Court Opinion

ID: 9891584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 23:03:15.265133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:43:27.255885
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/18/23 P. v. Ramirez CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H049145
                                                                    (Monterey County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. 19CR013754)

             v.

 LEONARDO RAMIREZ, JR.,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                I. INTRODUCTION
         Defendant Leonardo Ramirez, Jr., entered the home of a 10-year-old relative
through a window and raped the child in her bed at gunpoint. A jury convicted defendant
of rape by force or fear (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2); count 1),1 lewd or lascivious act
involving force or fear with a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); count 2), and sexual intercourse
with a child (§ 288.7, subd. (a); count 3). With respect to count 1, the jury found true
allegations that defendant personally inflicted bodily harm on the child (§ 667.61,
subds. (d)(7) & (j)(1)), that defendant committed the offense during the commission of a
burglary and personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon (§ 667.61, subds. (e)(2), (3)
& (j)(1)), and that defendant committed the offense against a child under the age of
14 years (§ 264, subd. (c)(1)). With respect to count 2, the jury found true allegations

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             All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
that defendant committed the offense during the commission of a first degree burglary
with intent to commit the offense against a child (§ 667.61, subds. (d)(4) & (j)(1)), that
defendant committed the offense during the commission of a burglary and personally
used a dangerous or deadly weapon (§ 667.61, subds. (e)(2), (3) & (j)(1)), and that
defendant personally inflicted bodily harm on the child (§ 667.61, subds. (d)(7) & (j)(1)).
       The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP) for each of counts 1 and 2, and an indeterminate term of 25 years to life
for count 3. The sentences for all three counts were mandatory sentences under the
“One Strike” law, section 667.61. For counts 1 and 2, the mandatory sentences were
LWOP because defendant’s offenses occurred under one or more of the circumstances
specified in section 667.61, subdivision (d), or under two or more of the circumstances
specified in section 667.61, subdivision (e). (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(1).) For count 3, the
mandatory One Strike sentence was 25 years to life, because defendant committed an
offense listed in section 667.61, subdivision (c), upon a victim who was a child under
14 years of age. (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2).)
       For each of counts 2 and 3, the trial court ordered: “This sentence shall be served
concurrent to all counts and this sentence shall be stayed pursuant to Penal Code
Section 654.” The trial court also ordered defendant to pay various fines and fees,
including a $10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and a parole
revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45 in the same amount, with the latter fine
suspended unless defendant’s parole is revoked.
       On appeal, defendant contends: (1) his case must be remanded for resentencing
to determine which offenses to stay under section 654; (2) defendant’s LWOP sentence
constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation of the United States and
California Constitutions; (3) defendant’s ineligibility for youth offender parole
consideration denies him his right to equal protection; (4) defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel by counsel’s failure to raise the cruel and/or unusual punishment

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and equal protection issues in the trial court; (5) the parole revocation restitution fine
must be vacated because defendant was sentenced to an LWOP term; and (6) the matter
should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to permit defendant to present and
preserve evidence pertaining to his youth at the time of the offenses.
       For reasons that we will explain, we will remand for full resentencing under
current law due to legislative amendments to section 654.
                                   II. BACKGROUND
       Defendant’s wife was related to the mother of a 10-year-old girl. On the morning
of the charged offenses, the girl’s mother had just left for work. The girl was sleeping in
her bed when she felt someone pulling down her pants. She turned around and saw a
man wearing a hoodie and a mask, holding what appeared to be a black handgun. The
man flipped the girl over onto her stomach. The girl tried to yell for help, but the man
covered her mouth with his hand and pointed the gun at her head, telling her to “shut up.”
Within a few minutes, the girl felt the man’s penis penetrate her vagina, causing her
“terrible” pain. The girl had difficulty breathing as her assailant’s hand was over her
mouth, but she resisted, including unsuccessfully grabbing for the handgun.
       After about a minute of penetrating the girl, the man gathered his items and left.
When the girl’s older sister awoke about an hour later, the girl told her sister what
happened. A sexual assault examination revealed dried blood around the girl’s nostrils,
red dots across her nose and cheek consistent with strangulation, a swollen lip with a
bump on it, an abrasion in the middle of her back, and injuries to her genitalia consistent
with vaginal penetration. Vulvar and vestibular swabs taken from the girl confirmed the
presence of sperm cells. The examiner could not complete a full examination because
the girl was in pain and began to bleed.
       The girl could not identify her assailant, but she did describe his skin color, deep
voice, and accent. Investigators also gathered male DNA from the sexual assault
examination and observed blood stains, sperm, and seminal fluid on a blanket and pillow

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from the girl’s bed. For two years, the assailant’s identity remained unknown until
defendant sent a message to the girl on Snapchat to connect with her. This caused the girl
to suspect that defendant was her attacker, and to report this to police. Police obtained a
DNA sample from defendant, which produced a “very strong” indication of a match with
the profile of the male DNA gathered from the attack. Police then interviewed defendant.
After initially denying any involvement in the attack, defendant made several admissions,
including that: he used a black “gas pistol” in the attack; he “abused her” including
pulling down her clothing, penetrating her with his finger, and “rubbing [his] penis on
her”; he told the girl to “shut up”; he held her face down and covered her mouth; and he
engaged in these actions to make the girl’s older sister “pay” for comments the older
sister made electronically about defendant’s wife.
       At trial, defendant briefly testified on his own behalf. He stated that he went to
the girl’s house to “reprimand the attitude of a person [the girl’s older sister] who was
bothering me and my wife through text messages.” He stated his intent was to “scare
[the girl’s older sister] and leave quickly.” On cross-examination, defendant denied
attempting to penetrate the girl, but he admitted to rubbing his penis on the girl, stating:
“It was just to do a mischievous act and leave out of there quickly.” Defendant testified
on cross-examination that “it just occurred” to him that morning to enter the house, and
when confronted with his possession of the “full mask” and “BB gun” used in the attack,
he testified that he kept these items on him. Defendant also stated that upon seeing the
girl, he thought she was the girl’s older sister and within one second, he started pulling
down her pants. Defendant testified on cross-examination that minutes after the attack
started, he learned the girl was not the older sister, and he left “fast -- quickly” after that.
       At sentencing, the trial court recounted the facts of the case, concluding: “The
Defendant’s actions in this case were absolutely abhorrent, egregious and appalling.”
After hearing argument in which the parties acknowledged that section 667.61 mandated
defendant’s sentences, the trial court pronounced the sentences. The court stated it

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considered the general objectives of sentencing, which include the following:
“[P]rotecting society, punishing the Defendant, encouraging the Defendant to lead a
law-abiding life in the future, and deterring him from future offenses, deterring others
from criminal conduct by demonstrating its consequences. Preventing the Defendant
from committing new crimes by isolating him for the period of incarceration. Securing
restitution for the victims of crime and achieving uniformity in sentencing.” The trial
court noted that it considered the aggravating factors of infliction of great bodily injury
on the child, the use of a weapon during the commission of the crime, the vulnerability
of the victim, and indications of a degree of planning, along with the mitigating factors
of defendant’s “minimal criminal history” and age or lack of maturity. The court
determined that the aggravating factors “significantly outweigh” the mitigating factors
and imposed the sentences mandated by section 667.61 for the three counts. This appeal
followed.
                                    III. DISCUSSION
       At the time of defendant’s sentencing hearing, section 654, subdivision (a),
provided in relevant part: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the
longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.” (Former § 654, subd. (a).) Effective
January 1, 2022, section 654, subdivision (a), was amended to read in relevant part:
“An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission
be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a), as amended by Stats.
2021, ch. 441, § 1.) “Previously, under section 654, ‘the sentencing court was required
to impose the sentence that “provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment” and
stay execution of the other term. [Citation.] . . . [S]ection 654 now provides the trial
court with discretion to impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could

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result in the trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the longer
sentence.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 45.)
       “ ‘ “Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the
‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “[A] court that is unaware
of its discretionary authority cannot exercise its informed discretion.” ’ [Citation.]
‘Generally, when the record shows that the trial court proceeded with sentencing on the
erroneous assumption it lacked discretion, remand is necessary so that the trial court may
have the opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at a new sentencing hearing.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1096–1097.) When a
statute retroactively supplies a trial court with sentencing discretion, remand is required
unless the record provides a “clear indicator of how the trial court would exercise its new
discretion . . . .” (People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1033.)
       Defendant contends that remand for resentencing is necessary because
amendments to section 654 that became effective after his sentencing hearing provide the
trial court with discretion as to which counts to stay. He asserts that the record does not
clearly indicate that the court would not have stayed the LWOP sentences in favor of the
25-years-to-life sentence on count 3 if the trial court had been aware of the discretion the
Legislature later granted it, and thus remand is required.
       In response, the Attorney General conceded that remand is required because the
amendments to section 654 are ameliorative changes that apply retroactively to
defendant’s nonfinal judgment under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740. The Attorney
General also conceded at oral argument that remand for full resentencing is required
under amended section 654.2

       2
        The Attorney General initially asserted in briefing that remand is unnecessary
because the sentences required under the One Strike law are mandatory and not subject to
stays under section 654.

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       We agree with the parties that the recent amendments to section 654 apply
retroactively to defendant’s judgment. (People v. Fugit (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 981, 995–
996; People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673; People v. Mani (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 343, 379–380.) We also accept the Attorney General’s concession that
remand for full resentencing under current law is required. “[T]he full resentencing rule
allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant.
[Citations.]” (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425.) This disposition
means we need not address defendant’s remaining contentions, which he may elect to
raise in the trial court in the first instance at resentencing.
                                     IV. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for full
resentencing under current law.

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                    BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:

DANNER, J.

WILSON, J.

People v. Ramirez
H049145