Court Opinion

ID: 9916242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 16:04:36.737311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:35.013289
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                       Docket No. 51088

 In the Matter of: Jane Doe I, A Child          )
 Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age.              )
 STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF                  )
 HEALTH AND WELFARE,                            ) Filed: January 9, 2024
                                                )
        Petitioner-Respondent,                  ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
                                                )
 v.                                             )
                                                )
 JANE DOE (2023-34),                            )
                                                )
        Respondent-Appellant.                   )
                                                )

       Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
       Kootenai County. Hon. Lamont C. Berecz, District Judge. Hon. Anna M. Eckhart,
       Magistrate.

       Judgment of the district court on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court,
       affirmed; order awarding attorney fees as a sanction, reversed.

       Derek A. Pica, Boise, for appellant. Derek A. Pica argued.

       Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Denise L. Rosen, Deputy Attorney
       General, Coeur d’Alene, for respondent. Denise L. Rosen argued.
                 ________________________________________________

GRATTON, Chief Judge
       Jane Doe (Doe) appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision affirming
the magistrate court. Doe argues the district court erred by affirming the magistrate court’s
amended permanency hearing order and various ancillary orders in the Child Protection Act (CPA)
case. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
                                                I.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Doe is the mother of Jane Doe I (Child). When Child was born, both Doe and Child tested
positive for Subutex, a medication to treat opioid addiction. The Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare (Department) met with Doe who stated she was homeless, unemployed, and did not have

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the means to care for Child. Law enforcement sheltered Child. The Department and Doe discussed
placement. Doe indicated her cousin and husband (collectively, “the relatives”) had expressed an
interest in adopting Child, though at one point had changed their minds. The relatives reside in
Indiana.
       On December 13, 2021, the Department initiated a child protection action, and the
following day the magistrate court held a shelter care hearing. At the shelter care hearing, Doe
stipulated to an unstable home environment and, thus, Child remained under the temporary legal
custody of the Department pending the adjudicatory hearing. Prior to the adjudicatory hearing,
Doe again stipulated to the entry of an adjudicatory decree. The parties then presented the
magistrate court with a written stipulated CPA adjudicatory decree, and the magistrate court
entered the decree on January 19, 2022. Legal custody of Child was thus vested in the Department.
Doe did not appeal the adjudicatory decree.
       During the pendency of the CPA case, the relatives filed a motion to intervene and the
Department objected. The relatives also filed a verified petition for adoption in the state of Indiana.
The Department petitioned the magistrate court for a jurisdictional determination under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The magistrate court, after
conferring with the Indiana court, determined that Idaho was Child’s home state and denied the
relatives’ motion to intervene. The magistrate court found that the relatives did not have a
mandatory or permissive right to intervene, Doe had stipulated to legal custody of Child with the
Department, and Doe did not, at that time, maintain a right to determine where and with whom
Child would be placed. As a result of the motion to intervene being denied, the relatives filed a
petition to terminate and adopt Jane Doe in Kootenai County Case No. CV28-22-4268. After
extensive briefing and argument, upon motion of the Department, the magistrate court dismissed
the petition. In so doing, the magistrate court held that the CPA case is the only case in which an
adoption for Child could be filed. Neither the relatives nor Doe appealed.
       After the case plan was adopted and prior to the first review hearing, the Department filed
its first progress report, noting that Doe had video visits with her relatives. However, the relatives
were no longer being considered a permanent placement option due to Indiana denying the
relatives’ request as a result of the husband’s criminal history. During regular review hearings,
the magistrate court found the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify Child with Doe, but

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reunification was contrary to the welfare and best interests of Child. Doe chose not to comply
with the case plan and made it clear that she did not wish to reunify with Child.
        Doe filed a motion to revoke the CPA adjudicatory decree. Doe asserted she could provide
a stable home environment by consenting to the relatives adopting Child and that she maintained
the absolute right to consent to the adoption. The magistrate court held a review and permanency
hearing and, thereafter, entered an amended permanency hearing order approving pursuing
termination of parental rights without reunification efforts as the permanency goal. The order
instructed the Department to file its petition for termination of Doe’s parental rights within thirty
days. The order also stated the relatives no longer wished to adopt Child. A month later, the
magistrate court entered its order denying Doe’s motion to revoke the CPA adjudicatory decree.
The magistrate court found a petition for adoption had not been filed in the case in which the court
retained exclusive jurisdiction. Doe appealed from the amended permanency hearing order and
the prior order denying her motion to revoke the CPA adjudicatory decree.
        During the appeal, Doe requested additional time to submit her appellant’s brief to the
district court. The guardian ad litem (GAL) filed an objection, a motion for sanctions, and sought
dismissal of the appeal. Ultimately, the district court granted Doe’s two-day extension to file her
brief, but ordered Doe’s counsel to pay the GAL’s attorney fees in the amount of $300 as a
sanction. The district court found it lacked jurisdiction to hear three of the four issues Doe raised
on appeal and affirmed the magistrate court’s amended permanency hearing order. Doe timely
appeals.
                                                   II.
                                      STANDARD OF REVIEW
           For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the
magistrate court, we review the record to determine whether there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate court’s
conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480,
482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal will affirm
or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955,
958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the magistrate court’s findings and conclusions, whether
the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis therefore, and either affirm
or reverse the district court.

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                                                 III.
                                            ANALYSIS
       Doe argues the district court erred by affirming the magistrate court. Specifically, Doe
contends the district court erred by: (1) affirming the amended permanency hearing order;
(2) ruling it lacked jurisdiction to review the magistrate court’s determination that it had exclusive
authority over adoption; (3) affirming the magistrate court’s determination that it need not consider
Doe’s consent relative to the permanency order; (4) finding that the order denying Doe’s motion
to revoke the CPA adjudicatory decree was not appealable under Idaho Code § 16-1625; and
(5) ordering a sanction for the GAL responding to the extension motion. Lastly, Doe asserts she
is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-117, 12-121, and 12-123. The Department
argues the amended permanency hearing order was the only appealable order properly before the
district court once Doe stipulated to jurisdiction. The Department further argues that the district
court did not err in affirming the magistrate court because the magistrate court has exclusive
jurisdiction over all proceedings and retains jurisdiction until terminated by the court.
A.     The Amended Permanency Hearing Order
       Pervasive throughout Doe’s arguments on appeal is Doe’s assertion that the Department
lacked standing relative to the amended adjudicatory order and motions in the CPA case, and the
magistrate court was without jurisdiction to proceed in the CPA case. Doe asserts that she retained
residual parental rights to consent to adoption. Therefore, upon her consent for the relatives to
adopt, the Department no longer had standing to proceed with termination and the magistrate court
had no jurisdiction to enter contrary orders. In support, Doe relies on I.C. § 16-1619(5)(b). The
Department argues the magistrate court obtained exclusive jurisdiction through the CPA that was
never terminated and the Department maintained vested legal custody. The Department further
contends that Doe’s residual rights may only be exercised within and with the magistrate court’s
approval in the CPA case.
       Doe acknowledges that the magistrate court had jurisdiction in the CPA case upon the
petition by the Department, her stipulations, and the magistrate court’s findings culminating in the
adjudicatory decree. Doe further acknowledges that the Department had valid legal custody of
Child at that time. However, Doe asserts I.C. § 16-1619(5)(b) provides that, after entry of the
adjudicatory decree, she retained and validly exercised her residual right to consent to adoption,

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thereby divesting the magistrate court of jurisdiction and eliminating the Department’s standing to
take action in the CPA case.1
       The magistrate court has the exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings over a child
who is living or found within the state when the parents or other legal custodian fail to provide a
stable home environment. I.C. § 16-1603(l)(b). The jurisdiction obtained by the court under the
CPA is retained until the child’s eighteenth birthday unless terminated prior thereto. I.C. § l6-
1604(1). If jurisdiction results in legal custody being vested in the Department, the Department
has the authority to determine where and with whom the child shall live, provided that the child
shall not be placed outside the state without the CPA court’s consent. I.C. § 16-1629(8).2
       The CPA court has exclusive jurisdiction of an action to terminate the rights of a parent
unless the court consents to a different venue or jurisdiction in the best interests of the child. I.C.
§ l6-2003. If an adoption arises from a CPA case, the petition to adopt must be filed in the court
having jurisdiction over the CPA case unless that court relinquishes jurisdiction over the adoption
proceeding. I.C. § l6-1506(l). Nonetheless, residual rights remain with a parent even after the
transfer of legal custody to the Department and include the right to consent to adoption. I.C. § 16-
1602(41). Where the Department has legal custody of the child, both the mother’s and the
Department’s consent to adoption is required. I.C. § 16-1504(1)(c) and (f).3
       A parent’s consent is subject to approval of the CPA court, and the adoption may be denied
if it is not in the child’s best interests. Idaho Dep’t of Health and Welfare v. Hays, 137 Idaho 233,
236, 46 P.3d 529, 532 (2002). A parent’s consent to place a child with an adoptive parent is subject

1
        Standing is jurisdictional, can be raised at any time, and the Court has a duty to raise it sua
sponte. Paslay v. A & B Irrigation District, 162 Idaho 866, 870, 406 P.3d 878, 882 (2017);
Arambarri v. Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734, 738, 274 P.3d 1249, 1253 (2012). Subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and the court has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 162, 244 P.3d 1244,
1248 (2010).
2
        Idaho Code § 16-1629(8) also states the court retains jurisdiction over the child and all
matters relating to them. In addition, the court must approve placing the child back in the home
the child was removed from and, “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, all other
determinations relating to where and with whom the child shall live shall be subject to judicial
review by the court and, when contested by any party, judicial approval.”
3
        Idaho Code § 16-1504(1)(a)-(i) lists the persons and entities from which consent for
adoption is required and includes (c) the mother of an adoptee born outside of marriage; and (f) any
legally appointed custodian or guardian of the adoptee.
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to the Department’s approval, since only the Department has the authority to determine where the
child should live. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 164 Idaho 883, 889, 436 P.3d 1232,
1238 (2019). Moreover, where the Department has legal custody of the child, the Department’s
consent to adoption is also required. I.C. § 16-1504(1)(f). Once the Department has legal custody
of a child under the CPA, a court’s authority over that child is limited to judicial review approving
placement. Doe, 164 Idaho at 889, 436 P.3d at 1238. As noted in Hays, the Department is vested
with the authority to select who should adopt a child; the magistrate court does not have the
authority to select adoptive parents. Hays, 137 Idaho at 237, 46 P.3d at 533. A parent may petition
to contest placement, but the CPA court has ultimate review authority through approval or
disapproval. Doe, 164 Idaho at 889, 436 P.3d at 1238.
       Termination of parental rights through voluntary consent occurs where the consent is filed
“in conjunction with a petition for adoption initiated by the person or persons proposing to adopt
the child, or where the consent to termination has been filed by a licensed adoption agency[.]” I.C.
§ 16-2005(5); Idaho Dept’t of Health and Welfare v. Doe (2017-21), 163 Idaho 83, 94, 408 P.3d
81, 92 (2017). While a parent has a right to consent to adoption and this is accomplished in the
CPA case, this right must be exercised in conjunction with the Department’s authority to place the
child, and the adoption will fail unless the Department also consents. Doe v. Idaho Dep’t of Health
& Welfare, 150 Idaho 491, 495, 248 P.3d 742, 746 (2011) (prospective adoptive parents needed
the Department’s consent which was refused and, thus, they could not adopt and the court could
not grant adoption without the Department’s agreement).
       Doe asserts her residual rights under I.C. § 16-1619(5)(b)4 permitted her to consent to the
adoption despite the Department’s legal custody and the CPA court’s jurisdiction. Doe argues
that, when she exercised her residual rights, the Department no longer had standing to pursue
termination of Doe’s parental rights. In essence, Doe argues an absolute right to consent to
adoption regardless of the legal custody of the Department and the jurisdiction of the magistrate
court in the CPA case. Doe is correct in that the statute states that custody in the Department is
subject to her residual parental rights, including consent to adoption, but fails to acknowledge that

4
        Idaho Code § 16-1619(5)(b) provides that upon entering the adjudicatory decree the court
shall consider any information relevant to the disposition of the child but shall “[v]est legal custody
in the department or other authorized agency subject to residual parental rights and subject to full
judicial review by the court and, when contested by any party, judicial approval of all matters
relating to the custody of the child by the department or other authorized agency.”
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the exercise of her residual parental rights is not absolute and must comply with the legal procedure
and designation of authority.
       Contrary to Doe’s argument, the phrase “subject to” in I.C. § 16-1619(5)(b) does not grant
her absolute authority to consent to adoption despite legal custody in the Department and
jurisdiction in the magistrate court in the CPA proceeding. Idaho Code § 16-1602(41) defines
“residual parental rights and responsibilities” as those rights and responsibilities remaining with
the parents after the transfer of legal custody and includes the right to consent to adoption,
visitation, determine religious affiliation, family counseling, and responsibility for support. The
interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which we exercise free review. Aguilar v.
Coonrod, 151 Idaho 642, 649-50, 262 P.3d 671, 678-79 (2011). Such interpretation must begin
with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary
meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). The plain language of the statute provides that,
aside from consent to adoption, residual parental rights include such matters as visitation, religious
affiliation, counseling, and support. Doe does not argue that these residual rights are absolute.
Yet, the Department’s authority is also “subject to” these residual rights.             Indeed, Doe
acknowledges, as she must, that the Department, having been vested with custody, retains power
and authority to determine visitation and counselling. Construing the statute as a whole, the
Department’s authority being “subject to” these residual rights requires that the Department
consider and respect these rights incident to its custody of a child and reunification efforts through
a case plan in the CPA proceeding. There is no basis in the language of the statute from which to
conclude that the residual parental right to consent to adoption is treated differently from the other
residual rights delineated therein.
       Further, Doe’s interpretation of residual rights would vitiate the Department’s authority to
maintain the health and welfare of a child within the scope of the CPA. Doe’s residual rights are
not absolute or preemptive rights; rather, the residual consent authority is subservient to the
Department’s lawful protective powers once the CPA is triggered. Idaho Code § 16-1619(5)(b)
does not preempt the need for Department consent. Nor does it affect the magistrate court’s
jurisdiction and authority in the CPA proceeding. Therefore, the district court correctly affirmed
the magistrate court’s exercise of authority to enter the amended permanency hearing order.

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       In addition to arguing that the magistrate court could not validly enter the amended
permanency order, Doe contends that the magistrate court erred in entering the amended
permanency hearing order. Specifically, Doe argues that the district court erred as a matter of law
when it ruled the magistrate court had no duty to consider Doe’s consent to adoption relative to
the permanency order. Doe contends that once she exercised her statutory right to consent, the
court was required to consider her wishes because the Department’s legal custody was then subject
to her residual right, and I.C. § 16-1629(8) no longer applied. The district court held:
               [Doe] also argues that the magistrate court failed to consider her desire for
       placement. However, “the department, having been granted legal custody of a
       child, shall have the right to determine where and with whom the child shall live,
       provided that the child shall not be placed outside the state without the court’s
       consent.” I.C. § 16-1629(8). The magistrate court is not required to consider who
       [Doe] desires to be the adoptive parents of the minor child or adjudicate
       relationship. See Idaho Dep’t of Health and Welfare v. Hays, 137 Idaho 233, 239,
       46 P.3d 529, 535 (2002).
The district court did not err in its determination that the magistrate court was not required to
consider Doe’s desire for placement because, as stated above, Doe’s consent to adoption is not
absolute. Instead, her residual right is subject to the safeguards within the CPA, including
Department and court approval. While Doe’s claims are without merit, we note that the magistrate
court was aware of her wishes at the time of entry of the amended permanency hearing order.
       The amended permanency hearing order complied with all of the applicable statutory
requirements. From the inception of the case, Doe stipulated to the Department having legal
custody. Doe made no attempts to comply with the case plan and agreed that she had an unstable
home environment. The Department complied with the statutory requirements for placement in
this case. The magistrate court had jurisdiction to enter the amended permanency hearing order,
and the Department had standing to petition for termination. Accordingly, the district court did
not err in affirming the magistrate court’s amended permanency hearing order.
B.     Other Challenged Intermediate Orders
       On appeal, Doe challenges a number of intermediate orders of the magistrate court and the
related rulings of the district court. First, Doe contends that the magistrate court erred in
determining that the CPA case is the only case in which an adoption petition can be filed. Doe
further contends that the district court erred in holding that there was no appealable order and,
thus, it had no jurisdiction to consider the argument. Second, Doe contends that the magistrate
court, without jurisdiction, ruled that pursuant to the UCCJEA, Idaho is the home state of Child
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for purposes of adoption proceedings. Doe also asserts that the ruling is an appealable order.
Third, Doe challenges the magistrate court’s denial of her a motion to revoke the CPA adjudicatory
decree. Among other things, Doe asserted that she could provide a stable home (through adoption)
and, therefore, the magistrate court no longer had jurisdiction. Doe argues that the district court
erred in holding that the order denying her motion to revoke the CPA adjudicatory decree is not
an appealable order under I.C. § 16-1625(b) and (c). We agree with the district court that none of
these rulings are appealable under I.C. § 16-1625. Therefore, we decline to address these issues
further.
C.         Attorney Fees
           An award of attorney fees may be granted under I.C. § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule
41 to the prevailing party and such an award is appropriate when the court finds that the appeal
has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. An award of fees
under I.C. § 12-117(1) requires finding that the nonprevailing party acted without reasonable basis
in fact or law. Doe argues the UCCJEA determination resulted in the magistrate court finding that
it was the only court in which an adoption proceeding could be filed and, thus, violated Doe’s
residual rights. Doe claims this finding is without a reasonable basis in fact or law because the
UCCJEA does not govern adoptions, and the Department’s vested custodial authority is subject to
her right to consent to adoption. The Department asserts that Doe’s arguments are without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. As Doe is not the prevailing party she is not entitled to attorney
fees.
           1.     Department’s fees on appeal
           The Department argues Doe pursued this case where the law is well-settled and therefore
attorney fees under I.C. §§ 12-121, 12-117 are appropriate. An appeal is generally considered
frivolous where it disputes factual findings by a trial court and simply seeks the reweighing of
evidence. Doe I v. Doe (2019-03), 166 Idaho 47, 57, 454 P.3d 1130, 1140 (2019). The
Department’s request for attorney fees is denied because of Doe’s fundamental liberty interests at
stake and her novel residual rights arguments.
           2.     GAL’s attorney fees awarded by the district court
           Doe contends that the district court abused its discretion in ordering sanctions. The district
court ordered Doe’s attorney to pay $300 for the GAL’s attorney fees incident to Doe’s two-day
motion for extension of time. Doe contends she requested the extension in a timely manner

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pursuant to I.A.R. 46 and 34(d). On the Friday her intermediate appellate brief was due, Doe filed
a motion for a two-day extension of time, until the following Monday. The basis for Doe’s motion
for extension was so that counsel’s legal assistant could finish the citation and the table of contents.
After the death of his former legal assistant, counsel secured the services of another legal assistant
and his brief, together with two others temporally related, were the legal assistant’s first in many
years. The following Monday, the GAL filed an objection and motion for sanctions. The GAL
objected, in part, on the basis that Doe’s counsel “could have undertaken the task of finalizing the
brief himself”; the timing of the motion for extension demonstrated a “lack of diligence and
preparation”; and a “concern” that the two-day extension (over a weekend) was a delay tactic.
        Doe filed her brief on the day requested in the extension, which was the same day the GAL
filed the objection. The district court granted Doe’s request for a two-day extension “for good
cause.” Nevertheless, the district court also imposed sanctions, requiring Doe to pay the GAL’s
attorney $300 for fees related to objecting to the two-day extension of time.
        Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(m) authorizes a district court, on intermediate appeal, to
sanction a party for a failure to timely take any step in the appellate process. Unless the district
court’s discretion granted under I.R.C.P. 83 “clearly appears to have been exercised unwisely and
to have been manifestly abused,” the sanction will not be overturned on appeal. State ex rel.
Goodwin v. Valentine, 107 Idaho 1033, 1035, 695 P.2d 418, 420 (Ct. App. 1985).
        Doe argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to act consistently with
the applicable legal standards and failed to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. First, Doe
argues that the district court did not act consistently with the legal standards because I.R.C.P.
83(m) only allows a sanction for failure to comply with time limits. Doe asserts that the motion
for extension of time was timely and, because the district court granted the motion for extension
of time, there could be no sanction for untimeliness. In addition, Doe asserts that the district court
did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Doe contends that there was no appreciable
delay in the appellate process; the circumstances attendant to the preparation of the brief presented
good cause for an extension (which the district court found); and the GAL, although taking
considerable time and incurring attorney fees to file the motion for sanctions and dismissal, was
not prejudiced by the filing of the brief on Monday and did not incur attorney fees attributable to
the time of filing. We agree with Doe. Under these circumstances, sanctions were neither
warranted nor consistent with reasons for sanctioning. Doe’s request for an extension was timely

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and, contrary to the GAL’s stated objections, which were largely petty, the reasons for the
extension were appropriate and did not evidence any intent to delay the proceedings,
notwithstanding the GAL’s “concerns” to the contrary. The district court’s award of fees, as a
sanction, from Doe’s counsel to counsel for the GAL is reversed.
                                               IV.
                                          CONCLUSION
       The district court did not err in affirming the magistrate court’s amended permanency
hearing order. We decline to address Doe’s other claims. The district court abused its discretion
in awarding fees to counsel for the GAL. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court is
affirmed. The district court’s order awarding fees to the GAL is reversed. Costs are awarded to
the Department as the prevailing party.
       Judge HUSKEY and Judge LORELLO CONCUR.

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