Court Opinion

ID: 9526063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:11:14.542965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:18.504102
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREEN, dissenting: I agree with the majority that the ordinance here is valid unless it (1) fails to meet the requirements of section 8 — 1(d) of the Park District Code, or (2) violates constitutional provisions for equal protection and against special legislation. The question of reasonableness is at the heart of all of those considerations. I do not agree with the conclusion of the majority “that the ordinance sweeps too broadly and is an unreasonable and arbitrary classification which unduly discriminates against motorcycles on park driveways.” The majority commendably recognizes that the language of the supreme court in Fries must be considered. It stated: “The classification of motorcyclists separately from operators of other vehicles has a reasonable basis. The differences are evident and need no elucidation at this point. Furthermore, the statute in question applies in exactly the same manner to all persons riding on motorcycles. We find that the statutory classification is reasonable and does not violate the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution.” (Emphasis added.) (People v. Fries (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 446, 448, 250 N.E.2d 149, 150.) The court then determined that the headgear requirement involved only personal safety and was thus beyond the police power of the State and thus deprived motorcyclists of due process. Considerations of merely personal safety are not involved here. As stated by the majority, the testimony of the former park district police chief was that most of the problem from cyclists operating their vehicles off-the-road occurred in the 1960’s. However, he did not testify that the problem was entirely eliminated. While Lieutenant Harris did testify that police records in Springfield did not indicate that motorcyclists had any greater propensity than other motorists to be in accidents or to commit traffic offenses, the trial court was not required to give substantial weight to such a survey. The classifieations involved here are not suspect ones and they need not be scrutinized strictly. The supreme court has recognized that there are “evident differences” between the operation of motorcycles and those of other vehicles. The park district commissioners could reasonably have concluded that motorcycles on the driveways of the parks impaired the use and enjoyment of the parks by the public and properly prohibited their use. The purpose of park districts is “for the recreation, health and benefit of the general public.” (Lincoln Park Traps v. Chicago Park District (1944), 323 Ill. App. 107, 112, 55 N.E.2d 173, 175.) The purpose of a city street “is to afford a way for traffic.” (People ex rel. Herman Armanetti, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1953), 415 Ill. 165, 168, 112 N.E.2d 616, 617.) Thus, that which might be a justifiable restriction or prohibition upon the use of park driveways could well be a totally arbitrary and unreasonable restriction or prohibition of the use of city streets. For example, a total closing of park driveways late at night would be reasonable, while a similar restriction or use of city streets would be totally arbitrary. A park district does not have a primary responsibility for affording “a way for traffic.” Accordingly, I do not consider Great Lakes Motorcycle Dealers Association to be analogous to the instant situation even if it be considered good law as to the regulation of city streets. I would affirm the convictions and fines.