Court Opinion

ID: 9899413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 18:04:33.385106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:24.812523
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/16/23 Marriage of Turner CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of CARRIE                                      2d Civil No. B327782
LYNN and TYLER SAMPSON                                      (Super. Ct. No. D398339)
TURNER.                                                         (Ventura County)

CARRIE LYNN TURNER,

     Respondent,

v.

TYLER SAMPSON TURNER,

     Appellant.

     Tyler Sampson Turner appeals from the judgment
approving the dissolution of his marriage to Carrie Lynn Turner.
Tyler1 contends the trial court erred when it found that he

         1 We use the parties’ first names to avoid confusion.                                  No
disrespect is intended.
electronically signed an agreement dividing his assets with
Carrie. We affirm.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      Tyler and Carrie married in 2006. Carrie petitioned to
dissolve the marriage in 2020. In May 2022, Carrie and Tyler
agreed to settle the issues remaining after the dissolution of their
marriage. Tyler’s attorney prepared a “deal memo”
memorializing the terms of the settlement.
      The deal memo required Tyler to pay Carrie $250,000, half
of which was due within 90 days of the memo’s execution. Tyler’s
attorney emailed Carrie’s attorney a copy of the memo bearing
his and Tyler’s signatures. Carrie and her attorney
countersigned the memo and circulated fully executed copies.
      In July, Tyler’s attorney sent Carrie’s attorney a proposed
judgment. Carrie’s attorney sent proposed revisions, but then
heard nothing for several weeks. When asked when they could
expect to receive any additional revisions, Tyler’s attorney said
that Tyler had not yet approved the judgment.
      At an August hearing, Carrie’s attorney told the trial court
that Tyler and Carrie had reached the terms of a settlement, but
that Tyler had not authorized revisions to the judgment. Tyler
said that he had relieved his attorney and requested more time to
review the matter with a new attorney.
      Three weeks later, Tyler sent Carrie a check for $125,000,
as required by the deal memo. He later put a stop payment on
the check and was “backing away” from the deal memo.
      Carrie requested an order to enforce the terms of the deal
memo pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. During
the hearing on Carrie’s request, the trial court found that the
memo had been signed by the parties and their attorneys. It

                                 2
based that finding on communications between the attorneys and
Tyler’s delivery of the $125,000 check per the memo’s terms. The
court granted Carrie’s request, and incorporated the memo’s
terms into the judgment.
                            DISCUSSION
        Tyler contends the trial court erred when it concluded that
he electronically signed the deal memo. We disagree.
        Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 permits a trial court
to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement. (Osumi v. Sutton
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.) When doing so, it is that
court’s duty to “determine in the first instance whether the
parties have entered into an enforceable settlement.” (Ibid.) “In
making that determination, ‘the . . . court acts as the trier of
fact.’ ” (Ibid.) We will not disturb the court’s factual findings if
supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
        Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Tyler and Carrie entered into an enforceable settlement. Tyler’s
attorney emailed Carrie’s attorney a copy of the deal memo
bearing his and Tyler’s signatures. Carrie and her attorney also
signed the memo, creating an enforceable settlement.
        Tyler complains that the trial court accepted his signature
without ensuring that it complied with the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (Civ. Code, § 1633.1 et seq.; UETA). But Tyler
did not raise this issue during the proceedings below. He cannot
do so for the first time on appeal. (Sea & Sage Audubon Society,
Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417.)
        Tyler’s complaint also lacks merit. Pursuant to the UETA,
an “electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the
act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any
manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security

                                 3
procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic
record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code,
§ 1633.9, subd. (a), italics added.) Here, the trial court
determined that the electronic signature on the deal memo was
the act of Tyler based on his attorney’s representation and him
complying with the terms of the memo by sending Carrie a
$125,000 check. It is not the province of this court to second
guess that determination. (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC
(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 545.)
                            DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Carrie Lynn Turner shall
recover her costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             CODY, J.

                                4
                    Rocky J. Baio, Judge

              Superior Court County of Ventura

               ______________________________

     David Ingram Law and David L. Ingram for Appellant.
     Ferguson Case Orr Paterson and Joshua S. Hopstone for
Respondent.