Court Opinion

ID: 9836791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:04.799273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.909698
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(concurring in the result):
In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), the Supreme Court held that litigants can offer any “facially valid” reason for a peremptory challenge, so long as the trial judge finds it to be genuine. A litigant’s explanation for a peremptory challenge does not have to be “persuasive, or even plausible,” for it to be considered legitimate. Id. A legitimate reason, according to the Purkett Court, is not one “that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.” Id. at 769, 115 S.Ct. 1769.
This Court’s standard for examining peremptory challenges, announced in United States v. Tulloch, 47 MJ 283 (1997), and perpetuated today (peremptory challenge will be sustained “unless the proffered reason is ‘unreasonable, implausible, or ... otherwise makes no sense’ ”) 53 MJ at 385, ignores our superior court’s teaching in Purkett. The focus should be on the genuineness of the asserted non-racial/non-gender motive, not the reasonableness of the trial advocate’s explanation. I have dissented from the majority’s justification for its deviation from the Supreme Court standard relating to peremptory challenges for courts-martial because I am unable to discern a valid reason to do so. 47 MJ at 289-96.
Under either Purkett or the more restrictive standard announced in Tulloch, appellant has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s challenge of Capt Moore was other than occupation-based. Accordingly, I too would affirm the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals.