Court Opinion

ID: 9603220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:04:19.26814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:09.857303
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s disposition of Case No. 4963, but I am unable to agree with the reversal in Case No. 5043.
The majority premises its reversal of Case No. 5043 on a finding that there is a possibility — given the instructions to the jury — the jury awarded double damages to the plaintiffs. It reaches this conclusion because the measure of damages for breach of contract and the measure of damages for fraud can, under certain circumstances, be the same. Coupling this statement — with which I have no basic disagreement — with the fact that the jury was not appropriately instructed as to the measure of damages to be specifically utilized in this case, the majority assumes there could have been a double assessment of damages.
First, it is important to note that the defendant made no claim in this appeal that the damages award amounted to a double recovery. This theory for reversal is a product of the majority’s own analysis of the record and the law. The defendant simply argued that there should have been a more specific measure-of-damages instruction, and that the absence thereof led to an excessive verdict.
Second, even if I assume that the majority’s double-recovery theory falls somehow within the defendant’s statement of the issue before us, I am still of the belief that the majority fails to go far enough in its analysis of the theory and its applicability to this case.
Assuming, arguendo, that the damage instructions were confusing and that it was “possible” that there could have been a double-damages award, this court — before reversing for a new trial — must determine whether a double award has likely been made. In doing so, the court must consider all the evidence and the verdict. 25A C.J.S. Damages § 181 at p. 204. In this ease, the majority fails to consider that the only evidence of damages in the record supports a verdict in the range of $126,000.00 — the amount ultimately awarded by the jury. Indeed, the defendant never pointed to anything in the record that would justify a different verdict — he simply stated in his brief that he could not “fathom” the verdict.
I would not consider the defendant’s bald assertions sufficient to rise above that of harmless error. When instructions recognize two different measures of damages when only one is appropriate, and they plainly tend to mislead the jury, and it cannot be determined from the record that the erroneous instructions were harmless, then, and only then, is a new trial in order. See, Hull v. Geary, 71 W.Va. 490, 76 S.E. 960 (1912). It was the defendant’s burden to show prejudicial error. Webber v. Farmer, Wyo., 410 P.2d 807, 811 (1966). See, Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P. He has failed, in my opinion, to sustain this burden. A party seeking reversal due to instructional error must establish that the error was prejudicial — prejudice is never presumed. Booth v. Hackney, Wyo., 516 P.2d 180, 183 (1973). By failing to consider the evidentiary support for the verdict that was rendered, the majority necessarily presumed the presence of prejudice. I can find no such prejudice, presumed or otherwise.
Had I been writing the majority opinion, I would have affirmed the judgment rendered in Case No. 5043.