Court Opinion

ID: 9364793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 06:04:16.794655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.501755
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                       UNPUBLISHED
In re TIMCO, Minors.                                                   January 19, 2023

                                                                       No. 358500
                                                                       Macomb Circuit Court
                                                                       Family Division
                                                                       LC Nos. 2019-000047-NA
                                                                               2019-000048-NA
                                                                               2019-000060-NA

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights
to his minor children, EMT, JAT, and JT, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to
adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), (g) (failure to provide
proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent).1
Respondent argues that trial counsel was ineffective, that the Department of Health and Human
Services (the Department) did not make reasonable efforts at reunification, that the trial court
clearly erred by finding statutory grounds for termination, and that the trial court clearly erred by
finding termination was in the children’s best interests. Finding no merit to respondent’s
arguments, we affirm.

                                 I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

       Respondent and the children’s mother were divorced with two children, EMT and JAT,
when the children were removed from their parents’ care in February 2019. The children’s mother
had been awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children under the parties’ divorce
judgment, and the judgment required respondent’s parenting time to be supervised. The
Department initiated proceedings for jurisdiction over the children after the children’s mother was
hospitalized for mental illness. Respondent did not have a suitable home to care for the children.

1
  The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother, but she is not a party
to this appeal.

                                                 -1-
Following a bench trial at the adjudicative phase, the trial court found statutory grounds for
exercising jurisdiction over EMT and JAT. Respondent was ordered to comply with a parent-
agency agreement to rectify the conditions that led to the children’s removal. Respondent’s mental
illness was the primary focus of the services offered to him. He had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia and displayed erratic and unstable behavior throughout the proceedings. After the
Department initiated proceedings, respondent was not allowed parenting time with the children
until he underwent a psychological evaluation to assess whether he was a risk of harm to the
children.

        During the proceedings, he sent e-mails and text messages to the Department’s workers
and the trial court regarding bizarre allegations such as governmental conspiracies and his belief
that he was kidnapped as a child. At one supervised visitation, respondent had an angry outburst
in which he yelled that people “who bleed from their crotches” should obey men. Respondent also
sent a caseworker messages saying that “if any worker came out to his house, he has a gun and he
would handle them accordingly.” Respondent’s supervised visitation was suspended because of
his aggressive and inappropriate behavior, which made the children afraid to attend visitation.
Respondent also did not promptly begin individual mental health therapy. When he did begin
therapy, he revoked his consent to the release of his treatment records to the Department.
Respondent did, however, complete parenting classes and attend domestic violence counseling.

        Although respondent and the children’s mother had divorced and were not planning jointly
for reunification, they had a third child, JT, while the proceedings were pending in March 2021.
The court also exercised jurisdiction over that child. Following a two-day hearing in July 2021,
the trial court found that statutory grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights were
established under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). The court held an additional best-
interest hearing and found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interests. This appeal followed.

                       II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

        Respondent first argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Generally,
“[w]hether counsel was ineffective presents a mixed question of fact and constitutional law, which
we review, respectively, for clear error and de novo.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 318; 964
NW2d 881 (2020). But when, as in this case, respondent did not raise the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel by moving for a new trial or evidentiary hearing, our review is limited to
mistakes apparent from the record. People v Carll, 322 Mich App 690, 702; 915 NW2d 387
(2018).

        The Michigan and United States Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to
the effective assistance of counsel. Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const Am VI. “Given the nature
of accusations and consequences in child-protective proceedings, this right has been extended to
these civil proceedings.” In re Casto Minors, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022)
(Docket No. 357656); slip op at 9, citing In re Martin, 316 Mich App 73, 85; 896 NW2d 452
(2016). To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the respondent must show “that
(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and that (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the respondent.” Martin, 316 Mich App at 85.
On the deficient performance element, a respondent must “overcome the strong presumption that

                                               -2-
counsel’s performance was born from a sound trial strategy.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich
38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). “[T]his Court must be cognizant of, and guard against, the bias of
applying 20/20 hindsight to counsel’s performance.” Casto, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 9.
To establish prejudice, a respondent must show that “but for counsel’s deficient performance, a
different result would have been reasonably probable.” Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich at 56 (quotation
marks and citations omitted). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and thus respondent
bears the burden of proving otherwise. See People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246
(2002).

        Respondent offers a litany of arguments criticizing counsel’s performance throughout the
proceedings, but he presents little as far as identifying what counsel could have done differently
that could have made a different result reasonably probable. Respondent generally complains that
counsel failed to present evidence and did not adequately cross-examine witnesses, but respondent
does not identify what evidence he believes counsel should have presented or explain how counsel
could have questioned witnesses differently. The proceedings against respondent focused on his
mental health, and over two years, respondent balked at participating in therapy, refused to take
medication for his condition, and revoked his consent to his provider’s disclosure of information
regarding his progress. Respondent fails to identify any evidence that counsel could have offered
to demonstrate respondent’s commitment to his mental health treatment or potential to maintain
mental stability.

        Respondent similarly complains that counsel’s closing argument at the termination trial
and best-interest hearing was brief and focused mostly on arguing that the court should allow
respondent more time to participate in services. At the termination trial, trial counsel did
emphasize respondent’s compliance with other aspects of his treatment plan, such as his
completion of parenting classes, which was one of the few aspects favorable to respondent.
Counsel asked the court to allow respondent more time in light of these efforts. And counsel again
requested that the court give respondent more time to address his mental health issues at the best-
interest hearing. To the extent that counsel’s arguments were not convincing, it was not because
of deficient performance by counsel, but because of the overwhelming evidence of respondent’s
significant mental health issues, which respondent was unwilling to acknowledge or address.
Under the circumstances, respondent has failed to establish that defense counsel made an
objectively unreasonable error in rejecting a potentially beneficial strategy. Respondent cannot
overcome the presumption that counsel’s strategy of urging the court to allow respondent more
time was a sound choice.

         Respondent complains that trial counsel failed to advocate for parenting time after the trial
court found that his psychological evaluation did not assess his risk to the children. He argues that
counsel should have followed the court’s suggestion to move for parenting time pending an
appropriate risk assessment if there was additional information to demonstrate that respondent was
not a risk to the children. But he does not identify what additional information counsel could have
presented in support of such a motion. Further, respondent fails to correlate this alleged error to
the outcome of the proceedings. It is undisputed that respondent was eventually granted parenting
time, but when he exercised that parenting time he made a poor showing of his parenting skills
and he acted inappropriately and aggressively toward the agency workers. There is no evidence
that suggests a more successful outcome would have been probable had visitation not been
delayed. Similarly, although counsel could have been more proactive in considering respondent’s

                                                 -3-
need for a guardian ad litem, one was appointed early in the proceedings, and there is no basis to
conclude that counsel’s failure to request one earlier impaired respondent’s progress.

        Respondent also contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request
accommodations for his disability. Respondent’s disability was a severe mental illness, and his
treatment plan focused heavily on mental health treatment. Respondent was required to undergo
psychological and psychiatric evaluations and participate in therapy and domestic violence
counseling. But as previously noted, respondent consistently impeded efforts to address his mental
health issues. Considering respondent’s unwillingness to participate in the mental health services
offered to him, he does not explain how these services could have been made more accessible and
more accommodating of his mental illness.

        For all these reasons, respondent has failed to demonstrate that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.

                 III. REASONABLE EFFORTS TOWARD REUNIFICATION

        Respondent next argues that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify
him with his children, particularly by failing to offer services to accommodate his mental health
disability.

        “In order to preserve an argument that [the Department] failed to provide adequate services
the respondent must object or indicate that the services provided to them were somehow
inadequate.” In re Atchley, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket Nos. 358502,
358503); slip op at 2 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Respondent did not request
accommodation of his disability or otherwise argue below that the Department’s services were
inadequate or that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts at reunification. Therefore,
this issue is unpreserved. We review unpreserved issues for plain error affecting a respondent’s
substantial rights. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 135; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). “Generally,
an error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the
proceedings.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 9; 761 NW2d 253 (2008).

        The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq., does not provide a
defense to proceedings to terminate parental rights. In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 24-25; 610
NW2d 563 (2000). Nonetheless, it requires the Department to reasonably accommodate a disabled
parent in the provision of services to achieve reunification and avoid termination of parental rights.
In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 86; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). The Department’s obligations under
the ADA dovetail with its affirmative duty under Michigan’s Probate Code “to make reasonable
efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” Id. at 85, citing MCL
712A.18f(3)(b) and (c); MCL 712A.19a(2). “While the [Department] has a responsibility to
expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate
responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are offered.” In re Frey,
297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). In order to prevail on an argument that
reunification efforts were inadequate, a respondent must establish that he would have fared better
if other services had been offered. See In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 543; 702 NW2d 192
(2005). This includes identifying the services that the Department should have provided to

                                                 -4-
accommodate the parent’s specific needs. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 266; 976 NW2d
44 (2021).

        Respondent asserts that the Department failed to offer individualized services to
accommodate his specific mental health concerns. As explained earlier, the Department did offer
mental health treatment services, which were the focus of respondent’s treatment plan, but it was
respondent who was unwilling to cooperate with these services. Moreover, respondent fails to
identify the additional services he believes should have been offered to accommodate his mental
illness. Respondent also argues that the Department failed to assist with housing, income, and
employment. With respect to housing, the evidence showed that respondent was living with his
mother, but he would not allow the home to be assessed by workers. Respondent also reported
that he was employed, but he failed to produce documentation verifying his employment and
income. In any event, these issues were not the principal barriers to reunification. Respondent’s
significant mental health issues prevented him from having unsupervised contact with the children.
In sum, respondent has not established any plain error related to the adequacy of the Department’s
efforts at reunification.

                     IV. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

       Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by finding that clear and convincing
evidence supported a statutory ground for termination.

        “In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been
met.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). We review for clear error
a court’s determination that a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). A trial
court’s decision is clearly erroneous “if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe
the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). If at least one
statutory ground for termination is established, we “need not consider whether the other grounds
cited by the trial court also supported the termination decision.” In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630,
633; 776 NW2d 415 (2009).

       Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding statutory grounds for
termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Under this provision, termination is authorized when:

       (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or
       more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,[2] and
       the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds . . . the following:

2
  MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) does not apply to JT because respondent’s parental rights to JT were
terminated in the initial dispositional order after that child’s adjudication.

                                                -5-
       (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
       reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time
       considering the child’s age. [MCL 712A.19b(3)].

Termination is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) where “the totality of the evidence amply
support[ed] that [the respondent] had not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions”
that led to adjudication. Williams, 286 Mich App at 272. Respondent’s mental illness was the
primary condition that led to the adjudication of EMT and JAT. Respondent delayed starting
recommended therapy. After he attended for a short time, he revoked his consent to the provider’s
release of treatment records to the Department. Respondent was also unwilling to acknowledge
his mental health condition or his need for treatment, or to take medication for his condition.
Respondent’s mental illness contributed to his unstable behavior throughout the proceedings. His
completion of parenting classes, participation in domestic violence counseling, and partial
cooperation with therapy were inadequate to address his significant mental health issues as a
barrier to reunification. And his partial compliance with the other aspects of his parent-agency
agreement was insufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that he would be able to adequately
address his mental health issues within a reasonable period of time. The trial court provided
respondent with ample opportunity to show progress in his treatment plan, noting that it was
“mindful of [the] fact that mental health challenges may require time to address.” But over two
years had passed by the termination trial since the initiation of proceedings against respondent.
Respondent had not only actively spurned certain efforts to improve his mental health, but his
mental health conditions had arguably worsened. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err
by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of respondent’s parental
rights to EMT and JAT under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).

        With respect to JT, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) provided a sufficient statutory ground for
termination of respondent’s parental rights. Under this provision, termination is proper when
“[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the
child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
Clear and convincing evidence supports that JT, as well as EMT and JAT, were reasonably likely
to be harmed if returned to respondent’s care. Respondent’s untreated schizophrenia rendered him
unable to effectively interact with his children, the Department’s workers, and the trial court. He
bombarded Department staff with inappropriate and irrational messages that were not relevant to
his treatment plan, he did not meaningfully interact with his children during visits, and he verbally
abused and threatened workers. Because respondent failed to rectify the severe mental health
issues underlying his erratic behavior, there existed a reasonable likelihood that the children would
be harmed if returned to his care. The trial court did not clearly err by finding that the evidence
supported termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).3

3
  Having concluded that at least one statutory ground supported termination of respondent’s
parental rights to each of his children, we need not address whether clear and convincing evidence
supported the trial court’s finding of statutory grounds under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) and (g). See
Foster, 285 Mich App at 633.

                                                -6-
                                      V. BEST INTERESTS

        Finally, respondent challenges the trial court’s findings that termination of his parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. “Even if the trial court finds that the Department has
established a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot terminate the
parent’s parental rights unless it also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is
in the best interests of the children.” In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 434; 871 NW2d
868 (2015), citing MCL 712A.19b(5). We review the trial court’s best-interest findings for clear
error. Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 276.

        The focus of the best-interest determination is on the children, not the parent. In re
Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 890 NW2d 676 (2016). “The trial court should weigh all the
evidence available to determine the children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701,
713-714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Factors to consider include “the child’s bond to the parent, the
parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the
advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App
35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted). Other relevant considerations are “the
parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child,
the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” White, 303 Mich App at
714. Unless “the best interests of the individual children significantly differ,” the trial court need
not make “redundant factual findings concerning each child’s best interests.” Id. at 715-716.

        The Department presented substantial evidence that termination of respondent’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. Respondent suffered from mental health issues that
contributed to his inability to focus on parenting skills or his children’s welfare. He demonstrated
distorted perceptions of reality when he neglected his children during visits, when he interacted
with the Department’s workers, and when he participated in court proceedings. Respondent
blames his lack of progress on inadequate services, but as discussed earlier, respondent did not
make any meaningful effort to address, or even acknowledge, his mental health concerns. In
particular, EMT entered court wardship with behavioral problems and developmental delays
attributable to psychological trauma while living with respondent, but he had made strong progress
since his removal. The three children were living together in foster care, and the trial court found
that the foster mother was capably meeting the children’s needs and the children were thriving in
her home. EMT and JAT participated in weekly therapy, and their foster mother fully cooperated
with therapy and other services the children needed. The foster mother was also willing to adopt
all three children and provide them with the stability and permanency they deserved. In sum, the
trial court did not clearly err by finding by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                              /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

                                                 -7-