Court Opinion

ID: 9925602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 15:05:51.161055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:15.397248
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                     CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                          JANUARY 22, 2024
                                                                      STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                    IN THE SUPREME COURT
                    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                      2024 ND 9

In the Interest of J.C., minor child

State of North Dakota,                                Petitioner and Appellee
      v.
J.C., child, J.C., father to J.C.,                              Respondents
      and
T.W., mother,                                       Respondent and Appellant

                                     No. 20230377

In the Interest of M.W., minor child

State of North Dakota,                                Petitioner and Appellee
      v.
M.W., child, Unknown, father to M.W.,                           Respondents
      and
T.W., mother,                                       Respondent and Appellant

                                     No. 20230378

Appeal from the Juvenile Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial
District, the Honorable Kelly A. Dillon, Judicial Referee.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Opinion of the Court by Bahr, Justice.
Rozanna C. Larson, State’s Attorney, Minot, ND, for petitioner and appellee.

William R. Hartl, Rugby, ND, for respondent and appellant.
                         Interest of J.C. and M.W.
                         Nos. 20230377 & 20230378

Bahr, Justice.

      T.W. appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights
to J.C. and M.W. We hold the court abused its discretion when it took judicial
notice of or considered evidence beyond the evidentiary record. We further hold
the court erred by making clearly erroneous findings. Despite these errors,
there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s decision to
terminate T.W.’s parental rights; however, we are unable to discern whether
the court abused its discretion by relying on the inadmissible evidence when it
decided to terminate T.W.’s parental rights. Therefore, we retain jurisdiction
under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3)(B) and remand with instructions for the court to
issue an order based only on the evidence received at trial.

                                       I

       T.W. is the mother of J.C. and M.W. The Ward County Human Services
Zone placed both children into foster care on April 14, 2021. At the time of the
children’s removal from T.W., T.W. was in a relationship with A.W. A.W.
contributed to the treatment of the children which led to their removal.
Following their placement in foster care, T.W. pled guilty to three counts of
child abuse. The juvenile court sentenced T.W. to ten years with 4 years to serve
in custody.

       The State filed a petition to terminate parental rights in December 2022.
The juvenile court held a trial in September 2023. The court found the children
had “been in foster care a total of 1123 continuous nights as of the date of the
trial.” The court further found T.W. is still attempting to maintain a
relationship with A.W. despite a no contact order and, due to T.W.’s continued
contact with A.W., the need for protection of the children is likely to continue.
The court ordered the termination of T.W.’s parental rights.

                                       1
                                        II

       “[N]atural parents have a fundamental right to their children, ‘which is
of a constitutional dimension.’” In re W.E., 2000 ND 208, ¶ 30, 619 N.W.2d 494
(quoting In the Interest of L.F., 1998 ND 129, ¶ 9, 580 N.W.2d 573). “The
constitutional protections, although not absolute, require that ‘[a]ny doubts
should be resolved in favor of the natural parent [,] and parental rights should
be terminated only when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interest of
public safety.’” Id. (quoting L.F., at ¶ 9).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20.
Under section 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(1), the court may terminate parental rights if
the child is in need of protection and the court finds “[t]he conditions and
causes of the need for protection are likely to continue or will not be remedied
and for that reason the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious
physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm[.]” Under section 27-20.3-
20(1)(c)(2), the court may terminate parental rights if the child is in need of
protection and the court finds “[t]he child has been in foster care, in the care,
custody, and control of the department or human service zone for at least four
hundred fifty out of the previous six hundred sixty nights[.]”

      Termination of parental rights proceedings under N.D.C.C. ch. 27-20.3
are governed by the North Dakota Rules of Juvenile Procedure and, to the
extent they are not inconsistent with the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. N.D.R.Civ.P. 1, 81(a). The North
Dakota Rules of Evidence apply to termination of parental rights proceedings.
N.D.R.Ev. 101(a), 1101(a), (b).

       “We will not overturn a juvenile court’s findings of fact in a termination
proceeding unless the findings are clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a).”
In re A.B., 2017 ND 178, ¶ 12, 898 N.W.2d 676. “A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a) if it is induced by an erroneous view of the
law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if, on the entire record, we are left
with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Id. “In reviewing
findings of fact, a ‘reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s

                                         2
opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.’” Id. (quoting N.D.R.Civ.P.
52(a)(6)).

                                         A

      Referring to the permanency hearings as “underlying files,” the juvenile
court wrote the underlying files “are incorporated into this matter as agreed to
by the parties.” T.W. asserts she did not agree to the court considering the
permanency hearing files, and the State concedes the record does not reflect
the parties agreed to the court considering the permanency hearing files.

        T.W. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by taking judicial
notice of and relying on the affidavits in the permanency hearings. The State
responds that the affidavits were part of the juvenile court records leading up
to the proceeding and that the affiants testified at the hearing. “We review a
. . . court’s decision to take judicial notice under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Koon v. State, 2023 ND 247, ¶ 11; Orwig v. Orwig, 2021 ND 33, ¶ 6,
955 N.W.2d 34.

         Under this Court’s precedent, juvenile courts may examine orders in past
cases:

         [I]n parental termination proceedings, due process and notice
         requirements prohibit a juvenile court from taking judicial notice
         of testimony in proceedings where termination is not an issue, but
         where termination is a culmination of prior proceedings the court
         need not operate in a vacuum regarding the results of those
         proceedings and may take judicial notice of orders in prior
         proceedings.

In re J.C., 2007 ND 111, ¶ 9, 736 N.W.2d 451. However, “[t]he court may only
take judicial notice of the evidence as presented, and not for the truth of the
matters asserted by the evidence.” Wessman v. Wessman, 2008 ND 62, ¶ 19,
747 N.W.2d 85 (quoting State v. Bergstrom, 2006 ND 45, ¶ 18, 710 N.W.2d 407).

       The juvenile court went beyond considering the orders in the
permanency cases; the court’s order specifically references and relies upon
“affidavits in the underlying files[.]” The court’s order also cites facts referred

                                         3
to in the affidavits. Although the court was allowed to consider the orders in
the permanency proceedings, it could not consider testimony, including
statements in affidavits, from the permanency proceedings. See J.C., 2007 ND
111, ¶ 9. The court abused its discretion by relying on the affidavits in the
permanency proceedings.

                                        B

     The juvenile court relied on statements in an affidavit submitted in the
termination proceeding. T.W. argues the court erred in doing so. The State
responds that the affidavit was in the record.

       The State did not offer and the juvenile court did not receive the affidavit
as evidence. An affidavit filed in a case is part of the court’s file or record.
However, generally an affidavit only becomes part of the evidentiary record
when a party offers it and the court receives it into evidence. The court abused
its discretion by relying on an affidavit the State never offered and the court
never received into evidence. In re Skorick, 2020 ND 162, ¶ 10, 946 N.W.2d 513
(the court abused its discretion when it considered an expert report the State
did not offer into evidence at the commitment hearing); Wetzel v. Schlenvogt,
2005 ND 190, ¶ 23, 705 N.W.2d 836 (petitions for protective orders and
affidavits are inadmissible hearsay under N.D.R.Ev. 801(c)).

                                        C

       The juvenile court’s order references and quotes the guardian ad litem’s
reports. T.W. argues the juvenile court erred and abused its discretion when
it considered the guardian ad litem’s reports. She explains the guardian ad
litem did not testify regarding all of the content of her reports and the State
did not introduce the reports into evidence. The State responds the guardian
ad litem’s reports were part of the juvenile court record.

      As previously noted, there is a distinction between the court file or record
and the evidentiary record. Generally, a document in the court file is not part
of the evidentiary record unless a party offers the document and the court
receives it. See Skorick, 2020 ND 162, ¶ 10.

                                        4
      The State provides no authority for the proposition a juvenile court may
consider a guardian ad litem’s report as substantive evidence despite the State
not offering the report into evidence. “One of the fundamental precepts of our
judicial system is that the finder of fact must rely only on the evidence
presented in court.” Green v. Green, 1999 ND 86, ¶ 10, 593 N.W.2d 398 (holding
the court committed reversible error when it relied on evidentiary facts in a
guardian ad litem’s report not introduced into evidence). The juvenile court
abused its discretion by relying on the guardian ad litem’s reports the State
never offered and the court never received into evidence.

      We conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion when it took judicial
notice of or relied on statements in affidavits from the permanency
proceedings, statements in an affidavit filed in the termination proceeding, and
the guardian ad litem’s reports, none of which the State offered as evidence or
the court received into evidence at trial. Based on those conclusions, we
determine the court’s findings of fact grounded solely on those documents are
clearly erroneous because they are not supported by evidence in the record.

                                        III

      T.W. argues the juvenile court’s finding the children were in foster care
a total of 1123 continuous nights is clearly erroneous. The State concedes the
court erred when it found the children were in foster care for 1123 nights.

      The parties agree, and the record shows, the children were in foster care
for 877 nights. We conclude the juvenile court’s finding on the number of nights
the children were in foster care is clearly erroneous.

                                       IV

       T.W. argues the juvenile court erred when it found the conditions and
causes of the need for protection are likely to continue. “[T]o show the
conditions and causes of [the need for protection] are likely to continue, or will
not be remedied, the State cannot rely on past [need for protection] alone, but
must provide prognostic evidence that the [need for protection] will continue.”
J.C., 2007 ND 111, ¶ 9.

                                        5
      The juvenile court’s finding the conditions and causes of the need for
protection are likely to continue is based on evidence presented at trial. The
court found T.W. cannot, or will not, extricate herself from A.W.; T.W. has
continued to maintain contact with A.W., “her children’s abuser[,] despite being
reminded repeatedly by multiple people of the no contact order and of the
trauma her children suffered at the hands of their abuser”; and T.W. continues
to put her needs and desires before the needs of her children. We conclude the
court’s finding the conditions and causes of the need for protection are likely to
continue is not clearly erroneous.

                                        V

       Under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1), the juvenile court “may” terminate
parental rights if the elements have been met. “When used in a statute, the
word ‘may’ is ordinarily understood as permissive rather than mandatory and
operates to confer discretion.” In re C.A.R., 2020 ND 209, ¶ 9, 950 N.W.2d 186.
Therefore, when the statutory elements to terminate parental rights are met,
the court has discretion, but is not required, to terminate parental rights. In re
J.J.G., 2022 ND 236, ¶ 9, 982 N.W.2d 851; In re C.D.G.E., 2017 ND 13, ¶ 4, 889
N.W.2d 863. The court’s discretion to terminate parental rights is not
unlimited. See J.J.G., at ¶ 9. We review a court’s exercise of its discretion to
grant or deny a parental-termination petition under the abuse of discretion
standard. C.D.G.E., at ¶ 9. A court “abuses its discretion if it acts in an
arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable manner, if its decision is not the
product of a rational mental process leading to a reasonable determination, or
if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Baker, 2015
ND 269, ¶ 7, 871 N.W.2d 830).

       T.W. does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding the children are in
need of protection. We concluded the court’s finding the conditions and causes
of the need for protection are likely to continue is not clearly erroneous. Thus,
the elements to terminate T.W.’s parental rights under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-
20(1)(c)(1) are met.

     The juvenile court improperly found the children were in foster care for
1123 nights, when they were actually in foster care for 877 nights. However,

                                        6
because the children were in foster care beyond 450 nights, the elements to
terminate T.W.’s parental rights under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2) are met.

      The juvenile court had discretion to terminate T.W.’s parental rights
under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(1) or (2). However, when exercising its
discretion, the court improperly considered evidence outside of the evidentiary
record and a clearly erroneous finding the children were in foster care for 1123
nights. The court abused its discretion in relying on that evidence. We cannot
determine what impact, if any, the improperly considered evidence and
erroneous findings had on the court’s exercise of its discretion.

      This Court has applied N.D.R.Civ.P. 61 in termination proceedings. In re
Adoption of K.J.C., 2016 ND 67, ¶ 27, 877 N.W.2d 62; In re J.S.L., 2009 ND 43,
¶ 25, 763 N.W.2d 783; In re Adoption of J.D.F., 2009 ND 21, ¶ 22, 761 N.W.2d
582; B.L.L. v. W.D.C., 2008 ND 107, ¶ 7, 750 N.W.2d 466; In re K.S., 2002 ND
164, ¶ 11, 652 N.W.2d 341. Under Rule 61, “[e]rror not affecting substantial
rights of the parties must be disregarded.” K.S., at ¶ 11. “Nonprejudicial
mistakes by the lower court constitute harmless error and are not grounds for
reversal.” Id. We have also explained:

      Entry of incompetent evidence in a nonjury trial will rarely be
      reversible error while exclusion of competent evidence will cause
      reversal when justice requires. We presume a court in a bench trial
      considered only competent evidence. Consequently, it is not
      reversible error to admit incompetent evidence in a bench trial
      unless it induced an improper finding.

In re R.L.-P., 2014 ND 28, ¶ 37, 842 N.W.2d 889 (quoting McKechnie v. Berg,
2003 ND 136, ¶ 7, 667 N.W.2d 628). The incompetent evidence received by the
juvenile court did induce improper findings. However, we cannot determine
what impact, if any, the improper findings had on the court’s exercise of its
discretion.

      As previously noted, there is competent evidence to support the juvenile
court’s findings it had grounds to terminate T.W.’s parental rights. The issue is
one of discretion. The juvenile court has discretion to terminate parental
rights. However, it must exercise that discretion based on admissible evidence.

                                       7
Thus, we remand to the juvenile court with instructions to, based on the
admissible evidence, exercise its discretion whether to terminate T.W.’s
parental rights.

                                       VI

      We have considered the parties’ other arguments and conclude they are
not necessary to our decision or are without merit. We retain jurisdiction under
N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3)(B) and remand to the juvenile court with instructions
that, within twenty days from the filing of this opinion, the court issue an order
based only on the evidence received at trial.

      Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

                                        8