Court Opinion

ID: 9734577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:38:12.583036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:23.204395
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
dissenting with separate opinion.
I respectfully dissent. In their motion to correct error and on appeal, the Gray-sons argue that Union Federal improperly disposed of the personal property that it acquired during the Sheriffs sale The motion to correct error, however, was filed in response to the trial court's granting of Union Federal's motion to correct order nune pro tune. Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(A):
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the trial court at any time before the trial court clerk issues its Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record.
I believe the Graysons' motion to correct error and subsequent appeal were limited to a claim that a nunc pro tune correction to the order was improper because the requested change is one of substance, not a clerical error. See Anderson v. Horizon Homes, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ("A clerical error is 'a mistake by a clerk, counsel, judge or printer which is not the result of a judicial function and cannot reasonably be attributed to the exercise of judicial consideration or discretion'" (citation omitted)), trans. denied.
Although I tend to agree with the majority that the change requested by Union Federal is substantive in nature and may not be effectuated by an Indiana Trial Rule 60(A) motion, the Graysons have not raised this issue. Harlan Bakeries, Inc. v. Muncy, 835 N.E.2d 1018, 1040 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."). The Graysons' motion to correct error and their brief on appeal focus on whether Union Federal properly disposed of the personal property. In my *1022opinion, to challenge the disposition of the personal property, the Graysons were required to file a motion to set aside default judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) and were not permitted to raise the issue for the first time in their motion to correct error. See GKC Indiana Theatres, Inc. v. Elk Retail Investors, LLC., 764 N.E.2d 647, 654 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) ("The Indiana Supreme Court held that because the issue was raised for the first time in the motion to correct errors, it was waived.").
I reach this conclusion in part because I do not believe that a party should be permitted to ignore litigation pending against it, be the subject of a default judgment, and then almost a year and a half later contest the merits of the disposition of the personal property by filing a motion to correct error following the trial court's correction of what it deemed to be a clerical error in the judgment. See Comer-Marquardt v. A-1 Glassworks, LLC, 806 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (observing that a party's technical default for failing to timely appear means that the party can no longer participate in or defend against this action). I cannot conclude that the trial court's granting of Union Federal's motion to correct order nunc pro tune opened the door to a challenge on the merits of the disposition of the personal property.
For these reasons, I do not agree with the majority that this matter should be remanded "for a trial on the issue of the disposition of the personal property involved." Op. at 1021. I would affirm the denial of the motion to correct error because the Graysons have neither argued nor established that the trial court improperly made the nune pro tune correction to the order.