Court Opinion

ID: 9760427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:55:01.643818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:12.203135
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Justice,
dissenting.
Today the Court holds that a timely request for findings of fact and conclusions of law extends the time for perfecting appeal when findings and conclusions are required by Rule 296, or when they are not required by Rule 296 but are not without purpose— that is, they could properly be considered by the appellate court. The Court opines that its new rule does not conflict with the core rationale of Linwood — "which, is a functional approach that rejects a broad construction of *444Rule 41(a)(1) that would allow the filing of a request for findings and conclusions to extend the time for perfecting appeal in every case adjudicated without a jury. See Linwood v. NCNB of Texas, 876 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.App.—Dallas), rev’d on other grounds, 885 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.1994).
I respectfully disagree. The rule the Court adopts continues to unduly complicate, rather than simplify, the issue raised in this case. In my view, the rule the Court adopts:
• Is in fact contrary to Linwood’s functional approach to construing Rule 41(a)(1);
• Requires the appellate court to review the entire record to accurately determine if the evidentiary hearing did in fact involve the trial court’s resolution of discrete fact issues outside the scope of the pleadings, motions, documents, and arguments of counsel;
• Ignores appellate standards of review that establish whether the trial court must resolve discrete fact questions, and the impact these standards of review have upon a particular appeal; and
• Adds delay to many appeals — an additional sixty days — when the judicial system is under fire from the legal community and the general public for the inordinate time — and concomitant costs — it takes to process a controversy through the system.
I believe a more appropriate and more workable rule is that whether a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law extends the time to appeal depends upon the standard of review that applies to the particular appeal. In my view, this rule would:
• Support Linwood’s functional approach to construing Rule 41(a)(1);
• Permit the parties to determine immediately whether findings and conclusions are necessary to the appeal and therefore necessary to request and extend the time to perfect the appeal;
• Permit the appellate court to determine immediately — without the necessity of reviewing the entire record — whether the request for findings and conclusions extends the time to perfect the appeal; and
• Avoid additional delays in processing and disposing of many appeals.
I. REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS OF FACT
Rule 41(a)(1) clearly relates to Ride 296. See Tex.R.App. P. 41(a)(1) and Tex.R. Crv. P. 296. Rule 296 only entitles a party to findings of fact and conclusions of law in cases tried in district or county court without a jury. Chavez v. Housing Auth. of El Paso, 897 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1995, writ denied). A court tries a case when there is an evidentiary hearing upon conflicting evidence. Linwood, 876 S.W.2d at 395; Chavez, 897 S.W.2d at 525. Accordingly, findings of fact are appropriate only when the court is deciding fact issues. Chavez, 897 S.W.2d at 525. Where the court rules without determining discrete fact questions, requests for finding of fact and conclusions of law are neither appropriate nor effective for extending appellate deadlines. WISD Taxpayers Ass’n v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 912 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex.App.—Waco 1996, no writ); Chavez, 897 S.W.2d at 525-26. Findings specifically tied to an appropriate legal standard are the only type of findings that can be truly beneficial to appellate review. Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 853 (Tex.1992).
II. PRINCIPAL APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Abuse of DISCRETION
Under an abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court reviews the entire record to determine if the trial court acted arbitrarily and unreasonably, and thus abused its discretion. Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1986). The reviewing court may not reverse the trial court for an abuse of discretion because it disagrees with the trial court’s decision so long as that decision is within the trial court’s discretionary authority. Beaumont Bank v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.1991); Downer v. *445Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex.1985).
Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, the appellate court does not review factual issues decided by the trial court under legal or factual sufficiency standards. Crouch v. Tenneco, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 643, 649 (Tex.App.—Waco 1993, writ denied). Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, legal and factual sufficiency claims are not independent, reversible grounds of error, but rather merely factors to consider in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Butler, 806 S.W.2d at 226. Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, findings of fact and conclusions of law are neither appropriate nor required. Crouch, 853 S.W.2d at 649.
An abuse of discretion does not exist if the trial court bases its decision on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports the trial court’s decision. See Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex.1993). An abuse of discretion does not exist if some evidence in the record shows the trial court followed guiding rules and statutes. Crouch, 853 S.W.2d at 649.
B. EVIDENTIARY STANDARD OF REVIEW
Legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence standards of review govern appeals of nonjury trials on the merits. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 852; Hall, Standards of Appellate Review in Civil Appeals, 21 St. Maey’s L. J. 865, 919-20 (1990). When a party appeals from a nonjury trial, it must complain of specific findings and conclusions of the trial court, because a general complaint against the trial court’s judgment does not present a justiciable question. Fiduciary Mortgage Co. v. City Nat’l Bank, 762 S.W.2d 196, 204 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied). Accordingly, findings of fact and conclusions of law are mandatory for a party to file to avoid the onerous presumptions that apply in an appeal from a nonjury trial. When an appellant does not request or file findings and conclusions by the trial court, the appellate court presumes the trial court found all fact questions in support of its judgment, and the reviewing court must affirm that judgment on any legal theory finding support in the pleadings and evidence. Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex.1987).
If the appellant does not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact, when filed, these facts are binding upon both the party and the appellate court. Wade v. Anderson, 602 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, writ refd n.r.e.). Accordingly, it is incumbent for the appellant to attack the findings by appropriate legal and factual sufficiency points of error. Lovejoy v. Lillie, 569 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
In an appeal of a nonjury trial, findings are specifically and meaningfully tied to appropriate standards of appellate review and are therefore truly beneficial to appellate review. See Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 853.
III. DISMISSAL AS A DISCOVERY SANCTION
The appellate standard of review of a trial court order dismissing a case as a discovery sanction is abuse of discretion. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 852; TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 919 n. 9 (Tex.1991). Findings are neither appropriate nor required under an abuse of discretion standard. Crouch, 853 S.W.2d at 649. Findings are not tied to the appellate standard of review and are not necessarily beneficial to appellate review. Accordingly, under the rule I propose, I would hold that findings and conclusions did not extend the appellate timetable in this case. I would affirm the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing the appeal and deny the writ.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court asserts that the rule it adopts is better than the one I propose because it sometimes happens that the appellate standard of review has not been finally determined. Thus, the Court concludes that the standard I would apply is less certain than the one it adopts. I beg to differ again.
There is a substantial body of statutory and case law that establishes appellate standards of review. Moreover, the bench and bar are fortunate to have available two excel*446lent law review articles that put this body of law together for ready reference. See generally Hall, Standards of Appellate Review in Civil Appeals, 21 St. MARY’S L.J. 865 (1990) and Hall, Revisiting Standards of Review in Civil Appeals, 24 St. Mahy’s L.J. 1045 (1993). “The law prescribing the standard of review to a particular ruling is complex but relatively well settled.” Hecht, Forward: Revisiting Standards of Review in Civil Appeals, 24 St. MARY’S L.J. 1041,1041 (1993).
Today the Court needlessly establishes a new standard when existing standards will better solve the problem. I respectfully dissent.