Court Opinion

ID: 9897258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:20.885058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:59.318383
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Oct 20 2023, 8:37 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Caroline B. Briggs                                         Theodore E. Rokita
Lafayette, Indiana                                         Attorney General of Indiana
                                                           Evan Matthew Comer
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kimberly J. Brook,                                         October 20, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CR-2110
        v.                                                 Appeal from the
                                                           Cass Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        James K. Muehlhausen, Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           09D01-1910-F6-384

                            Opinion by Judge Foley
     Judge Vaidik concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.
     Judge Tavitas concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.

Foley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023                           Page 1 of 40
[1]   Kimberly J. Brook (“Brook”) was convicted after a jury trial of resisting law

      enforcement 1 as a Class A misdemeanor, driving while suspended 2 as a Class A

      misdemeanor, unlawful possession or use of a legend drug3 as a Level 6 felony,

      and obstruction of justice 4 as a Level 6 felony. The trial court sentenced Brook

      to an aggregate sentence of two years with one year executed in the Indiana

      Department of Correction (“DOC”) and one year served on Community

      Corrections. On appeal, Brook raises several issues, which we consolidate and

      restate as:

                 I.           Whether, as a matter of first impression, the trial court
                              abused its discretion when it denied her request to
                              bifurcate her trial as to her driving while suspended
                              charge, which was elevated due to a prior infraction and
                              not a prior criminal conviction;

                 II.          Whether Lorazepam’s status as a legend drug is a question
                              of law that could be determined by the trial court;

                 III.         Whether the admission of testimony from Brook’s prior
                              attorney concerning her attempt to manufacture evidence
                              to avoid her conviction for unlawful possession of a legend
                              drug violated attorney-client privilege; and

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).
      2
          I.C. § 9-24-19-2.
      3
          I.C. § 16-42-19-13; I.C. § 16-42-19-27.
      4
          I.C. § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(4).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023                Page 2 of 40
              IV.      Whether Brook’s two-year aggregate sentence is
                       inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
                       character of the offender.

[2]   Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   On October 27, 2019, Logansport Police Officer Tanner Prentice (“Officer

      Prentice”) was working patrol duty when he observed a gold car being driven

      by a woman later identified as Brook. As the car drove past him, Officer

      Prentice conducted a license-plate check on the vehicle, which returned

      information indicating that the driver’s license of the car’s registered owner had

      been suspended. Officer Prentice reviewed the license photo of the car’s owner

      and determined that the picture matched the physical description of the woman

      he observed driving the car. Based on this information, Officer Prentice

      initiated a traffic stop of the car.

[4]   After the car stopped in an alleyway, Officer Prentice approached the driver’s

      side of the car, and the driver told him that her name was Kimberly Brook. At

      that time, Brook told Officer Prentice that “she wasn’t driving” and that “the

      keys weren’t in the ignition anymore.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 59. When Officer Prentice

      returned to his police car to enter Brook’s information into the system, a Bureau

      of Motor Vehicles records check for Brook revealed that Brook was subject to

      two active license suspensions, one for excessive points on her license and the

      other for a repeat insurance violation. Id. at 62. Brook’s suspensions became

      effective on May 22, 2019, and July 14, 2019, respectively, and the latest of

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023           Page 3 of 40
      them did not expire until July 13, 2020. Id. at 62–63; Ex. Vol. p. 5. While

      Officer Prentice was in his police car, Brook exited her vehicle and began

      yelling at him, telling him, “I don’t have time for this.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 64. Brook

      then began to walk away from the scene of the traffic stop although the traffic

      stop was still ongoing.

[5]   Officer Prentice got out of his car and ordered Brook to stop. However, Brook

      did not stop and, instead, began running faster. Officer Prentice chased Brook

      and caught up to her in the front yard of a nearby home. When Officer Prentice

      attempted to take Brook into custody, she tried to back away from him and

      continued to “rip and wrestle her arms away” from him. Id. at 65. At that

      time, Officer Prentice used a leg sweep to get Brook on the ground and allow

      him to take her into custody. Once Officer Prentice had placed Brook in

      custody, she continued to yell profanities at him, including calling him a “punk

      bitch.” Id. at 66.

[6]   Brook was transported to the Cass County Jail and searched during intake.

      Correctional Officer Bryce Hamilton (“Officer Hamilton”) performed the

      search of Brook’s clothing. When Officer Hamilton looked through Brook’s

      purse, he found a pill bottle containing multiple pills, one of which was marked

      EP904. A subsequent search on the website Drugs.com led Officer Hamilton to

      suspect that the pill with the EP904 marking was the drug Lorazepam. The

      other pills were determined to be hydrocodone. The label on the front of the

      pill bottle did not contain prescription information for Lorazepam. Officer

      Hamilton seized the pills and pill bottle and contacted Officer Prentice so that

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023     Page 4 of 40
      he could retrieve the evidence. Later laboratory testing confirmed that the

      EP904 pill was positive for Lorazepam, which is a controlled substance.

[7]   The State initially charged Brook with (1) two counts of Level 6 felony

      possession of a Schedule I, II, III, or IV controlled substance, (2) Class A

      misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, (3) Class A misdemeanor driving

      while suspended, and (4) Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The State

      later amended the charging information to reflect charges of (1) Class A

      misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, (2) Class A misdemeanor driving

      while suspended, (3) Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and (4) Level 6

      felony unlawful possession or use of a legend drug. After this amended

      charging information was filed, the State filed a notice under Evidence Rule

      404(b), which stated that it intended to introduce evidence that Brook

      “produced and provided to the State a forged prescription in an attempt to

      manufacture a defense to” the unlawful possession or use of a legend drug

      charge against her. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 50. Prior to trial, the trial court

      conducted a hearing on the State’s Rule 404(b) notice, during which the State

      called Brook’s former attorney, Andrew Achey (“Achey”), to testify about

      statements made by Brook regarding a falsified prescription for Lorazepam she

      had provided to him during the course of his representation in the case. Brook

      objected to Achey being allowed to testify to these statements based upon the

      attorney-client privilege.

[8]   The parties also addressed an issue raised by Brook about a “lack of clarity” in

      the distinction between the law regarding possession of a “controlled

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 5 of 40
       substance” and possession of a “legend drug.” Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 16–17. The

       State responded, “We’re just here to talk about legend drugs and [L]orazepam

       is unequivocally a legend drug.” Id. at 17. Two days later, the State moved to

       amend its charging information to include a count of Level 6 felony obstruction

       of justice based on the information conveyed by Achey in the hearing.

[9]    On May 6, 2022, the trial court issued an order, in which it addressed both

       issues raised at the hearing. As to Brook’s assertion of attorney-client privilege

       over her communications with Achey, the trial court found that the State made

       a prima facie showing that Brook had violated the law through her

       communications and “also established a relationship between the

       communication at issue and the prima facie violation.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II

       p. 73. The trial court also referenced that it may be willing to reconsider its

       previous order issued in April 2022, where it determined that Brook could not

       introduce evidence about whether “[ ][L]orazepam is a legend drug.” Id. The

       trial court expressed a willingness to reconsider the ruling if Brook’s witness

       “qualifies as an expert and his testimony is limited to the statutory definition of

       a legend drug found at [Indiana Code section] 16-18-2-199.” Id. The trial court

       further stated that “at this stage” it “still believes the question of whether . . .

       [L]orazepam[ ] is a legend drug is a question of law for the [c]ourt, J.P. v. State,

       878 N.E.2d 415 ([Ind. Ct. App.] 2007).” Id.

[10]   On July 12, 2022, a jury trial was held. That morning, Brook filed a motion in

       limine requesting that the State be prohibited from introducing testimony from

       Achey, and the trial court, after noting its ruling at the prior hearing, concluded

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023          Page 6 of 40
       that the State had made a prima facie showing that a “serious crime or fraud

       occurred” and that the State had connected the communication between Brook

       and Achey to the violation. The parties also addressed the trial court’s

       proposed preliminary jury instructions. Brook objected to the State’s proposed

       instruction regarding the driving-while-suspended charge, which stated that a

       person was guilty of driving while suspended if she “operates a motor vehicle

       on a highway less than ten years after the date on which judgment was entered

       for a prior unrelated violation of this section.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 10. Brook argued

       that the instruction should be stricken and that the proceedings should be

       bifurcated with a second phase to prove the prior driving violation, asserting

       that “having the prior conviction in front of the jury would just, it leads them to

       believe that she committed the crime more so.” Id.

[11]   The State opposed Brook’s request for bifurcation, arguing that “the driving

       while suspended statute elevates what’s normally an infraction, a civil

       judgment, to an A misdemeanor” and the “prior that we’re relying on is a civil

       judgment, so it is not a conviction.” Id. The trial court asked defense counsel if

       putting the word civil before judgment in the instruction would address the

       concern, and defense counsel responded that he would still have an objection

       “even though it’s not a criminal conviction, it’s still a driving while suspended

       and it’s still something that would leave the jury to believe that she’s more likely

       to have done this even if it was a civil judgment.” Id. at 11. The trial court

       stated it would take the bifurcation request under advisement.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023       Page 7 of 40
[12]   Brook also objected to the proposed preliminary instruction regarding the

       elements for unlawful possession or use of a legend drug, which provided in

       relevant part:

               The crime of unlawful possession or use of a legend drug is
               defined by statute as follows:

               A person who knowingly possesses or uses a legend drug unless
               the person has a valid prescription to do so or has the order of a
               practitioner acting in the course of his professional practice to do
               so, or was provided the drug by a practitioner or is a pharmacist,
               commits unlawful possession or use of a legend drug, a level 6
               Felony.

               To convict the Defendant[,] the State must have proved each of
               the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

               1. The Defendant

               2. knowingly

               3. possessed

               4. Lorazepam which the Court instructs you was classified at the time
               as a legend drug.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 106 (emphasis added).

[13]   Brook asserted that the language of the instruction essentially amounted to an

       instruction that “the [c]ourt is telling you [Lorazepam] is a legend drug.” Tr.

       Vol. 2 p. 12. Brook further stated that the drug’s status as a legend drug was

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023            Page 8 of 40
       “something the State must prove,” and the “[c]ourt just can’t give that element

       away.” Id. The State responded by noting that the challenged instruction was

       taken from the pattern instruction and that the language had been previously

       litigated by the parties. The State explained that the issue of whether

       Lorazepam qualified as a legend drug was “an issue of law,” and it noted that

       the trial court had “actually already ruled that it was an issue of law

       previously.” Id.

[14]   During the jury trial, the State moved to introduce Brook’s driving record as

       State’s Exhibit 1, and Brook objected to the admission of the records only on

       the basis that the State failed to lay an adequate foundation. The trial court

       overruled the objection and ordered Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. The

       State also called Brook’s former physician, Dr. Carolyn Kochert (“Dr.

       Kochert”), who testified that she began treating Brook around the year 2017

       and that she prescribed multiple medications for Brook but denied ever writing

       a prescription for Lorazepam. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 102. Dr. Kochert testified that she

       reviewed Brook’s medical charts and the State’s INSPECT database, which

       contains information about all prescriptions for controlled substances filled by

       pharmacies for a person, and found that neither indicated that Brook had been

       prescribed Lorazepam. Id. at 102–03.

[15]   Over a continuing objection by the defense based on privilege, the State later

       called Brook’s former counsel, Achey, as a witness, who testified that he

       represented Brook in the instant case and that he withdrew in 2020. Achey

       stated that, while he was serving as Brook’s attorney, she provided him with a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 9 of 40
       copy of a receipt indicating that a prescription for Lorazepam had been filled at

       the Pay Less Pharmacy in Lafayette, Indiana. At that time, Brook informed

       Achey that the pharmacy’s labels were not on her pill bottles because she did

       not like to carry pills in their original bottles while at work because she was

       afraid her pills would be stolen.

[16]   Based on this information, Achey initially requested that the State dismiss the

       unlawful possession or use of a legend drug charge. Achey further testified that,

       after deposing Dr. Kochert, who denied writing the prescription, Achey

       contacted Brook and asked whether the prescription she provided contained

       false information. Id. at 125. Achey testified that Brook became “very

       apologetic” and admitted to Achey that she did not have a prescription for

       Lorazepam. Id. Brook also told Achey that the document she provided had

       been created either by her or by another individual. Id. at 126. Shortly

       thereafter, Achey withdrew from his representation of Brook.

[17]   At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Brook guilty of Class A

       misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class A misdemeanor driving while

       suspended, Level 6 felony unlawful possession or use of a legend drug, and

       Level 6 felony obstruction of justice. The jury acquitted Brook of Class B

       misdemeanor disorderly conduct. At Brook’s sentencing hearing, the trial court

       sentenced Brook to one year executed for Class A misdemeanor resisting law

       enforcement, sixty days executed for Class A misdemeanor driving while

       suspended, two years executed for Level 6 felony unlawful possession or use of

       a legend drug, and two years executed for Level 6 felony obstruction of justice.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023     Page 10 of 40
       All of the sentences were to be served concurrently, resulting in an aggregate

       sentence of two years executed with one year to be served in the DOC and the

       second year to be served on Community Corrections, if eligible. Brook now

       appeals.

       Discussion and Decision

       I.       Bifurcation
[18]   Brook argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her request

       to bifurcate the proceedings with respect to her driving while suspended charge.

       More specifically, Brook argues that bifurcation is required under Indiana Code

       section 35-38-1-2 even though her enhancement was based upon a prior civil

       infraction and not a prior offense. 5 This is a matter of first impression.

       5
        In challenging the denial of her request for bifurcation, Brook takes particular issue with State’s Exhibit 1,
       which was her driving record that the State admitted into evidence to establish her prior driving while
       suspended infractions. She argues that it was highly prejudicial and that if bifurcation had been granted, the
       exhibit would not have been admitted into evidence. We agree that one of the purposes of bifurcation is to
       keep prior convictions away from the jury in their initial determination of guilt for the substantive crime
       charged. Hines v. State, 794 N.E.2d 469, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), adopted and incorporated by Hines v. State,
       801 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. 2004). Brook argues that the admission of her entire driving record, consisting of
       twenty-seven prior acts of poor driving, suspensions, or misconduct, deprived her of due process and
       portrayed her as someone with bad character. Brook conflates the issue of the admissibility of Exhibit 1 with
       her argument for bifurcation. Brook argues that Exhibit 1, as admitted in its entirety, was not relevant to
       prove her prior driving while suspended infractions and was violative of Evidence Rules 403 or 404 as being
       prejudicial due to its overbreadth. However, when the State sought to admit the exhibit at trial, Brook only
       objected as to foundation for the exhibit, which was overruled by the trial court. Therefore, to the extent that
       Brook is arguing that the exhibit and its contents were not relevant to her present offenses or overly
       prejudicial because of the overly broad contents, she has waived such argument by not raising it to the trial
       court. Leatherman v. State, 101 N.E.3d 879, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“It is well-established that we generally
       will not address an argument that was not raised in the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal.”)

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023                               Page 11 of 40
[19]   A trial court’s decision whether to bifurcate or trifurcate a trial is subject to an

       abuse of discretion standard. Russell v. State, 997 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ind. 2013).

       One of the purposes of bifurcation is to keep prior convictions away from the

       jury in its initial determination of guilt for the substantive crime charged. Hines

       v. State, 794 N.E.2d 469, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), adopted and incorporated by

       Hines v. State, 801 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. 2004).

[20]   Here, prior to trial, when the trial court was discussing the jury instruction for

       Brook’s charge of driving while suspended with the parties, Brook requested

       that part of the instruction be stricken and that the trial be bifurcated so that her

       prior driving while suspended infractions could be proven in a second phase.

       Tr. Vol. 2 p. 10. The State responded that, because Brook’s priors were not

       convictions but were instead, civil infractions, bifurcation was not required.

       The trial court took the issue under advisement, and although the trial court

       never explicitly ruled on the request, the trial was not bifurcated.

[21]   Brook was charged under Indiana Code section 9-24-19-2, which states:

               An individual who:

               (1) knows that the individual’s driving privileges, driver’s license,
               or permit is suspended or revoked; and

               (2) operates a motor vehicle upon a highway less than ten (10)
               years after the date on which judgment was entered against the
               individual for a prior unrelated violation of section 1 of this
               chapter . . .;

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023       Page 12 of 40
               commits a Class A misdemeanor.

       (emphasis added). Brook’s driving while suspended charge was elevated to a

       Class A misdemeanor based upon her prior civil infraction judgment, not a

       prior criminal offense.

[22]   Brook relies on Landis v. State, which found that when the State must prove a

       prior conviction in order to elevate the present offense, a bifurcated trial must

       be held where the evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction and the acts

       which culminated in that prior conviction cannot be introduced until the jury

       has first decided whether the defendant is guilty of the present charge. 693

       N.E.2d 570, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 704

       N.E.2d 113 (Ind. 1998). Landis concerned the elevation of a stalking offense

       based upon a prior conviction for stalking the same victim. Id. at 571–72. The

       instant matter is distinguishable because the elevation of Brook’s offense is

       based upon a prior civil infraction judgment.

[23]   Here, we are presented with a case of first impression of whether bifurcation is

       required where a defendant is charged with a criminal offense that is elevated

       due to a prior judgment of an infraction and not a prior conviction of a criminal

       offense. We find no case law conclusively deciding whether bifurcation is

       required in such circumstances. In Nasser v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2000), trans. denied, this court was faced with the specific situation we are

       faced with where the defendant was charged with driving while suspended as a

       Class A misdemeanor, which was elevated because of a prior judgement for

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023     Page 13 of 40
       driving while suspended in the previous ten years. Id. at 1107–09. However,

       there, the defendant did not object to the unitary proceedings and did not

       request bifurcation. Id. at 1108. In determining that the defendant could not

       succeed on his claim that his due process rights were violated when he did not

       receive bifurcated proceedings, this court held “[i]nasmuch as the evidence at

       trial was offered to enhance the infraction to a Class A misdemeanor, and [the

       defendant] did not object to the nature of the proceedings, there is no merit to

       Nasser’s contention under these circumstances that he was entitled to a

       bifurcated proceeding.” Id. at 1109. We, therefore, found there was no merit to

       the defendant’s contention and left “for another day the issue of whether a

       defendant is entitled to a bifurcated proceeding with regard to a previous

       adjudication for an infraction when he makes a specific and timely request for

       such a proceeding.” Id. at 1109 n.2.

[24]   It seems that day has come, as we conclude that Brook made a timely request

       for bifurcation. We begin by examining Indiana’s bifurcation statute, Indiana

       Code section 35-34-1-2.5, which provides “if the penalty for an offense is . . .

       increased because the person was previously convicted of the offense, the State

       may seek to have the person sentenced to receive the increased penalty by

       alleging, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, that the

       person was previously convicted of the offense.” (emphases added). Indiana

       Code section 35-38-1-2 requires bifurcation where: “(1) the State in the manner

       prescribed by IC 35-34-1-2.5 sought an increased penalty by alleging that the

       person was previously convicted of the offense”; and “(2) the person was

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 14 of 40
       convicted of the subsequent offense in a jury trial.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-2(c)

       (emphases added). Therefore, pursuant to statute, bifurcation is required when

       the State seeks to elevate an offense because a defendant has been previously

       convicted of the offense.

[25]   However, under Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-215, the term “offense” means

       a crime and does not include an infraction. Here, Brook was charged with

       driving while suspended elevated to a Class A misdemeanor due to the fact that

       judgment had been previously entered against her for a prior unrelated violation

       of Indiana Code section 9-24-19-1. That statute provides that an individual

       who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway while the individual’s driver’s

       license is suspended commits a Class A infraction. Thus, although her current

       criminal charge was for Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended, it was

       not elevated because she was previously convicted of the offense. Instead, her

       current offense was elevated because she previously had a civil judgment

       entered against her for Class A infraction driving while suspended, which is not

       a conviction for a criminal offense. See State v. Hurst, 688 N.E.2d 402, 405 (Ind.

       1997) (traffic violations are considered civil proceedings), overruled on other

       grounds; Schumm v. State, 866 N.E.2d 781, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (infractions

       are civil matters).

[26]   Therefore, because bifurcation is only required under the statute when the State

       seeks to elevate an offense because a defendant has been previously convicted of

       the offense, and the term offense means crime and not infraction, we hold that

       when a defendant is charged with a crime elevated based upon a prior

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023       Page 15 of 40
       infraction, the trial court is not required to bifurcate the proceedings. We limit

       our holding here to state only that bifurcation under Indiana Code section 35-

       38-1-2 is not required where the State seeks to elevate an offense based upon a

       prior civil infraction judgment. Because Brook’s Class A misdemeanor driving

       while suspended charge was elevated due to her prior judgment for an

       infraction, she was not entitled to bifurcation, and the trial court did not abuse

       its discretion in denying her request.

       II.     Lorazepam’s Status as a Legend Drug
[27]   Brook next argues that the trial court’s jury instruction for the offense of

       unlawful possession or use of a legend drug was clearly erroneous. The trial

       court determined that, as a matter of law, Lorazepam is a legend drug and

       incorporated that conclusion in its instruction. Brook contends that the jury

       instruction relieved the State from its burden of proof as to a material element

       of the offense, and because the State failed to present evidence on that element,

       the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction.

[28]   Indiana Code Chapter 16-42-19, Indiana’s Legend Drug Act, criminalizes

       various forms of possession, use, and sale of certain prescription drugs, which

       are known as “legend drugs.” Knutson v. State, 103 N.E.3d 700, 702 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2018). Indiana Code section 16-42-19-13 of the Legend Drug Act, which

       is the statute under which Brook was charged, makes it a crime for a person to

       “possess or use a legend drug or a precursor” without first obtaining the drug

       “(1) on the prescription or drug order of a practitioner; (2) in accordance with

       section 11(a)(2) or 21 of this chapter; or (3) in accordance with the rules
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 16 of 40
    adopted by the board of pharmacy under IC 25-26-23.” The term “legend

    drug” is statutorily defined within the Legend Drug Act under Indiana Code

    Section 16-18-2-199, which provides:

             “Legend drug,” for purposes of IC 16-42, means a drug that is:

             (1) subject to 21 U.S.C. 353(b)(1); or

             (2) listed in the Prescription Drug Product List as:

             (A) published in United States Department of Health and
             Human Services Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
             Equivalence Evaluations, Tenth Edition, (1990); and

             (B) revised in United State [sic] Department of Health and
             Human Services, Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
             Equivalence Evaluations, Cumulative Supplement to the Tenth
             Edition, Number 10 (1990).

    The publication referred to in subsection (2) is commonly known as the

    “Orange Book.” 6 J.P. v. State, 878 N.E.2d 415, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

6
 “The publication Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (commonly known as the
Orange Book) identifies drug products approved on the basis of safety and effectiveness by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) and related patent and
exclusivity information.” See https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/approved-drug-
products-therapeutic-equivalence-evaluations-orange-book [https://perma.cc/SSC8-FKL3] (last visited Aug. 2,
2023).

    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023                         Page 17 of 40
[29]   Therefore, depending on the nature of the drug at issue, the State can prove that

       a particular substance satisfies the definition of legend drug under the statute in

       one of two ways. First, if a drug is identified in court by a name specifically

       designated as a legend drug or controlled substance by the Indiana Code, then

       the State has proven as a matter of law the drug is a legend drug. Id. (citing

       White v. State, 316 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)). “If a drug is

       identified in court by a name specifically designated as a controlled substance

       by the Indiana Code, then the State has proven as a matter of law the drug is a

       controlled substance.” Barnett v. State, 579 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991),

       trans. denied. Second, if the substance is not specifically enumerated by the

       Indiana Code as a legend drug or a controlled substance, the State must offer

       extrinsic evidence to prove the substance falls within the Indiana Code’s

       definition. Id.

[30]   Here, Lorazepam’s status as a legend drug fits within the first of these

       categories. This particular issue was addressed by this court in J.P. v. State,

       where the defendant argued that the State did not present sufficient evidence at

       trial to prove that the drug Ritalin satisfied the definition of legend drug under

       the Legend Drug Act. 878 N.E.2d at 417. The defendant claimed that,

       although the State presented evidence that “Ritalin is a legend drug,” it failed to

       meet its burden of proof because it did not submit a copy of the Orange Book

       into evidence at her trial. Id. This court, in rejecting this claim, noted that it

       had previously been held that “where the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act identifies

       a specific drug by name and designates it a narcotic, ‘a conviction may be

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023       Page 18 of 40
       upheld as the trial court need only refer to the exact words of the statutory

       definition and determine the substance is a narcotic as a matter of law.’” Id. at

       417–18 (citing White, 316 N.E.2d at 702). This court recognized that Indiana

       Code section 16-18-2-199 “incorporates by reference” both 21 U.S.C. §

       353(b)(1) and “the Orange book, which expressly includes Ritalin in its list of

       drugs.” Id. at 418. While the Orange Book is not a statute, this court reasoned

       that it was “promulgated by a federal agency” and held that “the statute

       properly incorporates the Orange Book by reference.” Id. Therefore, the court

       concluded that “Ritalin is, as a matter of law, specifically listed as a legend drug

       under Indiana Code Section 16-1-8-2-199,” and the State presented sufficient

       evidence by having the trial court look to the statutory definition and determine

       that the substance met that definition. Id.

[31]   The holding in J.P. compels a similar conclusion here. At trial, evidence was

       presented that one of the pills found inside Brook’s purse during intake at the

       jail contained the inscription EP904, was identified as Lorazepam, and was

       later tested and found to be Lorazepam, a controlled substance. Like the drug

       at issue in J.P., Lorazepam appears in the Orange Book. See Federal Drug

       Administration, Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence

       Evaluations, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-

       databases/approved-drug-products-therapeutic-equivalence-evaluations-orange-

       book#Publications [https://perma.cc/FMK6-EJVZ] (last visited Aug. 2, 2023).

       Therefore, under J.P., the trial court in the present case could find that the State

       established Lorazepam’s status as a legend drug as a matter of law because

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 19 of 40
       Lorazepam is a legend drug under the definition contained in Indiana Code

       section 16-18-2-199. There is no dispute in this case that Lorazepam appeared

       in the Orange Book, so the drug falls within the class of medications

       incorporated by reference into Indiana’s statutory definition for the term legend

       drug. See I.C. § 16-18-2-199. Whether Lorazepam meets the statutory

       definition of “legend drug” was not a question of fact that the State was

       required to prove to the jury, but instead a matter of law that the trial court

       could decide by referring to the statutory language. See J.P., 878 N.E.2d at 417;

       Barnett, 579 N.E.2d at 86.

[32]   Accordingly, because Lorazepam’s status as a legend drug was not an issue of

       fact, the trial court did not erroneously invade the province of the jury by giving

       instructions that created a mandatory presumption indicating that the substance

       was classified as a legend drug. The purpose of jury instructions is to inform

       the jury about the law without misleading the jury and to help it arrive at a just,

       fair, and correct verdict. Wallen v. State, 28 N.E.3d 328, 330–31 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2015), trans. denied. We review a trial court’s instructions to the jury for an

       abuse of discretion. Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 484 (Ind. 2015), cert. denied.

       An abuse of discretion arises when the instruction is erroneous, and the

       instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury. Id.

       at 484–85.

[33]   “The Due Process Clause prohibits the State from relying upon an evidentiary

       presumption that has the effect of relieving it of its burden to prove every

       essential element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pattison v. State, 54

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 20 of 40
       N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. 2016) (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524

       (1979); McCorker v. State, 797 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Ind. 2003)). “A mandatory

       presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed facts if the State

       proves certain predicate facts,” and if it amounts to a shift in the burden of

       proof, it is unconstitutional. Id. (quoting Winegeart v. State, 665 N.E.2d 893, 904

       (Ind. 1996)) (emphasis added).

[34]   Here, the challenged jury instructions, Preliminary Instruction 8 and Final

       Instruction 11, informed the jury about a matter of law—that Lorazepam was

       classified as a legend drug at the time Brook committed the offense—but did

       not require the jury to reach any factual inferences. Under both instructions,

       the factual question of whether the State proved that the pill found in Brook’s

       possession was in fact Lorazepam was left for the jurors to decide as an element

       of the charged offense. Therefore, the instructions left the factual question to

       the jury, while informing the jury that Lorazepam satisfied the legal definition

       for the term legend drug. We conclude that the trial court’s instructions did not

       impermissibly shift the State’s burden of proof as to any issue to be decided by

       the jury, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

[35]   Likewise, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Brook’s conviction

       because it was not required to present additional evidence to establish

       Lorazepam’s status as a legend drug. We will affirm a conviction unless,

       considering only the evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all

       reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, no reasonable fact-finder could find the

       elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Love v. State, 73

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 21 of 40
       N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017). As previously determined, the trial court was free

       to find—and did find—that Lorazepam was a legend drug under Section 16-18-

       2-199. Therefore, the jury did not need to decide whether Lorazepam was a

       legend drug, but only whether the substance found in Brook’s possession was

       Lorazepam. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove this as the

       forensic toxicologist’s testimony and the toxicology report both demonstrated

       that the pill found in Brook’s purse tested positive for Lorazepam. Tr. Vol. 2

       pp. 92–93. We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to prove that

       Brook possessed the legend drug Lorazepam and to support her conviction.

       III. Admission of Testimony
[36]   Brook also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that her

       prior attorney, Achey, was required to testify regarding communications related

       to Brook’s attempt to present a false prescription record. The trial court has

       broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Thomas v. State, 81

       N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). Generally, evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an

       abuse of discretion, and we will reverse when admission is clearly against the

       logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[37]   Brook contends that the admission of the testimony of Achey violated attorney-

       client privilege and that, even if he could testify regarding Brook’s presentation

       of the fraudulent prescription record, any further questioning exceeded the

       fraud and was not permissible. “‘The attorney-client privilege protects against

       judicially compelled disclosure of confidential information.’” Skinner v. State,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023     Page 22 of 40
       920 N.E.2d 263, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Lahr v. State, 731 N.E.2d

       479, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). Indiana Code Section 34-46-3-1(a) provides

       that: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, the following persons shall not

       be required to testify regarding the following communications: (1) Attorneys, as

       to confidential communications made to them in the course of their

       professional business, and as to advice given in such cases.” The harm to be

       prevented is not the manner in which the confidence is revealed, but the

       revelation itself. Lahr, 731 N.E.2d at 482. “The privilege is intended to

       encourage ‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients

       and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the

       administration of justice.’” Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.

       383, 389 (1981)). Furthermore, the privilege allows both the attorney and the

       client to give complete and confidential information, so that both may be fully

       advised regarding the attorney’s services to the client, and the client is assured

       that confidences are not violated. Id.

[38]   This privilege, however, is not absolute and “sometimes the larger societal

       interest in preventing illegal conduct outweighs the equally important interest of

       safeguarding confidential communications.” Id. Pertinent here, Rule of

       Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(2) creates an exception to the attorney-client

       privilege that allows an attorney to reveal “information relating to the

       representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes

       necessary” to “prevent the client from committing a crime or from committing

       fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023       Page 23 of 40
       interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used

       or is using the lawyer’s services[.]” We use a two-part test to determine

       whether the crime-fraud exception applies in a given case: (1) the moving party

       is required to “make a prima facie showing that a sufficiently serious crime or

       fraud occurred”; and (2) the moving party must show that “some relationship

       between the communication at issue and the prima facie violation exists.” Id. at

       483 (citing United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 320 (6th Cir.1997)). “In order

       for the moving party to satisfy the prima facie showing, the evidence presented

       must be such that a prudent person [would] have a reasonable basis to suspect

       the perpetration of a crime or fraud.” Id. (quotations omitted).

[39]   Here, Brook’s communications with Achey were not privileged because they

       were made for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud on the State and trial court

       and for the purpose of committing the crime of obstruction of justice. Achey’s

       trial testimony revealed that Brook provided him with a copy of a receipt

       indicating that she had been prescribed Lorazepam by Dr. Kochert and that a

       prescription for Lorazepam had been filled at a Pay Less Pharmacy in

       Lafayette. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 118. Brook also told Achey that she did not carry the

       pills in their original pill bottle to work because she was nervous the pills would

       be stolen. Id. After Dr. Kochert was deposed and testified that she had never

       prescribed Lorazepam to Brook, Brook became “very apologetic” and admitted

       to Achey that she did not have a valid prescription for Lorazepam and that the

       document she had presented to him had been created either by herself or

       another individual. Id. at 125–26. This evidence provided a reasonable basis

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023     Page 24 of 40
       upon which a prudent person could have suspected that Brook was attempting

       to commit a fraud on the court system and was committing the crime of

       obstruction of justice. See Lahr, 731 N.E.2d at 483. Further, the State

       demonstrated a relationship between the communications and the attempted

       fraud because, in providing the fraudulent prescription record to Achey, Brook

       intended to use him to attempt to obtain dismissal of the unlawful possession or

       use of a legend drug charge against her. We, therefore, find that both parts of

       the test from Lahr were met in this case.

[40]   Brook asserts that the attorney-client privilege could give way only if Achey was

       involved in the perpetration of her fraud. Brook reads Lahr as only allowing the

       admission of attorney-client communications when they were made for the

       purpose of committing or continuing a crime or fraud. And therefore, because

       the trial court found “no indication [Achey] did anything wrong,” it was an

       error for the trial court to allow the statements to be admitted. Supp. Tr. Vol. 2

       p. 24. However, in Lahr, the defendant forged two letters for the purpose of

       bolstering his self-defense argument and enlisted the aid of his attorney in

       furtherance of a continuing crime or fraud, and this court held that the

       “information concerning this subterfuge is not protected by the attorney-client

       privilege.” Lahr, 731 N.E.2d at 484. Both here, and in Lahr, the client used the

       attorney, by presenting the forged or false documents as evidence in a criminal

       proceeding, to perpetuate the crime or fraud. Lahr did not limit admission of

       attorney-client communications to only situations where the attorney had

       culpability for the perpetration of the crime. Therefore, we conclude that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 25 of 40
       Brook’s communications to Achey fell within the crime-fraud exception to the

       attorney-client privilege, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

       admitted them into evidence.

       IV. Sentencing
[41]   Brook argues that her two-year sentence is inappropriate. The Indiana

       Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court’s

       sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d

       783, 784 (Ind. 2020). “That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule

       7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due

       consideration of the trial court’s decision, the sentence is found to be

       inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the

       offender.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019).

[42]   Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) focuses on “the forest—the aggregate

       sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts,

       or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell v. State, 895

       N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We generally defer to the trial court’s decision,

       and our goal is to determine whether the defendant’s sentence is inappropriate,

       not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State,

       972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference should prevail unless

       overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the

       offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023       Page 26 of 40
       defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples

       of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[43]   When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is

       the starting point the legislature has selected as the appropriate sentence for the

       crime committed. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). Brook was

       convicted of two Level 6 felonies and two Class A misdemeanors. A Level 6

       felony carries a possible sentence of between six months and two-and-a-half

       years with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). A Class A

       misdemeanor carries a possible maximum sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-3-

       2. The trial court sentenced Brook to two years for her conviction for Level 6

       felony unlawful possession or use of a legend drug, two years for Level 6 felony

       obstruction of justice, one year for Class A misdemeanor resisting law

       enforcement, and sixty days for Class A misdemeanor. All of the sentences

       were ordered to run concurrently for a total of two years, with one year served

       in the DOC and the second year to be served in Community Corrections, if

       eligible.

[44]   As to the nature of her offense, to show her sentence is inappropriate, Brook

       must portray the nature of her offense in a positive light, “such as accompanied

       by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. The

       circumstances of this case demonstrated that Brook engaged in several attempts

       over the course of the case to avoid being held accountable for her criminal

       behavior. Brook was initially pulled over for suspicion of driving while

       suspended. When the officer approached her car, Brook stated that “she wasn’t

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023     Page 27 of 40
       driving” and that “the keys weren’t in the ignition anymore” although the

       officer had just observed her driving the car, and no one else was in the vehicle.

       Tr. Vol. 2 p. 59. When the officer entered Brook’s information into the system,

       a BMV records check for Brook revealed that she was subject to two active

       license suspensions. While the traffic stop was still in process, Brook exited her

       vehicle and began yelling at the officer and told him that she did not “have time

       for this” and began to walk away from the scene. Id. at 64. She was ordered to

       stop and began running away. When the officer caught her, she continued to

       resist by backing away from him and pulling her arms away from him. When

       she was booked into jail, a pill was found in her purse that was later identified

       as Lorazepam, for which Brook did not have a prescription. Brook lied to her

       attorney and presented a false prescription document purporting to show that

       she had a prescription for Lorazepam. Because of the falsified document Brook

       gave to her attorney and the representations she made about its accuracy, her

       attorney requested dismissal of the legend drug charge against her. Brook has

       failed to portray the nature of her offenses in a positive light by showing

       restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.

[45]   As to her character, Brook argues that she is not one of the worst offenders and

       that her criminal history does not warrant the sentence imposed by the trial

       court. The character of the offender is found in what we learn of her life and

       conduct. Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

       “A defendant’s criminal history is one relevant factor in analyzing character,

       the significance of which varies based on the ‘gravity, nature, and number of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023     Page 28 of 40
       prior offenses in relation to the current offense.’” Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d

       1279, 1290 (Ind. Ct App. 2021) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Even a minor criminal history reflects poorly on a

       defendant’s character for the purposes of sentencing. Id.

[46]   Looking to her criminal history, Brook has a number of criminal convictions,

       including convictions for driving while suspended, operating a vehicle while

       intoxicated, theft, and conversion. Several of her convictions were for driving-

       related offenses and are similar to her present offense of driving while

       suspended. Further, during the course of this case, Brook displayed deceitful

       and dishonest behavior that reflects poorly on her character. Brook was

       charged with obstruction of justice for presenting her attorney with a fraudulent

       document that she purported to show that she had a prescription for the

       Lorazepam pill found in her possession. This dishonesty was only discovered

       when Brook’s doctor was deposed, which was after Brook’s attorney had

       unknowingly presented the fake document to the State and requested a

       dismissal of the charge. Additionally, Brook also repeatedly lied during her

       presentence investigation, stating both that she had no close friends that have a

       criminal history and that she “only uses prescribed medications,” which was

       proven false since she did not have a prescription for the Lorazepam found in

       her possession. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 166–67. As to her relationship

       with people who have criminal history, at sentencing, Brook continued to be

       dishonest when she asserted that she was no longer involved in a relationship

       with a person who had multiple felony convictions despite recorded phone calls

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023       Page 29 of 40
       which indicated that Brook was still in a romantic relationship with that

       individual and had spoken to him recently. Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 179–82. Therefore,

       during the course of her underlying prosecution, Brook engaged in numerous

       dishonest acts intended to evade accountability for her criminal behavior.

       Consequently, Brook has not met her burden to show “substantial virtuous

       traits or persistent examples of good character” such that her requested

       reduction of her sentence is warranted based on her character. Stephenson, 29

       N.E.3d at 122. We do not find that her sentence is inappropriate in light of her

       character.

[47]   Based on the facts in the record, neither the nature of Brook’s crimes nor her

       character merit a lesser sentence, and she has not shown that her two-year

       sentence is inappropriate.

       Conclusion
[48]   We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

       Brook’s request for bifurcation as her driving while suspended charge was

       elevated based on a prior infraction and not a criminal offense. We also hold

       that there was no abuse of discretion in instructing the jury and that the State

       presented sufficient evidence to support Brook’s conviction for possession of a

       legend drug because the trial court could find that the State established

       Lorazepam’s status as a legend drug as a matter of law. Further, we do not find

       that the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that Brook’s prior attorney

       was required to testify regarding communications related to Brook’s attempt to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023     Page 30 of 40
       present a false prescription record. Lastly, we conclude that Brook’s sentence is

       not inappropriate.

[49]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.

       Tavitas, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023       Page 31 of 40
       Vaidik, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[50]   I concur with the lead opinion on the issues of jury instructions, admission of

       evidence, and sentencing. However, I respectfully dissent on the issue of

       bifurcating the driving-while-suspended charge.

[51]   Driving while suspended is generally a Class A infraction, Ind. Code § 9-24-19-

       1, but a second violation within ten years is a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 9-

       24-19-2. Brook was charged with the Class A misdemeanor and asked for the

       trial of that charge to be bifurcated so the jury wouldn’t learn about her prior

       violation before deciding whether she committed the new violation. And the

       trial court seemed to agree that bifurcation was appropriate. When Brook’s

       attorney made the request, the court responded, “You know, he may have a

       point on that one.” Tr. Vol 2 p. 10. After further discussion, the court added,

       “I’m inclined to go ahead and bifurcate[.]” Id. at 11. But then, for reasons

       unclear from the record, the court allowed the trial to proceed without

       bifurcation. As a result, the jury was informed of Brook’s driving record, which

       includes not only the prior driving-while-suspended infraction but many other

       violations and suspensions.

[52]   In affirming on this issue, the lead opinion focuses its discussion on Indiana

       Code section 35-38-1-2(c), which provides:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 32 of 40
               If:

                        (1) the state in the manner prescribed by IC 35-34-1-2.5
                        sought an increased penalty by alleging that the person
                        was previously convicted of the offense; and

                        (2) the person was convicted of the subsequent offense in a
                        jury trial;

               the jury shall reconvene for the sentencing hearing. The person
               shall be sentenced to receive the increased penalty if the jury (or
               the court, if the trial is to the court alone) finds that the state has
               proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the person had a previous
               conviction for the offense.

       The lead opinion correctly notes that this statute expressly requires bifurcation

       only when the prior violation at issue was a criminal “offense,” which means a

       felony or misdemeanor. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-215. But it is also true that nothing

       in the statute expressly limits bifurcation to that situation. The statute simply

       doesn’t address whether bifurcation is required where, as here, the prior

       violation is an infraction rather than a criminal offense. Therefore, we are left

       with the fundamental legal principles underlying the concept of bifurcation.

       And those principles—due process and the general prohibition on character

       evidence—are implicated regardless of whether the prior violation is a criminal

       offense or an infraction.

[53]   More than fifty years ago, our Supreme Court held that a defendant had a due-

       process right to bifurcation of his jury trial when he was charged with safe

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023         Page 33 of 40
burglary and being a habitual criminal, based on prior convictions. Lawrence v.

State, 286 N.E.2d 830 (Ind. 1972). The Court explained:

        To be admissible, evidence must logically tend to prove a
        material fact. Accordingly, evidence of prior crimes is generally
        inadmissible in a criminal case, because it has no tendency to
        establish the guilt or innocence of the accused but, if effective at
        all, could serve only to prejudice or mislead or excite the minds
        and inflame the passions of the jury.

        In the principal case no showing was made that evidence of the
        defendant’s prior crimes was in any manner relevant to the safe
        burglary charge. Its sole relevance lay in its support of the
        habitual criminal charge.

        Inherent in [allowing a combined trial on the new charge and the
        habitual charge] is the belief that the jury can consider the prior
        convictions for the purpose of determining the status of habitual
        criminal, and at the same time make an independent
        determination of guilt on the crime charged solely on their
        evaluation of the evidence presented to support that charge. It is
        highly improbable that twelve jurors can be found with sufficient
        mental discipline to compartmentalize the evidence.

        The mental manipulation required by [a combined trial] would
        be difficult for one specially trained in the rules of evidence, and
        we would be less than realistic to expect evidence of prior
        convictions not to influence the jurors’ determination of guilt or
        innocence on the principal offense.

Id. at 832–33 (cleaned up). The right to bifurcation recognized in Lawrence was

later extended from the habitual-offender context to “cases where prior

convictions serve to elevate a present crime or enhance the penalty for a present

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023           Page 34 of 40
       conviction.” Spearman v. State, 744 N.E.2d 545, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), reh’g

       denied, trans. denied.

[54]   The due-process concerns first articulated in Lawrence are inherent in Evidence

       Rule 404, which governs the admissibility of character evidence. As relevant

       here, Rule 404(b)(1) provides, “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not

       admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular

       occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” In criminal cases,

       the purpose of this rule is to prevent the jury from indulging in the so-called

       “forbidden inference” that the defendant’s prior bad conduct suggests present

       guilt. Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019). As noted by the lead

       opinion, the purpose of bifurcation is the same: “to keep prior convictions away

       from the jury in its initial determination of guilt for the substantive crime

       charged.” Slip op. at ¶19 (citing Hines v. State, 794 N.E.2d 469, 472 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2003), adopted and incorporated by Hines v. State, 801 N.E.2d 634 (Ind.

       2004)). Ultimately, then, bifurcation is a 404(b) issue in a case like this.

[55]   The lead opinion doesn’t meaningfully engage with these important principles,

       proceeding as though Brook’s argument is limited to Section 35-38-1-2(c). Slip

       op. at ¶18. I disagree. That statute was not the basis for Brook’s bifurcation

       request in the trial court, and it is not the primary basis for her argument on

       appeal. At trial, Brook argued that “having the prior conviction in front of the

       jury would just, it leads them to believe that she committed the crime more so.”

       Tr. Vol 2 p. 10. That is a 404(b) argument. And the main thrust of her

       argument on appeal is that allowing evidence of her prior violations “was

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 35 of 40
       prejudicial to her fundamental rights because it was a wholesale attack on her

       character in violation of clearly established law.” Appellant’s Br. p. 18. Again,

       that is a 404(b) argument. Therefore, the broader due-process/404(b) argument

       for bifurcation is squarely before us.

[56]   That being the case, I see no reason not to apply those broad principles to

       Brook’s situation merely because the prior violation at issue was an infraction

       rather than a criminal offense. Based on that prior infraction, Brook’s current

       driving-while-suspended charge was elevated to a Class A misdemeanor,

       meaning that she faced up to a year in jail and a fine of up to $5,000 on that

       count. See I.C. § 35-50-3-2. Those are real criminal consequences. And there is

       little doubt that the jury was more likely to find Brook guilty on the current

       driving-while-suspended charge once it learned she had previously committed

       the same violation. Therefore, I would hold that due-process principles and

       Evidence Rule 404(b) entitled Brook to bifurcation even though Section 35-38-

       1-2(c) did not, and I would reverse her driving-while-suspended conviction.

[57]   Finally, even though I believe a defendant facing an increased penalty based on

       a prior infraction is entitled to bifurcation under due-process principles and

       Evidence Rule 404(b), I encourage the General Assembly to expand Section 35-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023     Page 36 of 40
38-1-2(c) to include that situation. Such an amendment would further clarify

and solidify this crucial right. 7

7
  Comparing the driving-while-suspended statutes with the driving-without-having-received-a-license statute
highlights the flaw I see in the current version of Section 35-38-1-2(c). Like a second instance of driving
while suspended, a second instance of driving without having received a license is a Class A misdemeanor.
I.C. § 9-24-18-1(a). But whereas the first instance of driving while suspended is a Class A infraction, which is
not a criminal “offense,” the first instance of driving without having received a license is a Class C
misdemeanor, id., which is a criminal “offense.” Oddly, this means that while a person charged with the
Class A misdemeanor driving without having received a license is entitled to bifurcation under Section 35-38-
1-2(c), a person charged with the Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended is not, due solely to the
classification of the prior violation. I can’t imagine the General Assembly considered and intended this
disparate outcome.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023                              Page 37 of 40
       Tavitas, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[58]   I concur with Judge Foley’s opinion regarding Issues I, III, and IV. I

       respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that the trial court did

       not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury with regard to the elements of the

       crime of possession of a legend drug.

[59]   The trial court instructed the jury that, to convict Brook of possession of a

       legend drug, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1)

       Brook, (2) knowingly, (3) possessed, (4) “Lorazepam, which the Court instructs

       you was classified as a legend drug.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 106, 138. By

       instructing the jury that Lorazepam was classified as a legend drug, the trial

       court relieved the State of its burden of proving each element of the offense.

       This is particularly concerning here because the State presented no evidence at

       all that Lorazepam is a legend drug. Instead, the State merely demonstrated to

       the trial court that Lorazepam is listed in the “Orange Book” promulgated by

       the federal government, and the trial court then instructed the jury that

       Lorazepam was, as a matter of law, a legend drug.

[60]   The majority considers this not to be a problem because this Court has

       previously held that “[i]f a drug is identified in court by a name specifically

       designated as a controlled substance by the Indiana Code, then the State has proven

       as a matter of law the drug is a controlled substance.” J.P. v. State, 878 N.E.2d

       415, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Barnett v. State, 579 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1991), trans. denied) (emphasis added). “If the substance is not specifically

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 38 of 40
       enumerated by the Code as a controlled substance, the State must offer extrinsic

       evidence to prove the substance falls within the Code’s definition.” Id.

[61]   Here, Lorazepam is not specifically enumerated by the Indiana Code as a

       legend drug.8 It is instead listed in a federal publication that is referenced by the

       Indiana Code section defining a legend drug. Accordingly, I believe that the

       State was required to offer extrinsic evidence—such as the relevant portion of

       the Orange Book—to prove to the jury that Lorazepam is a legend drug. See

       J.P., 878 N.E.2d at 417. By instructing the jury in the manner it did, the trial

       court gave the jury an impermissible mandatory instruction. Pattison v. State, 54

       N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. 2016) (defining a mandatory presumption as an

       instruction which informs the jury that it “must infer the presumed facts if the

       State proves certain predicate facts,” which, “if it amounts to a shift in the

       burden of proof, it is unconstitutional.”) (citations omitted). 9 The trial court

       here recognized that its instruction was mandatory, stating: “The [] mandatory

       8
         It is, however, specifically enumerated as a Schedule IV controlled substance. See Ind. Code § 35-48-2-
       10(c). The State, however, amended the charging information to allege that Brook committed possession of a
       legend drug, not possession of a controlled substance.
       9
         Although not raised by Brook on appeal, I cannot ignore the fact that the trial court’s instruction also
       invaded the constitutional role of the jury to be the exclusive judge of both the law and the facts in criminal
       cases. Article I, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution provides: “In all criminal cases whatever, the jury
       shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.” Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “[t]his
       provision requires that a jury in any criminal case be allowed to decide not only what the facts are but also
       what the law is and, consequently, how the law applies to the facts.” Harris v. State, 211 N.E.3d 929, 937
       (Ind. 2023). Thus, even when the State has presented incontrovertible proof of a defendant’s prior felony
       convictions, the jury still has the right to determine whether the defendant is, or is not, a habitual offender as
       a matter of law. Id. (citing Seay v. State, 698 N.E.2d 732, 737 (Ind. 1998)). The trial court here did properly
       instruct the jury that it was the exclusive judge of the law and the facts. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 154. Yet, by informing
       the jury that Lorazepam was, as a matter of law, a legend drug, the trial court invaded the role of the jury to
       be the exclusive judge of the law and the facts.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023                                 Page 39 of 40
       instruction o[f] the Court is telling you Lorazepam is a legend drug.” Tr. Vol. 2

       p. 13.

[62]   Here, the trial court’s instruction informed the jury that, if the State proved that

       Brook possessed Lorazepam, the State accordingly proved that this substance

       was a legend drug. Because this unconstitutionally relieved the State of its

       burden of proving all the elements of the offense, and because the State

       presented no evidence at all to the jury that Lorazepam is a legend drug, I

       would reverse Brook’s conviction for possession of a legend drug and remand

       for retrial on this issue.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2110 | October 20, 2023      Page 40 of 40