Court Opinion

ID: 9848737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:26:21.209838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:40.986901
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.,
dissenting: I concur with what Justice Schroeder has said in his dissenting opinion and agree that a new trial should be granted for the reasons he has given.
However, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed for an additional reason, to-wit: That the evidence wholly failed to establish that the value of the guns taken was $50.00 or more.
*212The only witness who testified as to the value of the guns was their owner, Dale Edward Howard. It is true this court has held that an owner is competent to testify as to the value of his property (Lawson v. Southern Fire Ins. Co., 137 Kan. 591, 21 P. 2d 387; Brenneisen v. Phillips, 142 Kan. 98, 45 P. 2d 867) but such has been on the premise that an owner is presumed to know his property’s value. In State v. Inverarity, 150 Kan. 160, 92 P. 2d 45, it was held: “An owner of property is presumed to know its value and may therefore give competent testimony with respect thereto.” ' (Syl. ¶1.)
It would seem only logical, however, that such a presumption should be rebuttable, and that when the owner admits to having no knowledge of value the presumption should fail. Kansas does not seem to have passed on this particular point, but it appears that while a division of opinion exists among the authorities, the prevailing, and what I would deem the better weight of authority, is that the presumption may be refuted and overcome.
An annotation covering the subject generally appears in 37 A. L. R. 2d 967, et seq., and on page 985 this statement is made:
“Of course, where it plainly appears in any case that the owner has no knowledge of the value he expresses an opinion about, the presumption arising from ownership is overcome and his opinion is inadmissible.”
Cases are cited from a good many jurisdictions in support of the foregoing statement as well as of the statement which follows on page 986:
“It thus follows that some knowledge of the value whereof the owner speaks is in most instances an implied requirement for application of the rule of admissibility, and the necessity of such factor has affirmatively been brought out in a number of instances.”
In Cofflin v. State, 230 Md. 139, 186 A. 2d 216, the Maryland Court said:
“. . . Thus, if it is demonstrated that the owner possesses no knowledge whatever of the market price and condition of the article in question, his testimony may be inadmissible. . . .” (p. 143.)
The record in the instant case shows that on direct examination Mr. Howard testified the guns were worth over $50.00. However, the record also shows that on cross-examination, in response to questions asked by defense counsel, Howard testified as follows:
“Q. I am talking about a rifle eight years old and a shotgun eight years old and a pistol that is unknown in age but considerably older.
“A. I have no comprehension of the value of the guns according to the present market. (Trans. 29, 30)
*213“Q. Now, just one last question: You don’t know that these guns are worth more than $50.00, do you?
“A. I do not, no. (Trans. 33)” (Emphasis supplied.)
In my opinion, the foregoing testimony of Mr. Howard on cross-examination completely destroys the probative value of his evidence as to value. The presumption that, as owner, he knew the value of die guns was wholly and entirely overcome, leaving no competent evidence of value in the case upon which the jury could base its verdict.
The value of property allegedly stolen is an essential element of grand larceny and must be proved by the same quantum of proof as is required to establish every other element of the offense, which is, beyond a reasonable doubt. (The State v. Grinstead, 62 Kan. 593, 607, 64 Pac. 49.) I cannot believe that the state sustained its burden of proving value when the only evidence offered was that of the owner who admittedly had no comprehension of the present market value of the guns and did not know they were worth more than $50.00.
I respectfully submit that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and that a new trial should be granted.