Court Opinion

ID: 9834048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:15:45.672653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.245066
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant insists that since Etier, the lessee, did not surrender the leased premises to the lessors or their assignees, J. S. and J. O. McCall, within 90 days next ensuing after he had notice of the sale of the property to the McCalls, neither he nor his assignees, the appellees in this cause, established any right to a return of the $1,050 in controversy. In other words, it is insisted, in effect, that time, to wit, the 90 days, was of the essence of appellant’s contract to reimburse Etier for the $1,050 which the latter and his associates'had deposited to be applied as rental for the last three months of the 'five-year rental period.
We do not concur in that construction of the contract. Appellant’s contract to reimburse the lessees the sum of money so advanced does not expressly stipulate that that would be done in the event only that the lessees surrender possession of the property within 90 days. It is manifest that the intention of the lessors in requiring the"lessees to surrender possession of the demised premises in the event of a sale of the property was that the lease held by them should not be an obstacle which would prevent the sale of the property by the lessors. It is also clear that after appellant sold the property it was impossible for him to furnish the premises to the lessees for occupancy during the last three months of the five-year period, and that, therefore, no consideration passed to appellant for the money deposited to cover that period. Under such circumstances, to permit appellant to hold the money so de'posited clearly would be inequitable, since a holding would, in effect, be that Etier had forfeited to appellant that sum by reason of his failure to surrender possession of the premises to the purchasers of the property within 90 days after notice of the sale to them, notwithstanding their lease did not in any manner interfere with the sale of the premises, arid notwithstanding the further fact that the purchasers permitted the lessees to continue in possession, in consideration of the payment of the same rentals theretofore paid to appellant. The contract contains no provision for such forfeiture, and the only basis for the claim by appellant is the breach of Etier’s agreement to surrender possession within the 90-day period. Forfeitures are not favored in law, and the right thereto can be based only on provisions in a contract that clearly and unequivocally give such right. Decker v. Kirlicks, 110 Tex. 94, 216 S. W. 385; Grubb v. McAfee, 109 Tex. 527, 212 S. W. 464.
While the deposit of the money in controversy to cover the last three months of the rental period was in part consideration for the execution of the lease, yet that fact in no manner militated against the lessors’ contract to return the money upon the happening of the contingency therein specified; the deposit of the money being merely an assurance that the lessors would be paid the money for the period of time covered by the deposit.
Appellant calls attention to the testimony of appellee J. S. McCall to the effect that after he purchased the property he wrote to appellant demanding the return to him of the money in controversy, and that that demand was made before Etier executed to him the assignment of his claim therefor, which written assignment is shown in the original opinion. If it be true that McCall did not have the right to the deposit until after the written assignment was executed, it was immaterial to his- recovery that he claimed the deposit before the execution of the lease, since the execution of that instrument clearly gave him the same right to the deposit as Etier himself had.
Appellant invokes a discussion of the assignment of error to the action of the court •in allowing plaintiff a recovery of interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum on the amount of the deposit. The time for which interest was allowed began with the refusal of appellant’s demand therefor after the deposit had been assigned to the' appellee. As stated in the motion, this assignment was not specifically discussed in our former opinion, but we did consider it and reached the conclusion that the same was without merit. The point made is that the interest could not be allowed as interest eo nomine, under the provisions of article 4977 of our Revised Statutes, and that if allowed at all it could be allowed only as damages, and that, since there was no finding of interest by the jury as damages, there was no basis for a recovery of the sainé as provided in the judgment.
There was no controversy in the testimony *895as to appellee’s right to recover the full' amount of the deposit of $1,050, if they were entitled to recover at all. The ease was tried on special issues, and the only issue submitted to the jury was:
“At the time the plaintiff, J. S. McCall and the defendant W. B. Boss executed the transaction by trading or exchanging property, was it understood and agreed by and between them that whatever amount said Boss had received from E. L. Etier under the terms of the contract introduced in evidence before you, and stated in the contract as being payment of the last three months’ rent on said premises, was a part of the consideration of said trade or exchange of property, and that said sum should be retained by W. B. Boss as his property?”
Upon that issue the jury answered: “No.” Nor did the parties to the suit request the submission of any other issue.
Under such circumstances, the trial court was authorized to allow 6 per cent, interest upon the amount of the deposit, even as damages, if it be true, as insisted by appellant, that such could not be allowed as interest eo nomine. Article 1985, V. S. Tex. Civ. Statutes.
Furthermore, we believe that the decision of the Commission of Appeals in the case of Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Kriton, 112 Tex, 532, 249 S. W. 193, cited by appellant, is adverse to the contention of appellant last noted.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.