Court Opinion

ID: 9642094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:48:10.176314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:42.970653
License: Public Domain

BARDGETT, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
An opinion written by Stockard, C., in Division 2 of this Court failed of adoption after submission of the cause to the Court en Banc. I believe that opinion accurately demonstrates that the failure of the state to comply with the discovery rule in this particular case resulted in an unfair trial. The unfairness of the trial occurred regardless of whether the conduct of the prosecuting attorney was intentional or negligent. It is clear to me that it was at least grossly negligent. I adopt the opinion of Stockard, C., as my dissent in this case and set it forth as follows:
“Charged under the Habitual Criminal Act with capital murder of Lela Tuggle, a 70-year-old woman, Ricky Wayne Smothers was found guilty by a jury of murder in the first degree and was sentenced by the court to life imprisonment.
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore we shall set forth only a brief statement of the events.
*134A jury reasonably could find from the evidence that in the early morning hours of September 3, 1978, appellant and Gary Ward went to the home of Lela Tuggle in Kennett, Missouri. Ward knocked on the front door but no one answered. He then climbed into the house through a bedroom window. When Mrs. Tuggle turned on a light he told her that he wanted to use her telephone, and at Ward’s request she permitted appellant to enter the front door. Appellant then grabbed Mrs. Tuggle, demanded money, and dragged her into the kitchen. She began to yell for her 89-year-old mother, Mrs. Rosa Runsick, who was in a bedroom. Appellant told Ward to kill Mrs. Runsick, and Ward went to the bedroom, hit her and began choking her. When Ward returned he told appellant that he had killed Mrs. Runsick, but in fact he had not. Appellant then used a towel to strangle Mrs. Tuggle causing her death. Ward and appellant left the house and took with them a mirror and Mrs. Tuggle’s purse, which they threw into a ditch. Later that morning Mrs. Runsick went to a neighbor’s house, and although badly injured and in a confused mental state, she caused the neighbors to investigate and call the police.
Chief of Police Cox arrived at the scene shortly after 8:00 o’clock in the morning. He found Lela Tuggle’s body on the floor of the house and Mrs. Runsick in an ‘incoherent state’ and ‘unable to furnish us anything at all about what took place the night before.’ Mrs. Runsick was taken to a hospital for treatment, and upon her release she was taken to Wichita, Kansas, where she remained with another daughter.
On September 19, Gary Ward was arrested for an unrelated offense, and while being held in the Dunklin County jail he told a trustee where Mrs. Tuggle’s purse and the mirror could be found. Ward later gave a statement admitting his part in the homicide and implicating appellant.
On December 4, 1978, appellant requested, pursuant to what was then Rule 25.82 (now Rule 25.03), that the state disclose, among other things, ‘The names and last known addresses of persons whom the state intends to call as witnesses at any hearing or at the trial, together with their written or recorded statements, and existing memo-randa, reporting or summarizing part or all of their oral statements.’ We do not find in the record before this Court the answers of the state made pursuant to this request. A discussion at trial between the court and counsel indicates that a few days after the above request was filed a conference was had between the prosecuting attorney and appellant’s counsel, and that appellant’s counsel was informed that Mrs. Runsick was in Wichita, Kansas, and that the prosecuting attorney had obtained no statement from her.
In his opening statement, the prosecuting attorney referred by name to four prospective witnesses, one of whom was Gary Ward who was also charged with the murder of Lela Tuggle, and he outlined the testimony he expected from each. Mrs. Runsick was indorsed as a witness, and in pretrial conferences the prosecuting attorney stated that she would testify. However, in his opening statement the prosecuting attorney did not indicate that there, would be any testimony from Mrs. Runsick or that any witness, other than Gary Ward, would testify that more than one person entered the Tuggle house at the time of the homicide. Appellant’s counsel then made an opening statement in which he said: ‘It is the position of this Defendant that there will be and is no demonstrative evidence that anyone other than Gary Ward was in the Tug-gle house on September 3, 1978, * * * [and] there is no believable evidence that the Defendant Ricky Smothers was in any way participating in the death of Lela Tug-gle.’ It was thus made clear at the time of the opening statements that appellant’s defense to the charge against him was that he did not participate in the homicide, and that he was going to rely on the fact that the only testimony that would be presented that he did so would come from a person who had already confessed to the crime.
The first witness for the state was Mrs. Tuggle’s daughter who was in Arkansas at the time of the homicide. She identified *135the purse and mirror recovered from the ditch to be those of her mother, and she described the layout of the house. The second witness was the doctor who performed the autopsy. The third witness was Mrs. Runsick who testified that on the morning of September 3 there were ‘two boys' who entered the house and ‘choked her [daughter] and killed her.’
A conference was then held out of the hearing of the jury at which appellant’s counsel inquired of the prosecuting attorney ‘how long he has known of this testimony of this witness.’ Appellant’s counsel stated to the court that such information had not been disclosed to him, and he added that ‘The only testimony that [he] knew from this Defendant [witness?] was that she was incoherent and could not give any statement.’ The prosecutor first stated that he did not ‘know what he’s [appellant’s counsel] talkin’ about,’ and he added that appellant had filed a motion to disclose names and addresses of witnesses and ‘that was done.’ Then, in referring to the request for ‘written or recorded statements, and existing memoranda reporting or summarizing part or all of their oral statements,’ he stated, ‘We don’t have any of that.’ Shortly thereafter the prosecutor admitted that he ‘had an oral statement’ of Mrs. Runsick, but stated that there was no ‘existing summary’ of it. Appellant requested a mistrial on the basis that the testimony was ‘extremely damaging’ and a ‘surprise’ to him. The trial court refused the mistrial, but stated it would afford defense counsel the opportunity ‘to interrogate this witness’ (Mrs. Runsick) privately before he was required to cross-examine her. However, when counsel attempted to do so in a conference room one of her daughters told him ‘We don’t have to tell you anything,’ and Mrs. Runsick was instructed by her daughter not to talk to appellant’s counsel, and she did not do so. Apparently the court was not advised of the refusal of Mrs. Run-sick to permit interrogation by appellant’s counsel until after the trial when this occurrence was related in support of appellant’s motion for new trial.
When appellant’s counsel returned to the courtroom following his unsuccessful attempt to interrogate Mrs. Runsick, the prosecutor made the following statement:
‘Your Honor, it has just come to my attention, and I did know it at one time, that my Investigator, of course he went to Wichita, and I think I told [appellant’s counsel] that; I know I told everybody else in Kennett, it’s been widely known and there was certainly no conspiracy to keep that a secret. My Investigator did take a taped statement from her when he was in Wichita. I can’t specifically recall listening to it. He told me what occurred there. A taped statement was made.’
Appellant then renewed his request for a mistrial, which was not granted. There followed a discussion concerning the location of the tape during which appellant’s counsel addressed the court as follows: ‘If you will not grant the Defendant a mistrial will you exclude the testimony of this witness?’ The court replied that it had ‘in mind granting a continuance until such time as the Prosecutor provides that tape’ to appellant’s counsel, and until there was ample opportunity to listen to the tape before he cross-examined Mrs. Runsick. A recess was declared, and following a telephone call to the prosecutor’s office, it was developed that the tape was in the briefcase of Mr. Harold W. Jackson, the investigator who had gone to Wichita to interview Mrs. Runsick and who was in the courtroom, and that the briefcase was in the prosecuting attorney’s automobile. During this discussion it was also developed that on February 1, which was less than one week before the trial started, appellant’s counsel had gone to the office of the prosecuting attorney and made copies of several tapes furnished to him by Mr. Jackson which contained statements of prospective witnesses, but the tape containing the statement of Mrs. Run-sick, which had been taken on January 22, was not made available to him.
When the trial court announced it would continue the recess until counsel had the opportunity to listen to the tape, appellant’s counsel suggested that if Mrs. Runsick *136would remain available for cross-examination he could play the tape later rather than have the jury wait, and that the trial could be resumed at once. Appellant subsequently elected not to cross-examine Mrs. Run-sick. The tape was introduced in evidence, and in the statement of Mrs. Runsick there recorded she said among other things that ‘the boy come in, there was two, one a lot bigger than the other, and they were just choking her to death.’
Mrs. Rosa Runsick was indorsed as a witness, and there is no doubt that the state intended to call her if she was coherent and capable of testifying. Her ability to testify was determined on January 22, 1979, approximately two weeks before the case was set for trial when a taped statement was obtained from her.
The duty to disclose pursuant to what is now Rule 25.03 ‘is a continuing one,’ State v. Curtis, 544 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Mo. banc 1976), and it is not discretionary, State v. Stapleton, 539 S.W.2d 655 (Mo.App.1976). See also what at the time of trial of this case was Rule 25.45 and is now Rule 25.16, and State v. Davis, 556 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. banc 1977). The taped statement was obtained by the prosecutor approximately two weeks before the date of trial, and in view of the written request for disclosure, upon obtaining that taped statement from Mrs. Runsick there immediately arose the duty to make it available to appellant’s counsel. The failure to do so is more pronounced by the circumstance that one week before trial appellant’s counsel went to the office of the prosecutor and was there provided several taped statements of prospective witnesses, but the taped statement of Mrs. Runsick was not one of them.
Rule 25.45 (now Rule 25.16) grants to the trial court several courses of action when a party fails to comply with a proper discovery rule or order, and what remedial action should be taken is a matter for the exercise of discretion, State v. Davis, supra, but the exercise of that discretion must be reasonable under the circumstances, and it cannot meet that standard if it results in fundamental unfairness. State v. Scott, 479 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. banc 1972). In this case the trial court ordered a recess to permit appellant’s counsel to listen to the taped statements of Mrs. Runsick. The jury had already been sworn and the trial started. An extended recess would not have been practicable because the jury had been sequestered. The trial court refused a mistrial and it refused to instruct the jury that the testimony of Mrs. Runsick had been excluded and was not to be considered.
The basic object of the process of pretrial discovery, insofar as a defendant in a criminal prosecution is concerned, is to permit him a decent opportunity to prepare in advance of trial, and thereby extend to him the fundamental fairness which the adversary system aims to provide. State v. Scott, supra; State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. banc 1975). In this case appellant’s counsel prepared for trial on the theory that there would be no witness who could place appellant at the scene of the crime except Gary Ward who was also charged with the homicide and who obviously had an interest in placing the primary blame for the crime on someone else. Appellant’s strategy was made abundantly clear at the time of the opening statements. Then, in the course of the trial, the only eyewitness to the crime, to the complete surprise of appellant’s counsel, testified that ‘two boys’ entered the house and killed Mrs. Tuggle. Mrs. Runsick was not asked on direct examination to identify either of the ‘two boys' or whether appellant was one of them. Appellant was then placed in the position of being required to ask the question on cross-examination, and not knowing her answer because of the failure of the state to comply with the rules of pretrial discovery and the refusal of Mrs. Runsick to submit to interrogation, or to permit the damaging testimony to stand without further explanation. This is precisely the unfair position that the rules pertaining to pretrial discovery were intended to prevent.
We agree that the drastic remedy of a mistrial should not be used simply because a statement of a prospective witness is not produced, State v. Johnson, supra, but in *137the circumstances of this case the failure to declare a mistrial resulted in fundamental unfairness, and for that reason the judgment cannot be permitted to stand.”
Additionally, I agree with Donnelly, J., as to the eroding effect that appellate and Supreme Court opinions are having with respect to the enforcement of discovery and consequentially upon the judicial process in criminal cases. This case, to me, clearly demonstrates a situation where the defendant was placed in an extremely awkward position during the trial as a direct and immediate consequence of the prosecutor’s failure to abide the discovery rules of this Court. In my opinion, a mistrial should have been declared and it was an abuse of discretion to fail to do so. I believe that it is inadvisable to excuse the prosecutor’s delinquency and its effect upon this trial because the defendant failed to make further demand for mistrial or other relief after the witness refused to speak with the defense counsel. The entire event was brought about as a direct result of the prosecutor’s failure or refusal to abide the rules of this Court and the court’s failure to either strike the testimony or grant a mistrial. Therefore the trial was, in my opinion, unfair, and if the rules are to mean anything then enforcement must come by way of reversal and remand, particularly where the unfairness of the trial has been as clearly demonstrated as in this case.
I therefore dissent.