Court Opinion

ID: 9907843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 14:00:38.286969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:32.673968
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14070   Document: 24-1    Date Filed: 12/07/2023   Page: 1 of 14

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-14070
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        ERIC WATKINS,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        OFFICER DAVID SESSION,
        402,
        WILLIAM VOGT,
        Oﬃcer, Lauderhill Police Department,
        DAVLIN SESSION,
        Oﬃcer, Lauderhill Police Department,
        CHIEF OF POLICE, LAUDERHILL POLICE DEPARTMENT,
        CITY OF LAUDERHILL,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14070

                                                       Defendants-Appellees,

        LAUDERHILL POLICE DEPARTMENT,

                                                                   Defendant.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-60810-RKA
                            ____________________

        Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Eric Watkins appeals the district court’s order dismissing
        with prejudice his third amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint
        against his arresting officers William Vogt and Davlin Session,
        Chief of Police Constance Stanley, and the City of Lauderhill, Flor-
        ida, alleging that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
        were violated when he was arrested for exposure of his sexual or-
        gans without probable cause. On appeal, Watkins argues that: (1)
        the district court erred in dismissing his claims against his arresting
        officers and the chief of police in their individual capacities because
        they did not have arguable probable cause to arrest him and were
        not entitled to qualified immunity; and (2) the court abused its
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        22-14070                 Opinion of the Court                              3

        discretion by dismissing his final-policymaker claim against the city
        and chief of police in her official capacity because he complied with
        its prior order instructing him not to file any new claims in his third
        amended complaint. After thorough review, we affirm.
                                             I.
               We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant qual-
        iﬁed immunity on a motion to dismiss, accepting the factual allega-
        tions in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences
        in favor of the nonmoving party. Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1284
        (11th Cir. 2019). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a
        complaint must contain suﬃcient factual matter, accepted as true,
        to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
        556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiﬀ
        pleaded suﬃcient factual content to allow a court to reasonably in-
        fer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.
        “[A]n amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and be-
        comes the operative pleading in the case.” Lowery v. Ala. Power Co.,
        483 F.3d 1184, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007).
                We review a district court’s order dismissing an action for
        failure to comply with the rules of the court for abuse of discretion.
        Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006). “Discretion
        means the district court has a range of choice, and that its decision
        will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not
        inﬂuenced by any mistake of law.” Id. (quotations omitted). Even
        so, a dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with court rules
        is an extreme remedy that is only proper when the district court
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-14070

        ﬁnds “a clear record of delay or willful conduct and that lesser sanc-
        tions are inadequate to correct such conduct.” Id. (quotations
        omitted).
                                          II.
                First, we are unpersuaded by Watkins’s claim that the dis-
        trict court erred in dismissing Counts One through Five, the Fourth
        and Fourteenth Amendment claims against his arresting oﬃcers
        and the chief of police in their individual capacities. To state a
        claim under § 1983, a plaintiﬀ must allege that (1) the defendant de-
        prived him of a right secured under the U.S. Constitution or federal
        law, and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. Rich-
        ardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010). Qualiﬁed im-
        munity protects public oﬃcials from undue interference with their
        duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability where they
        are not “on notice their conduct is unlawful.” See Garcia v. Casey,
        75 F.4th 1176, 1185, 1186 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted).
               To establish qualiﬁed immunity, a defendant must ﬁrst show
        that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority
        when the misconduct was alleged to have occurred. Id. at 1185.
        Once the defendant has established that he was acting within his
        discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiﬀ to show
        that qualiﬁed immunity is not appropriate. Id. An arresting oﬃcer
        is entitled to qualiﬁed immunity unless the plaintiﬀ shows that
        (1) he violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
        unlawfulness of his conduct was clearly established at that time. Id.
        A plaintiﬀ can demonstrate that a right is clearly established in one
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        22-14070                Opinion of the Court                          5

        of three ways, namely by pointing to (1) “case law with indistin-
        guishable facts,” (2) “a broad statement of principle within the
        Constitution, statute, or case law,” or (3) “conduct so egregious
        that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total ab-
        sence of case law.” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288,
        1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009).
               A defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly estab-
        lished right “unless the right’s contours were suﬃciently deﬁnite
        that any reasonable oﬃcial in the defendant’s shoes would have un-
        derstood that he was violating it.” Plumhoﬀ v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,
        778–79 (2014). Put diﬀerently, existing precedent must have placed
        “beyond debate” whether the oﬃcer violated that clearly estab-
        lished right. Id. at 779 (quotations omitted). Thus, the Supreme
        Court has “stressed the need to identify a case where an oﬃcer act-
        ing under similar circumstances was held to have violated” the
        Constitution. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018)
        (quotations and ellipsis omitted). Courts should not “deﬁne clearly
        established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
        the crucial question whether the oﬃcial acted reasonably in the
        particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoﬀ, 572 U.S. at
        779 (quotations and citation omitted).
                An arrest not supported by probable cause violates the
        Fourth Amendment. See Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186. Further, “the
        Constitution prohibits a police oﬃcer from knowingly making
        false statements in an arrest aﬃdavit about the probable cause for
        an arrest in order to detain a citizen . . . if such false statements
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-14070

        were necessary to the probable cause.” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d
        1271, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999). However, “the existence of probable
        cause at the time of arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent con-
        stitutional challenge to the arrest.” Gates v. Khokar, 884 F.3d 1290,
        1297 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted); see Black v. Wigington,
        811 F.3d 1259, 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2016) (determining that proba-
        ble cause defeated a malicious prosecution claim and holding that
        the plaintiﬀ’s claim failed because the defendants were entitled to
        qualiﬁed immunity).
               Probable cause exists “where facts, derived from reasonably
        trustworthy information, are suﬃcient to cause a person of reason-
        able caution to believe that a criminal oﬀense has been or is being
        committed.” Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186 (quotations omitted). In de-
        termining whether an oﬃcer had probable cause to seize a suspect,
        a court must “ask whether a reasonable oﬃcer could conclude that
        there was a substantial chance of criminal activity.” Id. (quotations
        and ellipses omitted). The validity of an arrest is not dependent on
        the oﬀense announced by the oﬃcer at the time of the arrest, and
        “[p]robable cause . . . may be found if there is probable cause to
        believe any crime was committed, whether or not there is probable
        cause for the crime the arresting oﬃcer actually believed had been
        committed.” Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 969 (11th Cir. 2018).
        Further, a warrantless custodial arrest can be supported by proba-
        ble cause even if the oﬀense is minor or seemingly insigniﬁcant. Id.
              But even without probable cause, an oﬃcer is entitled to
        qualiﬁed immunity from a false arrest claim if the oﬃcer had
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        22-14070               Opinion of the Court                          7

        arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiﬀ. Garcia, 75 F.4th at
        1186. Arguable probable cause exists where “a reasonable oﬃcer,
        looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could
        have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests.” Id. (quotations
        omitted). Arguable probable cause is only lacking “if the state of
        the law on the date of the alleged misconduct makes it obvious that
        the oﬃcer’s acts violated the plaintiﬀ’s rights in the speciﬁc set of
        circumstances at issue.” Id. (quotations and brackets omitted). So,
        the question becomes whether the plaintiﬀ has satisﬁed his burden
        of showing that, as a clearly established matter of law, an objective
        oﬃcer could not have reasonably concluded there was probable
        cause to arrest under the particular circumstances. Id.
               In pertinent part, a person who commits acts that “are of a
        nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public
        decency, or aﬀect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness
        them” is guilty of the Florida misdemeanor oﬀense of breach of
        the peace or disorderly conduct. Fla. Stat. § 877.03. Further, a per-
        son commits the Florida misdemeanor oﬀense of nuisance if his
        behavior “tend[s] to annoy the community, injure the health of the
        citizens in general, or corrupt the public morals.” Id. § 823.01.
               The standard by which a supervisor may be held responsible
        for the actions of a subordinate under § 1983 is extremely rigor-
        ous. Piazza v. Jeﬀerson Cty., Ala., 923 F.3d 947, 957 (11th Cir.
        2019). Supervisory oﬃcials are not liable under § 1983 for the un-
        constitutional acts of their subordinates based on respondeat supe-
        rior. Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). Rather,
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-14070

        supervisors can only be held personally liable when they (1) partic-
        ipate in the alleged constitutional violation, or (2) “there is a causal
        connection between actions of the supervising oﬃcial and the al-
        leged constitutional deprivation.” Knight through Kerr v. Miami-Dade
        Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 820 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). A
        plaintiﬀ can establish the necessary causal connection “when a his-
        tory of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice
        of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and [she] fails to do
        so.” Id. (quotations omitted).
               Here, the district court did not err in dismissing Counts One
        through Five against Oﬃcer Vogt, Oﬃcer Session and Chief Stan-
        ley in their individual capacity based on qualiﬁed immunity, since
        the allegations in the third amended complaint established that
        they had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Watkins for
        some crime. As for his claims against the Oﬃcers, it has been and
        remains undisputed that they were acting within their discretion-
        ary authority at the time of the alleged constitutional violation.
        Thus, Watkins bore the burden of establishing that (1) the Oﬃcers
        violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizures un-
        supported by probable cause, and (2) their actions were clearly un-
        lawful at the time of the incident. Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1185.
               The Oﬃcers’ arrest of Watkins was lawful if they had at
        least arguable probable cause to believe that he had committed or
        was committing some crime, and, notably, it does not have to be
        based on the oﬀense announced at arrest. See id. at 1186; Cannella,
        891 F.3d at 969. So the question is whether the Oﬃcers had
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        22-14070               Opinion of the Court                         9

        arguable probable cause to arrest Watkins for either breaching the
        peace or creating a public nuisance. See Manners, 891 F.3d at 969.
        Each Florida statute has a broad reach in the conduct it covers -- an
        individual violates either statute merely if his actions “are of a na-
        ture to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense of public
        decency, or aﬀect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness”
        or if his behavior “tend[s] to annoy the community, injure the
        health of the citizens in general, or corrupt the public morals.” Fla.
        Stat. §§ 823.01, 877.03.
               Accepting all the facts alleged in the third amended com-
        plaint as true, the Oﬃcers had arguable probable cause to believe
        Watkins was breaking the law or had broken the law under either
        statute. Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186. Watkins alleged that the
        Lauderhill Police Department had received several anonymous re-
        ports of someone urinating and defecating in the area Watkins was
        found. Watkins added that he admitted at the time of his arrest to
        dumping his urine in the public park. It was not unreasonable for
        oﬃcers to believe the act of dumping urine in a public park would
        aﬀect the peace and enjoyment of others trying to enjoy the area,
        especially considering the many recent complaints the police de-
        partment had received. It was also reasonably conceivable for the
        Oﬃcers to believe that dumping bodily ﬂuids in a public area could
        put the health of citizens at risk.
                As for Watkins’s claim that the Oﬃcers failed to provide any
        cases ﬁnding that public urination or public dumping of urine vio-
        lates Florida law, Watkins himself bears the burden of showing that
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                 22-14070

        a clearly established constitutional right was violated by the oﬃc-
        ers. Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1185–87. But he provides no caselaw sup-
        porting his claim that public urination or public disposal of urine
        does not violate Florida’s nuisance or breach of peace statutes and
        that oﬃcers making an arrest under similar circumstances violated
        a suspect’s constitutional rights. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64. And
        we’ve found nothing from the Florida Supreme Court, this Court,
        or the Supreme Court where an oﬃcer has been found to have vi-
        olated an arrestee’s Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights by
        placing them under arrest for the public disposal of urine.
                Moreover, because the Oﬃcers had arguable probable cause
        to arrest Watkins, the district court also did not err in dismissing
        Count Five against Chief Stanley in her individual capacity, since
        that supervisory liability claim was predicated on Counts One
        through Four. As the record reﬂects, Watkins did not claim that
        Chief Stanley personally participated in his challenged arrest. This
        means that in order to support a supervisory liability claim against
        Chief Stanley, Watkins was required to allege suﬃcient facts to
        plausibly indicate a causal relationship between Stanley’s actions
        and his arrest by the Oﬃcers. Knight through Kerr, 856 F.3d at 820.
        However, Watkins alleged only that Chief Stanley was the ﬁnal-
        policymaker and eﬀectively ratiﬁed the arrest made by the Oﬃcers.
        Because the Oﬃcers had arguable probable cause to arrest Wat-
        kins, he cannot demonstrate that Chief Stanley was on notice of
        consistent constitutional deprivations by her oﬃcers and that she
        failed to act. Id.
                                        II.
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        22-14070               Opinion of the Court                       11

               We also ﬁnd no merit in Watkins’s argument that the district
        court abused its discretion by dismissing his ﬁnal-policymaker
        claim in Count Five, against the City of Lauderhill and Chief Stan-
        ley in her oﬃcial capacity. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), if a
        plaintiﬀ fails to prosecute his case or comply with a court order, a
        defendant may move to dismiss the action. The court also has the
        inherent ability to dismiss a claim in light of “its authority to en-
        force its orders and provide for the eﬃcient disposition of litiga-
        tion.” Zocaras, 465 F.3d at 483. Generally, where the litigant has
        been forewarned, dismissal for failure to obey a court order does
        not amount to abuse of discretion. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835,
        837 (11th Cir. 1989). In addition, the district court’s consideration
        of alternative, lesser sanctions need not be explicit, if the record
        supports the conclusion that the court implicitly found that those
        sanctions would not better serve the interests of justice. Zocaras,
        465 F.3d at 484.
               Although both failure-to-train and ﬁnal-policymaker claims
        attack the execution of a government policy or custom as deﬁned
        under Monell, they require proof of diﬀerent actions. See Monell v.
        Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)
        (the execution of a government’s policy or custom must inﬂict the
        claimed injury for the local government to be held responsible un-
        der § 1983). To establish a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiﬀ must
        demonstrate that a city was deliberately indiﬀerent to citizens’
        rights by knowing of constitutional violation or a high likelihood
        thereof and making “a deliberate choice not to take action” in its
        training programs. See Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1293. Alternatively, the
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                       22-14070

        ﬁnal-policymaker theory requires a showing that “the deci-
        sionmaker possesses ﬁnal authority to establish municipal policy
        with respect to the action ordered” 1 and that the decisionmaker
        made “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action” considering
        various alternatives with respect to the subject matter in question.
        Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986).
               Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than for-
        mal pleadings drafted by lawyers and will be liberally construed.
        Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). Nev-
        ertheless, pro se litigants are required to comply with applicable pro-
        cedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
        Further, the leniency aﬀorded pro se litigants with liberal construc-
        tion “does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a
        party, or to rewrite an otherwise deﬁcient pleading in order to sus-
        tain an action.” Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1168–69 (quotations omitted).
        A district court need not allow amendment in the event of undue
        delay, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deﬁciencies, undue preju-
        dice to the opposing party, or futility of the amendment. Foman v.
        Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
                Here, we begin by noting that the district court properly dis-
        missed Watkins’s claim in his third amended complaint against
        Chief Stanley in her oﬃcial capacity. As the record makes clear, the
        district court had already dismissed any claims against Chief Stanley

        1 This Court has previously recognized that, under Florida law, police chiefs

        have final policymaking authority in their respective municipalities for law en-
        forcement matters. See Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2005).
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        22-14070               Opinion of the Court                       13

        in her oﬃcial capacity with prejudice in its order dismissing in part
        Watkins’s second amended complaint. At the end of that order,
        the district court speciﬁed that Watkins could ﬁle a third amended
        complaint “alleging the counts he has already advanced against the
        Defendants who now remain” and “will not be permitted to add
        new counts or defendants.” This instruction was suﬃcient to con-
        vey to Watkins that he could only replead the counts against the
        same defendants that the court had dismissed without prejudice.
                Moreover, when the district court later considered the De-
        fendants’ motion to dismiss Watkins’s third amended complaint, it
        did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Count Five against the
        City of Lauderhill and Chief Stanley in her oﬃcial capacity for fail-
        ure to follow the court’s order. Indeed, the court’s earlier order
        expressly cautioned Watkins that he would “not be permitted to
        add new counts or defendants” and was only allowed to “take his
        best crack” at reasserting the claims he had already alleged. Never-
        theless, while Watkins had asserted a failure-to-train claim in his
        second amended complaint, he asserted a ﬁnal-policymaker claim
        in his third amended complaint. The court correctly determined
        that those were two unique claims because they required proof of
        diﬀerent elements. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483; Lewis, 561 F.3d at
        1293. Thus, by asserting the ﬁnal-policymaker claim in his third
        amended complaint, Watkins directly violated the court’s order.
               Although dismissal with prejudice is an extreme measure,
        the district court was simply enforcing its previous instruction for
        Watkins not to add any new claims in his third amended complaint.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                22-14070

        It reasoned that dismissal was the only appropriate sanction to rem-
        edy Watkins’s repeated disregard of the court’s instructions, and it
        was not required to explicitly consider lesser alternative sanctions.
        See Zocaras, 465 F.3d at 483–84. Although pro se pleadings are held
        to a less stringent standard than those prepared by counsel, the dis-
        trict court had given Watkins multiple opportunities to amend his
        complaint to state a plausible cause of action. See Campbell, 760
        F.3d at 1168. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining
        dismissal was appropriate because Watkins’s ﬁnal-policymaker
        claim would likely require additional discovery, which would ex-
        pend additional time and resources even though the discovery pe-
        riod had closed two years prior to this new claim being raised.
               The court also was within its discretion to prohibit further
        amendment of the complaint because it found it would have been
        futile at such a late stage of the case and would result in undue
        prejudice to the Defendants. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Moreover,
        Watkins was forewarned, after receiving three opportunities to
        amend his complaint, that the next dismissal would be with preju-
        dice, and Watkins still failed to heed the court’s unambiguous in-
        struction. See Moon, 863 F.2d at 837.
                Accordingly, we aﬃrm the district court’s dismissal of Wat-
        kins’s third amended complaint.
              AFFIRMED.