Court Opinion

ID: 9622137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:12:32.627842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:00.549277
License: Public Domain

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, dissenting. In order to affirm the circuit court, the majority misconstrues Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. 218, 853 S.W.2d 882 (1993), and effectively overrules the Davlin decision sub silentio. Two fundamental principles were pivotal in Davlin: (1) the State’s inability to rebut the presumption of prejudice when there is no record of the communications with the jury after it retires for deliberation, and (2) the defendant’s constitutional right to be present during the representation of evidence, which extends beyond the procedural rights promulgated by the Arkansas General Assembly in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-125(e) (1987). When a jury retires to deliberate, “the jury may take with them all papers which have been” admitted into evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 16 — 89—125(d)(3) (1987). The General Assembly, however, has established a specific procedure governing how a jury may obtain any part of the evidence after the jury has retired to deliberate: After the jury retires for deliberation, if there is a disagreement between them as to any part of the evidence or if they desire to be informed on a point of law, they must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought into court, the information required must be given in the presence of or after notice to the counsel of the parties. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-125(e). This court has consistently required strict compliance with the procedure imposed by the legislature. Davlin v. State, supra; McKinney v. State, 303 Ark. 257, 797 S.W.2d 415 (1990). Furthermore, if the trial court does not strictly comply with the statute, we presume prejudice occurred. Atkinson v. State, 347 Ark. 336, 64 S.W.3d 259 (2002); Goff v. State, 329 Ark. 513, 953 S.W.2d 38 (1997); McKinney v. State, supra. The State then has the burden to show that no prejudice occurred. Goff v. State, supra. The facts in the Davlin case are strikingly similar to those presented in the instant case. A videotaped statement was played to the jury during the trial and again during jury deliberations. Davlin v. State, supra. Although section 16-89-125(e) mandates that the jury return to the courtroom and that the information be given to the jury in open court, “the videotape was not replayed in court, but in the room where the jury was deliberating.” Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. at 221, 853 S.W.2d at 884. Finally, no record was made of what actually occurred during the replaying of the tape, and the defendant was not present. Id. Due to the circuit court’s failure to strictly comply with the requirements of section 16-89-125(e), we had to presume prejudice in Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. 218, 853 S.W.2d 882. Moreover, the State failed to meet its burden of rebutting the presumption of prejudice. Id. The Davlin court also held that the errors can go beyond the procedural requirements of section 16-89-125(e), and encompass the defendant’s constitutional right to be present when a substantial step is taken in his case. Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. 218, 853 S.W.2d 882. In so holding, we stated that “[although section 16-89-125(e) does not expressly require a defendant’s presence during the representation of evidence or instruction of law, the foregoing principles of law do so require.” Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. at 223, 853 S.W.2d at 885 (emphasis added). Thus, it was the defendant’s personal absence during the representation of evidence that violated his constitutional right to be present during a substantial step in the proceedings. In the present case, the majority fails to address, much less acknowledge, the core holding in Davlin — the “representation of evidence” is a substantial step in the proceedings that mandates the presence of the defendant. Instead, the majority focuses on whether the tape has been admitted into evidence and conflates the admission of evidence with the representation of evidence.1 The Davlin court clearly concluded that the replaying of a videotaped statement, which had already been admitted into evidence, was the representation of evidence to the jury. The fundamental errors that mandated reversal in Davlin are also present in this case. First, the circuit court allowed the jury to take the audio tapes and a tape recorder into the jury room where the jury was deliberating, thereby making it possible for them to replay the taped statements in the jury room. As this court stated in Davlin v. State, supra, the replaying of taped statements amounts to “the representation of evidence.” The representation of evidence in the jury room clearly violated section 16-89-125(e), resulting in a presumption of prejudice that the State could not rebut because there is no record of what happened in the jury room. More importantly, the representation of evidence violated Anderson’s constitutional right to be present during a substantial step in his case. In focusing exclusively on whether the tapes were admitted into evidence, the majority completely ignores our holding in Davlin that it is the circuit court’s duty to bring the jury into the courtroom for the representation of evidence in the presence of the defendant. Once again, “had the jury returned to the courtroom, there would most likely have been a record of what occurred and the trial court would most likely have been reminded of appellant’s right to be present.” Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. at 223, 853 S.W.2d at 885. As to the majority’s valiant attempt to put some distance between Davlin and the present case, the majority opinion offers distinctions without a difference. For example, the majority suggests that the replaying of the audio tapes did not constitute a substantial step in the criminal proceedings because “there is nothing in the record to show that the jury would have been exposed to anything other than what was already played at trial.” However, this reasoning runs counter to the circuit court’s judgment when it directed the jury to convene in open court to hear the testimony of Anderson’s brother, Maurice, replayed in the presence of Anderson and counsel for both sides. The jury had already heard that witness’s testimony once, so there was nothing “the jury would have been exposed to” other than what had already been heard during the trial. Thus, under the majority’s rationale, the representation of Maurice’s testimony would not have been a substantial step in Anderson’s case because the jury was not being exposed to anything new. Yet, the circuit court and the State have acknowledged that the replaying of Maurice’s testimony amounted to a substantial step requiring Anderson’s presence. Indeed, during oral argument, the State reiterated that “if the jury needs to rehear evidence, that is critical, just as it is in the courtroom.” Thus, just as “the rereading of instructions to the jury constitutes a substantial step in the defendant’s case,” so does the rehearing or representation of evidence constitute a substantial step in a defendant’s case. Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. at 222, 853 S.W.2d at 885 (emphasis added). In short, the only appreciable difference between the replaying of Maurice’s testimony, and giving the jury an opportunity to replay the audio tapes of Anderson’s confession in the jury room, is the person who is doing the talking. That distinction rests on the majority’s assertion that when the defendant’s testimony is being replayed, it is not a substantial step in the proceedings. Such an assertion is without merit as the origin of the testimony that is being represented is irrelevant when determining whether a substantial step is being taken in the case. In fact, under our case law and section 16-89-125(e), the only inquiry that is proper is whether testimony is being represented. The majority fails to cite any authority for the proposition that the origin of the testimony to be represented is relevant in determining whether the defendant should be afforded the constitutional right to be present. Another purported distinction is that in Davlin the judge and counsel went into the jury room. Why that fact should make a difference is difficult to fathom. The beginning and end of our inquiry under Davlin is that prejudice is presumed if the provisions of section 16-89-125(e) are not strictly followed;2 the lack of a record will prevent the State from proving that no prejudice occurred; the replaying of a taped statement is nothing less than the representation of evidence; and a defendant’s constitutional right to be present is triggered by the representation of evidence. Finally, it is well settled that our case law interpreting a statute becomes a part of that statute. See, e.g., Estate of Hull v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 355 Ark. 547, 141 S.W.2d 356 (2004); Morris v. McLemore, 313 Ark. 53, 852 S.W.2d 135 (1993). Today’s decision effectively changes what the law has been for thirteen years under Davlin v. State, supra, and does so without any reference to the doctrine oí stare decisis and the threshold inquiry that must precede a decision to overturn precedent: “ [Precedent governs until it gives a result patently wrong, so manifestly unjust, that a break becomes unavoidable.” Zinger v. Terrell, 336 Ark. 423, 430, 985 S.W.2d 737, 741 (1999); see McGehee v. State, 334 Ark. 543, 975 S.W.2d 834 (1989) (citing Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968)). We also said in Sanders v. County of Sebastian, 324 Ark. 433, 922 S.W.2d 334 (1996): . While we do have the power to overrule a previous decision, it is necessary, as a matter of public policy, to uphold prior decisions unless a great injury or injustice would result. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that adherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 435-36, 922 S.W.2d at 335. A change in the law is particularly regrettable when it affects a person who is appealing his death sentence. For the above stated reasons, I must respectfully dissent. Corbin, J., joins this dissent.   For example, despite the absence of any reference to the phrase “presentation of new evidence” in Davlin, the majority states that it is the “presentation of new evidence,” and not the “representation of evidence,” that constitutes a substantial step in the proceedings. In fact, the “representation of evidence,” as that phrase was used in Davlin," is the reviewing of the videotape” or “the replaying of the tape” previously admitted into evidence. 313 Ark. at 220, 853 S.W.2d at 884.    The presumption of prejudice will be rendered meaningless as a result of the majority’s rationale that the jury would not have been “exposed to anything other than what was already played at trial.”