Court Opinion

ID: 9548505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:04:36.824775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:04.029734
License: Public Domain

HODGES, Vice Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent for the reason Title 59 O.S. 1971 § 1330(b) specifically requires that ten days’ notice be given to a bondsman. A cursory examination shows a definite legislative intent that notice to bondsmen is required. The holding of Russell v. State, 488 P.2d 1205 (Okl.1971), is contraposition to the obvious intent of the statute. I would specifically overrule the Russell case.
Assuming the application of 59 O.S.1971 § 1330(b), I would then declare the trial court’s requirement of a waiver of notice an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial authority. In order for the bondsman to do business in Cleveland County he had no choice but to sign the prescribed court form, which in pertinent part provides:
“The sureties hereto hereby specifically waive actual notice of the hearing or trial settings, and accept constructive notice thereof as reflected by the Orders and Dockets of the Courts.”
I am not unmindful that the constitutional right not to be deprived of property without due process of law may be waived, as other rights may be, by deliberate election.1 However, the intentional relinquishment of a known right may not be procured by coercion or undue influence.
Elementary contractual law requires the consent of the parties be free from undue influence.2 Undue influence consists in the use of one who holds real or apparent authority over the other party for the purpose of obtaining unfair advantage.3 In this instance, undue influence was exerted by virtue of the judicial authority of the district judge forcing a waiver of the right of notice of hearing guaranteed by the statute, the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, and of the United States. Courts may not for their own convenience arbitrarily deprive persons of their statutory and constitutional rights. The provision of adequate notice is not an undue burden on the courts of this state. While judicial efficiency is admirable, it is not to be permitted at the expense of the negation of due process.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice DOOLIN concurs in the views herein expressed.

. 15 O.S.1971 §§ 51, 53.

.Pierce Oil Corp. v. Phoenix Refining Co., 259 U.S. 125, 42 S.Ct. 440, 66 L.Ed. 855 (1922).

. 15 O.S.1971 § 61.