Court Opinion

ID: 9830357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:08:42.467444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:20.115495
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Plaintiff in error has filed a motion for rehearing herein in which it urges that, if the judgment of the trial court is not reversed, it should at least be reformed so as to permit a recovery by the Elevator Company of the insurance on the machinery only, and, as thus reformed, be affirmed. This contention is based upon the opinions of section A of the Commission of Appeals in the companion cases of the German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Fort Worth Grain & Elevator Co., 269 S. W. 430, and the Home Insurance Co. v. Fort Worth Grain & Elevator Co., 269 S. W. 432, rendered in said causes on March 11, 1925, and not yet [officially] reported. The opinions of the Courts of Civil Appeals in those cases appear in 257 S. W. 273, and in 262 S. W. 870, respectively. In those eases the Commission of Appeals reformed and affirmed the judgments of the trial courts so as to- allow recovery of insurance on the machinery only. As to the insurance of the stock of goods, recovery was denied. In doing so, Judge Bishop of the Commission used the following language:
“While, as stated, there is evidence- showing the adjuster was informed and knew that there had been a transfer of interest in violation of the terms of the policy, and that section 3 of the record warranty clause had not been complied with, there is no evidence to indicate that either the adjuster or the insurance company knew that sections 1 and 2 of the reeord warranty clause had not been complied with.
“The burden is on the insured to show that the insurance company knew .the facts which would entitle it to insist on forfeiture before ■they could claim that its right to so insist was waived. Here are shown four grounds, on each of which the insurance company, if not estop-*261ped, could insist on forfeiture. Its adjuster had full knowledge of two of these grounds, and so knowing, Ms assurance given the insured, under the facts in evidence, would estop his principal from insisting on forfeiture by reason of these two known grounds. But there were two other grounds upon which it could rely for forfeiture, of which neither it nor its adjuster was aware at the time the insured was led to believe the policy would be paid. It could not, under this state of facts, be held to have waived, nor be estopped from asserting, a ground of forfeiture of which it was ignorant.”
Section 1 of the record warranty clause provided that a complete itemized inventory of stock must be taken at least once in each calendar year, and, if none had been made within 12 months prior to issuance of policy, then that same be made within 30 days thereafter, etc. Section 2 provided that insured must prepare and keep a set of books showing all business, transacted, including all purchases, sales, and shipments, both for cash and on credit. The same or similar provisions appear in the policy sued upon in the instant case.
We have no way of ascertaining just to what extent the evidence in the two companion cases above referred to is identical with or similar to that in the case before us. Judge Bishop found that there was “no evidence to indicate that either the adjuster or the insurance company knew that sections 1 and 2” had not been complied with. Clearly then those' cases are not conclusive of the case before us, unless the evidence is likewise lacking in the instant case on the same issue.
In this case the question as to whether the insured had failed to comply with sections 1 and 2 of the policy, or, if it had not, whether the Insurance Company or its adjuster had knowledge of such failure prior to the date of the alleged waiver, was not submitted to the jury. In the absence of that, it will be presumed that the trial court’s finding on all necessary issues was such as to support the judgment. Was there any evidence to sustain such finding? J. ft. Stitt testified that, on account of operating on small capital, he took an inventory of the stock practically every day and kept same in his desk. He also testified in detail as to how books, tickets, and slips were kept which reflected with reasonable accuracy the stocks coming into and going out of the place of business. The trial court may have concluded, after hearing all this evidence, that the insured had substantially complied with sections 1 and 2 of the policy. But, whether the insured had done so or not, it was incumbent upon the Insurance Company to show a noncompliance before it was entitled to a forfeiture. Buckalew knew that part of the books and invoices had been destroyed, and that those saved were insufficient to show the loss. He went carefully through everything that was preserved, first with Eghn’s daughter, who was hostile to the insured, then with the bookkeeper and with Stitt. Everything was explained to him in detail, and Stitt twice subjected himself to a sworn examination. Stitt testified that the next morning after the fire Buckalew told him “that he represented the insurance companies as adjuster and he wanted to arrive at the amount of our loss, and he asked me about our books, invoices, and so forth.” Stitt further testified that, on the same occasion, “I explained to him that we did not have a complete- set of invoices of our stock' of merchandise on hand, nor an inventory.”
We think it reasonably appears, therefore, that instead of Buckalew not knowing that sections 1 and 2 of the record warranty clause of the policy had not been complied with, if, in fact, they had not,' h'e was informed of practically everything that had or had not been done, and knew on December 19, 1914, when he agreed to pay the policy, of whatever breach of those sections the insured had been guilty. So instead of there being “no evidence” in the instant case of facts on which waiver could be predicated, as was found to obtain in the two companion cases recently decided and above referred to, we think there' was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of waiver. This distinguishes the case before us from those relied upon by plaintiff in error in its motion for rehearing.
The motion is accordingly overruled.
Overruled.