Court Opinion

ID: 9707111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:02:41.467655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:28.229005
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, dissenting in part and specially concurring in part: I dissent in part because I believe that the majority has violated a basic principle of procedural interpretation. The majority states that the single count filed by plaintiff relates to a statutory cause of action found to be unconstitutional and void ab initio. The majority should have stopped there and said that the only count pled does not give the court subject matter jurisdiction, and the cause should be dismissed as void. Unfortunately, the majority proceeds to reinterpret the statutory claim and determines that it is also a common-law claim. I submit that it is axiomatic that, if a count is a statutory claim, it cannot also be a common-law claim. Assuming, arguendo, that it were, it still should be pled as a separate count as required by section 2 — 613(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 613(a) (West 2004)). The majority subverts the rule of procedure that requires parties to plead “as many causes of action *** as they may have, and each shall be separately designated and numbered.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 613(a) (West 2004). Analogically, the majority has determined that the apple is not merely an apple, it is both an apple and an orange. It accomplishes this feat of legerdemain by reviewing case law that is factually inapposite and applying the general statements of law contained therein without placing the statements in context. Not a single case cited by the majority involved a complaint wherein the count or counts were all deemed to be void. Not one case interpreted a single count as properly (or improperly) containing multiple causes of action. Not one case allowed a plaintiff to plead separate causes of action in a single count. Not one case allowed the majority to do what it does in this disposition — to interpolate a common-law cause of action in a clearly statutory cause of action. An example of the improper reliance upon inapposite case law is embodied in the majority’s reference to Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), as precedential authority. The case is not factually similar. Our supreme court therein rejected the defendants’ argument that the limitations period in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act was a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. The court reviewed the complaint and determined that the allegations set forth in the complaint stated a cause of action independent of the statute of limitations. However, the court went on to say, “Thus, in order to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court, a plaintiffs case, as framed by the complaint or petition, must present a justiciable matter. See People ex rel. Scott v. Janson, 57 Ill. 2d 457, 459 (1974) (if a complaint states a case belonging to a general class over which the authority of the court extends, subject matter jurisdiction attaches) [citations].” Belleville, 199 Ill. 2d at 334. The court in Belleville reviewed the complaint and did not parse words or find a cause of action at common law integrated into a void statutory cause. It did not even find the count void. It merely found that a limitations period in a particular statute was not jurisdictional. In conclusion, to interpolate a common-law cause of action as an integral part of a statutory count and allow the trial court to proceed without a separate common-law count vitiates the requirement to plead separate counts and allows courts to “read between the lines” to establish that a count, no matter how defective, has been pled. Plaintiff argues that such relief existed at common law. That is true. However, subject matter jurisdiction is not determined by whether or not a cause of action exists outside of a complaint. Subject matter jurisdiction is determined by whether or not the complaint contains at least one count that alleges a justiciable issue. Plaintiff had the right to plead more than one version of her claim, but she chose not to do so. She did not allege a justiciable matter in the statutory claim and she filed no other count. Therefore, a review of the complaint does not set forth a justiciable matter unless the majority treats the single count as something that it is not, a common-law count. Because plaintiff failed to include a common-law count, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and the orders appealed from are void. I specially concur as to the portion of the majority opinion that vacates the order prohibiting the parents from communicating with their daughter. I do not disagree with the analysis of the majority. However, the analysis contained in the partial dissent above establishes that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to enter the order prohibiting communication in the first instance. See In re Adoption of Schumacher, 120 Ill. App. 3d 50, 56 (1983) (petition for rule to show cause was properly dismissed because it was based upon the alleged violation of a void visitation order). I believe the same rationale applies here.