Court Opinion

ID: 9725114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:30:51.877173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:10.829146
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(dissenting). There is proof in this record from which the appeal board could, and did, find that the defendant employer had timely knowl*509edge of statutory disablement. That being so, our review of this administrative board’s findings must result in affirmance unless we are to disregard tbe legislative restraint imposed upon our review of such findings. CL 1948, §413.12 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.186); McVicar v. Harper Hospital, 313 Mich 48; Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich 286.
First, as to. the board’s finding of statutory disability: The board did find statutory disability— total disability; it did not, “advertently” or inadvertently, find only that plaintiff suffered an “injury” which justly may be called a nondisabling occupational ailment. The pertinent part of the appeal board’s opinion follows:
“We find as follows: Plaintiff has definitely established severe exposure to the hazards of silica over a period of many years up to June 3, 1955. Such exposure directly resulted in silicosis which has totally disabled plaintiff at all times since June 3, 1955, from performing the work he was doing for defendant on and prior to that date. Plaintiff has sustained a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment and due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer. It is very clear from a review of all the testimony that plaintiff should not be further exposed to the hazard of underground mining which caused his injury.”
Evidentiary support for such findings, sufficient to stay our hand from reversal, may be found in the testimony of the plaintiff and the medical witnesses. Defendant’s doctors testified plaintiff’s condition was no different at the time of hearing than it was when he left the mine in 1955 and had been for some years earlier. They based this conclusion upon examination of X-rays defendant had taken of plaintiff during annual physical examinations from 1935. To defendant’s doctors, plaintiff’s condition was only *510a first stage silicosis which they claimed would not disable him from mine work. However, plaintiff’s doctor testified that plaintiff’s current condition was a second stage silicosis and that he should not be put back underground where he would be exposed to silica dust. The appeal board was entitled to conclude, as it did, that plaintiff’s condition in 1955 was the same as it was in 1957. There was no evidence to the contrary. There remained only determination of the nature of that condition and as to that, the evidence was in conflict. Acceptance by the board of plaintiff’s doctor’s testimony, whether we would have done so or not were we sitting as members of the appeal board, cannot be disregarded or reversed by us in this review. Its finding that plaintiff’s silicosis had totally disabled him within the meaning of the statute is supported additionally by plaintiff’s own testimony of chest pains and shortness of breath occurring during the latter months of his employment which required him to rest 2, 3 or 4 minutes at a time while climbing ladders at work.
What makes this case difficult is the meaning of the word “disability” as used in our workmen’s compensation act. The statute says the word “means the state of being disabled from earning full wages at the work in which the employee was last subjected to the conditions resulting in disability.” CL 1948, §417.1 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev §17.220). Defendant would have us say that there can be no statutory disability so long as a workman continues to work; that there can be no statutory disability until he drops in his tracks. It is suggested that because Bruno Tomasini continued to work as an underground iron ore miner even after chest pains required him to rest 2, 3, or 4 minutes at a time while climbing ladders, and oven after X-rays disclosed to his employer that he should not be exposed to silica dust because of a silicosis condition, it cannot be *511said he was disabled within the statutory meaning of the term. He worked until the last, 42 years in defendant’s mine, and then retired; proof enough,it is said, that his occupational ailment was non-disabling. What this amounts to is that a worker cannot be said to be disabled from earning full wages at his work in the mine so long as he has the strength to do the job. I cannot accept such a barbaric limitation, the application of which in this case demonstrates the crippling effect it would have on our workmen’s compensation act.
That there are nondisabling occupational ailments, I do not doubt. But I reject an appellate conclusion to that effect on this record in the teeth of a valid appeal board finding to the contrary. The evidence in thi¡3 record, in my view, supports the appeal board’s finding that on June 3, 1955, plaintiff was totally disabled from performing the work he had done for defendant because of silicosis resulting from exposure to silica hazards encountered in his employment.
There remains for discussion only the issue of defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s statutory disability, knowledge which the appeal board found defendant should have had from information available to it and which placed upon defendant the burden of filing the report of injury required by section 15, part 2 (CLS 1956, § 412.15 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.165]) of the act. The issue is crucial to decision because if the appeal board was right, defendant’s failure to file the report tolls the statute of limitations upon plaintiff’s duty to file timely notice of disability with his employer. Section 10, part 7 (CL 1948, §417.10 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev §17.229]) of the act.
The appeal board found that defendant had available to it the annual X-rays of plaintiff’s chest which disclosed his silicotic condition and that defendant *512should have known .therefrom that on June 3, 1955, plaintiff should not be exposed to silica hazards and “thus had notice and knowledge of injury.” As I read Mr. Justice Black’s opinion, he deems it significant that the appeal board said “notice and knowledge of. injury” rather than of “disablement” or of “disability.” I cannot agree. I think it a matter of insignificance in this ocqupational disease, case that the board found the employer had notice and knowledge of injury, rather than of disease, disablement or disability. In the first place, the context of the appeal board’s findings quoted in Justice Black’s opinion, that which precedes and that which follows the criticized finding, clearly discloses that, whatever word was used to describe the fact, the board found defendant had notice and knowledge' that plaintiff was statutorily disabled. Furthermore, section 15, part 2, which imposes the burden upon the employer of making a report to the department upon acquiring such notice or knowledge, itself speaks in terms of “notice or knowledge” of the happening of the injury.
It is that section which requires an injured employee to give notice of his injury to his employer within 3 months after the happening of the injury. It also provides, however, that when the employer has notice or knowledge of the “happening of the injury” within 3 months of its occurrence, and fails to file a report of such injury with the department, the statute of limitations shall not run against the employee’s claim until said report is filed. This section is found in that part of the act dealing with personal injuries, and its language is appropriate for that purpose. But we deal here with an occupational disease, and claims for compensation for disability caused by occupational diseases are covered by the provisions of part 7 of the act.
*513Section 10 of part 7 of the act adopts for occupational disease claims the same procedural requirements for giving notice to the employer set forth in section 15 of part 2, and this is done by simple reference to the requirements of the latter section without restating them in terms more appropriate to occupational diseases.
Without further statutory assistance it would seem to me that logic and common sense would require our reading the language of section 15, part 2, when applied to occupational disease claims, in such fashion that it be made effective. But in this instance the legislature has specifically assisted our labors, perhaps anticipating that some might have difficulty applying statutory language designed for personal injury claims but adopted by reference for occupational disease claims. In section 1 of part 71 the legislature expressly defined “personal injury” to include an occupational disease or disability. When the appeal board makes a finding in a part 7 case that the employer “had notice and knowledge of injury,” as was made in this case, I venture to suggest that, since the word “injury” includes by statutory definition “diseases” and “disabilities,” such finding means that the employer had knowledge of the disease or disability.
But there is more. In section 2 of part 72 the legislature provided that disablement from occupational diseases “shall be treated as the happening of a personal injury” within the meaning of the act. That section further provides that, with exceptions not here relevant, the “procedure and practice” provided in the act shall apply to all proceedings under part 7 of the act, that part dealing with occupational diseases.
*514When the “procedure and practice” requirements Of section 15 of part 2 are sought to be applied to occupational disease cases, we are entitled, indeed required, by section 2 of part 7 to read the words “happening of the injury” as if they read “happening of the disablement.” See Joslin v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 359 Mich 420, at pages 427 and 428.
' It is with this statutory scheme in mind we must review the appeal board’s decision. When it found that the employer “had notice and knowledge of injury” as a result of annual X-rays it had taken of the employee’s chest since 1935, that finding is not vulnerable to judicial reversal for failure to use the words “disablement” or “disability.” The finding is good either because the legislature has said the word “injury” shall include disease or disability, or because the legislature has said that disablement from an occupational disease “shall be treated as the happening of a personal injury.” In either event, the effect of the appeal board’s finding of fact with reference to the employer’s knowledge tolls the statute of limitations until the employer files with the department a “report of said injury.”
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm and award costs to the plaintiff.
Adams, J., took no part in the decision of this case-.

 CL 1948, § 417.1 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.220).

 CL 1948, § 417.2 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.221).