Court Opinion

ID: 9896253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 20:14:21.841486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:31.140282
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                                            FILED
                 September 2023 Term
                   _____________                 November 9, 2023
                                                         released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                     EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                     No. 22-779                      SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

                   _____________                          OF WEST VIRGINIA

        STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA EX REL.
      WEST VIRGINIA ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
      MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL UNIT; AND
 NATHAN R. LYLE, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND
      IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF
     THE WEST VIRGINIA ATTORNEY-GENERAL
        MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL UNIT,
                     Petitioners,

                         V.

      THE HONORABLE KENNETH D. BALLARD,
JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KANAWHA COUNTY;
                 AND HISEL BAILEY,
                     Respondents.
  ________________________________________________

        PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

                  WRIT GRANTED
  ________________________________________________

                        AND

                   _____________

                     No. 22-781
                   _____________

      WEST VIRGINIA ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
      MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL UNIT; AND
 NATHAN R. LYLE, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND
      IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN EMPLOYEE OF
                 THE WEST VIRGINIA ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
                    MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL UNIT,
                        Defendants Below, Petitioners,

                                       V.

                               HISEL BAILEY,
                         Plaintiff Below, Respondent.
             ________________________________________________

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
                    The Honorable Kenneth D. Ballard, Judge
                            Civil Action No. 22-C-145

         AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
            ________________________________________________

                          Submitted: September 13, 2023
                             Filed: November 9, 2023

Michael D. Dunham, Esq.                     John J. Brewster, Esq.
Caleb B. David, Esq.                        Scott H. Kaminski, Esq.
Tyler L. Rittenhouse, Esq.                  Ray, Winton & Kelley, PLLC
Shuman McCuskey Slicer PLLC                 Charleston, West Virginia
Charleston, West Virginia                   Attorneys for Respondent
Attorneys for the Petitioners               Hisel Bailey

JUSTICE BUNN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
                             SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “Because Title 42, U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1979) does not create substantive

rights, but rather provides a remedy for pre-existing rights, all claims under this section

must allege a specific violation of the constitution or ‘laws’ of the United States. [To]

recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) the conduct complained of

was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) [the] conduct deprived

a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States.” Syllabus point 4, Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W. Va. 139, 479

S.E.2d 649 (1996).

              2.     “A government-official defendant can be held liable only for his or

her own misconduct. Therefore, to succeed on a claim of an alleged constitutional violation

under United States Code title 42, section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that each

government-official defendant, through that official’s own individual actions, has

personally and directly violated the Constitution, and that such violation caused or

contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.” Syllabus point 3, Vinson v. Butcher, 244 W. Va. 144,

851 S.E.2d 807 (2020).

                                              i
              3.     “A circuit court’s denial of a motion to dismiss that is predicated on

qualified immunity is an interlocutory ruling which is subject to immediate appeal under

the ‘collateral order’ doctrine.” Syllabus point 1, West Virginia Board of Education v.

Marple, 236 W. Va. 654, 783 S.E.2d 75 (2015).

              4.     “To the extent that governmental acts or omissions which give rise to

a cause of action fall within the category of discretionary functions, a reviewing court must

determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that such acts or omissions are in

violation of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights or laws of which a

reasonable person would have known or are otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive

in accordance with State v. Chase Securities, Inc., 188 W. Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (1992).

In absence of such a showing, both the State and its officials or employees charged with

such acts or omissions are immune from liability.” Syllabus point 11, West Virginia

Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority v. A.B., 234 W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751

(2014).

              5.     “If the plaintiff identifies a clearly established right or law which has

been violated by the acts or omissions of the State, its agencies, officials, or employees, or

can otherwise identify fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive acts committed by such official

or employee, the court must determine whether such acts or omissions were within the

scope of the public official or employee’s duties, authority, and/or employment. To the

                                              ii
extent that such official or employee is determined to have been acting outside of the scope

of his duties, authority, and/or employment, the State and/or its agencies are immune from

vicarious liability, but the public employee or official is not entitled to immunity in

accordance with State v. Chase Securities, Inc., 188 W. Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (1992)

and its progeny. If the public official or employee was acting within the scope of his duties,

authority, and/or employment, the State and/or its agencies may be held liable for such acts

or omissions under the doctrine of respondeat superior along with the public official or

employee.” Syllabus point 12, West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility

Authority v. A.B., 234 W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751 (2014).

                                             iii
BUNN, Justice:

              In these consolidated proceedings, the West Virginia Attorney General’s

Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (“MFCU”) and Nathan R. Lyle, a MFCU investigator, seek

review of the circuit court’s denial of their motion to dismiss certain claims alleged in a

civil rights action brought by Mr. Hisel Bailey. In case number 22-779, MFCU and Mr.

Lyle (collectively “Petitioners”) seek a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from

enforcing the part of its order finding that Mr. Bailey could maintain 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims against both MFCU and Mr. Lyle. They further seek to prevent the circuit court

from allowing Mr. Bailey to go forward with a whistle-blower claim against Mr. Lyle. We

grant the requested writ of prohibition. MFCU, a state agency, and Mr. Lyle in his official

capacity, may not be subjected to § 1983 claims. Furthermore, Mr. Bailey’s whistle-blower

claim is unsustainable because Mr. Lyle had no authority to make decisions affecting Mr.

Bailey’s employment and, therefore, was not his employer.

              In case number 22-781, Petitioners appeal the circuit court’s decision

denying them qualified immunity from Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims for unreasonable

seizure of the person against Mr. Lyle. These claims are based on two grounds: (1) an

alleged violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694

(1966); and (2) Mr. Bailey’s potential loss of liberty from an allegedly false report Mr.

Lyle submitted to the Cabell County prosecuting attorney. Petitioners also appeal the

circuit court’s rulings denying them qualified and prosecutorial immunity from Mr.

                                              1
Bailey’s claim of malicious prosecution. A § 1983 claim may not, as a matter of law, be

founded on a Miranda violation, and the mere risk of a loss of liberty is insufficient to

establish seizure of the person. Therefore, Mr. Lyle is entitled to qualified immunity from

Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims, and the circuit court erred by concluding otherwise. As to Mr.

Bailey’s malicious prosecution claim, we find that the complaint fails to allege sufficient

facts to meet the required heightened pleading standard to overcome MFCU’s and Mr.

Lyle’s qualified immunity, and the circuit court additionally failed to address whether Mr.

Lyle was acting within the scope of his employment—an analysis necessary to determine

MFCU’s entitlement to qualified immunity for any vicarious liability for Mr. Lyle’s alleged

conduct. Therefore, additional proceedings before the circuit court are required. Finally,

the circuit court correctly found Petitioners are not entitled to prosecutorial immunity. The

circuit court’s order is affirmed in part, and reversed in part, and this case is remanded for

additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                              I.

                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1

              Mr. Bailey is a registered nurse. At the time of the incident underlying these

proceedings, he had been employed by Mildred Mitchell-Bateman Hospital (“MMBH”)

              1
                  These facts merely recite what Mr. Bailey has alleged in his complaint.
Given that this case is at the Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal stage, and the
litigation below is ongoing, we do not resolve any disputed facts. It is well established that,
at this stage, the Court must take all allegations in the complaint as true.

                                              2
for about six years. 2 MMBH is a psychiatric facility operated by the West Virginia

Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”).

              Mr. Bailey alleges that on January 7, 2019, he and Krista Menchaca, a health

services worker, were walking a group of MMBH patients to the cafeteria for dinner.

Among them was M.C., a long-term patient of MMBH who had a known history of self-

harm and self-mutilation, which Mr. Bailey had witnessed at times. On the way to the

cafeteria, M.C. expressed a desire to beat and kill his mother. 3 He resisted attempts by Mr.

Bailey and Ms. Menchaca to redirect his attention. M.C.’s conduct escalated, and he

punched a wall causing his knuckles to bleed. Expressing pleasure at the sight of his own

blood, M.C. threatened to bite himself and raised his arm toward his mouth. Mr. Bailey

tried to keep M.C. from biting himself, and a struggle ensued. M.C. has an unsteady gate

due to cerebral palsy, so both men fell to the floor where M.C. bit, struck, and kicked Mr.

Bailey, and forcefully grabbed his testicles. Ms. Menchaca called for assistance, and four

other MMBH employees arrived and gained control over M.C. Mr. Bailey then escorted

M.C. back to his unit at MMBH where staff examined MC, found a small bump and small

cut over his eyebrow, and placed a bandage on the cut.

             According to Mr. Bailey, he had consistently received good performance
              2

reviews by MMBH and had no history of discipline.
              3
                  Mr. Bailey describes M.C. as an “Intellectual Development Disorder”
patient.

                                             3
              On January 11, 2019, Michelle Woomer, an employee of Legal Aid of West

Virginia (“LAWV”), was making rounds at MMBH and observed bruising around M.C.’s

eye. She asked M.C. about the bruise. He first stated that Mr. Bailey had thrown him against

a wall and banged his head during the January 7 event. Later, M.C. described that Mr.

Bailey threw him to the floor and banged his head during the episode. M.C. also explained

that the incident was witnessed by another patient, L.M. Ms. Woomer conducted an initial

investigation of the event, which Mr. Bailey claims was unauthorized insofar as Ms.

Woomer had not yet been officially assigned to investigate. As part of her initial

investigation, Ms. Woomer read the nursing notes, including a report by Mr. Bailey, and

viewed a security video of the struggle, which is of poor quality 4 and has no sound. John

Koeber and Olivia Shields, employees of MMBH; MMBH CEO Craig Richards; and

LAWV employee Teri Stone also viewed the video footage. Ms. Woomer then filed a

referral with Adult Protective Services. 5

              Separately, MMBH Director of Nursing, Cheryl Williams, filed a patient

grievance form on behalf of M.C. As a result, Mr. Richards assigned Ms. Woomer and Ms.

              4
               Mr. Bailey explains that the video skips seconds at a time and people appear
to move in a “stop-and-go manner.”
              5
                 Mr. Bailey’s complaint avers, at paragraph 47, that there is no evidence that
Adult Protective Services (“APS”) ever investigated the incident; however, his complaint
also states, at paragraph 177, that around August 6, 2019, he received a letter from APS
reflecting that they had “concluded their investigation and exonerate[ed] him of any
physical abuse related to the incident of January 7, 2019.”

                                              4
Shields to investigate the incident. By letter dated January 17, 2019, MMBH advised Mr.

Bailey that his employment was suspended pending an official investigation of the January

7 incident. The investigation consisted of Ms. Woomer and Ms. Shields viewing the

security video and interviewing M.C. and Ms. Menchaca. The interview of M.C. was not

recorded. Neither Mr. Bailey nor patient L.M. were interviewed. Ten other people visible

in the security video also were not interviewed. Based upon the official investigation, Ms.

Woomer’s subsequent report concluded that the allegations of physical abuse against Mr.

Bailey were substantiated. The report failed to relate M.C.’s history of self-harm and self-

mutilation, or that the incident began when M.C. punched a wall and attempted to bite

himself.

              Around March 6, 2019, a predetermination conference was held. 6 Although

Mr. Richards did not personally attend the conference, he recommended to DHHR that Mr.

Bailey’s employment be terminated, and DHHR approved the recommendation. In a letter

dated March 11, 2019, Mr. Richards advised Mr. Bailey that his employment with MMBH

was terminated due to his physical abuse of a patient. Mr. Bailey then filed a grievance

with the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board (“Grievance Board”). On April

              6
                We presume this was a predetermination conference pursuant to the
Administrative Rules of the West Virginia Division of Personnel. See W. Va. Code St. R.
§ 143-1-12.2.a.1 (requiring an appointing authority or its designee to “meet with the
employee in a predetermination conference and advise the employee of the contemplated
dismissal”).

                                             5
18, 2019, Mr. Bailey received notice that Ms. Shields had filed a complaint against him

with the West Virginia Board of Nursing, triggering proceedings against his nursing

license, 7 and he also received a notice from the West Virginia Department of Personnel in

July 2019 that he was no longer eligible for potential public employment in the State of

West Virginia.

              Mr. Bailey proceeded through the grievance process to a level three hearing

before an administrative law judge, 8 held on June 10 and 17 of 2019. On November 19,

2019, the Grievance Board issued its decision that reinstated Mr. Bailey to his position at

MMBH with back pay, interest, and restoration of all benefits. The Grievance Board also

directed that the January 7 incident be removed from Mr. Bailey’s personnel file as though

it never occurred. MMBH did not appeal the Grievance Board’s final ruling.

              Meanwhile, Mr. Richards, Ms. Shields, MMBH, and Ms. Woomer and/or

LAWV made a report to MFCU, causing it to investigate the January 7 incident. By letter

              7
                In April 2021, the Board of Nursing notified Mr. Bailey that it had
dismissed the complaint filed by Ms. Shields and would take no action against his nursing
license.
              8
               The West Virginia Public Employee Grievance Procedure levels are set out
at W. Va. Code § 6C-2-4. Level three, the final grievance procedure level, is a hearing
before an administrative law judge. See W. Va. Code § 6C-2-4(c). A final decision by an
administrative law judge is enforceable and appealable on certain grounds. See W. Va.
Code § 6C-2-5.

                                            6
dated October 4, 2019, MFCU “demanded” that Mr. Bailey submit to a “custodial

interrogation,” as characterized by Mr. Bailey. The “interrogation” occurred on December

2, 2019, and was conducted by MFCU employees Nathan R. Lyle and Erin Young, and

David Holtzapfel, a lawyer working for the West Virginia Attorney General’s Office. Mr.

Bailey was not advised of his Miranda rights. Following the “interrogation,” Mr. Lyle

authored a report about the January 7, 2019 incident and concluded that Mr. Bailey had

abused, assaulted, and battered M.C. Mr. Lyle referred the matter to the Cabell County

Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. Mr. Bailey alleges that Mr. Lyle made the referral despite

his knowledge that Mr. Bailey had been “exonerated” of any wrongdoing by the Grievance

Board. The Prosecuting Attorney’s Office filed criminal charges against Mr. Bailey, and a

magistrate found probable cause to believe that Mr. Bailey had committed the offenses. 9

As a result of these events, immediately after the Grievance Board reinstated Mr. Bailey to

his position, MMBH suspended him because the criminal complaint had been filed

involving the same, January 7, incident. On March 2 2021, the Cabell County Prosecuting

Attorney dismissed all charges against Mr. Bailey, without prejudice. 10

              9
               Mr. Bailey’s complaint does not specify what the charges were, but the
appendix record reflects that Mr. Bailey was charged with misdemeanor assault, two counts
of misdemeanor abuse or neglect of an incapacitated adult, and misdemeanor battery.
              10
                 While the charges were dismissed without prejudice, the circuit court
found that the statute of limitations for the charges had since expired, which rendered the
dismissal final.

                                            7
              On February 25, 2022, Mr. Bailey filed a civil complaint against DHHR,

MMBH, Ms. Shields, Mr. Richards, MFCU, Mr. Lyle, Ms. Woomer, Ms. Stone, and

LAWV in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. Pertinent to this appeal, Mr. Bailey

asserted civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on unreasonable and

unlawful seizure of the person, malicious prosecution, and violation of the Whistle-Blower

Law, West Virginia Code §§ 6C-1-1 to -8. MFCU and Mr. Lyle filed a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting qualified

immunity, absolute prosecutorial immunity, and challenging Mr. Bailey’s claims. The

circuit court denied the motion, and Petitioners filed a petition for writ of prohibition,

assigned number 22-779 by this Court, in which they claim the circuit court exceeded its

legitimate powers by denying their motion to dismiss with respect to Mr. Bailey’s § 1983

and whistle-blower claims. MFCU and Mr. Lyle filed a separate petition for appeal,

assigned number 22-781 by this Court, in which they sought review of the circuit court’s

denial of their motion to dismiss based upon their claims of immunity from Mr. Bailey’s

§ 1983 and malicious prosecution claims. We consolidated these two proceedings for

purposes of oral argument, consideration, and decision.

                                            II.

                     PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

              Before discussing the merits of Petitioners’ arguments in case 22-779, we

review the applicable standard for issuing a writ of prohibition. We separately address

                                             8
whether the circuit court should be prohibited from enforcing its order denying Petitioners’

motion to dismiss regarding Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims and his whistle-blower claim.

                             A. Standard for Issuance of Writ

              Petitioners invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction in prohibition claiming

that the circuit court erred and exceeded its legitimate powers by denying their motion to

dismiss Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 and whistle-blower claims. See Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Peacher

v. Sencindiver, 160 W. Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977) (“A writ of prohibition will not

issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court. It will only issue where the

trial court has no jurisdiction or having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers.

W. Va. Code, 53-1-1.”). Notably, “when a motion to dismiss has been denied by a circuit

court, a party may seek relief through a petition for a writ of prohibition.” State ex rel.

Devono v. Wilmoth, 248 W. Va. 654, ___, 889 S.E.2d 736, 742 (2023). See also State ex

rel. Skyline Corp. v. Sweeney, 233 W. Va. 37, 40, 754 S.E.2d 723, 726 (2014) (“When the

request for extraordinary relief concerns a circuit court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, we

consider the matter as a petition for a writ of prohibition.”).

              The standard applied in this case, where Petitioners contend that the circuit

court exceeded its legitimate powers, is well established.

                     In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of
              prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction
              but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded

                                               9
                its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors:
                (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate
                means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief;
                (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a
                way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower
                tribunal’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law;
                (4) whether the lower tribunal’s order is an oft repeated error
                or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or
                substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal’s order
                raises new and important problems or issues of law of first
                impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a
                useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary
                writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need
                not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of
                clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial
                weight.

Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996). 11 Finally,

we note that,

                        [w]here prohibition is sought to restrain a trial court
                from the abuse of its legitimate powers, rather than to challenge
                its jurisdiction, the appellate court will review each case on its
                own particular facts to determine whether a remedy by appeal
                is both available and adequate, and only if the appellate court
                determines that the abuse of powers is so flagrant and violative
                of petitioner’s rights as to make a remedy by appeal
                inadequate, will a writ of prohibition issue.

Syl. pt. 2, Woodall v. Laurita, 156 W. Va. 707, 195 S.E.2d 717 (1973).

                 As a preliminary matter, Mr. Bailey argues that Petitioners have failed to
                11

meet the standard for the issuance of a writ of prohibition. He reasons that because the
Hoover factors are joined with the conjunction “and,” they all are required but have not
been met by Petitioners. This argument ignores the plain language of Hoover, which
expressly states that “all five factors need not be satisfied.” Syl. pt. 4, in part, State ex rel.
Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996). Therefore, we find Mr. Bailey’s
argument unpersuasive.

                                                 10
                                       B. Discussion

              1. § 1983 Claims Against MFCU and Mr. Lyle. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates

a remedy for violation of federal rights committed by persons acting under color of state

law.” State v. Chase Sec., Inc., 188 W. Va. 356, 359, 424 S.E.2d 591, 594 (1992)

(commenting that “litigation directed at state officials is most frequently brought pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). Petitioners sought dismissal of Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims against

them, asserting that neither is a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The circuit court denied

the motion.

              Before this Court, Petitioners first argue that the circuit court committed clear

legal error and exceeded the scope of its authority by finding that Mr. Bailey’s § 1983

claims could be maintained against a state agency and an employee of a state agency who

was acting in his official capacity.

              There are two elements to a § 1983 claim: “‘[A] plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must

show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state

law.’” Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added)

(quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2254-55, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40

(1988)). This Court has similarly held that,

                                               11
                     [b]ecause Title 42, U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1979) does not
              create substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for pre-
              existing rights, all claims under this section must allege a
              specific violation of the constitution or “laws” of the United
              States. [To] recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must
              show that (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a
              person acting under color of state law; and (2) [the] conduct
              deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured
              by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Syl. pt. 4, Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W. Va. 139, 479 S.E.2d 649 (1996)

(emphasis added). Thus, “a claim can only be brought against a ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.” State ex rel. W. Va. Div. of Corr. & Rehab. v. Ferguson, 248 W. Va. 471, ___

n.11, 889 S.E.2d 44, 55 n.11 (2023). In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989), the Supreme Court of the United States

expressly held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are

‘persons’ under § 1983.” Id. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2312, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45.

              In denying the motion to dismiss Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims against MFCU,

the circuit court reasoned that “[w]hile Defendant MFCU may not be a ‘person,’ it is

vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of its employee, Defendant Lyle.” The circuit

court relied generally on West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority

v. A.B., 234 W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751 (2014), but it failed to analyze the opinion’s

relevance to a § 1983 claim. Had the court done so, the inapplicability of A.B. to § 1983

claims would have been apparent. In fact, the A.B. Court made clear that the complaint

“expressly asserted” that the plaintiff was “making no claims against the [defendant state

                                             12
agency] under Section 1983.” A.B., 234 W. Va. at 499, 766 S.E.2d at 758 (emphasis added).

Contrary to the circuit court’s conclusion, A.B. does not stand for the proposition that a

government agency may, in a § 1983 action, be held vicariously liable for the acts or

omissions of its employee.

                The United States Supreme Court has plainly declared that “vicarious

liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits[;] . . . the plaintiff in [such] a suit . . . must plead

that each Government-official defendant, through his own individual actions, has violated

the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940, 173

L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)).

                Because Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims against MFCU are not sustainable as it

is not a person, and MFCU cannot be vicariously liable for Mr. Lyle’s alleged violations

of § 1983, Mr. Bailey can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief from MFCU

under § 1983 and dismissal of those claims was proper. See Syl. pt. 3, Chapman v. Kane

Transfer Co., 160 W. Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d 207 (1977) (“The trial court, in appraising the

sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, should not dismiss the complaint

unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim which would entitle him to relief.”). The circuit court plainly erred by denying

                                                  13
Petitioners’ motion to dismiss Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims against MFCU and Petitioners

are entitled to a writ prohibiting the circuit court from allowing these claims to proceed.

              Petitioners also sought dismissal of the § 1983 claims against Mr. Lyle,

arguing that he was improperly sued in his official capacity and, therefore, also is not a

“person” for § 1983 purposes. Mr. Bailey responds that he did not sue Mr. Lyle only in his

official capacity, but also sued him in his individual capacity. In denying Petitioners’

motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims as to Mr. Lyle, the circuit court reasoned that the

question of whether Mr. Lyle was acting in his official capacity was “a question of fact and

cannot be the subject of a Motion to Dismiss.” However, to the extent that Mr. Bailey

asserted § 1983 claims against Mr. Lyle in his official capacity, the claims should have

been dismissed.

              [S]tate officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state
              official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the
              official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. . . . As
              such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.

Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2312, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S.

464, 471, 105 S. Ct. 873, 877, 83 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1985). Instead,

                     [a] government-official defendant can be held liable
              only for his or her own misconduct. Therefore, to succeed on a
              claim of an alleged constitutional violation under United States
              Code title 42, section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that each
              government-official defendant, through that official’s own
              individual actions, has personally and directly violated the
              Constitution, and that such violation caused or contributed to
              the plaintiff’s injuries.

                                               14
Syl. pt. 3, Vinson v. Butcher, 244 W. Va. 144, 851 S.E.2d 807 (2020). Accordingly, Mr.

Bailey can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief from Mr. Lyle acting in his

official capacity pursuant to § 1983 and the circuit court should have dismissed those

claims. See Syl. pt. 3, Chapman, 160 W. Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d 207. Therefore, Petitioners

are also entitled to the requested writ of prohibition relating to Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims

against Mr. Lyle in his official capacity. We need not address whether Mr. Bailey properly

asserted § 1983 claims against Mr. Lyle in his individual capacity, because, as we explain

more thoroughly below in our discussion of Petitioners’ appeal in number 22-781, Mr. Lyle

is entitled to qualified immunity for those claims as a matter of law.

              2. Whistle-Blower Claim Against Mr. Lyle. In denying Petitioners’ motion

to dismiss, the circuit court determined that Mr. Bailey could assert a claim against Mr.

Lyle under the Whistle-Blower Law, W. Va. Code §§ 6C-1-1 to -8, even though Mr. Lyle

and Mr. Bailey worked for different state agencies. In reaching this conclusion, the circuit

court relied upon the definition of the term “employer” in the Whistle-Blower Law.

              The Whistle-Blower Law prohibits an employer from making certain adverse

employment changes in retaliation for an employee’s protected conduct. According to the

Whistle-Blower Law,

                     (a) No employer may discharge, threaten, or otherwise
              discriminate or retaliate against an employee by changing the
              employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or

                                             15
              privileges of employment because the employee, acting on his
              or her own volition, or a person acting on behalf of or under
              the direction of the employee, makes a good faith report, or is
              about to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer or
              appropriate authority, an instance of wrongdoing or waste.

                     (b) No employer may discharge, threaten, or otherwise
              discriminate or retaliate against an employee by changing the
              employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or
              privileges of employment because the employee is requested or
              subpoenaed by an appropriate authority to participate in an
              investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by an appropriate
              authority or in a court action.

                     (c) No employer may deny a whistle-blower covered by
              the civil service system, because of his or her status or actions
              as a whistle-blower, a promotion or other increase in
              compensation that the whistle-blower otherwise would have
              received.

W. Va. Code § 6C-1-3 (eff. 2020) (emphasis added). 12 As used in this statute, the term

“‘employer’ means a person supervising one or more employees, including the employee

in question, a superior of that supervisor, or an agent of a public body.” W. Va. Code § 6C-

1-2(c) (eff. 1988).

              In seeking dismissal of this claim, Petitioners argued that Mr. Lyle was not

Mr. Bailey’s employer and, therefore, could not properly be the subject of Mr. Bailey’s

whistle-blower claim. The circuit court disagreed and found that Mr. Lyle fell within the

              12
                The version of this statute in effect at the time relevant to Mr. Bailey’s
claim was enacted in 1988; however, because the newer version contains the same pertinent
language, we refer to it in our analysis.

                                             16
Whistle-Blower Law’s definition of “employer” because he was “an agent of a public

body,” i.e., MFCU. W. Va. Code § 6C-1-2(c). Petitioners contend this conclusion was in

error, because Mr. Lyle was not Mr. Bailey’s employer. Mr. Bailey argues, without

authority, that the circuit court correctly denied Mr. Lyle’s motion to dismiss the whistle-

blower claim, because Mr. Lyle was a state employee who acted in concert with hospital

employee/defendants Ms. Shields, who was Mr. Bailey’s supervisor at MMBH, and Mr.

Richards, MMBH’s CEO. Echoing the circuit court’s findings, Mr. Bailey also contends

that Mr. Lyle satisfies the whistle-blower definition of employer because he is an “agent

of a public body.” Id. Mr. Bailey reasons that the Whistle-Blower Law is designed to

protect state employees and should be liberally construed.

              Our resolution of this issue requires us to analyze the Whistle-Blower Law.

“‘Interpreting a statute . . . presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review.’”

Syl. pt. 2, Freeland v. Marshall, No. 22-0109, ___ W. Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2023 WL

6804937 (W. Va. Oct. 16, 2023) (quoting Syl. pt. 1, in part, Appalachian Power Co. v.

State Tax Dep’t, 195 W. Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995).” Importantly, “[t]he primary

object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.”

Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361

(1975). Obviously, “[a] statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be

applied.” Syl. pt. 1, Farley v. Buckalew, 186 W. Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992). However,

“[w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute

                                               17
should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to

construe but to apply the statute.” Syl. pt. 5, State v. Gen. Daniel Morgan Post No. 548,

Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959).

              We find the definition of “employer” as used in the Whistle-Blower Law to

be ambiguous in its reference to “an agent of a public body.” W. Va. Code § 6C-1-2(c). A

literal application of this phrase would mean that any agent of a public body may be liable

under the Whistle-Blower Law, even when the agent works for a completely separate

agency from the aggrieved employee and has no supervisory authority over that employee.

We do not believe such an outcome corresponds with the legislative intent for the Whistle-

Blower Law. See Hutchison, 198 W. Va. at 150, 479 S.E.2d at 660 (recognizing that “one

of the foremost canons of statutory construction states: ‘The plain meaning of legislation

should be conclusive, except in the rare cases in which the literal application of a statute

will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.’” (emphasis

added) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S. Ct. 1026,

1031, 103 L Ed. 2d 290 (1989))).

              First, the definition of employer specifically lists persons who have

supervisory authority over the employee making a whistle-blower claim: “a person

supervising one or more employees, including the employee in question, a superior of that

supervisor . . . .” W. Va. Code § 6C-1-2 (c). It stands to reason that the inclusion of “an

                                             18
agent of a public body” at the end of this list is intended by the Legislature to also be

someone with supervisory authority over the subject employee. See Syl. pt. 4, Wolfe v.

Forbes, 159 W. Va. 34, 217 S.E.2d 899 (1975) (“It is a fundamental rule of construction

that, in accordance with the maxim noscitur a sociis, the meaning of a word or phrase may

be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases with which it is

associated. Language, although apparently general, may be limited in its operation or effect

where it may be gathered from the intent and purpose of the statute that it was designed to

apply only to certain persons or things, or was to operate only under certain conditions.”).

              Further evidence of the intended meaning of “employer” may be gleaned

from the type of conduct prohibited by the Whistle-Blower Law. See Syl. pt. 1, State ex

rel. Hall v. Schlaegel, 202 W. Va. 93, 502 S.E.2d 190 (1998) (“Statutes which relate to the

same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature’s intention

can be gathered from the whole of the enactments.” (quotations and citation omitted)).”

Under its plain language“[n]o employer may discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate

or retaliate against an employee by changing the employee’s compensation, terms,

conditions, location, or privileges of employment,” based upon the employee’s protected

activity. W. Va. Code § 6C-1-3(a) & (b) (emphasis added). Thus, the prohibited conduct

plainly refers to changes that could only be made by someone with supervisory authority,

or perhaps administrative authority, i.e., a superior of the supervisor as included in the

definition of employer. The language “an agent of a public body,” simply is not intended

                                            19
to refer broadly to employees of other state agencies that have no such supervisory

authority. W. Va. Code § 6C-1-2(c). Viewed properly, it identifies someone who may not

technically be a supervisor, but who, through some agency relationship, has obtained

supervisory authority over the subject employee.

             The absence of supervisory authority was a factor considered by this Court

in State ex rel. Grant County Commission v. Nelson, 244 W. Va. 649, 856 S.E.2d 608

(2021), when it concluded that a county commission was not liable for a whistle-blower

claim by an employee of a hospital it owned. The Nelson Court explained that, although

the county commission owned the hospital, its administration and management authority,

including the power to make employment decisions, was held by the hospital board of

trustees. For this reason, the Nelson Court concluded that the county commission was not

the employer of hospital employees,

             the Commission has no authority to make decisions regarding
             the Hospital’s employees and, thus, is not the [plaintiff’s]
             employer . . . . Therefore, for purposes of the Whistle-Blower
             Law and the Human Rights Act, we hold that a county
             commission, which owns a hospital pursuant to West Virginia
             Code section 7-3-14, is not the employer of individuals who
             work at the hospital. . . .

Nelson, 244 W. Va. at 656-57, 856 S.E.2d at 615-16 (footnote omitted). Applying this

reasoning here, it is clear that Mr. Lyle, an MFCU employee, had no authority to make

employment decisions affecting Mr. Bailey. Mr. Bailey has not alleged that Mr. Lyle had

any authority to change his compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of

                                           20
employment. 13 Therefore, Mr. Bailey’s complaint has failed to assert a whistle-blower

claim against Mr. Lyle upon which relief can be granted. See W. Va. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

See also Fass v. Nowsco Well Serv., Ltd., 177 W. Va. 50, 52, 350 S.E.2d 562, 563 (1986)

(stating that a “complaint must set forth enough information to outline the elements of a

claim or permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist”). The circuit court clearly

erred in finding that Mr. Bailey sufficiently asserted a whistle-blower claim against Mr.

Lyle; therefore, Mr. Lyle is entitled to the requested writ of prohibition on this ground. See

Syl. pt. 4, Hoover, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12.

               Because we find that the circuit court committed clear error of law in failing

to dismiss Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims against MFCU and Mr. Lyle in his official capacity,

and Mr. Bailey’s whistle-blower claim against Mr. Lyle, we grant the requested writ of

prohibition.

               13
                  In his complaint, Mr. Bailey alleged, in pertinent part, that Mr. Lyle
deliberately made false allegations against him and, while aided and abetted by other
defendants who are not part of this appeal, conducted a flawed and fraudulent investigation
into the false allegations, all as reprisal for Mr. Bailey’s testimony in another employee’s
grievance proceeding against MMBH. Mr. Bailey further alleged that, because of this
wrongdoing, he suffered an adverse employment action, a bogus complaint against his
nursing license, and was the subject of a bogus criminal complaint.

                                             21
                                            III.

                        APPEAL OF DENIAL OF IMMUNITY

               On appeal in case number 22-781, Petitioners contend that the circuit court

erred by finding they were not entitled to qualified immunity from Mr. Bailey’s § 1983

claims alleging violations of his right to be free from unreasonable seizures of the person

and from Mr. Bailey’s state-law malicious prosecution claim. They additionally argue that

the circuit court erred in concluding that they were not entitled to prosecutorial immunity

as to Mr. Bailey’s malicious prosecution claim.

                                  A. Standard of Review

               The denial of a motion to dismiss is generally not immediately appealable;

however, we have held that “[a] circuit court’s denial of a motion to dismiss that is

predicated on qualified immunity is an interlocutory ruling which is subject to immediate

appeal under the ‘collateral order’ doctrine.” Syl. pt. 1, W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Marple, 236

W. Va. 654, 783 S.E.2d 75 (2015). We give plenary consideration to this appeal. See Syl.

pt. 2, W. Va. Div. of Corr. & Rehab. v. Robbins, 248 W. Va. 515, 889 S.E.2d 88 (2023).

When conducting our review, we are mindful that “[t]he purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

[to dismiss] ‘is to test the sufficiency of the complaint.’ Cantley v. Lincoln Cnty. Comm’n,

221 W. Va. 468, 470, 655 S.E.2d 490, 492 (2007) (per curiam).” WW Consultants, Inc. v.

Pocahontas Cnty. Pub. Serv. Dist., 248 W. Va. 323, ___, 888 S.E.2d 823, 832-33 (2023).

Furthermore,

                                             22
              [t]he circuit court, viewing all the facts in a light most favorable
              to the nonmoving party, may grant the motion only if “it
              appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
              in support of his[, her, or its] claim which would entitle him[,
              her, or it] to relief.” Syl. pt. 3, in part, Chapman v. Kane
              Transfer Co., Inc., 160 W. Va. 530, 236 S.E.2d 207 (1977)[.]

State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W. Va. 770, 776, 461 S.E.2d

516, 522 (1995) (footnote omitted).

                                        B. Discussion

              1. Qualified Immunity From § 1983 Claims. We need not address MFCU’s

entitlement to qualified immunity from Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims because we determined

above that, as a matter of law, MFCU, a state agency, is not subject to a § 1983 suit.

Accordingly, our discussion of qualified immunity from Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims pertain

only to Mr. Lyle in his individual capacity. After reviewing the standards for qualified

immunity under federal law, we consider Mr. Bailey’s claim based on Mr. Lyle’s failure

to provide Miranda warnings. 14 We then address Mr. Bailey’s claim that he was placed at

risk of losing his liberty due to Mr. Lyle’s allegedly false report.

              14
                “Law enforcement officers must provide Miranda warnings, pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), when a person
is in custody and is interrogated.” State v. Delorenzo, 247 W. Va. 707, 722, 885 S.E.2d
645, 660 (2022).

                                              23
              a. Federal Qualified Immunity Standards. We apply federal immunity law

in addressing this issue. See Ballard v. Delgado, 241 W. Va. 495, 504, 826 S.E.2d 620, 629

(2019) (“[T]his Court’s ‘approach to matters concerning immunity historically has

followed federal law . . . when . . . public officers are sued in state court for violations of

federal civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’ City of Saint Albans v. Botkins, 228

W. Va. 393, 398, 719 S.E.2d 863, 868 (2011).”). The United States Supreme Court has

explained that qualified immunity should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of

litigation.

                     Because qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit
              rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively lost
              if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v.
              Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2815, 86
              L. Ed. 2d 411 (1985) (emphasis deleted). Indeed, we have
              made clear that the “driving force” behind creation of the
              qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that
              “‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials [will] be
              resolved prior to discovery.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
              635, 640, n.2, 107 S. Ct. 3034, [3039 n.2,] 97 L. Ed. 2d 523
              (1987). Accordingly, “we repeatedly have stressed the
              importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest
              possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,
              227, 112 S. Ct. 534, 536, 116 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1991) (per
              curiam).

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231-32, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009).

We address two questions in analyzing federal qualified immunity:

              First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has
              alleged . . . or shown . . . make out a violation of a
              constitutional right. . . . Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied
              this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue

                                              24
             was “clearly established” at the time of defendant’s alleged
             misconduct.

Id. at 232, 129 S. Ct. at 815-16, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001)). Accord Robbins, 248

W. Va. at ___, 889 S.E.2d at 97. While earlier opinions required these steps to be applied

in order, the Pearson Court determined that flexibility was warranted, and the arrangement

of the test should not be considered mandatory.

                     On reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we
             conclude that, while the sequence set forth there is often
             appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The
             judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be
             permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which
             of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
             addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular
             case at hand.

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S. Ct. at 818, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565. Accord Robbins, 248

W. Va. at ___ n.30, 889 S.E.2d at 97 n.30; Ballard, 241 W. Va. at 504 n.21, 826 S.E.2d at

629 n.21.

             b. § 1983 Claim Based on Miranda Violation. Mr. Bailey’s complaint

alleges that Mr. Lyle violated Mr. Bailey’s “rights under the Fourth Amendment . . . to be

free from unreasonable seizures of the person,” by conducting a custodial interrogation

without advising him of his Miranda rights.

                                            25
              In denying Petitioners’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, the

circuit court found that Mr. Lyle “conducted a custodial interrogation without providing

Plaintiff with his Miranda rights,” and summarily concluded that Mr. Lyle “has no

immunity for such a violation” of Mr. Bailey’s “legal and constitutional rights.” Mr. Lyle

contends that the circuit court’s ruling is erroneous, and he is entitled to qualified

immunity, because Mr. Bailey failed to allege deprivation of a constitutional right that may

be remedied in a § 1983 suit. We agree.

              The United States Supreme Court has found a defendant was entitled to

qualified immunity from a § 1983 claim based on a failure to read Miranda warnings to an

arrestee, explaining:

                       Rules designed to safeguard a constitutional right,
              however, do not extend the scope of the constitutional right
              itself, just as violations of judicially crafted prophylactic rules
              do not violate the constitutional rights of any person. As we
              explained, we have allowed the Fifth Amendment privilege to
              be asserted by witnesses in noncriminal cases in order to
              safeguard the core constitutional right defined by the Self-
              Incrimination Clause—the right not to be compelled in any
              criminal case to be a witness against oneself.

Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2003-04, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984 (2003)

(reversing lower court’s denial of qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment

claim because alleged conduct did not violate Self-Incrimination Clause). See also Vega v.

Tekoh, 597 U.S. ___, ___, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 2108, 213 L. Ed. 2d 479 (2022) (concluding

                                              26
that “a violation of Miranda is not itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment” and there was

“no justification for expanding Miranda to confer a right to sue under § 1983[.]”). 15

              Based on this well-established precedent, the failure to provide Miranda

rights is not a constitutional violation, and Mr. Bailey has failed to overcome qualified

immunity because he failed to allege facts showing that Mr. Lyle’s conduct violated a

constitutional right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150

L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001) (establishing that qualified immunity may only be overcome if the

facts alleged “show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right”).

              c. § 1983 Claim Based on a Potential Loss of Liberty. Mr. Bailey

additionally asserted that Mr. Lyle conducted a false investigation and produced a false

report “in violation” of Mr. Bailey’s Fourth Amendment right “to be free from

unreasonable seizures of the person.” Factually, this claim appears to be based on the

allegation that Mr. Lyle’s purportedly false report caused Mr. Bailey to be the subject of a

criminal investigation that “could lead to loss of his liberty.” Mr. Bailey additionally

alleged that he “was forced to turn himself in,” but his complaint contains no facts

indicating that he was arrested or taken into custody.

              15
                Because we resolve this issue on the ground that the failure to provide
Miranda warnings is not a constitutional violation actionable under § 1983, we do not
address Mr. Bailey’s claim that Mr. Lyle conducted a custodial interrogation.

                                             27
              The United States Supreme Court has explained that “a person is ‘seized’

only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is

restrained. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for

invoking constitutional safeguards.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100

S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). See also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,

626, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991) (“An arrest requires either physical

force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.”). Accordingly,

the Mendenhall Court concluded that

              a person has been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth
              Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances
              surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
              believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of
              circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the
              person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening
              presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
              officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or
              the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance
              with the officer’s request might be compelled.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554-55, 100 S. Ct. at 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (footnote omitted)

(concluding that, absent evidence of the type described, “otherwise inoffensive contact

between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a

seizure of that person”). Mr. Bailey has alleged no facts to show that Mr. Lyle restrained

Mr. Bailey’s freedom of movement by exerting “physical force or a show of authority.” Id.

at 553, 100 S. Ct. at 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497. Although Mr. Bailey contends that he “was

forced to turn himself in,” he fails to allege facts to describe the event or provide any

                                              28
context whatsoever. The bare allegation that Mr. Lyle’s report “could lead to loss of [Mr.

Bailey’s] liberty” is patently insufficient to show a seizure. Cf. United States v. Ley, 876

F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating “[l]ike this Court, the First, Second, and Seventh

Circuits have determined that a summons requiring the appearance in court does not

amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure,” and collecting cases). 16 Mr. Bailey has failed to

allege sufficient facts to show that Mr. Lyle’s investigation and report amounted to an

unconstitutional seizure. Because the complaint fails to properly allege violation of a

constitutional right, Mr. Lyle is entitled to qualified immunity, and the circuit court erred

in finding otherwise.

              2. State-Law Malicious Prosecution Claim. 17 We begin by discussing the

standards for qualified immunity in West Virginia and then determine whether the circuit

              16
                  See also Bracken v. Manor Twp., No. 2:19cv185, 2023 WL 2664361, at
*22 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2023) (“[T]o be sufficient to support a Fourth Amendment
violation, a seizure must result in either pretrial custody or ‘some onerous types of pretrial,
non-custodial restrictions.’ DiBella[ v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir.
2005)]. And ‘[m]erely having to appear in court to answer charges does not qualify as a
Fourth Amendment seizure.’ Roberts[ v. Caesar’s Ent., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 575, 581-82
(E.D. Pa. 2014)]”).
              17
                During oral argument before this Court, Mr. Bailey’s counsel stated that
Mr. Bailey has asserted malicious prosecution claims under state law as well as pursuant
to § 1983. Because the circuit court addressed only Mr. Bailey’s state-law malicious
prosecution claim and Petitioners similarly address only the state-law malicious
prosecution claim on appeal, we do not consider whether Mr. Lyle is qualifiedly immune
from any § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution alleged by Mr. Bailey.

                                              29
court erred by finding Petitioners were not entitled to qualified immunity from Mr. Bailey’s

malicious prosecution claim.

              a. Principles of State Law Qualified Immunity. Like federal immunity, we

have acknowledged that “[i]mmunities under West Virginia law are more than a defense

to a suit in that they grant governmental bodies and public officials the right not to be

subject to the burden of trial at all.” Hutchison, 198 W. Va. at 148, 479 S.E.2d at 658. “The

policy considerations driving such a rule are straightforward: public servants exercising

their official discretion in the discharge of their duties cannot live in constant fear of

lawsuits, with the concomitant costs to the public servant and society.” Id. Thus, “[a] public

official or State agency may claim to be qualifiedly immune from suit only when ‘the

[governmental] acts or omissions which give rise to the suit . . . involve . . . discretionary

governmental functions.’” Robbins, 248 W. Va. at ___, 889 S.E.2d at 97 (quoting Syl. pt.

10, in part, A.B., 234 W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751). When discretionary acts are the basis

for a claim of liability, qualified immunity applies unless clearly established and reasonably

known rights or laws have been violated, or the subject conduct is fraudulent, malicious,

or oppressive:

                     To the extent that governmental acts or omissions which
              give rise to a cause of action fall within the category of
              discretionary functions, a reviewing court must determine
              whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that such acts or
              omissions are in violation of clearly established statutory or
              constitutional rights or laws of which a reasonable person
              would have known or are otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or

                                             30
               oppressive in accordance with State v. Chase Securities, Inc.,
               188 W. Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (1992). In absence of such a
               showing, both the State and its officials or employees charged
               with such acts or omissions are immune from liability.

Syl. pt. 11, A.B., 234 W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751. 18 Finally, a claim implicating qualified

immunity must meet a heightened pleading standard. See Hutchison, 198 W. Va. at 149,

479 S.E.2d at 659 (“We believe that in civil actions where immunities are implicated, the

trial court must insist on heightened pleading by the plaintiff.”). However, the Hutchison

Court cautioned that “[a] plaintiff is not required to anticipate the defense of immunity in

his complaint.” Id. at 150, 479 S.E.2d at 660 (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640,

100 S. Ct. 1920, 1923-24, 64 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1980)). Thus, when the pleadings are

insufficient to overcome a defendant’s claim of governmental immunity, then, before

making a dispositive ruling, the circuit court should first direct a plaintiff to file a short and

plain statement of his complaint that rests on more than conclusions alone, pursuant to Rule

12(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The court may also require a

plaintiff to file a reply in accordance with Civil Procedure Rule 7(a) that is tailored to

respond to the defendant’s assertion of statutory or qualified immunity. Id.

                See also Syl. pt. 7, W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B., 234
               18

W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751 (2014) (“‘In the absence of an insurance contract waiving the
defense, the doctrine of qualified or official immunity bars a claim of mere negligence
against a State agency not within the purview of the West Virginia Governmental Tort
Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W. Va. Code § 29-12A-1 et seq., and against an officer
of that department acting within the scope of his or her employment, with respect to the
discretionary judgments, decisions, and actions of the officer.’ Syl. Pt. 6, Clark v. Dunn,
195 W. Va. 272, 465 S.E.2d 374 (1995).”).

                                               31
              b. Qualified Immunity for Malicious Prosecution. 19 To overcome

Petitioners’ entitlement to qualified immunity, Mr. Bailey contends that the malicious

prosecution was fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive. See Syl. pt. 11, in part, A.B., 234

W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751 (holding, in relevant part, that qualified immunity may be

overcome when governmental official’s discretionary functions are fraudulent, malicious,

or oppressive). 20 Petitioners argue that Mr. Bailey has failed to satisfy the heightened

pleading standard required to overcome qualified immunity for this claim because he failed

              19
                   Mr. Bailey has asserted a direct claim for malicious prosecution against
MFCU, a state agency. Therefore, in addressing this issue, we must assume that a state
agency is capable of acting with the malice necessary to support the claim. But see Morton
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 184 W. Va. 64, 68, 399 S.E.2d 464, 468 (1990) (per curiam)
(“Because a corporation does not exist as a living entity, the actions or omissions of its
employees or agents can form the basis for a corporation’s liability [for malicious
prosecution] under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”); Syl. pt. 1, Show v. Mount Vernon
Farm Dairy Prods., 125 W. Va. 116, 23 S.E.2d 68 (1942) (“A corporation is liable for a
malicious prosecution by its agent, acting within the scope of his employment and in
furtherance of his company’s business, notwithstanding the company may not have
expressly authorized or ratified his act.” (quotations and citations omitted)); Syl. pt. 1,
Meadows v. Corinne Coal & Land Co., 115 W. Va. 522, 177 S.E. 281 (1934) (same); Syl.
pt. 4, Lyons v. Davy-Pocahontas Coal Co., 75 W. Va. 739, 84 S.E. 744 (1915) (“A coal
mining corporation is liable for a malicious prosecution procured to be made by its
superintendent acting in furtherance of its business.”); Syl. pt. 1, Fetty v. Huntington Loan
Co., 70 W. Va. 688, 74 S.E. 956 (1912) (“A corporation is liable for a malicious
prosecution by its agent, acting within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of
his company’s business, notwithstanding the company may not have expressly authorized
or ratified his act.”). While we assume, for purposes of this interlocutory appeal addressing
only Petitioners’ entitlement to qualified immunity, that a state agency may be directly
liable for malicious prosecution, we make no such conclusion.
              20
                  See also W. Va. Div. of Nat. Res. v. Dawson, 242 W. Va. 176, 190, 832
S.E.2d 102, 116 (2019) (“[T]his Court has continually and consistently held that one way
to defeat qualified immunity is by alleging that the acts or omissions of a public official or
employee were fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive.”).

                                             32
to plead sufficient facts supporting his allegation that their conduct was fraudulent and

malicious. We agree. Mr. Bailey’s lengthy complaint is filled with conclusory statements

about Petitioners’ actions being fraudulent, malicious, and oppressive in providing a

“false” report to the to the Cabell County Prosecuting Attorney. The only arguably factual

allegations to support those statements are that the report was submitted to the Cabell

County Prosecutor after the Grievance Board had “cleared” Mr. Bailey, and that Mr. Lyle

knew or should have known of the Grievance Board’s decision. The complaint is devoid

of any specific facts regarding Mr. Lyle’s investigation or the resulting report and any

factual basis for Mr. Lyle’s alleged knowledge of the unreliability of the investigation

performed by defendants Woomer and LAWV.

               Because Mr. Bailey’s complaint failed to adequately allege facts supporting

his malicious prosecution claim against Petitioners, the circuit court should order Mr.

Bailey to file a short and plain statement of his complaint that rests on more than

conclusions and may insist on a reply tailored to respond to Petitioners’ assertion of

qualified immunity with respect to his claim of malicious prosecution. See Hutchison, 198

W. Va. at 150, 479 S.E.2d at 660 (commenting that, when immunities are implicated “the

trial court should first demand that a plaintiff file . . . ‘a short and plain statement of his

complaint . . . that rests on more than conclusion alone,’” and encouraging the circuit court

to “insist that the plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense of statutory

or qualified immunity” (quoting Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433 (5th Cir.1995)).

                                               33
              Furthermore, this Court has held that,

                      [i]f the plaintiff identifies a clearly established right or
              law which has been violated by the acts or omissions of the
              State, its agencies, officials, or employees, or can otherwise
              identify fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive acts committed by
              such official or employee, the court must determine whether
              such acts or omissions were within the scope of the public
              official or employee’s duties, authority, and/or employment.
              To the extent that such official or employee is determined to
              have been acting outside of the scope of his duties, authority,
              and/or employment, the State and/or its agencies are immune
              from vicarious liability, but the public employee or official is
              not entitled to immunity in accordance with State v. Chase
              Securities, Inc., 188 W. Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (1992) and its
              progeny. If the public official or employee was acting within
              the scope of his duties, authority, and/or employment, the State
              and/or its agencies may be held liable for such acts or
              omissions under the doctrine of respondeat superior along
              with the public official or employee.”

Syl. pt. 12, A.B., 234 W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751 (emphasis added). In ruling on

Petitioners’ qualified immunity from Mr. Bailey’s malicious prosecution claim, the circuit

court erroneously failed to analyze whether Mr. Lyle was acting within the scope of his

employment. Such an analysis must be conducted to determine whether MFCU is immune

from vicarious liability for Mr. Lyle’s conduct.

              As explained above, we find the circuit court erred in its ruling addressing

Petitioners’ assertion of qualified immunity from Mr. Bailey’s claim for malicious

prosecution. We reverse the circuit court’s qualified immunity ruling on this issue and

remand with directions that the circuit court require Mr. Bailey to file a short and plain

                                              34
statement of his complaint that rests on more than conclusions, or submit a reply tailored

to respond to Petitioners’ assertion of qualified immunity. We further instruct the court to

determine whether MFCU is entitled to qualified immunity from vicarious liability for Mr.

Lyle’s alleged malicious prosecution.

              3. Prosecutorial Immunity From State Law Malicious Prosecution

Claim. As their last assignment of error, Petitioners contend that the circuit court erred by

failing to dismiss Mr. Bailey’s malicious prosecution claim based on prosecutorial

immunity. They reason that the circuit court’s finding that they procured Mr. Bailey’s

prosecution required a corresponding finding that they acted as prosecutors and are,

therefore, entitled to prosecutorial immunity. This argument misconstrues prosecutorial

immunity and adopting Petitioners’ position would abolish malicious prosecution because

procurement is one of its elements and, under Petitioners’ theory, a finding of procurement

would always entitle an actor to absolute prosecutorial immunity.

              Prosecutorial immunity is absolute immunity afforded to prosecutors when

they are engaged in functions associated with the judicial process:

                     Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability
              for prosecutorial functions such as, initiating and pursuing a
              criminal prosecution, presenting a case at trial, and other
              conduct that is intricately associated with the judicial
              process . . . It has been said that absolute prosecutorial
              immunity cannot be defeated by showing that the prosecutor
              acted wrongfully or even maliciously, or because the criminal

                                             35
                defendant ultimately prevailed on appeal or in a habeas corpus
                proceeding.

Louis J. Palmer, Jr. & Robin J. Davis, Litig. Handbook on W. Va. Rules of Civ. Proc.,

§ 8(c), at 243-44 (5th ed. 2017) (footnotes omitted). This absolute immunity attaches only

to prosecutors’ functions related to the judicial process. When claims involve a

prosecutor’s functions that are not closely tied to the judicial process, such as their

investigatory or administrative functions, they are entitled only to qualified, not absolute,

immunity. See id. at 244 (“The absolute immunity afforded to prosecutors attaches to the

functions they perform, and not merely to the office. Therefore, it has been recognized that

a prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity when performing actions in an

investigatory or administrative capacity.” (footnote omitted)). Accord Jarvis v. W. Va.

State Police, 227 W. Va. 472, 478 n.5, 711 S.E.2d 542, 548 n.5 (2010); Mooney v. Frazier,

225 W. Va. 358, 370 n.12, 693 S.E.2d 333, 345 n.12 (2010). See also Dababnah v. Keller-

Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 470 (4th Cir. 2000) (“A prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for

prosecutorial functions ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.’ Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128

(1976).”). 21

                21
                     Stated another way,

                [t]o determine whether an act is so “intimately” associated with
                the judicial phase that it warrants absolute immunity, courts
                take a “functional approach,” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
                259, 269, 113 S. Ct. 2606, [2613,] 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993),
                looking to the “nature of the function performed” and not the

                                              36
             Prosecutors have been afforded absolute immunity for their functions

connected to the judicial phase of criminal proceedings,

             because, among other things, suits against prosecutors for
             initiating and conducting prosecutions “could be expected with
             some frequency, for a defendant often will transform his
             resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper
             and malicious actions to the State’s advocate,” [Imbler v.
             Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425, 96 S. Ct. 984, 992, 47 L. Ed. 2d
             128 (1976)]; lawsuits would divert prosecutors’ attention and
             energy away from their important duty of enforcing the
             criminal law, ibid.; prosecutors would have more difficulty
             than other officials in meeting the standards for qualified
             immunity, ibid.; and potential liability “would prevent the
             vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty that
             is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice
             system,” id., at 427-428[, 96 S. Ct. at 993-94, 47 L. Ed. 2d
             128]. The Court also noted that there are other checks on
             prosecutorial misconduct, including the criminal law and
             professional discipline, id., at 429[, 96 S. Ct. at 994, 47 L. Ed.
             2d 128].

Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 485-86, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1939, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991).

             “identity of the actor who performed it,” [Nero v. Mosby, 890
             F.3d 106, 118 (4th Cir. 2018)] (quoting [Buckley v.
             Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. at 269, 113 S. Ct. at 2613, 125 L. Ed. 2d
             209]. Even a prosecutor, that is, will be entitled only to
             qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, if she is
             performing a function that is not tied to the judicial phase of
             the process. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S. Ct. [at 2616, 125
             L. Ed. 2d 209].

Annappareddy v Pascale, 996 F.3d 120, 139 (4th Cir. 2021).

                                            37
              Some courts have found officials who are not prosecutors may be entitled to

prosecutorial immunity, but only for activities that equate with a prosecutor’s functions

related to the judicial process. See, e.g., Smith v. Hatcher, 516 F. Supp. 3d 1369 (S.D. Ga.

2021) (finding case manager entitled to prosecutorial immunity where claims stemmed

entirely from case manager’s function as a legal advocate, i.e., assisting in prosecution and

constructing a case for the prosecution); Golian v. New York City Admin. for Child. Servs.,

282 F. Supp. 3d 718, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (acknowledging that child services attorneys

are entitled to prosecutorial immunity for functions analogous to a prosecutor). However,

              there is a material difference between investigative functions
              normally performed by an investigator or police officer and the
              prosecutorial functions of filing and maintaining criminal
              charges. Consequently, . . . prosecutorial immunity does not
              extend to an investigator whose conduct is not intimately
              involved with the initiation and maintenance of criminal
              charges.

Stresemann v. Jesson, 868 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Minn. 2015). Furthermore, “the official seeking

absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the

function in question.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 486, 111 S. Ct. at 1939, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547. “The

presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect

government officials in the exercise of their duties.” Id. at 486-87, 111 S. Ct. at 1939, 114

L. Ed. 2d 547.

              Here, Petitioners have failed to meet their burden of showing that they seek

immunity for performing functions equal to those of a prosecutor intimately involved in

                                             38
the judicial phase of a criminal proceeding, instead relying on the circuit court’s general

statement that they procured Mr. Bailey’ indictment. Accordingly, we find no error in the

circuit court’s denial of prosecutorial immunity.

                                             IV.

                                      CONCLUSION

              For the reasons explained in this opinion, in case number 22-779, we grant

the requested writ of prohibition as to MFCU, and to Mr. Lyle to the extent Mr. Bailey’s

§ 1983 claims were asserted against Mr. Lyle in his official capacity, because a § 1983

claim may not be sustained against a state agency or its official acting in his or her official

capacity. Furthermore, because Mr. Lyle had no authority to make employment decisions

affecting Mr. Bailey’s employment, and, therefore, was not his employer as defined in the

Whistle-Blower Law, Mr. Bailey’s whistle-blower claim against him cannot survive

Petitioners’ motion to dismiss.

              In case number 22-781, we reverse the circuit court’s denial of qualified

immunity to Mr. Lyle for Mr. Bailey’s § 1983 claims, because a § 1983 claim may not, as

a matter of law, be founded on a Miranda violation, and the mere risk of a loss of liberty

is insufficient to establish seizure of the person. We also reverse the circuit court’s denial

of Petitioners’ motion to dismiss Mr. Bailey’s malicious prosecution claim. Mr. Bailey’s

complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to meet the heightened pleading standard to

                                              39
overcome Petitioners’ qualified immunity, and the circuit court failed to address whether

Mr. Lyle was acting within the scope of his employment—an analysis necessary to

determine whether MFCU may be entitled to qualified immunity from vicarious liability

for Mr. Lyle’s alleged malicious prosecution. Accordingly, we remand for additional

proceedings related to Mr. Bailey’s malicious prosecution claim consistent with this

opinion. Finally, we affirm the circuit court’s determination that Petitioners are not entitled

to absolute prosecutorial immunity.

                                                                    No. 22-779, writ granted.

                              No. 22-781, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

                                              40