Court Opinion

ID: 9633715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:57:36.781967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:40.520360
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The sentence imposed by the district court in this case is a prime example of a sentencing proceeding gone awry. Indeed, the district court handed down a sentence which was rife with procedural error as a result of its failure to comply with § 3553(a), the Sentencing Guidelines, or Rule 35(a). In short, the sentence imposed by the district court was improper and legally deficient. Thus, it is incumbent upon this Court to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. Because the majority goes to great pains to avoid this basic duty in the face of obvious and repeated sentencing error, I respectfully dissent.
I.
A simple recitation of the facts in this case demonstrates that Houston’s sentence is procedurally infirm and should therefore be remanded for resentencing. In March of 2006, Houston entered into a plea agreement with the government whereby Houston agreed to plead guilty to the offenses enumerated in a two count bill of information. The bill of information alleged that Houston participated in a conspiracy to conduct an illegal gambling enterprise between 2000 and 2005 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 as well as a conspiracy to launder the proceeds of an illegal gambling activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and 1957. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Houston agreed to forfeit upwards of $2 million in money and property and the government agreed to represent that Houston provided substantial assistance by truthfully describing his criminal activity and encouraging others to plead guilty.
Thereafter, on July 19, 2006, Houston appeared before the district court for sentencing where it appears that the district judge referred to the proceedings as having gotten “turned around.”1 During the hearing, defense counsel made a presentation regarding Houston’s age, character, business acumen and history of supporting his family, including his elderly mother, and the less fortunate. Houston argued that the district court should take into consideration those personal characteristics and the fact that he observed “the numbers” growing up “as part of a community where playing the numbers was *758culturally accepted” and impose a term of probation. (J.A. at 90)
The district court, however, brushed Houston’s arguments aside without discussion and noted in a cursory fashion that Houston was “the organizer of this thing,” the “main man” of the gambling conspiracy, and that the sentence was imposed
[biased upon the nature and circumstances of the offense and the time it went on[,] plus your history of working hard, but you have been in a little trouble in your life, not much, but some. Based upon the Guideline range[,] which is what, 15 months, 15 to 21 months. Based upon the fact that you cooperated and the government has made a motion for downward departure under Sentencing Guideline 5K1.1....
(J.A. at 200) In the course of this explanation, the district court did not discuss the § 3553(a) factors in any meaningful way. Instead, following this terse explanation, the district court sentenced Houston to a term of 12 months and one day of imprisonment.
After sentencing, Houston filed a “motion for reconsideration of the court’s sentencing decision.” In the motion, Houston questioned the district court’s consideration of his individual characteristics, the adequacy of the district court’s explanation at sentencing, and the district court’s consideration of unwarranted sentencing disparities. Houston contended that the district court failed to consider unwarranted sentencing disparities because no similarly situated defendant — i.e., individuals who had been convicted of an illegal gambling offense and cooperated with law enforcement — had been sentenced to a term of incarceration by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Houston, through counsel, averred that defendants in illegal gambling cases who cooperated with the government had routinely been sentenced to probation. Consequently, Houston argued that the district court should similarly impose a sentence of probation rather than a term of incarceration to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.
In response to the motion, the district judge stated that he had “considered” Houston’s personal characteristics and his history of civic engagement. The district judge, however, did not describe how he considered these characteristics or elaborate on his reasoning for the imposition of the initial 12 month sentence. Nevertheless, the district judge acknowledged that he had not considered “unwarranted sentencing disparities” and that Houston should be resentenced to a term of probation based on the sentences of similarly situated defendants. The district court reached this conclusion after conducting “independent research” and without any input or argument from the government. Although the district court said it knew it was on “questionable legal grounds,” the court amended Houston’s sentence to reflect a two year term of probation rather than 12 months of incarceration.
A few days later, apparently turned around once again, the district court reversed course and reinstated the 12 month and one day term of incarceration after an objection was lodged by the government. The government alleged that the district court was without jurisdiction to “reconsider” the sentence under Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and that the factual basis upon which the district court made its revised sentencing determination was flawed. The district court agreed that it was without authority to resentence Houston and therefore struck the amended judgment. Thereafter, the district court reinstated Houston’s 12 month and one day sentence. The district judge, however, continued to maintain that *759he had not fairly sentenced Houston and that the 12 month and one day sentence was excessive.
II.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, these facts demonstrate that the district court committed significant procedural errors that rendered Houston’s sentence unreasonable. To uphold such a procedurally infirm sentence, as the majority seems content to do, is to abdicate this Court’s responsibility to insure constitutionally sound sentencing practices.
Under Gall v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), this Court must “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” In the instant case, given all of the twists and turns that occurred during sentencing, it is clear that the district court fell well below the procedural benchmarks established by the Supreme Court for at least three reasons.
First, during the initial sentencing there was no indication that the district court considered Houston’s arguments regarding his family, cultural history or philanthropy; nor did the district court engage in an adequate explanation of the rationale behind the sentence ultimately imposed. As the Supreme Court recently noted in Gall, “[a]fter settling on the appropriate sentence, [the district judge] must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” 128 S.Ct. at 597. Even a cursory review of the sentencing transcript reveals that the district judge did not reference the arguments made by Houston during the brief statement made prior to the imposition of Houston’s initial sentence. Thus, in failing to explain the basis for Houston’s sentence, the district court ran afoul of the procedural requirements of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and its progeny and should therefore be reversed. See United States v. Klups, 514 F.3d 532, 537 (6th Cir.2008); United States v. Thomas, 498 F.3d 336, 340-41 (6th Cir.2007).
Indeed, the majority acknowledges that the district court did not “fully explain the extent of its consideration of [the] sentencing factors.” Slip Op. at 751. Astoundingly, however, the majority refuses to vacate and remand Houston’s sentence, finding no fault in the district court’s explanation, or lack thereof. This refusal to vacate Houston’s sentence flies in the face of well-settled precedent which holds that “[r]e-versable procedural error occurs if the sentencing judge fails to ‘set forth enough [of a statement of reasons] to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision-making authority.’ ” United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Rita v. United States, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)). We have long held that “when the judge makes only a conclusory reference to the § 3553(a) factors and does not address the defendant’s arguments regarding application of those factors, then this Court will find the sentence unreasonable.” Klups, 514 F.3d at 537 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 339 n. 4 (6th Cir.2007) (noting that this Court has long held that “we will vacate a sentence if the context and the record do not make clear *760the court’s reasoning”). In short, well-established precedent requires reversal where the sentencing court fails to explain to the defendant, and this Court, how it arrived at its sentencing determination, including how it considered defense arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. Contrary to the majority’s determination, unexplained or silent consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and Houston’s arguments does not satisfy the district court’s duty to explain how it chose to exercise its “legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2468.
Second, Houston’s sentence is rendered unreasonable by the district court’s admitted failure to consider unwarranted sentencing disparities pursuant to § 3553(a)(6). Post-Booker, district courts must independently “ ‘consider all of the § 3553(a) factors’ and ‘make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.’ ” United States v. Sedore, 512 F.3d 819, 828 (6th Cir.2008) (Clay, J., concurring) (quoting Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 596-97); see also United States v. Wilms, 495 F.3d 277, 282 (6th Cir.2007) (noting that a district court must independently consider the § 3553(a) factors at sentencing). On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court has indicated that a district court, when imposing a sentence, may not simply rely on the Guidelines or the Sentencing Commission’s recommendations with respect to the appropriateness of a particular sentence. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 596; Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2463. Rather, under the advisory regime announced by Booker, the Guidelines may not be used as a crutch or shorthand for the independent exercise of judicial discretion called for by § 3553(a). In particular, § 3553(a)(6) tells “the sentencing judge to consider ... the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities,” Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2463, “among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct” at sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
Although this Court noted in United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 623 (6th Cir.2007), that “[sjubsection 3553(a)(6) is concerned with national disparities among the many defendants with similar criminal backgrounds convicted of similar criminal conduct,” consideration of the factor includes an examination of regional sentencing disparities.2 As the Supreme Court noted in Rita, “the sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge and the Commission as carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the other at wholesale.” 127 S.Ct. at 2463. The district court’s “retail” consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, therefore, necessarily entailed consideration of the regional sentencing patterns highlighted by Houston. Indeed, in Gall, the Supreme Court found that a district court considered unwarranted sentencing disparities by inquiring “about the sentences already imposed by a different judge on two of Gall’s codefendants.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 599; see also Kimbrough v. United States, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 558, 574, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) (noting that § 3553(a)(6) “directs district courts to consider the need for unwarranted sentencing disparities-along with other § 3553(a) factors-when imposing sentences. Under this instruction, district courts must take account of sentencing practices in other *761courts ...” (emphasis in original and internal citations omitted)). Because the district court was required to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors and the district court failed to do so when imposing Houston’s sentence, the ultimate 12 month sentence was rendered procedurally unreasonable. Simmons, 501 F.3d at 625-26 (noting that a “district judge could also violate procedural reasonableness if the defendant is able to prove that the lack of explicit discussion stems from a complete ignorance of that factor”).
Lastly, Houston’s sentence was rendered procedurally infirm by the district court’s failure to comply with Rule 35(a) in its attempt to correct Houston’s sentence. Under Rule 35(a), “[wjithin 7 days of sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a). In the instant case, rather than rectifying the “clear error” committed during the initial sentencing, the district court compounded the error. In imposing the amended sentence, the district court failed to hear arguments from both Houston and the government regarding sentencing disparities or the other § 3553(a) factors. Further, the district court neglected to explain how it considered Houston’s arguments regarding his personal characteristics and history of philanthropy in Chattanooga. Thus, both in its initial imposition of the sentence, and in its attempt to correct the sentence initially imposed, the district court imposed a procedurally unreasonable sentence that warrants reversal.
III.
Despite the fundamental and obvious mistakes made by the district court during the sentencings, the majority inexplicably goes to great lengths to avoid remanding this case in order for Houston to be resen-tenced. As an initial matter, the majority argues that Houston’s failure to mention unwarranted sentencing disparities at the conclusion of his sentencing hearing subjects his procedural reasonableness challenge to plain error review on appeal under United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir.2008). In Vonner, this Court applied the rule announced in United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir.2004), to procedural reasonableness challenges. Under Bostic, a district court must give the parties an opportunity to make objections that were not previously raised to “aid the district court in correcting any error.” Id. at 873. Any objection not raised by the conclusion of a sentencing hearing is subject to plain error review on appeal. Id. In the instant case, Houston’s Rule 35(a) motion did in fact bring an objection to the attention of the district court for correction regarding the district court’s consideration of his arguments in favor of probation, the adequacy of the district court’s sentencing explanation, and the district court’s consideration of § 3553(a)(6). In United States v. Ellis, 417 F.3d 931, 933 (8th Cir.2005), for example, the Eighth Circuit held that a challenge to the mandatory imposition of the Guidelines was preserved despite the fact that it was first raised in a post-sentencing Rule 35(a) motion. The Ellis court reasoned that because the trial court was given “an opportunity to correct the error,” the objection was subject to review for reasonableness, rather than plain error, on appeal. Id. The logical force of Ellis applies equally to the instant case to preserve Houston’s objection.3 Conse*762quently, “[w]hen an objection to a sentence is preserved, we conduct a reasonableness review.” Simmons, 501 F.3d at 624. In the instant case, under our reasonableness review, based on even a cursory review of the record, it is clear that the sentence imposed by the district court was procedurally unreasonable.
In another effort to avoid remanding Houston’s case for resentencing, the majority suggests that the district court did in fact consider unwarranted sentencing disparities because it considered the Guidelines. Contrary to the majority’s determination, the district court’s consideration of the Guidelines did not cure the district court’s failure to consider unwarranted sentencing disparities. Although the Guidelines represent the Sentencing Commission’s “rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives,” including the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, the district court is required to independently assess and determine whether the § 3553(a) factors support the imposition of a particular Guidelines sentence. Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2464; Wilms, 495 F.3d at 282.
Under the majority’s rendition of the district court’s responsibilities with respect to the § 3553(a) factors, however, a district court applying the Guidelines is free to ignore other factors such as the seriousness of the offense and unwarranted sentencing disparities because such factors are taken into account by the Sentencing Commission when fashioning the Guidelines. Not only does the majority’s view render § 3553(a)(6) superfluous, it bears a striking resemblance to the pre-Booker sentencing regime. Wilms, 495 F.3d at 282; United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir.2006). Indeed, in United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir.2006), this Court noted that “[a] sentence within the Guidelines carries with it no implication that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors if it is not clear from the record, because, of course, under the Guidelines as mandatory, a district court was not required to consider the § 3553(a) factors. It would be unrealistic to now claim that a Guideline sentence implies consideration of those factors.” Because the majority unrealistically suggests that the application of the Guidelines can substitute for independent consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, I respectfully dissent.
IV.
I express no opinion as to what sentence should ultimately be imposed on Houston; however, inasmuch as the district court imposed a sentence that is procedurally infirm, I would vacate Houston’s sentence *763and remand for a sentencing proceeding that would appropriately conform to the mandates of Booker and its progeny.

. Contrary to the majority's contention, I do not entirely attribute the reference to the sentencing getting "turned around” to any "quip” made by the district judge on the record. Indeed, the improprieties that occurred in the instant case are not so easily captured by any one statement of the district court. Rather, it is clear from simply reading the entire record, including the initial sentencing transcript, that the sentencing was confused and thus the "turned around” reference is appropriate.

. The majority, relying on Simmons, dismisses the question of local or regional disparities, suggesting that they have no bearing on the district court’s consideration of unwarranted sentencing disparities. However, Simmons reaches no such conclusion. While Simmons stated that a district court could, in its discretion, consider sentencing disparities as between co-defendants, it was silent regarding the interaction between consideration of regional and national sentencing disparities. 501 F.3d at 623-24.

. Although the majority dismisses the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Ellis as having no weight in this circuit, the persuasiveness of Ellis' logic is quite clear: where a defendant raises an objection to the district court through a Rule 35(a) motion and therefore gives the *762district court an opportunity to respond to an alleged error, plain error review is inappropriate. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, the issue confronting the Ellis court was the same issue that we confront here, whether to apply plain error review to a procedural reasonableness challenge (i.e., the district court's application of the Guidelines as mandatory) where a defendant raises an objection in the form of a Rule 35(a) motion. Inasmuch as we have not yet resolved the impact of a Rule 35(a) motion on our standard of review regarding a district court's sentencing determination, Ellis is certainly relevant and ought to inform our thinking. Indeed, this Court routinely looks to our sister circuits for guidance when we encounter a legal question that we have not previously passed upon.
Rather than address the wisdom of plain error review under the unusual factual circumstances presented in this case, the majority unthinkingly applies such review in its haste to affirm the district court. Such unre-flective application of plain error review not only undermines this Court’s duty to review sentences for reasonableness under Booker, it is inconsistent with the tenets of plain error review that the majority relies upon, as Ellis demonstrates.