Court Opinion

ID: 9521549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:07:17.317305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:54.479521
License: Public Domain

BUCHANAN, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent.
My views concerning a dissolution court's mandatory duty to ascertain the value of marital property are not transitory. They have not changed since my concurring opinion in In Re Marriage of Church, (1981) Ind.App., 424 N.E.2d 1078, trans. denied, wherein I recoiled from the concept that a trial court could divide marital property without evidence of value of significant portions thereof:
"The effect of the majority opinion is to make it possible for a trial court to divide marital property in a dissolution action with little or no evidence as to its value, thereby overturning a long line of decisions, including the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Shula v. Shula, (1956) 235 Ind. 210, 182 N.E.2d 612, and our own decisions in Howland v. Howland, (1975) 166 Ind.App. 572, 387 N.E.2d 555, and Hardiman v. Hardiman, (1972) 152 Ind. App. 675, 284 N.E.2d 820. The supreme court in Shula reversed an alimony judgment because the trial court had before it no evidence as to the value of property awarded, saying that 'before the amount of alimony can be fixed, evidence must be introduced of facts and circumstances from which the court can determine the amount which is just and proper! 235 Ind. at 217, 132 N.E.2d at 615 (citations omitted). Shula and cases in its line of descent establish the rule that the trial court abuses its discretion when marital property is divided without sufficient evidence of value. See Howland v. How-land, supra; Hardiman v. Hardiman, supra; Snyder v. Snyder, (1964) 187 Ind. App. 72, 198 N.E.2d 8.
It may be expedient to adopt the majority's holding that the burden is on the parties to introduce evidence of property value, and any party who fails to shoulder that burden waives his right to appeal from the order dividing the marital estate on the grounds of lack of such evidence. But such a shifting of the burden does violence to the purpose behind the rule requiring the court to assign a value to marital assets: The trial court cannot fulfill its affirmative statutory duty to divide the parties' property in a 'just and reasonable manner' unless the necessary steps are taken to determine the value of that property. IC § 31-1-11.5-11. See also Wireman v. Wireman, (1976) 168 Ind.App. 295, 843 N.E.2d 292. In short, stare decisis and reason are best served by leaving the law as it is."
Id. at 1083-84 (emphasis supplied).
In Church, I was forced to concur in the majority's result because the unvalued property constituted only an insignificant portion of the Church marital estate. Thus, I was able to follow the established rules that a trial court is entitled to: (1) rely upon its own knowledge in affixing a value to common goods or (2) refrain from assigning a value to items which are of negligible worth. See In Re Marriage of Patus, (1978) 175 Ind.App. 459, 372 N.E.2d 498; Cross v. Cross, (1974) 159 Ind.App. 592, 308 N.E.2d T7.
In the present case, however, a far more serious error has been committed. The trial court disposed of the parties' real estate; *1233yet, there was no evidence taken as to the value of that property. Such action was surely prejudicial because real property is unique, incapable of valuation by guesswork or "rules of thumb." See Unger v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., (1981) Ind. App., 420 N.E.2d 1250. Allowing the trial court to distribute the Showley property without any evidence of its worth can in no way comport with Indiana's dissolution statutes and their purpose.
To permit a trial court to divide marital property without evidence of value is like depriving the carpenter of his hammer and saw or the bricklayer of his trowel. If evidence of value has not been presented, this court should send the case back for further proceedings as has been done in the past. See Howland, supra; Hardiman, supra; Snyder, supra. 1 do not refer to the situation in which one side has waived the right to present evidence of value in the face of evidence submitted by the other side.
Thus, I would reverse the trial court's decision and remand for a hearing to ascertain the value of the Showley marital property.