Court Opinion

ID: 9950403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 20:08:37.387741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:52.341605
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                          Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                      A23-1038

                                     State of Minnesota,
                                        Respondent,

                                             vs.

                                Deshaun Arnez-Lamar Baker,
                                        Appellant.

                                  Filed March 11, 2024
                                        Affirmed
                                      Slieter, Judge
                           Concurring specially, Schmidt, Judge

                               Ramsey County District Court
                                 File No. 62-CR-20-3233

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Shauna Kieffer, Kieffer Law LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

         Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Schmidt,

Judge.

                            NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SLIETER, Judge

         In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction of carrying a firearm without a

permit, appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his suppression motion

because of a law enforcement officer’s mistake of law in stopping his vehicle for illegal
window tint because it was a limousine, which is exempt from the window-tint prohibition.

Under the specific circumstances here, even if we assume the officer made a mistake of

law the district court properly denied the suppression motion, we affirm.

                                          FACTS

       In the early morning of March 5, 2020, appellant Deshaun Arnez-Lamar Baker was

driving a gray 2016 Chrysler 300, which is a four-door sedan, in St. Paul. A St. Paul police

officer observed Baker’s vehicle from his squad car, suspected the vehicle had illegal

window tint, 1 and initiated a traffic stop. During the stop, the two officers who approached

Baker’s vehicle noticed the smell of cannabis and saw a handgun laying on the center

console. Baker and the passenger were then detained while several officers searched the

vehicle. As relevant to this appeal, the officers recovered two handguns and ammunition

from the vehicle. Baker did not have a permit to carry a firearm in public. Respondent

State of Minnesota charged Baker with carrying a firearm in public without a permit in

violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1a (2018).

       Baker moved to suppress all evidence seized from the stop, arguing that the stop

was illegal because the statute prohibiting excessive window tint does not apply to a

limousine, and he asserted that the 2016 Chrysler 300 met the statutory definition of a

limousine. The district court denied Baker’s motion.

       A photo of the vehicle Baker was driving is presented here:

1
 The vehicle windows were later tested for visibility, and the result was 20% visibility,
which exceeds the statutory maximum window tint.

                                             2
       Following a stipulated facts and evidence trial, the district court found Baker guilty

and entered a conviction of carrying a firearm in public without a permit and imposed a

stay of imposition, placing Baker on probation for two years.

       Baker appeals.

                                        DECISION

       Baker argues that the district court erred by failing to suppress the evidence from

the traffic stop based upon the officer’s mistake of law in believing his vehicle was subject

to the statutory window-tint restrictions. Baker concedes the tint on his vehicle’s windows

violated the statutory prohibition. Baker contends, however, that his vehicle is a limousine

and that a limousine is explicitly exempt from the statute prohibiting excessive tinting of

vehicle windows and, hence, the stop of his vehicle for window tint was illegal as a mistake

of law. In doing so, Baker relies solely on the United States Constitution.

                                             3
       Appellate courts, when reviewing a district court’s decision on a pretrial motion to

suppress evidence, review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and review its

legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). The

interpretation of a statute is reviewed de novo. State v. Defatte, 928 N.W.2d 338, 340

(Minn. 2019).

       The United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the

government. U.S. Const. amend. IV. For a limited investigatory stop to be reasonable, a

police officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together

with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The standard for reasonable suspicion is not high, and the standard

is met when a police officer “can articulate specific facts which, taken together with

rational inferences from those facts, objectively support the officer’s suspicion.” State v.

Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016).

       The basis for the traffic stop was the officer’s suspicion that Baker’s vehicle violated

the window-tint statute, which reads, in relevant part,

              A person must not drive or operate any motor vehicle required
              to be registered in the state of Minnesota upon any street or
              highway under the following conditions: . . . when any side
              window or rear window is composed of or treated with any
              material so as to obstruct or substantially reduce the driver’s
              clear view through the window or has a light transmittance of
              less than 50 percent plus or minus three percent in the visible
              light range or a luminous reflectance of more than 20 percent
              plus or minus three percent.

Minn. Stat. § 169.71, subd. 4 (Supp. 2019).

                                              4
       The statute contains several exceptions. For example, subdivision 4a provides that

the prohibition “does not apply to glazing materials that . . . are applied to . . . the side and

rear windows of a limousine as defined in section 168.002, subdivision 15.” Id., subd. 4a

(Supp. 2019). Minn. Stat. § 168.002, subd. 15 (2018) defines “limousine” as “a luxury

passenger automobile that has a seating capacity of not more than 15 persons, including

the driver.” “Luxury passenger automobile” is not defined by statute, and the definition of

“limousine” has not been construed by Minnesota appellate courts.

       We acknowledge the canons of construction provide us with a method to determine

the definition of “luxury passenger automobile.” See State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d

432, 435 (Minn. 2017) (stating that the first step in statutory interpretation is to determine

whether the statute is ambiguous, and if the statute is ambiguous, then courts “may apply

the canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity”). However, we need not do so here.

In his principal brief, Baker relied solely on State v. George, where the Minnesota Supreme

Court applied the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to conclude a

mistake of law did not give rise to reasonable suspicion to support a vehicle stop. 557

N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).           George does not address whether the Minnesota

Constitution provides greater protections than the Fourth Amendment.

       Since George, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that a reasonable

mistake of law may provide the reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle. Heien

v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014); 2 see also Birkland v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 940

2
  Neither party cited to the United States Supreme Court decision in Heien regarding the
issue of whether a reasonable mistake of law may provide the reasonable suspicion of

                                               5
N.W.2d 822, 826 n.1 (Minn. App. 2020) (“In neither of these cases does the supreme court

base its reasoning explicitly on the Minnesota constitution and, therefore, we must apply

the Heien decision to our vehicle-stop analysis.”). Thus, even if we assume the officer

made a mistake of law when he stopped Baker’s vehicle, we conclude that any mistake was

reasonable under the United States Constitution. Here, the officer articulated facts that

objectively supported the officer’s suspicion.       The officer saw a vehicle—without

limousine plates 3—that had dark windows, which the officer reasonably believed violated

the window-tint statute. See Minn. Stat. § 169.71, subd. 4(a) (2018).

       For this reason, the district court properly denied suppression of the evidence seized

following the lawful stop of Baker’s vehicle.

       Affirmed.

criminal activity to support a vehicle stop. We requested supplemental briefing from the
parties on whether Heien applies and, if so, how. Baker’s supplemental brief was the first
occasion he argued that the Minnesota Constitution may be broader than the federal
constitution. But an argument is not properly before this court if it was not raised in
appellant’s main brief or in response to an argument made in respondent’s brief. See Wood
v. Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 654 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. App. 2002) (applying
this principal to new arguments in a reply brief), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003). Thus,
we decline to consider whether the Minnesota Constitution may afford broader protections
than the United States Constitution.
3
  We recognize that Minnesota law does not require a limousine to display limousine plates
if the person operating the vehicle uses it for personal use. See Minn. Stat. § 168.128, subd.
2 (Supp. 2019). But having limousine plates would outwardly identify to law enforcement
that the vehicle is exempt from the window-tint statute.

                                              6
SCHMIDT, Judge (concurring specially)

       I agree with the result. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s

reasoning to reach that result.

       Appellant Deshaun Arnez-Lamar Baker challenges the district court’s denial of his

motion to suppress, arguing the officer stopped Baker’s vehicle based upon a mistake of

law in believing the vehicle was subject to the statutory window-tint restrictions. The

majority assumes, without deciding, that the officer made a mistake of law when he stopped

Baker’s vehicle because the car might have qualified for an exception to the window-tint

law if the vehicle was, in fact, a limousine. The majority then affirms the district court’s

order denying the motion to suppress based upon a United States Supreme Court case that

concluded a reasonable mistake of law may still allow for reasonable, articulable suspicion

to stop a vehicle. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60-61 (2014).

       I disagree that we need to even assume that the police officer stopped Baker’s

vehicle based upon a mistake of the law. The sole basis for stopping Baker was the officer’s

knowledge of Minnesota’s tinted window statute and the officer’s belief that Baker’s

vehicle violated that law. There is nothing in this record to suggest that the officer had any

mistake of law. I, nonetheless, concur in the result because the officer knew about the

window-tint law, articulated reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and properly

initiated a stop to further investigate the suspicion.

       A limited investigatory stop is reasonable if the officer can “point to specific and

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,

reasonably warrant that intrusion.”      Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also

                                             CS-1
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (holding that if an officer has a

reasonable suspicion that a person has engaged in criminal activity, the officer may make

the traffic stop and “detain that person briefly in order to investigate the circumstances that

provoke suspicion” (quotation omitted)). “The factual basis required to support a stop is

minimal, and an actual violation is not necessary.” State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 354

(Minn. App. 2000) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). This standard

is not high. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016).

       The question of whether a police officer may stop a vehicle for an equipment

violation has been long settled. Law enforcement has an objective basis to stop a vehicle

if the officer observes a violation of a traffic law, including an insignificant equipment

violation. See State v. Pleas, 329 N.W.2d 329, 333 (Minn. 1983) (upholding stop based

on observation of a broken windshield, no front license plate, and an upside-down rear

plate); State v. Barber, 241 N.W.2d 476, 477 (Minn. 1976) (upholding stop based on

observation that license plates were attached with wires rather than bolts). Indeed, a police

officer does not need to be certain that the tinted windows constitute an actual violation of

the law. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d at 354. Nor does an officer need to have an assumption

that a violation actually occurred. See, e.g., Berge v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d

730, 733 (Minn. 1985) (“The trial court drew a distinction between actually seeing a

violation and merely ‘suspecting’ one. The Court of Appeals drew a dichotomy between

actually seeing a violation and ‘assuming’ that a violation occurred. In fact, suspicion is

all that is required, if the officer can sufficiently articulate the factual basis for his

suspicion.”). An officer is justified to make a stop based upon the suspicion of a crime

                                            CS-2
even if the activity that the officer observes is innocent. State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824,

826 (Minn. 1989) (holding even “innocent activity might justify the suspicion of criminal

activity”) (citation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (holding police may initiate a

stop when “a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent” if viewed separately,

“warranted further investigation” when taken together); State v. Combs, 398 N.W.2d 563,

565-66 (Minn. 1987) (rejecting trial court’s conclusion that, if the observed facts are

consistent with innocent activity, then the stop is invalid). The officer simply needs to

articulate facts that reasonably provides suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

       Here, the officer articulated facts that objectively supported the officer’s suspicion.

The officer saw a vehicle—without limousine plates 1—that had dark windows, which the

officer reasonably believed violated the tinted window statute. See Minn. Stat. § 169.71,

subd. 4(3) (Supp. 2019). Under the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard, the officer

had the requisite suspicion to initiate a stop. At that point, the officer could then investigate

further to determine whether the statutory exception applied, including whether the

vehicle—without “LM” plates—qualified as a “luxury” vehicle. Minn. Stat. § 168.002,

subd. 15. But at the time of the stop, the officer’s reasonable belief that the windows were

too dark was enough.

1
  Limousine plates reflect the unique registration category for limousines. Minn. Stat.
§ 168.128 (2020). If the vehicle had dark windows but also displayed license plates that
clearly identify the vehicle as a limousine under Minnesota Statutes section 168.002,
subdivision 15 (2020), then an officer’s stop of the vehicle for violating the window tint
statute would not be reasonable. See Minn. Stat. § 169.71, subd. 4a(a)(3)(iv) (Supp. 2019)
(exempting the side and rear windows of a limousine from the prohibitions on glazing
materials). But the vehicle in this case did not have limousine plates. As such, the officer’s
stop to conduct a further investigation was reasonable.

                                             CS-3
       Rather than assuming it to be true, I would reject Baker’s contention that the officer

acted under a mistake of law. If anything, the officer had a question of fact as to whether

Baker’s vehicle was a limousine. 2 The reasonable, articulable suspicion standard allows

the officer to investigate that fact question by stopping the vehicle and investigating.

       Analyzing this case under mistake of law jurisprudence is problematic for several

reasons. First, the analysis fails to recognize the long-standing reasonable, articulable

suspicion caselaw that allows the officer to make a stop after articulating facts that

reasonably support the suspicion of illegal activity. Second, the analysis fails to recognize

that after making the stop, the officer may investigate to confirm whether the initial

suspicion continues to be correct. Finally, the analysis fails to account for the potential

ramifications of its reasoning.     The practical effect of following the mistake-of-law

reasoning to its logical conclusion means an officer may only stop a vehicle under

suspicion of a statutory window-tint violation—without having a mistaken belief of the

law—if the officer (1) believes the vehicle’s windows are too dark such that the window-

tint statute may be violated, and (2) the officer eliminates the statutory exception regarding

limousines before making the stop. At the time of a stop, police will have to articulate

reasons why the vehicle—without limousine plates—is not a “luxury” vehicle. That

holding requires a degree of certainty that is not found in the law.

2
  Notably, there is nothing in this record to demonstrate that at the time of the stop Baker
said he was driving a limousine. This is not to say a defendant must affirmatively assert
the limousine exception during a stop. The issue can, as it was here, be raised for the first
time at the district court. But, in this case, the officer’s suspicion in making the initial stop
was not dispelled during the subsequent investigation, which eventually led to the
discovery of a gun and drugs.

                                             CS-4
       In sum, I disagree with the majority assuming a mistake of law and affirming under

a mistake-of-law analysis. Such an analysis is unnecessary if the officer had reasonable,

articulable suspicion for the stop. Under settled, longstanding caselaw, the officer had the

requisite suspicion—based upon the officer’s unmistaken belief of the law—to make the

stop. I would affirm because the district court applied the correct standard to conclude the

officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate the stop.

                                            CS-5