Court Opinion

ID: 9587433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:22:03.29378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:58.853400
License: Public Domain

Nichols, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The corollary principle that the majority should have applied is that although the former husband may waive his right to seek a reduction of periodic alimony payments *36to his former wife, he may not in his capacity as father waive the statutory right to seek reduction of periodic child support payments. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 235 Ga. 101 (218 SE2d 747) (1975). The case of Garcia v. Garcia, 232 Ga. 869 (209 SE2d 201) (1974) is not to the contrary, the issue having been whether or not the language of the settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decree waived rights. Anything in Steffner v. Steffner, 228 Ga. 189 (184 SE2d 575) (1971) contrary to what was said in Mitchell should have been expressly disapproved and overruled by the majority because Steffner was decided prior to Livsey v. Livsey, 229 Ga. 368 (191 SE2d 859) (1974), the case that put to rest the assumption stated in Grizzard v. Grizzard, 224 Ga. 42, 44 (159 SE2d 400) (1968) that rights of the minor child to revisions of child support payments could be waived.
The principle I would apply is supported by sound public policy considerations as well as by the decision of this court in Mitchell. A father is more apt to make his periodic child support payments if they reasonably are within his means. See Foote, Levy & Sander, Cases and Materials on Family Law (2d Ed. Little, Brown & Co.) p. 848. Accordingly, it is in the interest of the child that the statutory right of the child to revisions of periodic child support payments not be waived by his parents so as to preclude reductions.
I would hold as this court held in Mitchell that "neither the father nor the mother could waive any rights as affected child support.” I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Justices Hall and Bowles join in this dissent.