Court Opinion

ID: 9638443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:43:58.669756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:06.553156
License: Public Domain

AKIN, Justice,
dissenting.
Although I agree that the default judgment must be reversed,1 I cannot agree that judgment should be rendered in favor of U.S.F. & G. Instead, this case should be remanded to the trial court for five distinct reasons. Accordingly, I must dissent.
First, by failing to answer, U.S.F. & G. should not be in a better situation than if it had filed an answer and had lodged an objection to Plaintiff’s petition. In that situation, if the trial judge had sustained the objection, Cascio would have had the opportunity to amend her pleadings. Here, however, Cascio will have no opportunity to amend to assert any other cause of action against U.S.F. & G. arising out of this transaction because my colleagues have chosen to render rather than remand. Thus, U.S.F. & G. will benefit from its failure to answer.
Second, the effect of the majority's decision to render is to grant the defaulting defendant a summary judgment as to nonli-ability on appeal. This is even more extraordinary in light of cases such as Hall v. Mockingbird AMC/Jeep, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.1979) which hold that it is error for an appellate court to reverse and render a summary judgment where the winning appellant had not filed a cross motion for summary judgment. Here, U.S.F. & G. is being granted a judgment where not only did it not move for judgment but did not even file an answer!
Third, the majority has granted appellant U.S.F. & G. more relief on appeal than the trial court could have granted U.S.F. & G. on a timely filed motion for new trial. If the trial judge had been presented with such a motion he could have only granted U.S.F. & G. a new trial; he could not have granted U.S.F. & G. a judgment declaring that U.S.F. & G. had no liability to Cascio.
Fourth, I would remand because the facts with respect to Cascio’s suit against U.S.F. & G. have not been fully developed. See Jackson v. Hall, 147 Tex. 245, 214 S.W.2d 458, 459 (1948); Freeman v. Hernandez, 521 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1975, no writ).
Finally, this case should be remanded in the interest of justice because Cascio may be able to plead another cause of action or another theory of recovery against U.S.F. & G., which otherwise will be barred by res judicata if the majority opinion stands. Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.1972). Indeed, it has long been held that when a court of appeals reverses a judg*212ment for insufficient evidence, that court has an absolute duty to remand rather than render. Logue v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co. of Texas, 106 Tex. 445, 167 S.W. 805, 806 (1914); Texas Employers Insurance Assn. v. Burrell, 564 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Accordingly, justice demands that this default judgment be reversed and remanded to the trial court rather than being reversed and rendered here in favor of the defaulting defendant, U.S.P. & G.

. Although I agree that the default judgment must be reversed, I cannot agree with the majority's disposition because that opinion ignores the rule that a party by defaulting admits liability. See e.g., Morgan v. Compugraphic Corporation, 675 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex.1984).