Court Opinion

ID: 9854528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:08:46.953084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:08.513987
License: Public Domain

*624Justice MARTIN
dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s holding that the “year and a day” rule is no longer useful in the administration of justice in North Carolina and abrogation of the rule prospectively.
However, I dissent from the holding in this case which applies the “year and a day” rule to the charge of murder in the second degree against defendant Vance.
The indictment in this case positively shows that it is only a charge of murder in the second degree. The indictment reads: “Indictment Second Degree Murder.” Further, the agreed record on appeal recites that defendant was tried and convicted on the charge of murder in the second degree. Even the arrest warrant was on charge of murder in the second degree. This is not a case where defendant was charged with murder in the first degree and convicted of murder in the second degree. Vance was never charged with murder in the first degree.
It is not appropriate to extend the “year and a day” rule to charges of murder in the second degree. The reasoning of this unanimous Court in State v. Hefler, 310 N.C. 135, 310 S.E.2d 310 (1984), applies most cogently to the instant case, and the reader is referred to that opinion for a full discussion of the rule. See also Note, Criminal Law — Homicide—Death Resulting More Than a Year and a Day After Assault, 40 N.C.L. Rev. 327 (1962).
As stated in Hefler, the six cases mentioning the rule all involved sentences of death. Only in State v. Orrell, 12 N.C. 139 (1826), was the judgment of death arrested. This Court has never applied the rule to a charge of murder in the second degree. This is the first case in North Carolina in which a defendant has argued that the rule should be applied to a charge of murder in the second degree.
The reason for applying the rule to murder cases where the defendant’s life is at stake is that under those circumstances the rule of law ought to be certain. With the uncertainty as to the cause of death because of the long lapse of time between the infliction of the wound and death, the law applied a definite rule in cases in which the defendant’s life was at stake; if the death occurred more than a year and a day after the infliction of the wound, defendant could not be prosecuted on the charge involving the death penalty. See State v. Hefler, 310 N.C. 135, 310 S.E.2d 310 *625(1984); 3 Coke, Institutes 53 (1817); see State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974).
These reasons do not exist in the present appeal where the defendant was only charged and convicted of murder in the second degree. N.C.G.S. § 14-17 defines murder in the second degree and establishes it as a class C felony for the purposes of punishment. N.C.G.S. § 14-17 (1986) (entitled “Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment.”). A class C felony is punishable by imprisonment up to fifty years or by life imprisonment. N.C.G.S. § 14-1.1 (1986). In fact, defendant received a sentence of imprisonment for twenty years.
Under N.C.G.S. § 14-17 murder in the second degree has been construed to be the unlawful killing of a human being with malice. State v. Robbins, 309 N.C. 771, 309 S.E.2d 188 (1983); State v. Foust, 258 N.C. 453, 128 S.E.2d 889 (1963). Malice “aforethought” is not an element of murder in the second degree. State v. Duboise, 279 N.C. 73, 181 S.E.2d 393 (1971); State v. McGee, 47 N.C. App. 280, 267 S.E.2d 67, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 101, 273 S.E.2d 306 (1980).
The majority properly addresses the issue of retroactivity concerning the abolition of the rule. However, the majority does not discuss why the rule is applied in this case of murder in the second degree.
When a court is abolishing a rule of law, it is submitted that the proper exercise of judicial power should be explained and supported by broad policies concerning the criminal law . . .
State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 96, 318 A.2d 257, 261 (1974) (quoting from Note, The Abolition of the Year and a Day Rule: Commonwealth v. Ladd, 65 Dick. L. Rev. 166, 169 (1961)). The majority fails to cite any case or authority holding that the “year and a day” rule is applicable to a charge of murder in the second degree —and with good reason. The majority will stand alone in applying the rule to murder in the second degree.
The majority does not articulate, nor do I find, any convincing reason to extend the “year and a day” rule to this case of murder in the second degree where the defendant’s life was never at stake. I dissent from this holding of the majority.