Court Opinion

ID: 9750034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:14:22.729468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:01.760765
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring:
I join the majority. I write separately only to note my continuing adherence to the view that with the enactment of the Comparative Negligence Act, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 7102 (1982), the legislature also clearly intended the aboli*452tion of the defense of assumption of the risk in cases where the plaintiffs conduct can be characterized as negligent. In such cases, the plaintiffs conduct should be analyzed under the rubric of comparative negligence and compared to that of the defendant. Whether the plaintiffs conduct can also be characterized as a voluntary assumption of the risk should not be regarded as controlling. See Malinder v. Jenkins Elevator & Machine Co., 371 Pa.Super. 414, 538 A.2d 509 (1988) (Beck, J., dissenting); Berman v. Radnor Rolls, Inc., 374 Pa.Super. 118, 542 A.2d 525, 532-33 (1988).
As the majority notes, the “parameters of the assumption of the risk defense are somewhat difficult to define.” This case is a perfect illustration of the difficulties presented in ■ determining the applicability of the defense where the plaintiffs conduct is negligent. When precisely does the negligent conduct of a plaintiff rise to the level of a voluntary assumption of the risk? Under what circumstances can it be implied that the plaintiff has abandoned his right to complain of the consequences? Case law provides no workable standard to use in answering these questions. These difficulties would be avoided if it were recognized that the Comparative Negligence Act has eliminated the need for courts or juries to grapple with this unwieldy concept. The Act allows a jury to make a full and fair assessment of the plaintiffs conduct whenever it can be characterized as negligent, to compare it to that of the defendant, and to reduce or even bar recovery where appropriate.