Court Opinion

ID: 9367113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-30 23:00:39.259794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:57.372694
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-11393    Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023    Page: 1 of 16

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-11393
                           ____________________

        MICHAEL WADE NANCE,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        COMMISSIONER,   GEORGIA    DEPARTMENT      OF
        CORRECTIONS,
        WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC AND CLASSIFICATION
        PRISON,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.
                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-00107-JPB
USCA11 Case: 20-11393     Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023    Page: 2 of 16

        2                      Opinion of the Court               20-11393

                            ____________________

            ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                         UNITED STATES

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and NEWSOM and LAGOA, Cir-
        cuit Judges.
        WILLIAM PRYOR, CHIEF JUDGE:
               This appeal, on remand from the Supreme Court, arises
        from a Georgia prisoner’s objection based on his medical condi-
        tions to his prescribed method of execution. The district court dis-
        missed the action as untimely and for failure to state a claim. We
        hold that the action is timely because the prisoner raised an as-ap-
        plied challenge, so the limitations period commenced only when
        the claim became or should have become apparent to a person with
        a reasonably prudent regard for his rights. And we hold that the
        prisoner stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim when he al-
        leged that the medication gabapentin had reduced his brain’s re-
        ceptiveness to sedatives. But we hold that the prisoner failed to
        state a claim when he alleged that the lethal drugs cannot be in-
        jected into his veins according to standard protocols because he
        failed to plausibly allege that one alternative injection procedure
        could not constitutionally be performed. So, we reverse in part, af-
        firm in part, and remand for further proceedings.
USCA11 Case: 20-11393      Document: 56-1     Date Filed: 01/30/2023     Page: 3 of 16

        20-11393               Opinion of the Court                        3

                                I. BACKGROUND
                Michael Wade Nance is a prisoner sentenced to death after
        he was convicted of malice murder, among other crimes. The State
        of Georgia intends to execute him by injection of the drug pento-
        barbital, which has a sedative and, ultimately, lethal effect. Nance
        filed this action to enjoin execution by that method. See 42 U.S.C.
        § 1983.
               Nance alleged that due to his two medical conditions, exe-
        cution by lethal injection would violate his constitutional right to
        be free from cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST.
        amends. VIII, XIV. First, he alleged that his veins are “severely
        compromised,” so inserting an intravenous catheter might cause a
        vein to “blow” and leak the drug into the surrounding tissue, which
        would allegedly cause pain and prevent the administration of a full
        dose of the drug pentobarbital. He alleged that alternative injection
        procedures are complicated and painful. Second, Nance alleged
        that gabapentin, a medication he takes to treat back pain, has made
        his brain less responsive to other drugs, such as pentobarbital. Both
        conditions, he alleged, would prevent him from being fully sedated
        during the execution. As an alternative method of execution that
        would reduce his risk of severe pain, Nance proposed death by fir-
        ing squad.
                The Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Correc-
        tions moved to dismiss Nance’s complaint, and the district court
        granted the motion. Although Nance alleged one “claim for relief”
        in his complaint, the district court construed his arguments about
USCA11 Case: 20-11393      Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023      Page: 4 of 16

        4                       Opinion of the Court                 20-11393

        his compromised veins and his gabapentin usage as separate claims.
        The district court determined that Nance filed the action after the
        limitations period had expired. And it determined that Nance failed
        to state a claim for relief.
               On appeal, we construed this action as a habeas petition and
        held that it should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as second or
        successive. Nance v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 981 F.3d 1201,
        1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court reversed and held
        that section 1983 was a proper vehicle for a method-of-execution
        challenge that proposed an alternative method of execution not
        permitted by state law. Nance v. Ward, 142 S. Ct. 2214, 2219 (2022).
        It remanded to this Court to “address the timeliness question, as
        well as any others that remain.” Id. at 2226.
                           II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review de novo both the application of a statute of lim-
        itations, NE 32nd St., LLC v. United States, 896 F.3d 1240, 1243
        (11th Cir. 2018), and the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
        a claim for relief, Hopper v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318,
        1324 (11th Cir. 2009).
                                  III. DISCUSSION

               We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we explain
        that Nance’s complaint is timely. Second, we explain that Nance
        has properly stated a claim with respect to one of his medical con-
        ditions but not the other.
USCA11 Case: 20-11393      Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023      Page: 5 of 16

        20-11393                Opinion of the Court                         5

                          A. Nance’s Complaint is Timely.
                The district court determined that Nance’s complaint was
        untimely because the limitations period for his claim had expired.
        A claim brought under section 1983 is subject to the state statute of
        limitations governing personal injury actions, Boyd v. Warden,
        Holman Corr. Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 872 (11th Cir. 2017), which is
        two years in Georgia, GA. CODE § 9-3-33. But federal law deter-
        mines the date on which a cause of action accrues. “In Section 1983
        cases, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the facts
        which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be
        apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his
        rights.” Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987)
        (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
        ted). So, in an ordinary, facial challenge, “a method of execution
        claim accrues on the later of the date on which state review is com-
        plete, or the date on which the capital litigant becomes subject to a
        new or substantially changed execution protocol.” McNair v. Al-
        len, 515 F.3d 1168, 1174 (11th Cir. 2008). More than two years had
        passed since Nance’s death sentence became final and since the last
        change to Georgia’s execution protocol.
               Nance argues that the date on which the cause of action ac-
        crued should be determined differently when a prisoner brings an
        as-applied challenge. He contends that “an as-applied challenge to
        a State’s method of execution accrues when the plaintiff discovers
        or should reasonably discover the unique factual circumstances
        that render his execution unconstitutional.” (Emphasis added.) So,
USCA11 Case: 20-11393      Document: 56-1     Date Filed: 01/30/2023     Page: 6 of 16

        6                      Opinion of the Court                20-11393

        Nance asserts that the limitations period did not start running until
        he had “become aware that his veins would inhibit IV access and
        cause a vein to ‘blow’” and until he had “become reasonably aware
        that his increased and prolonged dosage of gabapentin would inter-
        fere with the sedative effect of pentobarbital.”

               The district court rejected the argument that the accrual of
        the cause of action should be “based on when [a plaintiff] happens
        to discover information purportedly sufficient to inform him that
        he has a viable claim.” It expressed concern that a plaintiff “could
        simply sit back and wait, ostensibly for as long as he wanted, to
        ascertain the alleged impact of a perceived injury under [section]
        1983, which would defeat the purpose of the statute of limitations.”
        (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted.) The district court
        was mistaken.

               If the basis for his claim became reasonably apparent later, a
        plaintiff may pursue an as-applied method-of-execution claim even
        though two years have passed since his sentence became final or
        since the execution protocol changed. The limitations period in an
        as-applied challenge “does not begin to run until the facts which
        would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent
        to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.”
        McNair, 515 F.3d at 1173 (quoting Mullinax, 817 F.2d at 716). So,
        as Nance correctly argues, “an as-applied challenge can only accrue
        once the plaintiff becomes aware (or should have become aware)
USCA11 Case: 20-11393       Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023      Page: 7 of 16

        20-11393                Opinion of the Court                          7

        that his unique personal circumstances would render his execution
        unconstitutional.”

               We have previously implied that the statute of limitations
        should be calculated in this way when a prisoner raises an as-ap-
        plied challenge to his method of execution, see Siebert v. Allen, 506
        F.3d 1047, 1049–50 (11th Cir. 2007), and we now reach that holding
        expressly. To the extent that Nance also raised facial challenges,
        those challenges are untimely, but his as-applied challenges sur-
        vive.

               The limitations period began to run for Nance’s as-applied
        challenge as soon as he learned of the conditions that led him to
        object to Georgia’s prescribed method of execution. Nance incor-
        rectly argues that the limitations period only began to run when he
        learned how his vein condition and medication would impact his
        execution. But a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his
        rights would inform himself of any impact his medical conditions
        might have on his execution when he learned of those conditions.
        Cf. McCullough v. United States, 607 F.3d 1355, 1359–60 (11th Cir.
        2010) (explaining that the statute of limitations begins to run when
        the plaintiff “learn[s] the ‘critical facts’ indicating that he had been
        hurt and who had inflicted the injury” (citation omitted)); see also
        Ledford v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th
        Cir. 2017) (indicating that a similar method-of-execution claim was
        untimely because the plaintiff had “been taking gabapentin for ap-
        proximately a decade” (emphasis added)); Siebert, 506 F.3d at 1049
USCA11 Case: 20-11393      Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023     Page: 8 of 16

        8                      Opinion of the Court                 20-11393

        (explaining that an “‘as-applied’ [method-of-execution] claim was
        timely” because it was “filed immediately upon diagnosis” of the
        prisoner’s medical conditions “and thus as soon as he could have
        brought it”).

               Nance could not, as the district court suggested, “sit back
        and wait . . . to ascertain the alleged impact of a perceived injury.”
        Instead, he would be on notice as soon as he received a diagnosis
        or relevant change in treatment. When Nance learned or should
        have learned of these two medical conditions—his vein condition
        and his increased dosage of gabapentin—is a factual question inap-
        propriate for resolution at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Santi-
        ago v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 986 F.2d 423, 425 (11th Cir. 1993). Alt-
        hough Nance conceded that he had been taking gabapentin for
        more than two years, he alleged that his dosage had been increased
        within the two-year timeframe. Whether Nance faced a risk of not
        responding to sedative drugs only because of the dosage increase is
        also a question of fact.
               Finally, the district court erroneously suggested that Nance
        had to affirmatively plead the date on which he discovered his med-
        ical conditions. It stated that because Nance “ma[de] no claim
        about when he learned of the potential adverse interaction be-
        tween” gabapentin and pentobarbital, his “gabapentin claim is
        clearly time-barred.” “Likewise,” the district court continued,
        Nance “ha[d] made no claim that his veins became compromised
        within the past two years.” But because the statute of limitations is
        an affirmative defense, Nance did not need to plead the date he
USCA11 Case: 20-11393      Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023     Page: 9 of 16

        20-11393               Opinion of the Court                         9

        became aware of his vein condition or the date he began taking an
        increased dose of gabapentin. See La Grasta v. First Union Sec.,
        Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds
        by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). It is not
        “apparent from the face of the complaint” that Nance’s claim is un-
        timely. Id. (citation omitted).

         B. One of Nance’s Claims for Relief Satisfied the Pleading Stand-
                          ard, but the Other Did Not.

                The district court alternatively dismissed Nance’s complaint
        for failure to state a claim for relief. Both the district court and
        Nance’s briefs on appeal have construed his complaint to plead two
        separate claims for relief based on his two medical conditions, and
        so do we.

               To “challenge . . . a lethal injection protocol” under the
        Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show that “(1) the lethal in-
        jection protocol in question creates a substantial risk of serious
        harm, and (2) there are known and available alternatives that are
        feasible, readily implemented, and that will in fact significantly re-
        duce the substantial risk of severe pain.” Gissendaner v. Comm’r,
        Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 779 F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2015) (alteration
        adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Su-
        preme Court has explained that “[i]f a State refuses to adopt such
        an alternative in the face of these documented advantages, without
        a legitimate penological justification for adhering to its current
        method of execution, then a State’s refusal to change its method
USCA11 Case: 20-11393     Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023     Page: 10 of 16

        10                     Opinion of the Court                 20-11393

        can be viewed as ‘cruel and unusual’ under the Eighth Amend-
        ment.” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008) (plurality opinion).

               The Commissioner argues that Nance failed both to allege
        that Georgia’s prescribed execution protocol creates a substantial
        risk of serious harm and to propose a suitable alternative method
        of execution. The latter argument is common to both claims. The
        Commissioner contends that the claims fall short of the pleading
        standard because Nance has failed to allege that his proposed alter-
        native method of execution, death by firing squad, constitutes a
        readily available alternative that would significantly reduce a sub-
        stantial risk of severe pain and because the State has a legitimate
        penological reason to reject that alternative. We conclude that
        Nance has alleged a plausible alternative method of execution and
        that Nance’s gabapentin claim meets the pleading standard but his
        claim based on his vein condition does not.

          1. Nance has Alleged a Plausible Alternative Method of Execu-
                                       tion.

                Nance has plausibly alleged that execution by firing squad
        would be a viable and less painful alternative method of execution,
        as applied to him. See Gissendaner, 779 F.3d at 1283. Nance pro-
        posed execution by firing squad as an alternative that would reduce
        his risk of severe pain and had been implemented in another juris-
        diction. His proposal, which cites the protocol described in Utah’s
        detailed technical manual, is “sufficiently detailed to permit a find-
        ing that the State could carry it out relatively easily and reasonably
USCA11 Case: 20-11393     Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023     Page: 11 of 16

        20-11393               Opinion of the Court                        11

        quickly.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1129 (2019) (citation
        and internal quotation marks omitted). And he has pleaded that
        “execution by firing squad is both swift and virtually painless” such
        that it would “eliminate the substantial risk of severe pain that [the
        Commissioner’s] current execution Protocol presents to Mr.
        Nance.”

               That lethal injection is the sole method of execution permit-
        ted under Georgia law, GA. CODE § 17-10-38(a), does not prevent
        Nance from proposing a different alternative. The Supreme Court
        has stated that “[a]n inmate seeking to identify an alternative
        method of execution is not limited to choosing among those pres-
        ently authorized by a particular State’s law.” Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at
        1128. If no method of execution would satisfy both the Federal
        Constitution and Georgia law, Nance cannot be executed. See
        Nance, 142 S. Ct. at 2223 (“Assuming it wants to carry out the death
        sentence, the State can enact legislation approving what a court has
        found to be a fairly easy-to-employ method of execution.”).

                The Commissioner argues that the State has a legitimate in-
        terest in refusing to execute Nance by firing squad, a practice that
        it characterizes as “relatively uncommon and archaic.” A state may
        refuse to adopt a prisoner’s proposed alternative method of execu-
        tion for a legitimate penological reason. Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at
        1125, 1129–30. But the district court did not pass on the question
        whether Georgia had a legitimate penological justification for its
        refusal. So, we leave that question to the district court on remand.
USCA11 Case: 20-11393      Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023     Page: 12 of 16

        12                      Opinion of the Court                 20-11393

        2. Nance has Sufficiently Pleaded that He Faces a Substantial Risk
          of Serious Harm Based on One of His Medical Conditions but
                                  Not the Other.

                The Commissioner also argues that Nance has not suffi-
        ciently pleaded that Georgia’s execution protocol “creates a sub-
        stantial risk of serious harm” to him. Gissendaner, 779 F.3d at 1283
        (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nance’s gabapen-
        tin claim meets the pleading standard, but his claim based on his
        vein condition does not.

                Nance’s gabapentin claim states a plausible claim for relief.
        See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Nance unambigu-
        ously alleged that his current dosage of gabapentin has made his
        brain less receptive to pentobarbital, the drug Georgia uses in lethal
        injections. Specifically, he alleged that “[p]rolonged gabapentin use
        alters a person’s brain chemistry and makes the person’s brain less
        responsive, or even unresponsive, to other drugs, including pento-
        barbital.” The district court did not explain why Nance failed to
        state a claim with respect to his gabapentin allegations, and it is not
        clear whether it even reached the issue after ruling that the claim
        was untimely. In any event, we hold that Nance has stated a claim
        for relief.

               Nance also alleged that the lethal drugs could not be admin-
        istered through a standard intravenous catheter due to his weak
        veins. He alleged that the State’s technicians would “cause [him]
        excruciating pain . . . by repeatedly attempting to insert needles
USCA11 Case: 20-11393      Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023      Page: 13 of 16

        20-11393                Opinion of the Court                         13

        into unidentifiable and/or inaccessible veins.” Nance also alleged
        that alternative methods of injecting the drugs—central venous
        cannulation and a cutdown procedure—were not constitutionally
        permissible. Central venous cannulation would involve “inserting
        a catheter into a central vein located either in the groin, or above
        or below the clavicle.” And a cutdown procedure would involve
        “making a deep incision into the subject’s skin to find a blood ves-
        sel, which is then cut open to allow for the insertion of a catheter.”
        Nance alleged that these alternative procedures do not pass consti-
        tutional muster because they are painful and difficult to perform.

               The district court rejected all these arguments. It deter-
        mined that the State’s technicians would presumptively carry out
        the execution humanely and that Nance “ha[d] no basis to allege
        that state officials will, effectively, torture him by repeatedly stick-
        ing him with a needle in a fruitless effort to locate a suitable vein.”
        It determined that “to the degree that [Nance] contends that his
        veins might ‘blow’ when injected with pentobarbital, [he] fails to
        state a viable claim because Georgia’s protocol mandates that a
        physician perform a medically-approved alternative” in such cir-
        cumstances. It ruled that “central venous cannulation is a routine
        procedure.” It also ruled that the theory that technicians would re-
        sort to a cutdown procedure was speculative, but it found that, in
        any event, they would carry out that procedure humanely too.

               Nance plausibly alleged that the lethal drug could not be suc-
        cessfully administered through a standard intravenous catheter due
USCA11 Case: 20-11393     Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023    Page: 14 of 16

        14                     Opinion of the Court                20-11393

        to his weak veins. By alleging that the pentobarbital would leak—
        causing severe pain and the possibility of incomplete sedation dur-
        ing execution—Nance plausibly alleged the State’s prescribed
        method of execution would subject him to a substantial risk of
        harm. The remaining question is whether Nance has also plausibly
        alleged that the existing alternatives to the standard injection pro-
        tocol, cannulation and a cutdown procedure, are also constitution-
        ally impermissible, as applied to him.

               Nance’s allegation that a cutdown procedure would consti-
        tute an impermissible alternative was not speculative. Although
        Georgia’s lethal injection protocol mentions only cannulation by
        name as an alternative to the standard injection procedure, it also
        allows “other medically approved alternative[s]” to be used.
        Nance’s allegation was not speculative because it was based on the
        statement of a prison medical technician that “the execution team
        would have to cut [Nance’s] neck to carry out the execution.” And
        even if the allegation were speculative, that determination would
        eliminate the alternative cutdown procedure from consideration;
        it would not alter the conclusion that Nance had properly pleaded
        a substantial risk of harm from the standard injection protocol.

               Nance’s allegation that a cutdown procedure would consti-
        tute an impermissible alternative was also not conclusory. Nance
        alleged that the cutdown procedure would be excessively painful
        and asserted that it is usually performed on a person “under deep
        sedation.” Nance could not be sedated during the procedure
USCA11 Case: 20-11393      Document: 56-1       Date Filed: 01/30/2023       Page: 15 of 16

        20-11393                 Opinion of the Court                          15

        because technicians allegedly would be unable to access his veins
        to administer a sedative under the normal protocol. Nance’s asser-
        tion went beyond “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
        of action,” and his allegations have a sufficient basis in fact “to raise
        a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
        555.

                 Nevertheless, the district court correctly concluded that
        Nance’s allegation that cannulation is an unacceptable alternative
        procedure was deficient. Although Nance asserted that cannulation
        is a painful and complicated procedure, he did not assert any facts
        supporting that allegation. Nance’s allegations based on his vein
        condition fail to state a claim for relief because he has not plausibly
        alleged that both of the identified alternative lethal injection proce-
        dures would be constitutionally impermissible. Even so, Nance is
        still at liberty to amend his complaint because no responsive mo-
        tions have yet been filed. See Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024,
        1032 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a motion to dismiss is not a
        responsive pleading).

                Additionally, the district court correctly rejected Nance’s ar-
        gument that state technicians would subject him to an unconstitu-
        tional level of pain by repeatedly pricking him with a needle. Nance
        did not plausibly allege that a futile attempt to locate a vein would
        give rise to a constitutionally intolerable level of pain. After all, “the
        Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a prisoner a painless
        death,” but rather it forbids the use of “long disused (unusual)
USCA11 Case: 20-11393     Document: 56-1     Date Filed: 01/30/2023    Page: 16 of 16

        16                     Opinion of the Court                20-11393

        forms of punishment that intensified the sentence of death with a
        (cruel) superaddition of terror, pain, or disgrace.” Bucklew, 139 S.
        Ct. at 1124 (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation
        marks omitted).

                               IV. CONCLUSION

               Because Nance’s challenge is timely and because he states a
        plausible claim for relief, we REVERSE in part and AFFIRM in part
        the judgment dismissing the complaint and REMAND for further
        proceedings consistent with this opinion.