Court Opinion

ID: 9711274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:27:52.363928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:03.288878
License: Public Domain

*714Hallows, J.
(dissenting in part). I dissent from that part of the decision which holds an attorney’s equitable lien upon a judgment is subordinated to a right to contribution asserted as set off against the judgment. In Stanley v. Bouck (1900), 107 Wis. 225, 83 N. W. 298, in discussing the equitable lien of an attorney upon a judgment secured by his services, the court clearly points out that the application to set off one judgment against another is addressed to the sound discretion of a court of equity and went on to state that the setoff “will not be allowed as against an attorney’s equitable lien for services and disbursements, where evident injustice will be done,” citing Gauche v. Milbrath (1900), 105 Wis. 355, 81 N. W. 487.
The three cases cited in the majority opinion for the proposition that “the right of setoff, when the judgments are in the same action, or actions growing out of the same subject matter, is generally deemed superior to the claim of an attorney for compensation” did not involve judgments for contribution and are not authority for such application. In Yorton v. Milwaukee, Lake Shore & W. R. Co. (1885), 62 Wis. 367, 21 N. W. 516, 23 N. W. 401, a setoff of a legal claim was allowed which consisted of setting off costs in favor of one against the costs in favor of the other party. The court put this result on the facts of the case upon equitable grounds. In Bosworth v. Tallman (1886), 66 Wis. 533, 29 N. W. 542, costs of one party to the action were set off against costs of the other party and the attorney’s lien on the costs was subrogated. This decision, likewise, placed the result upon the equities between the parties. Rayworth v. Goodrick (1916), 163 Wis. 404, 158 N. W. 57, likewise did not involve a balancing of the attorney’s lien with an equitable claim but a setoff of legal claims between the same parties.
In the instant case, it was the work and the services of the attorney which produced the judgment which is *715sought to be attached by a setoff procedure based on a claim for contribution. The claim for contribution is equitable and does not arise until one joint tort-feasor pays more than his share. At the time the setoff was allowed the right to contribution was conditional, but the attorney’s equitable lien was absolute. Of course, an attorney’s lien, whether statutory or equitable, is on the net recovery, but this is not a case of net recovery but of priority. No reason exists for not granting an attorney’s equitable lien the same priority as his legal lien. I do not consider it just or equitable to attorneys to subject their equitable lien for services on a judgment to the claim for contribution by a joint tort-feasor. I would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Beilfuss joins in this dissent.