Court Opinion

ID: 9942026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 14:08:44.750751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:35.997841
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Disciplinary Counsel v. Adams, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-559.]

                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.

                         SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-559
                         DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. ADAMS.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
        may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Adams, Slip Opinion No.
                                    2024-Ohio-559.]
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—
        Permanent disbarment and restitution ordered.
    (No. 2022-1256—Submitted July 18, 2023—Decided February 20, 2024.)
   ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
                                 Court, No. 2022-039.
                                 __________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Respondent, Dennis Lee Adams, Attorney Registration No. 0068481,
whose last known address was in Hamilton, Ohio, was admitted to the practice of
law in Ohio in 1997.
        {¶ 2} On September 2, 2022, relator, disciplinary counsel, filed a four-count
complaint with the Board of Professional Conduct, alleging among other things that
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Adams neglected three client matters, failed to reasonably communicate with those
clients, misappropriated their settlement funds, made false representations to clients
and at least one other attorney, and failed to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary
investigations.
       {¶ 3} On November 2, 2022, we suspended Adams’s license on an interim
basis based on his failure to respond to relator’s complaint in this case. See 2022-
Ohio-3898. We found Adams in contempt of court in January 2023 for his failure
to file an affidavit of compliance with our interim suspension order. 168 Ohio St.3d
1524, 2023-Ohio-63, 200 N.E.3d 1139.
       {¶ 4} In March 2023, we granted relator’s motion to remand this case to the
board to seek Adams’s permanent disbarment, see Gov.Bar R. V(14)(D). 169 Ohio
St.3d 1453, 2023-Ohio-660, 204 N.E.3d 556. Later that month, relator filed a
motion for default disbarment supported by more than 75 sworn or certified
exhibits, including the affidavits of four of Adams’s clients, eight attorneys (seven
of whom had had professional dealings with him or his clients), an assistant
disciplinary counsel, three other employees of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
and an employee of the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. See Gov.Bar R.
V(14)(F).
       {¶ 5} The board referred relator’s motion for disbarment to an attorney
commissioner for disposition pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(14)(F)(2)(a).              The
commissioner found that relator had submitted clear and convincing evidence to
establish that Adams committed 19 ethical violations. Five other alleged violations
were dismissed based on the insufficiency of the evidence.
       {¶ 6} The commissioner recommended that Adams be permanently
disbarred for his misconduct and be ordered to make restitution of more than
$25,000 to his clients and others harmed by his misconduct. The board adopted the
commissioner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and agreed that Adams
should be permanently disbarred. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we adopt

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the board’s findings of misconduct, permanently disbar Adams from the practice of
law, and order him to make restitution as set forth below.
                                 MISCONDUCT
                        Count 1—The McAdams Matter
       {¶ 7} In July 2017, Teresa and Jerry McAdams retained Adams to represent
them relative to injuries that Teresa had sustained in an automobile accident.
Teresa signed a contingent-fee agreement providing that Adams would be entitled
to 33 percent of the gross amount recovered.
       {¶ 8} Adams filed a lawsuit in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas
on behalf of the McAdamses against the other driver involved in the accident and
Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, Teresa’s uninsured/underinsured-
motorist-coverage (“UM/UIM”) carrier. In July 2018, Adams settled the claim
against the other driver for $22,000. When the McAdamses met with Adams to
indorse the settlement check, Adams told them that he would pay Medicaid and
Medicare liens arising from Teresa’s accident-related medical treatment and that
he would hold the remainder of the settlement proceeds in his client trust account
to pay the expenses of the ongoing litigation against Allstate. After depositing the
settlement check into his client trust account, Adams paid himself $1,500 and paid
the $1,768.26 Medicaid lien. But he did not pay the $3,969.75 Medicare lien, nor
did he distribute any settlement proceeds to the McAdamses.
       {¶ 9} On March 12, 2019, Adams filed a notice voluntarily dismissing the
McAdamses’ UM/UIM case against Allstate. He then emailed Teresa to inform
her that she did not need to attend the pretrial hearing scheduled for the next day,
without informing her that he had dismissed her case. Thereafter, Adams ignored
periodic requests from Teresa for information regarding the status of the case, and
he failed to refile her UM/UIM case within the one-year time limit applicable under
R.C. 2305.19(A).

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        {¶ 10} In August 2019, Teresa received a letter from the United States
Department of the Treasury informing her that her monthly Social Security benefit
would be reduced by up to 15 percent to satisfy the outstanding Medicare lien.
Teresa forwarded the letter to Adams, but he did not respond. After she reached
out to Adams a second time, he agreed to meet with her. During that meeting,
Adams told Teresa he would take care of the Medicare/Treasury matter and that he
expected to reach a settlement with Allstate by the end of the year. He once again
failed to disclose that he had dismissed the McAdamses’ case against Allstate.
        {¶ 11} Teresa repeatedly asked Adams to address Treasury’s recoupment
of the Medicare lien and to update her on the status of her case against Allstate. On
occasion, he requested additional documents or offered excuses for his failure to
communicate with Teresa, but he offered no substantive response to her inquiries.
In an April 2021 email to Adams, Teresa noted that it had been more than a year
since she had heard from him. Around that time, the McAdamses consulted with
another attorney, who informed them that Adams had dismissed their case against
Allstate more than two years earlier and that he had not refiled it.
        {¶ 12} After retaining new counsel in September 2021, the McAdamses
sent Adams a letter terminating his representation and instructing him to send their
file along with any money held on their behalf to their new attorney. Adams failed
to comply with that request.
        {¶ 13} Despite his earlier representations to Teresa, Adams never paid the
Medicare lien. His bank records show that in October 2020, his client-trust-account
balance had dropped to just $231.49—though he should have held more than
$20,000 of the McAdamses’ settlement proceeds in the account at that time. And
by July 1, 2022, Treasury had withheld $3,993.68 from Teresa’s Social Security
benefits to satisfy the Medicare lien, which had grown to more than $4,100 with
interest.

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                                  January Term, 2024

       {¶ 14} Under his contingent-fee contract with Teresa, Adams was entitled
to a fee of $7,260 and the McAdamses are entitled to the remaining settlement
proceeds, less any legitimate costs and expenses paid by Adams—which to date
consist solely of the $1,768.26 Medicaid lien. Therefore, the McAdamses are
entitled to receive $12,971.74.
       {¶ 15} In January 2022, the McAdamses filed a malpractice complaint
against Adams in the common pleas court. Adams failed to enter an appearance or
answer and failed to appear at a hearing on the McAdamses’ motion for default
judgment and damages. In January 2023, the court granted that motion and ordered
Adams to pay the McAdamses $272,284.65 in compensatory and punitive damages
and attorney fees, plus court costs and prejudgment interest.
       {¶ 16} The board found that relator had presented clear and convincing
evidence that Adams’s conduct in the McAdams matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3
(requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client),
1.4(a)(1) (requiring a lawyer to inform a client of any decision or circumstance with
respect to which the client’s informed consent is required), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a
lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4)
(requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable with a client’s reasonable
requests for information), 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit advance legal fees
and expenses into a client trust account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees
are earned or expenses incurred), 1.15(d) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver
funds or other property that the client is entitled to receive), 1.16(d) (requiring a
lawyer to promptly deliver client papers and property as part of the termination of
representation), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer
from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).

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         {¶ 17} In addition, the board recommends that Adams be required to pay
the McAdamses restitution in the amount of $12,971.74,1 representing their share
of Teresa’s personal-injury settlement. A similar amount is also included in the
compensatory damages awarded to the McAdamses in their malpractice action.
         {¶ 18} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and agree that the
McAdamses are entitled to $12,971.74 in restitution.
                                Count 2—The R.R. Matter2
         {¶ 19} In November 2016, R.R. retained Adams to represent him relative to
personal injuries he had sustained in an automobile accident that occurred in the
course of his employment. Their contingent-fee agreement provided that Adams
was entitled to 33 percent of any settlement. In October 2017, Adams filed a
complaint against the other driver involved in the accident, Muhyadin Mohamed,
and Mohamed’s employer, FedEx Custom Critical, Inc. (“FedEx”), in the Preble
County Court of Common Pleas.
         {¶ 20} During Adams’s representation of R.R., the Bureau of Workers’
Compensation (“BWC”) sent Adams four letters informing him that it had paid
nearly $11,000 in claims related to the accident. Those letters instructed Adams to
obtain the final lien amount from BWC before settling R.R.’s case. In August 2019,
R.R. agreed to settle his claim for $17,000. Adams did not notify BWC or obtain
the final lien amount before finalizing the settlement, nor did he pay the lien. He

1. Due to an apparent typographical error, the amount reads as $2,971.74 in the concluding
paragraph of the board’s report.

2. Because this count involves a Bureau of Workers’ Compensation claim, relator and the board
have identified the affected client by his initials, R.R., for the purpose—according to the board’s
report—of “preserv[ing] the statutory, nonpublic status of identifying information concerning BWC
claimants.” Our use of the client’s initials for purposes of this opinion should not be construed as
an adoption of the board’s view that anonymity is statutorily required in this circumstance. See R.C.
4123.88(B) (providing that BWC claim files, including any information directly or indirectly
identifying the name, address, or telephone number of a claimant—regardless of whether the
claimant’s claim is active or closed—are not public records for purposes of Ohio’s Public Records
Act, R.C. 149.43).

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                               January Term, 2024

deposited the settlement check into his client trust account in September 2019 and
collected his contingent fee of $5,610 two days later.
       {¶ 21} Adams did not respond to R.R.’s inquiries regarding the settlement
proceeds until R.R. made an unannounced visit to Adams’s office in December
2019 to obtain his share. At that time, Adams gave R.R. a check for $6,540.07 and
informed him that he was holding the remainder of the settlement proceeds (i.e.,
$4,849.93) to pay the BWC lien. But after R.R.’s check was deducted, the balance
in Adams’s client trust account was just $1,090.99.
       {¶ 22} Adams told R.R. that he would attempt to negotiate the amount of
the BWC lien, but he failed to do so and ignored BWC’s attempts to contact him.
He finally notified BWC of the settlement by email in February 2020. BWC
promptly responded, informing Adams that it would accept $5,300 to settle its
nearly $11,000 lien. But Adams ignored the letter and BWC’s subsequent efforts
to communicate with him.
       {¶ 23} BWC referred the matter to the Office of the Ohio Attorney General
for collection and later filed a complaint against R.R., Mohamed, and FedEx
seeking payment of the entire lien. The attorney for Mohamed and FedEx tried to
communicate with Adams, reminding him that he had represented that he would
pay the BWC lien out of the settlement proceeds, but Adams did not respond.
       {¶ 24} Mohamed and FedEx answered the BWC complaint. They also filed
a cross-claim against R.R. and a third-party complaint against R.R.’s wife, Adams,
and Adams’s law office. R.R. and his wife retained new counsel to represent them
in those proceedings. When their counsel spoke to Adams, Adams stated that the
remainder of R.R.’s settlement proceeds (i.e., the $4,849.93 he had retained to
resolve BWC’s lien) were in his client trust account and that he would contact
BWC’s counsel to settle the claim. But Adams’s client trust account contained just
$231.49 at that time, and Adams took no action to resolve the claim.

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       {¶ 25} In March 2021, the common pleas court granted Mohamed and
FedEx’s motion for a default judgment with respect to their third-party complaint
against Adams. The court further ordered Adams to indemnify Mohamed and
FedEx for all economic damages they might be ordered to pay to BWC, along with
their attorney fees, costs, and expenses associated with BWC’s action against them.
As part of a global settlement agreement, FedEx paid $5,300 as full and final
settlement of BWC’s claim against R.R. The court subsequently ordered Adams
and his law office to reimburse FedEx and Mohamed for that payment and to pay
the costs of the proceeding, which according to the docket in that case are $542.69.
All remaining claims were dismissed.
       {¶ 26} The board found that relator had presented clear and convincing
evidence that Adams’s conduct in the R.R. matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3,
1.4(a)(3), 1.15(c), 1.15(d), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).
       {¶ 27} In addition, the board recommends that Adams be required to pay
the court costs incurred in BWC’s action to enforce its lien in Preble County C.P.
No. 20CV032045. The board also recommends that Adams be required to pay
restitution in the amounts of $5,300 to FedEx to compensate for its double payment
of R.R.’s BWC lien, $3,836 to R.R. and attorney Kevin Connell for legal fees
incurred in connection with R.R.’s defense against BWC’s efforts to enforce its
lien, and an additional $4,849.93 to R.R. We note, however, that the $4,849.93 the
board found is owed to R.R. actually represents the amount that Adams withheld
from the settlement proceeds to settle the BWC lien. We therefore conclude that
that amount is more properly considered part of the $5,300 that Adams owes to
FedEx rather than an amount that R.R. is entitled to receive.
       {¶ 28} On these facts, we adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and
agree that Adams owes $542.69 in court costs to the Preble County Court of
Common Pleas, restitution in the amount of $5,300 to FedEx, and attorney fees of
$3,836 to R.R. and/or Connell.

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                               January Term, 2024

                          Count 3—The Weske Matter
       {¶ 29} In January 2013, Eileen Weske retained Adams to represent her in a
personal-injury case arising from an automobile accident. She agreed to pay him a
33 percent contingent fee. Before Adams filed a complaint on behalf of Weske,
Bethesda Hospital filed a complaint against Weske in the Hamilton Municipal
Court, seeking payment for medical treatment related to the accident. After Adams
answered Bethesda’s complaint, Weske agreed to a judgment awarding Bethesda
$680.76, to be held in abeyance until her personal-injury case was resolved. The
agreed entry was filed in December 2014, around the time Adams filed Weske’s
personal-injury complaint.
       {¶ 30} In January 2017, Adams voluntarily dismissed Weske’s personal-
injury case without prejudice. Approximately ten days later, Bethesda’s counsel
inquired about the status of the case. Adams replied, stating that he was “actively
working to get the matter settled and hope[d] to have the matter resolved within the
next (90) days.” He also assured Bethesda’s counsel that “any proceeds from the
settlement [would] be used to pay this outstanding judgment.”
       {¶ 31} Adams refiled Weske’s personal-injury case in January 2018. Two
weeks later, Weske agreed to accept $12,500 from the defendant’s insurer and
$2,500 from her own UM/UIM carrier to settle the case. Within a few days after
Adams deposited the $12,500 settlement check into his client trust account, he
wrote two checks for his fees: one to himself for $1,000, then another to his law
firm for $3,000.
       {¶ 32} Adams failed to respond to an inquiry from Bethesda’s counsel
regarding the status of Weske’s case around the time he issued himself another
$1,000 check for “Weske Expenses.” In mid-March 2018, Adams deposited the
$2,500 settlement check from the UM/UIM carrier and wrote himself a $459.28
check for “Weske Costs.”

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       {¶ 33} On March 30, 2018, Adams disbursed $6,025.31 of the settlement
proceeds to Weske and held the remaining $3,515.41 in his client trust account.
Thereafter, Adams did not respond to multiple inquiries from Bethesda’s counsel
regarding the status of the case and waited until September 2019—approximately
18 months after he paid himself and more than four months after Bethesda filed suit
against him—to pay Bethesda’s $680.76 judgment.
       {¶ 34} Under his contract with Weske, Adams was entitled to a contingent
fee of $4,950 (33 percent of $15,000) plus costs and expenses; he paid himself a
total of $5,459.28 from Weske’s settlement proceeds. Because Adams failed to
cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation, relator was unable to verify the
authenticity of Adams’s claimed costs and expenses or to account for the remaining
$2,777.72 of Weske’s settlement proceeds. Consequently, the board concluded that
Weske was entitled to, but had not received, an additional $3,287 of the settlement
proceeds.
       {¶ 35} The board found that relator had presented clear and convincing
evidence that Adams violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), and 1.15(d). We adopt
these findings of misconduct and agree that Weske is entitled to restitution in the
amount of $3,287.
            Count 4—Failure to Cooperate in the Disciplinary Process
       {¶ 36} Adams received relator’s first letter of inquiry regarding the
McAdams matter in January 2022. He requested and received an extension of time
to respond. He did not, however, submit his response by the new deadline. Nor
did he respond to relator’s multiple subsequent efforts to communicate with him.
       {¶ 37} Consequently, in May 2022, relator served Adams with a subpoena
for his deposition. Adams acknowledged receipt of the subpoena and requested a
two-week continuance to consult or retain counsel, stating that he intended to
prioritize resolving relator’s investigation.

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                               January Term, 2024

       {¶ 38} Relator agreed to continue the deposition on the conditions that
Adams inform relator of the identity of his counsel by May 27, provide a detailed
written synopsis of his representation of the McAdamses and an accounting of their
settlement proceeds by June 6, and appear at relator’s office in Columbus for the
deposition on June 14. Although Adams agreed to those terms, he did not make
the required disclosures—even after relator reminded him of his agreement and
informed him that the deposition would not be continued again. On June 13, Adams
sought another continuance, claiming that health issues had limited his ability to
prepare for the deposition. Rather than continue the deposition, relator offered
Adams the opportunity to participate by videoconference.
       {¶ 39} Adams ultimately appeared for the deposition, but in response to
many of relator’s questions regarding his handling of the McAdamses’ case, he
claimed that he could not recall what had happened. And when asked why his client
trust account contained just $290.99 in August 2020 even though he had not
disbursed any settlement proceeds to the McAdamses, he answered, “Ma’am, I
cannot tell you. It’s part of what I’m trying to figure out for myself.” He claimed
that due to a computer crash that had occurred more than nine months earlier and
health issues that had affected his memory, concentration, vision, and balance, he
would need an additional 60 days to reconstruct and go back through his files to
determine what had happened to the McAdamses’ settlement proceeds.
       {¶ 40} During his deposition, Adams agreed to search his physical files to
see whether he could determine what had happened to the McAdamses’ settlement
proceeds. The day after the deposition, relator sent Adams a letter requesting that
information, a complete copy of the McAdams file, a brief explanation of his
representation and distribution of funds on behalf of several other clients, and
information regarding the computer crash he claimed he had experienced.
McAdams did not provide the requested information or the file, even after relator
served him with a subpoena duces tecum ordering him to produce the documents.

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       {¶ 41} The board found that relator had presented clear and convincing
evidence that Adams’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer
from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information by a disciplinary
authority during an investigation). We adopt this finding of misconduct.
                                   SANCTION
       {¶ 42} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.
       {¶ 43} In determining the appropriate sanction to recommend for Adams’s
misconduct, the board acknowledged that “[d]isbarment is the presumptive
sanction for misappropriation,” Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 106 Ohio St.3d
418, 2005-Ohio-5411, 835 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 37, citing Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon,
95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 769 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 15.             Although that
presumptive sanction “may be tempered with sufficient evidence of mitigating or
extenuating circumstances,” Disciplinary Counsel v. Edwards, 134 Ohio St.3d 271,
2012-Ohio-5643, 981 N.E.2d 857, ¶ 18, there is just one mitigating factor present
in this case—the absence of a prior disciplinary record, see Gov.Bar R.
V(13)(C)(1).
       {¶ 44} Adams’s clean disciplinary record must be balanced against six
aggravating factors.        Adams engaged in a pattern of misconduct by
misappropriating settlement proceeds in three separate client matters, by repeatedly
failing to respond to communications from clients, and by failing to follow through
on commitments he had made to clients, attorneys representing other litigants and
lienholders, and relator. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3). He committed multiple
offenses—19 rule violations in all—and with the exception of his eventual
participation in a single deposition, he failed to cooperate in the disciplinary
process. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(4) and (5). In addition, Adams failed to

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                                 January Term, 2024

acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct and caused harm to vulnerable
clients, two of whom were subject to collection actions and another whose Social
Security benefits were garnished for nearly three years.             See Gov.Bar R.
V(13)(B)(7) and (8). Furthermore, he failed to make restitution to his clients and
others harmed by his misconduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(9).
        {¶ 45} The board considered four cases in which we permanently disbarred
attorneys for misconduct similar to that of Adams. Of those cases, we find
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Glatki, 88 Ohio St.3d 381, 726 N.E.2d 993 (2000), and
Disciplinary Counsel v. Muhlbach, 104 Ohio St.3d 340, 2004-Ohio-6563, 819
N.E.2d 698, to be most instructive.
        {¶ 46} In Glatki, we permanently disbarred an attorney for neglecting five
client matters, failing to carry out contracts of employment in those matters,
engaging in dishonesty with respect to clients in three of those matters, failing to
comply with the requests of two clients for copies of their files, and failing to refund
a single $500 retainer upon request. Just four of the six aggravating factors present
in Adams’s case were present in Glatki—namely, Glatki engaged in a pattern of
misconduct, committed multiple offenses, failed to cooperate in the disciplinary
process to the point that a default judgment was entered against her, and failed to
pay $500 in restitution in a single case. See id. at 381-382, 384. No mitigating
circumstances were evident from the record. Id. at 384.
        {¶ 47} Similarly, in Muhlbach, we disbarred an attorney who had
misappropriated nearly $25,000 in trust distributions belonging to two minor
clients, failed for nearly a year to respond to the requests of the clients’ parents for
an accounting of those funds, and paid just $1,400 in restitution by the time of our
decision. Like Adams, Muhlbach engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed
multiple offenses, and failed to make timely restitution. See Muhlbach at ¶ 8-9.
Although he failed to fully and freely disclose his wrongdoing during the resulting
disciplinary investigation, Muhlbach ultimately stipulated to the charged

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misconduct. Id. at ¶ 2, 8-9. On the other hand, Muhlbach presented no mitigating
evidence and had twice been disciplined—once for his failure to cooperate in a
disciplinary investigation and a second time for his neglect of an entrusted matter
and failure to cooperate. See id. at ¶ 2.
       {¶ 48} In Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Freeman, 128 Ohio St.3d 421,
2011-Ohio-1483, 945 N.E.2d 1034, the attorney engaged in comparable acts of
misconduct with respect to eight separate client matters. Among other violations,
Freeman misappropriated or failed to timely distribute clients’ settlement proceeds
in four matters, failed to resolve a Medicare lien on behalf of one of those clients,
engaged in multiple instances of neglect, failed to reasonably communicate with
clients, made false statements to clients and relator’s investigator, and failed to
cooperate in the disciplinary proceedings. In addition to the aggravating factors
present in this case, we found that Freeman had acted with a dishonest or selfish
motive. See id. at ¶ 23. And as in this case, the only mitigating factor in Freeman
was the absence of prior discipline. See id. Given that the presumptive sanction
for misappropriation is permanent disbarment and the nearly complete absence of
mitigating factors, we found that the only appropriate sanction for Freeman’s
misconduct was disbarment. See id. at ¶ 23-25.
       {¶ 49} In light of the facts of this case and our applicable precedent, we
agree that permanent disbarment is the only proper sanction for Adams’s
misconduct in this case, which includes significant acts of neglect,
misappropriation, and dishonesty.
                                  CONCLUSION
       {¶ 50} Accordingly, Dennis Lee Adams is permanently disbarred from the
practice of law in Ohio. In addition, he is ordered to pay $542.69 to the Preble
County Court of Common Pleas for costs incurred in case No. 20CV032045 and to
make restitution in the amounts of $12,971.74 to Teresa and Jerry McAdams,

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                               January Term, 2024

$3,836 to R.R. and/or Kevin Connell, $5,300 to FedEx Custom Critical, Inc., and
$3,287 to Eileen Weske. Costs are taxed to Adams.
                                                            Judgment accordingly.
        KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and DETERS,
JJ., concur.
        BRUNNER, J., not participating.
                               _________________
        Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond and
Martha S. Asseff, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
                               _________________

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