Court Opinion

ID: 9470573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:09:50.692026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:59.211807
License: Public Domain

FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Respectfully, I dissent from that part of the court’s opinion affirming the granting of the writ of habeas corpus. I agree that the issue of the prosecutor’s statements is properly before the court. However, I be*168lieve that the comments did not violate petitioner’s right against self-incrimination.
There are two reasons why I think the prosecutor’s comments on the uncontradict-ed nature of the evidence did not reflect on petitioner’s failure to testify. First, the evidence could have been contradicted by sources other than petitioner’s testimony. In fact, of the five references to the uncon-tradicted nature of the evidence, see p. 167 n. 4, ante, in four of them the prosecutor specifically referred to potential contradictory sources other than petitioner. Second, I believe the prosecutor had the right .to emphasize the unsupported nature of defense counsel’s speculation.
The majority erroneously assumes that only petitioner could have contradicted the evidence presented at trial. Pp. 166, 167, ante. However, contradictory evidence could have come from other sources, such as persons to whom Kobel described the events,* or perhaps physical evidence which may have indicated petitioner’s intentions regarding his wife. Four of the five times the prosecutor referred to the uncontradicted nature of the evidence he specifically referred to sources other than petitioner that could have offered contradictory evidence or could have offered support for defense counsel’s speculation. These four statements are as follows:
1. The facts were presented, and no one contradicted anything that Sam Ko-bel said. No witness contradicted it. The physical facts don’t contradict it.
2. [EJvery witness who testified from the witness stand about any facts of this case, we submit, shows that this Defendant committed premeditated murder, three counts of that, as well as the assault on Sam. His testimony has just not been refuted. It’s not been contradicted.
3. No one’s disputed [Kobel’s testimony] in any sense. According to Detective Yeutter, it was consistent with what he’d said at the preliminary hearing month’s [sic] ago; consistent with what he told Deputy Yeutter from his hospital bed shortly after this occurred.
4. [C]ounsel’s indicating now that there are inconsistencies in what Sam Ko-bel said today ..., and yet Detective Yeutter says that just isn’t so. There’s no material inconsistencies .... His story’s been consistent throughout. The material facts, all the material facts are consistent with that testimony, and that testimony has not been disputed. No one, no one witness has contradicted the testimony, the events of that evening as related to you by Sam Kobel.
see pp. 165-166, ante. (Emphasis added).
The majority, by isolating certain statements of the prosecutor, p. 167 n. 4, ante, makes it appear that the references to the uncontradicted nature of the evidence highlighted petitioner’s failure to testify. When the statements are read in context, this is not so. The only statement as to the uncon-tradicted nature of the testimony without an accompanying reference to evidentiary sources other than petitioner was the following: “Sam Kobel told us, and no one’s refuted it. No one said, ‘No, that’s not right. That’s not what happened at the door.’ ” P. 166, ante. This statement was the third of the five prosecutorial references to the uncontradicted nature of the evidence. Because it was both preceded and followed by suggestions as to sources of contradiction other than petitioner, I believe that even this statement does not make an improper reference to petitioner’s failure to testify.
The second reason I disagree with the majority is that I believe the prosecutor has a basic right to meet the speculative defenses and arguments raised by defense counsel and here the prosecutor’s statements fell within his right to comment on defense counsel’s speculation and on what the evi*169dence shows. A prosecutor is entitled to rebut defense counsel’s speculations. United States v. Harris, 627 F.2d 474, 476 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 961, 101 S.Ct. 375, 66 L.Ed.2d 229 (1980), cited at p. 167, ante. See United States v. Normile, 587 F.2d 784, 787-88 (5th Cir.1979). The majority attempts to distinguish Harris on the basis that the evidence in that case could conceivably have been contradicted by witnesses other than the defendant. P. 167, ante. This distinction is illegitimate for two reasons. First, as I have explained, Kobel’s testimony could have been contradicted by sources other than petitioner. Second, the Harris court makes no reference whatsoever to whether evidence could have come from any source other than the defendant and the court makes no indication that the possible sources of contradictory evidence affected its decision in any way.
The majority also attempts to distinguish Harris on the basis that it involved an isolated reference whereas in the instant case there were five references. P. 167 n. 4 ante. As explained above, the prosecutor specifically referred to possible sources of evidence other than petitioner in four of his comments. Even if the fifth comment were considered a reference to petitioner’s failure to testify, it was an isolated comment.
The majority gives prosecutors too narrow a range of permissible comment to rebut what appears to be unbounded and unfounded speculation. The majority would limit the prosecutor to telling the jury that defense counsel’s statements were mere speculation and were not evidence. P. 167 n. 3, ante. The prosecutor did that in the instant case. P. 165, ante. I see nothing wrong with the prosecutor making additional statements so that the jury will believe him when he says the statements were mere speculation. The prosecutor carefully went through the evidence, pointed out that all the evidence supported his theory of the case, and left the jury with the conclusion that that defense counsel’s remarks were indeed mere speculation. The majority erroneously assumes that just because a prosecutor tells the jury that defense counsel’s arguments are speculation, the jury will believe that defense counsel’s comments are no more than that. I will not make such an assumption. We are here dealing with a particularly brutal trilogy of murders, the evidence on which points unerringly at petitioner, whose constitutional rights were adequately respected in the state court proceeding.
Because the prosecutor did not refer to a matter about which only the accused could offer evidence and because the prosecutor’s comments were merely statements on the state of the record invited by the defense, I dissent.

 In fact, a detective said Kobel’s statements were always consistent. See p. 166, ante.