Court Opinion

ID: 9897250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:14.825368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.546521
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Oct 26 2023, 8:50 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ann M. Sutton                                              Theodore E. Rokita
Marion County Public Defender Agency                       Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Tyler Banks
                                                           Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                           General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Courtney Staton
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jason Dane Brown,                                          October 26, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CR-01241
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Mark Stoner,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           49D32-1708-MR-028177

                                  Opinion by Judge May
                           Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023                           Page 1 of 21
[1]   Jason Dane Brown appeals his conviction of murder. 1 He presents two issues

      for our review, which we expand and restate as:

                 1. Whether Brown’s right to due process was violated when the
                 State did not preserve a blood sample collected shortly after
                 Brown shot Lieutenant Aaron Allan;

                 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
                 urinalysis results from a sample collected shortly after Brown
                 shot Lieutenant Allan; and

                 3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence that Brown
                 knowingly or intentionally killed Lieutenant Allan.

      We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History                                2

[2]   On July 27, 2017, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Brown and Hassan London

      were in a vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed on Madison Avenue in

      Indianapolis. Brown, who was driving, made a sudden lane change, swerved to

      the right, overcorrected, and ran into the curb. Upon impact with the curb, the

      vehicle bounced off the curb, slid across the road, hit the median strip between

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
      2
       We held oral argument on this case on September 19, 2023, at Southeast Fountain Elementary School for
      an audience of students from Fountain Central High School, Seeger Memorial High School, and Attica High
      School. We thank counsel for their able presentations, and we thank the school administration and program
      organizers for their hospitality.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023                        Page 2 of 21
      the north and south lanes of Madison Avenue, and then started to roll. The

      vehicle “[e]nded up on the front lawn [of a house] upside down[.]” (Tr. Vol. VI

      at 126.) After the car came to a stop in the front lawn, London exited the car,

      seemingly uninjured, though he was “disoriented.” (Id. at 97.) There was

      extensive damage to the property where the car stopped, and the property

      owner asked London, “what were you thinking?” to which London replied,

      “we were just getting high and driving fast.” (Id. at 101-2.) The property owner

      noticed Brown was still in the vehicle, upside down, and suspended by his

      seatbelt. The property owner called 911.

[3]   Shortly after the crash, Michele Strack, a nurse passing by, approached the

      overturned vehicle to render aid and observed Brown suspended upside down

      in the vehicle. He appeared to be unconscious. Strack felt for a pulse and lifted

      Brown’s chin to ensure he was breathing. Another nurse who was passing by at

      the time of the accident, Angela Cook, also stopped to help. Cook did not

      observe any injuries on Brown but did not move him because he may have

      sustained a neck injury. She noticed Brown was “reaching for things, or

      fidgeting with things” on the roof of the vehicle that had fallen out of his

      pockets. (Id. at 213.)

[4]   Shortly thereafter, Major Charles Bowman of the Homecroft Police

      Department and Lieutenant Allan of the Southport Police Department

      responded to a report of a car accident on Madison Avenue in Indianapolis.

      When they arrived, Lieutenant Allan got down on his knees and crawled

      toward the passenger side of the vehicle. He spoke to Brown, who was still

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023     Page 3 of 21
      agitated and fidgety. Lieutenant Allan asked Brown if he knew what happened

      and if he knew what day it was. Brown mumbled in response and gave

      Lieutenant Allan his driver’s license. Brown continued to move around.

      Lieutenant Allan asked him to stop moving around and explained that medical

      personnel were worried about a neck injury. Brown told Lieutenant Allan his

      name was “Jason.” (State’s Ex. 148 at 0:42.)

[5]   Lieutenant Allan continued to try to calm Brown and reminded him to stay still

      while medical personnel were determining Brown’s condition. Suddenly,

      Brown yelled “fuck you” and said “give me the fucking gun.” (Id. at 1:09 - :11.)

      Lieutenant Allan backed out of the car and told Brown to stop. Brown again

      yelled profanities at Lieutenant Allan and began touching his own clothing.

      Lieutenant Allan looked back into the car and yelled, “he’s trying to grab

      something out of his pocket.” (Id. at 1:20.) Lieutenant Allan told Brown to

      stop. Brown pulled a firearm from the back of his waistband, lifted the firearm,

      and shot Lieutenant Allan until the firearm ran out of ammunition.

[6]   Officer Kevin Conjelko of the Johnson County Sheriff’s Department was off

      duty, but stopped at the scene when he passed by shortly after the accident

      occurred. While helping others on scene, Officer Conjelko heard gunfire. He

      immediately dropped to his knees, pointed his firearm at Brown, and shot six

      rounds in Brown’s direction. Officer Conjelko returned to his vehicle, reloaded

      his gun, and fired two more shots toward Brown. Chief John Ryan of the

      Homecroft Police Department, who was also on the scene, fired two shots

      toward Brown as well.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023   Page 4 of 21
[7]   When the gunfire stopped, Strack observed a person “down in the grass . . .

      someone laying on their back.” (Tr. Vol. V at 65.) She said, “we’ve got

      someone down” and officers went to the person on the ground. (Id.) One of

      the officers said, “Allan is down.” (Id.) Officer Conjelko attempted to speak to

      Lieutenant Allan, who was unresponsive. Officer Conjelko then rolled

      Lieutenant Allan over and “just saw massive trauma everywhere.” (Id. at 140.)

      He saw “multiple entry wounds, exit wounds . . . [that were] no longer

      bleeding.” (Id.) Shortly thereafter, medical personnel took Lieutenant Allan to

      the hospital. Lieutenant Allan died later that day from gunshot wounds to his

      right forearm, right upper arm, right knee, right lateral chest, right lower

      abdomen, right buttock, central lower abdomen, left forearm, left side, and left

      medial thigh. The autopsy indicated the shot through the left side was likely

      fatal because it struck Lieutenant Allan’s heart.

[8]   After medical personnel removed Lieutenant Allan from the scene, Officer

      Christopher Hemphill of the Homecroft Police Department arrived in response

      to the Code One 3 radio call. He learned from another officer, who still had his

      gun drawn, that Brown shot Lieutenant Allan. Officer Hemphill looked inside

      the vehicle where he saw Brown and the gun, which had “the slide locked

      back.” 4 (Tr. Vol. VI at 29.)

      3
          “Code One” is a radio call that indicates “there is an officer that’s down.” (Tr. Vol. VI at 83.)
      4
          When the slide locks back, it indicates the firearm is “empty.” (Tr. Vol. VI at 30.)

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023                                   Page 5 of 21
[9]    Officer Hemphill approached Brown, who was still hanging by his seatbelt in

       the overturned vehicle. He told Brown he was going to remove him from the

       vehicle so Brown needed to put his hands outside the car. He then told Brown

       “Don’t move. If you move, make any sudden movements towards the gun,

       you’re going to get shot.” (Id.) Brown complied with Officer Hemphill’s

       directions. Officer Hemphill cut the seatbelt. Another officer dragged Brown

       toward the back of the car, searched him, handcuffed him, and then allowed

       medics to treat him.

[10]   Paramedics transported Brown in an ambulance to Eskenazi Hospital. En

       route, Brown began to “moan and groan and talk.” (Id. at 62.) He was able to

       give paramedics his name and indicated he “knew what happened.” (Id.) At

       some point after Brown arrived at the hospital, medical personnel took a blood

       sample and a urine sample as part of his care. Brown sustained gunshot

       wounds to his left forearm, right neck, right cheek, nose, and the top of his

       head.

[11]   The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department assigned Detective Mark

       Prater to investigate the case. He immediately applied for and was granted

       search warrants for Brown’s vehicle, the crime scene, and Brown’s clothing. In

       the vehicle, Officer Christine Hagan of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police

       Department, who was assisting Detective Prater with the investigation, found

       eighteen spent bullet cartridges along with a nine-millimeter handgun with the

       “slide . . . in the locked back position . . . [and there] was no unfired cartridge in

       the chamber, and the magazine was empty.” (Tr. Vol. V at 212.) She also Court
       of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023        Page 6 of 21
       found a “potential quart-size Ziplock [sic] baggy [sic] that contained smaller

       bags with possible marijuana in them” and a scale in the vehicle. (Id. at 211.)

[12]   Detective Prater did not request a blood sample at the time of his initial

       investigation because “[t]here was no information that would warrant us getting

       a blood draw at that time.” (Tr. Vol. VI at 147.) However, after consulting

       with the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office, “the decision was made to try to

       obtain a blood sample” from Brown on the day of the crime. (Id.) On August

       15, 2017, after obtaining a search warrant for Brown’s blood sample, Detective

       Prater attempted to obtain the blood sample taken from Brown at Eskenazi

       Hospital shortly after the crime. A representative of Eskenazi Hospital

       indicated the blood sample had been destroyed, but Brown’s urine sample,

       which was collected at about the same time, was still available. After obtaining

       an additional search warrant for the urine sample, Detective Prater collected the

       urine sample on August 15, 2017, and sent it to a laboratory for analysis.

       Brown’s urine sample tested positive for THC; cocaine; two different types of

       “spice,” a synthetic cannabinoid; and hydromorphone, which was likely present

       because of the opioid pain medication Brown was given in the hospital.

[13]   On August 1, 2017, the State charged Brown with murder and Class A

       misdemeanor possession of marijuana. 5 On September 28, 2017, the State filed

       notice of its intent to pursue the death penalty. On May 24, 2021, Brown filed a

       5
           Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(b).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023     Page 7 of 21
       motion to exclude the results of the toxicology report. He argued toxicology

       results from a urinalysis are not relevant under Indiana Evidence Rule 401

       “because impairment or intoxication cannot be inferred from the results of a

       urine screen.” (App. Vol. IX at 131.) Additionally, Brown asserted the results

       should be excluded “because the State has failed to properly preserve the urine

       sample, the defense is unable to perform any of its own testing on the sample.”

       (Id.) The State filed its response, and then the trial court held a hearing on

       Brown’s motion on August 11, 2021.

[14]   On December 3, 2021, Brown entered an agreement with the State in which he

       would waive his right to a jury trial in exchange for dismissal of the State’s

       request for the death penalty. On January 3, 2022, the trial court denied

       Brown’s motion to exclude the toxicology results. Brown’s bench trial

       commenced on February 1, 2022. After the State’s case in chief, Brown moved

       for an involuntary dismissal of the murder charge and, in the alternative, Brown

       asked for dismissal of the possibility of a sentence of life without parole because

       the State had not “proven murder or the aggravating circumstance required for

       the life without parole sentence request.” (Tr. Vol. VII at 207.) Brown argued

       the State did not prove Brown acted knowingly or intentionally as required for a

       conviction of murder. Additionally, Brown argued that, if the trial court

       determined Brown committed murder, the State did not prove the aggravating

       circumstance that Brown “knew Lieutenant Allan was a police officer at the

       time of the shooting.” (Id. at 208.)

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023     Page 8 of 21
[15]   The trial court agreed the State had not proven Brown knew Lieutenant Allan

       was a police officer and, therefore, it dismissed the possibility of Brown

       receiving a sentence of life without parole. On February 22, 2022, the trial

       court found Brown guilty as charged. In doing so, the trial court recounted the

       elements of murder and acknowledged Brown’s defenses thereto:

               The evidence of the shooting and the identity of the shooter is
               overwhelming and uncontradicted. This is not a case based on
               circumstantial evidence alone where the State must exclude every
               reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The State does not require –
               the law does not require the State to prove motive. It’s always
               helpful, highly relevant but not necessary, because we know
               almost by definition the crime itself is an irrational act not based
               on logic and people commit criminal offensesfor [sic] the most
               illogical and even stupidest of reasons.

               [I]n similar fashion, the State does not have to prove
               premeditation for murder, a planned out thought for reason,
               because again, we [sic] know people do some of the most
               dangerous and violent acts within seconds without significant
               consideration of the likely consequences.

               This also is not a case where the State must prove the
               Defendant’s intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not
               a crime, unlike operating a motor vehicle under the influence of
               liquor causing death, where intoxication is an element of the
               offense. If it were, the State’s failure to obtain and preserve the
               Defendant’s blood sample would have crippled the case. While
               the State has argued vigorously its theory of the case with an
               emphasis on the Defendant’s drug use and/or the Defendant’s
               reaction to a potential drug withdrawal, the Court is not required
               to accept or even agree with that premise. The elements are
               simple, did the Defendant knowingly kill Lieutenant Allen [sic].

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023     Page 9 of 21
        The sole issue is the knowingly element. Normally, shooting at
        someone 18 times, hitting them 11 times would satisfy the
        element.

        More specifically, the issue here is whether the Defendant, based
        on a medical condition, lacked the mens rea to be held
        responsible under the law. While not a statutory defense
        specifically delineated by the legislature like insanity, it is similar.
        Yes, I did this, but I am not legally responsible for it.

        The defense has relied primarily on an expert witness, Dr.
        [Pamela] Blake, who admittedly is not an expert in the field most
        at issue. She is not an epileptologist. And while her knowledge
        of epilepsy is impressive, her actual experience with epilepsy
        patients is extremely limited. She changed her original theory of
        causation given under oath in a substantial way when she had an
        ample opportunity to observe the fallacy of her own conclusion
        and correct it.

        Her second causation theory rested primarily on the truthfulness
        and credibility of the Defendant’s passenger, Hassan London,
        not from his actual trial testimony but from his previous sworn
        and unsworn statements. This court personally observed
        London’s testimony under oath and found him to be of all of the
        witnesses in this case totally unreliable, evasive, self-serving and
        unworthy of belief. London refused to answer the simplest of
        questions despite having use immunity and the benefit of
        appointed counsel. Dr. Blake’s opinion also accepted those parts
        of London’s statements which fit her theory of the case and
        ignored statements which did not, his excited utterance that we
        were getting high and driving fast and the Defendant previously
        drove fast, as London described it, like a Nascar driver. Any
        expert opinion based upon London’s evidence is not reliable in
        the court’s view. Dr. Blake also accepted at face value without
        any medical documentation or substantiation the Defendant’s

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023         Page 10 of 21
        family assertions that the Defendant must have had seizures
        before.

        In addition to the defense expert’s changing opinions, reliance
        upon a witness with little to no credibility and the acceptance of
        family assertions of prior seizures without documentation, the
        expert acknowledged her opinion is consistent with the
        international standards established by professionals who have the
        specific expertise to guide courts in this, again using the
        Defendant’s expert’s own language, rarest of cases.

        The evidence is clear that Defendant’s situation does not meet
        those standards. Although Dr. Blake has a sincere belief in her
        conclusions, they are not credible to the Court and are the
        equivalent of trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. Even if
        the court accepted the defense theory, which the Court after
        careful consideration does not, allowing the Defendant to avoid
        responsibility for this violent act would not be just or fair. This is
        not a case where the Defendant’s unknown bad health condition
        caused him to unwillingly commit a criminal offense. Rather,
        the Defendant’s willful choice to not seek reasonable medical
        care from his previous alleged head traumas so that he could
        avoid negative legal consequences to himself has caused him to
        knowingly engage in dangerous behavior or activities which
        ultimately seriously hurt him and caused another citizen to lose
        his life.

        To summarize, the State has proven the elements of murder
        beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the
        circumstances. The Court further finds the State has disproven
        the defense’s contention, although rigorously and well-argued,
        beyond a reasonable doubt and enters judgment of conviction of
        Court One, murder, and Count Two, possession of marijuana.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023       Page 11 of 21
       (Tr. Vol. VIII at 211-3.) On May 6, 2022, the trial court sentenced Brown to an

       aggregate sentence of fifty-eight years incarcerated with three years suspended

       to probation.

       Discussion and Decision
       1. Blood Sample
[16]   Brown argues the State violated his right to due process when it failed to secure

       Brown’s blood sample taken shortly after the incident because such evidence

       may have been exculpatory. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

       Amendment “guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to

       present a complete defense.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006).

       “When the State fails to preserve materially exculpatory evidence, a due process

       violation occurs regardless of whether the State acted in bad faith.” Pimentel v.

       State, 181 N.E.3d 474, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Evidence is

       exculpatory if it clears or tends to clear the defendant from alleged fault or guilt.

       Id. “Evidence is materially exculpatory if it ‘possesses an exculpatory value that

       was apparent before the evidence was destroyed’ and must ‘be of such a nature

       that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other

       reasonably available means.’” Id. at 479 (quoting Chissell v. State, 705 N.E.2d

       501, 504 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied).

[17]   However, we need not consider the exculpatory nature of the blood sample or

       whether the State acted in bad faith by not preserving it because the State never

       possessed the blood sample. We examined this issue in Glasscock v. State, 576
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023     Page 12 of 21
       N.E.2d 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 6 In that case, on

       November 29, 1989, Glasscock was involved in a motor vehicle accident in

       which the occupants of the other vehicle died. Id. at 602. At the scene of the

       accident, witnesses “detected an odor of alcohol on Glasscock’s breath.” Id.

       During Glasscock’s emergency room visit immediately after the accident, the

       attending doctor took samples of Glasscock’s blood. Id. The results of one of

       the blood tests indicated Glasscock’s blood alcohol content (“BAC”) was

       .196%. Id.

[18]   Based thereon, the State charged Glasscock with operating a vehicle while

       intoxicated causing death, reckless homicide, and operating a vehicle with .10%

       or more BAC resulting in death. Id. On February 9, 1990, Glasscock filed a

       motion for independent blood analysis, which the trial court apparently

       granted. Id. Glasscock attempted to obtain the blood samples and discovered

       the hospital had destroyed them seven days after they were taken. Id.

       Glasscock then filed a motion to suppress the State’s BAC evidence. Id. The

       trial court denied his motion. Id. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered

       convictions on all counts. Id.

[19]   On appeal, Glasscock argued the BAC evidence was erroneously admitted

       because the blood samples taken by the hospital were destroyed before he could

       6
         We note Westlaw indicates Glasscock was disapproved by Abney v. State, 821 N.E.2d 375, 378-9 (Ind. 2005).
       However, the ground for disapproval in Glasscock – limiting the application of Indiana Code section 9-11-4-6
       (predecessor to Indiana Code section 9-30-6-6(g)) to when a physician refuses to draw a blood sample – is
       distinct from the portion of Glasscock that we rely on herein, which remains good law.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023                          Page 13 of 21
       conduct an independent analysis. Id. He claimed the State negligently

       destroyed material evidence and did so in bad faith, and thus his conviction

       should be overturned. Id. However, we noted “the police and the prosecution

       never possessed the blood samples. Upon Dr. Froderman’s own initiative,

       blood samples were taken and tested. Afterwards, the samples were destroyed

       in accordance with the hospital’s procedure.” Id. Based thereon, we held:

       “Where the police and the prosecution did not possess evidence, the rule

       requiring reversal of a conviction based upon evidence which was negligently

       destroyed does not apply.” Id.

[20]   The situation here is almost identical. As noted in the facts, emergency room

       staff at Eskenazi Hospital collected blood and urine samples from Brown

       shortly after the incident. When Detective Prater obtained a search warrant

       and went to collect the samples almost three weeks after the incident, he

       discovered the hospital had destroyed the blood samples. Like in Glasscock, the

       State never possessed the blood samples and, therefore, cannot be held

       responsible for the destruction of Brown’s blood samples. Brown has not

       demonstrated a violation of his right to due process.

       2. Urine Sample
[21]   Brown next argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the

       urinalysis results from the sample collected shortly after the shooting because

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023   Page 14 of 21
       the results were irrelevant under Indiana Rule of Evidence 401(1)(b) 7 and, even

       if relevant, the results were unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. 8 We afford trial

       courts broad discretion in ruling on the admission of evidence. Townsend v.

       State, 33 N.E.3d 367, 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. “Generally, we

       review the trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of

       discretion. We reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and

       effect of the facts and circumstances.” Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2013) (internal citation omitted), trans. denied.

[22]   The State offered the urinalysis evidence in support of its theory that Brown

       was chemically impaired, rather than having a seizure or other physical brain

       impairment, at the time that he shot Lieutenant Allan. During trial, Dr. Sheila

       Arnold with the Indiana State Department of Toxicology testified regarding her

       review of the urine sample results she received from the laboratory. She

       explained “[u]rine is an indicator of past usage. It doesn’t preclude current

       usage, but it generally is looked at as showing you what has been in that

       person’s system in hours or days prior.” (Tr. Vol. VII at 180.) Therefore,

       because the urinalysis could not pinpoint a time of usage, the evidence bore

       7
        Rule 401 states, in relevant part: “Evidence is relevant if: (1) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
       probable than it would be without the evidence; and . . . (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the
       action.”
       8
        Rule 403 states, in relevant part: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
       substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice[.]”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023                              Page 15 of 21
       only slight relevance to the issue of whether Brown was intoxicated at the time

       of the crime.

[23]   However, even if the evidence had been irrelevant, we would not reverse unless

       Brown was prejudiced by the admission. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66 (no error

       requires reversal unless it impacts the substantial rights of a party). When, as

       here, the court conducts a bench trial, we presume the trial court knows and

       properly applies the law and considers only evidence properly before the court

       as the court reaches a decision. See Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind.

       2012). “The risk of prejudice is quelled when the evidence is solely before the

       trial court.” Id. An error in the admission of evidence does not require reversal

       unless it affects the substantial rights of a party. Stewart v. State, 754 N.E.2d

       492, 496 (Ind. 2001). “The improper admission of evidence is harmless error

       when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of

       guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that

       the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction.” Barker v. State, 695

       N.E.2d 925, 931 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied.

[24]   Here, any error in the admission of the urinalysis was harmless because there

       existed substantial independent evidence to support Brown’s conviction. First,

       the trial court’s pronouncement of guilt suggested it did not rely on the

       toxicology report and instead rejected the State’s theory that Brown was

       intoxicated. (See Tr. Vol. VIII at 211) (“While the State has argued vigorously

       its theory of the case with an emphasis on the Defendant’s drug use and/or the

       Defendant’s reaction to a potential drug withdrawal, the Court is not required

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023      Page 16 of 21
       to accept or even agree with that premise.”). Second, the trial court’s

       pronouncement of guilt addressed in detail – and rejected – the evidence

       provided by defendant as to his theory of defense, and that rejection was

       supported by substantial evidence in the record. Brown was able to answer

       questions posed by Lieutenant Allan prior to the shooting and Brown provided

       Lieutenant Allan with his driver’s license when requested. Shortly after Brown

       gave Lieutenant Allan his driver’s license, Brown suddenly yelled “fuck you”

       and said, “give me the fucking gun.” (Id. at 1:09 - :11.)

[25]   Regarding Brown’s defense theory that he was unable to process the scene of

       the accident because of a head injury, prior head trauma, or a seizure, the State

       presented testimony from Dr. Troy Payner, a neurosurgeon from Goodman

       Campbell Brain and Spine. Dr. Payner testified his review of Brown’s CT scans

       taken shortly after the incident did not indicate any past trauma. He noted the

       CT scan indicated there was “bleeding in the right frontal part of the brain” that

       was “small, isolated to the right front part.” (Tr. Vol. VII at 135-6.) Dr. Payner

       testified that in the “thousands” of similar injuries he had seen in his career, he

       had never observed a patient with that injury be “aggressive or violent” and

       opined that “head injury patients who are intoxicated may[ ]be thrashing and

       what not.” (Id. at 137.) Dr. Payner testified it was his opinion that Brown’s

       “head injury did not occur as a result of the car accident.” (Id. at 149.)

       Regarding the defense’s theory that Brown suffered a seizure related to the

       accident causing him to be unable to understand his actions, Dr. Payner

       testified someone having a seizure would “make[] repetitive movement[s] . . .

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023     Page 17 of 21
       either shaking . . . their arm just shakes, or their lips move in a certain way.”

       (Id. at 159.) He stated those actions are “different than someone who is

       reaching to pick something up specifically, and that’s a more directed or

       volitional movement, including pulling a gun.” (Id.) Based thereon, Dr.

       Payner concluded, “I think there is tremendous evidence that he did not have a

       seizure.” (Id. at 169.) Because the evidence presented independent of the

       urinalysis rebutted the defense’s theory of the crime, any error in the admission

       of the urinalysis results was harmless. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 190 N.E.3d 462,

       466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (even if the admission of evidence may have been

       error, that error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s

       guilt), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

       3. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[26]   Brown argues the State did not present sufficient evidence he knowingly or

       intentionally killed Lieutenant Allan because Brown, who the defense

       contended was suffering from head trauma and/or a seizure, “was not

       processing the scene correctly. It is akin to self-defense, though his perception

       of what was happening was not reality. Jason Brown did not wake up that

       morning intending to inflict harm on anyone . . . [t]his was out of character for

       Jason Brown[.]” (Br. of Appellant at 27.) We apply a well-settled standard of

       review when evaluating claims of insufficient evidence:

               Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims . . . warrant a deferential
               standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge
               witness credibility. Rather, we consider only the evidence
               supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023     Page 18 of 21
               from that evidence. We will affirm a conviction if there is
               substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a
               reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty
               beyond a reasonable doubt.

       Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262-63 (Ind. 2020) (internal citations omitted).

       “The State must prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable

       doubt.” Willis v. State, 983 N.E.2d 670, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[27]   To prove Brown committed murder, the State had to prove he “knowingly or

       intentionally” killed Lieutenant Allan. See Ind. Code § 35-41-1-1(1). A person

       engages in behavior knowingly if, “when he engages in the conduct, he is aware

       of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). A person

       engages in behavior intentionally if, “when he engages in the conduct, it is his

       conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). Intent is a mental

       function, Laughlin v. State, 101 N.E.3d 827, 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), and unless

       a defendant confesses, a trier of fact must infer intent from the circumstances

       surrounding the act at issue. Id. To support a murder conviction, the

       knowingly mens rea “may be inferred from a defendant’s use of a deadly

       weapon in a manner likely to cause death.” Miles v. State, 51 N.E.3d 305, 611

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 931 (Ind. 1998),

       reh’g denied), trans. denied.

[28]   As noted supra in our analysis of the admission of the urinalysis, the State

       presented evidence Brown was able to answer questions from and provide his

       driver’s license to Lieutenant Allan prior to the shooting and shortly after the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023    Page 19 of 21
       accident. Additionally, he shouted, attempting to locate his gun, while

       Lieutenant Allan was in the vehicle rendering aid. Brown shot his gun until it

       was empty, that is, eighteen shots, ten of which hit Lieutenant Allan. Finally,

       the State’s expert, Dr. Payner, testified that, in his opinion, Brown’s behavior

       was not consistent with someone suffering a seizure and the CT scan taken of

       Brown shortly after the accident did not indicate the head trauma Brown

       claimed to have suffered prior to the car accident. Brown’s reliance on his

       expert, Dr. Sheila Arnold, and his alternative interpretation of the evidence is

       an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of

       witnesses, which we cannot do. See Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 262 (appellate court

       does not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). Based thereon,

       we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence Brown knowingly and

       intentionally killed Lieutenant Allan. See, e.g., Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925,

       931 (Ind. 1998) (“to fire a deadly weapon at point blank range is to be ‘aware of

       a high probability’ that death will result”) (quoting Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b)),

       reh’g denied.

       Conclusion
[29]   The State did not violate Brown’s due process right to a defense when it did not

       preserve Brown’s blood sample because the State never possessed Brown’s

       blood sample. Further, any error in the admission of Brown’s urinalysis was

       harmless because there existed sufficient evidence outside of the urinalysis to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023    Page 20 of 21
       disprove his defense. Finally, the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut

       Brown’s defense and prove that he committed murder. Accordingly, we affirm.

[30]   Affirmed.

       Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-01241 | October 26, 2023   Page 21 of 21