Court Opinion

ID: 9673882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:19:59.432676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:53.437419
License: Public Domain

Ryan, J.
(dissenting). The threshold consideration in determining whether the governmental immunity defense of MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107)1 is applicable to the instant case is *735whether, at the time Tracey-Ann Foxworth was injured, the Oscoda Area Schools and its employees were engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. In Thomas v Department of State Highways, 398 Mich 1; 247 NW2d 530 (1976), we recognized that the Legislature, by failing to statutorily define the term "governmental function”, intended that this Court look to the common law for guidance in determining whether governmental immunity was applicable in each case. On examination of case precedent, we find that this Court has consistently held the operations of a public school to comprise a governmental function.2 Sayers v School District No 1, Fractional, 366 Mich 217, 219; 114 NW2d 191 (1962); Richards v Birmingham School District, 348 Mich 490, 506; 83 NW2d 643 (1957); Daszkiewicz v Detroit Board of Education, 301 Mich 212, 220; 3 NW2d 71 (1942); Daniels v Board of Education of Grand Rapids, 191 Mich 339; 158 NW 23 (1916). In addition, an analysis of the allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint3 reveals that the activities in *737this case clearly fell within the purview of the operation of a public school. Accordingly, alleged tortious activities are within the ambit of a governmental function, for which immunity is accorded pursuant to MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107).
In Count III of plaintiffs’ complaint, it is alleged that the classroom in which the accident occurred was "defective” by reason of the lack of certain equipment such as safety showers, storage area, sinks and other laboratory equipment. Plaintiff further avers that the condition of the classroom comes within the statutory "building” exception to the grant of governmental immunity.
The defective building provision, in relevant part, provides:
"Governmental agencies have the obligation to repair *738and maintain public buildings under their control when open for use by members of the public. Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a dangerous or defective condition of a public building * * MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106).
The majority construes the building exception as imposing upon governmental agencies the duty to maintain "safe” public places. In so construing the building provision, the majority holds that a public building, or more specifically a school classroom, must be made safe for its then assigned use. Accordingly, the determination of whether a public building or classroom is free from dangerous or defective conditions must be made in light of the particular features, safety devices or equipment germane to the activity which the building or classroom houses.
Although I find the majority approach appealing as a substantive rule of law, I am compelled to dissent because such a construction of the "building” exception does not at all square with the manifest intent of the Legislature4 as expressed in the governmental immunity statute, MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107).
In MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), the Legislature undertook to balance the interests of the people of the State of Michigan against the interests of persons injured by the tortious acts of state agencies or their employees, in the light of its sweeping policy judgment that state agencies must *739be free to engage in various endeavors for the common good of all of the people of the State of Michigan, unhampered by the constraint of potential tort liability. In service to the balancing process the Legislature carved out a few exceptions to its grant of governmental immunity, one of which is at issue today.
When construing an exception to a general rule, care must be taken not to derogate from the general rule to the extent that its intent and purpose is undermined. See Grand Rapids Motor Coach Co v Public Service Commission, 323 Mich 624, 634; 36 NW2d 299 (1949). Today’s majority construes and applies the "building” exception in a way which significantly undermines the intent of the general immunity provision by characterizing as a building defect what is actually the behavior of the school district’s employees in utilizing a portion of the school building for a unique and highly specialized and always dangerous purpose, one for which it was not designed, constructed or intended to be used.
Simple logic compels the conclusion that a building or classroom is to be used in accordance with the purpose for which it was designed and constructed5 and that while the failure to do that may amount to negligence on the part of the user, it surely does not constitute the building defective. In this case all of the parties agree that the classroom in question was designed and constructed for use as a mathematics classroom. The "defect”, which the majority finds, is in the absence in a mathematics classroom of features or equipment peculiar to a laboratory or science classroom such as a safety shower, ventilation or *740exhaust hoods, sinks, enclosed storage areas, stationary laboratory desks and water and gas utilities. Common sense suggests that before one can conclude that a building is defective, it must first be ascertained whether the use to which it was put was reasonable.
It is eminently clear from an examination of the plaintiffs’ complaint that the essence of plaintiffs’ claim relates to the allegedly improper use of the classroom as a physical science laboratory despite the fact that it was neither designed nor equipped for laboratory experiments. As such, the alleged tortious conduct does not relate to a dangerous or defective condition in the building but, rather, to the conduct of the school authorities in utilizing as a science laboratory a room which was properly designed, constructed and equipped for teaching mathematics.
In concluding today that the test for determining whether a public building is "defective” and the agency operating it liable for failure to "maintain and repair” it, is whether it is safe in view of the use to which it is put, the Court does substantial violence to the will of the Legislature as the price of its not so thinly disguised disagreement with the doctrine of governmental immunity.
I would affirm the order of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment for failure to state a cause of action.
Coleman, C.J., concurred with Ryan, J.

 "Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a *735governmental function. Except as otherwise provided herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is affirmed.”

 The operation of a public school also comes within the "common good of all” definition of "governmental function” frequently cited by Michigan courts. Gunther v Cheboygan County Road Commissioners, 225 Mich 619, 621; 196 NW 386 (1923), citing Bolster v City of Lawrence, 225 Mass 387; 114 NE 722 (1917). See, also, McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich 65, 79; 247 NW2d 521 (1976) (opinion of Ryan, J.), and opinions cited therein.

Count I
"17. That the defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent students such as Tracey-Ann Foxworth from suffering injury due to foreseeable risks present under the said circumstances alleged in Paragraphs 8 through 13 of Count I of this complaint and in light of the age, maturity, experience and judgment of the students in Physical Science and particularly in the light of the explosive potential of a large quantity of alcohol and in view of the equipment *736construction requirements set by the United States Government for this particular school and the requirements of the Fire Prevention Act, being MCL 29.1-29.25, as amended, and the rules adopted and promulgated by the Commissioner of the State Police pursuant to the said statute. Defendants had a duty not to deliberately expose students to a defective classroom and to unreasonably large quantities of alcohol not properly packaged or contained and which defendants knew, or should have known, was capable of exploding with great violence. Defendants’ duty was commensurate with the grave risks attending such exposure.
"18. That the defendants were negligent, jointly and severally, in the conducting of the course in Physical Science in the following respects:
"(a) They undertook to hold the class in a room which was not designed, equipped or constructed for the performance of chemistry experiments involving the use of extra hazardous substances such as alcohol when they knew or should have known that this would be dangerous to the students and particularly would deny them access to the shower type device available in the chemistry laboratory.
"(b) They scheduled too many students in the class such that overcrowding resulted, equipment and supplies were congested, storage space was lacking and proper supervision by the teacher was difficult or impossible.
"(c) They failed to warn, instruct and supervise or provide adequate warning, instruction and supervision for the students as to the handling of their equipment and extra hazardous and inflammable substances such as alcohol and allowed spilled alcohol to lie on the counter contrary to good housekeeping practice when they knew or should have known that the alcohol would be exposed to sources of ignition in the form of matches and burning alcohol lamps.
"(d) They failed to handle, store or put away a large quantity of an extra hazardous and inflammable substance, alcohol, in a place not exposed to the open laboratory area when burning alcohol lamps would be in use by many student partners in violation of the said Fire Prevention Act and the rules adopted and promulgated pursuant to that act.
"(e) They failed to store a large quantity of an extra hazardous and inflammable substance, alcohol, in a safe container, but chose a damaged and split container which had originally contained another type of fluid and was not designed to dispense alcohol in the presence of sources of ignition.
"(f) They failed to have the fire alarm equipment in proper working order or energized and did not train and instruct students and personnel how to operate the alarm and extinguisher equipment.
"(g) They failed to follow laboratory requirements set out by the United States government, which advanced funds for the construction of the school and equipment, when the defendants had agreed to observe these requirements.”
Count II
"17. That the defendants’ acts of deliberately and intentionally:
"(a) scheduling the class in a room which was not designed, equip*737ped or constructed for the performance of chemistry experiments involving the use of extra hazardous and inflammable substances such as alcohol; and
"(b) scheduling too many students in the class such that overcrowding resulted, equipment and supplies were congested, storage space was lacking and proper supervision by the teacher was impossible; and
"(c) placing upon the rear counter a large quantity of an extra hazardous substance, alcohol, in a damaged and split container which had originally contained another type of fluid and which was not designed to dispense alcohol in the presence of open flame lamps or matches, and
"(d) ignoring the construction and equipment requirements set out by the United States federal government.”
Count III
"17. That defendants conducted the class in question in a building. defective by reason of the lack of safety equipment such as a safety shower, fire alarms and extinguishers, storage area, sinks and a complete lack of laboratory equipment in the classroom, contrary to MCL 691.1406.”
Count IV
"17. That to allow such a quantity of inflammable alcohol to remain upon an open counter where it might be exposed to sources of ignition and might be spilled by inexperienced students was an abnormal, extraordinary and exceptional use of a known inflammable liquid and was contrary to the said Fire Prevention Act and the defendants are strictly liable for the damages resulting from the explosion.”

 As Mr. Justice Carr said in Jones v Grand Ledge Public Schools, 349 Mich 1, 11; 84 NW2d 327 (1957):
"It is not within the province of this Court to read therein a mandate that the Legislature has not seen fit to incorporate. Our duty is to apply the law as we find it.”
It is equally outside of the province of this Court to pass upon the wisdom of legislation. Grand Rapids Motor Coach Co v Public Service Commission, 323 Mich 624, 634; 36 NW2d 299 (1949).

 In instances of renovation, one must look to the purpose for which the building was redesigned or reconstructed.