Court Opinion

ID: 9792838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:37:53.156288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:59:46.655437
License: Public Domain

JOSEPH, C. J.,
dissenting.
I dissent, because the majority misreads and misapplies the restitution statute, particularly ORS 137.103(2). That section has the function of defining (and confining) the term "pecuniary damages” in ORS 137.103(4) to mean those sorts of damages that "a person” (NOTE: not "the victim” or "the person injured”) could recover in an appropriate civil case. The trial judge here determined from the presentence report that the accident out of which the damages arose was the defendant’s fault. *727The majority quotes but does not deal with the language in ORS 137.103(2) about "the facts or events constituting the defendant’s criminal activities.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The indictment by which the defendant was charged said he "did operate a motor vehicle * * * in such a manner that it was involved in an accident which resulted in an injury to * * *, and thereafter did unlawfully and with criminal negligence leave the scene of the accident without first giving his name, address and his motor vehicle’s registration number * * *, or render reasonable assistance to the person injured * * Under ORS 483.602(1)1 the allegations quoted are parts of the offense to be charged and proved. The defendant had to have been driving a vehicle that was involved in an accident. It should go without saying that the imposition of restitution is part of the sanctions that may be imposed upon a person convicted of a crime, not a civil judgment. The trial judge’s determination that the accident was defendant’s fault was not only permissible, it was necessary in order to "characterize the defendant” for the purpose of determining the appropriate sanctions. See State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 405, 623 P2d 630 (1981).
The majority has misled itself into analyzing the statute as if it is dealing with issues of civil liability — which, of course, it is not doing, or should not be doing. It ignores the legislature’s clear recognition that civil liability is entirely another matter. ORS 137.109(2) says:
"(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a defendant’s liability for pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent civil action.”
I would hold that the trial court properly imposed the sanction of requiring the defendant to pay "pecuniary damages” (ORS 137.103(4)) which resulted from "the facts or events constituting the defendant’s criminal activities.” I see no purpose to be served by a hairsplitting analysis of the statute in the face of the legislature’s obvious intention *728to make a full and complete response to the Supreme Court’s regrettable decision in State v. Stalheim, 275 Or 683, 552 P2d 829 (1976).
THORNTON, J. and WARREN, J., join in this dissent.

 "The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident which results in injury or death to any person or causes damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person, immediately shall stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, until he has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (2) of this section. * * *”