Court Opinion

ID: 9643591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:33:37.537767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:01.713040
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that, when a testator devises a life interest in real estate to a beneficiary who is also the co-executrix of his will, with the real estate to be sold at the beneficiary’s death and the net proceeds distributed to charities as part of the residuary estate, the beneficiary/co-executrix may act along with the co-executor to sell the fee interest in the real estate and be paid outright for the value of her life estate from the proceeds of the sale. In reaching this conclusion, I believe that the majority has overlooked this Court’s own precedent. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
The relevant clause of the decedent’s will provides as follows:
(B) I give to Helen M. Colwell, if she survives me by thirty days, for her life, my interest in real property located at 302 Fox Chapel Road, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15238, being Apartment No. 309 in Fox Chapel Mews II; provided, however, that Mrs. Colwell shall advise my Corporate Executor of her election to occupy my apartment within 120 days following my death. Mrs. Colwell may occupy my apartment without bond and without liability for waste; provided, however, that she shall keep the apartment adequately *498insured, maintained and repaired and shall pay all real estate taxes, water and sewer rents, assessments, carrying charges and similar charges thereon. Upon Mrs. Colwell’s death, or if she should predecease me, upon my death (i) such apartment shall be sold and the net proceeds distributed as part of my residuary estate as set forth in Article III.
Will of Kenneth C. Hewitt, dated January 2, 1991; R.R. at 3a — 5a.
Thus, under the terms of the will, Mrs. Colwell was not explicitly given any interest in the proceeds of the sale of the realty; instead, those proceeds were to be distributed to the residuary estate. In Estate of Felice, 487 Pa. 342, 409 A.2d 382 (1979), this Court held that where the will did not explicitly furnish the life tenant with a right to the proceeds from the sale of the property, and where it was not necessary to sell the property for the payment of estate expenses, then the life tenant was not entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the property. Instead, the proceeds became a part of the residuary estate. The will in Felice provided as follows:
B. Trustees shall permit my friend, EDNA CHASE, full occupancy of the house in which I reside during her lifetime. Trustees shall also pay all taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, costs' or repairs, and other maintenance costs incurred in connection with this house while occupied by my friend---- (1) At the death of my friend, EDNA CHASE, or at my death, should she predecease me, by [sic] Trustees shall sell such house as is then held in trust.
Id. at 346, 409 A.2d at 383-84. In Felice, a unanimous Supreme Court, which included the author of the Majority Opinion in the instant matter, found, “[t]he provisions of the will express a clear intention by the testator to give to Ms. Chase the use and occupancy of the home rather than the proceeds of a sale of that property.” Id. at 351, 409 A.2d at 386. Thus, the Court directed the sale proceeds to be distributed to the residuary trust.
*499I do not believe that the facts in Felice can be distinguished from the facts in the matter sub judice in any meaningful way,1 nor do I believe that any compelling reasons have been advanced for overruling Felice.2 Pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, I would follow Felice and would hold that the proceeds from the sale of the real estate must be distributed to the residuary estate. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority's attempt to distinguish Felice in footnote five is unpersuasive. The majority states that, in Felice, the trustees owned the whole property, whereas here, the trustees had only a remainder interest in the property. The majority neglects to compare the precise language of the bequest in Felice, as set forth above, with that at issue here. In each will, the beneficiary was specifically provided a life estate in the property at issue, with no explicit provision for an interest in the proceeds of that property. Also, each will provided that the trustees were to sell the property at the death of the beneficiary and apply the proceeds to the residuary estate. Thus, in each case, the interest held by the trustees in the property was identical. The majority's attempt to characterize the trustee’s interest in Felice as a separate "ownership” interest, as opposed to the "remainder” interest held by the trustees in this matter, finds no support in the actual language of the documents. Moreover, I do not believe such a distinction would be relevant even if it did exist. The principle of Felice remains that the life tenant has no interest in the proceeds of the sale of the property absent an explicit bequest to that effect, regardless of whether the interest of the remaindermen is characterized as an "ownership” interest or a “remainder” interest.
Similarly, the attempt to distinguish Felice in the Concurring Opinion fails. The Concurring Opinion states that the testator in Felice devised a life estate in the residuary trust, not a life estate in real property. However, as set forth above, the actual language in the will stated that: "Trustees shall permit my friend, EDNA CHASE, full occupancy of the house in which I reside during her lifetime.” This Court stated: "The provisions of the will express a clear intention by the testator to give to Ms. Chase the use and occupancy of the home rather than the proceeds of a sale of that property.” Id. at 351, 409 A.2d at 386 (emphasis added).

. To the contrary, I believe that compelling reasons exist for continuing to adhere to this Court's decision in Felice. As Judge Johnson's dissent in the Superior Court aptly points out, Mrs. Colwell's actions in selling the property at issue resulted in almost $40,000 in additional and unnecessary tax liabilities to the estate. This $40,000 was also a part of the corpus of the estate to which the residuary legatees were intended beneficiaries. Allowing Mrs. Colwell to retain the net proceeds from the sale while simultaneously imposing this unnecessary $40,000 expense on the estate seems anomalous at best. As Felice holds, all net proceeds from the sale of the property at issue should revert to the residuary estate, with the $40,000 in expenses being deducted from *500tílese proceeds. Such a result, in addition to being compelled by this Court's own precedent, seems to me the far more equitable result.