Court Opinion

ID: 9781591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:53:24.937554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:28.363598
License: Public Domain

MELTON, Justice,
concurring specially.
This Court need not, and should not, overrule its prior case law that has directly and repeatedly interpreted OCGA § 17-7-171 (b) to “provide [ ] for discharge and acquittal in capital cases if a defendant *702is not given a trial within two regular terms of court following the filing of a demand for trial, assuming jury availability and the defendant’s readiness.” (Emphasis supplied.) Tutt v. State, 267 Ga. 49, 50 (472 SE2d 306) (1996); Burns v. State, 265 Ga. 763 (462 SE2d 622) (1995) (trial court properly denied motion for discharge where defendant “did not satisfy the statutory requirement that, at some point during the first two regular terms of court following the filing of his demand, he be present in court announcing ready for trial and requesting a trial on the indictment”) (punctuation and footnote omitted; emphasis supplied). The bench and bar have relied on this interpretation of OCGA § 17-7-171 (b) for nearly two decades, and the Legislature has not modified this Court’s interpretation of the statute in any way. Bailey v. State, 209 Ga. App. 390 (433 SE2d 610) (1993) (defendant who filed speedy trial demand “had to be tried before the end of. . . the second regular term of court following the term in which his demand was filed”); Harper v. State, 203 Ga. App. 775 (417 SE2d 435) (1992) (“Under § 17-7-171, the state is required to try the defendant within the next two terms after the demand is made”) (emphasis in original). See also RadioShack Corp. v. Cascade Crossing II, LLC, 282 Ga. 841, 843 (653 SE2d 680) (2007) (“Where a statute has, by a long series of decisions, received a judicial construction in which the General Assembly has acquiesced and thereby given its implicit legislative approval, the courts should not disturb that settled construction”) (citations and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that Walker’s motion for discharge and acquittal was premature for having been filed after only two terms of court had been convened and adjourned since the filing of her speedy trial demand. See Tutt, supra.4
However, I do agree with the majority that the trial court’s denial of Walker’s motion for discharge and acquittal was ultimately correct. Indeed, even though I do not believe that Walker’s motion for discharge and acquittal was premature, the record reveals that Walker waived her right to a speedy trial based on her failure to “present in court announcing ready for trial and requesting a trial on the indictment” during both terms following the filing of her speedy trial demand. OCGA § 17-7-171 (b). The record reveals that, at the calendar call in the November 2009 term of court (the first term after Walker filed her speedy trial demand), the State requested *703a continuance. Walker’s attorney responded to the State’s request by stating, “we have no objection subject to the fact that we filed a demand for a speedy trial on that case.” At this calendar call her attorney made no other statements regarding Walker’s readiness for trial and made no demands to proceed to trial that day. At the calendar call in the March 2010 term (the second term after Walker filed her speedy trial demand), Walker’s attorney stated, “[W]e would be prepared to go to trial right now,” and “I’m present and ready for trial, Your Honor.”
Pursuant to
subsection (b) of [OCGA § 17-7-171, there is] a three-prong procedure which must be complied with by defendants accused of [capital] offenses in order for their demand for speedy trial to be effective. First, the demand must actually be filed with the court. Second, there must be juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant at both of the first two regular terms of court following the term at which the demand is filed. Third, at sometime during both of the first two regular terms of court following the term at which the demand is filed, the defendant must be present in court announcing ready for trial and requesting a trial on the indictment.
Smith v. State, 261 Ga. 298, 299 (1) (404 SE2d 115) (1991). Where, as here, the first two prongs of the procedure have been met, the defendant may still waive his or her right to a speedy trial by failing to strictly comply with the third requirement. See Levester v. State, 270 Ga. 485 (512 SE2d 258) (1999). In this connection, with respect to the requirement of appearing in court and announcing ready to be immediately tried on the indictment during both of the first two regular terms of court following the term at which the demand is filed, “OCGA § 17-7-171 (b) does not provide for constructive compliance. The statutory requirements are plain and mandate strict adherence, and a defendant may waive the right to a speedy trial by his actions or inaction.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. at 486. See also Rice v. State, 264 Ga. 846, 847 (452 SE2d 492) (1995) (“A failure to comply with the express language of OCGA § 17-7-171 (b) that the defendant be in court ‘announcing ready for trial’ following the filing of a speedy trial demand operates as a waiver of that demand.”) The duty of a defendant to strictly comply with the statutory speedy trial requirements is absolute, as,
[g]iven the extreme nature of the sanction of absolute discharge and acquittal, it is applied only where there has *704been strict compliance with OCGA § 17-7-170 or § 17-7-171, whichever is the applicable statute prescribing the means by which a criminal defendant may assert a demand for trial.
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) State v. Varner, 277 Ga. 433, 434 (589 SE2d 111) (2003).
Here, when confronted with the State’s request for a continuance during the first term of court after she filed her speedy trial demand, Walker and her counsel informed the trial court that “we have no objection subject to the fact that we filed a demand for a speedy trial on that case.” Contrary to making any specific announcement that she was immediately ready to proceed to trial on the indictment on that same day, Walker (1) consented to having the trial continued and (2) merely referenced the fact that she had previously “filed” a demand for speedy trial. There is nothing about either of these statements that constitutes an express announcement of being ready to be immediately tried on the indictment. With respect to Walker’s first statement in which she consented to a continuance, at best, this statement says nothing about her own readiness to proceed to trial, and, at worst, the statement sends a message to the State and to the trial court that she is not ready to immediately proceed to trial. With respect to her second statement referencing the “filing” of a speedy trial demand, this statement only reminds the State and the trial court that Walker complied with step one of her duties under OCGA § 17-7-171 (b). See Smith, supra, 261 Ga. at 299 (1) (Under three-pronged procedure of OCGA § 17-7-171 (b), “[f]irst, the [speedy trial] demand must actually be filed with the court”). It does not act as a substitute for her separate and distinct duty to announce that she is presently ready for trial on the day that the case is called and that she is requesting an immediate trial on the indictment. Id. (announcement of ready for trial is third step of three-pronged procedure). See also Levester, supra; OCGA § 17-7-171 (b) (during both terms of court following filing of speedy trial demand, defendant must be in court “announcing ready for trial and requesting a trial on the indictment”). In this regard, by merely mentioning her previously filed speedy trial demand, Walker did not “strictly comply” with the requirement of making a separate announcement in open court of being presently ready for trial. At most, Walker’s reference to her compliance with the first of her duties under OCGA § 17-7-171 (b) (i.e., the filing of a speedy trial demand) could only constitute constructive compliance with her separate and distinct duty to make a new announcement in court that she is ready to immediately proceed to trial on the indictment. Because such constructive compliance with OCGA § 17-7-171 (b) is insufficient as *705a matter of law to allow for Walker’s speedy trial demand to remain viable, the trial court correctly concluded that Walker waived her demand for a speedy trial.5 See Smith, supra.
Decided March 19, 2012.
Harold B. Baker, Gerald B Word, for appellant.
Gregory W. Winters, District Attorney, John A. Regan, Assistant District Attorney, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Baula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein and Justice Benham join in this special concurrence.

 In this regard, it is Merrow v. State, 268 Ga. App. 47 (601 SE2d 428) (2004) that should be overruled, and not the prior precedent from this Court interpreting OCGA § 17-7-171 (b). See Merrow, supra, 268 Ga. App. at 51 (1), n. 32 (concluding that OCGA § 17-7-171 (b) requires that “three terms [must be] convened and adjourned [after] the term in which the speedy trial demand was filed” before a defendant would be subject to discharge).

 In light of this conclusion, the Court still would not have to address Walker’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as such a claim would still be premature at this point in the proceedings. See Brooks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 115, 117 (10) (501 SE2d 286) (1998) (“[A]n ineffective assistance of counsel claim is properly brought after a trial has been concluded and a verdict has been issued. As a practical matter, it is impossible to determine, prior to the result of the representation, whether such representation was ineffective”).