Court Opinion

ID: 9552296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:08:22.16423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:06.662369
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
MIZUHA, J.
I am of the opinion that the defendant has not sustained the burden of proving contributory negligence by substantial evidence. The only evidence from which the jury could find that the plaintiff was contribuíorily negligent by suddenly stopping is the following testimony of Nalua, the operator of defendant’s truck:
“Q Do you remember Mr. Collins asking you, What happend?’
“A Yes, he asked me.
“Q And what do you recall telling him?
“A I told him he came to a stop too suddenly for me to stop in time.
“Q And what else?
“A That the reason he stopped for, I thought was *430because tbe fella was laying tbe traffic cone out had just finished putting up a sign, traffic sign.
“Q Did you notice any sign in the vicinity of the accident after the accident happened?
“A Yes.
“Q What kind of a sign did you notice, if anything?
“A No left turn.”
There is no testimony from Kalua that plaintiff failed to make a hand signal or that plaintiff’s stop lights were not working, and that the stop was without warning. Plaintiff testified that he came to a normal stop and that his stop lights were working at that time. I am unable to find anything in plaintiff’s testimony from which the jury could have found or deduced that plaintiff had failed to give a hand signal of his intention to stop.1 In fact, *431the court sustained objection of defendant’s counsel to tbe following question put to plaintiff: “Prior to coming to a stop, Mr. Collins, did you make any signals that you were about to stop?”
Kalua’s statement to plaintiff, “I told him be came to a stop too suddenly for me to stop in time,” is not of a *432substantial character on which , a jury could be permitted to return a verdict. It is clear that Kalua’s statement applied to this situation where, because of his defective brakes, the stop was too sudden for him to stop in time. Kalua testified that his brakes were not working and that he had driven the track loaded with empty bottles for miles prior to the accident with defective brakes. He was travelling about 20 to 25 miles per hour and was 30 to 35 feet behind plaintiff’s car. When plaintiff’s car came to a stop, he pressed down on his foot brake, but it did not hold. He does not remember reaching for the emergency hand brake, nor is there any evidence that it was used prior to the collision. There is no testimony as to any other measures taken by Kalua to avoid crashing into plaintiff’s car. Kalua clearly understood why plaintiff stopped. Kalua testified “that the reason he [plaintiff] stopped for, I thought was because the fella was laying the traffic cone out had just finished putting up a sign, traffic sign!” Kalua first noticed plaintiff’s car when it was three car lengths ahead of him, moving slowly, which caused Kalua “to ease up on the gas.” Kalua saw the man *433laying traffic cones on the street.2 From the testimony of Kalua, there is only one conclusion. The traffic situation prior to the collision indicates that the plaintiff was slowing down to a stop. It is apparent from Kalua’s testimony that he was not and could not have been deceived by the manner in which plaintiff’s ear was being operated. I am unable to conclude that plaintiff’s car came to a “stop too suddenly” for Kalua to stop in time. There is absolutely no testimony that plaintiff had not operated his car in a careful and prudent manner.
*434But assuming that the jury believed Kalua that plaintiff did stop suddenly without a signal of his intention to stop, this in itself does not establish contributory negligence in the absence of other evidence to show a direct causal connection between the sudden stop and the collision, and that the sudden stop was the proximate cause of the collision and plaintiff’s injury. See Grace v. Kumalaa, 47 Haw. 281, 285, 386 P.2d 872, 876; Mitchell v. Branch, 45 Haw. 128, 131, 363 P.2d 969, 973; Dzurik v. Tamura, 44 Haw. 327, 329, 359 P.2d 164, 165; Fuller v. Honolulu Rapid Transit & Land Co., 16 Haw. 1, 9-10. “The very essence of contributory negligence is a want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff which is a proximate cause, an occasion, of the injury; not only must the negligence of one injured by the culpable negligence of another contribute to the injury, but it must contribute as a proximate cause, and not as a remote cause.” Fulton v. Chouteau County Farmers’ Co., 98 Mont. 48, 67, 37 P.2d 1025, 1031. Defendant has the burden of proof as to contributory negligence. Grace v. Kumalaa, supra at 287, 386 P.2d at 877; Anduha v. County of Maui, 30 Haw. 44, 50.
Modern highway driving requires frequent sudden stops. The mere fact that there was a sudden stop is not negligence. Kalua’s statement that defendant stopped sud*435denly is merely a legal conclusion, not a factual basis for a finding of negligence. What would constitute a stop without adequate warning might be one thing where there was no reason for drivers of following vehicles to anticipate a stop and something quite different where there was every reason to suppose that a person laying out traffic cones and a sign would require all vehicles moving in a stream of traffic to come to a halt. See Caraway v. Behrendt, 224 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App.); Shaw v. Malone, 55 York Leg. Rec. 150; Vienne v. Chalona, 28 So. 2d 154 (La. App.); Schlue v. Missouri Pacific Transp. Co., 62 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. App.); Cole v. Phephles, 241 Wis. 155, 5 N.W.2d 755.
In order for the defendant to avoid liability, he must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, the causal connection between plaintiff’s negligence and the collision. The mere inference that plaintiff’s vehicle came to a sudden stop without warning is not in itself sufficient to establish this necessary causal relationship. Proximate cause must be proved and is never presumed. Dmrik v. Tamura, supra.' There is no evidence in the record, not even a scintilla, to show that the sudden stop without warning was the proximate cause of the collision. All we have is the statement of defendant that he was travelling about three car lengths to the rear of plaintiff and was slowing down. But defendant has to prove by substantial evidence that at this distance and speed it was impossible to avoid this accident or to stop in time, even if he had good brakes. This is the criteria by which proximate causation will be judged from the facts of this case. The test as to contriblitory negligence on the part of the plaintiff under the . .circumstances is whether he acted as an ordinarily prudent man in stopping his vehicle. Reasonable care does not require the plaintiff to anticipate that the truck following him in the rear will be unable to stop *436because of defective brakes, when ordinarily, the rear driver would have plenty of time and space within which to avoid the collision.
It would be the same as to burden of proof on contributory negligence, if defendant had sued plaintiff for negligence on the theory that plaintiff had made a sudden stop without warning. Then, if the plaintiff asserts as an affirmative defense that defendant was contributorily negligent because of defective brakes, plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defective brakes were the proximate cause of the collision. In order to show this causal connection, plaintiff must offer evidence:
(1) That the truck had defective brakes, and
(2) That at the speed and distance maintained between vehicles, the operator could have stopped his truck in time to avoid the collision with normal brakes.
The majority opinion fails to consider the negligence of the defendant and its legal consequence in this particular situation. Rear-end collisions resulting from the operation of a vehicle with defective brakes must be viewed differently from ordinary cases where the rear car is equipped with normal working brakes.
Furthermore, assuming there was contributory negligence, the principle enunciated in British Columbia Electric Ry. v. Loach, L.R., 1 A.C. 719 (1916) is applicable here. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff will not disentitle him to recover damages if the defendant, by the exercise of due care, might have avoided the result of the negligence. It applies when the defendant, although not committing any negligent act subsequent to the plaintiff’s negligence, has incapacitated himself by his previous negligence from exercising such care as would have avoided the result of plaintiff’s negligence. See Little Rock Traction & Electric Co. v. Morrison, 69 Ark. 289, 62 S.W. 1045.
*437Under this rule, a defendant who knowingly operates a vehicle on our public highways with defective brakes has the burden of producing substantial evidence, that subsequent to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, the collision could not have been avoided by the exercise of due care. Adoption of this rule of law would discourage motorists from continuing to operate vehicles with defective brakes. Statements that the other vehicle stopped or turned suddenly without warning would be insufficient to find the necessary causation to establish contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff to defeat recovery.
I do not agree with the concurring opinion which concludes that the plaintiff failed to show as a matter of law that the defective brakes were a proximate cause of the accident. Kalua admitted to the police officer that “I hit the other car because of my brakes.” Kalua testified that he was travelling about 20 to 25 miles an hour when he first noticed the plaintiff’s car in front of him, and was about three car lengths — thirty-five feet behind. It was moving slowly, and he (Kalua) “eased up on the gas.” Kalua further testified that when he saw “the gap being closed, I mean I was pulling right up to him so I applied my brakes or what was left of it.” In response to the question, “Did they [brakes] hold?” Kalua answered, “No, they didn’t.” In the light of Kalua’s testimony as stated in the concurring opinion that “a normal stop at the speed of 20 to 25 miles an hour with the truck loaded as it was that day, would require 25 to 30 feet to stop the truck with good brakes,” and he permitted the gap between vehicles to close to “15 to 20 feet” before he first tried to stop the truck, I am at a loss as to what is required by way of proof to show that the defective brakes were the proximate cause of the accident.
It is not contended in this dissent that a defendant who operates a vehicle with defective brakes may be held *438responsible for an accident on the last clear chance doctrine, and in that “situation should not be heard to invoke contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.” The case was not tried on such a theory by plaintiff. Since one of the defenses defendant asserted was contributory negligence, defendant must prove the causal relationship —that the stop was the proximate cause of the accident. In order to do this, defendant must prove that at the distance and speed Kalua was travelling, he had no chance to stop after the necessity of stopping became apparent to him, even with good brakes. Kalua testified that a normal stop at the speed of 20 to 25 miles an hour with a truck loaded as it was that day, would require 25 to 30 feet to stop the truck with good brakes. He also testified that he was travelling 20 to 25 miles an hour. He was about 35 feet behind plaintiff’s car, when he “eased up on the gas” since plaintiff’s car was slowing down. He did not testify as to his speed at the time he tried to stop his truck when he was 15 to 20 feet behind plaintiff’s car, but it is logical to assume that at that particular time it was considerably less than his speed of 20 to 25 miles an hour, since he had “eased up on the gas” and his truck was in “second gear.” When Kalua’s statements are compared with his testimony as to the stopping distance for his truck with good brakes, there is only one conclusion; that had he good brakes, he could have stopped his truck in time to avoid the accident. Instead of it being evidence of contributory negligence, Kalua’s statements prove otherwise. It clearly shows that the stop was not the proximate cause of the collision.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial inasmuch as plaintiff did not move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

 “MR. COBBY [Plaintiff’s counsel]: What did you do after the car ahead of you stopped?
“WITNESS [Plaintiff]: I came to a stop also.
“Q [By Mr. Corey]: And would you put another square, could you put another square in purple?
“THE COUBT: We have a red one here.
“Q Very well. We’ll use the red square for you. Where did you stop?
“A Just behind the car ahead of me.
“Q How far would you say behind that car you stopped?
“A Two or three feet.
“Q May the record show that the witness has marked with a red pencil immediately adjacent to the Kokohead prolongation of Atkinson Drive where he stopped.
“THE COUBT: The record will so show.
“Q Now, after the car, strike that. How long did the car ahead of you remained [sic], stopped, if you know?
“A For a matter of seconds, about five seconds, I would say.
“Q Could it have been more or less?
“A More or. less. Not less because the car had been stopped and waited two or three seconds so let’s say between five and ten seconds.
“Q Very well. And then what happened after that car stopped?
“A Well, I noticed a fellow on the curb to my right with a sign in his hand.
“Q Could you see what kind of a sign it was?
“A I observed it to be a no left turn sign.
“Q How was he holding it in his hand?
“A He had the sign out into the street approximately a foot into the street. The base end of it was a maroon-colored metal base protruding about a foot into the street ahead of me about perhaps two feet in front of the right fender of my car.
“Q In which direction was the sign pointed? *431“A It was pointed in the direction, the base of the sign was pointed in the direction of Aloha Motors.
“Q And in which hand did he hold the sign?
“A He had the sign in both hands.
“Q And what happened after that?
“A I motioned him across because I thought that he was going to cross in front of me with the sign protruding into the street.
“Q Prior to coming to a stop, Mr. Collins, did you make any signals that you were about to stop?
“MB. CHUCK: I object to the question is being leading and suggestive, Your Honor.
“THE COUBT: Objection is sustained.
“Q Would you describe the way that you came to a stop, Mr. Collins?
“A Well, it wasn’t an emergency stop because I had sufficient time to observe the ear ahead of me slowing down.
“Q Would you describe exactly how you made the stop?
“A It was a normal stop.
“Q Well, what did you do with your hands and your feet and so forth?
“MB. CHUCK: I object to the question as being leading and suggestive.
“Q It is not leading. Trying to get the—
“THE COUBT: What did you do with your hands and feet, if anything?
“Q That is right, if anything. What did you do with your hands and feet?
“A My feet, my foot, my right foot was on my brake of my car and my left hand was on the steering wheel because I can recall making a gesture to the fellow with the sign to go ahead and cross, I believe.
“THE COUBT: Can you read that back?
“(The answer of the witness was read back by the Beporter.)
“Q Was your left hand on the steering wheel before or after you stopped?
“A I don’t recall.
“Q Would you take the witness stand? How fast were you going before you came to a stop, Mr. Collins?
“A I’d say approximately 15 to 20 miles an hour because I was observing the flashing red light I was approaching the intersection with caution naturally.
“Q And did you before you stopped note that anyone was, anyone in particular was behind you?
“A No, I did not.
“Q Well now, you stated that you motioned to the man with your right hand. Why did you motion with your right hand?
“A He was standing ahead of my car to my right and I can recall he *432looked at me for an indication that I would remain stopped. The sign, as I said, was protruding into the street so I assumed that he was going to cross in front of my car.
“Q And the motion you made with your right hand was for what purpose?
“A To direct him to go ahead and cross, indicating that I would remain stopped.
“Q How many seconds, if you can do this, how many seconds would you estimate approximately you remained stopped?
“A I would say approximately ten seconds.
“Q More or less?
“A That’s correct. Ten seconds after I had observed the fellow indicating that he was going' to cross.
“Q And then what happened?
“A Well, the next thing that I recall was a sudden impact and crashing sound and my ear hurdling [sic] forward even though I had my foot on the power brake at the time and I can recall being thrown violently back against the seat and being thrown against the steering wheel and flying helplessly through the air and smashing my head against an object above the windshield.”

 “MR. CORBY [Plaintiff’s counsel] : How fast were you going as you approached the Kapiolani Boulevard and Atkinson Drive intersection?
“WITNESS [Kalua] : About 20 miles, 20 miles an hour.
“THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, are you hearing this?
“(Affirmative reply from the Jury box.)
“Q [By Mr. Corey] : Could it have been a little more than 20 miles an hour?
“A It could have been.
“Q And you were in second gear?
“A I was in second gear.
“Q All right. As you approached the Kapiolani Boulevard intersection and Atkinson Drive intersection in your truck, what, if anything, did you notice ahead of you?
“A I noticed a ear.
“Q A car?
“A That’s right.
“Q Did you notice any other, any other things ahead of you other than a car? You say you noticed some cones?
“A Yes.
“Q Did you notice any persons connected with those cones in any way?
“A Not at that time.
“Q Not at that time. Very well. The ear that you noted ahead of you, how far was that car ahead of you at that time when you first noticed it?
“A I would say three car lengths.
“Q Three car or three truck lengths?
“A Three car lengths.
“Q Three car—
“A Thirty, thirty-five feet.
“Q I see. And was the car, the first time you noticed it, was the car moving?
“A Yes, it was.
“Q Was it going fast or slow?
“A It was slow.
“Q And what, if anything, did you do when you first noticed that' car ahead of you?
*434“A When I first noticed him moving slow, I eased up on the gas.
“Q In order to stop or slow down ?
“A No, just to, not to pick up any more speed.
“Q And then what?
“A Then I saw the gap being closed, I mean I was pulling right up to him so I applied my brakes or what was left of it.
“Q Do you remember your brakes skipping at that point?
“A Yes, it did.
“Q Did they skip partially or all the way down to the bottom?
“A I can’t say exactly.
“Q Did they hold?
“A No, they didn’t.
“Q You remember reaching down for the emergency brake?
“A No, I didn’t.
“Q Do. you remember the car ahead of you coming to a stop?
“A Yes.”