Court Opinion

ID: 9372638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 00:00:27.395773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:36.591322
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1077     Document: 010110815825       Date Filed: 02/21/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         February 21, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 22-1077
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:20-CR-00068-CMA-1)
  SAMUEL TERRAYE WINDOM,                                       (D. Colo.)

        Defendant - Appellant.

  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 22-1119
                                                    (D.C. No. 1:15-CR-00202-RM-1)
  SAMUEL TERRAYE WINDOM,                                       (D. Colo.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-1077    Document: 010110815825         Date Filed: 02/21/2023      Page: 2

       I.     INTRODUCTION

       In September 2019, a confidential informant notified Denver police detective,

 Joshua Vance, that someone named Trey “was selling” methamphetamine from his

 apartment in south Denver. The tipster, who Vance described as previously reliable,

 said he or she had purchased methamphetamine “in the past” from Trey’s apartment

 and had observed firearms and drugs inside his residence “during the past six

 months.” Further investigation revealed the identity of “Trey” to be Appellant,

 Samuel Windom. Authorities successfully arranged a controlled buy to corroborate

 this information, at which Windom was observed selling methamphetamine to a

 confidential informant. 1 As a result, Vance submitted an affidavit to support the

 search of Windom’s residence. A warrant was issued, and officers executed a search

 of Windom’s home on December 2, 2019. The search yielded approximately 78

 grams of methamphetamine and two semi-automatic guns. Windom admitted to

 police that he owned both guns and had previously sold methamphetamine.

       Windom was charged with possession of a gun by a previously convicted felon

 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 1); knowingly and intentionally

 possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.

       1
          At one point in its description of the controlled buy, the affidavit appears to
 refer to the dealer of drugs as “Anthony” and not Samuel or Windom. R. Vol. I, at
 45. The same paragraph correctly identifies the subject of the controlled buy as
 Samuel seven times. Id. Further, the name Anthony appears at no other point
 throughout the affidavit. Given the context of the description and the singularity of
 the reference, this court interprets the use of Anthony as a simple error that does not
 affect the substance of the affidavit. Therefore, we do not conclude the affidavit is
 inherently suspect on these grounds.
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 § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii) (Count 2); and knowingly using and carrying a firearm

 in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)

 (Count 3). Prior to trial, Windom moved to suppress the evidence recovered during

 the search of his apartment. He argued the warrant failed to establish probable cause

 for two reasons: first, it did not prove a sufficient nexus between the purported drug

 sales and his residence; and second, the information provided by the informant was

 several months old and, thus, stale. In turn, he asserted the affidavit was so lacking in

 probable cause that executing officers could not have relied upon the resulting

 warrant in good faith. Windom requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue of

 suppression, which the district court denied on the grounds that his motion did not

 raise any material factual dispute.

       The district court denied Windom’s motion to suppress. It determined the

 informant’s tip was not stale because it demonstrated ongoing drug activity and was

 effectively corroborated by the controlled buy. Further, the district court concluded

 an appropriate nexus was formed by an investigation linking Windom to the

 apartment and the informant’s direct implication of Windom’s residence. A jury trial

 was set for July 26, 2021, and concluded with guilty verdicts on Counts 1 and 2 of

 the superseding indictment. On appeal, Windom argues the district court erred in

 denying a hearing on the motion to suppress and renews his probable cause

 challenges. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by forgoing a

 suppression hearing and affirm the district court’s rulings that neither staleness nor

 lack of nexus undermined the probable cause supporting a search of Windom’s home.

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        II.     ANALYSIS

        Review of a district court’s analysis on the validity of a warrant is de novo.

 United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 970–71 (10th Cir. 2014). This court,

 however, “must accord ‘great deference’ to the probable-cause assessment of the

 state court judge who issued the warrant.” Id. at 971. Probable cause requires “only a

 probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such

 activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983). When making such a

 probable cause determination “we look to the totality of the circumstances as detailed

 in the affidavit accompanying the application for the search warrant.” Pulliam, 748

 F.3d at 971.

                a. SUPPRESSION HEARING

        This court reviews the denial of an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress

 for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1408 (10th Cir.

 1997). A trial court is required to grant a suppression hearing only when a defendant

 both presents facts justifying relief and demonstrates disputed issues of material fact.

 Id. An evidentiary hearing on suppression is warranted when the motion raises

 “factual allegations that are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and

 nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to

 the validity of the search are in issue.” United States v. Chavez-Marquez, 66 F.3d

 259, 261 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). A hearing is not required

 when a motion only challenges questions of law and not any underlying facts. United

 States v. Mathews, 928 F.3d 968, 978 (10th Cir. 2019).

                                              4
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       Rather than outline factual disputes, Windom’s motion to suppress offered

 three legal arguments—staleness, nexus, and lack of good faith—for why the

 affidavit was insufficient to support a search warrant. These arguments contained

 only perfunctory factual references, with none rising to the level of definite, detailed,

 and nonconjectural allegations. See United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 358 F.3d 1263,

 1266–67 (10th Cir. 2004). This absence of disputed facts and primary reliance on

 issues of law alone demonstrate the district court did not abuse its discretion by

 proceeding without a hearing. Recognizing this deficiency in his motion, Windom

 argues on appeal that the affidavit raised several material factual disputes on its face,

 including the exact timing and number of drug sales between the informant and

 Windom, and whether the original tipster was the same informant who participated in

 the controlled buy. Not only was this argument not presented to the district court,

 thereby subjecting it to the heightened standard of plain error review, but it also lacks

 definite, material facts “that, if established, would entitle [Windom] to relief.”

 Chavez-Marquez, 66 F.3d at 261. Given the totality of the circumstances, the timing,

 numerosity, and party identity of Windom’s drug exchanges do not alter the probable

 cause determination in this case. Thus, even if disputed facts were present on the face

 of the affidavit, the district court did not err in bypassing a suppression hearing.

              b. STALENESS

       “[P]robable cause to search cannot be based on stale information that no longer

 suggests that the items sought will be found in the place to be searched.” United

 States v. Burkhart, 602 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations

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 omitted). Whether staleness exists depends “on the nature of the criminal activity, the

 length of the activity, and the nature of the property to be seized.” United States v.

 Mathis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).

 Indication of “ongoing and continuous activity makes the passage of time less

 critical” when making determinations of staleness. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

 Additionally, “otherwise stale information may be refreshed by more recent events”

 for the purpose of probable cause analysis. United States v. Cantu, 405 F.3d 1173,

 1178 (10th Cir. 2005).

       As the district court articulated, staleness is not at issue here because the

 allegations offered by the informant indicated Windom’s drug activity was ongoing

 and the controlled buy effectively refreshed the information provided. The informant

 offered three critical pieces of information: a) Windom “was selling”

 methamphetamine from his apartment; b) he or she had purchased methamphetamine

 “in the past from [Windom’s] apartment;” and c) he or she had observed drugs and

 guns inside Windom’s apartment “during the past six months.” Although these details

 are not highly specific, they collectively suggest the type of ongoing trafficking that

 diminishes the significance of when the alleged activity took place. See United States

 v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir. 2001). Despite Windom’s arguments to the

 contrary, there is no reason to doubt the reliability of the informant. The affidavit

 clearly contains hallmark indicia of trustworthiness: the informant had provided prior

 accurate tips to police and gave ample facts that were successfully corroborated by

 authorities. United States v. Quezada-Enriquez, 567 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir.

                                             6
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 2009). Most significantly, the officers fully corroborated the informant’s core drug

 trafficking allegation through a carefully constructed controlled buy. To the degree

 any information offered by the informant was in danger of being stale, the controlled

 buy cured this threat by comprehensively refreshing the allegation that Windom was,

 in fact, dealing methamphetamine.

               c. NEXUS

        Probable cause also requires a nexus between the suspected criminal activity

 and the place to be searched. United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1225, 1228 (10th

 Cir. 2005). Personal knowledge of illegal activity taking place in the area to be

 searched is not required to establish nexus. United States v. Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272,

 1279 (10th Cir. 2009). Rather, “a sufficient nexus is established once an affidavit

 describes circumstances which would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the

 belief that ‘the articles sought’ are at a particular place.” Id. (internal quotations

 omitted).

        Although the controlled buy did not take place at Windom’s home, the

 informant’s tip directly implicated his apartment. The tip referenced purchasing and

 observing drugs inside Windom’s residence. Further, independent investigation by

 police makes it clear that the apartment searched both belonged to Windom and was

 the scene of the tip’s allegations. This court has held it is “merely common sense that

 a drug supplier will keep evidence of his crimes at his home.” United States v.

 Sanchez, 555 F.3d 910, 914 (10th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Garcia, 707

 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sparks, 291 F.3d 683, 689–90

                                              7
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 (10th Cir. 2002). Given this context, the strong evidence that Windom was engaged

 in drug trafficking, and the direct implication of his residence as a part of his drug

 activity, a reasonable person could certainly believe Windom kept drugs in his home.

 Accordingly, the affidavit successfully established a proper nexus to support the

 search warrant. 2

       III.   CONCLUSION

       The judgment 3 of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado

 is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Michael R. Murphy
                                             Circuit Judge

       2
          Windom argues that if this court were to deem the search warrant invalid, the
 “good-faith exception” should not apply. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
 922 (1984). This court concludes the warrant in this case is valid, and therefore, it
 need not reach the application of the exception.
        3
          Because no party makes any argument about the second appeal, we dismiss
 that appeal as abandoned. See Johnson v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty./Kan.
 City, 371 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2004) (“The cross-appeals were not briefed and
 deemed to have been abandoned. Accordingly we dismiss the cross-appeals.”).
 Similarly, Appellant’s Second Unopposed Motion to Supplement the Record on
 Appeal is denied as moot because it only supplemented the second appeal and did not
 implicate any argument made to this court.
                                             8