Court Opinion

ID: 9717981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:13:54.876447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:56.551469
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: All three defendants were convicted of Class 1 or 2 felonies, but were sentenced as if they had committed Class X felonies because of their prior convictions. This situation falls squarely within the terms of section 111— 3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 111 — 3(c)), which requires the State to give notice in the written charge whenever it intends to seek an enhanced sentence based on a defendant’s prior conviction. Because defendants did not receive the requisite notice here, their sentences should be vacated, and the causes should be remanded for re-sentencing. In my view, this is as straightforward and simple a case as has come before us. The majority nevertheless manages to go astray by adopting the view that section 111 — 3(c) is ambiguous and does not mean what its language clearly states. Although the same position has been embraced by the appellate court, I do not regard that as dispositive. An invalid idea, no matter how widely held, is still invalid. The majority states that there is "no evidence that the legislature intended to require the State to give a defendant pretrial notice of the possible sentence *** that he might receive.” (162 Ill. 2d at 290.) It is axiomatic, however, that the best indication of legislative intent is the language used. (County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151.) Under the plain language of section 111— 3(c), giving pretrial notice of possible sentences is precisely what the statute is aimed at. It says so explicitly. "When the State seeks an enhanced sentence because of a prior conviction, the charge shall also state the intention to seek an enhanced sentence and shall state such prior conviction so as to give notice to the defendant.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 111 — 3(c).) How could this be any clearer? What confuses the majority is the final sentence of the statute, which provides that the term "enhanced sentence” means "a sentence which is increased by a prior conviction from one classification of offense to another higher level classification of offense ***; it does not include an increase in the sentence applied within the same level of classification of offense.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 111 — 3(c). The majority construes this as limiting the notice requirement only to situations where the prior conviction operates to actually upgrade the level of the offense. Such is not the case. Under the statute, notice is required whenever the State intends to use the prior conviction to obtain a sentence at a higher level of offense than would otherwise be the case. This is so where the sentence would increase because the level of the offense itself is actually upgraded, as with the various statutes cited by the majority, and it is equally so where the law merely treats the defendant, for sentencing purposes, as if he had committed a higher level of offense, as it does here under section 5 — 5— 3(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3(c)(8)). There is no basis in the language of the statute for distinguishing the two situations. The only exception in the statute is for "an increase in the sentence applied within the same level of classification of offense.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 111— 3(c).) That exception covers the situation where the court finds the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b) of section 5 — 5—3.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.2(b)) to be present and can impose an extended term under section 5 — 8—2 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—2). In that situation, no change occurs either in the level of the offense for which a defendant can be convicted or, as in the cases before us, in the level of the offense for which a defendant can be sentenced. A person convicted of a particular class of felony is still sentenced for that same class of felony. The only difference is that the minimum and maximum sentences for that class of felony are extended. Obviously, that exception has no application here, where the defendants were all sentenced for a higher degree of felony than the one for which they were actually convicted. In reaching a contrary result, the majority makes much of the remarks made by Representative Homer during debates on the legislation in the House of Representatives. I note, however, that the quoted remarks from Homer are not inconsistent with the construction I have discussed. Although Homer focused on application of the notice requirement to cases where the offense itself is upgraded, nothing in the quoted passages states that notice is not likewise required where, as here, a defendant’s sentence is based on a higher grade of offense than the one for which he was actually convicted. Even if Homer did not understand the statute to require notice in the latter situation, his views are scarcely controlling. Where the language of a statute is clear on its face, its meaning should be given effect without resort to supplementary principles of statutory construction. (People v. Chandler (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 233, 253.) What matters is what the legislature ultimately said, not what it thought it was saying. No rule of construction allows us to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc. (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83. To the extent that some ambiguity can be tortured from the language of section 111 — 3(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 111 — 3(c)), the majority has resolved it the wrong way. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed (Chandler, 129 111. 2d at 254), and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of criminal defendants (People v. Foster (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 48, 55). This is especially true of statutes pertaining to the enhancement of sentences. (See People v. Juris (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 934, 935.) Under this standard, the law mandates a conclusion that the defendants here were entitled to the notice required by section 111 — 3(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 111 — 3(c)) before the State could seek to have them sentenced as Class X offenders. I therefore dissent. APPENDIX LIST OF CRIMES WHERE PRIOR CONVICTIONS ELEVATE CLASS OF OFFENSE OF WHICH AN ACCUSED IS CONVICTED 720 ILCS 5/11 — 14(b): Prostitution — third conviction elevates offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/11 — 15(b): Soliciting for a prostitute— third conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/11 — 17(b): Keeping a place of prostitution — third conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/11 — 17.1(c): Keeping a place of juvenile prostitution — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class 1 felony to a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 5/11 — 18(b): Patronizing a prostitute— third conviction elevates the offense from a Class B misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/11 — 19(b): Pimping — third conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/12 — 4.3(a): Aggravated battery of a child — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class 1 felony to a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 5/12 — 13(b): Criminal sexual assault— second conviction elevates offense from a Class 1 felony to a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 5/12 — 15(d): Criminal sexual abuse— second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 2 felony. 720 ILCS 5/12 — 20(a): Sale of body parts — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/16 — 1(b)(2): Theft — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/16 — 3.1(b): False report of theft and other losses — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/16 — 5(c): Theft from coin-operated machines — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/16 — 14(d)(2): Unlawful interference with public utility services — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/16 — 15(d): Unlawful use of a theft detection shielding device — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/16A — 10: Retail theft — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/16D — 3(b)(2): Computer tampering— second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/16D — 3(b)(3): Computer tampering— second conviction elevates the offense from a Class 3 to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/17 — l(B)(e): Deceptive practices — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/17 — 2(d): Impersonating a police officer— second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/17 — 11: Odometer fraud — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/21.2 — 4: Interference with a public institution — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class C misdemeanor to a Class B misdemeanor. 720 ILCS 5/24 — 1(b): Unlawful use of weapons— second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/26 — 1(b): Disorderly conduct — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 5/28 — 1(c): Gambling — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS 635/4: Prohibition of possession of instruments adapted for use of controlled substances — second conviction elevates the offense from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony.