Court Opinion

ID: 9520069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:30:48.07938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:30.088419
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: In 1975, this court held that a defendant in a criminal case who was represented by a special assistant Attorney General at trial was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. (People v. Cross (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 199, 331 N.E.2d 643.) That decision was reached without reference to the nature of the duties defense counsel performed in his capacity as a special assistant Attorney General. We denoted the conflict inherent. The Cross opinion, authored by Justice Green for a unanimous panel, relied upon the principles enunciated by our supreme court in People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441, which, in turn, relied upon the principles established in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792. “The right to the effective assistance of counsel is a fundamental right and entitles the person represented to the undivided loyalty of counsel. (Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457.)” (40 Ill. 2d 109, 111, 239 N.E.2d 441, 443.) Cross said, in part: “By statute, the Attorney General is required to assist in the prosecution of any party accused of crime when in the Attorney General’s judgment the interests of the People of the State require it and to represent the People of the State before the supreme court in all cases in which the State or the People are interested. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 14, par. 4.)” (30 Ill. App. 3d 199, 202, 331 N.E.2d 643, 645.) A per se conflict of interest rule was clearly established which mandates reversal of any conviction obtained under circumstances evidencing such a conflict. “We do not have to determine -whether the defendants suffered any actual prejudice in this case. As this court noted in People v. Fuller, 21 Ill. App. 3d 437, 315 N.E.2d 687, a per se rule has been adopted in this State in criminal cases when counsel has a conflict of interest stemming from a commitment to others. That is, an attorney’s commitment to others deprives his client of the effective assistance of counsel without showing of actual prejudice.” 30 Ill. App. 3d 199, 201, 331 N.E.2d 643, 645. Since the time this court announced its opinion in Cross, no court has disagreed with its holding or deviated from its strict application of a per se rule in instances of this type of conflict. (See, e.g., People v. Brown (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 562, 352 N.E.2d 15; People v. Gardner (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 529, 362 N.E.2d 14; People v. Pendleton (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 241, 367 N.E.2d 196.) No petition for leave to appeal was filed in Cross and it remains valid precedent at the present time. Two recent supreme court cases (People v. Coslet (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 127, 364 N.E.2d 67; People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162, 361 N.E.2d 569), authored by Justices Clark and Underwood, respectively, continue the per se rule. Indeed, those two cases clearly signal an adherence to the high standards set forth in Cross and in no way intimate that the supreme court would retreat upon this issue. As Justice Clark said in Coslet: “This court adopted a per se conflict-of-interest rule in People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109, 112, whereby allegations and proof of prejudice are unnecessary in cases where a defense counsel, without the knowledgeable assent of the defendant, might be restrained in fully representing the defendant’s interests due to his or her commitments to others, with even closer scrutiny being applied where counsel is appointed for defendant. (40 Ill. 2d 109, 113.) The test is not and cannot be based only upon the source of a financial gain by the attorney. A rule based solely on financial gain would not only be unworkable in the everyday practice of law but would also have no necessary correlation with the conflicts of interest that arise in such practice. The Stoval rule, based upon actual commitments to others, is both workable and necessarily correlates with such conflicts. See People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162, 166-69.” (67 Ill. 2d 127, 133, 364 N.E.2d 67, 83.) In Stoval, the supreme court was clear about the comprehensiveness of the rule: “There is no showing that the attorney did not conduct the defense of the accused with diligence and resoluteness, but we believe that sound policy disfavors the representation of an accused, especially when the counsel is appointed, by an attorney with possible conflict of interests. It is unfair to the accused, for who can determine whether his representation was affected, at least, subliminally, by the conflict. Too, it places an additional burden on counsel, however conscientious, and exposes him unnecessarily to later charges that his representation was not completely faithful. In a case involving such a conflict there is no necessity for the defendant to show actual prejudice. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60; Goodson v. Peyton (4th cir.), 351 F.2d 905.” People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109, 113, 239 N.E.2d 441, 444. The United States Supreme Court has also recently addressed this general question, albeit in the context of conflicts arising from the representation of co-defendants. As to the existence of a per se rule, however, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, said that Glasser should be read “as holding that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic.” (Holloway v. Arkansas (1978), 435 U.S. 475, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 437, 98 S. Ct. 1173.) If there be any doubt regarding the applicability of the principle enunciated in Holloway to the situation at bar, Chief Justice Burger’s further comments are instructive: “Finally, a rule requiring a defendant to show that a conflict of interests — which he and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objections to the joint representation — prejudiced him in some specific fashion would not be susceptible to intelligent, evenhanded application. In the normal case where a harmless error rule is" applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court can undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the jury. [Citations.] But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil — it bears repeating — is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney’s failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney’s representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney’s options, tactics and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation.” 435 U.S. 475, 490-91, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 438, 98 S. Ct. 1183, 1182. In People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149, the supreme court, again through Justice Clark, acknowledged that in certain instances the Attorney General could be called into conflict of interest situations because of his representation of conflicting state agencies or departments. Briceland cannot, however, be interpreted to obviate the instant situation or the rule of Cross. Briceland concerned the Attorney General’s constitutional duty to represent in civil matters all agencies of State government. In the context of the criminal law, the conflict of interest on the part of a special assistant Attorney General representing a defendant in a criminal matter raises the protection of the sixth amendment which is a right guaranteed to the defendant. That sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel cannot be abridged by reference to Briceland which concerns civil matters and a constitutionally mandated representation not present here. Another panel of this court, consisting of Judges Green and Mills, with Judge Trapp dissenting, in an opinion authored by Judge Green, has sought to distinguish or ameliorate the rule of Cross. (See People v. Crawford Distributing Co. (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 790, 382 N.E.2d 1223.) That opinion overrules Cross. The court then announces a new rule and creates a temporizing and unworkable rule completely ignoring established precedent. In effect, that opinion abandons the per se rule recognized in Cross and seeks to allow a “small” conflict of interest in the representation of criminal defendants. It should be obvious to even the casual logician that any conflict is a conflict. In Crawford, the Attorney General, by an assistant, was the prosecutor and an assistant was defense counsel, yet the court there found no conflict. So far as I am concerned, Crawford is lacking in any persuasion. It should be noted that a majority of the judges of this district still adhere to the Cross opinion. See People v. Fife (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 805, 382 N.E.2d 1234; Crawford. The opinion in Crawford is even more anomalous when it is considered that its author has concurred in Supreme Court Rule 23 orders (58 Ill. 2d R. 23) reversing criminal convictions in People v. Stone (4th Dist. No. 12740, November 18, 1975) and People v. Bernard (4th Dist. No. 13279, August 9, 1977). It must be asked, given this history, why Cross should now be interred by the majority here and in Crawford. To use these cases as a vehicle to overrule Cross is incomprehensible. Any difficulty in the administration of justice caused by the per se conflict of interest rule previously enunciated by this court is not caused by the Attorney General. He has directed his special assistants not to undertake the representation of criminal defendants precisely for the reason that a conflict of interest arises thereby. The Illinois State Bar Association, Committee on Discipline, has agreed with this position in Opinion No. 593 (66 Ill. Bar. J. 671 (1978)). The problem, if any, is caused by the insensitivity of those special assistants who knowingly enter into conflict situations without first securing a waiver from their clients. It is the opinion of a minority of the members of this court that the Cross rule places an undue burden on the administration of justice and may allow a defendant in a criminal case to successfully evade an otherwise legitimate conviction. Again, Justice Clark has already spoken to this problem in Coslet: “This court, in adopting this opinion, is well aware that in many, if not most, instances a prosecutor has no knowledge of, and, indeed, is probably powerless to avoid, a situation wherein the person he is prosecuting, by his or her own actions, retains an attorney who subsequently puts himself in a conflict-of-interest situation with his client, resulting, as here, in the reversal of a conviction against defendant. One could even conjecture that a defendant and his lawyer could knowingly and collusively enter into such an arrangement in an effort to obtain a reversal in the event of a conviction. This is a risk that this court is prepared to take, however, in order to assure that every person is assured of the right to effective assistance of counsel at his trial.” 67 Ill. 2d 127,136, 364 N.E.2d 67, 84. The majority opinion here accomplishes a reversion to those standards of ethical conduct by some which has brought down upon the members of our profession the ,scom of all reasonable and fair-minded persons. I refuse to participate in the legitimization of the obvious conflict of interest here. The defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.