Court Opinion

ID: 9493635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:13:47.255817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:56.511346
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In my view, the majority opinion mis-characterizes the claims Richard Pergler raises in this appeal. With respect to nearly all of Pergler’s claims, however, these mischaraeterizations are harmless because all but one of Pergler’s claims are without merit. But, with respect to Per-gler’s claim that his trial attorneys rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by restricting their cross-examination of Ron Nicholson, I believe these mischaraeterizations lead the majority to reach a conclusion that is erroneous. Accordingly, I dissent.
The majority opinion mischaracterizes Pergler’s claims in two ways. First, it treats all but one of Pergler’s claims as ordinary ineffective assistance of counsel claims despite the fact that both Pergler and the government view all of Pergler’s claims as conflict of interest claims and each of Pergler’s claims involves an allegation that his trial attorneys did not pursue an opportunity to bolster Pergler’s defense because of a conflict of interest. Second, the majority opinion does not accurately describe Pergler’s precise claims on appeal — that his trial lawyers labored under a conflict of interest that caused them: (1) *1012to refrain from pursuing an advice of counsel defense; (2) to truncate Ron Nicholson’s cross-examination; (3) to not call Joy Thomas to testify as to her alleged belief that the Fempouch product was reimbursable; and (4) to not call Paul DeMuro to testify as to when Pergler sought guidance on the legality of his actions.
Applying the special standards governing conflict of interest claims to the four precise claims Pergler raises requires an analysis very different from the one employed in the majority opinion. Before taking up Pergler’s precise claims, however, I should set out my understanding of how this court reviews conflict of interest claims. As the majority opinion rightly notes, the standard of proof for a defendant who claims that he or she received ineffective assistance of counsel because his or her attorney labored under a conflict of interest depends on whether the conflict was brought to the trial judge’s attention. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484-85, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). If the trial judge was made aware of, otherwise knew of, or reasonably should have known of a potential conflict, the defendant need only establish that the trial judge failed to adequately inquire into the conflict (inadequate inquiry) and that the conflict might have had an adverse effect on counsel’s performance (possible prejudice). Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1450 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Fish, 34 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir.1994). If the trial judge was not on notice regarding a potential conflict, the defendant must establish that counsel actively represented conflicting interests (actual conflict of interest) and that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance (actual prejudice). Spreitzer, 114 F.3d at 1450; Fish, 34 F.3d at 492.
Even properly characterized, Pergler’s first, third, and fourth claims are ultimately without merit. As such, it is not necessary to exhaustively analyze those claims. For completeness sake, however, I will address them briefly. Pergler’s first claim — that his trial attorneys did not pursue an advice of counsel defense because of a conflict of interest — must be judged under the inadequate inquiry/possible prejudice standard as there is no dispute that the parties raised the possibility of such a conflict of interest to the district court. Pergler cannot satisfy this standard, however, because the district court adequately inquired into the conflict and obtained a valid waiver of the conflict from Pergler. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 5 F.3d 1070, 1078-79 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 59-64 (7th Cir.1992). Pergler’s third and fourth claims — that his trial attorneys did not call Joy Thomas or Paul DeMuro to provide certain important evidence — do not involve conflicts that were brought to the district court’s attention and, therefore, must be considered under the actual conflict/actual prejudice standard. Under this standard, Pergler’s third and fourth claims must fail because there is inadequate evidence in the limited record available to determine'whether the alleged conflicts of interest adversely affected the performance of Pergler’s trial attorneys; in particular, nothing in the record establishes that an unconflicted attorney would have called either Thomas or DeMuro. See, e.g., United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 628-31 (7th Cir.1985).
Pergler’s second claim has considerably more merit than his other three claims. His second claim arises out of the decision of his trial attorneys to cut short their cross-examination of Ron Nicholson. As the majority opinion notes, Nicholson testified for the. government that, during a conference call regarding whether the Fempouch product was reimbursable, Paul DeMuro took more seriously than Pergler and the other participants in the conference call Nicholson’s suggestion that the parties present the product to Medicare authorities. Pergler’s trial attorneys wanted to rebut Nicholson’s testimony, but *1013informed the district court that they felt they could not do so because any questioning about the basis for his statement “puts Latham & Watkins in a difficult situation,” and calling DeMuro to provide rebuttal testimony could not be done “without raising a serious disqualification issue.” Per-gler’s trial attorneys therefore stuck with their request that the problematic portion of Nicholson’s testimony simply be struck, but the district court refused. Pergler now claims that his trial attorneys did not rebut Nicholson’s testimony because they labored under a conflict of interest.
The first matter that must be addressed is the government’s argument, echoed in the majority opinion, that the decision by Pergler’s attorneys to cut short their cross-examination of Nicholson does not even present a potential conflict of interest. The government and the majority opinion suggest that Nicholson’s testimony raises no conflict of interest problem because: (1) Pergler’s attorneys were given the opportunity to request that a foundation be laid for Nicholson’s testimony; (2) DeMuro would have been subject to direct examination, not cross-examination, from his colleagues; and (3) there were participants in the conference call other than DeMuro who could have testified. All of this is beside the point, however. Regardless of how it was to be accomplished, through further questioning of Nicholson, direct testimony from DeMuro, or testimony from other witnesses, Pergler’s trial attorneys were left, possibly, with the task of establishing that their colleague was not particularly concerned about presenting the Fempouch product to Medicare authorities for a reimbursability determination. In light of this possibility, I can only conclude that a potential conflict of interest did exist.
The next question, then, is whether the trial court was on notice of this potential conflict. It is clear that the court was, or at least should have been. Pergler’s attorneys all but told the judge that because of their obligations to Latham & Watkins they would not be pursuing a possibly fruitful line of cross-examination. They explained that any questioning about the basis for Nicholson’s testimony regarding the seriousness with which DeMuro took Nicholson’s advice “puts Latham & Watkins in a difficult situation.” And, they asserted that calling DeMuro to provide rebuttal testimony could not be done “without raising a serious disqualification issue.” The district court clearly was on notice that there might be a conflict of interest problem related to the.ability of Pergler’s attorneys to rebut Nicholson’s testimony.
As the district court was on notice of this potential conflict, the inadequate inquiry/possible prejudice standard governs Pergler’s claim that his representation suffered because of that conflict. Considering the inadequate inquiry requirement first, the question is whether the district court sufficiently probed the potential conflict to determine if there was a possibility that it might ripen into an actual conflict or otherwise took steps to address any possible conflict. Fish, 34 F.3d at 492-94; United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir.1994). The district court conducted no inquiry whatsoever. Moreover, the district court did not disqualify counsel or obtain a waiver of the conflict from Per-gler. Put simply, the district court’s inquiry into the potential conflict of interest behind the decision of Pergler’s trial attorneys to cut short their cross-examination of Nicholson was inadequate.
As for whether this potential conflict of interest created a possibility of prejudice, the issue is whether the conflict might have had an adverse effect on the performance of Pergler’s trial attorneys. Spreitzer, 114 F.3d at 1450; United States v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414, 1418 (7th Cir.1988). I think it might have. As noted above, there is a quite plausible argument that Pergler’s trial attorneys did not pursue a more extensive cross-examination of Nicholson because of a conflict of interest. And, it is possible that there is evidence *1014indicating that DeMuro did not take all that seriously Nicholson’s advice about presenting the Fempouch product to Medicare authorities, which could have been used both to undermine Nicholson’s credibility and to bolster Pergler’s good faith defense. Accordingly, I firmly believe that an unconflicted counsel would have presented such evidence, assuming it was available. As such, I can only conclude that there does exist a possibility that prejudice might have resulted from the conflict of interest that allegedly caused Pergler’s trial attorneys to truncate Nicholson’s cross-examination.
For the foregoing reasons, I believe Per-gler has established that his trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. On that basis, I would reverse his conviction.