Court Opinion

ID: 9786681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:00:37.600354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:15.452084
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30383     Document: 00516878800         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/30/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                   FILED
                                                                         August 30, 2023
                                 No. 22-30383                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                   Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Larry Caillier II,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 6:10-CR-76-01
                  ______________________________

   Before King, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
          After pleading guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in
   violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), Larry Caillier II was sentenced to a
   168–month term of imprisonment followed by a 15–year term of supervised
   release. During Caillier’s term of supervised release, the district court
   modified a number of the special conditions imposed. Caillier appeals,
   challenging the district court’s jurisdiction to modify his supervised release
   conditions, and contesting the substantive reasonableness of the conditions
   imposed.    Because the district court has jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
   § 3583(e)(2) to modify conditions of supervised release, and because the
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   district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning these conditions, we
   affirm.
                                           I
             Caillier was released from prison on February 25, 2022, and began
   serving his fifteen-year period of supervised release. Caillier’s original
   conditions of supervised release included two special conditions: (1) Caillier
   was required to participate in a sex offender treatment program; and
   (2) Caillier was prohibited from having “access to a computer, or an
   interactive computer service as directed by the United States Probation
   Office.” Two months into Caillier’s term of supervised release, the United
   States Probation Office petitioned the district court to modify his release
   conditions as follows: (1) that Caillier participate in a sex offender treatment
   program; (2) that he “not have Internet access on his personal computer,
   PDA, or any other device, without the approval of the U.S. Probation Office”
   and “[i]f internet access is granted, [Caillier] shall comply with the
   requirements of the Computer Monitoring Program”; (3) that he submit to
   polygraph testing as part of his therapeutic program; (4) that he not view or
   possess any materials depicting or describing sexually explicit conduct or
   child pornography; and (5) that he refrain from associating with any minor
   unless the minor’s guardian is present, except for incidental contact in
   normal commercial life.
             The Probation Office petitioned for these modifications without
   alleging that Caillier had violated the terms of his supervised release. The
   district court held a hearing in which Caillier was represented by counsel and
   heard Caillier’s objections regarding the modified conditions. The district
   court ultimately granted the Probation Office’s petition over Caillier’s
   objections, and modified Caillier’s terms of supervised release to include all
   of the new conditions. Caillier appeals, arguing that: (1) the district court did

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   not have jurisdiction to impose new supervised release conditions, and
   (2) the new conditions of supervised release are substantively unreasonable.
                                          II
          Caillier contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify
   his conditions of supervised release because the change in circumstance that
   precipitated the modification was a ruling that one of his conditions was
   unconstitutional. Caillier’s argument makes two assumptions. First, that a
   modification of supervised release conditions cannot be based on the illegality
   of one of those conditions. Second, that the district court only has authority
   to modify conditions of supervised release if there is a change in
   circumstance.
                                          A
          Caillier’s first assumption—that district courts lack jurisdiction to
   modify conditions based solely on the grounds that the conditions are
   illegal—is correct.
          District courts have jurisdiction to modify supervised release
   conditions only for statutorily enumerated reasons, such as to ensure
   deterrence or protect the public. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Those reasons—a
   subset of the factors considered during initial sentencing under § 3553(a)—
   do not include a change in law holding one of the conditions illegal. See id.
   §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).
          We have held, in the context of a restitution order, that a district court
   does not have jurisdiction to modify conditions of supervised release on the
   grounds that those conditions were determined to be unlawful. United States
   v. Hatten, 167 F.3d 884, 886 (5th Cir. 1999). We have previously relied on
   Hatten to reject challenges to the legality of a condition of supervised release
   brought under § 3583(e)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Zimmerman, 481 F.

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   App’x 199, 201 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Zimmerman cannot challenge the legality
   or constitutionality of the special conditions of his supervised release in a
   § 3583(e)(2) motion.”); Matthews v. United States, 378 F. App’x 451, 452
   (5th Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court lacks jurisdiction under § 3583(e)(2) to
   modify conditions of supervised release on grounds of illegality.”).
          However, this case is unique in that it is the government, not Caillier,
   that is allegedly using the § 3583(e)(2) motion as a vehicle to challenge an
   allegedly unlawful condition.
          We now clarify that a district court cannot modify an unlawful
   condition under § 3583(e)(2) if the illegality of that condition is the basis for
   modification, regardless of whether it was the defendant or government who
   brought the motion challenging the conditions. See Hatten, 167 F.3d at 886
   (concluding that § 3585(e)(2) does not provide a jurisdictional basis for
   modifying conditions on the grounds that the conditions were illegal, where
   both the defendant and the government had sought modification of those
   conditions). In the case at hand, however, Caillier’s appeal fails because the
   government did not move for modification solely on the basis of illegality, and
   the district court did not premise its ruling on the illegality of the special
   condition.
          According to Caillier, the Probation Office moved for modification of
   the supervised release conditions because one of Caillier’s original special
   conditions, the condition that barred him from all access to a computer, was
   ruled unconstitutional. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 108
   (2017). However, the Probation Office’s petition before the district court
   contains a multitude of reasons for the modification. The Probation Office
   stated that it sought modification of the terms of Caillier’s supervised release
   to “allow the defendant to be granted monitored internet access, to bring the
   conditions into conformity with current national and local U.S. Probation

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   Office policies, . . . to assist the U.S. Probation Office to better monitor the
   defendant, and to reduce potential risk to the community.” These stated
   reasons are not only in line with the § 3553(a) factors, they also show that this
   petition was not brought solely on the basis of the illegality of a condition.
          Further, the district court did not base its ruling on the alleged
   illegality. Rather, at the hearing on the petition the district court focused on
   protecting the public. In making a modification determination the court is
   required to consider “general punishment issues such as deterrence and
   public safety[,]” and these deterrence and community safety issues were
   discussed throughout Caillier’s hearing. Hatten, 167 F.3d at 886.
          Therefore, the district court in this case had jurisdiction because its
   ruling was based on public safety and general deterrence.
                                          B
          Caillier contends that even if the district court’s ruling was not based
   on the illegality of a condition, the district court still lacked authority to
   modify his conditions of supervised release because there was not a “change
   in circumstance” that precipitated the modification nor was there a
   “compelling cause” for the modification.
          We have found no cases, and Caillier does not cite any, requiring a
   “change in circumstance” or “compelling cause” to modify a condition of
   supervised release.    This argument is meritless given the language of
   § 3583(e)(2) allowing for modification of supervised release “at any time”
   prior to its expiration or termination. We also note that the Second, Seventh,
   Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all specifically held that a district
   court can modify a defendant’s conditions of supervised release pursuant to
   § 3583(e)(2) even without a showing of changed circumstances. See United
   States v. Parisi, 821 F.3d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Evans, 727
   F.3d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Davies, 380 F.3d 329, 332 (8th

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   Cir. 2004); United States v. Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2014);
   United States v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2011). The district court
   thus had jurisdiction to modify Caillier’s supervised release conditions.
   Accordingly, changed circumstances are not a jurisdictional requirement for
   modification of a condition of supervised release.
                                          III
          Caillier also challenges the substantive reasonableness of the modified
   supervised release conditions. When preserved, substantive reasonableness
   challenges to conditions of supervised release are reviewed for abuse of
   discretion.   United States v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2013).
   Unpreserved challenges to special conditions are reviewed for plain error.
   United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 2009). We have
   previously noted an ambiguity in our caselaw as to the appropriate standard
   of review where a defendant moves for modification of his supervised release
   conditions under § 3583(e)(2) without having first objected to the imposition
   of the original conditions. United States v. Doyle, 865 F.3d 214, 214 n.1 (5th
   Cir. 2017); United States v. Blank, 854 F. App’x. 559, 561 (5th Cir. 2021).
   This case is distinguishable because the government, not Caillier, moved to
   modify the conditions. Therefore, there is no concern that Caillier is raising
   arguments in a § 3583(e)(2) motion that should have been argued at the
   original sentencing. However, we need not resolve any potential ambiguity
   because even under the less deferential abuse of discretion standard Caillier’s
   challenges fail. “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision
   on an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” United
   States v. Castillo, 430 F.3d 230, 239-40 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
   marks omitted).
          “A district court has wide discretion in imposing terms and conditions
   of supervised release.” United States v. Winding, 817 F.3d 910, 914 (5th Cir.

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   2016). The modifications need only be “reasonably related” to one of four
   factors: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
   characteristics of the defendant”; (2) the need “to afford adequate
   deterrence to criminal conduct”; (3) the need “to protect the public from
   further crimes of the defendant”; and (4) the need “to provide the defendant
   with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
   correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C.
   §§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(1) and (2)(B)-(D); United States v. Weatherton, 567
   F.3d 149, 153 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a condition of supervised
   release must be reasonably related to one, but not all, of the four factors). In
   addition, a supervised release condition should not involve “a greater
   deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the latter three
   statutory goals.” United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 2001); see
   also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).
          Caillier focuses his briefing on the second special condition, which
   concerns restricting and monitoring Caillier’s internet usage. Caillier asserts
   that this restriction on his internet use is not reasonably related to any
   § 3553(a) factors because internet usage was not “in any way” involved in his
   offense of conviction. We disagree. Given that Caillier used his cell phone
   to exchange sexually explicit pictures with a minor, the district court had a
   reasonable basis to conclude that monitoring Caillier’s internet-capable
   electronic device would protect the public. See United States v. Sanchez, 842
   F. App’x 885, 894 (5th Cir. 2021) (upholding an internet-monitoring
   condition even where the defendant’s offense conduct did not involve the
   internet, text messaging, or even electronic devices, stressing that “we give
   great deference to the district court, which is most familiar with the details of
   the defendant’s offense, history, and other relevant circumstances”).
          Caillier further contends that this condition involving a restriction on
   his internet access posed a greater deprivation of his liberty than was

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   reasonably necessary under § 3583(d)(2). Again, we disagree given that the
   restriction here was limited in both scope and duration.
          Limiting the duration of a broad internet restriction is one way that a
   court can narrowly tailor such a prohibition. This Court has upheld even
   absolute internet bans, so long as the ban was limited in duration. E.g., United
   States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 157-58 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming absolute ban on
   internet and computer access for a period of three years); United States v.
   Rath, 614 F. App’x 188, 194 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming an absolute five-year
   ban on internet access). The restriction in this case lasts longer (fifteen years)
   than the absolute bans that this court has previously upheld, but that is not
   dispositive, as the restriction here was not absolute—it was limited in scope.
          The restriction at hand was not an absolute ban, its scope was limited
   in that it allowed internet usage with the prior approval of the Probation
   Office, and subject to the Probation Office’s continued monitoring.
   Therefore, it did not “effectively preclude [Caillier] from meaningfully
   participating in modern society.” United States v. Duke, 788 F.3d 392, 400
   (5th Cir. 2015).
          This Court has routinely upheld similar restrictions on internet and
   computer usage in cases involving child pornography, as we see no reason
   that the condition in Caillier’s case should be treated differently. See United
   States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 126 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming twenty-five-year
   ban on computer use absent probation office’s approval); United States v.
   Ellis, 720 F.3d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding prohibition on owning or
   using a computer without prior approval of the court); United States v.
   Halverson, 897 F.3d 645, 657 (5th Cir. 2018) (affirming a lifetime ban on
   internet access absent advance approval from the probation office).
          Caillier’s arguments regarding the remaining supervised release
   conditions are meritless. Caillier does not dispute the reasonableness of the

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   third condition; rather, he asserts that this polygraph testing would involve
   “forced speech” and violate his Fifth Amendment rights against self-
   incrimination. This court has rejected that argument. See United States v.
   Willis, 651 F. App’x 291, 294 (5th Cir. 2021) (“We now hold that requiring
   probationers to undergo polygraph examinations as a condition of their
   supervised release does not violate the Fifth Amendment.”); United States v.
   Locke, 482 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting challenge to a similar
   special condition and concluding that “[t]he fact that the questions were
   asked [to defendant] in the context of a polygraph test does not convert the
   question-and-answer session into a Fifth Amendment violation”); Sealed
   Appellee v. Sealed Appellant, 937 F.3d 392, 404-05 (5th Cir. 2019) (affirming
   condition that required polygraph testing, and noting that a court is not
   prohibited from including mandatory participating in polygraph testing “by
   the mere fact that polygraph testing is not mentioned [in the Sentencing
   Guidelines]”).
          Caillier’s fourth condition, which prohibits him from viewing or
   possessing “sexually explicit material,” is not unreasonable and does not
   violate the First Amendment. See United States v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220, 227
   (5th Cir. 2013) (“Because [defendant’s] crime was sexual in nature it was
   reasonable for the district court to restrict [the defendant’s] access to
   sexually stimulating material more broadly in an effort to prevent future
   crimes or aid in his rehabilitation.”); see also United States v. Chapman, 796
   F. App’x 229, 231 (5th Cir. 2020) (affirming a condition that prohibited the
   possession of adult pornography, noting that the prohibition played an
   important role in the defendant’s sex offender treatment program).
          Finally, Caillier’s fifth condition, which prohibits him from
   associating with minors unless a parent or guardian is present, is reasonably
   related to the § 3553(a) factors. This circuit has previously affirmed bans on
   contact with children. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408,

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   417-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming a three-year prohibition on unsupervised
   contact with children including the defendant’s own daughter); United States
   v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220, 225-26 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding lifetime ban on
   unsupervised contact with children, unless permission is granted by the
   probation officer); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 165-67 (5th Cir. 2001)
   (upholding condition requiring defendant to avoid direct and indirect contact
   with minors). The district court specified that this condition did not prohibit
   Caillier’s incidental contact with minors in a commercial setting, but rather
   applied only to non-commercial settings. The district court concluded that
   this condition was justified in order to limit Caillier’s access to his girlfriend’s
   minor children, given that his past conduct involved abusing a position of
   trust (as a high school teacher), and he would be in a similar situation with
   his girlfriend’s children.
          Caillier’s modified supervised release conditions are all reasonably
   related to the § 3553(a) factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion
   in imposing any of the modified supervised release conditions. Accordingly,
   the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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