Court Opinion

ID: 9829954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:45:04.78105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:23.665975
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING.
Appellant, among other things, insists that we were in error in giving effect to the Act of Congress cited in our original opinion, for the reason that appellees alleged no facts authorizing them to recover under said Act, and did not seek to recover thereunder, but joined the appellant and its connecting carriers for the purpose of recovering against each of them separately for the alleged damages to the horses involved. True, appellees did not allege a contract by appellant for through shipment and seem not to have based their suit on the Act of Congress of June 29, 1906, but the necessary facts were put in issue by appellant’s answer. It is distinctly alleged in appellant’s second amended original answer upon which, together with appellees’ pleadings, the case was tried, that the shipments in question were made by ' virtue of “written contracts duly and legally executed, by and between the plaintiffs and this defendant” at Bowie, Arizona Territory, on the third and fourth days of July, 1906, a number of the provisions thereof limiting appellant’s liability being specially pleaded, and the Interstate Commerce Law, as well as the law of Arizona, was specially invoked. In support of this answer the contracts were read in evidence by1 appellant. Among them we find what is designated as “Exhibit A: Live Stock Shipping Order Contract and Bill of Lading, dated Bowie Station, 7/4/1906,” which is plainly, we think, a “receipt or bill of lading” for appellees’ horses within the meaning of that part of the section of the Act of Congress quoted in our original opinion. It states the number and describes the horses as “range” ;
*39it states the consignee as “W. T. Meadors”, and the destination as “Colorado City, Texas,” thus showing the interstate character of the shipment, which, however, was otherwise expressly alleged. There were other stipulations governing the entire transportation from the initial point to destination undertaking to specify not only rights, duties and limitations relating to the parties to the contract, but also those of subsequent carriers, thus substantially making it a contract for through shipment within the construction of such contracts given by us in the case of Texas & P. Ry. v. Townsend, 106 S. W., 760, in which writ of error was refused by our Supreme Court. There was a like bill of lading and contract relating to the shipment that went to Pecos, except that the destination was given as “New Orleans, La.,” and the consignee as “W. T. Meadors & Company.” Appellees attempted to avoid the effect of the contracts for want of consideration, etc., but regardless of this issue the execution of the contracts is undisputed and we thought, and yet think, that it appears by both pleading and evidence that the facts bring this case within the operation of the amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, which prevents the application of all those clauses of the shipping contracts in question limiting appellant’s liability. We hence applied, and think we should continue to apply, that Act as the most ready way of disposing, of many of the assignments of error.
Since writing the original opinion, however, it has occurred to us, though not so suggested by appellant, that possibly the Act of Congress was not in force on July 3 and 4, 1906, when the shipments in question were made. This question arises by reason of a joint resolution of Congress passed on June 30, 1906, of the tenor following:
“That the Act entitled ‘An Act to amend an Act entitled ‘An Act to regulate commerce,’ approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, and all Acts amendatory thereof, and to enlarge the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, shall take effect and be in force sixty days after its approval by the President of the United States.” Fed. Stats., Anno. Sup. 1909, page 276. This resolution was not printed in connection with the Act of June 29, 1906, in the Supplement of 1907, from which we quoted in our original opinion, and it hence escaped our attention. Section 11 of the Act of June 29, 1906, declares: “That this Act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage,” and Judge Landis in the case of U. S. v. Standard Oil Co., 148 Fed. Rep. 722, held that it was approved by the President on the day of its passage. In that case, it became necessary to determine whether the penalties of the old or of the amended Act should apply. Judge Landis said: “It is contended in behalf of the United States that the Act of June 29, 1906, did not go into effect until after these indictments were returned. The pertinency of this proposition will appear hereafter. It is urged that this postponement was effected by the adoption of the joint resolution by Congress, approved June 30, 1906. That resolution provides that the rate law ‘shall take effect and be in force sixty days after its approval by the President of the United States.’ Of course, the purpose of this resolution is obvious. But it was wholly ineffective until approved by the President. This occurred on June 30th. And by its own terms *40the Act became effective upon its approval by the President one day before. Plainly, therefore, on June 30th the resolution was powerless to postpone that which had already occurred on June 39th.” So far as we are advised, this decision has not on this point been overruled, and on the authority thereof the publishers of 9th Current Law, page 471, say: “The rate law of June 39, 1906, became effective on the date of its approval.” A contrary ruling, however, seems to have been made by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the case of Nicola, Stone & Meyers Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 14 I. C. C. Rep. 199, but this latter authority is not available to us and we therefore do not know the basis of the ruling. As we understand, a legislative body may repeal or amend any of its Acts at will, but we know of no authority, certainly of no familiar rule, for otherwise affecting an Act once put in force and effect. ' In Wolfe et al. v. McCorrill, 76 Va. 876, it was held that the Legislature was without power by a joint resolution to recall for further consideration a bill theretofore duly enacted. See also the cases of People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y. 277; Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189, and People v. Hatch, 19 Ill., 283, cited in the Yirginia case. Suffice it to say, that without time for further consideration and as at present advised on the present state- of authority, we hold that on original hearing we correctly applied said Act of-June 39, 1,906.
The motion for rehearing is accordingly overruled.

Affirmed.

Writ of error granted. Reversed and remanded.