Court Opinion

ID: 9890919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 20:04:04.273001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:31.514113
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/16/23
                  CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                            DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                            2d Crim. No. B323282
                                    (Super. Ct. No. 2022007238)
     Plaintiff and Appellant,            (Ventura County)

v.

VICTOR MANUEL AGUIRRE,

     Defendant and Respondent.

       In 2012, the electorate passed Proposition 36, which
provides that, for all offenses committed on or after November 7,
2012, determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a
serious felony conviction or “strike” must be made “upon the date
of that prior conviction” and based on the relevant statute “as [it]
existed on November 7, 2012.” (Prop. 36, §§ 2-5, approved Nov. 6,
2012, eff. Nov. 7, 2012.) These provisions fix or lock in the status
of a conviction as a strike on the date of the prior conviction.
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) did not change that.
A gang-enhanced felony committed before Assembly Bill No.
333’s effective date still qualifies as a prior serious felony.
       The Ventura County District Attorney charged Victor
Manuel Aguirre with being a felon in possession of a firearm
(Pen. Code, 1 § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), ammunition (§ 30305, subd.
(a)(1)), and a machine gun (§ 32625, subd. (a)). As to each charge
it was alleged that Aguirre suffered a 2021 prior strike conviction
for possessing a firearm for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(28)). Effective January
1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 333 amended section 186.22 to require
evidence that the firearm possession provide more than a
reputational benefit to the street gang. Because no such evidence
supported Aguirre’s prior conviction, the trial court concluded
that it no longer qualified as a strike. Aguirre pleaded no contest
to the three charges against him and was sentenced to two years
in state prison.
       The district attorney appeals, contending Aguirre’s prior
conviction qualifies as a strike. We agree. Because Aguirre’s
violation of section 186.22 qualified as a strike on the date of his
conviction of that offense, it continues to qualify as a strike. 2 The
trial court therefore erred when it struck the prior conviction
allegations. Accordingly, we reverse.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       In May 2022, the district attorney charged Aguirre with
being a felon in possession of a firearm, ammunition, and a
machine gun. As to each charge, the district attorney alleged

      1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

      2 Because we resolve this issue in favor of the district
attorney, we need not reach his remaining contentions regarding
the interplay between Assembly Bill No. 333 and Proposition 21,
adopted by the voters in 2000. We also deny the district
attorney’s request to take judicial notice of the March 7, 2000,
voter information guide because it is not relevant to our decision.
(Najarro v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 871, 885, fn. 7.).

                                  2
Aguirre had suffered a prior strike due to his 2021 conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm for the benefit of a
criminal street gang.
       Aguirre moved to dismiss the prior strike allegations,
contending his violation of section 186.22 no longer qualified as a
serious felony conviction after the passage of Assembly Bill No.
333. Section 186.22 now provides that acting to “benefit,
promote, further, or assist” a gang “means to provide a common
benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more
than reputational.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3; see § 186.22, subd.
(g).) Because the record of his prior conviction contained no
evidence that his firearm possession provided more than a
reputational benefit to the gang, Aguirre argued his conviction of
that offense no longer qualified as a prior serious felony
conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law.
       The district attorney opposed Aguirre’s motion on the
ground that Proposition 36, adopted by the voters in 2012, fixed
the list of serious felonies as of November 7, 2012, and further
requires the seriousness of a prior conviction to be determined as
of the date of that conviction. Because Aguirre’s violation of
section 186.22 was a serious felony on the date of his conviction
in 2021, it remained a serious felony.
       The trial court agreed with Aguirre. It concluded his prior
conviction would no longer qualify as a serious felony conviction
and, on that basis, struck the prior strike allegations. Aguirre
then pleaded no contest to each alleged offense, and the trial
court sentenced him to two years in state prison.
                             DISCUSSION
       Determining whether Aguirre’s alleged prior conviction
falls within the ambit of the Three Strikes law “presents an issue

                                 3
of statutory interpretation for our independent review.” (In re
R.G. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 141, 146.) The same principles that
govern our interpretation of statutes enacted by the Legislature
apply to those adopted by the electorate. (People v. Superior
Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 571.) “Our fundamental
task is to ascertain the [electorate’s] intent when it enacted
[Proposition 36].” (In re R.G., at p. 146.) “We begin with the . . .
words [of the statutes enacted by the proposition], giving them
their plain, commonsense meanings.” (Ibid.) “We construe
[those] words in [the] context of related statutes, harmonizing
them whenever possible.” (Ibid.) “We presume the [electorate]
‘was aware of existing related laws’ when it enacted [the
statutes], and that it ‘intended to maintain a consistent body of
rules.’ ” (Ibid.) “We also presume the [electorate] was aware of
judicial construction of those laws and that it intended the same
construction to apply to related laws with identical or
substantially similar language.” (Ibid.)
                        The Three Strikes law
       “The Three Strikes law was ‘enacted “to ensure longer
prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a
felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or
violent felony offenses.” ’ ” (People v. Henderson (2022) 14 Cal.5th
34, 43 (Henderson), alterations omitted.) It “consists of two,
nearly identical statutory schemes.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “In March 1994,
the Legislature codified its version of the Three Strikes law by
adding subdivisions (b) through (i) to . . . section 667.” (Ibid.) “A
ballot initiative in November of the same year added a new
provision, section 1170.12.” (Ibid.)
       As originally enacted, subdivision (d)(1) of section 667
stated that “[a]ny offense defined . . . in subdivision (c) of [s]ection

                                   4
1192.7 as a serious felony” qualifies as a prior strike. (Stats.
1994, ch. 12, § 1.) Section 667, subdivision (d)(1) also stated that
“[t]he determination of whether a prior conviction is a [prior
strike] shall be made upon the date of that prior conviction.”
(Stats. 1994, ch. 12, § 1.) Subdivision (h) provided that “[a]ll
references to existing statutes in subdivisions (c) to (g), inclusive,
are to statutes as they existed on June 30, 1993.” (Stats. 1994,
ch. 12, § 1.)
        Section 1170.12, added with the adoption of Proposition 184
eight months later, included the same definition of a prior strike
and the same protocol for determining whether a prior felony
qualified as a strike. (See Prop. 184, § 1, approved Nov. 8, 1994,
eff. Nov. 9, 1994.) And like subdivision (h) of section 667, an
uncodified portion of Proposition 184 provided that “[a]ll
references to existing statutes [in section 1170.12] are to statutes
as they existed on June 30, 1993.” (See Prop. 184, § 2, approved
Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Nov. 9, 1994.)
        Over the succeeding three decades, various statutes and
voter initiatives added to or amended the Three Strikes law.
(Henderson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 43.) In 2000, for example, the
electorate passed Proposition 21, which added sections 667.1 and
1170.125 to the Penal Code. As enacted, these sections provided
that “[n]otwithstanding subdivision (h) of [s]ection 667 [or section
2 of Proposition 184], for all offenses committed on or after
[March 8, 2000], all references to existing statutes in subdivisions
(c) to (g), inclusive, of [s]ection 667, [and all references to existing
statutes in section 1170.12,] are to those statutes as they existed
on” March 8, 2000. (Prop. 21, §§ 14 & 16, approved March 7,
2000, eff. March 8, 2000.)

                                   5
       Twelve years later, the electorate passed Proposition 36.
Relevant here, Proposition 36 amended section 667, subdivision
(h) to state that “[a]ll references to existing statutes in
subdivisions (c) to (g), inclusive, are to statutes as they existed on
November 7, 2012.” (Prop. 36, § 2, approved Nov. 6, 2012, eff.
Nov. 7, 2012.) It made similar amendments to sections 667.1 and
1170.125: “[F]or all offenses committed on or after November 7,
2012, all references to existing statutes in subdivisions (c) to (g),
inclusive, of [s]ection 667, [and all references to existing statutes
in section 1170.12,] are to those statutes as they existed on
November 7, 2012.” (Prop. 36, §§ 3 & 5, approved Nov. 6, 2012,
eff. Nov. 7, 2012.) It also amended section 1170.12, subdivision
(b)(1) to state that “[t]he determination of whether a prior
conviction is a prior serious . . . felony conviction for purposes of
this section shall be made upon the date of that prior conviction.”
(Prop. 36, § 4, approved Nov. 6, 2012, eff. Nov. 7, 2012.) The
wording of these statutes remains unchanged today.
                         Assembly Bill No. 333
       Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 333 amended
section 186.22 in several ways. For example, the bill narrowed
the definition of “criminal street gang” to mean “an ongoing,
organized association or group of three or more persons . . .
having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or
more [enumerated] criminal acts . . . , having a common name or
common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members
collectively engage in, or have engaged in, a pattern of criminal
gang activity.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3; see § 186.22, subd. (f).)
It modified the “pattern of criminal gang activity” element of the
gang enhancement to require that the predicate offenses
commonly benefiting a criminal street gang must do more than

                                  6
affect the gang’s reputation. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3; see
§ 186.22, subd. (e).) And it clarified that to “benefit, promote,
further, or assist” a gang “means to provide a common benefit to
members of a gang where the common benefit is more than
reputational.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3; see § 186.22, subd. (g).)
                                Analysis
       The parties agree, as do we, that the Assembly Bill No. 333
amendments apply retroactively to nonfinal cases. (People v.
Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207.) But the issue is
whether those amendments retroactively alter the strike status
of Aguirre’s 2021 conviction for violating section 186.22. We
conclude that Assembly Bill No. 333 has no application here.
Because Aguirre’s conviction was a serious felony within the
meaning of the Three Strikes law in 2021, it remains so today.
       Pursuant to the Three Strikes law, a prior serious felony is
an “offense defined . . . in subdivision (c) of [s]ection 1192.7 as a
serious felony.” (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) A
felony offense that “would also constitute a felony violation of
[s]ection 186.22” is listed in that subdivision. (§ 1192.7, subd.
(c)(28).) Gang-enhanced felonies (see § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) are
included within this definition. (People v. Briceno (2004) 34
Cal.4th 451, 462 (Briceno).)
       Aguirre was convicted of his current offenses on or after
November 7, 2012. Thus, for purposes of the Three Strikes law,
the references to section 1192.7, subdivision (c) in sections 667
and 1170.12 are to that subdivision as it existed on that date.
(§§ 667, subd. (h), 667.1, 1170.125; see also People v. Johnson
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 684 (Johnson); People v. Fletcher (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 1374, 1381 [“the definition of a serious felony for
purposes of the Three Strikes law is what constituted a serious

                                  7
felony in 2012”], review granted Sept. 27, 2023, S281282.) In
November 2012, possession of a firearm for the benefit of a
criminal street gang was on the list of offenses that qualify as
prior serious felonies. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(28); Fletcher, at p.
1379.) Determining whether Aguirre’s alleged commission of
that offense continues to qualify as a prior serious felony, and
thus a strike, “shall be made upon the date of that prior
conviction.” (§ 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) Aguirre was allegedly
convicted of his offense in 2021. Because possession of a firearm
for the benefit of a street gang was a serious felony then (Briceno,
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 462), it is today.
       That Aguirre’s alleged prior conviction might no longer
qualify as a gang-enhanced felony under Assembly Bill No. 333’s
definitions is irrelevant. As our colleagues in the Fourth District
have explained, a gang-enhanced felony committed prior to 2022
continues to qualify as a serious felony because “ ‘the [electorate]
intended that the qualifying status of a conviction would be fixed
upon the date of the prior conviction.’ ” (People v. Scott (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 1176, 1181 (Scott), review granted Sept. 27, 2023,
S280776.) “This ‘means that [a trial] court is presently required
to look backward to see if, at the time of the conviction of the past
offense, such past offense qualified as a serious or violent
offense.’ ” (Id. at p. 1182, alterations omitted.) “It . . . does not
matter if the definition of a strike has subsequently changed.”
(Ibid.; see also Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 685-686
[sections 667.1 and 1170.125 require “bas[ing] sentencing on the
most recent classification of a defendant’s prior convictions,” not
the law in effect when the current offense was committed].)
       Our conclusion comports with prior judicial interpretations
of the Three Strikes law’s provisions. Just one year after the

                                  8
Three Strikes law’s enactment, our colleagues in Division 2 of
this district explained that determining “ ‘whether a prior offense
qualifie[d] as a “strike” ’ ” under section 667, subdivision (d)(1)
required a court to “ ‘look backward to see if, at the time of the
conviction of the past offense, such past offense qualified as a
[serious felony] under section 1192.7, subdivision (c).” (People v.
Green (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 280, 283 (Green), italics added.)
They subsequently explained that even convictions that predated
the enactment of section 1192.7 may qualify as prior serious
felonies, and thus strikes, because all references to existing
statutes in sections 667 and 1170.12 were to the statutes as they
existed on June 30, 1993. (People v. Moenius (1998) 60
Cal.App.4th 820, 826-827 [citing section 667, subdivision (h), and
section 2 of Proposition 184]; see also Moenius, at pp. 826-827
[compiling cases in accord]; Gonzales v. Superior Court (1995) 37
Cal.App.4th 1302, 1311 (Gonzales) [Three Strikes law applies to
felonies that “fit the definition of a ‘serious felony’ . . . on the
relevant date”].) And after the adoption of Proposition 21, they
explained that, pursuant to sections 667.1 and 1170.125 as they
then read, determining “whether a prior conviction alleged as a
serious felony [was] a prior strike” hinged on whether the offense
was defined as a serious felony on March 8, 2000. (People v.
James (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1151 (James), cited with
approval by Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 684; accord,
Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 577, fn. 11
[noting that offenses added to list of serious felonies between
1993 and 2000 did not qualify as strikes until passage of
Proposition 21].)
      For purposes of the narrow issue presented in this case,
Proposition 36 did no more than adjust the “relevant date”

                                 9
(Gonzales, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311) set forth in sections
667, 667.1, and 1170.125. That date is now November 7, 2012. A
gang-enhanced felony could qualify as a serious felony, and hence
a strike, on that date. Under the reasoning of Green, supra, 36
Cal.App.4th 280 and its progeny, it still can.
       Aguirre’s reliance on People v. Farias (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
619, review granted September 27, 2023, S281027, is misplaced.
The issue in Farias was whether the defendant’s 2009 conviction
for active participation in a criminal street gang could provide
the basis for imposing a five-year serious felony enhancement
under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). (Farias, at pp. 626, 639.)
That issue is not relevant here for two reasons. First,
interpretation of one of the elements of the gang participation
offense changed when the Supreme Court decided People v.
Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125. (Farias, at pp. 645-648.)
Here, we consider the impact of a legislative enactment, not a
judicial decision. The two have different retroactive effects: the
former operates prospectively, while the latter operates
retrospectively. (See Scott, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1183-
1184, review granted.) Second, Proposition 36’s lock-in provisions
apply to the Three Strikes law, not to serious felony
enhancements. (See §§ 667, subd. (h), 667.1, 1170.125.)
       We conclude that, to determine whether a gang-enhanced
felony conviction qualifies as a prior strike, Proposition 36’s
lock-in provisions require a trial court to examine whether the
“offense resulting in that conviction was a serious felony within
the meaning of the [T]hree [S]trikes law on” the date the
conviction occurred. (James, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151.)
The court below struck the gang-strike allegations against
Aguirre based on the amended version of section 186.22, rather

                                10
than on the statute as it existed when Aguirre was convicted. In
doing so, the trial court erred. (James, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1151.)
                             Conclusion
       When it enacted Assembly Bill No. 333, the Legislature
found that gang enhancements have not been shown to reduce
crime or violence. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2.) The Legislature
also found that these enhancements have been applied
inconsistently and disproportionately against people of color.
(Ibid.) They have additionally been applied to minor crimes—
despite being intended to target “crimes committed by violent,
organized criminal street gangs”—and have been used to
“legitimize severe punishment.” (Ibid.)
       These are valid concerns. But it is not the province of this
court to apply legislative concerns to a statutory scheme the
Legislature has left unchanged. As we have previously said, “it is
exclusively within the province of the Legislature to set the
penalty for criminal conduct.” (People v. Galvez (2011) 195
Cal.App.4th 1253, 1260; see also In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410,
414.) Therefore, if the provisions of Assembly Bill No. 333 are to
apply to the use of gang-enhanced felonies when sentencing
under the Three Strikes law, it is the Legislature (or electorate)—
not this court—that must amend the lock-in provisions that have
been in place since the passage of Proposition 36.

                                11
                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is vacated, and the July 19, 2022, order
granting Aguirre’s motion to dismiss the strike allegations is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                    BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             YEGAN, J.

                               12
                   Derek D. Malan, Judge

              Superior Court County of Ventura

               ______________________________

     Erik Nasarenko, District Attorney, and Thomas Frye,
Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, and Thomas M.
Hartnett, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and
Respondent.