Court Opinion

ID: 9963997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 18:10:14.270887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.834465
License: Public Domain

J-S06029-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 KATIE M. TRYMBISKI                      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 JOSEPH T. TRYMBISKI                     :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 2495 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 30, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
                               2020-61827

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                      FILED APRIL 26, 2024

     Joseph T. Trymbiski (“Father”) appeals from the order granting the

petition for protection from abuse (“PFA”) filed by Katie M. Trymbiski

(“Mother”) pursuant to the Protection from Abuse Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-

22. Father contends the court erred in considering hearsay evidence and the

evidence did not support a finding of abuse. We affirm.

     Father and Mother are married but Mother filed for divorce in September

2020. The divorce has not been finalized. They have three minor children

(“Children”) and share custody. On August 22, 2023, Mother filed a PFA

petition against Father. After an ex parte hearing, the trial court issued a

temporary PFA. On August 30, 2023, the court held a hearing on the petition,

where both parties were represented by counsel. At the outset of the hearing,

the court ruled that it would not be taking any testimony from Children.
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      At the hearing, Mother testified that she has concerns about Father

because “[h]e is an alcoholic” and “when he drinks, he gets abusive.” N.T.

8/30/23, at 31. She stated that Father “puts his hands on [her]” and gets very

angry and scary when he is intoxicated. Id. Mother testified that Father

consistently drinks and drives with Children. Id. at 47. Mother testified that

in the six weeks prior to the hearing, Father’s “alcohol abuse ha[d]

significantly increased.” Id. at 32. She stated that Father had failed to follow

the custody schedule in the last six weeks and “[h]e shows up stumbling,” is

intoxicated, and smells like vodka. Id. at 55. She stated that Children “had to

call 911 on August 6th[, three weeks before the hearing,] because [Father]

was convulsing on the ground” with “blood coming out of his mouth[.]” Id. at

32. Mother also spoke of another recent incident that occurred at Children’s

soccer tournament. Id. at 34. Mother testified that she expressed her concern

to Father about his drinking and how he was consistently intoxicated and

stumbling when he would get Children. Id. Mother stated that she and

Children were in her car when this discussion occurred and Father “opened

the car door, got in [her] face, screamed profanities at [her], and then

slammed the door shut.” Id. at 35. Mother said that she and Children felt

scared and threatened by Father. Id.

      Mother further testified as to previous incidents with Father that

occurred when they were living together. Mother stated that she would “watch

[Father] consume Tito’s Vodka on a regular basis.” Id. at 37. She described

an incident where Father was so intoxicated, he mistook Mother for an intruder

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and almost hit her with a baseball bat. Id. at 36. She also described another

episode where they were in bed arguing about Father’s drinking and Father

took a pillow from the bed and held it down on Mother’s head for 15 seconds.

Id. at 44.

      Mother stated that Father often drinks during his visits with Children.

The following exchange occurred at the hearing on this issue:

         [MOTHER]: So [A.T.], our 12-year-old, she has a watch, an
         Apple watch, and we have a code word, strawberries, to
         communicate when dad is intoxicated. And he is going to
         put them in the car, which he often does. He puts them in
         the car, and he drinks and drives with them on a consistent
         basis.

         [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Objection.

         THE COURT: The objection is overruled.

         [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: There is no foundation for this, Your
         Honor.

         [MOTHER]: She contacted me with, strawberries, and said,
         Can you please come get us, can you please come get us.

         [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Objection.

         THE COURT: This is when?

         [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Objection. This is hearsay. Now she
         is saying, come get us, come get us.

         THE COURT: How did she say come get us?

         [MOTHER]: She text[ed] me on her watch. I have screen
         shots of it.

         THE COURT: All right. And when did this take place?

         [MOTHER]: May 10th, May 16th, and there [are] other times
         she contacts me, as well. And I get calls from parents that
         he doesn’t go to pick them up. I get calls from --

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       [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Objection.

       THE COURT: Sustained.

       [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Can I have this marked, please?

       THE COURT: Apparently, we have documents that are going
       to be marked. Let’s have them marked, and then we can
       talk about that specific document.

                                    ...

       THE COURT: That which is marked --

       [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: M-1.

       THE COURT: Excuse me. Excuse me. That which is marked
       with the official marking, you can show it to the client, and
       you can certainly give me a copy of it.

       [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would object.

       THE COURT: What is the nature of the objection?

       [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: It has hearsay in it.

       THE COURT: I am sorry?

       [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: It has hearsay in it. And the
       important part of the document is all hearsay. I don’t think
       it should be reviewed or even discussed.

       [MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: It is a conversation. It is a text
       message conversation between the child and mother.

                                    ...

       THE COURT: You photocopied these?

       [MOTHER]: Right. I screen shotted it and printed them.

       THE COURT: Okay. And all right. Any further objections?

       [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Yes.

       THE COURT: Which part?

       [FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Well, it is a conversation between
       two people. She just identified it is a third-party who is not
       here to verify it, so it is hearsay.

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         THE COURT: Well, it comes from that -- it is that which is
         actually happened, and it is not just a question of a witness
         repeating it, which would make it hearsay. It is a question
         of showing what actually was communicated. And the
         objection as to hearsay is overruled. And you may continue
         with your questions.

Id. at 37-40.

      Mother testified as to an incident that occurred on May 16, 2023, where

her daughter texted her that Father was intoxicated. Id. at 42-43. Mother

indicated that she did not feel safe getting Children alone, so her neighbor

went with her. Id. at 42. Mother stated that when she arrived, Children were

“emotionally distraught,” and she observed Father to be “visibly intoxicated.”

Id. at 43. Mother said that Father opened the door to her car and “got in [her]

face in front of the kids.” Id. She felt that Father wanted to hurt her but he

“was just trying to hold himself back.” Id. at 44. She said he then slammed

the car door in her face while Children watched from the back seat. Id. at 43-

44.

      When asked why she requested a PFA, Mother stated:

         At this point, because of his years of alcohol abuse. And I
         don’t feel safe around him. He often gets too close to me,
         puts his body against me, there has been times where he’s
         blocked me from moving, laid on top of me so I couldn’t
         move, put his hands around my wrist. I don’t feel safe when
         he acts like that. I do not think the children are safe with
         him either.

Id. at 46.

      Father testified that he does not drink alcohol when Children are in his

custody. Id. at 10. He denied being an alcoholic. Id. at 8. Father stated that

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when Children had to call 911 recently, he was not drinking but rather had a

seizure from falling and hitting his head. Id. at 21, 23. He recalled an incident

in which his daughter contacted Mother because she was concerned that he

was drinking during the visit, but that was “an accusation that [he] get[s] a

lot” by his daughter to Mother. Id. at 24-25. He stated that he took three

breathalyzer tests a day on Soberlink for one year, which was a total of 500

to 600 tests, and passed all the tests. Id. at 60-61. On cross-examination,

Father indicated that he would not be willing to use Soberlink again even if

Mother paid for it. Id. at 73.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the court indicated that it did not find

Father’s testimony that he passed 600 Soberlink tests credible. Id. at 74-75.

It granted a final PFA order. Id. at 75. The order allowed partial custody and

visitation to continue but prohibited Father from driving with Children and/or

be in a car with Children unless Children are being transported by an

appropriate adult. This appeal followed.

      Father raises the following issues:

         1. Did the [c]ourt commit an error of law in finding that
            [Father] had committed one or more act(s) of abuse as
            defined in the Pennsylvania PFA Statute, 23 Pa.C.S.[A.]
            § 6102(a)?

         2. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, could a
            reasonable fact finder conclude that the entry of a
            Protection from Abuse Order is required to protect the
            [Mother] and/or the named protected parties from future
            acts of alleged abuse?

         3. Did the [c]ourt commit an error of law in considering
            hearsay evidence, over [Father’s] counsel’s objection,

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           that [Father] was intoxicated while in custody of the
           parties’ minor children, without which evidence the [t]rial
           [c]ourt could not have issued a Final Protection from
           Abuse Order?

        4. Did the [c]ourt commit an error of law in considering the
           contents of Exhibit marked for identification purposes as
           M-1, which was never admitted into evidence, without
           which the [t]rial [c]ourt could not have issued a Final
           Protection from Abuse Order?

        5. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, could a
           reasonable fact finder could conclude that [Father]
           perpetrated one or more act(s) of abuse as defined in the
           Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Statute, 23
           Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6102(a) because [Mother’s] allegations are
           predicated upon the claim that [Father] is an alcoholic,
           which fact could not be established by any admitted or
           admissible evidence at time of trial and which claim was
           clearly controverted by the evidence of [Father’s] Sober
           Link monitoring?

        6. Did the [c]ourt commit an error of law and abuse its
           discretion in directing [Father’s] counsel to “[s]top
           objecting unless you have a legitimate objection” in light
           of [Father’s] counsel’s legitimate objections, thus
           allowing testimony without which evidence the [t]rial
           [c]ourt could not have issued a Final Protection from
           Abuse Order?

        7. Did the [c]ourt commit an error of law and violate
           [Father’s] right to due process in directing [Father’s]
           counsel to “[s]top objecting unless you have a legitimate
           objection” in light of [Father’s] counsel’s legitimate
           objections, thus allowing testimony without which
           evidence the [t]rial [c]ourt could not have issued a Final
           Protection from Abuse Order.

Father’s Br. at 3-4 (suggested answers omitted).

     We initially note that Father has admittedly abandoned issues six and

seven on appeal. See id. at 4. Further, the argument section of Father’s brief

does not correspond to the remaining five enumerated issues in violation of

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Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(a). See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)

(stating the argument section of an appellate brief “shall be divided into as

many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head

of each part -- in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed -- the

particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of

authorities as are deemed pertinent”).

      Here, the argument is divided into two sections: a challenge to the

admission of evidence and a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the issuance of the PFA order. Thus, we will address the two issues

that Father has briefed.

      Father first argues that the trial court improperly considered hearsay

evidence when it considered A.T.’s text to Mother of the codeword

“strawberries,” which signaled that Father was drinking and trying to drive

with Children. Father’s Br. at 23-24. Father contends that this out-of-court

statement was admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, that is, to show

that Father was drunk, and that no hearsay exception applied. Id. at 24.

According to Father, “[t]he court based its findings that the [C]hildren need

protection exclusively on the uncorroborated hearsay evidence.” Id. at 27.

      “An appellate court’s standard of review of a trial court’s evidentiary

rulings, including rulings on the admission of hearsay[,] . . . is abuse of

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Walter, 93 A.3d 442, 449 (Pa. 2014). Thus,

we will not disturb an evidentiary ruling unless “the law is overridden or

misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the

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result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by evidence of record.”

Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655, 667 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted).

      “Hearsay is an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the

matter asserted.” Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 480

(Pa.Super. 2018) (citing Pa.R.E. 801(c)). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible

unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id. One

exception to the rule against hearsay is the present sense impression

exception:

         A statement describing or explaining an event or condition,
         made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.
         When the declarant is unidentified, the proponent shall show
         by independent corroborating evidence that the declarant
         actually perceived the event or condition.

Pa.R.E. 803(1).

      The    present sense     impression exception      “permits testimony of

declarations concerning conditions or non-exciting events observed by the

declarant.” Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 805 A.2d 566, 573 (Pa.Super.

2002). “The observation must be made at the time of the event or so shortly

thereafter that it is unlikely that the declarant had the opportunity to form the

purpose of misstating his observation.” Id. “[T]he present sense impression

does not require that the comments be made to another person also present

at the scene, but may be made over the telephone.” Id.

      Here, A.H. texted the codeword “strawberries” to Mother to describe her

observations of Father at the time of the event, which prompted Mother to

retrieve Children. Thus, the statement falls within the present sense

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impression exception to the hearsay rule. Moreover, contrary to Father’s

contention and as more fully set forth below, the evidence was sufficient,

regardless of whether he was intoxicated at that particular time. Any error in

admitting the testimony was therefore harmless. We further note that Father

has not challenged the court’s ruling declining to take testimony from

Children. Thus, this claim is without merit.

      Father next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

issuance of the PFA order. He argues that his “being intoxicated while

exercising custody over the [C]hildren, to the extent that such a conclusion

could be reached independently of the improper hearsay evidence in this case,

does not constitute abuse pursuant to the PFA statute.” Father’s Br. at 32. He

points out that Mother admitted that she has not witnessed Father be

physically abusive to Children. Id. Father contends that the “record fails to

establish that [he] had caused bodily injury to the [C]hildren, had placed them

in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury, had inflicted false

imprisonment, had sexually abused them, or had engaged in a course of

conduct or repeatedly committed acts under circumstances that placed them

in reasonable fear of bodily injury.” Id. Father further argues that there was

insufficient evidence that he abused Mother. He emphasizes that the baseball

bat and pillow smothering incidents took place years ago, and the most recent

allegation that he yelled profanities at Mother at a soccer tournament does

not amount to abuse under the PFA statute. Id. at 32-33.

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      “In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal

conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion.” Hood-O’Hara v. Wills,

873 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa.Super. 2005). An abuse of discretion exists where there

is not “merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that

the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Mescanti v.

Mescanti, 956 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

      A plaintiff seeking a PFA order bears the burden of proving abuse by a

preponderance of the evidence. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6107(a). On appellate review

of the grant of a PFA order, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the petitioner and grant him the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived

therefrom.” D.H. v. B.O., 734 A.2d 409, 410 (Pa.Super. 1999). “In reviewing

the validity of a PFA order, this Court must . . . defer to the lower court’s

determination of the credibility of witnesses at the hearing.” C.H.L. v. W.D.L.,

214 A.3d 1272, 1276-77 (Pa.Super. 2019). “[T]his Court has no authority to

overturn the trial court’s credibility determinations” in PFA matters. Karch v.

Karch, 885 A.2d 535, 537 (Pa.Super. 2005).

      The PFA Act defines “abuse” in relevant part as:

         The occurrence of one or more of the following acts between
         family or household members, sexual or intimate partners
         or persons who share biological parenthood:

                                         ...

         (2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious
         bodily injury.

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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a).

      “In the context of a PFA case, the court’s objective is to determine

whether the victim is in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury[.]”

Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation

omitted). “The intent of the alleged abuser is of no moment.” Id. Under the

PFA Act, “prior instances of abuse are relevant and admissible.” Hood-

O’Hara, 873 A.2d at 761. Further, “a person need not suffer actual injury to

be considered a victim of abuse” so long as the victim is “able to demonstrate

a reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury[.]” Ferri v. Ferri, 854 A.2d

600, 603-04 (Pa.Super. 2004) (emphasis in original).

      Here, the court determined that Mother and Children demonstrated a

reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury. See Trial Court Opinion,

dated 12/4/23, at 13, 14. The record supports the court’s conclusion. Mother

testified that Father has put his hands on her, almost struck her with a

baseball bat, smothered her with a pillow, and laid on top of her so she could

not move. In the six weeks before the hearing, Mother observed that Father’s

drinking had increased, and he would show up stumbling and visibly

intoxicated. At a recent soccer tournament, Father opened the door to

Mother’s car, got in her face, screamed profanities at her, and slammed the

door shut in the presence of Children in the car. Mother testified that she and

Children felt scared and threatened by Father.

      Mother also testified about another recent incident where she went to

pick up Children at Father’s house with her neighbor. She stated when she

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arrived, Children were emotionally distraught, and Father was visibly

intoxicated. Mother said that Father opened the door to the car and got in her

face in front of Children. Mother testified that she believed Father wanted to

hurt her but held himself back. She said he then slammed the car door in her

face while Children watched from the back seat.

      This evidence was sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that

Mother and Children had a reasonable fear of bodily harm. See McCance v.

McCance, 908 A.2d 905, 911 (Pa.Super. 2006) (concluding the evidence was

sufficient to establish that the petitioner was in reasonable fear of imminent

serious bodily injury where the petitioner testified that the defendant stood in

front of her car while she was in it and yelled obscenities and threats, that the

defendant struck her car so hard that repairs were needed, and that the

defendant had a drinking problem, anger issues and was physical with other

people in the past). The court evidently credited Mother’s testimony and found

Father’s testimony to not be credible. The court did not err or abuse its

discretion in entering the PFA order.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 4/26/2024

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