Court Opinion

ID: 9793200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:44:24.061462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:53.477774
License: Public Domain

McCLINTOCK, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot join in this court’s conclusion that the warrantless search of defendant’s automobile parked in his driveway is “not a constitutional search [requiring Fourth Amendment protection] and therefore not prohibited,” majority opinion at p. 540, nor can I agree that such a search falls within the plain-view doctrine. Defendant contends that the initial intrusion onto his property was improper and that there were no exigent circumstances to justify the war-rantless search. I agree.
I acknowledge the fact that some courts have held that in its purest application the doctrine of plain view does not constitute a search as contemplated by the constitution, “but simply sanctions the admission of evidence consisting solely of testimony as to the observations of an officer legally in the position from which the observations were made.” Reeves v. State, Alaska, 599 P.2d 727, 738 (1979). The search and subsequent seizure in the case at bar, however, do require Fourth Amendment protection. Reeves, supra.
The contested search was made without a warrant, and I therefore begin 'my inquiry with the proposition that “the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (the plain-view exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S., 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (the consent exception); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, reh. denied 400 U.S. 856, 91 S.Ct. 23, 27 L.Ed.2d 94 (1970) (the automobile-exigency exception); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (the hot-pursuit exception). If a search does not come within one of those recognized exceptions, the evidence obtained during the search must be excluded. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961). And “[t]he burden rests on the State to show the existence of such an exceptional situation.” Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970).
The right to personal liberty has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), also quoted in Mapp v. Ohio, supra, *545367 U.S. at 646-647, 81 S.Ct. at 1687, the Court, in considering the Fourth and Fifth Amendments stated that these amendments
“. . . apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property
The Court also stated that “constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed,” and that “[i]t is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.” Boyd, supra, 116 U.S. at 635, 6 S.Ct. at 535. In the present case, this court has failed to protect Wyoming citizens from the “stealthy encroachments” of the police.
I. Plain View
The majority opinion correctly sets forth the elements that are necessary for a finding of the plain-view exception in order to validate a warrantless search. However, I cannot agree that the State has met its burden in proving that the officers’ presence was proper. In order to be proper the officers must have had some “legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused.” Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038. Nor can I find that the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent.1
Beginning as I must with the premise that a warrantless search is per se unconstitutional, I have failed to find any evidence supporting the majority’s conclusion that the police were in a place where they had a right to be. This court bases this inference upon the theory that was suggested by the State in its appellate brief, rather than upon the record. Quoting from the State’s brief, this court has set forth the State’s version of the facts as follows:
“ ‘. . . Officer Snell proceeded up the driveway of the residence to ascertain whether anyone was at home. Enroute, he observed the speakers through the back windows of the black Pontiac, and the tape deck through the side windows . . . ’ ” Majority opinion at p. 538.
Adopting the State’s version of the facts while purporting to make an independent finding based upon the record this court concludes:
“Admittedly, it is not crystal clear from the record just exactly where in the driveway the vehicle was parked and where the house was with respect to the driveway and the automobile, but we must, nonetheless, give the State the benefit of the favorable facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom [citations omitted]. Through the application of this rule, we think we can fairly read the record to say that Officer Snell was walking up the driveway upon which the car was parked and it was necessary to pass the automobile on his way to the house to speak with the occupant for the purpose of gaining additional information about the burglaries. While in pursuit of this purpose, the officer observed the speakers and tape deck through the windows of the vehicle. (See, fn. 1.) If we are warranted in embracing these facts and their attendant inferences, it follows that Snell was in a place where he had a right to be ., . . .” (Emphasis added.) Majority opinion at p. 541.
I cannot agree that this court is required to view the facts most favorable to the State, giving every reasonable inference to *546these facts to support a finding that a per se unconstitutional search was proper. The State has the burden of proving the exceptional circumstance that warranted the intrusion and this court has a duty to review all of the evidence presented in cases that raise Fourth Amendment issues. I have previously said, in my dissent in Fitzgerald v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 1015, 1026, that when an appellate court is faced with a constitutional issue it is
“1. . . required to examine the entire record and to make an independent, reflective constitutional judgment on the facts. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741, 86 S.Ct. 1344, 16 L.Ed.2d 360 (1966); Walker v. State, 12 Md.App. 684, 280 A.2d 260 (1971). Whitman v. State, 25 Md.App. 428, 336 A.2d 515, 519 (1975).”
However, even giving the State every favorable inference that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence in the record, I am still unable to find any testimony that warrants the inferences that have been drawn by the majority. There is no testimony indicating where the automobile was parked in the driveway, or the relationship of the driveway to the house. No officer testified that it was necessary for them to walk up the driveway past the automobile in order to reach the front door of the house. Nor is there any testimony to the effect that the officers originally went to McCutcheon’s residence to question the occupants about the burglaries. And, finally, I cannot accept the majority’s inference as to the sequence of the events. I will agree that the officers were on McCutcheon’s driveway, they observed the speakers and tape deck in the automobile, and that as they were walking to the door to see if anyone was home, McCutcheon, his father and his girl friend arrived. However, there is no testimony to support the inference that the officers first observed the stolen property as they were going up to the front door of the house.
In arriving at these unwarranted inferences, the court in its opinion and the State in its brief have relied upon Officer Snell’s testimony given at both the suppression hearing and the trial. Officer Snell described the search in the following manner during the suppression hearing:
“Q. Could you tell us what you observed and where you observed it?
“A. I observed a, I believe a K-Mart eight track tape deck and a set of speakers in the back of a — or in a white over black Pontiac vehicle that had a temporary sticker in it and parked in the driveway at 1960 Johnstone Road.
“Q. And was there anything obstructing your view of those items when you saw them, or could you just tell us, describe to us how it was that you saw them?
“A. I could see the speakers, which were on the rear deck of the vehicle. I could see them both through the back windows. I could see the tape deck, which was mounted to the left of the steering wheel, beneath the dashboard. I could see that from the driver’s side window and also from the passenger’s side window.”
“Q. When you arrived at the premises was there anyone on the premises?
“A. I don’t — yes, there was, but at the time I didn’t realize it.
“Q. When did you determine that someone was present?
“A. What took place was we walked on to the premises, and the vehicle was setting in the driveway, was up on jacks, and I went to the door of the house to knock on the door, and before I had a chance to knock, Mr. McCutcheon and John McCutcheon drove up in another vehicle.”
Officer Snell did not explain why the officers initially went to McCutcheon’s residence, or how they happened to be on his private driveway. However, it is interesting to note that Officer Snell was apparently under the impression that no one was at home when the officers initially approached McCutcheon’s residence.
Officer Snell testified again at the trial and he made the following statements concerning the search of defendant’s automobile:
“A. * * * And he [Officer Millay] informed me that he had seen some speak*547ers in the rear deck of a vehicle, it was a black over white Pontiac that had temporary sticker in it and he further informed me that he had contacted the office in Cheyenne and found out that, who this vehicle was registered to, that it was registered to John McCutcheon of 1960 Johnstone Road, and that evening other officers and I went out to 1960 Johnstone Road in an attempt to obtain further information.
“Q. And could you tell us what happened or what you observed upon arriving at 1960 Johnstone Road?
“A. Upon arriving at that time I observed a white over black Pontiac, I believe it is a Tempest, in the driveway of 1960 Johnstone Road. The vehicle, the back of the vehicle was on jacks and, I believe, the trunk lid was open. As I was going to the house to ascertain whether anybody was at the residence or not a vehicle, another vehicle pulled into the driveway.
“Q. Did you ever make it up to the house?
“A. I don’t believe I did at that time.” (The majority has quoted this testimony in footnote 1 of the opinion.)
While the majority has inferred that “an attempt to obtain further information” means that the officers were on their “way to the house to speak with the occupant for the purpose of gaining additional information about the burglaries,” I cannot find support for such a broad inference in the record.
Officer Snell stated that he looked at the vehicle and when he was on the way to the door someone arrived. Moreover, the majority has failed to consider the testimony of Officer Cooper who was also present at the McCutcheon residence, and whose testimony supplies the time sequence not covered by Snell’s testimony. Cooper testified during the suppression hearing:
“Q. There were four officers approached the premises at the same time?
“A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
“Q. What did you do at the time when you got to 1960 Johnstone?
“A. We went to, we looked at the vehicle, this Pontiac that was in the yard and looked through the window at the tape deck, that was in the car, plus the speakers that were mounted in the rear deck of the vehicle, and then we tried to contact someone at the house by going to thé door and ringing the doorbell.
“Q. Did you raise anyone at the house?
“A. On our approach to the house a car drove up and in the car, I believe there was Mr. McCutcheon, John McCutcheon and April Garner.”
In light of Officer Cooper’s testimony that they “went to” and “looked at” the automobile, I cannot see how the majority has concluded that the officers were merely passing by the automobile on their way to the front door of the house when they observed the stolen property. The majority has not only drawn an incorrect inference, they have drawn an inference contrary to the specific testimony of Officer Cooper, the only officer who testified as to the sequence of events. The State has failed to prove that the officers had a right to be on defendant’s driveway.
Furthermore, the discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent. After the burglary, Millay’s neighbor informed him that he had seen a black Oldsmobile or Pontiac with square tail lights and no license plates in the vicinity of Millay’s garage on the day of the break in. After this conversation Officer Millay observed an automobile matching his neighbor’s description. While the car was stopped at a traffic light Millay observed a set of speakers similar to those that were stolen on the rear deck of the car. Millay made a note of the temporary license sticker number, obtained the owner’s name and address and then relayed this information to Snell.
Snell did not attempt to obtain a search warrant, nor was the failure to do so explained during the suppression hearing or at trial. The only fair inference is that the officers wanted to examine this particular car for the particular purpose of locating the stolen speakers. Because of this, I can*548not find that the discovery of the stolen property was inadvertent.
Moreover, plain view in and of itself is not sufficient to justify a search. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 468, 91 S.Ct. at 2039,
“. . . plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle . . that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent ‘exigent circumstances.’ ”
See also, State v. Sauve, 112 Ariz. 576, 544 P.2d 1091 (1976).
II. Exigent Circumstances
In the case at bar there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search of defendant’s automobile. McCut-cheon’s automobile on jacks with at least one tire removed was parked on his driveway. The officers knew that McCutcheon owned the automobile and that most likely the vehicle contained stolen property. One of the officers could have easily obtained a search warrant while the other officers watched the automobile. Sauve, supra, 544 P.2d at 1092.
In Sauve, the Arizona Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile that was parked on defendant’s driveway was not justified. The officers could not rely upon the doctrine of plain view and there were no exigent circumstances that could justify the search. When the detectives arrived at Sauve’s home, he had already been charged and was incarcerated. The detectives were looking for a television channel changer and believed that it was in the defendant’s ear. The court held “[tjhere was no justification for the seizure without a warrant, and the resulting evidence was not admissible.” 544 P.2d at 1093.
While the majority has pointed to the fact that the decision in Coolidge, supra, was only subscribed to by a plurality, Mr. Justice Harlan concurred with the plurality in Parts I, II-D and III. Portions of Part II-D are relevant to the present inquiry.
“[A] search or seizure carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of ‘exigent circumstances.’ ” 403 U.S. at 474-475, 91 S.Ct. at 2042. “Since the police knew of the presence of the automobile and planned all along to seize it, there was no ‘exigent circumstance’ to justify their failure to obtain a warrant. The application of the basic rule of Fourth Amendment law therefore requires that the fruits of the warrantless seizure be suppressed.” 403 U.S. at 478, 91 S.Ct. at 2044.
The only difference in the present case is that we have no direct testimony that the officers had specifically intended to seize defendant’s automobile or its contents.
III. Expectation of Privacy
The majority further holds that McCut-cheon had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway. The following observation is made:
“Snell was in a place where the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Majority opinion at p. 541.)
Once again, I cannot agree with this conclusion of law. In discussing the question of expectation of privacy, the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350, 88 S.Ct. 507, 510-511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), made the following statement:
“In the first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally protected area.’ Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’ That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection *549of a person’s general right to privacy — his right to be let alone by other people — is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.”
No authority is cited supporting the majority’s conclusion that McCutcheon had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway, nor have I discovered any other court that has made such a general holding. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has described the expectation of privacy in a driveway in the following manner:
“A driveway is only a semiprivate area. The expectation of privacy which a possessor of land may reasonably have while carrying on activities on his driveway will generally depend upon the nature of the activities and the degree of visibility from the street. It would be equally unwise to hold, as a matter of law, that all driveways are protected by the Fourth Amendment from all penetrations by police officers as to hold that no driveway is ever protected from police incursions. The test in each case should be that of reasonableness, both of the possessor’s expectations of privacy and of the officers’ reasons for being on the driveway.” United States v. Magana, 9th Cir., 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (1975).
Accepting the test set out in Magana the question is whether the officers’ intrusion onto McCutcheon’s private driveway constituted an invasion of an area that McCut-cheon sought to preserve as private. As the majority has correctly concluded, “[ajdmit-tedly, it is not crystal clear from the record just exactly where in the driveway the vehicle was parked and where the house was with respect to the driveway and the automobile.” Majority opinion at p. 541. In fact, there is no evidence in the record as to the location of the driveway in relationship with the house. The State has thus failed to present facts from which the court could make a determination as to expectation of privacy. Therefore the State has not met its burden in proving the reasonableness of the officers’ intrusion onto defendant’s private driveway. Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022.
IV. Consent to the Search
Relying upon the plain-view doctrine to support the search and seizure, this court has not found it necessary to discuss the issue of whether McCutcheon voluntarily consented to a search of his automobile. Since I cannot accept the finding of plain view, I must address the question of whether McCutcheon voluntarily consented to a search, thereby removing the taint of the unlawful search.
Under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, evidence that is the direct or indirect product of an illegal search is excluded if
“ ‘. . . the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959).” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
The Supreme Court of California has long recognized the rule that
“consent induced by an illegal search or arrest is not [voluntary], and that if the accused consents immediately following an illegal entry or search, his assent is not voluntary because it is inseparable from the unlawful conduct of the officers.” Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal.3d 238, 118 Cal.Rptr. 166, 174, 529 P.2d 590, 598-599 (1975).
The California court there held that the defendant’s consent to search his car was the product of an unlawful search of his office and was therefore involuntarily given. The court then suppressed the evidence that was taken from Burrows’ automobile.
The question of whether the consent is voluntary is to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra. In the case at bar, McCutcheon testified that when he returned home one of the car doors was open and the officers were standing around his *550automobile. The officers stated that at this time they had already looked inside the automobile. When defendant was asked if the officers could search his vehicle he informed them that they had already searched the car. I cannot find, therefore, that McCutcheon’s statement to go ahead and look was a voluntary consent that purged the illegality of the initial intrusion. His consent to the search was a mere acquiescence to lawful authority inseparable from the illegal search and cannot be considered as a voluntary consent. State v. Little, 249 Or. 297, 431 P.2d 810, 812, cert. denied 390 U.S. 955, (1967); Burrows, supra, 118 Cal.Rptr. 166, 174-175, 529 P.2d at 598-599.
I would reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

. In footnote 2 of the majority opinion it is said that the element of inadvertence is not a rule of law because the decision in Coolidge, supra, was only supported by a plurality. While the California court appears to be reluctant to accept the need for inadvertence, North v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 8 Cal.3d 301, 104 Cal.Rptr. 833, 502 P.2d 1305, 57 A.L.R.3d 155 (1972), numerous other courts have followed the Coolidge decision. See, for example, Reeves v. State, Alaska, 599 P.2d 727, 738 (1979); State v. Williams, 55 Ohio St. 82, 377 N.E.2d 1013, 1016 (1978); Bies v. State, 76 Wis.2d 457, 251 N.W.2d 461, 464-465 (1977); and United States v. McCormick, 9th Cir., 502 F.2d 281 (1974).