Court Opinion

ID: 9930582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 13:01:53.236335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:21.152891
License: Public Domain

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               GREGORY STIEGLER ET AL. v.
                 CITY OF MERIDEN ET AL.
                        (SC 20803)
             Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                    Ecker, Alexander and Suarez, Js.

                                   Syllabus

The plaintiffs, former Meriden firefighters who retired in January, 2015,
   sought to recover damages from the defendants, the city of Meriden
   and the Meriden Municipal Pension Board, for, inter alia, their alleged
   breach of a collective bargaining agreement between the city and the
   plaintiffs’ union. The collective bargaining agreement contained a wage
   reopener provision and incorporated by reference the pension plan for
   fire employees that the city had adopted. Under the terms of the pension
   plan, a firefighter can become eligible for retirement after he or she
   has completed twenty-five years of service, or after the firefighter has
   attained the age sixty-five, in which case he or she is retired automati-
   cally, effective the first day of the month following the sixty-fifth birth-
   day. Additionally, under the plan, the amount of any retiree’s normal
   retirement benefit is calculated in part by using his or her base rate of
   pay, which is defined as the ‘‘annual pay as fixed from time to time by
   the collective bargaining agreement.’’ The plaintiffs, all of whom were
   younger than sixty-five at the time of retirement, had retired voluntarily
   following twenty-five years of service with the city. At the time of their
   retirements, the city and the union were negotiating a wage reopener
   for the 2014–2015 contract year. When those negotiations reached an
   impasse, the matter proceeded to interest arbitration pursuant to the
   relevant provision (§ 7-473c) of the Municipal Employee Relations Act.
   The arbitration panel issued an award granting all Meriden firefighters
   a 2 percent wage increase retroactive to January 1, 2015, which was
   before the plaintiffs’ retirements took effect. The parties, having agreed
   that the facts were not in dispute and that the case presented purely
   legal questions, agreed to have the case tried to the court, which con-
   cluded, inter alia, that the defendants had breached the collective bar-
   gaining agreement by failing to recalculate the plaintiffs’ pension benefits
   based on the retroactive wage increase awarded in arbitration. The court
   reasoned that the interest arbitration award was ‘‘final and binding’’
   pursuant to § 7-473c (d) (10) and that that award was explicit that the
   effective date of the wage increase was January 1, 2015, at which time
   the plaintiffs were employees of the city and members of the union.
   Accordingly, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs with
   respect to liability on the breach of contract claims, the parties stipulated
   to the amount of damages, and the court rendered judgment for the
   plaintiffs, from which the defendants appealed. Held:

1. The defendants could not prevail on their unpreserved claim that the trial
    court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs did not
    exhaust their administrative remedies by requesting relief directly from
    the pension board prior to filing the present action:

   This court has held that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is
   required when a statute, regulation, or contractual provision explicitly
   requires it or, if the exhaustion requirement is not explicit, when the
   statutory, regulatory, or contractual scheme has an established proce-
   dure to redress a particular wrong, in which case the party must follow
   the specified remedy and may not institute a proceeding that might have
   been permissible in the absence of such a procedure.

   In the present case, the exhaustion doctrine was inapplicable insofar as
   the pension plan provisions that the defendants relied on to support
   their exhaustion argument, which vested the pension board with the
   power and duty to determine an employee’s eligibility and rights, and
   to do all things necessary and proper toward carrying out the pension
   plan’s purposes, contained no explicit exhaustion requirement and also
   failed to establish an exhaustion requirement by implication, there having
   been no established administrative process pursuant to which retirees
   could seek the recalculation of their pension benefits.

2. The trial court incorrectly determined that the defendants had breached
    the collective bargaining agreement by failing to recalculate the plain-
    tiffs’ pension benefits to reflect the 2 percent wage increase awarded
    in arbitration, and, accordingly this court reversed the trial court’s judg-
    ment as to the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims and remanded the case
    with direction to render judgment for the defendants on those claims:

   Although the parties agreed that the interest arbitration award was final
   and binding, they disagreed as to whether the plain language of the
   collective bargaining agreement, the pension plan, and the interest arbi-
   tration award required the defendants to recalculate the amount of the
   plaintiffs’ pension benefits to account for the 2 percent retroactive wage
   increase, and this court, upon reviewing the relevant provisions of those
   documents, concluded that, although those documents were clear that
   the 2 percent wage increase retroactively applied to employees’ wages,
   they were ambiguous with respect to whether the 2 percent wage increase
   retroactively applied to voluntary retirees earning pension benefits.

   In the present case, the parties had agreed that the relevant contract
   provisions could be construed as a matter of law, the parties did not
   introduce extrinsic evidence of the contracting parties’ intent, and, there-
   fore, in light of the way the case was tried by the parties and decided
   by the trial court, the issue on appeal presented a question of law for
   this court to determine independently, without reference to extrinsic
   evidence of intent, and in accordance with general principles of con-
   tract construction.

   This court concluded that the defendants’ construction of the operative
   documents, pursuant to which the 2 percent wage increase applied only
   to active employees and not to former employees who voluntarily retired
   before the issuance of the arbitration award, was the more reasonable
   construction insofar as it avoided rendering a certain provision of the
   pension plan superfluous and resulted in a more harmonious construc-
   tion of the other relevant contractual provisions.

   Specifically, the pension plan includes a provision stating that mandatory
   retirees who are forced to retire under the age sixty-five retirement rule
   while contract negotiations between the city and the union are ongoing
   may have their retirement and any payout retroactively increased by any
   raises for the time they would have been working prior to retirement,
   that provision would be unnecessary if both mandatory and voluntary
   retirees were entitled to a retroactive increase in pension benefits to
   reflect a retroactive wage increase for hours worked prior to retirement,
   and, by specifying that only mandatory retirees are entitled to a retroac-
   tive adjustment of pension benefits following a negotiated wage increase,
   the pension plan implicitly excluded voluntary retirees from receiving
   the same benefit.

   Moreover, the pension plan included certain language providing that a
   retroactive benefit payment would in no event be made and that a retiree’s
   base rate of pay is limited to the amount the retiree was receiving at
   the time of retirement, and, when read together, those provisions further
   bolstered the conclusion that the pension plan did not permit the recalcu-
   lation of pension benefits for voluntary retirees following a negotiated
   wage increase with retroactive effect.

   Furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiffs’ argument that the
   provision allowing for retroactive increases for mandatory retirees was
   not meant to exclude by implication voluntary retirees from receiving
   the same benefit or their argument that construing the operative docu-
   ments as allowing the 2 percent wage increase to apply only to active
   employees would render certain provisions of the pension plan super-
   fluous.

   In addition, the plaintiffs’ claim that fixing a retiree’s base rate of pay
   as of the date of retirement would yield an absurd result was unavailing,
   as it was not irrational for the contracting parties to negotiate an agree-
   ment that treats the wages of employees differently from the pension
   benefits of retirees or a particular class of retirees, such as voluntary
   retirees, and it would not be absurd for the contracting parties to provide
   employees with the ability to seek a wage increase through the wage
  reopener process, while at the same time limiting the effect of any
  retroactive increase obtained in that process to retirees who are forced
  to retire during ongoing contract negotiations due to the age sixty-five
  retirement rule.

  This court’s conclusion was not inconsistent with the interest arbitration
  award, insofar as the 2 percent increase, as well as the arbitration panel’s
  consideration of the statutory factors enumerated in § 7-473c (d) (9),
  was limited to the wages payable to employees, no mention was made
  of retirees, voluntary or otherwise, or the method used to calculate
  pension benefits, and, in the absence of extrinsic evidence of intent, this
  court could not conclude that the interest arbitration award modified the
  collective bargaining agreement to require the recalculation of pension
  benefits for retirees, like the plaintiffs, who voluntarily retired during
  ongoing contract negotiations.
    Argued October 25, 2023—officially released February 6, 2024

                           Procedural History

  Action to recover damages for breach of contract,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of New Haven and tried to the court,
Hon. Jon C. Blue, judge trial referee, who, exercising
the powers of the Superior Court, rendered judgment
in part for the plaintiffs, from which the defendants
appealed. Reversed in part; judgment directed.
  Raymond J. Rigat, for the appellants (defendants).
  James J. Healy, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
                           Opinion

   ECKER, J. The plaintiffs are three firefighters who
retired during ongoing contract negotiations between
their municipal employer and their union regarding a
wage reopener to their collective bargaining agreement.
After the effective dates of their retirements, an arbitra-
tion panel issued an interest arbitration award pursuant
to the provisions of General Statutes § 7-473c of the
Municipal Employee Relations Act, General Statutes
§ 7-460 et seq., granting all firefighters in that municipal-
ity a retroactive wage increase. The plaintiffs filed a
breach of contract action, alleging, among other things,
that they were entitled to a recalculation of their pen-
sion benefits to reflect the retroactive wage increase.
The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs and rendered
judgment in their favor on the breach of contract claims.
On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs
had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and,
on the merits, that the trial court had incorrectly con-
cluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to a recalculation
of their pension benefits. We conclude that the trial
court properly exercised jurisdiction but erroneously
determined that the plaintiffs are entitled to receive
a retroactive increase in their pension benefits and,
therefore, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
   The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this appeal. The named defendant, the city of
Meriden, employed each of the plaintiffs, Gregory
Stiegler, William Bergeron, and Kevin Grant, as a fire-
fighter for more than twenty-five years. Prior to the
effective dates of their retirements in January, 2015, a
collective bargaining agreement between the city and
the plaintiffs’ union, Meriden Fire Local #1148 Interna-
tional Association of Fire Fighters AFL-CIO (union),
governed the plaintiffs’ employment relationship with
the city. The collective bargaining agreement covered
the time period between July 1, 2011, and June 30, 2015,
and incorporated by reference the terms of the City of
Meriden Fire Employees Pension Plan (pension plan),
which the city had adopted by municipal ordinance.
The collective bargaining agreement contained a wage
reopener provision, pursuant to which the city and the
union commenced wage negotiations for the final contract
year of 2014 to 2015. Contract negotiations reached an
impasse, and the matter proceeded to interest arbitra-
tion in accordance with the statutory requirements set
forth in § 7-473c. Arbitration hearings were held on
October 9 and December 5, 2014.
   While the wage reopener was pending before the
arbitration panel, the plaintiffs, each of whom was eligi-
ble for retirement because he had completed twenty-
five years or more of service, submitted applications
to the defendant Meriden Municipal Pension Board
(pension board)1 for retirement benefits, effective in
January, 2015. Although the pension plan requires a
firefighter to retire ‘‘effective the first day of the month
following his sixty-fifth birthday,’’ none of the plaintiffs
was required to retire under this provision because they
were younger than age sixty-five at the time of their
retirements. The pension board approved the plaintiffs’
applications, and the plaintiffs retired accordingly.2
  On February 20, 2015, after the effective dates of the
plaintiffs’ retirements, the arbitration panel issued its
interest arbitration award. Pursuant to § 7-473c (d) (9),
the arbitration panel accepted the union’s last best offer
of an ‘‘increase [in] each step for each position on the
wage scale in effect on June 30, 2014 by [2 percent].’’
With respect to the retroactive effect of the wage
increase, the arbitration panel accepted the city’s last
best offer that ‘‘[t]he wage increase for 2014–2015 shall
go into effect on January 1, 2015.’’ Thus, all employees
covered by the collective bargaining agreement received
a 2 percent wage increase effective January 1, 2015. The
decision of the arbitration panel was ‘‘final and binding’’
on the city and the union pursuant to § 7-473c (d) (10).
   Approximately five years later, the plaintiffs filed the
present action, alleging that the defendants had breach-
ed the collective bargaining agreement by failing to
recalculate their pension benefits using the 2 percent
wage increase awarded in arbitration and to pay them
lost wages for the time period between the date on
which the interest arbitration award became retroac-
tively effective and the dates on which each plaintiff
retired. By agreement, the matter was tried to the court
solely on the basis of the pleadings and the exhibits
submitted by the parties, which included the collective
bargaining agreement, the pension plan, and the interest
arbitration award.3 The parties agreed that the underly-
ing facts were not in dispute and that the dispositive
issues were ‘‘purely legal question[s].’’
   The trial court issued a memorandum of decision,
concluding that the defendants had breached the collec-
tive bargaining agreement by failing to recalculate the
plaintiffs’ pension benefits using the retroactive wage
increase awarded in arbitration, because the interest
arbitration award was final and binding pursuant to § 7-
473c (d) (10), and ‘‘the decision of the panel with respect
to the effective date of the [r]uling is explicit: the ‘effec-
tive date’ is January 1, 2015,’’ at which time the plaintiffs
all ‘‘were employees of the [c]ity and members of the
[u]nion . . . .’’ With respect to the plaintiffs’ lost wages
claims, however, the trial court determined that those
claims were barred by the two year statute of limitations
in General Statutes § 52-596. See General Statutes § 52-
596 (‘‘[n]o action for the payment of remuneration for
employment payable periodically shall be brought but
within two years after the right of action accrues’’). The
trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
with respect to liability only on the breach of contract
claims and in favor of the defendants on the lost wages
claims. The defendants filed an appeal with the Appel-
late Court, and, after additional steps were taken in
the trial court to quantify the amount of the plaintiffs’
damages and to render a final judgment,4 this court
transferred the appeal to itself pursuant to General Stat-
utes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
   The defendants make two claims on appeal. The first,
which they did not raise below, is that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case because
the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies by seeking relief from the pension board
before filing the present lawsuit. The defendants’ sec-
ond claim challenges the trial court’s resolution of the
merits of the breach of contract counts. The defendants
argue that the trial court incorrectly determined that
they had breached the collective bargaining agreement
because, under the express language of the pension
plan, which was incorporated by reference into the
collective bargaining agreement, pension benefits for
any employee who voluntarily retires before the age of
sixty-five are calculated on the basis of the amount of
wages that the employee actually ‘‘was receiving at the
time of retirement,’’ rather than the amount the
employee would have been receiving at that time under
a retroactive wage increase awarded postretirement.
According to the defendants, the pension plan provides
that retroactive wage increases awarded postretirement
are not used to calculate a retiree’s pension benefits,
unless the employee was forced to retire ‘‘due to the
age sixty-five . . . retirement rule during contract
negotiations where their salary would have been
increased prior to retirement had they been allowed to
stay . . . .’’
  We conclude that the plaintiffs were not required to
exhaust their administrative remedies because there is
no established administrative process pursuant to
which they could have obtained relief. We further con-
clude that the trial court incorrectly determined that
the defendants had breached the collective bargaining
agreement because the pension plan does not permit
the retroactive modification of a retiree’s base rate of
pay following voluntary retirement, and nothing in the
interest arbitration award modified, amended, or termi-
nated this provision. Accordingly, we reverse in part
the judgment of the trial court.
                            I
   Although not raised in the trial court, the defendants
contend on appeal that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies because they did not
request relief directly from the pension board prior to
filing suit.5 The defendants’ exhaustion claim is unpre-
served, but we nonetheless address it because it might
implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial
court. See, e.g., Garcia v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 334, 339,
972 A.2d 706 (2009). Whether the trial court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the present action is a question
of law. See, e.g., Levine v. Sterling, 300 Conn 521, 528,
16 A.3d 664 (2011).
   The exhaustion doctrine ‘‘protects the courts from
becoming unnecessarily burdened with administrative
appeals and it ensures the integrity of the agency’s role
in administering its statutory responsibilities.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Stepney, LLC v. Fairfield,
263 Conn. 558, 565, 821 A.2d 725 (2003). We have held
that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is required
in two circumstances. First, exhaustion is required if a
statute, regulation, or contractual provision explicitly
requires a party to exhaust his or her administrative
remedies before filing an action in the trial court. See,
e.g., id., 564 (‘‘[t]he requirement of exhaustion may arise
from explicit statutory language’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also General Statutes § 4-183 (a)
(requiring party to exhaust ‘‘all administrative remedies
available within the agency’’ and to be ‘‘aggrieved by a
final decision’’ before filing ‘‘[an] appeal to the Superior
Court’’). No such explicit exhaustion requirement
applies in the present case.
   Second, even if the exhaustion requirement is not
explicit, a party must exhaust his or her administrative
remedies if the statutory, regulatory, or contractual
scheme at issue ‘‘has [an] established . . . procedure
to redress a particular wrong . . . .’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Piteau v. Board of Education,
300 Conn. 667, 678, 15 A.3d 1067 (2011). This type of
exhaustion applies if there is a comprehensive statu-
tory, regulatory, or contractual scheme that provides
the party with a remedy, in which case he or she ‘‘must
follow the specified remedy and may not institute a
proceeding that might have been permissible in the
absence of such a . . . procedure.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.; see, e.g., id., 680 (plaintiff alleging
that union breached duty of fair representation must
first exhaust administrative remedies before state Board
of Labor Relations, even though statutory scheme
‘‘contains no express exhaustion requirement’’); John-
son v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 248 Conn. 87,
97, 726 A.2d 1154 (1999) (‘‘[a]lthough the grievance pro-
cedures enumerated in General Statutes §§ 51-90
through 51-94 and Practice Book § 2-29 et seq. do not
expressly require the exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies before a judicial remedy may be sought . . . in
light of the comprehensive nature of the administrative
scheme, exhaustion of the remedies available thereun-
der is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial relief’’),
overruled in part on other grounds by Disciplinary
Counsel v. Elder, 325 Conn. 378, 159 A.3d 220 (2017).
The defendants contend that an exhaustion requirement
is implicit in the terms of the pension plan.
  The defendants base their exhaustion argument on
the language in the pension plan that vests the pension
board with the power and duty to ‘‘determine the eligi-
bility of an [e]mployee and his rights and the rights of
the [c]ity under the Special Acts’’ and to ‘‘do all things
necessary and proper toward carrying out the purposes
for which the [pension] [p]lan is created.’’ These provi-
sions, which manifestly contain no explicit exhaustion
requirement, also fall far short of establishing an
exhaustion requirement by implication under our case
law. Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that
the pension board has the power to recalculate a retir-
ee’s pension benefits under this provision, there is no
established administrative process pursuant to which
retirees may seek the recalculation of their pension
benefits.6 In the absence of any such administrative
process, we cannot conclude that the plaintiffs bypassed
an available administrative remedy that would have
provided them with relief. See, e.g., Levine v. Sterling,
300 Conn. 521, 527, 16 A.3d 664 (2011) (plaintiff ‘‘did
not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies . . .
because there were no administrative remedies avail-
able to him’’); Pepler v. Torrington, Superior Court,
judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. LLI-CV-21-
6029445-S (May 11, 2022) (spouse of deceased fire-
fighter was not required to exhaust administrative reme-
dies before municipal pension board because pension
agreement did ‘‘not explicitly define the administrative
procedure that an employee or employee’s spouse must
utilize when claiming pension benefits’’).7 See generally
Direct Energy Services, LLC v. Public Utilities Regula-
tory Authority, 347 Conn. 101, 146, 296 A.3d 795 (2023)
(‘‘[t]ypically, courts apply the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies doctrine when a party has completely
bypassed an available administrative process’’). In sum,
the exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable, and the trial
court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs’ claims.8
                            II
   The defendants claim that the trial court incorrectly
determined that they had breached the collective bar-
gaining agreement by failing to recalculate the plaintiffs’
pension benefits to reflect the 2 percent wage increase
in the interest arbitration award. The contractual terms
in dispute comprise provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, the pension plan, and the interest
arbitration award, and resolution of the claim on appeal
requires us to carefully scrutinize the relevant language
of these three documents9 and the interplay between
and among their terms. To begin with, the collective
bargaining agreement expressly incorporates by refer-
ence the pension plan, which became ‘‘a part of [the]
agreement . . . .’’ Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. BFA Ltd.
Partnership, 287 Conn. 307, 315, 948 A.2d 318 (2008);
see also Greene v. Waterbury, 126 Conn. App. 746, 751,
12 A.3d 623 (2011) (‘‘[w]hen a contract expressly incor-
porates a statutory enactment by reference, that enact-
ment becomes part of a contract for the indicated
purposes just as though the words of that enactment
were set out in full in the contract’’ (emphasis in origi-
nal; internal quotation marks omitted)). Benefits under
the pension plan are based in part on an employee’s
wage rate at the time of his or her retirement, which
is established by the collective bargaining agreement.
The wage rate under the collective bargaining agree-
ment for employees in January, 2015, the time when the
plaintiffs retired, was resolved by the final and binding
interest arbitration award issued on February 20, 2015,
which awarded all employees a 2 percent wage
increase. See Brass City Local, CACP v. Waterbury, 337
Conn. 576, 584, 254 A.3d 866 (2020) (‘‘[u]nlike grievance
arbitration, a process that seeks to interpret and apply
the rules of an existing contract to determine whether
a breach has occurred, interest arbitration is designed
to develop the contractual rules that will govern the
relationship’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
   Ordinarily, a ‘‘trial court’s factual findings as to
whether and by whom a contract has been breached
are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review
and, if supported by evidence in the record, are not to
be disturbed on appeal.’’ CCT Communications, Inc.
v. Zone Telecom, Inc., 327 Conn. 114, 133, 172 A.3d 1228
(2017). In the present case, however, the parties agreed
at trial that the contractual language is definitive and
that no factual dispute exists, and, therefore, the sole
issue for judicial determination was whether the plain
language of the operative contract required the defen-
dants to recalculate the plaintiffs’ pension benefits to
account for the 2 percent retroactive wage increase.
Under these circumstances, the issue on appeal ‘‘is a
question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ Id.;
see also Poole v. Waterbury, 266 Conn. 68, 88–89, 831
A.2d 211 (2003).
   We first examine the language of the pension plan,
which distinguishes between active employees and
retired members receiving pension benefits (retirees).
Specifically, article I, § 3, defines the term ‘‘employees’’
as ‘‘all regular full-time firefighters hired, elected or
appointed prior to March 18, 2003 and covered under
the [union’s] collective bargaining agreement.’’ In con-
trast, article I, § 4, defines the term ‘‘members’’ in rele-
vant part as ‘‘[a]n [e]mployee, who as of December 1,
2003, elected not to participate in the Municipal
Employees Pension Plan . . . who has met the partici-
pation requirements of [a]rticle VI, [§] 1. . . .’’
  Article VI, § 1, specifies two different ways in which
an employee can become eligible to retire and receive
a pension benefit. The first is voluntary in nature: an
employee of any age may elect to retire after he has
completed twenty-five years or more of service. The
second pathway to retirement is automatic or manda-
tory in nature. The pension plan provides that any
employee with twenty-five years or more of service who
has attained the ‘‘age 65 shall be retired automatically
on a pension by the [c]ity, effective the first day of the
month following his sixty-fifth birthday.’’ The plaintiffs
in the present case fall into the first category of retirees
because they retired voluntarily prior to reaching age
sixty-five.
   The amount of a normal retirement benefit for all
retirees, both voluntary and mandatory, is defined as
‘‘a monthly benefit equal to . . . (a) [2.2] percent . . .
multiplied by (b) the [b]ase [r]ate of [p]ay a [m]ember
was receiving at the time of retirement; multiplied by
(c) [y]ears of [s]ervice with the [city’s] [f]ire [d]epart-
ment . . . to a maximum of thirty . . . years; plus (d)
[50] percent . . . of the [e]moluments as defined in
[article I, § 2] that current [m]embers are receiving;
divided by (e) [t]welve . . . .’’ To calculate this
amount, one must ascertain an employee’s base rate of
pay, which is defined in relevant part as ‘‘[t]he annual
pay as fixed from time to time by the collective bar-
gaining agreement . . . . Base [r]ate of [p]ay shall not
include any additional salary including, but not limited
to, add pays, overtime, private duty, civil defense pay,
holiday pay and education incentive pay.’’
   The pension plan contains three other provisions that
can be construed to speak, either directly or indirectly,
to the retroactive payment of pension benefits. First,
article IX, § 1 (a), which governs the application for
pension benefits, provides in relevant part that ‘‘[i]n no
event will a retroactive benefit payment be made.’’10
Second, article VI, § 1 (b), provides in relevant part that
the pension benefits of mandatory retirees ‘‘shall be
based only on the amount of benefit accrued to him
as of his date of retirement.’’ Third, article I, § 6 (2),
addresses the amount of pension benefits payable to
mandatory retirees who are forced to retire under the
age sixty-five retirement rule while contract negotia-
tions between the city and the union are ongoing. Pursu-
ant to this provision, ‘‘any firefighter who must retire
due to the age sixty-five . . . retirement rule during
contract negotiations where their salary would have
been increased prior to retirement had they been
allowed to stay, may have their retirement and any
payout retroactively increased by any raises for the
time they would have been working prior to retirement
(i.e., an employee retired in September and raises are
granted for the prior January and July, the firefighter
may have such raise as increases for his retirement
salary retroactively). This language will be appended to
the retirement agreement.’’ No such language appears
in the pension plan with respect to retirees who volunta-
rily retire based on twenty-five years or more of service
prior to age sixty-five.
 Employee wages for the 2014–2015 contract year
were subject to a wage reopener in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, which ultimately was resolved by
the interest arbitration award. The arbitration took
place in the second half of 2014, and a decision was
issued on February 20, 2015. The interest arbitration
panel adopted the union’s last best offer of a 2 percent
wage increase over the city’s last best offer of a 1.75
percent wage increase, reasoning that the difference in
‘‘gross wages’’ between the two offers amounted to
only an average of ‘‘an additional $212.03 per year per
bargaining unit member or a weekly increase over the
[c]ity’s last best offer of $4.08 [per] week per employee.’’
   With respect to the effective date of the wage
increase, the arbitration panel accepted the city’s last
best offer that ‘‘[t]he wage increase for 2014–2015 . . .
go into effect on January 1, 2015.’’ The panel reasoned
that the city’s ‘‘financial pressures, particularly rising
benefit cost,’’ and its ‘‘low wealth ranking . . . make
the January 1, 2015 implementation date appropriate.’’
The panel observed that, under the interest arbitration
award, ‘‘firefighters will see an immediate salary increase
of 2 [percent], a modest retroactive payment to January
1, 2015, and an overall increase in their base salary of
2 [percent].’’ The arbitration panel did not discuss the
impact that a 2 percent wage increase would have on
the calculation of pension benefits for firefighters who
retired while contract negotiations between the city
and the union were ongoing.
   The parties agree that the interest arbitration award
is final and binding under § 7-473c (d) (10), but they
disagree whether its retroactive effect requires the
defendants to recalculate the amount of the plaintiffs’
pension benefits. The defendants argue that the 2 per-
cent wage increase applied only to active employees,
not to former employees who voluntarily retired before
the issuance of the interest arbitration award. In sup-
port of this claim, the defendants point out that, under
article VI, § 2 (b), of the pension plan, a retiree’s normal
pension benefit is calculated using ‘‘the [b]ase [r]ate of
[p]ay a [m]ember was receiving at the time of retire-
ment,’’ and the plaintiffs were not receiving, and in fact
never received, the 2 percent wage increase at the time
of their respective retirements. (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, the defendants argue that article I, § 6 (2),
of the pension plan permits a retroactive wage increase
to result in a retroactive increase in pension benefits
in only one limited circumstance—when an employee
is forced to retire due to the age sixty-five retirement
rule while contract negotiations between the city and
the union are ongoing. The plaintiffs, as voluntary retir-
ees, were not forced to retire under the age sixty-five
retirement rule, and, according to the defendants, this
means that they are not entitled to a retroactive increase
in their pension benefits.
  The plaintiffs contend that the plain language of the
operative contract requires the opposite result. Their
argument rests on the fact that pension benefits are
calculated using an employee’s ‘‘base rate of pay’’ at
the time of retirement, and article I, § 6 (1), of the
pension plan defines the base rate of pay in relevant
part as ‘‘[t]he annual pay as fixed from time to time by
the collective bargaining agreement . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.) Because the interest arbitration award increased
the plaintiffs’ annual pay under the collective bargaining
agreement, retroactive to January 1, 2015, before the
plaintiffs’ retirements, they argue that their pension
benefits must be recalculated to reflect the wage
increase. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants’
reliance on article I, § 6 (2), of the pension plan is
misplaced because that provision is not an exception
to a rule prohibiting pension recalculation to reflect
postretirement retroactive wage increases but, rather,
is intended only to clarify the language in article VI, § 1
(b) providing that the pension for those retiring at age
sixty-five ‘‘shall be based only on the amount of benefit
accrued to him as of his date of retirement’’—which,
according to the plaintiffs—‘‘standing alone seemingly
would have precluded any pension adjustment because
the mandatory retiree’s benefits had to be based ‘only’
on the ‘benefit accrued’ as of retirement . . . not the
traditional pension calculation that is governed by
‘[b]ase [r]ate of [p]ay.’ ’’ (Citation omitted.)
   In our view, these contractual provisions provide no
definitive answer to the issue presented. It is clear from
the plain language of the operative contract that the 2
percent wage increase retroactively applies to employ-
ees earning wages, but it is not clear whether the
increase retroactively applies to voluntary retirees
receiving pension benefits. On the one hand, as the
plaintiffs argue, they were employees on the date that
the wage increase became retroactively effective, Janu-
ary 1, 2015, and the pension plan expressly provides
that the base rate of pay used to calculate monthly
pension benefits is based on ‘‘[t]he annual pay as fixed
from time to time by the collective bargaining agree-
ment . . . .’’ Given that the interest arbitration award
increased their base rates of pay by 2 percent under
the collective bargaining agreement, and that the
increase was retroactively effective at a time when the
plaintiffs were still employees, it would be reasonable
to conclude that the plaintiffs’ monthly pension benefits
should be recalculated to reflect the wage increase.
  On the other hand, as the defendants argue, pension
benefits are calculated on the basis of the base rate of
pay that an employee ‘‘was receiving at the time of
retirement,’’ and the plaintiffs were not receiving the 2
percent wage increase at the time of their respective
retirements. The pension plan does not provide that
the benefits are calculated on the basis of the base rate
of pay that an employee was entitled to receive or
should have been receiving at the time of retirement.
And, significantly, the pension plan specifies only one
circumstance in which a retroactive pension benefit
will be awarded, namely, when an employee is forced
to retire due to the mandatory age sixty-five retirement
rule at a time when contract negotiations are ongoing.11
Because the plaintiffs’ retirements were voluntary instead
of mandatory, they cannot claim an entitlement to a
retroactive benefit under this provision. Thus, the defen-
dants also offer a reasonable interpretation of the opera-
tive contract leading to the conclusion that the plain-
tiffs’ monthly pension benefits may not be recalculated
to reflect the wage increase.
   As it relates to the specific issue in dispute, then,
the language of the operative contract is ambiguous
because it is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation. See, e.g., Cruz v. Visual Perceptions,
LLC, 311 Conn. 93, 103, 84 A.3d 828 (2014) (‘‘[A] contract
is ambiguous if the intent of the parties is not clear and
certain from the language of the contract itself. . . . If
the language of the contract is susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation, the contract is ambigu-
ous.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.)). ‘‘When the language of a contract is ambiguous,
the determination of the parties’ intent is a question of
fact . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 101.
To resolve an ambiguity in a contractual agreement,
the trial court typically will consider extrinsic evidence
of the contracting parties’ intent, such as ‘‘the conduct
of the parties’’; Poole v. Waterbury, supra, 266 Conn.
97; the contract’s ‘‘drafting history’’; Buell Industries,
Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn.
527, 546 n.17, 791 A.2d 489 (2002); and the contracting
parties’ past practices and negotiations. See, e.g., Man-
ville Forest Products Corp. v. United Paperworkers
International Union, AFL-CIO, 831 F.2d 72, 76 (5th
Cir. 1987) (‘‘the precedents clearly support using past
practice and negotiating history to resolve ambiguities
and gaps in written collective bargaining agreements’’).
   In the present case, no extrinsic evidence of the con-
tracting parties’ intent was presented in the trial court.
Instead, the parties agreed that the relevant contract
provisions could be construed as a matter of law with-
out reference to extrinsic evidence. The trial court, in
turn, determined as a matter of law that the defendants
had breached the operative contract on the basis of the
contract’s plain and definitive language and the law
governing the final and binding effect of interest arbitra-
tion awards. In sum, as a result of the way that the case
was tried by the parties and decided by the trial court,
the issue requiring resolution has been cast as ‘‘a ques-
tion of law . . . [that] may be redetermined indepen-
dently by this court on appeal.’’ Kraemer Bros., Inc. v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 555, 562, 278
N.W.2d 857 (1979); see also Mervin v. Magney Con-
struction Co., 416 N.W.2d 121, 123–24 (Minn. 1987) (if
contract is ambiguous and ‘‘there is no extrinsic evi-
dence . . . bearing on the meaning of’’ ambiguity, then
construction and application of contract is ‘‘properly
treated . . . as a question of law’’); 11 R. Lord, Williston
on Contracts (4th Ed. 1999) § 30:7, pp. 91–92 (‘‘in the
absence of any relevant extrinsic evidence, any ambigu-
ity in a written contract is to be resolved by the court
as a matter of law’’).
    We resolve the ambiguity in the operative contract
in accordance with general principles of contract con-
struction, without reference to extrinsic evidence of
intent.12 It is well established that, ‘‘[w]hen interpreting
a contract, we must look at the contract as a whole,
consider all relevant portions together and, if possible,
give operative effect to every provision in order to reach
a reasonable overall result.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Casualty
Co., 273 Conn. 448, 462, 870 A.2d 1048 (2005). ‘‘Parties
generally do not insert meaningless provisions in their
agreements and therefore every provision must be given
effect if reasonably possible.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Mack Financial Corp. v. Crossley, 209 Conn.
163, 168–69, 550 A.2d 303 (1988); see also United Illumi-
nating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 259 Conn. 665,
674, 791 A.2d 546 (2002); 2 Restatement (Second), Con-
tracts § 203 (a), pp. 92–93 (1981). Our construction of
the operative contract also is informed by the doctrine
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning ‘‘the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stratford
Police Dept. v. Board of Firearms Permit Examiners,
343 Conn. 62, 74, 272 A.3d 639 (2022); see also Biro v.
Matz, 132 Conn. App. 272, 282, 33 A.3d 742 (2011)
(‘‘[l]ong a staple of our statutory interpretation, this
court also has applied the principle [of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius] to contractual agreements’’).
   On balance, we conclude that the defendants’ con-
struction of the operative contract is the most reason-
able one because it avoids rendering article I, § 6 (2),
of the pension plan superfluous and results in a more
harmonious construction of the other relevant contrac-
tual provisions. As we previously explained, article I,
§ 6 (2), provides in relevant part that employees forced
to retire due to the age sixty-five retirement rule ‘‘during
contract negotiations where their salary would have
been increased prior to retirement had they been
allowed to stay, may have their retirement and any
payout retroactively increased by any raises for the
time they would have been working prior to retirement
(i.e., an employee retired in September and raises are
granted for the prior January and July, the firefighter
may have such raise as increases for his retirement
salary retroactively). . . .’’ This provision would be
unnecessary and perhaps altogether meaningless if all
employees who retired during contract negotiations
between the city and the union (both mandatory and
voluntary retirees) were entitled to a retroactive increase
in their pension benefits to reflect a retroactive wage
increase for hours worked prior to retirement. We are
persuaded that, by specifying that only one category of
retirees, namely, mandatory retirees, is entitled to a
retroactive adjustment of pension benefits following a
negotiated wage increase, the pension plan implicitly
excludes the other category of retirees, voluntary retir-
ees, from receiving the same benefit.
   Our conclusion that the pension plan does not permit
the recalculation of pension benefits for voluntary retir-
ees following a negotiated wage increase with retroac-
tive effect is bolstered by article IX, § 1 (a), of the plan,
which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[i]n no event will
a retroactive benefit payment be made,’’ and article VI,
§ 2 (b), of the plan, which provides that a retiree’s base
rate of pay is limited to the amount ‘‘a [m]ember was
receiving at the time of retirement . . . .’’ Reading
these contractual provisions together, as we are required
to do, we conclude that the defendants did not breach
the operative contract by failing to recalculate the plain-
tiffs’ pension benefits to reflect the retroactive wage
increase in the interest arbitration award.
   The plaintiffs contend that the reference to manda-
tory retirees in article I, § 6 (2), was not intended to
exclude by implication voluntary retirees from receiv-
ing the benefit of a retroactive negotiated wage increase
but, instead, is a clarification of the final sentence in
article VI, § 1 (b), which provides that the pension bene-
fits of a mandatory retiree ‘‘shall be based only on the
amount of benefit accrued to him as of his date of
retirement.’’ (Emphasis added.) Essentially, the plain-
tiffs argue that article I, § 6 (2), is necessary because,
otherwise, the pension benefits of a mandatory retiree
would be limited to the base rate of pay that the manda-
tory retiree was receiving as of the date of his retire-
ment, even if ongoing contract negotiations resulted
in a retroactive wage increase after retirement. This
argument is unpersuasive because, under the standard
pension calculation applicable to both mandatory and
voluntary retirees, the calculation of pension benefits
already is limited to the base rate of pay a retiree ‘‘was
receiving at the time of retirement . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added.) Thus, the amount of a retiree’s base rate of pay
is constrained by the temporal qualification confining
it to the wages the retiree ‘‘was receiving at the time
of retirement,’’ regardless of whether the nature of the
retirement was voluntary or mandatory. Although an
employee’s base rate of pay may change ‘‘from time to
time [under] the collective bargaining agreement,’’ a
retiree’s base rate of pay is fixed at one precise point
in time—the date of retirement. Article I, § 6 (2), is
therefore necessary to entitle mandatory retirees to a
pension recalculation reflecting a retroactive wage
increase; in the absence of such a provision, they would
be treated the same as other retirees under the pension
plan and would have no right to have their pension
benefits recalculated to reflect a retroactive wage
increase granted postretirement.
   The plaintiffs also argue that our construction of the
operative contract would render the final sentence in
article VI, § 1 (b), superfluous because, if the standard
pension calculation generally is limited to the base rate
of pay a retiree was receiving at the time of retirement,
then there would be no need for a separate provision
limiting the benefits of a mandatory retiree to ‘‘the
amount of benefit accrued to him as of his date of
retirement.’’ The plaintiffs’ argument is not without
some force but overlooks that this particular provision
refers to the total ‘‘amount of benefit accrued,’’ not
solely base rate of pay. The broader reference reflects
the fact that the total amount of a pension benefit is
not calculated solely on the basis of a retiree’s base
rate of pay, but also is premised on other factors, such
as ‘‘[e]moluments as defined in [article I, § 2, of the
pension plan] that current [m]embers are receiving
. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Emoluments are defined in
article I, § 2, as ‘‘longevity payments, holiday pay, life
insurance and health insurance minus cost share at the
value afforded to current employees year to year by
contract for as long as these items remain in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Emoluments do not include
educational bonuses/incentive pay, tuition reimburse-
ments and the like or other items not agreed to by the
City as an [e]molument.’’ Thus, the final sentence of
article VI, § 1 (b), can be given independent meaning,
apart from the subject of base rate of pay, by construing
it to limit the amount of emoluments that a mandatory
retiree can receive to those that have accrued to him
as of the date of retirement.
   The plaintiffs further claim that fixing a retiree’s base
rate of pay as of the date of retirement yields an absurd
result in light of the wage reopener in the collective
bargaining agreement. They posit that the contracting
parties could not have intended to reopen the collective
bargaining agreement to negotiate a change in wage
rates for the final contract year without also giving
retirees who voluntarily retire during contract negotia-
tions the benefit of a subsequent wage increase by recal-
culating their pension benefits. This claim lacks merit
because it is not irrational for the contracting parties
to negotiate an agreement that treats the wages of
employees differently from the pension benefits of retir-
ees or a particular class of retirees (e.g., voluntary retir-
ees). See, e.g., Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of
America, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157, 173, 92 S. Ct. 383, 30 L. Ed. 2d 341
(1971) (recognizing that employees and retirees ‘‘do not
share a [sufficiently broad] community of interests’’ and
that ‘‘union representatives on occasion might see fit
to bargain for improved wages or other conditions
favoring active employees at the expense of retirees’
benefits’’); Marcatante v. Chicago, 657 F.3d 433, 435
(7th Cir. 2011) (‘‘after two years of negotiations, the
[c]ity and unions agreed to make raises retroactive . . .
but only for current employees, employees laid off with
recall rights, and seasonal employees eligible for rehire,
not for . . . retirees’’). We cannot say that it would be
absurd for the contracting parties to provide employees
with the ability to seek a wage increase through the
wage reopener process, while at the same time limiting
the beneficial effect of any retroactive increase obtained
in that process to those retirees who are forced to retire
during ongoing contract negotiations due to the age
sixty-five retirement rule.
   Our conclusion is not in any way inconsistent with
the interest arbitration award, which did not modify,
amend, or terminate the operative contract to require
the recalculation of retiree pension benefits. The 2 per-
cent increase in the interest arbitration award, as well
as the arbitration panel’s consideration of the statutory
factors enumerated in § 7-473c (d) (9), was limited to
the wages payable to employees. No mention was made
of retirees, voluntary or otherwise, or the method used
to calculate pension benefits. In the absence of extrinsic
evidence of intent, we cannot conclude that the interest
arbitration award modified the collective bargaining
agreement to require the recalculation of pension bene-
fits for retirees, like the plaintiffs, who voluntarily
retired during ongoing contract negotiations. Accord-
ingly, on this record, the plaintiffs’ breach of contract
claims fail as a matter of law.
   The judgment is reversed as to the plaintiffs’ breach
of contract claims and the case is remanded with direc-
tion to render judgment in favor of the defendants on
those claims; the judgment is affirmed in all other
respects.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
     We hereinafter refer to the city and the pension board, collectively, as
the defendants, unless the context requires specification.
   2
     Stiegler’s and Bergeron’s retirements were effective on January 4, 2015,
when they were fifty-four and fifty-six years old, respectively. Grant’s retire-
ment was effective on January 15, 2015, when he was sixty years old.
   3
     No witnesses testified, and no extrinsic evidence of the contracting
parties’ intent was offered or admitted.
   4
     The trial court invited the parties to stipulate as to the amount of the
plaintiffs’ damages, but the defendants filed their appeal before any agree-
ment was reached. After the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the defendants’
appeal for lack of a final judgment, the parties stipulated that, for the time
period between January 4, 2015, and August 30, 2022, the plaintiffs were
entitled to the following damages in recalculated pension benefits: (1)
$7693.91 for Stiegler; (2) $7449.75 for Bergeron; and (3) $7417.77 for Grant.
The trial court rectified the record to reflect the joint stipulation and ren-
dered judgment accordingly.
   5
     The defendants do not contend that the plaintiffs were required to
exhaust their administrative remedies directly under the terms of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. That claim is precluded by our decision in Garcia
v. Hartford, 292 Conn. 334, 336–37, 343, 972 A.2d 706 (2009), which held
that employee grievance procedures in collective bargaining agreements do
not apply to individuals who have retired from employment. As in Garcia,
the grievance procedures in the collective bargaining agreement at issue
are limited to employees, and, therefore, the plaintiffs were not required to
exhaust those administrative remedies.
   6
     By way of contrast, there is an established administrative process pursu-
ant to which an employee eligible to receive pension benefits must apply
to the pension board for those benefits. See footnote 10 of this opinion.
   7
     The defendants claim that Pepler is distinguishable because, in that case,
the Torrington Police and Fire Pension Board did not have adjudicative
authority to determine the rights of members of the relevant pension plan,
whereas, in the present case, the pension board ‘‘has been expressly granted
the authority to determine the rights of the parties under the pension plan
and . . . to effectuate the purposes of the plan.’’ We reject this claim for
two reasons. First, the pension board in the present case is not expressly
granted authority to determine anything more than the pension eligibility
of employees. Second, in Pepler, the trial court determined that exhaustion
was not required because ‘‘the parties’ [a]greement [did] not mention an
administrative remedy in the [b]oard,’’ delineate ‘‘any administrative proce-
dure [by] which the plaintiff [would] be entitled to due process,’’ or describe
how the plaintiff could ‘‘make a claim to the [b]oard.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
Pepler v. Torrington, supra, Docket No. LLI-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S. The same is
true in the present case. The pension plan does not mention the availability
of an administrative remedy or describe the process by which the plaintiffs
could pursue that remedy. As a result, the exhaustion doctrine does not
apply.
   8
     In light of our conclusion, we do not address the plaintiffs’ alternative
claim that the exhaustion of their administrative remedies would have been
futile. See, e.g., Stepney, LLC v. Fairfield, supra, 263 Conn. 565 (party was
not required to exhaust administrative remedies ‘‘when recourse to the . . .
remedy would be futile or inadequate’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
   9
     We hereinafter refer to these three documents collectively as the opera-
tive contract.
   10
      Article IX, § 1 (a), provides that ‘‘[a] retirement benefit must be applied
for in writing to the [pension] [b]oard on a form and in a manner prescribed
by the [pension] [b]oard. Such application shall be duly attested, and it shall
set forth the date that the [m]ember desires to be retired, but such retirement
date shall be subsequent to the date of filing thereof, and not less than sixty
. . . days subsequent to the date of filing. In no event will a retroactive
benefit payment be made.’’
   11
      Specifically, article I, § 6 (2), of the pension plan provides in relevant
part that mandatory retirees ‘‘may have their retirement and any payout
retroactively increased by any raises for the time they would have been
working prior to retirement . . . .’’
   12
      In Awdziewicz v. Meriden, 317 Conn. 122, 129–30, 115 A.3d 1084 (2015),
and Kiewlen v. Meriden, 317 Conn. 139, 149, 115 A.3d 1095 (2015), we held
that a municipal pension plan adopted by city charter or ordinance should
be construed consistently with the principles of statutory construction. The
pension plan in the present case was incorporated by reference into the
collective bargaining agreement, and we have characterized it as part of the
operative contract. As far as we can discern, it makes no practical difference
in this case whether the pension plan is governed by rules of statutory
construction or contract construction. Statutes, like contracts, must be con-
strued reasonably, holistically, and harmoniously, and ‘‘[e]very word and
phrase is presumed to have meaning . . . so as [not] to render certain
words and phrases surplusage.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vibert
v. Board of Education, 260 Conn. 167, 176, 793 A.2d 1076 (2002). These
basic principles of construction are the primary ones guiding our analysis.