Court Opinion

ID: 9845937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:31:31.526112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:29.210065
License: Public Domain

HUSKINS, Justice.
The dispositive question on this appeal is whether statements allegedly made to plaintiff by defendant’s agent R. W. Rochelle, were properly admissible into evidence as the admissions of Southern Bell.
In North Carolina there are two grounds upon which the statement of an agent to a third party will be admitted into evidence as the admission of the principal. See generally, 2 Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence, § 169 (Brandis rev. 1973). First, such statement is admissible if it is spoken within the scope of an agent’s authority to speak for his principal. Norburn v. Mackie, 262 N.C. 16, 136 S.E. 2d 279 (1964); Carlton v. Bernhardt-Seagle Co., 210 N.C. 655, 188 S.E. 77 (1936); Russell v. Oil Co., 206 N.C. 341, 174 S.E. 101 (1934). If there is competent evidence that an agent is authorized to speak on behalf of his employer, then statements he makes to third parties within the scope of his authority and in the course of his agency are admissible in evidence as the admissions of the principal. 2 Stansbury, supra, § 169 at 12-15. Any intimations to the contrary in Pangle v. Appalachian Hall, 190 N.C. 833, 131 S.E. 42 (1925); McEntyre v. Cotton Mills, 132 N.C. 598, 44 S.E. 109 (1903); Summerrow v. Baruch, 128 N.C. 202, 38 S.E. 861 (1901), and Williams v. Telephone Co., 116 N.C. 558, 21 S.E. 298 (1895), are expressly rejected.
Second, if there is no competent evidence that an agent has authority to speak for his principal, then his statement to third parties will be received as an admission of his principal only if the statement relates to an act "presently being done by him within the scope of his agency or employment.” Hubbard v. R.R., 203 N.C. 675, 166 S.E. 802 (1932) (emphasis added). Accord, 2 Stansbury, supra, § 169, and cases cited therein. If the statement made is “merely narrative of a past occurrence,” it is not part of *68the res gestae but only hearsay and is not competent as against the principal. Hubbard v. R.R., supra. “Authority to do an act on the principal’s behalf does not ordinarily carry with it an implied authority to talk about it afterwards.” 2 Stansbury, supra, § 169 at 16.
Application of the above principles to the facts in this case leads us to conclude that the statements allegedly made to plaintiff by defendant’s agent, R. W. Rochelle, were erroneously admitted into evidence.
Plaintiff testified that he called Southern Bell immediately after his injury. He spoke to an operator and said: “ ‘Operator, I guess this is an emergency. I have been injured by what used to be a phone booth on your property. To whom should I speak?’ And I spoke with a lady .... She said she would have someone down there immediately and that she was sorry about the accident.” Approximately an hour and a half later a Mr. Rochelle, from Southern Bell, came into plaintiff’s shop, which was near the scene of the accident. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Rochelle told him the following:
“I am really sorry about the accident. That this is negligence on our behalf. That someone from the phone company will contact you today and let you know what doctor to go to. I am not versed in the medical aspect of this. I am not sure exactly who our physicians are, but someone will contact you today and tell you exactly what physician to go to there will be no trouble about it. That we will take care of everything for you.”
In order for this statement to be admissible as an admission of Southern Bell, there must be evidence that Mr. Rochelle had the authority to make such statements on behalf of Southern Bell or that such statements related to an act presently being done by Rochelle within the scope of his employment.
There is no evidence in the record establishing Rochelle’s authority to speak on behalf of Southern Bell with respect to the handling of negligence claims. The record shows only that Rochelle was Southern Bell’s service foreman for telephone booth maintenance. Apparently, he supervised the installation, cleaning and removal of telephone booths. Upon being alerted that the an*69chor brackets of a previously removed telephone booth had injured a pedestrian, he came to supervise the removal of the brackets. The mere fact that Mr. Rochelle may have taken it upon himself to make certain statements concerning Southern Bell’s liability is not probative of whether he had authority to make them. “The existence of the agency cannot be proved by the agent’s extrajudicial statements. It must be established aliunde, by the agent’s testimony or otherwise, before his admission will be received against the principal.” 2 Stansbury, supra, § 169 at 19, and cases there cited. See, e.g., Parrish v. Manufacturing Co., 211 N.C. 7, 188 S.E. 817 (1936). In summary, the record on appeal is silent as to whether Mr. Rochelle was Southern Bell’s agent for the purpose of handling negligence claims. Absent such evidence, his extrajudicial statements may not be received into evidence as the admissions of his principal.
Nor does the record indicate that Mr. Rochelle’s alleged statements to plaintiff related to an act “presently being done by him within the scope of his agency or employment.” Hubbard v. R.R., supra (emphasis added). Rather, his statements related to an accident that had occurred an hour and a half earlier. As such, they merely constitute a hearsay “narrative of a past occurrence,” which is not competent as against Southern Bell.
The erroneous admission of Rochelle’s extrajudicial statements to plaintiff constitutes prejudicial error. Other assignments are not discussed since they are not likely to recur upon retrial.
For the reasons stated the decision of the Court of Appeals as it relates to Southern Bell is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to New Hanover Superior Court for retrial as to both defendants.
Reversed and remanded.