Court Opinion

ID: 9520597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:45:00.423867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:30.449710
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Judge
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the trial court lacked the ability to suspend Gardiner's sentence below the minimum sentence. I do not find the Model Penal Code or Hutcherson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 962 (Ind.1982), cited by the majority, to be determinative or persuasive here. In fact, Indiana courts have allowed similar relief under the habitual offender statutes. See, eg., Coble v. State, 500 N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (Ind.1986) (holding that a defendant sentenced as an habitual offender who later successfully challenges one of his predicate offenses may have his habitual offender status and sentencing enhancement vacated through post-conviction relief or a motion to correct erroneous sentence); Olinger v. State, 494 N.E.2d 310, 311 (Ind.1986); State v. Jones, 819 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied.
I would not accord Ind.Code § 35-50-2-2(b)(1) or Ind.Code § 85-50-2-1(b) such strict interpretation as to tie the trial court's hands and give the court no discretion to suspend Gardiner's minimum sentence when circumstances warrant a modification of sentence. I believe that among legislative concerns is ultimate fairness. Further, I would not let the policy of more severely punishing repeated criminal activity outweigh the public policy of rewarding good behavior subsequent to sentencing, especially where, as here, the trial court believes a reduction to be just.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.