Court Opinion

ID: 9376959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 15:07:07.999488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:10.618420
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued February 28, 2023

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                         First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00112-CR
                           ———————————
                    WILLIAM DENON SMITH, Appellant
                                       V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 174th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 1706143

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury found Appellant William Denon Smith guilty of evading arrest or

detention in a motor vehicle and the trial court assessed his punishment at forty

years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In a single issue,

Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after a
witness for the State referred to a “robbery,” an extraneous offense involving

Appellant that was not directly related to the charged offense at issue.

      We affirm.

                                     Background

      This case stems from a high-speed motor vehicle chase on January 11, 2021.

Appellant William Denon Smith (“Appellant”) entered a Chase Bank (“Chase”) in

Spring, Texas. He had been there at least twice before, once on January 5, 2021,

and again on January 8, 2021, according to Chase employee Amelia Thompson

(“Thompson”). During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, Thompson testified that

on January 5, 2021, there was “an incident” at Chase involving a man who

approached her and got very close to her on the other side of the counter. He was

wearing a hat, sunglasses, and a mask. Thompson spent less than two minutes with

him and was “scared” after the incident. Three days later, on January 8, 2021, the

same man, dressed in the same clothes, approached Thompson and got close to her,

“right across from the counter.” This second “incident” lasted about three minutes

and left Thompson “terrified.”1

      Thompson further testified that on January 11, 2021, she saw a man she

believed to be the same man involved in the two previous incidents approaching

1
      During the punishment phase of trial, Thompson testified in greater detail about
      the two “incidents,” each involving a robbery. But because Appellant was not on
      trial for the robberies during these proceedings, the trial court ruled that the jury
      was not allowed to hear about the robberies during the guilt-innocence phase.

                                            2
the bank. She alerted the bank’s security officer and when he approached the man,

the man fled. The officer told Thompson the man left in an orange truck. During

trial, Thompson identified Appellant as the man who twice approached her in the

bank and who fled from the bank on January 11, 2021.

      Appellant was apprehended on January 11, 2021 after a high-speed chase

that lasted twenty to thirty minutes.   He was charged with evading arrest or

detention in a motor vehicle.2 During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, several

law enforcement personnel testified for the State regarding the high-speed chase

and Appellant’s apprehension.

A.    Trial Testimony

      1.    Mark Holmes

      Harris County Sherriff’s Deputy Mark Holmes (“Deputy Holmes”) testified

he was working as a uniformed officer on January 11, 2021 in a Chase Bank in

Harris County, Texas. He said he was talking to a bank employee on January 11,

2021 about an incident that had occurred several days earlier when the employee

saw the same man approaching the building. After the man made eye contact with

Deputy Holmes, the man left. Deputy Holmes followed the man, who was wearing

a mask. The man ran to an orange pickup truck with paper license plates, and

2
      Appellant also was charged with felon in possession of a firearm but the jury
      acquitted him of that charge.

                                        3
ignored orders from Deputy Holmes, who identified himself as a police officer, to

stop. The man got into the driver’s side of the truck and left.3

      2.     Steven Drake

      Deputy Steven Drake (“Deputy Drake”) works in the Harris County

Constable’s Office, Precinct 4. On January 11, 2021, Deputy Drake was patrolling

in Spring, Texas, when he heard a description of an orange truck with paper license

plates on his radio. He saw an orange truck with paper license plates in the area

and followed the truck, which was speeding. He intended to stop the truck for

speeding, so he activated his lights and turned on his siren, but the truck continued

driving. Other law enforcement joined the pursuit, all of them running their lights

and sirens. Deputy Drake testified the driver of the orange truck used his turn

signal to change lanes and for freeway exits but never made any attempt to stop.

He testified the driver appeared to be “going somewhere.” Deputy Drake was

involved in the pursuit for about twenty minutes, after which he was forced to exit,

and other law enforcement continued the pursuit. He estimated that at one point

they were traveling at ninety miles per hour and testified the truck was “swerving

through traffic” to avoid the law enforcement personnel chasing him. He estimated

he was involved in the chase for twenty or thirty miles. After the pursuit ended,

Deputy Drake saw Appellant in custody, standing near the orange truck. After he

3
      Deputy Holmes estimated the truck was parked 500 yards from the bank.

                                          4
was apprehended, Appellant did not struggle or attempt to get away but was,

rather, calm and polite.

      3.     Demon Callier

      Deputy Demon Callier (“Deputy Callier”) of the Harris County Constable’s

Office, Precinct 4, testified he took a call on January 11, 2021 about an orange

Dodge pickup with a paper license plate and radioed it to other deputies in the area.

He testified that approximately two minutes later, Deputy Drake spotted the truck

and tried to initiate a traffic stop for speeding, but the truck did not stop. Deputy

Callier joined the chase, activating his emergency lights and sirens, and stayed

with the pursuit until the end. The chase ended when the orange truck parked in

the driveway of a residence. The chase lasted twenty to twenty-five minutes,

involved ten or more officers, and included some “erratic driving” by Appellant.

When they approached the orange truck parked on the driveway, Appellant was

sitting in the driver’s seat. A woman was sitting in the passenger’s seat.4 In

searching the car, the officers found a semiautomatic Glock handgun in the

passenger’s purse. Appellant first said he did not own the gun but subsequently

admitted it was his.5

4
      The female passenger was detained but released without arrest.
5
      Deputy Callier initially testified he heard Appellant say the gun was his but later
      testified he may have heard from someone else that Appellant acknowledged
      owning the gun.

                                           5
      Deputy Callier wore a body-worn camera when he was in pursuit of

Appellant and his patrol car was equipped with a dash camera. The jury saw the

dash camera video. It depicted Deputy Callier’s lights and sirens activated as he

drove to catch up with the other deputies pursuing Appellant. By the time he

caught up to them, Deputy Drake’s vehicle was to the right of the orange truck and

other vehicles were involved in the pursuit. By that time, Deputy Callier testified,

Appellant “should have pulled over to the rightmost lane and stopped.” Deputy

Callier stated Appellant was traveling at an “excess speed.”          As the pursuit

continued, law enforcement from other jurisdictions joined the pursuit. Deputy

Callier testified that at one point, he was driving in excess of ninety miles per hour

to keep up with the orange truck. When Deputy Callier exited the freeway and

drove into a residential area, the orange truck was traveling at thirty-five to forty

miles per hour. Deputy Callier’s dashcam video indicated the chase lasted about

twenty-five minutes and covered approximately twenty miles before Appellant

stopped in a residential driveway. Deputy Callier arrived at the driveway seconds

after Appellant stopped there. After parking, Appellant did not try to flee, did not

struggle, and obeyed the instructions given by law enforcement personnel.

      4.     Ryan Hilz

      Deputy Investigator Ryan Hilz, a robbery and violent crime investigator with

the Harris County Sherriff’s Office (“Deputy Hilz”), testified that on January 11,

                                          6
2021, he recovered a handgun at the end of a vehicle pursuit involving Appellant

and the Precinct 4 Constable’s Office.        The gun was discovered during the

inventory search of Appellant’s vehicle, but Deputy Hilz was not involved in the

pursuit. Deputy Hilz recovered and took possession of a black Glock 21 found in

the purse of the vehicle’s passenger and submitted it as evidence. He did not know

whether Appellant owned the weapon.

      5.     David Helms

      Sergeant David Helms (“Sergeant Helms”), a Houston Police Officer,

responded to the scene of an investigation on January 11, 2021 involving a suspect

fleeing in a vehicle. Appellant, who was driving an orange truck, was ultimately

arrested. Sergeant Helms found a black Glock semiautomatic pistol in the front

when he searched the truck after the chase. After Appellant was arrested and read

his Miranda warnings, Sergeant Helms and Detective Hilz interviewed Appellant

in the FBI’s Houston office.6 During the interview, parts of which were played for

the jury, Appellant told them he fled because there was a gun in the truck and he

wanted to drive the truck to where he was staying. Appellant confirmed during the

interview that he was the driver of the orange truck, that he knew there was a gun

in the truck, that he knew the police wanted to stop him, that he is a felon, and that

he passed the pistol to his passenger to put in her purse. He stated during the

6
      See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).

                                          7
interview that he wanted to take his truck home and that he used his turn signals

during the chase. Sergeant Helms testified that Appellant consented to give a

DNA swab and to a search of his cell phone.

B.    The Motion in Limine, the Rule 404(b) Hearing, and Deputy Gheen’s
      Testimony

      Appellant’s motion in limine included a request that the State be ordered

“not to mention, refer to, or attempt to elicit in any manner” Appellant’s

extraneous offenses until the trial court conducted a hearing outside the presence of

the jury to determine the admissibility of the offenses. The trial court granted the

motion in limine before trial began.

      The State filed a Notice of Intention to Use Evidence of Prior Convictions

and Extraneous Offenses (“404(b) Notice”) pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence

404(b).7 The 404(b) Notice included two incidents involving robberies at Chase,

corresponding to the two prior incidents on January 5 and January 8, 2021, where

7
      Texas Rule of Evidence 404 pertains to “Character Evidence; Crimes or Other
      Acts.” Rule 404(b) states in part:
             (b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
             (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
                    admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that
                    on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
                    the character.
             (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another
                    purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
                    preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
                    lack of accident.
      TEX. R. EVID. 404(b).

                                           8
according to Thompson, a man had approached her at the bank. The trial court

conducted a Rule 404(b) hearing prior to the beginning of testimony. During the

hearing, Appellant objected as follows:

      I’m going to object to the facts of those two prior robberies as not
      relevant, which is the first prong for contextual evidence; as violating
      Rule 402; and being too prejudicial under Rule 403 and the
      Montgomery case; and in violation of Rule 404 as improper
      background contextual evidence. So those are my objections to both
      of those robberies being proved up at the guilt and innocence state of
      this trial.

The trial court judge remarked that he was looking at “the [Texas Rule of

Evidence] 403 issue:”

      It’s definitely – if you’re talking about all the specifics to the two
      bank robberies, I think it’s going to be highly prejudicial. Whether
      it’s unfair, I haven’t gotten that far, but it definitely appears to be
      highly prejudicial. But I will allow it in a means where you can
      establish what you need to establish without it being unfairly
      prejudicial.8

After the parties conferred with the trial court, they came to an agreement, as

articulated by the State:

      [J]ust to make sure that I comply with your rulings and don’t, you
      know, cause any unnecessary movement of the jury for efficiency, it’s
      Your Honor’s ruling that we can talk about incidents, the facts of how

8
      Texas Rule of Evidence 403 states:
             The Court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
             substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
             following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
             jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
      TEX. R. EVID. 403.

                                           9
      she came close to this defendant in the past, but certainly not the word
      “robbery” and nothing about a specific criminal act. . . .

Appellant’s counsel stated, “If that’s all they offer, then I’ll hold my objection in

abeyance.” To which the trial court ruled, “All right. So I think we’ll do it that

way to prevent any 403 issues.”

      Later that day, the State called Jeremy Gheen (“Deputy Gheen”), a Harris

County Constable’s Office Precinct 4 corporal, who responded to a call on January

11, 2021 regarding an orange truck that was evading the police. He testified about

his exchange with Appellant when the truck he was driving came to a stop:

      Q (by the State):           Were you present when the truck came to a
                                  stop?

      A (by Deputy Ghent):        That’s correct.

      Q:                          When the truck came to a stop, did you
                                  participate in a felony stop?

      A:                          That’s correct, I did.

      Q:                          What is a felony stop?

      A:                          It is guns drawn and giving out verbal
                                  commands to the suspects to retreat back to
                                  us in as safe a manner as possible and to get
                                  them detained.

      Q:                          Why was this a felony stop?

      A:                          We were informed about the robbery at a
                                  bank and –

                                           10
      Counsel for Appellant:     Objection, Your Honor. This gets into what
                                 we –

      The Court:                 All right. State, approach the bench —

      Counsel for Appellant:     Instruction to disregard.

      The Court:                 The jury will be instructed to disregard the
                                 last statement of the witness.

      Counsel for Appellant:     Move for a mistrial, Your Honor.

      The Court:                 That will be denied.

      (At the Bench, on the record)

      Counsel for the State:     Yes, Your Honor?

      The Court:                 Did y’all talk to him about this?

      Counsel for the State:     He’s very tired and sleepy and we –

      The Court:                 You did not talk to him –

      Counsel for the State:     We’ll take him out, Judge, with the Court’s
                                 permission. Can we take him out?

      The Court:                 Do you want to take –

      Counsel for Appellant:     I cannot hear what you’re saying. I’m sorry.

      Counsel for the State:     Can we take him out of the room and admonish
                                 him again?

Counsel for Appellant reurged his motion for a mistrial and the Court denied it

again, stating he would instruct the jury to disregard the statement.9

9
      The jury instructions contained the following language:

                                          11
      Deputy Gheen continued his testimony, stating that he saw Appellant driving

the orange truck and park it in a driveway. Deputy Gheen testified that after

Appellant emerged from the truck, he did not attempt to flee on foot, did not

struggle, and followed law enforcement personnel’s commands.

C.    Conviction and Punishment

      The jury convicted Appellant of evading arrest or detention with a motor

vehicle. Appellant elected for the trial court to assess punishment. The charge was

enhanced with two prior convictions for felony assault and harassment of a public

servant. Appellant pleaded true to the enhancements. The trial court assessed

Appellant’s punishment at forty years’ confinement in the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice. This appeal ensued.

                                    Discussion

      In one issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for

a mistrial after Deputy Gheen informed the jury that Appellant was involved in a

robbery in violation of the trial court’s ruling on Appellant’s motion in limine.

Appellant argues the State’s failure to properly instruct Deputy Gheen about the

court’s prior ruling “resulted in the jury being presented with that highly

            You are instructed that certain evidence may have been presented to
            you in regard to the defendant’s having been charged and convicted
            of an offense or offenses other than the one for which he is now on
            trial. Such evidence cannot be considered by you against the
            defendant as any evidence of guilt in this case.

                                         12
prejudicial and inflammatory” information.          Appellant argues the court’s

instruction to the jury to disregard Deputy Gheen’s statement was not adequate to

address the resulting harm and that a mistrial should have been granted, because

the error was incurable. The State responds that the trial court did not err because

the jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instruction to disregard the

statement. The State argues that “one slip of the word ‘robbery’ without reference

to [A]ppellant or when it occurred” was not calculated to inflame the minds of the

jury or “so damning as to suggest it would be impossible to remove any harmful

impression from the mind of the jury.” Thus, it argues, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for mistrial.

A.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of

discretion. Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Gonzalez

v. State, 455 S.W.3d 198, 205–06 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.

ref’d). “A mistrial is an appropriate remedy in ‘extreme circumstances’ for a

narrow class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors.” Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884

(citing Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). A mistrial is

warranted to stop trial proceedings “when error is so prejudicial that expenditure of

further time and expense would be wasteful and futile.” Id. Mistrial is “an

                                         13
extreme remedy” that “should be granted ‘only when residual prejudice remains’

after less drastic alternatives are explored.” Id. at 884–85.

      We determine whether an error requires a mistrial based on the particular

facts of each case. Id. at 884. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for mistrial, we

view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,

considering only those arguments before the court at the time of the ruling.” Id.

(citing Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).              The

reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court but will

decide, rather, whether the trial court’s ruling was “arbitrary or unreasonable.”

Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial court’s

ruling on a motion for mistrial must be upheld if it was “within the zone of

reasonable disagreement.” Wead, 129 S.W.3d at 129; Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884.

      Instructions to disregard “are generally considered sufficient to cure

improprieties that occur during trial.” Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Testimony that refers to or implies information regarding

extraneous offenses allegedly committed by the defendant “can be rendered

harmless by an instruction from the trial judge.” Davis v. State, 642 S.W.2d 510,

512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). It is “well-settled” that testimony that refers to or

implies the commission of extraneous offenses is rendered harmless if the trial

judge instructs the jury to disregard the testimony, “unless it appears the evidence

                                          14
was so clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury or is of such damning

character as to suggest it would be impossible to remove the harmful impression

from the jury’s mind.” Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 308 (Tex. Crim. App.

1992) (citing Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675, 696–97 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987)).

      When constitutional rights are not implicated, we evaluate whether a trial

court abused its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial by weighing the factors

enumerated in Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). We

consider “(1) the severity of the misconduct (the magnitude of the prejudicial

effect of the prosecutor’s remarks), (2) the measures adopted to cure the

misconduct (the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge), and (3) the

certainty of conviction absent the misconduct (the strength of the evidence

supporting the conviction).” Id.; Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007). In conducting this review, we examine the factors in light of the

entire record. Schutz v. State, 63 S.W.3d 442, 444-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

B.    The Parties’ Contentions

      Appellant argues that the State’s failure to instruct Deputy Gheen to refrain

from referring to robberies involving Appellant was “highly prejudicial and

inflammatory.”   Appellant concedes “there was sufficient evidence to support

guilt,” but asserts the evidence “was not overwhelming.” While he does not

dispute he was the driver of the orange truck in question, and he testified he was

                                        15
aware he was being pursued by law enforcement personnel, Appellant explains he

did not make any effort to hide from law enforcement during the chase, he used his

turn signals during the chase, and he “fully cooperated with law enforcement”

when he stopped in a place “he determined was safe.”

      Appellant argues that Deputy Gheen’s statement regarding a robbery

“garnered the jury’s attention and may have resulted in Appellant being improperly

tried for collateral offenses or for being a criminal generally.” He explains the jury

had already heard testimony from Thompson that she was “fearful” during the

January 5, 2021 incident and “terrified” after the January 8, 2021 incident.10 He

argues that Thompson’s testimony, coupled with Deputy Gheen’s reference to a

robbery involving Appellant, would have made it “very difficult” for the jury to do

anything other than convict Appellant.          Appellant argues that it is likely the

evidence of the extraneous offenses played a “significant role” in Appellant’s

conviction.

      Appellant argues the jury “certainly had some question about his guilt as

they spent a considerable period of time on the first day of deliberation and had to

return the following day to complete their task.”11 Appellant argues that one of the

10
      Thompson testified that she was “scared” after the first incident.
11
      Given that the jury was deliberating on two charges, it is not possible to determine
      how much of the jury’s deliberation pertained to the evading arrest charge. See
      supra, note 2.

                                           16
jury’s notes sent to the Court asked if there was a “specific distance when you must

stop when being followed by a police car with lights and siren active.”12 Thus,

Appellant asserts, “the evidence was not so overwhelming as to assure that the

extraneous offense evidence had no influence or only a slight influence on the

verdict.”

      The State contends that the court’s instruction to the jury to disregard

Deputy Gheen’s statement cured his reference to a robbery. The State further

argues that Appellant did not present evidence showing the jury failed to follow the

trial court’s instruction and thus, Deputy Gheen’s reference to “the robbery at the

bank” was not “so calculated to inflame the minds of a jury or of such a nature as

to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced.”

C.    The Mosley Factors

      Evaluating whether a trial court erred in denying a mistrial is similar to

performing a harm analysis. Archie, 221 S.W.3d at 700; Gomez v. State, 552

S.W.3d 422, 428 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.). “[W]hether a mistrial

should have been granted involves most, if not all, of the same considerations that

attend a harm analysis.” Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77. We use a harm analysis

12
      The jury’s actual question was, “Is there any language that specifies a distance of
      when you must stop when you are being followed by a police car with lights and
      siren active?”

                                          17
when there is error, and “ordinarily, error occurs only when the trial court makes a

mistake.” Id. at 76.

      Here, the trial court sustained Appellant’s objection to Deputy Gheen’s

testimony, instructed the jury to disregard his reference to a robbery, and included

a jury instruction in the charge admonishing the jury that it could not consider

evidence of extraneous offenses in determining guilt. As in Hawkins v. State, 135

S.W.3d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), “[t]he only adverse ruling—and thus the only

occasion for making a mistake—was the trial court’s denial of the motion for

mistrial.” Id. at 77–78.

      Appellant contends the reviewing court should consider in its analysis “the

nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error, and

how the error might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case.”

Appellant cites Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) in support

of its analysis. But Morales is about the exclusion of a relevant piece of evidence.

Id. at 864. We believe the proper analysis is that set forth in Mosley v. State, 983

S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The Mosley factors are based on federal

caselaw and are intended to construe the impact of Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 44.2(b), which states, “Any other error, defect, irregularity, or variance

that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” See Mosley, 983

S.W.2d at 259. Although Mosley involved an improper jury argument, the Mosley

                                         18
factors have been applied in other situations where mistrials were denied, such as

in cases involving testimony referring to extraneous offenses. See, e.g., Gomez,

552 S.W.3d at 427, 429 (affirming trial court’s denial of mistrial after testifying

officer referred to “previous family violence calls involving Appellant”).13 As

noted, under Mosley, we consider: “(1) the severity of the misconduct (the

magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks), (2) the measures

adopted to cure the misconduct (the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the

judge), and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct (the strength of

the evidence supporting the conviction).” Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259; see also

Hernandez v. State, 454 S.W.3d 643, 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014,

pet. ref’d) (citing Archie, 221 S.W.3d at 700)14; Griffin v. State, 571 S.W.3d 404,

13
      Although Gomez v. State, 552 S.W.3d 422, 428 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no
      pet.) does not expressly refer to the factors as Mosley factors, it identifies the
      factors and relies on Ramon v. State, 159 S.W.3d 927, 929 (Tex. Crim. App.
      2004), which cites the Mosley factors in its opinion concerning an appeal of the
      denial of a motion for mistrial.
14
      Hernandez v. State, 454 S.W.3d 643, 649 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014,
      pet. ref’d) identifies the Mosley factors but it does not address each factor. Rather,
      it bases its holding solely on the presumption that the trial court’s instruction to the
      jury to disregard testimony about an extraneous offense was sufficient to cure any
      harm. Id. at 650. In that case, we held the trial court’s denial of a motion for
      mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. Id.

                                             19
417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Archie, 340 S.W.3d

at 739) (citing Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259).15, 16

      1.     The Severity of the Misconduct

      Appellant argues the State did not instruct Deputy Gheen to refrain from

referring to any prior robberies. The State counters that the record does not reflect

it failed to instruct its witnesses to avoid referring to robberies; rather, the record

indicates only that there was “one tired witness who accidentally said the word

‘robbery.’”17 The transcript of the trial does not establish whether the witness was

told prior to his testimony not to refer to robberies, but the State did request

permission to admonish the witness “again.” As the State notes in its brief, “every

other witness complied with the court’s instruction, presumably because the State

informed them of such.” Thus, Appellant did not establish the State engaged in

severe misconduct.

      Further, Appellant did not establish that he was prejudiced by Deputy

Gheen’s statement.     “Prejudice is clearly the touchstone of the first factor in

the Mosley test.” Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77. “To be sure, particularly offensive

15
      In Griffin v. State, 571 S.W.3d 404, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019,
      pet. ref’d), this Court applied the Mosley factors to determine whether the trial
      court abused its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial.
16
      The parties did not address the Mosley factors in their briefs.
17
      Deputy Gheen stated at the beginning of his testimony that he had not had any
      sleep because he was on duty “very, very late” the night before.

                                            20
or outrageous conduct generally gives rise to a natural inference of prejudice and

can be considered as such, even when prejudice is not otherwise apparent from the

record.” Id. at 77–78. Appellant argued that “the evidence of extraneous criminal

offenses was inherently prejudicial and tended to confuse the issues in the case

because of the jury’s natural inclination to infer guilt of the charged offenses from

the extraneous offenses.” But Deputy Gheen’s single reference to a robbery was

not accompanied by any information about the robbery. To the extent Appellant

asserts the “mention of an extraneous robbery garnered the jury’s attention, and

may have resulted in Appellant being improperly tried for collateral offenses for

being a criminal generally,” he seems to argue that any accidental reference to an

extraneous offense will be prejudicial and should automatically result in mistrial.

That is not the law. See, e.g., Bendy v. State, No. 08-15-00369-CR, 2016 WL

6473054, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso Nov. 2, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (holding “the magnitude of any prejudicial effect was

low” when jury heard “single, isolated statement” that Appellant’s name appeared

in unspecified criminal investigation); Gomez, 552 S.W.3d at 426 (discussing first

Mosley factor, noting that officer who mentioned extraneous offenses after being

instructed not to did not refer to them again or provide details regarding offenses,

and finding that “limited nature” of his statement weighed against mistrial). As

Appellant notes, by the time Deputy Gheen testified, Thompson already had

                                         21
testified that she was “terrified” by the two prior incidents at Chase involving

Appellant. The jury was free to believe or disbelieve after her testimony that

something nefarious had transpired during those prior incidents.          Either way,

Appellant did not establish he was prejudiced by Deputy Gheen’s isolated

statement about a robbery devoid of any other factual context or information.

      Because it appears Deputy Gheen was admonished not to refer to robberies

but inadvertently disregarded the admonishment, and in the absence of a showing

that Appellant was prejudiced by the statement, this factor weighs against a finding

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for mistrial.

      2.     Measures Adopted to Cure the Misconduct

      Immediately after Deputy Gheen’s testimony regarding a robbery, Appellant

objected to the testimony about the extraneous offense and asked for an instruction

to disregard. The transcript indicates the trial court immediately instructed the jury

“to disregard the last statement of the witness.” In addition, the jury charge

instructed the jurors to disregard any evidence “in regard to the defendant’s having

been charged and convicted of an offense or offenses other than the one” for which

he was on trial.

      Instructions to disregard “are generally considered sufficient to cure

improprieties that occur during trial.” Gamboa, 296 S.W.3d at 580; see also

Davis, 642 S.W.2d at 512 (testimony “referring to or implying extraneous offenses

                                          22
allegedly committed by the defendant” is rendered harmless if judge gives

instruction to disregard); Sanders v. State, 25 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. dism’d) (“Because curative instructions are

presumed efficacious to withdraw from jury consideration almost any evidence or

argument which is objectionable, trial conditions must be extreme before a mistrial

is warranted.”); Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)

(“[T]he trial judge’s prompt sustaining of counsel’s objection conveyed the

appropriate message that the witness’s comment was not supported by the evidence

and was not to be considered.”). The general presumption is that a jury will follow

the judge’s instructions. Gamboa, 296 S.W.3d at 580 (citing Colburn v. State, 966

S.W.2d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).18 The presumption is rebuttable if the

complaining party “point[s] to evidence that the jury failed to follow the trial

18
      See Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675, 696–97 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987) (holding
      witness statement that “[appellant] told me that even when he was in the
      penitentiary, that he had stomach problems” was cured by trial court’s instruction
      to disregard); Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)
      (holding reference to appellant’s having “recently been released from the
      penitentiary” did not warrant mistrial when jury was instructed to disregard
      testimony); Ballard v. State, 537 S.W.3d 517, 521, 525–26 (Tex. App.—Houston
      [1st Dist. 2017, pet ref’d) (affirming denial of mistrial when limiting instruction
      was given because of witness’ testimony regarding finding of “crystal meth” and
      gun in appellant’s home despite limine order precluding evidence of extraneous
      offenses); Francis v. State, 445 S.W.3d 307, 320–21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
      Dist.] 2013) (holding mistrial properly denied because instruction to disregard
      cured reference to defendant’s “criminal history”), aff’d, 428 S.W.3d 850 (Tex.
      Crim. App. 2014); Williams v. State, 417 S.W.3d 162, 172–73 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (holding instruction to disregard cured
      prosecutor’s voir dire comment about his opinion of defendant’s guilt).

                                          23
court’s instructions.” Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)

(citing Coburn, 966 S.W.2d at 520). The presumption also is rebuttable “in the

most egregious cases” where the statement at issue is “extremely inflammatory.”

Griffin, 571 S.W.3d at 419 (quoting Williams v. State, 417 S.W.3d 162, 176 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d)).

      Appellant does not cite anything in the appellate record that indicates the

jury failed to follow the court’s instruction to disregard.19 As such, he did not

rebut the presumption that the jury followed the trial court’s instruction. See

Hernandez, 454 S.W.3d at 650 (affirming denial of mistrial, noting lack of

evidence suggesting jurors failed to follow trial court’s instructions to disregard

statement regarding extraneous offenses); Thrift, 176 S.W.3d at 224 (affirming

denial of mistrial after proper instruction to disregard was given by trial court, and

noting appellant failed to rebut presumption that jury followed instruction);

Lazarine v. State, No. 01-19-00982-CR, 2021 WL 5702182, at *11 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 2, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (concluding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion

for mistrial, stating, “Lazarine does not explain, and we cannot discern, why the

trial court’s instruction to disregard was not effective to cure the alleged error.”).

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we conclude the trial judge’s
19
      Appellant says in his brief, without elaboration, that “[a]n instruction to disregard
      would not have been adequate to address the harm and a mistrial was warranted.”

                                           24
instruction to disregard cured any error. This factor indicates the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s motion for mistrial.

         3.    The Certainty of the Conviction Absent the Misconduct

         After a review of the record, we conclude there were sufficient grounds to

convict Appellant regardless of the objected-to testimony.            Sergeant Holmes

testified that Appellant ran from him at the bank, even after Sergeant Holmes

identified himself as a police officer and ordered him to stop. Deputy Drake

testified that when he saw the orange truck, he attempted to make a traffic stop

because Appellant was speeding, but Appellant continued driving, disregarding

Deputy Drake’s lights and siren. He testified that Appellant’s truck was “swerving

through traffic” to avoid the several law enforcement vehicles that were following

him with lights and sirens activated. The dashcam footage verifies the orange

truck Appellant was driving led several law enforcement vehicles in pursuit on a

busy freeway.20 Both Deputy Drake and Deputy Callier testified that during the

pursuit, Appellant drove as fast as ninety miles per hour. Deputy Callier testified

that Appellant was “erratic” in his driving during the twenty- to twenty-five-minute

chase.

         Appellant concedes “there was sufficient evidence to support guilt.” He

further acknowledges he was the driver of the orange truck and “he was aware that

20
         The dashcam video was muted, but it is clear when viewing it that the law
         enforcement vehicles’ flashing lights were on.

                                          25
he was being pursued by law enforcement.” Appellant points to only two reasons

the jury should have questioned Appellant’s guilt: his use of turn signals during the

chase, and his cooperation with law enforcement authorities after the chase.

      It is not clear, as Appellant argues, that his use of turn signals and his failure

to struggle or attempt to run after exiting the truck is “inconsistent with a person

fleeing.” While the use of turn signals during a chase may be unexpected, it is not

enough to negate the overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s having evaded arrest

or detention.   And we decline to hold that Appellant’s cooperation with law

enforcement personnel after leading them on a high-speed chase tempers the fact

that he evaded them for twenty to thirty miles as they followed him in their

vehicles at a rate up to ninety miles per hour with lights and sirens activated for at

least twenty minutes.

      That Appellant led multiple law enforcement units with lights and sirens on

a high-speed chase for at least twenty minutes is compelling evidence of

Appellant’s guilt of the evading-arrest charge. Notwithstanding Appellant’s use of

his turn signals during the chase and his cooperation after the chase, this factor

weighs against a finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Appellant’s motion for mistrial.

      Under these circumstances, it was within the trial court’s discretion to deny

Appellant’s motion for mistrial.

                                          26
                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Countiss and Rivas-Molloy.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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