Court Opinion

ID: 9623154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:28:33.609771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:43.439825
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — I cannot agree with the majority that the facts of this case support a conclusion there was an intelligent waiver by the defendant of his Miranda rights *41prior to giving certain in-custody statements. The defendant was a juvenile and at no time was informed adult criminal punishment could result from his statements. I accept the reasoning and language of Pearson, J., on this issue where he stated in State v. Luoma, 14 Wn. App. 705, 709-10, 544 P.2d 770 (1976):
The defendant was arrested on suspicion of murder at approximately 8 p.m. on May 28, 1974. He was taken to sheriff's headquarters and advised of his Miranda rights, which he waived. He was then questioned at the station by, or in the presence of, various law enforcement officials, including the sheriff, the prosecuting attorney, their deputies, and the juvenile officer. This was clearly a custodial interrogation, State v. Vining, 2 Wn. App. 802, 472 P.2d 564, 53 A.L.R.3d 390 (1970), and at no time during this questioning was the defendant told adult criminal punishment could result from the statements he made. On the contrary, . . . the juvenile court officer who was present during most of the questioning told the defendant he was there to protect the defendant's rights.
State v. Prater, 77 Wn.2d 526, 463 P.2d 640 (1970), recognizes that statements made by a juvenile suspect to police during a custodial interrogation, if preceded by Miranda warnings and waiver, may be admissible in an adult criminal proceeding if it was made clear to the juvenile, either because of warnings by the police or because of the circumstances surrounding his statement, that he was involved in an adversarial situation rather than the close, noncriminal relationship which exists between juveniles and juvenile court authorities, and that criminal prosecution was possible.
While a juvenile's prior experience with law enforcement authorities may be sufficient to meet the requirements set forth in Prater, State v. Davis, 3 Wn. App. 684, 477 P.2d 44 (1970), the defendant in this case had had no such prior experience. In fact, the juvenile officer's assurance that he was there to protect Luoma's rights militates against any inference that the defendant understood the adversarial nature of the inquiry in which *42he was involved. We believe the statement secured by the police in these circumstances failed to meet the requirements of State v. Prater, supra, and should, therefore, not have been admitted at trial.
We should require, where a nonadversarial situation exists as it did in this case, a clear statement to a juvenile by the interrogating officer, in addition to the Miranda warnings, that adult criminal punishment can result from the statements he makes. To fail to do so invites an appeal in every case where no such statement is made.
The totality of circumstances in this case does not support a conclusion the defendant knew his statements could be used in adult prosecution. The fact that the crime charged was first-degree murder cannot be said to give the defendant constructive knowledge he would be charged as an adult. Juvenile courts throughout the state, in countless hearings, have exercised their discretion to determine whether even the gravest charges may be better handled at a juvenile, rather than adult level. Referral for adult prosecution is not and should not be assumed to be the automatic reaction of a juvenile court.
The statement in the Miranda warnings that "Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law" does not, even on its face, refer to adult, as distinguished from juvenile, prosecution. Finally, the juvenile officer's statement during interrogation that he was there to protect the defendant's rights, is convincing proof that there was a nonadversarial interrogation.
The record fails to show the defendant was aware he could be prosecuted as an adult before his in-custody statements were taken and they should be suppressed. This does not mean the defendant will necessarily go free. The case should be remanded for new trial where a noncustodial statement made by the defendant during the afternoon of *43May 28, 1974, would be admissible for reasons noted in the Court of Appeals opinion, State v. Luoma, supra at 710-12.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Utter, J.
Petition for rehearing denied March 14, 1977.