Court Opinion

ID: 9709546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:50:39.858862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:49.981866
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, P.J.
(dissenting). William Church entered the Quality Inn Motel with two intentions: (1) he intended to entice Jayson into his motel room so that he could cause Jayson to expose his penis; and (2) he intended to entice Jayson into his motel room so that he could give Jayson some marijuana.1 Church was successful in both respects. Jayson smoked the marijuana and Church took a picture of Jayson's exposed penis. The Wisconsin legislature, however, had anticipated both of Church's desires. The legislature made it a crime to cause a child under the age of eighteen to enter into a room with the intent to‘have the child expose his sex organ. See § 948.07(3), Stats. The legislature also made it a crime to cause a child under the age of eighteen to enter a room with the intent of giving him a controlled substance. See § 948.07(6).
The problem in this case is that Church did one act — he caused a minor to enter into a room — with two different intents. The majority concludes that this is really one crime, which can be committed in several *667ways. Thus, convicting Church of two crimes violates the double jeopardy provisions of our state and federal constitutions. I conclude that § 948.07, Stats., defines several crimes.
Wisconsin appellate courts have decided many double jeopardy cases. The theme of these cases is that we are to start with Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) to solve double jeopardy questions.
The majority analyzes Blockburger in a manner that other Wisconsin courts have not. It concludes that when statutory language is ambiguous, the rule of lenity makes Blockburger inapplicable and, absent any "clear intent" of the legislature to punish two crimes rather than one, double jeopardy prohibits conviction for two crimes.
This analysis bears a certain resemblance to the analysis used by the dissent in State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992). There, the dissenting justice wrote:
Applying the rule of strictly construing criminal statutes to safeguard the defendant's rights, or the rule of lenity, I conclude that any doubt concerning the legislature's intent should be resolved against turning a single act into an opportunity for multiple punishments.
Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 507, 485 N.W.2d at 10 (footnotes omitted). But a dissent is what the law is not. The majority in Sauceda permitted just what the dissent decried: a defendant who touched a sleeping juvenile's vaginal area was subjected to two punishments: (1) because he knew the victim was under the age of twelve, a violation of § 940.225(1)(d), Stats., 1985-86; and (2) because he knew the victim was unconscious, a violation of § 940.225(2)(d), Stats., 1985-86.
*668In State v. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d 740, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998), the court considered whether a defendant who violated two conditions of a bail bond could be subjected to two punishments or only one. The supreme court used the Blockburger analysis, even though it relied upon State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998), and concluded that each condition of a bail bond could support a separate conviction. The Anderson court said:
It is well-established that this court analyzes claims of multiplicity using a two-prong test: (1) whether the charged offenses are identical in law and fact; and (2) if the offenses are not identical in law and fact, whether the legislature intended the multiple offenses to be brought as a single count.
Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 747, 580 N.W.2d at 333. The court noted that this analysis is the same whether we review multiple charges brought under different statutory sections, or multiple charges brought under one statutory section. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 748, 580 N.W.2d at 333.
"The constitutional protections against double jeopardy in a single prosecution are meant to prevent a single offense from being arbitrarily transformed into multiple offenses with multiple punishments." State v. Kanarowski, 170 Wis. 2d 504, 510, 489 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Ct. App. 1992). Church caused Jayson to enter the motel room with two distinct purposes in mind, each of which is separately prohibited under § 948.07, Stats. Simply because one of the elements of each crime is shared by both crimes should not make a difference. As we said in State v. Johnson, 178 Wis. 2d 42, 48, 503 N.W.2d 575, 576 (Ct. App. 1993): "In simplest terms, the test is whether each offense requires proof of an *669additional element or fact which the other does not." If the test were whether a shared element exists, State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980), would have been decided differently. In Rabe, the defendant was charged with four counts of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle because he caused the death of four persons who died in an automobile accident. The "shared" element was the defendant's intoxication. The supreme court concluded that charging the defendant with four crimes did not offend the double jeopardy provisions of our constitutions.
Following Anderson, I conclude that each offense requires proof of an additional fact. Causing a child to expose his penis and giving the minor marijuana have nothing in common. Therefore, a presumption arises that the legislature intended to permit cumulative convictions of the statutes prohibiting those acts. State v. Selmon, 175 Wis. 2d 155, 161, 498 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Ct. App. 1993). This presumption may only be rebutted by a clear indication to the contrary. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 752, 580 N.W.2d at 335.2 To determine whether this presumption is rebutted, we examine four factors: (1) statutory language; (2) legislative history and context; (3) the nature of the proscribed conduct; and (4) the appropriateness of multiple punishment. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 752-53, 580 N.W.2d at 335. In some respects, I agree with the majority's observations as to these factors. But we differ significantly as to who bears the burden. I look to the four Anderson factors to see if they rebut the presumption that the legislature intended to permit cumulative convictions. The major*670ity looks at the four factors to see if they show a legislative intent to permit cumulative convictions.
Examining the statutory language, I find no clear indication that the legislature intended only one punishment no matter what Church did after he enticed Jayson into the room. At best, the language is ambiguous as to legislative intent. This does not rebut the presumption that the legislature intended multiple punishments.
The second factor we are to consider is legislative history and context. The majority concludes that the legislative history of the subsections in § 948.07, STATS., does not suggest that the legislature intended multiple punishments. While I agree, that is not the question. The legislative history cited by the majority does not clearly indicate to me that the legislature intended only one punishment. Thus, legislative history does not rebut the presumption that the legislature intended multiple punishments.
The third factor we are to consider is the nature of the proscribed conduct. Multiple punishments are permissible if the nature of the offenses is separate in time and significantly different in nature. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 756, 580 N.W.2d at 336. In Anderson, the court concluded that because the nature of the different prescribed conduct caused different harms, there was no clear indication under this factor to overcome the presumption of cumulative punishments. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 757, 580 N.W.2d at 336.1 see differences in the facts of Church's convictions. Causing a child to expose his penis causes harm to the juvenile's reputation and feelings of self-worth. Giving marijuana to a juvenile can harm the juvenile's health and can involve others, if the effects of using the marijuana are other *671than lethargy and sleep. The offenses are of a significantly different nature.
The final factor is the appropriateness of multiple punishments. By itself, this consideration does not have much meaning. But again, Anderson is helpful. The Anderson court focused on the deterrent effect multiple punishments have on potential violators and concluded that:
Without imposing multiple punishments for violating the different terms of bail, a defendant may even be encouraged to violate multiple terms, knowing that the punishment will be no different whether he or she violates one or all terms of bail. It is difficult to believe that the legislature intended this result.
Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 757, 580 N.W.2d at 337. A similar analysis can be used here. It strains credulity to believe that the legislature intended to give a free ride to multiple § 948.07, STATS., violators. I do not believe that the legislature intended that once a child enticer got a child in a room and exposed his or her sex organ to the child, there would be no further § 948.07 liability if the enticer caused the child to engage in prostitution, caused the child to expose his or her sex organ, made a recording of the child engaging in sexually explicit conduct, caused bodily harm to the child or gave the child a controlled substance. It is not a plausible argument that the legislature has made each of these acts crimes in and of themselves, regardless of whether enticement occurs. If we accept that logic, all of § 948.07 becomes redundant.
I conclude that the legislature intended § 948.07, STATS., to create criminal liability in addition to the liability under other statutes for the acts without the *672added element of enticement. Having so concluded, I see no reason why a separate conviction under each subsection of § 948.07 would be inappropriate. Using Anderson's analysis, alleged inappropriateness does not rebut the presumption that the legislature intended separate punishments.
I conclude that although the Blockburger test almost always results in a decision that the double jeopardy provisions of our constitutions are not violated by various multiple charging decisions, it is the test uniformly used by this court and the supreme court. There is probably a better test which would enhance the protection of our double jeopardy rights. Perhaps the majority's view is that test. But it is not the province of this court to promulgate a new test. State v. Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d 526, 533, 348 N.W.2d 159, 163 (1984). Accordingly, I cannot join in the majority opinion, and therefore respectfully dissent.

 Section 948.07, Stats., criminalizes certain acts of child enticers who cause a child to enter a building, room or secluded place. Whether the result in this case would be different if the State charged Church with entering the Quality Inn Motel with one intent and entering his room with another intent is an issue the parties have not briefed.

 The majority's analysis reverses this presumption. Under the majority's analysis, if a statute is not clear, the Blockburger test is inapplicable.