Court Opinion

ID: 9421886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:00:21.339455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:33.013115
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Clark,
whom. The Chief Justice joins,
dissenting.
The Court decides this case on the narrow ground that the arrest took place at the moment the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents stopped the car in which petitioner was riding and at that time probable cause for it did not exist. While the Government, unnecessarily it seems to me, conceded that the arrest was made at the *105time the car was stopped, this Court is not bound by the Government’s mistakes.*
The record shows beyond dispute that the agents had received information from co-defendant Pierotti’s employer implicating Pierotti with interstate shipments. The agents began a surveillance of petitioner and Pierotti after recognizing them as they came out of a bar. Later the agents observed them loading cartons into an automobile from a gangway up an alley in Chicago. The agents had been trailing them, and after it appeared that they had delivered the first, load of cartons, the suspects returned to the same platform by a .circuitous route through streets and alleys. The agents then saw peth tioner load another set of cartons into the car and drive off with the same. A few minutes later the agents stopped the car, alighted from their own car, and approached the petitioner. As they did so, petitioner was overheard to say: “Hold it; it is the G’s,” and “Tell him he [you] just picked me up.” Since the agents had actually seen the two suspects together for several hours, it was apparent to them that the statement was untrue. Upon being questioned, the defendants stated that they had borrowed the car from a friend. During the questioning and after petitioner had stepped out of the car one of the agents happened to look through the door of the car which petitioner had left open and saw three cartons stacked up inside which resembled those petitioner had just loaded into the car from the gangway. The .agent saw that the cartons bore Admiral shipping labels and were' addressed to a company in Cincinnati, Ohio. Upon further, questioning, , the agent was told that the cartons *106were in the car when the defendants borrowed it. Knowing this to be untrue, the . agents then searched the car, arrested petitioner and his companion, and seized the cartons.,
The Court seems to say that the mere stopping of the car amounted to an arrest of the petitioner. I cannot agree. The suspicious activities of the petitioner during the somewhat prolonged surveillance by the agents warranted the stopping of .the car. The sighting of the cartons with their interstate labels in the car gave the agents reasonable ground to believe that a crime was in the course of its commission in their very presence. The-search of the car and the subsequent arrest were therefore lawful and the motion to suppress was properly overruled.
In my view, the time at which the agents were required to have reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was committing a felony was when they began the search of the automobile, which was after- they had seen the cartons, with interstate labels in .the car. The earlier events certainly disclosed ample grounds to justify the following of the car, the subsequent stopping thereof, and the questioning of petitioner by the agents. This interrogation, together with the sighting of the cartons and the labels, gave the agents indisputable probable cause for the'search and arrest.
When an investigation proceeds to the point where an agent has reasonable grounds to believe that an offense is being committed in his presence, he. is obligated to proceed to make such' searches,' seizures, and arrests as the circumstances require. • It is only by such alertness that crime is discovered, interrupted, prevented, and pun-, ished. We should not place additional burdens on law enforcement agencies. .
I would affirm thé judgments on the .rationale of Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949), and Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925).

It may b,e that the Government is doing some wishful thinking in-regard to the relaxation of the standards incident to the “probable, cause” requirement by making this- a. test case. We should not lend ourselves to such indulgence..