Court Opinion

ID: 9609250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:24:28.817988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:49.706181
License: Public Domain

Barnes, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I find the trial court violated OCGA § 17-8-57 by improperly commenting on the evidence, I must respectfully dissent.
1. OCGA § 17-8-57 prohibits the trial judge from expressing or intimating his opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused. Nevertheless, the trial court told the jury: “The evidence in this case was [that] the witness was asked did you conspire with another person, weren’t you the one behind all of this. The answer to that question was, no. And until evidence is produced to change your opinion about that, the evidence is no.” Because this statement unequivocally expresses the trial court’s opinion “as to what has or has not been proved,” Caldwell’s conviction must be reversed pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-57 and the case remanded for a new trial. Ray v. State, 181 Ga. App. 42, 44 (3) (351 SE2d 490) (1986).
This is not a case in which the trial court merely repeated the testimony of a witness. Here, the trial court told the jury the effect of the testimony was to deny what Caldwell was trying to establish and *202that until evidence to the contrary was introduced they were bound by the evidence that “the answer is no.” This goes beyond saying that there was testimony on this point, and by telling the jury that they were bound by that evidence, the trial court violated OCGA § 17-8-57.
Although the majority contends the court’s “curative” instruction sufficiently remedies this error, this argument misses the point of the curative instruction. The trial court’s statement that, “[i]n no way did I intend to tell you that you had to believe what any witness said was true” neither modifies nor corrects the earlier violation of OCGA § 17-8-57. The trial court’s earlier instruction told the jury that the evidence “was no. And until evidence is produced to change your opinion about that, the evidence is no.” Therefore, the later instruction was not sufficient to correct the initial error.
Further, the discussion whether the trial court’s comment on the evidence constituted plain error is unnecessary. Caldwell properly and promptly objected to the trial court’s violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 when it occurred:
Your honor I have an objection to the instructions that you gave the jury in that I feel that the instructions that you gave the jury was or does have a — taint Mr. Caldwell’s defense in that you have tried to explain a witness’ testimony. The jury is supposed to decide the credibility of the witness and each witness that takes the stand. They are the ones that are supposed to decide. You have inferred that I did something unethical to the jury in your instructions in defense of Mr. Caldwell, which obviously makes it impossible for them to render a fair and impartial verdict; so, therefore, I would ask for a mistrial, that he cannot [get] a fair and impartial verdict based upon your instructions.
This objection was sufficient. Either an objection or a motion for a mistrial will preserve the issue for appellate review. State v. Griffin, 240 Ga. 470 (241 SE2d 230) (1978). Therefore, Caldwell did not waive the OCGA § 17-8-57 issue by failing to object again after the trial court’s later instructions. By requiring that Caldwell both object and move for a mistrial the majority is imposing a burden on Caldwell that does not exist in our law. Even assuming failing to object after the curative instruction waived the mistrial issue, such a failure does not waive the OCGA § 17-8-57 violation issue.
2. Therefore, as I find that the trial court violated OCGA § 17-8-57,1 would reverse Caldwell’s conviction and order a new trial.
Should any judge violate this Code section, the violation *203shall be held by the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals to be error and the decision in the case reversed, and a new trial granted in the court below with such directions as the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals may lawfully give.
Decided November 20, 2000
Reconsideration denied December 8, 2000.
Angela B. Clarke, Steven E. Phillips, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-8-57.
Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state tha.t Judge Phipps joins in this dissent.