Court Opinion

ID: 9686911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:11:06.41738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:22.924768
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C.J.
(dissenting). I dissent. The majority has misperceived the issue in this case. The question is not what is the best definition of asportation, but how much should a court read into a legislative enactment. I would go no further than the Supreme Court, has gone in remaking the "kidnapping” statute.
Accordingly, I would follow People v Hardesty,1 *15867 Mich App 376; 241 NW2d 214 (1976). Hardesty substantially has been incorporated into the Standard Criminal Jury Instructions. Compare CJI 19:1:01 with 19:1:02. The Supreme Court has urged all members of the bench and bar to use the standard instructions. Adm Order No 1977-1, 399 Mich lxxii (1977).

 I would note the cases cited to bolster the Worden position do not really stand for the proposition they were cited to support. In each case cited, People v Ford, 47 Mich App 420; 209 NW2d 507 (1973), People v Leszczynski, 49 Mich App 555; 212 NW2d 255 (1973), and People v Behm, 52 Mich App 119; 216 NW2d 631 (1974), this Court remanded for retrial because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury *158on the element of asportation. While each case involved coequal offenses, the decisions merely reflect, and rightly reflect, that asportation is always an element of kidnapping, unless some nonmovement element such as secret confinement supplies a necessary alternative to asportation. See e.g., People v Leszczynski, supra, at 557. They do not further hold asportation always means nonincidental movement. Each case directed upon retrial the jury should be instructed on the element of asportation "as required” or "as mandated” by Adams. On retrial of those cases the jury should have been instructed, as Adams mandates, that movement is an essential element of kidnapping, but movement incidental to an underlying coequal offense is sufficient.
Moreover, I would note it is no longer clear that Worden even enjoys the support of its author. Worden was authored by Judge Allen. In a subsequent case of People v Harris, 80 Mich App 161; 262 NW2d 912 (1977), Judge Allen wrote that Adams "appears to state that where the underlying offense is coequal in degree, viz: — a capital offense, Adams is inapplicable.” Id. 169. No reference was made at that point to the opposite interpretation of Adams in Worden.