Court Opinion

ID: 9773451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:46:21.449195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:53.962359
License: Public Domain

Pigott, J. (dissenting).
It is undisputed that “control is the test which measures generally the responsibility in tort of the owner of real property” (Ritto v Goldberg, 27 NY2d 887, 889 [1970]). As we explained in Ritto, a landowner who relinquishes control of a premises may nonetheless be held liable for injuries that occur thereon if the landowner or its employees engage in a “course of conduct” from which a jury could infer that the landowner intervened in the operation of the premises to the point that it induced reliance by those utilizing it (id.). In my view, plaintiff simply failed to produce any evidence to establish that the County of Monroe, through its employees’ conduct, so intervened in how the recycling center was run that it induced reliance on the part of Metro Waste and its employees to the point where the County should be held liable for the alleged improper stacking of the bales by Metro Waste employees.*
The comprehensive operations and maintenance agreement between the County and Metro Waste evidenced that the County *383relinquished control over the operations of the recycling center to Metro Waste. The agreement identifies Metro Waste as “an independent contractor” that “shall have complete charge of and responsibility for the [recycling facility and its site], its subcontractors, materialmen, materials, equipment and personnel engaged in the performance of its work.” Not only that, the agreement requires Metro Waste to “perform its work in accordance with its own methods and have complete responsibility to direct and control its performance under the Agreement, subject to the limited review authority of the County as set forth in the Agreement” (emphasis supplied).
Metro Waste’s obligations with regard to safety of its employees are just as comprehensive as its obligations to run the recycling center, if not more so: Metro Waste was obligated to “maintain the safety of the [recycling center] at a level consistent with Applicable Law and normal industrial and solid waste management practices” and, most importantly here, “at its cost and expense,” it agreed to
“take all reasonable precautions for the safety of, and provide all reasonable protection to prevent damage, injury or loss by reason of or related to the operation of the [recycling center] to . . . all employees working at the [recycling center] and all other persons who may be involved with the operation or maintenance of the [recycling center].”
The aforementioned provisions are significant because the County and Metro Waste agreed that Metro Waste was in “complete charge” of the recycling center, had “complete responsibility to direct and control its performance,” and that it was Metro Waste’s duty to “provide all reasonable protection” to its employees. Moreover, according to the agreement, the recyclable materials were to be “properly stored prior to removal and transfer” and it was Metro Waste’s responsibility to “expeditiously remedy any nuisance conditions.” Therefore, given the comprehensive terms of this agreement, the only way the County could be found to have owed a duty to plaintiff is if it so intervened in the affairs of the recycling center that it induced reliance on the part of Metro Waste and/or plaintiff.
Plaintiff seeks to hold the County liable for allowing an “unsafe, insecure, unstable and dangerous condition” to be present at the recycling center, namely, the improperly placed and stacked bale that struck plaintiff. But there is no evidence in *384this record that the County’s employees affirmatively directed Metro Waste or its employees as to how the bales should have been stacked. The majority makes much of the fact that “Rutkowski . . . testified that he had previously seen bales stacked nine feet high outside of the designated storage area, but did not know they presented an OSHA violation” (majority op at 378), but this underscores the point that the County, pursuant to the agreement, was not charged with controlling how Metro Waste operated the recycling center. It also demonstrates that the County did not intervene in directing how the bales were stacked and, therefore, it could not be said that the County induced reliance on the part of Metro Waste or plaintiff through its conduct. Indeed, plaintiff testified that he was unaware of any instance where the County told Metro Waste employees where or how to stack the bales, and Metro Waste’s general manager at the recycling center testified that it was Metro Waste’s responsibility alone to determine how and where bales were stacked.
The mere fact that Rutkowski himself allegedly believed that he had oversight authority over maintenance and safety issues, as the majority states (majority op at 378), is irrelevant. Given the comprehensive nature of the agreement, it is Rutkowski’s conduct that is relevant, not what Rutkowski believed. Plaintiff produced no evidence that would permit a jury to infer that the County controlled Metro Waste’s operations as to how the bales were to be stacked and stored. In fact, the evidence indicates otherwise. Unlike the situation in Ritto—where the landowner’s employees routinely reported malfunctions in the business tenant’s washing machines to both the repair service and the business tenant, intervening in the operation of the business to the point where a jury could infer that the residential tenants may have been induced to rely on the landlord’s reports of washing machine malfunctions—there is no evidence that any of the County’s conduct could have induced reliance on the part of plaintiff that the County was in charge of how the bales were to be stacked.
How the majority can conclude that there is a question of fact over whether the County assumed control over the safety operations based on the testimony that Rutkowski complained about litter and cleanliness on occasion or would advise Metro Waste management if he observed an employee not wearing a hard hat is beyond me. None of that evidence raises a question of fact vis-a-vis the County’s control over the recycling center’s *385operations or, more specifically, how the bales were stacked. Therefore, I would affirm the order of the Appellate Division.
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Graffeo and Jones concur with Judge Ciparick; Judge Pigott dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Judges Read and Smith concur.
Order reversed, etc.

 The majority does not dispute that the County met its initial burden establishing its entitlement to summary judgment.