Court Opinion

ID: 9927434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-27 07:15:58.664828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:38.601603
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed January 25, 2024

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                                 No. 11-22-00107-CV
                                     __________

                         DURK DEBOER, Appellant
                                        V.
                    ATTEBURY GRAIN, LLC, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 266th District Court
                              Erath County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. CV35746

                                    OPINION
      Appellant, Durk DeBoer, appeals an adverse judgment resulting from a bench
trial. Appellee, Attebury Grain, LLC, brought suit for Appellant’s breach of two
contracts after Appellant refused to accept shipment of wheat and corn as per the
contracts. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment for Appellee
and awarded Appellee actual damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees in
the amount of $1,188,640.96. In five issues, Appellant contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding contract damages, prejudgment interest, and
attorney’s fees and that the trial court erred because it “forced” Appellant to proceed
to trial without counsel. We modify and affirm in part, and reverse and remand in
part.
                           Factual and Procedural History
        Appellant is a “feed supplier and dairyman” in Dublin, Texas, where he buys
grain from sellers such as Appellee.       Doing business as DFS Premium Feed
Supplements, Appellant enjoyed a business relationship with Appellee that was
established around 2012. Appellant testified that, before the contracts at issue, the
parties were able to “work[] it out” when issues between them would arise. Appellee
entered into a credit agreement with Appellant in 2013. In 2014 and 2015, Appellant
entered into contracts with Appellee for the purchase of corn and wheat. The sale
of corn to Appellant is a single contract, but the sale of wheat encompasses five
contracts: one larger contract agreeing to the amount and terms, and four auxiliary
agreements, each speaking to the delivery amount and date of a specific shipment to
Appellant.
        Initially, Appellant was not a party to the wheat contracts. Appellee sold the
wheat to a third party, Grand Canyon Dairy, LLC, before Appellant agreed to assume
Grand Canyon Dairy’s wheat obligation. Appellee sent Appellant the amended
contract, Contract No. 1496-1A, on July 24, 2014. Appellee also sent four other
documents, which were assigned Contract Nos. 345000171, 345000172,
345000173, and 345000174 (Contract Nos. 171–174, respectively). These auxiliary
contracts specified the delivery date and amount of each shipment under Contract
No. 1496-1A. Neither party objected to the terms of any of the contracts. Appellant
fulfilled his obligation under Contract No. 171, but he refused shipment under the
remaining four wheat contracts throughout 2015. During this time, Appellant also
                                              2
entered into Contract No. 290, a contract to purchase corn from Appellee, but
Appellant ultimately refused shipment of the corn as well. The trial court concluded
that by refusing these corn and wheat shipments, Appellant had breached the
contracts (except for Contract No. 171).
      As a result of Appellant’s breaches, Appellee sent two letters, one on
August 30, 2016 for the corn contract and one on December 15, 2017 for the wheat
contracts. Both letters demanded payment on the outstanding balance of each
contract and demanded arbitration if full payment was not made. Appellant did not
pay and notice of arbitration was given to Appellant on October 25, 2017.
      Appellant retained Amber Miller of the law firm of Crenshaw, Dupree, and
Milam, L.L.P. because the firm specialized in arbitration. However, “[b]ased upon
communications with [Appellee] and [Appellant’s] refusal to arbitrate,” the National
Grain and Feed Association dismissed and closed the arbitration case on
November 13, 2019. Before then, however, Appellee initially filed suit against
Appellant and Grand Canyon Dairy on April 18, 2019. Appellee then nonsuited
Grand Canyon Dairy and proceeded exclusively on its claims against Appellant.
      On January 11, 2022, nine days before trial, Miller filed a motion to withdraw.
The motion asserted that Appellant had not paid counsel, and that Appellant had
been given reasonable warning that further failure to pay would result in her
withdrawal. The motion additionally stated that continued representation without
payment would result in an unreasonable financial burden on Miller and the firm,
preventing her and the firm from further representing Appellant in the matter.
Appellee filed its second amended petition the following day. The trial court set a
hearing on the motion to withdraw for January 20, 2022, the same date and time as
the final hearing. Miller then filed an amended motion to withdraw on January 19
at 4:50 p.m., asserting that Appellant had agreed to her withdrawal. The motion is
                                            3
silent as to which attorney’s substitution of representation was proposed. See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 10.
      On the morning of trial, the trial court addressed Miller’s amended motion to
withdraw. Despite the trial court’s notice, Miller was not present at the hearing, but
another attorney Russell King, who is not with Miller’s firm, was present and asked
to address the court in chambers regarding the matter before entering an appearance.
The trial court held an off-the-record conference in chambers with King and
Appellee’s counsel. On the record, the trial court stated that King did not enter an
appearance and “did not -- or has done nothing as far as representation in this matter
to enter [an] appearance for [Appellant],” noting that King “might have been misled
that it was set today solely on a motion to withdraw as opposed to a final hearing.”
Appellant denied that he agreed to Miller’s motion to withdraw.            Based on
Appellant’s appearance and his representations to the court, the trial court denied
Miller’s amended motion to withdraw. The trial court then took a short recess for
the court coordinator to contact Miller. The trial court summarized the contact with
Miller on the record:
             During the break, as directed, the court coordinator made contact
      with Ms. Miller, the attorney of record, advised her that her motion to
      withdraw had been denied[,] and that this matter would be heard for
      final at 1:00 o’clock.
            Ms. Miller advised that she would be physically unable to attend.
      And I directed the court coordinator to give her an opportunity to hire
      someone to stand in for today’s hearing.
             Shortly thereafter, I reconsidered and advised the court
      coordinator to make contact again with Ms. Miller and advise her that
      if she was going or would attempt or was in the process of getting
      someone to appear that I would wait until 1:00 o’clock to start the final
      hearing. Otherwise, if she was not going to get someone to appear for
      her or appear herself that I would start at 11:00 o’clock.
                                             4
            The court coordinator has advised the Court that in that phone
      conversation Ms. Miller stated: You might as well start at 11:00
      o’clock.
Trial started at 11:05.
      When the trial court asked Appellant if he was ready to proceed, Appellant
responded with a simple and unconditional “I’m ready.” After a brief trial that
totaled fifty-four pages of transcript, the trial court found for Appellee. In its
“Findings of Fact,” the trial court determined that “Durk de Boer had the knowledge
and skill in the purchase and sale of grain to qualify as a merchant.” There was no
testimony that Appellant did not have the knowledge or skill peculiar to the
transaction. Appellant now contests the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
trial court rested its conclusions regarding Appellant’s merchant status, as well as
the awards of prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees. In addition, Appellant argues
that the trial court committed harmful error when it “force[d]” him to go to trial.
                                       Analysis
      I. Appellant’s Merchant Status
      In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that there is insufficient evidence to
establish a valid and enforceable contract. Specifically, Appellant contends that
Appellee’s breach-of-contract claim expressly alleged Appellant’s merchant status
“as a basis for making an otherwise unenforceable contract enforceable,” and the
trial court’s conclusion that Appellant is a merchant “has no evidentiary support.”
See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (West 2009) ([A] contract for the sale
of goods is enforceable between merchants “if within a reasonable time a writing in
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the
party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements . . .

                                              5
against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within
ten days after it is received.”).
       When an appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting
an adverse finding on which he did not have the burden of proof at trial, he must
demonstrate that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. See City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005); Croucher v. Croucher, 660
S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983). Under a legal sufficiency review, we consider all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, make every reasonable
inference in that party’s favor, and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable
factfinder could not. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807, 822, 827. We cannot
substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder if the evidence falls within this zone
of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 822.
       The evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding only if (1) the record
discloses a complete absence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law or
evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the
only evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the
evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Id. at 810. “Anything
more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding.”
Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d
41, 48 (Tex. 1998). “More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence
would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach different conclusions.”
Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 259 (Tex. 2014). “However, if the evidence
is so weak that it only creates a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, it is
regarded as no evidence.” Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill,
Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 156 (Tex. 2014).

                                               6
      The trial court found that Appellant was a merchant as defined by
Section 2.104 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code and that Appellant had
not pleaded any affirmative defense that extinguished Appellee’s right to collection.
See BUS. & COM. § 2.104(a) (broadly defining “merchant,” in relevant part, as “a
person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself
out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction”) (emphasis added). Appellant admitted at trial that he had been dealing
in grain with Appellee since 2012. He was familiar with the types of contracts sued
upon, had both a practical understanding of these types of contracts, and he knew
that there were involved industry trade rules and regulations. As the factfinder,
based on the testimony provided, including Appellant’s testimony, the evidence
supports the trial court’s finding of fact and conclusion of law that Appellant
qualified as a “merchant” as defined by Section 2.104(a).
      Moreover, throughout the proceedings, Appellant did not plead any
affirmative defenses and did not give any indication or provide evidence that he was
not a merchant. The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense to a breach-of-
contract claim. TEX. R. CIV. P. 94. “The party pleading the statute of frauds bears
the initial burden of establishing its applicability.” Dynegy, Inc. v. Yates, 422
S.W.3d 638, 641 (Tex. 2013). If a party does not plead the statute of frauds as an
affirmative defense, he risks waiving it. W. Tex. Landscape, Inc. v. Meneses, No. 11-
19-00371-CV, 2021 WL 4201602 at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 16, 2021, no
pet.); Texan Pearl, LLC v. Koegel, No. 03-14-00556-CV, 2015 WL 6119491 at *3
(Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 14, 2015, no pet.). Appellant did not plead the statute of
frauds as an affirmative defense in his original answer or otherwise.
      Further, when Appellee objected, based on Appellant’s status as a merchant,
to Appellant’s line of questioning regarding whether the wheat contracts bore his
                                             7
“affirmative signature” showing that Appellant “agree[d] to this contract,” Appellant
did not dispute Appellee’s characterization that he was a merchant. We find that
sufficient evidence was presented in support of the trial court’s finding of fact that
Appellant had the knowledge and skill to qualify as a merchant, and its conclusion
of law that Appellant qualified as a merchant under Section 2.104. In light of the
evidence, the trial court did not err in concluding that Appellant acted as a merchant
in these transactions and that valid contracts were formed. Appellant’s first issue is
overruled.
        II. Prejudgment Interest
        Appellant’s second and third issues relate to the trial court’s award of
prejudgment interest. In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court’s
award is not supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence because Appellee
failed to establish the date on which prejudgment interest began to accrue. In his
third issue, Appellant contends that Appellee “failed to establish the prejudgment
interest rate.” 1
        We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review when evaluating a trial
court’s award of prejudgment interest. See Morales v. Morales, 98 S.W.3d 343, 348
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, pet. denied) (citing Marsh v. Marsh,
949 S.W.2d 734, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ)).
“Prejudgment interest is compensation allowed by law as additional damages for lost
use of the money due as damages during the lapse of time between the accrual of the
claim and the date of judgment.” Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex.
2015) (quoting Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d

        1
          Appellant makes no claim, nor did he plead an affirmative defense, of usury or that the contractual
interest of eighteen percent as found by the trial court was usurious.

                                                          8
507, 528 (Tex. 1998)); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Greenberg Peden, P.C.,
522 S.W.3d 471, 482 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
        The parties may contractually agree to a rate of interest. Texas law recognizes
that contracting parties are free to agree to post-maturity interest at the highest legal
rate and that a contract or note which provides interest at a specified rate is
enforceable. See Jones v. R.O. Pomroy Equip. Rental, Inc., 438 S.W.3d 125, 132
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2014, pet. denied); Pineda v. PMI Mortg. Ins. Co., 843
S.W.2d 660, 670 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ denied);
Dodson v. Citizens State Bank, 701 S.W.2d 89, 91–93 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1986,
writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also All Seasons Window and Door Mfg., Inc. v. Red Dot Corp.,
181 S.W.3d 490, 497–98 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.). “The parties to a
written agreement may agree to an interest rate . . . that does not exceed the
applicable weekly ceiling.” TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 303.002 (West 2016), 304.002
(rate is lesser of rate specified in contract or eighteen percent), 303.009 (providing
the maximum and minimum weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annualized ceiling).2 In
Appellee’s extension of credit, there is support in the record for the trial court’s
finding that eighteen percent prejudgment interest was agreed to by Appellant. The
parties had a history of grain business transactions together. It appears from the
record that at the relative inception of their dealings, Appellant received and

        2
          See Whitehead Utils., Inc. v. Emery Fin. Corp., 697 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
1985, no writ) (holding that Article 5069–1.03, a precursor to Section 302.002, does not apply when the
parties contracted for the “highest contract rate of interest Lessor may charge lessee under applicable law”);
cf. All Seasons Window and Door Manufacturing, Inc. v. Red Dot Corp., 181 S.W.3d 490, 499, 502 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.). (“All deferred payments shall bear interest from the time they are due
until paid at the maximum rate permitted by the applicable law.”); AU Pharm., Inc. v. Boston, 986 S.W.2d
331, 334 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.) (Section 302.002 does not apply when parties agreed to
zero percent interest); Bundrick v. First Nat’l Bank of Jacksonville, 570 S.W.2d 12, 15 (Tex. App.—Tyler
1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (allowing collection of the maximum legal rate of interest for a contract that provided
for “interest at the highest legal contract rate from the date of such default”).

                                                           9
executed a credit agreement on July 24, 2013. 3 It begins with the following
language:

            BY THIS AGREEMENT, the undersigned (“BUYER”) agrees
      to purchase goods and services from ATTEBURY GRAIN, LLC
      (“SELLER”) upon the following terms and conditions.

            SELLER may permit BUYER to make purchases on credit from
      time to time. The price for goods and services purchased will be due
      upon receipt of invoice.

            BUYER agrees to pay a finance charge at the rate of 18% per
      annum (1.5% per month) on any balance remaining unpaid after the
      30th day following invoice date.
              ....

             SELLER may place credit limits upon BUYER’S account under
      this same agreement and may raise or lower these limits from time to
      time without notice to the BUYER.

            SELLER may alter the terms of this CREDIT AGREEMENT at
      any time upon notice to BUYER as provided by law. Any change will
      be applied to existing account balances as well as to future purchases.
      If BUYER rejects any such change, BUYER must pay the existing
      account on the terms as they existed prior to the change.
By its terms, the credit agreement does not appear to be confined to a single specific
transaction. For example, it references “future purchases,” “purchases on credit
from time to time,” and raising or lowering credit limits “from time to time.” Thus,
the credit agreement’s terms are continuing and applicable to future transactions
between the parties. With no amendment or similar document of differing terms
subsequently entered into by the parties, the trial court as the finder of fact was free

      3
       In his brief, Appellant refers to the credit agreement as “the original contract.”
                                                         10
to conclude that Appellant, and a buyer under the circumstances, would have
understood the continuing terms upon which credit would be extended in any
transaction for goods and services to be at eighteen percent interest on all outstanding
balances, under which the parties had, from the outset, agreed to do business. Cf.
Adams v. H & H Meat Products, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 762, 780 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 2001, no pet.) (calculating interest rate using the rate set forth on
invoices exchanged between the parties); Montanaro v. Montanaro, 946 S.W.2d
428, 431 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1997, no writ) (finding an
appropriate interest rate as implied by other terms of the agreement).
        We conclude that the parties agreed to a rate of eighteen percent for
prejudgment interest. We next address Appellant’s argument that Appellee failed to
establish the accrual date from which prejudgment interest was to be calculated—
and that therefore the trial court’s prejudgment interest award was not supported by
legally and factually sufficient evidence.
        As stated in the credit agreement, the accrual of finance charges, which
functioned as interest in the credit agreement, 4 was to begin “on any balance
remaining unpaid after the 30th day following invoice date.” Neither the credit
agreement nor any other document included in the record defines the term,
“invoice,” and the record does not include a traditional commercial document or any
document that is labeled as an “invoice.” As such, the credit agreement does not
show that the term “invoice” is used in a technical or different sense in the

        4
         Appellee argues that the “finance charge” expressed within the credit agreement was interest. The
inclusion of certain additional charges other than the interest charges shown on the face of loan documents
often amounts to a means by which interest is exacted; depending on how they function within the
transaction, such charges may be considered interest. See Crowder v. First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Dallas, 567 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Appellant also
admits that the credit agreement asserted a “default interest rate” “of 18% or 1.5% per month.”
                                                          11
agreement. When a term is not defined in an agreement, we give the term its plain,
ordinary, and generally accepted meaning. See BP Oil Pipeline Co. v. Plains
Pipeline, L.P., 472 S.W.3d 296, 304–05 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,
pet. denied); see Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121–22 (Tex.
1996). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “invoice” as “an itemized list of goods or
services furnished by a seller to a buyer, usu. specifying the price and terms of sale;
bill of costs.” Invoice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Similarly,
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines “invoice” as “an itemized list of goods
shipped usually specifying the price and the terms of sale.” Invoice, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020) (cross-referencing the term “bill,” which is
defined as “an itemized account of the separate cost of goods sold,
services performed, or work done.”). Collins English Dictionary defines it as “a
document that lists goods that have been supplied or services that have been
done, and says how much money you owe for them.” Invoice, COLLINS ONLINE
DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/invoice (last
visited January 23, 2024). Consistent with these definitions, an invoice need not
take any specific form as long as it states the product or service provided and its
price. See CCC Group, Inc. v. Enduro Composites, Inc., 637 S.W.3d 153, 169 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021), judgment set aside, opinion not vacated, No. 14-
19-00204-CV, 2022 WL 34632 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 4, 2022, no
pet.) (defining the term “complete invoices” for the product of siding “must describe
the siding and state the price charged for the siding”).
      Here, Appellee introduced, and the trial court admitted, demand letters sent to
Appellant that indicated the amount of corn and wheat Appellant contracted to
purchase, which referenced the specific sales contracts that included the quantity of
goods and the prices, the balance due, the number of bushels purchased, and the date
                                             12
on which payment is required. As a result, the record reflects the dates upon which
invoice-type information was sent to and received by Appellant in the form of
demand letters on Appellee’s letterhead. Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial
court abused its discretion in its conclusion of law that Appellant “agreed to all sums
due and owing” using eighteen percent in its calculation of prejudgment interest.
       The trial court did not explain the basis for its calculation of prejudgment
interest, nor did it state the accrual date(s) on which it found that interest began in
its findings of fact or conclusions of law; however, in its findings of fact, the trial
court described the demand letters Appellee sent to Appellant and the date the letters
were sent.      Appellee contends that the calculations were based on the dates
established by the demand letters. Under the agreed upon terms found in the credit
agreement, the trial court should have calculated the accrual of prejudgment interest
from the thirtieth day following the invoice dates—that of the Appellee’s demand
letters that set out the relevant information needed to constitute an “invoice” as
contemplated by the agreement. The record shows that Appellant received these
demand letters. In response to Appellee’s original motions for summary judgment,
Appellant made the following judicial admissions 5
       [From 2014 until 2016], Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a series of
       agreements to acquire significant quantities of wheat.

       Defendant did not receive formal notice from Plaintiff concerning any
       alleged breach of contract claim related to any of the various
       transactions [involving wheat] until the [sic] December 14, 2017.

       5
          See Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2001) (assertions of
fact, not pled in the alternative, in a response to a summary judgment motion are judicial admissions).
                                                          13
        Defendant did not receive formal notice from Plaintiff concerning any
        alleged breach of contract claim related to any of the transactions
        involving corn between the parties until the [sic] August 30, 2016.
Correspondingly, the record includes the two demand letters sent by Appellee to
Appellant:
        A formal demand letter alleging breach of contract regarding “Sale of
        145,454.57 bushels of Soft Wheat under Sales Contract No. 345000172 dated
        June 24, 2014” addressed to Appellant was dated December 15, 2017.

        A formal demand letter alleging breach of contract regarding “Sale of 440,000
        bushels of #2 Yellow Corn under Sales Contract No. 345000290 dated July
        21, 2015” addressed to Appellant was dated August 30, 2016.
Accordingly, the record shows that the “invoice” on Appellee’s wheat-contract
claims was on December 15, 2017, thirty days from when prejudgment interest
began to accrue (January 15, 2018). The record shows that the “invoice” on
Appellee’s corn-contract claim was August 30, 2016, thirty days from when
prejudgment interest began to accrue (September 30, 2016).
        Appellant does not complain of the trial court’s calculation of principal
amounts—$436,645.00 on the wheat contracts and $126,098.32 on the corn
contract—as stated in the judgment. Prejudgment interest is computed as simple
interest; it does not compound. See FIN. § 304.104; Ventling, 466 S.W.3d at 153.
Therefore, prejudgment interest on the principal amount for wheat contracts is
$316,537.72,6 and for the corn contract it is $120,764.19, 7 for a total of $437,301.91
in prejudgment interest. Appellant is entitled to recover contractual prejudgment

        6
         $436,645 (principal) x .18 (prejudgment interest rate) divided by 365 (days in year) x 1,470 days
(January 15, 2018 to January 23, 2022).

        $126,098.32 (principal) x .18 (prejudgment interest rate) divided by 365 (days in year) x 1,942
        7

days (September 30, 2016 to January 23, 2022).

                                                       14
interest as explained above. An appellate court may determine the proper interest
rate to be applied in calculating prejudgment interest, calculate prejudgment interest
owed on judgment in a breach-of-contract case, and reform a trial court’s judgment
accordingly. See Siam v. Mountain Vista Builders, 544 S.W.3d 504, 514–15 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); Garden Ridge, L.P. v. Clear Lake Ctr., L.P., 504
S.W.3d 428, 452–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). We have
done so. Accordingly, we sustain Appellant’s second and third issues in part, and
we modify the judgment to reflect the proper amount of prejudgment interest:
$437,301.91.
       III. Attorney’s Fees
       In Appellant’s fourth issue, he argues that there is insufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. Attebury’s trial counsel, Grant
Zachary Gibson, briefly testified and stated that Appellee had incurred $37,090.75
in attorney’s fees.        The trial court awarded $31,964.75 in attorney’s fees to
Appellee. 8
       We review a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion.
El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2012). A trial court abuses
that discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal
principles, or if its decision is not supported by legally or factually sufficient
evidence. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); see also
Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (explaining that
legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in determining
whether trial court abused its discretion).

       8
         We note that the trial court awarded Appellee its requested attorney’s fees ($37,090.75) on the
record but that its judgment reflects that it awarded $31,964.75.
                                                          15
      A prevailing party may recover reasonable attorney’s fees for a breach-of-
contract claim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001(8) (West Supp.
2023). “When a claimant wishes to obtain attorney’s fees from the opposing party,
the claimant must prove that the requested fees are both reasonable and necessary.”
Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 489 (Tex.
2019).   Whether the fees requested by a prevailing party are reasonable and
necessary are both questions of fact to be determined by the factfinder. Id. at 498.
The lodestar method sets forth a two-step inquiry to ascertain what constitutes
reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. Id.
      First, the factfinder must determine the reasonable hours worked by counsel
multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate for counsel’s services. Id.; El Apple I, 370
S.W.3d at 760. At a minimum, the fee claimant’s proof of reasonable hours should
include “evidence of (1) particular services performed, (2) who performed those
services, (3) approximately when the services were performed, (4) the reasonable
amount of time required to perform the services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate
for each person performing such services.” Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 498.
This base lodestar calculation approximates “the reasonable value of legal services
provided” and, when supported by sufficient evidence, is presumed to reflect “the
reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees that can be shifted to the non-prevailing
party.” Id. at 498–99.
      Second, because other considerations may justify an enhancement or
reduction to the base lodestar figure, the factfinder must determine “whether
evidence of those considerations overcomes the presumption and necessitates an
adjustment to reach a reasonable fee.” Id. at 501. This step allows for the
enhancement or reduction of the base lodestar figure “when considerations not
already accounted for in the first step” establish that the base lodestar figure
                                            16
represents either an unreasonably low or an unreasonably high fee award. Id. at 502.
“[C]onsiderations already incorporated into the base calculation may not be applied
to rebut the presumption that the base calculation reflects reasonable and necessary
attorney’s fees.” Id. at 501 (noting that Arthur Andersen lists factors “that may
justify an adjustment” so long as they are noncumulative of the base-lodestar
considerations) (citing Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d
812, 818 (Tex. 1997)).
      “General, conclusory testimony devoid of any real substance will not support
a fee award.” Id.        Generalities about tasks performed provide insufficient
information for the factfinder to meaningfully review whether the tasks and hours
were reasonable and necessary.        El Apple I, 370 S.W.3d at 764.           While
contemporaneous billing records are not required, there must be some evidence to
inform the trial court of the time spent on specific tasks to enable the factfinder to
meaningfully review the requested fees. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 502;
Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam); City of Laredo v.
Montano, 414 S.W.3d 731, 736–37 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (reversing and
remanding to determine attorney’s fees when attorney testified to the time expended
and the hourly rate but failed to provide evidence of the time devoted to specific
tasks).
      Here, Appellee’s proof of reasonable hours falls short of a base lodestar
calculation. Through three pages in the record of his testimony, counsel established
some, but not all, of the minimum requirements of Rohrmoos. See Rohrmoos
Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 498.
      Gibson testified that another partner, Wyatt Brooks, was originally assigned
to the case and worked on the file but Gibson “took control of the file” when Brooks
experienced medical issues. Gibson testified that both his and Brooks’s hourly rate
                                             17
was $300, which was a reasonable rate given their skill and experience. Gibson
testified that “it took a substantial amount of time and effort” to work on the case
pretrial, including their work during the failed arbitration, drafting petitions,
addressing the motion to transfer venue, drafting discovery, filing motions and
responses, and taking a deposition. However, he did not testify as to “approximately
when [these] services were performed.”         Id. at 494–95.     The only testimony
regarding the timeframe of the case indicated that Brooks had not “done anything on
it in quite some time” due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Gibson did not give an
estimate of the reasonable amount of time to perform all of the services he described,
nor did he reveal how these hours were allocated to the various tasks mentioned, but
he did present a figure—$37.090.75—based on their $300 per hour rate, which
indicates approximately 124 hours worked. There is an absence of testimony or
other evidence that specifies how long Gibson and Brooks spent on the enumerated
activities or the specific total of hours spent during their representation.
      Here, there is evidence of the particular services performed, who performed
those services, and the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such
services.   But there is no evidence of approximately when the services were
performed or the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services.
Similar to El Apple I, “[t]he court could not discern from the evidence how many
hours each of the tasks required and whether that time was reasonable.” El Apple I,
370 S.W.3d at 763. Gibson did not present time records or other documentary
evidence or state when those services were performed or whether the time expended
was reasonable. The brief recitation of activities involved in the case and the
reasonable rate of the attorneys did not provide the trial court a basis upon which to
conduct a meaningful review of the award.

                                              18
      We conclude that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish
a base lodestar calculation. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it
awarded $31,964.75 in attorney’s fees. We sustain Appellant’s fourth issue.
      IV. Being Forced to Trial Without Counsel
      In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by “forcing” him
to proceed to trial without counsel. Appellant contends that the trial court’s act of
forcing him to trial without counsel was the functional equivalent of the trial court
granting his counsel’s motion to withdraw. We disagree with Appellant’s contention
because, as we have previously noted, the trial court overruled counsel’s motion to
withdraw.
      Here, Appellant contends that the trial court should have sua sponte granted a
continuance in light of counsel’s failure to appear. That might be the case if the trial
court had granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d
624, 626 (Tex. 1986); Jackson v. Jackson, 556 S.W.3d 461, 471 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). But here the trial court denied counsel’s motion
to withdraw. It is significant that Appellant subsequently made an unconditional
announcement of ready.          “Once both parties announce ready for trial
unconditionally, they commit themselves to a disposition of the action unless
relieved of this obligation by the grace of the court, and neither of them has an
unqualified right to withdraw its announcement or to obtain a continuance.” 4
MCDONALD & CARLSON TEX. CIV. PRAC. § 21:3 Withdrawing announcement of
ready (2d. ed.).
      To support his argument, Appellant cites to cases that analyze the trial court’s
discretion to grant a continuance. See Villegas, 711 S.W.2d at 626; Kinder Morgan
Prod. Co., LLC v. Scurry Cty. Appraisal Dist., 637 S.W.3d 893, 916 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2021, pet. denied); Jackson v. Jackson, 556 S.W.3d 461, 471 (Tex. App.—
                                              19
Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Wilborn v. Life Ambulance Servs. Inc., 163
S.W.3d 271, 274 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied). But Appellant did not
seek a continuance either prior to or during the trial.
      As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record
must demonstrate, among other things, that the complaint was made to the trial court
by a timely request, and that the trial court ruled on the request or refused to do so
and the complaining party objected to the refusal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). At
trial, Appellant made no complaints about proceeding to trial. Instead, when the trial
court asked if he was ready to proceed, Appellant responded “I’m ready,” with no
further questions or elaboration.
      Appellant asserts that his then-prospective counsel, King, stated in his verified
motion for new trial that “the Court denied the Motion for Continuance and ordered
Defendant to trial . . . [a] fact [that] was not challenged or controverted in the court
below.” In this regard, Appellant’s motion for new trial asserts that “Defendant
requested a continuance so he could secure new counsel” and that the trial court
denied the continuance. At oral argument, Appellant specified that King requested
an oral motion for continuance in chambers. On the record, the trial court did
mention an in-chambers meeting with King and Gibson prior to trial, but it did not
mention any motion for continuance: requested, ruled upon, or otherwise.
      This alleged oral motion for continuance, even taken at face value, presents
further problems. First, any request was not actually made by the defendant, but by
prospective—not retained—counsel. Therefore, “Defendant,” Appellant himself,
did not make this request. The request was made by a lawyer who did not represent
Appellant. This is confirmed by the trial court’s statement that King had “done
nothing as far as representation in this matter to enter [an] appearance for
[Appellant].”
                                              20
      Second, any oral motion for continuance conflicts with Appellant’s
subsequent representation that he was ready to proceed. Announcing “ready” waives
the right to subsequently seek a delay based upon any facts which are, or with proper
diligence should have been, known at the time. Reyna v. Reyna, 738 S.W.2d 772,
775 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ). At the time Appellant announced ready,
Miller had been contacted and she had refused to make an effort to attend her client’s
trial. Appellant was aware that Miller would not be present when the trial court
asked if he was ready to proceed and he announced, “I’m ready.”
      Third, the failure to file a written continuance risks waiving the issue. Many
intermediate courts—ours included—have noted that an oral continuance generally
does not preserve error. See, e.g., Kinder Morgan Prod. Co., LLC, 637 S.W.3d at
915 (citing In re Marriage of Harrison, 557 S.W.3d 99, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); Dempsey v. Dempsey, 227 S.W.3d 771, 776 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.); Taherzadeh v. Ghaleh-Assadi, 108 S.W.3d 927, 928
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied); see also Louison v. Caddette, No. 01-22-
00034-CV, 2023 WL 3358162, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 11, 2023,
no pet.) (mem. op.); Redmond v. Kovar, No. 09-17-00099-CV, 2018 WL 651272, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). Here, the alleged oral
continuance is not in the reporter’s record, and it is substantiated solely by post-trial
claims.
      Even if we considered the denial of any continuance on the merits, we
would overrule this issue. A motion for continuance should be in writing. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 251–254; Green v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Services, 25
S.W.3d 213, 218 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.); see In re Marriage of
Harrison, 557 S.W.3d at 118. An oral request for continuance does not preserve
error. See Phifer v. Nacogdoches Cnty. Cent. Appraisal Dist., 45 S.W.3d 159, 173
                                              21
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet. denied). It must be verified or supported by affidavit;
if not, an appellate court will presume that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion. Serrano v. Ryan’s Crossing Apartments, 241 S.W.3d 560,
564 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, pet. denied). Appellant nevertheless seeks review
on appeal. In doing so, he does not, however, discuss the relevant rule.
             Except as provided elsewhere in these rules, absence of counsel
      will not be good cause for a continuance or postponement of the cause
      when called for trial, except it be allowed in the discretion of the court,
      upon cause shown or upon matters within the knowledge or information
      of the judge to be stated on the record.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 253 (emphasis added). The rule for absence of counsel requires a
showing of good cause before the trial court may consider granting a continuance.
Rehabilitation Facility at Austin, Inc. v. Cooper, 962 S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1998, no pet.). Courts have repeatedly held that the absence of counsel does
not generally constitute good cause for a continuance, even when one is sought. See,
e.g., McKinney v City of Cedar Hill, No. 05-12-00368-CV, 2012 WL 5971178 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.); R.M. Dudley Constr. Co. v. Dawson,
258 S.W.3d 694, 701 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. denied); Hatteberg v. Hatteberg,
933 S.W.2d 522, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.). Moreover,
notwithstanding the showing of good cause, the rule states that a trial court, within
its discretion, may grant a continuance based on the absence of counsel; therefore,
whether to grant or deny a continuance remains within the trial court’s discretion.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 253.
      The record does not demonstrate that Appellant himself made a motion for
continuance to the trial court. Such a motion, at best, was unwritten, not reflected
in the reporter’s record, and by counsel that did not represent Appellant. If such a

                                              22
motion was in fact offered, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion to deny the unwritten motion. Appellant’s fifth issue is overruled.
                                     This Court’s Ruling
      The judgment of the trial court is modified as it relates to the amount of
prejudgment interest awarded, and it is reversed and remanded as to the attorney’s
fees. We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect an award of $437,301.91 in
prejudgment interest, and we reverse the award of attorney’s fees and remand that
issue for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The trial court’s judgment
is affirmed in all other respects.

                                                 W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                 JUSTICE

January 25, 2024
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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