Court Opinion

ID: 9899676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 15:13:07.511744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.045206
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                 November 17, 2023
                                                                                    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                                SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                     OF WEST VIRGINIA

Elizabeth Crawford,
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 22-615 (Kanawha County 20-C-594)

City of Charleston,
Defendant Below, Respondent

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Elizabeth Crawford appeals the June 27, 2022, order of the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County granting Respondent City of Charleston’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 The circuit
court concluded that respondent was immune from petitioner’s claim under the West Virginia
Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act (“Tort Claims Act”), West Virginia Code
§§ 29-12A-1 to -18, and that, as a result, petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Upon our review, finding no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error,
we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the
circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21(c).

         In July 2020, petitioner filed a civil complaint against respondent, alleging that she was
injured while walking on Wilkie Drive in Charleston, West Virginia, in July 2018. She claimed
that, to avoid traffic, she “was forced to step into a large pool of water that [had] collected in the
road.” She alleged that “green slime” hid under the surface of the water and that the green slime
caused her to slip, fall, suffer injuries, and incur damages. Petitioner claimed, “Based on
speculation and belief, the slime like substance . . . had been present for a considerable period of
time due to [respondent’s] negligent failure to maintain said road.” Petitioner asserted that
respondent was liable for her damages pursuant to West Virginia Code § 29-12A-4(c), which
provides, in relevant part:

              Subject to sections five and six of this article, a political subdivision is liable
       in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to persons or property allegedly
       caused by an act or omission of the political subdivision or of any of its employees
       in connection with a governmental or proprietary function, as follows:

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Erika Klie Kolenich. Respondent appears by counsel Kevin
Baker and Jason Neal.

                                                   1
               ....

               (3) Political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or
       property caused by their negligent failure to keep public roads, highways, streets,
       avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, aqueducts, viaducts, or public grounds within
       the political subdivisions open, in repair, or free from nuisance, except that it is a
       full defense to such liability, when a bridge within a municipality is involved, that
       the municipality does not have the responsibility for maintaining or inspecting the
       bridge.

        Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that
petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because, according to
respondent, West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(6) provided it with immunity from petitioner’s
claim as the condition that caused petitioner to fall was a temporary or natural condition resulting
from weather. West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a) provides, in relevant part:

               A political subdivision is immune from liability if a loss or claim results
       from:

               ....

              (6) Snow or ice conditions or temporary or natural conditions on any public
       way or other public place due to weather conditions, unless the condition is
       affirmatively caused by the negligent act of a political subdivision[.]

        Following a hearing on the matter, the circuit court entered an order on June 27, 2022,
granting respondent’s motion. The circuit court found that petitioner’s “negligence claim [was]
integrally related to the temporary and everchanging weather conditions,” and it concluded that
the claim was barred by the Tort Claims Act. Petitioner appeals the circuit court’s order to this
Court, arguing that the circuit court’s finding and conclusion were erroneous, and ultimately, that
the circuit court erred by granting respondent’s motion to dismiss. Our review of the circuit court’s
order is de novo. See Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W.
Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995) (“Appellate review of a circuit court’s order granting a motion to
dismiss a complaint is de novo.”).

        We find no error in the circuit court’s finding that petitioner’s negligence claim was
integrally related to the temporary and everchanging weather conditions. Petitioner’s complaint
describes a natural condition in the roadway—green slime in a pool of water—that clearly formed
because of weather conditions. As the circuit court astutely observed below: “[W]e can[not] throw
common sense out the door when we’re talking about these issues.” Consequently, we also
determine that the circuit court did not err in concluding that respondent is entitled to immunity
under West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(6). See Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Hutchison v. City of
Huntington, 198 W. Va. 139, 479 S.E.2d 649 (1996) (“The ultimate decision of whether qualified
or statutory immunity bars a civil action is one of law for the court to determine.”). As we have
explained “[i]mmunities under West Virginia law are more than a defense to a suit in that they

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grant governmental bodies and public officials the right not to be subject to the burden of trial at
all.” Id. at 148, 479 S.E.2d at 658. An immunity defense “spares the defendant from having to go
forward with an inquiry into the merits of the case.” Id. Where, as here, a claim results from a
natural condition existing due to weather conditions, a political subdivision such as respondent is
immune from liability. Because respondent is entitled to immunity under West Virginia Code §
29-12A-5(a)(6), the circuit court committed no error in granting respondent’s motion to dismiss. 2

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

ISSUED: November 17, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

DISSENTING:

Justice John A. Hutchison

       2
          We note three things: First, the circuit court’s June 27, 2022, order determined that
respondent was also entitled to immunity under West Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(10), and
petitioner argues on appeal that this determination was erroneous. Having decided that the circuit
court did not err in concluding that respondent is entitled to immunity under West Virginia Code
§ 29-12A-5(a)(6), we need not consider whether the circuit court’s determination concerning West
Virginia Code § 29-12A-5(a)(10) was correct. Second, the parties make arguments on appeal as to
whether the condition that caused petitioner to fall was open and obvious. Because the circuit court
made no findings as to whether the condition was open and obvious and because we have
determined respondent is immune from petitioner’s claim under West Virginia Code § 29-12A-
5(a)(6), we need not consider the issue. Third, we observe that petitioner’s brief argues that West
Virginia Code § 17-10-17 imposes liability upon respondent; however, petitioner made no
arguments concerning this statute to the circuit court and petitioner has not asserted that the circuit
court committed plain error in deciding respondent’s motion without considering West Virginia
Code § 17-10-17. Accordingly, we will not consider petitioner’s arguments concerning West
Virginia Code § 17-10-17 in this appeal. See State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 294, 316, 470 S.E.2d
613, 635 (1996) (“‘“One of the most familiar procedural rubrics in the administration of justice is
the rule that the failure of a litigant to assert a right in the trial court likely will result” in the
imposition of a procedural bar to an appeal of that issue.’” (quoting State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3,
17, 459 S.E.2d 114, 128 (1995)).
                                                  3
Hutchison, Justice, dissenting:

I dissent to the majority’s resolution of this case. I would have set this case for oral argument to
thoroughly address the error alleged in this appeal. Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and the
issues raised therein, I believe a formal opinion of this Court was warranted, not a memorandum
decision. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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