Court Opinion

ID: 5547899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-10 21:22:32.570336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:34:58.274013
License: Public Domain

The Chancellor.
It is a well settled principle of. equity pleading, that the defendant cannot plead and answer, or plead and demur, as to the same matter. If he pleads to any part of the bill, he asks the judgment of the court whether the matters of the plea are not sufficient to excuse him from answering so much of the bill as is covered, by the plea. Therefore, if he answers as to those matters which by his plea he has declined to answer, he overrules the plea; and if he demurs to any part of the bill, and also puts in a plea, which is a special answer to the same part, the demurrer is overruled. If he is willing to give the discovery sought by the bill, and has any defence which might be pleaded in bar of the relief sought, he will have- the full benefit of such defence, if he sets it up and insists upon it in his answer. This, is always the better course, where the expense of a full answer will not be great; especially if there is any doubt as to his right to set up the particular defence by way of plea.
In some cases, where the complainant anticipates the plea,, and sets up equitable circumstances in his bill to defeat the same, the defendant is not only permitted, but actually required, to support his plea by an answer as to those equitable circumstances. This, however, is only an exception to the general rule; and the answer is not put in as a defence, but to give the complainant the benefit of a discovery to defeat the plea, which only contains a general denial of the equitable circumstances. Even in that case the plea does not profess to cover the discovery as to those particular allegations in the bill. If they are admitted,, or not fully denied'by the answer, it may be used, on the argument of the plea to» *577c.ounter-prove the same. If they are denied, the complainant still has an opportunity to contradict the general denial in the plea, and the particular denial in the answer, by taking issue on the plea. And if the plea is falsified by the proofs, the complainant will not lose the benefit of his discovery as to the other matters in the bill, but may still examine the defendant on interrogatories, if a discovery is necessary. (Lube’s Eq. PI. 237, 335, 342. Mitf. 277, 302; 4 Lond. ed.) In the case now under consideration, the defendants have answered, as well as pleaded, to the whole of the charges in the bill, although no equitable circumstances were set up in anticipation of the plea. It is very evident, therefore, that this plea is overruled by the answer.
If the plea was bad in form only, but good in substance, as to the whole, or any part of the relief sought by the bill, and was not put in by the defendants in bad faith, the same should have been permitted to stand as a part of their answer, or they should have been allowed the full benefit of insisting upon the statute in their answer. But as the order has been drawn up in this case, although the defendants are to be permitted to insist upon the statute in their answer as a defence, it is somewhat doubtful, at least, whether they would not be precluded, on the final hearing, by the preceding part of the order, which declares that the statute is no defence to the matters and charges in the bill.
As to so much of the bill as seeks for a discovery and satisfaction of that part of the legacies which was not charged upon the land, I apprehend the statute would be a valid bar. The statute of this state having given a concurrent remedy in this court and in a court of law, to recover such legacies, it seems to follow that if the statute would be a good bar in an action at law for the legacy, it should be equally so on a bill filed in this court, for the same kind of relief. Whether the same principle would apply to the legacies chargeable on the land, after the defendants had subjected themselves to the payment thereof personally, or whether the complainants can call for an account for the period of twenty years In analogy to the limitation of actions at law to recover the *578possession of real estafe, are questions not necessary to be decided on this informal plea. Those questions can be discussed more profitable at the hearing, when all the facts are before the court.
I think the order of the vice chancellor should be. so modified as. to strike out that part thereof which declares that the statute does not apply, and is no defence to the matters and charges in the bill. So as to leave the Whole question, as to the merits of that defence, opemfor discussion at the hearing, if the defendants think proper to amend their answer, and insist upon the statute as a bar to all 'or any part of the complainant’s claim. The costs on this appeal must abide the event of the suit. And as the present vice chancellor of the second circuit was formerly counsel in the cause, the further proceedings in the case must be had before the chancellor ; the defendants to have thirty days, after notice of this decision, to file a supplemental answer by way of amendment for the purpose of insisting upon the statute.