Court Opinion

ID: 9759308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:11:51.58101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:01.077858
License: Public Domain

BELL, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Vernon Evans, Jr. challenges the judgments of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County denying: his motion, filed, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-435(a) and premised on the holdings in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), and Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (“Miller-El II”), to correct an illegal sentence (Appeal # 107) and his Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Proceeding, premised on these decisions (Appeal # 123) and on the findings of a study of the Maryland capital punishment system by University of Maryland Professor Raymond Paternoster, and request, in connection therewith, for discovery (Appeal # 124), and the challenge *371by Evans and others1 to the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City denying their motion for preliminary injunctive relief, to enjoin his execution, and all other executions, by lethal injection under the current protocol, which they alleged was improperly promulgated and was materially in conflict with Maryland Code (1999, 2006 Cum.Supp.) § 3-905 of the Correctional Services Article (Appeal # 122). The majority finds merit only in the argument that the execution protocol was not properly promulgated. 396 Md. 256, 271-72, 914 A.2d 25, 34 (2006). As to this aspect of Appeal No. 122, it reverses the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and remands the case to that court for issuance of a “final” injunction, id. at 341-42, 914 A.2d at 75-76 enjoining its use “until either (1) it is adopted as a regulation in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, or (2) the Legislature exempts it from the requirements of that Act.” Id. at 271-72, 914 A.2d at 34.
I do not disagree with the majority’s resolution of the “regulation” issue. On the other hand, I cannot agree with its other holdings and, indeed, take strong exception to them. Accordingly, as to each of them, I dissent.
A.
Maryland Rule 4-345, SENTENCING—REVISORY POWER OF COURT, provides, as relevant, “[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” To be sure,
“as a general rule, a Rule 4-345(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence is not appropriate where the alleged illegality ‘did not inhere in [the defendant’s] sentence.’ State v. Kanaras, [357 Md. 170, 185, 742 A.2d 508, 517 (1999) ]. A motion to correct an illegal sentence ordinarily can be granted only where there is some illegality in the sentence itself or where no sentence should have been imposed. See, e.g., Ridgeway v. State, 369 Md. 165, 171, 797 A.2d 1287, *3721290 (2002); Holmes v. State, 362 Md. 190, 763 A.2d 737 (2000); Moosavi v. State, 355 Md. 651, 662-663, 736 A.2d 285, 291 (1999). On the other hand, a trial court error during the sentencing proceeding is not ordinarily cognizable under Rule 4-345(a) where the resulting sentence or sanction is itself lawful. Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 323, 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989) (‘[W]hile improper motivation may justify vacation of the sentence, it does not render the sentence illegal within the meaning of Rule 4-345. Appellant did not raise this contention on direct appeal and may not do so here’). See also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430, 82 S.Ct. 468, 472, 7 L.Ed.2d 417, 422 (1962).”
Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 278-79, 855 A.2d 291, 309 (2004). There is, however, as the Evans Court itself acknowledged, “an exception to the above-summarized principles,” “where, in a capital sentencing proceeding, an alleged error of constitutional dimension may have contributed to the death sentence, at least where the allegation of error is partly based upon a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of this Court rendered after the defendant’s capital sentencing proceeding.” Id. It cited as an example of the exception, Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017, 124 S.Ct. 2084, 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004), which it summarized:
“[Oken] was a Rule 4-345 proceeding to correct an illegal or irregular sentence. The defendant Oken argued, relying on recent Supreme Court cases,[2] that a constitutional error in the capital sentencing proceeding contributed to the death *373sentence. Section 2-303(i) of the Maryland death penalty statute provides that the trier of facts ‘shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the aggravating circumstances under subsection (g) of this section outweigh the mitigating circumstances.’ (Emphasis added). In Oken, the case was presented to the sentencing jury under this ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard. The defendant Oken had raised no objection to this in the sentencing proceeding or in a prior post conviction proceeding. In the Rule 4-345 proceeding, however, Oken argued that the preponderance of the evidence standard violated due process and that a ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard was constitutionally required. This Court, in the Rule 4-345 proceeding, resolved the merits of the constitutional issue, with the majority holding that application of the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard was constitutional. See also Oken v. State, 367 Md. 191, 195, 786 A.2d 691, 693 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1074, 122 S.Ct. 1953, 152 L.Ed.2d 855 (2002), where the Court decided the merits of a similar challenge by the defendant Oken.”
Id. at 279-280, 855 A.2d at 309.
Concluding that the case presented by Evans was in the same posture—he claimed, relying chiefly on Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000), a United States Supreme Court opinion filed after his 1992 capital sentencing proceeding, that a provision of the Maryland death penalty statute was unconstitutionally applied to him at his capital sentencing proceeding and that this alleged error may have resulted in the death sentence—we decided the merits of that claim. Id. at 280, 855 A.2d at 309-310.
More recently, this Court, in Baker v. State, 389 Md. 127, 883 A.2d 916 (2005), applied the historic approach to illegal sentence review. There, the defendant, under sentence of death, which had been affirmed on direct appeal, filed, pursuant to Rule 4-345(a), a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, as well as a Motion to Reopen the Post-Conviction Proceeding, and a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 389 Md. at 131, 883 A.2d at 918. The defendant principally relied on a Uni*374versity of Maryland study of the Maryland Capital punishment system conducted by Professor Raymond Paternoster of the University of Maryland, 389 Md. at 131, 883 A.2d at 918, the same study relied upon which Evans relies in the instant case, albeit for a different legal purpose. Contending that study’s statistical findings establish that Maryland’s death penalty was sought more frequently depending on the racial combinations of the accused and the victim and depending on the geographic location of the prosecuted charge, the defendant argued that the death penalty statute was applied to him unconstitutionally. 389 Md. at 132, 883 A.2d at 918-919.
Relying on the constitutionality of Maryland’s death penalty statute under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-69, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2922-23, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 871-72 (1976) and Baker v. State, (Baker II), 367 Md. 648, 676, 790 A.2d 629, 646 (2002) and the lack of direct and specific evidence in the record to “suggest that Baker’s death sentence was surrounded by impropriety of any kind,” citing Baker v. State, (Baker I), 332 Md. 542, 571, 632 A.2d 783, 797 (1993), the Court pronounced Baker’s death sentence to be itself lawful, validly imposed, and, thus “not illegal under the pre-Oken general analytical principles governing motions brought under Rule 4-345(a).” Baker v. State (Baker III), 389 Md. 127, 137-38, 883 A.2d 916, 922 (2005). Acknowledging Oken and Evans, and the exception they represent, but noting the distinction between them and the case under review, the Court concluded that the historic approach, and not the exception, applied to Baker’s case. With regard to the exception, the Court observed:
“In a capital sentencing context, a motion to correct an illegal sentence enables the court to re-evaluate the initial sentence to ensure that it is not illegal, as that term has been defined in our cases considering Maryland Rule 4-345(a), its predecessors, and the common law. It is not an opportunity for the parties to litigate or re-litigate factual issues, but rather a vehicle to demonstrate, particularly in the case of the constitutional decision exception, that newly declared common law causes a penalty that was legal when *375administered now to be illegal as a matter of constitutional law.”
Id. at 140, 883 A.2d at 924 (footnote omitted). Thus, the Court reasoned: “because Baker relies almost exclusively upon the Paternoster Study, rather than a ‘new’ judicial decision bearing on relevant constitutional law, to establish the argued illegality in his sentence, his arguments do not fall within the exception recognized in Oken and Evans.” Id. at 138, 883 A.2d at 922-23.
Subsequently, in Evans v. State, 389 Md. 456, 462-63, 886 A.2d 562, 565 (2005), the Court confirmed its Baker decision, holding that “a statistical analysis conducted by Raymond Paternoster, a Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland, which Evans claims establishes a pattern of racial and geographic discrimination in the implementation of the death penalty in Maryland,” is not “an appropriate vehicle to raise this issue.” Like Baker, however, it recognized, and did not disavow, the exception to the “historic” approach this Court has recognized:
“We acknowledged in Baker that, in Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 184-86, 835 A.2d 1105, 1108, 1157-58 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017, 124 S.Ct. 2084, 158 L.Ed.2d 632 (2004), and in Evans v. State, supra, 382 Md. at 279, 855 A.2d at 309, we had recognized a limited exception to that general principle and had entertained a motion under Rule 4-345(a) where ‘in a capital sentencing proceeding, an alleged error of constitutional dimension may have contributed to the death sentence, at least where the allegation of error is partly based upon a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of this Court rendered after the defendant’s capital sentencing proceeding.’ ”
Id. at 463-64, 886 A.2d at 566, quoting Baker, supra, 389 Md. at 136, 883 A.2d at 921, in turn quoting Evans, supra, 382 Md. at 279, 855 A.2d at 309.
It is Evans’ contention that the decisions in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d *376360 (2005), and Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) are new “interpretations” of relevant constitutional precedents, Wiggins and Rompilla of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Miller-El of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), supporting his argument that an error may have contributed to the imposition of his sentence of death, and, therefore, require correction of that illegal sentence. In other words, Evans contends that the death sentence he received, although legal when imposed, is, in light of these decisions now illegal. Accordingly, a Rule 4-345(a) motion is appropriate. I agree.
1.
At his 1992 resentencing, Evans’ counsel presented a mitigation case. It consisted only of the testimony of six family members, the essence of which was that Evans grew up in a stable and supportive family. No professionals were called to provide mitigating evidence or an expert opinion with respect to Evans’ background or pre-criminal justice system involvement. Aside from testifying that they loved him and hoped that his life would be spared, they painted a picture of a home-life and environment that was happy and stable and of a family that was supportive of him. The testimony described family outings and family dinners, playful children and nurturing and concerned parents, who guided them through their young years. The testimony also reflected these relatives’ disbelief and astonishment that Evans had not accepted this lifestyle and, instead, had rejected it and his upbringing, favoring a life of drugs and violence.
In preparing the mitigation case they would present, counsel did not commission a social history report to be prepared and, thus, none was prepared. Although they retained a mitigation specialist, she was not made a part of the defense team and was not asked to conduct an investigation of Evans’ background or family history. As a result, the mitigation specialist conducted almost no investigation, she never met Evans and spoke to just a few of his family members. No one on the defense team, or on its behalf, reviewed, critically, the *377pertinent social services records pertaining to Evans and, so, the picture painted by the mitigation testimony was neither questioned nor critically analyzed.
This is to be contrasted with the investigation and preparation undertaken by new counsel, after the Wiggins and Rompilla cases, discussed infra, were decided by the United States Supreme Court. Counsel retained a mitigation specialist and charged her with conducting an investigation of Evans’ family and psychosocial history. Having received her report, the findings of which were different from the picture painted by the mitigation case presented at resentencing and, indeed, was in direct conflict with it,3 counsel retained the services of a psychologist to evaluate Evans. She concluded, after reviewing the social history report prepared by the mitigation specialist, interviewing Evans and reviewing records, that Evans met, and had done so since age 9, the criteria for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Chronic and Severe Depressive Disorder, and Generalized Anxiety Disorder, which, after numerous missed opportunities to intervene, left Evans vulnerable to the criminal forces on the City streets.
In Wiggins, the defendant was convicted of capital murder. Prior to his capital sentencing proceeding, his attorneys un*378successfully sought to bifurcate those proceedings, intending to prove that Wiggins was not directly responsible for the victim’s death and, if that failed, to present a mitigation defense. 539 U.S. at 515, 123 S.Ct. at 2532, 156 L.Ed.2d at 481. The motion to bifurcate was denied and, although counsel informed the jury in opening statement that it would hear about Wiggins’ “difficult” life,4 id. at 515,123 S.Ct. at 2532,156 L.Ed.2d at 481, they did not produce, or attempt to produce, any such evidence. Id. Indeed, despite proffering to the court the mitigation case it would have presented had its bifurcation motion been granted, no evidence or information was offered as to Wiggins’ life history or family background.5 Id. at 515-*37916, 123 S.Ct. at 2532, 156 L.Ed.2d at 481. The mitigation case proffered did not involve “any evidence of [Wiggins’] life history or family background,” id. at 516, 123 S.Ct. at 2532, 156 L.Ed.2d at 481, although the State made funds available to investigate those matters. Id. at 517, 123 S.Ct. at 2533, 156 L.Ed.2d at 482. The proffer was simply that he had limited intellectual ability, a childlike emotional state, exhibited no aggressive patterns, had a capacity for empathy and desired to function in the world, all of which would be supported by psychological reports and expert testimony. Id. at 516, 123 S.Ct. at 2532, 156 L.Ed.2d at 481. Wiggins was sentenced to death, and this Court, on direct appeal, affirmed. Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 597 A.2d 1359 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1007, 112 S.Ct. 1765, 118 L.Ed.2d 427 (1992).
Seeking post-conviction relief, Wiggins argued that his trial counsel’s failure to investigate his life history or family background and then present mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background was ineffective assistance of counsel. He relied primarily on Strickland. Under that case, in order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness defined by prevailing professional norms, and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Strickland,, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
In support of his ineffective assistance of counsel argument, Wiggins’ post conviction counsel presented expert testimony by a forensic social worker who “chronicled [Wiggins’] bleak life history.” 539 U.S. at 516, 123 S.Ct. at 2533, 156 L.Ed.2d at 482. The testimony was from the social history report, characterized by the Court as “elaborate,” 539 U.S. at 516,123 S.Ct. at 2531, 156 L.Ed.2d at 481, the social worker prepared from social service, medical, school records and interviews *380with Wiggins and numerous family members, and it provided “evidence of the severe physical and sexual abuse [Wiggins] suffered at the hands of his mother and while in the care of a series of foster parents.” 539 U.S. at 516, 123 S.Ct. at 2533, 156 L.Ed.2d at 482. Acknowledging the failure to investigate Wiggins’ family background or life history, trial counsel defended on the basis that, ‘Veil in advance of trial,” they had decided, upon re-trial, to concentrate on “retrying the factual case,” 539 U.S. at 517, 123 S.Ct. at 2533, 156 L.Ed.2d at 482, and disputing Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the murder. 539 U.S. at 517, 123 S.Ct. at 2533, 156 L.Ed.2d at 482. The trial court denied post-conviction relief, concluding, ‘Vhen the decision not to investigate ... is a matter of trial tactics, there is no ineffective assistance of counsel.” 539 U.S. at 517-518, 123 S.Ct. at 2533,156 L.Ed.2d at 482.
This Court affirmed. Wiggins v. State, 352 Md. 580, 724 A.2d 1 (1999). It agreed with the trial court that counsel’s decision to concentrate on principalship was “a deliberate, tactical decision.” 352 Md. at 608, 724 A.2d at 15. Moreover, the Court concluded that Wiggins’ trial counsel knew of Wiggins’ unfortunate childhood; after all, they had available to them the PSI report prepared by Parole and Probation and the social services report that detailed, albeit not as graphically as the petitioner’s social worker’s social history, instances of physical and sexual abuse, an alcoholic mother, foster care placements and borderline retardation. Thus, the Court stated that “counsel did investigate and were aware of [Wiggins’] background.” 352 Md. at 610, 724 A.2d at 16. Therefore, it reasoned, Wiggins’ counsel “made a reasoned choice to proceed with what they thought was their best defense.” 352 Md. at 610, 724 A.2d at 16.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted relief on Wiggins’ federal habeas petition, holding that Maryland’s rejection of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F.Supp.2d 538, 557 (D.Md.2001). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that trial counsel’s strategic decision to focus *381on establishing that Wiggins was not directly responsible for the murder was a reasonable one. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 639-640 (4th Cir.2002). The United States Supreme Court reversed. It held that the actions of Wiggins’ counsel at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 539 U.S. at 519, 123 S.Ct. at 2534, 156 L.Ed.2d at 483.
In the Supreme Court, Wiggins complained, as had Strickland, about his counsel’s decision to limit their investigation of the availability of mitigation evidence. The Supreme Court held that trial counsel’s decision not to expand their investigation beyond the PSI and DSS records, records of which they were already aware, “fell short of the professional standards that prevailed in Maryland ... ”—standard practice, at that time was to prepare a social history report, Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. at 2536, 156 L.Ed.2d at 486,—and the scope of the investigation they undertook was unreasonable in light of what the DSS records revealed about Wiggins’ mother’s alcoholism, her treatment of him and his siblings, his foster care placements, emotional difficulties, etc., and the fact that counsel had uncovered no evidence indicating that a mitigation case would be, or could be, unproductive. 539 U.S. at 525,123 S.Ct. at 2537, 156 L.Ed.2d at 487. Indeed, the Court was satisfied that the record of the sentencing proceeding, because it demonstrated that counsel never abandoned mitigation as a tactic and, in fact, put one on, albeit a “half hearted” attempt, “underseore[d] the unreasonableness of counsel’s conduct by suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly resulted from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment.” Id. at 526, 123 S.Ct. at 2537, 156 L.Ed.2d at 487.
This Court did not escape the Supreme Court’s criticism. In fact, we were reminded that the reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation can not be determined by assessing, alone, what the attorney knows; a reviewing court needs also to consider, and determine, whether the known information would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further, and that “Strickland does not establish that a cursory investigation automatically justifies a tactical decision with respect to *382sentencing strategy.” Id. at 527, 123 S.Ct. at 2538, 156 L.Ed.2d at 488. Accordingly, the Court admonished:
“The Maryland Court of Appeals’ application of Strickland’s governing legal principles was objectively unreasonable. Though the state court acknowledged petitioner’s claim that counsel’s failure to prepare a social history ‘did not meet the minimum standards of the profession,’ the court did not conduct an assessment of whether the decision to cease all investigation upon obtaining the PSI and the DSS records actually demonstrated reasonable professional judgment----The state court merely assumed that the investigation was adequate. In light of what the PSI and the DSS records actually revealed, however, counsel chose to abandon their investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with respect to sentencing strategy impossible. The Court of Appeals’ assumption that the investigation was adequate ... thus reflected an unreasonable application of Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As a result, the court’s subsequent deference to counsel’s strategic decision not ‘to present every conceivable mitigation defense,’ ... despite the fact that counsel based this alleged choice on what we have made clear was an unreasonable investigation, was also objectively unreasonable. As we established in Strickland, ‘strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.’ ”
Id. at 527-28, 123 S.Ct. at 2538-39, quoting Wiggins, 352 Md. at 609-610, 724 A.2d at 16 and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691,104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695.
Further, the Supreme Court determined that this Court had misapplied the standards articulated in Strickland. 539 U.S. at 527, 123 S.Ct. at 2538, 156 L.Ed.2d at 488. While cautioning that its decision did not mean that Strickland required counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing, and that Strickland does not require counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in *383every case, the Supreme Court re-asserted the principle that strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable only to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. 539 U.S. at 533, 123 S.Ct. at 2541, 156 L.Ed.2d at 492. It held, ultimately, that “[i]n deferring to counsels’ decision not to pursue a mitigation case despite their unreasonable investigation, the Maryland Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Strickland.” 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. at 2542, 156 L.Ed.2d at 492
In addition, the Supreme Court concluded that counsels’ failure to investigate and, then, present mitigating evidence prejudiced Wiggins to the extent that a jury, confronted with such evidence, may have returned a different sentence. 539 U.S. at 536,123 S.Ct. at 2543,156 L.Ed.2d at 494.
Rompilla is also pertinent on the question of the specific application to defense counsel of the reasonable competence standard required by the Sixth Amendment, 545 U.S. 374, 377, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2460, 162 L.Ed.2d 360, 369, and instructive, as it teaches, inter alia, that more is required of counsel by way of investigating the possibility of mitigating evidence than simply interviewing and relying on the defendant and his family members. 545 U.S. at 381-82, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2462-63, 162 L.Ed.2d at 372. There, the Supreme Court held “that even when a capital defendant’s family members and the defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial.” Id. at 377, 125 S.Ct. at 2460, 162 L.Ed.2d at 369.
To oppose the evidence presented by the State to justify the death sentence it sought against the defendant—proof of the aggravating factors that the murder was committed in the course of another felony and by torture and that the defendant’s significant history of felony convictions indicated the use or threat of violence—counsel for Rompilla offered rela*384tively brief testimony by five of the defendant’s family members. Those witnesses argued, in effect, for reasonable doubt, and begged the jury for mercy, on the basis of their belief that the defendant was innocent and a good man, and, in the case of his 14-year-old son, that he loved his father and would visit him in prison. Although the jury found the latter to be a mitigating factor, along with rehabilitation being possible, it sentenced the defendant to death. 545 U.S. at 378, 125 S.Ct. at 2460-61,162 L.Ed.2d at 370.
In preparing their mitigating case, trial counsel consulted three sources: Rompilla, his family members and three mental health workers. They got little, if anything, of substance from Rompilla regarding his background, who responded to questions concerning his schooling and childhood by saying they were “normal,” except for his dropping out of school in the 9th grade and, in some instances, by sending counsel off on false leads. 545 U.S. at 381, 125 S.Ct. at 2462, 162 L.Ed.2d at 371-372. Similarly, little of substance was developed by the family members. Although counsel developed a rapport with them, counsel did not have the feeling that they knew Rompilla that well, since he spent a great deal of time incarcerated. And, “because the family was ‘coming from the position that [Rompilla] was innocent ... they weren’t looking for reasons for why he might have done this.’ ” 545 U.S. at 382, 125 S.Ct. at 2463, 162 L.Ed.2d at 372. The three mental health witnesses, likewise, revealed “nothing useful.” 545 U.S. at 382, 125 S.Ct. at 2463, 162 L.Ed.2d at 372. Trial counsel did not consult school records, records of Rompilla’s juvenile and adult incarcerations, police reports available during pre-trial discovery, or anything that might have reflected that Rompilla had a dependence on alcohol. 545 U.S. at 382,125 S.Ct. at 2463,162 L.Ed.2d at 372.
The post-conviction court rejected Rompilla’s claims that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by their failure to investigate and then present, at sentencing, mitigation evidence concerning Rompilla’s childhood, mental capacity, health, and alcoholism. 545 U.S. at 378, 125 S.Ct. at 2461,162 L.Ed.2d at 370. On the contrary, it held that the trial counsel *385had done enough to investigate the possibilities of a mitigation case. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed and affirmed. Commonwealth v. Rompilla, 539 Pa. 499, 658 A.2d 626 (1995). The Federal District Court granted habeas relief, finding ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel, the court determined, in preparing the mitigation case, had failed to investigate “pretty obvious signs” that Rompilla had a troubled childhood and suffered from mental illness and alcoholism, and instead had relied unjustifiably on Rompilla’s own description of an unexceptional background. 545 U.S. at 379, 125 S.Ct. at 2461, 162 L.Ed.2d at 370. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that there was nothing unreasonable about the State Supreme Court’s application of Strickland, opining that defense counsel, who had attempted to uncover mitigation evidence from Rompilla, certain family members, and three mental health experts, Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233 (3rd Cir.2004), had gone far enough and done enough. 355 F.3d at 252.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. It held that, even when a capital defendant and his family members have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the trial’s sentencing phase. 545 U.S. at 385-386, 125 S.Ct. at 2465, 162 L.Ed.2d at 374-375. Thus, Rompilla’s counsels’ failure to examine a court file on Rompilla’s prior rape and assault conviction, a crime similar to the one with which he was charged, was deficient. 545 U.S. at 385-386, 125 S.Ct. at 2465-2466,162 L.Ed.2d at 375.
Further,
“[n]o reasonable lawyer would forgo examination of the file thinking he could do as well by asking the defendant or family relations whether they recalled anything helpful or damaging in the prior victim’s testimony. Nor would a reasonable lawyer compare possible searches for school reports, juvenile records, and evidence of drinking habits to the opportunity to take a look at a file disclosing what the *386prosecutor knows and even plans to read from in his case. Questioning a few more family members and searching for old records can promise less than looking for a needle in a haystack, when a lawyer truly has reason to doubt there is any needle there.”
545 U.S. at 389, 125 S.Ct. at 2467, 162 L.Ed.2d at 376-377.
The majority asserts that Wiggins and Rompilla are a mere re-applications of Strickland to the facts of those cases, and, as such, are not new interpretations of a Constitutional principle. 396 Md. at 275-76, 276, 914 A.2d at 36, 36-37. To the majority, those cases apparently are mere error correction, having absolutely no precedential value and informing not one future review of ineffective assistance of counsel, even when they are directly on point. Matter-of-factly, therefore, the majority dismisses Wiggins and Rompilla, and especially their analysis:
“Nothing in Wiggins or Rompilla changed, in any way, those standards adopted in Strickland. The Wiggins Court expressly relied on and applied the Strickland standards and simply concluded, based on its view of the factual record in that case, that, given the information they had regarding Wiggins’s childhood, counsel’s failure to broaden the scope of their investigation into possible mitigating factors in a death penalty case was both deficient and prejudicial under the Strickland standards. Indeed, the Court began its discussion of the ineffective assistance claim by expressly noting that ‘[w]e established the legal principles that govern claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington____’ Wiggins v. Smith, supra, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S.Ct. at 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d at 484.
“Like in Wiggins, the Rompilla Court expressly applied the standards enunciated in Strickland to find deficient and prejudicial performance by counsel. No new or different interpretation of Strickland was announced. Indeed Justice O’Connor, the author of the Opinion in Strickland, noted in Rompilla that the decision ‘simply applies our longstanding *387case-by-case approach to determining whether an attorney’s performance was unconstitutionally deficient under Strickland v. Washington... I (O’Connor, J., Concurring).”
Id. at 276, 914 A.2d at 36-37.6
To be sure, neither Wiggins nor Rompilla purports to change the established legal principles governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims announced in Strickland. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S.Ct. at 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d at 484; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 380, 125 S.Ct. at 2462, 162 L.Ed.2d at 371. They are, indeed, concerned, and seriously so, with not simply the application of the principles well established in Strickland, and sought to be clarified by its progeny, but with the proper and reasonable application of those principles. Thus, these cases are not mere error correction or exercises in futility.7
Federal habeas review is permitted, in fact, only when the federal law as to which review is sought is “clearly established” by Supreme Court precedents at the time the state court decision is filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2254,8 as amended by the *388“Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.” The Court made clear, in Wiggins, the scope of that provision:
“In order for a federal court to find a state court’s application of our precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous.... The state court’s application must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’ ”
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21, 123 S.Ct. at 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d at 484.
Having granted certiorari to review the application of “clearly established Federal law” as it had determined it, and having decided that the state court had applied the law objectively unreasonably, I would be surprised, and I suspect the Supreme Court would be more so, to learn that a state court found previously to have misapplied the “clearly established Federal law,” was not expected to consider the decision so concluding, and apply it in cases, involving the same issue, that arise subsequently, and that neither are the many other state courts that will be called on to apply it. After all, the point of appellate review is to instruct bench and bar as to the law and to provide precedents that they must follow. It makes no sense, not to mention that it trivializes, I believe, the Supreme Court’s review function, to permit a court that has been educated as to the proper application of a well-established legal precedent of the Supreme Court, one that the Court has determined has been misapplied “objectively unreasonably,” to avoid having to apply that precedent on the merits, when the issue to which it relates is raised in the context of a proceeding, sanctioned by that court, in this *389instance, whether to consider illegal sentences or to provide other discretionary relief, simply because the error, the effect of which is just as prejudicial, is not characterized as a “new interpretation” of that Supreme Court precedent. I am sorry, but to me, pointing out that a particular interpretation, and, therefore, application, of a precedent is “objectively unreasonable,” has the same feel and effects the same result, if it does not amount to the same thing.
In Wiggins, where counsel purported to be pursuing a strategy that did not include mitigation, presenting only a “half hearted” case and neglecting to do a social history report, this Court was instructed that deferral to counsel’s tactical decision relating to mitigation was objectively unreasonable because available information made it reasonable for counsel to have conducted more of an investigation and the Court was required, before deferring to the counsel’s decision, to evaluate the knowledge counsel had with that in mind. In this case, counsel presented a mitigation case, albeit, it was not a particularly strong one. They too did not do a social history report, accepting, in total, the representations and assurances of Evans and his family members as to the accuracy of the picture that they “painted” for the jury. If there was a deficiency in performance in Wiggins, where the mitigating case, if a priority at all, was only secondary, there certainly was a deficiency in this case, where the mitigation case, such as it was, was presented and it was the defense’s primary focus. This is especially the case in light of Rompilla’s recognition, and teaching, that counsel’s investigative responsibilities extend beyond, and are not co-extensive with, what he or she learns from the client and his or her family. 545 U.S. at 383, 125 S.Ct. at 2463, 162 L.Ed.2d at 373.
This latter point is critically important, as this case and Rompilla demonstrate: presenting a mitigation case without an adequate and full investigation, or without considering how what is presented can be used against the defendant and whether it may have the opposite effect, very well may aggravate, rather than mitigate, the defendant’s case. As Evans points out, the prosecution all but adopted the picture *390Evans’ mitigation case painted, telling the jury, agreeing with Evans, that his family was “a wonderful group of people,” “an excellent support system,” who “brought him up right.” Proceeding from that premise, it made the point that, viewed from that perspective, Evans’ actions were aggravated, “after all, they were always there, always there. Anytime he walked over and asked for help, he had help.”
Wiggins and Rompilla are constitutional decisions that can be, and logically should be, applied in connection with a Rule 4-345(a) motion to challenge an illegal sentence. Both holdings establish the boundaries of reasonable application in which a reviewing court, evaluating Strickland claims, must confine its analysis. They make clear that any sentence that is the result of an “objectively unreasonable” application of the guiding principles, clearly established ones announced by the Supreme Court, is illegal and thus reversible.
3.
A similar analysis applies to Evans’ jury empanelment argument. Evans was tried in 1984, prior to the decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). His jury consisted of ten whites and two African-Americans, exclusive of alternates, of which there were two, one white and the other African-American. Although only 31% of the jury pool were African-American, the prosecution used 80% of its peremptory strikes to exclude African-Americans from the jury venire. When, at the end of jury selection, the prosecutor’s use of his peremptory strikes was challenged, he responded by indicating that he had exercised his strikes on the basis of the venireperson’s “background, age, occupation, what was learned during voir dire at the bench and in open court.” Although the trial court denied Evans’ objection, it subsequently acknowledged, and, in effect, endorsed, that the prosecutor’s strikes may have been raced-based, noting “it’s logical to presume that perhaps [the prosecutor] was trying to get a jury which roughly reflects the composition of a cross-section of the county.” This is consistent with what the prosecutor told the trial court with regard to the racial *391composition of the County, “that 22% of the county population was African American and three of the jurors—two regular jurors and one alternate—were black, which constituted 21.4% of the panel.” The trial transcript reflects that the prosecutor only questioned one of the eight African-Americans he struck and that he did not strike similarly situated white jurors.
A similar pattern was evident in Miller-El II. There, Dallas County prosecutors used 10 of their 14 peremptory strikes to strike black jurors, in the process striking 91% (10 of 11) of the eligible, qualified black venire members during jury selection for petitioner Miller-El’s capital murder trial. 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. at 2325, 162 L.Ed.2d at 214. Miller-El’s objection under Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), the predecessor to Batson, was overruled, and he was convicted, the trial court finding no systemic exclusion of blacks. 545 U.S. at 236, 125 S.Ct. at 2322, 162 L.Ed.2d at 211. After Batson was decided, Miller-El’s objection was reviewed in light of that case, but the trial court found that the strikes were race-neutral and that no racially motivated strikes occurred. That decision was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the federal district court denied Miller-El habeas relief, Miller-El v. Johnson, Civil No. 3:96-CV-1992-H, 2000 WL 724534 (N.D.Tex., June 5, 2000), and the Fifth Circuit affirmed that decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 545 U.S. at 237, 125 S.Ct. at 2323, 162 L.Ed.2d at 212. Focusing on, as Evans characterizes it, “the strong statistical disparity in the State’s use of peremptory strikes against African Americans,” the Court noted:
“The numbers describing the prosecution’s use of peremptories are remarkable. Out of 20 black members of the 108-person venire panel for Miller-El’s trial, only 1 served. Although 9 were excused for cause or by agreement, 10 were peremptorily struck by the prosecution. Id. [Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 331, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1036, 154 L.Ed.2d 931, 946 (2003)]. ‘The prosecutors used their peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the eligible African-American venire members.... Happenstance is unlikely to *392produce this disparity.’ Id., at 342, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029.”
545 U.S. at 240-41,125 S.Ct. at 2325,162 L.Ed.2d at 214. The Court also was guided by the circumstances surrounding each strike, including the disparity of treatment of African American and white venire members. The extensive comparative analysis undertaken by the Court, see id. at 545 U.S. at 239-252, 125 S.Ct. at 2325-32, 162 L.Ed.2d at 213-221, made this fact evident and caused it to note that some of the proffered explanations for striking African Americans applied with equal force to some of the white venire members who were not challenged. The Court concluded: “[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 241, 125 S.Ct. at 2326, 162 L.Ed.2d at 215. Another circumstance determined to be significant was whether the prosecutor engaged, during voir dire, in meaningful voir dire on the “post hoc” reason for a strike; if he or she did not, the Court concluded, that was an indicia of implausibility. Id. at 244,125 S.Ct. at 2328,162 L.Ed.2d at 217. Finally, the Court looked to see, and found, evidence of past discrimination by the prosecutor’s office. Id. at 253-265,125 S.Ct. at 2332-2339, 162 L.Ed.2d at 222-229.
Every aspect of this analysis applies to Evans’ case, in spades. Statistically, the numbers are as “remarkable.” The applicability of the explanations for striking blacks to some of the non-challenged whites is just as evident. The dearth of the voir dire in relation to the “post hoc” explanations is just as lacking. In this case, however, there is the, at least, tacit, finding by the trial court that the strikes were race-based. That it may have seen this finding as benign does not matter; it buttresses the case for error and, thus, illegal sentence review.
The majority responds to Miller-El as it does to Wiggins and Rompilla, that it makes no new pronouncement, it is not a new interpretation, simply an application of Batson. This case is an habeas case and, therefore, was decided under 28 U.S.C. *393§ 2254, see supra note 8 at 387-88, 914 A.2d at 103. As such, what I said in support of the applicability of Wiggins and Rompilla to a Rule 4-345(a) review applies equally to this case. I will add what Evans notes as to the significance of habeas cases, a comment that also applies to the Wiggins and Rompilla discussion:
“The import of the Court’s decision is underscored by the fact that Miller-El obtained relief on federal habeas review, which is subject to a deferential standard under which ‘factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary,’ and factual determinations will not be overturned ‘unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.’ ”
(Quoting Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 324, 123 S.Ct. at 1041, 154 L.Ed.2d at 952).
B.
Maryland Code (2001, 2006 Cum.Supp.) § 7-102 of the Criminal Procedure Article provides:
“(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, §§ 7-103[9] and 7-104[10] of this subtitle and Subtitle 2 of this title, a convicted person may begin a proceeding under this title in the circuit court for the county in which the conviction took place at any time if the person claims that:
*394“(1) the sentence or judgment was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State;
“(2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; “(3) the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by law; or
“(4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack on a ground of alleged error that would otherwise be available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis, or other common law or statutory remedy.
“(b) A person may begin a proceeding under this title if: “(1) the person seeks to set aside or correct the judgment or sentence; and
“(2) the alleged error has not been previously and finally litigated or waived in the proceeding resulting in the conviction or in any other proceeding that the person has taken to secure relief from the person’s conviction.”
Our approach to petitions to reopen post conviction proceedings under this provision was most recently highlighted in Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 879 A.2d 1064 (2005). In Gray, the defendant had been convicted of second-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a violent crime. 388 Md. at 368, 879 A.2d at 1065. He filed a “Petition to Reopen Post Conviction Proceedings” pursuant to § 7-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article. 388 Md. at 369, 879 A.2d at 1065. The trial court denied the petition, finding it not to be in the interest of justice to do so. 388 Md. at 369, 879 A.2d at 1065. After the Court of Special Appeals affirmed that decision, Gray v. State, 158 Md.App. 635, 857 A.2d 1176 (2004), this Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Circuit Court was required to provide a written statement supporting its denial of relief. 388 Md. at 369, 879 A.2d at 1065.
In holding that no such statement was required by the Circuit Court, we explained that § 7-104 allows a court to reopen a post-conviction proceeding that was previously concluded, “ ‘if the court determines that the action is in the interests of justice.’ ” 388 Md. at 382, 879 A.2d at 1073, citing *395§ 7-104 (emphasis removed). That requires the exercise of discretion. Therefore, in analyzing whether a trial court’s denial of a petition to reopen a post conviction proceeding was an abuse of discretion, we explained:
“Abuse of discretion is one of those very general, amorphous terms that appellate courts use and apply with great frequency but which they have defined in many different ways____[A] ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling. The decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable. That kind of distance can arise in a number of ways, among which are that the ruling either does not logically follow from the findings upon which it supposedly rests or has no reasonable relationship to its announced objective. That, we think, is included within the notion of untenable grounds, violative of fact and logic, and against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court.”
388 Md. at 383-384, 879 A.2d at 1073-1074, citing Dehn v. Edgecombe, 384 Md. 606, 628, 865 A.2d 603, 616 (2005) (Emphasis added, internal quotations omitted).
The majority acknowledges that this standard should be applied to Evans’ motion to reopen the 1995 post-conviction proceeding. 396 Md. at 277-79, 914 A.2d at 37-38. The majority then states that, because Wiggins, Rompilla, and Miller-El II were not abuse of discretion cases, their mandates do not apply to an abuse of discretion evaluation in the case sub judice. 396 Md. at 278-79, 914 A.2d at 38.
I cannot agree. The petitioner does not assert that Wiggins, Rompilla, and Miller-El II are abuse of discretion cases, and § 7-104 does not require that the precedents relied upon be abuse of discretion cases. Evans’ point is that, given the three Supreme Court decisions, albeit rendered on habeas review, where a decision on the merits had to be made, this Court, on its review of the trial court denials in this case, could *396conclude, and should so conclude, that the trial court abused its discretion.
In Wiggins and Rompilla, the Supreme Court held that this Court and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, respectively, had objectively and unreasonably applied its holding in Strickland. 539 U.S. at 527, 123 S.Ct. at 2538, 156 L.Ed.2d at 488. The Court drew the same conclusion with regard to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals application of its holding in Batson. Those are definitive rulings by the Supreme Court, made only after determining that its well established precedent was not, apparently, so well understood as to be applied reasonably, even if incorrectly and erroneously. I am surprised to learn that Supreme Court decisions may be disregarded whenever the standard to be applied by a trial court is discretionary, that even when properly and timely raised, they summarily can be rejected as applicable, even before the trial court undertakes an, and, therefore, without any, analysis specific to the case or facts and circumstances. In fact, at the least, some level of case specific analysis must be made if the trial court is to exercise discretion; unless the court considers the argument on the merits, in light of the facts of the defendant’s case, it cannot properly and logically exercise discretion. Just as important, such an analysis should be required so that any review by this Court of the issue is meaningful.
Unless an analysis on the merits is required and this Court seriously reviews the discretionary decision, we pay only lip service to the availability of the remedy of reopening postconviction proceedings, and what I lamented earlier is absolutely true:
“It makes no sense, not to mention that it trivializes, I believe, the Supreme Court’s review function, to permit a court that has been educated as to the proper application of a well-established legal precedent of the Supreme Court, one that the Court has determined has been misapplied ‘objectively unreasonably,’ to avoid having to apply that precedent on the merits, when the issue to which it relates is raised in the context of a proceeding, sanctioned by that court, in this instance, whether to consider illegal sentences *397or to provide other discretionary relief, simply because the error, the effect of which is just as prejudicial, is not characterized as a ‘new interpretation’ of that Supreme Court precedent. I am sorry, but to me, pointing out that a particular interpretation, and therefore, application, of a precedent is ‘objectively unreasonable,’ has the same feel and effects the same result, if it does not amount to the same thing.”
C.
Evans, in No. 124, claims that United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), mandates that he be entitled to discovery in order appropriately and effectively to present his selective prosecution claims. The majority, in turn, holds that there is no such mandate. 396 Md. at 319, 914 A.2d at 62. I disagree.
In Armstrong, the Supreme Court considered the showing that a defendant must make to be entitled to discovery on a claim that the prosecuting attorney singled him out for prosecution based on race. 517 U.S. at 458, 116 S.Ct. at 1483, 134 L.Ed.2d at 694. Crucial to Armstrong’s claim was the theory that the government had declined to prosecute defendants of other races that were similarly situated. 517 U.S. at 458, 116 S.Ct. at 1483, 134 L.Ed.2d at 694.
Armstrong and a colleague had been arrested for conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack), conspiring to distribute the same, and for federal firearms offenses. 517 U.S. at 458, 116 S.Ct. at 1483, 134 L.Ed.2d at 694-695. In response to the indictment, Armstrong filed a motion for discovery, alleging selective prosecution based on race. 517 U.S. at 459, 116 S.Ct. at 1483, 134 L.Ed.2d at 695. The allegation stated that in every one of the 24 cases that contained similar charges as the ones brought against Armstrong, the defendant was black. 517 U.S. at 459, 116 S.Ct. at 1483, 134 L.Ed.2d at 695. The District Court granted the motion, instructing the government to produce information regarding the criteria for deciding *398when to prosecute cases in which it had charged both firearms and cocaine offenses. 517 U.S. at 459, 116 S.Ct. at 1484, 134 L.Ed.2d at 695. When the government refused to comply, the District Court dismissed the case, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
In reversing, the Supreme Court held:
“The requirements for a selective-prosecution claim draw on ‘ordinary equal protection standards.’ ... The claimant must demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy ‘had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.’ ... To establish a discriminatory effect in a race case, the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted.”
517 U.S. at 465, 116 S.Ct. at 1487, 134 L.Ed.2d at 699 (citations omitted).
Moreover,
“Having reviewed the requirements to prove a selective-prosecution claim, we turn to the showing necessary to obtain discovery in support of such a claim. If discovery is ordered, the Government must assemble from its own files documents which might corroborate or refute the defendant’s claim. Discovery thus imposes many of the costs present when the Government must respond to a prima facie case of selective prosecution. It will divert prosecutors’ resources and may disclose the Government’s prosecutorial strategy. The justifications for a rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-prosecution claim thus require a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such a claim.”
517 U.S. at 468,116 S.Ct. at 1488,134 L.Ed.2d at 701.
In discussing of what a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery should consist, and the test for such a showing, “colorable basis” or “substantial threshold showing,” employed by the Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court remarked:
“The Court of Appeals held that a defendant may establish a colorable basis for discriminatory effect without evidence that the Government has failed to prosecute others who are *399similarly situated to the defendant.... We think it was mistaken in this view.
“In the present case, if the claim of selective prosecution were well founded, it should not have been an insuperable task to prove that persons of other races were being treated differently than respondents. For instance, respondents could have investigated whether similarly situated persons of other races were prosecuted by the State of California and were known to federal law enforcement officers, but were not prosecuted in federal court. We think the required threshold-a credible showing of different treatment of similarly situated persons-adequately balances the Government’s interest in vigorous prosecution and the defendant’s interest in avoiding selective prosecution.”
517 U.S. at 469-470, 116 S.Ct. at 1488-1489, 134 L.Ed.2d at 701-702 (citations omitted). Therefore, under Armstrong, a credible showing of different treatment of similarly situated persons will justify discovery by the defendant.
The majority cites Armstrong for the proposition that:
“To establish a selective prosecution claim, ..., the claimant must demonstrate that the prosecutorial policy ‘“had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose,” ’ id. at 465,116 S.Ct. at 1487, 134 L.Ed.2d at 699, quoting from Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531, 84 L.Ed.2d 547, 556 (1985), and to establish a discriminatory effect in a race case, ‘the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted.’ United States v. Armstrong, supra, 517 U.S. at 465, 116 S.Ct. at 1487, 134 L.Ed.2d at 699. (Emphasis added).”
396 Md. at 319-20, 914 A.2d at 62-63.
The majority, having used Armstrong to establish the elements of selective prosecution, never returns to Evans’ argument that Armstrong requires only a threshold showing of selective prosecution in order to obtain discovery. Instead, the majority explains that, because Armstrong was not a *400death penalty case, and did not involve a statistical analysis like in the case sub judice, Evans is not entitled to relief. 396 Md. at 321-22, 914 A.2d at 63-64. It is clear, however, that neither of these factors makes any difference in reviewing whether discovery is warranted in a selective prosecution claim.
In Armstrong’s case, there was no showing—the study he submitted failed to identify individuals who were not black and could have been prosecuted for similar offenses, but were not so prosecuted. 517 U.S. at 470,116 S.Ct. at 1489,134 L.Ed.2d at 702. The Dr. Paternoster statistical analysis in the case sub judice, however, is significantly more in depth than the study conducted in Armstrong, and, as such, does satisfy the Armstrong standard. Accordingly, it does mandate the relief the Evans seeks.
The Paternoster study provides substantial evidence that the Baltimore County State’s Attorney’s Office singled out black defendants from similarly situated white defendants when choosing against whom to seek the death penalty. The study reflects that the State’s Attorney will seek the death penalty 83% of the time when the defendant is black and the victim is white, but will seek the death penalty only 60% of the time with respect to all other racial combinations. These two statistical findings, alone, trigger the mandate of Armstrong. While they do not mean that selective prosecution definitively has been established, merely that discovery is warranted, I do not see how, in light of the immense body of evidence presented by Dr. Paternoster, the threshold has not been satisfied.
This case is unlike Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.2005), a case cited by the majority, 396 Md. at 321-22, 914 A.2d at 63-64. That case involved the merits of the selective prosecution claim that the defendant brought against the State. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the claim, concluding that the State had produced evidence that adequately rebutted it. 414 F.3d at 1128-29. It explained:
“While we think that Belmontes’ statistics provide a strong showing of intentional discrimination, we need not decide *401whether, in a discriminatory charging case, statistics standing alone can make out a prima facie case. Assuming arguendo that they can and that Belmontes has made out a prima facie case, here the State has provided evidence that is sufficient to overcome that showing. In his deposition, the prosecutor stated that when he decided to pursue a death sentence against Belmontes, he had reason to believe that prior to the McConnell murder Belmontes had shot and killed Jerry Howard. In short, the prosecutor asserted that he pursued a death penalty against Belmontes, not because of McConnell’s death alone, but because he believed that Belmontes had actually committed more than one murder. Moreover, the evidence in the record is sufficient to provide a good faith basis for such belief. Thus, there appears to be a legitimate, race-neutral reason for a prosecutor to seek a death sentence in this particular case, and therefore sufficient evidence to rebut the inference of discrimination raised by Belmontes’ statistical study. More important, Belmontes does not challenge the state’s assertion that the prosecutor’s explanation is sufficient to rebut his prima facie case.”

Id.

That case, in short, is inapposite and, if anything seems to support the threshold showing required in this case. In any event, I reiterate, the merits of the selective prosecution claim are not yet on the table; this is a threshold inquiry into whether discovery is warranted. I believe that Evans has satisfied the burden.
D.
Evans, in No. 122, contests two items involving the State’s Division of Correction (D.O.C.), the department that carries out lethal injections. Since I do not disagree with the majority’s disposition of the “regulation” issue, I need only address the issue as to which I dissented in Oken v. State, 381 Md. 580, 851 A.2d 538 (2004), Evans’ contention that the D.O.C. protocols are inconsistent with Maryland Code (1999, 2003 Cum. *402Supp., 2005 Supp.) § 8-905 of the Correctional Services Article.
In Oken v. State, 381 Md. 580, 851 A.2d 538, this Court, in a per curiam order, denied Oken’s Motion for Stay of Warrant of Execution and Supporting Exhibits, rejecting his challenge to the method of execution the Division of Correction intended use in putting him to death. He had argued that that method violated § 3-905 of the Correctional Services Article, and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
The majority concludes that in the case sub judice, like in Oken, the Execution Operations Manual (EOM), which governs the aspects in which a death sentence by lethal injection is implemented, is not inconsistent with § 3-905. 396 Md. at 336, 914 A.2d at 72-73.
Maryland § 3-905 provides:
“(a) The manner of inflicting the punishment of death shall be the continuous intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate or other similar drug in combination with a chemical paralytic agent until a licensed physician pronounces death according to accepted standards of medical practice.
“(b)
“(1) The administration of the lethal substances required by this section is not the practice of medicine.
“(2) Notwithstanding any other law, a pharmacist or pharmaceutical supplier may dispense drugs, without a prescription, to the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee to carry out this section.”
The statute clearly requires the D.O.C. to use two substances, a barbiturate or similar drug, and a chemical paralytic agent. It also describes “the manner of inflicting the penalty of death,” how they are to be used in combination: “continuous intravenous administration,” in combination, until death is pronounced.
The method currently employed by the D.O.C. is not at all consistent with this statutory requirement. It involves the *403use of three different chemicals—two syringes of sodium pentothal, a sedative, and one syringe each of both pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride, both lethal agents. The process as described by the majority, 396 Md. at 330-31, 914 A.2d at 69, clearly describes the use of two “bursts” of the barbiturate, and two chemical paralytic agents. This significant departure from what the statute authorizes disturbs me. As I stated in Oken, 381 Md. at 582, 851 A.2d at 539 (Bell, C.J., dissenting),
“ ‘Continuous intravenous administration’ of a quick acting barbiturate, ‘in combination’ with a paralytic agent, is, I submit, vastly different from the intravenous administration, successively, of a barbiturate, a paralytic agent and potassium chloride, each discrete administration being separated by a saline flushing of the line.”
It seems clear to me that the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. This is not, as the majority characterizes, an issue of statutory construction, 396 Md. at 332, 914 A.2d at 70. We’ve held, most recently in Kilmon v. State, that “[i]f the statutory language is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then we give effect to the statute as written....” 394 Md. 168, 172, 905 A.2d 306, 308 (2006). See also Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006), Mackey v. Compass Marketing, Inc., 391 Md. 117, 141, 892 A.2d 479, 493 (2006), Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 689, 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004).
The majority states that because the Legislature did not say “one chemical paralytic agent,” when it clearly could have done so, this renders the actual meaning of the words “an” and “a” ambiguous, and thus, an exploration of legislative intent is required.11 The statute is so clear, no legislative *404digging is necessary. Indeed, even if there were ambiguities, the benefit of any ambiguity would be given to the defendant. As I explained in Oken,
“In any event, this statute is highly punitive, indeed, given the intended result of its implementation, it could not be more so. As a result, even if it were ambiguous, the rule of lenity would apply, that is, the benefit of the ambiguity would be required to be given to the defendant.”
881 Md. at 582-88, 851 A.2d at 539, citing Melton, 379 Md. at 488-89, 842 A.2d at 753.
It is of little consequence that other States with similar statutes employ the same three chemicals with no legal challenge; we should only be concerned with Maryland law. The statute authorizes two chemicals, and three are used. This clearly violates § 3-905. The majority claims that “the Legislature was well aware that, if it enacted the statute authorizing lethal injection, the statute would be implemented by the three-drug mixture----There is no evidence that any member of the Legislature questioned whether the approach described by the Commissioner would be consistent with the statute.” 396 Md. at 336, 914 A.2d at 72-73. As I stated in Oken, 381 Md. at 583, 851 A.2d at 540 (Bell, C.J., dissenting):
“... [F]or me, the critical question is whether the procedure comports with, is consistent with, or is the procedure contemplated by, the statute. Because I conclude that it is not and, in fact, is violative of the statute, I dissent.”
Judge GREENE authorizes me to state he joins in Parts C and D only of this dissent.

. The other parties involved are The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, The American Civil Liberties Union, and Maryland Citizens Against State Executions.

. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (in which the Supreme Court ruled that any fact that increased the penalty for a crime above the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (in which the Supreme Court held that an Arizona statute pursuant to which, following a jury adjudication of a defendant’s guilt of first-degree murder, the trial judge, sitting alone, determines the presence or absence of the aggravating factors required by Arizona law for imposition of the death penalty, violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in capital prosecutions).

. This is not surprising. The mitigation specialist interviewed Evans and twenty-nine of his family members, as well as a childhood friend and a one-time next door neighbor. She spent some thirty hours interviewing Evans and collected and reviewed a number of D.O.C.uments and records, school, medical and prison, relating to him. As a result the mitigation specialist produced a 51 page report, with a nine (9) page summary, in which she concluded that Evans "grew up in a toxic household characterized by chronic conflict, predictable violence, and hopeless despair.” Specifically, she reported frequent and severe beating of Evans, during his childhood, by his father, abandonment on two occasions, the absence of expressions of parental love or approval, that he was singled out for harsh treatment, that he attempted suicide at age ten, for which he was never treated and of which the family never spoke, that he was sexually assaulted when he was eleven and verbally and physically harassed at school and in the neighborhood and that he was exposed to pervasive crime and violence in his neighborhood. In addition, the mitigation specialist concluded that Evans and his family were adversely impacted by a significant history of untreated mental-health and substance abuse problems and violence.

. In addition to mentioning that Wiggins had a clean record, counsel told the jury: "You're going to hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life. It has not been easy for him. But he's worked. He’s tried to be a productive citizen, and he's reached the age of 27 with no convictions for prior crimes of violence and no convictions, period.... I think that’s an important thing for you to consider.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 515, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2532, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, 481 (2003).

. The Supreme Court was not at all sure that Wiggins’s counsel "did ... focus exclusively on Wiggins’s direct responsibility for the murder.” After referencing counsel's opening statement and noting specially that she did not "follow up” the proffer with details of Wiggins’ history, the Court observed:
"At the same time, counsel called a criminologist to testify that inmates serving life sentences tend to adjust well and refrain from further violence in prison—testimony with no bearing on whether petitioner committed the murder by his own hand____ Far from focusing exclusively on petitioner’s direct responsibility, then, counsel put on a half-hearted mitigation case, taking precisely the type of 'shotgun' approach the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded counsel sought to avoid----When viewed in this light, the 'strategic decision’ the state courts and respondents all invoke to justify counsel’s limited pursuit of mitigating evidence resembles more a post hoc rationalization of counsel's conduct than an accurate description of their deliberations prior to sentencing.”
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526-27, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2538, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, 488(2003), quoting Wiggins v. State, 352 Md. 580, 609, 724 A.2d 1, 15 (1999). In the passage to which the Court referred, this Court stated:
"[Counsel] understood that some lawyers use what he regarded as a ‘shotgun approach,' attacking everything and hoping that 'something sticks.' He was not of that view, however, preferring to concentrate his defense. He did not, therefore, have any detailed background *379reports prepared, although funds may have been available for that purpose. He expressed some concern that that kind of information might prove counterproductive.”
Id. at 609, 724 A.2d at 15-16.

. This is the only basis on which the majority rejects the applicability of Rule 4-345(a) to this case. The majority offers no other analysis, nor does it address, or even acknowledge, whether the Supreme Court’s determination that this Court, in Wiggins, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Rompilla, had "objectively unreasonably” applied Strickland, could impact other cases in which that very issue may have been, or could have been, raised.

. It is worth reminding ourselves of what the Wiggins’s Court emphasized with regard to the responsibility of the reviewing court when the adequacy of investigation is at issue:
“In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's investigation ... a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Even assuming [counsel] limited the scope of their investigation for strategic reasons, Strickland does not establish that a cursory investigation automatically justifies a tactical decision with respect to sentencing strategy. Rather, a reviewing court must consider the reasonableness of the investigation said to support that strategy.”
539 U.S. at 527, 123 S.Ct. at 2538, 156 L.Ed.2d at 488, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695.

. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), provides:
*388"(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—■
"(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
"(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

. Maryland Code (2001, 2005 Supp.) § 7-103 of the Criminal Procedure Article provides, as relevant:
"§ 7-103. Number and time of filing of petitions
‘‘(a) For each trial or sentence, a person may file only one petition
for relief under this title."

. Maryland Code (2001, 2005 Supp.) § 7-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article provides, as relevant:
" § 7-104. Reopening postconviction proceeding "The court may reopen a postconviction proceeding that was previously concluded if the court determines that the action is in the interests of justice.”

. The majority’s discussion of "a” and “an” as indefinite articles, as opposed to “the,” which they claim is a definite article, is without merit. While it is true that if I ask someone to give me “the book” as opposed to “a book,” the use of the word “the” necessarily implies a specific object, and the use of the word “a” may imply an indefinite object, this does not change that “a” refers to something singular. While the majority has cited cases which state that the article "a” can *404be interpreted as "more than one” in certain contexts, it is indeed the context which is most relevant. Under the plain language of § 3-905, the words "an” and “a” cannot be understood to refer to anything except for single items.
Assuming the "ambiguity,” the question remains, how does one explain that which is not ambiguous, the manner of inflicting death, the continuous injection, as opposed to "short bursts.” There certainly is nothing ambiguous about that. The majority's strained "ambiguity” approach serves to completely vary the statute.