Court Opinion

ID: 9963234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 19:11:09.835664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:43.242602
License: Public Domain

04/24/2024
                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                            AT NASHVILLE
                                February 7, 2024 Session

                                    IN RE ISAIAH F.

               Appeal from the Chancery Court for Robertson County
                     No. CH21-CV-63 Ben Dean, Chancellor
                     ___________________________________

                           No. M2023-00660-COA-R3-PT
                       ___________________________________

Foster parents appeal the dismissal of their petition to terminate a father’s parental rights
and to adopt. The petitioners sought to terminate the father’s rights on two grounds: failure
to file a timely petition to establish paternity and failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility for the child. The trial court
found insufficient evidence to support either ground for termination. Upon review, we find
clear and convincing evidence to support one of the alleged grounds. So we vacate the
judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated
                               and Case Remanded

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT
and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

Thomas H. Miller, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellants, Jeremy H. and Sarah H.

W. Stuart Scott, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jay L.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, Katherine P. Adams, Assistant
Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

Lisa Fiehweg, Nashville, Tennessee, Guardian ad Litem.
                                               OPINION1

                                                     I.

                                                    A.

       In February 2019, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”)
received a referral of a drug-exposed newborn. Kristen R. (“Mother”) tested positive for
marijuana, amphetamines, and MDMA2 at the delivery of Isaiah F. (“Child”). Although
Mother was married to Phillip R., the Child’s birth certificate identified David F. as his
father. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(29)(A)(ii) (defining “legal parent”), (44)
(defining “putative father”) (Supp. 2020); see also id. § 36-1-117(c)(4) (Supp. 2020).
Hospital personnel also reported that Mother and David F. were discovered using illegal
drugs in the hospital parking lot after the Child’s birth.

       The Davidson County Juvenile Court immediately placed the Child in emergency
protective custody. With the consent of Mother, David F., and Phillip R., the court later
adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected based on Mother’s drug use during
pregnancy, David F.’s unavailability due to incarceration, and Phillip R.’s failure to parent
despite legal paternity.

       Over a year later, another man, Jay L., appeared with Mother at a permanency
hearing in juvenile court. He told the juvenile court magistrate that he believed he could
be the Child’s father. The magistrate ordered DNA testing, which confirmed his claim.
And Jay L. filed a pro se petition seeking custody of the Child. A short time later, DCS
petitioned to terminate his parental rights as well as the parental rights of Mother and
David F. Among other things, DCS alleged that Jay L.’s parental rights should be
terminated for failure to file a timely paternity action. After retaining counsel, Jay L.
amended his custody petition to include a request to legitimate the Child.

        On February 8, 2021, Jeremy and Sarah H. (“Foster Parents”) filed a petition to
terminate all parental rights and to adopt the Child in Robertson County Chancery Court.
The juvenile court stayed its proceedings pending resolution of the adoption petition. See
id. § 36-1-116(f)(2) (Supp. 2020). So Jay L. re-filed his pending paternity petition in the
chancery court. In July, the court entered an agreed order establishing Jay L. as the Child’s
legal father (“Father”) and disestablishing David F. See id. § 36-1-102(29)(B).

        1
          The appellants filed a motion to strike all references to post-judgment facts in Jay L.’s appellate
brief. See TENN. R. APP. P. 14. We granted the motion and disregard post-judgment facts in our review.
        2
        “MDMA is a synthetic drug commonly referred to as ‘Ecstasy or Molly.’” In re Emmalyn H.,
No. E2022-00710-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 3411598, at *1 n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2023).

                                                     2
                                               B.

       The two termination petitions were consolidated for trial. Mother and Phillip R. had
already surrendered their parental rights. Only Father’s parental rights remained at issue.
During trial, DCS and Foster Parents withdrew all but two of the alleged grounds for
termination of Father’s parental rights: failure to file a timely petition to establish paternity
and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial
responsibility of the Child. See id. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi), (g)(14) (Supp. 2020).

       As Father related, he enjoyed a casual friendship with Mother, but their relationship
was not always platonic. He first learned about Mother’s pregnancy shortly before the
Child was born. At that time, Mother told him that David F. was the biological father.
From what Father knew of the timing of her pregnancy and delivery, he did not question
her claim. But in June 2019, Mother notified Father by email that he might be the Child’s
biological father.

        Father claimed that he was overjoyed at the news. He knew the Child was in foster
care. So he immediately went to the local DCS office and asked for a DNA test. The
receptionist gave him the contact information for the family service worker assigned to the
Child’s case. Father told the family service worker that he wanted to take responsibility
for the Child if he was the biological father. According to Father, he spoke with the service
worker several times throughout the summer and fall of 2019. Each time, she assured him
that DCS was investigating his paternity claim. From their conversations, he understood
that the process would take some time due to her heavy caseload. But he never heard back
from DCS.

       Father’s efforts to establish paternity did not stop with DCS. He also reached out
to Mother’s court-appointed attorney. Mother claimed her attorney would pursue the
matter with DCS. But the attorney never returned Father’s calls. He also planned to try an
at-home DNA test when Mother was released from jail. But he never had the opportunity.
In the spring of 2020, Father contacted the juvenile court clerk’s office as well as other
state agencies, inquiring about the process for obtaining a DNA test for a child in foster
care. He received few responses, none helpful. Then, in November 2020, Mother invited
him to the juvenile court hearing where he was finally able to assert his paternity claim.

        Because of the Child’s age and special needs, the juvenile court initially denied
Father visitation. It assigned Julie Flannery, a clinical psychologist who worked with the
court, to educate Father on the Child’s medical conditions. And it directed Father to record
and exchange video messages with the Child. After Father established paternity, the
chancery court allowed limited supervised visitation. Ms. Flannery supervised those visits.
She testified that Father worked hard to educate himself about the Child. Based on her
observations, she had no concerns about Father as a parent. Over time, Father and the
Child had formed a bond.
                                             3
        Father understood that reunification with the Child would be a slow process. He
had spoken with Dr. Jay Woodman, a clinical psychologist, about creating a successful
transition plan. To that end, he expressed his hope that Foster Parents would remain a part
of the Child’s life.

       Foster Mother explained that the Child needed an “incredible amount of support” to
reach his full potential. And she knew “beyond a shadow of a doubt” that he would receive
that support in her home. The Child had been diagnosed with neonatal abstinence
syndrome, autism spectrum disorder, and reactive airway disease. Foster Parents spent
more than 600 hours in various therapies with the Child, including developmental therapy,
speech and language therapy, feeding therapy, and physical and occupational therapy. At
three years old, he had made tremendous progress. Foster Parents loved him and wanted
to adopt him.

       Ms. Peak, a licensed clinical social worker, testified as an expert witness on behalf
of the petitioners. She did not perform an assessment on the Child, the foster family, or
Father. As she explained, her opinions were based on theory and research, not this
particular child. Research showed that severing a consistent, predictable relationship
affected an infant’s mental health. In her opinion, every disruption in a child’s life was a
trauma that would have an effect on a child’s development, especially if the child already
had a cognitive impairment or developmental delay.

       Father presented the expert testimony of Dr. Woodman. Dr. Woodman explained
that he met with Father several times and observed two supervised visits with the Child.
He also consulted Ms. Flannery. He observed that Father had forged a bond with the Child.
In his opinion, the Child would be negatively affected if his relationship with Father was
terminated. Dr. Woodman agreed that removal from the foster home would disrupt the
Child. But, under the circumstances, he believed the Child would ultimately thrive in
Father’s care.

       The current family service worker asserted that DCS had no record of Father’s
paternity claim before November 2020. DCS no longer employed the case worker Father
claimed to have contacted. So she could not verify his story. She explained that DCS did
not provide DNA testing for putative fathers. It was DCS policy to advise paternity
claimants to go to juvenile court for testing.

       In her view, the Child loved his foster family. And it would be in his best interest
to remain in his current environment. Still, she admitted that Father and the Child had
developed a good relationship. Father had a steady income and stable housing. And his
parenting assessment revealed no concerns.

                                             4
                                               C.

       Shortly after the trial, the judge’s term ended. And the presiding judge reassigned
the case to a new chancellor for resolution. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 63. The successor
chancellor reviewed the existing record and determined the case could be resolved without
prejudice to the parties. Before announcing a decision, he questioned counsel to confirm
that he fully understood the parties’ positions. And he gave the parties an opportunity to
provide any additional information they deemed necessary.

       The court made its final ruling based on the existing record and the responses of
counsel. It determined that the petitioners failed to establish either alleged ground for
termination of Father’s parental rights. So it dismissed both termination petitions without
reaching the best interest analysis.

                                               II.

        Father contends that we should dismiss this appeal as a matter of law because the
trial court failed to ensure an expedited final hearing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k).
By statute, termination proceedings must be expedited. Id. § 36-1-124 (2021). To that
end, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(k) directs the trial court to “ensure that the
hearing on the petition takes place within six (6) months of the date that the petition is filed,
unless the court determines an extension is in the best interests of the child.” Foster Parents
filed their termination petition on February 8, 2021. Although the case was initially set for
trial within the six-month window, the court continued the trial date two times. Father
complains that the court granted the first continuance without determining that an extension
was in the Child’s best interest.

        Although a trial was not conducted within six months of the petition to terminate,
we discern no reason to dismiss the appeal. First, even if Father’s complaints had merit,
dismissal would not be an appropriate remedy. Father should have sought an order from
this Court expediting the proceedings in the trial court. See id. § 36-1-113(k). He chose
not to do so. Second, Father misconstrues the trial court’s order. The order clearly implied
that the extension was in the Child’s best interest. See Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc. v.
Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595, 608 (Tenn. 2013) (when “construing orders and judgments, effect
must be given to that which is clearly implied, as well as to that which is expressly stated”).
And the court later expressly clarified that it considered the Child’s best interest when it
granted the first continuance.

                                               A.

       Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113 sets forth both the grounds and procedures
for terminating parental rights. In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 546 (Tenn. 2015). First,
parties seeking termination of parental rights must prove the existence of at least one
                                              5
statutory ground for termination. In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1). If they prove the existence of one or more statutory grounds,
they must then prove that termination is in the child’s best interest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-
1-113(c)(2).

        Because of the constitutional dimension of the rights at stake in a termination
proceeding, parties seeking to terminate parental rights must prove both the grounds and
the child’s best interest by clear and convincing evidence. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d
586, 596 (Tenn. 2010) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re Adoption of A.M.H.,
215 S.W.3d 793, 808-09 (Tenn. 2007); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 546). This heightened
burden of proof serves “to minimize the possibility of erroneous decisions that result in an
unwarranted termination of or interference with these rights.” Id. “Clear and convincing
evidence” leaves “no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions
drawn from the evidence.” Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn.
1992). It produces a firm belief or conviction in the fact-finder’s mind regarding the truth
of the facts sought to be established. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596.

        We review the trial court’s findings of fact “de novo on the record, with a
presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is
otherwise.” In re Taylor B.W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 112 (Tenn. 2013); TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d).
We then “make [our] own determination regarding whether the facts, either as found by
the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, provide clear and
convincing evidence that supports all the elements of the termination claim.” In re Bernard
T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97. We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo with no
presumption of correctness. In re J.C.D., 254 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

       Foster Parents contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their termination
petition. In their view, clear and convincing evidence supported both alleged grounds for
termination of Father’s parental rights. DCS does not share their view. On appeal, DCS
sides with Father, who argues that the trial court’s judgment was correct.

1. Failure to File a Timely Paternity Action

       Foster Parents insist that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of
Father’s parental rights for failure to file a timely petition to establish paternity, a ground
applicable to putative fathers. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi). Father concedes
that he was a putative father when Foster Parents filed their petition. See id.
§ 36-1-102(44). And we agree. See id. § 36-1-117(c)(3).

        As a putative father, Father’s parental rights were subject to termination if he “failed
to file a petition to establish paternity of the child within thirty (30) days after notice of
alleged paternity.” Id. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi). Father testified that Mother notified him
in June 2019 that he might be the Child’s biological father. Mother’s message provided
                                                6
the requisite “notice of alleged paternity.” See id. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(B)(i) (defining notice
to include the mother’s written statement “to a person who is believed to be the biological
father or possible biological father of the child”). Yet Father did not file a petition to
establish paternity until 2021.

       The trial court reasoned that Father’s failure to file a timely petition was “not
willful” because he “made and took every reasonable effort” to establish paternity. It
credited Father’s testimony that after he received Mother’s message, he immediately
contacted DCS.3 He provided the family service worker with his personal information, and
she told him that DCS would investigate his claim. But rather than investigate, DCS simply
“ignored Father’s request” and then “actively thwarted and delayed Father’s efforts to
discover if he were . . . father to [the] Child.”

        After a de novo review of the record, we conclude there is clear and convincing
evidence to support this ground for termination. We cannot ignore the plain language of
the statute. In re Adaline D., No. E2020-01597-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 5297683, at *11
(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2021). Foster Parents were not required to prove that Father’s
conduct was willful. See In re E.C., No. E2016-02582-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 2438574,
at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2017); In re H.A.L., No. M2005-00045-COA-R3-PT, 2005
WL 954866, at *8-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2005) (reasoning that the termination grounds
in (g)(9) “are less difficult to prove” in part “because they do not include a willfulness
requirement”). Nor does this ground “expressly require that DCS exert reasonable efforts
to assist Father in establishing himself as a legal parent.”4 In re E.C., 2017 WL 2438574,
at *10; see, e.g., In re Samone D., No. W2021-01225-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 1962016, at
*14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2023) (rejecting putative father’s argument that DCS’s failure
to assist him excused his failure to file a petition); In re Jase P., No. E2016-02519-COA-
R3-PT, 2017 WL 2672781, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2017) (rejecting argument that
“DCS could establish Father’s paternity more readily than Father”).

        Father learned he could be the Child’s biological father in June 2019. He did not
file a petition to establish paternity of the Child until 2021. As these facts are undisputed,
Foster Parents proved this ground for termination of Father’s parental rights. See In re
Rilyn S., No. E2018-00027-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 1130442, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Mar. 12, 2019) (reasoning that clear and convincing evidence supported this ground for

        3
           We typically give great deference to a trial court’s credibility assessments. Watson v. Watson,
309 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). But here the court’s findings were based on the trial transcript
and exhibits, not in-court testimony. So we may draw our “own conclusions with regard to the weight and
credibility” of the evidence. Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 693 (Tenn. 2014).
        4
          The “extent of DCS’s efforts to reunify the family is weighed in the court’s best interest analysis.”
In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555.

                                                      7
termination when it was undisputed that, “despite having notice of his alleged paternity,
Father failed to file a petition to establish paternity within thirty days”).

2. Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume Custody

        Foster Parents also contend that termination of Father’s parental rights was
appropriate under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14). Under this ground, a
parent’s rights may be terminated if he “[1] failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability
and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody . . . of the child, and [2]
placing the child in the [parent’s] legal and physical custody would pose a risk of
substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(g)(14). The statute does not define precisely the circumstances that might pose
a risk of “substantial harm” to a child. See id. But the risk must come from the child’s
placement in the parent’s legal and physical custody. Id. And the harm must be “a real
hazard or danger that is not minor, trivial, or insignificant” and is “more than a theoretical
possibility.” Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Both the
failure-to-manifest and the substantial-harm prongs must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674 (Tenn. 2020).

        Foster Parents argue that we must assess Father’s ability and willingness as of the
date the termination petition was filed. We have previously held that the most relevant
time period for this ground is the time preceding the filing of the petition to terminate
parental rights. In re M.E.N.J., No. E2017-01074-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 6603658, at *7
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2017). But the court may also consider the parent’s actions after
the petition was filed. In re Kendall K., M2021-01463-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 10331612,
at * 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2022); In re Jeremiah S., No. W2019-00610-COA-R3-PT,
2020 WL 1951880, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2020).

       Like the trial court, we find Father evidenced both an ability and willingness to
assume custody and financial responsibility for the Child. Father had a steady income and
a suitable home. Early on, he informed DCS that he wanted to parent the Child. He made
numerous efforts to obtain a DNA test. Once established as the legal father, he took
advantage of every opportunity to learn about the Child’s medical condition and special
needs. Through the exchange of videos and in-person visits, Father and the Child formed
an undeniable bond.

        We also conclude that the evidence of substantial harm fell short. Ms. Peak
described the adverse effect separation from a stable, predictable relationship can have on
a young child, especially one with special needs. But she did not address whether this
particular child would face more than a theoretical risk of harm to his psychological welfare
if placed in Father’s custody.

                                              8
                                            B.

       Finally, Father seeks an award of attorney’s fees at trial and on appeal as the
prevailing party in a custody dispute. But we have previously held that one of the statutes
that Father relied on, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), does not apply to parental
termination cases. See In re Makenzie L., No. M2014-01081-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL
3793788, at *21 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2015); In re Nathaniel C.T., 447 S.W.3d 244,
247 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014); Bryant v. Bryant, No. 01A01-9806-CV-00337, 1999 WL
43282, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 1999). We see no reason to depart from our prior
precedent.

        He also requests attorney’s fees as damages for a frivolous appeal. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 27-1-122 (2017). A frivolous appeal is one “utterly devoid of merit.” Combustion Eng’g,
Inc. v. Kennedy, 562 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tenn. 1978). This appeal was not totally devoid of
merit. Foster Parents were partially successful. So we also decline to award Father
attorney’s fees on this basis.

                                            III.

        We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the Foster Parents’ termination
petition. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support termination of
Father’s parental rights for failure to file a timely petition to establish paternity. So we
vacate the court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. On remand, the court should consider whether termination of Father’s parental
rights is in the Child’s best interest and enter an appropriate order. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(k). The current custody arrangement shall remain in effect pending the entry
of a new final order.

                                                      s/ W. Neal McBrayer
                                                   W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE

                                             9