Court Opinion

ID: 9744311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:00:13.788805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.469025
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that the facts in this case do not meet the standard of Jones with respect to compliance with section 19(f)(1). It is important to restate the majority finding as to the record of the proceedings from the date Boise received the Commission’s decision on January 23, 1997: “A written request for issuance of summons, with a return date of April 7, 1997, and the related documentation necessary to perfect the appeal, including the appeal bond and proof of payment of the probable cost of the record, were sent via Federal Express on February 11, 1997, and received by the circuit clerk on February 13, 1997.” 314 Ill. App. 3d at 168. The majority states that Boise did everything that was required to perfect its appeal. Although Kavonius argues that Boise failed to file proof of payment of the cost of the record, this is simply not true. Proof of payment of the cost of the record was shown. I agree with the majority’s citations to Bess, Beasley, Deichmueller, Berryman, and Illinois Armored Car concerning compliance with section 19(f)(1). The majority later states that “the record does not demonstrate that Boise complied with the material provisions of the statute within the 20-day time frame.” 314 Ill. App. 3d at 170. I suggest the record does show compliance and, more importantly, the majority finds that “the related documentation necessary to perfect the appeal” was timely received by the circuit clerk (314 Ill. App. 3d at 168). As in Jones, all of the required documents were received by the clerk within the 20-day time frame. The supreme court in Jones, in response to the respondent’s argument, found its decisions in Arrington v. Industrial Comm’n, 96 Ill. 2d 505, 451 N.E.2d 866 (1983), Wabash Area Development, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 88 Ill. 2d 392, 430 N.E.2d 1002 (1981), and Bemis Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 97 Ill. 2d 237, 454 N.E.2d 319 (1983), to be inapposite. With respect to the above cases, the court stated: “None of the holdings of the decisions cited by respondent address the precise legal question presented in the case at bar. Nor do these decisions involve a factual situation where, like here, the petitioner filed the request for summons within the statutory 20-day period, and exhibited proof of payment to the clerk of the court in the form required by the statute within the 20-day period.” Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 327, 721 N.E.2d at 570. The question in this case is, where the party seeking review sends all the required documents and materials to the clerk of the court, is the failure of the clerk to file all the documents a failure on the part of the appealing party to timely seek review? That Boise did nothing for some five months after it properly filed the necessary documentation does not mean Boise did not comply with the material provisions of the statute. Section 19(f)(1) strictures were complied with and, pursuant to Jones, this court should not dismiss for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. RAKOWSKI, J., joins in this dissent.