Court Opinion

ID: 9831940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:29:42.154085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:39.729972
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In our original opinion we held that appellee, M. A. Quilter, a licensee or tenant at will on the premises of appellant, John O’Neil, having failed to plead and prove that there was an understanding and agreement between him and O’NeiJ. when he went upon the premises that the dwelling house built by, him on the premises was to remain his property and to be removed by him at the termination of his license or tenancy, such house being the only dwelling house on the premises, it became a fixture and the property of the owner of the soil, as a matter of law. So holding, we reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of ap-*120pellee Quitter, and remanded the cause for another trial.
Counsel for appellee, Quitter, has filed his motion for a rehearing, and therein vigorously attacks and controverts our conclusion as above stated. He insists that upon the facts proven in this case the law raises the presumption that the house in question remained personal property, and that the title never passed out of Quitter. With vigor and with seeming confidence in his position, he insists- this court erred in holding that under the facts proven the house in question became a permanent improvement and a part of the realty; that under the circumstances of this case the presumed intention which the law imputes from the facts would make the house retain its character of personalty. He says that—
“At ancient common law it was ordinarily assumed that whatever was affixed to the land became part of the land, nor were the circumstances under which it was affixed, nor the relations which the parties affixing same sustained to the realty, ever considered. At common law the only question was ‘Has the building or structure in question become actually annexed or affixed to the land?’ Under the influence of the laws of trade, and for the encouragement of industry and agriculture, and out of a consideration for the equities of the case, these fixed rules of law have been gradually broken down until it has become settled law that the question of the intention of the party affixing the structure is the paramount question, and it is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary that a tenant having no interest in the freehold does not intend to enrich or increase its value, and all structures placed by him for the purpose of trade, or for his domestic use and convenience, are not fixtures, but are removable, and, under the influence of the principles of equity, a licensee who places buildings on the property with the consent of the owner retains the right to remove the property, because in a proper consideration the structure never becomes realty, but remains personalty, and his own property.”
In support of bis contention be quotes from 19 Cyc. pp. 1045 and. 1047, respectively, as follows:
“The intention with which a chattel is placed upon or affixed to realty is one of the facts that may' be looked to in connection with the other circumstance to aid in determining the status of what seems to be realty or personalty, as the case may be. Where there is a reasonable doubt from the manner of annexation whether the chattel has changed its status, or where there are conflicting claims thereto, the intention with which it was put in place is of importance. Indeed, it is sometimes said that the intent of the party annexing an article to the freehold is the most important criterion of its character as a fixture, and other circumstances or facts are valuable chiefly as evidence of such intention.
“If a structure is made for a residence, it generally is deemed part of the realty, although it has the appearance of being temporary and may be easily removed without injury to the freehold. Where, however, the structure is affixed to the premises by a temporary tenant thereof, or by a licensee, it is deemed temporary in its purposes and not part of the realty”'
-^and cites the following additional authorities: Wright v. Macdonnell, 88 Tex. 140, 30 S. W. 907; Copp v. Swift, 26 S. W. 438; Cullers v. James, 66 Tex. 494, 1 S. W. 314; 11 Ruling Case Law, pp. 1062, 1067, 1069, 1070,. 1075, 1082, § 25; Ingalls v. St. Paul M. & M. Ry. Co., 39 Minn. 479, 40 N. W. 524, 12 Am. St. Rep. 676; King v. Morris, 74 N. J. Law, 810, 68 Atl. 162, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439, and note, 12 Ann. Cas. 1086.
Appellant, O’Neil, never pleaded nor undertook to prove any peculiar fact which would: attach said house to the soil or make it a fixture. He only pleaded that there was am agreement that the house was to be left upon-the land as his property, and on this issue the jury found against him. After a careful review of the pleadings of both parties- and the facts proven, and an exhaustive investigation of authorities cited by both parties on the motion, we have, not without difficulty, reached the conclusion that ap-pellee’s contention is sustained by the best reason and the weight of authority, and that the evidence supports the finding of the jury on the controlling issue, and that we erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court. So believing, we sustain the motion and set aside the judgment of reversal heretofore rendered by us and now affirm the judgment of the trial court. The remaining errors pointed out by us in our original opinion are harmless and not,cause for reversal.
The judgment of the trial court is in alt things affirmed.
Affirmed.