Court Opinion

ID: 9766979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:05:28.860497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:27.542046
License: Public Domain

ASHWORTH, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I dissent to that part of the majority opinion which overrules appellant’s first ground of error—that his motion to dismiss should have been granted because he was denied a speedy trial.
The facts and applicable law are properly set forth in the majority opinion with regard to the issue of speedy trial. However, as viewed by this writer, such facts and law required the granting of appellant’s motion to dismiss. Appellant was indicted on January 13, 1981; on February 12,1981, he secured a continuance to better prepare for trial. Statements of two corroborating witnesses were secured on October 29, 1981. On November 18, 1982, appellant moved for a speedy trial alleging his witnesses are becoming unavailable. The case was then set for trial on March *69917, 1983, some four months later, because of the court’s crowded docket.
The State then sought a postponement of the March setting because the prosecutors were involved in a capital murder case. The case was then reset for August 18, 1983, some five months later, again due to a crowded docket. The case did not go to trial on such date. Appellant’s motion to dismiss was filed on August 30, 1983, and was denied. On August 31, 1983, without waiving his motion to dismiss, appellant filed a motion for postponement for want of a witness, alleging necessity for the testimony of the two corroborating witnesses and that such witnesses could probably be located. The trial court granted the postponement but expressly denied appellant’s request to reconsider the August 30, 1983, motion to dismiss. The case went to trial on November 1, 1983, and one of appellant’s corroborating witnesses could not be found for testimony.
The four guidelines set out in Barker v. Wingo, cited in the majority opinion, have been met in the instant case. A delay of nine months from the filing of appellant’s motion for speedy trial is excessive under the circumstances of this case. Trial schedules of the prosecutors and the court’s crowded docket are soft excuses for denying appellant’s constitutional right to trial for a period of nine months. Appellant properly asserted his right to a new trial; his fear of losing his witnesses materialized and he was denied the testimony in person by one of his witnesses, apparently due to the delay of his trial.
Appellant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial and his motion to dismiss should have been granted. The judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for entry of an order of dismissal.