Court Opinion

ID: 9667255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:40:35.028061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:35.476303
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice
(dissenting).
This is a venue suit in which venue is sought to be maintained in Travis County under Sub. 4, Art. 1995, V.T.C.S.
Under this subdivision there are three venue facts (1) one or more defendants must reside in county of suit (2) the party asserting his privilege is at least a proper party which is established by the pleading alone (3) plaintiff has a bona fide claim against the resident defendant which must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. McDonald Texas Civil Practice Vol. 1, Sec. 4.10.2,1 Gray v. Gulf Oil Corporation, Tex.Civ.App., 416 S.W.2d 875, Fort Worth, n. w. h.
There is no question but that under the authorities a mere stakeholder may select as between the counties in which various claimants reside and file a bill of inter-pleader in any of such counties, and such county will have venue as to all claimants. McCormick v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 35 S.W.2d 502, Tex.Civ.App., Waco, n. w. h., opinion by Justice Alexander; Luse v. *222Union City Transfer, 324 S.W.2d 935, Tex.Civ.App., Waco, writ dismissed.
McCormick cited in support of its decision Nixon v. New York Life Insurance Co., 100 Tex. 250, 98 S.W. 380, from which I quote:
“The remedy of interpleader is an equitable one, and is for the protection of the disinterested and innocent stakeholder, who claims no interest in the money or property as a claimant or litigant, and who, by reason of the conflicting claims of persons who derive their title either from a common source or one from the other, and the uncertain and doubtful position in which he is placed by the diverse claimants, knows not what to do, and fearing he may be hurt by some of them asks instructions, and protection from a court of equity.”
There are no cases, at least none has been cited and I have found none, which hold that an interested stakeholder may file an interpleader proceeding in a county where a claimant resides who has an interest similar to the interest of the stakeholder and hold venue against a non-resident claimant whose claim is adverse to the plaintiff and other claimants.
The only case considering this question is Noble v. Texacon Industries, Inc., 367 S.W.2d 872, Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, n. w. h. Concededly, this case is distinguishable on substantial grounds not stated by the majority, however it states a principle which I believe is applicable here, and which I quote:
“It will be borne in mind that this is a venue case. All the parties to this suit are domiciled in Harris County except Electrical Company. Brushing away matters of form and looking only to the substance of things, this suit is really one by Texacon and Electrical Company against Noble and Todes to recover the $10,000.00 placed in escrow by them. Venue in Bexar County must rest alone upon the fact that Electrical Company is domiciled in Bexar County. The evidence shows that there is no controversy between Texacon and Electrical Company. They have entered into a written agreement that whatever is recovered from Noble and Todes will be divided equally between them. Texacon and Electrical Company are in truth and in fact co-plaintiffs against the defendants Noble and Todes. Texacon is aligned with Electrical Company in a common fight to recover what they can from Noble and Todes. Under the provisions of our venue statute, Art. 1995, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats., Noble and Todes have a right to have this suit tried in Harris County. The mere fact that the suit is styled an ‘Interpleader’ should not be sufficient to deprive them of their very valuable right, given them by the venue statute, to be sued in the county of their residence.”
In discussing the requirements of sub. 4, Art. 1995, Texas Jur.2d, Vol. 59, Venue Sec. 98, p. 502, states:
“A real defendant, and one against whom the plaintiff has a cause of action, is contemplated by the statute in authorizing a suit in the county of the residence of one of the defendants. It is the actual position of the parties that determines their status; an artificial designation of a party plaintiff as a party defendant gives no right to fix the venue in the county of his residence as against defendants residing in another county.”
To the same effect is Park v. Wood, 146 Tex. 62, 203 S.W.2d 204, from which I quote:
“We have carefully considered the pleadings of the respondents and conclude that no cause of action was stated against Hogan, the resident defendant, within the purview of Exception 4 of *223Article 1995 of the venue statutes. We cannot find in the pleadings a single issue made between the plaintiffs named and the resident defendant Hogan. Nothing appears in the pleadings which would render Hogan adverse to the plaintiffs in any phase of the rather comprehensive suit. Hogan’s interest according to the pleadings, are aligned with those of the plaintiffs. Obviously no such cause of action has been alleged against the resident defendant Hogan as would deprive Park of his privilege to be sued in the county of his residence under Exception 4 of Article 1995. These conclusions also apply to the proof.”
The problem here is not of simple resolution because I concede that Laws had the right to file an interpleader proceeding and that a reasonable doubt existed as to his rights to one third of the money held by him ($5,000.00) and the right of his principals who are aligned with him to two thirds of such money ($10,000.00) and to the right of appellant to all of such money.
Of course, Laws could have filed his interpleader in Williamson County and received the same protection from double liability as he will receive in Travis County, and no questions of venue could have arisen. It is obvious to me that the dominant purpose of his suit was to recover $5,000.00 for himself, and not to avoid double liability.
It is my view and my opinion that when the reason for a rule disappears, the rule should disappear. The Court’s solicitude for an innocent, impartial stakeholder should not cause them to close their eyes and blindly condone a joint effort by principals and their agent to recover in the courts of Travis County $15,000.00 from a resident of Williamson County when the residents of Travis County upon whose residence as defendants venue must be based are in fact not real defendants but are in fact co-plaintiffs.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority has scrambled the venue law by apparently applying to both the cause of action against the resident defendant and the cause of action against the non-resident defendant Downing the rule that plaintiff was only required to establish a prima facie case, which rule, as shown by the authority cited, is applicable to subdivisions of Art. 1995 other than subdivision 4.