Court Opinion

ID: 9833338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:37:57.022527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:01.681083
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The briefs of the parties to this suit, as originally presented in this court, seemed to raise only the issues of the admissibility of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and amount of damages, and only as to the latter was there any apparent difference as to the facts. Appellee’s brief led us to believe that appellant’s contention that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was directed against his allegation as to punitory damages. Upon this view of the case, we affirmed the judgment. Upon motion for rehearing, appellant’s counsel convinced us that his assignment raised the issue of res ipsa loquitur as to actual damages also. He had asserted in his original brief, and reiterated the same in his motion for rehearing, that the only act of negligence proven was the act of collision. We examined appellee’s brief to see if this was controverted, and found that it was not; in accordance with rule 41 for government of appellate courts, we took it for granted that there was no evidence that the injury was occasioned by the negligence of those in charge of appellant’s trains, for which reasons we granted a rehearing, and reversed and remanded this case.
[5] Now comes counsel for appellee, and for the first time calls our attention to acts of negligence upon the part of those in charge of said trains. These facts are that said trains started as one train, but at Dublin was divided into two sections, and started on their journey, the one following the other, from which fact the conductor of the front train must have known that it was dangerous to stop his train on the track, without turning the switch so as to derail the rear train, or without putting a danger signal in rear of his train. The engineer of the rear train stated, as a part of the res gest», that he did not see the front train until he was too near to it to stop, at which time he jumped from his engine, presumably without applying the brakes, as he only mentioned having turned on the sand. The conductor and engineer of the rear train must have known that the other train was only a short distance in front, and was liable to stop at G-ranbury, a station on appellant’s road, and yet they came into said station, running 25 or 30 miles an hour, and did not keep sufficient lookout to see the front train in time to stop before running into it. The engineer of the first train had taken his engine to the stock pen; he evidently saw the rear train approaching, for the evidence is that he sounded the danger signal, but the rear train paid no attention to it.
We gave the statement of facts a careful examination when this ease was first submitted to us as to the only issue of fact presented by the briefs, and that was to the extent of appellee’s injuries, but the facts above recited escaped our attention, for the reason that appellee did not deny appellant’s statement as to this matter, but contented himself with insisting that he was entitled to recover under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Another fact to which our attention was not called is that the learned trial court did not submit the general issue of negligence, but limited the appellee’s right to recover to proof of negligence on the part of appellant’s employés in charge of the train. The jury found in favor of appellee on this issue, and the evidence as above set out is, we think, sufficient to sustain their verdict.
For the reason herein given, as well as for those given in the original opinion herein, we grant appellee’s motion for a rehearing, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Rehearing granted; judgment affirmed.