Court Opinion

ID: 9519834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:25:44.795078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:15.608077
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOFFMAN, specially concurring: I agree with the majority that we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. The Commission’s ruling of September 4, 2002, which is the subject of this appeal is not a declaratory ruling as defined in either section 5 — 150(a) of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/5 — 150(a) (West 2000)) or Rule 200.220(a) of the rules of practice for the Commission (83 Ill. Adm. Code § 200.220(a) (2000)). The ruling is nothing more than an interpretation of the Commission’s order of October 8, 1997, which determined that RTC’s Pontiac facility is a “qualified solid waste energy facility” (QSWEF) and required various electric utilities, including ComEd, to purchase electric energy from the facility for a period of 10 years. I also agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion that the October 8, 1997, order did not place any limit on the amount of energy that ComEd was required to purchase at a “Rider 3 retail rate” from RTC’s Pontiac facility and, as a consequence, the Commission’s ruling of September 4, 2002, must be reversed. I write separately because, unlike my colleagues, I believe that we should address the issue of whether the Commission has the authority to impose maximum output levels for QSWEF’s. As declared in section 8 — 403.1 of the Public Utilities Act, the policy of the State of Illinois is to “encourage the development of alternate energy production facilities in order to conserve our energy resources and to provide for their most efficient use.” 220 ILCS 5/8— 403.1 (West 2002). The Commission is charged with the responsibility of determining whether a facility is a QSWEF. Section 8 — 403.1(c) provides that the Commission “shall require electric utilities to enter into long-term contracts to purchase electricity from qualified solid waste energy facilities [QSWEFs] located in the electric utility’s service area, for a period beginning on the date that the facility begins generating electricity and having a duration of not less than 10 years in the case of facilities fueled by landfill-generated methane.” (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 5/8 — 403.1(c) (West 2002). That same section of the statute provides a formula for computing the rate per kilowatt hour to be paid by the utilities to a QSWEF. 220 ILCS 5/8— 403.1(c) (West 2002). A plain reading of the statute reveals that, once the Commission has determined that a facility is a QSWEF, it must require electric utilities in whose service area the QSWEF is located to enter into long-term contracts to purchase electricity from the QSWEF. The statute says nothing about the Commission being able to limit the amount of electricity that a utility is required to purchase from such a facility at the rate prescribed in section 8 — 403.1(c), unless “such purchase would result in estimated tax credits that exceed, on a monthly basis, the utility’s estimated obligation to remit to the State taxes it has collected under the Electricity Excise Tax Law [(35 ILCS 640/2 — 1 et seq. (West 2002))].” 220 ILCS 5/8 — 403.1(d) (West 2002). The powers of an administrative officer or agency are purely statutory, and they only have the powers given to them by statute. See Lake County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 119 Ill. 2d 419, 427, 519 N.E.2d 459 (1988). Any action by an administrative agency that exceeds its authority is void. Chemed Corp. v. State of Illinois, 186 Ill. App. 3d 402, 410, 542 N.E.2d 492 (1989). Administrative agencies have the inherent authority to adopt regulations and policies reasonably necessary to enable them to perform their statutory duties. Lake County Board of Review, 119 Ill. 2d at 428. However, they may not promulgate rules or policies that are inconsistent with the provisions of a statute they are charged with enforcing. Harton v. City of Chicago Department of Public Works, 301 Ill. App. 3d 378, 391, 703 N.E.2d 493 (1998). The stated policy of this state is to maximize the production and use of alternate sources of energy and to require utilities to purchase electricity from QSWEF’s. I believe that any attempt by the Commission to limit the amount of electricity that a utility company is required to purchase from a QSWEF located within its service area, except as specifically provided by statute, is wholly inconsistent with the provisions of section 8 — 403.1 of the Public Utilities Act and the public policy declared therein. I would hold that any such attempt by the Commission, except as specifically authorized by statute, exceeds its authority and is, therefore, void.