Court Opinion

ID: 9351873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-03 23:02:18.01683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:04:10.018342
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/3/23 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B317732

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. BA447872)
           v.

 GILBERT ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Renee F. Korn, Judge. Affirmed.
      Mark Yanis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Theresa A. Patterson,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                         INTRODUCTION
       A jury convicted appellant Gilbert Rodriguez of one count of
second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1, and also
found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
while committing the offense, causing great bodily injury or
death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In his first appeal, we affirmed
appellant’s conviction, but remanded the case so that the trial
court could exercise its discretion to strike or retain the firearm
sentencing enhancement. On remand, following briefing and
argument by the parties, the trial court declined to strike the
enhancement.
       In this appeal, appellant contends the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to strike the firearm enhancement or
impose a lesser enhancement. He argues that the court’s ruling
was based on a misunderstanding of material facts. We find no
abuse of discretion in appellant’s sentencing and therefore affirm.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Trial and First Appeal
       The underlying facts are discussed in detail in our prior
opinion, People v. Rodriguez (June 4, 2019, B287250) (nonpub.
opn.). We summarize them here as relevant to the instant
appeal.
       A.    Prosecution Evidence
       Appellant’s uncle, Antonio Rodriguez, operated a business
selling second-hand clothing and merchandise. Several of
Rodriguez’s employees, including victim Gustavo Chamorro and
witnesses Oscar Mata and Doris Mazariegos, lived in makeshift
shelters in the backyard of Rodriguez’s home. Several other

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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individuals also lived in the home, including appellant, witness
Henry Melendez, and Rodriguez’s girlfriend, Marilin Presiado.
        On June 22, 2016, Mata, Mazariegos, Melendez, Presiado,
and appellant were at the Rodriguez home sorting clothes and
doing other work. Appellant had been drinking much of the day.
Mazariegos testified that he seemed “intoxicated” and looked
“kind of mad.” Presiado told police appellant was “talking shit
about” Chamorro “the whole day,” “[s]aying he was scum, a thief,”
but denied saying those things at trial. Presiado left the property
a little before 6:00 p.m. to pick up a pizza.
        Chamorro arrived home as Presiado was leaving.
Mazariegos heard Chamorro arguing with appellant. Several
witnesses heard Chamorro refuse appellant’s loud demands that
he call Rodriguez or lend appellant his cellphone. Melendez
heard Chamorro say that appellant needed to learn to calm down
and respect his elders; Mazariegos heard Chamorro tell appellant
to leave him alone. Mazariegos and Melendez also heard
Chamorro use the Spanish word “machetasos.” Mazariegos
understood the word to mean something like “to swing a
machete.” Melendez understood it to mean “that [Chamorro]
wanted to kill [appellant], to cut him up in small pieces.”
        Melendez alone testified that Chamorro was holding a
machete during the dispute. Melendez testified that Chamorro
was seated, with a beer in one hand and the machete in the
other, hanging by his side near the ground. Melendez
demonstrated for the jury a pumping motion he saw Chamorro
make with the machete. He also described Chamorro as “like
desperate to stand up and get [appellant] out using the machete.”
Melendez admitted on cross-examination that he had not told the
police that Chamorro was holding a weapon.

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       After appellant and Chamorro exchanged words, appellant
approached Melendez and asked him, “Did you see the machete?
Did you hear something about the machete?” Melendez told
appellant that he did not want to get involved.
       Appellant went into the basement and emerged about a
minute later with a rifle, which he pointed at Chamorro. Mata
and Melendez both heard a shot. Melendez testified that he
heard the first shot hit an awning above Chamorro’s head and
heard someone say, “Oops, I missed.” At trial he claimed he did
not know who said those words, but he admitted that he told
police that appellant said them.
       Mazariegos, Mata, and Melendez all testified that they
then heard five or six shots. Chamorro fell to the floor.
Appellant began running around the house, asking residents for
their cell phones.
       Mata and Presiado unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate
Chamorro. Presiado called Rodriguez and the police. Appellant
left the property on foot when sirens could be heard approaching.
       Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers arrived on
the scene around 6:05 p.m. Officers found Chamorro lying dead
on the ground in the backyard, four spent .22-caliber casings on
the ground near his body, a .22-caliber Marlin rifle with a scope
propped up near the outside door to the bathroom, and two
additional shell casings in the basement. Ballistics testing
revealed that the casings had been fired from the Marlin rifle.
Officers searched the entire backyard and did not find any
knives, “bladed objects,” or “makeshift weapons.” Appellant was
apprehended down the street from the house.
       During interviews with the police, excerpts of which were
played for the jury and admitted into evidence, Melendez said

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twice that he heard appellant say “Oops, I missed.” Presiado told
police that appellant had been “talking shit about” Chamorro all
day, and told her that he shot Chamorro “because he deserved it.”
       A forensic pathologist testified that Chamorro had been
shot seven times in the head and torso; the wounds to his head
were fatal. Due to a lack of soot or stippling in the wounds, the
pathologist concluded that the shots were fired from more than
three feet away.
       B.    Defense Evidence
       Christian Martinez, another employee of Rodriguez’s,
testified that he was asked to clean up Chamorro’s belongings at
his residence. Martinez found a 14-inch machete among the
belongings, which he moved to a storage unit. He gave the
machete to a defense investigator in August 2016, and it was
ultimately turned over to the LAPD.
       A “presumptive screening” of samples of Chamorro’s blood
tested positive for methamphetamine. The criminalist who
performed the screening testified that she was not able to draw
any conclusions about the amount of methamphetamine in
Chamorro’s system or any effect it may have had on his behavior.
       C.    Conviction and Appeal
       The jury found appellant guilty of second degree murder (§
187, subd. (a)). The jury also found true the enhancement
allegations that appellant personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm and caused Chamorro’s death within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d).2

2      Section 12022.53, subdivision (b) imposes a 10-year
enhancement for personal use of a firearm during the commission
of a specified felony. Subdivision (c) imposes a 20-year

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      Appellant admitted several prior conviction allegations,
which the trial court struck in the interests of justice. The court
sentenced appellant to a term of 15 years to life on the murder
count and a consecutive term of 25 years to life on the section
12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement. The court imposed and
stayed sentences on the section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c)
enhancements.
      Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court
erroneously admitted evidence at trial. We disagreed and
affirmed his conviction. In rejecting appellant’s claim that the
court committed prejudicial error by admitting certain evidence,
we noted, “the evidence against defendant was very strong, and
the evidence supporting his theory of self-defense was relatively
weak at best. . . . What is clear is that the jury had before it
evidence that undermined defendant’s self-defense theory.
Defense counsel even reminded the jury during closing argument
that there was no evidence that Chamorro swung the machete,
held it in the air, or charged at defendant, and that Chamorro
‘wasn’t pointing it, he wasn’t swinging it, he wasn’t violently
charging my client.’”
      Appellant also contended that the case should be remanded
so the trial court could exercise its new discretion under section
12022.53, subdivision (h) to strike the firearm enhancement. The
Attorney General conceded this point and we agreed. Thus, we

enhancement where the person “personally and intentionally
discharges a firearm.” Subdivision (d) imposes an enhancement
of 25 years to life where the person “personally and intentionally
discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury
 . . . or death.”

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remanded the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion
pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (h) and section 1385.
II.    Remand
       On remand, appellant filed a brief requesting that the court
exercise its discretion to strike the section 12022.53, subdivision
(d) enhancement and impose a lesser firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) or (c). He argued that the
testimony at trial established that Chamorro was “holding a
‘machete’ in one hand and a ‘beer’ in the other” at the time of the
shooting, and also had methamphetamine in his system. Based
on this evidence, he argued that it “would be adequate
punishment” to impose a lesser enhancement. He attached
excerpts from the trial transcript, including testimony by
Melendez that while seated, Chamorro was “holding his hand
down to the ground and he was holding a machete and he said,
‘I’m going to take you out hitting you with my machete out of
here.’” Melendez testified that appellant was sitting on the steps
to the basement at the time, and afterward appellant approached
Melendez and asked if he had heard what Chamorro said about
the machete.
       The prosecution opposed appellant’s request, arguing that
he was the actual shooter, had time to “reflect on his actions and
exercise restraint,” but instead fired a “warning shot,” then shot
Chamorro multiple times, including two shots that struck
Chamorro in the head, killing him. The prosecution also cited
trial testimony that Chamorro was seated at the time he was
shot, and that Melendez testified that Chamorro never raised the
machete, swung it, stood up, or approached appellant with it.
       During the re-sentencing hearing, the court stated that it
had reviewed all of the material provided and considered the

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arguments of counsel. The court recognized its discretion, and
noted the three separate subdivisions of section 12022.53,
including subdivision (d) for firearm “discharge resulting in great
bodily injury or death.” The court took judicial notice of the court
file, our prior decision, the remittitur, and the record of appeal.
The court declined to strike the enhancement, finding that “[t]his
case involves the defendant shooting the victim Gustavo
Chamorro after a heated argument where victim Chamorro did
not have a weapon at that point, made no threats with any kind
of weapon. [¶] The court is aware that at some point in time, he -
- held a weapon in his hand - - not a firearm - - but never actually
threatened or used it in any manner. [¶] During that heated
argument, the defendant went inside his home, went
downstairs...and retrieved a rifle. He then pointed that rifle . . .
at victim Chamorro. [¶] Chamorro asked the defendant not to
point the rifle at him. Instead, defendant fired a shot. The bullet
struck a metal overhang . . . and defendant said, ‘Oops, I missed.’
Defendant then fired five additional rounds at Chamorro.
Chamorro was struck four times . . .” The court concluded,
“[a]fter reviewing the facts in this case, this court declines to use
its discretion under 1385, and 12022.53, subsection (a) to strike
or dismiss the firearm enhancement.”
       Appellant timely appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
       Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to strike the firearm enhancement under section
12022.53, subdivision (d). He argues that the court relied on a
misunderstanding of material facts. We disagree.

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I.     Governing Principles
       Section 12022.53, subdivision (h) gives the trial court
discretion “‘in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and
at the time of sentencing, to strike or dismiss an enhancement
otherwise required to be imposed by this section.’” (People v.
Pearson (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 112, 116; see also §12022.53, subd.
(h).) We review a trial court’s decision to dismiss or to strike a
sentencing allegation under section 1385 for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.) “In reviewing for
abuse of discretion, we are guided by two fundamental precepts.
First, ‘“the burden is on the party attacking the sentence to
clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary. . . . In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is
presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside on review.”’ Second, a
‘“decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people
might disagree.’”” (Id. at p. 377.)
       As relevant here, a trial court abuses its discretion when
the factual findings critical to its decision are not supported by
substantial evidence. (See People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
991, 998 (Cluff); In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057,
1065-1066.) As such, while we apply the abuse of discretion
standard to the trial court’s ultimate determination, we
determine whether the trial court’s underlying findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence. (See Haraguchi v.
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712 [“The abuse of
discretion standard is not a unified standard. . . . The trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its

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conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the
law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.”].)
II.   Analysis
      Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to strike the 25-year firearm enhancement in favor of a
lesser enhancement. He points to the court’s statement that he
“made no threats with any kind of weapon” and argues that this
finding lacked substantial evidence because of the testimony by
Melendez that Chamorro was holding a machete while
threatening to strike appellant with it.
      We disagree that the court’s statements at the hearing
demonstrate that the court misunderstood or disregarded the
evidence in the record. The court expressly recognized the
evidence that Chamorro was holding a weapon “at some point in
time” and confirmed that it had reviewed the record, including
the moving papers, in which appellant argued that Chamorro
threatened him with the machete and was holding the machete
at the time of the shooting.
      Instead, the trial court’s comments at the hearing suggest
that the court concluded that Chamorro was not holding the
machete at the time of the shooting. Substantial evidence
supports this finding. Only Melendez, one of several percipient
witnesses, testified to seeing Chamorro with the machete at any
time, and he admitted to not telling the police the same
information. No machete or other weapon was found near the
victim’s body, apart from appellant’s rifle. Melendez testified
that Chamorro was holding the machete during a portion of his
argument with appellant, after which point appellant went into
the basement and returned with his gun. No evidence in the
record before us establishes that Chamorro was holding a weapon

                                10
at the time appellant shot him. Thus, the trial court’s finding
was supported by the record.
       Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s
conclusion that Chamorro never threatened appellant with a
weapon. Melendez testified that although Chamorro threatened
to strike appellant with the machete, Chamorro kept the weapon
at his side and remained seated several feet from appellant
throughout the argument. Indeed, defense counsel conceded at
trial that there was no evidence Chamorro pointed or swung the
machete, or approached appellant while holding it. Thus,
although there was evidence that Chamorro verbally threatened
to hit appellant with the machete, there was no evidence that
Chamorro wielded the machete against appellant or physically
threatened him with it. Moreover, the jury rejected appellant’s
claims of self-defense and imperfect self-defense. Under these
circumstances, the trial court’s finding that Chamorro “made no
threats with any kind of weapon” is supported by substantial
evidence.
       Given our conclusion that the trial court’s findings were
supported by the evidence, appellant’s reliance on Cluff, supra,
87 Cal.App.4th 991 is unavailing. In Cluff, the defendant was
convicted of failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to
section 290. (Id. at p. 994.) The trial court denied Cluff’s
Romero3 motion to strike his prior offenses, finding that he had
intentionally violated the registration requirement in order to
“obfuscat[e]” his true residence. (Id. at p. 1001.) The Court of
Appeal reversed, concluding that there was no evidence in the
record of any intent by Cluff to deceive or evade law enforcement,
particularly where police were able to quickly find him at his

3     People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

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registered address. (Id. at pp. 994, 1001.) As such, the appellate
court found that “the trial court’s analysis became disconnected
from the evidence and entered the realm of imagination,
speculation, supposition, and guesswork,” and thus that the court
abused its discretion in denying the motion to strike. (Id. at p.
1002.) Here, we find no similar speculation by the trial court;
rather, the court’s findings were supported by the evidence at
trial and the jury’s verdict.
       Additional evidence further supports our conclusion that
the trial court was well within its discretion in declining to strike
the firearm enhancement. Witnesses testified that appellant
appeared angry for most of the day and began arguing with
Chamorro about use of a cell phone as soon as Chamorro arrived
home. After he retrieved his rifle, he fired a round at Chamorro,
remarked that he had missed, and then shot Chamorro with
numerous rounds, including two fatal shots to the head.
Afterward, appellant left the property while others attempted to
resuscitate Chamorro. One witness testified that appellant
stated he had shot Chamorro because he “deserved it.” On this
record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to
strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement
or impose a lesser enhancement.4

      4 For the same reasons we reject appellant’s contention that
the trial court’s decision violated his due process rights.

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                      DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                   COLLINS, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J

CURREY, J.

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