Court Opinion

ID: 9943406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 16:00:44.046546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:58.343332
License: Public Domain

21-6461
   Kadiyan v. Garland
                                                                                          BIA
                                                                                     Palmer, IJ
                                                                                  A208 571 350
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                      SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

           At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
   at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
   York, on the 23rd day of February, two thousand twenty-four.

   PRESENT:
               DENNIS JACOBS,
               GERARD E. LYNCH,
               JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                     Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   SUNIL KADIYAN,
             Petitioner,

                 v.                                                       21-6461
                                                                          NAC
   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES
   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
   _____________________________________

   FOR PETITIONER:                         Suraj Raj Singh, Esq., Richmond Hill, New York.

   FOR RESPONDENT:                         Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
                                           General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Carmel
                                           A. Morgan, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
                                           Litigation, United States Department of Justice,
                                           Washington, District of Columbia.
       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

petition for review is DENIED.

       Petitioner Sunil Kadiyan, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a July 21, 2021

decision of the BIA, affirming an April 18, 2019 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which

denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Sunil Kadiyan., No. A208 571 350 (B.I.A. Jul. 21, 2021), aff’g

No. A208 571 350 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 18, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with

the underlying facts and procedural history.

       We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”

Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review the agency’s

factual findings for substantial evidence, and questions of law and application of law to fact de

novo. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). “[T]he administrative

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude

to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

       Kadiyan alleges that he was attacked twice in India by members of the ruling Bharatiya

Janata Party (“BJP”) because he supported the Indian National Lok Dal Party (“Lok Dal”). He

testified that, after the first attack, he went to the police to file a report, but the police, who he

alleges were associated with the BJP, told him to leave or they would file a false case against him.

Kadiyan stated that he did not go to the police after the second attack because he “was convinced”

that they would not act against workers for the ruling party. Certified Administrative Record at

314.

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       On appeal, Kadiyan argues that the agency erred in concluding that his claims of past

persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution failed because he did not demonstrate

that the Indian government was unwilling or unable to protect him from local BJP members who

harmed him in the past or may seek to do so in the future. Kadiyan also contends that the agency

erred in alternatively finding that the government had met its burden of demonstrating that he could

safely and reasonably relocate within India to avoid future persecution or torture and that it would

be reasonable to expect him to do so. As set forth below, we find no basis to disturb the agency’s

finding regarding Kadiyan’s ability to relocate within India and, because that finding is dispositive

of each of his claims for relief, we need not address his challenges to the agency’s other findings.

See I.N.S. v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts and

agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the

results they reach.”); Gurung v. Barr, 929 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2019) (noting that remand is not

necessary “when the IJ articulates an alternative and sufficient basis for her determination”

(citation omitted)).

       When an applicant has established past persecution, he is entitled to a presumption of a

well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). As relevant here, the burden

then shifts to the government to demonstrate by “a preponderance of the evidence” that “[t]he

applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating” within the country of removal and that

“under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” 8 C.F.R. §

1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); see also Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2010). In determining

whether internal relocation is reasonable, the IJ considers relevant factors such as “whether the

applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil

strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical

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limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial

ties.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3). 1

        Here, even assuming arguendo that Kadiyan suffered past persecution on account of a

protected ground, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Kadiyan could safely

relocate from his home state of Haryana to another part of India, and that it would be reasonable

to expect him to do so. Kadiyan was assaulted by local members of the BJP and did not allege

that those members were connected to government officials on the national stage or otherwise

involved in the BJP at high levels. He further testified that Lok Dal party members hold seats in

the national assembly, indicating that they hold influence in other areas of India. 2 Further,

Kadiyan speaks Hindi, the national language, secured work as a commercial truck driver in the

United States, and attended three years of university studying civil engineering, all indicia upon

which the agency reasonably relied in its determination that he would be able to adjust to a new

area within India.

        Kadiyan argues that he cannot safely relocate because the BJP has a pervasive presence

throughout the country, and the police will track him to other states. However, there is no country

conditions evidence to support a conclusion that BJP supporters or the local police have the means

or inclination to track members of opposition parties. See Jagdeep Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th

106, 117 (2d Cir. 2021) (finding it reasonable to expect the petitioner to relocate within India where

the record reflected “no central countrywide registration system or nationwide police database that

1
 Citations in this order refer to the versions of the applicable regulations that were in effect at the time of
Kadiyan’s proceedings before the agency in 2019.
2
   The country conditions evidence also reflects generally “free and fair” national elections despite
“isolated instances of violence.” Certified Administrative Record at 196.

                                                      4
members of the [rival political party] could use to track rivals and that only high-profile militants—

not local party organizers . . .—are of interest to national authorities”). In short, on this record,

we are not compelled to conclude, contrary to the agency’s conclusion, that relocation within India

was not a reasonable and safe option for Kadiyan. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Jagdeep

Singh, 11 F.4th at 113 (“The scope of review under the substantial evidence standard is

exceedingly narrow, and we will uphold the BIA’s decision unless the petitioner demonstrates that

the record evidence was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find him eligible

for relief.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Accordingly, the agency did not err

in denying his application for asylum and finding him ineligible for withholding of removal. See

8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B).

        The agency’s relocation finding was also dispositive of CAT relief because it prevented

Kadiyan from establishing the requisite likelihood of torture. 3 See id. § 1208.16(c)(3) (listing

ability to relocate as consideration in determining likelihood of torture); Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d

111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that where record does not demonstrate a discernable chance

of persecution required for asylum, it “necessarily fails to demonstrate” the likelihood of harm for

CAT relief); accord Singh Bhagtana v. Garland, 88 F.4th 121, 125 (2d Cir. 2023), amended, No.

20-1673-ag (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 2024) (explaining that, where petitioner claimed he was persecuted

by BJP members, “[petitioner’s] ability to relocate within India is dispositive of the claims of

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because safe relocation precludes a finding of an

objectively reasonable fear of future harm”).

3
  CAT relief requires the applicant “to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be
tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).

                                                      5
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

                                    FOR THE COURT:
                                    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                    Clerk of Court

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