Court Opinion

ID: 9963732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 05:06:11.221665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:58.249004
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    April 25, 2024
                Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v                                                                  No. 365731
                                                                    Macomb Circuit Court
 SHANTAVIA CAROLYN-LALITA HAYDEN,                                   LC No. 2021-000229-FC

                Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and SERVITTO and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals as of right her jury trial convictions of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317, and second-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(3). The trial court sentenced defendant
to concurrent prison terms of 330 to 600 months for the murder conviction, and 78 to 120 months
for the child abuse conviction. We affirm.

                                  I. FACTUAL OVERVIEW

         Defendant’s convictions arise from the starvation death of her seven-week-old son, who
was pronounced dead upon arrival at Children’s Hospital in Detroit in the early morning of October
11, 2020. At trial, the prosecutor argued that defendant knowingly created a very high risk of
death or great bodily harm by failing to feed the infant for at least seven days. The attending
pediatric trauma physician testified that the baby had died more than two hours before defendant
brought him to the hospital, and was already in full rigor mortis upon arrival. The medical
examiner explained that there was nothing in the child’s colon, which demonstrated that he had
his last meal at least seven days before his death, and that he had not had adequate nutrition for
several weeks. She concluded that the cause of death was “starvation due to neglect” and the
manner of death was homicide. The prosecution also presented evidence that defendant’s inaction
of failing to feed the child was not because she lacked the resources to do so, because defendant
had been provided with more than sufficient food and financial resources through state agencies
to care for the child.

       The defense argued that defendant fed her child, there was some other cause for the child’s
death, and the argument that she did not feed the child “doesn’t make sense.” The defense

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emphasized that defendant would not have contacted emergency medical services regarding the
child having trouble digesting food and having trouble breathing on October 1 if she was not
feeding him. The defense further emphasized that despite the medical’s examiner’s conclusion
that the child had not been fed in at least seven days and that the process of starvation had begun
before those seven days, no one who came into contact with the child ever noticed any signs of
starvation or had concerns about his weight. Furthermore, defendant’s three other children were
healthy and well fed. The jury found defendant guilty as charged.

              II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS – INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

        Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying her request for an instruction on
the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. We disagree.

        Although questions of law pertaining to jury instructions are reviewed de novo, a trial
court’s decision whether an instruction is applicable to the facts of the case is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 82; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). A trial court
abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes. People v Armstrong, 305 Mich App 230, 239; 851 NW2d 856 (2014). A court’s failure
to give a requested instruction warrants reversal “only where the offense was clearly supported by
the evidence; an offense is clearly supported where there is substantial evidence to support it.”
People v McMullan, 488 Mich 922; 789 NW2d 857 (2010).

        Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser offense of murder, distinguished by the element of
       1
malice.     People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 533-534, 540-541; 664 NW2d 685 (2003).
Consequently, if a defendant is charged with murder, an instruction on involuntary manslaughter
must be given upon request if supported by a rational view of the evidence. Id. at 541. As
applicable to this case, if a homicide “was committed with a lesser mens rea of gross negligence
or an intent to injure, and not malice, it is not murder, but only involuntary manslaughter.” People
v Holtschlag, 471 Mich 1, 21; 684 NW2d 730 (2004). Thus, defendant would have been entitled
to an involuntary manslaughter instruction if a rational view of the evidence supported a finding
that the child’s death was caused by an act of gross negligence or an intent to injure, and not malice.

        Defendant argues that an involuntary manslaughter instruction should have been given
because her “actions could have been interpreted by the jury as having been grossly negligent.”
There was no evidence, however, to support this theory. The defense theory was that defendant
fed her child, and any argument that she failed to do so “doesn’t make sense.” As plaintiff aptly
observes, the defense questioning of prosecution and defense witnesses was aimed at establishing
that defendant did not starve her child, but regularly fed him, and that there was some other cause
of his death. The defense emphasized that there were no signs of physical abuse, that defendant’s
other three children were well fed and healthy, and that, despite the medical examiner’s opinion,
no one who came into contact with the child ever noticed any signs of starvation or had concerns

1
  “Malice is defined as ‘the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do
an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior
is to cause death or great bodily harm.’ ” People v Werner, 254 Mich App 528, 531; 659 NW2d
688 (2002) (citation omitted).

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about his weight. In sum, the defense never argued either that defendant had not fed her child or
that her action of not feeding the child was the result of gross negligence. Considering all the
evidence that was presented at trial, no rational juror could conclude that defendant’s conduct of
failing to feed her seven-week-old infant for at least seven days could be characterized as only an
act of gross negligence, committed without malice. Consequently, defendant was not entitled to
an instruction on involuntary manslaughter.

               III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS – VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

        As defendant acknowledges, there was never a request to instruct the jury on voluntary
manslaughter and no objection to the trial court’s instructions as given. Indeed, after the trial court
instructed the jury, the court asked the parties whether they were “satisfied with the jury
instructions?” Defense counsel stated, “Judge, the defense is.” By expressly approving the jury
instructions, defendant waived appellate review of claim that the court erred by failing to instruct
the jury on voluntary manslaughter. People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 504; 803 NW2d 200
(2011). Defendant’s waiver extinguishes any error, leaving no error to review. People v Carter,
462 Mich 206, 216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).

                                   IV. OFFENSE VARIABLE 7

       Defendant argues that she is entitled to be resentenced because the trial court erroneously
scored offense variable (OV) 7 (aggravated physical abuse) of the sentencing guidelines. Again,
we disagree.

        When reviewing a trial court’s scoring decision, the trial court’s “factual determinations
are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People
v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate
to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law,
is a question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo.” Id.

        MCL 777.37(1) requires an assessment of 50 points if a victim “was treated with sadism,
torture, excessive brutality, or similarly egregious conduct designed to substantially increase the
fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense.” Absent such conduct, the score will be
zero. MCL 777.37(1)(b). Each of the four listed categories offers a distinct basis for a 50-point
score. Hardy, 494 Mich at 440-442. In this case, the trial court assessed 50 points on the basis of
excessive brutality. A victim is treated with excessive brutality when a defendant treats the victim
with “savagery or cruelty beyond even the ‘usual’ brutality of a crime.” People v Rosa, 322 Mich
App 726, 743; 913 NW2d 392 (2018) (citation omitted). The focus when determining whether
points are appropriate under OV 7 is on the defendant’s conduct and purpose, rather than the
victim’s experience. People v Kegler, 268 Mich App 187, 191-192; 706 NW2d 744 (2005). When
scoring OV 7, sentencing courts may consider conduct that is inherent in the crime itself. Hardy,
494 Mich at 441-442.

       We agree with the trial court that defendant’s actions underlying her second-degree murder
conviction are sufficient to justify a score of 50 points on the basis that the child was treated with
excessive brutality. In its findings, the trial court aptly highlighted that there were “numerous
other ways the defendant could have killed this child that would have been more humane,” yet she

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deprived him of more than 50 meals “and allowed him to slowly waste away until his body was
eating away at his muscles in an attempt to survive.” According to expert testimony, the child had
not been provided any sustenance for at least seven days, had not had a full meal in 10 days, and
that “[h]is body had no nutrients and for such a long period of time that he had digested all of his
fat and was breaking down his muscle tissue.” There was an abundance of evidence presented
during trial regarding the condition of the child’s body, including that he had “essentially skin on
bone,” “no fat,” his eyes were “sunken in,” and there was very little muscle left on the extremities.
The medical examiner described this case as one of “the most graphic example of starvation” that
she had seen in her 23 years of practice, and the officer in charge similarly described the child’s
deceased body as one of the most horrific things he had seen during his 22-year law enforcement
career. In sum, a preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that defendant
treated the victim with excessive brutality, thereby supporting a 50-point score for OV 7.

                                  V. OFFENSE VARIABLE 10

        In her last claim, defendant challenges the 10-point score for OV 10 (exploitation of a
vulnerable victim).2 However, we need not determine whether there was sufficient evidence that
defendant exploited her seven-week-old child’s youth or other vulnerability because, regardless of
whether OV 10 was properly scored, defendant would not be entitled to resentencing. The trial
court scored the guidelines for defendant’s conviction of second-degree murder, which is a Class
M2 offense. MCL 777.16p. Defendant received a total OV score of 110 points, which combined
with her 20 prior record variable points, placed her in the C-III cell of the Class M2 sentencing
grid, for which the minimum sentence range is 225 to 375 months or life. MCL 777.61. The 10-
point score for OV 10 does not affect defendant’s placement in OV Level III (100+ points), and
thus has no effect on her guidelines range for second-degree murder. Because the scoring of OV
10 does not affect defendant’s sentencing guidelines range, she is not entitled to resentencing.
People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89 n 8; 711 NW2d 44 (2006).3

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                              /s/ Deborah A. Servitto
                                                              /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

2
  A score of 10 points is appropriate if “[t]he offender exploited a victim’s physical disability,
mental disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender abused his or her
authority status.” MCL 777.40(1)(b).
3
  Defendant has not asserted that her sentence is disproportionate and, had she done so, applying
a presumption of proportionality, People v Posey, 512 Mich 317, 357; 1 NW3d 101 (2023), we
would find that the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the matter and to defendant.

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