Court Opinion

ID: 9781624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:55:45.811039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:16.668051
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Judge
(dissenting):
¶ 12 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that this ease presents merely a level two stop of reasonable scope and duration.
¶ 13 First and foremost, I believe that Trooper Wright made a de facto arrest of Worwood when he took physical custody of Worwood and transported him from the canyon where the initial encounter occurred to Wright’s private residence. As a level three encounter, this arrest was illegal because it was not supported by probable cause. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 36, 63 P.3d 650 (“A level three encounter involves an arrest, which has been characterized as a highly intrusive or lengthy detention that requires probable cause.” (alterations omitted) (quotations and citations omitted)). However, even if Wright’s actions created only a level two encounter, Worwood’s detention was unreasonable in both its scope and its duration. See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ¶ 10, 998 P.2d 274 (“[A level two] ‘detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop[.]’” (citation omitted)). Wright’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment under either analysis, and I would suppress all evidence obtained as a result of those actions.
¶ 14 The only competent evidence of the events surrounding Worwood’s encounter with Wright was Wright’s testimony at the suppression hearing.1 Wright testified that he took Worwood into custody after observing his bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Rather than perform field sobriety tests on Worwood at the scene, however, Wright transported him in Wright’s private vehicle out of the canyon, onto the state highway, and to Wright’s private residence2 in Levan, Utah, a distance of “about a mile and a half.” Wright testified that he believed that Wor-wood knew he was a law enforcement officer. Wright entrusted Worwood’s vehicle to Wright’s passenger, and the passenger drove the vehicle to a local dairy to call for assistance, and then to Wright’s residence.
¶ 15 These actions represent a significant seizure of Worwood and his vehicle, and any reasonable person in Worwood’s position would have interpreted these actions as an arrest. Accordingly, I would hold that Wright effected a level three arrest as soon as Worwood became aware that he was in police custody, that his vehicle had been seized, and that he was going to be transported a significant distance for the purpose of being handed off to another officer. See State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 674 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (Orme, J., dissenting) (“The accepted rule is that what might have otherwise been a level-two stop evolves into a level-three de facto arrest when, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable, innocent person in the suspect’s place would believe himself to be under arrest.”); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (characterizing the relevant inquiry as whether the suspect believed he was being detained). I would also hold that Wright’s observations of Wor-wood provided only a reasonable suspicion that Worwood was driving while intoxicated, but not the level of probable cause required to make an arrest.3
*1270¶ 16 Wright’s reasonable suspicion clearly justified some detention of Worwood for further investigation. However, Wright exceeded the permissible scope and duration of that detention when he transported Worwood to his home for performance of field sobriety tests that could just as easily have been conducted at the initial scene. “Officers must diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly[.]” State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, ¶ 12, 107 P.3d 706 (quotations and citation omitted). Wright testified that he could have performed field sobriety tests at the scene of the initial encounter, but chose not to for the sole reason of personal convenience.4 The resulting increase in both the scope and the duration of Worwood’s detention were therefore unnecessary and exceeded the legal boundaries of an otherwise legitimate level two stop. See id. at ¶ 15 (“Investigative acts that are not reasonably related to dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for the stop are permissible only if they do not add to the delay already lawfully experienced and do not represent any further intrusion on [the detainee’s] rights.” (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)).
¶ 17 The majority suggests that Worwood’s transport was also justified by Wright’s motive to obtain more accurate results from field sobriety tests. I find this unavailing, as field sobriety tests are routinely performed roadside in less than ideal conditions. Further, such a justification would permit the routine “relocation” of drunken driving suspects to a jail or police station where environmental factors such as light, sound, and footing could be controlled.
¶ 18 For these reasons,51 would hold that Wright’s actions constitute both a level three stop unsupported by probable cause, and an impermissible departure from the allowable scope and duration of a legitimate level two stop. Under either analysis, the challenged evidence must be suppressed and Worwood’s conviction reversed. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion.

. The trooper who formally arrested Worwood testified at the preliminary hearing, but he offered only hearsay testimony about the circumstances of Worwood’s initial detention and transport.

. The fact that Wright chose to transport Wor-wood to his private residence gives me additional concern. While it does not appear to have been a factor in this case, the transport of a lone detainee to a private residence, in an unmarked car by an off-duty officer, could present significant cause for alarm to the detainee, particularly if it occurred at night. If the officer was an imposter, discomfort could escalate into grave danger. I do not believe that this is the sort of scenario that we wish to encourage by excusing Wright’s actions in this case.

.Wright testified that the only evidence of Wor-wood's intoxication at the time of his initial detention was his bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. He testified that he only smelled alcohol on Worwood once he and Worwood were inside *1270Wright's vehicle. Accordingly, Worwood's arrest preceded Wright’s observation of the smell of alcohol, and that evidence cannot be used to bolster the legality of Worwood’s initial arrest. Even taking the smell of alcohol into account, however, I believe that Wright could only objectively be said to have had a reasonable suspicion of Worwood's intoxication.

. Wright, being off duty, did not want to "mess[] up [his] night” by incurring the responsibility for Worwood's potential arrest and its accompanying paperwork. Instead, he wanted to hand off the situation to a fellow officer. While I find this motivation understandable, Wright, having chosen to exercise the power of the State to investigate Worwood despite his off-duty status, owed Worwood the full complement of constitutional rights. I do not believe that those rights permit the scope or duration of a level two stop to be extended on the basis of an officer's desire to avoid the responsibility of otherwise necessaiy paperwork.

. I believe reversal is warranted solely on the basis of violations of Worwood’s Fourth Amendment rights. However, I cannot help looking beyond the immediate case and seeing in the majority opinion a green light for the routine transport of drunken driving suspects on the flimsiest of excuses. In my opinion, today's result opens the door for all manners of avoidance of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. For example, the resulting ability to make an inventory search of a suspect's vehicle will provide a strong incentive for law enforcement to "smell alcohol” and transport the suspect and his vehicle, allowing them to make an otherwise impermissible search of the vehicle for contraband.