Court Opinion

ID: 9918326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 16:14:36.445408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:00:23.083280
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                      2024 WY 5

                                                     OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                          January 12, 2024

  IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
  NEAL E. TOKOWITZ a/k/a NEAL EDWARD
  TOKOWITZ, deceased:

  JAMES SILVERWOOD, Personal
  Representative of the Estate of Neal E. Tokowitz
  and RANDY GREEN, Trustee of the residual
  trust established for Carol Tokowitz,
                                                          S-23-0114
  Appellants
  (Objectors),

  v.

  CAROL TOKOWITZ,

  Appellee
  (Petitioner).

                    Appeal from the District Court of Park County
                    The Honorable Bobbi Dean Overfield, Judge

Representing Appellants:
      M. Jalie Meinecke, Meinecke & Sitz, LLC, Cody, Wyoming. Argument by Ms.
      Meinecke.

Representing Appellee:
      Jason Johnson, Davis, Johnson & Kallal, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by
      Mr. Johnson.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] When Neal E. Tokowitz died, he was survived by his wife of 30 years, Carol
Tokowitz, and two children from a former marriage. Mrs. Tokowitz asserted her right of
spousal election against Mr. Tokowitz’s will. After a hearing, the probate court granted
Mrs. Tokowitz’s right of election. James Silverwood, the personal representative of Mr.
Tokowitz’s estate, and Randy Green, the trustee of Mr. Tokowitz’s revocable trust, appeal.
They argue that Mrs. Tokowitz was not legally entitled to a spousal election. We affirm.

                                                 ISSUES

[¶2]    The Appellants offer four issues, which we consolidate and rephrase:

                1. Did the probate court commit reversible error in granting
                   Mrs. Tokowitz’s spousal election?

                2. Did the probate court err in refusing to rule on Mrs.
                   Tokowitz’s rights as a beneficiary under the Neal E.
                   Tokowitz Revocable Trust?

                                                  FACTS

[¶3] Mr. and Mrs. Tokowitz were married in 1990. Both had children from prior
marriages. Mr. Tokowitz died on April 23, 2021, in Maricopa County, Arizona. Mr.
Tokowitz died testate with a “pour-over” will devising all his property to his unfunded
revocable trust to “be held and administered in accordance with the terms of the trust.” The
will, which was executed on January 10, 2012, specified that Mr. Tokowitz was “now
domiciled in Park County, Wyoming.” Mr. Tokowitz made no provision for Mrs.
Tokowitz in the will.

[¶4] Mr. Silverwood, who was named as the personal representative for Mr. Tokowitz’s
estate, filed a Petition for Probate of Will. The petition alleges that Mr. Tokowitz, at the
time of his death, was a resident of Park County, Wyoming. Mrs. Tokowitz asserted her
rights to the elective share of Mr. Tokowitz’s estate under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101 and
to exempt assets under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-7-504 and -505. Over Mr. Silverwood’s
objection, the probate court granted Mrs. Tokowitz’s spousal election and set over the
exempt assets. Mr. Silverwood and Mr. Green 1 (the trustee of Mr. Tokowitz’s revocable
trust), collectively referred to here as Appellants, appeal.
1
 The record before this Court is unclear as to Mr. Green’s involvement in this litigation. In the petition for
probate, Mr. Green, as the Trustee of the Neal E. Tokowitz Revocable Trust, was named as a potential heir.
Mr. Green and Mr. Silverwood filed a joint motion to clarify the probate court’s original order. In its order
clarifying its decision on Mrs. Tokowitz’s petitions, the probate court refers to “Personal Representative,
James Silverwood, and Trustee, Randy Green, (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘Objectors’).”

                                                      1
                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶5] We “review a probate court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly
erroneous, inconsistent with the evidence, or contrary to the great weight of the evidence
. . . .” Powell v. Est. of Fletcher, 2006 WY 21, ¶ 7, 128 P.3d 670, 671–72 (Wyo. 2006)
(citing Matter of Est. of Jackson, 892 P.2d 786, 788 (Wyo. 1995)). We review a probate
court’s statutory interpretation de novo. In re Est. of Meyer, 2016 WY 6, ¶ 17, 367 P.3d
629, 634 (Wyo. 2016).

             In interpreting statutes, we first look to the plain language of
             the statute to determine the legislature’s intent. Wyo. Cmty.
             Coll. Comm’n v. Casper Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2001 WY 86,
             ¶¶ 16–17, 31 P.3d 1242, 1249 (Wyo. 2001); Fontaine v. Bd. of
             Cnty. Comm’rs, 4 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo. 2000); State ex rel.
             Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983).
             We examine the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used
             by the legislature to determine whether the statute is
             ambiguous. Wyo. Cmty. Coll. Comm’n, 2001 WY 86, ¶¶ 16–
             17, 31 P.3d at 1249.

                    A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such
                    that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning
                    with consistency and predictability. Parker Land &
                    Cattle [Co. v. Game & Fish Comm’n, 845 P.2d 1040,]
                    1043 [(Wyo. 1993)].         Conversely, a statute is
                    ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and
                    subject to varying interpretations. Id. . . . Ultimately,
                    whether a statute is ambiguous is a matter of law to be
                    determined by the court. Allied-Signal [v. Wyo. State
                    Bd. of Equalization], 813 P.2d [214,] 219 [(Wyo.
                    1991)].

             Id. at ¶ 17, 31 P.3d at 1249.

Meyer, ¶ 17, 367 P.3d at 634.

                                     DISCUSSION

I.    Did the probate court commit reversible error in granting Mrs. Tokowitz’s spousal
      election?

                                             2
[¶6] The probate court granted Mrs. Tokowitz’s spousal election pursuant to Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 2-5-101, which provides:

              Elective share of property.

              (a)    If a married person domiciled in this state shall by
              will deprive the surviving spouse of more than the elective
              share, as hereafter set forth, of the property which is subject
              to disposition under the will, reduced by funeral and
              administration expenses, homestead allowance, family
              allowances and exemption, and enforceable claims, the
              surviving spouse has a right of election to take an elective
              share of that property as follows:

                     (i)    One-half (1/2) if there are no surviving issue of
                     the decedent, or if the surviving spouse is also a parent
                     of any of the surviving issue of the decedent; or

                     (ii)  One-fourth (1/4), if the surviving spouse is not
                     the parent of any surviving issue of the decedent.

              (b)     If a married person not domiciled in this state dies, the
              right, if any, of the surviving spouse to take an elective share
              in property in this state is governed by the law of the decedent’s
              domicile at death.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101(a)–(b) (LexisNexis 2023) (emphasis added).

[¶7] In support of their contention that the spousal election was unavailable to Mrs.
Tokowitz, the Appellants proffer three arguments: (1) Mr. Tokowitz was not domiciled in
Wyoming; (2) because there was no evidence that Mrs. Tokowitz was entitled to less than
1/4 of the Wyoming estate under the Neal E. Tokowitz Revocable Trust, the district court
could not have determined she was entitled to an elective share; and (3) the spousal election
is not available when a spouse is a beneficiary in the decedent’s trust. We address each
argument in turn.

A.     Mr. Tokowitz was domiciled in Wyoming.

[¶8] The Petition for Probate of Will alleges that “At the time of death [Mr. Tokowitz]
was a resident of Park County, Wyoming, and left an estate therein subject to probate.”
Mr. Tokowitz’s will provides that Mr. Tokowitz is “a married man, now domiciled in Park
County, Wyoming.” The probate court addressed the statutory requirement that Mr.
Tokowitz be “domiciled” in Wyoming and stated that there is little Wyoming caselaw

                                              3
regarding whether “residency equals domicile.” While the probate court did not
definitively find Mr. Tokowitz was domiciled in Wyoming, it implicitly reached that
conclusion when it found Mrs. Tokowitz met the requirements for claiming a spousal share
under § 2-5-101.

[¶9] Appellants do not dispute that Mr. Tokowitz was a resident of Wyoming, but
contend he was not “domiciled here full time.” Appellants argue Mrs. Tokowitz’s petition
fails because she provided no proof that Mr. Tokowitz was domiciled in Wyoming. Mrs.
Tokowitz argues that Mr. Tokowitz was domiciled in Wyoming and that her contention is
supported by the Petition for Probate of Will.

[¶10] We have long recognized “a distinction between the ‘residence’ of a person and the
‘domicile’ of a person.” Wyo. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Woods, 888 P.2d 192, 198 (Wyo. 1994)
(citing State ex rel. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Niobrara Cnty. v. Sch. Dist. No. 12, Niobrara Cnty.,
45 Wyo. 365, 376, 18 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1933)). In 1909, this Court said:

              To construe the temporary residence of appellant with his wife
              in New York to be a change of domicile seems to me to be
              unwarranted; for, as Mr. Justice Depue said, in Harral v.
              Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. [279,] 285, 51 Am. Rep. 17 [(1884)], “to
              the factum of residence must be added the animus manendi,
              and that place is the domicile of a person in which he has
              voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for a mere temporary
              or special purpose, but with a present intention of making
              it his home, unless, or until, something which is uncertain
              or unexpected shall happen to induce him to adopt some
              other permanent home.” The doctrine laid down by the
              courts of the United States is that domicile, having been
              once acquired, continues until a new one is actually
              acquired animo et facto. 10 Am. & Eng. Encycl. L. 15;
              Cadwalader v. Howell, 18 N. J. Law, 138 [(1840)]; Clark v.
              Likens, 26 N. J. Law, 207 [(Sup. Ct. 1857)].

Duxstad v. Duxstad, 17 Wyo. 411, 100 P. 112, 114 (1909) (emphasis added) (quoting
Watkinson v. Watkinson, 60 A. 931, 933 (N.J. Ch. 1905)). “Residence” is interpreted
liberally. Woods, 888 P.2d at 198. “‘Domicile’ is narrowly defined: ‘the domicile of a
person is the place where he has voluntarily fixed his habitation with a present intent to
make it either his permanent home or his home for the indefinite future.’” Id. (quoting
Boswell v. S.C. Ins. Co., 509 A.2d 358, 362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (quoting In re McKinley’s
Est., 337 A.2d 851, 853 (Pa. 1975))). A “person may have a ‘domicile’ in only one place
at a time; however, the same person may be a ‘resident’ of several places at the same time.”
Woods, 888 P.2d at 198 (citing Casolari v. Pipkins, 624 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993); In re Yap, 241 N.Y.S.2d 976, 979 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Switz. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Ins.

                                             4
Co., 213 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), dismissed); see also Black v. De Black,
1 P.3d 1244, 1249–50 (Wyo. 2000).

[¶11] The legislature used “domicile” in § 2-5-101. We assume in using this term, the
legislature understood the difference between the terms “domicile” and “residence.” See
Woods, 888 P.2d at 198 (citing Catalanotto v. Palazzolo, 259 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476 (Sup. Ct.
1965) (“noting that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the difference between a
‘resident’ and a ‘domiciliary’”)); Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game & Fish Comm’n,
845 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Wyo. 1993) (“This court presumes that the legislature enacts statutes
‘with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it. They are
therefore to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as part
of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence[.]’” (quoting Civic Ass’n of Wyo. v. Ry.
Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236, 245 (1941))). The ordinary meaning of the term
“domicile” is the “place at which a person has been physically present and that the person
regards as home; a person’s true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to which that
person intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere.” Domicile,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Duxstad, 100 P. at 114; Woods, 888 P.2d
at 198. 2

[¶12] Appellants contend that Mrs. Tokowitz had the burden of establishing Mr. Tokowitz
was domiciled in Wyoming. Placement of the burden of proof is a question of law that we
review de novo. Wise v. Ludlow, 2015 WY 43, ¶ 19, 346 P.3d 1, 7 (Wyo. 2015). “The
surviving spouse whose claim to an elective share of the deceased spouse’s estate should
initially present prima facie evidence that he[] or she is entitled to the elective share
amount[.]” 170 Am. Jur. Trials § 50, at 60 (2021). “Once the surviving spouse has met
the initial burden of proof that he or she is eligible to make such a claim, and that the claim
has been timely made, the burden of proof shifts to the parties opposing the claim to prove
that the surviving spouse is not entitled to an elective share.” Id. 3 See also Powell, ¶ 10,

2
  Blacks Dictionary offers a second definition:
                The residence of a person or corporation for legal purposes. . . . Also
                termed . . . legal residence; domicile by operation of law. . . .
                        “Tax statutes frequently speak in terms of residence, intending it
                        to be the equivalent of domicile. For example, the New York
                        estate tax speaks in terms of residence and non-residence.
                        Similarly . . . , the United States imposes an estate tax on any
                        resident or citizen of the U.S. Although both statutes use the term
                        ‘residence,’ its usage has been construed to mean ‘domicile.’”
                        Robert C. Lawrence III, International Tax and Estate Planning
                        § 1.03(a)(4), at 8–9 (1989).
Domicile, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
3
                        Where the right of a surviving spouse to claim an elective share of
                the deceased spouse’s estate is being challenged, the party challenging
                must bring its proof both during cross-examination of the surviving

                                                     5
128 P.3d at 673 (“We think it evident that whether two wives marry the same decedent or
one wife marries a decedent and later marries a third party, the burden remains on the party
asserting the validity of the prior marriage—and the invalidity of the subsequent
marriage—to prove the prior marriage was not dissolved.”); Matter of Est. of Brown, 461
P.3d 754, 762 (Idaho 2020) (“the surviving spouse has the burden of proving ‘the matters
which must be shown in order to make a successful claim’ . . . [including] that the disputed
funds were acquired by the decedent while domiciled outside of Idaho” (citation omitted)).
Mrs. Tokowitz bore the burden of establishing a prima facie case that she was entitled to
the spousal election, which necessarily included evidence that Mr. Tokowitz was domiciled
in Wyoming.

[¶13] While Mrs. Tokowitz argues that she met her burden through the petition for probate
which alleges Mr. Tokowitz was a resident of Wyoming, the petition for probate does not
speak to domicile. As explained above, a person can have more than one residence, but
only one domicile. Supra ¶¶ 8–11. The only evidence of Mr. Tokowitz’s domicile is found
in his will. 4 Nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Tokowitz changed his domicile after
executing his will, and the petition for probate alleging that he was a resident neither
supports nor contradicts the will. The prima facie case with respect to Mr. Tokowitz’s
domicile was satisfied by the admission of Mr. Tokowitz’s will, which states that he is
domiciled in Wyoming. The burden then shifted to the Appellants to establish that Mr.
Tokowitz was not domiciled in Wyoming. Appellants failed to produce any evidence to
rebut Mrs. Tokowitz’s prima facia case. The probate court’s conclusion that Mr. Tokowitz
was domiciled in Wyoming was not clearly erroneous, inconsistent with the evidence, or
contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

B.     The terms of the trust and Mrs. Tokowitz’s rights under the trust are not
       relevant to her entitlement to an elective share.

                spouse’s witnesses, and on direct examination of its own witnesses. The
                first proof to be offered (if the issue is an active one under the facts of the
                case) relates to the qualification of the surviving spouse to make such an
                election[.]
170 Am. Jur. Trials § 51, at 62 (footnote omitted).
4
  We may affirm a district court decision on any basis supported by the record.
                An appellate court may affirm a trial court ruling, even though the trial
                court’s legal reasoning for the ruling was erroneous, if (1) the facts in the
                record are sufficient to support a proffered alternative basis, (2) the trial
                court’s ruling is consistent with the view of the evidence under the
                alternative basis, and (3) the record is materially the same as would have
                been developed had the prevailing party raised the alternative basis for
                affirmance below.
Winney v. Jerup, 2023 WY 113, ¶ 30, 539 P.3d 77, 86 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Hanft v. City of Laramie, 2021
WY 52, ¶ 34, 485 P.3d 369, 381 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Prancing Antelope I, LLC v. Saratoga Inn Overlook
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2021 WY 3, ¶ 41, 478 P.3d 1171, 1182 (Wyo. 2021))); see also Tram Tower
Townhouse Ass’n v. Weiner, 2022 WY 58, ¶ 43, 509 P.3d 357, 366–67 (Wyo. 2022) (affirming on equitable
basis not reached by district court).

                                                  6
[¶14] The Appellants assert that the relevant inquiry is whether Mrs. Tokowitz was
entitled to more than the elective share under the terms of the trust. They posit that because
Mrs. Tokowitz is entitled to more than one-fourth of the Wyoming estate under the trust,
she is not entitled to an elective share. They argue that Mrs. Tokowitz must present
evidence that her interests in the trust were less than one-fourth of the Wyoming estate to
establish she was entitled to the spousal election under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101(a).

[¶15] The statute specifies that if “a married person domiciled in [Wyoming] shall by will
deprive the surviving spouse of more than the elective share . . . of the property which is
subject to disposition under the will, . . . the surviving spouse has a right of election . . . .”
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101(a). 5 This language is clear. The statute makes no reference to
property transferred outside of the will, whether such property is transferred by trust or
other means. The terms of the trust and Mrs. Tokowitz’s rights under the trust are not
relevant to her entitlement to an elective share.

[¶16] Under Mr. Tokowitz’s will, after “the payment of all claims, debts, or expenses of
administration of [the] estate, including any taxes owing . . . ,” “the rest, residue and
remainder of [Mr. Tokowitz’s] property of whatever nature and wherever situated,” passes
to Mr. Tokowitz’s revocable trust. The will made no provision for Mrs. Tokowitz.
Because she was deprived, by will, of more than her elective share, she was entitled to the
spousal election.

C.      Property that passes by a pour-over will is a part of the probate estate.

[¶17] Appellants next contend that because Mr. Tokowitz’s will is a “pour-over will” and
Mr. Tokowitz’s trust was the sole beneficiary, the property poured into his trust was not
part of the probate estate against which Mrs. Tokowitz can assert a spousal share.

[¶18] In In re Estate of George, we considered whether assets, placed in a revocable inter
vivos trust before the settlor of the trust died, should be added back to the probate estate
for the purpose of the surviving spouse’s elective share under the Wyoming Probate Code.
In re Est. of George, 2011 WY 157, ¶¶ 44–57, 265 P.3d 222, 230–33 (Wyo. 2011). We
recognized that other states “utilize different statutory criteria to determine the validity of
the inter vivos transfers to an inter vivos trust with regard to the elective share.” Id. ¶ 47,
265 P.3d at 231. We held, however, “the plain language of [Wyoming’s] elective share
statute is limited to ‘disposition by will.’” Id. ¶ 48, 265 P.3d at 231.

                This so-called bright line rule is not dependent on the
                decedent’s intent or retention of control. Section 2-5-101

5
 Because Mrs. Tokowitz is not the parent of Mr. Tokowitz’s surviving children, her elective share is one-
fourth of the property subject to disposition under the will. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101(a)(ii).

                                                   7
              begins with the condition, “[i]f a married person domiciled in
              this state shall by will deprive the surviving spouse of more
              than the elective share, . . . .” Here, the surviving spouse was
              not deprived by will, but rather by the Decedent’s transfer of
              property to a revocable inter vivos Trust prior to her death. We
              have found no legal basis, nor has [the surviving spouse]
              cited any legal basis, for this Court to augment for purposes
              of the elective share the probate estate of the Decedent with
              the property transferred to the Trust prior to Decedent’s
              death or with property transferred by will substitutes at the
              time of Decedent’s death.

Id. (second emphasis added).

[¶19] In Estate of George, the decedent had funded her trust and had a will, which poured
over a “relatively small amount of property” to her trust. Id. ¶ 49, 265 P.3d at 231. To the
extent that Estate of George can be interpreted to hold that property transferred by the pour-
over provision (pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-103) is not part of the probate estate for
purposes of determining the elective share, it is incorrect. Id. ¶ 49, 265 P.3d at 231 n.1.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-103 provides:

                      By a will signed and attested as provided in this article
              a testator may devise and bequeath real and personal estate to
              a trustee of a trust which is evidenced by a written instrument
              in existence when the will is made and which is identified in
              the will, even though the trust is subject to amendment,
              modification, revocation or termination. Unless the will
              provides otherwise the estate so devised and bequeathed is
              governed by the terms and provisions of the instrument
              creating the trust including any amendments or modifications
              in writing made before or after the making of the will and
              before the death of the testator.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-103 (LexisNexis 2023). Section 2-6-103 addresses questions raised
by historic litigation regarding testamentary gifts to a trust created outside of a will. See
George Gleason Bogert & Elizabeth Deleery, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 106 (3rd
ed. 2021). It makes clear that a testator may give property to a trust established during the
testator’s lifetime so long as the trust is identified in the will and evidenced by a written
instrument in existence when the will was made. It directs that assets that pass to the trust
are governed by its terms and provisions unless the will provides otherwise. It does not
exempt assets passing by a pour-over will from the probate estate. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-
103. We take this opportunity to clarify that any property passing to a trust via a pour-over
provision in the will is part of the probate estate until the will is probated. Only after

                                              8
probate does it pass in accordance with § 2-6-103 to the trust to be distributed by the trust
terms. As the Florida courts have explained:

                      Estate planners frequently use non-probate mechanisms
              to transfer a decedent’s property outside of the probate system.
              This can be accomplished in a myriad of ways, such as: inter
              vivos gifts . . . , Totten trusts, joint tenancy, life insurance,
              employee benefit and other annuity beneficiary designations,
              payable on death or transfer on death accounts, and any other
              contractual means. The common thread of such non-probate
              mechanisms is that the assets to which they apply are
              distributed to the designated beneficiaries immediately upon
              the transferor’s death without the need for judicial intervention.

Blechman v. Est. of Blechman, 160 So. 3d 152, 157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). “In contrast with property transferred outside of
probate, property transferred from a ‘pour-over’ will to a trust constitutes part of the
decedent’s probate estate, albeit briefly, since the property is devised by way of a will.”
Blechman, 160 So. 3d at 157; see also Bogert & Deleery, supra, § 105 (“[T]he assets
remaining in the estate and the existence of the trust [must] be disclosed in the course of
probating a pour-over will.”). Property transferred by a pour-over will is part of the
decedent’s probate estate and is subject to the spousal election.

[¶20] Mr. Tokowitz had not transferred the property at issue here to his trust prior to his
death and it became part of his probate estate subject to the spousal election. The probate
court did not err when it concluded Mrs. Tokowitz established she was entitled to her
elective share.

II.    Did the probate court err in refusing to rule on Mrs. Tokowitz’s rights as a
       beneficiary under the Neal E. Tokowitz Revocable Trust?

[¶21] After the probate court granted Mrs. Tokowitz’s spousal election, Mr. Silverwood
asserted the probate court should declare any benefit to Mrs. Tokowitz under the terms of
the trust “null and void.” The probate court declined to rule on this argument, explaining:

              24.    Upon conclusion of probate, the Decedent’s will
              requires that the remaining assets and residue will pour over to
              the Neal E. Tokowitz Revocable Trust. In effect, any
              remaining assets, including property, will transmute from
              probate to non-probate assets through the administrative
              process.

                                              9
              25.     Although the will provides for the remainder of the
              property to be transferred into trust, that is where this Court’s
              jurisdiction ends, and it shall make no determination as to the
              rights and distributions granted by the Neal E. Tokowitz
              Revocable Trust in the foregoing probate matter.

Appellants claim the probate court’s failure to “rule on how the Trustee was to proceed
with distributions from the Trust once the spousal election had been paid” was an abuse of
discretion. We disagree.

[¶22] The Appellants provide no caselaw or statutory authority to support their position
that the probate court must instruct a trustee on distributions made under the terms of a
trust. Indeed, assets owned by a trust pass outside of probate. See supra ¶ 21. Issues
relating to the trust were outside the jurisdiction of probate court. See Est. of George, ¶ 58,
265 P.3d at 233. It is a longstanding rule that probate jurisdiction is limited:

              When the court was exercising its probate jurisdiction, that
              jurisdiction was limited and special; it could consider only
              those matters relating to the marshaling, distribution and
              settlement of decedents’ estates. If the court attempted to
              resolve issues which were not necessary to the exercise of its
              probate jurisdiction, or acted beyond the powers conferred by
              statutes, such determinations were not afforded any binding
              effect and were subject to collateral attack. We have noted,
              specifically, that a probate court cannot determine title to trust
              property when a third party claims title against the
              representative of the estate. Wayman v. Alanko, 351 P.2d 100
              (Wyo. 1960); Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles v.
              King, 46 Wyo. 59, 23 P.2d 851, 90 A.L.R. 125 (1933).

                    This line of authority in Wyoming is consistent with the
              general rule found in 4 Bancroft’s Probate Practice, § 1191 at
              519 (2d ed. 1950):

                     In the absence of statute a probate court has no
                     jurisdiction, after distribution, to appoint or control
                     trustees of a trust created by will.

              Wyoming has no such statute.

Matter of Est. of Fulmer, 761 P.2d 658, 660–61 (Wyo. 1988) (some internal citations
omitted). The probate court correctly concluded that its jurisdiction ended with the will.

                                              10
                                   CONCLUSION

[¶23] The probate court did not commit reversible error when it granted Mrs. Tokowitz
the Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101 spousal election. It correctly concluded it did not have
jurisdiction to determine claims arising from the Neal E. Tokowitz Revocable Trust
including the extent of Mrs. Tokowitz’s rights to distributions. We affirm.

                                         11