Court Opinion

ID: 9516469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:43:09.987676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:18.655741
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in rejecting the request of defense counsel to remove juror K.G. for cause.
To prevail on an appeal based on juror bias, the defendant must show that the challenged juror was subject to challenge for cause. State v. Stufflebean, 329 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Minn.1983). As the majority notes, a juror may be challenged for cause, inter alia, on the ground that there exists “a state of mind on the part of the juror, in reference to the case or to either party, which satisfies the court that the juror cannot try the case impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging.” Minn.R.Crim.P. 26.02, subd. 5(1).
This court has held that “[t]he test for the impartial juror is * * * [whether] he ‘can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.’” State v. Andrews, 282 Minn. 386, 394, 165 N.W.2d 528, 534 (1969) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-43, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)). Because the trial judge is in the best position to observe and to evaluate the demeanor of the prospective juror, the judge should be given broad discretion in determining whether to remove a prospective juror for cause. See State v. Graham, 371 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Minn.1985). This court will not lightly conclude the trial court abused its discretion if the juror indicates his or her “intention to set aside any preconceived notions, and demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of the trial judge that [he or she is] able to do so.” State v. Howard, 324 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1172, 103 S.Ct. 818, 74 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1983).
During voir dire, juror K.G. was first interviewed by the trial judge. The judge asked K.G. to expand on his response to question 34 of the jury questionnaire, which indicated that he might favor police testimony over the testimony of other witnesses. K.G. first agreed with the judge that police officers do make mistakes. He also indicated that he would not blindly accept the testimony of police officers. The judge then asked K.G. whether, in determining the credibility of and *326the weight to be given to the testimony of police officers, K.G. would apply the same standard that he would be instructed to apply to other witnesses. K.G. responded that he “probably would.” Finally, when the judge asked K.G. if in fulfilling his duty as a juror he could put aside any biases or prejudice that he might harbor, K.G. replied “I certainly could try, yes.”
Defense counsel next questioned juror K.G., and the majority opinion details this line of questioning at length. Defense counsel’s final question, which was a leading question that came at the end of a series of leading questions, was as follows: “Would it be fair to say it would be virtually impossible for you to conclude as a juror that a police officer had testified falsely in this ease?” K.G. responded, “Yes, I think.” Defense counsel then asked the trial judge to remove K.G. for cause.
Before ruling on defense counsel’s challenge, the trial judge granted the prosecutor an opportunity to rehabilitate K.G. When the prosecutor asked K.G. whether police officers do in fact lie, K.G. responded, “I don’t think I would have any doubt that somebody would lie, no matter who they are.” Next, when asked whether he would determine the credibility of police officers in the same way that he would determine the credibility of other witnesses, K.G. responded “Yes. I certainly would, yes.” K.G. also indicated that he would have no difficulty in following the trial judge’s instructions and that he would initially treat all witnesses the same and would presume nothing about their credibility before they testified. In response to an inquiry by the prosecutor, K.G. agreed that he is “basically trusting of people” and that until he had reason to believe otherwise, he would assume that any person coming into court would be telling the truth.
Defense counsel was then given another opportunity to question K.G. Defense counsel asked K.G. to clarify whether he would favor the testimony of police officers over that of other witnesses. K.G. responded by stating that he would not accept the testimony of police officers “as the number one priority”; he simply “respect[s] their work and what they do.” K.G. then indicated rather vaguely that he “would favor in some way, shape or form what [the police] do because that’s how I feel.” But, it is critical to the analysis of this case to recognize that K.G. continued his answer by stating that “[a]l-though, when asked — I would certainly be objective, you know, as best I could * * * [g]iven the instructions given to me I guess from the Judge.”
Other courts have held that a juror who harbors a bias or prejudice may nonetheless sit as an impartial juror if he or she expresses a willingness to try to be objective. For example, in United States v. Jones, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 865 F.2d 188, 189 (8th Cir.1989). During voir dire, the trial court refused to strike a juror for cause who had expressed strong antidrug feelings. The defendant was convicted, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in refusing to strike the juror for cause because, although the juror was not sure if her strong antidrug feelings would influence the way in which she viewed the evidence, she indicated that she would do her best to base her decision on the evidence. Id. at 190.
Under the facts of the present case, I cannot conclude that the trial court abused its broad discretion by refusing to remove juror K.G. for cause. At worst, some of K.G.’s answers to voir dire questions were vague. A close review of the record, however, reveals that, on the whole, K.G. indicated he would do his best to set aside his impressions and opinions. Although K.G. acknowledged that he in some way favors what the police do, he also clearly indicated during questioning by the trial judge, the prosecutor and defense counsel that he would be objective and would, to the best of his ability, follow the court’s instructions. See Andrews, 282 Minn. at 394, 165 N.W.2d at 534. The trial judge was in the best position to view the demeanor of K.G. and to determine whether K.G. would set aside his impressions and opinions and follow the court’s instructions.
Furthermore, I consider the majority’s reliance on United States v. Amerson, 938 F.2d *327116 (8th Cir.1991), to be misplaced. In Am-erson, while police officers attempted to stop an automobile, three guns were allegedly-thrown from the moving vehicle. Id. at 117. Officers arrested the driver and two passengers, charging each of them with possession of a firearm by a felon. Id. Before the three defendants’ joint trial, during voir dire, five prospective jurors clearly stated that they would favor police testimony over the testimony of other witnesses. Id. at 117-18. The trial court removed only one of the prospective jurors for cause on other grounds. Id. at 118. At trial, defense witnesses directly contradicted police testimony by testifying that they did not see any guns thrown from the vehicle. The jury convicted all three defendants. Id. at 117. On appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the defendants argued that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to strike the four jurors for cause. The court of appeals agreed, reversed the defendants’ convictions and ordered a new trial. Id. at 118.
In Amerson, the court of appeals first noted that the government had acknowledged that its case against the defendants turned entirely on police testimony, “pitting police testimony against that of the defense witnesses.” 938 F.2d at 117. The court then stated that “[f]aced with a clear showing of actual partiality for police testimony on the part of the challenged jurors, the district court abused its discretion by refusing to excuse the jurors for cause.” Id. at 118 (emphasis added). The court continued by stating that when the government’s case depends on the credibility of police officers, the trial court must ensure that jurors are not “predisposed to believe that testimony of police officers is inherently more credible than that of other witnesses.” Id. Most importantly, the court stated that “[wjhen jurors express this kind of bias, the district court must either ‘excuse [the jurors] for cause, or by instructions and additional questions convince the [jurors] that there is no special credence due the testimony of [police officers].’ ” Id. (quotation alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800, 806 (4th Cir.1990)). The court reversed the defendants’ convictions because the trial judge failed to give the jury any instructions and failed to use any additional questions to “convince” the jurors that they should not automatically give the testimony of police officers greater credence than that of other witnesses. Id.
The facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from those in Amerson. First, although K.G. acknowledged that he “would favor in some way, shape or form what [the police] do,” unlike the jurors in Amerson, K.G.’s responses did not clearly show that he would favor police testimony over the testimony of other witnesses. Indeed, K.G. stated that he would be objective and that he would do his best to follow the court’s instructions. Second, the testimony of police officers was not the state’s principal evidence against the defendant, and their testimony was in large part cumulative. The state presented several witnesses who were not involved in law enforcement and whose testimony indicated that the defendant freely participated in the robbery and in the murders. Third, during voir dire, the trial judge instructed K.G. that he should use the same standards to determine the credibility of police officers as that of other witnesses, and K.G. indicated that he would be willing to do so. Moreover, at the beginning of and at the close of trial, the judge gave the jury detailed instructions with respect to how they were to assess the credibility of witnesses who testified before the court. These facts clearly distinguish the present case from Amerson.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.