Court Opinion

ID: 9695418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:19:08.863652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:12.191522
License: Public Domain

HOMEYER, J.
(dissenting). Petitioner as plaintiff in the divorce action in Pennington County was awarded custody of the minor children. This decree has not been vacated or modified. Petitioner's custodial rights are not absolute and the divorce court has the power "at any time" to change provisions in its decree pertaining to children of the marriage. SDC 14.0724. Minor children in divorce proceedings are and continue to be wards, of the court. Houghton v. Houghton, 37 S.D. 184, 157 N.W. 316. The divorce court retains continuing jurisdiction over them, Matthews v. Matthews, 71 S.D. 115, 22 N.W.2d 27; 17A Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 815, and this jurisdiction cannot be impaired or defeated by guardianship proceedings in another court initiated by either parents or by third parties with or without the consent or approval of the parents. See State ex rel. Gravelle v. Rensch, 230 Minn. 160, 40 N.W.2d 881; State ex rel. Burris v. Hiller, 258 Minn. 491, 104 N.W.2d 851.
Habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy and historically its aim is to assure a swift determination of an alleged illegal restraint. The only proper question before the Circuit Court of Meade County was the legality of the restraint of said minor children by their maternal grandparents who were not involved in the divorce action. It had no authority to inquire into the custodial fitness of petitioner or to determine the question of the welfare and best interests of the children. Those matters were and are exclusively for determination by the Circuit Court of Pennington County. However, the Meade County Circuit Court had a limited jurisdiction by habeas corpus to aid the jurisdiction of the divorce court in enforcing and giving effect to its decree, although it lacked jurisdiction to interfere with or supersede such decree. Ex parte Quinn, 192 Or. 254, 233 P.2d *339767. The petition for habeas corpus alleged an illegal detention and restraint by the maternal grandparents. When upon the hearing it became apparent that petitioner was entitled to custody of her minor children under the decree of the divorce court, it was the duty of the trial judge to sustain the writ and order custody of the minor children restored to petitioner. If the maternal grandparents sought a change of custody, they were required to proceed in the divorce court. If circumstances warrant and upon proper showing, either the habeas corpus court or the divorce court would have inherent power to enter temporary orders protecting the children and the rights of other interested parties pending a hearing on the merits in the divorce court.
To permit courts other than the court granting the divorce to decide questions involving custody of children of divorced parents would create unwarranted confusion and cause unnecessary delay. Previous decrees granting custody would become emasculated of their effectiveness and well considered judgments based on voluminous evidence and personal obser-v vations would be a mockery. Custodial litigation could be unduly prolonged, expensive, and indecisive, with the children as the innocent and hapless victims of uncertainty engendered by failure of interested parties and their counsel to know in which court to proceed.
Except for the limited purpose defined herein, when in my opinion habeas corpus in another court is proper, I would deny any court other than the divorce court jurisdiction to litigate rights to custody of children of divorced parents.
I am authorized to say that Judge HANSON concurs in this dissent.