Court Opinion

ID: 9717841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:11:19.076911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:55.783628
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Essentially, I academically agree with my colleague, Justice Sabers. It is abundantly clear that the trial judge pronounced a total 85-year sentence and intended that Cady begin serving an 85-year sentence. This first sentence was effective on April 3, 1987. During a three-day period, it is apparent that minds began to question — to pierce — the propriety of the April 3, 1987 sentencing, whereupon another sentencing took place on April 6, 1987. The second sentence was totally different than the first sentence.
Finally, a third sentence, in the form of a written judgment, filed April 6,1987, was entered nunc pro tunc on the third day of April, 1987. It is my opinion that the second oral sentence was different from the first oral sentence and the written judgment is different than both of the oral sentences. But as Justice Sabers mentions, it was clearly within the intention of the circuit court judge, at the first hearing, to pronounce a sentence totaling 85 years. Once that was pronounced and the intent was there, absent fraud on the part of the defendant, this was a fixed sentence and could not be changed. State v. Ford, 328 N.W.2d 263 (S.D.1982). Ford is still good law in this state. I also disagree with footnote 2 of the majority opinion, for “[a] trial court may not use SDCL 23A-31-1 to increase the length of a sentence.” State v. Tibbetts, 333 N.W.2d 440, 441 (S.D.1983) (citing Ford, 328 N.W.2d 263).
Defendant began serving the first sentence. He was serving a sentence under the April 3, 1987 sentence. There is no legal basis upon which his sentence could be increased or changed. United States v. Raftis, 427 F.2d 1145 (8th Cir.1970). A valid sentence cannot be increased in severity after a defendant has commenced serving a sentence. This principle, steeped in precedent in South Dakota, may be found in State v. Jackson, 272 N.W.2d 102 (S.D.1978); Ex parte Watt, 73 S.D. 436, 44 N.W.2d 119 (1950); State ex rel. Conway v. Hughes, 62 S.D. 579, 584, 255 N.W. 800, 802 (1934). It is a well-recognized adage of law that as soon as a prisoner suffers some confinement, the sentence is under way, i.e., it has commenced. This even includes confinement in the custody of a law enforcement officer. See Annot., 159 A.L.R. *833161 (1945). State advocates that the trial court’s oral sentence is unclear. Assuming, arguendo, that the State’s contention is true, all ambiguous language in a pronounced sentence must be favorably construed for the defendant. Gaddis v. United States, 280 F.2d 334, 336 (6th Cir.1960).
This now takes me to the most objectionable part of the State’s case, and it is simply the fact that there is no authority whatsoever set forth in the State’s brief to sustain its position. There are four and three-fourths pages of argument and rationale beginning on page 24 of the State’s brief and not one authority or case is cited in support of its argument with the exception of the said Ford case, which the State mistakenly calls the “Forbes” case, and the State cites the exact quote set forth by Justice Sabers in the first full paragraph of his dissent. Ford, as far as I am concerned, is authority against the State’s position and not for it. It is noted that it is the first case cited by the majority writer in support of the statement that “[i]t is settled law in this state that the oral sentence is the only sentence and the written sentence must conform to it.” (Emphasis added.) The Ford cite is followed by numerous federal decisions supporting our state decision. The majority opinion proceeds to cite several federal court decisions about ambiguous oral sentences which can be changed or clarified by written judgment. Not one of these decisions are cited by the State. In essence, the State has cited no authority to support its decision and it is four pages of argument, per se. Under State v. Jones, 416 N.W.2d 875, 878-79 (S.D.1987); Drier v. Great American Ins. Co., 409 N.W.2d 357, 361 (S.D.1987); In re S.D., 402 N.W.2d 346, 352 (S.D.1987); Corbly v. Matheson, 335 N.W.2d 347, 348 (S.D.1983); State v. Shull, 331 N.W.2d 284, 285 n. 1 (S.D.1983); Graham v. State, 328 N.W.2d 254, 255 n. 2 (S.D.1982); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 258 (S.D.1976); Schumacher v. R-B Freight Lines, 73 S.D. 535, 539, 45 N.W.2d 458, 460 (1950), the State cannot prevail where it cites no authority. This is an additional reason for reversing the present judgment and remanding the sentence back to the lower court for reinstitution of the total 85-year sentence. Therefore, I concur in part (first issue) but dissent in part (second issue).