Court Opinion

ID: 9743638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:39:12.399584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:50.632964
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Our supreme court, in Outboard, Marine & Manufacturing Co. v. Gordon (1949), 403 Ill. 523, 87 N.E.2d 610, determined the legislative intent underlying section 604 of the Unemployment Compensation Act and established the guidelines to determine ineligibility thereunder when it stated: “The conclusion is unescapable that the legislature intended to provide for the innocent victims of a labor dispute by specifically excluding them from the denial of unemployment compensation. The previously quoted subsection *** was meant to protect and except such victims from the classes denied compensation by its terms. Those who were to be excluded from benefits by the statute were those who attempted to gain by conduct which caused their unemployment or those who actively aided or abetted the previous group, whether or not they gained or lost. A proximity of conduct aiding or abetting the strikers or proximity of result to be gained from the dispute were meant to be the measuring factors. The legislature did not intend to bar, because of remote claims of causation or result, those who were deprived of their employment from the benefits to be received under the act.” (Emphasis added.) Outboard, Marine & Manufacturing Co. v. Gordon (1949), 403 Ill. 523, 536-37. Applying the “proximity of result to be gained from the dispute” as a measuring factor to the facts in the case sub judice, I feel the trial court’s decision that the plaintiffs did not have a “direct interest” in the labor dispute of the United Mine Workers of America against the Bituminous Coal Operators Association was correct. First, the plaintiffs’ position that they had no direct interest in the United Mine Workers of America labor dispute is substantiated by the fact that Progressive Mine Workers of America members were already receiving more pay than the members of the United Mine Workers of America at the time of the commencement of the strike. As of November 12, 1977, a $2 a day increase for each employee of Sahara Coal Company went into effect. This increase had been negotiated and provided for in the contract, commencing April 10,1975. Second, the brief period of time remaining on the term of the collective bargaining agreement between Progressive Mine Workers of America and the Coal Producers Association of Illinois also limits the proximity of the result to be gained by plaintiffs as a consequence of the labor dispute. The work stoppage commenced in December of 1977 and the contract of the Progressive Mine Workers of America, including plaintiffs herein, was due to expire on April 9, 1978. This four-month period of time would limit the results to be gained by plaintiffs as a result of the United Mine Workers of America labor dispute in that if a more favorable or less favorable contract concerning wages or working conditions was received by the United Mine Workers of America, there would hardly be time to modify the existing agreement between the Progressive Mine Workers of America and the Coal Producers Association of Illinois prior to the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement. Third, it is important to note that plaintiffs, as members of the Progressive Mine Workers of America, returned to work at the Sahara facilities, not at the termination of the strike of the United Mine Workers of America against the Bituminous Coal Operators Association, but on March 7, 1978, at the time that President Carter issued a Taft-Hartley injunction. The strike of the United Mine Workers of America was not settled until March 27, 1978. Plaintiffs’ return to work on March 7, 1978, is a further fact demonstrating that they had no interest in the results of the strike and labor dispute of the United Mine Workers of America, particularly in light of the fact that the contract of the Progressive Mine Workers of America with the Coal Producers Association of Illinois was due to expire on April 9, 1978. Further, as was stated in plaintiffs’ brief and reflected in the record, Walter Lucas, vice-president of Sahara Coal Company, testified that plaintiffs were not financing or directly interested in the work stoppage of the United Mine Workers of America and were not involved in a labor dispute with Sahara. Thus, plaintiffs were not “directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work.” They failed to cross the picket line only because they were intimidated by threats of violence. This was testified to by the plaintiffs and is seemingly acknowledged by the majority in its opinion. Finally, it appears to me that there was not a “labor dispute at the *** establishment or other premises at which he or she was last employed,” as required by section 604. The majority stated that it would not consider this argument because the parties did not rely on this point on appeal. However, the plaintiffs stated in their brief: “Lucas admitted that none of the people listed in the PMW Contract with Sahara were financing or directly interested in the work stoppage of the United Mine Workers and that there was no dispute between those people and Sahara at that time. (Volume 2, p.31.) As far as Lucas knew, there was no labor dispute with the Company at that time.1  Thus, I think the point has been sufficiently raised. Also, a reviewing court may affirm a judgment of a trial court for reasons other than those advanced by the trial court. Well v. Schoeneweis (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 254, 258, 427 N.E.2d 1343. There was clearly no dispute of any kind between plaintiff employees and Sahara. On the contrary, the labor dispute was between other companies and workers at other premises. Section 604 bases ineligibility on three factors: the presence of (1) a work stoppage, (2) a labor dispute, and (3) proximate causation between the work stoppage and the labor dispute at the claimant’s factory, establishment or place of employment. The presence of a labor dispute at other premises is of no legal significance. See Central Foundry Division v. Holland (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 998, 345 N.E.2d 143. Therefore, I feel the trial judge was correct in reversing the decision of Director of Labor and finding plaintiffs were eligible for unemployment insurance. I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Saline County.   This is particularly significant as Section 604 of the Unemployment Compensation Act (Ch. 48, §434, Ill. Rev. Stat.) bases ineligibility for benefits on three factors including that proximate causation must be found between the work stoppage and the labor dispute at Claimant’s factory, establishment, or other premises.”