Court Opinion

ID: 9679760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:05:24.606428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:53.294813
License: Public Domain

*762TERRY JENNINGS, Justice,
dissenting.
The En Banc Court holds that a trial judge is not disqualified from sitting in an asbestos exposure case in which the defendant is represented by the judge’s former law firm even though the firm had, when the judge was a partner there, represented the same defendant in an asbestos exposure case involving the same facility, the same time period, and similar allegations, defenses, and issues.
The Texas Constitution commands that no judge shall sit in any case in which a lawyer, with whom the judge previously practiced law, served, during the time of their association, as a lawyer in the same matter in controversy. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 11; Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(l)(a); Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 221 S.W.3d 550, 553 (Tex.2006); In re O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex.2002). The Texas Supreme Court has clearly explained that the Texas Constitution requires the vicarious disqualification of judges because an attorney’s knowledge about a matter is “imputed by law to every other attorney in [his] firm.” Natl Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 131 (Tex.1996). Moreover, it has also clearly explained that constitutional disqualification is required when the “same matter in controversy” is involved, not only when the exact same lawsuit is involved, O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d at 449, i.e., not only when, as suggested by the En Banc Court, the pertinent plaintiffs are not “strangers” to each other and are “legally joined in their lawsuits,” their injuries arise out of the exact same incident, and they sue the same co-defendants.
Here, by a petition for writ of mandamus, relators, Edward and Margie Wilhite, challenge the multidistrict pretrial court’s1 order denying their motion to disqualify the trial court judge, the Honorable Edward P. Magre, from sitting in the underlying lawsuit.2 The Wilhites contend that Judge Magre is disqualified from presiding over the underlying lawsuit because his former law firm, Ellet, Camp, Magre & Glasser, P.C. (the “law firm”), represented the real party in interest, Alcoa, in two similar asbestos lawsuits while Judge Magre was a partner at the law firm. Because the underlying lawsuit and one of the asbestos lawsuits in which the law firm provided counsel involve the same matter in controversy, I would conditionally grant mandamus relief. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Background
Over a decade ago, Judge Magre was a partner at the law firm along with attorney Emory Camp. While Judge Magre worked at the firm, Camp, on behalf of the firm, twice represented Alcoa, the defendant in the underlying lawsuit. Judge Magre was not personally involved in either matter. The law firm first represented Alcoa in 1996, when the estate of former Alcoa employee, Glenn Whatley, sued a variety of defendants, including Alcoa, for negligently exposing him to asbestos at Alcoa’s plant in Rockdale, Texas. In that lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that Whatley developed mesothelioma after Alcoa and *763the other defendants exposed him to asbestos dust. Alcoa was later dismissed from the lawsuit. The law firm next represented Alcoa in 1997, when Bernice and Floyd Cavitt sued Alcoa and other defendants. The Cavitts alleged that Bernice developed mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos by her husband, Floyd Cavitt, who had been negligently exposed to asbestos while working for Alcoa at an unspecified plant. The Cavitts obtained a $2.11 million judgment against Alcoa.
In 2008, the Wilhites brought the underlying lawsuit, alleging that Alcoa and other defendants negligently exposed Edward to asbestos when he worked at Alcoa’s Rock-dale plant. The Wilhites filed the underlying lawsuit in Dallas County Court at Law Number 2, and it was transferred to the multidistrict pretrial court for pretrial proceedings. The pretrial court granted Alcoa’s motion to transfer venue to Milam County and set a trial date. The Wilhites then moved to disqualify Judge Magre on the ground that when he was a partner at the law firm, the firm had represented Alcoa in the Whatley and Cavitt lawsuits, which involve the same matter in controversy.
The multidistrict pretrial court, after confirming that Judge Magre would not remove himself from sitting in the case, denied the Wilhites’ motion to disqualify Judge Magre. At the hearing on the motion, the multidistrict pretrial court, after overruling Alcoa’s hearsay objections concerning the Wilhites’ evidence, concluded that the underlying lawsuit differs factually from the Whatley and Cavitt lawsuits.
Constitutional Disqualification
The Wilhites argue that Judge Magre, in accordance with the Texas Constitution and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, is vicariously disqualified from sitting in the case because the Whatley and Cavitt lawsuits, in which Camp served as counsel for Alcoa, share the same issues with and concern the same matter in controversy as the underlying lawsuit. See Tex. Const. art. V, § 11; Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(l)(a). Alcoa argues that Judge Magre should continue to preside over the case because the three suits concern different matters in controversy.
Mandamus relief is proper when a trial court erroneously denies a motion to disqualify. See In re O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d at 450. In Texas, a judge may be removed from a case because he is constitutionally disqualified, subject to a statutory strike, or recused. See In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex.1998). The grounds and procedures for each type of removal are fundamentally different. Id. Here, the issue is one concerning only the disqualification of Judge Magre.
Unlike statutory recusal, disqualification cannot be waived, and may be raised at any time. McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding). “[I]f an error is ever made as to disqualification, it should be in favor of the disqualification rather than against it.” Cotulla State Bank v. Herron, 202 S.W. 797, 798 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ).
The Texas Constitution, which establishes the grounds for judicial disqualification, provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o judge shall sit in any case ... when the judge shall have been counsel in the case.” Tex. Const, art. V, § 11. Judicial disqualification is also addressed in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that
Judges shall disqualify themselves in all proceedings in which:
(a) they have served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom they previously practiced *764law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter....
Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(l)(a). Rule 18b(l)(a) “was intended to expound rather than expand the Constitution.” Tesco Am., 221 S.W.3d at 553. Consequently, “the case,” as referenced in the Texas Constitution, is synonymous with the “same matter in controversy,” referenced in Rule 18b(l)(a). See id.; Slaven v. Wheeler, 58 Tex. 23, 25 (1882).
Vicarious disqualification is explicitly required under Rule 18b(l)(a). Tesco Am., 221 S.W.3d at 553-54. Although the Texas Constitution does not expressly mention vicarious disqualification, it, too, requires vicarious disqualification. Id. As explained by the Texas Supreme Court, an attorney’s knowledge about a matter is “imputed by law to every other attorney in the firm.” Nat'l Med. Enters., 924 S.W.2d at 131. When considering disqualification, it is irrelevant if the judge, while an attorney, had no part in the civil litigation pending before him if he had been a member of the law firm that gave counsel as to the pending litigation.3 See State v. Burks, 82 Tex. 584, 585, 18 S.W. 662, 662 (1891).
Thus, under Texas law, a judge is constitutionally disqualified when (1) the judge or the judge’s law firm was the attorney for a party in the case, and (2) the matter before the judge is the same matter that was before the judge or judge’s law firm. See In re O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d at 448 (citing Lade v. Keller, 615 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1981, no writ)) (“[I]t is necessary that the judge acted as counsel for some of the parties in [the] suit before him in some proceeding in which the issues were the same as in the case before him.”). The same “matter in controversy” must be involved, regardless of whether the same lawsuit is involved. In re O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d at 448^19 (“By its own terms, rule 18b(l)(a) is not limited to disqualifying a trial judge only when the ‘same lawsuit’ is involved. Rather, in plain language, rule 18b(l)(a) requires disqualification when the same ‘matter in controversy’ is involved.”) (citing Tex.R. Civ. P. 18b(l)(a)). However, the “fact that the two suits might have some facts in common” alone does not mean that they concern the same “matter in controversy.” Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. Channel Fueling Serv., Inc., 669 F.Supp. 150, 152 (E.D.Tex.1987) (referring to similar federal rule).
Here, no one disputes that Judge Magre was a partner at the law firm when the law firm represented Alcoa in the Whatley and *765Cavitt asbestos lawsuits. Accordingly, Judge Magre is vicariously disqualified from sitting in the underlying lawsuit if the firm previously represented Alcoa concerning the same “matter in controversy.” See In re O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d at 448. Thus, the critical question is whether the matter now before Judge Magre involves the same matter in controversy as did the Whatley or Cavitt lawsuits. See id. at 449 (“Thus, the issue here is whether the divorce and modification proceedings involved the ‘same matter in controversy.’ ”).
The Wilhites argue that the underlying lawsuit concerns the same matter in controversy as did the .Whatley and Cavitt lawsuits because all of the lawsuits involve claims of asbestos exposure at Alcoa plants and, specifically, Edward Wilhite and Glen Whatley worked at the Alcoa Rockdale plant during the same approximate time period. The Wilhites assert that “the pleadings in all three lawsuits include negligence claims and intentional tort claims which raise the following issues: (1) whether asbestos exposure poses a health risk; and, (2) whether and when Alcoa knew that asbestos exposure poses a health risk.” Alcoa filed a general denial in all three suits, contesting the allegations that asbestos exposure posed health risks and Alcoa had knowledge of such health risks. Also, Alcoa pleaded the same affirmative defense in all three lawsuits — that the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act.
The Whatley and Wilhite lawsuits share many similarities. First, both cases involve the issue of whether Alcoa knew of the risk of harm posed by asbestos exposure. The Whatley plaintiffs alleged,
Specific intentional acts and acts constituting negligence committed by the Alcoa defendants that proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries and damages resulting from the Decedent’s death include: ... Failure to provide adequate safety measures and protection against deadly and life-threatening asbestos dust, all despite Defendant’s knowledge of the extreme risk of harm inherent to asbestos exposure.
The Wilhites allege,
Alcoa, Inc., knew of the serious health hazards, including asbestosis, lung cancer, and death resulting therefrom, associated with asbestos exposure, at least as early as 1955.
Second, both cases involve the issues of whether Alcoa failed to warn its employees about the hazards of asbestos exposure and failed to ensure a safe work environment. The Whatley plaintiffs alleged,
The Defendants failed to properly remove and/or abate said asbestos at this facility during the time Decedent was employed there .... [Additionally, Alcoa failed] to provide safe equipment for Decedent to use ... [failed] to adequately warn Decedent of the inherent dangers of asbestos contamination ... [and failed] to provide Decedent a safe place to work....
The Wilhites allege,
Alcoa, Inc. took absolutely no action to warn employees such as Edward Wilhite of these serious health hazards and in fact, made a deliberate and calculated choice to keep this known information from its employees. Furthermore, Alcoa, Inc. intentionally failed to implement and follow the few policies and procedures it finally instituted in the 1970s to protect employees such as Edward Wilhite from health hazards related to asbestos exposure, even though Alcoa, Inc. was required to do so by state and federal law, and even though at the corporate level, Alcoa, Inc. knew that its local plants, including the Rock-dale plant, were not following asbestos regulations and internal policies related *766to asbestos exposure. Alcoa, Inc. intentionally chose to maintain unsafe working conditions at the Rockdale plant....
Third, both cases involve the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ mesothelioma was proximately caused by exposure to asbestos at the Rockdale plant. The Whatleys alleged,
In particular, Plaintiff would show that the Alcoa Defendants demonstrated such an entire want of care as to establish that their acts and omissions were the result of actual conscious indifference to the rights, safety, and welfare of the Decedent, and that such intentional acts and omissions proximately caused the Decedent’s death.
The Wilhites allege,
Alcoa, Inc.’s intentional conduct resulted in Edward Wilhite’s asbestos-related injuries, including mesothelioma, and these injuries are intentional in nature.
Fourth, both cases involve the issue of whether Alcoa knew or should have known that its actions would cause injury or death. The Whatleys alleged:
The Defendants knew or should have known that its individual actions would combine to cause the injuries and/or deaths of Plaintiffs Decedent.
The Wilhites allege,
Alcoa, Inc., knew with a substantial certainty that employees such as Edward Wilhite would be exposed to asbestos through their job duties; and knew with a substantial certainty that employees such as Edward Wilhite would contract an asbestos related illness, including mesothelioma, by reason of their job and job duties at the Rockdale location. In fact, based on the extent of Alcoa, Inc.’s knowledge of the health hazards of asbestos exposure and the ubiquitous use of asbestos during Edward Wilhite’s years of employment, it is impossible that Alcoa, Inc. was not substantially certain of these facts.
Finally, the plaintiffs in both suits alleged that Alcoa acted with intent, malice, or both. The Whatleys alleged,
The actions and omissions of all Defendants as specifically alleged herein-above, whether taken separately or together, were of such a character as to constitute a pattern or practice of intentional wrongful conduct and/or malice resulting in damages, injuries and/or death to the Plaintiffs Decedent.
The Wilhites allege,
Because Alcoa, Inc., was substantially certain ... that an employee such as Edward Wilhite would contract an asbestos-related illness, including meso-thelioma, Alcoa, Inc.’s actions rise to the level of an intentional tort.
The reasoning of In re O’Connor is applicable here. O’Connor, the ex-wife of O’Brian, was first represented by Kyle Hawthorne when the trial court ordered temporary orders regarding the custody of O’Connor’s and O’Brian’s child. In re O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d at 447. In its temporary orders, the trial court appointed O’Brian as sole managing conservator, with primary custody and the exclusive right to determine the child’s residence. Id. O’Connor’s attorney-client relationship with Hawthorne then ended. Id. O’Connor later petitioned to increase her time periods of possession of the child and to have the right to determine the child’s residence. Id. Judge Michel, a former law partner of Hawthorne, presided over the modification proceeding. Id. O’Con-nor moved to disqualify Judge Michel under Rule 18b(l)(a). Id. at 448. O’Connor contended that, because both of the proceedings involved possession of the child, they concerned the same “matter in controversy.” Id. O’Brian asserted that *767Rule 18(l)(a) was inapplicable because it applies only when the issues in the two lawsuits are identical. Id. The supreme court pointed out that, when assessing disqualification, whether two proceedings share the same matter in controversy is determinative, not whether each proceeding involved the same lawsuit. Id. at 449. Because the temporary orders and modification proceeding both dealt with the same matter in controversy — “custody, visitation, and the right to determine the child’s residence” — Judge Michel was disqualified. Id. at 449-50. Although the lawsuits were different, the judge was disqualified because the same matter in controversy was involved. Id.
Here, likewise, the underlying lawsuit and the Whatley lawsuit are not identical. However, they concern the same matter in controversy, which involves the same defendant in similar asbestos litigation stemming from asbestos exposure at the same location over a significant, overlapping period of time. Id. at 449. The underlying lawsuit and the Whatley lawsuit each involve the plaintiffs’ similar claims that they were exposed to asbestos by Alcoa at the same plant during the same approximate time period, that asbestos poses a health risk, and that Alcoa was aware of the health risk. Specifically, Whatley worked at Alcoa’s Rockdale plant from 1954 to 1990, and Wilhite worked there from 1955 to 1982.
Accordingly, I would hold that the underlying lawsuit and the Whatley suit involve the same matter in controversy. Both lawsuits share (1) similar essential facts leading up to the alleged asbestos exposure by the same company at the same location during the same period of time, (2) similar causes of action, and (3) similar responses and defenses by Alcoa. Id. Because the Whatley suit involved the same matter in controversy currently at issue in the underlying suit, I would further hold that Judge Magre is disqualified from sitting in the underlying suit and that mandamus relief should be conditionally granted. Id.
The Texas Supreme Court has emphasized that
[W]e must construe any ambiguity in the constitutional [disqualification] provision here to effectuate its purpose. Repeatedly, the people of Texas have insisted on constitutional protection against “counsel in the case” becoming a judge in the case[.]
Tesco Am., 221 S.W.3d at 554. Here, the En Banc Court holding eviscerates the constitutional protection. To hold that two lawsuits do not involve the same “matter in controversy” merely because they concern different plaintiffs who are “strangers” to each other and not “legally joined in their lawsuits,” their injuries do not arise out of the same incident, and they did not sue the same co-defendants is inconsistent with the Texas Supreme Court’s emphasis on the meaning of “matter in controversy” and its broad interpretation as something encompassing more than a “case” for purposes of disqualification. See In re O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d at 449.
As recognized by the supreme court, the vanquishing power of vicarious disqualification is of serious concern. Tesco Am., 221 S.W.3d at 554. Here, however, as in Tesco American, “no supine surprise was sprung” on the defendant. See id. None know better of the previous representation of Alcoa by the trial judge’s former law firm than Alcoa. See id.

. See Tex.R. Jud. Admin. 13; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 74.16I-.164 (Vernon Supp. 2008).

. The underlying lawsuit is titled Edward Wil-hite Individually and Margie Wilhite, Individually, v. Able Supply Co., Alcoa, Inc., Ametek, Inc., Aqua-Chem, Inc., A.W. Chesterton Co., Certainteed Co., Coltec Industries, Inc., Gar-lock Inc., Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC, Guard-Line, Inc., LGS Technologies, LP, Rapid American Co., Sepco Co., and Uniroyal Holding, Inc., No. 2008-15687, in the 11th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Hon. Mark Davidson, presiding.

. Similarly, in federal courts, a judge must disqualify himself "where in private practice he served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2). The "deliberate choice by congress demonstrates an intent that the words ‘matter in controversy’ mean something other than what we commonly refer to as a 'case' ... so we do not rely on this technical distinction.” Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 2004). The federal standard that a judge must "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned — is established when a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts, would expect that a judge knew of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality, notwithstanding a finding that the judge was not actually conscious of those circumstances.” Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 848, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2196, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). However, "a judge’s pri- or representation of a witness or a party in an unrelated matter does not automatically require disqualification.” David v. City of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1351 (10th Cir.1996) (citing United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1992)). Where a case "involves remote, contingent, indirect or speculative interests, disqualification is not required." Lo-vaglia, 954 F.2d at 815 (referring to federal rule).