Court Opinion

ID: 7101303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-24 12:16:06.593614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:13:25.090150
License: Public Domain

Reed, J.
The purpose of the pleader was undoubtedly to set up in the pleading controverting the answer of the garnishee what is denominated an equitable estoppel. The effect of such estoppel is to preclude the party from asserting a strict legal right, on the ground that his assertion of such right, under the circumstances of the case, would be against equity and good conscience. The pleading assumes that at the time the notice of garnishment was served on the garnishee he was not in fact indebted to Lustick, and that on strict legal grounds he was entitled to be discharged. Put the claim is that, having induced plaintiff, by the representation that he was indebted to Lustick, to institute the garnishment proceeding and incur the expense and trouble incident thereto, it would be manifestly unjust and inequitable in him to assert his exemption from liability thereon. And the question presented by the record is whether, under the facts stated in the pleading, the garnishee is estopped to deny that he is indebted to Lustick.
It will be observed that the representation on which plaintiff claims to have acted in instituting the garnishment proceedings consisted (1) in the statement of a matter of fact, viz., that the garnishee was at that time indebted to Lustick in a certain amount; and (2) in a promise or agreement as to his conduct in the future, viz., that he would withhold the amount, and not pay it over to Lustick, until plaintiff would *269liave an opportunity to procure an execution to issue, and notice of garnishment to be served upon him. But it does not appear from the averments of the pleading that the statement as to the matter of fact was not true when it was made; that is, it is not averred that the garnishee was -not indebted to Lustick at. the time the representation was made. Some time elapsed between the making of the representation and the service of the garnishment notice, and, for anything that appears in the pleading, the garnishee may have been indebted to Lustick at the time of the representation, and have paid the amount to him before the notice was served upon him. If those are the facts, the injury and damages which would result to plaintiff in case of the garnishee’s discharge would be occasioned, not by his denial of the truth of his statement that he was indebted to Lustick, but by his failure to perform the agreement to retain in his hands the amount of the indebtedness until the notice of garnishment should be served upon him. But an estoppel does not arise from the mere failure of a party to perform an executory agreement.
The doctrine of estoppel is applied to prevent the injustice which would result if one who has once asserted the existence of a fact, and thereby induced another to act in the belief of the truth of that statement, so as to change his previous position, were permitted afterwards to deny its truth. Under such circumstances, and as against the one who made the statement, the law is that it shall be conclusively presumed to be true. Pickard v. Sears, 6 Adol. & E., 469. But it is difficult to conceive a case in which one who is sued for the mere failure to perform an executory agreement would be precluded by the law from making any defense against the claim. It may be that plaintiff has a cause of action against the garnishee on the agreement; but, if so, he clearly cannot enforce it in this proceeding. Ilis remedy in that case must be sought in an original action against the party as defendant. In this proceeding, if he can recover at all, he can do so only by showing either that the garnishee was indebted to *270the defendant in execution when the notice of garnishment was served on him, or that such a state of facts existed that he is estopped to deny that he was so indebted: The pleading in question, in our opinion, does not show either of these states of fact.
Affirmed.