Court Opinion

ID: 9690578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:24:39.931818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:59.901188
License: Public Domain

*314Opinion of the Court by
Justice GRAVES.
Appellant, Binta Maryam Baraka, entered conditional guilty pleas to second-degree manslaughter and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and we granted discretionary review. The sole issue presented before us is whether the trial court erred when making a pre-trial Daubert ruling regarding the medical examiner’s theory of “homicide by heart attack.” For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
Appellant was indicted in Fayette Circuit Court for the murder of Brutus Price. The Commonwealth alleged that stress related to a physical altercation between the victim and Appellant caused the victim to suffer a fatal heart attack. Appellant requested a Daubert hearing concerning the testimony of Dr. Cristin Rolf1, M.D., a state medical examiner called by the Commonwealth. At the hearing, Dr. Rolf testified regarding her physical findings and her understanding of the circumstances surrounding the victim’s death. She ultimately concluded that the cause of death was heart attack and the manner of death was homicide.
Appellant contends that Dr. Rolfs opinion regarding the manner of death in this case was unreliable and does not assist the trier of fact. After reviewing the whole of Dr. Rolfs testimony, the trial court ultimately determined that Dr. Rolfs opinion was admissible pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). In Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909 (Ky.2004), this Court unanimously stated:
[W]hen an appellate court subsequently reviews the trial court’s Daubert ruling, it must apply the abuse of discretion standard. And as we have noted in the past, the test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.
Id. at 914 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Reliability is reviewed for clear error while the determination as to whether certain testimony assists the trier of fact is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Miller, swpra, at 917-19.
Here, the trial court based its reliability determination on the following evidence: (1) Dr. Rolf testified that “homicide by heart attack” was not a new, novel, or unique theory, but was widely accepted in the scientific community and among Dr. Rolfs colleagues; (2) Dr. Rolf was unaware of any colleagues who did not accept the theory; (3) Dr. Rolf introduced an article which indicated that the theory had been in practice and utilized for over 100 years; (4) Dr. Rolf knew of several other articles regarding the theory and had attended a lecture regarding the theory just a week prior; (5) Dr. Rolf had the education and professional experience to know of general theories regarding death and to make medical opinions based thereon; and (6) Dr. Rolf had performed autopsies on more than 500 heart attack victims. In the face of such uncontradicted testimony, we can find no clear error in the trial court’s reliability determination.
Appellant nonetheless takes issue with the fact that Dr. Rolfs opinion was based, in part, on disputed information regarding the circumstances of the victim’s death that was provided to her by police. Yet, as explained by the Court of Appeals, there is absolutely nothing improper about *315basing an expert opinion on “facts and data ... made known to the expert at or before the hearing.” KRE 703(a). Indeed, the facts and data in this case, information regarding the circumstances of the victim’s death provided by investigating officers, is exactly the kind of information customarily relied upon in the day-to-day decisions attendant to a medical examiner’s profession. See Buckler v. Commonwealth, 541 S.W.2d 985, 940 (Ky.1976). It has been long held that such underlying factual assumptions are properly left for scrutiny during cross-examination. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 934 S.W.2d 242, 247 (Ky.1996) (“the credibility of every witness presented to testify in a legal proceeding, including expert witnesses, is subject to attack and cross-examination, this being the primary means by which trial counsel can attempt to persuade jurors of the weight or significance to be attached to the testimony of the witnesses”) (quotation and citation omitted).
Moreover, it is axiomatic that a determination of the cause and manner which led to a person’s death is generally scientific in origin and outside the common knowledge of layperson jurors. See, e.g., Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883, 889-90 (Ky.1997) (“[Jurors] usually do need the assistance of a medical expert in determining the cause of a physical condition in order to understand the evidence and determine the ultimate fact in issue.”). Such medical testimony is even more critical in a case such as this where the manner of death is not necessarily clear from the mere physical evidence (as compared to a case where the person was shot or stabbed). We thus find it implicitly reasonable for the trial court to determine that a medical professional’s opinion is helpful when determining whether stress from a physical altercation caused the victim to have a heart attack. See Terry v. Associated Stone Co., 334 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Ky.1960) (where medical doctor testified that a worker’s heart attack was in part caused by physical exertion immediately prior to the attack, the Court stated “The question being of a medical nature entirely, determined on the basis of qualified expert testimony, it would be absurd for a court of lawyers to reject that conclusion as unsupported by probative evidence.”); see also, State v. Shaw, 260 Kan. 396, 921 P.2d 779, 782-83 (1996); State v. Washington, 581 A.2d 1031 (R.I.1990); Schlossman v. State, 105 Md.App. 277, 659 A.2d 371, 380 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Bailey v. State, 355 Md. 287, 734 A.2d 684 (1999); People v. Siwik, 2004 WL 32733 (Mich.App.2004) (unpublished).
The trial court’s determination is no less reasonable in spite of the fact that Dr. Rolfs determination necessarily included an opinion that a criminal act was likely committed in this ease. The term, homicide, of course, does not presuppose the occurrence of a criminal act, but simply refers to when a person causes the death of another human being. See Black’s Law Dictionary 739 (Seventh ed. 1999)(“The legal term for killing a man, whether lawfully or unlawfully is ‘homicide.’ There is no crime of ‘homicide.’ ”); see also, KRS 507.010. Medical examiners must make such determinations every time they indicate on a death certificate whether a death was natural, accidental, suicidal, homicidal, or undetermined. Such conclusions are an inherent part of the medical examiner’s duties and have never been thought to invade the province of the jury. Indeed, the Court of Appeals cited as such in its opinion:
It is settled law that expert medical testimony expressing an opinion as to the cause of death, based on a hypothetical question embracing the material facts supported by the evidence, does not invade the province of the jury, is *316admissible in evidence on the issue of cause of death, and although not conclusive on said issue, and even though it does not disprove every other possible cause of death, is sufficient to take such issue to the jury and to uphold a verdict in accordance therewith.
Nordmeyer v. Sanzone, 314 F.2d 202, 204 (6th Cir.1963) (citations omitted).
When the trial court’s ruling is viewed in light of these prevailing facts and law, there are simply insufficient grounds on which to base a finding of clear error or abuse of discretion by the trial court.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
COOPER, GRAVES, ROACH, SCOTT, and WINTERSHEIMER, J.J., concur.
COOPER, J., concurs in a separate opinion in which GRAVES and ROACH, J.J., join.
JOHNSTONE, J., dissents in a separate opinion in which LAMBERT, C.J., joins.

. Dr. Rolf's name is misspelled in both the briefs and in the Court of Appeals' opinion.