Court Opinion

ID: 9366594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 09:10:05.756593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:53.799959
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                          TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 10-18-00269-CR

D'WARREN LAMAR SIMMONS,
                                                            Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                            Appellee

                           From the 19th District Court
                            McLennan County, Texas
                           Trial Court No. 2015-1825-C1

                    MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND

       D’Warren Lamar Simmons was convicted of assault family violence with a prior

conviction for assault family violence and sentenced to 75 years in prison. See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). In Simmons’s original brief in this appeal, Simmons

contended that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding recorded statements

made by the complainant; (2) the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding

the charged offense; and (3) the court cost imposed for the time-payment fee was

unconstitutional.    In our original memorandum opinion, we rejected the first two
complaints but agreed with the third and modified the judgment by deleting $22.50 of

the assessed time-payment fee. See Simmons v. State, 590 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. App.—Waco

2019). The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, disagreed with our decision regarding

the constitutionality of the time payment fee and, in light of its decision in Dulin v. State,

620 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), vacated our judgment and remanded the case to

us for proceedings consistent with its opinion. See Simmons v. State, No. PD-1264-19, 2021

Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 381 (Crim. App. May 12, 2021) (per curiam).

       On remand, we modify and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

ISSUES RAISED ON ORIGINAL SUBMISSION

       Our original disposition of Simmons’s first two issues was not challenged on

petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals, and Simmons has not

complained about the disposition of these issues in his supplemental briefing on remand.

Accordingly, we adopt the disposition of those issues as written in our original

memorandum opinion and overrule Simmons’s first and second issues. See Simmons v.

State, 590 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019); see also Somers v. State, No. 10-09-00387-

CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9645, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 1, 2013, pet. ref’d) (not

designated for publication) (other issues resolved in prior opinion not addressed on

remand). Likewise, because the Court of Criminal Appeals held in Dulin that a time

payment fee was assessed prematurely, we overrule Simmons’s third issue. See Dulin v.

State, 620 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

Simmons v. State                                                                        Page 2
NONREVERSIBLE ERRORS 1

        In briefing on remand, Simmons’s counsel filed a supplemental brief in which he

noted several nonreversible errors regarding costs contained in the Certified Bill of Cost. 2

Specifically, counsel challenges a $20 jury fee; a $2 e-filing fee; a $15 conditional time

payment fee; and a $25, combined, time payment fee.                        We agree that all the fees

complained of by Simmons, except the $20 jury fee, are nonreversible errors.

        Assessment of Costs

        On appeal, we review an assessment of court costs to determine if there is a basis

for the cost, not to determine if there was sufficient evidence offered at trial to prove each

cost. Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We separately examine

each item of cost to which Simmons has lodged a complaint on appeal.

        — $20 jury fee

        Simmons asserts in his supplemental brief that the district clerk erroneously added

a $20 jury fee to a “new” bill of cost when it did not appear to be included in the original

assessment of costs. After extrapolating from an explanation of costs filed by the clerk

on November 2, 2021 and applying that extrapolation to the amount of “FCRM” included

in a summary of costs attached to an order of withdrawal, Simmons speculates that the

amount of “FCRM” did not include a jury fee at all. 3 His complaint on appeal, then, is

1
 See Cummins v. State, 646 S.W.3d 605, 615-618 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, pet. ref’d) for a discussion of
nonreversible error.

2
 The phrase, “Certified Bill of Cost,” refers only to the bill of cost dated July 30, 2021, and included in the
July 30, 2021 Supplemental Clerk’s Record.

3
  There is no way to really know if a $20 fee was or was not included in the summary other than this
extrapolation.
Simmons v. State                                                                             Page 3
that the clerk cannot now include a $20 jury fee in the Certified Bill of Cost when it was

not assessed originally. Simmons’s argument is not about the basis of the fee but, rather,

is about the clerk charging a fee years after, according to Simmons, a set amount of fees

was already assessed. Simmons, however, is confusing a summary of costs attached to

the Order to Withdraw Funds, both contained in the clerk’s record under one tab, with

an assessment of costs included within the trial court’s judgment. They are not the same.

       On the second page in the judgment, the trial court “adjudge[d] statutory court

costs against the Defendant.” The trial court also “order[ed] the Defendant to pay the

court costs” and “order[ed] the clerk to collect the court costs.” A Certified Bill of Cost

was not a part of the trial court’s judgment, nor was it made a part of the original Clerk’s

Record. It was created and included, upon request by this Court, in a Supplemental

Clerk’s Record filed on July 30, 2021. An explanation of the cost and fees included in the

Certified Bill of Cost was subsequently requested and is included in another

Supplemental Clerk’s Record filed on November 2, 2021. It is the Certified Bill of Cost,

dated July 30, 2021, and contained in the July 30, 2021 Supplemental Clerk’s Record, that

is the true and only Certified Bill of Cost relevant to this case. No other document, such

as a summary of costs attached to an order to withdraw funds, will be considered by this

Court or should be considered by the parties, the trial court, or the District Clerk, as the

Certified Bill of Cost to which this opinion refers. Thus, the clerk did not add a “new”

$20 jury fee when none had been previously assessed because statutory court costs had

been adjudged against Simmons in the judgment.

       Simmons concedes that at the time of his conviction in 2018, a $40 jury fee was

Simmons v. State                                                                      Page 4
authorized by statute, and it is undisputed that Simmons was convicted by a jury. See

Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 654 (H.B. 2182), § 2, effective September 1, 2015;

repealed by Acts 2019, 86th Leg., ch. 1352 (S.B. 346), § 1.19(1), effective January 1, 2020

(former TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.004; “A defendant convicted by a jury in a county

court, a county court at law, or a district court shall pay a jury fee of $40.”). Thus,

although there may not have been a basis for a jury fee in the specific amount of $20 at

the time of the judgment, there is a basis for a $40 jury fee.

       What to do?

       The State requests, in what could be characterized as a cross-point, that we amend

the Certified Bill of Cost to increase the amount of the jury fee charged to $40. Simmons

asserts we should deny the State’s request, arguing the State has a remedy under article

103.007 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

       Article 103.007 provides:

       After a defendant has paid costs, no more costs may be charged against the
       defendant unless the court rules on a motion presented to the court that
       additional costs are due.

       TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 103.007.

There is not much case authority interpreting this statute. Both parties point us to the

opinion in Smith v State, 439 S.W.3d 451, 463 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no

pet), abrogated on other grounds by, Meadows v. State, 455 S.W.3d 166, 171 n.2 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015), for support of each argument. In Smith, the Houston Court of Appeals

determined that a motion by the State to collect costs in excess of those assessed in the

judgment would be preferable to presenting such a request on direct appeal; but, because

Simmons v. State                                                                     Page 5
the Court had already reviewed the record due to Smith’s challenges to costs, it would

not be efficient to have the State relitigate the issue in a separate proceeding. Id. The

Court did not address whether or not Smith had paid his costs which would activate the

necessity of the State to file a motion.

       However, the Dallas Court of Appeals in Cuevas v. State, No. 05-12-01648-CR, 2014

Tex. App. LEXIS 4844 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 5, 2014, no pet.) (not designated for

publication) held the opposite. There, in a cross-point, the State argued that because the

trial court did not charge, or undercharged, $21 in mandated court costs, the court of

appeals should correct the judgment “and related documents” to show the increase in the

costs assessed. The Dallas Court of Appeals, focusing on the initial language of the

statute, “After a defendant has paid costs,…,” rejected the State’s cross-point, and

acknowledged that, although the Court had the authority to modify a judgment when

the Court had the necessary information in the record to do so, the record did not show

whether Cuevas had paid his court costs. Cuevas, No. 05-12-01648-CR, 2014 Tex. App.

LEXIS 4844, at *12-13. Thus, the Court would not order the trial court to impose

additional costs and would not modify the judgment to add additional costs. Id. at *13.

       The question before us is whether the amount to be assessed as court cost in the

judgment was erroneous. The trial court rendered judgment for “statutory court cost

against the Defendant.” The statutory jury fee is $40. The statutory fee was $20 before

the legislature increased it to $40 in 2015. The clerk included the incorrect fee amount,

$20, in the Certified Bill of Cost. As stated previously, the State requests that we order

the clerk to modify the Certified Bill of Cost to show a $40 jury fee. But like the Dallas

Simmons v. State                                                                    Page 6
Court in Cuevas, we do not know if Simmons has paid his bill; and because we do not

really have all the information necessary, we will not suggest the correction of the

Certified Bill of Cost to increase the amount of the jury fee to be included in the Certified

Bill of Cost. See also Houston v. State, 410 S.W.3d 475, 480 n.6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2013, no pet.) (“Because the record before us does not reflect whether Houston has or has

not paid court costs, we decline to impose additional costs on him in what could be

contravention of article 103.007's requirements.”). 4

        Accordingly, after reviewing the statutes and the record in this case, we find there

is a basis for the inclusion of at least $20 for the jury fee in the Certified Bill of Cost.

        — $2 e-filing fee

        The parties agree there is no basis for the $2 e-filing fee included in the Certified

Bill of Cost. At the time of Simmons’s conviction in 2018, the Government Code allowed

for a $5 e-filing fee. See Act of May 16, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1290, § 2, sec. 51.851(d),

2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3270, 3271 (repealed 2019). That $5 fee is properly included in the

Certified Bill of Cost. The Government Code no longer allows for an electronic filing fee,

and there is no other statute that provides for a $2 electronic filing fee. See TEX. GOV’T

CODE § 51.851 (current version showing e-filing fee repealed). 5 Thus, after reviewing the

4
 Moreover, we do not have the information necessary to know if the trial court “waived payment of all or
part of a fine or cost” under article 43.091 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 43.091(a).

5
  Local Government Code section 133.102 now provides for a percentage of a consolidated fee to be
designated for the “statewide electronic filing system account.” See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 133.102(e).
That provision was effective January 1, 2020. For offenses committed after January 1, 2004, and before
January 1, 2020, the date range within which Simmons’s offense was committed, the money collected as
court costs “shall be allocated according to the percentages provided in Subsection (e), as that subsection
existed and was applied on December 31, 2019.” Id. (d). Subsection (e), as it existed and was applied on
December 31, 2019, did not have an e-filing fee allocation. See Acts of 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 1249 (S.B. 1664),
Simmons v. State                                                                                       Page 7
statutes and the record in this case, we agree that there is no basis for the assessment of a

$2 e-filing fee.

        — $15 conditional time payment fee

        The parties also agree that a $15 time payment fee, conditioned on “full payment

of court costs, reimbursement fees, fines and costs” being paid within 30 days of the

judgment should be deleted from the Certified Bill of Cost. A $15 time payment fee is

permitted by article 102.030(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure if “[a] fine, court

costs, restitution, or another reimbursement fee” is not paid in full before the 31st day

after the date on which the judgment is entered assessing such. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

art. 102.030(a). However, article 102.030 does not apply to Simmons’s case because the

offense he committed occurred in 2015. See Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352,

§ 5.01 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws at 4035 (“Except as otherwise provided by this Act, the

changes in law made by this Act apply only to a cost, fee, or fine on conviction for an

offense committed on or after the effective date of this Act [January 1, 2020].”).

Accordingly, we agree that because the fee does not apply to Simmons’s offense, there is

no basis for the inclusion of the conditional $15 time payment fee in the Certified Bill of

Cost. Further, any time payment fee assessed or threatened is premature. See Dulin v.

State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see also Bryant v. State, 642 S.W.3d 847,

850 (Tex. App.—Waco 2021, no pet.).

§ 13(b), effective September 1, 2013. Thus, no statutory authority for the collection of a $2 e-filing fee
existed at the time Simmons committed or was convicted of the offense.

Simmons v. State                                                                                   Page 8
          — $25 in combined time payment fees

          Finally, the parties agree that, pursuant to the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion

in Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), the assessment of $25.00,

combined as a time-payment fee in this case was premature. 6 After reviewing the caselaw

and the record in this case, we agree that the assessment of a $25 combined time-payment

fee is premature, and thus conclude there is no basis for this fee.

CONCLUSION

          Accordingly, because each of Simmons’s three original issues on appeal have been

overruled and because there is nonreversible error regarding costs, the trial court's

judgment is modified to assess court cost in the amount of $244.00. As modified, the trial

court’s judgment is affirmed. 7

                                                    TOM GRAY
                                                    Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson, and
       Justice Smith
Affirmed as modified
Opinion delivered and filed January 25, 2023
Do not publish
[CRPM]

6
 The Certified Bill of Cost specifically includes $25 aggregated time-payment fees (listed in the explanation
of fees as an Administrative Justice Fee—$2.50; Time Payment Fees—$10.00; Time Payment-State Fee—
$12.50) in the balance of the costs owed.

7
    The bill of cost should be modified to reflect the cost due in the judgment as modified.

Simmons v. State                                                                                      Page 9