Court Opinion

ID: 9483683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:28:53.170736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:47.134515
License: Public Domain

SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I cannot agree that the government has proven the requisite elements of a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, I dissent.
To convict a defendant under § 846, “the government must prove the existence of an agreement to violate the drug laws and that each conspirator knew of, intended to join and participated in the conspiracy.” United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Stanley, 765 F.2d 1224, 1237 (5th Cir.1985)), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 978, 112 L.Ed.2d 1063 (1991). This requires that “the defendant had the deliberate, knowing, and specific intent to join the conspiracy_” United States v. Gordon, 712 F.2d 110, 114 (5th Cir.1983) (emphasis added). Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish a defendant’s intent, but “[sjuch inferential analysis is not boundless....” United States v. Bell, 954 F.2d 232, 236 (4th Cir.1992). Although this is an admittedly close case, I do not believe that a reasonable mind could find that defendant knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy.
The majority aptly summarizes the evidence introduced by the government. To be sure, the evidence naturally leads one to suspect that defendant knew that a drug ring was operating around her and that she had intentionally become a part of it. However, raising a mere suspicion of defendant’s involvement and knowledge is not enough. See United States v. Giunta, 925 F.2d 758, 766 (4th Cir.1991) (one cannot find “guilt by an unacceptable process of raw speculation rather than by a reasoned process of inferring guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”).
In a conclusory manner, the majority contends that the evidence shows that defendant was a member of the conspiracy. For example, the majority points to telephone conversations between other members of the conspiracy as showing that defendant was a member of the conspiracy. However, a review of the record shows that none of these conversations indicate that Davis intended to join the conspiracy or even knew of the conspiracy. Likewise, the testimony of other conspirators that defendant was a courier does not show that defendant intended to be a drug courier. Rather, the evidence shows only what the other conspirators intended or believed.
Other evidence is similarly flawed. For example, although defendant did receive money from other conspirators, there is no indication that she accepted the money knowing that it was payment for being a drug courier. Further, although defendant was physically present during cocaine sales, the majority points to no evidence that defendant was personally involved with or even aware of these transactions. Finally, although defendant travelled with other conspirators to New York City, the majority again fails to identify any evidence showing that defendant knew that drugs were being transported.
Several circuits, including our own, have refused to convict a defendant for conspiracy without specific proof of a defendant’s knowledge of or intent to join a conspiracy. See Bell, 954 F.2d at 233-38 (evidence proving that the defendants knew each other well, possessed cocaine, and were involved in drug trafficking did not prove their specific intent to conspire with each other); Giunta, 925 F.2d at 767 (evidence proving that “Giunta was a reprehensible person” who engaged in the buying and selling of heroin did not prove his intent to enter into a specific conspiracy); Pearce, 912 F.2d at *913162 (finding the defendants together in a crack house during a SWAT team raid did not prove a conspiracy existed); United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 89-91 (3d Cir.1988) (evidence that the defendant acted as a “look-out” during the movement of a truck containing drugs did not prove his intent to join a conspiracy absent proof that he knew of the contents of the truck); Gordon, 712 F.2d at 112, 115 (driving truck with hidden compartment containing marijuana was not enough to prove that the defendants had entered into a conspiracy).
Although all of these cases differ factually, the principle in each remains the same: A conviction for conspiracy requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant specifically entered into a criminal agreement. Because the evidence presented here does not contain such proof, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the conviction should be affirmed.
Moreover, I believe that this case comes dangerously close to expanding conspiracy into a crime of association with the wrong people. “[M]ere association with conspirators is not enough to establish participation in a conspiracy.” Pearce, 912 F.2d at 162 (quoting Stanley, 765 F.2d at 1243). See Gordon, 712 F.2d at 114 (“It is not enough that the defendant merely associated with those participating in a conspiracy....”); United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir.1977) (“One may not be convicted of conspiracy solely for keeping bad company."). Rather, there must be specific evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of and agreement to a conspiratorial agreement. See Bell, 954 F.2d at 236-38 (“A conspiracy is not shown until the government has presented evidence of a specific agreement to commit a specific crime, for the same criminal purpose, on the part of all indicted conspirators.”) (emphasis original); Gordon, 712 F.2d at 114 (“[I]t [is not] enough that the evidence places the defendant in a ‘climate of activity that reeks of something foul.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Galvan, 693 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir.1982)). Here, defendant was found guilty on the basis of her relationships with individuals engaged in drug trafficking. Because there is no evidence of defendant’s intent to conspire with these individuals, I would reverse defendant’s conviction.
For all the foregoing reasons, I DISSENT.