Court Opinion

ID: 9931611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 16:01:48.553943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:07.029717
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11385    Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11385
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       ANTOINE ROBERT SHELL,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00021-LAG-TQL-1
                           ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11385

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Antoine Robert Shell appeals his sentence of 120 months’
       imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a ﬁrearm. He ar-
       gues that Georgia aggravated assault does not qualify as a crime of
       violence and that, therefore, the district court calculated the incor-
       rect guideline range. He also contends that the court’s 120-month
       sentence was a substantively unreasonable upward departure.
               When appropriate, we will review the interpretation and ap-
       plication of the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. Cin-
       gari, 952 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2020). Where a sentencing court
       explicitly states that a guideline determination was immaterial to
       the ultimate sentence imposed because it would have imposed the
       same sentence under its § 3553(a) authority, however, we will not
       remand for resentencing, even if the guideline determination was
       erroneous. United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1348-50 (11th Cir.
       2006). Rather, in that circumstance, we will assume the enhance-
       ment did not apply and then review the ﬁnal sentence to ensure
       that it is substantively reasonable. Id. at 1349. Speciﬁcally, we will
       reduce the guideline range according to the way the defendant ar-
       gued and analyze whether the sentence would be substantively rea-
       sonable under that guideline range. Id. at 1349-50.
              Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3), a base oﬀense level of 22 ap-
       plies where the oﬀense involved a semiautomatic ﬁrearm, and the
       defendant committed the instant oﬀense after sustaining one
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       23-11385               Opinion of the Court                          3

       felony conviction of a crime of violence. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3).
       The Guidelines state that the base oﬀense level should be enhanced
       by 4-points if the defendant used or possessed a ﬁrearm or ammu-
       nition in connection with another felony oﬀense.                    Id.
       § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Additionally, the Guidelines allow for a 3-point
       reduction where the defendant has demonstrated an acceptance of
       responsibility. Id. § 3E1.1(a), (b). A base oﬀense level of 23, paired
       with a criminal history category of VI, yields a guideline imprison-
       ment range of 92 to 115 months. Id. ch. 5, pt. A.
              Here, Shell’s challenge to his base oﬀense level fails because,
       under Keene, even if the district court erred in overruling his objec-
       tion to the enhancement based on his Georgia aggravated assault
       conviction, that error did not aﬀect the outcome of his sentence.
       Instead, the court explained that it would have imposed the same
       120-month sentence irrespective of the guideline range. See Keene,
       470 F.3d at 1348-50. As such, the focus shifts back to substantive
       unreasonableness of the sentence with a guideline range that has
       been lowered to 92 to 115 months. See id. at 1349.
              We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a defer-
       ential abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States,
       552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears
       the burden of demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in
       light of the record, the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the
       substantial deference aﬀorded sentencing courts. United States v.
       Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11385

              We examine whether a sentence is substantively reasonable
       by considering the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at
       51. The district court must impose a sentence “suﬃcient, but not
       greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in
       § 3553(a)(2), including the need to reﬂect the seriousness of the of-
       fense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the
       oﬀense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the
       defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
              The weight given to any speciﬁc § 3553(a) factor is commit-
       ted to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v.
       Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). The district court is free to
       consider any information relevant to a defendant’s background,
       character, and conduct in imposing an upward variance. United
       States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2007). We give due
       deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors,
       as a whole, justify the extent of the variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 59-60.
              A court can abuse its discretion when it (1) fails to consider
       relevant factors that were due signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives an im-
       proper or irrelevant factor signiﬁcant weight, or (3) commits a clear
       error of judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably.
       United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
       Where a district court imposes an upward variance based upon the
       § 3553(a) factors, it must have a justiﬁcation compelling enough to
       support the degree of the variance. United States v. Early, 686 F.3d
       1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012). But a “rigid mathematical formula that
       uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining
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       23-11385               Opinion of the Court                         5

       the strength of the justiﬁcations required for a speciﬁc sentence” is
       not appropriate. Gall, 552 U.S. at 47. While an appellate court may
       take the degree of variance into account, there is no rule that re-
       quires “extraordinary” circumstances to justify a sentence outside
       the guidelines range. Id.
              A sentence is potentially unreasonable if the district court
       unjustiﬁably relied on a single factor. United States v. Kuhlman, 711
       F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013). However, signiﬁcant reliance on a
       single factor does not necessarily render a sentence unreasonable.
       Id. Additionally, a sentence outside the guidelines carries no pre-
       sumption of unreasonableness. Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S.
       708, 714 (2008). We will vacate on substantive reasonableness
       grounds only if we are left with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction
       that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
       weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
       outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of
       the case. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.
              Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in impos-
       ing the 120-month sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 41. Shell fails to show
       that this sentence is substantively unreasonable when considering
       the record and the § 3553(a) factors. Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378. The
       court considered and explained the § 3553(a) factors in sentencing
       Shell. In particular, the district court noted the nature and circum-
       stances of the oﬀense, Shell’s history and characteristics, and the
       need to protect the public and promote respect for the law. The
       court also explicitly considered Shell’s trauma following Hurricane
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11385

       Katrina but found that it did “not excuse [him] then [wreaking] vi-
       olence on other people and on the community.” Even assuming,
       arguendo, that the district court relied heavily on Shell’s past crimi-
       nal history, signiﬁcant reliance on a single factor does not neces-
       sarily render a sentence unreasonable. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d at 1327.
       Finally, even under a guideline range of 92 to 115 months, a sen-
       tence ﬁve months above this range carries no presumption of un-
       reasonableness. Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 714.
               In sum, the court provided suﬃcient justiﬁcations to support
       Shell’s 120-month sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 60. Thus, Shell’s sen-
       tence is substantively reasonable, and we also aﬃrm in this respect.
              AFFIRMED.