Court Opinion

ID: 9543237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:43:36.62822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:01.010197
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the holding in division IIIB that the city council had authority to disapprove the plat on the basis of insufficient access. The question is not the desirability of a statutory or ordinance provision or comprehensive plan delineating an access requirement. Rather it is whether the requirement can reasonably be found in an existing statute, ordinance or comprehensive plan.
The city council was acting in an administrative capacity in reviewing Oakes’ plat. It had no right at that time to legislate a new condition for approval. Although the court cites section 409.14, The Code, and chapter 9.50 of the city’s ordinance as providing the necessary authority, I do not believe they support the city’s action.
Section 409.14 gives the city authority to ascertain whether the plat conforms to relevant statutes, city ordinances, and, if adopted, the comprehensive city plan. It then provides:
If such plats shall conform to the statutes of the state and ordinances of such city, and if they shall fall within the general plan for such city and the extensions thereof, regard being had for public streets, alleys, parks, sewer connections, water service, and service of other utilities, then it shall be the duty of said council and commission to endorse their approval upon the plat submitted to it; provided that the city council may require as a condition of approval of such plats that the owner of the land bring all streets to a grade acceptable to the council, and comply with such other reasonable requirements in regard to installation of public utilities, or other improvements, as the council may deem requisite for the protection of the public interest.
The city did not have a comprehensive plan at the time involved here. Thus, authority for disapproval of the plat must be found in statute or ordinance.
Neither the city nor the court purports to find any statutory support for the city’s action outside of section 409.14. I find nothing in section 409.14 which authorizes the city to disapprove a plat because the developer does not provide a street through someone else’s property. In authorizing the city to impose “reasonable requirements in regard to installation of public utilities, or other improvements, as the council may deem requisite for the protection of the public interest,” the statute at most allows a requirement that a street be extended to the subdivision property line.
An analogous problem was discussed in Baltimore Planning Commission v. Victor Development Co., 261 Md. 387, 393-94, 275 A.2d 478, 482 (1971):
*810There is little doubt that the developer can be required to deal with the problems he creates in his own subdivision but there is even less doubt that he cannot be saddled with the resolution of problems common to the area and for which he is no more responsible than other citizens. In Baltimore v. Security Mortgage Corp., supra, the county sought to require a developer to share the cost of building a bridge on other land and when he refused the county withheld approval of his plats. We held that “in the absence of an enforceable contract or statutory authority * ⅜ * [a county] cannot, as a prerequisite to approval of a subdivision plat require a developer or owner to defray the cost and expense of land improvements which lie beyond * * * [his] property and are on land owned by others.” Id., 227 Md. at 239, 175 A.2d at 757.
Using similar reasoning, I would hold that the city’s disapproval of the plat was not authorized by section 409.14.
Nor is the disapproval authorized by any provision in ordinance chapter 9.50. Section 9.50.1(B) is merely a general statement of purpose. Whether the city’s purpose may be achieved depends on specific provisions of the ordinance. Section 9.50.5(A)(1) is the only specific provision cited by the court. That provision, however, does not purport to require continuation or extension of streets beyond subdivision boundaries. Section 9.50.5(A)(4)(k) addresses that issue. It provides: “Arterial and collector street[s] in a subdivision shall extend through to the boundaries thereof.” Also relevant is section 9.50.5(A)(4)(d) which provides: “No dead-end streets or alleys will be permitted except at subdivision boundaries on undeveloped areas.” Furthermore, the street in the Oakes subdivision is within the definition of local street in section 9.50.3(B)(2)(c). The plat admittedly complied with restrictions governing cul-de-sacs in section 9.50.-5(A)(2)(b)(4).
In view of the specificity with which the ordinance imposes other requirements regarding street construction, it seems reasonable that the city should have been able to anticipate the kind of problem presented in the present case. However, it did not do so.
If the city believes access to the Oakes subdivision should be provided across the Courtcrest property to the south, it has the power to provide it. This is not a question of Oakes compelling the city to construct a street. Instead, constructing a street is a method by which the city may solve the access problem which it perceives, if it chooses to do so.
The ultimate issue in this case is whether existing legislation authorized the city to disapprove the Oakes plat because it did not provide for a street across adjacent property. I do not find such authority even under a liberal construction of the relevant legislation. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court.
ALLBEE and SCHULTZ, JJ., join this dissent.