Court Opinion

ID: 9961979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 12:01:51.307788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:37.563693
License: Public Domain

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                                       State v. Webber

             STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM WEBBER
                           (AC 46150)
                          Bright, C. J., and Clark and Prescott, Js.

                                           Syllabus

         Pursuant to statute (§ 54-255 (c)), ‘‘[a]ny person who . . . (5) has been
            convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of
            any crime between October 1, 1988, and September 30, 1998, which
            requires [sexual offender] registration . . . and (A) served no jail or
            prison time as a result of such conviction or finding of not guilty by
            reason of mental disease or defect, (B) has not been subsequently con-
            victed or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of any
            crime which would require [sexual offender] registration . . . and (C)
            has registered with the Department of Emergency Services and Public
            Protection [as required]; may petition the court to order the Department
            of Emergency Services and Public Protection to restrict the dissemina-
            tion of the registration information to law enforcement’’ and ‘‘not make
            such information available for public access . . . provided the court
            finds that dissemination of the registration information is not required
            for public safety.’’
         The acquittee appealed to this court from the trial court’s denial of his
            petition to restrict the dissemination of his sexual offender registration
            information pursuant to § 54-255 (c) (5). In May, 1984, the acquittee was
            found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of two counts
            of sexual assault in the first degree, and, after a hearing, the court
            determined that he was mentally ill to the extent that his release would
            constitute a danger to himself or others. He was committed to the
            custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health for a maximum period
            of forty years. In July, 1985, the acquittee was placed under the jurisdic-
            tion of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. The board conditionally
            released the acquittee from confinement in July, 2007, after which he
            registered as a sexual offender pursuant to Megan’s Law (§ 54-250 et
            seq.). The board terminated the acquittee’s conditional release in Octo-
            ber, 2012, and, in December, 2019, the board again conditionally released
            the acquittee from confinement. Three years later, the acquittee filed
            the petition at issue, arguing that, with the exception of the date that
            he was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, he met
            all of the other statutory criteria in § 54-255 (c) (5), and distinguishing
            between him and the eligible offenders who fell within the statutory
            time frame would be arbitrary and contrary to the legislature’s intention
            of mitigating the retroactive effects of Megan’s Law and inconsistent
            with the equal protection clause of the United States constitution. The
            trial court denied the petition, concluding that, because the acquittee
            was acquitted outside of the date range set forth in § 54-255 (c) (5), the
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                                        State v. Webber
            court either lacked jurisdiction or did not have the ability to grant the
            relief that he sought. On appeal, the acquittee claimed that the trial
            court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over his petition
            and over his equal protection claim. In response, the state argued, inter
            alia, that, even if this court were to find that the trial court had jurisdic-
            tion over the acquittee’s claims and that the date range criterion of § 54-
            255 (c) (5) lacked any rational basis, the acquittee’s confinement in a
            hospital for psychiatric disabilities constituted jail or prison time served
            as a result of the finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or
            defect, and, accordingly, the court’s denial of the acquittee’s petition
            could be upheld on the alternative ground that he failed to satisfy the
            criterion in § 54-255 (c) (5) (A). Held:
       1. The trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the
            acquittee’s petition and his equal protection claim; the plain language
            of § 54-255 (c) clearly indicates that the trial court has statutory authority
            to grant the petition of any person who satisfies the statutory criteria,
            provided that the court also makes the requisite public safety finding,
            and, accordingly, the statutory criteria are not prerequisites to the court’s
            jurisdiction to consider a petition but, instead, are essential facts that
            must be proven to invoke the court’s statutory authority to order relief
            pursuant to § 54-255 (c) (5).
       2. The acquittee could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
            denied his petition, this court having found that, even if it were to agree
            with him on his equal protection argument, he still would not meet all
            of the requisite statutory criteria under § 54-255 (c) (5):
           a. Contrary to the acquittee’s argument that the terms ‘‘jail’’ and ‘‘prison’’
           as used in § 54-255 (c) are plain and unambiguous and clearly do not
           include an acquittee confined to a hospital, this court concluded that,
           when properly read in context, the phrase ‘‘jail or prison time’’ in § 54-
           255 (c) (5) (A) is most reasonably construed to include confinement in
           a hospital for psychiatric disabilities: the legislature has not defined
           ‘‘prison’’ or ‘‘jail’’ in § 54-255 or § 54-250 but has, in the statute (§ 1-1
           (w)) defining certain words and phrases used in the construction of
           statutes, defined ‘‘state prison’’ and ‘‘jail’’ as a correctional facility admin-
           istered by the Commission of Correction but excluding a hospital for
           psychiatric disabilities, and, although the acquittee’s interpretation was
           not unreasonable when the phrase ‘‘jail or prison time’’ is read in isolation
           from the remaining language in § 54-255 (c) (5) (A), the acquittee’s inter-
           pretation ignored the fact that § 54-255 (c) (5) (A) does not disqualify
           only individuals who have been convicted of certain crimes and have
           served jail or prison time as a result of the conviction but also disqualifies
           individuals who have served jail or prison time as a result of a finding
           of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect; moreover, at the
           time that the legislature amended § 54-255 to add the statutory language
           at issue, a court’s authority to confine a person found not guilty by
           reason of mental disease or defect was limited to confinement in a
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                                         State v. Webber
             hospital for psychiatric disabilities pursuant to statute (§ 17a-582), the
             current revision of the statute retains that limitation, and the legislature
             is presumed to have been aware when drafting § 54-255 (c) (5) (A), and
             when making subsequent amendments without revising that language,
             that it is not legally possible for a person found not guilty by reason of
             mental disease or defect to serve time in a jail or prison, as those terms
             are defined in § 1-1 (w), as a result of such finding; furthermore, given
             the limitation on the confinement of acquittees in § 17a-582, rigidly inter-
             preting ‘‘jail or prison time’’ in the manner advanced by the acquittee
             would mean that anyone found not guilty by reason of mental disease
             or defect of an offense requiring registration under Megan’s Law would
             necessarily satisfy § 54-255 (c) (5) (A), an interpretation belied by the
             fact that, if the legislature had intended for those terms to have the
             narrow meaning advanced by the acquittee, it would have had no reason
             to include the phrase ‘‘as a result of such . . . finding of not guilty by
             reason of mental disease or defect’’ in § 54-255 (c) (5) (A), and, because
             this court must presume that there is a purpose behind every sentence,
             clause, or phrase used in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous,
             ‘‘jail or prison time’’ within § 54-255 (c) (5) (A) must be construed to
             include confinement in a psychiatric hospital pursuant to § 17a-582 (e)
             (1), as this is the only construction of the statutory language that gives
             effect to the text of § 54-255 (c) (5) (A) in its entirety.
             b. This court’s interpretation that the phrase ‘‘jail or prison time’’ in
             § 54-255 (c) (5) includes confinement in a psychiatric hospital is also
             consistent with the relevant legislative history and with the policy that
             the statute was designed to implement: concerns regarding the harm to
             society caused by sex crimes and the relatively high rate of recidivism
             among sex offenders led the legislature to require the registration not
             only of persons convicted of certain sexual offenses or offenses against
             minors but also of persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease
             or defect of such crimes, and, significantly, with one exception, the
             legislature has made no distinction in the registration requirements or the
             penalties for not complying with such requirements between convicted
             persons and those found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect;
             moreover, the legislative history of various public acts amending Megan’s
             Law, together with the plain language of § 54-255 (c), indicate that the
             legislature intended to allow offenders who had committed less serious,
             nonviolent offenses and were required to register, regardless of whether
             they were convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease
             or defect, to petition to restrict the dissemination of their registration
             information pursuant to that statute where the public dissemination of
             the offender’s registration information was not required for public safety,
             and the legislative intent underlying the eligibility criteria in § 54-255 (c)
             (5) is thus most consistent with a broad construction of ‘‘jail or prison
             time’’ to include confinement in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities,
             as to construe that phrase to mean only confinement in a correctional
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                                    State v. Webber
         facility would potentially allow persons who committed the most serious
         and most violent sexual offenses to be removed from the public registry
         because they were confined in a hospital instead of in a correctional
         facility, a result that the legislature clearly did not intend.
         c. The acquittee’s argument that other statutory mechanisms prevent
         the release of acquittees who pose a public safety risk, and that it is
         therefore unnecessary to the public safety purpose of Megan’s Law to
         include those persons within the scope of § 54-255 (c) (5) (A), was
         unavailing: although the acquittee pointed to the fact that the state may
         petition pursuant to statute (§ 17a-593) for the continued commitment
         of acquittees perceived to pose a danger to the public and that those
         ordered released by the board would have already been determined by
         providers to not pose a threat to oneself or others, the acquittee disre-
         garded the fact that an acquittee who is conditionally released from
         confinement, rather than discharged, is by definition a person whose
         final discharge would constitute a danger to himself or others but who
         can be adequately controlled with available supervision and treatment
         on conditional release, and the legislature’s decision to require the regis-
         tration of persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect
         following their release from confinement indicates that the legislature
         was indeed concerned about the public safety risk that those persons
         posed upon their release despite the existence of the statutory mecha-
         nisms to which the acquittee referred; moreover, the acquittee’s argument
         that the requirement that courts must make a public safety finding to
         grant a petition under § 54-255 (c) (5) similarly alleviates the public
         safety concern associated with restricting the public dissemination of
         acquittees’ registration information could also be made as to persons
         who served jail or prison time as a result of a conviction of a crime
         requiring registration under Megan’s Law, and the legislative history
         reflects that the legislature concluded that individuals who had been
         confined, whether in a correctional facility or in a hospital, posed an
         inherently greater risk to public safety upon release, such that courts
         should not have discretion to make their own findings regarding the
         necessity of publicizing such offenders’ registration information, which
         finds support in the legislature’s choice to depart from the language in
         an earlier revision of § 54-255 that more broadly authorized courts to
         release a sexually violent offender from the registration obligation when-
         ever that person had maintained his or her registration for at least ten
         years and the court found that he did not suffer from a mental abnormality
         or personality disorder that made him likely to engage in sexually violent
         offenses; furthermore, although the acquittee attempted to distinguish
         offenders who are acquitted and confined from offenders who are con-
         victed and confined, there is no indication in the legislative history that
         the legislature believed that offenders who were confined in a hospital
         for psychiatric disabilities were inherently less dangerous than those
         who were confined in a correctional facility such that, assuming all other
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                                        State v. Webber
             statutory criteria are satisfied, only the former should be eligible to
             petition to restrict the dissemination of their registration information,
             and, instead, the legislature’s clear reference in § 54-255 (c) (5) (A) to
             conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect
             evidences an intent that the criterion to have served no jail or prison
             time would be effective as to both classes of offenders; additionally, this
             court was not persuaded by the acquittee’s argument that adopting the
             state’s interpretation of the statute would lead to the absurd result of
             conflating punishment with treatment and blurring the lines between
             the Department of Correction and the board, as the Supreme Court
             has recognized that the registration requirement is regulatory and not
             punitive in nature and, thus, prohibiting offenders from petitioning to
             restrict the dissemination of their registration information if they do not
             meet the statutory criteria is not a punishment but instead serves to
             advance the legislature’s nonpunitive goals of protecting the public and
             facilitating future law enforcement efforts.
         3. Because the issue of whether the trial court properly denied the acquittee’s
              petition could be resolved on statutory grounds, this court did not reach
              the merits of the acquittee’s constitutional claim.
                Argued November 6, 2023—officially released April 23, 2024

                                      Procedural History

           Petition to restrict the dissemination of the
         acquittee’s sexual offender registration information,
         brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
         New Haven, where the court, Harmon, J., rendered
         judgment denying the petition, from which the acquittee
         appealed to this court. Affirmed.
           James E. Mortimer, assigned counsel, for the appel-
         lant (acquittee).
            Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
         whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s
         attorney, and Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant
         state’s attorney, and Melissa R. Holmes, assistant state’s
         attorney, for the appellee (state).
                                           Opinion

           BRIGHT, C. J. The acquittee,1 William Webber,
         appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying
           1
             ‘‘ ‘Acquittee’ means any person found not guilty by reason of mental
         disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13 . . . .’’ General Statutes § 17a-
         580 (1).
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                                      State v. Webber

       his petition to restrict the dissemination of his sexual
       offender registration information pursuant to General
       Statutes § 54-255 (c) (5).2 On appeal, the acquittee
       claims that (1) the court erred in concluding that it
       lacked jurisdiction over his petition and (2) the statu-
       tory exclusion of his petition violates the equal protec-
       tion clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
       Although we agree with the acquittee that the court had
       jurisdiction over his petition, we nonetheless conclude
       that the court properly denied his petition because, even
       if we were to agree with him on his equal protection
       argument, he still would not meet all of the requisite
       statutory criteria under § 54-255 (c) (5). Accordingly, we
       affirm the judgment of the trial court on this alternative
       ground.

         The record reveals the following undisputed facts
       and procedural history. On May 23, 1984, the court,
       Norcott, J., found the acquittee not guilty by reason of
       mental disease or defect3 of two counts of sexual assault
         2
           ‘‘Section 54-255 authorizes a trial court to restrict the dissemination of
       registration information pertaining to persons who are convicted or found
       not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of certain sex offenses and
       offenses against minors, upon the granting of the offender’s petition to
       restrict the dissemination of such information.’’ (Internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission,
       298 Conn. 703, 721, 6 A.3d 763 (2010).
         3
           ‘‘Prior to 1981, a criminal defendant who prevailed on an insanity defense
       was deemed to be ‘acquitted on the grounds of mental disease or defect.’
       Public Acts 1981, No. 81-301, § 2, changed this standard to ‘guilty but not
       criminally responsible on the grounds of mental disease or defect.’ This
       standard was changed again in 1983 to its present form, ‘not guilty by reason
       of mental disease or defect,’ by Public Acts 1983, No. 83-486, § 2. . . . This
       change became effective on October 1, 1983 . . . .’’ State v. Putnoki, 200
       Conn. 208, 211 n.2, 510 A.2d 1329 (1986). In the present case, ‘‘[p]rior to the
       receipt of evidence, the court agreed with counsel for the [acquittee] that,
       given the fact that the events in question took place on August 7, 1983, the
       legal standard of insanity to be applied to this case was that standard as
       set forth in . . . General Statutes [Rev. to 1983] § 53a-13 . . . .’’ For the
       sake of clarity and because it does not affect our analysis, we use the
       terminology from the current revision of the statute.
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                                         State v. Webber

         in the first degree pursuant to General Statutes (Rev.
         to 1983) § 53a-70.4 Following a hearing before the court,
         Kinney, J., on August 27, 1984, the court found that
         the acquittee was ‘‘mentally ill to the extent that his
         release would constitute a danger to himself or others’’
         and committed him to the custody of the Commissioner
         of Mental Health (now the Commissioner of Mental
         Health and Addiction Services) for a maximum period
         of forty years pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to
         1983) § 53a-47 (a) and (b).5 In July, 1985, the acquittee
         was placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric
         Security Review Board (board). The board condition-
         ally released the acquittee from confinement on July
             4
              General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-70 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty
         of sexual assault in the first degree when such person compels another
         person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such
         other person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such
         other person or against a third person which reasonably causes such person
         to fear physical injury to such person or a third person.’’
            5
              General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-47 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1)
         When any person charged with an offense is found guilty but not criminally
         responsible on the grounds of mental disease or defect, the court shall order
         such person to be temporarily confined in any of the state hospitals for
         mental illness for a reasonable time, not to exceed ninety days, for an
         examination to determine his mental condition . . . . (3) Within sixty days
         of the confinement pursuant to subdivision (1), the superintendent of such
         hospital and the retained psychiatrist, if any, shall file reports with the court
         setting forth their findings and conclusions as to whether such person is
         mentally ill to the extent that his release would constitute a danger to himself
         or others. . . . (4) Upon receipt of such reports, the court shall promptly
         schedule a hearing. If the court determines that the preponderance of the
         evidence at the hearing establishes that such person is mentally ill to the
         extent that his release would constitute a danger to himself or others, the
         court shall confine such person in a suitable hospital or other treatment facil-
         ity.
            ‘‘(b) Whenever a person is committed for confinement pursuant to subdivi-
         sion (4) of subsection (a), his confinement shall continue until he is no
         longer mentally ill to the extent that his release would constitute a danger
         to himself or others, provided the total period of confinement, except as
         provided in subsection (d), shall not exceed a maximum term fixed by the
         court at the time of confinement, which maximum term shall not exceed
         the maximum sentence which could have been imposed if the person had
         been convicted of the offense. . . .’’
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                                      State v. Webber

       17, 2007, after which the acquittee registered as a sexual
       offender with the Department of Emergency Services
       and Public Protection (department) pursuant to Meg-
       an’s Law, General Statutes § 54-250 et seq.6After learn-
       ing that the acquittee was in possession of pornography,
       the board revoked the acquittee’s conditional release
       in May, 2012. Following a hearing, the board terminated
       the acquittee’s conditional release and returned him to
       confinement on October 1, 2012, on the basis that he
       would be most safely treated in an inpatient hospital
       setting. On December 10, 2019, the board again condi-
       tionally released the acquittee from confinement.
         On August 8, 2022, the acquittee filed a petition with
       the court, Harmon, J., pursuant to § 54-255 (c) (5),
       seeking an order directing the department to restrict
       the dissemination of his registration information for
       law enforcement purposes only, such that it would no
       longer be available for public access. In support of his
       petition, the acquittee argued that, with the exception
       of the date that he was found not guilty by reason
       of mental disease or defect, he meets all of the other
       statutory criteria to petition for the restriction of the
       dissemination of his registration information, including
         6
           In particular, the acquittee registered pursuant to General Statutes § 54-
       252 (a) (2), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who has been
       convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a
       sexually violent offense, and . . . is released into the community on or
       after October 1, 1998, shall, within three days following such release . . .
       register such person’s name, identifying factors and criminal history record,
       documentation of any treatment received by such person for mental abnor-
       mality or personality disorder, and such person’s residence address and
       electronic mail address, instant message address or other similar Internet
       communication identifier, if any, with the Commissioner of Emergency
       Services and Public Protection on such forms and in such locations as said
       commissioner shall direct, and shall maintain such registration for life. . . .’’
          Although § 54-252 has been amended since the acquittee was first required
       to register in 2007; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2007, No. 07-4, § 91;
       Public Acts 2011, No. 11-51, § 134 (a); Public Acts 2015, No. 15-211, § 6;
       those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the
       interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
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         that he (1) has served no jail or prison time as a result
         of the finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease
         or defect, (2) has not subsequently been convicted or
         found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of
         any crime that would require registration under Megan’s
         Law, and (3) has registered with the department as
         required by Megan’s Law. The acquittee also noted that
         ‘‘under the terms of his conditional release, [he] does
         not present a threat to public safety requiring the dis-
         semination of his registration information.’’ The
         acquittee acknowledged that § 54-255 (c) (5) is ‘‘argua-
         bly not directly applicable’’ to him because he was
         acquitted prior to October 1, 1988, and not between
         October 1, 1988, and September 30, 1998, as the statu-
         tory remedy requires. Nonetheless, he maintained that,
         because he meets all of the other statutory criteria,
         distinguishing ‘‘between [him] and the eligible offenders
         [who fall] within the statutory time frame would be
         arbitrary and contrary to the legislature’s intention of
         mitigating the retroactive effects [of Megan’s Law] and
         inconsistent with the equal protection clause . . . of
         the United States constitution.’’
            The court held a hearing on the acquittee’s petition
         on December 1, 2022. The state opposed the petition,
         arguing that the court could not grant the acquittee any
         relief under the current statutory framework. The court
         agreed with the state, concluding that, because the
         acquittee was acquitted outside of the date range set
         forth in § 54-255 (c) (5), the court either lacked jurisdic-
         tion or did not ‘‘have the ability’’ to grant the relief that
         he sought. Accordingly, the court denied the petition.7
         This appeal followed.
                                                 I
            The acquittee first claims that the trial court erred
         in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over his petition
          7
              The court circled ‘‘denied’’ on the order page of the acquittee’s petition.
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                              State v. Webber

       to restrict the dissemination of his registration informa-
       tion and over his claim that the statutory exclusion of
       his petition to restrict the dissemination of his registra-
       tion information violates his right to equal protection.
       According to the acquittee, the court had jurisdiction
       over his petition and his equal protection claim because
       ‘‘§ 54-255 (c) explicitly vests with the court the power
       to restrict the dissemination of registration information
       to law enforcement’’ and ‘‘the fourteenth amendment
       to the United States constitution and article first, § 20,
       of the Connecticut constitution provide courts with the
       authority to strike down laws that violate their respec-
       tive equal protection provisions.’’
          In response, the state argues that the acquittee’s fail-
       ure to satisfy two of the criteria set forth in § 54-255
       (c) (5)—namely, the requirements to have been found
       not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect between
       October 1, 1988, and September 30, 1998, and to have
       served no jail or prison time as a result of such finding—
       deprived the court of jurisdiction to entertain the peti-
       tion. Additionally, the state argues that the court’s inher-
       ent authority to strike down laws that violate constitu-
       tional principles does not confer jurisdiction on the
       court to consider an equal protection claim raised in a
       petition that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider
       in the first place. Therefore, according to the state, the
       court should have dismissed rather than denied the
       petition. We agree with the acquittee that the court had
       jurisdiction to consider his petition.
         ‘‘As a preliminary matter, we note that [i]t is well
       established that, in determining whether a court has
       subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring
       jurisdiction should be indulged. . . . When reviewing
       an issue of subject matter jurisdiction on appeal, [w]e
       have long held that because [a] determination regarding
       a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question
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                                 State v. Webber

          of law, our review is plenary. . . . Subject matter juris-
          diction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate
          the type of controversy presented by the action before
          it. . . . [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits
          of a case over which it is without jurisdiction . . . .
          The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be
          waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party,
          or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceed-
          ings, including on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks
          omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757, 770, 143 A.3d
          578 (2016).
              In the present case, the court concluded, on the basis
          of the date range criterion in § 54-255 (c) (5), that it
          ‘‘lack[ed] jurisdiction to change . . . the information
          being only available to the police department versus
          the general public at this time, and . . . [did not] have
          the ability to grant [the acquittee] the relief that [he
          was] seeking . . . .’’ Despite the court’s statement as
          to jurisdiction, it denied, rather than dismissed, the
          acquittee’s petition.
             We previously have noted ‘‘the ongoing confusion as
          to whether the failure to plead or prove an essential fact
          [for purposes of invoking a statutory remedy] implicates
          the [tribunal’s] subject matter jurisdiction or its statu-
          tory authority. . . . [O]nce it is determined that a tribu-
          nal has authority or competence to decide the class of
          cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject
          matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining
          the action. . . . [T]he question of whether the action
          belongs to the class of cases that the tribunal has author-
          ity to decide is [s]eparate and distinct from . . . the
          question of whether a [tribunal] . . . properly exer-
          cises its statutory authority to act. . . . A challenge
          to the tribunal’s statutory authority raises a claim of
          statutory construction that is not jurisdictional. . . .
          [A] claim that a party has failed to allege or to establish
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       an element of a statutory remedy implicates the tribu-
       nal’s statutory authority and the legal sufficiency of the
       complaint, not the tribunal’s subject matter jurisdic-
       tion.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
       ted.) Bridgeport v. Freedom of Information Commis-
       sion, 222 Conn. App. 17, 39–40, 304 A.3d 481 (2023),
       cert. denied, 348 Conn. 936, 306 A.3d 1072 (2024).

          Pursuant to § 54-255 (c), any person who meets the
       criteria set forth in subdivision (5) ‘‘may petition the
       court to order the [department] to restrict the dissemi-
       nation of the registration information to law enforce-
       ment purposes only and to not make such information
       available for public access.’’ The court then ‘‘may order
       the [department] to restrict the dissemination of the
       registration information . . . provided the court finds
       that dissemination of the registration information is not
       required for public safety.’’ General Statutes § 54-255
       (c). The statute’s plain language clearly indicates that
       the trial court has statutory authority to grant the peti-
       tion of any person who satisfies the statutory criteria,
       provided that the court also makes the requisite public
       safety finding. We conclude that the statutory criteria
       are not prerequisites to the court’s jurisdiction to con-
       sider a petition but instead are essential facts that must
       be proven to invoke the court’s statutory authority to
       order relief pursuant to § 54-255 (c). See Bridgeport v.
       Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 222
       Conn. App. 41 (whether essential fact that goes to merits
       of complaint has been established does not implicate
       tribunal’s jurisdiction); see also New England Retail
       Properties, Inc. v. Maturo, 102 Conn. App. 476, 481–82,
       925 A.2d 1151 (under statute prohibiting commence-
       ment of suit unless and until legal claim is rejected by
       estate, defendant’s claim that estate had not rejected
       plaintiff’s legal claim did not implicate court’s subject
       matter jurisdiction but, rather, its statutory authority),
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          cert. denied, 284 Conn. 912, 931 A.2d 932 (2007). Accord-
          ingly, in the present case, because the court determined
          that the acquittee simply failed to satisfy the statutory
          criteria under § 54-255 (c) (5), the court incorrectly
          stated that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the peti-
          tion.
                                       II
             The acquittee next claims that the statutory exclusion
          of his petition to restrict the dissemination of his regis-
          tration information violates the equal protection clauses
          of the federal and state constitutions. In particular, the
          acquittee claims that the date range criterion set forth
          in § 54-255 (c) (5) violates his right to equal protection
          because there is no rational basis for the statutory dis-
          tinction between offenders who were convicted or
          found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect
          between October 1, 1988, and September 30, 1998, and
          otherwise similarly situated offenders like himself who
          were convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental
          disease or defect prior to October 1, 1988. According
          to the acquittee, ‘‘[b]ut for the date of [his] conduct, he
          would be eligible to petition the court’’ to restrict the
          dissemination of his registration information.
             The state argues that we should not reach the
          acquittee’s equal protection claim because, even if we
          were to agree that the date range criterion lacks any
          rational basis, the court’s denial of the acquittee’s peti-
          tion can be upheld on the alternative ground that he
          does not satisfy the criterion in § 54-255 (c) (5) (A)—
          that is, that he ‘‘served no jail or prison time as a result
          of [the] . . . finding of not guilty by reason of mental
          disease or defect . . . .’’ See Pequonnock Yacht Club,
          Inc. v. Bridgeport, 259 Conn. 592, 599, 790 A.2d 1178
          (2002) (‘‘[w]e . . . may affirm the court’s judgment on
          a dispositive alternate ground for which there is support
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       in the trial court record’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
       ted)).
          We agree with the state that we should address the
       acquittee’s constitutional claim only if we first deter-
       mine that he meets the other statutory requirements
       for the court to grant his petition. We ‘‘do not engage
       in addressing constitutional questions unless their reso-
       lution is unavoidable.’’ State v. McCahill, 261 Conn. 492,
       501, 811 A.2d 667 (2002). Accordingly, ‘‘[i]f a case can
       be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a
       constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
       construction or general law, the [c]ourt will decide only
       the latter.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
       Graham S., 149 Conn. App. 334, 343, 87 A.3d 1182, cert.
       denied, 312 Conn. 912, 93 A.3d 595 (2014). We thus turn
       to the interpretation of the statutory criteria.
          ‘‘The interpretation of a statute, as well as its applica-
       bility to a given set of facts and circumstances, presents
       a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Village Apart-
       ments, LLC v. Ward, 169 Conn. App. 653, 659, 152 A.3d
       76 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 918, 154 A.3d 1008
       (2017). In construing § 54-255, ‘‘our fundamental objec-
       tive is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent
       of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to
       determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the
       statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,
       including the question of whether the language actually
       does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning
       . . . [General Statutes] § 1-2z directs us first to consider
       the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
       statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
       such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
       unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
       results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
       statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is
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          not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpreta-
          tive guidance to the legislative history and circum-
          stances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative
          policy it was designed to implement, and to its relation-
          ship to existing legislation and common law principles
          governing the same general subject matter . . . . The
          test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when
          read in context, is susceptible to more than one reason-
          able interpretation.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
          tion marks omitted.) State v. Drupals, 306 Conn. 149,
          159, 49 A.3d 962 (2012).
             ‘‘[W]e consider the statute as a whole with a view
          toward reconciling its parts in order to obtain a sensible
          and rational overall interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation
          marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802,
          813, 850 A.2d 114 (2004). ‘‘We are . . . guided by the
          principle that the legislature is always presumed to have
          created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . .
          [T]his tenet of statutory construction . . . requires
          [this court] to read statutes together when they relate
          to the same subject matter . . . . Accordingly, [i]n
          determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not
          only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader
          statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our con-
          struction. . . . [T]he General Assembly is always pre-
          sumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect
          that its action or [nonaction] will have upon any one
          of them.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 500 North
          Avenue, LLC v. Planning Commission, 199 Conn. App.
          115, 130–31, 235 A.3d 526, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 959,
          239 A.3d 320 (2020). ‘‘Legislation never is written on a
          clean slate, nor is it ever read in isolation or applied in
          a vacuum. Every new act takes its place as a component
          of an extensive and elaborate system of written laws.
          . . . Construing statutes by reference to others
          advances [the values of harmony and consistency
          within the law]. In fact, courts have been said to be
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       under a duty to construe statutes harmoniously where
       that can reasonably be done. . . . Moreover, statutes
       must be construed, if possible, such that no clause,
       sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignifi-
       cant . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
       v. Agron, 323 Conn. 629, 638, 148 A.3d 1052 (2016).
          In accordance with § 1-2z, we begin our analysis with
       the text of the statute and its relationship to other
       statutes to ascertain whether the statutory language is
       susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.
       Section 54-255 (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any per-
       son who . . . (5) has been convicted or found not
       guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of any
       crime between October 1, 1988, and September 30, 1998,
       which requires registration under sections 54-250 to 54-
       258a, inclusive, and (A) served no jail or prison time
       as a result of such conviction or finding of not guilty
       by reason of mental disease or defect, (B) has not been
       subsequently convicted or found not guilty by reason
       of mental disease or defect of any crime which would
       require registration under sections 54-250 to 54-258a,
       inclusive, and (C) has registered with the [department]
       in accordance with sections 54-250 to 54-258a, inclusive;
       may petition the court to order the [department] to
       restrict the dissemination of the registration informa-
       tion to law enforcement purposes only and to not make
       such information available for public access. . . .’’
       (Emphasis added.)
         It is undisputed that the acquittee satisfies § 54-255
       (c) (5) (B) and (C) because, since his acquittal in 1984,
       he has not been convicted or found not guilty by reason
       of mental disease or defect of another crime requiring
       registration under Megan’s Law and he has registered
       with the department. The parties disagree, however, as
       to whether the acquittee’s confinement in a hospital for
       psychiatric disabilities constitutes ‘‘jail or prison time
       [served] as a result of [the] . . . finding of not guilty
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                                          State v. Webber

          by reason of mental disease or defect’’ within the mean-
          ing of § 54-255 (c) (5) (A) such that he does not satisfy
          that criterion.

             On appeal, the acquittee argues that the terms ‘‘jail’’
          and ‘‘prison’’ as used in § 54-255 (c) ‘‘are plain and
          unambiguous and clearly do not include an ‘acquittee’
          confined to a ‘hospital.’ ’’ In support of this argument,
          the acquittee cites judicial opinions and other statutes
          that distinguish between correctional facilities and hos-
          pitals for psychiatric disabilities.8 The state argues, how-
          ever, that ‘‘in order not to frustrate evident legislative
          intent, and to arrive at a rational and sensible result,
          the phrase ‘jail or prison time’ must be construed gener-
          ally to mean a period of lawfully ordered confinement
          or captivity,’’ including in a hospital for psychiatric disa-
          bilities. We agree with the state that, when properly
          read in context, the phrase ‘‘jail or prison time’’ in § 54-
          255 (c) (5) (A) is most reasonably construed to include
            8
              Specifically, the acquittee draws our attention to four distinctions that
          our courts and legislature have made. First, our Supreme Court, in conclud-
          ing that the phrase ‘‘other facility’’ as used in the patients’ bill of rights,
          General Statutes §§ 17a-540 through 17a-550, was not broad enough to
          include correctional facilities, recognized that ‘‘[n]either hospitals nor clinics
          are ordinarily considered to be synonymous with prisons or correctional
          institutions.’’ Wiseman v. Armstrong, supra, 269 Conn. 813. Second, our
          Supreme Court has distinguished between the treatment focused purpose
          of the commitment of an acquittee and the punitive purpose of a criminal
          sentence. See Connelly v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 394, 404,
          780 A.2d 903 (2001) (‘‘commitment, unlike a criminal sentence, is not a
          sanction or penalty but, rather, a vehicle pursuant to which the court can
          ensure that [an acquittee] . . . will receive treatment for his or her mental
          disease or defect’’). Third, the definition of ‘‘hospital for psychiatric disabili-
          ties’’ under General Statutes § 17a-580 (6) explicitly excludes ‘‘any correc-
          tional institution of the state . . . .’’ Last, in other parts of the General
          Statutes, the legislature has established separate definitions for an inmate
          or prisoner and an acquittee, the former being defined as ‘‘any person in
          the custody of the Commissioner of Correction or confined in any institution
          or facility of the Department of Correction . . .’’; General Statutes § 18-84;
          and the latter as ‘‘any person found not guilty by reason of mental disease
          or defect pursuant to section 53a-13 . . . .’’ General Statutes § 17a-580 (1).
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       confinement in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities
       pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-582 (e) (1).9
           The legislature has not defined either ‘‘prison’’ or
       ‘‘jail’’ in § 54-255 or in § 54-250, which sets forth defini-
       tions for other words and phrases used in Megan’s Law.
       In addition, we have found no appellate case law inter-
       preting these terms as they are used in § 54-255.
       Although neither party has addressed it, the legislature
       has defined ‘‘state prison’’ and ‘‘jail’’ in General Statutes
       § 1-1 (w) as ‘‘a correctional facility administered by the
       Commissioner of Correction.’’ This definition plainly
       excludes a hospital for psychiatric disabilities, which
       General Statutes § 17a-580 (6) defines as ‘‘any public
       or private hospital, retreat, institution, house or place
       in which a person with psychiatric disabilities or drug-
       dependent person is received or detained as a patient,
       but does not include any correctional institution of
       the state . . . .’’10 (Emphasis added.)
          Given the definition in § 1-1 (w), and the other author-
       ities cited by the acquittee; see footnote 8 of this opin-
       ion; the acquittee’s interpretation is not unreasonable
       when the phrase ‘‘jail or prison time’’ is read in isolation
       from the remaining language in § 54-255 (c) (5) (A). See
       Palosz v. Greenwich, 184 Conn. App. 201, 213, 194 A.3d
       885 (noting that ‘‘the legislature is presumed to be aware
          9
            General Statutes § 17a-582 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) When any
       person charged with an offense is found not guilty by reason of mental
       disease or defect pursuant to section 53a-13 . . . (d) [t]he court shall com-
       mence a hearing . . . . (e) At the hearing, the court shall make a finding
       as to the mental condition of the acquittee and, considering that its primary
       concerns are the protection of society and the safety and well-being of the
       acquittee, make one of the following orders:
          ‘‘(1) If the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be confined
       or conditionally released, the court shall order the acquittee committed to
       the jurisdiction of the board and . . . confined in a hospital for psychiatric
       disabilities . . . .’’
          10
             This statutory definition was the same when the legislature amended
       § 54-255 to add the statutory language at issue. See General Statutes (Rev.
       to 1999) § 17a-580 (6) (defining ‘‘[h]ospital for mental illness’’).
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                                       State v. Webber

          of the common law when it enacts statutes’’ and that
          ‘‘[w]e presume that laws are enacted in view of existing
          statutes’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert.
          denied, 330 Conn. 930, 194 A.3d 778 (2018). Neverthe-
          less, the acquittee’s interpretation ignores the fact that
          § 54-255 (c) (5) (A) does not disqualify only individuals
          who have been convicted of certain crimes and have
          served jail or prison time as a result of the conviction.
          It also disqualifies individuals who have served jail or
          prison time ‘‘as a result of such . . . finding of not
          guilty by reason of mental disease or defect . . . .’’
          General Statutes § 54-255 (c) (5) (A). The question, then,
          is whether the acquittee’s interpretation of the statute
          renders this clause meaningless if persons found not
          guilty by reason of mental disease or defect cannot, as
          a matter of law, be confined in a prison or jail as defined
          in § 1-1 (w) and as argued by the acquittee. ‘‘It is a basic
          tenet of statutory construction that the legislature did
          not intend to enact meaningless provisions. . . .
          Accordingly, care must be taken to effectuate all provi-
          sions of the statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
          ted.) State v. Gibbs, 254 Conn. 578, 602, 758 A.2d 327
          (2000); see also Commissioner of Environmental Pro-
          tection v. Mellon, 286 Conn. 687, 692 n.7, 945 A.2d 464
          (2008) (‘‘[s]ection 1-2z does not require the courts to
          ignore the fact that the application of a statutory defini-
          tion would render redundant certain language in the
          statute under review’’).
            To answer this question, it is necessary to review the
          statutory scheme that provides for the confinement of
          persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease
          or defect. At the time that the legislature amended § 54-
          255 to add the statutory language at issue,11 a court’s
            11
               Section 54-255 was revised to add the statutory language at issue in
          1999; see Public Acts 1999, No. 99-183, § 6; and has retained that language
          following several amendments. See Public Acts 2001, No. 01-211, § 2; Public
          Acts 2002, No. 02-89, § 87; Public Acts 2005, No. 05-146, § 6; Public Acts
          2011, No. 11-51, § 134; Public Acts 2019, No. 19-189, § 41.
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       authority to confine a person found not guilty by reason
       of mental disease or defect was limited to confinement
       in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities. Specifically,
       General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 17a-582 (e) (1) pro-
       vides in relevant part: ‘‘If the court finds that the
       acquittee is a person who should be confined or condi-
       tionally released, the court shall order the acquittee
       committed to the jurisdiction of the board and either
       confined in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities or
       placed with the Commissioner of Mental Retardation
       [now the Commissioner of Developmental Services],
       for custody, care and treatment . . . .’’ The current
       revision of the statute retains this limitation. See Gen-
       eral Statutes § 17a-582 (e) (1). The legislature is pre-
       sumed to have been aware when drafting § 54-255 (c)
       (5) (A), and when making subsequent amendments
       without revising that language, that it is not legally
       possible for a person found not guilty by reason of
       mental disease or defect to serve time in a jail or prison,
       as those terms are defined in § 1-1 (w), as a result of
       such finding. See 500 North Avenue, LLC v. Planning
       Commission, supra, 199 Conn. App. 130–31 (‘‘[t]he Gen-
       eral Assembly is always presumed to know all the
       existing statutes and the effect that its action or [nonac-
       tion] will have upon any one of them’’ (internal quota-
       tion marks omitted)).
           Given the limitation in § 17a-582, rigidly interpreting
       ‘‘jail or prison time’’ in the manner advanced by the
       acquittee would mean that anyone found not guilty by
       reason of mental disease or defect of an offense requir-
       ing registration under Megan’s Law would necessarily
       satisfy § 54-255 (c) (5) (A). Thus, if the legislature had
       intended for those terms to have the narrow meaning
       advanced by the acquittee, it would have had no reason
       to include the phrase ‘‘as a result of such . . . finding
       of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect’’
       in § 54-255 (c) (5) (A). Consequently, the acquittee’s
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                                          State v. Webber

          interpretation of the statute renders that phrase mean-
          ingless. Because ‘‘we presume that there is a purpose
          behind every sentence, clause, or phrase used in an act
          and that no part of a statute is superfluous’’; Megos v.
          Ranta, 179 Conn. App. 546, 552, 180 A.3d 645, cert.
          denied, 328 Conn. 917, 180 A.3d 961 (2018); we conclude
          that ‘‘jail or prison time’’ within § 54-255 (c) (5) (A) must
          be construed to include confinement in a psychiatric
          hospital pursuant to § 17a-582 (e) (1). This is the only
          construction of the statutory language that gives effect
          to the text of § 54-255 (c) (5) (A) in its entirety.12
             In an effort to avoid this conclusion, the acquittee
          argues that there are two scenarios in which an
          acquittee could be required to serve time specifically in
          a jail or prison that would give meaning to the statutory
          language. First, he argues that ‘‘an individual may be
          found [not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect]
          of one offense requiring registration but guilty on oth-
          ers, receiving a sentence that provides for a term of
          incarceration.’’ Second, the acquittee asserts that a per-
          son may be confined in a hospital for psychiatric disabil-
          ities as a result of being found not guilty by reason of
          mental disease or defect and, while so confined, commit
          an offense for which he is convicted and transferred
          to a correctional facility. The problem with both of
          these scenarios is that § 54-255 (c) (5) (A) requires that
          a person must have served no jail or prison time ‘‘as a
          result of’’ being found not guilty by reason of mental
          disease or defect. In the acquittee’s two hypothetical
            12
               For the same reason, we also reject the acquittee’s argument that, if
          the legislature had intended for the phrase ‘‘jail or prison time’’ to include
          confinement of an acquittee in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities, ‘‘it would
          have made mention of ‘acquittees committed to a hospital for psychiatric
          disabilit[ies]’ or used analogous language.’’ We reiterate that the legislature’s
          express inclusion of persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease
          or defect in that provision demonstrates that the legislature did not intend
          for the phrase ‘‘jail or prison time’’ to be so narrowly construed such that
          it has no meaning as to those persons.
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       scenarios, the jail or prison time is not the result of
       the not guilty finding. They thus fall outside of the
       circumstances that the statute is intended to address.
       For this reason, the acquittee’s argument is unavailing.
         Our interpretation also is consistent with the relevant
       legislative history and with the policy that the statute
       was designed to implement.13 Although the legislative
       history does not directly address whether § 54-255 (c)
       (5) (A) was intended to encompass confinement in a
       hospital for psychiatric disabilities, it is well established
       that, ‘‘[i]n determining the true meaning of a statute
       when there is genuine uncertainty as to how it should
       apply, identifying the problem in society to which the
          13
             Although we conclude that the plain text of the statute, when properly
       read in context, strongly supports the state’s interpretation of the statutory
       language, we also recognize that the acquittee’s interpretation is not entirely
       implausible in light of the definition in § 1-1 (w). See Commissioner of
       Environmental Protection v. Mellon, supra, 286 Conn. 693 n.7 (‘‘It is of
       course true that, when a statutory definition applies to a statutory term,
       the courts must apply that definition. The question in the present case,
       however, is whether the statutory definition applies in the first instance.’’
       (Emphasis omitted.)). The statutory language is therefore ambiguous in the
       sense that it is unclear from the text of the statute, and its relationship to
       other statutes, whether the legislature intended for the statutory definition
       in § 1-1 (w) to apply to § 54-255. Indeed, the legislature’s decision to include
       the phrase ‘‘as a result of such . . . finding of not guilty by reason of mental
       disease or defect’’ in § 54-255 (c) (5) (A), for which a person cannot be
       sentenced to jail or prison, ‘‘raises doubt’’ as to whether the legislature
       intended for the definition in § 1-1 (w) to apply. Commissioner of Environ-
       mental Protection v. Mellon, supra, 692.
          Accordingly, to the extent that any ambiguity remains following our analy-
       sis of the plain text and its relationship to other statutes, we may consider
       extratextual sources in determining the intended meaning of ‘‘jail or prison
       time’’ in § 54-255. Id., 692–93; see also Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Interna-
       tional, LLC, 331 Conn. 53, 118–19, 202 A.3d 262 (Although ‘‘the plaintiffs’
       interpretation of the . . . language [in a federal statute] [was] plainly the
       more reasonable one . . . [the court] recognize[d] that the defendants’
       interpretation [was] not implausible. Therefore . . . [the court] also
       review[ed] various extrinsic sources of congressional intent to resolve any
       ambiguities,’’ which further supported court’s interpretation of statutory
       language.), cert. denied sub nom. Remington Arms Co., LLC, v. Soto,
       U.S.      , 140 S. Ct. 513, 205 L. Ed. 2d 317 (2019).
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                                 State v. Webber

          legislature addressed itself by examining the legislative
          history of the statute under litigation is helpful.’’ (Inter-
          nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Victor O., 320
          Conn. 239, 256, 128 A.3d 940 (2016). Our Supreme Court
          previously has set forth the circumstances that moti-
          vated the enactment of Megan’s Law. ‘‘On July 29, 1994,
          Megan Kanka, a seven year old child, was abducted,
          raped, and murdered near her home. The man who
          confessed to Megan’s murder lived in a house across
          the street from the Kanka family and had twice been
          convicted of sex offenses involving young girls. Megan,
          her parents, local police, and the members of the com-
          munity were unaware of the accused murderer’s his-
          tory; nor did they know that he shared his house with
          two other men who had been convicted of sex offenses.
          . . . Statutes such as [§ 54-250 et seq.] are called Meg-
          an’s Law, after Megan Kanka, [whose] sexual assault
          and murder . . . sparked enactment of sex offender
          registration and notification statutes in [the state of
          New Jersey] and several others. . . . Connecticut’s sex
          offender registration and notification statutes were
          enacted [i]n response to concerns regarding the harm
          to society caused by sex crimes and the relatively high
          rate of recidivism among sex offenders . . . .’’ (Cita-
          tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
          v. Misiorski, 250 Conn. 280, 290–92, 738 A.2d 595 (1999);
          see also 41 H.R. Proc., Pt. 11, 1998 Sess., p. 3718,
          remarks of Representative Michael Lawlor (discussing
          crimes against Megan Kanka that gave rise to Megan’s
          Law). These concerns led the legislature to require the
          registration not only of persons convicted of certain
          sexual offenses or offenses against minors but also of
          persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease
          or defect of such crimes. See General Statutes §§ 54-251
          through 54-254 (requiring registration of ‘‘[a]ny person
          who has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of
          mental disease or defect’’ of nonviolent sexual offense,
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       criminal offense against minor, sexually violent offense,
       sexual offense committed in another jurisdiction, or
       felony committed for sexual purpose). Significantly,
       with one exception, the legislature has made no distinc-
       tion in the registration requirements or the penalties
       for not complying with them between convicted per-
       sons and those found not guilty by reason of mental
       disease or defect.14
          Similarly, the legislative history of No. 99-183 of the
       1999 Public Acts (P.A. 99-183), and the plain language
       of § 54-255 (c), indicate that the legislature intended to
       allow offenders who were required to register, regard-
       less of whether they were convicted or found not guilty
       by reason of mental disease or defect, to petition pursu-
       ant to that statute only in limited circumstances where
       the public dissemination of the offender’s registration
       information was not required for public safety. See Gen-
       eral Statutes § 54-255 (c) (‘‘[t]he court may order the
       [department] to restrict the dissemination of the regis-
       tration information to law enforcement purposes only
       and to not make such information available for public
       access, provided the court finds that dissemination of
       the registration information is not required for public
       safety’’ (emphasis added)); 42 H.R. Proc., Pt. 11, 1999
       Sess., p. 3883, remarks of Representative Michael
       Lawlor (§ 54-255 ‘‘gives the limited authority to a judge
       to withdraw the information from the Internet and from
       the public aspect of the registration . . . if the court
       makes a finding that the public safety is not in any
         14
            The only exception is in General Statutes § 54-251 (a), which provides
       in relevant part that ‘‘any person who has one or more prior convictions of
       [a criminal offense against a minor or a nonviolent sexual offense] or who
       is convicted of a violation of subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section
       53a-70 shall maintain such registration for life,’’ instead of for only ten
       years. Notably, however, the legislature has not distinguished between those
       convicted and those found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect
       of a sexually violent offense, subjecting both to a lifetime registration require-
       ment. See General Statutes § 54-252 (a).
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          way in danger’’ (emphasis added)). In particular, the
          legislature appears to have intended that only certain
          offenders who had committed less serious, nonviolent
          offenses would have the opportunity to petition the
          court to restrict the dissemination of their registration
          information. During the legislative debate in the House
          of Representatives on P.A. 99-183, Representative
          Lawlor stated that whether an offender was incarcer-
          ated as a result of his or her conviction—the relevant
          inquiry under § 54-255 (c) (5) (A)—generally is an ‘‘indi-
          cation of how serious the crime was.’’15 42 H.R. Proc.,
          supra, p. 3916. Additionally, in response to a concern
          raised about a particular individual who was required
          to register as a sex offender for committing sexual
          assault in the fourth degree, which is considered a ‘‘non-
          violent sexual offense’’ under Megan’s Law; see General
          Statutes § 54-250 (5); Representative Lawlor stated,
          ‘‘that’s exactly the situation which is envisioned by the
          expanded discretion being provided to judges in the
          bill.’’ 42 H.R. Proc., supra, pp. 3915–16.
             The legislative intent underlying the eligibility criteria
          in § 54-255 (c) (5) is thus most consistent with a broad
             15
                Representative Lawlor stated in relevant part: ‘‘For persons who have
          been convicted of crimes and fall under Megan’s Law, in other words convic-
          tions dating back to 1988, assuming that was their one and only conviction
          and assuming they have never been subsequent[ly convicted], they were
          never incarcerated in connection with the original conviction and assuming
          they meet the other criteria outlined in the bill for future offenders, this
          gives the limited authority to a judge to withdraw the information from the
          Internet and from the public aspect of the registration, as long as they come
          forward and register first.
                                                 ***
             ‘‘[I]f in fact that was the first and only conviction for a crime and if in
          fact a person was not incarcerated as a consequence of the conviction—
          which is usually a[n] . . . indication of how serious the crime was—and
          assuming the judge makes a finding that this is in the best interest of all
          involved and would not in any way affect public safety, then under those
          circumstances—even for the people who have already been required to
          register—the judge would have the discretion to undo that public aspect
          of the registration.’’ (Emphasis added.) 42 H.R. Proc., supra, pp. 3883–3916.
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       construction of ‘‘jail or prison time’’ in § 54-255 to
       include confinement in a hospital for psychiatric disabil-
       ities. To construe that phrase to mean only confinement
       in a correctional facility would potentially allow per-
       sons who committed the most serious and most violent
       sexual offenses, such as sexual assault in the first
       degree, which is considered a ‘‘sexually violent offense’’
       under Megan’s Law; see General Statutes § 54-250 (11);
       to be removed from the public registry because they
       were confined in a hospital instead of in a correctional
       facility. This would be true, even when, as in this case,
       the acquittee’s period of confinement lasted for
       decades. Given that the legislature clearly was con-
       cerned with maintaining the public registration of per-
       sons who had committed more serious offenses, this
       cannot be the result that the legislature intended. ‘‘We
       must avoid a construction that fails to attain a rational
       and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose
       the legislature sought to achieve.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of
       Information Commission, 298 Conn. 703, 732, 6 A.3d
       763 (2010).16
         To the extent that the acquittee argues that other
       statutory mechanisms prevent the release of acquittees
       who pose a public safety risk, and that it is therefore
       unnecessary to the public safety purpose of Megan’s
       Law to include those persons within the scope of § 54-
       255 (c) (5) (A), this does not change our conclusion.
          16
             We acknowledge that the legislative history of P.A. 99-183 refers only
       to persons ‘‘convicted’’ or ‘‘incarcerated.’’ See 42 H.R. Proc., supra, pp.
       3882–83 (describing ‘‘persons who have been convicted of crimes and fall
       under Megan’s Law’’ as eligible to petition under § 54-255 if ‘‘that was their
       one and only conviction . . . [and] they were never incarcerated in connec-
       tion with the original conviction’’ and noting that lifetime registration require-
       ment applies to ‘‘persons convicted of the most serious, most predatory
       types of sexual misconduct’’). Nevertheless, the statute, as adopted, also
       expressly covers individuals found not guilty by reason of mental disease
       or defect. Thus, the legislative history must be read with this language
       in mind.
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          According to the acquittee, the state may petition ‘‘pur-
          suant to General Statutes § 17a-593 for the continued
          commitment of acquittees perceived to pose a danger
          to the public. . . . [Additionally], those ordered
          released by the board would have already been deter-
          mined by providers to not pose a threat to oneself or
          others. . . . Presumably, the legislature was familiar
          with . . . § 17a-593 (g).’’17 (Citations omitted.) We are
          not persuaded by the acquittee’s argument for two rea-
          sons.
             First, the acquittee disregards the fact that an
          acquittee who is conditionally released from confine-
          ment, rather than discharged, is a person whose ‘‘final
          discharge would constitute a danger to himself or oth-
          ers but who can be adequately controlled with available
          supervision and treatment on conditional release
          . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 17a-580
          (9). It is therefore untrue that all acquittees released
          from confinement have been determined to pose no
          risk to themselves or others. Second, the legislature’s
          decision to require the registration of persons found
          not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect follow-
          ing their release from confinement indicates that the
          legislature was indeed concerned about the public
          safety risk that those persons posed upon their release
          despite the existence of the statutory mechanisms to
          which the acquittee refers.18
             17
                Section 17a-593 (g) allows a court to discharge an acquittee from the
          board’s custody if the court finds that the acquittee’s discharge would not
          ‘‘constitute a danger to the acquittee or others.’’ See General Statutes § 17a-
          580 (11) (defining ‘‘person who should be discharged’’).
             18
                The legislative history of No. 95-175 of the 1995 Public Acts, which
          amended Megan’s Law to add persons found not guilty by reason of mental
          disease or defect to the class of persons required to register as sex offenders,
          reveals that this amendment was motivated by concerns that arose regarding
          such persons during the enactment of No. 95-142 of the 1995 Public Acts
          (P.A. 95-142). See 38 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1995 Sess., p. 3322, remarks of
          Representative Michael Lawlor (‘‘in the sex offender notification bill which
          was enacted in this House the other day, last week, the question arose
          regarding persons who had been found not guilty by reason of . . . mental
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          The acquittee also argues that the requirement that
       courts must make a public safety finding to grant a
       petition under § 54-255 (c) (5)—that is, that ‘‘dissemina-
       tion of the registration information is not required for
       public safety’’—similarly alleviates the public safety
       concern associated with restricting the public dissemi-
       nation of acquittees’ registration information. That
       same argument, however, could be made as to persons
       who served jail or prison time as a result of a conviction
       of a crime requiring registration under Megan’s Law—
       persons whom the acquittee argues are clearly excluded
       by the plain meaning of § 54-255 (c) (5) (A). The legisla-
       tive history reflects that the legislature concluded that
       individuals who had been confined, whether in a correc-
       tional facility or in a hospital, posed an inherently
       greater risk to public safety upon release, such that
       courts should not have discretion to make their own
       findings regarding the necessity of publicizing such
       offenders’ registration information. This proposition
       disease or defect of any of the enumerated charges in that bill and whether
       or not those persons would be required to register for the time period which
       had been outlined in that bill’’). The legislative history of P.A. 95-142 reveals
       the following concerns: ‘‘[A] lot more needs to be done in this area because
       [sex offenders], for the most part, can’t be treated properly. They can’t be
       cured. We have had testimony from the Department of Mental Health that
       that is the case. We also have had information provided to us that there is
       a major defect in this bill, which we would hope to close. We are not going
       to try to do that today . . . but there are circumstances which we will try
       to close later, for which sexual offenders can’t be released to the community.
       And those instances are in cases where a person is found not guilty by
       reason of insanity and is under supervision by the [board].’’ 38 H.R. Proc.,
       Pt. 8, 1995 Sess., pp. 2696–97, remarks of Representative Dominic Mazzoc-
       coli. We recognize that the skepticism expressed in the legislative history
       in 1995 regarding sex offender treatment has been largely debunked. See
       McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2002)
       (‘‘[t]herapists and correctional officers widely agree that clinical rehabilita-
       tive programs can enable sex offenders to manage their impulses and in
       this way reduce recidivism’’); Anthony A. v. Commissioner of Correction,
       339 Conn. 290, 324, 260 A.3d 1199 (2021) (same). Nevertheless, we are not
       at liberty to disregard the legislature’s stated purpose for adopting the law
       that it did.
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                                         State v. Webber

          finds support in the legislature’s choice to depart from
          the prior language of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999)
          § 54-255, which more broadly authorized courts to
          release a sexually violent offender from the registration
          obligation whenever that person had maintained his or
          her registration for at least ten years and the court
          found ‘‘that he [or she] [did] not suffer from a mental
          abnormality or personality disorder that [made] him [or
          her] likely to engage in sexually violent offenses.’’19
             Finally, the acquittee attempts to distinguish offend-
          ers who are acquitted and confined from offenders who
          are convicted and confined, arguing that ‘‘the mere fact
          that there was an order of commitment, following [a
          finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or
          defect] does not mean that the legislature perceived
          those [who] have been committed to a term of hospital-
          ization and treatment [to be] as ‘dangerous’ as those
          [who] were legally culpable and ordered to serve a term
          of incarceration, as opposed to treated in a therapeutic
          setting.’’ There also is no indication in the legislative
          history, however, that the legislature believed that
          offenders who were confined in a hospital for psychiat-
          ric disabilities were inherently less dangerous than
          those who were confined in a correctional facility such
             19
                General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 54-255 provides in relevant part: ‘‘A
          person required to register under section 54-252 shall maintain his registra-
          tion for not less than ten years from the date of his release into the commu-
          nity, after which he may apply to the court in which he was convicted or
          found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect for release from the
          obligation to register. The court shall grant such application and shall notify
          the Department of Public Safety that the person is no longer subject to
          registration under sections 54-102g and 54-250 to 54-259, inclusive, provided
          the person satisfies the court by clear and convincing evidence that he does
          not suffer from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes
          him likely to engage in sexually violent offenses. The court shall refer the
          application of such person to a board of experts on the behavior and treat-
          ment of sexual offenders, which shall examine the person and make an
          assessment for the court regarding the person’s potential for further violent
          sexual behavior. . . .’’
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                                     State v. Webber

       that, assuming all other statutory criteria are satisfied,
       only the former should be eligible to petition to restrict
       the dissemination of their registration information.20
       Instead, the legislature’s clear reference in § 54-255 (c)
       (5) (A) to ‘‘conviction or finding of not guilty by reason
       of mental disease or defect’’ evidences an intent that
       the ‘‘served no jail or prison time’’ criterion would be
       effective as to both classes of offenders. (Emphasis
       added.) For the same reason, we also are not persuaded
       by the acquittee’s argument that adopting the state’s
       interpretation of the statute will lead to the absurd
       result of ‘‘[conflating] punishment with treatment . . .
       [and] blur[ring] the lines between the Department of
       Correction and the [board], each formed and operated
       under distinct statutory schemes to accomplish very
       different purposes.’’21 Indeed, our Supreme Court has
       recognized that the registration requirement ‘‘is regula-
       tory and not punitive in nature.’’ State v. Kelly, 256
       Conn. 23, 94, 770 A.2d 908 (2001); see also State v.
       Waterman, 264 Conn. 484, 496–97, 825 A.2d 63 (2003).
       Thus, prohibiting offenders from petitioning to restrict
       the dissemination of their registration information if
       they do not meet the statutory criteria is not a punish-
       ment but instead serves to advance the legislature’s
       ‘‘nonpunitive goals of protecting the public and facilitat-
       ing future law enforcement efforts.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) State v. Kelly, supra, 92.
         20
            Indeed, our Supreme Court has noted that ‘‘the focus of the inquiry with
       respect to [the confinement of] [an] acquittee is upon the protection of the
       community, the same consideration which is of primary concern in relation
       to the imprisonment of persons convicted of crimes.’’ (Emphasis added.)
       State v. Reed, 192 Conn. 520, 529, 473 A.2d 775 (1984); see also General
       Statutes § 17a-582 (e) (court’s ‘‘primary concerns’’ in ordering confinement,
       conditional release, or discharge of acquittee are ‘‘the protection of society
       and the safety and well-being of the acquittee’’ (emphasis added)).
         21
            Of course, if the legislature shares the acquittee’s concerns and wishes
       to amend the statute to clarify the meaning of the phrase ‘‘jail or prison
       time’’ within § 54-255 (c) (5) (A) to make it plain that the phrase includes
       only a term of imprisonment imposed as the result of a conviction, it may
       do so in accordance with ‘‘its role as the policy-making branch of our
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                                     State v. Webber

             Applying our construction of the statutory language
          to the facts of this case, we conclude that the acquittee’s
          confinement in a hospital for psychiatric disabilities as
          a result of him being found not guilty by reason of
          mental disease or defect of a crime requiring registra-
          tion under Megan’s Law constitutes ‘‘jail or prison time’’
          within the meaning of § 54-255 (c) (5) (A). The acquittee
          therefore does not meet the statutory criteria to petition
          to restrict the dissemination of his registration informa-
          tion. Because we can resolve the issue of whether the
          court properly denied the acquittee’s petition on this
          statutory ground, we do not reach the merits of the
          acquittee’s constitutional claim. See State v. Graham
          S., supra, 149 Conn. App. 343. Accordingly, we affirm,
          although on a different basis, the court’s decision to
          deny the acquittee’s petition.
               The judgment is affirmed.
               In this opinion the other judges concurred.

          government.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Clark v. Waterford,
          Cohanzie Fire Dept., 346 Conn. 711, 736, 295 A.3d 889 (2023).