Court Opinion

ID: 9478097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:40:06.034786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:14.361935
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:
This appeal questions the district court’s conclusion that the individual defendants in this case are not entitled to qualified immunity from this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. The complaint in this case alleges that the defendants violated various statutory and constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. Concluding that the asserted federal statutory rights were clearly and particularly established at the time of the alleged wrongs, we affirm without reaching the constitutional issues.
I.
In 1980, Congress amended portions of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program in Title IV-A of the Social Security Act; 42 U.S.C. § 608. These amendments, known as the Adoptive Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679, (the “Child Welfare Act”) require that state foster care systems meet certain minimum conditions to qualify for federal funds. These conditions include, among others, requirements that the state develop a “case plan” for each child and a “case review system.” Id. § 671(a)(16).
A case plan is defined in the Act as a written document containing a description of the type of home or institution into which the child is placed, the appropriateness of the placement, and how the state plans to carry out the placement of the child. Id. § 675(1). Additionally, a case plan must provide a method for assuring that the child receives proper care and that services are provided to the child, the parents, and foster parents to improve conditions in the parents’ home to facilitate the return of the child to that home or to facilitate other permanent placement of the child. Id. The plan must also include a discussion of the appropriateness of the services provided in the plan. Id.
The Act defines the required case review system as a procedure for assuring that each child’s ease plan is designed to place the child in the “least restrictive (most family like) setting available and in close proximity to the parents’ home.” Id. § 675(5)(A). The system must have in place periodic reviews of the child’s status, and the reviews must occur at least once every six months. Id. § 675(5)(B).
The Child Welfare Act also requires that after October 15, 1983, the state must make “reasonable efforts” to prevent the need for the removal of children from their *1150homes or to make it possible for children to return to their homes. Id. § 671(a)(15).
The plaintiffs in this case are 15 children who have been or are at risk of being taken involuntarily into custody by the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) as foster children.1 In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants — various Louisiana state officials sued in their individual and official capacities — violated various provisions of the Child Welfare Act as well as various provisions of the United States Constitution. The suit seeks damages for the named plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The suit also seeks class-wide injunctive relief.
The individual defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity from damages and moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The motion stated that (1) the Child Welfare Act did not create substantive rights enforceable under Section 1983, and, if it did, the rights were not clearly established at the time of the alleged violations; and (2) the complaint failed to set forth a claim for the violation of recognizable constitutional rights, and, if it did, the rights were not clearly established at the time of the alleged violations. The district court denied the motion, holding that because the alleged illegal actions violated clearly established statutory and federal constitutional rights, qualified immunity was not available. The individual defendants filed this immediate appeal pursuant to Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appeal-able “final decision”).
II.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court held that government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from civil damages for conduct that does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights. The Court also said that this immunity is one “from suit rather than a mere defense to liability_” Mitchell, 105 S.Ct. at 2816 (emphasis deleted). It is this characteristic — immunity from suit — that justifies immediate appeal of the denial of qualified immunity, for requiring officials to wait until after trial for review would effectively destroy this aspect of the immunity. See Mitchell, 105 S.Ct. at 2816; Sorey v. Kellett, 849 F.2d 960, 961 (5th Cir.1988).
Because qualified immunity is designed to protect discretionary functions of officials, it is not available when the official acts in such a way that it is clear that the actions will violate a person’s rights. When the law is unclear, however, the official does require protection so that fear of suit will not cloud the decision-making process. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the proper focus of our review on the question of qualified immunity should be whether the alleged conduct violated “legal principals that were ‘clearly established’ ” at the time. Anderson v. Creighton, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).
The Supreme Court has provided us with a framework in which we are to determine whether rights are clearly established. See id. 105 S.Ct. at 3038-39. To illustrate the framework, the Court used as an example the rights supplied by the due process clause. The Court noted that “the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right.” Id. at 3038. It concluded, however, that such a broad definition of “clearly established” would defeat the policy behind qualified immunity — shielding officials from suit for the exercise of discretion in circumstances in which “their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the [plaintiff’s] rights....” Id. *1151Thus, the concept of “clearly established” had to be defined narrowly to serve the goals of qualified immunity.
To achieve the proper scope for the immunity, the Court focused on the application of the right to the particular circumstances faced by the official at the time of the exercise of discretion. The Court said:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has been previously held unlawful; but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
Id. at 3039 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). By particularizing qualified immunity to the facts of the case, the Court was able to protect officials in those many situations in which it is unreasonable to expect an official to know with complete certainty whether his actions will be unlawful. This method, however, also enabled the Court to remove the protection in cases in which the official should know that the proposed action would violate someone’s rights.
In this case, then, to decide whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we must determine whether an objectively reasonable official would understand that the alleged improper actions were unlawful. If so, these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
III.
The officials first argue that the Child Welfare Act does not create substantive rights enforceable under Section 1983 because the Act was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1545, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (“[T]he typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.”). But see Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770-71, 773, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987) (discussing Pennhurst and stating that the federal government’s power to audit state housing authorities and to cut off federal funds is “insufficient to indicate a congressional intention to foreclose § 1983 remedies”); L.J. ex rel. Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that violations of the Child Welfare Act are privately enforceable under Section 1983), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3769 (U.S. May 2, 1988) (No. 87-1796). Next, the officials argue that if a private Section 1983 right of action exists, the right is limited to injunctive relief and that damages may not be recovered. Compare Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582, 602 n. 23, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 3232 n. 23, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (opinion of White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.) (“Damages indeed are usually available in a § 1983 action, but such is not the case when the plaintiff alleges only a deprivation of rights secured by a Spending Clause statute.”); Scrivner v. Andrews, 816 F.2d 261, 264 (6th Cir.1987) (damages are not available for violations of Child Welfare Act); Harpole v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 820 F.2d 923, 928 (8th Cir.1987) (stating in dicta that no action for monetary damages exists for violations of the Act) with Guardians Association, 463 U.S. at 635-39, 103 S.Ct. at 3250-52 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun JJ.) (strongly criticizing Justice White’s statement about the availability of damages); L.J. ex rel. Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that “the Supreme Court did not distinguish between prospective equitable relief and an action for money damages in regard to the right to enforce privately”), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3769 (U.S. May 2, 1988) (No. 87-1796). We believe, however, that it would be premature for us to decide these abstruse questions on this interlocutory appeal because they do not directly affect the issue of qualified immunity.
As stated, qualified immunity exists to promote the integrity of the decision-making process for officials engaged in discre*1152tionary acts. Without qualified immunity, an official exercising discretion will naturally hesitate to act when faced with the possibility that suit and liability will follow if a court later determines that the act infringed on some right. See Harlow, 102 S.Ct. at 2736. The immunity helps to overcome the costs associated with the official’s uncertainty by allowing the official to make discretionary decisions without the fear of suit. However, when the course the official is to follow is clearly established by law in a particularized sense, so that the official should have no doubt about whether his actions are proper, this protection is unnecessary. Implicit in the definition of “clearly established” is the idea that the official is freed from doubt as to whether he may face suit. The official should know that following the clear dictates of the law will avoid suit. Thus, qualified immunity is unnecessary — and unjustified —when it should be clear to a reasonable official how the law applies in the particular circumstances.
As a consequence, the Supreme Court’s tests for qualified immunity naturally focus on the conduct of the reasonable official in light of the asserted right and the particular circumstances. The ultimate test is whether “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. The test is not whether a reasonable official would understand that he ultimately faces possible liability. Under the latter test, an official would be accorded decision making protection not only when the right is not clearly established, but also when the right is clearly established but the question of whether the individual has a private right of action for damages is unclear. Such broad protection is unnecessary to protect the integrity of the decision-making process; if the right is clearly established so that a reasonable official would understand how the law requires him to act, the official will know what to do to avoid possible liability.
We conclude, therefore, that the issues of whether the Child Welfare Act creates substantive rights enforceable under Section 1983 and whether if a private Section 1983 right of action exists, the right is limited to injunctive relief are not directly relevant to the question of qualified immunity. These issues implicate whether the officials will ultimately face liability for their actions, not whether the officials could understand that their actions violated the Child Welfare Act. Thus, we are not required to address these issues on this appeal.
While we might have the discretion to assume pendent appellate jurisdiction over these issues, see San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co., 737 F.2d 246, 255 (2d Cir.1984), we feel in this case that the more prudent course would be to follow the usual procedure of waiting until after a final decision in the district court. Depending on the disposition in the district court, it might become unnecessary to address these issues at all.
Thus, we now turn to the only directly relevant issue — whether the officials in this case should have understood that their alleged actions violated the Child Welfare Act.
IV.
In determining whether these officials should have understood that their actions violated the Child Welfare Act, we must examine their actions as alleged in the complaint 2 in light of the specific provisions of the Act.
*1153First, we examine the provisions of the Act governing the development of case plans. The Act requires that any state receiving federal funds develop a case plan for each child receiving foster care payments. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16). The Act specifies the elements to be included in the case plans. Id. § 675(1). The plan must be developed within 60 days of the date the child enters care, 45 CFR § 1356.21(d)(2), and must be reviewed by the state agency at least every six months, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B). The Act requires that the review be open to the child’s parents. Id. § 675(6). The Act requires that a state court hold a hearing within 18 months of placement to determine the child’s status. Id. § 675(5)(C). The appellees’ complaint alleges that some of the plaintiffs had no case plans for years and went 9 months or longer without reviews.
Second, the complaint alleges that the defendants, when they developed case plans, violated the requirement that the plans assure “the permanent placement of the child.” Id. § 675(1). They allege that many of the children have never had plans that assure placement. The Act says that states must implement a program designed to help children return to their families or be placed for adoption, id. § 627(a)(2)(C), and defines a case plan as including a plan for assuring the facilitation of the permanent placement of the child. Id. § 675(1). The complaint alleges, however, that the defendants delayed unnecessarily the implementation of many of the children’s plans, vitiating the goal of permanent placement.
Third, the complaint alleges that the defendants have violated protections, other than the case plans and case reviews, required by the Act. The Act requires that the case plan be designed to place the child in the “least restrictive (most family like) setting available and in close proximity to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child.” Id. § 675(5)(A); see also 45 CFR § 1856.21(d)(3). Six of the children were allegedly placed in institutions, which the plaintiffs allege are more restrictive and less family-like than necessary. Indeed, the complaint alleges that in one case the defendants failed to follow an order of the juvenile court specifically requiring that one of the children be placed in a setting less restrictive than that in which he was kept. The Act also requires that the plan assure that the child receives “proper care,” 42 U.S.C. § 675(1), and that the state establish, maintain, and reasonably assure foster homes and child care institutions that “are reasonably in accord with recommended standards of national organizations concerned with standards for such institutions or homes, including standards related to admission policies, safety, sanitation, and protection of civil rights ... ,” id. § 671(a)(10). The complaint alleges many instances of improper care and supervision, including inadequate screening and supervision of foster homes and sexual abuse by a foster parent.
Fourth, the complaint alleges that the defendants violated the provision requiring that after October 1, 1983, reasonable efforts be made prior to the placement of a child in foster care to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home and to make it possible for the return of a child to his home. The complaint alleges that several of the children were placed after this effective date, but that no reasonable efforts were made to return them home even though some of the parents were able or could have been able to take them home with only minimal help.
Finally, the complaint alleges that although the Act requires the state to conduct an inventory of all foster children and establish and operate an information system to track certain information about the children, id. § 627(a)(1), 627(a)(2)(A), no such system exists.
Overall, the complaint alleges wholesale neglect by these officials in following the dictates of the Child Welfare Act. Many of the allegedly neglected requirements are obviously clearly established in a particularized sense. Any reasonable person would know, for example, when to develop *1154a plan, when to review the plan, when to hold a hearing, what elements to include in the case plans, and that an information system must be developed. Moreover, as the Fourth Circuit found in a very recent case, the requirements calling for case plans, case review systems, proper care (as specifically defined in the Act) and the maintenance of standards reasonably in accord with those of national organizations “spell out a standard of conduct, and as a corollary rights in the plaintiffs” sufficient to defeat qualified immunity. See L.J. ex rel. Darr v. Massinga, 838 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir.1988), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3769 (U.S. May 2, 1988) (No. 87-1796). The complaint basically alleges that in many cases no attempt was made to follow these provisions of the Child Welfare Act. No reasonable official could have believed that such inaction was lawful. For this reason, we find that these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from this complaint.
V.
The complaint also says that the defendants violated three allegedly clearly established constitutional rights: (1) when a state takes a person into custody, the due process clause requires that the state not injure that person; (2) when the state deprives a person of liberty for noncriminal reasons, the state must place that person in the least restrictive, appropriate setting; and (3) when the state deprives a person of statutorily created property or liberty interests, it must do so in accordance with due process of law.
At this time, however, we need not decide whether these general rights are clearly established in the particular circumstances alleged. See Massinga, 838 F.2d at 122. Federal courts are to avoid addressing constitutional questions when possible. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 88 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Allowing interlocutory appeals on qualified immunity effectuates the policy of allowing officials to avoid litigation when they have unwittingly violated the law. In this case, however, we have already determined that further litigation is necessary on the statutory claims. Deciding the constitutional questions at this point, therefore, would not relieve the officials of the litigation burden. Further proceedings in the district court could avoid the need for a decision on these issues, and we therefore decline to address them now.
VI.
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we hold that the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. Therefore, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

. The plaintiffs have made a motion to certify as a plaintiff class in this suit approximately 6000 children who are in the foster care of Louisiana or who are at risk of foster care placement. The district court has deferred its decision on class certification.

. This appeal arises from the denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint or alternatively for summary judgment. Although normally this disposition would require us to examine affidavits and other summary judgment evidence, we need not do so in this case. It is clear from the parties’ briefs on appeal and from the proceedings at trial that the parties are challenging only the legal sufficiency of the complaint. The parties both referred throughout this appeal to the allegations in the complaint. Moreover, the defendants stated in their "Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment" that "[t]he thrust of defendants’ motion is that the children’s allegations, accepting them as true, fail to state a claim” or alternatively should be "dismissed under the doctrine of qualified immunity.” In their appellate briefs, appellants have failed to point to any specific factual insufficiency in the summary judgment evidence. *1153Therefore, we will confine our review to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.