Court Opinion

ID: 9759534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:19:32.739737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.662366
License: Public Domain

BERREY, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The school board did not attempt to accommodate the religious beliefs of Ms. Schumaker. The school board did not overcome its burden by proving it made any effort, let alone a good faith effort, to accommodate those beliefs. Had the school board met with Ms. Schumaker, it is entirely possible an accommodation could have been achieved. Refusing to meet with her and discuss her concerns shut the door on such possibility and was not in the spirit of the law. The school board took no initial steps to obviate Ms. Schumaker’s concerns — a critical failure under the law and one which the majority brushes aside.
This Court’s duty is to uphold the decision of the commission if it was supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the entire record. Hermel Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 564 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Mo. banc 1978).
“Substantial evidence” is evidence which, if true, has probative force upon the issues, i.e., evidence favoring facts which are such that reasonable men may differ as to whether it establishes them; it is evidence from which the trier or triers of the fact reasonably could find the issues in harmony therewith; it is evidence of a character sufficiently substantial to warrant the trier of facts in finding from it the facts, to establish which the evidence was introduced.
Collins v. Division of Welfare, 364 Mo. 1032, 270 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Mo. banc 1954). We must affirm the commission’s decision unless it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or the commission abused its discretion. Hermel, 564 S.W.2d at 894. This Court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the findings of the administrative body, together with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom to support its findings, disregarding all evidence opposing and unfavorable to the commission’s decision. JMH Constr. Management, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 810 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Mo.App.1991). This Court is not to substitute its judgment on the evidence for that of the commission. Id. If the evidence would support either of two opposed findings, this Court is bound by the administrative determination. Hermel, 564 S.W.2d at 894.
To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving that (1) she had a bona fide religious belief; (2) she informed her employer of her belief and it conflicted with her responsibilities as an employee; and (3) she was threatened with or subjected to discriminatory treatment, such as discharge, for her inability to fulfill the disputed job duty. E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1512 (9th Cir.1989). All parties agree that Ms. Schumaker met her burden in establishing a prima facie case, at which time the burden shifted to the employer school district to prove that it made good faith efforts to accommodate those beliefs. The school district must show that it has taken “some initial steps to reach a reasonable accommodation of the particular religious belief at issue.” Id. (quoting American Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster General, 781 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir.1986)). If the school district fails to propose an accommodation, it must accept Ms. Schumaker’s proposal or demonstrate that her proposal would cause the district undue hardship. Id.
Ms. Schumaker proposed that she be placed in an elementary school and that she be allowed to talk with the parents of the student to which she was assigned to determine if they objected to a less literal translation of objectionable words. The school district representatives testified that Ms. Schumaker’s talents would have been under utilized had they placed her at the elementary level, as she requested. It *934seems apparent, however, that under utilization is preferable to completely losing her talents as an interpreter. Additionally, because each interpreter is, for the most part, assigned to only one student for the entire year and interpreters are not generally required to interpret during recess or in the hallways, where objectionable language is most likely to occur, Ms. Schu-maker’s proposals are at least plausible enough to be considered by the board. That is not, however, the extent of the district’s responsibility. It must attempt to reach an accommodation with Ms. Schu-maker.
In the case at bar, there is no evidence whatsoever that the school district took any steps to attempt to reach an accommodation of Ms. Schumaker’s religious beliefs nor is there any evidence that any possible accommodation was ever discussed by the school board or any persons responsible for making such assessment. Ms. Schumaker was informed from her initial objection to the guidelines that if she was unable to abide by them, she would have to resign or she would not be recommended for continued employment.
When confronted with the standard of review that this court is bound by, I cannot concur with Judge Lowenstein’s opinion. We must affirm the decision of the commission if there is substantial evidence to support it. The evidence adduced at the hearing is more than adequate to support the findings of the commission and, therefore, I would reverse the decision of the circuit court and affirm that of the commission.