Court Opinion

ID: 9689097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:19:29.017308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:44.570719
License: Public Domain

Rawlings, J.
Being unable to agree with the conclusion reached in Divisions Y and YI of the majority opinion or the reasons given for it, I respectfully dissent.
Here the trial court gave an instruction tp the effect failure by the State to call a witness listed as such on the information (indictment) creates no inference or presumption as to what the testimony of the absent witness might or might not be.
*103The majority concedes this is too broad as a general statement of the law.
In State v. Cotton, 240 Iowa 609, 625, 33 N.W.2d 880, this court specifically adopted the principle that where evidence which would properly be a part of a case is within the control of the party whose interest it would naturally .be to produce it, and, without satisfactory explanation, he fails to so do, the jury may draw an inference that.it would be unfavorable to-him.
As best I have been able to determine we have never since, until now, abandoned the application of the foregoing rule in criminal eases. In that regard most of the cases and authorities cited by the majority relate to civil not criminal actions, and the rule in one is not necessarily applicable to the other.
Here the State gave no apparent explanation for its failure to call a named witness to testify.
I submit that under these circumstances there is a presumption, or at least an inference, the silent witness would have testified unfavorably to the prosecution. See State v. Cotton, supra; Billeci v. United States, 87 U.S. App. D.C. 274, 184 F.2d 394, 398, 399; and Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, Fifth Ed., section 45, page 91.
Furthermore to say, as does the majority, a named State’s witness is as available to defendant as to the prosecution serves to place an accused in an anomalous position. ■
Under the prior holdings of this court a defendant cannot determine in advance, by discovery procedure, the full substance or nature of the evidence which might be given by an identified witness for the prosecution. State v. Gates, 260 Iowa 772, 150 N.W.2d 617, and State v. District Court, 253 Iowa 903, 907-912, 114 N.W.2d 317.
The only possible relief available to a defendant in this direction is by use of statutory procedures allowed for the securing of a bill of particulars (Code section 773.6), or the taking of depositions (Code section 781.10).
But these are at best uncertain and -restricted avenues of approach usually of little or no value to an accused. See State v. Schreck, 258 Iowa 218, 137 N.W.2d 914, 916, 917, and State *104v. McClain, 256 Iowa 175, 180-182, 125 N.W.2d 764.
And any attempt by defendant to unofficially question the State’s witnesses would undoubtedly be characterized during trial as witness tampering or intimidation.
The majority cannot mean counsel for an accused should blindly call a person identified by an indictment or information as a witness for the accused. This would normally be classified as nothing short of sheer stupidity and an indicia of incompetency.
Conceding the instruction given was too broad, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
Becker, J., joins in this dissent.