Court Opinion

ID: 9946551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 21:00:57.567469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:24:53.497411
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-11656    Document: 42-1     Date Filed: 02/29/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 20-11656
                          ____________________

       KATHLEEN STEELE,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cv-02522-VMC-AEP
                          ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                 20-11656

       LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
               This case involving a posthumously conceived child returns
       to us for disposition from the Florida Supreme Court, to which we
       certified two questions of Florida law. Steele v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
       (“Steele I”), 51 F.4th 1059, 1065 (11th Cir. 2022). In considering our
       certified questions, the Florida Supreme Court found our first ques-
       tion dispositive: “Under Florida law, is P.S.S. ‘provided for’ in the
       decedent’s will within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 742.17(4)?” Id.;
       see Steele v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (“Steele II”), No. SC2022-1342, 2024
       WL 630219 (Fla. Feb. 15, 2024). In answering this question, the
       Florida Supreme Court held that “‘provided for’ in section
       742.17(4) means that the testator actually left something to the
       posthumously conceived child through the will” and that, as such,
       “the will must show that the testator contemplated the possibility
       of a child being conceived following his or her death.” Steele II,
       2024 WL 630219, at *3. And the Florida Supreme Court concluded
       that the will of the decedent, Phillip Steele, did not provide for
       P.S.S., Mr. Steele’s posthumously conceived child. Id.
              As we explain below, we hold that Mr. Steele’s will does not
       provide for P.S.S. and that he is not “eligible for a claim against the
       decedent’s estate,” § 742.17(4), based the Florida Supreme Court’s
       answer to our first certified question. Therefore, the administra-
       tive law judge did not err in denying Katherine Steele’s claim for
       child’s insurance benefits (“CIB”) for P.S.S. Accordingly, we affirm
       the district court’s order upholding the administrative law judge’s
       decision.
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       20-11656                    Opinion of the Court                       3

                      I.          RELEVANT BACKGROUND
               We have set forth the relevant facts of this appeal in Steele I,
       51 F.4th at 1061–62, but we briefly recount them for context. Mr.
       Steele, before his death, provided sperm samples to a fertility clinic.
       Id. at 1061. Following Mr. Steele’s death, Ms. Steele used one of
       those samples and conceived P.S.S. through in vitro fertilization. Id.
       Additionally, before Mr. Steele’s death, he prepared a will that spe-
       cifically listed his living children but also stated, “[t]he terms ‘chil-
       dren’ and ‘lineal descendants’ shall include those later born or
       adopted and whenever used in this instrument shall be equivalent
       to blood relationship and relationship by adoption.” Id.
               After P.S.S.’s birth, Ms. Steele applied for CIB under the So-
       cial Security Act on behalf of P.S.S., but the Social Security Admin-
       istration denied her claim. Id. Ms. Steele sought administrative
       review of that denial, but an administrative law judge similarly de-
       nied the claim for CIB. Id. at 1061–62. Ms. Steele then challenged
       the denial of her claim for CIB in federal court. Id. at 1062; see 42
       U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). A magistrate judge recommended af-
       firming the administrative law judge’s decision, and the district
       court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation over Ms.
       Steele’s objections. Steele I, 51 F.4th at 1062. This appeal ensued.
                           II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
              When an administrative law judge denies benefits and the
       Appeals Council denies review, as occurred in this case, we review
       the administrative law judge’s decision as the Commissioner’s final
       decision. Viverette v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 13 F.4th 1309, 1313 (11th
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  20-11656

       Cir. 2021). For factual questions, we determine whether the denial
       is supported by substantial evidence. Id. “In reviewing for substan-
       tial evidence, we ‘may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evi-
       dence, or substitute our judgment for that of” the administrative
       law judge. Id. at 1314 (quoting Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631
       F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)). But we review questions of law
       presented by the administrative law judge’s decision de novo. Id. at
       1313–14.
                                 III.   ANALYSIS
              As we explained in Steele I, the main issue in this appeal is
       whether P.S.S.—Mr. Steele’s posthumously conceived child—is
       considered a “child” within the meaning of the Social Security Act
       and is entitled to CIB. 51 F.4th at 1062–63.
              Under the Social Security Act, an applicant qualiﬁes for CIB
       if he “meets the Act’s deﬁnition of ‘child,’ is unmarried, is below
       speciﬁed age limits (18 or 19) or is under a disability which began
       prior to age 22, and was dependent on the insured at the time of
       the insured’s death.” Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 547
       (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). The Social Security Act deﬁned “child,”
       in relevant part, as “(1) the child or legally adopted child of an indi-
       vidual, (2) a stepchild [under certain circumstances], and (3) . . . the
       grandchild or stepgrandchild of an individual or his spouse [who
       meets certain conditions].” Astrue, 566 U.S. at 547 (alterations in
       original); 42 U.S.C. § 416(e). Additionally, a subsequential deﬁni-
       tion provision—42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)—provides that “[i]n deter-
       mining whether an applicant is the child or parent of [an] individual
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       20-11656                Opinion of the Court                          5

       for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Secu-
       rity shall apply [the intestacy law of the insured individual’s domi-
       ciliary State].” Astrue, 566 U.S. at 548 (some alterations in original)
       (quoting § 416(h)(2)(A)). Section 416(h)(2)(A) “completes the deﬁ-
       nition of ‘child’ ‘for purposes of th[e] subchapter’ that includes
       § 416(e)(1).” Id. at 558 (quoting § 416(h)(2)(A)).
               “Whether posthumously conceived children can inherit
       through intestacy under Florida law” was a question of ﬁrst im-
       pression for this Court, Steele I, 51 F.th at 1064, and the parties dis-
       puted the meaning and application of Florida Statute § 742.17(4) to
       the case, which provides that a “child conceived from the eggs or
       sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their
       eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a woman’s body shall not be eligible
       for a claim against the decedent’s estate unless the child has been pro-
       vided for by the decedent’s will.” (Emphasis added). Given this, we
       certiﬁed two questions to the Florida Supreme Court: (1) “[u]nder
       Florida law, is P.S.S. ‘provided for’ in the decedent’s will within the
       meaning of Fla. Stat. § 742.17(4)?”; and (2) “[i]f the answer is yes,
       does Florida law authorize a posthumously conceived child who is
       provided for in the decedent's will to inherit intestate the decedent's
       property?” Steele I, 51 F.4th at 1065.
             After considering our certiﬁed questions, the Florida Su-
       preme Court determined that the ﬁrst question—the interpreta-
       tion of the phrase “provided for” in section 742.17(4)—was
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       6                         Opinion of the Court                     20-11656

       dispositive. 1 Steele II, 2024 WL 630219, at *2. Applying the suprem-
       acy-of-text principle to section 742.17(4), the Florida Supreme
       Court noted that “[t]he term ‘provided for’ is not deﬁned in the
       statute or in any other part of chapter 742.” Id. (quoting
       § 742.17(4)). Therefore, the court looked to other “sources bearing
       on its objective meaning.” Id. After considering “era-appropriate”
       dictionaries and its case law in a related context, the Florida Su-
       preme Court concluded that “‘provided for’ in section 742.17(4)
       means that the testator actually left something to the posthu-
       mously conceived child through the will,” i.e., “the child must have
       some inheritance right under the will.” Id. at *3. As part of this
       requirement, the court explained, “the will must show that the tes-
       tator contemplated the possibility of a child being conceived fol-
       lowing his or her death.” Id.
              Applying this standard to the facts of this case, the Florida
       Supreme Court determined that Mr. Steele’s will did not “provide
       for” P.S.S. because “[n]o part of the will acknowledges the possibil-
       ity of children being conceived after Mr. Steele’s death.” Id. The
       court interpreted the will’s reference to afterborn or adopted chil-
       dren as referring “most naturally to children born after his will was
       drafted but conceived before his death, i.e., when the dispositional
       portions of the will create vested rights.” Id. “Thus, this reference

       1 Because the Florida Supreme Court determined the first certified question

       was dispositive of the case, it declined to answer the second question. Steele
       II, 2024 WL 630219, at *4.
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       20-11656                Opinion of the Court                           7

       to later-born children would not cover P.S.S., who was conceived
       after Mr. Steele’s death.” Id.
               Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court found that, even if
       “post-death conception was in some generic sense contemplated
       by Mr. Steele, P.S.S. could not have received anything under the
       will,” as “Mr. Steele’s will conveyed all relevant property to Ms.
       Steele.” Id. The court explained that, “[i]n the event that Ms. Steele
       had died before Mr. Steele, the tangible personal property would
       have been distributed to his ‘then living children.’” Id. “By its
       terms,” the court explained, “this fallback provision only applied to
       children living at the time Mr. Steele died and necessarily excluded
       any posthumously conceived children, like P.S.S.” Id. Thus, the
       Florida Supreme Court concluded that “as it was impossible for
       P.S.S. to inherit anything from the will, it is clear that Mr. Steele did
       not provide for P.S.S. as contemplated by section 742.17(4).” Id.
               For the reasons stated in the Florida Supreme Court’s deci-
       sion in Steele II, we conclude that P.S.S., who was conceived after
       Mr. Steele’s death, was not “provided for” in Mr. Steele’s will, as
       contemplated by section 742.17(4). Therefore, under the intestacy
       law of Florida, P.S.S. is not “eligible for a claim against the dece-
       dent’s estate” under section 742.17(4) and cannot inherit Mr.
       Steele’s personal property through intestacy, which means that
       P.S.S. is not considered a “child” of Mr. Steele for purposes of qual-
       ifying for CIB under the Social Security Act. Accordingly, the ad-
       ministrative law judge did not err in denying Ms. Steele’s claim for
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       8                     Opinion of the Court                20-11656

       CIB on behalf of P.S.S., and we aﬃrm the district court’s order up-
       holding the administrative law judge’s decision.
                            IV.    CONCLUSION
              For the foregoing reasons, we aﬃrm the district court’s or-
       der upholding the administrative law judge’s denial of Ms. Steele’s
       claim for CIB on behalf of P.S.S.
             AFFIRMED.