Court Opinion

ID: 9709971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:58:46.945853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:53.148167
License: Public Domain

*136ANDERSON, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. Absent a legislative pronouncement of public policy permitting a defendant to acquiesce to be tried by a jury greater than twelve, it is plain error to permit more than twelve jurors to deliberate.
An overriding principle is that the court of appeals is primarily an error-correcting court, State ex rel. Swan v. Elections Board, 133 Wis. 2d 87, 93, 394 N.W.2d 732, 735 (1986), and we are bound by the decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. State v. Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d 526, 533, 348 N.W.2d 159, 163 (1984). Even where we believe that a particular decision is incorrect, State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Shanks, 124 Wis. 2d 216, 221, 369 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Ct. App. 1985), and decisions from other jurisdictions are better reasoned, see Professional Office Buildings v. Royal Indemnity Co., 145 Wis. 2d 573, 580, 427 N.W.2d 427, 429-30 (Ct. App. 1988), we are prevented from changing existing law as announced by our supreme court. State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 253, 426 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Ct. App. 1988). I conclude that precedents from early statehood necessitate reversal of Ledger's conviction and remand for a new trial.1
*137Several decisions of our supreme court on criminal jury trial practice provide the basis for principles that bind this court. We are compelled to follow existing precedent even where, as in this case, there have been substantial changes in the law in the last 110 years, decisions from other jurisdictions are better reasoned, and the rights of Ledger were conscientiously protected by the trial court. I believe that prior decisions establish several binding principles.
First, under Wisconsin's Constitution, a defendant in a criminal action has a right to a twelve-person jury. Second, any change in the number of constitutionally mandated jurors is a question of public policy. Third, only the legislature is authorized to change public policy that deviates from the constitutional requirement of a twelve-person jury. Fourth, the legislature has explicitly permitted a defendant to agree to less than twelve jurors. Fifth, the legislature has explicitly not permitted more than twelve jurors because it requires that "additional jurors" be discharged before deliberations. These precedents lead me to conclude that the legislature has declared that it is the public policy of this state that no more than twelve jurors shall deliberate in a criminal action. Further, precedents prohibit a defendant from acquiescing to any variation from a constitutional jury of twelve unless authorized by the legislature.
I begin my analysis with the two provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution that secure the right of trial by jury to the citizens of this state. Article I, sec. 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides in part:
*138Trial by jury; verdict in civil cases. The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law.
Article I, sec. 7, provides in part:
Rights of accused. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right... in prosecutions by indictment, or information, to a speedy public tried by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed .. ..
It is well established that these two provisions secure separate and distinct rights. Wisconsin Constitution art. I, sec. 5 is limited to civil actions at law. See Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 74, 14 N.W. 912, 914-15 (1883). In criminal actions, Wisconsin Constitution art. I, sec. 7 secures to the defendant a right of trial by jury. Bennett, 57 Wis. at 75, 14 N.W. at 915. The obvious difference between these two constitutional provisions is that in civil actions a party has a constitutional right to waive a jury trial, while a criminal defendant does not have the equivalent right. If Wisconsin Constitution art. I, sec. 5 was applicable to criminal actions, there is no question that a criminal defendant could waive the right to a jury trial. Bennett, 57 Wis. at 74, 14 N.W. at 915.
However, the constitutional support for a jury trial in criminal actions is Wisconsin Constitution art. I, sec. 7; that provision's absolute guarantee of a jury trial has provided fodder for numerous appeals. The earliest Wisconsin case is State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403 (1877), where the question was whether a defendant could waive the right to trial by jury in favor of trial by the court. In reversing Lockwood's judgment of conviction entered *139after a court trial, the supreme court held that "[t]he right of trial by jury ... for crime, is secured by the constitution, upon a principle of public policy, and cannot be waived." Id. at 405.
Eight years later, the question before the court was whether a statute expressly permitting waiver of a jury trial in the Rock county municipal court was constitutional. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute the court held that the legislature had the power to permit a defendant to waive a jury and be tried by the court. In re Staff, 63 Wis. 285, 294, 23 N.W. 587, 590 (1885). In the opinion of our supreme court the right of a defendant to trial by a jury was a matter of public policy created by the legislature; the legislature was not prohibited from changing public policy as it saw fit.2 Id.
The next case to consider a variation of the twelve-person jury was Jennings v. State, 134 Wis. 307, 114 N.W. 492 (1908). In Jennings, one of the jurors failed to return for instructions and deliberations. Jennings then agreed that the eleven remaining jurors could decide the charges against him. In reversing his conviction our supreme court held that if a defendant in a criminal case cannot waive the right of trial by jury, the defendant cannot agree to be tried by less than twelve jurors. The court wrote, "If it is deemed good public policy to extend the privilege of waiving a jury in criminal cases, such policy should find expression in appropriate legislative action." Id. at 310, 114 N.W. at 493.
Our supreme court in State v. Smith, 184 Wis. 664, 200 N.W. 638 (1924), was again confronted with a defen*140dant's waiver of a jury trial. In 1911, the legislature, in response to Jennings, authorized a defendant to expressly agree to a trial by a jury of less than twelve. The court again held that a trial by other than a twelve-person jury was "more properly within the field of legislative than judicial declarations of public policy." Id. at 672, 200 N.W. at 641. The court commented that it appeared that the state constitutional right to a twelve-person jury trial was impregnable public policy and required legislative action to change that policy. See id. at 672-73, 200 N.W. at 641.
The foundation for these decisions is found not just in the absence of a right to waive a jury trial in Wisconsin Constitution art. I, sec. 7; it is also found in our supreme court's early recognition that "the jury mentioned in said section means a jury of twelve impartial men, — such a jury as was known to the common law and to the courts of the territory of Wisconsin before the state was organized." Bennett, 57 Wis. at 75, 14 N.W. at 915.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "the fact that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance 'except to mystics.' " Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970). In Williams, the Court concluded that the sixth amendment of the federal constitution does not require that a jury in criminal cases forever be composed of twelve people. Id. at 103. Williams establishes that the sixth amendment right to a jury trial is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment and supports the proposition that size of the jury is not of fundamental constitutional importance. See State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d 642, 645, 315 N.W.2d 369, 371 (Ct. App. 1981).
*141However, in Wisconsin we continue to recognize that the our state constitution guarantees a twelve-person jury. Id. Also, our supreme court continues to require that "jury trials in criminal cases cannot be waived absent statutory authorization." State ex rel. Sauk County Dist. Attorney v. Gollmar, 32 Wis. 2d 406, 410, 145 N.W.2d 670, 672 (1966).
The legislature has not authorized more than twelve jurors in criminal actions. Section 756.096(3), Stats., requires that " [a] jury in criminal cases shall consist of 12 persons unless both parties agree on a lesser number as provided in s. 972.02."
Section 972.02, Stats., governs criminal jury trials:
972.02 Jury trial; waiver. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, criminal cases shall be tried by a jury of 12, drawn as prescribed in ch. 805, unless the defendant waives a jury in writing or by statement in open court or under s. 967.08(2)(b), on the record, with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.
(2) At any time before verdict the parties may stipulate in writing or by statement in open court, on the record, with the approval of the court, that the jury shall consist of any number less than 12.
Section 972.04(1), Stats., provides that the twelve jurors shall be impaneled unless, under sec. 972.02(2), the court approves a stipulation for a smaller jury or the court orders that "additional jurors" be seated. However, the authorization for the court to seat "additional jurors" is not authorization for more than twelve to deliberate.3 The drawing of jurors and seating of "additional jurors" is dictated in sec. 805.08(2), Stats.:
*142A sufficient number of jurors shall be called in the action so that the number applicable under s. 756.096(3) (b) remains after the exercise of all peremptory challenges to which the parties are entitled under sub. (3). The court may order that additional jurors be impaneled. In that case, if the number of jurors remains more than required at the time of the final submission of the cause, the court shall determine by lot which jurors shall not participate in deliberations and discharge them. [Emphasis added.]
The legislature repeats the directive that "additional jurors" be discharged before deliberations in sec. 972.10(7), Stats.,
If additional jurors have been impaneled under s. 972.04(1) and the number remains more than required at final submission of the cause, the court shall determine by lot which jurors shall not participate in deliberations and discharge them. [Emphasis added.]
My analysis of precedent from the supreme court and current statutes sustains my opinion that the tried court erred in permitting thirteen jurors to deliberate. The trial court's variation of the constitutional jury of twelve was done without legislative authority. As Lockwood and Staff hold, Ledger's acquiescence to this variation of the constitutionally mandated twelve-person jury *143does not cure the error because the legislature has not explicitly declared that the public policy of this state permits a jury of more than twelve.
In support of the majority's holding that specific legislative authorization is not needed for Ledger to agree to the "greater . . . constitutional protection" of thirteen jurors, the majority declares that Ledger's chance of acquittal is better with thirteen jurors. The majority relies on four United States Supreme Court decisions to buttress this declaration. The majority quotes Williams, 399 U.S. at 101 & n.47: "[T]he 12-man jury [might] give[ ] a defendant a greater advantage since he has more 'chances' of finding a juror who will insist on acquittal and thus prevent conviction." (Majority opinion at 126.) However, the Williams Court continues by observing:
But the advantage might just as easily belong to the State, which also needs only one juror out of twelve insisting on guilt to prevent acquittal. What few experiments have occurred — usually in the civil area — indicate that there is no discernible difference between the results reached by the two different-sized juries. In short, neither currently available evidence, nor theory suggest that the 12-man jury is necessarily more advantageous to the defendant than a jury composed of fewer members.
Id. at 101-02 (footnotes omitted).
The Williams Court also commented, "[s]tudies of the operative factors contributing to small group deliberations and decisionmaking suggest that jurors in the minority on the first ballot are likely to be influenced by the proportional size of the majority aligned against them." Id. at 101 n.49.1 cannot reach a conclusion from this comment, but it does suggest that a lone dissenter *144on a thirteen-person jury is more likely to "cave in" to the other twelve than a lone dissenter on a twelve-person jury is to "cave in" to the other eleven.
A second decision the majority relies upon is Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). In Ballew, the Supreme Court held that a five-person jury substantially threatens constitutional guarantees. Writing the lead opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun carefully examined scholarly work on jury size spawned by the Williams decision. It is in the midst of Justice Blackmun's summary of studies on juries that the majority found the quote, " [sjtatistical studies suggest that the risk of convicting an innocent person ... rises as the size of the jury diminishes."4 (Majority opinion at 127.)
Justice Blackmun's summary of the scholarly work contains one project's conclusion that the optimal size of a jury is between six and eight. Id. at 234. The lead opinion in Ballew does not discuss any scholarly work on juries of more than twelve and does not reach a conclusion as to whether or not a jury of thirteen or more is beneficial or detrimental to a defendant. The only conclusion the Supreme Court reaches is "that the purpose and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a constitutional degree, by a reduction in size below six members." Id. at 239.
*145Finally, the majority relies upon Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972),5 and Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980),6 to support its conclusion that Ledger received greater protection from a thirteen-person jury. I distinguish those two cases because both were a challenge to Louisiana's nonunanimous jury verdict practice in criminal actions and not a challenge to the size of the jury.
I cannot accept the majority's logic that if smaller and smaller juries endanger a defendant then larger and larger juries protect the defendant. First, none of the United States Supreme Court decisions reaches this conclusion; in fact, in none of the cases was the Court asked to consider if a jury greater than twelve was constitutional. Second, none of the studies summarized in the opinions considered juries greater than twelve.

 I do not believe that the controlling precedent is well reasoned. If we were writing on a clean slate I would join the majority. Our supreme court first held that statutory authorization was required before a defendant could waive the right to a twelve-person jury trial in State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403 (1877). The wisdom of this holding was thoughtfully questioned in In re Staff, 63 Wis. 285, 293, 23 N.W. 590-91 (1885). However, the supreme court felt duty bound to follow the precedent of Lockwood despite believing the better decision would have been to permit a defendant to waive the right to a twelve-person jury without the authority of a statute. Along with the supreme court in Staff and the majority in this case, I recognize that a defendant may waive many rights secured by the constitution and it would be reasonable to include in that list the right to a twelve-person jury. *137Despite the attraction of a consistent policy on the waiver of constitutional rights, I believe that as an error-correcting court we cannot ignore precedent.

 The United States Supreme Court has also suggested that it is only the legislature that has the power to declare public policy and authorize a departure from the common law practice of a twelve-person jury. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970).

 The term "additional jurors" cannot be interpreted to mean that more than twelve jurors can deliberate. "Additional jurors" *142became part of the language of civil and criminal jury trial practice with the adoption of 1983 Wis. Act 226 which abolished the concept of "alternate jurors." The explanatory notes of the Judicial Council to this act make clear that the term was selected to do no more than promote an attentive attitude and collegial relationship among all the jurors. The Judicial Council carefully explained that the changes produced by the act required that the jurors exceeding the "proper number" be discharged and not permitted to participate in deliberations.

 The quote is from a summary of scholarly work questioning the accuracy of results reached by small juries:
Second, the data now raise doubts about the accuracy of the results achieved by smaller and smaller panels. Statistical studies suggest that the risk of convicting a innocent person (Type I error) rises as the size of the jury diminishes. Because the risk of not convicting a guilty person (Type II error) increases with the size of the panel, an optimal jury size can be selected as a function of the interaction between the two risks.
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), was decided two years after Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and did not benefit from the scholarly work summarized in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).

 Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980), accepts the conclusion in Ballew v. Georgia 435 U.S. 223 (1978), that the decrease in the size of the jury leads to less accurate fact finding. Brown, 447 U.S. at 332.