Court Opinion

ID: 9534254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:37:56.128941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:53.969830
License: Public Domain

MACK, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
The majority is silent with respect to an entire body of case law from this court finding plain error in circumstances identical to those found in this case. Since in my view this case law mandates reversal here, I must dissent.
Two .38 caliber weapons are involved in this case: a Smith & Wesson service revolver, and a Charter Arms five-shot revolver. The majority admits that even though appellant was charged with a single count of each weapons offense — carrying a pistol without a license and possession of an unregistered firearm1 — each count in *1033effect charged him with unlawfully carrying or possessing both pistols. The government introduced evidence of possession of both guns in support of each charge, and the trial court instructed the jury on the different elements of each offense as they applied to each gun and on appellant’s separate defenses applicable to the separate charges as to each gun. We have held that when “each count contain[s] a charge with respect to two guns,” the trial court must give the jury a special verdict form to determine whether, as to each charge, appellant “unlawfully carried or possessed one or the other gun, or both.” A special verdict form is necessary in these circumstances in order “to assure a conviction only if there was a unanimous verdict as to a particular gun.” Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485, 491 & n. 6 (D.C.1985). The general verdict returned by the jury in this case encompasses within it the possibility that half the jury found appellant guilty of carrying the Smith & Wesson revolver without a license and without registration, and the other half found appellant guilty of possessing the Charter Arms pistol without a license and without registration.
Even prior to Logan, we have held repeatedly that where one count encompasses more than one incident — here, more than one gun — the trial court has a duty to instruct the jurors not only that their verdict must be unanimous as to that count, but that it must be unanimous as to each incident. Davis v. United States, 448 A.2d 242, 243 (D.C.1982); Hack v. United States, 445 A.2d 634, 641 (D.C.1982); Hawkins v. United States, 434 A.2d 446, 449 (D.C.1981); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 369-70 (D.C.1979); Shelton v. United States, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 36, 165 F.2d 241, 245 (1947). The majority makes much of the fact that the trial court instructed the jury that its verdict must be “unanimous.” It overlooks the fact that the court told the jury that its verdict had to be unanimous only as to each count, not as to each gun. The court said, “There are three offenses charged, and with respect to each of them you have to reach a verdict of guilty or not guilty. And each of those verdicts must be unanimous.” Of course, although there were three counts in the information, since there were two guns involved in each count the instruction did nothing to insure against a nonunanimous verdict.
The court did tell the jury that two guns were involved in the case. Its instruction on this score, however, was hopelessly confused:
In connection with those offense[s], you must bear in mind that there are two guns, and that there is evidence relating individually to each gun. So far as the service revolver, of course, the regulations, the law, the regulations regarding special police officer relate to those, to that service revolver. And, of course, if you find that under the evidence that the defendant fit into the [special police officer] exception ..., if you find that exception is applicable in this case, of course then he wouldn’t have the right to have his service revolver. Of course, there would be — the offense of unregistered gun and unregistered ammunition wouldn’t be applicable as to that gun if you make that finding. But those regulations are applicable to the service re*1034volver and not the other weapon in the case. [Emphasis added.]
Not only does this instruction not inform the jury that its verdict as to each gun must be unanimous, it erroneously tells the jury (assuming the accuracy of the transcript) to find appellant guilty as charged even if it credits his defense, and finds that he was acting at the time of the offense as a special police officer.
The majority finds no plain error under the circumstances of this case, again overlooking the fact that the possibility of a conviction based on less than a unanimous jury vote implicates the Sixth Amendment and therefore affects substantial rights. We have repeatedly found plain error in identical or similar circumstances. Davis, 448 A.2d at 244; Hawkins, 434 A.2d at 449; Johnson, 398 A.2d at 369-70.
Ironically, the majority vacates the “convictions for possession of an unregistered firearm [the Smith & Wesson service revolver] and the ammunition for it,” ante at 1029, even though there is no way to be sure that a unanimous jury actually found appellant guilty of .these charges. The vacation of these convictions in any event does not eliminate the possibility of a non-unanimous jury verdict as to (1) carrying the Smith &. Wesson revolver without a license,' (2) carrying the Charter Arms revolver without a license, (3) possession of an unregistered Charter Arms revolver, (4) possession of ammunition for the Charter Arms revolver. The separate defenses asserted by appellant as to each revolver combined with the unclear jury instructions turn a nonunanimous verdict as to at least one of these charges into more than a possibility. Accordingly, I would reverse the convictions and order a new trial.2

. The information charged Chapman with a single count of "carrying pistol without a license," a single count of "fail to register firearm," and a single count of “ammunition violations." The government contends that our decision in Cormier v. United States, 137 A.2d 212 (D.C.1957), *1033would require it to charge appellant with a single count of carrying a pistol without a license even if 100 pistols had been recovered from his car. Without addressing the merits of this contention, I note that the government does not feel itself similarly restricted in cases of failure to register a firearm; see, e.g., Anderson v. United States, No. 83-1124 (D.C. Mar. 29, 1985) (unpublished) (appellant charged with and convicted of two counts of possession of an unregistered firearm based on the discovery of two unregistered pistols in his coat). The information here includes only one count of failure to register, mentioning only a single "pistol,” despite the fact that (1) the government intended to prove that appellant here had illegally failed to register both pistols found in his car, and (2) no legal impediment existed to clearly charging appellant with failing to register both guns. The "failure to register” count is therefore clearly duplicitous.

. In view of the disposition I would make, I do not address the issues of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel.