Court Opinion

ID: 9599280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:17:20.312245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:13.740927
License: Public Domain

MOORE, P. J., Concurring.
I concur in the opinion except that part commencing on page 282 with the words “The motion for a new trial” and concluding with the 11th line of page 283. In my opinion that part of the discussion is too much of a stricture upon the freedom of the trial judge in conforming his judgments with the circumstances peculiar to each separate action. While it is the ubiquitous rule that reasonable expenses out of a fund may be allowed to one whose efforts have conserved such fund, payable ratably strictly to counsel rather than to their clients, yet no sound reason appears why the parties to such an action as this may not stipulate to the entry of a personal judgment against the corporation for whose benefit the action is prosecuted. All parties approved of the form of the judgment and for valuable consideration, to wit: that the time of payment should be extended and that the judgment should bear interest at the rate of 4% per cent instead of 7 per cent. Of course the probability of prompt payment of the fund recovered would not justify a personal judgment. But, in view of the unanimous accord of the litigants and of the mutual advantages granted, I think the form taken by this judgment was proper under the circumstances although it cannot be regarded as a precedent in cases where there is no stipulation.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 5, 1942, and respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 2, 1942.