Court Opinion

ID: 9659863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:56:16.816989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:12.234792
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). In Pontiac Police Officers Association v Pontiac, 397 Mich 674; 246 NW2d 831 (1976), we held that grievance and other disciplinary procedures are "other terms and conditions of employment” within the meaning of the PERA and that the duty to bargain collectively on such issues and to perform in accordance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement prevails over conflicting provisions of the charter of a home-rule city.
This appeal raises the related question whether the provisions of a statute providing for the removal of probation officers bars implementation of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement providing a grievance procedure terminating in final and binding arbitration.
I
A collective bargaining agreement was entered into, effective July 1, 1973, for a term of three years, between the Board of Commissioners of Wayne County, the circuit and probate courts for that county, the Common Pleas Court and the Recorder’s Court for the City of Detroit, as the employers, and Council No. 23, affiliated with the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), as the union.1
The agreement provides that "[a]ll disciplinary *21actions shall be subject to the Grievance Procedure”.2 The grievance procedure terminates in final and binding arbitration and may be invoked by an employee who believes "he has cause for a grievance on any matter concerning his employment with the employer”. A "probation officer” is an employee covered by the agreement.
Chase Osborn, IV, a probation officer in the Recorder’s Court of the City of Detroit and a member of the bargaining unit covered by the collective bargaining agreement, was discharged November 6, 1974 for misconduct and negligence.
A statute provides that the Michigan Corrections Commission shall have the power to remove a probation officer "upon the certification of the judge or judges of the court * * * that a full hearing has been had before said judge or judges and as a result thereof the court has determined that such probation officer is incompetent or has been guilty of misconduct, neglect of duty or refusal to carry out the order of the court”.3
It is not claimed that Osborn’s removal was not in accordance with the requirements of this statute.
A grievance requesting arbitration was filed by AFSCME on Osborn’s behalf on November 15, 1974. The Recorder’s Court responded that Osborn was removed under authority of the statute and "as the collective bargaining contract cannot su*22persede the statute, the Court will not submit to arbitration”.
AFSCME and Osborn commenced this action in the Court of Appeals as an original action against the Judges of the Recorder’s Court for the City of Detroit4 seeking an order to show cause why an order of mandamus should not issue directing the Recorder’s Court Judges to submit to grievance arbitration. The Court of Appeals declined to issue a show cause order "for lack of merit in the grounds presented”.
AFSCME contends that the PERA imposes an obligation on public employers to bargain collectively with public employee bargaining units. The PERA provides that "to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder”.5 This language, which is the same as § 8(d) of the Federal Taft-Hartley Act,6 imposes, AFSCME contends, an obligation to bargain concerning grievance arbitration.7
AFSCME contends that there is no conflict between the statute concerning removal of probation officers and the arbitration grievance procedure under the contract. The statute prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Recorder’s Court *23to remove a probation officer. The grievance-arbitration clause of the contract "is not even triggered until after the termination of an employee becomes final”.
The judges respond that the provision of the statute providing for removal of probation officers imposes a nondelegable duty on the judges to conduct such hearings and, therefore, under a saving provision of the collective bargaining agreement, removal of probation officers is not subject to arbitration.8
The PERA does not expressly authorize grievance arbitration. The statute providing for removal of probation officers specifically deals with the subject matter. The judges contend that the specific statute prevails over the general.
The judges also assert that application of the arbitration provision in this case would be repugnant to Const 1963, art 6, § 1: "The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one court of justice”. The preparation of presentence reports and the supervision of probationers is an aspect of the sentencing power vested in the judiciary. The judicial power includes the power to determine who will assist in carrying out that function and to discipline or remove those found after a hearing to be unfit. The PERA should be construed to avoid conflict between its provisions and the judicial article.
II
This Court has said: "Court employees are public employees within the definition of [the PERA] and *24art 4, §48 of the Michigan Constitution”. Judges of the 74th Judicial District v Bay County, 385 Mich 710, 725; 190 NW2d 219 (1971).
In Pontiac Police Officers v Pontiac, supra, we concluded that disciplinary procedures and a proposal for final and binding grievance arbitration concern "other terms and conditions of employment” and are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the PERA.
The County of Wayne and the judges of the several courts agreed, in the collective bargaining agreement with AFSCME, that "[a]ll disciplinary actions” would be subject to a grievance procedure terminating in final and binding arbitration.
Under the statute a probation officer may not be removed except in accordance with the procedure there prescribed. By agreeing to a grievance procedure terminating in final and binding arbitration, the county and the judges have provided a means by which a probation officer may obtain de novo reconsideration of the removal determination.
The County of Wayne and the Recorder’s Court Judges were not obligated under the PERA to agree to the grievance arbitration procedure proposed by AFSCME. The obligation under the act was to bargain in good faith.
Ill
While the PERA is a general statute and the statute providing a procedure for removal of probation officers is specific it does not follow that the specific statutory provision governs.
The powers of the Wayne County Civil Service Commission are set forth in a specific statute. In Wayne County Civil Service Commission v Board of Supervisors, 384 Mich 363, 374; 184 NW2d 201 *25(1971), this Court held that the original authority and duty of the Wayne County Civil Service Commission "was diminished pro tanto, by the [PERA], to the extent of free administration of the latter according to its tenor”.
The power of a school district to discharge a tenured teacher, the standard ("reasonable and just cause”), the procedure and powers of the State Tenure Commission to review a discharge decision are set forth in a specific statute, the teachers’ tenure act.9 In Rockwell v Crestwood School District Board of Education, 393 Mich 616, 629, 630; 227 NW2d 736 (1975), we held that the PERA superseded the provisions of that act when the discharge is for concerted strike activity.
We agree that, in this instance, the PERA and the earlier, specific, statute concerning probation officer removal can be "consistently reconciled”, Edwards v Auditor General, 161 Mich 639, 644-645; 126 NW 853 (1910), and given "harmonious operation and effect” and "consonant operation”, 1A Sutherland’s Statutory Construction (Sands, 4th ed), § 23.10, and that, therefore, there is no "positive repugnancy”, Edwards v Auditor General, supra.
Under our reconciliation, the statutory and grievance procedures may both be utilized. Under our colleague’s reconciliation only the statutory procedure is operative. It is thus apparent that the two statutes can be "construed together”, "consistently reconciled”, "positive repugnancy” avoided, to reach opposite results, and therefore whether the statutes can "stand together”, be "consistently reconciled” and "positive repugnancy” avoided does not resolve the matter.
Whenever a grievance procedure terminating in *26final and binding arbitration is adopted it replaces the authority of a person or tribunal to make the ultimate decision. This Court has heretofore "consistently construed the PERA as the dominant law regulating public employee labor relations”; the "supremacy of the provisions of the PERA is predicated on the Constitution (Const 1963, art 4, § 48) and the apparent legislative intent that the PERA be the governing law for public labor relations”. Rockwell v Crestwood School District Board of Education, supra. Other statutory regulations of the employment relationship are "diminished pro tanto”by the PERA "to the extent of free administration of the latter”. Wayne County Civil Service Commission v Board of Supervisors, supra.
A large number of public employee collective bargaining agreements provide for final and binding grievance arbitration of disciplinary disputes.10 Although the earlier enacted teachers’ tenure act is "very specific” regarding removal procedures and the language of the PERA ("other terms and conditions of employment”) is "general”, teacher collective bargaining agreements commonly provide for final and binding grievance arbitration as the final step,11 effectively substituting the contract authority of the grievance arbitrator for the statutory authority of the State Tenure Commission to *27approve or disapprove a school district’s removal decision.
The power to reinstate a discharged probation officer is indeed "sensitive”. So too, having in mind the profound influence of a schoolteacher in molding the value system of a generation of students, is the power to reinstate a teacher discharged for incompetence or misconduct. Police officers wield great power over lives and property, the power to reinstate a disciplined police officer, Pontiac Police Officers Association v Pontiac, supra, is "sensitive”.12
What cannot be consistently reconciled are the concepts that grievance arbitration may dominate, by reason of the PERA, in some areas of the public sector, although there is an earlier enacted statutorily prescribed removal procedure, but does not in this area because there is an earlier enacted statutorily prescribed procedure.
IV
In consequence of collective bargaining public employers have relinquished some of the control they formerly exercised over their employees. It begs the question to argue that public employers may not delegate their authority. Whenever any public employer enters into a collective bargaining agreement and agrees to a modification of its powers of discharge, it relinquishes, transfers, "delegates” authority.
*28We see no basis for distinguishing between the judiciary and other public employers in resolving the question whether compulsory grievance arbitration is a valid term in a collective bargaining agreement.
Counties, home-rule cities, regents of universities and some commissions also have constitutionally vested powers.13 There is no discernible distinction between one constitutional function and another in the implementation of the legislative power, specifically enumerated in the Constitution (Const 1963, art 4, § 48), to enact laws for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees.
On the strength of that specific, constitutionally conferred power, the Legislature might have explicitly modified existing statutes concerning the discipline of public employees and provided that all grievances — or, more limited, grievances concerning disciplinary discharge where a collective bargaining agreement has been entered into— shall be resolved by a procedure terminating in final and binding arbitration.
If we were to hold that the doctrine of separation of powers bars the Legislature from authorizing the County of Wayne or the Recorder’s Judges from agreeing to a grievance procedure for court employees terminating in final and binding arbitration, it would be in effect to hold that it is beyond the power of the Legislature to enact legislation providing for final and binding arbitration of a grievance arising out of the discipline of a court employee.
The doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude the enactment of laws regulating the employment of public employees who serve the *29courts. The judiciary does not necessarily have the exclusive constitutional power to appoint and remove all public employees who serve the courts. Under the statute, probation officers are appointed and are subject to removal by the Corrections Commission on judicial recommendation.14
The Recorder’s Court Judges have not shown that the duty to bargain, the agreement reached providing a grievance procedure terminating in final and binding arbitration or the implementation of that agreement has inhibited the discharge of their constitutional function. A fairly administered grievance arbitration procedure for probation officers would not so burden the exercise of the constitutionally conferred powers of the judiciary as to warrant a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Since we conclude that the statutory procedure does not bar implementation of the negotiated grievance procedure and that inhibition of the constitutional function of the judiciary has not been demonstrated, any decision of the arbitrator requiring Osborn’s reinstatement would not involve relinquishment by the Recorder’s Court Judges of powers which by law or constitution they cannot relinquish (see fn 8).
V
The public interest in a sound probation system may be better served if probation officers do not have recourse to arbitration. There was, however, no obligation to agree to a grievance procedure terminating in final and binding arbitration.
In Pontiac Police Officers Association v Pontiac, supra, p 684, we said that it is "the prerogative of *30the Legislature to give such consideration as it deems warranted to the claims of public employers that the scope of the collective bargaining obligation impinges unduly on their power to govern”.
Kavanagh, C. J., and Ryan, J., concurred with Levin, J.

 The signatories include the four courts. Judge Bowles signed in behalf of the Wayne Circuit Court, Judge Connolly in behalf of the Common Pleas Court, Judge Ira G. Kaufman in behalf of the probate court, and Judge Joseph A. Gillis in behalf of the Recorder’s Court.

 The agreement also provides that "[an] employee shall lose his seniority for the following reasons only:
"(a) Resignation or voluntary quits.
"(b) Discharge or permanent removal from the payroll and the separation is not reversed through the grievance procedure.
"B. Loss of seniority under the above provisions are [sic] subject to the Grievance Procedure.”

 MCLA 771.10; MSA 28.1140.

 Actions for mandamus against a state officer are required to be brought in the Court of Appeals. GCR 1963, 714.1.

 MCLA 423.215; MSA 17.455(15).

 29 USC 158(d).

 The union relies on United Steelworkers v Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co, 363 US 574; 80 S Ct 1347; 4 L Ed 2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v American Manufacturing Co, 363 US 564; 80 S Ct 1343; 4 L Ed 2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp, 363 US 593; 80 S Ct 1358; 4 L Ed 2d 1424 (1960).

 "The arbitrator shall be without authority to require the employer to delegate, alienate or relinquish any powers, duties, responsibilities, obligations or discretions which by state law or state constitution the employer cannot delegate, alienate or relinquish.”

 MCLA 38.71 et seq.; MSA 15.1971 et seq.

 Pontiac Police Officers Association v Pontiac, 397 Mich 674; 246 NW2d 831 (1976), fns 19 and 23 and accompanying text.

 See Brown v Holton Public Schools, 397 Mich 71; 243 NW2d 255 (1976); Detroit Federation of Teachers v Detroit Board of Education, 396 Mich 220; 240 NW2d 225 (1976); Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School District v Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School Teachers’ Association, 393 Mich 583; 227 NW2d 500 (1975). Although the foregoing cases do not concern the rights of tenured teachers or the issue before the Court, they show the prevalence of such provisions where the bulk of the bargaining unit is composed of employees subject to the statutory procedure. While the contract provisions vary, the relative speed of the arbitration process has, in a large number of tenured teacher cases, resulted in pre-emption of the statutory process.

 Police officer and fire fighter collective bargaining agreements also commonly contain grievance procedures; the firemen and policemen’s civil service system act provides a disciplinary hearing procedure, MCLA 38.513, 38.514; MSA 5.3363, 5.3364.
A disciplinary hearing procedure is prescribed by state law for the county medical examiner and deputy county medical examiner, MCLA 52.201f; MSA 5.953(1f), and for officers and employees in the classified civil service of a township, MCLA 38.462; MSA 5.193(12).

 See Regents of the University of Michigan v Employment Relations Commission, 389 Mich 96; 204 NW2d 218 (1973).

 See fn 3.