Court Opinion

ID: 9666058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:03:38.281076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:23.270490
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting as to joinder issues only.
Section 29-2002, R. R. S. 1943, specifically provides that if it appears a defendant would be prejudiced by a joinder of offenses, the trial court may order separate trials. In this case the two robberies which were joined were completely separate offenses. They involved different victims, different locations, different property, and different witnesses. They did not even occur on the same day.
*106This court has continuously held that in a trial for commission of one crime, evidence of other unconnected crimes is inadmissible. See, Morgan v. State, 56 Neb. 696, 77 N. W. 64; State v. Casados, 188 Neb. 91, 195 N. W. 2d 210. One basic reason for the rule is that evidence of another crime may be given too much weight by the jury, thus resulting in the conviction of a defendant because he is a bad man and not because of his specific guilt of the offense with which he is charged. 1 Jones on Evidence (5th Ed.), § 162, p. 290; 2 Wigmore on Evidence (3d Ed.), § 302, p. 200. Exactly the same reason exists for holding that a trial for unconnected separate crimes should be separated if requested.
The very recent case of United States v. Foutz, 540 F. 2d 733 (4th Cir., Aug. 1976), specifically holds that where two or more offenses are joined for trial solely on the theory that the offenses were of the same or similar character, it was reversible error to deny a motion for severance, under a rule permitting severance where the accused would be unduly prejudiced by joinder. The court noted that one specific source of prejudice in such a case is that the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other because of his criminal disposition. It is particularly interesting to note that the test of prejudice adopted by the 4th Circuit in that case is whether evidence of one crime would be admissible at a separate trial for the other.
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance, approved and adopted in 1968, are specific on this point. “2.2 Severance of offenses, (a) Whenever two or more offenses have been joined for trial solely on the ground that they are of the same or similar character, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the offenses.” As noted in the commentary, the public interest in avoiding duplicitous time-consuming trials is weighed against prejudice to *107defendants. Where the offenses are completely separate as here, duplicity in trial time, if any, would ordinarily be minimal. As a practical matter, trial time may actually be saved in many cases. By trying one case first, the proceedings may be shortened, and a second trial may be eliminated. In this case, for example, the sentence on each count was the same, to run concurrently. On the other hand, if the defendant should be found not guilty on one count, the other counts may be prosecuted or dismissed as circumstances warrant.
It seems to me better judicial policy to grant a defendant’s motion for separate trials when the only connection between two counts is that they are both robberies or both burglaries. The possibility of prejudice is obvious and the constitutional guaranty of a fair trial should not have to rest on a technical interpretation of a joinder statute. Neither should the effectiveness of the constitutional right to .a fair trial be dependent upon an exercise of judicial discretion in granting or denying a motion for separate trial in a case like this.