Court Opinion

ID: 9746273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:10:20.929937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:11.344299
License: Public Domain

STEVENS, Judge,
dissenting:
The Majority, after careful consideration, finds that “manifest necessity” did not exist to justify the trial coürt’s declaration of a mistrial, and reverses the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the criminal information against him and further orders that defendant be discharged on the basis that defendant’s reprosecution would violate the principles of double jeopardy. I respectfully dissent.
In the instant case, I would affirm the trial court on the basis that there was “manifest necessity” for the declaration of a mistrial.
There is no question, as the Majority correctly notes, that whether the Commonwealth can pursue a new trial against a defendant after a mistrial has been declared without the defendant’s request or consent depends upon the existence of a “manifest necessity” of a mistrial. Commonwealth v. Diehl, 532 Pa. 214, 216, 615 A.2d 690, 691 (1992).
In the instant case, it would facilitate appellate review had the trial court made a more detailed record as to the court’s considerations of options less drastic than a mistrial. However, in the context of the case before the trial court, I find that the trial judge did consider alternatives to a mistrial and rejected same.
The trial judge, not the appellate court, is in a position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the emotional context of testimony before the jury, the tenor of counsel during questioning, and the over-all atmosphere in the courtroom at the time of trial. I do not agree with the majority opinion requirement that a trial court must direct counsel to rephrase a question prior to the trial court making a determination that there is need for a mistrial. Majority Opinion pg. 1139. Here, the question posed by defense counsel, “Do you hang out in the bar called The Village?” was, as the trial court stated, “... too prejudicial for me to permit it to go on ...” (N.T. 2/4/97 pp. 41, 45). It is obvious that the trial court thus found the question so prejudicial that it would have been futile to direct counsel to rephrase the question.
*1141Moreover, defense counsel failed to object.1 Rather, defense counsel merely said “So what do we do, come back next month?” (N.T. 2/4/97 p. 45). Again, in the context of the within matter, it is obvious that defense counsel did not question the trial court’s conclusion that there was “manifest necessity” for the declaration of a mistrial. I would take such a factor into consideration in reviewing whether or not there was “manifest necessity” while acknowledging that “mere acquiescence to the sua sponte grant of a mistrial by the trial judge is not sufficient to waive his double jeopardy claims ... Commonwealth v. McCord, 700 A.2d 938, 942 (Pa.Super.1997).
A fair reading of the record in the instant case supports the conclusion that the trial judge did consider other options and rejected same. Therefore, his finding of “manifest necessity” was proper, and I would affirm the decision of the trial court.

. The majority relies heavily on Commonwealth v. Balog, 395 Pa.Super. 158, 576 A.2d 1092 (1990). But in that case, there were specific objections by defense counsel to the grant of a mistrial.