Court Opinion

ID: 9658784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:13:28.67417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:58.642632
License: Public Domain

CLARIE, District Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent and disagree with the majority opinion that § 17-2d of the Connecticut General Statutes is unconstitutional. The residence time qualification for welfare eligibility of non-residents coming into the State, as contained in the law, is a reasonable one directly related to the problem sought to be governed. It is a valid legislative classification, which the State has the discretion and authority to enact. It is not within the province of the judiciary to determine whether the remedy chosen is a wise one, but only whether it is constitutional. Railway Express Agency v. People of State of New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109, 69 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed. 533 (1949); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224-225, 69 S.Ct. 550, 93 L.Ed. 632 (1949); Olsen v. State of Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246-247, 61 S.Ct. 862, 85 L.Ed. 1305 (1941).
Forty other states of the United States, including Connecticut, have established a one-year residence require*339ment, as a condition of eligibility to qualify for aid to families with dependent children.1 Congress itself has sanctioned the laws of these forty states, by enacting 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(b), which provides for a federal contribution to state administered programs, where the condition of eligibility does not exceed a one-year prior residence. As a practical matter, most states require a residence eligibility requirement or waiting period for all forms of welfare benefits.2
The majority opinion concedes that the purpose of § 17-2d is to protect the state’s fiscal responsibilities by discouraging entry of those who come into the state seeking relief.3 It goes even further and asserts that a classification denying aid to those whose sole or principal purpose in entering the state to seek aid would be unconstitutional. The principal basis for the majority position is that the law abridges the right of freedom to travel and to establish residence; and that because such a statute as § 17-2d has a chilling effect on the right to travel, it is therefore unconstitutional. The landmark case cited to support this position is Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941).
The latter case can be distinguished from the issue being litigated here. It involved a state statute, which made it a crime to transport across the state line into California, one who was an indigent. This statute was ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, because it not only restricted commerce between the several states, but it also actually limited the right of citizens to \ travel freely between the several states. On the contrary, the statute which is now in issue, does not prohibit travel between the states as such. What it does do and is intended to do, is to deter those who would enter the state for the primary or sole purpose of receiving welfare relief allotments.
Connecticut is comparatively generous in welfare grants. The legislature provides an open-end budget in its biennial appropriations to the State Welfare Department,4 so that no qualified applicant may be denied aid or caused personal hardship by delay or the arbitrary limitation of budgetary appropriations. Connecticut ranks fourth among all the states, with monthly payments of $197.00 (46% contributed by the federal government) for a family of four, compared with the national average of $148.00. An extreme comparison is had by comparing the average monthly payments for a similar family unit in Mississippi of $33.00; in Alabama, $48.00; in Florida, $60.00, and in South Carolina, $64.00. In these latter states, the federal government contributes 83'%, the state 17%.5 Thus by way of illustration and comparison, the State of Connecticut’s monthly contribution is $109.00 compared with that of Mississippi’s of $5.50. It should be noted that § 17-2d applies both to the general assistance allotments under § 17-273, Part I, Chapter 308, for which no federal contribution is provided, as well as to Chapter 301, aid to dependent children. Uncontrolled demands upon Connecticut’s welfare program could effect an overall reduction of aid paid to eligible beneficiaries. It *340is a proper function of the legislature to enact such reasonable statutory controls, under the police powers reserved to the state in the Federal Constitution,6 that its obligations to aid the needy of the state may continue to be generously fulfilled. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 629, 18 S.Ct. 488, 42 L.Ed. 878 (1898).
The United States Supreme Court recognized the problem when it upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Social Security Act:
“A system of old age pensions has special dangers of its own, if put in force in one state and rejected in another. The existence of such a system is a bait to the needy and dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven of repose. * * * ” Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644, 57 S.Ct. 904, 81 L.Ed. 1307 (1937).
Connecticut has always freely exercised its sovereign right as a state, to legislate and administer controls governing a myriad of comparable state services. A needy student, to be eligible for a scholarship loan, must have resided within the state for the twelve (12) months previous to his application; 7 to receive aid to send a blind child for instructions, both the child and one of his parents or guardians must have resided within the state for one (1) year preceding the application.8 To be an elector, one must have resided within the state for six months.9 To be eligible to hold a liquor permit one must first be an elector.10 With certain specified exceptions, a one year’s residence is a prerequisite to applying for employment in the state merit system.11 A plaintiff in a divorce action must have resided in the state continuously for three (3) years prior to bringing an action, unless the cause arose subsequent to residence within the state.12 The captains and members of the crew of oyster boats, in order to be licensed must have a one-year residence,13 as well as those who would take scallops from state waters;14 and so on ad infinitum.
Are these residence requirements established through several generations of orderly state growth, now to be struck down as constituting a constitutionally unlawful discrimination between the citizens who have just moved into the state and those who meet these reasonable statutory requisites? Such a decree by judicial fiat would go far toward completing the annihilation of the police powers, which were reserved to the several states and to the people under the tenth amendment to the Federal Constitution.
It is not within the province of this Court to pass upon the state legislature’s wisdom in causing the enactment of this law, but whether or not the law violates the constitutionally guaranteed rights of its citizens. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 647, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1942):
“It can never be emphasized too much that one’s own opinion about the wisdom or evil of a law should be excluded altogether when one is doing one’s duty on the bench. The only opinion of our own even looking in that direction that is material is our opinion whether legislators could in reason have enacted such a law.”
An historical review of the legislative act which preceded § 17-2d illuminates and discloses the true purpose of this law. § 1, Public Act No. 501, 1963 Connecticut General Assembly provided:
“When any person comes into this state without visible means of support *341for the immediate future and applies for aid to dependent children under chapter 301 or general assistance under part I of chapter 308 of the general statutes within one month from his arrival, the welfare commissioner shall determine whether such person’s remaining will serve the best interests of (a) the state, (b) the town to which the person has come and (c) such person. In making his determination, the commissioner shall consider (a) the circumstances involved in such person’s coming to this state, (b) his situation now that he is here, (c) the circumstances involved if he remains, (d) whether he comes to this state able and willing to support himself or whether he came for the purpose of seeking welfare assistance and (e) whether he will need such assistance indefinitely.”
The 1965 Session then amended the law, § 17-2d, so as to change the phrase “one month from his arrival” to “one year from his arrival”; it eliminated the statutory restrictive standards for the guidance of the Commissioner’s administration of the act, ánd adopted the maximum federal residence requirement. 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(b). The intent of the law was to exclude those from benefits, who came into the state for the primary purpose of seeking welfare assistance and it should be so construed and interpreted. It has always been a principle of constitutional interpretation that the Courts, if at all possible, should construe a statute so as to bring it within the Constitution. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 45 S.Ct. 18, 69 L.Ed. 162 (1924); United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 29 S.Ct. 527, 53 L.Ed. 836 (1909).
The Public Welfare Committee of the 1967 Legislature, just adjourned, considered this residence issue in Substitute for Senate Bill No. 166; the bill was defeated by recommitment to committee.
The legislature so exercised its sovereign police power to classify equally all non-residents who came into Connecticut, who applied for welfare aid within a stated time period. The law affected all persons similarly situated in the class described:
“Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.” Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32, 5 S.Ct. 357, 360, 28 L.Ed. 923 (1885).
Without such a statutory deterrent, this state would be powerless to prevent its becoming a refuge for welfare recipients of other states; even those who might be encouraged or even assisted to migrate from their settlement of origin.
“Freedom of residence is restricted as to citizens only while on relief. * * * No interference is had with the right of any citizen to choose and establish a home. What is controlled is the unrestricted imposition of indigent persons and families without settlement upon a community and State where they cannot establish a home because of their indigent status. * * * Such conditions restrict individual rights and freedom in the interest of the right, security and freedom of the rest of the community of the State.” Matter of Chirillo, 283 N.Y. 417, 28 N.E.2d 895 (dissenting opinion).
I further dissent from the award of money damages to the plaintiff by the majority for the past aid alleged to have been unconstitutionally withheld. Connecticut has not consented to be sued for money damages in this class of action. Principality of Monaco v. State of Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 324, 54 S.Ct. 745, 78 L.Ed. 1282 (1933); Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497, 41 S.Ct. 588, 65 L.Ed. 1057 (1920).
Welfare aid, by its nature, does not create a vested right to back payments, which have been denied. Public welfare is a current subsistence grant from public charity funds administered by statu*342tory standards. This is confirmed by the philosophy behind the state welfare laws requiring reimbursement from paupers for support payments. §§ 17-277, 17-298. This plaintiff has been living on monthly allotments from a private source, the Catholic Family Services of Hartford. A money judgment award, under the circumstances, would amount to a gratuitous windfall.
Without such a right to reimbursement for past allotments, the case is now moot. The plaintiff moved to Hartford, Connecticut, in mid-June 1966. Her present residence eligibility under § 17-2d, having been satisfied, she now qualifies to apply for aid to dependent children under Chapter 301. The case should accordingly be dismissed. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952).

. (a) Stipulation of the Parties, Para. 61. (b) States which do not have any waiting period are Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, North Dakota, South Dakota, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Pocket Data Book USA, 1967, U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Statistical Reports Division, Lib. Cong. Card No. A66-7638.

. Some thirty-five (35) states require that an applicant must have resided within the state five of the preceding nine years, including the immediate past year to be eligible to receive old age, deaf and blind benefits. Five (5) other states require simply a one-year residence to receive these benefits. See, Characteristics of State Public Assistance Plans Under the Social Security Act, U.S. Gov. Print. Off. (1965). Also see, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1202, 1352.

. Supra, note 1(b) at 182.

. Conn.Gen.Stat. (Rev.1958) § 4-95.

. Stipulation of Parties, Paras. 58, 59.

. Art. X, Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

. Conn.Gen.Stat. (Rev.1958) § 10-116c.

. Conn.Gen.Stat. (Rev.1958) § 10-295 (b).

. Conn.Gen.Stat. (Rev.1958) § 9-12.

. Conn.Gen.Stat. (Rev.1958) § 30-45(3).

. Conn.Gen.Stat. (Rev.1958) §, 5-39.

. Conn.Gen.Stat. (Rev.1958) § 46-15.

. Conn.Gen.Stat. (Rev.1958) § 26-212.

. Conn.Gen.Stat. (Rev.1958) § 26-288.