Court Opinion

ID: 9607918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:03:16.183233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:17.129805
License: Public Domain

Davis, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision inasmuch as it finds that K.A.R. 40-3-50 exceeds the scope of statutoiy authority granted to the Kansas Insurance Department (KID) by K.S.A. 40-1117. I would find that the regulation was within the power granted to KID by K.S.A. 40-1117.
K.S.A. 40-1117 mandates that a rating company provide to an insured information used in determining the insured’s rate. K.A.R. 40-3-50 reflects a determination on the part of KID that the free *545distribution of this rating information is a part of the basic service to which an insured is entitled simply by paying an insurance premium. I would find that this is a valid exercise of KID’s authority under the Kansas Insurance Act.
The purpose of the Kansas Insurance Act is to “promote the public welfare by regulating insurance rates to the end that they shall not be excessive, inadequate and unfairly discriminatory arid to authorize and regulate cooperation among insurers in rate making and other matters under the scope of this act.” K.S.A. 40-1111. A necessary part of this regulation includes the ability of KID to determine what services should be included in the premium rates charged by insurance companies. See generally K.S.A. 40-1111 et seq. Absent such ability, an insurance company could escape regulation by simply reducing the services it provides as a part of the basic premium and charging additional costs for such services, even though the services should rightfully be a part of the basic insurance package.
K.A.R. 40-3-50 fulfills the basic purpose behind the Kansas Insurance Act, which is to regulate insurance rates so that they are not- excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. K.S.A. 40-1117 mandates that an insured be provided with information which affects the insured’s rate. It is appropriate that the information be provided free of charge to ensure that such information be widely available to insureds. By requiring that the costs associated with providing this information be reflected in the costs of insurance premiums, the KID makes certain that these costs are subject to its review rather than completely unregulated.
The majority opinion recognizes that a specialized agency interpreting a statute which it has the duty to implement should be granted, deference if the agency’s statutory interpretation is supported by a rational basis. See State Dept. of Administration v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 257 Kan. 275, 281, 894 P.2d 777 (1995). K.A.R. 40-3-50 has a rational basis, and I would find that it is a valid exercise of the authorization granted by K.S.A. 40-1117.
Once the question of whether K.A.R. 40-3-50 is a valid exercise of the authorization granted to KID is determined, the question of whether the regulation is constitutional is easily settled. While *546NCCI argues that forcing it to provide worksheets to insureds and their agents free of charge represents a taking without compensation contrary to the 5th Amendment, it is clear that the regulation does not force NCCI to forego compensation for its services. Instead, the regulation merely requires NCCI to seek compensation from its insurance carriers rather than insureds and their agents. Thus, K.A.R. 40-3-50 is not a taking, as it does not diminish the value of NCCI’s distribution services but simply dictates who NCCI can charge for distribution fees.
Because I believe that K.A.R. 40-3-50 is a valid exercise of regulatory authority and is not a taking of property without just compensation, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.
Six, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.