at the far north edge of his property. Plaintiff’s TV shop was located south of the driveway and fronted on Flood Avenue. Plaintiff’s residence was located to the rear of the TV shop. A rental house was located upon the south portion of the plaintiff’s property.
The driveway was the sole means of ingress and egress to the TV shop and residence.
As a part of the street improvement the street was widened within the city’s preexisting right of way. This extended the street to within 3 feet of another commercial building located immediately north of plaintiff’s driveway.
Plaintiff testified after the improvements one backing from his driveway is unable to see traffic approaching from the north until his back wheels are protruding into the traffic lane. He admitted there is no barrier preventing southbound traffic from entering his driveway and that if no more than two vehicles are in the driveway one can turn around and pull out frontwards. He also testified if one drives out frontwards and gets to the extreme south side of the driveway at an angle heading southwest one can see by the corner of the building before the front end of the car enters the street. He testified this would take some effort.
The trial court determined any damages suffered by plaintiff were special damages and allowed the jury to determine the amount of such damages, if any.
This was in effect a finding as a matter of law that plaintiff’s right of access was materially impaired.
*1138In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Terminal Oil Mill Co., supra, we held that under the facts presented therein the issue of whether plaintiff’s right of ingress and egress had been materially impaired was a question of fact for the jury to determine. See also Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Chandler, supra; Henthorn v. Oklahoma City, Okl., 453 P.2d 1013.
If that line of authority is followed this case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to allow the jury to determine whether plaintiff’s right of ingress and egress has been materially impaired.
However, it is my opinion this issue should be a question of law for the court, [see Annotation, Access to Highway — Com-pensable Limitation, 42 A.L.R.3d 13, at p. 71] and in light of the undisputed evidence presented the trial court correctly determined that plaintiff’s right of ingress and egress was materially impaired by the street improvements.
City contends any impairment of access to plaintiff’s property was not caused by the improvements, but by construction of the adjacent building to within three feet of City’s right of way. I do not agree.
We have previously allowed property owners to recover for damages sustained when a city widened a street to the full extent of a pre-existing right of way.
In City of Tulsa v. Hindman, 128 Okl. 169, 261 P. 910, the owner constructed improvements to within 1.4 feet of the City’s right of way and the City then widened the street to its full width. We affirmed a judgment for the owner for depreciation in the market value of his property. We stated the question was whether a city is liable to an abutting owner for destruction of a sidewalk by converting it into a street or automobile traffic.
However, we stated:
“ * * * before answering the question, to restrict it to the particular subject matter, can such be done without adequate compensation for all resulting injuries to the property when this street * * * is extended up to 18 inches of one of plaintiff’s buildings intended for habitation or business ?
“We think not. * * * ”
This clearly indicates plaintiff there was not only allowed to recover damages resulting from removal of the sidewalk, but was also allowed to recover damages resulting from widening of the street to within 18 inches of plaintiff’s buildings. This recovery was allowed even though plaintiff had constructed his buildings to within 18 inches of the pre-existing right of way.
The City further contends plaintiff admitted the parking lot on the south portion of his tract was adequate to handle all of his business traffic and access to the parking lot was not impaired.
Plaintiff’s testimony does indicate after the street improvements were made he removed the rental house from the south portion of his property and constructed a parking lot in its place. It can reasonably be inferred plaintiff was compelled to do this due to the impairment of access to his driveway.
I do not believe the City should be allowed to rely upon plaintiff’s subsequent actions to mitigate damages. See Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Burk, Okl., 415 P.2d 1001.
I agree damages resulting from construction of a center median are not generally considered compensable damages.
However, in the present case it would be difficult to apportion damages between those arising from widening of the street and those resulting from installation of the center median. In similar circumstances we have allowed recovery for all damages resulting from the street improvements. State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Aker, Okl., 507 P.2d 1227; State ex rel. Dept. of Highways v. Bowles, Okl., 472 P.2d 896.
*1139There was evidence the street improvements impaired the value of plaintiff’s property.
It is my opinion the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
For the above reasons I respectfully dissent.