Court Opinion

ID: 9381619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 15:06:02.339807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:33.584014
License: Public Domain

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                                                  RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2023
                                                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                   2021-SC-0424-MR

EPIONN J. LEE-MCCAMPBELL                                              APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
V.              HONORABLE WILLIAM ANTHONY KITCHEN, JUDGE
                              NO. 18-CR-00660

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                     AFFIRMING

      Epionn J. Lee-McCampbell appeals as a matter of right1 from the

judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court convicting him of first-degree

manslaughter and fourth-degree fetal homicide. He was sentenced to twenty-

five years’ imprisonment. Lee-McCampbell raises four unpreserved claims of

error: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for fetal

homicide; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct during the opening

statement by making three false statements regarding anticipated evidence; (3)

the prosecutor misled the jury by eliciting testimony from a lay witness that

contradicted the testimony of an expert witness; and (4) the trial court

      1   Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b)
improperly admitted evidence of prior bad acts. None of these contentions

merit reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.

      Lee-McCampbell and the victim, Ja’Lynn Ragsdale, were dating. Their

relationship was plagued by discord and abuse. On March 1, 2018, after

working the night shift at McDonald’s, Ragsdale went to the residence of Lee-

McCampbell’s mother. Lee-McCampbell and Ragsdale slept until the

afternoon. Around 2:32 p.m., Lee-McCampbell called emergency services to

report that Ragsdale was not breathing.

      Paducah Firefighter Kurt Hanson responded first to the scene. Hanson

performed chest compressions and inserted a device into Ragsdale’s mouth to

prevent her tongue from blocking her airway. Hanson noticed dried blood in

Ragsdale’s nostrils and blood in her airway. When Paramedic Justin Dinovo

arrived, he discovered Ragsdale’s heart was not beating. Dinovo administered

epinephrine to revive her. He intubated Ragsdale and also noticed dried blood

in her nostrils and blood in her airway. The paramedics transported Ragsdale

to Western Baptist Hospital.

      Dr. Ben Thompson treated Ragsdale at the hospital. Ragsdale was

unresponsive and placed on a mechanical ventilator. Dr. Thompson observed

that Ragsdale had suffered a significant brain injury. He did not believe

Ragsdale had experienced a stroke, heart attack, or lung issue, which could

have explained her condition. Laboratory testing revealed Ragsdale had

elevated levels of human chorionic gonadotropin (HCG), which indicated she

was pregnant. Dr. Thompson consulted with neurologist, Dr. Joseph Ashburn,

                                       2
and cardiologist, Dr. Martin Raines. Dr. Ashburn confirmed Ragsdale did not

experience a stroke or other medical event, which would have explained

Ragsdale’s condition. Dr. Raines confirmed Ragsdale did not experience a

heart attack. Ragsdale’s condition continued to deteriorate to the point where

it was certain she would perish.

      Dr. Ashburn confirmed that Ragsdale was brain-dead. Ragsdale was

removed from life-support and was pronounced dead on March 4, 2018. Chief

Deputy McCracken County Coroner Ben Bradford listed the cause of death as

asphyxia due to suffocation and the manner of death as homicide. Chief

Deputy Bradford recommended an autopsy be performed.

      Dr. Christopher Kiefer performed the autopsy. Dr. Kiefer determined

Ragsdale’s death was caused by asphyxia due to suffocation. He concluded

Ragsdale was deprived of oxygen due to an object being placed over her mouth.

Dr. Kiefer also observed a nodule on Ragsdale’s uterus, which indicated the

early stages of pregnancy.

      Lee-McCampbell made several statements to police about the

circumstances leading to Ragsdale’s death. Lee-McCampbell’s essential story

was that he and Ragsdale were play wrestling in bed when they tumbled onto

the floor. When they hit the floor, Ragsdale was face down with Lee-

McCampbell on top of her, holding her arm behind her back. When asked why

he did not get off Ragsdale when she twice said she could not breathe, Lee-

McCampbell stated he thought Ragsdale’s pleas were a ruse to get the upper

hand in the wrestling match. Lee-McCampbell also stated he did not know

                                       3
how Ragsdale’s hooded sweatshirt had been pulled up to cover her nose and

mouth. Lee-McCampbell denied intending to hurt Ragsdale, but later told

police that he took responsibility for her death.

      Lee-McCampbell described his relationship with Ragsdale at length to

police. He stated he and Ragsdale were trying to have a baby and he suspected

Ragsdale may have been pregnant because she was showing early physical and

emotional signs of pregnancy, which he recognized because Ragsdale had

previously been pregnant. Lee-McCampbell recounted the tension in the

relationship caused by mutual infidelities. Lee-McCampbell admitted to

choking Ragsdale on two prior occasions. Lee-McCampbell also admitted to

headbutting Ragsdale with such force that she required treatment at the

emergency room. This incident occurred less than one month before

Ragsdale’s death. Additional investigation by police uncovered further

incidents of abuse.

      A McCracken County grand jury indicted Lee-McCampbell for murder

and third-degree fetal homicide. Following a four-day trial, the petit jury found

Lee-McCampbell guilty of first-degree manslaughter and fourth-degree fetal

homicide. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Lee-

McCampbell to a total of twenty-five years’ imprisonment. This appeal

followed.

      For his first contention of error, Lee-McCampbell argues he was entitled

to a directed verdict on the charge of fetal homicide. Specifically, he asserts the

Commonwealth failed to prove Ragsdale was carrying an unborn child. Lee-

                                        4
McCampbell concedes this argument was not properly preserved for appellate

review and requests palpable error review under RCr2 10.26, which provides:

      A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may
      be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an
      appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or
      preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a
      determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.

A palpable error is “easily perceptible, plain, obvious, and readily noticeable.”

Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006). To demonstrate

manifest injustice, a party must show the “probability of a different result or

error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of

law.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006). In other words, a

palpable error occurs where “the defect in the proceeding was shocking or

jurisprudentially intolerable.” Id. at 4. The failure to grant a directed verdict

based on the insufficiency of evidence amounts to palpable error because “it is

clear that a different result would occur, since a defendant convicted on

insufficient proof should be acquitted.” Commonwealth v. Goss, 428 S.W.3d

619, 627 (Ky. 2014). A conviction based on insufficient evidence necessarily

results in manifest injustice. Id.

      A trial court’s failure to grant a directed verdict should not be reversed

unless the appellate court determines “it would be clearly unreasonable for a

jury to find guilt.” Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).

When confronted with a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must

      2   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                          5
assume the truth of the Commonwealth’s evidence and “draw all fair and

reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth.” Id. A

conviction must be based on “evidence of substance, and the trial court is

expressly authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the prosecution

produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence.” Id. at 188.

      Purely circumstantial evidence may support a conviction if, “based on the

whole case, it would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Graves v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Ky.

2000). The Commonwealth is not required to “rule out every hypothesis except

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rogers v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.3d 303,

311 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979)). In

other words, “the question on a directed verdict motion is not necessarily what

evidence supporting the defendant was solicited, but rather what evidence the

Commonwealth produced in support of its burden of proof.” Sutton v.

Commonwealth, 627 S.W.3d 836, 848 (Ky. 2021).

      KRS3 507A.050(1) states “[a] person is guilty of fetal homicide in the

fourth degree when, with recklessness, he causes the death of an unborn

child.” KRS 507A.010(1)(c) defines “unborn child” as “a member of the species

homo sapiens in utero from conception onward, without regard to age, health,

or condition of dependency.” Fourth-degree fetal homicide “involves the death

of an unborn child under the same circumstances as the current law for

      3   Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                        6
reckless homicide.” Leslie W. Abramson, Kentucky Practice Series, Substantive

Criminal Law, § 4:12 (2022). For the purposes of the Kentucky Penal Code, “[a]

person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described

by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and

unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists.”

KRS 501.020(4).

       In the context of fetal homicide, the existence of an unborn child is

determined in reference to the time of conception. KRS 507A.010(1)(c).

However, KRS 507A.010 does not define the word “conception.” When

construing a statute, a court’s overarching duty is to effectuate the intention of

the legislature. KRS 446.080(1). The words in a statute are to be interpreted

“according to the common and approved usage of language,” except for

technical words, which are interpreted according to their “peculiar and

appropriate meaning in the law.” KRS 446.080(4). In Kentucky, the statutory

definition of a term, “wherever it may appear in the statutes,” controls

elsewhere unless the context or statutory language directs otherwise. Camera

Center, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 34 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Ky. 2000).

      Kentucky’s fetal heartbeat statute defines “conception” as “fertilization.”

KRS 311.7701(1). “Fertilization” means “the fusion of a human spermatozoon

with a human ovum.” KRS 311.7701(3); KRS 311.781(1). These definitions

track the ordinary, legal, and medical understanding of the word “conception.”

Generally, conception means “the process of becoming pregnant involving

fertilization or implantation or both.” Conception, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate

                                        7
Dictionary (11th ed. 2014). Legally, conception has also been defined as “[t]he

impregnation of an ovum; the onset of pregnancy.” Conception, Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Stated otherwise, the term is legally defined to

mean the “[f]ertilization of the female ovum by the male germ cell.” Conception,

Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3rd Edition), p. 237 (citing Am. Jur. Proof of Facts,

Medical Glossary). Medically, conception is defined as “[f]ertilization of ooccyte

by a sperm.” Conception, Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (28th ed. 2006). We

interpret the word “conception,” as used in KRS 507A.010(1)(c), to mean

fertilization, which is synonymous with the onset of pregnancy.

      The Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence of conception. Dr.

Thompson testified Ragsdale’s initial HCG hormone levels suggested the onset

of early pregnancy. He further testified that Ragsdale’s HCG levels were

trending upwards, which also indicated pregnancy. However, Dr. Thompson

acknowledged it was very early in Ragsdale’s pregnancy and she may not have

known she was pregnant. Dr. Ashburn also testified HCG levels climb when a

person is pregnant and Ragsdale’s levels were rising. Dr. Kiefer testified he

observed a nodule on Ragsdale’s uterus, which indicated the early stages of

pregnancy. Although Dr. Kiefer could not definitively state whether Ragsdale

was pregnant, he had no other explanation for the presence of the nodule.

      Beyond the Commonwealth’s evidence, Lee-McCampbell’s own expert,

Dr. George R. Nichols, II, agreed Ragsdale was pregnant “according to the

laboratory analysis.” Dr. Nichols also acknowledged his prior testimony at a

sworn deposition where he stated Ragsdale was pregnant. Additionally, Lee-

                                         8
McCampbell testified he and Ragsdale were trying to have a baby together.

Lee-McCampbell told Detective Blake Quinn that he suspected Ragsdale was

pregnant because she was more emotional and her breasts and stomach had

grown larger. Lee-McCampbell stated he was familiar with how Ragsdale acted

when she was pregnant because she had been pregnant before.

       Lee-McCampbell argues HCG evidence is not proof of fertilization. He

has inappropriately cited to various medical studies and publications, which

are not included in the record. We have specifically disapproved of this

practice:

      Appellants’ Brief is replete with citations to so-called “scientific
      studies” regarding the effectiveness of seat belts as safety devices.
      These studies were not introduced at the trial level and would not
      qualify as admissible evidence absent testimony as to their
      scientific authenticity and reliability from a credible source.
      Certainly our Court is not prepared to take judicial notice of the
      authenticity and reliability of the publications referred to in the
      Brief. For instance, appellants’ brief refers to a “front page article
      in the Wall Street Journal.” This was inappropriate in the brief
      and would be improper at trial. We disapprove of those references
      in the Brief to any material which was not introduced as evidence
      in the trial court, and point out that such material will not be
      admissible in the trial court unless first appropriately
      authenticated as a scientifically reliable source. We have
      disregarded this material in the Appellants’ Brief in making our
      decision.

Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 179-80 (Ky. 1987). We also acknowledge

the Commonwealth inappropriately cited to medical literature that was not

presented to the trial court in an attempt to bolster Lee-McCampbell’s

testimony that he suspected Ragsdale was pregnant. As a reviewing court, we

will not consider matters outside the record. This rule applies equally to both

parties.
                                        9
      Moreover, Kentucky law does not require a criminal conviction to be

supported with the degree of scientific certainty urged by Lee-McCampbell.

Under the reasonable doubt standard, “that which a jury may reasonably

believe to have been probable is enough to support a finding of guilt.” Timmons

v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 234, 238 (Ky. 1977). Further, Lee-

McCampbell’s attacks on the testimony of Dr. Thompson and Dr. Ashburn

implicate assessments of the weight and credibility of evidence, which are

uniquely within the province of the jury. Ross v. Commonwealth, 531 S.W.3d

471, 477 (Ky. 2017).

      Viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, we cannot conclude it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to

find conception had occurred. An appellate court is not authorized to

substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury. Timmons, 555 S.W.2d at

238. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence that Lee-McCampbell recklessly

caused the death of an unborn child.

      For his second contention of error, Lee-McCampbell argues the

prosecutor committed misconduct during the opening statement by making

three false statements regarding anticipated evidence. As this issue is

unpreserved, Lee-McCampbell again requests palpable error review. The

prosecutor’s statements did not amount to flagrant misconduct.

      In making its opening statement, the Commonwealth may state all the

facts and circumstances which it expects in good faith to be established by the

evidence. Freeman v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Ky. 1967). It is

                                       10
improper for the Commonwealth to state facts in an opening statement which it

does not reasonably expect to prove from the evidence at trial. Turner v.

Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 80, 81 (Ky. 1951). However, both the prosecutor

and defense counsel are given wide latitude during opening and closing

arguments because argument is not evidence. Slaughter v. Commonwealth,

744 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987).

      When a defendant fails to make a contemporaneous objection to alleged

prosecutorial misconduct, we will only reverse if flagrant misconduct rendered

the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d

310, 329 (Ky. 2016). To determine whether improper comments amount to

flagrant prosecutorial misconduct, we must examine: “(1) whether the remarks

tended to mislead the jury or to prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were

isolated or extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed

before the jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the accused.” Id.

(quoting Mayo v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 41, 56 (Ky. 2010)).

      Regarding the first alleged misstatement, Lee-McCampbell argues he was

prejudiced by the prosecutor’s erroneous statement that Dr. Kiefer would

testify he had confirmed Ragsdale’s pregnancy through the observation of a

fertilized egg. The prosecutor stated:

      Then I’m going to call Dr. Chris Kiefer. He is the state medical
      examiner. He works out of Madisonville. He conducted the
      autopsy. He will tell you about performing that autopsy . . . and he
      is going to tell you in no uncertain terms that Ja’Lynn was killed
      by asphyxiation, through suffocation, and that this was a
      homicide. He also saw a fertilized egg confirming that she was
      pregnant.

                                         11
      While Dr. Kiefer did not specifically testify that he observed a fertilized

egg, he did testify that he observed a “nodule” on Ragsdale’s uterus, which

indicated she was pregnant. Dr. Kiefer was also subject to cross-examination

on this topic and admitted he could not definitively state Ragsdale was

pregnant. However, Lee-McCampbell’s own expert, Dr. Nichols also testified

Ragsdale was pregnant. Lee-McCampbell further admits the prosecutor’s

reference to a fertilized egg was an isolated remark. That the prosecutor’s

remark was isolated tends to diminish any possibility of bad faith or deliberate

deception. While the conviction for fetal homicide was largely based on

circumstantial evidence, given the evidence as a whole, we cannot conclude the

prosecutor’s comment amounted to flagrant misconduct. The error, if any, was

harmless.

      Regarding the second alleged misstatement, Lee-McCampbell argues he

was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s erroneous statement that Autumn Stefanick

would testify Lee-McCampbell had choked Ragsdale on several prior occasions.

Regarding the prior choking incidents, the prosecutor stated:

      I’m going to call to Autumn Stefanick, a friend of Ja’Lynn’s, who is
      going to testify that she was present on February 18th, less than two
      months before Epionn killed Ja’Lynn, and that she called the police
      in an attempt to stop him from being violent with her. She’ll testify
      that she’s personally witnessed the defendant choke Ja’Lynn on
      several occasions.

Stefanick did not testify she witnessed Lee-McCampbell choke Ragsdale on

several occasions. Stefanick testified concerning a single altercation between

Lee-McCampbell and Ragsdale where Lee-McCampbell had violently pinned

Ragsdale to the floor. Stefanick was subject to cross-examination. Another
                                        12
witness, Ardajaha Clark, testified she witnessed Lee-McCampbell wrap his

arms around Ragsdale’s neck hard enough that Ragsdale said she could not

breathe. Lee-McCampbell himself admitted on direct examination that he had

previously choked Ragsdale on two occasions. He admitted having multiple

violent arguments with Ragsdale. The remark regarding Stefanick’s expected

testimony was isolated and we do not discern any bad faith on the part of the

prosecutor. Given the evidence as a whole, including Lee-McCampbell’s own

admissions, we cannot conclude the Commonwealth’s failure to elicit the

anticipated evidence from Stefanick amounted to flagrant misconduct.

      Regarding the third alleged misstatement, Lee-McCampbell argues the

prosecutor committed flagrant misconduct by stating that Ragsdale’s sister,

Erica Leggs, would testify she witnessed Lee-McCampbell punch Ragsdale. The

prosecutor did not call Leggs to the stand during the guilt phase, although

Leggs did testify during the penalty phase. Lee-McCampbell has failed to

demonstrate the prosecutor acted in bad faith by failing to call Leggs to the

stand. Lee-McCampbell could have mitigated any possible prejudice during

closing argument by indicating the Commonwealth failed to produce the

evidence described in its opening statement. We cannot conclude the

prosecutor committed flagrant misconduct.

      For his third allegation of error, Lee-McCampbell argues the

Commonwealth unfairly misled the jury by eliciting testimony from a lay

witness that contradicted the testimony of an expert witness. Lee-McCampbell

asserts the Commonwealth unfairly placed the jury in a situation where it

                                       13
would be forced to believe a police officer over a medical doctor. As this

argument is unpreserved, we will again review for palpable error.

      Sergeant Travis Watson testified he observed petechiae in Ragsdale’s

eyes. Petechiae is the plural form of petechia, which means “a minute reddish

or purplish spot containing blood that appears in skin or mucous membrane

as a result of localized hemorrhage.” Petechia, Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary Unabridged (1993). However, Dr. Kiefer, the medical

examiner, testified that he did not observe any petechiae on Ragsdale’s body.

      Lee-McCampbell does not claim Sgt. Watson’s testimony about petechiae

was inadmissible. He simply speculates about the weight and credibility the

jury assigned to this evidence. It is well-established that “a jury is free to

believe the testimony of one witness over the testimony of others.” Minter v.

Commonwealth, 415 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Ky. 2013). When a jury is presented

with competent evidence, we “will not invade the jury’s province to weigh

conflicting evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses and draw the ultimate

conclusion.” Clark v. Commonwealth, 567 S.W.3d 565, 569-70 (Ky. 2019). We

cannot discern any error concerning the conflicting evidence, much less

palpable error.

      For his fourth contention of error, Lee-McCampbell argues the trial court

erred by allowing improper evidence of prior bad acts. He asserts this

argument is “partially preserved,” because he made “a blanket objection to

relevance and that the probative value was outweighed by prejudice.” Upon

review of the record, we conclude the alleged error was not properly preserved.

                                         14
      Prior to trial, the Commonwealth provided Lee-McCampbell notice of its

intent to produce evidence of multiple prior incidents of abuse that Lee-

McCampbell had inflicted upon Ragsdale. Pertinent to the present appeal, the

Commonwealth stated that it would present evidence that Lee-McCampbell had

pulled a gun on Ragsdale and some of her friends on December 29, 2017, less

than three months before Ragsdale’s death. Lee-McCampbell filed a response

objecting to the introduction of any evidence of prior bad acts. However, Lee-

McCampbell did not specifically address the gun incident at the hearing on the

motion in limine or otherwise object to the introduction of the evidence at trial.

A generic objection to any evidence of prior bad acts is insufficient to preserve

an error for review. Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Ky. 2005).

Nevertheless, we will review for palpable error as alternatively requested by

Lee-McCampbell.

      While evidence of prior bad acts is generally inadmissible to prove a

defendant’s criminal predisposition, KRE 404(b) “specifically provides for the

admission of prior bad act evidence to show the absence of an accident.” Driver

v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Ky. 2012). In Driver, the defendant

brutally beat and attempted to strangle his wife with a belt. At trial, the wife

attempted to minimize the defendant’s culpability and testified that most of her

physical injuries were the result of yard work and “wrestling.” The

Commonwealth was permitted to introduce, over the defendant’s objection,

evidence the defendant had previously threatened his wife with a knife and

committed other acts of abuse. The defendant was ultimately convicted of first-

                                        15
degree assault. This Court recognized that evidence of prior abuse and threats

by the defendant against the victim is generally relevant and admissible “to

prove the absence of accident or mistake when he subsequently killed her.” Id.

(quoting Moseley v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Ky. 1997)). In such

circumstances, neither the temporal remoteness of the prior abuse nor

differences in the method of abuse necessarily negate the relevance and

admissibility of the evidence. Id.

      Lee-McCampbell’s theory of the case was that Ragsdale’s death was

caused by accident while they were “play wrestling.” Under Driver, evidence

that Lee-McCampbell previously threatened Ragsdale with a gun is admissible

to prove the absence of an accident. Id. at 885. In the present appeal, the

prior threat occurred close in time to Ragsdale’s death. Although Lee-

McCampbell was not charged with the use of a gun in connection with

Ragsdale’s death, the admissibility of evidence to prove the absence of accident

does not depend on substantial similarity. Lee-McCampbell further argues the

testimony concerning the gun incident was not corroborated by any other

evidence. However, we discern no requirement that evidence under KRE 404(b)

requires independent corroboration. The admission of this evidence did not

amount to palpable error.

      For his fifth and final contention of error, Lee-McCampbell argues that

his conviction should be reversed because of cumulative error. We disagree.

Cumulative error is “the doctrine under which multiple errors, although

harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to

                                       16
render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d

577, 631 (Ky. 2010). The only possible error we identified was the unpreserved

allegation of prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor referenced

evidence of a fertilized egg during the opening statement, which was not

produced at trial. However, given the totality of the evidence, the statement did

not rise to the level of prejudice required to find palpable error. In the absence

of a single instance of prejudicial error, we cannot find cumulative error

warranting reversal. Id.

      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court

is affirmed.

      All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Conley, Lambert, Nickell, JJ., concur. Bisig,

Keller, Thompson, JJ., concur in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Jennifer Wade
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Michael R. Wadja
Assistant Attorney General

                                        17