Court Opinion

ID: 9762550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:26:20.047183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:35.026838
License: Public Domain

BLEIL, Justice,
dissenting.
In our earlier decision, we reversed and remanded this cause for a new trial rather than render judgment because the taxing units had not been afforded the opportunity to present evidence tending to show their diligence to locate Doue’s address. Doue v. City of Texarkana, 757 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1988, writ denied). Upon remand, the trial court received a considerable amount of evidence regarding the extensive efforts to locate Doue and found that the taxing units made a diligent inquiry as to his whereabouts.1 I conclude that the trial court’s judgment is supported by sufficient evidence and would affirm that judgment.
On this appeal, Doue challenges the factual findings with this point of error: “The evidence presented by the Appellee does not support the trial court’s finding of a ‘diligent inquiry’ for an address for the Appellant, as ordered by the honorable Court of Appeals.”2 Responding to this assigned error, the majority treats the point as maintaining that Doue is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the evidence is legally insufficient.
Once having framed a new issue, the majority, without reference to any legal standards applicable to the review of its “matter of law” point, breaks new legal ground. It sets up a novel “contradicting” evidence standard. (Majority at 476). Then it says that the legal issue is not really whether there is evidence showing diligence; rather, it says that the legal issue concerns the “quality” of the efforts made to locate Doue. (Majority at 477). Further perplexing are the majority’s several suggestions that the taxing units’ attorney had actually possessed Doue’s correct address but failed to check his own file — this suggestion seems to have arisen in this Court’s chambers — absent any evidence to support such a suggestion.3 And *479stating that the taxing units showed “no evidence that they investigated the easily available sources for Doue’s address” (majority at 477) seems equally confounding.
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*480Could the majority have missed all the evidence upon which the trial court found specific efforts were made by the taxing units’ attorney? Perhaps sensing that it has overstepped its bounds, the majority addresses Doue’s actual point of error in passing, saying that, “As the evidence is legally insufficient, it is also factually insufficient.” (Majority at 477).4 If the majority purports to properly address the point of error raised challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and holds the evidence factually insufficient, then the proper remedy would be for it to reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
The result reached by the majority in this case appears laudable. However, this is yet another instance of the Court’s departure from traditional rules whenever it seems appropriate “to do justice.” This is not the first time I have felt compelled to express these sentiments. See, e.g., Penick v. Penick, 780 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1989, writ denied) (Bleil, J., dissenting) (I objected to a casting aside of "traditional rules” to do what was perceived to be right); and Joiner v. AMSAV Group, Inc., 760 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1988, writ denied) (Bleil, J., dissenting) (I urged that the “just result” reached by the majority did violence to our system of justice under law). Being staunchly committed to the proposition that the end never justifies the means, I cannot join in the majority’s decision.

.The trial court first noted the purpose of the remand, then made specific findings detailing the efforts to locate Doue shown by the evidence. The court specified in its judgment the following:
1. This matter was remanded by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Supreme Judicial District of Texas for the limited purpose of determining whether or not the Attorney for the Defendant Taxing Units made a "diligent inquiry" as to the whereabouts of Plaintiff, Charles L. Doue as required by Rule 117a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure prior to the citation by publication of the Plaintiff;
2. The Court finds that the Attorney for the Defendant Taxing Units attempted to determine the whereabouts of Charles L. Doue by
(a) checking the title records of a local title company;
(b) searching the city directory;
(c) checking the tax records to see if Charles L. Doue owned other real estate;
(d) checking the list of customers of the Texarkana Water Utilities Department;
(e) visually inspecting the subject real estate to determine if any "For Sale” signs were on the property;
(f) examining the deed to Charles L. Doue to determine if an address was reflected on the Deed;
(g)examining the Bowie County tax records for 1982 where the attorney found no address and a notation "m.r.” (mail returned) and found that at the time such check was made, the 1982 taxes were not paid.

. This point of error, although inartfully drawn, appears to challenge the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment. That was the issue resolved by the trial court. The attorneys’ briefs and arguments address that issue.

. The majority's preoccupation with the information possessed by the taxing units’ attorney seems curious. No evidence appears in the record that would suggest what, if anything, was in the files of the lawyer for the taxing units or his law firm. There is certainly no evidence indicating that the attorney had any information about Doue’s whereabouts. He swore that he checked every record he knew to check and could not locate Doue. He even checked the Bowie County tax records for 1982, only to discover that the mail sent to Doue by Bowie County was returned undelivered.
Nevertheless, because the majority’s misper-ception of the facts centers on "the letter,” I am required to further address this matter. The letter which Doue offered into evidence, dated August 7, 1978, is copied below:
*479Doue said that he received the letter and paid the taxes, as indicated by the memo in August 1978. To the extent that the majority concludes that this letter establishes, contrary to the sworn testimony, that the taxing units knew of Doue's whereabouts, I make certain points:
1.That the attorneys mailed a letter to Doue in 1978 does not mean they knew his address in 1982 and 1983;
2. If they had found a name of Charles L. Dave in the law firm files, there is no reason to think that they would have assumed that Doue and Dave were one and the same man; and
3. Doue admitted that, after the letter was sent he "moved out from that house. I changed my address to my office in San Francisco.” The majority’s view of the evidence may appear to be a reasonable view. But, is it not the trial court which is the trier of fact?

. To the extent that the majority determines the factual sufficiency issue, it does so in a clearly inadequate fashion. When reversing a trial court’s judgment after concluding the supporting evidence is insufficient, a court of appeals must detail the relevant evidence and clearly state why the evidence is factually insufficient. INA of Texas v. Briscoe, 780 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1989); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.1986). Perhaps had the majority more fully detailed the evidence relevant to the diligence question it might not so readily conclude that there is no evidence that the taxing units’ attorney diligently attempted to locate Doue.