Court Opinion

ID: 9716582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:44:38.226352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:46.971626
License: Public Domain

BARTEAU, Judge,
concurring.
I concur, writing separately to express my concern about seemingly contradictory Indiana precedents regarding cross-examination of a State's witness as to the witness's address. In particular, I perceive divergent caselaw on a burden-of-proof question: must the State demonstrate why its objection to the "witness's address" question should be sustained, or must the accused show why the witness's address should be disclosed.
It is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination is a matter committed to trial court discretion, and that such issues are reviewed for abuse of discretion only. However, discretion to limit cross-examination of government witnesses by an accused must be measured against the sixth amendment right to confront such witnesses. In my view, the majority opinion in Smith v. Ilinois (1968), 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 holds that a per se abuse of discretion occurs if a trial judge sustains a prosecutor's objection to the witness's address question.1 That holding is binding on state courts. 890 U.S. at 183, 88 S.Ct. at 750. Two Justices concurred, but wrote separately to state their opinion that it would be proper to sustain the objection if the prosecution could show legitimate concerns for the witness's safety. With the passage of time, the concurring opinion in Smith v. Illinois has come to the fore. See, eg., United States v. Navarro (1984), 7th Cir., 787 F.2d 625, 682-34, cert. denied sub nom. Mugercia v. United States, 469 U.S. 1020, 105 S.Ct. 488, 838 L.Ed.2d 864.
Turning to Indiana cases, in Crull v. State (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 1195, our supreme court reversed a narcotics conviction because the trial court sustained an objection to the witness's address question. Crull discussed Smith v. Illinois at length, then cited United States v. Palermo (1969), Tth Cir., 410 F.2d 468, which had agreed with the concurring opinion in Smith v. Tilinois, for the idea that "the threat to the witness must be actual and not a result of conjecture, and that the government bears the burden of proving to the [trial] court the existence of such a threat." 540 N.E.2d at 1199. See also Jackson v. State (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 853, 854-56 (where witness was in federal witness protection program, supreme court required disclosure of witness's prior felonies but not prior identity or address).
Crull stated that it was consistent with Johnson v. State (1988), Ind., 518 N.E.2d 1078. In Johnson, the supreme court held no error occurred in prohibiting the witness's address question where the witness testified during a hearing in camera that he had received anonymous threats and was under police protection. The cases seem inconsistent, however, because John*586son stated that "[tlo show an abuse of discretion, a defendant must demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the court's actions." 518 N.E.2d at 1075. I cannot ree oncile that with either the majority or concurring opinion in Smith v. Ilinois.2
When this issue was raised in Corbin v. State (1990), Ind., 568 N.E.2d 86, the supreme court held no error occurred, finding Johnson dispositive, and quoting the portion of Johnson stating that the defendant must demonstrate how he was prejudiced. As to Crull, Corbin distinguished itself in this way: "[iIn the instant case, unlike Crull, appellant made no request for an in camera hearing to determine reasonableness of refusal to disclose [the State's witness's address]." 563 N.E.2d at 90.
In this case, there was no in camera hearing, nor any request for one. Thus, Pigg was situated similarly to the defendant in Johnson, who had "point[ed] to no evidence he was prevented from presenting by failure to be advised of the witness' address." Johnson, 518 N.E.2d at 1075. However, the State in Pigg's case did not show an "actual" threat to the witness. Crull, 540 N.E.2d at 1199. Indeed, the witness started to give his address before the prosecutor objected. Record at 459.
In my opinion, Johnson and Corbin are authority to hold that there was no error here. On the other hand, Crull and Smith v. Illinois teach that it is reversible error to sustain an objection to the address question unless the government shows an actual threat to the witness. Faced with these divergent precedents, I choose to follow the higher authority, Smith v. Illinois, Accordingly, I coneur. '

. Smith v. Illinois acknowledged that it would be no abuse of discretion to limit cross-examination to protect a witness who has invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, or to prohibit cross-examination designed "merely to harass, annoy or humiliate [the witness]." 390 U.S. 129, 133, 88 S.Ct. 748, 750, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (quoting Alford v. United States (1931), 282 U.S. 687, 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, 220, 75 L.Ed. 624.

. The majority opinion in Smith v. Illinois followed, and quoted extensively, Alford v. United States (1931), 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624. The quoted portion of Alford included the following:
It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop. Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them.... To say that prejudice can be established only by showing that the cross-examination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending to discredit the testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right and withdraw one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial.
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. at 132, 88 S.Ct. at 750.