Court Opinion

ID: 9390639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 05:07:35.708852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.844029
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                      UNPUBLISHED
In re O O CLAUDIO-PEREZ, Minor.                                       April 27, 2023

                                                                      No. 360356
                                                                      Kalamazoo Circuit Court
                                                                      Family Division
                                                                      LC No. 18-000181-NA

                                           ON REMAND

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and O’BRIEN and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

                                       I. INTRODUCTION

        In this matter, mother appealed the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
son, OOCP, raising only two issues. First, mother argued that her plea of admission taken by the
trial court was not knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily made. Second, she argued that she
did not receive reasonable efforts toward reunification. We rejected mother’s arguments and
affirmed the trial court’s decision. In re O O Claudio-Perez, unpublished per curiam opinion of
the Court of Appeals, issued September 22, 2022 (Docket No. 360356).

        Mother subsequently obtained new counsel and filed an application for leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court, and challenged, for the first time, the trial court’s findings of statutory grounds
to terminate her parental rights. The Supreme Court, in lieu of granting mother leave to appeal,
remanded this case back to us pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), instructing us “to review and address
the trial court’s decision finding statutory grounds to terminate parental rights under MCL
712.A19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j).” In re O O Claudio-Perez, 984 NW2d 215 (Mich, 2023).

         Pursuant to this directive, we now address whether the trial court’s decision finding
statutory grounds to terminate mother’s parental rights under MCL 712.A19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and
(j) was proven by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm.

                                       II. BACKGROUND

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        In the interest of judicial efficiency, we assume the reader is familiar with the facts and
conclusions laid out in our prior opinion. See In re O O Claudio-Perez, unpub op at 1-4. However,
we will provide some additional facts in light of the new issue requiring resolution and in response
to the concerns raised in Justice CAVANAGH’S concurrence. See In re O O Claudio-Perez, 984
NW2d 215 (CAVANAGH, J., concurring).

        OOCP was removed from mother’s care in April of 2018 due to her physical abuse and
medical neglect of her medically fragile son, who suffered from a rare life-long condition called
Ehlers-Danlos syndrome. Ehlers-Danlos syndrome affected the production of OOCP’s connective
tissues, making him highly susceptible to serious injury. Because of his condition, OOCP required
extensive and frequent medical attention. Even the slightest inattention to his care could develop
into more significant conditions, including blood vessels rupturing, blood not clotting,
hypermobility of joints, instability of joints causing easy dislocations, scoliosis, tissue disease, eye
problems, dental problems, and life-threatening organ problems. OOCP also had other medical
conditions, including atrial septal defects, asthma, and developmental and speech delays.

       OOCP was in the DHHS’ care for over three years when the trial court ultimately
terminated mother’s parental rights on October 5, 2021. When OOCP was originally removed
from mother’s care, the goal was reunification. The record shows that the DHHS notified mother
early on that she was expected to be present for OOCP’s medical appointments and provided
mother with a calendar detailing OOCP’s upcoming medical appointments. As explained in our
prior opinion, however, “on numerous occasions, mother discussed and requested, at her own
accord, the possibility of changing the permanency goal from reunification to guardianship as early
as May 4, 2018.” In re O O Claudio-Perez, unpub op at 7. Although mother herself pushed for
the goal change from reunification to guardianship, the DHHS held off on changing the goal with
the court until mother and OOCP obtained their green cards to avoid the risk of deportation.1

        Mother’s engagement in the case service plan was practically nonexistent for the first two
years that OOCP was in the DHHS’ care. Although the DHHS caseworker admitted that with the
goal of guardianship in mind, they did not encourage mother to attend OOCP’s medical
appointments, the record shows that mother was still notified of these appointments and permitted
to attend. It was not until October of 2020 that mother engaged in the case service plan. The
following month, the DHHS filed its supplemental petition to terminate mother’s parental rights,
asserting that mother had not participated or shown any interest in OOCP’s medical care since his
removal. The DHHS further asserted that she had never inquired about his health progress or
condition and scarcely attended his medical appointments despite being notified of them. The
DHHS noted that prior to October of 2020, mother attended no more than two of OOCP’s weekly
physical and occupational therapy sessions.

       The trial court terminated mother’s parental rights on October 5, 2021, three years and five
months after DHHS filed its petition, finding that mother did not fully comprehend the abuse that
she inflicted on OOCP or the significance of his medical condition and disregarded ample

1
 DHHS also considered filing a supplemental petition changing the goal to adoption as early as
September of 2018, but the department held off on changing the goal until mother and OOCP
obtained their green cards to avoid the risk of deportation.

                                                  -2-
opportunities provided to her to learn to care for OOCP’s needs and how to properly discipline
him. The trial court based its holding, in large part, on its findings related to mother’s efforts after
she engaged in the case service plan in October of 2020. The court found that although mother
began attending most medical appointments, she did not otherwise partake in his care plan and
failed to educate herself about OOCP’s condition. The court relied on the record and found that
mother did not ask questions to OOCP’s physicians nor inquire about OOCP’s progress or
treatment while attending his medical appointments. The court also found that mother failed to
demonstrate an ability to manage and track OOCP’s medical appointments without relying on the
caseworkers. The court found that mother failed to promptly schedule OOCP’s appointments,
citing one instance on June 3, 2021, where OOCP’s Ears Nose and Throat (ENT) doctor canceled
OOCP’s appointment to review his hearing test because mother failed to schedule the hearing test.

                                  III. STATUTORY GROUNDS

       Mother argues that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights under MCL
712.A19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j), which permit termination of parental rights under the following
circumstances:

              (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
       182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
       and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

              (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
       no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
       time considering the child’s age.

               (ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s
       jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions,
       the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received
       notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the
       conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified
       within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

                                                * * *

               (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
       child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of
       the parent.

Before terminating a respondent’s parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that at least one statutory ground for termination exists. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444,
459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). To terminate parental rights, only one statutory ground for
termination needs to be satisfactorily proven. MCL 712A.19b(3).

                                         A. APPLICATION

       After carefully reviewing the record, we hold that the trial court did not err in terminating
mother’s parental rights under MCL 712.A19b(3)(c)(i). There is no dispute that more than 182

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days elapsed between the issuance of the initial dispositional order and the termination of mother’s
parental rights, and that mother’s medical neglect of OOCP was one of the conditions that led to
the adjudication.2 Equally clear from the record was the court’s determination that mother had not
demonstrated the ability to properly care for her medically fragile son suffering from Ehlers-
Danlos syndrome.

         Mother faults her caseworkers for her absence at OOCP’s medical appointments, arguing
that for the first two years, the caseworkers told her that she did not need to attend his medical
appointments. The trial court acknowledged the caseworkers’ missteps during the first two years
of this case but found that mother was well aware of the seriousness of OOCP’s medical condition3
and given ample opportunity to participate in his care but chose not to be involved. The trial court
found credible the testimony of Vanessa Guerrero, mother’s caseworker, who testified at the
beginning of the case that although she offered medical training to mother, mother did not attend.
Even still, the trial court’s decision finding statutory grounds to terminate mother’s parental rights
was primarily supported by its findings related to mother’s conduct after she reengaged in the case
service plan in October of 2020.

        The trial court did not clearly err when it found clear and convincing evidence to terminate
mother’s parental rights, as mother’s medical neglect of OOCP continued even after she began
attending his medical appointments. The trial court found that mother had done nothing to educate
herself on OOCP’s fragile medical condition. The court relied on BCS case manager Andrea
Vojtko’s court addendum, indicating that she never observed mother speak with OOCP’s physical
and occupational therapist about OOCP’s therapy nor ask questions about his treatment plan or
whether he was making any progress. The record evidence also proves that mother failed to
meaningfully participate in his care and improve her understanding of his unique medical needs,
including several reports from OOCP’s foster parents about mother’s lack of involvement or
obvious disinterest in OOCP’s medical care while attending his other medical appointments,
claiming that mother did not inquire about details or ask questions to his doctors. The foster
parents claimed that during medical visits that they attended with mother, mother did not ask
questions to the doctors or inquire about details, and that mother was usually more engaged with
OOCP than with the medical providers. Each one of OOCP’s medical appointments presented an
opportunity for mother to learn more about his severe medical condition and demonstrate her

2
  Mother’s physical abuse of OOCP was another condition that brought OOCP within the court’s
jurisdiction. The trial court also concluded that termination was proper under MCL
712.A19b(3)(c)(i) for mother’s failure to rectify that issue, finding that mother did not fully
comprehend the abuse she inflicted on OOCP. However, the trial court erred in that finding, as
the record is void of any instance of physical abuse by mother since OOCP was removed from her
care in April of 2018.
3
 In fact, mother was well aware, for many years preceding the DHHS’ petition, of the seriousness
of OOCP’s medical condition and his need for consistent medical care and attention. The record
shows that mother learned that OOCP had Ehlers-Danlos sometime while she was in Arizona from
2015 to 2017. Furthermore, in that time, CPS provided mother with two Duty to Warn letters
detailing the seriousness of OOCP’s condition and his need for prompt medical care.

                                                 -4-
ability to address his needs. However, mother failed to actively engage, beyond mere attendance,
in OOCP’s medical care and treatment.

         The record shows that mother could not comprehend the magnitude of OOCP’s life-long
medical conditions and his need for recurring and consistent medical care. Ms. Guerrero testified
that despite mother’s recent efforts to become more involved in OOCP’s care, her understanding
of OOCP’s condition remained superficial, in that she did not comprehend that Ehlers-Danlos was
a life-long condition requiring a significant amount of supervision. In fact, in October of 2020 and
in January of 2021, mother inquired about when OOCP’s need for physical and occupational
therapy would end, failing to acknowledge that therapy would be a lifelong circumstance. Even
more, Ms. Guerrero testified at the termination hearing that mother had recently asked her what
OOCP’s condition was called.

        The trial court also found that mother had not demonstrated an ability to keep track of and
schedule OOCP’s medical appointments independently and instead relied on the caseworkers. The
DHHS delegated the responsibility of managing and scheduling OOCP’s appointments to mother
following her request for more accountability in this regard. While Ehlers-Danlos syndrome could
not be cured, the extent of damage could be dramatically decreased by the type of care received.
Despite the importance of providing OOCP with prompt medical care, the record shows that
mother required repeated reminders from her caseworkers to schedule or attend OOCP’s medical
appointments.

         Mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that OOCP’s June 3, 2021, ENT doctor
appointment to review his hearing test was canceled due to mother’s failure to schedule the hearing
test. The trial court relied on the case worker’s report, which explicitly provided that OOCP’s
ENT appointment to review the hearing test results had to be canceled because “[mother] never
called to schedule” the prerequisite hearing test. Mother alleges that the cancellation occurred
only because the hearing testing facility did not have the appropriate referral slip, directing us to
testimony concerning events that occurred after the June 3, 2021, canceled appointment. Mother
first points to Ms. Vojtko’s testimony that on June 30, 2021, Ms. Vojtko instructed mother to call
the ENT doctor to find where the referral for OOCP’s hearing test had been sent, so that mother
could schedule OOCP’s hearing test. Ms. Vojtko also testified that rather than taking the initiative,
mother redirected the task to Ms. Vojtko. Mother also points to Ms. Vojtko’s testimony that on
July 27, 2021, mother informed her that the ENT doctor’s office would not schedule the hearing
test and that mother did not understand why. Ms. Vojtko further testified that when she called the
ENT doctor, she learned that a referral simply needed to be resent for the hearing test to an
audiology facility. Ms. Vojtko noted while giving her testimony that mother still had not scheduled
the hearing test despite OOCP’s ENT doctor having recommended the hearing test several months
prior and that she provided mother with multiple reminders.

        Clearly, Ms. Vojtko’s testimony related to discussions with mother on June 30 and July 27
that post-dated the initial June 3 appointment that was canceled due to mother’s neglect to schedule
it promptly. More significantly, Ms. Vojtko’s testimony reveals mother’s incapability of handling
simple tasks and that mother instead significantly relied on her caseworkers to help her overcome
even the smallest barriers to managing OOCP’s treatment plan. The record also demonstrates this
point. On June 30, 2021, Ms. Vojtko met with mother to assist her with calendaring and scheduling
OOCP’s upcoming medical appointments. Mother did not have OOCP’s upcoming appointments

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written down in her calendar, nor did she have the contact information for OOCP’s providers.
Instead, she relied on Ms. Vojtko for this information. According to Ms. Vojtko, she assisted
mother with calling OOCP’s physicians but “[w]hen it was necessary to leave voicemails for the
doctors, [she] encouraged [mother] to speak during the voicemails, but [mother] declined to speak
and asked [her] to leave the voicemails instead.” At this meeting, Ms. Vojtko also tasked mother
with following up with the ENT and Kellogg Eye Center. However, on July 6, 2021, mother
informed Ms. Vojtko that she still did not follow up with the ENT doctor or the Kellogg Eye
Center. Mother struggled with communicating with OOCP’s providers when scheduling his
appointments and hardly took the initiative to complete these tasks on her own.

        The record further shows that mother even struggled with managing and keeping track of
the appointments she had scheduled herself. For instance, following several complaints from the
foster mother that mother was not ensuring the proper nutrition for OOCP during parenting time
visits, mother made an appointment with a nutritionist. Upon arrival, however, the office staff
informed mother that she had canceled the appointment, presumably by accidentally canceling it
when mother received the appointment reminder notification. The office staff also informed
mother that she had scheduled the appointment under her own name, and not OOCP’s, and so the
doctor’s office did not even have OOCP’s medical history or any other information necessary for
the doctor to assist mother on a nutrition plan for OOCP. The record further shows that on July
29, 2021, mother asked Ms. Vojtko if OOCP had any upcoming appointments, although it was
mother’s responsibility to manage and track OOCP’s medical appointments. Not only did Ms.
Vojtko have to remind mother of OOCP’s upcoming appointments, which mother scheduled
herself, but also that OOCP had ongoing weekly physical and occupational therapy appointments.
Moreover, when Ms. Vojtko requested to review mother’s calendar to ensure that she had written
down all the appointments, mother avoided the requests.

        Based on these findings, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding that there was no
reasonable likelihood that mother’s barriers to reunification would be rectified within a reasonable
time, and, therefore, termination was proper under MCL 712.A19b(3)(c)(i). The trial court
properly found that mother had not demonstrated the ability to properly care for OOCP’s unique
and extensive medical needs, as the record proves that mother failed to educate herself about her
son’s condition and establish that she was capable of managing his treatment plan. Mother missed
ample opportunities to rectify the barriers that led to adjudication and was in no better of a position
to care for her son by the time of the termination hearing than she was when OOCP was initially
removed from her care more than three years prior. See In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272;
779 NW2d 286 (2009) (concluding the trial court did not clearly err when it terminated the
mother’s rights under (c)(i) because “the totality of the evidence amply supports that she had not
accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions existing by the time of the adjudication”).

        And, for these same reasons, we also find that the trial court did not err by finding that
termination was proper under MCL 712.A19b(3)(j), as there was a reasonable likelihood that,
based on mother’s medical neglect, OOCP would be harmed if he was returned to mother’s care.
The trial court properly found that with regard to OOCP’s medical care, despite having attended
more of his medical appointments, mother either did not care or did not comprehend the
seriousness of his condition and his need for prompt medical care. OOCP’s medical condition
distinguishes him from the average healthy child. Because of his condition, he required extensive
and frequent medical care, and even the slightest inattention to his care could result in significant

                                                 -6-
consequences. The evidence confirmed that mother did not have the capacity to attend to his
medical needs, and her lack of medical knowledge of her son’s condition posed a significant risk
to OOCP’s health and whether he would receive consistent treatment. Mother also failed to
manage even the simplest tasks, such as tracking and scheduling his appointments, and she
struggled to overcome barriers as small as calling the physician’s office to request a new referral.
In consideration of OOCP’s unique and serious medical condition, we hold that the trial court did
not err by finding that OOCP would likely be harmed if he was returned to mother’s care. We are
not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re LaFrance Minors,
306 Mich App 713, 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014).

         We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that statutory grounds to terminate
mother’s parental rights under MCL 712.A19b(3)(c)(i) and (j) was proven by clear and convincing
evidence. As only one statutory ground is required to terminate mother’s parental rights, it is
unnecessary to address whether the trial court properly found statutory grounds for termination
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii). See In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 244; 824 NW2d 569 (2012)
(“It is only necessary for the DHS to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of
one statutory ground to support the order for termination of parental rights.”). Moreover, as the
Supreme Court only instructed us to review and address the trial court’s decision finding statutory
grounds to terminate parental rights, we are not required to consider mother’s remaining
arguments, including her challenge to the trial court’s decision that termination was in OOCP’s
best interests.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                             /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                             /s/ James Robert Redford

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