Court Opinion

ID: 9912268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 22:02:01.913778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:22.074385
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/21/23 P. v. Montgomery CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B321606

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BA465944)
           v.

 FRANCESCA MONTGOMERY,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura F. Priver, Judge. Affirmed.
      G. Martin Velez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Appellant Francesca Montgomery appeals from her
conviction for grand theft by embezzlement from her former
employer. The company claimed that appellant, who was
responsible for the payroll, issued checks to herself without
authorization. At trial, appellant testified that her supervisor
had agreed to the payments for overtime and medical insurance
reimbursements.
       On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
failing to sua sponte instruct the jury with civil jury instructions
regarding the legal difference between nonexempt and exempt
employees. She contends that whether appellant was classified
as an exempt employee, and therefore not entitled to overtime,
was a material issue at trial. We find no error and affirm.
                    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       In 2019, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an
information charging appellant with one felony count of grand
theft by embezzlement (Pen. Code, §§ 503, 487, subd. (a).)1 The
jury trial began on May 3, 2022. On May 10, 2022, the jury found
appellant guilty of the charged offense. The jury also found true
the aggravating factor that the crime involved an attempted or
actual taking of great monetary value.
       The court imposed a suspended sentence and placed
appellant on two years formal probation. The court also ordered
appellant to perform 300 hours of community labor and to pay
restitution to the victim. The court found that appellant had no
ability to pay the other court-ordered fines, fees, and costs and
therefore stayed them. Appellant timely appealed.

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.    Prosecution Evidence
      1.     Background
      The Bakewell Company is run by members of the Bakewell
family. The company owns businesses including two newspapers,
the Los Angeles Sentinel (the Sentinel) and Los Angeles Watts
Times; a radio station; and commercial office buildings. Danny
Bakewell, Sr. is chairman and chief operating officer of the
Bakewell Company and publisher of the Sentinel.2 Danny
Bakewell, Jr. is vice president of the Bakewell Company and
executive editor of the Sentinel. Pamela Bakewell is executive
vice president and chief operating officer of the Bakewell
Company. Appellant worked at the Sentinel from 2012 to 2018.
During that time, the Sentinel had fewer than 20 employees.
      2.     Appellant’s employment
      Pamela testified that she managed the human resources
and accounting departments at the Sentinel. She hired appellant
in 2012 as an accounting clerk. Appellant reported to the
controller, Tracy Mitchell. Appellant’s job was to prepare the
checks to be signed for the company’s bills. Pamela testified that
appellant was hired as a nonexempt employee. She explained
that nonexempt employees were paid for working overtime, while
exempt employees were paid a salary but no overtime. She
stated that she was not aware of any instances in which
appellant was asked to work overtime.
      Mitchell also testified that appellant started as a
nonexempt employee entitled to overtime pay, and that appellant

2   We refer to members of the Bakewell family by their first
names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.

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filled out daily time sheets. Mitchell recalled that appellant
sometimes worked overtime between 2012 and 2015. On those
occasions, overtime had to be approved by appellant’s supervisor
and reflected in her time sheet. Mitchell testified that she was
dissatisfied with appellant’s work. Pamela testified that Mitchell
told her the same thing and warned Pamela that she should not
trust appellant.
       When Mitchell left the company in early 2015, Pamela
promoted appellant to a “larger role in managing the accounts
payable process.” Pamela told appellant she would receive a
raise, increasing her salary to $42,000, and would be assuming
more responsibility. Pamela testified that appellant’s new
position as an account specialist was an exempt position; as a
result, appellant was no longer entitled to overtime pay. Pamela
did not recall giving appellant any paperwork to sign in 2015 to
reflect the new job and change in status from nonexempt to
exempt. In her new position, appellant managed accounts
payable and handled payroll. Pamela admitted that between
2015 and 2017, appellant processed her own payroll without
oversight.
       In early 2017, the Bakewells promoted appellant to
executive assistant for the chairman, Danny Sr., when his
longtime assistant left. Appellant received another pay raise and
became responsible for managing Danny Sr.’s desk. Appellant
told Pamela that although she was assuming new duties, she
wanted to continue managing the payroll because she knew how
to do it and it did not take much time. Pamela testified that she
agreed because she trusted appellant. Once again, Pamela did
not give appellant any formal paperwork regarding her new job
or exempt employment classification. Pamela testified that after

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appellant changed positions in 2015, Pamela never agreed to pay
appellant overtime or other payments outside of her salary.
Appellant did receive end-of-year bonuses.
       Danny Jr. also testified that he never authorized appellant
to pay herself overtime after she became an exempt employee in
2015. He read portions of the Sentinel employment manual to
the jury regarding employees being classified as exempt or
nonexempt, and the policy that overtime work required prior
authorization and only nonexempt employees were eligible for
overtime pay. Danny Jr. also explained that he had reached an
agreement with one employee, Nichelle Holliday, regarding
health insurance reimbursement. He had known Holliday and
her family for a long time and knew when she started working at
the Sentinel that she wanted to keep her existing medical
insurance, so he agreed to reimburse her for the monthly cost of
the Sentinel’s health insurance. Danny Jr. stated that he never
agreed to reimburse appellant in this fashion. Pamela also
testified that she had never agreed to give appellant medical
reimbursement.
       In July 2017, Pamela became concerned with appellant’s
performance after she found bills that either were not paid or
were paid to the wrong accounts. Pamela told appellant she
thought handling payroll was becoming too burdensome for her
and that she would find outside help for that task. Appellant
responded that she could handle it and would work harder to
correct her mistakes.
       On September 8, 2017, appellant lost the phone number for
a celebrity who was waiting for a return call from Danny Sr.
According to Pamela, appellant became very flustered and said
she felt like she was having a stroke. Appellant went to her car

                                5
to look for the phone number and never returned to the office.
She texted Pamela and Danny Sr. over the weekend that she had
gone to the hospital and the doctor told her to stay off work for a
week due to stress.
      Pamela found that appellant’s computer was missing from
her office the following Monday. A few days later, appellant’s
cousin, who also worked at the company, took binders from
appellant’s office. At that point, Pamela had not been able to
reach appellant or secure the return of her computer, so she
called the police.
      Appellant ultimately agreed to allow Danny Jr. to retrieve
the computer from her. Afterward, Pamela saw text messages on
the computer from appellant that “indicated that she didn’t think
very much of us and had a problem with us.” Appellant remained
on leave until she was formally terminated in early 2018.
      Danny Sr. testified that while appellant was working as his
executive assistant, it did not appear that she was having any
trouble juggling her responsibilities. Appellant would tell him
that she loved her job. Danny Sr.’s former executive assistant,
Holliday, testified that appellant told her she was stressed about
her workload. Holliday also testified that she was an exempt
employee while employed at the Sentinel and that she did not
receive overtime pay.
      3.     Investigation
      Pamela testified that after appellant left, she hired a
consultant, Carlyne Ervin, to handle payroll. Pamela began to
suspect that “something wasn’t right,” and asked Ervin to do an
audit of the payroll records related to appellant.
      Ervin testified that the Sentinel’s internal controls were
“very sloppy,” with no formal policies or practices and no backup

                                6
documentation. She detailed several instances of “sloppy
bookkeeping” regarding other employees, where some earnings
were improperly coded as regular pay rather than sales
commissions.
       Ervin discussed the legal requirements necessary to
classify an employee as exempt, including a salary threshold and
certain job responsibilities. She testified that the Sentinel’s
policy, as set forth in its employee manual, required nonexempt
employees to turn in a time sheet every pay period and receive
preauthorization for any overtime. Ervin also explained that an
employer cannot legally pay an exempt employee overtime;
however, the employer can provide a merit bonus or a merit
increase in salary to an exempt employee.
       From her review of the Sentinel’s records, Ervin
determined that appellant was classified as a nonexempt
employee until 2015, and then as an exempt employee from 2015
to 2017. Ervin acknowledged that it was the “best practice” to
provide documentation to an employee when changing an
employment classification; she was not aware of any such
documentation for appellant. She confirmed that appellant
received raises in 2015 and January 2017.
       In her audit, Ervin discovered checks appellant had issued
to herself from the Sentinel in addition to her regular salary.
Specifically, Ervin found 42 additional payments to appellant
from 2015 to 2017, labelled in the payroll system as “regular,” but
issued in addition to her usual biweekly salary payment. These
payments totaled over $23,000. Ervin also found 69 payments to
appellant labeled as medical reimbursement during the same
time period, totaling over $16,000. Ervin noted that the amounts
fluctuated month to month, which would not happen with

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medical reimbursement of an employee’s insurance cost. In total,
Ervin found $39,847.60 in additional payments to appellant.
       Pamela testified that she was surprised when Ervin told
her about the payments to appellant. Pamela stated that
appellant never asked her for overtime or additional bonuses
during her employment at the Sentinel.
B.     Defense Evidence
       Appellant testified that she was not told her employment
classification when she was hired in 2012. She handled payroll
for the Sentinel and also payroll and accounts payable for the
company’s other newspaper, the L.A. Watts Times. She also
assisted with a food festival, Taste of Soul, and did various tasks
around the office. After reading the employee manual, she
learned about medical reimbursement and thought she was
“qualified to receive that.” She asked Mitchell in 2014 if she
could have the same arrangement regarding medical
reimbursement as Holliday, but Mitchell refused the request.
However, appellant made the same request to Pamela in 2015
and Pamela agreed.
       When Mitchell left in 2015, appellant assumed many of her
job responsibilities. At that time, no one explained that her
employment status would change to exempt. Starting in 2015,
appellant often worked longer than the usual eight-hour
workday. When Pamela explained her new duties, appellant
asked for additional compensation. According to appellant,
Pamela verbally agreed to give her a $10,000 annual salary
increase and continue to pay appellant for any overtime work at
the overtime rate.
       Appellant stated Pamela did not review or approve the
payroll before appellant submitted it for processing. Because

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appellant was not properly trained, she found the work
challenging and overwhelming. She expressed her frustration to
upper management “all the time.”
       Appellant testified that she was told she would be taking
over the executive assistant position in 2016; no one asked if she
wanted the new position. She was not relieved of any of her prior
responsibilities, instead, her additional responsibilities included
scheduling all of Danny Sr.’s meetings. Appellant did not receive
any documentation explaining that she was an exempt employee.
Once appellant started working for Danny Sr., he was abrasive,
yelled and cursed at her, and behaved “aggressively” when she
made a mistake. She worked very long hours, including working
every weekend.
       Appellant told Danny Sr. and Pamela that she could not
handle all of the responsibilities they had given her. On
September 8, 2017, she started feeling ill and left work after her
doctor told her to go to urgent care. The doctor ordered her to go
on bed rest. Appellant stopped to get her computer from her
office on her way home from the hospital because she had so
much work to do.
       According to appellant, she continued to complete time
sheets “every single pay period,” even after changing to a
purportedly exempt position in 2015. Although she processed the
payroll, appellant testified that she did not understand what was
meant by exempt or nonexempt employees. Instead, appellant
stated that she entered employee payroll data based on what she
was told about whether that employee did or did not submit
timesheets. She acknowledged that she was close friends with
Holliday, saw how much she worked, and saw from processing
her payroll that Holliday was not paid overtime, other than a

                                 9
“few times.” Appellant acknowledged that no one else at the
company had the same arrangement regarding a verbal promise
to be paid overtime for any work over eight hours. She received a
$10,000 raise in 2015, a $4,000 bonus in 2016, and another
$5,000 raise when she started training for the executive assistant
position.
       In a written statement following her interview with the
police, appellant stated that as her work increased, “promises of
more pay was discussed, overtime was not.” She also stated that
she “continued to pay myself overtime without discussing it
further with my boss.” Appellant testified that she did not think
she was doing anything wrong and stated that Pamela could
check the payroll at any time and see what she was doing. She
told the detective that she did not think Pamela would ever check
because Pamela was “not that bright.”
       During cross-examination, appellant acknowledged that as
of 2015 she had worked in payroll for five years, first with two
prior employers and then with the Sentinel. Each company had
exempt and nonexempt employees, and she understood that the
difference related to overtime. Appellant testified that she did
not believe that she was overpaid and believed that she should
have gotten every dollar she was paid. In rebuttal, Pamela
denied asking appellant to stay and work particular hours
outside of her normal working hours. She also denied any
agreement that appellant would receive overtime for any such
hours.
       Defense expert Kathy Johnson, a forensic accountant,
agreed that the Sentinel’s policies were sloppy and lacked review
protocols. She admitted that she saw neither time sheets for

                               10
appellant from 2015 to 2017 nor written documentation that
appellant was entitled to overtime or medical reimbursement.
                              DISCUSSION
       Appellant contends that the trial court should have
instructed the jury regarding the statutory definitions of exempt
and nonexempt employee. Although appellant admits she did not
request these instructions at trial, she argues that the court had
a sua sponte duty to instruct on the definitions as a general
principle of law necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case.
We find no error.
       “‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a
request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence’” and “‘necessary for
the jury’s understanding of the case.’” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3
Cal.5th 1, 73 (Brooks), quoting People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th
1176, 1189.) “It is also well settled that this duty to instruct
extends to defenses ‘if it appears ... the defendant is relying on
such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of
such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the
defendant’s theory of the case.” (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p.
73, citations omitted.)
       Appellant contends the trial court should have instructed
the jury that, as a matter of law, she was a nonexempt employee
entitled to overtime wages. Alternatively, if there was a question
of fact as to her classification, she argues the court should have
instructed the jury with CACI 2720 and/or 2721.
       CACI 2720 and 2721 are civil jury instructions setting forth
an affirmative defense to an employee’s claim for nonpayment of
overtime wages. CACI 2720 sets forth the requirements for an
employer to establish that overtime wages were not required

                                  11
because the employee was an executive employee. CACI 2721
similarly establishes an administrative exemption.
       Appellant points out that many of the witnesses at trial
discussed the distinctions between exempt and nonexempt
employees and testified as to how appellant was classified at the
Sentinel. As a result, she argues that whether she was an
exempt or nonexempt employee was a “material fact” in dispute
at trial and therefore the jury should have been instructed as to
the legal distinctions between those classifications. We disagree.
       Appellant did not assert as a defense at trial that she was
improperly classified as exempt. To the contrary, she testified
that she had a verbal agreement with Pamela authorizing her to
earn overtime pay regardless of her classification. Appellant also
stated that she did not know she had been changed from
nonexempt to exempt in 2015 and she had not been properly
trained for her job. As such, her counsel argued in closing that
appellant did not have the intent to steal required for
embezzlement, both because she was relying on the purported
verbal agreement and because any incorrect entries in the payroll
system were due to ignorance or mistake. Thus, the jury was not
required to receive instruction on whether appellant was
misclassified as exempt, as appellant did not assert that as a
defense.
       In any event, as respondent notes, appellant could not have
successfully asserted an affirmative defense to criminal
embezzlement on the basis that she was entitled to take overtime
payments without permission because she had been
misclassified.3 “Embezzlement is the fraudulent

3     Appellant did not file a reply brief on appeal and therefore
has not responded to this argument.

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misappropriation of property by a person to whom it has been
entrusted.” (People v. Creath (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 312, 318
(Creath).) Section 511 sets forth a claim-of-right defense to
embezzlement by establishing that “the property was
appropriated openly and avowedly, and under a claim of title
preferred in good faith, even though such claim is untenable.”
However, “this provision does not excuse the unlawful retention
of the property of another to offset or pay demands held against
him.” (§ 511.) Thus, this defense “is not established where an
employee unilaterally determines that he or she is entitled to
certain wages and thereafter, without authorization,
appropriates the property of the employer in purported payment
of such wages.” (Creath, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 318; see also
People v. Proctor (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 269, 277 [“[A]ppellant
claims the proceeds of the check here in question as an offset
against a debt due her for overtime wages. This is not a defense
contemplated by section 511.”].)
       Thus, even if appellant should have been classified as a
nonexempt employee, she could not have defended against the
charge of embezzlement by claiming that she paid herself the
overtime she was owed. Instead, appellant attempted to
establish that the overtime payments were authorized by her
employer, a contention the prosecution witnesses denied and the
jury ultimately rejected. Thus, the instructions regarding
employment classifications were neither relevant to the issues
raised by the case nor necessary for the jury’s understanding.
       We also reject appellant’s argument that the instruction
was required because exempt and nonexempt employees are
statutory terms that do “not have a plain, unambiguous
meaning,” and have a “technical meaning peculiar to the law or

                                13
an area of law.” (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1012
(Hudson), quoting People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988.)
While those terms have specific meaning under the Labor Code,
the jury was not required to understand them, as it was not
required to determine whether appellant was properly classified.
Thus, appellant’s reliance on Hudson is misplaced. There, the
defendant was charged with evading a pursuing peace officer’s
vehicle, and the statutory requirement that the pursuing vehicle
be “distinctively marked” was an element of the offense. Because
the statutory phrase “distinctively marked” carried a “particular
legal meaning that differs from its nonlegal meaning,” the
Supreme Court concluded that instruction on the phrase was
required. (Hudson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1013.) Here, by
contrast, whether appellant was properly classified was not
relevant to the jury’s determination of the embezzlement charge.
      Thus, we conclude that the trial court was not required to
instruct the jury as to the statutory definitions of exempt and
nonexempt employee.
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                           COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.                                         ZUKIN, J.

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