Court Opinion

ID: 9547739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:51:18.361724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:02.156786
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority, relying solely upon inapposite statutory provisions (Pen. Code, §§ 2600, 2601), challenges the propriety of the routine monitoring of conversations of inmates detained in county jail awaiting criminal trial. The majority assumes that such a practice violates an inmate’s privacy interests if conducted for the purpose of gathering incriminating evidence, rather than to safeguard institutional security or to protect the public. To the contrary, as I explain, sounder decisions have uniformly held, as a matter of law, that the practice of monitoring an inmate’s conversations is (1) reasonably necessary to maintain jail security, and (2) that a person incarcerated in a jail or prison possesses no justifiable expectation of privacy. Accordingly, regardless of the jail officials’ reason for monitoring a particular conversation, the practice is sensible, necessary and proper.
The majority relies exclusively upon sections 2600 and 2601 of the Penal Code. Section 2600 provides that “A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison may, during any such period of confinement, be deprived of such rights, and only such rights, as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the institution in which he is confined and for the reasonable protection of the public.” (Italics added.) Section 2601, subdivision (d), describes various civil rights available to prisoners, including the right “To have personal visits; provided that the department may provide such restrictions as are necessary for the reasonable security of the institution.” (Italics added.)
Is the monitoring of unprivileged jailhouse conversations “necessary for the reasonable security of the institution”? In the light of the history of violence committed during attempted jailbreaks and the ever-present danger and risks of escape, how can we possibly hold otherwise? To *880limit or restrict jail authorities’ right to monitor inmates’ conversations is to invite further acts of violence and escapes, thereby endangering not only institutional security but the safety of the public as well. This is exactly the position we took 10 years ago in North v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 301, 312 [104 Cal.Rptr. 833, 502 P.2d 1305, 57 A.L.R.3d 155], In North, we held that under the unusual circumstances in that case, a tape-recorded “jailhouse” conversation between husband and wife (see Evid. Code, § 917) should have been ordered suppressed as an impermissible invasion of marital privacy. We were careful, however, to explain the precise limits of our holding, as follows: “We emphasize that nothing in our opinion should be deemed a disapproval of the common practice of monitoring inmates’ conversations with others, including their spouses, in visiting rooms or similar places. That practice seems reasonably necessary in order to maintain jail security and ... is not proscribed by law.” (P. 312, italics added, fn. omitted.)
Thus North acknowledged as a matter of law that the monitoring of jailhouse conversations is “reasonably necessary” to jail security, thereby fulfilling the statutory requirement of sections 2600 and 2601 relied on by the majority herein. The majority, repeatedly and defensively characterizing the North exposition as mere “dictum,” suggests that the question of the necessity for jail security “poses questions of fact which cannot be resolved on the pleadings.” (Ante, p. 875.) To the contrary, as North indicates, no factual hearing is needed to confirm what both observation and common sense tells us, namely, the routine monitoring of unprivileged jailhouse conversations helps reduce the threat of escapes and accompanying violence. To suggest otherwise, as the majority does, is both naive and a reckless disregard of institutional and public safety. As was stated in People v. Morgan (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 90, 93 [16 Cal.Rptr. 838], and quoted with approval in North (8 Cal.3d at p. 309), authority to censor a prisoner’s communications “is necessary to protect against escape.” (See also People v. Estrada (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 76, 99-100 [155 Cal.Rptr. 731] [monitoring jailhouse conversations is consistent with Pen. Code, § 2600].)
The fundamental risks today, for custodians as for citizens, are no less than they were 10 years ago. Moreover, courts from other jurisdictions have uniformly recognized the necessity of routine monitoring of jail or prison conversations. We are not alone in our concerns. (See United States v. Paul (6th Cir. 1980) 614 F.2d 115, 116; United States v. Hearst (9th Cir. 1977) 563 F.2d 1331, 1344-1346, cert. den. 435 U.S. 1000 [56 L.Ed.2d 90, 98 S.Ct. 1656]; State v. Ryan (1976) 145 *881N.J.Super. 330 [367 A.2d 920].) I have found no case to the contrary, and the majority cites none. The Ryan court put it well: “A further rationale underlying the [jailhouse monitoring] rule is premised upon the necessity of jail officials to use reasonable security measures to protect the prisoners and the jail environment..... [If] Electronic surveillance ... is an essential prerequisite to the maintenance of security of the jail and its prisoners .... Lack of privacy must be balanced against reasonable security in the jail. In the end, the scales must be tipped in favor of security.” (P. 922.)
Apart from the security aspects, a second reason, in my view, conclusively justifies the monitoring in question. Jail inmates have no right to privacy in the traditional and accepted sense. Once again, North is directly in point: “[P]rior California cases have uniformly held that an inmate of a jail ordinarily has no right of privacy. [Citations.] The rationale underlying this general rule is based upon a policy favoring the use by jail authorities of reasonable security measures. ‘A man detained in jail cannot reasonably expect to enjoy the privacy afforded to a person in free society. His lack of privacy is a necessary adjunct to his imprisonment----’ [Citation.]” (8 Cal.3d at pp. 308-309; see Lanza v. New York (1962) 370 U.S. 139, 143 [8 L.Ed.2d 384, 387-388, 82 S.Ct. 1218]; United States v. Hearst, supra, 563 F.2d at pp. 1344-1346; Brown v. State (Fla.App. 1977) 349 So.2d 1196, 1197; Com. v. Look (1980) 379 Mass. 893 [402 N.E.2d 470, 482]; People v. Blehm (1980) 44 Colo.App. 472 [623 P.2d 411, 415].) In the words of the United States Supreme Court in Lanza, “a jail shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room. In prison, official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day.” (370 U.S. at p. 143 [8 L.Ed.2d at p. 388], fn. omitted.)
The majority apparently contemplates evidentiary hearings in this case to determine whether in fact the monitoring at the San Mateo County jail was undertaken for security purposes, and whether in fact the inmates so monitored did not entertain a reasonable expectation of privacy. In my view, such evidentiary hearings are wholly unnecessary in light of the authorities and principles cited above, which establish both propositions as a matter of law.
I would deny the peremptory writ.