Court Opinion

ID: 9541752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:28:22.56234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:36.242768
License: Public Domain

TURSI, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The issue presented for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the changes in circumstances, viewed in their totality, did not justify a modification in the existing child support order.
That issue must be addressed with the following principles in mind. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a trial court’s order of support is not to be disturbed on appeal. Rhoades v. Rhoades, 188 Colo. 423, 535 P.2d 1122 (1975); In re Marriage *385of Davis, 35 Colo.App. 447, 534 P.2d 809 (1975). And, the person seeking modification of a support order has a heavy burden. In re Marriage of Corbin, 42 Colo.App. 200, 591 P.2d 1046 (1979).
In January 1983, three months before the filing of this motion for increase in child support, father applied for discharge from the military service so that he would be able to complete his college education prior to the expiration of his educational benefits under the GI Bill of Rights. The hearing on wife’s motion was held shortly after his discharge and before he could seek employment.
At the hearing, father testified that he intended to reside with his parents while completing his college education in order to keep his personal expenses to a minimum. He also testified that he would seek part time work to supplement his income. Further, he stated that on the completion of his education, which he anticipated would be within two years, an increase in child support should be reconsidered.
Father does not seek to avoid the child support obligation imposed upon him while fully employed. Nor is there any evidence that father’s decision to leave the military was based upon a disinclination to work or a desire to frustrate payment of child support.
It is true that a mere disinclination to work, no matter what the motive, will not relieve a noncustodial parent with established earning capacity from contributing to the support of dependent children. Thus, where trial courts have ordered noncustodial parents to pay support based upon existing earning capacity, we have consistently found such orders to be within the discretion. Rapson v. Rapson, 165 Colo. 188, 437 P.2d 780 (1968); Berge v. Berge, 33 Colo.App. 376, 522 P.2d 752 (1974).
Here, however, though father’s partial unemployment is self induced, this is not dispositive. In re Marriage of Carney, 631 P.2d 1173 (Colo.App.1981). There is no evidence or purported finding that father’s reason for leaving the army was because of a disinclination to work. Rather, the trial court’s conclusions are consistent with father’s reasonable desire to continue his education and enhance his earning capacity. See § 14-10-115(l)(e), C.R.S. Cf. In re Marriage of Angerman, 44 Colo.App. 298, 612 P.2d 1166 (1980). And, where no disinclination to work is found, the trial court in addressing a motion to modify a support order must base its determination on conditions as they exist at the time of the hearing. In re Marriage of Serfoss, 642 P.2d 44 (Colo.App.1981). Therefore, we must not substitute our findings of facts for those found or not found by the trial court. Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792 (1979). And, a statement of the trial court taken out of context should not be used to impeach its final decision. Indeed, in cases of limited financial resources, when judged by need alone, few if any support orders are not “unconscionable.”
Based upon the record before us, I perceive no abuse of discretion by the trial court in limiting the increase in child support to the cost of health and accident insurance premiums for the child as agreed to by the father. I would therefore affirm.