Court Opinion

ID: 9723462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:15:56.252583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:37.359174
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring: I concur in the majority’s opinion. I write separately, however, to highlight several concerns that may be relevant in subsequent proceedings in this case. As the majority recounts, defense counsel had available to him a number of mitigation witnesses whom he did not choose to present at the defendant’s death penalty hearing. According to affidavits supplied by three of the potential witnesses — William Dillon and Grace Constable, employees of the Inner City Impact organization who knew the defendant from his involvement with that group, and the Reverend Douglas Moore, who had visited the defendant in jail — defense counsel rejected their testimony because they were not categorically opposed to the death penalty. This court has previously ruled, however, that testimony by mitigation witnesses concerning their attitudes toward the death penalty and its application to a particular defendant is not admissible at a capital sentencing hearing. (People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 22, 67-68; People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 502, 535; People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 252, 300-01.) Inquiry into the beliefs of Dillon, Constable, and Moore regarding capital punishment would therefore not have been relevant, and a defense objection to attempted cross-examination on the subject would have been proper. It appears, however, that the defendant’s participation in Inner City Impact had ended about a year before his commission of the offenses in this case, and counsel may well have decided not to present the testimony of Dillon and Constable because the defendant’s earlier activity in the group would have stood in sharp contrast to the gang-centered life he eventually chose to lead. Similar concerns may also have prompted counsel’s decision not to present the testimony of Pastor Moore, who would have testified about the defendant’s decision to leave Inner City Impact and join a street gang. The majority suggests that counsel conducted only a cursory investigation in preparing for the defendant’s sentencing hearing, waiting until the last minute to investigate possible sources of mitigating evidence. (126 Ill. 2d at 278-79.) I would note, however, that counsel’s pretrial preparation may have as well accomplished much of the investigation relevant to the sentencing hearing, making unnecessary further extensive investigation following the defendant’s conviction. See Darden v. Wainwright (1986), 477 U.S. 168, 184-85, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144,159-60, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2474. An evaluation of defense counsel’s performance must be based on the standard provided by Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052, which this court adopted in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27. Under Strickland there is a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably, and a defendant challenging counsel’s performance must demonstrate that the attorney’s conduct, when viewed against the circumstances of the case, fell outside the range of competent assistance. (466 U.S. at 689-90, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065-66.) The Strickland Court noted, “[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” (466 U.S. at 690-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.) I do not interpret our decision in this appeal as dictating any particular result in the proceedings on remand, and the circuit judge’s evaluation of the circumstances surrounding trial counsel’s performance will begin on a clean slate. I am neither unmindful of nor unsympathetic to the concerns expressed by Justice Ryan in his dissenting opinion with respect to delay in our legal system. In this case, however, the circuit court dismissed the defendant’s post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing, and we therefore have before us only the defendant’s unrebutted allegations. Unanswered and unchallenged, those allegations raise a question concerning counsel’s competency at the death penalty hearing. Remanding the cause to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing on this issue will allow the record to be developed so that we may then review, against the factual evidence, the defendant’s claims concerning counsel’s representation, rather than have the case proceed further with unanswered allegations. Had that been accomplished in the circuit court initially, the question of counsel’s effectiveness could have been resolved in the present appeal. This is not to say, however, that an evidentiary hearing is necessary, or appropriate, in every case. As I have pointed out, nothing in the majority opinion or in my special concurrence suggests what the eventual result should be, either in the circuit court or in this court on subsequent review. Once a hearing has been held, however, the trial judge, and later this court, will have available a complete record for evaluating the defendant’s claims under Strickland, which, we all agree, provides the applicable standard. An appropriate review at this time may very well shorten, rather than lengthen, the time it will take to get a final judgment in this case. Because only a single issue is presented, there is no reason why a hearing on remand and any appeal to this court cannot be accomplished on an expedited basis. CHIEF JUSTICE MORAN joins in this special concurrence.