Court Opinion

ID: 9777580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:16:00.538034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:56.597317
License: Public Domain

Stephens, J.
¶21 (dissenting) — This is now the second time I have faced the issue before the court, the first being in In re Personal Restraint of Knippling, 144 Wn. App. 639, 183 P.3d 365 (2008). Having had the benefit of a second look, I am still convinced that an offender who remains in prison beyond the lawful period of confinement because of a sentencing error must receive credit toward a term of community custody. Because the majority would deny Cliff Alan Jones credit toward his term of community custody for the 30 months he was wrongly confined, I respectfully dissent.
¶22 As an initial matter, it is important to distinguish the question of when Jones’s term of community custody began from the question of whether it was tolled. The governing statute makes clear Jones’s community custody term began when he completed his 51-month term of incarceration. Former RCW 9.94A.120(10)(a) (1999) states *250that “community custody shall begin ... upon completion of the term of confinement.” (Emphasis added.) The statute specifies “completion” of confinement as opposed to “release” from confinement. “The ordinary meaning of‘completion’ is different from the ordinary meaning of ‘release’ because an offender can complete a term of confinement without being released.”Knippling, 144 Wn. App. at 642 n.3. Thus, even though Jones spent an additional 30 months in prison, his term of community custody began when he completed his 51-month term of confinement.9
¶23 The majority reasons that Jones cannot be deemed to have served a period of community custody because he was not “in the community.” Former RCW 9.94A.030(4) (1999). Contrary to the majority’s view, an offender may receive credit toward a term of community custody even if the offender is not “in the community.” For example, “if an offender is detained pursuant to [former] RCW 9.94A.207 [(1999)] or [former] 9.94A.195 [(1984)] and is later found not to have violated a condition or requirement of community custody, time spent in confinement due to such detention shall not toll the period of community custody.” Former RCW 9.94A.170(3) (1999). In other words, the time an offender spends “in confinement” on suspicion of violating a condition of release counts toward the offender’s term of community custody. The offender is not “in the community,” but the statute nonetheless considers the offender to have served community custody.10
*251¶24 Moreover, the majority’s view that Jones must be “in the community” before he can serve community custody conflicts with its conclusion that Jones’s term of community custody was tolled during the excess period of his confinement. A term of community custody must begin before it can be tolled. By taking the position that Jones’s term of community custody was tolled, the majority necessarily accepts the premise that his term of community custody began while he was confined. This is true regardless of whether he was “in the community.”
¶25 Because Jones’s community custody began upon completion of his 51-month term of confinement, the only relevant question is whether the term of community custody was tolled. It was not. Jones spent the extra 30 months in prison because of a mistake in calculating his offender score.11 The tolling statute does not speak to this situation; it contemplates tolling a term of community custody because of a community custody violation, a new crime, or the like. The phrase “confinement for any reason” must be read in the context of the anticipated situations, i.e., when there is an actual reason for the continued confinement. See former RCW 9.94A.170(3) (tolling proper where offender confined for proven violation of condition of community custody); Knippling, 144 Wn. App. at 642 (tolling proper where offender confined for new crime); State v. Cameron, 71 Wn. App. 653, 657, 861 P.2d 1069 (1993) (tolling proper where offender confined on concurrent sentence for different crime). While not exclusive, these examples illustrate the general class of reasons covered by the tolling statute. Excess confinement because of a mistake is markedly different and does not fall within the statute’s reach.
¶26 We are thus left with one statute that plainly defines when Jones’s community custody term began— *252upon completion of his 51-month term of confinement — and a tolling statute that does not provide for tolling based upon a sentencing mistake. We should not expand the tolling statute beyond its intended reach. Nor does it matter that Jones was not “in the community” due to the sentencing mistake, as the statutory scheme allows offenders to serve community custody while they are confined. Jones should receive credit toward his term of community custody for the 30 months he spent in prison in excess of his lawful sentence.
¶27 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Alexander, J., and Sanders, J. Pro Tem., concur with Stephens, J.

 The majority seems to acknowledge this point. See majority at 248 (noting, “former RCW 9.94A.120(10)(a) set Jones’ sentence of community custody to begin after the completion of the incarceration term (51 months) of his new sentence”). On the other hand, it rejects allowing Jones credit for his excess incarceration as “in essence beginning his sentence of community custody while incarcerated.” Majority at 247.

 For the same reason, the majority’s reliance on public policy can go only so far. Despite the compelling rationale underlying community custody and reintegration of sex offenders into the community, the legislature allows offenders in some situations to serve their terms of community custody during periods when they are in confinement. Former RCW 9.94A. 170(3).

 The majority says that “[t]he reason [Jones] was confined for an excess of 30 months was because his initial sentence was later amended.” Majority at 245. In my view, it is more accurate to attribute the cause of the excess confinement to the sentencing mistake, not the later-amended sentence.