Court Opinion

ID: 9960136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 16:00:56.225641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:13.035420
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1304     Document: 010111031853        Date Filed: 04/15/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            April 15, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                               Clerk of Court
  PETER GEORGE NOE,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 23-1304
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-01618-LTB-STV)
  A. CIOLLI, (Warden),                                          (D. Colo.)

        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Peter George Noe is a federal prisoner housed at the USP Florence ADX

 (ADX) detention facility operated by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Proceeding

 pro se, he filed an application in the United States District Court for the District of

 Colorado for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which he later

 amended. He appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his amended

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-1304    Document: 010111031853         Date Filed: 04/15/2024     Page: 2

 application for lack of statutory jurisdiction. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

 § 1291, we affirm.

                                             I

        Noe asserted two claims in his amended application under § 2241. First, he

 challenged the BOP’s implementation of the First Step Act (Act) at ADX. Second,

 he recognized that the BOP’s system for implementing good-time credits under the

 Act properly uses a prisoner’s criminal history score from their presentence report;

 however, he maintained that he was wrongly denied good-time credits because his

 presentence report contains errors that resulted in a criminal history score that was

 too high. For relief, Noe requested that he “be resentenced to correct the sentencing

 errors in his [presentence report] to allow him to earn his full [good-time] credits.”

 R., vol. I at 42.

        Because § 2241 applications must be brought in the district where the prisoner

 is incarcerated, Noe filed his application in federal district court in Colorado. Later,

 he filed a motion to transfer claim two to the United States District Court for the

 District of Minnesota—the court in which he was convicted and sentenced. Noe

 maintained that transfer was “in the interest of justice” because claim two “deals with

 errors” in the presentence report and the “sentencing judge knows of the errors, the

 case, and has all of the documents and records in the case.” R., vol. I at 96.

        A magistrate judge recommended that the first claim be dismissed as

 duplicative because the same claim was pending in a different suit by Noe against

 USP-ADX. Further, the magistrate judge recommended that the second claim be

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 dismissed without prejudice for lack of statutory jurisdiction and denied the

 motion to transfer.

        Noe filed objections to the report and recommendation. While the

 objections were pending, he filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the first claim.

 The district court (1) overruled Noe’s objections; (2) dismissed the first claim under

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i); (3) adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation

 and dismissed the second claim without prejudice for lack of subject-matter

 jurisdiction; and (4) denied Noe’s motion to proceed without prepayment of fees on

 appeal.

                                             II

        “We review the district court’s dismissal of a § 2241 habeas petition de novo.”

 Brace v. United States, 634 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

 marks omitted). Because Noe proceeds pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally.

 See id.

                                             III

        A federal prisoner may pursue habeas relief under two statutes. The first is

 § 2241. An application under § 2241 “typically attacks the execution of a sentence

 rather than its validity and must be filed in the district where the prisoner is

 confined.” Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169 (internal quotation marks omitted). The second

 avenue of relief is 28 U.S.C. § 2255. “Congress created § 2255 as a separate

 remedial vehicle specifically designed for federal prisoners’ collateral attacks on

 their sentences.” Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 473 (2023). “A § 2255 motion is

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 ordinarily the only means to challenge the validity of a federal conviction following

 the conclusion of direct appeal.” Hale v. Fox, 829 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 2016).

           “But in rare instances,” the “savings clause in § 2255(e)” permits a prisoner to

 attack a conviction through a § 2241 habeas corpus application. Hale, 829 F.3d at

 1165 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The saving clause provides:

           An application for a writ of habeas corpus [pursuant to § 2241] in behalf
           of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to
           [§ 2255], shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has
           failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him,
           or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the
           remedy by motion [pursuant to § 2255] is inadequate or ineffective to
           test the legality of his detention.
 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added). The applicant “bears the burden of showing

 he satisfies § 2255(e).” Hale, 829 F.3d at 1170.

           In Jones, the Court explained that the circumstances in which the saving clause

 applies are narrow and “cover[] unusual circumstances in which it is impossible or

 impracticable for a prisoner to seek relief from the sentencing court” in a § 2255

 motion. 599 U.S. at 474 (giving examples such as the dissolution of the sentencing

 court).

           Putting a slightly finer point on the issue, the test for whether a supposed

 § 2241 falls within the saving clause is “whether a petitioner’s argument challenging

 the legality of his detention could have been tested in an initial § 2255 motion.”

 Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J.). “If the answer

 is yes, then the petitioner may not resort to the savings clause and § 2241.” Id. This

 rule applies regardless of whether the applicant did or did not actually make a § 2255

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 motion in the sentencing court, whether any such motion was rightly or wrongly

 decided or is now time-barred, or whether the defendant may be barred from bringing

 a second or successive § 2255 motion under § 2255(h). See id. at 586.

        Here, Noe argues that his criminal history score in the presentence report was

 incorrectly recalculated at sentencing and must be corrected. This argument could

 have been made in a § 2255 motion, and there is nothing to suggest that it is

 impossible or impracticable for Noe to seek relief under § 2255 from the sentencing

 court. Indeed, Noe specifically acknowledged that the “sentencing judge knows of

 the errors, the case, and has all of the documents and records in the case.” R., vol. I

 at 96. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing the second

 claim for relief for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

                                             IV

        Noe further argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to

 transfer his § 2241 application to the United States District Court for the District of

 Minnesota. He maintains that “the court could simply transfer the case to Noe’s

 [sentencing] judge who could order briefing as to Noe’s . . . criminal history and if

 there are errors to order the [presentence report] corrected and restore Noe’s lost

 good time.” Pet’r Reply Br. at 5. But Noe is incarcerated in Colorado, which means

 that his § 2241 application had to be filed in the federal district court in Colorado.

 See Brace, 634 F.3d at 1169 (holding that a § 2241 application must be filed in the

 district where the prisoner is confined). Thus, the court properly denied the motion

 to transfer.

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                                            V

        We deny Noe’s motion to proceed without prepayment of costs or fees because

 his appeal is legally and factually frivolous. See DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d

 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991) (requiring both an inability to pay and “the existence of a

 reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised

 on appeal.”). Consequently, he must immediately pay the full amount of appellate

 filing fees and costs.

                                           VI

        The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Bobby R. Baldock
                                             Circuit Judge

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