Court Opinion

ID: 9740202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:29:53.590705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.780444
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: As the portion of the Mayberry opinion that is quoted by the majority indicates, the defendants in Mayberry did not demonstrate that “a classification scheme based upon the amount of the pure drug contained in a given substance would be feasible.” (63 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 345 N.E.2d 97, 101.) Clearly,- this failure of proof was a factor in the court’s conclusion that the classification scheme under attack had a reasonable basis. Here, unlike the defendants in Mayberry, the defendant in this case has demonstrated that a classification scheme based upon the pure amount of the substance sought to be controlled (cocaine) is feasible. During cross-examination by the defense counsel, the forensic scientist testifying for the State explained that it was possible to quantify the amount of cocaine in a substance. He testified, however, that he did not . perform a quantitative analysis on the substance containing cocaine in this case because he did not have the “techniques set up.” The testimony of the forensic scientist for the State demonstrates that quantitative testing is feasible. Indeed, it is clear that quantitative tests are feasible and have been performed in the past. See People v. Taylor (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 454, 369 N.E.2d 573. Once it has been demonstrated that “a classification scheme based upon the amount of the pure drug contained in a given substance would be feasible” I cannot in good faith say that there is a reasonable basis for the classification scheme of section 401 of the Act with respect to that drug. This view is consistent with the language in Mayberry. The classification scheme under attack here provides that if a defendant possesses with the intent to deliver a substance that weighs thirty or more grams, he is a Class X felon if the substance contains any amount of cocaine. Yet this same scheme provides that any person who possesses up to thirty grams of pure cocaine is a Class 3 felon. If the amount of the drug can be ascertained then such classification is patently unreasonable. As the supreme court in Mayberry indicated, the only imaginable justification for this ostensibly unfair classification system is that any given amount of cocaine can be distributed to a greater number of people if it is mixed with another substance and thus arguably have a greater potential to be harmful. However, if the defendant is charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine, as the defendant is here, the above rationale is not applicable. Assuming that cocaine is not sold in its pure state, then the person with the largest amount of cocaine will be able to distribute it to the largest group of people. It is the amount of the cocaine that determines the potential quantity for distribution and harm rather than the amount of the substance with which it happens to be mixed. If, for some reason, the cocaine is to be distributed in its pure state, then everyone would agree that the person with the most cocaine poses the greatest threat to society. After all, it must be more harmful to ingest a drug in its pure form rather than in a diluted or mixed form. Clearly, if a defendant has the intent to deliver, or for that matter manufacture, possession of 29 grams of cocaine is potentially more harmful to society than the possession of 29 grams of sugar mixed with one gram of cocaine. But yet, it is the defendant that possesses the latter amount that will be punished more severely. Surely this is an arbitrary classification scheme when, as the defendant here has demonstrated, it is possible for the State to determine the quantity of cocaine contained in a substance. Therefore, I conclude that there is no reasonable basis for a classification scheme based upon the amount of a substance containing cocaine. Accordingly, I would find that section 401(a)(2) of the Act violates the equal protection clause of the United States and Illinois constitutions. For this reason, I must dissent.