Court Opinion

ID: 9738345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:50:47.772016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.510433
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP specially concurring: I concur in the conclusion that the judgment of conviction for reckless homicidé must be reversed, but suggest that it is unnecessary to hold that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3(b), is unconstitutional for want of due process and denial of equal protection of the law. It is the established policy of our courts to consider and determine constitutional issues only when necessary to a determination of the case. (People v. Sledge, 25 Ill.2d 403, 185 N.E.2d 262; People v. Fleming, 50 Ill.2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 872.) Since the constitutional issues are only reviewed upon the court’s suggestion of plain error, it seems appropriate to recall such policy. The principal opinion makes quite clear that within the language of par. 9 — 3(b), the elements of the respective offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide are identical and that the proof which would suffice to convict for one offense would equally support conviction of the other. Upon such premise, the judgment of not guilty of the offense of involuntary manslaughter is ‘legally inconsistent” with the finding of guilty of reckless homicide. (People v. Hairston, 46 Ill.2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840; People v. Joyner, 50 Ill.2d 302, 278 N.E.2d 756.) The opinion in Hairston quotes the language: “ ‘In law there is no inconsistency in verdicts of acquittal and conviction upon charges of crimes composed of different elements, but arising out of the same state of facts.’ ” It being apparent, as developed in the principal opinion, that there are, in fact, no “different elements” in the two offenses here charged, these verdicts are necessarily inconsistent. Hairston suggests that the inconsistent verdicts would require a new trial upon all counts. It appears, however, that a new trial upon the charge of involuntary manslaughter would not be permitted by the rule in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707, and Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300. A remandment and new trial upon the single charge of reckless homicide would seem to come necessarily within the operation of the doctrine of “collateral estoppel” stated in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, in that through the final judgment of not guilty of involuntary manslaughter it has been determined as an ultimate fact that defendant did not recklessly and willfully drive his automobile in such manner as to cause death. The verdicts being inconsistent in the legal sense, and a new trial upon the charge of reckless homicide being barred through collateral estoppel as a form of double jeopardy, the conviction must be reversed.