Court Opinion

ID: 9740477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:36:19.440016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.457405
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring specially).
That the City of Aberdeen, or any other city in South Dakota, is immune, as it scur-*112ríes to put out the fires, I have no reservation. Accordingly, I concur in that aspect of the majority opinion. But the immunity of this fireman, driving the city’s fire truck responding to a fire alarm, is a totally different issue. Can we in the law affix individual liability on him? As the majority opinion perceives, ordinarily, I should think not. See Shawnee Tp. Fire Dist. No. 1 v. Morgan, 221 Kan. 271, 559 P.2d 1141 (1977). On a hypothetical level, a situation could arise where a drunk fireman operating a fire truck in response to a fire alarm, could kill or maim someone. It appears this fireman was acting within his scope of employment as an employee for the City of Aberdeen when the collision occurred. It further appears that he and the City were involved in governmental functions. It is the traditional governmental/proprietary function test which is presently at issue. It does not appear the fireman herein served a proprietary function.
If firemen are successfully sued for responding to fires, as they exercise their governmental function to stop the spread of fires, I fear that firemen will leave their vocation for safer legal ground. Firemen, after all, are trying to minimize damage and protect the public’s best interests. Therefore, in my opinion, a fireman should only be subject to liability when he acts in reckless disregard for the safety of others which is clearly without the scope of his employment. SDCL 32-31-5 provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others.
Firemen deserve legal latitude when called upon to save life and limb. The undeniable truth is that the public calls upon firemen to ¿xecute a dangerous journey through traffic en route to a perilous mission. We need to recognize that these public servants must of necessity rush to a fire. See SDCL 32-31-4, which provides:
The speed limit set out in §§ 32-25-1 to 32-25-17, inclusive, does not apply to authorized emergency vehicles when responding to emergency calls provided the drivers thereof sound audible signals by siren or horn and two lighted red lights are displayed to the front, or one beacon light visible 360°, or to authorized emergency vehicles operated by peace officers who are measuring the speed of other vehicles by use of the emergency vehicle speedometer. Moreover, the driver of an ambulance who has been certified pursuant to § 34-11-6 and who, due to his training and experience, believes that the operation of audible signals would result in a serious threat to the condition of the patient may operate his emergency vehicle in excess of the speed limit without audible signals while operating outside the city limits of a municipality.
When we call upon firemen to act, we must legally insulate their actions executed in furtherance of their mission. It is wrong, in law, to be unduly critical of an on-the-scene judgment.
Substantively, I now have written.
Procedurally, I point out that appellants never got to “swing at the ball” when they were summarily judgmented out of the lawsuit. This legal point I brought home in Kringen v. Shea, 333 N.W.2d 445, 447 (S.D.1983) (Henderson, J., specially concurring), when I stated:
The trial court did not simply enter an order dismissing the complaint; rather, it treated the Motion to Dismiss as a Summary Judgment Motion.... ... Under.SDCL 15-6-12(b), a trial court has a right to treat a motion to dismiss based upon a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as a motion for summary judgment. .However, this triggers a responsibility of the trial court to grant unto the parties moved against, a reasonable opportunity to present all material which is pertinent to such a motion as called for by SDCL 15-6-56. Appellant was given no such notice. Therefore, the trial court erred in this highly critical procedural matter thereby depriving appellant of his day in *113court. See Olson v. Molko, 86 S.D. 365, 195 N.W.2d 812 (1972), for case in point. Therefore, I join in a reversal in part and would accordingly remand for pretrial discovery procedures so that the issue on appellee Shea’s alleged liability may be factually developed. This would permit the trial court to examine the facts and consider the criteria in making a determination of Shea’s discretionary or ministerial function. Appellant, before called “out,” should have a swing at the ball.
Therefore, I agree with the majority that the trial court’s procedural transformation of a motion to dismiss into a summary judgment was fatally flawed and thus prejudicial error.
I wish to note for the record that I did not participate in the decision of Leir and I am not bound by the precedent therein.