Court Opinion

ID: 9777360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:08:06.224104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:52.925761
License: Public Domain

WHITHAM, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion the prosecutor’s remarks during jury argument at the punishment phase concerning appellant’s lack of contrition, together with the prosecutor’s gesture in pointing to the ap*117pellant as he made the remark, constitute reversible error.
At least three opinions of the Court of Criminal Appeals require consideration.
First, in McMahon v. State, 582 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) the prosecutor at the punishment phase argued “Have you seen any remorse? Have you seen any remorse on the part of the defendants?” In disposing of the accuseds’ complaint that such remarks were a comment on their failure to testify, the court stated:
In reviewing the prosecutor’s argument as a whole, moreover, we do not agree that it constituted an improper comment on the appellants’ failure to testify. In Nowlin v. State, 507 S.W.2d 534 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), this Court stated that before a prosecutor’s argument may be so construed the language used must be viewed from the jury’s standpoint and the implication that the language refers to the defendant’s failure to testify must be a necessary one. It is not sufficient that the language might be construed as an implied or indirect allusion. If the prosecutor’s remarks may be reasonably construed as referring to the defendant’s failure to present evidence through a witness other than himself, reversal is not required, (citations omitted).
Second, in Overstreet v. State, 470 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) the prosecutor at the punishment phase argued:
Last of all, punishment is to rehabilitate the Defendant if you can rehabilitate them. When you think about rehabilitation you, you think about the first great step to rehabilitation is stepping forward and confessing one’s guilt and being ready to take the punishment that is doled out.
There the appellant objected that such an argument was a direct reference to the appellant’s failure to testify at the guilt or innocence phase in that it calls for a confession. The court, while commenting that the argument is not commended, perceived no reversible error.
However, in the third and most recent case, Johnson v. State, 611 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) the prosecutor at the punishment phase argued:
And another important thing in this ladies and gentlemen is that you never heard Tommy Johnson tell Mr. Houston or anybody else that he was sorry for what he did. He never up to now has said “I am sorry I committed this robbery, I confess to it, and I want you to give me probation,” you never heard him say that.
There the court concluded that the argument was so inflammatory that its prejudicial effect could not have been alleviated by an instruction to disregard and that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial based upon the prosecutor commenting on the appellant’s failure to testify. In Johnson, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction for the remark.
McMahon was an en banc decision. The thrust of the jury argument complained of in McMahon was virtually identical to the argument in the present case; the absence of an expression of sorrow in this case as opposed to the absence of an expression of remorse in McMahon. In neither case was the defendant mentioned by name with respect to the absent expression of sorrow or remorse. Johnson was a panel decision. The complained of jury argument remarked on the absence of a statement of sorrow from the defendant himself, and actually named the accused. In McMahon the en banc court repeated a familiar holding in cases where the defendant fails to testify that if the prosecutor’s remarks may be reasonably construed as referring to the defendant’s failure to present evidence through a witness other than himself, reversal is not required.
In Overstreet the prosecutor remarked on the fact that the first great step to rehabilitation was to come forward and confess one’s guilt. In that case the defendant was not mentioned by name as the person who did not confess. In finding no reversible error the court in Overstreet stated:
A defendant in a criminal case under our laws has the right to enter a plea of not guilty and to file a motion for probation, *118and the fact he has exercised those rights should not be utilized against him. He need not plead guilty in order to be entitled to probation. Although the argument is not commended, we perceive no reversible error. The issues at stake were punishment and probation. The appellant testified she desired probation though she disagreed with the guilty verdict and her counsel urged the jury to grant probation. The argument made was in response thereto.
In Overstreet the jury argument in question was in response to the defendant’s own testimony seeking probation and denying guilt. In Overstreet the accused testified. In the present case the defendant did not. Nor did the defendant testify in McMahon or Johnson.
Under the facts of the present case I would follow the holding in Johnson and reverse. In Johnson the prosecutor named the accused in his jury argument. In the present case the prosecutor pointed to the appellant as he made the remark. Naming the accused in the argument or pointing to the accused when the argument is made are one and the same. Johnson is controlling on its facts.
When the prosecutor comments on the accused’s lack of contrition, it should make no difference whether the prosecutor’s remarks may be reasonably construed as referring to the defendant’s failure to present evidence through witnesses other than himself. The only person who can step forward and confess is the accused — not some other witness on his behalf. The only person who can express sorrow and/or remorse within the actual meaning of such a jury argument is the accused — not some other witness on his behalf. It should make no difference whether reputation or character witnesses testify. It should make no difference whether the defendant himself is referred to in the argument complained of as was the case in Johnson. It should make no difference whether the prosecutor points to the defendant as he makes the argument. It should make no difference whether defendant’s witnesses or attorney state that the defendant is sorry for what he has done. Once the jury’s attention is called to the absence of sorrow, remorse, regret or any other act of contrition, it defies logic and common sense to believe that the remark refers to any person other than the defendant.
The right to plead not guilty and to maintain that position is basic to our criminal justice system. An accused has the right to plead “not guilty” and to maintain that position to whatever the bitter end for him might be. An accused has the right to seek probation. A prosecutor’s argument such as that in the present case calls for the jury, in assessing punishment, or in determining probation, to consider appellant’s failure to take the witness stand and say he is sorry or has remorse for the crime or present witnesses who will testify that the defendant is sorry or has remorse for the crime. As a practical matter, in either event, the argument calls for the jury to punish the defendant more severely, or deny probation, because he will not withdraw his “not guilty” plea and confess and plead “guilty.” To admit to sorrow or remorse is but an admission of guilt within the context of the issue here under discussion.
To place a defendant who has plead “not guilty”, but who has been found “guilty”, in the position of having to recant, confess, express sorrow, regret or remorse in order to obtain the jury’s sympathy for probation or a less severe sentence is a denial of the right of an accused to insist at all stages of his trial that he is “not guilty.”
Our system gives great deference to the accused’s plea of not guilty. For example, when a defendant refuses to plead to the indictment the court enters a plea of not guilty for him. Weddle v. State, 522 S.W.2d 475 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). The effect of a plea of not guilty is to put the State on proof of the guilt of the accused by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. When a plea is changed from not guilty to nolo contendere or guilty the jury should be retired and defendant admonished concerning the consequences of his plea. Crawford v. State, 466 S.W. 319 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). *119A trial court erred in allowing defendant to withdraw his plea of not guilty and plead guilty after hearing witnesses testify that defendant was of unsound mind and should have proceeded under the original plea and instructed jury on law regarding insanity. Gardner v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 227, 144 S.W.2d 284 (Tex.Crim.App.1940). Given this deference to an accused’s plea of not guilty, the prosecutor in jury argument at the punishment stage should not be permitted to make the argument here in question or any argument of that nature. Upon proper ground of error, reversal should follow if such argument is made and no mistrial granted.
If the defendant wishes to take the witness stand and say he is sorry or show remorse in order to obtain the jury’s sympathy for probation or a lesser sentence, that is his choice. But for the State to argue and gesture in the manner in question in the present case is tantamount to a jury argument that a failure to change the plea to “guilty” should be considered by the jury in imposing the penalty or determining probation. Such an argument is reversible error.
In my view, the manner of jury argument complained of in the present case should not fall within the scope of the rule that if the prosecutor’s remarks may be reasonably construed as referring to the defendant’s failure to present evidence through a witness other than himself, reversal is not required. Rather, it is my view that such an argument is so prejudicial as to deprive appellant of a fair trial and upon proper ground of error is reversible error separate and apart from the contention that such argument is a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.
As pointed out in Overstreet the defendant has a right to plead not guilty and to file a motion for probation and the fact that he has asserted that right should not be utilized against him. However, by perceiving no reversible error because the argument made was in response to the defendant’s testimony seeking probation, the court in Overstreet permitted the right to plead not guilty to be utilized against the defendant. Given the defendant’s right to plead not guilty and to file a motion for probation, the argument should be reversible error regardless of whether the defendant does or does not testify at either stage of trial. To hold otherwise is to utilize the accused’s rights against him and to adversely qualify his right to plead not guilty and to file a motion for probation.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse and remand.