Court Opinion

ID: 9941076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 20:03:11.545187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:12.271063
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/15/24 P. v. Cortez CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         B327055

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. BA503841)
          v.

 DAVID CORTEZ,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura Priver, Judge. Affirmed.
      Andrea Bitar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Jason Tran and Kristen Inberg, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

       A jury convicted defendant David Cortez of assault with a
deadly weapon and arson. On appeal, Cortez contends there was
insufficient evidence that he did not act in self-defense or defense
of another. Cortez also argues the trial court erroneously denied
his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the arson count. We
affirm the judgment.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On April 22, 2020, Oscar Garcia and Annie Wrate set out to
retrieve some tools from Lupe Cortez.1 Garcia told Wrate that
Lupe lived in an R.V., and they drove to its location in Garcia’s
vehicle. Garcia approached the door of the R.V. Wrate stayed
back 10 or 15 feet. Wrate saw Garcia and another man begin
arguing near the door of the R.V. She then saw the man come
out of the R.V. and stab Garcia twice. Wrate moved further away
from the R.V. and briefly turned her back on the interaction.
Lupe emerged and attempted to break up the fight. Garcia
eventually managed to get away. Wrate drove him to the
hospital. Wrate and Garcia were surprised and shocked at what
had happened. Wrate did not see Garcia with a knife or any
other weapon before, during, or after the incident.
       Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Officer Angelica
Gutierrez interviewed Garcia later that day. Garcia told
Gutierrez that Lupe’s brother stabbed him. Garcia had not met
or seen the brother previously, but he provided a physical
description. Garcia also described the location of the incident.

1     For the sake of clarity we refer to Lupe by first name only.
No disrespect is intended.

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Garcia suffered a collapsed lung and was hospitalized for four
days.
       LAPD Detective George Wilson went to the location Garcia
described the day after the stabbing. Cortez was at the site.
Another detective took photographs of Cortez, which showed
injuries to his face, several fingers, and both palms. Lupe was
also there, inside an R.V.
       A few days later, LAPD officers arrested Cortez. Wilson
and officer Kim Hanna conducted a recorded interview, during
which Cortez provided his account of the stabbing. Cortez told
the officers that he was at his sister’s R.V. on the day of the
incident. Garcia and Wrate appeared to be “aggressive” and
“sneaky” when they approached the R.V. Cortez was afraid they
were there to attack Lupe. He also believed Garcia was hiding
something behind his back or thigh. Cortez felt the situation was
becoming “very tense,” so he went inside the R.V. and grabbed a
knife. When he returned to the door, Garcia was holding a large
silver knife. The knife’s blade was “thick” and “longer than a
piece of paper.” Cortez came out of the R.V. and “jabbed” Garcia
twice “to push him back.” During the fight that ensued, Cortez
grabbed the blade of Garcia’s knife. Cortez heard Garcia say,
“ ‘you’re going to die, you’re going to die.’ ” Cortez eventually
dropped his knife and the struggle stopped.
       Sometime between the stabbing and Cortez’s arrest, the
R.V. was burned to the ground. Wilson and Hanna asked Cortez
about the fire during the interview. Cortez told them he set fire
to the R.V. because he did not want Lupe to live there anymore.
After the interview, Wilson returned to the R.V., where he found
Lupe sorting through its burned debris.

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       During the trial, after the prosecution rested its case,
Cortez moved for a judgment of acquittal on the arson charge
under Penal Code section 1118.1.2 He argued there was
insufficient evidence that the R.V. was inhabited at the time it
was burned. The trial court denied the motion.
       A jury convicted Cortez of arson of an inhabited structure
or property (§ 451, subd. (b)) and assault with a deadly weapon
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court imposed an aggregate
sentence of 12 years in state prison. Cortez timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
       Cortez contends there was insufficient evidence to support
either conviction. We disagree.
I.     Standard of Review
       To determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
criminal conviction, “we review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment of the trial court. We evaluate whether
substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and credible evidence
of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting the trier of fact to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Vargas (2020) 9
Cal.5th 793, 820.) We presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence, and we accept logical inferences the jury might have
drawn from circumstantial evidence. (People v. Baker (2021) 10
Cal.5th 1044, 1103 (Baker).) Reversal is not warranted unless it
appears “ ‘ “ ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)

2       All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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II.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Conviction for
       Assault with a Deadly Weapon
       Cortez argues the evidence was insufficient to allow the
jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he did not act
in lawful defense of himself or Lupe when he stabbed Garcia.
       “ ‘To justify an act of self-defense for [an assault charge
under section 245], the defendant must have an honest and
reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him
[or another]. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13
Cal.4th 1055, 1064 (Minifie).) “ ‘ “[T]he peril must appear to the
defendant as immediate and present and not prospective or even
in the near future. An imminent peril is one that, from
appearances, must be instantly dealt with.” ’ ” (In re Christian S.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 783 (Christian S.).) In addition, “ ‘any right
of self-defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable
under the circumstances. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Minifie, at
p. 1065.) “It is the prosecution’s burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful self-
defense. [Citation.] However, as stated above, our review is for
substantial evidence.” (People v. Cruz-Partida (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 197, 212 (Cruz-Partida).)
       The evidence at trial amply supported the jury’s rejection of
Cortez’s claim that he acted in defense of Lupe. The undisputed
evidence reflects that Lupe was not present when the altercation
began. According to Wrate, Lupe appeared only after Cortez had
already stabbed Garcia. In Cortez’s account, he said Lupe was
not at the R.V. when Garcia arrived. He did not mention Lupe
again in describing how the incident occurred. The jury could
reasonably conclude that Cortez did not stab Garcia because he
honestly and reasonably believed Garcia was about to inflict

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bodily injury on Lupe, since she was not even present. (Minifie,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1065.)
       Substantial evidence also supported the jury’s rejection of
Cortez’s self-defense claim. While Cortez offered his description
of the incident, Wrate’s account differed. Wrate testified that she
heard “a little bit of arguing” in voices that were “just barely”
raised, then a man, who Garcia later identified as Lupe’s brother,
exited the R.V. and started stabbing Garcia. Wrate had not seen
Garcia with a knife at any point that day. As she drove Garcia to
the hospital, they were both shocked and she was surprised at
“how everything went down.” Thus, accepting all logical
inferences that could be drawn from the testimony, Wrate’s
account was that in the midst of a verbal argument, Cortez
stepped out of the R.V. and began stabbing Garcia, who did not
have a weapon of any kind. This disproved any claim that Cortez
had a reasonable belief that Garcia was about to inflict bodily
injury on him, or that his resistance in the form of stabbing
Garcia was reasonable under the circumstances. The jury was
entitled to credit Wrate’s account.
       Moreover, there was other substantial evidence that even if
Cortez believed Garcia posed an imminent threat, that belief was
not reasonable. Cortez told officers that Garcia and Wrate were
aggressive, and that the situation at the R.V. was tense. He
believed Garcia was hiding something behind his back or thigh
and later saw that Garcia was holding a large knife. Although
this evidence, if credited, would support that Cortez perceived
Garcia as a threat, nothing in the record indicates the threat was
so immediate that Cortez needed to respond to it “ ‘ “instantly.” ’ ”
(Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 783.) There was no evidence
that Garcia ever tried to enter the R.V., lunged at or attacked

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Cortez, or even wielded the knife in a menacing manner before
Cortez began stabbing him. Cortez told officers that Garcia said,
“ ‘you’re going to die,’ ” but that was only after the stabbing. He
did not describe any other verbal threats. Even if a jury believed
Cortez’s statement that Garcia had a knife, the evidence also
supported the finding that Cortez did not honestly or reasonably
perceive this as an imminent threat.
       Cortez contends that the reasonableness of his fear of
imminent harm had to be evaluated from his particular
perspective. He cites People v. Sotelo-Urena (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th
732, in which an expert opined that the chronically homeless
suffer unusually high rates of violence and may therefore
“experience a heightened fear of aggression . . . .” (Id. at p. 751.)
The court found this expert opinion relevant because it “would
assist a jury in weighing the reasonableness of defendant’s belief
of imminent harm . . . .” (Ibid.) Yet, as Cortez concedes, there
was no evidence that he was homeless, or, as he suggests, that he
was a person “more experienced with violence, and thus more
quick to recognize a threatening situation.” The jury was not free
to speculate about Cortez’s background or life experiences, nor
are we. Based on the evidence as a whole as presented at trial,
the jury could fairly determine that Cortez did not honestly and
reasonably believe Garcia posed an imminent threat. (Minifie,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1064; Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 783.)
       Similarly, there was substantial evidence that Cortez used
unreasonable force under the circumstances. (Minifie, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 1065.) Immediately before the stabbing, Cortez
stood at the entrance of the R.V. and Garcia stood outside. As
noted above, there was no evidence Garcia took any steps to enter

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the R.V. According to Cortez, before he stabbed Garcia, he left
the entrance of the R.V. and went inside. Garcia did not pursue
him. Cortez then retrieved a knife, returned to the doorway, and
stepped outside to stab Garcia. There was no evidence the
stabbing was preceded by any physical action on Garcia’s part.
Cortez told officers that he “jabbed” Garcia twice “to push him
back.” Yet, the attack was severe enough that Garcia suffered a
collapsed lung and spent four days recovering in the hospital. A
reasonable jury could determine Cortez used unreasonable force
in response to any threat Garcia posed.
       Cortez contends his actions and injuries were “consistent
with a person acting defensively, not offensively.” But even
defensive injuries would not establish the stabbing was lawful
self-defense. It was undisputed that there was a scuffle between
Garcia and Cortez and the two men struggled. However, both
Cortez and Wrate appeared to indicate that the fight took place
after Cortez had already stabbed Garcia. In any event, to the
extent the evidence was in conflict, the jury was entitled to weigh
the evidence and make credibility determinations. “ ‘ “If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding. [Citation.] A reviewing court neither reweighs
evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (Cruz-Partida, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 206.)
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Cortez’s
       Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on the Arson
       Charge
       Cortez was charged with and convicted of “arson of an
inhabited structure or property” under section 451,

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subdivision (b). A structure is “inhabited” if it was “being used
for dwelling purposes[,] whether occupied or not,” at the time the
fire was set. (§ 450, subd. (d); People v. Vang (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 377, 386.) Cortez contends the trial court erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal of the arson charge
because there was insufficient evidence that Lupe inhabited the
R.V. when it was burned. We find no error.
        Section 1118.1 allows a defendant to move for a judgment
of acquittal after the close of evidence on either side and before
the case is submitted to the jury. It requires the court to enter a
judgment of acquittal if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction. (§ 1118.1.) This mechanism is “used to cull the
‘ “ ‘few instances in which the prosecution fails to make even a
prima facie case.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson (2021) 11
Cal.5th 259, 301 (Wilson).) “ ‘The standard applied by a trial
court in ruling upon a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant
to section 1118.1 is the same as the standard applied by an
appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, that is, “whether from the evidence,
including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there
is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the
offense charged.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Stevens (2007) 41
Cal.4th 182, 200.) “The sufficiency of the evidence is tested at the
point the motion is made. [Citations.] The question is one of law,
subject to independent review.” (Ibid.)
        Before Cortez moved for a judgment of acquittal, the
prosecution presented substantial evidence that Lupe lived in the
R.V. when it was burned. Cortez told LAPD officers that he was
at his sister’s R.V. on the day of the stabbing. He also said that
he set fire to the R.V. because he did not want Lupe to “live there

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anymore.” In addition, Wrate testified that Garcia told her Lupe
lived in the R.V. Wrate saw Lupe near the R.V. during the fight.
Finally, Wilson found Lupe inside the R.V. the day after the
stabbing. He later discovered Lupe at the site of the R.V., sorting
through its charred remains. This was sufficient for a jury to find
that the R.V. was inhabited.
       Cortez argues that the officers’ testimony is “second-hand”
evidence of what he said during the interview and there was
otherwise “very little evidence” that Lupe lived in the R.V. But
we must “ ‘ “accept logical inferences that the jury might have
drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” ’ [Citation.]” (Baker,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1103.) “We are not free to reform the
verdict simply because another theory is plausible.” (Wilson,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 302.) The evidence was sufficient to
sustain a conviction and the trial court did not err in denying
Cortez’s motion under section 1118.1.

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                       DISPOSITION
    The trial court judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                   ADAMS, J.

We concur:

             LAVIN, Acting P. J.

             EGERTON, J.

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