Court Opinion

ID: 9787013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:08:21.851886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.241074
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with today's holding that the state had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that McGee lacked any reasonable ground to believe his act was justified. I nonetheless dissent because the facts viewed most favorably to him did not support a necessity defense. The superior court's error as to the burden of proving the defense was therefore harmless.
The elements of necessity are: "1) the act charged must have been done to prevent a significant evil; 2) there must have been no adequate alternative; 3) the harm caused must not have been disproportionate to the *1264harm avoided." 1 As the court notes, a defendant must present "some evidence" to adequately raise the defense2 Some evidence is "'evidence in light of which a reasonable juror could have entertained a reasonable doubt ...' as to the element in question."3 "To determine whether this test has been met in a particular case the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant." 4 I do not believe that McGee presented evidence that could cause a reasonable juror to entertain a doubt about whether McGee's destruction of the truck windows was justified by necessity.
McGee's story is implausible. At trial he told the jury that Anderson threatened to run him over after they scuffled. So he broke the truck's windows so that Anderson would not be able to see McGee well enough to hit him with the truck. While a reasonable juror could conceivably find, as the court suggests, that "the panic of the moment blinded him to various alternative courses of action," 5 McGee's explanation is still dubious at best. McGee had a multitude of more reasonable, not to mention more effective, options at hand, the most obvious of which would have been to stay off the road and seek immediate help6 Furthermore, the question presented to the jury would not have been whether McGee subjectively believed that there were legal alternatives, but whether this belief was objectively reasonable. It is highly unlikely that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to McGee, any juror would entertain a reasonable doubt regarding the second element of the necessity defense-that there were "no adequate alternatives" to breaking the windows.7
Even if McGee satisfied the some evidence standard with respect to the second element of necessity, he definitely did not do so with respect to the first element. A cloger look at what he actually did to the truck makes it clear that no reasonable juror could entertain a doubt about whether McGee reasonably believed his actions were "done to prevent a significant evil.8 The vast majority of the damage done to Anderson's truck would not have impaired Anderson's ability to target and run over a pedestrian, which renders McGee's explanation unbelievable.
If McGee was really trying to make it difficult for Anderson to see out of the truck, one would expect a great deal of damage to *1265the driver's side of the front windshield. Yet, photographs show that McGee concentrated his front windshield destructive efforts largely on the passenger's side. Although he did smash a portion of the driver's side, he left a large area of untouched glass through which a driver could easily see.
Further, McGee smashed out at least two of the truck's rear window panels and three out of four of the truck's side windows. These acts of destructive mischief might make the truck more drafty but they could not have been meant to reduce visibility and thus thwart a vengeful driver. First, the windows were on the side and the back of the truck, so it would not have significantly hampered the driver's ability to aim the truck at someone in front of him. Second, McGee completely broke out all of the glass, so Anderson would have had no trouble seeing through the windows. There are numerous cases that indicate that a successful necessity defense must establish "a direct causal relationship reasonably anticipated between the criminal action taken and the avoidance of the threatened harm.9 There is plainly no direct causal relationship between breaking the side and rear windows and stopping the harm McGee claims he was trying to avoid.
The lack of a causal relationship between breaking the side and rear windows and stopping Anderson from running over McGee causes McGee's necessity defense to fail the some evidence test. First, the fact that he had no reason for breaking those windows completely undermines his proffered explanation regarding the front windshield. If his goal really was to reduce visibility, why would he have risked encountering an angry Anderson by expending considerable time and energy in order to completely break out the other five windows? These actions are not in any way consistent with his story and render his story unbelievable.
Second, the destruction of the side and rear windows, viewed in isolation, is sufficient to establish Hability. The defense of necessity, like self-defense, is based on the belief that one should not be convicted of a crime when there is no reasonable alternative to committing it. It is "a law of necessity, arising only when the necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity." 10 In self-defense no more force than appears reasonable to repel a threat may be used.11 Likewise, no greater destruction of property than appears reasonably necessary to repel a threat can be justified by the defense of necessity. When greater force, or more destruction, than reasonable is used, necessity-based defenses are not available as to the conduct that exceeds the justification.12 Whether these limits are exceeded will be a *1266jury question, except when no reasonable juror could conclude otherwise. Here that is precisely our situation. As is discussed above, while a juror might accept McGee's contention that he bashed in the truck's windshield so that Anderson could not see well enough to pursue him, no similar justification is available as to the destruction of the truck's side and rear windows. Since the malicious destruction crime is complete in terms of the required value of property destroyed when only the side and rear windows are considered,13 there was no need for an instruction on the necessity defense. Thus, the error the instruction contained was harmless.
For these reasons, I do not believe that McGee presented sufficient evidence to raise the defense of necessity. Since no instruction on the defense was needed, the error in the instruction that was given is harmless. I would therefore affirm McGee's conviction of criminal mischief.

. Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977, 979 (Alaska 1979). 'The defense is established if the accused reasonably believed at the time of acting that the first and second elements were present, but a reasonable belief will not suffice for the third element; the court makes an objective determination ... as to whether the defendant's value judgment was correct, given the facts as he reasonably perceived them." Seibold v. State, 959 P.2d 780, 782 (Alaska App.1998).

. Op. at 1261.

. Folger v. State, 648 P.2d 111, 113 (Alaska App. 1982) (quoting LaLonde v. State, 614 P.2d 808, 810 (Alaska 1980)).

. Seibold, 959 P.2d at 783. The court points to language in Toomey v. State that states that when. determining whether there is some evidence to support a defense, "[aluy weakness or implausibility in the evidence supporting [the defendant's] story is not a relevant consideration." Op. at 1262 n. 54 (citing Toomey v. State, 581 P.2d 1124, 1126 n. 10 (Alaska 1978)). However, this language must be read in conjunction with the some evidence test. If this court cannot consider a weakness or implausibility in a defendant's story that is so glaring as to render the defendant's story such that no reasonable person could entertain a reasonable doubt about it, then the Toomey exception would make the some evidence rule meaningless. In fact, the language in. Toomey relies on Brooke v. United States, 385 F.2d 279, 284 (D.C.Cir.1967), as well as a dissenting opinion by Justice Rabinowitz in Wilson v. State, 473 P.2d 633, 638 n. 2 (Alaska 1970), which also relies on Brooke. The Brooke court does state that no weakness or implausibility should be considered, but it only applied this rule to cases where there is already "evidentiary support for special facts sustaining a rational defensive theory." 385 F.2d at 284 (emphasis added).

. Op. at 1262.

. McGee testified that he knew that a friend of his was home only a block away.

. Nelson, 597 P.2d at 979. There are several Alaskan cases holding that a defendant did not properly raise the defense of necessity that emphasize the availability of adequate alternatives. E.g., Gerlach v. State, 699 P.2d 358, 361 (Alaska App.1985); Schnabel v. State, 663 P.2d 960, 966 (Alaska App.1983); Nelson, 597 P.2d at 980.

. Nelson, 597 P.2d at 979.

. - United States v. Butler, 485 F.3d 569, 572 (10th Cir.2007); also, eg., United States v. Poe, 442 F.3d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir.2006); United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 829 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 468 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Dixon, 413 F.3d 520, 523 (5th Cir.2005); United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 40 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir.1998); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 874 (4th Cir.1995).

. Harper v. United States, 608 A.2d 152, 154 (D.C.1992) (quotations omitted).

. E.g., State v. Walker, 887 P.2d 971, 978 (Alaska App.1994) (citing P. Rosmson, Criminal Law Derenses § 131(c), vol. 2, p. 77 (1984)); United States v. Biggs, 441 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir.2006); People v. Rodriguez, 258 Ill.App.3d 579, 197 Ill.Dec. 424, 631 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1994); Martin v. State, 784 N.E.2d 997, 1006 (Ind.App. 2003); Jones v. State, 357 Md. 408, 745 A.2d 396, 403 (2000); Com. v. Haddock, 46 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 704 N.E.2d 537, 540 (1999); State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn.1983); State v. Habermann, 93 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Mo.App.2002); State v. Colon, 298 N.J. Super. 569, 689 A.2d 1359, 1363 (App.Div.1997); Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 758 (Wyo.1995); 6 Am.Jur.2d Assault & Battery § 57 (1999).

. Cf. Martin, 784 N.E.2d at 997 (noting that "Iwlhere a person has used more force than necessary to repel an attack the right to self-defense is extinguished, and the ultimate result is that the victim then becomes the perpetrator") (quotations omitted); People v. Carrera, 282 A.D.2d 614, 725 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (App.Div.2001) ("Even if a defendant is initially justified in using deadly physical force in self-defense, if he or she continues to use deadly physical force after the assailant no longer poses a threat, a jury may find that the defendant is no longer acting in self-defense. Where homicide is charged, the People must prove that it was the excessive force which caused death."); 2 Cmarirs E. Torcm, Wearton's Criminat Law § 190, at 453 (15th ed. 1993) ("If a defendant uses more force than is reasonably necessary to defend himself, he is guilty of battery."); 6A CJ.S. Assault § 28 ("[When a person responds to an attack by using more force than is necessary to repel the aggres*1266sion or apparent aggression, he or she is liable for injuries caused by the unnecessary force."). Similarly, under our necessity jurisprudence, "a person claiming necessity in justification of a 'continuing offense' must offer some evidence that the continued violation of the law-as well as the initial violation-was justified." Reeve v. State, 764 P.2d 324, 326 (Alaska App.1988). It would be highly undesirable to establish a precedent suggesting that, even though a defendant must use only the force necessary when claiming self-defense and a defendant must take only the actions necessary when relying on necessity in the context of a continuing offense, a defendant need not show any such circumspection when relying on a necessity defense for a non-continuing offense.

. "A person commits the crime of criminal mischief ... if, having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe the person has such a right, ... with intent to damage property of another, the person damages property of another in an amount of $500 or more." AS 11.46.482(a). The cost of replacing just the side and rear windows was over $1,200. These acts are therefore in and of themselves sufficient to establish the elements of criminal mischief.