Court Opinion

ID: 9903566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:53:45.776904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.514780
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

IN RE: TRUST OF ADEAN E. WINES

                                         Case No. 5D22-1919
                                         LT Case No. 2022-CA-000244-A

________________________________/

Opinion filed February 3, 2023

Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Marion County,
Gary L. Sanders, Judge.

Joseph T. Eagleton and Ceci C.
Berman, of Brannock, Humphries, &
Berman, Tampa, and Eugene A.
Wiechens, of Landt, Wiechens,
Lapeer & Ayres, LLP, Ocala, for
Laurie A. Williams.

Jonathan S. Dean, of Dean and
Dean, LLP, Ocala, for Bobbye L.
Wines, As Trustee Of The Adean E.
Wines Estate.

EDWARDS, J.
      Without serving process on any interested person, Appellee, Bobbye

Wines, successfully petitioned the trial court to appoint her as trustee of the

Robert L. Wines and Adean E. Wines Family Revocable Trust (hereinafter

"the Family Trust"). The order appointing Appellee as trustee was entered

without any hearing. We agree with Appellant, Laurie Williams, that the trial

court erred in initially entering the order of appointment and in subsequently

denying Appellant’s motion to set aside the order of appointment.          We

reverse the order of appointment and the order denying Appellant’s motion

to set aside and remand for further proceedings.

                                 Background

      Robert Wines and Adean Wines created, funded, and were co-trustees

of the Family Trust. When Robert Wines passed away, Adean Wines

became the sole trustee. She thereafter executed a First Amendment to the

Family Trust so that on her death, the trust’s assets would go to her son,

Robert Wines, Jr., or to his trust, the Robert Wines, Jr., Trust, in which he

was initially the sole trustee and sole beneficiary. The First Amendment

provided that if Robert Wines, Jr., predeceased his mother, the Family

Trust’s assets were to be distributed equally to Adean’s granddaughters,

who were Robert Wines, Jr.’s daughters, Appellee and Mary Ann Wines.

                                      2
      In 2018, Adean Wines executed a Second Amendment to the Family

Trust which called for the Family Trust’s assets to be distributed, on Adean’s

death, only to the Robert Wines, Jr., Trust. The Second Amendment named

the trustee or successor trustee of the Robert Wines, Jr., Trust as the

beneficiary. 1 If that trust terminated before Adean’s death, then all of the

Family Trust’s assets would be distributed directly to Appellant. If Appellant

passed before the termination of the Robert Wines, Jr., Trust, then Mary

Anne Wines would receive all of the Family Trust’s assets.          The final

contingency of the Second Amendment provided that if the other

contingencies occurred and Mary Anne Wines did not survive termination of

the Robert Wines, Jr., Trust, all assets from the Family Trust would go to

Appellee. Robert Wines, Jr., predeceased everybody else mentioned in this

paragraph, with all the others surviving. Adean Wines continued as the only

trustee of the Family Trust.

      On February 9, 2022, Appellee filed a verified petition seeking to be

appointed as trustee of the Family Trust. In her petition, Appellee alleged

that Adean Wines was incapacitated and had not actually served as trustee

of the Family Trust for several years, during which Robert Wines, Jr., had

      1
       The parties acknowledge that it is unusual to name a trustee or
successor trustee as the beneficiary. However, that matter is not before this
Court at this time.

                                      3
served as successor trustee until he passed away. The petition did not seek

removal of Adean Wines as trustee, nor did it attach any evidence to support

the allegation that Adean was incapacitated. No other parties were named,

no summonses were issued, and there was no service of process on

anybody, including Appellant. However, Appellee’s attorney did send a copy

of the petition, by regular first-class mail, to Appellant’s attorney as a copy

for his records with the suggestion that he not hesitate to contact Appellee’s

counsel with any questions. Nobody was served by certified or registered

mail nor by any express delivery service.

      On March 16, 2022, the trial court, without holding a hearing, entered

an order granting the petition and appointing Appellee as trustee of the

Family Trust. Neither the court nor Appellee served a copy of the order on

Appellant or anybody other than Appellee’s counsel.

      Appellant learned that Appellee had been appointed trustee only when

Appellee’s counsel mailed Appellant’s counsel a second pleading in which

Appellee sought to have the Second Amendment to the Family Trust

declared invalid, due to Adean’s alleged incapacity at the time it was

executed.   If successful with the second petition, Appellee would have

eliminated Appellant as a contingent beneficiary, the status Appellant

enjoyed under the Second Amendment as she was: (1) the successor trustee

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of the Robert Wines, Jr., Trust; (2) named by Robert Wines, Jr., as the sole

beneficiary of that trust; and (3) named as the contingent 100% beneficiary

of the Family Trust if she survived. Furthermore, Appellant was the personal

representative of Robert Wines, Jr.’s probate estate.

     Within weeks of learning of the entry of the order appointing Appellee

as trustee of the Family Trust, Appellant filed and served a motion to set

aside that order. She argued in her motion that the lack of service of process

and lack of any noticed hearing leading up to the entry of the order of

appointment rendered the order void since it was done without affording her

due process of law, as she was clearly an interested and indispensable party

given her apparent standing as a contingent beneficiary. 2

      The trial court denied her motion to set aside the order of appointment,

finding that Appellant had actual notice and therefore could have objected to

Appellee’s appointment. Appellant timely appealed.

                                     Analysis

      Section 736.0201(1), Florida Statutes (2022), provides that “judicial

proceedings concerning trusts shall be commenced by filing a complaint and

shall be governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.” Here, Appellee

      2
       See § 736.0103(4), Fla. Stat. (2022) (defining beneficiary as “a
person who has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or
contingent”).

                                      5
filed a petition which, unlike a typical complaint, did not name any adverse

parties.   Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(a) states that “[u]pon

commencement of the action, summons or other process authorized by law

shall be issued forthwith by the clerk or judge,” which shall be literally signed

and sealed for delivery. Other provisions of rule 1.070 set forth details

regarding service of process and filing proof that service was accomplished.

Despite this requirement, Appellee neither obtained nor served a summons

on anyone.

      Section 731.201(23), Florida Statutes (2022), defines “interested

person” as “any person who may reasonably be expected to be affected by

the outcome of the particular proceeding involved.”3 In its order denying

Appellant’s motion to set aside the order of appointment, the trial court

explicitly recognized that Appellant was indeed an interested party. Appellee

has never contested Appellant’s status as an interested party. “Generally,

the only indispensable parties to a trust action . . . are the trustee, the settlor,

and the beneficiaries.” Demircan v. Mikhaylov, 306 So. 3d 142, 146 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2020) (citing Sylvester v. Sylvester, 557 So. 2d 599, 600 (Fla. 4th DCA

1990) (noting trustee and contingent remainder beneficiaries can be

      3
        That statutory section is part of the Florida Probate Code; however,
it has been applied to trusts as well. See Carvel v. Godley, 939 So. 2d 204,
209 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

                                         6
indispensable parties to trust litigation)). Moreover, given that Appellee is

now attempting to have the Second Amendment declared invalid, which

could oust Appellant as a beneficiary, Appellant’s status as an indispensable

party is even clearer. See Crescenze v. Bothe, 4 So. 3d 31, 32 (Fla. 2d DCA

2009) (“Florida has long followed the rule that the beneficiaries of a trust are

indispensable parties to a suit having the termination of the beneficiaries’

interest as its ultimate goal.” (quoting Fulmer v. N. Cent. Bank, 386 So. 2d

856, 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980))). By definition, indispensable parties must be

joined and served with process as provided by law. Id. at 33.

      The trial court recognized that Appellant was entitled to be notified that

Appellee had filed a petition seeking appointment as trustee. However, it

erred in finding that Appellant’s actual notice of the petition, having been

served on her counsel, was sufficient notice. Florida law does not recognize

actual knowledge of a suit as a substitute for proper service of process. See

Bedford Comput. Corp. v. Graphic Press, Inc., 484 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (Fla.

1986) (holding actual notice of lawsuit does not remedy invalid service of

process); Moss v. Est. of Hudson, 252 So. 3d 785, 787 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)

(“Actual knowledge of a suit does not cure insufficient service of process.”

(citing McDaniel v. FirstBank P.R., 96 So. 3d 926, 929 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)));

Shepheard v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 922 So. 2d 340, 345 (Fla. 5th

                                       7
DCA 2006) (“The judgment is voidable if the irregular or defective service

actually gives notice of the proceedings.”); see also Napoleon B. Broward

Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands Upon Which Taxes Due, 33 So. 2d 716, 718

(Fla. 1948).

      Furthermore, the order appointing Appellee as trustee of the Family

Trust was apparently entered without notice of or conducting a hearing. No

explanation has been given for why that was done; however, that

compounded the deprivation of due process already occasioned by the

failure of Appellee to join and serve Appellant. While we offer no opinion on

whether Appellee may ultimately be entitled to appointment as trustee if

proper procedure is followed, we note that Appellee’s and the trial court’s

bypassing of due process led to the entry of an order treating Adean as

though she were dead, when she is very much alive; appointing a successor

trustee without first removing the existing trustee, Adean; and doing so

without any evidentiary support for the bald allegation in the petition that

Adean was incapacitated.

      We quash the order appointing Appellee as trustee of the Family Trust

and reverse the order denying Appellant’s motion to set aside that order of

appointment. We remand for further proceedings in accordance with this

opinion that shall be conducted with appropriate pleadings, joinder, service

                                     8
of process, notice, and the opportunity for Appellant and all other

indispensable parties to meaningfully and timely participate.

     Appellant’s motion for an award of appellate attorney’s fees, which is

based upon Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.300(a) and 9.400(b), and

section 736.1005, Florida Statutes (2022), is granted, and we remand that

matter for the trial court to determine the amount of such reasonable fees.

     ORDER QUASHED, REVERSED, AND REMANDED.

EVANDER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.

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