Court Opinion

ID: 9394148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 15:00:50.368972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.532083
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10866    Document: 27-1     Date Filed: 05/12/2023   Page: 1 of 3

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10866
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       WESLEY SORROW,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cr-00038-MTT-CHW-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10866        Document: 27-1         Date Filed: 05/12/2023        Page: 2 of 3

       2                         Opinion of the Court                      22-10866

       Before JORDAN, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Wesley Sorrow appeals his sentence of 210 months’ incar-
       ceration, following his conviction on one count of bank robbery by
       intimidation. Sorrow asserts the district court abused its discretion
       at sentencing by declining to reduce his offense level for acceptance
       of responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. After review, 1 we
       affirm.
               A defendant may receive a two-level reduction in his offense
       level if he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his
       offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). However, the commentary to the
       Sentencing Guidelines expressly provides the “adjustment is not in-
       tended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its bur-
       den of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of
       guilt.” Id., comment. (n.2); see also United States v. Kinard, 472
       F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting the commentary to the
       Sentencing Guidelines generally is binding on the courts). If a de-
       fendant goes to trial to preserve issues that do not relate to his fac-
       tual guilt—such as to argue that the statute does not apply to his

       1 We review the application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United
       States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2009). “We review a denial
       of a reduction of sentence for an acceptance of responsibility for clear error,
       and that finding is entitled to great deference on review and should not be
       disturbed unless it is without foundation.” United States v. Knight, 562 F.3d
       1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).
USCA11 Case: 22-10866     Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 05/12/2023    Page: 3 of 3

       22-10866               Opinion of the Court                        3

       conduct—then the defendant might still qualify for the acceptance
       of responsibility reduction. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 comment. (n.2); but
       see United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 840-41 (11th Cir. 1998)
       (holding a defendant who goes to trial to make a factual, rather
       than a legal, challenge to the government’s criminal allegations is
       precluded from receiving a § 3E1.1 reduction).
              The district court did not clearly err in finding Sorrow was
       not entitled to a reduction for the acceptance of responsibility.
       First, while Sorrow confessed to robbing a bank in two separate
       phone calls to family members, at no point in the proceeding be-
       fore trial did he express to the Government an acceptance of re-
       sponsibility. Rather, he denied his factual guilt by pleading not
       guilty and by going to trial. He made no stipulations as to the al-
       leged factual basis of the offense, instead choosing to put the Gov-
       ernment to its burden on each element of the offense. As such, he
       was not entitled to a reduction under § 3E1.1. See U.S.S.G.
       § 3E1.1(a) comment. (n.2); see also Kinard, 472 F.3d at 1297. Fi-
       nally, despite his attempt to frame his trial strategy in other ways,
       he put the Government to its burden of proof by contesting
       whether he used intimidation in the commission of the burglary.
       As such, Sorrow’s arguments at trial amounted to a factual denial
       of guilt, and they were, therefore, inconsistent with acceptance of
       responsibility. Starks, 157 F.3d at 840-41. Accordingly, we affirm.
             AFFIRMED.