Court Opinion

ID: 9929690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-03 07:11:54.108128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:43:46.255380
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed February 1, 2024

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                                 No. 11-22-00336-CR
                                     __________

               BONNIE DESSIRAE KENESON, Appellant
                                        V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 161st District Court
                              Ector County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. B-21-0150-CR

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
      Appellant, Bonnie Dessirae Keneson, was convicted of the third-degree
felony offense of driving while intoxicated.       See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2023). Based on Appellant’s plea of “true,” the jury
found an enhancement allegation to be “true” and assessed Appellant’s punishment
at twenty years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice.1 The trial court thereafter sentenced Appellant accordingly and
assessed court costs, reimbursement fees, and restitution against her.
       On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue: the trial court abused its
discretion when it ordered Appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $60 to the
Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS). The State concedes, and we agree, that
Appellant’s contention is correct. Accordingly, we modify and affirm.
                                 I. Analysis - Restitution
       Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered
Appellant to pay the restitution amount referenced above ($60 for incurred lab fee
expenses) because DPS is not a “victim” of the offense for which Appellant was
convicted, and the assessed amount was not a direct result of the offense itself.
Although the challenged restitution amount was not orally pronounced by the trial
court when it sentenced Appellant, this amount is included and recited in the trial
court’s judgment of conviction.
       We review a challenge to a restitution order for an abuse of discretion.
Cartwright v. State, 605 S.W.2d 287, 288–89 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
Due process considerations are implicated if the trial court improperly orders
restitution. Burt v. State, 445 S.W.3d 752, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
       “[Restitution] may be ordered only to a victim of an offense for which the
defendant is charged.” Hanna v. State, 426 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(emphasis added); Goodman v. State, No. 11-21-00109-CR, 2021 WL 5830719, at
*2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 9, 2021, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Sheridan v. State, No. 11-19-00303-CR, 2020 WL
1887710, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 16, 2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem.
op., not designated for publication); Sexton v. State, No. 11-18-00278-CR, 2019 WL

       1
        Based on the jury’s finding, Appellant’s sentence was enhanced to a second-degree punishment
range. See PENAL § 12.42(a).
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4316791, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 12, 2019, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). As such, only a recognized “victim” may
receive restitution from a convicted defendant. In that regard, a trial court may order
a defendant who is convicted of an offense to pay restitution to either a victim of
that offense or to a crime victim’s assistance fund; however, a convicted defendant
who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment may not be ordered to pay restitution to
a law enforcement agency or an agency of the State of Texas, such as DPS. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.037(a) (West Supp. 2023); Hanna, 426 S.W.3d at
91, 94; Shircliff v. State, 654 S.W.3d 788, 793 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, no pet.);
Sheridan, 2020 WL 1887710, at *2–3; Sexton, 2019 WL 4316791, at *1.
      Here, Appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and the
“restitution” ordered by the trial court and assessed against Appellant consisted of a
$60 lab fee expense payable to DPS. Because the trial court had no authority to
order Appellant to reimburse DPS for this expense, it abused its discretion when it
did so. See CRIM. PROC. art. 42.037(a); see also Hanna, 426 S.W.3d at 91 (DPS fees
are not subject to a restitution order); Ortega v. State, No. 11-19-00081-CR, 2021
WL 2836799, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 8, 2021, no pet.) (per curiam)
(mem. op. on remand, not designated for publication); Hutson v. State, No. 11-19-
00037-CR, 2021 WL 2836976, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 8, 2021, no pet.)
(per curiam) (mem. op. on remand, not designated for publication); Sheridan, 2020
WL 1887710, at *2–3 (the trial court has no authority to assess DPS lab fees as
restitution or to order a defendant to reimburse DPS for lab fee expenses when the
defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment; DPS lab fees are not subject to a
restitution order under Article 42.037(a)); Sexton, 2019 WL 4316791, at *1–2
(same). Therefore, we must modify the trial court’s judgment to delete this improper
restitution assessment. Burt, 445 S.W.3d at 757–58. Accordingly, we sustain
Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
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                               II. This Court’s Ruling
      We modify the trial court’s judgment to delete the restitution assessment of
$60 for lab fee expenses that the trial court ordered payable to DPS. As modified,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b).

                                               W. STACY TROTTER
                                               JUSTICE

February 1, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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