Court Opinion

ID: 9688072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:00:28.827556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:55.826387
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit

No. 22-1624

                      IN RE: NATALY MINKINA,

                             Debtor.

                RODGERS, POWERS & SCHWARTZ, LLP,

                            Appellant,

                                v.

                         NATALY MINKINA,

                            Appellee.

         APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

         [Hon. Frank J. Bailey, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge]

                              Before

                       Barron, Chief Judge,
              Howard and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

     Dana E. Casher, with whom Casher Law Offices was on brief,
for appellant.
     Marques C. Lipton, with whom Lipton Law Group, LLC was on
brief, for appellee.

                         August 24, 2023
           HOWARD, Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us to assess

the propriety of a valuation method espoused in the Bankruptcy

Appellate Panel's ("B.A.P.") decision in Snyder v. Rockland Tr.

Co. (In re Snyder), 249 B.R. 40 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2000), for a

debtor's interest in property held as a Massachusetts tenant by

the entirety for purposes of the lien avoidance formula of 11

U.S.C. § 522(f).          The bankruptcy court below departed from that

approach, and appellant Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz, LLP ("RPS") -

- a law firm that is the holder of the judicial lien that appellee

Nataly Minkina seeks to avoid -- asserts that doing so constituted

legal error.       Finding no such error, we affirm the bankruptcy

court's order.       In doing so, we also clarify that the B.A.P.'s

decision     in    Snyder     both   misapplied    Massachusetts        law   and

impermissibly derogated from the plain text of § 522.

                                       I.

           We recite the factual background and procedural posture

of this appeal, "rely[ing] principally on the bankruptcy court's

recounting    of    the    facts."    Goat    Island   Condo.   Ass'n    v.   IDC

Clambakes, Inc. (In re IDC Clambakes, Inc.), 852 F.3d 50, 54 (1st

Cir. 2017).       In August 2018, Minkina filed a petition for relief

under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.            In re Minkina, 631 B.R.

544, 546 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2021).            She and her husband owned their

home in Brookline, Massachusetts as tenants by the entirety as of

the time of the filing of the petition.                Id.   The property was

                                     - 2 -
subject to (1) two mortgages totaling $177,741 and (2) a judicial

lien solely on Minkina's interest in the property in favor of RPS

in the amount of $250,094.1         Id.     The latter originated from a

Massachusetts Superior Court judgment that ordered Minkina to

reimburse RPS for the expenses the law firm incurred in defending

against   a    malpractice   suit    Minkina   brought   that   the   court

ultimately deemed frivolous.        In addition, Minkina and her husband

were entitled to a $500,000 homestead exemption, since Minkina's

husband caused a homestead declaration to be recorded in December

2010 under then-applicable provisions of Massachusetts law.            Id.;

see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1 (2010).

              Minkina moved to avoid the RPS judicial lien in March

2019 on the grounds that the lien "impair[ed] her homestead

exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)."          By way of context --

and as will be further discussed below -- the lien-avoidance

formula of § 522(f)(2)(A) in part requires an assessment of "the

value that the debtor's interest in the property would have in the

absence of any liens."        Minkina agreed to a valuation of the

property as a whole at $1,050,000 for purposes of the motion.

However, the point of contention in Minkina's case is how to

appraise the value of her interest in the property as a tenant by

the entirety for purposes of the formula.             Minkina urged the

     1 For the sake of clarity and consistency, we use the figures
cited by the bankruptcy court and round to the nearest dollar.

                                    - 3 -
bankruptcy      court      to   adopt    either       an   actuarial    approach     to

determining her share or to simply "treat [her share] as 50% of

the   value     of   the    [p]roperty."          Crucially     for     Minkina,   her

calculations suggested that using an actuarial approach would have

allowed her to avoid all but $4,759 of the judicial lien, and a 50

percent approach would have allowed her to avoid the lien in its

entirety.        However,       either    of     these     approaches    would     have

constituted a departure from the B.A.P.'s decision in Snyder, in

which    the    B.A.P.     opted   to    value    a    Massachusetts     "[d]ebtor's

interest in [a] tenancy by the entirety property for purposes of

the section 522(f) formula . . . at 100 percent" of the property's

value.   249 B.R. at 46.        By contrast, RPS urged the court to follow

the Snyder approach -- an unsurprising development, given that

such an approach would have prevented Minkina from avoiding the

lien under the § 522(f) formula.

               Given the centrality of Snyder to the avoidance motion,

both parties asked the bankruptcy court to first indicate whether

it would follow that case's valuation method before reaching a

final decision on avoidance.              The court indicated that it would

not follow the B.A.P.'s Snyder decision, reasoning that "[a]

property interest can be compared to a bundle of sticks . . . ; it

is undisputed that one spouse in a tenancy by the entire[t]y does

not hold all the sticks and that the other spouse holds many sticks

that limit the value of the debtor spouse's interest . . . ."

                                         - 4 -
Accordingly, the court noted that it was "inclined to hold that,

in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the interest of each

spouse in a tenancy by the entirety is equal to 50 percent of the

property's fair market value."

           Two   crucial    events   then    transpired    between     the

bankruptcy court's issuance of its preliminary and final decisions

on Minkina's motion to avoid the RPS judicial lien.          First, the

parties stipulated to the following with regards to the valuation

of Minkina's share "to minimize the expense to the parties of the

needless exercise of an evidentiary hearing":

           1.   For purposes of the Motion to Avoid
           Judicial Lien only, the value of the Property
           owned by the Debtor with her husband as
           tenants by the entirety, . . . is $1,050,000.

           2. That, for purposes of the Motion to Avoid
           Judicial Lien only, the market value of the
           Debtor's interest in the Property subject to
           her non-debtor spouse's right of survivorship
           does not exceed $525,000.

           3.   Nothing in this Stipulation shall be
           deemed to be an admission by RPS that, as a
           matter of law, the Debtor's interest in the
           Property is anything less than 100% of the
           Property's value.

Second, RPS "raised a new ground of opposition [to the motion to

avoid]: that if the value of the [p]roperty is to be allocated as

in a tenancy in common, then the homestead exemption and the other

liens . . . must   also    be   allocated"   between   Minkina   and   her

husband.   In re Minkina, 631 B.R. at 547.

                                  - 5 -
             The bankruptcy court ultimately granted Minkina's motion

to avoid.    It once again rejected the Snyder approach, reiterating

that -- contrary to RPS's assertions and the B.A.P.'s reasoning -

- Massachusetts law, and particularly the Supreme Judicial Court's

("SJC") decision in Coraccio v. Lowell Five Cents Sav. Bank, 415

Mass. 145 (1993), did not compel the conclusion that a spouse's

share in a tenancy by the entirety had to equal the full value of

the property.       In re Minkina, 631 B.R. at 551-55.             The court

consequently accepted the parties'           stipulation that Minkina's

share   in   the   property   was   worth   no   more   than   $525,000,   and

separately rejected RPS's arguments that the other liens and

homestead exemption needed to be allocated between the spouses.

Id. at 548, 556, 558-59.       Given these conclusions, Minkina could

avoid the judicial lien in its entirety under the § 522(f) formula.

Id. at 559.

             We permitted a direct appeal of the bankruptcy court's

interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), and this appeal

followed.

                                     II.

             "When considering an appeal from a bankruptcy court,

under most circumstances, '[w]e review the bankruptcy court's

legal conclusions de novo, its findings of fact for clear error,

and its discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion.'"              United

                                    - 6 -
Sur. & Indem. Co. v. López-Muñoz (In re López-Muñoz), 983 F.3d 69,

71 (1st Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting United Sur.

& Indem. Co. v. López-Muñoz (In re López-Muñoz), 866 F.3d 487,

496-97 (1st Cir. 2017)).     These principles apply to direct appeals

from a bankruptcy court.     Cf. Coughlin v. Lac du Flambeau Band of

Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (In re Coughlin), 33 F.4th 600, 604

(1st Cir. 2022), aff'd, 143 S. Ct. 1689 (2023) (applying de novo

review to a direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)).             As RPS has

solely raised claims of legal error on appeal, we review the

bankruptcy court's prior treatment of these claims de novo.

                                   III.

                                    A.

           Before turning to the merits, we note that the parties

remain bound on appeal by the stipulation that they entered.            See

Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 303 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002) ("A

party's stipulations are binding on that party and may not be

contradicted by him at trial or on appeal.").         As excerpted above,

the parties agreed in the stipulation "[t]hat, for purposes of the

Motion to Avoid Judicial Lien only, the market value of the

Debtor's   interest   in   the   Property   subject   to   her   non-debtor

spouse's right of survivorship does not exceed $525,000," but that

"[n]othing in this Stipulation shall be deemed to be an admission

by RPS that, as a matter of law, the [d]ebtor's interest in the

[p]roperty is anything less than 100% of the [p]roperty’s value."

                                   - 7 -
"Stipulations are interpreted according to general contract law

principles," Lestage v. Coloplast Corp., 982 F.3d 37, 48 n.5 (1st

Cir. 2020), and we are mindful of the maxims that "contracts

containing unambiguous language must be construed according to

their plain and natural meaning" and that "[a]ccepted canons of

construction   forbid   the     balkanization   of    contracts   for

interpretive purposes," Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability

Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1995).           We interpret the

combination of the two clauses highlighted above to mean that the

valuation of no more than $525,000 controls unless we conclude

that Minkina's interest in the property must equal the full market

value of the property "as a matter of law," since that is the claim

that RPS explicitly preserved through the stipulation. As detailed

below, we do not so conclude.

                                  B.

          Section 522(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "value"

for the purposes of § 522 -- and, therefore, for the judicial lien

avoidance formula of § 522(f)(2)(A) -- as the "fair market value

as of the date of the filing of the petition." While the Bankruptcy

Code does not define the term "fair market value," the phrase

generally refers to "[t]he amount at which property would change

hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being

under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable

knowledge of relevant facts."      Fair Market Value, Black's Law

                                - 8 -
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990); see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub.

L. 103-394, § 303, 108 Stat. 4106, 4132 (enacting the § 522(f)

formula); cf. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738

(2020) ("[We] normally interpret[] a statute in accord with the

ordinary    public    meaning   of   its     terms   at    the    time   of   its

enactment."); Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 783 (2010) ("[W]e

may look to dictionaries . . . to determine the meaning of words

the [Bankruptcy] Code does not define[.]").                At the same time,

"[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state law [for

purposes of the Bankruptcy Code] [u]nless some federal interest

requires a different result."         Butner v. United States, 440 U.S.

48, 55 (1979), superseded in part by statute, Bankruptcy Reform

Act of 1994.    This appeal trains on the interplay between those

two principles.       RPS claims that the fact that a Massachusetts

tenancy by the entirety comprises a "unitary title" compels the

conclusion that the value of Minkina's share in the property must

equal the full value of the property.           Minkina counters that such

a conclusion both rests on a misinterpretation of Massachusetts

law   and    raises     preemption      concerns,         given    the    Code's

aforementioned definition in § 522 of value as "fair market value."

            Minkina has the better of the argument.               The fact that

a Massachusetts tenancy by the entirety constitutes a "unitary

title" plainly does not compel the conclusion that an individual

spouse's interest in the tenancy must be valued at the fair market

                                     - 9 -
value of the entire property in question.                Moreover, the Snyder

approach     impermissibly      departed          from   Congress's     explicit

instructions to value the debtor's interest in the property absent

any liens as the fair market value thereof for the purposes of the

§ 522(f) formula.       We address these two points in turn.

                                       1.

             We   begin     with     RPS's        Massachusetts   law      claim,

irrespective of any preemption concerns the claim may raise.                 Much

like the B.A.P. in Snyder, RPS claims that the SJC's description

of a Massachusetts tenancy by the entirety in Coraccio as a

"unitary title . . . [that, in the wake of statutory amendments,]

guarantees each spouse an equal right to a whole," and -- therefore

-- a tenancy for which "it does not follow that each [spouse] has

an   equal   one-half     interest   in     the    property,"   supports    their

preferred approach to valuation.              415 Mass. at 151; see also

Snyder, 249 B.R. at 44 (interpreting the "unitary title" language

to mean that a tenancy by the entirety represents "a title in which

the interests of both husband and wife extend to the whole of the

property, not merely to some fractional interest that the other

does not also hold").2

      2 To be sure, our court did affirm Snyder in an unpublished
decision. See Snyder v. Rockland Tr. Co. (In re Snyder), 2 F.
App'x 46 (1st Cir. 2001). However, that opinion lacks precedential
value, see 1st Cir. R. 36.0(c), and -- as RPS acknowledges -- our
court did not address the valuation issue on the merits there
because we found that Snyder waived his valuation-based arguments.

                                     - 10 -
           This argument stretches selected quotes from Coraccio

too far.     As the bankruptcy court noted, Coraccio simply did not

concern valuation.       See In re Minkina, 631 B.R. at 553-54.            In

that case, the SJC sought to address whether the Massachusetts

legislature's statutory equalization of rights between men and

women in tenancies by the entirety in 1979 "prevents one spouse,

acting alone, from encumbering his or her interest in property

held by the entirety."     Coraccio, 415 Mass. at 148; see Mass. Gen.

Laws ch. 209, § 1 ("A husband and wife shall be equally entitled

to the rents, products, income or profits and to the control,

management and possession of property held by them as tenants by

the entirety.").     The excerpted passages served to reaffirm that

the    statutory   modification   of   the   common-law      tenancy    "did

not . . . alter    the    characteristics    of    the    estate     itself,"

including the features discussed above.           Coraccio, 415 Mass. at

151.   Indeed, the SJC did not so much as include the word "value"

in its opinion, and perhaps for good reason.             As the bankruptcy

court noted, valuation and a delineation of rights are different

enquiries.     See In re Minkina, 631 B.R. at 554-55.              Coraccio's

RPS also points to our decision in Garran v. SMS Financial V, LLC
(In re Garran), 338 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Snyder v.
Rockland Tr. Co. (In re Snyder), 279 B.R. 1, 4 (1st Cir. B.A.P.
2002)), for the proposition that        our court     has  "cited
Snyder . . . as authority for purposes of a motion to avoid [a]
lien," but that case cited to a subsequent B.A.P. decision that
did not concern the specific valuation question at issue in this
appeal.

                                  - 11 -
"unitary title" language describes the extent of the interest, not

the value thereof, and therefore imposes no requirement to value

Minkina's interest in the property as the full value of the

property.      Valuing a spouse's undivided interest in the property

at up to 50 percent of its fair market value, as the parties did

here through the stipulation, therefore does not run afoul of

Coraccio's explanation that a tenant by the entirety possesses "an

equal right to the whole" as part of a "unitary title," as opposed

to an "equal one-half interest."              415 Mass. at 151.      Given that

this Coraccio-based argument is RPS's sole argument on appeal

predicated on Massachusetts law, we conclude that the firm's state

law argument is unavailing.

                                         2.

              We thus turn to analyzing the propriety of the bankruptcy

court's valuation method under federal law.              RPS in essence claims

that "seek[ing] to apply the concept of value as 'the price at

which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and

a   willing     seller'"       --   almost    verbatim   the   above-referenced

definition of fair market value -- is improper because such an

approach      rests   on   a    "legal   fiction    [that]     is   [ostensibly]

impossible" under Massachusetts law.3               The challenge with this

argument is that, rather than federal law preempting Massachusetts

      3 RPS also notes that that there is "no preemptive federal
law to consider" in this case.

                                       - 12 -
law, RPS's position is tantamount to an argument that Massachusetts

law reverse-preempts the definition of "value" in § 522(a).                        Of

course,    given   our    above       conclusion    that    RPS's    Coraccio-based

argument    misapplies         Massachusetts       law,    there    is   no   genuine

preemption issue here -- after all, there is no Massachusetts law

to preempt.4       But teasing out the logic of RPS's argument also

helps    illustrate      how    the    Snyder     approach    in    effect    ignored

Congress's fair market value directive.

            Reaching such a conclusion requires an explanation of

Massachusetts tenancies by the entirety and the valuation problems

they raise in the context of § 522(f).                Indeed -- as both parties

acknowledge, and as previously noted -- even though the valuation

question is ultimately controlled by the plain text of § 522,

"[p]roperty interests are [in general] created and defined by state

law."      Butner,    440       U.S.    at   55    (emphasis       added).      Under

Massachusetts law, a spouse's interest in a tenancy by the entirety

is both highly encumbered by the other spouse's interest and -- in

part because of these encumbrances -- also necessarily distinct

     4  We also have no occasion to reach the preemption issue
Minkina raises by the same logic.     Cf. Vaquería Tres Monjitas,
Inc. v. Pagan, 748 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2014) ("[F]ederal courts
are not to reach constitutional issues where alternative grounds
for resolution are available." (quoting Am. C.L. Union v. U.S.
Conf. of Cath. Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2013))); PDK
Lab'ys Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enf't Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring) ("[T]he cardinal principle of
judicial restraint -- if it is not necessary to decide more, it is
necessary not to decide more -- counsels us to go no further.").

                                        - 13 -
from the tenancy as a whole.               As the bankruptcy court noted, a

spouse holding property in a Massachusetts tenancy by the entirety

"may [not] compromise or alter the tenancy unilaterally."                In re

Minkina, 631 B.R. at 552.           "For as long as the marriage continues,

the estate cannot be severed, terminated, or partitioned by either

spouse without the assent of the other."             Id.; see also Mass. Gen.

Laws ch. 241, § 1 (exempting tenants by the entirety from the

entitlement to partition).               However, despite the unitary title,

the SJC in Coraccio held that "either spouse [in a tenancy by the

entirety] may convey or encumber his or her interest in property

held as tenants by the entirety."             415 Mass. at 152.5   Even so, an

encumbered or conveyed interest is still subject to the limitations

outlined above.           Perhaps most importantly, a spouse's interest is

also       limited   by    the   other   spouse's   "indestructible   right   of

survivorship"; or the notion that, once one spouse is deceased,

the other "becomes seised as sole owner of the whole estate

       5On a related note, RPS claims that "Coraccio concludes only
that one spouse may encumber his or her interest in property held
in a tenancy by the entirety, not convey it," and that the
"language from Coraccio seeming to allow a conveyance by one spouse
of that spouse's interest . . . referenc[es] New York state law -
- not that of Massachusetts." That is patently incorrect. The
"may convey" passage was written without reference to New York
law, and the SJC also explicitly wrote that "the view expressed by
the New York Court of Appeals in V.R.W., Inc. v. Klein, 68 N.Y.2d
560, 565 (1986), [i.e., that 'each tenant may sell, mortgage or
otherwise encumber his or her rights in the property'] sets forth
the appropriate rule." Coraccio, 415 Mass. at 152 (quoting V.R.W.,
Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 565).

                                         - 14 -
regardless of anything the other may have done" -- including,

crucially for the purposes of this case, any encumbrances on the

deceased spouse's interest.      Coraccio, 415 Mass. at 149, 151

(second quoting Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 404 (1929),

superseded by statute, 1979 Mass. Acts 768, as recognized in

Coraccio, 415 Mass. at 150).   As Judge Kenner put it in her seminal

opinion on Massachusetts tenancies by the entirety:

          By virtue of the right of survivorship, the
          interest of the first spouse to die is no more
          than a life estate.    That spouse's interest
          terminates upon his or her death, and, with
          it, any interest acquired (by assignment or
          encumbrance, whether voluntary or not) from
          that spouse alone.

In re Snyder, 231 B.R. 437, 442 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999), aff'd as

modified, 249 B.R. at 47.6     In turn, from the point of view of a

conveyee of the spouse's interest, the interest he or she acquires

through the conveyance "would, among other things, be wholly

defeasible upon the death of the conveying spouse and survivorship

     6  We note that the right of survivorship does not appear to
be a lien under the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of the § 522(f)
formula.   See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) (incorporating into the
formula "the value that the debtor's interest in the property would
have in the absence of any liens"). 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) defines
a "lien" as a "charge against or interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Nothing in
this definition suggests that a "right of survivorship," which
does not pertain to "secur[ing] payment of a debt or performance
of an obligation," can plausibly be construed as a lien. And no
argument has been made to us that a non-debtor spouse's right of
survivorship should be so construed for purposes of the § 522
formula.

                                - 15 -
of the other."7     Id.   In sum, "Massachusetts law makes clear that

the unitary title does not give each spouse the same rights in the

property as he or she would have as sole owner."              Id. at 443.

"Each    spouse's    rights    in     the    property   are   drastically

circumscribed by those of the other."         Id.

           Those encumbrances on a spouse's interest in a tenancy

by the entirety both serve to differentiate it from the tenancy as

a whole and also pose the valuation problem in Minkina's case and

others like it.     RPS's argument illustrates the first point.        As

noted above, the firm claims that attempting to apply fair market

value to a debtor's interest in property held in a tenancy by the

entirety is a "legal fiction [that] is impossible, [because] it

necessarily presumes that the seller [i.e., the debtor spouse] has

the capacity to make a sale, . . . [when] no sale is possible

without destroying the tenancy."         That argument misses the point

-- the value in question here is not of the property, nor of the

tenancy as a whole, but rather of the debtor's interest in the

     7  Massachusetts law also mandates that "[t]he interest of a
debtor spouse in property held as tenants by the entirety shall
not be subject to seizure or execution by a creditor of such debtor
spouse so long as such property is the principal residence of the
nondebtor spouse," Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209, § 1, but we note
(without weighing in ourselves) that lower courts in our circuit
have concluded that this prohibition is preempted by the trustee
sale provision of 11 U.S.C. § 363(h).       See, e.g., Whitman v.
Lassman, No. 06–11780, 2007 WL 2259108, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 1,
2007); Desmond v. Green (In re Green), No. 13-10204, 2018 WL
4944988, at *4-5 (Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 11, 2018).

                                    - 16 -
tenancy, which is subject to the suite of encumbrances described

above that do not apply to the tenancy as a whole.                     Just as

importantly, the argument also ignores the fact that a spouse's

interest should have an identifiable present value, given that

Coraccio allows a tenant by the entirety to convey or encumber his

share.

               As to the second point, the discrepancy between a sole

owner    and    a   spouse's   interest   as   a   tenant   by   the   entirety

necessarily affects the valuation question, as well.                   A market

participant attempting to value a debtor's interest in a tenancy

by the entirety is simply analyzing a different (though subsidiary,

and much more limited) bundle of sticks than a property held in

fee simple absolute or one being conveyed with the assent of both

tenants by the entirety.          See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S.

274, 278 (2002) ("A common idiom describes property as a 'bundle

of sticks' -- a collection of individual rights which, in certain

combinations, constitute property.").              As Judge Kenner wrote,

anyone attempting to appraise a debtor's interest in a tenancy by

the entirety        has to grapple with        the "uncertainty about the

[tenancy's] future," In re Snyder, 231 B.R. at 445, given that

               a debtor spouse's interest will eventually
               come to one of three possible ends: (1) the
               debtor spouse will survive the nondebtor
               spouse and thereupon becomes seised of the
               whole estate, subject to seizure and execution
               by his creditors; (2) the debtor spouse will
               predecease the nondebtor spouse, resulting in

                                    - 17 -
            termination of the decedent's interest and of
            liens attaching exclusively thereto; or (3)
            the tenancy will be terminated (by voluntary
            conveyance, foreclosure on a jointly given
            mortgage, or divorce) before the death of
            either spouse, resulting in termination of the
            unitary title, division or apportionment of
            the net proceeds among the spouses (or at
            least    the   possibility    thereof),    and
            vulnerability of the debtor spouse's interest
            in the proceeds to seizure or execution by
            creditors.

Id. at 443.

            Indeed, it is that quandary that gave rise to the Snyder

approach.    However, as explained below, the logic of the B.A.P.'s

solution ran afoul of the plain text of the Code.

            Understanding the development of the B.A.P.'s approach

requires detailing Snyder's procedural history.                  There, Judge

Kenner originally entered a provisional order that valued the

debtor's interest as the full value of the property "based on the

express assumption that, upon termination of the tenancy by the

entirety, the [d]ebtor's interest will extend to the whole of the

property," but preserved the option to "reconsider[] [the order]

on   the   basis   of   actual   knowledge   about   how   the    tenancy   is

terminated."       Id. at 445.    The B.A.P. nevertheless proceeded to

reject the provisional aspect of the order, reasoning that "[o]ne

of the principal tenets of bankruptcy is finality in order to

insure . . . a fresh start," but upheld the full-value aspect of

the order.     Snyder, 249 B.R. at 45-46.      The panel concluded that

                                   - 18 -
the approach was warranted because a 50 percent approach would

ostensibly run afoul of Coraccio (an incorrect assumption, as

discussed above) and an actuarial approach would run afoul of the

panel's determination that "a hearing on a motion to avoid a lien

pursuant to section 522(f) . . . should be a summary proceeding

susceptible to a quick and binding resolution," as evidenced by

legislative history related to the formula and the Federal Rules

of Bankruptcy Procedure's treatment of these proceedings.          Id. at

46.

          Whatever   the   logic   and   advantages   of   the   B.A.P.'s

approach to such a complex question might be, we conclude that (in

addition to our disagreement with its reading of Coraccio) it

departed from the language of the Code itself.        Indeed, two words

were conspicuously absent from the B.A.P.'s ruling: fair market.

Suffice it to say that legislative history, the Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy's treatment of a provision, considerations of finality,

"basic" or "overarching principles" of bankruptcy (as RPS argues),

or even the fact that the Snyder approach "employ[ed] a bright

line that is easy to follow and apply," In re O'Connell, 334 B.R.

312, 315 n.6 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005), cannot trump our obligation

to follow the plain text of a statute.     See Puerto Rico v. Franklin

Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016) ("The plain text of

the Bankruptcy Code begins and ends our analysis."). Consequently,

bankruptcy courts applying the § 522(f) formula should instead

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calculate "the value that the debtor's interest in the property

would have in the absence of any liens" as the "fair market value

[of the foregoing] as of the date of the filing of the petition,"

just as Congress required -- no more and no less.

                                     IV.

            To be sure, we are acutely aware of the fact that

applying such a definition does not always prove an easy task (as

illustrated above), and that rejecting the legal bases of the

Snyder decision -- a decision which, as the bankruptcy court noted,

has been followed numerous times both within and outside this

circuit, see In re Minkina, 631 B.R. at 550 (collecting cases) --

could create some uncertainty.        However, on that note, there are

also reasons to be skeptical of the proposition that the fair

market value of any debtor's share in a tenancy by the entirety

equals the full value of the property "as of the date of the filing

of the petition," given the encumbrances discussed above.                  11

U.S.C. § 522(a)(2); see In re Naples, 521 B.R. 715, 717 (Bankr.

W.D.N.Y. 2014) (postulating that to conclude that a spouse being

"seized    of   the   whole   [tenancy]    means   valuing   the   [spouse's]

interest        of    all     of   the      equity     value       [of   the

property] . . . [ignores] the freedom that one entireties tenant

has to alienate his or her own undivided interest" (citing In re

Levinson, 372 B.R. 582 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007))); In re Bradigan,

501 B.R. 151, 154 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2013) ("Although fully seized

                                   - 20 -
of the whole, the separate interest of one spouse is subject to

rights of the co-owner.           By reason of this limitation, we must

value the debtor's interest at something less that the interest of

a single owner in fee simple absolute."); Town of N. Reading v.

Welch, 711 N.E.2d 603, 605 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (noting, in the

context of a tax foreclosure on a property held in a tenancy by

the    entirety,   that     "[t]he   actuarial   value   of     [the   spouse's]

survivorship interest . . . is likely to be less than the fair

market value of the locus unencumbered").

            Bankruptcy courts are in the best position to divine

fair market value in any individual case, and we go no further

than to reiterate the need to focus on the text of the Code.                 The

task   in   this   appeal    is   simple   enough   at   this    juncture:   the

stipulation stands, because neither state nor federal law requires

a valuation of Minkina's interest as the full value of her home,

and the bankruptcy court thus correctly accepted the valuation of

                                     - 21 -
no more than $525,000.8   The bankruptcy court's order is therefore

affirmed.9

     8  RPS also urges us to cap Minkina's homestead exemption for
the purposes of the § 522(f) formula at 50 percent if we affirm
the bankruptcy court's order (as we have done). The firm claims
that, because Massachusetts law provides that a homestead
exemption "shall remain whole and unallocated" in the case of a
tenancy by the entirety or a joint tenancy, but the bankruptcy
court's valuation approach ostensibly constitutes "treating each
individual as a tenant in common," we should treat the homestead
exemption in line with provisions for the latter, as well. Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1. However, as explained above, abiding by
the no more than $525,000 valuation does not negate the nature of
Minkina and her husband's tenancy by the entirety. RPS's argument
is therefore unavailing.
     9  Our holding in this case is limited to Massachusetts law
and -- as illustrated above -- is intertwined with the SJC's
holding in Coraccio that a tenant by the entirety may convey her
share in the tenancy. We express no opinion on whether the outcome
would be different in a jurisdiction where such a conveyance would
not be allowed.

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