Court Opinion

ID: 9763327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:41:10.185072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:41.181523
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
This is a condemnation case where in addition to the “bricks and mortar” of their property, appellees have pleaded and proved that there was a unique quality to their property that was compensable. The jury agreed, hence the award in question.
The majority, in ignoring the jury verdict, asserts that the damages sought for the uniqueness of the property do not lie because they are independent and apart from the compensable value of the property, and further that appellees have not sufficiently pleaded these specific damages.
This simply is not so.
Our Courts in Texas have historically held that a person can recover for the uniqueness of his taken property as a component part of the property’s total value. State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194,198 (1936); McFadden v. Schill, 84 Tex. 77, 19 S.W. 368, 370 (1892).1 Our Courts have also universally held that a business is property and when taken by a government authority, the owner must be compensated. *584City of LaGrange v. Pierrat, 142 Tex. 23, 175 S.W.2d 243 (1943); Hart Bros. v. Dallas County, 279 S.W. 1111 (Tex.Comm.App.1925, judgmt. adopted). It seems only quibbling to say that appellees can not now recover in this rare situation for the uniqueness of their business or that they have not properly sought these damages.
In the first place, in their objections to the award, appellees asked for all sums recoverable under both the federal and our State Constitution. U.S. Const, amend. V; Tex. Const, art. I, § 17. Additionally, appellant not only failed to timely and properly object to appellees’ allegedly defective pleadings, but also to the introduction of evidence proving the value of and the existence of the uniqueness in question. Consequently, this point was tried by consent and may not now be complained of on appeal. Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 90 (Supp.1982); Bednarz v. State, 142 Tex. 138, 176 S.W.2d 562 (1943).
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court based upon the uncontroverted jury findings.2

. The cited Supreme Court authority, and their progeny, state the controlling proposition that the fitness or adaptability of taken property for a particular purpose or use is a component part of the compensable value of taken property, as *584fixed as the taken property’s market value as determined by the jury.

. I am not alone in my holding. See Housing Authority of Saint Paul v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co., 282 N.W.2d 537 (Minn.1979); Feigenbaum v. New Britain Housing Site Development Agency, 164 Conn. 254, 320 A.2d 824 (1973); Gibson Estate v. State Highway Board, 128 Vt. 47, 258 A.2d 810 (1969); Bowers v. Fulton Co., 221 Ga. 731, 146 S.E.2d 884 (1966), to name but a few other jurisdictions who have passed upon this unique situation.