Court Opinion

ID: 9543919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:50:29.132436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:28.730750
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: The defendant in this case was convicted of aggravated battery for kicking a security officer in the groin. The evidence is indisputable that the defendant was the moving party in the scuffle with the officer. Defendant shoved the officer into an elevator, wrestled with the officer, and forcibly kneed and kicked the officer in the groin. The majority sees fit to order a new trial for the sole reason that the jury was not instructed on the lesser offense of reckless conduct. Why does the majority reason thusly? Because one witness described the defendant’s conduct as “wild and flailing about.” If defendant was “wild and flailing about,” says the majority, then perhaps his conduct was not intentional but was merely reckless. In the first place, the defendant plainly knew what he was doing. He forcibly attacked the officer and persisted in the attack. That his kicks to the groin may have been intended for a different part of the officer’s anatomy is not only unlikely beyond a reasonable doubt, it is entirely immaterial. It would be a queer situation in law to permit an attacker who intentionally batters another to assert that while he, of course, intended to hit the victim about the head, face and body, that the blows which caused hurt and injury were carelessly delivered to the wrong body parts and with more force than was intended; that the hurtful blows were recklessly made. Only the harmless blows were intentional. If we accept the rationale of the majority in the case at hand, we are virtually there. Simply because a defendant may not have intended to harm the victim does not compel the conclusion that he acted recklessly. (People v. Harris (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 703.) Further, a defendant is presumed responsible for the consequences of his acts when he knowingly engages in the activity. A case on point is People v. Rickman (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 755, where this court considered a similar issue to the one presented here. In Rickman, a security manager of a department store attempted to restrain the defendant for suspected shoplifting. The defendant struggled to escape restraint and handcuffing until he eventually fell on top of the security guard’s ankle and broke it. Rickman was charged with and found guilty of aggravated battery. On appeal, Rick-man argued that the State failed to prove that he knowingly caused great bodily harm to the security guard, that a person knowingly causes great bodily harm when he is consciously aware that such a result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct, and that he was attempting to escape, not harm the victim. This court disagreed, saying: “In order for [Rickman] to be proved guilty of aggravated battery, the State need only show that he knowingly scuffled with [the victim] and that [the victim] received great bodily harm as a result of the scuffle. That [Rickman] did not intend to break [the victim’s] ankle is immaterial; he did intend to scuffle with [the. victim] and he must accept responsibility for the result of the scuffle. Anyone who engages in a scuffle must be deemed to be aware that someone may be injured as a result.” Rickman, 73 Ill. App. 3d at 760. The trial court was correct in refusing to instruct the jury on reckless conduct; this conviction should be affirmed, not reversed or remanded, Accordingly, I dissent.