Court Opinion

ID: 9523452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:42:25.949097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:42.594007
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Arterburn, C.J.
I can not agree with the majority opinion. In this case the Appellant was an employee of the Fire Department of the City of Mishawaka, which Department was under the direction and management of the Board of Public Works and Safety of the City. It seems that the Chief of the Fire Department brought charges against the Appellant for misconduct. The charges included a charge of receiving stolen property. In accordance with the statute, a hearing was held before the Board of Public Works and Safety. The Board found the Appellant guilty, and he was dismissed from the fire department. He appealed to the Circuit Court which reversed the action of the Board, apparently on the ground that since the City Attorney was a member of the Board of Public Works and Safety, and apparently prepared the charges, presented the evidence and cross-examined the witnesses, he was incompetent to sit on the Board when it made its final decision. With this legal conclusion I do not agree for the reason that executive or administrative departments of government do not have to conform to the rules we use in the judicial branch. Basically, the executive department and the departmental heads have the tasks of managing their employees and operating a department. It is in the public interest that these tasks be *683done efficiently. The heads of the departments as well as the Board of Public Works and Safety have a duty of management which involves keeping themselves informed by a continuous investigation of departmental operations. An executive department can not assume a role as a court. Every department head and board member should have knowledge of what is going on in the department and has a duty to inform himself about the conduct of its personnel and operation. He should have the ability to manage and control the department. This cannot be done while acting like a court.
We should remember that not all remedies lie in the judicial department. Some remedies are in the ballot box. If the voters want an entire sweep and change in administration, they have the privilege of voting for it and getting it by winning an election. The courts should not thwart the will of the people in that sphere of government.
The majority rests its due process reasoning on the concept of “fundamental fairness.” However, the legislature could have authorized a department head or the Board of Public Works and Safety to discharge an employee for any reason. In other words, the legislature could have provided for a discharge for a cause (for example, mode of dress) which many people would consider even more “fundamentally unfair” than the procedure actually adopted by the legislature and followed in the instant case. Since the legislature may do the greater aifront to “fundamental fairness” it may surely do the lesser transgression; that is, provide that a person can only be discharged for a specified cause found by the Board of Public Works and Safety, constituted as in the case before us. I think the fact that the members of the Board of Public Works and Safety had made private investigations, or that other matters came to them which they felt should be investigated in the administration of the fire department does not disqualify them from acting within their statutory authority in discharging an employee after a hearing where there is substantial evidence to support their *684finding, even though before the hearing they may have had preconceived ideas about the merits of the matter. I do not think this city attorney showed any bias or prejudice. He was performing a function which the legislature knew he had to perform when it provided for his membership on the Board. The statute provides that on appeal the decision of the Board is to be deemed “prima facie correct” and this presumption should be interpreted to include procedural due process'. The evidence before the Board supported its finding that Appellant had received stolen property. The trial court had no right to override this finding. Additionally, I fail to find any prejudice exhibited by the city attorney. He is accused of bringing out the facts — which is precisely his statutory duty.
Following my principle a little further, I think that the legislature could have provided that a Chief of a fire department has the authority to discharge a member of the fire department for cause after a hearing and that such discharge could take place even though the Fire Chief saw the offense for which the member was discharged. The Chief would not have to be disqualified from hearing the matter further, but could make the discharge order. I feel that to hold otherwise would hamper the efficient operation of the executive department of government. We should not try to make little courts out of administrative departments, Boards or Commissions that have as their duty the proper operation of the executive branch of government. The running of a modern city is akin to the operation of a business, and you can not efficiently run a business by holding a court trial or a procedurally pure hearing before you give a routine order which is to affect someone.
Givan, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 310 N. E. 2d 65.