Court Opinion

ID: 9886451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 16:10:49.866913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:01.082543
License: Public Domain

J-S15018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 JOHN-WALTER E. WEISER                   :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :         PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant            :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 ALEXANDER D. BABIK                      :    No. 1351 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 26, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County
                   Civil Division at No: 2021-SU-0000343

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                       FILED: OCTOBER 6, 2023

      Appellant, John-Walter Weiser, appeals from an order denying his

petition to enforce his settlement agreement with Appellee, Alexander D.

Babik. Appellant argues that the trial court erred by declining to determine

that Appellee violated the non-disparagement clause of the settlement

agreement by making deprecatory remarks about Appellant in a Facebook

post and during a public meeting of a constable association. We agree with

Appellant that the evidence demonstrates that Appellee violated the non-

disparagement provisions. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for

further proceedings concerning the relief due.

      Appellant and Appellee were business partners in a cigar shop and

members of the Commonwealth Constable Association (“CCA”). The two had

a falling out, and on April 16, 2021, Appellant filed a civil complaint against

Appellee and a petition for an injunction. On May 28, 2021, Appellant and
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Appellee dissolved their business partnership by entering into a settlement

agreement (“Agreement”).

      Due to the hostility between the parties, the Agreement includes a non-

disparagement provision in which each party agrees not to make “any

disparaging communication about the other party.”          Agreement at 2.   The

Agreement defines “disparaging communication” as “a communication which

is belittling, contemptuous, decrying, degrading, demeaning, denigrative,

denigratory, deprecatory, depreciative, depreciatory, derisory, derogative,

derogatory,     detractive,      disdainful,   scornful,     slighting,   and/or

uncomplimentary.” Id. The Agreement states that if either party violates its

terms, the non-violating party can seek injunctive relief via an order to

prohibit further disparagement as well as counsel fees and costs incurred in

the course of obtaining the order. Id. at 4.

      On March 7, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to enforce the settlement

agreement     seeking   an    injunction   against   Appellee   for   disparaging

communications and an award of counsel fees and costs. Appellant alleged

that Appellee made disparaging statements about Appellant in a Facebook

post on July 10, 2021 and during a CCA meeting on January 20, 2022.

Appellee filed an answer to Appellant’s motion and a counterclaim alleging

four claims against Appellant.

      On August 23, 2022, the court convened an evidentiary hearing

concerning the parties’ claims.        The following evidence was adduced

concerning Appellee’s Facebook post.       Subsequent to the Agreement, both

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parties remained members of the CCA. Appellant acted as president of the

CCA from 2017 through 2020 and again in 2022.

      On July 10, 2021, Appellant and Shawn Vinson were the only individuals

running for president of the CCA in 2022. Hrg., 8/23/22, at 8. On that date,

Appellee published a post on Facebook that stated in relevant part:

      As a previous board member recently resigned due to the
      corruption of past leadership . . . I highly recommend the people
      push for an external audit of the financial state of the CCA . . . We
      need to know where our money is and where it is spent. Past
      leadership has abused our money. Past leadership has claimed
      our money as their own. Let[’]s unite together to ensure our
      money is ours, not a single person[’]s. Let’s take back the CCA
      like Shawn Vinson has been trying to do. Shawn will put us in the
      right direction. He is not corrupted. He will do what is right for
      the people. He will not steal from an association he stands for.
      Vinson is the only option. Vinson will bring us out of this. I (as
      an active constable) will not be victim of an association leadership
      being controlling and racist.

Appellant’s Exhibit 2. Immediately following this post, Appellant sent a letter

through his counsel instructing Appellee to stop making disparaging

communications. Subsequently, Appellant was elected President of the CCA.

      In response to Appellant’s prehearing requests for admission, Appellee

admitted that (1) he made the Facebook post, (2) Appellant was running for

president of the CCA in the upcoming year (2022) at the time of the post, and

(3) Appellee supported Shawn Vinson for president of the CCA.           Appellee

testified during the hearing that he published the Facebook to “get people to

vote for” Vinson.   Hrg. at 112.    Appellee did not introduce evidence that

anyone was running for president besides Appellant and Vinson.

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     Appellee admitted that he intended to group and refer to Appellant

Weiser as one of those people in the “past leadership” who were corrupt,

racist, and abusing the CCA’s money, even though he did not expressly state

Appellant’s name in the post:

     Counsel for Appellant: I’m asking just a simple direct question.
     Are you referring to [Appellant] as controlling and racist in this
     Facebook post; yes or no?

     Appellee: I already answered that question multiple times.

     The Court: Answer that question, sir.

     Appellee: Not directly, no, but I am grouping him into the group
     of all who were board members of the association.

     Counsel for Appellant: So you are grouping him in being
     someone as controlling and racist?

     Appellee: It could be under that category, correct.

     Counsel for Appellant: Not could be. You just said under oath
     you are lumping him in with this group of past leadership that’s
     controlling and racist, correct?

     Appellee: Correct. He’s in that group, yeah.

     Counsel for Appellant: And you’re lumping him in with the past
     leadership that he abused money, correct?

     Appellee: He potentially could have abused money, correct.

                                    …..

     Counsel for Appellant: You’re telling people who read this
     Facebook post whoever read it, members or whatnot, that
     [Appellant’s] part of the past leadership that has abused our
     monies, claimed those monies as their own and this is controlling
     and racist?

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      Appellee: At no point did I say his name.         I said the board
      members, past board members.

      Counsel for Appellant: No, but you already testified what you
      were referring to past leadership includes [Appellant]?

      Appellee: Correct, but it doesn’t name him directly.

Id. at 110-12.

      The evidence concerning the January 20, 2022 CCA meeting is as

follows. On that date, Appellant presided over a CCA meeting as president,

and Appellee attended in the audience. Approximately six persons attended

the meeting, and 125 persons viewed it online. Id. at 11. During the meeting,

Appellee asked about a supposed investigation by the Attorney General’s

Office into the CCA’s financial irregularities.   Appellant answered and then

added, “But I also think to sit here and act like we don’t know where that may

have stemmed from would be kind of foolish.” Id. at 20. Appellee asserts

this was directed at him. Following these remarks, Appellee responded, “I am

not going to go through these BS games of you doing whatever you are doing,”

“this is not fun anymore, I want you out of my life, to leave me alone,” and

“stop stalking me.” Id. at 12. Appellee was looking at Appellant when he

made these remarks.        Id.   Appellee admitted that he directed these

statements to Appellant.      Appellant’s Exhibit 2 (Appellee’s response to

requests for admission).    Appellee further testified that he used the term

“stalking” because Appellant had followed him after he left a cigar store in

February 2021. Hrg. at 94, 114. The court took judicial notice of the fact that

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stalking is defined as a criminal offense in the Crimes Code. Id. at 12 (citing

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1, the crime of stalking).1

       On August 26, 2022, the court denied Appellant’s motion to enforce the

settlement agreement and his request for counsel fees. The court also denied

Appellee’s counterclaims.         The court declined to enforce the settlement

agreement on the ground that the non-disparagement provision in the

settlement agreement was ambiguous:

       The Agreement’s Non-Disparagement provision presented before
       this court attempts to define the term “disparaging” by providing
       a host of other synonyms. Yet, the broad definition of the term
       compels this court to find that the term is ambiguous. The all-
       encompassing term, “disparaging,” could be constructed
       differently and understood in several ways depending on the
       context in which the statement is made. The agreement prohibits
       “disparaging”     communication      “about    the   other   party.”
       Importantly, there is no suggestion in the Agreement as to
       whether general statements that do not specifically mention the
       other party could be construed as disparaging against the other
       party through inference, implication or innuendo. The dictionary
       definition of “disparaging” is a statement “meant to belittle the
       value or importance of someone or something.”              Merriam-
       Webster.com Dictionary, s.v. “disparaging.” There is an element
                                      2

       of intent in the definition. Here, neither party mentioned the other
       specifically or directly or by name in any of the complained of
       statements. No intent to belittle the Appellant can be discerned
       from [Appellee’s] remarks.

____________________________________________

1 Section 2709.1 grades stalking as a first-degree misdemeanor for most first

offenses and as a third-degree felony for second and subsequent offenses.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(c).

2 The term “s.v.” stands for “sub verbo,” a Latin phrase meaning “under the

word.”

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Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Opinion, 10/31/22, at 5.      The court then determined that

neither the Facebook post nor the statement during the CCA meeting was

disparaging:

      With regard to the Facebook post, [Appellee] only provided
      general communications regarding the entire leadership board
      during an election cycle.      The statements were generalized
      without specificity to time or person. Though Appellant and two
      other members of the CCA, who were friends of Appellant, thought
      that the [Appellee] “probably” targeted Appellant with his
      communications, there is nothing within the July Facebook post
      directed toward Appellant unambiguously. Rather, [Appellee]
      posted generalized critiques of the leadership of the CCA that
      could apply to any previous leadership member as far back as
      1985 when the CCA was created. Appellant’s own witnesses
      testified that the statements could be directed toward other
      members of the leadership board, particularly the treasurer of the
      CCA.

      Similarly, this Court does not believe the other, barely audible,
      statements made during an exchange occurring between BOTH
      parties can be construed as disparaging statements in the context
      in which they were made. They were not intended to belittle
      Appellant but were rather a request to refrain from certain actions,
      and an expression of [Appellee]’s frustration. Despite Appellant’s
      efforts to portray the “stop stalking me” statement as a direct
      accusation of criminal behavior, this Court discerns that the use
      of the word “stalking” was no more than a generalized statement
      asking one person to leave the other alone.

      It is also noted the exchange was initiated by Appellant. Viewing
      the recording of the meeting, it is evident [Appellee] was the
      subject of discussion between Appellant and at least one other
      board member outside of the public meeting.

Id. at 5-6.

      Appellant filed post-trial motions, which the court denied, and a timely

notice of appeal on September 23, 2022. Both Appellant and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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     Appellant raises the following issues in this appeal:

     1. Whether the lower court committed an error of law and/or
     abused its discretion in finding that Appellee did not violate the
     non-disparagement provision of the parties’ settlement
     agreement when he told Appellant to “Stop stalking me” at a
     meeting of the CCA which was witnessed by numerous members
     and others?

     2. Whether the lower court committed an error of law and/or
     abused its discretion in finding that Appellee did not violate the
     non-disparagement provision of the parties’ settlement
     agreement when he published a Facebook post dated July 10,
     2021, where:

     a) this Facebook post expressly referred to “past leadership” of
     the CCA as being corrupt, racist, and having “abused our money”;

     b) this Facebook post was published during an election for the
     2022 President of the CCA which had only two (2) candidates
     running, with Appellant as the only challenger and the only
     member of the “past leadership” running against Appellee’s
     candidate (Shawn Vinson);

     c) the witnesses who testified at the hearing understood and
     believed that Appellee was referring to Appellant as part of the
     “past leadership” that was corrupt, racist, and abusing money in
     this Facebook post since he was the only challenger running for
     the 2022 President position against Appellee’s candidate (Shawn
     Vinson), and they viewed those comments as being negative and
     disparaging about Appellant; and,

     d) Appellee himself testified that he included Appellant in the “past
     leadership” being referred to in the post as being corrupt, racist,
     and having “abused our money” when he made that Facebook
     post in support of his candidate (Shawn Vinson) and against
     Appellant (who was the only candidate running against Mr.
     Vinson)?

     3. Whether the lower court committed an error of law and/or
     abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for the
     issuance of an order to prohibit Appellee from making future
     disparaging communications, and denied Appellant’s request for

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      an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in bringing the
      enforcement motion, where:

      a) Appellee had made one or more disparaging communications
      against Appellant in violation of the parties’ settlement
      agreement;

      b) Appellant had incurred reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to
      enforce the settlement agreement based upon the work required
      to be done in response to Appellee’s litigation strategy, and no
      time entry or cost was disputed as being unreasonable at the
      hearing; and,

      c) the parties’ settlement agreement expressly provided for such
      relief?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (cleaned up). Appellee did not appeal the denial of his

counterclaims or file a brief in the present appeal.

      In his first two arguments, Appellant contends that the trial court erred

by concluding that Appellee did not violate the non-disparagement clause of

the settlement agreement in his Facebook post or during the CCA meeting.

We agree with Appellant. Contrary to the trial court’s decision, we hold that

(1) the non-disparagement clause is clear and unambiguous, and (2) Appellee

disparaged Appellant under the plain language of the clause.

      In an appeal from an order denying enforcement of a settlement

agreement, our standard of review is as follows:

      The enforceability of settlement agreements is determined
      according to principles of contract law.          Because contract
      interpretation is a question of law, this Court is not bound by the
      trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of review over questions
      of law is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of our
      review is plenary as [the appellate] court may review the entire
      record in making its decision . . . With respect to factual
      conclusions, we may reverse the trial court only if its findings of

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        fact are predicated on an error of law or are unsupported by
        competent evidence in the record.

Mastroni-Mucker v. Allstate Ins. Co., 976 A.2d 510, 517-18 (Pa. Super.

2009).

        It does not appear that any Pennsylvania appellate court has had

occasion to address whether the terms of a non-disparagement provision in a

settlement agreement are ambiguous.             Even so, the standards governing

claims of contractual ambiguity are well demarcated, and we will apply them

here.

        The first step in resolving a claim of ambiguity is to “look to the writing

itself, for if [its] terms are clear and precise, performance must be required in

accordance with the intent as expressed in the agreement without resort to

rules of construction or extrinsic evidence.”        Circle K, Inc. v. Webster

Trustee of Webster Irrevocable Grantor Trust, 256 A.3d 461, 464 (Pa.

Super. 2021). “[W]hen the language of a contract is clear and unequivocal,

courts interpret its meaning by its content alone, within the four corners of

the document.” Dressler Family, LP v. PennEnergy Resources, LLP, 276

A.3d 729, 736 (Pa. Super. 2022). When a contract does not define a particular

word, we look to the word’s natural, plain, and ordinary meaning, and we

inform our understanding of the word by considering its dictionary

definition. Ungarean v. CAN, 286 A.3d 353, 380 (Pa. Super. 2022).

        “Courts do not assume that a contract’s language was chosen carelessly,

nor do they assume that the parties were ignorant of the meaning of the

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language they employed.” Mitch v. XTO Energy, Inc., 212 A.3d 1135, 1138-

39 (Pa. Super. 2019). “[T]his Court need only examine the writing itself to

give effect to the parties’ understanding. [We] must construe the contract

only as written and may not modify the plain meaning under the guise of

interpretation.” Id. “A court must not distort the meaning of the language

or resort to a strained contrivance to find an ambiguity.” Dominic’s Inc. v.

Tony’s Famous Tomato Pie Bar & Restaurant, Inc., 214 A.3d 259, 268

(Pa. Super. 2019).

      Here, the settlement agreement provides that each party shall not make

“any disparaging communication about the other party.”            The agreement

defines “disparaging communication” as “a communication which is belittling,

contemptuous, decrying, degrading, demeaning, denigrative, denigratory,

deprecatory, depreciative, depreciatory, derisory, derogative, derogatory,

detractive,   disdainful,   scornful,    slighting,   and/or   uncomplimentary.”

Agreement at 2.      The term “and/or” establishes that a communication is

disparaging if it fulfills any one of, or any combination of, the adjectives in the

definition.

      The trial court finds this definition ambiguous because it consists of a

“series of synonyms.” This is an error of law. These terms are unambiguous;

their plain meanings are easily ascertainable on their face or by resort to a

dictionary.   For example, “demeaning” means “damaging or lowering the

character, status, or reputation of someone or something,” Merriam-

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Webster.com., an easily understandable definition that we have no trouble

applying to the evidence.3 Curiously, the court calls the contract’s definition

ambiguous even though its own definition of “disparaging” (“meant to

belittle”) mirrors one of the adjectives in the contract’s definition (“belittling”).

         The court also asserts that the non-disparagement provision is

ambiguous because it fails to specify “whether general statements that do not

specifically mention the other party could be construed as disparaging against

the other party through inference, implication or innuendo.” Opinion at 5.

The court ultimately held that communications that did not specifically name

the other party fell outside the non-disparagement provision. This too was

error.     This provision prohibits each party from making disparaging

communications “about” the other party. “About” is a preposition that means

“with regard to: concerning,” Merriam-Webster.com, a broad term that

encompasses communications that concern the other party, either directly or

by implication and innuendo. The limitation imposed by the court runs afoul

of the plain language of the non-disparagement clause and cripples its

effectiveness by permitting the parties to disparage one another merely by

omitting the other’s name from derogatory statements.

____________________________________________

3 Two terms, “denigrative” or “denigratory”, do not appear in the dictionary,
probably because they are ungrammatical. Even so, the first eight letters of
these terms obviously refer to the verb “denigrate,” which means “to attack
the reputation of; defame,” id.

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      We hold that Appellee’s first communication, the July 10, 2021 Facebook

post, is disparaging under the definition in the parties’ agreement.       The

Facebook post referenced the “corruption of past leadership” of the CCA and

recommended an “external audit” of the CCA’s finances. The post went on to

assert that Shawn Vinson will “put [the CCA] in the right direction,” because

Vinson “is not corrupted” and “will not steal from an association he stands

for.” Although Appellee did not mention Appellant by name, Appellant was

part of the CCA’s “past leadership,” having served as the CCA’s president from

2017 to 2020. In addition, at the time of the post, Appellant and Vinson were

the only persons running for CCA president in the upcoming year of 2022.

Viewed with these facts as backdrop, the Facebook post was demeaning

because it implied that Appellant was corrupt, had stolen from the CCA in the

past, and would steal again from the CCA if elected president in 2022.

      The trial court refused to find Appellee liable on the ground that the

Facebook post was “generalized without specificity to time or person” and

“there [was] nothing . . . directed toward Appellant unambiguously.”

Pa.R.A.P. Opinion, 10/31/22, at 5-6. This decision rests upon the court’s error

of law that the non-disparagement provision only applies to communications

that directly name the other party. Construed properly, this provision also

prohibits communications such as the Facebook post that disparage the other

party implicitly or by innuendo.

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      We also hold that Appellee’s statement to Appellant during the January

20, 2022 CCA meeting, i.e., “stop stalking me,” violated the non-

disparagement provision.     During the meeting, Appellee asked about an

alleged investigation by the Attorney General’s Office into the CCA’s financial

irregularities. Appellant answered in relevant part, “I also think to sit here

and act like we don’t know where that may have stemmed from would be kind

of foolish.” Appellee replied, “I am not going to go through these BS games

of you doing whatever you are doing,” “this is not fun anymore, I want you

out of my life, to leave me alone,” and “stop stalking me.” Although the court

downplays this statement as “no[thing] more than a generalized statement

asking one person to leave the other alone,” Opinion at 6, it clearly was

demeaning because its plain import was to accuse Appellant of the crime of

stalking. Thus, as a matter of law, this communication transgressed the non-

disparagement provision.

      The court also excused the “stalking” statement on the ground that “the

exchange was initiated by Appellant.” Id. at 6. Under the non-disparagement

provision, however, it does not matter who began the exchange.         All that

matters is whether the content of any party’s communication is disparaging.

The “stalking” communication clearly was.

      Due to the court’s errors of law, we reverse the court’s order refusing

to enforce the non-disparagement provision. Mastroni-Mucker, 976 A.2d at

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517-18 (order declining to enforce settlement agreement is reversible when

trial court’s decision rests upon error of law).

      In his final argument, Appellant objects to the court’s refusal to grant

injunctive relief or award him counsel fees as a result of Appellee’s violation

of   the   settlement   agreement.      Having     determined   that   Appellee’s

communications breached the settlement agreement, we conclude that the

trial court should determine, in the first instance, the proper remedy for

Appellee’s violations. Accordingly, we remand this case in order for the court

to consider Appellant’s requests for injunctive relief and attorney fees.

      Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings in accordance

with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/06/2021

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