Court Opinion

ID: 9353788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 20:00:25.442406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:11:51.332112
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13789     Document: 35-1     Date Filed: 01/12/2023   Page: 1 of 37

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
               United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 21-13789
                           ____________________

        ROYAL PALM VILLAGE RESIDENTS, INC.,
        on behalf of the homeowner-members in its representative capac-
        ity
        and on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
        GENE ASBURY,
        on behalf of themselves, the class of current and former mobile
        homeowners in the Park and all others similarly situated,
        JAMES LEMONNIER,
        on behalf of themselves, the class of current and former mobile
        homeowners in the Park and all others similarly situated,
        BONNIE LOHMEYER, on behalf of themselves, the class of cur-
        rent
        and former mobile homeowners in the Park and all others similarly
        situated,
        FRED OSIER,
USCA11 Case: 21-13789     Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023    Page: 2 of 37

        2                      Opinion of the Court                21-13789

        on behalf of themselves, the class of current and former mobile
        homeowners in the Park and all others similarly situated, et al.,
                                                       Plaintiffs-Appellees,
        versus
        MONICA SLIDER,
        SHERI WOODWORTH,
        BELINDA LAWSON,
        SUN COMMUNITIES, INC.,
        ROYAL PALM VILLAGE, LLC, et al.,

                                                    Defendants-Appellants,

        SUN COMMUNITIES OPERATING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
        et al.,

                                                               Defendants.

                            ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-00874-CEH-SPF
                            ____________________

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1     Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 3 of 37

        21-13789               Opinion of the Court                        3

        JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
               Florida law awards attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party”
        in “proceeding[s] to enforce the provisions” of the Florida Mobile
        Home Act. See Fla. Stat. § 723.068. As relevant here, the district
        court ruled that § 723.068 did not provide for an award of fees as to
        voluntarily-dismissed amended complaints that—though alleging
        violations of the FMHA—did not include claims for violations of
        the FMHA, request relief under the FMHA, or seek to enforce com-
        pliance with the FMHA. Following oral argument and a review of
        the record, we agree with the district court and affirm.
                                          I
                Residents of the Royal Palm Village Mobile Home Park in
        Haines City, Florida, sued the Park’s owners in federal court. Gen-
        erally speaking, the residents alleged that the owners had engaged
        in fraud by, among other things, illegally passing on costs to the
        residents, embellishing lot descriptions to justify increased rents,
        and falsely promising to upgrade roads and other common areas.
               The residents filed a succession of complaints. The initial
        complaint comprised a combination of common-law, state, and
        federal statutory claims: four under the federal RICO statute, 18
        U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; one under the Americans With Disabilities
        Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; one under the Florida Unfair and
        Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201 et seq.; one un-
        der the Florida Mobile Homes Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 723.001 et seq.; and
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023      Page: 4 of 37

        4                       Opinion of the Court                 21-13789

        one for unjust enrichment. Acting sua sponte, the district court
        dismissed the residents’ initial complaint as a shotgun pleading.
                The residents filed an amended complaint alleging viola-
        tions of a slightly different collection of state and federal statutes:
        four counts under both the federal and Florida RICO statutes—as
        well as one under the ADA. The owners moved to dismiss. The
        district court dismissed the amended complaint for essentially the
        same reasons that it had dismissed the initial complaint.
                In response, the residents filed a more streamlined second
        amended complaint, which alleged only five federal statutory vio-
        lations—four federal RICO claims and one federal ADA claim. As
        in the previous complaints, the predicate acts underlying the resi-
        dents’ RICO claims were mail and wire fraud, and the theory un-
        derlying those violations was that the owners had used mail and
        wire communications to perpetrate violations of the FMHA. The
        alleged FMHA violations thus provided the factual bases for the
        residents’ RICO claims, but the second amended complaint (like its
        immediate predecessor) didn’t request relief under the FMHA it-
        self. Nor did it seek to enforce any provisions of the FMHA. In-
        stead, the second amended complaint requested treble damages for
        the alleged RICO violations and declaratory and injunctive relief
        for the alleged ADA violations.
                The owners again moved to dismiss. Although the residents
        initially opposed the owners’ motion, they eventually reversed
        course and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
        Because the owners hadn’t yet answered, the residents’ voluntary
USCA11 Case: 21-13789       Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023      Page: 5 of 37

        21-13789                Opinion of the Court                          5

        dismissal was self-executing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i); 9
        Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2363
        (4th ed. & Apr. 2022 update).
                Claiming victory, the owners sought attorneys’ fees under
        § 723.068, which entitles the “prevailing party” to such fees in “pro-
        ceeding[s] to enforce provisions” of the FMHA. The district court
        agreed in part. It permitted the owners to recover the fees that
        they had incurred prior to the dismissal of the initial complaint. Be-
        cause only the initial complaint asserted an FMHA claim, the dis-
        trict court explained, only that complaint aimed “to enforce” the
        provisions of the FMHA. And the owners were the “prevailing
        part[ies]” as to that FMHA claim, the district court held, because “a
        defendant can be considered a prevailing party on an abandoned
        claim.”
               The owners now appeal the district court’s rejection of their
        fee requests pertaining to the first and second amended complaints.
        Those complaints, the owners argue, were also “to enforce” the
        FMHA because the residents predicated the RICO claims in those
        complaints on violations of the FMHA. And, the owners say, they
        became the “prevailing part[ies]” with respect to those claims when
        the residents voluntarily dismissed them.
                                           II
               A district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees pursuant to a fee-
        shifting statute is usually reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
        Smalbein ex rel. Estate of Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach, 353
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1     Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 6 of 37

        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-13789

        F.3d 901, 904 (11th Cir. 2003). But here entitlement to fees depends
        on the interpretation of § 723.068 of the FMHA. Our review is
        therefore plenary. See, e.g., Jones v. United Space All., L.L.C., 494
        F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2007).
                                         A
                We affirm the denial of attorneys’ fees to the owners on the
        residents’ amended complaints for the reason articulated by the dis-
        trict court. As we explain, the amended complaints were not “pro-
        ceeding[s] to enforce provisions” of the FMHA under § 723.068.
               The common-law rule in Florida, as elsewhere, is that “each
        party pay[s] its own [attorneys’] fees.” Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v.
        Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003). As a fee-shifting
        statute in derogation of the common law, § 723.068 is “strictly con-
        strued.” Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 223, 226 (Fla. 2007).
               What does it mean to “strictly construe” a statute in Florida?
        One explanation is that statutes in derogation of the common law
        “will not be interpreted to displace the common law further than
        is clearly necessary.” Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish
        Comm’n, 354 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1977). So any doubts about
        § 723.068 cut against an award of fees.
               Fees are awarded to a prevailing party under § 723.068 in
        “proceeding[s] to enforce provisions” of the FMHA. Where the
        statute applies, fees are mandatory. See, e.g., Mihevic Mgmt., Inc.
        v. Gardens Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 964 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. 2d
USCA11 Case: 21-13789       Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023      Page: 7 of 37

        21-13789                Opinion of the Court                          7

        DCA 2007); Vidibor v. Adams, 509 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla. 5th DCA
        1987).
                   The key statutory phrase in § 723.068 is “to enforce.” As di-
        rected by the Florida Supreme Court, see Advisory Opinion to
        Governor re Implementation of Amendment 4, 288 So. 3d 1070,
        1078 (Fla. 2020), we look to dictionaries at the time of enactment
        to determine the phrase’s meaning. When § 723.068 became law
        in 1984, the word “enforce” meant “[t]o compel observance of or
        obedience to: enforce a regulation” or “[t]o compel.” The Ameri-
        can Heritage Dictionary Second College Edition 454 (1985). See
        also Black’s Law Dictionary 474 (5th ed. 1979) (“To put into execu-
        tion; to cause to make effective, as to enforce a particular law
        . . . .”).
               Here the alleged FMHA violations set out in the residents’
        amended complaints were not independent legal claims, but rather
        components of other claims (e.g., the RICO claims). The amended
        complaints did not seek any relief under the FMHA. Nor did they
        request compliance with the FMHA. Those complaints, therefore,
        were not “proceeding[s] to enforce provisions” of the FMHA. See
        Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 315 (2d ed.
        1995) (explaining, in the context of a contractual dispute, that the
        term “enforcing” is “not apt unless one is seeking specific perfor-
        mance”). Cf. Nelson’s Inc. v. Halifax Const. Co., 305 So. 2d 840,
        841 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (reversing award of attorney’s fees under
        Fla. Stat. § 713.29, which provides fees to failing parties in actions
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1     Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 8 of 37

        8                      Opinion of the Court                21-13789

        “to enforce a lien,” because the plaintiff only sued for breach of
        contract and did not seek to enforce or impress a lien).
                The Fifth District’s decision in T & W Dev., Inc. v. Salm-
        onsen, 31 So. 3d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)—which the district court
        relied on—supports this conclusion. In that case, a developer of a
        mobile home subdivision brought an action against a homeown-
        ers’ association and individual residents for injunctive and declara-
        tory relief arising out of the association’s amendment of the deed
        of restrictions. The defendants prevailed on the developer’s claim
        with respect to the amendment of the deed, and the trial court
        awarded them fees under § 723.068. On the developer’s appeal, the
        defendants argued that the award of fees was appropriate because
        the developer had asserted that the amendment of the deed vio-
        lated a provision of the FMHA. But the Fifth District rejected the
        notion that “simply invoking” the FMHA is “sufficient to confer
        entitlement to . . . fees,” and explained that it had to “look at the
        true nature of the relief requested and argued” by the developer.
        See id. at 301. Although the developer had claimed that the amend-
        ment of the deed was invalid on a number of grounds, including
        non-compliance with the FMHA, “the ultimate relief requested
        was invalidation of the amendment,” and such relief “d[id] not raise
        violations of, or otherwise implicate [the FMHA].” Id. at 301-302.
        Consequently, the developer’s claim challenging the amendment
        of the deed “did not seek to enforce any provision of [the FMHA]
USCA11 Case: 21-13789        Document: 35-1       Date Filed: 01/12/2023       Page: 9 of 37

        21-13789                 Opinion of the Court                             9

        and [the defendants] were not entitled to attorney’s fees.” Id. at
        302. 1
               As in T & W Developers, the alleged violations of the
        FMHA—cited by the residents in support of their other legal
        claims—did not make the amended complaints “proceeding[s] to
        enforce provisions” of the FMHA. The district court correctly de-
        nied fees to the owners as to those complaints under § 723.068.
                                             B
                In his well-written concurrence, Judge Newsom opts to de-
        cide the case on the ground that under Florida law a plaintiff’s vol-
        untary dismissal without prejudice does not make the defendant a
        prevailing party. Although he may be right on this point—we ex-
        press no view on the matter—it seems to us that the better path is
        to affirm on the ground the district court provided: that the resi-
        dents’ amended complaints did not seek “to enforce” provisions of
        the FMHA.
               First, we are a federal court sitting in diversity. Presented
        with two possible ways of resolving this case, “we rely upon the
        narrow ground in order to decide as little Florida law as is necessary
        to the result.” Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 398 (5th Cir. 1955).

        1 See generally 36 Fla. Jur. 2d, Mobile Homes and Recreational Vehicles § 74
        (Nov. 2022 Update) (using T & W Developers as an illustration of how
        § 723.068 operates).
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 10 of 37

        10                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13789

               Our decision today is based on, and limited to, the FMHA’s
        “to enforce” language in § 723.068. In contrast, a holding that a
        voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not lead to prevailing
        party status theoretically applies to many fee-shifting statutes and
        contracts in Florida. Cf. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
        715, 726 (1966) (“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided
        both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the par-
        ties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable
        law.”).
               Second, our holding is consistent with the text of § 723.068
        and with the one Florida appellate decision to have addressed the
        FMHA’s “to enforce” language. See T & W Dev., 31 So. 3d at 301-
        02. “[A]bsent a decision by the highest state court or persuasive in-
        dication that it would decide the issue differently,” we follow the
        “decisions of intermediate appellate courts in applying state law.”
        Galindo v. ARI Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 771, 775 (11th Cir. 2000).
        This rule applies even where, as here, there is only one intermedi-
        ate appellate decision. See, e.g., West v. Am. Telephone & Tele-
        graph Co., 311 U.S. 223, 231, 234-38 (1940); Six Cos. of California v.
        Joint Hwy. Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1940); Maseda v. Honda
        Motor Co., Ltd., 861 F.2d 1248 n. 14 (11th Cir. 1988).
              Third, Judge Newsom’s resolution seems to cut against the
        holdings of all five Florida intermediate appellate courts. As best
        we can tell, all five have held (at one point or another) that a de-
        fendant is a prevailing party for purposes of a fee-shifting statute or
        contract in Florida when the plaintiff voluntary dismisses his claim
USCA11 Case: 21-13789        Document: 35-1         Date Filed: 01/12/2023        Page: 11 of 37

        21-13789                   Opinion of the Court                              11

        without prejudice. See, e.g., State ex rel. Marsh v. Doran, 958 F.2d
        1082, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Ajax Paving Ind., Inc. v. Hardaway
        Co., 824 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Yampol v. Schindler
        Elevator Corp., 186 So. 3d 616, 616 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016); Alhambra
        Homeowners Ass., Inc., 943 So. 2d 316, 318-19 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006);
        Black Diamond Properties, Inc. v. Haines, 36 So. 3d 819, 820-21
        (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). 2
                There are admittedly some inconsistent/contrary decisions,
        such as Torruella v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 308 So. 3d 674, 676-
        77 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (holding that a “dismissal for lack of per-
        sonal jurisdiction does not confer ‘prevailing party’ status on the
        party over whom the trial court lacks jurisdiction because the trial
        court does not rule on any issue central to the merits of the dispute,
        and the legal relationship between the parties had not been mate-
        rially changed”). Be that as it may, a holding that a voluntary dis-
        missal without prejudice does not lead to prevailing party status is
        a broad pronouncement which conflicts with a number of Florida
        cases. In our view, it is better to avoid creating such dissonance
        between federal and state courts on an important issue of Florida
        law.

        2 Florida recently created a sixth intermediate appellate court, but it only be-
        came effective on January 1, 2023, and has not issued any opinions so far. See
        Fla. Stat. § 35.044.
USCA11 Case: 21-13789    Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023   Page: 12 of 37

        12                    Opinion of the Court               21-13789

                                       III
              The district court’s order denying fees to the owners is af-
        firmed.
              AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 13 of 37

        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
               I agree with the Court that the owners of Royal Palm Village
        Mobile Home Park are not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees
        in connection with their defense of a lawsuit brought by the park’s
        residents. Because I would reach that result by a different route,
        however, I must concur only in the Court’s judgment. I write sep-
        arately to describe my misgivings about the rationale underlying
        the majority opinion and to explain my own reasoning.
               All here agree that this case turns on the meaning of Fla. Stat.
        § 723.068. In pertinent part, that statute says that “in any proceed-
        ing between private parties to enforce the provisions of [the Florida
        Mobile Homes Act], the prevailing party is entitled to a reasonable
        attorney’s fee.” As relevant here, § 723.068 embodies two neces-
        sary conditions to a fee award. First, the “proceeding” with respect
        to which fees are sought must have been one “to enforce the pro-
        visions” of the FMHA. And second, the fee-seeker must have been
        the “prevailing party” in that proceeding.
               The majority affirms the district court’s denial of the own-
        ers’ fee request based on their failure to satisfy the first of
        § 723.068’s two conditions. Specifically, the majority holds that the
        residents’ suit was not a “proceeding . . . to enforce” the FMHA.
        That may well be right—although not, in my view, for the reasons
        the majority seems to think. In particular, I’ll confess some doubt
        (which I’ll try to explain) about the majority’s reading of the lone
        state-court decision on which it predicates its understanding of
        FMHA “enforce[ment].” In any event, if it were up to me, I’d
USCA11 Case: 21-13789     Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 14 of 37

        2                     NEWSOM, J., Concurring.               21-13789

        decide the case on what I think is a firmer ground—namely, that
        even if the residents’ underlying suit were a “proceeding . . . to en-
        force” the FMHA, the owners didn’t become “prevailing part[ies]”
        when the residents voluntarily dismissed their action without prej-
        udice.
                                          I
                First, let me briefly explain my skepticism of the majority’s
        rationale for concluding—though not necessarily of its ultimate
        conclusion—that the residents’ suit wasn’t a “proceeding . . . to en-
        force” the FMHA. Although the majority acknowledges that the
        residents’ amended complaints alleged FMHA violations as “com-
        ponents” of its RICO claims, it concludes that because those com-
        plaints didn’t “seek any relief under the FMHA” or “request com-
        pliance with the FMHA,” they didn’t initiate suits to enforce the
        FMHA. Maj. Op. at 7–8. The majority asserts that “[t]he Fifth Dis-
        trict’s decision in T&W Dev., Inc. v. Salmonsen, 31 So. 3d 298 (Fla.
        5th DCA 2010) . . . supports [its] conclusion.” Maj. Op. at 8. I’m
        not so sure.
               I agree with much of what the majority says about T&W. I
        agree, for instance, that “[i]n that case, a developer of a mobile
        home subdivision”—called Hollywood Estates—“brought an ac-
        tion against a homeowners’ association and individual residents for
        injunctive and declaratory relief arising out of the association’s
        amendment of the deed of restrictions” that established the devel-
        oper’s and residents’ respective rights and responsibilities. Id. And
        I agree that the Fifth District Court of Appeal there “rejected the
USCA11 Case: 21-13789     Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 15 of 37

        21-13789             NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                        3

        notion that ‘simply invoking’ the FMHA is ‘sufficient to confer en-
        titlement to . . . fees’” under § 723.068 and explained, instead, that
        a reviewing court “had to ‘look at the true nature of the relief re-
        quested and argued’ by” the plaintiff in the underlying suit. Id.
        (quoting T&W Dev., 31 So. 3d at 301).
                Importantly, though, as the majority acknowledges, the de-
        veloper there “had claimed that the amendment of the deed was
        invalid on a number of grounds”—only one of which was that it
        violated the FMHA. Id. In particular, the T&W court emphasized
        that while the developer had pleaded “a number of general allega-
        tions supporting invalidation, some invoking” the FMHA, “the spe-
        cific allegations of the count, when coupled with the argument
        proffered at the summary judgment hearing, indicate[d] that the
        ultimate relief requested was invalidation of the amendment be-
        cause it destroyed Hollywood Estates’ general plan of develop-
        ment and disregarded the intent of the deed of restrictions”—not
        because it violated the FMHA. 31 So. 3d at 301. “Th[o]se allega-
        tions,” the court said, “d[id] not raise violations of, or otherwise
        implicate” the FMHA. Id. at 302. “Consequently,” the court held,
        the developer’s claim “did not seek to enforce any provision of” the
        FMHA, and the residents, who had obtained summary judgment
        on the developer’s claim, were therefore “not entitled to attorney’s
        fees.” Id.
              The circumstances here, it seems to me, are pretty different.
        Whereas the developer in T&W—the would-be “enforce[r]”—
        could have prevailed in its suit with or without an FMHA violation,
USCA11 Case: 21-13789         Document: 35-1         Date Filed: 01/12/2023          Page: 16 of 37

        4                         NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                       21-13789

        the FMHA was integral to the residents’ claims here. In particular,
        the residents’ RICO claims—the ones that the fee-seeking owners
        say “enforce[d]” the FMHA—were predicated on accusations that
        the owners committed mail and wire fraud, and the mail- and wire-
        fraud accusations, in turn, were predicated on allegations that the
        owners used mail and wire communications to perpetrate viola-
        tions of the FMHA. See Doc. 47 at 18–28. So, at least as the resi-
        dents pleaded and pursued their action, the alleged FMHA viola-
        tions weren’t just “components” of the RICO claims; they were es-
        sential components of those claims. Absent an FMHA violation,
        there was no mail or wire fraud, and absent mail or wire fraud,
        there was no RICO violation—and thus no possibility of winning
        their lawsuit.
               None of that, to be clear, is necessarily to say that the resi-
        dents’ suit here was a “proceeding . . . to enforce” the FMHA
        within the meaning of § 723.068. I tend to think that there are
        pretty good reasons to think that it wasn’t. For one, there’s the
        ordinary meaning of the word “enforce.” 1 On balance, I tend to
        agree with the majority that the residents’ RICO-based lawsuit
        didn’t actually aim “[t]o compel observance of or obedience to” the
        FMHA as such. Maj. Op. at 7 (quoting The American Heritage

        1 For reasons I’ll explain in Part II, the majority is quite right that the Florida
        Supreme Court’s recent decision in Advisory Op. to Governor Re: Implemen-
        tation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070 (Fla.
        2020), requires a proper textualist analysis of statutory terms and phrases. See
        Maj. Op. at 7.
USCA11 Case: 21-13789       Document: 35-1         Date Filed: 01/12/2023        Page: 17 of 37

        21-13789                NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                             5

        Dictionary Second College Edition 454 (1985)). In fairness, though,
        I can see the other side: The owners contend that the residents’
        action aimed to prevent them from continuing their (alleged)
        RICO violations, and that an injunction requiring compliance with
        the FMHA would, for all practical purposes, accomplish that objec-
        tive.
               I think there may be a more fundamental—if somewhat con-
        ceptual—reason to conclude that the residents’ suit wasn’t one “to
        enforce” the FMHA. Recall, again, the (peculiar) manner in which
        the residents framed their complaint: As relevant here, they
        pleaded federal RICO claims, which they predicated on alleged vi-
        olations of the federal mail- and wire-fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C.
        §§ 1341, 1343 2—which, in turn, they predicated on alleged viola-
        tions of the FMHA. So, a question: If the residents’ suit was one
        “to enforce” the FMHA—which exists at the bottom of the resi-
        dents’ three-layer complaint—then doesn’t it stand to reason that
        it must also have been one “to enforce” the federal mail- and wire-
        fraud statutes, which comprise the middle layer? Put slightly dif-
        ferently, given the way the residents structured their lawsuit,
        wouldn’t their “enforce[ment]” of the FMHA here necessarily de-
        pend in the first instance—working one’s way back up the com-
        plaint’s several layers—on their “enforce[ment]” of the mail- and
        wire-fraud statutes? To the extent that logic follows—which I

        2 Under RICO, “racketeering activity” includes “any act which is indictable
        under” any of a number of federal criminal laws, including the mail- and wire-
        fraud statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B).
USCA11 Case: 21-13789     Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 18 of 37

        6                     NEWSOM, J., Concurring.               21-13789

        think, at least, that it does—it pretty severely undermines the own-
        ers’ “enforce[ment]”-related argument. The reason? The mail- and
        wire-fraud laws are federal criminal statutes, and federal criminal
        statutes are “enforce[d]” by the federal government—in particular,
        by the executive branch of federal government. They are not—
        indeed, as I’ve taken pains to emphasize elsewhere, they cannot
        constitutionally be—enforced by private litigants. Cf. Laufer v. Ar-
        pan LLC, 29 F.4th 1268, 1291–94 (11th Cir. 2022) (Newsom, J., con-
        curring) (explaining that the authority to enforce criminal laws is a
        non-delegable aspect of the “executive Power” that Article II of the
        Constitution vests exclusively in the President and his subordinates
        and that, accordingly, cannot be exercised by private parties); Sierra
        v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110, 1133–35 (11th Cir. 2021)
        (Newsom, J., concurring) (same). So, it seems to me, the owners’
        contention that the residents’ suit was one “to enforce” the FMHA
        may well founder on the shoals of an invalid implicit premise—
        namely, that the suit must also be understood as one “to enforce”
        the federal criminal laws on which the residents’ FMHA-based al-
        legations necessarily depend.
                I’ve gone on long enough. The upshot is that while I think—
        or at least I think I think—that the majority is right that the resi-
        dents’ suit wasn’t one “to enforce” the FMHA, I’m pretty sure that
        the question is more complicated than the majority’s brief analysis
        lets on. Accordingly, if it were up to me, I would resolve the case
        on what I think is more solid ground: I’d go straight to the key
        criterion that underlies the application of almost every fee-shifting
USCA11 Case: 21-13789         Document: 35-1          Date Filed: 01/12/2023          Page: 19 of 37

        21-13789                  NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                                 7

        statute and ask whether the owners here were “prevailing
        part[ies]” within the meaning of § 723.068—and in particular,
        whether they obtained prevailing-party status when the residents
        voluntarily dismissed their second amended complaint without
        prejudice.
                It is to that question that I now turn.
                                                 II
               To my way of thinking, this case presents a discrete question
        of Florida law: For attorneys’-fees purposes, does a defendant be-
        come a “prevailing party” when, as here, a plaintiff voluntarily dis-
        misses his own suit without prejudice? Having reviewed the perti-
        nent precedent—from both the Florida Supreme Court and the in-
        termediate courts of appeal—I conclude that the answer is no. 3 Be-
        fore unpacking that conclusion, I first explain my view that Florida
        law, rather than federal law, governs the prevailing-party issue.

        3 For two reasons, I wouldn’t certify the question to the Florida Supreme
        Court. First, as always, we must exercise “restraint” in certifying to state
        courts questions that arise in cases that fit squarely within a grant of federal
        jurisdiction. Royal Cap. Dev., LLC v. Maryland Cas. Co., 659 F.3d 1050, 1055
        (11th Cir. 2011). Second, for reasons I’ll explain, I’m confident that there are
        “sufficient sources of state law . . . to allow a principled rather than conjectural
        conclusion” about how the Florida Supreme Court would answer the narrow
        question here. Id. (quoting Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 274–75 (5th
        Cir. 1976)).
USCA11 Case: 21-13789     Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 20 of 37

        8                     NEWSOM, J., Concurring.               21-13789

                                          A
               At the risk of oversimplifying, state law applies in federal
        courts only if it is “substantive” rather than “procedural.” See
        Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 416 (1996) (citing
        Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). Unfortunately, dis-
        tinguishing between substance and procedure in state law is not
        always straightforward. Fortunately, we’ve already held that, as a
        general matter, fee-shifting statutes are substantive. See McMahan
        v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120, 1132 (11th Cir. 2001). So, at least at the
        statute level, Florida law governs the owners’ claim for fees.
               The residents nonetheless insist that federal law, rather than
        Florida law, governs the more granular issue whether the owners
        were “prevailing part[ies].” And so, the residents’ argument goes,
        they win because under federal law, a party qualifies for prevailing-
        party status only if it has “been awarded some relief by the court,”
        Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &
        Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001), such that the court has placed
        its “judicial imprimatur” on a change in “the legal relationship of
        the parties.” CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U.S. 419, 422
        (2016). And, the residents continue, “a dismissal without prejudice
        places no ‘judicial imprimatur’ on ‘the legal relationship of the par-
        ties.’” United States v. $70,670.00 in U.S. Currency, 929 F.3d 1293,
        1303 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting CRST Van Expedited, 578 U.S. at
        422). So, they conclude, parties like the owners—beneficiaries of a
        voluntary dismissal without prejudice—can’t claim prevailing-
        party status under the federal definition.
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023      Page: 21 of 37

        21-13789              NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                         9

                The residents urge us to employ the federal prevailing-party
        definition for two reasons. Neither is persuasive. The residents
        first contend that we should apply the federal definition because it
        (unlike the FMHA’s fee-shifting statute more generally) speaks to
        procedure. It’s true, of course, that “[i]f a federal statute or rule of
        procedure is on point, [we] apply federal rather than state law.”
        Garcia v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 48 F.4th 1202, 1210 (11th Cir.
        2022). But the residents point to no “statute or rule” that generally
        defines the term “prevailing party” for federal purposes or other-
        wise conflicts with the FMHA. Nor is it true, as the residents assert,
        that the federal definition is properly characterized as a federal-
        common-law procedural rule. For one thing, the definition has
        arisen out of federal courts’ interpretations of federal statutes,
        which (at the risk of oversimplifying yet again) is different from
        judge-directed common lawmaking. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines,
        Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 95
        n.34 (1981) (distinguishing between “interpret[ing] and apply[ing]
        statutory law” and “creat[ing] common law”). And for another,
        any federal-common-law rule would apply only in those “rare in-
        stances concerning rights and obligation[s] of the United States, in-
        terstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights
        of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty
        cases”—none of which exists here. Resnick v. Uccello Immobilien
        GMBH, Inc., 227 F.3d 1347, 1350 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quo-
        tation omitted).
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023      Page: 22 of 37

        10                    NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                 21-13789

                 Second, and separately, the residents assert that the federal
        definition should apply because the owners’ state-law fee-shifting
        claim implicates the federal courts’ supplemental jurisdiction, ra-
        ther than their diversity jurisdiction. It’s true that federal-court ju-
        risdiction over the owners’ fee-shifting claim is supplemental be-
        cause it “form[s] part of the same case or controversy” as the fed-
        eral statutory claims (RICO, ADA, etc.) over which original juris-
        diction exists. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even so, it is “well established”
        in this circuit that “the Erie doctrine also applies to pendent state
        claims [i.e., supplemental claims] litigated in federal courts.” Palm
        Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d
        1245, 1259 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814
        F.2d 600, 605 (11th Cir. 1987); cf. also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,
        151 (1988) (“[W]hen a federal court exercises diversity or pendent
        [i.e., supplemental] jurisdiction over state-law claims, ‘the outcome
        of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the
        same . . . as it would be if tried in a State court.’” (quoting Guaranty
        Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945))).
               Long story short: I would hold, in accordance with the gen-
        eral rule, see McMahon, 256 F.3d at 1132, that state law governs
        the interpretation of the phrase “prevailing party” in the FMHA. I
        turn, then, to a careful analysis of the Florida courts’ decisional law
        bearing on that question.
                                           B
               This Court has outlined a three-step process for making an
        “Erie guess” about the content and meaning of state law. At Step
USCA11 Case: 21-13789        Document: 35-1        Date Filed: 01/12/2023        Page: 23 of 37

        21-13789                NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                             11

        1, of course, we ask whether the state supreme court has issued an
        on-point decision. See Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th
        Cir. 2018). If it has, our job is done. But if the state supreme court
        hasn’t squarely decided the issue before us, we must attempt to
        “predict how the highest court would decide this case.” Id. To that
        end, we consider—at Step 2—decisions of the state’s intermediate
        appellate courts. Id. We follow their decisions unless—at Step 3—
        we find “some persuasive indication that the state’s highest court
        would decide the issue otherwise.” King v. King, 46 F.4th 1259,
        1263 (11th Cir. 2022); see also Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgen-
        corp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008, 1020–26 (11th Cir. 2014) (following this
        three-step progression).
               I won’t bury the lede: My research reveals (1) that the Flor-
        ida Supreme Court hasn’t squarely decided whether a plaintiff’s
        voluntary dismissal without prejudice renders the defendant a
        “prevailing party”; (2) that Florida’s intermediate courts of appeal
        are divided on the issue; and (3) that, while there isn’t any smoking-
        gun evidence, there is good reason to think—rising even to the
        “persuasive indication[]” level—that the Florida Supreme Court
        would hold that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not
        confer prevailing-party status. 4

        4To be clear, for reasons explained in text, because Florida’s intermediate
        courts haven’t all resolved the prevailing-party issue in the owners’ favor, we
        needn’t identify “persuasive indications” that the Florida Supreme Court
        would go the other way; I’m left, in effect, to predict de novo how the Florida
        Supreme Court would decide the issue. Even so, I think—again, for reasons
USCA11 Case: 21-13789       Document: 35-1        Date Filed: 01/12/2023        Page: 24 of 37

        12                      NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                   21-13789

                                             1
               Because the Florida Supreme Court hasn’t decided (at Step
        1) whether or not a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice
        confers prevailing-party status on a defendant, I would proceed (at
        Step 2) to consider the decisions of Florida’s intermediate appellate
        courts. Although not perfectly free from doubt, the majority rule
        among those courts seems to be that the beneficiary of a voluntary
        dismissal without prejudice is a prevailing party. A number of in-
        termediate-court decisions—and, for that matter, even one of our
        own unpublished opinions—suggest as much. See Dependable
        Component Supply, Inc. v. Carrefour Informatique Tremblant,
        Inc., 572 F. App’x 796, 801 (11th Cir. 2014) (cataloguing cases).
               The Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Alhambra
        Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Asad, 943 So. 2d 316, 318–19 (Fla. 4th
        Dist. Ct. App. 2006), best illustrates the majority rule. There, the
        plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their first lawsuit only to later refile
        “the same suit.” Id. at 319. Even so, the court held that the initial
        dismissal, however short-lived, was enough to make the defend-
        ants “the prevailing parties in the first suit.” Id. In light of Alham-
        bra, some Florida courts have been willing to award prevailing-
        party fees to a defendant following a voluntary dismissal without
        prejudice “even if the plaintiff refiles the case and prevails.” Mihalyi

        I’ll explain—that there are “persuasive indications” that the Florida Supreme
        Court would hold that beneficiary of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice
        is not a “prevailing party.”
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1       Date Filed: 01/12/2023      Page: 25 of 37

        21-13789              NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                         13

        v. LaSalle Bank, N.A, 162 So. 3d 113, 115 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
        2014); see also Marsh v. Doran, 958 So. 2d 1082, 1082 (Fla. 1st Dist.
        Ct. App. 2007) (“The refiling of the same suit after the voluntary
        dismissal does not alter the appellees’ right to recover prevailing
        party attorney’s fees incurred in defense of the first suit.”); cf. also
        McKelvey v. Kismet, Inc., 430 So. 2d 919, 922 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
        1983) (“[T]he term ‘prevailing party’ is applicable to a defendant
        against whom a voluntary dismissal is taken.”); Dolphin Towers
        Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Del Bene, 388 So. 2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. 2d Dist.
        Ct. App. 1980) (“[T]he term ‘prevailing party’ . . . should . . . be con-
        strued to include a defendant against whom a voluntary dismissal
        is taken.”).
                The Florida appellate courts, though, aren’t unanimous in
        their treatment of dispositions that, like voluntary dismissals, don’t
        “materially change[]” the parties’ legal relationship. The Fifth Dis-
        trict Court of Appeal seems to have embraced the federal approach,
        which (as already explained) denies prevailing-party status to ben-
        eficiaries of voluntary dismissals without prejudice. See Torruella
        v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 308 So. 3d 674, 676 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
        App. 2020) (“This [prevailing-party] standard, utilized by federal
        and Florida courts, requires a determination of whether a court-
        ordered material alteration of the legal relationship between the
        parties has occurred.”). Indeed, the Fifth District has denied pre-
        vailing-party status even to the beneficiary of an involuntary dis-
        missal without prejudice on the ground that the dismissal neither
        (1) rested on “a determination of any significant issue in the case”
USCA11 Case: 21-13789        Document: 35-1         Date Filed: 01/12/2023         Page: 26 of 37

        14                       NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                      21-13789

        nor (2) “br[ought] the litigation to an end” because it “afforded [the
        plaintiff] an opportunity to correct” his complaint. Shaw v.
        Schlusemeyer, 683 So. 2d 1187, 1188 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 5

        5 And  in fact, Florida law is even messier than my description of the inter-dis-
        trict split indicates. Even the courts that confer prevailing-party status on
        some beneficiaries of voluntary dismissals without prejudice don’t grant that
        status in every instance. Sometimes, they “look behind a voluntary dismissal
        at the facts of the litigation ‘to determine whether a party is a substantially
        prevailing party.’” Georges v. Avanti Condo. Ass’n, 324 So. 3d 991, 992 (Fla.
        1st Dist. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Tubbs v. Mechanik Nuccio Hearne & Wester,
        P.A., 125 So. 3d 1034, 1041 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013)); accord Walter D.
        Padow, M.D., P.A. v. Knollwood Club Ass’n, 839 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 4th Dist.
        Ct. App. 2003); Yampol v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 186 So. 3d 616, 617 (Fla.
        3d Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (“There are undoubtedly cases in which the general
        rule [to confer prevailing-party status after voluntary dismissals without prej-
        udice] may be inapplicable to a particular set of circumstances . . . .”). Using
        that power, they sometimes deny prevailing-party status to defendants who
        didn’t “really” prevail—as when the dismissal follows a settlement in which
        the defendants paid up. See Padow, 839 So. 2d at 745 (affirming the denial of
        prevailing-party fees to a party whose opponent, through an informal settle-
        ment, had “got most of what it sought” and “achieved all of the legitimate
        goals of its suit”); Isola Bella Homeowners Ass’n v. Clement, 328 So. 3d 1132,
        1135 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2021) (awarding a plaintiff prevailing-party fees
        after it voluntarily dismissed its own complaint because “under the settlement
        agreement, [the plaintiff] uncompromisingly obtained the only relief sought
        on the only issue raised in this litigation”); see also Tubbs, 125 So. 3d at 1042
        (denying prevailing-party status to a mortgagor when the mortgagee volun-
        tarily dismissed foreclosure claims because a superior mortgagee had success-
        fully foreclosed on the property). And at least one court has recognized that a
        defendant is less likely to deserve prevailing-party status when the dismissal is
        without prejudice. See Yampol, 186 So. 3d at 617.
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023      Page: 27 of 37

        21-13789              NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                        15

               The split among Florida’s intermediate appellate courts
        makes it impossible to identify (at Step 2) decisions to which we
        should defer. The Florida Supreme Court has indicated that inter-
        mediate-court decisions don’t “represent the law of Florida” in the
        event of an “interdistrict conflict.” State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d
        513, 523 (Fla. 2005), as revised on denial of reh’g (2006) (“[I]n the
        absence of interdistrict conflict, decisions of the district courts rep-
        resent the law of the state.”). And that makes sense, of course. It
        would be hard to say that “Florida law” embodies any particular
        rule—about prevailing-party status or otherwise—if the applicable
        rule depends on the particular locale in which a case arises.
               All is not lost, though. Whatever the state of intermediate-
        court precedent—and, as explained, I think it’s less well-settled
        than the owners contend—I believe that the Florida Supreme
        Court has given us, at Step 3, “persuasive indication[s],” King, 46
        F.4th at 1263, of how it would resolve the question whether the
        beneficiary of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice qualifies for
        prevailing-party status. I turn next to those indications.
                                           2
               I find in its precedent three indications that the Florida Su-
        preme Court would define the term “prevailing party” in Fla. Stat.
        § 723.068 not to include beneficiaries of voluntary dismissals with-
        out prejudice. Those indications—which I’ll consider in turn—are
        (1) the Florida Supreme Court’s insistence that fee-shifting statutes
        be strictly construed, (2) its general observations about the mean-
        ing of the term “prevailing party,” and (3) its recent insistence on
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 28 of 37

        16                    NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                21-13789

        interpreting statutory terms and phrases in accordance with their
        ordinary meaning.
                                          a
                Fee-shifting statutes contradict the traditional “American
        rule” that each party pays its own attorneys’ fees. Because these
        statutes are “in derogation of the common law,” Roberts v. Carter,
        350 So. 2d 78, 78–79 (Fla. 1977), Florida courts—like those in many
        other jurisdictions—long ago adopted what has become the “well-
        established rule” that “statutes awarding attorney’s fees must be
        strictly construed,” Dade Cnty. v. Pena, 664 So. 2d 959, 960 (Fla.
        1995) (quoting Gershuny v. Martin McFall Messenger Anesthesia
        Pro. Ass’n, 539 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 1989)); see generally Ocean
        Acc. & Guarantee Corp. v. Cauthen, 12 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 1943)
        (stating that a provision in “derogation of the common law” should
        “be construed strictly”); cf. also Florida Birth-Related Neurological
        Inj. Comp. Ass’n v. Florida Div. of Admin. Hearings, 686 So. 2d
        1349, 1355 (Fla. 1997) (“[S]tatutes designed to supersede or modify
        rights provided by common law must be strictly construed and will
        not displace common law remedies unless such an intent is ex-
        pressly declared.” (quoting Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt v. Heg-
        wood, 569 So. 2d 1295, 1296–97 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990))).
                In practice, this strict-construction rule requires Florida
        courts to apply the American-rule norm unless a statute clearly says
        otherwise. Accordingly, I start from the premise that if a statute
        like § 723.068 doesn’t clearly make a litigant a prevailing party, then
        that litigant doesn’t qualify.
USCA11 Case: 21-13789     Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 29 of 37

        21-13789             NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                       17

                                          b
               Although it hasn’t squarely decided the issue, the Florida Su-
        preme Court has signaled that the term “prevailing party” should
        be defined in a way that, in operation, would exclude beneficiaries
        of voluntary dismissals without prejudice. In particular, over the
        years, that court has repeatedly suggested that a party does not pre-
        vail unless and until (1) the litigation comes to an end and (2) the
        parties’ relationship is materially altered.
               Some 30 years ago, the Florida Supreme Court held (adopt-
        ing the then-applicable federal standard) that the “prevailing party”
        is the litigant who succeeds “on any significant issue in litigation
        which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing
        suit.” Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807, 809–10 (Fla.
        1992) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983));
        Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1194, 1200 & 1200 n.5 (Fla.
        2009) (identifying Hensley as the source of Florida’s definition of
        “prevailing party”). Under that standard, the “touchstone of the
        prevailing party inquiry [was] the material alteration of the legal
        relationship of the parties.” Texas State Tchrs. Ass’n v. Garland
        Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792–93 (1989) (applying Hensley).
        That’s a problem for the owners here, because a voluntary dismis-
        sal without prejudice neither definitively resolves any “significant
        issue” underlying the lawsuit nor “material[ly] alter[s]” the parties’
        legal relationship. To the contrary, as this Court has observed be-
        fore, a “voluntary dismissal renders the proceedings a nullity and
        leaves the parties as if the action had never been brought.”
USCA11 Case: 21-13789     Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 30 of 37

        18                    NEWSOM, J., Concurring.               21-13789

        University of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th
        Cir. 1999) (quoting Williams v. Clarke, 82 F.3d 270, 273 (8th Cir.
        1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord, e.g., 24 Am. Jur.
        2d Dismissal § 91 (2022) (“The effect of a voluntary dismissal of an
        action is to render the proceeding a nullity.”). Accordingly, under
        Moritz, it would seem to follow that a plaintiff’s voluntary dismis-
        sal without prejudice doesn’t confer prevailing-party status on the
        defendant.
               But there’s more. The Florida Supreme Court has addressed
        the prevailing-party status of beneficiaries of some voluntary dis-
        missals, and what it has said indicates that without-prejudice dis-
        missals don’t qualify. Sometimes, that court has clarified, “neither
        party is a ‘prevailing party’” because neither really achieves any
        meaningful benefit. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1203. Accordingly, despite
        the usual rule that “when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action,
        the defendant is the prevailing party,” the court has observed that
        “[t]here must be some end to the litigation on the merits so that
        the court can determine whether the party requesting fees has pre-
        vailed.” Thornber v. City of Ft. Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 919
        (Fla. 1990). To that end, the court has explained that a plaintiff’s
        voluntary dismissal with prejudice qualifies the defendant as the
        prevailing party precisely because the dismissal was “with preju-
        dice, thus signaling an end to the litigation.” Id. As already ex-
        plained, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, by contrast, does
        not signal an end to the litigation, but rather specifically contem-
        plates that it may recommence. Thus, according to the Florida
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 31 of 37

        21-13789              NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                       19

        Supreme Court’s reasoning, it’s the quintessential case in which
        “neither party is a prevailing party.” Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1203 (in-
        ternal quotation marks omitted).
               There is one final datapoint from the Florida Supreme Court
        regarding voluntary dismissals. That court clearly seems to recog-
        nize that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice lacks the conclu-
        siveness conferred by a with-prejudice dismissal—and that the dis-
        tinction matters for prevailing-party purposes. In one case, for in-
        stance, the court confronted a statute allowing for the recovery of
        attorneys’ fees “after voluntary dismissal.” Tellingly, the court in-
        terpreted that barebones statute to cover only voluntary dismissals
        with prejudice. Those dismissals—unlike voluntary dismissals
        without prejudice, the court emphasized—provided a “basis for a
        judgment of no liability.” MX Invs., Inc. v. Crawford, 700 So. 2d
        640, 642 (Fla. 1997). So to be clear, while the Florida Supreme
        Court didn’t squarely address the question before us, it did recog-
        nize the distinction between with- and without-prejudice volun-
        tary dismissals, and in so doing “indicat[ed],” King, 46 F.4th at 1263,
        that only the former confer prevailing-party status.
                                          c
                One more “indication” to go—this one more general, but no
        less significant. As the majority recognizes, the Florida Supreme
        Court has recently clarified—in the strongest possible terms—that
        it expects state statutes to be interpreted in accordance with the
        plain, ordinary meaning of their terms. See Maj. Op. at 7. In
USCA11 Case: 21-13789            Document: 35-1          Date Filed: 01/12/2023   Page: 32 of 37

        20                           NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                 21-13789

        particular, in a recent advisory opinion—permitted under state
        law 6—the court expressly announced that it strictly “adhere[s] to
        the supremacy-of-text principle,” under which “‘[t]he words of a
        governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey,
        in their context, is what the text means.’” Advisory Op. to Gover-
        nor, re Implementation of Amend. 4, The Voting Restoration
        Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia
        & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
        Texts 56 (2012) (other internal quotations omitted)). To operation-
        alize that principle, the court said, it “looks to dictionary defini-
        tions,” id. (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of Marijuana
        for Certain Med. Conditions, 132 So. 3d 786, 800 (Fla. 2014)), and
        interprets “every word . . . in its plain, obvious, and common sense,
        unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or en-
        large it,” id. (quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Consti-
        tution of the United States 157–58 (1833)). And, the court has
        shown since, it won’t hesitate to sideline non-textualist precedents.
        State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 507 (Fla. 2020).
                Given the Florida Supreme Court’s recent “turn to textual-
        ism”—my term—I think it reasonably clear that it would hold that
        the term “prevailing parties” in § 723.068 does not include benefi-
        ciaries of voluntary dismissals without prejudice. That is so for two
        reasons.

        6 See   Fla. Const. art. IV, § 1(c); Fla. R. App. P. 9.500.
USCA11 Case: 21-13789       Document: 35-1    Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 33 of 37

        21-13789              NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                      21

               First, “prevailing party” is a “legal term of art,” Buckhannon,
        532 U.S. at 603, that has appeared in federal statutes since 1867, id.
        at 611 (Scalia J., concurring). A term of art, Black’s explains, bears
        “a specific, precise meaning in a given specialty.” Term Of Art,
        Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In our particular “spe-
        cialty”—attorneys’-fees statutes—the term “prevailing party” car-
        ried three meanings in 1984, when the Florida Legislature enacted
        § 723.068. They were:
           1. the party to a suit who successfully prosecutes the action or
              successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue,
              even though not necessarily to the extent of his original con-
              tention,
           2. the one in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered
              and judgment entered, and
           3. the party ultimately prevailing when the matter is finally set
              at rest.
        Prevailing Party, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) (internal ci-
        tations omitted).
               None of those definitions, it seems to me, is properly under-
        stood to include the beneficiary of a voluntary dismissal without
        prejudice. A voluntary dismissal without prejudice (1) does noth-
        ing to definitively resolve the “main issue,” but rather leaves the
        parties where it found them, free to recommence their dispute; (2)
        is unaccompanied by any court “judgment,” see MX Invs., 700 So.
        2d at 642 (explaining that voluntary dismissals without prejudice
USCA11 Case: 21-13789      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 34 of 37

        22                    NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                21-13789

        are not a “basis for a judgment of no liability”); and (3) neither sets
        the matter “at rest” nor provides an “ultimate[]” resolution.
                Dictionary definitions aside, federal law in 1984—as today—
        clearly and consistently defined the term “prevailing party” not to
        include the beneficiaries of voluntary dismissals without prejudice.
        Then, as now, federal law held that a “prevailing party” was a liti-
        gant who had obtained either an enforceable judgment on the mer-
        its, Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980), or, at the very
        least, a court-approved consent decree, Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S.
        122, 129–30 (1980). See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603–04 (outlining
        the federal courts’ historical definition of the term and reiterating
        that “a consent decree may serve as the basis for an award of attor-
        ney’s fees”).
               In the light of the ordinary 1984-era meaning of the term
        “prevailing party” and the well-accepted federal definition, the
        question is whether there is any reason to think that Florida courts
        had settled on some idiosyncratic, divergent understanding at the
        time § 723.068 was enacted. There isn’t. To the contrary, their
        treatment of the term “prevailing party” circa 1984 was in a limbo
        of sorts, and in any event far from achieving term-of-art status. To
        be sure, some of Florida’s intermediate courts at the time conferred
        prevailing-party status on beneficiaries of voluntary dismissals
        without prejudice. See McKelvey, 430 So. 2d at 922; Dolphin Tow-
        ers, 388 So. 2d at 1269; Gordon v. Warren Heating & Air Condi-
        tioning, Inc., 340 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
        But their holdings to that effect were neither entrenched nor
USCA11 Case: 21-13789         Document: 35-1         Date Filed: 01/12/2023          Page: 35 of 37

        21-13789                 NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                                23

        uncontroversial. In fact, just the year before § 723.068’s adoption,
        the Third District Court of Appeal—without any meaningful ex-
        planation and over a vigorous dissent—had seemingly upended a
        decade-old consensus defining the term more or less as federal
        courts did. See McKelvey, 430 So. 2d at 922 (apparently reversing
        these cases); id. at 922–26 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).7
               In short, there is very good reason (grounded in settled lin-
        guistic understandings and consistent federal precedent) to think
        that the Florida Supreme Court would interpret § 723.068 to ex-
        clude the beneficiaries of voluntary dismissals without prejudice,
        and that there is precious little evidence to support a contrary con-
        clusion.

        7 See Steinhardt v. Eastern Shores White House Ass’n, 413 So. 2d 785, 786 (Fla.

        3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (“In order that there be a prevailing party and a losing
        party, there must necessarily be a disposition of the case or controversy as by
        judgment or order.”); Midway Shopping Mall, Inc. v. Airtech Air Condition-
        ing, Inc., 253 So. 2d 900, 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that “[t]here
        was not a favorable determination of such finality as would entitle the owner
        to” prevailing-party status); Sharpe v. Ceco Corp., 242 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 3d
        Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (“The prevailing party is regarded as that party who has
        affirmative judgment rendered in his favor at the conclusion of the entire
        case.”); see also Executive Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Durability Seating & Interiors,
        Inc., 402 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“Holding a party liable for
        attorney’s fees solely because they bring a law suit and then take a voluntary
        dismissal would have the deleterious effect of discouraging parties from seek-
        ing voluntary dismissals and is not what is contemplated by Section 57.105 [a
        prevailing-party statute].”).
USCA11 Case: 21-13789     Document: 35-1       Date Filed: 01/12/2023   Page: 36 of 37

        24                   NEWSOM, J., Concurring.               21-13789

                                       * * *
               To reiterate, I would hold for three reasons that Fla. Stat.
        § 723.068’s use of the term “prevailing party” is properly under-
        stood (and would be interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court)
        not to include the beneficiary of a voluntary dismissal without prej-
        udice. First, the Florida Supreme Court has long embraced the
        general interpretive principle that “statutes awarding attorney’s
        fees must be strictly construed.” Pena, 664 So. 2d at 960. Second,
        that court has held that, in general, a “prevailing party” is one in
        whose favor a “significant issue” in litigation has been definitively
        resolved, see Moritz, 604 So. 2d at 809–10, and a voluntary dismis-
        sal without prejudice, by its very nature, doesn’t accomplish that
        result. And finally, that court has recently underscored the im-
        portance of interpreting statutory words and phrases in accordance
        with their plain (and original) meaning, and the best evidence is
        that at the time of § 723.068’s enactment the term “prevailing
        party” didn’t—and thus doesn’t—include the beneficiary of a vol-
        untary dismissal without prejudice.
                                         III
              Our duty in a case like this is to make an informed “Erie
        guess” about how the Florida Supreme Court would decide the is-
        sues before us. I’m pretty sure—although not certain—that the
        majority has ultimately guessed right on the “enforce[ment]” ques-
        tion. But I’m more sure that I have a handle on how the Florida
        Supreme Court would decide the “prevailing party” issue. Having
        combed through the relevant Florida law, I conclude that the
USCA11 Case: 21-13789     Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2023     Page: 37 of 37

        21-13789             NEWSOM, J., Concurring.                       25

        Florida Supreme Court would hold that the beneficiary of a volun-
        tary dismissal without prejudice is not a “prevailing party” within
        the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 723.068—and, accordingly, that the
        owners here are not entitled to fees. I would thus affirm the district
        court’s decision on that basis.