Court Opinion

ID: 9601052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:35:47.597877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:47.737729
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I would reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Log Cabin, I respectfully dissent. The EEOC alleged in its complaint that Log Cabin violated the ADA when it refused to hire Stewart upon learning “that she was HIV positive,” and then submitted evidence regarding the effect that HIV (which had progressed to the AIDS stage) had on Stewart’s life activities. The district court struck that evidence on the basis of its judgment that a disability claim based on AIDS is a “gross departure” from a claim based on “being HIV positive.” Not only does this distinction improperly focus on the name of Stewart’s disability rather than its effects on her life activities, but it also is erroneous and therefore unreasonable. A person diagnosed with AIDS is also HIV positive. The majority upholds the district court’s judgment as manifestly reasonable because it views the EEOC as having belatedly refashioned its claim from one involving HIV to one involving AIDS. In my view, however, the EEOC did not change its claim, and the evidence submitted to demonstrate that Stewart is disabled should not have been disregarded on the basis of a distinction that has no meaning in this case.
Once a person is infected with HIV (or is “HIV positive”) that person remains HIV positive until his death. “HIV infection” (which is often shortened to “HIV” or “HIV disease”) refers to a single disease that is characterized by the progressive loss of CD4 + lymphocytes (or white blood cells). The Supreme Court has described the disease as having three stages — acute, chronic, and AIDS. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 633-37, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (describing the progression of HIV infection). The Center for Disease Control now recognizes five, rather than three, stages of HIV infection. See Center for Disease Control, Living With HIV/AIDS, http://www.cdc. gov/hiv/resources/brochures/livingwithhiv. htm# q2 (last visited August 31, 2008).
AIDS is the final stage of HIV, but there is no single test to diagnose AIDS. Id. Usually AIDS is diagnosed when a person’s CD4 + cell count drops below 200, but sometimes persons with higher cell counts are diagnosed with AIDS if they have certain diseases such as tuberculosis or pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP). See id.-, Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633-36, 118 S.Ct. 2196; Doe v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1262 n. 3 (4th Cir.1995) (“AIDS is the end-stage of HIV infection and is characterized by the presence of HIV and one or more ‘opportunistic’ infections”). In other words, an AIDS diagnosis can mean different symptoms for different people, and it does not necessarily represent a change in debilitation from the earlier stages of HIV. Rather, individuals suffer from the effects of HIV/AIDS at various stages in different ways.
HIV and AIDS are not separate diseases. Importantly, persons with AIDS do not cease to be HIV positive; once someone is HIV positive or is infected with HIV, she is always HIV positive. Nor do *447persons with AIDS no longer suffer from HIV infection.
Therefore, having AIDS is not inconsistent with being HIV positive, nor is it a new “cause of action” under the ADA. By the time Stewart applied for a position as a waitress at Log Cabin, she was both HIV positive and had AIDS. Though she did not reveal this to Log Cabin at the time she applied for the job, a manager at the restaurant discovered she was infected with HIV and wrote “HIV +” in large capital letters across her application. Stewart was not hired. Pursuant to the federal notice pleading standard, the EEOC’s complaint, which merely initiated this litigation, provided a short and plain statement of the grievance: Log Cabin refused to hire Stewart “because it learned she was HIV positive.” Any facts consistent with the complaint’s allegations could be proved later and did not require an amended complaint. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-14, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir.2005).
To meet its threshold burden of proving that Stewart is disabled as defined by the ADA, the EEOC submitted evidence that Stewart’s condition (which the affidavits refer to as “AIDS” or “HIV/AIDS”) substantially limits one or more of her major life activities. The district court acknowledged that Stewart’s disease (AIDS) caused serious limitations on a number of major life activities, including self-care, eating, and reproduction. But, inexplicably, it held that this evidence only pertained to the “AIDS claim” and could not be considered towards the “HIV claim,” and therefore that there was no evidence that Stewart’s HIV substantially impaired any major life activity.
This, to me, is illogical. It is undisputed that at all relevant times, Stewart was not only HIV positive (meaning she had HIV — the virus), but she also had AIDS. So the allegation in the complaint that Stewart was “HIV positive” is consistent with the fact that she has AIDS. It follows that the evidence regarding the impact that “HIV/AIDS” or AIDS has on Stewart’s life activities describes the impact that HIV has on Stewart’s life activities. Although the district court appears to have thought it necessary for Stewart to submit evidence of how HIV “alone” affects her life in order to provide evidence consistent with her complaint, that is impossible in Stewart’s case. The effects of AIDS on her life activities are not severable from the effects of HIV. Put another way, proof that Stewart’s major life activities are affected by AIDS is not different from proof that her major life activities are affected by HIV.
Indeed, whether one calls Stewart’s disease “HIV” or “AIDS” or “HIV/AIDS” misses the point of the ADA. “The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app., § 1630.2(j); see Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (holding that the “HIV infection satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the disease” but leaving it to courts to make a disability determination based on individual circumstances); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (note discussing § 1630.2(j)) (“HIV infection [is] inherently substantially limiting.”). What matters in analyzing whether an individual has a “disability” for purposes of the ADA is the impact of that condition. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, *448566, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 144 L.Ed.2d 518 (1999).
Because the EEOC presented evidence demonstrating that Stewart’s disease — regardless of whether her disease is called “HIV,” “HIV/AIDS” or “AIDS” — substantially limits one or more of Stewart’s major life activities, it met its burden of demonstrating that Stewart is “disabled” for purposes of the ADA. The names of the stages of this particular disease (HIV) are inconsequential; what matters is the impact of the disease on the individual. The district court erred in refusing to consider that evidence on the basis that different names were used to describe Stewart’s disability.
Despite this evidence, the majority opinion affirms the grant of summary judgment to Log Cabin on the rationale that the district court’s determination that the EEOC was belatedly altering the factual basis of its claim was “manifestly reasonable.” But I do not see how the EEOC was trying to “alter” its claim — that Stewart was discriminated against because she was HIV positive — by submitting evidence of how Stewart’s HIV/AIDS substantially limits her major life activities.
As an initial matter, the evidence that the EEOC submitted to prove Stewart is “disabled” for purposes of the ADA is consistent with her complaint, so the EEOC was not changing its claim. To the extent there is a difference between HIV and AIDS (not all people with HIV have AIDS), the majority’s focus on nomenclature overlooks whether that difference is consequential in this case. Even if all people with HIV do not have AIDS, it is undisputed that Stewart has both. In light of that, reliance on the difference between HIV and AIDS to disregard evidence regarding the effect that HIV has on Stewart’s life is unreasonable.
Furthermore, this is hardly a situation where the plaintiff attempted to reconfigure its claim, or where the complaint failed to give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiffs claim. The EEOC did not allege in its complaint that Stewart was fired because she had a cold and then provide evidence that she had cancer. That, to me, would be more similar to the cases cited by the majority for the proposition that a court need not entertain belated factual alterations. See Conner v. Ill. Dep’t of Natural Res., 413 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir.2005) (alleging disparate treatment based on the failure to receive pay for extra work is different from alleging discrimination based on the denial of a promotion or a hostile work environment claim); Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 817-18 (7th Cir.2002) (a retaliation claim based on an EEOC complaint filed on one date is distinct from a retaliation claim based on another EEOC complaint filed two months later). Rather, AIDS is one stage of HIV (similar to what “stage four cancer” might be to “cancer”), and HIV is a disease that can render someone “disabled” at all stages of the disease. AIDS is not a “substitute” disease for HIV.1
The majority relies on Bragdon to contend that the physical effects of AIDS are different — more severe — than those “associated with” being HIV positive. But Bragdon does not characterize AIDS as distinct from being HIV positive. See, e.g., Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 636, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (“During [the AIDS] stage, the clinical conditions most often associated with HIV, *449such as pneumocystis earninii pneumonia, Kaposi’s sarcoma, and non-Hodgkins lymphoma, tend to appear.”) (emphasis added). Rather, the Supreme Court described the course of illness for a person who is HIV positive as having three stages — acute HIV, chronic HIV, and AIDS.
The majority also concludes that because Log Cabin did not know Stewart had AIDS, she could not have relied on evidence regarding the impact of AIDS on her life activities even if the district court had considered it. But we have never held that an employer who acts improperly on the basis of a disability need know the extent to which the disability has progressed to be held liable. See Sanglap v. LaSalle Bank, FSB, 345 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir.2003) (“[Liability for disability discrimination does not require professional understanding of the plaintiffs condition .... It is enough to show that the defendant knew of symptoms raising an inference that the plaintiff was disabled.”); cf. Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir.1995) (an employer who has no knowledge of a disability whatsoever cannot be found to have been motivated by that disability).
This is not a case where Log Cabin had no knowledge of Stewart’s disability. It is undisputed Log Cabin knew she was HIV positive. And there is evidence linking Log Cabin’s knowledge of Stewart’s disability to its adverse action (Log Cabin prominently wrote “HIV+” on her employment application), which distinguishes this case from the rule of Hedberg. Hed-berg does not stand for the proposition that an employer who knows of a disability must properly diagnose that disability before it can be held hable for acting on the basis of it. So I do not see why the EEOC would need to demonstrate that Log Cabin knew her HIV infection had progressed to its final stage in order to hold Log Cabin liable for acting on that knowledge. Indeed, Log Cabin maintains that its reasons for not hiring Stewart had nothing to do with her disability.
This brings me to whether the EEOC demonstrated that Stewart was qualified for the position. Log Cabin asserts on appeal that it is an absolute requirement for waitresses to be able to lift 25-30 pounds. However, that assertion is undermined by Log Cabin’s owner, who when asked at a deposition whether having a lifting restriction “eliminates” someone from being employed as a waitress at the restaurant, responded “not necessarily.” Therefore, there is a material dispute as to whether the lifting requirement is an absolute requirement of the waitress job for which Stewart applied.
Even assuming the lifting requirement is an absolute one, there is a material dispute as to whether Stewart was not qualified since her lifting restriction was only temporary. Though she noted on her application that there was no way Log Cabin could accommodate her inability to lift more than ten pounds, she also contemporaneously told Log Cabin that her inability to do so was temporary. Indeed, that would explain why she wrote on her application that there was no accommodation for her restriction. If she believed the restriction would not be an issue by the time she began the position, there would be no reason for the Log Cabin to have to “accommodate” her. Therefore, a reasonable jury could find that Stewart was qualified for the job.
It is unfortunate to me that the district court’s focus on nomenclature obscured the real inquiry in this case, which is whether Log Cabin discriminated against Stewart. Indeed, I wonder if this case would have fared differently if the last stage of HIV were called “Stage 5 HIV” *450instead of “AIDS.” Because there is no meaningful difference between a discrimination claim based on being “HIV positive” and a discrimination claim based on “AIDS” when the claimant has AIDS, and because I do not believe it is possible for a person diagnosed with AIDS to provide evidence of how HIV alone affects her major life activities, the district court abused its discretion when it disregarded evidence based on these assumptions. Had the district court considered the evidence of Stewart’s disability, the EEOC would have met its threshold burden of demonstrating that Stewart was disabled for purposes of the ADA. I would reverse.

. To the extent that timing is an issue, it bears noting that the EEOC's summary judgment response (with the affidavits) was submitted a month before trial due to a mistake by Log Cabin, who failed to properly serve the EEOC with its motion for summary judgment until April 21, 2006 (well past the court's deadline for filing dispositive motions) at which point the district court was forced to revise its entire briefing schedule.