Court Opinion

ID: 9578075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:41:13.144901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:34.894276
License: Public Domain

*719Eggleston and Spbatley, JJ.,
dissenting.
As we understand it, the majority opinion holds that the accused is entitled to a new trial because the lower court refused to quash the writ of venire facias after it had learned that A. P. Echols, one of the prospective jurors, had discussed with certain of those accepted as jurors the fact that some years previous the accused had been convicted of stealing Echols ’ automobile. Because of the incident Echols was excused as a juror, but the other members of the panel with whom he had discussed the matter were accepted as qualified jurors.
However improper Echols’ conduct may have been, it does not, in our opinion, require the granting of a new trial.
It is, of course, well settled that the communication by a juror to his associates of evidence within his personal knowledge and not adduced in open court may require the granting of a new trial in a criminal case. But it is equally well settled that to require a new trial on this ground the statements made by the juror must be material to the issue before the jury and must result in prejudice to the accused or be of such nature as prejudice therefrom will be presumed. 39 Am. Jur., New Trial, sec. 70, p. 84 ff; 23 C. J. S., Criminal Law, sec. 1449-j, p. 1197 ff.
In Litz v. Harman, 151 Va. 363, 144 S. E. 477, cited in the majority opinion, the juror in effect gave evidence to his associates concerning matters which were material to the issues before the jury. This, we held, warranted the lower court in granting a new trial.
But the situation is quite different in the case now before us. The evidence on behalf of the Commonwealth, fully related in the majority opinion, shows a premeditated and brutal murder. The facts and circumstances of the homicide are not in dispute. The sole defense of the accused is that because of an overdose of insulin he was temporarily insane and does not “remember” anything about the homicide. The issue was not whether the accused committed the homicide, but whether he was insane at the time of its commission.
The incident of the theft by the accused of Echols’ car, which Echols discussed with his associates in the jury room, is in no way related to the issue of the sanity or insanity of the accused. As Echols said, several of the jurors knew about the incident and discussed it, but regarded it “as unimportant.”
*720The theft of the car was trivial in comparison with the coldblooded way in which the accused planned to take the life of the deceased and the brutal manner in. which the killing was done. In our opinion there is not the slightest probability that this discussion of the previous offense of the accused influenced the jury in finding him guilty and imposing upon him the maximum penalty.
We would affirm the judgment.