Court Opinion

ID: 9882750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:19:30.094416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:52.970807
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 2023-Ohio-3355.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

RYAN LICHTENSTEIN,                                        :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                      :
                                                              Nos. 111887 and 112340
                 v.                                       :

MELISSA LICHTENSTEIN,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                     :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 21, 2023

             Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Domestic Relations Division
                                 Case No. DR-16-362842

                                             Appearances:

                 McCarthy Lebit Crystal & Liffman Co., LPA, Richard A.
                 Rabb, and Rebekah Cline, for appellee.

                 Law Offices of Anne S. Magyaros, LLC, and Anne S.
                 Magyaros, for appellant.

LISA B. FORBES, J.:

                   Appellant Melissa Lichtenstein (“Wife”) appeals two journal entries

dated August 1, 2022, regarding issues of child support, certain marital assets, and

attorney fees in connection with these divorce proceedings, and two additional
journal entries dated April 28, 2022, and January 11, 2023, related to temporary

support. After reviewing the facts of the case and the pertinent law, we affirm.

I.   Procedural History

               Wife and Ryan Lichtenstein (“Husband”) were married on June 15,

2012, and had one child, A.L., in 2013. Husband filed for divorce on July 1, 2016;

Wife filed a counterclaim for divorce. The facts of this case are fully detailed in the

first appeal to this court in Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

108854, 2020-Ohio-5080 (“Lichtenstein I”). A brief summary of the procedural

history pertinent to the issues raised on appeal follows.

      A. Husband’s Motion to Modify Temporary Support

               In an agreed judgment entry, Husband and Wife agreed to terms of

“temporary alimony” (“temporary support”), effective July 1, 2017, in which

Husband “agree[d] to continue the payment of the PNC Bank Credit Card up to a

monthly amount of $665.00. * * * [Husband] shall pay all work related daycare

expenses, all health insurance coverage (health, dental, and vision) for [Wife and

child] and all car insurance expenses for [Wife].”

               Husband filed a motion to modify temporary support on October 19,

2017, arguing monthly support should be reduced.

               Following a hearing, on February 9, 2018, the magistrate issued an

order granting Husband’s motion, terminating the portion of the agreed journal

entry that permitted Wife to charge up to $665 each month on Husband’s PNC

credit card (the “PNC credit card”). Wife filed a motion to set aside that order,
arguing Husband had not demonstrated a change in circumstances. The trial court

denied as moot Wife’s motion to set aside.

       B. Divorce Trial

                A trial on Husband and Wife’s divorce and related matters, including

child support and financial issues related to the termination of parties’ marriage,

took place before a magistrate on December 15, 2017, and January 31, February 5,

and February 9, 2018.

                The magistrate’s decision granting the parties a divorce, dividing the

marital property, and issuing an order of shared parenting was journalized on

October 22, 2018. Wife filed objections to this magistrate’s decision.

                The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and overruled Wife’s

substantive objections on July 5, 2019.1

       C. Wife’s Motion to Modify Temporary Support

                On January 15, 2019, Wife filed a motion to modify temporary

support. In that motion she asserted that Husband’s “obligations have been reduced

by approximately $600/month since the temporary orders * * *.” The trial court

denied Wife’s motion as moot.

       D. Lichtenstein I

                In Lichtenstein I, Wife appealed (1) the orders granting Husband’s

motion to modify temporary support and denying as moot her motion to set that

       1 The trial court sustained Wife’s first objection regarding the absence of a list of

trial exhibits in the magistrate’s decision, finding “that the omission of the list of exhibits
on the first page of the Magistrate’s Decision was a clerical error.”
order aside, (2) the entry overruling her objections to the magistrate’s October 22,

2018 decision, and (3) the trial court’s denial as moot of her motion to modify

temporary support. This court found that the trial court had not conducted an

independent review of the divorce proceedings, and affirmed in part, reversed in

part, and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct an independent review

related to the following issues: child support, division of marital assets, and attorney

fees. This court also ordered the trial court to address Wife’s motion to set aside the

magistrate’s order modifying temporary support as well as Wife’s motion to modify

temporary support. Finally, this court strongly suggested that the trial court issue a

separate divorce decree. Lichtenstein I at ¶ 65.

               Pursuant to this court’s opinion in Lichtenstein I, the trial court

issued its April 28, 2022 journal entry in which it denied Wife’s motion to set aside

the magistrate’s February 9, 2018 order granting Husband’s motion to modify

temporary support. Further complying with the mandate in Lichtenstein I, on

August 1, 2022, the trial court issued two journal entries: one addressing the issues

raised in the remand order (the “Remand Journal Entry”) and another issuing a

separate divorce decree (the “Divorce Decree”) in which the trial court adopted the

magistrate’s decision journalized on October 22, 2018,2 “in its entirety, except as

modified herein.”     Wife appealed from these orders in 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 111887, which is now before this court.

      2 The divorce decree refers to the magistrate’s decision of “October 22, 2029.”  As
reflected on the court’s docket, the magistrate’s decision was journalized on October 22,
2018.
               On December 15, 2022, the magistrate held a hearing on Wife’s

January 2019 motion to modify temporary support. The magistrate issued an order

denying wife’s motion, which Wife moved to set aside. The trial court denied Wife’s

motion on January 11, 2023. Wife appeals from this order in 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 112340, which is also now before this court.

      E. Current Appeal

               Wife’s appeals in Appeal Nos. 111887 and 112340 were consolidated.

Wife was permitted to file two briefs, each presenting different assignments of error,

which have been renumbered here for ease of discussion. Those assignments of

error are as follows:

      Appeal No. 111887 (Remand Journal Entry, Divorce Decree and Denial
      of Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Husband’s Motion to Modify
      Temporary Support)

      [1]: The trial court abused its discretion when it granted [Husband’s]
      motion to modify temporary support.

      [2]: The trial court abused its discretion in failing to designate husband
      as the child support obligor.

      [3]: The trial court erred in determining husband’s income for support
      purposes.

      [4]: The trial court erred in failing to follow ORC Chapter 3119 in
      determining child support.

      [5]: The trial court erred in failing to address the allocation of
      uncovered medical expenses in the remand orders and the trial court
      erred in summarily ordering equal responsibility for the child’s
      uncovered medical expenses in the final divorce decree.

      [6]: The trial court erred in failing to address which parent can claim
      the child for tax purposes in its remand orders, and the trial court erred
      in summarily allocating the child to [Husband] for tax purposes in the
      final divorce decree.

      [7]: The trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees.

      Appeal No. 112340 (Denial of Wife’s Motion to Modify Temporary
      Support)

      [8]: The trial court erred in adopting the magistrate’s order which gave
      deference to the trial magistrate’s decision in a prior unrelated motion
      to modify decided a year before the motion at issue was filed.

      [9]: The trial court erred in failing to address the points raised in the
      motion to set aside and in summarily denying the motion without
      explanation and in accepting a conclusion of the support magistrate
      that was never made.

      [10]: The trial court erred in denying the motion to modify temporary
      orders by only reviewing the magistrate’s order and the motion to set
      aside and finding “nothing arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable”
      where the magistrate’s order does not contain any facts regarding (A)
      the parties’ income and how or if those incomes have changed, (B) how
      the parenting schedule has changed, (C) how the childcare and other
      expenses had changed, and does not address whether mother has met
      her burden to show a change of circumstances.

      [11]: The trial court erred in denying the motion to modify temporary
      orders.

II. Law and Analysis

      A. Standard of Review

              “[W]hen reviewing a trial court’s determination in a domestic

relations case, an appellate court generally applies an abuse of discretion standard.”

Deacon v. Deacon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91609, 2009-Ohio-2491, ¶ 13 (applying

an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to decisions regarding temporary

support); Buskirk v. Buskirk, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111399, 2023-Ohio-70, ¶ 28
(applying an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a trial court’s decision

regarding of child support).

               A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision “is unreasonable,

arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450

N.E.2d 1140 (1983). The Ohio Supreme Court recently explained that an abuse of

discretion “involves more than a difference in opinion.” State v. Weaver, Slip

Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶ 24.         That is, a trial court’s judgment that is

“profoundly and wholly violative of fact and reason” constitutes an abuse of

discretion. Id.

               Wife’s first six assignments of error address decisions regarding

temporary support and child support. Similarly, assignments of error Nos. 8, 10,

and 11 take issue with the trial court’s denial of Wife’s motion for temporary support.

As such, each of these assignments of error will be reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. The standards of review for the remaining assignments of error will be

discussed in their respective sections.

      B. Husband’s Motion to Modify Temporary Support

               In her first assignment of error, Wife claims the trial court abused its

discretion when it modified Husband’s obligation to pay temporary support. As

noted, in the February 9, 2018 order, the magistrate terminated the “$665 per

month” portion of temporary support and the trial court denied Wife’s motion to set

aside that order. The issue of temporary support became appealable once the final

divorce decree was issued. See Palnik v. Crane, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107400,
2019-Ohio-3364, ¶ 32 (noting that issues related to temporary support orders

become reviewable once the trial court enters a final judgment).

              In his motion to modify, Husband argued a reduction in his support

obligation was warranted because he believed Wife had obtained new employment

and changes in the cost of work-related daycare made the expense unmanageable

without contribution from Wife. Wife opposed the motion, arguing she had not

secured new employment.

              Husband’s motion to modify temporary support was heard during the

parties’ divorce trial.   Husband testified regarding a spreadsheet he created

identifying charges on the PNC credit card that he attributed to Wife.      That

spreadsheet demonstrates that Wife spent the following amounts:

      July 2017 — $950.52

      August 2017 — $976.68

      September 2017 — $836.82

      October 2017 — $430.01

      November 2017 — $697.32

      December 1 — 17, 2017 — $373

For the months of July through November, Wife averaged $778.27 per month. For

December 2017, Wife was on track to spend $680. For the five full months, Wife

was authorized to spend $3,325; the evidence showed Wife spent $3,891.35. That

is, the evidence presented to the court demonstrated that Wife exceeded the award

of temporary support.
                 While Wife admitted at trial that she had charged more than the

agreed $665 on the PNC credit card some months, she testified that she and

Husband “settled on just offsetting the next month with [her] spending less.” With

that agreement, she believed she had spent under the agreed amount of $665 when

considering all months together. The evidence of Wife’s spending did not support

Wife’s belief.

                 At the close of the trial, after hearing the testimony proffered and

seeing the documentary evidence presented (including evidence related to the

parties’ finances), the magistrate granted Husband’s motion and terminated the

$665 “cash” portion of temporary support. The magistrate stated on the record that

“there [were] numerous expenditures to what I will categorize as luxury-type items

every month * * *. And what I see is a lifestyle that includes out-of-control shopping,

expenditures and spending a lot of money on unnecessary items. And it’s not

[Husband’s] job to support that type of spending.” The court further stated that it

did not “think the [temporary support] [wa]s necessary anymore” because of Wife’s

“lack of financial responsibility[.]” On the same day, the magistrate signed an order

memorializing the granting of Husband’s motion to modify temporary support.

                 Similarly, in the separate August 1, 2022 Divorce Decree, the trial

court found “that spousal support is neither appropriate nor reasonable.” Wife did

not appeal that portion of the Divorce Decree, it is, therefore, not presently before

this court.
              “‘The purpose of awarding temporary spousal support is to preserve

the status quo during the divorce proceeding.’”       Deacon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 91609, 2009-Ohio-2491, at ¶ 49, quoting Cangemi v. Cangemi, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 86670, 2006-Ohio-2879, ¶ 14. Pursuant to R.C. 3105.18, trial courts

may award “reasonable temporary spousal support” during the pendency of divorce

proceedings. Borrowing from the law regarding permanent spousal support, the

parties argue that a change in circumstances is necessary to support a modification

of temporary support. We note that nothing in the statute addresses the standard

to apply when considering a motion to modify temporary support. The only

criterion is that an award of temporary support must be “reasonable.”             See

R.C. 3105.18(B).

              Based on the evidence and testimony in the record we find that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Wife’s motion to set aside the

magistrate’s order modifying temporary support. We find that the decision to

reduce temporary cash support to zero was reasonable. Notwithstanding that

decision, Wife continued to receive temporary support by way of Husband paying

for all work-related childcare for A.L., Wife and A.L.’s health insurance, and Wife’s

car insurance. We note that Wife did not dispute that the award of no permanent

spousal support was “reasonable.” Further, the evidence and testimony at trial

demonstrated a change in circumstances in that the parties agreed Wife was

permitted to spend $665 per month on the PNC credit card but Wife consistently

exceeded that amount.
              Accordingly, Wife’s first assignment of error is overruled.

        C. Child Support Obligor

              In her second assignment of error, Wife asserts that the trial court

abused its discretion when it designated her as the child support obligor. We

disagree.

              First, Wife asserts that the trial court “did not conduct a de novo

review of the evidence and testimony,” resting on her bare allegation without

identifying anything in the record to support her claim. As noted in Lichtenstein I,

when reviewing a magistrate’s decision, a trial court “does not sit in the same

manner as an appellate court; rather, it must conduct an independent review of the

facts and conclusions made by the magistrate.” Haupt v. Haupt, 11th Dist. Geauga

No. 2015-G-0049, 2017-Ohio-2719, ¶ 26, citing Phillips v. Phillips, 2014-Ohio-5439,

25 N.E.3d 371, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), “the court shall

undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the

magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the

law.”    “It is generally presumed that the trial court properly conducted an

independent review of the magistrate’s decision unless the party asserting the error

affirmatively shows otherwise.” Lichtenstein I at ¶ 13.

              In the Remand Journal Entry, the trial court acknowledged that the

case was remanded by this court with the instruction to conduct a de novo review

regarding issues related to child support. The trial court explained that it had
“undertaken an independent review” before overruling Wife’s objections to the

magistrate’s decision.

               Wife has not affirmatively demonstrated that the court did not

conduct a de novo review. Accordingly, Wife’s argument that the court failed to

conduct an independent review is not well taken.

               Second, Wife contends that the court abused its discretion in failing

to designate Husband as the child support obligor. Wife challenges the trial court’s

findings, arguing “[t]he Court’s reasoning for designating [Wife] as the ‘obligor’ was

that Father paid for nearly all the child’s expenses and [Wife] lacked credibility

about her alcohol use, both of which are wholly unsupported by the evidence and

which are not reasons that would justify or support making [Wife] the obligor.”

               In the Remand Journal Entry, the trial court found that “[a]lthough

the parties agreed to shared parenting, it is clear from the record that Plaintiff

[Husband] pays nearly all work-related child-care expenses, health insurance

expenses, and other related expenses for the minor child.” Although Wife testified

that she paid the majority of A.L.’s expenses, the court explained that it found Wife’s

testimony to be not credible “due to discrepancies in her testimony regarding her

alcohol abuse.”

               Further, the Divorce Decree “constitute[s] an order for shared

parenting,” setting forth the parties’ rights and responsibilities for the care of the

A.L. R.C. 3119.02(A)(1) provides:
      A court that issues a shared parenting order in accordance with section
      3109.04 of the Revised Code shall order an amount of child support to
      be paid under the child support order that is calculated in accordance
      with the schedule and with the worksheet, except that, if that amount
      would be unjust or inappropriate to the children or either parent and
      therefore not in the best interest of the child because of the
      extraordinary circumstances of the parents or because of any other
      factors or criteria set forth in section 3119.23 of the Revised Code, the
      court may deviate from that amount.

“The statute does not mandate which residential parent is to be named the obligor

or obligee in shared parenting situations.” MacKnight v. MacKnight, 12th Dist.

Butler No. CA2021-07-078, 2022-Ohio-648, ¶ 29.

              The Divorce Decree specifies that the child support obligor shall pay

the child support obligee “$0 per month as child support plus $0 per month as cash

medical support, for a total of $0 per month.” The court found that the “annual child

support obligation, as determined by the applicable worksheet, is $5,312.76 when

private health insurance is being provided and $3,689.15 when private health

insurance is not being provided.” However, the court ordered a deviation from those

amounts, pursuant to R.C. 3119.22, 3119.23 and 3119.24, because

      the annual obligation would be unjust and inappropriate and therefore
      not in the best interest of the minor child[] for the following reason(s):
      Extraordinary circumstances associated with shared parenting; ability
      of each parent to maintain adequate housing for the child[]; each
      parent’s expenses, including child care expenses, school tuition,
      medical expenses, dental expenses, and other expenses the court
      considers relevant; actual financial resources of [Husband]; and that
      the parties have relatively equal parenting time and the costs associated
      to same.
               We find that the trial court’s findings are supported by the record.

Husband not only testified to the specific expenses he pays for A.L., he also

submitted financial records regarding the same.

               Based on the foregoing, we overrule Wife’s second assignment of

error.

         D. Husband’s Income for Purposes of Calculating Child Support

               Next, Wife argues that the trial court erred when it determined

Husband’s income for purposes of determining child support. Specifically, Wife

takes issue with the trial court averaging Husband’s “income for three outdated

years.” Specifically, she argues that the court should have considered Husband’s

2017 income. Wife provides no case law or statutory support for her position.

               Pursuant to R.C. 3119.05(H), “When the court or agency calculates

annual income, the court or agency, when appropriate may average income over a

reasonable period of years.”    See also Wright v. Wright, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 91026, 2009-Ohio-128, ¶ 27 (affirming a trial court’s gross annual income

calculation pursuant to R.C. 3119.05(H) utilizing the husband’s income over the

previous three years).

               Here, the trial court determined Husband’s income was $72,000 per

year for purposes of calculating child support by averaging the income stated on his

W-2 statements for 2014, 2015, and 2016. The W-2 statements admitted into

evidence at trial demonstrate that for 2014, 2015, and 2016, Husband’s annual

income was $68,994.94, $ 74,506.84, and $69,841.13, respectively. The average of
these three years is $71,114.30, which is $885.70 less than the $72,000 used by the

trial court as Husband’s annual income.

                Wife argues that Husband’s income in 2017 was $79,130.18 as

reflected on his final paystub for 2017, which was admitted into evidence at the trial.

However, Husband’s W-2 statement for 2017, which was also in evidence, showed

that in 2017 Husband’s taxable income was $72,019.88.                     Pursuant to

R.C. 3119.05(A), the court is permitted to rely on supporting documentation such as

a W-2 statement to determine income. See In re M.C.M., 2018-Ohio-1307, 110

N.E.3d 694, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.). Had the trial court used Husband’s income as reported

on his W-2 statements for 2015, 2016, and 2017, Husband’s average income for

those three years would have been $72,122.62, $122 more than the $72,000 that the

trial court used as Husband’s income.

                Under these circumstances, particularly given the variable nature of

Husband’s income from year to year, we find that Wife has not demonstrated that

the trial court abused its discretion in determining Husband’s income to be $72,000

per year for purposes of calculating child support. Wife’s third assignment of error

is overruled.

      E. R.C. Chapter 3119

                In Wife’s fourth assignment of error, she argues that “[t]he trial court

did [not] follow the child support statute at all.” Wife cites to various sections of

R.C. Chapter 3119 that she claims the trial court failed to follow without any

explanation as to how the trial court allegedly failed to follow each of the statutes.
Rather, she simply states that the court quoted “the child support statutes and then

ignores their mandates completely.”

                “If an argument exists that can support this assigned error, it is not

this court’s duty to root it out.” Cardone v. Cardone, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 18349

and 18673, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2028, 22 (May 6, 1998). See also State v.

Watson, 126 Ohio App.3d 316, 321, 710 N.E.2d 340 (12th Dist.1998) (holding that

“[i]t is not the duty of an appellate court to search the record for evidence to support

an appellant’s argument as to any alleged error. * * * ‘An appellate court is not a

performing bear, required to dance to each and every tune played on appeal.’”),

quoting State v. McGuire, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA95-01-001, 1996 Ohio App.

LEXIS 1492, 40 (Apr. 15, 1996), aff'd, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112 (1997).

                Accordingly, we overrule Wife’s fourth assignment of error.

        F. Uncovered Medical Expenses

                Wife asserts the following in her fifth assignment of error:

        The trial court erred in failing to address the allocation of uncovered
        medical expenses in the remand orders and the trial court erred in
        summarily ordering equal responsibility for the child’s uncovered
        medical expenses in the final divorce decree.

                As noted, following this court’s mandate in Lichtenstein I, the trial

court issued the Remand Journal Entry and the Divorce Decree. While the Remand

Journal Entry does not address uncovered medical expenses, the Divorce Decree

does.

                In challenging the trial court’s order in the Divorce Decree that

Husband and Wife each pay 50 percent of A.L.’s uncovered medical expenses, Wife
asserts that “[u]ninsured medical expenses are customarily divided as per Line 16 of

the child support worksheets.” Wife cites to Peach v. Peach, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

Nos. 82414 and 82500, 2003-Ohio-5645, to support her argument. Whether

something is customary, as argued by Wife, is not pertinent to our review. Our

review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. Moreover, Peach

does not establish that it is “customary” to divide uncovered or uninsured medical

expenses according to line 16 of the child support worksheet. Rather, the Peach

Court quoted the terms of the divorce decree agreed to by those parties in which the

husband agreed to pay all uninsured medical expenses of the child “per line 16 of the

child support worksheet.” Peach at ¶ 18. Wife provides no other support for her

assertion that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion.

              Wife has not established the trial court abused its discretion in

ordering that Husband and Wife are equally responsible for uncovered medical

expenses. Wife’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

      G. Claiming Child for Tax Purposes

              In Wife’s sixth assignment of error, she argues that the court failed to

address who can claim A.L. for tax purposes in the Remand Journal Entry and when

it “summarily” allocated that deduction to Husband for tax purposes in the Divorce

Decree. While we acknowledge that the trial court did not address the issue of which

parent can claim the child for tax purposes in its Remand Journal Entry, we note

that the court did address the issue in the separate Divorce Decree. We find no error
in the court having done so. Further, we disagree that the court abused its discretion

when it allocated the tax deduction to Husband.

              R.C. 3119.82 discusses the issue of which parent may claim a child for

tax purposes. It states:

      In cases in which the parties do not agree which parent may claim the
      children as dependents, the court shall consider, in making its
      determination, any net tax savings, the relative financial circumstances
      and needs of the parents and children, the amount of time the children
      spend with each parent, the eligibility of either or both parents for the
      federal earned income tax credit or other state or federal tax credit, and
      any other relevant factor concerning the best interest of the children.

              In the Remand Journal Entry, the trial court specified that it

overruled Wife’s “Objections to Magistrate’s Decision * * * as to the child support

issues * * *,” and “adopt[ed] the Magistrate’s Decision with modifications herein.”

As the trial court did not specifically address which parent could claim A.L. for tax

purposes, it adopted without modification the magistrate’s decision in this regard.

The magistrate’s decision analyzed the R.C. 3119.82 factors and found:

      (a) Net tax savings: For the tax year 2017 the [Husband] is in a 25%
          income tax bracket and the [Wife] is in a 15% tax bracket. In tax
          year 2018, the [Husband] is in 22% tax bracket and the [Wife] is in
          a 12% tax bracket. Therefore, a greater net tax savings would be
          derived by awarding the [Husband] the tax exemption.

      (b) Relative financial circumstances and needs of the parents and
          children: In this case, [Husband] is paying the majority of the child’s
          expenses including health care and child care. [Husband] earns
          more “actual income” than that of the [Wife].

      (c) Amount of time the children spend with each parent: The parents
          have equal parenting time with their son.

      (d) Eligibility of either or both parents for the federal earned income tax
          credit or other state or federal credit: [Wife] earned approximately
          $20,000 in income in 2017. She likely qualifies for the earned
          income credit if she files single/head of household.

      (e) Other relevant factors: It furthers the best interest of the child to
          designate the [Husband] as the parent who may claim the child as a
          dependent for federal income tax purposes.

               Upon review, we find that the magistrate’s factual findings are

supported by evidence in the record. Wife argues that it was error to find that Wife

“would qualify for the earned income credit.” We note that the court only mentioned

that Wife “likely qualifies.” It did not conclude that Wife did or did not qualify. Wife

does not challenge any of the other findings, other than to claim that the trial court

did not take into account Wife’s financial circumstances. In fact, the magistrate

made a specific finding that Wife earned approximately $20,000 in 2017. That is,

the order demonstrates the court did take into account Wife’s financial

circumstances.

               Accordingly, Wife’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.

      H. Attorney Fees

               In her seventh assignment of error, Wife contends that the trial court

abused its discretion in awarding Husband $3,000 in attorney fees because it did

not conduct a de novo review and did so “without evidence.” We disagree.

               “The decision to award attorney fees under R.C. 3105.73 lies within

the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of

that discretion.” Wilson v. Wilson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112105, 2023-Ohio-1752,

¶ 23. “Under this highly deferential standard of review, we ‘may not freely substitute

[our] judgment for that of the trial court.’” Allan v. Allan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 107142, 2019-Ohio-2111, ¶ 95, quoting Dannaher v. Newbold, 10th Dist.

Franklin Nos. 05AP-172 and 05AP-650, 2007-Ohio-2936, ¶ 33.

              Pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(A):

      In an action for divorce * * * or an appeal of that action, a court may
      award all or part of reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
      to either party if the court finds the award equitable. In determining
      whether an award is equitable, the court may consider the parties’
      marital assets and income, any award of temporary spousal support,
      the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors the court
      deems appropriate.

              This court remanded the issue of attorney fees to the trial court in

Lichtenstein I. In the Remand Journal Entry, that trial court explained:

      [H]aving considered all the facts and evidence on this case the Court
      would be justified in ordering [Wife] to pay a much larger percentage
      of [Husband’s] attorney fees but has determined that it would be
      inequitable. However, an award of $3,000.00 which represents less
      than five percent of [Husband’s] total fees is appropriate considering
      all the facts and circumstances.

              At the trial on Husband and Wife’s divorce and related pending

motions, Husband’s attorney testified that working on this case was “a very difficult

task * * * [p]rimarily because of discovery, and primarily because of an inability to

work through simple agreements, and an inability to reach stipulations, any type of

agreement * * *.” Husband’s attorney explained some of the work performed in this

case including preparing motions to compel, requests for production of documents,

opposition to a motion to quash subpoenas, an agreed judgment entry, and

correspondence between himself and Wife’s attorney regarding discovery issues.

Husband’s attorney testified that he billed Husband $62,055 for his services, and a

fee bill was admitted into evidence.
                Wife argues that there was no evidence regarding Husband’s

attorney’s hourly rate. However at trial, Wife’s attorney had the following colloquy

with Husband’s attorney:

      Q: And how much do you charge an hour?

      A: Currently or on [Husband’s] case?

      Q: Well, what are you charging [Husband]?

      A: 285 – or 385, I’m sorry.

      Q: And what[] do you charge currently?

      A: 395.

                Accordingly, the record demonstrates that Husband’s attorney’s

hourly rate was in evidence, and the court properly exercised its discretion to award

Husband $3,000 of the $62,055 he requested.

                Wife’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.

      I. Deference to Prior Magistrate’s Decision on an Unrelated
         Motion — Wife’s Motion to Modify Temporary Support

                Wife argues in her eighth assignment of error that the trial court

“erred in giving deference to the Trial Magistrate’s decision on a prior motion to

modify the temporary orders * * *.”

                In denying Wife’s January 15, 2019 motion to modify, the magistrate

included a brief procedural history of the case. In that history, the magistrate stated

that the February 9, 2018 magistrate’s order that granted Husband’s motion to

modify temporary support “was determined by the Trial Magistrate. The Trial
Magistrate heard the case in-person and deference is provided to the Trial

Magistrate for the order of modification.”

              After discussing the history of the proceedings, the magistrate went

on to analyze the facts and evidence presented at the hearing on Wife’s January 15,

2019 motion to modify. The magistrate concluded “upon analysis of this case and

the uniqueness of the case * * * that the current order for temporary support

(pursuant to the Magistrate’s order journalized February 9, 2018) is fair and

reasonable and should remain in effect.” Nothing in the record indicates that the

magistrate deferred to the prior magistrate’s order regarding the motion at issue.

When the trial court denied Wife’s motion to set aside the magistrate’s order, it

clearly explained it was ruling on Wife’s motion to set aside filed on December 20,

2022, and concluded that Wife had not demonstrated a change in circumstances

sufficient to warrant a modification.

              Wife has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion.

Accordingly, Wife’s eighth assignment of error is overruled.

      J. Denial of Wife’s January 15, 2019 Motion to Modify Without
         Explanation

              Next, Wife argues that the trial court erred “in summarily denying the

motion [to set aside the magistrate’s order] without explanation * * *.” We disagree.

              Civ.R. 52 requires trial courts to issue findings of fact and conclusions

of law in limited circumstances not at issue here and authorizes parties to request

findings of fact and conclusions of law in other circumstances. Wife did not file a

motion pursuant to Civ.R. 52 requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Further, Wife does not identify, and we do not find, any law that requires a trial court

to explain its decision to deny a motion to set aside a magistrate’s order.

               Wife’s argument is not well-taken, and this assignment of error is

overruled.

      K. Wife’s Motion to Modify Temporary Support

               Wife’s tenth and eleventh assignments of error will be reviewed

together because both raise the same issue, that the trial court “erred in denying the

motion to modify temporary orders.” While Wife argues that the magistrate erred

in denying her motion to modify, her substantive arguments relate to the trial court’s

denial of her motion to set aside the magistrate’s order.

               A trial court’s decision to deny a motion to set aside a magistrate’s

order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Schutte v. Strittmatter, 2018-Ohio-

3472, 118 N.E.3d 485, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.).

               Wife filed her motion to modify temporary support arguing, among

other things, that a modification was warranted because Husband’s income had

increased and that his work-related childcare expenses had decreased since the

original order.

               On appeal, Wife challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to set

aside the magistrate’s order based on her assertion that the trial court did not review

transcripts or exhibits. We find her argument not well taken. Civ.R. 53 creates a

distinction between a magistrate’s decision and a magistrate’s order. Pursuant to

Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), when ruling on a party’s objections to a magistrate’s decision, a
trial court must conduct “an independent review as to the objected matters * * *.”

However, Civ.R. 53 makes no such requirement when a trial court is ruling on a

motion to set aside a magistrate’s order. See Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(b). Wife has not cited

any case law or statutory authority requiring the trial court to review the transcripts

or exhibits in ruling on a motion to set aside a magistrate’s order.

               Further, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Wife’s motion to set aside the magistrate’s order.

               The trial court noted in its entry denying Wife’s motion to set aside

the magistrate’s order that to modify an award of temporary support, “the moving

party must demonstrate a change in circumstances” such that the existing order is

“no longer reasonable and appropriate * * *.” See R.C. 3105.18.

               The magistrate denied Wife’s motion to modify temporary support,

finding that the then-existing order of temporary support was “fair and reasonable”

without modification.    Wife’s motion to modify temporary support sought an

increase because the parties’ “circumstances have changed warranting a

modification * * *.” Specifically, Wife argued in her motion that Husband’s income

had increased, his “child care expenses ha[d] decreased significantly,” and his

“obligations have been reduced by approximately $600/month since the temporary

orders and the parties are now enjoying 50/50 time sharing of their child.”

               At the hearing held in December 2022, Wife argued that

      at the time the [temporary support] orders went in, the child was in
      preschool and not in full-time schooling so he needed basically full-
      time childcare. At the time of filing of the Motion to Modify, the child
      was now a full-time kindergarten student, and the child support
      expenses went down to approximately $3,000 a year, so that was a
      savings to [H]usband under the prior orders of about $9,000 a year.

              Wife further stated that through the temporary support Husband

“was in essence paying [Wife’s] share of the childcare * * *.” Wife additionally

argued that Husband’s “base income went up from $66,000 and some change to

$72,000 and some change” between 2018 and 2019.

              In denying Wife’s motion to modify temporary support, the

magistrate acknowledged that Husband’s work-related childcare expenses “have

decreased, but * * * a review of the totality of the circumstances of the case evince

that this most likely was contemplated by the” parties. This finding is supported by

evidence in the record. At the divorce trial, which was consolidated with a hearing

on Husband’s motion to modify temporary support, Husband was asked on cross-

examination when he “expect[ed] the work-related childcare [expenses] to reduce.”

He responded in August when A.L. went to kindergarten. Further, while Wife

argued that Husband’s income had increased, the magistrate’s order found that “it

is unclear if [Wife’s] income has increased.” A review of the transcript from the

December 15, 2022 hearing on Wife’s motion to modify demonstrates that neither

party demonstrated whether Wife’s income had changed since the trial in this case.

              As noted, the purpose of an award of temporary support is to preserve

the status quo during the divorce proceedings.        Deacon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 91609, 2009-Ohio-2491. Such an award must be “reasonable.” R.C. 3105.18(B).
              We find that the magistrate’s findings were supported by evidence in

the record and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

Wife’s motion to set aside the magistrate’s order.         To the extent that Wife

demonstrated that Husband’s childcare obligations had decreased as expected, she

did not demonstrate that fact alone warranted an increase in temporary support to

her. For example, she did not establish a countervailing increase in her expenses.

              Wife’s tenth and eleventh assignments of error are overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR
KEY WORDS
Divorce, temporary support, child support, obligor, income for child support, child
tax credit, shared parenting order, attorney fees.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding temporary support, child
support, and attorney fees. Each of the court’s findings are supported by evidence
in the record. Additionally, appellant did not otherwise demonstrate that the trial
court abused its discretion.

Judgment affirmed.