Court Opinion

ID: 9925663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 18:02:37.046307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:21.541066
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/22/24 Friends of Westwanda Drive v. City of Los Angeles CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        DIVISION TWO

 FRIENDS OF WESTWANDA                                                B314932
 DRIVE,
                                                                     (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                     Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                        19STCP04113)
 CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
           Defendant and Respondent;
 KARLA SHAHIN et al.,
           Real Parties in Interest and
           Appellants.

      APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
      Channel Law Group, Jamie T. Hall and Julian K.
Quattlebaum for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Luna & Glushon and Kristina Kropp for Real Parties in
Interest and Appellants.
      Hydee Felstein Soto, City Attorney, Timothy McWilliams,
Managing City Attorney, and Steven G. Martin, Deputy City
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent.
            _______________________________________

      Friends of Westwanda Drive (Friends), an unincorporated
association, sought to set aside a determination by the City of Los
Angeles (City) that a tree-removal permit and proposed
construction of a home (Project) were exempt from environmental
review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)
(Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). The trial court denied the
writ petition, concluding, in part, the action is moot. We affirm
the decision, concluding the case is moot.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Facts
      Karla Shahin owns a lot on the corner of Westwanda Drive
and Stovell Lane in Benedict Canyon. The lot is surrounded by
existing single-family homes in a hillside residential
development. Real parties in interest Shahin and her husband,
Armen Melkonians, (collectively real parties) planned to build a
two-story single-family home with a footprint of 1,500 square feet
(the Project) on the lot.
      As relevant here, the Project required the removal of three
City-protected Coast Live Oak trees and six “remnant” California
Black Walnut tree stumps.1 The Project was designed to
accommodate the four remaining Coast Live Oak trees on the lot.

      1 California Black Walnut trees are also protected, but not
as stumps. (L.A. Mun. Code, § 46.01.) Apparently, the prior
owner of the lot had the trees cut down because they had died or
were in poor condition due to the draught.

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      On September 26, 2017, Shahin applied to the Bureau of
Street Services (BSS) for a tree-removal permit and included an
arborist’s report as required by the City’s Protected Tree
Ordinance. BSS recommended the tree-removal permit be
approved, the Project be found exempt from CEQA
environmental review, and 12 replacement trees be planted
pursuant to the ordinance.
      On March 7, 2018, the Board of Public Works held a
hearing to consider the tree-removal permit. Two speakers
opposed removing the protected trees, arguing that doing so
would harm the Benedict Canyon ecosystem and a wildlife
corridor in the area. They claimed “dozens” of residents were
against the tree-removal.
      During the hearing, the Board of Public Works discussed
how the Project was to be constructed to avoid harming the
remaining and replacement protected trees and to minimize any
negative impacts on the environment caused by removing the
trees. When the hearing concluded, the Board of Public Works
voted to approve Shahin’s permit application and found the
Project was exempt under CEQA. Issuance of the permit was
conditioned on the planting of replacement trees. On March 14,
2018, BSS issued the tree-removal permit. On March 15, 2018,
the three trees and six stumps were removed.
II.   Administrative Appeals
      On August 31, 2018, Friends appealed the Board of Public
Works’s decision. BSS submitted a report recommending the
appeal be denied.
      The appeal was forwarded to the City Council’s Public
Works and Gang Reduction Committee. Following an August 7,

                               3
2019 hearing, the appeal was then forwarded to the City Council
without recommendation.
        On August 20, 2019, the City Council heard and denied the
appeal. The same day, the City filed a Notice of Exemption
(NOE) with the recorder’s office of Los Angeles County. As
pertinent here, the NOE stated the Project was approved and
included the removal of three protected trees and six tree stumps
with the planting of replacement trees pursuant to the Protected
Tree Ordinance. The NOE also stated the Project qualified for
construction under CEQA categorical exemptions and no CEQA
exceptions applied.
III. Writ Proceedings
       Friends sought a writ of mandate compelling the City to
vacate and set aside the tree-removal permit, among others, and
to prepare and certify a legally adequate environmental review
under CEQA for the project.
       The petition pleaded traditional mandamus (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1085) and, in the alternative, administrative mandamus
(id., § 1094.5).
        The trial court clearly viewed the petition as seeking
 administrative mandamus, given that Friends had pursued an
 administrative appeal before the City Council and the court had
 an administrative record before it. (See Stanford Vina Ranch
 Irrigation Co. v. State of California (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 976,
 995–996.)
        Following a lengthy hearing, the trial court denied the writ
 petition on April 23, 2021. In its written ruling, the court
concluded the Project fell into one but not both category
exemptions found by the City and there were no applicable
exceptions. The court also concluded the entire action was

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 moot; the trees had been removed. On June 21, 2021, the trial
 court entered judgment for the City. This appeal followed on
 August 19, 2021.
                           DISCUSSION
I.     Timeliness of the Appeal
       We reject the City’s threshold contention Friends’s appeal
must be dismissed as untimely. Relying on Meinhardt v. City of
Sunnyvale (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 43, review granted June 15,
2022, S274147 (Meinhardt), and cases cited therein, the City
argues Friends failed to file the notice of appeal within the
requisite 60 days after service of the trial court’s April 23, 2021
order denying the petition. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.104(a)(1)(B).)
       The appellate court in Meinhardt, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th
43, review granted, held when “a court has entered a ruling on a
writ petition that constitutes a final judgment, any party seeking
appellate review of that ruling must timely appeal from that final
judgment—and the time to file a notice of appeal is not restarted
by the trial court’s subsequent entry of a document styled as a
‘judgment’ that merely reiterates the prior final judgment.” (Id.
at p. 50.) Here, by contrast, the trial court’s order of April 23,
2021 was not a final judgment. Instead, the court ordered the
City to prepare and serve a judgment, and also allowed Friends
10 days in which to object and prepare an alternative form of
judgment for the court’s consideration. The time for Friends to
appeal began running when the court entered its final judgment
on June 21, 2021. Friends timely filed a notice of appeal on
August 19, 2021, 59 days from the entry of judgment.

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II.    CEQA Overview
       CEQA “establishes a comprehensive scheme to provide
long-term protection to the environment. It prescribes review
procedures a public agency must follow before approving or
carrying out certain projects.” (Berkeley Hillside Preservation v.
City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1092.) “Under CEQA
and its implementing guidelines, an agency generally conducts
an initial study to determine ‘if the project may have a significant
effect on the environment.’ ” (Friends of College of San Mateo
Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College Dist. (2016) 1
Cal.5th 937, 945.) “If there is substantial evidence that the
project may have a significant effect on the environment,” then
the agency must generate an environmental impact report (EIR)
prior to approving the project. (Ibid.)
       “For policy reasons, the Legislature has expressly exempted
several categories of projects from review under CEQA.
[Citation.] By statute, the Legislature has also directed the
Secretary of the Natural Resources Agency . . . to establish ‘a list
of classes of projects that have been determined not to have a
significant effect on the environment and that shall be exempt
from’ CEQA.” (Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1092.) There are 33 categorical
exemptions. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15300–15333.2) Among
them is the Class 3 exemption for small structures (Guidelines,
§ 15303) and the Class 32 exemption for infill development

      2 Sections 15000 et seq. of title 14 of the California Code of
Regulations are the implementing administrative regulations,
and are referred to as “Guidelines.” (See Muzzy Ranch Co. v.
Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372,
380, fn. 2.)

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projects (Guidelines, § 15332). The City decided the Project fell
into both categorical exemptions, thereby obviating the need for
an EIR. (Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of
Arcadia (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 418, 429 [“If an exemption applies,
the project is excused from environmental review”].)
      Categorical exemptions, however, can be subject to certain
exceptions. If an exception applies, the exemption is foreclosed,
and an EIR is necessary. (Arcadians for Environmental
Preservation v. City of Arcadia, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 436;
Guidelines, § 15300.2.)
      Before the City Council and the trial court, Friends
maintained, in part, that based on the Project’s “location” and/or
“unusual circumstances” the Class 3 and Class 32 category
exemptions were unavailable, thereby requiring an EIR. (See
Guidelines, § 15300.2, subds. (a) [location exception] & (c)
[unusual circumstances exception].3) In a nutshell, Friends’s

      3 The “location exception” provides:   “Location. Classes 3,
4, 5, 6, and 11 are qualified by consideration of where the project
is to be located—a project that is ordinarily insignificant in its
impact on the environment may in a particularly sensitive
environment be significant. Therefore, these classes are
considered to apply in all instances, except where the project may
impact on an environmental resource of hazardous or critical
concern where designated, precisely mapped, and officially
adopted pursuant to law by federal, state, or local agencies.” The
“unusual circumstances exception” provides: “Significant Effect.
A categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where
there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a
significant effect on the environment due to unusual
circumstances.” (Guidelines, § 15300.2, subds. (a) & (c),
respectively.)

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theory was removing the protected trees not only damages the
trees, but also destroys the habitat (the Coast Live Oak-
California Black Walnut woodland) created by having trees on
the lot, which, in turn, diminishes the number of wildlife species
depending on the woodland for survival.
III. Mootness
       Generally, courts do not issue advisory opinions based on
hypothetical facts or controversies that are merely academic.
(People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1084; Sweeney v.
California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2021) 61
Cal.App.5th 1093, 1135.) A case “ ‘should be dismissed as moot
when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the
appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief.’ ” (Santa
Monica Baykeeper v. City of Malibu (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1538,
1547.) This rule has been applied to CEQA challenges.
(Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77
Cal.App.4th 880, 888; Parkford Owners for a Better Community v.
County of Placer (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 714, 722–723 [writ
petition].)
       Relying on our decision in Hixon v. County of Los Angeles
(1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 370 (Hixon) the trial court concluded the
“entire action is moot.” In Hixon, county residents petitioned for
a writ of mandate to compel the county to obtain an EIR for
street-widening projects that involved the removal of numerous
roadside trees and the replacement of new, younger trees. (Id. at
pp. 373, 376.) The trial court declined to order an EIR because
the trees had already been removed and replaced and “no public
benefit would be gained by requiring an EIR.” (Id. at p. 377.) We
agreed, explaining: “The project is ended, the trees are cut down
and the subject is now moot insofar as resort to a planning or

                                8
informational document, which is what an EIR is.” (Id. at
p. 378.)
       Here, the trial court properly concluded the case is moot.
Just as in Hixon, the court is unable to grant Friends any
effective relief. Friends’s administrative appeal requested the
City Council to “revoke and set-aside the approval of the tree
removal permit.” Friends’s writ petition commanded the City to
“[v]acate and set aside approvals of the Project, including but not
limited to, the Tree-Removal Permit for the Project.” The
petition also sought an injunction “prohibiting any actions by [the
City] until [the City] has complied with all applicable state,
federal and local laws and requirements of CEQA.”
       Whether preserving the trees (and their woodland) on the
lot qualified as an exception has long been rendered moot by the
permitted removal of the trees five months before the Board of
Public Works’s decision was appealed. We cannot turn back the
clock and restore those trees and their woodland.
       Friends resist this conclusion by arguing that reversing the
City’s decision would allow: (1) the California Black Walnut
stumps to be replanted either elsewhere or on the Project’s lot;
(2) similar woodland to be preserved in another location, or
(3) the Project to be altered—by bird-safe glass, no night lighting,
and changed fencing—or eliminated entirely so the trees could be
replaced and the woodland restored.
       We are not persuaded. That a ruling by this court could
provide effective relief because preparation of an EIR might
possibly result in Project modifications or other mitigation
measures is wholly speculative. Further, the record shows the
Project was substantially finished at the time of the writ
proceedings in April 2021. At this late date, preparation of an

                                 9
EIR would not serve any meaningful purpose. Finally, it is
unclear how mitigation measures undertaken off the lot would
redress any purported environmental losses that occurred on the
lot, which is the relief Friends has sought.
      There are three discretionary exceptions to the rules
regarding mootness: (1) when the case presents an issue of broad
public interest that is likely to recur; (2) when there might be a
recurrence of the controversy between the parties; and (3) when
material questions remain. (Cucamongans United for Reasonable
Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th
473, 479–480.) None of these exceptions apply. No issues of
broad public importance are implicated. As the trial court noted,
Friends’s claim that the dispute was whether proposed homes in
the Santa Monica Mountains zone, and particularly within
designated habitat blocks, can bypass environmental review is
both an overstatement and a misstatement. The issue here was
limited to a single-family residence at a specific location in the
Santa Monica zone. Because the subject trees are gone, a
recurrence of a dispute over the tree-removal permit is unlikely.
For the same reason, no material questions of significant import
remain. For these reasons, we agree with the trial court that any
opinions in this case would be purely advisory.
      CEQA was not designed to require generation of
meaningless paperwork (Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com.
(1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 283), and it would not be reasonable to
interpret the statute as compelling preparation of an EIR that
would be a pointless waste of Californians’ limited tax dollars.
Thus, we affirm the trial court’s decision that the case is moot.

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      Because we affirm the judgment on the ground of mootness,
we do not reach the issues whether exceptions barred both the
Class 3 and Class 32 category exemptions in this case.4

      4 Real parties do not join in the City’s arguments on appeal
that the City Council properly rejected Friends’s challenge to the
City’s reliance on the Class 32 category exemption. Instead, they
have filed an opening brief as “cross-appellants” to advance
essentially the same arguments as the City. We note the core of
these arguments—whether Los Angeles Municipal Code section
12.21.C.10(i)(3) supported the City’s issuance of building and
grading permits—is the subject of the related appeal, Friends
of Westwanda Drive v. City of Los Angeles (Jan. 22, 2024,
B321479) [nonpub. opn.].

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                         DISPOSITION
     The judgment that the entire action is moot is affirmed.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                         LUI, P. J.
We concur:

     CHAVEZ, J.

     HOFFSTADT, J.

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