Court Opinion

ID: 9459864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:33:40.993718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:22.012560
License: Public Domain

SPENCER WILLIAMS, District Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. There is absolutely no question that the conduct of appellant was contemptuous. He freely admits his guilt as to count one, and the majority herein agrees that in four of the five citations appellant was guilty of “substantive” contempt “. . . that poses significant, imminent threats to the fair administration of justice of the trial court.” This fact should, I submit launch this court on a search for grounds to affirm the trial court. Instead, the majority reverses on a point not raised in the pleadings, not briefed for the appeal and only briefly touched upon in oral argument. My dissent however is based on two other grounds. I disagree with the majority that allocution has become a constitutionally protected right in direct contempt of court matters, and I disagree that the record shows such right (if one there be) to have been abridged.
Initially, it is submitted that the factual distinctions between Groppi,1 on which this court so heavily relies, and the instant case, raise a serious question as to its applicability here. In Groppi, the appellant and his followers invaded the chambers of the Wisconsin State Assembly during the conduct of its regular session and completely disrupted the ability of the legislature to function. Groppi was removed by police and confined. Two days later, without notice or hearing and without affording him any opportunity to present a defense or material in mitigation, the Assembly adopted its resolution finding Groppi to be in contempt and ordering his imprisonment.
In the instant case the contemptuous acts were in the presence of the court. On each occasion, the court informed the appellant as to the basis of the contempt citation. Additionally, while the court did not at those times ask appellant if he had anything to say in his own defense, the rulings were made after lengthy, often heated discussions during which matters in defense were raised. In no instance did the court deny the appellant an opportunity to be heard. Furthermore, the court held a hearing on the question of the sentence (at which appellant was present with counsel) and *989heard motions and argument prior to the imposition of sentence. While there is no showing that appellant was asked whether he had anything to say by way of mitigation, there is no showing that he was denied this opportunity.
Absent from this case are the critical facts that so concerned the Supreme Court in Groppi: lack of notice and an opportunity to be heard; possibility of mistaken identity or mental disorder; or the taking of the challenged action out of the presence of the contemnor. Groppi, supra at 502-506, 92 S.Ct. 582.2
Finally, I am not persuaded that the majority has successfully distinguished Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962) and its progeny which uniformly hold that absence of allocution does not raise a Federal Question. In Hill, the court held that failure to afford the defendant in a federal trial the right to speak in mitigation before imposition of sentence (as is provided specifically by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)) was not a defect which opened the judgment to a collateral attack under the federal habeas corpus procedures (28 U.S.C. § 2255).
While the court hinted the result might have been different if “. the defendant was affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak during the hearing at which his sentence was imposed.” Hill, supra, at 429, 82 S.Ct. at 472, there is no factual basis for invoking such a rule in the instant case.

. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 92 S.Ct. 582, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972).

. In truth, this case is much closer on its facts to Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952) cited with approval by the Court in Groppi (404 U.S. at 506, 92 S.Ct. 582).