Court Opinion

ID: 9829344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:14:13.217835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:00.194113
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant, with reference to its assignment complaining of a denial of a trial by a jury, insists that this court misconstrued the record as to the fact of his negligence, in not filing an answer within the time prescribed by law, and which we held was a condition contributing to the action of the trial court in discharging the jury, and further insists that his answer was handed to ap-pellee’s counsel on Tuesday, the appearance day of court, and that the mere omission to file the answer on that day should not be charged against him. Our position in the matter was based upon the failure to present the answer, and not on the omission to file on Tuesday, and which entered into the action of the court.
The body of the bill of exceptions, excluding the explanation appended by the trial judge, says that the jury was in attendance upon the court Wednesday, when the jury fee was deposited with the clerk, and the jury “remained until Thursday, and was in court when said case was called on Thursday, which was the first day said ease could be reached or was reached or called for trial.” The trial court, in his explanation, stated that late the evening before, on Wednesday, the appellant requested the cause to be placed on the jury docket, which was granted, provided that all parties were ready for trial before the jury was discharged, otherwise to remain on the appearance docket, and the jury fee, if paid, was to be returned ; added to this the appellant says in his brief that the case was not reached and could not have been called for trial before Thursday. The court further says in his explanation that, when the “case was called Wednesday morning,” the defendant’s answer having been handed to plaintiff’s counsel the day before, and said attorney not having had time to examine the same and file any reply, and for other reasons mentioned in the bill, that “whereupon the court discharged the jury.” It is upon the statement in the bill made by the court, “when the case was called Wednesday morning” (the answer having been handed to plaintiff’s attorney the day before), appellant deduces his conclusion that the record shows he handed the answer to appellee upon Tuesday, appearance day, and hence he did, in substance, what the law required him to do. When the main body of the bill of exceptions, presumably prepared by appellant, recites that “Thursday” was the first day the cause “could be reached or was reached or called for trial,” and when appellant says in his brief that the cause was not “reached for trial and could not have been called before Thursday,” and the bill further showing that the court discharged the jury at the time and upon the day he called the case for trial, we think it a fair and reasonable construction that, when the-court used the language, “when the case was called Wednesday morning,” and said that, on account of certain conditions then existing, and according to the lights then before him, he believed other conditions would exist to delay the trial and thereupon discharged the jury, that the court meant to say that he did this “when the case was called Thursday morning,” and could not have meant anything else. The court surely did not take this action Wednesday morning before appellant requested a jury Wednesday evening; appellant himself says the jury was in attendance Thursday; hence we think it clearly in-ferable that it was Wednesday and not Tuesday appellant handed his answer to ap-pellee, on account of which the court says, when he called the ease upon Thursday,-ap-pellee’s counsel had not had time to examine and file a reply thereto, which, as a supplemental petition, constitutes seven and one-half pages in this record with numerous exceptions and filed on Thursday, evidently after the court had discharged the jury. As stated, the court recites at the time the case was called for trial appellee’s counsel had not had time to prepare and file said reply. A trial by a jury is not wholly an arbitrary right. When the trial court discharged this jury, based upon a condition and a delay then confronting him, and other conditions believed by him to exist, and produced by appellant, and exercising his discretion according to the conditions then presented, we are unable to say there was an abuse of discretion, and that appellant was improperly denied a jury. The motion for rehearing is in all things overruled.