Court Opinion

ID: 9615811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:40:54.148233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:52.322797
License: Public Domain

WESLEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority concludes that this case should be remanded to a new district court judge for specific performance of the government’s promise not to object to defendant’s request for an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. It does so in the name of preserving the integrity of the plea bargaining process and public confidence in the federal criminal justice system. I agree with my colleagues that courts must be vigilant in holding the government to its promises. I submit, however, that the majority’s analysis overlooks a crucial fact in this case — defendant’s own prior breach of the agreement. In my view, remand will seriously undercut the very policy concerns the majority seeks to protect. I therefore respectfully dissent and vote to affirm the judgment.
The Plea Agreement1
In late November, 2004, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) pursuant to a plea agreement with the government. Plea Agreement ¶ 1. The plea agreement contained stipulated facts, including defendant’s acknowledgment that he had admitted previously to an FBI agent that he had opened downloaded images containing child pornography in a “shared folder” on the KaZaA system.2 Id. ¶ 7(c). The plea agreement also noted the “defendant’s] state[ment] that in October of 2003, he had opened approximately ten (10) child pornography images obtained through Ka-*370ZaA.” Id. The stipulated facts further indicated that defendant did not realize that he had downloaded images containing child pornography, that he deleted six of them, that he was aware that four images remained on his computer, and that he moved two images to his “My Documents” folder. Id. ¶ 7(c)-(d).
Although there is no mention in the stipulated facts of defendant’s possession of a “BabyJ” movie, that movie plays a vital role in this case. The BabyJ movie is part of a series of BabyJ pictures and movies that are graphic and disturbing. They involve a young girl in a number of brutal sexual encounters. The undercover agent who first discovered defendant’s use of KaZaA to possess and to share child pornography did so by looking for “underage” video clips on KaZaA and came upon a media file shared by defendant entitled “Babyjl2.” Thus, possession, use, and familiarity with the BabyJ series were particularly relevant to defendant’s ultimate sentence exposure even though his colloquy was silent on the issue.
The plea agreement also reflects the parties’ inability to agree upon a number of potential sentencing enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. For instance, the government maintained (without defendant’s agreement) that a trafficking enhancement should apply. See Maj. at 358. The government also pressed for several enhancements that would raise defendant’s sentence — possessing pornograpic material involving children; using a computer for the possession, transmission, receipt, or distribution of material; committing an offense that included at least 10, but fewer than 150 images; and distributing images for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain. Id. Most importantly, the government took the position (also disputed by defendant) that a four-level enhancement should apply for defendant’s possession of images containing sadomasochistic conduct. Id.
The agreement left enhancement determinations to the district court, and provided that the government would not oppose a downward adjustment for defendant’s acceptance of responsibility. Plea Agreement ¶ 12. The precise effect of that adjustment would, of course, vary depending on the court’s ultimate Guideline determination.
Finally, the agreement allowed the government to “respond at sentencing to any statements made by the defendant or on the defendant’s behalf that [wejre inconsistent with the information and evidence available to the government;.... ” Id. ¶ 18(b); see also Maj. at 366 (noting “that the plea agreement [did not] requiref ] the government to remain silent were the defendant to make statements inconsistent with the government’s understandings”).
Defendant’s Initial Denial of Knowledge and the Government’s Response
In late March, 2005, defendant’s attorney submitted detailed objections (affirmed by defendant) to the presentence report (“PSR”). Those objections focused on the enhancements left open by the plea agreement. Defendant’s fourth objection — the objection most relevant here— was to the sentencing enhancement for sadomasochistic content. Defense Objections to Presentence Report, dated March 24, 2005, at 4 (“Def. March 24 Objections”). The basis for that enhancement — sought by the government and recommended by the Probation Officer — was defendant’s alleged admission to a government agent, recorded in the FBI’s 302 Report, that defendant knew about the BabyJ movie and had a copy of it on his computer. Defense counsel repeated his client’s prior denial of any knowledge of the BabyJ file *371and recalled that defendant previously had “stated, as he does here under oath, that he consistently denied knowing of the Ba-byJ file.” Id.
The government’s initial response to this objection was generic; it was “troubled by some of the defendant’s objections [to the PSR] which seem[ed] to raise questions regarding whether the defendant ha[d] truly accepted responsibility-” Statement of the Government with Respect to Sentencing Factors and Motion Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b), dated March 31, 2005, at 1. Two weeks later, the government countered defendant’s PSR objections in greater detail. This time, reacting to defendant’s factual and legal assertions, the government suggested that defendant was reneging upon his initial acceptance of responsibility by disclaiming any knowledge of the BabyJ video in contradiction to the statements defendant allegedly made to the government agent, and to the government’s assertion that defendant’s computer contained “almost the entire series of movies involving BabyJ.” Government’s Response to Defendant’s Objections to the Presentence Report, dated April 15, 2005, at 15.
While acknowledging the parties’ right to disagree on the applicable Guideline and any potential enhancements, the government expressed concern that defendant, through his denial of knowledge of the BabyJ files, was “now attempting to distance himself from the other images and movies found in his possession.” Id. at 20. The government argued that defendant was “distancing himself from the BabyJ movie series by discrediting the way the FBI conducted the interview memorialized in the FBI 302 report and by stating that he had repeatedly told law enforcement that he had ‘no idea’ what files or movies were on his computer.” Id. at 21. The government also suggested that defendant was trying to cabin the “relevant conduct” made applicable by U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a) for which his sentence could be enhanced for sadomasochistic content. Id. Once more, the government “question[ed] whether the defendant ha[d] truly accepted responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a).” Id. The government then proceeded to discuss how a defendant’s untruthfulness with respect to relevant conduct might affect the sentencing judge’s conclusion that defendant had accepted responsibility.
The Sentencing Hearing
In June and July of 2005, the district court conducted an extensive sentencing hearing that included four days of testimony. During the hearing defendant vigorously contested the government’s contentions that he: (1) was aware that a BabyJ file was on his computer,3 (2) had admitted that fact to the FBI when he was arrested, and (3) had actually viewed those files and searched for other BabyJ files. Indeed, just before the hearings began, defense counsel noted that defendant was aware of the consequences if defendant’s denials regarding BabyJ files were not accepted by the court:
*372I have gone over the acceptance of responsibility stakes with my client. He understands that if the Court decides that he is not truthful, if he does testify, and I have talked to him about testifying, that if he is not truthful with respect not only to the offense conduct, but also what the Court may deem to be relevant conduct, that he could lose his acceptance reduction. The Defendant, from very early on in the course of my recommendations, has indicated to me that he was not aware of these items in the shared folder .... So the Defendant is aware that if he is going to deny involvement with an awareness of the BabyJ file and the other materials in the shared folder, there may be consequences and he is prepared to go forward with that. He has not changed his position. He feels that the agents, while they certainly may not be misrepresenting the facts, misinterpreted what he said and he stands by his position.
Sent’g Hr’g Tr. May 23, 2005, at 24-25 (emphasis added).
Counsel’s statement followed an explicit warning from Judge Siragusa (paraphrasing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 app. n. 1(a)) that the sentence mitigation for acceptance of responsibility could be denied and that defendant faced an enhancement for obstruction of justice if he was untruthful. See id. at 20 (warning defense counsel that “there could be issues relating to acceptance of responsibility or an enhancement under 3E1.1 for obstruction of justice”). Judge Siragusa repeated his warning on several subsequent occasions, sometimes renewing his concern that defendant’s denials under oath might result in an enhancement for obstruction of justice. See Sent’g Hr’g Tr. June 2, 2005, at 4-5 (recalling prior comments on “the danger of losing acceptance] of responsibility”); Sent’g Hr’g Tr. June 21, 2005, at 7 (noting defendant’s denials under oath, and commenting that “[t]he Court wanted to impress upon the Defense that not only does the Defendant risk losing acceptance of responsibility, but also could potentially face an enhancement for obstruction of justice”); Sent’g Hr’g Tr. July 13, 2005, at 4 (paraphrasing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 app. n. 1(a) and providing defendant with an opportunity “to clarify his position”).
In response to defendant’s initial denials, and pursuant to the plea agreement provision permitting it to respond to defendant’s inconsistent statements, see Plea Agreement ¶ 18(b), the government offered evidence of the search terms used to locate the BabyJ file and other files. See Government Letter to Judge Siragusa, dated June 1, 2005, at 2-3. The government put forth this evidence based upon the fact that “defendant provided inconsistent statements and the government is entitled to exercise its rights to respond to those statements with the information available to it.” Id. at 3.
But defendant’s position changed radically during the hearing (even though he never testified). The government was able to establish, without objection from defense counsel, that defendant did have a BabyJ file on his computer and that that file was file-sharing-enabled. Furthermore, as a result of testimony from a defense expert, the court noted during the hearing that defendant had “opened ... a variant of BabyJ three separate times.” Sent’g Hr’g Tr. July 13, 2005, at 44. Moreover, defense counsel admitted that the evidence showed that defendant had viewed one of the BabyJ videos. Thus, the government was able to confirm its account of how defendant came to the government’s attention and that defendant lied when he denied knowledge or use of the BabyJ files.
Thereafter, defendant made a startling move not mentioned in the majority’s recitation of the facts. In a letter to the *373district court dated July 13, 2005 — one day before he was sentenced — defendant “corrected” the very statements that had generated the government’s earlier responses. The “correction” came after Judge Siragu-sa gave defendant an opportunity “to clarify his position,” and after three prior warnings about the consequences of a false denial. Id. at 4. Defendant finally “accepted] the Court’s invitation to correct his previous statements” and retracted his contention that he had never accessed a BabyJ file: “Defendant acknowledges that during his earlier use of the HP computer ..., he may have used the search term Baby J and may have browsed several files bearing the Baby J label.” Def. July 13 Letter. In addition, defendant acknowledged that, although he had previously denied admitting to the FBI that he recognized and downloaded the BabyJ images, “he may or may not have told agents that he recognized or downloaded this image.” Id. Defendant went on to say that he simply could no longer recall whether he had made the earlier admission or not. Id. In short, after being confronted with evidence that seriously undercut his previous factual assertions, and after repeated warnings from the court, defendant abandoned his earlier denials. In essence, he conceded: (1) facts that made some of the more punitive enhancements a certainty, and (2) that he had indeed been untruthful about relevant conduct.
Discussion
Judge Sack has thoughtfully outlined the law of this circuit with regard to claims of a breach of plea agreement. I concur in his analysis and endorse his conclusion that, while the government’s initial statement that it was “troubled” by defendant’s objections to the PSR was not a breach of the plea agreement, the government reached the tipping point when it “offered a thorough legal analysis, unsolicited by the court, and concluded by noting its own skepticism as to whether the defendant satisfied the requirements for an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility as set forth by its analysis.” See Maj. at 365. As Judge Sack points out, the government was free to argue that defendant’s factual assertions were incredible fabrications and that his legal arguments with regard to the enhancements lacked merit. Id. But when the government moved beyond mere factual analysis to offer its views on defendant’s entitlement to a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, it crossed into an area it had agreed not to enter.
What relief, then, is due defendant in light of the government’s breach and defendant’s own false denials? In the majority’s view, the choice of remedies is binary — either defendant is entitled to withdrawal of his plea, or he is entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement.4 Id. at 367 (citing United States v. Lawlor, 168 F.3d 633, 638 (2d Cir.1999)). As our case law implies, however, another possibility arises from two of the guiding principles that our precedent teaches in this area. First, contract law doctrine applies to plea agreements. See id. at 360 (citing United States v. Riera, 298 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir.2002)). Second, “not every breach requires a remedy. Rather, the need for a remedy depends on the ‘nature of the broken promise and the facts of each particular case.’ ” United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Brody, 808 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir.1986)).
The majority’s view — one I share — is that the government breached before the sentencing hearing. Judge Sack goes on to note that, even if (hypothetically) defendant had continued to deny the relevant *374conduct in question at the sentencing hearing and the district court disbelieved him, “this would not be relevant to the breach of the plea agreement, because the government’s sentencing letters were submitted prior to the sentencing hearing....” Maj. at 365 n. 7. Indeed, since the government’s breach occurred before the hearing, a later finding that defendant was untruthful after the government’s initial breach— without more — would not render the breach harmless. See Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706, 724 (7th Cir.1985) (Posner, J., dissenting in part) (“[I]f it is too late to undo the harm, the attempt at cure will not excuse the breach; you cannot cure a disease after the patient has died from it.”). In that scenario, the hearing would simply have continued the prior injury caused by the government’s implicit argument to the court undermining defendant’s acceptance of responsibility. In fact, however, the majority’s hypothetical never came to pass.
That defendant did not continue to maintain his denial is not clear from the majority’s incomplete recitation of the record. To know that defendant subsequently changed his position fundamentally, a fuller review of the record is required.5 What that review reflects is the all-important revelation' — prompted by the sentencing hearing — that culminated in defendant’s last-minute recantation, showing that his earlier denials had been untruthful. In plain language, he confirmed that he had lied from the very beginning. The belated retraction came after Judge Sira-gusa’s explicit warning of the cost of false denial, and after defense counsel’s statement that defendant was fully aware that he assumed the risk that his denials might have “consequences.” Against this backdrop, Judge Siragusa focused on defendant’s “eleventh hour” change of heart in deciding the acceptance of responsibility issue.6 Sent’g Hr’g Tr. July 14, 2005, at *37514. He could not have done otherwise, for that was the only evidence remaining before the court relevant to the acceptance of responsibility determination.7
This circuit has eschewed a “harmless error” or “lack of prejudice” defense to the breach of a plea agreement by the government, finding the absence of cognizable harm to a defendant irrelevant to the need for remedy. Vaval, 404 F.3d at 154 (“Whether a breach by sentence advocacy caused prejudice in the form of an increased sentence is irrelevant to the need for a remedy.”). We rightly noted in Va-val that “in order to preserve the integrity of plea bargaining procedures and public confidence in the criminal justice system, a defendant is generally entitled to the enforcement of a plea agreement without showing a tangible harm resulting from a breach.” Id. at 155.8 I readily agree. Generally, we will not accept the premise that once the government has abandoned a plea agreement promise the sentencing bell can be “unrung.” Maj. at 367 (citing Riera, 298 F.3d at 134). The stain from a breach is not easily removed; the impression upon the district court lingers, as does the impact upon a defendant (who, at re-sentencing, may well receive the same sentence as a result). Thus, silencing the government and mandating an acceptance of responsibility determination before a different district judge is sometimes justified “in order to preserve the integrity of plea bargaining procedures and public confidence” that federal criminal justice is not a one-sided affair. Vaval, 404 F.3d at 155.
But harmless error is not the hook upon which I hang my vote in this case. As with all contractual arrangements, each party has an obligation to operate in good faith, and to rigorously adhere to the obligations outlined in the contract and the law of the governing jurisdiction, from the contract’s inception. “[A] defendant is not entitled to the benefit of his bargain if he does not himself comply with the terms of the agreement.” United States v. Cruz-Mercado, 360 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir.2004). As we have said before, applying contract law principles to agreements between the government and a defendant in the criminal setting, “[tjhere is ... an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in every contract.” United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir.1990) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Rex-ach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir.1990) (citing Filner v. Shapiro, 633 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir.1980); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”). I am therefore hard pressed to award defendant a remand in light of his acknowledged untruthfulness long before the government’s breach. Defendant asks us to hold that the government be held to strict compliance with the plea agreement while ignoring his own admitted deviation from it.9 Judicial economy, the integrity of the plea bargaining process, and the public’s confidence in the *376federal criminal justice system compel us, in my view, to deny that request.
Returning Mr. Griffin to district court for one more “bite at the apple” will produce an interesting scenario. After his dramatic reversal at the sentencing hearing that was compelled by testimony directly contradicting his initial denials of responsibility, defendant no longer embraces the facts that served as the basis for his earlier objections to the PSR’s enhancements calculation.10 See Def. March 24 Objections, at 4-5 (objecting to the PSR, and denying that he: (1) knew of the BabyJ file, (2) admitted such to the FBI, or (3) downloaded the BabyJ file). Moreover, he can no longer argue, as he attempted to do in his objections to the PSR, that the only conduct relevant to his sentence is that contained in the plea agreement.11 No doubt, defendant will attempt to make the same argument at resentenc-ing that he made to the district court when he was originally sentenced — that he is entitled to a reduction in his sentence for acceptance of responsibility because that acceptance, however late in coming, was genuine.
The majority concedes that Judge Sira-gusa conducted an “unusually lengthy and complex” hearing in this ease with “extraordinary diligence” and, furthermore, acknowledges that “[t]he extent to which this exemplary effort will be wasted is a matter of no small concern.” Maj. at 367. I share the same concern. Indeed, I see no need to repeat the exercise.12
Finally, the majority takes the position that the remaining issues defendant raises need not be addressed on this round of appeal as the record could use clarification on the trafficking issue — one of first impression in this circuit — and because there have been some significant legislative developments in the interim with regard to discovery of computer hard drives that contain child pornography. Id. at 367-69. Had my view of the case carried the day, I would have been willing to resolve all of the issues that remain and affirm the judgment of conviction. As I find myself in the minority, and because my resolution of these other issues would not impact today’s result, I refrain from elaborating as to how I would face them. That effort I *377defer to another panel and to another day, confident that it is not far off.
Conclusion
For the reasons offered above, I respectfully dissent.

. Defendant has not raised any objection to the adequacy of his plea colloquy or to the knowing and voluntary nature of his consent to the plea agreement.

. Judge Sack’s opinion describes how KaZaA functions. See Maj. at 357.

. During the sentencing hearing an FBI agent testified that four computers were found at defendant's house. Sent'g Hr’g Tr. May 23, 2005, at 35. Two computers, however — a Dell and an HP — were the focus of later testimony. As discussed further below, the government was able to show that a BabyJ file on defendant's Dell computer was among those that were file-sharing-enabled. Sent’g Hr’g Tr. July 13, 2005, at 40. As also noted below, defendant later admitted that he may have employed the HP in order to search for, and browse BabyJ files. Defense Counsel Letter to Judge Siragusa, dated July 13, 2005 ("Def. July 13 Letter”). The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant had BabyJ files on both the Dell and HP computers. Sent’g Hr’g Tr. July 14, 2005, at 8-10.

. As the majority notes, defendant hopes for specific performance of the plea agreement, .rather than a retraction of his plea. See Maj. at 367.

. Questions arising from the government's alleged breach of a plea agreement, the majority agrees, "must be carefully studied in context,” United States v. Amico, 416 F.3d 163, 167 n. 2 (2d Cir.2005), and thus merit "a fact-specific analysis,” Maj. at 361. For this reason, careful consideration of the full record is all the more crucial in this case.

. The Application Notes to the provision of the Sentencing Guidelines governing acceptance of responsibility state (unsurprisingly) that "[i]n determining whether a defendant qualifies" for an acceptance of responsibility adjustment, “appropriate considerations include, but are not limited to,” among other things:
(a) truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § IB 1.3 (Relevant Conduct). Note that a defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction in order to obtain a reduction under subsection (a). A defendant may remain silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affecting his ability to obtain a reduction under this subsection. However, a defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility .... U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 app. n. 1(a) (2004) (emphasis added).
The majority makes the curious statement that I have failed to identify a clause in the plea agreement that required Griffin to be scrupulously honest in his statements to the district court. Maj. at 366. I cannot agree with the majority's obvious implication — that the plea agreement did not obligate Griffin to make factual representations to the court that were offered in good faith and were truthful. Were that the case, it would mark a quite radical departure from the contract law’s historical requirement of good faith. It would also create a perverse incentive for defendants to lie at no great cost, thereby undermining our plea bargaining system’s calculus of rewards and risks.

. Defendant does not contest the factual basis for that finding.

. Vaval recognized two exceptions to the need for a remedy — curative performance by the government and de minimis injury arising from the breach. Vaval, 404 F.3d at 155-56. Neither is applicable here.

. Although the majority is aware of my view that the government did, indeed, breach, see Maj. at 366, they nevertheless insist that I am attempting to "excuse[]” the government's noncompliance, or to “pardon” it. Id. at 366. While I am not willing to either excuse or pardon the government’s breach, I likewise believe that the government’s noncompliance cannot be examined in a vacuum, without reference to Griffin's own noncompliance.

. Nor does defendant argue on appeal that the court’s assessment of those enhancements is not supported by the record.

. That argument was, of course, specious to begin with, as “relevant conduct” is determined by the Sentencing Guidelines to in- . elude, not merely conduct averted to in the "four corners” of a plea agreement, but other conduct related to the charge as well. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (permitting a sentence to "be determined on the basis of ... all acts and omissions ... that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense ” (emphasis added)); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 (“In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661.”).

.As we have recently restated in a different context, " 'reassignment to another judge may be advisable in order to avoid an exercise in futility (in which) the Court is merely marching up the hill only to march right down again.’ ” United States v. Hirliman, 503 F.3d 212, 216 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir.1977) (en banc)). Although the majority’s order here is issued to a different district court, this will not likely save the resentencing judge from an unnecessary "march” of his own. Indeed, there is every reason to suspect that the resen-tencing judge will engage in the same "exercise in futility” that would have awaited Judge Siragusa, had we instead remanded directly to him.