Court Opinion

ID: 9672804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:00:34.78616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:18.446009
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, P.J.
(concurring). I fully concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I feel it is necessary to comment further upon whether intentional torts are covered under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, thereby barring a separate tort action.
The majority quite correctly rules that, where an injury is within the scope of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, workers’ compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy against both *79the employer and the coemployes. Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich 356; 245 NW2d 26 (1976); Holody v Detroit, 117 Mich App 76; 323 NW2d 599 (1982). However, not all injuries alleged against an employer are necessarily covered by the act. The employee is sometimes still allowed to sue the employer in court. In Moore v Federal Dep’t Stores, 33 Mich App 556; 190 NW2d 262 (1971), lv den 385 Mich 784 (1971), this Court held that false imprisonment is not the type of personal injury contemplated by the act. Slayton v Michigan Host, Inc, 122 Mich App 411; 332 NW2d 498 (1983), Pacheco v Clifton, 109 Mich App 563; 311 NW2d 801 (1981), lv gtd 417 Mich 888 (1983), and Stimson v Bell Telephone Co, 77 Mich App 361; 258 NW2d 227 (1977), all held that injuries resulting from employment discrimination are not covered by the act. Therefore, a separate suit is allowable. Likewise, Milton v Oakland County, 50 Mich App 279; 213 NW2d 250 (1973), held that, where the defendant violated the plaintiff’s employment rights for promotion, he was allowed to maintain a separate suit because this is not the type of industrial injury contemplated by the act. One particular type of injury not covered by the act is the injury arising from an intentional tort. Seals v Henry Ford Hosptial, 123 Mich App 329; 333 NW2d 272 (1983); Kissinger v Mannor, 92 Mich App 572; 285 NW2d 214 (1979); Broaddus v Ferndale Fastener Div, Ring Screw Works, 84 Mich App 593; 269 NW2d 689 (1978), lv den 403 Mich 850 (1978).
I disagree to some extent with the majority’s analysis of Genson v Bofors-Lakeway, Inc, 122 Mich App 470; 332 NW2d 507 (1983). Genson quite properly held that, merely because the plaintiff has alleged what he claims to be an intentional *80tort, he is not therefore automatically outside the act. In both Burgess v Holloway Construction Co, 123 Mich App 505; 332 NW2d 584 (1983), and McKinley v Holiday Inn, 115 Mich App 160; 320 NW2d 329 (1982), lv den 417 Mich 890 (1983), the workers had been injured through intentional torts. In Burgess, the worker had been murdered by a coemployee. While specifically stating that intentional torts are outside the act, this Court held that the exclusive remedy provision barred that particular suit anyway because plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that the employer itself had committed the intentional tort. In McKinley, the worker had been raped by a patron at the motel where she worked. Here, too, this Court held that the exclusive remedy provision barred the suit. However, McKinley specifically noted: "The instant plaintiff’s complaint against Holiday Inn is grounded solely in negligence. No intentional misconduct is alleged.” 115 Mich App 165.
Genson dealt with another aspect of the intentional tort issue. There, the workers had alleged that their employer had "maliciously, intentionally and wantonly” withheld from them information concerning benzidine and had "maliciously, intentionally and wantonly” assured them that benzidine would not harm them. However, most everything one does is intentional. In order to allege an intentional tort outside the act, the plaintiff must allege that the employer intended the injury itself and not merely the activity leading to the injury.1 In other words, the intentional *81tort necessary to get outside the act is the one that requires "the formation by the employer of a specific intention to cause an injury or death (combined with some action aimed at accomplishing such result), as opposed to mere negligence or even gross negligence”. Anno: What conduct is willful, intentional, or deliberate within workmen’s compensation act provision authorizing tort action for such conduct, 96 ALR3d 1064, 1068. The employer must have entertained the desire to bring about the result. Courtney v BASF Wyandotte Corp, 385 So 2d 391 (La App, 1980), cert den 386 So 2d 359 (La, 1980). Because the plaintiffs in Genson did not sufficiently allege that the employer had intended the injuries rather than intending the act leading to the injuries, the suit was barred by the act. Genson is not inconsistent with Kissinger and Broaddus.2
Artonio v Hirsch, 3 App Div 2d 939; 163 NYS2d 489 (1957), illustrates the distinction that is made. There, the worker alleged that the employer had deliberately sealed and intentionally made inoperative safety locks on certain steel presses that the plaintiff worked on. As a consequence, the employee was injured. Even though it alleges an intentional activity, such an allegation is insufficient by itself to overcome the exclusvie remedy provision. In analyzing this case, Professor Larson said:
"If [this decision seems] rather strict, one must re*82mind oneself that what is being tested here is not the degree of gravity of depravity of the employer’s conduct, but rather the narrow issue of intentional versus accidental quality of the precise event producing injury. The intentional removal of a safety device or toleration of a dangerous condition may or may not set the stage for an accidental injury later. But in any normal use of the words, it cannot be said, if such an injury does happen, that this was deliberate infliction of harm comparable to an intentional left jab to the chin.” 2A Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 68.13, p 13-27.
Earlier Professor Larson states the rule concerning intentional torts as follows:
"Intentional injury inflicted by the employer in person on his employee may be made the subject of a common-law action for damages on the theory that, in such an action, the employer will not be heard to say that his intentional act was an 'accidental’ injury and so under the exclusive provisions of the compensation act. * * * But when the intentional injury is committed by a co-employee the better rule is that an action in damages will not lie against the employer merely because the co-employee occupied supervisory status in relation to the claimant.” Id., § 68, p 13-1.
Certainly the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act should not be construed to encourage intentional torts.
"It would be anomalous to permit a defendant which, as in this case, acting through its officer assaulted the plaintiff herein, to say, T can assault you with impunity and the only remedy you have is to take Workmen’s Compensation which I provided for you.’ ” Garcia v Gusmack Restaurant Corp, 150 NYS2d 232, 233 (NYC Ct, 1954).
In Kissinger, supra, this Court stated:
*83"The Legislature could not have intended that the exclusive remedy section of the act be construed to preclude a plaintiffs record for injuries suffered in an intentional tort such as the one before us. A substantial portion of plaintiffs injuries did not arise out of an employer-employee relationship and they occurred irrespective of the fact that plaintiff happened to be employed at the factory.” 92 Mich App 577-578.
I feel that it is a total misconception of the act to inquire only into the type of injury to determine if it is covered. As the quote from Kissinger indicates, intentional torts normally do not occur within the course of employment. Therefore, the injuries that result from the intentional tort do not arise from the employment.
I do not believe that this Court is straying as far away from these principles as the majority indicates.

 This same distinction has been made in governmental immunity law. If an intentional tort is alleged and the government cannot justify its actions, governmental immunity does not apply. Smith v Michigan, 122 Mich App 340; 333 NW2d 50 (1983). However, an intentional tort must be alleged. The plaintiff cannot merely allege that the government acted intentionally. Elliott v Dep’t of Social Services, 124 Mich App 124; 333 NW2d 603 (1983); Randall v Delta Charter Twp, 121 Mich App 26; 328 NW2d 562 (1982).

 Genson recognized that the act is not limited to recovery for accidental injuries. Even if the worker is assaulted by a coemployee, he can recover under the act. Crilly v Ballou, 353 Mich 303; 91 NW2d 493 (1958); Andrews v General Motors Corp, 98 Mich App 556, 559; 296 NW2d 309 (1980), lv den 412 Mich 926; 315 NW2d 127 (1982). But saying this is very different than saying that the act is the exclusive remedy for an injury that the employer intentionally inflicts on the employee.