Court Opinion

ID: 9946564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 21:02:30.50997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:24:53.697937
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/29/24 P. v. Andorfer CA1/1
                    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                             DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
          Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                A165770
 v.
 PATRICK JOSEPH ANDORFER,                                       (San Mateo County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. 15SF002528A)
          Defendant and Appellant.

        A plausible basis exists to mandate lifetime sex offender registration
for violations of Penal Code sections 288.31 and 288.4 while imposing a 20-
year minimum registration period, and providing the opportunity to petition
for removal from the registry, for violations of section 288, subdivision (a)
(section 288(a)).
        Patrick Joseph Andorfer appeals from an order mandating lifetime sex
offender registration after he was convicted of meeting a minor for lewd
purposes and contacting a minor for a sexual offense. He contends that
mandatory lifetime registration violates his equal protection rights under the
federal and state Constitutions as the sex offender registration law treats
him differently than others who commit sexual offenses against children—

        1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                        1
who do not receive a lifetime registration mandate—without a rational basis
for doing so.
      We conclude a rational basis exists for the disparate treatment, and we
affirm.
                               I. BACKGROUND
      In 2015, Andorfer, then 51 years old, sent sexual messages to a 15-year-
old girl via social media and text. Andorfer arranged to meet the girl; when
he arrived at the meeting place, he was arrested.
      A jury convicted Andorfer of meeting a minor for lewd purposes
(§ 288.4, subd. (b)) and contacting a minor for a sexual offense (§ 288.3,
subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to three years in prison, which he
had already served, and imposed lifetime sex offender registration pursuant
to section 290.
                                II. DISCUSSION
      Andorfer’s sole claim on appeal is that mandatory lifetime sex offender
registration for convictions pursuant to sections 288.3 and 288.4 violates his
equal protection rights under the federal and state Constitutions when
compared to a minimum term registration period imposed on offenders
convicted pursuant to section 288(a). As we explain below, we disagree.
A. Pertinent Offenses and Sex Offender Registration Requirements
      To place the issues in context, we begin by describing the statutes
codifying the relevant offenses and imposing sex offender registration
mandates. Section 288.3, subdivision (a) makes it a felony to contact, or
attempt to contact, a minor with the intent to commit specified sex offenses.
      Section 288.4, subdivision (a)(1) makes it a felony to arrange a meeting
with a person believed to be a minor, when motivated by an abnormal sexual
interest in children, for specified purposes, including engaging in lewd or

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lascivious behavior. Section 288.4, subdivision (b) criminalizes going to the
arranged meeting place at the arranged time.
      The offenses described in sections 288.3 and 288.4 were created in
2006. Section 288.3 was adopted by voters in 2006 as part of Proposition 83.
(People v. Korwin (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 682, 689.) The purpose of
Proposition 83 was “ ‘to protect Californians from the threat posed by sex
offenders.’ ” (Korwin, at p. 690.) Proposition 83 placed “ ‘a high priority on
maintaining public safety through a highly skilled and trained law
enforcement as well as laws that deter and punish criminal behavior.’ ”
(Ibid.) The initiative’s findings and declarations observed the “ ‘universal use
of the Internet has also ushered in an era of increased risk to our children by
predators using this technology as a tool to lure children away from their
homes and into dangerous situations. Therefore, to reflect society’s
disapproval of this type of activity, adequate penalties must be enacted to
ensure predators cannot escape prosecution.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Also in 2006, the Legislature created the section 288.4 offense—along
with multiple other offenses involving child victims—by urgency measure.2
(People v. Fromuth, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 101, fn. 8; People v. Cornett
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1267.) The primary purpose of the measure “was to
prevent ‘future victimization’ of the community by sex offenders.” (Cornett, at
p. 1267.)

      2 “The offense was originally added as section 288.3 by an urgency

measure in September 2006. In November 2006, Proposition 83 enacted a
new section 288.3 creating a different crime. [Citation.] In 2007, the original
section 288.3 created by the Legislature was renumbered as section 288.4
without any substantive changes.” (People v. Fromuth (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
91, 101, fn. 8.)

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      California law has long required persons convicted of certain sex crimes
to register as sex offenders. (People v. Mosley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1044, 1048.)
“For many years, California took a one-size-fits-all approach to sex offender
registration: If registration was required, registration was always for life.”
(People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184, 190 (Franco).) Consistent with
this approach, section 290 imposed automatic lifetime registration for certain
sex offense convictions. (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th
871, 876–877 (Johnson).) Effective January 2021, however, the Legislature
amended section 290 and established a three-tiered registry for adult sex
offenders, requiring registration for a minimum of 10 years (tier one), 20
years (tier two), or for life (tier three), depending on the offense. (Legg v.
Department of Justice (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 504, 509 (Legg).)
      The purpose of the tiered registry system was to improve public safety
by focusing resources and attention on high-risk offenders—those likely to
reoffend. High-risk offenders would remain on the registry for life while
lower or medium-risk offenders—tiers one and two—would be allowed to
petition for removal from the registry. (See Franco, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
p. 191.)
      In this case, Andorfer compares his offenses to section 288(a), which
criminalizes the willful commission of “any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon . . .
a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person
or the child.” A conviction under section 288(a) is a tier two offense requiring
a minimum 20-year registration and allowing the offender to petition for
termination from the registry if certain criteria are met. (§§ 290, subds. (c),
(d)(2)(A), 290.5, subd. (a)(1).)

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       In contrast, Andorfer’s convictions under sections 288.33 and 288.4 are
tier three offenses requiring lifetime sex offender registration. (§ 290,
subd. (d)(3)(C)(xi), (xii)).)
B. Equal Protection Principles
       “The United States and California Constitutions prohibit denial of
equal protection of the laws.” (Legg, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 510.) The
federal and state equal protection guarantees require “the state to treat all
persons similarly situated alike or, conversely, to avoid all classifications that
are ‘arbitrary or irrational’ and those that reflect ‘ “a bare . . . desire to harm
a politically unpopular group.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       “An equal protection analysis has two steps. ‘ “ ‘The first prerequisite
. . . is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or
more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’ . . .” ’ [Citation.] If
the groups are similarly situated, the next question is whether the disparate
treatment can be justified by a constitutionally sufficient state interest.”
(Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1102.) Varying levels of
judicial scrutiny apply to this inquiry depending on the type of claim. (Id. at
p. 1107.) Most “ ‘legislation is tested only to determine if the challenged
classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.’
[Citation.] However, differences ‘in statutes that involve suspect
classifications or touch upon fundamental interests are subject to strict

       3 Under section 290, a section 288.3 violation is a tier three offense

unless it was committed with the intent to commit other targeted offenses
which are not at issue here and which do not result in mandatory lifetime
registration if certain criteria are met. (§ 290, subds. (c)(2), (d)(3)(C)(xi).) It
is undisputed that Andorfer’s section 288.3 conviction was for the targeted
offense of section 288, subdivision (c)(1), which requires lifetime sex offender
registration.

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scrutiny, and can be sustained only if they are necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest.’ ” (Ibid.)
      The parties assert, and we agree, that rational basis review applies to
Andorfer’s claim. (See Legg, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 511.) Under rational
basis review, equal protection of the law “is denied only where there is no
‘rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
governmental purpose.’ [Citation.] In other words, the legislation survives
constitutional scrutiny as long as there is ‘ “any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” ’ [Citation.]
This standard of rationality does not depend upon whether lawmakers ever
actually articulated the purpose they sought to achieve. Nor must the
underlying rationale be empirically substantiated. [Citation.] While the
realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored [citation], a court
may engage in ‘ “rational speculation” ’ as to the justifications for the
legislative choice [citation]. It is immaterial for rational basis review
‘whether or not’ any such speculation has ‘a foundation in the record.’ ”
(People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74–75.) “To mount a successful
rational basis challenge, a party must ‘ “negative every conceivable basis” ’
that might support the disputed statutory disparity. [Citations.] If a
plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-guess its
‘ “wisdom, fairness, or logic.” ’ ” (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 881.)
      We review an equal protection claim de novo. (California Grocers Assn.
v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 208.)
C. Analysis
      Here, it is undisputed that Andorfer—who violated sections 288.3 and
288.4—is similarly situated to offenders of section 288(a) with respect to sex
offender registration. Therefore, the question before us is whether a

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plausible basis exists to mandate lifetime registration for the former while
imposing a 20-year minimum registration period, and providing the
opportunity to petition for removal from the registry, for the latter. The
answer is yes.
      A plausible basis for the disparate treatment exists because the
Legislature could have concluded sections 288.3 and 288.4 offenders pose a
greater risk of recidivism than section 288(a) offenders. (See Franco, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 191.) We find support for this rationale when we
consider the background of sections 288.3 and 288.4 and the nature of the
pertinent offenses in conjunction with the purpose of the new tiered registry
system.
      The nature of the offenses proscribed by sections 288.3 and 288.4
differs from a section 288(a) offense. While a section 288(a) offense can occur
spontaneously, the offenses in sections 288.3 and 288.4 are “luring” crimes.
(See People v. Keister (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 442, 452 [section 288.3]; People
v. Yuksel (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 850, 854 [section 288.4].) We agree with the
People’s assertion that the planning typical of cultivating a relationship with
the targeted minor evinces a predatory mindset that goes beyond an
impulsive sexual act. (See, e.g., People v. Medelez (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 659,
663 [luring requires preparatory communication].) The concerns leading to
the creation of sections 288.3 and 288.4—including increased risk to children
by adult sexual predators using the Internet—are “not always present when
a person violates subdivision (a) of section 288, since a violation of that
provision can involve consensual sexual relations between minors or
teenagers in a romantic relationship. [Citation.] Thus, although those
convicted of offenses under section 288, subdivision (a) are subject to harsher
penalties . . . , the Legislature reasonably could have determined that

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section 288, subdivision (a) offenses could be committed by younger offenders
with more potential to rehabilitate—despite the severity of the offense”—
than offenders of sections 288.3 and 288.4. (Legg, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 515.)
      Legg—which considered an equal protection claim comparing
section 288(a) with a different offense mandating lifetime sex offender
registration—is instructive. There, the defendant was convicted of
committing a lewd act on a child who was 14 or 15 years old and at least 10
years younger than the defendant (§ 288, subd. (c)(1) (section 288(c)(1)), a
conviction which required him to register as a sex offender for life. (Legg,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 509–510.) The court reasoned that the concern
leading to the enactment of section 288(c)(1)—sexual exploitation of young,
vulnerable children by significantly older, predatory adults—was not always
present when someone violates section 288(a), which does not contain an age
differential requirement between the victim and offender. (Legg, at p. 515.)
      The Legg court’s rationale is applicable here notwithstanding that
sections 288.3 and 288.4 do not contain an age differential requirement as in
section 288(c)(1). The predatory nature of sections 288.3 and 288.4 offenses
and the risk of reoffending can be compared to section 288(c)(1), all of which
require lifetime registration. In enacting the tiered registry system, the
Legislature relied on “decades of research” which had provided “a much
better sense of who is at high risk of reoffending and who is not.” (Sen. Rules
Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 384
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 8, 2017, p. 12.) When enacting the
tiered registry system, the Legislature could reasonably have concluded that
offenders of sections 288.3 and 288.4 warranted lifetime registration while

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offenders of section 288(a) warranted a minimum term registration and the
opportunity to petition to terminate registration.
      Thus, the disparate treatment at issue bears a rational relationship to
a governmental purpose. There is a rational relationship to the purpose of
the tiered registry system—focusing resources and attention on offenders at
the highest risk to reoffend—and to the purpose of sections 288.3 and 288.4,
offenses which were created due to concerns about sex offenders, including
predatory adults using the Internet to lure children for sex.
      In attempting to demonstrate there is no conceivable basis for the
different registration requirements, Andorfer advances a single argument.
He compares the punishment for violations of sections 288.3 and 288.4 with a
section 288(a) violation. He reasons that his convictions carry less potential
prison time than a section 288(a) conviction but subject him to lifetime
registration, while a section 288(a) offender is subject to a 20-year minimum
registration period and may seek termination from the registry. (§§ 288.3,
subd. (a), 288.4, subd. (b), 288(a), 290, subd . (d)(2)(A), (d)(3)(A), 290.5,
subd. (a)(1).) This, he contends, is not rational.
      In support of this argument, Andorfer relies on D.M. v. Department of
Justice (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1439 (D.M.). There, a division of this court
held that disparate treatment in obtaining relief from sex offender
registration was a denial of equal protection. (Id. at p. 1443.) D.M.
considered a statutory disparity between people convicted of unlawful oral
copulation with a minor and people convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse
with a minor. (Ibid.) Upon a court issuing a certificate of rehabilitation, the
latter group were automatically relieved from any further duty to register as
a sex offender, while the former were not. (Id. at p. 1449.) In comparing the
incarceration periods for the two offenses, D.M. reasoned that “more severe

                                          9
treatment of those convicted of the lesser offense”—oral copulation—was
unjustified. (Id. at p. 1451.) It continued, the “length of the potential prison
term presumably corresponds to the severity of the offense. It is irrational—
indeed, perverse—and constitutionally impermissible, to impose stricter
registration requirements on those subject to a shorter prison term than
those subject to a longer term.” (Ibid.)
      In this court’s view, D.M. does not assist Andorfer for the following
reasons. First, the D.M. court based its holding on People v. Hofsheier (2006)
37 Cal.4th 1185, which has since been overruled. (D.M., supra,
209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1443; Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 888 [overruling
Hofsheier].) Secondly, the Supreme Court not only overruled Hofsheier, but it
also specifically disapproved of Court of Appeal decisions applying its
rationale. (Johnson, at p. 888.) Further, the Court acknowledged that the
Hofsheier court attempted to “limit its holding to the factual circumstances
before it . . . .” (Id. at p. 878) Thus, the application of Hofsheier was not
intended to reach beyond its narrow set of facts. Even still, Andorfer
contends the analysis and reasoning he relies upon from D.M. was not
disturbed by the California Supreme Court’s overturning of Hofsheier.
However, even considering Andorfer’s assertion that the above quoted
language from D.M. remains authority, his reasoning ignores the different
purposes of imprisonment and sex offender registration. Registration is
intended to “ ‘promote the “ ‘state interest in controlling crime and preventing
recidivism in sex offenders.’ ” ’ ” (Johnson, at p. 881.) It is not punishment.
Whereas the object of punishment is to exact retribution for past misconduct
and deter future transgressions, sex offender registration provides for the
collection of information about the identity and whereabouts of convicted sex
offenders, making it harder for such people to reoffend without getting

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caught. (In re Alva (2004) 33 Cal.4th 254, 287–288.) In fact, the purpose of
establishing a tiered registry system was to differentiate offenders based on
risk and focus resources and attention on high-risk offenders. (See Franco,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 191.) Specifically, “[p]lacement into Tier 1 and
Tier 2 turns on the crime of which the defendant ‘was convicted.’ [Citation]
Placement into Tier 3 generally turns on the crime of which the defendant
‘was convicted,’ but can also turn on the defendant’s ‘risk level . . .’ [and] on
his recidivism . . . .” (Ibid.) Focusing solely on comparing the potential prison
terms for the offenses—and thus on the “severity of the offense”—ignores this
purpose.
      Andorfer’s reliance on Newland v. Board of Governors (1977) 19 Cal.3d
705 is also misplaced. There, the California Supreme Court determined there
was no rational basis for allowing felons—but not misdemeanants—to obtain
a certificate of rehabilitation. (Id. at p. 712.) “The requirements invalidated
in Newland—for which the Attorney General never tried to offer a rational
basis, and which [the Supreme Court] described as so illogical that the nature
of their operation appeared inadvertent—were not as minimally rational as”
the lifetime registration mandates for offenders of sections 288.3 and 288.4.
(People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 296.)
      Given a plausible basis exists for the disparate treatment between
offenders of sections 288.3 and 288.4 and offenders of section 288(a),
Andorfer’s equal protection claim fails.
                               III.   DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

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                          LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BANKE, J.

A165770
People v. Andorfer

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