Court Opinion

ID: 9556907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-19 06:00:25.410169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:28.821785
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     NICK SANTOS,                                    DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  SF-0752-20-0114-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: August 18, 2023
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Edward J. Southcott, Esquire, and Richard L. Pinckard, Esquire, San
             Diego, California, for the appellant.

           Diana Mondragon, Chula Vista, California, for the agency.

           Julianne Kelly-Horner, San Diego, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     mitigated the appellant’s removal to a 60-day suspension.            For the reasons

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     discussed below, we GRANT the petition for review and REVERSE the initial
     decision. The removal action is SUSTAINED.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     We deny the appellant’s request to order compliance with the interim relief order
     and/or dismiss the agency’s petition for review.
¶2         In her initial decision, the administrative judge ordered the agency to
     provide interim relief under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A) in the event a petition for
     review was filed by either party.      Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 31, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 19-20. The Board’s regulations provide that when, as in this
     case, the appellant was the prevailing party in the initial decision and the decision
     granted the appellant interim relief, any petition or cross petition for review filed
     by the agency must be accompanied by a certification that the agency has
     complied with the interim relief order. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a). If the agency
     files a petition or cross petition for review and has not pro vided the interim relief
     ordered, the appellant may request dismissal of the agency’s petition. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.116(d). If the agency fails to demonstrate compliance with the interim
     relief order, the Board has discretion to dismiss the agency’s petition pursuant to
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(e), but is not required to do so.
¶3         Here, the agency’s petition for review was accompanied by declarations by
     a management official and a payroll accountant, purportedly certifying the
     agency’s compliance with the interim relief order. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1 at 24-25. The appellant challenged the agency’s certification, arguing
     that he had not in fact received interim pay and benefits. 2       PFR File, Tab 3.
     He requested that the Board order the agency to comply with the interim

     2
       Upon receiving the appellant’s challenge to the agency’s certification, the Board
     should have issued an order providing the agency an opportunity to submit evidence of
     compliance. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(b). It is unnecessary to issue such an order now, as
     the agency has already responded to the appellant’s challenge, and the issue of
     compliance can be resolved on the basis of the existing record. See Buckler v. Federal
     Retirement Thrift Investment Board, 73 M.S.P.R. 476, 483 (1997).
                                                                                       3

     relief order, and/or dismiss the agency’s petition. Id. at 6; see also PFR File,
     Tab 5 at 7-8.    In response, the agency argued that it had taken “appropriate
     administrative action” to ensure that the appellant receives interim pay and
     benefits, and that this was sufficient for compliance. PFR File, Tab 4 at 5-8.
     The agency further explained that the appellant is on administrative leave status
     because it has determined that his return to the workplace would be unduly
     disruptive.   Id. at 9-12; see 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B).      The agency
     subsequently provided evidence that, as of September 21, 2020, approximately
     3 weeks after the petition for review was filed, the appellant had received pay and
     benefits in accordance with the interim relief order. PFR File, Tab 6 at 14-18.
¶4         We deny the appellant’s request to order compliance with the interim relief
     order, as there is no authority that provides for filing such a request. See Dean v.
     Department of the Army, 57 M.S.P.R 296, 300 (1993).           We further find that
     interim pay and benefits were not unreasonably delayed, and that the agency
     complied with the interim relief order. See Buckler v. Federal Retirement Thrift
     Investment Board, 73 M.S.P.R. 476, 483-84 (1997); Salazar v. Department of
     Transportation, 60 M.S.P.R. 633, 639 (1994).          Accordingly, we deny the
     appellant’s request to dismiss the agency’s petition for review.

     The appellant did not contest the charge of conduct unbecoming a Supervisory
     Border Patrol Agent.
¶5         The agency based its charge of conduct unbecoming on the following
     specification:
           On September 2, 2018, while off-duty, the San Diego Police
           Department (SDPD) found you uncooperative, argumentative, and
           you appeared to be intoxicated. SDPD detained and transported yo u
           to McAlister Institute Inebriate Reception Center (MHRC). You
           admitted to Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) Office of Professional
           Responsibility (OPR) investigators you had consumed approximately
           seven (7) alcoholic beverages throughout the day.
                                                                                             4

     IAF, Tab 7 at 73. The appellant does not dispute this charge, and acknowledges
     that he engaged in conduct unbecoming a supervisor. Hearing Transcript (HT)
     at 174.
¶6         On   review,      the   appellant    asserts   that   the   administrative    judge
     mischaracterized the testimony of the SDPD officer when she stated that the
     officer “could not identify the point at which the appellant was uncooperative or
     argumentative.”   PFR File, Tab 1 at 22-23; see ID at 8 n.2.           However, as the
     administrative judge went on to explain, it was unnecessary for her to decide
     whether the appellant was uncooperative or argumentative, because the ap pellant
     did not dispute that he engaged in conduct unbecoming during the interaction. ID
     at 8 n.2. As the charge is uncontested, the alleged error does not affect the result,
     and therefore does not require further review. See Panter v. Department of the
     Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984).

     The charge of lack of candor is sustained.
¶7         To prove a charge of lack of candor, the agency must prove that (1) the
     appellant gave incorrect or incomplete statements, and (2) did so knowingly.
     Fargnoli v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶17 (2016).                  Unlike
     falsification, lack of candor does not require an intent to deceive.          Id., ¶ 16.
     A lack of candor charge may involve a failure to disclose something that, under
     the circumstances, should have been disclosed in order to make the given
     statement accurate and complete.          Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 278 F.3d
     1280, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

           Specification 1
¶8         In the first specification, the agency alleged the following:
            On September 2, 2018, while off-duty, you were examined by
           Emergency Medical Services (EMS). SDPD arrived at the scene and
           told EMS that if EMS cleared you, then you would be going with
           SDPD. Shortly thereafter, an EMS employee asked you if you had
           any pertinent health history that you should know about. You said
                                                                                         5

           you were a type (1) diabetic. In your interview with CPB OPR
           investigators, you stated you were not diabetic.
     IAF, Tab 7 at 73.      It is undisputed that the appellant gave EMS incorrect
     information when he stated that he was a type 1 diabetic. See IAF, Tab 18 at 9,
     Tab 21 at 22 (stipulating that the appellant has never had diabetes).
     The administrative judge found, however, that, because the appellant was so
     intoxicated the police found it necessary to take him to a detox facility, it was “as
     likely as not that the appellant did not knowingly make a misstatement.”
     ID at 10-11.
¶9        We disagree. The agency has provided the SDPD officer’s body camera
     footage from the incident, which records the following dialog between the
     appellant and one of the EMS paramedics:
          Paramedic: Do you have any pertinent past medical history we should know
          about, like say, diabetes, high blood pressure?
          Appellant: Diabetes, high blood pressure.
          Paramedic: You are a diabetic?
          Appellant: Yes.
          Paramedic: What type of diabetic are you?
          Appellant: Type 1.
          Paramedic: What do you take, [what] medicine?
          Appellant: Nothing.
          Paramedic: So you’re a type 1 diabetic who takes no medication
          whatsoever?
          Appellant: Correct.
          Paramedic: I don’t think I’ve ever met anyone who does that. Do you know
          any medications that you’re supposed to be taking?
          Appellant: Uh, metformin.
                                                                                            6

            Paramedic: Okay, type 1 diabetics don’t usually take metformin. 3
      IAF, Tab 8, 647f-file 2, at 3:07-3:44.
¶10          It is clear from this exchange that, more likely than not, the appellant
      knowingly gave incorrect information to EMS.               We have considered the
      appellant’s theory that, in his intoxicated state, he simply parroted the words
      “high blood pressure, diabetes.” HT at 177 (closing statement). However, while
      that might plausibly account for the appellant’s initial response to the
      paramedic’s inquiry, it does not explain why he would have gone on to state that
      he was a type 1 diabetic and that he was taking metformin for that condition.
      Though untrue, these statements were directly responsive to the paramedic’s
      questions and were not nonsensical or merely repetitive.         Moreover, while the
      SDPD officer who arrested the appellant outside the bar may have judged the
      appellant unable to exercise care for his safety or the safety of others, see Cal.
      Penal Code § 647(f), this does not imply that the appellant was too intoxicated to
      understand that his later statements to the paramedics were incorrect.          On the
      probable cause form, the arresting officer checked only 5 of the 21 signs and
      symptoms indicating the appellant was under the influence of an intoxicant,
      see IAF, Tab 7 at 105, and the police camera video taken before and during the
      appellant’s encounter with EMS does not show that the appellant was incoherent,
      showing signs of difficulty processing information, or struggling to speak clearly.
      Lastly, the fact that the appellant had a clear incentive to remain in the care of
      EMS, instead of being returned to police custody, lends further support to a
      finding that he knowingly misinformed EMS that he had a condition that could
      require further medical treatment. Based on the above considerations, we sustain
      the specification.

      3
        We take official notice under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.64 that metformin is prescribed to treat
      type 2 diabetes. See https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/a696005.html (last visited
      Feb. 17, 2023).
                                                                                        7

            Specification 2
¶11        In the second specification, the agency alleged the following:
            On September 2, 2018, while off-duty, EMS determined that you did
            not need to go anywhere by ambulance and you did not need EMS
            treatment after they examined you.       Next, an SDPD Officer
            handcuffed you and stated he had no other choice but to book you
            into county jail. While in SDPD custody, you stated that you
            believed you had a heart condition at that time, and SDPD
            acknowledged your heart condition. An SDPD Officer asked if you
            felt that way because of the position you were in or because there
            was something medically wrong with you. You answered that you
            would like to see a doctor. Consequently, you were released by
            SDPD to EMS for further medical evaluation at University of
            California San Diego Hospital in Hillcrest, via ambulance.
            Thereafter, when you were advised by EMS you were not in SDPD
            custody, you chose to go home rather than seeing a doctor or
            admitting yourself to a hospital.
      IAF, Tab 7 at 73.
¶12        Body camera footage of the incident shows that, after the appellant was
      cleared by EMS and returned to police custody, the following exchange occurred:
           Officer: Do you think there’s something wrong with your heart?
           Appellant: Yes sir.
           Officer: Yes, you think there’s something wrong with you?
           Appellant: Absolutely, yes sir.
           Officer: Would you like to go to the hospital?
           Appellant: Yes sir.
           Officer: Are you going to give these medics any problems?
           Appellant: No sir.
           Officer: Step out of the vehicle. [Appellant exits vehicle.]
           Officer: And what is it you think is wrong with you?
           Appellant: My heart’s beating very very fast.
           Officer: Okay, that’s not totally abnormal. Do you have a heart condition?
           Appellant: I believe I do right now, sir.
                                                                                       8

           Officer: Is it because of the position you’re in, or do you think there’s
           something medically wrong with you?
           Appellant: I’d like to see a doctor, sir.
      IAF, Tab 11, 647f, at 2:02- 2:38.
¶13         We agree with the administrative judge that the agency has not shown by
      preponderant evidence that the appellant gave incorrect or incomplete information
      during this exchange. It is undisputed that the appellant has a history of panic
      attacks, IAF, Tab 18 at 9, and while EMS found the appellant’s heart rate and
      blood pressure were normal at the time of his initial evaluation, the record does
      not contain medical evidence concerning the appellant’s condition at the time
      he reported symptoms to the SDPD officer. It is true that, regardless of his actual
      condition, the appellant would have had incentive to state that he was unwell so
      that he would be taken to the hospital instead of jail. Nonetheless, we cannot
      determine from the record whether the appellant may have developed a real or
      perceived heart condition following his return to police custody. Accordingly,
      we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the agency failed to prove this
      specification.

            Specification 3
            In its third specification, the agency alleged the following:
            On December 12, 2018, during your interview with CBP OPR
            investigators, you claimed you felt like you were having a panic
            attack on September 2, 2018, but you omitted to EMS and SDPD that
            you felt like you were having a panic attack, nor did you answer that
            you suffered from panic attacks when asked specifically about your
            health.
      IAF, Tab 7 at 74. Although the agency placed these allegations under a single
      specification, the agency appears to allege here that the appellant knowingly gave
      incomplete information on two occasions:         first, in his statements to EMS,
      and second, in his separate statements to the SDPD officer.
                                                                                           9

¶14         We first address the appellant’s statements to EMS.           As noted above,
      the EMS paramedic specifically asked the appellant if he had “any pertinent past
      medical history we should know about,” and offered high blood pressure and
      diabetes as examples.     Under those circumstances, the appellant should have
      disclosed his history of panic attacks, and by failing to do so, he gave EMS
      incomplete information. However, considering that the appellant was intoxicated
      and may have been distracted by the paramedic’s specific mention of high blood
      pressure and diabetes, it is as likely as not that the appellant forgot to menti on his
      history of panic attacks and did not knowingly conceal that information.
¶15         We also find that that the agency has also not shown that the appellant
      exhibited lack of candor by failing to inform the SDPD officer of his history of
      panic attacks. In this case, the agency has not shown that the appellant gave
      incomplete information, knowingly or otherwise. The officer did not specifically
      ask the appellant about his medical history, and we do not see how, under those
      circumstances, it was incumbent on the appellant to attempt a self-diagnosis.
      We therefore do not sustain the specification.
¶16         In sum, we sustain specification 1 of the lack of candor charge, and do not
      sustain specifications 2 and 3. When more than one event or factual specification
      supports a single charge, proof of one or more, but not all, of the supporting
      specifications is sufficient to sustain the charge. Burroughs v. Department of the
      Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the charge of lack of
      candor is sustained.

      The administrative judge correctly found that the agency failed to prove the
      charge of misuse of position.
¶17         The agency based its third and final charge on a single specification, as
      follows:
            On September 2, 2018, while off-duty, you interfered with the SDPD
            as they were questioning your friend. An SDPD officer stated that
            he could not leave your friend in her condition. Then, you told
            officers they had discretion whether to detain her.
                                                                                      10

      IAF, Tab 7 at 74. We agree with the administrative judge that the agency failed
      to prove the charge.
¶18        In the hearing order, the administrative judge cited Mann v. Department of
      Health and Human Services, 78 M.S.P.R. 1, 8 (1998), for the proposition that, in
      order to prove a charge of misuse of position, the agency must prove that the
      appellant misused his position for private gain, and that the charge cannot be
      sustained if no gain has been shown. At the prehearing conference, the agency
      argued that Mann was not the applicable precedent, and that under Burkett v.
      General Services Administration, 27 M.S.P.R. 119, 121 (1985), it was only
      required to show that the appellant used his office with the purpose of obtaining
      private gain, regardless of whether he actually benefited.     IAF, Tab 25 at 3.
      In her summary of the prehearing conference, the administrative judge stated that
      he agreed with the agency’s argument and would apply the standard set forth in
      Burkett. Id. In the initial decision, however, the administrative did not apply
      Burkett, but again cited Mann as the controlling precedent. ID at 7-8.
¶19         The agency correctly observes that the administrative judge’s reliance on
      Mann was inconsistent with her prior ruling.        However, to the extent t he
      administrative judge may have erred by relying on Mann rather than Burkett,
      the error is of no consequence, because the agency has not shown that the
      appellant used his public office for the purpose of obtaining private gain,
      successfully or otherwise. Body camera footage of the incident shows that the
      appellant identified himself as “law enforcement” in the c ontext of arguing that
      the SDPD officers had “discretion” to refrain from taking one of his companions
      to the detox facility.   IAF, Tab 11, AXON_Body_2_Video_2018-09-02_2234,
      at 3:30-3:42. In addition, the SDPD officer acknowledged in his testimony that
      the appellant did not state “I’m a cop; give my friend a break,” or otherwise ask
      for professional courtesy. HT at 74. Given these facts, we find it more likely
      than not that the appellant identified himself as a law enforcement officer for the
      purpose of claiming expertise on police procedures, and not for the purpose of
                                                                                       11

      obtaining favorable treatment.       Because the agency has not shown by
      preponderant evidence that the appellant used his public office for the purpose of
      obtaining private gain, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency
      failed to establish the charge.

      The agency proved nexus.
¶20         An agency may show nexus between off-duty misconduct and the efficiency
      of the service by three means: (1) a rebuttable presumption in certain egregious
      circumstances; (2) preponderant evidence that the misconduct adversely affects
      the appellant’s or coworkers’ job performance or the agency’s trust and
      confidence in the appellant’s job performance; or (3) preponderant evidence that
      the misconduct interfered with or adversely affected the agency’s mission.
      Hoofman v. Department of the Army, 118 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶ 16 (2012), aff’d, 526 F.
      App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In this case, the agency has provided evidence that
      the appellant’s off-duty conduct adversely affected its trust and confidence in
      the appellant’s ability to serve as a Supervisory Border Patrol Agent.          See
      HT at 148-49 (testimony of the deciding official). We discern no error in
      administrative judge’s finding that the agency established nexus, and the
      appellant does not contest that finding on review.

      The penalty of removal is within the bounds of reasonableness.
¶21         When the Board sustains fewer than all of the agency’s charges, the Board
      may mitigate the agency’s penalty to the maximum reasonable penalty so long as
      the agency has not indicated in either its final decision or in proceedings before
      the Board that it desires that a lesser penalty be imposed on fewer charges.
      Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The agency has not so
      indicated. Accordingly, we will consider whether the agency’s chosen penalty of
      removal is within the bounds of reasonableness for the sustained misconduct.
¶22         In evaluating the reasonableness of a penalty, the Board will consider,
      first and foremost, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct and its relation to
                                                                                          12

      the employee’s duties, positions, and responsibilities, including whether the
      offense was intentional or was frequently repeated. Saiz v. Department of the
      Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 521, ¶ 11 (2015). A higher standard of conduct and a higher
      degree of trust are required of an incumbent of a position with law enforcement
      duties. Luongo v. Department of Justice, 95 M.S.P.R. 643, ¶ 13 (2004), aff’d,
      123 F. App’x 405 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Table). Moreover, agencies are entitled to
      hold supervisors to a higher standard than nonsupervisors because they occupy
      positions of trust and responsibility.         Edwards v. U.S. Postal Service,
      116 M.S.P.R. 173, ¶ 14 (2010).           As the administrative judge observed,
      the sustained charge of conduct unbecoming is by itself a serious offense,
      especially considering the involvement of the local police department, which is a
      necessary partner of the Border Patrol. ID at 15; see HT at 145 (testimony of the
      deciding official).     Furthermore, as we have found here, the appellant
      compounded that offense by knowingly providing incorrect information to other
      first responders.
¶23         We have considered relevant mitigating factors, including the appellant’s
      length of service, his record of performance-based awards, and the rehabilitative
      potential evidenced by his willingness to admit to conduct unbecoming.
      However, considering that the sustained charge of lack of candor could
      potentially result in the appellant’s Giglio impairment, 4 it is doubtful that
      an alternative sanction, such as a suspension or demotion to a nonsupervisory law
      enforcement position, would be a viable option in this case. We find that the
      penalty of removal is within the bounds of reasonableness, and we therefore
      sustain it.

      4
        In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the
      Government must disclose evidence affecting the credibility of Government witnesses.
      Subsequent case law has extended this rule to require Government agencies to review
      the personnel files of Government witnesses and disclose material that could cast doubt
      on their credibility or potential for bias. See United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29,
      30-31 (9th Cir. 1991).
                                                                                       13

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      This is the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You
may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the
nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the
appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the
following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection
Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your
situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how
courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish
to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law
applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and
requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the
dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   14

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
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for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
                                                                                15

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     16

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to fil e petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       17

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.