Court Opinion

ID: 9552546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:12:56.145378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:01.780377
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ROVIRA
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion, but dissent to Part III.
The majority has laid down an absolute rule admitting of no exceptions when it concludes that Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 16, prohibits the admission of the transcript of a preliminary hearing at a subsequent trial *127when the witnesses whose testimony is sought have become unavailable.
It’s not for us to speculate as to events which may occur, or what mischief may arise from the adoption of the majority view. It is not inconceivable that the testimony of a witness at the preliminary hearing, who is unavailable at the time of trial, may be desired by the defendant. The rule as stated by my Brother Groves might preclude the acceptance of that testimony.
Mr. Justice White stated a correct resolution of the matter in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489:
“We also think that Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony was admissible as far as the Constitution is concerned wholly apart from the question of whether respondent had an effective opportunity for confrontation at the subsequent trial. For Porter’s statement at the preliminary hearing had already been given under circumstances closely approximating those that surround the typical trial. Porter was under oath; respondent was represented by counsel — the same counsel in fact who later represented him at the trial; respondent had every opportunity to cross-examine Porter as to his statement; and the proceedings were conducted before a judicial tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of the hearings. Under these circumstances, Porter’s statement would, we think, have been admissible at trial even in Porter’s absence if Porter had been actually unavailable, despite good-faith efforts of the State to produce him. That being the case, we do not think a different result should follow where the witness is actually produced.
“. . . If Porter [the witness] had died or was otherwise unavailable, the Confrontation Clause would not have been violated by admitting his testimony given at the preliminary hearing — the right of cross-examination then afforded provides substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement, as long as the declarant’s inability to give live testimony is in no way the fault of the State.”
In my view, the defendant’s constitutional rights are not abridged by the introduction at trial of preliminary hearing testimony where the defendant had the opportunity at the preliminary hearing to confront and cross-examine the witness and a proper foundation has been laid concerning the absence of the witness. See, e.g., Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965).