Court Opinion

ID: 9558471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:10:06.838471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:19.580168
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Chief Justice
(concurring in the result and commenting).
I concur in the result of the opinion by Justice Crockett; however, in the fourth paragraph of his opinion he inserted a statement about filing a counterclaim in an action for unlawful detainer to which I cannot agree. In stating that it was proper *1106to do so, he relied upon two cases1 which I shall subsequently discuss.
The law of this state was correctly set forth in two Utah cases a number of years ago and neither has ever been overruled. The first case is Dunbar v. Hansen2 where the defendant undertook to file a counterclaim in a statutory action of unlawful de-tainer. This Court said in holding that no counterclaim could be filed:
. We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that the action of the district court in attempting to adjudicate whatever rights defendants may have, if any, against the plaintiffs, or either of them, by reason of the facts set forth in the counterclaim, was nugatory and of no avail; that the statute does not authorize any such defense or any affirmative relief against the plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer action. It was error on the part of the court to attempt to adjudicate the rights of the defendants against plaintiffs, if any they had, growing out of the facts alleged in the counterclaim in this action, and in overruling the objections of 'plaintiffs to entertaining any testimony in support of the allegations of the counterclaim.
In 1930 this Court decided the same question in the case of Forrester v. Cook.3 There, it quoted from the Dunbar case and firmly set the law of this state, towit:
‘It appears to be thoroughly established, both in this state and in other jurisdictions having substantially similar statutes to our unlawful detainer statutes, that neither a counterclaim nor cross-complaint of any kind is permissible in an action in unlawful detainer. This question was discussed by the District Court of Appeal of the First District, in the recent case of Knight v. Black, 19 Cal.App. 518, 126 P. 512, where many authorities are cited. There is no distinction in the authorities between cases where the subject-matter of the attempted counterclaim or cross-complaint arises out of a violation of the terms of the lease upon which the action is brought, and other cases.’
The main opinion relies upon two cases to support the statement that “we have no disagreement with the proposition that if the defendant had a proper counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or business as the subject matter of the complaint it could be asserted herein . . A discussion of those two cases follows.
Lewis v. White4 was not a case of unlawful detainer at all, but was a suit in equity to enforce the forfeiture of a real estate contract; and there is no question about a counterclaim being properly permitted in such a case. The other case relied upon was a short per curiam5 based upon the bare statement that the new rules of civil procedure and particularly Rule 13 thereof permits counterclaims. The rule is stated herewith:
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. .
(b) Permissive Counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party’s claim.
(c) Counterclaim Exceeding Opposing Claim. A counterclaim may or not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind *1107from that sought in the pleading of the opposing party.
The per curiam opinion consisting of one page plus five lines does not discuss the reasons why counterclaims cannot be permitted in an action for unlawful detainer.
The main purpose for having a statute providing for an action in unlawful detainer is to provide a speedy remedy for the settling of disputes to the right of possession of realty. It thus tends to avoid breaches of the peace and possible bloodshed. The statute provides for a means of speedy trials that cannot be had in other types of suits and actions. It provides that the time to answer a summons may be shortened to three days instead of the usual twenty.6 It also provides that when the complaint is not served with the summons it must be filed within one day instead of the usual ten days. It further provides that an appeal must be taken from the judgment rendered within ten days7 instead of the usual one month. Would it be contended that Rule 73 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would permit an appeal to be taken from a judgment in unlawful detainer within twenty days? If the rules are applicable to counterclaims, it would seem that they should also apply to appeals.
Consider the problems that a counterclaim would raise. The defendant must answer within three days but his counterclaim may raise many issues which will require discovery, depositions, and motions on those diverse issues. The simple issue of who is entitled to the peaceful possession of a house can thus be delayed. Even the title to the land is not involved in the unlawful detainer action.8 It is not the purpose of the action to try title to the land.9 The filing of a counterclaim in the unlawful detainer action is reminiscent of a foxhound who always chases rabbits during the hunt. You just don’t permit it.
The statute requires that the appeal in the unlawful detainer action be filed within ten days. The appeal from the counterclaim could be filed within one month. Could the Court on appeal decide the issue of right to possession before it did the counterclaim? If so, why permit the counterclaim in the first place?
The counterclaim-creates too many side problems and makes it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a speedy determination of the right to possession of land. That speedy right is all that was contemplated by the statute. The case of White v. District Court should be overruled as not being in harmony with the provisions of the statute.
The Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provided in Table III that Title 104 (the then existing code of civil procedure) should have no further force and effect except as in Chapter 60 (the chapter in the code dealing with unlawful detainer).
When a statute is retained or adopted, the interpretation of its parts are adopted or retained along with the statute. The new rules of procedure affect only procedure and not substantive law. If the White v. District Court case is permitted to stand, the substantive law is seriously affected in that a speedy determination of the right to possession of realty is delayed, and that is contrary to the purpose of the statute.
I therefore, dissent from any idea that a counterclaim can be filed in an action of unlawful detainer. That which is said above is the strongest reason for not permitting consideration of defendant’s counterclaim in this unlawful detainer action.

. White, et al. v. District Court, 120 Utah 173, 232 P.2d 785 (1951); Lewis v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 P.2d 865 (1954).

. 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982 (1926).

. 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930).

. Supra at footnote 1.

. Id.

. 78-36-8, U.C.A.1953.

. 78-36-11, U.C.A.1953.

. Welling v. Abbott, 52 Utah 240, 173 P. 245 (1918).

. Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah 304, 237 P. 217 (1925).