Court Opinion

ID: 9744052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:52:37.96297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.399398
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: As the majority states, the Commission in its decision found “[petitioner sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment as the result of repetitive trauma on August 6, 1985, [rather than June 25, 1985] the day that Dr. Johnson took her off work because her employment aggravated her condition of ill-being.” (190 Ill. App. 3d at 854.) This decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We need only review the evidence which is indicated in the majority’s disposition. In the latter part of 1984, she began to note pain in her right shoulder, took some action, and in January 1985 experienced breathing problems and was referred to a doctor. She continued to work during this time, and on June 25, 1985, she was getting ready to test the ballasts and after shoving about 20 ballasts down to her test set felt a sharp pain in her right shoulder which went into her neck. She went to the nurse, who gave her a pain pill, and she returned to work. In July of 1985, she took one week’s vacation, returned to work, worked one week and then took two more weeks’ vacation and returned to work. While on vacation, she was not bothered by pain in her shoulder, but as soon as she used pressure, the pain returned. It was then on August 6, 1985, that the claimant saw Dr. Johnson. He gave her inflammatory pills, an injection, and told the claimant to stay home from work. As the Commission stated in its decision, “the date of an accidental injury in a repetitive trauma case is the date on which the injury ‘manifests itself,’ that is, the date on which both the fact of the injury and the causal relationship of the injury to the claimant’s employment would have become plainly apparent to a reasonable person.” (190 Ill. App. 3d at 854.) As pointed out recently by the supreme court in Sperling v. Industrial Comm’n (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 416, 421-22: “[A] reviewing court will not set aside the decision of an administrative agency unless the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. *** We must, therefore, affirm, even though our decision, were we the trier of fact, may have been different.”