Court Opinion

ID: 9559827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:36:12.970812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:46.559560
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice.
I concur with Mr. Justice WADE’S conclusion that this action may be maintained, but deem it proper to limit my concurrence to the facts here presented, i. e., that the plaintiff may sue the defendant for an alleged intentional personal injury commit*409ted during the interlocutory period, but to reserve judgment as to the more comprehensive proposition that such a suit could be maintained at any time during the marriage relation. This may seem inconsistent because this court has said that the parties are still married during the interlocutory period.1 But this is certainly not so in the absolute sense. Those cases were dealing with property rights and rights of inheritance. It is obvious that the legal status is mot exactly the same, — the rights and privileges of the spouses of a strictly personal mature incident to the marital relationship are suspended. I think there is a possibility that a different result may be arrived at under proper principles of judicial interpretation.
Where there is room for legitimate difference of opinion as to the meaning and application of statutes, as the briefs of •counsel, and the difference in the opinions of the judges of this Court indicate exists here, it is not only permissible to give consideration to well-defined standards of public policy, but they should have an important bearing on the result, especially where the court is under mandate of law to liberally interpret and apply the statutes to give effect to their objects to promote justice.2
Unquestionably the general purpose of the modern statutes referred to is to emancipate women and eliminate disabilities which existed under common law, including the fiction that the husband and wife are legally one. The latter seems to have been but a specious excuse for not allowing such suits rather than any valid reason. There was a sounder and more basic reason why such suits were not favored: i. e., the thought that allowing them would challenge the authority of the master of the home, disrupt its peace and harmony and thus threaten the marriage relation. The desirability of favoring a policy which would tend toward harmonious home life has always been recognized, and is of no less importance in our modern society, even though strife, discord and disruption of families is much more prevalent than formerly. Furthermore, in recent years there has arisen an additional reason why policy considerations would impel one to think that a wife should not be allowed to sue her husband in tort. If such suits can be maintained, widespread insurance coverage, particularly in automobile cases, poses a great temptation for collusion, which it should not be the policy of the law to encourage. The foregoing considerations may well be deemed to be of sufficient importance to lead to the conclusion that such suits should not be maintainable during coverture.
But it seems to me that the factors upon which the policy just discussed is based are either non-existent, or at least not near*410•ly so cogent; during the • interlocutory .period. • The .-interlocutory decree recognizes -that the_- marriage has already been; dis,-rupted and;.adjudicates that there are sufficient, grounds-for breaking the-marriage contract.-. While the union is not absolutely dissolved,- the marital .rights, are suspended and will automatically expire ;unless some,thing-is done to prevent the judgment from becoming absolute before the end of the interlocutory period.3 Even though it is true that the purpose -of the decree is to give estranged spouses an opportunity to become reconciled, it is also true that divorce is often accompanied by bitterness and ill feelings which sometimes result in violence and injury. If the suit were not maintainable, a wife might suffer grievous injury or abuse and be entirely without remedy -at- a time when she most needs the protection of the law. This runs counter to one of-the basic precepts: There is no wrong -without a remedy.4 To leave such an aggrieved- wife without redress would seem to be a greater evil than might eventuate from the possible further disruption, or prevention of reconciliation of marriages .already wrecked. - -Also, the danger of collusion -is greatly- minimized.
The fact' that there'-is uncertainty about the proper interpretation of the statutes permits public policy to be considered in applying.them. A suit of this nature would be a great deal more harmful to family unity if brought before an interlocutory decree of' divorce . than- such- a suit after-.wards. Therefore it seems-advisable to me to -meet the general’problem if and'when it arises, and ’to limit my-; concurrence to-the -facts here presented: that the suit may be maintained during the interlocutory pe-riod.

. Sanders v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 372, 230 P. 1026; In re Johnson’s Estate, 84 Utah 168, 35 P.2d 305.

. Sec. 68-3-2, U.C.A.1953.

. Johnson v. Johnson, 116 Utah 27, 207 P. 2d 1036.

. 1 O.J.S., Actions § 4, page 969.