Court Opinion

ID: 9791806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:18:23.85715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.696183
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Frantz
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Language of a statute which is general and purports to give generally a right to seek relief should not, under the guise of interpretation, be reduced to allowing relief only in a very restricted area. And yet I fear that the majority opinion accomplishes this unwarranted end result. For what has been granted legislatively to the generality of persons interested in an annexation ordinance is compressed to the point where a very limited few may seek relief.
I agree with the majority in its view that the County and the School District are aggrieved entities within the meaning of C.R.S. ’53, 139-11-6. See Village of Brown Deer v. City of Milwaukee, 274 Wis. 50, 79 N.W. (2d) 340; Town of Griffing v. City of Port Arthur, 36 S.W. (2d) 593 (Tex. Civ. App.); City of East St. Louis v. Touchette, 14 Ill. (2d) 243, 150 N.E. (2d) 178. But I am unable to agree that resident electors and taxpayers of the county, who will be injured in that a substantial and valuable industry and industrial site is removed from the tax rolls of Arapahoe County, so that the tax base of such county is greatly changed to the detriment of these individuals, are not aggrieved persons within the terms of the statute.
*454To restrict the application of the statute where the language employed is so broad and general is contrary to the intent of the Act as expressed by the legislature, and is tantamount to an amendment of the statute by judicial act — an injudicious and prohibited function.
C.R.S. ’53, 139-11-1, provides that:
“Territory in the State of Colorado may be annexed to a city, city and county, or incporated town, provided the territory is eligible therefor, as set out in section 139-11-2, and provided the procedures set out in sections 139-11-3 and 139-11-4 shall have been complied with.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be noted that two conditions are prescribed in order to accomplish annexation: (1) the territory must be eligible, and (2) certain procedures must be followed.
Only the following from C.R.S..’53, 139-11-2, need be considered in this case:
“Territory shall be eligible for annexation if such territory:
* % *
“(2) Abuts upon or is contiguous to the city, city and county, or incorporated town to which it is proposed to be annexed in a manner which will afford reasonable ingress and degress thereto, provided that not less than one - sixth of the aggregate external boundaries of the territory proposed to be annexed must coincide with existing boundaries of the annexing municipality.”
• Whether there is the necessary contiguity is a question of fact. If, as a matter of fact, the required contiguity is absent, the property proposed to be annexed is ineligible for purposes of attachment to the municipality.
An annexation of ineligible land is void. City of Denver v. Coulehan, 20 Colo. 471, 39 Pac. 425; Sharkey v. City of Butte, 52 Mont. 16, 155 Pac. 266. An attempt to annex property ineligible because of the lack of the necessary statutory contiguity rendered annexation “pro*455ceedings * * * void from the beginning.” Sharkey v. City of Butte, supra.
Beyond doubt, we are dealing with an allegedly void annexation, not one merely voidable because of some-formal lack in the annexation proceedings. May resident electors and taxpayers of the county from which the land is to be disconnected attack a void annexation? C.R.S. ’53, 139-11-6, allows “any person aggrieved by any annexation proceedings had under this article” to apply to the county court “for a hearing and appropriate relief.” Such action must be taken “within ninety days after the effective date of the approving ordinance.”
The statute does not provide, as the majority holds, that only a person may sue who is aggrieved in a manner “peculiar to himself as distinguished from the general detriment theoretically shared by all property owners in the governmental unit.” I contend that the majority view thus expressed is not interpretation; it is overt judicial legislation.
The statute affording “any person aggrieved by any annexation proceedings had under this article” the right to seek “appropriate relief” cannot be equated with giving relief only to those who suffer in a manner different from others, or from 100 others, or 1000 others, or from the whole populace of the county. If a person is adversely affected by an annexation, be it greatly or to a lesser degree, he is a person aggrieved; “any person aggrieved” has that broad a meaning. Hunt v. City of Laramie, 26 Wyo. 160, 181 Pac. 137. To reduce that meaning to something greatly less is not our function or prerogative, but is only for the legislature to do.
Annexation statutes are so varied by reason of differences in language used to convey legislative intent that precedent for our problem is difficult to come by. The best that can be achieved is approximation to our statutes and decisions construing such statutes.
It was held in State v. Village of Mound, 234 Minn. 531, 48 N.W. (2d) 855, that .ineligibility of land sought to *456be annexed, because of the lack of the necessary contiguity, could be contested by individuals through a statutory type of quo warranto proceedings. The individuals lived in an unincorporated area known as Spring Park. A part of this area was made up of an industrial site which formed contiguity with the annexing town by a railroad right of way. The individuals contesting the annexation lived outside the territory to be annexed but in Spring Park. The court spoke about “the party aggrieved” by the annexation and held that the annexation was void for lack of the necessary contiguity. The court thereupon held that the individuals properly could bring the action.
Throwing some light on our case is the opinion in In Re Annexation of Three Portions of Hazle Township, 183 Pa. Super. 212, 130 A. (2d) 230. The court was called upon to decide who would be “any person aggrieved by” the annexation ordinance in that case. The annexation statute of Pennsylvania does require the Commissioners to consider a number of factors, among them the assessed valuation of the township and of the territory to be annexed, and how the annexation would affect the remainder of the territory, in making their findings. It was held that the township and individual taxpayers (although not residing on the property annexed) were aggrieved persons because annexation would increase the burden of tax obligation in proportion to the loss suffered by reason of the annexation. Quoting from another case, the court adopted this language:
“ ‘To amputate a sizable section of Montgomery Township is an operation in which all taxpayers of the township are interested, for to some extent it affects them all.”
Other cases which throw some light on this question are: Village of Brown Deer v. City of Milwaukee, supra; Gorman v. City of Phoenix, 70 Ariz. 59, 216 P. (2d) 400; Town of Griffing Park v. City of Port Arthur, supra.
Quo warranto by the Attorney General is an improper *457remedy. During the ninety days after the passage of the approving ordinance, aggrieved persons may seek such appropriate relief from the county court as the situation warrants. It is a general rule that, where a statute creates a right and the remedy to enforce that right, such remedy is exclusive, at least until that remedy is exhausted. See 1 C.J.S. 974, §6b, and People v. South Platte District, 139 Colo. 503, 343 P. (2d) 812.
Section 139-11-6 places jurisdiction in the county court to determine whether a person has been aggrieved by an annexation. I seriously doubt that the county court has jurisdiction in quo warranto proceedings. It occurs to me that the Attorney General could not proceed in quo warranto until after the expiration of ninety days from the date of the approving ordinance, since during that time there is an exclusive remedy to test the validity of an annexation. The suggestion of relief by way of quo warranto in the majority opinion is, in my view, inappropriate; at best, it could have application only after the expiration of the ninety-day period to which I have alluded.
To the extent that the views expressed above are in disagreement with the majority, I dissent.