Court Opinion

ID: 9584953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:54:15.738191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:19.566421
License: Public Domain

KAPSNER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
[¶ 44] I agree with the modification of our prior opinion to the extent that we clarify the quitclaim deed alone is insufficient to demonstrate abandonment of the homestead. To hold that the deed alone is sufficient would be contrary to the right of the owner of homestead property to claim the proceeds of the transferred property as exempt. See generally N.D.C.C. § 47-18-16; Farstveet v. Rudolph, 2000 ND 189, ¶ 17 n. 1. Prior cases have made it clear a creditor cannot set aside as fraudulent a transfer of property that the debtor could have claimed as exémpt. See, e.g., Jahner v.. Jacob, 515 N.W.2d 183, 186 (N.D.1994) (“[A] creditor may challenge a transfer for fraud only if the property would be subject to levy and execution if revested in the transferor.”).
[¶ 45] We should make clear the execution and delivery of the quitclaim deed is merely evidence that must be considered in the context of other evidence to determine whether a person has abandoned the homestead. I do not agree that the deed is irrelevant, if that is what is meant by the majority on Petition for Rehearing, at ¶ 29, when it says: “[Abandonment must be established based upon facts independent of the transfer of the homestead.” Although the deed alone may be legally insufficient to establish abandonment, no case that I have located would indicate that the execution and delivery of a deed would be irrelevant evidence on the issue of abandonment.
*36[¶ 46] I must further disagree with the result of the majority because it effectively holds that, as a matter of law, the following facts cannot be considered when determining abandonment: continuing absence from the homestead for medical reasons; the sale of all cattle and machinery; the sale of all household goods; the lease of the property to a family member; and the execution and delivery of a deed to the homestead. Instead, the majority on Petition for Rehearing, at ¶ 36, holds that all of those things must be discounted and something “independent” must be proven, which, I believe, is the effect of the statement: “Without evidence of a clear intent never to return to her homestead, all of the circumstances found by the trial court are collectively insufficient to establish abandonment.”
[¶ 47] The involuntary removal from the homestead cannot, as a matter of law, establish abandonment. Larson v. Cole, 76 N.D. 32, 39, 33 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1948). But because the initial removal was involuntary does not mean the homesteader cannot subsequently form an intent to abandon. Nelson v. Griggs County, 56 N.D. 729, 735, 219 N.W. 225, 226 (1928). All of the subsequent events that the majority describes as “collectively insufficient” should be considered as relevant evidence because our prior cases have recognized conduct is relevant to establish intent to abandon. See, e.g., Larson, 76 N.D. at 39, 33 N.W.2d at 329; Nelson, 56 N.D. at 733, 219 N.W. at 226.
[¶48] Abandonment is a question of fact, based upon the intent of the property owner. Falconer v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 260 N.W.2d 1, 2 (N.D.1977).
To find abandonment, the trial court must determine that the debtor has voluntarily departed from the homestead property and left without the intent to return and occupy it as a home. Grotberg v. First Nat Bank, 54 N.D. 548, 210 N.W. 21 (1926); Smith v. Stafford, 16 N.D. 208, 112 N.W. 965 (1907). The dominant element in abandonment is intent. Because a debtor’s subjective intent is not a reliable indicator, a trial court often will look to the objective intent which the debtor’s conduct manifests. See 1 American Law of Property, Sec. 5.113, p. 886 (A. James Casner, ed.1952). See also 2A R. Powell, The Law of Real Property, Sec. 263[6], at 406.12(14-15).
Farmers State Bank v. Slaubaugh, 366 N.W.2d 804, 808 (N.D.1985).
[¶ 49] Issues of intent are particularly for the trial court to determine. Domicile, like abandonment, is an issue in which intent is determinative:
Domicile is a question of fact. Keating v. Keating, 399 N.W.2d 872, 874 (N.D.1987). To find a change of domicile, the fact of a physical presence at a residence must concur with the intent to make that place the legal residence, “the union of act and intent.” NDCC 54-01-26(7); Schillerstrom v. Schillerstrom, 75 N.D. 667, 32 N.W.2d 106, 115 (1948). The person’s intent must be determined from the person’s conduct and declarations. Schillerstrom, 32 N.W.2d at 115. A person’s declarations about his home, residence, or domicile are evidence of his intent, including a statement contained in a formal legal document like a will. Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws vol. 1, 81-83, Special Note on Evidence For Establishment of a Domicile of Choice (1969). The trial court must find the fact of domicile from the evidence of the person’s acts and declarations.
*37“Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.” N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Keating, 399 N.W.2d at 874. A finding of fact may also be clearly erroneous if it is based on a mistaken view of the applicable law. Estate of Ostby, 479 N.W.2d 866 (N.D.1992). In this case, we conclude that the trial court determined John’s domicile with a mistaken view of applicable law.
In re Estate of Burshiem, 483 N.W.2d 175, 180 (N.D.1992).
[¶ 50] In Burshiem, this court remanded the matter to the trial court for application of the correct law in making a determination of domicile, holding that the trial court failed to consider the evidence of intent contained in the will executed by the decedent. Id. at 182. Like the will in Burshiem, the deed in the present case is evidence that should be considered with other evidence on the matter of intent. The trial court did so.
[¶ 51] In a case with some similar facts, the trial court found that abandonment did not occur, and this court affirmed the finding. Meidinger v. See. State Bank of Medina, 55 N.D. 301, 303, 213 N.W. 850, 851 (1927) (finding no abandonment where the elderly debtor left his home, his furniture was sold at public auction, and his house was leased to his son-in-law). However, each case must be determined on its evidence: “Citations of cases are of little value in determining the issue [abandonment] involved here. The issue is so much' a matter of fact that it becomes necessary to determine each case largely by itself.” Nelson, 56 N.D. at 734, 219 N.W. at 226; accord Larson, 76 N.D. at 42, 33 N.W.2d at 331., Unless the evidence presented to the trial judge admits of only one inference and thus becomes a matter of law, we do not reverse a trial court even though we might have made a different finding. A choice between two permissible views of the evidence is not clearly erroneous. In re Estate of Nelson, 553 N.W.2d 771, 774 (N.D.1996) (holding that a trial court’s finding of lack of capacity was not clearly erroneous even though there was evidence supporting a contrary finding).
[¶ 52] We have recognized that forfeiture of the homestead right is not favored, and therefore a heightened burden of proof is employed to find abandonment. Larson, 76 N.D. at 38, 33 N.W.2d at 328. However, the trial court recognized the higher burden of proof. Here, the trial court found “by clear and convincing evidence that Eileen abandoned her homesteaded property. Thus, the transfer of the once homesteaded property to Della was fraudulent.” I am not convinced that such finding was clearly erroneous. I would affirm the decision of the trial court.
[¶ 53] DALE V. SANDSTROM, J.