Court Opinion

ID: 9745228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:42:20.049186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:57.770177
License: Public Domain

Warner, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the holding of the majority in Kurlander’s case (part 1 of the opinion).
The majority hold that in light of the evidence presented to the school committee Kurlander could not reasonably have read the committee’s vote on the cause of unbecoming conduct as anything other than a vote that the first four charges had been substantiated, and that he was not, therefore, prejudiced by the failure of the committee formally to state which charges it found substantiated. The majority hold further that the judge based his decision on the same four charges relied on by the committee.
Kurlander was first advised by the committee that the superintendent of schools had proposed his discharge for the causes of inefficiency, unbecoming conduct, insubordination and “other good cause.” As the majority note, these are generic causes for dismissal provided by G. L. c. 71, § 42. Kurlander then exercised his acknowledged right (ibid.) to request written charges of the causes assigned by the committee. A list of fourteen specific charges was given. See the *363Appendix. After extensive hearings the committee deliberated in private (and so we cannot determine from our own examination of the record which of the charges it found substantiated — nor could the Superior Court judge have done so), and then, in public session, unanimously voted that the “charges” of conduct unbecoming a teacher, insubordination and inefficiency had been substantiated, and to dismiss.
A close reading of the transcript of the evidence presented to the committee makes clear that it was open to the committee to find the first four charges not substantiated. Each of the charges involves allegations of language characterized as “intemperate, insolent and inappropriate,” and conduct as “inappropriate.” Most of the testimony against Kur-iander on these charges was in conclusory terms, using the same or similar characterizations as set forth in the charges. Kuriander disputed those characterizations.
Most, if not all, of the remaining ten charges, if substantiated, would have been sufficient to support dismissal for the cause of conduct unbecoming a teacher, and these and the first four charges, if substantiated, would have been sufficient to support dismissal for the cause of insubordination. Further, the causes assigned for Kurlander’s dismissal included “inefficiency.” The first four charges do not in any way allege conduct which would support this cause, and it may reasonably be assumed, therefore, that some other charge was found substantiated by the committee. The record is devoid of any statement by the committee of which of the fourteen charges, standing alone or in combination,1 it found substantiated and sufficient to support dismissal for the causes of conduct unbecoming a teacher, insubordination and inefficiency. While the majority’s conclusion that the committee found the first four charges substantiated *364and sufficient to support dismissal may be a good guess, it is nonetheless a guess.
The majority do not find it necessary to decide the issue, but suggest that while a teacher has a right to a statement of the specific charges alleged to support the causes for which his dismissal is proposed, he may have no right to a statement by the committee of which of those charges it finds substantiated.2 In my view, to state the proposition is to demonstrate its fundamental unfairness.3 Such a rule would result in a denial of procedural due process. Further, it would be inconsistent with the provisions of G. L. c. 71, § 42, and a misconception of the nature of the de nova review proceedings in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 71, § 43A.
General Laws c. 71, § 42 (as in effect in 1978), provided the generic causes for the dismissal of a tenured teacher, and for the furnishing of written charges to support those causes. It also dictated that there could be no dismissal “unless the charge or charges shall have been substantiated.” Here the committee made no such determination on the record, other than that which the majority find implicit in the vote to dismiss for the cause of conduct unbecoming a teacher.
The reliance by the majority on Springgate v. School Comm. of Mattapoisett, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 304 (1981) (hereafter Springgate), is misplaced. A reading of that case reveals that the school committee found ten of eleven charges “proved,” and that the Superior Court and this
*365court, in considering the case under the de nova principles mandated by G. L. c. 71, § 43A, reviewed the committee’s action on the charges found proven by it.4 De nova review under § 43A means review of the decision of the school committee. Inextricable parts of that decision, I suggest, are the conclusions of the committee on the charges brought.5 “Review is not managerial in nature, however; review is quintessentially judicial and management is executive in quality. The statute [§ 43A] does not invest the court with power to establish criteria for dismissing a teacher and initiating proceedings. Rather the statute confers upon the court the limited function of determining whether the school committee acted on the evidence rather than out of bias, political pressure, or other improper motive.” Spring-gate, supra at 305-306. If the majority’s suggestion were the rule, it would mean that, at least where there are multiple charges, the Superior Court judge, in the exercise of de nova review, could decide that dismissal of a teacher was justifiable on charges which were not found substantiated by the school committee.6 Surely then, the judiciary would be “made to trespass on executive prerogatives.” Spring-gate, supra at 305. See MacKenzie v. School Comm. of *366Ipswich, 342 Mass. 612, 615-616 (1961). “If there is ground for dismissal, the decision is for the school committee, and it is not the court’s function to consider whether the committee’s action is appropriate or wise. MacKenzie v. School Comm. of Ipswich, supra at 614-615, and 618.” Lower v. North Middlesex Regional Sch. Comm., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 536, 540 (1979). See Driscoll v. Mayor of Somerville, 213 Mass. 493 (1913). I think that principle cuts both ways, i.e., if the school committee decides that a charge is not substantiated, the court, on de nova review, ought not to override that decision.
The right to de nova review under G. L. c. 71, § 43A, is the teacher’s. It should not be necessary to point out that an appellant — which Kurlander was here — ordinarily seeks review only of those determinations adverse to him. If the school committee determines that a charge brought by it is not substantiated, that should be the end of it as to that charge. Kurlander was entitled to a statement of those determinations. To hold as the majority suggest would be to open the door for substitution of the judgment of the court for that of the school committee.
I would vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court for remand to the school committee for a statement of which of the fourteen charges it found substantiated and sufficient to support dismissal,7 and for further de nova review in the Superior Court of Kurlander’s dismissal on the basis of the charges found substantiated.
*367Appendix
“1. That Mr. Kurlander did, on or about March 20,1978, and in the presence of elementary school students make intemperate, insolent and inappropriate remarks to Helen G. Renzi and that he did behave in an inappropriate manner at that time.
“2. That Mr. Kurlander did, on or about March 20, 1978, and in the presence of elementary school students make intemperate, insolent and inappropriate remarks to Ronald J. Gagnon, when Mr. Gagnon attempted to video tape the class, and that he did behave in an inappropriate manner at that time.
“3. That Mr. Kurlander did, on or about March 20, 1978, make intemperate, insolent and inappropriate remarks to Mrs. Renzi, when she endeavored to discuss the foregoing incidents with Mr. Kurlander, and that he did behave in an inappropriate manner at that time.
“4. That Mr. Kurlander did, on or about March 21, 1978, make intemperate, insolent and inappropriate remarks, and did behave in an inappropriate manner in the presence of Superintendent John Madden, Mrs. Renzi, or both of them, following delivery of a letter from Superintendent Madden dated March 21, 1978, relative to the suspension of Mr. Kurlander.
“5. That Mr. Kurlander did, on numerous and divers dates, fail to submit adequate and timely bi-weekly plans, contrary to the express instructions of his superiors, and in breach of his duties, including those incidents set forth in the correspondence of Superintendent Madden to Mr. Kurlander dated November 14, 1977, and previously delivered to counsel for Mr. Kurlander, and on April 3, 1978.
“6. That Mr. Kurlander did fail to satisfactorily perform his responsibilities, in a timely manner, with regard to a curriculum development project scheduled for completion in August 1976.
“7. That Mr. Kurlander did fail to satisfactorily perform his duties in the Developmental Center, and was relieved of those responsibilities due to his propensity to arrive late, his unrealistic expectations for the children and his difficulty in accepting the authority of the teacher in charge of the educational program.
“8. That Mr. Kurlander did fail to perform various duties associated with his position, including but not limited to bus duty assignment, so-called, on or about January 16, 17, 19 and 23-27, 1978, and other divers dates.
“9. That Mr. Kurlander did effect a unilateral change in the teaching schedule, contrary to the express instruction of his superior.
“10. That Mr. Kurlander’s behavior did engender complaints from parents relating to his treatment of students, including but not limited to the tearing of a student’s jacket in or about October of 1977, and the embarrassing of a student in or about January of 1978 as she was leaving class for a violin lesson.
*368“11. That Mr. Kurlander did, contrary to the instructions of his superiors and in breach of his duties, fail to leave adequate lesson plans for substitute teachers on divers dates, including June 2, 1977.
“12. That Mr. Kurlander did fail, on numerous and divers dates, to keep his classroom in a clean and safe condition, contrary to the express instructions of his superiors, and in breach of his duties.
“13. That Mr. Kurlander’s course of conduct exhibited a failure on his part to cooperate and comply with the instructions of his superiors, and a disregard for their express instructions.
“14. That Mr. Kurlander’s course of conduct exhibited a failure on his part to adequately perform the responsibilities and tasks attendant to his employment and assigned to him by his superiors.”

 It is conceivable that the committee could have decided that the first four charges together, or considered separately, would not support dismissal, but when considered with other charges which it found substantiated, would support dismissal on one or more of the statutory causes. Such considerations are the prerogative of the committee.

 Curiously, the majority conclude the discussion of the question by stating that a school committee “might be well-advised to make a simple statement of the charges found proven.”

 It is obvious that Kurlander, and any teacher in similar circumstances, may have legitimate interests beyond the dismissal proceeding in having express determinations by the school committee on the specific charges, and review by a court of those determinations found substantiated. The possibility of future adverse consequences to Kurlander as a result of the committee’s failure to make determinations on ten charges (accepting for this purpose the majority’s view) should be apparent, especially where, as noted, it may be assumed that the committee found at least one, involving the cause of inefficiency, substantiated.

 An examination of the record in this court in Springgate shows that the school committee recorded its findings of “proven” or “not proven” on each of eleven charges brought against the teacher, and as to the one charge it found “not proven,” the Superior Court judge ruled that it was not before him. This court implicitly approved that ruling.

 I agree that a school'committee is not obligated to make findings of fact to support its dismissal action.

 Such a result follows in this case because the judge could not know, absent some indication by the school committee, which charges the committee found substantiated and sufficient to support dismissal. The majority acknowledge that the judge did not make findings on all of the charges. He found, on review of the transcript of testimony before the committee, that Kurlander’s conduct during and after one incident, involving at most four of the fourteen charges, was sufficient to justify dismissal. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the committee shared the judge’s view that the charges relating to that incident were substantiated and sufficient to support dismissal. In short, the judge could not possibly know what the decision, which he was charged with reviewing, was.

 The vote of dismissal was unanimous. If the majority of the school committee now in office participated in the vote, I would permit them to make the statement. Otherwise, I would require that the presently constituted committee hold a new dismissal hearing, affording Kurlander all of the procedural safeguards, including written charges if he so requests, provided by G. L. c. 71, § 42. In the event of such a hearing, de nova review under § 43A would be available to Kurlander on the charges expressly found substantiated by the committee.