Court Opinion

ID: 9794606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:08:26.229167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.204097
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds as a matter of law that a water ski kite is a “device for aerial navigation” based on two “critical” factors: (1) the aerodynamic principles which affect its ability to become and remain airborne, and (2) the degree of control which the operator has over its direction, speed, and the timing and place of landing.
I cannot agree that the exclusionary clause should be interpreted so broadly. A snow ski jumper’s skis during a jump comply with the “critical” factors outlined by the majority. Yet common sense clearly suggests that they are not devices for aerial navigation even though aerodynamic principles affect their abilities to become and remain airborne and their “operators” exercise a degree of control over direction, speed, and the timing and place of landing.
The majority opinion and other decisions which have interpreted provisions similar to the one in question, have attempted to define “aerial navigation.” It has been defined essentially as conducting travel through air. Edison v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 495 F.Supp. 484 (1980) aff’d, 664 F.2d 1130 (1981); Wilson v. Insurance Co. of North America, 453 F.Supp. 732 (1978); Fireman's Fund American Life Ins. Co. v. Long, 148 Ga.App. 216, 251 S.E.2d 133 (1978). The element of control involved in conducting travel through air has been emphasized by some jurisdictions, as it is by the majority here. Cabell v. World Service Life Ins. Co., Tex.Cir.App., 599 S.W.2d 652 (1980); Fielder v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 435 F.Supp. 912 (1977). Cf. Childress v. Continental Casualty Co., 461 F.Supp. 704 (1978) where the court focuses on the nature of a parachute in sport parachuting and concludes it is not a “device for aerial navigation.” See also Clark v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., Tex., 347 S.W.2d 290 (1961). I have no quarrel with these defini*100tions. I simply believe that the facts of this case do not require our constructing a general definition.
The question presented by this appeal is restricted to whether a device which is tethered to* the earth is a device for aerial navigation. Like many amusement park rides which remain tethered to the ground by cables and other mechanical means, a water ski kite depends for its operation upon its tether to the boat which it trails. Clearly amusement park rides are not devices for aerial navigation. Similarly, water ski kites cannot be so considered. There is no legitimate distinction between them.
I recognize that the court in Fireman’s Fund American Life Ins. Co. v. Long, supra, held that an insured’s death was not covered by the policy because a hang glider which was designed to be launched by towing behind a motor vehicle ivas a vehicle or device for aerial navigation within the policy’s aviation exclusion. However, the facts of that case are critically distinctive from the case at bar. There the glider was designed to be launched by towing and the tow rope was to be disengaged by a hand release control at the beginning of the ride. Here the disengaging of the tether is only performed to effect a landing (although that is not how the accident occurred). The glider’s ride is untethered in the air while the ride in the kite, like amusement park rides, depends upon the tether for its existence.
Exclusions and words of limitation are to be strictly construed against the insurer. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Cameron, Mont., 633 P.2d 1212 (1981); Brinkman v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 45 Cal.Rptr. 8, 63 C.2d 41, 403 P.2d 136 (1965); Thompson v. Ezzell, 61 Wash.2d 685, 379 P.2d 983 (1963).
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court.
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HOWE, J.