Court Opinion

ID: 9364873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 16:03:09.882608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:41.182201
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 127318

                                         IN THE
                                SUPREME COURT
                                             OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                    (Docket No. 127318)

                THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                          JUAN VILLAREAL, Appellant.

                              Opinion filed January 20, 2023.

        JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville and Overstreet concurred in the
     judgment and opinion.

        Justices Cunningham, Rochford, and O’Brien took no part in the decision.

                                         OPINION

¶1       Petitioner, Juan Villareal, pleaded guilty in the circuit court of Cook County to
     unlawful possession of a firearm by a gang member in violation of section 24-
     1.8(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010)). The
     circuit court sentenced petitioner to four years in prison pursuant to a plea
     agreement. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of
     the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)) arguing his sentence
     was improperly increased because he was required to serve a period of mandatory
     supervised release. The circuit court dismissed the petition.

¶2       On appeal, petitioner challenged section 24-1.8(a)(1) as facially
     unconstitutional under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
     (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) because the statute impermissibly criminalized his status
     as a gang member. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010). In supplemental
     briefing, petitioner added an additional claim, arguing the statute was facially
     unconstitutional, as it violated substantive due process. The appellate court rejected
     petitioner’s eighth amendment challenge and declined to address the due process
     claim, as it was raised for the first time in petitioner’s supplemental brief. 2021 IL
     App (1st) 181817, ¶¶ 17-21, 28. One dissenting justice found the statute violated
     substantive due process. Id. ¶ 44 (Walker, P.J., dissenting).

¶3       Petitioner now argues section 24-1.8(a)(1) is facially unconstitutional for three
     reasons: (1) it violates the fourteenth amendment’s guarantee of substantive due
     process (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) because it is not rationally related to a legitimate
     state interest, (2) it violates substantive due process because it is vague, and (3) it
     violates the eighth amendment. For the following reasons, we hold the statute is
     constitutional and comports with both the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the
     United States Constitution.

¶4                                     BACKGROUND

¶5       In October 2011, police officers stopped petitioner while he was driving a car
     the officers believed had been involved in a neighborhood shooting. During the
     traffic stop, officers searched the car and recovered a fully loaded handgun.
     Petitioner was charged with several offenses related to the firearm, including
     unlawful possession of a firearm by a streetgang member in violation of the
     Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010)). Petitioner pleaded
     guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a streetgang member. The State
     dropped the additional charges pursuant to the plea agreement. As part of the factual
     basis for the plea, the State informed the court petitioner was “a member of the
     Satan Disciples from 24 and Washtenaw” and that he had never been issued a

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     Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card. Petitioner stipulated to this
     information. The circuit court sentenced petitioner to four years in prison. Petitioner
     did not file a direct appeal.

¶6        In April 2018, petitioner filed a petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code
     of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)), arguing the statute governing
     Illinois’s mandatory supervised release scheme was unconstitutional because his
     sentence was improperly increased when he was required to serve an additional
     two-year period of mandatory supervised release. The circuit court dismissed the
     petition. Petitioner appealed the dismissal.

¶7       On appeal, petitioner abandoned the claims raised in his petition. Instead, he
     argued his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a streetgang member
     was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution
     because it increased the penalty for unlawful possession of a firearm based solely
     on the person’s status as a gang member. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010).
     Petitioner acknowledged he had not previously raised the claim in the circuit court
     but argued the issue was properly before the appellate court because a facially
     unconstitutional statute could be challenged at any time. See People v. Thompson,
     2015 IL 118151, ¶ 32.

¶8       After the parties filed their briefs, the appellate court sua sponte asked the
     parties to file supplemental briefs addressing two cases—State v. O.C., 748 So. 2d
     945 (Fla. 1999), and State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016)—
     dealing with the constitutionality of sentencing enhancements for streetgang
     members. In petitioner’s supplemental brief, he argued section 24-1.8(a)(1) was
     also facially unconstitutional because it violated substantive due process.

¶9       A majority of the appellate court rejected petitioner’s eighth amendment
     challenge, finding the statute criminalized more than mere gang membership
     because it also prohibited the voluntary possession of a firearm without a valid
     FOID card. 2021 IL App (1st) 181817, ¶¶ 17-21. In addition, the majority noted
     that, in a prosecution for unlawful possession of a firearm by a gang member, the
     “State must prove substantially more than mere gang member status; it must prove
     specific criminal offenses directly related to or in furtherance of the gang’s
     objectives, and therefore, an explicit nexus is required between illegal firearm
     possession and gang-related activity.” Id. ¶ 21. The statute did not allow for the

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       prosecution of passive gang members and only permitted the prosecution of gang
       members involved in specific criminal acts who also unlawfully possessed
       weapons. Id. ¶ 20. The majority declined to address the substantive due process
       claim, as it was raised for the first time in petitioner’s supplemental brief, which
       the majority found was in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff.
       Oct. 1, 2020). 2021 IL App (1st) 181817, ¶¶ 23-28.

¶ 10       Presiding Justice Walker dissented because he found the application of the
       harsher penalty under the statute was triggered solely by petitioner’s status as a
       gang member. Id. ¶ 33 (Walker, P.J., dissenting). Presiding Justice Walker noted:

               “The issue here is proof that the group qualifies as a street gang does not
           entail proof that an individual knew of the group’s criminal activities. In
           addition, proof that the group qualifies as a street gang does not entail proof
           connecting the possession of the firearm to any of the criminal acts that qualify
           the group for street gang status.” Id. ¶ 34.

       Presiding Justice Walker concluded the statute violated due process. Id. ¶ 43.

¶ 11        This court granted petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a)
       (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). We allowed the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois leave
       to file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioner’s position. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345(a)
       (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 12                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 13       Before this court, petitioner argues section 24-1.8(a)(1) is facially
       unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) it violates the eighth amendment to
       the Unites States Constitution because it increases an individual’s sentence based
       solely on his status as a gang member, and (2) it violates substantive due process
       under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because it
       (a) criminalizes mere gang association without requiring a nexus between the
       association and the conduct prohibited under the statute and (b) is vague as written
       and is therefore void. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010); U.S. Const.,
       amends. VIII, XIV. Although the appellate court declined to address petitioner’s
       substantive due process argument, we choose to address all of petitioner’s claims

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       because they are facial challenges to the statute, which this court has held can be
       raised at any time. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 61 (2003).

¶ 14       We begin with the familiar rules controlling the review of a facial constitutional
       challenge to a statutory provision. A party bringing a facial challenge to a statute
       faces a particularly heavy burden. People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, ¶ 34. The
       party must prove there is no set of circumstances under which the statute would be
       valid. Id. Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging the
       constitutionality of a statute has the burden of clearly establishing its invalidity.
       People v. Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22. This court has a duty to construe a statute in
       a manner upholding the statute’s validity and constitutionality if it can be
       reasonably done. People v. Hollins, 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 13. The issue of whether a
       statute is constitutional presents a question of law, which this court reviews
       de novo. People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 14.

¶ 15      Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of section 24-1.8(a)(1), which states:

            “(a) A person commits unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang
          member when he or she knowingly:

                  (1) possesses, carries, or conceals on or about his or her person a firearm
              and firearm ammunition while on any street, road, alley, gangway,
              sidewalk, or any other lands, except when inside his or her own abode or
              inside his or her fixed place of business, and has not been issued a currently
              valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card and is a member of a street
              gang[.]” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010).

       The definitions of a “streetgang” and a “streetgang member” are found in the
       Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act (Act) (740 ILCS 147/10
       (West 2010)). 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(c) (West 2010).

¶ 16       The Act defines a “streetgang” as “any combination, confederation, alliance,
       network, conspiracy, understanding, or other similar conjoining, in law or in fact,
       of 3 or more persons with an established hierarchy that, through its membership or
       through the agency of any member engages in a course or pattern of criminal
       activity.” 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2010). A course or pattern of criminal activity is
       defined as two or more gang-related criminal offenses committed in whole or in

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       part within this State when (1) at least one such offense was committed after
       January 1, 1993 (the effective date of the Act); (2) both offenses were committed
       within five years of each other; and (3) at least one offense involved the solicitation
       to commit, conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or commission of any offense
       defined as a felony or forcible felony under the Criminal Code of 1961 (now the
       Criminal Code of 2012). Id. A “gang-related” criminal offense “means any criminal
       activity, enterprise, pursuit, or undertaking directed by, ordered by, authorized by,
       consented to, agreed to, requested by, acquiesced in, or ratified by any gang leader,
       officer, or governing or policy-making person or authority, or by any agent,
       representative, or deputy of any such officer, person, or authority” for the benefit
       of the gang. Id.

¶ 17      A “streetgang member” is defined as

          “[(1)] any person who actually and in fact belongs to a gang, and [(2)] any
          person who knowingly acts in the capacity of an agent for or accessory to, or is
          legally accountable for, or voluntarily associates himself with a course or
          pattern of gang-related criminal activity, whether in a preparatory, executory,
          or cover-up phase of any activity, or who knowingly performs, aids, or abets
          any such activity.” Id.

¶ 18       We take each of petitioner’s constitutional arguments in turn and review these
       definitions as they impact each argument.

¶ 19                   A. Petitioner’s Substantive Due Process Challenges

¶ 20       The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides no person
       shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S.
       Const., amend. XIV. There are two aspects to the guarantee of due process,
       procedural and substantive. People v. Pepitone, 2018 IL 122034, ¶ 13. Petitioner
       argues section 24-1.8(a)(1) violates substantive due process. Substantive due
       process limits the State’s ability to act, irrespective of the procedural protections
       provided. People v. Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 17. A statute violates the
       constitutional guarantee of due process if it does not bear a rational relationship to
       a legitimate legislative purpose. People v. Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2010). A
       statute can also violate due process if it is unconstitutionally vague. People v. Plank,

                                                -6-
       2018 IL 122202, ¶ 12. Petitioner argues section 24-1.8(a)(1) violates due process
       for both reasons.

¶ 21                                     1. Rational Basis

¶ 22        In this case, the parties agree section 24-1.8(a)(1) does not impact a
       fundamental constitutional right. When a statute does not impact a fundamental
       constitutional right, the applicable standard for reviewing whether the statute
       conforms with substantive due process is the rational basis test. Boeckmann, 238
       Ill. 2d at 7. Applying the rational basis test, we must determine (1) whether there is
       a legitimate state interest behind the statute and, if so, (2) whether there is a
       reasonable relationship between the interest and the means the legislature has
       chosen to pursue it. Pepitone, 2018 IL 122034, ¶ 14 (citing People v. Johnson, 225
       Ill. 2d 573, 584 (2007)). If a statute is reasonably related to a legitimate state
       interest, the means or method the legislature has chosen to serve the state interest
       will also be reasonable. Id. ¶ 16. A challenged statute must be upheld if there is a
       conceivable basis for finding it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
       Boeckmann, 238 Ill. 2d at 7. Although it is not toothless, the rational basis test is
       highly deferential to the findings of the legislature. Pepitone, 2018 IL 122034, ¶ 17;
       People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 596 (2006).

¶ 23       In enacting section 24-1.8(a)(1), the legislature identified the legislative
       purpose of the statute as “to protect innocent citizens, public areas by severely and
       justly punishing those individuals who are prone to cause violence in public areas—
       gang members.” 96th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Oct. 29, 2009, at 152
       (statements of Senator Muñoz). To implement this legislative purpose, the statute
       was specifically aimed at “gang members who possess firearms and ammunition in
       areas where gang violence is most likely to erupt—the streets, sidewalks, alleys,
       gangways and roadways of urban areas throughout Illinois.” Id. The legislature thus
       enacted section 24-1.8(a)(1) and increased the penalty for the unlawful possession
       of a firearm or firearm ammunition in public without a FOID card when the person
       in possession of the firearm or ammunition is a gang member. 720 ILCS 5/24-
       1.8(a)(1), (b) (West 2010). We conclude the legislature’s decision to increase the
       penalty was reasonable and rationally related to its stated purpose of curbing gang

                                               -7-
       violence against innocent citizens in public areas. Accordingly, we hold section 24-
       1.8(a)(1) does not violate substantive due process.

¶ 24       Petitioner argues the statute fails the rational basis test because it does not
       require any connection between the gang association and the underlying offense of
       unlawfully possessing a firearm. Without this connection, petitioner argues, the
       statute does not actually target criminal gang activity, thus failing the rational basis
       test. However, in enacting section 24-1.8(a)(1), the legislature found violence
       against innocent citizens in public areas was committed by armed gang members.
       Connecting the legislative purpose of reducing this specific violence to the conduct
       to be prohibited—gang members possessing firearms—the legislature chose to
       enact a statute heavily punishing gang members for unlawfully possessing firearms
       in public areas. This direct connection distinguishes this case from Bonds, 502
       S.W.3d at 157, where the court found the gang enhancement statute increasing
       penalties for all offenses committed by a gang member failed “to even obtusely
       target gang-related criminal activity.” See also O.C., 748 So. 2d at 947 (striking
       down a gang enhancement statute increasing the penalty for all offenses committed
       by a gang member because there was no connection between the underlying offense
       and the gang membership).

¶ 25       The rational basis test asks whether there is a reasonable relationship between
       the legislative purpose and the means the legislature has chosen to pursue it.
       Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d at 584. We find increasing the penalty for the unlawful
       possession of a firearm in public when the offender is a gang member was a rational
       method of accomplishing the legislative goal of protecting innocent citizens from
       gang violence. While requiring the possession of the firearm to be directly
       connected to specific gang activity may be an alternate means of accomplishing the
       legislative purpose, the rational basis test does not require the statute to be the best
       means of accomplishing the legislature’s objectives. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 72. The
       determination of the best means to achieve the legislative goal is best left to the
       legislature, not the courts. Id.

¶ 26       Petitioner further argues the definition of a streetgang member does not require
       active gang membership and can sweep up individuals with mere passive
       association with the gang—thus violating substantive due process. The State
       contends the plain language of the statute makes it clear only gang members who

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       are ready and willing to commit crimes on behalf of the gang are swept into the
       definition of a gang member. We agree with the State and find the phrase “actually
       and in fact belongs to” when defining a gang member refers to a level of association
       beyond mere passive association.

¶ 27      We return to the definition of a gang member provided in the Act as

          “[(1)] any person who actually and in fact belongs to a gang, and [(2)] any
          person who knowingly acts in the capacity of an agent for or accessory to, or is
          legally accountable for, or voluntarily associates himself with a course or
          pattern of gang-related criminal activity, whether in a preparatory, executory,
          or cover-up phase of any activity, or who knowingly performs, aids, or abets
          any such activity.” 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2010).

       The second definition of a gang member undoubtedly encompasses active
       participation in gang-related criminal activity by a person acting as an agent of the
       gang. See id. Petitioner argues the first definition of a gang member includes gang
       members who passively associate with the gang with no knowledge of the gang’s
       criminal activity. Since the phrase “actually and in fact belongs to” is not statutorily
       defined, we turn to a dictionary for the common meaning of the term “belongs to.”
       People v. Comage, 241 Ill. 2d 139, 144 (2011) (“When a statutory term is
       undefined, it is appropriate to employ a dictionary definition to ascertain its
       meaning.”).

¶ 28       The Act went into effect in 1993. See Pub. Act. 87-932, art. II, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1,
       1993). The contemporaneous dictionary definitions of “belong” were “to become
       attached or bound (as to a person, group, or organization) by birth, allegiance,
       residence, or dependency.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 201
       (1993). “Bound” was defined as “under legal or moral restraint or obligation” (id.
       at 260), and “allegiance” was defined as “devotion or loyalty esp. to a person,
       group, or cause entitled to obedience or service and respect” (id. at 55). These
       definitions can also be found on the current online version of the Merriam-Webster
       Dictionary. In the context of section 24-1.8(a)(1), to belong to a gang thus means
       to be attached or bound to a gang in a manner expressing an active devotion or
       loyalty to the gang.

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¶ 29       This definition is in line with the definition of a gang, which is “any
       combination, confederation, alliance, network, conspiracy, understanding, or other
       similar conjoining, in law or in fact, of 3 or more persons with an established
       hierarchy that, through its membership or through the agency of any member
       engages in a course or pattern of criminal activity.” (Emphasis added.) 740 ILCS
       147/10 (West 2010). A “course or pattern of criminal activity” means two or more
       gang-related criminal offenses. Id. The statute also provides a detailed definition of
       gang-related criminal activity, which includes criminal activity to benefit the gang,
       such as by increasing the gang’s dominance in a geographical area or providing the
       gang with an advantage in a criminal sector. Id. Read together, these definitions
       indicate gang members are necessarily active participants in criminal activities on
       behalf of the gang. See Comage, 241 Ill. 2d at 144 (“To determine the plain
       meaning, we must consider the statute in its entirety and be mindful of the subject
       it addresses.”).

¶ 30       We find the plain language of section 24-1.8(a)(1) and the definitions it
       incorporates from the Act are clear as to the legislative intent. However, “[t]o the
       extent any residual doubt exists, it is erased through examination of
       the legislative history.” People v. Blair, 2013 IL 114122, ¶ 38. A reading of the
       statute to include only active gang members implements the legislative intent as
       confirmed by the sentiments of the legislature when section 24-1.8(a)(1) was
       enacted. When legislators expressed concern about criminalizing individuals who
       were not active gang members, they were reassured the statute would only include
       gang members who were “actively engaged in the criminal enterprise” “in that gang
       and the burden of proof from the State’s attorney’s office is—it has to be very, very
       high.” 96th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Oct. 29, 2009, at 158 (statements
       of Senator Millner); see People v. Murray, 2019 IL 123289, ¶ 39.

¶ 31        Therefore, for an individual to be prosecuted for unlawful possession of a
       firearm in public as a gang member, the State must prove—as an element of the
       offense—the individual was an active gang member at the time he possessed the
       firearm. We decline to read into the statute a legislative intent to punish passive
       members of a gang. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222 (1961) (declining to
       attribute to Congress a purpose to punish nominal membership); Hollins, 2012 IL
       112754, ¶ 13 (“We have a duty to construe the statute in a manner that upholds the

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       statute’s validity and constitutionality, if it can be reasonably done.”).

¶ 32                                  2. Void for Vagueness

¶ 33       A vagueness challenge arises from the notice requirement of the fourteenth
       amendment’s due process clause. Bartlow v. Costigan, 2014 IL 115152, ¶ 40. As a
       basic principle of due process, a statute is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are
       not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). A
       statute can be impermissibly vague if it (1) fails to provide people of ordinary
       intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits or
       (2) authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Hill v.
       Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). In addressing a vagueness challenge to a
       statute, we first examine the plain language of the statute in light of its common
       understanding and practice. Wilson v. County of Cook, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 24. If the
       plain text of the statute sets forth clearly perceived boundaries, the vagueness
       challenge fails, and our inquiry ends. Id.

¶ 34       Petitioner contends section 24-1.8(a)(1) is vague because the first definition of
       a gang member does not provide guidance on how a person may join a gang and
       because the second definition does not provide the minimal level of association
       necessary to trigger the statute. We disagree. Section 24-1.8(a)(1) provides a person
       of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand the prohibited
       conduct, which is the possession of a firearm or firearm ammunition in public
       without a valid FOID card. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010). Additionally,
       the definitions of what constitutes a streetgang, a gang member, and criminal
       activity are highly detailed and specific and further provide a person of ordinary
       intelligence with guidance on who is prohibited from the public possession of
       firearms under section 24-1.8(a)(1). The fact the definition does not provide an
       explanation for how a person may join a gang does not undermine the plain
       language explaining when a person is in fact an active gang member.

¶ 35       We find Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), on which petitioner
       relies, distinguishable. In that case, the United States Supreme Court struck down
       a New Jersey statute holding,

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          “Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a member of
          any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted at least
          three times of being a disorderly person, or who has been convicted of any
          crime, in this or in any other State, is declared to be a gangster . . .” (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 452.

       The Supreme Court noted the definition of a gang as “consisting of two or more
       persons” did not provide enough information on the meaning of the word. Id. at
       453. The Court looked to dictionaries and other sources and concluded the term
       “gang” was defined in many different ways, with no common-law definition. Id. at
       454-55.

¶ 36       The Court further found the expression “known to be a member” was
       ambiguous because it did not indicate whether it included active or putative
       membership. Id. at 458. The Court also noted the statute failed to indicate what
       constituted membership or how an individual could join a gang. Id. Ultimately, the
       Court struck down the statute because it “condemn[ed] no act or omission; the terms
       it employ[ed] to indicate what it purport[ed] to denounce [were] so vague, indefinite
       and uncertain” as to violate the due process clause. Id.

¶ 37       In contrast to the language at issue in Lanzetta, section 24-1.8(a)(1) provides
       detailed, clear definitions of a “gang” based on more than the number of a group’s
       membership. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(c) (West 2010); 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2010).
       Furthermore, the definition of a “gang member” requires active participation in
       criminal activity by an actual gang member or one acting as an agent for the gang.
       740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2010). Unlike in Lanzetta, the statute requires a person to
       actually belong to a gang or act on behalf of a gang, not simply be suspected of
       belonging to one. See Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 458. Section 24-1.8(a)(1) is also clear
       on what conduct it condemns—the unlawful possession of firearms in public spaces
       by gang members. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010). Section 24-1.8(a)(1) thus
       comports with due process.

¶ 38        Petitioner also argues the second definition of a streetgang member lacks clarity
       because it does not provide notice of what it means for a person to “voluntarily
       associate” and what minimal level of association is required. Petitioner fails to read
       “voluntarily associate” in the context of the entire definition, under which a person
       is a gang member if he

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          “knowingly acts in the capacity of an agent for or accessory to, or is legally
          accountable for, or voluntarily associates himself with a course or pattern of
          gang-related criminal activity, whether in a preparatory, executory, or cover-up
          phase of any activity, or who knowingly performs, aids, or abets any such
          activity.” 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2010).

       The phrase “voluntarily associates himself with” must be read in the context of the
       entire statutory text because “a word is given more precise content by the
       neighboring words with which it is associated.” Corbett v. County of Lake, 2017 IL
       121536, ¶ 31 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008)). In
       context, an individual’s association with a course or pattern of criminal activity
       must be in the same vein as one who acts as an agent or accessory in the planning,
       execution, and cover-up of a gang-related offense.

¶ 39       Further, to “associate” is not defined under the statute. See 740 ILCS 147/10
       (West 2010). We therefore rely on the dictionary definition, which is “to join often
       in a loose relationship as a partner, fellow worker, colleague, friend, companion, or
       ally.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 132 (1993). The plain
       language of the statute provides that a person voluntarily associates with a course
       or pattern of gang-related criminal activity when he joins as a partner, friend,
       companion, or ally in the preparation, execution, or cover-up of the gang-related
       criminal activity. This would not include the examples the petitioner cites, i.e., a
       person who merely likes a social media post about an offense he took no part in or
       one who makes laudatory comments about the offense or its perpetrators but
       otherwise did not participate in the offense. These activities do not generally
       constitute joining in the course or pattern of gang-related criminal activity, whether
       in a preparatory, executory, or cover-up phase.

¶ 40       Similarly, petitioner fails to show section 24-1.8 is vague because it authorizes
       or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by not providing a
       clear definition of a gang member. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 732. To avoid being struck
       down as vague, a statute must provide explicit standards to regulate the discretion
       of governmental authorities who apply the law. People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478,
       484 (2000). If the legislature fails to provide minimal guidelines to govern law
       enforcement, a criminal law “ ‘may permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows
       policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.” ’ ” Id.

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       (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983), quoting Smith v. Goguen,
       415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)). We find section 24-1.8(a)(1) provides the necessary
       guidance, through its clear and detailed definitions of both a gang member and a
       gang, to guide members of law enforcement and prosecutors properly following
       these definitions. The statute itself does not leave the determination of what
       constitutes a gang member to an officer’s or prosecutor’s personal discretion.

¶ 41       Petitioner argues the Chicago Police Department often relies on gang databases
       compiled in a discriminatory manner. This is a serious concern. However, this
       argument goes to the amount of evidence the State must introduce at trial to prove
       beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is a gang member under section 28-
       1.4(a)(1), including proving the group he is charged as a member of is a gang. See
       740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2010); Murray, 2019 IL 123289, ¶ 34 (finding, in a
       prosecution for a violation of section 24-1.8(a)(1), when proving the defendant is a
       gang member, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the
       gang as defined under the Act).

¶ 42       We also note the issue of whether a person is a gang member under the statute
       would arise only when the person is being charged for being in unlawful public
       possession of a firearm without a valid FOID card. At the point of arrest, the police
       officers would presumably arrest all individuals unlawfully possessing firearms
       without valid FOID cards, whether they are gang members or not. See 720 ILCS
       5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) (West 2010). Therefore, section 24-1.8(a)(1) would not
       permit an officer’s personal predilection to determine who would be arrested for
       unlawfully possessing a firearm. Once a person is arrested, the determination of
       how to charge him will depend on how much evidence the State believes it has to
       prove the defendant’s gang membership. Murray, 2019 IL 123289, ¶ 37. Because
       the statute provides detailed definitions of these terms, we find it is not vague under
       either vagueness standard and hold section 24-1.8 does not violate due process.

¶ 43                      B. Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment Challenge

¶ 44      The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and
       unusual punishments and applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
       U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV; People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 15. In
       Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-67 (1977), the United States Supreme Court

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       reviewed the history of the eighth amendment and the Court’s decisions in an effort
       to determine how the clause circumscribes the criminal process. The Court
       concluded the clause does so in three ways: (1) it limits the kinds of punishment
       that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes, (2) it proscribes punishment
       grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, and (3) it imposes substantive
       limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such. Id. at 667. The Supreme
       Court has recognized the last limitation as one to be applied sparingly. Id.
       Petitioner’s eighth amendment argument in this case concerns this last category,
       which stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson v. California, 370
       U.S. 660 (1962).

¶ 45       In Robinson, the Supreme Court struck down a statute criminalizing “the status”
       of drug addiction. Id. at 666. In reaching its holding, the Court found drug addiction
       to be “an illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily” and that
       criminalizing addiction was cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 667. The Court
       subsequently reviewed the limits of Robinson in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
       (1968). In Powell, the Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of a statute
       criminalizing public intoxication. Id. at 517. The Court upheld the statute after
       finding it did not criminalize the status of being a chronic alcoholic but the public
       behavior of being drunk in public on a particular occasion. Id. at 532. The Powell
       Court noted:

          “The entire thrust of Robinson’s interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
          Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the
          accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society
          has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common law terms, has
          committed some actus reus. It thus does not deal with the question of whether
          certain conduct cannot constitutionally be punished because it is, in some sense,
          ‘involuntary’ or ‘occasioned by a compulsion.’ ” Id. at 533.

¶ 46       Petitioner, relying on Robinson and Powell, argues section 24-1.8(a)(1)
       criminalizes an individual’s mere status of being a gang member. See 720 ILCS
       5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010). We find Powell instructive and find section 24-
       1.8(a)(1) constitutional because it includes an actus reus—a gang member’s public
       possession of a firearm or firearm ammunition without a valid FOID card. See
       Powell, 392 U.S. at 533. Section 24-1.8(a)(1) does not criminalize mere status as

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       in Robinson. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67. As a result, section 24-1.8(a)(1)
       comports with the cruel and unusual punishment clause and does not violate the
       eighth amendment.

¶ 47       Petitioner notes the act of possessing a firearm is already criminalized under
       section 24-1 and that section 24-1.8(a)(1)’s increase of the penalty is based solely
       on gang membership. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1, 24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010). The State
       contends the legislature may properly determine certain criminal acts warrant a
       greater penalty when committed by offenders with particular statuses. Given our
       conclusions regarding the statutory definition of gang member and the kind of
       offender the statute was intended to reach, we agree with the State. Section 24-
       1.8(a)(1) and (b) provide a greater penalty for an active gang member’s public
       possession of a firearm without a FOID card because the legislature determined it
       was an effective deterrent aimed at addressing the serious problem of gang violence
       in public areas. See 96th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Oct. 15, 2009, at 69-
       70. The legislature is free to do this under the eighth amendment. See Spencer v.
       Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559 (1967) (noting the Court’s history of sustaining enhanced-
       sentence statutes and other recidivist statutes); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
       284 (1980) (upholding a statute imposing a life sentence on a defendant due to his
       criminal history as constitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments).

¶ 48       Petitioner further argues section 24-1.8(a)(1) is unconstitutional because it
       criminalizes the involuntary status of gang membership, just as the statute struck
       down in Robinson criminalized the involuntary status of drug addiction. See
       Robinson, 370 U.S. 660. Petitioner argues some gang members are forced to join
       gangs for protection and self-preservation and that their membership is thus
       involuntary. In furtherance of his involuntary membership argument, petitioner
       urges this court to examine another category of status offenses found
       unconstitutional under the eighth amendment—homelessness or vagrancy laws.

¶ 49       Petitioner relies on Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1562 (S.D.
       Fla. 1992), where the district court noted courts had overturned vagrancy laws
       because they punish status or condition, but in deciding such cases, the
       voluntariness of the status or condition was the decisive factor. Because petitioner
       raises a facial constitutional challenge, he must show gang membership is an
       involuntary condition in all cases to show section 24-1.8(a)(1) is facially

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       unconstitutional. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2010). Petitioner fails to
       allege or show all gang membership is involuntarily, as he notes some gang
       members join a gang for social reasons or to reap the benefits of gang protection.
       Therefore, his facial challenge fails. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36 (noting a
       facial challenge requires showing the statute is unconstitutional under any set of
       facts).

¶ 50       Petitioner’s facial challenge fails for a second reason. Petitioner’s argument
       focuses on the first definition of a streetgang member—one who is actually and in
       fact belongs to a gang. 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2010). Petitioner acknowledges the
       second definition of a streetgang member may, in some cases, fulfill the requisite
       actus reus for purposes of the eighth amendment. This acknowledgement ends
       petitioner’s facial constitutional challenge. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36.
       However, petitioner argues the statute is still facially unconstitutional because it
       does not generally require all gang members to have engaged in criminal gang-
       related conduct before their sentences are enhanced. Citing City of Los Angeles v.
       Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 418 (2015), petitioner argues this court can review this as a
       facial challenge because “only applications of the statute in which it actually
       authorizes or prohibits conduct” should be considered. We find Patel inapplicable.

¶ 51       Patel involved the facial constitutional challenge to a statute granting police
       officers access to hotel records on their guests without a warrant. Id. The petitioner
       argued the facial challenge failed because the warrantless searches authorized under
       the statute would never be unconstitutional in all applications. Id. at 417. In some
       situations, warrantless searches would be allowed by consent, exigent
       circumstances, and court-ordered warrants. Id. at 417-18. The United States
       Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting while the person raising a
       constitutional challenge had to establish a law is unconstitutional in all its
       applications, when assessing whether a statute meets this standard, courts consider
       only applications of the statute in which it actually authorizes or prohibits conduct.
       Id. at 418. In situations where there was consent to search, exigent circumstances,
       or court-ordered warrants, the statute was not implicated. Id. at 418-19. As a result,
       these exceptions to the statute were irrelevant because they did not involve actual
       applications of the statute. Id. at 419.

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¶ 52       This is not the situation we have in the present case. Here, section 24-1.8(a)(1)
       plainly applies to both definitions of a streetgang member provided under the Act
       (740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2010)). The second definition is not an exception to
       section 24-1.8(a)(1). The application of the second definition to section 24-
       1.8(a)(1) is therefore relevant to a determination of whether the statute is
       constitutional. To sustain his facial constitutional challenge, petitioner must show
       section 24-1.8(a)(1) is unconstitutional when applied to both definitions of a
       streetgang member. Since he acknowledges there may be situations where the
       statute may be constitutionally applied to the second definition, his facial challenge
       fails.

¶ 53                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 54       For the foregoing reasons, we find section 24-1.8(a)(1) is facially constitutional
       under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. We
       therefore affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed petitioner’s
       conviction and sentence.

¶ 55      Affirmed.

¶ 56      JUSTICES CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN took no part in the
       consideration or decision of this case.

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