Court Opinion

ID: 9482782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:00:25.807114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:58.088753
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
While I concur fully in the majority’s opinion, I write separately to reenforce the majority’s observation that presumed damages may be appropriate for civil rights violations, including those arising under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988) (the “Act”), and to note that the amount of damages awarded by the administrative law judge (“AU”), while perhaps not supported by the evidence in this case, was well within the range normally awarded for violations of the Act.
Recent Supreme Court precedent has left untouched a court’s ability to award presumed damages for civil rights violations in the absence of evidence of tangible injury. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), for instance, defendants appealed the lower court’s ruling that plaintiffs would be entitled to “substantial” damages for violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process even if the trial court found that the ultimate adverse action taken against plaintiffs was justified. Id. at 252-53, 98 S.Ct. at 1046-47. In holding that such a finding would entitle plaintiffs to only nominal damages, the Court reasoned that, if defendants’ adverse action was indeed justified, it would be inappropriate to presume that plaintiffs had suffered an actual, compensable injury. Id. at 263, 98 S.Ct. at 1052. However, the Court was careful to note that its analysis did not transfer automatically to all deprivations of constitutional rights:
[T]he elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of another. As we have said, these issues must be considered with reference to the nature of the interests protected by the particular constitutional right in question.
Id. at 264-65, 98 S.Ct. at 1053 (citation omitted); see also Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151, 154-55 (6th Cir.1983), rev’d on other grounds, 469 U.S. 464, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985).
The Court’s more recent disposition in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986), likewise does not foreclose an award for presumed damages under the Act. In Stachura, the Court reversed an award under § 1983 on plaintiff’s claim that defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment, where in addition to compensatory and punitive dam*586ages, the court instructed the jury that it could award plaintiff the value of the right in the abstract:
“The precise value you place upon any Constitutional right which you find was denied to Plaintiff is within your discretion. You may wish to consider the importance of the right in our system of government, the role which this right has played in the history of our republic, [and] the significance of the right in the context of the activities which the Plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the violation of the right.”
Id. at 303, 106 S.Ct. at 2540 (quoting J.A. at 94). The Court objected to the instruction on the ground that it permitted an award merely on the basis of “the jury’s subjective perception of 'the importance of constitutional rights as an abstract matter.” Id. at 308, 106 S.Ct. at 2543. The Court noted, however, that “[w]hen a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but difficult to establish, some form of presumed damages may possibly be appropriate.” See id. at 310-11, 106 S.Ct. at 2544-45. Indeed, the Court reaffirmed the appropriateness of presumed damages in cases involving, for instance, the right to vote, on the ground that the right “ ‘is so valuable that damages are presumed from the wrongful deprivation of it without evidence of actual loss of money, property, or any other valuable thing.’ ” Id. at 311 n. 14, 106 S.Ct. at 2545 n. 14 (quoting Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir.1919)).
This court has repeatedly recognized that neither Carey nor Stachura forecloses an award of presumed damages for civil rights violations in appropriate circumstances. Thus, in Brandon, we held that Carey did not preclude an award' under § 1983 for presumed damages flowing from a police officer’s unconstitutional assault on plaintiff. Brandon, 719 F.2d at 155. More recently, in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 882 F.2d 1101 (6th Cir.1989), we held that Stachura did not prohibit the award of presumed damages for a civil rights action brought under § 1983. See id. at 1104; see also Walje v. City of Winchester, 827 F.2d 10, 13 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that general damages may be appropriate for violation of First Amendment right to free speech brought under § 1983).
In the instant case, Holley presented evidence of, and was awarded damages for, the actual injury he suffered as a result of Baumgardner’s discriminatory refusal to rent the subject dwelling on the basis of Holley’s sex. Therefore, I agree with the majority that there was no need on the facts of this case to “presume” damages. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310, 106 S.Ct. at 2545 (“Presumed damages are a substitute for ordinary compensatory damages, not a supplement for an award that fully compensates the alleged injury.”). I also agree that the AU’s allowance of the award “as a means of showing that the loss of civil rights is a serious matter and will not be disregarded by this forum,” J.A. at 52, while laudable in its intent, treads perhaps too closely to the “abstract” award found objectionable in Stachura. Nevertheless, had Holley been unable to come forth with direct evidence of compensable injury, he would not have been limited to merely nominal damages, but rather would have been entitled to seek presumed damages.
Finally, although I agree that the evidence presented by Holley was too sparse to support the damages awarded by the ALJ, this conclusion should not be read as implying that an award of $1,500 in any sense constitutes an upper limit of compensation for violations of the Act. A survey of recent cases from our circuit unequivocally establishes that awards in excess of the amount awarded by the AU in this case are often warranted. See, e.g., Green v. Century 21, 740 F.2d 460, 462, 465 (6th Cir.1984) (upholding award of $30,000 against one defendant and $11,000 against another for racial discrimination in violation of the Act); Stewart v. Crosson, 1 Fair Housing-Fair Lending Cases (P-H) ¶ 15,596, at 1019, 1019 (D.Tenn.1988) (awarding $6,000 in damages to mother and daughter for discomfort resulting from inferior housing); Pollitt v. Bramel, 669 F.Supp. 172, 177 (S.D.Ohio 1987) (awarding $25,000 to couple denied housing on the basis of race in violation of the Act); Shaw v. Cassar, *587558 F.Supp. 303, 315 (E.D.Mich.1983) (awarding $20,000 to couple denied housing on the basis of race in violation of the Act). Therefore, had Holley presented more probative evidence regarding the extent of his injury, economic and otherwise, it would certainly have been well within the ALJ’s discretion to compensate Holley in amount equal to and even in excess of the amount awarded in this case.