Court Opinion

ID: 9582140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:22:58.252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:28.790639
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTIN
dissenting.
I dissent from the holding and reasoning of the majority as to Mrs. Holland’s duty to secure her child in a restraint system.
The majority opinion slips into error in its reliance upon Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E. 2d 65. It is true this Court did hold in Miller that the allegation that plaintiff failed to wear a seat belt was not an allegation of facts constituting contributory negligence. However, it is necessary to note and understand that the plaintiff in Miller was an adult and there was not in effect at that time a statute requiring the use of seat belts.
Our case is not concerned with the duty, if any, of an adult to wear a seat belt for his own protection while traversing the highways. We are concerned with a much more serious and important issue: the duty of drivers of vehicles to attend to the safety of infants under the age of two years by securing such children in a child passenger restraint system. N.C.G.S. § 20-137.1 (1983).
This statute imposed an affirmative duty upon all drivers of motor vehicles to properly secure their children, under the age of two years, in child passenger restraint systems when transport*477ing such children in motor vehicles. The statute expressly states that a violation of it does not constitute negligence per se or contributory negligence per se. However, at the time of these events a violation of the statute constituted evidence of negligence to be considered by the jury in determining whether plaintiff had carried its burden to prove negligence under the common law. When a statutory violation is not negligence per se, the jury must consider such violation, if they find it occurred, along with all the other facts and circumstances in the case in determining whether the defendant has breached his common law duty of due care. Johnson v. Bass, 256 N.C. 716, 125 S.E. 2d 19 (1962); Moore v. Bezalla, 241 N.C. 190, 84 S.E. 2d 817 (1959); Bank v. Phillips, 236 N.C. 470, 73 S.E. 2d 323 (1954); Spruill v. Summerlin, 51 N.C. App. 452, 276 S.E. 2d 736 (1981).
The majority mistakenly assumes that because a violation of the statute is not negligence per se, it is also not evidence of negligence. Miller falls woefully short of supporting this defective legal theory. In Miller there was no statute imposing a duty on a guest passenger to wear a seat belt. Here, there is a statute imposing the duty on a driver-parent to properly secure his child. This statute was for the protection of infants. It must be remembered that a child cannot refuse to enter the vehicle, nor can the child take safety precautions while a passenger in the car. Surely it cannot be seriously debated that the violation of this statutory duty to a helpless child is not evidence of negligence! Our legislature evidently considered such a violation to be evidence of negligence, otherwise there would be no reason for its inexplicably recondite decision to amend the act in 1985.
This Court has no knowledge of how many claims on the behalf of children may be in existence based upon violations of the statute prior to its amendment in 1985. The statute of limitations on such claims does not commence to run until the child reaches majority. N.C.G.S. § 1-17 (1983). I, for one, will not adhere to a holding depriving helpless children of this statutory protection.
I vote to remand the case for a jury determination of the joint tort-feasor issue.