Court Opinion

ID: 9464285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:30:01.226126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:33.599857
License: Public Domain

WISDOM, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In this case, as in United States v. Almand, 5 Cir. 1977, 565 F.2d 927, the majority, in effect, overrules United States v. Frisbie, 5 Cir. 1977, 550 F.2d 335. I cannot see a meaningful distinction between the stop in this case and the stop in Frisbie. As I read Frisbie, the law in this circuit compels us to hold that stopping the vehicle in which Villarreal and Martinez were riding was unlawful. The later stop and search of the second vehicle were the illegal products of the first search; the evidence obtained was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
In Frisbie, in Almand, and in this case the sensors first picked up the vehicles on the western edge of Big Bend National Park near the border (four, six, and nine miles) between six and seven in the morning on Highway 118 leading north to Highway 90, a major interstate east-west highway.
The majority states the appropriate standard for judging the legality of a stop by roving Border Patrolmen: reasonable suspicion. But as the Court stated, “observation of the vehicle or its occupants made after the officer had signaled it to stop [can] be assigned no weight in a determination of the legality of the stop.” This statement is in accord with Frisbie, 550 F.2d at 338. The majority, if I may say so, with deference, misapplies this standard. The majority justifies the stop in this language:
*939In the appellants’ case, not only did sensors indicate two vehicles traveling north from the border in close proximity for approximately an hour, but the officers, before stopping the lead vehicle, observed that it had CB antennas, that its occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent, and that the passenger ducked beneath the dash as the vehicle approached the Border Patrol car. From this information, we conclude that the officers could have reasonably inferred that the vehicle initially stopped was the scout car for a second vehicle, indicated by the sensors, engaged in the transportation of illegal aliens.
The record, however, shows that the officers did not observe the CB antennas, the apparent Mexican descent of the occupants, or a passenger ducking beneath the dash before signaling the appellants’ vehicle to stop.1 The quotations from the record in this dissenting opinion and its footnotes support this statement. The record shows that Border Patrol officers Wilson, Newber-ry, and Whittington decided to stop the vehicles and established a checkpoint before they had seen the vehicles.2 Officer Wilson took a four-wheel drive vehicle and stationed himself on a parallel ranch road to stop any aliens that might jump and run when the stop occurred. Another officer parked a patrol car perpendicular to Highway 118 so that the Border Patrol emblem on the side of the car was “readily visible to any approaching vehicles [and] so they can see the red light”. Transcript at 127. They chose a spot, according to agent Newberry, “so they [the drivers of the approaching vehicles] can see us”. In cross-examination Newberry testified:
Q [Mr. Childs]: So they can see you and come to a stop?
A [Agent Newberry]: Yes, sir.
Q [You] got out of the car into the highway?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you just sit there for any length of time before the pickup showed up?
A Just a very short time, maybe a minute. Just a very short time.
Q When you saw it coming I guess you moved out into the highway?
A Yes, sir. I was there, yes, sir.
Q . When this pickup truck approached from the south there on Highway 118 and you were standing — were you standing approximately in the center of the highway?
A Yes, sir.
Q Apparently they approached in such a manner that you didn’t think you were going to get run over or you didn’t run off or anything like that?
A No.
Q They came to a normal stop?
A Yes, sir they slowed down to a normal stop.
Q And I believe that you testified that you saw one of them bend over?
A Yes, sir.
Q You saw the passenger bend over?
A Yes, sir.
Q As he approached?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far away was he?
A I’d say thirty-five or thirty yards.
*940Q How fast were they going?
A They were coming to a stop.
Q They were coming to a stop, and just twenty-five, thirty yards from you he bent over?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you think then?
A I didn’t think anything at that time until he had come up and stopped even with me.
Transcript at 129-32.
Agent Newberry’s direct testimony is to the same effect:
A [Agent Newberry] We pulled the car beside the highway, which we let the emblem show on the side. We have a red light on it, on that car, and we pulled it on the west side of the highway, and I approached the center of the highway.
Q [Mr. Guyer] All right. Were you in uniform?
A Yes, sir, I was.
Q Was Mr. Whittington in uniform?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what, if anything, what information had you received prior to setting up the checkstop?
A We had received word via radio that there were two cars coming north on Highway 118.
Transcript at 118.
Agent Whittington’s testimony is also to the same effect:
Q [Mr. Guyer] And did you in fact encounter a vehicle that day?
A [Agent Whittington] Yes. The first vehicle that — we heard it coming, and Mr. Wilson said that he could hear it too and I had the binoculars and Mr. Newber-ry was standing outside the vehicle getting ready to stop the vehicle.
Transcript at 153.
The record shows, therefore, first, that there was a Border Patrol car parked so as to display its government emblem and its red light to the first approaching vehicle. Second, agent Newberry was standing squarely in the center of the highway on which the appellants were traveling. Only after the first vehicle approached did an officer see the pickup’s CB antenna, the Mexican appearance of its occupants, and the ducking action of a passenger.
Before signaling to stop, the officers knew only the facts the majority lists in footnote 2 of its opinion. The majority does not attempt to distinguish these facts from those held insufficient to provoke a reasonable suspicion in United States v. Frisbie, 5 Cir. 1977, 550 F.2d 335. As we noted, the stops in this case and in Frisbie occurred on the same road and at almost the same time of day. In Frisbie, too, the stopping officers knew of a series of vehicles traveling together. Only by including information gained after the signal to stop does the majority distinguish Frisbie from this case. I would not uphold the stop of the pickup truck in which Villarreal and • Martinez were traveling, the first vehicle the officers stopped.
The factual question here — what constitutes reasonable suspicion to stop — is important. But it is much less important than the principle that an officer must justify his stop on the basis of what he knew before invoking his power. The stop must be “reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time”. Adams v. Williams, 1972, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 1975, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 618. As I see it, the majority approved the stop apparently because it brought information that would have justified it. I see no difference between this conclusion and a rule that would find that probable cause existed before every search later yielding contraband. I would hold that the stop of the “lead” vehicle was invalid.
The stop of the second vehicle3 must also fail as an incident of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Once the defendant *941shows that the government’s initial action was illegal “the burden falls upon the prosecution to prove that the information so gained has not ‘led,’ directly or indirectly, to the discovery of any of the evidence which it introduces”. United States v. Coplon, 2 Cir. 1950, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (Learned Hand, J.), cert. denied 1952, 342 U.S. 920, 72 S.Ct. 362, 96 L.Ed. 688. See Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York, 1964, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1609, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 in which the Court said, “Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence.” The majority uses information from the illegal stop of the lead vehicle to justify the stop of the load vehicle. It says the u-turn made by the trailing car is a suspicious factor. But the u-turn is suspicious, by the majority’s hypothesis, only because it was caused by a radio communication from the lead vehicle — a communication provoked by the illegal stop.4
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requires that we ask “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint”. Wong Sun v. United States, 1963, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 455. The evidence seized from the load vehicle must be suppressed unless (1) “the Government learned of the evidence ‘from an independent source’ ”, 371 U.S. at 487, 83 S.Ct. at 417, quoting Silver-thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 1920, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, 321; or (2) “the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’ ”. 371 U.S. at 487, 83 S.Ct. at 417, quoting Nardone v. United States, 1939, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307.
The “independent source” exception has no role in this case. It applies only when the independent source of information provides a distinct evidentiary trail that leads to the same destination, evidence of guilt. See, e. g., United States v. Castellana, 5 Cir. 1974, 488 F.2d 65, 67, rev’d on other grounds en banc 1975, 500 F.2d 325; United States v. Holsey, 10 Cir. 1970, 437 F.2d 250, 253, cited in United States v. Marder, 5 Cir. 1973, 474 F.2d 1192, 1196; United States v. Barrow, 3 Cir. 1966, 363 F.2d 62, cert. denied 1967, 385 U.S. 1001, 87 S.Ct. 703, 17 L.Ed.2d 541.
The attenuation exception does not apply here, either. That exception comes into play when there is “an independent act sufficient to break the causal connection between the alleged primary illegality and the evidence found as a result of the second search and admitted at trial”. United States v. Fike, 5 Cir. 1971, 449 F.2d 191, 193. See Parker v. Estelle, 5 Cir. 1974, 498 F.2d 625, 630. Here, the discovery of the contraband occurred almost immediately after the illegal stop. No independent act, such as a decision by a witness to testify or not to testify, intervened. Cf. United States v. Marder, 5 Cir. 1973, 474 F.2d 1192, 1196; United States v. Strickland, 5 Cir. 1974, 493 F.2d 182, 186-87. The second car’s u-turn was not an independent act, but a direct result of the illegal stop of the first car — if we are to believe the majority’s hypothesis that the load car turned around because the lead vehicle signaled it.
The only exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine that might apply in this case is the “inevitable discovery” exception. This third exception allows the fruit of the poisonous tree to be admitted into evidence if the prosecution can show that the fruit would have been found eventually without the government’s illegal act. *942If this Court recognized the “inevitable discovery” exception, the government could attempt to show that it would have had reasonable suspicion to stop the load car without having stopped the appellants’ pickup. It would have had difficulty in doing so, because the facts in this case that would have been available to the government without the illegal stop are far less suspicious than those we found to justify a stop in United States v. Barnard, 5 Cir. 1977, 553 F.2d 392. But this Circuit has unambiguously rejected the inevitable discovery rule. United States v. Houltin, 5 Cir. 1976, 525 F.2d 943, 949; Parker v. Estelle, 5 Cir. 1974, 498 F.2d 625, 629-30 n.12, cert. denied 1975, 421 U.S. 963, 95 S.Ct. 1951, 44 L.Ed.2d 450; United States v. Castellana, 5 Cir. 1974, 488 F.2d 65, 68, rev’d on other grounds en banc 1974, 500 F.2d 325. Contra, United States ex rel. Owens v. Twomey, 7 Cir. 1974, 508 F.2d 858, 865-66.
We rejected the inevitable discovery rule because it requires speculation by the Court as to what would have happened had the illegality not occurred. It requires no speculation, however, to say that the agents meant to stop both vehicles traveling north on Highway 118 on the morning in question with only the vehicle’s presence to provoke their suspicion. Agent Wilson testified as follows:
Q [Ms. Sloan] [A]t the time that you sent them [agents Newberry and Whit-tington] out to set up that stopping point, the two vehicles [the load vehicle and the lead vehicle] that were traveling on the road at that time were the two particular vehicles that you intended for them to stop, is that correct?
A I believe they are.
Transcript at 68.
Q [Mr. Childs] ... I take it that you all discussed this situation that had been reported to you, that two cars were traveling north on Highway 118?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then you determined that you would go out on the Highway 118 and intercept the two cars, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Transcript at 90-91.
Q Can we sum up your testimony so far like this: That at the time you received this call from Mr. Spencer, who is monitoring the sensors and the tape, that you deliberately set out on a pre-determined course to intercept these two vehicles and check them out?
A Yes, sir.
Q That’s exactly what you did, didn’t you?
A Yes, sir.
Transcript at 105.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to discourage future illegal conduct by government officers. See, e. g., United States v. Calandra, 1974, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571. If the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did not exclude this evidence, Border Patrol officers would be encouraged to make illegal stops on the leading vehicles in every group apparently traveling together. They could use any suspicious information gained in the illegal stops of the leading vehicles to stop trailing vehicles and to convict the occupants of all the cars. To allow such a result would be to ignore Justice Holmes’s statement about the exclusionary rule in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 1920, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319. The essence of the rule is not only “that . . . evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all”.
In sum, I would hold that the Border Patrol officers did not have enough information reasonably to suspect and to stop the vehicle containing Villarreal and Martinez. The later discovery of contraband must fail as the fruit of the illegal stop of their vehicle. Frisbie should be squarely faced, not bypassed. I regard it as controlling in this case and in Almand.

. Since United States v. Frisbie, 5 Cir. 1977, 550 F.2d 335 had not yet been decided, the officers could have believed that their suspicions were sufficient to stop the vehicles when they knew only that there were two vehicles on the highway.

. Q [Mr. Childs] And so in this particular instance the only suspicion that you had insofar as anything out of the ordinary is concerned was that three sensors had been set off?
A [Agent Newberry] Yes, sir.
Q And they were on 118?
A Yes, sir.
Q On that basis the three of you set out deliberately to intercept these two vehicles?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you?
A Yes, sir.
Transcript at 126.

. Both the appellants were in the lead car rather than in the car that contained the contraband. The stop of the first car, in which the appellants were riding, yielded no contraband. The government’s case is based on drugs found in the second car.

. It is clear that the agents were going to stop the second vehicle in any event. See quotations from agent Wilson quoted in the text. I find that no reasonable suspicion to search either car arose from the fact that they were traveling in tandem between 6:30 and 7:00 a. m.