Court Opinion

ID: 9412574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-31 20:04:45.637658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:10.518702
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/31/23 P. v. Ballard CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B317078

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
        v.                                                      A634817)

JIMMY LEONARD BALLARD,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tammy Chung Ryu, Judge. Affirmed.
      Patricia A. Scott, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, and Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       In 1985, defendant and appellant Jimmy Ballard
(defendant) and two accomplices planned to lure his ex-girlfriend
Yvette Robinson (Robinson) to a remote area to steal cocaine from
her; the plan was to rob her of the cocaine she brought to an
ostensible drug deal, steal the keys to her residence, and loot her
home of more drugs and money stored there. Defendant and one
of his accomplices, Fred Catchings (Catchings), obtained a
firearm in advance and, on the day of the supposed drug deal,
defendant accompanied Robinson in her car to the meeting
point—Robinson’s three-year-old daughter was with them. At
the scene, Catchings shot Robinson twice in the chest and
defendant fled, leaving the mortally wounded Robinson and her
daughter still at the scene of the crime. We are asked to decide
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that defendant is not entitled to Penal Code
section 1172.6 relief because he acted with reckless indifference
to human life (defendant does not challenge the court’s finding
that he was a major participant in Robinson’s murder).

                         I. BACKGROUND
      On the afternoon of December 12, 1985, in response to a
radio call, two patrol officers for the Los Angeles Police
Department drove to Wadsworth Avenue between 116th and
117th Streets in south Los Angeles. At the time, most of the
buildings on that particular stretch of Wadsworth Avenue had
been leveled as part of a highway construction project, which
made the area isolated.
      When the officers arrived at the scene, they found
Robinson’s body lying face down in the street in a pool of blood

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next to the open driver’s door of an Oldsmobile automobile.
Robinson had been shot twice in the chest.
      Robinson’s three-year-old daughter, Kanisha, was present
at the scene when the police arrived. Kanisha told a detective
that a third person, “Uncle Jimmy,” had been in the vehicle with
her and her mother. After interviewing Robinson’s relatives,
detectives identified “Uncle Jimmy” as defendant; they also
learned defendant was Robinson’s former boyfriend. That
evening, detectives located defendant and interviewed him as a
possible witness to the crime.

       A.    Defendant’s Two Statements to the Police
       In an initial statement to investigators, defendant admitted
he was present when Robinson was killed. According to
defendant, he had been approached by two men interested in
purchasing cocaine. Defendant contacted Robinson, who agreed
to sell two grams of cocaine to the men for $2,000. The sale was
to take place at “the Fields,” i.e., at 117th and Wadsworth.
Robinson drove defendant to the meeting with Kanisha seated
between them in the front seat.
       After they parked on Wadsworth Avenue behind the drug
purchasers’ automobile, which was a 1960s model Chevrolet, a
man approached the two parked vehicles. Defendant told the
police that when he exited Robinson’s car to conduct the sale, the
man pulled out a gun and demanded the drugs. Robinson told
the robber the drugs were in the vehicle’s trunk and gave him the
keys.1 As the robber searched the trunk, defendant convinced

1
     The keys to the Oldsmobile were found by police in the
trunk of the vehicle.

                                3
Robinson to hand the drugs, which were actually inside the
passenger compartment of the vehicle, over to the robber. After
she surrendered the drugs, the robber ordered Robinson to give
him her money. When Robinson and the robber began to argue,
defendant fled the scene. As he was running away, defendant
heard two gunshots.
      In the meantime, the police had detained George Williams
(Williams), the driver of a 1960s model Chevrolet with a license
plate number matching that of a vehicle seen leaving the crime
scene. Police detectives interviewed Williams, and after that, the
detectives considered defendant a suspect in the murder.
      The following day, detectives re-interviewed defendant.
Detectives advised defendant that Williams had implicated him
as responsible for Robinson’s murder, but defendant at first
continued to deny any responsibility and claimed he was merely a
witness to the shooting. Detectives then presented defendant
with what they claimed was evidence of his fingerprints in
Williams’s vehicle, at which point defendant’s “whole body kind of
drained and [he] kind of sunk in [his] chair.”
      Defendant thereafter provided an account of the shooting
and the events leading up to it that differed significantly from his
prior statement. Defendant related that, having previously lived
with Robinson, he believed she kept a large amount of cocaine
and money (as much as two kilograms and $50,000) at her home.
Defendant recruited Catchings to rob Robinson of the drugs and
money. The conspirators planned to lure Robinson away from
her house for an ostensible drug transaction and then, at
gunpoint, pocket the cocaine she would bring with her, take her

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house keys, and steal the drugs and money stockpiled at her
home.2
      Defendant and Catchings obtained the murder weapon, a
.32 caliber revolver, from Williams; Catchings kept the weapon
for use in the robbery. Defendant contacted Robinson and she
picked him up, with Kanisha, before they drove to the site of the
supposed drug deal. Once they arrived, Catchings stole the drugs
Robinson brought with her and shot her.

      B.     Defendant’s Trial, Conviction, and Sentencing
      The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
defendant with Robinson’s murder (Pen. Code,3 § 187, subd. (a)).
At defendant’s trial, audio recordings of defendant’s two
statements to the police were played for the jury during the
prosecution’s case.
      Defendant testified in his own defense during the defense
case. He told the jury “basically the same story” he initially
related to the police: he arranged a drug deal between Robinson
and Catchings; when Robinson, her daughter, and defendant
arrived at the designated meeting spot, Catchings pulled a gun,
grabbed Robinson, and robbed her of the drugs in her possession;
Catchings then demanded money from both Robinson and

2
      The trial record does not reveal what defendant and
Catchings planned to do with Robinson while they robbed her
home. There are only so many conceivable options, however, if
they wanted to ensure Robinson did not interfere with the
robbery or retaliate thereafter.
3
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

                               5
defendant; as Catchings reached into the car for Robinson’s
purse, defendant fled; and, while running away, defendant heard
gunfire.4
       In rebuttal, the prosecution called Alfred Montes (Montes),
a jailhouse informant, as a witness. Montes testified defendant
twice described his planning of and participation in the robbery
and death of a woman who sold drugs and whose little girl was
present during the crime. Defendant, who liked to “brag about
what a big man he was and the capers he pulled,” was “break
dancing and laughing” as he related his account of the robbery
and murder to Montes. Montes also stated defendant offered him
money to falsely tell the jury he had been instructed by one of the
detectives on how to testify.
       The jury was instructed on the felony murder rule and
found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The trial court
sentenced defendant to 25 years to life for the murder, plus an
additional year for an alleged firearm enhancement. We affirmed
the judgment on appeal. (People v. Ballard (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th
752 (Ballard).)

4
      Defendant admitted he was not truthful in his first
statement to detectives because, he said, he wanted to shield
other people from the police investigation. As for his second,
more incriminating statement, defendant claimed he admitted
involvement in the robbery because the police threatened him
with 25 years to life in prison if he did not cooperate and
promised him he could walk away if he told them about the
murder. As for the details of the purported two-stage robbery
plan, defendant testified he made those up because he thought
that was what the police wanted him to say.

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       C.    Defendant’s Petition for Resentencing
       In January 2019, defendant, proceeding without the benefit
of counsel, petitioned for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6
(former section 1170.95). The trial court appointed counsel for
defendant and obtained the record of the earlier criminal case.5
The District Attorney opposed the section 1172.6 petition.
Among other things, the District Attorney argued defendant was
ineligible for resentencing because he was a major participant in
the robbery (he conceived and planned the robbery, recruited
Catchings and Williams, and lured Robinson to the ostensible
drug deal) and acted with reckless indifference (he helped acquire
the murder weapon and rendered no aid to Robinson after
Catchings shot her).
       The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s petition in
December 2021. Neither party presented additional evidence and
both sides argued the matter based on the trial record. Defense
counsel conceded defendant was a major participant in the
robbery but contended his client was entitled to relief because he
did not act with reckless indifference to human life. The
prosecution maintained defendant’s reckless indifference was
evidenced by, among other things, his decision to press on with
the planned robbery despite Kanisha’s presence.
       The trial court denied defendant’s section 1172.6 petition.
The court found the evidence at trial indicated “beyond a
reasonable doubt” that defendant was a major participant in the

5
      Specifically, the trial court had before it copies of the
preliminary hearing transcript, the information, the jury
instructions, the signed verdict forms, and this court’s opinion in
Ballard.

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underlying felony—the “mastermind planner” in the court’s
words. Citing the following facts, the court also found that the
evidence showed defendant acted with reckless indifference to
human life: “his recruitment of the shooter, his presence when
the gun was obtained, his lack of activity to mitigate danger, his
failure to render assistance to the victim after she was shot, his
abandonment of the scene including the victim’s 3[-]year[-]old
child, and his lack of surprise that co-defendant Catchings shot
the victim.”

                         II. DISCUSSION
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that defendant exhibited reckless indifference to
human life in aiding and abetting Robinson’s murder. (People v.
Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 270 [review of a trial court
reckless indifference finding is for substantial evidence]; see also
In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 [analyzing “the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether [the defendant] acted
with reckless indifference to human life”] (Scoggins).) Defendant
planned a two-stage robbery, recruited accomplices, helped obtain
the firearm to be used in the crime, and lured the victim (even
with her young child) to an isolated location where she would be
robbed and then incapacitated in some manner while her home
was robbed. The plan necessarily called for a crime of long
duration and defendant by his own account never sought to
restrain commission of the crime or aid the victim. As we shall
explain in additional detail, these facts provide the requisite
evidence of reckless indifference to human life.
       “Reckless indifference to human life is ‘implicit in
knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave

                                 8
risk of death.’” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 676.) The concept
“‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing)
to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.’” (Id.
at 676-677.) Participation “in a garden-variety armed robbery,
where death might be possible but not probable” is insufficient.
(People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 802; see also People v.
Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 617 [“mere fact” that a robbery
involves a gun, “on its own and with nothing more presented, is
not sufficient to support a finding of reckless indifference”]
(Clark).)
       Our Supreme Court discussed the factors bearing on
whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life in Clark (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 618-623) and revisited
the factors more recently in Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th 667. They
are: “Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be used
during the felony? How many weapons were ultimately used?
Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did he or she
have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim?
What was the duration of the interaction between the
perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What was the
defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s propensity for
violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the
defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the
felony? [Citation.]” (Id. at 677.) A defendant’s major
participation in a murder—a point that is effectively conceded in
this appeal—also bears on the question of reckless indifference to
human life: as both the United States Supreme Court and our
Supreme Court have observed, it is generally the case that the
greater the defendant’s participation in the murder, the more

                                 9
likely the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 153; Clark, supra, at
615.)
       Defendant’s reckless indifference to human life is shown by
his own confession to the authorities, which the trial court was
entitled to credit in lieu of (or in addition to) aspects of his self-
serving trial testimony. (People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 298.)
       Defendant admitted he planned the two-part robbery
scheme that resulted in murder. Defendant and Catchings
jointly procured the lethal weapon that would be used in the
robbery. Defendant planned to (and did) direct Robinson to an
isolated location—which permits an inference either that
Robinson’s death was planned all along or at least that defendant
and his accomplices knew the crime carried with it a grave risk
that they would resort to actual violence. Defendant also knew
the planned criminal endeavor was not meant to be a short,
uneventful holdup; instead, the plan was for a follow-on robbery
at Robinson’s home—which establishes some incapacitation of
Robinson (killing, kidnapping, or, at a minimum, some sort of
restraint) was expected to ensure she did not prevent defendant
and his accomplices from successfully robbing her home.
       Once the plan was in motion, defendant knew Robinson’s
daughter would be present and the non-lethal options for
incapacitation would be further limited. Despite this knowledge,
he continued on with the plan and was present at the Fields
when Robinson was shot. Defendant never claimed, even during
his own testimony at trial, that he attempted in any way to
restrain commission of the crime, tried to intervene to prevent
Catchings from shooting Robinson, or attempted to aid Robinson

                                 10
or her three-year-old daughter before or after the fatal shots were
fired.
        To be sure, there was no evidence of what, if anything,
defendant knew about Catchings’ criminal history or propensity
to use violence (other than, perhaps, his willingness to be the one
who carried what would be the murder weapon). That fact,
however, does not defeat the substantial evidence supporting the
trial court’s reckless indifference finding. Defendant’s role in
planning the crime and obtaining the gun to be used, the
implications of the two-part robbery plan devised, the duration of
the crime (both expected and actual), defendant’s presence at the
scene of the murder, the lack of any actions to restrain the
shooting or aid the victims (we consider Kenisha a victim too),
and defendant’s demeanor after the murder as described by the
jailhouse informant who testified during the prosecution’s
rebuttal case reveal the requisite reckless indifference to human
life.6 (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 678 [“‘“the defendant’s
presence allows him to observe his cohorts so that it is fair to
conclude he shared in their actions and mental
state. . . . [Moreover,] the defendant’s presence gives him an
opportunity to act as a restraining influence on his murderous
cohorts. If the defendant fails to act as a restraining influence,

6
       The reversals in Scoggins and Clark do not undermine this
conclusion. In both of those cases, our Supreme Court held there
was insufficient evidence to support a finding of reckless
indifference because, even though the defendants in each case
planned and organized the robbery, neither was present at the
scene. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 677-678; Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at 613, 619-620.)

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then the defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting
murders”’”].)

                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                           BAKER, J.
We concur:

      RUBIN, P. J.

      KIM, J.

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