Court Opinion

ID: 9771221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:37:15.709562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:27.049122
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring. I concur in the affirmance but question the wisdom of considering the issue of ineffective counsel on direct appeal when raised by post trial motion. By permitting this post trial motion, we are thrown right back into the old Rule 36.4 posture. Rather than promoting judicial economy, an incentive is now in place for convicted defendants to shuck trial counsel after trial and either proceed pro se or retain new counsel to pursue an ineffectiveness claim as part of post trial relief prior to direct appeal. Which counsel handles the merits of the direct appeal then becomes problematic. We experimented with Rule 36.4 in 1989 and 1990. In doing so, we authorized post trial hearings on ineffectiveness of defense counsel and permitted joint appeals on that issue and the merits. There were problems with this procedure. The new Rule 37, effective January 1, 1991, was the result. Now we retreat and endorse a hybrid of the Rule 36.4 experiment. The majority cites Tisdale v. State, 311 Ark. 220, 843 S.W.2d 803 (1992), as authority for its position. In Tisdale, though, the issue of inadequate counsel was raised during the trial itself: However, the record here shows that during his trial, not afterwards, Tisdale requested the court to relieve Robert Scull III from being Tisdale’s counsel. 311 Ark. at 227, 843 S.W.2d at 807. We then said that we would review on direct appeal only objections relating to counsel made at trial. The majority also cites a 1986 case as authority — Lasiter v. State, 290 Ark. 96, 717 S.W.2d 198 (1986). But the Lasiter decision in this context constitutes ancient history because it occurred before the Rule 36.4 experiment and before the adoption of our new Rule 37 in 1991. In my judgment, we intended by the new Rule 37 to eliminate claims of ineffective counsel as part of direct appeals, except when raised during trial which was the situation in Tisdale v. State, supra. By the majority’s decision, we can now anticipate more post trial motions based on ineffective counsel. We can also anticipate more direct appeals relating to inadequate counsel and the associated motions for trial counsel to be relieved and new counsel appointed for purposes of the motion and direct appeal. In short, I am convinced that ineffectiveness claims are appropriately raised by collateral attack under Rule 37, and I would not consider this issue merely because it was raised by post trial motion. To do so blurs an area of procedure that had been clarified.