Court Opinion

ID: 9466773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:27:19.13808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:57.093486
License: Public Domain

SPRECHER, Circuit Judge.
The major issue in this appeal concerns the finality of the district court’s judgment. No issue is raised about the correctness of the trial judge’s determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties. Indeed, the defendant admitted in its answer its liability on the plaintiff’s claim to collect on a promissory note. Instead, the defendant here urges that the trial court abused its discretion in making its determination final by certifying it pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).1 A corollary of the appellant’s posi*946tion, were we to accept it, would seem to be that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the judgment and thus must dismiss the appeal for want of a final decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We need not decide this issue, however, because we hold that the entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) was within the trial court’s discretion. Because no issue is raised as to the merits, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
The several parties to this action were participants in a computer financing transaction which is apparently typical of most in the industry. The defendant-appellant, Federal Leasing, Inc., is in the business of leasing computer equipment to commercial and governmental users. To purchase equipment for subsequent lease, Federal obtained financing from banks such as the plaintiff-appellee, Bank of Lincolnwood. Federal executed a promissory note providing for payment in installments to the bank and containing an acceleration clause in the event of default. The note was secured by a related security agreement. Federal then leased the equipment to a user, in this case Dial Financial Corporation. The lease provided for rental payments equal to Federal’s installment obligations on the note, which the user paid directly to the bank.
Among the lease agreement’s provisions was one which precipitated the controversy here. The lease provided that the user could terminate the lease at its convenience without penalty. This obviously left Federal with a substantial contingent liability which Federal sought to insure against by obtaining a policy with Lloyd’s Underwriters and British Companies. The policies issued by Lloyd’s provided that it would indemnify Federal for losses arising out of early lease termination. Apparently rapid technological advances in the computer industry have prompted a substantial number of computer users to take advantage of the early termination clauses in Federal’s leases. Lloyd's, however, has refused to indemnify Federal for its losses from the cancellations because of Federal’s alleged failure to adhere to provisions in its policy of insurance.
The computer financing arrangement thus involves five participants: (1) The lessor purchases equipment from (2) the seller with financing from (3) the bank. The lessor then leases the equipment to (4) the lessee, with the possibility of losses insured by (5) the underwriter. This action has as parties four of the five participants — all except the computer seller — and arises out of financing arranged in 1976. In early 1979, Dial, the lessee, notified Federal of its intent to cancel its lease. Federal notified Lloyd’s which refused to pay, and Federal, therefore, was unable to meet its obligations on the promissory note held by Lincolnwood. Lincolnwood, in turn, exercised its option to accelerate the note and commenced this suit on June 8, 1979.
Lincolnwood’s complaint comprises three counts. Count I is solely against Federal and seeks to collect on the promissory note. Count II seeks to enforce Lincolnwood’s security interest in the computer equipment and names as defendants Dial, Federal, and another defendant. Count III is a claim against Lloyd’s and two of its brokers seeking recovery as a loss payee on the policy between Lloyd’s and Federal.
Summons were issued the same day the complaint was filed. Federal, however, did not immediately answer the complaint. Instead
[o]n July 6, 1979, prior to answering Lincolnwood’s Complaint, Federal moved to transfer the case to the District of Maryland, where Federal had, on June 12, 1979, filed a complaint against Lloyd’s based upon its failure to indemnify Federal for its losses with respect to the Lincolnwood transaction and with respect to 23 other similar transactions where the lessee had terminated the lease prior to its stated term.
Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. The district court deferred ruling on Federal’s motion *947until it filed its answer. Federal answered on August 13, 1979. The answer admitted liability under Count I, apparently denied the allegation in Count II, and did not respond to Count III since that count was not directed against it. Federal’s answer also included a cross-claim against Lloyd’s for indemnity for all amounts due under the accelerated note held by Lincolnwood.
On August 27, 1979, the trial court denied Federal’s motion to transfer as to Counts I and II and granted the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Count I.2 The court noted that liability and the amount of liability were admitted, a conclusion Federal does not challenge here. Moreover, the court, sua sponte, found there was no just reason for delay and directed entry of judgment on Count I pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). On September 5, 1979, the trial court denied Federal’s motion to amend the judgment by deleting the 54(b) certification. Other post-judgment proceedings before Judge Marshall finally resulted in the entry of a stay pending appeal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(d) upon Federal’s filing of a supersedeas bond in the amount of $452,000.
Because the only issues in this appeal concern Civil Rule 54(b), some review of that rule’s purpose and requirements is necessary. On the theory that prompt, efficient justice would be better served by broadening the previously accepted scope of lawsuits, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure included numerous provisions permitting the liberal joinder of parties and claims. To counterbalance what could be the occasional harsh effects of these joinder rules, the drafters also included rules vesting in the district court the discretion to provide some relief from their effects. Under Rule 42(b) the trial court may order separate trials for properly joined claims, so that, for example, a plaintiff’s suit is not swamped by generally unrelated claims between defendants. Rule 54(b) serves a similar purpose. Ordinarily, a final judgment will not be rendered by a trial court on an adjudicated claim until the court has resolved all of the issues between all of the parties to the action.
The liberalization of our practice to allow more issues and parties to be joined in one action and to expand the privilege of intervention by those not originally parties has increased the danger of hardship and denial of justice through delay if each issue must await the determination of all issues as to all parties before a final judgment can be had. In recognition of this difficulty, . . . Rule 54(b) . was promulgated.
Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511-12, 70 S.Ct. 322, 324, 94 L.Ed. 299 (1950). The rule thus gives the district court the power to render a final judgment as to a portion of a lawsuit provided that certain requirements are satisfied.
The requirements of the rule are easily stated, although their application has caused occasional difficulties. First, there must be an action involving multiple claims for relief or multiple parties. See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976) (certification is improper when action presents only variants of a single claim). Second, there must be a final decision by the district court as to at least one claim or the rights and liabilities of at least one of the parties. Third, the district court must make “an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” Finally, the court must expressly direct the entry of judgment.
Federal only questions the district court’s compliance with the third requirement of Civil Rule 54(b) — the “express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” The appellant challenges that determination on two grounds. First, Federal argues that the trial court erred in failing to provide a statement of reasons for its determination. Second, Federal insists that *948the trial court abused its discretion in making that determination.3
Whether there is no just reason for delay is a question addressed primarily to the discretion of the trial court. The district court is “the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons for delay.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437, 76 S.Ct. 895, 901, 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956). Nevertheless, because the Rule 54(b) procedure, if misused, can generate needless or duplicative appeals, the appellate court will review the district court’s determination. The appellate court’s review, however, is limited. It may reject a 54(b) certification and dismiss an appeal only if it finds an abuse of the district court’s discretion. See Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 452, 76 S.Ct. 904, 908, 100 L.Ed. 1311 (1956). This is in contrast, for example, to the procedure for certification for interlocutory review of controlling questions of law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). There, by statute, the appellate court may in its discretion decline to review issues certified by the district court. Thus, as recently stated by the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co.,-U.S.-,-, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 1466, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980), once the district court has made a Rule 54(b) certification
the standard against which a district court’s exercise of discretion is to be judged is the “interest of sound judicial administration.” . . . Admittedly this presents issues not always easily resolved, but the proper role of the Court of Appeals is not to reweigh the equities or reassess the facts but to make sure that the conclusions derived from those weighings and assessments are juridically sound and supported by the record.
Federal’s first objection is that the trial court failed to state reasons for its determination. It is true that this court in U. S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050, 1051 n.1 (7th Cir. 1979), admonished:
A proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion under Rule 54(b) also requires more than a recital of the statutory formula. The considerations underlying the exercise of that discretion should be articulated. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1975); Gumer v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 516 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1974); Panichella v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 252 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1958).
Whether or not that admonition was dictum, it represents this court’s opinion of what constitutes the “better practice,” and the failure to provide a written statement of reasons may in an appropriate case lead to a remand for such a statement.4 The statement is, however, primarily an aid to the appellate court to permit it to review the exercise of the trial court’s discretion.5 *949The failure of the district court to make a written statement at the time it makes a 54(b) certification is not a jurisdictional defect, see Allis-Chalmers Corp., 521 F.2d at 367 n.16 (remanding cause for a statement of reasons), and need not occasion even a remand if the basis for the district court’s determination is otherwise apparent.
In this case, the district court’s initial order certifying the cause pursuant to Rule 54(b) did fail to articulate specifically the reasons why the court believed there was no just reason for delay.6 The transcripts of the proceedings before the district court on the day of the order and thereafter, however, make plain the district court’s reasons for its conclusion. The district court relied on the following circumstances in entering judgment:
1) The admitted liability of Federal to the Bank of Lincolnwood and Lincoln-wood’s uncontested right to immediate payment.
2) The probability that Federal’s cross-claim against Lloyd’s would be litigated in another forum and the likelihood that the resolution of that claim might be long in coming.
3) The danger that delay in issuing final judgment might prejudice Lincolnwood’s ability to collect on its judgment because of Federal’s precarious financial position.
This is a sufficient statement of reasons to permit this court to review the exercise of the trial court’s discretion. Federal’s contention that only the factors articulated by the trial judge at the time of the certification may be considered is without merit. The Third Circuit’s decision in Allis-Chalmers, relied on by this court in U. S. General, makes it clear that a post-certification statement will suffice. A remand to the district court now for a formal statement when its reasons are already apparent would be a meaningless exercise and serve no purpose other than to further delay these proceedings.
Federal’s second allegation of error is that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that there was no just reason for delay.
At present, no precise test exists for determining whether there is a just reason to delay the entry of judgment that can be satisfactorily or easily applied in every case; thus, the district court should feel free to consider any factor that seems relevant to a particular action, keeping in mind the policies the rule attempts to promote.
10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2659 at 77-78 (1973). The Third Circuit has compiled the following catalogue of relevant considerations along with the caveat that it is not all-inclusive:
(1) The relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in set-off against the judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.
Allis-Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 364.7
Federal, dwelling on the first factor listed by the court in Allis-Chalmers, maintains *950that the relationship between Lincolnwood’s claim on the note and its unadjudicated cross-claim against Lloyd’s constitutes a compelling reason to withhold 54(b) certification. The note and the policy of insurance were parts of a single financial transaction. But to state that a cross-claim arises out of the same transaction as the principal claim does no more than restate a requirement of a proper cross-claim, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 13(g), and there is no doubt that Rule 54(b) permits separate treatment of the original claim and a cross-claim. See Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 452, 76 S.Ct. 904, 908, 100 L.Ed. 1311 (1956); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 154.35[2] (2d ed. 1976).
Federal also argues that the “integrated” nature of the transaction militates against permitting Lincolnwood to execute upon its judgment now.
As of March 31, 1976, Federal’s unamortized contingent obligations arising out of [computer leasing transactions] was approximately $40,000,000, an amount far in excess of Federal’s net worth of approximately $500,000. These facts were generally known in the financial community, and thus banks never would have become parties to the . . . transaction and made the required loan to Federal on the strength of Federal’s financial condition alone. A requisite premise of a bank’s loan to Federal is the insurance coverage by Lloyd’s. . . . The loan, lease and insurance policy are therefore essential parts of an integrated transaction.
Appellant’s Brief at 6 (citations omitted). It therefore reasons that, because Lincoln-wood was relying upon the insurance from Lloyd’s, it is unfair to permit it to proceed to collect against Federal. Yet the financial arrangement itself was structured so that the bank held a promissory note permitting it to accelerate the balance due upon default and pursue its remedies against Federal. Certainly, the risk as to the refusal of Lloyd’s to cover losses was intended to fall on the appellant, not the bank. Although the circumstances identified by Federal might justify the district court’s exercise of discretion to delay entry of final judgment, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in declining to give them substantial weight.8 This is *951particularly so when, as here, the liability as between the parties is uncontested and delay in the entry of judgment might prejudice the judgment winner’s ability to execute upon it.
A partial adjudication of an action absent a Rule 54(b) certification remains interlocutory and “is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims . . . .” Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(b). An important effect of a 54(b) certification is that the entry of judgment permits prompt execution. When no substantial reason appears why a litigant should not be entitled to collect upon a claim adjudicated in its favor immediately, the appellate courts will sustain the entry of judgment upon that claim by the trial court. See United Bank of Pueblo v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 529 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1976); Norris Manufacturing Co. v. R. E. Darling Co. , 315 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1963); cf. Allis-Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 364 (“miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations” may justify entry of judgment).
In United Bank of Pueblo, a bank brought an action to recover on a banker’s blanket bond. The defendant impleaded a third-party defendant, and the two claims were ordered to be tried separately. The original claim was tried first and determined in the plaintiff’s favor. Ten months later trial on the third-party claim was yet to be had, and the trial court entered judgment on the original claim. The Tenth Circuit, concluding that the 54(b) certification was not an abuse of discretion, noted,
the district court appeared concerned that pending a final judgment in the action, the Pueblo bank was being paid 6 percent interest on its $50,000 judgment, whereas the prime interest rate was 11 percent. Undoubtedly, the then 10-month delay in collecting its judgment was creating a financial injustice for the Pueblo bank.
529 F.2d at 492-93.
In Norris Manufacturing Co., the court sustained the 54(b) certification despite a pending counterclaim between the parties. The appeals court there noted “the [trial] Court could properly reconsider how much longer the plaintiff might be required to wait to collect the purchase price of the goods it had sold and which was admittedly long since due and payable.” 315 F.2d at 636.9
In the present case, like Norris, the liability of the appellant is uncontested. The possible financial detriment to Lincolnwood from delay is greater than the possible loss of interest in United Bank of Pueblo. Delay in the entry of final judgment would prevent execution. It is uncontested that a number of similarly situated banks have similar claims against Federal and that, absent a recovery from Lloyd’s, it is unable to satisfy them all. This is a situation in which creditors must move swiftly to protect their interests and are entitled — save the debtor’s bankruptcy — to the rewards of their diligence.
The just economic interest of Lincoln-wood in the prompt entry of a final enforcement judgment was a factor which the trial court could properly consider. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co.,--U.S. -, -, 100 S.Ct. 1460, -, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980). This is particularly so where, as here, the delay in adjudicating the remaining cross-claim promised to be considerable. Furthermore, no considerations of judicial economy indicate the inadvisability of the immediate judgment. There is little reason to believe the issue of liability on the note will be mooted by future events. A necessary prerequisite for *952any claim by Federal against Lloyd’s would seem to be its obligation to pay the bank. Compare Panichella v. Pennsylvania R. R., 252 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1958) (certification of dismissal of third-party claim for contribution is an abuse of discretion because if the plaintiff prosecuting the original claim takes nothing, there would be no need to consider the contribution question). Nor does it appear that the bank’s claim would have to be relitigated in further proceedings. The validity of the note is unquestioned by the parties here, and there is no indication that Lloyd’s intends to question the validity of that obligation. Finally, there is no possibility that Lincolnwood’s recovery will be subject to a set-off. Federal has interposed no counterclaims against Lincolnwood in this action.10 Thus, it cannot be said in this case that the trial court abused its discretion.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive” determination of lawsuits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. The defendant would have us construe them to permit it to delay payment of an obligation which it admits is immediately, indeed past due. The district court was not persuaded that any just reason existed for further delay. Neither are we. We hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering the entry of judgment. Because no challenge is made to the trial court’s disposition on the merits, the judgment is affirmed.

. Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
As discussed infra, the rule requires both “an express determination that there is no just reason for delay” and “an express direction for the entry of judgment.” The fulfillment of these two requirements is frequently referred to as a “Rule 54(b) certification.” This “certification” *946should not be confused with the distinct procedure for certification of controlling issues of law provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

. The court took under advisement the motion to transfer Count III. The motion was ultimately withdrawn when Count III was later dismissed without prejudice.

. Federal does not directly question the district court’s power to raise sua sponte the question of whether to direct entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). In this case, it would seem that the trial judge did no more than anticipate what surely would have been Lincolnwood’s next motion. In any event, the rule specifies no particular procedure for obtaining a Rule 54(b) certification and there is precedent for raising the question on the court’s motion. 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2660 at 85-86 (1973). The district court’s action here was within its discretion.

. Whether a statement of reasons is merely advisable or a mandatory requirement in connection with entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) is unsettled. The Second Circuit has expressed its opinion that such a statement is desirable, but apparently will not refuse to consider an otherwise appropriately certified case in the absence of such a statement. See Arlinghaus v. Ritenour, 543 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976), and cases cited therein. The Third Circuit has adopted the Second Circuit’s suggestion as a mandatory rule in that circuit. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 521 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1975). In Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Industries Corp., 526 F.2d 724, 726 n.6 (3d Cir. 1975), the court declined to give the rule adopted in Allis-Chalmers retroactive effect.

. The Second Circuit in Arlinghaus v. Ritenour, 543 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1976), commented:
The benefit of such a reasoned statement is not merely that, as stressed in Gumer, it will aid us in discharging our duty to review the district court’s exercise of discretion in issuing the certificate, . . . but that it will aid the district judge himself. A decision-*949maker obliged to give reasons to support his decision may find they do not; “the opinion will not write.”
There may be merit in this suggestion, but it would not seem to justify, by itself, the refusal of appellate courts to entertain appeals pursuant to Rule 54(b) which lack written statements of reasons. Indeed, in Arlinghaus, the court dismissed the appeal not for want of a statement of reasons, but for want of jurisdiction after holding that the trial court abused its discretion in making the 54(b) certification.

. The minute order of August 27, 1979, simply recites “The Court finds pursuant to Rule 54(b), F.R.Civ.P. that there is no just reason to delay the entry of a final enforceable judgment . . and therefore directs the clerk to enter a final judgment .

. The requirement that there be “no just reason for delay” is frequently referred to as a require*950ment that there be no just reason to delay an appeal. This, however, is too narrow a reading of the Rule. Rule 54 in general is concerned with judgments. Subsection (b) provides for their entry piecemeal and it is apparent that the necessary determination, therefore, is that there is no just reason to delay entry of final judgment.
The entry of a final judgment has a number of important consequences. Ordinarily it is only from a final judgment that an appeal may be prosecuted under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Indeed, the principal purpose of Civil Rule 54(b) is to permit piecemeal appeals “in the infrequent harsh case.” Advisory Committee Note, 5 F.R.D. 473 (1946); see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432-33, 76 S.Ct. 895, 897-98, 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956). Yet immediate appealability is obviously, not the sole consequence of a final judgment. See generally 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2661 (1973). A judicial determination has no res judicata effect until it is embodied in a final judgment. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 14 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). Interest on an adjudicated claim for money generally only accumulates upon the entry of a final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961. And perhaps most significantly for our purposes here, the process of collecting upon an adjudicated claim can only commence after a final judgment has been entered.
Thus, even though Rule 54(b) was promulgated largely to permit occasional piecemeal appeals, we do not believe that either its language or the sound administration of justice require that its use be confined solely to permit appeals. In determining whether there is no just reason for delay, the district court may properly consider all of the consequences of a final judgment or the lack thereof and balance the competing interests of the parties in the context of the particular case.

. Federal has suggested that the enforcement of the final judgment against it might impair its ability to prosecute its cross-claim against Lloyd’s or its action against Lloyd’s in Maryland. This consideration does not directly indicate that the Rule 54(b) certification was improper. It seems more relevant to whether the trial court should stay enforcement of the judgment until subsequent judgment is rendered as to the claims against Lloyd’s. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(h). Federal, however, has never formally moved that the trial court issue such a stay. Moreover, even if it had made such a motion *951and the trial court denied it, we could not say that this circumstance alone would be sufficient to permit us to conclude that the denial was an abuse of discretion. See Pioche Mines Consolidated, Inc. v. Dolman, 336 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1964).

. The plaintiff in Norris did have a demonstrable need for immediate recovery in order to pay its federal taxes. That need, however, is not much more compelling than the need of the plaintiff here to bring its claim to judgment. The trial court in Norris also required the plaintiff to post a bond to secure any judgment which might be entered on the defendant’s counterclaim.

. The absence of any considerations of judicial economy militating against the entry of judgment in this case is a natural result of the fact that the liability of Federal is uncontested. Normally, when partial final judgment is entered on a contested claim, the trial court’s determination that there is no just reason to delay is really that there is no just reason to delay an appeal. An appellate court reviewing that determination may become cognizant of factors, overlooked by the district judge, which make immediate appeal unadvisable. In contrast, where the liability is uncontested and therefore no substantial issues for appeal are present, the trial court’s determination is really that there is no just reason to delay execution on the judgment. Thus, considerations relevant to the policy against piecemeal appeals, e. g., delay of further proceedings in the trial court, avoidance of passing on questions unnecessarily, the importance of binding all parties in the litigation, are to a large extent inapplicable.