Court Opinion

ID: 9846865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:49:41.7023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:56.256118
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice
(concurring).
In my opinion the initial burden of proving a violation of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act was upon appellant.1 Study of the trial record reveals that appellant did not meet this burden. I, therefore, concur in the result reached by this court concerning the superior court’s admission into evidence of the telegram.2 In light of this conclusion, I find it unnecessary to decide whether, as a matter of policy, our courts should countenance a violation of section 605 in any court proceeding.3

. Compare Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-342, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307, 312 (1939); United States v. Morin, 378 F.2d 472, 475 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 834, 99 A.L.R.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied Guippone v. United States, 372 U.S. 959, 83 S.Ct. 1013, 10 L.Ed.2d 11 (1963); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636, 28 A.L.R.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920, 72 S. Ct. 362, 96 L.Ed. 688 (1952).

. I also concur in the court’s disposition of the foundation issue in regard to the admissibility of the telegram and in the decision reached concerning the judgment of acquittal issue.

. See State v. Giardina, 27 N.J. 313, 142 A.2d 609, 610 (1958); People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406, 183 N.E.2d 689, 691-692 (1962).