Court Opinion

ID: 9742986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:23:45.470504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:24.097043
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. My colleagues apparently want to "Save the Last Dance" for Ms. Breeding. I, however, believe she received what she bargained and signed the contract for-a reception hall with a dise jockey of Kye's choice. Stuck is stuck. Although the other members of the *192panel cannot "Stand by Me," I believe that Kye's clearly and explicitly reserved the right to select the dise jockey, and Breeding was bound by the clear and unambiguous contract.
The first clause of the contract confirms the reservation of Kye's facility. The clause ends with the statement that the contract is "for the use of this facility." Appellant's App. p. 10. In addition, the minimum facility fee is $1500.00, one-half of which Breeding paid at booking pursuant to the terms of the contract. I believe that the contract is clearly and unambiguously for the use of Kye's facility.
The entertainment clause of the contract begins with the statement that "[eluter-tainment, if desired, is to be arranged by the client with the exception of dise jockey services." Appellant's App. p. 10. The provision further explains that Kye's has an exclusive license agreement with Sounds Unlimited to provide dise jockey services at events held at Kye's if such services are requested and that a Kye's representative must approve all entertainment. Contrary to Breeding's contention, this provision is not a promise from Kye's to provide its clients with a specific dise jockey. Rather, it is a provision that merely limits the client's choices for a dise jockey and other entertainment. Because Kye's had no obligation to provide Breeding with the dise jockey services of Sounds Unlimited, Kye's did not breach the contract when it offered Breeding other dise jockey choices and did not allow Sounds Unlimited to perform at Breeding's reception.
Further, to the extent that Breeding argues that she intended to contract with Kye's solely for the services of Sounds Unlimited because she and her parents had been family friends of the owners of Sounds Unlimited and had attended weddings where Sounds Unlimited had provided the dise jockey services, I would point out that the intent relevant in contract matters is not the party's subjective intent but his or her outward manifestation of it. Real Estate Support Services, Inc. v. Nauman, 644 N.E.2d 907, 910 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trams. denied. We do not examine the hidden intentions secreted in the heart of a person but, rather, examine the final expression found in conduct and in light of the surrounding cireumstances at the time the contract was made. Id. at 910-11.
Here, Breeding visited Kye's on January 30, 2001, and met with one of its representatives. Breeding and the representative discussed reception food, music, and decorations. The following day, Breeding returned to the facility and signed the contract for the use of the facility. There is no designated evidence that Breeding ever told the representative that she intended to contract for the services of Sounds Unlimited. Rather, Breeding's manifested intent at the time she signed the contract was an intent to contract with Kye's for the use of its facility. I find no error and would affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Kye's.