Court Opinion

ID: 9929982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 20:09:01.664418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:01:57.269040
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Reyes, 2024-Ohio-403.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                   CASE NO. 2022-P-0018

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                 Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                   Court of Common Pleas

WALTER E. REYES,
                                                 Trial Court No. 2009 CR 00623
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                           OPINION

                                     Decided: February 5, 2024
                                   Judgment: Reversed; remanded

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Ohio Public
Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Defendant-
Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.

        {¶1}     This matter is before this court on remand from the Ohio Supreme Court for

further consideration based upon its holding in State v. Schilling, 172 Ohio St.3d 479,

2023-Ohio-3027, --- N.E.3d ----. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of

the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

        {¶2}     This appeal involves Ohio’s sex offender registration and reporting

provisions. “The current statutory scheme for sex offender registration and classification

was enacted in 2007 under R.C. Chapter 2950, 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, and is based
on the federal Adam Walsh Act [(“the AWA”)], Section 16901 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code.”

State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 7. The AWA

tier system replaced the prior scheme for the classification and registration of sex

offenders, known as Megan’s Law. Id. Although Ohio’s version of the AWA was not

effective until January 1, 2008, the statutory scheme, as enacted, included provisions

intended to apply retroactively. In Williams, an offender challenged the constitutionality

of these retroactive provisions of Ohio’s AWA, and the Ohio Supreme Court agreed that

application of Ohio’s AWA to those who committed their offenses prior to its enactment

violated the Ohio Constitution’s ban on retroactive laws. Williams at syllabus.

       {¶3}   Accordingly, pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Williams,

separate statutory schemes apply to classifying sex offenders depending on when they

committed their underlying offenses. State v. Howard, 134 Ohio St.3d 467, 2012-Ohio-

5738, 983 N.E.2d 341, ¶ 17. “The AWA applies to sex offenses committed on or after

January 1, 2008; Megan’s Law applies to sex offenses committed prior to January 1,

2008, even if the defendant was convicted after the AWA’s January 1, 2008 effective

date.” Schilling at ¶ 7, citing Howard at ¶ 17.

       {¶4}   With respect to the present case, in June 2010, Reyes pleaded guilty to four

counts of rape, committed between October 1, 2006, and January 1, 2007, and a

subsequent count of violating a protection order. In an entry dated July 8, 2010, the court

sentenced Reyes to an aggregate 30-year prison term and classified him as a Tier III Sex

Offender under the AWA.      However, pursuant to Williams, which was decided the year

after Reyes was sentenced, because the offenses occurred prior to January 1, 2008,

Megan’s Law, not the AWA, applied.

                                             2

Case No. 2022-P-0018
       {¶5}   Reyes failed to timely file a direct appeal, and, in 2013, this court overruled

Reyes’ motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. State v. Reyes, 11th Dist. Portage No.

2013-P-0012, 2013-Ohio-1493. Thereafter, Reyes filed numerous motions in the trial

court, many of which sought to vacate his pleas or requested postconviction relief. We

affirmed several of these judgments on appeal, and we dismissed other appeals for failure

of Reyes to file an appellate brief or for lack of a final, appealable order. See State v.

Reyes, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2013-P-0049, 2014-Ohio-1679; State v. Reyes, 2015-Ohio-

5344, 55 N.E.3d 485 (11th Dist.); State v. Reyes, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2016-P-0010,

2016-Ohio-5673; State v. Reyes, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2021-P-0014, 2021-Ohio-3478;

State v. Reyes, 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2016-P-0023 and 2016-P-0024 (Aug. 15, 2016)

(judgment entry dismissing appeals for failure to prosecute); State v. Reyes, 11th Dist.

Portage No. 2020-P-0048, 2020-Ohio-4955 (dismissing appeal for lack of a final,

appealable order).

       {¶6}   In one prior appeal, Reyes challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion

to vacate his AWA classification under its continuing jurisdiction to correct void judgments.

Reyes, 2021-Ohio-3478, at ¶ 4. With respect to whether his classification was “void,” this

court relied on the decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Harper, 160 Ohio

St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, and State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d

285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776.          In those cases, “the Supreme Court of Ohio

returned to the ‘traditional understanding’ of void and voidable judgments.” Reyes, 2021-

Ohio-3478, at ¶ 8, quoting Harper at ¶ 4; and Henderson at ¶ 34. “Pursuant to the

traditional view, ‘[a] judgment or sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court that lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the defendant. If the

                                               3

Case No. 2022-P-0018
court has jurisdiction over the case and the person, any error in the court’s exercise of

that jurisdiction is voidable.” Reyes, 2021-Ohio-3478, at ¶ 8, quoting Henderson at ¶ 43.

Therefore, this court concluded that any error in Reyes’ sex offender classification,

including any constitutional violation, would have resulted in a voidable, not void,

judgment. Reyes, 2021-Ohio-3478, at ¶ 9. We affirmed the trial court’s denial of Reyes’

motion because “Reyes’ classification was not void; his motion, construed as a

postconviction relief petition, was untimely; and he [had] not established the statutory

conditions for the trial court to consider a second petition.” Id. at ¶ 15. Moreover, we

concluded that “[b]ecause Reyes could have challenged the trial court’s retroactive

application of the Adam Walsh Act in a timely direct appeal from his conviction, any review

of that issue in a postconviction relief petition [was] barred by res judicata.” Id. at ¶ 16.

       {¶7}   The present appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of Reyes’ “motion to

classify defendant under Megan’s Law[.]” On November 14, 2022, this court issued an

opinion addressing Reyes’ following assigned error:

              The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant’s
              motion to classify Defendant under Megan’s [Law], because
              the classification requirements inherent in Megan’s Law are
              civil and remedial, and are not a punishment within the
              defendant’s sentence.

State v. Reyes, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2022-P-0018, 2022-Ohio-4046, ¶ 1, motion to

certify allowed, 169 Ohio St.3d 1497, 2023-Ohio-1242, 207 N.E.3d 829, ¶ 1, and rev’d

and remanded, 2023-Ohio-3644, ¶ 1.

       {¶8}   In our November 14, 2022 opinion, this court reiterated our determination in

Reyes’ prior appeal, namely: “that his failure to file a timely direct appeal resulted in the

forfeiture of his challenge to the trial court’s retroactive application of the Adam Walsh Act

                                              4

Case No. 2022-P-0018
and that his collateral attack on this alleged sentencing error is barred by the doctrine of

res judicata.” Reyes, 2022-Ohio-4046, ¶ 10, citing Reyes, 2021-Ohio-3478, at ¶ 9, 16,

and Henderson at ¶ 90 (Donnelly, J., dissenting), citing Harper at ¶ 41 (“A direct appeal

is the available legal process to address a trial court’s alleged sentencing error, and the

failure to challenge a sentencing error on direct appeal operates as res judicata to any

later collateral attack on the judgment.”). We concluded that Reyes had attempted to

reframe his challenge in the present appeal, “but the result [was] the same. Because the

trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over Reyes, any error

in the sentence—including the Adam Walsh Act Tier III classification—was voidable, not

void.” Reyes, 2022-Ohio-4046, at ¶ 11, citing Reyes, 2021-Ohio-3478, at ¶ 8-9, citing

Henderson at ¶ 43. Accordingly, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

       {¶9}   Thereafter, on Reyes’ motion, this court certified a conflict to the Ohio

Supreme Court on the following issue:

              Whether the State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-
              Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 7765 void/voidable analysis applies to
              Megan’s Law reclassification proceedings, since Megan’s
              Law reclassification proceedings are civil and remedial, not
              part of a criminal sentence, and, thus, separate entries and
              treated as separately appealable orders.

       {¶10} The Supreme Court determined that a conflict existed and held the case for

its decision in Schilling, 2023-Ohio-3027. State v. Reyes, 169 Ohio St.3d 1497, 2023-

Ohio-1242, 207 N.E.3d 829.

       {¶11} In Schilling, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether its holding

in Henderson that “when a court has jurisdiction to act, any errors in the court’s judgment

are voidable and are subject to res judicata if they are not timely appealed,” “applies to a

trial court’s erroneous classification of a defendant as a Tier I sex offender subject to the
                                             5

Case No. 2022-P-0018
registration and reporting requirements of Ohio’s [AWA], * * * when the date on which the

defendant committed the offense rendered the defendant subject to the registration and

reporting requirements of Ohio’s Megan’s Law[.]” Schilling at ¶ 1, citing Henderson at ¶

26-27.

         {¶12} The Supreme Court answered this question in the negative, stating:

                A person’s obligation to register and report as a sex offender
                under either of Ohio’s sex-offender registration and reporting
                schemes does not arise by judicial determination. It arises by
                operation of law based on the sex-offense conviction itself.
                Accordingly, Henderson does not apply here, because [the]
                holding in that case applies only with respect to errors in a trial
                court’s exercise of its judgment.

(Emphasis added.) Schilling at ¶ 2. On the authority of Schilling, the Supreme Court

reversed our November 14, 2022 judgment in the present case and remanded the matter

to this court for further consideration. State v. Reyes, 2023-Ohio-3644, --- N.E.3d ----

(Oct. 10, 2023).

         {¶13} We now proceed to further consider the present appeal pursuant to the

Schilling decision.

         {¶14} First, we note that in its discussion of Henderson, the Schilling Court stated:

                Our decision in Henderson does not apply to the trial court’s
                erroneous classification of Schilling as a Tier I sex offender
                under the AWA instead of as a sexually oriented offender
                under Megan’s Law. Neither Schilling’s sentencing entry nor
                any other judgment entered by the trial court in this case
                actually imposed, by judicial determination, the Tier I
                classification. The only such documents in the trial-court
                record that even mention Schilling’s purported status as a Tier
                I sex offender are the document signed by Schilling and the
                trial-court judge that informed Schilling of his duty to register
                and report as a Tier I offender and the court’s entry noting that
                Schilling had been informed of those duties. Neither of these
                is a trial-court judgment such that our holding in Henderson
                might apply to any error it may contain.
                                                6

Case No. 2022-P-0018
(Emphasis added.) Schilling, 2023-Ohio-3027, at ¶ 23. Thus, in Schilling, “there [was] no

court order or judgment in the record declaring that Schilling ha[d] been determined to be

a Tier I sex offender under the AWA, but rather only an indication that he had received

notice of his purported Tier I status and reporting requirements[.]” Schilling at ¶ 24.

        {¶15} Unlike Schilling, Reyes’ sentencing entry specifically states, “The Court

finds the Defendant is a Tier III Sex Offender.”1 Nevertheless, in Schilling, the Supreme

Court emphasized that the applicable statutory reporting scheme is determined by

operation of law based on the date of the offense. Schilling at ¶ 24-25. Further, the

Supreme Court did not specifically limit its holding to the facts present in Schilling; instead,

it phrased its holding as follows:

                 [W]e hold that a person’s classification as a sexually oriented
                 offender under Megan's Law occurs by operation of law, and
                 therefore, our recent decision in Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d
                 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, does not apply to a
                 trial court’s error in determining a person’s sex-offender
                 classification.

Schilling at ¶ 39. Therefore, because there is no dispute that Reyes committed the

offenses prior to the effective date of the AWA, Reyes’ classification under Megan’s Law

occurred by operation of law, and the Henderson holding does not apply to the trial court’s

error in finding that Reyes was a Tier III offender under the AWA.

        {¶16} Next, although our November 14, 2022 opinion did not address whether

Reyes’ present motion should be recast as a petition for postconviction relief, we did note

1. As with Schilling, it is unsurprising that the trial court misclassified Reyes under the AWA, as he was
sentenced in 2010, prior to the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Williams. See Schilling at ¶ 10, fn. 1
(“Our decision in Williams—holding that the retroactive application of the AWA is unconstitutional—was
issued approximately three years after Schilling’s conviction in this case. It is therefore understandable that
the trial court labeled Schilling a Tier I sex offender subject to the registration and reporting duties of the
AWA and that no appeal was taken from that determination.”).
                                                      7

Case No. 2022-P-0018
that Reyes had attempted to reframe his prior motion, which we had construed as a

postconviction petition on appeal. Reyes, 2022-Ohio-4046, at ¶ 11; Reyes, 2021-Ohio-

3478, at ¶ 15. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A), an offender meeting certain statutory criteria

may file a petition to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence in the court that

imposed sentence. Because the Schilling Court held that the applicable classification

between Megan’s Law and the AWA is imposed by operation of law, and thus not by

judgment of the trial court, we conclude that Reyes’ motion for classification under

Megan’s Law is not subject to recasting as a motion for postconviction relief. Accordingly,

Reyes’ motion is not subject to the requirements of R.C. 2953.21(A).

      {¶17} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this

matter for classification of Reyes under the version of Megan’s Law that was in effect at

the time Reyes committed the offenses.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

concur.

                                            8

Case No. 2022-P-0018