Court Opinion

ID: 9794478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:06:44.311954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:41.830639
License: Public Domain

*837SCHAUER, J.,* Concurring and Dissenting.
On the facts as recited in the majority opinion T would affirm the judgments as entered. The second sentence of that opinion states “Bostick and Pitts were charged with and admitted two prior felony convictions. ” As an essential prerequisite to such prior felony convictions it must be presumed that these defendants had been fully advised of their constitutional rights; they were, therefore, in the totality of the circumstances, not of a class governed by Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]. Rather, they come within the rule preserved by Mr. Justice Goldberg in authoring the Escobedo majority opinion as follows:
“Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 [78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448], does not compel a contrary result. In that case the Court merely rejected the absolute rule sought by petitioner, that ‘ every state denial of a request to contact counsel [is] an infringement of the constitutional right without regard to the circumstances of the case. ’ Id., at 440. (Emphasis in original.) In its place the following rule was announced :
“ 1 [S]tate refusal of a request to engage counsel violates due process not only if the accused is deprived of counsel at trial on the merits,.. . but also if he is deprived of counsel for any part of the pretrial proceedings, provided that he is so prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent trial with an absence of “that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice....” The latter determination necessarily depends upon all the circumstances of the case. ’ 357 U.S. at 439-440. (Emphasis added.)
“The Court, applying ‘these principles’ to ‘the sum total of the circumstances [there] during the time petitioner was without counsel, ’ id. at 440, concluded that he had not been fundamentally prejudiced by the denial of his request for counsel. Among the critical circumstances which distinguish that case from this one are that the petitioner there, but not here, was explicitly advised by the police of his constitutional right to remain silent and not to ‘say anything’ in response to the questions, id., at 437, and that petitioner there, but not here, was a well-educated man who had studied criminal law while attending law school for a year.” (Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) supra, 378 U.S. 478, 491-492.)
*838Surely acting as principals during the investigations, accusations, arraignments, pleas, trials, and convictions for two felonies each, should provide as much practical knowledge of police and court procedures, and of the constitutional rights of one accused of crime, as would the one year in a law school relied on in Crooker.
By compulsion of Griffin v. California (April 28, 1965, No. 202) 380 U.S. 609 [85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106], I concur with Mr. Justice Peters’ discussion and conclusion that the comment of the prosecutor and the trial court’s instructions relative to the failure of defendants to testify on the issue of guilt, constituted technical error; I further concur in holding that such error does not require (indeed, it would not support) reversal unless it has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, §§ 4 and 4%). By the sole empowering grant of jurisdiction to this court, coupled with the specific limitation on exercise of that power (as set forth in the above cited sections of California’s Constitution), we cannot reverse “unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, [we] shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 834-838 [11, 12, 13] [299 P.2d 243].)
Prom the facts related in the majority opinion, it appears to me that the police had the subject crimes substantially solved before interrogating any defendant. At the times the statements were made by the defendants the police already knew in a comprehensive way whether their respective statements were true or false. Those statements, therefore, in the totality of the record are of relatively minor importance.
After examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, I am not of the opinion that a miscarriage of justice is indicated as to any defendant. It follows that the judgments should be affirmed.
McComb, J., concurred.

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.