Court Opinion

ID: 9417916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:43:53.932063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:32.863750
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice McKenna,
concurring.
The court in its opinion disposes of the case solely by a construction of the act of Congress. Conceding, arguendo, that such view is wholly adequate to decide the cause, I concur in -the meaning of the act as expounded in the opinion of the court, and in the main with the reasoning by which that interpretation is elucidated. I prefer, however, to place my concurrence in the judgment upon an additional ground which seems-to be more fundamental. That ground is this : That as a consequence of the relation which the Hawaiian Islands occu-. pied towards the United States, growing out of the resolution of annexation, the provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amend*219ments of the Constitution concerning grand and petit juries were not applicable to that territory, because, whilst the effect of the resolution of annexation was to acquire the islands and subject them to the .sovereignty of the United States,'neither the terms of the resolution nor the situation whieh arose from it served to incorporate the Hawaiian Islands into the-United States and make them an integral part thereof. In other words, in my opinion, the case is controlled by the decision in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244.
The resolution of Congress annexing the islands, it seems, to me, makes the conclusion just stated quite clear, and manifests that it was not intended to incorporate the islands eo imtmiti, but-en the contrary, that the purpose was, whilst acquiring them, to leave the permanent relation whieh they were to bear to the Government of the United States to await the subsequent determination of Congress. By the resolution the islands were annexedj.not absolutely, but merely “as a part of the territory of the United States,” and were simply declared to he subject to its sovereignty. The minutest examination of the resolution fails to disclose any provision declaring that the islands are incorporated and made a part -of the United .States or endowing them with the rights which would arise from such relation. On the contrary, the resolution repels the conclusion of incorporation. Thus it provided for the government .of the islands by a commission, to be appointed by the President until Congress should have opportunity to create the government which would be deemed best. Further, it stipulated “until legislation shall he enacted extending the United States customs laws and regulations to the Hawaiian Islands the existing customs relations of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States and other countries shall remain unchanged.” And, if possible, to .make the purpose of Congress yet clearer, the act provided that “ the President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of .whom shall be residents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as soon as reasonably practicable, recommend to Congress such legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they shall deem necessary or proper.” All these provisions, in my opinion, clearly point out that, whilst the purpose was to acquire *220and extend the sovereignty of the United States over the islands, it was proposed only to provide by the resolution of annexation' a provisional government until Congress should become possessed of the information necessary to enable it to determine . what should be the permanent status of the annexed territory. And the meaning of the resolution of annexation thus indicated by its terms is refiexly demonstrated by the^act “ to provide a government for the Territory of Hawaii,” approved April 30, 1900, by which the islands were undoubtedly made a part of the United States in the fullest sense and given a territorial forjn of government. When the two acts are put in contrast and the declarations in the later act are considered, which were not found in the earlier act, and which it is,to be presumed were intentionally omitted from the resolution providing for annexation, I can see no reason for holding that the mere act of annexation accomplished the result which was brought about by the subsequent law containing the more comprehensive provisions.
The mere annexation hot having effected the incorporation of the islands into the United States, it is not an open question that the provisions of the Constitution as to grand and petit juries were not applicable to them. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516; Ross's case, 140 U. S. 453, 473; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 83, and cases cited on page 86; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 584; and Downes v. Bidwell, supra.
Nor is there anything in the provision in the act of annexation relating to dhe operation of the Constitution in the annexed territory which militates against the conclusions previously expressed. The text of the resolution on this subject is as follows:
“ The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, an'd not inconsistent with this joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in. force until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine.”
Now, in so far as the Constitution is concerned, the clause subjecting the existing legislation which was provisionally con*221tinued tó the control of the Constitution, clearly referred only to the provisions of the Constitution which- weré applicable and not. to those which were inapplicable. In other words, having by the resolution-itself created a condition of things absolutely incompatible with immediate incorporation, Congress, mindful that the Constitution was the supreme law, and that its applicable provisions were operative at All times, everywhere and .upon' every condition and persons, declared that nothing in the joint resolution contihuing the customs legislation and local law should be considered as perpetuating such laws, where they.were inconsistent with those fundamental provisions of the Constitution, which were by their own force applicable to the territory with which Congress was dealing.
To say the contrary would be but to declare that Congress had provided fpr the continuance of the tariff and other legislation, whilst at the same time it had enacted that that result should not be brought about. It would, moreover, lead to the-assumption that provisions of the Constitution which were inapplicable to the particular situation should yet govern and control that condition.
Mr. Justice McKehna authorizes me to say that he also, concurs in the result for the foregoing reasons.