Court Opinion

ID: 9828901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:50:01.291092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:54.229667
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
After further consideration, we have concluded that tbe record before us does not present a case coming within tbe rule of law discussed in tbe original opinion. Tbe judgment of tbe trial court was reversed upon tbe assumption that tbe appellant pleaded and relied upon a contract wbicb bad been purged of its legal impurity; that while two considerations may have entered into tbe original obligation, one lawful and tbe other unlawful, tbe .unlawful part bad been eliminated, and only that which-was lawful remained. A more careful inquiry into tbe evidence has convinced us that sucb an assumption is not sustained when tbe facts found by tbe jury are supplemented by those wbicb, tbe judgment implies, must have been found by tbe trial court. ' According to tbe finding of the jury, the appellant and Land contracted and agreed that the territory in wbicb Land was to sell tbe goods bought from tbe appellant was to be restricted. Tbe evidence was sucb as to warrant the court in further concluding that tbe appellant also agreed not to sell goods to any other dealer .in tbe territory to which Land was restricted. If that be true, then we have a “combination” between appellant and Land, to eliminate competition, wbicb falls clearly within tbe condemnation of tbe Texas antitrust statute (Acts 1903, p. 119). Land, expressly or impliedly, agreed to do two things in order to secure tbe goods. One was to pay tbe purchase price, and the other to sell tbe goods only to people within bis allotted territory. Likewise tbe appellant expressly *191or impliedly agreed to do two things; one to sell the goods to Land at wholesale prices, and the other' not to sell similar goods to any competitor in the territory allotted to Land; The inference is just as strong that the appellant agreed to protect Land from competition by other .salesmen as it is that Land agreed not to compete with appellant’s salesmen in other territory. That such a “combination” existed is amply supported by legitimate deductions from the undisputed facts. It is not required, in order to render the principal contract void, that the unlawful “combination” be disclosed by the terms of that contract. It is sufficient if the contract is a part of a covert scheme to conduct a business in an unlawful manner. If Land’s promise to pay the purchase price of the goods was based alone upon the consideration found in the value of the goods, then his promise made after the unlawful enterprise had ended, and the scheme abandoned, might create an enforceable contract because of the moral obligation resting upon Land to pay for the benefits he had received. But if, as we now conclude is the true situation, his promise was based not only upon the consideration furnished by the value of the goods, but upon the further consideration that the appellant would not sell similar goods to a competitor in that territory, the new promise still contains a part of the original taint. If, at the time Land received the goods, he had given his promissory notes for the purchase price, and after the dealings had ended had renewed the debt by giving new notes based upon the old consideration, the new notes would be only an extension of a debt unenforceable because based upon an unlawful consideration. The character of this transaction is not legally different because of the form in which it is presented in the record.
We have concluded that the facts bring this case clearly within the rule announced in the following cases: Wegner Bros. v. Biering & Co., 65 Tex. 506; Reed v. Brewer, 90 Tex. 144, 37 S. W. 418; Columbia Carriage Co. v. Hatch, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 120, 47 S. W. 288.
The judgment heretofore rendered in this appeal will be set aside, and the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.