Court Opinion

ID: 9460395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:48:58.689982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:35.836004
License: Public Domain

JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Maintenance and cure continues until the seaman obtains maximum cure or becomes permanently disabled. E. g., Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 69 S.Ct. 707, 93 L.Ed. 850 (1949). On November 24, 1970, the Public Health Service in New York declared plaintiff not fit for duty and permanently disabled. Although I do not believe that this diagnosis by the Public Health Service is necessarily conclusive,1 plaintiff did not submit any evidence to contradict the Public Health Service’s diagnosis at least for the period between November 24, 1970 and July 15, 1971, when plaintiff first saw Dr. Silverstein. I would therefore deny plaintiff maintenance and cure during this period on the basis that there is no evidence to support a finding that plaintiff was not *215permanently disabled.2 Furthermore, I believe that during this “gap” plaintiff’s right to maintenance and cure was merely suspended.3 See Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 519, 69 S.Ct. 707, 93 L.Ed. 850 (1949); Sobosle v. United States Steel Corp., 359 F.2d 7, 11 & n. 9, 12 (3d Cir. 1966).
Once plaintiff became aware on July 15, 1971 that his disability was not permanent and that “frequent” psychotherapy treatments would be useful as a “curative” measure, I believe the central issue became whether plaintiff acted with “reasonable diligence” to “secure proper treatment.” Repsholdt v. United States, 205 F.2d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1953).
To the extent that Maritime has an affirmative duty to provide treatment (as opposed to reimbursement for maintenance or treatment), I agree with the majority that notice is required. But I am aware of no decision which has held that reimbursement liability for maintenance and cure cannot attach until the shipowner is given notice of the seaman’s disability.4 To fashion such an inflexible rule would disregard, m my view, the possible lack of prejudice to the shipowner from lack of noticé5 and the admonition in Sobosle, supra, that, “admiralty recognizes the human rights that are involved, judging the seaman as he is, — subjectively, rather than as he might have been, — objectively, if he were someone else.”6
Thus, while I agree that Maritime could not have been obligated to provide treatment to plaintiff prior to June 9, 1972 at the earliest, I do believe that Maritime would be liable for the stipulated eight dollars per diem maintenance charge from July 15, 1971, provided plaintiff made reasonable efforts to seek treatment following Dr. Silverstein’s diagnosis on July 15, 1971.7 However, the record clearly discloses that plaintiff made no reasonable effort from that date forward to obtain the treatment suggested by Dr. Silverstein. And even if plaintiff was unaware of free medical treatment, all he had to do was notify Maritime who would then have had an affirmative obligation to provide treatment.8 Consequently, plaintiff should not be allowed to recover for maintenance and cure for the period between July 15, 1971 and June 9, 1972 because he did not make reasonable efforts to seek treatment during this time.
As for the period between June 9, 1972 and June 27, 1972, I would remand to the district court for two findings: 1) the date on which Maritime received notice that plaintiff was seeking maintenance and cure and 2) whether plaintiff’s failure to seek treatment prior to such date was willful. The majority appears to foreclose the latter finding by holding that “on this record a suspension of maintenance and cure for the period in question should be ordered.” As *216I read Sobosle, supra, on which the majority relies for this statement, suspension, rather than complete termination, of maintenance and cure depends on whether or not the seaman willfully refused treatment or, as in our case, willfully failed to seek treatment. Thus, by holding that maintenance and cure are suspended, the majority impliedly holds that plaintiff’s failure to make reasonable efforts to seek treatment, during the period prior to which Maritime was notified, was not willful. In my view, the district court should decide this issue in the first instance and then apply the Sobosle rule.

. See Gore v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 256 F.Supp. 104, 122 (E.D.Pa.1966), rev’d on other grounds, 378 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1967).

. Even if plaintiff had submitted evidence that he was never permanently disabled, I do not think Maritime should be held liable for maintenance and cure during a period in which both parties presumably accepted the conclusion of the Public Health Service.

. I believe, however, that the right to maintenance and cure is completely terminated if a seaman willfully delays contesting a diagnosis of permanent disability or if the equitable defense of laches applies. Cf. Sobosle v. United States Steel Corp., 359 F.2d 7 (1966). These exceptions have not been raised by Maritime and thus they do not confront us in this case.

. Compare, Brown v. Dravo Corp., 258 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1958).

. A shipowner is prejudiced from lack of notice chiefly when the seaman has failed to seek treatment on his own, thus prolonging the period for which the shipowner will be liable for maintenance and cure.

. 359 F.2d at 12. See Luth v. Palmer Shipping Corp., 210 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Murphy v. American Barge Line Co., 169 F. 2d 61 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 859, 69 S.Ct. 133, 93 L.Ed. 406 (1948).

. Maritime would also be liable for any reasonable expenses incurred for treatment, but none were sought by plaintiff.

. In this sense, notice to Maritime can be considered one factor in determining whether plaintiff made reasonable efforts to seek treatment.