Court Opinion

ID: 9583479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:39:07.63543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:02.723496
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). I dissent from the court's mandate and so much of its opinion as holds that the evidence on all counts did not require an instruction on the defense of entrapment.
At the outset it is important to note that the defendant, Becki Hilleshiem, was not charged with possession of a controlled substance, but with fifteen counts of delivery of a controlled substance, or party to the crime of delivery of a controlled substance. She requested that the jury be instructed on entrapment on all counts except counts one and twelve. However, the court gave the instruction only on counts four, nine, fourteen and fifteen. On three of the counts on which the instruction was given, Hilleshiem was acquitted.
The state analyzes Hilleshiem's testimony for each of the counts on which she sought, but was refused, an entrapment instruction. The state argues that Hil-leshiem's testimony on seven of the counts shows "an irredeemable lack of evidence of governmental induce*25ment." As to the remaining count (six), the state argues that Hilleshiem failed to present enough evidence of inducement to get the entrapment issue to the jury.
Hilleshiem argues that the inducements offered to her by the police over the ten-month period in which the alleged offenses occurred should not be viewed in the context of each offense, but in the context of the continuing relationship between Hilleshiem and the undercover agent who participated in each of the deliveries with which Hilleshiem is charged. I agree with Hil-leshiem's approach.
That approach takes into account several very important facts. First, the undercover agent, Steve Owen, arranged to meet Hilleshiem; she did not contact him. Second, Owen befriended Hilleshiem: he stayed overnight at her house frequently; he gave her money for groceries; he bought her flowers; he picked up her son for her from a roller rink; and he told her he was going to sponsor a band for her, fulfilling her lifetime dream of having a career in music. Third, from the outset, Owen induced Hilleshiem to obtain unlawful drugs for him by sharing the drugs with her or giving her money to obtain her own drugs. Owen knew that Hilleshiem was a cocaine addict. Hilleshiem overdosed on cocaine in June 1988 and her family reported the incident to the Rich-land Center police. Hilleshiem herself went to the chief of police in the summer of 1988 because her dealer had been threatening to kill her if she didn't pay him the money she owed him for cocaine. An August 1988 intelligence report described Hilleshiem's problems with cocaine addiction and her unsuccessful efforts at recovery. Her parents had talked to the police several times about Hilleshiem's problem with cocaine. They gave the police names of people who were supplying her with cocaine and begged the police to do something about it. *26The police chief was present on an occasion in the summer of 1988, when Hilleshiem's mother received a call from Hilleshiem's dealer; he heard Hilleshiem's mother beg the dealer to stop selling drugs to Hilleshiem. On one occasion, Hilleshiem's father asked Owen personally not to lend money to his daughter because of her cocaine addiction.
Prior to the course of conduct initiated by Owen, Hilleshiem had a single prior involvement on a drug-related offense.1 She was not "the unwary criminal," suggested by the state. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1958).
Hilleshiem introduced expert medical testimony that she could not control her addiction. As Hilleshiem notes, there is no longer any doubt that cocaine is the most severely addictive drug of abuse. See, e.g., COCAINE: A SYMPOSIUM, Proceedings of Wisconsin Institute on Drug Abuse and National Institute on Drug Abuse, April.17-19 (C. Brink ed. 1985).
"Entrapment is a defense available to a defendant who has been induced by law enforcement to commit an offense which the defendant was not otherwise disposed to commit." State v. Pence, 150 Wis. 2d 759, 765, 442 N.W.2d 540, 542 (Ct. App. 1989). Wisconsin has adopted the subjective "origin of intent" doctrine, rather than an objective test. Id. "The subjective test focuses on the reason for the defendant's state of mind which led to the intent to commit the crime, i.e., whether the police conduct affected or changed a particular defendant's state of mind." Id., 442 N.W.2d at 542-43. There is ample evidence that Hilleshiem was not disposed to commit the offense of delivery of a controlled substance.
*27"Once there is some evidence that the government induced the defendant to commit the crime, the question of entrapment becomes a factual one for the jury . . United States v. Timberlake, 559 F.2d 1375, 1379 (5th Cir. 1977). "In that situation the defendant is entitled to have his [or her] defensive theory of the case put before the jury with appropriate instructions from the trial judge." Id. Wisconsin follows the same rule. State v. Skaff, 152 Wis. 2d 48, 59, 447 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Ct. App. 1989) ("A defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction if it is timely requested and supported by credible evidence."). I conclude that Hilleshiem's defense on an entrapment theory is amply supported by the evidence and she was entitled to an instruction on that defense.

 In 1981, Hilleshiem was fined for possession of marijuana.