Court Opinion

ID: 9962002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 14:06:29.716836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:38.880433
License: Public Domain

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                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2499-22
                                                                   A-2500-22

N.S.,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

R.H.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
_______________________

R.H.,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

N.S.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Argued March 13, 2024 – Decided April 22, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier and Susswein.
            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
            Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
            Docket Nos. FV-04-2252-23 and FV-04-2251-23.

            Mark Alan Gulbranson, Jr. argued the cause for
            appellant in A-2499-22 and respondent in A-2500-22
            (Attorneys Hartman, Chartered, attorneys; Mark Alan
            Gulbranson, Jr., of counsel and on the briefs).

            Ronald Glenn Lieberman argued the cause for
            respondent in A-2499-22 and appellant in A-2500-22
            (Ridgen Lieberman, LLC, attorneys; Ronald Glenn
            Lieberman, of counsel and on the briefs).

PER CURIAM

      Appellant N.S.1 appeals from February 23, 2023 Family Part orders

entering a domestic violence final restraining order (FRO) against him and

denying his application for an FRO against his wife, R.H. The mutual domestic

violence complaints were tried together. We heard oral argument on these

appeals back-to-back and now consolidate them for the purpose of issuing a

single opinion. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the governing

legal principles, we affirm the FRO entered against N.S. Because the trial court

did not make specific findings on whether N.S. needs an FRO for his protection,

we remand for the trial court to consider the second prong under Silver and

1
 We use initials to protect the privacy and confidentiality of these proceedings.
R. 1:38-39(d)(10).
                                                                           A-2499-22
                                       2
determine whether R.H. requires an FRO for his safety. See Silver v. Silver,

387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006).

                                         I.

      We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record.

R.H. and N.S. were married in October 2017 and lived together with their

children from prior marriages. On the morning of January 26, 2023, the parties

got into an argument regarding R.H.'s children. R.H. testified she had a "panic

attack." She texted her best friend that she did not feel safe staying in the marital

home. N.S. sent her several texts that morning, including one in which he stated,

"I also apologize for my behavior as of now I've struggled with a lot [of]

cognitive issues and unfortunately my mental capacity and brain fog causes

argument."

      N.S. testified he began to pack a bag that evening because:

             [He] wasn't sure if [he] would need to leave the house
             because [he] had this feeling of anger from—from
             [R.H.] and [he] was worried that . . . would lead to a
             fight because two weeks previous to that [R.H.] gave
             [him] a black eye by hitting [him] five times in the face
             . . . with her hands, then a tissue box and actually bit
             [him] while [they] were laying nude in bed trying to go
             to sleep.

      R.H. testified that when she returned home that evening, N.S. "was pacing

the room throwing things into the suitcase and yelling at [her,] telling [her] [she]

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                                         3
needed to talk to him, calling [her] names. He told [her] [she] should kill

[herself]."   N.S. offered a different version, testifying R.H. came into the

bedroom and did not address him. He claims he asked her if they could talk,

and she ignored him.

      The parties agree that at some point, R.H. left the bedroom. N.S. testified

that after R.H. left the room, he locked the door. He testified R.H. subsequently

"broke through the door," pushed him, and he pushed her back. He also claimed

she "clawed" at him. He testified:

              I started screaming and hollering at her. I said some
              obscenities and she sat on the bed and I—I then just
              really at that point just got upset and then I grabbed the
              sheets and the bed and pulled her out into the living
              room, shut the door and called [9-1-1].

      R.H.'s account is different. She testified, "[w]hen I came back the door

was closed and I was not able to open it and it felt like he was holding the door

closed so I couldn't open it, I'm not really certain." She explained, "when I did

get through[,] it appeared that he had let the door go because it opened so

suddenly that I fell. . . ." She testified that after she got into the bed and put her

back against the headboard, N.S. "grabbed [her] feet and tried to pull [her] by

[her] feet off of the bed." She testified he

              gripped the corner of the bed sheets and use[d] that as
              leverage to pull everything on the bed, including myself

                                                                               A-2499-22
                                          4
            and the suitcase off. I landed on my right shoulder.
            And then he took both of his hands under my armpit,
            my right armpit, and he dragged me on the floor into
            the living room and at that point I was hysterically
            crying and . . . I didn't know where my phone was and
            I was too afraid—I didn't know what he was going to
            do . . . . I didn't know what he was going to do so I ran
            to the front of the house and called my daughter and I
            said call[] [9-1-1] and I ran up—I ran up the steps and
            she had already dialed [9-1-1]. And as soon as—he was
            running after me and as soon as he saw that he stopped
            and he went back downstairs.

      Both parties testified about past acts of domestic violence. R.H. testified

N.S. had been physical with her in the past. She stated he had "pushed [her] and

shoved [her] up against objects, probably around six or seven times," restrained

her arms and hands five or six times, pulled her hair and spat on her a couple of

times, pushed her out of bed, and had broken multiple doors. She also testified

years ago, N.S. "woke up in the middle of the night, he wanted to have sex, I

asked him to stop. I told him to stop multiple times and he did not."

      N.S. testified that in December 2022, while they were arguing about the

children, R.H. hit him in the face four times, and said "nobody would believe

that [she] would do that because [she's] a 4'11', blonde cute girl . . . and you're

this big guy." He also testified that in the summer of 2017, she punched him in

the face approximately four times during an argument.

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                                        5
      Following the January 26 incident, both parties obtained temporary

restraining orders (TROs) against each other.       The FRO hearing on both

domestic violent complaints was convened on February 23, 2023. The trial court

permitted a judgment of conviction against N.S. for possession of an unlawful

purpose and testimony about it into evidence. On March 9, 2023, the trial court

rendered an oral decision, entering an FRO against N.S. and dismissing the

domestic violence complaint against R.H. With respect to predicate acts of

domestic violence, the trial court found "we have predicate acts going back and

forth without question. The pictures of the injury at or near [N.S.'s] eye is

indicative of an assault. But [] we also have predicate acts perpetrated by" N.S.

      The trial court next addressed the question of credibility, explaining:

            So the real question here is one, credibility, and two,
            who has this need for a restraining order? Of course,
            the [c]ourt could just grant both [FROs] saying that
            both parties are in need for this protection. But I think
            that kind of is maybe inappropriate in most cases. In
            this particular case I find considering the way the
            parties testified, how they testified, their demeanor,
            how that demeanor is established, plus the fact that we
            have a conviction a crime by [N.S.] of an aggravated
            assault perpetrated on his mother, that there is an issue
            of credibility attacking his credibility. There's no
            similar concerns here with respect to [R.H.].

            The [c]ourt weighs the credibility. This of course is the
            case by the preponderance or greater weight of the
            evidence who the [c]ourt believes. Who is more

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                                        6
            credible to that degree. And watching the two parties
            testify, how they testify, for example of how people
            respond to questions, whether there is a direct response
            to a question, whether the—one answers questions
            truthfully, honestly, and without hesitation. And in that
            light, [N.S.] is not a very credible witness, especially in
            comparison to [R.H.]. Both parties here appear to be
            flawed individuals, meaning that they suffer from
            disabilities, not physical disabilities, but emotional
            disabilities.
            ....
            The [c]ourt simply needs to determine who is a more
            believable witness. And I find that [R.H.], is a more
            believable witness.

      Turning to the question of need for an FRO, the trial court explained:

            I find that [R.H.] is certainly in need of this restraining
            order, that the abuse that she suffers from someone who
            . . . has a controlling behavior, who is someone who
            wants to monitor where she is, how she is. There's a
            number of factors that the testimony developed here
            and I'm going to find that she is in need of this
            restraining order. Her restraining order will be granted,
            [N.S.]'s restraining order will be denied.

      This appeal follows. N.S. contends the trial court erred in relying upon

evidence of his prior criminal conviction, using it improperly to establish a

propensity for violence. He also contends the trial court erred in denying his

request for an FRO against R.H.

                                                                          A-2499-22
                                        7
                                       II.

      To provide context for our decision, we acknowledge basic principles

concerning appeals under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA),

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. The purpose of the PDVA is to "'assure the victims

of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide.'"

G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Brown,

394 N.J. Super. 492, 504 (App. Div. 2007)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18.

Consequently, "'[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of victims of domestic

violence,'" J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 473 (2011) (alteration in original)

(quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)), and courts will "liberally

construe[] [the PDVA] to achieve its salutary purposes," Cesare v. Cesare, 154

N.J. 394, 400 (1998).

      When determining whether to grant an FRO pursuant to the PDVA, the

judge must make two determinations. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27.

Under the first Silver prong, "the judge must determine whether the plaintiff has

proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the

predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred." Id. at 125

(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)).

                                                                           A-2499-22
                                       8
      If the court finds the defendant committed a predicate act of domestic

violence, then the second inquiry "is whether the court should enter a restraining

order that provides protection for the victim." Id. at 126. While the second

prong inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard

is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set

forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29[(a)](1) to -29[(a)](6), to protect the victim from an

immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127.

      "[T]he Legislature did not intend that the commission of one of the

enumerated predicate acts of domestic violence automatically mandates the

entry of a domestic violence restraining order." Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126-

27. The factors the court should consider include, but are not limited to:

            (1) The previous history of domestic violence between
            the plaintiff and defendant, including threats,
            harassment and physical abuse;

            (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or
            property;

            (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and
            defendant;

            (4) The best interests of the victim and any child;

            (5) In determining custody and parenting time the
            protection of the victim's safety;

                                                                             A-2499-22
                                        9
             (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection
             from another jurisdiction; and

             (7) Any pattern of coercive control against a person that
             in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with,
             threatens, or exploits a person's liberty, freedom, bodily
             integrity, or human rights with the court specifically
             considering evidence of the need for protection from
             immediate danger or the prevention of further abuse.

             [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).]

       Although the court is not required to incorporate all of these factors in its

findings, the PDVA "does require that 'acts claimed by a plaintiff to be domestic

violence . . . be evaluated in light of the previous history of violence between

the parties.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 401-02 (quoting Peranio v. Peranio, 280 N.J.

Super. 47, 54 (App. Div. 1995)). Whether a restraining order should be issued

depends on the seriousness of the predicate offense, on "the previous history of

domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant including previous

threats, harassment and physical abuse," and "whether immediate danger to the

person or property is present." Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 248

(App. Div. 1995). The second prong under Silver also "requires the conduct

must be imbued by a desire to abuse or control the victim." R.G. v. R.G., 449

N.J. Super. 208, 228 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126-

27).

                                                                              A-2499-22
                                        10
      We add that as a general matter, "findings by a trial court are binding on

appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v.

Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). "We accord substantial deference to Family

Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially

trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and more ordinary

differences that arise between couples.'" C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419,

428 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)).

"[D]eference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial

and involves questions of credibility.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J.

240, 254 (2007) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). Accordingly, we will not

disturb a trial court's factual findings unless "'they are so manifestly unsupported

by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence

as to offend the interests of justice.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova

Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However,

we do not accord such deference to legal conclusions, which we review de novo.

Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016).

                                        III.

      With those foundational principles in mind, we first address N.S.'s

contention the trial court erred in using evidence of his prior conviction for

                                                                              A-2499-22
                                        11
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose to establish a propensity for

violence. We recount in detail the relevant circumstances. In 2018, defendant

pled guilty to the weapons offense. The factual basis for the conviction was that

N.S. pointed a knife at his mother and told her to "get the f**k out of [his]

house."

      The following colloquy occurred during the cross-examination of N.S.:

            [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: Now, you've been with [R.H.]
            since approximately 2016, 2017?

            N.S.: Yes.

            [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: So you were actually with her
            when you chased your mom around the house with a
            knife, correct?

            N.S.: Incorrect.

            [N.S.'S ATTORNEY]:          Objection.    Facts not in
            evidence, [j]udge.

            ...

            [N.S.'S ATTORNEY]:           Completely inappropriate
            question.

            ...

            THE COURT: Well there's been developments of
            propensity for violence that you brought out from the
            cross-complainant. Now, the response is they want to
            bring that the—your client may have had a propensity
            towards violence. And the information on that question

                                                                           A-2499-22
                                      12
            makes reference to chasing someone around with a
            knife. That may not be true at all. But I assume there's
            a good faith basis for the attorney to ask that question
            so I'll permit it. Did you ever [chase] anyone around
            with a knife?

            [N.S.]: I have never chased somebody with a knife.

            [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: That's perfect.

            THE COURT: Thank you.

            ...

            [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: I'm going to show you what’s
            been marked as [p]laintiff's [e]xhibit [fourteen]. 2

      The court took a brief recess, after which N.S.'s counsel acquiesced to the

admission of the judgment of conviction as shown in the following discussion:

            THE COURT: Okay. I assume at this juncture the
            parties had an opportunity to review the exhibits and
            anything else that you worked out?

            [N.S.'S ATTORNEY]:             I really didn't have an
            opportunity to speak with [R.H.'s attorney]. Your
            Honor was in session. I did review everything. And I
            have an objection to the use of the complaint that was
            offered, which was what sparked my needing to leave.
            There's apparently a judgment of conviction and that's
            obviously admissible. But I don't believe that the
            complaint, which appears to be—it appears to be an
            exhibit that is duplicative anyway, but I don't believe
            that it's admissible. It's a hearsay document.

2
  Plaintiff's exhibit fourteen is N.H.'s judgment of conviction for possession of
a weapon for an unlawful purpose.
                                                                           A-2499-22
                                      13
THE COURT: Fair enough. But almost anything can
be used to cross examine a witness.

[N.S.'S ATTORNEY]: Sure. That's true. But I don't
want him to be asked to read what it says because it's
hearsay—

THE COURT: Correct.

[N.S.'S ATTORNEY]: —so he'd be reading hearsay
into the record.

THE COURT: But if there is a judgment of conviction
—

[N.S.'S ATTORNEY]: It addresses one of—one aspect
of the complaint.

THE COURT: Does the judgment of conviction—

[N.S.'S ATTORNEY]: Pardon me?

THE COURT: —make reference to an aggravated
assault with the—

[N.S.'S ATTORNEY]: It was a plea to a possession of
a weapon.

THE COURT: Okay.

[N.S.'S ATTORNEY]: I mean, she can—I mean, I
agree, she can certainly inquire about the basis of that,
but I don't believe that it's appropriate to be using the
complaint.

THE COURT: Fair enough.

                                                            A-2499-22
                          14
     [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: Thank you, Your Honor. And
     just so we're clear, extrinsic evidence, that being the
     summons as well, can be used to, as Your Honor has
     said, to cross examine him. So that's just what I'm
     doing. And actually I think I sent this actually to [N.S.'s
     attorney] because it's available online to the [c]ourt
     system prior to today, just so that we're clear.

The following exchange then took place during the cross-examination:

     [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: So, [N.S.], you've been with
     [R.H.] since approximately 2016, correct?

     [N.S.]: Correct.

     [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: And you would agree the
     incident with your mother happened in March of 2018,
     correct?

     [N.S.]: Correct.

     [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: And at that point you had taken
     a steak knife and pointed it . . . [at] your mother?

     [N.S.]: [Y]eah.

     [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: Okay. So you took that—it's
     described as a six inch blade, silver covered knife, and
     pointed it at her and . . . informed her to get the f**k
     out of your house, is that correct?

     [N.S.]: That is correct.

     [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: Okay. And then you had . . .
     grabbed her keys, which were attached to her purse
     strap, and then forcibly pulled her in a downward
     motion towards the ground, correct?

                                                                   A-2499-22
                                15
            [N.S.]: Correct.

            ...

            [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: Okay. And children were
            present during this incident, is that correct?

            [N.S.]: For part of the incident. Yes.

            [R.H.'S ATTORNEY]: Okay. And ultimately . . . you
            were convicted of a possession of a weapon for an
            unlawful purpose, is that correct?

            [N.S.]: Yes.

      N.J.R.E. 609(a)(1) provides "[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility

of any witness, the witness' conviction of a crime, subject to Rule 403, shall be

admitted unless excluded by the court pursuant to paragraph (b) of this rule." 3

"[S]uch conviction may be proved by examination, production of the record

thereof, or by other competent evidence." R. 609(a)(2)(A).

      We are not persuaded that in the present circumstances, N.S.'s prior

conviction for possession of a knife for an unlawful purpose is relevant to his

credibility. We note, however, that N.S.'s counsel did not object and, indeed,

affirmatively acknowledged the admissibility of the prior judgment of

conviction. Failure to object may be considered as opposing counsel's belief

3
  Paragraph (b) of the rule pertains to prior conviction evidence after ten years
and is not pertinent here. See R. 609(b).
                                                                           A-2499-22
                                      16
that the statements were not unduly prejudicial. See Linden v. Benedict Motel

Corps., 370 N.J. Super. 372, 398, (App. Div. 2004); see also Risko v. Thompson

Miller Auto Grp. Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 523 (2011). We are not persuaded the

admission of this evidence rises to the level of plain error. State v. Green, 447

N.J. Super. 317, 325 (App. Div. 2016); see R. 2:10-2 (Under the plain error

standard, we disregard any such error unless "clearly capable of producing an

unjust result.").

      We also acknowledge that such evidence may only be considered for

purposes of assessing credibility, not for establishing a propensity for violence.

It is true, of course, trial courts in domestic violence matters may consider past

acts of domestic violence, but that principle applies only to past acts of domestic

violence between the parties, not to past acts of domestic violence involving a

third party. See R.G., 449 N.J. Super. at 220-21.

      We do not agree with N.S.'s contention the trial court improperly relied

on his prior conviction as substantive evidence. In its oral decision, the trial

court suggested this evidence was used for purposes of assessing credibility

when it stated:

             In this particular case I find considering the way the
             parties testified, how they testified, their demeanor,
             how that demeanor is established, plus the fact that we
             have a conviction a crime by [N.S.] of an aggravated

                                                                             A-2499-22
                                       17
            assault perpetrated on his mother, 4 that there is an issue
            of credibility attacking his credibility.

      The trial court in its oral decision did not explicitly state the prior

conviction was used to establish propensity. It nonetheless would have been

better if the trial court had expressly acknowledged the prior conviction could

be used only in assessing credibility and not as substantive evidence. In sum,

although we believe it was error to allow cross-examination on the

circumstances of the prior conviction, in the absence of an objection or a request

for the functional equivalent of a limiting instruction to a jury, we are not

convinced the error warrants overturning the FRO issued against N.S.,

especially considering the other evidence establishing there was a physical

altercation and past acts of domestic violence between the parties.

                                       IV.

      We turn next to N.S.'s contention the trial court erred in dismissing his

domestic violence complaint against R.H.        Although we are deferential to

decisions made by Family Part judges, see MacKinnon, 191 N.J. at 253-54, that

deference presupposes the trial court sets forth the reasons for its decision to

4
   The judge incorrectly referred to the prior conviction as an "aggravated
assault." As noted, defendant was previously convicted of possession of a
weapon for an unlawful purpose.
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                                       18
permit meaningful appellate review. Here, the trial court found both parties

committed a predicate act of domestic violence, holding, "[t]he [c]ourt will start

with the fact that we have predicate acts going back and forth without question."

Although the trial court explained why R.H. needed an FRO against N.S., the

court did not make comparable findings with respect to N.S.'s need for an FRO

against R.H.      Furthermore, the trial court may have been under the

misapprehension that there is a policy against issuing mutual restraining orders

when it commented, "[o]f course, the [c]ourt could just grant both parties saying

that both parties are in need for this protection. But I think that kind of is maybe

inappropriate in most cases." We are aware of no precedent for the proposition

that in most cases, it is inappropriate to grant mutual FROs. Nor do we subscribe

to the notion that N.S. does not need the protection of an FRO against R.H.

because the FRO entered against him will prevent inappropriate contact between

the parties. We reiterate that when, as in this case, the predicate act involves

physical violence and there is past physical violence, the need for an FRO, while

by no means automatic, is nonetheless often perfunctory and self-evident. See

Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126-27.       The critical point is that the decision

regarding the need for an FRO is case-sensitive and requires a careful analysis

of all relevant circumstances. Because that analysis was not done with respect

                                                                              A-2499-22
                                        19
to N.S.'s application for an FRO against R.H., we are constrained to reverse the

dismissal of N.S.'s domestic violence complaint and remand for the trial court

to determine from the hearing record whether N.S. needs an FRO for his

protection. We instruct the trial court to make findings on that question in

sufficient detail to permit appellate review if needed. We offer no opinion on

whether an FRO should be issued against R.H.

      Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part for further

proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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                                      20