Court Opinion

ID: 9667864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:56:42.432374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:40.365050
License: Public Domain

R. M. Maher, J.
(dissenting). I find no basis to uphold the warrantless search of defendant’s automobile some 18 hours after his arrest.
An evaluation of the legality of the search must begin with the premise that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject to only a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”. Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 357; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 454-455; 91 S Ct 2022; 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971). Though the Supreme Court recognized, over 50 years ago, an exception to the warrant requirement when an automobile stopped on a highway is searched, Carroll v United States, 267 US 132; 45 S Ct 280; 69 L Ed 543; 39 ALR 790 (1925), "[t]he word 'automobile’ is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears”. Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 461; 91 S Ct 2022; 29 L Ed 564 (1971).
The search of defendant’s car cannot be justified as a warrantless search incident to an arrest. See Preston v United States, 376 US 364, 367; 84 S Ct 881; 11 L Ed 2d 777 (1964) ("Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest.”), cf. Coolidge v New Hampshire, supra. Unless the search falls within the *357exception created by Carroll, and expanded by Chambers v Maroney, 399 US 42; 90 S Ct 1975; 26 L Ed 2d 419 (1970), it runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.1
Probable cause to believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime is not, in itself, enough to bring the Carroll-Chambers exception into play. If only probable cause was necessary, this search would present no problem, for probable cause would not disappear here by the passage of time. In addition to probable cause, the "automobile exception” requires circumstances making delay impractical.
In Carroll, the Supreme Court recognized "a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect to which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile * * * where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought”. 267 US 132, 153; 45 S Ct 280, 285; 69 L Ed 543, 551. (Emphasis supplied.) In Chambers, the court did not lose sight of Carroll’s underlying basis in approving the station house search by police of an automobile they had just seized. "Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.” 399 US 42, 51; 90 S Ct 1975, 1981; 26 L Ed 2d 419, 428. In both Carroll and Chambers it is the necessity of a prompt search, one that, for practical reasons, cannot be delayed while a war*358rant is obtained, that allows a warrantless search to be viewed as constitutional.2
In Chambers, police stopped a car and arrested its occupants at night. The Supreme Court noted several factors that made the decision to search the car at the station house rather than at the scene a reasonable one. The choice then facing the police was either to conduct a prompt warrantless search or continue their seizure of the car until a warrant could be obtained. The court refused to express a preference for one or the other of these justified intrusions. "For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.” The Court’s approach in Chambers shows the appropriateness of then Judge Levin’s emphasis on the immediateness of the search in People v Weaver, 35 Mich App 504; 192 NW2d 572 (1971).
"In exusing a warrantless search at the station house, the majority in Chambers argued that the infringement on the defendant’s rights by such a search could not be said to be greater than the infringement caused by the detention of the automobile until a warrant could be obtained. Here, two days had passed. The additional intrusion caused by a few hours’ delay while a warrant is sought no longer outweighs the disadvantage to the defendant of not requiring a determination by an independent judicial officer before a search is made. Particu*359larly where, as here, the defendant is in jail, there can be no advantage to him in dispensing with the warrant requirement. He is not, in the vernacular, 'going anyplace’. There is no inconvenience to him, only to the people, in delaying the search until a warrant can be obtained.” 35 Mich App 504, 514.
As in Chambers, the police here were unable to make a complete search at the scene. This would permit a prompt search at the station where the trunk could have been opened. But, with the defendant in jail and the automobile in police control, the failure of the police to obtain a warrant during the 18 hours that elapsed between the arrest and the search cannot be excused.
The holding in People v Gordon, 54 Mich App 693; 221 NW2d 600 (1974), that the search of an automobile eight hours after it arrived at jail late at night was immediate, need not be questioned. The delay here was considerably longer. Texas v White, 423 US 67; 96 S Ct 304; 46 L Ed 2d 209 (1975), the latest Supreme Court case in this area, approved a station house search of an automobile that was conducted shortly after defendant’s arrest. Though the time period is not emphasized in the per curiam opinion, the fact that the arresting officers questioned defendant for 30 to 45 minutes then searched the automobile is mentioned.
This Court should not give its approval to warrantless searches of automobiles conducted when exigent circumstances can no longer be shown. Only if the basis of the "automobile exception”, the necessity of a search before it would be practical to obtain a warrant, is ignored and the exception extended well beyond any application given it so far by the Supreme Court can this search be validated. I would reverse.

 There is no possible application of either the inventory exception, see, e.g. Cady v Dombrowski, 413 US 433; 93 S Ct 2523; 37 L Ed 2d 706 (1973), or the "plain-view” exception, see, e.g. Harris v United States, 390 US 234; 88 S Ct 992; 19 L Ed 2d 1067 (1968), here.

 In Cardwell v Lewis, 417 US 583; 94 S Ct 2464; 41 L Ed 2d 325 (1974), the warrantless seizure of a car from which paint scrapings and tire impressions were taken was upheld. Both the plurality and the dissenting opinions stress the need for exigent circumstances in addition to probable cause to justify the warrantless search or seizure of an automobile. Their dispute was whether, under the facts, there were the necessary exigent circumstances.