Court Opinion

ID: 9488639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:51:06.849786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:00.351868
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join in the court’s judgment but for slightly different reasons. I agree with the trial court’s approach of examining when the police officer decided to shift his investigation from the initial, justifiable stop to a drug investigation. The latter must be supported by articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The critical decision in this case is the point at which the officer was in possession of those triggering facts. If that point were at .the stage adopted by the magistrate judge or the trial court, I would vote to sustain the trial court’s decision.
A review of the videotape (R., Vol. Ill) reveals without question, however, that the officer had the necessary articulable facts before his efforts turned to a search for drags. Although a close case, the strong smell of air freshener, coupled with the fact that a large truck was rented merely to transport clothes, provides a sufficient basis for additional investigation. The officer had possession of those facts before he asked to search the vehicle. Additionally, the videotape of the arrest reveals the officer telling another officer that he smelled air freshener when he initially approached the driver in the track. Any finding to the contrary by the trial court would be clearly erroneous.
Standing alone, air freshener is not sufficient to justify a reasonable search for drags. *1246However, we have repeatedly held that air freshener coupled with other indicia of criminal activity supports a reasonable brief inquiry for purposes of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The fact that air freshener may be used innocently does not mean it cannot be used under other suspicious circumstances.
While reaffirming my view that police officers must articulate reasons independent from the basis for the initial traffic stop before they may pursue an investigation for drugs, I believe such a requirement was satisfied in this case. Despite this conclusion, I believe that the court’s discussion about the focus of the officer’s questions is not faithful to our duty to defer to the findings of the trial court. I am persuaded that the question as to when and if an investigation shifts from the initial reason for a traffic stop to a drug investigation falls within the discretion of the trial court. I do not believe it is an issue of law for an appellate court to decide. We should accept such a finding unless clearly erroneous. I am unable to conclude that the trial court was clearly erroneous when it concluded that the officer shifted his focus to a drug investigation. Because the officer’s inquiry into the contents of the truck included a question about weapons, the focus of his investigation was clearly not related to whether the vehicle was stolen.