Court Opinion

ID: 9897430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:27.886648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.730494
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Apr 11 2023, 9:25 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michelle C. Harter                                          INDIANA ELECTION
Lekse Harter, LLC                                           COMMISSION
Greenwood, Indiana                 Theodore E. Rokita
ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE LIBERTY Attorney General of Indiana
DEFENSE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE Frances Barrow
                                                            Deputy Attorney General
Meghan C. Carver
Greenfield, Indiana                                         Melinda R. Holmes
                                                            Deputy Attorney General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                            ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE DANIEL
                                                            HOLTZ
                                                            Andrew M. Hicks
                                                            Warrick & Boyn, LLP
                                                            Elkhart, Indiana

                                             IN THE
     COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Amy Rainey,                                                 April 11, 2023
Appellant-Petitioner,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-PL-1548
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                            Court
Indiana Election Commission,                                The Honorable Gary L. Miller,
Daniel Holtz,                                               Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
Appellees-Respondents
                                                            49D03-2203-PL-7383

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1548 | April 11, 2023                            Page 1 of 7
                                      Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
                                     Judges Bradford and Pyle concur.

      Kenworthy, Judge.

[1]   Last year, Amy Rainey tried to run for public office, seeking candidacy as a

      Republican candidate in the May 2022 primary election. Daniel Holtz—the

      local party chair—challenged her candidacy, alleging Rainey was not affiliated

      with the party in the way Indiana Code Section 3-8-2-7 requires. In February,

      the Indiana Election Commission upheld the challenge. At that point, there

      was only one way Rainey could appear on the May ballot: Rainey had to seek

      judicial review of the Commission’s decision, starting at the trial court level.

[2]   In March, Rainey filed for judicial review. And with the primary approaching,

      Rainey also sought preliminary relief, asking the trial court for a preliminary

      injunction and an emergency stay of the Commission’s decision. The trial

      court held a hearing on those requests. On March 31—one month before the

      primary—the court issued an interlocutory order denying preliminary relief.

[3]   At that point, Rainey did not pursue an interlocutory appeal. Put differently,

      she did not immediately seek an appellate decision about granting preliminary

      relief. Because of the status quo, Rainey did not appear on the primary ballot.

[4]   After the election, the trial court held a hearing on Rainey’s claims. Those

      claims were: (1) The Commission made a mistake in upholding the challenge;

      (2) The Commission deprived Rainey of due process; and (3) Indiana Code

      Section 3-8-2-7(a)(4) (the “Affiliation Statute”)—the law underlying the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1548 | April 11, 2023         Page 2 of 7
      candidacy challenge—violated the United States Constitution and the Indiana

      Constitution. In June, the trial court issued a final order denying Rainey relief.

[5]   Rainey now appeals for the first time, even though she could have pursued an

      interlocutory appeal before the primary election. Rainey had the right to an

      interlocutory appeal because the court refused Rainey’s request to “grant . . . a

      preliminary injunction[.]” Ind. Appellate Rule 14(A)(5). Even if Rainey could

      not pursue an interlocutory appeal as of right, any litigant may pursue a

      discretionary interlocutory appeal under Appellate Rule 14(B). Moreover, the

      Appellate Rules accommodate urgency, creating procedures for shortened

      briefing deadlines in an interlocutory appeal, see App. R. 14(G)(2), as well as

      procedures for an emergency stay of the underlying decision, see App R. 39(D).

[6]   Was Rainey required to pursue an interlocutory appeal? No. See, e.g., Bojrab v.

      Bojrab, 810 N.E.2d 1008, 1014 (Ind. 2004) (“A claimed error in an interlocutory

      order is not waived for failure to take an interlocutory appeal but may be raised

      on appeal from the final judgment.”). 1 May Rainey appeal now? Absolutely.

      See Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6 (providing “in all cases an absolute right to one

      appeal”); id. art. 1, § 12 (specifying “[a]ll courts shall be open” and guaranteeing

      a “remedy by due course of law”); see also, e.g., Bojrab, 810 N.E.2d at 1014.

      1
       Sometimes an order “[i]ssued by an Administrative Agency” is “by statute . . . expressly required to be
      appealed as a mandatory interlocutory appeal.” App. R. 14(A)(9). We discern no such requirement here.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1548 | April 11, 2023                              Page 3 of 7
[7]   Yet by waiting for the election to pass, Rainey changed the nature of her case.

      That is, before the election, it was possible for Rainey to appear on the ballot.

      But after the election, no court could turn back the clock. Therefore, regardless

      of the outcome—indeed, even if Rainey prevailed—a judicial opinion would

      not change the legal relationship between Rainey and the defendants (Holtz and

      the Commission). There was no longer a concrete controversy between them.

[8]   In short, after the election, no court could render “effective relief . . . to the

      parties[.]” In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991). Therefore, the case

      became moot. See State ex rel. Pruitt v. Lake Cir. Ct., 201 N.E.2d 332, 333 (Ind.

      1964) (determining a case involving a similar timeline had become moot where

      “the primary election . . . had passed before th[e] case could be put at

      issue . . . and decided”); see also Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 37 (noting a case is

      moot “[w]hen the concrete controversy at issue in a case ‘has been ended or

      settled, or in some manner disposed of, so as to render it unnecessary to decide

      the question involved’” (quoting Dunn v. State, 71 N.E. 890, 891 (Ind. 1904))).

[9]   When a case is moot, a court typically dismisses. Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d

      599, 603 (Ind. 2009). That is because, without a concrete controversy, any

      judicial opinion is, “for all practical purposes,” an advisory opinion. I.J. v.

      State, 178 N.E.3d 798, 799 (Ind. 2022) (per curiam) (quoting Mosley, 178

      N.E.3d at 603). We generally “do not provide advisory opinions,” Hill v. State,

      592 N.E.2d 1229, 1230 (Ind. 1992), and instead focus on resolving live cases

      and controversies, see Mosley, 908 N.E.2d at 603. We avoid issuing advisory

      opinions because the Indiana Constitution calls for separation of powers. See

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1548 | April 11, 2023             Page 4 of 7
       Ind. Const. art. 3, § 1 (creating “three separate departments”—“the Legislative,

       the Executive including the Administrative, and the Judicial”—and specifying

       “no person, charged with official duties under one of these departments, shall

       exercise any of the functions of another, except as . . . expressly provided”).

[10]   As to separation of powers, even if a case is not moot (i.e., ripe), “it is a cardinal

       principle of the judicial function that we will pass upon the constitutionality of a

       coordinate branch’s action only when it is absolutely necessary[.]” Snyder v.

       King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 786 (Ind. 2011) (emphasis omitted). This doctrine of

       strict necessity flows from “the unique place and character, in our scheme, of

       judicial review of governmental action for constitutionality.” Id. (quoting

       Citizens Nat’l Bank of Evansville v. Foster, 668 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (Ind. 1996)).

[11]   Still, we may address the merits of a moot case under limited circumstances.

       See, e.g., E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466

       (Ind. 2022) (per curiam). That is, Indiana courts “have discretion to decide

       moot cases that present questions of great public importance likely to recur.”

       Id. at 465. Although the exception is narrow, this discretion is “broad.” Id. at

       466. In short, if justice requires an opinion, we have the discretion to issue one.

[12]   The Indiana Supreme Court recently addressed the merits in a consolidated

       appeal involving citizens involuntarily committed to mental health institutions.

       See T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039 (2019) (per

       curiam). In each case, the commitment order had expired. See id. at 1040–41.

       Even though the cases were moot because of the timeline, the Court applied the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1548 | April 11, 2023           Page 5 of 7
       public-interest exception and addressed the merits. See id. at 1042–44. The

       Court later discussed the function of the public-interest exception in that

       context, explaining: “[A]ppellate courts are not required to issue an opinion in

       every moot temporary commitment appeal, but they may readily do so to

       address novel issues or close calls, or to build the instructive body of law to help

       trial courts make these urgent and difficult decisions.” E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 466.

[13]   Turning to the case at hand, the parties briefed the mootness issue. We also

       held oral argument, where we explored mootness and the propriety of applying

       the public-interest exception. 2 As to the public-interest exception, the parties

       identified competing interests, highlighting tensions among (1) a candidate’s

       interest in reaching the ballot, (2) a voter’s interest in meaningful choice at the

       ballot, and (3) a political party’s interest in self-regulation. Rainey also asserted

       the parties—and the public—could benefit from our guidance on the claims.

[14]   Without a doubt, this case involves vital public interests. At the same time,

       unlike cases involving temporary civil commitments, candidacy challenges do

       not involve the immediate deprivation of personal liberty. And a challenge

       under the Affiliation Statute—directed toward Rainey or any other prospective

       candidate—is generally less likely to recur than a matter involving legal

       intervention to support a person with a mental-health condition. See, e.g., id. at

       465–67 (discussing a series of cases involving temporary commitment orders).

       2
         We thank those in attendance, who respectfully observed the oral argument, and we commend counsel for
       the skilled oral advocacy. We also thank amicus—Liberty Defense PAC—for helpful briefing in this matter.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1548 | April 11, 2023                            Page 6 of 7
       Moreover, it is not as though this case involves a straightforward challenge

       under the Affiliation Statute. Rather, there was a mismatch between Rainey’s

       basis for party affiliation and the allegations Holtz made on his challenge form.

       This sort of mismatch seems even less likely to recur. Further, we acknowledge

       Rainey’s assertion that an advisory opinion would provide useful guidance

       regarding the constitutionality of the Affiliation Statute and, among other

       things, the proper course and scope of administrative proceedings. That said,

       the public would benefit from an advisory opinion in many kinds of cases.

       Even so, we must remain mindful of the judicial function, respecting

       constitutional boundaries calling for restraint. Finally, and even more to the

       point, we cannot ignore that Rainey could have appealed before the election.

       Indeed, she had the chance for a timely and effective judicial opinion.

[15]   All in all, under the circumstances, we dismiss the case as moot. Cf. Pruitt, 201

       N.E.2d at 333 (dismissing as moot where the case involved exclusion from the

       ballot and the election had passed); I.J., 178 N.E.3d at 799 (granting transfer,

       vacating an advisory opinion from this Court, and dismissing the case as moot).

[16]   Dismissed.

       Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1548 | April 11, 2023        Page 7 of 7