Court Opinion

ID: 9771833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:55:00.847407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:37.777033
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge,
dissenting.
A Dallas police officer, Murray Jackson, testified that he worked as a security guard for Skaggs-Albertson Store to watch for, among other things, shoplifters and those who changed price tags on merchandise. While he was working there one afternoon he saw appellant remove a price tag from a large container of Tylenol and affix in its place the price tag from a smaller size. She was apprehended by Jackson outside the store.
The Court, on original submission, held that the State failed to prove that Murray Jackson was “the owner” of the merchandise as alleged in the information. The information alleged that appellant did “then and there knowingly and intentionally with intent to injure, defraud and harm, another, Murray Jackson, remove and substitute a, writing, to wit: price tag, which was not a governmental record.” The name of the person to be defrauded or harmed does not have to be alleged. Article 21.05, V.A.C.C.P., provides:
“Where a particular intent is a material fact in the description of the offense, it must be stated in the indictment; but in any case where an intent to defraud is required to constitute an offense, it shall be sufficient to allege an intent to defraud, without naming therein the particular person intended to be defrauded.”
Even though the information may have alleged more than was necessary, there was no variance between the allegation and the proof. V.T.C.A., Penal Code Section 32.-47(a), provides as follows:
“A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud or harm another, he destroys, removes, conceals, alters, substitutes, or otherwise impairs the verity, legibility, or availability of a writing, other than a governmental record.” (Emphasis added).
The statute neither requires the information to allege nor does it require proof as to the owner. “Another” is defined in V.T. C.A., Penal Code Section 1.07(4), as “. . .a person other than the actor.”
The information alleges that appellant intended to defraud and harm Murray Jackson, and the proof supports that allegation. Harm is defined in V.T.C.A., Penal Code Section 1.07(16):
“ ‘Harm’ means anything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, or injury, including harm to another person in whose welfare the person affected is interested.” (Emphasis added).
Even if proof of ownership were required, V.T.C.A., Penal Code Section 1.07(24): “ ‘Owner’ means a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.”
Jackson, by reason of his employment to prevent shoplifting and other crimes and to apprehend fraudulent takers of property and to return it to the store, had a greater right to possession than the appellant did. Jackson, under Section 1.07(16), supra, was interested in the welfare of those who owned the store and who were affected.
The State’s motion for rehearing should be granted and the judgment should be affirmed.
TOM G. DAVIS, DALLY and W. C. DAVIS, JJ., join in this dissent.