Court Opinion

ID: 9781011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 15:10:24.946188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:16.665712
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                              LEE FELDMAN,
                                Appellant,

                                      v.

           CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,
                            Appellee.

                               No. 4D22-865

                             [August 30, 2023]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Carol-Lisa Phillips, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE17-
012462.

   David B. Pakula of David B. Pakula, P.A., Pembroke Pines, and David
A. Neblett and James M. Mahaffey of Perry & Neblett, P.A., Miami, for
appellant.

  Kathryn L. Ender of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Coral
Gables, for appellee.

MAY, J.

    An insured appeals a final judgment for the insurer in a property
insurance dispute after a jury trial. He argues the trial court erred in
denying three of his motions: (1) his motion for directed verdict; (2) his
motion for proposed special jury instructions; and (3) his post-verdict
motion for new trial. We agree with him on his first issue and reverse. We
affirm on the second issue. The third issue is moot based on our
disposition of the first issue in all other respects.

   •   Facts

    The insured obtained an “all-risk” homeowner’s insurance policy for a
term covering May 11, 2016, to May 11, 2017. The policy provided: “We
insure against direct loss to property described in Coverage A and B only
if that loss is a physical loss to the property” during the policy period. The
policy did not define physical loss. The policy incorporated an anti-
concurrent cause provision and excluded a loss stemming from constant
or repeated seepage or leakage of water:

      GENERAL EXCLUSIONS: We do not insure for loss caused
      directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is
      excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing
      concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.

         ...

      14. Constant or repeated seepage or leakage of water or
      stream, or the presence or condensation of humidity, moisture
      or vapor, which occurs over a period of weeks, months or
      years.

    On July 12, 2016, the insured went to the property and saw that a piece
of the living room ceiling had fallen onto the floor. He immediately called
911 Restoration, which performed water remediation. A handyman
removed debris and replaced drywall and flooring. The insured filed a
claim. The insurer denied coverage.

   The insured filed suit, and the case proceeded to trial. Both sides’
experts testified regarding the origin of the ceiling collapse. The insured’s
expert testified a one-time, large-volume water event caused the extensive
damages. But the insurer’s expert testified a long-term water leak caused
the damages.

   At the close of all the evidence, the insured moved for a directed verdict
on the issue of whether a physical loss occurred within the policy period.
The trial court denied the motion.

   The insured then requested a submitted proposed special jury
instruction:

      If you find that [the insurer] sustains its burden of proving
      [the insured’s] loss occurred as a result of constant seepage
      or leakage of water over a period of months prior to the
      reported date of loss, [the insured] is nonetheless entitled to
      recover for damages caused during the first 13 days of the
      constant or repeated seepage or leakage.

The trial court denied the requested jury instruction, and then instructed
the jury:

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       To prove his claim, [the insured] must prove by the greater
       weight of the evidence that a direct physical loss to his
       property occurred during the policy period in which the
       property had insurance coverage (May 11, 2016, through May
       11, 2017).

       If you find that [the insured] met his burden of proof, you shall
       consider [the insurer’s] defenses. [The insurer] has the burden
       of proving its defenses by the greater weight of the evidence.

       On [the insurer’s] first defense, [the insurer] asserts that [the
       insured] seeks damages that are not covered under the
       insurance policy because they were caused by the constant or
       repeated seepage or leakage of water, or the presence or
       condensation of humidity, moisture or vapor which occurred
       over a period of weeks, months, or years.

   The jury answered “no” to the first question, rendering a verdict for the
insurer. The insured moved for a new trial, asserting the jury verdict was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the
motion.

   The trial court then entered a final judgment for the insurer. From this
judgment, the insured now appeals.

   •   Analysis

    The insured first argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for
directed verdict, regarding his initial burden of proof, because he proved a
physical loss occurred during the policy period. The insurer responds the
trial court correctly denied the insured’s motion because the insured failed
to establish a new, direct physical loss occurred during the policy period.

   We have de novo review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a
directed verdict. Young v. Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., 88 So. 3d 1002, 1011
(Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

   A trial court should only grant a motion for directed verdict when two
elements are met:

       (1) there are no conflicts in the evidence or no different
       reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence
       and;

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      (2) no view of the evidence, or inferences made therefrom,
      could support a verdict for the nonmoving party. In
      considering a motion for directed verdict, the court must
      evaluate the testimony in the light most favorable to the
      nonmoving party and every reasonable inference deduced
      from the evidence must be indulged in favor of the nonmoving
      party.

JD Dev. I, LLC v. ICS Contractors, LLC, 351 So. 3d 57, 60 (Fla. 2d DCA
2022), rev. denied, SC2023-0048, 2023 WL 2986878 (Fla. Apr. 18, 2023).

   Under an “all risks” policy, the insured must show a loss occurred
during the policy period, and then the insurer has the burden to prove the
damage is excluded from the coverage. Merrick Pres. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v.
Cypress Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 315 So. 3d 45, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
Here, the insured satisfied this initial burden when he provided evidence
his ceiling collapsed on July 12, 2016, during the policy period.
Accordingly, the trial court should have granted his motion for directed
verdict.

   The insurer’s suggestion the loss was not a new, direct physical loss
does not negate the physical loss’s timing. This court has previously held
the insured only has the burden of proving that their covered property
suffered a loss while the policy was in effect. Jones v. Federated Nat’l
Ins. Co., 235 So. 3d 936, 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). Here, there was no
conflicting evidence regarding where and when the ceiling collapsed.
Rather, the dispute focused on the loss’s “cause.”

   The insured satisfied the first basis for a directed verdict (no conflicting
evidence). The next question is whether no view of the evidence, or
inferences made, could support a verdict for the nonmoving party.

   Here, there is no view of the evidence that would support a verdict for
the insurer on when the ceiling collapse occurred. It is undisputed that
physical loss occurred on the insured’s property during the policy period.
In short, the insured satisfied the second requirement for a directed
verdict.

   The trial court erred in denying the insured’s motion for directed verdict
on his initial burden of proof. We therefore reverse and remand the case
for a directed verdict on this initial question and a jury trial on the
remaining issue of whether the exclusion for long term leakage and

                                      4
seepage precludes coverage. 1

   Next, the insured argues the trial court erred in failing to give his
proposed requested jury instruction.       The insured argues Hicks v.
American Integrity Insurance Co. of Florida, 241 So. 3d 925 (Fla. 5th DCA
2018) is on point. We disagree.

   “A trial court’s failure to give a requested instruction constitutes
reversible error if:

    (1) the requested instruction accurately states the law;

    (2) the facts of the case support their instruction and;

    (3) the instruction is necessary to allow the jury to properly resolve all
        issues in the case.”

Elder v. State, 296 So. 3d 440, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

   Here, (1) the proposed instruction did not accurately state the law
applicable to this policy, (2) the facts of the case did not support the
requested instruction, and (3) it was unnecessary to allow the jury to
resolve the issue. For these reasons we affirm on this issue.

     In Hicks, the Fifth District held “that an insurance policy excluding
losses caused by constant or repeated leakage or seepage over a period of
fourteen days or more d[id] not unambiguously exclude losses caused by
leakage or seepage over a period of thirteen days or less.” 241 So. 3d at
927. While Hicks also involved an all-risk policy, it excluded coverage “for
loss . . . [c]aused by . . . [c]onstant or repeated seepage or leakage of water
. . . over a period of 14 or more days.” Id. at 926 (emphasis added).

   Here, the policy uses different language. The policy excludes coverage
for “[c]onstant or repeated seepage or leakage of water or stream[,] . . .
which occurs over a period of weeks, months or years.” (Emphasis
added). No specific number of days is indicated. The insured proposed a
jury instruction that told the jury he was “entitled to recover for damages
caused during the first 13 days of the constant or repeated seepage or
leakage.” But the policy did not include “a period of fourteen days or

1 Because we remand for the court to enter a directed verdict on the initial
question, the insured’s third issue on appeal, the trial court’s denial of the motion
for new trial, is now moot.

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more.” Hicks is factually distinguishable.

   We therefore affirm the trial court’s refusal to give the insured’s
proposed requested jury instruction.

   Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.

CIKLIN and CONNER, JJ., concur.

                           *         *       *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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