Court Opinion

ID: 9702077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:53:37.509187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:33.462460
License: Public Domain

Brown, C. J.
(dissenting). While I agree that there was error in the case of Hilma Yarley, I disagree with the majority view that there was error in the case of John Yarley, calling for the restoration of the verdict and judgment thereon for him. It is my conclusion that the court committed reversible error in that ease, as claimed by the defendants’ bill of exceptions, in allowing John, hereinafter called the plaintiff, to testify to aggravation of a pre-existing heart condition as an element of damage and that, in *136consequence, by setting aside the verdict it reached the correct result.
The majority opinion correctly sets forth the ruling on evidence in question and the sole pertinent allegation of the complaint under which the evidence was offered. While the finding does not show specifically what the plaintiff’s pre-existing heart condition was, his counsel’s statement as to his two previous attacks suggests that it was of long standing and originated with a relatively serious attack. The evidence printed in connection with the appeal from the decision setting aside the verdict shows these further pertinent facts: The plaintiff had a severe coronary thrombosis in 1940 which confined him to his bed for many weeks and another less severe attack in 1942. Doctors Parsley and Freeman attended him. Thereafter he had had pain many times, and for relief he constantly carried nitroglycerin taJblets. I supplement the finding with these facts, which appear upon the undisputed evidence. See Friedler v. Hekeler, 96 Conn. 29, 34, 112 A. 651; Finnegan v. LaFontaine, 122 Conn. 561, 564, 191 A. 337; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc., § 73, p. 102. Dr. Friedberg, the only physieian called by the plaintiff, testified that he had never seen him prior to the accident. He stated that the plaintiff had a “cardiac decomposition” after the coronary thrombosis which followed the aceident, but that he had no way of knowing whether any part of it was connected with the thrombosis of 1940. His was the sole expert testimony on the plaintiff’s heart injury. The record further indicates that the lack of any allegation in the complaint of “aggravation” may well have resulted in the defendants’ failure to call Doctors Parsley and Freeman to bring out what part of the plaintiff’s heart condition was not attributable to the *137accident. In view of these facts, it sufficiently appears that the court’s ruling could have led to an award by the jury which was substantially in excess of just damages.
The situation recited above makes clear the importance of determining whether or not, in the absence of any allegation thereof in the complaint, the plaintiff was entitled to prove that the preexisting diseased condition of his heart was aggravated by the accident. There is no question that the words in the complaint “affected and injured his heart” constitute an allegation of special damage, for, as the majority opinion points out, such an injury does not necessarily follow from an accident. However, no more does it necessarily follow from the fact that this was an allegation of special damage that it was a sufficient allegation of the peculiar kind of special damage which the plaintiff sought to prove by the question objected to. That damage was something over and beyond any which was fairly described or indicated by the allegation quoted. Proof of the existence or the nonexistence of such aggravation, and, in case it was established, proof as to what part of the plaintiff’s resulting heart condition was due to pre-existing decomposition and what part was caused by the accident, necessarily must depend upon qualified expert testimony. Therefore, if aggravation was to be claimed as an element of damage, it was peculiarly important that the defendants be so informed by a sufficient allegation in the complaint.
The controlling rule of law in this jurisdiction as to the necessity and manner of pleading special damage and the reasons for it are succinctly stated in Tomlinson v. Derby, 43 Conn. 562. As we there say at page 566, in this state “we still adhere closely *138to the technical rule of the common law, that where the damages are special the matter must be distinctly averred in the declaration in order to apprise the defendant of the nature of the claim.” As we further say at page 567, with reference to the need and the nature of the averments so required, “[i]t is difficult to lay down any general rule by which to determine when the law implies the damage and when it does not. It would seem however that when the consequences of an injury are peculiar to the circumstances and condition of the injured party, the law could not imply the damage simply from the act causing the injury” (italics supplied). By the same token, the law cannot imply “aggravation of a preexisting heart condition” simply from the fact that the plaintiff’s heart was “affected and injured.” That this is so is emphasized by our further statement in the Tomlinson ease (p. 567) that “the sole object of the rule that requires special damage to be averred is to advise the defendant of the claim.” The factual situation which existed in the instant ease cogently illustrates how well founded is this reason for the rule. It is hard to conceive of a more apt and accurate description of the situation of this plaintiff than that stated in the words which I have italicized. The principles enunciated in the Tomlinson case have been reaffirmed by numerous subsequent decisions. Cordner v. Hall, 84 Conn. 117, 120, 79 A. 55; Smith & Egge Mfg. Co. v. Webster, 87 Conn. 74, 83, 86 A. 763; Baldwin v. Robertson, 118 Conn. 431, 435, 172 A. 859; Rusch v. Cox, 130 Conn. 26, 33, 31 A.2d 457.
While we have not ruled upon the precise question here presented, whether the complaint gives the defendant fair and proper notice is the controlling factor and this must be determined upon the sitúa*139tion in each case. “[T]he question whether the complaint sufficiently gives notice of the damages awarded must in each case be determined with reference to the character of the wrong complained of, and with some regard to the reason of the rule, which is to prevent a surprise upon the defendant.” Smith & Egge Mfg. Co. v. Webster, supra. The allegations of injury sustained by both plaintiffs are identical, except that in John’s complaint injury to “heart and lungs” is substituted for injury to “shoulder” and “abdomen” in Hilma’s. With this qualification, the injuries alleged as to each would seem to include about all of the ills to which flesh could be heir in consequence of such an accident. The anatomical afflictions are enumerated ad nauseam and, as the record discloses, with but slight regard to what the evidence actually tended to prove. These ills of the plaintiffs are set forth in such detail that, as counsel well observed in argument, a motion for a “less” rather than a “more” specific statement would have to be utilized to ascertain what the plaintiffs’ injuries really were.
This type of pleading, which might well be termed a common counts for negligence actions, is not designed to give the defendant the information to which he is entitled in order to prepare his defense properly. It is violative of the purpose and spirit of our rules of practice. It tends to needless trouble not only for opposing counsel but for the court as well. Allegations of personal injuries in a tort case should be confined to an honest and fair statement of what the attorney has reason to believe he can offer evidence to prove and ought not to omit the allegation of material factors as to damage upon which he expects to rely. The evil of a departure from these precepts relative to the claimed heart *140injury of the plaintiff John is accentuated by the five years’ delay between accident and trial and the further fact that the only doctor called on behalf of the plaintiff to testify to his heart condition had never seen him prior to the accident and had no way of knowing whether any part of the condition was connected with heart attacks suffered prior to the accident. Furthermore, not only did the plaintiff fail to produce either of the doctors who had attended him during his previous attacks but he offered no explanation of his failure to do so. I therefore conclude that, under the decisions referred to above, the plaintiff, to recover for the aggravation of his heart condition, was bound to allege it in his complaint in order to prevent unfair surprise to the defendants. For the reasons explained above, the principle that a defendant injuring a plaintiff takes him as he finds him (Flood v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 647, 13 A.2d 677) is not of controlling significance in the present ease, and the court erred in admitting the evidence.
While there is a conflict of authority upon the question whether aggravation of a pre-existing condition must be alleged to permit recovery for it, very substantial authority supports the conclusion which I have reached. Littman v. Bell Telephone Co., 315 Pa. 370, 380, 172 A. 687; Whitlock v. Mungiven, 36 R.I. 386, 388, 90 A. 756; Samuels v. New York Rys. Corporation, 226 App. Div. 94, 96, 234 N.Y.S. 377; Salmi v. Columbia & N.R.R. Co., 75 Ore. 200, 208, 146 P. 819; May v. Hexter, 226 S.W.2d 383, 388 (St. Louis Ct. App.); Fuller v. Mayor of Jackson, 92 Mich. 197, 199, 52 N.W. 1075; Guild v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 64 Ore. 570, 575, 131 P. 310; Hayes v. St. Clair, 173 Mich. 631, 641, 139 N.W. 1037. It is my conclusion that the court’s *141error entitles the defendants to a new trial in John’s case and that, inasmuch as this result is accomplished by its ruling setting aside the verdict, it should be held that there is no error upon the plaintiff John’s appeal.
In this opinion Baldwin, J., concurred.