Court Opinion

ID: 9747756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:31:27.417103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:26.545164
License: Public Domain

Sobeloff, C. J.,
delivered the following dissenting opinion, in which Delaplaine, J., concurred.
As the .decision in this case may carry implications important to those engaged in the real estate business, *599Judge Delaplaine and I feel impelled to state the reasons for our non-concurrence.
Real estate brokers, we think, will learn with surprise that they expose themselves to liability in damages under such circumstances as this record discloses.
It may be granted that the Brambles became liable for commissions to their broker, Seth, if he produced the Lynches, who were ready, willing and able to buy on the terms specified in his employment. It may be granted also that such liability would not be affected by the fact that an oral agreement between the Brambles and the Lynches might be unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds. It is far from clear, however, that the Brambles definitely engaged themselves, even orally, to sell to the Lynches. The record seems to show that before Seth tendered a deposit the Brambles changed their mind, as they had a perfect legal right to do.
Our attention, however, needs to be focused not on the Bramble-Lynch agreement, but on the Brambles’ agreement with Seth to pay him commissions when he had performed his service. It is for the alleged interference with the latter agreement that Seth sued Mrs. Horn.
As we see it, Seth has proved no case against her and has suffered no damage from her conduct. His right of action against the Brambles, if it arose at all, has remained complete. Mrs. Horn’s activities did not weaken Seth’s claim against the Brambles. Whatever effect these activities of Mrs. Horn may have had on the oral agreement (if any) between the Brambles and Lynch, they were innocuous as to the agreement between the Brambles and Seth.
There is no suggestion in the record that the Brambles would be unable to meet any judgment against them for commissions and no proof of special damage. Seth simply declined to sue the property owners for reasons undisclosed by the testimony. If he preferred not to sue them and has allowed limitations to run, this is no fault of Mrs. Horn.
*600The mere fact that in this case the owners may have deliberately obligated themselves to two brokers, and may be disinclined to pay one of them, is immaterial. They could have been made to pay Seth, if he procured a customer on their terms, and it is by no means certain that if he had made demand upon the Brambles they would not have paid without suit.
Recognizing that Seth cannot maintain a suit if he has suffered no damage, it is suggested in the opinion that his damage consisted in that he was put to the necessity of suing the Brambles. The answer is that there is nothing to indicate that Mrs. Horn advised the Brambles not to pay Seth, or that she even discussed his commissions with them. The cost of prosecuting a suit to recover five hundred dollars in commissions would in any event hardly equal that amount; but it may be that, as pointed out, no request having been made for an instruction as to damages the appellant cannot now complain of the size of the verdict. She did, however, challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict against her.
This case is distinguishable from Deming v. Hill, 251 N. Y. 573, 168 N. E. 432, for there insolvency of the owner supervened to defeat collection of the commission. The case most relied upon in the majority opinion, Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674, 84 A. L. R. 1, has itself been limited by the New York Court of Appeals, so as not to reach a case like this. Against this attenuated New York rule are the decisions referred to in Massachusetts and Ohio.
Our impression of the cases relied on in the Court’s opinion and other cases where liability has been upheld, is that in nearly all of them. the defendant interfered with an exclusive agency of the plaintiff of which the defendant had knowledge; or there was some aggravating factor such as fraud, deviousness or conspiracy, (as where a dummy corporation, was used to simulate a sale to an independent ■ purchaser, Skene v. Carayanis, 103 Conn. 708, 131 A. 497); or there was duress, or. malicious *601and wanton interference with the plaintiff beyond the press of competition, and the motive was to injure and not merely one of business rivalry, (as where plaintiff having preferred charges against defendant’s company before the Real Estate Board the defendant, angered and desirous of injuring plaintiff, threatened and coerced the prospective purchaser, thereby preventing him from consummating the deal which plaintiff broker had arranged. Krigbaum v. Sbarbaro, 23 Cal. App. 427, 138 P. 364.)
In the Hornstein case, itself, the plaintiff broker had procured a purchaser and a contract had been signed between buyer and seller. The real estate operator in whose office the broker was employed then connived with the owner to deprive the plaintiff of his commissions. There was no competition; no other customer was produced. They simply conspired to disguise and appropriate the customer the plaintiff had found, and proceeded to divide between themselves the commissions which plaintiff had earned. Moreover, the vendor corporation was insolvent. Under these circumstances— so different from the case here — the plaintiff’s employer who had fraudulently collaborated with the vendor was held liable. It was really not a case dealing with the activities of rival brokers.
An examination of notes and illustrations accompanying the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 768, discloses that the writers had in mind fact situations unlike this case.
As the opinion frankly recognizes, the question has been decided both ways in other jurisdictions. Since it is a new question in Maryland we should prefer the rule which is more in keeping with the practicalities of the real estate business. It seems to us not required by settled law, or consistent with sound policy, to put unnecessary impediments in the way of brokers engaged in competitive effort.
In this case Mrs. Horn was trying to obtain the property for her customer, while a competing broker was *602endeavoring to effect sale to his. Neither had an exclusive agency. Such rivalry not uncommonly becomes quite sharp. At what point must it stop? When a broker hears that his competitor has gotten an oral offer, but no contract has been signed and no deposit paid, must he desist or make himself liable? How was Mrs. Horn to know that the Lynches would really go through with their promise to come up with an offer backed by a deposit? They might still decide not to sign the contract or pay the deposit, despite all the eager talk. The experience of brokers will confirm that negotiations often reach this point and then abort. If the Brambles agreed to wait till one o’clock for a deposit, that was a nudum pactum, from which they were free to withdraw before the Lynches closed the deal with the deposit. Both parties obviously treated a deposit as the expected prerequisite to an effective engagement to buy and sell.
It cannot be said on this record that either the Brambles or the Lynches intended to commit themselves firmly by the telephone conversations; these communications, it seems to us, were only preliminary exchanges not meant to become binding until the customary deposit was paid and a contract signed. An oral contract is legally possible, but it would have to be more clear and explicit than anything established here.
Until the uncertainty was cleared Mrs. Horn was within her rights in persisting in the pursuit.
Real estate brokers are in no special class, and where fixed and definite contractual obligations have arisen they are required to respect them. Interference by a broker with an actual agreement is actionable, and a broker who has been injured may in a proper case sue the offending broker in tort as well as his principal in contract. But short of fully matured obligations, a broker ought not to be hobbled and confused by the threat of his becoming personally liable to his competitor.
*603More especially we see no cause of action in this case, where the plaintiff has suffered no injury through the defendant’s acts.
Judge Delaplaine authorizes me to say that he concurs in this opinion.