Court Opinion

ID: 9588473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:46.270762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:59.077106
License: Public Domain

Birdsong, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
As indicated in the majority opinion, the facts show that Powe was stopped by a state highway patrolman for a traffic offense of improper lane change, ultimately resulting in the disclosure of more than 100 pounds of marijuana in the car and a firearm in a briefcase also in the car. A traffic citation was prepared. The information was forwarded to the State Court of Bibb County for disposition of the traffic offense, if deemed appropriate, and the felonies forwarded (including the traffic violation) to the superior court of the county. On May 6, 1986, the district attorney’s office prepared a condemnation of property belonging to Powe used in the felonious acts. It was acknowledged by the assistant district attorney that the state’s representative was aware of the existence of the traffic offense as well as the felonies.
On May 7, the attorney representing Powe approached the solicitor of the state court and inquired as to the status of the traffic offense in the state court. It appears the traffic ticket had not procedurally progressed through administrative channels to the state court. Because of the interest evinced by Powe’s counsel, efforts were made to expedite the processing of the traffic offense because Powe was incarcerated and had not made bond. There is no contention either by the state court’s solicitor nor by Powe’s counsel that any mention was made of the pending charges in the superior court as to the felony charges.
By May 8, an expedited accusation was prepared for disposition in the state court showing only the changing lane offense. However, it was candidly conceded by the assistant solicitor presenting the case to the state court that he found the Powe case quite unusual because a simple traffic violator ordinarily would not be in jail. Therefore when the assistant solicitor saw the accusation for the simple offense of im*433proper lane change, he made special inquiry of the clerk who prepared accusations as to the circumstances of the case because of Powe’s incarceration. He was assured that the solicitor had directed the expedited disposition because Powe’s attorney had made inquiry. The next day when he presented the case to the judge of the state court, the solicitor overheard a conversation that made him as well as the court have concern as to the unusual circumstances as to why Powe was in jail on a simple traffic violation. Apparently the court was seeking to find out if there was a reason for a hold for some other crime. When informed by Powe that he had another case pending in another court, the judge orally announced sentence from the bench that Powe was sentenced to pay a fine for court costs. It appears that the assistant solicitor for the state court represented the State and Powe appeared without representation. It is undisputed that initially the assistant solicitor was unaware of the drug-related charges in the superior court. But in my opinion, it is the concern evidenced by the prosecutor and the trial court that presents the controlling question for decision by this court: Should the burden of communicating to the State the nature and origin of the charge pending before the state court (or higher court) be upon an unrepresented defendant or upon the legal representatives of the state who admittedly were aware of the implications of the bifurcated trials? I believe the burden should be upon the party who realizes the implications of the bifurcated charges and the one who has ready access to the channels of information and not upon an unrepresented defendant who honestly and fully informs the solicitor and the trial court of a pending charge (and an answer to the concern already evidenced by both those officials).
In spite of the obvious red flag of warning manifested by the admitted concern of the prosecutor and court, no inquiry was made by the trial judge or the solicitor as to the possible connection between the traffic offense and the charge pending in the superior court. Especially is this of concern in face of the further admission by the assistant solicitor that he would never accept a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor where a felony charge arising out of the same occurrence is involved. That same knowledge must be attributed to the trial court in face of the unusual action of unilaterally withdrawing the guilty plea by the court without notice to Powe when the court became aware of the felony charge. I am not prepared to hold in the face of an appropriate motion to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy that the appellant Powe, who apparently was not versed in the law, was required not only to forewarn the solicitor and the trial judge that there was another charge pending but that the charge arose out of the same transaction as the traffic offense.
It is my belief that the State sufficiently was placed on notice by the open and honest answer of the appellant that all known charges *434against Powe were not being tried in a court of competent jurisdiction at one trial or at least to the point of necessitating some further inquiry that would have exposed the problem. Thus in my opinion, Powe’s plea in bar was justified in light of the language contained in McCannon v. State, 252 Ga. 515 (315 SE2d 413) and McCrary v. State, 171 Ga. App. 585 (320 SE2d 567), affirmed 253 Ga. 747 (325 SE2d 151).
Decided December 5, 1986
Rehearing denied December 19, 1986
J. Robert Daniel, for appellant.
Willis B. Sparks III, District Attorney, Vernon R. Beinke, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The majority apparently agrees with the argument of the State that because the trial court after orally announcing its sentence still had not signed the sentence form (a form prepared in all guilty plea cases in that court), the court unilaterally could withdraw the guilty plea. I believe the sentencing process is separate from the verdict of guilty whether that verdict is found by a court or a jury. The power to increase or decrease a sentence orally announced but before being filed is not the same as the power sua sponte to withdraw a formally entered guilty plea subsequent to its acceptance but without notice to the defendant. The power to withdraw a plea of guilty surely must be initiated by a defendant or at the minimum be done only in the defendant’s presence and after affording him an appropriate hearing on the proposed withdrawal action. I do not believe the result in this case justifies the means or that the criminal law will be enhanced thereby. The old maxim still applies that it is better that one thousand guilty be freed rather than one improper conviction be tolerated. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier joins this dissent.