Court Opinion

ID: 9402055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 22:00:35.551281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:57.154678
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 14 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-10217

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                2:18-cr-50160-SPL-1
 v.

CHRISTINA FAVELA-FAVELA,                        MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted May 16, 2023
                                Phoenix, Arizona

Before: NGUYEN, COLLINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

      Christina Favela-Favela (“Favela”) appeals two of the supervised release

conditions imposed by the district court as unsupported by the record: (1) a

condition requiring her to abstain from possessing and using alcohol; and (2) a

condition requiring her to undergo a mental health assessment and to participate in

mental health treatment. Favela also contends that the mental health condition

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
improperly delegates the decision as to whether she must participate in treatment to

a medical or mental health professional. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the imposition of both conditions, but

remand for the district court to impose the District of Arizona’s new mental health

language.

      1.       Special Condition No. 4, prohibiting Favela from using or possessing

alcohol, does not lack reasonable support in the record. Favela’s past alcohol use

caused her to neglect her children and expose them to significant risks. While the

incident described in the record occurred many years ago, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in imposing the no-alcohol condition given the serious nature

of the incident and the fact that Favela still had minor children at the time of

sentencing.1

      2.        Special Condition No. 5 states, in relevant part, that:

      You must participate in a mental health assessment and participate in
      mental health treatment as determined to be necessary by a medical or
      mental health professional and follow any treatment directions by the
      treatment provider.

Favela experienced previous mental health struggles, sought therapy in the past,

and was interested in pursuing therapy again. Thus, the record supports the district

1
 Favela expressed concern that the condition barring possession of alcohol could
disqualify her from any job where she might handle alcohol. We interpret the
condition only to prohibit Favela from consuming alcohol or possessing alcohol for
personal use, not from serving alcohol as part of a job.

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court’s conclusion that Favela would benefit from mental health treatment.

       3.     The district court did not improperly delegate the decision of whether

Favela must participate in mental health treatment to a non-judicial officer. As

long as a district court “answer[s] the question of whether [a defendant] would

undergo treatment,” there is no improper delegation of judicial power. United

States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the district court used

mandatory language, requiring that Favela “must participate in a mental health

assessment and participate in mental health treatment.” We construe the clause

that follows, “as determined to be necessary by a medical or mental health

professional,” to refer to the determination of the appropriate type of treatment.

Because the district court mandated mental health treatment—leaving only “the

ministerial task[]” of choosing the appropriate method for compliance with the

court’s condition to a medical or mental health professional—it did not improperly

delegate its judicial authority. Id.

       Prior to oral argument, however, the government advised the court that the

District of Arizona recently modified the language used in its mental health

condition to account for United States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir.

2009) (holding that the district court cannot delegate the decision of whether a

defendant receives inpatient versus outpatient treatment to a probation officer).

The government does not object to a limited remand to apply the new standard

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language. Accordingly, we remand to the district court to impose the new

language.

      AFFIRMED and REMANDED.

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