Court Opinion

ID: 9719088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:42:15.120199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.583384
License: Public Domain

HUSPENI, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In addressing the second and third issues in this case (whether Beverly Wilson’s death arose out of the maintenance or use of an automobile and whether that automobile was uninsured), the majority notes preliminarily that these two issues need not be addressed because the majority had determined that no accident had occurred. The majority does, however, commendably go on to note that both of these issues should be resolved in favor of finding that uninsured motorist coverage was available. I concur with the majority in its analysis of each of these issues. I believe Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.1987), would permit no other answer but “yes” to the question: “Did this incident arise out of the maintenance or use of an automobile?” I also *221believe that Robert Wilson’s intentional act, which precluded availability of liability coverage to him, rendered the Cadillac uninsured, and made the uninsured motorist provisions of other policies under which Beverly Wilson was an insured available to her personal representatives.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s determination that this incident must be viewed from the point of view of the tortfeasor, and therefore cannot be considered to be an accident. I submit, instead, that the question of whether this incident is an “accident” should be addressed from the point of view of the victim and should be answered “yes.” 1 '
In Edwards v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 399 N.W.2d 95 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 1987), this court noted that
a majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have found that the term “accident” should be viewed from the perspective of the victim. Under this rationale, the courts have universally held that intentionally inflicted injuries were “accidents” within the scope of uninsured motorist coverage. See Country Companies v. Bourbon by Bourbon, 122 Ill.App.3d 1061, 78 Ill.Dec. 407, 462 N.E.2d 526 (1984); Redden v. Doe, 357 So.2d 632 (La.Ct.App.1978); Sciascia v. American Insurance Co., 183 N.J.Super. 352, 443 A.2d 1118 (N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div.1982), aff'd 189 N.J.Super. 236, 459 A.2d 1198 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1983).
Edwards at 97.
I believe that a critical distinction must be made between third party (liability) and first party (uninsured motorist) coverage. The tortfeasor seeking to invoke his or her liability coverage to compensate a victim the tortfeasor intentionally injured must, indeed, be denied that coverage and is, in fact, consistently denied that coverage because of the intentional acts exclusion in the policy. However, the same considerations are not present in the situation of a victim who seeks his or her own first party (uninsured motorist) coverage from his or her own insurer. The intentional acts exclusion is inapplicable to a victim who is guilty of no intentional act.
The mischief to be avoided in cases involving a tortfeasor’s intentional act while operating a motor vehicle is that which would result if the tortfeasor was able to insulate himself or herself from personal liability for those intentional acts. Permitting innocent victims to invoke their own first party coverage will in no way facilitate a tortfeasor’s improper use of automobile insurance.
Finally, I remain convinced that the most formidable and appropriate obstacle to a victim’s invocation of first party coverage should be that faced in convincing a court that the incident actually did arise out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. *222St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Sparrow, 378 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1986); Timmers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 374 N.W.2d 338, 339-40 (Minn.Ct.App.1985); Classified Insurance Corp. v. Vodinelick, 368 N.W.2d 921, 922-23 (Minn.1985); Tlougan v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 310 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn.1981). Once a court has been persuaded that the formidable “maintenance/use” prong has been met, that court should have little difficulty in recognizing that permitting victims of intentional tortfeasors to receive first party benefits is both legally sound and consistent with the policy that insurance should be available to compensate persons who are injured as a result of the hazards associated with motoring.

. In Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Klug, 394 N.W.2d 872 (Minn.Ct.App.1987), rev’d 415 N.W.2d 876 (Minn.1987), this court found that the incident did not arise out of the use or maintenance of an automobile and did not reach the issue of whether the incident (an intentional shooting) was an accident. Klug, 394 N.W.2d at 877. On review, the supreme court ruled that the incident did arise out of the use or maintenance of an automobile and remanded the case to this court to determine whether there had been an accident. Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 879. The Klug case was settled before this court could make that determination. I submit that our supreme court’s remand of the "accident” issue in Klug was a recognition of the viability of this issue. If there was literally no circumstance under which Minnesota courts would invoke uninsured motorist coverage for a victim of an intentional act, I believe the supreme court would have so indicated and avoided remand of that issue. I recognize, of course, the supreme court’s recent denial of a petition for certiorari in Petersen v. Croft, 447 N.W.2d 903 (Minn.Ct.App.1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 12, 1990). I also recognize, however, that the supreme court has stated
denial of a petition for further review [of an opinion of the court of appeals] means no more than that the supreme court has declined, at that time and for whatever undisclosed reasons, to consider the matter. [The supreme court’s] discretionary review is not unlike the certiorari jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, where that court has often said that a denial of certiorari cannot be interpreted as ah adjudication or expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
Murphy v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co., 388 N.W.2d 732, 739 (Minn.1986) (citations omitted). See also State v. Shamp, 427 N.W.2d 228, 230-31 n. 3 (Minn.1988).