Court Opinion

ID: 6468637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-26 14:08:48.389379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:53:45.813149
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING. BRICE, District Judge. The appellant has filed a motion for rehearing, in which it is claimed that at the time the quitclaim deed was made to appellee the appellant had the equitable title to the property in controversy, which equitable title was created by or resulted from appellant’s paying the Wilsons the purchase price for said premises, together with the fact of the execution of the deed by the Wilsons with the name of the grantee blank and its delivery to appellant. Assuming that the quitclaim deed, bearing a nominal consideration, was not effective as against a prior equitable title (which question it is unnecessary to decide), then, if appellant was possessed of such equitable title at the time of the execution and delivery of the quitclaim deed by appellee, it would appear that appellant’s motion for a • rehearing should be sustained.  [2] Under a parol agreement to convey land, the payment of the full purchase price without some further part performance, such as delivery of possession, the making of valuable improvements, etc., is not sufficient to vest' an equitable title in the purchaser, Ward v. Stuart, 62 Tex. 333; Grindling v. Rehyl, etc., 149 Mich. 641, 113 N. W. 290, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466; 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence; § 2246; Townsend v. Vanderwerker, 160 U. S. 171, 16 Sup. Ct. 258, 40 L. Ed. 383; Note to Houston v. Townsend, 12 Am. Dec. 120; Osborne v. Osborne, 24 N. M. 96, 172 Pac. 1039; Scheuer v. Cochem, 126 Wis. 209, 105 N. W. 573, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 427; 25 R. C. L. 68. If an equitable title was vested in appellant, it must necessarily have resulted, either from the execution and delivery of the deed with the grantor’s name left blank, or else on account of the payment of the purchase money, together with the execution and delivery of such deed. We are assuming,. for the sake of argument, that such payment was made by appellant, and that the deed in question was delivered to it with authority, express or implied, to fill in its name as grantee, and, acting under such authority, it authorized Bushman to fill in its name. That there is authority for the contention of the appellant is found in decisions of the Texas courts: “Here it clearly appears that the purchase money was paid to McDonough, and that the sale and conveyance was, in every respect, complete, save that the name of the grantee was not inserted in the deed. It also appears that it was intended by the parties that the title should vest in Latham at once, and he was expressly authorized by McDonough, at the time the deed was delivered, to insert his own, or any other, name in the deed as grantee. This was a power coupled with an interest vested by McDonough in Latham for the benefit of the latter, and is therefore irrevocable.” Threadgill v. Butler, 60 Tex. 601. And this case was followed by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in the case of Schleicher v. Runge et al., 37 S. W. 982, and Fennimore v. Ingham, 181 S. W. 513. In the Threadgill Case, just quoted from, Latham, after a sale of the property to Butler, wrote his name in as grantee in a deed from McDonough to Latham. In that suit by the heirs of McDonough against Butler, which was brought after the deed had been properly corrected, it was held that Latham still had power to perfect the instrument by inserting his name as grantee. This case would not be authority in the case at bar because the quitclaim deed to the appellee had been executed before the insertion of the appellant’s name as grantee. The case of Schleicher et al. v. Runge et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 37 S. W. 982, would seem to support appellant’s contention, for it is held that, notwithstanding the name of the grantee was never filled in during his lifetime, his heirs were entitled to recover the land from the heirs of the grantor; and the same conclusion was reached by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in the case of Fennimore v. Ingham, supra. If the conclusion of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals is correct, then our original opinion, is not the law. In the early days of Texas, it became a custom to transfer real property by the execution and delivery of deeds with the grantee’s name in blank, with authority to write in the name of the grantee or any other name as grantee in such conveyance, and title was passed by delivery of the deed until some purchaser inserted his own name therein. It is believed that this custom affected land titles to such a degree that Texas courts took this into consideration in adopting this rule (Schleicher v. Runge, 37 S. W. 982) ; but we are unable to assent to the doctrine laid down in these decisions. If the deed in question conveyed any title, it was a legal title. We have held such deed to be void, at least until the intended grantee’s name was supplied. Ii void, then such deed' was ineffective as a conveyance; a nullity. If a nullity, title to the property was not affected by its execution and delivery. We cannot see how efficacy could be given to it by reason of the fact (if it be a fact) that appellant had paid the purchase money. The payment of the purchase money was ineffective to transfer the equitable title, and the void deed did not add to its efficacy. 2 Tiffany on Real Property (2d Ed.) § 461, p. 1145; also section 434, p. 1597; 25 R. C. L. 655; Grafton v. Cummings, 99 U. S. 100, 25 L. Ed. 366. Our conclusion is that no equitable title was vested in appellant at the time of the execution and delivery of the quitclaim deed to appellee, for which reason the motion for rehearing should be, and is, denied. ROBERTS, C. J., and PARKER, J., concur.