Court Opinion

ID: 9468927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:26:53.786234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:06.918105
License: Public Domain

GARTH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree that there is substantial evidence to affirm the Board’s finding of unfair labor practices. I write separately to express my dissatisfaction and disagreement with an analysis that permits the Board to issue a bargaining order even though it has not in my opinion “appraise[d] those factors which might reasonably have a bearing on the likelihood of a fair rerun election.” Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Hedstrom II) (emphasis added).
In NLRB v. Armcor Industries, 535 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1976) and Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996, 101 S.Ct. 1699, 68 L.Ed.2d 196 (1981) this court held that when the Board imposes a bargaining order, it must articulate its reasoning and explain the factors that justify imposing this extraordinary remedy over the preferred remedy of ordering a new election. In NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) this court sitting en banc once again reviewed the Board’s practice of imposing a bargaining order rather than ordering a election. This court while reaffirming our previously announced Armcor-Hedstrom standard, which as I have noted requires an “appraisal of all factors bearing on the likelihood of a fair rerun election,” nevertheless, determined that the Board had met our standard. It did so by accepting as a sufficient articulation, conclusory statements of the Board, and a repetition of the Board’s findings with respect to the Company’s unfair labor practices.
*113I dissented from the majority’s approval of the Board’s “justification” in Permanent Label, contending in my dissent, that the Board, in order to comply with an Armcor-Hedstrom standard must discuss “why the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of insuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present is slight. . . . ” NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., supra, 657 F.2d at 533 (Garth, J. dissenting) quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1940, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969) (emphasis added). I will not repeat here my dissenting discussion in Permanent Label, other than to state that if we are to determine whether the Board is correct in rejecting an election which is the preferred remedy, then the justification furnished to us must include more than conclusory statements and a rehash of the unfair labor practices committed by the company, all of which generally may be cured by a cease and desist order and by reinstatement of discharged employees.
In the instant case, the ALJ justified a bargaining order by discussing the serious nature of the Company’s unfair labor practices, the small size of the company, the “top level” source of the unfair labor practices and the lack of effort to neutralize them. However, these reasons assembled by the ALJ do not focus on the central issue of why a fair re-election cannot be held.
The discussion of the Company’s actions is no more than a reiteration of the reasons for concluding that the employer committed unfair labor practices. The fact that unfair labor practices stem from a top level source does not support a finding that a bargaining order should issue. Most, if not all, unfair labor practices by employers emanate from upper management. The fact that the Company made»no real effort to counteract the unfair labor practices is no more helpful in assessing whether a fair election is possible. Rarely, if ever, does an employer undertake counteractive measures until the Board has made a finding of unfair labor practices and has issued a cease and desist order. Finally, although the ALJ’s opinion may be correct in stating that the small size of a bargaining unit means that unfair labor practices are more likely to contaminate an election process, the decision does not discuss why, even in a small unit, a cease and desist order and an order for an election would not cure the impact of such practices.
Nowhere in the ALJ’s opinion, which was summarily adopted by the Board, is there any discussion of why the Board’s traditional remedies — an order compelling the employer to cease and desist from unfair labor practices and to reinstate discharged employees — would not be sufficient to guarantee the employees’ right to select democratically a bargaining representative. There is no discussion of why such traditional and preferred remedies would not eliminate the impact of the Company’s prior unfair practices on the fairness of a future election. Nor is there any discussion of why a cease and desist order would not deter the employer from committing future unfair labor practices.1
Our review of the Board’s order is made unnecessarily difficult when the Board fails to address these issues. It must be obvious, that we cannot exercise our proper function as a reviewing court unless we are furnished with a reasoned analysis of the factors which led the Board to conclude that a fair election could not be had.
During oral argument, when counsel for the NLRB failed to explain why a cease and desist order and an election would not suffice in this case, the court, in colloquy with counsel, suggested the possibility that without such an order, an employer with a small workforce might seek to forestall unionization for a period of time by discharging employees who support the union. Without expressing any opinion on the merits of such a justification, I note first that even if *114valid, this reasoning, did not emanate from the Board. Second, such a post hoc rationalization by a reviewing court is never sufficient to justify agency action.
[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.
Securities and Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1577, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947).
In his opinion, Judge Gibbons has supplied still another post hoc justification for the Board’s issuance of the bargaining order. According to Judge Gibbons, “when the employer’s workforce consists of four persons, one of whom is the son of the president, and the other three sign valid union authorization cards, the degree to which employees’ free choice of a bargaining representative will be enhanced by a Board supervised secret ballot election is undiseernible.” Opinion of Judge Gibbons, typescript at 7. This rationalization merely underscores once again the deficiencies in the Board’s articulation, a deficiency which a court cannot cure.
One of the factors the Board must consider in deciding to issue a bargaining order based on valid authorization cards is whether those authorization cards represent the bargaining unit as of the time of the issuance of the proposed order. See NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc., 427 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957, 91 S.Ct. 2232, 29 L.Ed.2d 691 (1970). If the unit has undergone a dramatic expansion or change in personnel, the earlier authorization cards may no longer represent the free choice of the employees. In the instant case, despite inquiries made at oral argument, we have yet to be informed whether the two discharged employees, McClellan and Johnson will accept reinstatement or whether the employer has hired replacements for those employees. We do know that the working unit presently numbers more than one employee. Thus, it is not unlikely that the majority’s decision will result, for example, in an order directing the employer to bargain with the Teamsters even though only one out of a number of employees in the current unit authorized the Teamsters to act as the bargaining representative. Indeed, all of the other current employees might well desire a union, but prefer a bargaining representative other than the Teamsters. Or, they may of course reject unionization altogether.
Neither the ALJ nor the Board considered the propriety of a bargaining order in light of the change in the composition of the workforce. The fact of employee turnover has been held to be a significant event which must be considered by the Board in deciding whether an election or bargaining order is the appropriate remedy. Not only must the fact of turnover be considered, but the Board’s consideration must be articulated so that its reasoning may be examined by the reviewing court. Peoples Gas System v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 45-46 & n.18 (D.C.Cir.1980). Nor indeed has the Board expressed any other justifiable reason why the cease and desist order followed by an election would not fulfill the purposes of the Labor Management Relations Act. As a consequence, I cannot join the majority in enforcing the bargaining order which the Board has imposed.
I acknowledge the emphasis Judge Adams gives in his concurring opinion to NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614-15, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1940, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). That case established the guidelines for the Board’s issuance of bargaining orders. Nevertheless, although Judge Adams correctly refers to Gissel’s instruction that the Board’s choice of remedy be given special respect by us, 395 U.S. 612 n.32, 89 S.Ct. 1939 n.32, he does not mention the context in which the Court advanced that instruction.
The Supreme Court emphasized that elections, not bargaining orders, are the preferred method of assuring employees’ free *115choice of a bargaining representative, 395 U.S. 602, 89 S.Ct. 1934, and that an antidemocratic bargaining order, by which the Board imposes a particular union upon the workforce, should not be issued unless the possibility of ensuring a fair election is slight. 395 U.S. at 614, 89 S.Ct. at 1940. It was in this context that the Supreme Court instructed us to give respect to the Board’s choice of remedy. However, when the Board has given us no meaningful reasons to support its decision rejecting the preferred election remedy, and when evidence and reasoned findings are lacking as a predicate for the Board’s choice, I suggest that the Supreme Court’s instruction is inapposite. Thus, in such a case, as this one is, the Supreme Court would not require our deference nor our respect for such Board proceedings.2
Moreover, it appears to me that having been informed of our articulation requirements, the Board could enhance its own stature and more readily achieve its statutory objectives if it furnished the court with an explanation of its reasoning in the manner prescribed by our Armcor-Hedstrom standard. While it is true that sometimes the Board does succeed in securing approval of its justifications as being “sufficiently discernible for our review,” Opinion of Judge Gibbons, typescript at 7, as it has in the instant case and as it did in Permanent Label, it is also true that there are many more instances in which enforcement of the Board’s orders has been rejected due to non-compliance with our standard.
At the least, the Board’s current practice of refusing to furnish the enforcing court with articulated reasoning, has led to split decisions among the panels of this court and thus to a proliferation of en banc hearings with inevitable mixed results. See NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc); Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1980) (in banc) (Hedstrom II), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996, 101 S.Ct. 1699, 68 L.Ed.2d 196 (1981); NLRB v. Armcor Industries, Inc., No. 77-1495 (November 15, 1978) (Armcor II) (unreported per curiam), (denying enforcement by an equally divided court); NLRB v. K & K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1981); Electrical Products Division of Midland Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 210, 66 L.Ed.2d 91 (1980); NLRB v. Garry Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1980); Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1977) (Hedstrom I); NLRB v. Armcor Industries, Inc., 535 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1976). Such a practice serves no purpose. To the contrary, it results in confusion, uncertainty, expense, and delay in the enforcement of the labor laws. Yet, the Board has it within its own power to correct this situation and can do so immediately.
It does not make sense to me that a Board practice which has been constantly questioned by this and other courts as to the fact and degree of compliance with established standards, should be continued to the detriment of the parties, the Board, and the reviewing courts. I strongly suggest that the time has come for the Board and the courts to end such skirmishes. This, however, can only be accomplished when the Board recognizes the problem it has created by its mechanical issuance of *116bargaining orders, see Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 46, and its intransigence in resisting compliance with the standard we have established. The Board can easily eliminate the tensions that have developed by amending its practices to conform to our requirements. In my opinion it should do so without further delay.
I respectfully dissent from the enforcement of the Board’s order.

. It is obvious that the ALJ was not relying on Permanent Label at the time its opinion was filed. Permanent Label was announced on June 30, 1981; the ALJ’s decision was issued on July 14, 1980. Our “articulation” standard, however, was established as early as Armcor in 1976. Thus, little excuse exists for the failure to comply with that requirement.

. Judge Adams reliance on Vermont Yankee to support his and the majority’s position that the Board should not be required to do more than it did here is a misapplication of the principles prescribed by the Supreme Court in that case. In Vermont Yankee the Supreme Court held that reviewing courts could not compel administrative agencies engaging in rulemaking to adopt procedures prescribed by a court in addition to those provided in the Administrative Procedure Act. In the instant action, the issue is whether this court should require the Board to provide us with a sufficient explanation and articulation for its choice of remedy — i.e., a bargaining order — in a dispute resolved through adjudication.
In any event, I do not regard our articulation standard to constitute an intrusion on internal Board procedures in the manner proscribed by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee. I pointed this out once before in my dissent in Permanent Label, 657 F.2d at 532 (Garth, J., dissenting), in which I emphasized that our standard stems from the Supreme Court’s own instructions in Gissel and from fundamental rules of administrative law. Having expressed my views there, I do not deem it necessary to repeat them once again.