Court Opinion

ID: 9591474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:04:31.381297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:10.723778
License: Public Domain

Weltner, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent as to Division 2.
In Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479 (1) (299 SE2d 531) (1983), we dealt with a similar circumstance. Hudson contended that his trial *398counsel was subject to a conflict of interest in that he was, at the same time, solicitor of the state court and probate judge of the county.
Decided May 30, 1985.
Altman & McGraw, Harry J. Altman II, for appellant.
H. Lamar Cole, District Attorney, James E. Hardy, Assistant District Attorney, Eddie Snelling, Jr., Senior Attorney, for appellee.
We dealt with that contention in the following manner: “Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Sistrunk, 249 Ga. 543 (291 SE2d 524) (1982), relied on by defendant, is inapplicable. Sistrunk involved a situation where the conflict of interest amounted to a breach of the public’s trust; in the case before us defendant argues that the alleged conflict impairs his individual interests. That argument raises the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, but does not raise the issue of a violation of public trust.” 250 Ga. at 482, fn. 5.
In this case, by contrast, the question of public trust is squarely before us, and the valid concerns recognized by the majority should not yield to a perceived pragmatism.
Stripped of labels, the situation here is that the State of Georgia retains one member of a professional association to represent it in one of the courts created by the State of Georgia, while another member of the same professional association continues to represent parties against the State of Georgia in other courts created by the State of Georgia.
We need not consider whether Sistrunk, supra, applies here, as the issue properly should be resolved on the age-old proposition that a law firm is not permitted to represent both adversary parties in contested proceedings — whether in the same or different courts. Nor is it permissible for a law firm to represent one party in one matter and, at the same time, represent an adverse party in a different matter. See Gaulden v. State, 11 Ga. 47 (1852); Conley v. Arnold, 93 Ga. 823 (20 SE 762) (1894). “It cannot be denied that the state and those it prosecutes for crimes are adversaries. The public policy which will not permit counsel to change roles from representing a person accused of crime to representing the state in prosecuting the person will not permit him to change from representing one conspirator in crimes to prosecuting his alleged co-conspirator in those same crimes.” Lane v. State, 238 Ga. 407, 410 (233 SE2d 375) (1977).