Court Opinion

ID: 9794144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:00:21.685515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:33.245182
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice ROVIRA,
dissenting:
We have been asked to decide which statute of limitations applies to a tort action brought against the Regional Transportation District (RTD). The majority holds that the three year limitation period for actions arising under the Colorado Automobile Accident Reparations Act (No Fault Act limitation) applies rather than the two year limitation for actions against governmental entities (Governmental Entity limitation). Maj. op. at 666; Compare § 13 — 80—101(l)(j) with § 13-80-102(l)(h), 6A C.R.S. (1987). It concludes that when two conflicting limitation periods arguably apply to an action, the conflict must be resolved in favor of the longer limitation period. Because I believe the majority is continuing to follow an unsound premise in contravention of basic rules of statutory construction and without regard for the policies applicable to governmental entities, I dissent.
I.
The majority relies on two principal cases to support its holding, Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218 (Colo.1992) and Dawson v. Reider, 872 P.2d 212 (Colo.1994). Indeed, the majority explains that the “analysis in Dawson [is] applicable to the issue here posed.” Maj. op. at 668. The majority’s rationale here eon-tains many of the same errors I first identified in my dissent in Dawson,
As I stated in Dawson, the Jones holding was not premised on the principle of statutory construction that the longer statute of limitations should prevail when two statutes conflict. Dawson, 872 P.2d at 218 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting). Rather, in Jones, the court held that actions arising under the No Fault Act comprise a more specific class of actions than do tort claims generally.1 In Jones, once the court had answered the preliminary question of whether the No Fault Act covered an action between two motorists, it could readily identify the more general and specific statute. See Jones, 828 P.2d at 223.
In Dawson the court attempted to build on Jones, but was without identifiable general and specific statutes. Absent this guideline, it resorted to the conclusion that the length of the statutory period is dispositive. Here, the majority once again concedes that two of the three principles of statutory construction relied on in Jones are not present.2 Maj. op. at 668. Thus, while the court purports to rely on Jones, in reality that case provides little support for the majority’s decision.
II.
A.
The majority’s reliance on the proposition that the longer statute must prevail because statutes of limitation preclude presumptively valid claims is defective in three respects. First, the majority ignores the rule that statutes of limitations governing actions against governmental entities must be strictly construed. In so doing it ignores the policies clearly set forth in the Governmental Immunity Act (GIA). Second, it ignores the modern trend to view statutes of limitation favorably. Finally, the majority’s interpretation *671fails to harmonize these potentially conflicting statutes, leaving the two year limitation period without meaning.
I agree that the provisions of the No Fault Act apply to RTD as a public entity. Maj. op. at 666. That the substantive provisions of the No Fault Act apply is not, however, determinative of the procedural aspect of the applicable statute of limitations. Any limitation period providing for -claims against the government must be strictly construed. See Dawson, 872 P.2d at 219 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting). This rule finds strong support in the policies underlying exceptions to governmental immunity. When it enacted the GIA, the General Assembly recognized that “taxpayers would ultimately bear the fiscal burdens of unlimited liability and that limitations on the liability of public entities and public employees are necessary in order to protect the taxpayers against excessive fiscal burdens.” § 24-10-102, 10A C.R.S. (1988). Further, the importance of timely claims is evidenced in the statutory scheme where notice of any claim must be provided within one hundred and eighty days of discovery of the injury. § 24-10-109, 10A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). While the notice provisions ensure that dangerous conditions are immediately abated, they also foster prompt settlement of claims, see Antonopoulos v. Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 532 P.2d 346 (1975), and allow the public entity to make “adequate financial arrangements to meet any potential liability.” Woodsmall v. RTD, 800 P.2d 63, 68 (Colo.1990). Thus, the importance of ensuring against stale claims against the government presents a countervailing legislative policy which must be weighed against the No Fault Act’s policy of full compensation.3
B.
Further, as pointed out in my dissent in Dawson, limitation periods are viewed favorably in Colorado. Dawson, 872 P.2d at 218-19 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting) (citing Oberst v. Mays, 148 Colo. 285, 365 P.2d 902 (1961); Chuchuru v. Chutchurru, 185 F.2d 62, 64 (10th Cir.1950)). The cases relied upon by the majority to support the contention that the longer period applies all originate outside of Colorado, and reflect an archaic view toward limitations periods. The majority bases its conclusion on the fact that statutes of limitation bar presumptively valid claims. However, the GIA provides that there are no presumptively valid claims against any Colorado governmental entity, except those allowed by statute. See § 24-1-108 (“Except as provided in § 24-10-104 to 24-10-106, sovereign immunity shall be a bar to any action against a public entity for injury which lies in tort.”). Such statutorily created exceptions cannot be viewed as presumptively valid claims.
C.
Finally, the majority holds that application of the longer period of limitations would not eviscerate the two year limitation period for actions against governmental entities. I disagree. Statutes are to be read in harmony to avoid a construction that would render meaningless one or more such parts. People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo.1990). The majority points out the limitations statutes contain identical introductory language.4 Maj. op. at 668. Indeed, the one, two and •three year limitations periods all contain identical introductory language. Because limitations periods are defined for every category of claim that can be brought against a *672governmental entity, and we have already explained the difficulty in determining specificity based on type of claim or identity of defendant, under the majority view the two year Governmental Entity limitations period becomes virtually meaningless. That several of the actions that may arise against a governmental entity are subject to a similar two year limitation period is merely fortuitous, and does not restore meaning to the Governmental Entity limitation period.
The majority states that its interpretation is supported by the fact that the No Fault Act limitation contains no exception for the Governmental Entity limitation. Maj. op. at 669. Once again, I fail to understand the majority’s exclusionary argument. See Dawson, 872 P.2d at 221 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting). The majority’s analysis is equally persuasive to draw the opposite conclusion because the Governmental Entity limitation contains enumerated exceptions, none of which relate to the No Fault Act. See § 13-80-102(l)(h) (providing for a two year limitations period “except as otherwise provided in this section or section § 13-80-103”). In effect, the majority creates an additional exemption in the Governmental Entity limitation to provide for the No Fault Act limitation when such an exception was not intended.
III.
Finally, the “notions of fairness” contained in Jones does not suggest the longer statutory period should apply. While in Dawson the majority was influenced by the General Assembly’s rejection of a one year limitations period as too short to bring a claim, here, the two year period provides ample time for such a claim. See Dawson, 872 P.2d at 215 (explaining the only unanimous conclusion of the Special Task Force on Tort Liability and Insurance was “that a one-year interval is too short and a four year interval too long,_”). Indeed, we recently upheld the constitutionality of a two year limitations period based on our view that the statute properly “promote[d] justice, discourage[d] unnecessary delay, and forestall[ed] the prosecution of stale claims.” See Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Colo.1991).
Here, the respondents properly notified the RTD of their potential claims as required under the GIA. While such notice provided the RTD with ample time to prepare for the action, the intervening two year period also provided the respondents a “fundamentally fair” period in which to file their claim.
Because the majority continues to adhere to an outdated view of limitations periods without giving consideration to competing policies underlying the GIA or basic principles of statutory construction, I dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice VOLLACK joins in this dissent.

. I dissented in Jones because I believed the action there did not meet the threshold requirement of arising "under” the No Fault Act. In my view no conflict between two statutes existed because only one statute related to the claims. As such, there was no need to reconcile potentially conflicting limitation periods. Jones, 828 P.2d at 226-27 (1992) (Rovira, J., dissenting).

. The majority states that neither of the limitation periods were enacted earlier in time, nor does one statute apply to a more specific type of action. I expressed this view in my dissent in Dawson where I explained specificity was not dispositive because a statute defined by class of defendants is at once more specific and more general than a limitations period that applies to a specific class of claims. Dawson, 872 P.2d at 218 n. 1 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting).

. While the policy of the No Fault Act to ensure maximum compensation requires consideration, the policies underlying sovereign immtmhy are equally compelling. Moreover, I do not find persuasive the majority's concern that a two year statute of limitations, under these limited circumstances, would do violence to the No Fault Act. Maj. op. at 666.

. The sections were enacted simultaneously when the General Assembly repealed and reenacted the entire limitations scheme in 1986. See Ch. 114, sec. 1, §§ 13-80-101 to -118, 55th Gen.Ass., 2nd Sess., 1986 Colo.Sess.Laws 695. Section 101, containing the No Fault Act limitation is entitled General limitation of action'— three years, and section 102, containing the Governmental Entity limitation is entitled General limitation of actions — two years. Both begin as follows:
The following civil actions, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought, or against whom the suit is brought, shall be commenced within [three or two] years after the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter.