Court Opinion

ID: 9618081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:06:29.569181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:24.438806
License: Public Domain

DANIEL E. SCOTT, Judge,
concurring in result.
The State asked three defense witnesses if Appellant was using methamphetamine (“meth”) on the night in question, although there was no evidence that anyone was doing so. Each witness answered negatively. The State then asked each witness more meth questions — e.g., did Appellant “typically” use meth; could he could have done so without the witness’s knowledge; why did the witness believe Appellant was not using meth. The State even told one witness — and thus the jury — that Appellant currently was serving a ten-year prison term for manufacturing or distributing meth.
Meth and meth use were not relevant to the statutory rape charge or Appellant’s character, which was not at issue. Meth’s effect on Appellant’s ability to perceive and recall was irrelevant because he did not testify. Since he was not a witness, Appellant’s crimes and convictions could not be used to impeach him.
As the principal opinion notes, there is a general requirement of fairness in cross-examination and limits to its scope. State v. Creason, 847 S.W.2d 482, 486-87 (Mo.App.1993). Our courts long have required a good-faith basis for questions with negative implications such as here. State v. Primers, 971 S.W.2d 922, 931 (Mo.App.1998), citing Creason, 847 S.W.2d at 486 and State v. Willard, 192 S.W. 437, 440 (Mo.1917). At oral argument, this Court invited the State to defend the propriety of this questioning on any basis. I believe the State effectively conceded it could not do so, arguing instead that any prejudice was insufficient to justify plain error relief.
Albeit in the context of an uninvited reference to other crimes, this Court has considered five factors in analyzing the prejudicial effect of such evidence:
*3821) whether the statement was, in fact, voluntary and unresponsive, or whether the prosecutor deliberately attempted to elicit the information; 2) whether the statement was singular and isolated, and whether it was emphasized or magnified by the prosecutor; 3) whether the remarks were vague and indefinite, or whether they made specific reference to crimes committed by the defendant; 4) whether the court promptly sustained defense counsel’s objection, and instructed the jury to disregard the volunteered statement; and 5) whether in view of the other evidence presented and the strength of the state’s case, it appeared that the comment played a decisive role in the determination of guilt.
State v. Immekus, 28 S.W.3d 421, 431 (Mo.App.2000), citing State v. Smith, 934 S.W.2d 318, 320-21 (Mo.App.1996). Applying similar factors here: 1) the State deliberately asked about Appellant’s meth use, conviction, and imprisonment; 2) three different witnesses each were asked multiple meth questions; 3) the remarks were specific about meth use, and specific about Appellant’s conviction and imprisonment for meth manufacture or distribution (i.e., not mere possession or personal use); and 4) objections were not sustained (and sometimes not properly made) and the jury was not told to disregard.
As to the fifth Immekus/Smith factor, the strength of the State’s case is a prime factor in deciding if trial error resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. Primers, 971 S.W.2d at 931. This trial record reveals “a submissible, but fragile case of guilt” (Id.), into which the State injected Appellant’s prison sentence and repeated inferences linking Appellant to meth use, with no apparent evidentiary or legal justification therefor.
I concur, for these reasons, in this Court’s decision to reverse and remand. I do not necessarily agree with, and thus respectfully decline to join, the principal opinion’s criticisms of other questions or comments by the prosecutor, nor do I consider those necessary to the result we reach today.