Court Opinion

ID: 9518768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:01:38.059434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:27.668148
License: Public Domain

“Holman, Justice
(dissenting).
“The issue is whether the prophylactic purposes of Escobedo4 and Neely5 will be negated if admissions and confessions obtained by non-compliance with those cases are permitted to be used for impeachment of defendants. I am of the opinion that the inability of the prosecution to use such admissions and confessions in its case in chief for incriminating purposes will be sufficient to obtain compliance with Escobedo and Neely requirements by the police. If this is so there is no valid reason for *542not permitting the nse for impeachment purposes of evidence that everyone concedes is both relevant and truthful.”
The Walder rule seems to be gleaned not so much from what Justice Frankfurter, the author of W alder, said, but from the post-W alder cases which interpret what he said.6
This court is still free to read Walder and interpret it for itself, and it may well be that the misinterpretation of Agnello7 which gave rise to Walder has now attached to Walder.
Set out below is what I consider the essence of the Walder Case:
“The question which divided the court, and the sole issue here, is whether the defendant’s assertion on direct examination that he had never possessed any narcotics opened the door, solely for the purpose of attacking the defendant’s credibility, to evidence of the heroin unlawfully seized in connection with the earlier proceeding. Because this question presents a novel aspect of the scope of the doctrine of Weeks v. United States, 232 US 383, [34 S Ct 341, 58 L Ed 652], we granted certiorari. 345 US 992, [73 S Ct 1144, 97 L Ed 1399].
“The government cannot violate the Fourth Amendment—in the only way in which the Government can do anything, namely through its agents— and use the fruits of such unlawful conduct to secure a conviction. Weeks v. United States, supra. Nor can the Government make indirect use of such evidence for its case, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 US 385, [40 S Ct 182, 64 L Ed 319], or support a conviction on evidence obtained through leads from the unlawfully obtained evidence, cf. *543Nardone v. United States, 308 US 338, [60 S Ct 266, 84 L Ed 307]. All these methods are outlawed, and convictions obtained by means of them are invalidated, because they encourage the kind of society that is obnoxious to free men.
“It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government’s possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.” pp 64, 65.
I believe the above language enunciates the rule of law found in Walder. Following this language the court uttered the “mere denial” and “sweeping-claim” dictum—not as a rule of law, as Inge and others would have us believe—but merely as an illustration of the aggravated circumstances of the case. The court said:
“Take the present situation. Of his own accord, the defendant went beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged and made the sweeping- claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcotics. Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief. Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.
“The situation here involved is to be sharply contrasted with that presented by Agnello v. United States, 269 US 20 (46 S Ct 4, 70 L Ed 145). There *544the Government, after having failed in its efforts to introduce the tainted evidence in its case in chief, tried to smuggle it in on cross-examination by asking the accused the broad question “Did you ever see narcotics before?” After eliciting the expected denial, it sought to introduce evidence of narcotics located in the defendant’s home by means of an unlawful search and seizure, in order to discredit the defendant. In holding that the Government could no more work in this evidence on cross-examination than it could in its case in chief, the Court foreshadowed, perhaps unwittingly, the result we reach today:
“ 'And the contention that the evidence of the search and seizure was admissible in rebuttal is without merit. In Ms direct examination, Agnello was not ashed and did not testify concerning the can of cocaine. In cross-examination, in answer to a question permitted over his objection, he said he had never seen it. He did nothing to waive his constitutional protection or to justify cross-examination in respect of the evidence claimed to have been obtained by the search. * *’ 269 US 20, 35.
“The judgment is affirmed.” pp 65, 66. (Emphasis supplied.)
In my view, even the strictest construction of Walder in no way precludes alluding to statements made by defendant in this case, particularly in view of his testimony given on direct examination. If the “sweeping claim” test is the norm, then insofar as such a norm is comprehensible, the defendant here meets it.
As to the rebuttal testimony of Trooper Seymour, he simply testified that the defendant had made statements to him while returning from Pennsylvania, viz: that decedent would not allow defendant in the store; that decedent called defendant a thief; and that he had gone to decedent’s apartment to get the keys to Ohaloner’s store so he could get *545money. None of this testimony was inadmissible because of Walder, nor did such testimony establish elements of the crime. As the trial court pointed out to the jury before such proofs were received, the testimony was “simply to assist you in weighing the credibility of the defendant as a witness.”
Given the facts in this case, the option of adopting or rejecting cases like Brewton, and the certainty that there is no “federal standard” case squarely in point (including Walder), what compulsion is there for setting aside this conviction and adopting such a rule of law? Certainly it is not a thirst for justice.
Notwithstanding the facts above, the court today has undone the defendant’s conviction and for the third time afforded him a trial because the defendant was cross-examined by the prosecutor (not yet of itself considered an invasion of the rights of the accused) from statements he freely and voluntarily gave to arresting officers and the prosecutor some 25 years before Miranda.
There is nothing in the fifth amendment that gives the defendant in a criminal case the right to lie with impunity.8 He cannot, of course, be forced to take the stand, but once he does he ought to be subject to cross-examination as any other witness. If he has uttered prior contradictory statements, why shouldn’t the jury know this in evaluating his credibility—unless of course such statements have been obtained by threat or promise and for that very reason lacking in trustworthiness? (e.g. Brown v. Mississippi [1936], 297 US 278 [56 S Ct 461, 80 L Ed 682]).
*546Courts of this country have been charged with going to unbelievable lengths in showing concern for the accused and a concomitant indifference for the victim. At times it must seem that conviction itself is prima facie evidence of “error” in the trial. Courts have been caught up in a fascinating game played with the criminal law where the guilt or innocence of the accused is almost irrelevant. Justice Cardozo’s famous dictum of yesteryear is today’s legal heresy, as judges continue to flay the blundering constable by freeing the felon.9 Without question recent decisions have had a certain therapeutic value in police and prosecution practices and eliminated some inequities in the criminal law. But in the meantime the crime picture across the country darkens, and society wonders if a balance will ever be struck between the rights of the accused aiid the rights of the community. There is something almost suicidal in the headlong drive to use the courtroom primarily as a forum to train law enforcement officers in next year’s rules of criminal procedure and only incidentally to ascertain guilt or innocence of the accused. Ordered society as we have known it may not be around to reap the fruits of the experiment.
Criminal law cannot be equated with an athletic contest where it matters not who wins or loses but “how you play the game.” The function of criminal court proceedings historically has been a search for truth and justice—an honest endeavor to find out if the accused is guilty or innocent. Law enforcement officers today have a most difficult burden of trying to keep abreast of the TJ. S. Supreme Court’s actual decisions. On top of these there are piled erudite “interpretations” and artfully *547drawn “logical extensions” of these decisions in most self-respecting law journals and many “forward looking” appellate courts. Professors, heretofore occupied with more esoteric aspects of the law, have, in remarkably short time, become experts in the field of criminal law without ever leaving the campus. Trial and appellate courts vie with one another to be the first (on their block) to get where they feel the Supreme Court is going.
In the meantime the bewildered, angry populace braces itself against a rising tide of crime, and in utter frustration denounces the judiciary for what it considers a fatal fascination for experimenting with the criminal law. Editorial writers bemoan the frightening crime statistics and wonder why the courts are insensitive to it all. The trial courts of our largest city announce a moratorium on civil cases to devote all their man power to the burgeoning criminal docket (made up in no small part of' cases being tried for the second or third time). Humanitarianism is not something that only the accused may invoke. There ought to be a limit, for example, to the number of times an assault or rape victim is required to appear in court and recount the details of her trauma. ,
I cannot for the life of me see the justice in subjecting the defendant to a partial cross-examination, or compelling the state, in the interest of' a “fair trial”, to refrain from asking the accused embarrassing questions about the crime. Until we are compelled by clear and unmistakable precedent to do so, I would hold such use of prior contradictory statements permissible. I would affirm the conviction.

Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 US 478 (84 S Ct 1758; 12 L Ed 2d 977).

State v. Neely (1965), 239 Or 487 (395 P2d 557; 398 P2d 482).

 E.g. Inge v. United States (1966), 123 App DC 6 (356 F2d 345); United States v. Curry (CA 2, 1966), 358 F2d 904.

 Agnello v. United States (1925), 269 US 20 (46 S Ct 4, 70 L Ed 145).

 This Court’s suggested euro, prosecution for perjury, somehow doesn’t sound like a deterrent for a man facing a mandatory life sentence.

Cf., Cardozo, People v. DeFore (1926), 242 NY 13, 21 (150 NE 585, 587).