Court Opinion

ID: 991495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:37:32.68703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:38.734267
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 96-4470

JACKIE CLAYTON COCKRANE,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Shelby.
Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge.
(CR-91-90)

Submitted: January 23, 1997

Decided: February 10, 1997

Before RUSSELL, WILKINS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Charles W. McKeller, Brevard, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark
T. Calloway, United States Attorney, Jerry W. Miller, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Jackie Cockrane appeals from the district court's order revoking
his supervised release and sentencing him to twelve months incarcera-
tion. We affirm.

Cockrane was sentenced in December 1991 to fifteen months
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Cock-
rane began his period of supervised release on January 20, 1993, but
absconded from supervision in March 1993. In June 1993, a petition
was filed in the district court alleging a violation of supervised
release. Cockrane was arrested on state charges in South Carolina the
following month, and a detainer was filed with state authorities in
October 1993.

Although a detainer had been filed, Cockrane was not delivered to
the United States Marshal's Service upon his release from his state
imprisonment in September 1995--Cockrane was not arrested by the
United States Marshal's Service until April 1996. On June 3, 1996,
the district court revoked Cockrane's supervised release and sen-
tenced him to twelve months imprisonment.*

Cockrane claims that the thirty-four-month delay between the filing
of the supervised release revocation petition and his initial appearance
in district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(2) and his constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial. To show that a delay in disposing of
charges violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy
trial, a court considers four factors: (1) whether the delay was uncom-
monly long; (2) whether the government or the defendant is more to
blame for the delay; (3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted
his right to a speedy disposition; and (4) whether the defendant suf-
_________________________________________________________________
*Cockrane's imprisonment on state charges tolled the term of super-
vised release for 26 months. See 18 U.S.C.§ 3624(e) (1994) ("A term of
supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is
imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local
crime."). Therefore, Cockrane's term of supervised release would not
have expired until March 19, 1998.

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fered any prejudice as the delay's result. United States v. Thomas, 55
F.3d 144, 148 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3248 (U.S. Oct.
2, 1995) (No. 95-5689). On balance, these factors weigh against
Cockrane. Cockrane is to blame for most, if not all, of the delay in
this case, and he failed to assert his interest in a speedy disposition.
We therefore find that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was not
violated.

Finally, we find that the seventy-day period between Cockrane's
arrest and the revocation hearing was not "unreasonable" within the
meaning of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(2) (requiring a revocation hear-
ing to be held "within a reasonable time").

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
als before the court and argument would not aid the decisional pro-
cess.

AFFIRMED

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