Court Opinion

ID: 9696018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:33:49.313245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:17.739080
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Bell:
Mrs. Beley on May 1, 1945, more than 5 years before the outbreak of the Korean War, obtained a policy of life insurance on her son, Andrew Beley, who was then seventeen years of age. The policy provided for a monthly premium of |2.18, including an additional monthly premium of 20^ for double indemnity in case of accidental death: The policy included a clause limiting liability to a return .of the premiums in the event .'that the “insured engages in military or naval service in the time of war *unless the insured shall have pre*258viously secured from the Company a permit to engage in such service. It is conceded that such a permit had not been requested or secured.
The beneficiary also claimed “accidental death benefits” under the supplemental contract for additional accidental death benefits which was a part of the policy. This supplement provided: “Additional Accidental Death Benefit: — If the proofs of death . . . show that the death of the Insured resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries sustained . . . through . . . accidental means, . . . then upon such proof, the Company will pay to the beneficiary of record . . . additional amount of indemnity equal to the face amount payable under said Policy,. . .
“Risks Not Assumed — The Company shall not be liable for the additional Accidental Death Benefit specified above if said death shall result by reason of any of the following: ... (d) Military, air or naval service in time of war. (e) Any work in connection with actual warfare, riot, insurrection, police duties or any act incidental thereto, either on land or water . . . (g) Intentional injuries inflicted by any other person.” A termination clause also provided that the provisions for additional accidental death benefit “shall immediately terminate: ... (b) if the Insured shall at any time, voluntarily or involuntarily, engage in military, . . . service in time of war; . . .”.
Several years thereafter, Andrew Beley served in the army without the knowledge or permission of the insurance company and was killed in action in Korea on March 7, 1951. The insurance company denied liability and the beneficiary sued in assumpsit.
Although learned and distinguished Judges have allowed a recovery under this policy, their decision seems to me incomprehensible. The majority, I believe, ignore all the other language, terms and conditions of the policy — which aré insuperable barriers to recovery— *259and pin their decision on one word “war”. They hold that the Korean War is not War. This will shock millions and millions of American citizens and especially Korean veterans and their families. Every man, woman and child in America is informed by the newspapers and radio and knows that there are many thousands of American soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen who are now and for several years have been engaged with soldiers of North Korea and of China in open actual warfare. Our Navy is constantly patrolling and bombarding the coasts of North Korea; our Air Force is having daily dog fights with the enemy, and our soldiers are daily killing the enemy and being killed. We have for over two years been engaged in negotiations for a truce and are vainly trying to exchange prisoners of war. The United States casualties exceed 128,000. How is it humanly possible to say that the Korean War is not war? Moreover, even if the majority’s construction of that one word “war” were correct, it does not meet or answer, as we shall see, the other pertinent provisions of the policy which prohibit recovery.
The parties to a private contract, unaffected by a public interest, can make any agreement they wish (unless it is against public policy). The question therefore is: What did this private contract insure against? The majority change and limit the policy to read “if death shall result by reason of military service in war”; and then hold that the word “war” means a “Constitutional” war; and the Korean War is not a Constitutionally declared war. A reading of the policy will quickly demonstrate that the risk it covered, paid for and insured against, covered and was intended to cover peacetime activities in contradistinction to wartime activities.
The greater likelihood of death occurring, and the consequent increase in the risk assumed by the Insurance Company if the insured engaged in military service in time of war, is manifest; and it would seem obvious *260that the premium or cost would undoubtedly be much larger if the risk included death from war than if it only included death from peacetime activities. It is likewise obvious that the risk or likelihood of death would be equally great whether the insured was engaged in military service in time of actual Avar or in time of a “constitutionally declared” war; and consequently the line of distinction or demarcation which the majority seek to draw has no basis, reason or logic to support it.
Was this “an accidental death”; did death result from “military service in time of war”; or if not, did death result from work in connection with “actual warfareor if not, did death result from “intentional injuries inflicted by another person”; or if not, what did death result from? The majority's only attempt to ansAver these questions is to discuss the word “war”.
It is well settled that ordinary words are to bo given their ordinary and generally understood meaning, unless the instrument itself, considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances, clearly shows them to have been used in a technical or different sense. “The standard for the interpretation of words is their natural meaning to the parties who have contracted at the time and place where the contract is made, considering all the circumstances surrounding it: McMillin v. Titus, 222 Pa. 500. But, as is stated in Williston, volume 2, section 607, page 1169, ‘This rule has never been recognized as authorizing the interpretation of plain and unambiguous language of a written instrument in accordance Avith- any- other meaning than that- indicated by the words used in -the1 Instrument/ .-. . -Words are'to be construed -accordingdo-tkeir primary acceptation unless, from the; context" óf the instrument and- the -intention' of the pafties -t-a-be 'cdilécted-from-it,-they appear-to be used in ¿ different-sense”; Foundation and Construction Co. v. Franklin Trust Co., 307 Pa. 10, 15, 160 A. 711. See alsoto the samé effect: Hesse v. Travelers Ins. Co., *261299 Pa. 125, 149 A. 96; Aschenbrenner v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 292 U.S. 80; Restatement, Contracts, sec. 235.
Plaintiff in order to recover must therefore prove (1) that death was “accidental” and (2) that death did not result (a) from military service “in time of war”, or (b) from “actual warfare”, or (c) from “intentional injuries inflicted by another person”, as these terms are ordinarily understood and accepted.
It is said that there have been 156 armed fightings in the history of our Country. Some of these have been wars, some not; each case depends upon its own particular facts. In this case the mere fact that President Truman has declared the Korean War to be a “police action” does not, irrespective of his motives, make it so in construing a private contract of insurance.*
Although for political or international reasons, or to save the “position” of their leader, the majority in Congress have not formally declared war against the North Koreans or Red China, the Congress (as well as every person in the civilized world) knows that the United States is at war in Korea. See for example, the Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, Public Law 550, (U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News 1952, p. 3903-3929); and the 1952 Amendment to the Veterans’ Compensation Rates statute, Public Law 427, (U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News 1952, p. 3028). In the legislative history of the Veterans’ Compensation Rates statute of 1952 it is said pages 3320-3321): “Your committee . . . believes *262that the bill, as amended, will provide uniformity for veterans of all wars insofar as it deals with the statutory awards for the more seriously disabled groups .... All the provisions of this bill apply entirely and exclusively to service connected veterans of the Spanish-American War group, World Wars I and II and veterans of service on or after June 27, 1950.” (Date of Korean conflict).
Congress has also made provision for the use of United States troops in Korea by malting appropriations totaling billions of dollars (Public Law 843, 81st Congress, Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951). Furthermore, the Revenue Act of 1950 provides for certain income tax exemptions for members of the Armed Forces serving in combat zones, Korea being, of course, in this category. (Public Law 814, 81st Congress, sec. 202). But all of this deals with political questions and with issues arising thereout; it does not deal with private contracts and their meaning and intent.
In Stankus v. New York Life Insurance Company, 312 Mass. 366, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in considering a similar policy of insurance with respect to the death of a seaman on a United States Destroyer (killed when his ship was torpedoed while she was convoying merchant ships in the Atlantic in October, 1941, before a declaration of war against Germany and her allies) held that “death resulted from war or an act incident thereto.” The Court said: “As in the case of any other contract; the words of an insurance policy* in the absence of ambiguity, must be given their usual and ordinary meaning.' The'term ‘war* is not limited, restricted or modified by anything appearing in the policy. It refers to no particular type or kind of war, but applies in general to every situation that ordinary people would commonly regard as war. There is noth*263ing in the policy that indicates that the word was used in any vague, indefinite or ambiguous sense. A policy of insurance whose provisions are plainly and definitely expressed in appropriate language must be enforced in accordance with its terms. . . .
“A conflict between the armed forces of two nations under authority of their respective governments would be commonly regarded as war.”
The Supreme Court of the United States as early as 1799 held that our Country was actually at war with France although no formal declaration of war was made by Congress. Bas v. Tingy, 4 Dallas 37. Mr. Justice Chase stated: The decision of this question depends on “whether, at the time of passing of act of congress of the 2d of March 1799, there subsisted a state of war between the two nations. . . . What then is the nature of the contest subsisting between America and France? In my judgment it is a limited, partial, war. Congress has not declared war in general terms; but congress has authorized hostilities on the high seas by certain persons in certain cases .... So far it is, unquestionably, a partial war; but, nevertheless, it is a public war, on account of the public authority from which it emanates.” Also, Mr. Justice Washington, agreeing, said: “It may, I believe, be safely laid down, that every contention by force between two nations, in external matters, under the authority for their respective governments, is not only war, but public war.”
As recently as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U. S. 579, (1952) Mr. Justice Jackson said (page 642) : “Of course, a state of war may in fact exist without a formal declaration.”
Many Courts throughout the land have held that war can exist between the United States and the armed forces of another nation de facto or de jure, without any formal declaration of war; and that war means actual *264war: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F. 2d 260; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Davis, 79 Ga. App. 336 (1949); Dole v. Insurance Co., 51 Me. 465, 470; Prize Cases, 2 Black 635; Darnall v. Day, 240 Iowa 665, 37 N.W. 2d 277; Lincoln v. Harvey, Texas Civil Appeals, 191 S.W. 2d 764.
More important still, the boys who are engaged in the Korean War, their families and untold millions of American citizens have recognized that this tragic episode in our lives is War — the Korean War l They agree with the Supreme Court of Maine which said in Dole v. Insurance Co., 51 Me., supra, (involving an insurance policy on a ship sunk by a Confederate ship.) “War is an existing fact, and not a legislative decree. ... it exists, whether there is any declaration of it or not.”
A similar decision in point is Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Davis, 79 Ga. App. 336, 53 S.E. 2d 571. In that case the insured, while serving in the Army was killed on August 19, 1945, as the result of the explosion of an ammunition dump in Germany. The policy read: “ ‘The double indemnity will be payable . . . the insured died as a direct result of bodily injuries . . provided that the double indemnity shall not be payable if death resulted . . from military or naval service in time of war, or from any act incident to war . .’ ”.
The question was whether or not World War II was over within the meaning of the phrase “military service in time of war”. The Court said: “Military or naval service in time of war is recognized as a hazardous occupation. This extreme danger exists because in time of war opposing military and naval forces are constantly attacking each other in an all-out effort to accomplish utter destruction. This hazard either does not exist at all or exists to a very limited extent at a time when the shooting war is over and the state of warfare continues to exist only because of the lack of *265completion of negotiations of the terms of peace.” The Court then held that for the purposes of construing this insurance policy there was no war (or any act incident thereto) at the date of the explosion and consequently plaintiff could recover the double indemnity.
In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F. 2d 260, the insured was killed at Pearl Harbor (12/7/41) before any actual declaration of war. The insurance policy provided for double indemnity for accidental death but excluded from its coverage “death . . . resulting from war or any act incident thereto.” The Court held there could be no recovery under a double indemnity clause of the policy since war meant actual war or actual warfare. The Court said: “When one sovereign nation attacks another with premeditated and deliberate intent to wage war against it, and that nation resists the attacks with all the force at its command, we have war in the grim sense of reality. It is war in the only sense that men know and understand it. Mankind goes no further in his definitive search— he does not stand on ceremony or wait for technical niceties. . . .
“The subject matter of the contract was a risk assumed on the life of the insured by the Company, for a stipulated premium, and the use of the word war was obviously intended to denote a restriction or limitation upon the risk assumed. It is plain, therefore, that the definition given to the word war bears a direct relationship to the risk assumed, which is the subject matter of the contract. Viewed in this light, it is also plain that when the parties used the word war, they had in mind the hazard to human life incident thereto.”
In the Prize Cases: The Amy Warwick: 2 Black 635 (1862), various vessels were captured and brought in as prizes by public ships of the United States. Their seizure and condemnation were sustained by the *266Supreme Court of the United States because actual war existed although there had been no declaration of war. The Court said: “A state of actual war may exist without any formal declaration of it by either party; and this is true of both a civil and foreign a war.”
With due regard for my colleagues who differ with me, a holding that under the provisions of this policy the Korean War is not War — in the face of 128,000 American casualties — is so unrealistic and legalistic as to be utterly unjustifiable.
But what about the rest of this insurance policy— language which clearly sets forth the intent of the parties and which the majority ignore! This insurance policy provides that the company shall not be liable for additional accidental death benefits “if said death shall result by reason of .. . (e) Any work in connection with actual warfare, . . . .” “Actual warfare” cannot possibly mean “Constitutional” warfare; there is no such thing! The policy also prohibits the recovery of accidental death benefits if death results from “(g) Intentional injuries inflicted by any other person”. How can this provision be avoided or ignored or be held inapplicable when death unquestionably resulted from “intentional injuries inflicted by another person”!
Equally important, how is it possible to ignore or distort those clear, unambiguous words “accidental death”? It is instantaneously offensive to our knowledge, our experience and all our senses to say that this was an accidental death.
If authority be needed for anything so obvious, it may be found in Hesse v. Traveler’s Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 125, 149 A. 96; Urian v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 310 Pa. 342, 165 A. 388; Arnstein v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 329 Pa. 158, 196 A. 491. The leading case of Urian v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 310 Pa., supra, is directly in point and governs *267the instant case. In that case the beneficiary sued on insurance policies which contained double indemnity provisions identical with the provision in the instant case. The Court found that death was accidental where the insured died from inhalation of carbon monoxide gas discharged by the engine while he was attempting to repair his automobile in his garage. The door was open, the gas was odorless and the plaintiff proved that inhalation for a period of 10 seconds would cause death. The Court reviewed the many cases on the subject of “accidental means” and in a very able opinion said: “All the policies provided that double indemnity should be paid if the death of the insured resulted ‘solely from bodily injuries caused directly, exclusively and independently of all other causes by external, violent, and purely accidental means.’* The principal question raised by this appeal is where death was caused by ‘accidental means.’ It is not disputed that it was the result of ‘external and violent’ means.
“The expression ‘accidental means’ has been in use in policies of insurance for more than fifty years. It has been interpreted in nearly every state in the union. The case which is most often quoted is probably U. S. Mut. Acc. Assn. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, where the following instructions were approved by the Supreme Court of the United States: ‘If a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means; but if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means.’ This is substantially the definition given in the text*268books: 6 Cooley, Briefs on Insurance (2d edition) 5234; Couch, Insurance, section 1137; Vance, Insurance, 871.
“Another frequently quoted definition is that given by Sandborn, J., in Western Comm. Travelers’ Assn. v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401: ‘An effect which is the natural and probable consequence of an act or course of action is not an accident, nor is it produced by accidental means. It is either the result of actual design, or it falls under the maxim that [every man must be held to intend the natural and probable consequence of his deeds]. On the other hand, an effect which is not the natural or probable consequence of the means which produced it, an effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reasonably anticipated from the use of those means, an ■ effect which the actor did not intend to produce and which he cannot be charged with the design of producing, ... is produced by accidental means. It is produced by means which were neither designed nor calculated to cause it. Such an effect is not the result of design, cannot be reasonably anticipated, is unexpected, and is produced by an unusual combination of fortuitous circumstances; in other words, it is produced by accidental means/ . . .
“Our cases have uniformly held that where the cause of injury or death was an act of the insured, the means which caused the result, to be accidental, must be undesigned and unintentional, that accidental injury or death is an unintended and undesigned result arising from acts done, while injury or death by accidental means is a result arising from acts unintentionally done. Thus, recovery was allowed on- these principles in Taylor v. Gen. Acc. Ass. Corp., 208 Pa. 439; Erb v. Comm. Mut. Acc. Co., 232 Pa. 215; Kelley v. Pittsburgh Cas. Co., 256 Pa. 1; Eby v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 Pa. 525; Bloom v. Brotherhood Ace. Co., 85 Pa. Superior Ct. 398; Horan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 104 Pa. Superior Ct. 474; see *269Pickett v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 79; and denied in Hesse v. Traveler’s Ins. Co., supra; Semancik v. Continental Cas. Co., 56 Pa. Superior Ct. 392; Trau v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., supra; Camp v. Prudential Ins. Co., 107 Pa. Superior Ct. 342.”
The limited nature of this policy is further apparent from the fact that, according to its express terms, accidental death benefits cannot be recovered if death results from suicide, from flying, from participating in a submarine descent, from participating in an assault or felony, or from taking poison or inhaling gas, or from bodily or mental disease, or from bacterial infection. In other words, it is clear as crystal that accidental death meant accidental death; and the parties intended to limit the accidental death benefits to (a) death resulting from an accident, with the further limitation (b) that the accident must not result from flying, or from a submarine descent, or from a fight, or from a felony, or from intentional injuries inflicted by another. The majority opinion makes no attempt to discuss, let alone refute, the requirement of accidental death or the specific additional limitations which we have just pointed out. The reason for their omission seems obvious.
These limitations clearly define and illuminate and limit the intentions of the parties and create and constitute insuperable barriers to a recovery under the facts of this case!
For each of these reasons I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.

 Italics throughout, ours.

 Moreover, if contrary to the belief of- countless millions of American citizens, the Korean War is not war but only “a police action” as. President Truman and his Administration say, dyes it not follow that a soldier killed therein was performing “police duties or any act incidental thereto, either on land or water”, and hence cannot recover under the express terms of the policy!

 The policy in the instant case contains an identical double indemnity provision.