Court Opinion

ID: 9406288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 16:08:00.568934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:28.708015
License: Public Domain

J-S18019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RICHARD A. PRICE                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 495 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 3, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0008805-2018

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                  FILED JUNE 30, 2023

        Appellant, Richard A. Price, appeals from the February 3, 2022 Order

dismissing his first Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, as meritless. Appellant claims that his plea

counsel provided ineffective assistance and, as a result, Appellant entered his

guilty plea involuntarily and unknowingly. After careful review, we reverse and

remand for further proceedings.

        The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On December

4, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a Criminal Complaint against Appellant

charging him with 17 counts related to his sexual assault of a minor. Due to

several factors, including delays in processing DNA evidence and the victim’s

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S18019-23

failure to appear in court, there were numerous continuances granted for the

trial. Once the DNA evidence was processed, there was insufficient data to

determine if DNA material found in the victim’s underwear originated from

Appellant, but he was not excluded as a contributor.

        On October 21, 2019, Appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of

Indecent Assault of a Person Less than 16 Years Old and one count of Unlawful

Contact with a Minor1 in exchange for which the Commonwealth nolle prossed

the other charges. On the same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate term of 11½ to 23 months of imprisonment, followed by 3 years of

probation. Appellant was immediately paroled, having already served 11½

months. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion or an appeal from his

Judgment of Sentence.

        On March 5, 2020, the Commonwealth arrested Appellant for a

probation violation. On March 13, 2020, the court (“VOP court”) held a hearing

after which it found that Appellant had violated the term of his probation

requiring that he attend drug treatment. The VOP court imposed a sentence

of 11½ to 23 months of imprisonment, followed by 5 years of probation.

        On June 23, 2020, Appellant timely filed the instant PCRA petition pro

se, claiming that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced because he was not

informed of DNA evidence results that may have exonerated him. Petition,

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(8), 6318(a)(1), respectively.

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J-S18019-23

6/23/20, at 2-3. The PCRA court appointed counsel who filed an Amended

PCRA Petition developing Appellant’s argument that plea counsel had provided

ineffective assistance that caused Appellant to enter an involuntary and

unknowing plea. Amended Petition, 4/6/21, at 6. In particular, Appellant

asserted that plea counsel failed to disclose the results of the DNA analysis

and erroneously advised Appellant to opt for the plea and resulting immediate

release rather than risk facing a “hanging judge.” Id. at 10.

       On November 1, 2021, the PCRA court provided notice of its intent to

dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.2 Appellant did

not respond. On January 12, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s

petition without a hearing.

       This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

       1. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA
       petition alleging counsel was ineffective[?]

       2. Whether [t]rial [c]ounsel’s assistance was ineffective for causing the
       Appellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea[?]

Appellant’s Br. at 7.

____________________________________________

2 The lower court opined that the PCRA Petition was untimely filed before
addressing the merits of the claims raised. See Notice of Intent to Dismiss
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, 1/12/2020, at 2. Our review indicates, however,
that Appellant’s PCRA petition was timely filed on June 23, 2020, within one
year of the date the judgment became final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).

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      We review a PCRA court’s decision to deny a request for an evidentiary

hearing for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601,

617 (Pa. 2015). Where a PCRA Petition raises “material disputes regarding the

reasonableness of counsel’s actions, a hearing is required.” Commonwealth

v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 501 n.26 (Pa. 2014); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2)

(requiring a PCRA hearing “when the petition for post-conviction relief . . .

raises material issues of fact”). Additionally, our Supreme Court has expressed

a preference for an evidentiary hearing on counsel’s action or inaction where

a petitioner has raised “a colorable claim” of ineffectiveness. Commonwealth

v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 299 (Pa. 2017).

      To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant

must demonstrate that (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2)

counsel’s performance lacked a reasonable basis; and (3) the ineffectiveness

of counsel caused the appellant prejudice. Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d

335, 338 (Pa. Super. 2012). “[A]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection

with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the

ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing

plea.” Id. (citation omitted). “Where the defendant enters his plea on the

advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s

advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal

cases.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Appellant argues that plea counsel was ineffective because plea counsel

failed to disclose DNA reports which could have exonerated Appellant.

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Appellant’s Br. at 13. Appellant claims that “had he been aware of the [DNA]

reports, he never would have pled guilty.” Id. at 14. Additionally, Appellant

asserts that plea counsel urged Appellant to take the plea so that Appellant

could be immediately released, rather than face a “hanging judge,” further jail

time, and additional continuances of the trial. Id. at 13-14.

      The PCRA court reasoned that Appellant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim lacked merit because Appellant “stated at his guilty plea that he

was very satisfied with his counsel” and indicated no deficiencies in either his

written guilty plea colloquy or the oral colloquy. PCRA Ct. Op., 8/4/22, at 5-

6. Further, the court reiterated that in exchange for Appellant’s guilty plea,

the Commonwealth nolle prossed all remaining charges and Appellant was

immediately paroled, indicating that plea counsel’s advice had a reasonable

basis. Id. at 6. The PCRA court concluded that Appellant had not shown that

“counsel’s advice was unreasonable or that he entered the plea unknowingly.”

Id.

      After reviewing the record and case law, we conclude that Appellant

presents a colorable claim of ineffectiveness and a material dispute regarding

plea counsel’s actions. While it may be true that the actions of plea counsel

resulted in immediate release from custody, Appellant indicates that he only

opted for immediate release due to the uncertainty caused by the multiple

continuances granted due to victim’s failure to appear in court and the delays

in DNA processing. Id. at 13. Appellant “had been in jail for eleven months[,]

. . . was sick due to his diabetes,” and took the plea on the advice of plea

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counsel to avoid further continuances. Id. Additionally, Appellant claims that

while trial counsel informed Appellant that DNA reports were not available at

the time of the guilty plea, the reports had in fact been completed months

earlier. Id. at 14.

      Under these circumstances, the certified record and Appellant’s petition

indicate an outstanding question of fact as to when Appellant and plea counsel

learned of the DNA evidence and whether ineffective assistance of counsel

prejudiced Appellant. To resolve these questions, the PCRA court must make

a credibility determination weighing the evidence set forth in Appellant’s

petition and related testimony, as well as plea counsel’s recollection of events.

      Since neither this Court nor the PCRA court could resolve these factual

questions based on the information in the certified record alone, a hearing is

necessary. We, therefore, reverse the PCRA court’s order dismissing

Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, and remand to the

PCRA court to hold an evidentiary hearing.

      Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/30/2023

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