Court Opinion

ID: 9807957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:22:16.61619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:26.541723
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
concurring in result only. I agree with the Court that the objection of the plaintiff to the tax valúa*903tion was some evidence to go to' the jury. The plaintiff, Dob-son, frankly told the tax lister what the machinery bad cost, but insisted that it should be listed at a much lower sum. I think this might have been considered by the jury as evidence tending to show deterioration of the property, but not as contradicting the defendant, who presumably meant that it was assessed out of proportion to other manufacturing property. ' Those who have bad anything to do with such enterprises know that there is a great difference between the price second-hand machinery would bring upon the open market and the amount it would take to replace it, and yet the machinery may be as valuable to the owner, that is may have as great a productive value, as when it was new. This is the only ground on which I can agree in granting a. new trial. Here I wish the opinion bad stopped, as I at least must stop. I cannot agree in granting a new trial, either as a matter of right or of discretion, for the’ admission of evidence or the method of examination of a witness to which there is no exception. Where such a ruling, in addition to the fact of being made upon matters not before us, is in itself essentially erroneous, I must respectfully dissent. In its opinion the Court says: “The plaintiff’s counsel subjected this witness to a very severe and rigid cross-examination, which we think was calculated to impeach bis credibility and disparage him before the jury, and thereby prejudice the defendant.” Further on the court says: “A large part of the testimony of the witness, Finch, was incompetent because it was bear-say.” There is no suggestion that any part of Finch’s testimony was favorable to the defendant. Therefore, the defendant could not possibly be hurt by any disparagement of the witness. If the witness’ testimony was unfavorable to the defendant, as it must have been, then the disparagement of the witness was a positive benefit to the defendant, and it would have no ground of complaint. The defendant may *904’have so thought, as its able counsel failed to enter an exception, except in terms too general to be considered. Can we do for them what they failed to do for themselves ? Or can we do what is equivalent thereto — -pass upon the matter as if it were under exception? This has been done in a few instances with the consent of the Attorney General in eases of capital felony; but never, as far as I have the knowlege, in civil cases.