Court Opinion

ID: 9494099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:29:25.416324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:08.238220
License: Public Domain

CALABRESI, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree that the petitioner’s habeas claim fails under pre-AEDPA standards of review. And I also concur that we should not, given the particular history of this case, [see infra at 65], decide today which standard of review applies. I therefore join the panel opinion. I write separately, however, to explain my view that, though correct in delaying a decision, we do State courts no favor by declining to determine, and as soon as possible, that the pre-AEDPA standard of review should indeed be applied in cases like this one — cases, that is, in which State courts have rejected a petitioner’s federal constitutional claim without specifically addressing it (even if only by citing to federal case law or to *62State court decisions that apply federal law).
The AEDPA requires federal courts hearing habeas petitions brought by persons incarcerated “pursuant to the judgment of a State court” to give deference to the State court judgments they review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Specifically, the AED-PA mandates that “a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Hence, where a habeas petitioner’s claims have received an “adjudicat[ion] on the merits” and, as a result of that adjudication, have been rejected by a State court, the AED-PA commands that federal courts yield to the state court decision, and do so even in some instances where that decision is legally incorrect. Federal courts must do this rather than undertake an independent, de novo review of the claim’s merits. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
One .of the Congress’s principal purposes in adopting this deferential standard of review was to recognize the independent stature of State courts and to accord State court adjudications respect. This purpose is clearly revealed both on the face of the AEDPA and in multiple statements made by the statute’s congressional proponents. Thus Senator Hatch stated that the deferential standard of review imposed by the AEDPA:
simply ends the improper review of State court decisions. After all, State courts are required to uphold the Constitution and to faithfully apply Federal laws. There is simply no reason that Federal courts should have the ability to virtually retry cases that have been properly adjudicated by our State courts.
142 Cong. Rec. S3446-02, 3447 (1996). And Representative Hyde said that AED-PA deference:
is given to State courts’ legal decisions if they are not contrary to established Supreme Court precedent. That is to avoid relitigating endlessly the same issues. There is a system of State courts. We give them deference, provided their decisions are not contrary to Supreme Court precedent.
142 Cong. Rec. H2247-01, 2249 (1996).
But in spite of these sympathetic purposes, the AEDPA runs the risk of imposing a heavy, and sometimes unwanted and unmanageable, burden on State courts. Specifically, if AEDPA deference were deemed automatically and universally to apply, then that law would require extremely busy State court judges to figure out what can be very complicated questions of federal law at the pain of having a defendant incorrectly stay in prison should the State court decision of these complex questions turn out to be mistaken (but not unreasonably so). Indeed, under such a reading of the AEDPA, the only alternative to this outcome would be the highly undesirable one of having federal courts reviewing State court decisions on habeas frequently declare such decisions to be not just mistaken but also unreasonable. Assuming, as we surely should, that federal courts will not do this,1 State courts would *63inevitably be led to do a lot of work on all federal questions, no matter how difficult, in order to avoid mistaken, but not unreasonable, decisions. And they would do so regardless of whether they wished to spend the time arriving at deeply thought out judgments on such hard federal questions.
In contrast, a reading of the AEDPA under which AEDPA deference does not apply where a State court has rejected a petitioner’s claim without expressly mentioning its federal aspects allows State courts to avoid this burden. It enables State courts to choose whether or not they wish to take on the burden and be deferred to. It does this by giving them a simple form of words — for example a specific reference to the law governing a petitioner’s federal constitutional claims— through which they can signal their choice. Under this interpretation, State courts that wish fully to evaluate federal claims need only indicate that they have done so, and their decisions will be deferred to. Conversely, State courts that believe that their energy and resources are better employed elsewhere can remain silent without having the AEDPA impose on them the burden (and all the consequences) of being treated as if they have given the in depth consideration that AEDPA deference implicates. And they can make this docket controlling choice on a case by case basis.
The rule that State court rejections of a petitioner’s federal constitutional claims receive AEDPA deference only where they make specific reference to these claims is, therefore, no empty formalism. It can, instead, be a substantial and appropriate part of the solution to the problem of coordinating the activities of the two structures of independent courts that characterize our federal system. Nor does this rule at all infringe on the freedom of State courts by “impos[ing] on [them] the responsibility for using particular language in every case in which a state prisoner presents a federal claim.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 739, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Rather than “dictating to state courts that they must issue opinions explicitly addressing the issues presented or else face ‘second guessing’ by the federal courts,” Capellán v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir.1992), the rule that AEDPA deference applies only where State courts have signaled that they have considered a petitioner’s federal constitutional claim presents State courts with a powerful linguistic device by means of which they can command" deference concerning the issues they wish to decide, and pass on for de novo review the issues they prefer to avoid, or to treat less fully. In this way, it permits them to exercise that control over their judicial resources which a true respect for state sovereignty requires.2
*64Of course, even though this rule comports with the spirit underlying the AED-PA, we would be powerless to adopt it if the text of the AEDPA mandated otherwise. We would have to reject this approach if the AEDPA required federal courts hearing habeas petitions to defer to State court decisions in all cases, regardless of whether the State courts that issued the decisions wished to be given such deference. But the approach to AEDPA deference laid out above has been adopted by the Third Circuit.3 And, as one view noted in the panel opinion points out, [see supra at 53-54], this approach is consistent with the text of the AEDPA itself,4 and also coheres with the views expressed by at least six justices in Williams v. Taylor,5 All this demonstrates that, at the very least, the AEDPA is ambiguous on this point, and where the text of a statute is ambiguous, courts interpreting the statute should adopt the construction that best comports with the intent of the Congress that enacted the. statute. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76, 105 S.Ct. 479, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1985); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395, 71 S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035 (1951) (Jackson, /., concurring). And in this situation that purpose is unambiguously effectuated by the construction of the AEDPA proposed above.
Of course, given the unanimous agreement of the panel that the petitioner’s claim fails even under non-deferential, pre-AEDPA review, any statement — as to which rule applies when State courts make no reference to the federal grounds for their decision — would in this case be dicta. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court has explained in the context of qualified immunity, appellate courts may and often should establish the existence of constitutional rights even where they ultimately deny a plaintiffs damages action on the ground of qualified immunity, because constitutional dicta can be appropriate when it serves to clarify the constitutional principles that govern official conduct. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998); see also Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 112-13 (2d Cir.1999) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (discussing the Sacramento rule).6 A *65signaling device is of no use unless the sender of the signal is informed of how its signs will be interpreted, and the sooner the better. For that reason — and in order to clarify the law for the benefit of State courts, so that they might make use of the structures of deference that the AEDPA creates — I wish I could conclude that we should, in this case, establish as correct the interpretation of the AEDPA argued for above, even though that reading would not be outcome-determinative.
Nevertheless, I join the rest of the panel in declining to do so today. In order to address what is an undoubtedly difficult question, we would need the benefit of additional full and careful briefing and argument on the proper application of AED-PA deference in the absence of a State court signal. Furthermore, since an earlier version of the panel opinion has made plain that the petitioner’s habeas claim would fail even under the pre-AEDPA standard of review, requesting supplemental briefing on the questions raised in this concurrence would not cure the problem. For the petitioner (and his able counsel) would have-no live interest in the outcome of the second round of briefing. Under the circumstances, we have no choice but to allow the issue of the correct interpretation of the AEDPA to await a decision by a future panel. Accordingly, while recognizing the costs of such delay, I concur fully in the panel opinion.

. They will, of course, do so from time to time. See, e.g., Penry v. Johnson, — U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (finding objectively unreasonable a State court determination of the constitutional ade*63quacy of jury instructions that led to the imposition of a sentence of death).

. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935, 111 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997) (holding that the Congress may not commandeer State executive officers to execute federal laws); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (holding that the Congress may not order state legislatures to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program). State courts, by contrast, can be compelled to apply federal law. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394, 67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967 (1947); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) (“Although Congress may not require the legislative or executive branches o[ the States to enact or administer federal regulatory programs, it may require state courts of adequate and appropriate jurisdiction to enforce federal prescriptions insofar as those prescriptions relate to matters appropriate for the judicial power”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). Nevertheless, due regard for State sovereignty suggests exhibiting care and restraint *64in imposing such burdens even on Stale courts.

. See Harneen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 248 (3d Cir.2000), cert, denied, —-—, 121 S.Ct. 1365, 149 L.Ed.2d 293 (2001); but see Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 163 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) and Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir.1999) (both holding that AEDPA deference applies to a State court decision of a petitioner's federal constitutional claim regardless of whether or not the Slate court specifically referred to the federal law governing this claim).

. The procedure the AEDPA commands federal habeas courts to follow — which involves examining State court decisions in order to determine which clause of § 2254(d)(1) to apply, and in particular whether the decisions were (a) "contrary to” or (b) "an unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law — cannot readily be performed if the State court does not (in one way or another) identify the rule of law under which it acted.

. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 394, 395, 397-98, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (opinion of Stevens, J.); id. at 414-16, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); and id. at 417-19, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (all analyzing the reasoning employed by the State court in ways that would have been impossible if the State court had not identified the federal precedents under which it acted).

. The Ninth Circuit referred to this rule in the context of the AEDPA, and held that even where a federal court denies habeas on the ground that a State's court's decision was not unreasonable, it should nevertheless also decide whether the State court's decision was mistaken simpliciter, in order to "promote! ] clarity in ... constitutional jurisprudence” and thereby "provide! ] guidance for state courts.” See Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, *651155 (9th Cir.2000). In Bell, 236 F.3d at 162, the Fourth Circuit rejected the Tran rule on the ground that the AEDPA allows federal courts to grant habeas only where State courts misapply Supreme Court rather than Circuit Court precedent.