Court Opinion

ID: 9550659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:39:50.212208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:06.068343
License: Public Domain

LA PRADE, Justice
(specially concurring).
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion but desire to state my reasons therefor. I cannot agree with the statements made that it is only when a car is in good operating condition that the dealer “has the right to warrant it”. The appellant-dealer in this case undoubtedly believed that the car was in good operating, condition and did, in. fact, warrant it, and became liable in damages for a breach of the conditions of the warranty.
One of the purposes of the Act in question was to place price limitations upon used cars. The Act provides for an “as is” price and authorizes an additional charge over and above the “as is” price when a warranty is given with the car. The warranty is,—
“(1) that the car is in good operating condition, and
“(2) that it will remain in such condition, under normal use, for a period of 30 days or 1,000 miles.”
In the second paragraph of the prescribed warranty form, in subsection (c) of section 7, the dealer agrees to repair the car as “may be necessary to its good operating condition in accordance with normal use and service.” These repairs are to be made on a 50-50 basis. The reported cases indicate that this is the clause that caused confusion. I think that the legal effect of this ’clause is clearly analyzed in Monahan v. Jacobs & Politi, 187 Misc. 332, 66 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211, wherein it is said:
“ * * * It appears to be perfectly clear, but many are apparently under the impression that this limits the dealer’s liability to 50% of the cost of any repairs necessary to put the car in good operating condition. This is Irue if the car was in good condition when sold and then, through normal use, gets out of such condition. *395However, it is a condition precedent that the car was in good condition when sold. If such be not the fact, then the dealer is liable for his breach of the first warranty and he has made an overcharge in the amount of the warranted price, under paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) of section 5 of the Regulation (10 Federal Register 1384). Such an overcharge gives the .buyer the remedies provided in subdivision (e) of section 205 of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, U.S.C.A. Tit. 50, Appendix, § 925, as amended; hereinafter referred to as “Price Control Act.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In section 3 of the Act it is provided that “when a dealer charges the ‘warranted’ maximum price for a used car not in good operating condition, or fails to make the above refund when he, the dealer does not make the repairs or the replacements required by his warranty, he is. liable to the sanctions imposed by the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, including payment of damages to the buyer pursuant to section 205(e).” The sanctions of the Act only come into play when there has been a breach of the warranty: Savoie v. Snell, La.App., 29 So.2d 315; Tyson v. Ross, 75 Ga.App. 200, 43 S.E.2d 125. I agree with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion that the trial court was justified in finding that the car was not in good operating condition.
I think that the failure of the dealer to deliver the warranty in writing at the time of the sale constituted only a technical violation of the rule requiring a delivery of the statutory- warranty in writing. The buyer at all times had a legally enforceable contract of warranty. As it is pointed out in the maj ority opinion, there was a memorandum signed by the dealer indicating that he had charged for a warranty. The warranty referred to could be identified by parol or extrinsic evidence. 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 1007(a). The warranty referred to' was MPR 540. The terms and conditions of this statutory warranty would not have to be established by parol evidence. It was more than a moral obligation on the part of the seller, as would be the case where the seller’s contract of warranty was oral with no written memorandum thereof, as was the case of Porter, Adm’r O.P.A. v. Nowak, 1 Cir., 157 F.2d 824, where the agreement of warranty was wholly oral.
In 'the case before us, the statute of frauds would not have been available to the seller. Consequently, the car was sold as a warranted car and the warranty was that referred to in the regulations, and for the reasons stated I believe that this warranty was breached. If no warranty had been given and the charge made therefor, then the action would have been for making an overcharge for something not delivered, namely, the warranty. The warranty having been given, paid for, and breached, the action can only be for breach of warranty.