Court Opinion

ID: 9543229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:43:29.403488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:00.382660
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: The decision of the Secretary of State is not only against the manifest weight of the evidence but the decision is against all relevant evidence presented to the hearing officer. This is the third application by the plaintiff for driving privileges as a result of his revocation, which occurred on May 29, 1982, after a conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor on May 11,1982. With respect to the first application on March 14, 1983, the Secretary found that there was no proof of completion of an alcohol remedial education program, that the plaintiff considered himself a social drinker, and that the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (MAST) indicated that he still may have a problem drinking. He again applied for reinstatement on March 1, 1985. That application was denied on May 23, 1985, the evidence showing that the plaintiff had not used alcohol for V-k years. The evidence both at that hearing and now is unrebutted that the driver has abstained from the use of alcohol since July of 1983. At the time of this application, which was heard on September 26, 1985, the evidence showed the MAST and Alcohol Use Inventory results did not indicate any alcohol problem, there had been no drinking for Vk years, successful completion of the Dry Roads remedial program and the Illinois Driver’s Improvement program. Abstinence and sobriety were verified and there was no need for additional counseling. The principal argument of the Secretary of State in this case is that the plaintiff is a recovering alcoholic and failed to prove that he would be a safe, responsible driver and had only recently begun participation in a self-help group for continued abstinence. Importance is given by the Secretary of State to the admission of the plaintiff that he is an alcoholic. Anyone who has drunk to excess and has become an abstainer can consider himself to be an alcoholic. He is going to carry that description throughout the rest of his life whether he has another drink or not. That fact alone, designation as an alcoholic, has nothing to do with a proper disposition in this matter. The majority indicates that the plaintiff only recently joined AA. There was nothing in either the first or second application with respect to the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer that indicated a need for the petitioner to join the AA program. The fact that he has joined AA certainly should not be used as evidence against his petition. It seems to beg the question to say he should be denied his application in part because he waited two years after he stopped drinking to begin AA. The majority’s reference to the plaintiff’s background concerns four alcohol-related offenses, dated January 9, 1976, November 30, 1977, June 22, 1978, March 6, 1982. At some point even a felon’s background convictions become inadmissible. (People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695.) Alcohol has taken its toll on plaintiff’s habits and health. There simply is no evidence presented by the Secretary of State that would show that the plaintiff is at risk if he is given his driving privileges. Both Murdy and Franz v. Edgar (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 513, 478 N.E.2d 1165, dictate a reversal of the Secretary of State. In Agans, the facts and evidence presented were not as conclusively convincing or undisputed. The plaintiff has sustained his burden and should be granted full driving privileges.