Court Opinion

ID: 9956877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 08:13:38.619933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:57.518569
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-23-00218-CR

               SASHA SKARE, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

         On Appeal from the 186th District Court
                 Bexar County, Texas
             Trial Court No. 2021CR3863

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

         A Bexar County jury convicted Sasha Skare of murder and assessed a sentence of fifty-

five years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Supp.). In her sole point of

error on appeal, Skare argues that the State’s final argument during the punishment phase of the

trial was fundamentally unfair because it invited the jury to assess punishment based “on the

present and future sufferings of the [victim’s] family.”1 Because Skare did not preserve her sole

point of error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.       Background

         “As a general proposition, victim-impact evidence may be admissible at the punishment

stage of a criminal trial when that evidence has some bearing on the defendant’s personal

responsibility and moral culpability.” Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002).

         “As the Supreme Court stated in Payne v. Tennessee, such evidence is . . . a way to

inform ‘the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question.’” Id.

(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)). Victim-impact evidence “is designed

to remind the jury that murder has foreseeable consequences to the community and the victim’s

survivors—family members and friends who also suffer harm from murderous conduct.” Id.

         The victim’s family testified during the punishment phase of the trial.                   The State’s

closing argument included the following, which Skare complains of:

1
 Originally appealed to the Fourth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). We follow the
precedent of the Fourth Court of Appeals in deciding this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
                                                       2
              So now we have [the victim] himself. And one of the extraordinary things
       about [the victim] and [his] family is this, that he was incredibly loved. And if
       you reach a certain age, you learn that the people that are incredibly loved, they
       deserve the love. They deserve to be loved because out of their goodness and
       kindness.

               So as you’re deciding what happened, be mindful that his death resulted in
       the loss for this entire family. But being mindful of what happens in the 2030’s,
       sometime in 2030’s when his mother sees how his siblings miss him. As a
       mother, how is she going to comfort his siblings? In the 2030’s how is she going
       to do that?

              Do any of you know how you would comfort your other children after
       you’ve lost your child? How would you do that? In the 2030’s or 2040’s, these
       emotions will come up, and it will be left to [the victim’s mother] to comfort her
       children. Can you imagine that sort of burden in the 2030’s or 2040’s or 2050’s?
       His memory will constantly come up and she will have to deal with all that.

Skare did not object to this argument at trial.

II.    Skare’s Sole Point of Error is Unpreserved

       The State argues that Skare’s sole point of error is unpreserved because she failed to

lodge an objection during the State’s closing argument. We agree.

       Although Skare attempts to skirt the preservation requirement by claiming fundamental

error, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has determined that “[t]he right to a trial untainted by

improper jury argument is forfeitable.” Cantu v. State, 678 S.W.3d 331, 356 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2023, no pet.) (quoting Hernandez v. State, 538 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018)). “Even an inflammatory jury argument is forfeited if the defendant does not pursue [her]

objection to an adverse ruling.” Id. (quoting Hernandez, 538 S.W.3d at 622–23); see Ayers v.

State, 483 S.W.3d 230, 233 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref’d) (finding that “[t]he

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fundamental error doctrine does not save [an appellant] from the preservation of error

requirement”).

       By failing to timely and properly object, Skare has failed to preserve her complaint about

the State’s closing argument on punishment. See Cantu, 678 S.W.3d 357; TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a). As a result, we overrule her sole point of error.

III.   Disposition

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                               Jeff Rambin
                                               Justice

Date Submitted:        March 21, 2024
Date Decided:          April 1, 2024

Do Not Publish

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