Court Opinion

ID: 9599566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:19:42.394718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:40.390216
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE HODGES
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. By declaring the subject portion of 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-9-113(2)(c) unconstitutional, the majority of this court has, in my judgment,- taken *448away a portion of the legislative prerogative to define and render illegal certain offensive conduct. This is accomplished by what I would describe as a strained and overly technical interpretation of said provision of law which makes it a class I petty offense for a person to loiter in a public place for the purpose of engaging or soliciting another person to engage in deviate sexual intercourse.
The majority opinion declares that this statute makes status alone punishable as a criminal offense and therefore under the authority of Arnold v. City and County of Denver, 171 Colo. 1, 464 P.2d 515 (1970) and Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colorado 1969), the statute is unconstitutional. In Arnold, the vagrancy ordinance of the City and County of Denver was declared unconstitutional because it made the status of being a vagrant a crime. In Goldman, the Colorado vagrancy statute was declared unconstitutional for the same reason; however, it was recognized therein that conceivably loitering on public property when coupled with some other offensive activity, such as preparation to commit a criminal offense or interference with the activities of others, would be within the scope of legislative prohibition. In Goldman, because the Colorado statute on vagrancy did not require that the loitering be associated with any other such conduct, it was held to be constitutionally invalid as not satisfying due process and equal protection requirements.
It appears obvious that the main legislative intent behind this enactment was to punish the overt act of solicitation while loitering in a public place. All reasonable intentments must be indulged to support the constitutionality of legislative acts. People v. Trujillo, 178 Colo. 147, 497 P.2d 1 (1972). In applying this general rule of statute interpretation, it must be presumed that the legislature in adopting this law intended to define and render unlawful certain specific conduct, and on the other hand, did not intend to pass an unconstitutional act which punished status or what may be the subject of a person’s thoughts when he loiters in a public place. Both the Arnold and Goldman decisions had been *449announced many months prior to 1971 when the subject statute was enacted, and on this basis, it must also be presumed that the legislature intended at this point in time to pass a law which did not suffer from the same constitutional infirmities found in the vagrancy laws struck down in Arnold and Goldman, Therefore, in my view, the statute in question must be interpreted to require as an element of proof the overt act of solicitation. This is a reasonable interpretation because it is clear that the thrust of the statute is against such acts of solicitation.
Furthermore, in my view, this statute does not suffer from the vagueness which would render it unconstitutional as argued by the defendant. This provision of law is reasonably certain in its terms. Its language is clear and it definitely sets forth the exact and limited conduct which it proscribes. A prohibitory statute must be clear, definite, and certain so that an average person who may be subject to its provisions will be able to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a punishment for particular acts or courses of conduct. Junglen v. Board of Review, 184 Colo. 59, 518 P.2d 826, and Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). All that is constitutionally required of a statute when testing it on the vagueness issue is that it conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. People v. Cardwell, 181 Colo. 421, 510 P.2d 317 (1973). The legislative enactment we are concerned with here fully meets the tests for constitutionality as defined above because a reasonable reading of the statute conveys the warning that this act of solicitation in a public place is a crime. It is recognized that the vagueness issue is not discussed in the majority opinion.
The majority opinion also suggests that this provision of law may be inconsistent with 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1973, 40-2-301 which provides that a person is guilty of criminal solicitation if he commands, induces, entreats, or otherwise attempts to persuade another person to commit a felony. Since the legislature has now repealed statutes making *450it unlawful to engage in consentual deviate sexual intercourse, it is stated that the statute we are now concerned with is inconsistent with 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-2-301, and therefore impliedly was not an offense which the legislature would want to deal with. Certainly, it is within the legislative prerogative to make it a crime to do something in public which may be perfectly legal if done in private.
I would declare that the subject portion of 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-9-113(2)(c) is constitutional, and would therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PRINGLE and MR. JUSTICE KELLEY have authorized me to state that they join in this dissent.