Court Opinion

ID: 9755402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:37:08.78574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:06.959743
License: Public Domain

*180Concurring opinion by HARRELL, J., which RAKER, J., Joins.
I concur fully with the Majority opinion’s analysis regarding the prosecutor’s improper “golden rule” closing argument and the consequences of that error. I write separately, however, to record my disagreement with the Majority opinion’s conclusions regarding the prosecutor’s argument references to the “law of the streets.” In its brief to this Court, the State defended the prosecutor’s remarks only on the grounds of the “invited response” doctrine. The State did not argue that the comments were, in the first instance, proper, independent of the “invited response” doctrine. Because the Majority opinion discusses, in its analysis of the “invited response” argument, why the “law of the streets” appeal was improper as a threshold matter, I feel compelled to state my contrary view, the State’s silence thereon notwithstanding.1
“There can be no dispute that during summation [at the end of all evidence], counsel may ‘state and discuss the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the facts in evidence.’ ” Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 230, 596 A.2d 1024, 1037 (1991) (quoting Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 412, 326 A.2d 707, 714 (1974)). Attorneys may treat closing argument as an “opportunity to creatively mesh the diverse facets of trial, meld the evidence presented with plausible theories, and expose the deficiencies in his or her opponent’s argument.” Henry, 324 Md. at 230, 596 A.2d at 1037. Accordingly, attorneys are afforded a “wide latitude” in closing arguments. Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 430, 722 A.2d 887, 902 (1999). “The prosecutor is allowed liberal freedom of speech and may make any comment that is warranted by the evidence or inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” Degren, 352 Md. at 430, 722 A.2d at 901 (internal *181quotation omitted). “Determining whether a prosecutor has crossed the line separating ‘oratorical conceit’ from prosecutorial misconduct .... is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. The exercise of that discretion will not constitute reversible error unless clearly abused and prejudicial to the accused.” Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 435, 583 A.2d 218, 241 (1990); Degren, 352 Md. at 431, 722 A.2d at 902. In sum,
“[wjhile arguments of counsel are required to be confined to the issues in the cases on trial, the evidence and fair and reasonable deductions therefrom, and to arguments of opposing counsel, generally speaking, liberal freedom of speech should be allowed. There are no hard-and-fast limitations within which the argument of earnest counsel must be confined—no well-defined bounds beyond which the eloquence of an advocate shall not soar. He may discuss the facts proved or admitted in the pleadings, assess the conduct of the parties, and attack the credibility of witnesses. He may indulge in oratorical conceit or flourish and in illustrations and metaphorical allusions.”
Spain v. State, 386 Md. 145, 153, 872 A.2d 25, 29 (2005) (quoting Degren, 352 Md. at 429-30, 722 A.2d at 901-02).
The prosecutor’s “law of the streets” comments merely were permissible rhetorical flourishes. The prosecutor’s essential point was simple: Cotton lied about the identity of his attacker because of his friendship with Lee. The prosecutor’s first reference to the “law of the streets” makes that clear. The prosecutor stated, “Richard Cotton came here to help his boy, his friend, his buddy because this Court read you the law of the State of Maryland, but that has nothing to do with the law of the streets of Baltimore.” The first half of the sentence is clearly a permissible statement. A prosecutor is permitted to challenge the credibility of a witness because of his friendship with the defendant, where that friendship was a matter of evidence. The second half of the sentence, where the prosecutor mentions the “law of the streets,” should be viewed as a rhetorical device designed to make the credibility argument effective and memorable for the jury.2
*182In introducing the phrase the “law of the streets,” the prosecutor supplied, in context, a relative definition of a corollary of the phrase: refusing to cooperate with authorities in order to protect one’s friends and associates. Thus, in the context of the closing argument, the jury likely was not misled or confused as to what the prosecutor was arguing.
In Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 439, 326 A.2d 707, 728-29 (1974), we held that it was not improper for the prosecutor, in a murder prosecution in Baltimore City, to make reference to the number of murders that had been committed in Baltimore during the previous year. We stated that the “reference the prosecutor made to the number of murders committed in Baltimore in 1972—based upon the widespread publicity given such data—was but a direction by him to the jury of a fact that was within their common knowledge.” Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 440, 326 A.2d at 729. It is an understatement to say that recent difficulties encountered by police and prosecutors in obtaining full witness cooperation in Baltimore (and elsewhere) have been well-publicized.3 In fact, it is much more likely that a juror would be aware of the challenges surround*183ing witness cooperation than that same juror being aware of the number of murders in Baltimore.
The prosecutor’s later references to the “law of the streets” are extensions of her first use of the phrase. For example, the prosecutor stated that “[u]nder no circumstances, if you live by the law of the streets of Baltimore, do you help police.” The jury could not be confused by a term which the prosecutor already had introduced and defined in context.4
As noted above, the “invited response” doctrine does not apply to the present case because defense counsel’s remarks were not improper (Majority op. at-), and the “law of the streets” remarks were not improper. Nonetheless, I would deem the “law of the streets” comments from the prosecutor, even assumed arguendo to be improper, a fair response to defense counsel’s closing argument. Appealing to the jury’s common sense, defense counsel argued that it would be contrary to human nature for a victim who had been shot three times to lie to protect his assailant. Thus, defense counsel argued, Cotton’s testimony that Lee was not the shooter should be considered credible. The prosecution countered, providing an alternate theory of Cotton’s motivation for his testimony. The prosecutor, also appealing to the jury’s common sense, argued in rebuttal that Cotton’s testimony could be explained by his reluctance to incriminate his friend and cooperate with authorities. Both arguments address the same underlying issue, Cotton’s credibility. Both arguments appeal to the jury’s understanding of human nature and motivation. The prosecutor’s comments were a fair alternative explanation of the same evidence, ie., Cotton’s testimony that Lee did not attack him.
*184Accordingly, although I concur with the judgment of the Majority opinion and its analysis of the “golden rule” invocation, I would hold that the prosecutor’s “law of the streets” comments were mere oratorical conceits permissible under the liberal freedom of speech allowed in closing arguments.
Judge RAKER has authorized me to state that she joins in this concurring opinion.

. I also disagree with the Majority opinion’s analysis of the “invited response” doctrine. The Majority opinion correctly notes that the invited response doctrine only applies where opposing counsel has made some improper remark or argument. Majority op. at -. There was nothing improper in either counsel’s closing remarks to the jury-

. This rhetorical device is not novel. The rhetorical value of the phrase is apparent upon a careful analysis of the sentence. The phrase “the *182law of the streets of Baltimore” is preceded by a similar phrase, "the law of the State of Maryland.” Parallelism is a rhetorical device designed to make arguments more persuasive. Wikipedia, Parallelism (rhetoric), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallelism_(rhetoric) (last visited 3 June 2008). In crafting sentences combining different thoughts and phrases, writers are encouraged to use similar words and structure to create parallelism in their arguments. William Strunk Jr. & E.B. White, The Elements of Style 26-28 (4th ed. 2000). It is apparent to me that the prosecutor was using a basic rhetorical device (parallel structure) to craft a more persuasive argument regarding a permissible topic (witness credibility). The Court should be more leery of intruding into the discretion best left to the trial court where counsel is using rather standard rhetorical devices to argue about permissible topics.

. The "widespread publicity” regarding the number of murders in Baltimore in 1972, according to the Court, consisted of two news articles (in two different newspapers) published 19 days before the trial. Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 439 n. 10, 326 A.2d 707, 728 n. 10 (1974). A current search of the Baltimore Sun for "stop snitching” turns up 97 articles over the past three years. In addition, witness cooperation was a continuing theme of a fictional, but highly influential, HBO crime drama based in Baltimore that recently signed off the air.

. The prosecutor's last reference to "the law of the streets” aims at a somewhat different sense. The use of the phrase, however, likely was not confusing or misleading to the jury. The prosecutor asked the jury to "teach the defendant not to follow the laws of the streets of Baltimore, but to follow the laws of the State of Maryland.” This is a straightforward exhortation to the jury to uphold the rule of law (a frequent theme of sanctioned Law Day ceremonies in Maryland and elsewhere).