Court Opinion

ID: 9948125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 16:05:29.282447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:10.934398
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                        No. 1D2022-0191
                 _____________________________

MATTHEW PATRICK HASLAUER,

    Appellant,

    v.

ASHLEY MARIE HASLAUER,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.
John T. Brown, Judge.

                          March 6, 2024

WINOKUR, J.

     Matthew Patrick Haslauer (“Former Husband”) appeals a
Final Judgment dissolving his marriage to Ashley Marie Haslauer
(“Former Wife”) and seeks review of an order granting attorney’s
fees pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c)(3).
We affirm the dissolution judgment. However, because we find
that Former Wife did not establish her entitlement to attorney’s
fees pursuant to section 61.16, Florida Statutes, we vacate the fee
order.
                                   I

     When the parties married in 2015, Former Husband had a
money market account with a balance of approximately $21,000.
At some point after the marriage, the account became a joint
account between Former Husband and Former Wife. Sometime
later, Former Wife told Former Husband that she wanted a
divorce. Before either party filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage, Former Husband transferred approximately $17,500
from the joint account into a separate account that he alone
controlled. When confronted by Former Wife about the transfer,
Former Husband stated: “I need those funds in an accessible
account to pay for my lawyer.” True to his word, Former Husband
then used those funds to retain the services of an attorney. Not
long thereafter, Former Husband filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage.

     Former Wife filed a counter petition, which included a
boilerplate request for attorney’s fees:

        The Wife has become obligated to pay the
    undersigned attorney a reasonable fee and costs to
    represent her in this action, on both a temporary and
    permanent basis. The Husband has the financial
    resources to pay same and should be required to do so.

In that request, however, Former Wife did not allege that she
needed financial assistance so that she could obtain the services of
an attorney. Nor did Former Wife file a request for an interim fee
order so that she could continue to maintain or defend the action.

     As part of the equitable distribution of marital assets and
liabilities in the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the trial
court ordered Former Husband to make a $41,000 equalization
payment to Former Wife. 1 After considering salaries and child
support, the parties monthly net incomes were roughly equivalent:
$6,845 for Former Husband and $6,854 for Former Wife. At the

    1 The trial court granted a motion for rehearing in part by

reducing the equalization payment from $49,000 to $41,000.

                                  2
time of dissolution, Former Wife had an annual salary of $98,000
and Former Husband had an annual salary of $128,000. Former
Wife did not request spousal support; however, the trial court
ordered Former Husband to pay her $850 per month in child
support.

     Regarding attorney’s fees, the Final Judgment of Dissolution
of Marriage ordered Former Husband to pay Former Wife’s
attorney’s fees without making any specific findings of fact to
support and explain the decision, saying only “[Former] Wife is
found to have the need and the [Former] Husband is found to have
the ability to pay [Former] Wife’s attorney’s fees and costs.” The
court reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount. In the order
on rehearing, the trial court characterized the fee order as an
equitable reimbursement for Former Husband’s unilateral
transfer of marital funds:

    The Court cannot as a matter of equity allow one party to
    spend marital funds on that one party’s attorney’s fees
    without taking that into consideration in the award of
    attorney’s fees to the other party. The payment of
    attorney’s fees is not a race that benefits the faster in this
    matter.

    After Former Husband filed a notice of appeal, the trial court
conducted a hearing to determine the fee amount, ruling that
Former Wife was entitled to $58,738.59 from Former Husband for
her attorney’s fees. Former Husband then filed another notice of
appeal, which this Court treated as a motion for review under
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c)(3).

                                  II

     Section 61.16, Florida Statutes, authorizes a trial court to
order one party to pay another party’s reasonable attorney’s fees
in a proceeding held under Chapter 61, Florida Statutes. See
§ 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (“The court may from time to time, after
considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to
pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees, suit money, and the
cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding

                                  3
under this chapter, including enforcement and modification
proceedings and appeals.”).

     We note first that section 61.16 “is not a prevailing party fee
statute.” Schneider v. Schneider, 32 So. 3d 151, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA
2010) (citing Widder v. Widder, 673 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 4th DCA
1996)); see also Humerickhouse v. Humerickhouse, 932 So. 2d 1142,
1145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“An award of attorney’s fees in domestic
support cases is not dependent on one party’s success in the
litigation but rather upon the parties’ relative financial
resources.”) (citing Bullock v. Jones, 666 So. 2d 224, 225 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1995)). Instead, as the supreme court explained in Rosen v.
Rosen, the purpose of section 61.16 is “to ensure that both parties
have similar access to competent legal counsel, the trial court must
look to each spouse’s need for suit money versus each spouse’s
respective ability to pay.” 696 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1997); see also
Mishoe v. Mishoe, 591 So. 2d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
(“Attorney’s fees may be awarded in domestic cases to insure that
each party has a similar ability to secure competent legal
counsel.”). Section 61.16 helps mitigate the future harm that would
otherwise result from an economic disparity between the parties.
See Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So. 2d 620, 621–22 (Fla. 1988) (“[T]he
equitable considerations underlying our dissolution law compel
the trial court to mitigate the harm an impecunious spouse would
suffer where the other spouse’s financial advantage accords him or
her an unfair ability to obtain legal assistance.” (citation omitted));
see also Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 835
(Fla. 1990) (“A significant purpose of [section 61.16 as a] fee-
authorizing statute is to assure that one party is not limited in the
type of representation he or she would receive because that party’s
financial position is so inferior to that of the other party.”).

     Because it provides “access” to legal representation, section
61.16 contemplates a prospective, rather than a retrospective, fee
order. This court explained this principle in Jessup v. Werner, 354
So. 3d 605, 608–09 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022):

    [A] trial court must consider whether the requesting
    party has a lack of access to money or other assets that
    precludes him or her from hiring counsel to assist in ably
    seeing the proceeding through to its conclusion. The

                                  4
    statute uses the phrase “from time to time,” which
    indicates the interlocutory and ongoing nature of the
    consideration in a dissolution or paternity action. This
    approach stands in marked contrast with that taken in a
    case involving a typical prevailing-party fee provision,
    where a trial court would not consider a fee request until
    after a final judgment is rendered.

         In this case, the trial court did not make an interim
    order regarding attorney’s fees. Instead, it tucks into its
    final    paternity    judgment      just   a   preliminary
    determination of whether there should be a fee payment
    at all. In doing so, it treats the fee determination as a
    matter of reimbursement for fees that the mother
    ostensibly already paid, and perhaps for fees she still has
    to pay. Section 742.045, though, is not a reimbursement
    provision, like a prevailing-party provision might be.
    Instead, the terms of section 742.045, as characterized by
    the supreme court, required the trial court to consider
    whether the mother needed money from the father to hire
    and retain competent counsel to represent her in the
    proceeding.

But see Nichols, 519 So. 2d at 621 (concluding that denying a
spouse’s motion for temporary attorney’s fees solely because the
spouse was represented by counsel at the hearing was
unacceptable because it “would mean that the requesting spouse
as a matter of sheer formality must appear pro se in order to be
entitled to temporary attorney’s fees”).

     “A trial court’s order granting or denying a request for
attorney’s fees [under section 61.16] is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” Dennis v. Dennis, 230 So. 3d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 1st DCA
2017) (citing Broemer v. Broemer, 109 So. 3d 284, 290 (Fla. 1st DCA
2013)).

                                5
                                III

    The fee order is erroneous in several respects, which we
address in turn.

                                 A

     In her counter-petition, Former Wife only included a generic
request for attorney’s fees. Although Former Wife alleged that
“Husband has the financial resources” to pay the attorneys’ fees
for both parties, the counter-petition failed to allege that Former
Wife could not obtain the services of a competent attorney without
an order under section 61.16. Instead of demonstrating how, for
example, Former Husband’s unilateral transfer of funds created a
need for an order under section 61.16, Former Wife alleged that
she used a “high interest credit card” to retain the services of her
attorney. Then at trial, Former Wife testified that she wanted
Former Husband to pay her attorney’s fees because she “already
paid his attorney’s fees.”

     But as stated above, equitable reimbursement is not the
purpose of section 61.16. Because the counter-petition failed to
plead an immediate need for financial assistance, it did not
establish a basis for an award of attorney’s fees under section
61.16. See Longmeier v. Longmeier, 921 So. 2d 808, 809 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2006) (finding that “a request for fees must be specifically
pled under section 61.16, which is a discretionary-fee provision,”
and that “it is error for a trial court to award attorney’s fees
pursuant to section 61.16(1) where attorney’s fees are not
specifically pled.” (citation and footnote omitted)); see also
Szymanski v. Szymanski, 603 So. 2d 73, 74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
(holding that an award of attorney’s fees and costs in a dissolution
proceeding is error “in the absence of a properly pled request”).

                                 B

     Given the sizeable equalization payment ($41,000) and the
balanced economic positions of the parties (net monthly income of
approximately $6,850.00 for both), Former Husband “is in no
better position [than Former Wife] to pay attorney’s fees.” Galligar
v. Galligar, 77 So. 3d 808, 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Because both

                                 6
parties have a similar ability to pay their own legal fees, the trial
court erred when it ordered Former Husband to pay Former Wife’s
attorney’s fees under section 61.16. See Haywald v. Fougere, 164
So. 3d 786, 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“It is an abuse of discretion to
grant fees where both parties are equally able to pay their own.”).
See also Williams v. Jones, 290 So. 3d 609, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)
(finding that after “an equitable distribution of the marital
property has been achieved and the trial court has equalized
incomes through its alimony award, the trial court abuses its
discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.”); Nolan v. Nolan, 188 So.
3d 977, 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (holding that an award of
attorney’s fees is error “if the equal distribution of the marital
property has been achieved and the trial court equalized incomes
through its alimony awards.” (citation omitted)).

                                 C

     The trial court waited until the end of the proceedings to order
Former Husband to pay Former Wife’s attorney’s fees under
section 61.16. With regard to Former Husband’s ability to pay, the
court found that “his gross annual pay is $128,213.00.” As to
Former Wife’s need for financial assistance, however, no specific
findings of fact support or explain the trial court’s determination.
To the contrary, the court found that Former Wife works “as a
Civilian Contracting Officer with the Department of Veteran
Affairs [and] her gross annual pay is $98,286.00.”

     Given these facts as well as the lack of any specific finding as
to Former Wife’s need for financial assistance, we see no basis in
the record to support the trial court’s decision to order Former
Husband to pay Former Wife’s attorney’s fees. The failure to make
specific findings of fact to support its decision also constitutes
reversible error. See Dorsey v. Dorsey, 266 So. 3d 1282, 1289 (Fla.
1st DCA 2019) (holding that an “award of fees and costs under
section 61.16 must include specific findings of fact to support and
explain the ruling” and that the “absence of any such findings
requires reversal of this part of the final judgment and a remand
for specific findings of fact to support any directive for
contribution”); see also Fleming v. Fleming, 279 So. 3d 763, 765
(Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (same); Allen v. Allen, 114 So. 3d 1102, 1104
(Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (same).

                                 7
                                  D

     We specifically reject the trial court’s reliance on a footnote in
Bellows v. Bellows, 245 So. 3d 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), which
stated as follows:

    However, if a spouse depletes a marital asset to pay for
    attorney’s fees in the dissolution case, it follows that a
    trial court may take this factor into account in
    determining whether the spouse has a need for an award
    attorney’s fees and, if so, the amount of the spouse’s need
    for attorney’s fees.

Id. at 1001 n.1. Unlike this case, however, Bellows did not involve
an order requiring one party to pay the other party’s attorney’s
fees. Rather, Bellows involved a challenge to the trial court’s
decision to distribute a valueless account to the former wife. Id. at
1000–01. The parties in that case had a joint account that “had a
marital value of $7,145 as of the date of the petition for
dissolution.” Id. at 1001. The wife “used this asset on attorney’s
fees and living expenses during the pendency of the [dissolution
proceedings].” Id. Although “[t]here was no evidence or finding of
misconduct,” the lower court apparently included the un-depleted
value of the asset in the equitable distribution grid. Id. at 1000–
01. Expressed in terms of valuation dates, the trial court valued
the asset as of the date of the petition ($7,415) – not as of the date
of dissolution ($0).

     The Fourth District reversed in Bellows, stating: “As the case
law makes clear, depleting an asset to pay attorney’s fees in the
divorce case is insufficient, without a finding of misconduct, to
warrant assigning the depleted asset as part of the equitable
distribution plan.” Id. at 1000. At the end of that sentence, the
court included the footnote cited by the lower court in this case–
that depletion of a marital asset can be taken “into account in
determining whether the spouse has a need for an award
attorney’s fees.” Id. at 1001 n.1. However, nothing in Bellows
suggests that a trial court can order the payment of attorney’s fees
under section 61.16 without making specific findings of fact to
support and explain the award. In short, Bellows simply recognizes
the possibility of a 61.16 award.

                                  8
                                 E

     As stated above, nothing in section 61.16 permits payment of
fees merely because a party unilaterally transferred funds for that
party’s use in the dissolution. But regardless of section 61.16,
without any trial court finding of misconduct by Former Husband,
the trial court could not reimburse Former Wife for Former’s
Husband’s unilateral transfer of funds. See Ballard v. Ballard, 158
So. 3d 641, 642–43 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (holding that “[s]ums that
have been diminished during dissolution proceedings for purposes
reasonably related to the marriage, such as attorney’s fees for the
dissolution, should not be included in an equitable distribution
scheme unless there is evidence that one spouse intentionally
dissipated the asset for his or her own benefit and for a purpose
unrelated to the marriage” and that “[i]n that event, the trial court
must make a specific finding of intentional misconduct.”).

    The court specifically found that Former Husband committed
no misconduct. In the order on rehearing, the trial court
characterized the fee order as an equitable reimbursement for
Former’s Husband’s unilateral transfer of marital funds (to pay his
own attorney’s fees). However, the trial court expressly found that
Former Husband did not engage in intentional misconduct when
he made the unilateral transfer: “The Court does not find the
[Former Husband]’s dissipation resulted from intentional
misconduct . . . .”

     Absent misconduct, Former Husband was free to use marital
funds to pay his legal fees for the dissolution proceeding. See Lopez
v. Lopez, 135 So. 3d 326, 329 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“Attorney’s fees
spent on the dissolution of the marriage are considered reasonable
living expenses.”); see also Bellows, 245 So. 3d at 1000 (“Where a
spouse depletes an asset for attorney’s fees or reasonable living
expenses and there is no finding of misconduct, the asset should
not be assigned to that spouse as part of the equitable distribution
plan.”). 2

    2 The trial court’s erroneous finding regarding Former Wife’s

entitlement to attorney’s fees was made in the dissolution order
rather than the later order awarding fees to Former Wife. Because

                                 9
                                 IV

    For the reasons outlined above, we grant the Former
Husband’s motion for review of the order awarding attorney’s fees
to Former Wife. We affirm the dissolution order.

    AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

ROBERTS, J., concurs; TANENBAUM, J., concurs with opinion.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

TANENBAUM, J., concurring.

     Key to the error that we are correcting here on a motion for
review is the fact that the post-decretal fee order is retrospective
and remedial. That is not what section 61.16, Florida Statutes,
authorizes. The terminology used in section 61.16 points to the
relief allowed being temporary and prospective, awardable during

the award of fees was intertwined with the equitable distribution
of marital assets and liabilities, we initially viewed the entitlement
to the award as appealable under Rule 9.110(h) with the amount
of the award separately reviewable by motion under Rule
9.600(c)(3). See generally Nolan v. Nolan, 188 So. 3d 977, 980 (Fla.
1st DCA 2016) (“A trial court abuses its discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees if the equal distribution of the marital property has
been achieved and the trial court equalized incomes through its
alimony awards.”). However, the more traditional view is that the
issue was nonfinal until the court awarded fees. See, e.g., McGee v.
McGee, 264 So. 3d 1087, 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (noting that a
portion of the final judgment determining entitlement to fees but
not awarding fees is nonfinal). Accordingly, we have addressed this
matter pursuant to motion for review of the fee order under Rule
9.600(c)(3).

                                 10
the pendency of one of the phases of the dissolution proceeding and
not “after the fact.” See § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (allowing a trial court,
“from time to time,” to “order a party pay a reasonable amount for
attorney’s fees, suit money, and the cost to the other party of
maintaining or defending any [dissolution proceeding], including
enforcement and modification proceedings and appeals” (emphasis
supplied)); cf. § 61.052(3), Fla. Stat. (listing the interim orders that
a trial court may make while the dissolution proceeding is ongoing:
“for the support and alimony of the parties; the parenting plan,
support, maintenance, and education of the minor child of the
marriage; attorney’s fees; and the preservation of the property of
the parties”); § 61.071, Fla. Stat. (authorizing an allowance for
“alimony and suit money” pendente lite, or while the suit is
pending).

     As the majority opinion observes, the purpose of the statute is
to ensure that both spouses have equivalent access to capable legal
counsel. To fulfill that purpose, a trial court necessarily will be
looking prospectively: How much does the requesting spouse need
(but does not have) so that he or she can pay a lawyer to keep
prosecuting or defending the dissolution, enforcement,
modification, or appellate proceeding? Once the trial court makes
that assessment, the trial court will consider whether the other
spouse has the financial resources to cover that need in the
interim. Cf. § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring the trial court to
consider “the financial resources of both parties”).

     Because it is prospective, the trial court’s order under section
61.16 does not operate like a judgment: It does not permanently
establish a legal right of one spouse against the other or alter the
legal relationship between the spouses that extends beyond the
trial court’s jurisdiction over the parties. Cf. § 61.052(4), Fla. Stat.
(providing for a “judgment of dissolution of marriage” that
“result[s] in each spouse having the status of being single and
unmarried”); § 61.075(2), Fla. Stat. (stating that any award of a
cash payment as part of equitable distribution “vest[s] when the
judgment is awarded and the award shall not terminate upon
remarriage or death of either party . . . but shall be treated as a
debt”); § 61.075(4), Fla. Stat. (stating that the “judgment
[equitably] distributing assets shall have the effect of a duly
executed instrument of conveyance, transfer, release, or

                                   11
acquisition which is recorded in the county where the property is
located”); § 61.075(9), Fla. Stat. (requiring trial court to “consider
whether a judgment of alimony shall be made” after it determines
the “equitable distribution of the marital assets and liabilities”);
§ 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (“For purposes of establishing or modifying
parental responsibility and creating, developing, approving, or
modifying a parenting plan, including a time-sharing schedule,
which governs each parent’s relationship with his or her minor
child and the relationship between each parent with regard to his
or her minor child, the best interests of the child must be the
primary consideration.” (emphasis supplied)).

     The order instead establishes an obligation on the part of the
payor spouse, at the hands of the trial court—the order then being
enforceable through contempt proceedings rather than through
execution. See § 61.16(2), Fla. Stat.; but cf. § 61.11, Fla. Stat.
(authorizing a writ of bodily attachment to enforce support
obligation); § 61.14, Fla. Stat. (providing for modification and
enforcement of alimony and child-support orders, including
contempt proceedings for non-payment of alimony or child support,
and for a judgment of delinquency for non-payment of child
support); § 61.17, Fla. Stat. (providing for enforcement of an “order
or judgment for the payment of alimony or child support,”
including through a “judgment for arrearages”).

     An order under section 61.16, then, is not supposed to be
remedial. Contrast this type of an order with a judgment awarding
fees to a prevailing party, which adjudicates that party’s legal
entitlement to fees based on the application of law to a judicially
determined set of facts about events that already have occurred.
This judgment comes after rendition of an earlier judgment that
has made one party or the other the prevailing one—a post-
decretal, supplemental and recordable judgment that is separately
appealable as such. Cf. Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (characterizing a true
“interlocutory order” as one leading up to a final judgment and
distinguishing that type of order from a “final post decretal order,”
which is one coming after a final judgment that nevertheless “is
dispositive of any question” and “completes the judicial labor on
that portion of the” post-judgment cause).

                                 12
     An order under section 61.16 does not have this effect. It is
interlocutory and procedural and allows the trial court to manage
the spouses’ relative ability to hire and keep counsel during a
phase in the dissolution proceeding. For this reason, Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.600(c) allows for our review of such orders
by motion for review to be filed in the appeal of the underlying
judgment. But cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii)a. (providing for
an appeal of a non-final order in a family law matter that
determines a right to immediate monetary relief).

     It is important to highlight here, then, that the final order on
appeal is the final judgment of dissolution, which was dated
October 26, 2021, as modified on the former husband’s motion for
rehearing. Among other things, it dissolved the marriage,
established parenting responsibility and timesharing, and
distributed marital assets. To be sure, the judgment effected a
significant, conclusive change in the legal relationship and the
relative rights between the divorcing parties and their children. As
to the marital assets, the judgment is conclusive regarding what
the trial court determines to be a fair and just division. There is no
statutory provision that authorizes alteration of that distribution.
Any “true-up” to correct for any interim imbalances must occur at
the time of the judgment making the distribution. Cf. § 61.075(1),
(3), Fla. Stat. (requiring presumption of equal distribution but
allowing for “an unequal distribution” based on a variety of factors,
including “factors necessary to do equity and justice between the
parties,” but at all events requiring that the trial court make
“factual findings in the judgment” that support the court’s
“rationale” for the distribution); § 61.075(5), Fla. Stat. (allowing for
“interim partial distribution during the pendency of a dissolution
action” but requiring that the court take the interim distribution
into account “and give appropriate credit . . . in its final allocation
of marital assets and liabilities”).

     In awarding the fee order on review in this case, rather than
focus on whether the former wife had a continuing need to hire or
retain counsel in the dissolution proceeding (say, for enforcement
or modification of the court’s orders)—as section 61.16 requires—
the court made its determination looking backwards at the
equitable distribution reflected in the judgment that had just
become final. The trial court made the fee award based on the

                                  13
rationale that it “cannot, as a matter of equity, allow one party to
spend marital funds on that one party’s attorney’s fees without
taking that into consideration in the award of attorney’s fees to the
other party.” This is not a permissible basis for a fee award under
section 61.16.

     The order in essence second-guesses the equitable
distribution—which already included an equalization payment of
$49,128.51 from the former husband to the former wife—by
requiring an even larger, additional cash payment to make
everything fairer. Section 61.16 cannot be used as an end-run
around the well-established principle of a judgment’s finality. See
Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1, 3
(Fla. 1970) (“Unless a proper motion or petition is filed within the
allotted time, the judgment or order of the trial court becomes
absolute. Except as provided by Rules 1.530 and 1.540, Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court has no authority to alter,
modify or vacate an order or judgment.”); Kippy Corp. v. Colburn,
177 So. 2d 193, 196–97 (Fla. 1965) (same); see also Pruitt v. Brock,
437 So. 2d 768, 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (describing two
mechanisms by which a trial court can reconsider and correct its
own final judgment—timely motion for rehearing and timely
motion for relief from judgment—and observing that the trial court
otherwise loses jurisdiction over its judgment). By the time of the
award, in fact, the dissolution proceeding in the trial court had
come to an end, and an appeal had commenced in this court. The
trial court had no authority to reconsider how it distributed the
marital property between the former spouses and try to “make it
right” via a fee order.

     Meanwhile, it is quite telling that the trial court made a
general finding in the dissolution judgment that the former wife
had a need for suit money and the former husband had an ability
to pay, without making any determination as to an amount. The
trial court’s approach here is redolent of that used in civil
litigation: Make an initial determination of entitlement, based on
who the prevailing party is, and determine an amount at a later
hearing. This is not the correct approach, because section 61.16
does not authorize prevailing party fees. The only question for the
trial court was whether, at the time it was considering an award
of fees, the former wife still needed money for a lawyer.

                                 14
     After the judgment was entered, though, how could there still
be a need? The former wife had had the benefit of counsel all along,
and at no point during the dissolution proceeding did she claim
that she needed money from the former husband to pay for her
lawyer. She made the decision instead to finance her lawyer’s fees
by credit card. Her decision to incur her own debt to pay for her
lawyer, rather than to seek assistance from the court, was hers
alone to make. She (and her lawyer) now must live with that
decision because the law does not allow for any alternative once
the equitable dissolution judgment was rendered. This is not to say
the former wife now could not still seek some award of fees
prospectively to cover her continued need for counsel to prosecute
this appeal or to modify or enforce the timesharing or support
components of the dissolution judgment. The former wife, however,
was not seeking prospective litigation support when she obtained
the current fee order, so that is not a basis before us for review.

     For the reasons set out in more detail in the majority opinion,
I concur in affirming the dissolution judgment and in vacating the
fee order rendered under section 61.16.

                 _____________________________

Michael T. Webster of Michael T. Webster, P.A., Shalimar, for
Appellant.

Tonya C. Petermann of Tonya C. Petermann, P.A., Fort Walton
Beach; Richard D. Zasada of Zasada Law, LLC, Miramar Beach,
for Appellee.

                                15