Court Opinion

ID: 9458542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:55:01.319447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:48.249393
License: Public Domain

EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
Respectfully, I dissent.
The majority’s statement of facts passes lightly over several difficult questions concerning the admissibility of the confession. However, these are not the focus of my disagreement with the disposition of this case.
*1059My major dissatisfaction with the result here is the order that on remand the indictment must be dismissed.
I cannot agree that the evidence of guilt, ignoring the confession, was “inadequate to sustain the conviction.” On the contrary, it was quite sufficient to sustain a conviction.
On February 20, 1970, a man walked into a Florida automobile dealership, purportedly with the intention of purchasing a used car. He was permitted to drive a 1969 Cadillac “around the block.” Instead of returning after a test drive, he stole the car.
On August 16, 1970, a man of similar appearance drove the Cadillac into a used car lot in Long Beach, California. Under the pretext of trading in the Cadillac on a 1969 Lincoln Continental Mark III, he obtained the Continental for a test drive, drove off in that car, and did not return.
In a trial to the court, it was stipulated that the Cadillac stolen in Florida was the car involved in the exchange of vehicles six months later in California.
One of the government’s witnesses positively identified Stage as the man who left the Cadillac at the Long Beach lot and drove away in the Continental.
Another government witness, a Florida car salesman, identified Stage as the man who stole the Cadillac in Florida. The second identification was not positive. Skillful questioning by the trial judge elicited these two crucial responses from the witness:
THE COURT: . . . Are you positive of his identification now?
THE WITNESS: Sir, I couldn’t be positive, no sir.
* * * * * -X-
THE COURT: I am interested in knowing just about how sure you are this is thé‘ man.
THE WITNESS: Well, I wouldn’t bet my life on that, sir. To the best of my ability this is the man.
Thus, even without the confession, the government had the stipulation that the same car was involved in the Florida theft and the California vehicle exchange, and the two eye-witness identifications.
Had the confession been suppressed and Stage convicted on the basis of the other evidence, I would have had no difficulty in sustaining the conviction. In reviewing the sufficiency of the government’s case to sustain a conviction, of course, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1969).
I would not expect the majority to contest the proposition that the stipulation and the testimony of the two eyewitnesses — if creditable and credited— would be sufficient to sustain a conviction for interstate transportation of a motor vehicle, knowing that vehicle to have been stolen.
The question, then, is whether the trial judge could have credited the eyewitness identification by the Florida ear salesman. Clearly he might have done so. The witness stated: “To the best of my ability this is the man.” While the trier might still have declined to convict, he could as well on the basis of the witness’ testimony and demeanor, and the other admissible evidence in the ease, have concluded that Stage was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine whether or not a witness’ best recollection fifteen months after the event is accurate.
Indeed, the best inference from the record is that the trial judge did accept the testimony of the two eye-witnesses and did in fact think the government’s case was persuasive even without the confession. When the government attorney offered the confession in evidence, the trial judge observed:
“Of course, I don’t know that the confession is absolutely necessary, having in mind the other evidence in the case.”
*1060A motion to strike the identification testimony was denied.
I conclude that the government’s case, even without the confession, was sufficient to support a conviction. I would remand with specific instructions that the trial judge enter a finding on the question whether he was convinced by the government’s case in the absence of the confession. If he were, the introduction of the confession would be harmless error in a trial to the court and the conviction should be affirmed. If not, he should order an acquittal. Cf. Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 81 S.Ct. 421, 5 L.Ed.2d 428 (1961); United States v. Cepelis, 426 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1970), after remand 443 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 846, 92 S.Ct. 149, 30 L.Ed.2d 83 (1971).
Alternatively, the case could be remanded for a new trial without the confession the majority finds inadmissible.
But the indictment should not be dismissed.