Court Opinion

ID: 9949184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-09 00:01:44.634467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:38.927487
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/24 Sankranthi v. El Camino Hospital CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 RUTH SANKRANTHI,                                                    H049506
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Appellant,                                Super. Ct. No. 18CV334546)

             v.

 EL CAMINO HOSPITAL,

             Defendant and Respondent.

         Appellant Ruth Sankranthi1 was terminated from her position at El Camino
Hospital (ECH). Sankranthi, who was pregnant at the time of her termination, brought an
action against ECH alleging, inter alia, discrimination based on her gender and national
origin, and wrongful termination after she became disabled due to pregnancy. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of ECH.
         On appeal, Sankranthi argues that triable issues of material fact remained as to the
discrimination, pregnancy disability, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination
causes of action. She also challenges various evidentiary findings. Finding that
summary judgment was properly granted, we will affirm the judgment.

         Sankranthi’s last name was erroneously spelled as “Sankrathi” in the original
         1

complaint, and the erroneous caption was used on documents filed in this court. On our
own motion, we have corrected the caption used on appeal and will use the correct
spelling of the appellant’s last name in this opinion.
                                          I. FACTS
       In October 2016, Jessica Hatala, then an interim manager in the Clinical
Document Improvement (CDI) Department at ECH, interviewed Sankranthi for a CDI
Specialist position. The position consisted primarily of daily clinical review of records to
ensure accuracy of the records and medical coding, and to communicate with physicians
to obtain missing or conflicting medical record documentation. This is a function of the
hospital’s Clinical Quality Department.
       Hatala recommended that Sankranthi be hired with a salary of $130,000 per year.
Sankranthi asked for, and Hatala approved, a higher salary of $147,000 per year.
Sankranthi began working in December 2016. Hatala knew that Sankranthi identified as
female and that her national origin was Indian. Hatala also hired three other CDI
specialists, T.B. (who like Sankranthi was a female from India), Y.C. (an Asian female),
and F.S.2 (a Black/Nigerian male).
       In the beginning, according to Sankranthi, she and Hatala had a “great” working
relationship. However, Hatala noticed some problems. According to Hatala, Sankranthi
“exhibited significant difficulties in performing her duties as a CDI Specialist as well as
significant professionalism shortcomings.” In particular, Sankranthi did not compose
“clinically valid queries to physicians,” her work resulted in “frequent coding
mismatches,” and staff members complained to Hatala about Sankranthi’s “demeanor and
manner of dress.”
       On April 10, 2017, Hatala noticed that Sankranthi and another CDI Specialist,
C.E., a Mexican male, had a large number of cases marked “ ‘in progress,’ ” and as a
result, informed them that they would not receive any new case assignments to provide
them time to complete their cases. A week later, on April 18, 2017, Hatala noted that
they had not completed the tasks, and sent both of them an e-mail requesting that they

       2
        F.S. is the father of the child Sankranthi was pregnant with at the time of her
termination.

                                             2
complete their assignment by week’s end. She also sent an e-mail to the entire CDI team,
chastising them all for being late to a joint meeting with another department and for
unprofessional conduct during the meeting.
       On April 20, 2017, Hatala sent an e-mail to human resources (HR) regarding
Sankranthi and C.E., stating that their performance was not meeting expectations. With
regard to Sankranthi, Hatala noted the following: “general unprofessional behavior,
inappropriate dress and flirtatious behavior, calling her coworker and telling her to leave
work early and not [to] do more work than [Sankranthi], general lack of participation in
the Claro education, tardiness, generally needing more work and more redirection in her
work, inability to recognize and act on query opportunities that are considered a core part
of our CDI job, and what I can only describe as temper tantrums.” (“Claro” referred to
Claro Health Care Consultants, which provided a two-week training program to the
CDI’s in April 2017.) Hatala also noted that “[w]e already had a 1:1 about her attitude,
but I have seen no improvement over the last two weeks.” Hatala asked for guidance on
whether Sankranthi was eligible for a performance improvement plan (PIP), or if she
could issue a written warning.
       In early July 2017, Sankranthi contacted HR, spoke to HR representative Faridah
Hemani, and complained about Hatala. According to Hatala, Sankranthi alleged that
Hatala was “ ‘targeting’ ” her by discussing her job performance shortcomings with her.
According to Sankranthi’s deposition, her complaints about Hatala included: (1) Hatala
told her she dressed like she was going to a club; (2) in front of other people, Hatala said
she was surprised that Sankranthi owned pants; (3) Hatala waved her hand in front of
Sankranthi’s face and said “Hello” at a group education meeting; (4) Hatala told
Sankranthi and a coworker that they looked cute from behind and that she wanted to take
their picture; and (5) Hatala repeatedly talked to Sankranthi in a demeaning manner.
       On July 11, 2017, Sankranthi met with HR representative Hemani, Catherine
Carson (Senior Director of Quality and Hatala’s supervisor), and Hatala to discuss

                                              3
Sankranthi’s concerns. Hatala acknowledged that she could be direct but emphasized to
Sankranthi that she needed to dress professionally and reiterated that “coworkers had
complained about [her] demeanor and dress . . . , including a comment that Ms.
Sankranthi ‘dressed like she was going to the club,’ ” which Hatala had conveyed to
Sankranthi.
       A few days later, on July 14, 2017, T.B. approached Hatala regarding concerns she
had about Sankranthi. Later that day, Hatala summarized those concerns in an e-mail to
HR and Carson. She reported that T.B. came to her because she felt “uncomfortable”
around Sankranthi. T.B. reported that Sankranthi made multiple negative comments
about Hatala, was not collaborating or talking with another colleague, and encouraged
T.B. not to speak with or engage with that colleague. Hatala concluded by stating “it
appears that [Sankranthi] is creating a toxic environment on the team and is having a
negative effect on at least two members.” Hatala expressed her desire to “bring this out
in the open and put an end to it once and for all.”
       Hatala summarized her ongoing concerns in a written memo to Sankranthi dated
September 7, 2017, that documented her “Oral/Verbal Counseling” (hereafter “oral
counseling”) sessions with Sankranthi that day and in April 2017. The memo noted that
on April 3 and April 28, 2017, Hatala met with Sankranthi to discuss performance
concerns, inappropriate work attire, and reports that Sankranthi encouraged another staff
member to leave work when Sankranthi did and “not to send more queries than”
Sankranthi did. The memo stated that Hatala had also received a report that Sankranthi
told a coworker that they had been “ ‘doing too many reviews’ ” and engaged in
“generally negative talk about the department.” And finally, the memo noted that “a staff
member alerted [Hatala] and [her department’s] HR Business Representative, Hemani,
that this department is a ‘toxic environment’ and the stress is impeding their work
performance.”

                                              4
       On September 7, 2017, Hatala also gave Sankranthi a three-page PIP, detailing
overviews of expected competencies, how to demonstrate that competency, manager
support in each competency, and expected outcomes. The PIP was in effect for 60 days,
during which time Hatala met with Sankranthi on a weekly basis. In opposition to the
motion, Sankranthi declared that she disagreed that there were performance “issues
needing to be addressed” but signed the PIP because she was told she had to. She also
declared, based on the team’s monthly performance reports for June through August
2017, that her performance was “far better than that of average team members.”
       According to Hatala, Sankranthi’s performance issues persisted into November
2017, and in consultation with HR, Sankranthi’s PIP was extended by 30 days on
November 6, 2017. On November 6, 2017, Hatala met with Sankranthi to discuss her
performance issues and extend her PIP. Sankranthi was issued an “Action Report,”
which contained her “First Written Warning” for unsatisfactory work performance and
described some of the issues with her work and a letter that repeated and expanded on the
statements in the Action Report. The report and letter explained that Sankranthi had
failed to meet the expectations of the CDI role, as well as the conditions of her 60-day
performance improvement plan. The report and letter noted specifically that Sankranthi’s
query response results3 were “inaccurate this past month, increasing from 55% agree rate
to a 92% agree rate” and that Sankranthi had “responded to this finding by reporting that
[she] did not know the correct way to report [her] results.” In the letter, Hatala stated that
Sankranthi had asked her to ask their team members how they would interpret the query
responses. Using a sampling of Sankranthi’s cases, Hatala polled the team; they
discussed the responses as a group and “the team unanimously reported that the query
responses from the physicians were all some degree of ‘disagree,’ ” which indicated that

       3
         We understand the “query response results” to mean whether the treating
physician or practitioner essentially agreed or disagreed with the points raised in the CDI
specialists’ queries.

                                              5
Sankranthi’s results were not as high as she reported. The letter also stated that Hatala,
three other ECH managers or officers, outside consultants, and others in the Clinical
Quality Department had noted that Sankranthi continued “to be nonparticipatory and
display closed, and negative body language in team meetings and education sessions.”
Sankranthi signed both the letter and the report acknowledging receipt but added that she
did not agree with the results and that it was “not an accurate judgment of [her]
performance.” After the 90-day PIP period, and with “focused attention and much
handholding,” Sankranthi was able to “briefly improve and meet the CDI Specialist role’s
minimum requirements.” However, Sankranthi’s performance declined again, and by
early March 2018, Hatala “consulted with HR regarding the next steps . . . including the
possibility of another PIP, or the termination of her employment.”
       On March 18, 2018, Hatala met with Sankranthi and informed her that “she
continued to demonstrate a lack of medical knowledge in her queries, that she was failing
to notice mismatches in DRG[4] codes, and that she was recommending lower-weighted
DRG’s or medical billing codes than those supported by the medical documentation.”
Sankranthi insisted that the quality of her work was not poor because she was meeting
productivity goals. Hatala reiterated that “quantity does not equate to quality,” and
requested that Sankranthi formulate a third PIP to improve her job performance.
       On March 27, 2018, in consultation with Carson and HR, Hatala determined that a
further PIP would not be helpful and decided to terminate Sankranthi’s employment. On
March 28, 2018, Hatala entered the termination into the ECH online portal. Because
Sankranthi was out on leave that day, Hatala scheduled a meeting with Sankranthi for the
following day (March 29, 2018) at 3:00 p.m. to inform Sankranthi of the termination.

       4
         The initialism “DRG” refers to “diagnosis-related group,” a coding system that
classifies hospital cases according to groups that are expected to have similar hospital
resource use costs. DRG’s categorize patients with respect to diagnosis, treatment, and
length of hospital stay, among other variables.

                                             6
       Sankranthi had taken leave on March 28, 2018, for a doctor’s appointment. At the
appointment, her physician recommended that Sankranthi, who was then five and a half
months pregnant, not work due to her pregnancy and provided her with a note for her
employer. Sankranthi came into work early on March 29, 2018, gave the note to HR, and
requested she be placed on pregnancy disability leave. HR told Sankranthi of the dates of
her pregnancy disability leave, and Sankranthi thereafter called Hartford Insurance
directly to obtain disability benefits.
       That same day, a few minutes before their scheduled 3:00 p.m. meeting,
Sankranthi advised Hatala and Carson that she was not feeling well and left work. HR
representative Hemani therefore sent Sankranthi a letter, dated March 29, 2018, advising
her that her employment had been terminated. The letter stated that the “Department had
determined earlier this week that despite two performance improvement plans (the initial
plan and an extension) and ongoing support since that time, you had not been able to
demonstrate or sustain the required level of job performance” and that the meeting
scheduled for that day “was to separate your employment with” ECH.
       A second letter from Hatala, dated March 30, 2018, which was hand-delivered,
again advised Sankranthi that she had been terminated “for unsatisfactory performance
and failure to meet the requirements of the CDI Specialist role.” The letter summarized
that Sankranthi had received documented oral counseling and a 60-day performance
improvement plan, which “highlighted specific areas where immediate improvement was
required,” including delivering “compliant and clinically appropriate queries,”
communicating “with others in a collaborative, professional, and respectful manner,” and
completing “daily workload as assigned and requested by your manager (productivity).”
The letter noted that on “November 6, 2018 [sic], at the end of 60 days, you were notified

                                            7
that you had failed to meet [the] expectations of the PIP.”5 The letter further noted that,
as a result, Sankranthi was issued a written warning, because her “work remained
inaccurate” and she “continued to remain non-participatory in meetings and education
sessions.” Accordingly, the PIP was extended 30 days, after which Sankranthi was
notified on December 6, 2017, that she was taken off the PIP because she had met the
minimum requirements of the plan.
       The letter then addressed Sankranthi’s performance in the first quarter of 2018. It
noted three meetings in January, four meetings in February, and four meetings in March,
at which Hatala and Sankranthi discussed individual charts that were examples of the
“poor quality of the work.” The letter also noted that physicians were not agreeing with
Sankranthi’s work, that she was sending queries that were not supported and
demonstrated a lack of medical knowledge, and that there was significant code
disagreement. Finally, the letter noted that “as we investigated these performance
concerns and your work performance history[,] we became aware that you do not hold a
doctorate in medicine (M.D. degree). You had listed an MD in your employment
application, but you actually hold a MBBS degree (Bachelors [sic] in Medicine).” The
letter concluded, “For these reasons, it is the decision of El Camino Hospital to terminate
your employment, effective immediately.”
                               II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On September 7, 2018, Sankranthi filed a lawsuit against ECH, asserting eight
causes of action: (1) discrimination based on gender and race/ethnicity/national origin
(Indian); (2) violation of Pregnancy Disability Leave (PDL) statute; (3) failure to
accommodate; (4) disability discrimination; (5) retaliation; (6) failure to prevent
discrimination; (7) interference with Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) rights; and

       5
         In referring to the events of September, November, and December 2017, Hatala
referred to the year as “2018.” But since the letter was sent in March 2018, that appears
to have been a typographical error.

                                             8
(8) retaliation for exercising California Family Rights Act (CFRA) leave. ECH answered
the complaint with a general denial and asserted numerous affirmative defenses.
      On May 14, 2021, ECH moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative,
summary adjudication. ECH argued that Sankranthi’s gender and national origin cause
of action lacked merit. Even assuming Sankranthi was a member of a protected class and
suffered an adverse employment action, ECH argued she failed to demonstrate a
discriminatory motive in her treatment or termination. Rather, ECH argued that
Sankranthi was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance. ECH noted the numerous
documented meetings concerning Sankranthi’s job performance, complaints concerning
her demeanor and behavior at work, the 60-day PIP which was extended by 30 days, and
the written documentation concerning her failure to meet expectations for the CDI
Specialist role. ECH noted that in response to one of Sankranthi’s queries, a physician
replied that Sankranthi’s query was “ ‘unintelligible.’ ” In sum, ECH argued that its
decision to terminate Sankranthi’s employment for performance-related reasons was well
supported by the record, and that the reasoning could not be dismissed as pretextual.
      Additionally, ECH contended that Sankranthi’s disability claim failed because she
could not prove that she suffered an adverse employment action because of a disability,
especially in light of the fact that her disability was unknown to ECH when it decided to
terminate her employment. ECH emphasized that the decision to terminate Sankranthi’s
employment was made before her request for pregnancy disability leave, which rendered
meritless her pregnancy-related claims.
      Sankranthi opposed the motion for summary judgment. She asserted that she
dressed professionally and behaved appropriately and disagreed with the characterization
of her conduct as negative or nonparticipatory. She asserted that her performance during
her 60-day PIP was “excellent” and that she received positive feedback, and despite this,
Hatala extended her PIP by 30 days and issued a written warning. Sankranthi referenced
e-mails from December 2017, February 2018, and March 2018, wherein Hatala

                                            9
characterized Sankranthi’s performance positively. Sankranthi argued that asking an
employee to “come up with their own PIPs” violated ECH’s company policy and asserted
that when the prospect of a third PIP was raised, she was more than five and a half
months pregnant “and her pregnancy was showing.” Sankranthi disagreed that she
misrepresented her medical credentials, asserting that she was forthright about her
“credentials obtained from India.”
       On April 19, 2021, a hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment.
Following the hearing, the court issued a written order granting the motion for summary
judgment. As to the discrimination claim (first cause of action), the court determined that
ECH established legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Sankranthi’s termination,
namely her job performance, and that she failed to demonstrate pretext. The court also
found, in the alternative, that Sankranthi failed to establish a prima facie case for
discrimination.
       Addressing the pregnancy disability claim (second cause of action), the court
concluded that ECH did not have knowledge of Sankranthi’s pregnancy until after
making its decision to fire her. The court noted that the decision to terminate
Sankranthi’s employment was made on March 27, 2018, two days before Sankranthi
requested pregnancy disability leave on March 29, 2018. Further, the trial court noted
that Hatala was unaware of Sankranthi’s pregnancy when she made the final decision to
terminate her employment. Although Sankranthi disputed ECH’s evidence, the court
found she failed to offer any evidence in opposition to raise a triable issue of fact to
defeat summary judgment or summary adjudication of this claim.
       As for the causes of action for failure to accommodate (third cause of action),
disability discrimination (fourth cause of action), and retaliation (fifth cause of action),
the court concluded, as with the second cause of action, because ECH terminated
Sankranthi’s employment due to her poor job performance and did so before learning of
her pregnancy, these additional causes of action also failed. Addressing the failure to

                                              10
prevent harassment and discrimination claim (sixth cause of action), the court concluded
that the claim failed because Sankranthi did not allege an underlying cause of action for
harassment, and because she failed to establish any unlawful discrimination by ECH.
       Finally, as for the interference with FMLA rights claim (seventh cause of action)
and CFRA retaliation claim (eighth cause of action), the court concluded that the claims
failed because ECH made the decision to terminate Sankranthi’s employment before
receiving notice of her intent to take pregnancy disability leave and terminated her
employment “based on her declining job performance.”
       On August 20, 2021, the trial court entered its order granting the motion for
summary judgment, and ECH gave notice of entry of that order on September 3, 2021.
On October 19, 2021, Sankranthi filed a notice of appeal from the order granting
summary judgment, erroneously characterizing it as an appeal from a “[j]udgment after
an order granting a summary judgment motion.” Two days later, the trial court entered a
judgment of dismissal based on its order granting summary judgment.
       “An appeal lies from the judgment, not from an order granting a summary
judgment motion.” (Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 11, 14, fn. 1; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (m)(1).) We construe
Sankranthi’s notice of appeal “as being from the subsequently rendered final judgment”
(Dominguez v. Financial Indemnity Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 388, 391, fn. 1) and as
having been filed on October 21, 2021, the date the trial court entered the judgment of
dismissal.
                                    III. DISCUSSION
       On appeal, Sankranthi argues that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment because triable issues of material fact remained with respect to her causes of

                                            11
action for discrimination, violation of PDL, retaliation, and failure to prevent
discrimination.6 Sankranthi also challenges certain evidentiary rulings.
       A. General Principles Regarding Summary Judgment and Standard of Review
       Summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is
no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).)
       To be entitled to summary judgment, the moving party must show by admissible
evidence that the “action has no merit or that there is no defense” thereto. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) A defendant moving for summary judgment, like ECH,
meets this burden by presenting evidence demonstrating that one or more elements of the
cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the claim.
(Id., subds. (o), (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849-850, 853-854.) Once the
defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable
issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or defense. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); see Aguilar, at p. 850.) Material facts are those that relate to the
issues in the case as framed by the pleadings. (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993)
12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67 (Juge).) There is a genuine issue of material fact if, and only if,
the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of
the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.
(Aguilar, at p. 845.)

       6
         In her opening brief, Sankranthi expressly limits the issues on appeal to these
four claims and presents no argument about the trial court’s rulings on her failure to
accommodate, disability discrimination, interference with FMLA, and retaliation for
exercising rights under CFRA claims. We therefore conclude that any challenges to the
latter four claims have been forfeited. (See Swain v. LaserAway Medical Group, Inc.
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59, 72 [appellant forfeited argument by failing to make it in its
opening brief]; Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554-555.)

                                              12
       We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same
three-step analysis the trial court uses. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th
317, 334 (Guz); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court (2001) 24
Cal.4th 945, 972; Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1,
29 (Zamora).) We first identify the issues framed by the pleadings. Next, we determine
whether the moving party has established facts justifying judgment in its favor. If the
moving party has met its initial burden, the final step is to decide whether the opposing
party has demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Zamora, at p. 29,
citing Varni Bros. Corp. v. Wine World, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 880, 886-887.)
       We review the evidence in the light most favorable to Sankranthi, as the losing
party in this case, liberally construing her evidence while strictly scrutinizing ECH’s
showing and resolving any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in Sankranthi’s favor.
(Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768-769; Zamora, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 29.) On appeal, as in the trial court, the “court focuses on finding
issues of fact; it does not resolve them. The court seeks to find contradictions in the
evidence or inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence that raise a triable issue of
material fact.” (Trop v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1133,
1143-1144 (Trop).)
       B. Discrimination
       In cases alleging employment discrimination, we analyze the trial court’s order on
a motion for summary judgment using a three-step process that is based on the burden-
shifting test that was established for trials of employment discrimination claims in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792. (Serri v. Santa Clara
University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 860 (Serri), citing Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp.
354-355 & Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 111 (Reeves).)
This test “reflects the principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare,
and that such claims must usually be proved circumstantially. Thus, by successive steps

                                              13
of increasingly narrow focus, the test allows discrimination to be inferred from facts that
create a reasonable likelihood of bias and are not satisfactorily explained.” (Guz, at p.
354.) This same test also applies to Sankranthi’s FEHA retaliation claim. (Cornell v.
Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 942.)
       In the trial court, under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
plaintiff may raise a presumption of discrimination by presenting a “prima facie case,”
the components of which vary depending upon the nature of the claim, but typically
require evidence that the plaintiff (1) was a member of a protected class, (2) was
performing competently in the position held or was qualified for the position sought,
(3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) some other circumstance that
suggests discriminatory motive. (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.) “ ‘A
satisfactory showing to this effect gives rise to a presumption of discrimination which, if
unanswered by the employer, is mandatory—it requires judgment for the plaintiff.’ ”
(Ibid.) Under the second step of the test, the employer may dispel the presumption by
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. “At that
point the presumption disappears.” (Id. at pp 860-861.) Under the third step, the plaintiff
may attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination or offer other
evidence of discriminatory motive. (Id. at p. 861, citing Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 356.)
       The McDonnell Douglas framework is modified on a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication. (Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861.) To obtain
summary adjudication of an employment discrimination claim, the employer, as the
moving party, has the initial burden to present admissible evidence showing either that
one or more elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case is lacking or that the adverse
employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors. (Ibid.) “[I]f
nondiscriminatory, [the employer’s] true reasons need not necessarily have been wise or
correct. [Citations.] While the objective soundness of an employer’s proffered reasons

                                             14
supports their credibility . . . , the ultimate issue is simply whether the employer acted
with a motive to discriminate illegally. Thus, ‘legitimate’ reasons [citation] in this
context are reasons that are facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and which, if true,
would thus preclude a finding of discrimination.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 358.)
Examples of legitimate reasons include a loss of confidence in an employee or the
employee’s failure to meet performance standards. (Serri, at p. 861.) “The employer’s
evidence must be sufficient to allow the trier of fact to conclude that it is more likely than
not that one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were the sole basis for the
adverse employment action.” (Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical
Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158 (Featherstone).)
       On summary judgment, if the employer meets its initial burden, “the burden shifts
to the employee to ‘demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial evidence that the
employer’s stated reasons were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with a
discriminatory animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the
employer engaged in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.’ ” (Serri, supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at p. 861.) “The plaintiff's evidence must be sufficient to support a
reasonable inference that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor in the
decision. [Citations.] The stronger the employer’s showing of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger the plaintiff's evidence must be in order to create a
reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive.” (Featherstone, supra, 10
Cal.App.5th at p. 1159.) “The employee’s ‘subjective beliefs in an employment
discrimination case do not create a genuine issue of fact; nor do uncorroborated and self-
serving declarations.’ [Citation.] The employee’s evidence must relate to the motivation
of the decision makers and prove, by nonspeculative evidence, ‘an actual causal link
between prohibited motivation and termination.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       The “great weight of federal and California authority holds that an employer is
entitled to summary judgment if, considering the employer’s innocent explanation for its

                                             15
actions, the evidence as a whole is insufficient to permit a rational inference that the
employer’s actual motive was discriminatory.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 361,
fn. omitted.) “It is not sufficient for an employee to make a bare prima facie showing or
to simply deny the credibility of the employer’s witnesses or to speculate as to
discriminatory motive. [Citations.] Rather it is incumbent upon the employee to produce
‘substantial responsive evidence’ demonstrating the existence of a material triable
controversy as to pretext or discriminatory animus on the part of the employer.” (Serri,
supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.)
              3. Analysis
       In seeking summary adjudication of the discrimination claim, ECH argued both
that its decision to terminate Sankranthi was based on legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons, and that Sankranthi could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The
trial court concluded that Sankranthi did not make the requisite prima facie showing of
discrimination, and in any event, ECH established it terminated her employment based on
poor job performance, and Sankranthi failed to make a showing of pretext. On appeal,
Sankranthi argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her
discrimination claim because there are disputed factual issues about whether Hatala acted
with discriminatory motive.
       We disagree. ECH met its burden of showing legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for Sankranthi’s firing. A reason is “legitimate” if it is “facially unrelated to
prohibited bias, and which if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination.”
(Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 520, fn. 2 (Reid).) ECH presented evidence
of concerns about Sankranthi’s performance—including difficulty composing queries,
coding mismatches, failure to complete her work, and complaints about her demeanor
and manner of dress by both coworkers and her supervisor—arising in April 2017, early
in her tenure, which resulted in a number of meetings and an e-mail to HR regarding
Sankranthi’s performance shortfalls. In July 2017, when Hatala and others met with

                                              16
Sankranthi to address Sankranthi’s complaints, Hatala reiterated her concerns about
Sankranthi’s demeanor and failure to dress professionally. ECH presented evidence that
just a few days after that meeting, one of Sankranthi’s coworkers complained that she felt
uncomfortable around Sankranthi and that Sankranthi was not collaborating with others
on the team. In September 2017, Hatala met with Sankranthi to discuss job performance
issues, issued a memo documenting oral counseling for inappropriate conduct, and placed
Sankranthi on a 60-day PIP. Hatala and Sankranthi met frequently during this period to
improve her performance, but Sankranthi was placed on a 30-day PIP extension. In
December 2017, Sankranthi’s performance improved for a time, which was also
documented by ECH. But by March 2018, performance concerns had reemerged. Hatala
and Sankranthi met on March 18, 2018, to discuss continued concerns regarding
Sankranthi’s work performance and Hatala ultimately made the decision to terminate
Sankranthi. In sum, ECH set forth a detailed and consistent record of documented
concerns about Sankranthi’s job performance, which was more than sufficient to meet its
burden to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action. And as the trial court noted, this shifted the burden to Sankranthi to present
evidence that ECH’s decision was pretextual or was motivated at least in part by
prohibited discrimination.
       Sankranthi did not meet her burden to demonstrate pretext or discriminatory
animus. Pretext may be demonstrated by showing “ ‘the proffered reason had no basis in
fact, the proffered reason did not actually motivate the discharge, or, the proffered reason
was insufficient to motivate discharge. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Hanson v. Lucky
Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 224.) To meet his or her burden, “ ‘the
[employee] must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its
action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them “unworthy of credence,”
[citation], and hence infer “that the employer did not act for the [the asserted] non-

                                             17
discriminatory reasons.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Hersant v. Department of Social
Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1005 (Hersant), original italics; accord Serri, supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at p. 863.)
       Sankranthi argues that she made the necessary showing to demonstrate national
origin discrimination based on Hatala’s request that she not nod her head, Hatala’s
comments about her appearance (she looked like she was going to a club and not owning
pants), and Hatala’s assertion that she had misrepresented the nature of her medical
education from India. Sankranthi asserts that Hatala’s “repeatedly” telling her to “stop
nodding her head,” was discriminatory “because nodding heads is something Indians are
particularly known to do.” She also asserts that as part of her culture, she generally wears
dresses, and therefore comments about her clothing and appearance and not owning pants
were discriminatory.
       These assertions, however, are insufficient to demonstrate pretext. “An issue of
fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is not created by speculation or
conjecture.” (Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798,
807 (Horn).) Assuming Hatala did ask Sankranthi not to nod her head, Sankranthi failed
to demonstrate that Hatala did so on the basis of Sankranthi’s national origin. Although
Sankranthi herself interpreted this as a reference to her Indian background, her own
speculation or conjecture is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact. (King v. United
Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 433 [“[P]laintiff’s subjective beliefs in
an employment discrimination case do not create a genuine issue of fact; nor do
uncorroborated and self-serving declarations”].)
       As for the comments about Sankranthi’s attire, she did not present evidence that
she wore Indian clothing to work or that she was criticized for wearing Indian attire.
There was evidence that Hatala repeatedly complained that Sankranthi dressed
unprofessionally, like she was going to a club, and that Hatala counseled Sankranthi on

                                              18
the need to wear clothing that was work appropriate. Nothing in the record supports the
conclusion that the references to the way she dressed related to her Indian origin.
       As for the alleged misrepresentation of the nature of her medical degree, Hatala
cited this as one additional ground for her termination in her March 30, 2018, letter. The
letter referenced only the nature of the degree and did not mention that it was from India.
Sankranthi explained that her medical degree from India was an M.B.B.S., that medical
schools in India do not award M.D. degrees, that the drop-down list in the online
application that she used when she applied for the job did not include an M.B.B.S., so she
selected the M.D. option; and that ECH had copies of her degree and certifications.
Nothing in the record suggests that the M.B.B.S. degree is unique to India. Given the
evidence that Sankranthi was terminated for repeated performance issues, the fact that the
employer also mentioned alleged misrepresentations regarding the nature of her degree is
not sufficient to demonstrate discrimination based on national origin.
       Moreover, in our view, assuming as true Hatala’s other statements, this evidence
does not demonstrate a discriminatory animus or motive. While the evidence may have
raised only a weak suspicion of discrimination sufficient to have sustained Sankranthi’s
burden of proving a prima facie case, it did not amount to substantial evidence of
discrimination necessary to defeat summary judgment. Indeed, circumstantial evidence
militates against any such inference. “ ‘[W]here the same actor is responsible for both
the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a
short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive.’
[Citation.]” (Horn, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 809.) If Hatala were biased against
Sankranthi based on her gender or national origin, then presumably she would not have
hired her in the first place. Although a significant passage of time may attenuate this
“same-actor presumption” (id. at p. 810), in this case Hatala’s concerns about Sankranthi
arose very shortly after she was hired. Thus, the presumption applies with particular
force here because Hatala began documenting the concerns that led to Sankranthi’s

                                             19
termination shortly after she hired her. (West v. Bechtel Corp (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 966,
981.)
        Nor is the evidence that Hatala complimented Sankranthi’s work sufficient to
show pretext. It was undisputed that Hatala was dissatisfied with Sankranthi’s work
performance, and that Sankranthi had received oral and written warnings about her job
performance. Hatala also acknowledged providing both positive and negative feedback,
and stated there was a brief period when Sankranthi’s performance improved before it
declined again. In other words, Sankranthi’s evidence in opposition is largely consistent
with ECH’s evidence of poor job performance. Thus, Sankranthi’s evidence of positive
feedback fails to show an inconsistency warranting a presumption of pretext.
        Sankranthi also points to the “substantial evidence of her good performance,”
ECH’s demand that she create her own PIP in March 2018, and other alleged failures to
follow its own policies regarding discipline, PIP’s, and termination as further evidence of
pretext. To show that an employer’s reason for termination is pretextual, an employee
“ ‘cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the
factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not
whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.’ ” (Hersant, supra, 57
Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.) In our view, these points all go to the question whether ECH
was wise or correct or prudent when it disciplined Sankranthi and ultimately terminated
her employment and do not demonstrate unlawful discrimination.
        Sankranthi also contends that summary judgment should be reversed based on
“mixed motive.” She acknowledges that the argument was not raised in the trial court but
argues that this court can nonetheless consider the argument for the first time on appeal,
citing Husman v. Toyota Motor Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1185. Husman,
however, is inapposite. In that case, the court concluded that the issue was not waived
because the plaintiff had set forth “evidence that discrimination was a substantial
motivating factor for his discharge” and “he provided the trial court with all of the

                                             20
elements of a mixed-motive claim.” (Id. at pp. 1187-1188.) Such is not the case here.
While the evidence in Husman pointed to numerous decision makers, one of which
clearly “harbored stereotypical views of gay men” (id. at p. 1191), here Sankranthi can
only point to a single decision maker and weak speculative inferences as to Hatala’s
discriminatory motive. Given that the record lacks a factual basis for a mixed motive
claim, in exercising our discretion, we decline to consider this claim for the first time on
appeal.
       In a separate section of her brief, Sankranthi argues that there are triable issues as
to sex discrimination. The arguments in this section rely on much of the same evidence
presented in her national origin discrimination and PDL claims. We note that of the five
CDI specialists in her department, two were men and three were women, and that the
management personnel involved in the decisions to discipline and terminate her (Hatala
and Carson) were both women. Sankranthi does not point to any evidence that she was
treated differently from the men in her department based on sex. Indeed, it appears she
and C.E. (a male) were treated similarly when they fell behind in their work and were not
assigned new cases to permit them to catch up. And everyone on the staff received the
same e-mail after they were all late to a meeting. We therefore conclude that Sankranthi
has not met her burden to demonstrate pretext or discriminatory animus with regard to
her sex discrimination claim.
       Sankranthi argues that summary adjudication should not have been granted on her
discrimination claim because ECH’s separate statement did not address one of the
theories of liability set forth in her complaint: that she was subject to different terms and
conditions of employment based on her sex and national origin because her work was
subject to a higher level of scrutiny than others in her department. Sankranthi’s
complaint alleged that ECH’s “discrimination took many forms, including but not limited
to being subjected to different terms and conditions of employment and being
terminated.” Since ECH’s motion for summary judgment assumed that Sankranthi

                                             21
suffered an adverse employment action and ECH met its burden of showing that it had
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons supporting its decisions to discipline and terminate
Sankranthi, we perceive no error in failing to address the different forms of alleged
adverse employment action separately.
       In summary, we conclude that ECH satisfied its burden to show legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons supporting its decisions to discipline and ultimately terminate
Sankranthi, and that in response, Sankranthi failed to produce substantial responsive
evidence demonstrating the existence of a material triable controversy as to pretext or
discriminatory animus on the part of ECH, either based on her national origin or that fact
that she is female. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err when it granted
summary adjudication of Sankranthi’s discrimination claim.
       B. PDL Claim
       Sankranthi argues that the trial court erred by granting summary adjudication of
her PDL claim because she was terminated after she had already presented a note to HR,
and was already on pregnancy disability leave, as well as the fact that by the time she
requested leave, she was wearing maternity clothes and her pregnancy was visibly
showing.
       California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), through the PDL statute,
provides that it is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer to refuse to allow
an employee disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition to take a
leave for a reasonable period of time not to exceed four months and thereafter return to
work.” (Gov. Code, § 12945, subd. (a)(1).) It is also unlawful for an employer “to
interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of, or the attempt to exercise, any right
provided under this section.” (Gov. Code, § 12945, subd. (a)(4).)
       Sankranthi’s PDL discrimination claim lacks merit because the hospital decided to
terminate her employment before it knew she was disabled by pregnancy. ECH
submitted evidence that it decided to terminate Sankranthi’s employment on March 27,

                                              22
2018, and entered her termination into the online system on March 28, 2018. On March
28, Sankranthi took a day off, went to see her physician, and was then told to take
pregnancy-related leave. She first presented the doctor’s note to ECH the following day,
March 29.
       Sankranthi challenges this timeline largely by asserting that the evidence
submitted from the online system lacked foundation and was not properly authenticated.
Hatala, however, as the person who entered the firing into the online system, had
personal knowledge of the document and the facts contained therein. “[A] document is
authenticated when sufficient evidence has been produced to sustain a finding that the
document is what it purports to be.” (Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 321.)
Here, Hatala declared that she had personal knowledge of the matters contained in her
declaration and that the record of the termination was a true and correct copy from the
hospital’s online portal. Sankranthi’s challenge to the admissibility of ECH’s timeline
evidence is meritless, and that evidence is conclusive with respect to her pregnancy
disability discrimination claim.
       Sankranthi also asserts that her pregnancy was visible prior to her requesting
PDL.7 She asserts it is reasonable to presume Hatala knew about her pregnancy based on
her 20-pound weight gain and because she wore maternity clothes. “When the pregnancy
is apparent, or where plaintiff alleges that she has disclosed it to the employer, then a
question of the employer’s knowledge would likely preclude summary judgment. If the
pregnancy is not apparent and the employee has not disclosed it to her employer, she
must allege knowledge and present, as part of her prima facie case, evidence from which
       7
         In her opening brief, Sankranthi challenges the trial court’s evidentiary ruling
excluding her declaration statements that she was visibly pregnant, among other
evidentiary objections. In section E, ante, we conclude that her challenges to the court’s
various evidentiary rulings are forfeited for failure to provide reasoned argument with
citation to authority. However, because Sankranthi’s declaration statements do not affect
the outcome of this appeal, here we assume without deciding, that even if the statements
were admissible, Sankranthi’s pregnancy disability discrimination claim fails.

                                             23
a rational jury could infer that the employer knew that she was pregnant.” (Trop, supra,
129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.)
       Here, Sankranthi stated in her deposition that she only told the father, F.S., and her
friend C.E. about her pregnancy, and that they “don’t really disclose personal information
to any others.” Sankranthi confirmed she told no one else at the hospital that she was
pregnant prior to requesting pregnancy disability leave. In addition, Hatala declared that
she was not aware that Sankranthi was pregnant or suffered from any disability when
ECH “finalized the decision” to fire her, that Sankranthi had not informed anyone at ECH
that she was pregnant or disabled, and that “no one in management or HR knew that she
was pregnant or disabled until after she submitted her leave request on March 29, 2018.”
In the absence of any evidence that anyone knew Sankranthi was pregnant, her
speculative assertion that Hatala or HR knew about the pregnancy, when considered with
Hatala’s declaration of no knowledge, is “ ‘insufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact.’ ” (Trop, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.)
       Further, even assuming Hatala or management knew Sankranthi was pregnant, it
does not necessarily follow that Hatala or management therefore knew that Sankranthi
would soon be taking pregnancy disability leave, meaning that she would be disabled
based on her pregnancy. Sankranthi cites Trop for the proposition that it may be inferred
that her employer knew about her pregnancy based on her appearance. But Trop
concerned a claim of pregnancy discrimination, not a claim based on pregnancy
disability. Whether or not Sankranthi was visibly pregnant is logically irrelevant to her
employer’s knowledge of her pregnancy-related disability.
       For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err when it granted summary
adjudication of the PDL claim.
       C. Retaliation Claim
       Sankranthi argues there are triable issues of fact with respect to her retaliation
claim. In her complaint, she asserted that she engaged in protected conduct, including

                                             24
requesting protected leave time, accommodation for her pregnancy-related disability, and
otherwise exercising her rights under FEHA. On appeal, she contends that triable issues
remained regarding the discipline she received after she complained to HR about Hatala’s
conduct toward her. However, these cannot constitute material facts. As framed by the
pleadings (see Juge, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 67), Sankranthi’s claim of retaliation
related only to her exercise of her right to pregnancy disability leave and attendant
accommodations, not her complaints to HR about Hatala’s conduct.
       To the extent Sankranthi’s retaliation claim was based on conduct related to her
leave or accommodation request and pregnancy related disability, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the claim. Simply put, because
the hospital established it was unaware of her pregnancy or disability at the time it fired
Sankranthi, it could not have done so in retaliation for those actions.
       D. Failure to Prevent Discrimination
       Sankranthi asserts that ECH’s separate statement presented no facts on this issue.
While she concedes a claim for failure to prevent discrimination cannot proceed in the
absence of a viable discrimination claim, she argues that if summary adjudication of the
discrimination claim is reversed, this claim should be reversed as well.
       Because we find no error in the trial court’s resolution of the discrimination claim,
Sankranthi’s failure to prevent discrimination claim necessarily fails.
       E. Evidentiary Objections
       Both sides filed written objections to the opposing party’s evidence. Sankranthi
also made oral objections at the hearing on the motion. The trial court overruled all of
Sankranthi’s objections, sustained 14 of ECH’s objections, and overruled ECH’s other
12 objections. On appeal, Sankranthi challenges four of the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings.
       According to the weight of authority, appellate courts review a trial court’s
evidentiary rulings in a summary judgment proceeding for an abuse of discretion. (Serri,

                                             25
supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; San Francisco Print Media Co. v. The Hearst Corp.
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 952, 962 & fn. 7; but see Reid, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 535
[Supreme Court concluded that it need “not decide generally whether a trial court’s ruling
on evidentiary objections based on papers alone in summary judgment proceedings are
reviewed for abuse of discretion or reviewed de novo”] & Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 255, fn. 4 [observing that standard of review is unsettled
and assuming, without deciding, that the abuse of discretion standard applies].) As the
party challenging the court’s evidentiary rulings, Sankranthi has the burden to establish
such an abuse, which we will find only if the trial court’s order exceeds the bounds of
reason. (Serri, at p. 852.)
       Sankranthi challenges the trial court’s order overruling her objection to exhibit J to
Hatala’s declaration, the “purported computer printout showing the decision to terminate
[Sankranthi] was made prior to the hospital’s knowledge of her pregnancy . . . .” As we
have discussed the admissibility of this document previously, we will not address it
separately here. Sankranthi also challenges the court’s rulings sustaining three of ECH’s
objections to statements in her declaration and excluding those statements.
       Sankranthi has failed to establish an abuse of discretion as to any of the trial
court’s evidentiary rulings. The trial court’s evidentiary rulings are presumed correct.
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “ ‘To demonstrate error, an
appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and
citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error.’ [Citation.] When a point
is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without
foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ [Citation.]” (In re S.C.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 (S.C.).)
       Here, Sankranthi’s challenge to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are not
supported by any citations to legal authority, and the few citations to the factual record
are threadbare at best. For example, with regard to ECH’s objections Nos. 4 and 16,

                                             26
which were based on hearsay, it is insufficient to argue that the trial court erred in
sustaining these objections without providing any legal analysis or explanation as to why
the statements were not hearsay or why one of the myriad exceptions to the hearsay rule
applies. Without meaningful analysis supported by relevant legal authority, Sankranthi’s
evidentiary arguments have been forfeited. (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
                                     IV. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                              27
                                        _______________________________
                                        Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________
       Wilson, J.

______________________________________
      Adams, J.*

H049506
Sankranthi v. El Camino Hospital
_________________
      * Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution