Court Opinion

ID: 9454585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:50:46.774091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:10.769494
License: Public Domain

JAMES M. CARTER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Garland William Boggus, was convicted after a jury trial of smuggling gold into the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545, and was given a probationary sentence. He now appeals. We affirm.
The appeal presents the following questions:
1. Was appellant required to invoice the gold he brought into the United States ?
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that appellant smuggled the gold into the United States with intent to defraud the United States?
3. Was the evidence presented by the government agent obtained in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights ?
4. Did the requirement that appellant declare the gold he brought into the United States violate his privilege against self-incrimination ?
Appellant and Alvin Hartley (a co-defendant) traveled to Mexico in July, 1967 to investigate purchasing gold bars which were to be resold later to people in Miami, Florida. Appellant and Hart-ley were shown two bars of gold; to test their purity, appellant drilled both bars and placed the shavings (approximately 6.2 grams) in a piece of paper in his shirt pocket. Appellant and Hartley then returned to the United States to have the gold shavings analyzed; at the border they stated they had not bought anything, but they did not declare the gold as required by law.
After returning to their motel room in Nogales, Arizona, appellant received a telephone call from a customs agent who pretended to be Ed Franks, the agent representing the Miami buyers. The next morning, the customs agent, still *112posing as Ed Franks, visited appellant and Hartley at their motel room. The agent saw the gold shavings, discussed the sale of gold bars with appellant, was told by appellant that 15 tons of gold were available, and elicited promises from appellant that they, Boggus and Hartley, would bring the gold across the border. Appellant and Hartley were then arrested. The customs agent testified at the trial about what he saw and heard in appellant’s motel room, over appellant’s objection. The charge against Hartley was dismissed, and he also testified for the government.
I.
Appellant contends that he was not required to invoice the gold he brought into the United States as charged in the indictment, and therefore his conviction must be reversed.
The indictment, following the language of the statute, charged that appellant “* * * wilfully and knowingly, and with intent to defraud the United States of America, did smuggle and clandestinely introduce into the United States of America at the Port of Nogales, merchandise, that is, approximately six and two-tenths (6.2) grams of gold shavings, which should have been invoiced, all in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 545.” Thomas v. United States, 314 F.2d 936 (5 Cir.1963), a marihuana case, discussed the phrase “should have been invoiced” as used in the smuggling statute and concluded, “* * * the word ‘invoiced’, as used therein, carries the meaning attached to it in the customs law, viz., lawfully entered or declared.” (314 F.2d 938). We agree with this interpretation of the statutory language as applied to this case. There are statutory provisions requiring entry and declaration of goods at the border. Current v. United States, 287 F.2d 268 (9 Cir.1961), held that 19 U.S.C. § 1461 applied to a non-commercial importer and furnished the statutory requirement for the language in the indictment in that case which alleged the marihuana “had not been presented for inspection, entered and declared.”
The regulations also are pertinent. 19 CFR § 10.19 is headed “Declaration and entry” and provides that “All articles brought into the United States by any individual shall be declared to a customs officer,” at the port of first arrival. 31 CFR § 54.8 requires the declaration to Customs of all gold brought into the United States. Thus, appellant was required to invoice (enter and declare) the gold, and the government proved that he failed to do so, as charged in the indictment.
The essence of the charge, laid under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 545, was the words “did smuggle and clandestinely introduce * * * merchandise.” Thomas v. United States, supra, states, “No additional element of the offense of smuggling marihuana exists by virtue of the phrase ‘which should have been invoiced’.” (314 F.2d at 938).
We think that the phrase “which should have been invoiced” was to make clear what type of merchandise was placed under the ban of the statute. Only that merchandise, which was required to be entered and declared, was included.
Appellant discusses the 5 day period for entry in 19 U.S.C. § 1484. We doubt that the section has any application to our problem, since it imposes duties only on a “consignee.” See Current v. United States, supra, 287 F.2d at 269. But passing the consignee limitation, the section could not apply to the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 545. Once a person has smuggled something into the country it would be senseless to provide he had five days thereafter to enter and declare it and wash away his crime. We do not discuss the possible application of 19 U.S.C. § 1484 to the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 545, concerning importing or bringing merchandise into the United States.
We conclude appellant’s contention is without merit.
*113II.
Appellant contends the evidence was not sufficient to show that he smuggled the gold into the United States with intent to defraud the United States. He contends that he did not surreptitiously conceal the gold shavings and that he had no fraudulent intent since the gold shavings did not have any commercial value as required by Current v. United States, supra, 287 F.2d at 270.
We believe there was ample evidence to show, as the jury found, that appellant wilfully and knowingly smuggled the gold. “Intent to defraud the United States” means intent to avoid and defeat the United States customs laws (see, United States v. Kushner, 135 F.2d 668, 671-672 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 212, 63 S.Ct. 1449, 87 L.Ed. 1850 (1943)); there was ample evidence to show appellant intended to avoid the customs laws, since those laws would have prevented him from bringing the gold into the United States. Moreover, the gold shavings did have some value, since 6.2 grams (approximately one-fifth ounce) would be worth about seven dollars. We find appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to be without merit.
III.
Appellant contends the verbal and tangible evidence obtained by the government agent, who intruded by stealth, was the result of an unlawful entry into appellant’s room in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and was thus inadmissible. In Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966), a factually similar case, the United States Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating (385 U.S. at 211, 87 S.Ct. at 427): “But when, as here, the home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street. A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant.” We believe Lewis controls this case; we therefore find no violation of appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
IV.
Appellant contends the requirement that he declare the gold he brought into the United States violates his privilege against self-incrimination. He relies on the recent United States Supreme Court cases finding Fifth Amendment violations in various registration statutes, to wit, Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 86 S.Ct. 194, 15 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965) (federal law requiring Communist party members to register); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968) (federal law requiring gamblers to register and pay excise and occupational tax); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 88 S.Ct. 722, 19 L. Ed.2d 923 (1968) (federal law requiring registration of certain firearms). In all the cases cited by appellant, a person who registered pursuant to the statute risked criminal punishment. However, under 31 CFR § 54.8, when a person without a license declares gold at the border, the Customs Service merely detains the gold until the person importing it obtains the proper license. Thus, no criminal punishment is risked by complying with the statute and declaring the gold, even though the importer has no license to lawfully bring it into the United States. We therefore find no violation of appellant’s privilege against self-incrimination under the principles set forth in Albertson, Marchetti, and Haynes.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.