Court Opinion

ID: 9558806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:17:08.976798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:36.659628
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J.
pro tempore, dissenting.
The majority holds that Rivett’s request, during the stop, for consent to search the car is proper, because “an officer does not need authority to ask a person for consent to search.” 126 Or App at 38. Because ORS 810.410(3) controls the officer’s authority to question a driver, during a stop, about his willingness to consent to a search, the majority’s conclusion is incorrect. See State v. Aguilar, 126 Or App 22, 29-34, 867 P2d 520 (1994) (Durham, J. pro tempore, dissenting); State v. Bucholz, 114 Or App 624, 627, 836 P2d 180 (1992).
The prosecutor never asked and the officer never stated her reason for requesting consent to search the car. On the record, we cannot determine what the officer actually believed was the legal basis for that action. See State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 204, 729 P2d 524 (1986). Thus, we cannot determine whether the request for consent bore a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the stop, or whether it was authorized on some basis other than the traffic infraction. State v. Porter, 312 Or 112, 120, 817 P2d 1306 (1991). The state has not met its burden to show that this warrantless search was authorized. ORS 810.410(3); State v. Baker, 100 Or App 31, 33, 784 P2d 446 (1989).
For these reasons, I dissent.