Court Opinion

ID: 9477654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:28:13.338396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:58.958246
License: Public Domain

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I write separately because I believe we are obliged to reach the jurisdictional issue the majority avoids. Without subject matter jurisdiction over the case we would be without power or authority to consider the government’s affirmative defense of waiver. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellant’s claim since 5 U.S.C. § 8347(c) deprived it of judicial power to entertain appellant’s claim for retirement disability benefits. Smith v. Horner, 664 F.Supp. 576, 577 (D.D.C.1987). “Due to that Congressionally imposed finality provision, this Court is not free to review those factual determinations even when they are sought to be presented in the context of a Title VII claim.” Smith v. Horner, 645 F.Supp. 97, 100 (D.D.C.1986) (footnote omitted). The district court did not hold that without regard to section 8347(c) it lacked Article III jurisdiction, rather only absent authority or jurisdiction to review the facts upon which the denial of retirement disability was based (which *1525Congress had foreclosed), it could grant no relief in the case and thus it had no remaining Article III jurisdiction. I think the court’s premise was correct — it lacked jurisdiction to review the factual disability determination — but I think it was mistaken in concluding that it lacked authority to grant any relief and thus it was not ousted of subject matter jurisdiction over the entire case.
Appellant contends that, since he alleges OPM’s denial of retirement disability benefits was discriminatorily motivated, under Title VII law he is entitled to de novo review of that determination. He asserts that the very arbitrariness of OPM’s decision — when compared with its treatment of other disability cases — is evidence of its discriminatory motive. And, therefore, it is impossible to judge fairly his discrimination claim without retrying his disability claim in federal district court. According to Smith, the district court was in error in perceiving section 8347(c) as even applicable to such a proceeding because, whatever limitations that section imposes on the Federal Circuit’s review of disability claims, those jurisdictional restrictions do not apply when the disability claim is an integral part of a Title VII lawsuit.
Smith relies on Supreme Court cases holding that Title VII plaintiffs are entitled to de novo review of discrimination claims in federal courts even if a federal or state administrative agency has already adjudicated the same claims. See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3225, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 846, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 1952, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-48 & n. 8, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019 & n. 8, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). Those cases do not involve, as in Smith’s case, a collateral administrative proceeding not directed at a discrimination claim but which itself gives rise to a Title VII lawsuit. Still, the logic of those opinions suggests the outcome in such a proceeding would be the same. That is to say, for example, if a Title VII lawsuit were based on a claim that an employer discriminatorily denied disability benefits, depending on the strength of plaintiff’s prima facie case, the district court might well be obliged to consider de novo the disability claim even though a state agency had determined that the employer was correct as a matter of state disability law.
Here, however, we encounter a separate federal statute, section 8347(c), that limits the scope of federal judicial review of the disability claim, and I think the district court was right in concluding that appellant could not circumvent that section’s jurisdictional limitations merely by seeking review of the disability claim as part of his Title VII suit. Section 8347(c), after all, does not apply only to the Federal Circuit’s review of MSPB orders; it forecloses review by any federal court of factual questions of disability, Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 784, 105 S.Ct. 1620, 1629, 84 L.Ed.2d 674 (1985). As the district court noted Congress’ specific limitation or restriction of judicial review of these medical facts conflicts with (and preempts) the general grant of a trial de novo in Title VII cases. 645 F.Supp. at 100 n. 6. I think, unlike the district court, however, the two statutes can and should be reconciled and, therefore, the district court retained subject matter jurisdiction to provide limited review of denial of a retirement disability claim. Lindahl made clear that review of a disability determination is available (at least in the Federal Circuit) to determine whether “there has been a substantial departure from important procedural rights ... or some like error going to the heart of the administrative determination.” 470 U.S. at 791, 105 S.Ct. at 1633. It would be hard to imagine an error more to the “heart” than a revealed discriminatory motive. So if it were not for Congress’ jurisdictional allocation between the Federal Circuit’s review of MSPB determinations and the federal district court’s authority over Title VII cases, the Federal Circuit apparently would be permitted under Lin-dahl to consider procedural evidence of discrimination in the review of a disability determination (and as we note later may still be if no Title VII claim is made). To be sure, in Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 835, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1969, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976), the Supreme Court stated that Title *1526VII is “the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment,” but that was in the context of holding that a government employee could not circumvent Title VII’s procedural limitations by bringing an action against the government under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. It is not at all clear to me that that case forbids a government employee from even presenting procedural discriminatory evidence to the MSPB and the Federal Circuit as support for his contention that he was deprived of “important procedural rights.”
In any event, it does seem clear that the discrimination allegations can form a separate Title VII claim in the federal district court since, but for a possible limitation caused by Brown v. GSA, it could be raised as a procedural defect pursuant to Lin-dahl. In other words, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lindahl holds that Congress, by passing 8347(c), did not totally foreclose judicial scrutiny of denials of retirement disability; it just foreclosed judicial inquiry of any kind into the underlying medical facts. In order to make a prima facie case, however, a plaintiff would have to allege and produce evidence other than merely a contention that an agency’s denial of benefits was factually unsupported or even arbitrary and capricious. Separate evidence of discriminatory motive (other than based on the medical facts) would be necessary; otherwise any member of a protected class could circumvent section 8347(c) by seeking indirect review of a disability claim in a Title VII suit.1
If, independent of the medical facts in a disability case, a plaintiff could show a discriminatory motive on the part of the agency, it similarly would not be open to the government defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s claim by pointing to the validity of the adjudication since then the court would — in order to determine whether the agency’s defense was a pretext — be in the proscribed position of intruding into a factual determination that Congress wished unreviewed. And, if the court concluded that the plaintiff had proved discriminatory motive, it would truly be irrelevant whether or not the disability determination could otherwise be defended. The proper disposition in such a case, where, as here, plaintiff has asked for any relief the court believes appropriate, would be an order directing a new disability determination free of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (wide powers given to district courts to make whole identifiable victim of discrimination); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-22, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372-73, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). That approach harmonizes the broad remedial reach of Title VII with the jurisdictional limitations of § 8347(c).
I do not think Rosenfeld v. Department of the Army, 769 F.2d 237 (4th Cir.1985), upon which appellant relies, supports his position. There the Fourth Circuit held section 8347(c) was no bar to the federal courts’ examination of a plaintiff’s mental health in an age discrimination suit. The Army, after the plaintiff Rosenfeld sought a transfer, required him to undergo a medical examination — which led to a determination that Rosenfeld not only should not be transferred, but because of “latent schizophrenia” should be retired. Rosenfeld unsuccessfully challenged the retirement order through the administrative process, but he did not seek direct judicial review, perhaps because the Army subsequently and inexplicably rehired him. 769 F.2d at 239 n. 1. Instead, Rosenfeld brought suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1982), claiming the transfer denial was discriminatory and seeking back pay for the period he had been involuntarily retired. The district court dismissed the claim because, by virtue of the “unreviewable” disability determination, Rosenfeld could not show he was qualified for employment and thus did not, according to the district court, present a prima facie case. The Fourth Circuit reversed and seems to *1527have drawn a reasonable and, to my view, appropriate distinction between the question whether Rosenfeld was entitled to disability benefits (which he was not seeking) and the analytically separate issue whether he was qualified for the job. See 769 F.2d at 242.2 The former issue, not the latter, is foreclosed by section 8347(c), and the Army could not use the disability determination to foreclose judicial inquiry into Rosen-feld’s qualifications. The same facts may have been relevant to both proceedings, but section 8347(c) only forecloses judicial examination of those facts for purpose of reviewing a disability determination.
The district court in this case was thus quite correct, in my view, in concluding that it could not, by reviewing the facts of the disability determination, provide the relief plaintiff specifically sought — the grant of disability benefits. But, as I have explained, I think the district court was in error in concluding no relief was possible; therefore, it retained subject matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to remand because I agree with my colleagues the district court’s judgment can be affirmed based on appellant’s waiver.

. A prima facie case typically is presented by showing that the plaintiff is a minority or woman and that he or she was qualified for the benefit or position that the employer denied; then the burden shifts to the employer to adduce a nondiscriminatory reason for the denial. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-95, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Here the plaintiff cannot claim he or she was "qualified" (entitled) for retirement disability because that is the very issue foreclosed by § 8347(c).

. At least one circuit has rejected the Fourth Circuit’s premise that ADEA claimants have the same right to de novo review as that available under Title VII. See Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 279-283, No. 87-1321, slip op. at 6-13 (8th Cir. Mar. 30, 1988).