Court Opinion

ID: 9352093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 21:03:27.122737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:52.822400
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/4/23 P. v. Conrady CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B322516

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                  (Merced County
                                                             Super. Ct.
CHANISH CONRADY,                                             No. 18CR-06159)

         Defendant and Appellant.

______________________________

THE PEOPLE,
                                                             B322531
         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

STEVE REA PEREZ, JR.,

         Defendant and Appellant.
      APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Merced
County, Carol K. Ash, Judge. Convictions affirmed, sentence
vacated, and remanded with directions as to Steve Rea Perez, Jr.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part; remanded with directions
as to Chanish Conrady.
      Matthew J. Watts, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Chanish Conrady.
      Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Steve Rea Perez, Jr.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant
Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Christina Hitomi
Simpson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                       _________________

      Four-year-old Kyis Conrady (Kyis) died while in the care of
his mother, Chanish Conrady (Chanish), and Chanish’s
boyfriend, Steve Rea Perez, Jr. The jury found Perez guilty of
assault on a child causing death (Pen. Code, § 273ab, subd. (a);1
count 1) and felony child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 4). The
same jury found Chanish guilty of three counts of felony child
abuse for having care or custody of Kyis and willfully permitting
Kyis to be injured (§ 273a, subd. (a); counts 2-4).
      On appeal, Perez contends the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting Kyis’s statement that Perez had hit him
and an autopsy photograph of Kyis. Perez also argues the trial
court erred in providing erroneous and incomplete jury

1       Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

                                 2
instructions for felony child abuse and improperly instructing on
the lesser included offense of assault on a child causing death. In
addition, Perez asserts the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to declare a mistrial after the jury deadlocked and by
subsequently discharging a juror without determining whether
there was good cause to dismiss the juror. Further, both Perez
and Chanish contend there was not substantial evidence to
support their convictions. Chanish also challenges her sentence,
arguing the trial court violated section 654 by failing to stay two
of her three felony child abuse convictions because they arose
from a single course of conduct.
       In addition, in his supplemental brief Perez contends, the
People concede, and we agree, that because the trial court
selected the upper term on count 4, he is entitled to resentencing
pursuant to the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b),
made by Senate Bill No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3) (Senate
Bill 567), which apply to all cases not yet final as of the
legislation’s January 1, 2022 effective date.
       We affirm Perez’s convictions. We reverse Chanish’s felony
child abuse conviction on count 4 and otherwise affirm. We
remand for resentencing as to Perez and Chanish consistent with
the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b).

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Prosecution Case
      In 2013 17-year-old Chanish became pregnant after dating
19-year-old Kyle Conrady (Kyle). The couple moved in together,
and Chanish gave birth to Kyis in May 2014. Chanish and Kyle
married in 2016 but separated a year later.

                                 3
      After the separation, Kyle dated Naomi Lartigue and
moved to Sacramento with Lartigue and her daughter Lydia in
early 2018. Chanish dated Perez and moved with him to the city
of Dos Palos in mid-2018. Chanish and Kyle had an informal
custody agreement under which Chanish had custody of Kyis on
weekdays and Kyle had custody on weekends.

      1.     The September 2018 events (count 4)
      On Saturday, September 8, 2018, Kyle and four-year-old
Kyis attended Lydia’s birthday party, which was held by a river.
Kyle watched over Kyis during the entire time they were at the
party. After they came home, Kyle helped Kyis undress for a
bath because Kyis’s clothes were wet. When Kyle started pulling
down Kyis’s pants, Kyis said “‘[o]w.’” Kyle noticed “a large bruise
on [Kyis’s] groin area.” Kyle testified he asked Kyis “what had
happened,” and Kyis replied, “‘Steve had punched me in the
night.’” Kyle observed Kyis became nervous and did not want
Kyle to leave his side. Kyle went to the kitchen and told Lartigue
to take a look at Kyis. Lartigue heard Kyis crying and went into
the bathroom. She saw a “blue and kind of purple-ish” bruise on
Kyis’s groin area.2 Lartigue testified Kyis “was actually kind of
scared and nervous to tell” Kyle and her that Perez “had went in
his room at night and had punched him in his groin.”
      Kyle called Chanish and asked why Kyis had a bruise on
his groin area. Chanish became upset and responded she did not
know what Kyle was talking about. She asked Kyle to bring Kyis

2     The prosecutor displayed to the jury a photograph of Kyis’s
groin injury (exhibit 101). The photograph shows a large blue
and purple bruise to the groin area.

                                 4
back to her home.3 Kyle refused, and Chanish threatened to call
the police if Kyle did not bring Kyis back. Kyle told Chanish “to
go ahead and call the police, but [he] wasn’t going to bring [Kyis]
back.” The next day officers from the Sacramento Police
Department came to Kyle’s home to perform a welfare check of
Kyis. They instructed Kyle to bring Kyis to the Dos Palos Police
Department on Monday, September 10.
       At the Dos Palos police station, Dos Palos Police Officers
Emeterio Cuevas and Battles and child protective services (CPS)
social worker Antonio Ruezga interviewed Kyle and Kyis. Kyle
said Kyis had an injury to his groin area, and he showed a
photograph of the injury to the officers and Ruezga. Officer
Battles then asked Kyis what had happened. Kyle testified he
was present for Kyis’s interview because Kyis “wasn’t
comfortable doing the interview by himself.” Kyle told Kyis to
tell Officer Battles what Kyis had told Kyle two days earlier.
Kyis responded that “‘Steve hit me.’” However, Kyis did not give
any details or answer Officer Battles’s follow-up questions about
where, when, and how it happened. Officer Battles asked Kyle
whether Perez had hit him in the past, and Kyle responded no.
When asked whether he was afraid of Perez, Kyle said he was
not. During the interview, Ruezga asked Kyis about school, and
Kyis responded that Perez had hit him. Ruezga testified he
found it odd because he did not ask Kyis if he got hurt. After the
interview, a five-day emergency protective order was issued

3     During custody exchanges, Kyle and Chanish would
typically discuss any injuries Kyle had from riding his scooter or
bike or playing on the playground. During the custody exchange
on Friday, September 7, 2018, Chanish did not inform Kyle about
any injury to Kyis.

                                 5
against Chanish and Perez, and Kyis returned with Kyle to
Sacramento.
      Ruezga and the officers interviewed Chanish, Perez, Perez’s
son and daughter, and Perez’s ex-girlfriend, Christian Quiroz. At
the conclusion of the investigation, Ruezga and the officers found
the abuse allegation was inconclusive, and they decided not to
detain Kyis.
      After the emergency protective order expired, Kyle and
Chanish formalized their custody arrangement. They agreed
Kyis would reside with Chanish on weekdays to attend preschool
and with Kyle on weekends. The parents further agreed Kyis
would not be alone with either Lartigue or Perez.

       2.    The October 2018 events (count 3)
       On Friday, October 12, 2018 Perez dropped off Kyis at his
preschool. Perez informed Kyis’s teacher, Melissa Harrelson,
that a bug had bitten Kyis, causing a bump on the left side of
Kyis’s face. Harrelson did not see a bump on Kyis’s face, but she
told Perez she would “keep an eye on it.”
       Later that evening Kyle picked up Kyis from Chanish for
the weekend and noticed a minor scratch and swelling near
Kyis’s left eye. Lartigue, who went with Kyle to pick up Kyis,
testified she noticed a bump close to one of Kyis’s eyes. Chanish
told Kyle during the pickup that Kyis had been hit with a toy fire
truck at school.4 Kyis similarly told Kyle later that a child at his
school had thrown a truck at him. That weekend, Kyle took Kyis
to San Jose to visit his parents. Lartigue testified that during
the weekend the bump near Kyis’s eye started to swell. However,

4     Harrelson testified the preschool had toy trucks but
nothing of the size that could cause an injury.

                                 6
Kyle put ice on the injury, and the swelling went down by the
time he returned Kyis to Chanish at the end of the weekend.
       Kyle testified that on Sunday, October 14, on the drive back
to Chanish’s home in Dos Palos, Kyis threw a tantrum in his
booster seat and “just refused to go back to his mom.” Kyis
banged his head and tried to get out of his seat. According to
Kyle, Kyis had been having tantrums throughout October, and
this incident “was a little bit greater than the ones prior.”5 Kyle
believed Kyis had tantrums because of the constant changes in
Kyis’s life, including multiple moves and changes in the people in
his life, including Perez and Lartigue. Chanish told Kyle she
believed Kyis might have autism or Asperger’s syndrome.6
       Harrelson testified that when Kyis returned to preschool on
Monday, October 15, Kyis “might have [had] a little bit of
bruising” and discoloration on the left side of his face, but
otherwise he “looked normal.” Chanish told Harrelson that Kyis
said a student had thrown a toy at him. Kyis similarly told
Harrelson a child had thrown a truck at him inside the
classroom. But about an hour later Kyis told Harrelson a

5     Harrelson testified that when Kyis started preschool in
August 2018, he was “excited but nervous” and “happy to come to
school.” By October 2018, however, Kyis became “more nervous”
and had “anxiety attacks” that involved uncontrollable crying “to
the point where he would almost vomit.” In addition, “[i]f a child
got too close to him he would say that they touched him in some
way [even though] . . . no other children would touch him.”
6     Chanish told Harrelson a therapist had evaluated Kyis for
autism or Asperger’s syndrome, but a documented diagnosis was
never provided to Harrelson. Harrelson did not see any signs
indicating Kyis had autism.

                                7
different story—that a child of the opposite gender had hit him
with a toy outside the classroom.
       Kyis did not attend school on October 16 and 17. Chanish
told Harrelson she had taken Kyis to the hospital because Kyis’s
“eye had swelled up to the point where he was having trouble
with his vision.” On October 17 Officer Cuevas and Ruezga went
to the hospital to investigate abuse allegations. Officer Cuevas
observed the left side of Kyis’s face was swollen and “smooshy,”
and “one of his eyes was swollen.”7 Chanish stated in Kyis’s
presence that a student had thrown a toy truck at Kyis’s head
and caused his injuries. Officer Cuevas asked Kyis what had
happened to his face, and Kyis similarly answered that he was
playing at school and a “‘kid had a [plastic] truck’” and “‘he
throwed it at me.’” Chanish also reported the bruises on Kyis’s
shins were caused by Kyis falling off his bike. Ruezga observed
Kyis appeared comfortable with Chanish and did not want to
leave her side. When asked, Kyis stated he felt safe at home.
Ruezga found the abuse allegation inconclusive and did not
detain Kyis.
       On October 18 Chanish brought Kyis back to school, and
Harrelson observed Kyis had a swollen eye and some bruising on
the left side of his face. Harrelson testified Kyle “was very timid,
very shy,” and “very attached” to her. That day Chanish and
Perez met with the school program director, Joanne Birdsall.
Chanish said a child had thrown a toy at Kyis in the classroom,

7     The prosecutor showed the jury photographs of Kyis’s facial
injuries (exhibit 106) and leg bruises taken at the hospital on
October 17, 2018. The prosecutor also displayed two photographs
of Kyis with facial injuries taken by Officer Cuevas at Chanish
and Perez’s home sometime between October 18 and 22.

                                 8
but according to Birdsall, Chanish’s explanation then “changed to
a child out on the playground.” Birdsall testified Chanish and
Perez told her Kyle had been “hit pretty hard” by another
student. Birdsall commented that if the injury was as bad as
they were describing, Kyis would have cried or told a staff
member. Perez responded that Kyis had a high threshold for
pain.
       On the afternoon of October 18, Harrelson overheard Kyis
tell a teacher’s aide, Alejandra Perez (Alejandra), “that he was at
his dad’s house, he was riding his bike, he broke his bike, and
because of his broken bike, his dad had hit him.” Kyis added that
his dad told him to say one of his friends caused his injury, and
not his dad. About 30 minutes later, Kyis told Harrelson one of
his friends had hit him. When Harrelson or Alejandra asked
Kyis to get the toy that had injured him, Kyis went to the
classroom science area, looked around, and brought back a
lightweight, plastic cylinder disk that was two-to-three inches in
diameter (exhibit 103).8 As a mandated reporter, Harrelson
reported Kyis’s allegation of Kyle’s abuse to a CPS social worker.
As a result, Officer Cuevas issued a five-day emergency
protective order prohibiting Kyle from contact with Kyis. Kyle
denied he ever hit Kyis or told Kyis to blame a friend for an
injury to Kyis.
       On October 22 Kyis was again admitted to the hospital for
injuries. Officer Cuevas went to the hospital the next day to
investigate suspected child abuse. Officer Cuevas took
photographs of Kyis’s facial injuries and noted the swelling on
the left side of Kyis’s face “didn’t go down.” The photographs

8     The prosecutor showed the jury a photograph of the toy.

                                 9
show significant swelling on both eyes.9 Officer Cuevas testified
Kyis’s injuries had gotten worse since he last saw Kyis on
October 17. Chanish reported Kyis “woke up with two bruised
eyes” and complained of a headache; she gave him Benadryl and
brought him to the hospital. Officer Cuevas responded that the
stories weren’t “adding up” and he believed “there was more than
that to it.” Chanish then said Kyis “did go to his father’s house
over the weekend, that he was riding his bike, and because he fell
to the ground, the dad got upset, and he hit him, [and] that she
didn’t really know how or with what.” Officer Cuevas and
Ruezga arranged for a multi-disciplinary interview center
(MDIC) interview of Kyis.10
      At 1:06 in the afternoon of October 24 Saul Rodriguez, a
CPS support staff member, arrived at the hospital to transport
Kyis and Chanish to Merced for a 2:30 p.m. MDIC interview.
When Kyis learned he was leaving the hospital, he cried and
refused to leave his hospital bed. Rodriguez calmed Kyis down,
and Kyis agreed to the car ride. According to Rodriguez,
“Chanish didn’t provide any comfort to Kyis or talk to him or try
to help him out.”
      They went to Rodriguez’s car, and Chanish attempted to
buckle Kyis’s seatbelt as Rodriguez continued to talk to him.
Kyis started “screaming and crying that he didn’t want to go in
the car.” When Rodriguez tried to help Chanish get Kyis in the

9     The prosecutor showed the jury the three photographs
Officer Cuevas took at the hospital on October 23.
10    Officer Cuevas testified a MDIC interview of a child is
performed by a social worker or professional in a neutral
environment with two-way mirrors or video feeds where others
can watch the interview.

                               10
car seat, he saw Chanish place part of her left hand into Kyis’s
mouth. Rodriguez asked her twice why she was doing that, but
she did not respond. Rodriguez told her to stop. Kyis broke free;
he ran out of the car crying, kicking, and screaming; and then he
tripped on the curb and fell. Chanish told Rodriguez “she
couldn’t believe that it was okay for [Kyis] to bite her or hit her,
but it wasn’t okay for her to do the same to him.” Chanish went
to help Kyis, but he ran away from her. Chanish started
screaming profanities and accused Kyis “of acting up so he could
stay in the hospital and not go home.” After five minutes,
Chanish grabbed Kyis by his shirt collar and pulled him for a few
minutes.
       Chanish and Rodriguez tried to put Kyis in the car seat a
second time, but they were not successful because Kyis was still
“crying, screaming and refusing to go in the car.” Chanish called
a relative to bring her and Kyis home. After the call, Chanish
threw her phone on the ground and screamed profanities. Kyis
calmed down, but Chanish continued screaming and using
profanities for 30 to 45 minutes. The MDIC interview was
rescheduled for October 30, 2018.
       On Saturday, October 27, after the emergency protective
order expired, Kyle, Lartigue, and Lydia went to Dos Palos and
took Kyis to the movies. According to Lartigue, Kyis looked
worse than when they had last seen him two weeks earlier, with
injuries to both eyes, which appeared sunken in, with
discoloration to his jaw and shins. Chanish told Kyle that Kyis’s
injuries were caused by a student hitting Kyis with a fire truck
and Kyis falling off a bike. Lartigue did not believe Chanish’s
explanations, noting Chanish did not look her in the eye as they
talked. Chanish also failed to explain why Kyis’s injuries were
getting worse. Kyle drove Kyis back to Chanish’s home after the

                                 11
movies. When Chanish greeted Kyis, Kyis “latched onto [Kyle]
extremely tight and told [Kyle] that he didn’t want to go with his
mom.” Chanish’s friend Dominique coaxed Kyis out of the car,
and Kyis “eventually” went to Dominique. At Chanish’s request,
Kyle, Lartigue, and Lydia went inside Chanish’s home and
stayed for about 20 minutes so Kyis would be comfortable with
them leaving.
      On Monday, October 29 Kyis had a panic attack at his
preschool. He started hyperventilating and cried for Chanish.
Harrelson saw a bruise on Kyis’s face around his jaw and two
bruises on his shins. Harrelson brought Kyis to Birdsall’s office
because of the panic attack. Kyis was crying and said his legs
hurt. At Birdsall’s request, Kyis pulled up his pant legs, and
Birdsall saw he had “some bruises on his legs.” Birdsall asked
Kyis what had happened, and Kyis replied he fell off his bike.
Harrelson called Chanish to pick up Kyis. Chanish confirmed
Kyis got the injuries from falling off his bike. She added that a
hospital was running tests on Kyis to determine whether he
might have a hereditary condition that caused his bruising.
      On October 30 Ruezga drove Chanish and Kyis to the
MDIC interview in Merced. Officer Cuevas testified that “once
the interview was about to take place, Kyis threw a big fit
throwing chairs around, [and] kicking his mother.” The interview
was cancelled because Kyis was not cooperative. Officer Cuevas
transported Chanish and Kyis back to Dos Palos. During the 35-
to-40-minute car ride back Kyis started kicking, tossing and
turning, hitting his head on the booster seat, and cursing.
Chanish tried to calm Kyis down, but she was not successful.
According to Officer Cuevas, Chanish did not lose her temper,
curse, or yell at Kyis. When they arrived at Chanish and Perez’s
home, Kyis was still out of control, flailing his arms and shaking

                               12
his head. However, Perez talked to Kyis and was able to calm
him down.

       3.    Kyis’s death in November 2018 (counts 1, 2)
       When Kyle picked up Kyis on Friday, November 2, 2018,
Kyis complained his stomach hurt. Kyis also had a “runny stool”
that lasted until Saturday morning. On Saturday, Kyle took Kyis
to visit Kyle’s parents in San Jose. While there, Kyis soiled his
pants and threw a tantrum, kicking, screaming, and trying to hit
himself in the face. Kyle brought Kyis back to Chanish’s home on
Monday evening. On the drive back, Kyis threw another tantrum
and said multiple times he “‘hated his mom.’”11 When they
arrived, Chanish stood outside the car, and Kyis said he did not
want to go with her.
       The following evening (November 6), Kyle talked to Kyis by
telephone before Kyis’s bedtime. At 11:36 p.m. Perez called 911.
At the start of the call, Perez said, “Hey, get your ass up now.
[unintelligible] what’s going on buddy?”12 Perez told the operator
that his stepson “just was walking to the bathroom and fell over
right now.” Paramedic Brian Milbauer, his paramedic partner,
and a paramedic intern responded to Chanish and Perez’s home.
Milbauer testified that when they arrived, they found Kyis lying

11     Lartigue testified Kyis began saying he hated his mom
after the September 2018 incident. Kyis also told Lartigue that
he did not like Perez, Perez yelled at him, and Perez threw hot
sauce at him. Kyle similarly testified that sometime after the
September 2018 incident, Kyis told him that Perez put “hot
Cheetos” in Kyis’s eyes.
12      The prosecutor played a recording of Perez’s 911 call for the
jury.

                                  13
on his back on the bed in a bedroom. Chanish told the
paramedics Kyis was returning from the bathroom when he
collapsed and fell to the floor. Chanish and Perez moved Kyis to
the bed and poured cold water on him to wake him up, but he was
unresponsive. Milbauer described the situation when he arrived
as there being an “off feeling in the house”; he found it “strange”
that Chanish, as the mother, was “not as hysterical as you would
expect one to be.”
       Milbauer determined Kyis had fluid build-up on the top of
his head, which was “not normal at all for anybody.” Because
Kyis had a “very weak pulse,” the paramedics rushed him to the
hospital. But as Kyis was being carried to the ambulance, he lost
his pulse. Milbauer and the intern attempted to resuscitate Kyle
during the ride to the hospital, but Kyis did not regain a pulse.
       Around midnight Kyle received a call from Chanish, who
said Kyis had a seizure and “passed out,” and she and Kyis were
going to the hospital. Kyle and Lartigue immediately drove from
Sacramento to the hospital. About a half hour into their drive,
Chanish called to report that Kyis had died. When Kyle arrived
at the hospital, Perez hugged Kyle and said, “‘I tried. I tried. I’m
sorry.’” Kyle and Chanish also hugged, and Kyle told Chanish
that she was a good mom. Lartigue observed Chanish was crying
“off and on” at the hospital. Chanish told Lartigue, “‘I’m sorry.
I’m sorry for everything,’” and she thanked Lartigue for taking
care of Kyis. After Kyis’s death, Chanish called Birdsall and said
Kyis “had seizures, and that he had passed away.” Birdsall
testified “[it] was just like we were having a regular
conversation,” and Chanish was not “emotional or anything.”

                                14
      4.    The autopsy
      On November 8 Dr. Mark Super, a forensic pathologist,
conducted an autopsy of Kyis. At the time of death, four-year-old
Kyis was 3 feet 5 inches tall and weighed 40 pounds. Kyis had a
tear in his mesentery,13 a lacerated liver, bruises on his small
bowel and both lungs, head injuries, two bruises on the back of
his right hand, a bruise on the back of his left forearm, a healing
bruise on his left elbow, bruises on both legs, and bruises on both
sides of his abdomen and chest. Most of the bruises were not
likely to be caused by a child’s “rough and tumble” play. The
court admitted a photograph of Kyis taken at the time of the
autopsy (exhibit 102), on which Dr. Super pointed out the bruises
on Kyis’s abdomen and chest, a healing bruise on his scalp with a
subscapular hematoma, and “two more recent bruises on the
front of his scalp and then on the mid-back of his scalp.”
Dr. Super testified “[t]he head injuries were severe,” but “[i]t
didn’t appear to be serious enough to have caused his death.”
       Dr. Super opined Kyis died from “bleeding in the abdomen
due to blunt impact abdominal injuries,” likely caused by one or
more punches or kicks. Given the type of abdominal injury, the
child “would cry bloody murder if somebody hit [him] that hard in
the abdomen assuming that . . . he’s alert and awake during this
whole process.” It would “[a]bsolutely” be painful. Because the
injury was to his abdomen, the child would become nauseous and

13    The mesentery is a fold of membrane that attaches the
intestine to the abdominal wall.
( [as of January 4, 2023].)

                                15
weak, and “the longer he gets into shock, then he becomes
disoriented.” The punches or kicks would have caused him to
become unconscious but “wouldn’t kill him instantly.” Dr. Super
explained “it takes time for this injury to result in [] shock and
death, so it takes probably several hours” to cause death.
Dr. Super opined that because of the severity of the injury,
“[e]ven three hours I think would be a lot for a little child like
that.” He added, “I’m taking three hours to be kind of where I
would think this child could possibly survive this . . . if this thing
wasn’t bleeding profusely right off the bat.”
      On cross-examination, Dr. Super acknowledged Kyis’s
abdominal injury could have been caused by falling “from some
good height onto something rounded” or “a really significant
bicycle accident,” but “[i]t’s not going to cause all the rest of the
bruises.” Further, the bruise and hematoma were not likely to
have been caused by another child with a toy truck because the
injury to the top left side of Kyis’s head was very large, and a toy
would “cause a very small area of injury even if it caused an
injury.” Dr. Super acknowledged, however, that a minor head
injury could be exacerbated by a child banging his head against a
car window during a tantrum.

       5.    The police investigation
       On November 15, 2018 a police detective requested
Lartigue to make a pretext call to Chanish “to ask her questions
about the night of the incident.” Lartigue made the call from a
detective’s office, and the call was recorded. Chanish told
Lartigue she was in the bathroom when she saw Kyis “fall on the
floor and ha[ve] a seizure.” Chanish confirmed four times that
she saw Kyis have a seizure and collapse.

                                  16
       On November 20 Merced County Sheriff’s Detectives Jose
Andrade and Ortiz interviewed Chanish at the Merced County
Sheriff’s Department office.14 Chanish stated she went to sleep
at 9 p.m. on November 6 because she was tired from her
pregnancy and had taken an anti-depressant medication. She
did not see Kyis fall. Perez woke Chanish up and called the
ambulance. Perez told Chanish he woke up when Kyis threw up
in the bathroom. Perez gave Kyis some water and sent him back
to bed. Fifteen minutes later, Kyis came out of his bedroom and
“‘just dropped.’” Chanish had experienced seizures and fainting
spells, and she thought Kyis had a seizure, although he had
never had one before. When Chanish went into Kyis’s bedroom,
she saw he had urinated in his bed. Chanish explained she told
Lartigue that she saw Kyis fall because “‘[it’s] just Naomi, and I
don’t trust her.’” Chanish lied to Lartigue “‘[b]ecause she’s not
his mother’” and “I told her just whatever I told her to [get] her
off the phone.”

B.     The Defense Case
       Perez testified on his own behalf.15 Perez was in a
relationship with Quiroz before they broke up in December 2017.
Perez and Quiroz have a nine-year-old son and an eight-year-old
daughter. In March 2018 Perez started dating Chanish, and they
immediately started living together. Kyis lived with Perez and
Chanish on the weekdays and Kyle on weekends, unless Kyle
cancelled the visit. Perez’s children visited on the weekends and

14    Chanish spoke to the detectives after waiving her Miranda
rights. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.) The prosecutor
played portions of the interview for the jury.
15    Chanish did not testify.

                                 17
shared a room with Kyis. Perez had “a very good” relationship
with Kyis. They watched television together, including football
games, they played video games, and sometimes Kyis would join
Perez when he exercised. Perez took Kyis to the park, to the
river a couple of times, and to a high school football game. He
also taught Kyis how to ride a bicycle. At school, Kyis made
Perez “a bracelet with the Rams colors because [Perez was] a
Rams fan.” Kyis was “an active kid” who “liked to play a lot.”
Kyis “could get frustrated pretty quick,” and if something did not
go his way, he would throw a tantrum by screaming and
“sometimes trying to scratch or kick.” Chanish would get
frustrated by Kyis’s tantrums, and she would sometimes yell or
curse.
       Perez testified he did not discipline Kyis. However, on
cross-examination he admitted he told detectives that he spanked
his son. He stated it occurred only one time, during his
relationship with Quiroz. Perez denied ever hitting Kyis, and he
was shocked when he heard the allegation. Perez loved Kyis and
would not do anything to hurt him.
       In October 2018 Perez was out of town when Chanish
informed him that Kyis had gotten hit in the head by a student
from the preschool. When Perez came home, he saw Kyis had a
bump on the left side of his head. The next week Perez’s son
woke up Perez and Chanish and said Kyis’s eyes were shut.
Perez went to the children’s bedroom and saw Kyis’s eyes were
“really swollen.” Chanish’s grandmother took Chanish and Kyis
to the hospital, and Kyis was hospitalized for two days.
       Perez learned from Chanish there was an attempt to
interview Kyis. When Officer Cuevas, Chanish, and Kyis
returned from the scheduled interview, Chanish went inside the
apartment and told Perez that Kyis “was throwing a fit and

                               18
didn’t want to get out of the police car.” Perez went outside to
calm Kyis down, and Kyis grabbed him and held him tight. Kyis
said, “‘All I wanted was you.’” Perez was able to get Kyis out of
the car and into the apartment.
       On Monday, November 5, 2018, Kyis “seemed a little
irritated” when he returned from his stay with Kyle. Perez
believed Kyis wanted to stay longer with Kyle. The next day
when Kyis returned from school at around noon, he “looked more
sad” and acted “real distant.” Chanish and Perez put a blanket
outside for Kyis to play on, and they left the apartment door open
so they could see him. After dinner, Perez watched a college
basketball game in the master bedroom on his cell phone. Perez
wore headphones and had the game “on full blast.” He watched
the postgame show and “didn’t come out of the room until close to
10:00.” Perez then went to the living room, and Chanish said she
had already put Kyis to bed. Chanish and Perez argued because
Chanish wanted Perez to spend more time with her. At about
10:30 p.m. Chanish said she was going to sleep. She first went to
the bathroom and then to Kyis’s room for a few minutes to check
on him.
       Later that night Kyis came out of his bedroom and told
Perez “his tummy was hurting.” Perez gave Kyis some water and
told him to use the toilet if he had to throw up. Kyis went to the
bathroom and vomited “some yellow stuff.” Kyis then returned to
his bedroom.
       As Perez was falling asleep on the couch, he heard the door
open again followed by a thud, and he saw Kyis on the ground
outside his bedroom. Perez ran to Kyis and grabbed him. Perez
panicked because Kyis was stiff and shaky, and his eyes “looked
like they were turning in the back of his head.” Perez “was
mostly yelling trying to get [Kyis] up,” and then he yelled to

                               19
Chanish, who was in the master bedroom, to call 911. When the
paramedics arrived, Perez escorted them into the apartment and
led them to Kyis, who was on the bed in the master bedroom.
The paramedics picked up Kyis and transported him and
Chanish to the hospital. When Perez arrived at the hospital, he
learned Kyis had died. Perez later saw Kyle, hugged him, and
cried with him. Perez told Kyle “I am sorry, and I tried
everything I could” because Perez had “tried doing CPR, mouth to
mouth, trying to keep [Kyis] awake.” Perez was “severely
depressed” following Kyis’s death.
      The next day Officers Cuevas and Battles, a sheriff’s
deputy, and a social worker came to the apartment. Perez
showed them around, including to where Kyis had collapsed.
Perez was arrested a couple of weeks later. On November 20 he
waived his Miranda rights and answered the detectives’
questions for six to eight hours. Perez initially stated he never
saw Chanish physically abuse Kyis. At some point, the detectives
informed Perez that Kyis had died from blunt force trauma, and
Perez realized he was a homicide suspect. The detectives told
Perez he “was the only one awake” and therefore was “the only
possible person.” The detectives also said Chanish had accused
him of killing Kyis. When one of the detectives asked Perez
whether he had seen Chanish spank Kyis, he replied, “Yes, I’ve
seen him spanked,” saying it happened at the grandparents’
house. The detective asked why, to which Perez answered,
“Because he’s kicking, swinging, scratching, and she just swang
at him.” Perez explained, “‘Well, when she . . . gets mad, she
grabs the arm. She pulls real hard sometimes. She gets real
frustrated at me. She gets real mad sometimes towards him.’”
Perez added, “‘I remember she hit [Kyis] once, and she said she
was trying to hit him on his butt but missed and got him on his

                               20
side. She said it was an accident, but she was mad. When she
gets mad, she doesn’t think.’” Perez testified the incident
occurred when Kyis ran ahead of Chanish and Perez during a
walk and “some guy in a truck pulled up and started giving
Chanish crap about not watching him, and she got frustrated,
and he was throwing a tantrum at the same time.” However,
Chanish only hit Kyis that one time.
      Perez also told the detectives that Chanish took medication
for anxiety and depression. On the night of November 6, Perez
had to kick the bed to wake up Chanish. Perez admitted that
when he yelled “‘get your ass up now’” on the 911 call, it was
directed at Chanish.

C.     The Verdicts and Sentencing
       On March 10, 2020 the jury found Perez guilty of assault on
a child causing death (§ 273ab, subd. (a); count 1) and felony child
abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 4). The jury found Chanish guilty
of three counts of felony child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a); counts 2-
4). On June 10, 2020 the trial court sentenced Perez to an
indeterminate term of 25 years to life on count 1 for assault on a
child causing death, plus the upper term of six years on count 4
for felony child abuse. The court sentenced Chanish to an
aggregate term of six years eight months, comprised of the
middle term of four years on count 2, plus two consecutive terms
of 16 months (one-third the middle term) on counts 3 and 4.
       Chanish and Perez timely appealed.

                                21
                         DISCUSSION

A.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting
       Kyis’s Statement Under Evidence Code Section 1360
       1.     Proceedings below
       In February 2020 the prosecutor filed a motion in limine
requesting Kyle be allowed to testify that on September 8, 2018
he observed a bruise on Kyis’s groin area, and when Kyle asked
what had happened, Kyis responded, “‘Steve hit me in the night.’”
The prosecutor argued Kyis’s statemen was admissible pursuant
to Evidence Code section 1360. In response, Perez filed a motion
in limine objecting to admission of Kyis’s statement. Perez
argued Kyis’s statement was unreliable because “Kyis tended to
blame many different people for a wide variety of problems which
were later confirmed to be not true.”
       At an evidentiary hearing on the motions, the parties
stipulated Kyis was under the age of 12 and deceased, and
therefore, he was unavailable. Kyle testified that on September
8, 2018 he noticed a bruise on Kyis’s groin area when he helped
Kyis remove his wet clothes after swimming. Kyle became upset
when he saw Kyis’s groin area, and he asked what had happened.
In response, Kyis “blatantly said that Steve had punched him in
the penis.” Kyle then clarified that Kyis used the word
“‘privates’” instead of “‘penis.’” Kyle admitted he later told
officers Kyis said “‘Steve hit me in the night.’”16 Kyle observed
Kyis was “nervous” and “shaken.” Kyle believed Kyis was telling
the truth because he “looked into [Kyle’s] eyes and physically was

16    During cross-examination by Chanish’s attorney, Kyle
acknowledged he was not certain whether Kyis said “Steve had
hit him in the night or Steve hit me in the penis.”

                               22
shaken, [and] did not want [Kyle] to leave his side after he
admitted that.” After Kyis’s disclosure, Kyle asked Lartigue to
come to the bathroom to view the injury.17
       Two days later Kyle and Kyis were interviewed at the Dos
Palos Police Department. Kyle was present when Kyis told police
officers and a CPS social worker that Perez had punched him at
night. The officers tried to ask Kyis more questions, but Kyis
“was getting a little bit nervous.” Kyle told the officers that Kyis
tended to ramble and had made statements about Perez that
Kyle “put aside,” including that Perez put Hot Cheetos in Kyis’s
eyes. Chanish later told Kyle that Kyis’s groin injury was caused
by Kyis falling on a trampoline or off a bunk bed at a friend’s
house.
       Perez’s attorney argued Kyis’s statement was unreliable
because his injury in the photograph looked “like something a
child would get from falling off a trampoline or a bike.” In
addition, Kyis would say things “that weren’t necessarily true,”
including accusing Kyle of hitting him.18 Perez’s attorney

17    Although the motions in limine focused on Kyis’s statement
to Kyle, as discussed, Lartigue also testified at trial that she saw
Kyis’s groin injury and Kyis told her “Perez had went in his room
at night and had punched him in his groin.”
18     In response to questioning by Perez’s attorney as to
whether police officers asked Kyle about Kyis’s allegation that
Kyle had hit him, Kyle denied the allegation was true. Alejandra
testified with respect to the October 2018 bruise on Kyis’s jaw
that Kyis initially said a school friend hit him with a toy, but he
later said Kyle hit him because Kyis broke a piece of his bike.

                                23
asserted the statement was “extremely prejudicial” and Perez
could not get a fair trial if the statement were admitted.
       The trial court found the photograph of Kyis’s injury was
corroborating physical evidence Kyis was injured. The court
acknowledged there was no showing that Kyis knew the
difference between a truth and a lie. However, Kyis’s statement
that Perez hit him was spontaneous because it was in response to
Kyle asking “‘[w]hat is this,’” and Kyle did not prompt Kyis by
asking “‘[w]ho did this.’” The court added, “I don’t have any
motive Kyis would have to lie about how he received that injury,
and he did repeat it two times. I mean, he said it once to his dad
and then later, evidently, to the police and to CPS, so I believe
under [Evidence Code section] 1360 that is a reliable statement
that should go in front of the jury, and they can decide if they
believe it or not, but they should at least hear that statement.”

       2.    Governing law and standard of review
       Evidence Code section 1360, subdivision (a), provides, “In a
criminal prosecution where the victim is a minor, a statement
made by the victim when under the age of 12 describing any act
of child abuse or neglect performed with or on the child by
another, or describing any attempted act of child abuse or neglect
with or on the child by another, is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if all of the following apply: [¶] (1) The statement is
not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule. [¶] (2) The
court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the
jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement
provide sufficient indicia of reliability. [and] [¶] (3) The child
either: [¶] (A) Testifies at the proceedings. [or] [¶] (B) Is
unavailable as witness, in which case, the statement may be
admitted only if there is evidence of child abuse or neglect that

                                24
corroborates the statement made by the child.” (Accord, People v.
Roberto V. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1367 [noting Evidence
Code section 1360 “safeguards the reliability of a child’s hearsay
statements”].)
      Factors “relevant to the reliability of hearsay statements
made by child witnesses” include “(1) spontaneity and consistent
repetition; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use of
terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age; and (4) lack of
motive to fabricate.” (In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15, 29-30;
accord, In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239.) “[E]ven if
the child was incompetent to testify at trial because he or she did
not understand the duty to tell the truth, this [does] not
necessarily render the child’s hearsay statements unreliable, but
[is] merely a factor to consider.” (People v. Brodit (1998)
61 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1330; accord, Cindy L., at p. 34.)
      We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s
admission of evidence under Evidence Code section 1360.
(People v. Mitchell (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 919, 927; People v.
Roberto V., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1367.)

      3.      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
              admitting Kyis’s statement to Kyle
       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
Kyis’s statement that Perez hit him. The statement was
corroborated by the photograph of Kyis’s injury, as required
under Evidence Code section 1360, subdivision (a)(3)(B), when a
child is unavailable to testify. (See In re Cindy L., supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 35 [“Corroborative evidence in this context is
‘“‘evidence . . . which would support a logical and reasonable
inference’” that the act of abuse described in the hearsay
statement occurred.’”].) Perez argues Kyis’s statement was not

                                25
spontaneous because it was in response to Kyle asking him what
had happened. But as the trial court noted, Kyle did not prompt
Kyis to cast blame on another person by asking who caused the
injury. Perez also asserts Kyis had a motive to fabricate an
allegation against him because Kyis wanted to spend more time
with his father. However, the record does not show that at the
time Kyis preferred to spend time with Kyle, and even if he did,
that Kyis had the sophistication to make up an abuse allegation
to make it happen.
      Further, Kyle’s description of the circumstances of Kyis’s
statement—that Kyis was “[n]ervous” and “shaken” and did not
want Kyle to leave his side—was consistent with the statement.
Moreover, regardless of whether Kyis said “Steve hit me in the
night” or hit him in his “‘privates,’” Kyis’s language was
appropriate for a four-year-old child. Accordingly, the “time,
content, and circumstances surrounding” Kyis’s statement
provided sufficient indicia of reliability under Evidence Code
section 1360.

B.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting
       the Autopsy Photograph
       1.    Proceedings below
       Perez filed a motion in limine requesting all autopsy
photographs be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.
At a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor moved to introduce one
autopsy photograph (exhibit 102) to “use it with Dr. Super as a
demonstrative so he can describe where the injuries were on
Kyis” that he observed during the autopsy. The court responded,
“A lot of times he’ll use diagrams. But one photo doesn’t seem too
much, if I could look at it and see. Obviously, it’s disturbing, but
it doesn’t seem unduly gruesome.” The prosecutor stated she did

                                26
not “select any photos where it shows any part of examination,
internal examination, or anything, what I feel to be unduly
prejudicial or inflammatory.” The court ruled the photograph
was admissible.

      2.     Governing law and standard of review
      “‘Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action.”’” (People v.
Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 87; accord, People v. Daveggio and
Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 822.) “‘The court in its discretion
may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.’ (Evid. Code, § 352.)” (Hardy, at p. 87;
accord, People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 105.)
      “‘[T]he prejudice which exclusion of evidence under
Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not the
prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from
relevant, highly probative evidence. “[A]ll evidence which tends
to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the defendant’s case.
The stronger the evidence, the more it is ‘prejudicial.’ The
‘prejudice’ referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to
evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against
the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on
the issues.”’ (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 610; accord,
People v. Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 105.)
      “So long as the probative value of graphic or disturbing
material is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effects,
a prosecutor is entitled to use such evidence to ‘present a

                                27
persuasive and forceful case.’” (People v. Merriman (2014)
60 Cal.4th 1, 80; accord, People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332,
357 [“Graphic evidence in a murder case is always disturbing
[citation] but it is not inadmissible simply because it is
unpleasant to view.”]; People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141,
171.) “‘The admission into evidence of photographs lies within
the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of that discretion.’” (People v. Avila (2014) 59 Cal.4th 496,
518; accord, People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1304.)

      3.     The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
             admitting the autopsy photograph
      Perez contends the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the autopsy photograph because it was inflammatory,
Kyis’s cause of death was not disputed, and other photographs
depicting Kyis’s prior injuries were admitted into evidence.
However, “‘“[a]s a rule, the prosecution in a criminal case
involving charges of murder or other violent crimes is entitled to
present evidence of the circumstances attending them even if it is
grim” [citation], and even if it “duplicate[s] testimony, depict[s]
uncontested facts, or trigger[s] an offer to stipulate.”’” (People v.
Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 196 [although there was no dispute
victim was stabbed to death and defense counsel offered to
stipulate that bloody shirt and pants belonged to victim, trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs of
victim’s bloody clothes]; accord, People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th
672, 687-688.)
      Here, the autopsy photograph was used during the direct
examination of Dr. Super to support his testimony about Kyis’s
external bruises at the time of the autopsy. (See People v.
Roundtree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 852 [“We have consistently

                                 28
upheld the admission of autopsy photographs disclosing how the
victim was wounded as being relevant to the question of
deliberation and premeditation, as well the appropriate
penalty.”]; People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 304 [autopsy
photograph was admissible to “corroborate the testimony of the
forensic pathologist”].) We have reviewed the autopsy
photograph, which is not unusually inflammatory (showing a
deceased child with bruises, not any open wounds or blood), and
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding it
was more probative than prejudicial.

C.     The Trial Court Did Not Commit Prejudicial Error in Its
       Instructions on the Lesser Included Offenses as to Count 1
       1.    Duty to instruct on lesser included offenses
       “Under California law, trial courts must instruct the jury
on lesser included offenses of the charged crime if substantial
evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant committed
the lesser included offense and not the greater offense.”
(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 196 (Gonzalez); accord,
People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 53, 96.) “That duty exists
because of the right under the California Constitution ‘“to have
the jury determine every material issue presented by the
evidence.”’” (Gonzalez, at p. 196; accord, People v. Breverman
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 155.) “The prejudice arising from the
failure to give such instructions is the risk that the jury ignored
its instructions and convicted the defendant of an offense . . . for
which the prosecution did not carry its burden. The jury might
have been convinced that the defendant was guilty of some lesser
included offense and, as a result, tempted to convict of a greater
offense rather than acquit.” (Gonzalez, at p. 200; accord,
People v. Eid (2014) 59 Cal.4th 650, 657.)

                                 29
      “The erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included
offense generally is subject to harmless error review under the
standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, at pages 836-
837. Reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable the
jury would have returned a different verdict absent the error or
errors complained of.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179,
1267; accord, Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 196 [“The failure to
instruct on lesser included offenses supported by substantial
evidence was state law error.”].)

      2.    Proceedings below
      At the pretrial hearing on jury instructions, the trial court
reviewed the proposed jury instructions with the attorneys.
Perez’s attorney stated the proposed jury instructions were
acceptable.19 The court instructed the jury with modified

19     In their respondent’s brief, the People contend Perez
forfeited his claims of instructional error because his attorney did
not object to the instructions or request any modifications.
However, a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser
included offenses where the evidence raises a question whether
all the elements of the charged offense were present. (People v.
Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 154.) Further, we review any
claim of instructional error that affects a defendant’s substantial
rights whether or not trial counsel objected. (§ 1259 [“The
appellate court may also review any instruction given . . . even
though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the
substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”];
People v. Burton (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 917, 923 [“‘Failure to
object to instructional error forfeits the issue on appeal unless the
error affects defendant’s substantial rights.’”]; People v. Bedolla
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 535, 544 [same].) And “[w]e can only
determine if [a] defendant[’s] substantial rights were affected by

                                 30
CALCRIM No. 3517 as to the lesser included offenses: “If all of
you find that a defendant is not guilty of a greater crime, you
may find him or her guilty of a lesser crime. If you are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that
lesser crime, a defendant may not be convicted of both a greater
and a lesser crime for the same conduct. Now I will explain to
you the crimes affected by this instruction. Attempted assault on
a child causing death is a lesser crime of assault on a child
causing death, charged in count 1. Assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury is a lesser crime of assault on
a child causing death, charged in count 1. Simple assault is a
lesser crime of assault on a child causing death, charged in count
1.”
       The court also instructed the jury with modified CALCRIM
No. 460: “Attempted assault on a child causing death is a lesser
crime to assault on a child causing death. To prove that a
defendant is guilty of attempted assault on a child causing death,
the People must prove that, one, the defendant took a direct but
ineffective step towards committing . . . assault on a child causing
death; and, two, the defendant intended to commit attempted
assault on a child causing death.” The court also instructed on
what is required to prove a direct step toward committing an
assault on a child causing death.

deciding whether the instruction was given in error and, if so,
whether the error was prejudicial.” (People v. Medina (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 146, 154, fn. 7.) That is, if Perez’s claims have
merit, they have not been forfeited. We therefore necessarily
review the merits of Perez’s contention the instructions violated
his rights. Because we find no forfeiture, we do not reach Perez’s
argument his attorney’s failure to object constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.

                                 31
      The trial court did not initially instruct the jury with
CALCRIM No. 875 on assault with force likely to produce great
bodily injury. However, the jury initially deadlocked on count 1,
and the court discharged juror no. 2 (who indicated he could no
longer serve) and replaced him with an alternate. At that point,
the jury foreperson inquired where the instruction was for the
lesser included offense of assault with force likely to produce
great body injury. Perez’s counsel stated he had no objection to
the court instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 875, and the
court proceeded to read the instruction to the jury.

      3.     The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in
             instructing the jury on attempted assault on a child
             causing death
       Perez contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury
on attempted assault on a child causing death as a lesser
included offense of count 1 because the offense is not a crime in
California, relying on In re James M. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 522
(attempted assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer is not
a crime) and People v. Duens (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 310, 314
(attempted assault with intent to commit rape is not an offense).
The James M. court explained attempted assault was not a
“logical absurdity,” but the assault statute showed a clear
legislative intent not to punish an attempt to commit a battery
without the present ability to do so (an attempted assault).
(James M. at pp. 521-522.)
       Even assuming it was error for the trial court to instruct on
attempted assault on a child causing death, Perez has failed to
show prejudice. As discussed, a defendant may be prejudiced by
the failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense
because of the possibility the jury would convict the defendant of

                                32
a greater offense even if the elements had not been proven,
rather than acquit. (Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 200.) But
here, the jury was offered the option to convict Perez of the lesser
included offense. Thus, there is no risk the jury convicted him of
the greater offense to avoid an acquittal.

      4.     The trial court did not commit prejudicial error in its
             delayed instruction on assault with force likely to
             produce great bodily injury
       Perez contends the trial court erred in failing initially to
instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 875 for assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury, which is a lesser included
offense of assault on a child causing death. As discussed, the
court initially instructed the jury that assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury is a lesser included offense of
the assault charged in count 1. However, it is undisputed the
court inadvertently failed initially to instruct the jury with
CALCRIM No. 875. Once the jury foreperson notified the court
that the jury had not been instructed on assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury, the court rectified its error
by giving the instruction.
       Perez contends he was prejudiced by the initial omission of
CALCRIM No. 875 because the deadlocked jury did not have the
instruction during its 10 hours of deliberation and would have
“reached a more favorable verdict” on count 1 had it been
properly instructed. But to demonstrate prejudice, Perez needed
to have submitted juror declarations to show it was reasonably
probable the deadlocked jury would have found Perez guilty of
the lesser included offense of assault with force likely to produce
great bodily injury had the jury been instructed with CALCRIM
No. 875. Perez did not submit any declarations. We recognize

                                 33
the most relevant juror declarations would have been
inadmissible, for example, hypothetically, a declaration from
juror no. 2 explaining that he voted not guilty of assault on a
child causing death and would have voted guilty of the lesser
included offense had he been properly instructed. (See Evid.
Code, § 1150, subd. (a) [“Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a
verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be received as to
statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring,
either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is
likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is
admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct,
condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental
processes by which it was determined.”].)
       As the Supreme Court explained in People v.
Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1281, “‘This statute
distinguishes “between proof of overt acts, objectively
ascertainable, and proof of the subjective reasoning processes of
the individual juror, which can be neither corroborated nor
disproved. . . .” [Citation.] “This limitation prevents one juror
from upsetting a verdict of the whole jury by impugning his own
or his fellow jurors’ mental processes or reasons for assent or
dissent. The only improper influences that may be proved under
[Evidence Code] section 1150 to impeach a verdict, therefore, are
those open to sight, hearing, and the other senses and thus
subject to corroboration.”’” (Accord, People v. Flores (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 100, 108 [statements in juror declarations as to
jurors’ subjective understandings were inadmissible, but
statements as to what was said in the jury room relating to
punishment were admissible because they were made “out loud,

                               34
heard by all the jurors, and involved information that could have
influenced the verdict”].)
       Although arguably a juror could state what an oral vote
count in the jury room was at the time of the deadlock (whether
10 jurors voted guilty or not guilty), absent information on how
juror no. 2 voted and how he would have voted on the lesser
offense, it is speculation whether juror no. 2 would have voted
guilty of the lesser offense and would have been able to convince
the other 11 jurors (who later voted guilty on the greater offense
after they were instructed with CALCRIM No. 875) to vote not
guilty of the greater offense and guilty of the lesser offense.
Perez has therefore not met his burden under Watson to
demonstrate prejudice. (See People v. Hernandez (2011)
51 Cal.4th 733, 746 [“This requirement that the defendant
demonstrate actual prejudice is consistent with the defendant’s
burden under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 837, to establish
a reasonable probability that error affected the trial’s result.”].)
       A comparison of the two jury instructions supports our
conclusion. Three of the differences between the instructions on
assault causing death of a child (CALCRIM No. 820) and assault
likely to produce great bodily injury (CALCRIM NO. 875) are not
in dispute (assuming Perez was the perpetrator): the People
must prove (1) the defendant had care or custody of a child who
was under the age of eight; (2) the force was applied to a child;
and (3) the defendant’s act caused the child’s death. The only
significant difference between the two instructions is that to
prove an assault causing death of a child, the People must prove
that “[w]hen the defendant acted, he was aware of facts that
would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its
nature would directly and probably result in great bodily injury
to the child.” (CALCRIM No. 820, italics added.) By contrast, for

                                 35
assault likely to produce great bodily injury, the People must
prove “[w]hen the defendant acted, he was aware of facts that
would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its
nature would directly and probably result in the application of
force to someone.” (CALCRIM No. 875, italics added.)
       The evidence at trial does not support a finding that Perez
was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize
his conduct in kicking or punching Kyis in the abdomen would
have resulted in the application of force, but not great bodily
injury. Dr. Super testified to the significant injuries suffered by
Kyis, including a tear in his mesentery, a lacerated liver, bruises
on his small bowel and both lungs, and bruises on both sides of
his abdomen and chest. According to Dr. Super, Kyis died from
bleeding in his abdomen due to a blunt impact likely caused by
one or more punches or kicks. Further, given the nature of the
injuries, a child “would cry bloody murder if somebody hit [him]
that hard in the abdomen,” causing the child to die within three
hours. There was no expert testimony to the contrary.
Therefore, it is not reasonably probable the jury would have
returned a not guilty verdict of the greater offense had it been
given the option to convict Perez of the lesser offense based a
finding he was aware (through the lens of a reasonable person)
that kicking or punching Kyis hard in the abdomen, causing Kyis
to scream in pain, would have resulted in the application of force,
but not great bodily injury.20

20    Perez also argues the trial court erred in instructing the
jury with CALCRIM No. 251 that the offense of assault on a child
causing death is a specific intent instead of general intent crime.
But as Perez concedes, instructing the jury that specific intent
was required to prove the offense was not prejudicial error

                                36
D.     The Trial Court Erred in Instructing the Jury on Criminal
       Negligence with Respect to the Offense of Felony Child
       Abuse Charged in Count 4 as to Perez, but the Error Was
       Harmless
       1.    Proceedings below
       With respect to felony child abuse charged in count 4
(§ 273a, subdivision (a)), the trial court instructed the jury with a
modified version of CALCRIM No. 253: “For you to find a person
guilty of the crime of child abuse as charged in Counts 2, 3 and 4,
a person must do an act or fail to do an act with criminal
negligence. Criminal negligence is defined in the instructions on
that crime.”
       The court instructed the jury further with modified
CALCRIM No. 821: “The defendants are charged with child
abuse likely to produce great bodily harm or death in violation of
Penal Code section 273a(a). To prove that a defendant is guilty of
this crime, the People must prove that, one, the defendant, while
having care or custody of a child, willfully caused or permitted
the child’s person or health to be injured; two, the defendant
inflicted pain or suffering on the child or caused or permitted the
child to suffer or be injured or be endangered under
circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm
or death; and three, the defendant was criminally negligent when
he or she caused or permitted the child to be injured.”
       The court instructed further, “Criminal negligence involves
more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in
judgment. A person acts with criminal negligence when, one, he

because it increased the People’s burden. The instruction of the
jury with CALCRIM No. 251 was likewise not prejudicial as to
the lesser included offenses.

                                 37
or she acts in a reckless way that is a gross departure from the
way an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation;
two, the person’s acts amount to disregard for human life or
indifference to the consequences of his or her acts; and, three, a
reasonable person would have known that acting in that way
would naturally and probably result in harm to others.”
       In her closing argument, the prosecutor stated as to count
4: “[B]oth defendants are charged with felony child abuse on or
between September 1 and September 8. And that would have
been the injury to Kyis’s groin. I start here because I know there
is some overlap in these charges, and so I wanted to explain, up
front, that there are different ways to hold people accountable for
these crimes. Ms. Conrady is charged with child abuse because
she had care and custody of Kyis on all of these dates. And she
allowed him to be placed in a position in which he suffered harm
likely to cause great bodily injury. That is why she’s charged.
Mr. Perez is charged with actually causing these injuries in early
September and then on November 6 when Kyis was killed.” The
prosecutor added as to count 4, “For this count, [Perez] is charged
with willfully causing or permitting the child to be placed in a
situation where his health was in danger, that he inflicted pain
or suffering on the child or caused or permitted him to suffer and
be injured under circumstances likely to cause great bodily
injury. And he was—and that he was criminally negligent when
he or she caused or permitted the child to be injured. . . . And
[Perez] is the one who did it.”

      2.    The trial court erred in instructing the jury on count 4
            as to Perez
      “Section 273a, subdivision (a) ‘is an omnibus statute that
proscribes essentially four branches of conduct.’ [Citation.] As

                                38
relevant here, it provides: ‘Any person who, under circumstances
or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,
[1] willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or [2] inflicts
thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or
[3] having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or
permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or
[4] willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a
situation where his or her person or health is endangered, shall
be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one
year, or in the state prison for two, four, or six years.’” (People v.
Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 783 (Valdez), fn. omitted; accord,
People v. Flores (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 855, 873.) “Violation of
section 273a, subdivision (a), ‘“can occur in a wide variety of
situations: the definition broadly includes both active and passive
conduct, i.e., child abuse by direct assault and child endangering
by extreme neglect.”’” (Valdez, at p. 784; accord, People v.
Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1215-1516.) “[W]hen the conduct
at issue involves the direct infliction of unjustifiable physical
pain or mental suffering on a child, criminal negligence is not an
element of the offense. Rather, the defendant must have a mens
rea of general criminal intent to commit the proscribed act.”
(Sargent, at p. 1224; accord, Valdez, at p. 786.)
       Perez argues the trial court erroneously instructed the jury
on felony child abuse as charged in count 4 against him. We
agree. Perez’s liability for felony child abuse was based on the
theory Perez willfully inflicted the groin injury on Kyis. As the
prosecutor argued, “Mr. Perez is charged with actually causing
these injuries in early September,” and further, he “is the one
who did it.” Because the People argued Perez was liable for
directly inflicting physical pain on Kyis, as the Sargent court and
CALCRIM No. 821 make clear, the People had to prove Perez had

                                 39
a mens rea of general criminal intent to commit the prohibited
act. (See People v. Sargent, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1224.) Yet the
trial court instructed on criminal negligence, not general criminal
intent.21

      3.     The instructional error is not prejudicial under
             Chapman
      “Among the constitutional errors subject to [Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18] review is misinstruction of the jury
on one or more elements of the offense.” (People v. Hendrix
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 942 [under Chapman, “[t]his ‘stricter’
standard of review requires reversal unless the error is ‘harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt’”]; accord, People v. Wilkins (2013)
56 Cal.4th 333, 351.) “This is because the federal Constitution
requires ‘criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination
that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citations.] A

21     The People argue the trial court properly instructed on
criminal negligence because the court instructed the jury on
CALCRIM No. 821, alternative C—that “[t]he defendant, while
having care or custody of a child, willfully caused or permitted
the child’s person or health to be injured”—and thus the jury was
correctly instructed on criminal negligence, which applies to this
alternative. The People are correct that the court instructed with
alternative C, but the People’s theory of the case as expressed in
the prosecutor’s closing argument was that it was Perez who
inflicted unjustifiable physical pain on Kyis (alternative A) (“[t]he
defendant willfully inflicted unjustifiable physical pain or mental
suffering on a child”), with Conrady permitting Kyis to be injured
(alternative C). Therefore, the court should have instructed on
general criminal intent as to felony child abuse charged against
Perez.

                                 40
jury misinstruction that relieves the prosecution of its burden to
prove an element of the crime—by either misdescribing the
element or omitting it entirely—violates this requirement.”
(Hendrix, at p. 942; accord, Neder v. United States (1999)
527 U.S. 1, 10 [“In both cases—misdescriptions and omissions—
the erroneous instruction precludes the jury from making a
finding on the actual element of the offense.”].)
       The trial court’s misinstruction on the mens rea of the
felony child abuse charge against Perez was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt under Chapman. A defendant has general
criminal intent if he “intended to do the proscribed act.”
(People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 82 [“‘When the definition
of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act,
without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future
consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the
proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal
intent.’”]; accord, People v. Hering (1999) 20 Cal.4th 440, 445.)
The only evidence at trial as to the cause of Kyis’s groin injury
was Kyis’s statements to Kyle, Lartigue, and the police officers
and social worker that Perez hit him. There was no evidence the
injury occurred accidentally or that Chanish inflicted the injury
while Kyis was in Perez’s care. Although Perez in his testimony
denied he ever hit Kyis in his groin area (or anywhere), Perez
also denied he ever saw Chanish “mistreat Kyis to cause that
bruise.” Given the evidence of Kyis’s multiple statements that
Perez hit him and the photograph of the significant bruising to
Kyis’s groin area (exhibit 101), the jury necessarily found Perez
hit Kyis in the groin with the intent “to do the proscribed act”
(inflict the injury). (Atkins, at p. 82; accord, Hering, at p. 445.)
Accordingly, the People have met their burden to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error in failing to instruct on general

                                 41
criminal intent did not contribute to the verdict. (People v.
Hendrix, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 942; People v. Wilkins, supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 351.)

E.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Directing
       Further Jury Deliberations and Did Not Commit
       Prejudicial Error in Discharging Juror No. 2
       1.    Proceedings below
       The jury began deliberations on Wednesday, March 4, 2020
at 3:35 p.m., and deliberated for approximately an hour. The jury
resumed deliberations at 9:05 a.m. the following day, continued
until just before noon, then left for the day. On Friday, March 6,
the jury resumed deliberations just after 9:00 a.m. At 11:39 a.m.
the jury requested readback of the testimony of Perez and Dr.
Super. The court wrote in response, “‘OK, it may take a little
while. Also, if any of you are not available this afternoon or next
week, please let me know now.’” The jury sent a note back
stating, “‘Juror 2 not available next week.’” The court then took a
lunch recess. After lunch, the court reporter read back the
testimony of Perez and Dr. Super (from approximately 1:20 to
3:20 p.m.).
       Just after 4:00 p.m. the jury sent a note to the trial court
stating, “We have a verdict on counts 2, 3 & 4. [¶] We cannot
reach agreement on Count 1.” (Capitalization omitted.) The
court called the attorneys on the record and notified them of the
jury’s note. The court stated in part, “I don’t think they have
been deliberating long enough. I would tell them to deliberate
further, but I wanted to get counsel’s input.” The prosecutor
responded, “I don’t think they’ve deliberated that long, because
they were out yesterday afternoon.” Chanish’s attorney queried,
“The concern I have, is, are we going to lose a juror on Monday?”

                                42
The court replied, “Well, we can bring an alternative in.”
Chanish’s attorney responded, “Well then they have to start
deliberations over.” The prosecutor indicated she wanted to
obtain more information from the jury. The court asked Perez’s
attorney, and he replied, “I’m not sure, Your Honor. I’ll do
whatever the court wants to do.” The court then asked the
attorneys to return to the courtroom so the jury could be brought
out and questioned.
       When the attorneys returned to the courtroom, the trial
court stated its intent to question the jury and then “have them
go back in and we can discuss further what we want to do.” The
jury was brought into the courtroom, and the court asked the
foreperson, “Do you think any further deliberations would help
you or any reading back of other testimony?” The foreperson
responded, “We did try that, and, no, I do not believe—because
we tried approaching it from all different options; yes.” The court
then asked, “Do any of the other jurors feel that any further read-
back or further deliberations would help you reaching a verdict
on count 1?” No juror raised a hand. Next, the court asked,
“Foreperson, without telling me which way, if you can tell me
how many ballots have you taken?” The foreperson stated the
jury had taken approximately four ballots on count 1, and the
split in votes “started out one to 11, and ended up two to ten.”
The court then sent the jury back to the jury room for further
deliberations.
       Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court noted the
jury had deliberated for approximately nine hours (not including

                                43
the hour of deliberations on March 4).22 The prosecutor stated,
“In my experience, when a split is this close and they haven’t
been deliberating for a significant period of time—I guess,
especially compared to the length of the tria1—is that the judge
would usually send them back to further deliberate, but I would
submit it on that, Your Honor.” Perez’s attorney stated, “Your
honor, I don’t have any thoughts on the matter.”
       Chanish’s attorney expressed concern that if the
deliberations went to Monday, there would be “one or two new
jurors, and if those jurors are not the two people that are holding
out, we're going to be in the same position we are in now, with
maybe a different [c]ount.” The court responded, “That’s why I
wouldn’t have alternates in because I think it’s going to change
the dynamic. It’s just—my concern is I don't believe they have
actually been deliberating long enough, given the length of the
trial. And unfortunately, since we ran over time, we’re running
into time constraints. But that is the purpose of the alternates,
and I realize they have reached verdicts on 2, 3, and 4, but unless
those verdicts have been received and recorded, they could still
start deliberations all over again.” The prosecutor argued the
verdicts should not be recorded “because then you’re having a
different jury decide part of the case,” and the court agreed.

22    The trial court observed the jury deliberated for three
hours on March 5 and six hours on March 6. The court noted it
had recessed at approximately 3:30 p.m. on March 4, but it did
not address the jury’s deliberations reflected in the record for
March 4. For purposes of our discussion, we use the 10-hour
estimate made by Perez in his opening brief that includes the
March 4 deliberations. We note the 10-hour estimate includes
the two-hour readback of Perez’s and Dr. Super’s testimony.

                                44
      The jury returned to the courtroom, and the trial court told
the jurors they needed to continue deliberating. The court
inquired whether any juror could not come back the following
week, and juror no. 2 indicated he would not be available. The
court stated, “So at this time, the juror in seat number two, I’ll
excuse you. We’ll randomly select an alternate to come in and
take your spot, and then we’ll resume deliberations, and when
the alternate comes in next week, I’ll give you further
instructions on how to do that.” After the jury decided to return
on Tuesday, the court told juror no. 2, “I appreciate your service.
Unfortunately, we ran long, and so it ran into your schedule, but
I do appreciate the time you put in.”
      On Tuesday morning, March 10, the trial court swore in an
alternate juror. The court instructed the jury to disregard its
prior deliberations and start deliberations from the beginning.
After further discussions in the courtroom, the jury resumed its
deliberations at 9:23 a.m. At 2:25 p.m. the jury indicated it had
reached verdicts on all counts. The jury returned verdicts of
guilty on all counts as to Perez and Chanish.

      2.    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
            directing further jury deliberations
      Section 1140 provides, “Except as provided by law, the jury
cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them until
they have agreed upon their verdict and rendered it in open
court, unless by consent of both parties, entered upon the
minutes, or unless, at the expiration of such time as the court
may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no
reasonable probability that the jury can agree.” “The
determination whether there is a reasonable probability of
agreement rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.

                                45
[Citation.] ‘Although the court must take care to exercise its
power without coercing the jury into abdicating its independent
judgment in favor of considerations of compromise and
expediency [citation], the court may direct further deliberations
upon its reasonable conclusion that such direction would be
perceived “‘as a means of enabling the jurors to enhance their
understanding of the case rather than as mere pressure to reach
a verdict on the basis of matters already discussed and
considered.’”’” (People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 363-364;
accord, People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 783 [“the trial
court’s statement that 21.5 hours of deliberation was a ‘drop in
the bucket’” was not coercive]; People v. Pride (1992)
3 Cal.4th 195, 265 [it was not coercive for the court after a week
of deliberations on the penalty phase of a death penalty case to
order further deliberations where vote remained at 11 to 1].)
       Perez contends the trial court coerced the jury to reach a
verdict by telling the jurors they had not deliberated long enough
after 10 hours of deliberation. However, the court did not make
any statement to pressure the jury to reach a verdict. The court
appropriately concluded there was a reasonable probability the
jury could reach an agreement because the jury was actively
deliberating. According to the foreperson, after taking four
ballots on count 1, the split in votes changed from 11 to one to 10
to two. Although the change in votes shows the jury was moving
away from unanimity, it also demonstrates the jury was
continuing to deliberate. Further, it was not an abuse of
discretion, after eight days of trial testimony and counsel’s
argument on multiple counts against two defendants, for the
court to conclude after approximately 10 hours of jury
deliberations that further deliberations could be fruitful. (See
People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177, 209 [trial court did not

                                46
abuse its discretion in denying mistrial motion where “the jury
had only been deliberating for a day and a half as to three
defendants, after a trial that had lasted two months”]; People v.
Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582; 617 [“the jury in this case had
deliberated less than two full days, around 10 hours; we have
upheld courts’ denials of mistrials even after fruitless
deliberations for longer periods”], disapproved on other grounds
in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686, fn. 13; People v.
Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 615 [no abuse of discretion where
trial court ordered a deadlocked jury, which had deliberated for a
day and a half, to continue deliberating for the afternoon].)

      3.     The trial court’s discharge of Juror No. 2 was not
             prejudicial error
       During voir dire, juror no. 2 asked the trial court, “I just
had a question on . . . the length of the trial, because I have some
commitments, like, after March the 8th.” The court responded,
“No, we’ll be done before then. I estimated February 28th, and
that was—I tried to build in a little bit of padding into it, so I’m
sure that you would be fine, and we’ll have alternates, so if
something does come and you’re unavailable, there would be a
juror that would substitute in for you.” Juror no. 2 replied, “No,
I’m fine until then, so I just wanted to make sure until I know
where I’m at.” The trial ran longer than expected, and the jury
did not begin deliberations until March 4. As discussed, on the
afternoon of Friday, March 6 juror no. 2 indicated he would not
be available the following week. The court discharged juror no. 2
and replaced him with an alternate juror.
       “The trial court may discharge a juror at any time if good
cause exists to find that the juror is unable to perform his or her
duty. (§ 1089.) ‘The trial court’s decision whether or not to

                                 47
discharge a juror under section 1089 is reviewed for abuse of
discretion and will be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence; to warrant discharge, the juror’s bias or other disability
must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.’ [Citation.]
A reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence but ‘must be
confident that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly supported
by evidence on which the court actually relied.’” (People v. Lopez
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 365; accord, People v. Landry, supra,
2 Cal.5th at pp. 88-89; People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96,
124-125.)
       The trial court did not inquire into the reason for juror
no. 2’s unavailability after March 8. Although a juror’s
unavailability to serve on the jury would constitute good cause for
discharge, it may well have been that juror no. 2 had a doctor’s
appointment, a work commitment, or other short-term
unavailability after March 8 that could have been accommodated.
Further, the court did not expressly state its reasons for
discharging juror no. 2 other than the juror’s general statement
he was not available. Because the record does not reflect good
cause for discharging juror no. 2, the court abused its discretion.23
However, Perez has failed to establish he was prejudiced by
discharge of the juror under the Watson harmless error standard.
(See People v. Henderson (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 530, 566-567

23     We recognize the trial court informed juror no. 2 that if the
trial ran past March 8, the court would replace him with an
alternate. Thus, the juror had a reasonable expectation he would
not have to serve after that date. However, the court’s statement
was made without inquiry into the reason for the juror’s
unavailability, and it cannot take precedence over Perez’s right to
have the jury decide the case absent good cause for discharge of
the juror.

                                 48
[applying Watson harmless error standard to discharge of juror
without good cause]; People v. Bowers (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 722,
735 [same].) There is no evidence as to how juror no. 2 voted
when the jury deadlocked on count 1, voting 11 to one and then
10 to two. Further, Perez does not contend the alternate juror
was biased or incompetent. Perez “has a right to jurors who are
qualified and competent, not to any particular juror.” (People v.
Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 672.) Therefore, Perez has not shown
it is reasonably probable that had juror no. 2 not been excused,
Perez would have obtained a more favorable verdict. (Henderson,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 567; Bowers, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at
p. 735.)

F.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Convictions Except for
       Felony Child Abuse Charged in Count 4 as to Chanish
       1.     Standard of review
       “When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence for a jury finding, we review the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court. We
evaluate whether substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and
credible evidence of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting
the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820; accord, People v.
Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142 (Penunuri) [“‘To assess the
evidence’s sufficiency, we review the whole record to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt.’”].) “‘“Conflicts and even testimony [that] is
subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a
judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury
to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of

                                 49
the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We
resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we
look for substantial evidence.”’” (Penunuri, at p. 142; accord,
People v. Mendez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 680, 703.)
       “‘“The standard of review is the same in cases in which the
prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.”’”
(People v. Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 820; accord, People v.
Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 324.) “‘We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably
could infer from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the
judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’”
(People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713 (Westerfield);
accord, Penunuri, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 142 [“‘A reversal for
insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that
upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support’” the jury’s verdict.’”].)

      2.    Substantial evidence supports Perez’s conviction of
            felony child abuse (count 4)
      As discussed, Perez was charged in count 4 with felony
child abuse based on the theory he hit Kyis in the groin sometime
between September 1 and 8, 2018, inflicting unjustifiable
physical pain on Kyis. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s
finding that Perez inflicted the groin injury. Chanish and Perez
had custody of Kyis on September 7, when Kyle met them at an
exchange location in Los Banos for the custody exchange. The
next day Kyle watched Kyis during Lydia’s birthday party, and
Kyle did not observe any injuries. But when Kyle helped Kyis
remove his wet clothing for a bath, Kyis complained of pain when

                               50
Kyle started pulling down Kyis’s pants. At that point Kyle
noticed the large bruise on Kyis’s groin area, and when Kyle
asked what had happened, Kyis responded that “‘Steve had
punched me in the night.’” Kyle asked Lartigue to take a look at
Kyis. Lartigue heard Kyis crying and saw a “blue and kind of
purple-ish” bruise on Kyis’s groin area. Lartigue testified Kyis
“was actually kind of scared and nervous” to say what had
happened, but Kyis stated consistently that Perez “had went in
his room at night and had punched him in his groin.” Kyis
repeated his statement that “Steve hit me” two days later to
Ruezga and Officers Cuevas and Battles during an interview at
the Dos Palos police station.
      Perez suggests Kyis may have sustained the injury at the
party because if Kyis had sustained a groin injury before Kyle
picked him up on Friday, Kyis likely would have complained
about it. But Kyis was nervous about telling Kyle about his
injury, and he only disclosed it after Kyle asked what had
happened. Further, there is no evidence Kyis was injured at the
party. The jury could have reasonably inferred that Kyis did not
disclose the abuse until Kyle saw the injury and asked what had
happened because Kyis was scared to reveal it.
      Perez also asserts multiple arguments why it was Chanish
who caused the injury. He notes the photograph of Kyis’s groin
injury (exhibit 101) only corroborated that Kyis was injured, not
that Perez caused the injury.24 Further, Kyis made numerous

24    Perez also argues the prosecutor did not present any
evidence to establish who took the photograph or when it was
taken. However, Lartigue testified Kyle photographed Kyis’s
groin injury. And Kyle testified that on September 8 he sent
Chanish’s grandmother a photograph of the groin injury because

                               51
conflicting statements regarding other injuries he sustained in
October, including that two different students threw a toy truck
at him and Kyle had hit him after Kyis broke a piece of Kyis’s
bicycle. And Kyis’s unsolicited statement to Ruezga that Perez
hit him after Ruezga asked him about school, as well as Kyis’s
inability to answer follow-up questions from Officer Battles,
showed Kyis had been coached. Perez also relies on evidence
Chanish became easily frustrated with Kyis, exhibited
inappropriate parenting behavior, and lied about how Kyis
sustained his other injuries. By contrast, there was no evidence
Kyis was afraid of Perez, and Perez was able to comfort Kyis
after Officer Cuevas drove Kyis and Chanish home from the
unsuccessful October 30 MDIC interview. In addition, Perez
argues Kyis had a motive to lie because he wanted to spend more
time with Kyle.25
       Although the jury could have found Perez’s contentions
persuasive, it did not. As discussed, on appeal we consider
whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding, not
whether the circumstances could have supported a contrary
finding. (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 713; Penunuri, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 142.) Kyis’s consistent statements that Perez had

she did not believe him. Officer Cuevas likewise testified Kyle
showed the officers a picture of Kyis’s groin injury on September
10. In light of this testimony, the jury could reasonably have
inferred Kyle took the photograph of Kyis’s groin injury on
September 8.
25    Perez ignores testimony from Lartigue that Kyis told her
he did not like Perez, Perez yelled at him, and Perez threw hot
sauce at him. In addition, as discussed, it is speculative that
Kyis would have made up the allegation that Perez hit him in
order to spend more time with Kyle.

                                52
hit him, first made on the day after Kyle took custody of Kyis
from Perez and Chanish, along with the photograph of Kyis’s
significant groin injury, amply support Perez’s conviction of
felony child abuse as charged in count 4.

      3.     Substantial evidence supports Chanish’s convictions
             of felony child abuse for counts 2 and 3 but not
             count 4
       The jury was instructed under the third branch of section
273a, subdivision (a), that to find Chanish guilty of felony child
abuse, the People had to prove that while having care or custody
of Kyis, Chanish willfully caused or permitted Kyis’s person or
health to be injured under circumstances likely to produce great
bodily harm. (Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 783; see CALCRIM
No. 821, Alternative C.) Count 4 alleged conduct between
September 1 and 8, 2018 (the groin injury), count 3 alleged
conduct between October 12 and 22, 2018 (the facial injuries),
and count 1 alleged conduct on November 6, 2018 (the abdominal
injuries that caused Kyis’s death). In her closing argument, the
prosecutor argued with respect to counts 2 and 3 that Chanish
was “charged with felony child abuse under the theory of
endangerment for allowing her son to be with this man, who she’s
been put on notice that has abused him before.” As to count 4,
the prosecutor similarly argued Chanish permitted Kyis to be
placed in a situation in which he suffered great bodily injury
inflicted by Perez.
       To convict Chanish of felony child abuse, the jury had to
find Chanish willfully caused or permitted Kyle’s person or
health to be injured. (Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 787;

                                53
People v. Flores, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 874.)26 The mens rea
for “indirect abuse” under section 273a, subdivision (a), is
criminal negligence. (Valdez, at pp. 786-787; Flores, at p. 874.)
Criminal negligence “‘“must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or
reckless, that is, the conduct of the accused must be such a
departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily
prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances as to
be incompatible with a proper regard for human life . . . or an
indifference to consequences.”’” (Valdez, at p. 788; accord, Stark
v. Superior Court (2011) 52 Cal.4th 368, 399.) “‘Under the
criminal negligence standard, knowledge of the risk is
determined by an objective test: “[I]f a reasonable person in
defendant’s position would have been aware of the risk involved,
then defendant is presumed to have had such an awareness.”’”
(Valdez, at p. 783; accord, Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5
Cal.4th 561, 574 [“there can be no criminal negligence without
actual or constructive knowledge of the risk”]; People v. Felton
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 260, 269.)
       Chanish contends the People failed to present evidence she
was criminally negligent for permitting Perez to live with Kyis in
September 2018, enabling Perez to inflict injury on Kyis. We
agree substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding of
criminal negligence on count 4. The People argue a reasonable

26    Valdez considered the fourth branch of child abuse, in
which a defendant willfully permits a child to be placed in a
situation where his or her person or health is endangered.
(Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 787.) However, the criminal
negligence standard is the same for indirect abuse under either
the third branch of child abuse (permitting the child’s person or
health to be injured) or the fourth branch (permitting the child’s
person or health to be endangered). (Id. at pp. 789-790.)

                                54
person in Chanish’s position would have been aware in
September of the risk that Perez would inflict injury on Kyis
because, as Perez told detectives, he spanked his biological
children as a form of discipline. Perez admitted in his testimony
that he spanked his son one time during his relationship with
Quiroz. However, there is no evidence Chanish was aware that
Perez had spanked his son. Further, even if Chanish was aware
that Perez had previously spanked his son, absent evidence the
discipline was excessive, a reasonable person in Chanish’s
position would not have suspected that Perez would violently
injure Kyis. Nor is there any other evidence Chanish was or
should have been aware of Perez’s violent nature. The People’s
argument that Chanish should have known about the abuse
because they lived in a two-bedroom apartment with the
bedrooms “directly apart from each other” likewise lacks merit
because there is no evidence of the size of the apartment, where
the abuse took place, or whether Chanish was home when it
happened.
       The People also rely on Perez’s testimony that Chanish
would sometimes get frustrated and scream and curse at Kyis
and that she hit Kyis one time. But the prosecutor did not argue
at trial that Chanish caused Kyis’s groin injury. And even if the
jury believed Chanish had hit Kyis one time, this does not bear
on whether a reasonable person under the same circumstances
would have been aware of Perez’s likely abuse. We therefore
reverse Chanish’s conviction on count 4.
       Chanish also argues there was not substantial evidence to
support her convictions on counts 2 and 3 because there is no
evidence anyone told her that Perez had punched Kyis in
September, and therefore she would not have been on notice that
Perez might injure him again. Substantial evidence supports

                               55
Chanish’s convictions on both counts. On September 8, after
Kyle discovered Kyis’s groin injury, he called Chanish and asked
why Kyis had a bruise on his groin area, refusing to return Kyis
to her care. A few days later Ruezga and Officers Cuevas and
Battles interviewed Chanish about Kyis’s injury. And the police
issued a five-day emergency protective order against Chanish
and Perez after Kyis disclosed that Perez had hit him. The jury
could have reasonably inferred that Ruezga, Officers Cuevas and
Battles, or Kyle informed Chanish of Kyis’s accusation against
Perez during the investigation. A reasonable person in Chanish’s
position, with knowledge of the accusation against Perez as to the
September groin injury, would have been aware Kyis was at risk
of being physically injured by Perez if Kyis continued to reside
with him.

      4.     Substantial evidence supports Perez’s conviction of
             assault on a child causing death (count 1)
       “Assault on a child resulting in death requires a showing
that (1) the defendant had care or custody of a child under eight
years old, (2) the defendant did an act that by its nature would
directly and probably result in the application of force to the
child, (3) the defendant did that act willfully, (4) the force used
was likely to produce great bodily injury, (5) when the defendant
acted, he was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person
to realize that his act by its nature would directly and probably
result in great bodily injury to the child, (6) when the defendant
acted, he had the present ability to apply force likely to produce
great bodily injury to the child, and (7) the defendant’s act caused
the child’s death.” (People v. Sanchez (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 961,
978; accord, People v. Wyatt (2010) 48 Cal.4th 776, 780.)
“Because the defendant ‘need not know or be subjectively aware

                                56
that his act is capable of causing great bodily injury,’ the
requisite mens rea may be established ‘even when the defendant
honestly believes his act is not likely to result in such injury.’”
(People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 702.)
       On appeal, Perez argues only that he is not the one who
committed the act that caused Kyis’s injuries and death.
Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Perez
caused the fatal injuries. Dr. Super testified that Kyis died from
abdominal bleeding caused by one or more punches or kicks likely
inflicted within three hours before his death at 1:30 a.m. on
November 7, 2018.27 As Perez concedes on appeal, only Chanish
and Perez had the opportunity to injure Kyis on the night of
November 6. It is undisputed that Kyle returned Kyis to Perez
and Chanish’s home on Monday evening, November 5. Kyis went
to preschool the next day, and when he returned at noon, Perez
and Chanish put a blanket outside for Kyis to play on and left
their apartment door open so they could watch him. There is no
evidence Kyis suffered an injury that day while in school or while
he was playing outside. And given the jury’s finding that Perez
hit or punched Kyis in the groin area two months earlier, causing
a significant injury, the jury could have reasonably concluded it
was Perez who again inflicted the injuries on Kyis.
       According to Perez, after dinner he went to the master
bedroom and watched a basketball game on his cell phone and
listened to the game through his headphones from approximately

27    Perez notes Dr. Super acknowledged the injuries could
have resulted from a fall from a good height onto something
rounded or a significant bicycle accident. But there is no
evidence Kyis fell from a tall structure or fell off his bicycle on
November 6.

                                  57
6:30 until almost 10:00 p.m. Perez asserts Chanish could have
hit or kicked Kyis in the abdomen while Perez was watching the
basketball game or when she went to Kyis’s room before going to
bed. However, if Chanish injured Kyis prior to 10:00 p.m., it was
outside the three-hour window Dr. Super identified as when the
injuries likely occurred.
       Perez next argues Chanish was still awake when Kyis
collapsed, pointing to the November 15 pretext call in which
Chanish told Lartigue multiple times that she had been awake
and saw Kyis have a seizure and collapse. But in her November
20 police interview Chanish told detectives she was asleep when
Kyis collapsed, and she had lied to Lartigue because she did not
trust Lartigue and wanted to get her off the phone. Chanish’s
November 20 statement was consistent with Perez’s statement to
the detectives that he had to kick the bed to wake up Chanish. It
was also consistent with Perez’s admission on cross-examination
that when he said in the 911 call “get your ass up now,” he was
directing the comment to Chanish. Further, in his November 20
police interview, Perez admitted Chanish took medication for
anxiety and depression, which corroborated Chanish’s statement
to detectives that she took an anti-depressant medication before
going to bed at 9:00 p.m.
       Perez also points to evidence of Chanish’s inappropriate
parenting behavior to suggest Chanish caused Kyis’s death.
When Chanish attempted to buckle Kyis’s seatbelt in Rodriguez’s
car after leaving the hospital on October 24, Kyis started
screaming and crying, and Chanish responded by placing part of
her left hand in his mouth. Chanish told Rodriguez “she couldn’t
believe that it was okay for [Kyis] to bite her or hit her, but it
wasn’t okay for her to do the same to him.” When Kyis broke free
and ran out of the car, Chanish started screaming profanities,

                               58
grabbed him by his shirt collar, and pulled him for a few minutes.
Certainly, Rodriguez’s testimony shows Chanish reacted
inappropriately to Kyis’s behavior, and the jury could have found
she was the one who punched or kicked Kyis. But it did not.
Instead, the jury could have reasonably believed that Chanish
took anti-depressant medication and went to bed at 9:00 p.m.,
then was asleep when Perez abused Kyis, causing Kyis to
collapse on the floor. (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 713;
Penunuri, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 142.)

G.     Perez Was Not Prejudiced by the Cumulative Effect of the
       Errors
       Perez contends he suffered cumulative prejudice from
multiple errors. “‘[A] series of trial errors, though independently
harmless, may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the
level of reversible and prejudicial error.’” (People v. Cunningham
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009; accord, In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th
428, 483 [“In theory, the aggregate prejudice from several
different errors occurring at trial could require reversal even if no
single error was prejudicial by itself.”].) In evaluating cumulative
error, we consider whether the cumulative error caused the trial
to be fundamentally unfair in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process guarantee. (People v. Rogers (2006) 39
Cal.4th 826, 890; Cunningham, at p. 1009 [cumulative error did
not render trial “fundamentally unfair,” observing “[d]efendant
was entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one”]; People v.
Thomas (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 924, 971 [“‘The “litmus test” for
cumulative error “is whether defendant received due process and
a fair trial.”’”].)
       Considered cumulatively, the four errors we found or
assumed did not affect the outcome of Perez’s trial or render it

                                 59
fundamentally unfair. As discussed, with respect to the
instruction on the lesser offense of attempted assault on a child
causing death, the jury was offered the option to convict Perez on
the lesser offense but convicted him of the greater offense. As to
the delay in instructing the jury on assault with force likely to
produce great bodily injury, 11 of the initial jurors found Perez
guilty of the greater offense of assault on a child causing death
even after being instructed on both the greater and lesser
offenses. Although the court erroneously instructed the jury on
criminal negligence for the felony child abuse count, in finding
Perez guilty of child abuse the jury necessarily found Perez hit
Kyis with the intent to inflict the injury. And Perez failed to
show it was reasonably likely he would have obtained a more
favorable verdict had juror no. 2 not been excused.

H.     Section 654 Does Not Apply to Chanish’s Multiple Child
       Abuse Convictions
       At the time of Chanish’s sentencing, former section 654,
subdivision (a), provided, “An act or omission that is punishable
in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished
under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of
imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.”28

28    Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021,
ch. 441), effective January 1, 2022, amended section 654 “to
remove the requirement that a court impose the longest sentence
when a defendant is convicted of more than one offense arising
from the same conduct.” (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
459, 468; accord, People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 351.)
Current section 654, subdivision (a), provides, “An act or omission

                                60
       The trial court sentenced Chanish to the middle term of
four years on count 2, plus consecutive terms of 16 months each
on counts 3 and 4. The court explained, “And I am running them
consecutive because these were all separate instances that
happened to Kyis. She was aware of them. And I admit she took
him to the doctor and appeared to try to be doing what she could,
but I don’t think she really was doing what she could. . . . Her
best [course] or way of action would have been to remove him
from that home. And unfortunately, I’m sure she does regret his
loss now, and it’s going to be hard for her to 1ive with, but it’s
still—she lost her chi1d because of those acts.”
       Chanish contends the trial court erred by not staying the
sentence under section 654 on count 3 for felony child abuse
because her convictions on counts 2 and 3 arose from a single
course of conduct with a single intent and objective.29 (See People
v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501, 507 [section 654 bars
separate punishment for multiple offenses arising from the same
act or from a series of acts constituting an indivisible course of
criminal conduct].) We do not reach whether Chanish’s
convictions of child abuse arise from an indivisible course of

that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case
shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.”
29     Chanish argues the sentences on two of the three counts
should have been stayed, but because we reverse Chanish’s
conviction on count 4, we only address whether the court should
have stayed the sentence on count 3.

                                61
conduct because section 654 does not apply to Chanish’s
convictions of the same provision of the Penal Code.
       Although not cited by Chanish or the People, in People v.
Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 344 (Correa) the Supreme Court
held that based on the language and purpose of section 654, it
only applies to conduct that violates multiple criminal code
provisions. The defendant in Correa was convicted of seven
counts of being in possession of a firearm after he was
apprehended from a house with a cache of seven guns. (Id. at
p. 334.) In holding section 654 did not apply to bar multiple
punishment for the convictions, the Supreme Court disapproved
dictum in footnote 1 of its earlier decision in Neal v. State (1960)
55 Cal.2d 11, 18, which stated, “Although section 654 does not
expressly preclude double punishment when an act gives rise to
more than one violation of the same Penal Code section or to
multiple violations of the criminal provisions of other codes, it is
settled that the basic principle it enunciates precludes double
punishment in such cases also.” (See Correa, at p. 337.)
       The Correa court observed the language of section 654
made clear it only barred punishment for an “‘act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of
law.’” (Correa, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 341.) The court held,
“[H]aving reconsidered the Neal footnote, we conclude that
section 654 does not bar multiple punishment for violations of the
same provision of law. In doing so we reject dictum, correct a
legally unsupported principle, are more consistent with our later
jurisprudence, and conform to the plain language of the
statute.” (Id. at p. 344; accord, People v. Chung (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 462, 468 [considering Correa but applying
section 654 to two counts of transportation of different controlled

                                62
substances because the counts were punishable under separate
provisions of the Health and Safety Code].)
       The Supreme Court in Correa cited with approval its
earlier decision in People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 337,
which held section 654 did not apply to bar punishment for three
convictions of forcible sexual penetration where the defendant
committed the acts in succession. (See Correa, supra, 54 Cal.4th
at p. 342.) The Harrison court explained that “[t]o adopt such an
approach [applying section 654] would mean that ‘once a
[defendant] has committed one particular sexual crime against a
victim he may thereafter with impunity repeat his offense,’ so
long as he does not direct attention to another place on the
victim’s body, or significantly delay in between each
offense.” (Harrison, at p. 337.)
       Here, as in Correa and Harrison, Chanish was convicted on
counts 2 and 3 for violation of the same statute—for felony child
abuse. Thus, section 654 does not apply. To hold otherwise
would be contrary to the language of section 654, and further,
would have allowed Chanish to continue to allow Perez access to
Kyis despite repeated abuse by Perez, without additional
consequences.

I.    Senate Bill 567’s Amendments to Section 1170,
      Subdivision (b), Require Resentencing of Perez on Count 4
      At the time of Perez’s sentencing, former section 1170,
subdivision (b), provided as to offenses for which there are three
possible terms, “the choice of the appropriate term shall rest
within the sound discretion of the court.” On count 4 for child
abuse, the court found the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factors and imposed the upper term of six years. The
court explained, “As to count 4, that’s the punch to the groin or

                                63
the hit to the groin, I am going to find certain factors in
aggravation, that crime did involve great body harm or threat of
great bodily harm. And it did display a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness and callousness to hit a young boy like that, only five
years old, in his groin that left a horrible, horrible bruise. [¶] He
was only five. I think he was particularly vulnerable. I guess
you could argue it’s a dual use of facts because you had care and
custody of child. Obviously, children are vulnerable, but I think
that’s such a young age that makes it extra aggravating. So I’m
finding that as an aggravating factor as well. I would also find
under Rule 421(b)(1) that you have engaged in violent conduct
that does indicate a serious danger to society. So I think those
are aggravating factors . . . . [I] find the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating factors as to count 4 . . . . So as to
count 4 you would receive upper term of six years.”
       Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b),
effective January 1, 2022, to limit the trial court’s sentencing
discretion, as follows: “(1) When a judgment of imprisonment is
to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the
court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence
not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (2). [¶] (2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding
the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. . . . [¶]
(3) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may
consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining

                                 64
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.”
       Perez contends, the People concede, and we agree Senate
Bill 567’s changes to section 1170, subdivision (b), are retroactive
under the principles set forth in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d
740, 742 because they lessen the punishment for the offense by
limiting the trial court’s discretion to impose the upper term of
imprisonment. (People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098,
1109 [“section 1170’s current statutory language applies
retroactively in all nonfinal cases”]; People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 459, 465 [“[t]he People properly concede that Senate
Bill No. 567’s ameliorative amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b) apply retroactively to all cases not yet final as of
January 1, 2022”]; see People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 628
[“‘Estrada stands for the proposition that, “where the amendatory
statute mitigates punishment and there is no saving[s] clause,
the rule is that the amendment will operate retroactively so that
the lighter punishment is imposed.”’”]; People v. Superior Court
(Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 307.)
       As the People concede, Perez is entitled to resentencing
under the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b), because
in selecting the upper term on count 4, the court relied on
circumstances in aggravation that were not stipulated to by
Perez or found true by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we vacate Perez’s sentence and remand for
resentencing consistent with section 1170, subdivision (b).

                                65
                         DISPOSITION

       We affirm Perez’s convictions. We reverse Chanish’s
conviction on count 4 for felony child abuse and affirm her other
convictions. We vacate the sentences for Perez and Chanish and
remand with directions for the trial court to resentence them in
accordance with the terms of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), and
all other applicable, newly enacted ameliorative legislation.

                                     FEUER, J.
We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             SEGAL, J.

                                66