Court Opinion

ID: 9370626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 14:11:34.259623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:22.637354
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Athey, Chaney and Raphael
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Winchester, Virginia

              MICHAEL JAMES HETLE
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0304-22-4                                    JUDGE VERNIDA R. CHANEY
                                                                                 FEBRUARY 14, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
                                                Randy I. Bellows, Judge

                               (George L. Freeman, IV; The Law Offices of George L. Freeman,
                               IV, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

                               Lindsay M. Brooker, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     A jury in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County (circuit court) found Michael James Hetle

              (Hetle) guilty of first-degree murder, in violation of Code § 18.2-32, and use of a firearm in the

              commission of murder, in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. The circuit court sentenced Hetle to

              incarceration for life on the murder conviction and three years of incarceration on the firearm

              conviction. On appeal, Hetle contends that the circuit court erred in (1) denying his motion to

              dismiss a juror who observed “apparent misconduct” by a trial spectator, (2) admitting into evidence

              “intended confidential communications” between Hetle and his wife, (3) barring Hetle from

              testifying to what he told a neighbor about feeling physically threatened after recent encounters with

              the victim, (4) allowing the Commonwealth to cross-examine Hetle about prior allegations of racial

              bias, and (5) admitting into evidence Hetle’s son’s testimony about Hetle’s use of racial slurs in

                     *
                         Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
reference to the victim and his family. Finding no reversible error, this Court affirms Hetle’s

convictions.

                                          BACKGROUND

       “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party” in the circuit court. McGowan v.

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 516 (2020) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472

(2018)). We “regard as true all credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all

inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence.” Id. (citing Gerald, 295 Va. at 473).

                                I. Hetle’s Relationship with the Victim

       Hetle had a contentious relationship with his neighbor, Javon Prather, who lived next door to

Hetle’s townhouse in Fairfax County. From September 2018 to March 2020, Hetle made many

complaints about Mr. Prather and his wife to their homeowners’ association and the police. Hetle

complained about public intoxication, noise, trespass, and vandalism, among other grievances. In

March 2019, Hetle alleged that Mrs. Prather threw glass bottles and other objects at him, his house,

and his car. In May 2019, Hetle obtained a two-year protective order against Mrs. Prather. The

protective order protected Hetle, his wife, and his teenage son. Hetle complained to his son that the

Prathers were “not good for the neighborhood.” Hetle’s son heard him refer to Mr. Prather as a

“nigger” or “negro” at least ten times. Hetle told his son that he would shoot the Prathers “if they

ever come close to us or harm us.” Hetle also told his son that the Prathers “should be scared of

him because he’ll kill them.”

       Hetle’s wife testified that Mr. Prather had exhibited increasingly hostile behavior towards

her and Hetle, such as yelling insults and obscenities at them. A video from Hetle’s security

camera showed Mr. Prather calling Hetle “a faggot ass fuck nigger” in September 2019, when

                                                 -2-
the police were at Hetle’s home investigating a complaint against Mr. Prather. Mrs. Hetle also

testified that it was not uncommon for Mr. Prather to threaten to beat up Hetle.

       A neighbor of Hetle testified that the day before the shooting, Hetle told her that

Mr. Prather had been increasingly aggressive towards him and recently threatened him. The

neighbor advised Hetle to call the police. When the neighbor asked Hetle if he was okay, Hetle

replied, “No, I’m scared. I’m scared for my life. I’m scared of Javon and I’m scared of [his

wife]. I’m afraid that they’re going to stab me when I get out walking.” Hetle also told the

neighbor that he was afraid for his own wife and son. The neighbor testified that Hetle “was

genuinely scared.” The neighbor again advised Hetle to call the police.

       A second neighbor testified that he had once witnessed Hetle and Mr. Prather “getting

ready to go to blows.” He also testified that Hetle had a reputation among his neighbors for

being “quiet and peaceful,” but Mr. Prather’s “reputation in the neighborhood was aggressive

and tending toward violence.”

       On March 3, 2020, the day of the shooting, Hetle called the police multiple times,

complaining about the Prathers. The police eventually responded to Hetle’s calls for service, but the

Prathers left before the police arrived. When the Prathers returned around 4:30 p.m. and resumed

playing loud music from their car, Hetle called the police again. While waiting for the police to

return, Hetle shouted out his window to Mr. Prather, “Yo, yo, yo! Police coming, my man!”

Mr. Prather responded, “What am I doing? . . . You’re a pussy. . . . You fat fuck. Fuckin’ bitch. . . .

I didn’t do nothing wrong.”

                                          II. The Shooting

       Around 5:00 p.m. that same day, Mr. Prather walked from his home to Hetle’s townhouse,

knocked on Hetle’s front door, stepped back from the door, and awaited a response. Hetle’s son

                                                 -3-
testified that from his upstairs bedroom, he heard loud pounding on the front door that shook the

walls of the house.

         Moments after Mr. Prather knocked on Hetle’s door, Hetle opened the door with a

semi-automatic pistol pointed at Mr. Prather. Hetle immediately shot Mr. Prather twice in the chest.

As Mr. Prather turned and fled down the stairs, Hetle shot him multiple times, including in the back.

Hetle again shot Mr. Prather in the chest after he collapsed on Hetle’s driveway.

         After shooting Mr. Prather seven times, Hetle walked down the stairs, pointed the gun at the

Prather’s townhouse, and shouted, “You want it too?” After Mrs. Prather responded that she was

calling the police, Hetle again pointed the gun in her direction and shouted, “You get the fuck out of

here!”

         When Hetle returned inside his townhouse, Mrs. Prather immediately went out to help

Mr. Prather. As she approached Hetle’s driveway, Hetle came out, pointed the gun at her, and

repeatedly shouted, “Get out!” and “Get away!” Hetle returned inside his townhouse when

Mrs. Prather walked up the stairs of a neighboring townhouse. Then Mrs. Prather walked back to

Hetle’s driveway and tried to drag her husband toward their townhouse. Hetle again came out and

repeatedly shouted, “Get away!” Mrs. Prather replied, “I am. We’re getting away,” and she

continued to drag Mr. Prather by his arms. After moving her husband’s motionless body a few feet,

Mrs. Prather wept and exclaimed, “You killed him!” Hetle yelled back, “Leave him!” But

Mrs. Prather responded, “No! I’m not leaving my husband!,” as she kept trying to move him.

When Mrs. Prather stopped and tried to revive Mr. Prather, Hetle went back inside his townhouse.

Mr. Prather died of gunshot wounds at the scene of the shooting.

                                                 -4-
                                        III. Hetle’s Jury Trial

                                 A. Juror Note about Trial Spectator

        On the third day of trial, Juror Number 20 submitted a note informing the circuit court that

she saw a trial spectator photograph some of the jurors outside the courthouse the day before. The

juror informed the circuit court that she did not communicate with anyone else about her reported

observations. The circuit court instructed the juror not to share her reported observations with

anyone else.

        At Hetle’s request, the circuit court asked Juror Number 20 whether she believed that her

observation of the trial spectator photographing jurors “might impact or affect [her] ability to be a

fair and impartial juror in this case at all?” Juror Number 20 replied, “No, sir.”

        Hetle moved to dismiss Juror Number 20 and replace her with one of the two alternates so

that there would be “no chance that this gets back to other jurors.” The circuit court denied Hetle’s

request to remove and replace Juror Number 20.

                            B. The Hetles’ Recorded Jail Telephone Call

        Over Hetle’s objection, the circuit court admitted into evidence a portion of a recorded

telephone call Hetle made from jail to his wife. After Hetle’s wife answered the call, an automated

message stated, “This call may be recorded and is subject to monitoring at any time.” Near the

beginning of the call, Hetle reminded his wife, “Just be careful; these phone calls are recorded.”

Mrs. Hetle replied, “Yes, they are. I know.”

        During the recorded call, Hetle’s wife told him that the police took their security video

camera from the front of their townhouse and the password to the camera. Hetle responded, “Shit.”

Hetle’s security camera recorded the shooting of Mr. Prather and Hetle’s subsequent interactions

with Mrs. Prather.

                                                 -5-
        Hetle objected that this phone conversation was an intended confidential communication

between husband and wife. Hetle contended that while he was incarcerated, his only means of

communicating with his wife was through the jail telephone system because the jail’s pandemic

protocols disallowed in-person visitation. Given that jail calls were the only available means of

spousal communication, Hetle argued that his jail calls to his wife were protected under the spousal

privilege. The circuit court overruled Hetle’s objections.

                        C. Hetle’s Statement to a Neighbor about the Victim

        The circuit court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection to Hetle’s testimony that he told

a neighbor the day before the shooting that Mr. Prather’s recent conduct made him feel that

Mr. Prather was preparing to stab him. The circuit court rejected Hetle’s argument that it was an

admissible “state-of-mind statement.”

                    D. Cross-examination about Prior Allegations of Racial Bias

        Over Hetle’s objection, the circuit court allowed the Commonwealth to cross-examine Hetle

about a reprimand he received as a police officer in 2001, twenty years before the shooting of

Mr. Prather. The Commonwealth sought to elicit testimony that Hetle was reprimanded for

(1) commenting on the nationality of an Ethiopian woman during a traffic stop, (2) stating that he

would call to ask that her driving be re-tested, and (3) threatening to call INS to have her deported

after she filed a complaint against him. The Commonwealth argued that the information was

relevant to the element of malice. Hetle argued that the alleged events were unrelated to and

attenuated from the events at issue, that the information was irrelevant to this case, that the

information was unfairly prejudicial, and that the probative value of the information was “nearly

none.” The circuit court overruled Hetle’s objections.

        On cross-examination, Hetle acknowledged that when he worked as a police officer, he

received a written reprimand regarding a traffic stop he made of an Ethiopian woman. Hetle denied

                                                  -6-
making comments about her ethnicity. Hetle also denied stating that he would call and ask that her

driving be re-tested, and he denied threatening to call INS to have her deported.

                            E. Testimony about Hetle’s Use of Racial Slurs

        Over Hetle’s objection, his son testified that Hetle had referred to Mr. Prather “in a racial

derogatory manner.” Specifically, Hetle’s son testified that at least ten times, Hetle referred to

Mr. Prather using racial slurs which Hetle’s son identified by spelling out the words “n-i-g-g-e-r”

and “n-e-g-r-o.” Hetle objected that this evidence was unrelated to the shooting and unfairly

prejudicial. The circuit court overruled Hetle’s objections, finding that “the probative value

outweighs the prejudice.”

                                             ANALYSIS

                            I. Denial of Motion to Dismiss Juror Number 20

        Hetle contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss Juror Number 20

after the juror informed the court that she saw a trial spectator photographing some of the jurors

outside the courthouse. On appeal, a trial court’s decision not to remove a juror for cause is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Hunt v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 395, 399 (1997). As

our Supreme Court has recognized:

                An abuse of discretion . . . can occur in three principal ways: when a
                relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not
                considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and
                given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and no
                improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those
                factors, commits a clear error of judgment.

Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352 (2011) (alteration in

original) (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984)). Additionally, a

trial court “by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Porter v.

Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 260 (2008) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)).

When deciding whether to retain a prospective juror on the jury panel or whether to remove a juror
                                                  -7-
from the jury mid-trial, a trial court must determine whether something “would prevent or

substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and

his oath.” Hunt, 25 Va. App. at 399 (quoting Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 236 (1992));

see also Code § 8.01-361 (“If a juror, after he is sworn, be unable from any cause to perform his

duty, the court may, in its discretion, cause another qualified juror to be sworn in his place . . . .”).

        In denying Hetle’s request to replace Juror Number 20 with an alternate juror, the circuit

court noted that the court instructed the juror not to inform any jurors that she saw someone

photograph some jurors. The circuit court concluded that there was no reason to believe that Juror

Number 20 would not follow this instruction. The circuit court also found that Juror Number 20

firmly expressed to the court “that it would not affect her ability to be a fair and impartial juror at

all.” Thus, the circuit court found “it would have no effect on her judgment as to performing her

duties properly as a juror.”1 Therefore, the circuit court concluded that there was no basis to excuse

Juror Number 20.

        Given Juror Number 20’s assurances that (i) her observation of a trial spectator

photographing jurors would not affect her ability to be fair and impartial and (ii) she would not

inform her fellow jurors about her observation, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by

refusing to remove Juror Number 20. As the circuit court concluded, there is no basis for finding

that Juror Number 20’s reported observation would prevent or substantially impair the performance

of her duties as a juror in accordance with her instructions and her oath.

                                         II. Evidentiary Rulings

        Hetle challenges several evidentiary rulings by the circuit court. “Decisions regarding the

admissibility of evidence ‘lie within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed on

        1
          The circuit court also asked the sheriff’s office “to escort the jurors to the public parking
lot for the remainder of the trial.”
                                                 -8-
appeal absent an abuse of discretion.’” Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 692, 697

(2019) (quoting Michels v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 461, 465 (2006)). On appeal, a trial

court’s evidentiary ruling will be deemed an abuse of discretion “[o]nly when reasonable jurists

could not differ.” Nottingham v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 221, 231 (2021) (quoting Grattan v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)). “[E]videntiary issues presenting a ‘question of law’ are

‘reviewed de novo by this Court.’” Id. (quoting Abney v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 337, 345

(2008)).

                     A. Admission of the Hetles’ Recorded Jail Telephone Call

        Hetle contends that the circuit court erred in admitting into evidence his recorded telephone

call from jail to his wife. Hetle argues that because the call was an intended confidential spousal

communication, the call is protected from disclosure under Code § 19.2-271.2 and inadmissible

under Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:504(b). Rule 2:504(b), which is derived from Code

§ 19.2-271.2, in relevant part provides:

                [I]n any criminal proceeding, a person has a privilege to refuse to
                disclose, and to prevent anyone else from disclosing, any confidential
                communication between such person and his or her spouse during
                their marriage . . . . For the purposes of this Rule, “confidential
                communication” means a communication made privately by a person
                to his or her spouse that is not intended for disclosure to any other
                person.

Rule 2:504(b)(2) (emphasis added). Hetle argues that his call from the jail to his wife was protected

from disclosure as an intended confidential communication because the jail’s telephone system

provided his only means of communicating with his wife while he was incarcerated. However,

Hetle cites no authority in support of this proposition, and it appears there is no such supporting

authority. Indeed, the loss of privacy is an “inherent incident[ ] of confinement.” Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 (1984) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)).

                                                 -9-
        The circuit court found that Hetle’s recorded call to his wife was not a confidential

communication because “both parties were advised that it might be recorded and subject to

monitoring at any time.” In addition to the automated message informing Hetle and his wife that

the call was subject to monitoring and recording, Hetle told his wife that the call was being recorded

and she replied, “I know.” Under these circumstances, the Hetles’ phone conversation does not

qualify as a communication made privately between spouses. Even if the Hetles had no means of

having private, confidential communications while Hetle was incarcerated, this circumstance would

not protect their monitored communications from disclosure as if they were private, confidential

communications. Thus, the recorded call was not a confidential communication as defined in Rule

2:504(b)(2) and the circuit court did not err in admitting the call into evidence.

                         B. Exclusion of Hetle’s Statement to His Neighbor

        Hetle contends that the circuit court erred in sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to

his testimony that he told a neighbor that his recent encounters with Mr. Prather made him feel that

Mr. Prather was planning to stab him. Hetle argues that the statement is admissible under the

state-of-mind exception to the rule against hearsay. See Va. R. Evid. 2:803(3) (providing that the

following is not excluded by the hearsay rule: “[a] statement of the declarant’s then existing state of

mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling,

pain, and bodily health)”). The circuit court ruled that Hetle’s testimony about his own statement

was inadmissible, but Hetle could testify to his own state of mind at the time. The circuit court

noted that it had allowed Hetle’s neighbor to testify to the same statement under the state-of-mind

exception. Hetle argues that for the same reason that the neighbor’s testimony to the statement was

admitted, his own testimony to the statement should have been admitted.

        On review of the trial court’s decision, this Court seeks “the best and narrowest grounds

available” for its decision. Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017) (quoting

                                                 - 10 -
Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015)). Here, this Court holds that the best and

narrowest ground for decision is our conclusion “that the alleged trial court error, if error at all, was

harmless as a matter of law.” Id. Non-constitutional error is harmless if “the error did not influence

the jury, or had but slight effect.” Holloman v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 147, 171 (2015)

(quoting Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 341, 356 (2014)). When excluded testimony is

“merely cumulative” of other testimony, its exclusion “could not have affected the jury’s

determination and, thus, was harmless error.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 523, 545

(2020) (quoting King v. Cooley, 274 Va. 374, 380 (2007)). The statement excluded from Hetle’s

testimony is the same statement to which Hetle’s neighbor testified. The neighbor testified that the

day before the shooting, Hetle told her that Mr. Prather’s recent conduct made Hetle afraid that

Mr. Prather would stab him. Because the neighbor testified to the same statement that was

excluded from Hetle’s testimony, the excluded testimony was merely cumulative of the neighbor’s

testimony. See Va. R. Evid. 2:403 (“Relevant evidence may be excluded if . . . the evidence is

needlessly cumulative.”). Additionally, on cross-examination, the Commonwealth elicited Hetle’s

confirmation that “on the day before the shooting . . . you talked to one of your neighbors and you

told her you feared for your life . . . .” Since the jury could consider and weigh Hetle’s statement to

his neighbor, the exclusion of Hetle’s testimony to the same statement did not affect the jury’s

verdict. Therefore, if the circuit court erred in excluding Hetle’s cumulative testimony to the

statement he made to his neighbor, such error was harmless. See Code § 8.01-678 (“When it plainly

appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the

merits and substantial justice has been reached, no judgment shall be arrested or reversed . . . for any

error committed on the trial.”).

                                                  - 11 -
                    C. Cross-examination about Prior Allegations of Racial Bias

        Hetle contends that the circuit court erred in overruling his objection to the

Commonwealth’s questioning and eliciting testimony from him about prior allegations of racial

bias. Hetle argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in permitting cross-examination about

an incident twenty years ago on a wholly irrelevant topic. Hetle also argues that the questioning

was intended to inflame the jurors’ emotions and “to inject an aura of racism into the trial.” Op. Br.

15. Hetle claims that the evidence should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial.

        Hetle’s argument ignores the fact that Hetle’s responses on cross-examination denied most

of the allegations implicit in the Commonwealth’s questioning about the reprimand he received as a

police officer. Although Hetle admitted receiving a written reprimand regarding a traffic stop of an

Ethiopian woman, he denied the implicit allegations that he commented on the woman’s nationality

and threatened her with deportation and other consequences. Thus, there is no evidence of the

prejudicial facts suggested by the Commonwealth’s questions and, consequently, no erroneous

admission of evidence of any prejudicial facts. To the extent that Hetle is arguing a separate point

that the Commonwealth’s questioning about the reprimand itself was unfairly prejudicial, this Court

finds no reversible error. Assuming without deciding that the Commonwealth’s questioning about

the reprimand was itself unfairly prejudicial, this Court finds no reversible error because there is no

significant probability that the Commonwealth’s questioning affected the verdict given the

overwhelming evidence of Hetle’s guilt. See Holmes v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 34, 59 (2022)

(“Non-constitutional error is harmless if other evidence of guilt is so ‘overwhelming’ and the error

so insignificant by comparison that we can conclude the error ‘failed to have any “substantial

influence” on the verdict.’” (quoting Dandridge v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 669, 685 (2021)));

see also Code § 8.01-678.

                                                 - 12 -
                     D. Admission of Testimony about Hetle’s Use of Racial Slurs

        Hetle contends that the circuit court erred in admitting into evidence his son’s testimony that

Hetle used racial slurs in reference to Mr. Prather. The circuit court found that this testimony was

relevant “on the issue of malice with respect to the charge of murder” and that “the probative value

outweighs the prejudice.” Hetle argues on appeal that the evidence of his use of racial slurs was

unduly prejudicial and should have been excluded under Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:403

(“Relevant evidence may be excluded if . . . the probative value of the evidence is substantially

outweighed by . . . the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”).

        This Court holds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the danger

of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the contested evidence.

“‘[U]nfair prejudice’ refers to the tendency of some proof to inflame the passions of the trier of fact,

or to invite decision based upon a factor unrelated to the elements of the claims and defenses in the

pending case.” Lee v. Spoden, 290 Va. 235, 251 (2015). Here, as the circuit court found, Hetle’s

use of racial slurs in reference to the victim related to the malice element of murder. The circuit

court reasonably concluded that the evidence of Hetle’s use of racial slurs did not invite the jury to

decide the case based on an unrelated factor or on inflamed passions instead of probative evidence.

We hold, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in admitting testimony about Hetle’s use of

racial slurs in reference to the victim.

                                             CONCLUSION

        The circuit court did not err in refusing to remove a juror mid-trial when the juror assured

the court that her observation of a trial spectator photographing jurors outside the courthouse would

not affect her performance of her duties as a juror in accordance with her instructions and her oath.

Additionally, the circuit court’s contested evidentiary rulings did not constitute reversible error.

                                                   - 13 -
Accordingly, this Court affirms Hetle’s convictions for first-degree murder and use of a firearm in

the commission of murder.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

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