Court Opinion

ID: 9722692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:45:25.987642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:38.793307
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority that the failure of the property owners to timely comply with Supreme Court Rule 19 (134 Ill. 2d R. 19) does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to consider the constitutional challenge to section 11 — 31—1 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11 — 31—1(a) (West 1996)). I also agree with the majority that the property owners have standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 11 — 31—1, but their challenge fails because the statute is rationally related to the public interest in health and safety. Lastly, I agree with the majority that the cause must be remanded because the circuit court lacked the evidentiary basis for entry of an order of demolition pursuant to section 11 — 31—1. I part company with the majority, however, because the majority gives its imprimatur to other findings of the circuit court which likewise lack evidentiary support in the record. The majority’s error is all the more lamentable because resolution of these issues is not needed in light of the remand ordered by the court. The findings in question are that the building is dangerous and unsafe, and the cost of repair is $75,000. The majority states: “There was testimony by Jennifer Schaefer, a sanitarian, that in 1998 there were mouse feces throughout the building, as well as feces of some larger mammal, not a dog, at two places in the building. Schaefer also testified that in May of 2000, shortly before the hearing, she saw gaps in the building through which vermin could enter. She stated that the amount of feces suggested ‘numerous’ mice, that mice are known to carry disease, and that mice would go out into the surrounding area in search of food if none were available in the building. Schaefer was only one of several witnesses who described ways in which the building may threaten public health and safety. Based on the testimony, the finder of fact could conclude that the building is a threat to public health. We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the building is dangerous and unsafe.” 211 Ill. 2d at 133. The majority’s summary of Schaefer’s testimony omits her further testimony that she did not see any evidence of animal harborage in the building. Although the presence of mice droppings, endemic to public and residential buildings in the Chicago metropolitan area and cities throughout our state, is far from commendable, Schaefer’s testimony supports an inference of past, not present, rodent infestation. The majority’s summary of other dangers posed by the building is understandably vague since these dangers represent only potential threats to public health and safety. Not satisfied with vague references to danger in the analysis section of the opinion, the majority advances more specific references in the conclusion section of the opinion. The majority states: “The record also includes evidence of the possible buildup of methane gas, possible contamination of the Village water supply, and photographs that depict the generally dilapidated condition of the building.” 211 Ill. 2d at 135. Although more specific, these threats remain in the realm of potential dangers. As shown by the appellate court opinion upon which the majority purports to rely, the Village’s plumbing inspector testified that he performed no tests to determine if methane gas was present in the building. 334 Ill. App. 3d at 494. He further testified that he did not determine whether the building’s plumbing system was tied into the Village’s drinking water system. Indeed, earlier testimony established that the building had not been provided water by the Village since 1989. Without information that the building’s plumbing system tied into the Village’s drinking water system, the circuit court could hardly determine that the building posed a danger of contamination to the Village’s drinking water system. Moreover, if the building’s plumbing system tied into the Village’s system, the opposite conclusion would hold since there was no testimony of present contamination of the Village’s water supply. The majority also endorses the circuit court’s finding that the cost of repair is $75,000. As the majority acknowledges, however, “City of Aurora [v. Meyer, 38 Ill. 2d 131 (1967),] requires that a finding that a building is beyond reasonable repair must be based on a comparison of value with cost of repair.” 211 Ill. 2d at 133. As further explained in City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d at 137, the circuit “court should find from the evidence what the specific defects are which render the building dangerous and unsafe. If they are such as may readily be remedied by repair, demolition should not be ordered without giving the owners a reasonable opportunity to make the repairs.” Thus, the cost of repair is the cost necessary to correct the conditions that render the structure dangerous and unsafe. At trial, a contractor with 10 years of experience in “rehab” and remodeling testified that the building was safe to be in, as it was “very sound.” He further testified that the property could be completely renovated into a single-family residence for a cost of between $64,000 and $75,000. In finding that the cost of repair is $75,000, the circuit court used the cost of complete renovation of the building, rather than the cost of repair of the specific defects which render the building dangerous and unsafe. The circuit court committed clear error. In light of the majority’s citation to City of Aurora as controlling authority, the majority’s endorsement of the circuit court’s finding is likewise erroneous. CONCLUSION As the majority acknowledges, this cause must be remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. The circuit court must obtain evidence regarding the value of the building and compare the building’s value to the cost of repair of the defects that render the building dangerous and unsafe. Additionally, the majority instructs the circuit court that it may consider evidence that the condition of the building has changed since the first hearing. 211 Ill. 2d at 134. Given the need for remand, the majority’s review and endorsement of the circuit court’s findings is particularly unwise. The circuit court’s findings were purely speculative. There was simply no evidence on the cost of repair to correct the specific defects which render the building unsafe. There was simply no evidence of danger to the Village’s drinking water system. There was simply no evidence regarding the buildup of methane gas in the building. This lack of evidence calls for reversal, not approval, of the circuit court’s findings. As this court has heretofore recognized, “[t]he law is well settled that in cases of this nature courts do not go further than is necessary to protect the public interest.” City of Aurora, 38 Ill. 2d at 136. Such restraint applies not only to the circuit court at hearing on the need for demolition, but to this court on review of the propriety of the circuit court’s order. Because the majority insists on endorsing the circuit court’s speculative findings, I cannot join fully in the majority opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW and JUSTICE KIL-BRIDE join in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.