Court Opinion

ID: 9679946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:13:45.619311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:50.297981
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge.
DISSENTING OPINION
Thirty years ago this Court generously interpreted a durational residency requirement to promote access to the ballot. State ex rel. King v. Walsh 484 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. banc 1972), involved an extensive discussion of the facts relating to the residency of a candidate for governor. In this case, Gibbons, the disqualified candidate, sought to run for the office of associate circuit judge.
Unlike State ex rel. King v. Walsh, this case does not call for examination of the facts because we have the trial court's finding that Gibbons was not a resident for one year immediately prior to the November 2002 general election. On this factual issue, I agree that we should defer to the trial court. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).
Gibbons could, however, qualify for the ballot in the Democratic primary against the incumbent, Lewis, if we read the statute as written and not try to improve on the legislature’s word choices.
In considering the one-year residency requirement of section 478.320.6, State ex rel. King v. Walsh is a reminder that, in a democratic system, the opportunity to vote and to run for public office are important interests. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S., 134, *470143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972); see also Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626-628, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). If a statute limits the opportunity to run for office, its limitations should be narrowly confined to the precise statutory language in order to promote access to the ballot. See also State ex rel. Upchurch v. Blunt, 810 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. banc 1991).
The generous spirit evident in State ex rel. King v. Walsh would be appropriate here in our reading of the statute.
Article V, section 21, approved by the voters in 1976, allows the General Assembly, by law, to place qualifications on those who would run for the office of associate circuit judge. The constitutional provision contains a residency requirement but does not contain a durational residency requirement. Section 478.320.6, enacted in 1985, states:
No person shall be elected as an associate circuit judge unless he has resided in the county for which he is to be elected at least one year prior to the date of his election; provided that, a person who is appointed by the governor to fill a vacancy may file for election and be elected notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection.
Lewis argued, and the trial court and the majority of this Court agree, that the relevant period was the one year immediately prior to the election and that the previous period of residence in the county was irrelevant.
Gibbons contends he meets the requirement of section 478.320.6 because he has lived in Knox County one year prior to the election; i.e., the period prior to going to college. There is no dispute that Gibbons was a resident of Knox County from 1964 to 1983. When he went to college in 1983, he said he remained a resident until 1991, when he completed law school.
Section 478.320.6 is clear as written. It requires that Gibbons be a resident of Knox County “at least one year prior to the date of his election.... ” The statute does not say “immediately prior to” or “next preceding.” As the words of section 478.320.6 are written, any residency of at least one year’s duration prior to the election will suffice. Where the legislature chooses - to impose the requirement that residency must be immediately prior, it usually has . done so explicitly.1 Courts *471may read “immediately” into the phrase “prior to” in some contexts.2 We should decline to so here because a statutory restriction on the opportunity to run for this office ought to be explicitly stated.
It may be that the legislature meant to impose a requirement of one year’s residency immediately prior to election for associate circuit judges. In construing statutes, courts search for legislative intent, as the majority does here. See also J.S. v. Beaird, 28 S.W.Bd 875, 876 (Mo. banc 2000). However, the majority’s search for legislative intent results in adding words — “immediately” or “next preceding” — that are not in the statute. In the final analysis, especially where an important interest such as access to the ballot is concerned, courts should be bound by what the statute says, not by what the lawmakers might have been thinking. Hinnah v. Director of Revenue, 77 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Mo. banc 2002)(No. SC84192, decided June 25, 2002).
The majority asserts that the reading of the statute advocated here is absurd because it would allow any one-year period of residency to be counted. The point is not without irony. Incumbent-protection laws, such as the one at issue here, often are inherently absurd. If the reading that I advocate seems absurd, it may be precisely what this statute deserves.
In any event, the statute simply requires that Gibbons be a resident of Knox County at least one year prior to the election. He
has met that requirement. I therefore dissent.

. See, e.g., section 51.050 (county clerk shall have resided "within the county for which he is elected six months just prior to his election"); section 55.060 (county auditor shall have resided "within the county for which he is elected or appointed for three months immediately preceding the election or his appointment”); section 56.010 (sheriff "shall have resided in said county for more than one whole year next before filing for said office”); section 58.030 (coroner shall have resided "within the county for which he is elected, six months next preceding the election”); section 452.305 (party to a dissolution action must be a resident of the state "for ninety days next preceding the commencement of the proceeding ... ”). See also article IV, section 3 ("governor shall be ... a resident of this state for at least ten years next before election”); arti-ele IV, section 10 (lieutenant governor shall have the same qualifications as the governor); article IV, section 13 (state auditor shall be a resident of this state for át least ten years next before election); article III, section 6 (state "senator shall be thirty years of age, and next before the day of his election shall have been ... a resident of the district which he is chosen to represent for one year ... ”); article III, section 4 (state “representative shall be twenty-four years of age, and next before the day of his election shall have been ... a resident of the county or district which he is chosen to represent for one year ... ”); article V, section 21 ("judges of the supreme court and court of appeals - shall have been ... qualified voters of the state for nine years next preceding their selection ... circuit judges *471shall have been ... residents of the state three years next preceding their selection, ... and residents of the circuit for at least one year ...”). But see Chowning v. Magness, 792 S.W.2d 438 (Mo.App. 1990) (courts and parties assumed statute referred to 12 months immediately prior to the election.).

. For example, in workers compensation cases, a "prior” employer is interpreted, within the context of that statutory scheme, to mean the most recent employer. See Owens v. Norb Hackmann, 979 S.W.2d 941 (Mo.App. 1998), and Endicott v. Display Technologies, 77 S.W.3d 612 (Mo. banc 2002). That interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the workers' compensation law to provide injured workers with a simple means of obtaining compensation.