Court Opinion

ID: 9704831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:47:38.614502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:05.678239
License: Public Domain

JOHN J. GARRITY, Judge,
Specially Assigned, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In an effort to effectuate the “benevolent purpose” of the Workers’ Compensation Act in favor of this particular retiree, the majority ignores the distinction between temporary and permanent disability compensation that this Court has repeatedly acknowledged. Indeed, a temporary disability period is a separate and unitary period of compensation distinguished from a permanent disability. Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 574, 585, 521 A.2d 320 (1987); City of Baltimore v. Oros, 301 Md. 460, 468, 483 A.2d 748 (1984); Jackson v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 185 Md. 335, 339, 44 A.2d 811 (1945); Gorman v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 178 Md. 71, 78, 12 A.2d 525 (1940). While addressing other issues in Queen, supra, Chief Judge Murphy observed on the Court’s behalf:
Differentiating between temporary and permanent disabilities, several courts have observed that temporary disability payments are a substitute for lost wages during the temporary disability period, while permanent disability is for permanent bodily impairment and is designed to indemnify for the insured employee’s impairment of future earning capacity. Thus, these courts indicate that *635permanent disability is not based solely on loss of wages, but is based on actual incapacity to perform the tasks usually encountered in one’s employment, and on physical impairment of the body that may or may not be incapacitating. (Citations omitted).
Id. 308 Md. at 585, 521 A.2d 320.1 I view this to be the context in which the Court held, in Miller v. Western Electric Co., 310 Md. 173, 187, 528 A.2d 486 (1987), a matter which involved an employee who suffered from an occupational disease, that an actual wage loss is not a prerequisite to recovery for permanent disability. Indeed, the case of Beth. Shipyard v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 50 A.2d 799 (1947), which was relied upon by the majority to support its proposition that temporary total disability benefits are based on loss of one’s earning capacity rather than wages, dealt with a workman who was permanently disfigured.
The question, then, is not what the Legislature intended by its use of the word “disability” in the Act, but rather, more specifically, what sort of loss it designed temporary total disability payments to compensate. In this regard, I agree with the “several courts” alluded to above in Queen and would hold that temporary total payments are a substitute for lost wages during the temporary disability period, “in order to enable claimant to support self and family during that period.” Stiennon v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 68 Or.App. 735, 683 P.2d 556, 558 (1984), citing Taylor v. S.A.I.F., 40 Or.App. 437, 595 P.2d 515, rev. den. 287 Or. 477 (1979); see also Electronic Associates Inc. v. Heisinger, 111 NJ.Super. 15, 266 A.2d 601 (1970), holding that where there is no wage loss, an award of temporary disability compensation “would depend upon creating a fictitious wage earning status for the unemployed workman ...” Id. 266 A.2d at 604.
*636The rationale for applying a lost-wage measure of recovery to temporary disability claims is, to me, unassailable. Section 36(2) of the Act exists to support “injured workmen and their dependents” until they are able to return to work or are deemed permanently injured. The very word “temporary” obviously presupposes a resumption of employment with a particular employer. Furthermore, as the majority notes, the amount of a temporary total award is determined by reference to the average weekly wage of the employee.
The claimant, who is 64 years-of-age, however, had ended his employment with Proctor and Gamble approximately two years before his knee injury worsened, causing the temporary disability at issue. He was receiving Social Security payments, and possessed a $250,000.00 lump sum as a result of liquidating his profit sharing plan with Proctor. While he indeed could have acquired a new job after retirement, it would not have been with Proctor. Yet, the majority essentially requires Proctor to further fund the claimant’s retirement. Proctor is required to compensate someone not in its employ and who, being in retirement, suffered no loss in wages. I find this result to be totally inconsistent with the Act’s purpose and intent.
Courts in other states that have addressed this issue have uniformly supported Proctor’s position. The case from outside of Maryland which is most clearly on point, and which involves a similar statute, is Stiennon v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 68 Or.App. 735, 683 P.2d 556 (1984). In Stiennon, the claimant sustained a compensable injury to his right knee in August 1979. In December 1979, he turned 65 and applied for his retirement in February of 1980. Later, in 1981, the claimant received a permanency award for his right knee. In 1982, the claimant underwent surgery. Although the insurer provided medical expenses, the claimant was denied temporary total disability since there was no loss of wages involved. The Oregon Court of Appeals noted that the Workers’ Compensation Act’s statutory purpose was to compensate a claimant for wages lost because of inability to work as a result of a compensable *637injury. The Court remarked, “If the claimant has retired voluntarily following the injury, he can suffer no loss of wages, because, by definition he has no expectation of receiving wages.” Id. 683 P.2d at 558.
In short, I believe the majority has engaged in an “earning capacity” analysis where such an approach is unwarranted. As I would apply the lost-wage standard to a worker who has been temporarily disabled, I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the lower court. The claimant, a voluntary retiree of two years duration, could suffer no loss of wages compensable by Proctor, because he had no expectation of receiving wages from his former employer. Inherent in voluntary retirement is the claimant’s desire not to return to work; he is no longer a member of Proctor’s labor force. Indeed, the claim for temporary total disability benefits in the absence of wage loss is a claim which seeks a remedy where there is no damage.

. In Queen, the Court went on to apply the temporary-permanent disability distinction in a divorce context, holding that "only the portion of the husband’s award compensating for a loss of earning capacity during the marriage is marital property subject to equitable distribution by the trial judge.” Id. 308 Md. at 586-87, 521 A.2d 320.