Court Opinion

ID: 9960591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 17:00:48.164769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:39.272637
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 16 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-50173

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                5:20-cr-00041-JGB-1
 v.

JONATHAN GARCIA, AKA FreeHugs,                  MEMORANDUM*
AKA kingjongar, AKA thekingjongar,

                Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-50261

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                5:20-cr-00041-JGB-1
 v.

JONATHAN GARCIA,

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                    Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted April 4, 2024
                              Pasadena, California

Before: R. NELSON, VANDYKE, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      Defendant-Appellant Jonathan Garcia appeals his 300-month custodial

sentence and the imposition of a term of supervised release. We have jurisdiction

under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the custodial sentence

and issue a limited remand to allow the district court to conform its oral

pronouncement of Condition Eight to the written judgment and to allow Garcia an

opportunity to object to that condition.

      Garcia first argues that the district court procedurally erred by failing to

explain sufficiently its sentencing decision, and in particular the court’s failure to

address certain arguments raised by Garcia in his sentencing memorandum.

Because Garcia did not raise these challenges below, the panel reviews his

procedural error claim for plain error. United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608

F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). A sentencing court need not chronicle every

reason for its decision, particularly when it is within the Guidelines range and the

record indicates that it considered the parties’ arguments. See Rita v. United

States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007); see also United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984,

992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). “At bottom, the sentencing judge need only set

forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’

arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking

authority.” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 113 (2018) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

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      The district court did not commit plain error. The district court stated it had

considered the parties’ sentencing arguments and the presentence report, and

explained its downward departure based on a mitigating circumstance. The court

clearly was familiar with the parties’ arguments and materials, as it mentioned

Garcia’s childhood sexual abuse as the reason for its imposition of a within-

Guidelines sentence of 300 months rather than the recommended statutory

maximum of 360 months. The court also imposed mental health and sex offender

treatment supervised release conditions, which Garcia had argued were “what is

needed here” to protect the public and prevent recidivism. On this record, Garcia

has failed to demonstrate any plain or obvious error. See Valencia-Barragan, 608

F.3d at 1108.

      Nor did the district court plainly err in its failure to address Garcia’s other

sentencing arguments, including that the court should reject the Guidelines as a

matter of policy. District courts are under no obligation to have a policy

disagreement with the Guidelines, and the district court here properly

acknowledged its authority to deviate from the Guidelines. United States v.

Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 2011). Even if the court’s bare

explanation amounted to procedural error, Garcia has not shown that this error

affected his substantial rights by demonstrating a “reasonable probability” that he

would have received a different sentence in the absence of error. United States v.

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Joseph, 716 F.3d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 2013).

      Garcia also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, which we

review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir.

2009). Although this court’s review is not a rubber stamp, we afford “significant

deference” to the decision of the sentencing court and “will provide relief only in

rare cases.” United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d 1069, 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 2012)

(en banc). Garcia’s sentence is not unreasonable based on his offense and personal

characteristics. The record reflects that Garcia solicited 50-100 young girls by

posing as a minor and inducing his victims—some as young as nine years old—to

produce and send sexually explicit videos and images to him. His conduct lasted

for four years, during which time he had a pending charge in state court for lewd or

lascivious acts with a minor. Balancing these aggravating factors, the court

considered Garcia’s own history of childhood sexual abuse as a factor warranting

mitigation of his sentence. The district court was not obligated to agree with

Garcia’s view that the Guidelines are overly punitive. Henderson, 649 F.3d at

963-64. Finally, Garcia’s sentence is not substantively disproportionate as

compared to other defendants. See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal

Sentencing of Child Pornography Production Offenses, at 3, 46, 50 (Oct. 2021).

      Garcia also argues that the district court erred when it did not orally

pronounce as a condition of his supervised release that he would be required to pay

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for the Computer Monitoring Program reflected in Condition Eight of the written

judgment. This court reviews a claim that the district court failed to make an oral

pronouncement imposed in the written sentence de novo. United States v.

Montoya, 82 F.4th 640, 646 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc). It is undisputed that the

district court did not orally pronounce the payment requirement for the Computer

Monitoring Program, nor did it orally incorporate the condition by reference. The

district court thus erred by failing to orally pronounce a payment requirement as a

condition of supervised release, requiring remand. Id. at 644, 650.

      Although the parties agree that error was committed, they disagree as to the

scope of remand. Garcia argues that we should vacate the judgment and remand

with instructions to strike the portion of Condition Eight that requires Garcia to pay

for the Computer Monitoring Program, while the government argues that remand

should be limited to allow the district court to amend its oral pronouncement to

conform to the written judgment and to allow Garcia to object. We agree with the

government that a limited remand is appropriate. Because there was no other

sentencing error, we “exercise our discretion” to limit remand “so that the district

court can cure its error by orally pronouncing any of the standard conditions of

supervised release that it chooses to impose and by giving [Garcia] a chance to

object to them.” Id. at 656.

      AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

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