Court Opinion

ID: 9627788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:54:29.867248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:45:23.263409
License: Public Domain

Schwellenbach, J.
(concurring) — First, I believe that the appeal should be decided on the merits, in order to obviate another appeal.
Second, I concur in the result arrived at in the majority opinion, but not for the reasons assigned therein. I do not agree that the trial court and the appellate court each get a separate and distinct shot at the verdict of the jury. If the trial court finds the damages to be so excessive or inadequate as unmistakably to indicate passion or prejudice, it may order a new trial, or order a new trial unless the party adversely affected consents to a reduction or increase of the verdict. (It may also, under its inherent power, and independent of statute, in the exercise of its discretion, order a new trial or give the prevailing party the option to *449accept a smaller amount or submit to a new trial. Scobba v. Seattle, 31 Wn. (2d) 685, 198 P. (2d) 805.)
In case of an appeal from that order, we, as an appellate court, are limited by the terms of the statute. There is a presumption that the amount of damages awarded by the jury was correct. That amount must prevail unless we find from the record that the damages were so excessive or so inadequate as unmistakably to indicate that the amount of the verdict must have been the result of passion or prejudice. That is not getting a second guess. We are functioning as an appellate court.
In the instant case, the trial court was of the opinion that the verdict was so excessive as to unmistakably be the result of passion or prejudice. It therefore was the court’s duty under the statute to order a new trial unless the plaintiff consented to a reduction to five hundred dollars. The holding of this court in the Lundquist case did not prevent such an order.