Court Opinion

ID: 9756663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:46:01.872182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:02.489464
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by GREENE, J., which BELL, C.J., Joins.
Respectfully, I dissent.
The majority concludes that the evidence was sufficient in the case sub judice for the trier of fact to convict Petitioner of *605all three elements of the common law crime of indecent exposure—intent to expose, an actual exposure in public, and an exposure that is, or is likely to be, observed by others. (Maj. op. at 603-04, 921 A.2d at 288-89); see Messina v. State, 212 Md. 602, 606, 130 A.2d 578, 580 (1957). I agree-with the majority that Petitioner’s intent to expose himself was willful and deliberate and that his exposure was observed by other individuals. I disagree, however, that Petitioner’s exposure to individuals located inside a private residence constitutes a “public” exposure under the common law offense of indecent exposure.
As the majority sets forth, the crime of indecent exposure in Maryland is a common law offense derived originally from the English Common law. (Maj. op. at 589-90, 921 A.2d at 280). Sir William Blackstone explained that indecent exposure is a crime against religion and morality that requires “open and notorious lewdness.” 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 41, 65 (6th ed. 1775). In 1897, Lewis Hochheimer stated that the crime of “Indecent exposure of person” consists of:
[Ejxposure in public of the entire person, or of parts that cannot properly be exhibited in public.[ ] An exposure is said to be “public,” or in a “public place,” if it occurs under such circumstances as to render it probable, that it would be seen by a number of persons, it being immaterial that it was not actually seen by any one.[ ]
Lewis Hochheimer, The Law of Crimes and Criminal Procedure 453 (1897).
Messina v. State, 212 Md. 602, 130 A.2d 578, is the leading case on this issue. In Messina, two thirteen year-old girls were walking along Northern Parkway in Baltimore when one of the girls noticed Messina sitting in his car. Messina, 212 Md. at 604, 130 A.2d at 579. According to one of the girls, Messina gave her a funny look and then exposed himself. The State charged him with indecent exposure. He argued that because only one girl saw him, the exposure was not public. We stated that:
*606The place where the offense is committed is a public one if the exposure be such that it is likely to be seen by a number of casual observers.
An exposure is “public,” or in a “public place,” if it occurs under such circumstances that it could be seen by a number of persons, if they were present and happened to look.
* * * * * *
An exposure becomes indecent, and a crime, when defendant exposes himself at such a time and place that, as a reasonable man, he knows or should know his act will be open to the observation of others.
Messina, 212 Md. at 605-06, 130 A.2d at 579-80 (citations omitted). We then determined that because Messina “could have been seen by anyone who happened to walk or drive by on the busy street where it was taking place[,] [u]nder those circumstances, it amounted to an offense against public decency.” Messina, 212 Md. at 606, 130 A.2d at 580.
The majority bases its holding, in large part, upon this language of Messina. It also examined the plain meaning of the term “casual,” and found it to mean “not expected, foreseen, or planned.” (Maj. op. at 601, 921 A.2d at 287) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 231 (8th ed.2004)). The majority concludes that a “[cjasual observer in the context of the crime of indecent exposure, then, is one who observes the defendant’s acts unexpectedly.” (Maj. op. at 601, 921 A.2d at 287). The majority holds, therefore, that because the visitors of the home in which Wisneski exposed himself did not expect to see Wisneski’s genitalia, they were casual observers and the home became a public place. I disagree with this interpretation of the phrase, “casual observer” and with such an expansion of the common law; we have never considered a private home to be a public place in the context of indecent exposure and such an extension of the concept is not warranted here.
Based on our reasoning in Messina, a casual observer is an individual who happens upon a defendant in the midst o f his or her indecent exposure such that the confrontation with that *607individual is “not expected, foreseen, or planned,” like the situation involving the teenager who happened to walk by Messina while he was exposing himself in his car. We have never concluded that a casual observer is an individual with whom a person has spent an afternoon inside a private dwelling who then happens to act in an unexpected manner.
Messina was convicted of indecent exposure because a teenager saw him expose himself on a busy street and we stated explicitly that the exposure was public because Messina “could have been seen by anyone who happened to walk or drive by on the busy street where it was taking place[,] [ujnder those circumstances, it amounted to an offense against public decency.” Messina, 212 Md. at 606, 130 A.2d at 580 (emphasis added). The majority takes the language of Messina out of context and, in doing so, expands the common law beyond its intended boundaries. Messina dealt solely with a man who exposed himself on a busy, public street in Baltimore. The majority draws from the dicta in Messina and applies it to events that occurred inside a private home.
In my view, the other individuals who were present when Wisneski exposed his private parts were not casual observers and Wisneski’s exposure inside the private dwelling did not convert the private home into a public place. He did not expose himself to any individuals other than those inside the home. Based on Messina and the definition of “casual,” listed supra, a casual observer would have to be one who happened to walk or drive by and see Wisneski. There was no evidence that Wisneski exposed himself in front of a large window or open door so that passers-by would see his exposure. Because Wisneski exposed himself in the living room of a private home, in which there were only invited guests, there were no casual observers who could have seen the exposure of his private parts. Under these circumstances, the private home in which Wisneski exposed himself does not constitute a public place consistent with the common law offense of indecent exposure.
*608In addition, the majority notes that the courts of our sister states are divided on the issue of whether exposure in a private dwelling can satisfy the “public” element of indecent exposure, but that the majority of states hold that indecent exposure may be criminalized in private dwellings. Essentially, all of the cases upon which the majority relies as support for its conclusion, however, are distinguishable from the case sub judice. While the cases that the majority cites support a conviction for indecent exposure in a private place, almost all of those cases are based upon the common law offense as modified by statute. The courts in those cases, therefore, interpreted the language of the applicable statutes and . analyzed the defendants’ behavior under the relevant statutory provisions. See, e.g., State v. Whitaker, 164 Ariz. 359, 793 P.2d 116 (1990); Greene v. State, 191 Ga.App. 149, 381 S.E.2d 310 (1989); People v. Randall, 711 P.2d 689 (Colo.1985); State v. Odom, 554 So.2d 1281 (La.App.1989); McGee v. State, 165 Ga.App. 423, 299 S.E.2d 573 (1983); People v. Legel, 24 Ill.App.3d 554, 321 N.E.2d 164 (1974). As explained above, the crime of indecent exposure is a common law offense in Maryland, and is one that neither the General Assembly nor this Court has modified1 until today.
As to states that have found a private home to be a public place based solely on the common law crime of indecent exposure, similarly,. those cases are distinguishable from the present case as well. For example, in Commonwealth v. Bishop, 296 Mass. 459, 6 N.E.2d 369, 370 (1937), the court affirmed the conviction of a defendant for indecently exposing himself in his own home. The court determined that the public place element of the crime was satisfied. In that case, however, the defendant did not expose himself to someone who was within the confines of his private dwelling. Instead, he exposed himself in a room that was visible from his *609neighbor’s window with the intention of having his neighbor see him. To get his neighbor’s attention, he “flash[ed] a mirror” that caused rays of light to form on the neighbor’s walls. Bishop, 6 N.E.2d at 369. Bishop is distinguishable from the case sub judice because Mr. Bishop eliminated the essence of privacy from his dwelling by intentionally exposing himself in a manner that was visible to individuals outside of the private residence. In the case sub judice, Petitioner exposed himself only to those individuals inside the house and did not demonstrate any intent to expose himself to those on the outside. He did not walk up to a window and deliberately attract attention so that any number of individuals, passers-by, or other “casual observers” would see him. Thus, Petitioner did not change the character of the place from private to public.
The majority’s holding creates a slippery slope. Holding that a private home can constitute a public place and that a casual observer is simply one who was not expecting to see what he or she saw expands the common law beyond its intended bounds; especially since indecent exposure is a general intent crime. In addition, my concern is that the majority’s holding in this case will require courts, when applying the law of indecent exposure, to draw distinctions based upon different areas of the home, in effect, creating public zones within a private dwelling. Surely, this will create a trap for the unwary. For example, if a woman holds a bachelorette party at her home and pays for an exotic dancer to perform, but one of the guests was not aware that a dancer would be performing and is offended by the male dancer’s behavior, then the dancer would be guilty of indecent exposure and the host would be complicit in that crime. Even more offensive, if a man and his fiancé are undressed in their bedroom with the door slightly ajar, and a friend of either occupant walks in and observes the individuals nude, the nude occupants of that room would be guilty of indecent exposure pursuant to the majority’s definition of a “casual observer.”
The General Assembly has the ability to study and modify the common law as to the crime of indecent exposure, and, in *610doing so, can expand the concept of a public place, just as other jurisdictions throughout this country have done. See, e.g., State v. Whitaker, 164 Ariz. 359, 793 P.2d 116 (1990); Greene v. State, 191 Ga.App. 149, 381 S.E.2d 310 (1989); People v. Randall, 711 P.2d 689 (Colo.1985); State v. Odom, 554 So.2d 1281 (La.App.1989); McGee v. State, 165 Ga.App. 423, 299 S.E.2d 573 (1983); People v. Legel, 24 Ill.App.3d 554, 321 N.E.2d 164 (1974). Under those circumstances, the General Assembly would have spoken and expanded the common law to embrace the conduct of Wisneski in this case. Until it does so, however, we are bound by the common law. Of course, this Court has the ability to expand the common law where there is good reason to do so, but, consistent with the underlying purpose of the law. The underlying purpose of the crime of indecent exposure was to proscribe acts of indecency and immorality that occurred in a public place. To the contrary, the common law was not designed to proscribe indecent and immoral acts that occurred inside a private residence.
Wisneski intentionally exposed his genitalia to others while he was inside a private residence. He did not expose himself to anyone outside the residence. Therefore, his actions did not change the character of the location. The residence remained a private place even though others saw his private parts, or did not see his private parts but could have seen them if they had looked. Accordingly, there is no disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that Wisneski’s conduct was both lewd and intentional. It has been said that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” Thus, homeowners would be better advised to become more selective as to those persons that they choose to invite into their homes, than for this Court to expand the common law to make lewd behavior, such as that demonstrated by Wisneski herein, a crime.
Chief Judge BELL authorizes me to state that he joins the views expressed in this dissent.

. As the majority explained, the General Assembly did codify one aspect of the common law offense of indecent exposure in 1902. The General Assembly repealed that provision, however, in 1977 and therefore revitalized the crime of indecent exposure as a common law offense. (Maj. op. at 591, n. 7, 921 A.2d at 281, n. 7).