Court Opinion

ID: 9407691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 23:03:43.243263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.697789
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/7/23 P. v. Villalpando CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E079902

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. RIF2201458)

 ERICK ANGEL VILLALPANDO,                                                OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean P. Crandell, Judge.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

         Wohl Law and David E. Wohl for Defendant and Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and

Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                 INTRODUCTION

         Defendant and appellant Erick Angel Villalpando was charged by amended felony

complaint with driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a),
                                                             1
count 1) and driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher (Veh. Code,

§ 23153, subd. (b), count 2). As to both counts, it was alleged that defendant personally

inflicted great bodily injury (GBI). (Pen. Code,1 § 12022.7, subd. (a).) Pursuant to a plea

agreement, he pled guilty to both counts and admitted the GBI allegations. A trial court

placed him on probation for a period of three years, on specified terms and conditions,

including that he spend 120 days in county jail. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to

withdraw his plea (§ 1018), after learning that his teaching credential was revoked based

on his conviction for a strike offense. The court denied the motion.

       On appeal, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his

motion to withdraw his plea. He also contends the denial of relief violated his equal

protection rights. The People concede, and we agree, that the court erred in denying his

motion. We therefore reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings.

                            PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On March 24, 2022, the Riverside County District Attorney (the district attorney)

filed a felony complaint, charging defendant with driving under the influence of alcohol

(Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a), count 1) and driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08

percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b), count 2).

       On May 17, 2022, the district attorney amended the complaint to add the

allegation, as to both counts 1 and 2, that defendant personally inflicted GBI during the

commission of the felony. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)

       1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
                                             2
      The court held a hearing that same day. At the outset of the hearing, the court

stated that it had a chambers conference with the parties that morning. The court noted

there was an issue as to whether, if defendant pled guilty, the People would be adamant

that he needed to serve the time “straight in custody.” Defense counsel informed the

court about defendant’s employment as a schoolteacher and the potential loss of his job if

he remained in custody, given that they were at the end of the school year.

      The court stated that if defendant entered a plea, it would impose 120 days of

custody and order him to wear a SCRAM device2 while released on probation. The court

added that it would postpone the surrender date for that custody time until June 23, 2022,

at which time it would determine whether the time needed to be served straight or if

defendant could serve the time on the work release program. The court then informed

defendant that the People had submitted an amended complaint, which added allegations

under section 12022.7. The prosecutor confirmed that the allegation would add three

years to the sentence, and defense counsel informed the court that defendant had been

advised that the allegation was under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), and would add an

additional three years and make the offense a strike offense, and his maximum exposure

was now six years.3 The court reviewed the plea form with defendant and confirmed that

he understood he was pleading guilty to a strike offense and that he understood the

      2   A SCRAM device appears to be an alcohol detection device.

      3  We observe that defense counsel only referred to a single allegation and strike
offense, whereas the amended complaint added the section 12022.7 allegation to both
counts 1 and 2.
                                            3
constitutional rights he was waiving by signing the form. The court also informed

defendant that because he was pleading to a felony, he would no longer be able to own or

possess a weapon or ammunition. It then gave him the following example: “Say you’re

back at school teaching and some student dropped a bullet and you think you’re doing the

world a favor by collecting that and you picked it up, some police officer could say

you’re in violation of the law by having that bullet, and you could go to state prison up to

three years. Because you have a strike in this case, that would get doubled to six.”

Defendant acknowledged his understanding and pled guilty to counts 1 and 2 and

admitted as true the GBI allegations.

       The court proceeded to place defendant on formal probation for a period of three

years. It informed him that he would be released that day, he had two days to have the

SCRAM device affixed, and he needed to complete a first offender impaired driver

program. The court also stated that he would be brought back to court on June 23, 2022,

and that if he was complying with all the specified conditions, it would likely allow him

to serve the remainder of his time on the work release program instead of in county jail.

       The court concluded by addressing defendant directly and stating: “You have a lot

of things going for yourself. You have an impressive education. You have a good job, a

lot of people that obviously care about you and watch you today, but you also obviously

have some kind of issue with alcohol which you’re struggling with; . . . The problem

becomes when you drive a motor vehicle, and in this case you injured somebody. . . . As

I advised you, if you do it again and you were to kill somebody this conviction would be

evidence that the district attorney will use in your homicide trial to show that you’ve been

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advised and lectured.” The court added, “there’s a lot of people in here that really don’t

have a lot going for themselves, and in some ways not a lot to lose. You have quite a bit

on the table and so you have a major incentive.”

       Defendant returned to court on June 23, 2022, and requested to serve the rest of

his sentence on work release. The court granted his request.

       On August 3, 2022, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. He argued that

he had good cause for withdrawing his plea since it was the product of mistake and

ignorance. He said that at the time he entered his plea, he was unaware that his

admission of the GBI enhancement would result in the automatic loss of his teaching

credential. Defendant attached a copy of a letter he had received from the Commission

on Teacher Credentialing (the Commission), informing him that pursuant to Education

Code section 44424, his teaching credential was revoked due to his felony convictions

and admitted GBI enhancements.4 He also submitted a declaration stating that he

graduated from the University of California, Riverside, with a master’s degree in

education, and received his teaching credential in June 2013. In August 2013, he got a

job teaching Spanish at a middle school and loved it. When he was subsequently charged

with two counts of driving under the influence and causing GBI, he opted to take the plea

bargain. He said no one advised him that by admitting the GBI allegation he would

       4 Education Code section 44424 provides, in relevant part: “Upon the conviction
of the holder of any credential issued by the State Board of Education or the Commission
on Teacher Credentialing of a violation, or attempted violation, of a violent or serious
felony as described in Section 44346.1 . . . the commission shall revoke the credential.”
A “serious felony” includes any felony in which the defendant personally inflicts GBI on
any person. (Ed. Code, § 44346.1, subd. (c), Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).)
                                             5
automatically lose his ability to teach, and he found out only when he received the letter

from the Commission. Defendant said he was devastated when he found out, and that, if

he had known, he unequivocally would have rejected the court’s offer and asked for more

time or tried other ways to get the prosecutor to drop the GBI allegation so that he

“would not lose what [he] worked for so long to achieve.”

       The court held a hearing on the motion on September 13, 2022. Defense counsel

argued there was good cause to withdraw the plea because defendant was unaware that

his plea would result in automatic revocation of his teaching credential. He asserted that

advisement as to the loss of the credential needed to be part of advisement given to

someone “who’s entering into this type of plea.” Counsel argued, “[T]he reality is there

should have been an advisement of that, and the fact that there wasn’t led to prejudice

that literally took away [defendant’s] entire career.” Defense counsel compared the

situation to that of a defendant who pleaded guilty without being advised as to the

immigration consequences of the plea. He said he could not find a case directly on point

but that defendant had demonstrated good cause for withdrawing his plea by showing that

he entered the plea without knowing it would cause him to lose his career. Defense

counsel contended such loss was not a collateral consequence of the plea, but a direct

consequence since the Education Code stated that if someone is convicted of a strike

offense, they lose their credential and are not entitled to a hearing.

       The prosecutor argued that defendant’s motion should be denied because the only

evidence provided was defendant’s self-serving declaration. The prosecutor also argued

                                              6
that collateral consequences “do not need to be advised to the defendant” and that

defendant losing his teaching credential was a collateral consequence.

       The court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, stating that “a

defendant does need to be advised of all of the direct consequences that would flow from

a conviction. He needs to be advised of what he’s pleading guilty to, the maximum

consequences, the length of probation, the time he’s going to serve, [and] terms of

probation.” The court said it looked up the Education Code statute cited in the

Commission’s letter and noted that losing his credential was “essentially an immediate

consequence of the fact of the type of conviction he suffered.” The court then focused on

whether defendant was legally entitled to “have that information provided to him.” It

stated that it found Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, which concerned a similar

situation with immigration consequences, to be instructive. The court then concluded

that there was no requirement for defendant to be advised of the consequence of losing

his teaching credential and that it was a collateral consequence of the plea. The court

added, “. . . here under the circumstances, I don’t feel that anything occurred that

[defendant] wasn’t advised of that he didn’t take into consideration and that he needed to

be advised of.” The court was empathetic, but said defendant was not foreclosed from

being a teacher permanently since he could be successful on probation and possibly have

his credential reinstated. The court then found that good cause had not been shown and

denied the motion.

                                              7
                                       DISCUSSION

        The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying the Motion to Withdraw

       Defendant argues the court abused its discretion in denying his motion by applying

the wrong standard and finding there was no good cause under section 1018. He asks this

court to reverse the order denying the motion and give him relief that we consider “just,

proper, and equitable.” The People concede that the court applied the wrong standard

when it concluded there was no requirement that defendant had to be advised of the

consequence of losing his teaching credential and thereby erred in denying the motion.

The People state that defendant is entitled to a new hearing at which the court applies the

correct law. We agree with the People.

       A. Standard of Review

       “A defendant who seeks to withdraw his guilty plea may do so before judgment

has been entered upon a showing of good cause.” (People v. Weaver (2004) 118

Cal.App.4th 131, 145 (Weaver); see § 1018.) “To establish good cause, it must be shown

that defendant was operating under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming

the exercise of his free judgment. [Citations.] Other factors overcoming defendant’s free

judgment include inadvertence, fraud or duress.” (People v. Huricks (1995) 32

Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208.) “ ‘The burden is on the defendant to present clear and

convincing evidence [that] the ends of justice would be subserved by permitting a change

of plea to not guilty.’ ” (Weaver, at p. 146.) “ ‘Withdrawal of a guilty plea is left to the

sound discretion of the trial court. A denial of the motion will not be disturbed on appeal

absent a showing the court has abused its discretion.’ ” (Huricks, at p. 1208.) “A trial

                                              8
court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standards applicable to the

issue at hand.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 85.)

       B. The Court Abused its Discretion

       In People v. Superior Court (Giron) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793 (Giron), the California

Supreme Court held that a defendant could establish good cause to withdraw a guilty plea

under section 1018 by showing that he or she was unaware that the plea would result in

deportation. (Id. at p. 798.) In that case, the defendant claimed that when he pled guilty

to possessing marijuana, he, his attorney, the prosecutor, and the court were all unaware

that deportation would be a collateral consequence of his plea. (Id. at pp. 796-797.) The

Supreme Court stated that a trial court “in the exercise of its discretion directed to the

promotion of justice may take into consideration such material matters with which an

accused was confronted and as to which he made erroneous assumptions when he entered

a guilty plea. The court might consider that justice would not be promoted if an accused,

willing to accept a misdemeanor conviction and probationary status, cannot by timely

action revoke his election when he thereafter discovers that much more serious sanctions,

whether criminal or civil, direct or consequential, may be imposed.” (Id. at p. 797.) The

Court specifically stated: “We do not deem the thrust of the argument to be that [the

defendant] was entitled as a matter of right to be advised of such collateral consequences

prior to the acceptance of his plea nor do we so hold.” (Ibid.) The Court held that “the

test of abuse in such circumstances is whether after consideration of all relevant factors

there was good cause shown for granting the motion and whether justice would be

promoted thereby.” (Id. at p. 798.)

                                              9
       In People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885 (Patterson), the defendant similarly

sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that at the time of the plea, he was

unaware the conviction would render him subject him to deportation. (Id. at p. 895.) In

that case, the defendant was advised that his plea may have immigration consequences,

and he alleged he was unaware that his plea would make him subject to deportation and

that he would not have entered the plea if he had known. (Id. at p. 898.) The Supreme

Court stated that, “[i]f those allegations are true, he did not appreciate the risk he was

taking by entering a guilty plea. Nothing in our cases bars a trial court from exercising its

discretion in these circumstances to grant or deny a motion under section 1018 to

withdraw the plea on grounds of mistake or ignorance.” (Ibid.) In other words, even

when a defendant receives a proper advisement under section 1016.5, the advisement did

not appear to be “a categorical bar to the withdrawal of a guilty plea on grounds of

mistake or ignorance.” (Id. at p. 896.)

       The Court in Patterson noted that the trial court “did not rule on whether [the

defendant] had credibly demonstrated that he would not have entered a guilty plea to

possession of a controlled substance had he known the plea’s immigration

consequences.” (Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 899.) Rather, the trial court concluded

that even if he was unaware of the actual immigration consequences of his guilty plea,

“he could not, as a matter of law, show good cause to withdraw that plea because he had

been advised that his plea ‘may’ have adverse immigration consequences.” (Ibid.) The

Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion on that basis and

reversed the order and remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine

                                              10
whether defendant had shown good cause to withdraw his plea on the grounds of mistake

or ignorance. (Ibid.)

       Here, it appears that the trial court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw based

on its conclusions that the loss of his teaching credential was a collateral consequence,

and he was not required to be advised of that consequence. The court stated, “I don’t feel

that anything occurred that [defendant] wasn’t advised of that he didn’t take into

consideration and that he needed to be advised of.” The court was apparently saying it

did not think anything happened that defendant needed to be advised of and thereby made

the standard that he was not required to be advised that he would have his teaching

credential revoked. However, whether or not defendant was advised of the consequence

of losing his teaching credential was not determinative of whether he established good

cause to withdraw his plea. In other words, the trial court did not rule on whether he had

established good cause on the grounds of mistake or ignorance under section 1018. (See

Patterson, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 899.)

       We further note, as defendant points out, that the court’s representations made it

seem as if he would be able to keep teaching. At the outset of the plea hearing, defense

counsel informed the court that defendant was a teacher and could lose his job if he

remained in custody, given that they were at the end of the school year. The court agreed

to postpone the surrender date until June 23, 2022, at which time it would determine if he

could serve his custody time on the work release program. Furthermore, the court

informed defendant that because he was pleading to a felony, he would no longer be able

to own or possess a weapon or ammunition. It gave him the example that he would be in

                                            11
violation if he was “back at school teaching” and a student dropped a bullet, and he

picked it up. The court later acknowledged defendant had a “good job” and warned him

of what would happen if he were to drink and drive again and kill someone, stating that

he had “quite a bit on the table.”

       In view of the circumstances, we will remand the matter to the trial court to

consider the relevant factors and rule on whether defendant has credibly demonstrated

that he would not have entered a guilty plea had he known of the consequence of losing

his teaching credential. (See Giron, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 798 & Patterson, supra, 2

Cal.5th at p. 899.) In light of this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to address

defendant’s additional argument that the court’s denial of his motion violated his right to

equal protection.

                                      DISPOSITION

       The order denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea is reversed, and the

matter is remanded to the trial court to determine if defendant has established good cause

to withdraw his plea on the grounds of mistake or ignorance under section 1018. We

express no view as to whether defendant has established good cause.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                FIELDS
                                                                                          J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                Acting P. J.
MILLER
                           J.

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