Court Opinion

ID: 9449655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:18:16.118579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:55.667355
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
This appellant was found guilty of a violation of D.C.Code, § 22-3501 (a) (1961). He claims that a judge of the Municipal Court (now the Court of General Sessions) peremptorily denied him an adequate preliminary examination. He relies upon a provision of Fed.R.Crim. P. 5(c) which requires when a defendant does not waive examination that the magistrate “shall hear the evidence” at a hearing where the accused “may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf.”
*616We agree that this appellant should have been accorded an adequate opportunity not only to hear the evidence against him, but to cross-examine witnesses and to introduce evidence. However, cross-examination was permitted, though perhaps not as fully as desired, and the accused offered no evidence that was excluded. Moreover, a valid indictment was returned against the appellant, and in all the circumstances of this case such shortcomings as may have attended the conduct of the preliminary hearing do not infect the case with error which invalidates the judgment of conviction.
Appellant argues further that police brutality against him requires that we reverse his conviction. We have noted the sense of outrage voiced by appellant's counsel, indeed there is testimony that the accused was beaten in excess of whatever force reasonably might have been required to subdue him. Yet, we are bound to say that the conviction was reached entirely apart from the police misbehavior, and the appellant must be remitted to such other remedies as are afforded by law.*
We find without merit such other contentions as have been urged by a dutiful court-appointed counsel.
Affirmed.

Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167-187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961).