Court Opinion

ID: 9762444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:23:44.773794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:34.407765
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The judgment of the court of appeals is correct; it should be affirmed. Failing that, the petition for discretionary review should be dismissed as improvidently granted.
*755The opinion of the court of appeals advances two reasons for its decision: one, that an agreement between the parties, without more, does not constitute a protective order within contemplation of V.T.C.A. Family Code, § 71.11; two, that “the underlying agreed order must be sufficient to support contempt sanctions before the penal sanctions of [V.T.C.A. Penal Code] § 25.08 are available.” Lee v. State, 742 S.W.2d 80, at 81-82 (Tex.App.—Austin 1987). If the so-called “Agreed Protective Order” is not a protective order under law, the judgment of the Austin Court is supportable, regardless of sufficiency of the “agreed protective order.” 1
A proceeding for a protective order is commenced by filing an application for a protective order by a person entitled under §§ 71.02 and 71.04; certain requisites and procedures are provided, including hearing and findings, §§ 71.04 — 71.10(a), before the court “may make any protective order authorized by this chapter,” and apply it to a party to the proceeding who (1) is found to have committed family violence; or (2) has agreed to the order under 71.12 of this code,” § 71.10(b) and (c).
Section 71.11 prescribes authority for content of “a protective order,” subsection (b) of which is pertinent here, viz:
“(b) In a protective order the court may prohibit a party from:
(1.) * * * *
^2) * * * *
3) going to and near the residence or place of employment of a member of the family or household. The court shall specifically describe the prohibited locations and the minimum distances therefrom, if any, that the party must maintain unless Section 71.111 of this code applies, in which case, the court order need not disclose the place of the protected party’s residence.”
According to § 71.13(a) such a protective order made under 71.11 is effective for the period specified in the order, not to exceed one year. See generally Magill v. Sheffield, 612 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1981) writ refused n.r.e. Within that period upon motion, notice and hearing, the court “may modify a prior order to exclude any item included in the prior order or to exclude any item that could have been included in the prior order.” § 71.14.
The statutory provisions reviewed ante authorize the court to make a protective order enjoining a party to do or to refrain from doing acts prescribed in 71.11. Thus a court may “prohibit a party” from doing certain of those acts. In that context an order is a command or direction and “should be in the form of a command.” 51 Tex.Jur.3d 657 and 658, § 15. Requisites. In this respect a protective order is analogous to an injunction or restraining order, and it is axiomatic that such writ “must command the person ... to whom it is directed to desist and refrain from the commission or continuance of the act enjoined,” Tex.R.Civ.Pro. 687.
Manifestly the instant “agreed protective order” does not meet the statutorily prescribed requisites of a protective order for the court does not in terms “prohibit” appellee from doing any act; it does not “command ” appellant to cease and desist from any act.
The form appears to be the product of an effort to combine an agreement of the parties and findings of the court. However, “an order is an act of the court,” Lindley v. Flores, 672 S.W.2d 612, at 614 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984), no writ; “[a] court acts by and through its orders and not otherwise,” City of Hurst v. City of Colleyville, 501 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1973), writ refused n.r.e. Not only is the form not a protective order, also it is violative of § 71.12.
To-facilitate settlement of a proceeding for a protective order, § 71.12(a) provides the parties “may agree in writing, SUBJECT to the approval of the court, to do or refrain from doing any act that the court could order under Section 71.11.” Thus there is first a written agreement *756made and then presented to the court for consideration.
Thereafter comes action by the court: “If all or part of the agreement is approved by the court, ” the section mandates, “the part of the agreement approved by the court SHALL BE ATTACHED TO THE PROTECTIVE ORDER and become a part of THE ORDER OF THE COURT.” 2
Accordingly, to comply with § 71.12(a), two instruments must be produced, i.e., a written agreement by the parties and a protective order by the court. And just to remove any possible misunderstanding, § 71.12(b) provides: “The agreement expires when the court order expires.”
Therefore, one reason for the decision of the Austin Court of Appeals is correct in law, and on that basis its judgment may be affirmed.
Because the majority do not dismiss the petition as improvidently granted, I respectfully dissent.

. All emphasis is mine throughout this opinion unless otherwise indicated. All references in the following discussion are to sections in the Family Code in effect in April and May 1986 unless otherwise indicated.

. There is good reason for requiring a separate protective order: because it determines the issues and terminates this specially provided proceeding, the order is more in the nature of a judgment of the court.