Court Opinion

ID: 9961721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 16:12:45.482046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:24.851065
License: Public Domain

J-A03045-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 GIANTE LEE THOMAS, JR.                :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 283 WDA 2023

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 8, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-02-CR-0001955-2021

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 GIANTE LEE THOMAS, JR.                :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 284 WDA 2023

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 8, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-02-CR-0001956-2021

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 GIANTE LEE THOMAS, JR.                :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 285 WDA 2023

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 8, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-02-CR-0002654-2021

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-A03045-24

                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
    GIANTE LEE THOMAS, JR.                       :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :   No. 286 WDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 8, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-02-CR-0001965-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                  FILED: April 19, 2024

       Giante Lee Thomas, Jr. (Appellant), appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after he pled guilty to three counts of recklessly

endangering another person; two counts of firearms not to be carried without

a license; and one count each of robbery, robbery of a motor vehicle,

endangering the welfare of children, aggravated assault, assault of a law

enforcement officer, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, strangulation, and

possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.1 Appellant challenges

the trial court’s denial of his post-sentence motion (PSM) to withdraw his

negotiated guilty pleas. We affirm.

       The facts underlying Appellant’s convictions are not relevant to this

appeal. In 2021, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with the foregoing

crimes, at four trial court docket numbers, as well as numerous other offenses

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2705, 6106(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(ii), 3702(a), 4304(a)(1),
2702(a)(4), 2702.1(a), 2718(a)(1); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).

                                           -2-
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(23 charges in total).        As we discuss further below, Appellant and the

Commonwealth         negotiated     a    guilty    plea   agreement,   whereby   the

Commonwealth withdrew 10 of the 23 charges in exchange for Appellant’s

pleas.     See N.T., 2/23/22, at 3-4 (prosecutor detailing terms of plea

agreement).       The trial court conducted two hearings with respect to

Appellant’s guilty pleas, on February 23, 2022, and March 3, 2022

(collectively, plea hearings). Appellant completed written and oral guilty plea

colloquies.    The trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty pleas as knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily tendered.          See N.T., 3/3/22, at 10. The trial

court also stated that it “find[s] there is a legal and factual basis to accept

[Appellant’s] guilty plea….” Id.

         Prior to sentencing, Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Appellant asserted a “claim of innocence” and that the Commonwealth would

not be prejudiced if the trial court permitted Appellant to withdraw his pleas.

Motion to Withdraw, 6/9/22, ¶¶ 9, 11. On July 21, 2022, the trial court held

a hearing on the matter (plea withdrawal hearing).2 The trial court denied

Appellant’s motion to withdraw the pleas on August 5, 2022.              See Order,

8/5/22, at 1 (“After careful consideration of the evidence and argument

____________________________________________

2 The certified record did not contain Appellant’s June 9, 2022, motion or the

transcript of the plea withdrawal hearing. However, upon inquiry by this
Court, the trial court included these documents (as well as Appellant’s written
guilty plea colloquy dated February 23, 2022) in a supplemental record filed
in this Court on February 21, 2024.

                                           -3-
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presented at the motion [to withdraw] hearing, the court finds that [Appellant]

failed to establish a ‘fair and just’ reason to allow the pre-sentence withdrawal

of his plea.”); see also Commonwealth v. Jamison, 284 A.3d 501, 505 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (stating where a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea prior to

sentencing based on a claim of innocence, the claim must be at least

“plausible,” as opposed to a “bare assertion,” to establish “a fair and just

reason for allowing presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea.”).

      On November 8, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate 3½ to 7 years in prison, followed by 10 years of probation.

Appellant timely filed the PSM to withdraw his guilty pleas on November 17,

2022. Appellant subsequently filed an amended PSM, with leave of court, on

December 19, 2022. Appellant claimed the trial court erred in accepting his

guilty pleas, and in subsequently refusing his request to withdraw the pleas,

where the court did not (1) “elicit information to support that there is a factual

basis for the plea”; or (2) “elicit information to support that [Appellant]

understood the permissible range of sentences and/or fines for all the offenses

charged, but, rather, only for the offenses to which he pled guilty.” Amended

PSM, 12/19/22, ¶¶ 11, 12 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).

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       The trial court held a PSM hearing on February 2, 2023 (PSM hearing).

The trial court denied the PSM on February 15, 2023.       This timely appeal

followed.3 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant presents two issues for review:

       1. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] post-sentence
          motion to withdraw his guilty plea where it failed to elicit
          information that he knew the permissible sentencing range of
          all offenses charged, not just those to which he pled guilty?

       2. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] post-sentence
          motion to withdraw his guilty plea where it failed to elicit
          sufficient information to support that there was a sufficient
          factual basis for the plea?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (italics in original).4

       Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in denying his PSM to

withdraw his guilty pleas, where it failed to colloquy him as to all of the 23

____________________________________________

3 Appellant’s notices of appeal at the four trial court docket numbers
improperly stated that the appeals lie from the February 15, 2023, order
denying Appellant’s PSM. See Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155,
158 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“An appeal from an order denying a post-trial
motion is procedurally improper because a direct appeal in a criminal
proceeding lies from the judgment of sentence.”). We have corrected the
caption accordingly. This Court sua sponte consolidated the appeals on March
22, 2023.

4 Appellant raised a third issue in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement
challenging the trial court’s denial of his pre-sentence motion to withdraw the
guilty pleas. Concise Statement, 4/3/23, ¶ 1. However, Appellant abandoned
this issue on appeal. See Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1018
n.6 (Pa. 2003) (finding waiver where appellant abandoned claim on appeal);
see also generally Trial Court Order, 8/5/22 (addressing denial of
Appellant’s pre-sentence motion); Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/23, at 3-4
(referencing trial court’s August 5, 2022, order).

                                           -5-
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charges against him, including the charges withdrawn by the Commonwealth

pursuant to the plea agreement. See id. at 20-28. According to Appellant,

“there is no evidence whatsoever demonstrating that [he] had any awareness

of his maximum sentencing exposure.” Id. at 22. Appellant claims the trial

court’s guilty plea

      colloquy was emphatically not “a protracted and comprehensive
      proceeding wherein the court is obliged to make a specific
      determination after extensive colloquy on the record that a plea is
      voluntarily and understandingly tendered.”

Id. at 28 (quoting Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1046 (Pa.

Super. 2011) (citation omitted)).

      The Commonwealth counters that the trial court did not err in denying

Appellant’s PSM, where Appellant (1) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

tendered the pleas under the totality of the circumstances; and (2) failed to

meet his burden of establishing that withdrawal of his pleas was justified. See

Commonwealth Brief at 4-11.         According to the Commonwealth, the trial

court’s oral guilty plea

      colloquy was thorough. In addition to reciting the grading and
      maximum penalty of each charged offense, the colloquy also
      included, inter alia, affirmations from [A]ppellant that he
      understood the terms of the agreement as recited by the
      Commonwealth, that he was stipulating to the factual averments
      set forth in the affidavits of probable cause, that he could read,
      write, and understand English and was not otherwise cognitively
      impaired that day, that he had spoken to his attorneys about the
      elements of each offense and his maximum sentencing exposure,
      and that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty.

                                      -6-
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Id. at 9. Further, the Commonwealth claims that Appellant’s “actual sentence

was so much lower than his potential aggregate maximum sentence that the

fact that the lower court did not recite the maximum penalties of the

withdrawn charges is immaterial.” Id. at 10; see also id. (emphasizing that

Appellant’s “total sentencing exposure, even after all of the other charges had

been withdrawn, was 109 years” (emphasis in original)). According to the

Commonwealth, “[A]ppellant seems to be under the impression that he can

point to a technical defect in a plea colloquy and automatically be entitled to

withdraw his plea”; however, the “law presumes that a defendant who entered

a guilty plea knew what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of

proving otherwise.” Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).

      In reviewing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a post-sentence

motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we apply an abuse of discretion standard.

Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 664 (Pa. Super. 2017). “When a

trial court comes to a conclusion through the exercise of its discretion, there

is a heavy burden on the appellant to show that this discretion has been

abused.” Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 120 (Pa. 2019) (citation

and brackets omitted). “An abuse of discretion will not be found based on a

mere error of judgment, but rather exists where the [trial] court has reached

a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment

exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias

or ill-will.” Id. (citation omitted).

                                        -7-
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      When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing, he

“must demonstrate prejudice on the order of manifest injustice….” Yeomans,

24 A.3d at 1046 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Broaden,

980 A.2d 124, 129 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating post-sentence motions for

withdrawal of a guilty plea, unlike pre-sentence motions for withdrawal, “are

subject to high[] scrutiny since courts strive to discourage entry of guilty pleas

as sentence-testing devices.”    (citation omitted)).   “A showing of manifest

injustice may be established if the plea was entered into involuntarily,

unknowingly, or unintelligently.”    Yeomans, 24 A.3d at 1046; see also

Jamison, 284 A.3d at 506 (“A guilty plea may be withdrawn, regardless of

when the plea was entered or the motion to withdraw was filed, if the

defendant shows that the plea was not voluntary and knowing.”).

      To ensure that a plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,

      Rule 590 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
      that a trial court conduct a separate inquiry of the defendant
      before accepting a guilty plea. … As the Comment to Rule
      590 provides, at a minimum, the trial court should ask questions
      to elicit the following information:

         (1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the
         charges to which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo
         contendere?

         (2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?

         (3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has a
         right to a trial by jury?

         (4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is
         presumed innocent until found guilty?

                                      -8-
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         (5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range
         of sentencing and/or fines for the offenses charged?

         (6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by
         the terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge
         accepts such agreement?

      Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment [(emphasis added).]

Hart, 174 A.3d at 667-68 (emphasis and footnote omitted).

      The required determination with respect to the aforementioned six

inquiries of Rule 590 may “be shown by a written plea colloquy read and

signed by the defendant that is made part of the record and supplemented by

an oral, on-the-record examination.”         Jamison, 284 A.3d at 506.           “A

defendant is bound by the statements which he makes during his plea colloquy

and cannot assert challenges to his plea that contradict his statements when

he entered the plea.” Id. Further, “[o]ur law presumes that a defendant who

enters a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of

proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa. Super.

2015) (citation omitted). The “entry of a negotiated plea is a ‘strong indicator’

of the voluntariness of the plea.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Myers,

642 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa. Super. 1994)).

      Relevantly,

      in order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, the guilty plea
      colloquy must affirmatively show that the defendant understood
      what the plea connoted and its consequences.                       This
      determination is to be made by examining the totality of
      the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea. Thus,
      even though there is an omission or defect in the guilty plea
      colloquy, a plea of guilty will not be deemed invalid if the

                                       -9-
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      circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that the
      defendant had a full understanding of the nature and
      consequences of his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily
      decided to enter the plea.

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 832 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis

added) (quoting Yeomans, 24 A.3d at 1047); see also Commonwealth v.

Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489, 500 (Pa. 2004) (stating although the Supreme Court

“has admonished that a complete failure to inquire into any one of the six,

mandatory subjects [of the Comment to Rule 590] generally requires reversal,

… in determining the availability of a remedy in the event of a deficient

colloquy, it has in more recent cases moved to a more general assessment of

the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent character of the plea, considered on

the totality of the circumstances.” (internal citations omitted)).   Thus, the

proper focus of our inquiry with respect to the validity of a guilty plea is

whether it “was knowing and intelligent, not whether certain talismanic

questions were asked and answered.”       Commonwealth v. Anthony, 475

A.2d 1303, 1306 (Pa. 1984) (citation omitted).

      This Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 819 A.2d 81 (Pa.

Super. 2003), is on point. There, the defendant entered a negotiated guilty

plea, but subsequently claimed on appeal that the trial court erred in failing

to “advise[] him of the permissible maximum sentence or range of sentences

he could receive if he went to trial.” Id. at 82; see also id. at 83 (defendant

claiming he “did not have enough knowledge to make an intelligent choice as

to whether to accept the negotiated plea because he did not know the range

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of sentences he could receive if he were found guilty at trial.”). This Court

held that

      [t]he failure to advise a defendant of the possible
      maximum sentence will not necessarily justify the
      withdrawal of an otherwise voluntary guilty plea.                To
      amount to manifest injustice justifying withdrawal of the plea, the
      mistake must be so great as to have a material effect on the
      defendant’s decision to plead guilty.

Id. at 86 (emphasis added). We elaborated as follows:

            Our appellate courts have directed the withdrawal of guilty
      pleas in certain circumstances where the defendant justifiably was
      unaware of or misled about the “compared to what” of the
      maximum sentence. In Commonwealth v. Hodges, … 789 A.2d
      764 (Pa. Super. 2002), a 16-year-old defendant was permitted to
      withdraw a negotiated plea where he pled guilty to avoid the death
      penalty but was in fact ineligible for the death penalty because of
      his age. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Lenhoff, … 796 A.2d
      338 (Pa. Super. 2002), the defendant was permitted to withdraw
      a negotiated plea where, although his sentence was in accord with
      the plea bargain, he was told that he faced a 10-year maximum
      when it was actually less.

             At the same time, we do not believe that every mistake
      in computing the possible maximum or advising the
      defendant of the possible maximum will amount to
      manifest injustice justifying the withdrawal of a guilty
      plea; the mistake must be material to the defendant’s
      decision to plead guilty. This determination must be fact- and
      case-specific. Certainly, if a defendant were to plead guilty to
      avoid a death sentence when there is no possibility of a death
      sentence, then this mistake would clearly be material. On the
      other hand, suppose there were a robbery of five people together
      with conspiracy and weapons charges, and the defendant were
      told that he faced a maximum sentence of 70 to 140 years rather
      than 65 to 130 years. If the plea negotiations resulted in a
      sentence of 5 to 10 years, then this mistake would not be material.

Barbosa, 819 A.2d at 83 (emphasis added).

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      Relatedly, in Commonwealth v. Martin, 392 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super.

1978) (en banc), we stated as follows:

      Certainly, the questioning or advising of an accused as to the
      permissible scope of sentences is an important element of a guilty
      plea colloquy[.] However, the omission of such advi[c]e from a
      colloquy[, w]here the plea has been negotiated, … will not
      automatically invalidate the plea. Where a plea bargain has been
      entered into by an accused represented by counsel, the
      surrounding circumstances of the plea may sufficiently indicate
      that the appellant pleaded knowingly and voluntarily even though
      he was not apprised on the record of the possible range of
      sentence.

Id. at 862 (emphasis and internal citations omitted).

      Instantly, at Appellant’s plea hearings, the prosecutor detailed the terms

of the negotiated plea agreement on the record.         N.T., 2/23/22, at 3-4.

Appellant’s counsel responded in the affirmative to the trial court’s question,

“Are you waiving and stipulating as to all the affidavits of probable cause?”

Id. at 3; see also id. at 6 (Appellant confirming his “understanding of the

plea agreement” and that he “stipulated to the criminal information”).

Appellant acknowledged he was a high school graduate and could read and

understand the English language. Id. at 6; N.T., 3/3/22, at 3. Appellant

represented he was not under the influence of any medication, alcohol, or

drugs that would render him unable to understand the proceedings.          N.T.,

2/23/22, at 7; N.T., 3/3/22, at 4. Appellant further confirmed that he did not

suffer from any mental or physical infirmity.    N.T., 2/23/22, at 7-8; N.T.,

3/3/22, at 4. Appellant agreed that no one had coerced or forced him into

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pleading guilty, or made any promises that were not contained in the plea

agreement. N.T., 2/23/22, at 8; N.T., 3/3/22, at 5.

       The trial court explained the permissible range of sentences for each of

the charges to which Appellant was pleading guilty.5 N.T., 2/23/22, at 8-9;

N.T., 3/3/22, at 4-7. Appellant represented he had spoken to his counsel

about the charges and possible penalties and he “fully and completely

understand[s] the maximum penalties that [he was] facing….” N.T., 3/3/22,

at 7-8. Appellant conceded that he was pleading guilty to the charges because

he was, in fact, guilty. Id. at 10.

       Finally, Appellant confirmed that he had reviewed and executed, with

the assistance of counsel, a “Guilty Plea Explanation of [] Rights” (GPER) form6

Id. at 8; see also generally GPER, 2/23/22.7 In the GPER form, Appellant

answered in the affirmative to the question, “Have you and your

attorney discussed the maximum possible sentences which th[e trial

c]ourt could impose?” GPER, 2/23/22, ¶ 44 (emphasis added); see also

id. ¶¶ 10, 62 (Appellant confirming he “had ample opportunity to consult with

[his] attorney before entering [his] plea” and had enough time to “check any

____________________________________________

5 It is undisputed that the trial court did not advise Appellant of the possible

penalties associated with the numerous withdrawn charges.

6 Appellant confirmed that he understood all of the questions contained in the

GPER form and truthfully answered each one. N.T., 3/3/22, at 8.

7 The GPER form is contained in the supplemental record filed in this Court on

February 21, 2024.

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questions of fact or law”). Appellant stated he understood his “plea must be

voluntary and [his] rights must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently

waived.” Id. ¶ 52; see also id. ¶¶ 52-56.

     The trial court determined, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, that it did not

err in denying Appellant’s PSM to withdraw his guilty pleas, competently

reasoning as follows:

     [Appellant’s] statements made under oath at the plea hearings
     made clear that he had full and total awareness of the charges to
     which he was pleading, and the caselaw is clear that he is bound
     by those statements and cannot simply contradict them later on
     in order to withdraw a plea. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832
     A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003).

           Moreover, based on statements made by [Appellant]
     himself, the [trial] court found that his attempt to withdraw his
     plea prior to sentencing was rooted in his unsupported belief
     regarding a particular sentence that he thought he would receive.
     [Appellant’s] motivation to withdraw his plea was based on his
     dissatisfaction with a yet-to-be-imposed sentence and not at all
     based on any genuine or sincere lack of understanding of his plea.
     (See Motion Hearing, held 7/21/22, pp. 36-37).

           After considering all of the above, this court maintains that,
     even if it did not strictly abide by Rule 590’s
     recommendation to advise [Appellant] as to the
     permissible range of sentences for all 23 charges that
     [Appellant] originally faced, … any such defect was not
     fatal to this plea because the totality of the circumstances
     show[s] that [Appellant] knew and understood the facts
     underlying his charges, as well as the nature and elements
     of each offense to which he actually pled. This court even
     continued, out of an abundance of caution, [Appellant’s] first plea
     hearing to ensure that he had ample time and opportunity to
     consult with his attorney regarding the details of the plea and its
     implications.

           Respectfully, and in this court’s estimation, a mandate to
     set forth penalties for charges that were withdrawn has the

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     strong potential for creating more confusion in the defendant’s
     mind regarding the charges and his bargained for agreement,
     particularly in a case like this where [Appellant] initially had nearly
     two dozen charges against him.

           Such a requirement to announce penalties for all charged
     offenses, while certainly well intentioned, does not fit neatly into
     the reality of what occurs during a plea hearing.           In the
     overwhelming majority of cases, the defendants are not writing
     down with pen and paper the penalties as they are recited by the
     plea court. …

            It would seem that the requirement of reciting all penalties
     for all charged offenses is more of an academic exercise that, for
     practical purposes, does not meaningfully enhance a defendant’s
     ability to understand and appreciate the terms of his actual
     agreed-upon plea, the same way that the other five (5) mandated
     areas of inquiry do. (See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment).

            It is further harder to reconcile why a plea court would be
     required to engage in a rote discussion of penalties for “all charged
     offenses” when there is no similar requirement for the inquiry into
     a defendant’s understanding of the nature of “all charged
     offenses,” which presumably, is just as, if not more important
     than, the question of penalties, lest a defendant unwittingly plead
     guilty in the first place to a charge for which there was no factual
     basis. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment. To be sure, Rule 590’s
     Comment advises the inquiry only into the “nature of the charges
     to which he or she is pleading guilty….” Id. (emphasis
     added).

            The duty to review the full extent of a defendant’s
     sentencing exposure relating to all charged offenses is better
     placed with his attorney at the time that counsel is advising the
     defendant as to the pros and cons of a plea agreement so that a
     full discussion can take place regarding the issue.

           Based on the foregoing, the fact that this court did not
     inquire into whether [Appellant] understood the
     permissible range of sentences for all 2[3] original charges
     is not sufficient to render his plea invalid based on the
     totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, this court did not
     abuse its discretion when it denied [Appellant’s PSM.]

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Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/23, at 11-14 (emphasis added; some capitalization

modified).    The trial court concluded “the totality of the circumstances

establishes that [Appellant] ‘had a full understanding of the nature and

consequences of his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to

enter the plea.’” Id. at 8 (quoting Eichinger, 108 A.3d at 832).

      The trial court’s foregoing reasoning is supported by the record and the

law, and we agree with its conclusion.         See id. at 8, 11-14; see also

Barbosa, 819 A.2d at 86 (stating that the “failure to advise a defendant of

the possible maximum sentence will not necessarily justify the withdrawal of

an otherwise voluntary guilty plea.”); Eichinger, 108 A.3d at 832

(emphasizing that “even though there is an omission or defect in the guilty

plea colloquy, a plea of guilty will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances

surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that the defendant had a full

understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea and that he

knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.”).       Appellant failed to

show “prejudice on the order of manifest injustice” that would allow for the

withdrawal of his guilty pleas. Yeomans, 24 A.3d at 1046. The trial court

did not err; Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief.

      In his second issue, Appellant challenges the denial of his PSM to

withdraw his guilty pleas, where the record did not provide a factual basis for

the trial court to accept the pleas. See Appellant’s Brief at 28-31; see also

N.T., 3/3/22, at 10.     Appellant concedes he stipulated at the guilty plea

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hearing as “to the factual allegations in the respective affidavits of probable

cause….” Id. at 31.        Nevertheless, Appellant argues the record does “not

evince that the trial court did anything to ensure that [Appellant] wasn’t

pleading guilty to an offense his conduct didn’t constitute.”        Id. at 29.8

Appellant challenges “the trial court’s view that stipulation to an affidavit of

probable cause is sufficient to dispense with Rule 590’s requirement of a

factual basis….” Id. at 31.

       The Commonwealth counters that “this Court should hold [A]ppellant to

his waiver of the factual recitation and his stipulation to the factual basis for

the plea.” Commonwealth Brief at 12.               The Commonwealth emphasizes

Appellant

       cites no case law in support of his contention that even a
       defendant’s voluntary stipulation to the facts is somehow not
       enough for purposes of ensuring that the plea colloquy sufficiently
       covers the factual basis of the plea.

Id. According to the Commonwealth, if Appellant “had wanted to force the

Commonwealth to place a factual recitation on the record, then he could have

done so. He did not do so….” Id.

       The trial court rejected Appellant’s challenge to the factual basis for his

pleas in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, reasoning as follows:

              At the outset of the first plea hearing on February 23, 2022,
       this court asked defense counsel whether they were “waiving and
____________________________________________

8 We reiterate the Commonwealth charged Appellant with 23 offenses, for
multiple episodes of criminal conduct. Appellant pled guilty to 10 charges; he
fails to specify which of these charges he challenges.

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       stipulating to all the affidavits of probable cause” and defense
       counsel said yes.       ([N.T., 2/23/22], p. 3).     [Appellant’s]
       agreement to accept as true the factual averments contained in
       the affidavits for each case relieved the Commonwealth of its
       burden to recite the factual basis on the record. Commonwealth
       v. Johnson, 2021 WL 1753401, at *4 (Pa. Super. 2021)
       [(unpublished memorandum)9].

             The [d]efendant in Johnson “attempted to preempt the
       Commonwealth from placing the factual basis on the record by
       stipulating that the affidavit of probable cause contained sufficient
       information to support the pleas.” Id. at 4. The defendant then
       attempted to argue that his plea was invalid because there was
       no factual basis for the plea. In finding that there was a sufficient
       factual basis, the court explained that:

            [“t]he court will hold a party bound to his stipulation:
            concessions made in stipulations are judicial admissions,
            and accordingly may not later in the proceeding be
            contradicted by the party who made them.” Tyler v.
            Kind, 496 A.2d 16, 21 (Pa. Super. 1985) (citing, inter
            alia, Commonwealth v. Barksdale, 281 A.2d 703 (Pa.
            Super. 1971)).         Given his stipulation, the
            Commonwealth was relieved of its duty to state a
            full factual basis stated in open court. Accord
            Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 430, 462 (Pa.
            2006) (“By entering into the stipulation [that the
            defendant had no significant prior criminal history], the
            defense was relieved of the burden of calling witnesses
            to prove that [the defendant] had no criminal history
            prior to the current conviction.”).

       Id. at *4 (emphasis added). Accordingly, pursuant to Johnson,
       [Appellant’s] stipulation as to the factual accuracy of the affidavits
       relieved the Commonwealth’s burden of placing a factual basis on
       the record. Therefore, [Appellant’s] plea was not rendered invalid
       on this ground, and the court did not abuse its discretion in finding
       no merit to this issue in his post-sentence motion.

____________________________________________

9 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2), unpublished non-precedential
memorandum decisions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court filed after May 1,
2019 may be cited for their persuasive value.

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J-A03045-24

Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/23, at 15-16 (footnote added).

      Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s foregoing analysis and find

Johnson’s reasoning persuasive and applicable. See id.; see also Tyler,

496 A.2d at 21 (stating stipulations are judicial admissions that cannot later

be contradicted). We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s attempt to distinguish

Johnson. See Appellant’s Brief at 30-31. Accordingly, Appellant’s second

issue does not merit relief.

      Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of the trial court’s

discretion in denying Appellant’s PSM to withdraw his guilty pleas.          See

Norton, 201 A.3d at 120, 121 (stating, “an appellate court should not

substitute its judgment for that of a trial court that ruled on a [] motion to

withdraw a guilty plea,” where the defendant has failed to carry his or her

“heavy burden” of establishing an abuse of discretion (citation omitted)).

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 04/19/2024

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