Court Opinion

ID: 9611690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:59:24.723833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:16.926442
License: Public Domain

SCHWAB, J.,
Pro Tempore, dissenting.
I cannot concur in that portion of the opinion of the majority which holds that it was not error to refuse to grant a mistrial when the plaintiff’s doctor on cross-examination unnecessarily referred to litigants being, in some instances, “* * * ‘hounded’ by the insurance company * *
This court, as pointed out in Blake v. Webster Orchards, 249 Or 348, 354, 437 P2d 757 (1968), has “* # » -QQ-fc always been precise in our statement of the rules covering the consequences of the introduction of insurance * * The court then goes on to hold:
[W]e have adhered to the following 6(# # *330basic principles: If insurance is not relevant and is intentionally injected into the ease, the trial court must grant a motion for mistrial and if it does not it has committed reversible error. Leishman v. Taylor, 199 Or 546, 263 P2d 605 (1953). If insurance is not relevant, but has come into the case through inadvertence, whether or not to grant a mistrial is in the discretion of the trial court. Denton v. Arnstein, 197 Or 28, 54-56, 250 P2d 407 (1952). This discretion is largely uncontrolled by this court. "We permit the trial court to decide whether or not prejudice has been created. Wells v. Morrison, 121 Or 604, 256 P 641 (1927).” 249 Or at 354-55.
I do not believe that it is proper (1) to differentiate between intentional or inadvertent injection of insurance, or (2) to provide no standard by which a decision can be made as to when the injection of insurance is prejudicial.
The reason for the rule against the injection of insurance is to insure, so far as possible, that the defendant gets an unprejudiced determination of his liability. Johnson v. Hansen, 237 Or 1, 389 P2d 330, 390 P2d 611 (1964). It follows that mention of insurance is no more or no less prejudicial because it is intentionally or inadvertently mentioned. Intent is not relevant to the determination of prejudice.
Prejudice, like obscenity, is in the mind of the beholder. There is no way by which a court can accurately measure the mental reactions of jurors. Johnson v. Hansen, supra, at 10. But we must, nevertheless, fashion some standard because we are thus far committed to the concept that:
“In the ordinary case, the presence or absence of insurance is not only irrelevant, but * * * is *331prejudicial * * *.” Johnson v. Hansen, supra, at 4. (Emphasis supplied.)
I would therefore adopt a rule such as:
The unnecessary injection of insurance, be it intentional or inadvertent, is prejudicial and ground for a mistrial unless the court can point to some special circumstance negating the likelihood of prejudice.
Such a circumstance might be that the defendant is a major national corporation. Undoubtedly there are others.①
The application of the rule I here propose would result in a reversal in the case at hand. Not only was the comment of the medical witness unnecessary — not only did it inject the existence of insurance into the case — but it inferred that the insurance company improperly “hounded” the plaintiff, to her detriment. This in a case in which liability was admitted and the only questions were the extent of the plaintiff’s injury and the compensation to be awarded.
It can be argued that the witness did not refer to the present case but was only speaking of injured plaintiffs generally in situations in which the defendants had liability insurance. Such an argument is too thin. No juror would likely so understand it. A juror would have to come to the conclusion either that the response was germane to the case or the court was permitting irrelevant evidence.
*332There are no special circumstances in this case from which we can affirmatively determine that the mention of insurance was not prejudicial.
For the foregoing reasons I dissent.
Holman, J., joins in this dissent.

 Such a rule would not give free rein to the intentional and unnecessary injection of insurance into every case in which it could be affirmatively said that the mention of insurance was not prejudicial. Deliberate misconduct can be dealt with in many ways.