Court Opinion

ID: 9838036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-04 09:09:05.315123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:03.043845
License: Public Domain

In the
                   Court of Appeals
           Second Appellate District of Texas
                    at Fort Worth
                  ___________________________

                       No. 02-22-00170-CR
                  ___________________________

            MUHAMMAD FAIZAN ANSARI, Appellant

                                   V.

                       THE STATE OF TEXAS

               On Appeal from the 372nd District Court
                      Tarrant County, Texas
                     Trial Court No. 1629392R

Before Birdwell and Bassel, JJ.; and Lee Gabriel (Senior Justice, Retired,
                       Sitting by Assignment)
              Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted Muhammad Faizan Ansari of two counts of online solicitation

of a minor. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(f). The trial court assessed his

punishment at ten years’ confinement on each count, suspended the sentences, and

placed him on community supervision for ten years. See id. § 12.33. The trial court

also assessed a fine of $2,000 on count one. Payment of the fine was not suspended.

In his first point, Ansari contends that the electronic messages allegedly sent between

him and the fictitious child victim were not properly authenticated and were thus

improperly admitted. In his second point, Ansari seems to argue that if the messages

had not been admitted, the evidence would have been insufficient to support his

conviction. We affirm.

                                I. BACKGROUND

      In 2018, Detective William Maddox worked in the internet crimes unit of the

Fort Worth Police Department. He exclusively investigated crimes involving child

victims by focusing on offenses that had an internet or technological component to

them. He described his specialized training for the job:

      I have training on . . . understanding how the internet works, what an IP
      address is, the different platforms that are used for online
      communication[,] and how they relate to crimes against children; training
      on engaging in undercover chat operations where we will pose as
      somebody else online and look for offenders online; training in peer-to-
      peer file-sharing networks where users are sending files to each other via
      the internet; and other training related to how technology is used to
      engage in crimes against children.

                                           2
      He furthered explained that an IP address means an Internet Protocol, which

he analogized to the physical address of a house. “[T]o engage in communication

online, you have to report what your address is to whatever the source online is that

you’re looking at so that they know who you are, where you are[,] and how to send

information back to you.”

      Maddox explained that he also received specialized training in undercover

investigations that would target online-solicitation-of-a-minor and child-pornography

cases. He detailed how he developed a persona where he posed as a thirteen-year-old

girl. He also explained how his unit had a limited amount of photographs of real

children that were donated for use in these types of investigations.           These

photographs were not sexual in any way.        Maddox testified that he conducted

operations targeting online solicitors by posting an ad on a platform that children

commonly use, which then remained idle until somebody responded.

      Maddox testified that on March 13, 2018, he posted an ad on Craigslist, a

classified-ads website, using the name “Emily”—the thirteen-year-old-girl persona

Maddox used—that stated, “Contact information: Young and needing something to

do, W4M.[1] Mom is out of town and friends went on trips for spring break. I’m

boooooooored.” The first response to the ad came in within twenty minutes from a

Craigslist anonymized email address with a username of “Faizan.” The response

      1
       He explained that “W4M” means “Woman for Man.”

                                         3
arrived in the inbox of an email account that Maddox created and linked to the ad.

“Faizan” and “Emily” then communicated by emails that only they could see.

      In the very first email “Faizan” sent to “Emily,” he asked if she was alone and

offered to come and “give [her] company.” In her very first reply, “Emily” asked

“Faizan” if it was okay that she was only thirteen years old. “Faizan” responded,

“Yeah. . . . I was looking for someone like you.” “Faizan” sent “Emily” a picture of

himself. He described himself as twenty-five, 5′8″, and athletic. He asked “Emily” to

send him multiple pictures of her, and Maddox sent the pictures. In the exchange,

“Emily” asked “Faizan” what he wanted to do. “Faizan” responded, “Well, [w]e can

make out and [c]uddle and see where it goes.” “Emily” followed up by asking him

where he thought it would go. “Faizan” replied,

      It will definately [sic] go far lol. . . . I’ll have [y]ou sit on my lap. We can
      start with a long kiss [a]nd making out while feeling each other[’s]
      bodies. I’ll start going down on you kissing all over then might lick it if
      you like . . . and then . . [.] a lot more.

“Emily” then told “Faizan” that she had never done the acts he was describing

before, and he responded that he would show her when they met. He said he was

available to meet her that day.

      Maddox testified that “Emily” and “Faizan” exchanged approximately twenty

emails before they decided it would be faster to switch to a different platform to

                                             4
communicate. After exchanging usernames for Kik2—the platform that they chose—

they continued to exchange messages and pictures for “most of an afternoon and

evening.”    Maddox testified that he was the author of all of “Emily’s”

communications. He described that during the communications, “Faizan” solicited

thirteen-year-old “Emily” to engage in sexual contact and sexual intercourse.

“Faizan” also communicated in a sexually explicit manner.

      In his last email sent through Craigslist, “Faizan” told “Emily” that his Kik

username was “faiz1208.” “[F]aiz1208” then contacted “Emily” on the Kik username

she provided to him. The message received by “Emily” showed a username of

“faiz1208” and a name of “M Faizan.”         After switching to the Kik platform,

“faiz1208’s” profile picture was the same picture he had previously sent by email to

“Emily.” In the Kik messages, “Emily” told “faiz1208” that she was in 7th grade.

She explained that she was nervous about what they were going to do and needed to

know what to expect. “[F]aiz1208” explained in more detail what he would do and

then asked, “Do you want intercourse?” When “Emily” expressed concern about

getting pregnant, “faiz1208” explained that he would use a condom and exactly how

condoms work. He concluded that discussion by stating, “You will be safe.”

      After the two had discussed the progression of sexual acts they could engage in

when they met, they discussed where to meet. After “faiz1208” told “Emily” that he

     According to Maddox, “Kik is a mobile app that is used for texting
      2

communication, . . . and it also has capabilities for phone and video calls.”

                                         5
lived in Dallas, they decided to meet at a park in Hurst. But immediately after

discussing the meeting location and where they could go from there, “faiz1208”

asked, “One last thing. Just to make sure you’re real. Can we video chat[?] Or just

send me video [of] you saying hello.” Maddox could not send a video and tried to

make excuses for not being able to do so. When “Emily” could not provide what he

requested, “faiz1208” responded, “I can’t trust you then. It’s important.” When

“Emily” stated that she felt like she could trust him, he replied, “But I’m the one who

will be in trouble lol.” When a video could not be provided, “faiz1208” asked if

“Emily” had a Facebook account and for her name on Facebook. She provided him

with a name for Facebook. He told her that his name on Facebook was “Faizan

Ansari” and that his Facebook account had the same picture as his Kik account. He

sent her a link and told her to click on the link to his account, which was

“https://www.facebook.com/muhammadfaizan.ansari.”           “Emily” did not send a

request on Facebook. Communication slowed and then stopped after “Emily” did

not follow “faiz1208’s” directions.

      After the communications ceased, Maddox continued his investigation using

the information he had gathered from the emails on Craigslist and the text messages

on Kik. He issued administrative subpoenas to the companies he knew Ansari used in

online activities, including Kik and Craigslist. Maddox explained that when he sent

the subpoena to Kik, he asked “for basic subscriber information, any profile picture,

device information, account creation date, and Kik[-]version birth date, user[-]location

                                           6
information including IP addresses, most recent IP addresses, and a historical log of

IP addresses.” Maddox testified that he received basic subscriber information from

Kik that showed an email address of heart.hacker.forever@gmail.com for the person

with the username “faiz1208.” Kik also provided an IP address log that showed that

“faiz1208” was utilizing a specific IP address during the time of the communications

between “faiz1208” and “Emily.” Maddox explained that the same IP address was

used when he was communicating as “Emily” with “faiz1208.”

      After receiving that IP address from Kik, Maddox used a publicly available IP

lookup service and determined that the IP address was issued by Charter

Communications. To follow up, he sent a subpoena to Charter for information on

the IP address as of March 14, 2018, at 22:24:41 UTC. The subscriber information

Charter provided for that date and time was Muhammad Faizan Ansari at an

apartment in Dallas, Texas. Charter further supplied Maddox with the phone number

associated with the account.

      Maddox also subpoenaed information from Craigslist related to records for

heart.hacker.forever@gmail.com. The information from Craigslist indicated that the

relevant email address was used both to post ads and respond to ads. One particular

post made from heart.hacker.forever@gmail.com listed a washer and dryer for sale.

That post stated that anyone interested in purchasing the items could call or text

“Faizan,” who lived in Dallas, at the same phone number supplied by Charter.

Maddox considered the phone number to be important to his investigation because

                                         7
“[i]t indicates that the same contact information is provided for the Craigslist account

that was used to respond to [his] original ad [and is] the phone number that appears

on the records of the internet subscriber where the IP address originate[d].”

      Maddox further investigated the person he had been communicating with by

obtaining the driver’s license photo and information for Ansari, who lived at the

address provided by Charter.      The driver’s license photo was admitted without

objection. Maddox identified the person in the photo as the same person depicted in

the photo emailed by “Faizan” in response to the Craigslist ad as well as the profile

photo of the Kik account that Maddox communicated with. Maddox also testified

that the address on the driver’s license was the same address provided by Charter and

that the birthday showed that he would have been twenty-five years old when the

communications were taking place.

      Maddox then prepared an arrest warrant for Ansari for the offense of online

solicitation of a minor and presented it to a judge. The judge found there was

probable cause to issue the warrant and signed it on May 3, 2018. The warrant was

sent to the fugitive unit of the Fort Worth Police Department.

      Officer Martin King testified that on May 21, 2018, he was assigned to the

fugitive unit of the Fort Worth Police Department. He explained that on that date, he

and his team were looking for Ansari because they had a warrant for his arrest on the

charge of soliciting a minor. He described how he first searched databases to confirm

the address for Ansari in Dallas. Once confirmed, he went to that location and “set

                                           8
up on the apartment.” He had Dallas police presence staged nearby in case the

fugitive “got mobile and left,” and then he waited for his team to arrive. Once that

happened, King and his team went to the apartment, knocked on the door, and

identified themselves as law enforcement. He stated that they did that “as loud as

[they could]” and that they announced themselves in that manner for their safety, the

target’s safety, and the safety of everyone on the property. He explained that there

was no answer when they knocked on the apartment door and that they just waited

for a period of time.    When no one answered, they used a key obtained from

management of the complex to unlock the door and enter the apartment. While the

team was clearing the apartment, the suspect finally responded to them, and they

determined he was locked in a bathroom. Ansari refused to unlock the door, and

King described how he used force to “pop the door.” Ansari was then taken into

custody. King identified Ansari in open court as the man arrested that day. King

testified that while he was still at the apartment, he spoke to Maddox by phone. After

that conversation, King seized a laptop and a cell phone found in the apartment and

took those devices to Maddox personally.

      Maddox asked James Willingham, a civilian employee with the Fort Worth

Police Department who worked in the digital forensics lab, to analyze the devices that

were seized. The items were delivered to the lab.3 Willingham was accepted without

      3
       Willingham also referred to a search warrant that he received and used to
guide his retrieval of relevant information.

                                           9
objection as an expert in his field of digital evidence. His explanation concerning IP

addresses was very similar to Maddox’s. However, Willingham analogized them to

phone numbers:

      [I]t’s essentially, an easy way to think of it is, a phone number for every
      device on the internet.

               When you have a particular device and you’re talking to the
      internet, the internet needs to know who you are . . . . The bottom line
      is . . . you have a number that is unique on the internet. That’s how it
      knows where to send the data. So essentially, it’s the phone number to
      your device . . . .

      Willingham testified that he found “a lot of data on the computer” taken from

Ansari’s home, including internet histories and a variety of user files.       He then

described his process of creating a spreadsheet detailing the data he found on the

laptop. In this instance, that included the internet history from the computer. When

asked if there was a listed username on the computer he examined, he replied that

“the name Ansari was in numerous places on the computer.” Summing up his role,

Willingham stated, “[M]y job is to do the technical recovery . . . and leave the evidence

for the detective to evaluate.” Maddox then reviewed the data retrieved and found

that the internet history showed that the computer seized from Ansari’s apartment

had been used to access the Craigslist ad that Maddox created on the date the

communications were occurring.

      The trial court heard testimony outside the presence of the jury concerning the

thirty emails exchanged in response to the Craigslist ad and the nineteen text messages

                                           10
on Kik. Ansari argued outside the presence of the jury that the emails were not

relevant and that the State had failed to prove the authenticity of the communications.

The trial court “conditionally” overruled the objections to the communications and

specified that they were not yet admitted for all purposes, thereby allowing the State

to produce evidence before the jury that met the threshold level of proof for

authenticity.

       During Maddox’s testimony before the jury concerning the evidence tying the

communications to Ansari, the State again offered for all purposes the thirty emails

exchanged in response to the Craigslist ad. Ansari made no additional objections but

reasserted his objections made outside the presence of the jury. The trial court

overruled those objections and admitted the thirty emails for all purposes. After

additional questioning of Maddox, the State also offered the nineteen text messages

from Kik into evidence. Ansari urged the same objections he made to the emails, and

the trial court overruled those objections and admitted the nineteen Kik messages for

all purposes.

       Ansari’s father testified during the defense portion of the guilt-or-innocence

phase of the trial. He told the jury that he was living with his son at the apartment in

Dallas in February of 2018 when the apartment was burglarized. He testified that his

son’s silver Apple laptop was stolen. He said the burglary was reported to the police.

He described how a woman he knew, named Marina, came into the convenience store

he worked in months later and tried to sell him the stolen laptop for $50. He testified

                                          11
he told her that he recognized the laptop and that if she did not give it to him, he

would call the police. He said her response was to run away and leave the computer.

Ansari’s father testified that the computer was returned to his son on the same day

they “were raided by the police.” He later acknowledged that was the same day his

son was arrested.    Ansari also testified that his apartment was burglarized on

February 12, 2018, and his laptop stolen. He testified that the laptop was returned to

him in early May and that his father was “mistaken” when he testified that it was

returned on May 21, 2018, when he was arrested.

      The jury found Ansari guilty of two counts of online solicitation of a minor

under fourteen years old. Ansari elected to go to the trial court for punishment. The

trial court assessed his punishment for each count at ten years’ confinement in the

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and ordered that

the sentences be suspended and Ansari placed on community supervision for ten

years on each count. The trial court also ordered a $2,000 fine on count one that was

not suspended. Ansari appealed.

         II. ADMISSION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

      To properly authenticate a piece of evidence, “the proponent must produce

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it

is.” Tex. R. Evid. 901(a); Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

“Whether the proponent has crossed this threshold as required by Rule 901 is one of

the preliminary questions of admissibility contemplated by Rule [of Evidence] 104(a).”

                                          12
Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 637–38. The trial court’s responsibility is to make a threshold

determination that the proponent of the evidence has supplied facts sufficient to

support a reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic. Id.

at 638; see Butler v. State, 459 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). We review a

trial court’s threshold determination of authenticity under an abuse-of-discretion

standard. Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600; see De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343–44

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (stating that appellate courts review trial court’s evidentiary

rulings for abuse of discretion). Ultimately, the jury must decide whether an item is

what the proponent claims it is. Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600.

      The exhibits in issue in this case are all electronic communications—emails and

social-media posts. In the context of these types of communications, the

authentication issue that generally arises is whether the evidence is sufficiently linked

to the purported author. “[A]s with the authentication of any kind of proffered

evidence, the best or most appropriate method for authenticating electronic evidence

will often depend upon the nature of the evidence and the circumstances of the

particular case.” Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 639.

      Ansari argues on appeal that the State did not produce sufficient evidence to

prove that the emails and the Kik messages were sent by him. In doing so, he relies

exclusively on Butler to support his position that the exhibits were improperly

admitted. 459 S.W.3d at 595. Specifically, Ansari suggests that because no one saw

him send the messages and there was no witness to associate his cell phone number to

                                           13
the messages, the evidence was insufficient to authenticate the emails or the Kik

messages. But Butler recognizes that authentication “can be accomplished in myriad

ways, depending upon the unique facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. at 601.

Evidence can be authenticated through the testimony of a witness with knowledge,

evidence of distinctive characteristics, or by circumstantial evidence.       Tex. R.

Evid. 901(b)(1) (testimony of a witness with knowledge), (b)(4) (distinctive

characteristic and the like); Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 602 (“[A]uthenticating evidence may

be direct or circumstantial.”). Yet, Ansari argues there was “no evidence establishing

that [he] was the person engaging in a conversation with Detective Maddox.”

      Ansari’s argument is simply incorrect. Maddox painstakingly traced identifying

information tying Ansari to the emails and text messages in question through

administrative subpoenas, internet searches, and other investigative methods yielding

Ansari’s physical address, IP address, email address, Kik username, phone number,

date of birth, and driver’s license photo. Each of these items individually and as a

whole traced back to Ansari. Ansari’s username on Craigslist was “Faizan.” The IP

address provided by Kik was the same IP address used by “faiz1208” and was used to

communicate with Maddox on Kik. The Kik username also contained 1208, which

Maddox explained had personal significance to Ansari. The email address obtained

from Kik matched the email address used to post and respond on Craigslist and

connected the phone number provided by Charter to the phone number used in a

post on the Craigslist account. In his last Kik message to “Emily,” “faiz1208” sent a

                                          14
link   to   his   Facebook      account    that    contained      his   full   name   of

“muhammadfaizan.ansari.” The photo of the responder to Maddox’s ad on Craigslist

matched both the photo on Kik and Ansari’s driver’s license photo.              “Faizan”

described himself to “Emily” as twenty-five years of age and living in Dallas. His

driver’s license also confirmed this information to be correct.

       Ansari was arrested at the physical address that was listed in the subscriber

information provided by Charter. Ansari did not answer the door when the police

announced their presence at that address and was found by the officers locked in a

bathroom. An officer had to use force to open that door. Ansari’s laptop computer

was seized and later searched pursuant to a warrant. The internet history showed that

the computer seized from Ansari’s apartment was used to access the Craigslist ad

created by Maddox on the date the communications were taking place between the

responder to the ad and “Emily.”

       This is ample direct and circumstantial evidence—with all of the individual,

particular details considered in combination—to support a prima facie case that would

justify admitting the emails from Craigslist and the text messages from Kik to allow

the jury to consider and decide the ultimate question of authenticity. See Tienda,

358 S.W.3d at 647 (“In performing its Rule 104 gate-keeping function, the trial court

itself need [only] be persuaded that the . . . evidence has supplied facts that are

sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the evidence . . . is

                                           15
authentic.”); Hines v. State, 608 S.W.3d 354, 367 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020,

no pet.).

       While it is true that Ansari and his father testified that the computer had been

stolen at a point in time, they disagreed as to when the computer was returned.

Nevertheless, there was some evidence for the jury to consider suggesting that the

computer may not have been in Ansari’s possession during the relevant time period.

“The jury acts as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and may choose to

believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented.” Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d

756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Barker v. State, No. 02-22-00255-CR, 2023 WL

2536762, at *1, *5 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 16, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication).        This alternate scenario suggested by Ansari’s

evidence was one for the jury to assess in its ultimate determination of whether the

electronic communications were authored by him. See Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 646. The

jury’s verdict reflects that it rejected the proffered defense.

       “The trial court’s determination of whether the proponent has met [the]

threshold requirement is subject to appellate review for an abuse of discretion and

should not be countermanded so long as it is within the zone of reasonable

disagreement.” Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600. The trial court’s decision to admit the

emails and Kik messages and leave the ultimate question of authenticity to the jury

was well within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Therefore, the trial court did

not err in admitting the electronic evidence. We overrule Ansari’s first point.

                                             16
                   III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

      Ansari summarizes his second point as follows:

      If [a]ppellant’s objections had been sustained by the trial court in
      [a]ppellant’s [f]irst [p]oint of [e]rror, then the evidence would be legally
      insufficient to support [a]ppellant’s conviction for online solicitation of a
      minor.

He goes on to argue that if the electronic evidence had been properly excluded, a

rational jury would not have had sufficient evidence to convict him.

      Federal due process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt

every element of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S. Ct.

2781, 2787 (1979); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV. In our evidentiary-sufficiency review,

we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine

whether any rational factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316, 99 S. Ct. at 2787; Queeman v.

State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the

factfinder’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence,

and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson,

443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.

      The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. We may not reevaluate the

evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s.

Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine whether the necessary inferences

                                           17
are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative force when viewed in the light

most favorable to the verdict. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences

in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Id. at 448–49. The

standard of review is the same for direct- and circumstantial-evidence cases;

circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt. Jenkins

v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

         “Contrary to the methodology suggested by appellant, when conducting a

[]sufficiency review, this [c]ourt considers all evidence in the record of the trial,

whether it was admissible or inadmissible.” Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999); see Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

While Ansari does not seem to argue that his sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument

applies if the electronic evidence was properly admitted, in an abundance of caution,

we will still address the issue. We are bound to consider all of the evidence submitted,

including the electronic evidence, and having done so, we hold that Ansari’s argument

fails.

         In the first count of the indictment, Ansari was charged with online solicitation

of a minor as follows:

         That Muhammad Faizan Ansari, hereinafter called defendant, on or
         about the 14th day of March 2018, in the County of Tarrant, State of
         Texas, did then and there over the internet, by electronic mail or text
         message or other electronic message service or system, or through a
         commercial online service, knowingly solicit a minor, W. Maddox, to

                                            18
       meet another person, including the defendant, with the intent that W.
       Maddox will engage in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate
       sexual intercourse with the defendant.

       In the second count of the indictment, Ansari was again charged with online

solicitation of a minor:

       that the defendant in the County of Tarrant and State aforesaid on or
       about the 14th day of March, 2018, did with intent to commit indecency
       with a child and/or aggravated sexual assault over the internet, by
       electronic mail or text message or other electronic message service or
       system, or through a commercial online service, intentionally
       communicate in a sexually explicit manner with a minor, W. Maddox, an
       individual whom the defendant believed to be younger than 14 years of
       age, and the defendant was 17 years of age or older at the time of the
       offense.

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 33.021(b), (c). A “minor” is someone younger than

seventeen years of age or someone whom the defendant believes is younger than

seventeen years of age. Id. § 33.021(a)(1). It is not a defense that the meeting did not

occur. Id. § 33.021(d).

       In his second point, Ansari again argues that “[t]he lone issue contested at trial

was identity.” Based on the same evidence and testimony produced by the State that

satisfied the State’s burden to authenticate the electronic communications and from

which the jury decided that the emails and text messages came from Ansari, we

determine that a rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the

offense as alleged in both counts one and two beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson,

443 U.S. at 316, 99 S. Ct. at 2787; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.

                                           19
      Based on the combined and cumulative force of all the above-described

evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, we hold that the jury was rationally

justified in finding Ansari guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both counts of online

solicitation of a minor. We overrule Ansari’s second point.

                               IV. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled both of Ansari’s points on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                                     /s/ Lee Gabriel

                                                     Lee Gabriel
                                                     Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 31, 2023

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