Court Opinion

ID: 9398981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 16:12:35.00173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:37.762455
License: Public Domain

J-S12031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS :             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    TO: A.L., A MINOR              :                  PENNSYLVANIA
                                   :
                                   :
    APPEAL OF: C.L., MOTHER        :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :             No. 1647 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Decree Entered November 16, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Orphans' Court at
                           No(s): 058-ADOPT-2022

BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                FILED: JUNE 1, 2023

        C.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the November 16, 2022 decree that

terminated her parental rights to her daughter, A.L., born in October 2007.1

In this Court, Mother’s counsel has filed an application to withdraw pursuant

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that Mother’s

appellate claims are frivolous, along with a brief. After careful review, we

affirm the decree of the orphans’ court and grant counsel’s application.

        Cumberland County Children & Youth Services (“CYS” or “the agency”)

first became involved with this family following two referrals in February 2021

regarding allegations of inappropriate discipline by Mother and A.L.’s truancy.

See N.T., 11/15/22, at 6.          Specifically, the agency received reports that

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   A.L.’s father was G.S., who passed away on February 1, 2008.
J-S12031-23

Mother was expressing inappropriate anger towards A.L., threatening to throw

her out of the family home, and that A.L. had over fifty unexcused absences

from school between November 2020 and January 2021. Id. at 19-20. Upon

establishing contact, CYS also became concerned regarding Mother’s mental

health due to her “erratic behavior,” which included excessive “yelling and

screaming” and threats to file “criminal charges” against CYS representatives

for defamation of her character. Id. at 6, 24-25. During this initial meeting,

Mother claimed that certain unidentified individuals were “following her and

trying to kill her.”   Id. at 84.   Mother was also unwilling, or unable, to

acknowledge A.L.’s serial educational absences. Id. at 7. Shortly thereafter,

A.L. self-reported that she was “not feeling safe in Mother’s home.” Id. at 8.

      On April 13, 2021, CYS filed a dependency petition with respect to A.L.,

which was granted on June 23, 2021. A.L. was placed with a foster family and

the court initially set a permanency goal of reunification with Mother.

Following evaluation, A.L. was diagnosed with a generalized anxiety disorder

and an “attachment injury,” or an inability to form an appropriate maternal

bond with Mother. Id. at 67-70. These disorders were directly attributable

to Mother’s upbringing of A.L., and her symptoms worsened during her

interactions with Mother. Id. Specifically, A.L. would experience negative

changes in her eating behavior and exhibit despondent behavior on days she

was scheduled to visit her Mother. Id. at 59.

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       With respect to her permanency objectives, Mother was ordered to: (1)

present records from her mental healthcare provider(s) or, in the alternative,

obtain a mental health assessment and sign related medical releases; (2)

complete a parenting evaluation with Alternative Behavior Consultants

(“ABC”); and (3) cooperate with the agency’s efforts to provide services. Id.

at 13; see also Order, 6/23/21. Initially, Mother was permitted supervised

visitations with A.L. in the community. However, A.L. quickly expressed she

was “not comfortable” continuing with these visits. N.T., 11/15/22, at 35-39,

60-62. In response, CYS offered in-person visitations at ABC, which Mother

declined due to her concerns regarding the staff. Id. at 38-39. Consequently,

Mother had no physical visits with A.L. for approximately one year and little

other contact aside from a limited number of supervised video calls that took

place between May and September 2022. Id. at 35-39, 50-51.

       On September 22, 2022, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),

and (b).2 Six days later, Mother reached out to CYS and, for the first time,

expressed a willingness to go forward with in-person visits at ABC. Id. at 28.

The orphans’ court held a termination hearing on November 15, 2022, wherein

CYS adduced testimony from, inter alia, CYS caseworkers Pricylla Derosier and

____________________________________________

2 On July 13, 2022, the orphans’ court appointed Jennifer Archer, Esquire, to
serve as A.L.’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and separately designated Cindy
Martin, Esquire, as her legal counsel pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).

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John Bouder, CYS casework supervisor Katherine Whitney, case manager

Lauren Taylor, A.L’s foster father, and Leslie Londre, a mental health clinician

who evaluated A.L. for the purposes of this matter. A.L. also testified at the

hearing and expressed, inter alia, her preference that Mother’s parental rights

be terminated. Id. at 103. Mother testified on her own behalf.

      Ultimately, the orphans’ court concluded that CYS had met its burden

and terminated Mother’s parental rights to A.L. in a final decree filed on

November 16, 2022. On December 2, 2022, Mother filed a timely notice of

appeal along with a timely concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Thereafter, the orphans’

court filed a responsive opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a)(ii).

      In this Court, Mother’s counsel has filed an application to withdraw

pursuant to Anders along with a brief expressing his belief that Mother’s

potential appellate claims are frivolous. This Court has extended the Anders

procedures to appeals taken from decrees terminating parental rights

involuntarily. See In re Adoption of B.G.S., 240 A.3d 658, 661 (Pa. Super.

2020) (citing In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992)).

Accordingly, we will begin our review by considering counsel’s petition to

withdraw and the accompanying brief. See B.G.S., 240 A.3d at 661 (“When

faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of

the underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”).

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      In order to withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must: (1) petition

the court for leave to withdraw and aver that, after making a conscientious

examination of the record, he has determined that an appeal would be

frivolous; (2) furnish a copy of the Anders brief to the appellant; and (3)

advise the appellant that they have the right to retain private counsel or bring

additional arguments to the court’s attention. Id. By way of confirming that

client notification has taken place, our precedent requires that counsel provide

this Court with a copy of the letter advising the appellant of his or her rights

in conformity with Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa.

Super. 2005). See B.G.S., 240 A.3d at 661.

      Our Supreme Court has also set forth substantive requirements for

counsel’s Anders brief, which must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural

history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the

record that counsel believes would arguably support the appeal; (3) set forth

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s

reasons   for   concluding   that   the   appeal   is   frivolous.   Id.    (citing

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009)).                   Thus, a

compliant Anders brief should “articulate the relevant facts of record,

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion

that the appeal is frivolous.” Id. (quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361).

      Instantly, counsel has submitted both a petition to withdraw and an

Anders brief averring that Mother’s appeal is frivolous. Attached to counsel’s

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application is a Millisock letter dated February 7, 2023, indicating that

counsel provided a copy of the brief to Mother. See Application to Withdraw,

2/9/23, at 6-7.      This letter properly advised Mother of her right to retain

alternative counsel or raise supplemental arguments on her own.3 Id. Our

review similarly confirms that counsel’s Anders brief provides a cogent and

well-cited summary of the factual and procedural history of this matter. See

Anders Brief at 6-9.       Furthermore, the brief contains an orderly and well-

researched discussion of governing Pennsylvania law.              Counsel refers to

several lines of argument that might support Mother’s appeal, but ultimately

explains that these potential points of contention are frivolous in light of the

unchallenged      evidence      supporting     the   orphans’   court’s   involuntary

termination of her parental rights. Id. at 10-19.

       Based on the foregoing, we find that counsel has complied with the

requirements attendant to Anders. Accordingly, we will proceed to review

the issues outlined in his brief.         In so doing, we must also “conduct an

independent review of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-

frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” B.G.S., 240 A.3d at 662 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015)).

       Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:

       In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
       appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
       decree of the termination court is supported by competent
____________________________________________

3   Mother has not tendered a response to counsel’s application to withdraw.

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      evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
      accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
      determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
      trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
      appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
      has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

      An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
      reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
      facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
      may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
      of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
      will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
      courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
      hearings.

      In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court
      must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions
      concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with
      the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and
      support.    Termination of parental rights has significant and
      permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such,
      the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to
      establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence,
      which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
      as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
      hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed at statute by

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 of the Adoption Act, which necessitates a bifurcated analysis

that first focuses upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct

that may warrant termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1)-(11). M.E., 283

A.3d at 830. If the orphans’ court determines that a petitioner has established

grounds for termination under at least one of these subsections by “clear and

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convincing evidence,” the court then assesses the petition under Section

2511(b), which focuses primarily upon the child’s developmental, physical and

emotional needs and welfare. Id. at 830 (citing In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251,

267 (Pa. 2013)); see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). This Court “need only agree

with any one subsection of § 2511(a), in addition to § 2511(b), in order to

affirm the termination of parental rights.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citing In

re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc)).

     Our analysis in this proceeding implicates Section 2511(a)(8) and (b),

which provide as follows:

     (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
     may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

                                    ....

        (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
        by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
        agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
        removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
        removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
        termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
        and welfare of the child.

                                    ....

     (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
     physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
     of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
     environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
     to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
     efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein

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      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

      In order to satisfy Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that:

(1) the child has been removed from the parent’s care for at least 12 months;

(2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3)

that termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of

the child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super.

2018). Furthermore, termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) does not

require an evaluation of a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the

conditions that led to the removal or placement of the child.       See In re

M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super. 2017). Rather, the relevant inquiry is

focused upon whether the at-issue “conditions” have been “remedied” such

that “reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the hearing.”

In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009). This Court has acknowledged:

      [T]he application of Section (a)(8) may seem harsh when the
      parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems
      that had led to removal of her children.            By allowing for
      termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to
      exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child's
      life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable to
      perform     the   actions    necessary    to    assume     parenting
      responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate
      indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
      parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we
      work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a short
      period of time, to wit eighteen months, in which to complete the
      process of either reunification or adoption for a child who has been
      placed in foster care.

Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).

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     Finally, this Court has explained that,

     while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to
     evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to
     resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to
     addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as pr[e]scribed
     by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must
     address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

     With respect to Section 2511(b), we are required to “give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). It is well-established that this inquiry

“requires the trial court to consider the nature and status of bond between a

parent and child.” M.E., 283 A.3d at 837 (citing In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481,

484-85 (Pa. 1993). “When examining the effect upon a child of severing a

bond, courts must examine whether termination of parental rights will destroy

a ‘necessary and beneficial relationship,’ thereby causing a child to suffer

‘extreme emotional consequences.’”     In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d

937, 944 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting E.M., 640 A.2d at 484-485). However,

the “bond examination” is only one amongst many factors to be considered in

assessing the soundness of termination:

     In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
     emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
     the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
     the child might have with the foster parent. In determining needs
     and welfare, the court may properly consider the effect of the
     parent’s conduct upon the child and consider whether a parent is
     capable of providing for a child’s safety and security or whether
     such needs can be better met by terminating a parent’s parental
     rights.

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M.E., 283 A.3d at 837 (internal citations omitted).

      Instantly, the orphans’ court concluded that termination of Mother’s

parental rights was appropriate pursuant to section 2511(a)(8) and set forth

the following rationale for its holding:

      [A.L. has] indisputably been removed from [Mother’s] care for a
      period of 12 months or more. The reasons for the [c]hild’s
      removal from [Mother’s] care were based in [Mother’s] untreated
      mental health affecting her ability to parent, and the most critical
      piece of reunification has always been [Mother] obtaining a mental
      health assessment and subsequent mental health treatment,
      which turned into a directive for a psychiatric assessment, and the
      corollary directive to obtain the parenting assessment to assess
      parenting skills needs. [Mother’s] refusal to engage with these
      goals and directives on the basis that she feels they are
      unnecessary has left the case essentially where it began over a
      year ago. It is clear to us, as it always has been, based both on
      reports of [Mother’s] fabricated allegations akin to conspiracy
      theories that participants in the dependency action have labored
      to keep her daughter from her and in unsafe conditions, on
      [Mother’s] demeanor in the courtroom, and on obvious sorrow and
      trauma displayed by her daughter in the courtroom and to her
      [GAL], that [Mother] requires mental health treatment.
      Unpredictability in [Mother’s] behavior is the touchstone of this
      case. [A.L.] was removed from her care on the basis of such
      unpredictability, making [A.L.] feel unsafe and miss extensive
      school, and which has played out in [Mother’s] inability to discern
      what is reality, or act sensibly, and practically speaking, in the
      ability of the parent and child to communicate in a health or safe
      manner or for [A.L.] to feel secure in the home with [Mother].
      This condition has not been remedied in any manner and has in
      fact increased in severity based on our observations of [Mother]
      and on continued reports of [Mother’s] fantastical allegations.

                                      ....

      We found competent evidence of record and are convinced that it
      is in [A.L.’s] best interests to terminate [Mother’s] parental rights
      and allow for her to be adopted by her foster parents. [A.L.] feels
      safe, stable, and loved in the home she has come to feel like her

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      own since April of last year. [A.L.] feels love for [Mother], worries
      about her, and believes she will have contact with her in the
      future, but does not feel the relationship is presently emotionally
      healthy or comfortable for her and wishes to be adopted by her
      foster family.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 9-11.        Our review of the certified record

reveals ample support for the orphans’ court’s above-recited findings.

      With respect to the first prong of Section 2511(a)(8), there is no dispute

that A.L. was removed from Mother’s care and placed with her foster family in

June 2021, more than twelve months prior to the agency’s filing of a

termination petition in September 2022. Thus, this first factor is satisfied.

      Removal was mandated after CYS became concerned regarding the

status of Mother’s mental health and its effects upon A.L. See N.T., 11/15/22,

at 6-8, 24-25.     Specifically, A.L. described Mother’s parenting as “very

unpredictable” and testified that Mother regularly resorted to “yelling and

throwing stuff and just not really caring about what anyone else thinks or like

has to say[.]” Id. at 100, 106. In addition to threatening to kick A.L. out of

her home at the age of fourteen, Mother’s mental state contributed to A.L.

accruing more than fifty school absences in a mere three-month period. Id.

at 19-20.   Moreover, A.L. was diagnosed with both a generalized anxiety

disorder and an “attachment injury” due to her inability to “feel safe” with

Mother. Id. at 67-70.

      In the fifteen months since A.L.’s removal, the record reflects that

Mother has flatly declined numerous opportunities to address these concerns.

See id. at 10-13. Instead, Mother advanced unfounded claims concerning her

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daughter, including that A.L. was pregnant, being starved and abused by her

foster family, and had been diagnosed with a heart condition that prevented

her from attending school. Id. at 31-35, 43, 53, 56-57. Mother also contacted

both local law enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and

claimed that A.L. was the victim of human trafficking being perpetrated by her

foster family, which triggered an investigation that found no basis for the

allegations. Id. at 33-35. To be clear, none of these assertions have ever

been substantiated, and A.L. vigorously denied them during the termination

hearing. Id. at 33-35, 107. Furthermore, Mother has been unable to adduce

alleged proof of these claims when asked to do so. Id. at 57-58.

     Mother has also largely refused to provide releases that would permit

the disclosure of her psychological evaluations and related medical records.

Id. at 11.    She provided a single, limited release with respect to one

healthcare provider in June 2021, which confirmed only that she had been

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. However, the agency was

unable to obtain any follow-up information concerning Mother’s prognosis or

recommended treatment.      Furthermore, despite receiving two referrals for

parenting evaluations in September 2021 and March 2022, Mother was

“unsuccessfully discharged” from the program on both occasions for failing to

schedule an initial appointment. Id. at 15. On another occasion in February

2022, Mother threatened to assault Ms. Derosier with a pair of scissors during

a home visit. Id. at 30, 53-54.

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       Based on the foregoing testimony, we also find ample support for the

orphans’ court’s finding that the conditions that led to A.L.’s removal persist.

Thus, the second prong of Section 2511(a)(8) has been satisfied.

       Turning to the third and final statutory prong, the record also supports

the orphans’ court’s conclusion that A.L.’s needs and welfare will be best

served by severing Mother’s parental rights. At the termination hearing, Ms.

Londre averred that A.L.’s mental trauma and resulting diagnoses were

attributable to her upbringing by Mother. Id. at 69-70. Furthermore, Ms.

Londre reported that A.L.’s mental health symptoms initially improved

following her removal, but worsened once in-person visitations with Mother

began in September 2022. Id. at 73 (“[A]fter the in-person visits began is

when we noticed the uptick in severity of symptoms.”). As noted above, A.L.

was a chronic truant under Mother’s care.          Since entering foster care, by

contrast, A.L. has greatly improved her educational performance and is

currently earning “all A’s” at school.4 Id. at 17. Taken as a whole, the record

uniformly indicates that Mother causes A.L. to experience serious anxiety and

detrimentally affects her ability to thrive. Accordingly, we discern no error in

the orphans’ court’s assessment that termination of parental rights best

served A.L.’s needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).

       Having determined that there are sufficient grounds for termination

pursuant to at least one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a), we now turn to
____________________________________________

4 At the termination hearing, her foster father expressed the family’s intention
to pursue adoption, which A.L. also desires. See N.T., 11/15/22, at 73, 91.

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Section 2511(b), which affords “primary consideration” to “the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

With respect to the bond assessment required under this subsection, we

acknowledge that Mother clearly professed that she loves A.L. and desires that

she be returned to her care. See N.T., 11/15/22, at 41, 118. However, the

record equally reflects that A.L. does not share these feelings for Mother and

does not feel a bond with her. Id. at 97. Specifically, Ms. Taylor reported

that A.L. did not want to have any contact with Mother:          “[A.L.] was not

comfortable with visits period. . . .      [S]he would’ve preferred no visits

entirely.” Id. at 61. To that end, Ms. Taylor testified that A.L. and Mother

“primarily communicated through bickering and arguing.” Id. at 62.

      The following exchange is demonstrative of A.L.’s preferences:

      Q     [A.L.], do you believe your mom loves you?

      A     Yes.

      Q     Do you believe that she wants the best for you.

      A     I think she wants what’s best for her.

      Q     Why do you say that?

      A     Because in the long run she doesn’t think about how
      anything she’s done has affected me, and she only thinks about
      her own reputation out of this.

      Q     Do you understand that if the [c]ourt does terminate your
      mom’s rights that that’s it, it’s final? Her rights will be completely
      and finally terminated, do you understand that?

      A     Yes.

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      Q     Okay. But you’re still asking the [c]ourt to do that?

      A     Yes.

Id. at 103. Stated succinctly, there is no evidence of a positive bond between

Mother and A.L. and there is no indication that termination will destroy a

“necessary and beneficial relationship,” or otherwise cause A.L. to suffer

“extreme emotional consequences.” J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944.

      Moreover, as detailed above in our analysis of the third prong of Section

2511(a)(8), there is more-than-adequate support for the orphans’ court’s

finding that terminating Mother’s parental rights served A.L.’s developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare. Thus, we discern no error.

      In sum, our independent review confirms that Mother is not entitled to

relief and we are satisfied that the record does not contain any non-frivolous

issues overlooked by Mother’s counsel. Therefore, we grant counsel’s petition

to withdraw pursuant to Anders and we affirm the decree of the orphans’

court involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to A.L.

      Petition to withdraw granted. Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/01/2023

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