Court Opinion

ID: 9408243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 23:03:29.094856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:32.944308
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/11/23 P. v. Sanchez CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H049979
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. C2105635)

             v.

 TERRY SANCHEZ,

             Defendant and Appellant.

         Terry Sanchez pled no contest to inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant, in
violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), and admitted to sustaining a prior
conviction for a strike offense.1 The trial court granted Sanchez’s motion to strike his
prior conviction and sentenced him to the middle term of three years in prison. On
appeal, Sanchez argues his sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for
resentencing because the trial court misapplied section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), which
requires the court to impose the lower term of imprisonment if it determines that
childhood trauma was a contributing factor to his offense, unless “the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)

         1
        Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.
Concluding that the trial court properly applied the provision, we affirm the judgment and
sentence.
                       I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       The Santa Clara County District Attorney filed an information charging Sanchez
with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, maliciously
obstructing use of a wireless communication device, and inflicting corporal injury on a
cohabitant. (§§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 591.5, 273.5, subd. (a).) The information further
alleged that Sanchez had been convicted of a prior strike offense, which made him
statutorily ineligible for probation. (§§ 667, subd. (c), 1170, subds. (h)(3), (f), 1170.12,
subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c).)
       Sanchez pled no contest to inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant and admitted
to sustaining a prior conviction for a strike offense, in exchange for dismissal of the
remaining counts and a sentence of no more than four years in prison. Under the terms of
the plea, Sanchez would have the opportunity to file a motion to strike his prior
conviction pursuant to People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 427 (Romero), which if
granted, would reduce his prison exposure and potentially render him eligible for county
jail and probation.
       In his Romero motion, Sanchez detailed the violence he had suffered as a child.
Specifically, the motion referenced Sanchez witnessing violence being perpetrated by his
father against his stepmother and suffering physical abuse by his stepmother. The motion
described how Sanchez began abusing alcohol and narcotics at the age of six and
continued to struggle with addiction throughout his life. The district attorney’s
opposition acknowledged Sanchez’s difficult childhood, stating “Defendant’s motion
makes it evident that his background is marred with unique trauma. Defendant was
exposed to violence and drug abuse at a young age. He was physically abused by his
step-mother [sic] which led to his abuse of drugs and alcohol from the early age of six.”
Nevertheless, the prosecutor contended that Sanchez’s Romero motion should be denied
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in light of his extensive criminal history, which included four prior felony convictions
and fifty-seven prior misdemeanor convictions—six of which were domestic violence
related. The district attorney also pointed out that Sanchez’s performance on prior grants
of probation and PRCS had been unsatisfactory and that he had committed the offense
while on PRCS supervision in another case.
       At sentencing, the trial court granted Sanchez’s Romero motion, citing to the age
of the strike offense, Sanchez’s youth at the time it was committed, the fact that Sanchez
had not committed additional violent felonies since the offense, and the relatively minor
injury Sanchez inflicted in this case. Nevertheless, the court indicated that it intended to
sentence Sanchez to the middle term of three years, stating “there are many factors that
are not in your favor. Your criminal history is terrible. You’ve had a Romero granted
before and you’re not doing well on supervision. Your attorney says that you’re not
doing well on supervision; you need more supervision. . . . So your criminal history, like
I said, is terrible. Your performance on supervision is terrible. And you need to change
those things, or you’re going to be back.”
       Prior to the imposition of sentence, Sanchez asked the trial court to consider the
newly enacted section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), which requires a sentencing court to
impose a lower term sentence upon a person if that person had suffered childhood trauma
that played a contributing role in the offense, “unless the court finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term
would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Reiterating the
facts set forth in his Romero motion, Sanchez argued that he had suffered childhood
trauma, “including the exposure to domestic violence in the home and exposure to drugs
at a very, very young age,” and requested that he be sentenced to the lower term of two
years. The trial court responded, “I am going to impose the middle term. I did consider
those things, but I think, in light of [Sanchez’s] history, I’m not going to impose the
lower term.” The court sentenced Sanchez to the middle term of three years.
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        Sanchez filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence.
                                        II. DISCUSSION
   A. Standard of Review
        We review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) To prove an abuse of discretion,
“ ‘ “[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing
decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.]” ’ ” (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 984, 988 (Fredrickson); see also People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
377 (Carmony) [a sentencing court “does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it”].) “ ‘ “In the absence
of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate
sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence
will not be set aside on review. [Citation.]” ’ ” (Fredrickson, at p. 988.)
   B. The Trial Court Properly Applied Section 1170, Subdivision (b)(6)
        Sanchez argues on appeal that his sentence must be vacated and the matter
remanded for resentencing because the trial court misapplied section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6), which makes a lower term sentence presumptively appropriate in circumstances
where a defendant’s experience of childhood trauma was a contributing factor to the
commission of the offense. Sanchez contends that because he had put forth evidence of
childhood trauma, the trial court was required to either sentence him to the low term or
state on the record what proven or admitted aggravating circumstances made the
imposition of the low term unjust. We conclude that the trial court properly applied
subdivision (b)(6) and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Sanchez to the middle
term.

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       1. Legal Principles
       Section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) directs trial courts to impose no more than the
middle term of a sentencing triad unless certain circumstances exist.2 Assembly Bill
No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5) further amended section 1170,
subdivision (b), which now provides in subdivision (b)(6), “unless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition
of the lower term upon a finding that any of the certain enumerated conditions were a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse,
neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) In March 2022,
California Rules of Court, rule 4.420, which sets forth the criteria for selecting the
appropriate term of imprisonment in felony sentencing, was revised to incorporate this
provision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(e)(1).)
       2. The Trial Court Considered Evidence of Sanchez’s Childhood Trauma
       Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) was in effect at the time of Sanchez’s sentencing
in April 2022. At the sentencing hearing, Sanchez directed the court’s attention to the
provision, put forth facts relating to his childhood trauma, “including the exposure to
domestic violence in the home and exposure to drugs at a very, very young age,” and
argued that such trauma contributed to the circumstances of the offense. On that basis,
Sanchez asked the court to impose the low term. The court declined Sanchez’s request,
stating that while it did consider evidence relating of Sanchez’s childhood trauma, it was
nevertheless going to impose the middle term in light of Sanchez’s criminal history.

       2
         Section 1170, subdivision (b) provides: “When a judgment of imprisonment is to
be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph[] 2.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).)
                                              5
       Even though subdivision (b)(6) makes the lower term presumptively appropriate
under the enumerated circumstances, the sentencing court may nevertheless impose the
middle term if it finds that imposition of the lower term would be “contrary to the
interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) In determining the “interests of justice,” the
court is permitted to consider Sanchez’s “background and prospects, including the
presence . . . of a record,” as well as the mitigating factors of subdivision (b)(6). (Adv.
Com. com., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420.) Here, Sanchez had the opportunity to
present evidence of childhood trauma, both in his Romero motion and at the sentencing
hearing itself. Sanchez also expressly argued to the sentencing court that it was required
to sentence him to the low term unless it found the low term to be unjust. Prior to
imposing sentence, the court stated on the record that it had considered evidence of
Sanchez’s childhood trauma but determined that the middle term was appropriate because
of his extensive criminal history. On this record, we cannot say that the court failed to
consider section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), or that its decision to impose the middle term
notwithstanding the provision was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person
could agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
       3. Aggravating Factors Used to Impose the Middle Term Need Not be Admitted to
          or Proven Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
       Sanchez next argues that prior to sentencing him to the middle term, the trial court
was required to state on the record what proven or admitted aggravating circumstances
made the imposition of the low term unjust. Sanchez misunderstands section 1170,
subdivision (b), and California Rules of Court, rule 4.420, both of which distinguish
between the imposition of an upper and middle term, not a middle and lower term. While
aggravating circumstances used by a sentencing court to impose an upper term must be
“stipulated to by the defendant” or “found true beyond a reasonable doubt” (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(2), Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(a)), no similar requirement exists for imposition of
a middle term. Indeed, rule 4.420(d) provides for the opposite, stating, “In selecting

                                              6
between the middle and lower terms of imprisonment . . . [t]he court may consider factors
in aggravation and mitigation, whether or not the factors have been stipulated to by the
defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the judge in a
court trial.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.420(d), italics added.) Because the trial court
sentenced Sanchez to the middle term, not the upper term, any aggravating circumstance
it relied upon to do so did not need to be stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable
doubt. In addition, the trial court did specify on the record the aggravating factor it
believed made the imposition of a lower term sentence contrary to justice—namely,
Sanchez’s extensive criminal history. This complied with section 1170, subdivision (c).
       We perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to sentence Sanchez to
the middle term.
                                      III.   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

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                                  _______________________________
                                   Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_______________________________
  Grover, J.

_______________________________
  Lie, J.

H049979
People v. Sanchez

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