Court Opinion

ID: 9662408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:08:28.914935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:39.333407
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice.
I concur in the Court’s opinion hut desire, briefly, to state my views.
Appellant District was created under authority of Art. 16, § 59, of our Constitution, which provides, in part:
“There may be created within the State of Texas, or the State may be divided into, such number of conservation and reclamation districts as may be determined to be essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of this amendment to the Constitution, which districts shall be governmental agencies and bodies politic and corporate with such powers of government and with the authority to exercise such rights, privileges and functions concerning the subject matter of this amendment as may be conferred by law."
Art. 8263a, V.A.C.S., pertaining to Navigation Districts, was enacted pursuant to the above amendment and Sec. 4 thereof provides, in part, that such Districts
“* * * shaii i,e Governmental Agencies and bodies politic and corporate with such powers of Government and with the authority to exercise such rights, privileges, and functions as may be essential to the accomplishment of * * *”
the purposes for which they were created.
Consistent with these provisions is the opinion in Willacy County Water Control and Improvement District No. 1 v. Abendroth, quoted from in the Court’s opinion, which held, on grounds of public policy, that a Water Control District created under Sec. 59, Art. 16, supra, was not amenable to garnishment statutes. It is to be noted that iii the quotation made by the Court from Abendroth that districts created under this constitutional provision
“are not classed with municipal corporations, but are held to be political subdivisions of the State, performing governmental functions, and standing upon the same footing as counties and other political subdivisions established by law.”
The above observations would lead, it seems to me, logically to the conclusion that districts such as appellant would not be amenable to the general statutes of limitation involved here since there is no statute subjecting them thereto, under the rule that political subdivisions, other than municipal corporations, when acting in a governmental capacity are not bound by general laws of limitation. See Delta County v. Blackburn, 100 Tex. 51, 93 S.W. 419; Linz v. Eastland County, Tex.Com.App., 39 S.W.2d 599, 77 A.L.R. 1466; Comanche County v. Burks, Tex.Civ.App., 166 S.W. 470, writ ref.
On the other hand the Bassett case, a suit for taxes by the city and school district, cited by the Court, states that the two year statute of limitations was available as a defense to tax suits brought by irrigation and levee districts at times when there was no contrary statute citing Texas & P. R. Co. v. Ward County Irr. Dist., Tex.Com.App., 270 S.W. 542; Rutledge v. State, 117 Tex. 342, 292 S.W. 164, 7 S.W.2d 1071; State for Dallas County Bois D’Arc Island Levee Dist. v. Glenn, 118 Tex. 334, 13 S.W.2d 337, 15 S.W.2d 1028.
The Glenn case went to the Supreme Court on a certified question the question being whether or not a levee district, created under statutes enacted under Art. 16, Sec. 59, of the Constitution, was exempt from the operation of general statutes of limitation. The question was answered in the negative upon the authority, principally, of Rutledge v. State, supra. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Ward was not cited.
The Rutledge case also went to the Supreme Court on a certified question. It involved a county levee improvement district organized under statutes enacted prior (1915) to adoption of Art. 16, Sec. 59 of *311the Constitution (1917). The question presented was whether or not the general two year statute of limitation was available as a defense to taxes due for the years 1917 and 1920. The answer was “yes”, the Court basing its decision upon the Texas & P. R. Co. v. Ward County case.
The Irrigation District in the Ward County case was organized under statutes, enacted pursuant to Art. 16, Sec. 59 of the Constitution. That case reached the Supreme Court by writ of error. It was held that the general two year statute of limitations was applicable in a suit by the district for taxes. The only case cited to support its decision was Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 36, 37, 3 S.W. 249.
The. Mellinger case involved a city suing for taxes. The Court held, following cases of its own as well as cases from other jurisdictions, that limitations would run against a municipal corporation unless exempted by statute. This case was referred to by Judge Williams in Delta County v. Blackburn, supra [100 Tex. 51, 93 S.W. 422], from which I quote:
“In the case of Coleman v. Thurmond, 56 Tex. 514, it was broadly stated that the statute did not run against a county, for the reason that it was a part of the State, performing a portion of its governmental functions, and entitled to the immunity that belonged to it. In Houston & Texas ■Central Railway Co. v. Travis County, ' 62 Tex. [16] 18, the principle was lim■ited to cases ‘where the sovereignty is substantially interested in and vested with the right and ownership of the subject matter in litigation and which is sought to be subjected to the operation of the statutes of limitations/ and it was, in effect, held that in other ■ classes of cases the statute operates against counties. This distinction ; seems to be generally observed with . reference to municipal corporations and to protect causes of action assert- : ed by them when ‘they are of a public ¡nature, and such as pertain purely to governmental affairs.’ 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 191, and cases cited. It would be difficult to apply the principle thus expressed in favor of towns and cities consistently with some of our own decisions. [Mayor, etc., of City of] Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. [349] 408; Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. [37] 40-41, 3 S.W. 249, but, as we have seen, it has been applied in favor of counties which, when suing substantially in behalf of the state, are treated with respect to this question as if they were the state.”
I believe the law should be as declared by Judge Williams and as approved, in principle, in Abendroth, but I do not believe this Court has the power to so declare it in view of the specific holdings in the Ward, Rutledge and Glenn cases.