Court Opinion

ID: 9726855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:10:50.348123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:31.504794
License: Public Domain

*670Liacos, J.
(concurring). The Superior Court judge, who denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss, but reported the question, concluded that the assistant district attorney was empowered to act as he did. The judge, however, looked with disfavor on such conduct. I share his sentiments. If the removal of the cases from the District Court in these circumstances was not perhaps an “act of effrontery” to that court such as was seen in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 353 Mass. 429, 432 (1967), it was an affront at least to the spirit of the Court Reorganization Act (Act). St. 1978, c. 478. One goal of the Act was the disposition of minor criminal cases promptly and efficiently by consolidation of the several courts of trial jurisdiction. See St. 1978, c. 478, § 1; Lydon v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 356, 358-359 & n.4 (1980). Toward this end, jurisdiction of de novo appeals from conviction of crimes tried before a District Court was taken from the Superior Court Department. G. L. c. 212, § 6, as amended through St. 1978, c. 478, § 117. At the same time, the right of de novo trial of offenses tried initially to a judge of a District Court was limited to the jury of six sessions of the District Court Department. G. L. c. 218, § 26A, inserted by St. 1978, c. 478, § 188. G. L. c. 218, § 27A, inserted by St. 1978, c. 478, § 189. G. L. c. 278, § 18, as amended through St. 1978, c. 478, § 302.
This reflects, I think, a legislative intention that trials of offenses wholly within the jurisdiction of the District Court Department should, once begun there, be fully resolved within that department. This intention is especially served, from the standpoint of effective case management if from no other, with regard to proceedings which have progressed to the extent seen in the case at bar. Here, the Commonwealth initially elected to prosecute complaints at the District Court level. A trial date was set and discovery commenced. There is no indication that the pending District Court action was viewed as involving anything other than trial on the merits. G. L. c. 218, § 30. Corey v. Commonwealth, 364 Mass. 137, 141 n.7 (1973). Commonwealth v. Crosby, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 679, 681-682 (1978). There is, *671however, a suggestion, arising out of the timing of events, that the indictment was sought either because the matter was progressing in the District Court at a pace faster than the district attorney wished, or because he was engaging in “forum shopping.” This “suggestion” of course is not strong enough to bring the case within the purview of Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra. Nevertheless, I believe the action of the prosecutor was “hardly conducive to inspire in the public respect for our District Courts or confidence in the administration of justice.” Id. at 432. Cf. Commonwealth v. Silva, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 791 (1980). While the prosecutor may have had the power to act as he did in the circumstances of this case, his actions seem to me to have been neither prudent nor factually justified. Such actions certainly were not consistent with an awareness of crowded Superior Court dockets. His actions appear to me to have caused an unexplained and unnecessary waste of limited judicial resources in both the District and the Superior Court Departments of the Trial Court, as well as of this court.