Court Opinion

ID: 9520021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:29:36.2368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:27.212288
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GUILD, dissenting: I dissent. I feel that the majority has misinterpreted the purpose of the neglect statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37, par. 702 — 4(1) (a)) and the application to the facts of this case. At the outset I am fully conversant with, and agree without a shadow of a doubt that the natural parent has the superior right to the custody of his or her child. I further recognize that oft times social workers have a tendency to feel that the child in question is better off in a foster home where better creature comforts are available. This is, of course, a fallacy. The love and affection of a parent for his or her child is not measured by what material benefits they may be able to afford for the child. On the other hand, the right of the parent must yield where the facts indicate that the welfare and best interest of the child would be better served. The majority does not believe that the facts of this case are such as to warrant a finding of neglect under section 2 — 4 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37, par. 702 — 4). I do not agree. The hearing, both at the adjudicatory stage and at the dispositional stage, seems to have been based primarily upon the recriminations of each parent against the other. That is not the issue herein. It may well be that the father is not an exemplary parent. But there is evidence that the mother did, in fact, neglect the children — the paternal grandmother stating that from the time Sam, Jr., was 15M months old he was with her 4 or 5 days a week, Sam being 3/2 years old at the time of the first hearing herein. More important is the fact that at the time of the dispositional hearing both parents were in jail! I do not find that In re Stacey (1973), 16 Ill. App. 3d 179, 305 N.E.2d 634, cited by the majority, is controlling. In Stacey the events which were the basis of the neglect petition had occurred more than a year and a half before the hearing thereon. In the meantime, the Stacey parents had moved to Zion, Illinois, had established their home there and the children were with them. As pointed out in Stacey, “There is no fixed standard for a determination of neglect, so each case must be determined on its particular facts.” Going further, it is to be noted that the pediatrician advised the court on or about the time of the adjudicatory hearing that the interest of the child, Sam, Jr., would be best served by leaving him with his grandmother who, “For all practical purposes this woman has taken care of Samuel’s physical and emotional needs for greater than a year.” Likewise, the caseworker for the Department of Children and Family Services recommended that the children remain with their grandparents, observing, “The grandparents could help with a transition back to the parents when there is housing and means of support.” The dispositional hearing was held in October of 1977. The record discloses that as late as December 1977 the mother of the children was living in a rented room. This does not appear to be adequate for the care of two little children. This is not a case of permanently taking the children from the parents, or either of them. Neglect cases are on-going. I am sure that if the mother secures the proper housing and can demonstrate to the court that she is in a position to care and provide for the children that they will be returned to her in that event. In the meantime, the considerable efforts of all the people who have attempted to assist in this case should not go unappreciated. Nor should we substitute our judgment for that of the court. This is best stated by our supreme court in In re Stilley (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 515, 520, 363 N.E.2d 820, 822: “Given the varying circumstances of neglect cases, the trial court must have broad discretion to reach a just determination. [Citations.] Only where there has been an abuse of discretion or the judgment has been against the manifest weight of the evidence should the decision be disturbed on appeal. The delicacy and difficulty of child-custody and child-neglect cases justify the burden of responsibility placed on the trial court and the ensuing deference which must be given to the trial court.” I did not find, as the majority did, that the guardian ad litem for the children “* * # admitted the allegations of the complaint on their behalf.” The trial court so found, and the majority adopted that finding, but the record does not indicate that the guardian ad litem admitted anything. As a matter of fact the guardian ad litem attempted to place the decision up to the court, stating in part, ° ° I would merely demand that the court’s decision require full proof of all of the allegations made by the State’s Attorney * * At this point the trial court erroneously stated, “Are you aware that your clients admitted the petition early in this case?” The record does not so indicate. Under the facts of this case I agree with the trial court that the children were neglected and I would affirm the finding, again noting that the proper procedure in a change of circumstances of the mother, or the father for that matter, is a continuing matter for the trial court to consider.