Court Opinion

ID: 9790318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:51:10.499097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:28.519929
License: Public Domain

Mallery, J.
(concurring in the result) — Chapter 214, Laws of 1955, relates to the “Western Regional Higher Education Compact.” It ratifies a compact between this and certain other states and territories. 67 Stat. 490 specifically gives the consent of the Congress to this compact. The statute in question provides the mechanics of this state’s participation with the other members of the compact in cooperatively providing higher educational facilities for training doctors, veterinarians, etc., to serve the needs of the region covered by the compact. Many of the members do not have the potential students nor the financial resources to accomplish this purpose by themselves.
*866Relator petitioned for a writ of prohibition in January, 1956, to restrain the respondent state auditor from deliver^ ing a Warrant drawn pursuant to chapter 214, Laws of 1955, on the ground that the law is unconstitutional. The case was tried on the merits, and relator appeals from a judgment for respondent. . ....
This action has already delayed fulfillment of the state of Washington’s obligation under the ¡compact for about two and one-half, years. ■-
Respondent moved in this court to dismiss the action for the reason that appellant’s petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. This issue is properly before this court under Rule on Appeal 43, 34A Wn. (2d) 47, as amended, effective January 2, 1953, which provides that this objection may be made at any time.
In appellant’s petition the only allegations pertinent to her right to maintain the instant action are as follows:
“(13) That Jennie M. Tattersall, on whose relation this action is brought, is a citizen, elector and taxpayer of this state.
“(14) That heretofore and on January 4, 1956, demand was made in behalf of said relator upon the attorney general to institute an appropriate action against the state auditor and any other official involved, praying that the issuance of warrants under said chapter 214 be enjoined on the ground that the compact is invalid as contravening the federal and state constitutions; and that on January 10, 1956, the attorney general by letter declined to bring such action.” (Italics mine.)
This is not a suit to enjoin the expenditure of public moneys in violation of a statute. Indeed, it is very clear that the expenditure in question is made pursuant to the statute. The purpose of the action is to invalidate the statute, and thus take the state out of the compact.
Neither the appellant’s personal nor property rights are affected by the compact. She, therefore, cannot maintain her action under any common-law theory and must rely upon the declaratory judgment act to do so.
*867RCW 7.24.020, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 7.84-2, provides:
“A person interested under a deed, will, written'contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” (Italics mine.)
To come under the statute, the appellant must specify what property or constitutional personal right of hers is affected by the statute. She, of course, cannot do so for the simple reason that she has none so affected, and it follows that she cannot maintain this suit under the declaratory judgment act for the mere purpose of challenging the constitutionality of the law. We made this clear in Kahin v. Lewis, 42 Wn. (2d) 897, 259 P. (2d) 420, wherein we said:
“This court has many times held that, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under the declaratory judgment act, there must be an actual, existing justiciable controversy . . . ” (Italics mine.)
Political opposition to a law does not constitute a justiciable issue. Many personal and property rights are guaranteed to individuals by our state constitution. The majority must respect these rights, and an individual can invoke the aid of the courts to defeat the political action of the majority whenever it attempts to destroy them.
However, when a dissident citizen asserts no constitutional right in a law, he is free to work politically for its repeal only. Specifically, he cannot implement his political opposition to a law by maintaining .a court action to invalidate it. Such a suit, if it were to be successful, would, in the absence of a justiciable issue, be tantamount to a privately procured judicial veto. A justiciable issue is indispensable to the court’s interposition in legislative matters under our constitutional form of a three-branch government. Indeed, this form would be unworkable if the courts repeatedly subjected the other branches of..government to *868the “law’s delay” at the whim of every litigious member of a political minority.
We are not concerned in this case with the procedure to restrain public officials from violating existing laws or misappropriating public funds. Neither do we reach the question of the respondent’s immunity from suit for, in any event, the consent of the sovereign to be sued does not affect the requirement that a plaintiff shall have a cause of action which presents a justiciable. issue in- order to maintain his action. The absence of a justiciable issue is determinative of this case. The motion to dismiss was well taken. We should not reach the merits of this . case.
Finley, Weaver, and Rosellini, JJ., concur with ' Mal-lery, J.