Court Opinion

ID: 9683399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:28:01.960129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:47.606127
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge,
dissenting.
I.
I remain convinced that the oath required by V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 12.31(b), is neither the equivalent of nor an adequate substitute for the requirements of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). See Part I of my dissenting opinion in Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246, 257-264 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). I would accordingly hold that the trial judge improperly excused prospective jurors McLarty and Nixon in violation of Witherspoon.1
Although McLarty first stated that she could never vote to inflict the death penalty, she later testified that she could truthfully answer the punishment stage questions according to the evidence. She admitted in response to the prosecutor’s leading question that the death penalty factor would in some way “affect her deliberations.” However, she later clarified her views in her last testimonial statement when she said, “I still think it [the death penalty] would be in the back of my mind that it would result that way.”
Prospective juror Nixon was asked by the prosecutor, “Mr. Nixon, how do you yourself feel about the death penalty; do you believe in it?” The following then occurred:
“A My religious—
“THE COURT: I can’t hear you.
*329“MR. NIXON: My religious — no.
“THE COURT: Against your religion? All right, get your card and go back to the central jury room.”
The appellant then objected on Wither-spoon grounds and the prosecutor continued his examination. Nixon stated that because of his religious beliefs he could never vote for the death penalty “not unless, you know, the only, you know, I believe, you know, what the Bible says.” The prosecutor then asked if the mandatory sentence of death or life imprisonment would affect Nixon’s deliberations in the case. When Nixon said it would, the State “submitted” the juror and the judge excused him over appellant’s exception.
For the reasons stated in my dissent in Shippy, I do not believe these jurors were disqualified.2 The due process requirements of Witherspoon were therefore violated, and reversal should result. See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976).
II.
In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2992, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), Justice Stewart, speaking for three members of the Court, wrote that “the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however, long. Death in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.”3 This statement occupies a position of relative insignificance in the midst of over two hundred pages of death penalty opinions issued by the Supreme Court on July 2, 1976.4 Nonetheless, I believe that the statement is extremely important to a proper interpretation of death penalty law as it exists today under our federal Constitution.
In its opinions of July 2nd, the Supreme Court re-affirmed what had become, for some,5 a dubious proposition: that the death penalty is not, in and of itself, cruel and unusual punishment. This has always been my view. See Tezeno v. State, supra, 484 S.W.2d at 377; Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934, 950, note 11 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Dissenting Opinion of Roberts, J.). This conclusion is supported by the Constitution itself, particularly in the language of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, both of which provide that the state or federal government may not deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property without due process.6 (Emphasis added). Of course, what the *330Due Process Clause unquestionably implies is that one may be deprived of life, liberty, or property if the taking is in accord with due process. This is a simple enough proposition, yet it is at the heart of any proper understanding of the death penalty.7
The Due Process Clause also implies something which is just as important in any consideration of the death penalty: By its choice of language, the Clause states and even emphasizes the relative importance of the three values it seeks to protect. The Clause speaks in terms of life, liberty, and property—in that order.
It is an order which has obvious meaning. As Americans, we value life above liberty and liberty above property. It follows that more process is due when one is on trial for his life than when he faces only a deprivation of his liberty, just as more procedural protection is required when an individual’s liberty is at stake than is necessary when it is the individual’s property which the State seeks to expropriate.
Thus, due process requires that all death penalty juries be selected and guided with greater care than is demanded in other criminal trials. Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra; Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Woodson v. North Carolina, supra. This is in accord with well-established precedents. For example, due process demands that the State be put to a greater burden of proof in a criminal trial — where life or liberty is at stake — than that required in a civil trial where property issues are involved. In re Winship, 397 U.S 358, 362-364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958). And compare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 194, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), with Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836, 93 S.Ct. 2803, 37 L.Ed.2d 993 (1973).
In summary, then, I would hold that the procedural safeguards afforded a criminal defendant are necessarily greater in a death penalty case, not only because due process demands it, not only because our society’s values affirm the need for it, but also because the finality of the death penalty itself makes it imperative. No matter how innocent or guilty an individual may be, no matter how greatly his rights may have been violated, he can gain no relief from any court if he has already been executed.
This is not to say that every error in a death penalty case is presumed to be harmful; nor is it meant to deny the importance of vigorous prosecution of capital defendants. What is necessary, however, is that this Court — indeed, every court — take special care to assure that a death penalty defendant be treated with the scrupulous fairness that due process requires. We may not do otherwise without violating the Constitution we have sworn to uphold.
III.
In determining whether a defendant’s due process rights have been violated by the conduct of the voir dire examination, we should look to the entire voir dire and not to portions in isolation — except of course where those portions standing alone constitute reversible error, e. g., Davis v. Georgia, supra. This is the approach we take, for example, when we review the court’s charge or when we review a record to determine whether erroneously admitted evidence — or other error — is harmless.
Thus in Bailey v. State, 532 S.W.2d 316, 322 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), we held that “[i]n considering the charge on appeal, we will not review isolated portions, but will consider the charge as a whole.” Yet in Ransonette v. State, 550 S.W.2d 36, 42-43 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) (Opinion on Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing), we held that an instruction on circumstantial evidence is required if circumstantial evidence is relied upon to establish the appellant’s guilt as a principal, even though the court’s charge *331includes an instruction on principals. And in Gavia v. State, 488 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), a murder prosecution under the 1925 Penal Code, we held that the inclusion in the court’s charge of an instruction on the right of self-defense arising from a reasonable expectation or fear of death or serious bodily injury did not eliminate the need for an instruction on self-defense against an unlawful violent attack as provided for by Article 1224 of the former Code.
We may thus derive an exception to the general rule of Bailey. We will review the charge as a whole except where the absence of a given charge is, standing alone, a significant deprivation of the defendant’s rights, as guaranteed to him by the Constitution or statutes, or by well-settled case law.
We follow a similar rule when we consider whether the error in the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence is harmless. Generally, we review the record of the case as a whole and determine whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Cole v. State, 484 S.W.2d 779, 783-784 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), and authorities there cited. However, there are some constitutional rights “so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), quoted with approval and followed in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978).
An examination of the entire voir dire seems especially mandated in any review of a capital case because of Witherspoon’s requirement that the State not “produce . a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.” [Footnote omitted.] 391 U.S. at 521, 88 S.Ct. at 1776.8 I therefore turn to the voir dire examination to determine whether this death penalty was imposed by a jury “organized to return a verdict of death.” 9
IV.
A.
When James L. Godbolt was called as a prospective juror, he testified that he did not believe in the death penalty. Then, in response to the prosecutor’s questions, God-bolt stated that this “personal belief” would preclude him from ever voting for the death penalty. Godbolt also affirmed that the mandatory sentence of death or life, taken together with his feelings against the death penalty, would affect his deliberations on the fact issues in this case, especially his deliberations on the three questions asked at the punishment stage of the trial. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 12.31(b); Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P.
However, upon closer examination by defense counsel and the trial judge, Godbolt stated unequivocally that he could set aside his feelings about the death penalty and answer the three punishment questions “honestly [and] based on the evidence . even though [appellant] would get the death penalty.” In accord with Wither-spoon, as well as Section 12.31(b), supra, the trial judge declared, “All right, he’s qualified on that point.”
The prosecutor then asked Godbolt if his business or personal life would suffer if he were forced to be sequestered for several nights the following week with the rest of the jury panel. Godbolt replied that he was a barber, that every day he was away from work was a day he received no pay, and that he was behind on his bills. He also stated that he was one of only two barbers in the shop where he worked, and the other barber had been summoned for jury duty the following Tuesday. Godbolt concluded that if he were to serve on this jury the barber shop would have to be shut down until he or the other barber had completed jury duty. After a brief additional exami*332nation on the same subject, Godbolt was exciised from the jury by the trial judge, who acted without the benefit of a motion by the State or the defense or any agreement between them to excuse the juror. Defense counsel noted his exception in a timely manner.10
Thus the trial judge was confronted with a venireman who personally opposed the death penalty but could still qualify as a juror in this case. Since Godbolt was not subject to a challenge for cause, it was error for the court to excuse him.
B.
The voir dire examination of prospective juror Patricia Brightman represents another instance of the denial of due process demonstrated by the voir dire as a whole. In responding to the prosecutor’s questions, Brightman stated that she believed the death penalty should be imposed only in those cases where a man raped a young girl or a baby; otherwise, she was opposed to capital punishment. Upon further examination Brightman qualified her answer by indicating that she might be in favor of capital punishment in some murder cases: “[I]t all depends, you know, on what the case is about.”
The State then determined that Bright-man could consider the full range of punishment for the lesser included offense of murder. Next, the prosecutor asked Brightman if she could find someone guilty of murder even though the State presented no evidence of motive. Initially, Brightman, responded that she could not do so, then indicated that she would only “prefer” to have such evidence, and finally stated unequivocally to the prosecutor that she would not require evidence of motive before finding someone guilty of capital murder.
The prosecutor then turned to the issue of premeditation, defining it as “kind of a pre-planning or pre-scheming” and explaining that Texas law does not require the State to prove premeditation in a murder case.11 In response to the prosecutor’s questions, Brightman stated that she would require the State to present some evidence of premeditation before she could find a person guilty of murder, even though Texas law did not require it. The State then “submitted” the juror.
The appellant followed the State’s lead and also assumed that premeditation is never part of the required proof in a capital murder case.12 The defense began its questioning of Brightman by pointing out that premeditation is often insusceptible of proof because it exists only in the mind of the assailant. Brightman then acknowledged that she could follow the law and not require the State to prove premeditation despite her personal feelings to the contrary.
*333The State then resumed its examination of the prospective juror. What follows is the entirety of the remaining voir dire examination of Patricia Brightman:
“Q [By Prosecutor] Now, Miss Bright-man, I won’t belabor the point, but I had just asked you the same question and you had said that you would require some evidence of premeditation.
“A Yes.
“Q Is that still the way you feel?
“A My personal feeling—
“Q Yes.
“A —yes, that’s the way I feel. But going by the law, then I would have to go by the law.
“Q In other words, then, if you were selected on a jury and you knew that the man was charged with capital murder and you know that if he’s found guilty of that by you, he’s going to get a sentence of death or a sentence of life, you know that.
“A Uh-huh.
“Q All right, my question is: Before you could find him guilty of murder where he’s going to get a sentence of death or a sentence of life, would you have to have some evidence of premeditation?
“A Well, my—
“MR. HUDSON [Defense Counsel]: Object to the question, Your Honor. She’s answered it.
“THE COURT: Well, since she’s answered both ways — .
“A My personal feeling, I would have to, but by the law, I would have to go with everyone else. This is my personal feeling. I would have to have some evidence, but if I had to go by the law—
“THE COURT: No, if you’ve got to have some evidence, that disqualifies you. Get your card.
“MR. HUDSON: Note our exception, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: Take your exception. You’ve been very kind, Miss Brightman. I’m sorry you had to wait so long.
“MISS BRIGHTMAN: Yes.” (Emphasis added.)
The emphasized portion of Brightman’s response makes it evident that she was in the process of repeating her assertion that she could “go by the law” and not require the State to provide proof of premeditation. The trial judge then cut the juror off and disqualified her, once again on his own motion.
Thus, for the second time the trial judge was confronted with a prospective juror who had initially expressed strong reservations about inflicting the death penalty in all cases that the law allowed it, but who was nonetheless qualified to serve as a death penalty juror. Again, it was error for the court to excuse a qualified juror whose answers nevertheless made it clear that she would be less inclined than many other prospective jurors to inflict the death penalty on this appellant.
C.
The examination of Doris Minicks began with a discussion of whether she was acquainted with some of the appellant’s relatives; she concluded that she was not and also stated that she did not know Nannie Jones, Linda Fay Marshall, Robert Wayne Trotter, or Larry Bickems, four of the State’s listed witnesses in the case. Minicks then testified that, to the best of her knowledge, she had never seen appellant. Next, the prosecutor asked if she knew either of appellant’s attorneys, Steve Halsey or Sam Hudson. She replied, “I know Sam Hudson indirectly; somebody pointed him out to me.” The voir dire examination then proceeded as follows:
“MR. HALSEY [Defense Counsel] I’m sorry, I missed your answer, you know Sam Hudson how?
“MISS MINICKS: Indirectly; somebody pointed him out to me and his father works for the same department I work for. Other than that, I don’t — I don’t know him personally; he doesn’t know me.
*334“MR. HALSEY: I see, okay.
“Q [By Prosecutor] Do you know his father pretty well?
“A Not really. He works in another section in the same department I work in.
“Q Have you ever talked with his father?
“A Yeah.
“Q What type of work do you do?
“A Well, I’m a secretary for Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Regional Council.
“Q And what does Sam’s father do?
“A I think he’s an EO specialist, equal opportunity specialist.
“Q Well, do you feel like the fact that you know Sam’s dad, that that might make — you know, you’d rather sit on some case where you don’t know the lawyers on either side? Don’t you think that might be a little bit better?
“A Well, it’s up to you because I — I don’t know him personally; I know—
“Q Well, you’re going to see his dad and, of course, we’re going to be trying this case and afterwards you’re going to go back and work with his dad, you know. And, of course, both sides have got a position in this case and, you know, in all fairness to both sides and that’s the only reason I asked that question. You know, there’s other juries that you can serve on and other cases where you don’t know either party.
“A Okay.
“Q Do you think that might be better that way?
“A Yeah.
“THE COURT: I think so, too, since you know a member of the family. “MR. HALSEY: Judge, let me just ask her—
“EXAMINATION

“BY MR HALSEY:

“Q Would it put you in an uncomfortable position, I mean I know you
don’t know Sam Hudson personally, but since you know his dad, would it put you in an uncomfortable position if you found against Sam’s client, for example, and had to go back there and work with his dad?
“A No. See, I don’t work with him directly. I see him in the hall. He — works in another section and I’m in another section and I just see him, you know, to speak to him; other than that—
“Q Oh, I see. Well, if you think it might affect, you know, your business or, for that matter, listening to the testimony in some way, then that’s fine.
“A I don’t think — you know, I don’t think it would.
“THE COURT: Both of you work for the government?
“MISS MINICKS: Uh-huh.
“THE COURT: Federal government? You all have lunch in the same place?
“MISS MINICKS: No, I’ve never had lunch with him, no.
“THE COURT: How did you know that was his dad?
“MISS MINICKS: Somebody — let me see. One of the attorneys I work with told me that his son was an attorney and, you know, somebody pointed him out to me.
“THE COURT: You’ve never had any business dealings with him? “MISS MINICKS: No, he don’t know me at all.
“THE COURT: What’s the State’s position?
“MR. BURNHAM [Prosecutor]: Well, Judge, we feel like that since she does know Sam’s dad it might be better for her to sit on another case and that way neither side would have someone on the jury that they know; we wouldn’t want someone on the jury that we know.
“THE COURT: I think that’s more or less a fair proposition. Don’t you? You look like an awful fair-*335minded young lady. I’m going to agree with that because, after all, you’d run into him when this is over with and there you’d be, you know. You’re very fair minded. Thank you so much. I’m sorry you had to wait so long to find this out.
“MR. HALSEY: I guess we’ll except to that ruling.
“THE COURT: Go about your business. Go back to work for the government.
“MR. TOKOLY [Prosecutor]: I’m a little surprised at Mr. Halsey in light of the fact that we’ve agreed to excuse people who knew a police officer or had a relative that knew a police officer and this lady has indicated she felt like she knew a relative of the Defendant and she knew Sam Hudson or at least had met his dad.
“THE COURT: Next juror.”
The trial judge erred in excusing Minicks over appellant’s objection, since she was not subject to a challenge for cause. Art. 35.16, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. Ordinarily, this error would be deemed harmless. Valore v. State, supra; Rogers v. State, supra. However, the voir dire examination of Minicks cannot be fairly considered without comparing it to the voir dire of several other prospective jurors and especially to the examination of Mrs. Rayford Bolin.13
D.
First, I observe that the prosecutor sought to justify the trial judge’s action in excusing Minicks by stating that the State had agreed to excuse any prospective juror “who knew a police officer or had a relative that knew a police officer.” The prosecutor’s assertion is not supported by the record. Nineteen of the prospective jurors acknowledged that they, or a relative of theirs, knew one or more police officers.14 Of these, only two, Claxton and Rings, were excused by the trial judge because of this knowledge — Claxton because he admitted bad feelings toward police officers as a result of his son’s juvenile arrest and Rings because he admitted that he “really didn’t know” whether his friendship with an Irving police lieutenant would affect his judgment of the police witnesses in the case.
Of the seventeen remaining prospective jurors, ten were struck by appellant, three were struck by the State, and four served as jurors. In contrast with the examination of juror Minicks, the trial judge made no effort to intervene when these prospective jurors acknowledged that they were acquainted with police officers, nor did the State make any offer — spontaneous or otherwise — to excuse any of these seventeen jurors, even though several of them were much more closely acquainted with police officers than Minicks was with counsel’s father.15
This is not to say that these seventeen prospective jurors should have been excused automatically by the trial judge. However, when taken together with the examination of Minicks, the judge’s failure to intervene in this aspect of the voir dire not only *336undermines the prosecutor’s assertion on this issue, it also accentuates the error in the excusal of Godbolt and Brightman. Unfortunately, the examination of prospective juror Bolin reveals other, similar error.
E.
The State first determined that Bolin did not know appellant or his attorneys. The prosecutor then asked how Bolin felt about the death penalty. She answered “I believe in the death penalty. I’m for it in certain instances.” A few moments later she added that she had believed in the death penalty for a long time.
After asking Bolin several questions about her personal background and ascertaining that she would have no difficulty being part of a sequestered jury, the prosecutor received her assurance that she would base her verdict solely on the evidence. He explained to her the bifurcated nature of the trial as well as the nature and content of the special issues at the punishment stage. Bolin stated that her answers to these issues would be based on the evidence and her deliberations on them would not be affected by the mandatory sentence of death or life imprisonment. She also stated that she could follow the law as explained by the prosecutor and not require evidence of motive or premeditation. She also testified that she could consider the full range of punishment for the lesser included offense of murder. She agreed to follow the law by requiring the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, by presuming appellant innocent until proved guilty, by considering appellant’s indictment as no evidence of his guilt, and by according the appellant his right to remain silent.
Appellant began his examination of Bolin by asking several more questions about her personal background. Bolin then stated that she had read about the case at the time the offense occurred and gave a short summary of what she remembered from her reading; her knowledge of the case was accurate but not extensive. She testified that she could disregard what she had read and base her decision on the evidence alone.
After several additional personal questions, counsel asked Bolin if she knew any prosecutors or police officers; she replied that she did not and also stated that neither she nor her husband had ever belonged to any neighborhood law enforcement organization or the like. She stated that neither she nor any member of her family had ever been charged with a crime, nor had any of them been a victim of a crime.
She acknowledged that she belonged to the same church as Judge John Vance, a criminal district judge in Dallas, but testified they were not well-acquainted. She stated that she had served as a juror in a misdemeanor case, and that the jury had reached a verdict. Defense counsel then re-examined her on several points covered earlier in her testimony.
Defense counsel then showed Bolin a list of the witnesses in the case and asked if she knew anyone on the list. She replied that she knew of Deia Sutton, the deceased’s companion when he was killed, because Sutton’s father was “a customer of my husband’s in the insurance business.” Although Bolin stated that she did not know Sutton or her father personally, she testified that she and her husband had discussed Sutton’s involvement in this case. It is noteworthy that in testifying about her husband’s insurance business with Sutton’s father, Bolin referred to the Sutton family as “our customers” even though Bolin did not work in the business.
Bolin stated, however, that she did not think that she would be influenced by this business relationship if she were chosen as a juror. Then, after counsel interrogated Bo-lin briefly about her husband’s views on the death penalty and her own possible racial prejudice, the defense concluded its examination of Bolin and asked that the judge grant its challenge for cause on the basis of “knowledge of the complaining witness in this case testifying, being a customer of her husband.”16 The judge denied this challenge, and the prosecutor told the judge that the State would accept the juror.
*337Because appellant had exhausted his peremptory challenges, he asked for an additional such challenge. The judge denied this request, and Bolin was seated as the final juror in the case.
F.
The majority concludes that it was not an abuse of discretion to overrule this challenge for cause and deny the request for an additional peremptory challenge. But in so holding, the majority fails to look at the trial judge’s action in the context of the entire voir dire, especially the examination and excusal of Doris Minicks. By saying that Minicks was disqualified because of her faint awareness of defense counsel’s father while at the same time asserting that Bolin was qualified despite her husband’s business relationship with the family of one of the victims,17 we are giving a signal to trial judges that their discretion in the selection of capital juries will not be given a meaningful review by this Court.
This is the opposite of due process; it is in fact no process at all. The record reveals that the trial court allowed the selection of a jury which was not merely neutral but was predisposed to impose the death penalty. This clearly violates the mandate of Witherspoon as well as the requirements of our own Texas Constitution.
I would hold that an examination of the entire voir dire reveals a jury selection process in violation of due process and the due course of the law of the land.18 More specifically, I would hold that the trial court reversibly erred in excusing prospec-five jurors Godbolt, Brightman, and Min-icks, and in seating juror Bolin.
V.
Finally, I would point out that reversal in this case is not only required by the Federal Constitution; our Texas Constitution mandates it also. See Article I, Section 19, of the Texas Constitution, quoted in footnote 6, supra. This section was construed in Paris v. State, 35 Tex.Cr.R. 82, 31 S.W. 855 (1896). Paris was found guilty of murder and sentenced to die. The case was reversed because of the trial court’s failure to allow the defendant sufficient cross-examination of one of the State’s witnesses, because of the court’s failure to give a limiting charge on impeachment testimony, and also because of its failure to give a proper charge on the issue of duress. The Court concluded its opinion with the following language:
“Whether the jury which tried the case would have attached any weight to the excluded testimony is not for us to say, or whether the charge of the court, if it had properly limited the admitted testimony, in the one case, and had presented the issues to the jury, in the other, would have changed the result, is not our province to inquire; but we do know that, under the law and the decisions of this state, the defendant has been deprived of testimony to which he was entitled, and the charge of the court did not adequately present the issues as to the other evidence which was admitted. Every citizen, when placed upon trial for his life, is *338entitled to a trial according to the due course of the law of the land; and the rules of evidence in the admission of testimony, and the application of rules of law to admitted testimony, are as much a part of the law of the land as trial by jury itself. These rules of law may be termed by some technicalities, but they accord with a fair and an impartial trial, and are founded in the wisdom of experience; and, moreover, some of these constitute the safeguards and bulwarks of human rights, and, whenever and wherever they have been disregarded or ignored, that era has marked the decadence of human freedom.” (Emphasis added). 34 Tex.Cr.R. at 96, 31 S.W. at 858.
As in Paris, the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.
PHILLIPS, J., joins in this dissent.

. This error as to McLarty is property preserved for appellate review. After the trial judge made it clear that he was going to excuse McLarty, he told counsel, “Take your exception.” Except for a few short preliminary matters, the entire voir dire of McLarty had dealt with her ability to vote in favor of the death penalty. Thus the trial judge not only had notice what appellant’s objection would be; he actually anticipated the objection and granted it before it was made. That counsel subsequently made other objections is not destructive of this objection, which was clearly overruled by the trial judge.
The error as to Nixon was also preserved. Appellant reserved a timely exception to the excusing of Nixon. Although counsel made no specific mention of Witherspoon, his ground of objection was clear, since the only subject of examination during Nixon’s voir dire was his ability and willingness to inflict the death penalty.

. I do believe that prospective jurors Hamilton and Chase were absolutely disqualified under Witherspoon, even though the majority prefers to justify their disqualification under the lesser standard of V.T.C.A., Section 12.31(b). Hamilton remained staunch and unequivocal in her acknowledged inability to vote for the death penalty in any case, while Chase repeatedly stated that she “probably” could not vote to inflict the death penalty. This was sufficient. See Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 383-384 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 104, 108-109 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976).

. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Two other members of the Court apparently agree, albeit much more emphatically, since they both believe that the death penalty is so different from a term of imprisonment as to be unconstitutional. See Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. at 305-306, 96 S.Ct. 2978 (Opinions of Brennan and Marshall, JJ.); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 227, 231, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976) (Opinions of Brennan and Marshall, JJ.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257, 314, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Opinions of Brennan and Marshall, JJ.).

. In addition to Woodson and Gregg, the cases are Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976).

. See, e. g., Goldberg, THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE SUPREME COURT, 15 Ariz.L.Rev. 355 (1973); Tao, BEYOND FURMAN V. GEORGIA : THE NEED FOR A MORALLY BASED DECISION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 51 Notre Dame Lawyer 722 (1976); Comment, THE DEATH PENALTY: A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, 27 Sw.L.J. 298 (1973); Note, IS THE DEATH PENALTY DEAD?, 26 Baylor L.Rev. 114 (1974).

. Similarly, Article I, Section 19, of the Texas Constitution provides: “No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.” (Emphasis added).

. See Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 117, 96 S.Ct. 2909; Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. at 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978; Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. at 522-523, 88 S.Ct. 1770.

. The Witherspoon court also specifically held that “a State may not entrust the determination of whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death.” [Footnote omitted.] 391 U.S. at 521-522, 88 S.Ct. at 1776.

. See note 8, supra.

. This Court has consistently held that it is error for the trial judge to excuse prospective jurors on his own motion; however, this erroneous removal is deemed harmless unless the defendant shows that he was injured. E. g., Valore v. State, 545 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex.Cr. App.1977). Nonetheless, it should be remembered that this holding is conditioned on the requirement that “neither the Constitution nor the statutes [be] violated.” Rogers v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 260, 261, 289 S.W.2d 923, 924 (1956). As will be seen, my concern is not with the exclusion of this juror standing alone; it is instead with the part this exclusion played in an overall pattern of jury selection which denied appellant his right to due process of law.

. At this point it should be observed that one form of capital murder does require proof of premeditation, although that word is not specifically mentioned in the statute. Section 19.-03 of our Penal Code defines capital murder. Subsection (a)(3) of that section sets out one of the methods of committing capital murder: when “the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration.” It seems to be beyond dispute that capital murder under this subsection cannot be proved without evidence of premeditation, and that a prosecutor who fails to present such evidence has not met his burden of proof. Thus, the prosecutor’s statements on this issue were overbroad and constituted, at least in part, an incorrect statement of the general law of murder, which was the focus of that portion of the voir dire examination.

.See note 11, supra.

. See Part III of this opinion, supra.

. These were jurors Mary Price, Harrell, Martin, Funk, Blackmore, Chamness, Valentine, Claxton, Christian, Rings, Carter, Shanks, Barker, Hunnicutte, Bums, Legg, McFadden, Cecil Price, and Shaw. Of the nineteen, the first ten were examined before Minicks, the remaining nine afterwards.

. For example, juror Harrell stated that one of his nephews was a police officer in California and another nephew was a court bailiff there. Harrell himself had once been a Treasury Department investigator. He was the subject of appellant’s second peremptory challenge.
Juror Blackmore, who was also struck by appellant, stated that he had met two or three Dallas Police Department officers and also knew one reserve deputy, who had been a guest in Blackmore’s home. The deputy was a good friend of Blackmore’s son.
Juror Shanks stated that a friend of his daughter’s was a Dallas Police Department officer. Similarly, prospective juror Barker testified that he had two “friends that I went to high school with that are members of the Dallas Police Department.” Juror Bums stated that he knew “a few” Dallas police officers and that one was a “close friend.” All three of these prospective jurors were struck by the appellant.

. The appellant also urged that Bolin was racially prejudiced.

. And see the examination of juror McFarland, summarily excused by the judge because of her acquaintance with the appellant’s mother. Compare also the examination of Jackson, excused because her brother knew the appellant somewhat and mentioned the case to her.

. The record contains numerous other previously undiscussed examples of this erroneous selection process. For examples, see the examination of prospective jurors Dunaway (an anti-death penalty venirewoman who nonetheless could impose it but who stated she could not impose the minimum five-year punishment for the lesser included offense of murder; the appellant’s attempts to rehabilitate her on this issue were prematurely cut off), Sparks (a prospective juror whose support of the death penalty was hesitant but who also qualified on this issue; when he stated he too could not consider the minimum punishment for murder, appellant was again cut off in his attempts at rehabilitation), Lister (prospective juror who did not believe in the death penalty, but could impose it, excused because she was the mother of children over ten years old — see Art. 2135, V.A. C.S.), Wolford (anti-death penalty venirewom-an; appellant prematurely cut off from Wither-spoon rehabilitation), Palmo (again, appellant was prematurely cut off from rehabilitating anti-death penalty venirewoman).