Court Opinion

ID: 9948963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:15:53.722778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:26.238301
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
03/08/2024 09:15 AM CST

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                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        316 Nebraska Reports
                                                  STATE V. RASHAD
                                                  Cite as 316 Neb. 101

                                        State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
                                         Justin N. Rashad, appellant.
                                                    ___ N.W.3d ___

                                          Filed March 8, 2024.    No. S-22-097.

                 1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Generally, a trial court’s
                    determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy
                    trial grounds is a factual question that will be affirmed on appeal unless
                    clearly erroneous.
                 2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. Under a clearly erroneous standard of
                    review, an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence but considers
                    the judgment in a light most favorable to the successful party, resolving
                    evidentiary conflicts in favor of the successful party, who is entitled to
                    every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence.
                 3. Speedy Trial: Statutes. The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth
                    in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016).
                 4. Speedy Trial. If a defendant is not brought to trial by the 6-month
                    speedy trial deadline, as extended by any excluded periods, he or she is
                    entitled to absolute discharge from the offense charged and for any other
                    offense required by law to be joined with that offense.
                 5. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Words and Phrases. “Good cause,” for
                    purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) (Reissue 2016), means a
                    substantial reason and one that affords a legal excuse. Good cause is a
                    factual question dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
                 6. Good Cause: Proof. A trial court’s good cause findings must be sup-
                    ported by the evidence in the record, and the State bears the burden of
                    establishing facts showing that good cause existed.
                 7. Speedy Trial. To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court
                    must exclude the day the information was filed, count forward 6 months,
                    back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under Neb. Rev. Stat.
                    § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016) to determine the last day the defendant can
                    be tried.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    316 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. RASHAD
                            Cite as 316 Neb. 101

 8. Judges: Witnesses: Testimony. The judge presiding at the trial may not
    testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to
    preserve the point. This rule applies not only to formal testimony but
    also to whenever the judge assumes the role of a witness.
 9. Speedy Trial: Pretrial Procedure. Oral or other informal statements
    are obviously a poor procedure when speedy trial rights are involved.

   Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals, Pirtle,
Chief Judge, and Arterburn and Welch, Judges, on appeal
thereto from the District Court for Douglas County, Marlon
A. Polk, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded with directions.
   Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, Korey
T. Taylor, and Cindy A. Tate for appellant.
  Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, Kimberly A. Klein,
and Erin E. Tangeman for appellee.
  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
  Funke, J.
                       INTRODUCTION
   The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the
district court for Douglas County, Nebraska, overruling Justin
N. Rashad’s motion for absolute discharge under Nebraska’s
speedy trial statutes. We granted Rashad’s petition for further
review. On further review, Rashad argues that the Court of
Appeals’ decision was erroneous because the State failed to
meet its evidentiary burden to show good cause to continue
his case past the 6-month speedy trial deadline. We agree.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and remand the cause to the Court of Appeals with directions
as set forth below.
                     BACKGROUND
  In an information filed on April 12, 2021, Rashad was
charged with first degree assault and use of a firearm to
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  316 Nebraska Reports
                        STATE V. RASHAD
                        Cite as 316 Neb. 101

commit a felony in connection with the shooting of his father.
Rashad subsequently filed a motion for discovery, which was
granted 2 days later. Rashad also filed a motion that resulted
in a pretrial conference being continued from May 24 until
June 22.
   At the pretrial conference on June 22, 2021, Rashad
requested that a jury trial be scheduled within the statutory
6-month speedy trial period. The trial was then set for October
18. However, shortly before the trial was scheduled to begin,
the parties were informed that Rashad’s case was going to be
continued because the judge had another trial scheduled to
begin on October 13.

               Hearing Regarding Continuance
   Subsequently, on October 26, 2021, the district court held
a hearing regarding the continuance of the trial. The hear-
ing began with the State observing that the trial had been
scheduled for October 18, but that “the Court let us know that
[Rashad’s trial] would be continued because the Court was
in a[nother] jury trial.” The State then asked that the case be
continued for good cause.
   Rashad agreed that “the Court” informed the parties that
it “did not have the availability to try [his] case last week.”
However, Rashad indicated that he was “very concerned
about his speedy trial [rights]” and that he objected to a
continuance.
   The State responded that the case had been set for trial
within 6 months of the date when the information was filed,
but that the trial could not be commenced within that time “due
to another trial being set the week before [Rashad’s trial] and
going into [his] jury trial time.” As a result, the State argued,
“the Court should make a good cause finding [for] continuing
this trial.”
   The judge then asked counsel about their availability for
the rescheduled jury trial. After the judge indicated that he
heard jury trials during the last 2 weeks of each month, the
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  316 Nebraska Reports
                        STATE V. RASHAD
                        Cite as 316 Neb. 101

State’s counsel indicated that counsel’s earliest availability was
February 2022. Counsel for Rashad responded that “to have
a speedy trial that would be sometime in the November time
frame” and that “February [was] going out rather far at this
point in time.” However, Rashad’s counsel also stated that his
schedule was “pretty open” for February, but he had matters
set for January.
    Counsel for the State replied that if Rashad’s counsel was
“already set for January and February’s the first availability,
. . . that’s probably the way to do it.” Rashad’s counsel coun-
tered that he was available in November 2021 if the court was,
but the trial judge indicated that he had a 2-week trial “spe-
cially set” for November.
    The district court then concluded:
       [B]ased upon the record that has been made regarding
       the continuances and the Court being in trial and the
       availability of both counsel, the Court is going to make a
       good cause finding that this trial that was scheduled for
       October 18th, 2021, should be and hereby is continued.
       And the trial setting that the Court has available, based
       upon the Court’s trial calendar, where [Rashad’s case]
       would be the primary case and first up, would be on
       Monday, February 14th, 2022.
    Following this statement, Rashad’s counsel reiterated that
he was available in November and December 2021 and that
his January 2022 case did not have a “speedy trial portion.”
Rashad’s counsel also indicated that although he had a 2-week
trial set for February 14, Rashad’s case “would take prece-
dence” for him.
    The judge left the case set for February 14, 2022.

                    Hearing on Motion for
                     Absolute Discharge
   Thereafter, at a hearing on February 3, 2022, Rashad essen-
tially made an oral motion for absolute discharge on statutory
speedy trial grounds, arguing that the county attorney failed
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  316 Nebraska Reports
                        STATE V. RASHAD
                        Cite as 316 Neb. 101

to perform his duty under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1205 (Reissue
2016) to bring to the attention of the trial court any cases fall-
ing within Nebraska’s speedy trial statutes and advise the trial
court of facts relevant in determining the order of cases to be
tried. Rashad also argued that the State provided insufficient
evidence for the district court to find good cause to continue
the trial. Rashad claimed that although the court had another
trial on October 18, 2021, there was “no information to say
that [he] should not have been in court in November, January,
or December.”
   The State responded that the transcript of the October 26,
2021, hearing, which was admitted into evidence, was
      dispositive as to the issue because the Court found that
      there was good cause to continue the matter until February
      [2022] based on the fact that . . . cases before the Court
      that had priority over this case would, in effect, have
      bumped [Rashad’s] case. Due to the Court’s trial sched-
      ule, the soonest availability was February.
The State argued that “although the good cause was granted”
after October 18, 2021, the district court specifically found
that there was good cause to continue the case until February
14, 2022.
   The district court agreed with the State, observing that it
      made a good cause finding that the trial on October 18th,
      2021, was not able to go forward due to the Court’s
      availability and having a trial going on at that time.
      And the Court then moved this case. Obviously, couldn’t
      [sic] do it in November because the Court was also in a
      trial that was scheduled to take place in the November
      panel, and thus the Court’s next available trial date was
      February 14th, 2022, and that was part of the Court’s
      good cause finding.
   After the hearing, Rashad filed a written motion for dis-
charge consistent with the arguments that he made at the
hearing. The district court subsequently issued a written order,
also consistent with its statements at the hearing, overruling
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          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   316 Nebraska Reports
                          STATE V. RASHAD
                          Cite as 316 Neb. 101

Rashad’s written motion. In that order, the district court stated
that the trial it had set for the week of October 13, 2021, was
a “homicide trial.”
                  Court of Appeals’ Decision
   Rashad appealed to the Court of Appeals, a majority of
which affirmed the order of the district court overruling his
motion for absolute discharge. 1 In doing so, the majority
cited State v. Alvarez 2 and its progeny for the proposition that
“docket congestion in trial courts can constitute good cause
for delay in speedy trial calculations.” 3 The majority conceded
that the record in this case was “thin,” but it nonetheless found
that the district court did not clearly err in finding that there
was good cause to continue Rashad’s trial given the evidence
in the record. 4
   Specifically, as to the continuance of the October 2021 trial
date, the majority observed that although there was no for-
mal stipulation, counsel for Rashad and counsel for the State
“agreed to the fact that the [district] court was overseeing a
different criminal trial at the time Rashad’s trial was set to
begin.” 5 The majority then stated that it gave deference to the
finding that the district court was presiding over another trial
on October 18 and that “[b]ased on the acknowledgment from
both parties,” it could not find that this factual finding was
clearly erroneous. 6 Therefore, the majority found that there
was good cause for the district court to continue Rashad’s trial
from October 18.
   As to rescheduling Rashad’s jury trial to February 2022,
the majority acknowledged Rashad’s argument that even if
1
  State v. Rashad, 31 Neb. App. 779, 989 N.W.2d 741 (2023).
2
  State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281, 202 N.W.2d 604 (1972).
3
  Rashad, supra note 1, 31 Neb. App. at 788, 989 N.W.2d at 748.
4
  Id. at 789, 989 N.W.2d at 748.
5
  Id.
6
  Id.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    316 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. RASHAD
                             Cite as 316 Neb. 101

there was good cause to continue the October 18, 2021, trial,
the State failed to prove good cause to continue the trial past
November 12, the expiration of his speedy trial calculation.
However, the majority held that “[a]ssuming without deciding
that the State would have to make a separate offer of proof
of good cause to take Rashad beyond his original speedy
trial date [in November],” good cause was present here. 7 The
majority observed that the district court determined that good
cause was present due to the “unavailability of the court, as
well as counsel for both parties,” prior to February 14, 2022. 8
Accordingly, the majority found that “based on the court’s
schedule only, good cause existed at the time the continuance
was granted to continue trial beyond the November [2021]
speedy trial deadline.” 9
   The dissenting judge, in contrast, would have found the
record “too thin in relation to the State’s burden.” 10 The dis-
senting judge gave deference to the district court’s finding
that the other trial existed, but indicated that “[t]he issue lies
in there being no indication as to why that trial was scheduled
ahead of Rashad’s trial or why the trial could not have been
otherwise accommodated.” 11
   Rashad petitioned for further review, which we granted.
                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
   Rashad assigns, restated, that the Court of Appeals erred
in affirming the district court’s order denying his motion for
absolute discharge.
                 STANDARD OF REVIEW
  [1,2] Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether
charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a
7
   Id. at 790, 989 N.W.2d at 749.
8
   Id.
 9
   Id.
10
   Id. at 798, 989 N.W.2d at 753 (Welch, J., dissenting).
11
   Id. at 797, 989 N.W.2d at 753.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    316 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. RASHAD
                            Cite as 316 Neb. 101

factual question that will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly
erroneous. 12 Under a clearly erroneous standard of review, an
appellate court does not reweigh the evidence but considers
the judgment in a light most favorable to the successful party,
resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the successful party,
who is entitled to every reasonable inference deducible from
the evidence. 13
                           ANALYSIS
   [3,4] The sole question presented here is whether Rashad
was entitled to absolute discharge on statutory speedy trial
grounds. The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016). 14
Under those statutes, if a defendant is not brought to trial by
the 6-month speedy trial deadline, as extended by any excluded
periods, he or she is entitled to absolute discharge from the
offense charged and for any other offense required by law to be
joined with that offense. 15
   [5,6] Specific periods of delay are required under
§ 29-1207(4)(a) through (e) to be excluded in computing the
time for trial. However, § 29-1207(4)(f) also excludes “[o]ther
periods of delay not specifically enumerated . . . , but only if
the court finds that they are for good cause.” “Good cause,”
for purposes of § 29-1207(4)(f), is not defined by statute.
However, we have previously held that “good cause,” as used
in the speedy trial statutes, means a substantial reason and one
that affords a legal excuse. 16 Good cause is a factual question
dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 17 A trial court’s good cause
findings must be supported by the evidence in the record,
12
   State v. Williams, 313 Neb. 981, 987 N.W.2d 613 (2023).
13
   State v. Chase, 310 Neb. 160, 964 N.W.2d 254 (2021).
14
   State v. Nelson, 313 Neb. 464, 984 N.W.2d 620 (2023).
15
   Williams, supra note 12.
16
   Id.
17
   See id.
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     316 Nebraska Reports
                                 STATE V. RASHAD
                                 Cite as 316 Neb. 101

and the State bears the burden of establishing facts showing
that good cause existed. 18
   [7] To calculate the time for statutory speedy trial purposes,
a court must exclude the day the information was filed, count
forward 6 months, back up 1 day, and then add any time
excluded under § 29-1207(4) to determine the last day the
defendant can be tried. 19 Applying this formula in the present
case, the parties agree that the information was filed on April
12, 2021, and that based on the exclusion of 31 days of delay
attributable to Rashad, the last day for trial would have been
November 12, 2021. The dispute concerns whether the State
met its burden of establishing facts showing that there was
good cause to continue Rashad’s jury trial from October 18,
2021, until February 14, 2022.
   The State argues that “if there is any evidence of good
cause in the record,” 20 it met its burden, and it specifically
points to evidence showing that “[t]he court was . . . unavail-
able at the time this case was set for trial because it was
already involved in the trial of another case . . . .” 21 The
State also maintains that “[t]he evidence from the October
[2021] hearing contains essentially a stipulation that the
court informed the parties” of its unavailability on October
18. 22 Rashad, in contrast, argues that “[t]here is no evidence
to support a finding of good cause to continue [his] trial.” 23
Specifically, Rashad argues that the continuance was “solely
based on the trial court’s statement and the State’s statement
as to their general unavailability until February [2022].” 24
18
   Id.
19
   Nelson, supra note 14.
20
   Brief for appellee at 9-10.
21
   Id. at 11.
22
   Id. at 10.
23
   Brief for appellant at 14.
24
   Id. at 17-18.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    316 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. RASHAD
                           Cite as 316 Neb. 101

Rashad claims that this evidence was not enough to show
good cause under Alvarez and related cases.
   We have expressly or impliedly recognized that docket con-
gestion can constitute good cause for delay under Nebraska’s
speedy trial statutes. 25 However, our prior decisions affirming a
trial court’s finding that docket congestion was good cause for
delay have involved more substantial evidentiary records than
that in the present case.
   For example, in Alvarez, we observed that there was tes-
timony from the clerk of the district court, as well as other
evidence, showing the number of criminal and civil cases filed
in the district court in the prior calendar year and the first 6
months of the current calendar year, the number of criminal
and civil cases disposed of in the prior calendar year, the
number of days actually utilized for trial during the defend­
ant’s 6-month speedy trial period, and the court and other
activities occupying the trial judge on each day during the
speedy trial period. 26 There was also evidence that no court
reporter was available to the judge for a period of 12 days. 27
Based on this evidence, we found that we could not say that
the district court’s implicit finding that the delay was occa-
sioned by docket congestion was not supported by the evi-
dence. 28 As such, we affirmed the district court’s order deny-
ing the defendant’s motion for absolute discharge on statutory
speedy trial grounds. 29
25
   See, State v. Moody, 311 Neb. 143, 970 N.W.2d 770 (2022); State v.
   Abernathy, 310 Neb. 880, 969 N.W.2d 871 (2022); State v. Gnanaprakasam,
   310 Neb. 519, 967 N.W.2d 89 (2021); State v. Brown, 310 Neb. 224, 964
   N.W.2d 682 (2021); Chase, supra note 13; State v. Billingsley, 309 Neb.
   616, 961 N.W.2d 539 (2021); State v. Sommer, 273 Neb. 587, 731 N.W.2d
   566 (2007); Alvarez, supra note 2.
26
   See Alvarez, supra note 2.
27
   Id.
28
   Id.
29
   Id.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    316 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. RASHAD
                             Cite as 316 Neb. 101

   We took a similar view in State v. Moody. 30 The record there
contained an affidavit from the trial judge’s bailiff attesting,
among other things, that there were “‘several months where
jury trials were not empaneled, because of the [COVID-19]
pandemic’” and that when jury trials resumed, each judge
“‘was allotted one day for a criminal jury trial to be empaneled
for that month.’” 31 The record also contained several orders of
the district court, including three orders of continuance, which,
in turn, cited orders by the presiding judge of the district court
limiting the number of criminal cases to be heard or continuing
such cases. 32 In addition, the district court took judicial notice
of the files in the case. 33 We found that this record “provide[d]
sufficient evidence regarding the context and circumstances
that were in existence at the specific periods that the continu-
ances were ordered,” 34 the relevant public health concerns and
restrictions, and the effect of such restrictions on the district
court’s ability to hold jury trials. As a result, we affirmed the
district court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for abso-
lute discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds.
   There was similar evidence in other cases. 35
   In Rashad’s case, in contrast, the evidence consisted solely
of emails regarding the scheduling of the hearing on the con-
tinuance and a transcript of that hearing. The emails show that
“the Court” indicated at some time prior to September 30,
2021, that Rashad’s trial was “getting bumped.” The transcript
30
   Moody, supra note 25.
31
   Id., 311 Neb. at 148, 970 N.W.2d at 775.
32
   Moody, supra note 25.
33
   Id.
34
   Id. at 155, 970 N.W.2d at 780.
35
   See, Abernathy, supra note 25; Gnanaprakasam, supra note 25; Brown,
   supra note 25; Chase, supra note 13. But see Sommer, supra note 25 (only
   evidence was certified copy of journal entries from other case whose trial
   date had conflicted with defendant’s trial date, but those entries showed
   that defendant in other case had pled guilty and his sentencing was
   deferred).
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    316 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. RASHAD
                             Cite as 316 Neb. 101

of the October 26 hearing similarly shows that the trial judge
had another jury trial scheduled for October 13, that the judge
also had a trial scheduled for November, and that the prosecu-
tor was not available during the last 2 weeks of any month
until February.
   [8] Such mere statements of unavailability are, without
more, insufficient to show docket congestion existed, such
that there was good cause to continue Rashad’s jury trial past
the statutory 6-month speedy trial deadline. We also note that
much of the information about the judge’s availability came
from statements by the judge. The parties agree that “the
Court” told them of the conflict with the October 18, 2021,
trial date. It is unclear whether this means the judge or another
source. However, even assuming that this specific reference is
to someone other than the judge, all the information about the
judge’s availability in and after November came from state-
ments by the judge. As we have explained, “comments by the
trial judge are not evidence.” 36 By statute, the judge presiding
at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. 37 No objec-
tion need be made in order to preserve the point. 38 This rule
applies not only to formal testimony but also to whenever the
judge assumes the role of a witness. 39
   There was some suggestion in the proceedings below that
the schedule of Rashad’s counsel was among the reasons for
36
   State v. Baird, 259 Neb. 245, 250, 609 N.W.2d 349, 353 (2000).
37
   Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-605 (Reissue 2016). See, also, e.g., Chase, supra note
   13; In re Interest of J.K., 300 Neb. 510, 915 N.W.2d 91 (2018), abrogated
   on other grounds, State v. Ezell, 314 Neb. 825, 993 N.W.2d 449 (2023);
   Baird, supra note 36.
38
   In re Interest of J.K., supra note 37.
39
   Id. See, also, State v. Rhoads, 11 Neb. App. 731, 660 N.W.2d 181 (2003)
   (trial judge’s statement that specific date was first available trial date
   was not evidence), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petty, 269 Neb.
   205, 691 N.W.2d 101 (2005); State v. Roundtree, 11 Neb. App. 628, 658
   N.W.2d 308 (2003) (ignoring any facts that trial judge related that were
   not otherwise supported by bill of exceptions or that may not be properly
   judicially noticed).
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                           STATE V. RASHAD
                           Cite as 316 Neb. 101

finding that there was good cause to continue Rashad’s trial
past November 12, 2021, the expiration of his speedy trial
calculation. We reject such a suggestion under the facts and
circumstances of this case. While Rashad’s counsel partici-
pated in another trial the week of October 18, he indicated that
Rashad’s trial “would’ve taken precedence, from a speedy trial
perspective,” if it had been held as scheduled. Rashad’s coun-
sel made a similar statement about the case he had scheduled
for January 2022. Otherwise, Rashad’s counsel made clear that
he was available in November and December 2021.
   [9] As Nebraska courts have stated, oral or other informal
statements are obviously a poor procedure when speedy trial
rights are involved. 40 The situation here could have been
avoided if the trial court had issued a written order on the
motion for a continuance. Such an order could have articulated
the reason for the continuance of the trial and put the State
on notice as to the evidence that it would need to present at
any subsequent hearing on a motion for absolute discharge.
Additionally, in lieu of statements by the trial judge, in par-
ticular, the State could have introduced other evidence to sub-
stantiate docket congestion, such as scheduling issues or case
priorities. 41 The State took no such steps in this case.
   As a result, we agree with Rashad that the State failed to
meet its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that there was good cause to continue his jury trial.
                        CONCLUSION
   For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals with directions to reverse the order of the
district court and remand the cause to the district court with
directions to grant Rashad’s motion for absolute discharge.
                 Reversed and remanded with directions.
40
   State v. Vela-Montes, 19 Neb. App. 378, 807 N.W.2d 544 (2011); State v.
   Shipler, 17 Neb. App. 66, 758 N.W.2d 41 (2008); Roundtree, supra note
   39.
41
   Cf., Baird, supra note 36; Rhoads, supra note 39.