Court Opinion

ID: 9628595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:25:48.094637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:08.215384
License: Public Domain

Ott, J.
(concurring in the result)—When the legislature adopted limited access facilities for the state of Washington in 1951, it made a declaration of policy as follows:
“Unrestricted access to and from public highways has resulted in congestion and peril for the traveler. It has caused undue slowing of all traffic in many areas. The investment of the public in highway facilities has been impaired and highway facilities costing vast sums of money will have to be relocated and reconstructed. It is the declared policy of this state to limit access to the highway facilities of this state in the interest of highway safety and for the preservation of the investment of the public in such facilities.” RCW 47.52.001.
The act also defined existing highways:
“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘existing highway’ shall include all highways, roads and streets duly established, constructed, and in use. It shall not include new highways, roads or streets, or relocated highways, roads or streets, or portions of existing highways, roads or streets which are relocated.” RCW 47.52.011.
In 1955, the legislature amended the law relating to the right of access of abutting owners to existing highways as follows:
“No existing public highway, road or street shall be constructed as a limited access facility except upon the waiver, purchase, or condemnation of the abutting owner’s right of access thereto as herein provided. ...” RCW 47.52.080.
*42The court found, in conformity with the stipulated facts, that the appellant owned property in Chelan county, and that “said property lies immediately east of and abuts upon Primary State Highway No. 2.” (Italics mine.)
The admitted facts establish that the highway commission converted a part of the formerly designated primary state highway No. 2 (at the location here in question) into a freeway, with limited access facilities which contained concrete barriers preventing ingress and egress except through the established medium of limited access approaches.
The deed which the state obtained from the abutting owner was a standard form of warranty deed:
“ . . . the Grantors . . . for and in consideration of the sum of TEN ($10.00) Dollars, and other valuable considerations in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged hereby convey and warrant to the State of Washington, the following described real estate situated in Chelan County, in the State of Washington: [metes and bounds description of the real estate] ...”
The stipulation indicates that the actual consideration was $1,740.
The construction of such freeways, with limited access facilities and the regulation of traffic thereon, as the legislature ordained, is a proper exercise of the police power of the state. When a governmental agency exercises the state’s police power, in accordance with the statute, any inconvenience, previous use, or rights enjoyed by an individual are not compensable in damages for the reason that the use, rights, and inconvenience are subordinate to the greater duty which the state owes to all of its citizens, namely, their safety and protection. See State v. Calkins, 50 Wn. (2d) 716, 314 P. (2d) 449 (1957).
In adopting the limited access facilities statute, the legislature, after declaring the act to be an exercise of its police power, granted compensation to abutting property owners, if their access to the existing highway is impaired, as follows:.
“No existing public highway . . . shall be con*43structed as a limited access facility except upon the waiver, purchase, or condemnation of the abutting owner’s right of access thereto as herein provided. ...” (Italics mine.) RCW 47.52.080, supra.
Did the state purchase the owner’s right of access? The deed does not so provide. It compensates the abutting property owner only for the area which was purchased. If any part of the consideration paid was for “the abutting owner’s right of access” to the then existing primary state highway No. 2, the deed should so state. There was no waiver or condemnation of the abutting owner’s right of access.
Since the agreed facts in the instant case do not indicate that there was a waiver, purchase or condemnation of the access rights of the abutting owner to an existing highway, the owner has been divested of the right of access without due process of law.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the result that the judgment should be reversed. ■
December 16, 1959. Petition for rehearing denied.