Court Opinion

ID: 9896495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 13:09:20.709928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:04.423793
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued November 9, 2023

                                    In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                   For The

                         First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                            NO. 01-22-00343-CV
                          ———————————
                 HART CUSTOM HOMES, LLC, Appellant
                                      V.
            PALOMAR INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC, Appellee

                  On Appeal from the 113th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 2020-75861

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This is an appeal from a post-answer default judgment. In four issues,

appellant Hart Custom Homes, LLC (“Hart”) contends that the trial court

reversibly erred by (1) denying its request to vacate the trial court’s default
judgment based on insufficient evidence and under Craddock;1 (2) failing to vacate

its severance order and default judgment because of an arbitration clause; and

(3) severing appellee Palomar Investment Group’s (“Palomar”) claims against

Hart.

        We agree with Hart’s first issue and reverse and remand.

                                    Background

        Palomar contracted with Hart to build three townhomes for $590,000. When

the project stalled, Palomar contacted Hart’s principal, Keynan Dutton, for a

project accounting and a timeline of the anticipated completion date. After Dutton

failed to respond, Palomar sued Hart and Dutton for breach of contract, violations

of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and a declaratory judgment that Hart

and Dutton misrepresented the completion timeframe of the project. Palomar

sought actual damages, interest, court costs, and attorney’s fees.

        Acting pro se, Dutton answered for Hart, but not for himself. Palomar then

moved for a default judgment claiming that Dutton never answered and that

Dutton, who is not a licensed attorney, improperly answered for Hart.

        At a subsequent hearing, the trial court informed Dutton that, since he was

not an attorney, he could not represent Hart and it instructed Palomar to move to

1
        See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. [Comm’n
        Op.] 1939).
                                          2
strike the answer that Dutton filed for Hart. The trial court also instructed Dutton

to file an answer for himself and advised him to hire an attorney.

      Dutton subsequently filed an answer for himself. And Palomar moved to

strike Hart’s answer, which the trial court granted.

      Shortly thereafter, Palomar moved for a default judgment solely against Hart

this time seeking damages of $352,105.79, interest, and attorney’s fees of

$5,749.49.    Attached to Palomar’s new motion was the parties’ contract, a

spreadsheet of damages, an affidavit by Donovan Campbell, the executive vice

president of Palomar, a spreadsheet and invoice of attorney’s fees, and affidavits of

Palomar’s attorneys, Donald Sepolio and Mark Sonnier.

      Hart and Dutton did not appear at the default judgment hearing.            And

Palomar did not offer any evidence to be admitted during the hearing.

      After the hearing, Palomar filed an Amended Motion for Award of Damages

that included a contract with another contractor, Buildtechz Construction, to

complete the three townhomes for $280,000.             The trial court then signed an

interlocutory order granting Palomar’s motion for a default judgment against Hart

and awarding Palomar the amounts it requested—$352,105.79 in actual damages,

and $5,749.49 in attorney’s fees.

      Hart and Dutton filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. And

Palomar moved to sever its claims against Dutton. Hart argued in the motion to set

                                          3
aside that, among other things, the default judgment had to be vacated because

Palomar offered no evidence to prove its case against Hart, as required for a post-

answer default. Palomar focused its response on the Craddock factors, but did not

refute Hart’s argument that there was no evidence to support the post-answer

default judgment.

      The trial court denied the motion to set aside and severed Palomar’s claims

against Dutton—creating a final judgment against Hart.2 Hart now appeals from

that judgment.3

                                  Default Judgment

      In its first issue on appeal, Hart argues that the trial court reversibly erred in

granting the post-answer default judgment because Hart answered the case, albeit

defectively, and therefore Palomar had to prove its case in the trial court—which it

failed to do.

2
      Upon the signing of the severance order, the June 25, 2021 default judgment
      against Hart became final because it merged into the severance order, which
      finally disposed of all remaining parties and claims in the severed suit. Harris
      Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Adam, 66 S.W.3d 265, 266 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam)
      (severance of adjudicated claim into new cause creates final judgment for new
      cause if severance “dispose[s] of all parties and issues in that [severed] cause”);
      Wright v. Texas Comm’n on Hum. Rights, No. 03-03-00710-CV, 2005 WL
      1787428, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin July 27, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (when
      severance order creates final judgment in suit, prior interlocutory judgments in suit
      merge into severance order to form final judgment).
3
      After this appeal was perfected, the trial court signed an order granting Hart’s and
      Dutton’s motion to compel arbitration and to stay the underlying case. Palomar
      never appealed that order. As a result, it not properly before this Court.
                                            4
A.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      Generally, two types of default judgments are recognized under Texas law—

a no-answer default judgment and a post-answer default judgment. See Paradigm

Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177, 183–84 (Tex. 2012);

Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 930 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).

A no-answer default judgment is “caused by a defendant’s failure to answer after

service.” Paradigm Oil, 372 S.W.3d at 183; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 239. “[T]he

non-answering party in a no-answer default judgment is said to have admitted both

the truth of facts set out in the petition and the defendant’s liability on any cause of

action properly alleged by those facts.” Paradigm Oil, 372 S.W.3d at 183 (citing

Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. 1984)).

      Consequently, “[w]hen a no-answer default judgment is rendered, the

defendant’s liability for all causes of action pled is conclusively established and all

allegations of fact in the petition, except the amount of unliquidated damages, are

deemed admitted.” Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 242 S.W.3d 67,

72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. denied). Stated another way, “[i]n a no-

answer default context, judgment can be entered on the pleadings alone, and all

                                           5
facts properly pled are deemed admitted.” Whitaker v. Rose, 218 S.W.3d 216, 220

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).4

      By contrast, a post-answer default judgment “occurs when a defendant who

has answered fails to appear for trial.” Lerma, 288 S.W.3d at 925. “In the latter

instance, a post-answer default ‘constitutes neither an abandonment of the

defendant’s answer nor an implied confession of any issues thus joined by the

defendant’s answer.’” Paradigm Oil, 372 S.W.3d at 183 (quoting Stoner v.

Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979)).               “Because the merits of the

plaintiff’s claim remain at issue, judgment cannot be rendered on the pleadings,

and the plaintiff must prove its claim.” Id.

      A trial court’s decision to overrule a motion to set aside a default judgment

and grant a new trial is subject to review for abuse of discretion. Lerma, 288

S.W.3d at 926; Interconex, Inc. v. Ugarov, 224 S.W.3d 523, 536 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts

in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or when it acts without reference to any

guiding rules or principles. Beaumont Bank v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.

1991). Accordingly, a trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a ruling that

is supported by no evidence. See Weisel Enters., Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58.

4
      “[N]o evidence is necessary to support a no-answer default judgment because the
      defendant’s failure to answer is taken as admitting the allegations of the petition.”
      Williams v. Williams, 150 S.W.3d 436, 446 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied)
      (citing Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992)).
                                            6
(Tex. 1986); see also Loya v. Loya, No. 14-12-00385-CV, 2013 WL 830940, at *1

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 5, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).

         We review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a post-answer default

judgment under the same standards of review governing the sufficiency of the

evidence at a contested trial. See Tex. G & S Invs., Inc. v. Constellation

Newenergy, Inc., 459 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no

pet.).

         We must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and

indulge every reasonable inference that supports the challenged finding. City of

Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). And we credit favorable

evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a

reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 827. “[W]hen the evidence offered to prove

a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of

its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no

evidence.” Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004) (quoting

Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)).

B.       Analysis

         Here, the record shows that an answer was filed for Hart by its principal,

Dutton, a non-attorney. As correctly pointed out by Palomar below, Dutton could

not file an answer on behalf of Hart. See Rabb Int’l, Inc. v. SHL Thai Food Serv.,

                                           7
LLC, 346 S.W.3d 208, 209 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)

(stating, “Corporations may appear in court and be represented only by a licensed

attorney”).

      But, an “answer” filed by a non-lawyer corporate officer, although

“defective”, is not void and thus is sufficient to constitute an answer for default-

judgment purposes. Id. at 210 (“[A] document filed in court by a non-attorney

purportedly on behalf of a corporation is defective but not void, and may be

effective for certain purposes, such as avoiding a default judgment and perfecting

appeal”).5 A default judgment after such an answer is filed must therefore follow

the requirements for a post-answer default judgment. See id.

      Consequently, before the trial court could properly enter a post-answer

default judgment for Palomar, Palomar had to “prove all aspects of [his] claim”

against Hart. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d at 930. In that regard, it is settled that a judgment

after a post-answer default “cannot be entered on the pleadings, but, rather, a

5
      See also Guadalupe Econ. Servs. Corp. v. Dehoyos, 183 S.W.3d 712, 715–17
      (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (Because “[c]ourts have repeatedly held that
      due process requires that a party be given notice of a lawsuit and an opportunity to
      be heard” and defendant—corporation filed pro se letter with court that constituted
      answer, defendant was entitled to notice and hearing on post-answer default
      judgment); KSNG Architects, Inc. v. Beasley, 109 S.W.3d 894, 899 n.5 (Tex.
      App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (“An answer filed on behalf of a corporation by a
      non-attorney is sufficient to prevent a default judgment.”); Wuxi Taihu Tractor
      Co. v. York Grp., Inc., No. 01-13-00016-CV, 2014 WL 6792019, at *9 (Tex.
      App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 2, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[A] non-
      attorney’s answer on behalf of a corporation, although defective, prevents the trial
      court from granting a default judgment against the corporation.”).
                                           8
plaintiff must offer evidence and prove his case as in a judgment on trial.” Sharif v.

Par Tech, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 869, 873 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no

pet.).

         Here, the record shows that the trial court asked Palomar about damages at

the default judgment hearing. And Palomar responded by explaining how the

parties had entered into a contract and that Hart did not complete the townhomes.

Palomar also explained that the parties’ contract and other supporting documents

were attached to his motion for default judgment.

         But Palomar called no witnesses to testify and offered no documents as

evidence at the default judgment hearing. See Guerinot v. Wetherell, No. 01-12-

00194-CV, 2013 WL 2456741, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 6,

2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (documents attached to pleadings are not evidence unless

they are offered and admitted as evidence by trial court).6 As a result, the trial

court stated at the end of the hearing that “I will have to take the damages under

advisement because I don’t see an affidavit that clearly shows—that lays out the

damages in this case.”

         Indeed, because no evidence was admitted at the default judgment hearing to

support Palomar’s claims against Hart, there is no legally sufficient evidence

6
         See also Ugwa v. Ugwa, No. 05-17-00633-CV, 2018 WL 2715437, at *2 (Tex.
         App.—Dallas June 6, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Nelson v. Neal, 787
         S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex. 1990) (“Exhibits tendered but not admitted into evidence
         are not part of the record and cannot be considered on appeal.”)).
                                            9
supporting the post-answer default judgment in this case. See Sharif, 135 S.W.3d at

873 (reversing post-answer default judgment in sworn account suit, when verified

answer was filed, and no record was made to show that any evidence to support

judgment was admitted).7 As a result, we must reverse and remand. See Lerma,

288 S.W.3d at 930 (holding that proper disposition is to reverse and remand case

involving post-answer default judgment supported by legally insufficient

evidence).

      We therefore sustain Hart’s first issue.8

7
      See Raines v. Gomez, 143 S.W.3d 867, 869 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.)
      (reversing post-answer default judgment because plaintiff did not present any
      evidence to prove case); Maldonado v. Puente, 694 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. App.—
      San Antonio 1985, no writ) (post-answer default set aside in suit on a note, when
      no evidence was admitted at trial).
8
      Because we have sustained Hart’s first issue, it is not necessary to address Hart’s
      remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
                                          10
                                     Conclusion

      Based on the record before us, we sustain Hart’s first issue and reverse the

trial court’s post-answer default judgment in all things and remand this case to the

trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                     Terry Adams
                                                     Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.

                                          11