Court Opinion

ID: 9895426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 13:06:44.75591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:35.286172
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                       No. COA22-909

                                Filed 7 November 2023

Halifax County, No. 18CVD180

HUNTER LEE SMITH (Now known as HUNTER SMITH WILLETTE), Plaintiff,

              v.

REID ALAN DRESSLER, Defendant.

        Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 20 January 2022 by Judge Teresa

R. Freeman in Halifax County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 August

2023.

        Tharrington Smith, LLP, by Jeffrey R. Russell, for the plaintiff-appellee.

        Wyrick, Robbins, Yates & Ponton, LLP, Charles W. Clanton, K. Edward Greene,
        and Jessica B. Heffner, for the defendant-appellant.

        TYSON, Judge.

        Reid Alan Dressler (“Father”) appeals an order modifying child custody entered

on 20 January 2022, which granted Hunter Lee Smith (“Mother”) primary legal

custody of Mother’s and Father’s minor child. We vacate the trial judge’s order and

remand for entry of an order concluding a substantial change in circumstances was

not shown.

                                  I.     Background

        Mother and Father are the parents of minor child, W.D., born on 14 September
                                 SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                  Opinion of the Court

2017. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b) (pseudonyms and initials used to protect the identity

of minors). Mother and Father began a romantic relationship in August 2016, while

both were undergraduate students at North Carolina State University, which

resulted in W.D. being conceived.       After W.D.’s birth, Mother’s and Father’s

relationship deteriorated and ultimately ended.

         Mother filed a complaint for Child Custody and Child Support on 2 March

2018. At that time, Mother was residing in her parents’ home in Halifax County.

After a hearing was held in April, the trial court awarded temporary primary custody

to Mother on 24 May 2018. Three hearings were held to modify the Order for

Temporary Custody and Child Support between July 2018 and June 2019, but the

order was only changed to grant Father additional visitation. The Honorable W.

Turner Stephenson, III, (“Judge Stephenson”) presided over the trial and hearings.

         Mother informed Father on 20 October 2019 that she had joined the United

States Air Force and would be leaving for basic training in Texas in approximately

one week.

         On 1 November 2019, Father filed a Motion for Temporary Custody and to

Present New Evidence.      Father asserted Mother “misled” Father regarding her

current employment and pretended she was still employed at Braswell Family

Farms. He also included information about Mother’s failure to inform Father she had

enlisted in the military until approximately one week prior to departing from the

state.

                                         -2-
                                 SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                  Opinion of the Court

        Mother filed a motion to stay the proceedings on 18 November 2019 pursuant

to section 3932 of the Servicemember Civil Relief Act. See 50 U.S.C. § 3932. The trial

court postponed the hearing because “it did not have jurisdictional authority to

proceed as [Mother] was in basic training and thus was an active-duty member of the

United States Air Force.” The trial court re-scheduled a hearing for 16 March 2020,

but the hearing did not occur due to COVID-19 protocols.

        The trial court granted the motion to reopen the evidence and heard testimony

from both parties on 15 June 2020. The trial court orally granted Father primary

custody of W.D. and visitation with Mother when she exercised military leave. The

order, however, was not written, signed, and entered until over six months later on

22 January 2021 (“First Custody Order”).

        Mother was stationed at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey when the

evidentiary hearing was held on 15 June 2020. Shortly after the hearing, Mother

married Dylan Willette (“Stepfather”) on 18 September 2020, who also served in the

Air Force. Sometime in late July or August 2020, Mother and Stepfather conceived

a child, who was due in May of 2021. Mother and Stepfather returned to North

Carolina and held a wedding ceremony with Mother’s family and W.D. on 10 October

2020.

        When Mother returned to duty in New Jersey at the end of October, Mother’s

superior informed her she was eligible for discharge due to her pregnancy. On 30

October 2020, Mother’s honorable discharge from the military was approved.

                                         -3-
                                   SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                    Opinion of the Court

Mother’s official date of separation was listed as 20 December 2020, as Mother had

accumulated twenty-five days of leave. Mother used her twenty-five days towards

her “terminal leave” and permanently moved back to North Carolina on 25 November

2020.

        When the evidentiary hearing was held on 15 June 2020, Father lived in

Hampstead, in Pender County, but he presented evidence indicating he had

purchased land in Burgaw and planned to build a house. In fall 2020, Father and

W.D. often stayed in Clayton with Father’s parents while his house was being built.

When Father and W.D. were not staying with Father’s parents, they lived in a two-

bedroom guest house owned by Father’s paternal aunt and uncle. Father’s home in

Burgaw was completed in July 2021. From July 2021 until January 2022, Father

and W.D. lived Burgaw, where W.D. attended pre-kindergarten classes.

        Mother’s and Father’s counsels communicated with each other and the trial

court, and they entered several motions between the evidentiary hearing held on 15

June 2020 and the entry of the order issued on 22 January 2021. After the hearing,

“counsel for [each of] the parties had agreed that each would write the trial judge in

support of their contentions” and to propose orders based upon Judge Stephenson’s

oral rendition of the order at trial.

        Father’s trial counsel sent the proposed custody order on 25 September 2020

to: Judge Stephenson, Mother’s counsel, and the trial court administrator.        The

proposed order was in a “redline format showing the differences remaining between

                                           -4-
                                 SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                  Opinion of the Court

counsel as to the language of the order.”

      Father’s proposed custody order contained the following language:

             2. [Father] is granted primary physical custody of the
             aforesaid minor child.

             3. [Mother] shall have visitation with the aforesaid minor
             child away from the residence of [Father] as follows:

                   a.     She may have a two-week visit with the child
                   from Saturday, July 18, 2020[,] until August 1, 2020.
                   The child will be flown to the nearest safe airport
                   near the residence of [Mother] by [Father] and the
                   child will be returned by [Father] to Raleigh-
                   Durham Airport to the custody of [Father] at the
                   conclusion of said visitation. Said visitation will
                   begin at the time a morning flight can be arranged
                   to Philadelphia or whatever major airport is closest
                   to Joint Base McGuire and is deemed the safest for
                   transportation of a child. The flight shall leave from
                   Raleigh-Durham Airport. The parties will equally
                   split the cost of the child’s airline tickets and will
                   each be responsible for the cost of their own tickets.

                   b.     In addition to the two[-]week visitation period
                   granted to [Mother] above for the remainder of this
                   year and in years to come [Mother] is granted
                   visitation with her child whenever she is on “Military
                   Leave” or at other times when has [sic] the ability to
                   return to North Carolina while still serving in the
                   United States Military. When the [Mother] is on
                   leave, she should give [Father] as much notice as
                   reasonably possible but in no event less than forty-
                   eight hours’ notice of her intent to exercise visitation
                   with her child in the State of North Carolina.
                   [Father] is to be given priority for all holiday periods
                   of Thanksgiving, Easter, Fourth of July, and Labor
                   Day if [Mother] can arrange leave for those periods.
                   As to the Christmas holiday, [Father] shall have the
                   child with him every Christmas Eve from 6:00

                                            -5-
                               SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                Opinion of the Court

                  o’clock P.M. until 12:00 noon on Christmas Day.
                  Other than this part of the Christmas holiday,
                  [Mother] may have the child with her during this
                  holiday period whenever she can arrange leave.

                  ...

                  g.     As long as [Mother] gives the required 48
                  hours’ notice of her intent to exercise military leave
                  visitation with her son this visitation will be
                  preemptive, and she shall be entitled to said
                  vacation unless the child is ill except for Christmas
                  Eve and Christmas Day as set forth above.
                         When [Mother] exercises the military leave
                  visitation or at any other times when she can return
                  to North Carolina for visitation with the minor child
                  while still serving in the United States Military
                  Service, she shall inform [Father] where she will be
                  staying with the minor child and provide an
                  emergency address for contact.
                         In exercising military leave or at any other
                  times when she can return to North Carolina for
                  visitation with the minor child while still serving in
                  the United States Military Service, [Mother] is free
                  to choose the time she may come but she may not
                  visit more than every other weekend unless it is in
                  connection with Labor Day, Fourth of July, Easter,
                  Thanksgiving or Christmas and New Year’s
                  vacation which are special times and are set forth
                  above.

(emphasis supplied).

      While Father’s proposed order was pending before the court, Mother filed a

purported Rule 59 Motion on 20 November 2020. Mother sought temporary custody

of W.D. and to present new evidence, because the trial judge had not entered the

proposed custody order sent to him on 25 September 2020. Mother’s new evidence

                                       -6-
                                 SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                  Opinion of the Court

included the following allegations: Mother had married Stepfather in September 2020

and was expecting a child in May 2021; Mother was being honorably discharged from

the Air Force at the end of 2020; Mother owned a home in Wilson County and planned

to move into the home on 25 November 2020; and, Mother had contacted her former

employer, Pfizer, to discuss gaining re-employment in Rocky Mount.

      On 7 December 2020, Father filed a motion for entry of the proposed custody

order orally announced after the hearing on 15 June 2020. Father attached a revised

copy of the proposed custody order, which was nearly identical to the version sent to

the trial court on 25 September 2020, except Father deleted the redlined comments

and renumbered certain facts and conclusions that were nonsequential in the

previous draft. Father also attached a notice of hearing for 21 December 2020.

Father’s motion also provided the following assertions:

             11. Again, as she has frequently done in this case, [Mother]
             lied to [Father] as on November 16, 2020, [Mother] verified
             a motion to introduce “allegedly” newly discovered evidence
             in this case and seeking a new custody order granting
             custody of the aforesaid minor child to [Mother]. She did
             not discuss or tell [Father] that she had sworn to said
             motion on November 16, 2020 or that the same had been
             filed on November 20, 2020 by her attorney. [Father] did
             not find out about the motion until the undersigned
             attorney returned from his Thanksgiving vacation and
             notified [Father] of the existence and filing of said motion
             on November 30, 2020.

             12. Moreover, unlike she stated she would do, [Mother] did
             not and has not returned the minor child to the custody of
             the [Father] and for a period of three days would not even
             tell [Father] where his son was, how his son was doing

                                         -7-
                                  SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                   Opinion of the Court

             physically or mentally, or when she was leaving for North
             Carolina. Indeed, during this period between Wednesday,
             November 25, 2020, ·and Friday, November 27, 2020,
             [Mother] would not respond to any attempted
             communication from [Father].       Then from Saturday,
             November 28, 2020, until Monday, November 30, 2020,
             [Mother] would not respond to any communication
             attempted by [Father].

             13. On November 30, 2020, [Mother] advised the [Father]
             in writing that she had been “legally advised to ignore you
             {sic [Father]} as long as possible.”

             14. When the [Father] pointed out the exact wording of the
             proposed Judgment herein and pointed out the
             pronouncement of Judge Stephenson, [Mother] replied in
             text that “that was never filed or signed by a Judge and it
             is not an order. I am not going to argue with you over texts.
             I would be more than happy to go over a new schedule for
             both of us to spend time with [W.D.]. For now, I am going
             to enjoy my time with him. Please let me know when you
             would like to discuss this schedule.”

      No order was entered regarding whether Mother’s motion for temporary

custody and to present new evidence was granted or denied. The record also does not

indicate whether the scheduled hearing on Father’s motion for entry of the First

Custody Order was held. The trial court, however, entered the First Custody Order

granting primary custody to Father and visitation to Mother on 22 January 2021.

      While the findings of facts and conclusions of law contained in the twenty-two

pages of the First Custody Order are identical to the draft order sent to the trial court

on 25 September 2020, the trial court significantly modified the visitation orally

announced at trial on 15 June 2020 and explained: “The Court with the consent of

                                          -8-
                                 SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                  Opinion of the Court

the parties having determined that the visitation originally announced in open court

on June 15, 2020[,] is no longer in the best interest of the child, determines that

[Mother] shall have visitation with the aforesaid minor child away from the residence

of [Father.]” On appeal, both Mother and Father assert the changes to the visitation

rendered on 15 June 2020 were not literally consented to.

      The trial court’s First Custody Order entered on 22 January 2021 included the

following language, which was never consented to by the parties, orally announced at

trial, or included in the proposed draft order sent to the trial court on 25 September

2020 or in Father’s Motion for Entry of Order:

             3b.   [Mother] shall have additional visitation privileges
             with the aforesaid minor child away from the residence of
             [Father] as follows:

                   1.     Every other weekend during the public school
                   system year of the child as hereinafter defined from
                   Friday beginning a[t] 7:00 P.M. until the following
                   Sunday at 7:00 P.M. Said visitation is to begin on
                   Friday the 5th day of February 2021 and every other
                   weekend thereafter;[ ]however if [Mother’s] work
                   schedule is such she has to work on said weekend,
                   then her every other weekend visitation will begin
                   on Friday February 12th 2020 at 7:00 P.M. until the
                   following Sunday and every other weekend
                   thereafter.

                   2.     During the Christmas season of each even
                   numbered year from 2:00 P.M. on Christmas Day
                   until 6:00 P.M. on the day before the public school
                   system of the county wherein[ ]the minor child
                   resides (hereinafter the school system) resumes
                   after Christmas vacation and during the Christmas
                   season of each odd numbered year from 6:00 P.M. on

                                         -9-
             SMITH V. DRESSLER

              Opinion of the Court

the day that the school system adjourns for the
Christmas holiday until 2:00 PM on Christmas Day.
       [Father] shall have the custody of the child
during the Christmas season of each odd numbered
year from 2:00 P.M. on Christmas Day until 6:00
P.M. on the day before the school system resumes
after Christmas vacation and during the Christmas
season of each even numbered years from 6:00 P.M.
on the day the school system adjourns for the
Christmas holiday until 2:00 P.M. on Christmas
Day.
       The intention of this Order is that the parties
should alternate their respective halves of the
Christmas holiday.

3.     During the Thanksgiving holiday for each odd
numbered year from 6:00 P.M. on the day school
recess[es] for the school holiday until 6:00 P.M. on
the day before school resumes at the expiration of
the holiday.
       [Father] shall have the minor child with him
during the Thanksgiving holiday of each even
numbered year.

4.     During the spring break holiday of each even
numbered year from 6:00 P.M. on the day school
recesses for the holiday until 6:00 P.M. on the day
before school resumes at the expiration of the
holiday.
       [Father] will have the child with him during
the spring break holiday of each odd numbered year.

5.    [Mother] shall always have Mother’s Day
Weekend and [Father] shall always have Father’s
Day Weekend regardless of the every other weekend
schedule.

6.    During the summer vacation of the child from
the county school system, the parties will alternate
weeks with the child’s summer vacation beginning
on the last Friday after school adjourns for the

                     - 10 -
              SMITH V. DRESSLER

               Opinion of the Court

summer at 6:00 P.M. and continuing to the following
Friday until 6:00 P.M.
       During odd numbered years, [Mother] will
have the first week and [Father] will have the next
week[,] and they will then alternate weeks until the
last Friday before school resumes from summer
break at 6:00 P.M. at which time the weekend
visitation will resume.     Although the summer
vacation[,] as does the other holiday visitation
periods[,] controls weekend visitation, the parties
will not change the count or progression of weekend
visitation so it will remain constant and known to
the child even though not exercised during summer
holiday visitations. Thus, the parties shall simply
refer to a calendar and know when to resume the
weekend visitation at the conclusion of the summer
vacation. Summer vacation will be deemed to end
on the last Friday on the summer vacation period
before the School System resumes.
       During even numbered years, [Father] shall
have the first week and [Mother] shall have the next
week and they shall then alternate weeks until the
last Friday before school resumes from summer
break at 6:00 P.M. at which time the weekend
visitation will resume.

7.     If the parties elect not to have a joint birthday
party for the minor child during odd numbered years
when the child’s birthday is during a weekday[,] the
child will celebrate his birthday with [Mother] and
during even numbered years with [Father] from the
time school is out until 8:00 P.M. During the years
when the child’s birthday does not fall on a weekend,
the parent not with the child may celebrate the
child’s birthday the day before from the time school
is out until 8:00 P.M.
       If the child’s birthday falls on a weekend, then
the child shall be with the parent whose weekend it
is and the other parent may have the child to
celebrate his birthday from 12:00 P.M. to 8:00 P.M.
on the child’s birthday during that weekend.

                      - 11 -
                    SMITH V. DRESSLER

                     Opinion of the Court

      ...

      9.     The provisions for Christmas, Thanksgiving,
      Spring Break, Mother’s Day, Father’s Day,
      birthdays, and summer override the weekend
      visitation privileges granted herein. When there is
      a conflict of either party’s visitation i.e., Christmas,
      Thanksgiving, Spring Break, Mother’s Day, Father’s
      Day, birthdays, or summer with weekend visits,
      then the weekend visitations will not occur, will not
      be made up[,] and will be subordinated to and not
      occur during these other special periods.

4.     The party having the child with him or her will allow
the child to have telephone, FaceTime, Skype, Zoom, or
other communication, if available, with the other parent
one time per day between 5:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M. The
parties shall exchange phone numbers to facilitate the
ability of the parties to contact the child by phone,
FaceTime, or Skype.

5.    When either party has the aforesaid child in his or
her physical custody and either party plans to be away
from home with the child for a period of more than 48
hours, then he or she will provide all travel arrangement
information including the times of travel and the places to
which travel is being made to the other party.

6.    If the child has scheduled academic, athletic, or
other events[,] the parent having physical custody will
make sure that the child attends these activities.

7.    Each party will make certain that any prescribed
medication for the minor child accompanies the child when
the child goes to visit [Mother] and the same is returned
with the child to [Father].

8.     The parties shall meet and exchange the child on the
occasion of each visitation at 1103 North Breazeale Ave,
Mount Olive NC 28365. Either party may use a family

                            - 12 -
                                  SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                   Opinion of the Court

             member related by blood or marriage to provide
             transportation for the child.

             9.    Each party will notify the other party of any
             emergency concerning the child as soon as reasonably
             possible.

             10.     If the child is ill, [Father] will let [Mother] know and
             if this illness impedes a regular weekend visitation[,] then
             said visitation may be made up the next weekend even if
             this results in two (2) weekends in a row for [Mother].

             11.    If [Mother] has an emergency arise or should some
             other events arise which means that she cannot exercise
             her visitation with the minor child, she must let [Father]
             know this as soon as reasonably possible.

Notably, all references to W.D.’s visitation with Mother being related to her serving

in the military or while she was exercising “military leave” were removed from the

trial court’s entered First Custody Order.

      W.D. injured his right leg while jumping on a trampoline at Father’s parents’

home on Christmas Day in December 2020. Father notified Mother about the injury.

Mother took W.D. to an orthopedist on 26 December 2020, who diagnosed W.D. with

a probable fracture in his tibia. Mother reported W.D.’s injuries to Child Protective

Services (“CPS”).

      CPS notified Father they had commenced an investigation concerning W.D.’s

leg injury in January 2021, along with five other alleged instances of cuts, scrapes,

bruises, and a possible tooth injury. An independent medical examination prompted

by CPS initially noted evidence of potential neglect and abuse. Upon further review,

                                          - 13 -
                                 SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                     Opinion of the Court

however, the same medical examiner “altered the diagnosis to state that significant

child neglect cannot be made in this case.”

      Mother filed a motion on 25 February 2021 to modify the First Custody Order,

alleging a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. W.D. was three years

old when Mother filed the motion. Hearings were held on 29 and 30 June 2021, 5

August 2021, 14 September 2021, and 19 October 2021. At those hearings, Mother

produced evidence tending to show several circumstances had changed since the 15

June 2020 hearing.

      The alleged changed circumstances largely mirrored the assertions Mother

had included in the purported Rule 59 Motion filed on 20 November 2020, i.e., Mother

had married another man, was expecting another child, was medically discharged

from the military, and was moving from New Jersey back to North Carolina. The 24

February 2021 motion also included allegations W.D. had sustained injuries while in

Father’s care and allegations Father had deliberately concealed certain cold

symptoms before testing positive for COVID-19.

      On 20 January 2022, the court found a substantial change in circumstances

had occurred. The court modified the existing child First Custody Order, granted

primary custody to Mother, and awarded visitation to Father. Father appeals from

the trial court’s order (“Second Custody Order”) filed on 20 January 2022.

                               II.      Jurisdiction

      Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(2) (2021).

                                            - 14 -
                                  SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                   Opinion of the Court

             III.   Modification of an Existing Custody Order

      Father asserts the trial court erred by finding a substantial change in

circumstances had occurred to support a modification of custody and erred in

awarding primary custody to Mother.         Father argues the trial court improperly

considered evidence of events, which had occurred prior to and were accounted for in

the First Custody Order entered on 22 January 2021. Father further argues the trial

court’s findings were insufficient to support its conclusions of law.

                              A. Standard of Review

      “When reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for the

modification of an existing child custody order, the appellate courts must examine

the trial court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by

substantial evidence.” Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253

(2003) (citation omitted).

      A trial court may not modify a permanent child custody order unless it finds a

substantial change in circumstances has occurred and exists, which affects the

welfare of the child. Simmons v. Arriola, 160 N.C. App. 671, 674, 586 S.E.2d 809, 811

(2003). Whether a substantial change in circumstances exists for the purpose of

modifying a permanent child custody order is a legal conclusion. Spoon v. Spoon, 233

N.C. App. 38, 43, 755 S.E.2d 66, 70 (2014). “Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo

and are subject to full review.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878

(2011) (citations omitted).

                                          - 15 -
                                  SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Wide discretion is vested in the trial judge when awarding primary custody of

a minor child. Shamel v. Shamel, 16 N.C. App. 65, 66, 190 S.E.2d 856, 857 (1972).

“It is well established that where matters are left to the discretion of the trial court,

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of

discretion.” White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985). “A trial

court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are

manifestly unsupported by reason[,]” or has misapprehended and committed an error

of law. Id.

                                     B. Analysis

                       1. Previously Disclosed Circumstances

      A substantial change of circumstances is required to be shown by the movant

before the trial court may modify a permanent custody order. This burden of proof is

required to prevent dissatisfied parties from relitigating a permanent custody order

in another court in hopes of reaching a different conclusion. Newsome v. Newsome,

42 N.C. App. 416, 425, 256 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1979) (“The rule prevents the dissatisfied

party from presenting those circumstances to another court in the hopes that

different conclusions will be drawn.”). “A trial court may order the modification of an

existing child custody order if [the movant proves and] the court determines that

there has been a substantial change of circumstances affecting the child’s welfare and

that modification is in the child’s best interests.” Spoon, 233 N.C. App. at 41, 755

S.E.2d at 69 (citation omitted); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7 (2021). “[W]hen evaluating

                                          - 16 -
                                 SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                  Opinion of the Court

whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances, courts may only

consider events which occurred after the entry of the previous order, unless the events

were previously undisclosed to the court.” Woodring v. Woodring, 227 N.C. App. 638,

645, 745 S.E.2d 13, 20 (2013) (emphasis supplied) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

      Our threshold inquiry is whether the events that occurred between 15 June

2020, the day the evidentiary hearing was held and rendition of the order, and 22

January 2021, the day the First Custody Order was entered, were previously

disclosed to and considered by the trial court. Id. at 645-46, 745 S.E.2d at 20. Father

argues a significant portion of the assertions and evidence Mother included only one

month later in her 24 February 2021 motion to modify the First Custody Order was

previously disclosed, considered and addressed by the trial court, and the same

evidence cannot be used to support a finding that a substantial change had occurred.

      The First Custody Order entered in January 2021 contains findings that were

disclosed to the trial court before entry of the First Custody Order. Mother’s Rule 59

motion to present new evidence, filed 20 November 2020, asserted Mother: had been

recently married, was expecting a child, was honorably discharged from the Air Force,

planned to return to North Carolina, owned a home in Wilson, and hoped to gain re-

employment with Pfizer.

      Mother also expressed her dissatisfaction with Father’s compliance with

Mother’s preferred visitation schedule between W.D. and her parents, W.D.’s

                                         - 17 -
                                 SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                  Opinion of the Court

maternal grandparents.

      In the Second Custody Order entered in January 2022, the trial court relied

upon assertions contained in Mother’s 20 November 2020 Rule 59 motion to support

its finding that a substantial change had occurred. The trial court found Mother had:

married, given birth to a child, been honorably discharged from the Air Force,

returned to North Carolina, acquired a home in Wilson, gained proximity to and more

support from her family, and been re-employed by Pfizer.

      The trial court also cited Mother’s dissatisfaction with Father’s decision to

refrain from scheduling visitation with certain members of Mother’s family. Before

Mother returned to North Carolina, she asserted Father would bring W.D. to his

maternal grandfather’s house, but not to his maternal grandmother’s house or his

maternal aunt’s house. Notably, Mother’s desire for W.D. to spend time separately

with both of her parents and her maternal aunt was not contained in the First

Custody Order, but instead was a self-asserted expectation.

      This court has held that when evaluating whether a substantial change in

circumstances has occurred, a trial court “may only consider events which occurred

after the entry of the previous order, unless the events were previously undisclosed to

the court.” Id. at 645, 745 S.E. 2d at 20 (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted).

      Here, the trial court erred when it considered and re-evaluated events which

were disclosed to and considered by the trial court prior to the entry of the First

Custody Order. Id.; Lang v. Lang, 197 N.C. App. 746, 750, 678 S.E.2d 395, 398 (2009)

                                         - 18 -
                                  SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                  Opinion of the Court

(explaining a trial court properly considered only those events which occurred after

the entry of the prior custody order when concluding whether a change of

circumstances had occurred); Ford v. Wright, 170 N.C. App. 89, 96, 611 S.E.2d 456,

461 (2005) (“As the trial court had already considered the parties’ past domestic

troubles and communication difficulties in the prior order, without findings of

additional changes in circumstances or conditions, modification of the prior custody

order was in error.”).

      Any evidence contained in Mother’s Rule 59 motion was previously disclosed

to and addressed by the trial court, as is demonstrated by the record before us and in

the First Custody Order itself.     That order provides the trial judge considered

evidence and the numerous changes in Mother’s status, which had occurred after the

15 June 2020 hearing.

      Further, the First Custody Order reveals the trial court clearly considered

Mother’s discharge from the military and relocation to North Carolina, because the

trial court: completely removed all references to Mother visiting with the child while

serving in the military or while on “military leave”; included an exact address for

Mother and Father to exchange W.D.; and provided an extensive, alternating summer

break and holiday schedule.

      When comparing the proposed custody order submitted to the trial court on 25

September 2020, which reflected the oral decretal on 15 June 2020, to the First

Custody Order entered on 22 January 2021, the changes are striking and evident the

                                         - 19 -
                                  SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                   Opinion of the Court

trial judge considered and addressed Mother’s marriage, pregnancy, discharge from

the military, and relocation to North Carolina.

      The trial court had already considered Mother’s changes in her circumstances

through the end of 2020 and could not use these factors again as a basis to support a

finding and conclusion a substantial change in circumstances had occurred in its

entry of the Second Custody Order. Id.

                     2. Substantial Change in Circumstances

      Father further argues the remaining evidence before the trial court did not

support a substantial change in circumstances to justify modification of the First

Custody Order. The only assertions the trial court had not previously considered to

trigger a change in the First Custody Order were the injuries W.D. had sustained and

the way Father had handled his COVID-19 infection in April 2021.

       The trial court noted injuries W.D. had purportedly received over the two

years while in Father’s custody to constitute a substantial change:

         •   W.D. fell, scraped his side, and had minor bruising on his leg.

         •   W.D. fractured his tibia while jumping on the trampoline with his

             paternal uncle on Christmas Day.

         •   W.D. slipped on a rug while running in the bathroom, hit his face on the

             toilet or wall, and injured his tooth.

         •   W.D. fell outside on a concrete patio, which caused a bloody nose and

             scabbing and bruising on his knees, legs, and bottom.

                                          - 20 -
                                 SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                  Opinion of the Court

          •   W.D. scratched his leg when jumping into a pool.

          •   W.D. bumped heads with another child in the pool, injuring his nose.

      Expert evidence was entered at trial to address whether W.D. was either

neglected or abused. Father testified W.D. was a “wide open four[-]year[-]old little

boy who[ ] climbs, jumps[,] and falls” and any injuries were the result of “normal wear

and tear.” W.D.’s pediatrician testified he noticed various cuts and bruises on W.D.

since June 2020, but they were “not abnormal and didn’t cause [him] any concern.”

      W.D.’s pre-kindergarten teacher was questioned about a black eye W.D.

allegedly presented with at school, but she could not recall whether W.D. had ever

sustained a black eye. W.D.’s daycare teacher similarly testified she never observed

anything concerning regarding W.D.’s health, and volunteered she is a “mandatory

reporter.” CPS also found no evidence of abuse after investigating Father at Mother’s

behest.

      The trial court also found Father had a runny nose and mild headache before

W.D.’s weekend visitation with Mother ended on 4 April 2021 and had failed to inform

Mother. Father subsequently tested positive for COVID-19. Father did not disclose

he had tested positive until the day before Mother’s next weekend visit, which began

on 16 April 2021. Father testified he did not inform Mother about his positive test

earlier, because he was “out of quarantine” by the time he met with Mother to

exchange W.D. He was not in W.D.’s presence until he had passed his isolation

period.

                                         - 21 -
                                  SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                   Opinion of the Court

      A “determination of whether changed circumstances exist is a conclusion of

law.” Head v. Mosier, 197 N.C. App. 328, 334, 677 S.E.2d 191, 196 (2009) (citing

Brooker v. Brooker, 133 N.C. App. 285, 289, 515 S.E.2d 234, 237 (1999)). “[C]ourts

must consider and weigh all evidence of changed circumstances which affect or will

affect the best interests of the child, both changed circumstances which will have

salutary effects upon the child and those which will have adverse effects upon the

child.” Metz v. Metz, 138 N.C. App. 538, 540, 530 S.E.2d 79, 81 (2000).

      Even where a substantial change of circumstances is shown, the court must

still consider whether the change affected the welfare of the child and if a change in

custody is in the child’s best interest. Shipman, 357 N.C. at 474, 586 S.E.2d at 253.

      Mother relies on Shipman and argues the trial court’s findings should be

upheld, even if they do not “present a level of desired specificity,” because the effects

of the changes on the welfare of W.D. are self-evident and supported by some

evidence. Id. at 479, 586 S.E.2d at 256.

      She also asserts the combination of W.D.’s purported injuries, Father’s

handling of his COVID-19 infection, and her change in familial status and relocation

to North Carolina collectively affected W.D.’s welfare, which is “self-evident.” Id.

      Father argues evidence of Mother’s re-marriage and newborn child, even if

these facts were undisclosed or not considered before entry of the First Custody

Order, does not constitute a substantial change. Father cites Hassell v. Means, 42

N.C. App. 524, 531, 257 S.E.2d 123, 127 (1979) (“Remarriage in and of itself is not a

                                           - 22 -
                                 SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                  Opinion of the Court

sufficient change of circumstance to justify modification of a child custody order.”

(citation omitted)) and Kelly v. Kelly, 77 N.C. App. 632, 636, 335 S.E.2d 780, 783

(1985) (explaining the birth of new child does not constitute a substantial change).

      The evidence previously disclosed and addressed in the prior order, and which

the trial court relied upon, does not support a conclusion that a substantial change

occurred. See Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255. (“As our appellate case

law has previously indicated, before a child custody order may be modified, the

evidence must demonstrate a connection between the substantial change in

circumstances and the welfare of the child, and flowing from that prerequisite is the

requirement that the trial court make findings of fact regarding that connection.”

(citing Carlton v. Carlton, 145 N.C. App. 252, 262, 549 S.E.2d 916, 923 (Tyson, J.,

dissenting), rev’d per curiam per dissent, 354 N.C. 561, 557 S.E.2d 529 (2001), cert.

denied, 536 U.S. 944, 153 L.Ed.2d 811 (2002)).

      The evidence failed to establish W.D. was abused or neglected while in Father’s

care. Father enrolled W.D. in a private day care and pre-kindergarten programs, and

Father adequately provided and cared for W.D. as his primary caretaker for several

years. His pediatrician and both of W.D.’s teachers testified. Similarly, this Court

has never held the failure to inform another parent of a potential viral infection

constituted a substantial change, and more particularly of contacts outside of any

quarantine period.

      A trial court may not modify an existing custody order unless a substantial

                                         - 23 -
                                SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                 Opinion of the Court

change in circumstances has occurred and been proven by the movant. Spoon, 233

N.C. App. at 41, 755 S.E.2d at 69. The trial court’s conclusion that a substantial

change in circumstances had occurred is unsupported and is vacated. This erroneous

conclusion was the basis for the trial court to amend the First Custody Order and to

enter the Second Custody Order in 2022. We need not address Father’s remaining

argument that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Mother primary legal

custody of W.D., as this argument is moot.

                               IV.   Conclusion

      The trial court improperly considered previously disclosed, considered, and

addressed events when issuing the Second Custody Order in January 2022.

Woodring, 227 N.C. App. at 646, 745 S.E.2d at 20; Lang, 197 N.C. App. at 750, 678

S.E.2d at 398; Ford, 170 N.C. App. at 96, 611 S.E.2d at 461. Without the previously

considered evidence, the trial court’s findings were inadequate to support a

conclusion that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. Shipman, 357

N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255; Spoon, 233 N.C. App. at 41, 755 S.E.2d at 69.

      We vacate the trial court’s conclusion that a substantial change in

circumstances had occurred and the award of primary custody of W.D. to Mother. We

remand for further findings and conclusions in accordance with this opinion.

      The parties are free to pursue custody mediation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 7A-494 (2021) or the need for appointment of a parenting coordinator pursuant to

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-90 to 100 (2021) to decrease potential conflicts, recalcitrant

                                        - 24 -
                                  SMITH V. DRESSLER

                                   Opinion of the Court

conduct, and further litigation. It is so ordered.

      VACATED AND REMANDED.

      Judge CARPENTER and Judge FLOOD concur.

                                          - 25 -