Court Opinion

ID: 9612096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:04:49.946518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:19.491582
License: Public Domain

Justice Fkye
dissenting.
The law is clear that the trial court would not have erred by relying on plaintiff’s default admissions and granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this case. See, e.g., Rahim v. Truck Air of the Carolinas, Inc., 123 N.C. App. 609, 473 S.E.2d 688 (1996); Overnite Transp. Co. v. Styer, 57 N.C. App. 146, 291 S.E.2d 179 (1982); Rhoads v. Bryant, 56 N.C. App. 635, 289 S.E.2d 637, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 386, 294 S.E.2d 211 (1982). However, that is not the question this Court must decide. The sole question presented to this Court, by virtue of a division on the Court of Appeals’ panel, is whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s failure to respond to the request for admissions. I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Rule 36(a), as the majority here correctly notes, provides that if a party fails to respond to a request for admission within thirty days after service of the request, or within such time as the court may allow, then the matter is deemed admitted. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 36(a) (1990). The rule goes on to provide:
Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 36(b) (emphasis added). The majority focuses on the first part of this section, which provides that any matter ad*283mitted is conclusively established unless the court “on motion” permits a withdrawal or amendment of the admission. However, the latter part of the rule, which concerns preservation of the merits of the action, must also be considered.
In this case, the first of defendants’ three requests went to the central issue of whether defendants had violated the standard of care; this issue was obviously in dispute since it was the essence of plaintiff’s lawsuit. I believe the trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment, in effect allowing plaintiff to withdraw her default admissions in order to “sub-serve” the merits of the case. Defendants do not argue that they would be prejudiced in maintaining their defense on the merits if the admissions were withdrawn. Defendants contend only that plaintiff did not make a “motion” to withdraw or amend her admissions, and therefore, the trial court had no choice but to rule against her on a motion for summary judgment.
“The North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure are modeled after the federal rules. In most instances they are verbatim copies with the same enumerations.” Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 99, 176 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1970) (citation omitted). This is certainly true of N.C. R. Civ. P. 36, which is virtually identical to the Federal Rule 36. Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are the source of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court has said that we will look to decisions under the federal rules “for enlightenment and guidance as we develop ‘the philosophy of the new rules.’ ” Id. at 101, 176 S.E.2d at 165.
This Court should heed its own words and look to the body of case law pertaining to Federal Rule 36 for guidance in resolving the present issue. In Kosta v. Connolly, 709 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1989), the court reasoned as follows:
Defendants argue that because plaintiffs have not answered defendants’ request for admissions, under F.R. Civ. P. 36(a) we should consider the statements admitted. . . . Accepting these statements in the requests for admission as conclusively proven facts, defendants argue that plaintiffs have admitted to violating [the statute].
The purpose of F.R. Civ. R 36(a) is to expedite trial by eliminating the necessity of proving undisputed and peripheral *284issues. We should not employ the rule to establish facts which are obviously in dispute or to answer questions of law.
In the case at bar, the question whether the plaintiffs violated the statute is neither undisputed nor peripheral. . . . Moreover, the question of plaintiffs’ guilt is central to this case. If plaintiffs admitted to violating the statute, they would effectively resolve the disputed issues of selective enforcement, malicious prosecution, violation of constitutional rights, etc. Clearly, that is not the plaintiffs’ position, and Rule 36 is not intended to make it so.
Id. at 594 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
Likewise, in Bergemann v. United States, 820 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1987), the court upheld the district court judge’s discretion to deny a motion for partial summary judgment and give relief from an admission achieved by default. The court stated:
Bergemann’s position in this court is basically that because the United States failed to answer the requests for admission . . . the United States, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a), is deemed to have admitted that there was a common law marriage between Bergemann and Dunkle, and that such admission, under the circumstances of this case, is conclusive and continues to this date. We disagree.
. . . Bergemann’s rejoinder to Rule 36(b) is that any withdrawal or amendment of an admission may only be “on motion,” and that the United States did not file any motion.
We think Bergemann’s argument is overly technical and does not recognize the reality of the situation. . . .
The district judge, after reflection and careful analysis of the matter, denied the motion for partial summary judgment, and, in so doing, necessarily granted the United States relief from any admission that there was a common law marriage between Bergemann and Dunkle. In this latter regard, we find no abuse of discretion as Rule 36(b) permits withdrawal where it promotes a decision on the merits while not prejudicing the party who obtained the admission. We find no prejudice in this case. Bergemann clearly knew defendants challenged the existence of a common law marriage. . .. The prejudice contemplated by Rule *285now has to convince the jury of its truth. Something more is required.
Id. at 1120-21 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
“The canon of interpretation of the Federal Rules is one of liberality, and it has been held in numerous decisions that the general policy of the Rules is to disregard technicalities and form and determine the. rights of litigants on the merits.” Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 40, 42, 187 S.E.2d 420, 421 (1972). We should not in this case elevate form over substance in the interpretation of North Carolina’s rules, thereby depriving the trial court of the discretion to preserve the merits of a case, based on the lack of a “motion” by the pro se plaintiff where there is no evidence that the other party would suffer any prejudice in the presentation of its defense.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.