Court Opinion

ID: 9453075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:01:37.330686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:29.810480
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. LEWIS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) .
By a two count complaint, characterized by the government as a count in the “nature of assumpsit” and one for unjust enrichment, the United States seeks to recover the value of medical services rendered to the defendant through the facilities of the Veterans Administration. The essence of the government’s claim to right is contained in its amended complaint in these words:
“7. By reason of the incorrect and erroneous applications, incorrect and erroneous approval of the applications, and incorrect and erroneous admissions to the hospital, the plaintiff erroneously and wrongfully expended the value of the hospitalization services, goods and benefits contrary to the provisions of the statute authorizing the plaintiff to provide such services, 76 Stat. 381, 38 U.S.C. 610(a) (1) (B).”
Upon appeal, the government now asserts, and the main opinion holds, that *724the plaintiff (V.A.) neither in error nor wrongfully admitted the defendant to the hospital and there treated him but that it did so through the compulsion of the congressional mandate that the oath of applicant “shall be accepted as sufficient evidence of inability to defray necessary expenses.” 88 U.S.C. § 622. To me, the argument of the government is in defiance of its pleading, is self-denying of its claim, and would be sufficient to warrant affirmance of the trial court in dismissing the action as pleaded. However, since the case has been argued and briefed to an extent far past a question of pleading I am content to so consider it for I believe the judgment below should be affirmed in any event. But in so doing I consider it permissive to make reference to facts presented by the government but not contained in the pleadings.
The government does not claim that defendant in his application made any express misrepresentation of his financial condition, his assets or liabilities, or that he concealed anything. The only “incorrect and erroneous” statement relied upon is the conclusionary statement that defendant was “unable” to defray the necessary expenses of hospital care. Presumably, the government upon trial will now contend that defendant’s net worth will indicate the fact of ability to pay; defendant will contend that his total lack of cash, liquid assets, his modest income and his family obligations will show his inability to pay. The case is also complicated by the fact that the government seeks recovery for services rendered upon three separate occasions each one following a separate application resulting in treatment accorded in December 1962, March 1963, and October-December 1963.
The type of controversy which this case presents would seem to typify the very situation in which Congress has indicated its unwillingness to allow the V.A. or the Attorney General to participate. The legislative history clearly apprehends and rejects the concept that the V.A. should function as a collection agency, 99 Cong.Rec. p. 6740 (1953), or that the Attorney General be allowed to “sell everything the veteran had except his homestead,” p. 6746, and the resolution of the Committee on Veterans Affairs, 100 Cong.Rec. p. 3806, indicates a, clear intent to accept the veteran’s sworn statement with finality for all purposes until and if it appears that different legislation is required.
I would affirm. The trial court correctly held that the problem is one for Congress, not the courts.