Court Opinion

ID: 9840152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 14:05:24.109866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:08:56.963583
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

                            ELIZABETH PIRMAN,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

   SOUTH POINTE OF TAMPA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,

                                 Appellee.

                               No. 2D23-58

                            September 15, 2023

Appeal from the County Court for Hillsborough County; Michael J. Hooi,
Judge.

Elizabeth Pirman, pro se.

Charles Evans Glausier, Standford Dean Rowe, and Katie Renee Russo of
Glausier Knight Jones, PLLC, Tampa, for Appellee.

SMITH, Judge.
     Elizabeth Pirman appeals the final judgment rendered against her
after the county court granted summary judgment in favor of South
Pointe Homeowners Association, Inc. (the Association), on her breach of
contract claim. Because the county court erred in granting summary
judgment on the basis that Ms. Pirman has not suffered any damages,
we reverse the final judgment and remand for further proceedings.
     Ms. Pirman owns real property in the South Pointe subdivision
located in Riverview, Florida, which is subject to the "Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions[,] and Restrictions of South Pointe."1
     Ms. Pirman filed a statement of claim in small claims court alleging
that the Association "illegally fined" her for dead grass and a dirty
driveway in violation of the Declaration by failing to give her notice of the
alleged violations and by further failing to provide the statutorily required
fourteen days' notice of a hearing prior to assessing these fines. See §
720.305(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2021) ("A fine or suspension levied by the board
of administration may not be imposed unless the board first provides at
least 14 days' notice to the parcel owner and . . . an opportunity for a
hearing before a committee of at least three members appointed by the
board who are not officers, directors, or employees of the
association . . . . If the committee, by majority vote, does not approve a
proposed fine or suspension, the proposed fine or suspension may not be
imposed."). Ms. Pirman also alleged that she could not remedy the dirty
driveway because under a local ordinance pressure washing is prohibited
unless related to "public health and safety."2 See Hillsborough County,
Fla., Ordinance 111-7 (Apr. 21, 2021).
     The Association filed a motion for summary disposition arguing
that Ms. Pirman has not yet paid the fines imposed and, therefore, has

     1 Ms. Pirman's property is also subject to other governing

documents of the Association that are not relevant to this opinion.
     2 Because we hold that the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment on the basis that Ms. Pirman has not suffered any damages,
which is dispositive to this case, we do not reach the remaining issues
related to whether the Association complied with its Declaration and/or
governing documents and section 720.305(b)(2)'s fourteen-day notice
requirement or whether the county ordinance precluded Ms. Pirman from
cleaning her driveway.

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not suffered any damages. The county court held a hearing3 on the
Association's motion and granted the same, finding "[a]t the time this
action was filed, [Ms. Pirman] had not yet paid the fines that she
disputes in the Statement of Claim. Without [Ms. Pirman] having
suffered any damages, there is no triable issue of fact."
     We review the trial court's order granting summary judgment de
novo. See Limones v. Sch. Dist. of Lee Cnty., 161 So. 3d 384, 390 (Fla.
2015) ("We review de novo rulings on summary judgment with respect to
purely legal questions."). Under the new summary judgment rule,
summary judgment may be granted where "there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a) (2021).
     Here, the county court granted the Association's motion, finding
that because Ms. Pirman had not yet paid the disputed fines, she
suffered no damages and thus, there was no triable issue of fact.
However, homeowners subject to an association's governing documents
are expressly permitted to bring suit against the association if and when
the association fails to comply with its statutory or contractual
obligations to the homeowners. Section 720.305(1)(a) allows association
members to sue an association "at law or in equity, or both," to redress
an association's alleged failure to comply with the community's governing
documents. See Roebuck v. Sills, 306 So. 3d 374, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA
2020) (interpreting the related subsection (b), which applies to members
suing other members, to allow both legal and equitable relief, without

     3 Ms. Pirman was not present at the hearing on the Association's

motion for summary disposition. She alleged in her motion for rehearing
that technical issues prevented her from appearing at the December 22,
2022, Zoom hearing. Ms. Pirman's motion for rehearing was denied by
the county court.

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limitation, to enforce covenants); see also Rosenberg v. MetroWest Master
Ass'n, 116 So. 3d 641, 644 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (acknowledging that
section 720.305(1) expands a member's rights to sue an association for
violations of chapter 720).
     Moreover, Ms. Pirman's pleadings make it clear that she is not
seeking money damages from the Association but is rather asking the
court to remove the wrongfully imposed fines, which is akin to
declaratory or injunctive relief. See Chancey v. Chancey, 880 So. 2d
1281, 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (noting that the father was "a pro se
litigant and his pleadings should be liberally construed"); see also Gillis
v. Jackson Shores Townhomes Ass'n, 351 So. 3d 668, 670 (Fla. 2d DCA
2022) (holding that a homeowner was permitted to bring an action
against the homeowner's association for declaratory and injunctive relief
seeking to compel the association to rescind a fine levied against him
where the association failed to give the homeowner the proper notice
prior to fining him). Therefore, the county court in this case erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of the Association on the basis that
Ms. Pirman failed to allege any damages where she had not yet paid the
allegedly erroneous fines. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and
remand for further proceedings.
     Reversed and remanded.

SLEET, C.J., and LABRIT, J., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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