Court Opinion

ID: 9406833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-03 23:03:27.759106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:33.524599
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/3/23 Estate of Ruiz CA2/6

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

ESTATE OF VICTORIA RUIZ,                                        2d Civ. No. B321647
                                                              (Super. Ct. No. 56-2018-
   Deceased                                                   00508275-PR-LA-OXN)
______________________________                                   (Ventura County)

SARA T. HARRISON, as
Administrator of Estate,

     Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

VINCENT RUIZ BOUVET,

  Interested Party and
Appellant.

      Appellant Vincent Ruiz Bouvet (Vincent) and his three
siblings, respondent Sara T. Harrison (Sara), Annette Ruiz
(Annette) and Robert Ruiz (Robert) (collectively “siblings”)
inherited the single-family residence owned by their mother,
Victoria Ruiz (Victoria), when she died intestate in 2012.1 On the
day Victoria died, Vincent privately told each of his siblings that
Victoria had given him both the property and her savings so that
he would have a place to live. He repeated that claim to all his
siblings at the funeral home the next day.
       Vincent and Annette continue to live on the property as
they had prior to Victoria’s death. Vincent made no attempt to
secure sole ownership of the property until 2018, when Sara
brought this probate proceeding on behalf of Victoria’s estate.
Vincent then filed a separate action to quiet title based on
adverse possession, Case No. 56-2018-00515518-CU-OR-VTA
(Quiet Title Action).
       That action was tried in November 2019. At the close of
Vincent’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted Sara’s motion for
judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 631.8). It found that Vincent had
failed to meet his burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that he had given notice to the other cotenants (i.e., his
siblings) of his claim of exclusive ownership of the property. We
affirmed that decision. (Ruiz-Bouvet v. Harrison (Dec. 16, 2021,
B304805) [nonpub. opn.] (Ruiz-Bouvet I).)
       Thereafter, Sara, as the estate’s administrator, petitioned
the probate court for an order instructing her to file an unlawful
detainer action against Vincent and Annette. The court granted
the petition. Vincent, again appearing in propria persona,2
appeals that order. He principally contends the probate court
lacked jurisdiction to issue the order because the notice of the

      1  For the sake of clarity, we refer to the family members by
their first names. No disrespect is intended.
      2   Vincent is an inactive member of the State Bar.

                                  2
petition to administer Victoria’s estate was not properly
published. We affirm.
             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
        The siblings’ parents, Victoria and Vincent Canalez Ruiz,
acquired the property located at 6825 Dove Street in Ventura in
1972. Vincent Canalez Ruiz later quitclaimed the property to
Victoria, who remained the sole legal owner of the property until
her death in March 2012.
        Vincent and Annette lived with Victoria until her death.
Annette paid the monthly utility and cable TV bills and Vincent
paid $150 per month in rent. Because Victoria died intestate, the
four siblings became equal tenants in common by operation of
law. (See Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 691
[“It is . . . settled that when a decedent dies intestate, his heirs,
both known and unknown, acquire an interest in his estate by
operation of law at the moment of death”].) Thus, as of the date
of Victoria’s death, each sibling owned an equal one-quarter
share of the property as tenants in common.
        When Sara petitioned for administration of Victoria’s
estate, she gave notice to her siblings as required by statute. The
probate court issued letters of administration and appointed Sara
as the administrator.
        Vincent then filed the Quiet Title Action. Because Vincent
and his siblings were cotenants as a matter of law, he had to
prove their ouster from the property by clear and convincing
evidence. He failed to do so. The trial court found that “Vincent’s
testimony that he told his siblings he was claiming sole
ownership to the exclusion of their rights as co-tenants lacks

      Portions of this section are taken from our prior opinion in
      3

Ruiz-Bouvet I, supra, B304805.

                                  3
credibility and does not rise [to] the level of clear and convincing
evidence.” We upheld this decision, concluding that
“[s]ubstantial evidence supports [the] trial court’s finding that
‘[o]ther than an oral statement to his siblings shortly after his
mother’s death, Vincent did not signal in any manner the open
hostility and exclusivity of [his] occupation of the property to the
extent of an ouster of the other cotenants.’” (Ruiz-Bouvet I,
supra, B304805.)
       Thereafter, the probate court issued an Order of
Instructions directing Sara, as the estate administrator, to file
the unlawful detainer action against Vincent and Annette.
Vincent challenges that order.
                            DISCUSSION
                         Standard of Review
       “‘In view of the varied nature of the matters which may be
freely brought before the probate court [through] a petition for
instructions, the action of the court with respect thereto should
be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]”
(Estate of Denton (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1070, 1075.) Under this
standard, “we will only interfere with [the probate court’s] ruling
if we find that under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in
support of the [probate] court’s action, no judge reasonably could
have reached the challenged result.” (Estate of Billings (1991)
228 Cal.App.3d 426, 430.)
          Vincent has Implicitly Conceded the Validity of All
     But One of the Arguments Raised in the Respondent’s Brief
       Vincent’s 44-page opening brief raises several distinct
arguments, which Sara addresses in her brief. Vincent’s 37-page
reply responds only to the arguments on a single issue: whether
the publication of the notice of the probate petition was defective.

                                 4
An appellant’s failure to respond to an argument raised in the
respondent’s brief typically is deemed an implicit concession of
the argument’s validity. (Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89-90 [appellants made implicit concession by
“failing to respond in their reply brief to the [respondent’s]
argument on th[at] point”]; Reygoza v. Superior Court (1991) 230
Cal.App.3d 514, 519 & fn. 4 [same].)
       But even if Vincent had preserved these arguments for
appeal, he would not prevail. In addition to the publication issue,
Vincent contends the judgment in the Quiet Title Action is void
on its face and fails to support the Order for Instructions; the
civil court failed to hold the requisite default prove-up hearing
before issuing the judgment in the Quiet Title Action; Code of
Civil Procedure section 764.010 prohibited the civil court from
adjudicating the siblings’ respective interests in the property; and
the probate court’s Order of Instructions is invalid. As we shall
explain, none of these claims has merit.
       Vincent Fails to Establish that Notice of the Petition to
      Administer Victoria’s Estate was Not Properly Published
       When a petition to administer an estate is filed, Probate
Code section 81204 requires that notice of the hearing on the
petition “be published before the hearing in the manner provided
in this article.” Section 8121 states that notice of the hearing
must be published three times, at least 15 days before the
hearing, in a newspaper of general circulation in the city where
the decedent resided at the time of death.
       The probate court has no authority to entertain the petition
unless the publication requirement is satisfied. Section 8124

      4Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to
the Probate Code.

                                 5
provides: “A petition for administration of a decedent’s estate
shall not be heard by the court unless an affidavit showing due
publication of the notice of hearing has been filed with the court.
The affidavit shall contain a copy of the notice and state the date
of its publication.” (See Estate of Buckley (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d
434, 448.)
       Here, the Order of Instructions confirms that “[n]otice to
creditors was given by publication of the Notice of Petition to
Administer the Estate, pursuant to . . . §§ 8120 and 8121.
Publication was made in the Tri-County Sentry, a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Ventura, the city where the
Decedent resided at the time of her death. Publication occurred
on March 2, March 9, and March 16, 2018. The Affidavit of
Publication, showing such publication of Notice in the manner
and form required by law, was filed within thirty days after
completion of the publication, on March 19, 2018. More than four
months have elapsed since the issuance of Petitioner’s Letters
Testamentary, and since the first publication of the Notice to
creditors. All known and reasonably ascertainable creditors
described in . . . §9050 have received the notice described in . . .
§9054. The time for filing claims has expired . . . .”
       Vincent argues the probate court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because the statutory publication requirements were
not satisfied. He claims Sara did not establish that notice of the
probate hearing was published “in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city where the decedent resided at the time of
death.” (§ 8121, subd. (b).)
       Trial courts have authority to adjudicate whether a
newspaper qualifies as a “‘newspaper of general circulation’” in a
particular jurisdiction. (Gov. Code, §§ 6000, 6008; In re

                                 6
Establishment of Eureka Reporter (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 891,
897, fn. 4.) On July 12, 1993, the Ventura County Superior Court
decreed “that [the] Tri-County [Sentry] Newspaper is a
newspaper of general circulation within the intent and meaning
of Government Code section 6000.” That order was modified on
November 4, 1999 and December 18, 2020 to reflect that the Tri-
County Sentry is a newspaper of general circulation for specific
cities within Ventura County, including “Ventura, Moorpark,
Simi Valley, Thousand Oaks, Camarillo, Ojai, Fillmore, Santa
Paula, and Port Hueneme.”5 (Italics added.)
       In his reply brief, Vincent argues for the first time that the
Ventura County Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to modify the
1993 order because notice of the proposed 1999 and 2020
modifications was not published pursuant to Government Code
section 6020. Absent good cause, we do not consider points raised
for the first time in the reply brief. (Campos v. Anderson (1997)
57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3.) Not only has Vincent failed to
demonstrate good cause, but he also has not overcome the
presumption “that official duties have been regularly performed
[by trial judges].” (Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
570, 575; see Evid. Code, § 664.) Vincent assumes the 1999 and
2020 modification orders would have reflected publication if it
had indeed occurred, but “‘the absence of a recital that
jurisdictional requisites were met does not produce a judgment
void on its face. [Citations.] To the contrary, all presumptions

      5We grant Sara’s unopposed request, filed on February 27,
2023, to take judicial notice of the judgments and orders issued
by the Ventura County Superior Court determining that the Tri-
County Sentry is a newspaper of general circulation.

                                 7
favor the judgment. [Citations.] If the invalidity does not appear
on the face of the record, it will be presumed that what ought to
have been done was not only done but rightly done.’ [Citation.]”
(Elena S., at p. 575.) We are bound by this presumption.
           The Issue of Whether the Quiet Title Judgment
            is Void on Its Face is Not Properly Before Us
       As previously discussed, the trial court entered judgment
against Vincent in the Quiet Title Action, which we affirmed on
appeal. (Ruiz-Bouvet I, supra, B304805.) Vincent now seeks to
collaterally attack that judgment as “void on its face.” “‘“A
judgment or order is said to be void on its face when the
invalidity is apparent upon an inspection of the judgment-roll.”’”
(Calvert v. Al Binali (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 960.)
       Vincent did not submit the judgment-roll with his opening
brief. After Sara filed her brief, Vincent requested that we take
judicial notice of his version of the judgment-roll.
       Although an argument that a judgment is void on its face
can be reviewed for the first time on appeal, we decline to do so.
(See Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 175, 185.) This
is not Vincent’s first appeal. Vincent challenged the Quiet Title
judgment on various grounds in his prior appeal. (Ruiz-Bouvet I,
supra, B304805.) Having failed to argue that the judgment was
void on its face, and providing no good cause for his delay,
Vincent is precluded from raising the issue now.6 (See Rincon EV

      6We therefore deny Vincent’s request, filed on March 15,
2023, to take judicial notice of the trial court’s judgment-roll
records in the Quiet Title Action, but grant his unopposed
request to take judicial notice of the records from his earlier
appeal (No. B304805).

                                8
Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th
988, 1001-1004 (Rincon EV Realty) [appellants could not raise
new issues in second appeal that they could have raised in first
appeal].)
            Vincent Improperly Raises Issues Concerning His
                  Pending Third Appeal (No. B325258)
      Because defaults were entered against Robert and Annette
in the Quiet Title Action, judgment was entered only as to Sara
individually and as the estate administrator. After we affirmed
that judgment, the trial court issued an order to show cause why
judgment should not be entered in favor of the two defaulting
defendants.
      Following briefing, the trial court entered judgment in
favor of Robert and Annette. Citing Code of Civil Procedure
section 579, the one final judgment rule and the law of the case
doctrine, the court concluded it was barred “from doing anything
other than entering judgment against Vincent and in favor of
Annette and Robert to the same extent as the Judgment entered
by the Court on December 12, 2019.”7 Vincent has appealed that
decision (No. B325258).
      To the extent Vincent raises arguments relating to that
appeal, which has yet to be briefed, we decline to address them.
We also do not reach his claims that the trial court failed to hold
the requisite default prove-up hearing before issuing the Quiet

      7  We take judicial notice of the trial court’s minute order
dated October 26, 2022 regarding the “Court’s Order to Show
Cause (CCM) Why Judgment Should Not Be Entered in Favor of
Defaulted Defendants Ruiz and Against Plaintiff,” which was
filed in Vincent’s third appeal (No. B325258) on January 10,
2023. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)

                                 9
Title judgment and improperly adjudicated the siblings’
respective interests in the property. Those issues could have
been raised in Vincent’s appeal from the Quiet Title judgment
and thus are not reviewable here. (Rincon EV Realty, supra, 43
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1001-1004; Global Protein Products, Inc. v. Le
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 352, 369.)
       In sum, Vincent has failed to demonstrate an abuse of
judicial discretion. His arguments either lack merit or were
waived.
                          DISPOSITION
       The judgment (Order Instructing Administrator to File
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer) is affirmed. Sara shall recover
her costs on appeal.
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    CODY, J.
We concur:

     GILBERT, P. J.

     YEGAN, J.

                               10
                      Roger L. Lund, Judge
                Superior Court County of Ventura
                 ______________________________

     Vincent A. Ruiz, Jr., in pro. per., for Interested Party and
Appellant.
     Arnold Larochelle Mathews VanConas & Zirbel, Susan L.
McCarthy, for Petitioner and Respondent.

                                11