Court Opinion

ID: 9589700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:47:34.380134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:34.859246
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as it is my view that genuine issues of material fact remain as to defendant’s constructive knowledge of the clear liquid which allegedly caused plaintiff Dana Daniel’s fall and as to defendant’s maintenance of a distraction which prevented plaintiff Dana Daniel from discovering this hazard. In fact, with regard to the issue of defendant’s constructive knowledge, I find no evidence to support the majority’s statement that “[t]he record in this case shows that the restaurant [personnel] conducted a routine inspection of the floor shortly before Daniel slipped and fell, which revealed no liquid *227on the floor.”
On December 21, 1992, plaintiff Dana Daniel and her nine-year-old son arrived at defendant’s fast-food restaurant (“McDonald’s”) for an early dinner. They entered McDonald’s and went to the order counter where they received their food along with a videotape, all which was placed on a single tray carried by plaintiff Dana Daniel. She then proceeded to a condiments counter where she obtained napkins, salt, pepper, and straws. While at the condiments counter, she noticed for the first time a Christmas tree located against a partition between the level on which she was located and a lower dining level. The Christmas tree, a live tree in a stand with a fleecy white skirt underneath the tree, was located to the right of the steps down to the lower level. The skirt beneath the tree was rectangular in shape and one corner of the skirt was protruding out close to the steps and in her path so that plaintiff Dana Daniel became concerned that she would step on it and possibly dislodge the tree or cause some other damage. In order to proceed down these steps, she stepped over to the left side of the steps while looking back to the right to be certain that she had avoided the skirt beneath the tree. Her foot slipped on the landing at the top of the steps, and she fell down the steps. As she was falling, she looked over to the left and saw a small puddle of a clear liquid which looked like water but may have been “Sprite.”
While plaintiff Dana Daniel admitted that she could have seen the liquid if she had been looking in that direction, she maintains that she was distracted by the placement of the skirt beneath the tree. “ ‘ “Looking continuously, without intermission, for defects in a floor is not required in all circumstances. (Cits.) ‘What is “a reasonable look-out” depends on all the circumstances at the time and place.’” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Food Giant v. Cooke, 186 Ga. App. 253, 257 (366 SE2d 781). Where the defendant creates a distraction which would normally divert the plaintiff’s attention from where she is going so as to be the proximate cause of her injury, this constitutes actionable negligence on the part of the defendant. Barentine v. Kroger Co., 264 Ga. 224 (443 SE2d 485); Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623 (272 SE2d 327). In this instance, it is my view that jury issues remain as to whether the placement of the Christmas tree (and accompanying skirt) so close to the steps as to encroach upon the customer’s path when using the steps amounted to a distraction which excused the failure to maintain a lookout sufficient to spot the small amount of liquid on the floor and constituted the proximate cause of plaintiff Dana Daniel’s injury. Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 213 Ga. App. 27, 29 (1) (443 SE2d 670); Begin v. Ga. Championship Wrestling, 172 Ga. App. 293, 295 (322 SE2d 737); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Chandler, 152 Ga. App. 427, 428 (1), 430 (263 SE2d 171).
By presenting evidence that plaintiff Dana Daniel was prevented *228from discovering the liquid on the floor for a reason attributable to defendant, I believe plaintiff raises genuine issues of material fact concerning one of the two prongs of the test applicable to foreign substance slip and fall cases. The second part of the test stated in Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623, supra, requires that the plaintiff show that defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance, in this case, the liquid upon which plaintiff Dana Daniel slipped.
Constructive knowledge may be based upon a failure to exercise reasonable care in inspecting the premises and in the absence of evidence of a reasonable inspection of the premises, a plaintiff is not required to establish how long a spill had remained on the floor. Jackson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 206 Ga. App. 165, 167 (2), 168 (424 SE2d 845). Evidence as to normal store procedures for inspecting floors does not provide proof that inspections were actually carried out in accordance with such policies. Burke v. Bi-Lo, 212 Ga. App. 115, 117 (441 SE2d 429). Although there is ample evidence as to defendant’s normal procedure for inspecting floors in the case sub judice, there is no evidence that the inspections, which should have immediately preceded the incident at issue, were actually conducted.
The McDonald’s manager on duty at the time plaintiff Dana Daniel fell states that it was normal procedure to inspect the floors of the restaurant every 30 minutes, but he never testified or deposed that such an inspection was actually conducted just before plaintiff Dana Daniel fell. He stated only that “the last time prior to the incident involving Mrs. Daniel when I would have instructed a crew person to perform a travel pass would have been at 5:00 p.m.” The majority takes this evidence to mean that such a “travel pass” was actually conducted. I cannot go along with this conclusion.
On summary judgment, supporting or opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge. OCGA § 9-11-56 (e). As is apparent by use of the term “would” in the restaurant manager’s affidavit, the deponent could not swear, under penalty of perjury, that he has actual knowledge that an inspection of the restaurant floor was done at 5:00 p.m. on the day plaintiff Dana Daniel fell. The best the restaurant manager can muster is that he “would” have customarily asked a crew member to do it. The manager does not state that he actually told a crew member to perform the 5:00 p.m. inspection or that he observed an employee doing such an inspection. Under these circumstances, I do not agree with the majority that “[t]he record in this case shows that the restaurant [personnel] conducted a routine inspection of the floor shortly before Daniel slipped and fell, which revealed no liquid on the floor.”
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that genuine issues of material fact remain as to defendant’s constructive knowledge of the clear *229liquid which allegedly caused plaintiff Dana Daniel’s fall and as to defendant’s maintenance of a distraction which prevented plaintiff Dana Daniel from discovering this hazard.
Decided July 14, 1995
Reconsideration denied July 28, 1995
Hollberg, Weaver & Kytle, James W. Kytle, for appellant.
Goldner, Sommers, Scrudder & Bass, Henry E. Scrudder, Jr., Tammy S. Skinner, for appellee.
I would therefore reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and permit the plaintiff here to have her day in court before a jury of her peers.