Court Opinion

ID: 9613334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:16:12.990475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:28.136005
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring specially.
In the only other case to address the exact question before this Court, Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash.2d 109, 508 P.2d 166, 172 (1973), the court held:
“The appellant-department contends that SEPA [State Environmental Policy Act] and WRA [Water Resources Act] may not be applied in this case because the application for the water use permit, its issuance, the contested hearing, and the superior court review all occurred pri- or to August 9,1971, the effective date of the acts. Although these events did transpire before the effective date of SEPA and WRA, the agency’s action had not been finalized prior to the passage of the statutes and remains tentative even to this date. The statutes’ application in this case cannot be deemed retroactive, although relating to some events occurring prior to the statutes’ enactment.”
*626The result and reasoning in Stempel are entirely correct.1 If one could gain an interest in water which would be insulated from subsequent legislation simply by filing an application with the Department of Water Resources, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the legislature to protect the public’s interests in and uses of the waters of this state. The state, as a sovereign, owns the unappropriated waters within its borders.
“Such interest or title is not ‘in the proprietary sense, but rather in the sovereign capacity as representative of all the people for the purpose of guaranteeing that the common rights of all shall be equally protected and that no one shall be denied his proper use and benefit of this common necessity.’ Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Idaho 236, 125 P. 812, 814, 43 L.R.A., N.S., 240.” Poole v. Olaveson, 82 Idaho 496, 502, 356 P.2d 61, 65 (1960).
A clear example of state action designed to insure that the common rights of all to the beneficial use of Idaho waters is equally protected is our minimum stream flow legislation, I.C. § 42-1501 et seq. The Department of Water Resources, pursuant to its constitutional duty — see ID. Const, art. XV, § 7, has developed a state water plan, and in 1978, the same year that minimum flow legislation was adopted, the legislature moved to insure that the state water plan included safeguards for certain specified waters of the state. I.C. § 42-1736A, which was adopted in 1978, provides in part that:
“(2) In order to preserve the stream flows the following criteria shall be established as the beneficial use in the public interest as the minimum daily flow on the main stem of the Snake River:
Gaging Station Minimum Daily Flow
Milner 0 cfs
Murphy 3,300 cfs
Weiser 4,750 cfs
“(3) In order to retain the stream flows and hydro-base, the following criteria shall be established as the minimum daily flow on the main stem of the Snake River:
Gaging Station Minimum Daily Flow
Johnson’s Bar 5,000 cfs”
The district court specifically found that on March 29, 1978 (shortly before I.C. §§ 42-1501 et seq. & 42-1736A became effective), there were over 300 applications to appropriate a total of more than 13,000 cubic feet per second from the Snake River below Milner dam.2 Obviously if each of these applications was insulated from subsequent legislation because the application conferred a “right” upon the applicant, it would be difficult, and on some streams well-nigh impossible, to implement the express legislative intent of I.C. § 42-1501 et seq. and I.C. § 42-1736A to establish minimum flows, at least without compensating the applicants for whatever “interest” they might have in a pending application.3 Although it may be more difficult to assess the impact of prior applications on the effectiveness of legislation dealing with “local public interest” than on legislation establishing minimum flows, the principle remains the same. According recognition as a vested right, or even some lesser interest which does not rise to the level of a vested right but which is nevertheless insulated from subsequent legislation, in having filed a mere application for a water appropriation permit, could have severe impacts upon present and future attempts at efficient, fair and uniform implementation of water law and policy in Idaho.
Finally, I feel compelled to note that the “finality” of the director’s order was not raised below or in this Court. The dissent asserts that “[although the paragraph addressing judicial review in I.C. § 42-203 *627remained in the statute following the passage of the APA ... there is nothing in I.C. § 42-203 which conflicts with I.C. § 67-5215, except for the time limit for bringing an appeal which is not at issue here.” I.C. § 42-203 provided in part at the time that the order in question was appealed that “[a]ny person ... feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the director ... may appeal therefrom to the district court ... within sixty (60) days from the ruling or action of the director . . . . ” I agree that the time limit for bringing an appeal is not at issue here. It is worthy of note, however, that the finality of the director’s order is not at issue, either, and it seems a bit hard-handed for the dissent to raise the issue of finality and then decline to address the time limits of I.C. § 42-203, when those time limits forced the filing of this appeal. It is also worthy of note that the APA does not define “final decision,” while the Appropriation of Water Act does indicate the type of decision which triggers the sixty day appeal time. I.C. § 42-204 provides, and provided at the time that this appeal was taken, that: “The approval of an application shall be indorsed thereon, and a record made of such indorsement in the department of water resources. The application so indorsed shall constitute a permit .... ” (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the endorsement of an application is the “judgment” contemplated by the approval of application provisions of I.C. § 42-203. The application at issue here was endorsed by the director within the meaning of I.C. §§ 42-203 and 42-204 and this appeal was taken from that endorsement. Appellant was faced with the distinct possibility that, if the sixty day appeal period of I.C. § 42-203 were to lun without a notice of appeal being filed, it would be precluded forever from appealing the order of the director. Faced with this limit, and the very real probability that the hearing and decision on the issue of local public interest would not occur until after the sixty days had run, appellant wisely chose to comply with the apparent requirement of I.C. § 42-203 and appeal within the statutory time period. After all, the appellant is concerned in this appeal, not with the director’s decision on the merits of the local public interest question (which decision has not yet been made), but rather with the fact that the director was willing to consider local public interest at all. That part of the director’s order was final and irreversible. If requested within thirty days, he would hold a hearing to consider local public interest. Even if the APA contained a definition of a final decision and I.C. § 42-204 did not (the opposite is true), the provision in I.C. § 67-5215(a) that “A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final decision would not provide an adequate remedy” would be applicable here.

.Stempel, a unanimous opinion, is brought to our attention in the briefs submitted. Yet the dissenters do not even attempt to illustrate any fallacies in its reasoning.

.It appears that the district court misunderstood the testimony of Stephen Allred, the director of the Department of Water Resources, in this regard. Mr. Allred testified that statewide there were applications for some 13,000 cfs pending. The lesson to be drawn from this example, however, remains the same.

.Valuation of such an interest in a condemnation proceeding would be extremely difficult.