Court Opinion

ID: 9471953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:44:53.865181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:39.493856
License: Public Domain

WISDOM, Circuit Judge,
with whom BROWN, POLITZ, RANDALL, TATE and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
This case involves a proposed consent decree providing for institutional, color-conscious, affirmative action to undo the effects of generations of past discrimination against blacks as a group in the New Orleans Police Department.
I concur in the holding expressed in Judge Williams' opinion for the Court that Title VII does not bar affirmative action and does not limit permissible remedies to actual victims of past discrimination. In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 1979, 443 U.S. 193, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480, the United States Supreme Court conclusively determined that Title VII does not prohibit race-conscious affirmative action plans. Id. at 201-03, 99 S.Ct. at 2726-27. Weber involved private affirmative action, but the issue here is the same as the issue in Weber: Is it consistent with Title VII for an employer voluntarily to adopt prospective race-conscious goals to *1571remedy past exclusion of blacks from the workplace?1 One thing Weber did make clear: To undo the effects of historical race discrimination by an employer, there need not be a showing of identifiable victims. This Court reached the same conclusion a decade earlier. See Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 5 Cir.1969, 407 F.2d 1047. We have never departed from our interpretation of Title VII that Congress intended that affirmative action be taken to remove the vestiges of racial discrimination. United States v. City of Miami, 5 Cir.1980, 614 F.2d 1322, aff'd in part and in part vacated and remanded on other grounds (en banc), 5 Cir.1981, 664 F.2d 435. A principal purpose for the passage of Title VII was to induce voluntary solutions, including race-conscious remedies, to end racial discrimination in the workplace.2 Weber, 443 U.S. at 202, 99 S.Ct. at 2726; Detroit Police Officers v. Young, 6 Cir. 1979, 608 F.2d 671, 690, cert. denied, 1981, 452 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 3079, 69 L.Ed.2d 951. Any position that would prohibit such action is anomalous and must be rejected.3
At this late date in the development of remedial relief for longstanding race discrimination, the government intervenors and my esteemed brothers Gee and Higginbotham contest the authority of this Court to order prospective affirmative race-conscious remedies. Judge Gee questions the existence of constitutional authority to order prospective affirmative action by “a unit of state government” that benefits a class or group “without reference to whether those favored have ever been the victims of discrimination or those injured have either practiced or benefitted from it”.4 Judge Higginbotham expands Judge Gee’s exposition of this argument and also *1572adds a contention based on the legislative history of Title VII.5 The government intervenors contend that this Court’s power to order affirmative relief is limited by the fourteenth amendment to those measures that are necessary to make whole the actual, identifiable victims of unlawful discrimination. The government intervenors maintain that the challenged one-for-one promotion plan is constitutionally infirm for two reasons. First, the proposed consent decree makes no provision for identifying the actual victims of unlawful discrimination or for limiting relief to those victims.6 Second, the one-for-one ratio allegedly does not serve a compelling state interest.
Judge Williams’ opinion for the Court does not reach the constitutional issues. I do. The Constitution is race-conscious. Under the thirteenth amendment, the Constitution contemplates, and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment *1573does not prohibit, race-conscious, class-based, prospective relief in a unit of state government in the appropriate case. The appropriate case is one in which discrimination in a state governmental unit is system-wide, institutional, and the product of a long history of discrimination against blacks as a group to continue what amounts to a caste system.7 I would hold that the requested relief is within the district court’s power to grant. I respectfully dissent from the part of the Court’s opinion holding that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the proposed consent decree.
I.
Color-blindness is not constitutional dogma.8 When a vice is inherent in a system, the vice can be eradicated only by restructuring the system. This was preeminently true of the public school systems in the South. The principle of institutional relief is also applicable in apportionment cases, eighth amendment prison condition cases, mental hospital cases, and other eases.9 It is especially applicable in many state, county, and municipal departments in which historically there has been discrimination not against an individual black as an individual but against blacks as blacks. Thus, when faced with our society’s systemic racial discrimination against blacks as a class, an effective remedy must be color conscious. Writing separately in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 1978, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750, Justice Blackmun stated:
“In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race ____ [a]nd in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot ... let the Equal Protection Clause perpetrate racial supremacy.”
Id. at 407, 98 S.Ct. at 2807. The Constitution calls for equal treatment under the law, and in the light of the pervasive past discriminatory practices and the present effects of these practices, in many cases this goal can be achieved only by taking active, affirmative steps to remove the effects of prior inequality.10 ” Neither ordering affirmative action by the courts nor permitting such action by employers in the area of employment discrimination breaks new legal ground.11
*1574That affirmative action is permissible and, in some cases, required does not mean that such remedies escape scrutiny by the courts. The government intervenors in this case urge that “strict scrutiny” of all racial classifications is required by Supreme Court precedent. Their position is unsound, at least in Title VII cases. This Court has rejected the use of the strict-scrutiny standard in the context of affirmative actions plans embodied in Title VII consent decrees. United States v. City of Miami, 5 Cir.1980, 614 F.2d 1322, 1337-38, aff'd in part and in part vacated and remanded on other grounds (en banc), 1981, 664 F.2d 435. Under the standard adopted in City of Miami, an affirmative action plan must meet two requirements: It must be reasonably necessary to remedy the discriminatory practice, and it must be substantially related to the goal of ending a pattern of discrimination. 614 F.2d at 1339. The record in this case reveals a gross statistical disparity between the percentage of blacks in all ranks of the police force and the percentage of blacks in the community and in the work force. On the record, as I read it, I would find that the challenged one-to-one promotional plan aimed at removing this disparity is both reasonably necessary to eliminate the effects of past discrimination and substantially related to the important governmental interest in removing racial barriers in employment. The plan passes constitutional muster based on the standard of review adopted by this Court in City of Miami.
Nor am I inclined to retreat from the position taken by the Court in City of Miami. A strict-scrutiny standard of review is not constitutionally required in so-called “benign” discrimination,12 or affirmative action, cases. Strict scrutiny is required when the group that suffers harm because of the classification possesses the “traditional indicia of suspectness”, that is, when the target class historically has been subjected to disabilities or singled out for unequal treatment by the majority. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Classifications that harm an oppressed group are likely to be the result of invidious discrimination or prejudice. Such classifications stigmatize the group and warrant the protections afforded by strict scrutiny. Brown v. Board of Education, 1954, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873. Conversely, strict scrutiny is not required when the majority favors a minority at the majority’s own expense; in such cases, the risk of invidious discrimination is diminished. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.Chi.L.Rev. 723, 727-35 (1974). Because affirmative action plans fall into the latter category, strict scrutiny is not required; an intermediate level of scrutiny is sufficient to meet constitutional requirements.
Even accepting the government intervenors’ position, however, and assuming that the Constitution requires strict scrutiny of all classifications based on race, I would conclude that a properly formulated affirmative action plan13 aimed at achieving ra*1575cial equality of employment in a police or fire department survives strict scrutiny. Under a strict-scrutiny standard of review, a classification must serve a compelling governmental interest and must be closely tailored to that purpose. A plan such as the one challenged in this case serves at least two such interests, both of which promote domestic tranquility within the state. First, the state has a compelling interest in curing the effects of past racial discrimination in the workplace and in ensuring an integrated work force. Kurst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 Va.L.Rev. 955, 965 (1974). This interest focuses on group representation in employment and is distinct from that focused on the individual’s right to be free from discrimination. EEOC v. AT & T Co., 3 Cir.1977, 556 F.2d 167, 179-80, cert. denied, 1978, 438 U.S. 915, 98 S.Ct. 3145, 57 L.Ed.2d 1161. Thus, the state’s interest cannot be served adequately by a remedy that addresses only the rights of identifiable victims.
Second, as is urged in this case by the City of Detroit (amicus curiae) and as has been recognized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the improved law enforcement that results from greater minority participation is a sufficiently compelling reason for affirmative action.14 Detroit Police Officers’ Association v. Young, 6 Cir.1979, 608 F.2d 671, 695, cert. denied, 1981, 452 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 3079, 69 L.Ed.2d 951. This interest has been labled the “operational needs” defense. Id. It is based upon the findings of law enforcement studies that public cooperation with and support of the police force are enhanced by minority representation that is reflective of the community.15 Because of the importance of public assistanee to effective law enforcement, the government has an interest in a police department in which the blacks have a fair share of policing responsibilities.
Despite the importance of the governmental interests served by affirmative action, the government intervenors in this case assert that a prospective race-conscious plan cannot withstand strict scrutiny because it is not “closely tailored” to the state’s interest. They maintain that relief is “closely tailored” only when it is limited to make-whole remedies awarded to identifiable victims of prior racial discrimination. I reject this contention. In some circumstances, class-based relief is both required and “closely tailored”. By failing to recognize this principle, the government intervenors ignore thirty years of jurisprudence and strike a severe blow to the cause of equal protection.
When the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, it showed little interest in the individual plaintiffs. If the discrimination the plaintiffs suffered individually had been a primary concern of the Court, the Court would have required instant admission of the children to the schools to which they had applied. Instead, the Court postponed argument on relief to the following Term, because its interests focused on undoing the effects of longstanding discrimination against blacks as an ethnic group, rather than on providing relief to the “identifiable” individuals. The remedy of desegregation “with all deliberate speed” was a clear recognition that in a case involving restructuring of an institution the relief must be group oriented.
Unfortunately, on remand a highly regarded judge took a narrow view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown. *1576Judge John Parker seized upon language appealing to die-hard segregationists and to those lawyers and judges schooled on the notion that the only rights created by the fourteenth amendment are rights personal to the individual. Briggs v. Elliott, 1955, E.D.S.C. (per curiam), 132 F.Supp. 776:
“The [equal protection clause] ... does not require integration. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation.”
Id. at 777. This Court labored to overcome the Briggs dictum, which I view as identical in meaning and in effect with the Attorney General’s shibboleth in this ease: Relief is limited to identifiable victims. This Court finally overcame the Briggs v. Elliott thinking in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 5 Cir.1966, 372 F.2d 836, 846 n. 5. In Jefferson, this Court stated that the Supreme Court’s delay in fashioning relief in Brown was a recognition that “the ‘personal and present’ right of the individual plaintiffs must yield to the overriding right of Negroes as a class to a completely integrated public education”. Id. at 868. We imposed an affirmative duty on the school boards to eradicate the dual educational system “lock, stock, and barrel”.16 Without this relief, some discrimination, such as deterrence of unidentifiable black applicants even before they apply for jobs, would go unremedied. Thus, relief aimed at the group meets the constitutional requirement of “closely tailored” relief when systemic discrimination has been perpetrated against the group. When the vice is in the system or the institution, the system or institution must be restructured to eliminate the vice.17
Nor can it be argued persuasively that such a group right is appropriate only in the area of school desegregation.18 Education serves little purpose and small motive exists to obtain an education, if blacks are denied the opportunity to use their education through equal employment opportunity. Accordingly, in Morrow v. Crisler, 5 Cir. (en banc), 491 F.2d 1053, cert. denied, 1974, 419 U.S. 895, 95 S.Ct. 173, 42 L.Ed.2d 139, we ordered the fashioning of an affirmative hiring program for the Mississippi Highway Patrol that would “work[ ] and work[ ] now ... [to eliminate] discriminatory hiring policies ... and [to eradicate] the evils of their existence”. Id. at 1056. And in the voting rights cases of the 1960s, this Court adopted remedies designed to ensure that all vestiges of discrimination would be removed.19 In doing so, we had to deal with blacks as blacks, not individually but as a group. This relief was “closely tailored” within the meaning of the constitutional requirement.
No progress can be made in remedying discriminatory practices until, in an appropriate case such as this one before the Court, we fashion relief for the oppressed group and wholly reject the concept of “identifiable victims”. Parenthetically, I ask: Who were the “identifiable victims” of segregated drinking fountains or wading pools in public parks? The folly of the government intervenors’ position should be evident: If relief had been limited to identifiable victims of discrimination, desegrega*1577tion would still be a litigable issue in many areas in which it is now a dead issue. I loathe to see this Court retreat to a position long ago overcome, and I therefore reject any contention that prospective race-conscious steps by government employers is proscribed by either Title VII or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
I also reject the proposition, implied in Judge Gee’s opinion, that the Constitution does not grant the power to the federal government to provide for remedial action aimed at eliminating the present effects of past discrimination against blacks as a class. Wholly aside from the fourteenth amendment, the thirteenth amendment20 is an affirmative grant of power to eliminate slavery along with its “badges and incidents” and to establish universal civil freedom. The Civil Rights Cases, 1883, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835. The amendment envisions affirmative action aimed at blacks as a race.21 When a present discriminatory effect upon blacks as a class can be linked with a discriminatory practice against blacks as a race under the slavery system, the present effect may be eradicated under the auspices of the thirteenth amendment. As the first Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissenting opinion in The Civil Rights Cases:
“That there are burdens and disabilities which constitute badges of slavery and servitude, and that the power to enforce by appropriate legislation the Thirteenth Amendment may be exerted by legislation of a direct and primary character, for the eradication, not simply of the institution, but of its badges and incidents, are propositions which ought to be deemed indisputable. They lie at the foundation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866____ [My brethren] admit, as I have said, that the Thirteenth Amendment established freedom; that there are burdens and disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery, which constitute its substance and visible form; that Congress, by the act of 1866, passed in view of the Thirteenth Amendment, before the Fourteenth was adopted, undertook to remove certain burdens and disabilities, the necessary incidents of slavery, and to secure to all citizens of every race and color, and without regard to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey property as is enjoyed by white citizens; that under the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has to do with slavery and its incidents; and that legislation, so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not.”
109 U.S. at 35.
In enacting Title VII, Congress expressly relied upon its power under the commerce clause. The legislation is supportable, however, under the enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment to the same extent that, as the first Justice Harlan said, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is supported by the thirteenth amendment. At the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the thirteenth amendment was in a state of *1578disuse. Not until the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 1968, 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189, was the amendment restored to its rightful place in the constitutional scheme. The constitutionality of action taken by Congress, however, “does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise”. Woods v. Miller, 1947, 333 U.S. 138, 144, 68 S.Ct. 421, 424, 92 L.Ed. 596, 602; see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 1983, 460 U.S. 226, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 75 L.Ed.2d 18. Thus, the thirteenth amendment lends constitutional support to affirmative action taken under the auspices of Title VII.22
The congressional debates on the thirteenth amendment reveal that both its opponents and its proponents recognized its far-reaching potential. See generally Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous.L.Rev. 1 (1974); tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 39 Calif.L.Rev. 171 (1951).23 The abolition of slavery mandated by the amendment is not confined to the elimination of the “auction block”, that is, the institution of legally enforceable servitude. It also extends to the badges and incidents of a slavery system that were imposed upon blacks as a race. The abolition of slavery was intended to leave in its wake universal civil freedom.24 In granting Congress the power to carry out this mandate, the amendment necessarily grants the power to eliminate practices that continue to burden blacks with badges of inferiority and to hinder the achievement of universal freedom.
The Congress that drafted the thirteenth amendment recognized its broad scope, but early judicial interpretation artificially narrowed its reach. In The Civil Rights Cases, 1883, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835, the Supreme Court held that the thirteenth amendment did not give Congress the authority to enact a law providing that all persons have equal right of access to accommodations in inns, to public conveyance, and to public amusements. Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley reasoned that “[i]t would be running the slavery argument into the ground, to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make”. Id. at 24, 3 S.Ct. at 30. Justice Bradley adopted a narrow view of what constituted a badge of slavery, limiting the definition to the legal capacity to enjoy fundamental rights.25 Id. at 24-25, 3 S.Ct. at 30-31.
The first Justice Harlan, in his famous dissent, rejected the restrictive interpretation adopted by the majority. He reasoned that badges of slavery encompassed all practices that continued to label blacks as inferior because of their race. Id. at 39-40, 3 S.Ct. at 41-42; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896, 163 U.S. 537, 552, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 1143, 41 L.Ed. 256 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the thirteenth amendment’s mandate of universal civil freedom necessitated protection of blacks as a class against racial discrimination with regard to their civil rights. 109 U.S. at 36, 3 S.Ct. at 24. The burdens on enjoyment of their new-found rights thus should be classified as badges of slavery.
*1579Although Justice Harlan’s interpretation closely reflected the intent of the drafters of the thirteenth amendment, that interpretation went unheeded for 85 years. Eventually it was vindicated by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 1968, 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189. In Jones v. Mayer, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of Congress, based on the thirteenth amendment, to prohibit all racial discrimination in the sale and rental of property. Id. at 437-44, 88 S.Ct. at 2202-05. The Court held that “Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.”26 Id. at 440, 88 S.Ct. at 2203. Under the Jones v. Mayer rationale, current forms of racial discrimination are badges of slavery that may be proscribed under the thirteenth amendment if they are historically linked with slavery or involuntary servitude.27
One of the cornerstones of slavery was the race-based denial of equal economic opportunities, especially in governmental jobs requiring the exercise of authority. Historically, there is a close linkage between the discrimination against blacks in the New Orleans Police Department and the Black Codes and Jim Crowism, which were substituted for slavery. There were, of course, no black law enforcement officers before federal troops occupied New Orleans in the Civil War in 1862. There is testimony in the record that there were no black officers in the Department until 1950. This is historically incorrect. Federal troops occupied New Orleans from 1862 until 1877, and policed it, assisted by a small force of municipal police officers, almost all black. In 1868 Governor Henry Clay Warmouth put through legislation creating the Metropolitan Police for Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard parishes. Using the Republican (mostly black) members of the old city police as a nucleus, Warmouth made it into a military organization that was later expanded into what amounted to a state militia under the governor's control. The Metropolitan Police came to be the military arm of the Radical Republicans from 1869 through 1877. Needless to say, most Louisiana whites bitterly resented the police. On September 14, 1874, a date still celebrated annually by certain citizens of New Orleans, the White League (Knights of the White Camellia/First Crescent City Regiment) fought a pitched battle against the Metropolitan Police at the foot of Canal Street in New Orleans. The White Leaguers, among whom was Edward Douglas White, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, routed the police- with loss of life on both sides, and although federal troops under General Philip Sheridan later restored order, the Metropolitan Police was no longer effective. Armed White .Leaguers patrolled the polling precincts in the election of 1876. After the Hayes-Tilden “deal” in 187728 *1580and until Louisiana adopted its Constitution of 1898, there were unquestionably some brave black police officers in New Orleans. After 1898 — the deluge. That constitution disenfranchised blacks. There were not only no black voters to speak of; there were no black officeholders. And there were no black policemen. The dynamics of Reconstruction and then “Redemption" of the state had relegated blacks to the bottom of the caste system, especially in terms of serving as police officers in the City of New Orleans.29 Historically, therefore, the lack of employment opportunity for blacks with the New Orleans police force is closely linked to the former system of slavery and the reaction of whites unwilling after Reconstruction and Redemption to accept any blacks on the police force. The under-representation of blacks on the force since 1898, or perhaps since 1874-77, is a badge of slavery: it is a sign, readily visible in the community, that attaches a stigma upon the black race.
Because the thirteenth amendment seeks to attain “universal civil freedom for blacks as a race”,30 remedial action must address the needs of blacks as a race. Remedies limited to identifiable victims will not carry out the mandate of the amendment to eliminate the “badges and incidents” of slavery. Nor will a prohibition on present practices alone remove the vestiges of slavery; posifive, prospective remedial action is required. See Note, The “New” Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1294, 1308 (1969). Accordingly, the structure of an organization that not only reflects but necessarily continues the effects of past discrimination must be changed to eliminate the effects of that discrimination. The thirteenth amendment focuses on the rights of a people, in Dred Scott declared inferior and incapable of participating as citizens. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 1857, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L.Ed. 691. Their right of national citizenship made effective through the first sentence of the fourteenth amendment,31 and their thirteenth amendment rights to be liberated from the badges of slavery, can be vindicated only through affirmative race-conscious relief.
II.
I dissent from the Court’s conclusion that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the proposed consent decree. I also dissent from the approach used to reach that conclusion.
I agree with Judge Williams’ that our duty is to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion in rejecting the consent decree. See, e.g., Cotton v. Hinton, 5 Cir.1977, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331-32. In making that determination, however, this Court must consider the effect of the proposed consent decree as a whole.32 Id. *1581The settlement stands or falls in its entirety. Id. Neither this Court nor the district court is free to rewrite the agreement reached by the parties by deleting, modifying, or substituting individual provisions of the proposed settlement. See Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission, 9 Cir.1982, 688 F.2d 615, 630, cert. denied, 1983, — U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 1219, 75 L.Ed.2d 456; Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 7 Cir.1980, 616 F.2d 305, 315; Cotton v. Hinton, 5 Cir.1977, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331-32.
The district judge rejected the entire decree, and by affirming that judgment, this Court also rejects the decree in its entirety. Thus, the Court is incorrect in saying that “[t]he great bulk of the proposed decree was approved by the court”. A consent decree is not a series of severable provisions.33 If the Court’s opinion is upheld, the parties must renegotiate and the case must be retried. Accordingly, the question before this Court is not whether the district court abused its discretion in rejecting the single provision upon which the district court and the majority focus, but whether the court abused its discretion in rejecting the entire decree when it found only one provision objectionable. If this Court accepts the district court’s conclusion that the one-to-one promotion plan is unreasonable — a proposition I reject for the reasons stated in this opinion — it should ask whether that provision is so objectionable that it outweighs the total gain that would be realized from the proposed consent decree. In formulating an answer to this question, the Court should consider the probable effect of the total rejection of the consent decree. In this case, the first EEOC charge was filed in 1972. This suit was filed in 1973. Eight years later, on the eve of trial and after a lengthy period of negotiation and compromise, the parties reached a settlement agreement. In 1984, this agreement is in jeopardy. Members of this Court have had to study the case carefully, consuming more time. If the consent decree is rejected, the parties will have to begin anew with settlement negotiations. If the delicate balance reached by the parties and upset by the district court cannot be reconstructed, a trial on the merits will follow, causing additional expense to the litigants and further delay in remedying the unlawful discrimination that almost unquestionably will be found. With all deference to my colleagues, I suggest that if they had considered more carefully the abuse of discretion issue in the context of the entire decree, I am certain that a different result would have been reached.
Even under the narrow focus used by Judge Williams in his opinion for the Court, however, I would find that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting the consent decree. Voluntary settlement is the method preferred by Congress for resolving Title VII suits and eliminating employment discrimination. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 1974, 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147. The public interest is served by voluntary settlements: settlement minimizes the costs to the parties and the strain on scarce judicial resources. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 7 Cir.1980, 616 F.2d 305, 313 (citing Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d at 1331). Remedial decrees drafted by the parties themselves engender community support for the voluntary effort to eliminate discriminatory practices and effects. Such support is beneficial to achieving the objectives of the Act. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 318. The district judge erred in not giving sufficient attention to the policy favoring voluntary settlement of Title VII suits.34
*1582Because of the strong policy in favor of settlement, this Court accords a presumption of validity to proposed consent decrees. United States v. City of Alexandria, 5 Cir.1980, 614 F.2d 1358, 1362. This presumption is overcome only on a showing that the decree contains provisions that are unreasonable, illegal, unconstitutional, or against public policy. Id. The district judge found that “the proposed consent decree readily passes constitutional muster as fair, adequate and reasonable” to members of the oppressed class. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 1982, E.D.La., 543 F.Supp. 662, 665. He found also that, at the time of settlement, the parties were facing a lengthy, hotly contested, and complex trial on the merits. A trial would cost the parties several hundred thousand dollars and would cause delay in fashioning and implementing relief. Id. Despite the benefits of the proposed decree, the district court rejected it, finding that the targeted 50 percent minority representation was unsupported by the evidence,35 that the impact of the one-to-one promotion ratio would be impermissibly harsh on non-blacks, that this impact would be exacerbated by the probable duration of the decree,36 and that the promotion plan was “unnecessary” to afford relief to the plaintiffs. Id. at 684-85. None of these findings justifies the rejection of the proposed consent decree.
First, the district court’s rejection of the 50 percent goal constitutes an abuse of discretion. Mathematical certainty is not required in the context of a consent decree; the figure need only be reasonable. I stand on the opinion of the original panel regarding the correctness of the 50 percent goal, and I shall not duplicate the panel’s analysis here. See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 5 Cir. 1982, 694 F.2d 987. I note, however, that in City of Alexandria we held that a goal based on the racial proportion of the labor force is presumptively reasonable. 614 F.2d at 1336 n. 18; see also United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 1979, 443 U.S. 193, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480. The 50 percent goal contained in the proposed consent decree is based on the 1980 census showing that 55 percent of the New Orleans population is black.37
The district judge rejected the use of the population of the City of New Orleans as a data base, maintaining that the population of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) should be used. A significantly lower percentage of the suburban area of New Orleans is black. The district court abused its discretion in rejecting the use of the City population figures: The City is clearly an appropriate labor market. A state statute directs that officer-candidates be selected from among the qualified voters of the city. If, “after diligent effort”, a sufficient number of candidates cannot be found from this population, the department may then select candidates from other areas. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 33:2411 (West Supp.1982). On similar facts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the city population of Detroit, not the SMSA, was the appropriate population base to be used in formulating an affirmative action plan. Detroit Police Officers’ Association v. Young, 6 Cir.1979, 608 F.2d 671, 688, cert. denied, 1981, 452 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 3079, 69 L.Ed.2d 951. The police force in New Orleans also serves only the City’s population. In these circumstances, the City population is a proper basis for formulating a decree.
Even if I were to agree that the SMSA is one appropriate comparison, I would find it an abuse of discretion for the district judge to reject other appropriate labor markets. *1583See id. at 688. The court’s role in evaluating a consent decree is limited to determining whether the terms are reasonable, fair, and lawful. Certainly, the parties’ choice of the City as a labor market is fair, and not unlawful. The district court is not free to impose its perspective on the parties, but should accept their decision if it is within a “range of reasonableness”. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department, 6 Cir.1982, 679 F.2d 541, 559, cert. granted, June 6, 1983, 51 U.S.L.W. 3871. In this case, the district judge improperly imposed his perspective on the parties, and by doing so abused his discretion.
Second, the district court erred in holding that the one-to-one promotion ratio would have an impermissibly harsh effect on women, Hispanics, and non-minorities. Under the standards enunciated in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 1979, 443 U.S. 193, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480, the proposed one-to-one ratio is permissible. This consent decree, like the voluntary plan in Weber, is aimed at breaking down patterns of segregation and opening opportunities for blacks in traditionally segregated fields. Id. at 208, 99 S.Ct. at 2730. A “sharing of the burden” of remedying past discrimination by other employees is not impermissible. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 1976, 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444. Some burden is acceptable. See Moore v. City of San Jose, 9 Cir.1980, 615 F.2d 1265, 1272, stating that the district court should consider the effect of the settlement on incumbent employees, but that some harm is justified to achieve the goals of Title VII. The proposed consent decree does not “unnecessarily trammel” 38 the interests of non-black employees. It neither calls for the discharge of any worker nor creates an absolute bar to advancement of non-blacks. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 99 S.Ct. at 2729; see also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 1977, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396, in which the Supreme Court implicitly approved a consent decree requiring that the company hire one black or Spanish-surnamed person for every white hired, until the percentage of minorities employed by the company reflected the percentage of minorities in the metropolitan area.
This Court adopts the district court’s finding that the proposed consent decree would adversely affect women. This position is difficult to understand and certainly untenable: black women would be aided by the decree because they, like black men, would be included in the one-to-one promotion plan. Non-black women are in the same position as non-black men, and thus would not be burdened “impermissibly”.
The Hispanic officers contend that the decree will have an impermissibly harsh impact on them. At this time, however, they are adequately represented. As pointed out in the panel opinion, white Hispanics constitute 3.4 percent of the population of New Orleans. In the supervisory rank, Hispanics constitute 3.5 percent of the sergeants, 3 percent of lieutenants, 12.7 percent of captains, and 16.78 percent of the majors in the department.
Because the one-to-one promotion plan contained in the proposed consent decree complies with the standards provided in Weber, I must conclude that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting the decree on the basis of that aspect of the decree.
In his opinion for the Court, Judge Williams attempts to escape the inevitable conclusion that this provision is fair and reasonable by stating that the issue is the “extent of preferential treatment” that is appropriate, and not whether preferential treatment per se is reasonable. In so doing, however, the Court ignores the cardinal principle of district court review of consent decrees: The district court is not free to substitute its judgment for that of the parties. The provision was lawful under Weber and other cases. By definition, therefore, it could not unreasonably “trammel the interests” of other employees, and should have been accepted. Nor was the question one of extent, as Judge Williams *1584implies. The district court totally rejected any preferential promotion plan for existing positions. It did not find that another ratio would be more appropriate, but rejected out-of-hand any consent decree containing a preferential plan for existing positions.39
Third, the district court found that the alleged impact on non-minority officers would be increased by the probable length of time that the one-to-one promotion plan would be in effect before the percentage of blacks in the supervisory ranks reached the 50 percent goal. This period was conservatively estimated at twelve years, not necessarily long in view of the complete elimination of blacks in the department after 1898 and until 1950. A twelve-year plan is still a temporary one, as is required by Weber. In considering the reasonableness of this provision, it should be compared with the probable remedy that would, be ordered after a trial on the merits. Stotts, 679 F.2d at 552-53; Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 312. If, after a trial, a district court found that the police department had unlawfully discriminated against blacks, it could order a rightful place remedy. Under such a remedy, all promotions would go to the victims of discrimination for a period of years, undeterminable from this record. Viewed in this light, a one-to-one promotion plan for a period of twelve years has a less harsh impact on non-minority employees than does a total bar on advancement for a period of fewer years. The district court did not properly weigh the settlement against the probable result of litigation on the merits, and therefore reached an incorrect result.
The district judge’s final objection — that the one-to-one promotion plan was not “necessary” to afford complete relief to the plaintiffs, 543 F.Supp. at 685 — can be disposed of briefly. In so holding, the district judge exceeded the scope of his discretion by impermissibly substituting his judgment for that of the parties. The parties agreed on the plan. They considered this provision “necessary” to their agreement. It should not be rejected, absent a finding of unlawfulness or adverseness to public policy.
Because the district court abused its discretion in rejecting the proposed consent decree, the judgment of the district court should be vacated and the case remanded with instructions to institute the consent decree.

. The Equal Employment Advisory Council, an association organized to promote (among other interests) the interest of employers, filed a brief as amicus curiae. The brief argues that this "Court should reaffirm that employers who voluntarily enter or have entered into agreements that are consistent with the standards set out by the Supreme Court in Weber ... remain free to use such agreements as a defense to 'reverse discrimination’ suits.” The general counsel for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) submitted a brief to the Justice Department that adopted a similar position, staling that "a court’s remedial authority under Title VII is not limited solely to making whole individual victims of discrimination, and properly may encompass relief in the form of race-conscious goals for the hiring and promotion of minorities.” Although the EEOC did not submit the brief to this Court, its contents were incorporated by reference in an amicus curiae brief. See infra note 5.

. Judge J. Skelly Wright, discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stated that
“The purpose of the legislation cannot be denied: to help blacks and members of other minority groups overcome the prejudice that oppresses them. Its effect is to give special advantage to those minority groups. To call such legislation 'color-blind' is a meaningless abstraction. Legislation against invidious discrimination helps one race and not the other because one race and not the other needs such help."
Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U.Chi.L.Rev. 213, 220-21 (1980).

. See O. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction (1978), staling that
"The beneficiary of the typical civil rights injunction is not an individual, or even a collection of identifiable individuals; rather it is a social group — the blacks. The contours of the benefitted group arc determined not by the personal characteristics of the person who happens to be the named plaintiff but rather by considerations of who should — as a matter of fairness, efficacy, and equal protection theory — receive the benefit.... [Tjhis is due ... to the group character of the underlying substantive claim."
Id. at 14-15.

. It is clear that Title VII does not prohibit affirmative action by governmental employers. This Court has upheld affirmative action plans by governmental employers. United States v. City of Alexandria, 5 Cir.1980, 614 F.2d 1358; United States v. City of Miami, 5 Cir.1980, 614 F.2d 1322. In Bratton v. City of Detroit, 8 Cir. 1983, 704 F.2d 878, 884, cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1431, 79 L.Ed.2d 754, the Court noted that "Title VII was specifically amended to include public employees within its purview so that states and their official agencies are explicitly subject to Title VII mandates". See The Equal Employment Act of 1972, § 2(1), (5), Pub.L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. The City of Detroit’s Police Department used a 50-50 ratio and the establishment of a 50 percent end goal to be achieved by 1990. In Weber Justice Brennan emphasized the private nature of the affirmative action only to make clear that there was no stale action issue in the case.

. Judge Higginbotham contends that the legislative history of Tille VII "makes plain that as Senator Humphrey put it: [T]hcrc is nothing in [the proposed Bill] that will give any power to the Commission or to any court to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial 'quota' or to achieve a certain racial balance”. The answer to his argument is made in the brief prepared by the EEOC, but filed in its entirety as an appendix to the brief of two amici curiae, The Center for National Policy Review and the William O. Douglas Inquiry into the State of Individual Freedom. I adopt the reasoning, authorities, and language of that brief as a short answer, in this opinion, to Judge Higginbotham’s and the Department of Justice's arguments on legislative history.
Under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. App. at 150 (West Supp.1979), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978) and Executive Order No. 12067, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1978), all federal agencies arc required to coordinate their interpretations of Tille VII with the EEOC, the primary agency in settling inter-agency disputes relating to Title VII. The EEOC prepared a careful brief to be filed in this case supporting the proposed consent decree. According to the press, “The White House and Justice Department, attempting to squelch a major internal dispute over civil rights policy, have pressured the Equal Employment Opportunitite (sic) Commission successfully to withdraw an Appeals Court brief that sharply criticized Administration stands on racial quotas and affirmative action ... and said Justice’s position had no legal merit and was a threat to efforts to eradicate employment discrimination.” Administration Prods EEOC on Quotas Brief, Washington Post, p. A1 (April 7, 1983). Details of this episode appear in the BNA Daily Labor Report, “EEOC Bows to White House Pressure, Says It Won't File New Orleans Brief, 1983 DLR 67: A6 (April 6, 1983). See also, Pressure Seen in Vote to Withdraw Brief on Quotas, N.Y. Times, p. D15 (April 8, 1983); EEOC Reverses Stand on New Orleans Suite Due to Pressure From Justice Department, Wall St.J., p. 16 (April 7, 1983).
The brief carefully examined the legislative history of Title VII and all of the relevant decisions touching upon the origin and meaning of that title. The EEOC concluded that:
"[1] [T]hcre simply is nothing in the language of Section 706(g) or its legislative history to indicate that Congress intended to preclude courts from approving prospective race-conscious relief simply because the benefits of such relief are not restricted to actual victims of past discrimination.
[2] [Tjhcre simply is not a sufficient basis cither in fact or law for the Department of Justice’s suggestion that prospective race-conscious employment goals arc absolutely prohibited by the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.”
The only decision directly in point agrees with the EEOC’s conclusions. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 3rd Cir.1977, 556 F.2d 167, cert. denied, 1979, 438 U.S. 915, 98 S.Ct. 3145, 57 L.Ed.2d 1161.

. Ignoring the legal issues for the moment, there arc practical problems with the "identifiable victims” approach advocated by the government in this case. The government intervenors ignore the evidentiary problem of identifying the individual victims. Some blacks would not have applied for a position with the New Orleans Police Department because of their slim chance of being accepted, or if accepted, of their slimmer chance of being promoted. A police department that is perceived as anti-black in hiring and in promoting inhibits applications from blacks who are deterred from applying by the department's discriminatory practices. It would be impossible to identify these individual victims.
In addition, restricting relief to identifiable victims would impede voluntary settlement of Title VII suits. A consent decree is not an appropriate vehicle to identify actual victims. Every Title VII suit would require a phase II judicial proceeding to determine which individuals would be entitled to relief. This approach would contravene the clear intent of Congress to favor voluntary settlement and would place additional strain on the already-strained dockets of the district courts.

. See Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle Toward a Constitutional Standard [or Review of Race Cases, 30 Wayne L.Rev. 1 (1983):
"[Both liberals and conservatives] depict the primary wrong of official racial discrimination ... as a failure to treat black people as individuals without regard to race.... This understanding of personal rights and the individual wrong of racial discrimination ignores a fundamental problem: the potential group nature of the injury. Longstanding caste discrimination can build bias into a society’s institutions and impose general harm on most members of the disadvantaged racial group.... The wrongdoing extends beyond the specific discriminatory acts of particular public officials, and the harm is not limited to particular persons directly affected by those acts....”
Id. at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).

. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 1978, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, Black-mun, and Marshall, JJ.), stating that "no decision of this Court has ever adopted the proposition that the Constitution must be color-blind”. Id. at 336, 98 S.Ct. at 2771. See also United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 5 Cir. 1966, 372 F.2d 836, aff’d en banc, 1967, 380 F.2d 385, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840, 88 S.Ct. 67, 19 L.Ed.2d 103, stating that
"The Constitution is both color blind and col- or conscious. To avoid conflict with the equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be based on race. In that sense, the Constitution is color blind. But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.”
372 F.2d at 876.

. See Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635 (1982).

. See Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U.Chi.L.Rev. 213 (1980). The prospective removal of racial barriers and the remedying of the present effects of these barriers through affirmative action and promotional goals in the workplace arc necessary steps. See also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 1971, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554, finding that affirmative plans are constitutionally required to eliminate state-imposed segregation.

. "We are not Johnny-come-latelys in the eradication of racial discrimination through race *1574conscious means." Morrow v. Crisler, 5 Cir. 1974 (en banc), 491 F.2d 1053, 1057 (Brown, J., concurring). For a detailed discussion of affirmative action in this circuit, see F. Read & L. McGough, Let Them Be Judged: The Judicial Integration of the Deep South (1978), and J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke (1979), especially chapter 5. The Supreme Court has expressly upheld affirmative, race-conscious relief in voting rights cases and in school desegregation cases. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 1977, 450 U.S. 144, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229, stating that "the Constitution does not prevent a state ... from deliberately creating or preserving black majorities”, Id. at 161, 97 S.Ct. at 1007, and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 1971, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554, stating that "affirmative plans are required to eliminate state-imposed segregation." Id. at 12, 91 S.Ct. at 1274.

. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 1977, 430 U.S. 144, 169, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229, 248 (Brennan, J., concurring), characterizing plans that use race in a purposeful manner as "benign” when they contain no racial slur or stigma.

. A properly formulated plan is one that advances the purposes of Title VII, that does not “unnecessarily trammel” the interests of other employees, and that does not create an absolute bar to advancement by non-minority employees. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208, 99 S.Ct. at 2729.

. See Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro — The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw.U.L.Rev. 363 (1966). Although Professor Kaplan suggests that the judiciary maintain a hands-off policy with respect to affirmative remedies, he recognizes that in urban police work a black officer may be more effective in his job simply because of his race. Id. at 388.

. Detroit Police Officers’ Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d at 695 (citing National Advisory Comm’n on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police (1973); National Comm’n on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Final Report: To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility (1969); Report of the National Advisory Comm’n on Civil Disorders (1968); President's Comm’n on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (1967)).

. The Supreme Court described this duty as one requiring the elimination of school discrimination "root and branch". Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 1968, 391 U.S. 430, 437, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716, 723.

. See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 235 (1971). Professor Fiss notes that "[i]t is a well-established principle that a decree may hold a defendant who has violated a legal prohibition to a higher standard of conduct than that required by the prohibition itself. The decree should not only prevent discriminatory employment decisions from occurring but also eradicate the effects of those decitions." Id. at 287 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

. See Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 7 Cir.1980, 616 F.2d 305, 317, finding that “it is clear that the rights involved in employment desegregation cases are similar in scope, origin, and significance" to those involved in school desegregation cases.

. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 5 Cir.1964, 339 F.2d 679; United States v. Duke, 5 Cir.1964, 332 F.2d 759; United States v. Lynd, 5 Cir.1962, 301 F.2d 818, cert. denied, 1963, 371 U.S. 893, 83 S.Ct. 187, 9 L.Ed. 125.

. "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”
U.S. Const. amend. XIII.

. See Howe, Federalism and Civil Rights, 77 Proc.Mass.Hist.Soc’y 15 (1966), stating that
"Congress is ... vested with the power conferred upon it by the Thirteenth Amendment — the power, that-is, to extirpate the vestiges of slavery.... Congress should be permitted to seek the fulfillment of the predominant promise of the three Civil War amendments. That promise was that henceforth the Nation's authority would so be exercised as to subdue law’s inhumanity to man.... [I]t takes no stretch of constitutional power to exercise the Nation's authority over acts of racial terror and violence in communities that have rejected the supreme law of the land and encouraged hatred to go at large.”
Id. at 27.

. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-13, at 259 (1978), stating that "Congress is free, within the broad limits of reason, to recognize whatever rights it wishes, define the infringement of those rights as a form of domination and thus an aspect of slavery, and proscribe such infringement as a violation of the thirteenth amendment”.

. For a more complete discussion, see tenBroek, Equal Under Law (Rev. 1st Ed.1965).

. See Howe, Federalism and Civil Rights, 77 Proc.Mass.Hist.Soc’y 15, 23 (1966), stating that the thirteenth amendment was "a constitutional outlawry” of slavery that "empowered [Congress] to make the outlawry totally effective". "The Thirteenth Amendment, Harlan pointed out, abolished the 'national right’ of slaveholders to hold slaves and substituted a new national right to freedom from the status of an ‘inferi- or race,’ a status the Negro had been forced into by the institution of slavery." Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 Rutgers L.Rev. 387, 408 (1967).

. These rights included the right to contract to hold property, and to testify in court. Fundamental legal rights were distinguished from social rights. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22-24.

. "Just as the Black Codes, enacted after the Civil War to restrict the exercise of those rights, were the substitutes for the slave system, so the exclusion of negroes from white communities became a substitute for the Black Codes. And when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery."
Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. at 441-43, 88 S.Ct. at 2204-05.

. Justice Douglas, concurring in Jones v. Mayer, maintained that persisting racial prejudices are themselves relics of slavery. 392 U.S. at 448-49. Similarly, in Bell v. Maryland, 1964, 378 U.S. 226, 247-48, 84 S.Ct. 1814, 12 L.Ed.2d 822, Justice Douglas argued that "the Black Codes were a substitute for slavery, that segregation was a substitute for the Black Codes”, and that "discrimination in the sit-in cases [therefore] is a relic of slavery". See also Note, The "New” Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1294, 1308-09 (1969); Howe, Federalism and Civil Rights, 77 Proc.Mass.Hist.Soc’y 15 (1966).

. In the national election of 1876 Samuel J. Tilden and the Democratic Ticket received a quarter of a million more popular votes than Rutherford B. Hayes received and 184 uncontested electoral votes, or just one short of the number required to elect. Hayes trailed with only 166 uncontesled electoral votes. The 19 doubtful votes were from Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida. Two governments competed for control in both South Carolina and Louisiana. Congress created an Electoral Commission to decide the question. Justice Joseph P. *1580Bradley, author of the majority opinion in The Civil Rights Cases, cast the deciding vote in the Commission’s eight-to-seven decision to recognize the Republican delegates for Hayes. After a brief delay President Hayes removed federal troops from the statehouses of Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida, and the last of the Carpetbag regimes collapsed. Subsequent presidential appointments and congressional legislation raise the inference that the compromise extended beyond the removal of federal support of Republican regimes in Louisiana and South Carolina as a quid pro quo for the blessing given President Rutherford B. Hayes. C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South 23-74 (1951). See generally C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction (1951).

. For a more detailed discussion of this segment of Louisiana history, see United States v. Louisiana, E.D.La.1963, 225 F.Supp. 353, 363-76, aff’d, 1965, 380 U.S. 145, 85 S.Ct. 817, 13 L.Ed.2d 709, and the authorities there cited. For a recent discussion, see J. Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877, at 176-82, 503-08 (1974).

. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.

. “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S.Const., amend. XIV, § L

. Among the factors to be considered are the complexity, expense, and duration of the litigation, the strength of the plaintiff's case on the merits, the reaction of the class to the proposed settlement, the stage of the proceedings at which the decree is proposed, the likelihood of liability and the amount of damages at stake, the ability of the defendants to withstand the probable judgment, and the range of reasonableness for the settlement. Armstrong v. Board of School Directors, 7 Cir.1980, 616 F.2d 305; Lowenschuss v. Benkdorn, 2 Cir.1980, 613 F.2d 18, cert. *1581denied, 1981, 449 U.S. 840, 101 S.Ct. 117, 66 L.Ed.2d 46; Girsh v. Jepson, 3 Cir.1975, 521 F.2d 153.

. See Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, 9 Cir.1982, 688 F.2d 615, cert. denied, 1983, 459 U.S. 1217, 103 S.Ct. 1219, 75 L.Ed.2d 456, holding that a settlement must stand or fall as a whole. Id. at 630.

. Although the public objectives embodied in the Civil Rights Act warrant a careful review of the provisions of a proposed consent decree, the clear policy in favor of encouraging voluntary settlement should also be taken into account, particularly when voluntary compliance by the parties will be required over an extended period to achieve statutory goals. Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union, 2 Cir.1975, 514 F.2d 767, 771, cert. denied, 1976, 427 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3198, 49 L.Ed.2d 1203.

. The court did not, however, suggest an alternative figure.

. The plan would be in effect until a racial balance was achieved; the required period has been estimated to be twelve years.

. More than 67 percent of the applicants to the police department in 1980 were black; a part of this percentage is accounted for by an intensified effort to recruit blacks. The record, however, cannot reflect the number of blacks who were deterred from applying to the Department because of its known discriminatory policies. See supra note 2.

. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.

. The district judge did not find that the provision creating new supervisory positions was unreasonable.