Court Opinion

ID: 9930733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 17:05:30.993247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:22.934917
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-2040
                             Filed February 7, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RANDY LYNN BARNES,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister,

Judge.

      A criminal defendant appeals his sentence following conviction for eleven

burglary-related offenses. AFFIRMED.

      Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

       Randy Lynn Barnes appeals from the sentence entered following guilty

pleas to nine counts of burglary in the third degree, class “D” felonies in violation

of Iowa Code section 713.6A(1) (2021); one count of possessing burglar’s tools,

an aggravated misdemeanor in violation of Iowa Code section 713.7; and one

count of attempted burglary in the third degree, an aggravated misdemeanor in

violation of Iowa Code section 713.6B(1). The facts of conviction are not at issue.

The short version is that Barnes repeatedly broke into Polk County bars and stole

cash, he tried to enter a business after-hours by breaking the door while in

possession of a crowbar, and he broke into an unoccupied garage and stole

personal property.

       The State recommended a prison term of forty-nine years, arguing the need

to protect the community given Barnes’s decades-long criminal history.              The

presentence investigation (PSI) report considered placement at a treatment facility

but recommended prison in light of Barnes’s criminal history, his failure to

rehabilitate, and his elevated scores on risk-assessment tools. Barnes’s attorney

acknowledged his lengthy criminal history and opportunities to rehabilitate but

urged the burglaries were not violent and he could succeed if placed in treatment

on probation. In allocution, Barnes told the court about recent deaths in the family

and said he “fell off the deep end” before committing the burglaries.

       The district court sentenced Barnes following a lengthy explanation of its

reasoning. The court first considered whether Barnes was “a good candidate for

probation,” noting the position of trust he had earned at the jail, his “host of criminal

convictions” spanning more than thirty years, and his need for structured
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treatment.   The court found probation was not appropriate, largely based on

Barnes’s “pretty poor track record,” including that he committed these burglaries

while on probation for another offense, and the danger he posed to the public if not

confined. The court then considered what length of prison term was appropriate

and, in part due to Barnes’s acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty,

imposed a combination of consecutive and concurrent counts totaling twenty-five

years in prison.

       “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within

the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only

be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate

matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). To show an abuse

of discretion, a defendant bears the burden to affirmatively show that the district

court relied on improper factors or clearly untenable grounds. State v. Sailer, 587

N.W.2d 756, 759, 762 (Iowa 1998).

       Barnes complains that the district court, in casting its choice as one between

probation and prison, did not specifically consider probation with “special terms

and conditions.” But probation with “special terms and conditions” is a form of

probation, which the district court expressly considered. And in any event, a

sentencing court need not “give its reasons for rejecting particular sentencing

options”—it “need only explain its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed.”

State v. Russian, 441 N.W.2d 374, 375 (Iowa 1989). The district court fulfilled that

requirement here.

       AFFIRMED.