Court Opinion

ID: 9762485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:25:27.17353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:34.975627
License: Public Domain

OPINION

NIX, Chief Justice.
Appellant, Harry Eugene Halsted, was convicted by a jury of two counts each of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse1 and indecent assault2 and sentenced to five to ten years’ imprisonment. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, and Appellant appealed to this Court. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
On April 6, 1987, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Steven Danko went to the home of eleven-year-old B.M. to answer a *320complaint of possible child abuse. Trooper Danko interviewed B.M. in the presence of his father. The -child told the trooper that while visiting Appellant’s home with eight-year-old G.W., Appellant’s grandson, Appellant performed oral sex on him in the presence of G.W. Trooper Danko then interviewed G.W., who stated that Appellant did perform oral sex upon -B.M. and that his grandfather had told him to stand guard so they would not be discovered. G.W. also told the trooper that Appellant had performed oral sex on him once when he was five years old and once when he was four years old. Trooper Danko contemporaneously recorded the boys’ statements verbatim at the time of the interviews. Danko prepared a typewritten police report verbatim from his interview notes with G.W. either that night or the following day.
Several days later, Trooper Danko and another officer interviewed Appellant. After being advised of his constitutional right to remain silent, Appellant admitted to having performed acts of fellatio on B.M. and G.W. and provided the officers with a signed statement. Appellant was charged with two counts each of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and indecent assault.
At trial, B.M. testified that Appellant had performed oral sex on him.3 G.W. also testified at trial; however, he claimed that he had not seen Appellant engage in oral sex with B.M., that he had not acted as a look out for such an act, that he had not been sexually abused by Appellant, and that he could not recall telling Trooper Danko that such abuse had occurred. The Commonwealth unsuccessfully attempted to refresh G.W.’s recollection by confronting him with the statement he had made to Trooper Danko.
In response to G.W.’s testimony, the Commonwealth called Trooper Danko as a witness to testify as to what G.W. had told him during their interview. Following an in camera hearing, Trooper Danko was permitted to read into the record the text of G.W.’s statement from his typewritten police report *321as substantive evidence of the offense. Appellant’s written admission was then admitted into evidence.
The court of common pleas cited this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992), in holding that Trooper Danko’s typewritten report of the interview he had with G.W. was admissible as substantive evidence of the crimes charged. Commonwealth v. Halsted, Nos. 1987-279 and 280, slip op. at 4 (C.P. Crawford County Jan. 11, 1994). According to the trial court, “the statement was a contemporaneous verbatim recording of the witness’ statement and therefore pursuant to Lively was admissible as substantive evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). The Superior Court affirmed, holding that Trooper Danko’s report was admissible under Lively. Commonwealth v. Halsted, 438 Pa.Super. 694, 652 A.2d 407 (1994).
We granted allocatur to address the issue of whether Trooper Danko’s typewritten report was a contemporaneous, verbatim recording of G.W.’s prior inconsistent statement, and therefore admissible as substantive evidence of the crime charged against Appellant. We now reverse.
Appellant argues that Trooper Danko’s report was not a contemporaneous, verbatim recording of G.W.’s statement and that the trial court erred in admitting it as substantive evidence. According to Appellant, in order for a prior inconsistent statement to be admissible under Lively, that statement must reach a certain level of reliability and trustworthiness which the statement in question fails to meet. In support of his position, Appellant notes that Trooper Danko’s handwritten notes which were made during his interview with G.W. were never produced at trial and that there was uncertainty as to whether the notes still existed at the time of the trial. Additionally, Appellant claims that it is the material recording of a statement which furnishes the requisite reliability and trustworthiness. It is Appellant’s assertion that allowing this statement absent the actual recording impermissibly extends this Court’s holding in Lively.
*322It is the Commonwealth’s position that the statement taken by Trooper Danko from G.W. was admissible as substantive evidence as it was a contemporaneous, verbatim recording of the child’s statement. According to the Commonwealth, Trooper Danko’s testimony was properly admitted.
In Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986), this Court reconsidered the long-standing rule that a prior inconsistent statement made by a non-party witness could not be admitted substantively. In overturning that rule of law, we held that such a statement could be used as substantive evidence provided the declarant is a witness at trial and is available for cross-examination. Id. at 125, 507 A.2d at 67. In allowing a tape recorded statement which was inconsistent with a witness’ trial testimony to be admitted as substantive evidence, we noted that the declarations made in the recording were made under highly reliable circumstances.4 Id. at 133, 507 A.2d at 71. Later, in Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992), this Court was called upon to consider our decision in Brady and determine under what circumstances a prior inconsistent statement may be admitted as substantive evidence.
In Lively, the appellant was charged with first degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime. At trial, three Commonwealth witnesses refused to implicate the appellant in the murder and were then confronted with prior inconsistent statements they had made. We held that such statements “may be used as substantive evidence only when the statement is given under oath at a formal legal proceeding; or [when] the statement ha[s] been reduced to a writing signed and adopted by the witness; or [when] a statement ... is a contemporaneous verbatim recording of the witness’s statements.” 530 Pa. 464, 471, 610 A.2d 7, 10 (1992). This was the standard to be used in determining whether the witnesses’ statements were made under highly reliable circum*323stances such that they could be admitted as substantive evidence. Id. Two of the statements did not meet any of the criteria established and were therefore inadmissible as substantive evidence. Id. at 471-72, 610 A.2d at 10-11. One of these statements was a memorandum prepared by the interviewing detective. We held that although the witness’ statements were reduced to a writing, it had not been signed or adopted by him. “Furthermore, the memorandum was not a contemporaneous verbatim recording of [the witness’] statements because the memorandum was not prepared until after the interview.” Id. at 472, 610 A.2d at 11 (emphasis added).
In the instant matter the Superior Court held “that the verbatim statements of [G.W.] met the guidelines for admissibility under the Lively case.” Commonwealth v. Halsted 438 Pa.Super. 694, 652 A.2d 407 (1994). We cannot agree. It is clear that the police report read into evidence by Trooper Danko was not made contemporaneously with his interview with G.W. Trooper Danko testified that he recorded G.W.’s statements verbatim on a small pad during the interview and that he later made a typewritten police report of these exact statements. The note pad, which was the contemporaneous verbatim recording, was not produced at trial, and Trooper Danko was uncertain as to whether it still existed at the time of trial. Therefore, Trooper Danko’s report can not be said to have been made contemporaneously with G.W.’s statement as it was made after the interview.
The statement introduced to form the corpus delicti in the instant matter is not distinguishable from the memorandum which this Court held inadmissible in Lively. As Trooper Danko’s report was not recorded contemporaneously with the making of G.W.’s statements, it was error to admit it as substantive evidence.
The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion would uphold Appellant’s conviction on the basis that Trooper Danko’s statement was admissible as substantive evidence under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1 (“Tender Years Hearsay Act” or “Act”).5 However, *324that opinion’s analysis under the Act is flawed and does not provide a basis for admission of Trooper Danko’s statement.
The analysis of the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion begins with the conclusion that, “[w]ith respect to subsection (a)(1), the trial court properly found that this prong had been met.” Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, op. at 330. However, this conclusion cannot be maintained because the trial court never considered the applicability of the Tender Years Hearsay Act. The sole basis for admitting the statement in the trial court was its erroneous reading of this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992). Thus, the trial court could not have found that the first prong of the Act had been met. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion has taken a fact and retroactively fit it within the guidelines of the Act.
Also in support of its position, the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion points to the fact that an in camera hearing was held to determine whether G.W.’s statement to Trooper Danko would be admissible. This in camera hearing is described by the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion as that which is required by the Tender Years Hearsay Act. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, op. at 330. Again, because the trial court was not considering the admission of the statement under the Act, it cannot be said to have had a hearing required by the Act. Moreover, there is no evidence that the proper factors were considered in that hearing.
In Commonwealth v. Hanawalt, 419 Pa.Super. 411, 615 A.2d 432 (1992), the Superior Court was confronted with the issue of whether the Tender Years Hearsay Act violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United *325States Constitution. In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Superior Court relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). The Superior Court noted that in considering the admissibility of the hearsay statements of a child witness in sexual abuse matters, the United States Supreme Court
identified a non-inclusive list of factors to consider when making such a determination. Such factors include, but are not limited to: 1) the spontaneity and consistent repetition of the statement(s); 2) the mental state of the declarant; 3) the use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age; and, 4) the lack of motive to fabricate.
Commonwealth v. Hanawalt, 419 Pa.Super. at 422, 615 A.2d at 438. We agree with the Superior Court’s holding in Hanawalt that the factors enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, as well as any other relevant factors, should be considered in determining whether the statement of a child is admissible under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1. The court of common pleas and the Superior Court considered the admissibility of G.W.’s statement only under the test established by this Court in Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992). Because none of the factors set forth in Hanawalt were considered in assessing G.W.’s statement, the courts below cannot be said to have properly admitted that statement under the Tender Years Hearsay Act.
The Act also requires that the proponent of the statement give notice to the adverse party of the proponent’s intention to offer the statement into evidence. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1(b). According to the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion this requirement was satisfied because Appellant had notice that the statement existed, had a copy of the statement, knew that G.W. was twelve years old or younger, and filed an in limine motion to preclude admission of the statement. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, slip op. at 332. Additionally, the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion would hold that Appellant was on notice that G.W.’s statement could be admitted under the Act because defense counsel is charged with *326knowing the law of the Commonwealth. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, slip op. at 332 n. 2. However, the fact that the adverse party may know of the existence of evidence the Commonwealth could possibly intend to introduce, does not remove the Commonwealth’s burden of actually notifying that party that an attempt to introduce the evidence will be made. Furthermore, although it is true that persons licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania are charged with knowing the law of the Commonwealth, they are not to be penalized when the opposing party fails to abide by the requirements of those same laws.
Because there was no basis for the admission of G.W.’s statement through Trooper Danko, the Order of the Superior Court is reversed and the matter is remanded to the court of common pleas for a new trial.
ZAPPALA, J., files a concurring opinion in which
FLAHERTY, CAPPY and CASTILLE, JJ., join.
CASTILLE, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion.
MONTEMURO, J., is sitting by designation.

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123.

. 18Pa.C.S. § 3126.

. Appellant's conviction for the acts committed against B.M. are not presently before us, as Appellant does not allege that this conviction was improper.

. Those circumstances were that the witness' attorney was present along with her mother and that the attorney questioned both the witness and her mother to assure that the statement was being given knowingly, voluntarily and with understanding of her rights and options. Id. at 131-32, 507 A.2d at 70.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1(a)(1) provides:
*324(a) General rule. — An out-of-court statement made by a child victim or witness, who at the time the statement was made was 12 years of age or younger, describing indecent contact, sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding if:
. (1) The court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.