Court Opinion

ID: 9526559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:19:57.54239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:33.861697
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
Consent to adoption is not required of “(1) A parent or parents if the child is adjudged to have been abandoned or deserted for six (6) months or more immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition; or a parent of a child in the custody of another person, if for a period of at least one (1) year he fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the child when able to do so or knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree (when the parent or parents have made only token efforts to support or to communicate with the child, the court may declare the child abandoned by the parent or parents);”
I.C. 31-3-1-6(g)(1). The statute particularizes certain conditions under which the parental rights of a natural parent may be terminated by adoption without that parent’s consent. The last phrase of the parenthetical insert to that subparagraph gives the trial court discretion to find abandonment when there is merely token efforts to support or to communicate. The significance of communication is not a commodity to be measured merely in terms of numbers of visits, but rather the quality thereof. The statutory language creates the authority for the trial court to find abandonment, even though there exists some minimal or token efforts of support or communication. The language in fact does not obligate the court to specifically state the reasons for abandonment.
Further, a general finding that the allegations of any petition for adoption are true is sufficient in the absence of any request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law by one of the parties. Horlock v. Oglesby, (1967) 249 Ind. 251, 231 N.E.2d 810. It is not necessary for the trial court to recite its findings in detail or specificity so long as the ultimate findings are stated in the order of adoption. The record herein does not indicate any request by appellant for specific findings of fact or law and the Order of Adoption does in fact make certain findings of fact pertinent to the resolution of the adoption question. The Order of Adoption certainly is sufficient in light of the requirements in Hor-lock, supra, since appellant has failed to request the trial court to make special findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The decision of the trial court comes to the appellate court clothed with the presumption that a correct result was reached and the burden is upon the appellant to overcome that presumption. In re Adoption of Anonymous, (1973) 158 Ind. App. 238, 302 N.E.2d 507. The appellant may not overcome that burden by merely asking us to reweigh the evidence, which is not our function. The Record on Agreed Statement reflects a number of items of contested factual matters before the court, all of which were presented to the court at trial through the testimony of the natural father, the natural mother, and the adoptive father. The natural father talked with his sons by telephone in April and December of 1979, and in March of 1980. The facts regarding other attempts of communication were disputed. The father’s mother’s visits in April, 1979, and March, 1980, are irrelevant to this issue of abandonment. These facts are sufficient for the trial judge to conclude under the statute that the natural father had failed without “justifiable cause to communicate significantly” with *519his children or had made only token efforts to communicate with the children and thus had abandoned them.
We will consider only the evidence most favorable to appellee together with any reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom to determine whether the decision is sustained by sufficient evidence within the standard of proof of clear, cogent and indubitable evidence. Matter of Adoption of Lockmondy, (1976) 168 Ind. App. 563, 343 N.E.2d 793. We should not set aside the trial court’s judgment unless it appears to be clearly erroneous and should give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses as they sat before the trial court and testified. Matter of Adoption of Lockmon-dy, supra.
I would affirm the trial court.