Court Opinion

ID: 9749524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:49:16.786146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:51.026190
License: Public Domain

Shangraw, J.,
(dissenting in part). I agree that the judgment should be affirmed as to the defendants Monmaney. I am unable to agree with the majority that it was error to direct a verdict in favor of defendants William Speno and Emily Speno.
The general rule, as I understand it to be, is that a seller of realty is not liable for injury to a buyer in possession, or to any third party, which is caused by a dangerous condition on the premises, whether natural or artificial, which existed when the buyer took possession. Hut v. Antonio v. Guth (1967) 95 N.J.Super. 62, 229 A.2d 823, 826; Sarnicandro v. Lake Developers, Inc., 55 N.J.Super. 475, 151 A.2d 48, 50, 65 C.JS. Negligence §93, p. 1046. This has been true even though the vendor has failed to make repairs after receiving notice of the dangerous and defective condition. 65 C.J.S. Negligence, supra, p. 1047. See cases cited.
The general rule of non-liability on part of a vendor has some exceptions. I do not consider that any of the exceptions to the general rule are applicable to the facts presented in this case.
A voluntary sale of premises by a landlord terminates the relation of landlord and tenant as between the original lessor and tenant, even though the lease, as such, is not terminated by a sale of the premises. 51C C.J.S. Landlord & Tentant §93(2), p. 301.
In the case now considered, Mr. and Mrs. Speno did not reserve possession of the property. The relations of vendor-vendee and landlord-tenant arise out of totally different types of transactions and contemplate entirely different t}q?es of possession. In an absolute *593sale, a vendor divests himself of title and all right of possession or of re-entry for repairs or for any other purpose. Following a transfer of ownership and possession of real estate to vendee without reservation, a vendor of realty is in no position to control the use thereof.
I believe it may be assumed that a purchaser of real estate usually purchases with opened eyes. The facts in this case reveal that the lack of railing on the steps in question, was not a latent condition, but clearly a patent one, — one which the purchaser could have readily discovered by taking a view. This condition cannot be considered a concealed or undisclosed hazard; on the contrary it was open and visible. The Spenos had no reason to believe that the Monmaneys would not have discovered the lack of a railing or realized the risk.
No claim is made that there was anything wrong structurally with the steps other than the absence of a railing. Here, the ice on the steps was the dominant factor which caused the accident. This condition came in existence after the transfer of the property. There was nothing latent, secret or hidden about the ice. It was open and observable to the plaintiff. She was an habitual user of the steps.
This is not a case where a plaintiff falls from a veranda solely by reason of the absence of a guard railing. As I view the evidence, the accident would not have occurred except for the presence of ice on the steps. This icy condition developed after the transfer and possession of the property vested in the Monmaneys. The icy condition was not created by the Spenos.
Aside from the legal isues in the case, the evidence demonstrates that plaintiff was aware that her husband had salted the steps the evening previous to the accident, which to say the least, called for extra caution on her part at the time of the accident.
If the practical aspects of such a case are to be considered, it may be a real dilemma, in that a vendor of property would be uncertain when his liabilities in connection with the ownership of property cease. If it is a reasonable time after the transfer, — what is a reasonable period? How long would a vendor’s liability continue? When and where would the line be drawn ? These very questions would unjustly breed litigation.
I would affirm the directed verdict and judgment thereon in favor of William and Emily Speno.
I am authorized to say that Justice Keyser joins in the views expressed in this dissent.