Court Opinion

ID: 9929439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 17:04:01.569089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:44.468274
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Feb 02 2024, 9:11 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR
Jonathan M. Young                                          APPELLEE RYAN DEJEAN
Law Office of Jonathan M. Young, P.C.                      Laurie Baiden Bumb
Newburgh, Indiana                                          Bumb Law Office, LLC
                                                           Evansville, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Bryan J. Jackson,                                          February 2, 2024
Appellant-Respondent,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-DC-1410
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Warrick Superior
                                                           Court
Samantha DeJean,                                           The Honorable Krista Hamby
Appellee-Petitioner,                                       Weiberg, Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause Nos.
Ryan DeJean,                                               87D01-2101-DC-97
Appellee-Intervenor.                                       87D02-2002-JP-26

                                  Opinion by Judge Mathias
                               Judges Tavitas and Foley concur.

Mathias, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024                           Page 1 of 14
[1]   B.J., the biological father of M.D., filed a petition to establish paternity to

      M.D., who was born to S.D. (“Mother”) during her marriage to R.D. After

      S.D.’s marriage to R.D. was dissolved, B.J. and Mother married and had

      another child, J.J. Mother later filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to B.J.

      R.D., Mother’s former husband and the putative father of M.D., was allowed to

      intervene in B.J.’s paternity action.

[2]   In B.J.’s separate paternity action concerning M.D., the trial court denied R.D.

      any custodial or visitation rights to M.D., awarded Mother “modified legal

      custody” of M.D., and awarded B.J. parenting time with M.D. In the

      dissolution action between Mother and B.J., Mother was awarded custody of

      J.J. with B.J. having parenting time. Shortly thereafter, the trial judge resigned.

      Mother and R.D. then filed motions to reconsider and to correct error in

      Mother’s dissolution action with B.J. and in the paternity action, which were

      considered by the successor trial judge.

[3]   The successor trial judge reviewed the transcripts and issued modified orders in

      both cases. The subsequent order in the paternity case awarded joint custody of

      M.D. to Mother and R.D. and allowed those parties to determine B.J.’s

      parenting time. In the dissolution proceeding between Mother and B.J., the

      successor trial judge reduced B.J.’s parenting time with J.J.

[4]   B.J. appeals, raising the following dispositive issue: whether the successor trial

      judge erred when the judge reweighed the evidence and the credibility of the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024        Page 2 of 14
      witnesses in issuing her orders granting Mother’s and R.D.’s motions to correct

      error and reconsider.

[5]   Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse and remand for

      proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

      Facts and Procedural History
[6]   Mother and R.D. were married for seven years and they had two daughters.

      During the marriage, Mother became pregnant with M.D., a son, who was born

      in October 2018. R.D. believed he was M.D.’s biological father but shortly after

      M.D.’s birth, R.D. took a paternity test and learned that he was not M.D.’s

      biological father.

[7]   Mother and R.D.’s marriage was dissolved in November 2019. In the

      dissolution decree, the parties agreed that R.D. was not M.D.’s biological

      father.

[8]   In Fall 2019, Mother, her two daughters and M.D. moved into B.J.’s residence.

      On February 12, 2020, B.J. (hereinafter “Father”) filed a petition to establish

      paternity to M.D. Mother and Father were married in July 2020 and had

      another child, J.J., who was born in October 2020.

[9]   On January 20, 2021, Mother filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to

      Father. 1 Shortly thereafter, Mother and R.D. modified their dissolution decree

      1
          During Mother’s and Father’s marriage, Father’s oldest child, S.J., alleged that Father molested her.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024                                Page 3 of 14
       and agreed that M.D. was a child born of the marriage, and the trial court

       approved of their modification of the decree. Thereafter, R.D. began to pay

       child support for M.D.

[10]   The trial court consolidated the paternity case and Mother and Father’s

       dissolution case for the purpose of conducting hearings. However, each case

       retained its own case number. In August, R.D. filed a motion to intervene in

       both cases and argued that he was M.D.’s legal and/or de facto custodian. The

       trial court granted R.D.’s motion to intervene in the paternity case.

[11]   The court held evidentiary hearings across several days in early 2022. The

       parties presented conflicting evidence concerning Father’s and R.D.’s roles in

       providing care and support for M.D. Mother presented evidence that Father

       had not seen M.D. and J.J. for several months, while Father claimed that

       Mother had refused to allow Father to have parenting time with either child.

[12]   On June 8, 2022, the trial court issued a consolidated final order in both cases.

       With respect to the issues presented in this appeal, the trial court found:

               1. This Order is in the best interest of the children.

                                                         ***

               4. The Mother shall have modified joint legal custody of the
               minor children, [M.D. and J.J.]. The Mother shall consult and
               discuss major decisions regarding the minor children concerning
               the upbringing of the children, including decisions regarding
               education, healthcare, religion, and extracurricular activities. In
               the event of a dispute between the parties, the Mother’s decision
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024          Page 4 of 14
        regarding the children shall be final until further order of the
        court. Mother shall consult and discuss major decisions regarding
        the child with the Father, and shall only make a major decision
        regarding the children after significant and meaningful
        communication between the Father and the Mother. Any
        decision by the Mother regarding the minor child is subject to
        review by the Court.

        5. The Father shall have Parenting Time with the children one
        time per week for a period of up to three (3) hours, supervised by
        a third-party supervisor such as Mike Jones or similar. These
        visits can occur at a place as determined by the Father. The
        Father shall pay for the supervisor. The visits shall occur on
        Saturdays unless the Father has to work on Saturday and as
        otherwise agreed to between the parties.

        6. The Father shall be allowed to attend school functions, extra-
        curricular activities, and other functions involving the minor
        children that occur at school or other businesses/entities without
        the necessity of a supervised parenting time provider present.

                                                  ***

        23. [R.D.] shall have no custody or visitation rights to the minor
        child [M.D.].

Appellant’s App. pp. 66-69. The court also ordered Father to pay child support

in the amount of $207 per week. Finally, the court concluded that the de facto

custodian statute did not give the court authority to grant visitation between

R.D. and M.D. Id. at 69. Shortly after issuing the final orders in this case, the

trial judge resigned.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024         Page 5 of 14
[13]   Before the successor judge was appointed, Mother and R.D. filed joint motions

       to reconsider and to correct error. They argued that the trial court’s ruling was

       not supported by the evidence presented, and that the trial court erred as a

       matter of law when the court concluded that R.D. was not M.D.’s de facto

       custodian. Mother and R.D. claimed that the evidence established awarding

       joint legal and physical custody of M.D. to Mother and R.D. was in M.D.’s

       best interests. Father filed a timely response, and the trial court scheduled a

       hearing on the motion.

[14]   The successor judge was appointed on November 28, 2022. The new judge held

       a hearing on Mother’s and R.D.’s motions on January 11, 2023. The parties

       informed the judge that the basis of the motions was whether the originally

       presented evidence supported the judgment. The court told the parties it would

       listen to the recorded hearings before ruling on the motions. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 170-

       71, 174.

[15]   The court held another hearing on April 5. At that hearing, the court stated that

       it had listened to the original evidentiary hearings, and the court then allowed

       the parties to present argument on the pending motions. Father argued that the

       court should deny the motions because the prior trial judge was in a better

       position to weigh the evidence after observing the demeanor of the witnesses.

       Id. at 201.

[16]   On May 26, the trial court issued its order granting Mother’s and R.D.’s

       motions to reconsider and correct error in the paternity case. In its order, the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024      Page 6 of 14
court initially addressed the fact that it did not preside over the evidentiary

hearings but had listened to the recorded evidentiary hearings. After listening to

the hearings, the court concluded that a new trial was not necessary.

Appellant’s App. p. 30. The court then issued its own findings of fact, which are

set forth below in relevant part:

        3. Following [M.D.’s] birth, R.D. believed he was the biological
        father of the child, due in part to the deception of both [Mother]
        and [Father], at [Father’s] insistence, that [R.D.] be convinced
        that he was the child’s father.

        4. [R.D.] and Mother have jointly and consistently provided the
        primary care for [M.D.] since his birth. When not residing
        together, they have alternated weeks with [M.D.] and [R.D.] has
        cared for [M.D.] many other times.

        5. [Father] has provided minimal care for [M.D.].

        6. [Father] had no contact with [M.D.] at all until he was 6
        months old. [Father] exercised no parenting time and had no
        contact with the child for extended periods of time, including
        from January, 2021 through at least June, 2022, and he made no
        effort to see [M.D.].

        7. [R.D.] has been the primary provider for [M.D.’s] needs since
        birth. He has provided for [M.D.’s] housing and he assisted
        [Mother] financially to obtain her own home after [Father]
        evicted [Mother] and the children out of his home.

        8. [R.D.] has provided for [M.D.’s] other needs, including food,
        clothing, health insurance, health care expenses, child care and
        other expenses. He also pays weekly child support for [M.D.].
        [Mother] has contributed financially to [M.D.’s] needs as her
        income would allow. [Father] has provided very little for [M.D.]
        and does not pay any child support for [M.D.], despite earning a
        fairly substantial income.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024         Page 7 of 14
        9. Before [M.D.’s] birth, [Father] made it clear that he did not
        want to be [M.D.’s] father. [Father] acquiesced in [R.D.’s]
        parental relationship with [M.D.] since [M.D.’s] birth. [Father]
        did not request the amendment of [M.D.’s] birth certificate that
        showed [R.D.] as the father. [Father] did not request that [M.D.]
        be given his last name. [Father] did not object to [R.D.] caring
        for the child in alternate weeks, even during his marriage to
        [Mother]. [Father] did not object to [R.D.] coming to his home
        during [Mother’s] parenting time on alternate weeks to see
        [M.D.] and [R.D.’s] other children. [Father] did not intervene or
        correct [M.D.] when he called [R.D.] “Daddy”. [Father]
        acquiesced in [R.D.] being the primary provider for [M.D.’s]
        needs and did not contribute or offer to contribute to the support
        of [M.D.].

        10. [R.D.] and [M.D.] have a very close and loving relationship.
        The emotional bond between them has grown even stronger over
        time. [M.D.] also has close and loving relationships with his
        Mother, . . . his siblings, [R.D.’s] parents and other family
        members, and [Mother’s] family members. [R.D.] provides
        stability and security for [M.D.]. [R.D.’s] love, devotion, and
        care for [M.D.] has never wavered. He has continued to provide
        and love [M.D.] without interruption and without change.

        11. [Father] has no relationship with [M.D.]. His involvement in
        [M.D.’s] life has been minimal at best. [Father’s] family members
        are not close to [M.D.] and would focus on [Father’s] other child,
        [S.J.], and ignore [M.D.] during his marriage to [Mother].

        12. [Father] has been determined to have sexually abused his
        daughter, [S.J.], which [sic] she was 6 years old. The Warrick
        County Department of Child Services substantiated these
        allegations and [Father] failed a polygraph test administered by
        the Indiana State Police. [Father] agreed to participate in a
        therapeutic program for sex offenders, and his parenting time
        with [S.J.] and his younger child with [Mother], [J.J.], w[as]
        limited and supervised. [Father] exercised such parenting time
        inconsistently and sporadically.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024       Page 8 of 14
               13. [Father] is not a fit and proper person to have custodial rights
               with respect to [M.D.], who will be 5 years old in October 2023.

               14. The trial court erred in its June 8, 2022 Order by ruling that
               [R.D.] has no custody and visitation rights to [M.D.]. The trial
               court erroneously based its ruling on the inaccurate premise that
               [R.D.] sought visitation rights with [M.D.] The evidence is
               undisputed that [R.D.] has consistently requested that he and
               [Mother] share equal joint 50-50 legal and physical custody of
               [M.D.], as they have done since his birth. The statute and case
               law cited in the June 8, 2022 Order in support of this ruling are
               not relevant or applicable to the facts of this case.

       Appellant’s App. pp. 30-33.

[17]   The court also found that R.D. had met the statutory criteria to be considered

       M.D.’s de facto custodian. Id. at 33. The court concluded that it was in M.D.’s

       best interests to award equal legal and physical custody of M.D. to Mother and

       R.D. Id. at 36. Finally, the court found that Father would not be awarded any

       custody rights to M.D. but would have “such supervised parenting time with

       [M.D.] as may be agreed upon by [Mother and R.D.]” Id. at 36-37.

[18]   On June 1, the court issued a separate order granting Mother’s post-trial motion

       in Mother’s and Father’s dissolution proceeding. The court reduced Father’s

       parenting time with J.J. from three hours of supervised time per week to one

       hour every other week.

[19]   Father now appeals. R.D. filed an Appellee’s brief, but Mother does not

       participate in this appeal.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024         Page 9 of 14
       Discussion and Decision
[20]   Father presents the following dispositive issue for our review: whether the

       successor trial judge erred by reweighing the evidence and the credibility of the

       witnesses when ruling on the parties’ post-trial motions. In the June 8, 2022,

       order, the original trial court judge did not issue factual findings in support of

       the judgment, but the judge specifically found that its custody decision was in

       the best interest of M.D. and J.J. Appellant’s App. p. 66. Mother and R.D. filed

       motions to reconsider and to correct error. In part, Mother and R.D. claimed

       that the evidence established awarding joint legal and physical custody of M.D.

       to Mother and R.D. was in M.D.’s best interests. Mother also challenged the

       trial court’s decision to award Father parenting time with J.J.

[21]   The successor judge informed the parties that she would listen to the evidence

       presented during the original evidentiary hearings that the first trial court judge

       had presided over. Indiana Trial Rule 63(A) provides that

               The judge who presides at the trial of a cause or a hearing at
               which evidence is received shall, if available, hear motions and
               make all decisions and rulings required to be made by the court
               relating to the evidence and the conduct of the trial or hearing
               after the trial or hearing is concluded. If the judge before whom the
               trial or hearing was held is not available by reason of death, sickness,
               absence or unwillingness to act, then any other judge regularly sitting in
               the judicial circuit or assigned to the cause may perform any of the duties
               to be performed by the court; but if he is satisfied that he cannot perform
               those duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason,
               he may in his discretion grant a new trial or new hearing, in whole or in
               part.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024               Page 10 of 14
       (Emphasis added.)

[22]   Citing Rule 63(A), Father acknowledges that a new trial is not required in every

       case. However, Father directs our attention to Urbanational Developers, Inc., et al.

       v Shamrock Engineering, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 416, 372 N.E.2d 742 (1978), wherein

       our court considered the problem that arises under Trial Rule 63(A) when “the

       successor judge is confronted with issues involving the trial judge’s familiarity

       with the evidence.” Id. at 420, 372 N.E.2d at 746. In Urbanational, our court

       observed that, in many cases, the successor judge may resolve post-trial issues

       and motions by reviewing the trial transcripts. Id. at 420-21, 372 N.E.2d at 746.

       On the other hand, a successor judge may be “ill-equipped to perform the

       functions of the regular trial judge” when the successor judge “is confronted

       with an issue which requires for its resolution a determination of the credibility

       of witnesses or the weight to be accorded certain evidence.” Id. at 421, 773

       N.E.2d at 746.

[23]   In the latter circumstance, Rule 63(A) allows the successor judge to grant a new

       trial or hearing, in whole or in part, when the judge believes he or she cannot

       perform the duties of the regular trial judge because he or she did not preside at

       trial. Id. Our court observed that,

               [w]hen a successor judge attempts to resolve questions of
               credibility and weight of evidence without having had an
               opportunity to hear the evidence and observe the demeanor of
               witnesses, he [or she] is depriving a party of an essential element
               of the trial process. Such an undertaking by the successor judge is
               against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024      Page 11 of 14
               the court and amounts to an abuse of discretion. To hold
               otherwise would be to grant a power of review to the successor
               judge that is not even claimed by appellate courts.

       Id. (citation omitted).

[24]   More recently, in In re I.P., 5 N.E.3d 750, 752 (Ind. 2014), our supreme court

       held that, where the magistrate who presided over a termination-of-parental-

       rights fact-finding hearing resigned before reporting its findings and conclusions

       to the trial judge, the trial court was required to hold a new evidentiary hearing.

       The trial court’s failure to do so violated the parent’s due process rights. Id. In

       particular, our supreme court noted:

               A party is entitled to a determination of the issues by the judge
               who heard the evidence, and, where a case is tried to a judge who
               resigns before determining the issues, a successor judge cannot
               decide the issues or enter findings without a trial de novo. When
               a successor judge who did not hear the evidence or observe the
               witnesses’ demeanor attempts to weigh evidence and make
               credibility determinations, the judge “is depriving a party of an
               essential element of the trial process.”

               It is precisely because the judge or magistrate presiding at a
               termination hearing has a superior vantage point for assessing
               witness credibility and weighing evidence that we give great
               deference to a trial court’s decision to terminate a parent’s rights.
               But in this case, the magistrate who reported recommended
               findings and conclusions to the judge did not hear the evidence
               or observe the witnesses firsthand.

       Id. at 752 (citations omitted). Although our supreme court’s analysis was not

       under Trial Rule 63(A) as there was no final judgment issued by the trial judge,

       the violation to the parent’s due process rights occurred for the same reasons

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024       Page 12 of 14
       discussed in our court’s Urbanational decision and is entirely consistent with the

       logic and policy underlying Rule 63(A).

[25]   Father’s claim of error must also be considered in light of our well-established

       preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in

       family law matters because the judge presiding at a family law evidentiary

       hearing has a superior vantage point for assessing witness credibility and

       weighing evidence. E.g., Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). Our

       supreme court has also observed that reviewing courts “‘are in a poor position

       to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who

       saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as

       it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of

       the evidence.’” Id. (quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002)).

[26]   Father raised these precise concerns with the successor trial judge because the

       judge had only reviewed the transcript of the hearings. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 201. For

       example, the parties had presented conflicting evidence at the original

       evidentiary hearings with respect to the care and support Father had provided

       during M.D.’s life after the parties determined that R.D. was not M.D.’s

       biological father. The parties also presented conflicting evidence as to R.D.’s

       role in M.D.’s life while Father and Mother resided together before and during

       their marriage. While Mother presented evidence that Father had not seen

       either M.D. or J.J. for several months prior to the evidentiary hearings, Father

       testified that Mother refused to allow him to see the children while the paternity

       and dissolution matters were pending.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024      Page 13 of 14
[27]   Mother’s and R.D.’s post-trial motions argued that the trial court’s original

       order in the paternity and dissolution hearings was not supported by the

       evidence. In ruling on the motions, the successor judge improperly reweighed

       the evidence and improperly reassessed the credibility of the witnesses based on

       her reading of the transcript. The successor judge did not hold a new

       evidentiary hearing in whole or in part, and, thus, she did not have an

       opportunity to hear the evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses for

       herself.

[28]   For all of these reasons, the trial court abused its discretion when it deviated

       from the direction provided under Trial Rule 63(A) and issued new findings of

       fact and new conclusions of law based only upon a review of the transcripts.

       “To hold otherwise would be to grant a power of review to the successor judge

       that is not even claimed by appellate courts.” See Urbanational, 175 Ind. App. at

       421, 372 N.E.2d at 746.

[29]   Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s orders granting Mother’s and R.D.’s

       post-trial motions and remand for a new, consolidated trial on the parenting

       time and custody issues presented by Mother’s and Father’s divorce case and

       paternity case concerning M.D.

[30]   Reversed and remanded for a new, consolidated trial.

       Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1410 | February 2, 2024      Page 14 of 14