Court Opinion

ID: 9892196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 21:00:59.134661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:46.083445
License: Public Domain

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)              1

                       ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                           _________________

                      No. 23A243 (23–411)
                           _________________

  VIVEK H. MURTHY, SURGEON GENERAL, ET AL. v.
               MISSOURI, ET AL.
                 ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
                        [October 20, 2023]

   The application for stay presented to JUSTICE ALITO and
by him referred to the Court is granted. The preliminary
injunction issued on July 4, 2023, by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Louisiana, case
No. 3:22–cv–01213, as modified by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on October 3, 2023, case
No. 23–30445, is stayed. The application for stay is also
treated as a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the petition
is granted on the questions presented in the applica-
tion. The stay shall terminate upon the sending down of
the judgment of this Court.
   JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and
JUSTICE GORSUCH join, dissenting from grant of application
for stay.
   This case concerns what two lower courts found to be a
“coordinated campaign” by high-level federal officials to
suppress the expression of disfavored views on important
public issues. Missouri v. Biden, ___ F. 4th ___, ___, 2023
WL 6425697, *27 (CA5, Oct. 3, 2023). To prevent the con-
tinuation of this campaign, these officials were enjoined
from either “coerc[ing]” social media companies to engage
in such censorship or “active[ly] control[ling]” those compa-
nies’ decisions about the content posted on their platforms.
Id., at *7, *15. Today, however, a majority of the Court,
without undertaking a full review of the record and without
2                   MURTHY v. MISSOURI

                      ALITO, J., dissenting

any explanation, suspends the effect of that injunction until
the Court completes its review of this case, an event that
may not occur until late in the spring of next year. Govern-
ment censorship of private speech is antithetical to our
democratic form of government, and therefore today’s deci-
sion is highly disturbing.
   This case began when two States, Missouri and Louisi-
ana, and various private parties filed suit alleging that pop-
ular social media companies had either blocked their use of
the companies’ platforms or had downgraded their posts on
a host of controversial subjects, including “the COVID–19
lab leak theory, pandemic lockdowns, vaccine side effects,
election fraud, and the Hunter Biden laptop story.” Id., at
*1. According to the plaintiffs, Federal Government offi-
cials “were the ones pulling the strings,” that is, these offi-
cials “ ‘coerced, threatened, and pressured [the] social-me-
dia platforms to censor [them].’ ” Ibid. (alteration in
original). Based on extensive findings of fact that spanned
82 pages, the District Court held that the plaintiffs were
likely to be able to prove their claims and were threatened
with irreparable harm, and it therefore issued a prelimi-
nary injunction against a number of Executive Branch
agencies and officials. Missouri v. Biden, ___ F. Supp. 3d
___, 2023 WL 4335270 (WD La., July 4, 2023).
   On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District
Court’s assessment of the evidence, which, in its words,
showed the existence of “a coordinated campaign” of un-
precedented “magnitude orchestrated by federal officials
that jeopardized a fundamental aspect of American life.”
Missouri v. Biden, 2023 WL 6425697, *27. The Court of
Appeals found that “the district court was correct in its as-
sessment—‘unrelenting pressure’ from certain government
officials likely ‘had the intended result of suppressing mil-
lions of protected free speech postings by American citi-
zens.’ ” Ibid.
   To stop this “campaign,” the injunction, as it now stands,
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)              3

                       ALITO, J., dissenting

prohibits the covered officials from doing two things. First,
they may not “coerce” social media platforms to make “con-
tent-moderation decisions.” Id., at *32. Second, they may
not “meaningfully contro[l]” social media platforms’ “con-
tent-moderation” efforts. Ibid. Displeased with these re-
strictions, the Government filed an emergency application
asking us to stay the effect of this injunction pending certi-
orari.
   Under a straightforward application of the test we use in
deciding whether to grant a stay, the Government’s appli-
cation should be denied. To obtain a stay pending the dis-
position of a petition for a writ of certiorari, an applicant
must show, among other things, “a likelihood that irrepara-
ble harm will result from the denial of a stay.” Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam).
A stay is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be
awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled
to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 22 (2008) (discussing the similar stand-
ard for an injunction). Thus, the Government in this case
must make a “clear showing” of irreparable harm. And to
do that, it is not enough to “simply sho[w] some ‘possibility
of irreparable injury.’ ” Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434
(2009). A mere “ ‘possibility’ standard is too lenient.” Id.,
at 435 (quoting Winter, 555 U. S., at 22). Instead, the Gov-
ernment must prove that irreparable harm is “likel[y].”
Hollingsworth, 558 U. S., at 190. Here, the Government’s
attempts to demonstrate irreparable harm do not come
close to clearing this high bar.
   Instead of providing any concrete proof that “harm is im-
minent,” White v. Florida, 458 U. S. 1301, 1302 (1982)
(Powell, J., in chambers), the Government offers a series of
hypothetical statements that a covered official might want
to make in the future and that, it thinks, might be chilled.
Application 36–38. But hypotheticals are just that—specu-
lation that the Government “may suffer irreparable harm
4                    MURTHY v. MISSOURI

                      ALITO, J., dissenting

at some point in the future,” not concrete proof. White, 458
U. S., at 1302 (emphasis added). And such speculation does
not establish irreparable harm. Nken, 556 U. S., at 434; see
also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 414, n. 5
(2013) (rejecting similar speculation as insufficient to es-
tablish an Article III standing injury).
   Moreover, it does not appear that any of the Govern-
ment’s hypothetical communications would actually be pro-
hibited by the injunction. Nor is any such example provided
by the Court’s unreasoned order. The Government claims
that the injunction might prevent “the President and the
senior officials who serve as his proxies” from “speak[ing] to
the public on matters of public concern.” Application 36;
accord, id., at 3 (suggesting that the Fifth Circuit’s decision
implicates “the use of the Office’s bully pulpit to seek to per-
suade Americans”). The President himself is not subject to
the injunction, see Missouri v. Biden, 2023 WL 6425697,
*33, and in any event, the injunction does not prevent any
Government official from speaking on any matter or from
urging any entity or person to act in accordance with the
Government’s view of responsible conduct. The injunction
applies only when the Government crosses the line and be-
gins to coerce or control others’ exercise of their free-speech
rights. Does the Government think that the First Amend-
ment allows Executive Branch officials to engage in such
conduct? Does it have plans for this to occur between now
and the time when this case is decided?
   Despite the Government’s conspicuous failure to estab-
lish a threat of irreparable harm, the majority stays the in-
junction and thus allows the defendants to persist in com-
mitting the type of First Amendment violations that the
lower courts identified. The majority takes this action in
the face of the lower courts’ detailed findings of fact. But
“[w]here an intermediate court reviews, and affirms, a trial
court’s factual findings, this Court will not ‘lightly overturn’
the concurrent findings of the two lower courts.” Easley v.
                   Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2023)              5

                       ALITO, J., dissenting

Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234 (2001); see also Glossip v. Gross,
576 U. S. 863, 882 (2015); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Products Co., 336 U. S. 271, 275 (1949). And the major-
ity suspends the relief afforded below without a word of ex-
planation.
   Applying our settled test for granting a stay, I would deny
the Government’s application, but I would specify in the or-
der that in the unlikely event that a concrete occurrence
presents a risk of irreparable harm, the Government can
apply for relief at that time, including, if necessary, by filing
an emergency application here. Such an order would fully
protect the ability of Executive Branch officials to speak out
on matters of public concern.
   At this time in the history of our country, what the Court
has done, I fear, will be seen by some as giving the Govern-
ment a green light to use heavy-handed tactics to skew the
presentation of views on the medium that increasingly dom-
inates the dissemination of news. That is most unfortu-
nate.