Court Opinion

ID: 9701635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:28:32.42004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:26.459407
License: Public Domain

*56CIRILLO, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the majority that appellant’s Rule 11001 claim is meritless and approve of most of the reasoning in its opinion. Nevertheless, I am compelled to briefly comment on appellant’s contention that the lower court improperly computed the length of the first extension permitted by Rule 1100.
Appellant maintains that the lower court improperly concluded that certain periods of delay were caused by him.2 He contends, therefore, that the length of the first extension was excessive, making the filing of the second petition for extension untimely. Even assuming that appellant did not cause all of the delays attributed to him by the lower court, his argument is without merit. The length of the extension is not determined solely by the length of delay which could have been excluded under the Rule. “The length of extension is restricted only by the requirement that the extension be ‘reasonable, limited. . . specifying the date or period within which trial shall be commenced.’ ” Commonwealth v. Gibson, 248 Pa.Super. 348, 352, 375 A.2d 132, 134 (1977), quoting Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214, 220, 364 A.2d 1345, 1348 (1976). I would find that the length of the first extension was reasonable. The extension order specified the date before which trial was to commence, and trial, in fact, was scheduled before the new run date. Therefore, the second petition for extension filed prior to the new run *57date was timely, and appellant was not denied his right to a speedy trial.

. Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 1100, 42 Pa.C.S.A.

. The lower court and appellant refer to particular periods of delay as “chargeable” to either party. It should be noted that in Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8, 364 A.2d 694 (1976), the Supreme Court expressly denounced the wording of Rule 1100 issues in this manner: “... [Sjuch terminology only serves to confuse the issue and thereby tends to cause confusion in the application of the Rule.... [Arguments relating to Rule 1100 are properly advanced by employing the terminology of the Rule.” Id., 469 Pa. at 13-14, 364 A.2d at 696-697. See also Commonwealth v. Goodman, 260 Pa.Super. 266, 393 A.2d 1256 (1978).