Court Opinion

ID: 9778434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:04:28.593804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:08.026043
License: Public Domain

O’QUINN, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I am in complete disagreement with the results reached by the majority, I file this dissent and set out my reasons for disagreeing.
From two administrative determinations, in April of 1977, Cottrell appealed by way of petition to the executive secretary of the Teacher Retirement System requesting that the two earlier decisions be overruled. In August of 1977 the executive secretary in effect affirmed the earlier administrative actions in his decision which in pertinent part stated:
“1. The USMA is not a public school maintained in whole or in part for ‘children of United States citizens’ .
“2. The USMA is not a public school system maintained in whole or in part by any other state or territory of the United States. It is a military school maintained to educate and train future military officers .
“3. * * * [Under Attorney General Opinion H — 945 and Section 3.23] the Board of Trustees has not by ‘rule or regulation’ found that a member who has taught at a United States military service academy is eligible to purchase out-of-state teaching service credits under section 3.26 of the Texas Education Code.
“4. The Petitioner was not a teacher or auxiliary employee in a public school system as defined in section 3.02(3) [3.02(a)(3)] while an Air Force officer assigned to the USMA. He was primarily an Air Force officer subject to assignment by the Air Force.
“Decision. Petitioner is not eligible to purchase creditable service toward retirement with the Teacher Retirement System of Texas for service rendered at the U.S. Military Academy under Section 3.26, Texas Education Code. The service would be eligible as military duty and creditable under Section 3.23(c), Texas Education Code subject to five years limitation on such military duty.”
From decision of the executive secretary, Cottrell appealed to the Board of Trustees of the Teacher Retirement System. The Board in September of 1977 adopted the decision of the executive secretary and stated, “Petitioner’s request to purchase out-of-state credit service for the period in which he, as a military officer, was assigned to *932service as an instructor at the United States Military Academy is denied.”
Cottrell on appeal argues (1) that under an opinion of the attorney general, filed in 1977, his application to purchase additional credit under Section 3.26 would be proper, and (2) that an Act passed by the Legislature a few months after Cottrell filed his application, which would not affect Cott-rell’s rights, amended the law to prevent future grants of the type of credit sought in this suit.
The Legislature amended Section 3.26(a) effective June 1, 1977, by adding: “Specifically excluded from out-of-state service credit is service while a member of the Armed Forces rendered at a public school, for which service the member was compensated by the United States.”
For reasons more fully developed below, I am persuaded that the opinion, which Cott-rell urges is controlling, fails to give the relief sought in this case. The attorney general’s opinion relied on began with the condition: “If a person has been determined to be eligible under both sections 3.23 and 3.26. . . . ” The opinion thereafter recognized that “Certainly, there are numerous types of fact situations which are encompassed in your questions, and the determination of whether a particular situation falls within the statute involves a determination of fact. The Legislature, in this case, has specifically delegated the authority to make such fact determinations to the State Board of Trustees of the Teacher Retirement System in section 3.23. . .” The opinion is not controlling in the instant case because the Board here has merely exercised its delegated authority to determine that Cottrell is not entitled to purchase credits under Section 3.26(a).
Cottrell’s second argument springs from amendment of the statute specifically to exclude the purchase of the type of credits sought here for out of state service.
As will be demonstrated in greater detail, I believe there are other principles of statutory construction applicable to this case which operated to justify the Board’s exclusion of the purchase of such credits even prior to the specific exclusion of these credits under terms of the amendment.
The first reason the Retirement System should prevail in this cause is that the initial determination of eligibility to purchase retirement credits is properly a question to be resolved by the System. As mentioned above, the attorney general’s opinion Cott-rell relies on stated, “The Legislature . has specifically delegated the authority to make such fact determinations [of whether a particular situation falls within the statute] to the State Board of Trustees of the Teacher Retirement System. . . .”
The opinion then continued: “In view of the foregoing, we cannot say as a matter of law that a member of the military employed as a teacher in a United States Armed Forces service academy . . . is or is not eligible under section 3.26 to purchase membership service credits.” It is also observed that Section 3.02(b) declares “In case of doubt the State Board of Trustees of the retirement system shall determine whether a person is an employee within the contemplation of this chapter.” Education Code, Section 3.02(b) (Supp.1979).
The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act provides that “Where the law authorizes review under the substantial evidence rule, or where the law does not define the scope of judicial review, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions committed to agency discretion . .” Article 6252-13a, § 19(e) (Supp. 1979).
Prior to the Procedure Act, “If . the meaning of the provision be doubtful or ambiguous, the construction placed upon a statutory provision by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to weight. . . .’’ Ex parte Roloff, 510 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex.1974); Calvert v. Kadane, 427 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tex.1968); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. State, 541 S.W.2d 639, 644 *933(Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1976, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440, 443-444 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1970, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
One court stated, “ . . . whether the meaning of the provisions of an act is unclear the interpretation given them by the administrative agency charged with its implementation is entitled to great weight. . ” Beekendorff, et al. v. Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence District, 558 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston (14th Dist.) 1977, writ ref’d n. r. e., opinion approved, 563 S.W.2d 239); see also, Tarry Moving & Storage Co. v. Railroad Commission, 359 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1962, aff’d, 367 S.W.2d 322). (Emphasis added in Beekendorff).
I believe that the Board of Trustees of the Teacher Retirement System in denying Cottrell’s application merely exercised the-authority delegated to the Board to determine whether the applicant was covered by the respective sections of the statute. Cott-rell was permitted to purchase five years of credit under Section 3.23, but was denied the right to purchase an additional three years under Section 3.26(a). In this respect the Board has determined that Cottrell’s application for the additional credits was not within the contemplation of the legislature because (1) the military academy— West Point — is not a public school, and (2) an officer teaching at the military academy is rendering military service under assignment by the military, rather than primarily performing teaching duties as contemplated under the Act.
On the public school question, the Retirement System’s view was expressly conveyed to Cottrell by letter in this language:
“Both the Texas Legislature and the United States Congress normally use the term ‘public school’ according to its generally accepted meaning: public tax-supported elementary and secondary schools and state universities. . . . That
Congress does not contemplate the Academy as a ‘public school’ or element of public education is shown by the fact that Title 20 (Education) covers teachers, students, and elementary and secondary education without mention of the Academy which is covered by Title 10 (Armed Forces). Teaching at USMA is not service in a ‘public school’ as contemplated by Section 3.26(a).”
To those authorities and definitions, the System might have added the generally recognized authority of Webster: “public school ... In the United States . an elementary or secondary school, now usually free, maintained by the local governmental authority.” Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed., unabridged.
The letter from the System to Cottrell also stated that the System construed teaching at the United States Military Academy, while on active duty in the service, to be military duty rather than out of state teaching service. Each of the determinations by the Board was well within the authority of the Board, as recognized in the attorney general’s opinion, and as delegated to the Board under Sections 3.02(b) and 3.23(a).
Returning to the amendment of the statute, I examine the effect to be found in it upon the facts of this case. Cottrell urges that the amendment added in 1977 must be recognized as an intended change in the law, coming too late to bar approval of his application.
Statutory amendments are not necessarily and in all instances intended changes in the law. Some amendments may be construed as legislative interpretation of the former or existing law. And, in case of an inconsistency between a general rule and a particular rule, the particular rule may be construed properly as an exception to the general rule.
Although Texas Jurisprudence recognizes a general rule, relating to construction of amendments to a statute, that “In enacting an amendment, the legislature is presumed *934to have intended to change the law, and a construction should be adopted that gives effect to the intended change, rather than one that renders the amendment useless,” yet recognition is also accorded the rule that, “ . . .an amendment may constitute a legislative interpretation of the law, that is entitled to much weight.” (Emphasis added). 53 Tex.Jur.2d Statutes, Secs. 187, 178 (1964).
The Commission of Appeals in 1926 stated, “While this amendment ... [to an existing statute] cannot affect the litigation in the present controversy, yet it is a legislative interpretation of the act amended . . .” Creager v. Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 4, 283 S.W. 151, 153 (Tex.Comm’n App.1926, opinion adopted). This Court in 1961 wrote, “We believe that it is proper for this Court to use an Amendatory Act to arrive at the intention of the Legislature in a previous Act.” Calvert v. Audio Center, Inc., 346 S.W .2d 420, 423 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
If this rule of construction be followed, we should give effect to the amendment as a legislative means of clarifying and making more specific terms of the Act being amended. Giving effect to what we consider the manifest purpose of the law making body, I contend the amendment merely made explicit what the Legislature had intended to be part of the original Act. Wright v. State, 71 S.W.2d 352 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1934, no writ).
An additional rule of construction, which favors the position of the Retirement System, has been stated in this language: “ . . . where one section of an act prescribes a general rule which, without qualification, would embrace an entire class of subjects, and another section prescribes a different rule for individual subjects of the same class, the latter will be construed as an exception to the general rule.” 53 Tex. Jur.2d Statutes, sec. 143 (1964). The rule has been followed, for example, by this Court in Trinity Universal Insurance Company v. McLaughlin, 373 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1963, rehearing denied, 373 S.W.2d 350, no writ). See also Town of Highland Park v. Marshall, 235 S.W.2d 658, 663 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1950, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
The Supreme Court explained the rule in this language in Lufkin v. City of Galveston, 63 Tex. 437, 439 (1885):
“It is a cardinal rule in the construction of constitutions and statutes that the whole instrument must be taken together — and the whole scheme had in view by the law-making power must be understood and carried out; and where there are apparent conflicts or inconsistencies between different parts of the instrument, that construction must be adopted which will give effect to every part, rather that that which will render any portion nugatory and of no avail.
“As a natural result of this principle, it follows that where in one section a general rule is prescribed, which without qualification would embrace an entire class of subjects, and in another section a different rule is prescribed for individual subjects of the same class, the latter must be construed as exceptions to the general rule, and be governed by the section which is applicable to them alone.”
Under this analysis, Section 3.26 of the Education Code must be read as stating the general rule. Prior to the amendment in 1977, Section 3.26(a) read as follows:
“(a) Any member of the retirement system who has been employed as a teacher or as an auxiliary employee in any public school system maintained in whole or in part by any other state or territory of the United States or by the United States for children of United States citizens may purchase equivalent membership service credits under this retirement system for such service.” (Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 37, ch. 19, § 2, effective March 20, 1975).
Pursuing the same analysis, Section 3.23(c) would be read as the inconsistent *935particular rule which should be construed as an exception to the general rule found in Section 3.26. As it applied in April of 1975, Section 3.23(c) read as follows:
“Any member who perform[s] one or more years of military duty prior to becoming a member of the retirement system shall be permitted to deposit to his individual account in the member savings account for each year of such military duty, but not to exceed five years, an amount equal to his deposits made with the retirement system during the first full year of service as a teacher or auxiliary employee after becoming a member of the retirement system. He shall then be entitled to one year of membership service credit for each year of military duty.” (Emphasis added). (Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 122, ch. 57, § 2, effective April 18, 1975).
The denial of Cottrell’s application was grounded in part upon application of this principle, as evidenced by the following excerpt from the letter by which the director of member benefits explained to Cottrell the reasons for disallowing purchase of credit for three years of teaching at the military academy, in addition to the maximum five years previously allowed for military service:
“Since the essential characteristic of instruction at the service academies is military duty, its crediting under TRS should be governed exclusively by Sec. 3.23 of the Texas Education Code. The legislature has made ample provision for crediting military duty. The provisions of Sec. 3.26 are intended to deal with persons who are essentially career teachers but who have not rendered all their service in the Texas public schools. This does not accurately describe the instructors at the service academies who are members of the Armed Forces.”
It is my conclusion that, for the several reasons already stated, the Teacher Retirement System, acting through its administrative processes in considering the application of Cottrell, correctly exercised the discretion delegated to the System in denying the application, and that the order of the Board of Trustees should be sustained. It appears to me that the result reached by the majority simply permits Cottrell to obtain eight years of credit for his military service instead of the maximum of five years plainly fixed by the Legislature.