Court Opinion

ID: 9961824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 21:00:35.816775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:59.703104
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4631

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        PRISCILLA ANDERSON COVINGTON,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Columbia. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (3:19-cr-00421-MGL-2)

        Submitted: March 25, 2024                                         Decided: April 18, 2024

        Before HARRIS and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: James T. McBratney, Jr., MCBRATNEY LAW FIRM, PA, Florence, South
        Carolina, for Appellant. Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, Columbia, South
        Carolina, Amy F. Bower, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Priscilla Anderson Covington pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to

        conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. Covington’s conviction

        stemmed from her participation, along with her husband and two sisters-in-law, in a

        Medicaid fraud scheme.         The district court sentenced Covington to 39 months’

        imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The court ordered Covington to pay

        $3,647,094.83 in mandatory restitution in monthly installments of $200, to begin 30 days

        after entry of the judgment. The court also imposed a discretionary special condition of

        supervised release requiring Covington to adhere to the restitution payment schedule

        (hereinafter, “restitution condition”).

               On appeal, Covington’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

        U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there were no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning

        whether Covington’s guilty plea is valid. In a pro se supplemental brief, Covington

        challenged the substantive reasonableness of her sentence. Upon review of the case

        pursuant to Anders, we ordered supplemental briefs from the parties to address two related

        questions: (1) whether the district court made sufficient factual findings pursuant to the

        Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A, 3664, to support the

        imposed restitution payment schedule, and (2) whether the district court adequately

        explained its reasons for imposing the restitution condition. The parties have filed their

        supplemental briefs. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

               A guilty plea is valid if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently pled

        guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”

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        United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). “A defendant’s solemn declarations in open court affirming a plea agreement

        carry a strong presumption of verity.” United States v. Paylor, 88 F.4th 553, 560 (4th Cir.

        2023) (cleaned up).

               Because Covington did not move to withdraw her guilty plea in the district court,

        we review the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing for plain error. United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d

        812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). To establish plain error, Covington must show that “(1) an error

        was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error

        seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

        United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934, 940 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). “An error is plain when it is clear or . . . obvious under current law.” United

        States v. Hope, 28 F.4th 487, 507 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). “[F]or an error to prejudice

        a defendant sufficiently to affect substantial rights, it must have affected the outcome of

        the district court proceedings.” Gillespie, 27 F.4th at 940 (cleaned up).

               Our review of the plea hearing transcript reveals that the district court did not inform

        Covington of the penalties for perjury or false statement, of her right to counsel at every

        stage of the proceedings, and of the potential immigration consequences of pleading guilty.

        See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(A), (D), (O). Nonetheless, the court ensured that Covington

        was competent to plead guilty, that her plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and

        that an independent factual basis supported the plea. And nothing in the record suggests

        that, but for the minor omissions in the plea colloquy, Covington would have elected to

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        proceed to trial. See Sanya, 774 F.3d at 816. We therefore conclude that Covington’s

        guilty plea is valid.

               Next, when ordering restitution under the MVRA, a district court must “specify in

        the restitution order the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the

        restitution is to be paid.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). In doing so, the court must consider a

        defendant’s “financial resources and other assets,” her “projected earnings and other

        income,” and any other “financial obligations . . . , including obligations to dependents.”

        18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)(A)-(C). “[T]his provision . . . requir[es] the district court to make

        factual findings keying the payment schedule to these factors and demonstrating the

        feasibility of the schedule.” United States v. Leftwich, 628 F.3d 665, 668 (4th Cir. 2010).

        A court may comply with its factfinding obligations under the MVRA “by announcing its

        findings on the record or by adopting adequate proposed findings contained within a

        presentence report [(PSR)].” United States v. Dawkins, 202 F.3d 711, 716 (4th Cir. 2000)

        (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Covington did not challenge the restitution

        order in the district court, we review the sufficiency of the court’s factual findings for plain

        error. United States v. Seignious, 757 F.3d 155, 165 (4th Cir. 2014).

               Here, the district court did not “announc[e] its findings on the record” with respect

        to the MVRA. Dawkins, 202 F.3d at 716. And although the court adopted the findings in

        the PSR, which provided that restitution was mandatory and suggested a payment schedule

        of $200 a month, the PSR did not explain why the suggested payment schedule was feasible

        in light of Covington’s financial circumstances. See id.

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               Nonetheless, Covington has not demonstrated that any error, even assuming it was

        qualified as “plain,” affected her substantial rights. On appeal, Covington does not address

        how the court’s alleged error prejudiced her, nor does she contend that the restitution

        payment schedule has proven infeasible.       The PSR recounted that Covington had a

        bachelor’s degree, professional certifications, and a consistent employment history—all of

        which suggested she would have the ability to pay $200 a month. See United States v.

        Karam, 201 F.3d 320, 330 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that “[a] negative net worth at the time

        of sentencing [did] not necessarily indicate an inability to pay,” where the PSR established

        that defendant was “well-educated” and had “extensive [work] experience”).             Also,

        notably, the court delayed Covington’s reporting date by several years, corresponding to

        the expiration of her husband’s custodial term. Thus, unlike most defendants, Covington

        was not incarcerated for several years following the court’s judgment, allowing her the

        opportunity to obtain employment. Accordingly, we conclude that Covington fails to

        demonstrate that any error concerning the district court’s factfinding obligations under the

        MVRA affected her substantial rights.

               Covington next argues that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons

        for imposing the restitution condition. “We review the reasonableness of a sentence under

        18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Nance, 957

        F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020).      We must first “evaluate procedural reasonableness,

        determining whether the district court committed any procedural error, such as improperly

        calculating the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or

        failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. Because Covington did not

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        challenge her supervised release conditions in the district court, we review those conditions

        for plain error. United States v. Boyd, 5 F.4th 550, 554 (4th Cir. 2021).

               “District courts have broad latitude to impose discretionary conditions of supervised

        release.” Id. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, “a court may only impose

        conditions that (1) are ‘reasonably related’ to the goals of deterrence, public protection,

        and rehabilitation; (2) affect ‘no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’

        to achieve those goals; and (3) are ‘consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued

        by the Sentencing Commission.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).

               To permit meaningful appellate review, a district court must explain why a

        discretionary condition is warranted under § 3583(d). Id. However, “[t]he degree of

        explanation required . . . varies with the complexity of a given case.” Id. “[I]f the reasons

        for a given condition are self-evident, and a defendant fails to raise nonfrivolous

        objections” to the condition, “a court’s overarching explanation of [the] sentence as a

        whole” may suffice. Id. at 559 (cleaned up).

               We conclude that Covington fails to demonstrate plain error with respect to the

        restitution condition. Because the restitution condition merely required Covington to

        adhere to the restitution payment schedule, the condition did not create any imposition to

        which Covington was not already subject under the judgment. See id. at 557 (noting that

        “the more onerous the term of supervised release—whether due to its duration or to the

        rigor of its conditions—the greater the justification required” (internal quotation marks

        omitted)).   Furthermore, the reasons for the restitution condition are “self-evident”

        considering Covington’s mandatory restitution obligation. Id. at 559 (internal quotation

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        marks omitted). Consequently, the district court’s “explanation of [the] sentence as a

        whole” sufficed. Id.

               Our review of the record does not reveal any procedural error related to Covington’s

        sentence. The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range, allowed the parties

        to argue, and explained why it believed a below-Guidelines sentence of 39 months’

        imprisonment was appropriate. Covington’s sentence is therefore procedurally reasonable.

               Finally, in her pro se supplemental brief, Covington contends that her sentence is

        substantively unreasonable because of her minimal role in the conspiracy and because she

        did not originate the conspiracy. Our “review for substantive reasonableness takes into

        account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused

        its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in

        § 3553(a).” Nance, 957 F.3d at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]ny sentence

        that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively

        [substantively] reasonable.” Gillespie, 27 F.4th at 945.

               At sentencing, the district court found that Covington had a substantial role in the

        conspiracy and that she had the capability of ending the conspiracy but did not do so. Still,

        the court varied downward because Covington did not originate the conspiracy and because

        she arguably lacked as much decision-making authority as her coconspirators. On this

        record, Covington fails to rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded

        her below-Guidelines sentence.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

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        This court requires that counsel inform Covington, in writing, of the right to petition the

        Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Covington requests that a petition

        be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

        move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

        that a copy thereof was served on Covington. We dispense with oral argument because the

        facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

        argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                       AFFIRMED

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