Court Opinion

ID: 9670299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:18:23.394153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:03.709530
License: Public Domain

NETTESHEIM, J.
{concurring). I agree with the majority that the juvenile court orders in this case should be affirmed. However, I reach that conclusion on a different basis. I contend that we must unfortunately, but necessarily, affirm the orders because we have lost our competency to proceed in this appeal since our decision is issued beyond the statutory deadline set out in § 809.107, Stats.
*647Section 809.107, STATS., provides, in relevant part, at subsec. (6):
(a) The appellant shall file a brief within 15 days after the filing of the record on appeal.
(b) The respondent shall file a brief within 10 days after the service of the appellant's brief.
(c) The appellant shall file within 10 days after the service of the respondent's brief a reply brief or statement that a reply brief will not be filed.
(e) Cases appealed under this section shall be given preference and shall be taken in an order that ensures that a decision is issued within 45 days after the filing of the record on appeal with the court of appeals. [Emphasis added.]
The parties to this appeal have previously stipulated to waive the statutory deadline within which this court must issue its decision pursuant to this statute. However, since the statutory deadline travels to this court's subject matter jurisdiction and occasions the loss of our competency to proceed, the parties' stipulation is of no consequence. See Green County Dep't of Human Servs. v. H.N., 162 Wis. 2d 635, 657, 469 N.W.2d 845, 853-54 (1991). "[W]e have consistently ruled that a court's loss of power due to the failure to act within statutory time periods cannot be stipulated to nor waived." Id. In addition, we must inquire as to our subject matter jurisdiction even if the parties do not raise the question. State ex rel. Teaching Assistants Ass'n v. University of Wis.—Madison, 96 Wis. 2d 492, 495, 292 N.W.2d 657, 659 (Ct. App. 1980).
If it were not for the supreme court's decision in Green County, I would treat the statutory deadline set out in § 809.107, Stats., as a mere administrative directive by the legislature, akin to our holding in Vil*648lage of Elkhart Lake v. Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d 185, 194, 366 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 1985). There, we held that the circuit court did not lose jurisdiction to adjudicate an implied consent proceeding despite the court's failure to decide the case within the five-day requirement set out in § 345.305(8)(b), STATS., 1983-84.1 Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d at 193-94, 366 N.W.2d at 510. We said:
Once jurisdiction has attached it continues until final disposition. The normal construction of jurisdictional rules includes a presumption that once jurisdiction attaches, it cannot be ousted or lost absent a clear indication of such a purpose. Any doubt is resolved in favor of retention of jurisdiction. The divestiture of jurisdiction is a serious matter, and therefore, before a party can claim that a statute has the effect of divesting jurisdiction which has regularly and fully vested, the law in favor of such divestment must be clear and unambiguous.
Id. at 193, 366 N.W.2d at 510 (citations omitted).
Because the statute did not indicate that the trial court lost jurisdiction, we adhered to the presumption that jurisdiction still prevailed. Id. at 194, 366 N.W.2d at 510. Instead, we construed the statutory deadline as "an administrative directive by the legislature" signaling its "desire for promptness in issuing decisions related to refusal hearings." Id.
However, the supreme court's decision in the later Green County case presents serious obstacles to an application of the Borzyskowski rationale to this case. *649In Green County, the juvenile court had scheduled a hearing for the extension of a CHIPS order within the thirty-day time limit following the expiration of the prior order pursuant to § 48.365(6), STATS. However, the hearing was adjourned to a date outside the statutory limit at the request of the parent and without objection from the other interested parties. Green County, 162 Wis. 2d at 642-43, 469 N.W.2d at 847. When the hearing was finally commenced, the parent who had obtained the adjournment contended that the juvenile court had lost jurisdiction because the statutory deadline had passed. Id. at 643, 469 N.W.2d at 847-48.
The supreme court ruled that the failure to hold the hearing within the prescribed statutory time limit caused the juvenile court to lose its competency. Id. at 654, 469 N.W.2d at 852. The court stated that "the child clearly has a due process right to have his or her ’best interests' redetermined by a fixed date." Id. at 649, 469 N.W.2d at 850. The court held that this was so even if the expiration of the CHIPS order put the child's best interests at risk. See id.
In so holding, the supreme court rejected the appellant's argument that § 48.315, STATS., the general statute governing continuances in ch. 48, STATS., proceedings, authorized the juvenile court to hold the extension hearing beyond the thirty-day time limit specifically recited in § 48.365(6), STATS. Green County, 162 Wis. 2d at 653-54, 469 N.W.2d at 852. The court stated, "Chapter 48 is considered a carefully drawn legislative enactment which circumscribes judicial and administrative action in juvenile matters." Green County, 162 Wis. 2d at 645-46, 469 N.W.2d at 849.
In making its ruling, the supreme court did not specifically address the presumption in favor of the *650retention of jurisdiction upon which we relied in Borzyskowski.
I conclude that Green County governs this case. As the supreme court cautioned, ch. 48, STATS., represents a carefully drawn legislative circumscription of judicial and administrative actions in juvenile matters. Green County, 162 Wis. 2d at 645-46, 469 N.W.2d at 849. I recognize that § 809.107, STATS., is obviously not embodied in ch. 48. However, the statute expressly addresses, and is limited to, appeals in ch. 48 termination of parental rights cases. The question of the statute's effect on our competency to proceed should not be governed by the accident of where it is located in the statutes. Rather, the question should be governed by the statute's language, focus and effect. Section 809.107 is aimed squarely at appeals in ch. 48 termination of parental rights cases. Just as § 48.365(6), Stats., carefully circumscribes the juvenile court's competency to proceed in termination cases, so also does § 809.107 carefully circumscribe our appellate competency to proceed in such cases.
That Green County was a CHIPS case, whereas this is a termination case, does not change the effect of the supreme court's language. The overriding concern in all ch. 48, Stats., proceedings is the best interests of the child. See § 48.01(2), STATS. If a child's due process right to certainty regarding his or her status under a proposed CHIPS extension order requires determination by a fixed date, see Green County, 162 Wis. 2d at 649, 469 N.W.2d at 850, then the child must certainly have an equivalent right in a termination of parental rights proceeding. The same would hold true for parents in such a proceeding.
Thus, I see us as bound by the supreme court's logic and analysis in Green County, despite the differ*651ent nature of this proceeding and the different judicial level at which it is considered. On this basis, I conclude that we have lost our competency to proceed, and we must affirm the juvenile court's orders as a result.
Having said all of the above, I nonetheless address the folly and illogic of § 809.107, Stats. As noted, the statute requires that this court issue its decision within forty-five days after the filing of the record on appeal with the court of appeals. See § 809.107(6)(e). The appellate record in this case was filed on January 20,1995. Thus, our decision was due on March 6,1995. As the accompanying footnote explains, the workings of § 809.107 required our decision in this case to be issued on the very day the appellant's reply brief was due.2 Recently, this court encountered a case where the statute required our decision to be issued before the *652appellant's reply brief was due.3See Fond du Lac County Dep't of Social Services v. Shairi A.K., No. 94-2956, unpublished slip op. at 3 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 1994).
It is obvious that this statute is unworkable. At the risk of oversimplification, the appellate process requires the following: (1) reading the briefs; (2) examining the trial court record; (3) legal research; (4) the decision-making process by the assigned single judge or a decision conference by a three-judge panel if the case is converted to a three-judge appeal; (5) writing the opinion by the author; (6) reviewing of the opinion by the other members of the panel; and (7) editing, cite-checking and proofreading the opinion before release.
The legislative requirement set out in § 809.107(6), Stats., offers minimal opportunity in all cases, and no opportunity in others, for the orderly progression of this process, nor for the reflection, study and consideration which the appellate process requires.
I appreciate that the legislature's enactment of § 809.107, Stats., was intended to speed up the appellate process in termination of parental rights cases. While the legislature undoubtedly thought that such was in the best interests of children (and perhaps parents), I seriously question whether this statute serves that goal. While every court has an obligation to conduct its business with efficiency and appropriate speed, it also has an obligation to give every case the consideration it deserves. This statute imposes artificial haste *653on the appellate process. A hasty decision runs a greater risk of being a wrong decision.
Moreover, it appears that the only judicial entity governed by a decisional deadline in termination of parental rights cases is the court of appeals. The statute does not impose any similar deadline on the supreme court.4 And, while the juvenile code imposes many procedural time limits on the juvenile court as to when it must conduct proceedings, it does not impose any time deadline within which the juvenile court must decide an ultimate issue. This uneven treatment between the juvenile court and the supreme court on the one hand and the court of appeals on the other makes no sense.
Finally, a statute which imposes decisional deadlines on the judicial branch of government where there are no forces of nature, biology or law which otherwise compel such haste may raise serious constitutional questions regarding separation of powers.
Section 809.107, Stats., although well intended, is unwise, unworkable and perhaps unconstitutional. It should be repealed.

 In Village of Elkhart Lake v. Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d 185, 192 n.3, 366 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 1985), the appellant did not specify whether he was challenging subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or both.

 In making this computation, we look to the following statutes: (1) § 809.107(6)(e), STATS., which requires that the court of appeals decision be issued within forty-five days after the filing of the record on appeal; (2) RULE 809.82, STATS., which provides that in computing the time limits under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, §801.15(1), STATS., applies; and (3) §801.15(1), STATS., which excludes from the computation the day of the act from which the designated period of time runs, the last day of the period if it falls on a nonworking day, and weekends and holidays when the prescribed period of time is less than eleven days.
The appellate record in this case was filed on January 20, 1995. The appellant's brief was due fifteen days later. Since that deadline fell on a Saturday, the appellant's brief was due the following Monday, February 6.
The respondent's brief was due ten days later. Since that deadline was less than eleven days, the ensuing weekend days are not included in the computation. Thus, the respondent's brief was due on February 20. The appellant's reply brief was due ten days later. Again, the ensuing weekend is excluded from *652the computation. Thus, the appellant's reply brief was due on March 6, the very day our decision was required to be issued.

 Fortunately, the appellant chose not to file a reply brief and so advised us in sufficient advance time such that we could comply with the time limit.

 An earlier proposed version of the statute required the supreme court to issue its decision within forty-five days after granting a petition for review. This provision was later removed. The statute as enacted merely requires the supreme court to give "preference" to a petition for review. Section 809.107(6)(f), Stats. It imposes no deadline for issuance of a supreme court decision if a petition for review is granted.