Court Opinion

ID: 9852940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:39:34.737372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:38.158275
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the record does not show that defendant waived his right to be present at the individual voir dire of the prospective jurors and the selection of the jurors who were to determine his guilt or innocence.
The right to be present “at all stages of the trial... is an important right of the defendant, guaranteed by our [Georgia] Constitution . .. .” Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 77 (90 SE2d 557) (1955). According to Wilson, supra at 74, it is derived from the portion of the Bill of Rights which then provided: “No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend his own cause in any of the courts of this State, in person, by attorney, or both.” Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. IV. A brief history of that provision may be found in Bloomfield v. Liggett & Myers, 230 Ga. 484 (198 SE2d 144) (1973). This court recognized the right to be present as being derived from the same part of the 1976 Constitution, in Palmer v. State, 155 Ga. App. 368 (271 SE2d 24) (1980).
The provision was revised in 1983: “No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII. The revision did not change defendant’s right to be present which, as acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Wilson, is a principle which has been recognized since the establishment of that court. As quoted there: “ ‘The accused and his counsel have the right to be present at every stage of the proceedings and personally see and know what is being done in the case. To say that no injury results when it appears that what occurred in their absence was regular and legal would, in effect, practically do away with this great and important right, one element of which is to see to it that what does take place is in accord with law and good practice.’ [Cits.]” Id. at 74-75. As written by Chief Justice Bleckley regarding the right to be present at all stages of the proceeding in a murder case, including when a jury charge is given: “The presence of the counsel was no substitute for that of the man on trial.” Wilson v. State, 87 Ga. 583, 584 (13 SE 566) (1891).
The right to be present has been acknowledged and protected. See, e.g., Tiller v. State, 96 Ga. 430 (1) (23 SE 825) (1895) (during *571argument of counsel to jury); Seay v. State, 111 Ga. App. 22 (3) (140 SE2d 283) (1965) (during colloquy between jury and judge); Palmer v. State, supra (during jury view); Martin v. State, 160 Ga. App. 275, 278 (2) (287 SE2d 244) (1981) (during jury view of evidence); Collins v. State, 191 Ga. App. 289 (2) (381 SE2d 430) (1989) (during recharge to jury). Compare Jones v. State, 259 Ga. 603 (2) (385 SE2d 400) (1989) (absence of defendant not shown); Stone v. State, 177 Ga. App. 750 (1) (341 SE2d 280) (1986) (brief colloquy before jury selection).
The right extends to jury selection, “when a defendant may challenge prospective jurors ‘simply on the basis of the sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another.’ (Punctuation and citation omitted.) [Cit.]” Fictum v. State, 188 Ga. App. 348, 350 (373 SE2d 54) (1988).1
The 1955 Wilson case held that, with respect to the right to be present, counsel could waive it for defendant but “in order for the waiver of counsel to be binding on the defendant, it must be made in his presence or by his express authority, or be subsequently acquiesced in by him.” Wilson, supra at 77-78. Earlier this court had held that the defendant’s right to be present at every stage from arraignment to verdict “can not be waived by the attorney, except by the express authority of the defendant.” Lyons v. State, 7 Ga. App. 50 (2) (66 SE 149) (1909). This principle was repeated in Palmer, supra. According to Palmer, the court may not deprive defendant of the right “in the absence of a personal waiver by him.”
“[T]he standard for waiver requires an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” under our Constitution as well as under the federal constitution. Butler v. State, 198 Ga. App. 217, 220 (1) (401 SE2d 43) (1990) (physical precedent only but cited in Kirkland v. State, 202 Ga. App. 356, 357-358 (1) (414 SE2d 502) (1991), in connection with waiver of counsel. The standard was first articulated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (58 SC 1019, 82 LE 1461) (1938)). This standard has been applied to the right to be present as it is guaranteed by the Constitution of this State. Martin v. State, supra. The court held that defendant had a right to be present at a jury viewing of evidence.
In Harwell v. England, 234 Ga. 640 (217 SE2d 154) (1975), the *572Court ruled that under Georgia law, a waiver of the right to be present, when made by counsel in defendant’s presence, does not require that defendant know or have been specifically warned of the right being waived. That case dealt with defendant’s absence during a jury’s view of the site of a crime where agreed-upon aspects of the site were pointed out. Moreover, the court also found a subsequent acquiescence in the waiver.
In this case, on the other hand, the waiver involves the defendant’s right to be present at the crucial time when jurors are being examined for their possible prejudice and selected to decide the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Understanding the significance of his presence and personal participation at this proceeding, which is uniquely and peculiarly a trial experience, cannot be presumed to exist in the mind of the lay person. In determining what must be shown to constitute a valid waiver of presence, the questions which must be asked are, “at what?” and “what is the significance of presence?” at the particular event. Where presence would be, at the mere viewing of a site, as in Harwell, or where the meaning of absence would have little or no significance, as also was the situation in Harwell, then the waiver can more easily be acknowledged as valid. But where the event is one at which the defendant’s presence is critical, and the lay person cannot be expected to understand the significance or what part he or she would play in the event, then the waiver must be scrutinized more carefully.
Here we are concerned about the defendant’s presence at voir dire and selection, a process which would be unfamiliar to a lay person, but critically important to the fairness of his trial, and the standard as articulated in Johnson v. Zerbst should be observed.
The record on the motion for new trial shows that before trial, the district attorney and counsel discussed the motion for individual voir dire and agreed to the procedure for accommodating it. Defendant was not part of this discussion but was in the courtroom. The district attorney and counsel then left the courtroom and discussed it with the judge either in the hallway before she came into the courtroom or in her chambers. After the panel of jurors was sworn and qualified, the court announced that individual voir dire and jury selection would be conducted in the jury room.
Then defendant’s counsel stated: “For the record, the accused — his counsel waives his presence at the voir dire of the jurors.” The court asked: “And specifically requests that he not be present, is that correct?” Counsel responded “yes,” whereupon the voir dire and selection process proceeded in the jury room, in the defendant’s absence. When it was completed, the proceedings continued in open court, in defendant’s presence. Nothing was said at that time with respect to defendant’s absence.
*573Neither the record of the trial nor that of the motion for new trial shows that defendant knew he had a constitutional right to be present and intentionally relinquished it. He testified at the motion hearing that he did not know he had such a right, so he did not question counsel about it when counsel decided to question prospective jurors and choose the jury without him. For the same reason, and because he was very nervous, he did not say anything to the court.
Counsel, who believed that defendant was innocent and at the motion hearing still had doubts of his guilt and thought that defendant was “very candid” with him, made the decision himself to preclude defendant, as a trial tactic to encourage candor from the jurors on sensitive personal questions and because defendant was dressed “like he was going to a nightclub,” in a black silk shirt and maybe a gold jacket and pants. He was certain he discussed defendant’s absence with him but could not recall it specifically; he said he usually asks the court to expressly record a personal waiver of defendant on the record, but that was not done here. The most he could say was that “I would say that I had — did tell Mr. Williamson that he had a right to be there,” and that “probably” defendant’s response was that he would do what counsel thought best. He explained: “I say probably because I’m applying a probability theory to this.” There is no evidence that defendant was aware of what his absence from the selection process meant and no clear evidence that he knew of his right to be present unless he chose, on counsel’s advice, to be absent.
Defendant’s waiver, exercised by counsel in this case, was not shown to meet the standard. We cannot presume that, because defendant was present in court when counsel spoke the words, he knew of his right. Nor is it shown that he thereafter learned of his right and acquiesced in the process by which the jury had been questioned and selected.
This case is unlike Allen v. State, 199 Ga. App. 365, 367 (6) (405 SE2d 94) (1991). There the record showed that trial counsel informed defendant of his right to be present at jury selection and, after it was done in his absence, defendant and counsel met to discuss the impaneled jury and no complaint was made.
It also differs from State v. Phillips, 247 Ga. 246, 247 (1) (275 SE2d 323) (1981), in which defendant left the courtroom during examination of a witness, apparently as a deliberate tactical decision made by counsel. He was present again when the judge and district attorney recounted the events leading to his withdrawal. The Court held that the evidence showed that defendant acquiesced in counsel’s express waiver and that it was “both ‘knowing’ and ‘voluntary.’ ” Id. at 249-250.
Appellant is entitled to a new trial at which, if he does waive his presence at any stage, the waiver is shown to be a valid one.
*574Decided March 2, 1993.
Carla J. Friend, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Alfred D. Dixon, Rebecca A. Keel, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
I do not reach the issues decided in Division 2 of the majority opinion but I concur in Division 3.
I am authorized to state that Judge Cooper joins in this dissent.

 Of course, racial discrimination is precluded. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). The United States Supreme Court, in reversing a conviction because of defendant’s absence during jury challenges, stated: “The prisoner is entitled to an impartial jury composed of persons not disqualified by statute, and his life or liberty may depend upon the aid which, by his personal presence, he may give to counsel and to the court and triers, in the selection of jurors. The necessities of the defence may not be met by the presence of his counsel only.” Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 578 (4 SC 202, 28 LE 262) (1884).