Court Opinion

ID: 9567477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:54:20.04312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:37.928952
License: Public Domain

Birdsong, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because (a) the majority opinion does not accurately represent certain material facts and implies that the police held certain beliefs contrary to their trial testimony; (b) the search of appellant’s purse violated both her state and federal constitutional rights against unreasonable searches; and, (c) the constitutional issues were timely *140raised by appellant and require our consideration.
Appellant filed a pretrial suppression motion challenging the issuance of the warrant on grounds including both the violation of the State and Federal Constitutions, and challenging the validity of the search on similar grounds. On appeal appellant enumerates certain errors including that the trial court erred in denying her suppression motion and by overruling her timely objection to the introduction into evidence of items “found” in her purse. In her brief appellant argues the want of an “independent justification” for the search of her purse, which inherently includes the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment issues of reasonableness of search. These issues are most serious and mandate careful appellate consideration. See, e.g., OCGA § 5-6-48 (f).
The effect of the majority opinion, in view of the actual posture of the facts of this case, is to condone the execution of a general exploratory provision inserted into a search warrant. These types of search warrant provisions are prohibited and void. Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U. S. 319 (99 SC 2319, 60 LE2d 920); Collins v. State, 187 Ga. App. 430 (370 SE2d 648); compare with Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455 (177 SE2d 487).
Searches of persons not named in a search warrant but found on the premises are illegal absent independent justification for personal search. Wyatt v. State, 151 Ga. App. 207 (1) (259 SE2d 199). The general language in the warrant could not standing alone supply independent justification for the search of appellant’s property. Id. However, the State could justify the officer’s search of appellant’s purse provided that it proved the search was conducted in compliance with the statutory provisions of OCGA § 17-5-28, as that statute has been construed to meet existing constitutional requirements. See Wyatt v. State, supra at 209.
OCGA § 17-5-28 provides two bases for search. The first statutory basis of OCGA § 17-5-28 (1) is to protect the officer from attack. To meet constitutional requirements, any search conducted on this basis must comply with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889). Terry requires that the officer who has lawfully detained a citizen must have and be able to articulate “a reasonable belief that [the citizen] was armed and presently dangerous” to authorize “a patdown of [his] person for weapons.” (Emphasis supplied.) Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 92 (100 SC 338, 62 LE2d 238); Terry v. Ohio, supra at 24, 27 and 30; see Brown v. State, 181 Ga. App. 768 (1) (a) (353 SE2d 572). In this case, the facts when viewed in totality conclusively demonstrate that the searching officer did not have or articulate any reasonable belief for concluding that the appellant was armed and dangerous or that she was carrying a weapon in her purse. In fact, Detective Stancil testified at the suppression hearing that al*141though the purse was secured so appellant could not have access to it, he “didn’t know if there was any weapons or anything” in it. Additionally, as a totally separate issue, the record is silent as to the construction of the purse, thus it cannot be ascertained whether or not it could have been subjected to an effective “patdown.” However, the record discloses that Detective Stancil did not attempt to “patdown” the purse in any manner prior to subjecting it to a “full” search. Thus, he did not discover any hard object or other item by the “patdown” process, which might have provided a basis under Terry for a further intrusion therein (assuming the “patdown” requirement of reasonable belief had first been met in this case, which it had not).
The second statutory basis of an OCGA § 17-5-28 (2) search is “[t]o prevent the disposal or concealment of any . . . things particularly described in the search warrant.” The following facts are relevant: Detective Stancil, the searching officer, testified at the suppression hearing that he searched the purse “to see if there was any contraband drugs being stored in [the] pocketbook,” because “[we search anything and everything in the location when we’re there. . . .” At no point in his testimony did Detective Stancil even express any articulable suspicion, let alone any basis for probable cause, that the appellant’s purse contained drugs or other contraband. Appellant had been under Detective Stancil’s constant observation since the police kicked down the door to the residence, and she had done nothing suspicious. Moreover, the police were unaware of the appellant’s identity until after the search of her purse; and, the record discloses that the police did not voice any suspicion that she was in any way connected with anyone named in the warrant until after the purse search was completed. The police testified further that appellant was not arrested until after the purse search; moreover, no probable cause existed for her arrest prior to the purse search.
A search conducted under the authority of OCGA § 17-5-28 (2) must be based on probable cause; otherwise, the statute would be subject to serious constitutional challenge. Ybarra v. Illinois, supra at 94-96 and 96 n. 10 and 11. Clearly, the facts of this case establish that OCGA § 17-5-28 cannot legitimize the search of appellant’s purse, and interestingly the majority avoids effectively discussing its provisions. However, to the extent that the majority opinion attempts to justify the purse search on the basis of Terry, it is also in error. For reasons above discussed, the facts of this case did not justify a “full” search of appellant’s purse for weapons. Secondly, Terry does not provide authority to conduct a “full” search of either a person or his property or to “aid the evidence-gathering function of the search warrant” in the absence of “probable cause.” Ybarra v. Illinois, supra at 94-96; Scott v. State, 253 Ga. 147, 149 (317 SE2d 830); see generally Daniel, Ga. Criminal Trial Practice § 4-16.
*142Under the facts of this case, the police even lacked any articulable suspicion or belief that appellant was in the possession of drugs. Thus, the state of the evidence does not come close to establishing the necessary “probable cause” required by OCGA § 17-5-28 (2) and Terry/Ybarra to justify a “full” search of appellant’s purse for possible drugs. Accordingly, the conduct of the police under the facts of this case violated appellant’s rights both under the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII of the Georgia Constitution.
The majority ultimately attempts to justify this search on the basis of necessity. The mere fact a weapon was found in the purse as a result of illegal police conduct does not provide a legal basis for rendering an illegal search legal. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 484 (83 SC 407, 9 LE2d 441); Willis v. State, supra at 457. The police in this case clearly searched appellant’s purse only as a matter of police routine because the warrant contained a general exploratory search provision. Not a single officer testified at trial or at the suppression hearing that they perceived themselves in any danger from appellant, and their conduct towards her at the scene is totally consistent with such a belief. Terry holds that in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in the circumstances, due weight must be given to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts “in light of his experience.” Terry v. Ohio, supra at 27. This test cuts both ways! When the officers draw specific reasonable inferences, based on their professional experience, that an appellant poses no danger to them, we should respect those inferences and not supply after-the-fact rationalizations to justify conduct motivated by entirely different reasons. Further, if the police wanted to ensure appellant did not gain access to her purse while they were still on the premises, this could have been arranged easily without violating appellant’s constitutional rights. All that had to be done was to usher everyone, both those to be arrested and those to be released, outside the premises, while leaving the purse inside; and, then not allowing anyone to go back into the premises until after the police drove away in obvious safety with those to be arrested. This procedure would have protected the police while leaving the appellant behind, constitutional rights intact, to subsequently retrieve her purse. Moreover, the dissent does not claim that given these same circumstances, the police could not on another occasion articulate a reasonable belief for the immediate patdown of appellant and her purse. We only note that these particular officers in light of their experience did not have such a belief or conduct such a patdown procedure.
Finally, I am compelled to comment on certain factual inferences and analogies contained in the majority opinion. The majority opinion repeatedly attempts to connect the appellant with her husband,
*143Linzie Bonds, in such a manner as to imply that the police conducting the search actually held, at least, a reasonable belief that she had some connection to her husband and the drug operation before they searched her purse. The trial record not only does not support this inference, it shows that the police neither knew who the appellant was nor harbored any belief as to how she arrived at the premises at least until after her purse was searched and her driver’s license found. In fact, the police testified to their lack of knowledge of her identity before the search, and to their lack of any prior information connecting her to any drug activity. They did not testify that they either suspected or had probable cause to believe her purse contained drugs merely because she and teenage girls were found in the same house as Linzie Bonds. The majority further states that appellant “was not visiting her son because he was not at home.” Unrefuted evidence of record establishes that appellant was visiting the premises. When appellant first arrived at her son’s house, he was at home; subsequently he left the premises to go to school and just happened to be absent when the police arrived. However, even during his absence his co-resident, Raymond Mendel, was present in the two-bedroom premises. As far as the police were concerned, appellant and the teenage girls could have been lawfully visiting the co-tenant. Moreover, the police testified they did not know who appellant was, and during their candid testimony they did not speculate as to the reason for her presence on the premises. Thus, the majority’s conclusion that appellant was not a visitor is not supported by the operative facts. The majority also attempts to draw an analogy between this search and the search of a purse of a person entering a courthouse or airport departure area. This argument is totally devoid of merit in my opinion. First, there exists certain unique security problems in courthouses and airports that warrant extraordinary precautions in the interest of public safety. See McSweeney v. State, 183 Ga. App. 1, 2 (358 SE2d 465). The search here was conducted in a private dwelling and pursuant to general exploratory language in a search warrant. Secondly, people entering airport departure areas and courthouses may avoid purse searches merely by electing not to use the facilities offered at that time. In this case, appellant was given no equal right of election, and gave no consent to the search of her purse.
This case should be reversed. See generally Ybarra v. Illinois, supra; Wyatt v. State, supra; Bundy v. State, 168 Ga. App. 90, 91 (308 SE2d 213); Childers v. State, 158 Ga. App. 613, 615 (281 SE2d 349).
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier, Judge Pope and Judge Benham join in this dissent.
*144Decided July 15, 1988
Rehearing denied July 29, 1988
Ralph J. Hunstein, for appellant.
Robert E. Wilson, District Attorney, John H. Petrey, Eleni A. Pryles, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.