Court Opinion

ID: 9710029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:00:06.538148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:53.646503
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The majority concludes that an anonymous tip provided to the Alpena Police Department was sufficient to justify a stop and subsequent search of Merl Faucett’s vehicle, and reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals. I would affirm.
i
The Alpena Police received an anonymous telephone call advising that Faucett was then transporting a quarter of a pound of either marijuana or cocaine in a "newer model blue pickup, possibly a Datsun,” and that he was traveling into Alpena on Werth Road and would turn onto Hobbs Drive and then onto either Third or Grant. The tipster also advised that the drugs would be concealed in a carrying case behind the front seat of the vehicle.
The circuit court suppressed evidence of drugs found during a subsequent stop, finding that the anonymous tip did not justify a reasonable suspi*174cion of criminal activity sufficient to support an investigative stop of Faucett’s vehicle because it "did not contain the necessary range of details concerning the Defendant’s present and future actions.” The Court of Appeals affirmed.
We all appear to agree concerning the law. The minimum constitutional standard that the police and the anonymous tip must meet is established under the federal constitution.1 The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Alabama v White, 496 US 325; 110 S Ct 2412; 110 L Ed 2d 301 (1990), is controlling.2
The focus in White was whether the anonymous tip sufficiently predicts future behavior of the defendant, verified by the police, to justify the police in concluding that the tipster has special familiarity with the affairs of the defendant, and thus there is sufficient indicia of reliability of the tip to justify a stop.
In White, Corporal Davis of the Montgomery Police Department received an anonymous telephone call informing him that Vanessa White (1) would be leaving apartment 235-C of the Lynwood Terrace Apartments at a particular time *175later that day, (2) would enter a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight lens, (3) would drive to Dobey’s Motel, and (4) would be in possession of an ounce of cocaine in a brown attaché case.3
Davis and his partner watched the Lynwood Terrace Apartments and observed a woman leave building 235 in the time frame designated by the caller, enter the brown station wagon, and proceed in the most direct route possible to Dobey’s Motel. White was stopped by another squad car at Davis’ direction before actually reaching the motel. Before stopping White, the Montgomery Police Officers had corroborated the following predictions made by the anonymous tipster: (1) a woman would leave building 235 of the Lynwood Terrace Apartments during a designated time frame, (2) she would enter a specifically described vehicle, and (3) would drive to a specific destination.
In deciding on the sufficiency of the tip in White, the Court emphasized the caller’s ability to predict White’s future behavior. As the Court observed (quoting its prior opinion in Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 [1983]), "the anonymous [tip] contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted”4 (emphasis added). The Court explained:
The fact that the officers found a car precisely matching the caller’s description in front of the 235 building is an example of the former. Anyone could have "predicted” that fact because it was a condition presumably existing at the time of the *176call. What was important was the caller’s ability to predict respondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated inside information — a special familiarity with respondent’s affairs. The general public would have had no way of knowing that respondent would shortly leave the building, get in the described car, and drive the most direct route to Dobey’s Motel.[5]
In finding the tip sufficient to support the investigative stop under the totality of the circumstances — and the Court said that White was a "close case”6 — the Court focused on the tipster’s prediction of White’s future behavior that was verified by the police, and concluded that there was sufficient indicia of reliability to establish reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of her vehicle. It was the veriñcation of the prediction of future behavior that provided indicia of reliability and the police in White with reasonable suspicion:
Because only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individual’s illegal activities. When significant aspects of the caller’s predictions were veriñed, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop.[7]
II
To provide sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigative stop, the tip must indicate that the caller has special familiarity with the *177defendant’s affairs. Under White, such indicia arises from the tipster’s ability to accurately predict the defendant’s future behavior.
The anonymous tip in this case did not contain the same level of indicia of reliability, arising from the verification of prediction of future behavior, as did the tip in White.
The tip to the Alpena Police Department was made while Faucett was already driving into Alpena on Werth Road in his "newer model blue pickup, possibly a Datsun.” Thus, the only prediction of future behavior contained in the tip that could possibly have been verified by the police was that Faucett would turn onto Hobbs Road, and then onto either Grant or Third. The only prediction actually verified by the police was that Faucett would turn from Hobbs — where he was first observed — onto either Grant or Third.
The majority relies on the following as critical to its conclusion that the anonymous tip to the Alpena Police was sufficient to justify the stop in this case: "(1) the anonymous caller identified defendant, (2) the caller knew at the time of the call that defendant was en route, (3) the caller described the pickup truck with substantial accuracy, and (4) defendant’s travel route was described in significant detail.”8
Evaluating the majority’s four "critical facts,” there was not sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop in this case. Although the officers verified that it was Faucett in the truck and that the truck appeared to have been traveling along Werth Road,9 this part of the tip, the first three of the four "critical facts” relied on by the majority, did not provide indicia of reliability under the *178principles set forth in White.10 The tipster’s statement that Faucett was traveling in his blue pickup into Alpena on Werth Road did not indicate that the caller had inside information, and is more properly characterized as a condition existing at the time of the tip, observable by any member of the general public.11
This leaves what is left of the fourth "critical fact,” namely, that Faucett would turn from Hobbs Drive onto either Third or Grant. And thus the majority concludes that the Alpena police had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop of Faucett’s truck simply because the police had verified that Faucett would turn from Hobbs Drive —where Faucett was first observed by the Alpena Police — onto either Third or Grant.
Under the principles set forth in White, this was not sufficient indicia of the reliability of the tip. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

 Because the evidence of drugs was seized outside the curtilage of a dwelling house, the Michigan Constitution does not provide greater protection. Const 1963, art 1, § 11 provides:
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug . . . seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.

 I have considered this Court’s decision in People v Walker, 401 Mich 572; 259 NW2d 1 (1977). Alabama v White, the United States Supreme Court’s most recent explication of the principles established in Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983), is controlling.

 The prohibited substance was found in the attaché case, but this was after the stop and search and did not provide retrospectively a basis for the stop.

 496 US 332.

 Id. (Emphasis added.)

 Id.

 Id. (Citations omitted, emphasis added.)

 Ante at 167.

 Bearing in mind that Faucett was not observed until he was already on Hobbs Drive, albeit in the vicinity of the intersection of Hobbs Drive and Werth Road.

 The majority stresses that the Alpena police verified all facts available before stopping Faucett, and asserts that it was not relevant that the caller did not provide a point of departure under the circumstance that Faucett was already en route when the call was made. This analysis obscures White’s emphasis on the verification of prediction of future behavior to establish reliability.

 Faucett was identified by name, and this might have some relevance in determining whether the ■ remainder of the tip was credible. Anyone who knew Faucett but lacked "inside information” or "special familiarity” with his affairs could, however, have so identified him.