Court Opinion

ID: 9758086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:10:32.422145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:41.960301
License: Public Domain

RONNIE L. WHITE, Judge
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.1 The principal opinion does an “end-run” around the proper standard of review for summary judgments by interjecting the outcome-oriented conclusion that the policemen’s call to the prosecutor constituted an intervening event disrupting the chain of causation. This conclusion ignores the obvious, that but for Hale’s instigation of an apparently false police report, and but for the protracted conflict between these two parties, which the officers considered, the Highfills would not have been subjected to a false arrest for the crime of stalking.
“The essence of the cause of action of false arrest, or false imprisonment, is the confinement, without legal justification, by the wrongdoer of the person wronged.”2 “A person may also be liable for false arrest if he does not actually confine the plaintiff but merely instigates it, as in the case of providing information on the basis of which a subsequent unlawful arrest is made.”3
There is no dispute that the Highfills were restrained against their will when they were arrested without a warrant for stalking, and the Highfills are not required to prove that Hale explicitly ordered or directed the arrest, but only that her conduct amounted to encouraging or instigating the arrest.4 Instigation can be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence and can take place over an extended period of time.5
The record supports, and the principal opinion admits, that multiple complaints made by Hale to the police prior to the day of the arrest were considered by the police at the time of the arrest. In fact, to be prosecuted for the crime of stalking there must be purposeful and repeated harassment, so the police had to consider the *283prior incidents when making their probable cause determination.6
It is disingenuous to assert that the independent observation of “the fence” was all that was required to make this arrest. Moreover, the independent observation of this fence could have just as easily been interpreted as the Highfills taking defensive security measures against Hale’s actions, which could just as equally be considered grounds for an arrest for harassment and stalking. Indeed, the fact that Hale placed three calls to the police on the day of arrest supports an inference that she intended to continue calling until an arrest was made. Clearly there are disputed material facts as to the intent and motivations of Hale when she made her instigating calls to the police.
That being said, justification is a complete defense to this cause of action, and even if Hale instigated the arrest, she cannot be held liable for false imprisonment if the arrest was justified.7 To assert justification as an affirmative defense, Hale would have to prove that the arrest was lawful or that the officers had probable cause to make the arrest.8 “Probable cause to arrest exists when the arresting officer’s knowledge of the particular facts and circumstances is sufficient to warrant a prudent person’s belief that a suspect has committed an offense.”9 In general, “the defense of probable cause is a question of fact for the jury.”10
Hale claims that the arrest was justified based solely on the police officers’ independent observations on the day of the arrest, but as previously noted the stalking statute only criminalizes conduct that amounts to purposeful and repeated harassment. Without an inquiry into the purpose of the fence and without specific knowledge of prior incidents of harassment by the High-fills against Hale, the police could not have formed a reasonable belief that the High-fills were guilty of stalking and there could be no probable cause to support the arrest. Moreover, knowledge of the facts and circumstances as to whether an offense has been committed for purposes of arresting someone is completely divorced from a prosecutor’s decision to charge a person for a crime. The call to the prosecutor is totally irrelevant to this determination.
For summary judgment purposes, a genuine issue of material fact exists if there is competent evidence in the record of two plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts.11 When viewed in the light most favorable to the Highfills, as is required,12 the record reveals that there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could determine that Hale instigated the arrest. Hale also failed to demonstrate the facts necessary to support the affirmative defense of probable cause. There are two plausible accounts concerning the material facts of this case, and the call to the prosecutor did not break the chain of causation.
*284The principal opinion’s claim that to allow a jury to hear this case would result in some type of global civil liability for anyone complaining about possible criminal behavior not only lacks merit, but essentially demonstrates a distrust of our jury system to competently examine the evidence and make a proper determination. Summary judgment in this instance was simply inappropriate. I would reverse and remand for further proceedings and trust our jury system to weigh the disputed material facts and reach the proper result.

. This opinion substantially follows the analysis of an opinion authored by the Honorable Glenn A. Norton.

. Rustid v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Mo. banc 1984).

. Id.

. Day v. Wells Fargo Guard Service Co., 711 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Mo. banc 1986).

. Id.

. Section 565.225.2. All statutory citations refer to RSMo 2000.

. Day, 711 S.W.2d at 505.

. Wehrman v. Liberty Petroleum Co., 382 S.W.2d 56, 63 (Mo.App.1964); Parrott v. Reis, 441 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Mo.App.1969).

. State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 767 (Mo. banc 1996).

. Signorino v. National Super Markets, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo.App.1989).

. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. banc 1993).

. Id. at 376.