Court Opinion

ID: 9767183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:12:09.192388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:29.294604
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
The delusional utterances of an unquestionably ill individual should not be admitted generally as substantive evidence of the guilt of that person of the crime charged. See Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 329 A.2d 258 (1974); Commonwealth v. Mozzillo, 443 Pa. 171, 278 A.2d 874 (1971). *372The only purpose such evidence can legitimately serve, at the adjudicative stage, is to reflect upon the mental state of the actor when that is in question. Commonwealth v. England, 474 Pa. 1, 375 A.2d 1292 (1977); Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627 (1974); Commonwealth v. Zlatovitch, 440 Pa. 388, 269 A.2d 469 (1970); Commonwealth v. Williams, 307 Pa. 134, 160 A. 602 (1932). A reading of the charge does not satisfy me that this distinction was clearly made to the jury and on that basis alone a new trial is justified. A reading of the charge as a whole as we must, Commonwealth v. Wortham, 471 Pa. 243, 369 A.2d 1287 (1977), indicates the jury may have used Ms. Bracey’s statement as support for their finding that she in fact caused her child’s death as well as a basis for assessing her mental state at the time. The latter is permissible, Commonwealth v. England, supra; Commonwealth v. Demmitt, supra; Commonwealth v. Zlatovitch, supra; Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, but the former clearly is not. Commonwealth v. Ware, supra; Commonwealth v. Mozzillo, supra.
Of even more significance is that the post-verdict court has ruled adversely upon appellee’s motion in arrest of judgment. This motion was predicated upon appellee’s claim that the Commonwealth failed to establish her sanity at the time of the killing beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Tempest, 496 Pa. 436, 437 A.2d 952 (1981); Commonwealth v. Green, 493 Pa. 409, 426 A.2d 614 (1981); Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 491 Pa. 300, 421 A.2d 147 (1980); Commonwealth v. Reason, 485 Pa. 450, 402 A.2d 1358 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 485 Pa. 353, 402 A.2d 999 (1979); Commonwealth v. Tyson, 485 Pa. 344, 402 A.2d 995 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 305, 396 A.2d 1183 (1979); Commonwealth v. Delker, 467 Pa. 305, 356 A.2d 762 (1976); Commonwealth v. Moyer, 466 Pa. 464, 353 A.2d 447 (1976); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 466 Pa. 245, 352 A.2d 40 (1976); Commonwealth v. Williams, 463 Pa. 370, 344 A.2d 877 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974); Commonwealth v. Demmitt, supra. Since the remand of the majority is limited to the remaining issues in *373appellee’s motion for a new trial on post-verdict motions, it would appear that this Court has affirmed the denial of the motion in arrest of judgment. This claim has considerable merit and should not be dismissed without explanation by either the court below or this Court.1
*374In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth to prove sanity, we must view such evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner. Commonwealth v. Metzler, 499 Pa. 122, 451 A.2d 1352 (1982); Commonwealth v. Tempest; supra; Commonwealth v. Green, supra; Commonwealth v. Hicks, supra. So viewed, the evidence adduced in the instant case was clearly insufficient to prove appellee’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. Evidence Establishing The Existence of Mental Illness Prior to March 28, 1978.
The undisputed facts clearly demonstrate a long history of mental illness prior to Easter Sunday, March 28, 1978, when *375this incident occurred. At that time, Nakia, appellee’s daughter, was three years of age. Nakia’s father, Bobby Little, maintained an unsteady relationship with appellee during the period in question.
The first indication of mental illness reflected in the record occurred in May of 1976. On that occasion Ms. Bracey informed her sister that people were chasing her and trying to kill her. As a result of this behavior, appellee’s family took her to the Crisis Center of Temple University Hospital. The hospital records indicate that appellee was then experiencing auditory hallucinations and was diagnosed as schizophrenic, paranoid type. Appellee was given medication and released.
Later in 1976, Bobby Little and another friend again took appellee to the hospital because of mental problems. On that occasion, appellee refused to stay, giving as a reason that people on motorcycles were waiting outside to harm her. Bobby Little testified from that time appellee would occasionally get depressed or paranoid requiring medication. For example, during this period she on one occasion expressed the belief that people on the street were trying to kill her.
Appellee continued to periodically receive medication and to experience acute episodes. Medical records reflect that both in May and July, 1977 appellee required emergency treatment (including in-patient care) at the Crisis Center. During February of 1978, appellee again began to manifest paranoia. She stated to her sister that Nakia was acting in a strange manner and looked as though she had been transformed into a wolf. She also stated to a cousin that Nakia’s father and his family were attempting to turn Nakia against her.
In March 1978 her conduct became increasingly bizarre. She stated to people that her name was Eve and that she was the Lord’s messenger. In the early part of March, Bobby Little went to appellee’s home where he observed appellee conducting a pseudo-religious ceremony in which she claimed to be a nude Christ. During'this time appellee *376also kept a sunlamp in her home and told a number of people that if that lamp ever went out, the world would end.
She was again taken to the Crisis Center on March 11, 1978. The records of that visit indicate that appellee complained of auditory and visual hallucinations and that she was experiencing feelings of paranoia. Appellee was provided with medication and again sent home. On March 13, 1978 appellee refused to consent to any further treatment at the Crisis Center. On that date she stated to her sister that Nakia had taken knives and forks and hidden them throughout the house.
Because of the alarming increase in the intensity of her bizarre behavior and her resistance to medical help, appellee’s family had unsuccessfully attempted to have her committed to Friends Hospital. The commitment petition included, a statement that appellee had started a fire in a pan which she placed in the middle of the floor in order to drive evil spirits from her home, and then climbed out on the roof of the dwelling wearing neither coat nor shoes. The petition also recited appellee’s claims of hearing voices and of her refusal to receive treatment or to take medication. After confinement for a period of seventy-two (72) hours at the Crisis Center of North Central Philadelphia Community Mental Health/Mental Retardation Center, she was discharged by court order on March 16, 1978. During that commitment, the hospital records reflect that appellee claimed various articles of furniture had been flying around in her room.
Following her release from the involuntary commitment, appellee continued to exhibit bizarre conduct. During a visit to appellee’s home between March 16,1978 and the date of the killing, appellee’s sister observed that appellee had arranged a Bible, a photograph album, a cross, a crystal ball, a scorpio and a witchcraft book on the floor of her living room. Ms. Bracey explained that she was employing the objects in her prayers to save her baby, Nakia. On the Sunday one week before the date of the killing, appellee stated to Bobby Little that Nakia had grown bigger and had *377attempted to kill her. She also stated that Nakia had turned into an animal.
During the week immediately preceding March 28, Ms. Bracey stated to her cousin that her daughter, Nakia, was possessed and that whenever Nakia had in her possession a knife or a fork, she would attempt to stab appellee. During this same time span appellee’s brother observed Ms. Bracey carrying a shopping bag containing a crystal ball, a Bible and a witchcraft book. Her brother further testified that during the days immediately preceding March 28, it was necessary for him personally to take Ms. Bracey to receive psychiatric treatment on three separate occasions.
B. Evidence Establishing Mental Illness at The Time of The Incident
During the Saturday before Easter, appellee was in the company of Bobby Little. Although her behavior appeared normal in the early part of the day, towards evening her medication began to lose its effect and Ms. Bracey’s behavior became erratic. She told Little that she was the Messiah, that she had baptized Nakia and sent the baby’s good part to heaven, and that she now wanted also to send the baby’s bad part to heaven. Little left appellee’s home at approximately midnight. Nakia was at this time staying at the home of Little’s mother, which is where the child usually stayed during the times that appellee was experiencing difficulties.
The next morning (March 28) Mrs. Little informed her son that during the night appellee had taken Nakia from the Little residence. Becoming alarmed because of appellee’s mental state, Little went immediately to appellee’s home. Appellee refused to admit Little and told him he could not take the child because appellee was performing a ritual for her. Appellee then brought the child to the front door and held her up for Little to see. At this time, both appellee and her child were nude. Little attempted to force his way into the house and appellee stabbed him in the hand in repelling him. Subsequently, appellee ran from the house nude.
*378Little entered the home after appellee left and found Nakia lying in the center of the floor of the living room. Also lying on the floor was a Bible, a book entitled Helping Yourself to White Witchcraft, a photograph album, a key chain, a cross, several pieces of jewelry, a crystal ball, a bracelet, a hound’s tooth, spirits of peppermint, and a copy of the lyrics to a popular song. Nakia had sustained two stab wounds which resulted in her death.
Several police officers observed appellee running naked down the street. When one of the officers attempted to stop her, she screamed and continued running. She was finally apprehended in a house four and one-half blocks away. At this point appellee was nude except for a set of beads.
Appellee was taken to the hospital where she became hysterical, “screaming and yelling and banging her hands on the floor,” and had to be calmed and seated by the officers. She then was transported by police vehicle to the Police Administration Building. During the ride, which lasted approximately 15 minutes, appellee began chanting religious psalms and stomping her feet. During the administrative questioning at police headquarters, appellee had to be restrained on several occasions from removing her clothing. Throughout the entire period she was incoherent and contradictory.
C. Conclusion
In addition to this uncontroverted testimony of a serious mental illness prior to and at the time of the killing, the irrational circumstances of the killing, her confused, anxious, and delusional state at the time of the arrest, all of the medical evaluations subsequent to her apprehension, with a single exception, would conclusively demonstrate that Ms. Bracey was legally insane on March 26, 1978. After a court ordered psychiatric examination, conducted by a psychiatrist and psychologist, she was declared incompetent on April 19, 1978 and committed to Byberry for a period of ninety (90) days under the Mental Health Procedures Act, Act of July 9, *3791976, P.L. 817, No. 143, § 101 et seq., 50 P.S. § 7101 et seq. (Supp.1981-82).
Dr. Cooke, a forensic psychologist who examined her while she was in custody found her to be delusional.2 She believed she had died and was reincarnated as Eve. She believed the sun spoke to her and that she had the power to control the sun. She believed that she had a mission to “lead your people home.” She thought she was an angel sent to announce the end of the world. The doctor also found her to be paranoid. She thought people were speaking in unknown tongues; that they were practicing witchcraft and could read her thoughts; anyone nice to her would be hurt; and that people, including her attorney, were working against her. Dr. Cooke testified that Ms. Bracey said she would be reunited with her baby and it would benefit the world and it was God’s wish that her baby be sent to heaven as sacrifice.
Dr. Cooke diagnosed Ms. Bracey as a chronic schizophrenic, paranoid type and concluded that she “was legally insane because she did not know the quality of the act, and felt that what she was doing was right.”3 In spite of seventy-*380one (71) pages of cross-examination, Dr. Cooke remained firm in this view.
Dr. Robert Sadoff, a forensic psychiatrist was equally firm in the view that Ms. Bracey was legally insane.4 He personally examined El vita Bracey twice: April 6, 1978 at City Hall and June 7, 1978 at Byberry. He requested Dr. Cooke to do additional testing. The direct examination of Dr. Sadoff culminated with the following:
Q. Doctor, based upon your examination in this case, including all other materials available to you, do you hold an opinion as to a degree of medical certainty regarding whether Elvita Bracey, at the time she committed the acts on Easter Sunday was aware of the *381nature and quality of those acts and what she was doing wrong?
A. Yes, I have an opinion.
Q. And that question is referred to the McNaughton issue; is that correct?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. All right. What is your opinion on that issue?
A. My opinion is that she has had a chronic psychotic illness which preceded that day and was existing on that day, in my opinion, in a blatant psychotic form, and on the basis of her psychoses, her delusional system, her hallucinations and her distorted thinking, Elvita Bracey, at the time that she stabbed her daughter knew the nature of what she was doing. The nature is, I take a knife. I have to go to the drawer to get it and I plunge it into a baby.
The quality of the act is what she did not know. Quality of the act for me is that, did she know she was killing her daughter? Did she know what the consequences of her action were and in the context of the reality situation?
Sunday morning, her apartment, Easter Sunday. In my opinion, her delusions and her hallucinations so affected her judgment and her behavior that it was her belief that she was killing a bedeviled child who had been given the devil by Bobby Little’s family and that she firmly believed, because of her delusional system, that Bobby Little was going to come in and kill her and take the baby away, and that also led to her not knowing the full quality of her act in killing her daughter.
And did she know there is a law against killing? Yes, she knows there’s a law against killing. Did she believe at the time she stabbed her daughter and killed her she was doing wrong? By breaking the law she knew she was doing wrong.
But wrong also for her, at that time, meant that, “I am killing the devil. My daughter has the devil in her and needs to be exorcised. He will come in and prevent me *382from getting the devil out of her. I must handle it this way.”
And for that reason she did not believe at the precise time that she stabbed her that she was doing something morally wrong.
Dr. Sadoff’s diagnosis that Ms. Bracey suffers from schizophrenia, paranoid type was described as a life-long diagnosis. He maintained the diagnosis through forty-eight (48) pages of cross-examination.
The diagnosis is a life-long diagnosis. She has had it for years prior to that Easter Sunday and probably the beginnings of it were even before 1976, but the first outward manifestation that I am aware of happened when she heard the voices and believed that she was the messenger of God.
She continues to hold that diagnosis, . . . which means she is blatantly psychotic or overtly crazy,....
Appellee also placed into evidence her medical records which contained the following diagnoses or impressions from eight (8) psychiatrists who had seen and evaluated her:.

Chager, M.D. July 2, 1977 Paranoid type
Chager, M.D. March 11,-1978 Paranoid state
Turner A. Johnson, M.D. March 11, 1978 Paranoid state
L. Bird, M.D. March 13, 1978 Paranoid...
(Indecipherable) March 15, 1978 “There is no making of sense of this unless she is hospitalized. I can recommend nothing other.”
Milton L. Bluett, M.D. March 15, 1978 Manic depressive illness, manic type
Alex vonSehlichten, M.D. April 17, 1978 Chronic schizophrenic illness, paranoid in nature
Muthaiya P. Krishnaraz, M.D. Aug. 11, 1978 Schizophrenia, paranoid type
*383The single exception in this record to this overwhelming evidence supporting a finding of legal insanity was the testimony of Dr. Kenneth Kool, a psychiatrist called by the prosecution. Dr. Kool did not conduct a personal evaluation of Ms. Bracey nor did he hear the testimony of the various witnesses. His answers were in response to a hypothetical question twenty-eight (28) pages in length consisting of selected portions qf evidence. Ms. Bracey’s prior hospitalizations, previous diagnosis, and medications were not included in the hypothetical question. Although conceding appellee’s mental illness, Dr. Kool maintained that she was legally sane and in touch with reality.5
With due deference to Dr. Kool’s competence, I believe the following excerpt from the record, which reflects the concluding question put to Dr. Kool on cross-examination and his response, and t-he subsequent redirect examination is most informative.
Q. Doctor, if Miss Bracey had a Bible, a witchcraft book, a picture book, a Scorpio ball, a charm, some weeds burning in a little hub cap and she and her daughter were naked except for jewelry, and Miss Bracey were performing some kind of ritual that she perceived as necessary to free her daughter of the possession and the evil spirits that possessed her, would you say she was in touch with reality?
A. Yes.
MR. SCUTTI: Thank you. I have no further questions.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LUNKENHEIMER:
Q. Why?
A. Because ritual religion has been with us as long as the recorded history of mankind, and religion and ritual are *384more prominent now than ever in the history of mankind, because there are more people on the face of the earth than ever in the history of mankind, and all of these religious articles and all of these things mentioned are easily available at any store.
Religious things and ritual and exorcism does not equal psychosis. Does not equal insanity. Does not equal schizophrenia. People who do these things, you don’t say, therefore, they are nuts or they are crazy. It doesn’t equal mental illness.
Q. There is exorcism in the Catholic Church; is that correct?
A. I believe so.
In light of the above, I am firmly of the belief that the Commonwealth failed to carry its burden of establishing sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would reverse the order of the Court of Common Pleas dismissing the motion in arrest of judgment and discharge appellee as to the criminal charges. The cause then should be remanded to the trial court to determine the proper disposition of Ms. Bracey under the provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act, Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, No. 143, § 101 et seq., 50 P.S. § 7101 et seq. (Supp.1981-82).
ZAPPALA, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. I cannot accept the majority’s view that Ms. Bracey’s failure to exercise her right to an interlocutory cross-appeal from the trial court’s denial of her motion in arrest of judgment amounts to a waiver of the sufficiency issue. Such a finding is clearly impermissible. It must be noted initially that Pa.R.A.P. 311, which permits a criminal defendant to take such an appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(5), explicitly states that a defendant’s failure to do so does not constitute a waiver of the issues which could have been raised at that stage of the criminal proceedings. Pa.R.A.P. 31 l(d)(l)(i) provides:
(d) Waiver of objections
(1) where an interlocutory order is immediately appealable under this rule, failure to appeal:
(i) under subdivision (a) or subdivision (b)(2) of this rule shall not constitute a waiver of the objection to the order and the objection may be raised on any subsequent appeal in the matter from a determination of the merits. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, under the rules of this Court, Ms. Bracey did not waive her sufficiency claim by failing to take a cross appeal.
Moreover, even in the absence of Pa.R.A.P. 31 l(d)(l)(i), Ms. Bracey’s failure to appeal cannot operate as a waiver of her right to appellate review of her sufficiency claim. It is well established that the right to appeal is a personal right which may be relinquished only through a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); Commonwealth v. Clayton, 496 Pa. 492, 437 A.2d 1147 (1981); Commonwealth v. Cathey, 477 Pa. 446, 384 A.2d 589 (1978); Commonwealth v. Jones, 447 Pa. 228, 286 A.2d 892 (1971); Commonwealth v. Maloy, 438 Pa. 261, 264 A.2d 697 (1970); Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson v. Myers, 427 Pa. 104, 233 A.2d 220 (1967); Commonwealth exrel. Edowski v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 229, 223 A.2d 749 (1966). Under Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), the trial court must advise the defendant of his right to appeal and, if he is indigent, of his right to court-appointed counsel on appeal. Commonwealth v. Brown, 488 Pa. 320, 412 A.2d 529 (1980); Commonwealth v. Morris, 486 Pa. 391, 406 A.2d 337 (1979); Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Pa. 658, 334 A.2d 282 (1975); Commonwealth v. Mack, 451 Pa. 319, 304 A.2d 93 (1973); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 435 Pa. 449, 257 A.2d 251 (1969); Commonwealth v. Sapp, 428 Pa. 377, 238 A.2d 208 (1968); see Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(c), 1405(b). The record indicates that Ms. Bracey was advised of her right to file post-verdict motions, which she exercised. However, the trial court did not thereafter conduct an on-the-record colloquy to advise Ms. Bracey of her right to appeal that court’s decisions on her post-verdict motions. Thus, on this record, the sufficiency issue cannot be considered waived.
*374In general, the remedy this Court has afforded in situations where the trial court has failed to advise a defendant of his rights is the return of the proceedings to the stage at which the defect occurred. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cathey, supra; Commonwealth v. Kulp, 476 Pa. 358, 382 A.2d 1209 (1978); Commonwealth v. Miller, 469 Pa. 370, 366 A.2d 220 (1976); Commonwealth v. Tyler, 468 Pa. 193, 360 A.2d 617 (1976); Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 312 A.2d 597 (1973). In the instant circumstances, however, no purpose would be served by remanding a matter already before us on appeal. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hall, 430 Pa. 163, 242 A.2d 241 (1968). First, the trial court has already ruled on Ms. Bracey’s motions. Thus no further action is required of that court. Second, since there is no need for additional testimony, the record after remand would be identical to the one presently before this Court. The issue of the sufficiency of the evidence is thus ripe for our decision. To remand for the filing of a notice of appeal would be an empty ritual.
The only remaining question is whether it is appropriate to consider the sufficiency issue sua sponte at this point. If the sufficiency claim were to prevail on appeal, retrial would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Commonwealth v. Vogel, 501 Pa. 314, 461 A.2d 604 (1983); Commonwealth v. Meadows, 471 Pa. 201, 369 A.2d 1266 (1977). Yet, should this Court refuse to consider that claim now, Ms. Bracey would be precluded from interposing a double jeopardy claim in the event the trial court awards a new trial on her remaining motions. Thus, she would be forced to undergo a second prosecution even though her claim that she was entitled to an acquittal may be meritorious. Once she is subjected to retrial, no relief will be capable of vindicating her basic constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy. Only by considering the sufficiency issue now can we prevent this potential injustice. See Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977).

. Dr. Cooke is a clinical psychologist specializing in forensic psychology. He earned a Ph.D. in clinical psychology in 1966 from the University of Iowa. In 1973 he became Chief Forensic Psychologist at the Norristown State Hospital. He is on the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania, Continuing Education Program where he lectures on forensic psychology and also on the faculty of Temple University. In his position at Norristown he has examined some two or three thousand mentally ill patients charged with crimes. He also trains psychiatric residents and psychological interns. He is a consultant at Graterford Prison and Camp Hill, a state correctional institution housing juveniles. He has published twenty-three papers in professional journals, book chapters and has testified on criminal responsibility at least ten times.

. Based upon his examination of Ms. Bracey and her medical history including diagnosis and treatment, Dr. Cooke concluded:
Q. Doctor, based upon your psychological evaluation of Miss Bracey, do you have an opinion that you hold to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty regarding whether Miss Bracey on March the twenty-sixth, [sic] 1978, understood the nature and quality of her actions, and understood that what she was doing was wrong?
A. I do have an opinion yes.
Q. And what is that opinion?
*380A. Well, as the law has stated, it has three parts to the nature of the act; the quality of the act and whether or not she knew what she was doing was wrong, and my understanding is that if any one part of that is compromised, then the individual is not responsible under the M’Naghten rule. I thought that she did know the nature of her act. That is, she knew on a very concrete basis she was going to inflict damage, if not death on the individual, on the baby, but it is my opinion — and I think there is a consistency with that of the court other, [sic] in believing that she did not know the quality of her act.
That is, that she believed that what she was doing was right, that in her mind the quality was not so much killing, that it was, instead, a matter of following God’s commands, and making a sacrifice, reuniting spirits, doing something good for the world. And so that while she knew, on a concrete level, that there was a killing involved, she also felt that what she was doing was right, and that God’s command had to be followed.
Q. Alright.

. Dr. Sadoff formerly taught at Temple Law School and the Medical School. He is now Associate Professor of Clinical Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania and lecturer in law at Villanova University School of Law. He has two Board certifications: one in psychiatry from the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in 1967 and one in forensic psychiatry from the American Board of Forensic Psychiatry, Inc. in 1978. He has published many papers in national journals of law and medicine or psychiatry and has written three books, Forensic Psychiatry, A Practical Guide for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, (1975); co-author of Psychic Injuries (1975) and Violence and Responsibility (1978). He has examined for the M’Naghten legal insanity issue on several hundred occasions. He has been an expert witness on matters pertaining to mental responsibility in state and federal courts.

. Dr. Kool concluded that Ms. Bracey suffered from schizophrenia, schizo-affect type, with prominent paranoid features.