Court Opinion

ID: 9536280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:57:03.237617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:29.871649
License: Public Domain

McINERNEY, Justice
(dissenting).
The issue here is whether the content of condemnor’s notice to the landowner meets the minimum standards of the XIVth Amendment’s due process clause. This presents a question of federal law.
Federal protection of condemnee’s claim to fair treatment and orderly process in procuring just compensation for his property is not the product of the present-day trend to a liberal construction of our constitutional commands. It antedates the turn of this century. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897). For at least five decades the states have stood constitutionally compelled to afford the owner a meaningful opportunity “to be heard and to offer evidence as to the value of the land taken.” *267Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 205, 66 S.Ct. 66, 67, 90 L.Ed. 3 (1945); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 40 S.Ct. 62, 64 L.Ed. 135 (1919). Unless notice reasonably conveys, “the required information” and is plain to understand, the process is a “mere gesture” and not due process. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-315, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); Griffin v. Cook County, 369 Ill. 380, 16 N.E.2d 906, 118 A.L.R. 1157; 16 Am.Jur.2d, Const.Law, § 562, p. 966.
Condemnor’s notice clearly did not contain the “required information” commanded by Mullane. While it advised condemnee of the time and place condemnor will present its application for appointment of the commissioners, it did not tell him that this was but the first step in a multi-stage proceeding the object of which was to invest the State with title to the affected land. In short, there is nothing in the heavy legal jargon of the notice that would plainly convey to the owner that minimum which Anglo-American law has required of legal process since time immemorial— that it inform the party served of the relief demanded against him and apprise him of the result consequent on his default. This much, if not more, is required to be imparted by a civil summons. 12 O.S.Supp. 1969 § 153. The recent amendment requiring a copy of the petition to be attached to the summons serves further to expand the quantum of knowledge our Legislature intended the defendant to have. 12 O.S. Supp.1969 § 153.1. Far more information is required by statute to be contained in a notice issued under our administrative procedure. 75 O.S.Supp.1969 § 309. It borders indeed on a legal paradox to hold that litigants in these cases may enjoy more favorable treatment than condemnees who enjoy express federal protection from unfair state procedures.
The argument that our statutory provisions operate here to amplify the deficiency in the content of condemnor’s notice is predicated on the principle of common law that “no one is excused by the ignorance of the law.” This principle must yield in the face of a plain constitutional command as but an “illusory substitute” for notice. Electric Short Line Terminal Co. v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., 242 Minn. 1, 64 N.W.2d 149, 153. Due process in its present-day form plainly places a limit on the application of this common-law doctrine. Lambert v. People of the State of California, 355 U.S. 225, 228, 78 S.Ct. 240, 243, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957). Any statement to the contrary that can be divined from North Laramie Land Company v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 45 S.Ct. 491, 69 L.Ed. 953 (1925) may no longer be regarded as a correct exposition of the present federal law.
Condemnor’s notice did not reasonably convey that quantum of information that federal due process requires. Its endorsement by me would be tantamount to approval of less favorable treatment for con-demnees than that which stands afforded by Oklahoma law to litigants in nearly all other classes of suits. This court would give approval to an unreasonable classification of state litigants that, in my opinion, is violative of equal protection. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966).
I would deny the writ by an opinion requiring more ample notice having prospective effect only, i. e., to this case and to all condemnation notices issued after the date the opinion became final. Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., Okl., 440 P.2d 713 (1968).
I am authorized to state that Berry, V. C. J., concurs in the views herein expressed.