Court Opinion

ID: 9788346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:44:02.749574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:08.504910
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
IRVINE, Judge.
¶ 1 Munninger was charged with aggravated assault, a class three dangerous felony. A jury convicted him, finding that the offense was dangerous. The trial court imposed an aggravated and enhanced sentence of 12.5 years in prison. The presumptive sentence was 7.5 years and the maximum was 15 years. On appeal we held that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), decided while Mun-ninger’s appeal was pending, required resen-tencing. State v. Munninger, 209 Ariz. 473, 104 P.3d 204 (App.2005). The Supreme Court of Arizona remanded this matter for reconsideration in light of State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618 (2005) and State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 115 P.3d 601 (2005). After reconsideration, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.
¶ 2 Martinez held that a single Blakely-exempt or Blakely-compliant factor1 permits the imposition of an aggravated sentence. 210 Ariz. at 585, ¶ 26, 115 P.3d at 625. The supreme court found that the jury’s verdict implicitly found an aggravator. Id. at 585-86, ¶ 27, 115 P.3d at 625-26. Accordingly, the sentencing judge in Martinez did not violate Blakely by relying on other factors to determine the length of Martinez’s aggravated sentence. Id.
¶ 3 In our previous opinion, we found that the superior court used three factors to justify an aggravated sentence for Munninger: extraordinary harm to the victim, viciousness of the crime and use of a weapon.2 None of these facts were either Blakely-compliant or Blakely-exempt.3 Accordingly, the holding of Martinez does not directly apply. Consequently, because no aggravating factor found by the jury and no aggravating factor not subject to the requirement of a jury finding is present in this case, the superior court erred in imposing an aggravated sentence.
¶ 4 Nevertheless, we must consider whether the Blakely error at issue in this case requires us to reverse Munninger’s sentence. Henderson held that if a defendant does not object at trial a Blakely error is subject to fundamental error review and the defendant bears the burden of establishing that he was prejudiced by the error. 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607. This burden requires a defendant to “show that a reasonable jury, applying the appropriate standard of proof, could have reached a different result [in finding an aggravator] than did the trial judge.” Id. at 569, ¶ 27, 115 P.3d at 609.
¶ 5 Henderson involved a super-aggravated sentence, so the issue was whether two aggravating factors existed.
If we find that a reasonable jury applying the correct standard of proof could have reached a different conclusion than did the trial judge as to any or all aggravators, we must then consider whether at least two aggravators not subject to such a conclusion remain to sustain the defendant’s super-aggravated sentence. If not, the defendant has made an adequate showing of prejudice.
Id. at 569, ¶ 28, 115 P.3d at 609 (internal citations omitted). The court found that one, but only one, such circumstance was present: the age of the victim. Id. at 570, ¶ 33, 115 P.3d at 610. The defendant, therefore, had successfully demonstrated that he had been *396prejudiced by the Blakely error because “the victim’s age, by itself, could not expose Henderson to [a] super-aggravated sentence.” Id. at 570, ¶ 34, 115 P.3d at 610.
¶ 6 In this case, Munninger’s sentence was not super-aggravated, so only a single aggravating factor would be enough to expose him to an aggravated sentence. Therefore, we must consider whether at least one aggravator remains to sustain the aggravated sentence.
¶ 7 In our previous opinion we determined that one aggravating fact, the victim’s extraordinary harm, was “indisputable.” Munninger, 209 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 40, 104 P.3d at 216. In other words, no reasonable jury would disagree with the judge’s finding that the victim suffered extraordinary harm. In light of this finding, and applying Henderson, it was not fundamental error for Munninger to be exposed to an aggravated sentence. See also State v. Brown, 212 Ariz. 225, 231 n. 5, ¶ 28, 129 P.3d 947, 953 n. 5 (2006) (noting “that judicial factfinding may be harmless error when no reasonable jury could have reached a determination contrary to that made by the judge.”).
¶ 8 We also conclude that it was not fundamental error for the trial court to consider other aggravating circumstances that are not Blakely-compliant in determining a sentence. As noted above, viciousness of the crime was also considered by the trial court and this factor was neither found by a jury nor found by this court to be indisputable. Nevertheless, once the sentencing range is expanded to allow an aggravated sentence, whether by proof of a Blakely-compliant factor or a finding under Henderson that reliance on an aggravator is not fundamental error, we see no reason why the rationale of Martinez does not apply to allow other factors to be considered. See also State v. Cleere, 213 Ariz. 54, 138 P.3d 1181 (App.2006); State v. Molina, 211 Ariz. 130, 118 P.3d 1094 (App.2005). Consequently, Blakely does not require resentencing.
¶ 9 This does not, however, end our analysis. In our prior opinion we found that the trial judge improperly considered the use of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon as an aggravating factor. We addressed this in the Blakely context and concluded that cases decided by both the supreme court and this court generally required resentencing when an invalid aggravating factor was relied upon by the trial court. We explained:
When a trial court relies on an improper factor, and we cannot be certain that it would have imposed the same sentence absent that factor, we must remand for resentencing. A sentencing error involving the improper consideration of aggravating factors is harmless only if we can be certain that, absent the error, the court would have reached the same result. [State v.] Hardwick, 183 Ariz. [649] at 656-57, 905 P.2d [1384] at 1391-92 [(App.1995) ]. After weighing and balancing aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentencing judge may “impose a just sentence anywhere within the range authorized by statute.” State v. Henderson, 133 Ariz. 259, 263, 650 P.2d 1241, 1245 (App.1982), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Pena, 140 Ariz. 544, 683 P.2d 743 (1984). The reversal of a single aggravating factor may mean that “the sentencing calculus ... has changed.” Lehr, 205 Ariz. at 109, ¶ 8, 67 P.3d at 705. The exercise of sentencing discretion is the trial court’s, not ours. See A.H. by Weiss v. Superior Court, 184 Ariz. 627, 630, 911 P.2d 633, 636 (App.1996) (“[T]he sentence to be imposed is completely within the discretion of the trial judge.”). The reversal of some aggravating factors affects the balance of all the circumstances, aggravating and mitigating, and the balancing process is within the realm of the sentencing judge.
Munninger, 209 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 41, 104 P.3d at 216. The question before us is whether this reasoning still applies now that Blakely is no longer an issue.
¶ 10 It appears to be undisputed that there was no objection below to the improper use of the dangerous instrument/deadly weapon aggravating factor. Indeed, in his opening brief Munninger stated it was a proper aggravating factor, and did not challenge it on appeal. Therefore, we review only for fundamental error. Again applying Henderson, the issue becomes whether the error was *397both fundamental and prejudicial. Once again, the burden is on the defendant.
¶ 11 Fundamental error will only be found in “those rare cases that involve ‘error going to the foundation of the case, error that takes from the defendant a right essential to his defense, and error of such magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.’ ” Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607 (quoting State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90, 688 P.2d 980, 982 (1984)). Generally, “[imposition of an illegal sentence constitutes fundamental error.” State v. Thues, 203 Ariz. 339, 340, ¶ 4, 54 P.3d 368, 369 (App.2002). But see Washington v. Recuenco, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) (holding Blakely error is not structural error entitling a defendant to automatic reversal).
¶ 12 In this case, Munninger did not receive an illegal sentence. His sentence was within the aggravated range prescribed for his offense. The sentencing judge “explicitly found that each of the aggravating factors alone would outweigh the mitigating factors.” Munninger, 209 Ariz. at 486 n. 14, ¶ 42, 104 P.3d at 217 n. 14. Thus, it is clear that an aggravated sentence would have been imposed even if the improper aggravator had not been used. Under these circumstances, we do not believe any error was fundamental.
¶ 13 We find support for this conclusion in a recent supreme court case. In State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 116 P.3d 1193 (2005), the supreme court addressed a similar issue, concluding:
We note that because Glassel’s use of a deadly weapon was used to enhance the range of punishment under section 13-604(1), the trial court erred in relying on Glassel’s use of a deadly weapon as an aggravating circumstance. See A.R.S. § 13-702(C)(2)____ Glassel, however, has waived these issues by not raising them at trial or on appeal.
Id. at 57 n. 17, ¶ 101, 116 P.3d at 1217 n. 17. In specifically addressing the Blakely claim, the court concluded: “And because Glassel does not challenge the trial court’s use of any of the other aggravating circumstances, his claim that the trial court’s imposition of aggravated sentences violated the holding of Blakely fails.” Id. at 58, ¶ 104, 116 P.3d at 1218. In Glassel, the supreme court plainly recognized the error of using an improper aggravating factor, but did not find it to be fundamental.
¶ 14 We also conclude that Munninger has not met his burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the use of the improper aggravating factor. He asks us to speculate that the sentencing judge might have sentenced him to less than 12.5 years if the weapon aggravator was not considered, but there is no support in the record for such speculation. Before Henderson, as we discussed in our prior opinion, the standard was whether we were certain the sentence would be the same absent the improper factor. Munninger, 209 Ariz. at 485-86, ¶¶ 41-42, 104 P.3d at 216-17. Henderson clarifies, however, that the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate prejudice.4 It is plain from the transcript that the trial court intended to impose an aggravated sentence — something between 7.5 and 15 years. The transcript contains no evidence to support defendant’s claim that it would have been less than 12.5 years. Given that the burden is on the defendant, prejudice has not been shown.
¶ 15 We note that a case from Division Two of this court has also found that simply considering an improper aggravating factor is not reversible error under Henderson:
Citing State v. Carriger [143 Ariz. 142, 692 P.2d 991 (1984)], Ruggiero also argues that “[t]he trial court committed fundamental error by considering the improper aggravating factor of failure to accept responsibility.” But, Ruggiero did not object below and we therefore review this claim for fundamental error. We agree with Ruggiero that the fact that a defendant “chooses not to publicly admit ... guilt ... is irrelevant to a sentencing determination.” But, Ruggiero has not demonstrated how the error prejudiced her and *398has therefore failed to carry her burden under fundamental error review.
State v. Ruggiero, 211 Ariz. 262, 269 n. 6, ¶ 29, 120 P.3d 690, 697 n. 6 (App.2005) (citations omitted). Equally, Munninger has failed to carry his burden.
CONCLUSION
¶ 16 Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.
CONCURRING: PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Judge.

. Prior convictions are Blakely-exempt because the sentencing court may consider them even if a jury does not find them. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531.

. Munninger, 209 Ariz. at 484, ¶¶ 34-37, 104 P.3d at 215. In its supplemental brief the State argues that the viciousness of the crime was not a separate aggravating factor, but merely part of the explanation of the extraordinary harm to the victim. Given our resolution of the issues involving the two aggravating factors expressly addressed by the trial court, it is unnecessary for us to address whether the viciousness of the crime is a separate aggravating factor.

 Our opinion rejected the possibility that the use of a weapon or the seriousness of the injury could be used to (1) prove guilt, (2) find dangerousness and (3) aggravate the sentence. 209 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 38, 104 P.3d at 216.

. Henderson expressly mandated: "To the extent that any prior decisions are inconsistent with today’s holding, we disapprove of them." 210 Ariz. at 568, ¶ 21, 115 P.3d at 608.