Court Opinion

ID: 9478014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:36:58.363224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:10.150168
License: Public Domain

TANG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I agree that Jaco-bo has not adduced any evidence that the United States knew of the condition of the tank, thereby creating a duty to warn of unusual dangers under Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). However, I believe that the United States had a duty to enforce the Navy’s own safety regulations and that summary judgment was thus inappropriate.
In Scindia the Supreme Court articulated the rule that a shipowner has no general duty to discover dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of operations assigned to stevedores, “absent contract provision, positive law, or custom to the contrary.” Id. at 172, 101 S.Ct. at 1625. The Ninth Circuit has extended the same duties of care to employees of independent repair companies who are working on a vessel. Cook v. Exxon Shipping Co., 762 F.2d 750, 752 (9th Cir.), amended, 773 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir.1985). The critical inquiry in this case is whether contract provisions, positive law or custom create a duty to supervise the tank cleanup operation. In my view, the contract requires compliance with the Navy’s Technical Manual, Chapter 074 Volume 3, which sets out specific guidelines and requirements for gas free engineering, the most pertinent of which is the requirement that tanks be tested for toxic contaminants before employees enter.
Although the majority may be correct in saying the Navy’s internal safety regulations do not have the force of law, its reliance on cases seeking review of a social security benefits determination, Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 101 S.Ct. 1468, 67 L.Ed.2d 685 (1981) or damages under the Federal Torts Claim Act, Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir.1979), is inappropriate in this admiralty case. There do not appear to be any maritime tort cases discussing the role of shipowners’ safety rules in setting a standard of care, so I would look to the closely analogous body of federal law applying the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). See Gilmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty (2d ed. 1975), passim (references to points of similarity between remedies for seamen under the Jones Act and remedies for railroad employees under FELA).
The FELA does not contain a statement of standards of care but it is clear that some duties, such as the duty to provide a *643safe workplace, have become integral parts of the FELA. Ragsdell v. Southern Pac. Transp., 688 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir.1982). It is well-settled in FELA cases that the internal safety rules of individual railroads set standards of care above and beyond those imposed by federal and state regulations. See, e.g., Ackley v. Chicago and North Western Transp. Co., 820 F.2d 263, 266 n. 5 (8th Cir.1987) (noting that certain employer duties have become integral parts of the FELA, including the duty to promulgate and enforce safety rules, citing Ybarra v. Burlington N., Inc., 689 F.2d 147, 150 (8th Cir.1982), which approved an instruction that a railroad must publish and enforce adequate safety rules in the exercise of its duty to use reasonable care in protecting its employees); Bailey v. Grand Trunk Lines New England, 805 F.2d 1097, 1102 (2d Cir.1986) (railroad has a duty to establish safety rules for the guidance and protection of its employees and, once promulgated, the employee is entitled to rely on these safety rules as the appropriate standard of conduct); Moore v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 493 F.Supp. 1252, 1265 (D.W.Va.1980) (whether a railroad exercised care in making rules is a question for the jury).
Maritime law is solicitous of the safety and welfare of seamen, longshoremen and repairmen. I would therefore adopt the rigorous standards of the FELA, which is equally solicitous of the welfare of railroad workers, and hold that the Navy’s internal safety regulations set the standard of care that should govern in this case. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for for further proceedings.