Court Opinion

ID: 9894374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 16:10:36.025568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:28.816665
License: Public Domain

J-S17035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    KURT LINO                                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 819 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 15, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0002239-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED: November 1, 2023

       Appellant, Kurt Lino, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in

the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial convictions for

aggravated indecent assault of a child, aggravated assault, simple assault,

recklessly endangering another person, strangulation, indecent assault, and

endangering the welfare of a child.1 We affirm the convictions but vacate the

judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.

       The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as

follows:

           The convictions arose from Appellant’s actions in engaging
           in sexually inappropriate contact, with apparent signs of
           struggle, with a four-year-old female [(“Child”)] on or about
           January 11, 2021.       Appellant, widower of the child’s
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3125(b), 2702(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), 2705, 2718(a)(1),
3126(a)(7), and 4304(a)(1), respectively.
J-S17035-23

       maternal grandmother, resided with the child, the child’s
       mother, S.W., and the child’s nine-year-old half-sister, M.J.,
       [in] Erie, Pennsylvania. On the evening of January 11,
       2021, after the mother dropped off the child’s half-sister,
       M.J., at that child’s father’s residence, the mother and
       [Child] returned home and went to bed together in the
       mother’s upstairs bedroom. After the mother fell asleep,
       Appellant removed the child from bed and took her
       downstairs, ostensibly to watch a movie together.

       After an unknown period, Appellant returned [Child] to the
       mother’s bed where the mother was sleeping. When the
       mother woke in the morning, she noticed a scratch on the
       nose of [Child], where no scratch had been the night before.
       Shortly after 7:00 a.m., the mother dropped off [Child] at
       the residence of Linda Lander, the child’s babysitter of
       approximately three years. The child slept for a short period
       at Lander’s residence. After the child woke and Lander was
       helping her in the bathroom, Lander observed blood in the
       child’s underwear. When the child attempted to urinate, she
       cried and told Lander “it hurt.” The child told the babysitter
       in graphic terms she had pain in the genital area. As Lander
       changed the child’s clothes, she observed blood at the
       child’s genital area.

       Upon inquiry, the child told Lander that Appellant had gotten
       the child up in the night to watch a movie downstairs while
       the mother was sleeping. The child related to the babysitter
       that Appellant told the child not [to] tell anyone what
       happened downstairs. Lander reported the incident to the
       mother who, by this time, had reported to work. The
       mother left work, and together with the child’s father, took
       the child to the Erie CARE Clinic at UPMC Hospital in Erie,
       Pennsylvania, where a forensic examination was performed.

       The combined findings upon initial examination and a
       subsequent follow-up examination at the hospital included
       abrasions or tears near the labia; a complete transection of
       the child’s hymen consistent with genital penetration;
       ligature marks on the child’s neck; genital bleeding;
       petechial marks on the exterior of both of the child’s eyes
       and on her cheeks; and scratches under the child’s cheeks.
       Testimony was introduced that Appellant’s and the child’s
       DNA was found in mixture samples from two mattress

                                   -2-
J-S17035-23

          cuttings.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/20/22, at 1-2).     On October 21, 2021, the

Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging Appellant with offenses

related to his abuse of Child.

       On March 31, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a motion to admit certain

out-of-court statements from Child pursuant to the “tender years” statute, 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1.          Specifically, the Commonwealth sought to utilize

testimony from a forensic interviewer about Child’s statements from two

interviews at the Children’s Advocacy Center in 2021. The Commonwealth

also sought to use testimony from Child’s father regarding Child’s statements

following the assault.         In a separate filing from that same day, the

Commonwealth submitted a motion to allow Child to testify via videotape or

in another room, outside the presence of Appellant, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 5984.1, 5985. In this motion, the Commonwealth argued that Child would

suffer severe emotional distress if she was required to testify in Appellant’s

presence.

       Also on March 31, 2022, after the Commonwealth filed its evidentiary

motions, the court conducted a hearing on a previously filed motion for

nominal bond.2 After the court granted Appellant’s motion and set bond at

one dollar, the prosecutor raised the issue of the evidentiary motions she had

____________________________________________

2 Appellant filed his motion for nominal bond on February 18, 2022.

                                           -3-
J-S17035-23

filed earlier in the day. The court expressed a desire to “take care of these

[evidentiary motions] now,” rather than “waste the time and delay this trial

any further[.]”   (N.T. Hearing, 3/31/22, at 9).    At that point, the court

scrutinized the motions with the prosecutor and defense counsel. Although

defense counsel was initially reluctant to address motions that the

Commonwealth had just filed, he did not object to the Commonwealth’s

positions after learning about the substance of the Commonwealth’s

arguments:

        [PROSECUTOR]:               As a proffer for [defense
        counsel], the testimony, Your Honor, pursuant to the statute
        is merely the mother and father, based under their
        observations after the allegation and what happened, the—
        what they saw happen to their daughter and their belief that
        if she had to be face-to-face in a room at this tender age it
        would be their concern that [she] would just regress and go
        back to those—to just shut down.

        So, per the statute, that’s why I was going to put that on
        the—

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:       I have no problem with her
        testifying in another room.

        [PROSECUTOR]:                That’s exactly what this is.
        That’s all I’m trying to explain out. We would do it in Room
        209 outside of [Appellant’s] presence, but [Appellant], of
        course, would be able to watch the proceedings via video
        and confer with [defense counsel]. So that’s one of … the
        documents.

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:         Okay. I have no objection to
        that one.

        [PROSECUTOR]:              Yes. And then the one, Your
        Honor, was just to be able to put in the—the two, both
        recordings, that you have.

                                    -4-
J-S17035-23

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:         Of the—

        [PROSECUTOR]:              Uh-huh.

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:       Yeah.      I don’t        have    an
        objection to that. Again, I didn’t get—

        THE COURT:                 I understand. I understand.

        [PROSECUTOR]:               I’m just fleshing it out. And then
        [Child’s father’s] testimony that I believe was at the prelim
        or not, what statements she had made to him.

        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:         Well, I think that’s something
        that can be addressed at trial.

(Id. at 11-13) (emphasis added).

     Despite these comments from defense counsel, Appellant filed a motion

for reconsideration and motion in limine on April 11, 2022.              In the

reconsideration motion, Appellant argued that the court erred by considering

the Commonwealth’s evidentiary motions at the March 31, 2022 hearing,

“[d]espite repeated objections by counsel for [Appellant].”        (Motion for

Reconsideration, filed 4/11/22, at ¶16). Appellant maintained that the court

erred by addressing the motions “without notice to” Appellant and “without a

formal evidentiary hearing.” (Id.) The motion in limine averred that Child’s

hearsay statements should be excluded because: 1) four-year-old Child is

presumed to be incompetent; 2) the court failed to determine whether Child

competently made the statements at issue; and 3) the court failed to

determine whether Child’s statements were subject to taint or undue

influence. (See Motion In Limine, filed 4/11/22, at ¶20, ¶¶22-23).

                                    -5-
J-S17035-23

      Also on April 11, 2022, the Commonwealth filed an amended motion to

admit an out-of-court statement from Child pursuant to the tender years

statute. In this filing, the Commonwealth sought to utilize testimony from,

the babysitter, Ms. Lander, regarding Child’s statements “relative to

[Appellant] and the assault.”       (Motion, filed 4/11/22, at ¶1).       The

Commonwealth requested that the court conduct a hearing to determine the

admissibility of the evidence under Section 5985.1.

      On April 12, 2022, the parties appeared for the start of trial. Prior to

jury selection, the court addressed the parties’ outstanding pretrial motions.

Initially, defense counsel complained about the Commonwealth’s motions to

admit Child’s hearsay statements.     Defense counsel insisted that Section

5985.1 “requires adequate notice and time to, you know, prepare a defense

to the motions[.]” (N.T. Trial, 4/12/22, at 3-4). Defense counsel maintained

that the court erred by considering the Commonwealth’s motions at the March

31, 2022 hearing.    Further, defense counsel argued that he did not have

adequate time to prepare for the Commonwealth’s amended motion filed on

April 11, 2022.

      The prosecutor responded that defense counsel “indicated on the record

that he had no objection” to the Commonwealth’s motions that the court

addressed on March 31, 2022. (Id. at 5). Regarding the Commonwealth’s

amended motion, the prosecutor emphasized that the tender years statute

“doesn’t require that much notice,” and defense counsel had already received

                                    -6-
J-S17035-23

Ms. Lander’s statement during discovery. (Id. at 4). The court subsequently

denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration and motion in limine. The court

also permitted the Commonwealth to question Ms. Lander about Child’s

hearsay statements.

      After addressing the pretrial motions, the prosecutor reminded the court

of the need “to have some form of finding competency.” (Id. at 10). Thus,

the court conducted an in camera hearing with Child. (See id. at 13-20).

Following the in camera hearing, the court deemed Child competent, counsel

provided their opening statements, and the prosecutor called Child as her first

witness.   Child testified via teleconference from another room in the

courthouse.

      At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty on all counts.

Prior to sentencing, on June 9, 2022, the Commonwealth filed notice of intent

to seek a mandatory minimum sentence for the aggravated indecent assault

of a child conviction, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718(a)(3).        The court

conducted Appellant’s sentencing hearing on June 15, 2022. At that time, the

court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of twenty-three (23) to forty-

six (46) years’ imprisonment.       The sentence included a Section 9718

mandatory minimum term of ten (10) years’ imprisonment for the aggravated

indecent assault of a child conviction.

      Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July 13, 2022. On July 26,

2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

                                     -7-
J-S17035-23

statement of errors complained of on appeal.3 Appellant timely filed his Rule

1925(b) statement on August 15, 2021.

       Appellant now raises two issues for this Court’s review:

          Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or
          committed an error of law when it granted the
          Commonwealth’s motion to allow child witness to testify and
          notice of intent to use hearsay evidence without conducting
          a hearing and denied Appellant’s motion to reconsider and
          motion in limine?

          Whether an error of law occurred when the trial court
          granted Commonwealth’s notice of intent to seek mandatory
          minimum sentence?

____________________________________________

3 Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement preserved the following claims:

          Prior to trial the [trial] court erred in granting the
          Commonwealth’s motion to allow child witness to testify
          pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5984.1 and/or § 5985 and notice
          of intent to use hearsay evidence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.
          § 5985.1 on March 31, 2022, when a bond hearing was
          scheduled to be heard without any notice to [Appellant],
          without the motions being filed and scheduled for a hearing,
          and without conducting an in camera hearing as required by
          the statute.

          In failing to grant [Appellant’s] motion in limine to exclude
          hearsay as unreliable from a witness that is not competent.

          In granting Commonwealth’s notice of intent to seek
          mandatory minimum sentence filed less than a week prior
          to sentencing, after conviction and without the submission
          of the alleged enhancing element being submitted to the
          fact-finder for deliberation in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
          9718(c) and (c.1).

(Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed 8/15/22, at 2) (some capitalization and
numbering omitted).

                                           -8-
J-S17035-23

(Appellant’s Brief at 3).

       In his first issue, Appellant raises three distinct arguments to attack the

court’s evidentiary rulings on the Commonwealth’s pretrial motions.          First,

Appellant cites Section 5984.1(b) for the proposition that the court should

have observed and questioned Child before granting the Commonwealth’s

motion to allow Child to testify from a location outside the courtroom.4 (See

id. at 10). Next, Appellant baldly asserts that the court “abused its discretion

and/or committed an error of law in denying [Appellant’s] motion in limine to

exclude hearsay as unreliable for a witness that is not competent.” (Id. at

9). Finally, Appellant complains that the court erred in granting the amended

motion to admit Child’s hearsay statement to Ms. Lander, where the

Commonwealth did not provide notice of its intent to use the statement

“sufficiently in advance” of trial.            (Id. at 14) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

5985.1(b)). Appellant concludes that this Court must vacate his convictions

on these bases. We disagree.

       This Court’s standard of review for issues regarding the admissibility of

evidence is well settled:

          Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are
____________________________________________

4 Although Appellant cites to Section 5984.1, this statute deals with situations

where a child witness’s testimony is recorded for presentation in court. Here,
Child’s testimony was not recorded. Rather, the court permitted Child “to
testify via teleconference from another room[.]” (N.T. Trial, 4/12/22, at 38).
Therefore, we will proceed to analyze the comparable provision contained in
Section 5985, which governs testimony by contemporaneous alternative
method.

                                           -9-
J-S17035-23

         within the sound discretion of the trial court and we will not
         reverse a trial court’s decision concerning admissibility of
         evidence absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. An
         abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but
         is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the
         exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the
         result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the
         evidence of record. If in reaching a conclusion the trial court
         overrides or misapplies the law, discretion is then abused
         and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.

Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 78 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 244 A.3d 1222 (2021) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 9-10 (Pa.Super. 2014)).

      Section 5985 governs a child victim’s testimony by contemporaneous

alternative method, in pertinent part:

         § 5985. Testimony by contemporaneous alternative
              method

             (a) Contemporaneous           alternative      method.—
         Subject to subsection (a.1), in any prosecution or
         adjudication involving a child victim or a child material
         witness, the court may order that the testimony of the child
         victim or child material witness be taken under oath or
         affirmation in a room other than the courtroom and
         transmitted by a contemporaneous alternative method.
         Only the attorneys for the defendant and for the
         Commonwealth, the court reporter, the judge, persons
         necessary to operate the equipment and any person whose
         presence would contribute to the welfare and well-being of
         the child victim or child material witness, including persons
         designated under section 5983 (relating to rights and
         services), may be present in the room with the child during
         his testimony. The court shall permit the defendant to
         observe and hear the testimony of the child victim or child
         material witness but shall ensure that the child cannot hear
         or see the defendant. The court shall make certain that the
         defendant and defense counsel have adequate opportunity
         to communicate for the purposes of providing an effective

                                      - 10 -
J-S17035-23

         defense. Examination and cross-examination of the child
         victim or child material witness shall proceed in the same
         manner as normally permitted.

            (a.1) Determination.—Before the court orders the child
         victim or the child material witness to testify by a
         contemporaneous alternative method, the court must
         determine, based on evidence presented to it, that testifying
         either in an open forum in the presence and full view of the
         finder of fact or in the defendant’s presence will result in the
         child victim or child material witness suffering serious
         emotional distress that would substantially impair the child
         victim’s or child material witness’s ability to reasonably
         communicate. In making this determination, the court may
         do all of the following:

                 (1) Observe and question the child victim or child
            material witness, either inside or outside the courtroom.

                  (2) Hear testimony of a parent or custodian or
            any other person, such as a person who has dealt with
            the child victim or child material witness in a medical or
            therapeutic setting.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985(a), (a.1).

      Additionally, the statute governing the tender years exception to the

hearsay rule provides, in relevant part:

         § 5985.1. Admissibility of certain statements

            (a)   General rule.—

               (1)      An out-of-court statement made by a child
            victim or witness, who at the time the statement was
            made was 16 years of age or younger, describing any of
            the offenses enumerated in paragraph (2), not otherwise
            admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in
            evidence in any criminal or civil proceeding if:

                  (i)   the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that
               the evidence is relevant and that the time, content
               and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient

                                     - 11 -
J-S17035-23

                indicia of reliability; and

                   (ii)   the child either:

                          (A)   testifies at the proceeding; or

                          (B)   is unavailable as a witness.

                                    *     *      *

             (b) Notice      required.—A     statement     otherwise
         admissible under subsection (a) shall not be received into
         evidence unless the proponent of the statement notifies the
         adverse party of the proponent’s intention to offer the
         statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently
         in advance of the proceeding at which the proponent intends
         to offer the statement into evidence to provide the adverse
         party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the
         statement.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1(a)(1), (b).

      Instantly, the trial court determined that it did not commit reversible

error in addressing the Commonwealth’s evidentiary motions at the March 31,

2022 hearing:

         Ultimately, an in camera interview of the child was
         conducted on April 12, 2022 before the trial began. The fact
         [that] the [c]ourt initially addressed the Commonwealth
         filings on March 31, 2022 at a hearing originally scheduled
         on Appellant’s unrelated motion to be released on nominal
         bail is of no moment. At the hearing on March 31, 2022,
         following an offer of proof by the Commonwealth,
         Appellant’s counsel stipulated he had no objection to the
         child testifying live, outside the presence of Appellant, and
         to playing for the jury the two recordings of forensic
         interviews with the child.

(Trial Court Opinion at 5). The record supports the court’s assertions in this

regard. Further, we emphasize defense counsel’s comment from the first day

                                        - 12 -
J-S17035-23

of trial: “Again, I don’t object to the child testifying in another room.” (N.T.

Trial, 4/12/22, at 7).

      Even if defense counsel had provided additional argument against the

ruling that allowed Child to testify from a location outside the courtroom, we

note that Appellant’s motion for reconsideration requested that the court

“[c]onduct an in camera hearing to determine whether the evidence is

relevant and reliable[.]”     (Motion for Reconsideration at ¶17(D)(1)).

Subsequently, the court conducted the in camera hearing that Appellant

requested. Defense counsel was present during the in camera hearing, but

he did not have any questions for Child. (See N.T. Trial, 4/12/22, at 19). On

this record, we cannot say that the court committed any error in granting the

Commonwealth’s request to allow Child to testify in another location or

denying Appellant’s motion for reconsideration.      See LeClair, supra; 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.

      To the extent Appellant claims that the court erred in denying his motion

in limine to exclude Child’s hearsay statements as unreliable, the court

expressly found Child to be competent following the in camera hearing. (See

Trial Court Opinion at 10). Appellant does not cite to the record to point out

any flaws in the in camera hearing, and he does not argue that Child was

unable to perceive the nature of the events about which she testified. See

Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 611 Pa. 280, 25 A.3d 277 (2011), cert.

denied, 566 U.S. 1035, 132 S.Ct. 2711, 183 L.Ed.2d 70 (2012) (stating

                                     - 13 -
J-S17035-23

competency hearing for minor witness is directed to mental capacity of that

witness to perceive nature of events about which she is called to testify, to

understand questions about that subject matter, to communicate about

subject at issue, to recall information, to distinguish fact from fantasy, and to

tell truth). Thus, we decline any invitation to revisit the court’s competency

determination.    See id. (stating competency is threshold legal issue to be

decided by trial court).

      Finally, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement did not include his argument

about the Commonwealth’s failure to provide adequate notice of its intent to

have Ms. Lander testify about Child’s hearsay statements. (See Rule 1925(b)

Statement at 2).      Appellant’s argument is waived on this basis.         See

Commonwealth v. Carr, 227 A.3d 11, 18 (Pa.Super. 2020) (observing any

issues not raised in Rule 1925(b) statement will generally be deemed waived).

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first claim.

      In his second issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth must

provide notice of its intent to seek a Section 9718 mandatory minimum

sentence prior to conviction. Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth did

not provide notice until after the conviction in this case. Appellant concludes

the court committed an error of law by imposing a Section 9718 mandatory

minimum sentence for the aggravated indecent assault of a child conviction in

this case. We agree.

      “[B]ecause a sentencing court loses its authority to exercise discretion

                                      - 14 -
J-S17035-23

when a mandatory minimum sentence applies, the question of the propriety

of applying a mandatory minimum sentencing provision implicates [the]

legality” of the sentence. Commonwealth v. Prinkey, ___ Pa. ___, ___,

277 A.3d 554, 564 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 636 Pa. 37,

57, 140 A.3d 651, 663-64 (2016) (Baer, J., concurring)).          Section 9718

provides a mandatory ten-year term of imprisonment for any person convicted

of aggravated indecent assault of a child. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718(a)(3). “Notice

to the defendant of the applicability of this section shall be required prior to

conviction.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718(c.1).

      Instantly, the trial court recognized that it erred by imposing a Section

9718 mandatory minimum sentence under the circumstances of this case:

         [T]he record is devoid [of evidence that] the Commonwealth
         provided notice of the applicability of the mandatory
         minimum sentence prior to conviction in the event Appellant
         was convicted at count one.            At sentencing, the
         Commonwealth conceded it did not provide Appellant notice
         prior to conviction. The Commonwealth erroneously argued
         that pursuant to [Commonwealth v. Schmuck, 561 A.2d
         1263 (Pa.Super. 1989)], this notice requirement only
         applies in the guilty plea context. The Commonwealth’s
         reliance on Schmuck is misplaced as Schmuck was
         decided before the statute was amended by adding §
         9718(c.1).

(Trial Court Opinion at 12) (internal citation to the record omitted).

      We agree and conclude that we must vacate the illegal sentence for

Appellant’s aggravated indecent assault of a child conviction. See Prinkey,

supra; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718(c.1). Because our disposition might upset the

trial court’s overall sentencing scheme, we vacate the entire judgment of

                                     - 15 -
J-S17035-23

sentence and remand for resentencing. See Commonwealth v. Bartrug,

732 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 561 Pa. 651, 747 A.2d

896 (1999) (holding sentencing error on one count in multi-count case

normally requires appellate court to vacate entire judgment of sentence so

trial court can restructure its sentencing plan on remand).   We affirm the

convictions in all other respects.

      Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded

for resentencing. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

DATE: 11/01/2023

                                     - 16 -