Court Opinion

ID: 9468984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:28:51.488279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:09.246782
License: Public Domain

J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I write only to express my view that 13 D.C.Code § 423(a)(1) provides strong statutory support for the result reached in this case. That subsection authorizes the “exercise [of] personal jurisdiction over a person * * * as to a claim for relief arising from the person’s * * * transacting any business in the District of Columbia * * *.” Here, appellant’s cause of action arises directly from Interpol’s constant communications with the USNCB in the District, and in particular from appellee’s alleged publication of a defamatory notice in the District.1 Given the broad reach of subsection (a)(1),2 Interpol’s activity undoubtedly constitutes the transaction of “any business.” Cf. Sta*933bilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 205 (D.C.Cir.1981) (foreign corporations transacted business in the District even though they had not entered it); Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1218 (D.C.Cir.1973) (discussing cases holding that individuals transacted business by making telephone calls into state) (dicta); Novack v. Hot Rod Ass’n, 247 Md. 350, 356, 231 A.2d 22, 26 (1967) (identical Maryland provision covers purposeful activity within the state even if the acts are neither part of commerce nor for profit).

. See Complaint ¶ 6 (Appendix at 4).

. Indeed, subsection (a)(1) permits the exercise of jurisdiction to the limits of the due process clause of the Constitution. Environmental Research International, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 810-811 (D.C.C.A. 1976) (en banc).