Court Opinion

ID: 9559670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:33:31.389755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:29.218089
License: Public Domain

Durham, J.
(concurring) — [1] The majority properly rejects the plurality opinion issued in State v. Collicott, 112 Wn.2d 399, 771 P.2d 1137 (1989) (Collicott I), and returns to the correct analysis of "same criminal conduct" under RCW 9.94A.400. I have previously proposed what I believe to be the appropriate reasoning:
In State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 743 P.2d 1237, 749 P.2d 160 (1987), we adopted the following analysis for determining when crimes "encompass the same criminal conduct" under RCW 9.94A.400(1)(a):
[TJrial courts should focus on the extent to which the criminal intent, as objectively viewed, changed from one crime to the next. . . . [P]art of this analysis will often include the related issues of whether one crime furthered the other and if the time and place of the two crimes remained the same.
Dunaway, at 215. We also held that crimes involving multiple victims can never encompass the same criminal conduct. Dunaway, at 215.
Collicott I, at 412-13 (Durham, J., dissenting). The application of the Dunaway analysis to the facts of this case can also be found in my dissent to Collicott I, at 415-17.
*670My disagreement with the majority opinion here is that it goes beyond what is necessary to resolve this case. I refer specifically to the discussions of collateral estoppel, the "clearly too lenient" standard, and the "zone of privacy" factor.
Accordingly, I concur.
Brachtenbach, Andersen, and Guy, JJ., and Callow, J. Pro Tem., concur with Durham, J.
After modification, further reconsideration denied June 4, 1992.