Court Opinion

ID: 9678587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:24:44.029219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:05.857471
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(dissenting). The spectre of administrative tribunal finality confronts us again. Once again we are asked to say that the administrative procedure act, PA 1952, No 197 (CLS 1956, § 24.101 et seq. [Stat Ann 1952 Eev and Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 3.560 (21.1) et seq.]), does not apply to the “final decisions” of an administrative agency which is not among those expressly excluded from the provisions of the act. Once again we are asked to interpret legislative language in such fashion (strained, in my view) that administrative action is precluded from the judicial review by our circuit courts expressly provided by said act. Judged by what this Court recently said in its majority opinion in Imlay Township Primary School District No. 5 v. *318State Board of Education, 359 Mich 478, petitioner here is foredoomed.
That the legislature intended to include the State tax commission as one of the agencies governed by the provisions of the administrative procedure act is scarcely open to question, in view of the following language contained in the first section of said act:
“Sec. 1. For the purposes of this act:
(1) ‘Agency’ means any State board, commission, department, bureau or officer, authorized by law to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases, except the workmen’s compensation commission, the employment security commission, the department of revenue, the public service commission and those in the legislative and judicial branches.”
In the administrative procedure act our legislature said that any person aggrieved by a “final decision” of an administrative agency (other than those few expressly excepted) is entitled to a judicial review thereof as provided in the act.* In the general property tax law, our legislature said that the action of the State tax commission shall be final.† There is no conflict between the words “final decision” and the words “action * * * shall be final”, as used in the 2 acts, unless this Court itself creates the conflict. If the legislature intended actions of the State tax commission to be final in the sense that they are not subject to judicial review, we would not hesitate to say such attempted legislative proscription of our judicial duties was unconstitutional (see Board of Education of Grand Rapids v. State Tax Commission, 291 Mich 50), and we would probably say the same with reference to such attempted legislative proscription of' the circuit courts’ judicial duties (see article 7, § 10, Constitu*319tion 1908). But, clearly, this was'not the meaning intended by the legislature in the general property tax law.
If we would hold, as indicated above, that the word “final” means something less than judicial finality in the face of constitutional powers of the judiciary to review administrative decisions and actions by certiorari, must we not also hold,,logically, that the word does not acquire any greater scope or meaning in the face of a legislative command that any person aggrieved by a “final decision” is entitled to judicial review thereof by a procedure which Mr. Justice Black correctly . identifies as identical to our procedure on certiorari.* It is obvious from the foregoing, that I would hold that the word “final” as used in the general property tax law and in the administrative procedure act means only “administrative finality”. Thus read, the acts are neither in conflict with one another, nor does one 'attempt to impliedly repeal the other.
I see no reason in logic or in law, for the judiciary of this State to voluntarily relinquish any of its powers of review over the actions of administrative agencies. Nor do I see any reason for this Court to so read legislative language that conflict is found where none exists, with the consequence that still another administrative agency is freed (by judicial implication) from the salutary provisions of the'administrative • procedure act, one of the purposes of which the title tells us is:
“To prescribe the rights of the public in the administrative procedure before State administrative agencies.”
I would reverse and remand.
Black, J.; concurred with Souris, J.

 OLS 1956, S 24.108 (Stat Ann 1952 Rev S 3.560 [21.8]). * OLS 1956; S 211.152 Supp

 (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp S 7.210). 1959 Cum Supp S 7.210). (Stat Ann 1959 CumSupp � 7.210).

 Imlay Township Primary School District No. 5 v. State Board of Education, 359 Mich 478, 489 (dissent).