Court Opinion

ID: 2964851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:11.699937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:02.070321
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
          No. 96-1655
                                   UNITED STATES,
                                      Appellee,
                                         v.
                                  MARTIN FERNANDEZ,
                               Defendant - Appellant.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                    [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                           Cyr and Lynch, Circuit Judges,
                           and McAuliffe, District Judge.
                                _____________________
               Miriam Conrad, Federal Defender Officer, for appellant.
               Robert E. Richardson, Assistant United States Attorney, with
          whom Donald 
                      K. 
                         Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for
          appellee.
                                ____________________
                                   August 6, 1997
                                ____________________
                              
           Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.

                    McAULIFFE, 
                              District Judge
                                            . Martin Fernandez pled guilty
          to an unarmed bank robbery charge in February of 1996.    See 18
          U.S.C. S 2133(a). The district judge (Young, J.), confronted with
          Fernandez' criminal history, found him to be a career offender and
          sentenced him accordingly.  See U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1.
                    On appeal Fernandez challenges his sentence, arguing that
          he did not qualify as a career offender under the sentencing
          guidelines. He says the district court's contrary finding was
          legally incorrect for at least two reasons: (1) the district judge
          erred when he concluded that the Massachusetts crime of assault and
          battery on a police officer (one of Fernandez' predicate offenses)
          is, categorically, a crime of violence within the meaning of
          U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1; and (2) the district judge's alternate finding
          (that the facts underlying Fernandez' offense establish it as a
          crime of violence) was based on an impermissible judicial inquiry
          into the discrete circumstances of his offense conduct.
                    Because we conclude that the Massachusetts crime of
          assault and battery on a police officer is, categorically, a crime
          of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, we need not
          address Fernandez' contention that the trial judge's factual
          inquiry was inconsistent with the mandate of    Taylor v.  United
          States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and we affirm the sentence.
                                     Background
                    Fernandez' career offender status rested on two
          underlying state convictions: assault and battery by means of a
          dangerous weapon and assault and battery upon a police officer.
          Fernandez did not object to classification of the former as a

          "crime of violence" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. He
          did, however, object to consideration of his prior assault and
          battery upon a police officer as a "crime of violence." The
          district judge overruled Fernandez' objections, determined that he
          was indeed a career offender, and sentenced him at the low end of
          the applicable guideline range.
                    On appeal, Fernandez argues that because, under
          Massachusetts law, the crime of assault and battery upon a police
          officer can include both violent and non-violent variants, the
          district judge erred when he classified the offense as one of
          violence within the meaning of the career offender provisions of
          the guidelines. Fernandez' guideline sentencing range would have
          been more favorable to him if the offense had not been so
          classified.
                                     Discussion
                    Whether Fernandez' prior conviction for assaulting a
          police officer is properly deemed a predicate "crime of violence"
          under U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1 is a question of law, which we review   de
          novo. See 
                    United States
                                  v. 
                                     Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1994).
                    For purposes of the career offender provisions, the
          sentencing guidelines define "crime of violence" as:
               (1)  [A]ny offense under federal or state law
                    punishable by imprisonment for a term
                    exceeding one year that --
                    (i) has as an element the use, attempted use,
                    or threatened use of physical force against
                    the person of another, or
                    (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or
                    extortion, involves use of explosives,     or
                                         -3-

                    otherwise  
                              involves  
                                        conduct  
                                                that  
                                                      presents  
                                                                a
                    serious 
                            potential 
                                      risk 
                                           of 
                                              physical 
                                                       injury 
                                                               to
                    another.
          U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2 (November 1, 1995) (emphasis supplied). Some
          offenses are easily recognized as crimes of violence because they
          are specifically listed in the guideline (e.g., arson), or because
          an essential element includes the use or threatened use of force
          against another person (e.g., armed robbery).
                    But an offense not listed, and which does not include
          among its elements the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
          force against another person, still might qualify under S 4B1.2 if
          it involves conduct that "presents a serious potential risk of
          physical injury to another." Whether such an offense qualifies on
          that ground is determined according to a standard generic approach,
          "in which inquiry is restricted to the statutory definition[] of
          the prior offense[], without regard to the particular facts
          underlying [it]."  United 
                                    States v. Meader, No. 96-2123, 1997 WL
          375003, at *6 (1st Cir. July 11, 1997);  accord United 
                                                                 States v.
          Schofield, 114 F.3d 350, 351 (1st Cir. 1997); Winter, 22 F.3d at
          18; 
             cf. 
                 Taylor v. 
                           United States
                                        , 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (adopting
          a similar categorical approach when determining whether a crime is
          one of violence under the armed career criminal provisions of 18
          U.S.C. S 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
                    As this court has previously held:
                    [R]ather than investigating the facts and
                    circumstances of each earlier conviction, an
                    inquiring court, in the usual situation, looks
                    exclusively to the crime as the statute of
                    conviction defined it; or, put another way,
                    the court examines only the statutory
                                         -4-

                    formulation of the predicate crime in order to
                    ascertain whether that crime is a crime of
                    violence for purposes of the federal
                    sentencing guidelines.
          United 
                 States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (footnote
          omitted). Only under limited circumstances may a court look beyond
          the elements of the crime as statutorily defined and examine
          documents, such as charging papers or jury instructions, in an
          effort to determine whether the predicate offense should count for
          career offender purposes.   See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602;   United
          States v. DeJesus, 984 F.2d 21, 23 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993).
                    Here, Fernandez argues that assault and battery on a
          police officer should not be classified as a crime of violence
          under S 4B1.1 because the criminal statute defining his offense
          (Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, S 13D) criminalizes both violent and non-
          violent conduct. His point about the statute's scope finds support
          in this court's opinion in United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 1234
          (1st Cir. 1992), where we noted: "The Massachusetts 'assault and
          battery' statute covers two separate crimes -- one involving actual
          (or potential) physical harm and the other involving a
          'nonconsensual' but unharmful touching."  Id. at 1236.  Because
                              
           Under the Massachusetts criminal code, both simple assault and
          battery (Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, S 13A) and assault and battery upon
          a police officer (Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, S 13D) are specific intent
          crimes.  Compare Commonwealth v. Chasson, 423 N.E.2d 306, 311 n.4
          (Mass. 1981) ("A conviction of assault and battery requires a
          finding of an intentional striking of the victim.")          with
          Commonwealth v. 
                         Moore, 632 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)
          ("The offense of assault and battery on a police officer requires
          a specific intent to strike a police officer."). The only
          substantive distinction between the elements of those offenses is
          that with regard to the latter, the defendant must know that the
                                         -5-

          both violent and non-violent conduct is covered by the statute, and
          because his prior conviction could have been based on the non-
          violent variant of assault and battery upon a police officer,
          Fernandez says his prior offense should not have been counted in
          deciding his career offender status.
                    Although we have not directly addressed the precise issue
          Fernandez raises, we have implied that assault and battery upon a
          police officer, in violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, S 13D, is
          properly considered a "crime of violence" for federal sentencing
          guidelines purposes.  See United 
                                           States v. Santiago, 83 F.3d 20,
          26-27 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that although the defendant was
          sentenced to less than one year in prison, his conviction for
          assault and battery against a police officer constituted a
          "predicate offense[] within the purview of the career offender
          guideline."); United States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 993 (1st Cir.
          1990) (holding that defendant's state misdemeanor convictions, two
          of which were for assault and battery on a police officer,
          constituted predicate "crimes of violence" under U.S.S.G.
          S 4B1.1.); see also United States v. Tracy, 36 F.3d 187, 199 (1st
          Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant had adequate notice of the
          government's intention, for sentencing purposes, to rely upon his
          state conviction for assault and battery upon a police officer and
                              
          victim is a police officer, acting in the course of his or her
          official duties. Accordingly, for the purposes of this discussion,
          we will assume that our reasoning in Harris, supra, applies with
          equal force to the crime of assault and battery upon a police
          officer and, therefore, that it is possible to commit that crime by
          means of a nonconsensual, but unharmful touching of a police
          officer. 
                                         -6-

          concluding that the district court did not err in considering
          defendant's conviction in enhancing his sentence under the Armed
          Career Criminal Act.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1717 (1995).
                    In any event, that Fernandez 
                                               might have been convicted of
          the non-violent variety of assault and battery upon a police
          officer (looking just at the record of conviction and the
          Massachusetts statute) does not undermine our conclusion that the
          crime is, for purposes of U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, properly categorized as
          a crime of violence. As we have said, the important point
                    is not the breadth of the statutory sweep but
                    the degree of risk, expressed in terms of the
                    probability of physical harm presented by the
                    mine-run of conduct that falls within the
                    heartland of the statute. Applying this test
                    in the post- Taylor era, we have repeatedly
                    classified as crimes of violence offenses in
                    which actual or threatened force against
                    another person is likely, although by no means
                    certain.
          DeJesus, 984 F.2d at 24.
                    It would seem self-evident that assault and battery upon
          a police officer usually involves force against another, and so
          meets that standard. At a minimum, assault and battery upon a
          police officer requires purposeful and unwelcomed contact with a
          person the defendant knows to be a law enforcement officer actually
          engaged in the performance of official duties. 
                                                        See 
                                                            Commonwealth v.
          Moore, 632 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). While it is
          true that neither violence, nor the use of force, is an essential
          element of the crime as statutorily defined, still, violence, the
          use of force, and a serious risk of physical harm are all likely to
                                         -7-

          accompany an assault and battery upon a police officer.      See,
          e.g., Winter, 22 F.3d at 20 ("A categorical approach is not
          concerned with testing either the outer limits of statutory
          language or the myriad of possibilities girdled by that language;
          instead, a categorical approach is concerned with the usual type of
          conduct that the statute purports to proscribe.").
                    Our conclusion is entirely consistent with our holding in
          United  
                 States v.   Harris,  supra. While we acknowledge that
          Massachusetts does criminalize both violent and non-violent
          assaults upon police officers in the same criminal statute, we also
          necessarily recognize that the conduct proscribed by the statute
          nearly always involves the intentional striking of a police officer
          while in the performance of official duty. This nearly always
          poses a serious risk of actual or potential physical force and the
                              
           Recent Massachusetts cases in which the defendant was charged
          with assault and battery upon a police officer reveal, not
          surprisingly, the consistent involvement of physical force and risk
          of injury. Each reported case involved actual (not merely
          threatened) use of force by the defendant and a serious risk of
          injury to the officer or another.  See Commonwealth v. Gogan, 449
          N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 1983) (defendant resisted arrest, struggled with
          officer, and fell to ground on top of officer);  Commonwealth v.
          Gagnon, 643 N.E.2d 1045 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (defendant convicted
          of masked armed robbery, assault with intent to murder, attempted
          murder, and assault and battery upon a police officer), modified,
          645 N.E.2d 696 (Mass. 1995); 
                                      Commonwealth v. 
                                                     Moore, 632 N.E.2d 1234
          (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (defendant grabbed officer's wrist and
          dragged him along road with his vehicle); 
                                                   Commonwealth v. 
                                                                   Collins,
          627 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (defendant head-butted officer
          in jaw); Commonwealth v. McCrohan, 610 N.E.2d 326 (Mass. App. Ct.
          1993) (defendant initiated a violent struggle with two police
          officers); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 609 N.E.2d 489 (Mass. App. Ct.
          1993) (defendant struck officer with car door, knocking him to the
          ground); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 500 N.E.2d 287 (Mass. App. Ct.
          1986) (defendant struck officer).
                                         -8-

          likelihood of physical injury -- to the police officer initially,
          and to the perpetrator (and even the public) subsequently, when the
          officer reacts or attempts to subdue the offender. That law
          enforcement officers usually carry weapons when on duty only
          heightens the serious risk of injury associated with such an
          assault.
                    Accordingly, we hold that assault and battery upon a
          police officer, in violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, S 13D, is
          categorically a crime of violence within the meaning of the career
          offender provisions of the sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1,
          notwithstanding that its statutory definition admits a non-violent
          means of commission.
                                     Conclusion
                    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that an assault and
          battery upon a police officer, in violation of Mass. Gen. L.
          ch. 265, S 13D, is categorically a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.
          S 4B1.1. Accordingly, the district judge's conclusion that
          Fernandez is a career offender under the guidelines, and the
          sentence imposed, are affirmed.
                              
           Of course, a defendant may, in an appropriate case, seek relief
          under the guidelines by filing a departure motion if his or her
          predicate offense actually involved the non-violent form of assault
          and battery on a police officer. This, however, is not such a
          case. Fernandez did not attempt to show that he actually committed
          a non-violent form of assault and battery upon a police officer.
          Instead, he has simply asserted that because the underlying state
          statute criminalizes both violent and non-violent conduct alike,
          that crime cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a "crime of
          violence" for purposes of determining his career offender status
          for federal sentencing purposes.
                                         -9-