Court Opinion

ID: 2965159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:36:21.313829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:05.999619
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                           United States Court of Appeals 
                                for the First Circuit

                                 ____________________

          No. 97-1645

                             RAFAEL APONTE MATOS, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                             PEDRO TOLEDO D VILA, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                       Selya, Stahl, and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                                ______________

                                 ____________________

                  Rafael Castro  Lang with whom  Marlene Aponte  Cabrera was
                  ___________________            _______________________
          on brief for appellants.
                  Sylvia  Roger-Stefani, Assistant  Solicitor General,  with
                  _____________________
          whom  Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Puerto  Rico Solicitor General,  and Edda
                ________________                                       ____
          Serrano-Blasini,  Deputy Solicitor  General,  were on  brief  for
          _______________
          appellees Toledo-D vila, Zapata, Ort z-D az, and Fern ndez.
                  John  F. Nevares,  with whom  Lizzie M.  Portela,  Paul B.
                  ________________              __________________   _______
          Smith, and Smith  & Nevares were on brief  for appellees Haddock,
          _____      ________________
          Torres-Lebr n, Laboy-Escobar, Col n, and Nieves-Dom nguez.
                  Isabel  Mu oz  Acosta, Assistant  United States  Attorney,
                  _____________________
          with whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, was on brief for
                    _____________
          appellees Plichta and Ilario.

                                 ____________________
                                   February 3, 1998
                                 ____________________

                      LYNCH,  Circuit Judge.  A Puerto Rican family whose
                      LYNCH,  Circuit Judge.
                              _____________

            home  was  searched  under a  warrant  authorizing  a weapons

            search sued the  intruding Puerto Rican and  federal officers

            and their supervisors on various claims of violation of civil

            rights.  The district court dismissed all claims  against all

            defendants  in  a series  of  summary judgment  orders.   One

            argument made by plaintiffs on appeal leads us to reinstate a

            portion of their case.  

                      Plaintiffs  claim  that  the  Puerto  Rican  police

            officer,  Ernesto Laboy-Escobar, who  filed the affidavit and

            swore to facts in support of the search warrant lied in doing

            so,  fabricating the "facts"  asserted in order  to establish

            probable  cause.     Plaintiffs'  evidence  presents  genuine

            disputes of fact  as to whether the  material representations

            made by  Laboy in the  warrant application were true  or were

            fabricated.   It has long  been well established that  such a

            material  fabrication  violates  the  Warrant  Clause of  the

            Fourth Amendment.   Further, we have  no doubt that  officers

            reasonably understand  that  they may  not  lie in  order  to

            establish  probable cause  in  a  warrant  application.    If

            plaintiffs are able to prove their claim at trial, Laboy will

            not be protected by qualified immunity.

                      Accordingly, it was error to enter summary judgment

            in favor of  Laboy on  that claim.   But plaintiffs have  not

            made any  showing that  others assisted or  even knew  of the

                                         -2-
                                          2

            alleged  falsehoods, nor  have plaintiffs  provided facts  to

            support  the claim that  the search itself  was unreasonable.

            For  these and  other  reasons  the  dismissal of  all  other

            defendants and all other claims is affirmed.  

                                          I.

                      Entry of summary  judgment is reviewed de  novo and

            we take  the facts in the  light most favorable  to the party

            opposing summary  judgment.  See Acosta-Orozco  v. Rodriguez-
                                         ___ _____________     __________

            de-Rivera, 1997 WL 775350 at *1 (1st Cir. Dec. 22, 1997).  
            _________

                      On  December 6, 1993,  plaintiffs Cruz Mar a Andino

            Serrano (Andino Serrano) and her daughter Mar a Aponte Andino

            (Aponte  Andino) were  at home in  R o Piedras,  Puerto Rico,

            when Aponte  Andino noticed several unmarked cars approaching

            the house.  A group of people emerged from the cars and began

            walking toward the house.  One member of the group had an ax;

            none was uniformed.  Plaintiffs  believed they were about  to

            be   robbed.    Without   identifying  themselves  as  police

            officers, the individuals  broke down the  door to the  house

            with the  ax and entered.   Only after plaintiffs  begged the

            people not to kill them  did the officers identify themselves

            as police  and show  the two women  a search warrant  for the

            house.  The  warrant authorized a search  of plaintiffs' home

            for weapons, and nothing else.  

                      The  officers conducted the  search in an efficient

            and orderly  fashion,  without the  use  of force.    Several

                                         -3-
                                          3

            officers  questioned the two women inside about whether there

            were  large sums of drug money hidden  inside the house.  FBI

            Agent Michael Plichta  also attempted to search  the computer

            files  to find evidence of drugs or drug money, but could not

            gain  access to  any files.    The entire  search lasted  two

            hours, and  failed to  turn up  evidence of illegal  weapons,

            drugs,  drug money,  or, indeed,  of  any criminal  activity.

            Another daughter,  Iris Teresa  Aponte Andino  (Iris Teresa),

            returned and  tried to enter  the house.  An  officer outside

            refused to let Iris Teresa through the blockade.  

                      In  May of  1995,  Aponte Andino,  Andino  Serrano,

            Rafael  Aponte  Matos (Andino  Serrano's  husband), and  Iris

            Teresa filed this action for  damages under 42 U.S.C.   1983,

            and against the federal officials  under 28 U.S.C.   1331 and

            Bivens  v. Six  Unknown Named  Agents, 403  U.S.  388 (1971).
            ______     __________________________

            They  alleged  violations   of  the  Fourth  and   Fourteenth

            Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.  

                      Plaintiffs  sued two  groups  of defendants.    The

            first group  is  composed  of  the  state  and  federal  line

            officers who participated in the search:  Puerto Rican Police

            Officers Ernesto Laboy-Escobar, Ernesto  Torres Lebr n, Jimmy

            Col n, Zulma Fern ndez, Iv n-Nieves  Dom nguez, and FBI Agent

            Michael Plichta.   Plaintiffs alleged  that these  defendants

            violated  plaintiffs'  right  to  be  free from  unreasonable

            searches by fabricating  facts to obtain the  search warrant,

                                         -4-
                                          4

            conducting a search  that exceeded the scope of  the warrant,

            and using excessive force in carrying out the search.1

                      Plaintiffs sued the second group of defendants, the

            supervisors, alleging  that they failed  adequately to  train

            and supervise the  first group of defendants.   This group of

            defendants  included  both  state  and  federal  supervisors:

            Puerto  Rico Police  Department  (PRPD) Superintendent  Pedro

            Toledo-D vila, PRPD Supervisor Carlos Haddock, PRPD Auxiliary

            Superintendent of  Inspection and  Disciplinary Affairs  Jos 

            Zapata, PRPD  Lieutenant  Juan Ort z-D az,  and FBI  Director

            Lewis  Freeh   and  an  unidentified   FBI  supervisor  named

            "Ilario."  Plaintiffs alleged that these defendants knew that

            the officers involved in the  search had records of violence,

            and  that   the   supervisors   had   callously   disregarded

            plaintiffs' constitutional rights by inadequately supervising

            their subordinates.

                      All defendants moved for summary judgment  based on

            qualified immunity.  On December 13, 1995, the district court

            granted  in part Agent Plichta's motion for summary judgment,

            dismissing the claim  that Plichta engaged in  a "pretextual"

                                
            ____________________

            1.    Plaintiffs also  alleged  in their  complaint  that the
            officials conducting the search  deprived plaintiffs of their
            right to counsel during the  search.  They alleged that their
            lawyer was  outside of  the house, but  the police  would not
            allow counsel to  be with her clients inside.   Plaintiffs do
            not present  this claim  as a specific  issue on  appeal, nor
            develop any argument  regarding the claim,  and it is  deemed
            waived.  See  King v. Town of Hanover, 116 F.3d 965, 970 (1st
                     ___  ____    _______________
            Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).

                                         -5-
                                          5

            search  of plaintiffs'  home.   On  May 29,  1996, the  court

            entered partial  judgment dismissing  plaintiffs' claim  that

            Plichta  exceeded the  scope  of  the  warrant  by  searching

            plaintiffs'  computer files.   On  July 22,  1996, the  court

            entered partial judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claim against

            the  unnamed federal supervisor "Ilario."   On April 4, 1997,

            the  court dismissed  all the  remaining  claims against  all

            defendants on qualified immunity  grounds.  Plaintiffs appeal

            all of these dismissals.

                                         II.

                      Our review of the district court's grant of summary

            judgment is de novo.  See St.  Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71
                                  ___ ____________    _______________

            F.3d 20,  24  (1st  Cir.  1995).   We  will  affirm  if  "the

            pleadings,  depositions,  answers   to  interrogatories,  and

            admissions on  file, together  with the  affidavits, if  any,

            show that there  is no genuine issue as to  any material fact

            and that  the moving party  is entitled  to a  judgment as  a

            matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  In order to overcome

            defendants'  motions for  summary  judgment, plaintiffs  must

            come forward with "specific,  provable facts which  establish

            that  there  is   a  triable  issue."     Febus-Rodriguez  v.
                                                      _______________

            Betancourt-Lebron, 14  F.3d 87,  91 (1st Cir.  1994).   For a
            _________________

            dispute to be "genuine," there must be sufficient evidence to

            permit a  reasonable trier  of fact to  resolve the  issue in

                                         -6-
                                          6

            favor  of the  non-moving party.    See United  States v. One
                                                ___ ______________    ___

            Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992).
            _______________________

                      Qualified immunity protects both  federal and state

            officials from liability for damages in a civil rights action

            if "a reasonable officer could have believed [his actions] to

            be lawful,  in  light  of clearly  established  law  and  the

            information the  [acting] officer[] possessed."   Anderson v.
                                                              ________

            Creighton, 483 U.S.  635, 641 (1987).  There  are two aspects
            _________

            to  this  standard.    The  first   inquiry  is  whether  the

            constitutional  right  asserted  by  plaintiffs  was  clearly

            established  at  the time  of  the  alleged violation.    The

            second, if the  right was clearly  established, is whether  a

            reasonable  officer  in  the   same  situation  would   "have

            understood  that   the  challenged   conduct  violated   that

            established  right."   Hegarty v.  Somerset  County, 53  F.3d
                                   _______     ________________

            1367,  1373 (1st Cir.  1995) (quoting Burns  v. Loranger, 907
                                                  _____     ________

            F.2d 233, 235-36 (1st Cir. 1990)).  If the first level of the

            analysis   yields   a   determination   that   the   asserted

            constitutional right  was  not  clearly  established  at  the

            relevant time, then we need  not proceed to the second prong;

            there is  qualified immunity.   See Soto v. Flores,  103 F.3d
                                            ___ ____    ______

            1056, 1064-65 (1st Cir. 1997).  

            A.  The Use of False Statements to Obtain a Search Warrant
                ______________________________________________________

                      In  1978, the  Supreme  Court  held  in  Franks  v.
                                                               ______

            Delaware,  438  U.S.  154  (1978),  that  the  use  of  false
            ________

                                         -7-
                                          7

            statements  to obtain a  warrant, where the  false statements

            are necessary to the finding  of probable cause, violates the

            Fourth  Amendment's warrant requirement.  As the Franks Court
                                                             ______

            noted,  the Warrant  Clause of  the  Fourth Amendment  itself

            contemplates the affiant's truthfulness:  

                      [N]o  warrants  shall   issue,  but  upon
                      probable  cause,  supported  by  Oath  or
                      affirmation.  

            438 U.S. at 164 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV).  

                      Franks  involved  a  challenge to  a  warrant  in a
                      ______

            criminal  proceeding  and   set  forth  the  elements   of  a

            challenge:  there must be allegations of deliberate falsehood

            or  of reckless disregard  for the truth  on the part  of the

            affiant;  these allegations must be supported by an affidavit

            or sworn  or otherwise  reliable statements;  the allegations

            must  point  specifically  to  the  portion  of  the  warrant

            application claimed to be false  and must have a statement of

            supporting reasons; and the  material that is the subject  of

            the alleged falsity  or reckless disregard must  be necessary

            to establish  probable cause.  See id. at  171-72.  It is not
                                           ___ ___

            enough to  allege negligence  or innocent  mistake.   See id.
                                                                  ___ ___

            This court  has consistently followed the Franks  rule.  See,
                                                      ______         ____

            e.g.,  United States  v. Valerio,  48 F.3d  58, 62  (1st Cir.
            ____   _____________     _______

            1995); United States v. Carty,  993 F.2d 1005, 1006 (1st Cir.
                   _____________    _____

            1993).

                                         -8-
                                          8

                      An officer  who obtains a warrant  through material

            false statements which  result in an unconstitutional  search

            may be held personally liable  for his actions under   1983.2

            "It  has  long  been  clearly  established  that  the  Fourth

            Amendment's warrant  requirement is  violated  when 'a  false

            statement  knowingly  and  intentionally,  or  with  reckless

            disregard for  the truth,  was included by  the affiant  in a

            warrant affidavit if the  false statement is necessary for  a

            finding of probable  cause.'"   Clanton v.  Cooper, 129  F.3d
                                            _______     ______

            1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-
                                                 ______

            56).  See also Krohn v.  United States, 742 F.2d 24, 26  (1st
                  ________ _____     _____________

            Cir.  1984)  (noting  plaintiff's  civil  rights  claim  that

            federal agent intentionally misrepresented facts necessary to

            obtain warrant).  

                      The  force of the Franks rule in a   1983 action is
                                        ______

            reinforced by the decision of  the Supreme Court this term in

            Kalina v. Fletcher, 1997 WL 756635 (U.S. Dec. 10,  1997).  In
            ______    ________

            that case, the  Court held that a prosecutor  is not entitled

            to  absolute immunity  for  making  false  statements  in  an

            affidavit supporting  an application  for an arrest  warrant,

            and may be  personally liable for such  actions.  See  id. at
                                                              ___  ___

            *3.

                                
            ____________________

            2.    This   is  similar  to,  and  derives   from  the  same
            constitutional  source  as,   the  claim   that  an   officer
            reasonably should have known that facts alleged in support of
            a warrant application were insufficient to establish probable
            cause.  See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
                    ___ ______    ______

                                         -9-
                                          9

                      Here, plaintiffs allege that Laboy fabricated facts

            in support of probable  cause in order to obtain a warrant to

            search plaintiffs' home, and that other  defendants conspired

            with  Laboy to  obtain  this fraudulently  procured  warrant.

            Plaintiffs have  presented no  evidence  that other  officers

            conspired with Laboy  to falsely obtain a search warrant, and

            we  readily  affirm  the district  court's  grant  of summary

            judgment on that claim.

                      As to Laboy, there is evidence  that on December 2,

            1993,  FBI  Agent   Plichta  received  a  tip   that  several

            individuals intended  to break into  plaintiffs' home, hoping

            to find two million dollars in hidden drug money and weapons,

            and that they  planned to murder plaintiffs.   On December 3,

            1993,  Plichta notified Sergeant  Carri n of the  Puerto Rico

            Police Department of the information, and suggested that they

            obtain a warrant and search  plaintiffs' home for the  money.

            We  do  not  comment on  the  implicit  suggestion  that such

            information alone could support a warrant.  In any event, the

            Puerto Rican Police did not seek a warrant on that basis.

                      On December  4, Plichta  discussed the matter  with

            Laboy.   Laboy told  Plichta that on  December 3,  soon after

            Plichta   spoke  with   Carri n,   Laboy  had   independently

            established facts sufficient to show probable cause to search

            plaintiffs' home.  He said  he had observed, while working on

            another  matter, an  illegal  weapon  exchange  in  front  of

                                         -10-
                                          10

            plaintiffs' home.   On  December 6, Laboy  obtained a  search

            warrant  based on  his  affidavit,  and  invited  Plichta  to

            participate in the search.

                      Laboy's affidavit in support of his application for

            a warrant stated:

                      [On the]  3rd day  of December, 1993,  at
                      about  4:30 p.m.  I was  in  the area  of
                      Cupey in R o  Piedras, Puerto Rico trying
                      to locate an address about a complaint  I
                      am investigating and upon arriving to the
                      Pedro  Castro Road  which is a  dead end,
                      when  I  turn at  the end  of the  same I
                      realized   there   was    an   individual
                      approximately  6  feet tall,  with  white
                      skin, brown  hair giving a long  wood and
                      black  color  firearm  to  another  white
                      individual, who was  approximately 5 feet
                      10 inches tall, wearing khaki pants and a
                      black  sweater  and  at  that  time  both
                      looked toward the vehicle I  was in . . .
                      and the individual in the khaki pants and
                      black sweater walked toward the front and
                      gave  the weapon  once  again to  the  6'
                      individual with white skin and turned his
                      back and  entered  the  residence.    The
                      other   individual   also   entered   the
                      residence. . . .  That for my  experience
                      as investigating agent  what was observed
                      by  me  there  was  a  violation  to  the
                      Weapons Act of Puerto Rico and that  said
                      residence  is  being   utilized  for  the
                      custody of firearms. 

            The affidavit also  described plaintiffs' house as  the place

            to be searched and added that "[t]he services of the K-9 Unit

            of the Puerto  Rico Police shall be utilized  for this search

            and seizure." 

                      The  district  court  granted  summary judgment  to

            defendants, finding that "[p]laintiffs .  . . have failed  to

                                         -11-
                                          11

            produce a scintilla of  non-speculative and reliable evidence

            that  the  Defendant-Officers  either  knowingly  used  false

            information or recklessly  disregarded the truth in  order to

            obtain the  warrant."  We  disagree with the  district court,

            and reverse the grant of summary judgment as to Laboy on this

            claim.

                      Plaintiff Andino Serrano put in sworn evidence that

            she was  in her house at  the time Laboy says he  saw two men

            enter the house.3   She says  that no man entered  the house.

            She also says that the physical description given by Laboy of

            one  of the  men who  allegedly  entered the  house fits  her

            husband.  But, she says, her husband did not enter the  house

            and was not at the house then.  Her husband, plaintiff Rafael

            Aponte Matos, confirms this and says he was elsewhere.  

                      It is difficult to think of what more could be said

            by the  plaintiffs to  raise a  question as  to the  truth of

            Laboy's statements in the  affidavit that two men carrying  a

                                
            ____________________

            3.  Andino Serrano's affidavit states:  

                      I was at my house,  and no male, not even
                      my husband, entered my house at 4:30 p.m.
                      on December 3,  1993. . .  . I have  read
                      the sworn declaration  submitted in order
                      to procure a search warrant to search  my
                      home on  December 6,  1993, and  although
                      the physical  description of  one of  the
                      individuals described in said declaration
                      resembles my husband, I  know for a  fact
                      he was not  at my house that  day at that
                      time.

                                         -12-
                                          12

            weapon entered the plaintiffs' house.4  The plaintiff who was

            home  at the time says that did  not happen.  Plaintiffs also

            suggest that Laboy had a motive to  lie:  he wanted access to

            the house  to see if  there was a "narco-treasure"  there, as

            the  information from Agent Plichta suggested.5  And finally,

            plaintiffs  note, when  the house  was  searched, no  illegal

            weapon was found.  This evidence tends  to contradict Laboy's

            statement in the  affidavit that he saw two men,  one with an

            illegal weapon, entering  the house, and  that, based on  his

            observation   and  experience,  this   meant  the  house  was

            illegally being used for custody of firearms.  That statement

            was  essential  to  the probable  cause  determination.   See
                                                                      ___

            Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. 
            ______

                                
            ____________________

            4.   Laboy  attempts  to buttress  his  position through  the
            affidavit of Officer Nieves Dom nguez,  who was with Laboy at
            the time.  But Nieves  saw nothing himself and simply reports
            what Laboy said after he made the alleged observations.

            5.  Plaintiffs say that on December 22, 1993, two weeks after
            the police  search,  three  unidentified  individuals  robbed
            plaintiffs' home.  One of  them, dressed as a police officer,
            said they were  there to investigate  the December 6  search.
            When plaintiffs opened the  door, the two other robbers  drew
            their guns and held plaintiffs Andino Serrano, Aponte Andino,
            and  Rafael  Aponte  Matos  at  gun  point.    The  intruders
            questioned  plaintiffs about the  $2 million dollars  in drug
            money.   The  robbers  went  directly  to  the  places  where
            plaintiffs kept their  valuables, and took money,  a handgun,
            and jewelry.   Plaintiffs have  alleged that the  robbery was
            connected to the prior police search.

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      Our decision  does not forecast  whether plaintiffs

            will succeed on  this claim at trial; that is for the jury to

            decide.6

            B.   The Claim  That the  Search  Exceeded the  Scope of  the
                 ________________________________________________________

            Warrant
            _______

                      The warrant authorized a search of plaintiffs' home

            for weapons, specifically for "anything [in plaintiffs' home]

            that  is in  violation to  [sic]  the Weapons  Act of  Puerto

            Rico."  Plaintiffs  claim that the searching  police officers

            and Agent Plichta exceeded the scope of the warrant by asking

            them  questions about two million dollars allegedly hidden in

            the house and by Plichta's efforts to get into their computer

            files.

            The Computer Search 
            ___________________

                      The unlawful computer search  claim against Plichta

            is  not properly before  us, as  plaintiffs failed  timely to

            perfect an  appeal from the district court's entry of summary

            judgment on  that claim.  On May 29, 1996, the district court

            issued  a Memorandum and  Order granting summary  judgment to

                                
            ____________________

            6.   The parties' briefing sometimes characterizes the Franks
                                                                   ______
            issue as an  issue of whether there was  a pretextual search.
            We  reject  that  conceptualization  of  the  legal doctrines
            involved.   The  Franks rule  is as  we have  stated it;  not
                             ______
            whether   the  search  was  pretextual.    Under  the  Fourth
            Amendment reasonableness calculus,  inquiry into an officer's
            subjective  motivations is rarely  appropriate.  See  Ohio v.
                                                             ___  ____
            Robinette,  117  S. Ct.  417,  419  (1996); Whren  v.  United
            _________                                   _____      ______
            States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996).
            ______

                                         -14-
                                          14

            Plichta  on the computer  search claim,7 and  entered partial

            judgment dismissing  the claim.   This  was a  final judgment

            within the meaning  of 28 U.S.C.    1291 and Fed. R.  Civ. P.

            54(b), and was immediately appealable to this court.  Fed. R.

            App. P. 4(a)  required plaintiffs to file a  notice of appeal

            from that final judgment within  60 days.  Plaintiffs did not

            file a notice of appeal in this case until May 5,  1997, long

            after the 60 day deadline had passed.8

            The Search of the House
            _______________________

                      The  issue  whether  the  district  court erred  in

            granting summary judgment to the  other defendants as well as

            Plichta on  the claim that  the search exceeded the  scope of

            the warrant has been timely appealed.  

                      In 1993  it was  undoubtedly "clearly  established"

            that  a  search must  not  exceed  the  scope of  the  search

            authorized  in the warrant.   See  Maryland v.  Garrison, 480
                                          ___  ________     ________

            U.S. 79,  84 (1986) ("By limiting the authorization to search

            to the specific areas and  things for which there is probable

                                
            ____________________

            7.   The  court reasoned  that  because Plichta's  attempt to
            search plaintiffs' computer files was unsuccessful (due to an
            apparent inability to "boot up" the hard drive), there was no
            search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  We do not
            address this conclusion because the appeal is untimely.

            8.   The  appeal of  the  district court s  grant of  summary
            judgment  in favor of the unnamed federal supervisor "Ilario"
            is not properly before us for the same reasons.  The district
            court entered partial  judgment in favor of "Ilario"  on July
            22, 1996.  Plaintiffs had 60 days to appeal the judgment, but
            did not do  so until the current  appeal was taken on  May 5,
            1997.

                                         -15-
                                          15

            cause  to   search,  the  [Fourth   Amendment  particularity]

            requirement  ensures  that  the  search   will  be  carefully

            tailored to  its justifications,  and  will not  take on  the

            character  of  the   wide-ranging  exploratory  searches  the

            Framers  intended to  prohibit."); cf. Horton  v. California,
                                               ___ ______     __________

            496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990) ("If the scope of the search exceeds

            that permitted by the terms of a validly issued warrant . . .

            the subsequent  seizure is unconstitutional  without more.").

            But to state the  rule is not to answer the  question of when

            the search does in fact exceed the warrant.

                      Plaintiffs' evidence  is insufficient to  show that

            the officers who  carried out the search are  not entitled to

            immunity.   All plaintiffs  offer is  that when  the officers

            began  their  search,  they  "questioned"  plaintiffs  Andino

            Serrano and  Aponte  Andino  as to  the  whereabouts  of  two

            million dollars in  hidden drug money.  There  is no evidence

            that the  officers searched anywhere  in the house  that they

            otherwise could not  have searched for a weapon.   See United
                                                               ___ ______

            States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982) ("A lawful search of
            ______    ____

            fixed premises generally extends to  the entire area in which

            the object of  the search may be  found . . . .").   The Ross
                                                                     ____

            Court  provided an illustration  pertinent here:   "A warrant

            that  authorizes an  officer  to search  a  home for  illegal

            weapons also  provides  authority to  open  closets,  chests,

            drawers, and containers in which the weapon  might be found."

                                         -16-
                                          16

            Id.  at 821.   Further,  at least  for immunity  purposes, an
            ___

            officer could reasonably  think that weapons are  more likely

            to be in a  house if there are millions of  dollars hidden in

            the house  as well,  and that  the question  was sufficiently

            related to the  warrant.  The topic of  questioning during an

            encounter  which itself does not violate the Fourth Amendment

            is not so clearly defined  against the officers as to deprive

            them of  immunity.  Cf. Florida  v. Royer, 460 U.S.  491, 497
                                ___ _______     _____

            (1983)  (officers  do   not  violate   Fourth  Amendment   by

            approaching individual in public place and posing questions);

            United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Fourth
            _____________    __________

            Amendment   not  violated  when  officers  ask  questions  of

            individuals   without    particularized   suspicion,    where

            reasonable person would not feel obligated to answer).  There

            is  no  suggestion  that the  searching  officers  ordered or

            forced  plaintiffs  to answer  the questions,  and plaintiffs

            were free not  to answer.  See  Robinette, 117 S. Ct.  at 421
                                       ___  _________

            (Fourth  Amendment  reasonableness requirement  not  violated

            where  officer  asks driver  questions  unrelated to  initial

            justification  for  stop,  and  driver  voluntarily   answers

            questions and consents to search).

                      Plaintiffs'  evidence  is  inadequate  to  overcome

            qualified immunity.  We affirm the district court's  grant of

            summary  judgment  dismissing  the  claim  that   the  search

            exceeded the scope of the warrant.

                                         -17-
                                          17

            C.  Failure to Knock and Announce
                _____________________________

                      Plaintiffs assert  that the officers  who conducted

            the  search violated plaintiffs'  Fourth Amendment  rights by

            failing to announce their presence and identify themselves as

            police before  they entered the  house by  breaking down  the

            door with an ax.   The district court acknowledged that "upon

            approaching  the entrance  to the  home,  the officers  never

            announced their  presence or  their purpose."    It did  not,

            however,  rule on  the claim  that  this was  a violation  of

            plaintiffs' rights,  see Richards  v. Wisconsin,  117 S.  Ct.
                                 ___ ________     _________

            1416  (1997)  (Fourth  Amendment  does  not  permit   blanket

            exception  to knock and  announce rule); Wilson  v. Arkansas,
                                                     ______     ________

            115 S.  Ct 1914 (1995)  (failure to knock and  announce forms

            part of  reasonableness inquiry), nor  do we.   Even assuming

            that there  is, on these  facts, a right  to have the  police

            knock  and announce,  the  asserted  right  was  not  clearly

            established  as being of constitutional dimension at the time

            the alleged violation occurred.  

                      As Richards  makes clear, Wilson  neither announced
                         ________               ______

            an absolute  knock-and-announce rule nor  created categorical

            exceptions to the  rule for felony drug cases.   In Richards,
                                                                ________

            the court found that  a no-knock entry into a hotel  room was

            justified  where the officers had a reasonable suspicion that

            the   occupant  would  destroy  the  evidence  if  given  the

            opportunity.  See  Richards, 117 S. Ct.  at 1422.  We  do not
                          ___  ________

                                         -18-
                                          18

            reach  the question of whether it is reasonable for officers,

            armed  with a  warrant  to  search for  weapons,  to fail  to

            announce they  are police  before they enter  the area  to be

            searched, because we resolve this on immunity grounds.

                      In  St.   Hilaire,  this   court   held  that   the
                          _____________

            requirement that officials identify themselves to the subject

            of a  search or  seizure, absent  exigent circumstances,  was

            "not clearly  of constitutional dimension" until  the Supreme

            Court decided Wilson in 1995, and that the notice requirement
                          ______

            "was not  . .  . clearly  established in  this  Circuit as  a

            constitutional requirement  until Wilson."   St. Hilaire,  71
                                              ______     ___________

            F.3d at 28.   We thus held that  defendant officials' failure

            to  identify themselves to  the plaintiff s decedent  in 1990

            did   not  violate  a  "clearly  established  law,"  and  the

            defendants  were  "entitled  to qualified  immunity  on  [the

            failure to announce] theory."  Id.
                                           ___

                      The same  is true here.  Plaintiffs' claim rests at

            best on  Wilson; Wilson  was decided in  1995; the  search of
                     ______  ______

            plaintiffs'  residence occurred in 1993.  We affirm the grant

            of summary judgment to defendants on this claim.

            D.  Use of Excessive Force in Executing the Search
                ______________________________________________

                      Plaintiffs  claim that the search of their home was

            unreasonable because it was carried out with an excessive use

            of force.  

                                         -19-
                                          19

                      Plaintiffs  basic theory  may  be  sound but  their

            arguments  seek shelter  in the  wrong  doorway.   Plaintiffs

            point  us  to   the  substantive  due  process   "shocks  the

            conscience" standard  announced in Rochin  v. California, 342
                                               ______     __________

            U.S. 165 (1952).  But  an "excessive force" claim that arises

            in the context  of a search or seizure  is "properly analyzed

            under  the  Fourth   Amendment's  'objective  reasonableness'

            standard."    Graham  v. Connor,  490  U.S.  386,  388 (1989)
                          ______     ______

            (expressly rejecting the Rochin "shocks  the conscience" test
                                     ______

            where the  claim arises  in the context  of an  investigatory

            stop).   "The 'reasonableness' of  a particular use  of force

            must be  judged from the perspective of  a reasonable officer

            on  the  scene,   rather  than  with  the   20/20  vision  of

            hindsight."   Id.  at 396;    see also  Alexis v.  McDonald's
                          ___           __________  ______     __________

            Restaurants, 67 F.3d  341, 352 (1st  Cir. 1995) ("[A]  viable
            ___________

            excessive  force  claim  must  demonstrate  that  the  police

            defendant's actions  were not objectively  reasonable, viewed

            in light of the  facts and circumstances confronting  him and

            without regard to his underlying intent or motivation.").

                      Plaintiffs  point  to  the  following  actions   in

            support  of their  excessive  force  claim:    the  officers 

            failure  to announce  their presence,  the  use of  10 to  15

            officers to carry out the search,  the use of an ax to  knock

            down the door,  the use  of dogs during  the search, and  one

                                         -20-
                                          20

            officer s   allegedly   threatening  behavior   directed   at

            plaintiff Iris Teresa. 

                      We will assume  that there may be  searches carried

            out in  such an excessive  manner that they  are unreasonable

            under the Fourth Amendment.  It is also true that the typical

            "excessive force" claim  arises in the  context of an  arrest

            and generally  involves physical  contact and  injury to  the

            arrestee.  Here,  there was no arrest, no  physical force was

            used on any  of the plaintiffs,  and none sustained  physical

            injury.    To  the extent  there can be  such a claim  in the

            absence of  physical force, the  plaintiffs themselves stated

            in  their depositions  that the searching  officers conducted

            themselves in an orderly manner  once inside the home.  Under

            these circumstances, we doubt  any Fourth Amendment violation

            at all has been stated,  let alone one unreasonable enough to

            overcome official immunity.  See Hinojosa v. City of Terrell,
                                         ___ ________    _______________

            834  F.2d  1223,  1229  (5th  Cir. 1988)  (in     1983  suit,

            excessive force claim was not sustainable  where there was no

            evidence of physical injury). 

                      The only  allegation worthy  of discussion is  that

            Officer  Jimmy Col n directed abusive language at Iris Teresa

            when  she  sought entry  to  plaintiffs'  home, and  that  he

            displayed his  weapon and threatened  to kill her if  she did

            not stay behind the police barricade.

                                         -21-
                                          21

                      We assume that  Iris Teresa's version of  the facts

            is accurate -- that Col n  threatened her and pointed his gun

            at her.  Even so, as the district court held, defendant Col n

            is entitled to  qualified immunity.  Iris  Teresa insisted on

            entering the  house at the  time a police search  for weapons

            was underway.   Col n was  posted at the blockade  and it was

            his  duty to  ensure  that  no one  entered  the house.    He

            reasonably could have believed  that he needed to assert  his

            authority  in order  to  prevent  Iris  Teresa  from  passing

            through the blockade.  Indeed,  the threat may well have been

            reasonably intended  to avoid  the need  to use  any physical

            force to restrain her.  There is no dispute that no  physical

            force was used.   Cf. Hinojosa, 834 F.2d 1223, 1229-30.9  The
                              ___ ________

            evidence  is plainly insufficient  to sustain a  finding that

            Col n's actions were objectively unreasonable.  

                                
            ____________________

            9.   In  Hinojosa, the  Fifth  Circuit confronted  a  similar
                     ________
            situation and found the lack  of physical injury to be highly
            relevant in deciding the excessive use of force claim:

                      There  is absolutely  no evidence  . .  .
                      that   Hinojosa  was   struck,  or   even
                      touched, during  the incident.   Hinojosa
                      did not claim to have suffered even minor
                      physical  injuries  or   intrusion.    He
                      sought no medical attention. . . .  Thus,
                      even stretching the  testimony as far  as
                      possible  in a  light  most favorable  to
                      Hinojosa,  the  only harm  occasioned  by
                      Jones'   pointing   his   gun   was   the
                      understandable     immediate    emotional
                      distress of Hinojosa  at being the target
                      of the gun point.

            834 F.2d at 1230.

                                         -22-
                                          22

            E.  Supervisory Liability
                _____________________

                      Finally, we affirm  the district  court s grant  of

            summary  judgment  on  the  claim  that  defendants  Haddock,

            Toledo-D vila,  Zapata, and  Ort z-D az  are liable  in their

            supervisory capacity.  Plaintiffs argue that these defendants

            were  negligent  in  the  training  and  supervision  of  the

            searching officers, and that they therefore exhibited callous

            indifference to plaintiffs  constitutional rights.

                      Supervisory  liability  under     1983  "cannot  be

            predicated on a  respondeat theory, but only on  the basis of

            the supervisor s own acts or omissions."  Seekamp v. Michaud,
                                                      _______    _______

            109 F.3d 802,  808 (1st Cir.  1997) (citations and  quotation

            marks omitted).   There is supervisory liability  only if (1)

            there  is subordinate  liability,  and  (2) the  supervisor s

            action  or   inaction  was  "affirmatively  linked"   to  the

            constitutional  violation caused by the subordinate.  See id.
                                                                  ___ ___

            (citing Lipsett v. University  of Puerto Rico, 864  F.2d 881,
                    _______    __________________________

            902 (1st Cir.  1988)).  That affirmative link  must amount to

            "supervisory encouragement,  condonation or  acquiescence, or

            gross  negligence  amounting   to  deliberate  indifference."

            Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 902.
            _______

                      There  is no  possibility of  subordinate liability

            except for the  falsification claim against defendant  Laboy.

            See supra.   But plaintiffs' evidence  does not link  Laboy's
            ___ _____

            supposed  falsehoods to  supervisory  condonation or  callous

                                         -23-
                                          23

            indifference.  None of the defendants here had any connection

            to Laboy's affidavit.  

                      Plaintiffs  offer evidence  that defendant  Haddock

            pressured his subordinates  to execute at least  three search

            warrants  every month.  They also  offer documents they claim

            prove  Laboy's history of misconduct, including a 1989 Puerto

            Rico  Supreme Court case  criticizing Laboy for  having acted

            irresponsibly  in a  criminal case  in 1985.   See  People v.
                                                           ___  ______

            Castillo Morales, 123 P.R. Dec. 690 (1989).  That Haddock may
            ________________

            have exerted pressure on his staff to execute search warrants

            is not evidence he acquiesced in or callously disregarded the

            making of false statements to  a judicial officer.  And while

            a supervisor's failure  to take remedial actions  regarding a

            miscreant officer  may result in supervisory  liability where

            it  amounts   to  "deliberate  indifference,"  see   Diaz  v.
                                                           ___   ____

            Martinez, 112 F.3d  1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997),  a judicial opinion
            ________

            citing Laboy  as irresponsible in something he did nine years

            before  the  events at  issue  here does  not  establish such

            indifference.  

                                         III.

                      The district  court's grant of summary  judgment is

            reversed and remanded with respect to the falsification claim
            _____________________

            against  defendant Laboy  in  the  obtaining  of  the  search

                                         -24-
                                          24

            warrant,  and  affirmed  with respect  to  all  other claims,
                           ________

            including the claims against all the remaining defendants.10

                      Each side shall bear its own costs.

                                
            ____________________

            10.      After   oral  argument,   plaintiffs   submitted   a
            "Supplemental Request for  Relief."  Plaintiffs  request that
            if  we  reverse as  to  some  defendants,  we remand  to  the
            district  court  with  the   instruction  that  it   exercise
            supplemental (pendent party)  jurisdiction over the remaining
            defendants as to whom there are viable state law claims.  See
                                                                      ___
            28  U.S.C.     1367.   The  only  claim as  to  which  we are
            reversing  is the falsification  claim against Laboy.   As we
            see it,  the claim  that Laboy made  false statements  in his
            warrant application is  entirely distinct from any  state law
            claims that  might arise out  of the execution of  the search
            itself.   We decline  plaintiffs' invitation to  instruct the
            district court to exercise  supplemental jurisdiction; but we
            do  so without  prejudice  to plaintiffs'  right  to ask  the
            district court,  in its discretion, to  exercise supplemental
            jurisdiction on remand.
                 Our disposition of this matter obviates the need to rule
            on  defendants' "Motion  Requesting Appellants'  Supplemental
            Request  for Relief  Be Stricken,"  which  they submitted  in
            response to plaintiffs' "Supplemental Request." 

                                         -25-
                                          25