Court Opinion

ID: 9366980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-30 15:07:49.658247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:56.369353
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued January 26, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-21-00341-CV
                           ———————————
              PAKISTAN PETROLEUM LIMITED, Appellant
                                        V.
 SPECIALTY PROCESS EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, SPEC ENERGY
   DMCC, SPEC OIL & GAS FZCO, S7 CONSTRUCTION INC., AND
           NEWPORT OIL & GAS (USA), LLC, Appellees

                    On Appeal from the 11th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 2019-35747

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                   Background

      In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, appellant Pakistan Petroleum Limited

(PPL) appeals the trial court’s order denying its special appearance in the suit
brought against it by appellees Specialty Process Equipment Corporation, SPEC

Energy DMCC, SPEC Oil & Gas FZCO, S7 Construction Inc., and Newpoint Oil &

Gas (USA) LLC, asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and

quantum meruit. In two issues, PPL contends that the trial court erred in denying its

special appearance because there is insufficient evidence to support the exercise of

personal jurisdiction over it. We reverse and render.

                                   Background

A.    Factual History

      PPL is a gas exploration and production company organized and existing

under the laws of Pakistan and with its principal place of business in Karachi. SPEC

Energy DMCC (DMCC) is a company organized and existing under the laws of the

United Arab Emirates (UAE) with its principal place of business in Dubai.

      In 2015, PPL sought bids for a project to build a gas processing facility at

Gambat South Block in Sindh, Pakistan (the Project). It published an invitation to

bid in Dawn, the local newspaper in Pakistan, the Khaleej Times, a UAE newspaper,

and the Houston Chronicle in Texas. Fareed Siddiqui, PPL’s corporate

representative, testified that PPL published the invitation in the Houston Chronicle

because its website is widely read by oil and gas business professionals throughout

the world and PPL wanted to reach an international audience. DMCC did not see

                                          2
PPL’s invitation in the Houston Chronicle but instead learned about the invitation to

bid through “word of mouth.” DMCC submitted a bid for the Project.

      PPL and DMCC conducted negotiations in Dubai and Pakistan. Following

PPL’s selection of DMCC as the contractor for the Project, PPL and DMCC

executed a Works Contract for Gas Processing Facility (GPF-III) at Gambat South

Block on Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Commissioning (EPCC)

Basis (the Contract) in Pakistan on May 9, 2016.

      Under the Contract, DMCC was responsible for the design engineering,

procurement (supply) of materials, construction, installation/erection, pre-

commissioning, commissioning, and startup of the Project, as well as remedying any

defects arising during the defect liability period. Under Section 3.2 of the Contract,

all equipment and materials had to be supplied from vendors on PPL’s approved

vendor list which included vendors from all over the world. DMCC decided which

approved vendors to select from the list. Section 3.7 of the Contract provided that

DMCC was responsible for the cost of all services, including materials and personnel

required for its performance, and the import of equipment and materials. Under

Section 3.10, PPL was responsible for the issuance of documents required for

DMCC’s execution of its work.

       Section 3.15 provided that daily progress review meetings would be held at

the plant site and monthly progress review meetings would be held in Karachi,

                                          3
Pakistan. Under Section 3.17, DMCC was required to provide insurance that

complied with the applicable laws in the country of operation. Section 3.19 stated

that the Contract “shall be construed and governed in accordance with the laws in

Pakistan” and contract disputes were to “be referred for resolution by arbitration in

Karachi.” Section 3.34.1 provided:

       In case of JV/Consortium, the invoice(s) shall be raised by the lead
       consortium partner on behalf of itself and other JV consortium
       partner(s) clearly stating the amounts attributable to each consortium
       partner. The COMPANY shall make payment to the designated
       accounts of each consortium partner respectively as per the amounts
       mentioned in the invoices(s) [sic].

       The Contract price was US $70,750,644.1 Under the Contract, PPL was

required to pay DMCC various percentages of the Contract price based upon

DMCC’s achievement of certain milestones. Section 3.28.13 of the Contract set forth

the procedure for DMCC to submit an invoice for payment by PPL of a percentage

of the Contract price once particular milestones were met. DMCC also provided

bank guarantees and bonds from financial institutions located in Pakistan and the

UAE.

B.     Procedural History

       By September 2018, relations between PPL and DMCC had deteriorated.

Citing Section 3.24, DMCC invoked the arbitration clause of the Contract and filed

1
       The amount due was (i) US $63,000,764; and (ii) PKR 811,800,027.00 (equivalent
       to US $7,749,880 on the date of the Contract) for the work.
                                          4
for arbitration of the dispute in Pakistan. DMCC also filed claims against PPL in a

court in Dubai related to the encashing of performance bonds DMCC had provided

to PPL under the terms of the Contract. Additionally, DMCC and PPL have pending

claims in the High Court of Sindh, Pakistan, related to the contract dispute. In

February 2019, PPL and DMCC met in Islamabad to discuss their dispute and

attempt to reach a resolution, but to no avail. On May 10, 2019, PPL terminated the

Contract.

      On May 23, 2019, DMCC and its “sister companies”—Specialty Process

Equipment Corporation (SPEC) (a Texas corporation), SPEC Oil & Gas FZCO

(SPEC Oil & Gas) (a UAE company), and S7 Construction Inc. (S7) (a Texas

corporation)—filed suit against PPL in Harris County, Texas, asserting claims for

breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and attorney’s fees. They alleged that they

entered into the Contract with PPL as a joint venture alliance with DMCC as the lead

partner. They later amended their petition to add Newpoint Oil & Gas (USA) LLC,

formerly known as Newpoint Gas LLC (a Texas limited liability company)

(Newpoint), as a plaintiff as well as a claim for quantum meruit. DMCC and the

other plaintiffs pleaded that the trial court had jurisdiction over PPL “pursuant to §

17.042 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because [PPL] contracted

with a Texas resident (namely SPEC, S7[,] and Newpoint), and each of SPEC, S7,

and Newpoint performed the contract in whole or in part in Harris County, Texas.”

                                          5
      On June 24, 2019, PPL filed a special appearance and motion to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction which it later amended. PPL argued that (1) it is a non-resident

foreign corporation with its principal place of business in Pakistan, (2) the Contract

was executed by PPL and DMCC only, (3) PPL had no relationship or connection

with any other plaintiff, and (4) the entire work under the Contract was to be

completed in Pakistan. It further asserted that the contract was executed in Pakistan

and governed by the laws of Pakistan and that all payments under the Contract were

made to DMCC from Pakistan. It attached copies of the filings related to the

arbitration and litigation in Pakistan and the Contract as exhibits to its amended

special appearance.

      On September 26, 2019, DMCC and the other plaintiffs filed a motion for

continuance of the special appearance hearing, a request for sanctions, and a motion

for limited discovery. On September 27, 2019, they filed a response to PPL’s

amended special appearance arguing that Texas courts could exercise specific

jurisdiction over PPL because (1) the Contract specifically authorized work to be

performed in Texas and (2) PPL’s contacts with Texas were substantial. They

attached the following as exhibits to their response:

         1) a copy of the Contract,

         2) a Recommended Vendors/Manufacturers List,

                                          6
          3) Franchise Tax Account Status printouts reflecting that SPEC and S7 are

             registered businesses in the State of Texas,

          4) the declarations of Zafar Sheikh, a Director of DMCC, SPEC, SPEC

             Oil & Gas, and S7, and Irtaza Sheikh, a Director of S7,

          5) various purchase orders, and

          6) photographs of employees at the Project site.

The trial court granted the motion for continuance and the request for limited

discovery.

      The parties completed jurisdictional discovery and subsequently filed

additional briefing and evidence prior to the hearing on the special appearance.

Following a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court signed an order denying PPL’s

special appearance on June 7, 2021. The trial court also denied PPL’s request for

findings of fact and conclusions of law. This interlocutory appeal followed.

                                     Discussion

      PPL contends that the trial court erred in denying its special appearance

because PPL lacks sufficient minimum contacts to support the assertion of specific

or general jurisdiction, and that any implied finding from the trial court that PPL had

sufficient minimum contacts to support the exercise of jurisdiction is not supported

                                          7
by legally or factually sufficient evidence.2 In support of its contention, it argues that

(1) PPL contracted only with DMCC, a UAE company, and not the Texas plaintiffs,

(2) an analysis of the factors applicable to breach-of-contract disputes demonstrates

that jurisdiction is lacking, and (3) the remaining alleged minimum contacts relied

on by appellees are insufficient. It further argues that exercising jurisdiction over

PPL would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

      Appellees respond that PPL failed to satisfy its burden to negate each of the

bases of personal jurisdiction alleged in their amended petition. They argue that PPL

engaged in sufficient minimum contacts to establish specific jurisdiction because it

(1) contracted with an entity with a strong presence in Texas, (2) conducted business

with Texas residents, (3) advertised in Texas, and (4) required appellees, vendors,

and contractors to comply with Texas law. It also asserts that a substantial amount

of work within the scope of the Contract was performed in Texas.

A.    Standard of Review

      We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a special

appearance. Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806

(Tex. 2002). A plaintiff must plead allegations that bring a non-resident defendant

2
      A nonresident’s contacts can give rise to either general or specific personal
      jurisdiction. Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex.
      2013). Because appellees concede on appeal that, on these facts, general jurisdiction
      does not exist as to PPL, we consider only whether specific jurisdiction exists.

                                            8
within the provisions of the Texas long-arm statute. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v.

Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex. 2002). The Texas long-arm statute provides

that a non-resident who “does business” in the state, such as by contracting with a

Texas resident where the contract is to be performed in whole or in part in Texas, is

subject to personal jurisdiction. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042(1); BMC

Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795.

      Once the plaintiff has pleaded sufficient jurisdictional allegations, the

defendant filing a special appearance bears the burden to negate all bases of personal

jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Const., Inc., 301 S.W.3d

653, 658 (Tex. 2010). “Because the plaintiff defines the scope and nature of the

lawsuit, the defendant’s corresponding burden to negate jurisdiction is tied to the

allegations in the plaintiff’s pleading.” Id. at 658; Brenham Oil & Gas, Inc. v. TGS–

NOPEC Geophysical Co., 472 S.W.3d 744, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2015, no pet.). The defendant can negate jurisdiction on either a factual or legal

basis. Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 659. Factually, the defendant can present evidence that

it has no contacts with Texas, effectively disproving the plaintiff’s allegations. Id.

Legally, the defendant can show that even if the plaintiff’s alleged facts are true, the

evidence is legally insufficient to establish jurisdiction. Id.

      When, as here, a trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusion of

law in support of a special appearance ruling, then “all facts necessary to support the

                                            9
judgment and supported by the evidence are implied.” BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at

795. However, these findings are not conclusive when the appellate record includes

both the clerk’s and reporter’s records, as it does here, and a party may challenge

these findings for legal and factual sufficiency on appeal. Id.; Waterman Steamship

Corp. v. Ruiz, 355 S.W.3d 387, 402 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet.

denied).

B.    Applicable Law

      Texas courts may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if

(1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction, and (2) the

exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state due process standards.

Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007). The Texas

long-arm statute allows Texas courts to exercise personal jurisdiction “as far as the

federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit.” BMC Software, 83

S.W.3d at 795 (quotation omitted). Federal due process requires that the nonresident

defendant have purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state,

such that the defendant reasonably could anticipate being sued there. Curocom

Energy LLC v. Young–Sub Shim, 416 S.W.3d 893, 896 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2013, no pet.). The exercise of personal jurisdiction must also comport with

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.

                                           10
      Specific jurisdiction arises when the defendant purposefully avails itself of

conducting activities in the forum state, and the cause of action arises from or is

related to those contacts or activities. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,

472 (1985); Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658; Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling

Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. 2009). In a specific jurisdiction analysis, “we focus

. . . on the ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum[,] and the litigation.’” Moki

Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575–76 (quoting Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v.

English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 228 (Tex. 1991)). The plaintiff must

show a substantial connection between the defendant’s contacts with the forum state

and the operative facts of the litigation. Id. at 585. The “purposeful availment”

inquiry has three parts. See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168

S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005). First, only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are

relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or a third person. Id. Second, the

contacts relied upon must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or

attenuated. Id.; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 n.18. Third, the “defendant

must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by ‘availing’ itself of the jurisdiction.”

Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785.

C.    Specific Jurisdiction —Breach of Contract Claim

      In its amended petition, appellees pleaded that “[t]he Court has jurisdiction

over PPL pursuant to § 17.042 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

                                           11
because [PPL] contracted with a Texas resident (namely SPEC, S7[,] and Newpoint),

and each of SPEC, S7[,] and Newpoint performed the contract in whole or in part in

Harris County, Texas.” PPL contends that the evidence conclusively negates this

alleged basis for jurisdiction. It argues that even if the evidence showed that such a

contract existed, jurisdiction would nevertheless be lacking.

      1.     Parties to the Contract

      “As a general rule, the benefits and burdens of a contract belong solely to the

contracting parties, and no person can sue upon a contract except he be a party to or

in privity with it.” First Bank v. Brumitt, 519 S.W.3d 95, 102–03 (Tex. 2017)

(quotation omitted); Kenyon Int’l Emergency Servs., Inc. v. Starr Indem. & Liab.

Co., No. 01-17-00386-CV, 2018 WL 6241461, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Nov. 29, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Here, the Contract for the construction

of the gas processing facility in Pakistan states that it is between PPL, the Company,

and DMCC, the Contractor. The contract is signed only by two parties: PPL and

DMCC. No other party appears on the face of the Contract.

      Appellees argue that they are parties to the Contract because they bid on the

Project and executed the Contract as a consortium/joint venture. They assert that the

consortium/joint venture consisted of DMCC, as the lead consortium/joint venture

partner, and the other entities including SPEC, SPEC Oil & Gas, and S7. They argue

that the Contract “indisputably acknowledges that a consortium/joint venture is

                                         12
being used for the Project.” In support of their argument, appellees point to Section

3.34.1 of the Contract:

      In case of JV/Consortium, the invoice(s) shall be raised by the lead
      consortium partner on behalf of itself and other JV consortium
      partner(s) clearly stating the amounts attributable to each consortium
      partner. The COMPANY shall make payment to the designated
      accounts of each consortium partner respectively as per the amounts
      mentioned in the invoices(s) [sic].

      Section 3.34.1 does not establish that appellees executed the Contract as a

consortium/joint venture. Rather, the provision provides the procedure for invoicing

in the event of a joint venture/consortium. And, as noted above, the Contract itself

does not reflect execution as a consortium/joint venture. Siddiqui testified that the

bidding procedure for the Contract requires any joint venture be identified in writing

and that a copy of the joint venture agreement, which would include the composition

of the joint venture, be provided with the bidding document. There is nothing in the

record showing that a joint venture agreement was provided in the bid. Irtaza Sheikh,

appellees’ corporate representative, testified that he did not know if an agreement

among the purported consortium members existed. There is no evidence that

appellees executed the Contract as a joint venture.

      PPL argues that even if DMCC had executed the Contract as a joint

venture/consortium, this fact alone would not render each individual member of the

joint venture an actual party to the agreement. We agree. “[A] joint venture, like a

partnership, is an entity legally distinct from the partners.” Bank One, Tex., N.A. v.
                                         13
Stewart, 967 S.W.2d 419, 444 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).

And, “a contract with one corporation . . . is generally not a contract with any other

corporate affiliates.” In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Tex.

2007) (orig. proceeding); see also R. Hassell Builders, Inc. v. Texan Floor Serv.,

Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 816, 829–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied)

(noting that while corporation and joint venture were part of same “corporate

family,” they were each separate legal entities and “[a]s such, they are each

responsible for their own debts and liabilities.”).

      2.     Purchase Orders

      Appellees argue that, pursuant to the Contract, each individual invoice for

approved work performed by the consortium members constituted an agreement for

PPL to pay. They assert that each individual invoice that DMCC sent for SPEC and

S7 (Texas corporations) was an individual contract for PPL to pay SPEC and S7.

This argument is unavailing. The “invoices” upon which appellees rely are purchase

orders sent by DMCC to various vendors. PPL is not named as a purchaser on any

of the purchase orders. The materials purchased were all to be shipped to SPEC Oil

& Gas in Dubai. Irtaza Sheikh testified that only DMCC, and no other party, was to

receive payments from PPL under the Contract. This comports with Section 3.7.20

of the Contract which provides that DMCC was responsible for procuring and paying

vendors for the materials. Because PPL was not a party to the purchase orders, the

                                           14
orders do not establish a contract between PPL and SPEC or PPL and S7. See

Brumitt, 519 S.W.3d at 102 (noting benefits and burdens of contract belong only to

contracting parties); see also Shell Compania Argentina de Petroleo, S.A. v. Reef

Expl., Inc., 84 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied)

(holding that defendant was not party to various agreements and therefore

agreements were not relevant to consideration of issue of specific jurisdiction).

      3.     Factors Applicable in Breach-of-Contract Disputes

      Moreover, even if appellees could demonstrate that PPL contracted with the

Texas entities, that fact alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction. Merely

contracting with a Texas corporation does not satisfy the minimum contacts

requirement. Shell Compania Argentina, 84 S.W.3d at 837 (citing TeleVentures, Inc.

v. Int’l Game Tech., 12 S.W.3d 900, 908 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied)).

Prior negotiations, contemplated future consequences, the terms of a contract, and

the parties’ course of dealing are all factors that must be considered in determining

whether a defendant purposely established minimum contacts within the forum. Id.

      In this case, the undisputed evidence shows that contract negotiations and

execution of the Contract took place in Dubai or Pakistan, not Texas. As to

contemplated future consequences, the Contract expressly provides that any future

disputes would be governed by Pakistani law and subject to arbitration in Pakistan.

This evidence supports a finding that PPL did not purposefully avail itself of Texas.

                                         15
See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 792 (noting that “insertion of a clause designating a

foreign forum suggests that no local availment was intended”).

      The “place of contractual performance” is also an important consideration in

determining whether a defendant purposely availed itself of the forum state. See

Sayers Constr., L.L.C. v. Timberline Constr., Inc., 976 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 2020).

As part of this consideration, courts look at whether the contract contemplated or

required performance in Texas, where the defendant performed its obligations, and

where the contract centered. See M & F Worldwide Corp. v. Pepsi–Cola Metro.

Bottling Co., 512 S.W.3d 878, 889 (Tex. 2017) (noting fact that contract did not

contemplate or require performance in Texas); see also Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v.

OAO Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding plaintiff’s unilateral

performance of activities in Texas was insufficient where “the defendant did not

perform any of its obligations in Texas, the contract did not require performance in

Texas, and the contract is centered outside of Texas.”). Here, the Contract is for the

construction of a gas processing facility located in Pakistan—thus, the place of the

Contract’s performance is centered in Pakistan. The Contract also provided that

regular status meetings would be held either in Karachi or at the site in Pakistan. All

payments were made to DMCC from Pakistan. Nothing in the Contract contemplates

or requires performance in Texas. See Univ. of Ala. v. Suder Found., No. 05-16-

00691-CV, 2017 WL 655948, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 17, 2017, no pet.)

                                          16
(mem. op.) (concluding circumstances did not establish purposeful availment where

“[the Defendant’s] contract performance was substantially in Alabama, and the

parties’ contractual relationship was centered in Alabama, not Texas”); Weatherford

Artificial Lift Sys., Inc. v. A & E Sys. SDN BHD, 470 S.W.3d 604, 615 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (concluding that evidence showing contract was

negotiated in Malaysia and required that payment would have been made from

Malaysia was insufficient to support exercise of jurisdiction in Texas).

      4.     Approved Vendor List

      Appellees argue that Section 3.2 of the Contract contemplated performance in

Texas. That section provides: “All equipment and materials supplied under the

CONTRACT shall be new/unused and from the vendor as mentioned in

recommended manufacturer/vendor list . . .” They point out that over 90% of the

approved vendors are located outside of Pakistan, with many of them in the United

States, and the Contract contemplated that the parties to the Contract would use

Texas vendors for performance of the Project. Thus, they argue, PPL specifically

targeted Texas residents.

      While the forty-four page approved vendor list includes some Texas vendors,

it includes companies from all over the world and nearly every one of the companies

is listed as international. The international focus of the approved vendor list suggests

that Texas was neither targeted nor the focus of the list. See Suder Found., 2017 WL

                                          17
655948, at *7 (concluding fact that defendant university was obligated to assist in

development of Texas-based foundation’s national program and provide it with data

to promote its larger nationwide mission underscored that contractual relationship

was not Texas-centered). And, appellees’ corporate representative testified that it

was DMCC who chose the Texas vendors, not PPL. Thus, it stands to reason that

DMCC could have equally chosen a vendor from outside of Texas.

      5.      Insurance Provision

      Appellees assert that Section 3.17 of the Contract requires all vendors and

subcontractors to carry insurance that complies with the law of the state that the

vendor is in—that is, comply with the laws of the State of Texas. They argue that

this evidence demonstrates that PPL purposely availed itself of Texas law. However,

by its terms, Section 3.17 applies to any subcontractor anywhere in the world and is

not specific to Texas. This means that Texas law would only be implicated when

DMCC selected a Texas vendor. Such a contact is merely fortuitous rather than

purposeful. See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785 (stating that contacts relied upon must

be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated to constitute purposeful

availment).

      6.      Work Performed in Texas and Other States

     Appellees contend, as they did in the trial court below, that PPL engaged in

more than $16 million worth of work related to the Contract with entities located in

                                        18
the United States of which approximately 66% was performed in Texas or by Texas

residents. They assert that the total amount of work contracted for by Texas residents

on the project is $10,590,409.37. Thus, they argue, Texas residents made up a large

part of PPL’s business dealings related to the Project.

      In their response to PPL’s special appearance, appellees included a chart

listing the vendors chosen by DMCC who provided materials for the Project. The

chart reflects that $16 million worth of work for the gas processing plant was

performed in Texas and various other states. The chart shows that a significant

portion of the materials were provided from vendors outside of Texas—including

Wisconsin, Tennessee, New York, Indiana, and Oklahoma—and two of the locations

are listed as “USA.” The work performed for the project outside of Texas is not

relevant to determining whether PPL had any contacts with Texas. See J. McIntyre

Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011) (plurality op.) (“Here the question

concerns the authority of a New Jersey state court to exercise jurisdiction, so it is

petitioner’s purposeful contacts with New Jersey, not with the United States, that

alone are relevant.”). After the amount of work performed by the non-Texas entities

is deducted, the chart shows that the amount of work performed in Texas is slightly

more than $10.5 million. The chart also includes two purchase orders from Newpoint

that DMCC stated in the arbitration were cancelled. With the cancellation of those

purchase orders, the amount of work performed in Texas is reduced to slightly more

                                         19
than $1.8 million, of which only $180,000 was performed by an appellee (S7) in this

case. When viewed in the context of the entire amount ($16 million), and given the

undisputed evidence that DMCC, not PPL chose the vendors for the project, this

evidence is insufficient to support an implied finding that “millions of dollars’ worth

of work was perform[ed] in Texas by SPEC plaintiffs.”

      7.     Inspection in Texas

      Appellees argue that, under the Contract, PPL ordered an inspection of the

work completed in Texas, and that this contact demonstrates purposeful availment.

      Siddiqui testified that PPL hired TUV, an Austrian company, to perform

inspections all over the world, and that the inspectors would go “anywhere where

[]DMCC tells them to go for inspection.” Siddiqui testified that the company

performed one inspection in Texas, one in Colorado, and forty or fifty in the UAE.

One inspection in Texas, which occurred at DMCC’s direction, is merely an isolated

contact which cannot support jurisdiction. See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785 (stating

that, for purposes of purposeful availment inquiry, only defendant’s contacts with

forum are relevant, not unilateral activity of third person, and contacts relied upon

must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated).

                                          20
        8.    Houston Chronicle Advertisement

        Appellees point to PPL’s advertisement in the Houston Chronicle to publish

its invitation to bid on the Project as evidence that PPL targeted Texas businesses

and marketed its project in Texas.

        Siddiqui testified that PPL published the invitation to bid on the Project in

Dawn, the local newspaper in Pakistan, the Khaleej Times, a UAE newspaper, and

the Houston Chronicle in Texas. He testified that PPL published the invitation in the

Houston Chronicle because its website is widely read by oil and gas business

professionals throughout the world and PPL wanted to reach an international

audience. Irtaza Sheikh acknowledged that DMCC did not see the Houston

Chronicle listing but instead learned about the invitation to bid through “word of

mouth.” This single advertisement in the Houston Chronicle, intended for an

international audience and which DMCC did not see, is an isolated contact that does

not satisfy jurisdictional requirements. See id.

D.      Specific Jurisdiction—Unjust Enrichment and Quantum Meruit Claims

        In addition to their breach of contract claim, appellees asserted claims for

unjust enrichment and quantum meruit against PPL. As to their unjust enrichment

claim, appellees alleged:

     • Defendant received Plaintiffs’ work valued at the full amount of the
       contract. This money belongs to Plaintiffs in equity and good
       conscience. Further, the goods and services were obtained by

                                          21
      Defendant on account of fraud and taking undue advantage of Plaintiffs
      (directly and indirectly[)] through Defendant’s representatives.

As to their quantum meruit claim, appellees alleged:

   • Plaintiffs provided valuable services and materials to Defendant PPL
     as evidenced by its detailed invoices documenting these items. These
     services and supplies were rendered for the direct benefit of Defendant
     PPL. Further, these services and supplies were accepted by Defendant
     PPL, and Defendant PPL was notified that in performing these services
     and providing these supplies, Plaintiff expected to be paid by Defendant
     PPL.

      Under Texas’s long-arm statute, appellees were required to plead that PPL

committed the alleged tortious acts in Texas. See Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658–59 (“If

the plaintiff fails to plead facts bringing the defendant within reach of the long-arm

statute (i.e., for a tort claim, that the defendant committed tortious acts in Texas), the

defendant need only prove that it does not live in Texas to negate jurisdiction.”);

Proppant Sols., LLC v. Delgado, 471 S.W.3d 529, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658–59). Neither appellees’

amended petition nor its responsive briefing alleges that PPL committed any acts in

Texas much less any tortious acts. That is, appellees did not plead where any alleged

fraud and taking of undue advantage occurred, and appellees do not contend that

these alleged acts occurred in Texas. Similarly, appellees’ allegations underlying

their quantum meruit claim do not identify where PPL’s alleged actions occurred.

Moreover, we note that any alleged services and supplies would presumably have

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been accepted by PPL at the plant in Pakistan.3 See Vinmar Overseas Singapore PTE

Ltd. v. PTT Int’l Trading PTE Ltd., 538 S.W.3d 126, 133 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (“When the plaintiff fails to allege an act by the defendant

occurring in Texas, the plaintiff has not met its initial burden of pleading acts

sufficient to invoke jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.”); see also

Moncrief, 414 S.W.3d at 153–54, 156–57 (holding nonresident defendant was

subject to jurisdiction for misappropriation of trade secrets claim where defendant

obtained trade secrets in Texas but not for tortious interference claim where alleged

acts of interference occurred outside of Texas). Because PPL proved that it is not a

Texas resident, it negated personal jurisdiction over appellees’ unjust enrichment

and quantum meruit claims. See Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658–59.

      Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support any

implied finding that PPL had sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to support the

exercise of jurisdiction over it. Because PPL did not purposefully avail itself of the

privilege of conducting activities in Texas, the trial court erred in denying its

amended special appearance. Having concluded that PPL negated all bases for the

assertion of personal jurisdiction, we sustain PPL’s issues.4

3
      Appellees do not address the issue of jurisdiction over their unjust enrichment and
      quantum meruit claims in their brief on appeal.
4
      In light of our holding, we need not address the question of whether the exercise of
      personal jurisdiction would offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial
                                            23
                                    Conclusion

      We reverse the trial court’s June 7, 2021 order denying PPL’s amended

special appearance and render judgment dismissing appellees’ claims against PPL.

                                               Amparo Guerra
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Hightower, and Guerra.

      justice. See 11500 Space Ctr., L.L.C. v. Private Cap. Grp., Inc., 577 S.W.3d 322,
      336 n.9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
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