Court Opinion

ID: 9711054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:23:34.510637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.906320
License: Public Domain

Spencer and Boslaugh, JJ.,
dissenting.
The problem in this case is not the office or function of a proviso, but rather what was the proviso included *381in the 1963 amendment to section 79-403, R. S.. Supp., 1963.
L.B. 691, as introduced in the 1963 session of the Legislature, amended section 79-403, R. S. Supp., 1.961, so as to authorize a transfer where the route to the schoolhouse in the adjoining district was more practicable, one-half or more of the distance was over hard-surfaced roads, and the distance to the schoolhouse in the adjoining district was not more than 6 miles greater. The 6-mile limitation was in the form of a proviso. Language authorizing a transfer where tuition had been paid for 2 or more consecutive years was inserted following the proviso by a standing committee amendment.
The question is whether the payment of tuition was intended to be separate ground for transfer or to be a part of the proviso. We think that the more reasonable construction of the statute is that the proviso consists of the 6-mile limitation on increased distance to the new schoolhouse and refers to a transfer based upon a more practicable route.
Prior to our decision in State ex rel. Bottolfson v. School Board, 170 Neb. 417, 103 N. W. 2d 146, section 79-402, R. S. Supp., 1957, authorized a transfer between Class III districts where tuition had been paid for 2 or more years. It is reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended to restore this method of transfer which had been eliminated by the Bottolfson case. The 1965 amendment to section 79-403, R. S. Supp., 1963, which is described as a clarification of the statute is consistent with this construction.