Court Opinion

ID: 9730791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:24:02.468473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:09.359874
License: Public Domain

N. J. Kaufman, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the well-written opinion of the majority. Although I do acknowledge that the general rule is to afford restrictive covenants strict construction, I do not believe that this rule is immutable.
As the Supreme Court of this state declared almost a century ago:
"While the rule in construing covenants is to construe them most strictly against the covenantor, and most favorably to the covenantee, yet the rule should be carefully observed as nearly as possible by the obvious intention of the parties, which must be gathered from the whole context of the instrument, interpreted according to the reasonable sense of the words.” Redding v Lamb, 81 Mich 318, 328; 45 NW 997 (1980).
Thus, I do not think this case should turn on the question of whether a "Winnebago” is a motor home or a trailer but, rather, upon two issues:
1. Is there a restrictive covenant;
2. Has the covenant been violated?
*124As to the first issue, it is agreed by stipulation that a restrictive covenant does exist. As to the issue of the covenant’s violation, it seems to me that the covenant was adopted for the benefit of all of the property in the subdivision. That the covenant did not embrace every conceivable excluded item is clear; however, the intent of the restriction is clearer to me than any dictionary definition could be. A panel of this Court in Malcolm v Shamie, 95 Mich App 132, 137-138; 290 NW2d 101 (1980), stated:
"It has been the policy of our judiciary to protect property owners who have complied with the restrictions from violations of the covenants by others. Covenants of restriction, especially those pertaining to residential use, preserve not only monetary value, but aesthetic characteristics considered to be essential constituents of a family environment. Consequently, failure to give complete effect to restricted covenants in accordance with their import can work a great injustice to the property owners.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Cases involving restrictive covenants are to be determined on their particular facts. Edgewood Park Ass’n v Pernar, 350 Mich 204; 86 NW2d 269 (1957).
On an examination of the briefs and records of this particular case, I believe that the trial judge’s evaluation of the facts before her should be affirmed. To my view, the intent of the subdivision’s restrictions is clear: to preserve the aesthetic appeal of the property. Dictionary definitions notwithstanding, in common parlance a trailer is often synonymous with a motor home.
"The language employed in stating the restriction is to be taken in its ordinary and generally understood or popular sense, and is not to be subjected to technical *125refinement, nor the words torn from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon.” Seeley v Phi Sigma Delta House Corp, 245 Mich 252, 253; 222 NW 180 (1928).
In fact, it seems to me that only those who have really "kept up” with the trends in "recreational vehicles”, "modular homes”, "mobile homes”, "motor homes”, "campers”, and "vans”, recognize what are, to me, distinctions far more subtle than a general class of large vehicles which could become eyesores were they to be parked outside of numerous subdivision residences.
Viewing the restriction as a whole, with its prohibition against trailers, boats, heavy equipment and temporary structures, I am convinced that the trial court did not err in including defendant’s "Winnebago” within the parameters of the covenant.
As was stated by the Supreme Court:
"The danger to home owners in the building restriction cases is that today’s exception becomes tomorrow’s precedent and the next day’s settled usage. Thus the isolated violation may plant the seed of a general practice which may subsequently lead to a finding of abandonment of the restrictive reciprocal easements. Better the seed were never planted.” Oosterhouse v Brummel, 343 Mich 283, 289; 72 NW2d 6 (1955).
In my view, the issue is not whether the "Winnebago” is a trailer within strict statutory or dictionary definition, but whether defendant’s activity was of the type intended to be prohibited by the restrictive covenant. Believing that the intent of the restriction is sufficiently clear, I would not plant the first seed and would therefore affirm the trial court.