Court Opinion

ID: 9665153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:41:51.473357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:13.438745
License: Public Domain

MacKenzie, P.J.
(dissenting in part). I dissent from Part m of the majority opinion. In my view, *535the favored work doctrine requires an employer to keep open an offer of favored work for a reasonable time under all the circumstances; after the expiration of a reasonable time, however, the employee forfeits the right to workers’ compensation benefits. Because I believe that in this case the bounds of reasonableness had expired when Hart-sell sought compensation, I would reverse the award of benefits retroactive to the date Richmond Lumber ceased operations.
In Bower v Whitehall Leather Co, 412 Mich 172; 312 NW2d 640 (1981), the Supreme Court made it clear that "the favored-work doctrine must be tempered with reasonableness.” 412 Mich 183. The Court stated:
The primary purpose of the doctrine is that of mitigation. It allows an employer to reduce or completely eliminate compensation payments by providing work within the injured employee’s physical capacity. At the same time, it encourages the employee to return to productive employment rather than to remain idle, thus also serving a rehabilitative function. Pulley v Detroit Engineering & Machine Co, 378 Mich 418; 145 NW2d 40 (1966).
To hold that the reasonableness of an employee’s action in refusing favored work cannot be considered in determining whether benefits should be forfeited would be to contradict the basic principle underlying both these purposes. The common-law doctrine of mitigation is founded upon notions of reasonableness ....
Further, in the area of rehabilitation, the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act itself specifically incorporates the factor of reasonableness in judging forfeiture .... [412 Mich 182-183.].
The obvious corrollary to the above reasoning is that the reasonableness of an employer’s with*536drawal of an offer of favored work must also be considered in determining whether benefits should be awarded. I fail to see how the mitigation or rehabilitation purposes underlying the favored work doctrine are served by deciding, as the majority does, that an offer of favored work must be left open without limit even though, as here, the worker has clearly demonstrated utter disinterest in returning to his employer’s workplace.
The record in the instant case establishes that Richmond Lumber offered Hartsell favored work in 1967, but Hartsell voluntarily quit the work on June 23, 1967. Almost two years later, in April, 1969, Richmond reiterated the offer of favored work and Hartsell again refused. Hartsell never inquired about further employment at Richmond Lumber, although he had unsuccessfully sought work at several other places. Yet in 1978—some nine years after the offer of favored work was made and rejected for the second time—Hartsell, prompted by his former employer’s closing, claimed that the offer of favored work had been withdrawn so that he was entitled to compensation.
Applying the rule of reason mandated by Bower, I would hold that on these facts Richmond Lumber reasonably withdrew its offer of favored work and that Hartsell had forfeited his right to compensation. It should be noted that I was on the panel of Steward v Westran, 130 Mich App 68; 343 NW2d 7 (1983), upon which the majority relies. Steward specifically states that under the circumstances of that case the decision of the appeal board was reasonable. There is no justifiable reason to hold that an employer’s duty to mitigate under the favored work doctrine requires the employer to hold open a job for someone who is clearly not interested in working at that place of employment.
I would reverse the award of compensation.