Court Opinion

ID: 9710230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:04:45.740377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.216667
License: Public Domain

DOYLE, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the adjudication of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (Board), which determined that the refusal of Upper Makefield Township to submit the issue of Officer Matthew Schrum’s discharge grievance to arbitration was an unfair labor practice and a violation of Section 6(1)(a) and (e) of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act (PLRA)1 and Act 111.2
*604As a preface, although the procedural facts as given in the majority opinion are not in dispute, as the majority opinion correctly points out, there are additional undisputed facts which are also relevant which will illuminate what I believe is the untenable position of the Township, because it previously did submit the issue of the arbitrability of the Schrum grievance to binding arbitration and subsequently refused to abide by that arbitrator’s decision.
Officer Schrum was hired as a full-time police officer for a one-year probationary period in August of 1991.3 On July 15, 1992, the Township terminated Schrum’s employment, and the Upper Makefield Township Police Association (Association) filed a grievance over his dismissal. The Chief of Police, by letter dated July 22, 1992, refused to process the grievance asserting that Schrum was “no longer an ‘Officer’ as that term is defined in Article XX, Section [4] of the contract. Therefore, the grievance procedures in the contract are not available to Mr. Schrum.” (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 71a.) In response to the Township’s refusal to employ even the four-step grievance procedure in the 1990-1992 CBA, the Association filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board, which charges were sustained, and by a final order entered on May 11, 1994, the Board ordered the Township to proceed with arbitration over the arbitrability of the issue of whether Schrum was covered under the provisions of the 1990-1992 CBA.5 That final decision made it explicitly clear that the ultimate and substantive issue regarding Schrum’s dismissal was not the principal issue to be immediately arbitrated in the first instance, and, bearing in mind that the Township refused to even' discuss the grievance with the Association or employ the four step grievance procedure in the CBA, the Board wrote:
In granting collective bargaining rights to policemen and firemen in Section 1 of Act 111, the legislature expressly stated that they “shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances.” Clearly the Act 111 employer has a corresponding duty to discuss employe grievances with their representative where, as here, the collective bargaining agreement contains a grievance procedure.
We must reject the Township’s invitation to interpret the collective bargaining agreement and determine whether Schrum’s termination falls within the scope of the grievance procedure. As discussed by the hearing examiner, it is not the Board’s role to determine the scope of the grievance procedure. Rather, that is the function of an arbitrator, at least in the first instance, Bald Eagle, [499 Pa. 62, 451 A.2d 671 (1982),]; East Pennsboro [Area School District v. Commonwealth], [78 Pa. Cmwlth. 301, 467 A.2d 1356 (1983) ].
*605We emphasize that we are not deciding whether or not Schrum’s termination falls within the scope of the grievance procedure.... If the Township has a good faith belief that Schrum’s termination is beyond the scope of the grievance procedure, it may state that position in responding to the grievance but may not flatly refuse to process the grievance. Otherwise, the employer could prevent the union from ever receiving an arbitrator’s ruling on arbitrability by simply refusing to process the grievance at an earlier stage of the grievance procedure.
(R.R. at 63a-64a.) (Emphasis added.)
That final order of the Board was never appealed by the Township, and the Township proceeded to arbitration before Arbitrator Kathleen A. Davis on February 6, 1994, on the issue of arbitrability. On June 12, 1994, Arbitrator Davis entered an award finding that the Township was obligated to provide the Association with access to the grievance resolution procedure contained in the 1990-1992 CBA and failing resolution of the grievance through that procedure, the parties were then obligated to farther proceed with final binding arbitration on the substantive issue of whether Officer Schrum was covered as a full-time police officer under the terms of the 1990-1992 CBA.6
The Township did then proceed to engage in the grievance procedure through step four, which resulted in the Township’s Board of Supervisors rejecting the Schrum grievance. The Association notified the Township on December 21, 1995, of its intent to proceed further with binding arbitration. The Township, by letter dated December 26, 1995, refused to appoint an arbitrator, stating that the decision of the Supervisors was final and binding under the CBA. The Association then filed, for the second time, unfair labor practice charges with the Board.
Although it is these charges which form the basis for the present appeal, the fact remains that there is presently extant a final determination by the Board, entered on May 11, 1994, and unappealed by the Township, which ordered the Township to submit the issue of arbitrability to arbitration. The Township complied with that order and that arbitration resulted in an arbitrator’s award on June 12, 1994, which held that “the only choice to resolve the dispute if the Association chooses to go further would be arbitration. The PLRB directs it and the Township has apparently agreed to comply.” (R.R. at 60a.) Therefore, in my view, the Township’s present refusal to proceed to arbitration is in clear violation of the Board’s first order of *606May 11, 1994, and would be fully enforceable by the Association under the holding of Pottstown Police Officers’ Association v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 160 Pa.Cmwlth. 87, 634 A.2d 711 (1993) (en banc). In Pottstown, we held that the Board had jurisdiction to enforce a determination that an employer’s refusal to comply with a dispute resolution is an unfair labor practice. Such a ruling would be completely independent of the present final order of the Board in this appeal, which, again, orders the Township to submit Officer Schrum’s discharge to final binding arbitration.
Regarding the merits of the present appeal itself, I respectfully disagree with the majority that the Supreme Court has not held that arbitration is the only method allowable within the framework of Act 111 to settle disputes and grievances over discipline.
The issue in Chirico v. Board of Supervisors for Newton Township, 504 Pa. 71, 470 A.2d 470 (1983), concerned a dispute over the interpretation of a provision in an existing collective bargaining agreement. Such a dispute is designated a “grievance” and must be submitted to “grievance arbitration,” as contrasted with “interest arbitration,” which would involve a dispute over the terms of the collective bargaining agreement itself, and must be submitted to interest arbitration. See Township of Moon, 508 Pa. at 501 n. 5, 498 A.2d at 1308 n. 5.
There is another type of grievance arbitration, however, involving disputes over the disciplining of police officers and firefighters, which type of grievance is the predicate cause of this appeal. This type of a dispute results in no less of a grievance, because of its nature, than a dispute over the interpretation of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement, and nowhere in either our Constitution or Act 111 did the constitutional authors or the General Assembly distinguish one type of grievance from any other type of grievance. Article 3, Section 31 of our Constitution provides:
The General Assembly may enact laws which provide that the findings of panels or commissions, selected and acting in accordance with law for the adjustment or settlement of grievances or disputes or for collective bargaining between policemen and firemen and them public employers shall be binding on all parties
Pa. Const., art. 3, § 21 (emphasis added).
Under that constitutional authority, the General Assembly enacted Act 111 in 1968, which provides in Section 1, 43 P.S. § 217.1, that police officers and firefights “shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act.” Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court, which has never made a distinction between one type of grievance and another, wrote in Chirico:
Act 111 does not set forth the specific mechanism by which grievance, as compared with interest, disputes are to be arbitrated. We acknowledge it is clearly inadequate to recognize a right “to a settlement of grievances or disputes,” while failing to provide any method for the implementation of those rights. This obvious vacuum must not be countenanced. Yet resort to the courts to meet this need would contravene the strong affirmance of the use of non-adversarial methods for the resolution of disputes between governmental employers and police and firemen embodied in section two of the Act.
First, Act 111 specifically avoids the use of the courts for dispute resolution. This policy is so strong that section seven of the Act, 43 P.S. [§]217.7, provides for binding arbitration and contains the unique provision that “[n]o appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.” Thus the only method for settling grievance disputes allowable within the framework of Act 111 is arbitration. This objective would be completely frustrated if we were to superimpose, by judicial fiat, a layer of court intervention.
Id. at 78-79, 470 A.2d at 474-75 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
There is, in my view at least, the same strong public policy reasons, and possibly more, to support a procedure for the swift resolution of disputes over discipline as there are for the swift resolution of interpretation of the terms of some provision in a collective *607bargaining agreement, for example, “vacation week.” Chineo.
The majority dismisses the clear and forceful language of the Supreme Court in Chirico by concluding that:
It is apparent that Section 1 [of Act 111] does not express the same clear mandate for grievance arbitration [as is] expressed in Act 195.
... This Court ... does not read Chirico so broadly, specifically where the language of Act 111 itself sets forth no such mandate.
(Maj. op. at. 601-02.) These are the very arguments (that, there is no explicit mandate in Act 111 to arbitrate grievances) that the appellants argued in Township of Moon, and which the Supreme Court rejected:
Appellant contends that Act 111 is limited to “interest” arbitration and does not permit the use of “grievance” or contract arbitration between the public employer and police and fire personnel in the resolution of disputes that may arise under the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement. This contention is premised upon the fact that Act 111 expressly provides for interest arbitration. See 43 P.S. § 217.4. Act 111 does not contain any express provision authorizing the arbitration procedure set forth in section 4, 43 P.S. § 217.4, to be used to resolve grievances that might arise under a collective bargaining agreement. Thus appellant states that this absence of an express authorization represents a legislative intent not to provide binding arbitration as a means for resolution of disputes as to the interpretations of the teims of the contract. In support of this position appellant notes the fact [that] the Public Employe Relation Act, Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, § 101, 43 P.S. § 1101.101 et seq. (hereinafter “Act 195”), specifically provides for grievance arbitration as indicative of a legislative awareness of the distinction between the two types of arbitration procedures and as further evidence of a deliberate legislative judgment to deny grievance arbitration between public employers and police and fire personnel.
Id. at 501, 498 A.2d at 1308.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument and held:
Thus the constitutional predicate for Act 111 expressly provides for binding resolution of grievances or disputes as well as for collective bargaining. Moreover, as previously noted[,] section 1 of Act 111 in setting forth the intended scope of that legislation also expressly stated that police and fire personnel “shall have the right to” settlement of their grievances or disputes. The mere fact that the arbitration procedure is set forth in the context of an impasse does not warrant the inference that the concept of binding arbitration was to be limited to the resolution of contract negotiation difficulties. To do so would render meaningless section l’s assurance that the resolution of grievances and disputes comprised part of the subject matter to be addressed in the Act. Further, section 1 unquestionably provides the right to an adjustment of grievances and disputes under the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement. To conclude that the arbitration procedure was not intended to cover grievance and dispute resolutions creates a light without providing a remedy for its enforcement.
Id. at 505, 498 A.2d at 1310.
The third case authority upon which the Board relied to conclude that Act 111 contains an implicit statutory mandate for grievance arbitration over discipline was Upper Providence Township v. Buggy, 100 Pa. Cmwlth. 389, 514 A.2d 991 (1986). The majority distinguishes this case, as it does Chirico and Township of Moon, by stating that a “[r]eview of these decisions demonstrates that the question of whether Act 111 contains a statutory mandate for grievance arbitration was not addressed by either the Supreme Court or this Court.” (Slip op. at 6.) What is meant, of course, is grievance arbitration over a disciplinary dispute, and, in that context, I would agree that neither Buggy, nor Chirico, nor Township of Moon concerned disciplinary grievances.
*608All three did, however, involve the arbitration of grievances over the interpretation of a particular provision in an arbitration award or a collective bargaining agreement — specifically, the level of wages in Buggy, the inclusion of a provision for binding grievance arbitration in Township of Moon, and the meaning of the term “vacation week” in Chineo. Although I agree that Act 111 does not provide an explicit mandate for the arbitration of any grievance, the Supreme Court and this Court has filled in this “obvious vacuum”7 and held that binding arbitration must be employed in disputes over “grievances.” Neither Court made any distinction between grievances over the interpretation of the provisions of an agreement, which is a “grievance,” and a dispute over the discipline of a police officer, which is likewise a “grievance.” I cannot agree, therefore, that there is a distinction, and both types of grievances are within the implicit mandate that the dispute must be submitted to final binding arbitration.
While the majority opinion states that the “Supreme Court has held simply that Act 111 authorizes grievance arbitration, Chirico; Moon; Betancourt,” (maj. op. at 601) (emphasis added), I believe it is inescapable that the Supreme Court has mandated arbitration. To repeat from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Chirico: “Thus the only method for settling grievance disputes allowable within the framework of Act 111 is arbitration.” Chirico, 504 Pa. at 79, 470 A.2d at 475.
Lastly, I agree with the majority that West Lampeter Township v. Police Officers of West Lampeter Township, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 226, 598 A.2d 1049 (1991), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 531 Pa. 658, 613 A.2d 562 (1992), may be distinguished from the facts presented in this appeal, because the collective bargaining agreement in West Lampeter stated explicitly that “[t]his decision shall be final,” when referring to the final decision of the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors resolving the grievance. It is important to note, however, and pertinent to our deliberations in this appeal, that, although the grievance arbitration in West Lampeter involved the suspension and discipline of a police officer and hence was a disciplinary grievance,8 the term “grievance” in that collective bargaining agreement was defined as follows:
A grievance is hereby defined as a claim or complaint by a member of the bargaining unit regarding the meaning, interpretation or application of any provision of this contract.
West Lampeter, 598 A.2d at 1049. Clearly, therefore, although not specifically included in the definition of a grievance, the dispute over the discipline of Officer McCord in West Lampeter was grieved, and the West Lampeter Court held only that final arbitration was excluded because of the specific agreement of the parties, i.e., that the decision of the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors would be final. The West Lampeter Court did not hold that Chirico, Township of Moon, and Buggy were not controlling because the collective bargaining agreement and Act 111 did not provide for a grievance procedure. The holding of the Court was just the opposite, that is, that there was no “obvious vacuum,” because the parties themselves specifically had agreed that there would not be a final arbitration to settle the dispute.
Therefore, in my view, West Lampeter supports the position of the Board in the resolution of this appeal, and I believe that the Board’s argument that we should reconsider and overrule that decision is misplaced. In its brief the Board argues, succinctly, that the duty to arbitrate grievance and interest disputes is an extension of the statutory obligation to collectively bargain in good faith and that a violation of that obligation is an unfair labor practice. I would not disagree with that statement, but the Board advances this reason, i.e., a statutory mandate, as the *609sole reason to overrule West Lampeter, concluding implicitly that any agreement to the contrary of that public policy would be void as against public policy. However, there are some circumstances and limited exceptions to that public policy that the Supreme Court has permitted, notably, that, although an arbitration award may not mandate that a governing body carry out an illegal act, City of Washington v. Police Department of Washington, 436 Pa. 168, 259 A.2d 437 (1969), a governing body, in limited circumstances, may agree to such acts and be prevented on principles of estoppel from avoiding those otherwise “illegal” provisions. Fraternal Order of Police v. Hickey, 499 Pa. 194, 452 A.2d 1005 (1982); Grottenthaler v. Pennsylvania State Police, 488 Pa. 19, 410 A.2d 806 (1980). See also Township of Moon, where an Act 111 interest arbitration panel included in the award a provision for “binding” grievance arbitration as provided for in the Uniform Arbitration Act. Id. at 499 n. 2, 498 A.2d at 1307 n. 2. The Uniform Arbitration Act, however, contrary to the judicial scope of review under Act 111,9 provides for judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision under a judgment N.O.V. standard. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2).
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Board.

. Act of June 1, 1937, P.L. 1168, as amended, 43 P.S. § 211.6(1)(a) and (e).

. Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-.10.

. The Board found this as a fact and the Township does not disagree that Officer Schrum’s probationary period was for one year. (Township's brief page 4.) However, the Township’s brief further asserts that, because Schrum was only a probationary officer, he was not covered under the provisions of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and, therefore, was not entitled to grieve his dispute as the grievance procedure only applied to "full-time officers." Of course the Township's argument in this respect is self-proving, because whether Schrum was or was not an "officer” under the provisions of the 1990-1992 CBA is a legal conclusion disputed by the parties. The 1990-1992 CBA covered “all full-time police officers holding the rank of Sergeant and below” and defines "officer” in Article XX, Section 1 of the CBA as any "full-time member of the Upper Makefield Township Police Department holding the rank of Sergeant or below .... ” with certain exceptions, like the Chief of Police, which are not pertinent here. Officer Schrum was a full-time police officer of the Department, even though he was only a probationary officer; hence the dispute.

. See supra footnote 3.

. While initially there was a question regarding which CBA was applicable to the Schrum grievance, the 1990-1992 agreement or the 1992-1994 agreement, the parties stipulated during the subsequent arbitration hearing on February 6, 1994 that the 1990-1992 contract was the applicable and controlling document. Although the 1992-1994 CBA was effective from January 1, 1992 to January 1, 1994, and Officer Schrum was discharged on July 15, 1992, the subsequent 1992-1994 interest arbitration award was not effective until it was awarded by Arbitrator DiLauro on March 17, 1993. Interestingly enough, that arbitration award provided both a grievance and an arbitration procedure. See Arbitrator Davis' award, dated June 2, 1994, pp. 2, 10; R.R. 50(a), 58(a).

. The arbitration award states:
The Township argues that even if the Grievant possesses the right to engage in [the]grievance procedure, he is limited to the procedure as outlined in the Agreement. Directing the parties to arbitration would add a fifth step beyond the scope of the negotiated agreement. Whereas this argument is appropriate in the private sector, the policy considerations that underwrite public employment law require that there be some means to enforce Act 111’s mandate that police and firefighters have some mechanism to resolve disputes and grievances. That mechanism is grievance and arbitration. In Township of Moon v. Police Officers of Township of Moon, [508 Pa. 495,] 498 A.2d 1305 (1985), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined the legislative intent behind Act Ill’s key language concerning disputes: "... the right to adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this Act.” 43 P.S. [§ ]217.1. The Court held that the 1967 Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article III, Section 31 explicitly provided for binding arbitration for the resolution of disputes for police and firefighters. Id. [498 A.2d] at 1310. Further, the Court goes on to state that binding arbitration was not limited to contract negotiation difficulties: "[T]o conclude that the arbitration procedure was not intended to cover grievance and dispute resolutions creates a right without providing a remedy for its enforcement.” Id. [498 A.2d] at 1310. Similarly in this case, the imposition of the last step of the grievance procedure as the final opportunity to resolve the grievance also creates a right without enforcement.
Despite the Township’s opposition to arbitration here, in this case if the grievance is not settled during the grievance process, the only choice to resolve the dispute if the Association chooses to go further would be arbitration. The PLRB Order directs it and the Township has apparently agreed to comply.
(R.R. 59a-60a.) (Emphasis added.) On January 11, 1995, the Township filed, in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, a petition to vacate the arbitration award and, on October 3, 1996, Common Pleas dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. No appeal has been taken from that final judgment.

. Chirico, 504 Pa. at 79, 470 A.2d at 474.

. Sergeant William McCord of the West Lampeter police department was given a ten day suspension for intemperance and conduct unbecoming an officer, when, during his daughter’s birthday party with approximately 200 guests present and outside a home in a residential neighborhood, he became visibly intoxicated and used his authority and profane language to interfere with the efforts of the West Lampeter and State police to terminate the noise and quell a disturbance at the party.

. See Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Association (Betancourt), 540 Pa. 66, 656 A.2d 83 (1995).