Court Opinion

ID: 9956932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:11:14.342374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:59.135705
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Allegheny County Prison Employees       :
Independent Union (ACPEIU),             :
                         Appellant      :
                                        :
          v.                            : No. 637 C.D. 2021
                                        : Argued: February 6, 2024
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania          :
(County Jail)                           :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE                                    FILED: April 3, 2024

      Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union (the Union) appeals
from the June 2, 2021 order (Order) of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County (Common Pleas) which denied the Union’s Petition to Vacate (Petition to
Vacate) an Act 195 Grievance Arbitrator’s Supplemental Remedy Award (Remedy
Award) issued by Arbitrator Vincent C. Longo, Esquire (Arbitrator). At issue is the
Union’s dispute with Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (Employer) over whether
Allegheny County Jail (the jail) Corrections Officer David Foriska (Grievant) was
entitled to lost wages during the period of time he was off work after Employer
improperly terminated his employment, where Grievant failed to seek comparable
alternative employment. After review, we affirm.
                                     BACKGROUND
       The facts, as found by Arbitrator, are as follows and are not in dispute.1
Grievant is a corrections officer at the jail. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 158a. The
Union is the collective bargaining representative of the corrections officers at the
jail. Id. at 157a-58a. In an Arbitration Award dated September 13, 2018 (Arbitration
Award), Arbitrator addressed Employer’s suspension and discharge of Grievant for
allegedly violating the jail’s Use of Force Policy and Code of Ethics. Id. at 158a.
Arbitrator concluded Employer discharged Grievant from his position without just
cause in violation of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and
converted Grievant’s discharge to an unpaid 30-day suspension. Id. Arbitrator
directed Grievant “shall be made whole for any and all losses, including lost
overtime opportunities” and Employer was “entitled to a set off for all reasonable
interim earnings and unemployment compensation.” Id. at 158a, 166a. Arbitrator
retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the Arbitration Award. Id.
       On September 16, 2018, Employer reinstated Grievant to his former position,
but did not pay Grievant any amount of back pay. Id. On October 12, 2018,
Employer appealed the Arbitration Award to Common Pleas by filing a Petition to
Vacate Award (Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award). Id. On December 4, 2018,
Common Pleas denied Employer’s Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award.                         Id.
Employer appealed to this Court. Id. at 159a. On November 7, 2019, this Court

1
  It is well established that an “arbitrator is authorized to make findings of fact to inform his
interpretation of the [collective bargaining agreement].” Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Millcreek
Twp. Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 210 A.3d 993, 1006 (Pa. 2019). “An arbitrator’s findings of fact
are not reviewable on appeal, and as long as he has arguably construed or applied the collective
bargaining agreement, an appellate court may not second-guess his findings of fact or
interpretation.” Coatesville Area Sch. Dist. v. Coatesville Area Teachers’ Ass’n/Pa. State
Educ. Ass’n, 978 A.2d 413, 415 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).

                                               2
denied Employer’s appeal. Id. Also on November 7, 2019, the Union demanded
Employer pay Grievant back pay. Id.
      On January 10, 2020, the Union requested a hearing before Arbitrator for the
purpose of enforcing the Arbitration Award and determining the amount of back pay
due to Grievant. Id. On August 28, 2020, Arbitrator held a remedy hearing. Id. At
the remedy hearing, Grievant testified that before his termination, his wife stayed
home with their children as the primary caregiver. Id. at 160a. However, after
Employer terminated his employment, Grievant and his wife “switched roles,” and
he chose to stay at home to care for their children, one of whom has special needs
and requires significant attention, while his wife obtained employment outside the
home. Id. Grievant testified that following his suspension and discharge in October
2017, he drove for Uber for a short period of time and earned a total of approximately
$600. Id. This job ended when he began having issues with his vehicle. Id. Grievant
testified there are other jails and prisons near where he lived, but he did not apply to
work at any of them and did not make any other attempt to secure employment. Id.
                           Arbitrator’s Remedy Award
      On October 7, 2020, Arbitrator issued his Remedy Award in favor of
Employer, concluding Employer was not required to provide any back pay to
Grievant. Id. at 171a. Relying on Philips Respironics v. Workers’ Compensation
Appeal Board (Mika), 232 A.3d 1019 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020), Arbitrator explained that
case presented similar facts to those of Grievant’s as the claimant in that case elected
to stay home with his children while his wife returned to work due to his family’s
financial considerations. Ultimately, in Philips Respironics, this Court determined
that “[b]ecause [the claimant] acknowledged that there was work he could do, but
he chose not to pursue it due to personal financial considerations, [the employer]

                                           3
was not required to present evidence of available work within [the claimant’s]
restrictions or expert testimony regarding [the claimant’s] earning power.” Id. at
1024. Finding this determination persuasive, Arbitrator explained:

      It is well-established in labor arbitration that employees who are
      discharged or suspended without just cause have a duty to mitigate their
      losses if they wish to receive back pay upon their return to the job from
      which they were discharged. This duty to mitigate does not require the
      employee to apply for any available position. It requires that the
      employee seek positions with similar duties, wages, hours, and
      location. The employee is held to a due diligence standard. He or she
      need not succeed in securing alternative employment. Rather, he or she
      must make a bona fide attempt to mitigate their losses by seeking
      alternative employment.

      ....

      [Grievant], however, did not apply for any jobs (with the exception of
      a brief time driving for Uber). Instead, [Grievant] elected to stay at
      home to care for his children while his wife, who had been the primary
      caregiver, returned to work full time. [Grievant] made a financial
      decision that made sense for his family.

      ....

      [Grievant] testified at hearing that there are other jails and prisons in
      the area to which he could have applied but did not. [Grievant] may
      have faced some hurdles in securing alternative employment at another
      jail or prison, given that he had just been discharged from [the jail].
      However, it cannot be assumed or known with certainty that no jail or
      prison would have hired him if he had applied. [Grievant] was required
      to use “due diligence” in seeking alternative employment. [Grievant]
      made no attempt to seek alternative employment. He thus did not
      satisfy his due diligence obligation.

      ....

      [Arbitrator] does not disagree that [Grievant] probably made a
      reasonable decision to stay at home and care for the children in lieu of
      working a minimum wage job. [Arbitrator] also agrees that principles
      of Worker[s’] Compensation law are not identical to principles of labor

                                         4
      arbitration. The reasoning of Philips Respironics certainly cannot be
      disregarded in the instant case[.]

      However, one need not resolve the question of how making a
      reasonable financial decision impacts [Grievant’s] entitlement to back
      pay. As noted, it is well-established in labor arbitration that a
      discharged or suspended employee must exercise due diligence and
      make a bona fide effort to mitigate his or her losses by seeking similar
      alternative employment. It is undisputed that there are other jails and
      prisons in the western Pennsylvania area. These facilities employ
      Corrections Officers – the position [Grievant] held at the [jail] prior to
      his discharge. It is also undisputed that [Grievant] did not apply to or
      otherwise make any effort to secure employment at any of these
      facilities, much less exercise due diligence and make a bona fide effort.

      [Grievant] did what he believed was best for [his] family. It was most
      likely reasonable for [Grievant] to stay home to care for his special
      needs child in lieu of working at a fast food restaurant for minimum
      wage. But this did not absolve [Grievant] of his clearly-established
      responsibility to mitigate his losses by exercising due diligence by
      making a bona fide effort to seek similar alternative employment.

R.R. at 168a-69a. Accordingly, Arbitrator concluded Employer was not required to
provide any back pay to Grievant.
                             Common Pleas’ Decision
      The Union filed its Petition to Vacate with Common Pleas. On June 2, 2021,
Common Pleas denied the Union’s Petition to Vacate and affirmed the Remedy
Award. Id. at 299a-301a. In its Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a),
Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a), Opinion dated July 27, 2021 (1925(a) Op.), Common Pleas
explained the Remedy Award in this case was rationally derived from the CBA
because

      the CBA includes the issue of discipline[;] therefore[,] it is within the
      jurisdiction of [Arbitrator] to modify the discipline imposed on
      [Grievant] by reducing the discipline from termination to a suspension
      without pay. Because discipline is covered by the CBA, and suspension
      without pay is a form of discipline, it logically flows that [Arbitrator]

                                          5
       in this case had the authority to determine the need for back pay and
       any ‘setoffs’ to which [Grievant] may be entitled.

1925(a) Op. at 3.
       Further, Common Pleas concluded the Remedy Award did not violate public
policy.   Common Pleas explained the remedy imposed by Arbitrator reduced
Grievant’s termination to a suspension without pay and eliminated Employer’s
obligation to pay lost wages because Grievant failed to mitigate his damages. Id. at
5-6.   Common Pleas rejected the Union’s assertion that the Remedy Award
implicated the public policy of parents’ rights to make decisions regarding the care,
custody, and control of their children, and the state’s interest in protecting the best
interests of children. Id. at 5. Common Pleas explained the Union was “unable to
point to any law or case-law establishing that a parent’s right to choose to be a stay-
at-home parent because he believes it is in the best interest of his child relieves that
parent of the duty to mitigate damages in a labor dispute.” Id. In its Order, Common
Pleas pointed out that the Union could not “enunciate a well-established public
policy that parents of dependent children are exempt from the obligation to mitigate
damages.” Order, at 2. Additionally, Arbitrator did not force Grievant to accept a
lower paying job instead of caring for his daughter. Id. Rather, the Remedy Award
only required Grievant to have made a good-faith effort to find comparable
employment. Id.
       Similarly, Common Pleas rejected the Union’s assertion that the Remedy
Award violated public policy by incentivizing Employer’s non-compliance with the
Arbitration Award during the appeal by requiring Grievant to mitigate lost wages
without any notice or demand made to Grievant to do so. 1925(a) Op. at 5. Common
Pleas explained the Remedy Award did not relieve Employer of the enforceability
of the Arbitration Award because Grievant was reinstated at work three days after

                                           6
Arbitrator issued his Arbitration Award, and if Grievant had properly mitigated his
damages, any amount due to him after the hearing on set-off would have been
binding and enforceable. Id. at 6. Common Pleas pointed out that Arbitrator retained
jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the Arbitration Award and “[c]ompliance
include[d] [Grievant’s] duty to mitigate damages.” Order, at 2. Accordingly,
Common Pleas concluded Arbitrator was within his authority to determine Grievant
was not entitled to back pay. Id. at 3.
                               Arguments on Appeal
      The Union now appeals to this Court. On appeal, the Union asserts Common
Pleas erred by holding the Remedy Award drew its essence from the CBA. The
Union’s Br. at 8. Additionally, the Union argues Common Pleas erred by finding
the Remedy Award did not violate public policy (1) by denying Grievant “make-
whole wages by forcing . . . Grievant to prioritize the mitigation of lost wages . . .
over providing personal care for his special needs child” and (2) by “incentivizing
[Employer’s] non-compliance with [the Arbitration Award].” Id. at 8-9.
      In response, Employer asserts the Remedy Award denying back pay was in
accordance with the law and the CBA. Employer’s Br. at 1, 5. Employer points out
that in addition to the explicit retention of jurisdiction within the Arbitration Award,
the Union acknowledged Arbitrator’s retention of jurisdiction when it requested a
hearing before Arbitrator to enforce the Arbitration Award and to determine any
back pay due to Grievant. Id. at 5. Additionally, Employer contends both the
Union’s arguments that the Remedy Award violates public policy lack merit. Id.
First, Employer asserts an employee’s duty to mitigate damages has no effect upon
parental rights and thus does not violate public policy. Id. Second, Employer argues
the Remedy Award did not incentivize Employer’s non-compliance with the

                                           7
Arbitration Award because Arbitrator retained jurisdiction; therefore, Employer did
not fail to comply with a final lawful award. Id. at 26.
                                        DISCUSSION
         Our standard of review of labor arbitration awards under the Public Employe
Relations Act (PERA)2 is the “essence test.” Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist. v. Cent.
Dauphin Educ. Ass’n, 767 A.2d 16, 18-19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Under the essence
test, we must first determine if the issue is encompassed within the terms of the CBA.
Id. If so, we will uphold an arbitrator’s award provided the arbitrator’s interpretation
may be rationally derived from the CBA. Id. at 18-19. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has explained that the essence test requires

         an arbitrator’s interpretation be upheld if it can, in any rational way, be
         derived from the language and context of the agreement. When an issue,
         properly defined, is within the terms of a collective bargaining
         agreement and the arbitrator’s decision can in a rational way be derived
         from the terms of the agreement, one can say that the decision draws its
         “essence” from the agreement, and reversal is not warranted even if a
         court believes that the decision, though rational, is incorrect.

Delaware Cnty. v. Del. Cnty. Prison Emps. Indep. Union, 713 A.2d 1135, 1137 (Pa.
1998) (emphasis in original and citation omitted). Further, the Court noted in State
System of Higher Education (Cheyney University) v. State College University
Professional Association (PSEA-NEA), 743 A.2d 405, 413 (Pa. 1999), a court should
“only vacate an arbitrator’s award where the award indisputably and genuinely is
without foundation in, or fails to logically flow from, the collective bargaining
agreement.” The essence test applies equally to our review of an arbitrator’s
threshold determinations of the legal enforceability of a CBA, as well as the

2
    Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101–1101.2301.

                                                8
jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Am. Fed’n of State,
Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 84, 692 A.2d 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).
                                    Essence Test
        First, we address the Union’s assertion that Common Pleas erred by holding
Arbitrator’s Remedy Award was rationally derived from the CBA under the essence
test. The Union’s Br. at 26. The Union argues Arbitrator exceeded its jurisdiction
by denying Grievant wages he was awarded under the Arbitration Award. Id. In
response, Employer maintains Arbitrator’s Remedy Award satisfies the essence test
because Arbitrator retained jurisdiction to allow further modification of the remedy
and the Union petitioned Arbitrator to review the discipline issued. Employer’s Br.
at 7.    Employer asserts both parties acknowledged Arbitrator’s jurisdiction to
determine whether Grievant was entitled to back pay and if so, the amount, by
placing those issues before Arbitrator. Id. Employer points out that arbitrators have
the authority to modify discipline and “[i]nherent within the authority to modify
discipline is the review of all relevant evidence to determine the need for and/or
amounts of back pay.” Id. at 9. We agree with Employer.
        An arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide the arbitrability of an issue, and we
give broad deference to the arbitrator’s determinations regarding arbitrability of the
subject matter of a grievance. Wattsburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Wattsburg Educ. Ass’n,
PSEA/NEA, 884 A.2d 934, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); Scranton Fed’n of Tchrs., Loc.
1147, AFT v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 444 A.2d 1144, 1147 (Pa. 1982). This Court has
previously held that reopening an arbitration under retained jurisdiction, in order to
afford a remedy under the original award, is not only permissible, but fulfills the
arbitration policy of PERA to provide inexpensive, expeditious contractual

                                           9
remedies. Greater Latrobe Area Sch. Dist. v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, 615 A.2d 999,
1004-05 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).
      Regarding remedies, it is well established that an arbitrator may fashion a
remedy in a particular case that is not explicitly prescribed in the CBA so long as the
remedy furthers the essence of the CBA. Rose Tree Media Sec’y & Educ. Support
Pers. Ass’n v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 136 A.3d 1069, 1080 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
An arbitrator has broad authority with respect to crafting an award, which requires
the court give an arbitrator latitude and flexibility in doing so. Pa. State Sys. of
Higher Educ., Lock Haven Univ. v. Ass’n of Pa. State Coll. & Univ. Facs., 193 A.3d
486, 495-96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018); Pa. Tpk. Comm’n v. Teamsters Loc. Union No.
250, 639 A.2d 968, 974 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). However, this authority is not limitless.
Where an award changes the language of a CBA or adds new or additional provisions
to the agreement, it fails the essence test. Cheyney Univ., 743 A.2d at 422. The
United States Supreme Court explained the following:

      When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the
      collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment
      to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially
      true when it comes to formulating remedies. There the need is for
      flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations. The draftsmen may
      never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to meet
      a particular contingency.

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
Specifically, regarding an award of back pay, this Court has held that where the CBA
sets no limits on the remedial power of the arbitrator, an arbitrator’s award of back
pay to a grievant neither adds to, subtracts from, nor modifies the provisions of the
agreement. Slippery Rock Univ. of Pa., State Sys. of Higher Educ. v. Ass’n of Pa.

                                          10
State Coll. & Univ. Fac., 241 A.3d 1278, 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). Therefore, an
award of back pay satisfies the essence test. Id.
        Here, the issue before Arbitrator was whether Grievant was entitled to back
pay and if so, what amount. Article XVIII of the parties’ CBA covers suspension
and discharge, and Article XXI of the CBA covers compensation (R.R. at 46a-47a,
51a-58a). Arbitrator previously modified Grievant’s termination to a suspension in
its Arbitration Award. The issue of whether Grievant was entitled to back pay based
on that modification and, if so, the amount, logically flows from the CBA, and the
first part of the essence test is satisfied.
        Next, we determine whether Arbitrator’s Remedy Award can be rationally
derived from the CBA. We conclude that it can. First, the CBA between these
parties did not preclude Arbitrator’s retention of jurisdiction in this case.         If
resolution of this dispute between the parties required new grievance procedures and
possible arbitration, this could have caused excessive delay and expense. Rather,
Arbitrator avoided further delay of final resolution of the grievance by retaining
jurisdiction. Second, Arbitrator’s Remedy Award was rationally derived from the
CBA because the CBA covers suspension and discharge, as well as compensation,
which encompasses the issue of back pay. Arbitrator’s Remedy Award determining
Employer owed Grievant no back pay did not add to, subtract from, or modify the
provisions of the CBA.         See Slippery Rock Univ. of Pa., 241 A.3d at 1288.
Accordingly, the Remedy Award derives from the CBA and satisfies the essence
test.
                                       Public Policy
        Because the essence test is satisfied, we turn to the Union’s assertion that the
Remedy Award violates public policy. The Union sets forth two arguments in

                                               11
support of its contention that the Remedy Award violates public policy. First, the
Union asserts the Remedy Award “forc[ed] [Grievant] to prioritize the mitigation of
lost wages during a period of dispute over his discharge, over providing personal
care for his special needs child.” The Union’s Br. at 34. Second, the Union contends
the Remedy Award “incentiviz[ed] [Employer’s] non-compliance with [the
Arbitration Award], by requiring [Grievant] to mitigate lost wages by applying for
comparable employment during the period of Grievance Arbitration, employment
that he would not, in fact, receive given the nature of the charges and discipline then
in effect.” Id. at 48.
      Whether the public policy exception applies in a case is a question of law
subject to our plenary, de novo review. Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Am. Fed’n of State,
Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Dist. Council 33, Loc. 934, 52 A.3d 1117, 1121 (Pa. 2012).
This means we review the entire record on appeal, and we do not defer to the lower
court when reaching our decision. Mercury Trucking, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
55 A.3d 1056, 1082 (Pa. 2012) (citing Heath v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pa. Bd.
of Prob. & Parole), 860 A.2d 25, 29 n.2 (Pa. 2004)). The public policy exception
requires the application of a three-prong test:

      First, a reviewing court must identify precisely what remedy the
      arbitrator imposed.       Westmoreland [Intermediate Unit #7 v.
      Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 Classroom Assistants Educ.
      Support Pers. Ass’n, PSEA/NEA], 939 A.2d [855, 865-66 (Pa. 2007)]
      (urging that “a court should not enforce a grievance arbitration award
      that contravenes public policy”). Next, the court must inquire into
      whether that remedy implicates a public policy that is “well-defined,
      dominant, and ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents
      and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” Id.
      at 866. Finally, the reviewing court must determine if the arbitrator’s

                                          12
      award compels the employer to violate the implicated policy, given the
      particular circumstances and the factual findings of the arbitrator.

Millcreek, 210 A.3d at 1011 (emphasis in original). While there must be “some
reasonable, calibrated, defensible relationship between the conduct violating
dominant public policy and the arbitrator’s response,” Philadelphia Housing
Authority, 52 A.3d at 1128, ultimately, our “focus must be on whether the arbitration
award, if enforced, would contravene public policy[.]” Blairsville-Saltsburg Sch.
Dist. v. Blairsville-Saltsburg Educ. Ass’n, 102 A.3d 1049, 1052 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
Because the Union is the party asserting the public policy exception, it bears the
burden of establishing such a violation. Westmoreland, 939 A.2d at 864.
                                    The Remedy
      Applying the three-prong test to this case, we conclude the Remedy Award
does not violate public policy. Regarding the first prong, Arbitrator issued a remedy
that relieved Employer of its responsibility to pay Grievant back pay where Grievant
failed to make any attempt to seek similar alternative employment after his
employment was terminated by Employer.
                            Implication of Public Policy
      Next, we consider the second prong, whether the remedy implicates a well-
defined public policy. First, regarding the Union’s argument concerning parental
rights, we agree with the Union that there is an important public policy in protecting
“the fundamental right of parents to make decisions as to the care, custody, and
control of their children.” The Union’s Br. at 36; see J.C.D. v. A.L.R., 303 A.3d 425,
433 (Pa. 2023) (acknowledging that parents have a fundamental right to direct the
care, custody, and control of their children). We disagree, however, that the
existence of this public policy interest is in any way applicable to the issue of
whether Grievant is entitled to back pay. Under this prong, the issue is not whether

                                         13
a public policy exists, but rather whether the remedy implicates the public policy.
Arbitrator determined Grievant was not entitled to back pay because he failed to seek
similar alternative employment after Employer terminated his employment. This
remedy in no way implicates a public policy regarding parental rights, and we reject
the Union’s argument to the contrary.
      Similarly, the remedy does not implicate a public policy against incentivizing
an employer’s non-compliance with an arbitrator’s award. The Union’s argument
rests entirely on its assertion that Employer failed to comply with the Arbitration
Award by failing to pay Grievant back pay. However, while the Arbitration Award
provided Grievant was to be “made whole for any and all losses,” it also provided
Employer was “entitled to a set off for all reasonable interim earnings and
unemployment compensation.” R.R. at 158a, 166a. Additionally, the Arbitration
Award itself contained specific language indicating Arbitrator was retaining
jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the Arbitration Award. Id. Therefore, the
amount of back pay Employer owed Grievant was not set forth and the need for
Arbitrator to determine that amount in the future was inherent within the Arbitration
Award. In this case, Employer did not fail to comply with the Arbitration Award by
waiting for Arbitrator to determine the amount of back pay owed before it paid
Grievant. Because Grievant failed to mitigate his losses, Arbitrator found Employer
owed Grievant no back pay. Thus, the remedy does not implicate a public policy
incentivizing an employer’s non-compliance with an arbitration award.
                             Violation of Public Policy
      We turn to the third prong of the analysis, whether the Remedy Award
compels Employer to violate public policy, given the circumstances of the case and
factual findings of Arbitrator. Millcreek, 210 A.3d at 1011. An arbitrator’s award

                                         14
will be found to be in violation of a stated public policy where it makes a mockery
of, or causes an employer to violate, an implicated public policy. See Phila. Hous.
Auth., 52 A.3d at 1125. The Remedy Award does neither. Instead, Arbitrator’s
Remedy Award awarding no back pay where Grievant failed to put forth any effort
to find work after he was wrongfully discharged is consistent with the law. See Pa.
Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Sand’s Rest. Corp., 240 A.2d 801, 806 (Pa. 1968) (holding that a
“wrongfully discharged employee is bound to use reasonable efforts to find work
and, if he does not do so, wages he could have earned are deducted from his back
pay award”). Because the Remedy Award does not compel Employer to violate
public policy, the third prong is satisfied.
                                   CONCLUSION
      The Remedy Award derives its essence from the CBA. Additionally, the
Union failed to prove the Remedy Award violates any well-defined public policy.
Accordingly, we affirm Common Pleas’ order denying the Union’s Petition to
Vacate.

                                                ______________________________
                                                STACY WALLACE, Judge

                                           15
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Allegheny County Prison Employees    :
Independent Union (ACPEIU),          :
                         Appellant   :
                                     :
         v.                          : No. 637 C.D. 2021
                                     :
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania       :
(County Jail)                        :

                                 ORDER

     AND NOW, this 3rd day of April 2024, the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County’s June 2, 2021 order is AFFIRMED.

                                     ______________________________
                                     STACY WALLACE, Judge