Court Opinion

ID: 9649689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:06:17.613828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:13.590252
License: Public Domain

*25Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
concurring in the result.
In State v. W.A, 184 N.J. 45, 59, 875 A.2d 882 (2005), we held that, “by its terms, Rule 3:16 provides a defendant with the right of presence at every stage of his trial, including sidebar conferences during jury selection.” In that case, we explained that “a defendant’s exclusion from sidebar, after having requested presence, and in the absence of a substituted process such as the use of technology, [does not] automatically warrant[ ] reversal,]” and that “each case is subject to a harmless error analysis.” Id. at 64, 875 A.2d 882. We stated that “a defendant’s absence from the sidebar examination of a juror who does not deliberate in the ease is necessarily harmless.” Ibid. Further, we noted that in the event a defendant is excluded from the sidebar examination of a juror who is seated and deliberates in the case, “reversal will not be automatic but will depend on the facts.” Id. at 65, 875 A.2d 882.
This appeal requires that we determine whether W.A’s precepts have retroactive application and, if so, how they are to be applied. The majority interprets W.A to mean that “W.A is made up of two distinct parts: (1) a restatement of a defendant’s right of presence during voir dire, including the methods used to secure such presence; and (2) a new template for the implementation of the various methods.” Ante, 190 N.J. at 22, 918 A.2d at 19 (2007). Based on that interpretation, the majority concludes, as a substantive matter, that “the right of presence, securable by various means, is a well-settled principle of constitutional jurisprudence” and, therefore, “it follows that it is not a new rule of law but one that has always applied.” Ibid. Distinguishing between the substantive right of presence and its procedural implementation, the majority reads W.A as “imposing] a new approach to the established methods for securing voir dire presence [that] constituted a break with past practice and thus a ‘new rule.’ ” Ibid. The majority then analyzes what retroactive effect is to be given to that “new rule” and “see[s] no reason to give the unanticipated rule of W.A anything other than full prospective application.” Id. *26at 24, 918 A.2d at 20. The majority reasons that “[t]o apply [the unanticipated procedural portion of rule of W.A] retroactively would punish the justifiable reliance of the judicial system on the old rule, which we did not declare unconstitutional, and would upend settled expectations and force reconsideration of long resolved matters.” Ibid, (citation omitted). It thus concludes that “[t]here is simply no counterweight to those negatives that would justify retroactivity.” Ibid.
I disagree. In my view, the aggregate of the substantive and procedural portions of the rule adopted in W.A was a new rule of law that should be given “pipeline retroactivity” effect, “that is, this new rule applies in [W.A.], in future cases, and in any case still on direct appeal at the time this new rule is set forth.” State v. Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 99, 875 A.2d 906 (2005). Because defendant’s direct appeal was pending before the Appellate Division when we decided WA., the rule of W.A. should apply in this appeal. However, although defendant had a right to be present during these sidebars and he was denied that right, defendant has failed to show how that denial was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. Thus, in the absence of any proof of harm and because only three jurors who were examined at sidebar in fact were seated on the petit jury yet defendant had eleven unused peremptory challenges when the jury as a whole was seated, the exclusion of defendant from the sidebar examinations of these jurors was harmless. I therefore concur in the judgment reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstating defendant’s convictions and sentence.
I.
W.A. clearly sets forth the governing rule in respect of a defendant’s presence at sidebar during jury voir dire: “If a defendant seeks to be present at sidebar during voir dire he should be accommodated as far as security will allow.” W.A, supra, 184 N.J. at 60, 875 A.2d 882 (emphasis supplied). W.A. recognizes that, in its application, this rule is not absolute. There*27fore, “[i]n the event that safety issues militate against a defendant’s physical presence at a voir dire sidebar, other methods should be employed to guarantee his meaningful participation in the jury selection process.” Ibid. We have explained that “[t]hose methods include the use of technology!,]” ibid, (citations omitted), or “a modified use of the struck-jury system!,]” ibid, (citations omitted). We also have explained that “[i]f all of those methods are unavailable ... the judge may resort to the lawyer-shuttle system.” Id. at 61, 875 A.2d 882. We have emphasized that
when the lawyer-shuttle system is used, the lawyer must confer with his client after each sidebar interview that involves more than innocuous scheduling-type matters. In addition, if the lawyer-shuttle system is employed and a defendant so requests, the judge should take a recess before defendant’s peremptory challenges are exercised to allow him to listen to the tape or review the court stenographer’s notes of the sidebar colloquy with the non-excused jurors. By that approach, we balance the court’s interest in security, the juror’s in privacy, and the defendant’s in presence.

Ubid,']

Although certainly not favored, the use of the lawyer-shuttle system does not establish per se error. In that context, we “address[ed] whether a defendant’s exclusion from sidebar, after having requested presence, and in the absence of a substituted process such as the use of technology, automatically warrants reversal!,]” id. at 64, 875 A.2d 882, and we held “that it does not and that each case is subject to a harmless error analysis.” Ibid. Therefore, when addressing a defendant’s exclusion from the individual voir dire of a potential juror who is seated and deliberates, the overriding rule remains that “reversal will not be automatic but will depend on the facts.” Id. at 65, 875 A.2d 882.
II.
I address first whether the rule of W.A. constitutes a “new rule of law” and, if so, what level of retroactivity should be given to it. This process “implicates a three-step analysis.” State v. Cummings, supra, 184 N.J. at 97, 875 A.2d 906. In respect of the first step, we have explained that
*28we must engage in the threshold inquiry of whether the rule at issue is a new rule of law for purposes of retroactivity analysis. The test for determining whether the rule at issue is a new rule of law is whether a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the State or if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. Stated differently, a decision involving an accepted legal principle announces a new rule for retroactivity purposes so long as the decision’s application of that general principle is sufficiently novel and unanticipated.
{Ibid, (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted).]
Of course, if it is determined that no “new rule of law” has been announced, the analysis is at an end. However, if a “new rule of law” does result, we address the second step of the retroactivity analysis. In that second step,
three factors generally are considered to determine whether the rule is to be applied retroactively: (1) the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application, (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice.
[Ibid, (quoting State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 251, 678 A.2d 642 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).]
We have explained that “[although those three factors have received detailed attention in our retroactivity case law, our cases also indicate that the retroactivity determination often turns more generally on the court’s view of what is just and consonant with public policy in the particular situation presented.” Ibid, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have emphasized that
[t]hose factors are not of equal weight, as the first factor, the purpose of the new rule, is often the pivotal consideration, and the second and third factors come to the forefront of the retroactivity analysis when the inquiry into the purpose of the new rule does not, by itself, reveal whether retroactive application of the new rule would be appropriate. We distinguish between the second and third factors as follows: the second factor inquires whether law enforcement agents justifiably relied on the old rule in performing their professional responsibilities, while the third factor in the retroactivity analysis, the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice, recognizes that courts must not impose unjustified burdens on our criminal justice system.
[Id. at 97-98, 875 A.2d 906 (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted).]
If it is determined that a “new rule of law” has been announced and that the retroactive application of that new rule is appropriate, we must nevertheless determine “which retroactivity option is *29to be chosen.” Id. at 98, 875 A.2d 906. We have described the process as follows:
This Court has four options in any case in which it must determine the retroactive effect of a new rule of criminal procedure. The Court may decide to apply the new rule purely prospectively, applying it only to cases in which the operative facts arise after the new rule has been announced. Alternatively, the Court may apply the new rule in future cases and in the case in which the rule is announced, but not in any other litigation that is pending or has reached final judgment at the time the new rule is set forth. A third option is to give the new rule “pipeline retroactivity,” rendering it applicable in all future cases, the case in which the rule is announced, and any cases still on direct appeal. Finally the Court may give the new rule complete retroactive effect, applying it to all cases, including those in which final judgments have been entered and all other avenues of appeal have been exhausted. [Ibid, (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 249, 678 A.2d 642).]
Those principles mandate the conclusion that W.A. established a new rule of law. Common practice prior to W.A. ordinarily limited attendance at sidebar conferences during jury voir dire to the judge, the potential juror, the prosecutor, and defense counsel. After W.A., criminal defendants now have a recognized right to be present at sidebar conferences during jury selection, albeit that right is not absolute. The purpose of the rule announced in W.A. was to give further meaning to the right of a criminal defendant to be present at his own trial and such right is advanced by a retroactive application. Moreover, in light of the earlier Appellate Division decisions in both State v. Dishon, 297 N.J.Super. 254, 687 A.2d 1074 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 144, 693 A.2d 112 (1997), and State v. Lomax, 311 N.J.Super. 48, 709 A.2d 277 (App.Div.1998), the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it could not have been great. Finally, no evidence has been adduced to show that a retroactive application of W.A’s rule would have an adverse effect on the administration of justice.
The pre-W.A. restriction on presence was not necessarily for safety reasons, but more typically for the reasons the trial court expressed in this record: to encourage candor by the potential juror under questioning that, due to its subject matter, demands enhanced privacy. Because that practice and its apparent univer*30sal application militate against full retroactive application of the rule of W.A, “pipeline” retroactivity is warranted for those defendants whose direct appeals were pending when W.A was decided. That is, this new rule should apply in this case, in future cases, and in any ease still on direct appeal as of the date of our decision in W.A, June 21, 2005.
Because the rule of W.A should apply to those eases that were on direct appeal when W.A was decided, and because defendant’s petition for certification from his direct appeal was pending when W.A was decided, defendant’s claims that he was improperly excluded from the sidebar conferences during jury voir dire should be measured by the rule of W.A It is to the application of W.A to defendant’s claims that I now turn.
III.
Despite repeated requests, defendant was denied physical participation in the sidebar conferences with potential jurors during the voir dire. The reasons advanced by the trial court for doing so did not implicate questions of safety. Instead, the trial court was concerned that defendant’s presence during the close setting of a sidebar conference would adversely affect the “jurors being able to speak freely[.]” That reason standing alone patently does not directly implicate the safety concerns that animated the exceptions carved out from W.A’s rule. Under W.A, then, the trial court’s exercise of discretion to bar defendant from attending or participating in the sidebar individual voir dire of potential jurors “is subject to a harmless error analysis.” W.A, supra, 184 N.J. at 64, 875 A.2d 882.
We have made clear that “[a]ny error or omission which does not prejudice a substantial right shall be disregarded by the trial court before, during and after trial[,]” Rule 1:7-5, and that “[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result,” Rule 2:10-2. We have explained that
*31[t]he use with respect to “harmless error” of the same formula we had stated for “plain error” was simply an acknowledgment that after all was said, the question for the appellate court was simply whether in all the circumstances there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the error denied a fair trial and a fair decision on the merits, and that upon that question the reviewing judge was inevitably remitted to his own conscientious judgment.
[State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 338, 273 A.2d 1 (1971).]
The fact that an alleged error is of constitutional dimension does not change the fundamentals of the analysis. Although “[a]s to ‘constitutional’ errors, some may go so plainly to the integrity of the proceedings that a new trial is mandated without more[,]” we have also concluded that “[e]qually clear must be the proposition that not every ‘constitutional’ error can sensibly call for a new trial.” Ibid. In sum, the yardstick to be applied is a practical one: “a new trial shall be ordered if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the constitutional error contributed to the verdict.” Id. at 340, 273 A.2d 1.
The trial court ruled, without objection, that defendant was able to see “the jurors’ expressions and demeanor” and that he was not “blocked” or otherwise impeded in his view. Also, defendant’s counsel was present at all sidebar conferences and was instructed by the trial court to — and did — consult with defendant in respect of the jurors who were not dismissed for cause.3 Further, defen*32dant admitted that he was “very actively involved in jury selection!]]” that “not a single juror was selected here without [his] input[,]” and that “he himself chose certain jurors to be selected off the panel or requested other jurors to stay.” Finally, and most tellingly, defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the lawyer-shuttle process directed by the trial court simply did not work, a burden defendant admittedly did not meet. Neither defendant nor his counsel ever averred that they did not discuss, as part of the “lawyer-shuttle” process, the substance of what was disclosed during the individual juror voir dire at sidebar. In that conteict, the fact that defendant had the means and the opportunity to review the tapes of the individualized sidebar voir dire juror conferences and to strike the potential jurors who were interviewed at sidebar but were not dismissed for cause leads inexorably to the conclusion that defendant’s exclusion from the individual sidebar voir dire of potential jurors was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
The conclusions originally reached by the Appellate Division when it considered defendant’s first appeal — that “[defendant was in the courtroom and could observe the gestures and expression of the juror[s; that d]efense counsel was instructed by the trial judge to discuss the juror[s’] response[s] with defendant^ and that] the sidebars were conducted before any [peremptory] challenges were exercised, not after they had all been exhausted”— were, and remain, correct. I therefore reject the truncated view of W.A advanced by defendant and adopted by the majority. I rely, instead, on W.A’s clear import: that a defendant has the right to be present during sidebar interviews of prospective jurors, that such right is not absolute, and that the denial of that right must be gauged under the harmless error standard. Thus, although I would find that defendant had a right to be present during these sidebars and that he was denied that right, I would ultimately hold that, under the circumstances, such denial was not *33clearly capable of producing an unjust result and, hence, the error was harmless.
IV.
In contrast, then, to the majority’s view, the substance of the rule of law announced in W.A. — that, save for security reasons, a defendant has an unqualified right of presence at the sidebar voir dire of individual jurors but that the denial of that right must be gauged under the harmless error standard — is entitled to pipeline retroactivity effect. However, applying that right to the facts in this case, the denial of that right was harmless. Therefore, I concur in the result reached by the majority reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstating defendant’s conviction and sentence.
For reversal and reinstatement — Chief Justice ZAZZALI and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS — 7.
Opposed — None.

 Nothing in this record supports the assertion on appeal that defendant's trial counsel failed to abide by the trial court’s instructions to consult with defendant concerning each juror examined at sidebar. Indeed, during oral argument, defendant’s appellate counsel was repeatedly asked whether defendant’s trial counsel did or did not discuss with defendant the individual voir dire examinations of potential jurors at sidebar. Defendant’s appellate counsel candidly admitted that there is nothing in the record "in respect of what discussion in fact occurred between [defendant’s trial] counsel and the defendant in the lawyer-shuttle process so that [this Court] can ... make an informed decision.” Tellingly, defendant’s appellate counsel conceded that it is "the defendant’s obligation” to make that record for appellate review.
Moreover, although not addressed by either party, an independent review of the videotape of the jury selection conclusively demonstrates that defendant's trial counsel did utilize the "lawyer-shuttle system” and consulted with defendant after each sidebar voir dire of the jurors who were not excused for cause. Although the fact of the consultations has been confirmed independent of the *32representations of the parties, the record remains barren in respect of the substance of those consultations.