Court Opinion

ID: 9840979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:05:52.743558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:32:06.331286
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 220112-U
                                            No. 1-22-0112
                                    Order filed September 20, 2023
                                                                                        Third Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                               IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                          FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                           )    Appeal from the
                                                                )    Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                  )    Cook County.
                                                                )
     v.                                                         )    No. 15 CR 6620
                                                                )
 JEFFREY WILLIAMS,                                              )    Honorable
                                                                )    Thaddeus L. Wilson,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                 )    Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice R. Van Tine concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1        Held: We affirm the circuit court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s pro se
                postconviction petition which failed to establish arguable claims of ineffective
                assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

¶2        Defendant Jeffrey Williams appeals from the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his pro

se petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.

(West 2020)). On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred by dismissing the petition when

it set forth arguable claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. We affirm.
No. 1-22-0112

¶3      The facts of this case were detailed in our disposition of defendant’s direct appeal, and we

recite only those facts relevant to the issues in this appeal.

¶4      Following an April 7, 2015, incident in which a child was accidently shot by another child,

defendant was charged with two counts of armed habitual criminal (AHC), four counts of unlawful

use or possession of a weapon by a felon, two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and

two counts of unlawful use of a weapon. Relevant here, the counts for AHC alleged that defendant

possessed a firearm (count I) and a second firearm (count II) after being convicted of certain

qualifying offenses. At trial, the State proceeded on counts I and II for AHC. The remaining counts

were nol-prossed.

¶5      T.H., who was 10 years old at the time of trial, testified that on April 7, 2015, he was 8

years old and lived in an apartment with his mother M.B., his sister D.B., and defendant. 1 D.B.

had her own room, and T.H. generally slept in M.B.’s room. When defendant spent the night,

however, defendant slept in M.B.’s room. On the night of April 6, 2015, T.H. hosted his friend

Antonio for a sleepover, and they slept in the front room. 2 Defendant spent the night and slept in

M.B.’s room.

¶6      The next morning, T.H. and Antonio witnessed M.B. tell defendant to “get the gun out of

the house.” T.H. saw defendant retrieve one of T.H.’s shirts, remove a firearm from under a bed,

place the firearm in the shirt, and walk toward the kitchen. T.H. then heard the back door close. A

few minutes later, M.B. and D.B. left the house. T.H. and Antonio played, and then Antonio

entered the bedroom and looked under the bed. T.H. saw another firearm under the bed.

        1
          As we did in our disposition of defendant’s direct appeal, we refer to M.B. by initials since she
shares a family name with her underage daughter.
        2
          The transcript does not contain Antonio’s family name.

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No. 1-22-0112

¶7     The boys next went to the kitchen and climbed onto the counter. Antonio “grabbed [a] gun

and got down.” Antonio pulled the trigger, but nothing happened. When Antonio pulled the trigger

a second time, the firearm discharged and T.H. suffered a gunshot wound to the stomach. Antonio

placed the firearm on the counter, gathered his belongings, and left. T.H. wiped off blood, changed

clothes, and threw the shell casing off the balcony.

¶8     M.B. and D.B. returned to the apartment, then went outside with T.H. and met defendant.

When T.H. saw defendant, defendant “holler[ed],” asking, “ ‘Why did you touch the gun.’ ” T.H.

denied touching it, and defendant fell to his knees. Defendant then walked to the apartment, and

T.H. was driven to the hospital by M.B.’s friend. During the drive, M.B. instructed T.H. to say that

he was shot outside. T.H. initially complied because he did not want his mother to “go away.”

However, after speaking to his grandmother, he told police what really happened.

¶9     During cross-examination, T.H. testified that he saw defendant put the firearm in a shirt

while defendant was in M.B.’s room. Later, T.H. was at the door to the bedroom when Antonio

looked under the bed; from there, T.H. could see another firearm. They did not remove that firearm

from under the bed. Antonio climbed onto the kitchen counter first, then T.H. followed. The

firearm in the kitchen was located above the refrigerator cabinet, and was not wrapped in a shirt.

When T.H. and his family encountered defendant outside, M.B. and defendant argued and

defendant asked why T.H. touched the firearm. Defendant fell to his knees and began crying.

¶ 10   D.B., who was 13 years old at the time of trial, testified that on the morning of April 7,

2015, she and M.B. were in M.B.’s bedroom when defendant entered. T.H. and Antonio were

outside the room. Defendant asked M.B. for a firearm and stated that he “was gonna get into it

with somebody.” M.B. removed a firearm from under the bed, wrapped it in a shirt, handed it to

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No. 1-22-0112

defendant, and told him to “take it out.” Defendant exited the room and went toward the kitchen.

D.B. and M.B. then went to the store. On the way back, they encountered Antonio, who stated that

T.H. had been shot.

¶ 11   When D.B. and M.B. entered the house, T.H. had a hand on his stomach and was crying.

After T.H. lifted his shirt to display a bullet wound, the three left the house and encountered a

relative, who spoke with M.B. When defendant arrived, M.B. told him what happened and he

yelled at T.H., asking why T.H. played with the firearm. T.H. denied playing with the firearm and

said that Antonio had.

¶ 12   During cross-examination, D.B. stated that defendant did not spend the night at the

residence the night before the shooting. She later spoke to detectives at her grandmother’s home,

but did not tell the detectives about the conversation between M.B. and defendant. D.B. did not

remember telling the detectives that she saw a firearm that morning and that she, M.B., and

defendant left the house together. D.B. then testified that she did not speak to detectives; rather,

she was present while they spoke to her grandmother. She later acknowledged telling the detectives

that she saw a firearm wrapped in a shirt. At trial, D.B. testified that after M.B. gave defendant the

firearm, he went to the kitchen.

¶ 13   M.B. testified that she had a prior conviction for forgery and a firearm-related conviction

arising out of this incident. On April 7, 2015, she received a phone call from defendant, who was

her boyfriend at that time. Defendant stated that he had “gotten into it” with someone and asked

her to retrieve a weapon. M.B. retrieved a firearm from under her bed and wrapped it in T.H.’s

shirt. She walked to the backdoor, opened it, and handed the firearm to defendant. Defendant

entered the residence. M.B. told defendant to “ ‘calm down’ ” and put the firearm away before he

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No. 1-22-0112

did something “stupid.” She asked him to remove the firearm from the house and for money for

the store.

¶ 14    After receiving money from defendant, M.B. told T.H. and Antonio to watch television

while she went to the store. M.B., D.B., and defendant left the apartment together. M.B. and D.B

went to a store where M.B. purchased alcohol, and defendant went his own way. On the way home,

M.B. saw Antonio running and yelled his name. Antonio stated that T.H. had been shot. When

M.B. returned home, T.H. stated that Antonio mistakenly shot him. After looking at the wound,

she thought it was just a “skin mark,” and the family walked to the corner to see a family member.

There, M.B. saw defendant and stated that T.H. was shot. Defendant yelled and asked T.H. why

he touched the firearm. T.H. stated it was Antonio. As the group walked home, the family member

stated that the wound was more serious, and M.B. asked a friend to take them to the hospital.

¶ 15    M.B., who was scared, told police that T.H. was injured in a drive-by shooting. While M.B.

was at the hospital, defendant called to check on T.H. and stated that he would turn himself into

authorities if necessary. At one point, officers removed M.B. from T.H.’s room and asked her to

tell the truth, which she eventually did. She did not own or keep firearms in her home.

¶ 16    During cross-examination, M.B. acknowledged that as a person with a felony conviction,

she is not supposed to be around firearms. However, she did not know that the firearm was in the

house. Defendant did not live with her at that time but sometimes stayed with her, including the

night before the shooting. Defendant left early that morning, then called her to state that he was

coming for the firearm. When defendant returned, he was angry. She did not remember if defendant

had another firearm when he returned. M.B. wrapped the firearm in a shirt and gave it to defendant.

Defendant removed the firearm from the shirt, held it, and went “off” about how he “got into it

                                               -5-
No. 1-22-0112

with somebody.” M.B. told him to put the firearm away and not do anything “stupid.” She then

walked to the bathroom.

¶ 17   M.B. told the police that T.H. was shot outside because she did not want to get into trouble.

She knew that she could not possess a firearm because she was a felon and it would result in

eviction from the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) building where she lived. When she went to

a police station, she was not advised of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966). She did not remember telling a detective that when defendant “came back” she observed

a firearm “sticking” out of his back pocket. M.B. admitted that she drank alcohol the prior night

and that morning. She did not contact the police to ask them to remove the firearm from her home.

¶ 18   Prior to the State’s next witness, Chicago police detective Carlton Flagg, defense counsel

asked the trial court if he could perfect certain impeachment by cross-examining Flagg during the

State’s case, rather than recalling Flagg during the defense’s case. The State did not object.

¶ 19   Flagg testified that he spoke with T.H. at a hospital and then relocated to T.H.’s home,

where he searched the backyard and recovered a .45-caliber shell.

¶ 20   During cross-examination, Flagg acknowledged that a supplemental case report, which

summarized the investigation, did not state that T.H. saw defendant walk from the bedroom to the

kitchen with a firearm or that T.H. saw a firearm under his mother’s bed that day. Flagg spoke

with M.B. at a police station after advising her of the Miranda rights. M.B. stated that she observed

a second firearm “sticking” out of defendant’s back pocket when he returned to the apartment and

this information was contained in the supplemental case report.

¶ 21   During the jury instruction conference, trial counsel asked whether the State planned to

proceed on both AHC counts. The court then asked the State which firearm was the subject of

                                                -6-
No. 1-22-0112

count I. The State responded that the firearm retrieved from under the bed was the subject of count

I. The court then inquired as to the firearm referenced in count II. The State responded that there

was testimony that defendant had another firearm on his person, but conceded that there was not

“any evidence about that second handgun.” The trial court then clarified that the firearm referenced

in count II was the firearm allegedly in defendant’s pocket when he returned to the apartment, and

the State answered in the affirmative.

¶ 22    The court stated that it did not recall “any evidence” of the second firearm, and although

there were “questions of that and attempts to impeach with respect to that from defense counsel,”

no one testified “with any memory recollection that that actually occurred.” The court asked the

State if it was “missing something” and the State responded by making a motion to nol-pros count

II for AHC. The trial court noted that count II was nol-prossed and, after further discussion as to

jury instructions, adjourned for the day.3

¶ 23    The jury found defendant guilty of count I for AHC. Following a hearing, he was sentenced

to 14 years in prison.

        3
          The record on appeal does not contain the transcript from October 6, 2016, the second day of trial.
While an unnotarized affidavit from a court reporter states that she cannot locate the transcript from October
6, 2016, both parties’ briefs on appeal cite to the October 6, 2016, report of proceedings. This court’s clerk’s
office has requested that the Office of the State Appellate Defender supplement the record on appeal with
this transcript. However, the record has not been supplemented.
         Our order on direct appeal, and our review of the parties’ briefs, reveal that the second day of trial
included the testimony of a Chicago police officer as to defendant’s flight and arrest, the admission through
a stipulation of defendant’s two qualifying convictions for purposes of AHC, and the jury’s verdict. This
gap in the record has not affected this court’s ability to adjudicate the issues in this appeal, because
defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance relate to trial counsel’s failure to object to portions of M.B.’s
testimony and counsel’s cross-examination of M.B. on the first day of trial. Moreover, defendant, as
appellant, bears the burden of presenting a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings to support his
claims of error, and any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record on appeal will be resolved
against him. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984).

                                                     -7-
No. 1-22-0112

¶ 24   On direct appeal, we affirmed defendant’s conviction and remanded the cause so that

defendant could file a motion challenging the fines and fees order in the circuit court. See People

v. Williams, 2020 IL App (1st) 163417.

¶ 25   On September 7, 2021, defendant’s pro se postconviction petition was filed in the circuit

court alleging that he was denied effective assistance when, relevant here, trial counsel failed to

file a pretrial motion to exclude evidence of defendant’s other “bad acts” and “recklessly” elicited

evidence that defendant possessed a firearm in addition to the one “alleged in the indictment,” and

appellate counsel failed to raise these issues on direct appeal. The petition did not acknowledge

that defendant was charged with possessing two firearms, that the State proceeded to trial on two

counts of AHC, and that the State nol-prossed count II for AHC during the jury instruction

conference.

¶ 26   On November 29, 2021, the circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and

patently without merit in a written order.

¶ 27   On appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court erred by summarily dismissing the pro

se postconviction petition when it established arguable claims of ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel. He argues that he was denied effective assistance by trial counsel’s failure to

ensure that the jury did not hear evidence of his propensity to commit armed violence and his

alleged possession of a second firearm. Defendant further asserts that he was denied effective

assistance when appellate counsel failed to raise these issues on direct appeal.

¶ 28   The Act provides a three-stage procedural mechanism through which a defendant may

assert a substantial denial of his constitutional rights in the proceedings which resulted in his

conviction. People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶¶ 8-9. “The purpose of [a postconviction] proceeding

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No. 1-22-0112

is to allow inquiry into constitutional issues relating to the conviction or sentence that were not,

and could not have been, determined on direct appeal.” People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506, 519

(2001). Thus, issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are forfeited.

People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443-44 (2005).

¶ 29   At the first stage, the defendant files a petition, which the circuit court independently

reviews and, taking the allegations as true, determines whether it is frivolous or is patently without

merit. Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. A petition should be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently

without merit only when it has no arguable basis in either fact or law. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.

2d 1, 11-12 (2009). A petition lacks an arguable basis in fact or law when it “is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” Id. at 16. Fanciful factual

allegations are those which are “fantastic or delusional,” and an indisputably meritless legal theory

is one that is “completely contradicted by the record.” Id. at 16-17. We review the summary

dismissal of a postconviction petition de novo. Id. at 9.

¶ 30   To determine whether trial counsel was ineffective, we follow the standards set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17. At the first stage of

postconviction proceedings, “a petition alleging ineffective assistance may not be summarily

dismissed if (i) it is arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and (ii) it is arguable that the defendant was prejudiced.” Id.

¶ 31   Both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied by the defendant for a finding of

ineffectiveness. People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 30. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims

are generally reviewed de novo. People v. Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 91.

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No. 1-22-0112

¶ 32      Here, defendant’s allegations that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel

are based upon witness testimony and therefore could have been raised on direct appeal. These

issues are, therefore, forfeited in this postconviction petition. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 2014 IL

115595, ¶ 13 (the Act allows inquiry into constitutional issues arising from the original conviction

that were not raised and could not have been adjudicated on direct appeal; issues that could have

been raised, but were not, are forfeited). However, defendant attempts to overcome this forfeiture

by challenging appellate counsel’s failure to challenge trial counsel’s effectiveness on direct

appeal.

¶ 33      “The Strickland standard applies equally to claims of ineffective appellate counsel, and a

defendant raising such a claim must show both that appellate counsel’s performance was deficient

and that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the appeal would have been

successful.” People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 497 (2010). However, appellate counsel is not

obligated to argue every conceivable issue on appeal, and a defendant cannot claim prejudice based

on appellate counsel’s failure to raise a non-meritorious issue. People v. Pingelton, 2022 IL

127680, ¶ 64. If the underlying claim would not have succeeded, “then ‘there is no arguable legal

basis’ ” for the defendant’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel on

direct appeal. People v. Randall, 2021 IL App (1st) 191194, ¶ 66 (quoting Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d at

501-02).

¶ 34      In order to establish deficient performance under the first prong of the Strickland test, a

defendant must demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance was “objectively unreasonable under

prevailing professional norms.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st)

170542, ¶ 94. “A defendant is entitled to competent, not perfect, representation, and mistakes in

                                                - 10 -
No. 1-22-0112

trial strategy or judgment will not, of themselves, render the representation ineffective.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) People v. Bell, 2021 IL App (1st) 190366, ¶ 63.

¶ 35   Under the second prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s complained-of errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 96. “When the evidence at trial is

‘overwhelming,’ a reviewing court will not be ‘persuaded that it is reasonably probable that a jury

would have acquitted [the] defendant even in the absence’ of counsel’s alleged errors.” Id. (quoting

People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, ¶ 87). “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffective assistance

claim on the ground that it lacks sufficient prejudice, then a court may proceed directly to the

second prong and need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient.” People v.

Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 331 (2010).

¶ 36   Defendant first contends that he was denied effective assistance by trial counsel’s failure

to ensure that the jury did not hear evidence that defendant had the propensity to commit armed

violence. He argues there was no strategic reason for counsel not to object to M.B.’s

“inflammatory” testimony that defendant had “gotten into it with someone” and asked her to

retrieve a firearm from under her bed, and that when defendant arrived at her home upset, she told

him to calm down and put the firearm away before he did anything “stupid.”

¶ 37   We note, however, that this information had already been presented to the jury through

D.B.’s testimony that defendant asked M.B. for the firearm and stated that he “was gonna get into

it with somebody.” Further, as counsel’s theory of the case was that defendant did not possess the

firearm and M.B. had motive to blame defendant in order to escape accountability, counsel

reasonably chose to attack M.B.’s credibility by questioning her as to her alcohol consumption,

                                               - 11 -
No. 1-22-0112

why she told T.H. to lie to the police about the shooting, and the consequences facing M.B., a felon

and a CHA resident, if she possessed a firearm.

¶ 38   Moreover, even if we were to agree that counsel’s failure to object constituted deficient

performance, defendant cannot establish prejudice. Here, three witnesses testified that defendant

possessed the firearm that was retrieved from under M.B.’s bed, and that when defendant learned

that T.H. had been shot, defendant fell to the ground, cried, and asked T.H. why he played with

the firearm. See People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009) (“the testimony of a single

witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to convict”); see also People v. Sanchez, 2013 IL

App (2d) 120445, ¶ 35 (“Statements or conduct indicating the defendant’s consciousness of guilt

may serve as circumstantial evidence supporting a conviction.”).

¶ 39   Defendant asserts that T.H., D.B., and M.B. were incredible witnesses, noting that the

family members initially stated that T.H. was shot outside and gave conflicting testimony as to

who retrieved the firearm from under the bed and where defendant took possession of the firearm.

All three witnesses, however, testified that defendant possessed the firearm. See People v. Gray,

2017 IL 120958, ¶ 47 (contradictory testimony, or inconsistencies in collateral matters, does not

render the witness’s testimony “as to material questions incredible”). Considering the State’s

evidence, we are not persuaded that it is reasonably probable that the jury would have acquitted

defendant in the absence of counsel’s alleged errors. Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 96. Thus,

defendant cannot establish that he was arguably prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to object.

Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17.

¶ 40   Defendant next contends that he was denied effective assistance by trial counsel’s

elicitation of “damaging” testimony that defendant possessed a firearm in his back pocket. He

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No. 1-22-0112

asserts that testimony regarding the firearm allegedly in his back pocket “could permit the jury to

find him guilty of AHC, “regardless” of whether the jury believed there was sufficient evidence

that defendant possessed the firearm from the top of the refrigerator. He argues that there was no

reason to attack M.B.’s “credibility” by questioning her as to whether she told police that she

observed defendant in possession of a second firearm, and that this testimony “affirmatively

harmed” defendant. We disagree.

¶ 41   At the time of trial counsel’s complained-of actions, defendant was charged with two

counts of AHC based upon the possession of two distinct firearms. The firearm retrieved from

under M.B.’s bed and used in the shooting was the subject of count I and the firearm allegedly in

defendant’s back pocket when he returned to the apartment was the subject of count II. Thus, given

that two counts of AHC based upon defendant’s possession of two firearms were at issue at this

point in the trial, trial counsel challenged the evidence as to defendant’s possession of each firearm.

¶ 42   To that end, trial counsel elicited that M.B. did not remember whether defendant possessed

another firearm when he returned to the apartment and did not remember telling a police detective

that she observed a firearm in defendant’s back pocket when he returned to the apartment. Further,

challenging the reliability of M.B.’s assertion that defendant returned to the apartment to obtain a

firearm that he had left there, trial counsel then asked M.B., “[s]o according to what you don’t

remember, [defendant] already had a gun but he came back to get a gun, is that right?” To which

M.B. again responded that she did not remember. As impeachment of M.B.’s testimony, trial

counsel then elicited from Detective Flagg that M.B. stated that defendant possessed a second

firearm that stuck out of his back pocket when he returned to the apartment. Counsel’s questioning

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No. 1-22-0112

of M.B. regarding whether she told police that she observed defendant in possession of a second

firearm was a reasonable attack on the credibility of her version of events.

¶ 43   Further, defendant cannot establish prejudice from the complained-of conduct. As noted

above, M.B. was not the only witness who testified that defendant possessed the firearm removed

from under the bed. Both T.H. and D.B. testified defendant possessed that firearm, and we do not

find it reasonably probable that the jury would have acquitted defendant in the absence of counsel’s

alleged errors in questioning M.B. about a firearm in defendant’s pocket.

¶ 44   Moreover, at the jury instruction conference, trial counsel asked whether the State planned

to proceed on both AHC counts, which led to the trial court questioning the State as to the evidence

supporting count II, and the State’s ultimate decision to nol-pros that count. In other words,

following the jury instruction conference and as a result of trial counsel’s questioning of M.B.

regarding the firearm in defendant’s pocket, defendant faced a possible conviction for one count

of AHC rather than two. Defendant therefore cannot establish that he was arguably prejudiced as

not only did T.H.’s and D.B.’s testimony establish that defendant possessed the firearm removed

from under the bed, trial counsel’s complained-of actions resulted in the State nol-prossing AHC

count II premised upon his possession of a firearm in his pocket. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17.

¶ 45   As defendant has failed to establish that he was arguably denied the effective assistance of

trial counsel, his claim that he was arguably denied effective assistance of appellate counsel on

direct appeal for failure to challenge trial counsel’s performance similarly fails. See Pingelton,

2022 IL 127680, ¶ 64 (“a defendant cannot claim prejudice based on appellate counsel’s failure to

raise an issue that is not meritorious”).

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No. 1-22-0112

¶ 46   Accordingly, the circuit court properly summarily dismissed defendant’s pro se

postconviction petition when it failed to establish that he was arguably denied the effective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel. See Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17.

¶ 47   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 48   Affirmed.

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