Court Opinion

ID: 9678450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:20:12.580258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:33.052562
License: Public Domain

DUNN, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I would reverse the decision of the trial court granting custody of the minor children to appellee.
The trial court has broad discretionary powers in determining the custody of minor children and this court will not interfere with that discretion unless there is a clear case of abuse presented by the record. O’Connor v. O’Connor, 307 N.W.2d 132 (S.D.1981); Engels v. Engels, 297 N.W.2d 489 (S.D.1980); Isaak v. Isaak, 278 N.W.2d 445 (S.D.1979). “This exercise of judicial discretion, however, must have sound and substantial basis in the testimony.” Aulner v. Aulner, 296 N.W.2d 533, 535 (S.D.1980); Haskell v. Haskell, 279 N.W.2d 903 (S.D.1979). The best interests of the children relative to their temporal, mental and moral welfare are the primary criterion to be considered by the court in custody determinations. Haskell v. Haskell, supra; Yager v. Yager, 83 S.D. 315, 159 N.W.2d 125 (1968). I do not feel that the record supports the trial court’s finding that the best interests of the child will be served by granting custody to appellee.
The evidence introduced at trial indicates that appellant was willing and competent to care for the parties’ children. Appellant has cared for the needs of the children since appellee abandoned the family in November of 1979. He has fed, bathed, and dressed the children; met with their teachers at school; taken them to church and arranged for their religious education; and has handled the necessary household chores of cooking, washing and cleaning. Appellant has a stable job of farming and has made arrangements for the care of his children while he is working. The record does indicate, however, that he was slow to make repairs.
With regard to appellee, on the other hand, the record indicates that she left the *712home for short periods on two occasions during the marriage, and that she left permanently on November 20,1979. After this final departure, she had no contact with her family until shortly before the hearing on the Order to Show Cause on December 28, 1979. Meanwhile, she had moved to North Dakota. Prior to the divorce hearing on March 27, 1980, appellee exercised her visitation rights only once. Evidence was also introduced at trial indicating that appellee did not properly bathe or clothe her children; that her housekeeping duties were often neglected as evidenced by dirty dishes and full garbage bags sitting around the house; and that she was subject to attacks of temper and rage. Appellee’s emotional stability was questioned at the trial through introduction of evidence regarding her leaving home on three occassions and of attempting to stab herself with a knife. After appellee committed perjury at the divorce hearing, she finally admitted having had sexual intercourse with another man after leaving her family in November, 1979. Appellee did not indicate at trial the plans she has made for the education of her children or for their care while she was working if given custody of the children.
This evident lack of stability on the part of appellee should have been given greater consideration by the trial court. There will be no father or grandparents in North Dakota to pick up the pieces when appellee leaves in frustration as she has in the past; and she will have frustrations even greater than those caused by a broken down washer in trying to raise three boys alone! The stability for the boys is on the farm with their father and their grandparents nearby ready and willing to lend a hand. In my opinion, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to move these boys out of this stable farm home, and place them in a completely unknown environment with ap-pellee.