Court Opinion

ID: 9950945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 13:00:59.959368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:52.540827
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1834    Document: 33     Page: 1   Filed: 03/15/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

           RONALD LOUIS CHAPMAN, SR.,
                Claimant-Appellant

                             v.

       DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
              VETERANS AFFAIRS,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                        2023-1834
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
 Veterans Claims in No. 21-4919, Judge Joseph L. Falvey,
 Jr.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: March 15, 2024
                 ______________________

    RONALD LOUIS CHAPMAN, SR., Zachary, LA, pro se.

     GALINA I. FOMENKOVA, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY; AMANDA BLACKMON, Y. KEN LEE, Office of Gen-
 eral Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Af-
 fairs, Washington, DC.
Case: 23-1834    Document: 33      Page: 2    Filed: 03/15/2024

 2                                   CHAPMAN v. MCDONOUGH

                  ______________________

     Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE and DYK, Circuit
                          Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
     Ronald L. Chapman appeals a decision of the Court of
 Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) that af-
 firmed in part a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
 (Board). Because we lack jurisdiction over Mr. Chapman’s
 appeal, we dismiss.
                        BACKGROUND
      Mr. Chapman served on active duty in the U.S. Army
 from June 1980 to February 1981. Veterans Court Deci-
 sion at 2. 1 In February 1981, he applied for disability ben-
 efits for a left ankle condition. Id. The Department of
 Veterans Affairs (VA) granted a service connection but as-
 signed a 0% rating. Id. In January 1989, Mr. Chapman
 requested a rating increase for his left ankle disability and
 reported issues in his right foot and knee. Id. In May 1989,
 he applied for disability benefits for a right foot and knee
 condition. Id. The VA denied both claims in June 1989.
 Id. at 3. Mr. Chapman appealed to the Board, and in July
 1991, the Board granted an increase to 10% for the left an-
 kle disability but found no right leg disability had been
 demonstrated. Id. Mr. Chapman did not appeal.
     In September 1993, Mr. Chapman sought another rat-
 ing increase for his left ankle disability and a service con-
 nection for his right ankle. Id. The VA denied both claims
 in May 1995. Id. Mr. Chapman filed a Notice of

      1  “Veterans Court Decision” refers to the Veterans
 Court decision found in Mr. Chapman’s Appendix, ECF 10-
 2 at 5–15. The pages cited correspond to the page numbers
 of the decision itself.
Case: 23-1834    Document: 33      Page: 3    Filed: 03/15/2024

 CHAPMAN v. MCDONOUGH                                       3

 Disagreement for the May 1995 decision but only men-
 tioned the left ankle claim. Id.
      In August 2003, Mr. Chapman filed a claim for bilat-
 eral knee disorders and a right ankle condition. Veterans
 Court Decision at 3. The VA eventually awarded him a
 20% disability rating for both the right knee and right an-
 kle conditions with an effective date of August 5, 2003. Id.
 at 4. In February 2014, Mr. Chapman filed a Notice of Dis-
 agreement challenging the effective date for both condi-
 tions. Id. In November 2016, after a series of denials, he
 appealed to the Board. Id. In December 2018, the Board
 issued a decision denying earlier effective dates for multi-
 ple conditions, including the right knee and right ankle
 conditions. 2018 Board Decision at 9–12. 2 The Board
 found that Mr. Chapman’s 1989 claim was adjudicated and
 became final after the Board’s July 1991 decision, and that
 his 1993 claim was denied in the VA’s May 1995 rating de-
 cision, which he did not appeal. Id. at 10–11. The Board
 thus denied Mr. Chapman’s claim for an earlier effective
 date for service connection. Id. at 11–12. Mr. Chapman
 appealed to the Veterans Court.
      The Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision. Vet-
 erans Court Decision at 8–9. The court concluded that the
 Board did not clearly err in finding that any prior right an-
 kle and knee claims had been finally adjudicated. Id. Spe-
 cifically, the court reasoned that the Board had a plausible
 basis to find that the July 1991 decision and the May 1995
 decision both denied Mr. Chapman’s claims for a service
 connection for his right ankle and knee conditions. Id.

     2    “2018 Board Decision” refers to the Board decision
 found in Mr. Chapman’s Appendix, ECF 10-2 at 16–32.
 The pages cited correspond to the page numbers of the de-
 cision itself.
Case: 23-1834     Document: 33      Page: 4     Filed: 03/15/2024

 4                                     CHAPMAN v. MCDONOUGH

 Thus, the court affirmed the Board’s denial of an earlier
 effective date. Id. at 11. Mr. Chapman appeals. 3
                          DISCUSSION
     Our jurisdiction over decisions of the Veterans Court is
 limited. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), we may review “the
 validity of a decision of the [Veterans] Court on a rule of
 law or of any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation
 thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter)
 that was relied on by the [Veterans] Court in making the
 decision.” Except with respect to constitutional issues, we
 “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination,
 or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the
 facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).
     On appeal, Mr. Chapman argues the Board clearly
 erred regarding his claims for an earlier effective date for
 his right ankle and knee conditions. Informal Opening Br.
 at 2–7. 4 He argues the Board incorrectly interpreted the
 Board’s July 1991 decision as adjudicating his 1989 claim.
 Id. at 5 (citing Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990)).
 He also argues the Board failed to follow the benefit of the
 doubt rule when reviewing his form filed in January 1989.
 Id. at 6–11 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 3007(b) (1988) (benefit of the
 doubt doctrine), 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (reasonable doubt regu-
 lation), and 38 C.F.R. § 3.155 (informal claim regulation)).
 Mr. Chapman further argues the Board failed to appreciate
 his Notice of Disagreement for the May 1995 rating deci-
 sion was an appeal of the entire decision. Id. at 14–15. He

     3   The Veterans Court remanded Mr. Chapman’s
 claims for an earlier effective date for a left knee disability,
 bilateral pes planus, and a 20% rating for a left ankle dis-
 ability. Mr. Chapman does not appeal the remanded
 claims.
     4   “Informal Opening Br.” refers to Mr. Chapman’s
 Informal Brief, ECF 18-1 at 4–17.
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 CHAPMAN v. MCDONOUGH                                         5

 contends there was a question of doubt as to his right knee
 and right ankle conditions based on his filings in January
 1989, September 1993, and August 1995 such that the Vet-
 erans Court should have reversed the Board’s decision. Id.
 at 15–17.
     Each of Mr. Chapman’s arguments either challenge
 factual determinations or the application of laws or regula-
 tions to the facts of his case. We lack jurisdiction over these
 arguments. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). For example, Mr.
 Chapman argues the Veterans Court’s decision does not
 mention the form he filed in January 1989, which identified
 issues with his bilateral knees and right ankle. Informal
 Opening Br. at 4. This argument challenges a factual find-
 ing in the record, which is not subject to our review. He
 also argues the Veterans Court erred because the Board’s
 1991 decision does not mention his right knee or right an-
 kle conditions. Id. at 4–5. This argument challenges the
 Veterans Court’s application of the law to the facts of his
 case. Veterans Court Decision at 8–9. We do not have ju-
 risdiction to review application of law to facts. 38 U.S.C.
 § 7292(d)(2).
     Mr. Chapman argues we have jurisdiction over his ap-
 peal because he cited statutes and regulations in his brief.
 Informal Reply Br. at 2–4. Our jurisdiction is determined
 based on whether the case presents a question of law, in-
 cluding interpretations of constitutional and statutory pro-
 visions. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d). Mr. Chapman cited statutes
 and regulations in his brief, but the Veterans Court did not
 interpret any laws or regulations in its decision. Instead,
 the Veterans Court reviewed the Board’s decision for clear
 error. Veterans Court Decision at 8–9 (citing Gilbert, 1 Vet.
 App. at 53 in applying the “clearly erroneous” standard of
 review). This application of law to the facts of the case is
 not subject to our review.
     Mr. Chapman’s other arguments essentially ask us to
 review the record and Board’s decision on the
Case: 23-1834     Document: 33       Page: 6   Filed: 03/15/2024

 6                                     CHAPMAN v. MCDONOUGH

 determination of his effective date for service connection,
 which are factual findings not subject to our review. Butler
 v. Shinseki, 603 F.3d 922, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 5 Because
 Mr. Chapman disputes factual findings and the application
 of laws to the facts of his case, we lack jurisdiction over his
 appeal.
                         CONCLUSION
     We have considered Mr. Chapman’s remaining argu-
 ments and find them unpersuasive. Because his appeal
 does not raise issues within this Court’s limited jurisdic-
 tion, we dismiss.
                         DISMISSED
                             COSTS
 No costs.

     5    Mr. Chapman’s mention of due process does not
 suffice to raise a constitutional issue within our jurisdic-
 tion. See Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
 1999) (“[The appellant’s] characterization of [a] question as
 constitutional in nature does not confer upon us jurisdic-
 tion that we otherwise lack.”).