Court Opinion

ID: 9669712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:06:59.373135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:59.884267
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in result).
A statute can be stretched like a rubber band, and, ultimately, you can stretch it only so far and then it breaks. The statute becomes no good. The rubber band becomes no good. Too much stretching erodes the statute until its original intent is destroyed. I concur in the result of this case only because I am afraid that the stretching will break the rubber band, nay the intent of the statute.
Appellant’s pleadings were three in number and were all dated November 15, 1985. As the majority opinion points out, the pleadings were unverified. By affidavit of February 26, 1986, appellant supposedly “swears to the truth” of the November 15, 1985 pleadings. This is some type of a “retroactive swearing.” The swearing itself is faulty because the affidavit says that the facts in the pleadings “are true and correct to the best of her knowledge, information and believe [sic].” This retroactive bootstrapping by the use of a 1986 so-called affidavit, to raise the pleadings back in 1985 to a level of being verified, is totally untenable as a matter of law.
This decision, although temporal in nature, does violence to our past holdings and to the intent of SDCL 15-6-56(e). Quite recently, in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McElvain, 363 N.W.2d 186, 188 (S.D.1985) (a mortgage foreclosure case), this Court expressed: “When considering a motion for summary judgment, the formal issues presented by the pleadings are not controlling and a party may not rest upon the mere allegations contained therein.” In reviewing the affidavit and the pleadings of appellant, it is readily apparent that the pleadings do not contain specific facts but are rife with mere conclusions, legal arguments, legal contentions in supposed theory, and general allegations. This does not satisfy SDCL 15-6-56(e). In reading SDCL 15-6-56(e), it becomes obvious that affidavits shall be supporting affidavits and opposing affidavits and shall be made on personal knowledge; they are to “set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence. ...” It is manifest that the matters set forth in the pleadings, which are now retroactively “sworn to,” are not evidence which is admissible in a court of law. Therefore, do not stretch the rubber band so that it breaks.
It behooves a party who resists summary judgment to go to work. When I say, go to work, I mean commence the business of being a good workmanlike lawyer. Oppose a summary judgment by assembling and *660revealing your proofs. This practice of law can be accomplished by depositions, admissions and affidavits, but, controvert — controvert — controvert. See Smyser, The Summary Judgment — Ascertainment of The Genuine Issue, 16 S.D.L.Rev. 20, 23 (1971). Diligence is required in resisting a motion for summary judgment. Lee v. Beauchene, 337 N.W.2d 827, 829 (S.D.1983). Once a motion for summary judgment is supported, the nonmoving party must show that genuine issues of fact exist for trial. Hunt v. Briggs, 267 N.W.2d 566, 567 (S.D.1978).
Reference is made to a recent negligent representation case, Peterson v. Rogers, 347 N.W.2d 580 (S.D.1984), wherein this Court upheld summary judgment because the party opposing the motion filed no affidavits and relied exclusively upon general allegations reflected in the pleadings. In Peterson, 347 N.W.2d at 581, we stated:
SDCL 15-6-56(e) requires the party opposing a summary judgment motion to be diligent in resisting it; mere general allegations which do not set forth specific facts will not prevent issuance of a summary judgment. Since appellants have failed to set forth any evidence on the essential element of the falsity of the representation, summary judgment was properly granted. (Citations omitted.)
I acknowledge the Ruple v. Weinaug, 328 N.W.2d 857 (S.D.1983), rule concerning the acceptability of verified complaints. Here, as the majority opinion points out, appellant simply did not verify the pleadings. Appellant’s affidavit is a backdoor attempt to verify a pleading. It is a weak affidavit, to say the least, because it is upon “information and believe [sic].” It is further ill because it refers to pleadings that do not fall within the rules of evidence and are conclusory in nature. Facts advanced by a summary judgment cannot be met by denials, allegations and legal conclusions. If the courts of this state permitted such type of procedure to raise genuine issues, against uncontradicted facts, it would nullify the utility of the rule itself. See Ruple, 328 N.W.2d at 861.
Therefore, although I agree with the general principle and citations set forth in the majority opinion, I do not agree that “[w]e therefore will consider whether the allegations contained in her pleadings were sufficient to raise a material factual issue.” I do appreciate the general tenor of the majority opinion, that this is not a preferred practice and “may not in the future, after this warning, be acceptable or sufficient.”