Court Opinion

ID: 9925949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 16:00:55.385416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:57.225948
License: Public Domain

21-6553
    Jara-Jara v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                            Laforest, IJ
                                                                           A209 138 008

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day of January, two thousand
    twenty-four.

    PRESENT:
                      DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                            Chief Judge,
                      RICHARD C. WESLEY,
                      GERARD E. LYNCH,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    JUAN DIEGO JARA-JARA,
             Petitioner,

                      v.                                         21-6553
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER:                          Michael Borja, Esq., Borja Law Firm, P.C.,
                                         Jackson Heights, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                          Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
                                         Attorney General; Edward E. Wiggers, Dawn
                                         S. Conrad, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office
                                         of Immigration Litigation, United States
                                         Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

       Petitioner Juan Diego Jara-Jara, a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review

of a September 21, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming a February 7, 2019, decision

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum. 1 In re Juan

Diego Jara-Jara, No. A209 138 008 (B.I.A. Sept. 21, 2021), aff’g No. A209 138 008

(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 7, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history.

       Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by

the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005).

1
  Jara-Jara does not challenge the BIA’s determination that he waived his claims for withholding
of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, so we do not reach those
issues. Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023).
We review factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of law and

application of law to fact de novo. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d

Cir. 2009).   “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

      An applicant for asylum “must establish that race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least

one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). “To

succeed on a particular social group claim, the applicant must establish both that

the group itself was cognizable, and that the alleged persecutors targeted the

applicant on account of her membership in that group.” Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d

191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “In cases where

there is more than one motive for mistreatment (also known as mixed-motive

cases), . . . an applicant’s status as a member of a particular social group . . . must

be at least one of the central reasons, rather than a minor reason, for why that

individual is being targeted.” Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 757 (2d Cir.

2022); see also Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010).

      The agency did not err in determining that Jara-Jara failed to meet that
burden. His proposed social group consisted of relatives of his cousin. The agency

reasonably concluded that, even assuming this group was cognizable, he failed to

establish a nexus between the harm he suffered and fears and his membership in

the group because his testimony demonstrated that gang members targeted him

to gain financial resources and members rather than for any “animus toward” his

cousin’s family. Garcia-Aranda, 53 F.4th at 758 (agreeing that applicant failed to

establish a nexus between harm she and her family suffered and her family

membership where a gang targeted her business-owning family based on the

family’s perceived wealth rather than animus against the family); see also Ucelo-

Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When the harm visited upon

members of a group is attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary

criminals rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering

those people a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of the [Immigration

and Nationality Act].”).

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                     FOR THE COURT:
                                     Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                     Clerk of Court