Court Opinion

ID: 9596014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:45:25.162708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:33.101148
License: Public Domain

Burnett, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I respectfully dissent from the holding that the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage) and the derivative action for loss of consortium are preempted by the federal Copyright Act (Act).
I agree the Act preempts civil actions which arise under the Act. An action “arises under” the Act “if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, e.g., a suit for infringement or for the statutory royalties for record reproduction, 17 U.S.C. § 101, ... or asserts a claim requir*131ing construction of the Act,... or, at the very least and perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of the claim.” Maxey v. R.L. Bryan Co., Inc., 295 S.C. 334, 336, 368 S.E. (2d) 466, 467 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F. (2d) 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915, 85 S.Ct. 1534, 14 L.Ed. (2d) 435 (1965)).
Mrs. Griggs alleges in her complaint that “[t]he Defendant, through its assurances that it would remove Plaintiffs recipe from its cookbooks coupled with its subsequent. . . failure to do so” inflicted intentional emotional distress upon her. This cause of action arises from the conduct of the Defendant. The majority’s conclusion that this cause of action is preempted because it “stems from” the publication significantly modifies the test of Maxey.
To recover for outrage, a plaintiff must prove (1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress or was certain or substantially certain that such distress would result from his conduct, (2) the conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community, (3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff’s emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe so that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E. (2d) 776 (1981).
The basis of a cause of action for outrage is the conduct of the Defendant. The tangential relationship of this conduct to a publication covered by the Act cannot serve to insulate the Defendant from potential liability.
Applying the Maxey test, the outrage cause of action is not for a remedy expressly granted by the Act, does not assert a claim requiring construction of the Act, and does not present a case where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of the claim. This claim simply does not “arise under” the Act.
I would reverse the decision of the trial court to the extent that it dismissed Mrs. Griggs’ cause of action for outrage and Mr. Griggs’ cause of action for loss of consortium. I express no opinion on the merits of either claim.