Court Opinion

ID: 9958146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 14:01:00.179641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:57.890456
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-6158     Document: 010111028010       Date Filed: 04/08/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            April 8, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 23-6158
                                                     (D.C. No. 5:22-CR-00005-R-14)
  NANCY ISABEL MORALES                                        (W.D. Okla.)
  RODRIGUEZ,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       A jury convicted Nancy Isabel Morales Rodriguez of drug-trafficking crimes,

 and the district court sentenced her to 120 months’ imprisonment. Ms. Morales now

 appeals.1 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
       1
         In response to an inquiry by the district court, Ms. Morales stated she should
 be called “Ms. Morales” rather than “Ms. Rodriguez.”
Appellate Case: 23-6158     Document: 010111028010         Date Filed: 04/08/2024    Page: 2

                                     BACKGROUND

        Ms. Morales was indicted with two counts: (1) participating in a conspiracy to

 distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and (2) distributing

 five kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of

 cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). She went to trial before

 a jury, which found her guilty on both counts.

        A month after the trial, Ms. Morales filed a pro se letter indicating

 dissatisfaction with her conviction and her counsel. She asked the court “for the

 chance to take back [her] guilty plea, under the grounds of [her] whole story not

 being said nor explained.” R. Vol. I at 233. She further asked to “terminat[e] [her]

 lawyer” because she did not “feel that he’s been honest with the judicial system by

 advising [her] to not be honest about [her] full story and whole situation.” Id. She

 also did not “feel like he is representing [her] to the best of his ability, which has

 caused a conflict of interest between [them].” Id.

        In response, Ms. Morales’s counsel moved to withdraw. Counsel informed the

 court he had attempted to speak with Ms. Morales, but she had declined and had

 directed him to file the motion to withdraw. He stated that “[d]ue to allegations of

 ineffective assistance of counsel, [he] is not in a legal, or ethical position to continue

 his representation” and that he “would submit that a break down in the

 Attorney/Client relationship has arisen.” Id. at 237.

        The district court held a hearing to explore the allegations in Ms. Morales’s

 letter. At the hearing, Ms. Morales initially said she did not believe counsel could

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 continue representing her. The district court discussed her concerns, and it heard

 from counsel. It ascertained there was no actual conflict of interest, but Ms. Morales

 perceived she was not being adequately represented. Telling her it was satisfied she

 was being adequately represented and it believed her best option was to continue with

 her counsel, the court asked if she would try to work with counsel. She replied she

 was willing to do so, but she wanted more information when she asked questions.

 After directing counsel to spend time with Ms. Morales and answer all her questions

 in preparation for sentencing, the district court denied Ms. Morales’s motion for

 substitute counsel and counsel’s motion to withdraw.2

       Four months later, the district court sentenced Ms. Morales to the statutory

 mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served

 concurrently. Ms. Morales now appeals.

                                     DISCUSSION

       Represented by new counsel, Ms. Rodriguez makes only one argument on

 appeal: that the district court erred in denying her motion to substitute counsel. We

 review the denial of substitute counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v.

 Williamson, 859 F.3d 843, 857 (10th Cir. 2017). “The overriding question is whether

 the district court’s decision was one of the rationally available choices given the facts

 and the applicable law in the case at hand.” United States v. Clark, 717 F.3d 790,

       2
         The court granted a separate motion to withdraw by a second attorney who
 had been participating for training purposes, concluding dual representation was not
 necessary for sentencing. Ms. Morales does not challenge that decision, and it is not
 an issue in this appeal.
                                             3
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 810 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In the absence of specific

 findings by the court, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the

 court’s ruling.” United States v. Dunbar, 718 F.3d 1268, 1277 (10th Cir. 2013).

       “To warrant a substitution of counsel, the defendant must show good cause,

 such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or an

 irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.” Id. at 1276

 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is a “high standard” for a defendant to meet.

 United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1025 (10th Cir. 2009). We analyze four

 factors, considering whether

       (1) the defendant’s request was timely; (2) the trial court adequately
       inquired into the reasons for making the request; (3) the defendant-attorney
       conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of communications precluding
       an adequate defense; and (4) the defendant substantially and unreasonably
       contributed to the breakdown in communications.

 Williamson, 859 F.3d at 860.

       Ms. Morales suggests there was a complete breakdown of communication.3

 She contends that her motion was timely, that the district court’s inquiry was

 inadequate, and that she agreed to keep her attorney “reluctantly . . . because the

 district court ruled that he was effective” and “[t]here was nothing she could do at

       3
          Ms. Morales also vaguely refers to ineffective assistance of counsel, but we
 generally defer ineffective assistance claims to collateral proceedings, see United
 States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc), and we see no
 reason to depart from that rule here. See United States v. Vargas, 316 F.3d 1163,
 1165 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting new counsel “appears to partially characterize this case
 as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,” and “[i]f that were an accurate
 description, such a claim would presumptively be dismissed in this circuit”). We
 therefore express no opinion on ineffective assistance of counsel.
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 that point.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 8-9. She does not address the fourth factor. We

 conclude the first factor favors Ms. Morales, but the remaining three factors do not.

       The government concedes Ms. Morales’s motion was timely, and we agree. It

 was filed only a month after trial, and five months before sentencing. See United

 States v. Lott, 433 F.3d 718, 725 (10th Cir. 2006) (accepting as timely a motion to

 substitute filed three months before sentencing). Accordingly, the first factor weighs

 in favor of Ms. Morales.

       The second factor addresses the district court’s obligation to inquire into the

 circumstances. See Dunbar, 718 F.3d at 1276 (“When presented with a motion to

 substitute counsel, the district court is under a duty to make formal inquiry into the

 defendant’s reasons for dissatisfaction with present counsel.” (brackets and internal

 quotation marks omitted)). Although the district court held a hearing, Ms. Morales

 asserts its “inquiry into the merits was non-existent. The district court immediately

 countered the defendant and said that her attorney was in fact effective.” Aplt.

 Opening Br. at 8. This description, however, is inaccurate.

       At the hearing, the district court asked Ms. Morales about the grounds for her

 motion. When she said she wanted a chance to tell her side of the story, it informed

 her she would have that opportunity at sentencing. The court heard her concerns that

 her attorney had not given her enough information and had not asserted an available

 defense, and then it heard counsel’s response to those concerns. It determined

 Ms. Morales was not truly intending to assert a conflict of interest, but that she was

 concerned about the quality of the representation. Only then did the court tell her

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 that it believed she was being represented adequately and that her best course was to

 continue with counsel. Contrary to Ms. Morales’s assertions, the court did not

 contradict her without any further inquiry. Further, it was not improper for the court

 to opine on counsel’s performance. See United States v. Byrum, 567 F.3d 1255, 1266

 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Beers, 189 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999).

 Because the district court adequately inquired into the reasons for requesting

 substitute counsel, the second factor weighs against Ms. Morales.

       As for the third factor, “[m]ere strategic disagreement between a defendant and

 [her] attorney is not enough to show good cause; rather, there must be a total

 breakdown in communications.” Dunbar, 718 F.3d at 1276 (internal quotation marks

 omitted). Accordingly, Ms. Morales’s dissatisfaction with counsel’s defense does not

 establish the district court erred in denying her motion.

       The record does not support finding a total breakdown in communications.

 After initially expressing reluctance to continue with her counsel, Ms. Morales

 eventually informed the court she would be willing to work with counsel if he gave

 her more information. The court directed counsel to spend the time necessary to

 answer her questions, and counsel agreed to do so. On appeal, Ms. Morales asserts

 she only “reluctantly agreed to keeping [counsel] in the end because the district court

 ruled that he was effective.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 8. But even if her agreement was

 reluctant, it supports a conclusion there was not a total lack of communication.

 See United States v. Holloway, 939 F.3d 1088, 1099 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Conflict that

 results in a total breakdown of communication exists where the defendant and

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 counsel could not, in any manner, communicate.” (emphasis added)). The third

 factor therefore weighs against her.

       Finally, the fourth factor requires examining Ms. Morales’s role. It appears

 she substantially contributed to any breakdown in communications because she

 declined to speak with counsel. Accordingly, the fourth factor also weighs against

 her. See id. at 1102 (“A defendant cannot simply manufacture a breakdown in

 communication and thereby give rise to a constitutional violation.” (internal

 quotation marks omitted)).

       With three factors weighing against Ms. Morales, it was a rationally available

 choice to deny the motion for substitute counsel. We see no abuse of discretion.

 See Lott, 433 F.3d at 726 (affirming the denial of a timely motion to substitute

 counsel because “the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the other

 three . . . factors weighed against finding a complete breakdown in communication”).

                                    CONCLUSION

       We affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Bobby R. Baldock
                                             Circuit Judge

                                            7