Court Opinion

ID: 9691311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:25:10.385965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:16.649765
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(dissenting). At the heart of this case is every lawyer’s duty to inspire the confidence, respect and trust of his or her clients and of the public, by avoiding the appearance of impropriety. SCR 20.48(6)(1986). SCR 20.49(2) (1986) provides that to avoid the appearance of impropriety a lawyer may not accept private employment in a matter in which the lawyer had substantial responsibility while a public employee. Because I believe these two canons of ethics and Attorney Southwick’s duties as the county’s corporation counsel prevent him from representing a private client in a condemnation action involving a county highway, I would reverse the judgment, order a new trial, and direct that the trial court disqualify Southwick.
At the outset, a somewhat detailed recitation is necessary of the facts surrounding Attorney South-wick’s representation of the county in the highway project which is the subject of this case. Southwick is retained on salary as the county corporation counsel and has an office in the Richland County courthouse. This is a parttime position which allows him to maintain a separate office outside of the courthouse for the private practice of law. He was employed under a resolution which requires him to serve as legal advisor to the county highway department and the county highway committee and to attend to all *215legal matters in and out of court where the department or committee is an interested party. The county highway committee has the power to acquire land for highway purposes by purchase or condemnation. Section 83.08(1), Stats.
The highway project in this case involves the improvement of state trunk highway 80 and county trunk highway C. Richland County initiated the project and entered into a contract for engineering services. The county paid to the state department of transportation twenty percent of the administrative costs incurred for initiating this project. The county highway committee requested engineering services from the state department of transportation. The county board and the state department of transportation subsequently entered into a jurisdictional transfer agreement. Thereafter, the county did not participate in the project. The trial court found that South-wick "probably had some involvement” on behalf of the county in these matters. Southwick does not deny his involvement.
Where, as here, the facts are undisputed the trial court "'enjoy[s] no particular advantage over appellate courts in [its] formulation of ethical norms.’” Berg v. Marine Trust Co., 141 Wis. 2d 878, 888, 416 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Ct. App. 1987), quoting Novo Terapeutisk, etc. v. Baxter Travenol Lab., 607 F.2d 186,189 (7th Cir. 1979). It is appropriate then to determine whether the trial court’s refusal to disqualify an attorney is predicated upon a proper understanding of applicable ethical principles. Novo, 607 F.2d at 188.
The error of the trial court was in requiring the county to have a direct financial interest in the outcome of this litigation as a prerequisite to finding a conflict of interest. The majority and the trial court *216fail to consider an attorney’s "obligation] to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.” Ennis v. Ennis, 88 Wis. 2d 82, 99, 276 N.W.2d 341, 348 (Ct. App. 1979). It is the court’s duty to "utilize opportunities to criticize and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys and counselors, brought to [its] attention.” Code of Judicial Ethics, SCR 60.01(7).
We are concerned here with an attorney who has a continuing obligation to represent a subdivision of the state in the very project with respect to which he undertakes to represent a private client against the state.1 He is a public servant or official. It is the public consciousness which the rules of ethics seek to promote. "[T]he court has an obligation to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process in the eyes of the public.” Unified Sewerage Agency, etc. v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981). "Thus we must notice that in matters of ethics and professional probity, the cause and effect impact upon the public consciousness is almost, perhaps quite, as important as actual fact.” State v. Galati, 319 A.2d 220, 223 (N.J. 1974).
The burdens placed on an attorney who chooses to represent a public body are greater than those imposed upon a private attorney.
[A]n attorney who represents the public must be particularly wary of potential conflicts because he *217is measured not only by the honesty of his intentions and motives, but by the suspicion with which his acts may be viewed by the public. "'A public officer owes an individual duty to the public whom he serves, and is not permitted to place himself in a position which will subject him to conflicting duties or expose him to the temptation of acting in any manner other than in the best interests of the public.’”
In re LaPinska, 381 N.E.2d 700, 703 (Ill. 1978) (citations omitted).
Here the condemnation action pursued by the attorney on behalf of private parties is affected with a public interest. The county, whom the attorney also represents, has an interest in having the state highway project completed, even though that interest is no longer directly financial. The county was involved in the initial stages of this project and would have undertaken the improvement itself if the arrangement with the state had not been made.2 Southwick has a continuing responsibility to be watchful of the county’s interests in the project. Can we say that not one member of the public would find it incongruent, distasteful, or suspicious to have the county’s corporation counsel on behalf of a private client battling the state on a public highway improvement project?
Because of Southwick’s continuing responsibility to the county, the conflict in this case is potentially more serious than that involved in City of Whitewater v. Baker, 99 Wis. 2d 449, 299 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. *2181980). In Whitewater at 455, 299 N.W.2d at 587, we held that the city attorney’s prosecution of a condemnation action against property owners he had previously assisted in acquiring the property was "obviously” adverse representation. The attorney was barred from participating in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety and to avoid possibly injuring a former client. Id. at 456, 299 N.W.2d at 587. Here there exists not only the appearance of impropriety but the possible injury to a present client. I believe the trial court should have granted the state’s motion to disqualify Southwick.

 Because the county is a subdivision of the state, the majority’s reliance on Forecki v. Kohlberg, 237 Wis. 67, 75, 295 N.W. 7, 10, 296 N.W. 619 (1941), is misplaced. The state is not only protecting the county’s interest but its interest — a public interest — as well. The state does not lack standing to object to Southwick’s representation. I question whether the strict standing rule imposed by Forecki is applicable after the promulgation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Ethics which go to great lengths to enforce attorney ethics.

 To distinguish the county from the state at this point immerses the issue in "'hair-splitting niceties’ which properly have been condemned in the enforcement of ethical standards.” First Wisconsin Mtg. Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp., 571 F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).