Court Opinion

ID: 9532892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:25:53.521465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:51.912326
License: Public Domain

Brown, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent to the majority’s holdings reversing the trial court on the ER *97803(a)(4) issue. I also would hold the superior court’s denial of Mr. and Mrs. D.’s request for funds to have a false memory expert was harmless error, and that the issue of whether the State improperly influenced witnesses was not preserved for review. I concur with the majority holdings rejecting the due process challenge to the destruction of the interviewers’ notes and likewise fail to find merit in the pro se contentions. Finally, I would affirm a peremptory challenge issue not addressed by the majority.
ANALYSIS
1. Application of ER 803(a)(4), Cindy Andrews testified that she counseled M.D. on a regular basis, beginning on February 9, 1995. She stated that her custom in the initial interview is to inform her clients who are children that she is a counselor, and she explains what a counselor does. The record shows Ms. Andrews and M.D. participated in an initial interview and thereafter continued an ongoing therapeutic relationship. M.D. further testified Ms. Andrews was her therapist. These are objective, uncontested facts.
The majority decision turns on an isolated question and answer during the State’s direct examination of M.D. during the trial and following the trial court’s earlier determination pursuant to ER 104 that her statements to the therapist were admissible under ER 803(a)(4). During M.D.’s direct testimony in the State’s case, the prosecutor asked what Ms. Andrews did. M.D. simply responded “I don’t know.” There was no further direct or cross-examination to clarify what M.D. understood the question pertained to and, more importantly, there was no objection raised at this point. M.D. certainly understood that Ms. Andrews was her therapist in view of her earlier testimony during the trial. Whether M.D. understood how Ms. Andrews performs her functions as a therapist is irrelevant to the admissibility of the evidence. Even if this testimony did conflict with M.D.’s earlier testimony, and even if the defense had pointed out to the court the specific objection *98raised here, the testimony would merely be just part of the range of testimony on the subject. Therefore, the trial court would have been well within its discretion to admit it.
The therapeutic relationship is unmistakably established by the testimony of the therapist and by M.D.’s testimony. This is not a case where M.D. lacks the capacity to testify, nor is it a case of claimed incompetence. There is no challenge to her ability to know, recollect or communicate, nor is there a challenge to the trial court’s determination that she is a bright and intelligent nine-year-old child. This is not a confrontation problem, as M.D. testified by appearing at the trial and describing the acts of claimed sexual contact alleged in the hearsay. State v. Rohrich, 132 Wn.2d 472, 481, 939 P.2d 697 (1997). This is not a case where there is a claim of failed unavailability under RCW 9A.44.120. To elevate the single question and response above all other inferences to be drawn from this record is error. We do not sit as fact finders in the place of the trial judge. We cannot ignore the function of the trial court as a preliminary fact finder under ER 104.
Moreover, the critical time for judging the admissibility of a hearsay statement is at the time the statement is made by the declarant, not later. For example, an excited utterance depends upon whether the declarant is excited at the time the statement is made, not later at trial when the declarant may not remember what took place or, for some self-serving reason, deny his or her excitement at the time of the declaration A trial court is not prevented from considering other objective and relevant testimony from bystanders on the same subject and making its determination under ER 104. If at trial the statement or circumstances are denied or contradicted by a declarant, then such evidence may certainly be admissible for determining the credibility or weight to be given the evidence, but it does not prevent the trial court from admitting the hearsay in the first instance. Nor does the later testimony prevent a fact finder from considering all the evidence bearing on the question, no matter who offers it. I believe the *99majority’s holding today in effect, elevates this isolated portion of the testimony to a form of evidentiary trump card. I believe witnesses should not be permitted to hold this kind of power over the truth-telling process.
A declarant’s self-interest in receiving effective medical diagnosis or treatment “carries special guarantees of credibility that [a] trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony.” White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743, 116 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1992). The circumstances of the declaration provide the independent indicia of reliability needed to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns. White, 502 U.S. at 356. The rule’s criteria are objective: Was the statement “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment”? And, was it “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment”? United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 100 (9th Cir. 1992). Inquiries into the declarant’s motive are “not contemplated by the rule; the rule itself has built in guarantees that assure the trustworthiness of [the] statement.” United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1494 n.5 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1184 (1994). Requiring the trial court to determine the declarant’s subjective motivation needlessly complicates the rule’s application without reaping a corresponding benefit. As previously noted, it also opens the possibility some declarants, if they are parties to the court action, will disclaim the necessary motivation if it furthers their position at trial.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority relies on cases from other jurisdictions, many of which involved children considerably younger than M.D. Here, M.D. was nine years old. We also have the help of the trial court’s observation that she appeared intelligent and mature. I see no reason to treat M.D. differently from other declarants.
Additionally, Mr. and Mrs. D.’s objection did not preserve the issue they now raise for appellate review. To preserve an issue for review, a party must specify the particular ground upon which the objection is made. State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 422, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985), cert. denied, 475 *100U.S. 1020 (1986). Here, Mr. and Mrs. D. did not specifically argue to the trial court that application of ER 803(a)(4) was improper because M.D. did not understand the treatment purpose of her visits with Ms. Andrews. They simply argued M.D. did not make her statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.
2. Denial of funds for additional false memory expert. I agree it was important for Mr. and Mrs. D. to present testimony of a false memory expert and the trial court should have granted the defense request for funds to provide testimony on this theory of the case. It was important to explain why a child may make untruthful statements. When the court first considered a request for funds to obtain a false memory expert, the request should have been granted, and the failure to do so was error.
However, I am convinced any error in denying Mr. and Mrs. D. funds for an expert was harmless. The testimony of Dr. Gerald McCarty, who the court appointed as a defense expert on the subject of recantation of abuse allegations by children, addressed the issue of false memory. Dr. McCarty testified about circumstances that could engender recall in a child different than what actually occurred.
Mr. and Mrs. D. have not explained what an expert on false memory syndrome could add to Dr. McCarty’s testimony. I therefore conclude the denial of funds for such an expert was not reversible error.
3. Improper influence. I agree the facts cited by Mr. and Mrs. D. indicate possible misconduct. However, they did not request a hearing at the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate review is limited to issues the appellant raised in the trial court. A claim of manifest error affecting a constitutional right is an exception to that rule. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995); RAP 2.5(a)(3). An error is manifest if the defendant “show[s] how, in the context of the trial, the alleged error actually affected [his] rights; it is this showing of actual prejudice that makes the error ‘manifest.’ ” McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 333. To demonstrate actual prejudice stemming from *101counsel’s failure to move for or object to the admission of evidence, a defendant “must show the trial court likely would have granted the motion if made [or sustained the objection].” McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 333-34.
The claimed error here is not manifest. The defense explored facts of the alleged misconduct in its cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, but those witnesses denied the allegations. A hearing and the entry of findings would have resolved these disputes. Even though I agree a better record would improve review of this question, it is improper to address Mr. and Mrs. D.’s contentions based on this record.
4. Peremptory challenge. The majority is silent on a peremptory challenge question. Because they reverse, I presume it is their view that it is not necessary to reach this issue. Because I differ in the outcome, I believe it is necessary for this issue to be reached in the event of further review.
The issue is whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to exercise a peremptory challenge to a juror already passed. Mr. and Mrs. D. made the following objection with regard to the State’s peremptory challenge of juror number 34:
Mr. Howard: Your Honor, yesterday during jury selection Mr. Fore had initiated a pass when we were doing preemptory [sic] challenges. He passed to Juror No. 34. He then apparently did not know where the pass line was or the strike zone was, and the Court allowed him to go back and preempted [sic] a juror that he had passed on previously.
The Court: Okay. And the reason I allowed it was because of all the cause strikes we had, I had a hard time figuring out where the strike fine was. In fact, counsel came up, and I had it in the wrong place at that time, too. So it was confusing, given all the jurors that we had stricken for cause as well as preempts [sic] by then; so I gave the benefit of the doubt to Mr. Fore that he was simply confused.
CrR 6.4(e)(2) sets forth the procedure for the parties’ *102exercise of peremptory challenges. It provides: “[Pjeremptory challenges shall be exercised alternately . . . until the peremptory challenges are exhausted or the jury accepted.” Here, the rule was not strictly complied with because the court permitted the prosecutor to back up and exercise a peremptory challenge to juror 34. The court based its ruling on the fact the number of cause strikes had created confusion over where on the jury panel the strike line ended.
The burden of showing prejudice or a lack thereof flowing from an error in the jury selection process depends upon whether the departure from procedure is material. If the parties have complied with the substance of the jury selection procedures, the defendant has the burden of proving the lack of strict compliance prejudiced him or her. State v. Tingdale, 117 Wn.2d 595, 600, 817 P.2d 850 (1991). The breach of procedure in Mr. and Mrs. D.’s case was not substantial. It in no way compares to the procedural breaches that occurred in the cases they rely upon. Compare State v. Rice, 120 Wn.2d 549, 562, 844 P.2d 416 (1993) (no gross departure from guidelines when excusing jurors) with Tingdale, 117 Wn.2d at 601 (selection process allowed court to assemble a panel of its own choosing). There was no error.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, I would affirm Mr. and Mrs. D.’s convictions.
Reconsideration denied January 27, 1998.
Fetition for review granted and case remanded to the Court of Appeals at 136 Wn.2d 1019 (1998).