Court Opinion

ID: 9543958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:50:54.823329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:35.470107
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting): I am willing to concede, for the purposes of this dissent, that the juvenile court’s finding that the mother “has substantially and continuously refused and neglected to give the minor children the parental care and protection necessary for their health, morals and well being, pursuant to section 48.40(2) (b) of the Statutes” is not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. This concession may appear to end the matter since one would think that a judicial decision which is supported by substantial evidence could not be arbitrary or capricious. However, this court has held that the mere existence of a statutory ground for termination of parental rights cannot alone justify the court’s ordering termination. As the majority opinion explains, the trial court must take a further step. The trial court “must consider all the circumstances and exercise its sound discretion as to whether termination would promote the best interests of the child.” In re Johnson, 9 Wis.2d 65, 75, 100 N.W.2d 883 (1960).
The majority states that the trial court order terminating parental rights is better designed to promote the best interests of the children than the guardian ad litem’s recommendation that the mother’s rights not be terminated. I concede that the facts which the court recites in *587support of this conclusion clearly substantiate the court’s earlier order removing the children from the physical custody of the mother; but the facts do not support termination of the mother’s parental rights. The facts relied on by the majority to support termination of parental rights occurred for the most part prior to the court’s transfer of physical custody to the grandparents. There is no evidence in the record of events occurring after the transfer of custody which necessitates or permits the court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.
The record shows that since April 30, 1974, the children have resided with their maternal grandparents and that the children have been well provided for. The record does not establish that the mother’s conduct or relationship with the children — admittedly poor — was harmful to the children during the period they resided with the grandparents. Nevertheless the majority holds that termination is in the best interests of the children and necessary for the “sense of continuity important to child development.”
This holding is fallacious on two grounds. First, the majority mistakenly places unquestioning reliance on the importance of “continuity of relationship” and the “psychological parent-child” relationship. The supposedly paramount importance of the continuity of the psychological parent-child relationship was propounded in Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973). This theory is the subject of great controversy. See, e.g., Kadushin, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: An Essay Review, 48 Soc. Sci. Rev. 508 (1974); Smith v. Offer, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n. 52 (1977). Yet the majority appears to accept the theory not only without hesitation but also without the benefit of any expert or other opinion or testimony about the theory or its application to the facts of this case.
*588Second, the majority’s holding that termination would strengthen the children’s “sense of continuity and stability” is unsupported by the record. The trial court, after finding that a ground for termination existed, simply concluded that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate parental rights. The trial court did not explain or justify its conclusion; it did not consider the significance of the continuity of relationship. This court has held that a decision which requires the exercise of discretion and which on its face demonstrates no consideration of any of the factors on which the decision should be properly based constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 278, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971). The court is obliged, however, to uphold a discretionary decision of a trial court if, from the record, it can conclude that there are facts of record which would support the trial judge’s decision had discretion been exercised on the basis of those facts. Klimas v. State, 75 Wis.2d 244, 247, 249 N.W.2d 285 (1977); Maier Const., Inc. v. Ryan, 81 Wis.2d 463, 473 260 N.W.2d 700 (1978).
Reviewing the record, I find no facts adequate to support the conclusion that termination of the mother’s rights will strengthen the children’s sense of continuity.
It is probable that if physical custody continued in the grandparents the mother’s relationship with the children would continue whether or not her parental rights were terminated. It is hard to believe that the mother would be barred forever from visiting her parents’ home. Indeed the maternal grandfather testified that he prayed his daughter (the children’s mother) would improve her way of life. He said that if in the future his daughter changed and she wanted the children back she should have them: “Children belong to their real full parents. They belong to them until the end of their days. I believe that.” The maternal grandmother also testified that *589if her daughter changed, she should he given the chance to see the children.
A witness made passing reference to the “possibility of disruption” of the children unless the mother’s rights were terminated. The disruption in the children’s sense of continuity and stability, and in their lives generally, had already been substantially decreased by the award of their physical custody to their grandparents. The record fails to show that the disruption would be further decreased by the termination of their mother’s legal rights.
Terminating the mother’s parental rights did not clear the way for final placement of the children. The record indicates that the rights of the father had not yet been terminated and that no proceedings of termination had yet been commenced. See secs. 48.425(5), (6n), Stats. Thus the mother’s rights have been terminated but the children cannot yet be finally placed. At some future time these children could be removed from the grandparents, and could be placed with another family on a temporary or permanent basis. The court’s action did not assure continuity and stability for the children.
The power to terminate parental rights, the power to sever permanently the legal ties between parent and child, is an awesome governmental power. Such power should be exercised with restraint. The record in this case justifies the court’s continuing the children in the physical custody of their maternal grandparents. But the record does not establish that it is in the best interests of the children that the mother’s parental rights be terminated.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice HEFFER-NAN and Mr. Justice DAY join in this dissenting opinion.