Court Opinion

ID: 9865292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:30:42.691625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:22.137400
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hilliard,
concurring in the order for reversal of the judgment, but dissenting, nevertheless, from a portion of the opinion.
While I shall not pause to review the point extendedly, I regard the conclusion of the court to overrule McRae v. People, 101 Colo. 155, 71 P. (2d) 1042, as retrogressive. The doctrine of that case, I believe, was *260bottomed upon, and logically and properly deduced from, our earlier decisions, several of which we there cited and reviewed. Not only so, but, as the author of the majority opinion here concedes, the McRae opinion, while not in harmony with majority holdings in some jurisdictions, the court’s “count" accepted, does, nevertheless, enjoy support in others. In that connection, as my study convinces, the cases which appear to hold contrary to the McRae opinion, generally are distinguishable in that they are based on statutory enactments or on earlier court decisions in the several states of their origin, decisions that are contrary to our earlier pronouncements, and on which the McRae opinion rests. The overall question in the McRae case had to do, as does the point in investigation here, with the burden of proof. The effect of the instruction there, and here, required defendant to sustain the burden of showing that the homicide involved was the result of an accident or misadventure, in support of which there was evidence in both cases. Our theory in the McRae case, and I still think it announced a sound and wholesome rule of procedure, was that “It is not incumbent upon the defendant in a criminal case, either by his own evidence or that of the people, or both combined, to prove anything to the satisfaction of the jury. It is sufficient * * * if the defendant, by any evidence in the case, succeeds in raising a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury of the truth of any essential element of the charge made against him.” Zipperian v. People, 33 Colo. 134, 79 Pac. 1018. “The defense that the homicide was accidental is not considered as an affirmative defense, but as a denial of criminal intent, placing the burden of proving such intent on the prosecution.” 40 C.J.S., Homicide, p. 1097, §196. For exhaustive discussion, see, State v. Hazlet, 16 N.D. 426, 113 N.W. 374. “The defense that the killing was accidental is not of the affirmative type which threw upon defendant the burden of proving it, either by preponderance of evidence or otherwise; such a de*261fense, instead of admitting the intentional act charged in the indictment, directly challenges and controverts it.” Commonwealth v. Kluska, 333 Pa. 65, 3 A. (2d) 398.
I think the inquiry should have been resolved-in the light of the McRae case, and the judgment reversed on the authority thereof; but, since the court has concluded otherwise in relation to that case, Í record my dissent to that portion of the opinion. For the reasons stated in the closing portion thereof, however, I concur in the order reversing the judgment below, and for a new trial.