Court Opinion

ID: 9811685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:27:19.805667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:07.436854
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Baker and Howard both agreed that Baker loaned Howard $55,000 at 15% interest, which was to be repaid in 84 equal monthly installments of $1,061.32 each. The loan was made without a note or any security agreement being executed by Howard. Shortly after the loan was made and before Howard made his first payment, Baker delivered to Howard a computer-printed amortization schedule with the following at the top of the schedule:
LOAN AMOUNT $55,000.00
INTEREST RATE 15.000%
FIRST PAYMENT DUE 03/01/87
PAYMENT AMOUNT $1,061.32
*454Below this information were six columns for the following data:
[[Image here]]
Howard admitted that he agreed to the 15% interest rate and that the amortization schedule correctly set out the terms of the loan. After making seven monthly payments in accordance with the schedule, which he noted by circling the payment number in the second column, Howard made the eighth payment by giving Baker a “hot tub” in lieu of cash. He then refused to make any further payments.
Howard sued Baker to set aside two deeds which he executed to Baker in connection with the transaction, claiming the deeds were really unconstitutional mortgages on his business and residential homesteads to secure the loan. Baker said that he agreed to reconvey the property back to Howard after the loan was fully repaid in accordance with their agreement. In any event, Baker filed a cross-action against Howard for the unpaid balance of the loan. Howard admitted that he owed Baker the unpaid balance on the loan, but alleged in a trial amendment that the 15% interest rate on the loan was usurious because there was no “written contract" between the parties within the meaning of article 5069-1.-04(a). See TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5069-1.04(a) (Vernon 1987).
Based on a jury finding that the transaction between the parties was a loan, the court entered a judgment canceling the deeds on Howard’s homesteads, awarding Baker a recovery on the unpaid balance of the loan after deducting a usury penalty authorized by article 5069-1.06(1), and awarding Howard attorney’s fees. See id. at art. 5069-1.06(1). In its judgment the court concluded that the loan was usurious as a matter of law and, in a separate legal conclusion, held that there was no written contract between the parties within the meaning of article 5069-1.04(a).
Baker’s principal point on appeal is that the court erred when it concluded that the interest rate was usurious because the amortization schedule qualified as a written contract under article 5069-1.04(a) as a matter of law. The majority rejects this argument with the following comment:
The question of whether or not the unsigned amortization schedule was the written contract of the parties or merely a memorial of the prior oral agreement of the loan transaction was a fact issue for the jury, turning on the intent of the parties. Simmons And Simmons Construction Co. v. REA, 155 Tex. 353, 286 S.W.2d 415 (1955). This fact issue was not submitted to the jury in our case. The judgment carries the implied finding of the trial court that the schedule was not the written agreement of the parties. Rule 279, Vernon’s Tex.Rules Civ.Proc. Evidence we have recited supports this finding, showing that the loan agreement was entirely completed, including the amount of the monthly payments, several weeks before the schedule was supplied to Howard by Baker. Additionally, *455the schedule was not sued on or pleaded by either party. Under the evidence, the trial court was justified in determining that the parties merely intended and used the amortization schedule as evidence of the prior completed oral contract of the loan transaction upon which they acted. As mere evidence of the oral contract, the schedule was not a “written contract” within the meaning of Article 5069-1.04(a).
I respectfully dissent to this portion of the opinion.
Whether a contract exists between parties is a fact issue if there is a dispute over their intent. See Foreca, S.A. v. GRD Development Co., Inc., 758 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex.1988); Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pacific, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex.1972)1. However, the court decides the issue as a question- of law when evidence of intent is undisputed. See Foreca, 758 S.W.2d at 746; Rea, 286 S.W.2d at 419; Henry C. Beck Company v. Arcrete, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1974, writ dism’d). In fact, any reliance on Rea is misplaced if it is cited as authority for holding that the jury could have decided whether the parties intended the amortization schedule to be a written contract. There, the court decided the question as a matter of law because there was no dispute over the parties’ intent. See Rea, 286 S.W.2d at 419. Here, Baker’s and Howard’s intent was never in dispute, and the question of whether the amortization schedule was a written contract was for the court to determine as a matter of law.
This quote from Rea clearly sets forth the applicable law: “The following observations by Professor Corbin in his work on contracts are pertinent: ... An unsigned agreement all the terms of which are embodied in a writing, unconditionally assented to by both parties, is a written contract.” Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
Under this rule and the facts presented, two essential questions arise: (1) whether the unsigned amortization schedule embodied all of the terms of the loan; and (2) whether the parties unconditionally assented to the terms of the loan. If the evidence conclusively established the affirmative of these questions, then the amortization schedule was a written contract as a matter of law.
Baker and Howard both admitted that the unsigned amortization schedule embodied all of the terms of the loan.2 Likewise, the evidence conclusively established that Howard and Baker unconditionally assented to the terms of the loan. There simply was no evidence to support a contrary conclusion or to raise a fact issue on either question. Thus, the amortization schedule was a written contract as a matter of law, and failing to expressly plead it as such did not make it otherwise. See id.
There was nothing for the jury to determine with respect to what the parties intended because their intent was never a disputed issue. Furthermore, an issue can be deemed found under Rule 279 only if “there is factually sufficient evidence to support a finding thereon.” TEX.R.CIV.P. 279. There was no evidence to support a deemed finding that the parties intended the schedule not to be a written contract. In fact, the evidence conclusively established the contrary.
Article 5069-1.04(a) provides that parties to any “written contract” may agree to a rate of interest not exceeding 18%. TEX. REV. Cl V.STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04(a), (b)(1) (Vernon 1987). Based on the undisputed evidence, the amortization schedule was a “written contract” within the mean*456ing of article 5069-1.04(a) as a matter of law, and the 15% interest rate was thus not usurious.
Consequently, I would hold that the court erred when it ruled that the loan was usurious and would sustain Baker’s first point. Under my view of the proper disposition, the second point is never reached. Furthermore, I would reverse the portions of the judgment deducting the usury penalty from the amount due Baker on the loan and awarding Howard attorney’s fees, and then reform and affirm the judgment in Baker’s favor for the amount due on the loan and attorney’s fees.

. There was conflicting evidence in Foreca and Scott on whether the parties intended to be immediately bound by their agreement or intended their agreement to have no significance until it was reduced to writing and signed. Foreca, S.A. v. GRD Development Co., Inc., 758 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tex.1988); Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pacific, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex.1972).

. That the schedule was not signed by the parties did not prevent it from being a written contract. See Simmons and Simmons Construction Co. v. Rea, 155 Tex. 353, 286 S.W.2d 415, 418 (1955). Moreover, the record contains no evidence that Baker or Howard ever conditioned their assent to the terms of the loan upon their signatures being affixed to any written instrument. See id.