Court Opinion

ID: 9760226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:43:29.218969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:09.444540
License: Public Domain

Lawson Cloninger, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that this case must be reversed and remanded on the grounds that the voir dire was not conducted in accordance with § 43-1903, but I believe the majority is mistaken in holding that it was error to allow evidence of appellant’s prior D.W.I. convictions and evidence of appellant’s revoked driver’s license. It is not seriously contended that appellant caused serious physical injury to another by means of a deadly weapon; he only contends that his acts were not committed under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 404 (b), permits evidence of other acts to prove intent or absence of mistake or accident. The appellant contends that the collision resulting in injury was an accident, and the purpose of introducing evidence of appellant’s prior D. W.I. convictions and revoked driver’s license was to rebut that contention. The question is not whether the appellant, when he drove an automobile while drunk, intended to injure another; the question is whether he manifested extreme indifference to the value of human life under the circumstances. Part of the circumstances was the fact that appellant had been convicted of doing exactly the same thing on three previous occasions, which means that he was detected and convicted only three previous times; the further circumstance was the fact that appellant had been declared unfit to operate an automobile and he knew it. He caused serious injury and he did so because, just has he had done at least three times before, he manifested total indifference to the value of human life and had even been told by the State that he was not a fit person to operate a vehicle. The jury found that this was no accident and the jurors were the triers of fact. There is no way we can say that the trial judge did not weigh the danger of undue prej udice simply because he did not say the magic words, and there is no evidence that he abused his discretion in admitting the evidence. I would reverse and remand on the issue of improper voir dire and find no merit to the appellant’s other points for reversal.