Court Opinion

ID: 9958567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 16:12:14.879351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:29.260203
License: Public Domain

J-S10007-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 JOSEPH GERALD HENSLEY                    :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 687 WDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 4, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-62-CR-0000528-2015

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                      FILED: April 9, 2024

      Appellant, Joseph Gerald Hensley, appeals from the order entered on

May 4, 2023, dismissing as untimely his second petition filed pursuant to the

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as

follows.   On June 16, 2016, Appellant pled guilty to aggravated indecent

assault – complainant less than 16 years old, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(8). On

October 7, 2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 36 to 108 months of

incarceration. On October 11, 2016, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion

for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on December 9, 2016.

Appellant did not file a direct appeal.

      On February 8, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition and the

PCRA court appointed counsel who represented Appellant at an evidentiary

hearing.   On June 22, 2018, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing
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Appellant’s first PCRA petition. On July 31, 2018, the PCRA court entered an

order granting PCRA counsel’s request to withdraw from representation.

Appellant did not appeal the PCRA court’s dismissal of his first petition.

       On June 18, 2021, Appellant filed a second, pro se PCRA petition. On

July 16, 2021, the PCRA court appointed PCRA counsel. On December 15,

2021, the PCRA court granted PCRA counsel’s request to withdraw and

appointed new PCRA counsel. On April 20, 2022, PCRA counsel filed a motion

to withdraw as counsel. On April 25, 2022, the PCRA court filed a notice and

accompanying memorandum pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907,1 explaining its

intent to dismiss the PCRA petition at issue without an evidentiary hearing.

Within its Rule 907 declaration, the PCRA court also granted PCRA counsel’s

motion to withdraw.         The PCRA court, however, did not enter an order

dismissing Appellant’s second PCRA petition for over a year, or until May 4,
____________________________________________

1   Rule 907, provides, in pertinent part:

       [T]he judge shall promptly review the [PCRA] petition, any answer
       by the attorney for the Commonwealth, and other matters of
       record relating to the defendant's claim(s). If the judge is satisfied
       from this review that there are no genuine issues concerning any
       material fact and that the defendant is not entitled to
       post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose would be served
       by any further proceedings, the judge shall give notice to the
       parties of the intention to dismiss the petition and shall state in
       the notice the reasons for the dismissal. The defendant may
       respond to the proposed dismissal within 20 days of the date of
       the notice.     The judge thereafter shall order the petition
       dismissed, grant leave to file an amended petition, or direct that
       the proceedings continue.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) (emphasis added).

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2023, and only after Appellant filed, on April 24, 2023, pro se objections to

the PCRA court’s notice of intent to dismiss. In its May 4, 2023 dismissal

order, the PCRA court noted that Appellant’s objections were untimely. This

appeal resulted.2
____________________________________________

2  Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on June 7, 2023. Upon review of
the record, however, there is no docket notation that the order entered on
May 4, 2023 was served on Appellant. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c)
(providing that trial court criminal docket entries shall contain, inter alia, “the
date of service of the order or court notice”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4) (providing
that when PCRA petition is dismissed without hearing, the judge shall issue an
order to that effect, and, in addition to advising defendant via certified mail
of his right to appeal, “[t]he order shall be filed and served as provided in Rule
114”) (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Hess, 810 A.2d 1249,
1253 (Pa. 2002) (noting that Rule 114’s language leaves no question that the
trial court clerk’s obligations regarding docket entries are not discretionary).

Although Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal was facially untimely, we decline
to quash this appeal. See Commonwealth v. Midgley, 289 A.3d 1111, 1117
(Pa. Super. 2023) (“Where the trial court docket in a criminal case does not
indicate service on a party or the date of service, we will not quash the appeal
or require further proceedings. Rather, we will treat the time in which to take
an appeal as never having started to run and treat the appeal as timely.”);
Moreover, Appellant is incarcerated and his pro se notice of appeal was dated
June 1, 2023, or within the 30-day appeal period from the May 4, 2023
dismissal order. See Pa.R.A.P. 903 (“General[ly,] notice of appeal shall be
filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is
taken.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 121(f) (“A pro se filing submitted by a person
incarcerated in a correctional facility is deemed filed as of the date of the
prison postmark or the date the filing was delivered to the prison authorities
for purposes of mailing as documented by a properly executed prisoner cash
slip or other reasonably verifiable evidence.”); see also Commonwealth v.
Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997) (explaining prison mailbox rule). As
such, we treat the instant appeal as timely filed.

By order dated August 4, 2023, this Court directed the PCRA court to clarify
whether Appellant remained represented by counsel, and if not, whether
Appellant was entitled to the appointment of counsel. On September 28,
2023, following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court appointed collateral
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       PCRA counsel for Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

       A. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
          [petition without] a hearing, after it deemed the filing of []
          Appellant’s objections to [the] notice of intent to dismiss [the]
          PCRA petition [at issue] as untimely when no order was ever
          issued dismissing the PCRA petition until after [] Appellant filed
          his objections?

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (superfluous capitalization omitted).

       Here, Appellant claims that the PCRA court “erred in dismissing [his

instant] PCRA petition due to what [it] considered to be the ‘untimely’ filing of

his [o]bjections” to the PCRA court’s notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant acknowledges that the PCRA court gave notice

of his right to respond within 20 days as provided under Rule 907. Id. at 9.

However, Appellant argues that the PCRA court failed to use the term “shall”

to indicate that Appellant’s response “had to be filed within the prescribed

period of time.”     Id. at 9-10.       Appellant maintains that he “exercised his

option to file his objections, admittedly one day short of a year from the filing

of the [PCRA c]ourt’s notice[, but] before the [PCRA] court issued an order

dismissing his PCRA petition.” Id. at 10 (superfluous capitalization omitted).

Appellant asserts that once he filed objections to the PCRA court’s notice of

intent to dismiss under Rule 907, it “should have prompted the [PCRA c]ourt

to order a hearing to allow [] Appellant to be heard[.]” Id.

____________________________________________

appeal counsel to represent Appellant on appeal. Counsel subsequently filed
an appellate brief on Appellant’s behalf with this Court.

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      “[T]his Court's standard of review regarding an order denying a petition

under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported

by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.”       Commonwealth v.

Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344, 347 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Initially, we

note that, as set forth above, the plain language of Rule 907 specifically states

that “[t]he defendant may respond to the proposed dismissal within 20 days

of the date of the notice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. There is simply no requirement

that a Rule 907 notice contain the term “shall.” Instead, the discretionary rule

provides that a defendant “may” respond to Rule 907 notice. In this case, the

PCRA court used the precise language proscribed by the rule. Moreover, this

Court has previously determined that even the complete “failure to issue Rule

907 notice is not reversible error where the record is clear that the [PCRA]

petition is untimely.” Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849, 852 n.2

(Pa. Super. 2016), citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super.

2013) (“even if the issue [of the absence of Rule 907 notice] is raised, where

the petition is untimely, it does not automatically warrant reversal[]”). Finally,

we note that the PCRA court did not dismiss Appellant’s instant PCRA petition

until after it received Appellant’s response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice,

and, thus, we presume the PCRA court considered it.

      Furthermore, as we have stated:

      [T]he timeliness of a PCRA petition is also a jurisdictional requisite.
      A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall
      be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment of
      sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment
      of sentence is deemed final “at the conclusion of direct review,

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      including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
      States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
      expiration of time for seeking the review.”          42 Pa.C.S.A.
      § 9545(b)(3). The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness
      provisions in the PCRA allow for very limited circumstances under
      which the late filing of a petition will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
      § 9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, a petition must allege and
      the petitioner must prove:

         (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
         interference by government officials with the presentation
         of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
         Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
         States;

         (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
         unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
         ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

         (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
         recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
         the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
         provided in this section and has been held by that court to
         apply retroactively.

      42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A PCRA petitioner must present
      his claimed exception within [one year] of the date the claim first
      could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). As such,
      when a PCRA petition is not filed within one year of the expiration
      of direct review, or not eligible for one of the three limited
      exceptions, or entitled to one of the exceptions, but not filed
      within [one year] of the date that the claim could have been first
      brought, the [PCRA] court has no power to address the
      substantive merits of a petitioner's PCRA claims.

Zeigler, 148 A.3d at 853 (internal quotations and case citations omitted).

      Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant on October 7, 2016. Appellant

filed a timely post-sentence motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied

relief on December 9, 2016.       Appellant did not pursue a direct appeal.

Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final 30 days after the

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denial of post-sentence relief, or on Monday, January 9, 2017, when the time

for seeking an appeal expired. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2) (“If the defendant

filed a timely post-sentence motion, the notice of appeal shall be filed [] within

30 days of the entry of the order deciding the motion[.]”); see also Pa.R.A.P.

903(a) (stating notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days); see also

1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (stating that when the last day of the appeal period falls

on Sunday, that day shall be omitted from the computation of time).

Appellant thus had one year from January 9, 2017 to file a timely petition for

collateral relief. As such, the PCRA petition at issue, filed on June 18, 2021,

is patently untimely.

      In his PCRA petition, Appellant alleged that his constitutional rights were

violated and that his predicated claims were unknown and could not be

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii) and (iii).    See PCRA Court Opinion, 4/25/2022, at *4

(unpaginated).   More specifically, Appellant claimed that his mental health

conditions required a competency or capacity hearing prior to the trial court’s

acceptance of his guilty plea. See id. (“[Appellant] claims that trial counsel

failed to properly support evidence of his mental health conditions with

documentation and that no competency and capacity hearing had taken place

though one was required.”) (“The alleged new facts concern [Appellant’s]

mental health diagnoses[.]”).        Accordingly, Appellant averred that his

constitutional rights were violated and the facts underlying his claim were

unknown to him and could not have been ascertained with due diligence. Id.

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        Regarding the newly-recognized constitutional right exception at 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), our Supreme Court has explained:

        First, [the exception] provides that the right asserted is a
        constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of
        the United States or [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,] after
        the time provided in this section. Second, it provides that the
        right “has been held” by “that court” to apply retroactively. Thus,
        a petitioner must prove that there is a “new” constitutional right
        and that the right “has been held” by that court to apply
        retroactively. The language “has been held” is in the past tense.

        These words mean that the action has already occurred, i.e., “that
        court” has already held the new constitutional right to be
        retroactive to cases on collateral review. By employing the past
        tense in writing this provision, the legislature clearly intended that
        the right was already recognized at the time the petition was filed.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 679 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted;

brackets supplied).      Here, Appellant failed to plead and prove that a new

constitutional right, recognized by either the United States Supreme Court or

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court within the calendar year before Appellant

filed   the    instant   PCRA   petition,   retroactively   required   competency

examinations before the entry of a guilty plea under the circumstances

presented in this case. Our independent research has not revealed any such

decision.     Therefore, Appellant cannot invoke the new constitutional right

exception set forth under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii).

        The exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) requires the petitioner to allege

and prove that there were facts that were unknown to him and that he could

not have ascertained those facts by the exercise of due diligence. “The focus

of the exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered

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or newly willing source for previously known facts.”       Commonwealth v.

Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (internal citations, quotations, and

original brackets omitted).        Here, the PCRA court recognized that “[t]he

alleged new facts concern [Appellant’s] mental health diagnoses, but

[Appellant] has acknowledged prior [awareness] of his mental health

conditions.” See PCRA Court Opinion, 4/25/2022, at *4 (unpaginated). We

agree.3

       Based upon our standard of review and our review of the record, we

conclude that the PCRA court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA

petition. The PCRA court gave Appellant proper notice of its intent to dismiss

his PCRA petition under Rule 907. Moreover, Appellant failed to plead or prove

an exception to his patently untimely PCRA petition. Without jurisdiction, the

PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition and, thus, he is not

entitled to relief.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

3    We note that, on appeal, Appellant does not challenge the PCRA’s
jurisdictional determinations. Instead, as set forth at length above, Appellant
confines his appellate argument to the notice he received under Rule 907.

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4/9/2024

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