Court Opinion

ID: 9668044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:01:00.55275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:42.667378
License: Public Domain

ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING AND/OR TRANSFER TO THE SUPREME COURT

PER CURIAM.
Thomas Sanders and Helen Sanders (plaintiffs) filed a motion for rehearing before this court. Hartville Milling Company (Hartville) filed a motion for rehearing and alternative motion to transfer to Supreme Court of Missouri. The motions are denied. An issue in plaintiffs’ motion warrants comment in that the rationale relied on in their argument misconstrues when a judgment is final and, therefore, when post-trial motions are timely.
Plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing is directed to the part of the judgment that was reversed, the award of prejudgment interest. Plaintiffs rely on piecemeal rulings on issues in the case rather than on the disposition of all pending issues that were before the trial court in asserting Hartville’s *216post-trial motion was filed out of time, more than 30 days after entry of judgment. See Rules 72.01(b) and 78.04.1
Plaintiffs filed an 11-count petition against Hartville and “Cargill-Nutrena,” a division of Cargill, Inc. (Cargill). On March 26, 1998, the trial court entered a “Memorandum Opinion and Order” that concluded, “It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant Cargill shall have judgment in its favor and against Plaintiffs on all counts of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition and shall have judgment against Plaintiffs for its taxable costs.”
A Second Amended Petition had been filed by plaintiffs. The trial court concluded that the reference to the First Amended Petition in its March 26, 1998, document was a clerical error. On October 27, 1999, the trial court entered an order “pursuant to Rule 74.06(a) and leave granted by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District,” correcting the clerical error. The October 27, 1999, document states, “It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant Cargill shall have judgment in its favor and against Plaintiffs on all counts of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Petition and shall have judgment against Plaintiffs for its taxable costs.”
Counts I and IV were tried before a jury.2 Copies of docket sheets that are included in the legal file reflect a docket entry dated “8-3-98” that states, “Motion for Directed Verdict At The Close Of All Evidence filed by Defendant. Jury Instructions and Verdict form, signed by 9 Jurors filed.” A docket entry dated “3-11-98” states, “Trial Minutes signed by Judge John Moody filed.”3
A docket entry dated “3-20-98”states, “Judgment signed by Judge John Moody filed, (faxed copy) [sic] Certified copy of said Judgment was mailed to attorneys Gammon, Sweeney and Condry and Lowry on 3-23-98.” A docket entry dated “3-23-98” states, “Judgment signed by Judge John Moody filed, (original signature)” [sic].
Neither the “Trial Minutes” nor the “Judgment” that was filed March 23, 1998, ruled on the issue of prejudgment interest. The “Judgment” filed March 23, 1998, disclosed it was taking “under advisement any award of prejudgment interest.” The trial court did not rule on the prejudgment interest issue until June 30, 1998. A further “Judgment” was filed. It disclosed that the award of prejudgment interest had been “previously taken under advisement.” It states that the trial court “now having ruled that issue in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs are awarded $127,130 in prejudgment interest.” The June 30, 1998, “Judgment” is in favor of plaintiffs and against Hartville “on Counts I and IV ... in the amount of $529,130.00, together with interest thereon after the date of judgment at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum.” Costs were taxed against Hartville. The June 30, 1998, “Judgment” concluded, “SO ORDERED, Nunc Pro Tunc, this 20th day of March, 1998.” It was signed by the trial Judge.
Hartville’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or alternative motion for new trial was filed April 20, 1998. Plaintiffs’ erroneously argue that the “Judgment” to which it was directed was rendered March 11, 1998, the date the trial judge filed the “Trial Minutes” that bore his signature. Because the April 20, *2171998, filing was more than 30 days following March 11, 1998, plaintiffs contend it was not timely filed. Rule 78.04 requires, “A motion for new trial shall be filed not later than thirty days after the entry of the judgment on a jury verdict, except as provided in Rule 74.01(b).” Rule 72.01(b) addresses motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It provides, “Not later than thirty days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict.” It permits a motion for new trial to be joined with the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative to that motion.
Rule 74.01(b), to which Rule 78.04 refers, provides that in the absence of the trial court having entered judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims or parties in an action and having made the determination that there was no just reason for delay in entering judgment, “any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action.” Any such “order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.”
The judgment that adjudicated the last of the pending issues was entered June 30, 1998. Hartville’s motion was filed April 20, 1998. At that time the trial court had pending the issue of prejudgment interest. Hartville’s motion addressed that issue even though at the time the motion was filed, the issue had not been finally decided. In that regard it was, arguably, premature. Nevertheless, it was filed “not later than thirty days after the entry of the judgment on a jury verdict....,” Rule 78.04, and, as provided by Rule 72.01(b), “[n]ot later than thirty days after entry of judgment....” Plaintiffs’ claim that Hartville’s post-trial motion was not timely filed is without merit.
The use of fragmented rulings erroneously denominated as judgments is a practice that trial courts should avoid. The uncertainty that may result in complicated cases is illustrated by the facts in this case.
Where separate trials are not ordered in cases with multiple claims and parties, there should be one final judgment that disposes of all parties and all issues. M.F.A. Central v. Harrill, 405 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Mo.App. 1966). In Watson v. Moore, 983 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.App. 1999), this court suggested:
In formulating a judgment in a multi-court case, it is helpful to identify the specific counts presented by the pleadings and enunciate particular findings with respect to each count. It is likewise helpful if a judgment’s decretal pronouncements identify with particularity the claim adjudicated by each pronouncement. Judgments fashioned in this manner assist in ascertaining whether all claims of all parties have been determined.
Id. at 209. Had the admonitions of M.F.A. Central and Watson been heeded in this case, its determination on appeal would have been less difficult.

. References to rules are to 1998 Missouri Rules of Court.

. The trial court had previously granted Hart-ville’s motion for summary judgment as to the other counts of the petition.

.The March 11, 1998, trial minutes state only that the trial court "accepts verdict and enters judgment for Plaintiff on Court [sic] I and Court [sic] IV for $402,000.00.” It includes no ruling on plaintiffs’ claim for prejudgment interest.