Court Opinion

ID: 9902057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 20:09:15.098205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:43.727952
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Keller, 2023-Ohio-4240.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    SANDUSKY COUNTY

State of Ohio                                         Court of Appeals No. S-23-008

        Appellee                                      Trial Court No. 22CR785

v.

Roger Keller                                          DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                     Decided: November 22, 2023

                                               *****

        Beth A. Tischler, Sandusky County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Alexis M. Otero, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Andrew R. Schuman, for appellant.

                                               *****
        MAYLE, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Roger Keller, appeals the February 1, 2023 judgment of the

Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him following his conviction of

rape. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                                        I. Background and Facts

        {¶ 2} Keller was indicted on two counts of rape in violation of R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(b), each a first-degree felony; two counts of gross sexual imposition in

violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), each a third-degree felony; and two counts of gross
sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(B), each a third-degree felony. Keller and

the state reached an agreement under which Keller would plead guilty to one count of

rape in exchange for the state dismissing the other five charges in the indictment.

       {¶ 3} At the plea hearing, after the state recited the terms of the agreement,

Keller’s attorney, in addition to confirming the terms of the deal, explained to the court

that he had spoken to Keller “at great length” about the plea offer and the case. Counsel

said that he and Keller had discussed trial strategy, the trial process, “further things that

[counsel] could do if we were to proceed to trial, in particular, the issue of a possible

suppression motion[,]” “other trial motions” counsel could file, and the “severe penalty”

that he was facing.

       {¶ 4} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard statements from the victim,

the victim’s mother, the state, defense counsel, and Keller before imposing sentence. As

part of his statement, defense counsel noted that Keller cooperated with the police and

“made an admission to” the investigating detective. Counsel again mentioned that he

“discussed * * * a possible suppression motion * * *” with Keller. Counsel also noted

that “Mr. Keller always told [counsel] that he was not going to make the [victim] testify *

* *” and “was never going to take this matter to trial * * *.” After hearing from the

parties and reviewing the applicable law, the trial court sentenced Keller to “life in

prison.”1

1
 We note that “life in prison” is not one of the two sentencing options available to a trial
court when a defendant is convicted of violating R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), the victim is less

2.
       {¶ 5} Keller now appeals, raising one assignment of error:

              Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion

       to suppress appellant’s confession made to fremont [sic] police.

                                   II. Law and Analysis

       {¶ 6} In his assignment of error, Keller argues that his trial counsel was ineffective

because counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the statement that Keller made to the

detective investigating the case. He makes the conclusory claims that counsel’s decision

to forgo a suppression motion “was not tactical[,]” and filing a suppression motion “could

have likely resulted in a more favorable outcome * * *.”

       {¶ 7} In response, the state points out that Keller makes only a “bare assertion”

that filing a suppression motion could have gotten him a better outcome and that counsel

“both considered and counseled [Keller] about the potential of filing a motion to suppress

* * *.” The state also argues, based on its review of the video of Keller’s statement

(which is not in the record), that any suppression motion was unlikely to succeed.

       {¶ 8} To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must

show that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989),

than 10 years old, and no other specifications are involved. See R.C. 2907.02(B); R.C.
2971.03(B)(1); State v. Statzer, 2016-Ohio-7434, 72 N.E.3d 1202, ¶ 30 (12th Dist.) (the
only two options available to the sentencing court are an indefinite term of 15 years to
life in prison or life in prison without the possibility of parole). However, neither Keller
nor the state raised this as error on appeal, so we will not address it further.

3.
paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.E.2d 674 (1984). To show that counsel was ineffective relative to a

guilty plea, the appellant must show that counsel’s alleged deficiencies “‘caused [his]

plea to be less than knowing and voluntary.’” State v. Henley, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-

22-034, 2023-Ohio-396, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Green, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2017-T-

0073, 2018-Ohio-3536, ¶ 19. Thus, an appellant’s guilty plea waives his right to assert

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim unless he argues that counsel’s errors affected

the knowing and voluntary character of the plea. State v. Rivera, 6th Dist. Wood Nos.

WD-19-085 and WD-19-086, 2021-Ohio-1343, ¶ 10.

       {¶ 9} Here, Keller does not argue (or even imply) that his plea was made

unknowingly or involuntarily because trial counsel failed to seek suppression of his

statement to the police. In fact, counsel told the court at the plea and sentencing hearings

that he discussed the possibility of suppressing the statement with Keller, and said at

sentencing that Keller did not want the victim to have to testify at a trial. If anything, this

supports a finding that Keller knew what he was doing when he entered the plea and

voluntarily chose to plead. Regardless, because Keller does not allege that his plea was

not knowingly and voluntarily entered, he has waived his ineffective assistance of

counsel argument. Rivera at ¶ 10.

       {¶ 10} Keller’s assignment of error is not well-taken.

4.
                                       III. Conclusion

         {¶ 11} For the foregoing reasons, the February 1, 2023 judgment of the Sandusky

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Keller is ordered to pay the costs of this

appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                         Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See
also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J.                           ____________________________
                                                           JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.
                                                 ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J.                                       JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                 ____________________________
                                                           JUDGE

          This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
     Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
          version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                   http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

5.