Court Opinion

ID: 9929834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 15:03:20.713992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:55:54.186194
License: Public Domain

THIRD DIVISION
                           DOYLE, P. J.,
              GOBEIL, J., and SENIOR JUDGE FULLER

                NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                           https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                February 5, 2024

 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

A23A1344. BARSAMIAN v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS.

A23A1345. LAUGHLIN et al. v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS.

A23A1346. CLARK et al. v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS.

A23A1347. HENAGAN, III v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS.

A23A1348. FEUSS et al. v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS.

A23A1349. MASSEY SI, LLC v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS.

A23A1350. WAGUESPACK AS TRUSTEE OF THE DONALD
JAMES WAGUESPACK TRUST v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF
TAX ASSESSORS.
A23A1351. GREENWALD, III et al. v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD
OF TAX ASSESSORS.

A23A1352. BURTON, AS TRUSTEE OF THE 1998 ROBERT E.
BURTON FAMILY TRUST v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF
TAX ASSESSORS.

A23A1353. RHODES et al. v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF
TAX ASSESSORS.

A23A1354. OCR 22, LLC v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS.

A23A1355. HOLLEY v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS.

A23A1356. BARSAMIAN v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS.

A23A1357. BURTON, TRUSTEE OF THE 1998 ROBERT E.
BURTON FAMILY TRUST v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF
TAX ASSESSORS.

A23A1358. CLARK et al. v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS.

A23A1359. FEUSS et al. v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
ASSESSORS.

A23A1360. GREENWALD, III et al. v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD
OF TAX ASSESSORS.

A23A1361. HENAGAN, III v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF
TAX ASSESSORS.

                               2
 A23A1362. HOLLEY v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
 ASSESSORS.

 A23A1363. MASSEY SI, LLC v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF
 TAX ASSESSORS.

 A23A1364. OCR 22, LLC v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
 ASSESSORS.

 A23A1365. RHODES et al. v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF TAX
 ASSESSORS.

 A23A1366. WAGUESPACK v. GLYNN COUNTY BOARD OF
 TAX ASSESSORS.

      GOBEIL, Judge.

      In these 23 companion cases, a group of property owners appealed the 2015 and

2017 property tax assessments of their quarter interest units in the Cloister Ocean

Residences (“COR”) located on Sea Island, contending in pertinent part that the

Glynn County Board of Tax Assessors (the “County”) improperly included in the

appraisal of their real property interests the separate value of their memberships in the

Sea Island Club, which the property owners contend is nontaxable intangible personal

property. The appeals progressed through the Glynn County Board of Equalization

(“BOE”) to the Superior Court of Glynn County. In Case Nos. A23A1344 through

A23A1355, Bonnie A. Barsamian (A23A1344), John C. Laughlin and Gail H. Laughlin

                                           3
(A23A1345),1 Peter S. Clark and Stacy W. Clark (A23A1346), Charles S. Henagan, III

(A23A1347), Charles E. Feuss and Linda U. Feuss (A23A1348), Massey SI, LLC

(A23A1349), Donald J. Waguespack, as Trustee of the Donald James Waguespack

Trust (A23A1350), Taylor C. Greenwald, III and Anne D. Greenwald (A23A1351),

Maxine H. Burton, as Trustee of the 1998 Robert E. Burton Family Trust

(A23A1352), John P. Rhodes and Lisa T. Rhodes (A23A1353), OCR 22, LLC

(A23A1354), and Leigh Pierce Holley (A23A1355) (collectively, the “2017

Taxpayers”), appeal from the superior court’s denial of their motion for partial

summary judgment and the grant of the County’s motion for summary judgment with

respect to the County’s 2017 valuation of their property interests. In Case Nos.

A23A1356 through A23A1366, Bonnie A. Barsamian (A23A1356), Maxine H. Burton,

as Trustee of the 1998 Robert E. Burton Family Trust (A23A1357), Peter S. Clark and

Stacy W. Clark (A23A1358), Charles E. Feuss and Linda U. Feuss (A23A1359),

Taylor C. Greenwald, III and Anne D. Greenwald (A23A1360), Charles S. Henagan,

III (A23A1361), Leigh Pierce Holley (A23A1362), Massey SI, LLC (A23A1363), OCR

22, LLC (A23A1364), John P. Rhodes and Lisa T. Rhodes (A23A1365), and Donald

      1
          The Laughlins did not file an appeal from the 2015 valuation of their property.
                                             4
J. Waguespack, as Trustee of the Donald James Waguespack Trust (A23A1366)

(collectively, the “2015 Taxpayers”), appeal from the superior court’s denial of their

motion for partial summary judgment and the grant of the County’s motion for

summary judgment with respect to the County’s 2015 valuation of their property

interests. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

      “Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review a grant or denial

of summary judgment de novo and construe the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmovant.” Havenbrook Homes, LLC v. Infinity Real Estate Investments, Inc.,

356 Ga. App. 477, 478 (847 SE2d 840) (2020) (citations and punctuation omitted).

                                   Background Facts

      The stated intent of Georgia’s tax laws is to tax properties at their fair market

value. See OCGA §§ 48-5-1, 48-5-6 (“[a]ll property shall be returned for taxation at

its fair market value . . .”). The County is tasked with ensuring “that all taxable

property within the county is assessed and returned at its fair market value and that

fair market values as between the individual taxpayers are fairly and justly equalized

so that each taxpayer shall pay as nearly as possible only such taxpayer’s proportionate

                                           5
share of taxes.” OCGA § 48-5-306 (a). Under OCGA § 48-5-2 (3), the fair market

value of a property is defined as “the amount a knowledgeable buyer would pay for the

property and a willing seller would accept for the property at an arm’s length, bona

fide sale.” As a result, “Georgia imposes taxes upon all owners of nonexempt real and

tangible personal property at the property’s fair market value.” Morton v. Glynn

County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 294 Ga. App. 901, 904 (1) (670 SE2d 528) (2008).

      The Georgia Department of Revenue (“DOR”) has adopted regulations,

compiled as an “Appraisal Procedures Manual” (“APM”), to assist county tax

officials in appraising tangible real and personal property for ad valorem tax purposes.

Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-11-10-.01 (1). The APM defines taxable “real property”

as “the bundle of rights, interests, and benefits connected with the ownership of real

estate. Real property does not include the intangible benefits associated with the

ownership of real estate, such as the goodwill of a going business concern.” Ga.

Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-11-10-.02 (1) (x). The APM lists the “sales comparison

approach,” used by the County in the instant cases, as an appropriate method of

appraising real property. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-11-10-.09 (4). The APM directs

appraisal staff utilizing this method to estimate value by comparing the property in

                                           6
question to similar properties that have recently sold. See Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r.

560-11-10-.09 (4) (b) (“The appraisal staff shall use the following four steps when

applying the sales comparison approach: market research and verification, selecting

appropriate units of comparison, making reasonable adjustments based on the market,

and applying the adjusted comparison units to the subject of the appraisal.”).

       The Sea Island Club is a private recreational club whose members are given

exclusive access to its beach, dining, golf, tennis, spa, and fitness facilities. There are

three different categories of membership: full, beach and sports, and invitational. Full

membership, which includes access to all facilities and covers greens fees for the golf

courses, is only available to owners of real property on Sea Island or within one of its

designated communities. All three categories of membership require submission of an

application to the Sea Island Company,2 which must be approved by a membership

committee. In 2017, an applicant for a full membership was required to pay a $100,000

deposit, which would be fully refundable in the event the member later terminated his

       2
        The Sea Island Company is a family-owned hospitality and real estate
corporation, which manages the Sea Island Club. See Rogers, Ellen. “Sea Island
Company.” New Georgia Encyclopedia, last modified Jan 27, 2023.
https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/business-economy/sea-island-com
pany/
                                            7
or her membership. In addition to the deposit, each full membership holder is required

to pay annual dues, which totaled $15,496 in 2017, plus an additional annual member

fee of $1,100 for active members who own property on Sea Island. When an individual

with a full membership sells his or her Sea Island property, he or she can transfer the

membership to one of his or her adult children, retain it for himself or herself, or

transfer it back to the Sea Island Company.

      Each of the 2015 Taxpayers and the 2017 Taxpayers owns at least one Quarter

Ownership Interest3 of certain condominium units in the COR. Purchasers of Quarter

Ownership Interests in the COR also are eligible to apply for and, if approved, acquire

full membership in the Sea Island Club with some important differences from a

traditional full membership. First, the $100,000 refundable membership deposit is

waived. Second, the membership dues owed are a quarter of those owed by a

traditional full member, and totaled $4,149 per year in 2017. Nevertheless, owners of

each COR quarter interest are permitted to utilize their Sea Island Club memberships

      3
        The COR permits ownership of quarter shares of an individual condominium
unit; such an owner would be authorized to use the condominium for one-quarter of
the year.
                                          8
for the entire year as opposed to just a quarter of the year even though they pay only

a quarter of the annual dues.

      As relevant here, the Declaration of Condominium for the COR (the

“Declaration”) expressly provides that memberships held by owners of a quarter

interest are not transferable, that COR sales terminate memberships, and that

purchasers must then apply anew for club membership:

      Membership in the Sea Island Club held by an Owner of a Quarter
      Ownership Interest as a result of ownership of such Quarter Ownership
      Interest or Residence Unit shall terminate at such time as the Owner
      conveys, transfers[,] or otherwise disposes of such Quarter Ownership
      Interest. Such membership is not transferable or assignable. The purchaser
      from any Owner of a Quarter Ownership Interest may, as determined by
      Sea Island Company, be provided an opportunity to apply for and, if
      approved for membership by Sea Island Company, acquire a membership
      in Sea Island Club, in accordance with the terms of the Sea Island Club
      Membership Program and Rules and Regulations then in effect.

The Declaration also states that “all Quarter Ownership Interests therein . . . shall be

held, sold, conveyed, mortgaged, hypothecated, encumbered, leased, rented,

occupied, improved and used subject to this Declaration.” And by accepting a deed,

each owner, including owners of Quarter Ownership Interests, “covenants, consents

                                           9
and agrees to and with the Declarant . . . to be bound by, observe[,] comply with and

perform the covenants, conditions, reservations, restrictions, easements and

limitations contained in this Declaration and in the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws

and Rules and Regulations of the [COR] Condominium Association[.]”

      The Public Offering Statement, through which SIA Propco I, LLC (“SIA”),

acting as the developer of the COR, offered Quarter Ownership Interests in the COR,

similarly provides:

      Purchasers of Quarter Ownership Interests are eligible to apply for a
      membership in the Sea Island Club (the “Membership”). Upon approval
      for Membership, a Quarter Ownership Interest Owner shall be entitled
      to privileges of use of the facilities of the Sea Island Club, subject to
      compliance with then existing applicable Membership Program and
      Rules and Regulations of the Sea Island Club (the “Membership
      Program”) and payment of the then existing dues and other fees or
      charges of the Sea Island Club. The terms of Membership for the
      Quarter Ownership Interest Owners are provided for in the membership
      application for the Sea Island Club (the “Membership Application”),
      Membership Program, referenced below, and the Declaration.

Further,

      Membership held by a Quarter Ownership Interest Owner as a result of
      ownership of such Quarter Ownership Interest shall terminate at such

                                         10
      time as the Quarter Ownership Interest Owner conveys, transfers or
      otherwise disposes of such Quarter Ownership Interest and is not
      transferable or assignable, and may not be transferred or assigned in
      connection with the sale of any real estate. Provided, however, upon the
      conveyance, transfer[,] or assignment of a Quarter Ownership Interest
      to a new Owner of the Quarter Ownership Interest, the prior Owner’s
      Membership shall terminate and [SIA] shall provide the new Owner with
      the opportunity to apply for a Quarter Ownership Interest
      Membership[.]

      In the instant appeals, the 2017 Taxpayers and the 2015 Taxpayers assert that

membership in the Sea Island Club is directly transferable upon sale of a property

owner’s interest in the COR, and thus, considered intangible personal property not

subject to taxation. However, as discussed in more detail below, based on existing

precedent and the COR’s governing documents, membership in the Sea Island Club

terminates when a Quarter Ownership Interest owner sells his or her interest, and

thus, is inextricably bound with the sale of real property. As a result, we conclude that

the superior court did not err in concluding that the value of membership in the Sea

Island Club may be included in assessing the fair market value of such properties.

                       Case Nos. A23A1344 through A23A1355

                                           11
         In these twelve appeals, the County appraised each Quarter Ownership Interest

owned by the 2017 Taxpayers a fair market value for 2017 ad valorem purposes, using

the sales comparison approach. The 2017 Taxpayers appealed the assessments to the

BOE, challenging the constitutionality of the assessment, inaccurate valuation,

exemption, lack of equalization, and non-uniformity. After a hearing, the BOE upheld

the County’s 2017 assessments, and the 2017 Taxpayers then appealed to the superior

court.

         The County filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that, based on

existing precedent, it was not required to adjust the taxable value of the 2017

Taxpayers’ property interests to exclude the value of Sea Island Club Memberships

or the value of reduced dues associated with those memberships. The County asserted

it was entitled to summary judgment in large part because the transactions in which

buyers purchased Quarter Ownership Interests in COR units did not include the

purchase and sale or other conveyance of a Sea Island Club Membership. Rather, the

transaction “merely granted the purchaser the right to immediate access to a

[m]embership, which would be acquired via an entirely separate transaction with the

Club itself.”

                                           12
       The 2017 Taxpayers in turn filed a motion for partial summary judgment,

arguing that the “unreasonableness and arbitrary nature of the assessment process

renders the valuation of the [s]ubject [p]arcels invalid as a matter of law.” The motion

also asserted that the valuation “violates the constitutional and statutory requirements

of uniformity and equalization.” Specifically, the 2017 Taxpayers argued that the

membership rights in the Sea Island Club constituted intangible personal property,

which was exempt from taxation, and thus, the appraisals of their property interests

should be downwardly adjusted by the value of the membership received at the time

of sale.

       Following a hearing, in an order dated August 23, 2022, the superior court

denied the 2017 Taxpayers’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted the

County’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that the cases were

controlled by our holding in Morton, concluding that:

       the County did not improperly include the value of the Club membership
       in its appraisals and could properly include the enhanced value paid to
       the seller for the right to apply for membership as part of the fair market
       value of the property. This increased value is a benefit connected to the
       real property itself, rather than an intangible benefit such as goodwill.

                                           13
In Case Nos. A23A1344 through A23A1355, the 2017 Taxpayers appeal from the

superior court’s August 23, 2022 order.

                       Case Nos. A23A1356 through A23A1366

      In these eleven appeals, the 2015 Taxpayers appealed the County’s 2015

valuation for their property assessments to the BOE raising the grounds of market

value, taxability, and uniformity. After a hearing, the BOE found in favor of the 2015

Taxpayers and reduced the 2015 valuation. The County appealed the BOE’s decision

to the superior court. On October 27, 2020, the County voluntarily dismissed the

cases against the 2015 Taxpayers without prejudice.

      On April 26, 2021, the County filed a renewal action under OCGA § 9-2-61 (a).

As relevant here, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. In support of

their motion for partial summary judgment, the 2015 Taxpayers argued that the

County’s 2015 valuations were higher than the fair market value of their property

interests because they were based upon sales of comparable Quarter Ownership

Interests that included the value of Sea Island Club membership rights as well as the

value of interior furnishings. The County countered that it was not required to reduce

the value of comparable sales to account for the value of a membership in the Sea

                                          14
Island Club or the value of reduced dues associated with those memberships, because

the purchase and sale of quarter ownership interests in COR units did not include the

direct transfer of a Sea Island Club Membership.

      In an order dated August 24, 2022, the superior court denied the 2015

Taxpayers’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted the County’s motion

for the same reasons as outlined in its August 23, 2022 order with respect to the 2017

Taxpayers. Specifically, the court reiterated “that the County did not improperly

include the value of the Club membership in its appraisals and could properly include

the enhanced value paid to the seller for the right to apply for membership as part of

the fair market value of the property.”4 In Case Nos. A23A1355 through A23A1366,

the 2015 Taxpayers appeal from the superior court’s August 24, 2022 order.

                                      Analysis

      In their respective appeals, the 2017 Taxpayers and the 2015 Taxpayers raise

the same enumerations of error, arguing that: (1) the superior court erred in granting

the County’s motion for summary judgment; (2) the superior court erred in denying

      4
      The superior court granted the 2015 Taxpayers’ motion for partial summary
judgment with respect to the issue of unit furnishings, noting that the County
conceded that the value of these furnishings should have been excluded from the
comparable sales used to value the properties in question.
                                          15
the 2017 Taxpayers’ and the 2015 Taxpayers’ motions for partial summary judgment;

and (3) “[a]t a minimum,” the superior court failed to recognize that genuine issues

of material fact remain thereby precluding the grant of summary judgment to the

County. For the sake of clarity and ease of reference, we address the arguments of the

2017 Taxpayers and the 2015 Taxpayers together (and hereafter, collectively referred

to as the “Taxpayers”).

      1. The Taxpayers assert that the superior court improperly granted the

County’s summary judgment motions because membership in the Sea Island Club is

transferred directly to the purchaser at the time of a sale of a Quarter Ownership

Interest — thus, the membership rights are intangible personal property that are not

subject to ad valorem taxation. In a related claim of error, they maintain that “[a]t a

minimum,” issues of fact remain as to whether the Sea Island Club Membership was

included in the sales of the property interests, and thus, the superior court’s grant of

summary judgment was improper.

      Previously, this Court considered the issue of whether the County was required

to downwardly adjust the value of Sea Island Company properties by the value of the

                                           16
membership. First, in Morton,5 we held that, although a club membership is per se

intangible personal property and therefore not taxable real estate, if the applicable

procedure for transferring club memberships shows that a purchaser obtains a right

to apply for a membership with the club, rather than purchasing a membership directly

from the property seller, such a right is inextricably bound with the sale of qualified

real property and is, therefore, properly considered when assessing the fair market

value of such properties. 294 Ga. App. at 904-905 (1).

      Such properties sell at an enhanced value, not because they include a
      membership, but because the seller agrees to arrange that the buyer will
      have preferential eligibility for an available membership. It is this
      enhanced value, not the value of the membership itself, that is included
      in the county’s appraisals.

Id. at 905 (1). The Morton Court thus concluded that “the County could properly

include the enhanced value paid to the seller for the right to apply for membership as

part of the fair market value of the property. This increased value is a benefit

      5
       Morton involved the interplay between the Sea Island Club Membership and
the calculation of property tax values, but was related to different Sea Island
properties. 294 Ga. App. at 902.
                                          17
connected to the real property itself, rather than an intangible benefit such as

goodwill.”6 Id.

      Then, in Glynn County Board of Assessors v. SIA Propco I, LLC, 351 Ga. App. 103

(830 SE2d 403) (2019), SIA, which owned 52 Quarter Ownership Interests in 17

condominium units in COR as of 2015, appealed the County’s calculation of each

interest’s fair market value for 2015 ad valorem tax purposes.7 Id. at 103. The BOE

reduced the valuations to account for the value of membership rights in the Sea Island

Club that were included in the sales price of the comparable properties. Id. The

      6
        In Morton, this Court noted that goodwill is not deemed real property for
taxation purposes because it is “a favor which the management of a business wins
from the public, and as such is more associated with a business operation than the
property on which the business is located.” 294 Ga. App. at 905 (1) (quoting Pine
Pointe Housing, L. P. v. Lowndes County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 254 Ga. App. 197, 200 (1)
(b) (561 SE2d 860) (2002); punctuation omitted).
      7
        It appears that the County appealed the 2015 valuation for SIA and the 2015
Taxpayers to superior court. Those cases were consolidated for discovery purposes.
SIA and the County filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the superior
court denied the County’s motion for summary judgment and granted in part and
denied in part SIA’s motion. see SIA Propco I, 351 Ga. App. at 103. In SIA Propco I,
discussed in more detail infra, this Court reversed in part, concluding that the superior
court erred by granting partial summary judgment in favor of SIA. Id. at 105-107 (1).
SIA is not a party to the instant appeals.
                                           18
County appealed that decision to the superior court, which found the factual

circumstances present in Morton to be distinguishable, concluding:

      In Morton, the sale of the membership was a separate transaction
      between the seller and the Club. Here, despite the language in the Public
      Offering Statement [and] Declaration, the undisputed fact[ ] remains
      that membership is guaranteed as part of the transaction between buyer
      and seller.

SIA Propco I, 351 Ga. App. at 104-105 (1). In support, the superior court pointed to the

deposition testimony of Frankie Strother, Vice President of membership for the Sea

Island Club, in which Strother described that Club membership is “automatically

approved with the purchase. I mean, we tell them, the [membership] committee, you

know, this unit or this share has been purchased and this is who bought it and this is

who will be a member, but it comes with the unit.” Id. at 106 (1). The court also relied

on Strother’s affidavit, dated March 15, 2017, in which she stated that “[u]pon the

sale of a COR unit, the membership is transferred by the current owner to the new

owner by a transfer executed at the time of sale. The membership is transferred

directly from the current owner to the new owner.” Id. at 106-107 (1). The superior

court in turn held, as a matter of law, that the County was required to exclude the

                                           19
value of Sea Island Club membership rights from the comparable sales price used to

value the subject properties otherwise the County “would be impermissibly taxing the

membership transaction and in turn, the value of sales concessions and intangible

rights included with the sale.” Id. at 107 (1). The County then appealed to this Court.

      In our opinion in SIA Propco I, we found that Strother’s testimony — that

membership in the Sea Island Club automatically transferred with the sale of an

ownership interest — was in direct conflict with the Declaration of Condominium for

the COR and the COR Public Offering Statement issued prior to the sale of Quarter

Ownership Interests, which each outlined that quarter-interest purchasers are entitled

only to an opportunity to apply for membership. 351 Ga. App. at 107 (1). Furthermore,

Strother deposed that owners have never been able to sell memberships to another

individual; “[t]hey always go through Sea Island.” In an errata sheet, Strother

clarified her response and stated: “But membership of COR unit owners do transfer

directly to new owners.” We noted that the contradiction in Strother’s testimony

should, absent a reasonable explanation, be construed against SIA for the purposes of

summary judgment. Id. at 107 (1); see Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga.

27, 28 (1) (343 SE2d 680) (1986) (“[I]f on motion for summary judgment a party

                                          20
offered self-contradictory testimony on the dispositive issue in the case, and the more

favorable portion of his testimony was the only evidence of this right to a verdict in his

favor, the trial court must construe the contradictory testimony against him.”).

Because there was no evidence in the record that Strother offered an explanation

about her seemingly contradictory testimony, we concluded that it must be construed

against her. SIA Propco I, LLC, 351 Ga. App. at 107 (1). And because this was the only

evidence offered by SIA in support of its position — that the County was required to

exclude the value of Sea Island Club membership rights from the comparable sales

price used to value the subject properties — we reversed the superior court’s grant

of partial summary judgment in favor of SIA on this ground because an issue of fact

remained.8 Id.

      In the instant appeals, the Taxpayers continue to assert, as a matter of law, that

membership rights in the Sea Island Club should have been excluded from the

valuation of their property interests — contending that the membership rights were

      8
        We highlighted that the COR’s “governing documents, at a minimum, create
an issue of fact as to whether the procedure for obtaining a club membership at COR
associated with Quarter Ownership Interests is inextricably bound with the sale of
qualified real property.” SIA Propco I, 351 Ga. App. at 106 (1) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
                                           21
conveyed directly from unit sellers to purchasers as part of the same transaction as the

purchase and sale of a Quarter Ownership Interest, as evidenced by Strother’s

testimony and the unit purchase agreements. In an attempt to distinguish Morton, the

Taxpayers argue that, while the properties at issue in Morton included only the right

to apply for a Sea Island Club Membership (which was enhanced value inextricably

linked with the properties and thus properly considered for taxation purposes), their

interests included the actual Sea Island Club memberships, which constitute intangible

personal property and thus, should not be subject to taxation. They further argue that

Strother’s testimony does not contradict the governing documents for COR, and in

any event, she provided a reasonable explanation for any alleged contradiction in her

errata sheet and subsequently-filed affidavit (dated September 9, 2021) so the Prophecy

rule (which we enforced in SIA Propco) has no application here. Finally, they also

maintain that while the Club memberships were directly transferred in the sales of the

property interests, these memberships are still considered separate for the purposes

of calculating ad valorem taxation because: (1) use of memberships does not take place

on the subject parcels, and (2) the memberships are more closely associated with the

Sea Island Club’s business operation than the subject parcels.

                                          22
      As noted above, the Declaration and the Public Offering Statement both outline

that the purchase of a COR Quarter Ownership Interest includes the right to apply for

membership in the Sea Island Club, but not the actual membership itself. Importantly,

when an owner sells his or her interest in the property, he or she does not have the

ability to directly transfer the actual membership to the purchaser of the property

interest. Rather at the time of the sale, the seller would have to relinquish

membership, which could then be reissued by the Sea Island Company to the

purchaser. Notably, even if a seller intended to transfer the membership to the

purchaser, the purchaser would still have to submit an application to the Sea Island

Company and await approval before becoming a member. Even if the approval of the

purchaser for membership was a mere formality, the issuance of the membership was

from the Sea Island Company to the purchaser; not directly from the seller to the

purchaser.

      To support their argument that the Sea Island Club memberships should be

excluded from the calculation of ad valorem taxes (because the memberships are

transferred from the current owner to the new owner directly at the time of sale), the

Taxpayers point to the COR Quarter Ownership Interest Purchase Agreement. They

                                         23
highlight section 37 of the purchase agreement, which provides as follows: “Purchaser

acknowledges that as an Owner of a Quarter Ownership Interest in a Residence Unit

within the Condominium, that Seller agrees to provide to Purchaser . . . a non-equity,

non-refundable membership in the Sea Island Club.” In the first instance, the

executed purchase agreement in the record is between SIA and homeowners who are

not parties to the current appeal, and thus, it is unclear whether the document is the

same as the purchase agreement signed by the Taxpayers, or even relevant to the

instant appeals. In any event, the Taxpayers fail to acknowledge the full text of section

37 of the purchase agreement in the record, which continues:

      The Sea Island Club membership is not separable from the Quarter
      Ownership Interest and is appurtenant thereto. Membership in the Sea
      Island Club held by an Owner of a Quarter Ownership Interest as a result
      of ownership thereof shall terminate at such time as the Owner of such
      Quarter Ownership Interest conveys, transfers[,] or otherwise disposes
      of such Quarter Ownership Interest.

As a result, the language in the purchase agreement, assuming it is properly before us

in the instant appeals, mirrors that found in the Declaration and the Public Offering

Statement whereby an owner’s membership in the Sea Island Club terminates when

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he or she conveys his or her interest in the property, and thus, cannot be directly

transferred to the purchaser.

      Next, the Taxpayers rely on Strother’s deposition, errata sheet, and affidavits,9

in which she represented that when a buyer purchases a quarter interest in the COR,

membership in the Sea Island Club is directly transferred by the current owner to the

new owner by a transfer executed at the time of sale. Here, the superior court

pretermitted the application of Prophecy to Strother’s testimony. Instead, the court

highlighted that the record shows that Strother’s testimony regarding the transfer of

a Sea Island Club Membership is in direct conflict with the language contained in

COR’s governing documents.

      9
        SIA Propco I involved Strother’s deposition (taken on July 19, 2017), errata
sheet, and affidavit, dated March 15, 2017. In 2021, Strother filed a second affidavit,
dated September 9, 2021. Although Strother’s 2017 and 2021 affidavits contain similar
language, the 2021 affidavit contains additional statements that appear to be her
attempt to provide an explanation of alleged inconsistences in her testimony to avoid
application of the Prophecy rule. For example, Strother states that in her deposition,
she was asked: “Have Sea Island memberships ever been transferable from like -- has
an owner ever been able to sell his membership to another individual?” Strother
responded “No.” In her 2021 affidavit, she explained that she “understood the
question from the County’s attorney to be focused on memberships other than
memberships associated with the COR units.”
                                          25
      Condominium instruments, which include the declaration of
      condominium, are analogous to an “express contract” between the unit
      owners/members and the condominium association. These instruments
      are strictly construed as they are written, giving the language its clear,
      simple, and unambiguous meaning.

Quality Foods, Inc. v. Smithberg, 288 Ga. App. 47, 50 (1) (653 SE2d 486) (2007)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

      Where the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the
      court will look to the contract alone to find the intention of the parties.
      Such a contract is the only evidence of what the parties intended and
      understood by it. Parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or
      construe an unambiguous contract. Parol evidence is only admissible
      when any ambiguity cannot be resolved through the application of the
      rules of contract construction and when such unresolved ambiguity must
      be resolved by a jury as a matter of disputed fact. The existence or
      nonexistence of ambiguity in a contract is a question of law for the court.

UniFund Financial Corp. v. Donaghue, 288 Ga. App. 81, 82-83 (653 SE2d 513) (2007)

(citations and punctuation omitted).

      Based on the clear, simple, and unambiguous language of the Declaration and

the Public Offering Statement, purchasers of a Quarter Ownership Interest are

afforded the right to apply for a Sea Island Club Membership, but not the direct

                                          26
transfer of the membership itself during the sale. As a result, Strother’s deposition and

affidavit — in which she represents that Club membership of COR unit owners

transfers directly to new owners — is in conflict with the terms of the condominium

documents. And parol evidence is never admissible “to add to, take from, or vary a

written contract.” OCGA § 13-2-2 (1).

      The Taxpayers counter that Strother’s testimony is not in conflict with the

governing documents because the terms of these documents are subject to “then

existing applicable rules and regulations of the Sea Island Club.” They maintain that

Strother, as Vice President of Membership for the Sea Island Club, “is certainly

qualified to explain Sea Island Club’s existing rules,” and thus, her testimony does not

contradict the COR governing documents; rather, it provides “clarity” on the Club’s

then-existing rules and regulations with regards to its membership. In the first

instance, the Taxpayers did not raise this precise argument in the superior court. See

Pfeiffer v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 275 Ga. 827, 829 (2) (573 SE2d 389) (2002)

(“Routinely, this Court refuses to review issues not raised in the trial court. . . .

Fairness to the trial court and to the parties demands that legal issues be asserted in

the trial court.”) (footnotes omitted). In any event, the Taxpayers have failed to point

                                           27
to where in the record Strother references the written rules and regulations of the Sea

Island Club to support her contention that club memberships are directly transferred

from seller to buyer during the sale of the property interest. Rather, Strother attempts

to alter the plain terms of the governing documents by opining that purchasers are

offered club memberships as a matter of course, and the application process is a mere

formality. See Burns v. Reves, 217 Ga. App. 316, 317-318 (1) (457 SE2d 178) (1995)

(parties are not “authorized to make an unambiguous contract ambiguous by the

introduction of parol evidence”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

      Because there is no ambiguity in the Declaration and Public Offering Statement

insofar as to the right to access to club memberships, the rules of construction could

not be employed to insert a right to guaranteed membership where none existed. See

Gill v. B & R Intl., 234 Ga. App. 528, 530 (1) (a) (507 SE2d 477) (1998) (“[W]here the

terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the contract

to find the parties’ intent.”). And absent Strother’s testimony, the Taxpayers have

failed to create a genuine issue of material fact to show that the purchase of a COR

Quarter Ownership Interest includes a Sea Island Club Membership, as opposed to

the mere right to access membership. See Golden Peanut Co. v. Hunt, 203 Ga. App.

                                          28
469, 470-471 (2) (416 SE2d 896) (1992) (parol evidence that trade usage defined

“bona fide offer” in peanut contract to mean offer from federally registered peanut

handler was barred under parol evidence rule, where evidence did not merely explain

or supplement plain, unambiguous contract for sale of peanuts but rather contradicted

clear language of agreement and sought to place additional terms and conditions on

parties); Marvel Enterprises, Inc. v. World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc., 271

Ga. App. 607, 612-613 (3) (610 SE2d 583) (2005) (parol evidence was unnecessary and

inadmissible to construe merchandise licensing agreement between toy company and

professional wrestling company with regards to agreement provision that allowed list

of licensed elements to be amended, where the agreement itself unambiguously

defined the terms and stated that wrestling company reserved the right to amend the

list of licensed elements from time to time to keep the list current with its licensing

rights). Accordingly, the superior court did not err in granting the County’s motions

for summary judgment as to these claims.

      2. The Taxpayers also assert that the superior court erred in denying their

respective motions for partial summary judgment because the County failed to adjust

the appraisal of their property interests, as required under the applicable tax rules and

                                           29
regulations, to account for intangible personal property, including the waiver of the

initiation fee and reduced dues for a Sea Island Club Membership, and thus the

County’s valuation does not represent the fair market value of the subject properties.

      We addressed the issue of excluding the value of the reduced dues in SIA Propco

I, 351 Ga. App. at 108 (2). Specifically, we explained that this aspect of club

membership available to owners of Quarter Ownership Interests “is part of, and

cannot be separated from, the value of the membership discussed in Division 1.” Id.

See generally Morton, 294 Ga. App. at 904 (1) (“real property” for the purpose of real

property taxation is defined as “the bundle of rights, interest and benefits connected

with the ownership of real estate”) (citation and punctuation omitted). We find that

reasoning persuasive in the instant appeals, and thus, conclude that the County was

not required to account for the value of the waiver of the initiation fee or reduced

membership dues for the Sea Island Club in assessing the fair market value of the

Taxpayers’ subject parcels.

      Judgments affirmed in Case Nos. A23A1344 through A23A1366. Doyle, P. J., and

Senior Judge C. Andrew Fuller concur.

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