Court Opinion

ID: 9838689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 16:01:03.557321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:43.400529
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10433    Document: 22-1      Date Filed: 09/07/2023   Page: 1 of 13

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10433
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        MICHAEL PALMER,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        RICHARD ROBBINS,
        JAMES WINSTON,
        CHRISTOPHER MCBRIDE,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10433

                     D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00167-RSB-CLR
                           ____________________

        Before JORDAN, BRANCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Appellant Michael Palmer appeals the district court’s order
        denying his supplemental motion for new trial. While working at
        Herty Advanced Materials Development Center (“Herty”), Palmer
        was arrested and charged in a criminal prosecution for allegedly
        stealing gas from Herty’s gas pumps. Herty is a research and
        development center located in Savannah, Georgia, and a division
        of Georgia Southern University. Herty installed a surveillance
        camera at the gas pumps, and it recorded the alleged theft. After
        authorities dismissed Palmer’s criminal prosecution, Palmer filed
        suit against Richard Robbins, plant manager at Herty, Christopher
        McBride, Georgia Southern University police officer, and James
        Winston, a team leader/supervisor at Herty, alleging that they
        maliciously prosecuted him in violation of his Fourth Amendment
        rights. The district court granted summary judgment to McBride
        and Winston based on immunity, and the case proceeded to trial
        on the sole issue of whether Robbins caused Palmer’s criminal
        prosecution. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Robbins, and
        the district court denied Palmer’s supplemental motion for new
        trial. After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we
        affirm the district court’s order.
                                             I.
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        23-10433                Opinion of the Court                            3

               We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s order
        denying a motion for new trial. Chmielewski v. City of St. Pete Beach,
        890 F.3d 942, 951 (11th Cir. 2018). Because Palmer failed to move
        for a directed verdict at trial, “our inquiry is limited to whether
        there was any evidence to support the jury’s verdict, irrespective of
        its suﬃciency.” Hercaire Int’l, Inc. v. Arg., 821 F.2d 559, 562 (11th Cir.
        1987) (quotations omitted).
               We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary
        judgment based on qualiﬁed immunity. See Rowe v. Schreiber, 139
        F.3d 1381, 1383 (11th Cir. 1998).
                                               II.
               We must determine whether we have jurisdiction to review
        the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Oﬃcer McBride
        based on qualiﬁed immunity, and to Winston based on state law
        immunity. Palmer contends that under Federal Rule of Appellate
        Procedure 3, we do have jurisdiction because the notice of appeal
        encompasses the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
        Robbins contends that we do not have jurisdiction because the
        notice of appeal speciﬁed only the district court’s order on the
        motion for new trial.
               Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
        that the notice of appeal must “designate the judgment — or the
        appealable order — from which the appeal is taken.” F.R.A.P.
        3(c)(1). The rule further states in part that the notice of appeal
        “encompasses all orders that, for purposes of appeal, merge into
        the designated judgment or appealable order.” Id. at 3(c)(4). “It is
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10433

        not necessary to designate those orders in the notice of appeal.” Id.
        The rule also provides in part that “a notice of appeal encompasses
        the ﬁnal judgment, whether or not that judgment is set out in a
        separate document under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, if the
        notice designates: (A) an order that adjudicates all remaining claims
        and the rights and liabilities of all remaining parties; or (B) an order
        described in Rule 4(a)(4)(A).” Id.at 3(c)(5). Finally, Rule 3(c)(6)
        provides that “[a]n appellant may designate only part of a judgment
        or appealable order by expressly stating that the notice of appeal is
        so limited.      Without such an express statement, speciﬁc
        designations do not limit the scope of the notice of appeal.” Under
        the Rule, we conclude that the summary judgment order is
        encompassed within the appealable order, and we have jurisdiction
        to review it.
               A. Oﬃcer McBride
               Palmer asserted a federal malicious prosecution claim
        against Oﬃcer McBride, and Oﬃcer McBride moved for summary
        judgment, arguing that there was no evidence that he caused any
        seizure of Palmer that violated the Fourth Amendment; that
        Palmer’s arrest was supported by probable cause or, at minimum,
        arguable probable cause; and that he did not institute or continue
        the criminal prosecution against Palmer or unduly inﬂuence the
        decision to prosecute. The district court concluded that Palmer did
        not prove his claim of malicious prosecution, and that Oﬃcer
        McBride was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity. Based on our review,
        we agree with the district court.
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        23-10433               Opinion of the Court                          5

               To succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution, Palmer
        must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free
        from unreasonable seizures and the elements of the common law
        tort of malicious prosecution. Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147,
        1157 (11th Cir. 2020). These tort elements include “(1) a criminal
        prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2)
        with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the
        plaintiﬀ accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiﬀ
        accused.” Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 882 (11th Cir. 2003). Palmer
        must also produce evidence to prove that he was seized in violation
        of his constitutional rights. See Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d
        1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004). An arrest is a seizure of the person, and
        “the reasonableness of an arrest is . . . determined by the presence
        or absence of probable cause for the arrest.” Skop v. City of Atlanta,
        485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). Stated diﬀerently, “the
        existence of probable cause” for an arrest warrant “defeats a § 1983
        malicious prosecution claim.” Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F. 3d
        1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010).

               Moreover, qualiﬁed immunity protects government oﬃcials
        performing discretionary functions from personal liability if their
        conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or
        constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
        known.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002)
        (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738
        (1982)). To rely upon qualiﬁed immunity, Oﬃcer McBride must
        show that he acted within his discretionary authority, i.e., he was
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10433

        “performing a legitimate job-related function . . . through means
        that were within his power to utilize.” Holloman ex rel. Hollomon v.
        Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). The record
        demonstrates that Oﬃcer McBride was performing a legitimate job
        function through permissible means when he investigated the gas
        theft at Herty.

               We next consider whether Palmer proved a violation of his
        constitutional rights by Oﬃcer McBride that were clearly
        established at the time of the incident. See Keating v. City of Miami,
        598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010). To prove that he was seized in
        violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, Palmer must establish
        (1) that the legal process justifying his seizure “was constitutionally
        inﬁrm;” and (2) “that his seizure would not otherwise be justiﬁed
        without legal process.” Williams, 965 F.3d at 1165. Palmer “can
        prove that his arrest warrant was constitutionally inﬁrm if he
        establishes either that the oﬃcer who applied for the warrant
        should have known that his application failed to establish probable
        cause, or that an oﬃcial, including an individual who did not apply
        for the warrant, intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or
        omissions necessary to support the warrant.” Id. (internal citations
        omitted).

                We conclude that, based on the record, Palmer did not
        satisfy his burden of proof. Contrary to Palmer’s assertions, there
        is no record evidence that Robbins lied to Oﬃcer McBride when he
        identiﬁed Palmer in the video, and Palmer admitted in his
        deposition that there was no evidence that Oﬃcer McBride knew
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        23-10433               Opinion of the Court                          7

        about the lies perpetuated by Robbins. In addition, there is nothing
        in the record to indicate that Oﬃcer McBride made an intentional
        or reckless misstatement or omission necessary to obtain the arrest
        warrant. Rather, the record shows that Oﬃcer McBride
        investigated the gasoline theft, created a case ﬁle, gave that case ﬁle
        to a police oﬃcer, and that oﬃcer secured the arrest warrant.
        There is no evidence that Oﬃcer McBride was responsible for the
        decision to prosecute or arrest Palmer. Thus, Palmer did not show
        that Oﬃcer McBride caused him to be seized in violation of his
        Fourth Amendment right.
                Based on the record, we also conclude that probable cause,
        or at least, arguable probable cause, existed for the issuance of the
        arrest warrant and Palmer’s arrest. “We have not always
        consistently articulated the probable-cause standard in the context
        of arrests.” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 (11th Cir. 2022).
        Relying on the Supreme Court’s explanation, we stated recently
        that probable cause “exists when the facts, considering the totality
        of the circumstances and viewed from the perspective of a
        reasonable oﬃcer, establish ‘a probability or substantial chance of
        criminal activity.’” Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
        U.S. 48, 57, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018)). Thus, on review, a court
        must inquire “whether a reasonable oﬃcer could conclude . . . that
        there was a substantial chance of criminal activity.” Id. at 899
        (emphasis added) (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61, 138 S. Ct. at 588).
        Here, two of Palmer’s supervisors, Robbins and Winston,
        identiﬁed Palmer in the video, based on their numerous years
        working with Palmer, his physical characteristics, the truck he
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                23-10433

        drove, and his mannerisms. Thus, a reasonable oﬃcer, possessing
        the same information as Oﬃcer McBride, could conclude that
        Robbins and Winston’s identiﬁcations of Palmer were reliable, and
        that there was a substantial chance or probability that Palmer was
        involved in criminal activity. Oﬃce McBride himself observed that
        Palmer drove a truck like the one depicted in the video.
        Considering the totality of the circumstances, we aﬃrm the district
        court’s grant of summary judgment to Oﬃcer McBride.

              B. James Winston
                Palmer alleges a state law malicious prosecution claim
        against Winston pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40, and Winston
        asserts oﬃcial immunity pursuant to the Georgia Tort Claims Act,
        O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20, et seq. (“GTCA”). Winston relies on his role
        as team leader and supervisor to assert that his identiﬁcation of
        Palmer was committed within the scope of his employment. The
        district court found that Winston was entitled to summary
        judgment based on immunity. Based on our review, we agree with
        the district court.
               Under the GTCA, “[a] state oﬃcer or employee who
        commits a tort while acting within the scope of his or her oﬃcial
        duties or employment is not subject to lawsuit or liability.”
        O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(a). However, the Act does not give a state
        oﬃcer or employee immunity from suit and liability if a plaintiﬀ
        can prove that the oﬃcer or employee’s conduct was not within the
        scope of his or her oﬃcial duties or employment. Riddle v. Ashe,
        495 S.E.2d 287, 288 (Ga. 1998). (internal quotation marks omitted).
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        23-10433               Opinion of the Court                        9

        To determine whether the employee acted within the scope of his
        authority, the court must examine whether the employee was
        “performing the regular duties of [his] employment, during [his]
        regular hours of employment, at [his] regular site of employment.
        Shekhawat v. Jones, 746 S.E.2d 89, 93 (Ga. 2013).
               Based on the record, we conclude that the district court
        properly granted Winston immunity. First, Winston was acting
        within the scope of his employment when he identiﬁed Palmer as
        the suspect in the video. Winston was the team leader and
        supervised 12 to 15 Herty employees, including Palmer. Winston
        was performing his duties during the regular work hours at his
        normal place of business when he identiﬁed Palmer as a suspect.
        Further, Winston had a duty, pursuant to University policy, to
        investigate and report any employee misconduct of which he was
        aware. See Massey v. Roth, 290 Ga. App. 496, 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)
        (“Actions taken by employees to . . . enforce university policies can
        reasonably be construed as actuated by a purpose to serve the
        employer, and thus fall within the scope of their employment.”).
        Accordingly, we aﬃrm the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment to Winston on Palmer’s state malicious prosecution
        claim.
                                            III.
              Palmer asserts that the district court abused its discretion in
        denying his supplemental motion for new trial because the jury’s
        ﬁnding that Robbins did not cause Palmer’s criminal prosecution
        was against the clear or great weight of the evidence. See Hewitt v.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10433

        B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984). To the
        contrary, Robbins contends that there was overwhelming evidence
        to support the jury’s verdict. Robbins claims that since he was not
        a member of law enforcement and directly involved in the decision
        to arrest or prosecute Palmer, a jury could only ﬁnd that Robbins
        caused the criminal prosecution if he engaged in deception or
        undue pressure regarding the law enforcement personnel who had
        the authority to arrest or prosecute. See Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d
        1187, 1195 (11th Cir. 1989). Robbins argues that Palmer failed to
        make such a showing at trial, and we should uphold the jury
        verdict.
                To prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution, Palmer must
        show that Robbins caused a criminal proceeding to be instituted or
        continued against him; that Robbins acted with malice and without
        probable cause; that the proceeding terminated in his favor; that he
        was unlawfully seized because of the criminal proceeding; that
        Robbins’s conduct caused Palmer’s injuries; and that Robbins acted
        under color of law. See Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir.
        2019). In this case, the jury did not address every element of the
        malicious prosecution claim because it found that Palmer failed on
        the ﬁrst element of causation. A defendant cannot be the legal
        cause of a prosecution or other criminal proceeding where there is
        no evidence that the defendant had anything to do with the
        decision to prosecute or that the defendant had improperly
        inﬂuenced that decision. See Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1160-
        61 (11th Cir. 1994). “The intervening acts of the prosecutor, grand
        jury, judge[,] and jury . . . each break the chain of causation unless
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        23-10433              Opinion of the Court                       11

        plaintiﬀ can show that these intervening acts were the result of
        deception or undue pressure by the defendant.” Barts, 865 F.2d at
        1195.
               The trial record shows that the jury heard two days of
        testimony from Robbins, McBride, Winston, and Don McLemore,
        Robbins’s supervisor, and law enforcement personnel. The jury
        viewed the surveillance tape, which was introduced by Palmer.
        Robbins described his duties as running the daily operations at
        Herty. In 2016, he learned that unauthorized gas was missing from
        Herty’s pumps, and he installed a surveillance camera to monitor
        the gas pump area. Robbins stated that he was able to identify,
        based on their physical characteristics and the vehicles they drove,
        three Herty employees stealing gas from the pumps for personal
        use. Robbins contacted his supervisor, McLemore, who stated that
        he would contact the University Police Department. Robbins
        testiﬁed that McLemore instructed him to contact Oﬃcer McBride,
        and McLemore corroborated this testimony, stating that it was his
        decision to involve the police based on his observation of the
        criminal conduct he saw in the surveillance video.
                McBride testiﬁed that he personally viewed the surveillance
        video, and it was obvious to him that the individuals were taking
        the gas for their own personal use. McBride originally told Robbins
        and McLemore to handle the matter internally, but McBride’s chief
        later instructed him to conduct a further investigation. McBride
        then contacted Robbins and asked him to ﬁnd another witness who
        could identify the individuals in the video. Robbins asked Winston
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        12                    Opinion of the Court               23-10433

        to watch the video, which he did, and he clearly identiﬁed Palmer
        and two other individuals. Winston stated that he truthfully
        identiﬁed the three individuals, and he was not pressured to
        identify a speciﬁc individual. However, Palmer introduced a phone
        call recording in which Winston told Palmer that he felt he was
        being used by Robbins. Winston explained at trial that his
        statements on the phone were made in anger because he did not
        want to be involved in the investigation, and he felt he was being
        used in an inappropriate manner.
               McBride further testiﬁed that he asked Robbins to arrange a
        meeting with Palmer and the other two suspects. While he was at
        Herty for the meeting, McBride noticed the three vehicles driven
        by the suspects appeared to be the same three vehicles he saw in
        the surveillance video. McBride identiﬁed the vehicles based on
        their color, make and model. McBride stated that his chief
        instructed him to secure arrest warrants for the suspects because
        the Georgia Southern University’s administration wanted to
        pursue criminal charges. McBride then contacted the Savannah-
        Chatham Metro Police Department and sent the case ﬁle to
        Sergeant Joe Lewis to review, and his department issued the arrest
        warrants. Thus, neither Robbins, McBride, nor Winston procured
        the arrest warrants for Palmer and the other two suspects.
              The record demonstrates that the district court did not err
        in denying Palmer’s supplemental motion for new trial. The trial
        testimony demonstrates that Robbins identiﬁed Palmer as a
        suspect in the theft, the intervening acts of McLemore, McBride,
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        23-10433              Opinion of the Court                      13

        and the Savannah-Chatham police broke the causal chain, and that
        Robbins had no authority or intention to have Palmer prosecuted
        criminally. McBride’s testimony showed that law enforcement
        independently analyzed the facts and required other pieces of
        evidence apart from Robbins’s identiﬁcation in deciding to pursue
        criminal charges against Palmer. Apparently, the jury found
        McBride and Winston credible, and it is not within the court’s
        discretion to overturn the jury’s determination on issues of
        credibility. Palmer failed to prove that Robbins’s identiﬁcation of
        him was the legal cause of his criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
        based on the aforementioned reasons, we aﬃrm the district court’s
        order denying Palmer’s supplemental motion for a new trial on his
        claim of malicious prosecution.
              AFFIRMED.