Court Opinion

ID: 9493799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:20:04.616188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:02.815509
License: Public Domain

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that “the District Court never applied Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c) [and instead] held that the government must demonstrate the evidence sought could not be obtained by other means,” I respectfully dissent. Majority Opinion at 315. I believe that the District Court validly exercised its discretion under Rule 17(c) and did not impose a broad “no-alternative-means” test. Therefore, I would affirm.
The Government claims that the District Court applied a broad-reaching “no-alternative-means test” to determine whether the attorney’s subpoena was fair and therefore enforceable. Appellant’s brief at 39. Apparently, the Majority agrees.1 It holds that the court employed an analysis “based on ‘fundamental fairness’ [that] deviated from the established procedures which ensure the institutional independence of the grand jury.” Majority Opinion at 316. I agree that such a blanket rule, if it were imposed, would improperly place a substantive limitation upon the grand jury, is outside the District Court’s supervisory powers, and has been implicitly rejected by this Court in Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.1992). See Appellant’s brief at 39-41.
However, I disagree with the Majority’s characterization of the District Court’s holding. The District Court did not impose a new substantive limitation upon the grand jury. Rule 17(c) of the Federal *319Rules of Criminal Procedure states that “[t]he court ... may quash or modify [a] subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.” See also United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299, 111 S.Ct. 722, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991). The Majority recognizes Rule 17(c) as a valid “form of restraint” upon the grand jury, but nonetheless holds that the District Court failed to apply it. Majority Opinion at 315. I concede that the District Court never explicitly invoked Fed. R.Crim.P. 17(c), but such an omission is not fatal as long as what the court did is clear.2 Furthermore, we “may affirm the District Court on any grounds supported by the record.” Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir.2000).
The District Court in his case considered the specific facts and circumstances before it and found that it was “fundamentally unfair for the U.S. Attorney’s Office to seek [the attorney’s] testimony?’3 Rule 17(c) empowers a court to quash a subpoena if it is “unreasonable or oppressive.” Presumably, the Majority believes that a finding of “fundamental unfairness” is insufficient to satisfy this standard. In contrast, I fail to see a difference. A subpoena described as “fundamentally unfair” could just as easily be described as “unreasonable and oppressive.” Therefore, I believe that the District Court sufficiently invoked the authority of Rule 17(c). Unlike the Majority, I would not reverse based entirely upon an unimportant semantic distinction.4
Assuming the District Court did act under Rule 17(c), we review its decision to *320quash a grand jury subpoena solely for abuse of discretion. We must “uphold the district court’s decision ‘unless it is clearly arbitrary or without support in the record.’ ” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 191 (3rd Cir.1998).5 There is nothing in the record to suggest that the District Court’s decision to quash the Government’s subpoena under these specific facts constituted an abuse of discretion. The court was concerned that enforcing the Government’s subpoena would put attorneys in a “very precarious position,” subjecting them to grand jury subpoena any time they made representations pertaining to the existence of subpoenaed records. See App. at 172-73 (“I guess the lawyer can’t say a word to the U.S. Attorney’s office about those things because he’d be subject to coming in to testify as to what his course of knowledge is.”).
This threat would certainly chill communication between attorney and client. Both the government and the Majority seem to believe, however, that the attorney-client privilege is the only means by which a district court can protect that relationship. See Majority Opinion at 316 (“[T]he proper course under Fed. R.Crim.P. 17(c) was to rule on whether the lawyer’s testimony was protected under the attorney-client privilege.”); Appellant’s brief at 13-14 (“The only proper substantive limitation on the grand jury’s ability to compel [the attorney’s] testimony is the attorney-client privilege.”). I do not read a district court’s discretion so narrowly. American jurisprudence has long recognized the central importance of the attorney-client relationship. The privilege is the most common means of protecting the relationship, but it is not the only one. In appropriate factual situations, such as the present case, a district court can, within its discretion, conclude that a subpoena is unreasonable and oppressive because it harms the attorney-client relationship, even if the privilege does not apply.
A constant threat of subpoena would also affect the ability of lawyers to cooperate with the government. The Government contends that “[t]he duty to safeguard ‘the healthy relationship between the criminal defense bar and the U.S. Attorney’s Office’ lies squarely with the parties to that relationship itself, not the district court.” Appellant’s brief at 52. It appears that the Government misunderstands the court’s concern. If a court were to enforce a grand jury subpoena against an attorney in a case such as this, where there were numerous alternative avenues of gathering the desired information, it would impose the threat of subpoena over all representations made by counsel. It does not escape my attention that this would grant the U.S. Attorney’s Office tremendous leverage' — so much in fact that any competent counsel would produce a custodian rather than respond to inquires. See App. at 171-75. This would severely hamper the efficient administration of justice, a matter of paramount concern to this Court.
These consequences might be acceptable (and reasonable) if the Government had no *321other means of obtaining the desired information. In this case, however, the U.S. Attorney’s Office repeatedly served subpoenas that were never enforced, and it failed to insist-upon authentication from a custodian of records. As a result, the District Court found that the burden upon the attorney was unreasonable, and I cannot disagree.

. At the very least, the Majority believes that the District Court "impose[d] substantive limitations on the power of the grand jury [and placed] the initial burden on the government to prove the validity of its subpoenas.” Majority Opinion at 315.

.See United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 862 (3d Cir.1997) ("Although the court did not explicitly state that it was denying the motion, nor did it state the reasons for doing so, it is clear from the record that the court carefully considered Baird's cooperation within the § 5K1.1 frame of reference.”); Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. v. Charter Techs. Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1228-29 (3d Cir.1995) ("While-it is true that the bankruptcy court did not indicate that it was acting pursuant to § 328(c), ... we find that the denial of FE&B’s fees application may be upheld as an exercise of the bankruptcy court's authority under § 328(c).”); United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344, 346 n. 2 (3d Cir.1993) ("[T]he district court did not state its reason for admitting the evidence. [However], we will assume that the district court believed the evidence was admissible as background.”); United States v. Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110, 1120 (3d Cir.1992) ("Although the district court did not explicitly state in its written judgment that the foregone fifteen year sentence was a basis for the upward departure, we believe Thomas’ firearm possession played a major, if not predominant, role in the court's sentencing decision.”); Inmates of the Allegheny County Tail v. Wecht, 901 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir.1990) ("Although the district court did not slate whether it intended its July 17, 1989 order to be a civil contempt sanction, it is clear from the circumstances that the order is most properly characterized as a coercive civil contempt order entered in a post-permanent injunction proceeding.”); Southeastern Sprinkler Co., Inc. v. Meyertech Corp. (In re Meyertech Corp.), 831 F.2d 410, 419 (3d Cir.1987) (“The bankruptcy judge did not explicitly state under which paragraph of § 2715 he fashioned his remedy; however, we can presume that his calculation was rendered under § 2715(b).”); Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 613 F.2d 1240, 1244 (3d Cir.1980) ("Although the court did not clearly state so, it is apparent from a review of its decision that the dismissal was based primarily on the ground that the plaintiffs had not stated a ground upon which relief could be granted.”)

. The court cited numerous avenues that the Government could have pursued to obtain the same information, "which are far less offensive [than] seeking to pierce the attorney-client privilege.” These included subpoenas that the U.S. Attorney’s Office choose not to enforce and the Government’s failure to insist that a custodian of records confirm the attorney's assertions. The court also noted that compelling his testimony could "unnecessarily 'drive a wedge’ between a client and his attorney, thereby 'chilling' communications.”

. It is beyond dispute that "unfair,” "unreasonable,” and "oppressive” are often used synonymously. A Westlaw searched revealed 1710 federal decisions, 40 of which were Supreme Court decisions, where "unfair” appeared within five words of "unreasonable” or "oppressive.” See e.g. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 525, 546, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Refusing to supplant Illinois law with a federal definition of waiver, we explained that the state court's *320declaration 'should bind us unless so unfair or unreasonable in its application to those asserting a federal right as to obstruct it.’ ”); Asahi Metal Industry Co. Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 116, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1034, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this instance would be unreasonable and unfair.”); Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1234-35 (3d Cir.1992) ("We believe that factors such as the nature of the process by which jury lists are composed, the length of time of underrepresentation, and the strength of the evidence that purports to establish an 'unfair and unreasonable’ representation should be examined under Duren.”).

. See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 138 F.3d 442, 444 (1st Cir.1998); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1499 (9th Cir.1996); In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1984) ("We review a district court decision to quash, or not quash, a grand jury subpoena, solely for abuse of discretion, with much deference being owed to the lower court’s authority.”).