Court Opinion

ID: 9863889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 07:08:25.242054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:46.336750
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
      Second Appellate District of Texas
               at Fort Worth
            ___________________________

                 No. 02-22-00187-CR
            ___________________________

STEVEN ADAM MOORE A/K/A STEVEN MOORE, Appellant

                           V.

                THE STATE OF TEXAS

         On Appeal from the 355th District Court
                 Hood County, Texas
               Trial Court No. CR14357

          Before Kerr, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
          Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Steven Moore was a passenger in a car that was stopped for a traffic

violation. After police found drugs in the car, Moore (along with the driver and another

passenger) was arrested. Moore moved to suppress the drugs found in the car. The trial

court overruled his motion to suppress, and Moore pleaded guilty to possession of a

controlled substance. A jury determined his punishment and assessed a sentence of

twelve years in prison. The trial court sentenced Moore in accordance with the jury’s

recommendation.

       On appeal, Moore challenges the trial court’s suppression decision and claims

that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to one of the prosecutor’s

alleged statements during closing argument. We affirm.

                                    I. Background

      Mikevin Singletary was a patrol officer with the Granbury Police Department in

2018. Late in the afternoon on August 16, he saw a white Acura that lacked a current

registration, and he was unable to confirm through the Department of Public Safety

database that the car was insured. Officer Singletary turned on his overhead lights to

stop the car.

      The Acura continued driving to the point where Officer Singletary felt he needed

to activate his siren. Even then, the car passed a few places that the officer thought were

safe enough for the car to stop. While he continued following the Acura, Officer

Singletary could see the front-seat passenger making untypical movements inside the

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car. That passenger turned out to be Moore. Combined with the driver’s hesitancy to

stop, Officer Singletary believed that Moore was trying to conceal some type of

contraband.

       After the car stopped, Officer Singletary approached it and introduced himself.

But as soon as he did so, the driver introduced himself and started “rambling on,” which

Officer Singletary characterized as the “strangest . . . contact” that he had ever seen. In

the officer’s opinion, the driver’s behavior indicated extreme nervousness. The driver,

Brandon Guice, was especially interested in explaining that he had a flyer from a car

dealership promising him $1,000. Moore was in the front passenger seat, and a man

named Lee was seated in the back.

      Officer Singletary asked both Guice and Moore about their criminal histories.

Neither mentioned having been recently arrested for possession of a controlled

substance, but a search of their criminal history showed otherwise. Guice had been

arrested eleven times, which included drug arrests in 2010, 2014, and 2017. Moore had

been arrested for possession of a controlled substance in 2013 and 2018. Officer

Singletary knew from past experience that Lee was a drug user. In the officer’s opinion,

a person who conceals his past involvement with drugs is trying to distance himself

from drugs in general and, in turn, trying to distance himself from any drugs in the car.

These factors combined to constitute enough reasonable suspicion to believe that there

were drugs in the Acura. Guice refused Officer Singletary’s request for consent to

search the car.

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          Officer Singletary called Officer Branum, Granbury’s canine officer, who was at

home along with his drug dog. Officer Singletary explained to Officer Branum that he

had stopped a car for traffic violations and that the driver was nervous. Officer Branum,

as it happened, knew Guice “from previous narcotics dealings.” Officer Branum

changed clothes, loaded the dog in his car, and drove to the location of the traffic stop.

Due to heavy traffic, it took him over twenty minutes to arrive at the place where

Officer Singletary had detained the car. Officer Branum did not activate his emergency

lights.

          Officer Branum arrived at the scene, took the dog out of his car, and set her to

work. Prior to that day, Officer Branum had worked with his dog in both training and

real-life situations hundreds of times. The dog began her free-air sniff around the car

and alerted to the presence of drugs in Guice’s car. The three men were arrested for

drug possession.

          Moore was charged with possessing 4 grams or more (but less than 200 grams)

of methamphetamine, enhanced with a prior felony. Before trial, Moore filed a motion

to suppress evidence of the drugs found in Guice’s car. The then-sitting district judge

heard Moore’s motion and denied it. After a new judge took the bench, he held a new

hearing on the matter at Moore’s request. The new judge also denied the motion.

          Moore pleaded guilty without a plea bargain. A jury heard punishment evidence

and assessed a sentence of twelve years in prison. The trial court sentenced Moore

accordingly.

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                                II. Motion to Suppress

       In his lone issue, labeled a “point of error,” Moore argues that the trial court

erred by denying his motion to suppress because Officer Singletary lacked reasonable

suspicion to continue detaining him for a canine sniff.

A. Standard of Review

       We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress evidence. State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

Because the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the witnesses’ credibility and

the weight to be given their testimony, Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007), we defer almost totally to a trial court’s rulings on questions of historical

fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on evaluating credibility and

demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn

on credibility and demeanor, Martinez, 570 S.W.3d at 281.

B. Applicable law

       The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by

government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24. A defendant

seeking to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds bears the initial burden

to produce some evidence that the government conducted a warrantless search or

seizure that he has standing to contest. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–05, 100 S.

Ct. 2556, 2561 (1980); State v. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

Once the defendant does so, the burden shifts to the State to prove either that the

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search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or, if warrantless, was otherwise

reasonable. Martinez, 569 S.W.3d at 623.

       A detention, as opposed to an arrest, may be justified on less than probable cause

if a person is reasonably suspected of criminal activity based on specific, articulable

facts. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968); Johnson v. State, 622 S.W.3d

378, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention

when he reasonably suspects that an individual is violating the law. See Johnson,

622 S.W.3d at 384. Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the

circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with

rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a

particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Id. This is an

objective standard that disregards the detaining officer’s subjective intent and looks

solely to whether the officer has an objective basis for the stop. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State,

537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

C. Analysis

       Moore argues that the State failed to demonstrate that Officer Singletary

possessed reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Moore “long after a citation could

have been issued.” The State replies that the facts at the scene, viewed in their totality,

amounted to ample reasonable suspicion. We agree with the State.

       When Officer Singletary tried to stop the car, Guice did not immediately pull

over. While Guice kept driving, the officer saw that the front-seat passenger (Moore)

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was “making movements inside the car that—that weren’t typical for a passenger inside

of a vehicle to do.” Officer Singletary explained that the driver’s “hesitancy to stop”

combined with the passenger’s movements indicated that “things [were] being hidden

or more well concealed inside the vehicle, like, hey, this is our last chance, like let’s try

to hide this real quick.” In other words, it would be reasonable to conclude that Guice’s

purpose in not immediately pulling over was to enable Moore to hide something. See

Motley v. State, No. 05-01-00721-CR, 2002 WL 1981362, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug.

29, 2002, pet. ref’d, untimely filed) (not designated for publication) (holding that

because car continued driving after patrol car activated lights and because driver made

furtive movements, officer was justified in belief that driver was trying to conceal

contraband inside the car).

       Reasonable suspicion further developed when Officer Singletary began to

question the car’s occupants. First, he testified that Guice displayed “[e]xtreme

nervousness.” See Haas v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 54 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref’d)

(“Increasing or extreme nervousness and conflicting or implausible information can,

along with other factors, raise a reasonable suspicion.”). Although not attributable to

Moore, Guice’s nervousness could have led Singletary to reasonably suspect that some

criminal activity was occurring in the car. Second, Officer Singletary asked them if they

had been in any kind of trouble previously. Guice told him that he had been charged

with prescription fraud. Moore told Officer Singletary that he had an aggravated

robbery charge in 1996 in addition to some other non-serious incidents. When

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Singletary ran their criminal histories, however, he discovered several controlled-

substance arrests. Guice had been arrested eleven times and Moore twice—in 2013 and

2018. In Officer Singletary’s experience, those who try to hide their drug-arrest histories

are “trying to distance themselves from drugs and then, in turn, that means distancing

themselves from drugs maybe in the vehicle.” Officer Singletary could have reasonably

detained Moore for further investigation based on his omissions when asked about his

criminal history. See Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

(“Deception regarding one’s own criminal record has also been recognized as a factor

that can contribute to reasonable suspicion.”).

       Moore also argues that his detention was unlawful because it lasted nearly an

hour. The length of Moore’s detention while Officer Singletary waited for the drug dog

is not per se unreasonable. See Strauss v. State, 121 S.W.3d 486, 492 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d) (holding that a seventy-five-minute detention from the traffic

stop until the arrival of canine unit was not unreasonable); Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831,

840–41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding that a ninety-

minute detention from the time of the stop until the officers searched the vehicle was

not unreasonable). The evidence showed that Officer Singletary “diligently pursued a

means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel [his] suspicions quickly”—

calling for a canine unit as soon as Guice refused consent to search the car. United States

v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985); see Backer v. State, No. 14-18-

00603-CR, 2019 WL 3788722, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 13, 2019,

                                             8
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that detention was not

unreasonably prolonged when officer “requested the [canine] unit as soon as appellant

withdrew her consent to search”). It took Officer Branum about fifteen to twenty

minutes to change clothes and load the dog into his car. He testified that he arrived at

the scene as fast as he reasonably could, though he was hampered by rush-hour traffic.

Under the circumstances, we conclude that neither Officer Singletary nor Officer

Branum unduly prolonged Moore’s detention. See McAnally v. State, No. 2-08-342-CR,

2009 WL 3956749, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 19, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (holding seventy-minute continued detention of suspect

was reasonable when officer had to call more than one canine unit to find someone

who could come to the scene).

       We overrule Moore’s point of error.

                   III. Moore’s Ineffective-Assistance Argument

       In a section of his brief entitled “Other Argument and Authorities,”1 Moore

accuses his trial attorney of ineffective assistance for failing to object to a portion of the

State’s argument, “which introduced the issue of prayer and answered prayer [and]

possibly so inflamed and influenced the jury’s decision that [his] right[s] to due process

and equal protection were violated.”

       1
        This section was not labeled as a separate point of error or issue.

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       We have examined the State’s punishment argument and can find no references

to either “prayer” or “answered prayer.”2 Moore’s brief, moreover, contains no citation

to the record pointing to such an argument. We hold that Moore has inadequately

briefed this argument. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (stating that brief must contain

“appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”). To the extent that Moore’s

reference to ineffective assistance of counsel constitutes a separate point of error, we

overrule it.

                                   IV. Conclusion

       Having overruled both Moore’s suppression arguments and his ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claim, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                                      Elizabeth Kerr
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: September 21, 2023

       The prosecutor referred to Moore’s testimony that he has found God and
       2

acknowledged that this was a “good thing.” But this comment does not seem to be the
focus of Moore’s complaint.

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