Court Opinion

ID: 9407881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 18:00:48.41891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:40.713736
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40016        Document: 00516814562             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/10/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                                FILED
                                                                             July 10, 2023
                                      No. 22-40016
                                     ____________                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                 Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Rogelio Guerra,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 7:21-CR-717-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Rogelio Guerra challenges the district court’s imposition of several
   discretionary conditions of supervised release, arguing that the court erred
   when it failed to pronounce them. Because the challenged conditions are not
   more restrictive than the pronounced sentence, we AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40016     Document: 00516814562           Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/10/2023

                                    No. 22-40016

                                         I
          Guerra pleaded guilty to importing 500 or more grams of
   methamphetamine, as well as aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
   §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), and 960(b)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The appendix to
   Guerra’s presentencing report recommended that, while on supervised
   release, Guerra “shall comply with the following applicable mandatory
   conditions and all standard conditions of supervision that have been adopted
   by the Court as well as any additional special conditions.” The appendix did
   not, however, recommend any special conditions.
          At the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a 210-month
   term of imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release.
   The court instructed Guerra that he was “to comply with the standard
   [supervised release] conditions adopted by the Court.” Given Guerra’s
   history of drug and alcohol abuse, the court also stated that it was ordering
   Guerra to participate in an outpatient drug- and alcohol-treatment program.
   The court did not orally pronounce any other special conditions of supervised
   release.
          When the written judgment issued, the document listed five special
   conditions of supervised release:
          [1] You must participate in an outpatient alcohol and
          substance-abuse treatment program and follow the rules and
          regulations of that program. The probation officer will
          supervise your participation in the program, including the
          provider, location, modality, duration, and intensity. You must
          pay the costs of the program, if financially able.

          [2] You may not possess any controlled substances without a
          valid prescription. If you do have a valid prescription, you must
          follow the instructions on the prescription.

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          [3] You must submit to substance-abuse testing to determine if
          you have used a prohibited substance, and you must pay the
          costs of the testing if financially able. You may not attempt to
          obstruct or tamper with the testing methods.

          [4] You may not use or possess alcohol.

          [5] You may not knowingly purchase, possess, distribute,
          administer, or otherwise use any psychoactive substances,
          including synthetic marijuana or bath salts, that impair a
          person’s physical or mental functioning, whether or not
          intended for human consumption, except as with the prior
          approval of the probation officer.
   Of these five special conditions, only the first was pronounced at the
   sentencing hearing.
          Guerra timely appealed the judgment, arguing that the four non-
   pronounced special conditions—Special Conditions 2, 3, 4, and 5—conflict
   with the orally pronounced sentence.
                                          II
          “The district court must orally pronounce a sentence to respect the
   defendant’s right to be present for sentencing.” United States v. Diggles, 957
   F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). “If the in-court pronouncement
   differs from the judgment that later issues, what the judge said at sentencing
   controls.” Id. at 557. “This pronouncement rule applies to some supervised
   release conditions, but not all of them.” Id. “A sentencing court must
   pronounce conditions that are discretionary under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).” Id.
   at 563. “If a condition is required,” however, “the court need not pronounce
   it.” Id. at 559. The conditions at issue in this appeal are all discretionary, so
   the district court was required to pronounce them. Id. at 563. It did not do so.

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          While in most cases our case law requires us to strike a discretionary
   condition that was not pronounced, we have recognized a narrow exception.
   Id. “When there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the
   written judgment, we must first determine whether such discrepancy ‘is a
   conflict or merely an ambiguity that can be resolved by reviewing the rest of
   the record.’” United States v. Prado, 53 F.4th 316, 318 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (quoting United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006)). “In the
   event of a conflict, the written judgment must be amended to conform with
   the oral pronouncement, which controls.” Id.
          Though we have often used the word “conflict” in this context, that
   word is a term of art, and it has a very precise meaning here. “A conflict
   occurs if the written judgment broadens the restrictions or requirements of
   supervised release from an oral pronouncement or imposes more
   burdensome conditions.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and
   citations omitted). On the other hand, we have held that there is no conflict
   if there is “no material difference between the oral pronouncement and the
   written judgment.” United States v. Perez-Espinoza, 31 F.4th 988, 989 (5th
   Cir. 2022). In the latter situation, “we look to the sentencing court’s intent
   to determine the sentence.” United States v. Tanner, 984 F.3d 454, 456 (5th
   Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Tang, 718 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 2013)
   (per curiam)). “We determine that intent by examining ‘the entire record.’”
   Id. (quoting United States v. English, 400 F.3d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2005)).
          Guerra challenges Special Conditions 2, 3, 4, and 5. Because the
   challenged special conditions appeared for the first time in the written
   judgment, Guerra did not have an opportunity to object to them. We thus
   review the imposition of Special Conditions 2, 3, 4, and 5 for abuse of
   discretion. United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2020). The
   Government concedes error as to Special Conditions 3, 4, and 5. Despite this
   concession, we still review the district court’s judgment for abuse of

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   discretion. See United States v. Castaneda, 740 F.3d 169, 171 (5th Cir. 2013)
   (per curiam). We begin our discussion with Special Conditions 3, 4, and 5
   and then turn to Special Condition 2.
                                           A
          Special Conditions 3, 4, and 5 are no more restrictive than Special
   Condition 1, which was pronounced. Special Condition 3 requires Guerra to
   submit to substance-abuse testing and to pay for the testing if able. Special
   Conditions 4 and 5 prohibit Guerra from using or possessing alcohol and
   psychoactive substances during the period of supervised release. In light of
   Guerra’s history of substance abuse, and the district court’s pronouncement
   of Special Condition 1, the supervised-release condition requiring him to
   undergo outpatient alcohol- and substance-abuse treatment, it is easy to see
   how these special conditions merely clarify the orally pronounced condition
   requiring outpatient treatment. Drug testing, we have long acknowledged,
   “is a likely component of any drug treatment program.” United States v.
   Vega, 332 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2003). Special Condition 3 facilitates that
   component of treatment and further clarifies that Guerra’s being an
   outpatient does not give him license to evade drug testing. See id. As for the
   other two conditions, it should go without saying that Guerra cannot use
   alcohol or drugs while in treatment for abusing those substances. Indeed,
   permitting him to use such substances during the period of treatment would
   defeat the very purpose of ordering alcohol- and substance-abuse treatment
   in the first place.
          Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
   Special Conditions 3, 4, and 5. In fact, on several occasions we have held that
   special conditions identical to Special Conditions 3, 4, and 5 did not create a
   conflict with an orally pronounced special condition requiring substance-
   abuse treatment. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Brewster, No. 20-40817,

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   2022 WL 4077165, at *3–4 (5th Cir. Sept. 6, 2022) (unpublished) (per
   curiam); United States v. Roblez, No. 21-40586, 2022 WL 16570786, at *1 (5th
   Cir. Nov. 1, 2022) (unpublished) (per curiam); United States v. Zavala, 835
   F. App’x 767, 768 (5th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (per curiam); United States
   v. Lozano, 834 F. App’x 69, 75 (5th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (per curiam).
   Though these opinions are not binding, we see no reason to depart from them
   in this case.1
                                                B
           We turn now to Special Condition 2, which provides that Guerra
   “may not possess any controlled substances without a valid prescription”
   and that, “[i]f [he] do[es] have a valid prescription, [he] must follow the
   instructions on the prescription.” Guerra rightly does not contest the first
   part of the special condition, which prohibits him from possessing controlled
   substances without a prescription, as that condition is mandatory. See 18
   U.S.C. § 3583(d). After all, mandatory conditions need not be pronounced.
   Diggles, 957 F.3d at 559. Guerra challenges instead the second part of the
   condition, which requires him to “follow the instructions on the

           _____________________
           1
             We reiterate that the district court’s imposition of alcohol- and substance-abuse
   treatment is key to our decision today. Indeed, all but one of the cases cited by the parties
   in support of striking the special conditions are distinguishable on this ground, because in
   each such case (and unlike this case), the defendant was not subject to a valid special
   condition requiring substance-abuse treatment. See United States v. Rodriguez, 852 F.
   App’x 810, 811–12 (5th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (per curiam) (substance-abuse treatment
   not validly imposed); United States v. Johnson, 850 F. App’x 894, 896 (5th Cir. 2021)
   (unpublished) (per curiam) (same); United States v. De La Cruz, 819 F. App’x 266, 267 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Boshears, 818 F. App’x 337,
   338 (5th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (per curiam) (sex-offender treatment); United States v.
   Morin, 832 F.3d 513, 514–15, 518–19 (5th Cir. 2016) (same). But see United States v.
   Hernandez, No. 21-40161, 2022 WL 1224480, at *1, *4 (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 2022)
   (unpublished) (per curiam).

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   prescription,” arguing that it is more restrictive than Special Condition 1,
   which requires him to undergo alcohol- and substance-abuse treatment.
          Regardless of any potential conflict with Special Condition 1, the
   challenged condition is no broader than the mandatory condition prohibiting
   unauthorized possession of controlled substances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).
   Guerra is already prohibited from possessing controlled substances, the only
   exception being if he has a valid prescription. See id.; see also 21 U.S.C.
   § 844(a). Special Condition 2 merely reinforces that mandatory condition by
   preventing the unlawful abuse of a lawfully prescribed controlled substance:
   If Guerra is given a valid prescription, then he must follow the physician’s
   instructions and thus remain within the realm of lawful possession of a
   controlled substance.
          Guerra argues that “[u]nder the plain language of Special Condition
   2, Mr. Guerra could be subject to reimprisonment for violating the conditions
   of his supervised release if he failed to finish a course of prescribed
   antibiotics, or skipped a dose of any prescribed medication.” Not so. We read
   special conditions of supervised release “in a commonsense way.” United
   States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177, 193 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.
   Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 167 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1002 (2002)).
   Here, the requirement that Guerra follow instructions on prescriptions is
   included in, and immediately follows, the condition making a narrow
   exception to the otherwise categorical ban on possessing controlled
   substances. In context, therefore, the condition applies to prescriptions for
   controlled substances only, not to every single prescription that Guerra
   happens to receive from a physician.
          This case is unlike United States v. Prado, where we held that a special
   condition requiring the defendant to take all prescribed mental-health
   medications was more restrictive than a discretionary condition requiring the

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   defendant to undergo mental-health treatment. See 53 F.4th at 318–19. Here,
   Special Condition 2 applies only to restrict any potential abuse of lawfully
   prescribed controlled substances, thus facilitating Guerra’s compliance with
   the mandatory condition prohibiting his unlawful use of controlled
   substances. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). In contrast, the special condition in Prado
   was a blanket order requiring Prado to take any and all prescribed medications
   without regard to whether they were controlled substances. See Prado, 53
   F.4th at 318–19. In other words, the special condition here is fully in line with
   the mandatory condition against unlawful possession of controlled
   substances, but the special condition at issue in Prado had no such
   connection. Therefore, Special Condition 2 poses no conflict with the
   pronounced sentence.
          AFFIRMED.

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