Court Opinion

ID: 4885974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2021-09-02 23:37:19.23973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:12.371550
License: Public Domain

JACK, Justice.
This cause is brought by appeal from the District Court of Austin County. It was an action brought in that court by *532Oliver Jones against Rebecca Cummings, administratrix of John Cummings, to recover damages on a breach of covenant by the intestate in his lifetime. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, a new trial was asked for and refused by the court, and the defendant appealed. The record contains a statement of facts, certified by the judge below, containing many material facts as to the contract and breach thereof on the part of the intestate, and damages sustained by the plaintiff. But it does not show that the plaintiff proved a demand of the administra-trix and her refusal to allow the claim as a debt against the estate. The counsel for the appellee insist that this court ought to presume that a demand was proven, inasmuch as the defendant’s counsel below raised no objections to the want of such evidence, nor asked any charge of the judge in relation to it. This position would, we think, be correct, if the record itself did not contain a certificate of the judge that the statement of facts sent up contains all the evidence introduced on the trial below. We are bound to take the record as true. The question then presented to us is: did the plaintiff make out his case in the district court? The statute (volume 4, page 116) directs, that no bearer of a claim against a succession shall commence an action against such succession before presenting such claim to the administrator, etc., for allowance. That if the claim be not allowed by the administrator, the owner thereof, for the purpose of establishing the same, may bring his action, etc.
The petition must contain an allegation of such demand and refusal, and it is equally necessary to prove it. This proof in the case before us was not made in the trial below.
The verdict of the jury was Dot sustained by the evidence and a new trial ought to have been granted.
Let the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.