Court Opinion

ID: 9716233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:31:41.386328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:43.115496
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
The administration of criminal justice is constitutionally effective only if it satisfies both the needs of *476maintaining public order and preserving individual freedoms. Both the societal interest and that of the individual defendant are encompassed in the constitutional concept of a speedy trial. Both interests demand a prompt disposition of charges pending against an accused.
A prompt trial of criminal offenses must not be delayed by either the prosecution or the defense. Nor may courts contribute to such delays. Society’s interest in the prompt presentation of criminal cases and the defendant’s right to speedy trial recognize delay only for good cause. See, e.g., American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial, §2.3 (Approved Draft, 1968). The accused may not have relief because of delay for which he is responsible. Nor may the prosecutor be permitted to defeat the constitutional guarantee of a prompt trial by pursuing a course of dilatory conduct which he creates.
The constitutional mandate of a speedy trial compels enforcement of that safeguard by effective sanctions. Here, where the time for trial commenced from the date of our mandate granting a new trial* (September 26, 1967), and trial was not begun until June 1, 1970, that sanction means the discharge of the defendant. See American Bar Association Standards, supra, §2.2. No “good cause” has been advanced by the Commonwealth to sustain its failure to promptly retry appellant. As the majority correctly notes, an unexcused seven-month delay existed prior to the withdrawal of appellant’s first counsel, and a year delay subsequent to the appointment of his final counsel. The cause of these delays has in no way been attributed to appellant.
*477On this record, the unnecessary delay in retrying appellant constitutes a form of injustice clearly violative of defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 297 A. 2d 127 (1972).
I dissent and would discharge the defendant.
Mr. Justice Nix and Mr. Justice Manderino join in this dissenting opinion.

 Or, at most, the time of trial began to run from the date that mandate was received by the trial court.