Court Opinion

ID: 9698801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:00:18.63437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:05.037053
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     PAMELA LONGMIRE,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          DC-0752-20-0460-I-2

                  v.

     NUCLEAR REGULATORY                              DATE: August 25, 2023
       COMMISSION,
                  Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Karen J. Malachi and Peggy Jones Golden, Atlanta, Georgia, for the
             appellant.

           Cathy Scott, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

           Garett Dane Henderson and Vinh Hoang, Rockville, Maryland, for the
             agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     reversed the agency’s removal decision and granted the appellant’s affirmative

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     defenses of disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate and
     harmful procedural error. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in
     the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner ’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
     clarify and supplement the administrative judge’s findings regarding the
     appellant’s affirmative defenses, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was employed as a Project Manager with the agency’s Office
     of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. See Longmire v. Nuclear Regulatory
     Commission, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-20-0460-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 1 at 1, Tab 7 at 24. By a letter dated January 8, 2020, the agency proposed
     the appellant’s removal based on a charge of absence without leave (AWOL),
     supported by 33 specifications covering the period from November 12, 2019,
     through January 2, 2020. IAF, Tab 1 at 6-10. The appellant provided a written
     response to the proposal with supporting documentation. IAF, Tab 7 at 45-62.
     After considering the appellant’s response, the deciding official issued a decision
     that sustained the AWOL charge and all 33 specifications, removing the appellant
     from her position, effective February 21, 2020. IAF, Tab 1 at 17 -22.
                                                                                       3

¶3        The appellant filed a Board appeal and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1
     at 2. She raised affirmative defenses of discrimination on the bas es of disability,
     age, and race, and alleged that the agency committed a prohibited personnel
     practice and engaged in harmful procedural error by removing her.          Id. at 3.
     After holding the first 2 days of the requested hearing, the appeal was dismissed
     without prejudice to refiling. IAF, Tab 55; see IAF, Tabs 50, 52. The appeal was
     subsequently refiled, see Longmire v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, MSPB
     Docket No. DC-0752-20-0460-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 1, and after a third
     hearing day the administrative judge issued an initial decision reversing the
     removal action.   I-2 AF, Tab 4, Initial Decision (ID).     He concluded that the
     agency discriminated against the appellant based on a failure to accommodate her
     disability when it removed her, and so the agency action could not be sustained.
     ID at 3-19; see I-2 AF, Tab 3. The administrative judge also determined that the
     agency committed harmful error in the application of its procedures by failing to
     comply with its Management Directive and the collective bargaining agreement
     (CBA) when it denied the appellant reasonable accommodation.          ID at 21-23.
     Finally, the administrative judge determined that the appellant failed to prove her
     affirmative defenses of disparate treatment disability discrimination and
     discrimination based on sex and race.        ID at 19-21.     Because the agency
     committed harmful procedural error and engaged in disability discrimination
     based on its failure to accommodate the appellant when it removed her, the
     administrative judge reversed the removal action. ID at 1, 23.
¶4        The agency timely filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1. The appellant has filed a response in opposition to the petition for
     review, and the agency has filed a reply. PFR File, Tabs 3, 5.
                                                                                            4

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge did not err in concluding that the agency discriminated
     against the appellant based on its failure to accommodate her disability.
¶5         The administrative judge reversed the removal, finding that it was based on
     the agency’s failure to accommodate the appellant’s disability.           ID at 3.   On
     review, the agency argues that the administrative judge incorrectly concluded that
     the appellant proved this affirmative defense. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-18, 23-31.
     Specifically, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred by:
     (1) neglecting to address how the agency’s failure to accommodate the appellant’s
     disability caused the charged misconduct; (2) determining that it failed to engage
     in the interactive process; (3) finding that the appellant was a qualified individual
     with a disability; and, (4) concluding that the appellant’s request for full-time
     telework 2 did not constitute an undue hardship on the agency. Id. at 12-18, 23-31.

           Applicable legal standard
¶6         The Board adjudicates claims of disability discrimination raised in
     connection with an otherwise appealable action under the substantive standards of
     section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, which has incorporated the standards of the

     2
       The parties refer to the appellant’s request to work from home as a request for
     full-time telework, and Article 7 of the CBA, which governs telework, includes a
     provision that explicitly covers “Full-Time Telework.” IAF, Tab 24 at 42-43. We note
     that the terms “telework” and “remote work” are distinct work arrangements, and are
     often improperly used interchangeably. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2021
     Guide to Telework and Remote Work in the Federal Government at 11 (hereafter “OPM
     Guide to Telework and Remote Work in the Federal Government”), available at
     https://www.opm.gov/telework/documents-for-telework/2021-guide-to-telework-and-
     remote-work.pdf. In practice, telework “is a work arrangement that allows employees
     to have regularly scheduled days on which they telework and regularly scheduled days
     when they work in their agency worksite.” Id. By contrast, remote work “is an
     alternative work arrangement that involves an employee performing their official duties
     at an approved alternative worksite away from an agency worksite, without regularly
     returning to the agency worksite during each pay period.” Id. at 53. Here, although the
     appellant’s request to work from her home full-time appears to fall within the definition
     of remote work in the OPM Guide to Telework and Remote Work in the Federal
     Government, because the parties considered the appellant’s request as a request for
     “full-time telework” under the CBA we will refer to it as telework in this order.
                                                                                         5

     Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as amended.           Haas v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 28. Under the relevant provisions, it is
     illegal for an employer to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis
     of disability.” Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualified individual with a disability
     is one who can “perform the essential functions of the . . . position that such
     individual holds or desires” with or without accommodation. Haas, 2022 MSPB
     36, ¶ 28; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).            An agency is
     required to provide reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified
     individual with a disability, unless the agency can show that doing so would
     cause an undue hardship on its business operations. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5);
     Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 28; Clemens v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R.
     616, ¶ 10 (2014).     Reasonable accommodation includes modifications to the
     manner in which a position is customarily performed in order to enable a
     qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential job functions, or
     reassigning the employee to a vacant position whose duties the employee can
     perform. Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 10.
¶7         In the initial decision, the administrative judge determined the following:
     (1) the appellant was an individual with a disability based on her asthma, chronic
     rhinosinusitis, and allergy exacerbation conditions, which substantial ly limit her
     ability to breathe; (2) she was a qualified individual with a disability because she
     could safely and efficiently perform the essential functions of her position; (3) the
     decision to remove her was based on her disability insofar as the agency failed to
     engage in the reasonable accommodation interactive process or otherwise attempt
     to accommodate her before removing her; and (4) accommodating the appellant
     by permitting her to telework would not have caused the agency undue hardship.
     ID at 4-19. On review, the agency has not disputed the administrative judge’s
     finding that the appellant is an individual with a disability, so we need not
     address that finding. We turn now to consider each of the remaining findings.
                                                                                          6

           We agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant
           was a qualified individual with a disability.
¶8         As previously noted, a qualified individual with a disability is a person who
     can   perform   the   essential   functions   of   her   position   with   or   without
     accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The Board has indicated that the core
     duties of a position are synonymous with the essential functions of a position
     under the ADA, as amended, i.e., the fundamental job duties of the position, not
     including marginal functions.         Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 21; Clemens,
     120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 6; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). A job duty may be considered
     essential for a number of reasons, including, among other things, because the
     reason the position exists is to perform that function, because of the limited
     number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function
     can be distributed, or because the function is highly specialized so that the
     incumbent is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular
     function.   Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 21; Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 6.                In
     determining whether a particular function is “essential,” the Board will c onsider a
     number of factors, such as the employer’s judgment as to which functions are
     essential, written position descriptions, the amount of time spent performing the
     function, and the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
     function. Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 6.
¶9         On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge failed to give
     adequate deference to agency management’s assessment of the appellant’s
     essential job duties, citing precedent from the Equal Employment Opportunity
     Commission (EEOC) and Federal appellate courts concerning the substantial
     deference given to employers to determine an employee’s essential job duties.
     PFR File, Tab 1 at 23-25. The agency also argues that the administrative judge
     inappropriately credited the appellant’s testimony concerning her job duties and
     failed to acknowledge testimony by comparator employees that the frequency
     with which certain job duties are performed varies among the different agency
                                                                                       7

      branches. Id. at 26-27. Finally, the agency argues that because there has not
      been an assessment of the appellant’s medical status and limitations since
      September 2018, it is impossible to determine whether she can perform the
      essential functions of her position. PFR File, Tab 1 at 22 -30.
¶10         To the extent the agency is challenging the administrative judge’s decision
      to credit the appellant’s testimony concerning the nature of her job duties over
      that of her former first-line supervisor, the Board has regularly held that it will
      not disturb an administrative judge’s findings when he considered the evidence as
      a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reason ed conclusions on issues of
      credibility.   Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997);
      Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359
      (1987). Here, the administrative judge made credibility determinations based on
      his observation of each witness’s demeanor at the hearing, and we decline to
      disturb those findings on review.       See ID at 16-17, n.1 (citing Hillen v.
      Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987) (identifying the factors
      that an administrative judge must consider in making credibility determinations ));
      Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
      (concluding that the Board generally must give deference to an administrativ e
      judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly,
      on the observation of the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing and may
      overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for
      doing so).
¶11         Regarding the agency’s specific argument that the administrative judge
      failed to consider the testimony of the purported comparators concerning the role
      public meetings played in the appellant’s branch, the administrative judge did
      identify and discuss testimony from each of the comparators regarding the role
      public meetings played in their respective branches. ID at 18-19 (citing Aug. 19,
      2020 Hearing Transcript (HT 2) at 190-92, 216, 229-31, (testimony of purported
      comparators); I-2 AF, Oct. 23, 2020 Hearing Transcript (HT 3) at 225-26
                                                                                       8

      (testimony of purported comparator)). The administrative judge’s decision not to
      specifically discuss the testimony from the comparators—none of whom were
      assigned to the appellant’s branch—concerning the frequency of public meetings
      in the appellant’s branch, does not mean that he did not consider that testimony
      and is not a basis for overturning his well-reasoned findings on review.      See
      Gardner    v.    Department     of   Veterans     Affairs,   123 M.S.P.R.    647,
      ¶ 25 (2016) (concluding that the administrative judge’s failure to mention all of
      the evidence of record does not mean that he did not consider it in reaching his
      decision), clarified by Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget , 2022 MSPB
      31, ¶¶ 23-24; Marques v. Department of Health and Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R.
      129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).
¶12        Regarding the agency’s assertion that, based on existing EEOC and Federal
      appellate court precedent, the administrative judge failed to give adequate
      deference to its determination about which of the appellant’s duties were
      essential, we disagree. Although the decision cited by the agency held that the
      inquiry into the essential functions of an employee’s job should not “second guess
      the employer or [] require the employer to lower company standards,” the court
      also held that the deference granted to agencies is “not absolute,” and that the
      agency’s assessment is one of several factors to be considered in determining
      which of the employee’s job functions are essential. PFR File, Tab 1 at 24-25;
      Vargas v. DeJoy, 980 F.3d 1184, 1188 (7th Cir. 2020); see Elledge v. Lowe’s
      Home Centers, LLC, 979 F.3d 1004, 1009 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting that an
      employer’s assessment of an employee’s job duties is entitled to “considerable
      deference” from the courts, but also acknowledging that the ADA states that other
      factors are also relevant to the question, and that the court’s assessment must
      “consult the full range of evidence bearing on the employer’s judgement. . .”);
      29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (identifying additional factors to be considered in
      determining whether a job duty is “essential,” including whether the position
                                                                                         9

      exists to perform the function, whether a limited number of e mployees can
      perform the function, and whether the function is highly specialized).
¶13           Based on the appellant’s testimony describing her regular job duties and the
      frequency with which she performed them, as well as a review of the appellant’s
      position description, the administrative judge determined that the appellant could
      perform the essential functions of her position while teleworking. ID at 14-15;
      Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) 3 at 138-40 (testimony of appellant); IAF, Tab 26
      at 4.    He highlighted testimony from the appellant stating that she had not
      performed the two contested job functions since 2012 and 2016 respectively, as
      well as testimony from the appellant’s former first-line supervisor that did not
      indicate that the appellant had any issues completing her job duties while
      teleworking. ID at 15-17; see IAF, Aug. 18, 2020 Hearing Transcript (HT 1)
      (testimony of appellant’s former first-line supervisor); HT 3 at 123-28 (testimony
      of appellant).      Contrasting that testimony, the administrative judge cited
      testimony from the appellant’s first-line supervisor acknowledging that he was
      not aware whether the appellant had ever performed either of the challenged job
      functions, and testimony from the agency reasonable accommodation coordinator
      (RAC) acknowledging that the essential functions analysis considers the actual
      duties the employee performs, not just the generic duties described in an
      employee’s position description. ID at 17; HT 1 at 116-17, 125-26 (testimony of
      appellant’s first-line supervisor; HT 3 at 61-63). In the absence of “sufficiently
      sound” reasons for doing so, we discern no basis upon which to disturb the
      administrative judge’s credibility determinations in this regard or to reweigh the
      evidence or substitute our assessment of the record evidence for his.        Haebe,
      288 F.3d at 1302.
¶14           Finally, we find no merit in the agency’s argument that because the
      assessment of the appellant’s limitations provided by Federal Occupational
      Health (FOH) was sparse or outdated, it was not possible to assess whether she
                                                                                            10

      could perform the essential functions of her position. 3 PFR File, Tab 1 at 28-30.
      Because we ultimately agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the
      agency’s failure to adequately engage in the interactive process is what caused
      the failure to accommodate the appellant’s disability, see infra ¶¶ 15-24, to
      whatever extent the agency now asserts that it was hindered in its ability to
      adequately assess the appellant’s medical limitations, it was the agency’s own
      actions that caused the hindrance.            Accordingly, we conclude that the
      administrative judge properly considered the relevant factors based on the entire
      record. We agree that the appellant was a qualified individual with a disability
      because she could perform the essential functions of her position with or without
      accommodation.

            The administrative judge’s finding that the agency failed to
            adequately engage in the interactive process is supported by the
            record.
¶15         The agency also challenges the administrative judge’s finding that it failed
      to engage in the interactive process by failing to properly process the appellant’s
      requests for telework. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-17. Specifically, the agency argues
      that it made repeated efforts to engage in the interactive process and ins tead it
      was the appellant who failed to engage in the interactive process in good faith.

      3
        To the extent the agency suggests, for the first time on review, that the appellant’s
      traumatic brain injury (TBI) diagnosis affected her ability to complete her job functions
      and that an assessment of her limitations is necessary in light of her TBI condition, the
      agency did not raise this argument below and we need not consider it on review. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 28-30. See Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016)
      (noting that the Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time
      in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence
      not previously available despite the party’s due diligence); Banks v. Department of the
      Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980) (same); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). Additionally,
      the record reflects that the agency RAC closed the appellant’s request for reasonable
      accommodation in connection with her TBI claim after the appellant failed to provide
      supporting medical documentation, and the administrative judge did not rely on the
      appellant’s TBI condition as a part of his finding that the agency failed to accommodate
      the appellant’s disability. HT 2 at 45-46 (testimony of agency RAC); IAF, Tab 22
      at 23-32; see ID at 6, 9-13.
                                                                                            11

      Id. As the administrative judge observed, once an employee informs the agency
      that she requires an accommodation, the agency must engage in an interactive
      process to determine an appropriate accommodation. Kirkland v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 119 M.S.P.R. 74, ¶ 18 (2013); see Paris v. Department of the
      Treasury, 104 M.S.P.R. 331, ¶ 17 (2006) (finding an employee need only let her
      employer know in general terms that she needs accommodation for a medical
      condition).    A request for reasonable accommodation is the first step in the
      informal, interactive process between the individual and the employer. See EEOC
      Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
      under the Americans with Disabilities Act (EEOC Enforcement Guidance),
      Question      5,    Notice     No.      915.002     (Oct.     17,     2002),    available
      at https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-reasonable-
      accommodation-and-undue-hardship-under-ada.             “The appropriate reasonable
      accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that
      involves both the employer and the individual with a disability. ” 29 C.F.R. part
      1630, appendix, § 1630.9.        Additionally, courts have generally required both
      parties to engage in this process in good faith. See Rehling v. City of Chicago,
      207 F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 2000); Collins v. U.S. Postal Service,
      100 M.S.P.R. 332, ¶ 11 (2005).           Nevertheless, the failure to engage in the
      interactive process alone does not violate the Rehabilitation Act; rather the
      appellant must show that this omission resulted in failure to provide reasonable
      accommodation. Clemens, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 17.
¶16         In the initial decision, the administrative judge relied on testimony from the
      agency’s RAC, who testified at length concerning the agency’s reasonable
      accommodation process. ID at 10-11 (citing HT 2) (testimony of agency RAC)).
      The   agency       RAC   testified   that,   pursuant   to   the    agency’s   reasonable
      accommodation policy, the agency should begin processing an employee’s request
      for accommodation no later than 5 days after the request is initiated, and the
      requesting employee’s supervisor must discuss the request with a Human
                                                                                       12

      Resources (HR) representative. The RAC testified that she did not process any
      reasonable accommodation requests for the appellant during the period from
      September 24, 2019, through January 30, 2020. ID at 10-11. Observing that the
      appellant requested full-time telework on several occasions in 2019, including on
      September 24, 2019, October 8, 2019, November 6, 2019, and December 30,
      2019, the administrative judge concluded that the none of the requests were
      forwarded to the RAC as required under the reasonable accommodation policy .
¶17        On review, the agency argues that it engaged in the interactive process in
      good faith. It points to the fact that the appellant was provided with an enclosed
      office and an air purifier in October 2017, and cites an October 18, 2019 email
      from the appellant’s first-line supervisor, asking the appellant whether her current
      accommodations were adequate and requesting that she provide approp riate
      medical documentation to support her absences. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-15; see
      IAF, Tab 23 at 43-44. The agency notes that the appellant failed to provide the
      requested medical documentation when asked and otherwise failed to provide
      evidence demonstrating that her prior accommodation of an enclosed office with
      an air purifier was not an effective accommodation. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15 -17.
      The agency also argues that the administrative judge incorrectly stated that the
      appellant’s first-line supervisor proposed her removal 1 week after he received
      her accommodation request, noting that the email cited by the administrative
      judge had not been addressed to the supervisor. Id. at 16; see ID at 11-12.
¶18        As an initial matter, there is no merit to the agency’s claim that the
      administrative judge failed to address that the appellant had been provided an
      accommodation for her respiratory condition that was “deemed to be effective by
      FOH and the [a]ppellant’s treating physicians,” or alternatively, that there was no
      medical evidence demonstrating that the existing accommodation was ineffective .
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 14, 16-17. The administrative judge specifically addressed
      these claims below, concluding that the identified accommodation, the in-office
      air purifier, was “clearly ineffective” based on the “overwhelming evidence” the
                                                                                     13

      appellant provided demonstrating that she was unable to work in her office, even
      with the offered accommodation. ID at 17. The administrative judge made this
      determination based on his review of the evidence as a whole and his observation
      of the demeanor of the witnesses testifying at the hearing, and we decline to
      disturb those findings on review. See ID at 16-17, n.1 (citing Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R.
      at 458); Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301.
¶19        Additionally, although the document the agency cites from the FOH
      physician noted that the in-office purifier “would be a medically reasonable way”
      of accommodating the appellant, he also observed that the appellant needed to be
      in an “extremely clean office environment” to work effectively and that telework
      as an accommodation “would likely be effective as well.” IAF, Tab 22 at 17. In
      a later correspondence to the agency RAC regarding the continuing severity and
      pervasiveness of the appellant’s condition, the FOH physician noted that the
      appellant’s condition was “quite severe” and that if she continued to comp lain of
      symptoms even when working in a private office with an air purifier, “she should
      be allowed to continue to telework.”     Id. at 65.   The appellant also provided
      additional medical documentation to agency officials dated August 2018 through
      January 2020, clearly indicating that her existing accommodations were not
      working and that she should not return to the office. IAF, Tab 7 at 50-56; HCD 3
      at 36-38 (testimony of the appellant).
¶20        We also find no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the
      agency failed to properly engage in the interactive process.    ID at 9-13. The
      administrative judge based his determination on the RAC’s failure to process any
      of the appellant’s requests between September 24, 2019, and January 30, 2020, as
      requests for reasonable accommodation, as well as the first-line supervisor
      proposing the appellant’s removal without giving the agency’s telework
                                                                                         14

      coordinator adequate time to review the telework request denial. 4         ID at 12.
      Similarly, we are not persuaded by the agency’s argument that the appellant’s
      first-line supervisor’s request for medical documentation and the appellant’s
      failure to provide the requested information constituted clear examples of the
      agency’s good faith effort to engage in the interactive process and appellant’s
      failure to engage in the interactive process in good faith.        PFR File, Tab 1
      at 14-15.   As the agency RAC testified, after the interactive process was
      triggered, it was the RAC’s responsibility to coordinate with the appellant
      regarding the request, including requesting any necessary supporting medical
      documentation, so the appellant’s failure to provide medical documentation to her
      supervisor does not undermine the administrative judge’s finding that the agency
      failed to properly engage in the interactive process. 5 PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-16; ID
      at 12; HT 2 at 88-89 (testimony of agency RAC).
¶21        Finally, the agency disputes the administrative judge’s finding that the
      appellant’s supervisor issued the removal proposal “one week after he received
      the [a]ppellant’s [December 30, 2019] request for accommodation.” We agree
      with the agency that there is no evidence in the record indicating that the
      appellant’s first-line supervisor ever received the December 30, 2019 email, as
      the email was not addressed to the supervisor and there is no testimony in the

      4
        As noted supra footnote 2, the CBA includes a provision governing requests for
      “full-time telework” that appears to be applicable to the appellant’s requests to work
      from home. IAF, Tab 24 at 42-43 (Article 7.10). Under Article 7.3.5 of the CBA, if an
      employee requests a telework arrangement in order to enable her to perform the full
      range of her official duties, such a request is a request for reasonable accommodation
      that must be submitted to the agency RAC. IAF, Tab 24 at 38. Here, management
      officials did not follow this provision, and this failure appears to have caused the
      RAC’s failure to engage in the interactive process.
      5
         Although not addressed in the initial decision, the agency’s reasonable
      accommodation procedures specify that the agency must provide an interim
      accommodation to allow the employee to perform some or all of the essential fu nctions
      of her position while the accommodation request is under consideration, which the
      agency also failed to do. IAF, Tab 24 at 145.
                                                                                       15

      record concerning him having received it. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16; HT 1 at 163-64
      (testimony of appellant’s first-line supervisor). Nevertheless, there is no dispute
      that the supervisor became aware of the appellant’s request approximately
      2 weeks later, and that the supervisor still failed to provide the information
      necessary for the telework coordinator to act on the appellant’s reconsideration
      request prior to the removal decision. ID at 11-12; IAF, Tab 25 at 36-44; HT 1
      at 163-65. Further, the agency has not disputed the administrative judge’s finding
      that agency officials, including the appellant’s first-line supervisor, failed to
      properly act on the appellant’s other requests for accommodation during the
      period from September 24, 2019, through January 30, 2020. ID at 10-12.
¶22        Accordingly, we find no error in the administrative judge’s determination
      that the agency failed to adequately engage in the interactive process by failing to
      process any of the appellant’s repeated requests for telework as requests for
      reasonable accommodation, and that this failure resulted in the failure to provide
      the appellant with reasonable accommodation.          ID at 9-13; see Clemens,
      120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 17.

            The administrative judge did not err by concluding that
            accommodating the appellant would not cause the agency undue
            hardship.
¶23        The agency also argues that the administrative judge erred by concluding
      that accommodating the appellant would not cause the agency undue hardship.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 30-31; see ID at 17-19. Specifically, the agency argues that,
      because the appellant failed to engage in the interactive process, the agency was
      unable to complete an individualized assessment of appellant’s needs and
      restrictions that would serve as the basis for determining an appropriate
      accommodation. PFR File, Tab 1 at 30-31.
¶24        As the administrative judge noted, after the appellant requested and was
      denied permanent telework through the agency’s ordinary telework policy, the
      appellant requested reconsideration of that decision through the telework
                                                                                       16

      coordinator on December 30, 2019, noting that her disability prevented her from
      working in the office and that her pulmonologist recommended that she telework
      indefinitely. IAF, Tab 25 at 29; see ID at 10-11. As a part of the reconsideration
      process, the telework coordinator sent a set of questions to both the appellant and
      her first-line supervisor concerning the nature of the appellant’s job duties. IAF,
      Tab 25 at 33-43; HCD 2 at 154-55 (testimony of agency telework coordinator).
      After reviewing the first set of responses from each party, the telework
      coordinator sent a follow-up set of questions to the appellant’s supervisor. IAF,
      Tab 25 at 40; HCD 2 at 156-59 (testimony of agency telework coordinator). The
      appellant’s supervisor did not respond to the follow-up set of questions before the
      appellant’s removal was effectuated on February 21, 2020, and so the telework
      coordinator was unable to act on the appellant’s reconsideration request prior to
      her removal. IAF, Tab 25 at 44-45, 55; HT 2 at 157-58, 177-78 (testimony of
      agency telework coordinator).
¶25        In those follow-up questions, the telework coordinator sought clarification
      about factors that would have aided the agency in determining whether the
      appellant’s requested accommodation would cause the agency an undue hardship,
      including the frequency with which the appellant completed the job duties her
      supervisor     determined   were   not   portable,   and    potential    alternative
      accommodations.     IAF, Tab 25 at 40; HT 2 at 168-75, 177-79 (testimony of
      agency telework coordinator) (noting that questions sent to the appellant’s
      supervisor were intended to assist the agency in determining whether and to what
      extent the appellant’s full-time telework request would cause an undue burden on
      the agency, and to what extent the appellant’s non -portable duties could be
      redistributed within the branch without causing disruption to the agency’s
      operations).
¶26        The agency bears the burden of production to show that a reasonable
      accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the agency.               Henry v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 100 M.S.P.R. 124, ¶ 15 (2005).          Because the
                                                                                      17

      appellant’s supervisor never provided responses to these follow -up questions and
      failed to properly process the appellant’s other requests for reasonable
      accommodation, to whatever extent the agency was hindered in its ability to
      assess the potential hardship that accommodating the appellant would have had on
      the agency’s operations, it was a problem of the agency’s own creation.
      Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the ag ency
      failed to show that accommodating the appellant’s disability would impose an
      undue hardship on the agency’s operations.        Smith v. U.S. Postal Service,
      113 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 8 (2009) (concluding that the agency failed to meet its burden
      of proving that accommodating the appellant would impose an undue hardship) ;
      29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a); see ID at 13, 17-19.

      The appellant established that the agency’s action was based on the agency’s
      failure to accommodate her disability.
¶27        The agency asserts that the administrative judge treated the appellant’s
      disability discrimination claim as the central question in the case, rather than as
      an affirmative defense, and “unless the agency’s actions regarding her
      accommodation were the cause of her misconduct ,” the agency’s actions should
      not excuse it. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12. The agency posits that the appellant was
      absent from duty on the days at issue in the AWOL charge, she ignored inquiries
      to request leave or otherwise communicate with management, and t he initial
      decision failed to address how the agency’s purported failure to provide the
      appellant telework as an accommodation excuses her misconduct. Id. at 13.
¶28        An appellant alleging disability discrimination based on a failure to
      accommodate must show that the action appealed was “based on” her disability.
      Kirkland v. Department of Homeland Security, 119 M.S.P.R. 74, ¶ 18 (2013). As
      noted above, the AWOL charge upon which the agency based its removal action
      was supported by 33 specifications covering the period from November 12, 2019,
      through January 2, 2020, and the appellant has submitted evidence showing that
      existing accommodations had been ineffective and she was unable to physically
                                                                                         18

      work in the office during that period due to her disability. Further, the appellant
      requested full-time telework on several occasions in 2019, including on
      September 24, 2019, October 8, 2019, November 6, 2019, and December 30,
      2019, and we have found that the agency failed to respond to these requests as
      required by the interactive process. Considering these findings, as well as the
      determination that the appellant was able to perform the essential functions of her
      position with the accommodation of telework, we find no merit in the agency’s
      argument that its failure to accommodate the appellant did not cause the charged
      misconduct. To the contrary, we find that the agency’s failure to provide the
      appellant with a reasonable accommodation did cause her absences during the
      period at issue, and we therefore conclude that the appellant has met her burden
      to show that the removal action was based on her disability.

      Conclusion
¶29         For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the administrative judge’s
      conclusion that the agency discriminated against the appellant based on its failure
      to accommodate her disability, and thus the removal decision cannot be sustained.

      We affirm the administrative judge’s findings regarding the appellant’s disparate
      treatment disability discrimination, race discrimination, and sex discrimination
      claims.
¶30         After the initial decision was issued, the Board issued an Opinion and Order
      clarifying   the   standard   and   methods   of   proof   for   disparate   treatment
      discrimination claims arising under both Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act.
      Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 19-25, 35, 40. Having reviewed the relevant portions
      of the initial decision, we find that the administrative judge’s analysis was
      consistent with Pridgen. ID at 19-21. Because the appellant does not contest the
      administrative judge’s findings on her disparate treatment claims, we affirm these
      findings on review.
                                                                                        19

      To the extent that the appellant previously raised affirmative defenses of reprisal
      for requesting reasonable accommodation and discrimination based on age, she
      effectively abandoned those claims.
¶31         In her response to the administrative judge’s affirmative defense order, the
      appellant identified her affirmative defenses as including, among other things, an
      allegation that she was “retaliated against as a result of her disability and request
      for accommodation.” IAF, Tab 17 at 8 (emphasis added). This could reasonably
      be interpreted as a claim of reprisal for requesting reasonable accommodation.
      Nevertheless, the administrative judge did not include this as an issue for
      adjudication in the prehearing conference summary nor did he render findings on
      this claim in the initial decision. IAF, Tab 31 at 2-3; ID at 3-23.
¶32         Aside from this single apparent reference to reprisal for requesting
      reasonable accommodation in her affirmative defense order response, the
      appellant, who was represented by an attorney, did not raise this claim in any of
      the other pleadings in the record below and did not object to the administrative
      judge’s failure to include this as an issue to be determined at hearing, nor does
      she identify it on review. PFR File, Tab 3. Applying the relevant factors, we
      find that to the extent the appellant previously attempted to raise this affirmative
      defense, she effectively abandoned it.      See Thurman v. U.S. Postal Service,
      2022 MSPB 21, ¶¶ 17-18 (identifying a nonexhaustive list of factors the Board
      should consider in assessing whether a previously-raised affirmative defense
      claim was abandoned or waived, including the following, among others: (1) the
      degree to which the appellant continued to pursue her affirmative defense in the
      proceedings below after initially raising it; (2) whether the appellant objected to a
      summary of the issues to be decided that failed to include the potential
      affirmative defense when she was specifically afforded an opportunity to object
      and the consequences of her failure were made clear; (3) whether the appellant
      raised her affirmative defense or the administrative judge ’s processing of the
                                                                                            20

      affirmative defense claim in her petition for review; and (4) whether the appellant
      was represented during the course of her appeal).
¶33         Finally, as previously noted, the appellant also identified discrimination
      based on age as one of her affirmative defenses in her initial appeal. IAF, Tab 1
      at 3. Although the administrative judge acknowledged that the appellant raised
      this claim in her initial appeal, he did not address it in the initial decision. See ID
      at 2. After identifying this claim on her initial appeal form, the appellant, who
      obtained legal representation soon after filing her appeal, see IAF, Tab 14 at 4,
      failed to identify the age discrimination claim in her response to the
      administrative judge’s affirmative defense order, see IAF, Tab 17. She also did
      not file an objection to the administrative judge’s order summarizing the issues to
      be decided in the appeal, to the exclusion of all others, which did not include this
      claim.   See IAF, Tab 31.       Nor did she identify it in any of her prehearing
      submissions, see IAF, Tabs 29, 33-38, or address it during the hearing, 6 see IAF,
      Tabs 50, 52; I-2 AF, Tab 3. Additionally, she did not raise the administrative
      judge’s failure to adjudicate this affirmative defense claim in her response to the
      agency’s petition for review. See PFR File, Tab 3. Accordingly, we conclude
      that to the extent the appellant attempted to raise an affirmative defense of
      discrimination based on age, she effectively abandoned that claim. See Thurman,
      2022 MSPB 21, ¶¶ 17-18. 7

      6
        During testimony from one of the appellant’s purported comparators, the agency
      objected to a question concerning the comparator employee’s date of birth and the
      administrative judge questioned the relevance of the testimony, asking “[t]his is not an
      age discrimination case, is it?”, in response to which the appellant’s attorney agreed to
      withdraw the question, supporting our conclusion that this claim was abandoned. See
      HT 2 at 182-83 (testimony of appellant’s comparator).
      7
        An appellant’s harmful procedural error claim is moot when, as here, she is already
      entitled to all of the relief she would obtain if she were to prevail on that claim.
      Desjardin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2023 MSPB 6, ¶ 34. Accordingly, we need not
      address the agency’s assertions in its petition for review that the administrative judge
      erred in finding that the agency committed harmful procedural errors.
                                                                                        21

                                            ORDER
¶34         We ORDER the agency to CANCEL the removal and to retroactively
      restore the appellant and to restore the appellant effective February 21, 2020. See
      Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The
      agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this
      decision.
¶35         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s
      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due,
      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶36         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶37         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶38         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
                                                                                22

necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
made within the 60-day period set forth above.

                NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                      YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                     ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
     You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at Title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                     NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT
                 REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                     COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your compensatory
damages, including pecuniary losses, future pecuniary losses, and nonpecuniary
losses, such as emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental ang uish, and loss
of enjoyment of life. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at
42 U.S.C. § 1981a.     The regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201,
1201.202, and 1201.204. If you believe you meet these requirements, you must
file a motion for compensatory damages WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF
THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You must file your motion with the office t hat
issued the initial decision on your appeal.
                                                                                     23

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.              5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       24

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim    of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
                                                                                25

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other secur ity.       See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial deliver y or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     26

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           27

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1.      Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
     describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2.      The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
        a.       Employee name and social security number.
        b.       Detailed explanation of request.
        c.       Valid agency accounting.
        d.       Authorized signature (Table 63).
        e.       If interest is to be included.
        f.       Check mailing address.
        g.       Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
        h.       Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
             collected (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1.       Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
     Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2.       Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3.       Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4.       If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address
     to return monies.
5.       Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6.       If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of
     the type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7.       If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual
     Leave to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and
required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum
Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
        a.      Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
        b.      Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
        c.      Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.