Court Opinion

ID: 9417924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:44:03.554921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:52.762830
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Brewer,
with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Peckham concurred, dissenting.
I am unable to concur in the opinion and judgment in this .case, and deem .the matter of sufficient importance to justify an expression of my reasons therefor.
It is well to understand exactly the facts of the case. Sections 30 and 35 of the Laws of New York, 1897, chap. 418, are quoted in the opinion of the court. By the first a lien is given on a seagoing or oceanbound vessel, if the amount of the debt is $50 or upwards, and on any other vessel if $15 or upwards. And among other things the lien is for work done or material or other articles furnished for the building or repairing of such vessel. By the second the lien, if founded upon a maritime contract, can be enforced only in the United States courts; if not founded upon such a contract, by proceedings in the state courts, in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure.
The canalboat, upon which the lien was claimed, was not a seagoing or oceanbound vessél, but engaged in carrying merchandise between Buffalo and other ports within the limits of the State of New York. The statements in two affidavits, *39one of the plaintiff, and the other the defendant, (the plaintiff- . being the owner of the claim and the defendant the owner of the boat,) were, by stipulation between the parties, agreed upon as the facts in the case. No question was made of the justice of the claim or the liability of the owner of the boat therefor. The work consisted in “ permanent repairs upon the boat,” in this that “a part of one side of said boat was taken out and her cheek, plank removed and the side' of the boat and the cheek plank were rebuilt into said boat.” The work was done upon dry docks belonging'to the plaintiff in the village of Middleport, a village located on the Erie Canal. The boat at the time was on a trip from New York to Buffalo. The value of these permanent repairs was $154.40, and the boat when thus repaired, sold for only $155. Further, according to the bill of particulars, 727 feet of lumber, 47 bolts, 165 pounds of spikes and 265 pounds of iron, as well as 334 hours of labor, which, at 10 hours a day, amounted to over 33 days, were used ; in the work. The size .of the canalboat is not given, but from this statement as to the .amount and value of the work it is evident that, the repairs might well be considered a rebuilding of the boat. Be that as it may, the contract.was made on land, to be performed on land, and was in fact performed, on land. The plaintiff was a canalboat builder, having dry docks and yards at the village of Middleport, and on these dry docks the work was done.
Was this a maritime contract? A contract for building a ship or supplying materials for her construction is not a maritime contract. People’s Ferry Co. of Boston v. Beers, 20 How. 393; Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129. In the former of these cases the court said (p, 402): “So far from th§ contract being purely maritime, and touching rights and duties appertaining to navigation (On the ocean or elsewhere), it was a contract made on land, to be performed on land.”
So in Sheppard v. Steele, 43 N. Y. 52, 56 :
“The claim here, is for labor upon the hull of a vessel, while in the. process of construction, before launching, while yet on *40the land. This is not a' maritime contract. It is one relating to a subject on the land, and it is to be performed on the land. The admiralty courts have no jurisdiction'for its enforcement. Foster v. The Richard Busteed, 100 Mass. 409.”
That a dry dock is'to be considered as land in the maritime law seems to be clear from the decision of this court in Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Company, 119 U. S. 625, in which it was held that a dry dock was not a subject of salvage service, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court, saying (p. 627): “ A fixed structure, such as this dry dock is, not used for the purpose of navigation, is not a subject of salvage service, any more than is a wharf or a warehouse when projecting into or upon the water.” The dry dock referred to. in this case was a floating dock fastened by chains to the bank of the Mississippi River. Whether the dock in this case was likewise fastened by chains or a structure permanently attached to the land does .not appear. Certainly it cannot be presumed, for the purpose of reversing the judgments of the state courts, that it was not permanently attached to and as much a part of the land as a bridge or a wharf.
In this connection reference may be had to Bradley v. Bolles, Abbott’s Admiralty Reports, 569, in which it was held by Judge Betts that work done upon a vessel in a dry dock in. scraping her bottom preparatory to -coppering her is not of a maritime character, and that compensation for such labor cannot be recovered in a court of admiralty. .Judge Betts' says in his opinion that the court had repeatedly held that contracts of that description do not constitute a lien upon vessels, which can be enforced in admiralty. In Boon v. The Hornet, Crabbe, 426, a canalboat was hauled on shore on the bank of a river where the tide ebbed and flowed, and there repaired. It was held that, although the law of.the State gave á lien, the admiralty court would not take cognizance of such a claim.
So .also where damage is done wholly upon, the land admiralty will not take jurisdiction, although the causé of the *41damage originated on waters subject to its jurisdiction. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20; Ex parte Phenix Insurance Company, 118 U. S. 610; Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Company, 119 U. S. 388. Two of these were cases in which fire original- • ing on a vessel communicated to property on land, and the owner of the property attempted to recoyer in the admiralty courts, but their jurisdiction was denied. The other was where a vessel,-while being towed in the Chicago River, struck and damaged a building on .the land. For this damage an action was maintained in the state court and the jurisdiction of that court upheld. It would seem to follow from these cases that a contract made on land, to be performed on land, and in fact performed on land, is not subject to admiralty jurisdiction.1 And, likewise, that a tort resulting in injury to something on "the land is also not subject to admiralty jurisdiction, although the tort was on waters subject to such jurisdiction. It is true many cases may be found in which it is stated generally that admiralty has jurisdiction, of claims for repairs upon vessels, but evidently that contemplates repairs made while the vessel is in the water.
In this connection I notice a statement in the opinion of the court, that “for incidental repairs made on land to articles • of a ship's furniture or machinery it has never been supposed , that a court of admiralty had jurisdiction.” But if an engine be taken out of a steam tug and repaired on land, and a court of admiralty has no jurisdiction of the claim for such repairs, has it any more claim when the hull of a canalboat is brought ’ on to the land and the side of it replaced? In each case the contract is one performed on the land, and although having ultimate relation to navigation on the water it is not of itself directly connected'with navigation.
Further, no objection can of course be made to the New York statutes. Section 30 gives a lien, and no one questions the power of. a State to provide for such a lien to be enforced in some court. Section 35 provides that if. the lien is founded on a maritime contract it is enforcible only in the courts of the *42United. States. Surely that, is as far as the most strenuous advocates of an extended admiralty- jurisdiction can claim, and it is only in those cases, as the section provides, where the lien is not founded upon a maritime contract, that the state courts may exercise jurisdiction. The state courts of New York, from the trial through the Supreme to the Court of Appeals, have all held that this lién was not founded upon maritime contract. Upon what just ground can this court .disturb this'finding? If it be a pure question of fact, we have often held that we are bound by the action of the state courts.. If it is one partly of fact and partly of law, then surely we ought not, except in the clearest case, to reverse those courts.
• Still again, it has been repeatedly declared by this court, following the statute, that a claim cognizable in admiralty can be enforced in the state courts by common law remedies. Now, whatever may be the nature of the contract, (the foundation of the lien in this instance,) the only provision in section 35 is that it can be enforced in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure.
Turning to the Code of Civil Procedure, we find in Title IV of chapter 23 the provisions for the enforcement of liens on vessels. These provisions are, first, the lienor is to make a written application to a justice of the Supreme Court for a warrant to enfdtce the lien and to collect the amount thereof, which application must state substantially the same facts as in an ordinary pleading to enforce a mechanic’s lien on buildings. Section 3420. Upon the filing of' such application the justice is directed to issue a warrant for the seizure of the vessel, and at the same time to grant an order to show cause why the vessel should not be sold to satisfy the lien. A copy of the order and the application for the warrant must be served personally upon the máster or other person in charge of the vessel, “'and personally upon the owner and consignee of such vessel if a resident of the State, or if not a resident of the State, by mail addressed to such owner or consignee at his last known place of residence, within ten days after the *43execution of such warrant.” Sections 3422 and 3423. By section 3424, the applicant is also required to give notice in some paper published in the county where the vessel was seized, “stating the issuance of the warrant, the date thereof, the; amount of the claim specified therein, the name of the applicant, and the time and place of. the return of the order to show cause.” By section 3425, the ownér or consignee, or any other person interested, may appear and- contest the claim of the lienor. Subsequent provisions authorize an appeal, as in other civil cases. The record shows that the proceedings had were substantially in accordance • with these provisions. The application’ called a petition, was filed, setting forth all the facts required, including the name of the owner. An order of sale and an order to show cause were both issued, and the owner appeared in response to such notice. It is true there is in the record no proof of service upon the owner, but the fact of her appearance to contest the application is shown. It is" also true that she did not after her appearance contest the amount of the claim, but-contented herself with challenging the jurisdiction of the court. But such action on her part does not obviate the fact that the proceedings on behalf of the petitioner were substantially those to collect a civil debt by attachment against the property of the defendant. In this’ connection reference may be had to The Hine v. Trevor, 4. Wall. 555, in which an Iowa statute was held unconstitutional, but, as said by Mr.' Justice Miller, speaking for the court, on page 571, describing the. remedy provided for by that statute:
“The remedy pursued in the Iowa courts, in the case before us, is in no sense a common law remedy. Jt is a remedy par-talcing of all the essential features of an admiralty proceeding in rem. The statute provides that the vessel may.be sued and made defendant without any proceeding against the owners, or even mentioning their names. That a writ may be issued and 'the vessel seized, on filing a petition similar in substance to a libel'. That after a notice in the nature of a monition. *44the vessel may be condemned and an ordeyrjnade for her sale, if the liability is established for which she' was sued.- Such is the general character of the steamboat laws of the Western States.”
But in the very same case it was also said by the learned justice:
“While the proceeding differs, thus from a common law remedy, it is also essentially different from what are in the West called suits by attachment, and in some of the older States foreign attachments. In these cases there is a suit against a personal defendant by name, and because of inability to serve process on him on account of non-residence, or for some other reason mentioned in the various statutes allowing attachments to issue, the suit is commenced by a writ directing the proper' officer to attach sufficient property of the defendant to answer any judgment which may be rendered against him. This proceeding may be had against an owner or part owner of a vessel, and his interest thus subjected to sale in a. common law court of the State.
“Such actions may, also, be maintained in personam against a defendant in the common law courts, as the common law gives; all .in consistence with the grant of admiralty powers in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act.”
So in the case at bar, we have a proceeding.authorized.by the statute in which the owner is named, and notice required to be served on him, and notice in fact served, an appearance of the defendant and an opportunity to try the merits of the claim, as in any other civil action.
That a State has. full control over the practice and procedure to be pursued in its courts has been often adjudged. Thus in Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 31, it was said by Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court:
; “We might gd still further, and. say, with undoubted truth, that there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees fit for all or any part of its territory.”.
*45Again, in Ex parte Regget 114 U. S. 642, 651, Mr. Justice Harlan used these words:
“That Commonwealth [Pennsylvania] has the right to establish the forms of pleadings and process to be observed in her own courts, in both civil and criminal cases, subject only to those provisions of the Constitution of the United States involving the protection of life, liberty and property in all the States of the Union.”
So Mr. Justice White, speaking for the court, in Iowa Central Railway Company v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389, 393, declared:
“But it is clear, that the Fourteenth Amendment in no way undertakes' to control the power of a State to determine by what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obligations be enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted for these purposes gives reasonable notice and affords fair opportunity to be heard belore the issues are decided.”
See, also, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Company, 169 U. S. 557, 570; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172; League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156, 158.
But it is said that while this is generally true there is this limitation, that the State cannot, as to claims against vessel's, adopt the procedure now obtaining in admiralty cases, or, without actual notice to the owner, seize and sell a vessel in satisfaction of a lien. Of course, it is not necessary to determine that question, because, as I have stated, there was notice to the owner and an appearance by her, and such proceeding was authorized by the statute. But even if it was not so authorized, and was simply a direct proceeding to enforce a lien upon the vessel and sell it in satisfaction thereof, I insist that the state courts may entertain jurisdiction. It was held in Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, that a State may provide by statute that the title to real estate within.its limits shall be settled and determined by a suit in which the defendant, being a non-resident, is only brought into court by publication. The question was discussed at length, the authorities *46reviewed, and the conclusion reached that the State had such jurisdiction over real estate within its limits that it could determine the title without the personal presence of the owner. But has the State any less jurisdiction over personalty situated within its borders than it has over real estate? Upon what theory" of státe power can it be held that a State may divest a non-resident, of his title to real estate and not a nonresident of his title to personal property? . There seems to • be á contention that there is a peculiar sanctity in the form of admiralty proceedings which excludes the States from resort to them,"* but the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts does not depend on the form of the procedure. Congress may if it see fit change entirely that procedure. As said by Chief Justice Taney in The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, 460:
“The Constitution declares that the judicial power of the United States shall extend io 'all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.’ But it does not direct that the court shall proceed according to ancient and established forms, or shall adopt any other form or mode of practice. The grant 'defines the subjects to .which the jurisdiction may be expended by Congress. But the extent of the power as well as the mode of proceeding in which that jurisdiction is to be exercised, like the power and practice in all the other courts of the United States, are subject to the regulation of Congress, except where that power is limited by the terms of the Constitution or by necessary implication from its language. In admiralty and maritime cases there is'no such limitation as to the mode of proceeding, and Congress may therefore in cases of that description give either party right of trial by jury, or modify the practice of the court in any other respect that it deems more conducive to the administration of justice.”
Suppose Congress should exercise this power and substitute for the procedure in admiralty courts the common law practice, and make it the only method of procedure therein. What would become of the argument that the State cannot resort to the procedure obtaining in admiralty courts for enforcing *47the rights of claimants? Must it then desist from common law remedies because they have been adopted in admiralty and go back to that form of procedure now obtaining in the admiralty courts? Can it be that the power of a State to vest jurisdiction in one of its- courts depends upon the form of procedure which it adopts?
Why should we be so anxious to drive parties having small claims away from their local courts to courts not infrequently held at a great distance? Why should we be so anxious to force litigants into a court where there is no constitutional right to a trial by jury ? I for one believe that the right of trial by jury is not to be taken away from a claimant unless it be a case coming clearly within the well-established limits of equity and admiralty cases. I do not like to see these provisions which have so long been the boast of our Anglo-Saxon system of procedure frittered away by either legislative or judicial action.
Furtherit seems a great hardship that a party who has been brought into a court of general jurisdiction, with full opportunity to litigate the claim of the plaintiff, and has carried the case through all the courts of the State without ever disputing its validity, should now obtain a reversal of the entire proceedings when such reversal may' operate to prevent the collection of the- debt. By section 33 of chapter 418, heretofore referred to, the lien expires at the expiration of twelve months from the time the debt was contracted. Of course, the lien is now gone. - The canalboat has’very likely disappeared and the owner may be entirely irresponsible.
Even if these objections to the opinion and judgment of the court are wholly without foundation, there is still another, broader and deeper. I do not believe that'under the true interpretation of the Constitution the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts extends to contracts for the repairs of vessels engaged wholly in commerce within a State. I recognize the fact that this court has decided in a series of cases, commencing with The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, that *48the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts is not limited by tide waters, as admiralty jurisdiction was understood to be limited both in Great Britain and in this country .at the time the Constitution was framed, but extends to all navigable waters of the United States, and I have no disposition to question the correctness of those decisions, or in any way limit their scope. But what is admiralty? It is the. law, not of the water, but of the seas.
As said in Edwards on Admiralty Jurisdiction, p. 29:
“But its jurisdiction may be said to rest generally on the following considerations: First, the nature? of the property to be adjudicated upon; secondly, the question to be decided; thirdly, the origin of the cause; and fourthly, the locality; and these must .be of the sea to give the admiralty a jurisdiction.”
So also in Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, 553, is this declaration of this court:
“Maritime contracts are such as relate to commerce and navigation, and unless a contract to build a ship is to be regarded as a maritime contract, it will hardly be contended that a contract to furnish the materials to be used in accomplishing that object can fall within that category, as the latter is more strictly a contract made on land, and to be performed on land, than the former, and is eertainly one stage further' removed from any immediate and .direct relation to commerce and navigation.”
It grew up out of the fact that the ocean is not the territorial property.of any nation, but the common property of all; that vessels engaged in commerce between the different nations ought, so far as possible,,to be subject to a uniform law, and not annoyed by the conflicting local laws and customs of the several nations which they visit. I do. not mean that the several maritime nations did not establish different rules, or that there is not some dissimilarity in their maritime laws, for as long as each nation is the master of its own territory it may legislate as it sees fit in reference to-maritime matters coming within its jurisdiction, and yet this does not abridge the fact *49that admiralty grew up out of the thought of having a common law of the seas. It was well said by Mr. Justice Bradley in The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 572:
“Perhaps the maritime law is more uniformly followed by commercial nations than the civil and common laws are by those who use them. But, like those laws, however fixed, definite and beneficial the theoretical code of maritime law may be, it can have only so far the effect of law in any country as it is permitted to have. But the actual maritime law can hardly be said to have a fixed and definite form as to all the subjects which may be embraced within its scope. Whilst it is true that the great mass of maritime law is the same in all commercial countries, yet, in each country, peculiarities exist either as to some of the rules or in the mode of enforcing them. Especially is'this the case on the outside boundaries of the law, where it comes in contact with or shades off into the local or municipal law of the particular country and affects- only .its own merchants or people in their relations to'each other. Whereas, in matters affecting the stranger or foreigner, the commonly received law of the whole commercial world is more assiduously observed — as, in justice, it should be. No one doubts that every nation may adopt its own maritime code. France may adopt one, England another-, the United States a third; still, the.convenience of the commercial world, bound together, as it is, by mutual relations of trade and intercourse, demands that, in all essential things wherein thos'e relations bring them in contact, there should be a uniform law founded on natural reason and justice. Hence the adoption by all commercial nations (our own included) of the general maritime law as the basis and groundwork of all their maritime regulations. . . . Each State adopts the maritime law, not as a code having any independent or inherent force, pro-prio vigore, but as its own law, with such modifications and qualifications as it sees fit. Thus adopted and thus qualified in each case, it becomes the maritime la\v of the particular nation that adopts it. And without such voluntary adoption *50it would not be law. And thus it happens that from the general practice of commercial nations in making the same general law the basis and groundwork of their respective maritime systems, the great mass of maritime law which is thus received by these nations in common comes to be the common maritime law of the world.”
In the opinion of Chief Justice Taney, in The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, in which this court for the first time held that, the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts extended above tide water, the argument is thus stated (p. 454):
“In England, undoubtedly, the writers upon the subject, and the decisions in its courts of admiralty, always speak of the jurisdiction as confined to tide water. And this definition in England was a sound and' reasonable one, because there was no navigable stream in the country beyond the ebb and flow of the tide; nor any place where a port could be established to carry on trade with a foreign nation, and where vessels could enter or depart with cargoes. In England, therefore, tide water and navigable water are synonymous terms, and tide water, with a few small and unimportant exceptions, meant nothing more than public rivers, as contradistinguished from private ones; and they took the ebb and flow of the tide as the test, because it was a convenient one, and more easily determined the character of the river. Hence the established doctrine in England, that the admiralty jurisdiction is confined to the ebb and flow of the tide. In other words, it is confined to public navigable waters..
“At the time the Constitution of the United States was adopted, and our courts of admiralty went into operation, the definition which had been adopted in England was equally proper here. In the old thirteen States, the far greater part of the navigable waters are tide waters. And in the States which were at that period in any degree commercial, and where courts of admiralty were called on to exercise their' jurisdiction, every public river was tide water to the head of navigation. And, indeed, until the discovery of steamboats, *51there could he nothing like foreign commerce upon waters with an unchanging current resisting the upward passage. The courts of the United States, therefore, naturally adopted the English' mode of defining a public river, and consequently the boundary of admiralty jurisdiction. It measured it by tide water. . And - that definition having found its way into our courts, became, after a time, the familiar mode of describing a public river, and was repeated, as cases occurred, without particularly examining whether it was as universally applicable in this country as it was in England.”
Again, as said by this court, in The Propeller Commerce, 1 Black, 574, 579:
“All such waters are, in. truth, but arms of the sea, and are as much'within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States as the sea itself.”
Such being the general nature of admiralty, and the jurisdiction of its courts being understood, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, to relate to the ocean and the arms thereof, with the view of uniformity in respect to international commerce, what was granted to the general government when to its courts was given exclusive jurisdiction over “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction?” Did it mean that the judicial power of the United States should extend to com troversies respecting contracts and torts concerning every vessel upon all the waters of the several States? It is not pretended that it did. Take an inland lake, wholly within the limits of the territory of a State and having no connection with the ocean. ■ The admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts does not extend to contracts or collisions in respect to or upon such waters. The Montello, 11 Wall. 411. But why should the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts not extend to landlocked waters wholly within the limits of a State when it does extend to waters having connection with the ocean? Clearly, as shown by the quotation from Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in The Genesee Chief, because since the use of steam, foreign commerce may extend into such *52waters, and therefore, the full exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction which concerns the law of the sea requires that that jurisdiction should be co-extensive with waters which may be traversed by oceangoing vessels. It matters not whether such waters are natural or artificial highways, canals or rivers. If they, open to the ocean or are. connected with the ocean they become, or may become, the highways of ocean commerce, and therefore in order that the admiralty jurisdiction may be fully exercised it was held, and rightfully, in The Genesee Chief, -that it extends to all navigable waters of the United States. Take the case of a landlocked lake, within the limits of New York. Unquestionably the State has full jurisdiction ovér its waters and the vessels traversing them. The admiralty courts of the United States would not assume any jurisdiction. Can it be that if the State of New York constructs a canal by which the waters of that lake are connected with the ocean, it is deprived of its full jurisdiction over those waters and the vessels traversing them? Doubtless to a certain extent and for the purpose of fully effectuating the admiralty jurisdiction of the nation the Federal courts in admiralty would have a. certain jurisdiction. Take the case of The Diana, Lush. 539, in which Dr. Lushington assumed jurisdiction ov§r a collision between two British vessels in the Great North Holland Canal. Can it for a moment be supposed that the English admiralty courts would take jurisdiction of a claim for repairs made on a Dutch canalboat in such canal; or, to bring the case nearer home, would the British admiralty courts take jurisdiction of the claim of this plaintiff. for the work done upon the defendant’s canalboat? Or would the admiralty courts of the United States take jurisdiction of a like action brought for repairs done to a canalboat on the canal between Liverpool and Manchester? Clearly these matters are of local significance, and of local significance aloné.
If. it be said that the State of New York in the case cited would, notwithstanding the construction of a canal between *53the hitherto landlocked lake and the ocean, still retain jurisdiction to enforce claims for repairs, but only by proceedings according to the course of the common law, I reply that, while it remained still a landlockéd lake with no connection with the ocean, the State of New York, having fy.ll jurisdiction, could, as we have seen, resort to any proceeding it saw fit for the enforcement of claims for repairs. It has full control over •its own procedure and may change and alter it as it sees fit.
Can it be that, having such power before the waters are connected with the ocean, it loses that power by the act of connecting the waters with the ocean, and is deprived of its hitherto unquestioned control over the remedies it chooses to provide?
But it is said that given the fact that the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts extends to all navigable waters of the United States, and that such jurisdiction is exclusive, it follows that the moment any navigable waters are connected with the ocean the jurisdiction of the Federal courts over those waters becomes exclusive. In this case we touch upon the difference, between contracts and torts. As said in The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 637.
"Principal subjects of admiralty jurisdiction are maritime contracts and maritime torts, including captures jure belli, and seizures on water for municipal and revenue forfeitures.
“(1.) Contracts, claims, or service, purely maritime, and touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation, are cognizable-in the admiralty.
“ (2.) Torts or injuries committed on navigable waters,, of a civil nature, are also cognizable in the. admiralty courts.
“Jurisdiction in the former case depends upon the nature of the contract, but in the latter it depends entirely upon locality.”
We have here no matter of torts; but simply one of contract. The question, therefore, is not one of locality, but one of'the nature of the contract. The contract was for work done, not on an oceangoing vessel or one capable of engaging in foreign *54commerce, or, like a tug, The Glide, 167 U. S. 606, one which can be used directly in assisting foreign commerce, but a canal-boat necessarily used only on inland waters, and in fact only so used. Can this fairly be adjudged a maritime contract? I think not. Wilson v. Lawrence, 82 N. Y. 409; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532. In addition to the fact that this boat was designed primarily for use upon a canal, to be drawn by animals moving on the land, the place at which the work was done is also worthy of consideration. While the admiralty jurisdiction may extend to canals, yet the United -States have no such exclusive control over canals as over natural, navigable waters. The canal was built by the State, is owned by the State, and it' cannot for one moment be assumed that the national government can, interfere to restrict the State as to the size of the canal, the depth of water, the construction of bridges, or other things in respect to which it has full' control over the natural navigable waters. It seems an anomaly that when the State builds a waterway and owns a waterway, and has a general control over that waterway, it cannot provide as it sees fit- for enforcing claims for work done on vessels navigating such highway when the vessels are of a character which prevents them being used for any foreign commerce.
Recapitulating: I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court because, first, I think the contract, being made on land, for work to be done on land, and in fact done upon the land, is not a maritime contract, and therefore cannot be a subject of admiralty jurisdiction. Second, the proceeding, which was instituted was authorized by the statutes of the State, and in its essential features an.ordinary proceeding according to the course of the common law, which may always be resorted to, even, in respect to contracts which are of strictly a maritime nature. Third, because the grant to-the national government over admiralty and maritime, matters was in furtherance of commerce between this nation and others and designed to secure uniformity in respect thereto, and does not extend to contracts made in respect to vessels which are in*55capacitated from foreign commerce, designed and used exclusively' for mere local traffic within a State.
I am authorized to say that the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Peckham concur 'in this dissent.
Mr. Justice Harlan also dissents.