Court Opinion

ID: 9963096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 16:10:42.6409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:40.905112
License: Public Domain

166                    April 24, 2024               No. 259

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                STATE OF OREGON,
                 Plaintiff-Respondent,
                           v.
           SHAWN QUENTIN GREENWOOD,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
              Baker County Circuit Court
                20CR02558; A177025

   Matthew B. Shirtcliff, Judge.
   Argued and submitted June 5, 2023.
   Emily P. Seltzer, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
   MOONEY, J.
  Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment of dis-
missal on Counts 7 and 8 and for further proceedings.
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)   167
168                                      State v. Greenwood

        MOONEY, J.
         Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for
criminally negligent homicide, ORS 163.145, fleeing or
attempting to elude a police officer, ORS 811.540, and first-
degree burglary, ORS 164.225, entered after conditional
no-contest pleas. He assigns error to the trial court’s denial
of his pretrial motion to dismiss, arguing that “an irrebutta-
ble and conclusive presumption of prejudice” arose when the
state violated his state and federal constitutional right to
counsel by “intrud[ing] upon [his] attorney-client privilege,”
when the lead detective listened to recordings of defendant’s
phone conversations with his attorney. Alternatively, defen-
dant argues that the state bore the burden to show that
the purposeful intrusion did not prejudice him and that the
state failed to meet that burden. Defendant emphasizes that
the calls “contained discussion of trial strategy,” that the
intrusion was intentional, and that the detective who com-
mitted the intrusion had been “involved in every aspect of a
lengthy and wide-ranging criminal investigation, and * * *
worked closely with other officers and with the prosecutor.”
Defendant contends that because the lead detective’s role
was “central” and her conduct “egregious and intentional,”
the state’s case was “irreparably tainted” and dismissal was
required.
         We conclude that the state violated defendant’s con-
stitutional right to counsel when the lead detective inten-
tionally listened to several recorded phone conversations
between defendant and his attorney, which included priv-
ileged communications between them about trial strategy.
We conclude, further, that a rebuttable presumption of prej-
udice arose once defendant made a prima facie showing that
the violation occurred, that it was intentional, and that it
resulted in the disclosure of defense trial strategy. The bur-
den then shifted to the state to show, by clear and convincing
evidence, that defendant was not prejudiced by the violation.
As we will explain, the state did not meet its burden to rebut
the presumption of prejudice as to those charges that were
added after the violation occurred (Counts 7 and 8). We,
thus, conclude that the trial court erred when it declined
to dismiss those two counts. But, as we will also explain,
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                                   169

the state did not have the opportunity to develop a factual
record addressing the correct legal question with respect to
the charges on which defendant had already been indicted
before the violation occurred. Our disposition is intended
to allow the state that opportunity should defendant opt to
withdraw his plea.
         We reverse and remand the judgment for the trial
court to:
     1.   Enter a judgment of dismissal on Counts 7 and 8;
     2. Allow defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea
     pursuant to ORS 135.335(3); and
     3. If defendant does withdraw his plea, afford the state
     an opportunity to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
     that defendant was not prejudiced by the state’s violation of
     defendant’s constitutional right to counsel with respect to
     Counts 1 through 6.
                          I. THE FACTS
A. The Shooting and the Arrest
        The pertinent facts are not disputed. On January 13,
2020, law enforcement officers responded to reports of a
shooting at the Baker Land Management building. Officers
discovered two victims—a man with a gunshot wound to his
hand and a deceased woman. Defendant was arrested that
same day, lodged at the Baker County Jail (the jail), and
charged by district attorney’s information with two counts
of second-degree assault. The information was amended the
next day to add a count of second-degree murder.
B.    The Indictments
         Defendant was charged by indictment dated
January 23, 2020, with two counts of second-degree assault,
one count of second-degree murder, and one count of fleeing
or attempting to elude a police officer. The indictment was
amended on March 19, 2020, to add one count of solicitation to
commit murder. In April 2020, the court extended the grand
jury’s term to allow the state more time “to examine other
potential charges relating to this case.” On September 9,
2020, the second amended indictment was filed adding a
count of first-degree assault. The indictment was amended
170                                       State v. Greenwood

again on October 21, 2020, to add one count of first-degree
murder, and again, on February 10, 2021, to add one count
of first-degree burglary. The lead detective who listened to
the recorded jail calls testified before the grand jury before
each indictment was issued.
C. The Jail’s Telmate System
        The Baker County Sheriff’s Office (the sheriff’s office)
operates a software system known as Telmate that enables
it to monitor and record telephone calls placed by inmates.
Lieutenant Duby of the Baker City Police Department had
direct access to Telmate through a password-protected
account that the sheriff’s office assigned to him. Duby
shared his access credentials with Detectives Regan and
Sells, who were responsible for listening to jailhouse calls
and preparing reports for Duby’s review.
        Jail staff have the ability to block designated phone
numbers from Telmate’s recording function. Attorney phone
numbers are generally blocked to ensure that conversations
between inmates and their attorneys are not monitored
or recorded. For unknown reasons, the phone number for
defendant’s attorney had never been properly entered into
the system as a blocked number. Defendant called his attor-
ney several times using that unblocked number.
D. The Recorded Calls
         In November 2020, defendant asked his attorney to
determine whether any calls that took place between the two
of them while he was lodged at the jail had been recorded.
Corporal D. Lefever confirmed that five such calls had, in
fact, been recorded. Lefever made two copies of the recorded
calls, and one CD was turned over to defense counsel and
the other to Sheriff Ash. Ash testified that although he
intended to deliver his copy to the prosecutor’s office, he did
not do so. He held that copy in his desk, where it remained
for approximately eight months.
           Based on conversations with Telmate, the sher-
iff’s office initially reported that the recorded calls had not
been listened to or otherwise accessed. But by June 2021,
Corporal M. Lefever confirmed that several of the calls
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                                               171

between defendant and his attorney had been accessed
through Duby’s Telmate credentials on September 14, 2020.
When the prosecutor was told that there were recorded calls
between defendant and his attorney and that the calls had
been accessed, he questioned Duby, Sells, and Regan, each
of whom denied listening to the calls. The prosecutor made
a report to the Department of Justice and the Oregon State
Police, and an investigation was conducted. It was deter-
mined that Regan, the lead detective on defendant’s case,
had accessed the calls from her computer.
E. The Lead Detective’s Role
          In her role as lead detective, Regan gathered crime
scene evidence, drafted search warrants, and interviewed
witnesses. She worked with, and reported to, Duby and the
prosecutor. The criminal investigation was ongoing at the
time Regan listened to the calls. Regan did not tell Duby or
the prosecutor that she had listened to the recorded phone
calls, and she did not report the content of those calls to
either of them. Detective Sells explained that although they
were permitted to listen to and monitor calls that defendant
placed while he was in jail, they were not permitted to mon-
itor calls between defendant and his attorney. Sells testified
that he remembered Regan “mentioning she had heard an
attorney phone call,” but during that conversation, Regan
stated that she “went to the next call.” They did not discuss
the call further and he assumed that the access had been
inadvertent.1
            II. THE TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
         Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and to sup-
press evidence, asserting that his state and federal con-
stitutional right to counsel had been violated. Relying on
State v. Russum, 265 Or App 103, 333 P3d 1191, rev den,
356 Or 575 (2014), defendant argued that a presumption of
prejudice arose from the violation of his right to counsel. He
argued further that the presumption of prejudice should be
deemed conclusive because the violation was intentional and
because it was carried out by the lead detective on the case.

    1
      The indictments and key events are listed in the following table, in chrono-
logical order, for ease of reference:
172                                                  State v. Greenwood

He argued that, even if the presumption was rebuttable,
the state could not meet its burden. The state opposed the
motion, arguing that dismissal was not appropriate because
(1) the prosecutor had agreed not to call Regan as a witness,
and (2) the court had insufficient information to determine
whether the violations were purposeful or inadvertent.
         At defendant’s request, and pursuant to his limited
waiver of the attorney-client privilege, the trial judge asked
a different judge to conduct an in camera inspection of the
recorded phone calls. After doing so, the reviewing judge
prepared two memoranda for the trial judge, one outlining
the content of the calls and one outlining the trial strat-
egy discussed during the calls. After reviewing those mem-
oranda, the trial court concluded that the level of intrusion

Date                 Event
January 23, 2020     Indictment
                     ✔ Count 1 – Assault II
                     ✔ Count 2 – Assault II
                     ✔ Count 3 – Murder II
                     ✔ Count 4 – Fleeing Police Officer
March 19, 2020       First Amended Indictment
                     ✔ Adds Count 5 – Solicitation to Commit Murder
September 9, 2020    Second Amended Indictment
                     ✔ Adds Count 6 – Assault I
September 14, 2020   Lead detective listens to recorded phone calls between
                     defendant and his attorney
October 21, 2020     Third Amended Indictment
                     ✔ Adds Count 7 – Murder I
November 2020        Sheriff’s deputy confirms calls were recorded; advises
                     defense counsel that calls had not been listened to
                     Corporal burns two CDs of calls and provides one to
                     defense counsel and one to Sheriff
February 10, 2021    Fourth Amended Indictment
                     ✔ Adds Count 8 – Burglary I
June 2021            Sheriff confirms that phone calls were accessed through
                     police lieutenant’s Telmate account
                     Lead detective denies listening to calls
                     DA is advised of intrusion; reports to DOJ and OSP;
                     investigation is conducted which determines that Regan
                     accessed calls from her computer
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                                  173

into defendant’s right to counsel, based in part on the state’s
concession that the “breach falls into the purposeful cate-
gory,” was not inadvertent. It further found that the calls
contained “discussions relating to trial strategy.” The trial
court required the state to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the content of the calls was not conveyed to
the prosecution. The court found that the state met that
burden:
   “The state has demonstrated by clear and convincing evi-
   dence that the prosecutor did not receive a copy or the
   contents of the communications of the privileged calls at
   question in this matter. Moreover, the court finds [Sheriff
   Ash] credible that he did not share the copies of the tapes
   or their contents with the District Attorney’s Office. The
   court finds Detective Sells credible that he did not dis-
   cuss the contents of the tapes with Detective Regan and
   did not learn through her the matters discussed including
   any trial strategy contained on the calls. This court finds
   that the contents of the calls were not listened to by anyone
   in law enforcement other than Detective Regan and that
   the contents of the calls were not conveyed to the District
   Attorney who is the prosecutor on the case.
   “While this case is factually distinguishable from the
   Russum case in that this case involves a purposeful intru-
   sion, the court does not find that the factual scenario rises
   to grossly shocking or outrageous conduct warranting
   dismissal of the case. To be sure, the violation of [defen-
   dant’s] right to counsel is clear and problematic; however,
   this is not a case where a prosecutor intentionally received
   defense trial strategy information that irreversibly taints
   the case. Moreover, the state has demonstrated by clear
   and convincing evidence that the contents of the calls
   including any trial strategy was not disclosed to the pros-
   ecutor and that no evidence resulted from the privileged
   information, and that no other compromise of defendant’s
   constitutional rights occurred. Therefore, the court is deny-
   ing the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.”
The court did, however, grant the motion to suppress, and
it issued an order excluding (1) Regan’s testimony; (2) all
jail calls recorded on or after September 14, 2020, the date
Regan accessed the calls; and (3) all evidence obtained by
Regan after September 14, 2020. The court also instructed
174                                      State v. Greenwood

the state to seek the court’s advance direction at any point
during trial that it might wish to offer any evidence col-
lected by Regan before September 14, 2020, and to do so
outside the presence of the jury.
         Defendant entered conditional no-contest pleas to
criminally negligent homicide (Count 3), fleeing or attempt-
ing to elude a police officer (Count 4), and first degree bur-
glary (Count 8), and was convicted of those crimes. The
remaining counts—second degree assault (Count 2), solic-
itation of murder (Count 5), first degree assault (Count 6),
and first degree murder (Count 7) were dismissed pursuant
to negotiations. This appeal followed.
             III.   ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL
         Defendant asks us to adopt a rule that would pre-
sume prejudice and require outright dismissal “when the
state purposefully violates a defendant’s right to counsel by
accessing privileged communications.” The state does not
dispute that the violation occurred or that it was intentional
but instead contends that a rule that presumes prejudice
and requires dismissal would amount to a rule based on
structural error, which would be inconsistent with Article
VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. The
state adds that “defendant offers this court nothing more
than his own idle speculation” that, despite the prosecutor’s
lack of direct knowledge of the calls, he may have indirectly
received information obtained from the calls by Regan
through their interactions on the case after the violation
occurred. Defendant responds, however, that the burden to
disprove prejudice should reside with the state in this case,
and that the state’s argument amounts to a reflexive and
improper volley of the burden back to him. Defendant rea-
sons that even if Regan never expressly conveyed the con-
tents of the privileged calls to the prosecutor, her knowledge
of defense strategy likely guided her work on the case and as
that work unfolded, the content of the calls would have been
conveyed to the prosecutor on a subliminal basis. Defendant
acknowledges that, “[b]ecause the prosecutor never learned
the content of the attorney-client calls, [the prosecutor] was
not able to make a fact-dependent argument about the effect
of that content on the prosecution team.” But in defendant’s
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                              175

view, that simply means that if the presumption is rebutta-
ble, the state did not meet its burden to disprove prejudice.
         The state asks us to “pause” and take note of what
defendant does not challenge on appeal. In the state’s view,
defendant does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings
of fact and he does not challenge the trial court’s ruling to
suppress certain evidence and to exclude Regan’s testimony
altogether. The state emphasizes that it does not dispute,
nor does it seek to justify, Regan’s conduct in “purposefully
listen[ing] to the recordings” of the jail calls that included
“privileged attorney-client communications.” But accord-
ing to the state, by the time Regan listened to the recorded
jail calls in September 2020, defendant had already been
charged on the basis of information that had necessarily
been gathered before the constitutional violation occurred.
It argues that the trial court crafted a clear and stringent
suppression order that properly balanced the very serious
violation of defendant’s right to counsel with the state’s
interest in the prosecution of crimes and the protection of
the public.
              IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
         We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dis-
miss for legal error. Russum, 265 Or App at 105. “We defer to
the trial court’s findings that are supported by evidence in
the record, and, if there are no express findings of fact with
respect to disputed factual issues, we presume that the facts
were decided in a manner consistent with the trial court’s
decision.” Id.
                       V.   ANALYSIS
      Defendant relies on both Article I, section 11, of the
Oregon Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution in support of his argument that
Regan’s intentional violation of his right to counsel conclu-
sively prejudiced him. We have not before encountered the
precise factual scenario presented by this case. The legal
question, as framed by the parties, is one of first impression
for us. We begin by reviewing each constitutional provision,
“address[ing] defendant’s state constitutional claim first.”
State v. Krieger, 306 Or App 71, 75, 473 P3d 550 (2020),
176                                             State v. Greenwood

rev den, 367 Or 535 (2021) (citing State v. Velykoretskykh,
268 Or App 706, 707 n 2, 343 P3d 272 (2015) (“Under Oregon
court’s ‘first things first’ doctrine, we have an obligation
to address state constitutional law claims before federal
ones.”)).
A. The Right to Counsel Under the Oregon Constitution
          Article I, section 11, embodies the state right to coun-
sel for those accused of crimes and, as relevant, provides:
      “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
      right * * * to be heard by himself and counsel[.]”
Concerning that right, the Oregon Supreme Court has
declared that:
      “The right to counsel is essential in our adversarial system
      of criminal law. Criminal prosecutions can carry great con-
      sequences, and criminal proceedings can be complex. The
      state utilizes trained professionals to represent its inter-
      ests in prosecutions, and Article I, section 11, guarantees
      defendants the right to do the same.”
State v. Craigen, 370 Or 696, 704, 524 P3d 85 (2023) (foot-
note omitted). The court further stated:
      “The right [to counsel] exists so that, when the state exer-
      cises its prosecutorial powers against a person, the person
      can call on counsel to assert and protect the person’s rights.
      As such, it is a particularly important right, one through
      which other rights are given effect * * *.”
Id. at 705.
         The right to counsel is an individual right that, by
its nature, also serves the greater public good:
          “Although the Article I, section 11, right to counsel is
      an individual right, it benefits the criminal legal system
      and the public in general. The state constitutional rights
      of individuals, including the right to counsel, help ensure
      that the state abides by the legal limits on its authority,
      that criminal proceedings are fair, and that verdicts are
      reliable. Thus, although they are individual rights, they
      help preserve the rule of law and the integrity of the legal
      system.”
Id.
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                               177

          It is well established that “when an individual has
a constitutional right to consult with counsel, that right
includes the right to confer privately with counsel.” State v.
Durbin, 335 Or 183, 190, 63 P3d 576 (2003). Indeed, “Oregon
case law is resolute that confidentiality is inherent in the
right to consult with counsel; to hold otherwise would effec-
tively render the right meaningless.” Russum, 265 Or App
at 111-12 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The right to
confer privately with counsel serves purposes in common
with the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 112. That statu-
tory privilege permits the client to prevent the disclosure
of “confidential communications made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the
client[.]” OEC 503(2). The attorney-client privilege is “under-
stood” to encourage open, honest, and complete discussions
between attorneys and their clients to “promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration
of justice.” Russum, 265 Or App at 112 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The attorney-client privilege thus animates
the constitutional right to counsel by promoting open dia-
logue between the accused and his legal counsel through its
promise of confidentiality.
         The remedy for a violation of an individual’s right
to counsel under the Oregon constitution is, generally, “the
exclusion of any prejudicial evidence obtained as a result
of that violation.” State v. Prieto-Rubio, 359 Or 16, 38, 376
P3d 255 (2016). “[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the
absence of evidence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys
the content of attorney-client communications to the prose-
cution.” Russum, 265 Or App at 111.
         In Russum, we considered whether the defendant
could “be prosecuted after a jail official and a detective ha[d]
opened mail to or from his attorney.” Id. at 105. The let-
ter, opened by a detective, had not been properly marked as
“legal mail” and it contained discussion of the defendant’s
trial strategy. Id. at 108. When the detective realized that
the letter was a privileged communication between an attor-
ney and his client, he promptly notified the prosecutor, who
instructed the detective not to communicate the letter’s con-
tents to him, to seal it, and to send it to the defendant’s
178                                              State v. Greenwood

attorney, which the detective did. Id. at 106. The prosecutor
contacted the defendant’s attorney to explain the situation.
Id. at 107. We concluded:
      “[N]o presumption of prejudice arises in the absence of evi-
      dence of a purposeful intrusion that conveys the content of
      attorney-client communications to the prosecution. If the
      intrusion is inadvertent, [the] defendant must offer some
      evidence to show prejudice to his constitutional rights, such
      as the disclosure of trial strategy to the prosecution or the
      production of tainted evidence.”
Id. at 111. We deferred to another day the question that is
now before us:
      “If a purposeful intrusion takes and conveys privileged
      information, it will remain for another case to determine
      whether prejudice should be conclusive or might be rebutted
      by an appropriate standard of proof if the state could show
      that defense strategy or evaluations were not actually com-
      municated to the prosecution, that no evidence resulted
      from or in response to the privileged information, and that
      no other compromise of defendant’s constitutional rights
      occurred.”
Id.
B.     The Right to Counsel Under the Federal Constitution
            The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
      “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
      right to * * * have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
In describing the Sixth Amendment right to “have the [a]
ssistance of [c]ounsel,” the United States Supreme Court
has said:
      “This right, fundamental to our system of justice, is meant
      to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process. Our
      cases have accordingly been responsive to proved claims
      that governmental conduct has rendered counsel’s assis-
      tance to the defendant ineffective.
         “At the same time and without detracting from the fun-
      damental importance of the right to counsel in criminal
      cases, we have implicitly recognized the necessity for pre-
      serving society’s interest in the administration of criminal
      justice.”
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                               179

United States v. Morrison, 449 US 361, 364, 101 S Ct 665,
66 L Ed 2d 564 (1981) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted). The federal right to legal counsel thus not
only “protects the whole range of the accused’s interests
implicated by a criminal prosecution[,]” Briggs v. Goodwin,
698 F2d 486, 494, vac’d on other grounds, 712 F2d 1444 (DC
Cir 1983), cert den, 464 US 1040 (1984), it serves to balance
those interests with the opposing interests of the state and
society in general.
         Much like Article I, section 11, “the essence of the
Sixth Amendment right is * * * privacy of communication
with counsel.” U.S. v. Rosner, 485 F2d 1213, 1224 (2nd Cir
1973), cert den, 417 US 950 (1974). Given that legal advice
is delivered and received through the medium of language
and is, at base, dependent upon candid, two-way dialogue
between attorney and client, the importance of maintaining
that confidentiality is clear.
          The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated
either by (1) the complete denial of counsel, or (2) the denial
of the effective assistance of counsel. United States v. Cronic,
466 US 648, 659, 104 S Ct 2039, 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984).
Unless a defendant is denied counsel entirely or at a crit-
ical stage of the proceeding, making the verdict unreli-
able, a defendant claiming a violation of his federal right
to the effective assistance of counsel must show prejudice.
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 US 162, 166, 122 S Ct 1237, 152 L Ed
2d 291 (2002). A defendant making an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim under either Article I, section 11, or
the Sixth Amendment must show (1) substandard perfor-
mance by legal counsel and (2) prejudice. Strasser v. State
of Oregon, 368 Or 238, 247-48, 489 P3d 1025 (2021). The
state and federal standards for such ineffective assistance of
counsel claims are, thus, “functionally equivalent.” Montez
v. Czerniak, 355 Or 1, 6-7, 322 P3d 487, adh’d to as modified
on recons, 355 Or 598, 330 P3d 595 (2014).
        The United States Supreme Court in Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 US 545, 547, 97 S Ct 837, 51 L Ed 2d 30 (1977),
a private civil rights action filed under 42 USC section 1983,
addressed the issue of whether an undercover law enforce-
ment agent who sat in on meetings between the defendant
180                                                    State v. Greenwood

and his attorney had “deprived [the defendant in the under-
lying criminal case] of his right to the effective assistance
of counsel guaranteed him by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution or deprived
him of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” The agent attended those meetings to main-
tain his undercover status and to avoid revealing his true
identity to the defendant. Id. at 549. He did not provide
the prosecution with any information about trial strategy
or the defendant’s defense, a fact that the Court explicitly
relied on to hold that no Sixth Amendment violation had
occurred. Id. at 549-50, 558 (“[U]nless [the agent] commu-
nicated the substance of the [attorney-client] conversations
and thereby created at least a realistic possibility of injury
to [the defendant] or benefit to the State, there can be no
Sixth Amendment violation.”).
         The Court concluded that the defendant was
required to show prejudice, noting that, “[a]s long as the
information possessed by [the agent] remained uncommu-
nicated, he posed no substantial threat to [the defendant’s]
Sixth Amendment rights.” Id. at 556. The Court, thus,
declined to adopt a per se rule of prejudice, and explained
that in the absence of (1) tainted evidence, (2) communica-
tion of defense strategy to the prosecution, or (3) evidence
that the government agent acted purposefully, “there was
no violation of the Sixth Amendment insofar as it is applica-
ble to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.”2
Id. at 557-58.
        The Court later struck a balance between “the
fundamental importance of the right to counsel in crimi-
nal cases” and “society’s interest in the administration of
    2
      Other courts refer to those three factors as the “Weatherford factors” or the
“Weatherford test,” used “to determine whether a violation of the sixth amend-
ment’s right to privileged communication has occurred.” See, e.g., U.S. v. Dyer,
821 F2d 35, 38 (1st Cir 1987) (“In Weatherford, the Court looked for (i) tainted
evidence; (ii) communication of defense strategy to the prosecution; and (iii) pur-
poseful intrusion by the government.”); see also U.S. v. Levy, 577 F2d 200, 210
(3rd Cir 1978) (“We think that the Court was suggesting by negative inference
that a sixth amendment violation would be found where, as here, defense strat-
egy was actually disclosed or where, as here, the government enforcement offi-
cials sought such confidential information.”); see also U.S. v. Danielson, 325 F3d
1054, 1067-69 (9th Cir 2003) (discussing and applying the Weatherford factors).
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                             181

criminal justice” explaining that “Sixth Amendment depri-
vations are subject to the general rule that remedies should
be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional vio-
lation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing
interests.” Morrison, 449 US at 364. The Court concluded
that “absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat
thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate,
even though the violation may have been deliberate.” Id. at
365.
         As we move to a discussion of other federal cases
in which violations of the right to counsel are alleged, we
note the large variety of contexts in which those cases arise.
Indeed, many do not apply here. We describe a narrow subset
of cases that focus on whether the violation was intentional,
whether trial strategy was communicated to the prosecutor,
and whether there was prejudice.
         The First Circuit adopted a rule requiring the gov-
ernment to prove the absence of prejudice upon the defen-
dant’s prima facie showing of prejudice. U.S. v. Mastroianni,
749 F2d 900, 907-08 (1st Cir 1984). That court noted that
“[t]he burden on the government is high because to require
anything less would be to condone intrusions into a defen-
dant’s protected attorney-client communications.” Id. at 908.
It concluded that there was no Sixth Amendment violation
in that case because the “reports did not in any way tend
even to suggest [the defendant’s] defense strategy to the gov-
ernment.” Id.
         The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held
that, even where the government intrusion is intentional,
the defendant must demonstrate prejudice to establish a
Sixth Amendment violation warranting a remedy. See U.S.
v. Steele, 727 F2d 580, 586 (6th Cir 1984), cert den, 467 US
1209 (1984) (“Even where there is an intentional intrusion
by the government into the attorney-client relationship,
prejudice to the defendant must be shown before any remedy
is granted.”); U.S. v. Singer, 785 F2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir
1986) (explaining that a Sixth Amendment violation alone
does not require dismissal, and affirming the district court’s
decision to permit government agents with knowledge of
the file to testify because defendant had not identified any
182                                                    State v. Greenwood

testimony that indicated knowledge of privileged informa-
tion or that caused him prejudice); U.S. v. Danielson, 325
F3d 1054, 1074 (9th Cir 2003) (remanding case to district
court because after the defendant showed purposeful viola-
tion by the government, the court must determine whether
the government met its burden to show that its trial strat-
egy was obtained from a legitimate source rather than from
the informant who had wrongfully recorded the privileged
conversations).
         The Tenth Circuit adopted a per se rule of prejudice
in a case where it concluded:
    “[W]e believe this case presents a situation unlike
    Weatherford in that the intrusion here was not only
    intentional, but also lacked a legitimate law enforcement
    purpose.”
Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir 1995).3
Reasoning that Weatherford “recognized that under some
circumstances a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights may
be violated by the state’s intrusion into the attorney-client
relationship[,]” and noting Weatherford’s emphasis on “both
the absence of purposefulness in the prosecutor’s intrusion
and the legitimate law enforcement interests at stake,” that
court held:
    “[W]hen the state becomes privy to confidential commu-
    nications because of its purposeful intrusion into the
    attorney-client relationship and lacks a legitimate justifi-
    cation for doing so, a prejudicial effect on the reliability of
    the trial process must be presumed. In adopting this rule,
    we conclude that no other standard can adequately deter
    this sort of misconduct.”

    3
      We note that the Tenth Circuit has pending before it a case that it will
decide en banc, with a request to counsel for supplemental briefing on two
questions:
    “A. Did Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F3d 1132 (10th Cir 1995) correctly hold
    that it is structural error for the government to purposefully intrude without
    legitimate justification into the attorney-client relationship and that preju-
    dice must be presumed?
    “B. When, if ever, does the government unjustifiably intrude into the
    attorney-client relationship by intentionally obtaining attorney-client com-
    munications that are not privileged?”
United States v. Hohn, 91 F4th 1060 (10th Cir 2024).
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                                             183

Shillinger, 70 F3d at 1138-39, 1142. The court nevertheless
remanded to the trial court to determine whether a retrial
could “sufficiently purge the Sixth Amendment taint occa-
sioned by the prosecutor’s intrusion.” Id. at 1143.
         The Third Circuit concluded that where a prosecu-
tor with improper knowledge of defense strategy tried a case
to conclusion, the violation irreversibly tainted the proceed-
ing and dismissal was the only means to cure the violation.
U.S. v. Levy, 577 F2d 200, 210 (3rd Cir 1978). It reasoned:
   “[T]he interests at stake in the attorney-client relation-
   ship are unlike the expectations of privacy that underlie
   the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. The fundamental
   justification for the sixth amendment right to counsel is
   the presumed inability of a defendant to make informed
   choices about the preparation and conduct of his defense.
   Free two-way communication between client and attorney
   is essential if the professional assistance guaranteed by the
   sixth amendment is to be meaningful. The purpose of the
   attorney-client privilege is inextricably linked to the very
   integrity and accuracy of the fact finding process itself.
   * * * In order for the adversary system to function properly,
   any advice received as a result of a defendant’s disclosure
   to counsel must be insulated from the government. * * * We
   think that the inquiry into prejudice must stop at the point
   where attorney-client confidences are actually disclosed to
   the government enforcement agencies responsible for inves-
   tigating and prosecuting the case. Any other rule would
   disturb the balance implicit in the adversary system and
   thus would jeopardize the very process by which guilt and
   innocence are determined in our society.”
Id. at 209 (emphasis added). Dismissal was required because
“the integrity of the attorney-client relationship would be
ill-served by devices to isolate new government agents from
information which is now in the public domain.” Id. at 210.
C. Other States
        State right-to-counsel cases, like federal cases,
range broadly in their factual contexts and they address a
wide variety of legal questions, not all of which are relevant
here.4 We restrict our discussion to cases that address the
    4
      For example, the Georgia Court of Appeals suggested in dicta that a per se
Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the government purposefully intrudes
184                                                     State v. Greenwood

questions of intentionality, prejudice, and remedy where
the state becomes aware of confidential trial and defense
strategy. As we will explain, states generally tend to favor
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice of some sort, with a
requirement that the remedy be tailored to address the prej-
udice caused by the violation. There is considerable varia-
tion, however, as to (1) whether state courts presume preju-
dice and, if so, under what circumstances, (2) whether they
place an initial burden on the defendant to show prejudice
or on the state to show the absence of prejudice, and (3) what
quantum of proof is required to meet that burden. See, e.g.,
State v. Lenarz, 301 Conn 417, 438, 22 A3d 536, 550 (2011)
(holding that disclosure of trial strategy to a prosecutor is
presumptively prejudicial, shifting the burden to the state to
disprove prejudice through clear and convincing evidence).
          Deliberate prosecutorial misconduct often triggers
closer scrutiny and more stringent remedies. For example, in
South Carolina, deliberate prosecutorial misconduct raises
a conclusive presumption of prejudice, regardless of the con-
tent of the intercepted communication. State v. Quattlebaum,
338 SC 441, 448, 527 SE2d 105, 109 (2000). In that case,
the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed several con-
victions on direct appeal where the prosecutor had deliber-
ately eavesdropped on a privileged conversation between the
defendant and his attorney. Id. at 448-49, 527 SE2d at 109.
Addressing the question of whether a Sixth Amendment vio-
lation resulted from the intrusion, the court explained:
    “We conclude, consistent with existing federal precedent,
    that a defendant must show either deliberate prosecutorial
    misconduct or prejudice to make out a violation of the Sixth
    Amendment, but not both.”
Id. at 448, 527 SE2d at 109 (emphasis in original). That
court held that “[d]eliberate prosecutorial misconduct raises
an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice.” Id.
into the attorney-client relationship, becomes privy to an attorney-client com-
munication, and the intrusion is not justified by any legitimate law enforce-
ment interests. Burns v. State, 368 Ga App 642, 645, 889 SE2d 447, 451 (2023),
rev allowed (2024). However, that court did not adopt such a rule because it con-
cluded that the communication between the accused and his attorney that was
at issue was not, in fact, confidential because “there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in a recorded telephone call made from a jail or prison.” Id. at 646, 889
SE2d at 451-52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                                  185

         Connecticut required dismissal where the court
found, after burden-shifting, that the prosecutor “clearly
invaded privileged communications that contained a
detailed, explicit road map of the defendant’s strategy” and
failed to disclose the invasion. Lenarz, 301 Conn at 451, 22
A3d at 558. It thus adopted a rebuttable presumption of prej-
udice when defense trial strategy is disclosed to the pros-
ecutor, because such disclosure is “inherently prejudicial,”
without regard to the “subjective intent of the government.”
Id. at 437, 22 A3d at 549-50 (emphasis in original). That
court also adopted a clear and convincing burden of proof for
rebuttal. Id. at 437-38, 22 A3d at 550.
        It is clear that any prosecutorial access to privi-
leged information, especially trial strategy, is relevant to
the analysis of prejudice. Idaho accurately highlighted the
fundamental difficulty presented by such cases:
   “While there are not clear answers as to if and how the
   prosecution’s access and retention led to specific outcomes
   that were prejudicial to [the defendant] at trial, this uncer-
   tainty is precisely the problem when the privileged com-
   munications at issue consist of the defendant’s plans and
   strategies.”
State v. Robins, 164 Idaho 425, 435, 431 P3d 260, 270 (2018).
         In Nebraska, “a presumption of prejudice arises
when the State becomes privy to a defendant’s confidential
trial strategy.” State v. Bain, 292 Neb 398, 418, 872 NW2d
777, 790-91 (2016). That “presumption is rebuttable—at
least when the State did not deliberately intrude into the
attorney-client relationship.” Id. at 418, 872 NW2d at 791.
That court explained that the presumption is rebuttable
because
   “some disclosures of confidential information to the State
   might be insignificant. Or the State could prove that it
   did not use the confidential information in any way to the
   defendant’s detriment. For example, the State could prove
   that it did not derive its evidence and trial strategy from
   the disclosure of a defendant’s trial strategy by showing
   that it had legitimate, independent sources for them.”
Id. The Nebraska court held that the state’s burden of proof
on rebuttal must be by clear and convincing evidence:
186                                          State v. Greenwood

       “In cases involving individual rights, whether crimi-
   nal or civil, the principle consideration in determining the
   proper standard of proof is whether the standard mini-
   mally reflects the value society places on individual liberty,
   because the function of legal process is to minimize the risk
   of erroneous decisions. The individual should not be asked
   to share equally with society the risk of error when the pos-
   sible injury to the individual is significantly greater than
   any possible harm to the state.
       “Applying these principles, we conclude that a mere pre-
   ponderance standard is inappropriate. Both the State and
   the public have a substantial interest in the fair admin-
   istration of criminal justice and protecting a defendant’s
   constitutional rights. More particularly, our society neces-
   sarily places a high value on ensuring that criminal trials
   are not tainted by disclosures that unfairly advantage the
   prosecution and threaten to subvert the adversary system
   of criminal justice. And requiring a defendant to share a
   roughly equal risk of error in determining whether the
   State used his confidential information to his detriment
   does not reflect those values.
      “Conversely, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is
   a criminal trial protection that should not apply because
   the State is not proving the elements of a charged offense.
   And we recognized that this strictest criminal standard
   does not apply to the admissibility of evidence or * * * the
   prosecution’s burden of proof at a suppression hearing when
   evidence is challenged on constitutional grounds.”
Id. at 420-21, 872 NW2d at 792 (internal quotation marks
and footnotes omitted; ellipsis in original).
         Arizona has adopted a burden-shifting rule of prej-
udice in cases involving purposeful intrusions into the
attorney-client relationship, and it holds the state to a bur-
den of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Warner, 150
Ariz 123, 128, 722 P2d 291, 296 (1986). That court remanded
the case with the following instructions:
   “The trial court should make separate and detailed find-
   ings regarding the motive behind the seizure of defendant’s
   papers, the use made of them, whether the interference
   with the attorney relationship was deliberate, whether the
   state benefitted in any way from the seizure, if the papers
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                                  187

   were used how any taint was purged in defendant’s trial
   and whether defendant was, in fact, prejudiced.”
Id. at 129, 722 P2d at 297.
          States generally do not favor dismissal as a rem-
edy for right-to-counsel violations if a less extreme remedy
can be tailored to neutralize prejudice and ensure fairness.
See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 209 A3d 25, 58 (Del 2019) (“The
overwhelming weight of the case law * * * holds that dis-
missal of an indictment with prejudice * * * should not be
imposed absent findings of irreparable prejudice.”). Not long
after Weatherford, the California Supreme Court decided
such a case. It dismissed the indictments because the evi-
dence showed actual prejudice—reluctance of defendants to
cooperate with their attorneys—stemming from the wrong-
ful disclosure of defense strategy to the prosecutor by the
undercover agent who had heard the privileged conversa-
tion. Barber v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal 3d 742, 755, 760, 598
P2d 818, 825, 828 (Cal 1979). Subsequent California cases
likewise focus on whether prejudice exists when discerning
the appropriate remedy:
   “[W]e conclude the assumed violation of the right to coun-
   sel in this case is not an error that by itself constitutes a
   miscarriage of justice, without consideration of the error’s
   impact on the outcome of the case.”
People v. Alexander, 49 Cal 4th 846, 897, 235 P3d 873, 897
(Cal 2010), cert den, 563 US 945 (2011). The California
Supreme Court explained in a different case that it fol-
lows the analytic approach of Weatherford to evaluate Sixth
Amendment claims:
      “Accordingly, we look to Weatherford to evaluate defen-
   dant’s Sixth Amendment claim. * * *
      “* * * * *
      “Applying the Weatherford factors to defendant’s claim,
   he fails to establish a constitutional violation. The officers
   who provided security were expressly admonished not to
   reveal the content of any overheard conversations to any-
   one. Again, there is no evidence they disregarded the court’s
   admonishment by disclosing confidential communications.
   Nor did the officers testify regarding any attorney-client
188                                          State v. Greenwood

   conversation. Finally, defendant fails to identify any evi-
   dence allegedly developed as a result of the correctional
   officers’ presence. It is defendant’s obligation to make such
   a record.”
People v. Delgado, 2 Cal 5th 544, 561-63, 389 P3d 805, 818-
19 (Cal 2017) (emphasis in original; citations and footnote
omitted). The court, thus, concluded that the defendant had
not established a Sixth Amendment violation and that, even
if he had, he “failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability
that, absent any alleged violation, the trial’s outcome would
have been more favorable.” Id. at 568, 389 P3d at 823. That
is to say, he did not establish prejudice. The court also noted
that the evidence against the defendant was compelling. Id.
          The Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana, recog-
nized the state’s “unique responsibility as a fiduciary to fun-
damental principles of fairness” and found that its intrusion
was purposeful, but it nevertheless required the defendant to
show that she had been prejudiced by the intrusion. Morrison
v. State, 575 SW3d 1, 17 (Tex App 2019); see also Robins, 164
Idaho at 435, 431 P3d at 270 (holding that defendant “satis-
fied a prima facie showing of prejudice” where the evidence
showed that the prosecuting attorney had “prolonged access
to privileged notes” that included defense strategy, which
shifted the burden to the state to prove an “independent ori-
gin” for its evidence and argument).
         The Supreme Court of Washington held that “eaves-
dropping is presumed to cause prejudice to the defendant
unless the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the eavesdropping did not result in any such prejudice.”
State v. Fuentes, 179 Wash 2d 808, 812, 318 P3d 257, 259
(2014) (emphasis in original). The court thus concluded that
“eavesdropping” is presumptively prejudicial, and it required
the state to show, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that
defendant was not prejudiced. Id. at 819-20, 318 P3d at 262.
         Even in states where the facts led to a presump-
tion of prejudice—with the exception of South Carolina—
the courts employed a burden-shifting approach to deter-
mine actual prejudice. The wide variation in outcomes, it
seems to us, reflects the wide variation in the factual cir-
cumstances of each case. It is likewise clear to us that the
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                                189

analytic approach of Weatherford effectively balances the
significant and opposing interests at stake in each case,
yielding functionally different outcomes for different cases
that are nevertheless consistent with those constitutionally
protected interests.
D. This Case
         The question here, as framed by the parties, is
whether the court erred in denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss. We conclude that the trial court erred in not dis-
missing Counts 7 and 8 when it ruled on defendant’s pretrial
motions. We reverse and remand the judgment for the court
to enter a judgment of dismissal on Counts 7 and 8. We also
reverse and remand the judgment to allow defendant an
opportunity to withdraw his plea. If defendant withdraws
his plea, the trial court is to proceed as to the first six counts
in a manner consistent with this opinion.
         We begin by summarizing the key constitutional
principles discussed in the cases we have already men-
tioned. By its nature, the right to counsel ensures—through
counsel—that other constitutional rights are asserted and
enforced. The individual’s right to counsel ensures fairness
in the adversary process for the individual and for soci-
ety. Fair trials promote and preserve the integrity of the
criminal justice system through reliable verdicts, and they
advance the public’s interest in community and personal
safety. The fact-specific nature of right-to-counsel cases
requires careful attention to the violator’s purpose, the con-
tent of the information obtained, and whether the violation
prejudiced the defendant.
         Next, we acknowledge that the assigned trial judge
here enlisted the assistance of a different judge to evalu-
ate the recorded calls, and that he asked that judge to con-
duct his review under Russum. In doing so, the trial judge
(1) screened himself from evidence, the admissibility of which
was uncertain, and (2) identified the most recent Oregon
authority relevant to the task. The procedure employed by
the trial court was thoughtfully designed, and we assume
the accuracy of the factual description of the recorded calls
as reported by the reviewing judge. But we do not agree with
190                                       State v. Greenwood

the trial court’s framing of the state’s burden. The state’s
burden was not simply to prove that the content of the calls
had not been conveyed to the prosecutor. It was to prove
the absence of prejudice to defendant—i.e., that defendant’s
position was the same “as if the state’s officers had remained
within the limits of their authority.” State v. Davis, 295 Or
227, 237, 666 P2d 802 (1983). When properly framed, the
record does not support the trial court’s finding that the
state met its burden, and it erred in concluding otherwise.
         It is important to our analysis that the constitu-
tional violation was intentional, that it served no legitimate
law enforcement purpose, and that it yielded privileged
information about trial strategy. When Regan was asked
whether she had listened to the recorded calls, she denied
that she had done so. But Regan’s digital trail revealed that
she listened to the calls and that she did so for an amount
of time sufficient to establish that she did so on purpose.
Regan’s false denial strongly supports inferences that (1) she
knew that listening to the calls was wrong, and that (2) the
state derived some advantage from the information that she
obtained by listening to the calls. The trial court was cor-
rect in finding that the violation was “clear and problem-
atic,” but it erred in concluding that the violation was not
grossly shocking or outrageous.
          Regan violated defendant’s right to counsel inten-
tionally and, in so doing, she obtained privileged trial strat-
egy information. Regan not only led the investigation for one
and a half years, but she also continued to lead the investi-
gation for nine months after she listened to the calls, even
after she lied about listening to the calls. The indictment
was amended twice after Regan listened to the calls—once
to add a count of murder in the first degree and once to add
a count of burglary in the first degree. It is significant that
Regan testified before the grand jury in each instance in
support of the additional charge. We conclude that a pre-
sumption of prejudice arose once defendant made a prima
facie showing that the violation occurred, that it was inten-
tional, and that the violation resulted in the disclosure of
defense trial strategy. We also conclude that the presump-
tion is rebuttable. Our conclusion is consistent not only with
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                                              191

Oregon caselaw, but also with the vast majority of cases from
other state and federal courts in this country.5 It also follows
Oregon’s approach to remedying constitutional violations
“in order to vindicate the individual’s personal rights” by
presumptively suppressing any prejudicial evidence “unless
the state shows that the evidence did not result from that
violation.” Craigen, 370 Or at 711-12. Finally, our conclusion
is also consistent with the principle that the state’s interest
as the people’s representative is not to “win a case, but that
justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 US 78, 88,
55 S Ct 629, 79 L Ed 1314 (1935).
         Defendant made a prima facie showing of an inten-
tional violation of his right to counsel that revealed defense
trial strategy information to the state’s lead detective. That
showing shifted the burden to the state to prove the absence
of prejudice to defendant. The fact that the lead detective
concealed the violation from the prosecutor may well be rel-
evant to what the prosecutor knew or did not know, but it is
not dispositive on the question of prejudice.6 There is a dif-
ference between asking (1) whether the content of the calls
had been conveyed to the prosecutor or to the other officers,
(2) whether new evidence was discovered because of the vio-
lation, and (3) whether the state’s case against defendant
was influenced by the violation. The answer to each of those
questions requires a greater showing than the question
before it.
         Whether the prosecutor was told about the content
of the calls is not the same question as whether the case
he was preparing was influenced by the content of those
calls. Developing or refining trial strategy is not the same
as gathering or developing evidence. To rebut the presump-
tion of prejudice the state must do more than offer testimony
from the other law enforcement officers that they did not
    5
       Our review of federal caselaw, set forth above, leaves us unconvinced that
the federal constitution would provide any greater remedy for defendant in this
case than is provided under the Oregon Constitution. We, thus, resolve this
appeal under the Oregon Constitution and we decline to further address defen-
dant’s federal constitutional arguments.
    6
       The burden-shifting approach that we adopt today does not require us to
accept the collective knowledge doctrine on which defendant relies and we do not
do so. That doctrine is no more applicable here than it was in Russum. 265 Or App
at 119.
192                                       State v. Greenwood

know about the recordings, that they did not listen to them,
and that no one ever told them what was in the calls. But
because the trial court framed the question for the state as
whether the content of the calls had been conveyed to the
prosecutor, rather than whether defendant was prejudiced
by the constitutional violation, that was the focus of the tes-
timony that the state brought forward at the suppression
hearing. There was no evidence offered that the state’s case
against defendant remained the same in terms of evidence
and strategy after the violation occurred. Framed correctly,
the record might have developed differently.
          We next turn to the measure of proof that is required
on rebuttal. As already mentioned, state and federal courts
vary in their approach to the proper standard of proof when
rebutting prejudice. In determining the appropriate stan-
dard, we are guided, in part, by the constitutional principle
in Oregon that requires us, as an appellate court, to affirm a
verdict despite any error when there is little likelihood that
the particular error affected the outcome. State v. Davis, 336
Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003). Implicit in that constitutional
principle is the recognition that, even where a defendant’s
rights have been affected by a trial court’s error, the ends of
justice do not require an appellate remedy if there is “little
likelihood” that the error affected the outcome. In such a
case, despite the existence of error, we would affirm. While
the state’s burden of proof following an intentional viola-
tion of the right to counsel bears no legal relationship to the
standard we apply when determining whether to remedy a
trial court’s error, we think that the underlying interests of
justice are analogous. That is, when there is an intentional
violation of the right to counsel that discloses trial strategy,
a remedy is appropriate unless the state can show that the
violation has little likelihood of affecting the outcome. Thus,
the state bears a suitably heavy burden to show that the
defendant will not suffer prejudice in the wake of the state’s
own unlawful acts. Translating that concept into the lan-
guage of a more familiar standard of proof, we think the one
most appropriate is the “clear and convincing” standard.
That standard “requires the state to produce evidence that
is of extraordinary persuasiveness and that makes the facts
at issue highly probable.” State v. A. D. S., 258 Or App 44,
Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024)                                                193

47, 308 P3d 365 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We, thus, adopt a clear and convincing evidence standard as
the state’s burden of proof on rebuttal to show the absence of
prejudice.
         Dismissal of criminal charges is reserved for
extreme cases because it is a remedy that “frustrates the
public interest in having the prosecution of crimes occur in
order to promote the protection of the public and the reha-
bilitation of offenders.” State v. Hadsell, 129 Or App 171,
174, 878 P2d 444, rev den, 320 Or 271 (1994). A case-by-case
analysis is required whenever a defendant seeks dismissal.
Trial courts must tailor appropriate remedies, taking into
consideration all the circumstances of a given case and bal-
ancing the competing interests at stake.7
         This is an extreme case. Regan’s intentional con-
duct was grossly shocking and outrageous. Counts 7 and 8
should have been dismissed because they were added after
Regan violated defendant’s right to counsel and, impor-
tantly, after she testified in the grand jury proceedings that
resulted in the indictments with the new charges. The state
did not, and on that record could not, carry its burden to
show the lack of prejudice at that point in time.
         We recognize that Counts 1 through 6 are differ-
ent because they were included in indictments that were
filed before Regan violated defendant’s constitutional right
to counsel. The question is whether the prosecutor gained
an advantage in developing and refining the state’s case
against defendant on those existing charges because of the
information that Regan obtained when she listened to the
recorded calls. Although the trial court found, and the record
supports, that Regan did not expressly disclose defendant’s

     7
       For example, we concluded that a trial court did not err in denying dis-
missal of a delivery of controlled substance case on speedy trial grounds where the
nineteen-month delay did not prejudice the defendant. State v. Garcia-Plascencia,
148 Or App 318, 324, 939 P2d 641, rev den, 326 Or 58 (1997). In another case, we
held that the defendant was entitled to suppression of a breath test after a police
officer denied her attorney’s request to speak with defendant on an unrecorded
line, noting that the chilling effect occurred at the time of conversation and as
such, “[t]he violation cannot be cured later simply because no one listened to the
tape.” State v. Riddle, 149 Or App 141, 147-48, 941 P2d 1079, rev den, 326 Or 68
(1997).
194                                        State v. Greenwood

trial strategy to the prosecutor, it is not possible to conclude,
on this record, that the prosecutor’s case development and
strategic planning were not influenced by that information,
especially given Regan’s extensive and continued work on
the case. The record is not sufficient to allow a finding of
what information had been developed, or from what source
it had been obtained, before the date on which Regan lis-
tened to the calls in September 2020. Should defendant
withdraw his plea on remand, the state is to be afforded the
opportunity to develop a factual record on the question of
whether, on Counts 1 through 6, defendant was prejudiced
by the constitutional violation. See State v. Turay, 371 Or
128, 169, 532 P3d 57 (2023) (remanding a case for further
proceedings where “[n]either party had the opportunity
below to address the standard that we have now identified
as governing” nor “was alerted to the need to create a fac-
tual record * * * under that standard”). If the state does not
meet its burden, dismissal would be required. If the state
meets its burden, the trial court would, at that point, be in
the best position to determine whether anything more than
a broad exclusionary order would be necessary to avoid the
taint of the violation and to ensure a fair trial.
        Having concluded that the trial court erred, we
reverse and remand the judgment for the trial court to enter
a judgment of dismissal on Counts 7 and 8, to allow defen-
dant an opportunity to withdraw his plea, and for the court
to proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion.
        Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment of
dismissal on Counts 7 and 8 and for further proceedings.