Court Opinion

ID: 9533117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:28:31.045562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:55.006293
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING JUSTICE LORENZ delivered the opinion of the court: In its petition for rehearing, defendant Firm seeks clarification of our holding for the trial court on remand. The Firm contends that this opinion may be interpreted as authority for imposing liability upon attorneys for expressing their opinion as to the possible consequences of litigation. The Firm argues emphatically that “the results of litigated matters cannot be the subject of an attorney’s guarantee and the attorney’s failure to accomplish the desired result for his client does not constitute negligence.” As we noted in our original opinion, in order to maintain an action for legal malpractice in Illinois, four elements must be established: (1) that an attorney-client relationship existed giving rise to a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) that defendant breached this duty; (3) that defendant’s breach constituted the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury; and (4) that as a result of this injury, plaintiff suffered actual damages. See Oda v. Highway Insurance Co. (1963), 44 Ill. App. 2d 235, 251, 194 N.E.2d 489; Olson v. North (1934), 276 Ill. App. 457, 475-77. The Firm contends that our opinion characterizes the Firm’s conduct as the giving of advice, but that the allegations characterize the Firm’s conduct as expressing their opinion as to the possible consequences of litigation. We see little value in debating the conclusiveness of alternative characterization, as we believe that our decision precisely indicates that this is a question of fact to be determined in the trial court, not a matter of law to be determined by summary judgment.  Further, we take no issue with the Firm’s contention that an attorney is not liable for an error of judgment, as the law distinguishes between negligence and mere errors of judgment, the latter not constituting a basis for malpractice. See Stevens v. Walker & Dexter (1870), 55 Ill. 151; Brainerd v. Kates (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 781, 785, 386 N.E.2d 586; House v. Maddox (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 68, 71, 360 N.E.2d 580.  Although we agree with the Firm that an attorney is not liable as a guarantor of litigation, an attorney may be liable in negligence for the making of a guarantee, if it can be shown that it was in fact made and the making of the guarantee was a breach of the standard of care owed to the plaintiff by the Firm. If an attorney tells his client that he will accomplish a certain result, we believe that the attorney’s duty to his client requires that he exercise that degree of skill and care .used in the community to reach such a conclusion. This degree of skill and care is a question of fact to be measured through expert testimony, and usually cannot be determined by the trial court as a matter of law. See Brainerd v. Kates (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 781, 386 N.E.2d 586; Brown v. Gitlin (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180; Olson v. North (1934), 276 Ill. App. 457, 476. Here, the trial court granted summary judgment finding that, even if words of guarantee were made, no genuine issue of material fact was present, as it viewed these words to be in the nature of an attorney telling his client what the results of the attorney’s actions would be. While we express no opinion whatsoever concerning whether the Firm breached a duty owed to plaintiff, or whether such breach proximately injured plaintiffs, we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment where questions of fact, which could amount to a cause of action in negligence, remain unresolved. Remaining questions of fact include: 1. Whether the Firm gave a guarantee of the outcome of litigation; 2. Whether a similarly situated attorney in the exercise of reasonable skill and care would have given such a guarantee; 3. Whether plaintiff was injured as a proximate consequence of the giving of such a guarantee. Finally, the Firm uses the example of a defense attorney advising a client that a case has a verdict potential of $100,000-$150,000. The Firm contends that under our decision, if the verdict exceeded $150,000, defense counsel would be subject to a possible lawsuit. We find no merit with this application of our decision, as we have clearly stated that the fact that the attorney misjudged the result does not give rise to a cause of action. It is only if the attorney breached the applicable standard of care, and the breach proximately injured plaintiff, that the attorney would be liable. We believe that attorneys owe no less to their clients. For the foregoing reasons defendant’s petition for reconsideration or rehearing is denied. MEJDA, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J., concur.