Court Opinion

ID: 6423111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 12:01:38.661908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:51.804873
License: Public Domain

C. Allen, J.
These policies were in the form of the Massachusetts Standard Policy, and each provided that “ This policy shall be void ... if, without such assent [namely, the assent in writing or in print of the company], the situation or circumstances affecting the risk shall, by or with the knowledge, advice, agency, or consent of the insured, be so altered as to cause an increase of such risks, ... or if gunpowder or other articles subject to legal restriction shall be kept in quantities or manner different from those allowed or prescribed by law.” Various other circumstances were enumerated which would also avoid the policy. At the beginning of the trial, the defendant waived every defence except increase of risk. The defence of the illegal keeping of intoxicating liquors, as a separate and distinct defence, was therefore waived.
*121We have to consider, in the first place, whether the instructions requested by the defendant were given in substance. The plaintiff contends that they were. The learned judge before whom the case was tried adopted in substance the third and fifth instructions asked for by the defendant, and thus instructed the jury, that if they should find that during the time for which these policies were issued the plaintiff Kyte, by obtaining a common victualler’s license and making use of this building under said license, and legally or illegally selling intoxicating liquors therein, increased the risk, then this policy became void as to the plaintiff Kyte, and he could not recover for his interest therein;-and if they should find that while these policies were in force intoxicating liquors were kept and sold in this building by the plaintiff Kyte, or with his consent or knowledge, and that thereby the risk was increased, this policy became void as to his interest, and he could not recover. This was a general and broad instruction, including the increase of risk by using the premises as a common victualling place, or as a place for selling intoxicating liquors legally or illegally, and well covered the general question of the effect of an increase of risk. From this instruction, taken alone, a jury might well have inferred that the policy would be void in ease of any such increase of risk at any time during the time covered by the policies and before the fire.
But the defendant, in the fourth request for instructions, asked for a special instruction, adapted to the case of a temporary increase of risk which had ceased before the time of the fire; that is to say, that if the jury should find that, by .the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors in this building by the plaintiff Kyte, or by others with his consent and knowledge, for a certain portion of the time for which these policies were issued, the risk was for that, period increased, this policy would be void as to Kyte’s interest, and he could not recover, although this increase was not permanent. The judge declined to give this ruling, and instructed the jury, in substance, that if that illegal use was temporary, not contemplated at the time when the policy was taken by the plaintiff, and ceased before the fire, then the fact that he had made an illegal use of the premises in 1882, which was during the time covered by the policy, would not deprive the plaintiff of the right to maintain the action; and that his right under *122the policy, if suspended while the illegal use of the building continued, would revive when he ceased to use it illegally. This instruction did not in express terms mention the subject of an increase of risk by the illegal use of the premises for selling liquor; but the instruction was given in place of the fourth request for instructions, and that request was refused, the judge saying that he had given what would be entirely inconsistent with it.
The question is thus presented whether the provision of the policy that it shall be void in ease of an increase of risk means that it shall be void only during the time while the increase of risk may last, and may revive again upon the termination of the increase of risk. The provision is. that the policy shall be void if any one of several circumstances successively enumerated shall be found to exist. Some of these circumstances relate to the time of issuing the policy,, and others could not arise till after-wards. They are of different degrees, of importance, some of them going to the essential matters of the contract, and others being comparatively trivial in character. The language of the policy is the same in respect to them all, that the policy shall be void.
In Hinckley v. Germania Ins. Co. 140 Mass. 38, the policy was in the same form as those in the present cases, and for a short time during the term of the policy the plaintiff kept a bowling alley and billiard table without having any license therefor. There was no question of increase of risk, or other actual prejudice to the insurer; and under these circumstances two questions arose: first, whether the plaintiff’s act fell within the provision that the policy should be void if gunpowder or other articles subject to legal restriction should be kept in a manner different from that allowed by law; and secondly, whether, assuming that the policy would be void during the time of the illegal keeping of the bowling alley and billiard table, it would revive after such temporary use had ceased. In deciding the case, the court intimated that the plaintiff’s act was not within the meaning of the provision in the policy, unless the risk was thereby increased, but placed the decision upon the second ground, that the policy would revive. The court now thinks it would have been better to place the decision of *123this part of the case solely upon the first ground, leaving it an open question whether a departure from the terms.of the provision of the policy, without an increase of risk, may be deemed merely to suspend, and not absolutely to avoid the policy. However that may be, we think an increase of risk entitles the insurer to avoid the policy absolutely. The contract of insurance depends essentially upon an adjustment of the premium to the risk assumed. If the assured by his voluntary act increases the risk, and the fact is- not known, the result is that he gets an insurance'for which he has not paid. In its effect upon the company, it is not much different from a misrepresentation of the condition of the property.
If the provision stood alone, that in case of any material misrepresentation as to the risk or any voluntary increase of risk afterwards the policy should be void, it could hardly be doubted that the words should be taken in their natural, obvious mean ing. The fact that with this are coupled the other provision» above referred to does not change its. meaning with reference tc the effect and consequence of an increase of risk. An increase of risk which is substantial, and which is continued for a considerable period of time, is a direct and certain injury to the insurer, and changes the basis upon which the contract of insurance rests; and since there is a provision that, in case of an increase of risk which is consented to or known by the assured, and not disclosed and the assent of the insurer obtained, the policy shall be void, we do not feel at liberty to qualify the meaning of these words by holding that the policy is only suspended during the continuance of such increase of risk. Lyman v. State Ins. Co. 14 Allen, 329. Mead v. Northwestern Ins. Co. 7 N. Y. 530.
It follows, therefore, that the fourth instruction which was requested, or something in substance like it, should have been given. Upon the facts stated and assumed, the increase of risk, if there was one, continued for fifteen months, and could not be treated as a casual, inadvertent, or inevitable thing.

Exceptions sustained.