Court Opinion

ID: 9362948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 16:00:35.244826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.828466
License: Public Domain

19-2208
   Singh v. Garland
                                                                            BIA
                                                                      Laforest, IJ
                                                                    A206 468 833
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
   New York, on the 13th day of January, two thousand twenty-
   three.

   PRESENT:
            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
            BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
            ALISON J. NATHAN,
                 Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   KULDEEP SINGH,
            Petitioner,

                      v.                                  19-2208

   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
            Respondent.
   _____________________________________

   FOR PETITIONER:                    Deepti Vithal, Richmond Hill, NY.

   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
                                      General; Carl McIntyre , Assistant
                                      Director; Nancy E. Friedman,
                             Senior Litigation Counsel, Office
                             of Immigration Litigation, United
                             States Department of Justice,
                             Washington, DC.

    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

    Petitioner Kuldeep Singh, a native and citizen of India,

seeks review of a June 27, 2019 decision of the BIA affirming

a February 5, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

denying    Singh’s   application       for   asylum,   withholding   of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”).     In re Kuldeep Singh, No. A 206 468 833 (B.I.A. Jun.

27, 2019), aff’g No. A 206 468 833 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb.

5, 2018).       We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history.

    We have reviewed      the IJ’s       decision as modified and

supplemented by the BIA.     See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of

Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v.

Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005).            The applicable

standards of review are well established.                See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d

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Cir. 2009); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d

Cir. 2018).

    “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

the applicant or witness” and on inconsistencies within and

between    an   applicant’s    statements    and   other    evidence,

“without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or

falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any

other relevant factor.”       8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).       “We

defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

ruling.”   Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.

2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.            In this case,

substantial     evidence   supports    the   adverse       credibility

determination reached by the agency given the omissions and

inconsistencies in the record and the IJ’s demeanor findings.

    Singh alleged that he was attacked by members of a rival

political party when he was returning from a conference of

his own party, the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (“SADA”)

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party, in December 2010.        Singh also alleged that in February

2014,    after     returning   from       abroad,    two   men     physically

threatened him, telling him to leave his political party or

they would return for him.            However, as the agency found,

Singh gave inconsistent testimony regarding the 2010 attack,

thus undermining his credibility.

    Specifically, although Singh alleged in his application

that his face was covered during the attack, Singh’s direct

testimony omitted any reference to his face or head being

covered.    On cross-examination, Singh failed to mention that

either    his    face   or   head    was     covered     despite     repeated

questioning regarding what he was able to see during the

attack, only eventually referencing his face or head being

covered in response to a question about whether he said

anything to his attackers.          The agency reasonably determined

that the manner in which Singh responded on cross-examination

supported    the    conclusion      that    he   was    “embellishing      his

story,”    rather    than    offering      “honest     response[s]    to   the

government’s . . . question[s].”             Liang v. Garland, 10 F.4th

106, 116 (2d Cir. 2021).

    The agency also reasonably relied on the inconsistencies

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between Singh’s testimony and a letter from the SADA party

regarding Singh’s role within that group.                           The letter stated

that Singh “used to attend rallies, serve food and water to

the participants, set up tents, past[e] posters etc.”                                App’x

158.     On direct examination, Singh testified generally about

his role in the party, without mentioning any of these

specific activities.               And on cross-examination, when asked

pointedly about the activities listed in the letter, Singh

testified     in      a    matter      that       the     IJ        characterized      as

deliberately evasive and as though he was trying to avoid

contradicting      the      letter.         When    the        IJ    gave    Singh     the

opportunity      to       explain     the       differences          between       Singh’s

testimony    and      the    letter,        Singh       appeared,       in     the    IJ’s

determination,            “quite     testy”        and     “annoyed,”              further

undermining      his       credibility.            App’x       43.          Such     vague

testimony, particularly when viewed in light of the IJ’s

observations regarding demeanor, fairly support the inference

that Singh’s account was fabricated.                       See Jin Shui Qiu v.

Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d. Cir. 2003) (holding that

where an applicant gives “very spare” testimony, the fact-

finder     may     “fairly         wonder       whether        the     testimony        is

                                            5
fabricated”), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang

Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007).

    Finally, the agency reasonably relied on Singh’s failure

to provide specific information related to his alleged stay

in Cyprus.    Though Singh testified to having lived and worked

in Cyprus for two years before returning to India in 2014,

his application for asylum did not list any residences or

employment in Cyprus.          When Singh sought to explain these

omissions, his explanations were — like much of his testimony

— vague and, accordingly, the agency was not obligated to

credit them.       See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d.

Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible

explanation       for   his   inconsistent   statements         to     secure

relief.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Viewed cumulatively with the other discrepancies the agency

noted,    these    omissions    provided   proper    support         for   the

agency’s adverse credibility determination.

    In sum, these inconsistencies, omissions and demeanor

findings     provide    substantial    evidence     for    the       agency’s

adverse      credibility       determination.             See        8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.                        The

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adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum,

withholding of removal and CAT relief because all three forms

of relief were based on the same factual predicate.               See Paul

v.   Gonzales,    444    F.3d      148,   156–57   (2d     Cir.    2006).

Accordingly,     we   need   not   address   the   BIA’s    alternative

grounds for denying Singh relief.

     For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

                                   FOR THE COURT:
                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                   Clerk of Court

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