Court Opinion

ID: 9604546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:23:14.659549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:04.373672
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, Justice,
dissenting:
The plaintiff’s wife died on February 11, 1981, at which time the Oklahoma Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act had been in effect some two and one half years. Among the short periods of limitations established by the Act at its inception was one imposing a requirement for notice to the political subdivision in claims for wrongful death within one year after the alleged injury resulting in death. 51 O.S. 1978 § 156(D).
The Act in 51 O.S.1978 § 152(6) originally defined political subdivisions as
“either an incorporated city or town, a school district or a county and all their institutions, instrumentalities or agencies.”
The legislature amended that section effective July 1, 1979 as follows:
“Political subdivision means:
a. a municipality;
b. a school district;
c. a county; or
d. a public trust where a city, town, school district or county is a beneficiary” (emphasis added)
Such was the status of the Tort Claims Act on the date plaintiff’s wife died.1
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was supported by an affidavit that the South Oklahoma City Hospital Trust d/b/a South Community Hospital was a public trust created in accordance with 60 O.S.1961 § 176-180, and that its beneficiary is the City of Oklahoma City. Attached to plaintiff’s brief is a copy of Page 10 of the Trust Indenture, providing in part as follows:
“Article VIII Beneficiary of Trust
(1) The beneficiary of this Trust shall be the City of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, under and pursuant to Title 60, Oklahoma Statutes 1961, Sections 176 to 180, both inclusive, and *1086other statutes of the State of Oklahoma as presently in force and effect. Trustor now declares that this Trust Indenture shall be irrevocable from the moment it is signed by him and delivered to the Trustees, and that it shall thereafter stand without any power whatsoever at any time to alter, amend, revise, modify, revoke or terminate any of the provisions of this Trust Indenture.”
A majority of the court has determined that the statutory notice requirements don’t apply because the South Community Hospital is not a political subdivision at all, and that is because it is not a real public trust; it is merely an “illusory” public trust.
The Act under which South Community Hospital and all other public trusts in the state are formed is found at 60 O.S.1981 §§ 176-180 (originally adopted in 1951) under the heading “Trusts for Furtherance of Public Functions.” In light of those sections let us examine the court’s conclusions.
Conclusion # 1. “In the absence of dissolution, there is no direct monetary benefit to the City. The City does not budget for the operation of the Hospital nor does the Hospital contribute to the City’s treasury.”
Section 176(a) provides in part:
“Provided, that no funds from said beneficiary derived from sources other than the trust property, or the operation thereof, shall be charged with or expended for the execution of said trust, except by express action of the legislative authority of the beneficiary....”
So although the Act doesn’t forbid the city from lawfully providing funds for the trust, nowhere does the Act require it.
Conclusion #2. “The Hospital’s business is conducted without consultation with the City nor is it conducted within any parameters of City sponsored policy. The trust indenture specifically strips the City of any power or control.”
Section 178D provides in part:
“Meetings of trustees of all public trusts shall be open to the public to the same extent as is required by law for other public boards and commissions. Such meetings shall also be open to the press and any such equipment deemed necessary by the press to record or report the activities of the meetings.... Records of the trust and minutes of the trust meetings of any public trust shall be written and kept in a place, the location of which shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk of each county, wherein the trust instrument shall be recorded. Such records and minutes shall be available for inspection by any person during regular business hours.”
Nowhere does the Act require the trust to conduct its business in the proximity of or with the approval of the city council. Nor does the Act attempt to give the beneficiary-city any control over the way the trust-hospital does business.
Conclusion #3. “The only connection between the hospital and the City is the trust agreement which provides fiscally attractive statutory funding.”
This is also a correct statement. But no rule of the law requires that there be a “connection” between the trust and the beneficiary apart from the trust instrument. Section 176(a) tells us why trusts such as this one may be created:
“Express trusts may be created to issue obligations and to provide funds for the furtherance and accomplishment of any authorized and proper public function or purpose of any ... municipality_”
The court, however, has not pointed out a single invalidity in the way the South Community Hospital Trust was established or conducted. The hospital is a public trust created and doing business under 60 O.S. 1981 §§ 176-180; at least there is no evidence to the contrary. The majority opinion appears to be burdening it with the obligations of a municipal hospital created under 11 O.S.1981 § 30-101, which it is not.
Is it a political subdivision? No, not now, because of the legislative amendment effective October 1, 1985. Was it a political subdivision on February 11, 1981, the date of death? Yes, if we are to believe the legislature. If the statute says a “political subdivision” is a “public trust where a city is a beneficiary” I am obliged to agree. In Oliver v. City of Tulsa, 654 P.2d *1087607 (Okl.1982), we said, quoting from Minnix v. State, 282 P.2d 772 (Okl.Cr.1955),
“It is within the province of the legislative body to define words appearing in legislative acts, and where an act passed by the legislature embodies a definition, it is binding on the courts.” (Id at 611)
We are thus not at leisure to disregard a definition placed in a statute by the legislature.
Nor is the doctrine of Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937) well placed here. The case of a sham transfer to defeat a wife’s interest under community property laws is hardly applicable to a hospital serving the public in full compliance with the statutes under which it was established.
My disagreement with the special concurring opinion is that I find no offense done to Article 5, Section 51 of the Oklahoma Constitution. That provision forbids the legislature from granting any “exclusive rights, privileges, or immunities.” (emphasis mine). It, along with Article 2, Section 32, is designed to prevent the granting of exclusive rights and privileges and the creation of monopolies. Ex parte Sales, 108 Okl. 29, 233 P. 186 (1925). It is intended to preserve equality between citizens who are similarly situated. Kimery v. Public Service Co. of Okla., 622 P.2d 1066 (Okl.1980). South Oklahoma City Hospital Trust has been granted no exclusive immunity; it succeeds to the identical status enjoyed by any and all public trusts “where a city, town, school district or county is a beneficiary.”
Nor do I find any constitutionally prohibited “special” legislation involved in this case.
I would affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the action for failure to give the statutorily required notice.
I am authorized to state that Justices HODGES, LAVENDER, and HARGRAVE join this dissent.

. The legislature has since seen fit to amend “out" hospitals such as defendant here by the following exclusion from 51 O.S.1985 § 152(8) (effective October 1, 1985).
"Political subdivision" means:
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“d. A public trust where a city, town, school district or county is a beneficiary, provided, that for purposes of this act a public trust shall not include any hospital operating under a trust authority." (emphasis added)