Court Opinion

ID: 9758789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:45:53.813143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:55.714327
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Hall, J.
This case is long since moot. While we may determine a moot appeal when the public interest in the issue presented is so great as to make a resolution of it desirable, Busik v. Levine, 63 N. J. 351, 364 (1973), appeal dismissed 414 U. S. 1106, 94 S. Ct. 831, 38 L.Ed. 2d 733 (1973), we should not do so when, as here, the record and contentions on a novel and very far-reaching question are so unsatisfactory that we cannot be confident of reaching the correct result.
The action, in lieu of prerogative writ, commenced in the Law Division in 1970, sought a declaration of invalidity of a police power ordinance of the city of Clifton requiring a certain minimum floor area for each dwelling unit based on the number of occupants. The enactment then required 150 square feet of floor space for each of the first two- occupants and an additional 100 square feet for each additional occupant regardless of age. The prohibition of the ordinance extended to any person occupying, or letting to another for occupancy, any dwelling or dwelling unit which did not comply. Prior to 19'64, the ordinance required only 120 square feet for the first occupant and 80 square feet for each additional occupant, except that only 60 square feet was *206needed for each child under six years of age. By amendment in that year, the requirement for the first occupant was raised to 150 square feet and 100 square feet for each additional occupant, irrespective of age. An amendment in 1970 raised the requirement for the second occupant to 150 square feet.
Plaintiff was employed as superintendent of a garden apartment complex and received the use of an apartment rent-free as part of his compensation. His family consisted of his wife and five children. The apartment was not large enough to meet the requirements for a living group of that size. Plaintiff was threatened by municipal officials with enforcement of the ordinance against him, which would mean he would not only have to vacate the apartment, but give up his job. The suit followed.
The trial court sustained the enactment, without a trial, by granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment.1 While plaintiff’s appeal was pending unheard in the Appellate Division, he was discharged from his position and so required to vacate the apartment. The family moved to another municipality in October 1972 and obviously plaintiff no longer has any real interest in Clifton’s ordinance or litigation attacking it. The action, which thereby became moot, has since been carried on in plaintiff’s name by a civil liberties organization (which arranged counsel for him originally) having no standing itself. Such included continuation of the appeal in the Appellate Division, resulting in an affirmance of the trial court, 123 N. J. Super. 274 (1973), and the prosecution of the present appeal to this court, which was brought on the claim of involvement of a substantial constitutional question. B. 2:2-1 (a)(1).
Regulations basing minimum floor area requirements of a dwelling unit on the number of occupants apparently have *207never previously been passed upon by an appellate court. The only ease that can be found on the subject is a trial court opinion in Ohio, Nolden v. East Cleveland City Commission, 12 Ohio Misc. 205, 232 N.E. 2d 421 (1965), which sustained a comparable enactment, having, however, certain ameliorating aspects.
The instant ordinance affects a fundamental for living — housing — very drastically. Mot only must an apartment tenant vacate if the birth of an additional child or the arrival of an aged relative causes the minimum required floor area to be exceeded, but the owner of a single-family dwelling must likewise move his family from their own home if such an event occurs. The minimum figures are such that mobile homes and two person occupancy of a one-room apartment are impossible. And no distinction is made with respect to the age of the occupants; young children and possibly elderly people may well need less living space. Moreover, since this regulation is grounded in the general police power and not as part of the municipality’s zoning ordinance, under the law of this state to date it applies to all dwelling units as of the moment of passage and there is no protection to a nonconforming unit. In addition, for the same reason, there is no possibility of obtaining any alleviation. The regulation in the Ohio case cited was at least subject to these ameliorative features.
Turning to the factual and legal contentions and the record, the case was, as we have said, decided in the Law Division on motion without a trial. Plaintiff offered no substantial evidence and rested on abstract federal constitutional propositions largely of little relevance. These included claims of violation of due process and equal protection by burdening the exercise of fundamental rights without a compelling state interest, such as the right to privacy, the right to procreate,2 *208the right to marry, the right to the free exercise of religion, and the right not to be uprooted, as well as by discrimination against large families, the poor and racial minorities. The municipality relied on the conelusional affidavit of its local health officer, as a purported expert (he was not even cross-examined), in support of the legal propriety and reasonableness of the regulation. The arguments on appeal follow the same tack.
We assume that government may legitimately require a minimum floor area for living units based on the number and character of the occupants in the interest of public health and that such power has been delegated to municipalities in this state by N. J. 8. A. 40:48-2. The real questions with respect to any such regulation are whether the mínimums prescribed are legally reasonable, and if so, whether the regulation was actually adopted for health reasons and not for some other purpose. As previously indicated, regulations of this kind drastically affect the availability of housing, especially for large families of poor or modest means, like plaintiff’s, as to whom there is undoubtedly a general severe shortage of decent, suitable living accommodations. The record indicates this is true in Clifton.
The consequences being so great in so fundamental an area, perhaps justification for the particular enactment ought to rest upon the municipality. See Moyant v. Paramus, 30 N. J. 528, 535 (1959). Indeed, the legal reasonableness of a regulation of this kind might depend upon proof that every person enjoying less than the particular prescribed minimum amount of living space necessarily encounters a realistic individual health hazard and presents a substantially certain public health problem. (It may be noted that the Clifton mínimums are, in one respect at least, higher than suggested in the proposed model housing codes relied upon in the affidavit.) A municipal enactment should neither be struck down nor validated when, as here, truly vital aspects have not been presented or considered.
*209Furthermore, the absence of any exploration at the trial level of why this ordinance or its predecessors was adopted makes one wonder what was the real reason for passage. The health officer’s affidavit did not say that health was the reason and the progressive increases in the minimum suggest the possibility of some other motivation. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that Clifton is adjacent to the cities of Paterson and Passaic, both of which have substantial and increasing numbers of poor families predominantly from minority groups, which might be expected naturally to spill over into Clifton. Such families are frequently large and cannot afford expensive quarters, but still need extensive municipal services. The Clifton ordinance will effectively wall them out of the municipality. The city should be required to establish that it was not enacted for any such improper purpose.
For all of the reasons mentioned, we should not decide this moot appeal nor should the Appellate Division have entertained it. It is dismissed and the judgment of the Appellate Division is vacated. No costs.

Planitiff’s cross-motion was denied except that a section of the ordinance giving municipal officials free access to all dwelling units, without a warrant, to inspect the same for ordinance compliance was declared unconstitutional as violative of the Fourth Amendment.

See Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U. S. 632, 94 S. Ct. 791, 39 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1974), holding invalid compulsory maternity leaves for teachers at a prescribed point in pregnancy, not referred to by the parties.