Court Opinion

ID: 9911543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 15:02:59.585701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:47.943813
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

                         WILFRED RAMOS, JR.,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

                         STEAK N SHAKE, INC.,

                                Appellee.

                             No. 2D22-3465

                           December 20, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Emmett L.
Battles, Judge.

Ashley N. Richardson of Marie A. Mattox, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.

J. Robert McCormack and John C. Getty of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash,
Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Tampa, for Appellee.

SLEET, Chief Judge.
     Wilfred Ramos appeals the final judgment entered in favor of Steak
N Shake, Inc., in Ramos's discrimination action below. On appeal,
Ramos argues that the trial court erred in finding that Ramos failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies under the Florida Civil Rights Act of
1992 (FCRA), §§ 760.01-.11, Fla. Stat. (2020). Because Ramos was not
required to specifically allege in his charge of discrimination that his
claims were under the FCRA, the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Steak N Shake and in determining that Ramos failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing the civil suit.
                             I.    Background
     In October 2017, Steak N Shake hired Ramos as a grill operator.
During his employment, Ramos was in an off-the-job car accident in
which he suffered a back injury. Thereafter, his work schedule was
allegedly reduced from thirty hours a week as a grill cook to six hours a
week as a janitor. On November 11, 2017, Ramos filed a charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). His charge included a factual description of the basis of his
allegations. It did not include any reference to the FCRA, nor did he
allege that Steak N Shake violated the FCRA. Instead, he alleged a
"violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991." On November
27, 2017, he was terminated from his position.
     On April 10, 2018, the EEOC forwarded the charge to the Florida
Commission on Human Relations (Commission) with the following
notation: "Pursuant to the worksharing agreement, this charge is to be
initially investigated by the EEOC." Following an investigation, on
September 4, 2018, the EEOC dismissed the charge. Ramos received
from the EEOC Form 161, which is a printed form notice, entitled
"DISMISSAL AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS." The form stated in part that
"THE EEOC IS CLOSING ITS FILE ON THIS CHARGE FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASON." Listed below were seven boxes to be marked as
applicable by the EEOC, each of which contained accompanying reasons
why the EEOC was closing its file. Ramos's form contained an "X" next
to box five, which was accompanied by the following language:

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     The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon its
     Investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the
     information obtained establishes violations of the statutes.
     This does not certify that the respondent is in compliance
     with the statutes. No finding is made as to any other issues
     that might be construed as having been raised by this charge.
     On January 27, 2020, Ramos filed in the circuit court a two-count
complaint, asserting discrimination and retaliation in violation of the
FCRA. Steak N Shake answered, asserting in one of its affirmative
defenses that Ramos failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The
trial court referred the parties to nonbinding arbitration, after which
Ramos timely filed a motion for trial de novo.
     Thereafter, Steak N Shake filed its motion for final summary
judgment, arguing that the undisputed evidence showed that Ramos
failed to allege any FCRA claims in his charge and that he did not
exhaust his administrative remedies under the FCRA. Five days before
the motion hearing, Ramos filed his opposition, arguing that under
section 760.11(1), he could file a complaint with the EEOC in lieu of the
Commission. The trial court held a hearing, and it granted summary
judgment in favor of Steak N Shake, finding that Ramos failed to allege
claims under the FCRA in his EEOC charge and that therefore he did not
properly exhaust his administrative remedies. The trial court also found
that the failure could not be cured because the time for filing or
amending his administrative claims had expired. Ramos moved for
reconsideration and rehearing, which the trial court denied. This appeal
followed.
                              II.   Analysis
     On appeal, Ramos argues that the trial court erred in finding that
his failure to cite the FCRA in his charge amounted to a failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies under the FCRA. We agree.

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       We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130
(Fla. 2000). Summary judgment is proper only if there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). Here, Ramos does not argue that
there were any genuine issues of material fact that remained; rather, he
contends that Steak N Shake was not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
       The FCRA "prohibits discrimination in the workplace because of an
individual's race, color, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital
status." Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Mitzel, 83 So. 3d 865, 873 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2012); see § 760.10. And "[s]ection 760.11 establishes
administrative and civil remedies for violations of the [FCRA]." Ross v.
Jim Adams Ford, Inc., 871 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
Specifically, section 760.11(1) provides that "[a]ny person aggrieved by a
violation of ss. 760.01-760.10 may file a complaint with the
[C]ommission within 365 days of the alleged violation." "Although this
statute states that a complaint 'may' be filed with the Commission, it is
clear that such a complaint must be filed either with the Commission or
its federal counterpart by anyone who wishes to pursue either a lawsuit
or an administrative proceeding under [the FCRA]." Ross, 871 So. 2d at
315. Essentially, "[a]s a prerequisite to bringing a civil action based
upon an alleged violation of the FCRA, the claimant is required to file a
complaint with the [Commission] within 365 days of the alleged
violation." Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d
891, 894 (Fla. 2002). "The purpose of these requirements is to notify the
employer of discriminatory practices and to provide the [Commission]
with 'the first opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory

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practices to permit it to perform its role in obtaining voluntary
compliance and promoting conciliation efforts.' " Sunbeam Television
Corp., 83 So. 3d at 874 (quoting Gregory v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 355
F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004)).
      Under Florida's workshare agreement, the EEOC and the
Commission each designate the other as an agent for the purposes of
receiving and drafting charges, thus allowing an aggrieved party to elect
to dual file a charge of discrimination with both agencies. See U.S. Equal
Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, FY 2017 EEOC/FEPA Worksharing
Agreement, Worksharing Agreement Between Florida Commission on
Human Relations and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 2 (2017) ("In order to facilitate the assertion of employment
rights, the EEOC and the [Commission] each designate the other as its
agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges, including those
that are not jurisdictional with the agency that initially receives the
charges."). The statute confirms as much. See § 760.11(1) ("In lieu of
filing the complaint with the [C]ommission, a complaint under this
section may be filed with the federal [EEOC] . . . .").
      The Commission is then responsible for investigating the charge
and determining within 180 days "if there is reasonable cause to believe
that discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the [FCRA]."
§ 760.11(3). Thereafter, a finding issued by the Commission takes one of
three forms. First, if the Commission determines that there is
"reasonable cause" to believe that a discriminatory practice occurred,
then the aggrieved person may bring a civil action in any court of
competent jurisdiction. § 760.11(4)(a). Second, if the Commission fails
to determine whether there is "reasonable cause" within 180 days after
the filing of the complaint, then the aggrieved person may proceed to

                                      5
court as if the Commission issued a cause determination. § 760.11(4)(a),
(8). Third, if the Commission determines that there is not reasonable
cause ("no cause") to believe that a violation of the FCRA occurred, then
the Commission must dismiss the complaint and the aggrieved party
must request an administrative hearing in front of an administrative law
judge within thirty-five days of the no cause determination or the claim
will be barred. § 760.11(7). In other words, a no cause determination
and the failure to timely request an administrative hearing precludes a
civil suit under the FCRA. Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 894-95.
     The issue presented in this case is whether section 760.11 requires
that the aggrieved party specifically allege a violation of the FRCA in its
complaint with the Commission or EEOC. We conclude that it does not.
     "[C]hapter 760 is remedial and requires a liberal construction to
preserve and promote access to the remedy intended by the [l]egislature."
Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000); see also
§ 760.01(3) ("The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 shall be construed
according to the fair import of its terms and shall be liberally construed
to further the general purposes stated in this section and the special
purposes of the particular provision involved."). And "[w]e are guided by
the [l]egislature's stated purpose for enacting this chapter and its
directive that the [FCRA] be liberally construed in reaching our decision."
Joshua, 768 So. 2d at 435.
     In explaining the requirements for the complaint, section 760.11(1)
states only that "[t]he complaint shall contain a short and plain
statement of the facts describing the violation and the relief sought."
And Ramos's charge of discrimination did just that. He checked the
boxes for discrimination based on retaliation and disability and indicated
that he "want[ed] this charge filed with both the EEOC and the State or

                                      6
local agency, if any." In the "Particulars" box, Ramos included the
factual allegations and a discrimination statement alleging
discrimination based on his disability and/or perceived disability and by
retaliation for his request for reasonable accommodation. Ramos's
subsequent civil claims were identical, also alleging discrimination based
on disability and retaliation. Thus Steak N Shake was fully on notice as
to the nature and substance of Ramos's claims. Cf. Sunbeam Television
Corp., 83 So. 3d at 874 (explaining that notice to the employer is "of
course, frustrated when a claimant asserts one set of claims in the
administrative proceedings but attempts to assert another set of
unrelated claims in a subsequent civil action"). The EEOC then
appropriately forwarded the dual-filed charge to the Commission noting
it would initially investigate the charge. And after receiving a dismissal
from the EEOC stating that it was "unable to conclude that the
information obtained establishes violations of the statutes," Ramos
appropriately filed a civil action. See Woodham, 829 So. 2d at 897
(holding that an "unable to conclude" decision does not equate to a
determination that "there is not reasonable cause" and that therefore
Woodham was permitted to proceed under section 760.11(4) and file a
civil action).
      If the legislature intended for the statutory language in section
760.11 to require that the aggrieved party specifically allege in the
complaint that his or her claims were under the FCRA, it could have said
so, but it did not. And in finding that Ramos failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies by failing to specifically allege in his charge of
discrimination that his claims were under the FCRA, the trial court
added a requirement that is not found anywhere within the statute and
contravenes the legislature's clear intent that the statute be interpreted

                                      7
liberally. We conclude that Ramos was not required to specifically allege
in his charge of discrimination that his claims were under the FCRA and
that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Steak
N Shake and determining that Ramos failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Additionally, we certify conflict with the Fourth
District's opinion in Belony v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 48 Fla. L. Weekly
D2106, D2107 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 1, 2023), to the extent that it holds
"when a discrimination charge only and specifically alleges a violation of
federal law, the act of dually filing the charge with the [Commission] is
insufficient to comply with the requirements of section 760.11, Florida
Statutes (2019)."1
     Reversed; remanded; conflict certified.

LaROSE and BLACK, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

     1 Section 760.11 was amended in 2020, but the portions of the

statute relevant to this case were not changed.

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