Court Opinion

ID: 9552400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:09:59.81969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:17.660689
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — The majority confuses legislative judgment about the merits of Pierce County's decision to change to a punch card voting system with its judicial role of determining whether a referendum is constitutionally authorized in this case. The majority states: " Highways and salaries are arguably much more vital to state government than the replacement of adequate voting machines to county government." Majority opinion, at 199. Whether that is true or not is irrelevant to our present inquiry. Our judicial function in deciding whether a referendum is constitutionally authorized does not involve an inquiry into the merits of the legislative decision. If it did, then the referendum process itself would be superfluous: we, and not the people, could serve as the final arbiters of the dispute.
The majority finds ordinance 81-21 not "'necessary' for the support of County government or its existing institutions, as there is no question but that the existing voting machine equipment" is adequate. Majority opinion, at 199. In making this statement, the majority puts a new focus on judicial inquiry with regard to the "support of . . . existing public institutions" exception contained in article 2, section 1(b) of the Washington State Constitution. "The real controversy", as the court in State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 263, 148 P. 28.(1915) stated, "revolves around the words 'support' and 'public institutions.'" In a long line of cases, we have left to the legislative body the question of what is "necessary." State ex rel. Helm v. Kramer, 82 Wn.2d 307, 510 P.2d 1110 (1973). See, e.g., State ex rel. Hoppe v. Meyers, 58 Wn.2d 320, 363 P.2d 121, 100 A.L.R.2d 304 (1961); State ex rel. Pennock v. Reeves, 27 Wn.2d 739, 179 P.2d 961 (1947), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. Pennock v. Coe, 42 Wn.2d 569, 257 P.2d 190 (1953); State ex rel. Case v. Howell, 85 Wash. 281, *201147 P. 1162 (1915); State ex rel. Brislawn v. Meath, 84 Wash. 302, 147 P. 11 (1915); State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, supra. The Pierce County Council's decision to change the method of voting was not a meaningless act, and we should not second-guess its judgment by labeling its decision to fund the punch card system "unnecessary."
Its decision was in support of the existing public institution of administering the electoral process. The term "support" should be read broadly. As we stated in Blakeslee, supra at page 270:
The intent and purpose of the people, as gathered from the words of the constitution and the circumstances attending the adoption of the seventh amendment, impels the holding that the people intended to use the word "support" in its fullest sense. When so considered, "support" includes appropriations for current expenses, maintenance, upkeep, continuation of existing functions, as well as appropriations for such new buildings and conveniences as may be necessary to meet the needs and requirements of the state in relation to its existing institutions.
The Council conducted numerous public hearings on the issue. While undoubtedly the two methods of vote tabulation have their individual merits, the Council felt it was in the best interests of the County and the administration of the voting process to make the change. Since ordinance 81-21 supports one of the County's existing institutions, it falls within the second exemption of Const, art. 2, § 1(b).
Application of this long-standing interpretation of "support" does not create an exception that engulfs the rule. As we stated in Blakeslee, at page 271:
It does not follow that a referendum may not be had of a law, or any part of a law, carrying an appropriation. If a law were passed bringing the state into a new activity, or providing for a new function so that it might be fairly said that it did not pertain to the support of the government as then organized or to any existing institution, as for instance, a law like the one creating the industrial insurance commission, the law creating a railroad commission, or a law establishing an entirely new institution, *202the rejection of the law would cause a lapsation of the appropriation.
Not even the majority contends that ordinance 81-21 creates a "new" public institution. The ordinance merely modifies the method by which an existing institution will be administered. If the Council were to create a new public institution, the ordinance would be subject to referendum unless it were to fall within the other exception contained in article 2, section 1(b) — those acts "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety . . ." See State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers, 61 Wn.2d 772, 380 P.2d 735 (1963).
While I agree with the majority that the entire ordinance is legislative in character,5 I believe it errs in authorizing a referendum by failing to follow our previous cases and in applying the wrong standard for whether ordinance 81-21 falls within the constitutional exception for legislative acts "in support of . . . existing public institutions". Our present role is not one of determining which of the two voting systems is best for Pierce County; nor is it even one of determining whether the Pierce County Council's acts were arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law. We are here solely to decide whether a referendum is constitutionally authorized in this context. I submit it is not. The people of Pierce County are not without recourse. They may avail themselves of the very punch cards that are the cause of this dispute.
Brachtenbach, C.J., and Stafford, J., concur with Utter, J.

I also agree with the majority that the prosecutor had no discretion to refuse to ballot title appellant's proposed referendum. Nevertheless, since the issue of constitutional authorization for a referendum is before us, I — like the majority— reach the substantive question.