Court Opinion

ID: 9618583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:13:57.638691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:54.280338
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The offense of negligent homicide is consummated where “the actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another.” 1 The language of the statute punctuates the necessity of a substantial causal relationship between the act of defendant and the death of the victim, which relationship constitutes a necessary element of the offense.2 To this end, criminal law adopts the notion of proximate cause-the defendant’s conduct must proximately result in the victim’s injury.3 As in other areas of the law,4 a defendant’s criminal liability is cut off where the injury in question arose from the operation of an unforeseeable, independent intervening force.5 Under such circumstances, the defendant’s conduct becomes a remote cause, which gives rise to no legal responsibility. This holds true even where the defendant, by negligent action, creates a condition which is subsequently acted upon by another unforeseeable, independent and distinct agency to produce the injury, even though the injury would not have occurred except for defendant’s act.6 It is, moreover, noteworthy that proximate causation, like any other element of a crime, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.7 Where, on appeal, it appears from the evidence (viewed in a light most favorable to the state) that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt regarding the causal relationship in question, reversal and dismissal are in order.8
The evidence produced at trial does not discount beyond a reasonable doubt the possibility that the actions of the decedent on the morning of September 25, 1977, consti*340tuted an independent, unforeseeable intervening cause. In this regard, it is to be noted that the evidence produced at trial clearly established that the accident occurred in broad daylight and that the stop sign in question had not been removed from the intersection, but merely bent over into a position where it was still marginally visible. Moreover, the word “Stop” was clearly printed in large block letters on the pavement leading into the intersection.9 Even if we were to assume, however, that defendant’s action in bending the stop sign over erased all indication that vehicles proceeding north on 4620 West were obliged to yield right-of-way, such would render the location of the accident an unmarked intersection. The law requires due care in approaching such intersections, with such reasonable precautions as may be necessary under the circumstances.10
Evidence also appearing in the record indicates that decedent was moving at an imprudent speed when she entered the intersection. Although the exact rate of speed is disputed, it is unchallenged that she had, less than a block behind, passed a truck which, itself, was doing the legal speed limit. All parties testified that she made no attempt to slow or brake upon entering the intersection. Under such circumstances, reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was the sole efficient legal cause of her death.11
I would reverse the trial court and dismiss the charge of negligent homicide.

. U.C.A., 1953, 76-5-206.

. State v. Wilson, 117 Utah 368, 216 P.2d 630 (1950).

. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 37.

. See e.g., Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970); Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah 110, 138 P.2d 639 (1943).

. 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 200, p. 448.

. 57 Am.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 196.

. U.C.A., 1953, 76-1-501(1).

. State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d 880 (1978); State v. Middelstadt, Utah, 579 P.2d 908 (1978); State v. Fort, Utah, 572 P.2d 1387 (1977); State v. Logan, Utah, 563 P.2d 811 (1977).

. A fact not acknowledged in the main opinion.

. U.C.A., 1953, 41-6-72; Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 279 P. 893 (1929).

. The state argues that, in order to be found to be a superseding intervening cause, the decedent’s conduct must, itself, be found to have been negligent. Such an argument misconstrues the nature of causation. Contributory negligence, alone, is not a defense to criminal liability. Only when some agency other than the defendant’s conduct, be it the victim’s actions (negligent or otherwise), or an extrinsic force, is so completely and solely responsible for the resultant injury that defendant’s acts become only a remote cause, is criminal liability cut off.