Court Opinion

ID: 4049869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 01:06:14.131225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:30:49.956841
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                             07-14-00340-CR
                                                                 SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                           AMARILLO, TEXAS
                                                                       2/26/2015 10:27:22 AM
                                                                            Vivian Long, Clerk

                       No. 07-14-00340-CR
                  ______________________________
                                                           FILED IN
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 7th COURT OF APPEALS
                                                  AMARILLO, TEXAS
       SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS, AMARILLO,      TEXAS
                                              2/26/2015 10:27:22 AM
               ______________________________       VIVIAN LONG
                                                             CLERK
                     ALLYNE SHANE DOYLE,
                                      Appellant,
                              v.

                     THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                            Appellee.
                  ______________________________

           On Appeal from the 69th Judicial District Court
                      Of Dallam County Texas
                 ______________________________

                         STATE’S BRIEF
                  ______________________________

NANCY NEMER                                *JOSEPH P. CORCORAN
District Attorney, Pro Tem       Assistant District Attorney, Pro Tem
Assistant Attorney General                Assistant Attorney General
                                                Supervising Attorney
                                             for Non-Capital Appeals
                                           Criminal Appeals Division
*Lead Appellate Counsel                       State Bar No. 00793549
                                Joseph.Corcoran@TexasAttorneyGeneral.gov

                  P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
                        Austin, Texas 78711
                     Telephone: (512) 936-1400
                     Facsimile: (512) 936-1280
                  _____________________________
                  ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE
              IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant
     Allyne Shane Doyle

     Represented by

          TIMOTHY D. SALLEY
          (At both trial and on appeal)
          Salley & Lands
          102-B E 7th Street
          Dumas, TX 79029
          (806) 934-3185
          tsalley53@gmail.com

Appellee
     The State of Texas
     Represented by

          JOSEPH P. CORCORAN (on appeal)
          NANCY NEMER
          District Attorneys Pro Tem
          Dallam County, Texas
          Assistant Attorneys General
          OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
          P.O. Box 12548 – MC067
          Austin, Texas 78711-2548
          512-936-1400
          Joseph.Corcoran@texasattorneygeneral.gov
          Nancy.Nemer@texasattorneygeneral.gov

                                  ii
                                   TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                                                      Page

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................................. ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS .........................................................................iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................. 1

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................. 4

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................ 4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS ..................................................... 10

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES .................................................... 12

I.     Standard of Review ....................................................................... 12

II.    Resolution of Appellant’s Point of Error Is Impossible Because It Is
       Premised Upon Extra Record “Facts” Not Properly before the Court,
       and Which Could Not Have Been Considered by the Trial Court
       When Appellant’s Original Motion Was Overruled by Operation of
       Law ................................................................................................. 13

       A.      The 30-day time limit to file a motion for new trial ............. 13

       B.      Appellant’s “supplemental” motion for new trial was in
               reality an untimely amendment ........................................... 14

       C.      The trial court could not have considered the Amended
               Motion over the State’s objection; hence, Appellant
               failed to preserve his single point of error for review .......... 15
                                                     iii
III.   Even Assuming, Arguendo, that the Amended Motion was Properly
       Before the Trial Court, Appellant Fails to Establish that the Trial
       Court Abused its Discretion When it Denied the
       Amended Motion. .......................................................................... 16

       A.     The trial court has no duty to inform a defendant that
              he has a constitutional right to testify, or to ensure that
              a defendant’s waiver of that right is knowing or
              voluntary, under Texas law this obligation is on defense
              counsel ................................................................................... 16

       B.     Appellant has failed to meet his burden of establishing
              that the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for new
              trial was an arbitrary or unreasonable application of
              Strickland. ............................................................................. 19

       C.     Appellant fails to meet his burden under either prong of
              Strickland. ............................................................................. 22

PRAYER FOR RELIEF .......................................................................... 24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................ 25

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................... 26

                                                   iv
                          INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Adams v. State, 514 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) ....................... 16

Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)...................... 21

Dugard v. State, 688 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ...................... 14

Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997) .................................... 17

Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ......................... 21

Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ...................... 16

Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) .................. 19

Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ................ 20

Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ................ 12, 23

Johnson v. State, 120 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003) ............... 17

Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ............... 17, 18

Klapesky v. State, 256 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. App.–Austin 2008) ................ 14

Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)............................. 12

Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) .......................... 20

Marras v. State, 741 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ...................... 16

Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ........... 19, 20, 21

                                          v
My Thi Tieu v. State, 299 S.W.3d 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

  2009) ..................................................................................................... 22

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) ..................................................... 17

Rodriguez v. State, 292 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2009) 19, 20, 21

Shanklin v. State, 190 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005)

   .............................................................................................................. 22

State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998) ........................ 22

State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .................... 22

State v. Zalman, 400 S.W.3d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ................ 14, 15

Strickland v. Washington.................................................................. 12, 20

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ..................... 21
Will. v. State, 780 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).................... 14

Statutes

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art 42.013 .............................................................. 2

Tex. Penal Code § 12.32 ............................................................................ 1

Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(b) ........................................................................ 1

Rules

Tex. R. App. P. 21.2 ................................................................................. 16

                                                        vi
Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(a) ............................................................................. 13

Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(b) ............................................................................. 13

Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(c) ............................................................................... 3

Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(2) .......................................................................... 3

                                                  vii
                        STATEMENT OF THE CASE

      The Grand Jury of the 69th Judicial District Court of Dallam

County Texas, indicted Appellant, Allyne Shane Doyle, with the second-

degree felony offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. CR 5.1

The indictment included a single, final-felony enhancement allegation,

which if proven, increased the potential punishment range to that of a

first-degree felony (i.e., to a term of not less than five years, and not more

than ninety-nine years, or life). CR 5; see Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(b)

(West 2013); see also Tex. Penal Code § 12.32 (West 2013) (defining the

punishment range for a first-degree felony offense). Appellant pleaded

not guilty and proceeded to a bench trial. CR 35–36; 2 RR 5. The trial

court found Appellant guilty of the offense as alleged in the indictment.

CR 35–36; 3 RR 121. On the same day—July 8, 2014—after conducting a

hearing on punishment, and after finding the enhancement paragraph to

      1  “CR” refers to the Clerk’s Record—the transcript of pleadings and documents
filed with the clerk during trial and is followed by page number. “RR” refers to the
Reporter’s Record of the transcribed trial proceedings, and is preceded by volume
number and followed by page number.

                                         1
be true, the trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty-five years’

imprisonment. 2 3 RR 187–88; CR 35. Although he was present when his

sentence was pronounced in open court, Appellant did not testify at the

punishment proceeding. 3 RR 133–86. As relevant to this appeal,

immediately prior to the start of the punishment portion of the trial,

Appellant voluntarily waived his right to be present during the

questioning of witnesses, and left the courtroom. 3 RR 126–29.

      On July 15, 2014—seven days after his sentence was imposed in

open court—Appellant filed a motion for new trial, alleging only that “the

verdict in this cause is contrary to the law and the evidence.” CR 38 (the

State will refer to Appellant’s July 15, 2014 motion for new trial as the

“Original Motion”). Appellant’s Original Motion did not advance an

allegation that he wished to testify at the punishment hearing, or a claim

that his constitutional right to testify was violated. See id. Next, on

August 19, 2014—42 days after his sentence was imposed in open court—

      2 The trial court also entered two additional findings: first that the offense for
which Appellant had been convicted involved family violence under Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art 42.013; and second, that Appellant used a deadly weapon in commission of
the offense. CR 5.
                                           2
Appellant filed a “supplement” to his Original Motion in which he

attached two affidavits, each suggesting two additional claims. CR 40–43

(the State will refer to this August 19, 2014 pleading as the “Amended

Motion”). The first affidavit seemed to suggest that the State mistreated

the complaining witness at trial. CR 42. The second affidavit was from

Appellant himself, in which he stated that he had desired to testify

during the punishment hearing, but that due to some kind of

misunderstanding with trial counsel, he did not. CR 43.3

      The State timely objected to the trial court’s consideration of the

Amended Motion, contending that it constituted an untimely amendment

of the Original Motion. CR 47–48. No hearings occurred on either motion

for new trial, and the lack of a written ruling in the record suggests that

they were overruled by operation of law. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(c).

      Appellant filed his notice of appeal on September 9, 2014. CR 44;

see Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(2). The State understands Appellant to raise

a single point of error: That the trial court erred in denying his Amended

      3The second affidavit appears to be the basis for the single point of error
pending before the Court.
                                       3
Motion, in which he first sought a new punishment hearing, because

Appellant was unable to testify at that punishment hearing as a result of

a misunderstanding between he and trial counsel. See Appellant’s Br. at

8–11.

             STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

        Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 39.1, the State does

not believe that oral argument is necessary because the dispositive issue

or issues have been authoritatively decided; the facts and legal

arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record; and the

decisional process would not be significantly aided thereby.

                         STATEMENT OF FACTS

        Larry Wilkerson testified that on August 1, 2013, he was walking

back from a local bank, along Fourth Street, when he heard two men

arguing. 3 RR 10–11, 13. As he approached, he saw the two men standing

in the open, continuing to argue. 3 RR 15–16. Eventually, Wilkerson saw

one of the men jump into a pickup truck and forcefully drive the truck in

reverse toward the other man, violently striking him. 3 RR 16. The driver

was moving in reverse with sufficient force to cause the tires to “spin.” 3

                                     4
RR 16, 19. The man who was struck by the pickup was later identified as

Quincy Allyn Doyle, Appellant’s father. 3 RR 41. The truck’s tailgate was

down, and Quincy was struck with sufficient force that he “fell” onto the

back of the truck. 3 RR 16, 19–20. The driver continued moving

backwards, eventually striking the back of the truck—and Quincy—into

a pile of “junk.” 3 RR 16. If the driver had driven Quincy into anything

other than a “junk pile,” it would have “[s]quashed him dead.” 3 RR 16.

The driver then proceeded to move the truck forward with Quincy still

hanging on, “spinning the gravel and everything, and . . . [Quincy] finally

fell off the truck about the middle of the street.”4 3 RR 16. Wilkerson then

approached Quincy concerned that he was injured and might not be alive.

3 RR 16. Wilkerson then waited for police to arrive, and gave them his

statement. 3 RR 16.

     Quincy Allyn Doyle testified that Appellant is his son. 3 RR 32.

Quincy has had a “rocky relationship” with Appellant for five to ten years.

3 RR 33–35. Appellant has a “really bad temper.” 3 RR 38. Appellant

tends to get angry when he “doesn’t get his way.” 3 RR 40. On August 1,

     4   The driver left the scene. 3 RR 79.
                                           5
2013, Quincy had a “very loud argument” with Appellant over Appellant’s

attempt to take a tow bar from Quincy without a deposit, and also over

Appellant’s failure to pay money owed to Quincy. 3 RR 37–38. Appellant

became extremely angry, got into his pickup truck, and “took off in his

truck coming at me, you know, backwards and rammed me up in a pile

of junk.” 3 RR 40. In order to avoid being crushed between the truck and

pile of junk, Quincy had to jump into the bed of the truck. 3 RR 40.

Appellant then “took off” and Quincy eventually rolled off the truck and

out into the street. 3 RR 40. In the street, Quincy encountered Wilkerson.

3 RR 41. Quincy acknowledged that he told police that Appellant had

tried to kill him, and that in retrospect “you could say that.” 3 RR 42.

Quincy also testified that Appellant sent him several letters from jail, in

which he repeatedly asked Quincy to file an affidavit of non-prosecution,

in an effort to get the charged offense dismissed. 3 RR 54–63. Quincy also

testified that in one of the letters, Appellant suggested that Quincy

contact Wilkerson in an effort to obtain an affidavit of non-prosecution

from Wilkerson. 3 RR 61–62.

                                    6
     Officer Rodrigo Jackson testified that he is a police officer for City

of Dalhart Police Department. 3 RR 74. He testified that he was on duty

on August 1, 2013, when he received a call to go to 320 Scott Street. 3 RR

74. Upon arrival Officer Jackson observed Quincy sitting on the ground,

3 RR 76, and asked Quincy what had happened, to which Quincy replied

“Shane just tried to kill me.” 3 RR 75; accord 3 RR 104 (“[Quincy] told me,

my son, Shane, just tried to run me over.”). Officer Jackson observed tire

tracks that appeared to confirm that someone tried to hit Quincy with a

vehicle. 3 RR 79. Officer Jackson testified that backing a truck up into a

person could be a deadly weapon. 3 RR 101. Officer Jackson confirmed

that Wilkerson was a witness to the “entire incident,” and that Wilkerson

provided a witness statement to that effect. 3 RR 105. Officer Jackson

also testified that Appellant’s reputation in the community was “not

good.” 3 RR 84.

     Michelle Griffin testified that she was the chief dispatcher for the

Dalhart County Jail. 3 RR 111. She testified regarding a letter that

Appellant sent to Quincy from the jail. 3 RR 111–16; State Ex. 5. In the

letter, Appellant attempted to have Quincy execute and file a non-

                                    7
prosecution affidavit. 3 RR 114. Appellant also asked Quincy to contact

Wilkerson and ask “him if he would tell that chick in Austin – and chick

is spelled c-h-i-c just so you know – in Austin he wants no part in the

situation, then she has no pull at all anyway look – any way you look at

it.”5 3 RR 115.

      After he was found guilty, and during sentencing, Angela Reynolds

testified that she had previously dated Appellant from May or June of

2008, until October of 2011. 3 RR 133–34. Reynolds testified that during

the five-year period she dated Appellant, he was “very” violent, and that

he repeatedly made her fear for her life. 3 RR 135. Reynolds testified that

she was convicted of a drug offense that Appellant had actually

committed, for the benefit of Appellant. 3 RR 136. She testified that

Appellant repeatedly violated protective orders against him, and

threatened to kill Reynolds and her family. 3 RR 140. Despite such

violations, Appellant was not prosecuted. 3 RR 142. On one occasion,

Reynolds attempted to leave Appellant, but he followed her with his

      5This reference appears to be to Nancy Nemer, the assistant attorney general
who prosecuted Appellant. See 3 RR 115.
                                        8
truck, grabbed her by her hair and put in the passenger seat. 3 RR 143.

After Reynolds exited the truck, Appellant repeatedly tried to ram her

with the truck, forcing her to get behind trees to prevent him from hitting

her. 3 RR 144. This was not the first time that Appellant grabbed

Reynolds by her hair and forced her into his truck, against her will. 3 RR

146–47. Reynolds testified that over a five-year period, Appellant beat,

choked, hit, slapped, kicked, threw down, and pulled her hair “a hundred

times.” 3 RR 148. And that she thought she was going to die “quite a few”

times. 3 RR 148.

     Brandy Blanco testified during sentencing that she had previously

dated Appellant “on and off the last two . . . years.” 3 RR 157. Blanco

testified that during the two-year period she dated Appellant, he was

violent, and he continually beat her up. 3 RR 157. Blanco testified that

Appellant’s threats caused her to be concerned for the safety of her entire

family, and particularly her daughter. 3 RR 157–58. Blanco testified that

she once tried to leave Appellant, and that after he found her, he forced

her into his truck by threatening to kill her grandmother and daughter.

3 RR 159. At one point Appellant burned Blanco with a “torch,” telling

                                    9
her that “love hurts.” 3 RR 160. Blanco testified that she believed

Appellant injected her with narcotics without her consent. 3 RR 161–62.

Indeed, Blanco testified that Appellant repeatedly punished her for

calling the police. 3 RR 163. Although she repeatedly tried to leave

Appellant, Blanco would return because he would threatened to hurt her

daughter. 3 RR 164. Moreover, when Blanco stood up to Appellant’s

violent abuse, he often instituted the “three-second rule” in which he

would choke her to unconsciousness in three seconds. 3 RR 166. On one

occasion Appellant became particularly violent and forced Blanco’s face

and head into hot water, burning her. 3 RR 172–73. Appellant did this in

front of Blanco’s daughter, who yelled at Appellant to stop. 3 RR 173.

Blanco’s daughter then called Blanco’s grandmother on a cellphone who

came over to pick them up and Appellant threatened to kill them. 3 RR

173–74. Despite the presence of Blanco’s grandmother—and her threat

to call police—Appellant refused to let Blanco leave. 3 RR 174. Blanco

also testified that Appellant contacted her from jail (after his arrest for

the present offense), and asked her to lie. 3 RR 174–75.

                  SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

                                    10
     The Court should overrule Appellant’s single point of error. First,

the Amended Motion for new trial in which Appellant first suggested his

desire to testify, and in which he first requested a new punishment

hearing, constituted an untimely amendment to the Original Motion.

This is because the Amended Motion was filed more than 30 days after

the trial court imposed Appellant’s sentence in open court. The State

objected on this basis in the trial court, which meant the Amended

Motion was not properly before the trial court. Since the trial court could

not have abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for new trial

on that basis, the single point of error presents nothing for this Court to

review.

     Second, even assuming that the Amended Motion was properly

before the trial court—and hence, that the trial court made a

discretionary decision thereto, reviewable by this Court—Appellant’s

point of error is without merit. Under Texas law there is no free-standing

obligation on the part of the trial court to either inform a defendant of his

right to testify, or to ensure that the right is properly waived. Rather, the

Texas courts place the duty to so inform on trial counsel, and analyze the

                                     11
question of whether a defendant was denied his right to testify under the

auspices of Strickland v. Washington. 6 And because the record does not

contain any information upon which to reverse the trial court with

reference to Strickland, Appellant fails his burden and the Court should

overrule his point of error.

                       ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

  I.        Standard of Review

       This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial

under an abuse of discretion standard. Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995). “We do not substitute our judgment for that of

the trial court; rather, we decide whether the trial court’s decision was

arbitrary or unreasonable.” Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006). A trial court abuses its discretion denying a motion for

new trial only when no reasonable view of the record would support the

trial court’s ruling. Id.

       6   466 U.S. 668 (1984).
                                    12
II.   Resolution of Appellant’s Point of Error Is Impossible Because It Is
      Premised Upon Extra Record “Facts” Not Properly before the Court,
      and Which Could Not Have Been Considered by the Trial Court
      When Appellant’s Original Motion Was Overruled by Operation of
      Law.

      A.   The 30-day time limit to file a motion for new trial

      To be timely, a motion for new trial must be filed within 30 days of

“the date when the trial court imposes or suspends sentence in open

court.” Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(a). The same 30 day rule applies to

amendments:

      To Amend. Within 30 days after the date when the trial court
      imposes or suspends sentence in open court but before the
      court overrules any preceding motion for new trial, a
      defendant may, without leave of court, file one or more
      amended motions for new trial.

Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(b). Here, Appellant’s request for a new punishment

hearing—which included the affidavit suggesting his desire to testify—

was advanced as part of the Amended Motion, filed more than 30 days

after sentencing. Hence, to the extent that the Amended Motion

constituted an “amendment” under Rule 21.4(b), it was untimely.

                                   13
     B.    Appellant’s “supplemental” motion for new trial was in reality
           an untimely amendment.
     The law in Texas is plain: Filing affidavits in support of a motion

for new trial more than 30 days after sentencing, is considered an

untimely attempt to amend the initial motion for new trial. Dugard v.

State, 688 S.W.2d 524, 529–30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), overruled on other

grounds by Williams v. State, 780 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex. Crim. App.

1989); see also Klapesky v. State, 256 S.W.3d 442, 455 (Tex. App.–Austin

2008, pet. ref’d). Since the Amended Motion—which was filed some 42

days after sentencing—contained the new legal claim described in the

affidavit (regarding Appellant’s purported desire to testify at sentencing),

it constituted an untimely amendment to the Original Motion. See

Dugard, 688 S.W.2d at 529–30; Klapesky, 256 S.W.3d at 455.

     And to the extent that Appellant might argue that the Amended

Motion was merely a more detailed argument in support of the Original

Motion, his argument again fails. See State v. Zalman, 400 S.W.3d 590,

594–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (noting that counsel cannot supplement a

form motion for new trial that advances a generic claim, with an untimely

and more detailed amendment that advances a specific claim). Here,

                                    14
there was nothing in the Original Motion that even hinted at Appellant’s

purported desire to testify; and hence, Appellant’s Amended Motion,

upon which this appeal is premised, was untimely.

     C.    The trial court could not have considered the Amended
           Motion over the State’s objection; hence, Appellant failed to
           preserve his single point of error for review.

     “[I]t is error for the trial court to rule on an untimely amendment

[to a motion for new trial] over a proper objection.” Zalman, 400 S.W.3d

at 595. Here, the State objected to the Amended Motion as being

untimely. CR 47–48. As a result, the trial court was not permitted to

“rule” on the untimely amendment contained within the Amended

Motion. Zalman, 400 S.W.3d at 595. And since the order denying

Appellant’s motions for new trial (by operation law) could not have

extended to discretionary consideration of the Amended Motion, the point

of error presents nothing for this Court to review.

     The same holds for the factual assertions in the affidavit itself:

           A motion for new trial is a prerequisite to presenting a
     point of error on appeal only when necessary to adduce facts
     not in the record.

                                    15
Tex. R. App. P. 21.2 (emphasis added). Because review of Appellant’s

point of error would require reference to a factual assertion existing

outside of the record of the trial proper, Appellant’s failure to advance the

affidavit as part of a timely motion for new trial means that his evidence

of error is not before the Court, and any error is “waived.” See Adams v.

State, 514 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); see also Marras v.

State, 741 S.W.2d 395, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), overruled on other

grounds by Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“The

appellant failed to make this complaint at trial or in his motion for new

trial. The appellant has failed, therefore, to show this Court any violation

of Article 36.27 and has failed to overcome the presumption of regularity

in the proceedings.”). Appellant’s point of error should be overruled.

III.   Even Assuming, Arguendo, that the Amended Motion was Properly
       Before the Trial Court, Appellant Fails to Establish that the Trial
       Court Abused its Discretion When it Denied the Amended Motion.

       A.   The trial court has no duty to inform a defendant that he has
            a constitutional right to testify, or to ensure that a defendant’s
            waiver of that right is knowing or voluntary, under Texas law
            this obligation is on defense counsel.

       In the interests of justice, the State alternatively addresses

Appellant’s unpreserved point of error on its merits. A criminal
                                     16
defendant undoubtedly has a constitutional right to testify in his own

defense. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49–52 (1987). This right

arises from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution, is

personal to the defendant, and cannot be waived by counsel. Id. at 46–47.

To be effective, any waiver of the right to testify must be made knowingly

and voluntarily. Johnson v. State, 120 S.W.3d 10, 15 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2003), aff’d 169 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing

Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1997)).

     While the right to testify occupies an important place in our

constitutional framework, the Court of Criminal Appeals (the “CCA”) has

determined that a trial court has no duty to actually inform a defendant

about that right to testify. Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 235 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005) (“If the trial court is not required to admonish a

represented defendant about the right not to testify—arguably the “more

fragile right”—then the trial court surely has no duty to do so with regard

to the converse right to testify”) (emphasis in original).

     Rather “defense counsel shoulders the primary responsibility to

inform the defendant of his right to testify, including the fact that the

                                     17
ultimate decision belongs to the defendant.” Id. Moreover, in Johnson the

CCA rejected the minority approach which would have required a trial

court to affirmatively ensure that a defendant who does not testify has

knowingly waived that right. See id. at 234–35 (rejecting the minority

view “imposing on the trial court a duty to ensure a knowing waiver of

the right to testify.”).

      And because “imparting that information is defense counsel’s

responsibility,” the courts are directed to apply the legal framework

described in Strickland v. Washington to measure whether a defendant’s

right to testify was effectively “denied by defense counsel.” Johnson, 169
S.W.3d at 235. In other words, the CCA has grafted Strickland’s two-part

legal measure to resolve all claims that a defendant was denied his

constitutional right to testify. Id.

      To this end, the State next analyzes the requirements of Strickland

to determine if Appellant has met his burden of establishing that the trial

court’s decision not to act and to deny his Amended Motion new trial was

arbitrary or unreasonable.

                                       18
     B.    Appellant has failed to meet his burden of establishing that
           the trial court’s decision to deny his motion for new trial was
           an arbitrary or unreasonable application of Strickland.

     “Strickland v. Washington is the seminal case setting forth the

standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the United

States Constitution.” Rodriguez v. State, 292 S.W.3d 187, 188 (Tex. App.–

Amarillo 2009, no writ). Strickland established a two-pronged legal

measure—reversal requires Appellant to demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2)

the deficient performance prejudiced Appellant. Id. at 188–89 (citing

Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 54–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)).

     The first prong of the Strickland test requires an appellant prove

that counsel made such serious errors that he did not function as the

“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 189. The second

Strickland prong requires an appellant “show a reasonable probability

that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Mitchell v. State, 68
S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). “Reasonable probability” means

probability of a degree sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

                                   19
Id. The Strickland test for prejudice applies even in cases like this one,

in which the purported deficiency relates only to a non-capital sentencing

outcome, and not to the question of a defendant’s guilt. See Hernandez v.

State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“Assuming Strickland

left open the question of whether a defendant is required to show

prejudice from deficient attorney performance at noncapital sentencing

proceedings, we perceive no valid reason why Strickland cannot apply, or

why   a   different   rule   should   apply,   to   noncapital   sentencing

proceedings.”).

      An appellant bears the burden of proving ineffective assistance of

counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. Rodriguez, 292 S.W.3d at 189

(citing Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642). The Court’s review of counsel’s

performance is highly deferential, and a strong presumption exists that

counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable professional

assistance. Id. (citing Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App.

2001)); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (noting there are countless ways

to provide effective assistance in any given case).

                                      20
     To overcome the presumption of reasonable professional assistance,

any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly rooted in the record.

Rodriguez, 292 S.W.3d at 189 (citing Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808,

813–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). In the majority of cases, the record on

direct appeal is inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an

objectively reasonable standard of performance; thus, the better course

is to pursue the claim in habeas proceedings. Mitchell, 68 S.W.3d at 642.

Absent evidence of counsel’s reasons for the challenged conduct, the

Court is not permitted to conclude the challenged conduct constituted

deficient performance unless the conduct was so outrageous that no

competent attorney would have engaged in it. Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d
436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

     And this burden is even higher in the present procedural posture,

because the Court is to review the two prongs of Strickland v.

Washington, through this abuse of discretion prism governing motions

for new trial, reversing only if the trial court’s decision is arbitrary or

unreasonable. See Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004), superseded in part by rule of appellate procedure 21.8(b) on other

                                    21
grounds, as recognized by State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901, 905 n.5

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); My Thi Tieu v. State, 299 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d); Shanklin v. State, 190
S.W.3d 154, 158–59 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005), pet. dism’d,

211 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Gill, 967 S.W.2d 540, 542

(Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding that when a trial court

grants a motion for new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of

counsel, an appellate court should review the standards of Strickland

through a prism of the abuse of discretion standard and decide whether

the trial court’s decision to grant a new trial was so outside the zone of

reasonable disagreement that it is subject to reversal). Appellant has

failed to establish a Strickland violation by means of this highly

discretionary standard.

     C.    Appellant fails to meet his burden under either prong of
           Strickland.

     The record is devoid of any evidence upon which to analyze the

lower court’s purported decision to overrule the Amended Motion for new

trial, at least with respect to this point of error. In his Amended Motion,

Appellant failed even to allege—much less to argue—that counsel was
                                    22
constitutionally ineffective with respect to Appellant’s right to testify

during punishment. Moreover, Appellant fails to establish the required

Strickland prejudice as to his ultimate sentence; and failed even to

provide the lower court with a description of the testimony he would have

given. Appellant cannot establish prejudice because of the horrific nature

of the State’s evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. Because

Appellant provided no affirmative evidence in support of either prong of

Strickland, he necessarily fails to establish that the trial court acted

arbitrarily or unreasonably when it denied his motion for new trial. See

Holden, 201 S.W.3d at 763.

     This point of error should be overruled.

                                   23
                        PRAYER FOR RELIEF

     FOR ALL THESE REASONS, the State respectfully requests that

this Honorable Court overrule Appellant’s single point of error and affirm

his conviction and sentence.

                                  Respectfully submitted,

                                  NANCY NEMER
                                  District Attorney, Pro Tem
                                  Assistant Attorney General

                                  /s/ Joseph P. Corcoran
*Lead Appellate Counsel           JOSEPH P. CORCORAN*
                                  Assistant District Attorney, Pro Tem
                                  Assistant Attorney General
                                  Supervising Attorney
                                    for Non-Capital Appeals
                                  Criminal Appeals Division
                                  State Bar No. 00793549
                                  Joseph.Corcoran@TexasAttorneyGeneral.gov

                                  P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
                                  Austin, Texas 78711-2548
                                  Telephone: (512) 936-1400
                                  Facsimile: (512) 936-1280

                                  ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE

                                   24
                       CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      Pursuant to Rule 9.5(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure, I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing

notice was served electronically through the electronic filing manager, on

the following attorney via electronic mail:

      Timothy D. Salley
      State Bar No. 00795633
      tsalley53@gmail.com

Moreover, I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing

pleading has been served directly on counsel of record on the same day of

this electronic filing, to Mr. Salley, via electronic mail.

                                    /s/ Joseph P. Corcoran
                                    JOSEPH P. CORCORAN
                                    Assistant District Attorney, Pro Tem
                                    Assistant Attorney General

                                      25
              CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH
           TEXAS RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.4

     This brief complies with Tex. R. App. Proc. 9.4(i)(2)(C) in that it

contains 4,109 words (excluding the sections designated in Rule 9.4(i)(1)),

in Microsoft Word 2010, Century, 14 points..

                                  /s/ Joseph P. Corcoran
                                  JOSEPH P. CORCORAN
                                  Assistant District Attorney, Pro Tem
                                  Assistant Attorney General

                                    26