Court Opinion

ID: 9860767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:32:04.457105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:39.120066
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority denies compensation to claimant under the profound misapprehension that it followed the “analytical framework set forth in Sisbro II.” 348 Ill. App. 3d at 652. The reality of the situation, however, is that the majority failed to learn from the errors in Sisbro I. Because the majority’s disposition is directly in opposition to our Supreme Court’s dictates in Sisbro II, I must dissent. In Sisbro II, our supreme court reversed the order entered by this court in Sisbro I and held there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that claimant’s work-related accidental injury to his ankle aggravated or accelerated claimant’s preexisting condition, and, thus, workers’ compensation was properly awarded by the Commission. Our supreme court specifically found that this court failed to give appropriate deference to the factual findings of the Commission and applied an overly broad interpretation of the “normal daily activity” limitation on recovery in preexisting condition cases. Our supreme court compared and contrasted numerous cases relied upon by the majority herein and ultimately concluded as follows: “When an employee with a preexisting condition is injured in the course of his employment, serious questions are raised about the genesis of the injury and the resulting disability. The Commission must decide whether there was an accidental injury which arose out of the employment, whether the accidental injury aggravated or accelerated the preexisting condition or whether the preexisting condition alone was the cause of the injury. Generally, these will be factual questions to be resolved by the Commission. However, the Commission’s decision must be supported by the record and not based on mere speculation or conjecture. If there is an adequate basis for finding that an occupational activity aggravated or accelerated a preexisting condition, and, thereby, caused the disability, the Commission’s award of compensation must be confirmed.” Sisbro II, 207 Ill. 2d at 215, 797 N.E.2d at 678. In reaching this conclusion, our supreme court specifically relied on three other cases in which the claimant suffered a heart attack. Sisbro II discussed National Malleable & Steel Castings Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 32 Ill. 2d 184, 204 N.E.2d 748 (1965), Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 35 Ill. 2d 474, 220 N.E.2d 435 (1966), and Rock Road Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 37 Ill. 2d 123, 227 N.E.2d 65 (1967). In National Malleable and Illinois Bell, compensation was denied because the connection between work and the heart attack was too tenuous, while in Rock Road compensation was allowed because the evidence allowed for a legitimate inference that the “ ‘occupational activity or exertion was in fact a causative factor in hastening the decedent’s death.’ Rock Road Construction, 37 Ill. 2d at 128[, 227 N.E.2d at 68].” Sisbro II, 207 Ill. 2d at 211, 797 N.E.2d at 676. The Sisbro II court pointed out that neither National Malleable nor Illinois Bell “stand[s] for the proposition that where a causal connection between work and injury has been established, it can be negated simply because the injury might also have occurred as a result of some ‘normal daily activity.’ ” Sisbro II, 207 Ill. 2d at 211, 797 N.E.2d at 676. Instead, the court found: “[T]hese cases demonstrate that whether ‘any normal daily activity is an overexertion’ or whether ‘the activity engaged in presented risks no greater than those to which the general public is exposed’ are matters to be considered when deciding whether a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the employment has been established in the first instance. We have never found a causal connection to exist between work and injury and then, in a further analytical step, denied recovery based on a ‘normal daily activity exception’ or a ‘greater risk exception.’ ” Sisbro II, 207 Ill. 2d at, 211-12, 797 N.E.2d at 676. Despite our supreme court’s instructions in Sisbro II to narrow the “normal daily activity” limitation, the majority chooses instead to broaden the limitation to bar compensation in the instant case. The majority’s denial of compensation appears to be based entirely upon Dr. Cohen’s responses to questions posed during cross-examination. In response to a hypothetical question, Dr. Cohen admitted that a person with claimant’s degree of occlusion (90% blockage) could suffer a heart attack with any level of activity or even no activity. Dr. Cohen also affirmatively responded to the question, “A person with that degree of occlusion is basically a heart attack waiting to happen, would you agree?” The majority opinion hinges upon these two answers and all but ignores the facts of the instant case which show that claimant’s duties on the day he suffered the heart attack were extremely physical in nature and performed under severe conditions. Claimant was hired to remove asbestos from a plant in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Claimant’s travel, lodging, and food expenses were paid by the employer. On the day in question, claimant began working at 7 a.m. The temperature outside was approximately five degrees. The disused plant was not heated, and the temperature indoors was only 10 to 15 degrees. During the course of the day, claimant was required to enter a steel bin in which the temperature was even colder than the outside temperature. On the day in question, claimant removed over 500 large bags of asbestos material. Each bag weighed approximately 40 to 45 pounds. The 500 bags were placed in a commercial Dumpster, which was accessed by walking down several flights of stairs and across 40 to 50 feet outside the building. To make matters worse, claimant was required to wear a full respirator and protective clothing while performing his duties. At approximately 2:30 p.m., claimant started feeling chest pains. He sat down and rested, and while the pain diminished, it never completely dissipated. Claimant left work at 3:30 p.m. and returned to his motel room. The other workers went to eat, but claimant did not feel like eating. His chest pains eventually worsened. After going to bed, claimant woke up in a cold sweat with severe chest pains. He was taken to the hospital where it was determined that he had sustained a myocardial infarction. Under these circumstances, and in light of our Supreme Court’s holding in Sisbro II, the majority is flat out wrong to reverse the Commission’s finding of sufficient causal connection between claimant’s work and his injury. Like Rock Road, and unlike National Malleable and Illinois Bell, claimant’s occupational activity and exertion were clearly factors in his heart attack. I can find nothing tenuous between claimant’s work and heart attack under the facts of the instant case. Sisbro II specifically states that the causal connection between work and injury cannot be negated simply because it might have occurred as the result of some normal daily activity. Here, there is clearly an adequate basis for finding that claimant’s occupational activity aggravated or accelerated claimant’s preexisting heart condition and thereby caused his resulting disability. Accordingly, I would affirm the Commission’s award of compensation.