Court Opinion

ID: 9388521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 19:02:43.538056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:20.774138
License: Public Domain

Filed: 4/20/23 Harris v. Gilliam CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 LYDIA HARRIS,                                                         B320824

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. BC268857)
           v.

 KEVIN GILLIAM,

           Defendant;

 WASSERMAN, COMDEN &
 CASSELMAN,

           Third Party Claimant and
           Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David Sotello, Judge. Affirmed.
      Dermot Givens for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Law Offices of Peter Q. Ezzell and Nancy Lucas Ezzell for
Third Party Claimant and Respondent.
                          _______________________________
       Lydia Harris and her wholly owned record company, New
Image Media Corp., represented by the law firm then-named
Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Pearson, LLP (Wasserman
firm), obtained a default judgment for $107 million against
Marion “Suge” Knight and Death Row Records in March 2005
based on Harris’s allegation she had been the victim of a
conspiracy to deprive her of a 50 percent ownership interest in
Death Row Records. Seventeen years later, on March 14, 2022,
Harris, represented by Dermot Givens, Knight and Death Row
Records’ former counsel in the litigation, moved pursuant to Code
                                              1
of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), to set aside as
void the judgment entered in her favor. Harris contended the
superior court lacked jurisdiction over her 2002 lawsuit because
the claims asserted were an asset of her bankruptcy estate and
could only have been pursued by the bankruptcy trustee in
federal bankruptcy court—an argument previously rejected on
multiple occasions because the bankruptcy trustee had ratified
the 2005 judgment through settlements, approved by the
bankruptcy court, with Knight’s and Death Row Records’
bankruptcy estates. The court denied Harris’s motion, finding
nothing in Harris’s papers that indicated those prior rulings were
incorrect. We affirm.

1
      Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
stated.

                                2
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        1. Harris’s Bankruptcy Proceedings
        Death Row Records was founded in 1991 by, among others,
                                                     2
Knight and Harris’s former husband, Michael Harris. Harris on
May 17, 1996 filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy court
under chapter 7 of title 11 of the United States Code. She did not
list as an asset her claimed 50 percent ownership interest in
Death Row Records. Harris was denied a discharge on July 21,
1997, and the case was closed without administration of any
assets on December 15, 1999.
        2. The 2002 Death Row Litigation, Default Judgment,
           Secret Partial Settlement and the Attorney Lien
           Litigation
       Harris and the Wasserman firm entered into a contingency
fee retainer agreement in January 2002 providing the law firm
would receive 40 percent of any recovery from Harris’s lawsuit
asserting her ownership interest in Death Row Records. The
lawsuit was filed in February 2002 against Knight, Death Row
Records and others (Death Row litigation). After striking the
answer of Knight and Death Row Records for a series of discovery
violations, the trial court entered their default and on March 9,
2005, following a prove-up hearing, a judgment in favor of Harris
and New Image Media and against Knight and Death Row
Records for $107 million ($45 million for economic damages,

2
        Lydia and Michael Harris’s marriage was dissolved in
2005.

                                 3
$2 million for noneconomic damages and $60 million for punitive
         3
damages). No appeal was taken from the judgment.
       Harris discharged the Wasserman firm on May 19, 2005,
indicating on her substitution of counsel form that she would be
representing herself in the Death Row litigation. The
Wasserman firm filed a notice of attorney fee lien the same day.
       The following week Knight, acting through attorney
Givens, paid Harris $1 million ($10,000 on May 20 and $990,000
on May 27, 2005) in (partial) satisfaction of the $107 million
judgment in the Death Row litigation. The Wasserman firm
contended in a lawsuit filed against Harris, Givens and others
(Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Pearson, LLP v. Harris
(Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2005, No. BC340196) (attorney lien
litigation)) that it was unaware of the payment to Harris when
made and that, in providing the payment, Givens had ignored the
Wasserman firm’s attorney fee lien and interfered with its right
to collect fees pursuant to its retainer agreement with Harris.
       Following a bench trial in July 2007 in the attorney lien
         4
litigation, the court found the Wasserman firm’s lien was valid
and the firm was entitled to its lien on any recovery in the Death
Row litigation. The court further found that Givens, aware of the

3
      Prior to the default and default judgment, the court had
entered judgment in favor of Interscope Records and two of its
executives, named as defendants by Harris, after granting their
motion for summary judgment. We affirmed that judgment on
appeal. (Harris v. Interscope Records (June 9, 2004, B166253)
[nonpub. opn.].)
4
      Prior to the bench trial the Wasserman firm settled its
claims with Harris. Its claims against defendants other than
Givens were severed due to pending bankruptcy proceedings.

                                4
lien, “intentionally and with malicious intent to deprive [the
Wasserman firm] of [its] earned attorney fees, unethically
ignored the fee lien while lying to Ms. Harris that [the
Wasserman firm] was not entitled to [its] lien and saying
‘obviously we won’t be paying them any money.’” After denying
Givens’s motion for a new trial, which argued the judgment in
the Death Row litigation and the Wasserman firm’s retainer
agreement were invalid because the bankruptcy court had
exclusive jurisdiction over Harris’s claim to an ownership interest
in Death Row Records, the trial court on April 30, 2008 entered
judgment awarding the Wasserman firm $805,752 in
compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages
against Givens. Givens did not appeal the judgment.
       Beginning in November 2007, following the bench trial in
the attorney lien case, and continuing through mid-2008, Givens
filed a series of motions to intervene and to set aside the
judgment in the Death Row litigation on which the Wasserman
firm’s tort claims against him were based. Givens argued the
Harris bankruptcy proceeding created a “judicial estoppel” that
precluded the superior court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
               5
Harris’s claims.
      On June 25, 2008 the Harris bankruptcy trustee, who had
been reappointed after learning of the 2005 judgment in the
Death Row litigation, filed an opposition to the last of Givens’s
successive motions to intervene. In addition to arguing that
Givens, as a third party stranger to the litigation, had no

5
       As a condition to entering settlement discussions in 2005,
Givens’s clients, Knight and Death Row Records, waived their
right to attack the judgment.

                                 5
standing to attack the judgment, the trustee explained that
approximately $50 million of the $107 million judgment resulted
from post-petition claims as to which Harris was the sole real
party in interest: “Had [Harris] listed the pre-petition claim as
an asset, this action would still have proceeded. It would likely
have been prosecuted jointly by [Harris] (as owner of the post-
petition claims) and the Trustee (as owner of the pre-petition
claims) as co-plaintiffs[,] and there is no reason to believe the
result would have been any different.” The trustee noted that a
tentative agreement had been reached between Harris and the
trustee as to their respective interests in the judgment.
       The Wasserman firm, as lien claimant, also filed an
opposition to Givens’s motions. Givens’s serial motions to
intervene were all denied.
      3. Additional Bankruptcy Court Proceedings
      In April 2006 Knight and Death Row Records each filed
voluntary petitions for relief in bankruptcy court under
chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code. Harris filed
proofs of claim in both bankruptcy proceedings based on the $107
million judgment in the Death Row litigation.
      Harris’s earlier bankruptcy case was reopened on
August 21, 2007; and, as discussed, the former trustee was
reappointed after learning of Harris’s $107 million judgment,
which the trustee believed may have involved rights existing
when Harris filed her bankruptcy petition in 1996.
      Adversary proceedings were initiated by Knight as debtor-
in-possession and Death Row Records as debtor-in-possession in
the Knight bankruptcy case against Harris seeking to declare the
judgment in the Death Row litigation satisfied or to disallow the
judgment under various theories and by Harris seeking to declare

                                6
the judgment a nondischargeable debt. Following mediation the
parties settled the dispute, effective February 6, 2008. Under the
terms of the settlement among Harris, her former husband and
the trustees of the Harris, Knight and Death Row Records
bankruptcy estates, a portion of Harris’s proof of claim in the
Knight and Death Row Records bankruptcy proceeds was
allowed, in part as an unsecured claim and in part as a
subordinated claim. In addition, in consideration of, and subject
to, the terms of their agreement, the trustee of Harris’s chapter 7
bankruptcy estate fully released the Death Row Records trustee,
the Death Row Records estate, the Knight trustee and the Knight
estate from all claims, causes of action, obligations and liabilities.
Harris personally agreed to a general release of all claims she
might have relating to the matters addressed in the settlement
agreement. The settlement was approved by the bankruptcy
court on June 9, 2008.
       In November 2014 the bankruptcy court approved a
settlement among Harris, the Wasserman firm, the trustee of the
Harris estate and others that resolved the Wasserman firm’s fee
claim. The reopened bankruptcy proceeding for Harris’s estate
was closed on December 17, 2015.
      4. Givens’s Efforts To Assert Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction
         over the Wasserman Firm’s Claims
      In September 2007 and early 2008 Givens attempted to
remove the attorney lien litigation to the bankruptcy court. The
case was remanded on both occasions.
      In November 2008 Givens filed a lawsuit against the
Wasserman firm for intentional and negligent misrepresentation,
asserting the firm had misrepresented its authority to enter into
the retainer agreement with Harris and to pursue the Death Row

                                  7
litigation on her behalf because Harris’s claim to an ownership
interest in the record label belonged to her bankruptcy estate.
Givens dismissed the action in response to the Wasserman firm’s
special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16.
       In February 2015 Givens moved to set aside the judgment
in the attorney lien litigation as void pursuant to section 473,
subdivision (d), arguing the retainer agreement and subsequent
attorney fee lien were invalid because Harris’s claim to an
ownership interest in Death Row Records was a prepetition claim
and only the Harris bankruptcy trustee was authorized to pursue
it. The court denied the motion in May 2015, and in September
2015 it denied Givens’s motion for reconsideration. Our
colleagues in Division Four of this court affirmed the order
denying the motion to set aside, holding, even if the contract
between Harris and the Wasserman firm was void or voidable,
that would not constitute a jurisdictional defect in the
Wasserman firm’s action against Givens. (Wasserman, Comden,
Casselman & Pearson, LLP v. Givens (Mar. 29, 2017, B268664)
               6
[nonpub. opn.].)
      Givens filed another lawsuit in November 2017, this time
in federal court, seeking a declaration that the Wasserman firm

6
      Givens also contended the automatic stay in the reopened
Harris bankruptcy case deprived the superior court of jurisdiction
over the attorney lien litigation. The court of appeal in affirming
the order denying Givens’s motion explained that the existence of
an automatic stay that may have protected Harris had no bearing
on the superior court’s jurisdiction over the Wasserman firm’s
claims against Givens. (Wasserman, Comden, Casselman &
Pearson, LLP v. Givens, supra, B268664.)

                                 8
did not have standing to pursue its claim or collect its judgment
in the attorney lien case, again based on the superior court’s
purported lack of jurisdiction due to Harris’s bankruptcy. The
lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice with the court
characterizing it as “meritless and frivolous.”
       In July 2021 Givens made one more attempt to void the
judgment in the attorney lien litigation, moving to vacate the
judgment on the ground the bankruptcy court, not the superior
court, had jurisdiction over the Wasserman firm’s claims that he
interfered with the firm’s contractual rights arising from the
Death Row litigation. The court denied the motion on
November 1, 2021, stating it “lack[ed] merit procedurally and
substantively,” and awarded sanctions to the Wasserman firm,
ruling the procedural history in the Death Row litigation and the
attorney lien litigation “clearly shows the jurisdictional claims
pursued by Defendant Givens are not warranted by existing law
or its modification.”
       Givens then attempted to have the Harris bankruptcy case
reopened so California state courts would recognize the
jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy court. In the court’s
December 1, 2021 ruling and memorandum of opinion denying
the request to reopen, United States Bankruptcy Judge
Geraldine Mund found that Givens had no standing because the
attorney lien case in which he was a defendant never involved
the bankruptcy estate. In addition, Judge Mund wrote,
“Whatever rights the estate had were settled by the Trustee and
none exist at this time. The litigation in the Harris v. Knight
case has been concluded in the state court. There is no relief to
be granted in the bankruptcy court . . . . [¶] This issue has been

                                9
decided several times by other courts and I find no grounds to
reopen when no relief can possibly be given.”
       5. Givens’s Attempts on Behalf of Harris To Set Aside the
          2005 Default Judgment
       On June 14, 2019 Givens, who, as discussed, had previously
represented Knight and Death Row Records in the Death Row
litigation and then sought to intervene and set aside the
judgment on his own behalf, moved as Harris’s counsel to set
aside the 2005 default judgment. The trial court initially granted
the motion on September 20, 2019, accepting the argument the
judgment was void because Harris’s claims should have been part
                         7
of her bankruptcy estate. On October 1, 2019 the Wasserman
firm, asserting standing because of its lien on Harris’s judgment
and explaining it had not received notice of the motion to set
aside, asked the court to reconsider its September 20, 2019
ruling. The court granted the motion for reconsideration on
December 12, 2019 and vacated its earlier ruling setting aside
the judgment, explaining the Wasserman firm had provided
information not disclosed by Harris or Givens, including that the
trustee of Harris’s bankruptcy estate was aware of the judgment
and had ratified it after the fact through settlements in the
bankruptcy cases involving the various parties, including Harris
and Knight.
      In March 2020 the court denied Harris’s motion for
reconsideration of the December 12, 2019 order vacating its
September 20, 2019 ruling. It denied a second motion to set aside

7
     The superior court judge who entered the 2005 default
judgment and denied Givens’s efforts to set aside the judgment in
2007 and 2008 retired in 2014.

                                10
Knight’s and Death Row Records’ defaults in September 2020 and
in October 2020 granted the Wasserman firm’s motion for
sanctions.
      One day after the court awarded the Wasserman firm
sanctions, Givens on behalf of Harris filed a new motion to set
aside the default. The court again denied the motion, explaining,
with a citation to its December 12, 2019 minute order, “Counsel
Givens is well aware that the Court previously found that the
bankruptcy trustee was aware of Harris’ pre-bankruptcy petition
                                                        8
interest in the Judgment and ratified it after the fact.”
       Finally, on March 14, 2022 Givens, on behalf of Harris,
filed the motion to set aside a void order pursuant to section 473,
subdivision (d), which is the subject of this appeal. Harris did not
                                            9
include her motion in the record on appeal, but, as described by
the court in its order denying the motion, Harris again contended
the superior court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Death Row

8
      Harris’s appeal of the trial court’s September 9, 2020 order
denying her motion to set aside default was dismissed for failure
to pay the required filing fee. (Harris v. Wasserman, Comden &
Casselman, LLP, B308872.)
9
       Using the optional Judicial Council form for designating
the record on appeal in limited civil cases, Givens requested that
the record include an exhibit attached to Harris’s motion (the
transcript of the bankruptcy hearing before Judge Mund) but not
the motion itself, the Wasserman firm’s opposition memorandum
or Harris’s reply to the opposition memorandum. The
Wasserman firm then designated additional documents to be part
of the clerk’s transcript, including its opposition to Harris’s
motion but, like Givens, omitted the motion itself and Harris’s
reply papers.

                                11
litigation because the subject matter of the action—damages
arising from Harris’s alleged ownership interest in Death Row
Records—was property that belonged to her bankruptcy estate
and the claims could only be asserted by the bankruptcy trustee.
As reflected in the court’s ruling, Harris’s motion—her “new
evidence”—was based on statements made by Judge Mund in
connection with her December 1, 2021 ruling denying Givens’s
motion to reopen the Harris bankruptcy case that Harris’s claims
to an ownership interest in Death Row Records were not
“automatically abandoned” because not listed in the bankruptcy
schedules in 1996.
                                                           10
       The court denied Harris’s motion on April 25, 2022. In its
ruling the court explained Judge Mund’s statements were not in
conflict with the reasoning of its own prior order rejecting
Harris’s jurisdiction claim. Whether or not the claim to an
interest in Death Row Records had been automatically
abandoned, Judge Mund stated “abandonment is not the issue”
and found the trustee “certainly knew about it.” Indeed, the
superior court reiterated, as the bankruptcy court ruled, Harris
and the bankruptcy trustee entered into a settlement with
respect to the 2005 default judgment, fully resolving any possible

10
       At the outset of its ruling the court observed, “This is the
latest groundless attempt by Plaintiff Lydia Harris and her
current attorney Dermot Givens, who represented Defendant
Gilliam in [the] case, to essentially void this action ab initio for
lack of jurisdiction over alleged bankruptcy assets beyond this
court’s authority, which, if granted could collaterally affect LASC
Action No. BC340196 [the attorney lien litigation]—in which a
Los Angeles Superior Court rendered a judgment of over
$1 million against Dermot Givens . . . .”

                                 12
jurisdiction issue: “Plaintiff settled her claims with the
bankruptcy estate . . . . The U.S. Bankruptcy Court concluded
that the bankruptcy estate has settled its affairs and refused to
reopen the bankruptcy case.”
      Harris (still represented by Givens) filed a timely notice of
appeal.
                           DISCUSSION
      1. Standard of Review
      Section 473, subdivision (d), provides a trial court “may, on
motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside
any void judgment or order.” “[I]nclusion of the word ‘may’ in the
language of section 473, subdivision (d) makes it clear that a trial
court retains discretion to grant or deny a motion to set aside a
void judgment.” (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007)
146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495; accord, Pittman v. Beck Park
                                                     11
Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020.)        The

11
       Harris relies on extrinsic evidence—her 1996 bankruptcy
filing and statements from subsequent bankruptcy proceedings—
to argue the 2005 default judgment is void. Appellate decisions
distinguish for purposes of section 473, subdivision (d), between
judgments void on the face of the record and those shown to be
invalid through extrinsic evidence. (See, e.g., Pittman v. Beck
Park Apartments Ltd., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021.) These
decisions hold a motion to set aside a judgment void on its face
may be made at any time in the underlying action but must be
challenged within the six-month time limit prescribed by
section 473, subdivision (b), or by an independent action in equity
if the invalidity can be shown only through consideration of
extrinsic evidence. (Ibid.; see OC Interior Services, LLC v.
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1328;
Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
1434, 1440.) Whether that distinction is correct is now before the

                                 13
reviewing court “generally faces two separate determinations
when considering an appeal based on section 473, subdivision (d):
whether the order or judgment is void and, if so, whether the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in setting it aside.” (Nixon
Peabody LLP v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 818, 822.)
The trial court’s determination whether an order is void is
reviewed de novo; its decision whether to set aside a void order is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.; see Airs Aromatics,
LLC v. CBL Data Recovery Technologies, Inc. (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1018; Cruz, at p. 496.)
      2. Harris Failed To Demonstrate the 2005 Default
         Judgment Is Void
      In her appellate briefs Harris argues, as she and Givens
have repeatedly done in other fora, that her claim to an
ownership interest in Death Row Records was an asset of her
bankruptcy estate omitted from the schedules she filed in 1996;
that the federal bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over
the claim; and that, as a consequence, the trial court in 2022
should have set aside the 2005 default judgment in the Death
Row litigation. In support Harris asserts the December 1, 2021
opinion of the bankruptcy court agreed her claims to an
ownership interest remained an asset of the bankruptcy estate.
Therefore, Harris argues, her claims were subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and nothing in the record
supports a finding the bankruptcy trustee (with the approval of
the bankruptcy court) can ratify the superior court’s exercise of

Supreme Court in California Capital Insurance Co. v. Hoehn,
review granted January 25, 2023, S277510. Because we find no
merit to Harris’s arguments on appeal, we need not address the
timeliness of her renewed motion to vacate the judgment.

                                14
jurisdiction under the circumstances present here (as actually
phrased by Harris, “can unilaterally cede the jurisdiction of a
federal bankruptcy court to the Superior Court”).
       Contrary to Harris’s recitation, however, the bankruptcy
court did not find Harris’s claims were currently an asset of a
bankruptcy estate. What the court actually said was that
Harris’s claims of ownership were not automatically abandoned
when the bankruptcy case was closed in 1999. Crucially, the
court added that the trustee was aware of the claims and
“abandonment is not the issue.” In other words, as the court
emphasized, even if some pre-petition ownership rights had at
some point been an asset of the bankruptcy estate, the trustee
had fully settled the rights of the bankruptcy estate with respect
to the claims, the state court case had been concluded, and
neither the estate nor Harris had any further interest in the
matter—all points ignored (repeatedly) by Harris.
       That was also the analysis of the superior court on
December 12, 2019 when it vacated the order it had “mistakenly
entered” because Harris failed to disclose pertinent information—
that is, that the trustee of Harris’s bankruptcy estate was aware
of the 2005 default judgment and ratified it through settlement
agreements with Harris personally and with the trustees of the
bankruptcy estates of Knight and Death Row Records, which
were approved by the bankruptcy court. And the court in
denying Harris’s March 14, 2022 motion accurately stated that
nothing in the December 1, 2021 bankruptcy ruling was
inconsistent with its prior analysis. In addition, the trustee’s
2008 filing in opposition to Givens’s attempt to set aside the
judgment on his own behalf explained that Harris’s post-petition
claims (that is, claims relating to her ownership interest in Death

                                15
Row Records that arose after May 17, 1996, worth approximately
$50 million) were not part of the bankruptcy estate and were
properly determined in the superior court action.
       Moreover, Harris’s argument inverts the parties’ burdens
on appeal. Because there is a presumption in favor of the validity
of the judgment (see, e.g., Kinney v. Superior Court (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 168, 177 [“‘“[a] judgment or order of a lower court
is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and
presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness”’”]), it was
Harris’s obligation as appellant to demonstrate reversible error.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609; accord, Farnum
v. Iris Biotechnologies Inc. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 602, 608;
Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 766.) “To
demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal
analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts
in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a
point is asserted without argument and authority for the
proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without foundation and requires
no discussion by the reviewing court.’ [Citations.] Hence,
conclusory claims of error will fail.” (In re S.C. (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
       Harris has presented nothing but a conclusory claim of
error, citing no legal authority for the proposition that
subsequent actions by a bankruptcy trustee, particularly when
expressly approved by the bankruptcy court (here, settling all
claims relating to Harris’s claimed ownership interest in Death
Row Records with Harris, Knight and Death Row and the
trustees of their bankruptcy estates), cannot effectively preclude
a subsequent challenge to a superior court judgment, even if the

                                16
underlying claims (or some of them) should have been pursued in
federal bankruptcy court.
      Harris’s additional contention the 2005 default judgment
and the April 25, 2022 postjudgment order now on appeal were
improperly entered while an automatic stay imposed by federal
                                                  12
bankruptcy law was in effect is utterly frivolous. Harris’s 1996
bankruptcy case was closed without administration of any assets
in December 1999, three years before Harris’s initial lawsuit. It
was not reopened by motion of the trustee until August 2007—
more than two years after Harris obtained the $107 million
judgment against Givens’s clients. And the reopened bankruptcy
proceeding was again closed in December 2015, well before the
superior court’s repeated rejections of Harris’s efforts to set aside
the judgment. Not only was there no bankruptcy stay in effect at
any material time, but also the automatic stay is not applicable to
actions initiated by the debtor. (See Shah v. Glendale Federal
Bank (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1375; cf. Danko v. O’Reilly
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 732, 748 [“‘[T]he automatic stay operates
for the benefit of the debtor and trustee only, and gives other

12
       “Upon the filing of a bankruptcy proceeding, federal
bankruptcy law imposes an automatic stay on all state and
federal proceedings outside the bankruptcy court against the
debtor and the debtor’s property. (11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) & (2);
[citation omitted].) . . . ‘The automatic stay is self-executing and
is effective upon filing the bankruptcy petition. (See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a).)’ [Citation.] Section 362(a)(3) of title 11 of the United
States Code provides for an automatic stay of ‘any act to obtain
possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate
or to exercise control over property of the estate.’” (Shaoxing
County Huayue Import & Export v. Bhaumik (2011)
191 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1196.)

                                 17
parties interested in property affected by the automatic stay no
substantive or procedural rights. [Citations.] If the debtor or
trustee chooses not to invoke the protections of the automatic stay,
no other party may attack any act in violation of the automatic
stay’”].) Accordingly, Harris’s position is entirely without merit.
       3. Harris Forfeited Her Additional Claims Challenging the
          Trial Court’s Postjudgment Order
       As further grounds for reversing the order denying her
motion to set aside the 2005 default judgment, Harris contends
the trial court erred in permitting the Wasserman firm to
intervene in the Death Row litigation without adhering to the
                                             13
requirements of section 387, subdivision (c), and the court’s
order was the product of racial bias. Both arguments have been
forfeited.
       As discussed, the Wasserman firm on October 1, 2019
moved for reconsideration of the September 20, 2019 order
setting aside the 2005 default judgment, asserting it had the
right to seek relief because of its lien on the judgment—an
entirely appropriate basis for intervention. (See § 387,
subd. (d)(1)(B) [court may permit a nonparty to intervene if “[t]he
person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that
person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair
or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest”].) The
court granted the Wasserman firm’s motion and vacated its
September 20, 2019 order.

13
      Section 387, subdivision (c), provides in part, “A nonparty
shall petition the court for leave to intervene by noticed motion or
ex parte application.”

                                 18
       Although it is difficult to fathom how any technical
irregularity in permitting the Wasserman firm to intervene in
the Death Row litigation in light of its attorney lien could be
prejudicial—a point Harris does not address—if Harris wanted to
object to the intervention, she should have done so in connection
with the October 1, 2019 motion and the trial court’s
December 12, 2019 order granting reconsideration of its
September 20, 2019 order. The time for that objection has long
since passed. In addition, even if such a procedural challenge
were timely, because Harris failed to include a copy of her
March 14, 2022 moving papers in the record on appeal, we cannot
determine if the issue was properly presented to the trial court
and thus preserved for appeal. (See Cabatit v. Sunnova Energy
Corp. (2020) 60 Cal.App.5th 317, 322 [“[i]f a party fails to raise an
issue or theory in the trial court, we may deem consideration of
that issue or theory forfeited on appeal”]; Rancho Mirage Country
Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252,
264 [“[a]s a general rule, issues not raised in the trial court
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal” (internal quotation
marks omitted)]; accord, People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th
838, 894.)
       As for the charge of racial bias, Harris contends she and
Givens are a Black woman and man, the lawyers from the
Wasserman firm and its counsel are White, and the court’s
comments during the hearing on her motion and “nonsensical
reasoning” demonstrated its bias. Because Harris did not provide
a reporter’s transcript or settled statement, we are unable to
evaluate any claim based on what occurred during the
proceedings in court. (See Randall v. Mousseau (2016)
2 Cal.App.5th 929, 935 [“Failure to provide an adequate record on

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an issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant.
[Citation.] Without a record, either by transcript or settled
statement, a reviewing court must make all presumptions in
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favor of the validity of the judgment”].) And, as discussed, far
from being irrational (or nonsensical), the court’s reasoning and
resulting ruling denying Harris’s motion to set aside were
entirely proper.
                         DISPOSITION
     The April 25, 2022 postjudgment order is affirmed. The
Wasserman firm is to recover its costs on appeal.

                                     PERLUSS, P. J.
      We concur:

            SEGAL, J.

            FEUER, J.

14
      Harris, through her counsel Givens, checked and
separately initialed the box on the form designating the record on
appeal electing to proceed without a record of the oral
proceedings in the trial court. In doing so, she acknowledged the
appellate court “will not be able to review any issues I might
want to raise about what was said in the trial court during those
proceedings.”

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