Court Opinion

ID: 9855149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:20:18.508539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:42.245690
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
dissenting:
The majority holds that North-West Leasing Corporation (North-West) was not only the named insured under its insurance policy with Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers), but, by offering to sell to petitioner Antonio Passamano (Passamano) various insurance coverages for specified prices, was *1327also an insurer with respect to its rental agreement with Passamano. Maj. op. at 1317, 1318. In so holding, the majority determines that North-West, as an insurer, was required to offer uninsured motorist coverage to prospective customers and that Pas-samano, as a named insured, was entitled to acquire or reject uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to section 10-4-609(1), 4A C.R.S. (1994). Id. The majority therefore concludes that the rental agreement between North-West and Passamano constitutes an insurance policy.
The majority also concludes that the rental agreement between respondent Budget Rent-A-Car Systems (Budget) and petitioner Cecil Kent (Kent) constitutes a contract of insurance and that Budget was required to offer uninsured motorist coverage to Kent pursuant to section 1(M-609(1). Maj. op. at 1323.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the rental agreement constitutes an insurance policy. I dissent because the rental agreements between North-West and Passamano and between Budget and Kent do not constitute contracts of insurance; employees of a car rental agency are not agents of the insurance company; and Colorado does not require rental ear agencies, including self-insured rental ear agencies, to offer uninsured motorist coverage to customers of the rental car company for purposes of section 10-4-609(l).1 I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in Passamano v. Travelers Indemnity Co., and the judgment of the trial court in Kent v. Budget Bentr-A-Car Systems, Inc.2
I.
The determinative issue in these eases is whether Colorado’s statutory scheme concerning Automobile Insurance Regulations requires a car rental agency to offer uninsured motorist benefits to customers renting automobiles.
In Passamano v. Travelers Indemnity Co., National Car Rental Systems, Inc., and North-West Leasing Corp., 835 P.2d 514 (Colo.App.1991), the court of appeals, in affirming the trial court’s entry of summary judgment, concluded that North-West, as a named insured, was not required to offer uninsured motorist benefits to Passamano in its rental agreement. According to the court of appeals, the provision of liability insurance within the rental agreement was offered to Passamano as an insured and not as a named insured. See Nelson v. Strode Motors, Inc., 198 Colo. 366, 367, 600 P.2d 74, 75 (1979). The court of appeals determined that the coverage contained within the rental agreement between Passamano and North-West did not transform the car rental agreement into a contract of insurance as defined in section 10-1-102(7), 4A C.R.S. (1994).3 Passamano, 835 P.2d at 516. Relying upon the language used in the rental agreement,4 the *1328court of appeals ruled that the rental agreement is not a contract of insurance but is, instead, a bailment. Id.; see Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 987-88 (Colo.1986) (“Leasing a vehicle from a car rental agency creates a bailment contract for the mutual benefit of the parties.”).
The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment of respondents Travelers, North-West, and National Car Rental Systems, Inc. (National). Relying upon this court’s decision in Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo.1986), the trial court determined that the car rental agreement between Passamano and North-West created a bailment contract for the mutual benefit of both parties and did not constitute a contract of insurance. The trial court also determined that, under the insurance policy issued to North-West by Travelers, North-West was the named insured and Passamano was an additional insured. The trial court therefore concluded that Passamano had no authority to acquire or reject uninsured motorist coverage.
In Kent v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Budget. The petitioners, Cecil Kent and Chuck Brown, moved for summary judgment, claiming that Budget was required to provide uninsured motorist coverage as a result of an automobile accident that involved a ear rented to Kent by Budget and a vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist. Budget thereafter filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in the trial court on the basis that, as a self-insurer, it was not required to offer uninsured motorist coverage to Kent.
II.
A.
North-West purchased liability insurance from Travelers that covered all of NorthWest’s vehicles. North-West maintained this liability insurance policy with Travelers, which provided automobile liability and no-fault coverage for the renters of NorthWest’s vehicles. North-West, as the designated named insured of Travelers’ policy, exercised its option in writing to reject uninsured motorist coverage.
Passamano rented an automobile from North-West, a licensee of National. NorthWest’s standard two-sided rental agreement elicited information concerning the customer, including the method of payment, the vehicle rented, and the rental date, and contained several options with respect to insurance coverage.5 Prior to Passamano’s signing the rental agreement form, Northwest’s salesperson at the sales counter discussed with Passamano the type of vehicle to be rented and the terms of the agreement, the length of the rental term, and the optional coverage available for an additional charge, including “personal accident insurance” and a “collision damage waiver.”
The rental agreement provided liability coverage and no-fault coverage provisions. The liability insurance provision in paragraph 5 of the rental agreement provided in pertinent part as follows:
5. LIABILITY INSURANCE
Authorized Driver is covered by an automobile liability insurance policy or qualified self-insurance arrangements ... for bodily injury or death (limits $100,000 each person, $300,000 each accident) and for property damage (limit $25,000) for each accident arising from use of Vehicle as permitted by this Agreement. Minimum Mandatory No Fault coverage as required by applicable law is also provided. Company will not provide “Uninsured Motorist” coverage, “Underinsured Motorist” coverage or supplementary “No Fault” unless such coverages are required to be provided by applicable law and cannot be rejected. If required, and not rejectable, the limits will be the minimum required by law.
The rental agreement also contained a collision damage waiver provision which stated in part: “THIS COLLISION DAMAGE WAIVER IS NOT INSURANCE.”
*1329The majority contends that the rental agreement between North-West and Passa-mano was substantively a contract of insurance by offering insurance coverages for specified prices. Maj. op. at 1317. I disagree.
As the court of appeals correctly determined, North-West did not undertake to indemnify Passamano within the statutory definition of “insurance” provided under section 10-1-102(7), 4A C.R.S. (1994). 835 P.2d at 516. Rather, the insurance policy between Travelers and North-West provided that Travelers was responsible for processing and paying claims against North-West. According to the court of appeals, this contractual arrangement establishes that Travelers, not North-West, was the insurer.
In my view, sections 10-1-102(7), 10-1-102(8), 4A C.R.S. (1994), and 10-2-202(1), 4A C.R.S. (1987), are dispositive on the issues of whether a rental agreement is a contract of insurance and whether the sales representatives of a car rental agency are insurance agents.
Section 10-1-102(7) defines the term “insurance” as “a contract whereby one, for consideration, undertakes to indemnify another or to pay a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon determinable risk contingencies.” Section 10-1-102(8) defines the term “insurer” to mean “every person engaged as principal, indemnitor, surety, or contractor in the business of making contracts of insurance.” (Emphasis added.) Section 10-2-202(1) defines an “insurance agent” as “a person appointed by an insurer to solicit applications for a policy of insurance or to negotiate a policy of insurance on its behalf.”
Applying these statutory provisions to the facts of this ease, I believe there is ample evidence to support the court of appeals’ holding that the rental agreement was a bailment and not an insurance contract. NorthWest is engaged in the business of renting motor vehicles, and not in the business of insurance sales. Accordingly, the rental agreement should not be construed as an insurance contract. North-West’s sales representatives do not fall within the definition of insurance agents as set out in section 10-2-202(1), and thus the sales representatives cannot be considered agents of Travelers. Further, neither North-West nor its salespersons were licensed by the State of Colorado to act as lawfully registered insurance agents nor authorized to issue policies of insurance to motorists.
Basic principles of contract law serve to further discredit the majority’s holding a rental agreement to be a contract of insurance. A person contracts with a ear rental agency with the intent to rent a car. A person renting a car does not contract with a car rental agency for the purpose of buying an insurance policy to protect him/her from an accident with an uninsured motorist. The rental agency establishes the terms and conditions in the rental agreement, including whether to provide uninsured motorist coverage. If a person accepts the terms and conditions delineated in the rental agreement, the person may rent the ear. If the person does not accept the terms and conditions specified in the rental agreement, then the person does not have to rent the car.
Decisions from this court and the California Court of Appeal have arrived at a similar outcome even though these cases involved statutory contexts different from that presented here. For example, in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 842 P.2d 208 (Colo.1992), where we were required to interpret a Budget rental agreement and United States Fidelity’s insurance policy for purposes of basic liability coverage, we stated that the “Rental Agreement does not represent itself as an insurance contract, although it purports to insure Authorized Drivers ‘in accordance with the standard provisions of a Basic Automobile Liability Insurance Policy.’” Id. at 211 n. 4.
In Nelson v. Strode Motors, Inc., 198 Colo. 366, 600 P.2d 74 (1979), we held that a renter of a vehicle who, as a pedestrian, was struck and injured by a car driven by an uninsured motorist, was not entitled to personal injury protection benefits for an accident which occurred away from his rented vehicle as he was not a named insured. Nelson commenced a breach of contract action against *1330Strode Motors, the company that had rented him the automobile, claiming that he was entitled to various insurance protections based on contract and insurance law. We viewed the renter as an insured under the existing policy, and Strode Motors as the named insured.6 We therefore determined that Strode Motors was not obligated to obtain for the renter additional insurance coverages aside from the required liability coverage for bodily injuries and property damage.
The California Court of Appeal has also held that a rental agreement is not a policy of insurance, and that, as such, a rental company cannot be held to the standard of an insurer to provide statutorily mandated insurance coverage, including uninsured motorist coverage. Truta v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 193 Cal.App.3d 802, 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 (1987). The Truta court reviewed California appellate decisions that had already addressed the question of whether a particular entity was engaged in the business of insurance. For example, the court examined the analysis performed by California Physicians’ Service v. Garrison, 28 Cal.2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946), in which the court held that providing medical services to low-income patients who paid monthly membership dues did not constitute engaging in the insurance business because the principal purpose or object of the operation was service rather than indemnity. Truta, 193 Cal.App.3d at 812, 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 (citing California Physicians’ Serv., 172 P.2d at 16). The Truta court additionally analyzed the reasoning employed in Transportation Guarantee Co. v. Jellins, 29 Cal.2d 242, 174 P.2d 625 (1946), where the court determined that truck maintenance contracts containing provisions that the maintenance company agree to insure the vehicles for the owner with an authorized insurance company did not constitute insurance contracts. The Transportation Guarantee Co. court stated:
“We are satisfied that a sound jurisprudence does not suggest the extension, by judicial construction, of the insurance laws to govern every contract involving an assumption of risk or indemnification of loss; that when the question arises each contract must be tested by its own terms as they are written, as they are understood by the parties, and as they are applied under the particular circumstances involved.”
Truta, 193 Cal.App.3d at 813-14, 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 (quoting Transportation Guarantee Co., 174 P.2d at 629).
The court in Transportation Guarantee Co. continued:
“Plaintiffs obligations (with their reciprocal contractual rights) to make repairs, to maintain the truck in good running order, and to keep a truck constantly available to the owner except for reasonable service periods, do not in our opinion, make the plaintiff an insurer. Such obligations are similar to those ordinarily undertaken by a lessor of motor vehicles and, unless we are prepared to hold that any lessor of such vehicles, entering into such a contract, is in the insurance business, then we should not hold that plaintiff is, on that account, in such business.”
Truta, 193 Cal.App.3d at 814, 238 Cal.Rptr. 806 (quoting Transportation Guarantee Co., 174 P.2d at 631-32).
In summary, I conclude that a car rental agreement does not constitute a contract of insurance for the purposes of section 10-1-102(7), and that sales representatives of a car rental agency are not agents of an insurance company as provided in section 10-2-202(1). I further hold that a car rental agency does not assume the status of an insurer pursuant to section 10-1-102(8) since a car rental agency is not in the business of making contracts of insurance. The court of appeals therefore correctly determined that the rental agreement between Passamano and North-West was a bailment and not an insurance contract, and that North-West, as a named insured, was not required to offer uninsured motorist benefits to Passamano.
*1331B.
The majority performs a laborious statutory construction analysis and examination of the legislative history behind Part 6 of Title 10, Article 4, and consequently digresses from the plain meaning of the relevant statutory provisions.
Pursuant to well-accepted rules of statutory construction, a statute is to be interpreted and applied so as to give meaning to all portions thereof, based upon the plain meaning of its terms. Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.1991); A.B. Hirschfeld Press, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 806 P.2d 917, 920 (Colo.1991). Further, when the legislature defines a term, courts must give meaning to that definition, and use that definition wherever it appears in the statute. R.E.N. v. City of Colorado Springs, 823 P.2d 1359, 1364 (Colo.1992). Moreover, it is axiomatic that, when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the courts should interpret the statute as written and need not resort to the rules of statutory construction. Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218, 221 (Colo.1992); Bloomer v. Board of County Comm’rs of Boulder County, 799 P.2d 942, 944 (Colo.1990).
The term “automobile policy” is defined within section 10-4-601, 4A C.R.S. (1994), which provides that the definition of “policy” is to be utilized in Part 6 of Title 10, Article 4, “unless the context otherwise requires”:
Definitions. As used in this part 6, unless the context otherwise requires:
[[Image here]]
(2) “Policy” means an automobile insurance policy providing coverage for all or any of the following coverages: Collision, comprehensive, bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments, and uninsured motorist coverage, or a combination automobile policy providing bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments, uninsured motorist, and physical damage coverage, delivered or issued for delivery in this state, insuring a single individual, or husband and wife, or family members residing in the same household, as named insured, and under which the insured vehicles therein designated are of the following types only:
(a) A motor vehicle of the private passenger or station wagon type that is not used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers nor rented to others[.]
Section 10-4-608, 4A C.R.S. (1994), which exempts from the protection of part 6 those policies insuring more than four vehicles or covering garages, automobile sales agencies, and similar commercial enterprises, provides as follows:
Exemptions. This part 6 shall not apply to any policy ... insuring more than four automobiles, or to any policy covering a garage, automobile sales agency, repair shop, service station, or public parking place operation hazard, or to any policy of insurance issued principally to cover personal or premises liability of an insured even though such insurance may also provide some incidental coverage for liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the motor vehicle on the premises of such insured, or on the ways immediately adjoining such premises.
Section 10-4 — 609(1), 4A C.R.S. (1994), governs uninsured motorist benefits, and dictates under what circumstances such benefits must be provided:
No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle licensed for highway use in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; except that the named insured may reject such coverage in writing.
In my view, the statutory language is unambiguous and therefore we are bound to apply the statutes as written. Only by construing the statutory provisions in part 6 together do we effectuate the plain meaning *1332of the relevant statutes. Based on my reading of sections 10-4-601, 10-1-608, and 10 — 1-609 together, I conclude that the uninsured motorist provision does not apply to a car rental agreement covering motor vehicles that are rented to others or to an automobile insurance policy insuring more than four vehicles.7
The majority concludes that the rental agreement constitutes an automobile liability insurance policy pursuant to section 10-4-609(1). The majority reaches this conclusion by determining that the definition of “policy” in section 10-4-601(2) applies only to sections 10-4-601 to -608, and not to section 10-4-609. In devising this holding, the majority jumps through endless hoops to reach this result.
The majority does not construe the language in section 10-4-601 as exempting liability insurance policies covering rental vehicles from the provisions of section 10 — 4-609(1). Maj. op. at 1318. I do. In looking at the rental agreement only, the majority so quickly forgets that section 10-4-601 defines “policy ” as an automobile liability insurance policy providing uninsured motorist coverage to an insured vehicle which is not rented to others.
The majority’s emphasis on the chronological history of the Automobile Insurance Policy Cancellation Act — first articulated in 1969 as sections 72-30-1 to -8, and recodified in 1973 as sections 10-4-601 to -608, 4 C.R.S. (1973) — fails to convince me that the uninsured motorist provision — originally codified in 1965 as section 72-12-19 (1965 Perm. Supp.), and later removed from the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility section and added in 1979 by amendment to the Automobile Insurance Regulations section, as section 10-4-609, 4 C.R.S. (1973 & 1979 Supp.)— should be read separately from the other provisions in part 6. Contrary to the majority’s contention, the decision of the General Assembly in 1979 to reenact section 72-12-19 as section 10-4^609 reflects the General Assembly’s intent to have the definition of “policy” articulated within part 6 to also apply to uninsured motorist coverage. Nothing contained within section 10-4-609 “otherwise requires” that a different definition of “policy” apply from that provided in section 10-4-601(2). If the General Assembly had not intended the definitions provided in 10^4-601, or the exemptions provided in 10-4-608, to apply to 10-4-609, the General Assembly could easily have stated so in 1983, when the uninsured motorist section was again amended into its present form. The General Assembly, however, made no express effort to isolate 10-4-609 from the rest of part 6.
In defining the term “policy” in section 10-4-601(2) to mean an automobile liability insurance policy insuring certain types of vehicles but excluding motor vehicles rented to others, I conclude that section 10-4-609 does not apply to the rental agreement issued by North-West to Passamano. My conclusion is further reinforced by examining the other relevant statutory provisions in part 6 and sections 10-1-102(7), 4A C.R.S. (1994), 10-1-102(8), 4A C.R.S. (1994), and 10-2-202(1), 4A C.R.S. (1987).
The majority also discounts the exemptions created in section 10-4-608 by construing the rental agreement in isolation from North-West’s automobile liability insurance policy with Travelers. In performing this creative mechanical maneuver, the majority casually passes off the undisputed fact that North-West, by virtue of being a rental car agency, insured more than four automobiles.8 The plain language of section 10-4-608 provides that no part of part 6, including section 10-4-609, shall require an automobile insurer who issues a policy insuring more than four automobiles to provide or offer uninsured motorist coverage. Contrary to the majority’s analysis, I believe that the exemptions provided in section 10^V608 apply to the facts of this case.
In my view, the majority’s decision is also irreconcilable with the plain language of section 10-4-609. The uninsured motorist statute requires an insurer who provides an au*1333tomobile liability insurance policy to offer uninsured motorist coverage to the named insured although such coverage may be rejected in writing by the named insured.9 Section 10-4-609 requires that no automobile liability insurance policy be delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed, unless coverage is provided to protect against uninsured motorists. The statutory language explicitly addresses the rights and duties of the insurer and the insured under a contract of insurance. To read into the language a requirement that a car rental agency under the terms of a rental agreement must provide uninsured motorist coverage would distort its clear and unambiguous meaning.
III.
Kent rented an automobile from Budget. The agreement contained the following relevant provisions:
6) LIABILITY INSURANCE: IF THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF ANY OF THE USE RESTRICTIONS IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE, Renter and any Authorized Driver shall, while operating the Vehicle, be provided with liability coverage in accordance with the standard provisions of a Basie Automobile Liability Insurance Policy or in accordance with the requirements of a qualified self-insurer instead of such coverage, for protection against liability for causing bodily injury (including death) and property damage with one of the following applicable coverage limits:
—coverage limits imposed by the state financial responsibility law where this rental transaction takes place; OR
—coverage limit of $100,000 for each person, but not more than $300,000 for each occurrence, and property damage limits of up to $25,000 for each occurrence if a Renter, at time of rental, possessed valid Budget CorpRate or Sears Checklist Charge credentials, and such rental is charged at a valid Budget CorpRate or Sears Checklist Charge rate.
(If S.L.I. is offered and accepted, a higher limit of liability insurance will be provided as described in the applicable brochure[.])
A. A1 coverages automatically conform to the basic requirements of any “No-Fault” law which may be applicable. RENTER WAIVES UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST, SUPPLEMENTAL NO-FAULT AND OTHER OPTIONAL COVERAGES.
B. If any coverages herein cannot be excluded or waived, Renter agrees that such coverages shall be automatically reduced to the minimum requirements of the applicable financial responsibility law and that such coverages shall be excess to any other applicable insurance.
Budget was self-insured, and neither offered nor provided uninsured motorist coverage to Kent. As a self-insurer, Budget is obligated to provide only statutorily mandated benefits, namely, liability and no-fault benefits as required under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act. Section 10-4-716, 4A C.R.S. (1994), sets forth the obligations of self-insurers and provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) Any person in whose name more than twenty-five motor vehicles are registered may qualify as a self-insurer by obtaining a certificate of self-insurance issued by the director.
(2) The director may, in his discretion, upon the application of such person, issue a certificate of self-insurance when he is satisfied that such person is possessed and will continue to be possessed of ability to pay direct benefits as required under section 10-4-706 and to pay any and all judgments which may be obtained against such person.
The majority discounts Budget’s status as a self-insurer and instead finds the relationship between Budget and Kent controlling. In the majority’s view, Kent is the named insured and Budget is the insurer under the rental agreement executed between Kent and *1334Budget. Maj. op. at 1323. Consequently, the majority concludes that Budget was required to offer Kent the option of rejecting uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to section 10-4-609(1). The majority makes an unconvincing attempt to downplay Budget’s status as a self-insurer which in my view dictates whether Budget is required to offer uninsured motorist coverage to its customers.
In Passamano v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 835 P.2d 514 (Colo.App.1991), the court of appeals stated:
The trial court correctly relied on White v. Regional Transportation District, 735 P.2d 218 (Colo.App.1987) (self-insurers need not provide uninsured motorist coverage in the absence of a legislative declaration) in its refusal to judicially legislate this interpretation. We reach the same conclusion. The issue is best left to the General Assembly for its consideration.
In summary, we hold that the automobile rental agreement here is not an insurance contract. By definition, then, plaintiff is not a “named insured” thereunder.
Id. at 517.
Section KM-716 requires only that a self-insurer be possessed with the ability to pay no-fault benefits as required under section 10-4-706, 4A C.R.S. (1994), and to pay any and all judgments which may be obtained against the self-insurer. Budget’s waiver of uninsured motorist coverage complied with section 10-4-716 since Budget is neither required by law to offer nor provide such benefits. White v. Regional Transp. Dist., 735 P.2d 218 (Colo.App.1987).
The issue of whether a self-insurer is required to provide uninsured motorist coverage to the driver or passengers of a self-insurer’s vehicle has already been resolved by our courts. In White v. Regional Transportation District, 735 P.2d 218, 219 (Colo.App.1987), the court of appeals determined that section 10-4-609(1) does not apply to self-insurers. The court of appeals noted that the majority of courts who have addressed this issue have held that a certificate of self-insurance is not an insurance policy, and thus, self-insurers are not required to obtain uninsured motorist coverage for the benefit of drivers and passengers of a self-insurer’s vehicles in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary. In electing to follow the majority rule, the court of appeals stated:
The General Assembly’s failure to include any reference to a certificate of self-insurance in any of the statutes dealing with uninsured motorist coverage evidences its intent not to require self-insurers to obtain uninsured motorist coverage. Section 10-4-609(1), C.R.S. (1986 Cum. Supp.), which obligates insurance companies to offer uninsured motorist coverage, makes no mention of certificates of self-insurance. Concomitantly, §§ 10-4-716, C.R.S. and 42-7-501, et seq., C.R.S. (1984 Repl.Vol. 17), which detail the manner in which a certificate of self-insurance is obtained, contain no provisions regarding uninsured motorist coverage.
White, 735 P.2d at 219.
The majority of other jurisdictions have held that self-insurers, including self-insured lessor car rental agencies, are not required to offer uninsured motorist benefits to their lessees. For example, in Diversified Services, Inc. v. Avila, 606 So.2d 364 (Fla.1992), the court resolved the issue as to whether a self-insured automobile leasing company is required to offer uninsured motorist coverage. The Diversified Services court found its recent decision in Lipof v. Florida Power and Light, 596 So.2d 1005 (Fla.1992), where the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the term “motor vehicle liability policy” is defined as a policy “issued by any insurance company authorized to do business in this state,” to be instructive to this case. Diversified Servs., 606 So.2d at 366 (quoting Lipof, 596 So.2d at 1007). Because the employer in Lipof was not an insurance company, the court concluded that the employment agreement did not fit within the definition of a “motor vehicle liability policy.” Consequently, the Diversified Senices court held that Budget’s rental agreement was not a policy of insurance and Budget, as a self-insurer, had no duty to offer or provide uninsured motorist benefits to its renters. Other courts have reached similar holdings. See Robinson v. Hertz Corp., 140 Ill.App.3d 687, 95 Ill.Dec. 111, 489 N.E.2d 332 (1986) *1335(holding that a self-insured auto rental company need not provide uninsured motorist coverage to renters); Lapp v. Transport Indem. Co., 164 Cal.App.3d 161, 210 Cal.Rptr. 135 (1985) (finding that a car rental company legally waived uninsured motorist coverage and such waiver binds renter of vehicle); Reeves v. Wright & Taylor, 310 Ky. 470, 220 S.W.2d 1007, 1010 (1949) (“[T]he owner of the leased automobiles is not engaged in the insurance business when he procures a certificate of self insurance from the Department of Revenue in lieu of a liability insurance policy. The certificate merely shows that he has produced evidence of financial responsibility.”); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 116 Ariz. 225, 568 P.2d 1123 (App.1977) (finding that a self-insured employer had no duty to provide uninsured motorist coverage to an employee injured on the job notwithstanding Arizona’s statutory requirement that uninsured motorist coverage be included in any policy of motor vehicle liability insurance).
Although Budget’s status as a self-insurer provides an additional reason why it was not required to offer uninsured motorist protection to its customers, my analysis of the statutory provisions in part 6, discussed supra, governs with equal force the situation presented here. Accordingly, the exemption contained within section 10-4-608, 4A C.R.S. (1994), excluding part 6 from applying to a policy insuring more than four automobiles, applies to these facts since Budget, as a certified self-insurer, had to possess more than twenty-five automobiles pursuant to the requirements in section 10-4-716. Based on this exemption, the coverage required under section 10-4-609 does not apply. Therefore, for the same reasons that North-West was not required to offer uninsured motorist coverage, Budget also was not required to offer uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to section 10-4-609. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Budget.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice ROVIRA joins in this dissent.

. Section 10-4-609(1), 4A C.R.S. (1994), provides as follows:
Insurance protection against uninsured motorists. (1) No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle licensed for highway use in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; except that the named insured may reject such coverage in writing.

. We consolidated Passamano v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 835 P.2d 514 (Colo.App.1991), and Kent v. Budget Rent-a-Car Systems, Inc., for our review.

. Section 10-1-102(7), 4A C.R.S. (1994), defines the term "insurance” as "a contract whereby one, for consideration, undertakes to indemnify another or to pay a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon determinable risk contingencies.”

. The agreement provides: "This is an Agreement between you and the Company to rent to you a motor Vehicle.” (Second emphasis added.) Immediately above the signature line, the form contract states: "I HAVE READ THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS RENTAL AGREEMENT AND AGREE THERETO. RENTER'S SIGNATURE _” (Emphasis added.) The court of appeals stated: "These terms are consistent with those used in a rental contract; they are not the terms found in contracts of insurance.” Passamano, 835 P.2d at 516 (emphasis added).

. Lessees were given an opportunity to select additional coverages which were referred to as "options” in the rental agreement.

. In Nelson, the controlling statute was § 10-4-706, 4A C.R.S. (1973), governing no-fault benefits. Nevertheless, the distinction between the status of a renter of a vehicle as an insured, and not as a named insured, cannot be diminished.

. The record indicates that North-West owned, leased, and/or operated a fleet of approximately 700 vehicles in the course of its rental activities.

. The majority states the obvious: the rental agreement between North-West and Passamano covers only one vehicle.

. In the instant case, Travelers, the insurance company, properly offered uninsured motorist coverage to its named insured, North-West, which exercised its option to reject uninsured motorist coverage. The offer and rejection satisfy the requirements of § 10-4-609, and are valid and effective.