Court Opinion

ID: 9539594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:06:27.570169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:00.521485
License: Public Domain

*527SHORT, J.,
(concurring in part, dissenting in part):
I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part.
I agree with the majority that Appellants’ Consumer Protection Code and constitutional arguments are not preserved for review. However, I find the issue of whether the prejudgment interest should have been presented to the jury is not preserved for review.3 Furthermore, I would remand the action for the trial court to set the amount of prejudgment interest.
As noted by the majority in footnote 2, the issue of the amount of interest due is still unsettled. As there is something remaining to be done prior to full resolution of this case, I would remand to the Honorable Deadra L. Jefferson for a hearing to determine the amount of prejudgment interest to award Prevost. See TranSouth Fin’l Corp. v. Cochran, 324 S.C. 290, 297, 478 S.E.2d 63, 66-67 (Ct.App.1996) (remanding for an additional hearing to determine the amount of the final judgment where the parties disputed, inter alia, the prejudgment interest due on an undisputed principal amount due). See generally Adams v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 303 S.C. 251, 255, 399 S.E.2d 788, 790 (Ct.App.1990) (remanding case due to legal error because agency failed to make critical findings).
The inequity arising from an award of prejudgment interest calculated by multiplying one percent of the judgment by 725, as is the case here as calculated by the majority, and the parties’ confusion as to the amount of the judgment including *528prejudgment interest, requires me to respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.4

. I recognize parties are free to contract for higher interest rates within legal limits. See Taylor, Cotton & Ridley, Inc. v. Okatie Hotel Group, 372 S.C. 89, 99, 641 S.E.2d 459, 464 (Ct.App.2007). However, the prejudgment interest rate here is clearly beyond any legal rate of interest and is unconscionable. See S.C.Code Ann. § 34-31-20(A) (Supp.2007) (setting legal rate of interest on accounts stated at 8.75 percent per annum).

. After the jury returned its verdict, Appellants argued the prejudgment interest rale was a matter for the jury. The trial judge stated: 'T am inclined to believe, although I’m not fixed in that opinion, that the one percent that would be due on the debt is a matter of law for the Court.” The judge required the parties to submit orders on the issue of, inter alia, prejudgment interest. In the final order, the court concluded Prevost was entitled to prejudgment interest at the contract rate without ruling on the issue of whether the interest should have been decided by the jury. Appellants filed no post-trial motions. See Elam v. South Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 24, 602 S.E.2d 772, 780 (2004) (stating a party must file a motion to reconsider when an issue has been raised, but not ruled on, to preserve issue for appellate review).