Court Opinion

ID: 9954353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 22:15:47.334492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:05.820539
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION ONE

 In the Matter of the Marriage of                    No. 85667-7-I
 STEVEN L. POLLARD,

                            Respondent,

                   and                               UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 STEPHANIE M. POLLARD,

                             Appellant.

       BOWMAN, J. — Stephanie Pollard appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion

to vacate portions of its final divorce order under CR 60(b)(4) and (11), arguing that

Steven Pollard misrepresented the extent of his retirement benefits. Because the

trial court did not apply the correct legal standard under CR 60(b)(4), we reverse

and remand for further proceedings on that issue. We affirm denial of the motion to

vacate under CR 60(b)(11) and defer imposing appellate attorney fees and costs to

the trial court.

                                          FACTS

       Stephanie and Steven1 married in March 2005 in Las Vegas, Nevada.

During their marriage, Stephanie worked as a dental hygienist. Steven worked as

an electrician, accumulating retirement benefits in two pensions and an annuity.

Stephanie and Steven separated in November 2016 and Steven petitioned for

divorce in May 2017 in Wahkiakum County. Both parties represented themselves.

       1
      We refer to Steven Pollard and Stephanie Pollard by their first names for clarity.
We mean no disrespect.
No. 85667-7-I/2

They submitted a stipulated final divorce order and agreed findings and conclusions

to the court, which the court entered in August 2017.2

       The final divorce order allocated as assets to Steven the marital home, a

vehicle, and “[a]ll other items except as other awarded to [Stephanie].” And the

order allocated to Stephanie half of the equity in the marital home, a vehicle, certain

personal property items, and 50 percent of Steven’s “pension accumulated while

married.”3 It did not identify as an asset or specifically award to either party

Steven’s second pension or the annuity.

       In February 2021, Stephanie moved to vacate under CR 60(b)(4) and (11)

the portions of the final divorce order related to the parties’ financial assets and

debts. Stephanie argued that Steven fraudulently concealed his annuity and

second pension, warranting relief under CR 60(b)(4), and that his misrepresentation

led to an unjust and inequitable division of assets, warranting relief under CR

60(b)(11). Stephanie asked for attorney fees for bringing the motion to vacate.

       Stephanie submitted a declaration with her motion. In her declaration,

Stephanie says:

       In the divorce, I believed that I would receive half of Steve[n]’s annuity,
       which is the only retirement asset I knew of at the time. The divorce
       order refers to a “pension,” but I thought that just meant “retirement”
       generally — I didn’t know there was a difference between a pension
       and an annuity.

She explains that “[d]uring our marriage, I remember seeing statements related to

       2
        Despite living in King County, the parties filed for dissolution in Wahkiakum County
because it does not require personal appearance before entering a stipulated final divorce
order. See PACIFIC & WAHKIAKUM COUNTIES SUPER. CT. LOCAL CIV. R. 9.
       3
        The final divorce order also allocated the outstanding mortgage obligation and
about $40,000 in credit card debt to Steven and a $30,000 vehicle loan to Stephanie. It did
not award a money judgment to either party.

                                             2
No. 85667-7-I/3

Steve[n]’s annuity arrive in the mail. I didn’t know that he also had pensions.” And

she says that in early 2020, she discovered that an annuity is different from a

pension, so she contacted Steven to request that they divide the annuity.

       Steven objected to the motion to vacate. He argued that Stephanie’s motion

was untimely and that she “has not shown the necessary ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ justifying relief.” Steven also requested attorney fees, arguing that

Stephanie’s motion to vacate was frivolous.

       Steven submitted a declaration in which he says that Stephanie knew about

the annuity and pensions because she took care of their finances during the

marriage. He declares that he and Stephanie “spent a lot of time negotiating the

final order in this case,” that “she knew she was getting half the pension,” and that

she “knew the difference between” the two pensions and the annuity.

       The court denied Stephanie’s motion to vacate. It ruled that the final divorce

order awarded to Steven as personal property “[a]ll other items except as other

awarded to [Stephanie],” and because Steven’s annuity was not awarded to

Stephanie elsewhere in the order, it was included in the “[all] other items” clause.

The court declined to “make a factual determination of the intent of the parties

outside of the orders they agreed to” because “[f]inal orders were entered nearly

four years ago.” The court denied attorney fees for both parties.

       Stephanie appeals.

                                      ANALYSIS

       Stephanie argues the trial court erred by denying her motion to vacate under

CR 60(b)(4) and (11). Both parties request attorney fees and costs on appeal.

                                           3
No. 85667-7-I/4

1. CR 60(b)

          Under CR 60(b), “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may

relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for “(4) [f]raud

. . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party” or “(11) [a]ny

other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”4 The party

seeking relief bears the burden of showing relief is warranted. See Fowler v.

Johnson, 167 Wn. App. 596, 605, 273 P.3d 1042 (2012) (defaulting party must

demonstrate at least a prima facie defense to the claim asserted by the opposing

party).

          We generally review a trial court’s decision on a CR 60(b) motion for an

abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Bresnahan, 21 Wn. App. 2d 385, 406, 505

P.3d 1218 (2022). A court abuses its discretion if it makes its ruling on untenable

grounds or for untenable reasons or bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the

law. Id.

                 A court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the
          range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal
          standard; it is based on untenable grounds if the factual findings are
          unsupported by the record; it is based on untenable reasons if it is
          based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the
          requirements of the correct standard.

In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

          A. CR 60(b)(4)

          Stephanie argues that the trial court abused its discretion by applying the

incorrect legal standard to her CR 60(b)(4) motion. We agree.

          4
              Stephanie did not move to vacate under the other subsections of CR 60(b).

                                                 4
No. 85667-7-I/5

        To prevail on a CR 60(b)(4) motion, the moving party must establish by clear

and convincing evidence that the adverse party’s fraudulent conduct or

misrepresentations caused the entry of the judgment. Bresnahan, 21 Wn. App. 2d

at 406. “Clear and convincing evidence is evidence showing that a fact is ‘highly

probable.’ ” Id. A petitioner can establish fraudulent concealment or

misrepresentation by either (1) affirmatively pleading and proving the nine elements

of fraud5 or (2) showing that the respondent breached an affirmative duty to disclose

a material fact. Crisman v. Crisman, 85 Wn. App. 15, 21, 931 P.2d 163 (1997).

When a duty to disclose exists, the suppression of a material fact amounts to

misrepresentation. Id. at 22.

        Spouses owe each other the highest fiduciary duty. Peters v. Skalman, 27

Wn. App. 247, 251, 617 P.2d 448 (1980). Part of this fiduciary duty requires

spouses to disclose all community and separate property before and during

dissolution.6 Seals v. Seals, 22 Wn. App. 652, 655-56, 590 P.2d 1301 (1979). “The

full disclosure mandated by the fiduciary relationship assumes that one party has

information which the other needs to know to protect [their] interests.” In re

Marriage of Burkey, 36 Wn. App. 487, 490, 675 P.2d 619 (1984). Spouses need

        5
           To establish fraud, a moving party must show (1) a representation of an existing
fact, (2) its materiality, (3) its falsity, (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity or ignorance
of its truth, (5) his or her intent that it should be acted on by the person to whom it is made,
(6) ignorance of its falsity on the part of the person to whom it is made, (7) the latter’s
reliance on the truth of the representation, (8) his or her right to rely on it, and (9) the
consequent damage. N. Pac. Plywood, Inc. v. Access Rd. Builders, Inc., 29 Wn. App. 228,
232, 628 P.2d 482 (1981).
        6
         Spouses in a dissolution proceeding also have a duty to inform the court of their
assets so it can make a just and equitable distribution of property under RCW 26.09.080.
Bresnahan, 21 Wn. App. 2d at 404; In re Marriage of Wright, 179 Wn. App. 257, 261, 319
P.3d 45 (2013). Stephanie argued below that Steven breached this duty to the court but
does not argue the issue on appeal. So, we do not address it.

                                                 5
No. 85667-7-I/6

not know the exact financial status of the other spouse. Friedlander v. Friedlander,

80 Wn.2d 293, 302, 494 P.2d 208 (1972). But the parties must sufficiently disclose

assets such that they “can intelligently determine” whether to enter into settlement

agreements and not be “prejudiced by the lack of information.” In re Marriage of

Cohn, 18 Wn. App. 502, 507, 569 P.2d 79 (1977).

       Stephanie argues she is entitled to relief under CR 60(b)(4) because Steven

violated his fiduciary duty by failing to disclose to her his second pension and

annuity. Steven denies the allegation. Each party filed competing declarations with

the trial court. CR 60(b)(4) requires the trial court to resolve the disputed issues of

fact and determine whether Steven committed fraud, misrepresentation, or

misconduct. But the court sidestepped the issue by concluding the property went to

Steven under a catch-all provision in the final divorce order.7 Because the court

applied the incorrect legal standard to Stephanie’s motion to vacate under CR

60(b)(4), it abused its discretion, and we reverse and remand for the trial court to

resolve the disputed facts and rule on that issue.

       B. CR 60(b)(11)

       Stephanie argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to vacate

under CR 60(b)(11). We disagree.

       A trial court may vacate a judgment under CR 60(b)(11) for any reason

“justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” But relief under CR 60(b)(11)

is “ ‘confined to situations involving extraordinary circumstances not covered by any

       7
          It appears the trial court may have treated the motion to vacate as a request to
partition personal property. “Property undisposed of by a dissolution action becomes
property held by the former spouses as tenants in common.” Seals, 22 Wn. App. at 655.
Partition is an equitable action that allows the trial court to dispose of property held by
tenants in common. See Kelsey v. Kelsey, 179 Wn. App. 360, 365, 317 P.3d 1096 (2014).

                                             6
No. 85667-7-I/7

other section of the rule.’ ” In re Marriage of Tang, 57 Wn. App. 648, 655, 789 P.2d

118 (1990)8 (quoting In re Marriage of Yearout, 41 Wn. App. 897, 902, 707 P.2d

1367 (1985)). That is, we apply CR 60(b)(11) “to serve the ends of justice in [only]

extreme, unexpected situations.” State v. Ward, 125 Wn. App. 374, 379, 104 P.3d

751 (2005).

       Stephanie argues that she is entitled to relief for extraordinary circumstances

because Steven’s failure to disclose his retirement assets rendered the stipulated

dissolution orders unfair at the time the court entered them. But Stephanie’s

argument turns on Steven’s alleged misrepresentation. As a result, it falls under CR

60(b)(4), not (11). And alone, a party’s assertion that a separation agreement is

unfair does not amount to extraordinary circumstances. Yearout, 41 Wn. App. at

902. The trial court did not err by denying Stephanie’s motion to vacate under CR

60(b)(11).

2. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

       Both Stephanie and Steven ask for attorney fees and costs on appeal under

RCW 26.09.140.9 RAP 18.1(a) permits a party to request attorney fees and

expenses on appeal where applicable law grants them that right. Under RCW

26.09.140, an appellate court “may, in its discretion, order a party to pay for the cost

to the other party of maintaining the appeal and attorneys’ fees in addition to

statutory costs” in dissolution proceedings. But because we reverse and remand for

the trial court to resolve the competing declarations and rule on the CR 60(b)(4)

       8
           Internal quotation marks omitted.
       9
          Steven also asks for attorney fees under RAP 18.9(a), arguing Stephanie’s appeal
is frivolous. Because her appeal is not frivolous, we deny his request for attorney fees
under RAP 18.9(a).

                                               7
No. 85667-7-I/8

motion to vacate, we defer any award of appellate attorney fees and costs to the

trial court. See Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 153, 94 P.3d 930 (2004)

(“[w]here a party has succeeded on appeal but has not yet prevailed on the merits,

[we] should defer to the trial court to award attorney fees”), abrogated on other

grounds by Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516,

404 P.3d 464 (2017).

       We reverse the trial court’s denial of Stephanie’s motion to vacate under CR

60(b)(4) and remand for the court to resolve the disputed facts and rule on that

issue, affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to vacate under CR 60(b)(11), and

defer the award of appellate attorney fees and costs to the trial court.

WE CONCUR:

                                           8