Court Opinion

ID: 9384884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 15:03:06.500493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.983582
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                          Opinion filed April 5, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D21-2160
                        Lower Tribunal No. 19-7997
                           ________________

                          Stephanie Dussan,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                           Ahmed El Zoghbi,
                                  Appellee.

     An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ivonne
Cuesta, Judge.

     Harvey D. Rogers, P.A., and Harvey D. Rogers, for appellant.

      Davis Smith & Jean, LLC, Laura Davis Smith, and Sonja A. Jean, for
appellee.

Before SCALES, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

     MILLER, J.
      Appellant, the mother, appeals a final judgment denying her any

attorney’s fees in the contested paternity action she litigated below against

appellee, the father. On appeal, the mother asserts a myriad of errors. We

confine our analysis to two dispositive, overlapping issues. The mother

contends the lower tribunal abused its discretion in denying her motion for

continuance. Standing alone, the denial might not constitute an abuse of

discretion. But, coupled with a second issue, the blanket exclusion of the

mother’s exhibits at the ensuing trial in the absence of any individualized

determination of prejudice, the ruling “created an injustice,” warranting

reversal. See Fleming v. Fleming, 710 So. 2d 601, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

                               BACKGROUND

      After the parties wed, divorced, and reunited, the mother gave birth to

her second child. The relationship ultimately deteriorated, yet again, and the

mother filed a paternity lawsuit in the circuit court.    The father denied

paternity and refused to pay interim child support. Although the trial court

ordered confirmatory DNA testing, the father failed to comply with the court

order for nearly six months.

      In due course, the father’s paternity was established, and the parties

embarked on financial discovery.      Throughout the process, the mother

repeatedly contended the father was concealing assets.         Eventually, a

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general magistrate ordered the father to furnish dozens of “missing” financial

documents by a date certain. After the father responded, the mother filed a

motion seeking the appointment of a forensic accountant. The trial court

referred the matter to a general magistrate. The magistrate granted the

motion and ordered an evidentiary hearing to allocate the associated costs.

      The trial court ratified and approved the magistrate’s report twice, but

on each occasion, the parties agreed to vacate the relevant orders to allow

the father additional time to effectuate filings. The father subsequently filed

exceptions, contending that “[t]here was no competent, substantial evidence

presented by [the mother] as to why the [c]ourt should appoint a forensic

accountant.” The exceptions remained pending, unadjudicated, for the next

four months.

      In the interim, the judge set the case for trial. Pursuant to the terms of

the scheduling order, trial was slated to commence via the Zoom

videoconferencing platform on September 9, 2021.            The parties were

required to file pretrial catalogues, complete with intended witnesses and

exhibits, within fifteen days of the trial date.

      After the trial order issued, the parties attended mediation and

negotiated a stipulated parenting plan. The plan provided for agreed child

support payments and purported, by its express terms, to resolve all issues,

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save “a final timesharing schedule and the [m]other’s request for attorney’s

fees and costs.” As to fees and costs, the plan contained the following

caveat: “The parties agree to leave that issue for determination by the court.”

      As the trial date drew near, the parties engaged in a flurry of activity.

On August 30, 2021, the mother filed a motion for continuance. In her

motion, she cited strategic uncertainty as the result of the pending

exceptions to the magistrate’s report.

      On September 1, 2021, the trial court entered an order overruling the

father’s exceptions. In a seemingly inapposite ruling, the court denied the

request for a forensic accountant 1 and, extending the deadlines imposed in

the trial order, required the parties to exchange billing records no later than

two days before trial.

      On September 2, 2021, the father filed his pretrial catalogue. His

exhibit disclosure reflected: (1) both parties’ financial affidavits; (2) all

exhibits listed by the mother; (3) documents filed with the clerk of court; (4)

all discovery exchanged by the parties; (5) all documents produced by way

1
  Given our disposition, we do not reach the issue of whether this ruling was
proper. See De Clements v. De Clements, 662 So. 2d 1276, 1282 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1995) (“[A] [magistrate’s] findings of fact and conclusions of law come
to the trial court clothed with a presumption of correctness, and the trial court
may only reject these findings and conclusions if they are clearly erroneous
or if the [magistrate] has misconceived the legal effect of the evidence
presented.”).

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of mandatory disclosures and discovery; and (6) all pleadings, motions, and

notices filed with the clerk of court. The father listed the parties, the mother’s

attorney, “any rebuttal witnesses,” and an expert attorney as potential

witnesses.

      On September 8, 2021, the mother filed an exhibit list, containing

dozens of exhibits. The following day, both parties appeared by Zoom for

the trial. The trial court confirmed on the record that the written request for

continuance had been previously denied. The court refused to allow the

mother to admit any exhibits on the basis that the clerk had not been

furnished with hard copies of the exhibits in advance and that the late

disclosure violated the time requirement imposed under the trial order.

Repeated oral requests for continuance were denied.

      At the conclusion of the trial, the court ratified the agreed parenting

plan and denied attorney’s fees. Rehearing proved unsuccessful, and the

instant appeal ensued.

                                  ANALYSIS

      The trial court is afforded broad discretion in deciding whether to grant

or deny a continuance. See Morris v. City of Cape Coral, 163 So. 3d 1174,

1180 (Fla. 2015). This discretion is not, however, entirely unbridled. It is

axiomatic that “such rulings must comport with fairness and due process.”

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Fisher v. Perez, 947 So. 2d 648, 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). In assessing

whether the denial of a continuance runs afoul of these considerations, this

court has consistently examined the following factors: (1) whether the

request for continuance was dilatory or unforeseeable; (2) whether the denial

created an injustice for the movant; and (3) whether the opposing party

would have suffered prejudice or inconvenience. Bryan v. Bryan, 824 So.

2d 920, 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).

      In the instant case, the mother filed her motion for appointment of a

forensic accountant before the trial order issued, and she timely obtained a

ruling from the general magistrate. Given that the trial court twice ratified the

recommendation of the magistrate, the mother had a reasonable basis to

conclude that the appointment was all but a certainty.

      When no ruling was forthcoming, the mother duly filed a written motion

for continuance. By the time the trial court ruled on the exceptions, the trial

deadlines had expired. The conundrum created by this delay did not pass

without notice. The father failed to timely file his trial disclosures, and the

court, at the eleventh hour, extended the time for the exchange of billing

records.

      The last-minute simultaneous refusal to appoint a forensic accountant

and grant a continuance, combined with the wholesale refusal to allow the

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introduction of late-disclosed evidence, left the mother in a “Catch-22.” The

request for a forensic accountant was denied on the proverbial eve of trial,

but when the mother attempted to prove her case through other means, she

was denied the opportunity. The net effect of this course of events was that,

for all practical purposes, the mother was deprived of a meaningful day in

court. See, e.g., Clayman v. Clayman, 536 So. 2d 358, 359 (Fla. 3d DCA

1988) (holding denial of mother’s motions to continue trial denied her

sufficient opportunity to review reports received a week before trial and

present any evidence to court).

      Thus, we must examine the propriety of excluding the exhibits. In the

watershed case of Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310, 1311 (Fla.

1981), the Florida Supreme Court balanced the need for firm trial deadlines

and orderly trials with the right to due process and developed a framework

to assess whether the late disclosure of a witness warrants exclusion. The

court cautioned that the trial court should not exercise its discretion “blindly”

but rather focus on the prejudice the use of undisclosed evidence would

inflict upon the objecting party. Id. at 1314. The court articulated three

guiding principles of discretion:

      (i) the objecting party’s ability to cure the prejudice or, similarly,
      his independent knowledge of the existence of the witness; (ii)
      the calling party’s possible intentional, or bad faith,
      noncompliance with the pretrial order; and (iii) the possible

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      disruption of the orderly and efficient trial of the case (or other
      cases).

Id. The rationale advanced in Binger applies equally to untimely exhibit

disclosures. See Montero v. Corzo, 320 So. 3d 976, 980 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).

      Here, the trial court did not find, nor did the father argue, any specific

factual grounds evincing prejudice or bad faith so as to justify either the

denial of continuance or exclusion of exhibits. Instead, a careful examination

of the record compels the opposite conclusion. The father, too, filed his

exhibit and witness disclosures beyond the court-imposed deadlines. Most,

if not all, of the documents the mother sought to introduce had been

previously produced in discovery, filed of record, and adopted as exhibits by

the father. There was no evidence of bad faith, and the failure to file the

pretrial catalogue was attributable to the attorney, not the mother.

      Under these circumstances, we conclude the denial of continuance,

considered in tandem with the exclusion of evidence, amounted to reversible

error. See Higgins v. Higgins, 351 So. 3d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022)

(holding trial court’s denial of former wife’s motion for continuance created

an injustice to her where court’s denial precluded former wife from presenting

any evidence whatsoever); Fasig v. Fasig, 830 So. 2d 839, 841 (Fla. 2d DCA

2002) (finding denial of request for continuance created injustice where it

prohibited wife from presenting any case for purpose of evaluating husband’s

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financial information for alimony determination); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 451

So. 2d 914, 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (“Special circumstances . . . may

require a continuance where there has not been sufficient time to complete

discovery and properly prepare for trial and where the continuance causes

no substantial prejudice or injustice to the opposing party.”); Kamhi v.

Waterview Towers Condo. Ass’n, 793 So. 2d 1033, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA

2001) (“[G]iven the fact that Kamhi was erroneously precluded from

presenting any case, her request for a three-month continuance . . . was not

an attempt . . . to unduly delay or prejudice Waterview’s case.”); see also

Montero, 320 So. 3d at 980–81 (footnote omitted) (“[B]ecause the trial court

failed to consider and analyze the Binger factors, and failed to make any

findings, including the failure to make a determination of Binger prejudice,

we reverse and remand for a new trial.”); Reive v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr.

Co., 190 So. 3d 93, 94 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“We conclude that the court’s

denial of the continuance together with the admission of witnesses and

documents not timely disclosed to the defendant constituted ‘surprise in fact’

in this case and violated [Binger].”).

      We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.          Upon

remand, the trial court shall attach the child support guidelines worksheet to

the final order. See Dep’t of Rev. ex rel. K.A.N. v. A.N.J., 165 So. 3d 846,

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848 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Dorvilien v. Verty, 335 So. 3d 146, 147 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2022); Tinoco v. Lugo, 342 So. 3d 845, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022); Fla.

Fam. L. R. P. 12.285(k).

     Reversed and remanded.

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