Court Opinion

ID: 9897302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:53.568375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.612607
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         Aug 23 2023, 8:48 am

                                                                              CLERK
                                                                          Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                             Court of Appeals
                                                                               and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Christopher J. Evans                                       Theodore E. Rokita
Dyllan M. Kemp                                             Attorney General of Indiana
Dollard Evans Whalin LLP                                   Evan Matthew Comer
Noblesville, Indiana                                       Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Roger Mendez-Vasquez,                                      August 23, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-CR-226
        v.
                                                           Appeal from the Hamilton
                                                           Superior Court
State of Indiana,
                                                           The Honorable Darren Murphy,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           29D07-2202-F6-1187

                             Opinion by Judge Bradford
                                Judge Riley concurs.
                    Judge Weissmann dissents with separate opinion.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023                                Page 1 of 16
      Case Summary
[1]   In February of 2022, Fishers Police Officer Jospeh Ryder stopped a truck driven

      by Roger Mendez-Vasquez after witnessing a traffic infraction and determining

      that the truck’s registration had expired. Officer Ryder discovered that

      Mendez-Vasquez had never had a valid driver’s license in Indiana, arrested

      him, decided to impound his truck, and performed an inventory search. During

      the search, Officer Ryder discovered items that led to a charge of and

      conviction for Level 6 felony methamphetamine possession. Mendez-Vasquez

      contends that Officer Ryder’s inventory search of his truck was unconstitutional

      and that the trial court therefore abused its discretion in admitting the evidence

      recovered during it. Because we disagree, we affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On February 24, 2022, Officer Ryder was following a black truck driven by

      Mendez-Vasquez westbound on 96th Street in Hamilton County when he saw

      him activate his turn signal less than 200 feet away from the intersection with

      Wading Crane Avenue and make an “unexpected” right turn. Tr. Vol. II p. 8.

      Officer Ryder determined that Mendez-Vasquez’s license plate had expired the

      month before and suspected that he had turned suddenly in an attempt to avoid

      him, so he pulled his police car onto nearby Springstone Road and waited to

      see if Mendez-Vasquez would return to the area. Shortly thereafter, Officer

      Ryder again spotted Mendez-Vasquez’s truck westbound on 96th Street. Officer

      Ryder initiated a traffic stop and observed that Mendez-Vasquez was the

      vehicle’s driver and sole occupant. Mendez-Vasquez produced some

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023         Page 2 of 16
      identification but not a valid driver’s license, and Officer Ryder learned that a

      person with Mendez-Vasquez’s name had an active warrant for his arrest from

      Marion County for operating a vehicle without ever having received a license.

      Once Officer Ryder confirmed Mendez-Vasquez’s identity, he arrested him.

[3]   After Mendez-Vasquez was taken into custody, Officer Ryder decided to have

      the truck impounded. At the time, the Fishers Police Department had a policy

      regarding inventory searches of impounded vehicles, pursuant to which officers

      are required to “log the property of value that is located within the vehicle and

      put it into the inventory log sheet.” Tr. Vol. II p. 13. Before beginning his

      search, Officer Ryder asked Mendez-Vasquez to identify items of value that he

      wanted in the inventory, and Mendez-Vasquez replied that he had “a lot of

      tools[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 13.

[4]   During his inventory search, Officer Ryder found a purse in the passenger

      compartment, which was the same purse from which Mendez-Vasquez had

      retrieved his identification after he was stopped. When Officer Ryder opened

      the purse, he observed a glass smoking pipe with a substance inside that

      appeared to be a pipe used for smoking methamphetamine. Inside the

      compartment in the truck’s armrest, Officer Ryder located a small, partially

      transparent plastic container, which contained a light-colored, crystal-like

      substance, which was later determined to be methamphetamine.

[5]   On February 25, 2022, the State charged Mendez-Vasquez with Level 6 felony

      possession of methamphetamine and Class C misdemeanor unlawful possession

      of paraphernalia. Mendez-Vasquez’s bench trial began on January 17, 2023.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023        Page 3 of 16
      Mendez-Vasquez did not object to the impoundment of his truck on Fourth

      Amendment grounds. Mendez-Vasquez, however, did object to the inventory

      search of the vehicle, claiming that the search of the purse in which the

      contraband was discovered was outside the scope of a permissible inventory

      search because Mendez-Vasquez had not identified the purse as an object of

      value prior to the initiation of the search. The trial court overruled Mendez-

      Vasquez’s objection and permitted Officer Ryder to testify about the items he

      had located inside the purse and truck. The trial court ultimately found

      Mendez-Vasquez guilty of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and

      not guilty Class C misdemeanor unlawful possession of paraphernalia. The

      trial court sentenced Mendez-Vasquez to 654 days of incarceration.

      Discussion and Decision
[6]   A constitutional challenge to the admission of the fruits of a warrantless search

      at a criminal trial implicates the Fourth Amendment’s and Article 1, section

      11’s, exclusionary rules, which means that the issue is properly left to the trial

      court’s discretion over the admission of evidence. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d

      1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). We review such decisions for abuse of that discretion.

      Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). Although the ultimate question

      of a search’s constitutionality is a matter of law that courts review de novo,

      Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014), Fourth Amendment claims are,

      by their nature, fact-sensitive inquiries, and a trial court’s determination of the

      facts is entitled to deference. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008).

      Reversal of a conviction is appropriate only if a defendant can show that the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023          Page 4 of 16
      admission of evidence was contrary to the logic and effect of the facts and

      circumstances presented by his case or based on a misinterpretation of the law.

      Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001).

      I.      Article 1, section 11
      Mendez-Vasquez contends for the first time on appeal that the impoundment

      and inventory search of his truck violated his rights against unreasonable search

      and seizure pursuant to Article 1, section 11, of the Indiana Constitution. It is,

      however, well-settled that an issue must first be raised in the trial court by

      raising a timely objection, and the failure to do so results in waiver of the claim

      on appeal. Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018). When Mendez-

      Vasquez objected to the admission of the purse’s contents at trial, Mendez-

      Vasquez claimed that they were “fruit of the poisonous tree” under the Fourth

      and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution but made no

      mention of Article 1, section 11, of the Indiana Constitution. Consequently, he

      has waived his Indiana constitutional claims for appellate review. See Durden,

      99 N.E.3d at 652.

      II. Fourth Amendment
[7]   As for Mendez-Vasquez’s federal claims, the Fourth Amendment generally

      requires that police obtain a warrant to conduct a search of a defendant’s

      person, house, papers, or effects unless one of the Amendment’s “well-

      delineated” exceptions applies. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). As

      courts have long recognized, one of these exceptions occurs when police

      officers conduct an inventory search following the impoundment of a vehicle.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023         Page 5 of 16
      Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 374 (Ind. 2016). The purpose behind the

      inventory-search exception is to “protect an owner’s property while it is in the

      custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized

      property, and to guard the police from danger.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.

      367, 372 (1987). An inventory search’s validity is determined based on a two-

      part test: first, because the need for an inventory arises from an impound, the

      State must establish that the impoundment is valid under either statute or as a

      matter of community caretaking; and second, courts must consider whether the

      scope of the inventory search was reasonable. Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 431

      (Ind. 1993).

[8]   Mendez-Vasquez claims for the first time on appeal that Officer Ryder’s

      impoundment of his truck was unconstitutional; consequently, this claim is

      waived for appellate review. See Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652. This leaves us only

      with Mendez-Vasquez’s contention that the scope of the inventory search of his

      truck was unconstitutionally broad. Even when a vehicle is validly impounded,

      the inventory search itself “must be conducted pursuant to standard police

      procedures.” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 435. The purpose of this requirement is to

      make sure that the search is carried out in a manner that serves the objectives

      justifying inventory searches and that sufficiently limits the discretion of the

      officer so that the search cannot become a pretext for a general rummaging for

      incriminating evidence. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 995 (Ind. 2021). That

      said, even when an inventory search is conducted according to a policy, it is

      possible for the policy, as established by the record, to be so broad as to be the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023         Page 6 of 16
       equivalent of having no policy at all. See, e.g., Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 436. This is

       what Mendez-Vasquez argues.

[9]    For its part, the State argues that Officer Ryder’s testimony provided sufficient

       detail regarding his department’s policy to conclude that it sufficiently regulated

       officer discretion. Specifically, the State points to Officer Ryder’s testimony

       that he was required to log items “of value,” required to note whether the items

       were taken to a locker or left in the vehicle, and permitted to only search

       containers that might contain valuables. The only real point of contention is

       whether an inventory-search policy that requires officers to inventory items that

       are “of value” is sufficiently restrictive of officer discretion to pass constitutional

       muster. We conclude that it is.

[10]   We agree with the State that limiting the inventory search to items “of value,”

       i.e., items that the police could reasonably expect to be the subject of complaint

       were they to disappear or be damaged while in police custody, serves the

       purposes of the inventory-search exception while disallowing a general

       rummaging for incriminating evidence. For example, a purse and its contents

       can be inventoried because they are likely to be of value to the owner while,

       without more, items such as discarded paper bags cannot be searched because

       they are not likely to be of value. While it may be tempting to imagine a policy

       with additional guidance for determining value such that officer discretion is

       further limited, we are somewhat at a loss to understand how such a policy

       could be workable in practice. Attempting to craft an inventory-search policy

       based on apparent monetary value (perhaps the only more-or-less objective

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023           Page 7 of 16
       criterion that could realistically be added to such a policy) strikes us as an

       exercise in futility, because an item of no apparent monetary value may

       nonetheless have great practical or sentimental value to its owner.

[11]   Another possibility would be to require the officer to rely on the vehicle

       occupant’s identification of items of value. This, however, is also inadequate,

       because the occupant would then be able to defeat any inventory search at all

       by denying that there was anything of value in the vehicle, which would

       completely thwart the purposes of inventory-search procedures, which are to

       “protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure

       against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police

       from danger.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. Perhaps the best practice when

       identifying items of value for purposes of an inventory search is to combine the

       exercise of officer judgment with the identification of specific items of value by

       the vehicle’s occupant, as Officer Ryder did here. In any event, we conclude

       that the inventory-search policy here, which required that items of value be

       inventoried and was followed by Officer Ryder, sufficiently constrains the

       exercise of officer discretion and is therefore constitutional. See Peete v. State,

       678 N.E.2d 415, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that trial counsel was not

       ineffective for failing to challenge an inventory search where the search policy

       at issue provided that “‘the officer is required to go through the vehicle, the

       interior of the vehicle and the trunk of the vehicle to ascertain if there is any

       valuable property or contraband or basically it is designed to protect the private

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023           Page 8 of 16
       party from loss [of] the property and the wrecker lots and the police department,

       for liability’”) (record citation omitted and brackets in Peete), trans. denied.

[12]   While we acknowledge the similarity between the policy at issue in this case

       and the policies found to be unconstitutionally vague in Fair and Sams v. State,

       71 N.E.3d 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), we nonetheless conclude that those cases

       are distinguishable on the facts. In Fair, the police officer testified as follows

       regarding his police department’s inventory-search policy: “Officer Wager

       testified only that ‘we conduct an inventory search of the car to see what kind of

       items are in it. If there’s anything valuable that might need to be placed in the

       property room or otherwise noted as being in the car.’” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 436

       (emphasis in original). In contrast to this case, however, the Court noted

       several indicia of pretext harmful to the State’s position, including that the

       vehicle was searched at the scene by an officer responsible for criminal

       investigations; the officer made no note of Fair’s personal effects, focusing

       instead on the contraband; there was no indication that inventory sheets were

       ever completed; and it was unclear that the vehicle was ever actually

       impounded. The Fair Court concluded that the search at issue was

       unreasonable because “[t]here was no testimony whatsoever that provided the

       particulars of the policy and, therefore, it is not possible for this Court to

       determine whether the seemingly suspicious circumstances which attended the search

       were in fact irregular.” Id. (emphasis added).

[13]   Here, however, the record contains few of the “seemingly suspicious

       circumstances” that were so suggestive of pretext in Fair. Id. Officer Ryder

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023           Page 9 of 16
       testified that the Fishers Police Department’s inventory policy was to inventory

       items of value and note them on an inventory log sheet, and even Mendez-

       Vasquez does not dispute that his purse was an item of value that contained

       items of value. Officer Ryder testified that the items in the vehicle were entered

       on an inventory sheet by another officer. Officer Ryder testified in greater

       detail regarding the Fishers Police policy than did the officer regarding the

       policy in Fair, including that it specifically allowed closed containers to be

       opened so long as they could contain items of value. Finally, there is no

       indication that anything was searched and inventoried that was not of value,

       which would indicate pretext. Because the Fair Court was evaluating the search

       policy against a backdrop of strong indicia of pretext that are not present in this

       case, we conclude that Fair does not require reversal.

[14]   Mendez-Vasquez also relies on our decision in Sams, in which the testimony

       regarding the inventory policy was “[w]e look at the vehicle and make sure

       anything that would be valuable [is inventoried], if you look at [it and

       determine] that’s valuable[.]” 71 N.E.3d at 379 (first three sets of brackets in

       Sams). In reversing the trial court’s decision to admit evidence found in the

       inventory search, we observed that the above policy was

               indistinguishable from what Fair held to be no policy at all:
               “[W]e conduct an inventory search of the car [to see if] there’s
               anything valuable that might need to be ... noted as being in the
               car....” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 436; see also Rhodes v. State, 50 N.E.3d
               378, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (invalidating inventory search)
               (inventory “to make sure no valuables are left inside the vehicle
               before it’s towed”), trans. denied. In part, this is because
               inventory searches are definitionally searches for valuables (and,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023         Page 10 of 16
               to some degree, dangers). See [South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
               U.S. 364, 369–70 (1976)]. Without further definition by
               standardized criteria, a policy “to inventory for valuables” gives
               officers unconstitutionally broad discretion. There is nothing in
               the record of what standardized criteria GPD officers use to
               decide what is “valuable” under the policy.
       Sams, 71 N.E.3d at 380.

[15]   In Sams, however, it was not necessary to reach the question of the policy’s

       unconstitutionality because the officers did not follow the policy, searching a

       discarded fast-food paper bag that they did not even bother to claim was

       valuable. Id. at 375. The search of the fast-food bag therefore failed to fulfill

       any valid administrative purpose of an inventory search, creating an inference

       of pretext that the State could not counter. Because it was not necessary to

       reach the question of whether the policy itself was invalid in Sams, any

       declaration on the subject was rendered obiter dictum. In summary, because we

       conclude that Fair and Sams are distinguishable on the facts, they do not require

       reversal in this case.

       We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

       Riley, J., concurs.

       Weissmann, J., dissents with separate opinion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023           Page 11 of 16
       Weissmann, Judge, dissenting.

       I respectfully dissent.

[16]   The State bears the burden to prove that an inventory search was conducted in

       good faith under standardized inventory procedures that sufficiently curtail the

       discretion of the searching officer. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 995 (Ind.

       2021) (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1125

       (2022). Based on this scant record, I cannot conclude that this search passes

       constitutional muster.

[17]   The State’s evidence of a proper inventory search amounts largely to the

       following testimony from the arresting officer:

               Q: And does Fishers have a procedure on how to conduct an
               inventory of a vehicle?

               A: Yes, we are to log the property of value that is located within
               the vehicle and put it into the inventory log sheet. I had another
               officer come and assist me and when he responded he stated that
               he would do the paperwork for the logging of the vehicle.

               Q: Did you follow this procedure when inventorying the
               defendant's vehicle?

               A: I did.

       Tr. Vol. II p.13. But since the arresting officer passed off the “paperwork” of

       the search to a different officer, his testimony can only go so far towards

       ensuring the proper procedures were followed. Id. To that end, the State failed

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023          Page 12 of 16
       to elicit testimony from the officer responsible for the administrative work and

       neglected to admit into evidence the inventory sheets themselves, proof of

       impoundment, or the written text of Fishers’ inventory search policy. Thus,

       despite the majority’s claim to the contrary, this case shares almost all the

       pretextual concerns that led to suppression in Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 436

       (Ind. 1993).

[18]   As in Fair, Mendez-Vasquez’s truck was (1) searched at the crime scene by (2)

       an officer responsible for, and with extensive experience in, criminal drug

       enforcement. As in Fair, (3) the record contains only the searching officer’s

       testimony—not the officer who filled out the paperwork. And as in Fair, there

       is no evidence of (4) completed inventory sheets, or (5) actual impoundment of

       the truck.1 The only indicator of a pretextual search not present here is that

       Officer Ryder asked about, and appears to have kept track of, Mendez-

       Vasquez’s personal items. Yet, based on the State’s failure to enter the

       inventory log sheets into evidence—or elicit testimony from the officer who

       filled out the sheets—Officer Ryder’s brief testimony that “[he] did” follow the

       proper procedures of an inventory search falls short of the State’s burden. Tr.

       Vol. II p. 13.

[19]   While the majority makes much of Officer Ryder’s clarification that Fishers’

       policy allowed him to open closed containers so long as they might contain

       1
         I don’t doubt that the truck was impounded based on Mr. Mendez-Vasquez’s appellate arguments. But this
       concession on appeal does not relieve the State of its burden of showing a constitutionally permissible
       inventory search.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023                         Page 13 of 16
       valuables, this fails to calm my fear of pretext, as it does little to establish the

       existence of the necessary procedural safeguards. This is the critical inquiry

       courts must undergo in determining the constitutionality of inventory searches.

       For instance, Indiana has consistently required the State to explain not just what

       the inventory search policy is, but how the officer’s actions matched those

       procedures in practice. See, e.g., Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 377–78 (Ind.

       2016); Sams v. State, 71 N.E.3d 372, 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017);2 Rhodes v. State,

       50 N.E.3d 378, 382–83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); Whitley v. State, 47 N.E.3d 640,

       647–48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Indeed, our Supreme Court has explicitly stated:

                Simply put, [a] passing reference to “our procedures in that
                situation” fails to “provide the particulars of the policy” as Fair
                requires. On this record, we know literally nothing about the
                substance of the “procedures” the officer referenced, let alone
                how his actions adhered to those procedures. Without these
                “particulars,” then, we cannot evaluate whether this
                impoundment was a reasonable exercise of the community-
                caretaking function and not merely pretext for an inventory
                search.

       Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 377–78 (internal citation omitted).

[20]   Here, all we know is that officers look for valuables. But how does an officer

       gauge value? How does an officer determine which containers may be opened

       2
         In Sams, our court made two things clear: (1) a policy consisting only of searching for “anything valuable”
       was unconstitutional; and (2) the officer’s repeated deviations from that policy required reversal. The
       majority incorrectly relegates the first premise to irrelevant dicta. If anything, this has the dicta analysis
       backwards. Sams, 71 N.E.3d at 383 (holding “even if” the inventory search policy was constitutional, “the
       officers’ major deviation from that regime” also required reversal).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023                               Page 14 of 16
       to log items of value? Requiring an answer to such basic questions is not too

       much to ask where the State is attempting to justify a warrantless search. See,

       e.g., Sams, 71 N.E.3d at 379–80; People v. Mortel, 197 A.D.3d 196, 233 (N.Y.

       2021) (Chambers, J., concurring in part) (“Surely, if the standardized procedure

       in this case were limited to what [the officer] actually described, namely a

       generalized instruction to ‘go through the vehicle’ and ‘note all the valuables,’ it

       would be difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that such a procedure is

       designed to meet the legitimate objective of the search while limiting the

       discretion of the officer in the field.”); U.S. v. Mundy, 621 F.3d 283, 290–91 (3rd

       Cir. 2010) (holding constitutional inventory search policy “for valuable items”

       that sufficiently explained procedural safeguards); U.S. v. Battle, 370 Fed. Appx.

       426, 429 (4th Cir. 2010) (same); U.S. v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001)

       (same). In short, exactly like in Wilford, we know nothing about the substance

       of the procedures used here, let alone whether Officer Ryder’s actions adhered

       to that policy.3

[21]   Though the State relied on the inventory exception to justify the search of the

       purse, it failed to establish the necessary showing to ensure the search passed

       3
          This is not to say that I disagree with the majority’s view that usefulness or practicality may be a
       component of a lawful inventory search policy. Slip Op. ¶¶ 10-12. But the majority’s discussion on this point
       is just conjecture because the State failed to provide the evidence necessary to properly review Fishers’
       inventory search procedures. The only case the majority opinion affirmatively cites for its position—without
       having to explain away the opposite result—possessed the evidence necessary to review the substance of the
       procedures lacking here. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Peete v. State, 678 N.E.2d 415, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
       inventory search constitutional where the officer “testified articulately” about his actions in conducting the
       search, explained how the general procedures of an inventory search matched his actions, and the written
       policy was entered into evidence)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023                               Page 15 of 16
constitutional muster. Based on this failure in the State’s burden of proof, I

would grant Mr. Mendez-Vasquez’s motion to suppress.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-226 | August 23, 2023      Page 16 of 16