Court Opinion

ID: 9702971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:35:06.896023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:44.346081
License: Public Domain

Peck, J.,
dissenting. For the reasons set forth below, I disagree with the result reached in this case by the majority. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
After rehearsing several federal cases dealing with the admission of so-called tainted evidence, the majority appears to have reached three conclusions with which I am in disagreement. First, the majority contends the defendant did not open the door, on cross-examination of the prosecution’s police witness, to the rebuttal question asked of the officer by the State on redirect. Second, I believe the attempt by the majority to tie the redirect examination question to the concept of impeachment is wrong. However objectionable the question may have been otherwise, it was not related to impeachment; indeed as the majority do note correctly there was nothing to impeach. Third, I submit the conclusion that the error was not harmless is not justified under the facts of this case.
Addressing my first objection relating to the defendant’s cross-examination of the police officer, counsel inquired, in substance, whether the operator of a motor vehicle might cross the centerline of the highway, and thereafter fail the on-site sobriety tests as well because he was sick, fatigued, or injured. The officer of course answered in the affirmative. Through the device of this deceptively innocuous question and the officer’s answer, defendant placed an inference before the jury that illness or other cause might explain the defendant’s shortcomings rather than the ingestion of alcohol. The inference was given additional meaning later in the trial when defendant himself testified that his inability to perform the coordination test successfully was due to the fact that he was sleepy and had a head cold.
In considering this issue we should bear in mind that the question which first injected the fatigue-illness-injury possibility into the case did not come from the prosecution. The defense introduced it, later strengthening it during presentation of its case-in-ehief, through testimony of the defendant himself.
*367To say, as the majority opinion does, that the defense opened no door by its pointed, unambiguous question to the officer, and that the prosecution was helpless to rebut the inferential possibility which the defense clearly wanted the jury to make, is contrary to the obvious. As a consequence, the pathway has been cleared for all manner of game playing, which leaves the prosecution helpless as far as its ability to clarify and put the game into its proper perspective is concerned.
My second objection to the majority opinion applies to its apparent reliance on the impeachment principle. Impeachment is not in the case. The question asked of the officer by the State had nothing to do with it. At that point the defense had presented nothing to impeach. No claim had been made that defendant was ill, injured or tired. Now, that possibility was in the minds of the jurors, there to begin its work. The inference of a possibility was in. The jury might, even then, begin to speculate and let its speculation solidify into a conviction requiring a later rebuttal by the State, rather than support by defendant. In fairness to the prosecution, the time to scotch the inference was upon its appearance, not after it has had its chance to take root and grow into an unexplained possibility “consistent with innocence.” In my view, the door was opened wide on the State’s right to put that inference in its proper perspective. This Court’s denial of that right establishes a gag rule, fostered in part by a misapplication of impeachment.
The majority states next that it cannot say the “error” did not contribute to the conviction. Since courts do not attend jury deliberations, it is never possible to say that an error, however trivial, could not possibly have undermined a defendant’s case. But some judgment must be applied; some common sense must be used in examining the likelihood or remoteness of a possibility. The evidence of defendant’s guilt here is so persuasive that even if there was any error, which I do not concede, it is patently harmless. In my judgment, defendant has not been prejudiced.
The astute may argue that even if the State’s question of the officer on redirect was rebuttal, it came at the wrong time; merely rebutting an unsupported inference is not permissible. The second step to this argument would be that because of the State’s question defendant felt compelled to take the stand as a *368witness on his own behalf which he would not, or might not, have done otherwise. My answer to this is that it is speculation. Defendant did not suggest or claim that he was effectively forced to take the stand against his better judgment. Accordingly, even if the State’s question came before its time, it served to rebut defendant’s later testimony that he was sleepy and suffering from a cold. The question would have been a proper rebuttal at that time, and there being no claim that he was compelled to take the stand, the error, if any, once again, was harmless.
The majority cites State v. Shores, 143 Vt. 224, 465 A.2d 269 (1983), in support of its conclusion. It should perhaps be pointed out to the majority that Shores does not rule out the possibility of harmless error, in fact the possibility is acknowledged expressly. That opinion merely recites the criteria for a finding of harmless error in certain cases, and concludes they were not satisfied in that case.
Finally, the majority expresses itself as unwilling to extend the exceptions established by federal cases relating to the admissibility of tainted evidence. Aside from the fact that the evidence in question here is not tainted to begin with in my view, I have only two comments. First, the cases cited involve impeachment, which is not truly involved here, as even the majority concedes. We are concerned here with the rebuttal of an inference. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the evidence is tainted and we are concerned somehow with impeachment, there is nothing in the federal cases which prohibit an extension in an appropriate case. I believe this is such a case. The mere fact that the particular circumstance here has not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court should not act as a deterrent to a serious consideration of additional extensions here; we might even be sustained.
In my view the majority has today thrown up still another roadblock to the efforts to control the awful carnage on our highways caused by irresponsible drinking drivers. Another shackle has been fastened around the prosecution. Given the vast array of protections established by the courts to protect the rights of those drivers, today’s decision creates still another. It is not necessary and is not justified, either in principle or on the facts here. I would affirm.