Court Opinion

ID: 9926424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 18:04:37.581064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:49.491868
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/24/24 P. v. Aguilar CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E081901

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. RIF2300818)

 JUAN BATZ AGUILAR,                                                      OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Charles G. Rogers, Judge.

(Retired Judge of the San Diego Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art.

VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.

         Juan Batz Aguilar, in pro. per.; Cindi B. Mishkin, under appointment by the Court

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
                              STATEMENT OF THE CASE

       On March 2, 2023, a felony complaint charged defendant and appellant Juan Batz

Aguilar with making terrorist threats under Penal Code1 section 422 (count 1); resisting,

delaying, and obstructing a police officer under section 148, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2);

and violating a protective order under section 273.6, subdivision (a). The complaint also

alleged a single strike prior within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (c), and (e),

and section 1170.12, subdivision (c).

       On August 1, 2023, defendant pled guilty to counts 1 and 2 and admitted the strike

prior. Thereafter, the trial court imposed the agreed-upon term of four years as follows:

the middle term of two years for count 1, doubled per the strike prior, and one year for

count 1, to be served concurrently with count 1. The court then found that defendant had

no ability to pay fines or fees, and imposed and stayed the minimum restitution fine and

parole revocation fine. The court did not impose additional fees. Additionally, the court

awarded custody and good-time credits, struck an existing criminal protective order, and

issued a new criminal protective order.

       On August 9, 2023, and August 16, 2023, defendant filed in pro. per. notices of

appeal. Neither notice of appeal included a request for a certificate of probable cause;

hence, the trial court did not issue a certificate of probable cause.

       1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

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                                STATEMENT OF FACTS

       At the hearing wherein defendant pled guilty, he admitted his strike prior and that

he violated sections 422 (count 1) and 148, subdivision (a)(1).

       As to count one, the following dialogue ensued:

       “The Court: . . . Count 1 alleges that you committed a criminal threat, that is a

verbal statement to another person that threatens death or great bodily injury. It is a

statement that is under the circumstances of which it was made so definite and immediate

that it scared the other person to think you were going to do it, and it caused that person

to remain in sustained fear for their own safety or safety of family members.

       “Did you make a threat like that sir?

       “The Defendant: Yes.”

       As to count 2, the prosecutor summarized the evidence as follows:

       “[Prosecutor:] While the officer was attempting to investigate the current charge,

the defendant fled on foot. They eventually later that evening, five to six hours later, 11

o’clock at night found him in his car.

       “The officer would have testified to the fact they saw the defendant in the car.

Were able to identify him, were notifying him on speaker phone on like the car speaker in

English and Spanish that he needed to come out. The car door was locked. They tried to

get [him] out. Exhausted multiple resources, including I believe it’s the AVR vehicle,

um, multiple officers to try to get the defendant out of the car.

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       “In the testimony they would have said he start[ed] moving around in the car, still

not coming out. I believe the [standoff] lasted for about an hour. And then they pulled

him out of the car.

       “The Court: Sir, did you run from the police at any point?

       “[Defendant]: I don’t remember.

       “The Court: Okay. Um, do you remember the police contacting you in your car?

       “Defendant: No. I don’t remember. I was sleeping.

       “The Court: Okay. Um, do you remember the police waking you up while you

were sleeping in your car?

       “Defendant: When they threw tear gas on me I was sleeping?

       “The Court: Do you agree if the evidence were presented, according to what’s

described in the discovery that would be presented in evidence?

       “[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.”

       After defendant pled guilty to counts 1 and 2, the trial court asked defendant: “Is

it likewise true, sir, that you have suffered a conviction for a prior strike that being the

probation violation case ending 614. Is it true you were convicted of that offense in that

case?” Defendant responded, “Yes. That’s true.”

                                       DISCUSSION

       After defendant appealed, and upon his request, this court appointed counsel to

represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979)

25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 setting forth a statement of

the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues, and has requested this

                                               4
court to undertake a review of the entire record. Pursuant to Anders, counsel identified

the following issues to assist the court in its search of the record for error:

       1.     “Is appellant’s plea constitutionally valid?”

       2.     “Did the trial court comply with its duty under Penal Code section 1192.5

to establish a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea?”

       We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief. On

December 28, 2023, defendant filed a one-page handwritten brief with attachments.

       In his brief, defendant argues that he “never had a firearm nor was one found on

my person,” and did not know that he was admitting to a strike prior because he “had no

knowledge of a strike prior to signing the deal.” Moreover, defendant contends that “I

feel I was taken advantage of and was pressured to sign my deal with the D.A.”

       Defendant’s claims challenge the validity of his pleas. Under section 1237.5, “ ‘an

appeal may not be taken after a plea of guilty or no contest unless the defendant has filed

a statement showing reasonable grounds for appeal and the trial court has executed and

filed a certificate of probable cause. This requirement does not apply, however, if the

appeal is based upon grounds that arose after entry of the plea and that do not affect the

validity of the plea.’ ” (People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 195; § 1237.5.)

Hence, because defendant did not obtain a certificate of probable cause, his claims are

barred. (§ 1237.5, subd. (b); People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 379.)

       Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have

independently reviewed the record for potential error. We find no error.

                                               5
                                      DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                    MILLER
                                                             J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                    Acting P. J.

FIELDS
                                 J.

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