Court Opinion

ID: 9790589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:55:32.596452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.392949
License: Public Domain

Sci-moEDER, J.,
dissenting: In my opinion the danger which exists in connection with a slush pit fire is obvious to, and fully appreciated by, a boy thirteen years of age.
Falling from a building or cliff has been held not to come within the attractive nuisance doctrine. (Brennan v. Kaw Construction Co., 176 Kan. 465, 271 P. 2d 253; and Zagar v. Railroad Co., 113 Kan. 240, 214 Pac. 107.) Surely the vertical walls of a trench pit used for the disposal of waste materials in the drilling of an oil well fall in the same category. The danger from falling is obvious. In the Brennan case the child was a mere two-year-old boy, and the building was much higher than the vertical walls of the slush pit in the instant case.
Only in a relatively few instances, each dealing with an unusual situation, has the doctrine of attractive nuisance been applied to a child more than ten years of age. In Moseley v. City of Kansas City, 170 Kan. 585, 228 P. 2d 699, the court said:
“The attractive nuisance doctrine, recognized by the federal courts and by the courts of some (not all) of the states, including Kansas, is a modification of the general rules of liability for negligence and applies only to a child of ‘tender years,’ in which the child is a trespasser, at least in a technical sense, but is excused from the normal liability of a trespasser because of an attractive object or situation, dangerous if used or handled by children who by reason of their tender years lack capacity to know or realize the danger of being about or handling the attractive object or condition. It does not apply to adults. Neither does it apply to children old enough to know the possible danger involved. The term ‘tender years’ never has been defined in exact years and months, but in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, where the doctrine is used, it is rarely applied in the case of a child more than ten years of age. In a relatively few instances, each dealing with an *481unusual situation, the doctrine has been applied to a child of the age of eleven, twelve, thirteen or fourteen years of age. . . .” (pp. -590, 597.)
Ry far the strongest reason to deny application of the attractive nuisance doctrine in the instant case is the appellants’ second point. That is, the danger involved is patent or obvious, particularly to a child thirteen years of age. Cases cited by the appellants on this point fully support this position. Appropriate language relative to the fact that open fires are not an object of attractive nuisance is found in Skelton v. Sinclair Refining Company [Okla.] 375 P. 2d 948, where the Supreme Court of Oklahoma had before it an action involving a suit by a minor, an eight-year-old girl. The court said:
“. . . One of the first things a child is taught, or learns by experience, is that fire will bum and cause discomfort. This is a matter of common knowledge. Therefore, it can not be said that the location and character of the stove in question constituted a ‘hidden danger’ for the plaintiff in this case.” (p. 953.)
It is respectfully submitted the judgment of the lower court should be reversed on the ground the petition does not state' a cause of action under the doctrine of attractive nuisance.
Parker, C. J., and Price, J., join in the foregoing dissent.