Court Opinion

ID: 9744758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:15:20.330036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:51.431525
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting: My disagreement with the majority of my colleagues does not stem from a belief that, measured by the standards of today’s enhanced public concern with the conservation of natural resources and their preservation for public use, the legislation authorizing conveyance of this submerged land is desirable. Rather, my expression of disagreement is prompted by my belief that the question of the validity of Senate Bill 782 is not now open to consideration. More than 10 years ago the then Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General opposed a taxpayer’s suit and urged this court to affirm a trial court judgment which held Senate Bill 782 valid. This court did so. (Droste v. Kerner (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 495.) The ordinary res judicata effect of that decision is said not to operate here because that portion of the opinion dealing with the validity of Senate Bill 782 was dicta, and the present court is therefore free to reexamine that question in the light of today’s standards which militate considerably more strongly against validity. I would concede that the reasons for applying the doctrine of res judicata here may be somewhat less compelling in that the object of Senate Bill 782 — the conveyance of the submerged land to United States Steel — has not occurred and, for that matter, may never occur since the conveyance to United States Steel was conditioned upon reconveyance by the Chicago Park District to the State of the District’s interest in this land, and the Park District has not reconveyed. (In fact, the District’s trial court position in the present litigation, in addition to asserting the Attorney General had no standing to bring this action, was that the State was attempting to convey lands which the District owned.) But the Droste court passed on the validity of Senate Bill 782, since it was only the question whether that legislation violated the Constitution which supported this court’s appellate jurisdiction. While, in view of the fact that no conveyance has occurred, perhaps no substantial changes of position have been made in reliance thereon, I do not view the uncompleted conveyance as justification for what seems to me to be a disregard for the finality and stability of judicial decisions. We simply do not know, for example, whether alternatives which might have been successfully pursued 10 years ago are now available to the prospective purchaser. And, it is also apparent from this record that numerous other conveyances of State-owned lands, including submerged Lake Michigan land, have been made in years past to private grantees, among them other steel companies. While the doctrine of laches probably bars a current challenge fo the validity of the legislation authorizing those conveyances, it is unsettling to think that, if a way could be found to question their validity, they would be scrutinized in the light of present-day concerns. I concur with the court’s statements regarding the desirability and efficacy of the public trust doctrine. Measured by the standards that existed when Droste was decided, however, I could not then and cannot now conclude the legislation violated this doctrine. The South Work’s Plant was and is a major employer with a multi-million-dollar payroll and of undeniable benefit to the Chicago and Illinois economies. Nearly a century old, yet the largest steel-producing plant in Illinois, there was shown to be some doubt whether the plant could remain competitive without significant expansion. Affidavits of reputable experts disagreed concerning the feasibility of landward expansion onto noncontiguous sites. Experts also disagreed whether the proposed industrial development of this presently submerged parcel was compatible with existing and anticipated surrounding land uses. There is little, if any, dispute that, because of the existence of the United States government breakwater to the south of the parcel, the proposed development would not disrupt navigation into Calumet Harbor. Rather, the principal controversy concerns recreational opportunities to which the submerged land area might be put. It is clear, however, that the area immediately south of 79th street is zoned for industrial use. It is also clear the only land access to the submerged property, when filled, would be across the present South Work’s site. Despite this, some of plaintiffs’ experts suggested that the highest and best use of the parcel is recreational, as an adjunct to Rainbow Park to the north. Other experts worried that the development would be environmentally or ecologically harmful. However, the proposed reclamation must meet strict permit requirements of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, and further development would have to comply with all pertinent zoning and pollution requirements of Federal, State and local agencies, safeguards which would seem sufficient public protection. I am also satisfied that the cost to United States Steel of this parcel is not, as in the opinion of one affiant, “patently preposterous.” Estimates of the cost to merely bulkhead and fill the site ranged from $107,000 to $162,000 per acre. The estimated assessed valuation in 1975 of the resulting property, filled and appropriately zoned, ranged from $28,300 to $180,000 per acre. And these estimates apparently included no reference to any expenditures which might be required to secure from the Park District a conveyance of its claimed interest in the site. One of plaintiffs’ experts, at the end of a lengthy affidavit filed in 1975, concluded: “Although one cannot dispute that the State of Illinois has a valid interest and role in aiding commerce in general, and possibly the United States Steel Corporation South Works in particular, the questions of whether the proposed action would ‘create no impairment of the public interest’ and whether the 194.6 acre site is otherwise ‘useless and unproductive’ are not clearly settled.” (Affidavit of Robert B. Teska, at 22.) I agree these questions were not, are not and may never be “clearly settled.” The General Assembly considered those questions in 1963, however, and concluded that, on balance, the conveyance was in the public interest. I could not say in 1966, and cannot now say, that determination was clearly erroneous. RYAN and CREES, JJ., join in this dissent.