Court Opinion

ID: 9761073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:30:58.345309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:19.974655
License: Public Domain

TAMILIA, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s determination that appellee was properly permitted to proceed in forma pauperis and despite the technical deficiencies that a proper hearing would have corrected, the extreme importance of this proceeding to the appellee and the lack of prejudice to the Nelsons warrants our erring in favor of appellee.
I strenuously object to the decision by the majority affirming the trial court in denying the Nelsons’ petition to terminate the parental rights of appellee. It appears the trial court and the majority, in denying the petition to terminate, were effected by the pleas of a young woman to return her child rather than by the evidence which clearly met the test of clear and convincing evidence required to sustain a termination Order. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).
The trial court substituted its judgment for that of competent psychological witnesses in an area where the expertise of the psychologist could not be second guessed by the court. *608The court did not dispute the findings of Dr. King, the court-appointed expert, but determined those findings were not convincing in light of appellee’s ability to muster a legal defense and take steps in preparation for the return of B.G.S. (the child subject of the termination proceeding). I submit that observation of the appellee in the court room, no matter how convincing, cannot substitute for evaluation and review of the history of appellee’s vacillation about termination and subsequent involvement in therapy. The mental stability of appellee throughout this period was of vital importance and although the trial court asserts it had sufficient information to make a decision without the records of Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic (WPIC), failure to admit this vital data precluded the court from having the full and exhaustive hearing that is required in a termination case. It also denied this Court critical information on the record necessary for appellate review.
The most troubling aspect of this case concerns the events that led up to the placement of B.G.S. While the court in its Opinion castigated the lawyer intermediary for his conduct in pursuing the adoption, and perhaps on this basis alone might have concluded the termination procedure was defective, it failed to give proper weight to the conditions and circumstances that led to placement. There was family intolerance to the mother retaining custody, she had no resources to maintain the child on her own, she and her parents initiated the placement process and throughout the placement, despite her ambivalence, she asserted her intent to proceed with adoption and to have the adoptive parents assume legal responsibility for the child. The evidence of this conduct is in conflict with the picture and testimony presented by appellee at trial. Also, despite several months of counseling from a mental health counselor, she found it necessary to admit herself to WPIC to undergo psychiatric treatment and medication. It was during her stay at WPIC that she instructed her counsel to revoke her consent to adopt and instead seek custody. This precipitated the petition for involuntary termination by the pre-adoptive parents. Her testimony about her *609parents being abusive in her childhood and the vacillation and misrepresentation as to her intent regarding adoption point to instability which supports the findings by the court-appointed psychologist.
Dr. King holds both masters and doctorate degrees in the psychology of child development and has practiced and taught at the university level (University of Pittsburgh, clinical psychologist and professor of child development) for seventeen years. To hold, as did the trial court, that Dr. King had a bias against returning infants after six months placement in preadoptive homes ignores his expertise and evaluation of the mother in terms of her fitness to care for the child. The trial court’s reliance on In re Adoption of Stunkard, 380 Pa.Super. 107, 551 A.2d 253 (1988), to negate Dr. King’s use and reliance on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is misplaced and error. The MMPI, in the hands of a properly qualified expert, is a highly effective diagnostic/prognostic tool in combination with other data and information as was the case here. The birth mother, with no parenting skills, a history of emotional instability and lacking solid family support, who is pursuing educational career goals and attempting to obtain financial independence through employment, presents the degree of incapacity to parent that meets the proof of failure of parenting capacity required under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2):
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule. — The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
Id. The court refused to consider the records of the mother’s hospitalization at WPIC as to both the precipitating cause of *610her illness and her capacity to parent. The majority herein found the records both material and relevant and that they should have been admitted on the record (Majority Opinion, p. 9) but excused failure to do so by assuming the court acquired sufficient knowledge of their contents by indirection, through the testimony of Dr. King, appellee’s expert, Dr. Levit and the Nelsons’ expert, Dr. Cohn. This is unacceptable because we do not have those records available for our review. This is particularly important when the trial court (and apparently the majority) found Dr. King’s views tainted, Dr. Levit’s testimony to have little probative value and Dr. Cohn’s testimony refuting Dr. Levit’s and presumably supportive of Dr. King’s. Under the circumstances appellant is justified in alleging that the trial court ignored all of the experts’ testimony and made its own psychological/psychiatric finding.
It is not possible to determine from the trial record and the trial court’s analysis precisely what basis the court used for its decision other than to find that its observations of appellee in court led to the conclusion she could provide adequate housing, clothing, food and love for the child. With the serious emotional and psychiatric instability evidenced by the record, that finding was inadequate to establish that the mother’s incapacity had been remedied as required by section 2511(a)(2). I submit that this finding is not supported by the record. The infant has never been with the mother, her parenting capacity is unknown, there has been no bonding between them, her homemaking skills are unknown and she is now embarked on a program of work and self-improvement which will leave her little time to overcome the two-year deficit in child care and the trauma that transfer to her from the pre-adoptive parents will occasion in the child. See Adoption of R.I., 468 Pa. 287, 361 A.2d 294 (1976); Sarver Adoption Case, 444 Pa. 507, 281 A.2d 890 (1971); Schwab Adoption Case, 355 Pa. 534, 50 A.2d 504 (1947). The Court here has failed to examine all of the evidence, as required by Adoption of Embick, 351 Pa.Super. 491, 506 A.2d 455 (1986), and the conclusions it drew as to the mother’s fitness are conjectural and actually contradicted by the record.
*611The second consideration presented by this case and which was ignored by the trial court and misconstrued by the majority is the provision contained in section 2511(b), which provides:
(b) Other considerations. — The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
The court, in refusing to consider best interest as it had not found the mother unfit, even if such a finding was justified, needed to consider the needs and welfare of the child. Since the ground for involuntary termination and the basis upon which the court made its analysis and finding was section 2511(a)(2), it could not disregard the needs and welfare of the child. Here, the court could not have determined on the record that the “neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent” (§ 2511(a)(2)) even if the court found the parent was fit. This is not a case where the child was removed by the state or there was a history of parenting or nonparenting which needed to be scrutinized and “the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, [and] the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child” pursuant to section 2511(a)(5). That situation is the basis upon which In the Interest of Coast, 385 Pa.Super. 450, 561 A.2d 762 (1989), was decided and the law relating to best interest was established as pronounced in the vast majority of the cases for involuntary termination.
This case began with a consensual placement leading to voluntary termination under section 2502, Relinquishment to adult intending to adopt child. It resulted in an involuntary termination proceeding only after the child had been in placement with the pre-adoptive parents for a considerable period of time. The court’s inquiry under these circumstances, since *612the unity of the family never existed as is an important consideration in the usual involuntary termination case, should have focused on section 2511(b), giving primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child. In re E.M., 401 Pa.Super. 129, 584 A.2d 1014 (1991) (Orphans Court erred in failing to consider properly needs and welfare of children as discrete element under statutory scheme in terminating parental rights); In re Quick, 384 Pa.Super. 412, 559 A.2d 42 (1989) (Termination would meet needs and welfare of the child as removal from foster home would upset children’s need for stability); Appeal of Diane B., 456 Pa. 429, 321 A.2d 618 (1974) (A mere desire to perform parental duties is insufficient to preserve the parent-child relationship); Adoption of R.I., supra (R.I.’s best interest would dictate who should have custody in such circumstances. To remove R.I. from her foster home might well create psychological and emotional distress similar to that caused by her initial removal from her natural parent). See Sarver Adoption Case and Schwab Adoption Case, supra. In re Adoption of J.J., 511 Pa. 590, 607, 515 A.2d 883 (1981) (Judicial inquiry is to be centered on the best interest of the child rather than the fault of the parent).
Coast, supra, limited its discussion on best interest to whether a balancing test as between the two parents should be applied in evaluating the termination petition. The issue arose as to which of the two homes, the foster home or that of the natural parents, was better. Here, it is not a question of which of the two homes is better. There is prima facie case that the natural parent has never functioned as a parent during the child’s lifetime, has shown no ability to provide a home for the child and is arguably mentally and emotionally unable to assume responsibility for the child. Discussion or debate at this point about the child’s best interest and what it means in the context of the adoption law is academic. The statute does, however, mandate that “[t]he court in terminating the rights of the parent shall give primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child.” Section 2511(b), Other considerations. This writer, in his Concurring and Dissenting *613Opinion in Coast, went to considerable length to explain how this provision was necessarily incorporated into a termination proceeding with documentation of similar requirements in other jurisdictions. The majority in Coast did not disagree but limited its discussion to the balancing issue and did not make any finding on the “needs and welfare” provision. Coast, therefore, is not authority for limiting consideration of the needs and welfare of the child under the facts of this case.
While it may be premature to find that the birth mother cannot remedy her incapacity to care for the child under section 2511(a)(2), the record does not support her present ability to do so. This does not mean that the Orphan’s Court is presented with an either-or proposition where it must either terminate parental rights or place the child with the birth mother. Relying on section 2511(b), the court may bring into play the assistance of children’s agencies and proceed to determine by proven methods of visitation and supervised placement, whether the child can be successfully returned to the appellee and whether she can establish an emotional and physical bond with the child which will avoid irreversible harm and detriment to her. Failing to accomplish this result, the court may reasonably proceed to terminate parental rights of B.G.S. The cases are legion where the appellate courts have found that the requirements of termination have not been met but refused to disturb the placement of the child when it would be traumatic to do so. See Adoption of R.I., Sarver Adoption Case and Schwab Adoption Case, supra. This most certainly comes within the requirement that the court, in terminating the rights of a parent, shall give primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child.
For the above reasons, I would vacate the decree of the trial court and remand with instructions to obtain the birth mother’s psychiatric records and give proper weight to the psychological testimony and consideration to the needs and welfare of the child and to do anything required thereafter to fulfill the mandate of section 2511(b).