Court Opinion

ID: 9536328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:57:39.062046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:19.830331
License: Public Domain

PRATHER, District Judge
(concurring specially in result, dissenting in part).
The crux of this case revolves around the question of whether or not a licensed purveyor of intoxicating liquors at retail can be held liable, as a matter of law, for the sale of intoxicating beverages to one who is already obviously, actually and apparently intoxicated. This question is really a question of whether or not this Court will say as a matter of law that such sale could or could not be the proximate cause of the ensuing automobile accident.
At the outset it should be remembered that this Court is not deciding the ultimate question of liability. That question wilt be decided by a jury. What this Court is. really deciding is whether or not a plaintiff will have the opportunity to prove to a jury, by a preponderance of the evidence, that further sale of intoxicating liquor to a. person who is already obviously, actually^ and apparently intoxicated can be the proxi- _ mate cause of ensuing injury caused by the acts of the intoxicated person. The plaintiff will have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the person in question was, at the time, obviously, actually and apparently intoxicated and will have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the bartender knew, or should have known, such fact. Furthermore, the plaintiff, to be successful upon such a cause of action, would have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the serving of the additional drinks of intoxicating liquor, after the subject person was already obviously, actually and apparently intoxicated, was a contributing proximate' cause of ensuing injuries caused by the-subject person to others.
*396This is a case of first impression in the State of Idaho and it will be necessary to find our answers upon general and fundamental principles of the law of torts. At the outset we are guided only by I.C. § 73-116, which provides:
“The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state.” (Emphasis supplied)
Idaho has adopted a complete statutory scheme which covers the questions involved and results in a denial of relief to the plaintiffs herein. The first legislature of the State of Idaho in 1891 (S.L.1891, § 5, p. 34) adopted provisions for the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors. One of the provisions was § 5 thereof and another provision was § 9 thereof.1 These provisions were carried forward into the Idaho Political Code (1901), Chapter 58, § 1507, and in slightly amended form became Revised Codes of Idaho (1908), Chapter 33, § 1511, and were in effect when the entire State of Idaho adopted prohibition. S.L. 1915, Chapter 28, §§ 1, 2 and 3.2 Chapter 28 of the 1915 laws constituted the entire State of Idaho a prohibition district. Chapter 11 of the 1915 S.L. defines and sets forth a prohibition district. It is noted that Chapter 28 of the 1915 laws does not contain any provisions attempting to repeal any other laws of the State of Idaho. Chapter 11 of the 1915 S.L. does contain language (§ 24) that “all other Acts and parts of Acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.”
The writers and publishers of the compiled laws (1918) in a note preceding Title *39720, Chapter 116, at page 662, assumed that these 1915 laws repealed the 1891 law and its amendments. But the annotator’s sweeping conclusion is too broad. The compiler of the 1918 laws said in his note, “it (S.L. Ch. 28, 1915) superseded — various other statutory provisions recognizing the liquor traffic as a licensed occupation.” With that conclusion this writer does not agree. Examination of § 5 and § 9 of the 1891 law reveals that they deal with other matters of liquor traffic than that of sale by licensed vendors. The 1918 publisher also stated he was relying upon the cases of In re Crane, 27 Idaho 671, 151 P. 1006, L.R.A.1918A, 942 (1915); Chas. L. Joy & Co. v. Carlson, 28 Idaho 455, 154 P. 640 (1916); and State v. Frederic, 28 Idaho 709, 155 P. 977 (1916). The compiler and publisher of the 1918 Compiled Laws did not place good reliance upon those cases. Examination of them reveals that they do not in any way discuss or deal with the subject matter contained in § 5 and § 9 of the 1891 law.
When a new law does not expressly, by direct reference, repeal a prior law there are various rules that govern the deliberation of courts in deciding whether or not the prior law has, in fact, been repealed. The intention of the legislature in enacting the alleged repealing act is controlling. A statute which expressly repeals so much of an earlier statute as is inconsistent therewith evinces a clear legislative intent that the earlier statute shall stand in respect of its other provisions. A general provision in an act to the effect that all acts or parts of acts inconsistent or in conflict therewith are repealed, has been regarded as a strong implication, or an express recognition of the fact, that there may be acts or parts of acts on the same subject which are not thereby repealed. Where an act, which is not a complete law within itself covering the whole subject, contains a provision to the effect that all laws and parts of laws inconsistent or in conflict therewith are repealed, the repeal extends to conflicting statutes and provisions only; all laws and parts of laws not in conflict therewith are left in full force and effect. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 518 and § 520.
Repeals by implication are not favored in the law. State v. Martinez, 43 Idaho 180, 250 P. 239 (1926); Engelking v. Investment Board, 93 Idaho 217, 458 P.2d 213, filed June 30, 1969; and 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 538. A repeal by implication is carried no further than is required to gratify the legislative intent manifested in the later act. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 535. The implication of a repeal, in order to be operative, must be necessary, or necessarily follow from the language used, because the last or dominate statute admits of no other reasonable construction. The courts will not hold to a repeal if they can find reasonable grounds to hold to the contrary; if two constructions are possible, that one will be adopted which operates to support the earlier act, rather than to repeal it by implication. Only a clear repugnancy between the new and the old acts requires the old act to give way and then it gives way only to the extent of the repugnancy. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 68 Idaho 185, 191 P.2d 359 (1948); Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439, 65 S.Ct. 716, 89 L.Ed. 1051; Engelking v. Investment Board, supra; and, 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 538. Since laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with full knowledge of existing ones on the same subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the legislature, in passing a statute, did not intend to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable. Except where an act covers the entire subject matter of earlier legislation, is complete in itself, and is evidently intended to supersede the prior legislation on the subject, a later act does not, by implication, repeal an earlier act unless there is such a clear, manifest, controlling, necessary, positive, unavoidable, and irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy, that the two acts can not, by a fair and reasonable construction, be reconciled, made to stand together, and be given effect or enforced con*398currently. Moreover, a statute is only repealed by the repugnancy of matter in a subsequent statute to the extent of such repugnancy, and if any part of the earlier act can stand as not superseded or affected by the later act, it is not repealed. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 543. For one statute to repeal another by implication, they must both relate to the same object or purpose. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 545. The policy against implied repeals has peculiar and special force when conflicting provisions, which are thought to work a repeal, are contained in a special or specific act in a later or general or broad act. In such case, there is a presumption that the general or broad law was not designed to repeal the special or specific act. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 564.
Applying the above rules we find that neither Chapter 11 nor Chapter 28 of the 1915 Session Laws repealed § 5 and § 9 of the 1891 laws. In § 5 of the 1891 law, we note that the person making complaint was to name only the person from whom his relative, having intemperate habits, obtains his liquor. It is noted that this is applicable to any person and not just a licensed vendee. Likewise, upon receiving the complaint the justice of the peace issued a notice to the “person.” The act went on to provide, as penalties in the event any person that was so notified made a sale to the interdicted person, that the one doing so could lose his license if he had one, was subject to a misdemeanor penalty, and was subject to a civil action for damages limited to the amount of two-hundred dollars ($200.00) for each offense. It is also noted that said § 5 applied not only to sales but to the giving away of intoxicating liquor. No such provisions as are contained in § 5 of the 1891 law are found in Chapters 11 or 28 of the 1915 laws. It should be further noted that the 1915 laws provided that licensed pharmacists or members of the clergy were permitted to have intoxicating liquors in their possession. Therefore, even after adoption of the laws in 1915, § 5 of the 1891 laws continued to have applicability. Likewise, § 9 of the 1891 laws charged that every person, whether he had a license for the sale of liquor or not, was, not to sell or give away liquor to any person already intoxicated. No such provisions are found in either Chapter 11 or Chapter 28 of the 1915 law. So again, keeping in mind that there were persons who could lawfully have intoxicating liquor in their possession, it is apparent that § 9 of the 1891 law continued to have efficacy and applicability after adoption of the 1915 laws. Sections 5 and 9 of the 1891 law, not being inconsistent with the prohibition laws of 1915 they were therefore not repealed by the 1915 laws and are to this day in full force and effect.
The purposes of §§ 5 and 9 of the 1891 law and of the prohibition laws of 1915 are not inconsistent. Art. 3, § 24 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho provides as. follows:
“The first concern of all good government is the virtue and sobriety of the people, and the purity of the home. The legislature should further all wise and well directed efforts for the promotion of temperance and morality.”
Sections 5 and 9 of the 1891 law are obviously well calculated to carry out these constitutional mandates. Likewise, the prohibition laws of 1915 were so calculated.
Concluding that §§ 5 and 9 of the 1891 law are still in full force and effect, the question becomes whether such laws provide or prohibit a right of recovery to the plaintiffs herein. It is obvious from considering §§ 5 and 9 of the 1891 law together that the legislature was considering the problem of intoxicated persons who obtain more liquor after they are already intoxicated. Having had this problem before it, and having considered the problem,, the legislature concluded to give a limited right of civil damages pursuant to § 5 and' provided only a penal remedy in those cases not covered by § 5. Having the problem before it, and the legislature having acted' upon it, any claim based upon facts such as plaintiffs claim herein must fall before the rule of statutory construction that inclusio> *399unius est exclusio alterius. Having considered the problem and acted as it did, it is evident that the legislative intent was not to afford persons such as plaintiffs herein any right of recovery. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed because of the continued efficacy of §§ 5 and 9 of the 1891 law which provided a complete legislative scheme upon the subject and excludes a right of recovery to plaintiffs.
Were it not for the statutory exclusions of plaintiffs’ claim herein, I apprehend no reason that plaintiffs’ action would as a matter of law have to be dismissed.
Many cases and texts are found wherein the broad and sweeping general statement is made that at common law there was no right of recovery by an injured third person against the party who sold intoxicants to one who subsequently injured such third person while intoxicated. As is usual with such broad statements it is an over simplification and a generalization and is not found to be entirely accurate. This supposed common law rule is predicated upon the reasoning that the drinking of the liquor is the proximate cause of the injury, not the furnishing of it. However, the common law rule is generally qualified to the extent of giving a right of action against one furnishing liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication of the person so furnished, where the liquor was given or sold to a person who was in such a condition as to be deprived of his willpower or responsibility for his behavior or in violation of a prohibitory statute. 30 Am.Jur., Intoxicating Liquor, § 520. The lcey to the supposed common law rule of non-liability is found in the words “sale to ordinary able-bodied men.” If we consider that the consumer of the alcohol is healthy, sober, and not known to be addicted to consuming alcohol to the point of becoming intoxicated, the common law rule is logical as the supplier of the liquor should not be bound as a matter of law to foresee that such a person would drink to the point •of intoxication. On the other hand, if the person, to whom the liquor was sold or given, was in such a state of helplessness or debauchery as to deprive him of his willpower, or responsibility for his behavior, an entirely different situation would exist. In such latter situation, the common law has recognized that there is a right of recovery by those injured by the subsequent acts of the intoxicated person. 30 Am.Jur., Intoxicating Liquor, § 521. (See cases annotated in 130 A.L.R. 353 and 75 A.L.R.2d 833.) Under the I.R.C.P., a complaint is sufficient if it states facts that will advise the defendant generally of the nature of the claim made against him. The plaintiffs’ complaint herein is sufficient under the I.R.C.P. to permit the plaintiff to prove that Freeman was not, at the time of the sale of the liquor to him, an ordinary able-bodied man and thus enable plaintiffs to bring their cause within the exceptions to the general common law rule.
I can not agree with the fundamental premise of those cases holding that there can be no liability on the part of one furnishing or supplying intoxicating liquor to another who is intoxicated when such other subsequently injures an innocent third party because of such intoxication. We can at once dismiss from consideration cases considering claims for damages or injuries suffered by the intoxicated person himself or by his surviving heirs. The acts of the intoxicated person himself would be sufficient to constitute contributory negligence that would prohibit such recovery. However, there can be no such contributory negligence charged against the innnocent third person injured by the intoxicated party. Some courts cling steadfastly to the myth that it is the drinking and not the sale that is the proximate cause of the ensuing injury and are wearing blinders when it comes to observing the ordinary course of human events. It is quite ordinary to observe that persons who commence drinking intoxicants pass through various stages from complete sobriety to incapacitating intoxication and unconsciousness. It is quite observable that the first small amounts of liquor do not affect the person’s ability to control himself and his actions. When the *400person has imbibed sufficient liquor that the effects thereof are becoming obvious to the ordinary person, the imbiber is still able to control himself and his actions sufficiently to avoid injury to others. If the imbiber continues to drink intoxicants, however, his condition will worsen until he reaches the point that he can not control his thought or muscular processes. After the first signs of apparent and obvious intoxication have begun to show on a person who is drinking, it is within the knowledge and experience of nearly all people that such person should not indulge in any further use of intoxicants until his body has rid itself of that which he has already imbibed. When so viewed, I perceive no difference in regarding the sale of further intoxicants to one already drunk as a proximate cause of ensuing injuries and in those cases wherein the sale of firearms to minors or incompetents, the sale of explosives to minors or incompetents, the sale of dangerous drugs to those known to be addicted, or the manufacture and release upon ■ the market of dangerously defective commodities are held to form a basis for liability. The underlying principle of all of these cases is that the seller is sending out into the public a thing of danger which a reasonably prudent person under like circumstances would apprehend would be likely to cause injury to someone else.
When -most people walked and few had horses or. carriages, or even in the days when the horse and buggy was a customary mode of travel, it may have been that the common law rule of non-liability arising from the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person was satisfactory. But the situation then -and the problem in today’s society of the.-imbiber going upon the public highways and operating á machine that requires quick response of mind and muscle and capable of producing mass death and destruction are vastly different. While it is true that I.C. § 73-116 directs that the common law of England is in force in this state, this does not mean that we must continue to apply the law as it existed in 1864 when I.C. § 73-116 was adopted. The common law only applies insofar as it is adaptable to the wants and necessities of its people. 15 Am.Jur.2d, Common Law, § 11. Statutory provisions adopting the common law as it exists at a particular time do not alter the flexibility and capacity for growth which characterize the common law. 15 Am.Jur.2d, Common Law, § 12. Common law rules will be recognized and adopted when they meet conditions existing in the state, and they will not be allowed to control when the conditions are those not contemplated by the common law. 15 Am.Jur.2d, Common Law, § 13. It is obvious that in 1864 the modern high-powered automobile and highway was not contemplated by the common law. Young v. Wright, 77 Idaho 244, 290 P.2d 1086 (1955). The courts may disregard the common law entirely when it is not suited to the habits and necessities of the people. Revision of an outmoded common law rule is within the competence of the judiciary, and indeed it is the duty of the courts to bring the law into accordance with present day standards of wisdom and justice. Courts must recognize that the law is not static; the great body of laws is the great product of progressive thinking which attunes traditional concepts to the needs and demands of the changing times. A court should not be bound by an early common law rule unless it is supported by reason and logic. 15 Am.Jur.2d, Common Law, § 14.
As hereinabove demonstrated, it affronts and abuses one’s sense of logic to contend that in today’s society that the furnishing of more intoxicants to one who is already actually, obviously and apparently intoxicated can not be a contributing proximate cause of ensuing automobile accidents caused by the intoxicated person. This court has not hesitated to change the common law when it no longer meets the needs of modern day society. Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1969); and State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797, filed June 30, 1969.
None of the cases decided since 1947, that this writer has been able to read, have-' *401had the courage to face forthrightly the question of whether or not the old common law rule of nonliability continued to meet the needs of modern society. The courts found it easier to escape responsibility behind the hoary doctrine of stare decisis. They occasionally attempt to bolster their courage by criticizing those courts that did squarely examine the social problems involved as being unable to dis-enthrall themselves of the lurking suspicion that liquor in and of itself is evil. It might equally be said that such courts are unable to disenthrall themselves of the mystic of the ancient common law or the fear that some bartender be held responsible for his acts. The courts clinging to the old common law rule further bolster their position by contending that the legislatures have recognized liquor as part of the public policy and the social scene in that they have legitimatized the manufacture and sale thereof, and derive great revenue from taxation thereof. Such reasoning would as well apply, for example, to the manufacture and sale of automobiles or of a loaf of bread. Such manufacture and sale is authorized by law, is supervised and regulated, and yields great revenue to the state. Yet the courts have never found this a reason to deny liability for an unlawful operation of an automobile nor to deny liability for the sale of a poisoned loaf of bread.
Some complain of illogic in holding a licensed retailer of liquor to such a liability for selling to an intoxicated person and not exacting the same liability of a friend who might give the intoxicated person more liquor. Such illogical result need not follow. If the giving of more intoxicating liquor to one who is already intoxicated can be a contributing proximate cause of ensuing injury caused by the intoxicated person, then the rule would apply to both the licensed and the unlicensed dispensers or furnishers of intoxicating liquor. In view of the damage caused by intoxicated drivers upon the highways there would seem to be sound public policy in holding to some degree of accountability those who wish to dispense liquor to intoxicated persons whether they be licensed retailers or generous friends.
The discussion of the old common law and whether it should or should not be continued in Idaho is probably academic. Idaho in 1891 changed the common law. The common law of England in 1864, which was adopted by I.C. § 73-116, did not contain any prohibition, either court made or statutory, against the sale of intoxicating liquor to one who was already intoxicated. In 1891 the Idaho legislature enacted a statute prohibiting such sales. S.L. 1891, § 9, p. 36. As set forth hereinabove, this section is still the law of the State of Idaho and has never been repealed. The enactment in 1947 of what is now I.C. § 23-929 is not inconsistent with the 1891 law. The 1947 law applied only to licensed retail liquor sellers, whereas the 1891 law applied to every person whether with or without a license for retail sale of liquor. Thus, since 1891 has the common law been abrogated in Idaho.
The violation of a statutory provision containing a mandate to do an act for the benefit of another, or a prohibition against the doing of an act which may be to his injury, is generally regarded as giving rise to a liability and creating a private right of action, whenever the other elements essential to a recovery are present. This is true regardless of actual negligence on the part of the violator of the statute, and although no actions are given in express terms by the statute. Jorstad v. City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 456 P.2d 766, filed July 9, 1969. The test whether an individual injured by the violation of a statute may recover from the wrongdoer has been declared to be whether the legislature intended to give such right. The absence of express provision for civil liability in case of the violation of a statute does not negate the existence of the legislative intent that the statute shall affect private rights; the intention to impose the liability may be inferred. Sometimes the violation of a statute is regarded as actionable in and of itself on the theory of nuisance or of negligence per se. Jorstad v. City of Lewiston, *402supra. The liability is said to arise through the operation of common law principles. There is no difference in the quality or character of an action whether it has its origin from the principles of common law, as formulated by decisions of the court, or whether it has its own origin in the declared word of the legislature as expressed by its legislative enactments. Am.Jur., Statutes, §§ 584 and 585.
The foregoing principles have been recognized and applied by the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho. In Curoe v. Spokane & Inland Empire Railroad Co., 32 Idaho 643, 186 P. 1101, 37 A.L.R. 923 (1920), a railroad had allowed combustible material to collect upon its road right-of-way. A fire commenced thereon and spread from the railroad right-of-way to adjoining lands of the plaintiff. There was no allegation or contention that the fire had been started or caused by the railroad. Compiled Statutes, §§ 2948 and 8346 provided that a railroad keep its right-of-way clear of cumbustible materials and that if it permitted a fire to spread from its right-of-way to adjoining lands was guilty of a misdemeanor. The railroad was held liable. The Supreme Court of Idaho said:
“Appellants (railroads) liability arises from a violation of its duty in that it permitted an accumulation of combustible material to remain on its right of way * * *. This was a violation of the law enacted for the protection of respondent, and others like situated, and constituted negligence resulting in damage for which this action is maintainable.”
The foregoing is followed in the case of Carron v. Guido, 54 Idaho 494, 33 P.2d 345 (1934). In the Carrón case, plaintiffs sued the defendant for the death of plaintiffs’ minor son and based their cause of action upon the contention that defendant had sold ammunition to their son in violation of I.C.A. § 17-2715, which prohibited the sale of ammunition to a minor under the age of sixteen (16) and made such act of sale a misdemeanor. The allegations of the complaint were proven and the trial court granted a non-suit. The granting of the non-suit was reversed by the Idaho Supreme Court and after pointing out that the decedent was killed by the unskillful and careless handling of the pistol by a companion of the plaintiffs’ son, the court said:
The violation of a law, intended for the protection of a person and others like situated, which results in his injury and is the proximate cause of it, is negligence per se.”
In the Carrón case, in considering the question of the acts of the negligent handler of the gun, which herein may be considered as analogous to the arguments that it is the drinking and not the sale of the liquor that causes the injury, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted with approval the following language:
“It is firmly settled that the intervention of a third person or of other and new direct causes does not preclude a recovery if the injury was the natural or probable result of the original wrong. * * * The rule goes so far as to hold that the original wrong-doer is responsible, even though the agency of a second wrongdoer intervened. * * * where an act unlawful in itself is done, from which an injury may reasonably and naturally be expected to result, the injury, when it occurs, will be traced back and visited upon the original wrong-doer.”
The Curoe and Carrón cases, supra, were cited in Pittman v. Sather, 68 Idaho 29, 188 P.2d 600 (1947), by the Idaho Supreme Court for the proposition that negligence per se is the violation of a statutory duty. In the case of Anderson v. Blackfoot Livestock Commission Co., 85 Idaho 64, 375 P.2d 704 (1962), the Carrón and Curoe cases, supra, are cited for the support of an instruction given the jury that:
“You are instructed that the violation of a statute or regulation made by a state agency under authority of statute, intended for the protection of a person and *403others like situated, which results in his injury and is the proximate cause of it, is negligence per se.”
In Bale v. Perryman, 85 Idaho 435, 380 P.2d 501 (1963), the Idaho Supreme Court held that I.C. § 49-713 was a safety measure enacted for the protection of all persons using roads and highways and again, following Carrón, supra, held that violation of a law, intended for the protection of a person and others like situated, which results in his injury and is the proximate cause, is negligence per se.
There is a great analogy herein with Title 49, Chapter 7 of the Idaho Code which provides rules for the operation of automobiles upon the roads and highways of Idaho. Nowhere in Chapter 7 of Title 49 has the legislature declared that the violation of any part thereof was intended to give a right of civil damages to any person injured by one violating said sections. Yet in Bale v. Perryman, supra, and in numerous other cases this Court has said that the violation of such statute is negligence per se. It is significant that in enacting Chapter 7 of Title 49 or any of its predecessor sections, even in fact its original parent Chapter 179 of the 1913 Session Laws, the legislature did not ever declare that these rules for the operation of motor vehicles were enacted for the safety of persons or property in the State of Idaho. In contrast, Chapter 274 of the 1947 Session Laws, which enacted what is now I.C. § 23-929, also enacted I.C. § 23-901 wherein it is expressly said:
“The restrictions, regulations, and provisions contained in this act are enacted by the legislature for the protection, health, welfare and safety of the people of the state of Idaho and for the purpose of promoting and encouraging temperance in the use of alcoholic beverages within said state of Idaho.” (Emphasis added)
In Jorstad v. City of Lewiston, supra, this Court, without discussing whether or not faulty design of a traffic divider was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, held it was negligence per se for defendant City to not employ a licensed engineer pursuant to I.C. § 54 — 1218. In Jorstad, the Court relied upon I.C. § 54-1201, which declared that I.C. § 54-1218 was enacted “to safeguard life, health and property * * There is no logical difference between that language and the language in I.C. § 23-901 that declares I.C. § 23-929 was enacted “for the protection, health, welfare and safety * * In fact, it seems to this writer that there is of necessity far more probability of resulting injury in giving a drunk more to drink than in failing to consult a registered professional engineer. Nothing good can foreseeably come from giving a drunk more booze, but it is common knowledge that experienced contractors and carpenters may likely build perfectly safe and sound structures.
If, without legislative declaration, this Court can declare violation of statutes against accumulating combustible material along a railroad right-of-way, a statute against sale of firearms to a minor, and statutes prescribing rules of operation of motor vehicles upon a highway to give rise to negligence per se when violated, I do not see how this Court can escape declaring violations of I.C. § 23-929 negligence per se in view of the express legislative declaration that it was enacted for the safety of the people of the State of Idaho. Failure to perform a public duty owed to, or intended for the benefit of the individuals composing the public gives a cause of action to anyone injured by such failure. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 4(8); Bale v. Perryman, supra; Carron v. Guido, supra; and Curoe v. Spokane & Inland Empire Railroad Co., supra.

. “Section 5. Any wife, mother, father, son, daughter or sister of a person who is a habitual drunkard, or in the habit of getting intoxicated, or the county commissioners, or the mayor of any city, or any county officer, may make complaint to any justice of the peace of the precinct where such person resides or may be staying, or to the probate judge of the county where such person resides or may be staying, alleging the name of such person, the fact of his being a habitual drunkard or in the habit of getting intoxicated, and the name or names of the person or persons from whom the person having such habits obtains his liquor, as such relative or officer believes, which complaint shall be verified by the person making the same ; whereupon said justice of the peace or said probate judge shall issue a notice in writing to such person or persons so named, notifying him or them that no intoxicating liquors of any kind must be sold or given away by him or them, or at his or their place or places of business, to such person having such habit, and which notice must at once be served upon such person or persons as summons are served from justice courts. After the service of such notice, if any person or persons so notified shall sell, give away, or permit any person at his place of business to sell or give away, any intoxicating liqquor to such person about whom he or they have received notice as aforesaid, his or their license' to sell liquor shall, from that time, be deemed and held to be cancelled and annulled; and said person, and each of said persons, if more than one, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and be liable in a civil action brought in the name or for the benefit of the person making such complaint, in the sum of two hundred dollars for each offense, and the wife, if there be one, may bring such suit without uniting her husband as a party to the action.”
“Section 9. Every person with or without a license who shall sell or give away to any person already intoxicated any spirituous, malt or fermented liquor or wine, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in any sum not less than one hundred dollars nor more than three hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail not to exceed six months.”

. “Section 1. The manufacture, disposal and transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes are prohibited in the State of Idaho.
“Sec. 2. The State of Idaho is hereby constituted a prohibition district, and all statutory provisions now or which may hereafter be in force in prohibition districts, so far as the same are not inconsistent herewith, are made applicable and operative for the enforcement hereof.
“Sec. 3. This Act shall be in force and take effect on and after January first, 1916.”