Court Opinion

ID: 9621760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:06:10.109985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:08.848690
License: Public Domain

Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON
dissenting.
The majority conflates the burden of persuasion — the exclusive province of the jury — with the burden of production. In so doing, the majority improperly weighs the evidence and substitutes its own judgment for the jury’s. I therefore respectfully dissent. Because plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award of punitive damages, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

I. N.C.G.S. § ID-15

Subsections 1D-I5(a) and (b) state that:
(a) Punitive damages may be awarded only if the claimant proves that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages and that one of the following aggravating factors was present and was related to the injury for which compensatory damages were awarded:
(1) Fraud.
(2) Malice.
(3) Willful or wanton conduct.
*729(b) The claimant must prove the existence of an aggravating factor by clear and convincing evidence.
N.C.G.S. §§ ID-15 (a),(b) (2007).
To determine the General Assembly’s intent in requiring “clear and convincing” evidence of punitive damages under N.C.G.S. § ID-15 and whether by establishing such burden of proof, the General Assembly intended to alter the trial court’s review of the evidence upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, I believe it instructive to closely examine two basic concepts of law: the burden of proof and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

II. Burden of Proof

The burden of proof in any case includes both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. Black’s Law Dictionary 209 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Black’s]; see also N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 301 (2007) (distinguishing between the burden of production and the burden of persuasion); Hunt v. Eure, 189 N.C. 482, 486, 127 S.E. 593, 594 (1925); Speas v. Merchs. Bank & Tr. Co., 188 N.C. 524, 526, 125 S.E. 398, 399 (1924); 1 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence § 30 (6th ed. 2004) [hereinafter Broun], The burden of production, also known in North Carolina as the “duty of going forward,” Speas, 188 N.C. at 529, 125 S.E. at 401, is “[a] party’s duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by the fact-finder, rather than decided against the party in a peremptory ruling” such as a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Black’s 209. See also Speas, 188 N.C. at 526, 125 S.E. at 399 (contrasting the “burden or duty of going forward and producing evidence” with the party’s burden of persuasion); Broun § 30 (same). The burden of persuasion, meanwhile, is the “party’s duty to convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that favors that party.” Black’s 209; see also Broun §.33. The burden of persuasion is commonly known in North Carolina as the “burden of the issue.” Speas, 188 N.C. at 529, 125 S.E. at 401; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Makely, 139 N.C. 54, 57-58, 139 N.C. 30, 35-36, 51 S.E. 784, 786 (1905); Broun §§ 30, 33. The burden of persuasion is also often “loosely termed [the] burden of proof.” Black’s 209 (emphasis omitted); see also Broun § 33.
The burden of production and the burden of persuasion are distinct concepts. See, e.g., Speas, 188 N.C. at 529, 125 S.E. at 401 (“The burden of the issue and the duty of going forward with evidence are two very different things.”); Makely, 139 N.C. at 57-58, 139 *730N.C. at 35-36, 51 S.E. at 786 (distinguishing the burden of production from the burden of proof); Black’s 209 (same). Significantly, the trial court may review the evidence to ensure that the burden of production is met, while the burden of persuasion rests with the trier of fact:
“The important practical distinction between these two senses of ‘burden of proof,’ is this: ‘The risk of non[]persuasion operates when the case[s] . . . come into the hands of the jury [] while the duty of producing evidence implies a liability to a ruling [of] the judge disposing of the issue without leaving the question open to the jury’s deliberation[].’ ”
Hunt, 189 N.C. at 488, 127 S.E. at 596 (quoting 5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 2487 (2d ed. 1923) (alterations in original)); see also Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N.C. 395, 405, 139 N.C. 503, 516, 52 S.E. 201, 206 (1905) (“The legal sufficiency of proof and the moral weight of legally sufficient proof are very distinct in the conception of the law. The first lies within the province of the court, the last within that of the jury.”); Black’s 209 (defining the burden of production as the “party’s duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by the fact-finder” rather than by the trial judge, while the burden of persuasion is the “party’s duty to convince the fact-finder”); Broun §§ 32, 33, 39.

A. Varying Levels of the Burden of Persuasion

The burden of persuasion is “heavier or lighter depending upon the kind of case and the particular issue involved.” Broun § 33; see also Speas, 188 N.C. at 528-29, 125 S.E. at 400-01 (describing the differing levels of the burden of persuasion); Black’s 209 (identifying varying burdens of persuasion). In civil cases, the burden of persuasion is usually the “greater weight” or “preponderance” of the evidence, Black’s 209, but other civil cases require a greater burden of persuasion, that of “clear and convincing evidence,” see Speas, 188 N.C. at 528-29, 125 S.E. at 401, also called the “middle burden of proof,” Black’s 209. See also Broun § 42. In criminal cases, the burden of persuasion is almost always “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Speas, 188 N.C. at 528, 125 S.E. at 400; Black’s 209. In each case, the jury must determine whether the party with the burden of persuasion has met that burden with evidence that preponderates, clearly convinces, or establishes the matters at issue beyond a reasonable doubt. These various burdens of persuasion relate to the credibility of the evidence offered rather than the quantity of the evidence. See In re Will of *731Lomax, 225 N.C. 592, 595, 35 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1945) (noting that the probative value of testimony offered “is a matter only for the jury”).

B. The “Clear and Convincing” Burden of Persuasion

The majority asserts that, as a matter of law, plaintiff failed to present “clear and convincing” evidence in support of his claim for punitive damages. In so concluding, the majority conflates the burden of production with the burden of persuasion. Determining whether a plaintiff has met the burden of persuasion by producing “clear and convincing” evidence is the exclusive province of the fact finder. See, e.g., In re Will of McCauley, 356 N.C. 91, 102, 565 S.E.2d 88, 95 (2002) (“Whether the evidence on these questions is clear, strong, and convincing is for the jury to decide.”); Speas, 188 N.C. at 530, 125 N.C. at 401. This principle is well established. As this Court admonished in Lehew v. Hewett, 130 N.C. 15, 16, 130 N.C. 22, 22-23, 40 S.E. 769, 770 (1902):
The evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury, with the instruction that it must be clear, strong and convincing to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff, but whether it was or was not “strong, clear and convincing” was to be determined by the jury and not by the court; otherwise, the jury would be useless.
“The [j]udge has no more right, when the testimony[,] if believed[,] is sufficient to be submitted to the jury, to determine in the trial of civil actions what is strong, clear and convincing proof[,] tha[n] he has in the trial of a criminal action to express an opinion as to whether guilt has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (quoting Cobb v. Edwards, 117 N.C. 167, 173, 117 N.C. 245, 253, 23 S.E. 241, 244 (1895) (alterations in original)); see also Lefkowitz v. Silver, 182 N.C. 361, 372, 182 N.C. 339, 350, 109 S.E. 56, 61 (1921) (noting that it is the role of the jurors to decide if evidence is strong, cogent and convincing, “just as they decide in ordinary civil cases whether the proof of plaintiff preponderates, or in criminal cases whether the State has established the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”).
Section ID-15 of the North Carolina General Statutes, like so many statutes, sets forth both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. To be awarded punitive damages, the plaintiff must meet his burden of production by producing evi*732dence of (1) fraud, (2) malice, or (3) willful or wanton conduct. N.C.G.S. § 1D-I5(a). The plaintiffs burden of persuasion is to produce “clear and convincing” evidence of one of these aggravating factors. Id. § 1D-I5(b). The “clear and convincing” burden of persuasion required by N.C.G.S. § 1D-I5(b) is neither novel nor unique in our statutory scheme and case law. Our statutes require varying burdens of persuasion — from preponderance of the evidence, to clear and convincing, to beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-805 (2007) (requiring clear and convincing evidence); 7B-2409 (2007) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt); 42-30 (2007) (requiring preponderance of the evidence). The majority concludes that because the burden of persuasion set forth in N.C.G.S. § ID-15 is “clear and convincing,” the trial court must, upon a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, review and determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing. Yet as explained above, the burden of persuasion lies within the province of the jury. See Martin v. Underhill, 265 N.C. 669, 675, 144 S.E.2d 872, 876 (1965) (stating that when the required burden of persuasion is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, “whether the evidence has that convincing quality is a question for the jury upon proper instructions from the court” but “the rule as to the sufficiency of the proof to withstand a motion for judgment of nonsuit [is] the same as in other cases” (citations omitted)). I do not believe, and the majority offers no compelling argument otherwise, that the General Assembly intended to overturn this settled principle of law by merely requiring a heightened burden of persuasion in order to recover punitive damages under N.C.G.S. § ID-15.

III. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

“A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict... is essentially a renewal of an earlier motion for a directed verdict.” Taylor v. Walker, 320 N.C. 729, 733, 360 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1987) (citation omitted). It requires the trial court to assess whether the burden of production has been met by evidence that is “legally sufficient to take the case to the jury.” Id. (citations omitted). It is well established that “[t]he party moving for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, like the party seeking a directed verdict, bears a heavy burden under North Carolina law.” Id. “In ruling on the motion, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in his favor.” 320 N.C. at 733-34, 360 S.E.2d at 799 (citing, inter alia, Smith v. Price, *733315 N.C. 523, 340 S.E.2d 408 (1986)). Judgment notwithstanding the verdict may not be granted “unless it appears as a matter of law that a recovery simply cannot be had by plaintiff upon any view of the facts which the evidence reasonably tends to establish.” Id. (emphases added) (citing Manganello v. Permastone, Inc., 291 N.C. 666, 231 S.E.2d 678 (1977)).
Contrary to the majority’s assertions, the trial court does not alter its review of the plaintiff’s burden of production upon a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict merely because the burden of persuasion is higher or lower in each case. As long as the plaintiff has met his burden of production and the facts in evidence establish a prima facie case, the case belongs with the jury. See, e.g., Millers Mut. Ins. Ass’n v. Atkinson Motors Inc., 240 N.C. 183, 187, 81 S.E.2d 416, 420 (1954); Campbell, 139 N.C. at 405, 139 N.C. at 516-17, 52 S.E. at 206 (noting that “the province of the jury should not be invaded in any case” and that when reasonable minds “might reach different conclusions, the evidence must be submitted to the jury” (citations omitted)). The trial court then instructs the jury on, inter alia, the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion, and it is “for the jury to say, upon the facts and the circumstances shown by [the] plaintiff’s evidence” whether the plaintiff has established his claim. Millers Mut. Ins., 240 N.C. at 187, 81 S.E.2d at 419-20.
Here, the trial court instructed the jury regarding plaintiff’s “clear and convincing” burden of persuasion on his claim for punitive damages. “This Court presumes that jurors follow the trial court’s instructions.” State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 623, 536 S.E.2d 36, 53 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 997 (2001). The jury applied the clear and convincing burden of persuasion to plaintiff’s evidence and found that punitive damages were warranted. The jury in its discretion, therefore, awarded plaintiff punitive damages. See Watson v. Dixon, 352 N.C. 343, 348; 532 S.E.2d 175, 178 (2000). This Court will not set aside the jury’s determination unless only a single inference, unfavorable to the plaintiff, is possible from the evidence:
Taking the case away from the jury, while a duty sometimes unavoidable, is always a delicate task, involving much more than a strong feeling that the plaintiff ought not to recover. The power of the court is limited to the ascertainment whether there is any evidence at all which has probative value in any or all of the facts and circumstances offered in the guise of proof. It is not a matter of passing upon the weight of evidence when it has *734weight. That power is denied us. It is a matter of dropping the proffered proof into evenly poised balances to see whether it weighs against nothing.
Wall v. Bain, 222 N.C. 375, 378, 23 S.E.2d 330, 332-33 (1942) (emphases added) (citations omitted).

TV. Evidence Presented

In the present case, I conclude that plaintiff met his burden of production. Taken in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the evidence shows that plaintiff, a forty-one year old African-American man, was terminated from his employment as a part-time shoe salesman at Dillard’s after mistakenly allowing two African-American women to leave the store with two pairs of shoes for which they did not pay. When plaintiff realized his mistake, his “hands start[ed] shaking” and he uttered an expletive. Plaintiff immediately reported his mistake to the manager on duty, Steven Gainsboro. Gainsboro took no action to recover the shoes, but merely checked the register tape. Gainsboro believed that plaintiff’s actions were inadvertent rather than intentional. Gainsboro told plaintiff he would speak to his supervisor, shoe department manager David Hicklin, the following day. Although other Dillard’s shoe department employees later observed the two women carrying the bag with the shoes, no steps were taken to approach or apprehend the women.
The next day, plaintiff telephoned Hicklin three times to explain what had happened. When plaintiff finally reached him, Hicklin told plaintiff he didn’t “know what [plaintiff was] talking about” but that they would talk when plaintiff came to work that evening. When plaintiff arrived at Dillard’s that evening, Hicklin summoned him to the manager’s office, where he waited outside for approximately fifteen minutes. Once plaintiff was allowed to enter the office, he was interviewed by Hicklin, store manager Kevin McCluskey, and Officer Cullen Wright of the Mecklenburg Police Department. McCluskey immediately told plaintiff, “I cannot believe you’re in my office again.” McCluskey had formally reprimanded plaintiff the previous week for referring a customer to another store when Dillard’s did not carry the type of shoe the customer desired to purchase.
The “draining]” interview lasted at least two hours, during which the three men repeatedly accused plaintiff of being acquainted with the women and intentionally allowing them to leave with the shoes. McCluskey threatened to charge plaintiff with embezzlement and *735“mess up” his job at First Union if he did not reveal the names of the two women. Plaintiff repeatedly explained that he had made a mistake, took responsibility for the incident, and offered to pay for the shoes and to submit to a polygraph examination. At the end of the interview, McCluskey terminated plaintiff’s employment at Dillard’s and banned him from entering any Dillard’s store. Plaintiff was “very upset” and “very surprised” by the interview. Dillard’s referred the matter to Officer Wright and Officer Ken Schul, another Mecklenburg Police Department officer who also worked at Dillard’s, for prosecution. Officer Wright later arrested plaintiff at his place of employment with First Union on charges of embezzlement. First Union subsequently suspended plaintiff without pay because of his arrest for embezzlement.

V. Punitive Damages Based on Malicious Prosecution

In establishing his malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff here was required to prove that defendant (1) initiated the earlier proceeding, (2) with malice and (3) without probable cause, and (4) that the earlier proceeding terminated in his favor. Jones v. Gwynne, 312 N.C. 393, 397, 323 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1984) (quoting Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 202, 254 S.E.2d 611, 625 (1979)). The jury found defendant liable for malicious prosecution of plaintiff and — as the majority acknowledges — the validity of that verdict stands. Thus it is uncontroverted that at least the greater weight of the evidence showed that defendant acted with malice.
The majority appears to concede that plaintiff presented evidence of the aggravating factor of malice, but concludes that the evidence falls short of the “clear and convincing” standard required by N.C.G.S. § ID-15. Again, however, whether evidence is clear and convincing is a matter for the trier of fact. The majority’s efforts to rationalize and explain the actions of various persons and events illuminate the difficulty of reviewing a cold record and attempting to assess whether evidence is clear and convincing. For example, the majority characterizes McCluskey’s threat to plaintiff to “mess up” his job at First Union if he did not reveal the names of the women who took the shoes — even though McCluskey possessed the name of one of the women, whom he did not bother to investigate — as “somewhat intemperate” and “simply confronting plaintiff with the truth.” This is indeed one possible inference from the evidence presented. An equally plausible view of the evidence presented is that McCluskey had no intention of conducting a genuine investigation of the incident, that instead, he personally disliked plaintiff and believed him to *736be an incompetent employee, and that he therefore seized upon plaintiffs mistake in order to terminate his employment with Dillard’s and advance his termination at First Union. Such a view is imminently reasonable given the evidence of the pre-existing ill will McCluskey demonstrated towards plaintiff, plaintiff’s lack of involvement in the theft, the interrogation-style interview McCluskey conducted, McCluskey’s threat to “mess up” plaintiffs job at First Union, and the fact that no one at Dillard’s appeared to be at all interested in locating the two women or recovering the merchandise. The jury may have also drawn conclusions from the fact that none of plaintiff’s supervisors at Dillard’s — Gainsboro, Hicklin, or McCluskey— testified at trial.
In Jones this Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to justify submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury based on malicious prosecution when there was evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant’s investigation of the plaintiff was conducted with reckless and wanton disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. 312 N.C. at 408-09, 323 S.E.2d at 18. In that case the evidence tended to show that the defendant conducted only “a superficial and cursory investigation” of the plaintiff employee before soliciting his prosecution for alleged embezzlement. Id] see also Williams v. Boylan-Pearce, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 315, 319-20, 317 S.E.2d 17, 20-21 (1984) (holding the trial court erred in failing to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury when there was evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant maliciously prosecuted the plaintiff in a manner evincing a “reckless and wanton disregard of her rights”), aff’d per curiam, 313 N.C. 321, 327 S.E.2d 870 (1985). The majority contends Jones and Williams are factually distinguishable and therefore, inapplicable. Cases may always be distinguished on their facts, however. Whether cases may be meaningfully distinguished is the pertinent question. That the majority dedicates nearly half of its opinion to discussing the facts of the instant case and attempting to distinguish them from the facts of Jones and Williams speaks volumes.

VI. Conclusion

Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, I conclude that plaintiff met his burden of production by presenting evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant acted with malice and with reckless and wanton disregard for plaintiff’s rights. Given the various possible interpretations of the evidence, judgment notwithstanding the verdict was improper. Taylor, 320 N.C. at 733-34, *737360 S.E.2d at 799. It was the jury’s role to sift through the evidence, evaluate the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether plaintiff met his burden of persuasion by producing clear and convincing evidence in support of his claim for punitive damages. The jury did so and found in favor of plaintiff. The majority’s decision usurps the jury’s role and imposes its own view of the evidence, contrary to well-established case law. I respectfully dissent.
Justice HUDSON joins in this dissenting opinion.