Court Opinion

ID: 9883578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:50:43.386642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:39.135900
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.
I dissent.
The access regulation of the Agricultural Labor Relations Board is invalid on three grounds. First, federal law has established that nonemployee organizers have no right of access to an employer’s property whenever other reasonable means of communication are available. Even when access is permissible, it is restricted to nonworking areas. The California Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 (Lab. Code, § 1140 et seq.) incorporated the federal law; the board’s regulation, in authorizing access when other means of communication are available, and in permitting access to working areas, is contrary to federal law and therefore violates the state statute. Second, because the board’s regulation is in conflict with the penal trespass statute it usurps the legislative function, and is thus invalid. Third, the regulation constitutes an unwarranted infringement on constitutionally protected property rights.
The Regulation Conflicts With The Agricultural Labor Relations Act
A. The Federal Law
Two United States Supreme Court decisions have specifically dealt with the issue of nonemployee union organizer access to private property. In Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1956) 351 U.S. 105 [100 L.Ed. 975, 76 S.Ct. 679], employers prohibited nonemployees from distributing union literature on employer-owned parking lots. The National Labor Relations Board (labor board) ruled that the employers’ conduct constituted an unfair labor practice. The labor board based its ruling on a decision establishing that employees could use nonworking areas of the employer’s premises for organizational activities. (Republic Aviation Corp. v. Board (1945) 324 U.S. 793 [89 L.Ed. 1372, 65 S.Ct. 982, 157 A.L.R. 1081].)
*422The court in Babcock unanimously ruled that the labor board had erred in failing “to make a distinction between rules of law applicable to employees and those applicable to nonemployees.” (351 U.S. at p. 113 [100 L.Ed. atp. 983].)
Having identified the source of the labor board’s error, the Supreme Court stated the legal principles which govern nonemployee access cases. “[A]n employer may validly post his property against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer’s notice or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution. In these circumstances the employer may not be compelled to allow distribution even under such reasonable regulations as the orders in these cases permit.” (351 U.S. at p. 112 [100 L.Ed. at p. 982].)
In Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB (1972) 407 U.S. 539 [33 L.Ed.2d 122, 92 S.Ct. 2238], the second United States Supreme Court decision, the labor board again found an employer to have engaged in an unfair labor practice by excluding nonemployee union organizers from its parking lot. In making this ruling, the labor board decided that the employer had violated First Amendment rights of the employees under Food Employees v. Logan Plaza (1968) 391 U.S. 308 [20 L.Ed.2d 603, 88 S.Ct. 1601],
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Logan Plaza’s First Amendment analysis was inapplicable, and that if the labor board’s attempt to apply Logan Plaza to nonemployee organizers were allowed to stand, it would “constitute an unwarranted infringement of long-settled rights of private property protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (407, U.S. at p. 547 [33 L.Ed.2d at p. 129].)
The Supreme Court reiterated its Babcock holding that nonemployee organizers may not be allowed access when other reasonable means of communication are available. The court added: “The principle of Babcock is limited to this accommodation between organization rights and property rights. This principle requires a ‘yielding’ of property rights only in the context of an organization campaign. Moreover, the allowed intrusion on property rights is limited to that necessary to facilitate the exercise of employees’ § 7 rights.[1] After the requisite need for access to *423the employer’s property has been shown, the access is limited to (i) union organizers; (ii) prescribed nonworking areas of the employer’s premises; and (iii) the duration of organization activity. In short, the principle of accommodation announced in Babcock is limited to labor organization campaigns, and the ‘yielding’ of property rights it may require is both temporary and minimal.” (407 U.S. at pp. 544-545 [33 L.Ed.2d at p. 127].) The dissent in Central Hardware did not relate to the points involved here. Even the dissenting justices expressly stated that the labor board should have followed Babcock.
The federal law of nonemployee access is therefore settled, establishing that there is no right of access where alternative methods of communication exist. If there are no alternative methods, the nonemployees’ right of access is limited to prescribed nonworking areas of the employer’s • premises. The Supreme Court has expressly held that the broader right of employees to engage in organizational activities recognized by Republic Aviation v. Board, supra, 324 U.S. 793, does not apply to the nonemployee organizer. Employee organizers are legally upon the employer’s premises as employees; thus, their presence usually does not interfere with the employer’s property rights. The employer’s interest in securing effective work is the only interest subject to potential interference. Accordingly, the limitation on employees’ right to organize relates to discipline. Nonemployee organizers, however, are not invited on the premises. In this situation, not only is the employer’s interest in securing effective work jeopardized, but his property rights under the United States Constitution are interfered with as well.
B. The Legislature’s Incorporation of the Federal Law
Labor Code section 1152 establishes the right of employees to organize. That section contains language identical to section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,2 the section applied in Babcock and Central Hardware. Labor Code section 1148 states: “The board shall follow applicable precedents of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.” (Italics added.)
“When legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on the same or an analogous subject is framed in the identical language, it will ordinarily be presumed that the Legislature intended *424that the language as used in the later enactment would be given a like interpretation. This rule is applicable to state statutes which are patterned after the federal statutes. [Citations.]” (Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (1960) 54 Cal.2d 684, 688-689, [8 Cal.Rptr. 1, 355 P.2d 905].)
In Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority, as in the instant case, the Legislature had used language from section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. This court held that, because the federal courts had interpreted part of the language to include the right to strike, the Legislature intended to grant a right to strike despite the fact that the state statute applied to governmental employees who ordinarily have no such right.
By using the language of section 7, the Legislature clearly manifested its intention to adopt the federal construction of section 7. In Babcock and. Central Hardware, the United States Supreme Court construed section 7. That construction was therefore adopted by our Legislature when it enacted section 1152. Any doubt in the matter was eliminated when the Legislature, in section 1148, expressly required the board to follow applicable federal precedents. Accordingly, the inescapable conclusion is that the Legislature intended the board to apply the rule of Babcock and Central Hardware, which denies access rights to non employee organizers when reasonable alternative methods of communication are available.3
It is generally recognized that the Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 is a compromise among the various interests. (Levy, The Agricultural Relations Act of 1975.—La Esperanza de California Para El Futuro (1975) 15 Santa Clara Law. 783.) When the competing interests agreed to compromise, the Legislature was faced with three choices: it could turn the board loose with little definition of its duties, powers, limitations on *425those powers, or standards to be applied; it could, on the other hand, sharply define the duties, powers, limitations, and standards; or it could incorporate the highly developed federal law, which had over a period of 40 years arrived at definitions of both the rights and interests of the affected parties, as well as the duties, powers, limitations, and standards of the administrative agency.
The Legislature chose to incorporate the highly developed federal law. This is clear from its adoption of section 1152, which is substantially identical to section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, and adoption of section 1148, which requires the board to rely on applicable federal precedents.
The majority, of course, is not unmindful of the necessity to resort to federal law. There is no specific mention of a right of access in the act (other than for board officials) and no express delegation empowering the board to adopt a right of access. The majority, in finding a right of access, relies upon sections 1148 and 1152, which adopt federal law, and section 1144 which grants general rule-making powers to the board. Obviously, a general rule-making power with no specification as to what those rules relate is not the same as an express power to create access rights. It is evident that the majority must resort to federal law to find board authority to create access rights.
It is manifestly unfair to the Legislature, in light of the history and language of the act, to rely on federal law to establish board power to create an access right, and at the same time to ignore the standards and limitations placed upon that right by the same federal law. Rather, the Legislature’s incorporation of the federal law includes the duties, powers, limitations, and standards.
Although the board is given general rule-making power, regulations adopted pursuant to this power must conform to the legislative command requiring application of federal law. As this court stated in Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 733 [63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697]: “Under Government Code section 11373, ‘Each regulation adopted [by a state agency], to be effective, must be within the scope of authority conferred. ...’ Whenever a state agency is authorized by statute ‘to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific or otherwise carry out the provisions of the statute, no regulation adopted is valid or effective unless consistent and not in conflict with the statute. . . .’ (Gov. Code, § 11374.) Our first duty, therefore, is to determine whether the Administrator *426exercised quasi-legislative authority within the bounds of the statutory mandate. While the construction of a statute by officials charged with its administration, including their interpretation of the authority invested in them to implement and carry out its provisions, is entitled to great weight, nevertheless ‘Whatever the force of administrative construction . . . final responsibility for the interpretation of the law rests with the courts.’ (Whitcomb Hotel v. California Emp. Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 753, 757 .. . , and authorities there collected.) Administrative regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void and courts not only may, but it is their obligation to strike down such regulations. {Whitcomb Hotel v. California Emp. Com., supra; Hodge v. McCall (1921) 185 Cal. 330, 334 . . .; Boone v. Kingsbury (1928) 206 Cal. 148, 161-162 . . .; First Industrial Loan Co. v. Daugherty (1945) 26 Cal.2d 545, 550 . . .; see Brock v. Superior Court (1938) 11 Cal.2d 682, 688 .. ..)” (67 Cal.2d atp. 748.)
C. The Regulation’s Conflict With the Federal Law and the Statute
As we have seen, the federal law incorporated in the act by the Legislature denies access to nonemployee organizers whenever reasonable alternative means of communication are available. Further, even when access is allowed, it is restricted to nonworking areas. By permitting blanket access to all agricultural property, regardless of the existence of alternative means of communication, and by permitting access to working areas, the board’s regulation is contrary to Babcock and Central Hardware, violating the statutory command to follow federal precedent.
The conflict may not be avoided on the basis of the board’s finding that “[generally” there is no alternative means of communication. The absence of alternative means of communication in most cases does not relieve the board of its obligation to adhere to Babcock and Central Hardware any more than an N.L.R.B. finding of the availability of alternative means of communication in most cases would justify the N.L.R.B. from denying nonemployee access in all cases.
Conflict With Trespass Statute
Penal Code section 602 provides in relevant part: “Every person who willfully commits a trespass by any of the following acts is guilty of a misdemeanor: (j) Entering any lands, whether unenclosed or enclosed by fence, for the purpose of injuring any property or property rights or with *427the intention of interfering with, obstructing, or injuring any lawful business or occupation carried on by the owner of such land, his agent or by the person in lawful possession. [H] (k) Entering any lands under cultivation or enclosed by fence, belonging to, or occupied by, another... without the written permission of the owner of such land, his agent or the person in lawful possession, and [It] (1) Refusing or failing to leave such lands immediately upon being requested by the owner of such land, his agent or by the person in lawful possession to leave such lands,... [II] (/) Entering and occupying real property or structures of any kind without the consent of the owner, his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof. [If] (m) Driving any vehicle . . . upon real property belonging to or lawfully occupied by another and known not to be open to the general public, without the consent of the owner, his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof. [H] (n) Refusing or failing to leave land, real property, or structures belonging to or lawfully occupied by another and not open to the general public, upon being requested to leave by a peace officer and the owner, his agent, or the person in lawful possession thereof.”
The conflict between the access regulation and the trespass statute is apparent.
The law regarding conflict between administrative acts and legislative acts is well-settled. “Administrative regulations that violate acts of the Legislature are void and no protestations that they are merely an exercise of administrative discretion can sanctify them. They must conform to the legislative will if we are to preserve an orderly system of government.” {Morris v. Williams, supra, 67 Cal.2d 733, 737; italics added.) “It is fundamental that an administrative agency may not usurp the legislative function, no matter how altruistic its motives are.” {City of San Joaquin v. State Bd. of Equalization (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 365, 374 [88 Cal.Rptr. 12].)
Administrative agencies “may not exercise [their] sublegislative powers to modify, alter or enlarge the provisions of the legislative act which is being administered. Administrative regulations in conflict with the Constitution or statutes are generally declared to be null or void. {Hammond v. McDonald, 49 Cal.App.2d 671, 679 . . .; Hodge v. McCall, 185 Cal. 330, 334 . . . .)” {Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 1, 6 [39 Cal.Rptr. 192]; Accord: Morris v. Williams, supra, 67 Cal.2d 733, 748-749; Duskin v. State Board of Dry Cleaners (1962) 58 Cal.2d 155, 161-162 [23 Cal.Rptr. 404, 373 P.2d 468]; Schenley *428Industries, Inc. v. Munro (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 106, 111 [46 Cal.Rptr. 678]; Am. Distilling Co. v. St. Bd. of Equalization (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 799, 805-806 [131 P.2d 609].)
As the court in Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd., supra, noted: “The order of priority with respect to jurisdiction, accordingly, is as follows: (1) The Constitution is the supreme expression; (2) to the extent that it does not conflict with the Constitution, the Legislature may act; (3) to the extent that it does not conflict with the Constitution, or with lawful acts of the Legislature, the department [administrative agencies] may act through its rules and regulations.” (228 Cal.App.2d at p. 7; italics added.)
The doctrine that administrative regulations are subordinate and must give way to legislative enactments is equally applicable when the regulation contravenes a provision of a statute or code other than the statutes creating the agency or administered by it. (Tolman v. Underhill (1952) 39 Cal.2d 708, 712 [249 P.2d 280]; Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club (1951) 36 Cal.2d 734, 737-738 [227 P.2d 449]; In re Potter (1913) 164 Cal. 735, 739 [130 P. 721]; Cleveland Chiropractic College v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 25, 34-35 [89 Cal.Rptr. 572]; Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd., supra, 228 Cal.App.2d 1, 6.)
The Legislature, as the majority points out, may make exceptions to other statutes and may expressly authorize an administrative agency to make exceptions. Such exceptions may also be made by the incorporation of other law, including federal law. In addition, an agency’s right to make an exception to general statutory provisions might be implied in cases of necessity, when exercise of a power expressly granted to the agency will necessarily involve a violation of the other statute. In these circumstances, exceptions are warranted by the general principle that specific statutory provisions govern general ones. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1859; People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 479-480 [82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580].)
However, the special-general principle does not apply when the agency’s power to act is not express but merely implied. Because the agency’s power is implied, it can never be special in relation to a conflicting express legislative declaration. If the rule were otherwise, agencies in their field of expertise would be free to ignore almost all statutes enacted by the Legislature.
*429The Legislature has not expressly provided for access by nonemployee organizers to employer property. Nor has the Legislature expressly delegated to the board the authority to formulate an access rule. Having refused to follow Babcock and Central Hardware and the federal law, the majority may not properly claim that the Legislature incorporated an access rule by reference to federal law. Nor has the board or the majority shown it to be absolutely necessary to sanction violations of the Penal Code in order to effectuate the powers expressly granted to the board.
The Agricultural Labor Relations Act deals with labor relations; it does not deal with trespasses to real property. Penal Code section 602 deals with trespass to real property; its relevant provisions do not expressly deal with labor relations. The instant case deals with labor relations and trespasses. Thus each statute is on par with the other, and the Penal Code provision being a legislative enactment, it must take precedence over the administrative regulation based on a power implied from the labor statute. Moreover, if either the act or the Penal Code provisions must be categorized as special in relation to the activities before us, the Penal Code provisions should be so categorized. Related provisions of the Penal Code expressly deal with both trespasses and labor relations (Pen. Code, §§ 552.1, 555.2), and in In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal.2d 666, 668-669 [36 Cal.Rptr. 286, 388 P.2d 182, 10 A.L.R.3d 840], it was held that the provisions of those sections must be read into section 602, subdivision (/), one of the subdivisions presently before us.
Constitutionality Of The Access Regulation
The majority concludes that the access regulation is constitutional and does not impinge upon private property rights because a rational relationship exists between the access regulation and the purposes of the act. The majority finds that the rational relationship test is the proper standard for constitutional review by analogizing the issue here presented to the issues' raised when the validity of a zoning ordinance is challenged. The majority, however, has erred in its analogy, applied an improper standard of constitutional review, and thereby sanctioned an impermissible invasion on constitutionally protected property rights.4
*430When regulations such as zoning are challenged, the constitutional issue raised is the extent to which the government may regulate a landowner’s use of his own property. The access regulation, on the other hand, presents a very distinct situation. In promulgating such a regulation the government is requiring a property owner to surrender the use of his private property not for public use but for the use of other private parties—nonemployee union organizers.
The distinction is of major significance. In the private access situation we must weigh the strength of the interest asserted against the infringement on private property rights. The proper judicial function is to balance the competing interests; although the rational relationship test applies in zoning cases, the law of zoning is not a universal solvent in which property rights are dissolved.
This court is apparently the only court unable to grasp that the appropriate standard for review is one of balancing and not of rational relationship. In Labor Board v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., supra, 351 U.S. 105, the United States Supreme Court stated: “This is not a problem of always open or always closed doors for union organization on company property. . . . Accommodation between the two [organizational rights and property rights] must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.” (Id., at p. 112; italics added.) Similarly, in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, supra, 407 U.S. 539, the Supreme Court stated: “the principle of accommodation announced in Babcock is limited to labor organization campaigns, and the ‘yielding’ of property rights it may require is both temporary and minimal.” (Id., at p. 545; italics added.) The proper test is one of balancing, not a determination of rational relationships.
The federal Courts of Appeals have fully recognized that balancing is the proper standard for review. (E.g., N. L. R. B. v. Visceglia (3d Cir. 1974) 498 F.2d 43, 45; McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. N. L. R. B. (8th Cir. 1973) 472 F.2d 539, 544; Diamond Shamrock Co. v. N. L. R. B. (3d Cir. 1971) 443 F.2d 52, 56-58; see Asociacion de Trabajadores, Etc. v. *431Green Giant Co. (3d Cir. 1975) 518 F.2d 130, 135; Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corporation (5th Cir. 1973) 478 F.2d 73, 82.)
Indeed, in the only federal Court of Appeals case decided after Babcock and Central Hardware specifically discussed by the majority, the court recognized that the proper standard for resolving this issue is one of balancing. (N. L. R. B. v. S & H Grossinger’s Inc. (2d Cir. 1967) 372 F.2d 26, 29-30.) Moreover, the fact that access has been permitted in several federal cases is hardly surprising under a balancing test. However, it does not follow, as the majority suggests, that because the balance in some cases has favored access that the balance in all cases will do so. If this were otherwise then the United States Supreme Court’s use of the word “accommodate” is meaningless, as is the federal Courts of Appeals’ continual use of a balancing approach.
The United States Supreme Court balanced the competing interests in Babcock and Central Hardware, and because, as pointed out above, the board’s regulation violates the rule of those cases, the access regulation violates the constitutional provisions protecting private property. The board’s regulation does not even attempt to balance or accommodate the competing interests. It allows access when alternative means of communication do in fact exist. And it permits blanket entry onto private property during working hours. The regulation as presently promulgated is unconstitutional.
Conclusion
In a case such as this, where conviction and feeling run high, we should apply the law to the facts carefully and objectively, to assure that the result of our decision comports with precedent, thereby carrying out the intent of the Legislature. In this, the majority has failed today. To reach its result, it has relied on inapplicable precedent, applied the wrong constitutional standard of review, nullified the Legislature’s mandate to the board, and subordinated the Legislature to an administrative agency.
McComb, J., and Richardson, J., concurred.
On March 31, 1976, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act is substantially identical to Labor Code section 1152.

The operative language of section 1152 is identical to section 7. The only difference between the statutes is that section 7 cross-references to another federal statute while section 1152 cross-references, of course, to a state statute.

The majority attempts to characterize the access regulation as “limited in purpose, in time and place, and in the number of organizers ....”(Ante, p. 400.) But in characterizing these as limitations, the majority relies on the irrelevant. These limitations in no way indicate the unavailability of alternative means of communication—the very showing that must be made before any access, regardless of how limited, is permitted. Moreover, the majority’s statement that elections under the ALRA are required to be held within short periods of time {ante, p. 416), while true, has nothing to do with the access regulation. The elections must be held within seven days of the filing of a petition signed by a majority of the currently employed. (Lab. Code, § 1156.3, subd. (a).) However, the access regulation does not limit access to the period following the filing of a petition. The regulation is thus open-ended and the infringement on property rights it sanctions— contrary to the majority’s implication—is therefore neither limited in time nor is it minimal.

The majority justifies its application of the rational relationship test on grounds that the access regulation’s infringement of property rights is “not a deprivation of ‘fundamental personal liberties.’ ’’ However, property rights are fundamental and personal. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. (1972) 405 U.S. 538 [31 L.Ed.2d 424, 92 S.Ct. 1113], “[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful *430deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a ‘personal’ right, whether the ‘property’ in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized. J. Locke, Of Civil Government 82-85 (1924); J. Adams, A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, in F. Coker, Democracy, Liberty, and Property 121-132 (1942); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 138-140.” (Id, at p. 552 [31 L.Ed.2d at pp. 434-435].)