Court Opinion

ID: 9786719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:01:35.146816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:47.865414
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
dissenting.
Today's opinion concludes that Cunningham did not have an expectation that upon payment of the note the amount underlying the lien on his property would be considered paid in full and the lien discharged. I disagree. The third and fourth sentences of the promissory note state that
[wlhen the balance has been paid, all obligations from me to Ronnie R. Clanton will have been met, and Ronnie R. Clanton's child support obligations to Janay B. Wolff will also have been met. Any liens, en*485cumbrances, or judgments involving myself or my properties will be dismissed, considered paid in full, and all conditions met.
The court reads the promissory note as giving Cunningham a "reasonable expectation that his performance will reduce, and thus potentially discharge, the CSED lien up to the amount of his payment."1 But this understates the plain meaning of the note. It says that when the balance ($25,000) has been paid then Clanton's child support obligations to Wolff "will ... have been met" and "[a/ny liens ... will be dismissed [and] considered paid in full." (Emphasis added.) The note clearly contemplates that the payment of the $25,000 would fully discharge (and not just reduce or "potentially discharge") the CSED lien.2
In my view, the superior court was correct in considering the promissory note as an agreement regarding child support and therefore "not valid until it receives judicial scrutiny under Rule 90.3."3 In my opinion, what the superior court should have done upon making this observation was review the note and consider whether it should be approved.4 A If the superior court had taken this step as of the time of its initial ruling on May 4, 2005, the record indicates that it would have found that the amount necessary to discharge the lien was a little less than the amount of the note plus interest.5 Thus there would have been no reason not to approve the note as an agreement regarding support. Although we do not know how the account currently stands, it seems at least reasonably possible that even now approval and enforcement of the note would be appropriate and would not retroactively modify child support arrearages.
Based on this rationale, I think the judgment of the superior court should be reversed with directions to the court to consider approving the note as an agreement regarding support.6

. Op. at -.

. The court relies on the fifth sentence of the promissory note which promises "reasonable effort" to facilitate the release of any of the liens as proof that Cunningham could not have expected that the $25,000 would fully discharge the lien. Op. at -; Op. at -. But this sentence seems best read as a promise on behalf of Clan-ton and Wolff to help out in obtaining a lien release, not as a statement that Cunningham must pay the amount of the note even if the payment would not result in the state's lien being released. Under this reading, the third, fourth, and fifth sentences in the note are reconcilable rather than conflicting.

. Nix v. Nix, 855 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Alaska 1993) (discussing Cox v. Cox, 776 P.2d 1045 (Alaska 1989)).

. Instead, the superior court simply concluded that the agreement was not enforceable because it was "never presented to the court for approval." A few days after the court made this ruling Wolff moved for approval of the note as an agreement related to child support. She contended that the note with interest would when paid fully discharge arrearages. The court made no ruling on this motion.

. See Child Support State of Account as of April 30, 2005. Despite the fact that the note is silent on the subject of interest, Cunningham appears to have admitted that the note bears interest. Thus when asked by the superior court about liability for excess accounts due," Cunningham answered: "Defendant admits that the promissory note states 'plus interest," however denies the note is collectable by Janay Wolff in this case."

. Could the court on remand approve the note if doing so would forgive a part of the outstanding arrearages? Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2), which prohibits the retroactive modification of child support arrearages, would seem to bar any such action. On the other hand, one may question whether a slight discount in arrearages should necessarily stand in the way of obtaining substantial satisfaction, given the age of the arrearages-the child reached the age of majority in 1996-and the difficulties encountered in collecting them. It is often. a foolish policy to reject a very good result in pursuit of a perfect one. It may be that the case would be seen as sufficiently compelling that the prohibition on retroactive modification could be relaxed under Civil Rule 94. In any event, this issue is only a hypothetical possibility at this point because payment of the note plus interest might fully satisfy the outstanding ar-rearages.