Court Opinion

ID: 9494168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:31:00.160703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:15.444961
License: Public Domain

KING, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
Although I agree with the majority that the decision appealed from must be reversed and this case remanded for trial, I reach that conclusion through a separate route from my learned colleagues. I write separately to explain my position.
First of all, characterizing what occurred below as a dismissal of the indictment confuses the issue. It is elementary that a motion to dismiss an indictment implicates only the legal sufficiency of its allegations, not the proof offered by the Government. In most cases, “an indictment is sufficient if it alleges an offense in the words of the statute, assuming those words ‘fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence.’ ” United States v. Wicks, 187 F.3d 426, 427 (4th Cir.1999) (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (internal citation omitted)).
There is no legal deficiency in this indictment. It alleges each essential element of a federal crime under § 844(i), and it asserts particularly that the First Baptist Church was “used in interstate and foreign commerce and in activity affecting interstate and foreign commerce.” J.A. 41. The pretrial proceedings thus necessarily assaulted the Government’s proof as outlined in the stipulated proffer, not the allegations of the indictment.
Second, it has been clear at least since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), that an accused is entitled to have a jury decide each element of the offense with which he is charged. The jury’s function is not merely to determine the existence vel non of the factual components underlying the essential elements, “but to apply the law to those facts and draw the ultimate conclusion of guilt or innocence.” Id. at 514, 115 S.Ct. 2310.
The mandate of Gaudin applies even to “jurisdictional” elements, and specifically to the interstate commerce element of the federal arson statute. See United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir.1997) (“Because the ‘substantially affects interstate commerce’ requirement is a jurisdictional element [of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) ], it must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (citing United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1246 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 524 (9th Cir.1995)). The jury must be *372properly instructed, of course, taking into account the recent jurisprudence on the point. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 855, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000) (holding § 844(i) element that subject property be “used” in activity affecting commerce to require “active employment for commercial purposes”).
Third, even before Gaudin, the prevailing view was that the Government’s proof with respect to jurisdictional elements is subject to evaluation by the trial court solely in connection with a motion for judgment of acquittal made “after the evidence on either side is closed,” as specified by Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 Such review may not ordinarily be undertaken in considering a pretrial motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b). See United States v. Nukida, 8 F.3d 665, 669-70 (9th Cir.1993) (in product tampering prosecution, Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on ground that commerce element was lacking “amounted to a premature challenge to the sufficiency of the government’s evidence tending to prove a material element of the offense”); United States v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048 (11th Cir.1987) (“[A] pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment cannot be based on a sufficiency of the evidence argument because such an argument raises factual questions embraced in the general issue.”).2 The district court’s preliminary ruling in this case regarding the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence was therefore an aberration. It was, perhaps, a serious enough departure from established methodology to warrant reversal on procedural grounds.3
Had the matter actually proceeded to trial, the result would have hinged on the timing of the district court’s ruling. If we assume that the trial evidence would have conformed to the proffer, the court may have been inclined to enter a judgment of acquittal following the Government’s casein-chief or after the defense had rested. Because the district court’s judgment would have been based upon its determination that the evidence was insufficient to convict Terry, principles of double jeopardy would have barred any appeal by the Government. See United States v. Mackins, 32 F.3d 134, 137-38 (4th Cir.1994). If the court had instead deferred its entry of judgment until after the jury had returned a guilty verdict, the Government would have been permitted to appeal Terry’s acquittal inasmuch as the verdict could simply be reinstated without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731; United States v. Mitchell, 177 F.3d 236, 238 (4th Cir.1999) (citations omitted).
The district court here, however, entered its judgment prior to the attachment of jeopardy, rendering the situation analogous to post-verdict cases like Mitchell. That is, the Double Jeopardy Clause poses *373no impediment to the Government’s appeal. We are therefore obliged to review de novo the district court’s judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29. United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). In so doing, we are bound (as was the district court) to “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and inquire whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In that vein, this case would pose the following question: “Could a reasonable jury, properly instructed, find as a fact that the First Baptist Church was used in interstate commerce, or in activity affecting interstate commerce?” The evidence related by the majority and stipulated to by the parties, ante at 368, is clearly sufficient to establish the interstate commerce element.
I agree with the majority that the most compelling fact in that regard is the evidence regarding the day care center operated within the church. But I would reach the same conclusion even had no day care center existed. Reviewed under the deferential Rule 29 standard, the additional evidence concerning the interstate commerce element would, standing alone, compel denial of a judgment of acquittal.
The majority, like the district court, treats the interstate commerce issue as being primarily a legal one, suitable for court determination in the first instance. I do not agree. The interstate commerce element of § 844(i) requires proof of a fact, and, in the ordinary course, it is subject to our review of the Government’s evidence in accordance with Rule 29 — and not otherwise.
In all events, I am pleased to concur in the judgment.

. In setting forth the applicable procedure, Rule 29 provides, in pertinent part:
The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 (emphasis added).

. Rule 12(b) permits only those defenses, objections, or requests “capable of determination without the trial of the general issue” to be raised and addressed by motion prior to trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b).

.I say "perhaps” because the Government may have waived its right to object to the unusual procedure employed by the district court by acceding to the court’s demand for a proffer. Had the Government instead refused the invitation to stage a dress rehearsal, thereby triggering dismissal of the indictment, the procedural point would have been preserved.