Court Opinion

ID: 9454639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:53:12.09768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:12.915444
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent.
Two hundred sixty-eight days in jail for this indigent defendant before trial, without the effective assistance of counsel, because of neglect by court and prosecutor cannot be tolerated. Under these circumstances, I would hold that the nearly eleven months between indictment and trial denied petitioner Solomon a speedy trial, “one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.” Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226, 87 S.Ct. 988, 995, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). In this context, the mildest description of the state’s claim of lack of prejudice is that it is unrealistic. To be consigned to prison for almost nine months, forgotten by government officials while making vain efforts to contact supposedly appointed counsel, is prejudicial. Anyone put through the same experience would so regard it.
I realize that the claim is that this bungled incarceration did not prejudice petitioner at trial. But how can anyone be sure about that ? In Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 379-380, 89 S.Ct. 575, 578, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969), the Court pointed out of a defendant incarcerated while awaiting trial in another jurisdiction:
Confined in a prison, perhaps far from the place where the offense covered by the outstanding charge allegedly took place, his ability to confer with potential defense witnesses, or even to keep track of their whereabouts, is obviously impaired. And, while “evidence and witnesses disappear, memories fade, and events lose their perspective,” a man isolated in prison is powerless to exert his own investigative efforts to mitigate these erosive effects of the passage of time. [Footnote omitted.]
While the period of delay there was much longer than here, the rationale is the same. See Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 Stan.L.Rev. 476, 493-97 (1968).
Moreover, the exclusive focus on prejudice to the defendant at trial ignores other important aspects of the right to a speedy trial. In United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966), the Court recognized these other types of prejudice in speaking of the right to a speedy trial:
This guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.
There can be no doubt that petitioner has suffered “undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial.” Of equal importance is the often neglected but nonetheless pressing public interest in speedy trials. A recent report of an advisory committee of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for *93Criminal Justice, composed of distinguished judges, scholars and lawyers, emphasized this public interest:
From the point of view of the public, a speedy trial is necessary to preserve the means of proving the charge, to maximize the deterrent effect of prosecution and conviction, and to avoid, in some cases, an extended period of pretrial freedom by the defendant during which time he may flee, commit other crimes, or intimidate witnesses.
Standards Relating to Speedy Trial 10-11 (1967). That observation, made two years ago,1 was persuasive then and is even more so now. While defendant here was not on bail so that the dangers of too long a period of pretrial freedom were not present, the need for swift enforcement of the law was. The surest way to dilute the deterrent effect of the criminal law is to delay its enforcement unduly. The responsibility for that swift enforcement should be placed where it belongs: on the agencies of the government whose job it is to bring it about, the prosecutors and the courts. It was because of this public interest in speedy trials, for example, that the ABA Report recommended that, in considering when the time for a speedy trial commences to run, it should not matter whether a defendant has demanded one, see Speedy Trial Report 16-17. Of course, that question frequently arises in the context of waiver and need not concern us here, since this indigent defendant, while incarcerated and without counsel, did not waive his right to a speedy trial.
There is no need to discuss each of the decisions relied on by the majority, distinguishing some and picking out bits and pieces of language in others that would support reversal here; e. g., United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1963) (“even a short delay might constitute a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right where the defendant is held without bail, and there is no reason for the delay”); United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880, 79 S.Ct. 118, 3 L.Ed.2d 109 (1958) (“a showing of prejudice is not required when a criminal defendant is asserting a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment”). It is enough to point out that in none of those cases was there the striking combination of government neglect and denial of counsel we have here. Nor is it now necessary in this area of predominantly judge-made law to fix a minimum period beyond which any delay is “undue,” although such a recommendation has been made to both court and legislature. Thus, the ABA Speedy Trial Report proposed that (at 14):
A defendant’s right to speedy trial should be expressed by rule or statute in terms of days or months running from a specified event. Certain periods of necessary delay should be excluded in computing the time for trial, and these should be specifically identified by rule or statute insofar as is practicable.
There was, of course, no significant period here of “necessary delay” since the state conceded that it was ready to try the defendant immediately after his indictment and no explanation has been advanced for its failure to do so or for the failure of the state court promptly to replace Mr. Kij after he twice withdrew as petitioner’s assigned counsel. The ABA Report also points out that:
In the few states which currently express the [permissible] time [from a specified event until trial] in days or months rather than terms of court, the times range from seventy-five days to six months.
And:
The President’s Crime Commission has proposed that the period from arrest to trial of felony cases be not more than 4 months.
Id. at 14 & n. 1. Cf. N.Y.Code of Cr.Proc. §§ 668, 669-a.
*94The wisdom of these suggested periods is not now before us; I mention them only to emphasize — as does the ABA Report — that speedy trials are not just the private concerns of the defendants involved and that the delay in this case was not insignificant. Cf. authorities cited in Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 Stan.L.Rev. 476, 478 & n. 18 (1968); Godfrey v. United States, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 358 F.2d 850 (1966) (delay of only 4 months from offense to arrest). All I would hold here is that an almost eleven-month delay is too much when for about nine months of that period an indigent defendant is incarcerated without counsel through government neglect. Under those circumstances, I would reverse the judgment below and direct the granting of the writ. This result is certainly made no less palatable by the fact that appellant has already been imprisoned for over five years, a period longer than his minimum sentence.

. The Report was later adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in February 1968.