Court Opinion

ID: 9918327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 17:00:34.131153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:35.805061
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 12 2024
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARLOS ANTONIO CHONAY ROSALES, No. 18-72267
AKA Luis Armiro Garcia,
                               Agency No. A076-360-283
             Petitioner,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                           Submitted January 10, 2024**
                              Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,***
Judge.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
      Petitioner Carlos Antonio Chonay Rosales petitions for review of an order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an Immigration

Judge (IJ) order denying him withholding of removal and relief under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT). In 1990, after a conviction for a controlled

substance offense, Chonay Rosales was deported to his home country of Guatemala.

He then illegally reentered the United States later the same year. In October 2016,

the Department of Homeland Security issued a notice of intent to reinstate Chonay

Rosales’s prior 1990 order of deportation. He then applied for withholding of

removal and CAT protection, expressing a fear of returning to Guatemala.

      In the early 1980s, Chonay Rosales participated in student protests against the

Guatemalan government during Guatemala’s civil war. Chonay Rosales was beaten

by the military “about 7 times” during protests in 1985 and 1986. The military

“didn’t like” the student protests and “would send trucks of soldiers to disperse” the

students and strike them with their weapons. As a result, Chonay Rosales was “left

beaten and sore.”

      Chonay Rosales explained he was still afraid of being harmed in Guatemala,

because he thought the government was still corrupt; and, although he does not fear

the specific soldiers who beat him in 1985, “there is a record” of his involvement in

protests against the government because the Guatemalan soldiers wrote down his

identifying information on several occasions. Chonay Rosales told the asylum

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officer that based on “[w]hat we are seeing through the news[,] the military is

mandated and manipulated always [and] they do bad actions through what is

established.” Chonay Rosales was unaware of the 1996 Guatemalan peace accords

ending the civil war or the changes the country has undergone since.

      The IJ denied Chonay Rosales’s application for withholding of removal and

CAT relief.1 The IJ denied withholding of removal after determining that Chonay

Rosales was not a credible witness, that his “unsupported allegation that he faces a

danger of being harmed by the Guatemalan government or military due to his

involvement in protests over 30 years ago [was] frivolous,” and that he had not

shown it was more likely than not that he would be persecuted in Guatemala if he

were to return. Reasoning that Chonay Rosales based his applications for both forms

of relief on the same set of facts, the IJ denied CAT relief because “[w]ithholding of

removal requires a much lower showing of harm than relief under CAT,” and

Chonay Rosales had failed to show the requisite harm for his withholding claim.

1
  As to Chonay Rosales’s application for withholding of removal, the IJ pointed out
that the application relied exclusively on events prior to the 1990 deportation order,
and, because Chonay Rosales did not seek asylum during the 1990 deportation case,
his application for withholding was barred by res judicata. While Chonay Rosales
argues the IJ’s res judicata determination was erroneous, the BIA did not rely on
that ground in denying his petition. Therefore, we do not reach his contentions
regarding res judicata. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010)
(noting that the court’s review “is limited to the actual grounds relied upon by the
BIA”).

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Therefore, Chonay Rosales could not meet the higher showing of harm required for

relief under CAT.

      Reviewing the IJ’s decision, the BIA concluded that, even assuming Chonay

Rosales was credible and his past mistreatment amounted to persecution, the IJ’s

denial of withholding was not clearly erroneous as—based on a changed country

conditions report from the United States Department of State—the conditions in

Guatemala have undergone a “fundamental change” in the 30 years since Chonay

Rosales’s mistreatment. As to CAT relief, the BIA agreed with the IJ that the harm

Chonay Rosales experienced did not rise to the level of torture and he had not

established a clear likelihood that he would be tortured upon his return to Guatemala.

Thus, the BIA upheld the IJ’s conclusions and dismissed Chonay Rosales’s appeal.

      On appeal, Chonay Rosales argues the BIA made two errors. He first claims

that the BIA erroneously found he was ineligible for withholding of removal because

he was entitled to a presumption of future persecution which was not overcome by

evidence in the record. He then claims that the BIA erred in holding his past

mistreatment did not amount to torture.

      Our review is “limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s

opinion is expressly adopted” by the BIA. Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957

(9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2005)).

“We examine the BIA’s ‘legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for

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substantial evidence.’” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en

banc)). Substantial evidence review requires the BIA’s determinations be upheld “if

the decision is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the

record considered as a whole.” Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir.

2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Put differently, “[w]e may

only reverse the agency’s determination where the evidence compels a contrary

conclusion from that adopted by the BIA.” Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1142 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

      I.       The BIA did not err in its withholding of removal determination.

      To succeed on a petition for withholding of removal, the applicant “must

demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he would be subject to persecution on

one of the specified grounds” in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), such as one’s political

opinion or membership in a social group. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190

(9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The applicant can make this showing either “by

establishing a presumption of fear of future persecution based on past persecution”

or “through an independent showing of clear probability of future persecution.”

Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(b)(1)–(2)).     The BIA assumed Chonay Rosales experienced past

persecution.     This triggered a presumption that his “life or freedom would be

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threatened in the future in [Guatemala] on the basis of the original claim.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(b)(1)(i). “To rebut this presumption, the government must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that country conditions have so changed that it is no

longer likely that the applicant would be persecuted there.” Aden v. Wilkinson, 989

F.3d 1073, 1086 (9th Cir. 2021); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A).

      The BIA implicitly found that the government had met this burden by

affirming the IJ’s finding of a fundamental change in country conditions over the

past 30 years. There is no evidence in the record that compels a finding contrary to

the BIA’s. The country conditions report from the State Department adequately

rebutted the presumption of a likelihood of persecution. As the agency found, the

likelihood of future harm is minimal as the country conditions report provides

evidence that the Guatemalan government has drastically changed over the past

thirty-plus years and is taking affirmative steps to prevent the type of harm that

petitioner suffered decades ago. See Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995,

1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding BIA’s determination that the presumption of future

persecution was rebutted by a fundamental change in country conditions in

Guatemala).    Further, Chonay Rosales’s fear of returning is based on his

unsubstantiated claim that “[t]he army always keeps resentments,” even though the

army in power during his past mistreatment is no longer part of the Guatemalan

government. Because the evidence does not compel a contrary conclusion to the one

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reached by the BIA, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Chonay

Rosales’s claim for withholding of removal.

      II.    The BIA did not err in finding Chonay Rosales’s past harm did not
             amount to torture.

      To succeed on a claim for CAT relief, Chonay Rosales “had the burden to

prove that it is more likely than not that (1) []he, in particular, would be (2) subject

to harm amounting to torture (3) by or with the acquiescence of a public official, if

removed.” Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1147 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). “Torture is

an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms

of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to

torture.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2). “[S]peculative fear of torture is not sufficient to

satisfy the applicant’s burden.” Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1148.

      Chonay Rosales’s history of being beaten seven times does not rise to the

extreme level of torture.      Although undoubtedly painful, the beatings were

intermittent, and Chonay Rosales did not report any significant bodily injury or seek

medical attention. See Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 700, 706 (9th

Cir. 2022) (holding petitioner who was twice kidnapped and “beaten with brass

knuckles that caused hearing damage” had not shown past torture); Ahmed v. Keisler,

504 F.3d 1183, 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding petitioner being “beaten on four

occasions,” resulting in “scars all over his body” did not establish past torture).

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      Additionally, Chonay Rosales fears future torture because the soldiers who

beat him in the 1980s wrote down his identifying information and the “army always

keeps resentments.” However, as discussed above, substantial evidence supports the

agency’s view that circumstances in Guatemala have fundamentally changed since

that time. Finally, Chonay Rosales asserts fear based on generalized evidence of

violence and corruption in Guatemala, but this is insufficient to compel a conclusion

contrary to the BIA’s, especially given the finding of a fundamental change in

country conditions. See Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008)

(per curiam) (noting that State Department reports failed to demonstrate applicant

faced “any particular threat of torture beyond that of which all citizens of Nepal are

at risk”); Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding

that generalized evidence of violence and crime in Mexico not particular to

petitioners was insufficient to establish CAT eligibility).

      Because substantial evidence supports both the BIA’s findings that (1) the

country conditions in Guatemala have changed significantly, thus rebutting any

presumption that future persecution was likely, and that (2) Chonay Rosales’s past

harm does not rise to the level of torture, we deny Chonay Rosales’s petition for

review.

      PETITION DENIED.

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