Court Opinion

ID: 9572470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:41:54.917601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:08.773222
License: Public Domain

POOLER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc.
I see no error in the district court’s nor the panel’s determinations using the “traditional rules” that guide striking jurors for cause and excluding a draft plea agreement as evidence of mitigating factors. See United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264 (2d Cir.2009) (Calabresi, /., dissenting from the denial of rehearing in banc). However, I agree with Judge Calabresi that our Court would benefit from in banc review since the factual circumstances of this case raise the question whether traditional rules suffice if “the death penalty verdict here is constitutionally ‘unusual.’ ” Id. at 273. We must first ask whether application of a precedent to a particular case is appropriate before it is followed. The law’s stability is necessarily balanced with the need for flexibility in light of unusual or changing circumstances. Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[Tjhat our understanding of the Constitution does change from time to time has been settled since John Marshall breathed life into its text.”). There are concerns of constitutional dimension in this death penalty case that warrant further inquiry.
I believe the value of in banc review of this case outweighs the reasons for declining review. I therefore have voted in favor of in banc review.