Court Opinion

ID: 9376639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 15:04:03.99475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.051924
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 24, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

          Commonwealth of Kentucky
                 Court of Appeals

                    NO. 2021-CA-0968-MR

SAMUAL AUSTIN MILLER                                APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 14-CR-00590

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                             APPELLEE

AND

                    NO. 2021-CA-1220-MR

SAMUAL AUSTIN MILLER                                APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 14-CR-00590

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                             APPELLEE

                          OPINION
                       VACATING AND
                        REMANDING
                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Samual Austin Miller appeals from a July 15, 2021, order of

the Christian Circuit Court revoking his shock probation and sentencing him to

thirteen-years’ incarceration pursuant to the terms of his original plea agreement

with the Commonwealth.1 For the reasons stated, we vacate and remand.

              On August 17, 2016, Miller entered into a plea agreement with the

Commonwealth. In exchange for truthful testimony against his co-defendants, the

Commonwealth agreed to amend certain charges and not oppose a motion for

shock probation after Miller served an additional year of incarceration from the

date of the plea agreement. In all, Miller agreed to thirteen-years’ incarceration for

complicity to wanton endangerment, complicity to tampering with physical

evidence, and distribution of matter portraying sexual performance by a minor.

              On July 31, 2017, Miller filed a motion for shock probation. The

motion was granted by Order on Motion for Shock Probation entered August 8,

1
 The original Notice of Appeal was filed on August 13, 2021 (Appeal No. 2021-CA-0968-MR).
Prior to filing the Notice of Appeal, Samual Austin Miller filed a motion to reconsider the July
15, 2021, order. That motion was subsequently denied by order entered on September 15, 2021,
and that order was appealed on October 12, 2021 (Appeal No. 2021-CA-1220-MR). The two
appeals were consolidated by Order of this Court entered October 20, 2021.

                                              -2-
2017, which probated the remainder of Miller’s sentence for a period of five years.

The order, in pertinent part, states the conditions of Miller’s probation as follows:

             Not commit another offense; report to probation officer
             as directed; permit the probation officer to visit the
             defendant at home or elsewhere; answer all reasonable
             inquiries by the probation officer and promptly notify the
             probation officer of any changes in address or
             employment; avoid injurious or vicious habits; avoid
             persons or places of disreputable or harmful character;
             support dependents and meet other family
             responsibilities; pay the costs; remain within the area set
             by probation officer; work faithfully at suitable
             employment as far as possible; make reparation or
             restitution to [left blank] in the amount of $[left blank],
             for damages or loss caused by the defendant, said sum
             shall be payable [left blank] (plus 5% service fee added
             to each payment); enroll in substance abuse treatment as
             follows: [left blank]; support dependents and meet other
             family responsibilities; pay the cost of the proceeding
             herein as set by the court; remain within the area set by
             the probation officer; community service work as follows
             (list agency, manner, terms and conditions) until
             employed fulltime: [left blank]; alternative sentence as
             follows: This order is consistent with the terms of the
             plea agreement signed by the parties.

Record at p. 551.

             The record before us indicates Miller had no probation violations until

May 2021, when the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke probation. Attached

to the motion was a Notice of Preliminary Hearing from the Department of

Corrections, Division of Probation and Parole, indicating Miller had been arrested

for a new misdemeanor offense of driving under the influence on April 21, 2021.

                                         -3-
He was also charged with speeding; driving too fast for traffic conditions; and

no/expired registration plates. The revocation hearing was continued until July 14,

2021. In the interim, on June 13, 2021, Miller was again pulled over for vehicle

exhaust and playing loud music. He was also cited for failure to produce proof of

insurance. There was also an open bottle of Hennessey Cognac in plain view of

the police officer for which he was cited. Shortly thereafter, Miller submitted to a

urine analysis at the request of his probation officer, Megan Goss, which tested

positive for alcohol. At that point, Miller admitted to Ms. Goss he had been

drinking due to family problems. Ms. Goss arranged for him to be evaluated by a

social services clinician, who recommended Miller attend an alcohol treatment

program for at least ninety days.

             At the time of the revocation hearing in July 2021, Miller’s

misdemeanor and traffic offenses were still pending in district court. Miller did

stipulate at the hearing to failing the urine analysis for alcohol. Ms. Goss testified

that Miller had no probation violations prior to his DUI arrest in April of 2021.

She also testified he had steady employment, had started his own business, and

reported to her as required. Ms. Goss recommended Miller as a good candidate for

an inpatient alcohol treatment program who would benefit therefrom. Miller’s

girlfriend testified the cognac bottle found in Miller’s vehicle was always empty

and belonged to her. She stated she intended to make a candle holder from the

                                          -4-
bottle. Miller also testified at the hearing. Although he refused to testify regarding

the pending DUI charges, he did admit to drinking alcohol on several occasions

after the DUI arrest and admitted he told Ms. Goss he had a problem with alcohol.

             The circuit court revoked Miller’s probation. The written order made

the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

                    The defendant, Samual Miller, did, in fact violate
             the terms of probation in that he has subsequently used
             alcohol and this conduct creates a significant community
             risk that prevents appropriate community management.
             KRS [Kentucky Revised Statutes] 439.3106(1).

                   Based upon the above and considering the
             defendant’s failure to benefit from previous Probation,
             IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the judgment
             previously imposed herein shall be forthwith carried out
             and the probation previously granted is HEREBY
             REVOKED.

                    No sufficient cause having been shown why
             judgment should not be pronounced, it is ADJUDGED
             BY THE COURT that the defendant is guilty of the
             following charges: use of alcohol (2 counts) and is
             sentenced to imprisonment for a maximum term of 13
             years.

Record at p. 568.

             On appeal, Miller argues the circuit court abused its discretion in

revoking his probation. Our standard of review for probation revocation rulings

below is for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773,

780 (Ky. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (“Under our abuse

                                         -5-
discretion standard of review, we will disturb a ruling only upon finding that the

trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound

legal principles.”). The lower court’s decision must be within the range of

permissible decisions allowed by the application of the facts to the law. McClure

v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Ky. App. 2015).

               The circuit court revoked Miller’s probation for “use of alcohol (2

counts).” However, based on our review of the record, including the plea

agreement and the order granting shock probation, the nonuse of alcohol does not

appear to be listed as a condition of Miller’s probation.2 “Due process requires,

among other things, notice or fair warning of what conduct might result in

revocation.” United States v. Twitty, 44 F.3d 410, 412 (6th Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted); Wilfong v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 84, 95 (Ky. App. 2004). The

circuit court heard evidence that Miller had a pending DUI case and other traffic

offenses, as well as Miller’s admitted use of alcohol on occasions separate from the

DUI. However, the circuit court did not state which evidence it relied on in

revoking Miller’s probation. See Baumgardner v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d

560, 561 (Ky. App. 1985). If the circuit court relied solely on the evidence related

to Miller’s admitted use of alcohol and his positive urine analysis, we cannot

2
 Courts in Kentucky speak only through written orders entered on the court’s official record.
Midland Guardian Acceptance Corp. of Cincinnati, Ohio v. Britt, 439 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Ky.
1968).

                                              -6-
ascertain how this conduct violated Miller’s conditions of probation as stated in the

Order on Motion for Shock Probation entered August 8, 2017.

             Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 533.030(1) provides, in relevant

part, that a court shall “provide as an explicit condition of every sentence to

probation or conditional discharge that the defendant not commit another offense

during the period for which the sentence remains subject to revocation.” KRS

533.030(2) lists other conditions of probation that a court may impose “in addition

to any other reasonable condition.” KRS 533.030(2)(l) permits a court to impose,

in relevant part, the condition that a defendant “[s]ubmit to periodic testing for the

use of controlled substances or alcohol, if the defendant’s record indicates a

controlled substance or alcohol problem.” There is nothing in the record before

this Court to indicate Miller had an alcohol problem at the time of entry of his plea

in 2017, and the underlying crimes were unrelated to alcohol consumption by

Miller. The portion of the Order granting shock probation that addressed substance

abuse treatment was left blank by the circuit court. Although the circuit court had

authority to order abstention under KRS 533.030(2), the order granting shock

probation does not specifically list abstention from alcohol as a condition of

Miller’s probation.

             Due to the circuit court’s failure to state what evidence it relied on in

revoking Miller’s probation, we do not know to what extent, if any, it relied on

                                          -7-
Miller’s pending misdemeanor and traffic charges to reach its decision. We

acknowledge that:

             An individual’s probation may be revoked any time
             before the expiration of the probationary period when the
             trial court is satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence
             presented in a revocation hearing that the probationer
             violated a condition of probation. Although new
             charges may form the basis for revocation
             proceedings, a conviction on those charges is not
             necessary in order to revoke probation.

Barker v. Commonwealth, 379 S.W.3d 116, 123 (Ky. 2012) (emphasis added).

            Further, a probationer is “required to answer all reasonable questions

related to compliance with the conditions of probation that do not tend to

incriminate them in a future criminal prosecution.” Id. at 128. As previously

stated, Miller did not testify regarding the DUI charge at the revocation hearing.

However, Miller did admit that he violated his probation by using alcohol although

neither party has cited to this Court where in the record below this probation

condition can be found. Miller also testified that the open cognac bottle found in

his car was empty and belonged to his girlfriend for a craft project. And, the

ultimate disposition of the DUI and traffic offenses does not appear in the record

before the Court.

            The evidence introduced at the revocation hearing supported the

circuit court’s finding that Miller used alcohol. However, the nonuse of alcohol

alone does not appear to be a specific condition of Miller’s probation. Although

                                         -8-
Ms. Goss testified that Miller had been arrested and charged with a DUI, and had

an open alcohol container in his vehicle on a subsequent stop, there was no other

evidence admitted regarding those charges except for Miller’s denial of having an

open container during the second traffic stop. The circuit court had authority under

KRS 533.020(1) to modify Miller’s probation to include abstention from alcohol or

referral to an alcohol treatment program as suggested by Ms. Goss; however, the

court did neither. Rather, the court revoked Miller’s probation.

             Based on the foregoing, we conclude the circuit court’s findings of

fact were not sufficient to revoke Miller’s probation based on the evidentiary

record in this case. Similarly, the court’s findings did not satisfy the requirements

of KRS 439.3106, as argued by Miller on appeal. KRS 439.3106(1) provides that

supervised individuals shall be subject to:

                   (a) Violation revocation proceedings and possible
                   incarceration for failure to comply with the
                   conditions of supervision when such failure
                   constitutes a significant risk to prior victims of the
                   supervised individual or the community at large,
                   and cannot be appropriately managed in the
                   community; or

                   (b) Sanctions other than revocation and
                   incarceration as appropriate to the severity of the
                   violation behavior, the risk of future criminal
                   behavior by the offender, and the need for, and
                   availability of, interventions which may assist the
                   offender to remain compliant and crime-free in the
                   community.

                                         -9-
             The Kentucky Supreme Court has explained that “KRS 439.3106(1)

requires trial courts to consider whether a probationer’s failure to abide by a

condition of supervision constitutes a significant risk to prior victims or the

community at large, and whether the probationer cannot be managed in the

community before probation may be revoked.” Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 780. As

this Court has previously stated, “the General Assembly intended the task of

considering and making findings regarding the two factors of KRS 439.3106(1) to

serve as the analytical precursor to a trial court’s ultimate decision: whether

revocation or a lesser sanction is appropriate.” McClure, 457 S.W.3d at 732. By

directing the trial court to make such a determination, “the legislature furthers the

objectives of the graduated sanctions schema to ensure that probationers are not

being incarcerated for minor probation violations.” Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 779.

             The circuit court failed to make sufficient factual findings under KRS

439.3106 for this Court to adequately review the court’s compliance with the

statute, including whether Miller’s conduct posed a significant community risk that

could not be appropriately managed in the community, as required by KRS

439.3106(1) and Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773.

             Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Christian

Circuit Court’s July 15, 2021, Order Revoking Shock Probation and Judgment and

remand for the circuit court to conduct another revocation hearing and make

                                         -10-
appropriate findings in accordance with applicable law and consistent with this

Opinion.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jennifer Wade                             Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Stephanie L. McKeehan
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                                       -11-