Court Opinion

ID: 9693849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:03:41.806094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:14.355101
License: Public Domain

CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.,
Dissent.
*623Dissenting Opinion by HARRELL, J., which CATHELL, J., Joins.
Although I agree with the Majority opinion’s analysis and conclusion regarding Gorge’s confession (Maj. op. at 621-22, 873 A.2d at 1183-84), I depart from its discussion and holding that his sentencing was flawed. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
Although it is tempting to make a stand, on this record, based on the undisputed timely actual notice given Gorge, I shall not. Nonetheless, if there is a better case illuminating the wisdom of why it is frequently said to be a bad idea to elevate form over substance, I have not seen it. There is no doubt that the pertinent statute requires the State to give written notice, at least 30 days prior to trial, of its intent to seek the penalty of life without the possibility of parole. Md.Code (2002), Crim. Law Art., § 2-203(a). There also is no doubt that the original or a copy of such qualifying written notice is absent from this record. On the other hand, there is equally no quibble that Gorge, through his trial counsel, conceded that he had actual notice of the State’s intent in this regard well in advance of 30 days before commencement of trial on 12 November 2002. Thus, the obvious underlying purposes for the statutory notice requirement, that is, to avoid surprise and permit the defendant to consider plea negotiations and/or prepare fully his defense, were vindicated fully here.
For example, the trial judge commented at Gorge’s sentencing on 3 March 2003, when Gorge’s attorney first posed a question regarding the State’s ability to demonstrate manifestly its literal compliance with § 2-203(a) 1:
*624My notes reflect when we first came in for a pretrial conference[2] the State disclosed to both the Defense and the Court that the State would not be seeking the death penalty because of the fact that the family of the victim did not want this, but the State would be seeking life without parole.
Indeed, Gorge’s trial counsel, in the course of the 3 March sentencing proceeding, conceded the accuracy of the trial judge’s recollection of what occurred at the pretrial conference, saying
Your Honor, I will be quite candid with the Court, ... [the prosecutors] ... had pretty much early on after I got the case[3] indicated they were going to be seeking a sentence of life without parole.
On other occasions over the course of that proceeding, defense counsel repeated her acknowledgment of receipt of actual notice:
Your Honor, the Defense had been put on notice some time ago prior to the trial that the State was going to be seeking this sentence at the conclusion of the trial.
*625[T]he Defense certainly had oral notice thirty days prior to even the June trial date[4] that we originally had that the State was going to seek the sentence that it was seeking. Again, Your Honor, we will submit that we had oral notice.
Of greater significance to me in reviewing the trial judge’s resolution of whether the State complied literally with § 2-203(a), however, is the circumstantial indicia in the record that a timely written notice5 was in fact given. Defense counsel ruminated at different times on the record:
Somewhere in the back of my mind I thought I remember reading this notice, but unfortunately — not unfortunately. Funny enough neither myself nor the State could find a copy.
From what I remember, I thought the State did hand up a paper or certainly made it clear on the record they were seeking this sentence.
As I said, the State has, again, filed notice in accordance with the statute. I will submit to the Court.... The State has filed written notice in written form today.[6] (Emphasis added).
In addition, although of possibly less weight, was the prosecutor’s representation that:
*626One of the reasons I know that we have previously filed a written notice, although I cannot put my hand on it, when I do a case like this, I make up separate manilla folders. I basically break down — I have a couple of copies. A discovery of the case file which would be what we would send to Ms. Robinson [Gorge’s trial counsel]. I have a copy that I keep just for my records. The third copy which is my working copy of the file. When I make up these manilla folders, I keep things piece by piece. I have a manilla folder in this case entitled “Life Without Parole Notice.” It was empty. I believe it was empty because we had sent a copy to Ms. Robinson. At the conclusion of the case I had provided a copy to the Court. It would have the original date on it that we sent it.[7]
My review of the trial judge’s oral ruling on the defense’s “question”8 was expansive enough to embrace an implicit finding that a timely written notice, despite its incorporeal status in this record, was given in fact. Although he alluded briefly to the existence of actual notice well in excess of 30 days before trial, he also relied on the circumstantial indicia of a timely written notice in declaring
I am going to proceed in the case on the basis that there was notice given to the Defense.
Specifically, he referred to the 16 October 2002 plea offer letter, which contained the following allusion: “At disposition, the State will argue for Life Without Parole, pursuant to the Notice that has been filed.” As mentioned supra, although not singled-out by the judge in his oral ruling, the record of *627the 3 March 2003 sentencing proceeding also reflected defense counsel’s recollections, in the context of a timely written notice, of “reading [a] notice.” Accordingly, from these circumstantial indicia that a timely written notice was given, the trial judge reasonably could infer, as he apparently did, that the State fulfilled its duty to Gorge under § 2-203(a).9 See State v. Suddith, 379 Md. 425, 430, 842 A.2d 716, 719 (2004) (finding that a fact-finder’s conclusion “based in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence is no different from [a conclusion] based on direct eyewitness accounts” (citations omitted)).
Judge CATHELL authorizes me to state that he joins this dissent.

. It is not entirely clear on this record what Gorge’s complaint below was. When broached at the 3 March sentencing, Gorge’s counsel stated:
There has been discussion [presumably with the prosecutors) as to whether or not the State had actually filed its notice to seek a life sentence without the possibility of parole.
*624As a plain reading of § 2-203(a) reveals, the State is not required necessarily to file with the circuit court such a notice, only that it give the defendant written notice. To be sure, one possible means that would contribute to proving that timely written notice was given might include "filing” a copy or the original of the written notice (see Maj. op. at 620-21, 873 A.2d at 1183-84); even then, however, proof of compliance with the statute conceivably also could be made in a number of other ways not involving filing a paper.

. The record does not reflect when this pretrial conference occurred, whether prior to the first scheduled trial date (8 July 2002) or thereafter prior to the actual commencement of trial on November 12.

. Gorge's trial counsel entered her appearance on 19 February 2002. The docket suggests that Gorge's counsel may have "gotten" the case earlier than that. An entry reflects that, on 13 February 2002, "information available to the court indicates that the Public Defender’s Office will enter appearance.”

. Actually, as noted supra, n. 2, an earlier trial date of 8 July 2002 had been postponed to 12 November 2002.

. The circumstantial evidence refers to a written notice earlier than the untimely one delivered to defense counsel on or about 16 October 2002 contained in a plea offer letter. This form of written notice was received by Gorge 28 calendar days prior to the commencement of trial on 12 November 2002.

. Although defense counsel was referring at the time to a confirmatory, formal written notice submitted contemporaneously by the State at the 3 March proceeding, her use of "again” permitted a reasonable inference to be drawn by the trial judge that counsel also was referring to an earlier, timely predecessor that, unfortunately, no one could produce the original or a copy of at that time.

. Although no1 representative of the gold standard (see the Majority opinion's suggestions at slip op. 18-19) for proof of literal compliance with § 2-203(a), the record in the present case is adequate to support the trial judge's apparent conclusion that timely written notice was given.

. Neither the Court, prosecutor, nor defense counsel offered an explanation for why no one could produce a file copy or the original of an earlier, timely written notice.

. I repeat, it is not crystal clear whether the defense was complaining merely that the court’s file, as well as her own and the State's personal files, lacked the original or a copy of a timely written notice, or that, in fact, the State failed to give Gorge timely written notice at all. The latter is somewhat problematical as a reasonable assumption to make in light of defense counsel’s recollection of an earlier writing in this context.