Court Opinion

ID: 9890894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 19:03:32.983597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:12.846173
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/16/23 P. v. Chweya CA2/5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B301780

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. VA093880)
           v.

 RODNEY D. CHWEYA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra A. Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed.

     Christopher L. Haberman, under appointment by Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance
E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan
Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and
Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

                              __________________________
       In 2006, appellant Rodney D. Chweya pled guilty to
unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor. Twelve years later,
Chweya moved to vacate his plea under newly-enacted Penal
Code section 1473.7 and claimed that, due to his defense
counsel’s inaccurate advice, he did not understand that his plea
subjected him to deportation.1 He also argued he was prejudiced
by his counsel’s failure to bargain for an immigration-neutral
plea. The trial court denied the motion, and he appealed. After
we affirmed on direct appeal, the Supreme Court granted review,
then transferred the matter to us for reconsideration in light of
its opinion in People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311
(Espinoza). We have done so, and again affirm.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.     Appellant’s Conviction
       In 2006, the District Attorney charged appellant, an
immigrant from Kenya, with unlawful sexual intercourse with a
minor (§ 261.5, subd. (d)), committing a lewd act upon a minor
(§ 288, subd. (c)(1)), and oral copulation of a minor (§ 288a,
subd. (b)(2)). Appellant admitted committing the charged acts.
       On April 26, 2006, appellant pled guilty to unlawful
intercourse with a minor. On the plea form, appellant initialed
the following provision: “I understand that if I am not a citizen of
the United States, conviction for the offense charged may have
the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization under the laws of the
United States.”
       Appellant’s counsel signed a waiver form stating he had
explained to appellant each of the rights set forth in the plea
agreement. At a hearing, the prosecutor asked appellant, “If you

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                 2
are not a citizen of the United States, your plea will cause you to
be deported, denied re-entry, denied naturalization and amnesty.
Do you understand this?” (Emphasis added.) Appellant
responded, “Yes.” Appellant faced a maximum four-year
sentence. The court imposed and suspended a sentence of three
years in state prison. Appellant was placed on five years’
probation and ordered to serve 364 days in county jail. The
remaining charges were dismissed.2
2.     Deportation Proceedings
       Four years later, in 2010, the Department of Homeland
Security charged appellant with removability for his conviction.
The department noted that appellant was a citizen of Kenya who
had come to the United States on a visa in 1988 when he was 10
years old. An immigration judge sustained the charge of
removability.
       The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed,
holding that a conviction of unlawful sexual intercourse with a
minor was an aggravated felony that subjected appellant to
deportation. The Board also denied appellant’s application for
adjustment of status, declining to exercise its discretion to waive
inadmissibility to the United States. The Board reasoned that
appellant did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion because
he had “an extensive criminal record including, in addition to his
sex offense, convictions in 1995 for assault, child cruelty, and
disturbing the peace, 1997 for assault, 2002 for disturbing the
peace and contempt of court, 2003 for providing false
identification to a police office[r], and 2008 for driving with a

2     By pleading guilty to section 261.5, subdivision (d),
defendant avoided mandatory registration as a sex offender. The
dismissed charges would have required lifetime sex-offender
registration. (§ 290, subd. (d)(2)(B).)

                                 3
suspended license, an offense which he acknowledged occurred
after his license was suspended for failing to repay child support
arrears.”
3.     Appellant’s Motion to Withdraw His Plea
       On November 17, 2010, after being charged with
deportation, appellant filed a motion in the trial court under
sections 1192.5, 1475 and 1487(3) to withdraw his plea. At the
motion hearing, the court heard testimony from David Price, the
attorney who had represented appellant in the underlying
criminal proceedings. Price told the court that, during the plea
negotiations, appellant had been “concerned about his being
deported,” and had pled “to what [Price] thought was a
misdemeanor so he would not be deported.” Counsel testified
that he told appellant that he could “come back and reduce the
felony to a misdemeanor . . . and if . . . it was a misdemeanor,
[appellant] would not be deported.”
       The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that appellant
“had a taped confession to basically three felony counts, two of
them definitely not reducible, and, as you say, maybe the lifetime
[sexual offender] registration would be nothing if he got deported;
but nevertheless, you take that into consideration if you think
he’s going to stay here. . . . I don’t think I can ignore the fact that
this was not a case Mr. Chweya could go to trial on. I agree the
deportation was a harsh consequence, but I don’t believe there’s
sufficient cause for me to set aside the plea . . . .”
4.     Appellant’s Motion to Reopen His Case and Vacate
       His Conviction
       Eight years later, in 2018, the Legislature enacted
section 1473.7, which provides that a court “shall” vacate a
conviction or sentence upon a showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, of “prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s
ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly

                                   4
accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences
of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)
       In December 2018, appellant filed a motion to reopen his
case and vacate his conviction under sections 1473.7 and 1016.5.3
It is the denial of this motion that forms the basis of the appeal.
Appellant argued he did not meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the adverse immigration
consequences of his plea. His “attorney did not advise him of any
immigration consequences or even speak with him as to any
consequences that would accompany his plea.”
       Appellant supported his motion with declarations by
himself and counsel Price. In appellant’s declarations, he stated
that his attorney “never discussed with [him] any immigration
consequences that stemmed from entering the plea.” Had his
attorney or the trial court advised him “of the immigration
consequences triggered by [his] plea, [appellant] would not have
entered” the plea, but would have attempted to negotiate an
alternative plea or taken his case to trial.
       Although appellant stated he did not discuss immigration
consequences with his attorney, Price stated in a declaration that
appellant’s immigration status “was an important consideration
in this case.” At the time of the plea deal, Price believed that
appellant’s sentence “would not have any effect” on appellant’s
immigration status because if appellant complied with the terms

3      Section 1016.5, among other things, contains the statutory
mandate that a defendant must be advised of the immigration
consequences of the plea.
       This motion was taken off calendar due to confusion about
whether appellant had retained new counsel. Several months
later, in March 2019, appellant filed a new motion to vacate his
conviction making the same arguments. The trial court
considered the materials filed in support of both motions at the
hearing.

                                 5
and conditions of probation, he could apply to the court to have
the charge reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor.”
       Appellant was unable to attend the hearing on his motion
because, by then, he had been deported to Kenya. Price testified
at the hearing, however. Price’s testimony was inconsistent as to
whether he and appellant had discussed the immigration
consequences of the plea. Price initially testified that he thought
appellant was pleading to a misdemeanor because appellant was
only sentenced to 364 days in jail. Price did not know if the plea’s
immigration consequences “would be neutral, but I didn’t think
he would be deported.” Price did not remember discussing the
plea’s immigration consequences with appellant, testifying:
“other than to take the plea, I don’t recall advising him on that
issue at all, but I don’t recall not advising him.” Price was
testifying in 2019 about events that had taken place in 2006.
       Later in the hearing, Price testified that he had understood
appellant was pleading guilty to a felony. In addition, when
asked whether Price had “explained to [appellant] that within a
few years, if he stayed out of trouble, no violation problems, if he
was able to reduce the felony . . . to a misdemeanor, that he
would no longer be deportable,” Price responded, “I believe that’s
correct. Yes.” Price later clarified that he told appellant that if
there were no probation violations, “there is a possibility that
[appellant] can apply to have the sentence reduced after a while
so [he] would not be deported.”
       After Price testified, the prosecution moved to exclude
appellant’s declarations because appellant was not available for
cross-examination. Appellant’s counsel objected, arguing the
declarations were admissible because appellant was unavailable
as he had been deported to Kenya. The court ruled that
appellant’s declarations were inadmissible.

                                 6
       The court denied appellant’s motion and concluded that
appellant had understood the immigration consequences of his
conviction. The court noted that appellant initialed the waiver
form dealing with the immigration consequences of his plea, and
appellant’s counsel indicated he went over that form with
appellant. The court found that Price and appellant both “knew
that he was pleading to a felony and the plan was that if he got
through probation, it could be reduced to a misdemeanor.” The
court noted that even if it had admitted appellant’s statements,
the “ruling would not change.”
       Appellant timely appealed. We affirmed by unpublished
opinion. (People v. Chweya (July 30, 2021, B301780) [nonpub.
opn.].)
       On October 13, 2021, the Supreme Court granted review
but deferred briefing pending its decision in Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th 311. After the Court issued its opinion in Espinoza, it
transferred the matter back to us and ordered us to vacate our
prior decision and reconsider the appeal in light of the new
authority.
                           DISCUSSION
1.    Legal Principles
       Under section 1473.7, a person who is no longer in criminal
custody may move to vacate a conviction or sentence where the
“conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error
damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand,
defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)4 That is, a defendant must

4     When section 1473.7 was enacted in 2017, California courts
uniformly assumed that moving parties who claimed to have
received erroneous information from counsel needed to

                                 7
first show he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea and then demonstrate that his
misunderstanding was prejudicial. The error is prejudicial if it is
reasonably probable the defendant would have rejected the plea if
he had correctly understood the immigration consequences.
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319; People v. Vivar (2021)
11 Cal.5th 510, 529 (Vivar).)
       “When courts assess whether a petitioner has shown that
reasonable probability, they consider the totality of the
circumstances. [Citation.] Factors particularly relevant to this
inquiry include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the
importance the defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the
defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain, and whether the
defendant had reason to believe an immigration-neutral
negotiated disposition was possible.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 529–530.) Additional factors include “the defendant’s
probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome if he had
rejected the plea, as well as the difference between the
bargained-for term and the likely term if he were convicted at
trial.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 320–321.) These
factors are not exhaustive, however, and no single factor is a
prerequisite to relief. (Id. at pp. 321, 325.)
       A defendant must corroborate his assertions of prejudice
with objective evidence, which “includes facts provided by
declarations, contemporaneous documentation of the defendant’s
immigration concerns or interactions with counsel, and evidence

demonstrate that counsel rendered ineffective assistance under
the guidelines enunciated in Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668. (People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998,
1005.) In 2018, the Legislature amended section 1473.7 to clarify
that a finding of prejudicial error “may, but need not, include a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id. at p. 1006.)

                                8
of the charges the defendant faced.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 321; see Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.) Although
objective evidence includes facts provided by a defendant’s
declaration, “ ‘[c]ourts should not upset a plea solely because of
post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have
pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies.’ ” (People v. DeJesus
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1134, quoting Lee v. U.S. (2017)
582 U.S. 357, 369 (Lee).)
       “In addition to submitting declarations, both parties are
entitled to request an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1473.7, subd. (d).)
The more robust and inclusive a record, the greater the
opportunity for effective persuasion and meaningful judicial
review. And the inquiry into a defendant’s state of mind may
often involve the weighing of credibility and circumstantial
evidence.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 325.)
       We review the trial court’s ruling on a section 1473.7
motion under the independent standard of review. (People v.
Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 524.) “ ‘[U]nder independent
review, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to
determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ [Citation.]
When courts engage in independent review, they should be
mindful that ‘ “[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of de
novo review . . . .” ’ [Citation.] An appellate court may not simply
second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s
own observations. [Citations.] . . . In section 1473.7 proceedings,
appellate courts should similarly give particular deference to
factual findings based on the trial court’s personal observations of
witnesses.” (Id. at p. 528.)
2.    Appellant Does Not Demonstrate Prejudice
       Appellant argues that his conviction must be vacated
because Price failed to properly advise him of the immigration
consequences of his plea or pursue an immigration-neutral plea

                                 9
deal. Appellant contends he did not meaningfully understand the
adverse immigration consequences of his plea and would not have
accepted the plea if he had. Instead, he would have sought a plea
to some other charge or faced the risks of trial. We do not resolve
whether appellant understood the immigration consequences of
the plea because we conclude appellant has not shown a
reasonable probability that, but for any deficiency in the
advisement, he would not have entered the same plea. That is,
appellant has not established legal prejudice from any
inadequate advisement.
      Appellant points to the evidence cited in support of his
inadequate-advisement claim—namely, Price’s post-hoc
statements and evidence contemporaneous to the time of the
plea—to establish the importance he placed on his immigration
status. Appellant first argues that the record establishes Price
misadvised him “that by pleading Guilty to this charge he would
be able to protect his immigration status as it could be later
reduced to a misdemeanor . . . .” But over the years, Price
provided inconsistent testimony about what he advised appellant
during the plea negotiations. In 2010, Price testified he told
appellant he could avoid deportation by applying to reduce the
felony to a misdemeanor. In 2019, at the section 1473.7 hearing,
Price initially said he could not remember discussing with
appellant the immigration consequences of his plea. Price then
revised this statement, testifying that he told appellant “there is
a possibility” appellant could apply to have his sentence reduced
so he “would not be deported”.
      We do not read this record as establishing that Price told
appellant he would be able to “protect his immigration status” by
pleading guilty. Instead, when questioned by the district
attorney about his statements to appellant, Price revised his
previous version and testified that he told appellant there was a

                                10
possibility he could avoid deportation by subsequently moving to
reduce the felony to a misdemeanor. To the extent Price’s
testimony was internally inconsistent, it was for the trial court—
not this court—to resolve the conflict. The trial court’s findings
as to Price’s testimony do not support appellant’s argument on
appeal. (Compare Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320 [because
trial court “conducted no evidentiary hearing, there is no basis for
deference” to its factual findings or prejudice determination].)
       As for appellant’s own understanding of and investigation
into the immigration consequences of his plea, the only
contemporaneous evidence was that appellant understood his
plea subjected him to deportation: When the district attorney
asked him at the plea hearing whether he understood his plea
would cause him to be deported, appellant responded without
hesitation, “Yes.” (Cf. Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 318
[defendant advised the plea may have adverse immigration
consequences]; Lee, supra, 582 U.S. at pp. 369–370 [when the
trial judge during a plea colloquy asked the defendant if he
understood he could be deported and whether that affected his
decision, the defendant replied that it did and asked his attorney
for advice].)
       “Another consideration is whether alternative,
immigration-safe dispositions were available at the time of the
defendant’s plea. Factors relevant to this inquiry include the
defendant’s criminal record, the strength of the prosecution’s
case, the seriousness of the charges or whether the crimes
involved sophistication, the district attorney’s charging policies
with respect to immigration consequences, and the existence of
comparable offenses without immigration consequences.”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323.)
       Appellant argues that he could have pled guilty to an
equivalent immigration-safe felony. But unlike in Espinoza,

                                11
appellant has not offered any evidence that there were
immigration-safe alternatives his attorney could have pursued.
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 317, 321.) To the contrary,
the record shows appellant could not “expect or hope a different
bargain” was possible in light of the seriousness of the offense,
his criminal record, and his confession to police that he had
sexual intercourse with a minor. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 529.)
       Appellant also argues that the evidence against him was
relatively weak and the prison term he would face after trial was
reasonably low, thereby reducing the risks of trial and the
comparative benefits of the plea bargain.5 (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 321 [“Also relevant are . . . the difference between
the bargained-for term and the likely term if [the appellant] were
convicted at trial”].) Yet those arguments understate the risk he
faced. If appellant had been convicted of either dismissed count
(§§ 288, subd. (c)(1), 288a, subd. (b)(2)), he would have been
required to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life (§ 290,
subd. (d)(2)(B) & (d)(3)). In exchange for his plea, he was
convicted of a single count (§ 261.5, subd. (d)) that did not require
registration.
       The Supreme Court’s opinions in Vivar and Espinoza stand
in contrast to the case before us. In Vivar, the defendant moving
for section 1473.7 relief filed a declaration claiming he would
never have entered this plea had he understood that it would
require his deportation. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530.) His
counsel’s recollection and contemporaneous notes showed that
the defendant had been concerned about the “consequences” of

5     Appellant’s request for judicial notice of the Los Angeles
District Attorney’s current charging policies is denied. Policies
enacted in 2022 are not probative of the options available to
appellant in 2006.

                                  12
his plea. (Ibid.) The record also showed that the prosecution had
offered the defendant a plea under which he could have avoided
mandatory deportation. (Id. at p. 531.) Under those
circumstances, the court found “ ‘ “a reasonable probability” ’ that
the [defendant] could have tried ‘to obtain a better bargain that
[did] not include immigration consequences.’ ” (Ibid.) Likewise,
in Espinoza, the defendant had “no prior criminal history at the
time of his plea.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 324.) And, as
in Vivar, there was evidence an immigration-neutral plea would
have been available to him. (Id. at pp. 317, 321.) In this case,
appellant has not made a similar showing.
       Finally, “[t]ies to the United States are [another] important
factor in evaluating prejudicial error under section 1473.7
because they shed light on a defendant’s immigration
priorities. . . . Community ties may be established by length of
residence; immigration status; lack of connection to the country of
origin; connections to family, friends, or the community; work
history or financial ties; or other forms of attachment.”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) “Objective evidence of a
defendant’s community ties includes facts provided by a
defendant’s declaration or declarations from family members,
friends, colleagues, community members, or other
acquaintances.” (Ibid.)
       The defendant in Espinoza presented ample evidence on
this point, including “30 letters from family, friends, community
members, clients, and employers documenting his family ties,
community connections, and work history.” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 317.) Here, by contrast, although there is
evidence appellant came to the United States at a young age and
has family here, there is no evidence that he has strong ties to
those family members or responsibility for their financial or
emotional support. To the contrary, one of his convictions

                                13
stemmed from a failure to pay child support. Nor is there
evidence of appellant’s participation in the community or his
work history.
        Here, based on our independent but deferential review,
appellant has not offered evidence sufficient to establish his
contemporaneous concern about the immigration consequences of
his plea when he accepted the bargain, that he could have
expected an immigration-neutral disposition, or that he would
have gone to trial if he had fully understood the immigration
consequences. Accordingly, appellant has not shown prejudice.
 3.     Any Error in Excluding Appellant’s Declarations Was
        Harmless
        Appellant argues the trial court erred in excluding his
 declarations on the ground that he was not present at the
 hearing to be cross-examined. Any error in the trial court’s
 ruling is harmless.6 (See People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585,
 611 [we review the erroneous exclusion of evidence for whether
 it is reasonably probable the defendant would have achieved a
 more favorable result had the evidence been admitted].)
        One part of the excluded testimony was that Price “never
 discussed with me any immigration consequences that stemmed
 from entering the plea.” (Emphasis added.) This statement
 undercuts appellant’s argument that his attorney misinformed
 him that he had a chance of avoiding deportation, however. The
 statement also suggests that appellant was not concerned about

6     Respondent argues that appellant forfeited the argument
that, under section 1473.7, an unavailable defendant may submit
a declaration even though there would be no opportunity for
cross-examination. The point is a question of law without
controverted facts. Accordingly, we find no forfeiture. (See DD
Hair Lounge, LLC v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 1238, 1242.)

                               14
 the immigration consequences of his plea because, even though
 the plea form and oral advisement informed him that he could or
 would be deported, appellant chose not discuss the subject with
 his attorney.
        Other parts of appellant’s declaration included an
 uncorroborated assertion that he would have rejected the plea
 had his attorney properly advised him that his conviction “would
 result in deportation.” (See Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530
 [when a defendant claims he would not have entered his plea
 had he understood it would require his deportation, he must
 “ ‘ “corroborate such assertions with ‘objective evidence’ ” ’ ”].)
        From our reading of the record, it is unlikely that if the
trial court had admitted the declarations, the court would have
ruled differently. But we need not speculate because the trial
court has given us the answer: The trial court expressly said
appellant’s statements “would not change” its ruling:
        “I believe Mr. Chweya understood he faced deportation. I
        think the 364 days was a device that they were trying to
        use to hope that he would not be deported. I think that
        sometimes occurs. But that is just someone or people
        trying to work around something. But I think that Mr.
        Chweya knew that he was going to be deported and they
        were hoping that if the judge sentenced him a month later,
        because he pled in April and was sentenced in May, that
        they were hoping that maybe he was able to slip through
        the immigration custody.”
      We take the trial court’s statement to mean that in
addition to resolving any conflicts in Price’s testimony in the
prosecution’s favor, the court would have resolved any conflicts
between Price’s testimony and appellant’s declarations the same
way: in the prosecution’s favor. We conclude any error—error
that we do not find—was necessarily harmless.

                                15
                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying appellant’s section 1473.7 petition is
affirmed.

                                     RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

                  MOOR, J.

                  KIM, J.

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