Court Opinion

ID: 9492480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:42:16.978963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:19.694031
License: Public Domain

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all of the majority’s well-written opinion, except its treatment of the Massiah issue. On the facts of this case, I would hold that “adversary judicial proceedings” had been initiated by the government’s filing of a formal motion to preserve and videotape the testimony of material government witnesses for subsequent use against the defendant at trial, even though the motion was filed before indictment.
I.
The Supreme Court has held that Mas-siah’s protections come into play, and the right to counsel attaches, at the initiation of “adversary judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 182, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984). In *948the typical ease, of course, adversary judicial proceedings are initiated “by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment.” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972).1 However, this was not the typical case. As even the government concedes, “The filing of the motion to take videotaped depositions was the first court proceeding involving Hayes.” Brief for Appellee United States at 26, n. 28 (Emphasis added.)
The majority says, “Although the depositions were preceded by adversary judicial proceedings against the witnesses, none had been initiated against Hayes.” With all due respect,, this reveals the heart of the majority’s error — its failure to appreciate the significance of material witness depositions. The depositions at issue here were not taken for discovery, nor were they taken as sworn statements for investigative purposes. These depositions were sought and videotaped for the unabashed purpose of preserving testimony for use against Hayes at trial, for replay to a jury. It was exactly for that reason that the court appointed a lawyer to represent Hayes at the video depositions even though the indictment had not yet been returned.
As specifically required by Rule 15(d), Fed.R.Crim.P.,2 the depositions were conducted like a trial for use at a trial — direct examination by the prosecutor, cross-examination by defense counsel, the requirement that the government turn over to the defense before cross-examination the witness’s prior statements, and the defendant’s right to be present in person and confront the witnesses. For all intents and purposes, the trial had begun — and prosecution witnesses called to the stand— prior to indictment. It is no wonder that just one week after the indictment was returned, the government made its “Motion to Admit Deposition Testimony of Material Witness at Trial.”
What transpired in this case is hardly the usual scenario. In fact, by statute, depositions generally are not even allowed until after indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a). But under the peculiar circumstances here, it seems undeniable that “adversary judicial proceedings” had been initiated by the .government’s deposition motion even though formal charges had not yet been filed.
Once it is recognized that adversary judicial proceedings had been initiated by the material witness proceedings, it follows that this case falls squarely within the prohibitions of Massiah. Koutchesfahani was not acting on his own. At the time he instigated the coffee house meeting with Hayes, Koutchesfahani was a cooperating witness. He, not Hayes, set up the meeting and he did so, wired for sound, at the government’s behest. This is even more aggravated than what occurred in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. *9492183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). In that case, while Henry was in jail, the government recruited Nichols, another inmate in the same cellblock, to keep his ears open for any incriminating statements from Henry. Id. at 266, 100 S.Ct. 2183. In holding Henry’s statements to Nichols inadmissible on Massiah grounds, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
[T]he concept of a knowing and voluntary waiver of Sixth Amendment rights does not apply in the context of communications with an undisclosed undercover informant acting for the Government. In that setting, Henry, being unaware that Nichols was a Government agent expressly commissioned to secure evidence, cannot be held to have waived his right to the assistance of counsel.
[W]e conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that Henry’s statements to Nichols should not have been admitted at trial. By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This is not a case where, in Justice Cardozo’s words, “the constable ... blundered[;]” rather, it is one where the “constable” planned an impermissible interference with the right to the assistance of counsel.
Id. at 272, 275, 100 S.Ct. 2183 (citations omitted).
In the present case, it is undisputed that the government prevailed on Koutchesfa-hani to initiate a meeting with Hayes and to attend the meeting wearing a concealed listening device. The purpose was clear— to “create[ ] a situation which would likely cause the defendant to make incriminating statements.” United States v. Harris, 738 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir.1984). Since this clandestine interrogation occurred after the government brought its motion for pre-indictment depositions and after Hayes had been appointed counsel, the government’s use of Koutchesfahani as an undercover agent runs afoul of Massiah. Hayes’s coffee house statements to Koutchesfahani should have been suppressed.
II.
As the majority’s opinion amply demonstrates, however, the other evidence of Hayes’s guilt was overwhelming. The error in admitting the coffee house statements at the trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for its role in Hayes’s sentencing. The coffee house statements formed the basis of the obstruction of justice enhancement. Although I would affirm the conviction, I would remand to district court for re-sentencing with directions to to disregard the coffee house statements.

. Clearly, Massiah is not triggered by a pre-indictment lineup, Kirby v. Illinois, supra, the sending of a “target letter,” United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976) (plurality opinion), see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 182 F.3d 668, 670-71 (9th Cir.1999) or a prisoner’s placement in administrative segregation while being investigated for crimes, U.S. v. Gouveia, supra. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, it is the “initiation of adversary judicial proceedings,” not pretrial investigation, that triggers the right to counsel and Massiah's concomitant protection. Id. at 188, 104 S.Ct. 2292.

. Rule 15(d), Fed.R.Crim.P. states:
Subject to such additional conditions as the court shall provide, a deposition shall be taken and filed in the manner provided in civil actions except as otherwise provided in these rules, provided that (1) in no event shall a deposition be taken of a party defendant without that defendant's consent, and (2) the scope and manner of examination and cross-examination shall be such as would be allowed in the trial itself. The government shall make available to the defendant or the defendant’s counsel for examination and use at the taking of the deposition any statement of the witness being deposed which is in the possession of the government and to which the defendant would be entitled at trial.