Court Opinion

ID: 9734873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:49:13.260694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:51.985358
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 64. (concurring). I have not yet written in what has become a continuing *19discussion on the issue of imposition of costs in disciplinary cases. Much has been written and the topic has consumed, in my opinion, an undue amount of this court's time and resources.1 A petition has been filed for the court to consider new guidelines and standards in the imposition of such costs.2 Let us hear the petition, make changes to our current procedures as we deem necessary, and get on with the business of this court.
¶ 65. Both my life experience and my experience on this court impel me to the conclusion that we need uniform procedures and they need to be uniformly applied. Each case has its unique facts which result in differing levels of discipline. But no matter what the circumstances involved, the procedures should be the same.
¶ 66. The procedures and standards must apply equally regardless if the respondent is with a large firm or small firm, specialized practice or general practice, urban or rural. I believe it to be laudatory that the *20dissent envisions new approaches and considers better ways of doing things. However, to apply a new standard in this case, which has not been applied in others, only because some justices have a new idea for a temporary standard, promotes instability and lack of uniformity in our procedures. It is also unfair to others who have not had the benefit of catching the attention and imagination that prompts this new stopgap approach.
¶ 67. Notably, this new approach will likely be more costly, which may exacerbate rather than minimize the concern regarding high costs advanced by the dissent. It will require a determination by a fact finder as to what is "substantially related." Although the dissent suggests that such a determination is "simple," I do not think so.
¶ 68. It may not be so simple to parse what part of trial preparation is attributed to which count. Likewise, in my experience, it may not be able to easily determine what fraction of the hearing before the referee or the oral argument in this court is as a result of what count. Are we to add the total minutes or hours of the proceeding, and then analyze the questions and answers to determine how each is to be allocated?
¶ 69. After we have a hearing on the newly filed petition and consider the positions advanced by those who appear, the court may well embrace the position set forth by the dissent. Or, it may consider an alternative. But whatever we do, we must be consistent in the application of our standards and procedures.
¶ 70. Let's have the hearing on the filed petition, decide it, and turn our attention to the many other pressing issues before this court.
*21¶ 71. I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, JUSTICE JON E WILCOX, and JUSTICE N. PATRICK CROOKS, join this concurrence.

 See, e.g., OLR v. Trewin, 2004 WI 116, 275 Wis. 2d 116, 684 N.W.2d 121; OLR v. Polich, 2005 WI 36, 279 Wis. 2d 266, 694 N.W.2d 367; OLR v. Konnor, 2005 WI 37, 279 Wis. 2d 284, 694 N.W.2d 376.

 Petition Number 05-01, In the Matter of the Petition For Amendment to Supreme Court Rule 22.001(3) Relating to Cost Assessments in the Lawyer Regulation System, filed by Keith Sellen, Director, Office of Lawyer Regulation. The petition requests that the court amend SCR 22.001(3) to define "costs" in the Lawyer Regulation System to include "the compensation and necessary expenses of referees [and] litigation expenses other than counsel fees of the office of lawyer regulation ...." As a result, counsel fees would not be assessed against the respondent in a disciplinary case, but would be absorbed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation's operating expenses, paid for by all of the members of the Bar.