Court Opinion

ID: 9765449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:03:09.239295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:10.044626
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority has misinterpreted the Texas Tort Claims Act. The Tort Claims Act has affected a limited waiver of governmental immunity in three specific instances: (1) use of motor vehicles; (2) premise defects; and (3) use or condition of tangible personal or real property. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. secs. 101.021 and 101.022 (Vernon 1986).
In this case, the Armendarezes rely on a use of tangible personal property to prove a waiver of governmental immunity. According to the majority, the fact that a vacuum extractor was used to move the child from a position at which a cesarean section could have been performed to a *308position where it could no longer be performed created a waiver of governmental immunity. However, reliance on the vacuum extractor to prove a waiver of immunity is inappropriate.
There must be a genuine issue of causation between Allen’s injuries and the use of tangible personal property in order to affect a waiver of governmental immunity. Russell v. Texas Dep’t of Human Resources, 746 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied) and cases cited therein; TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. sec. 101.021(2). Only the bruise to Allen’s head was arguably caused by the vacuum extractor; the brachial plexus injury was not. Movement of the child, aided by the use of the vacuum extractor, did not cause the shoulder injury. The birth of the child through a narrow birth canal caused the injury to the child’s shoulder. To say the vacuum extractor caused the shoulder injury is as baseless as saying the stabbing of a child who happened to be on a school bus was caused by the use of a motor vehicle merely by virtue of the child’s presence on the bus. The Ninth District Court of Appeals rejected such a contention in Garza v. McAllen Independent School District, 613 S.W.2d 526 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.), in which the court stated that the stabbing of a youngster on a school bus was not caused by the use of a motor vehicle, but by the use of a knife. Id. at 528. In this case, the injury about which the Armendarezes complain was not caused by the vacuum extractor, but by the narrow birth canal. As other courts have realized, governmental immunity is not waived every time a government employee and a piece of tangible personal property are combined. See, e.g., Velasquez v. Jamar, 584 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex.Civ.App.- Tyler 1979, no writ) and cases cited therein. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment because there was no summary judgment proof of causation and I would affirm summary judgment on behalf of the Hospital District.
Summary judgment was also properly granted on behalf of the individual doctors as the doctors enjoy official immunity. Although the majority correctly recognizes Texas law holds government employees are entitled to official immunity if their position has a quasi-judicial status and the employee acts in good faith within the scope of his authority, Austin v. Hale, 711 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex.App.-Waco 1986, no writ) and cases cited therein, they do not apply official immunity in this case.
Instead, the majority disregards all Texas authority and finds public employees are not entitled to official immunity if their duties “are not uniquely different from those engaged in the same duties in the private sector or where no function unique to government is being exercised.” Presumably, the majority reaches this conclusion based on opinions from other jurisdictions holding likewise. While it is not necessarily wrong to follow the law of other jurisdictions, the majority disregards all Texas law to do so in this case.
Under Texas law, there is a simple analysis which must be made in order to determine whether a public employee is entitled to official immunity: (1) can the employee’s actions be classified as quasi-judicial; i.e., do his actions require personal deliberation, decision and judgment; (2) did the employee act in good faith; and (3) were the actions taken within the scope of the employee’s authority. If the answer to each of these questions is yes, then the employee is entitled to official immunity as a matter of law. See Russell, 746 S.W.2d at 513; Austin v. Hale, 711 S.W.2d at 66; Augustine v. Nusom, 671 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Richardson v. Thompson, 390 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Torres v. Owens, 380 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Morris v. Nowotny, 323 S.W.2d 301, 311 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin, writ ref’d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 889, 80 S.Ct. 164, 4 L.Ed.2d 124 (1959). It does not matter whether the public employee is a doctor, police officer, or social worker; the analysis is the same. The fact that no other Texas court has *309addressed the application of official immunity to doctors in particular is immaterial. We need only answer the three questions enumerated above in order to determine whether to apply official immunity. In this case, the answer to each question was yes; thus, the doctors are entitled to official immunity.
Texas has an established body of law relating to official immunity which courts should follow. Because the majority refuses to apply official immunity to the doctors, and finds summary judgment was improperly granted on behalf of the hospital even though there was no proof of causation, I dissent.