Court Opinion

ID: 9519193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:11:07.051591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:04.621738
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GALLAGHER,19  specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent. The trial court’s determination of whether the State has a valid, neutral-based reason for its exercise of a peremptory challenge is entitled to "great deference” and should not be disturbed on review unless the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 412, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1871 (1991). A potential juror possessing an unfavorable trait may be accepted while another juror possessing that same negative trait, but also possessing other negative traits, may be challenged. People v. Benson, 266 Ill. App. 3d 994, 999, 641 N.E.2d 617, 622 (1994), appeal denied, 158 Ill. 2d 554, 645 N.E.2d 1360 (1994). Here, Ms. Bond is a public high school principal and a renter. There were other educators selected for the jury, but all the excused potential jurors were renters. "A venireperson may be excluded on a peremptory challenge based on the fact that he rents his home.” People v. Thomas, 266 Ill. App. 3d 914, 922, 641 N.E.2d 867, 873 (1994), citing People v. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d 231, 538 N.E.2d 1107 (1989). The majority has placed the trial court in an unenviable position. Even though there was a facially valid reason for excluding this juror, the trial court must second-guess the State as to why it did not exclude another person with a negative trait. The majority opinion would require the trial court to second-guess the State as to the best use of its peremptory challenges. Where there are race-neutral reasons for challenging venirepersons, the trial court need go no further and inquire whether there are other persons with more or stronger race-neutral reasons. Yet, the majority herein holds otherwise. The trial court should not have to bear that burden. I accordingly dissent. I concur with the remainder of the majority’s well-reasoned opinion regarding the appropriate admission of prior consistent statements.  Justice Rizzi originally heard oral argument in this case prior to his retirement. Justice Gallagher was substituted and has reviewed the record, briefs and audio recording of the oral argument.