Court Opinion

ID: 9714139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:31:53.090108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:23.797748
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I concur in the affirmance of the summary judgment as to Red Giant Foods, Inc. I dissent with respect to Rowsey.
The majority affirms the summary judgment holding that "as a matter of law, Row-sey's actions do not offend a person of ordinary sensibility." Op. at 667. I disagree. While one trier of fact might well find that, under the cireumstances, Rowsey's intrusion into Terrell's private vehicle was not "highly offensive", another reasonable trier of fact might conclude otherwise.
The trial court observed that Indiana ree-ognizes the tort of invasion of privacy 2 but granted summary judgment because as a matter of law, "[dlefendants' intrusion was not wrongful". Record at 248. The employer was clearly entitled to prohibit consumption or possession of aleohol by employees on the premises and to discipline employees who are under the influence in the work place. That entitlement, however, does not include the prying into private places in which an employee has every expectation of privacy. Such a place is one's private vehicle, whether parked on the employer's property or otherwise. Most reasonable persons would have a belief and expectation that their private vehicle will not be entered and searched by unauthorized individuals.
*668Cases from other jurisdictions have countenanced recovery of damages for such violations. In Sutherland v. Kroger Co. (1959) 144 W.Va. 673, 110 S$.E.2d 716, a somewhat extreme case, a supermarket cashier insisted upon peering into a shopping bag from another store in order to assure that the customer had not secreted Kroger goods. The cashier had a store-policy duty to do so and, although the Kroger employee made no accusatory comment, there were other persons in the check-out line who may have drawn an incriminating inference. The court held that an "illegal search by a private individual" gives rise to a cause of action for a trespass in violation of the right of privacy.
Other cases, more analogous to that which is before us, have recognized a viable tort claim. In Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) U.S. D.Kan. 588 F.Supp. 831, the court acknowledged a Kansas cause of action for invasion of privacy triggered by the employer's policy to randomly search employee vehicles prior to their exit from its property. However, in Gretencord, the employee objected and no search took place. Therefore, there was no cause of action.
More recently, the Ohio Court of Appeals in Sowards v. Norbar, Inc. (1992) 78 Ohio App.3d 545, 605 N.E.2d 468, made several salient statements. There, plaintiff was a long-distance truck driver who, during a twelve hour required layover, occupied a room permanently reserved by the employer for its drivers. The employer entered the room without the driver's authorization to search for a missing permit book. The court held that the jury was entitled to determine, as it did, that although the room was rented and paid for by employer, there was an invasion of privacy. In doing so, the court stated:
"Similarly, the fact that appellee's personal property may not have been disturbed during the search does not preclude appellee from asserting an invasion of his legitimate right of privacy in the room itself. [Citation omitted.]
Appellant next contends that the brief intrusion should be forgiven, since the search was conducted in good faith and without a belief appellee had stolen the permit book. However, this fact does not vindicate appellant, since an invasion of privacy need not be committed intentionally or maliciously in order to be actionable.... Moreover, whether appellant's intrusion was reasonable, under the circumstances, is a question to be answered by the jury." 605 N.E.2d at 475.
In K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trott (1984) Tex.App., 677 S.W.2d 682, in the employee's absence, the employer searched the employee's on-premises private locker following a report that some unidentified employee had stolen a watch and that some price-marking guns were missing. The court held that the case was properly submitted to the jury but that reversal was necessary because the court refused an instruction that the intrusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. In Vernars v. Young (1976) 3d Cir., 539 F.2d 966, Pennsylvania law was applied and the court held a ecause of action existed for invasion of the right of privacy where the employer opened and read plaintiff's private mail without authority. In doing so, the court emphasized the reasonable expectation of persons with respect to their mail.
The United States Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Ortega (1987) 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714, held that a physician and psychiatrist at a state hospital had a protectible expectation of privacy as to the materials in his desk and the filing cabinets in his office. This expectation and privacy right was considered in the context of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suit stemming from a search of the office and the effects in the office by the public employer. The majority holding, as contained within Justice O'Con-nor's plurality opinion, is attributable to Justice Scalia's separate concurrence. His opinion was that, contrary to the plurality view, the Fourth Amendment does apply to such searches, but that the search in this instance was justified by workplace considerations and was therefore not unreasonable. It is worthy of note, however, that the majority concluded that neither the employer nor the employee was entitled to summary judgment. The majority view was premised upon the observation that the parties were in dispute *669concerning justification of the search and its reasonableness. The four dissenters were of the view that the standard employed by the majority, by which to gauge the intrusion, was erroneous. They would have held the intrusion clear and unmistakable, giving rise to plaintiffs § 1983 claim.
Thus all nine members of the U.S. Supreme Court were in agreement that the matter could not be decided in the employer's favor by summary judgment. The same rationale should be applied in our case.
At worst, from Terrell's perspective, there is a question of fact as to whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his vehicle as it sat in the parking lot that day. There was a legitimate question of fact as to whether, under the cireumstances, the search was justified and whether, under all of the circumstances, it was reasonable. In light of this representative authority, I would hold that a reasonable jury might find the allegedly minimal intrusion into Terrell's vehicle wrongful and offensive.
The argument is present that because Terrell was not present at the time of the intrusion and because he suffered no physical injury or damage to his personal property, the claim should be discounted, as a matter of law. As noted in Sutherland, supra, 110 8.E.2d at 724, as to damages, the legal wrong in itself constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's right and gives rise to damages. The damage flows from the wrongful act, itself injurious to another's right, even though no perceptible loss or harm accrues therefrom. This view finds support in Indiana as well. In American Fletcher National Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick (1969) 146 Ind.App. 122, 252 N.E.2d 839, the court held that the law presumes that at least nominal damages result from a harm.
I would reverse the summary judgment as to Rowsey.

. In Cullison v. Medley (1991) Ind., 570 N.E.2d 27, at 31, our Supreme Court clearly recognized that a tort claim lies for an invasion of the right to privacy which takes the form of an intrusion and that such actionable intrusion may lie for the conduct of an illegal search.