Court Opinion

ID: 9853094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:42:31.133796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:40.775591
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority, in reaffirming the holding in State ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Pressley, 74 Ariz. 412, 250 P.2d 992, have compounded the error initiated by the language used in S. H. Kress & Co. v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 67, 182 P.2d 931 (1947). The error now results in denying petitioner the right to trial by jury guaranteed by Article 2, § 23 of the Constitution, A.R.S. of this state.
PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO SUE
By Article 18, § 6 of the Constitution of Arizona, adopted at statehood in 1912, employees were guaranteed a right of action to recover damages for personal injuries suffered during the course of employment.
“The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, * * Art. 18, § 6, Const, of Arizona.
Of Article 18, § 6, we said:
“Taken into consideration with the preceding sections 4 and 5, it is beyond question that the ‘right of action to recover-damages for injuries * * * ’ therein' mentioned is the common-law action of negligence, * * Alabam’s Freight Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 443, 242 P. 658, 665.
We also said:
“It is urged that this provision makes the former common-law action for negligence a constitutional one, and that it cannot be abrogated by the Legislature. We think there is no question that this proposition, stated in the abstract, is correct.” Moseley v. Lily Ice Cream Co., 38 Ariz. 417, 420, 300 P. 958, 959.
Thereafter, the people of Arizona, in 1925, amended the Constitution to provide for a workmen’s compensation law.
“The Legislature shall enact a Workmen’s Compensation Law * * * by which compensation shall be -required to be paid to any such workman, in case of his injury * * *; provided that it shall be optional with any employee engaged in such private employment to settle for such compensation, or to retain the right to sue said employer as provided by this Constitution; * * Art. 18, § 8, Const, of Arizona.
This amendment gives an employee alternative remedies where the employee has received personal injuries. He has the option to bring suit against those responsible for his injuries or to take the benefits conferred by workmen’s compensation. It does not restrict the right of action to recover damages; it simply gives an injured workman an additional remedy, the right to take compensation if he so chooses.
The legislature did enact a workmen’s compensation law. It recognized and reinforced the plain language of the Constitution by providing that it would be optional with an employee as to whether he accepted compensation or retained the right to sue *157the employer. Laws of 1925, Ch. 83, § 60, now A.R.S. § 23-906, subsec. A.1 By subsections B, C, D and E of § 23-906,2 the legislature provided the circumstances by which the employee signified his acceptance of the election to take compensation, thus waiving the right to sue guaranteed by Article 18, § 6.
It will be noticed that in subsection B the statute uses the word “election” and in subsections C and D “elected”. This election is an election of remedies.
“An election of remedies has been defined as the act of choosing between two or more different and coexisting modes of procedure and relief allowed by law on the same state of facts. The phrase is also used in a more restrictive sense to denote the doctrine that the adoption, by an unequivocal act, of one or two or more inconsistent remedial rights has the effect of precluding a resort to the others.” 25 Am.Jur.2d, Election of Remedies, p. 646.
“An election of remedies is an affirmative defense. It must be pleaded by the party who asserts it and the burden of proof is on him to establish it.” Kuhl v. Hayes, 10 Cir., 212 F.2d 37. And see Bagwell v. Susman, 6 Cir., 165 F.2d 412.
“But, apart from that, it is not the plaintiff’s burden to prove that his action is outside the scope of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1. Compare Butler v. Eberstadt, 113 N.J.L. 569, 175 A. 159. That would be a matter *158of defense to be advanced by the defendant.” Dailey v. Mutual Chemical Co. of America, 125 N.J.L. 465, 16 A.2d 557, aff’d. 126 N.J.L. 426, 19 A.2d 778.
As an affirmative defense, an election of remedies cannot be raised by a motion to dismiss as was done in the instant case. Macias v. Klein, D.C., 106 F.Supp. 107; Southern Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Wyatt, 234 Ark. 649, 353 S.W.2d 531; Household Finance Corp. v. Suhr, 44 Ill.App.2d 292, 193 N.E.2d 611; Vitarelli v. Brunson Const. Corp., 235 App.Div. 804, 256 N.Y.S. 637; Hanover Estates, Inc. v. Finkelstein, 194 Misc. 755, 86 N.Y.S.2d 316; Saso v. State, 20 Misc.2d 826, 194 N.Y.S.2d 789; New Hanover County v. Sidbury, 225 N.C. 679, 36 S.E.2d 242.
The choice, denominated an election by the statute, is essentially a waiver of the right of action to recover damages for injuries guaranteed to petitioner by Article 18, § 6 of the Constitution. The essence of a waiver is that there be an opportunity of choice between the relinquishment and the enforcement of a right. Arizona Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Modern Homes, 84 Ariz. 399, 330 P.2d 113. It is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Murphey v. Valenzuela, 95 Ariz. 30, 386 P.2d 78; City of Tucson v. Koerber, 82 Ariz. 347, 313 P.2d 411; In re Brandt’s Estate, 67 Ariz. 42, 190 P.2d 497; Meason v. Ralston Purina Co., 56 Ariz. 291, 107 P.2d 224; Southwest Cotton Co. v. Valley Bank, 26 Ariz. 559, 227 P. 986.
Waiver must be pleaded affirmatively.
“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. * * * ” Rule 8(d), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. (Emphasis supplied.)
And see Allstate Insurance Co. v. Moldenhauer, 7 Cir., 193 F.2d 663; Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Beverforden, 8 Cir., 93 F.2d 166; Hunter Milling Co. v. Koch, 10 Cir., 82 F.2d 735.
The burden of proving waiver is upon the party claiming or asserting it. Cowles v. Ohio Farmers Insurance Co., 242 F.2d 73; Buffum v. Chase National Bank, 7 Cir., 192 F.2d 58, cert. denied 342 U.S. 944, 96 L.Ed. 702, 72 S.Ct. 558. Waiver is a question of fact for the jury where the facts are disputed. Cannon v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 8 Cir., 314 F.2d 657; Albert v. Joralemon, 9 Cir., 271 F.2d 236; Home Indemnity Co. of New York v. Allen, 7 Cir., 190 F.2d 490; Ross Engineering Co. v. Pace, 4 Cir., 153 F.2d 35. “The cases uniformly hold that questions of waiver are questions of fact to be submitted to the jury.” Ross Engineering Co. v. Pace, supra, 153 F.2d 35, 50.
It is, of course, immaterial whether the selection of one or the other of the options provided in the Constitution, Art. 18, § 8, is denominated a waiver or an election of remedies. The result is the same.
“An employer who contends that he is one of a class of persons protected from an action at law by the Workmen’s Compensation Act must plead and prove the conditions necessary to bring himself within the statute. The employee is pursuing a common law remedy which existed before the enactment of the statute and which continues to exist in cases not covered by the statute. It is incumbent upon the employer to prove that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is a bar to the employees’ ordinary remedy.” Popejoy v. Hannon, 37 Cal.2d 159, 231 P.2d 484.
At this point it might be well to summarize: One, the Constitution, by Article § 6, gives petitioner a right of action to recover damages for his personal injuries— a right which “shall never be abrogated.” Two, the subsequent amendment, Article 18, § 8, gives him an additional right, that is, a choice between the right to sue or to take *159compensation without suit. Three, the legislative enactment, § 23-906, since it can neither augment nor diminish the right to sue granted by the Constitution, simply provides the time when and method by which the election or waiver of that right is evidenced. And four, the assertion of an election or waiver by the employer is an affirmative defense not to be determined on motion, but as any other contested factual issue.
PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
By the Constitution, Article 2, § 23, the people of this state have provided:
“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, * *
We have said repeatedly that the Constitution does not give the right to trial by jury, but its purpose is to guarantee a preservation of the right. Rothweiler v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 37, 410 P.2d 479; State v. Cousins, 97 Ariz. 105, 397 P.2d 217; Brown v. Greer, 16 Ariz. 215, 141 P. 841. Since the Constitution preserves a jury trial in the common-law action of negligence, Alabam’s Freight Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 242 P. 658, supra, it would seem beyond the possibility of quibbling that Morgan should have had a jury trial on Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer’s affirmative defense that he elected to take under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, thereby waiving his common-law action.
“It is fundamental that the California Constitution preserves, to litigants the right to jury trial as it existed at common law in 1850. * * * The legislature may not, directly, or in the guise of procedural changes or changes in remedy, deprive a litigant of a jury in a case formerly triable at law. People v. Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 133, 263 P. 226. People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, supra, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 299, 231 P.2d 832.” Ripling v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.App.2d 399, 247 P.2d 117.
How is it, then, that the majority of this Court now concludes, in the face of such plain, unequivocal, constitutional language that the question of petitioner’s waiver of his constitutional right of action is to be determined by the trial judge ?
The words of Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent to Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 695, 64 S.Ct. 327, 333, 88 L.Ed 400, capsulizes the problem here:
“ ‘Jurisdiction’ competes with ‘right’ as one of the most deceptive of legal pitfalls.”
We have here a simple case in which the petitioner is seeking to exercise his constitutional right but the majority persist in talking about “jurisdiction.”
The Arizona Constitution, Article 18, § 6, speaks of the “ ‘right of action’ to recover damages.” The right to bring suit to obtain the relief sought is a “right of action.” It is the right to pursue a remedy.
“At the risk of being elementary, it is well to define certain terms — the more so as they have been, at times, a source of confusion. The right of action is merely the right to pursue a remedy.” Yankwich, J., in United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., D.C., 21 F.Supp. 645, 660.
And see Adams v. Albany, D.C., 80 F.Supp. 876; Foster v. Humburg, 180 Kan. 64, 299 P.2d 46; Douglas v. Daniels Bro. Coal Co., 135 Ohio St. 641, 22 N.E.2d 195, 125 A.L.R. 761; Landry v. Acme Flour Mills, 202 Okl. 170, 211 P.2d 512; East Side, etc., Co. v. Southeast Portland Lumber Co., 155 Or. 367, 64 P.2d 625; Elmo v. James (Tex. Civ. App.), 282 S.W. 835; Seymour v. Richardson, 194 Va. 709, 75 S.E.2d 77.
The statute does not confuse “jurisdiction” with the “right to pursue a remedy.”
“The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this chapter for injury sustained by an employee shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer, except as provided by §§ 23-906 * * * ” A.R.S. § 23-1022. (Emphasis supplied.) *160It says the right to recover compensation shall be the remedy.
The error in confusing jurisdiction with the petitioner’s right to pursue a remedy in the superior court originated in S. H. Kress Co. v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 67, 182 P.2d 931. There, a suit was brought by a minor, age thirteen, against the Kress Company for his personal injuries. The Kress Company brought a writ of prohibition in this Court. In the course of the decision holding that a minor could make a valid election, the Court said:
“ * * * it is the prime contention of the respondent that in light of the constitutional provision heretofore quoted, the child labor laws of our state and sections of our Workmen’s Compensation Law that the child involved in this case was not sui juris to make a binding election before injury so as to make the Workmen’s Compensation Act- his exclusive remedy, and the writ of prohibition in this case should not issue since the Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear this case.”
It then said this:
“Statutes direct that the Superior Court has no jurisdiction to hear this case if the injured boy’s exclusive remedy is under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, for the right to appeal is by statute only * * * and the only appeal given from an award of the Commission is by Sec. 56-972, A.C.A. 1939: * * *.” 66 Ariz. at 72, 182 P.2d at 934.
This latter statement is palpably a non sequitur. The right to appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission is, of course, given by statute exclusively to the Supreme Court; but respondent, as plaintiff in the superior court, was not attempting to appeal an award of the Commission. He was seeking to invoke a right of action guaranteed by the Constitution of Arizona, Article 18, § 6, supra. The Industrial Commission, by processing the claim under legislative acts, could not oust the jurisdiction granted to the superior court by Article 6, § 14 of the Constitution of Arizona to hear and determine respondent’s case.
“Jurisdiction is the power to decide a case on its merits.” Sil-flo Corp. v. Bowen, 98 Ariz. 77, 402 P.2d 22. It is not dependent upon the unsuccessful assertion of a defense such as accord and satisfaction, contributory negligence, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, laches, release, limitation of actions, waiver or election. These are defensive matters which, if found to be true, would defeat recovery on a plaintiff’s right of action. It would be an absurdity, to which this Court would not for one moment listen, were it urged, for example, that contributory negligence, fraud, estoppel or laches could be raised by a motion to dismiss and decided by the trial judge without submission to a jury by the occult device of labeling the issue “jurisdictional.”
In March, 1951, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, decided Taylor v. Hubbell, 188 F.2d 106. There, it seized upon the language of the Kress case, saying:
“ * *• * And where allowance by the Commission is the exclusive remedy of an injured workman, the Arizona courts have ‘no jurisdiction to hear’ an action for damages. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Superior Court, 1947, 66 Ariz. 67, 182 P.2d 931, 934.” 188 F.2d at 108
and concluded:
“Being jurisdictional, these issues [as to whether there had been an election] were triable to the court not to the jury.” 188 F.2d at 109.
This error was perpetuated the following year in State ex rel. Industrial Commission v. Pressley, Nov. 1952, 74 Ariz. 412, 250 P.2d 992, wherein this Court quoted from and followed Taylor v. Hubbell without serious analysis.
Palpably, there is here no question of jurisdiction. The matter is as simple as this: If the jury determines the election against the plaintiff in the superior court, judgment should be entered in defendant’s favor. The determination of whether the exclusive remedy is in the Commission is *161just another factual issue to be decided as all factual issues have been decided from time immemorial under the Anglo-American jury system.
I cannot acquiesce in this Court’s disposition of the case. The language of the Kress decision, misapplied in Pressley and now stubbornly adhered to, whittles away at one of the most valuable of constitutional rights so that now a workman of this state may not have a jury resolve this dispute with his employer.
I dissent.
BERNSTEIN, C. J., concurs in the dissent

. “A. Employers who comply with the provisions of § 23-961 as to securing compensation shall not he liable for damages at common law or by statute, except as provided in this section, for injury or death of an employee wherever occurring, but it shall be optional with employees to accept compensation as provided by this chapter or to reject the provisions of this chapter and retain the right to sue the employer as provided by law.”

. “B. The employee’s election to reject the provisions of this chapter shall be made by a notice in writing, signed and dated by him and given to his employer, in duplicate in substantially the following form:
‘To (name of employer):
You are hereby notified that the undersigned elects to reject the terms, conditions and provisions of the law for the payment of compensation, as provided by the compulsory compensation law of the state of Arizona, and acts amendatory thereto.’
“C. The notice shall be filed with the employer prior to injuries sustained by the employee, and thereafter within five days the employer shall file with the commission the duplicate of the notice so served by the employee. All employees shall be conclusively presumed to have elected to take compensation in accordance with the terms, conditions and provisions of this chapter unless the notice in writing has been served by the employee upon his employer prior to injury.
“D. Every employer engaged in the occupations designated in this chapter shall post and keep posted in a conspicuous place upon his premises, in all languages spoken by his employees and available for inspection by all workmen, a notice in substantially the following form:
‘All employees are hereby notified that in the event they do not specifically reject the provisions of the compulsory compensation law they are deemed by the laws of Arizona to have accepted the provisions of such law, and to have elected to accept compensation under the terms of such law, and that under the terms thereof employees have the right to reject the same by written notice thereof prior to any injury sustained, and that blanks and forms for such notice are available to all employees at the office of this company.’
“E. If an employer fails to post and keep posted the notice as required by this section, or fails to keep available at the place where the employees are hired the blank forms of notice to be signed by the employee, no employee who thereafter engages in employment for such employer, during the time that the notices are not posted or during the time that the blanks are not available, shall be deemed to have accepted the provisions of this chapter, and it shall be optional for such employee, if injured during the period when blanks were not available or the notice was not posted, to accept compensation under the provisions of this chapter or maintain other action against the employer.”