Court Opinion

ID: 9763275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:39:54.927127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:40.314531
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Judge FRIEDMAN.
Because I believe that the record fails to establish that Lawrence E. Keller (Keller) used the authority of his office to obtain any private pecuniary benefit, I respectfully dissent.
As mayor of the Borough of New Hope (Borough), Keller was authorized,1 but not required,2 to perform marriage ceremonies. When approached by engaged couples to perform their marriage ceremonies, Keller requested that they tender to him the sum of $150.00 which he would donate to local non-profits or charities. Keller deposited these funds into a personal savings account used exclusively for the monies he received for performing marriage ceremonies. Between April 1988 and December 2001, Keller received and deposited a total of $16,805.00 into that account; during the same period, he withdrew $15,225.70, which he donated to charitable, service or non-profit agencies in the New Hope area.3 The contributions were listed as donations from Keller, but he took no tax deductions for them. Keller received favorable publicity for these contributions and, presumably, political gain.
The State Ethics Commission (Commission) determined that Keller’s conduct violated section 1108(a) of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act (Act), 65 Pa.C.S. § 1108(a), which states that “[n]o public official or public employee shall engage in conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest.” The majority affirms the Commission’s decision, despite the fact that Keller’s conduct does not fall within the type of conduct prohibited by the Act.
The Act defines “conflict of interest” as a public official’s use of the “authority of his office ” for the “private pecuniary benefit ” of the public official, his family, or a business with which he or his family is associated. Section 1102 of the Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102. The record reflects that Keller neither used the “authority of his office” nor received any “private pecuniary benefit.”
Under the Act, the phrase “authority of office” means “the actual power provided by law, the exercise of which is necessary to the performance of duties and responsibilities unique to a particular public office.” Id. Because the Domestic Relations Code also authorizes active, senior and retired judges, and ministers, priests and rabbis, to perform marriage ceremonies, I cannot agree with the majority that the authority *670of a mayor is unique in this respect. More important, the performance of marriage ceremonies cannot be “necessary to the performance” of Keller’s “duties and responsibilities,” where the mayor is only permitted, but not required by law, to so act. In reaching a contrary conclusion, I believe the majority confuses the concepts of authority and duty when it states that the mayor has the “responsibility” to perform marriage ceremonies. (Majority op. at 663-64.)
Moreover, the record is devoid of evidence that Keller’s conduct resulted in a “private pecuniary benefit.” Although the Act does not define this term, the legal meaning of “pecuniary benefit” is “[a] benefit capable of monetary valuation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 167 (8th ed.2004). The majority affirms the Commission’s determination that Keller “received financial gains when he deposited the funds into his personal bank account and then obtained political gain_” (Majority op. at 9.) However, there is absolutely no evidence that Keller benefited jfinancially, and no suggestion that he ever intended to benefit financially, from his conduct. In determining otherwise, I believe that the Commission and the majority mistakenly equate political gain with financial benefit. I recognize that in our society, concepts of political gain and pecuniary gain may appear inextricably intertwined. Nevertheless, as a matter of law, they remain distinct. And this distinction is not only significant, but central to the very purpose of the Act, which declares at the outset that “any effort to realize personal financial gain through public office other than compensation provided by law is a violation of [the public] trust.” Section 1101.1(a) of the Act, 65 Pa.C.S. 1101.1(a) (emphasis added).
Similarly, section 1107(13) of the Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 1107(13), authorizes the Commission to order restitution to the appropriate governmental body only where the Commission finds that a public official has obtained a financial gain in violation of the Act. Indeed, the Act specifically states that an order based on such a finding “may require the restitution plus interest of that gain.” Id. (emphasis added). Because Keller received no financial benefit from performing marriage ceremonies, I also believe that the Commission lacked authority to order Keller to pay to the Borough the $1,503.09 that was intended by Keller and the contributing couples to be used for charitable purposes.
In reviewing the Commission’s decision, this court must consider whether all the facts found by the Commission constitute clear and convincing proof that the public official violated the Act. Kraines v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 805 A.2d 677 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), appeal denied, 572 Pa. 761, 818 A.2d 506 (2003). I believe that the facts of this case fall far short of the evidence necessary to prove a violation of the Act, and, accordingly, I would reverse.

. Under section 1503(a) of the Domestic Relations Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 1503(a), authority to perform marriage ceremonies is vested in: active, senior and retired judges; city or borough mayors; and ministers, priests and rabbis of any regularly established church or congregation.

. The duties of mayor are set forth in section 1029(1) of the Borough Code, Act of February 1, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1656, as amended, 53 P.S. § 46029(1), as follows: to preserve order in the borough; to enforce the ordinances and regulations; to remove nuisances; to exact a faithful performance of the duties of the officers appointed; and "to perform such other duties as shall be vested in his office by law or ordinance.” (emphasis added).

.Keller left the remaining balance undistributed after learning that the State Ethics Commission was investigating a complaint about this activity.