Court Opinion

ID: 9446372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:53:01.745813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:37.850368
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
On November 3, 1954, in the District Court of Moore County, Texas, the appellant, George Lee Parker, was adjudg*942ed guilty of forgery and was sentenced to be confined in the State Penitentiary for a term of not less than two jmars nor more than seven years. Without counsel, he appealed on the record with no bills of exception. On March 23, 1955, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, in a very brief opinion, affirmed the judgment of conviction. Parker v. State of Texas, 276 S.W.2d 533. On August 29, 1955, Parker filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas a petition for habeas corpus alleging among other grounds that he was denied the assistance of counsel, was ill, and due to his physical condition was unable intelligently to defend himself. On September 21, 1955, that Court denied his application for permission to file writ of habeas corpus. On February 27, 1956, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, 350 U.S. 971, 76 S.Ct. 444, 100 L.Ed. 843. Parker has thus exhausted the remedies available in the courts of Texas as required by 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. — See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469.
On August 31, 1956, Parker filed his application for the writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas alleging that he had been denied the assistance of counsel and was unable to defend himself, “that he was 67 years of age, and had been confined to bed with organic heart disease almost constantly since March, 1953, and had been treated at Moore County Jail, from one to four times per week, by Doctor O. J. Richardson of Dumas, Texas from August 27 to November 3, 1954, and at trial was suffering from extreme ‘dizzy spells’ and in no way in position to obtain justice.” The district court called upon the State of Texas and O. B. Ellis, General Manager of the Texas Prison System to answer Parker’s petition. The issues framed by the petition, answer, and Parker’s replication were thus stated by the district court in its order of October 8, 1956:
“The issues of law and facts are thereby presented of whether Parker is in custody in violation of the Constitution, Laws, or Treaties of the United States (Section 2241(c) (3), Title 28, U.S.C.A.), in that at his trial in the State Court:
“(a) He was not represented by counsel.
“(b) He was (as he claims) sick when tried.
“(c) The evidence (as he claims) was insufficient to support his conviction.”
The district court ordered: “That the evidence in this matter be taken by November 5, 1956, under Section 2246, Title 28, U.S.C.A., by deposition and affidavit, etc.”
Parker was not represented by counsel, nor was he present at any hearing of his petition for habeas corpus. He was not advised and did not take advantage of his right under said Section 2246 “to propound written interrogatories to the affiants,” etc.
The stenographic transcript of the testimony upon Parker’s trial for forgery shows that he was not represented by counsel, and that the trial court advised him as shown in footnote 3 to the majority opinion.
The indictment charged Parker with the forgery of only one check and that was in the amount of $38.00. The first witness for the prosecution was Elzy Quattlebaum, the son of Phoebia Quat-tlebaum, who testified that he did not sign nor authorize the signature to any of seven cheeks purporting to be signed “Phoebia Quattlebaum by Elzy Quattle-baum.” The checks were in small amounts, the smallest $25.00 and the largest $55.00, and aggregated only $252.15. Each of the checks was payable to G. L. Parker, the appellant, by name and was endorsed by G. L. Parker. One bore his address. There was obviously no attempt to conceal Parker’s actions. The jury could not have known from Elzy Quattlebaum’s testimony that he had any family connection with Parker; in fact, he left the contrary impression:
*943“Q. You know G. L. Parker, don’t you? A. I know of him.
“Q. Well, he is the defendant sitting here, isn’t he ? A. I think so.”
It now appears from an affidavit of Maggie Parker:
“That, she is a sister of Elzie Quattlebaum, and the wife of George Lee Parker, ever since the month of May 1909, and
“That, for several years her brother, Elzie, has been a bitter enemy of her husband, Geo. L. Parker, against whom her Bro., Elzie, became the complaint, witness on on, apparently, tromped up charge of forgery in the Disct. Court in Moore County, Texas, and
“That, the Bank account, at Cheyenne, Okla. on which the controversial check was drawn was in her Mothers name, Mrs. Phoebia Quat-tlebaum, not in her Bro. Elzie Quat-tlebaum, the prosecuting witness against her husband.”
Mrs. Phoebia Quattlebaum did not testify against her son-in-law, Parker, nor has she testified in any of the proceedings following his conviction. A reading of the testimony upon Parker’s trial for forgery shows that he badly needed counsel. He did not cross-examine any one of the four state witnesses, except for a brief cross-examination of the one rebuttal witness. He did not testify in his own behalf, nor did he ever prove his family connection with the Quattlebaums.
John Easley, the Sheriff of Moore County, Texas, in answer to a question by counsel for the State, testified:
“Q. Mr. Parker has been in ill health, somewhat, hasn’t he? A. Yes, sir, he has been in very ill health. I have had to buy him medicine and had to take him up and give him shots. I believe the doctor says he has heart trouble.”
Four of the character witnesses introduced by Parker adverted to his ill health. The last one worked with Parker at a county swimming pool. “We worked at the swimming pool. He was sick and I knew he was sick and barely getting around * *
As its closing witness in rebuttal, the State recalled Sheriff Easley. Without any objection on behalf of Parker, he was permitted to testify as follows:
“Q. Mr. Easley, I will ask you whether or not there is at this time another indictment pending against this defendant, George Lee Parker?
A. Yes, sir, there is.
“Q. And, that is another forgery case? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Mr. Easley, I will ask you whether or not you have received the record from the FBI on Mr. Parker ?
A. Yes, sir, I have.
“Q. Do you have it there in your hand? A. Yes, sir, I have it here.
“Q. I will ask you to refer to it to refresh your memory and tell us how many times that indicates he has been in the penitentiary in connection with forged checks or fictitious checks? A. I believe seven times he has been in the penitentiary for bogus and forged checks.
“Q. That was in what state?
A. Arkansas and Oklahoma, I believe, and also—
“Q. And,. I think you said seven times. Would you refer to that again and tell us bow many times he has been in the penitentiary regardless of the cause? A. Nine times. The first time he went was 1922 for removal of mortgaged property and then there was one other time there. It is either eight or nine times — I believe it is nine altogether and one of those was for disposing of mortgaged property in 1922.
“Q. What was the last time he was sentenced to the penitentiary? A. 1948 — the 8th month and 29th day.
“Q. What was that charge? A. Forgery.
“Q. And, where was he sent? A. He was sent to Jefferson City, *944Missouri and got two years and I believe was paroled after serving some time.
“Q. And, that is approximately when he came to this county. Is that right ? A. I don’t know when Mr. Parker came to this county.
“Q. Are there any other miscellaneous offenses other than those that you have mentioned — I don’t care that you mention them? A. Yes, sir. There has been a drunk charge, I believe, against George one time.”
Any person with the slightest experience in the trial of criminal cases would know that after that testimony conviction of the defendant was a foregone conclusion. Further, his conviction was assured not because he was guilty of the offense for which he was indicted, but because, under that testimony, he was an habitual forger, still continuing his criminal career, and under indictment, whether guilty or not, for another offense of forgery. Those were not the issues on which Parker was entitled to be tried.
Upon such a record, it would appear that Parker’s efforts to defend himself were little short of farcical. In view of the small amounts of the checks, his family connection with the Quattle-baums, and the open way in which the checks were payable to and endorsed by Parker, it is quite possible that he may have had a defense to the charge of forgery, or at least that mitigating circumstances might have been shown. The record of Parker’s trial for forgery shows that he suffered badly from the lack of assistance of counsel, and tends to corroborate his claim of extreme illness.
If Parker was unable to defend himself, his trial without counsel was a mockery of justice and deprived him of due process of law. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595. On that issue, as recognized by the district court, a substantial question of fact was presented. Notwithstanding the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2246,1 think that the rule in habeas corpus proceedings, as well as in Section 2255 proceedings, is still that: “Where, as here, there are substantial issues of fact as to events in which the prisoner participated, the trial court should require his production for a hearing.” United States v. Hayman, 1952, 342 U.S. 205, 223, 72 S.Ct. 263, 274, 96 L.Ed. 232.
Indeed, the statute itself plainly so requires: “Unless the application for the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2243.
Of that provision, the Reviser’s Note states: “The fifth paragraph providing for production of the body of the detained person at the hearing is in conformity with Walker v. Johnston, 1941, 312 U.S. 275, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2243, Reviser’s Note, page 458.
This was commented on in footnote 38 to United States v. Hayman, supra, 342 U.S. at page 222, 72 S.Ct. at page 274.
The statute further provides:
“A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2243.
On the showing made, I think that Pai'ker is entitled to issuance of the writ or to a show cause order, and to a hearing on the merits at which he should be present. Further, in its discretion and in order to assure justice, I think that the district court should offer Parker the assistance of counsel upon such hearing. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Rehearing denied: RIVES, Circuit Judge, dissenting.