Court Opinion

ID: 9753604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:20:00.237546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:39.000369
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION by
Judge McCullough.
I concur in the result reached by the Majority. I agree that the Community College of Beaver County (College), as a legal entity, falls within the definition of “person” set forth at section 2(2) of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (CPL)1 and is subject to private actions brought under section 9.2 of the CPL.21 also agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the claims set forth in the complaint sound in contract, rather than tort. However, I respectfully diverge from the focus of the Majority’s analysis.
The instant action was filed by a group of students (Students) who were enrolled in the College’s police academy training program (Academy) and had completed a substantial portion of their training when the Academy lost its Act 120 certification.3 As a consequence, the credits Students earned are likely of little use towards obtaining Act 120 certification necessary to obtain employment in the field of law enforcement. Students filed a two-count complaint against the College; relevant here, Students allege that the College committed numerous unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of the CPL.4
The threshold question raised in this appeal is whether the College is subject to *612private actions brought under section 9.2 of the CPL. In deciding this issue, I believe the Majority considers questions neither raised nor necessary to decide for purposes of this appeal. In contrast to the Majority’s approach, I would confíne our analysis to the issues raised by the parties.
The College asserts that it is not subject to the CPL, based in part on the assertion that it is not a “person,” which term is defined by section 2(2) of the CPL as “natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other legal entities.” 73 P.S. § 201-2(2). Like the Majority, I disagree.
The College contends that, as a general principle, the word “person” does not include a government entity unless the same is expressly included in the statutory definition.5 In support of this argument, the College relies on decisions in other jurisdictions, particularly, Leonard v. Masterson, 70 A.D.3d 697, 896 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2010). The petitioner in Leonard owned property surrounded by land owned by the county. The petitioner sought to establish a private road over part of the county’s land pursuant to a state statute that essentially provides for a private condemnation proceeding. (Highway Law §§ 300 et seq.) The issue on appeal in Leonard was whether the legislature intended to provide that land owned by a government entity may be the subject of such a proceeding. The court observed that the statutory language at issue referred to a “person or persons” through whose land the private road is to pass. The court relied on previous New York decisions to affirm the denial of the petition, observing “it has long been the law ... that the term ‘person’ generally does not include a government entity unless a statutory definition expressly includes that governmental entity within the meaning of the term.” Id. at 360.
I agree with the Majority that the holding in Leonard is inapplicable here; indeed, I believe that the statute, facts, and policy concerns in Leonard are so distinguishable as to render any reference to that case of no value.
More important, no Pennsylvania court has issued a similarly explicit holding. Relying on Huffman v. Borough of Millvale, 139 Pa.Cmwlth. 349, 591 A.2d 1137 (1991), the College claims that our courts have applied a substantially comparable principle in construing a statutory definition. However, I believe that the College’s reliance on Huffman is misplaced. Huffman involved an injured borough police officer who filed a complaint alleging that the borough failed to compensate him for holiday, vacation and sick leave benefits. On appeal, this Court first addressed the trial court’s determination that the police officer had no cause of action under the Wage Payment and Collection Law (Wage Law)6 because the Wage Law does not apply to municipalities. At issue was the Wage Law’s definition of “employer,” which includes “every person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, receiver or other officer of a court of this Commonwealth and any agent or officer of any of the above-mentioned classes employing people in this Commonwealth.”7 We noted that *613“boroughs” are not included within the statutory definition of an “employer” under the Wage Law, and we relied on the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius to affirm the trial court’s conclusion, reasoning as follows:
Municipal corporations such as the Borough are not included within the definition of “employer,” and we, as an appellate court, cannot expand the definition of “employer” to include them. There is a clear distinction between municipal and private corporations and, if the legislature wished that municipal corporations be covered by the Law, it could have easily included them. We apply the legal maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius which directs that the mention of a specific matter in a statute implies the exclusion of others not mentioned. Samilo v. Pennsylvania Insurance Department, 98 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 232, 510 A.2d 412 (1986).
Huffman, 591 A.2d at 1139 (footnote omitted). Subsequently, in Philipsburg-Osceola Education Association v. Philipsburg-Osceola Area School District, 159 Pa.Cmwlth. 124, 633 A.2d 220, 223 (1993), we relied on our analysis in Huffman to hold that a school district was not an employer under the Wage Law. (“The legislature could have easily included municipal corporations or, for that matter, school districts under its definition of employer, but it did not. We therefore decline to extend the Wage Law to school district employers.”)
These cases have been cited for the propositions that: (1) the Wage Law does not apply to municipal employees; and (2) the court will not supply a missing term in a statute. Neither case has been cited for the principle that a statute does not apply to a government entity unless the statute specifically so provides. Notably, neither is part of a “line of cases” holding that the legislature did not intend to include governmental entities within a listing of persons and entities which might technically encompass them where it did not expressly include the governmental entity in such listing.
The College cites In re Keifer, 430 Pa. 491, 243 A.2d 336 (1968), for the established principle of statutory construction that “an act does not deprive the Commonwealth of any prerogative, right or property, as would a statute of limitations, unless the Commonwealth is specifically named therein or unless an intention to include the Commonwealth is necessarily implied. When the act is an expression of “public policy,” however, the general rule does not apply.” Id. at 495, 243 A.2d at 339 (citations omitted). Keifer was an eminent domain proceeding that addressed whether a statute of limitations barred the state from accepting a dedication of land. Concluding that the statute was not an expression of public policy, the court in Keifer held that it did not apply against the Commonwealth. The College also relies on the decision in Hoffman v. Pittsburgh, 365 Pa. 386, 398, 75 A.2d 649, 654 (1950) (“It is axiomatic that a statute is never presumed to deprive the state of any prerogative, right, or property unless the intention to do so is clearly manifest, either by its express terms or necessary implication”). The court in Hoffman held that an ordinance adopted by the City of Pittsburgh pursuant to a statute did not authorize the City to acquire a fee simple title in property owned by the Commonwealth.
Both of these cases are factually distinguishable from the present matter in an important respect: they involved the status of the Commonwealth, rather than a local government agency. Moreover, the College cites no Pennsylvania case applying such a principle to other governmental entities. The distinction between sovereign and governmental entities is well rec*614ognized in Pennsylvania. For example, in affording protection from liability in actions sounding in tort, the legislature has separately provided for sovereign immunity and governmental immunity. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8521-22 (related to sovereign immunity) and 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-42 (related to governmental immunity). With respect to more general legal principles, I note that in Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chemical, 389 Pa.Super. 11, 566 A.2d 591 (1989), the court held that a community college could not assert the doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi (time , does not run against the king) because the community college was not a commonwealth agency.
Accordingly, I agree with the Majority that the College’s arguments are without merit. I also would note Students’ response to the College’s argument that the failure to explicitly include a community college or governmental entity in the CPL’s definition of “person” precludes the application of the statute to those entities: the CPL expressly identifies those entities that are not subject to its provisions.

Unlawful acts or practices; exclusions

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce as defined by subclauses (i) through (xxi) of clause (4) of section 2 of this act and regulations promulgated under section 3.1 of this act are hereby declared unlawful. The provisions of this act shall not apply to any owner, agent or employe of any radio or television station, or to any owner, publisher, printer, agent or employe of an Internet service provider or a newspaper or other publication, periodical or circular, who, in good faith and without knowledge of the falsity or deceptive character thereof, publishes, causes to be published or takes part in the publication of such advertisement.
73 P.S. § 201-3. As Students point out, the legislature did not include community colleges or governmental entities of any kind in this provision.8
Finally, I agree that a review of the averments establishes that the protection of bargained-for expectations is implicated in this case. Accordingly, I join the Majority in concluding that the College is not immune from Students’ claims under the CPL.
However, I believe that the Majority unnecessarily considers issues that are in no way implicated in this appeal. To the extent that this part of the Majority’s analysis is other than dicta, I am compelled to disagree.
Indeed, despite the “dual use” of the word “person” within the CPL, I believe it would be equally reasonable to conclude that the CPL’s various provisions reflect a legislative intent to provide two distinct methods of ensuring that the purpose of the statute is met. Significantly, the purpose of the CPL is to protect the public from fraud and unfair or deceptive business practices. Burke v. Yingling, 446 Pa.Super. 16, 666 A.2d 288 (1995); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Packet v. Ziomek, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 675, 352 A.2d 235, 238 (1976) (“The purpose of the General Assembly in passing the [CPL] was to protect citizens from unfair or deceptive practices, and the Legislature granted to the Attorney General the power to bring an action in the name of the Commonwealth for injunctive relief to protect the individual citizens.... ”). The CPL effectuates *615this purpose by permitting certain private and public actors to bring suit. Thus, section 9.2 of the CPL authorizes private actions to recover actual damages,9 and section 4 of the CPL authorizes the Attorney General or District Attorney to act in the public interest by bringing actions to restrain unlawful practices.10,11 73 P.S. §§ 201-4; 201-9.2; see also Portis v. River House Associates, L.P., 498 F.Supp.2d 746 (M.D.Pa.2007) (observing that the fact that a public actor may bring suit ensures that the CPL’s purpose can be realized even in those circumstances in which private actors can not file suit). Because the intent of the statute is to protect consumers, I question the Majority’s analysis concerning the protection afforded to governmental agencies by a transaction-purpose filter set forth in section 9.2 of the CPL. (Majority op. at 595) Contrary to the Majority’s view, I believe it would be reasonable to interpret this language as a restriction on parties who may bring a private action under the CPL.
Moreover, holding that all governmental entities are persons permitted to bring an action under section 9.2 of the CPL— which specifically authorizes “a private action” — overlooks the very meaning of the word “private,” which is “[rjelating or belonging to an individual, as opposed to the public or the government.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1815 (9th ed.2009).
Therefore, whereas the Majority sua sponte decides that all public entities are “persons” that can bring private actions and can be subject to suit under the CPL, I would simply hold that there is no legal basis to conclude that the College is not subject to the action brought by Students under section 9.2 of the CPL.12
*616Finally, I note that the College raises the issue of treble damages to argue that Students’ claims actually sound in tort. According to the College: section 9.2 allows for an award of treble damages; treble damages have been described as having “a strong punitive dynamic;” and punitive damages are not available for a breach of contract claim; therefore, Students’ averments under the CPL are, in fact, tort claims. As previously indicated, I agree with the Majority that Students’ averments sound in contract rather than tort. Having so concluded, I would dismiss outright the College’s argument “raising the specter of’ treble damages.

. Act of December 16, 1968, P.L. 1224, as amended, 73 P.S. § 201-2.

. Added by the Act of November 24, 1976, P.L. 1166, 73 P.S. § 201-9.2.

. The Municipal Police Officers Education and Training Act, 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 2161-70, is informally known as "Act 120.”

. Students’ complaint alleges "some fairly egregious failures on the part of the College,” as our Supreme Court described them, including the failure of Academy instructors to be properly certified to teach various courses and the Academy’s failure to accurately document student examination scores. Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County, 606 Pa. 539, 541-42, 2 A.3d 499, 500 (2010).

.A community college is a local governmental agency. Bucks County Community College v. Bucks County Board of Assessment Appeals, 147 Pa.Cmwlth. 505, 608 A.2d 622 (1992); Community College of Allegheny County v. Seibert, 144 Pa.Cmwlth. 616, 601 A.2d 1348 (1992).

. Act of July 14, 1961, P.L. 114, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 260.1-260.45.

. Section 2.1 of the Wage Law, added by the Act of July 14, 1977, P.L. 82, 43 P.S. § 260.2a.

. This provision, identifying parties to whom the CPL does not apply, distinguishes the CPL from statutes that specifically include state and local entities in their definitions of "person.”

. In relevant part, section 9.2(a) of the CPL, 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a) (emphasis added), states as follows:
(a) Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by section 3 of this act, may bring a private action to recover actual damages or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater.

. Section 4 of the CPL, 73 P.S. § 201-4, (emphasis added) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever the Attorney General ... has reason to believe that any person is using or is about to use any method, act or practice declared by section 3 of this act to be unlawful, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, he may bring an action in the name of the Commonwealth against such person to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the use of such method, act or practice.

. In Weinberg v. Sun Company, Inc., 565 Pa. 612, 777 A.2d 442 (2001), our Supreme Court recognized that there is a distinction between Commonwealth actions and private actions brought under the CPL. In Weinberg, purchasers of gasoline filed a consumer class action under the CPL, the consumer fraud laws of all other states, and common law, challenging the corporation’s advertising of the gasoline and alleging that the corporation's advertisements induced consumers to purchase the gas when their vehicles did not need the high level of octane the gas contained. The trial court denied class certification on the basis that requirements of numerosity and common questions were not met and individual questions of fact predominated. The Superior Court reversed as to two of the four CPL claims. On further appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court involved the interpretation of section 9.2 of the CPL, permitting a private right of action. The court reviewed section 4 of the CPL, applicable to the attorney general, and section 9.2, governing a private action, and concluded that "Commonwealth actions and private actions are readily distinguishable.” Id., 565 Pa. at 617, 777 A.2d at 445.

.Thus, unlike the dissenting view expressed by Judge Leavitt, I would not address the question of whether the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its agencies, political subdivi*616sions or any other governmental entity engages in “trade” or "commerce” that is regulated by the CPL. However, were this issue raised by either party on appeal, I believe that a statement to the effect that no such entity is engaged in trade or commerce, (Dissent, pages 1, 5), is factually and legally incorrect. (See the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board’s website directing users to its “retail page.”) Also, I am not persuaded that a breach of contract claim against the College is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In addition, I do not believe that it is necessary to revisit our decision in Commonwealth v. TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 885 A.2d 1127, 1143-44 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005), and consider again whether the Commonwealth has parens patriae standing to pursue damage claims of individuals under the CPL, where the issue in the present case is whether an action may be brought under the CPL against the College.
Finally, in answer to the query whether accountability under the CPL is needed, (Dissent, pages 608-09), I believe that the egregious conduct alleged here, see footnote 4, infra, suggests that such accountability is not redundant.
Moreover, in light of the specificity with which the phrase "unfair or deceptive acts or practices” is defined by section 2(4)(i)-(xxi) of the CPL, 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(i)-(xxi), and particularly in light of the nature of the conduct described, e.g., passing off goods or services as those of another, I do not share the concerns expressed in Judge Brobson’s dissent and do not expect that actions will regularly be brought against state or local agencies for the egregious conduct the CPL prohibits. More important, I would not characterize such acts by public entities as causing "purely private injury.”