Court Opinion

ID: 9715998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:23:03.173521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:40.705681
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent in part. While concurring in the court’s treatment of the compensatory damage award and the discretionary exclusion of defendant’s expert under Rule 220, I disagree with the majority on the question of punitive damages. As noted by the majority, whether punitive damages should be submitted to the trier of fact is a question of law to be considered by the court, and the circuit court’s determination on that involves an exercise of its discretion that will not be overturned absent abuse. (J.I. Case Co. v. McMartin-McAuliffe Plumbing & Heating, Inc. (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 447, 516 N.E.2d 260; Obermaier v. Obermaier (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 602, 470 N.E.2d 1047.) On the basis of the evidence presented and the applicable standards, as set forth in the majority’s opinion, the trial court apparently decided that a trier of fact could reasonably find that defendant’s acts could be construed as involving fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence or oppression, wilfulness or such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others. The decision whether to award punitive damages is then a question left to the trier of fact and that decision should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. (See Beaton & Associates, Ltd. v. Joslyn Manufacturing & Supply Co. (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 834, 512 N.E.2d 1286.) In the instant case, the trier of fact had adequate evidence before it to award punitive damages, just as the trial court had an adequate basis to allow the question of punitive damages to be submitted to the trier of fact. There was in the record sufficient evidence for a determination that punitive damages were appropriately submitted to the jury and adequate evidence for that jury to award punitive damages. Plaintiffs’ evidence indicated that Mr. Huelsmann phoned the defendant at his home, told defendant that his wife was throwing up large amounts of blood clots, and was bleeding, and although defendant requested to speak to Mrs. Huelsmann, she was unable to talk. Defendant’s advice was to gargle with hydrogen peroxide. Defendant Berkowitz indicates that this was part of the discussion, but that he also suggested going to the emergency room of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital. Defendant Dr. Berkowitz testified that he waited for two hours for a return call as to Mrs. Huelsmann’s condition and never received one, but did not check either at the hospital or at the Huelsmann home to determine his patient’s condition. Defendant then left town on a previously scheduled trip; there is evidence in the record that Dr. Berkowitz’s absence was not communicated to plaintiff, nor that plaintiff was given the name and phone number of a physician covering Dr. Berkowitz’s calls. Expert testimony was presented concerning the standard of care that should have been provided to Mrs. Huelsmann. Dr. Dobbs indicated that bleeding to the extent of death can result from a tonsillectomy and, specifically in this case, indicated that when a patient is spitting up blood and choking, she should be directed to a doctor immediately for care. He also testified that Dr. Berkowitz should have told this patient to go to the nearest emergency room immediately. As to Dr. Berkowitz’s trip, there was evidence that the proper standard would have been to inform his patient that he would be out of town and indicate the doctor who would be on call to service that patient as well as indicating how to reach that doctor. Evidence submitted to the jury on activities after the contact with Dr. Berkowitz gave a further basis for a submission of a punitive case to the jury. The evening after contacting Dr. Berkowitz, Mrs. Huelsmann again suffered coughing up blood and choking. At this time, they were unable to reach the doctor, as he had left town. They discovered this fact the next morning when phoning Dr. Berkowitz’s office. Mr. Huelsmann took her to the emergency room at St. Joseph’s Hospital in Breese on Tuesday night, where treatment included removing a blood clot from her throat, treatment to prevent further bleeding, a shot to prevent her from going into shock, and transfusion with two units of blood. She was then admitted to the hospital for an overnight stay and released the next afternoon. A subsequent bleeding episode a few days later resulted in a return visit to St. Joseph’s Hospital, from which she was sent to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital and further treated to stop the bleeding. The hospital stay ran from Saturday until Wednesday, during which time she was treated with pain medication and mild tranquilizers for her nerves. Plaintiff was unable to return to her employment for approximately a week, and upon her return performed only half-day service for the first couple of weeks. She testified of inability to sleep due to nightmares about bleeding and fear of death and received medication for nerves and sleep inducement. She was subsequently treated for anxiety and depression by Dr. Fazle Yasin, to whom she complained of hyperactivity, irritability, panic feeling, inability to cope with stress, excess crying, insomnia, weight loss, inability to work, a feeling of a loss of trust, and a decreased energy level. The diagnosis was depression. Plaintiffs’ evidence further indicated improvement of plaintiff’s condition but an extended prognosis of another year to reach her presurgical condition. Given the standards cited above for submission of a punitive damage question to the trier of fact and the evidence submitted to the jury, the trial court’s determination that the punitive damage question should be submitted was appropriate. The trial court's determination had a factual basis, and the trier of fact’s decision to award punitive damages did not constitute an abuse of discretion. For the above-stated reasons, I dissent from the reversal of the judgment for punitive damages.