Court Opinion

ID: 9427531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:06.387433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:07.794457
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Brennan,
dissenting in part.
Respondents are representatives of the news media. They are defendants in a libel action brought by petitioner, Lieu*181tenant Colonel Anthony Herbert (U. S. Army, Ret.), who is concededly a public figure. The Court today rejects respondents’ claim that an “editorial privilege” shields from discovery information that would reveal respondents’ editorial processes. I agree with the Court that no such privilege insulates factual matters that may be sought during discovery, and that such a privilege should not shield respondents’ “mental processes.” 568 F. 2d 974, 995 (CA2 1977) (Oakes, J.). I would hold, however, that the First Amendment requires predecisional communication among editors to be protected by an editorial privilege, but that this privilege must yield if a public-figure plaintiff is able to demonstrate to the prima facie satisfaction of a trial judge that the publication in question constitutes defamatory falsehood.
I
The Court'of Appeals below stated that “the issue presented by this case is whether, and to what extent, inquiry into the editorial process, conducted during discovery in a New York Times v. Sullivan type libel action, impermissibly burdens the work of reporters and broadcasters.” Id., at 979 (Kaufman, C. J.). The court grouped the discovery inquiries objected to by respondents into five categories:
“1. Lando’s conclusions during his research and investigations regarding people or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the '60 Minutes’ segment and the Atlantic Monthly article;
“2. Lando’s conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of mind with respect to the veracity of persons interviewed;
“3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a conclusion concerning the veracity of persons, information or events;
“4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or excluded from the broadcast publication; and
*182“5. Lando’s intentions as manifested by his decision to include or exclude certain material.” Id., at 983.
The Court of Appeals concluded:
“If we were to allow selective disclosure of how a journalist formulated his judgments on what to print or not to print, we would be condoning judicial review of the editor’s thought processes. Such an inquiry, which on its face would be virtually boundless, endangers a constitutionally protected realm, and unquestionably puts a freeze on the free interchange of ideas within the newsroom.” Id., at 980.
The Court of Appeals held that all five categories of information sought by petitioner were shielded by an editorial privilege.
The holding of the Court of Appeals presents a novel and difficult question of law. Federal Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b)(1) provides: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The instant case is brought under diversity jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (a), and Fed. Rule Evid. 501 states that “in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness [or] person . . . shall be determined in accordance with State law.” Although New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), placed constitutional limits on state libel claims, it did not itself create a federal cause of action for libel. The “rule of decision” in this case, therefore, is defined by state law. There is no contention, however, that applicable state law encompasses an editorial privilege. Thus if we were to create and apply such a privilege, it would have to be constitutionally grounded, as, for example, is executive privilege, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), or the privilege against self-incrimination. See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 (1924). The exist*183ence of such a privilege has never before been urged before this Court.
This case must be approached from the premise that pretrial discovery is normally to be “accorded a broad and liberal treatment/’ Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 507 (1947), and that judicial creation of evidentiary privileges is generally to be discouraged. We have in the past, however, recognized evidentiary privileges in order to protect “interests and relationships which . . . are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of justice.” E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 152 (2d ed. 1972). For example, Hickman v. Taylor, supra, created a qualified privilege for attorneys’ work products in part because, without such a privilege, “[t]he effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing.” 329 U. S., at 511. Similarly, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (1957), recognized a qualified “informer’s privilege” for “the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement.” Id., at 59.
The inquiry to be pursued, therefore, is whether the creation of an editorial privilege would so further the purposes and goals of the constitutional scheme as embodied in the First Amendment, as to justify “some incidental sacrifice” of evidentiary material. This inquiry need not reach an inflexible result: The justifications for an editorial privilege may well support only a qualified privilege which, in appropriate instances, must yield to the requirements of “the administration of justice.”
II
Mr. Justice Brandéis reminded us over a half century ago that “[t]hose who won our independence . . . valued liberty both as an end and as a means.”1 Whitney v. California, 274 *184U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion). In its instrumental aspect, the First Amendment serves to- foster the values of democratic self-government. This is true in several senses. The First Amendment bars the state from imposing upon its citizens an authoritative vision of truth.2 It prohibits the state from interfering with the communicative processes
*185through which its citizens exercise and prepare to exercise their rights of self-government.3 And the Amendment shields those who would censure the state or expose its abuses.4 *186These various senses can sometimes weave together, as can be seen in the letter of 1774 addressed by the First Continental Congress to the inhabitants of Quebec, listing the rights “a profligate [English] Ministry are now striving, by force of arms, to ravish from us”:
“The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.” 5
*187Although the various senses in which the First Amendment serves democratic values will in different contexts demand distinct emphasis and development, they share the common characteristic of being instrumental to the attainment of social ends. It is a great mistake to understand this aspect of the First Amendment solely through the filter of individual rights.6 This is the meaning of our cases permitting a litigant to challenge the constitutionality of a statute as overbroad under the First Amendment if the statute “prohibits privileged exercises of First Amendment rights whether or not the record discloses that the petitioner has engaged in privileged conduct.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 432 (1963). Our reasoning is that First Amendment freedoms “are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society,” id., at 433, and that a litigant should therefore be given standing to assert this more general social interest in the “vindication of freedom of expression.” Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 487 (1965). See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940). It is also the meaning of the “actual malice” standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 279-280. Even though false information may have no intrinsic First Amendment worth, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 732 (1968), and even though a particular defendant may have published false information, his freedom of expression is nevertheless protected in the absence of actual malice because, “to insure the ascertainment and publication *188of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.” Ibid.7
In recognition of the social values served by the First Amendment, our decisions have referred to “the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences,” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis supplied), and-to “the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties.” Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936) (emphasis supplied). In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967), we stated that the guarantees of the First Amendment “are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society.” Id., at 389.
The editorial privilege claimed by respondents must be carefully analyzed to determine whether its creation would significantly further these social values recognized by our prior decisions. In this analysis it is relevant to note that respondents are representatives of the communications media, and that the “press and broadcast media,” Gertz v. Robert *189Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 343 (1974),8 have played a dominant and essential role in serving the “informative function,” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 705 (1972), protected by the First Amendment. “The press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized role of that institution in informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate.” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 781 (1978).9 “The newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.” Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, at 250. An editorial privilege would thus not be merely personal to respondents, but would shield the press in its function “as an agent of the public at large. . . . The press is the necessary representative of the public’s interest in this context and the instrumentality which effects the public’s right.” Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 863-864 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
*190Ill
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), struck down as undue interference with the editorial process a Florida statute granting a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticisms of his record by a newspaper.
“Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials — whether fair or unfair — constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.” Id., at 258.
See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376, 391 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 120, 124-125 (1973). Through the editorial process expression is composed; to regulate the process is therefore to regulate the expression. The autonomy of the speaker is thereby compromised, whether that speaker is a large urban newspaper or an individual pamphleteer. The print and broadcast media, however, because of their large organizational structure, cannot exist without some form of editorial process. The protection *191of the editorial process of these institutions thus becomes a matter of particular First Amendment concern.10
There is in this case, however, no direct government regulation of respondents’ editorial process. But it is clear that disclosure of the editorial process of the press will increase the likelihood of large damages judgments in libel actions, and will thereby discourage participants in that editorial process.11 And, as New York Times stated: “What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.” 376 U. S., at 277. Of course New York Times set forth a substantive standard defining that speech unprotected by the First Amendment, and respondents’ editorial process cannot be shielded merely so as to block judicial determination of whether respondents have in fact engaged in such speech. As the Court states: “[I]f the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless falsehoods, those effects are precisely what New York Times and *192other eases have held to be consistent with the First Amendment.” Ante, at 171. Our inquiry, therefore, becomes the independent First Amendment values served by the editorial process and the extent to which exposure of that process would impair these First Amendment values.
In Tornillo we defined the editorial process in a functional manner, as that process whereby the content and format of published material is selected. The Court of Appeals below identified two aspects of this process. The first concerns “the mental processes of the press regarding 'choice of material’ . . . .” 568 F. 2d, at 995 (Oakes, J.). This aspect encompasses an editor’s subjective “thought processes,” his “thoughts, opinions and conclusions.” Id., at 980, 984 (Kaufman, C. J.). The Court of Appeals concluded that if discovery were permitted concerning this aspect of the editorial process, journalists “would be chilled in the very process of thought.” Id., at 984.
I find this conclusion implausible. Since a journalist cannot work without such internal thought processes, the only way this aspect of the editorial process can be chilled is by a journalist ceasing to work altogether. Given the exceedingly generous standards of New York Times, this seems unlikely. Moreover, New York Times removed First Amendment protection from defamatory falsehood published with actual malice— in knowing or reckless disregard of the truth.12 Subsequent decisions have made clear that actual malice turns on a journalist’s “subjective awareness of probable falsity.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S., at 335 n. 6. It would be anomalous to turn substantive liability on a journalist’s subjective attitude and at the same time to shield from disclosure the most direct evidence of that attitude. There will be, of *193course, journalists at the margin — those who have some awareness of the probable falsity of their work but not enough to constitute actual malice — who might be discouraged from publication. But this chill emanates chiefly from the substantive standard of New York Times, not from the absence of an editorial privilege.
The second aspect of the editorial privilege identified by the Court of Appeals involves “the free interchange of ideas within the newsroom,” 568 F. 2d, at 980 (Kaufman, C. J.), “the relationship among editors.” Id., at 993 (Oakes, J.). Judge Oakes concluded that “¡[i]deas expressed in conversations, memoranda, handwritten notes and the like, if discoverable, would in the future ‘likely’ lead to a more muted, less vigorous and creative give-and-take in the editorial room.” Id., at 993-994. Chief Judge Kaufman stated that “[a] reporter or editor, aware that his thoughts might have to be justified in a court of law, would often be discouraged and dissuaded from the creative verbal testing, probing, and discussion of hypotheses and alternatives which are the sine qua non of responsible journalism.” Id., at 980.
An editorial privilege protecting this aspect of the editorial process would essentially be analogous to the executive privilege which shields the “advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations ... by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V. E. B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F. R. D. 318, 324 (DC 1966). As our cases interpreting Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b)(5), make clear, this privilege would not protect merely “factual” material, but only “deliberative or policymaking processes.” EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 89 (1973). The rationale for this privilege was succinctly stated in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 705: “Human experience teaches that those who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking process.”
*194The same rationale applies to respondents’ proposed editorial privilege. Just as the possible political consequences of disclosure might undermine predecisional communication within the Executive Branch, see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 151 (1975), so the possibility of future libel judgments might well dampen full and candid discussion among editors of proposed publications. Just as impaired communication “clearly” affects “the quality” of executive decisionmaking, ibid., so too muted discussion during the editorial process will affect the quality of resulting, publications. Those editors who have doubts might remain silent; those who would prefer to follow other investigative leads might be restrained; those who would otherwise counsel caution might hold their tongues. In short, in the absence of such an editorial privilege the accuracy, thoroughness, and profundity of consequent publications might well be diminished.
Such a diminution would affect First Amendment values. The Amendment embraces the public’s interest in “accurate and effective reporting by the news media.” Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S., at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting). “Those who won our independence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth.... Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press . . . impairs those opportunities for public education that are essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular government.” 13 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95 (1940). Petitioner is concededly a public figure; “[o]ur citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of *195‘public officials.’ ” Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C. J., concurring in result). To the extent coverage of such figures becomes fearful and inhibited, to the extent the accuracy, effectiveness, and thoroughness of such coverage is undermined, the social values protected by the First Amendment suffer abridgment.
I find compelling these justifications for the existence of an editorial privilege. The values at issue are sufficiently important to justify some incidental sacrifice of evidentiary material.14 The Court today concedes the accuracy of the underlying rationale for such a privilege, stating that “[w]e do not doubt the direct relationship between consultation and discussion on the one hand and sound decisions on the other . . . .” Ante, at 173. The Court, however, contents itself with the curious observation that “given exposure to liability when there is knowing or reckless error, there is even more reason to resort to prepublication precautions, such as a frank interchange of fact and opinion.” Ante, at 174. Be*196cause such “prepublication precautions” will often prove to be extraordinarily damaging evidence in libel actions, I cannot so blithely assume such “precautions” will be instituted, or that such “frank interchange” as now exists is not impaired by its potential exposure in such actions.
I fully concede that my reasoning is essentially paradoxical. For the sake of more accurate information, an editorial privilege would shield from disclosure the possible inaccuracies of the press; in the name of a more responsible press, the privilege would make more difficult of application the legal restraints by which the press is bound. The same paradox, however, inheres in the concept of an executive privilege: so as to enable the government more effectively to implement the will of the people, the people are kept in ignorance of the workings of their government. The paradox is unfortunately intrinsic to our social condition. Judgment is required to evaluate and balance these competing perspectives.
Judgment is also required to accommodate the tension between society’s “pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation,” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 86 (1966), and the First Amendment values that would be served by an editorial privilege. In my view this tension is too fine to be resolved in the abstract. As is the case with executive privilege, there must be a more specific balancing of the particular interests asserted in a given lawsuit. A general claim of executive privilege, for example, will not stand against a “demonstrated, specific need for evidence . . . .” United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 713. Conversely, a general statement of need will not prevail over a concrete demonstration of the necessity for executive secrecy. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 41 (1953). Other evidentiary privileges are similarly dependent upon the particular exigencies demonstrated in a specific lawsuit. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (1957), for example, held that the existence of an informer’s privilege depends *197“on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.” Id., at 62. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495 (1947), similarly required ad hoc balancing to determine the existence of an attorneys’ work-product privilege. The procedures whereby this balancing is achieved, so far from constituting mere “formalism,” ante, at 175 n. 23, are in fact the means through which courts have traditionally resolved conflicts between competing social and individual interests.
In my judgment, the existence of a privilege protecting the editorial process must, in an analogous manner, be determined with reference to the circumstances of a particular ease. In the area of libel, the balance struck by New York Times between the values of the First Amendment and society’s interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation must be preserved. This can best be accomplished if the privilege functions to shield the editorial process from general claims of damaged reputation. If, however, a public-figure plaintiff is able to establish, to the prima facie satisfaction of a trial judge, that the publication at issue constitutes defamatory falsehood,15 the claim of damaged reputation becomes specific and demonstrable, and the editorial privilege must yield.16 Contrary to the suggestion of the Court, an editorial privilege so understood would not create “a substantial interference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff to establish the ingredients of malice as required by New York Times.” Ante, at 170. Requiring a public-figure plaintiff to make a *198prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood will not constitute an undue burden, since he must eventually demonstrate these elements as part of his case in chief.17 And since editorial privilege protects only deliberative and policymaking processes and not factual material, discovery should be adequate to acquire the relevant evidence of falsehood. A public-figure plaintiff will thus be able to redress attacks on his reputation, and at the same time the editorial process will be protected in all but the most necessary cases.
IV
Applying these principles to the instant case is most difficult, since the five categories of objectionable discovery inquiries formulated by the Court of Appeals are general, and it is impossible to determine what specific questions are encompassed within each category. It would nevertheless appear that four of the five categories concern respondents’ mental processes, and thus would not be covered by an editorial privilege. Only the fourth category- — -“Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or excluded from the broadcast publication” — would seem to be protected by a proper editorial privilege. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that respondents had already made available to petitioner in discovery “the contents of pre-telecast conversations between Lando and Wallace . . . .” 568 F. 2d, at 982 (Kaufman, C. J.). Whether this constitutes waiver of the editorial privilege should be determined in the first instance by the District Court. I would therefore, like the Court of Appeals, remand this case to the District Court, but would require the District Court to determine (a) whether respondents have waived their editorial privilege; (b) if not, whether petitioner Herbert can overcome the privilege through *199a prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood; and (c) if not, the proper scope and application of the privilege.

 Freedom of speech is itself an end because the human community is in large measure defined through speech; freedom of speech is therefore intrinsic to individual dignity. This is particularly so in a democracy *184like our own, in -which the autonomy of each individual is accorded equal and incommensurate respect. As the Court stated in Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 24 (1971):
“The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.”
Respondents properly do not rest their arguments for an editorial privilege on the value of individual self-expression. So grounded, an editorial privilege might not stop short of shielding all speech.

 As Professor Zeehariah Chafee, Jr., stated in 1946:
“The First Amendment protects ... a social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way. . . . Truth can be sifted out from falsehood only if the government is vigorously and constantly cross-examined . . . Free Speech in the United States 33.
Mr. Justice Holmes gave this social value a broader and more theoretical formulation:
“Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. . . . But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. . . . While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be *185eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate cheek is required to save the country.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969).

 “Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.” A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 27 (1965).
See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 765 (1976); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965).

 See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. Bar Found. Research J. 521. Lord Erskine, while defending Thomas Paine in his trial for seditious libel, offered a compact and eloquent statement of this position:
“Gentlemen, I have insisted, at great length, upon the origin of governments, and detailed the authorities which you have heard upon the subject, because I consider it to be not only an essential support, but the very foundation of the liberty of the press. If Mr. Burke be right in his principles of government, I admit that the press, in my sense of its freedom, ought not to be free, nor free in any sense at all; and that all addresses to the people upon the subjects of government, and all speculations of amendment, of what kind or nature soever, are illegal and criminal; since if the people have, with out possible re-call, delegated all their authorities, they have no jurisdiction to act, and therefore none to think or write upon such subjects; and it would be a libel to arraign govern*186ment or any of its acts, before those who have no jurisdiction to correct them. But on the other hand ... no legal argument can shake the freedom of the press in my sense of it, if I am supported in my doctrines concerning the great unalienable right of the people, to reform or to change their governments. It is because the liberty of the press resolves itself into this great issue, that it has been in every country the.last liberty which subjects have been able to wrest from power. Other liberties are held under governments, but the liberty of opinion keeps governments themselves in due subjection to their duties.” 1 Speeches of Lord Erskine 524-525 (J. High ed. 1876).
This position is often predicated upon a natural adversity between the government and the press. See A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 80-88 (1975). In Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 219 (1966), for example, we stated:
“[T]he press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change . . . muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free.”

 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 108 (1774) (W. Ford ed. 1904):

 “[I]t is useless to define free speech by talk about rights. The agitator asserts his constitutional right to speak, the government asserts its constitutional right to wage war. The result is a deadlock.
“The true boundary line of the First Amendment can be fixed only when Congress and the court's realize that the principle on which speech is classified as lawful or unlawful involves the balancing against each other of two very important social interests, in public safety and in the search for truth.” Chafee, supra n. 2, at 31, 35.

 In an analogous manner the Court has, over my strong protest, analyzed the exclusionary rule as permitting a defendant to assert social interests that do not reduce to his personal rights:
“The primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have established that the rule is not a personal constitutional right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any ‘[reparation comes too late.’ Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead,
“ 'the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect . . . .’ United States v. Calandra, [414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974)].” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976).

 Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 282 (1964): “In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 575, this Court held the utterance of a federal official to be absolutely privileged if made ‘within the outer perimeter’ of his duties. . . . Analogous considerations support the privilege for the citizen-critic of government. It is as much his duty to criticize as it is the official’s duty to administer.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 Of course, “the press does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten.” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 782. “The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press ... is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to the public . . . .” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S., at 705.

 This is not, of course, to imply that the editorial process of persons or institutions other than the communications media does not merit First Amendment protection.

 The editorial process could be inhibited in other ways as well. For example, public figures might bring harassment suits against the media in order to use discovery to uncover aspects of the editorial process which, if publicly revealed, would prove embarrassing to the press. In different contexts other First Amendment values might be affected. If sued by a powerful political figure, for example, journalists might fear reprisals for information disclosed during discovery. Cf. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 192 U. S. App. D. C. 376, 593 F. 2d 1030 (1978). Such a chilling effect might particularly impact on the press’ ability to perform its “cheeking” function. See n. 4, supra. In the instant case, however, petitioner is not such a public official, nor are respondents claiming to be suffering the effects of such a chill.

 Elements of petitioner’s complaint appear to set forth a claim for invasion of privacy. See Time, Inc. v. Hitt, 385 U. S. 374 (1967). The case has come to this Court framed as a libel action, however, and I shall so consider it.

 Were the plaintiff in this case a public official intent upon using discovery to intimidate the press, other First Amendment values might well be implicated. See n. 11, swpra.

 My Brother Powell writes separately to emphasize that district courts must carefully weigh “the values protected by the First Amendment” in determining the relevance of discovery requests. Ante, at 180. At the same time, however, he concludes that there should not be an evi-dentiary privilege which protects the editorial process because “whatever protection the ‘exercise of editorial judgment’ enjoys depends entirely on the protection the First Amendment accords the product of this judgment, namely, published speech,” ante, at 178, and because an editorial privilege “is unnecessary to safeguard published speech.” Ibid. I assume my Brother Powell means by this that the exposure of predecisional editorial discussions will not meaningfully affect the nature of subsequent publications. But if this is true, I have difficulty understanding exactly what First Amendment values my Brother Powell expects district courts to place in the balance. He may be suggesting that First Amendment values are impaired merely by requiring media defendants to respond to discovery requests like any other litigant. But even if district courts were to apply stricter standards of relevance in cases involving media defendants, the burden of pretrial discovery would be only marginally decreased, and it does not seem justified to assume that this result would meaningfully affect the nature of subsequent publications.

 See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U. S. 6 (1970).

 I do not reach the case in which a media defendant has more specific and concrete interests at stake. See nn. 11 and 13, supra. Nor do I reach the case in which a litigant with more weighty interests than a civil plaintiff attempts to overcome a claim of editorial privilege. See, e. g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103 (1937); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945).

 A plaintiff can make his prima facie showing as part of his motion for an order compelling discovery under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37, or at any other appropriate time.