Court Opinion

ID: 9657494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:27:51.899908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:45.588695
License: Public Domain

Archer, J.
(dissenting). This litigation arises out of a constitutional challenge to the 1985 legislative reform of the workers’ compensation act, 1985 PA 103. Two key sections of the legislation are in dispute: § 206, which abolishes the position of hearing referee currently held by employees within the state’s classified civil service, and § 213, which establishes a Board of Magistrates that would be excepted from the civil service.
We are asked to decide whether 1985 PA 103, §§206 and 213, MCL 418.206, 418.213; MSA 17.237(206), 17.237(213), violate the civil service provisions of art 11, § 5 of the Michigan Constitution.
We would hold that because the Board of Magistrates created under § 213 is not required to carry *635out any of its primary functions as a collective body, it is not a true board for purposes of the "boards” and "commissions” exception to the civil service amendment. We would, therefore, declare that § 213 of 1985 PA 103 violates art 11, § 5 of the Michigan Constitution. Our decision would automatically render § 206 of 1985 PA 103, which abolishes the current position of hearing referee, and all other sections contained in 1985 PA 103 that are delineated as nonseverable from §213 inoperative.
I
Facts
Since 1980, Michigan’s Governors and legislators have evidenced a strong desire to reform the state’s workers’ compensation system. In response to legitimate business concerns, while balancing the concerns of injured employees, 1980 PA 357, 1981 PA 192-203, 1982 PA 32, and 1983 PA 159 were approved by Governors William Milliken and James Blanchard. In furtherance of the reform of the workers’ compensation system, Governor Blanchard, on September 14, 1983 appointed Professor Theodore J. St. Antoine of the University of Michigan Law School to be his special counselor on workers’ compensation and to conduct a study and issue a report.
Professor St. Antoine submitted his report on Workers’ compensation in Michigan: Costs, beneñts and fairness to Governor Blanchard on December 12, 1984. Among other observations contained in his report, Professor St. Antoine noted: Hearing referees issue short-form awards with no statements of reasons for their decision, and as a result of hearings de novo before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which announces its findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing, there was *636a 7,000-case backlog.1 In order to correct the problem, Professor St. Antoine recommended that findings of fact by the hearing referees be deemed conclusive if "supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record” and that the hearing referees be required to prepare written findings of fact and conclusions of law.2
Professor St. Antoine acknowledged expressed concern by some that hearing referees were deficient in objectivity and impartiality of judgment. He concluded, however, that the claims of bias were exaggerated.3 He did, nevertheless, urge the Legislature or the Civil Service Commission to establish a bipartisan Qualifications Advisory Committee to interview and evaluate prospective candidates for the position of hearing referee, with ratings to be transmitted confidentially to the appointing authority.4
Upon receipt of Professor St. Antoine’s report, both the House and Senate introduced a series of bills and amendments to effectuate reform of the workers’ compensation system. A conference committee of House and Senate members ultimately worked toward a compromise that resulted in the enactment of 1985 PA 103. The position of hearing referee was abolished in § 206. A Board of Magistrates, excepted from civil service, was established by § 213.5 Section 4 of 1985 PA 103 tied § 213 to *637many other sections of the law, so that if this Court found § 213 to be unconstitutional then most of the changes in the workers’ compensation law *638would not go into effect.
Governor Blanchard approved 1985 PA 103 on July 30, 1985.
On August 8, 1985, plaintiff Civil Service Commission filed a complaint in the Ingham Circuit Court, seeking a declaratory ruling that §§ 206 and 213 are in violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5. The commission also sought injunctive relief.
On August 16, 1985, plaintiffs hearing referees filed a similar action in the Ingham Circuit Court, seeking a declaratory ruling that §§206 and 213 are unconstitutional. The hearing referees also sought a writ of mandamus against defendants6 to direct them to continue employment of the current hearing referees within the Workers’ Compensation Bureau and classified civil service.
On September 17, 1985, Governor Blanchard filed an Executive Message with this Court requesting that the Ingham Circuit Court be authorized to certify a controlling question. In lieu of granting the Governor’s request, we directed the Ingham Circuit Court to establish an accelerated schedule of proceedings to include discovery6
7 and trial, and to issue a final judgment in this case. On December 2, 1985, the Ingham Circuit Court issued a final judgment.
Relying on this Court’s holding in Case v Liquor *639Control Comm, 314 Mich 632; 23 NW2d 109 (1946), the circuit court declared §213 unconstitutional, stating:
It does not appear the Legislature sought to create a body which, by virtue of its importance, is deserving of the name "board” and whose members ought therefor to be excepted from the classified service. Rather, the impression is unavoidable that the Legislature sought simply to create unclassified positions in the interests of enhanced accountability, and then attempted to justify their exclusion from the classified service by incorporating them as a "board.” Apart from this exclusionary purpose, the incorporation of the magistrates as a board appears to play no independent meaningful role in the functioning of the worker’s compensation system. The board is not a body of importance and dignity. It is merely a tool, an artifice whose sole purpose is to legitimize the removal of positions from the classified service. This is impermissible under paragraph 1 of Article 11, § 5. In view of the historical purpose of paragraph 1, the common understanding of those who ratified it, and the construction given it in Case, it is clear that § 213 of the Act must be stricken as unconstitutional.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals on December 9, 1985. The Governor then filed a request with this Court asking that we certify the following question for immediate appeal here:
Do 1985 PA 103, § 213, which establishes a Worker’s Compensation Board of Magistrates as an autonomous entity and independent body in the Department of Labor, as part of legislation intended by the Legislature to ". . . increase the administrative efficiency of the adjudicative processes of the worker’s compensation system; to improve the qualifications of the persons having adjudicative functions within the worker’s compen*640sation system; to prescribe certain powers and duties; to create the board of worker’s compensation magistrates . . .; [and] to provide certain procedures for the resolution of claims . . and 1985 PA 103, § 206, which abolishes as of March 31, 1987 the Legislatively created position of Hearing Referee, occupied by civil service personnel classified as Administrative Law Examiners, violate Article 11, § 5 of the Michigan Constitution?
We granted leave for immediate appeal on December 20, 1985.
II
Issue: Do 1985 PA 103, §§ 206 and 213 violate THE CIVIL SERVICE PROVISIONS IN ARTICLE 11, § 5 OF the Michigan Constitution?
Defendants assert that because §213 creates a Board of Magistrates, an independent and autonomous body of importance and dignity, it is exempt from the classified civil service under art 11, § 5 of the Michigan Constitution.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that § 213 is unconstitutional because it does not create a true board. They assert that § 213 creates a board in name only.8 We believe that the question of the board’s constitutionality is to be answered by analyzing the duties of the board, and not by assessing the motives of the Legislature in creating it.
The first paragraph of art 11, § 5 reads in pertinent part:
The classified state civil service shall consist of all positions in the state service except those filled *641by popular election, heads of principal departments, members of boards or commissions, the principal executive officer of boards and commissions heading principal departments, employees of courts of record, employees of the legislature, employees of the state institutions of higher education, all persons in the armed forces of the state, eight exempt positions in the office of the governor, and within each principal department, when requested by the department head, two other exempt positions, one of which shall be policy-making. [Emphasis added.]
Defendants rely on the quoted reference to the "boards or commissions” exemption from the classified civil service to support their argument that § 213 does not violate art 11, § 5.
Ill
Historical Background
A brief review of the historical background of the civil service amendment is necessary before we determine the constitutionality of the challenged section of 1985 PA 103. Prior to the adoption of the civil service amendment by the people of Michigan, the state had experienced a longstanding "spoils system” of state personnel practices. In 1935, the Civil Service Study Commission was appointed by Governor Frank D. Fitzgerald to conduct a study of Michigan’s personnel practices. After conducting a year-long study, the study commission reported its findings and recommendations to the Governor. Michigan’s civil service system came into being as a result of the 1936 report of the study commission.9
The Legislature responded to the 1936 study *642commission report by passing 1937 PA 34610 which established the state civil service system. The act purported to eliminate the "spoils system” and to contribute to the merit system in public employment.11 This was accomplished at least in part through the act’s prohibition of civil servant participation in political activities and assessment schemes during hours of employment.12 Also, the act exempted boards and commissions required by law to be appointed by the Governor from the classified civil service.
In 1939, Michigan experienced an almost complete reversal in its civil service policy with the passage of 1939 PA 97, which amended 1937 PA 346. While maintaining the ban on political activity by civil servants by banning all political activity during and after hours of employment, 1939 PA 97 contained a number of destructive provisions which seriously weakened the newly created civil service system.13
In 1940, the people of Michigan adopted the civil service amendment to the constitution which superseded 1937 PA 346 and set up a new commission and system.14 The amendment provided that all positions in the state service were a part of the state civil service except specific listed positions,15 *643including boards and commissions.
The people adopted a new constitution in 1963. Const 1963, art 11, §5 revised the civil service amendment adopted in 1940 by strengthening the role of the chief executive and the administrator and by providing for limited legislative control of wage increases under specified circumstances. Also provided were additional exempt positions.
IV
Analysis
Turning to the issue presented in this case, we must determine the common understanding of the words "boards” and "commissions” as contained in art 11, § 5.
In Traverse School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390, 405-406; 185 NW2d 9 (1971), we set forth the following three rules of construction of a constitution: 1) the primary rule is the rule of "common understanding” of the words employed; 2) "to clarify [the] meaning [of the words employed], the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered”; 3) "wherever possible an interpretation that does not create constitutional invalidity is preferred to one that does.”
In Oakland Co Taxpayers' League v Oakland Co Supervisors, 355 Mich 305, 323; 94 NW2d 875 (1959), a test was formulated to determine whether a statute is constitutional. We held:
[T]his Court will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it is plain that it violates some *644provisions of the Constitution and the constitutionality of the act will be supported by all possible presumptions not clearly inconsistent with the language and the subject matter.
See also Case v Liquor Control Comm, supra, 638.
A "board” is commonly understood as a body composed of more than one person which performs its primary functions collectively rather than through individual members. People v Maynard, 15 Mich 463 (1867). In Maynard, the issue was whether legislation organizing a new township and county was invalid because the county included only one township. The Court held that the new act failed to create a viable "board of supervisors,” as required by the constitution, because one supervisor could not act as a "board.” It stated that among the necessary incidents of a county are townships "whose supervisors conjointly may exercise the legislative and administrative powers of the corporation.” Id., 468 (emphasis added). The county board of supervisors’ power could not be delegated to one person, because the board was designed to act as an "aggregation of town officers.” Id., 472.
In a separate concurrence, Justice Cooley further elaborated upon the necessary attributes of a "board of supervisors”:
The powers conferred upon [the county board] by the constitution are of very high importance, some of them legislative in their character, requiring consultation, discussion and deliberation, and such as in no part of our political system are conferred upon single individuals. . . . [TJhe term "board,” in its derivation as well as in its ordinary use, indicates a deliberative body, composed of more than one person. [Id., 473. Emphasis added.]
This common understanding of the meaning of *645"board” is again exemplified in Case v Liquor Control, supra, which analyzed that term for purposes of the civil service exemption at issue here. Both defendants and plaintiffs rely on this Court’s holding in Case as authority for their respective arguments concerning the constitutionality of § 213.
In Case, this Court considered whether an amendment to the Liquor Control Act of 1933,16 which created a Board of Hearing Examiners, violated the civil service amendment. The act provided that "the hearing examiners or any member thereof shall conduct hearings on questions *646referred to the board by the commission . . . The act also provided that "[i]n all instances when a license is to be either suspended or revoked the commission shall cause a complaint to be filed with said board whereupon said board shall conduct a hearing . . . (Emphasis added.) We held that the statute creating the Board of Hearing Examiners did not violate the civil service amendment, stating:
The legislature by section 5a . . . created a board of importance and in language that showed that the appointment of mere employees was not contemplated, but an additional auxiliary body to assist the commission. The mere labeling of a body of employees as a board would be insufficient, but that was not the legislative intent as seen by the wording of the act. It was to be a real board of hearing referees which was to be independent of the commission, but its findings would not bind the commission. We believe that the creation of a body of such importance and dignity, and characterized by the legislature as a board, as a matter of fact created a board which is expressly excepted by the civil service amendment. [314 Mich 641. Emphasis added.]
The statute construed in Case authorized the board or any member thereof to conduct hearings on questions referred to the board by the commission. However, in instances where the commission filed a complaint against a licensee, the statute provided that the board should hold a hearing. Individual members of the board were not authorized to hold such hearings. Hence, the Board of Hearing Examiners was required by statute to conduct hearings on complaints filed by the Liquor Control Commission as a collective entity. In contrast, we note that none of the provisions contained in 1985 PA 103, including § 213, require the Board of Magistrates to function as a collective body.
*647Relying on Napuche v Liquor Control Comm, 336 Mich 398, 401; 58 NW2d 118 (1953), the majority states that the practical construction of the statute presented in Case was that any member of the board could conduct a hearing on a complaint against a licensee seeking a suspension or revocation of a license. The plain language of the statute in Case indicates that the board or any member could conduct hearings on questions referred to the board by the commission. The statute, however, required the board to conduct hearings on complaints to revoke or suspend a liquor license which were filed by the commission. There was no provision authorizing any member of the Board of Hearing Examiners to conduct a hearing on complaints filed by the commission. Case can be distinguished from Napuche because the Case Court was deciding the constitutionality of the challenged act, the problem we are confronted with in this case. The Napuche Court, however, was not confronted with the constitutionality of the statute which established the Board of Hearing Examiners. Instead, the question presented in Napuche was whether the plaintiffs were afforded due process when the Liquor Control Commission did not conduct its own hearing, but relied on the testimony received at a hearing conducted by a hearing examiner. The Court concluded that plaintiffs did receive their due process rights because plaintiffs were afforded an opportunity to be heard at the hearing conducted by the hearing examiner and the Liquor Control Commission had access to the transcript.
A second rule of constitutional interpretation requires an examination of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a provision. A review of all Michigan boards and commissions in existence during the time the 1940 civil service amendment *648was adopted by the people,17 indicates that the boards or commissions were required to perform at least some of their primary functions as a collective body.
We summarize some examples of the duties and characteristics of state boards and commissions as they existed in 1940.
The Unemployment Compensation Commission was created by statute18 in 1936 and consisted of four members appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. Three members constituted a quorum for the transaction of commission business. The commission was authorized to prescribe its organization and methods of procedure. It was responsible for developing rules and regulations to reduce unemployment, to encourage and assist in the adoption of practical methods of vocational training, retraining, and vocational guidance for use during times of business depression and unemployment, and to promote the reemployment of workers throughout the state. Hearings concerning the policies or rules and regulations of the commission were to be held before an appeal tribunal or the commission. Individual members of the commission were authorized to issue subpoenas to persons who were required to appear before the commission or its duly authorized agent to be examined regarding any matter within the scope of inquiry or investigation being conducted by the commission. The commission was required to establish regulations providing for the examination of claims, the determination of their validity, and the amount and duration of benefits to be paid. Unemployment compensation claims were to be examined by representatives designated by the commission. These representatives made *649determinations of fact which were appealable to a referee employed by the commission. Referee decisions were final decisions of the commission unless timely appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Appeal Board, discussed below. The commission was independent and employed its own staff. The commission was also a policy-making body which was required by statute to transact its business through a quorum of three members. Hence, it was required to carry out at least part of its decisionmaking functions collectively.
A three-member Unemployment Compensation Appeal Board was provided for in a statute19 enacted to amend the statute which created the Unemployment Compensation Commission. The statute required that the appeal board members be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The appeal board on its own motion was authorized to affirm, modify, or set aside any decision of a referee on the evidence submitted to the referee, or direct the taking of additional evidence, or permit any of the parties to initiate further appeals before it. The appeal board was empowered to remove to itself or transfer to another referee the proceedings in any claim pending before a referee. Any proceedings so removed to the appeal board had to be heard by a quorum of the board. While the statute provided that any member of the appeal board was authorized to administer oaths, take depositions, and issue and enforce subpoenas, persons appealing a referee decision had to appear before the board and be examined. The appeal board was independent and was required by statute to act as a board to make its own motion to affirm, modify, or set aside any decision of a referee.
*650The Labor Mediation Board, created by statute20 in 1939, consisted of three members appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The statute provided that two members constituted a quorum, but "official orders . . . require[d] concurrence of a majority of the board.” The board was independent and responsible for mediating labor disputes between organized employees and employers in Michigan. The board, each member and each person designated had power to hold public or private hearings, subpoena witnesses, and administer oaths. Yet, official orders of the board required concurrence by at least two of the three members of the board.
The Liquor Control Commission was created by statute21 in 1933 and consisted of five members. Three of the members were appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Governor and the Secretary of State served as ex-officio members of the commission. The commission, and not individual members, was authorized by statute to establish policies concerning the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages in Michigan. The commission was also empowered to issue and revoke or suspend liquor licenses. The policies established by the commission included the fixing of prices of alcoholic beverages to be sold by specially designated distributors, and the uniform pricing of alcohol to be sold by state liquor stores. The commission also designated hours within which liquor could be sold. The policy-making functions of the Liquor Control Commission were carried out through collective decisionmaking.
The State Hospital Commission was created by *651statute22 in 1937 and consisted of seven members appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The commission was required to hold not less than ten meetings per year. It had jurisdiction over the state mental institutions. The entire hospital commission, and not individual members, was responsible for making policies concerning the "methods of care, treatment, and prevention of insanity, feeble-mindedness, and epilepsy.” It was also responsible for developing a statewide mental hygiene program. The commission carried out its policy-making functions through collective decisionmaking.
The Board of Aeronautics, created by statute23 in 1929, was composed of five members to be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The State Highway Commissioner was directed and authorized to cooperate with the board. The Board of Aeronautics was given general supervision and control over all airports and landing fields used for commercial purposes, all state and municipal airports, and all schools of aviation. It was specifically empowered to develop rules and regulations governing commercial airports and the curriculum for the schools of aviation. Additionally, the board reviewed and approved applications to operate airports, landing fields, and schools of aviation. The statute creating the Board of Aeronautics did not authorize individual members of the board to make decisions concerning the rules and regulations or on applications submitted to the board.
Finally, the Athletic Board of Control, created by statute24 in 1939 consisted of five members. Four members were appointed by the Governor *652with the advice and consent of the Senate. The board was headed by the State Athletic Commissioner. The board had sole jurisdiction over all boxing and sparring matches, wrestling contests, and exhibitions held in the state. The board collectively made decisions concerning the issuance and revocation of licenses. Rulings of the commissioner on matters not covered by the act governing the Athletic Board of Control were to be final only until the next regular meeting of the entire board. Special meetings of the entire board could be requested by any party aggrieved by a ruling of the commissioner.
Our review of the above boards and commissions indicates that they were independent and they were responsible for making policies, or, as in the case of the Labor Mediation Board, settling disputes in their respective areas. At least some of the members on each of these bodies had to be appointed by the Governor. We believe that these boards carried out their primary functions through collective decisionmaking. None of the statutes creating these boards and commissions authorized individual members to carry out all of the board’s or commission’s primary functions.25
*653We conclude that the people, in adopting the civil service amendment in 1940, commonly understood the words "boards or commissions” to mean a body which carried out all or some of its primary functions as a collective entity. We do not believe that the common understanding of these two words changed when the people adopted Const 1963, art 11, § 5.
We note that, in declaring that "[t]he classified state civil service shall consist of all positions in the state service . . .,” art 11, § 5, with numerical specificity, excepts from the covered principal departments of state government only the department head and no more than five additional positions. That leaves within the classified service some 57,000 executive branch state employees, including a wide spectrum of professionals, division and bureau chiefs, institutional directors, and high ranking police officials, many of whom are responsible for the supervision of thousands of employees and the expenditure of millions of dollars of public funds.
The expression of such closely guarded numerical exceptions within the operating departments of state government, leaving within the classified service positions of high importance, leads us to believe that the amendment drafters would not, in turn, undo their work by exempting boards and commissions unless they were uniquely different from other functions of state government. Our review of the boards and commissions extant in 1940 clearly reveals those distinguishing charac*654teristics which we feel motivated the boards and commissions exception.
We agree with the majority that independence or autonomy is one of those characteristics; however, we cannot agree with their dismissal of the collective deliberation requirement, which was so common to the 1940 boards and commissions and which represents the most common understanding, literally and historically, of the words "boards and commissions.”
On the basis of the above discussion, we would hold that the following three criteria should be used in determining whether a statute validly creates a civil service exempt board or commission under the Michigan Constitution. Members of the board or commission should be appointed by the Governor or the Legislature. The members of these bodies should be required by statute to perform some of their primary decisionmaking functions collectively either as an entire board or commission or through panels of the bodies. The board or commission should also be independent in the exercise of its principal responsibility and have either a policy-making or an adjudicative role.
Conclusion
We would hold that because the Board of Magistrates created under § 213 is not required to carry out any of its primary functions as a collective entity, the board is not a true board for purposes of the "boards” and "commissions” exception to the civil service amendment. We, therefore, would declare that § 213 violates art 11, § 5.26
*655Our decision in this case would automatically render § 206, which abolishes the current position of hearing referee, and all other sections contained in 1985 PA 103 which are nonseverable from § 213 inoperative.
Our holding would make it unnecessary to address the remaining issues raised by plaintiffs and the various amici curiae because they all challenge the constitutionality of § 206.
Brickley and Riley, JJ., concurred with Archer, J.

 See St. Antoine, Workers’ compensation in Michigan: Costs, beneñts and fairness, pp 67-69.

 See St. Antoine, supra, p 71.

 See id., p 72.

 See id., p 75.

 "(1) The worker’s compensation board of magistrates is established as an autonomous entity in the department of labor. The board shall consist of 30 members appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. The governor shall appoint the initial members of the board not later than March 31, 1986 and shall designate 1 of the appointees as the member that will be chairperson. A person shall not be appointed to the board who has not been recommended *637by the qualifications advisory committee. All members of the board shall be members in good standing of the state bar of Michigan.
"(2) The members of the board shall be appointed for terms of 4 years except that of the members first appointed, 10 shall serve for 2 years, 10 shall serve for 3 years, and 10 shall serve for 4 years. A member who has served for 12 years shall not be reappointed to a new term. A vacancy caused by the expiration of a term shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment. A member shall not serve beyond the expiration of his or her term unless the qualifications advisory committee fails to submit a recommendation to the governor before the expiration of the term. A member may be reappointed. A member appointed to fill a vacancy created other than by expiration of a term shall be appointed for the balance of the unexpired term. A member of the board may be removed by the governor for good cause which shall be explained in writing to the worker’s compensation magistrate. Good cause for removal shall include, but not be limited to, lack of productivity or other neglect of duties.
"(3) The governor may designate a member of the board as the chairperson upon a vacancy occurring in that position. The chairperson of the board shall have general supervisory control of and be in charge of the employees of the board and the assignment and scheduling of the work of the board. The chairperson may also establish productivity standards that are to be adhered to by employees of the board, the board, and individual magistrates. Each member of the board shall devote full time to the functions of the board. Each member of the board shall personally perform the duties of the office during the hours generally worked by officers and employees of the executive departments of the state.
"(4) The chairperson of the board shall serve as chairperson at the pleasure of the governor.
"(5) Each member of the board shall receive an annual salary and shall be entitled to necessary traveling expenses incurred in the performance of official duties subject to the standardized travel regulations of the state.
"(6) The board may employ the staff it considers necessary to be able to perform its duties under this act which may include legal assistants for the purpose of legal research and otherwise assisting the board and individual members of the board.
"(7) The board is an independent body with the powers and duties as provided for under this act. The board may promulgate rules on administrative hearing procedures for purposes under this act.
"(8) The chairperson of the board may assign and reassign worker’s compensation magistrates to hear cases at locations in this state.
"(9) The department of labor shall provide suitable office space for the board of worker’s compensation magistrates and the employees of the board.” (Emphasis added.)

 When the hearing referees filed their original complaint, they named members of the Civil Service Commission as defendants. Once the hearing referees became aware of the fact that the esc had filed its own lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of 1985 PA 103, they filed a motion for "realignment” of the parties. The circuit court granted the motion, and the individually named members of the esc were dropped as defendants and added as plaintiffs in the action brought by the hearing referees.

 Prior to the circuit court’s declaratory ruling, the court considered opposing motions filed by plaintiffs to compel discovery and by defendants for a protective order. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion and granted defendants’ motion on the basis that the information sought to be discovered was not relevant to plaintiffs’ claim under Const 1963, art 11, § 5.

 The plaintiffs also claim that the Legislature acted in bad faith in creating the Board of Magistrates and in abolishing the position of hearing referee in the Workers’ Compensation Bureau. Additionally, the hearing referees claim that 1985 PA 103 violates state and federal constitutional provisions other than the civil service amendment.

 See Litchfield, Michigan’s experience with civil service, 2 Personnel Administration (No 4), pp 1-2 (December, 1939) (publication is now called Management Review).

 It should be noted that 1937 PA 346 exempted from the classified civil service boards and commissions required by law to be appointed by the Governor.

 See Litchfield, n 9 supra, pp 2-3.

 See Council No 11, AFSCME v Civil Service Comm, 408 Mich 385, 398; 292 NW2d 442 (1980), for the pertinent provisions of the statute.

 Boards and commissions required by law to be appointed by the Governor continued to be exempt under 1939 PA 97, § 7(l)(e).

 Const 1908, art 6, § 22, effective January 1, 1941.

 The amendment read in pertinent part:
"The state civil service shall consist of all positions in the state service except those filled by popular election, heads of departments, members of boards and commissions, employees of courts of record, of the legislature, of the higher educational institutions recognized by *643the state constitution, all persons in the military and naval forces of the state, and not to exceed 2 other exempt positions for each elected administrative officer, and each department, board and commission.”

 1933 (Ex Sess) PA 8, § 52, as amended by 1945 PA 133, 1929 CL (1945 Supp) 9209-20a; MSA 18.975(1), read:
"There is hereby created a board of hearing examiners to consist of 3 members to be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, for terms of 6 years each: Provided, That of the members first appointed 1 shall be appointed for a term of 2 years, 1 for a term of 4 years and 1 for a term of 6 years. Any vacancy shall be filled by the governor for the unexpired term in the same manner. Members of the board may be removed by the governor for misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance in office. Members of the board shall receive an annual compensation of $6,000.00 and shall be entitled to actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of duties, to be paid in the same manner as salaries and expenses of other state officers are paid. Such board of hearing examiners or any member thereof shall conduct hearings on questions referred to the board by the commission, under such rules and regulations as the commission may establish. The examiners shall report their findings to the commission for decision. Each member of the board is authorized to examine witnesses and administer oaths. The attorney general shall assign 3 of his assistants to the commission. In all instances when a license is to be either suspended or revoked the commission shall cause a complaint to be ñled with said board whereupon said board shall conduct a hearing limited to the facts and law and rules and regulations of the liquor control commission as specified in said complaint. In the conducting of hearings no hearsay testimony shall be admissible and the licensees named in the complaint shall have the right to have all witnesses testify in person at the hearing. The findings of the board shall be based upon the facts and the law and the rules and regulations of the liquor control commission. A statement of the facts may be requested by either the commission or the licensee. The complaint filed with the board shall specify the date of the alleged offense, the names of the witnesses, and any other facts that may be in issue at the hearing.” (Emphasis added.)

 See 1939-40 Michigan Manual, pp 664-682.

 1936 (Ex Sess) PA 1.

 1937 PA 347, amending 1936 (Ex Sess) PA 1.

 1939 PA 176.

 1933 (Ex Sess) PA 8.

 1937 PA 104.

 1929 PA 177.

 1939 PA 205.

 The majority states that at the time the civil service amendment was adopted there were at least two commissions which consisted of only one person. The Racing Commission consisted of the Racing Commissioner who was empowered to hire employees for purposes of the racing commission act. The Racing Commissioner was also empowered to fix and determine the salaries of the commission’s employees. The Corporation and Securities Commission consisted of the Corporation and Securities Commissioner, who was empowered to appoint three subordinate deputy commissioners. The Racing Commissioner and the Corporation and Securities Commissioner were department heads. We believe that the majority mistakenly concludes that these two commissioners acted as a commission of one when the commissioners were mere department heads exempted from the civil service amendment under the department head exception.
Further, the 1939 Michigan Manual listed the Racing Commissioner and the Corporation and Securities Commissioner on page 639 under "Officers appointed by the Governor, with the approval of the *653Senate.” Included in that list were all department heads but none of the boards and commissions. Beginning on page 664, there is a list of "State Boards and Commissions,” among which the Racing Commissioner was not included. Interestingly enough, there was included under that heading a Michigan Corporation and Securities Commission comprised of five members.

 We note that Justice Levin states in his opinion that the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board no longer carries out its functions as a collective body or entity. Our holding in this case would not result in making the existing Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board uncon*655stitutional under Const 1963, art 11, § 5. As we noted above, a board which sits in panels to discharge its adjudicative or administrative functions is not unconstitutional.