Court Opinion

ID: 9554877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 14:06:52.530756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:14.656226
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael C. Romig,                               :
                              Appellant         :
                                                :    No.     C.D.
                 v.                             :    Submitted: January        ,
                                                :
Mifflin County Tax Claim Bureau                 :

BEFORE:          HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
                 HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                 HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS                                                      FILED: August         ,

                 Michael C. Romig (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order entered by
the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County (trial court) that denied his “petition
to preserve for civil lawsuit for loss of removed property” in favor of the Mifflin
County Tax Claim Bureau (Bureau). As best as we can discern, Appellant argues the
Bureau is liable because Appellant’s personal property was allegedly removed from
his home. We vacate the order below, strike Appellant’s “motion for judgment on
pleadings/dispositive motion” filed in this Court, and remand with instructions to
dismiss Appellant’s petition because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resolve
Appellant’s claim under the Real Estate Tax Sale Law (Tax Sale Law), Act of July
 ,      , P.L.        , as amended,      P.S. §§       .     to .    .
                                      I. BACKGROUND1
                 Appellant is currently incarcerated. While he was incarcerated, the

       1
         Due to the procedural posture, which we discuss below, we glean the undisputed facts
from the original record. But because the original record transmitted to this Court was incomplete,
we occasionally rely on the docket’s description of documents. Unfortunately, the docket
Bureau sold Appellant’s real property, among others. See Trial Ct. Order, / / ;
see generally Tax Sale Law. Appellant filed a motion requesting that the tax sale be
set aside for various reasons, including improper notice. Mot. for Halt of Sale of
Prop., / / .2 The trial court granted the motion. Order, / / .3
               Subsequently, the Bureau filed a petition for confirmation of a judicial
sale of multiple properties, which apparently included Appellant’s property, and the
trial court issued a rule to show cause. Order, / / . Following a show cause
hearing, the trial court again “set aside” Appellant’s property from any judicial sale.
Id.4
               Appellant filed the petition at issue, which alleges that Appellant’s
family notified Appellant that his belongings were removed from the property. Pet.
to Preserve for Civil Lawsuit for Loss of Removed Prop., /                    / , ¶ . Appellant
further claims that he was insured for $            ,     and, therefore, “sues [the Bureau] and
[its] actors for the [amount] of $        ,     .       for loss of property within the property,

references multiple properties, as there are numerous entries and references to legal filings,
counsel, and property owners that are not reflected in the instant original record. See generally
Dkt., No.         -     . The prothonotary may have sufficient reason to combine multiple cases
into a single docket, but it led to a deficient original record. For example, the initiating pleading
is absent from the record. See generally Pa.R.A.P.              & cmt. Finally, we construe pro se
pleadings liberally, and we may state dates per the prisoner mailbox rule. Young v. Est. of Young,
    A. d , (Pa. Cmwlth.              ).
         2
           Notwithstanding the label of his motion, Appellant explicitly requested “the setting aside
of a tax sale” of his property. Mot. for Halt of Sale of Prop. at .
         3
           The order granted Appellant’s “Objections,” which we construe as Appellant’s motion.
         4
           The order appears to identify a buyer of Appellant’s property at the judicial sale. Very
briefly, the Tax Sale Law provides for (a) upset tax sales and (b) judicial sales subject to several
conditions, which include a failure to bid the upset price at a prior upset tax sale. See Sections
and       of the Tax Sale Law, P.S. §§          . ,        . ; In re Tax Sale Pursuant to Real Estate
Tax Sale Law of          , A. d       ,     - (Pa. Cmwlth.          ) (explaining that property must
essentially be up for sale at an “upset sale” before a “judicial sale”). An “upset price” is the price
equivalent to the full amount of outstanding taxes owed on the property. Fieg v. Somerset Cnty.
Tax Claim Bureau,         A. d     ,     (Pa. Cmwlth.        ).

                                                    2
after a Nov. [ ],          Order halting [the] sale . . . .” Id. ¶ & ad damnum cl.5 The
Bureau filed an answer, generally denying the averments. Answer, / / .
               The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, at which Appellant and
Rebecca Ganoe, director of the Bureau, testified. See generally Notes of Testimony
(N.T.) Hr’g, / / , at - . In relevant part, Appellant did not adduce testimony or
otherwise present evidence that personal property was removed from his home. See
generally id.6
               The court denied Appellant’s petition, and Appellant timely appealed.
Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.                      (b) statement of errors
complained of on appeal, which did not raise an issue that the Bureau lacked
authority to initiate a sale of the property. The court filed a Pa.R.A.P.                        (a)
opinion.7
                                           II. ISSUES
               On appeal, Appellant contends that the court erred in denying his “civil
[lawsuit], where there was no valid sale of real estate,” and he “should have been
compensated for lost [chattels] wrongfully removed without notice . . . .”
Appellant’s Br. at . Appellant also maintains that “the loss of chattels” was a direct
result of the Bureau’s improper notice. Id.

       5
          Giving Appellant the benefit of the doubt, see Young,      A. d at , it appears Appellant
raises a claim of negligence against the Bureau because his personal property was removed from
his home.
        6
          We acknowledge that Appellant attempted to present hearsay testimony that personal
property was removed from his home. N.T. Hr’g at . The Bureau objected on the basis of hearsay.
Id. The trial court did not explicitly sustain the objection, but noted that Appellant failed to have
the declarant (Appellant’s father) present at the hearing. Id. at .
        7
          Because no outstanding claims remain, we construe the order at issue as a final order. See
generally Pa.R.A.P.         . Appellant subsequently filed a “motion for judgment on
pleadings/dispositive motion” in this Court, based on the appellate briefs previously filed.
Appellant’s Mot. for J. on Pleadings/Dispositive Mot., / / .

                                                 3
                                     III. DISCUSSION8
               Before summarizing Appellant’s arguments, we must resolve whether
Appellant’s petition was a permitted filing, i.e., a cause of action, under the Tax Sale
Law. In other words, the issue is whether the Tax Sale Law permits Appellant to
raise a claim for damages against the Bureau or whether Appellant was required to
pursue his common law claim by filing and serving a complaint on the Bureau.9
               The Tax Sale Law “is a self-contained statute” for “the collection and
adjudication” of tax claims, including the “sales of real property,” as needed. Section
    of the Tax Sale Law,       P.S. §        .    note; In re Upset Sale, Tax Claims Bureau,
     A. d       ,     (Pa. Super.         ).10 The Tax Sale Law was enacted to provide
“speedier and more efficient procedures for enforcing tax liens and to improve the
quality of titles obtained at a tax sale.” Povlow v. Brown,                A. d        ,       (Pa.
Cmwlth.         ) (footnote omitted).
               The Tax Sale Law does not explicitly provide for an action against the
Bureau. See generally Sections           -       of the Tax Sale Law,       P.S. §§        .     to
.    ; Alpini v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tinicum Twp.),                 A. d        ,       (Pa.
     ) (defining “action” in a particular statute as a civil suit in which the plaintiff
seeks, inter alia, damages). Cf. Wagner v. Anzon, Inc.,             A. d       ,      (Pa. Super.
     ) (stating “the absence of a private cause of action in a statutory scheme is an
indicator that the statute did not contemplate enforcement for individual harms”

       8
           Typically, we would review an order resolving a tax sale for an abuse of discretion or
error of law. Famageltto v. Cnty. of Erie Tax Claim Bureau,        A. d    ,    n. (Pa. Cmwlth.
      ) (en banc). However, that review necessarily presumes the trial court could enter the order
at issue in a tax sale case.
         9
            The Bureau notes that although Appellant could file a civil lawsuit, the trial court
nevertheless considered the instant petition and held an evidentiary hearing. Bureau’s Br. at .
         10
            We may cite to Superior Court cases to the extent we find them persuasive. See Rickell
v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 289 A.3d 1155, 1160 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).

                                                 4
(emphasis added)); cf. also NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. v. PennMont Secs.,                             A. d
    ,        -      (Pa. Super.        ) (NASDAQ) (explaining that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action subject to federal preemption).
                    The Tax Sale Law establishes a multi-stage process that we briefly
summarize. See generally Sections                    to       of the Tax Sale Law,             P.S. §§
        .    to .      . The first stage resolves the existence and validity of a property tax
claim. See id.; Sections             to    of the Tax Sale Law,           P.S. §§        .     to .       .
Very simply, the taxing authority files a tax claim against the delinquent taxpayer,
who may challenge the validity of the claim. Id. Upon a final ruling upholding the
validity of the claim, i.e., the claim is “absolute” in Tax Sale Law parlance, the taxing
authority may then pursue a sale of the taxpayer’s property unless the taxpayer
discharges the claim, i.e., pays off the amount owed. Id. Sections                      to      of the
Tax Sale Law,              P.S. §§     .   to .      .
                    The taxing authority may then sell the taxpayer’s property. Id. Sections
        to       of the Tax Sale Law,             P.S. §§       .      to .       . If the taxpayer’s
property is sold, then the taxpayer may challenge the validity of the sale. See, e.g.,
id. Section            (d) of the Tax Sale Law,               P.S. §          .     (d) (stating that
“objections or exceptions” “may question the regularity or legality” of the tax sale,
subject to one exception not relevant here); Rivera v. Carbon Cnty. Tax Claim
Bureau,             A. d       ,     (Pa. Cmwlth.           ) (explaining that the taxpayer could
challenge the notice requirements for a judicial sale).
                    The Tax Sale Law permits the taxpayer to file objections or exceptions
on various grounds but, as noted above, does not explicitly authorize an action or
claim for damages against the taxing authority for a failure to comply with the Tax
Sale Law. See generally Sections             to          of the Tax Sale Law,        P.S. §§          .

                                                    5
to .      ; Pa.C.S. §        (granting conditional preference to a statutory remedy over
a common law remedy). The Tax Sale Law does not seemingly bar such a claim in
a separate lawsuit.
                 For example, in Hughes v. Chaplin,            A. d         (Pa.        ), the
plaintiff filed a tort action seeking damages for the defendants’ removal of coal from
land allegedly owned by the plaintiff. Hughes,          A. d at       . In relevant part, the
plaintiff challenged whether the municipality complied with the extant requirements
for a tax sale of the plaintiff’s property. Id. at       . Although the Hughes plaintiff
did not sue the municipality directly for damages, that posture occurred in a different
case. See In re Upset Sale of Props. Against Which Delinq.                        Taxes Were
Returned to Tax Claim Unit On or About First Monday of May,                     (Skibo Prop.),
       A. d        (Pa.     ) (Skibo).
                 In Skibo, our Supreme Court resolved an issue involving the plaintiffs
suing the taxing authority for negligence. Id. at         . In pertinent part, the plaintiffs
contended that because the taxing authority failed to provide proper notice, the
plaintiffs’ purchase of the property was set aside. Id. The plaintiffs thus sued the
taxing authority for damages, specifically “for loss of interest on the amounts they
borrowed to buy the property at the sale.” Id. Neither case, however, directly
addressed whether the plaintiffs could raise their tort claims within the scope of an
action under the Tax Sale Law. See generally id.; Hughes,             A. d at       -   .
                 Instantly, the trial court’s order at issue denied Appellant’s petition to
“preserve for civil lawsuit for loss of removed property,” in which Appellant
apparently accused the Bureau of negligence and requested damages of $                      ,   .
See Pet. to Preserve for Civil Lawsuit for Loss of Removed Prop.; see also Young,
       A. d at    (noting courts may liberally construe pro se pleadings). The Tax Sale

                                              6
Law permits the taxpayer to file objections or exceptions to the tax sale itself. See,
e.g., Section       (d) of the Tax Sale Law,             P.S. §     .    (d). However, the Tax
Sale Law does not explicitly provide for an action or claim for negligence, let alone
a remedy upon a finding that the Bureau is liable. See Pa.C.S. §                    ; Sections
to      of the Tax Sale Law,         P.S. §§         .     to .   ; see generally Section         of
the Tax Sale Law,         P.S. §        .   note; Alpini,         A. d at      .
                Further, we note the trial court sustained Appellant’s objections or
exceptions. See Order,          / / ; Order, / / . In other words, Appellant is not
presently aggrieved by any adverse action under the Tax Sale Law as to trigger his
right to file any objections or exceptions, let alone the petition at issue. Appellant’s
claim, as raised in his petition, should have been filed in a complaint. Cf. generally
Hughes,         A. d at      ; Skibo,       A. d at          .
                Because the Tax Sale Law does not authorize Appellant’s petition, the
trial court erred by resolving it in this jurisdictional context.11 Since the trial court
could not entertain Appellant’s petition, an administrative breakdown in court
operations occurred when the court resolved Appellant’s petition. Consequently, the

       11
           We do not hold that the trial court can never entertain Appellant’s apparent negligence
claim. Cf. Wagner,        A. d at     ; NASDAQ,       A. d at    - . Rather, we hold that because
Appellant filed his petition under the Tax Sale Law, which does not expressly provide for
Appellant’s claim, the trial court erred by resolving the petition. The issue of whether Appellant
has a cause of action for an alleged violation of the Tax Sale Law is not before this Court. Cf.
NASDAQ, A. d at            - (resolving whether the plaintiffs had a common law cause of action
for an alleged violation of a federally authorized rule).
        We add that permitting Appellant’s claim to proceed under the Tax Sale Law seemingly
raises numerous procedural issues. For example, if the trial court found in Appellant’s favor, then
we would have to resolve the availability of post-trial relief and whether judgment could even be
entered against the Bureau. See Pa.R.Civ.P.        (noting a judgment in a tax claim case is enforced
against the real property). If Appellant had filed a complaint, then it appears the trial court may
exercise its general jurisdiction over the action. Cf. NASDAQ, A. d at          - .

                                                 7
court’s order resolving Appellant’s petition is void.12
                                      IV. CONCLUSION
               For these reasons, we vacate the order below, strike Appellant’s
“motion for judgment on pleadings/dispositive motion” filed in this Court, and
remand with instructions to dismiss Appellant’s petition.

                                                      LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

       12
          But even if we could address the merits of Appellant’s appeal, he did not establish
entitlement to relief. We agree with the trial court that Appellant failed to establish any personal
property was removed from his home and, even if property was removed, that the Bureau was
responsible for its removal. Trial Ct. Op., / / , at . To the extent Appellant argues that the
Bureau lacked the authority to initiate a sale while he was pursuing collateral relief from his
criminal conviction, he waived the issue by failing to raise it in his Pa.R.A.P.       (b) statement.
See generally City of Phila. v. Lerner,   A. d        ,     (Pa.      ).

                                                 8
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael C. Romig,                          :
                          Appellant        :
                                           :   No.     C.D.
             v.                            :
                                           :
Mifflin County Tax Claim Bureau            :

                                      ORDER
                                 th
             AND NOW, this            day of August,     , we VACATE the July          ,
     order entered by the Mifflin County Court of Common Pleas, STRIKE the
“motion for judgment on pleadings/dispositive motion” filed by Michael C. Romig
(Appellant), and remand with instructions to DISMISS Appellant’s “petition to
preserve for civil lawsuit for loss of removed property.” Jurisdiction relinquished.

                                LORI A. DUMAS, Judge