Court Opinion

ID: 9567388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:53:26.060516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:35.316775
License: Public Domain

Judge MARTIN, Mark D.,
concurring.
I believe the trial court’s reliance on plaintiff’s actions in a voluntarily dismissed case (case I) to support, in any manner, its dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff’s present case (case II), was inappropriate.
The trial court, in its order dismissing case II with prejudice, found “[p]laintiff has established a pattern of disregarding due dates for responding to discovery . . . and ignoring orders of Court requiring plaintiff to respond fully and in a timely manner to discovery requests by opposing parties.” (emphasis added). To find that a “pattern” existed in the present case, the trial court must necessarily have considered both cases I and II as it concluded in its order, “plaintiff has again willfully violated . . . the North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure.” (emphasis added).
Cases I and II are related to the extent case I, voluntarily dismissed on 4 October 1993, was refiled on 6 January 1994 as case II. Nevertheless, case I was terminated by the voluntary dismissal and case II is, therefore, not a continuation of case I. See Ward v. Taylor, 68 N.C. App. 74, 78, 314 S.E.2d 814, 818-819, disc. review denied, 311 N.C. 769, 321 S.E.2d 157 (1984) (after plaintiff files a voluntary dismissal, that action terminates and no suit is pending in the court); 2 G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure § 41-2 (1989) (voluntary dismissal constitutes the final termination of a case). Rather, case II is an independent cause of action and, as such, the trial court must determine sanctions based solely on plaintiff’s actions during the prosecution of case II. Goss v. Battle, 111 N.C. App. 173, 177, 432 *376S.E.2d 156, 159 (1993) (proper sanction under N.C.R. Civ. P. 37(d) to be determined from the facts and circumstances of each case) (Greene, J., concurring). Therefore, I believe the majority should have clearly determined whether plaintiffs actions in case II, alone, supported the dismissal of case II with prejudice.
Considering only plaintiffs actions in case II, I believe plaintiffs failure to respond to certain discovery requests despite a court order is, standing alone, sufficient to support the trial court’s dismissal of case II with prejudice. See, e.g., Silverthorne v. Land Co., 42 N.C. App. 134, 137-138, 256 S.E.2d 397, 399-400, disc. review denied, 298 N.C. 300, 259 S.E.2d 302 (1979). Accordingly, I concur in the result of the majority opinion.