Court Opinion

ID: 9668560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:18:01.967266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:46.102887
License: Public Domain

Carr, J.
(dissenting). The facts in-this case, insofar as established by the testimony .taken before .a deputy of the workmen’s compensation commission, are not materially in dispute. For approxi*648mately 2, years prior to February 17, 1953, plaintiff was employed by defendant Penegor as a logging truck driver. On the date mentioned, while engaged in such work, he suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage as a result of which he became partially paralyzed. Application for compensation was made in accordance with the workmen’s compensation act,* and proofs in support of plaintiff’s claim were submitted.
From his consideration of the testimony, the deputy concluded that plaintiff had not established his right to compensation under the statute and an order denying the award sought was entered. The appeal board reversed the order on the ground that plaintiff’s disability resulted “from causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer.” An award was accordingly made under part 7 of the compensation act on the ground that the disability was suffered under such circumstances as to bring it fairly within the scope of part 7, § 1, of the act as amended by PA 1943, No 245 (CL 1948, § 417.1 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.-220]). From such award defendants, on leave-granted, have appealed. In consequence the case is now before us for review on writ of certiorari, the issue being whether the testimony before the deputy was sufficient to support the finding of the board..
The record discloses that immediately prior to the time that plaintiff suffered the hemorrhage he and other employees of defendant Penegor were preparing a load of logs on a trailer for hauling. In connection with such work it was customary to bind the load with chains, one hear the front and the other at the rear of such load. The driver who was to takeout the load affixed the front chain, and plaintiff proceeded to secure the load toward the rear. The proc*649ess involved the attaching of a chain to the right side of the trailer, throwing the loose end over the load so that it could be reached from the opposite side, and then pulling down the chain to a point where it might be attached to binding mechanism on the left side. This involved hooldng the chain in position and then tightening it by means of a handle, or lever, on the binder. If the.chain was sufficiently tight the mechanism automatically locked as the handle was pressed down into position. The testimony indicates that the operation was one that required physical exertion and skill.
The inference follows from the testimony of the witnesses that the binding operation was more difficult in some instances than in others. If unusually difficult a pipe was employed for the purpose of facilitating the operation, or assistance was rendered by a fellow employee. In the ease at bar it does not appear that plaintiff experienced any difficulty in securing the load in the manner indicated. He was at the time 26 years of age, was experienced in the work, and physically strong. He did not undertake to procure a pipe to use, nor did he seek help from any other employee. That such help was available to him if he needed it, because of difficulty in the operation, clearly appears from the record. One of his fellow employees, Neilo Maki, testified that he watched plaintiff while the latter was engaged in fastening the load binder, that he observed that plaintiff had the chain hooked, concluded that no help was required, and started to walk away. After-wards, on inspection, he discovered that plaintiff had completed the operation.
Testimony was offered indicating that in order to reach the end of the chain that had been thrown over the load plaintiff stepped up on the wheel of the trailer, 2 or 2-1/2 feet above the ground. The record ■does not show whether he stepped down after reach*650ing the chain or remained standing on the wheel while' hooking the chain and manipulating the handle of the binder. Apparently as he walked away from the trailer no one observed his actions. However, after he had gone a few feet he made an exclamation that attracted the attention of his1 fellow workmen, and then fell to the ground. He was taken to a hospital at Ontonagon for medical attention. A physician who examined him, and who testified in his behalf on the hearing, diagnosed his trouble as a subarachnoid hemorrhage, concluding also that plaintiff had at the time of the occurrence an aneurysm, described as a weak and distended blood vessel. The witness further testified that such a condition may be congenital or may be the result of disease. He did not undertake to express any opinion as to the length of time that such condition had existed, nor is there any proof as to the nature of the disease, progressive or otherwise, that might cause an aneurysm in the brain. The witness specifically stated as his opinion that plaintiff suffered his disability because the aneurysm ruptured and caused the hemorrhage.
Counsel for plaintiff have called attention to prior-decisions of this Court in which awards of compensation under part 7 were sustained on the ground that proofs were offered to show that the disabilities for which compensation was sought actually resulted from causes or conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer. Such was the situation in Mills v. Detroit Tuberculosis Sanitarium, 323 Mich 200. There the proofs on behalf of plaintiff indicated that he contracted tuberculosis as the result of washing dishes regularly in defendant sanitarium, which dishes had been used by patients afflicted with the ailment. In Underwood v. National Motor Castings Division, Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Company, 329 Mich 273, plain*651tiff’s work required her to bend and twist in tbe handling of heavy cores in a foundry, resulting in a lumbosacral strain with some evidence indicating a herniated disc. Under the proofs offered, it appeared that plaintiff’s condition developed, as in the Mills Case, from the work that she was required to do and its manner of performance. Comparable situations existed in Fields v. G. M. Brass & Aluminum Foundry Company, 332 Mich 113, and Gibbs v. Motor Wheel Corporation, 333 Mich 617.
In the case at bar there is no claim that the aneurysm that resulted in the hemorrhage was caused by characteristics of the employment. Insofar as the right to compensation under part 7 of the statute is concerned, the claim rests wholly on the theory that the weakened blood vessel ruptured because of physical exertion on plaintiff’s part in securing the load in the manner indicated. The testimony of the medical witness, above mentioned, indicated that “strenuous physical activity” may result in raising blood pressure, and further stated as his opinion that if one takes a bent or cramped position of such nature as to constrict the liver additional blood may be forced into the peripheral circulation. In the instant case there is no proof that plaintiff was in a cramped position while hooking the chains and manipulating the lever on the binder, nor may It be said that the testimony here supports a conclusion, insofar as plaintiff was concerned, that there was strenuous activity on his part. He knew how to perform the task and apparently went about it in a methodical way. It does not appear that he had any difficulty in hooking the chains or- in pressing down the lever on the binder. As before noted, the testimony indicates what would necessarily follow as an inference, that on some occasions the securing of a load of logs involved more difficulty than in 'others. We may not conclude, however, from the *652proofs before us here that plaintiff found tbe task particularly difficult on the occasion in question. Apparently he did not find it necessary to use a pipe or to seek available assistance from his fellow employee. Neither does it appear that the operation was other than brief.
On behalf of appellants it is insisted that the decision of this Court in McGregor v. Conservation Department, 338 Mich 93, is significant. There, as here, the award of compensation to the plaintiff was based on part 7 of the compensation act. There, as here, plaintiff had a pre-existing condition, in that case arteriosclerosis of a coronary vessel. He was employed as a fire warden, and at times his ordinary duties were somewhat strenuous. This Court, while recognizing the fact that plaintiff’s duties involved hard physical labor, denied compensation. In reaching such conclusion Hagopian v. City of Highland Park, 313 Mich 608, was cited in support of the proposition that plaintiff’s disability was not due to “causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer.” For like reasons the award of the appeal board in the case at bar may not be sustained under part 7 of the statute.
A situation somewhat analogous to that in the instant case was presented in Carter v. International Detrola Corporation, 328 Mich 367. There plaintiff was employed by defendant in work involving the inspection of mine detector units. In performing her duties she was required to exert muscular effort and suffered difficulty in using her arms. Apparently the period during which she was engaged in the occupation began in February, 1944, after the workmen’s compensation law was amended by PA 1943, No 245. Her difficulty was finally diagnosed as hypertrophy of the scalenus anticus muscle which pressed on the cords of the brachial plexus, compressing the axillary artery and causing circulatory disturbance and *653pain. The condition, which resulted from a preexisting variation in muscle position and use of the muscle, was finally relieved by an operation. The compensation commission entered an award in plaintiff’s favor, which this Court reversed. In reaching the conclusion indicated, it was said, in part (pp 369, 370):
“Plaintiff’s disability did not result from an accidental injury or fortuitous event. If compensable at all it must be as a ‘disability which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer.’ CL 1948, § 417.1 (Stat Ann 1949 Cum Supp § 17.220).
“Plaintiff did manual work which required the continuous use of her arms. In this respect it was no different than many other factory jobs. The resulting excessive movement of the scalenus anticus muscle is not so unique as to be ‘characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer.’ Muscle use is common to most other employments, and the act does not permit compensation for injuries caused by this alone. See Bederin v. Ex-Cell-O Corporation, 311 Mich 334; and Hagopian v. City of Highland Park, 313 Mich 608.”
This brings us to the question whether the award should be upheld on the theory that plaintiff is entitled thereto under part 2 of the compensation law. The appeal board declined to base an award thereon. The proceeding is before us on writ of certiorari and, as before stated, the question is whether there was testimony supporting the conclusion of the appeal board that plaintiff was entitled to an award under part 7. However, and without reference to this phase of the situation, I cannot agree that under the circumstances plaintiff was entitled to an award under part 2. Any such claim involves an interpretation of the amendments to the compensation law made by PA 1943, No 245. This has been a repeated matter *654of consideration and discussion by this Court. For the reasons set forth in Hagopian v. City of Highland Park, supra; Arnold v. Ogle Construction Co., 333 Mich 652, and other decisions in accord therewith,' the claim that the amendments made to the statute by the act of 1943 broadened the scope of part 2 of the compensation law is not well founded. In other words, the legislature did not so change part 2 of the act as to render nonaccidental injuries compensable thereunder.
A repetition of what has been said on prior occasions would serve no useful purpose. It is significant to note, however, that the act of 1943 amended section 1 of part 7. of the statute, hereinbefore cited. Prior to such amendment part 7 related to occupational diseases as defined by the legislature in PA 1937, No 61. The amendment enlarged its scope to include disabilities arising out of and in the course of the employment and due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the; employer. If at the same time the legislature, as it is now claimed, changed the statute so as to make compensable under part 2 all injuries whether accidental or otherwise arising out of and in the course of the employment, why was it deemed necessary to amend section 1 of part 7 in the manner indicated? Under the specific language used, “disability” is included in “personal injury.” Bearing in mind that we are concerned here with the matter of statutory interpretation, we must of necessity give due consideration to all portions of the act tending to throw light on the matter of legislative intent. As declared in Smith v. Wilson Foundry & Machine Co., 296 Mich 484, 487, the statute “must be construed and ■administered according to. its terms, * * * and its scope may not be enlarged beyond the terms of its enactment.”
*655The case should be remanded to the appeal board with directions to set aside the award.
Sharpe, J., concurred with Caer, J.

 PA 1912 (1st Ex Sess), No 10, as amended (CL 1948, §411.1 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1950 Bev § 17.141 ,et seq., as amended]