Court Opinion

ID: 9604879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:27:39.302508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:24.782510
License: Public Domain

DON BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority states:
The record establishes that Reid, although admitting the subject of the Ma-brys’ dispute was discussed, denied he had authority to, or did in fact, enter into any oral settlement agreement with Charles Mabry. Mabry testified by deposition as to an alleged oral settlement agreement based upon his understanding in conversations with Reid during one of their Beaumont meetings.2
They then conclude: “By granting Reid’s motion, the trial court made an implied factual determination that either there was no oral settlement agreement or Reid’s conduct in the course of the settlement negotiation was not fraudulent. By presenting legally and factually sufficient evidence that Reid committed no act that would justify a Texas court’s assertion of jurisdiction over him, Reid negated an essential jurisdictional element of Mabry’s claim and eliminated the basis for the Texas courts’ jurisdiction.”
Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law. Hotel Partners v. Craig, 993 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied). In resolving this question of law, a trial court must frequently resolve questions of fact. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex.2002). When reaching a decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction based on the defendant’s alleged commission of a tort, the trial court should rely only upon the necessary jurisdictional facts and should not reach the merits of the case. In other words, ultimate liability in tort is not a jurisdictional fact, and the merits of the cause are not at issue. Portland Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Bernstein, 716 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), rev’d on other grounds by Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.1998). Accordingly, where the plaintiff alleges an action in tort that arose out of an act committed in Texas, the necessary proof is only that the purposeful act was committed in this State. Ring Power Sys. v. Int’l de Comercio Y Consultoria, 39 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Arterbury v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 553 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ). In deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, a court may not weigh the claims’ merits but must consider only the plaintiffs’ pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. County of Cameron v. *391Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex.2002); Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2001); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554-55 (Tex.2000).
A portion of Mabry’s claim is fraud. The only jurisdictional facts the trial court should have considered were whether Reid was in Jefferson County and whether there was a discussion about the matter. Whether the discussions did in fact constitute an oral agreement or a fraudulent one go to the merits of the case and beyond the jurisdictional facts. Consequently, I disagree with the majority’s holding on issue one. I would reverse the trial court’s order granting the special appearance.

. Does the majority engage in a credibility determination when they describe Mabry’s deposition testimony as only establishing an alleged oral agreement?