Court Opinion

ID: 9391225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 16:07:05.622213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.416364
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 MARIO MORANCY                             :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :    No. 1221 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 16, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0002842-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:               FILED: MAY 1, 2023

      Mario Morancy appeals pro se from the order entered in the Berks

County Court of Common Pleas on December 9, 2019, dismissing his petition

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act. After careful review, we affirm.

      Morancy was charged with criminal homicide, first-degree murder, third-

degree murder, four counts of aggravated assault, attempted homicide,

burglary, criminal trespass, and possessing instruments of crime. These

charges arose from an incident on May 7, 2017 in which Morancy discharged

a shotgun multiple times at two brothers. One brother died as a result of his

injuries, and the other brother sustained serious bodily injury.
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       On December 9, 2019, Morancy entered an open nolo contendere plea

to third-degree murder and attempted homicide.1 All other charges were

dismissed. Morancy was sentenced the same day to an aggregate term of

thirty to sixty years’ incarceration. Morancy filed a timely post-sentence

motion seeking to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion without

a hearing.

       On January 16, 2020, trial counsel filed a timely notice of appeal along

with a motion to withdraw as counsel. The trial court granted trial counsel

leave to withdraw and appointed new appellate counsel. Appellate counsel

subsequently filed an Anders2 brief and a petition to withdraw as counsel with

this Court. In the Anders brief, counsel raised a potential issue regarding the

voluntariness of Morancy’s nolo contendere plea. This Court concluded the trial

court did not err in finding Morancy was not entitled to withdraw his plea

____________________________________________

1 Morancy and the Commonwealth had initially reached an agreement whereby
Morancy would enter an open plea, with further agreement to enter the plea
as guilty but mentally ill. See N.T., 12/9/19, at 3. Morancy did not dispute
that he fired multiple shots at the two victims, killing one, and seriously
injuring another. See id. at 7, 11. However, Morancy indicated he could not
recall the specific facts of the offenses. See id. at 9. Accordingly, the
Commonwealth stated it was willing to accept a nolo contendere plea, instead
of a guilty plea, if Morancy acknowledged the Commonwealth would be able
to prove the necessary facts at trial. See id. at 13. Morancy acknowledged
this on the record, and the written colloquy was updated to reflect the change
from a guilty plea to a nolo contendere plea. See id. at 14-15. The court then
made a determination on the record that Morancy “met his burden that at the
time of the offense he was guilty but mentally ill”. Id. at 17.

2   Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

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because the record showed that Morancy entered his plea knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. See Commonwealth v. Morancy, 240 A.3d

932, 129 MDA 2020 (Pa. Super., filed September 15, 2020) (unpublished

memorandum). Accordingly, we agreed the appeal was frivolous and affirmed

Morancy’s judgment of sentence, and granted appellate counsel leave to

withdraw.

        On December 3, 2020, Morancy filed a pro se PCRA petition, claiming

his plea was unlawfully induced due to his mental health issues, his sentence

was illegal, and his plea counsel was ineffective. PCRA counsel was appointed,

but did not file an amended petition. Instead, counsel filed a Finley3 no-merit

letter, along with a petition to withdraw as counsel. The PCRA court

subsequently issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a

hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. After receiving an extension of time,

Morancy filed a response to the Rule 907 notice, in which he changed his

ineffectiveness claims to layered ineffectiveness claims of all prior counsel;

PCRA counsel, appellate counsel, and plea counsel. The PCRA court reviewed

and ultimately dismissed the PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed.

        On appeal, Morancy raises a layered claim of ineffective assistance of

PCRA counsel. Specifically, he argues PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing

____________________________________________

3   See Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

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to properly litigate and layer the following ineffectiveness claims against prior

counsel:

      a. Was direct appeal counsel ineffective by failing to claim trial
      counsel's ineffectiveness in neglecting to advise [Morancy] to
      exercise his rights in attempt to withdraw his guilty but mentally
      ill plea [agreement] after the trial court refused to accept the plea,
      due to lack of memory; moreover, counsel advised [Morancy] to
      plead no contest?

      b. Was direct appeal counsel ineffective by failing to allege trial
      counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to argue an insanity defense
      when the trial court refused to accept [Morancy’s] guilty but
      mentally ill plea [agreement] (to murder of third degree and
      attempted murder in the first degree), due to lack of memory of
      the facts of the crimes committed?

      c. Was direct appeal counsel ineffective by failing to challenge trial
      counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to object to the sentencing, on
      both: third degree murder and attempted murder in the first
      degree, where [the] Commonwealth and [the] trial court failed to
      show intentional, knowingly, and/or malice?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

      Our “standard of review for an order denying post-conviction relief is

limited to whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and

whether that decision is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not

be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”

Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 591 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted).

      Generally, “[t]he PCRA court may dismiss a petition without a hearing

when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine issues concerning any

material fact, the defendant is not entitled to post conviction collateral relief,

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and no legitimate purpose would be served by any further proceedings.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1273 (Pa. 2016) (citation and

internal quotation mark omitted). When the PCRA court denies a petition

without an evidentiary hearing, we “examine each issue raised in the PCRA

petition in light of the record certified before it in order to determine if the

PCRA court erred in its determination that there were no genuine issues of

material fact in controversy and in denying relief without conducting an

evidentiary hearing.” Commonwealth v. Khalifah, 852 A.2d 1238, 1240

(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

       Morancy’s claims challenge the effectiveness of counsel. “A criminal

defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea process as well as

during trial.” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365, 369 (Pa. Super.

2006) (citation omitted). However, “[a]llegations of ineffectiveness in

connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if

the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing

plea.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(citation omitted).4 Also, “[w]here the defendant enters his plea on the advice

of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends upon whether counsel’s

____________________________________________

4For purposes of review, a plea of nolo contendere is treated the same as a
guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 791 A.2d 1227, 1230 (Pa. Super.
2002).

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advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal

cases.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

      We presume counsel is effective, and a PCRA petitioner bears the burden

to prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195

(Pa. 2012). The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is the same under

both the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kimball,

724 A.2d 326, 330-332 (Pa. 1999). A petitioner must demonstrate: (1) his

underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct

pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate

his interests; and (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

See Commonwealth v. Solano, 129 A.3d 1156, 1162-63 (Pa. 2015). A

failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness requires rejection of

the claim. See id. at 1163.

      When an appellant claims PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge prior counsel's effectiveness, the appellant must present a layered

claim of ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014,

1022-23 (Pa. 2003).

            Where the defendant asserts a layered ineffectiveness claim
      he must properly argue each prong of the three-prong
      ineffectiveness test for each separate attorney.

            Layered claims of ineffectiveness are not wholly distinct
      from the underlying claims, because proof of the underlying claim

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      is an essential element of the derivative ineffectiveness claim. In
      determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry
      is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was
      ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel. If
      that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be
      deemed ineffective for failing to raise the underlying issue.

Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1190 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted and formatting altered). In any event, it is well settled that “counsel

cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.”

Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (citation

omitted).

      Unfortunately, Morancy’s claims are underdeveloped. While he does

present subsections for each prong of the ineffectiveness test under each

individual claim, he does not address each prong with respect to all three

counsel included in his layered claim. Instead, within each claim, he switches

aimlessly between trial counsel and PCRA counsel. See e.g. Appellant’s Brief,

at 9-14 (analyzing the arguable merit prong for the first claim in regards to

trial counsel only), compare Appellant’s Brief, at 14-17 (analyzing the

reasonable basis and prejudice prongs for the first claim in regards to PCRA

counsel only). We could therefore deny relief on this basis alone.

      In any event, Morancy’s claims would nevertheless be without merit.

Morancy’s primary claim on appeal is that trial counsel was ineffective by

failing to advise Morancy to withdraw his guilty plea when the trial court

rejected his plea of guilty but mentally ill. See Appellant’s Brief, at 9, 12.

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Morancy claims trial counsel was further ineffective by advising Morancy to

tender a plea of nolo contendere instead. See id.

      However, Morancy has not established that his plea of guilty but

mentally ill was rejected by the trial court. Both the sentencing transcript and

an order of the court entered on the date of sentencing indicate that the court

made a determination on the record that Morancy met his burden to prove he

was guilty but mentally ill. See N.T., 12/9/19, at 17; see also Order, 12/9/19.

Nevertheless, even if we gave Morancy the benefit of the doubt, and found

the record was ambiguous as to whether the court accepted or rejected a

finding of guilty but mentally ill, Morancy has failed to establish that he

suffered any prejudice from such a rejection.

      The only distinction between the convicted defendant and the
      convicted defendant determined to have been mentally ill at the
      time of the commission of the offense is that, in the case of the
      latter, the judge, before imposing sentence, must take testimony
      and make a finding as to whether the person at the time of
      sentencing is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment.
      … Thus, the only effect of a verdict of guilty but mentally ill is to
      trigger an inquiry at the time of sentencing to determine the
      defendant’s mental status at the time of the sentencing phase.

Commonwealth v. Sohmer, 546 A.2d 601, 606-07 (Pa. 1988).

      The additional finding of being mentally ill at the time of the offense has

no impact on the adjudicative process. Rather, it simply triggers an inquiry at

the time of sentencing to determine whether the person at the time of

sentencing is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment at that time.

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The duration of the sentence, however, is not affected by a determination of

guilty but mentally ill.

      [A] guilty but mentally ill defendant may have any sentence
      imposed on him which may lawfully be imposed on any defendant
      convicted of the same offense, and is entitled to no reduction in
      the term as a result of the finding of mental illness. Likewise, a
      defendant found guilty but mentally ill cannot evade a mandatory
      minimum sentence. The only distinction between guilty but
      mentally ill and guilty at sentencing is that the judge is required
      to hear testimony and make a finding on the issue of whether the
      defendant at the time of sentencing is severely mentally disabled
      and in need of treatment. Mental health treatment is then
      provided in accordance with available resources.

Miskovitch v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 77 A.3d 66, 71-

72 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

      Since the guilty but mentally ill plea would affect only whether Morancy

received treatment after sentencing, Morancy has not identified any basis that

would have entitled him to withdraw his plea even if the trial court had

rejected his guilty but mentally ill plea. Further, Morancy has not alleged or

argued that he was still mentally ill at the time of sentencing. Nor has he

alleged or argued that the sentencing court failed to determine whether he

was mentally ill at the time of sentencing. Finally, he has failed to allege or

argue that he was in need of treatment at the time of sentencing. As a result,

he has not demonstrated any prejudice, even if we assume the trial court

rejected his guilty but mentally ill plea. He therefore has not established either

the arguable merit or the prejudice prong of his ineffectiveness claim.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 05/01/2023

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