Court Opinion

ID: 9852550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:32:38.2811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:29.496632
License: Public Domain

Shepherd, P.J.
(concurring). I agree with the result but write separately because I believe that the authorities do not necessarily mandate a conclusion that instructional error occurred.
Defendant does not dispute that the victim died from a gunshot wound inflicted by defendant. The defense theory at trial was not that something else caused the victim’s death, but that defendant did not intend to kill. Defendant argued that, even though he fired several shots toward the victim, he only intended to scare him. According to defendant, since that is the intent required for an assault, People v Joeseype Johnson, 407 Mich 196, 210; 284 NW2d 718 (1979), the evidence would support a conviction of the assault offenses. Judge Borman agrees with defendant and holds that the assault instructions should have been given because of the holding in People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 (1975). I do not believe Ora Jones requires this result.
In Ora Jones, the Court was concerned with the possibility that the jury might have convicted defendant of the greater offense because the judge refused to instruct on lesser offenses which reflected defendant’s theory or were supported by evidence at trial. See, also, People v Jones, 419 Mich 577; 358 NW2d 837 (1984); People v Richardson, 409 Mich 126; 293 NW2d 332 (1980). As later noted by the author of the majority opinion in Ora Jones:
"In deciding Ora Jones and Chamblis [People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408; 236 NW2d 473 (1975)] this Court was concerned with a defendant’s constitutionally *590guaranteed right to trial by jury. We noted that a trial court’s denial of a proper request for instruction on lesser included offenses exposes a defendant to conviction on a charged offense because the jury may be reluctant to acquit one guilty only of a lesser crime. Conversely, a trial court’s refusal to instruct increases the possibility that one guilty of a lesser crime may be acquitted. Either result is unnecessary. We believe a trial court’s failure to give a properly requested instruction attacks the 'very heart of our jury trial system.’ People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669, 676; 187 NW2d 404, 406 (1971).” People v Kamin, 405 Mich 482, 494-495; 275 NW2d 777 (1979).
The concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Ora Jones and its progeny are not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was neither evidence that the victim survived nor that he died from some cause other than a shot fired by the defendant. Defendant’s theory that he intended only to assault the victim was fairly covered by the instructions issued by the trial court. In my view, defendant’s own theory made out a strong case of second-degree murder. Firing several shots toward a human being is, at minimum, "an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm”. People v Woods, 416 Mich 581, 627; 331 NW2d 707 (1982); People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 714; 299 NW2d 304 (1980). The jury was also given an opportunity to convict defendant of involuntary manslaughter, a decision which would have implied a factual conclusion that defendant’s conduct was criminally negligent. Ora Jones, supra, p 393; People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 590-591; 218 NW2d 136 (1974). In addition, the trial judge actually gave one too many cognate offense instructions when he charged the jury on reckless use of a firearm, death resulting. MCL 752.861; MSA 28.436(21). Defendant admitted *591that he intentionally fired the rifle several times. There was no evidence that the gun was inadvertently discharged, which proof would call for an instruction on reckless use. Compare, Richardson, supra, p 133; Ora Jones, supra, p 385.
Judge Borman cites Justice Coleman’s dissent in Ora Jones, which contains a list of offenses (including assault offenses) which might, in her view, have to be given in murder cases as a result of the Ora Jones holding. It seems obvious that Justice Coleman was merely pointing to the possibility of defendants raising numerous claims of instructional error, based on extension of Ora Jones to an extreme. In my view, the appellate courts of this state should recognize that defendant’s right to instructions on cognate offenses has its logical limits. I believe that in murder cases in which the only issue is the accused’s intent, the extent of that right is demarcated by the uncontroverted result of his conduct, namely death. There are enough offenses involving death in the criminal code to cover any conceivable defense theory with regard to the intent of the accused. We need not burden the jury with consideration of an entire new set of offenses.
I admit that Judge Borman’s viewpoint finds support in People v Boles, 420 Mich 851; 358 NW2d 894 (1984), rev’g 127 Mich App 759, 770-771; 339 NW2d 249 (1983). In that case, the Supreme Court found reversible error in the trial court’s refusal to give an assault instruction in a murder trial. "The defense theory [self-defense] conceded that defendant had killed the deceased with a knife.” 127 Mich App 771. However, the peremptory order in Boles, supra, is seemingly at odds with its holding in People v Adams, 416 Mich 53; 330 NW2d 634 (1982). In Adams, the Court held that an attempt instruction need not be given *592in all cases upon a defense request. This obligation arises only if "the defense is that there was only an attempt and there is evidence that the completed offense may not have been committed or the defense is that the jury should not credit evidence tending to show that it was completed”. 416 Mich 60. I am not convinced that in its peremptory order in Boles the Supreme Court intended to definitively restate Michigan law on this subject in a manner that would both negate the implications of Adams and push the obligation of trial judges to instruct on cognate offenses to the outer extremes alluded to by Justice Coleman in Ora Jones. If the Supreme Court so intended, it would be my hope that they grant leave to appeal in this case and issue a full opinion indicating that in a death case all assault charges which apply in nondeath cases must be given if requested.
In the present case, there is no proof that the victim survived or died from a cause other than the actions of defendant. The accused did not dispute the completion of the killing, nor did he deny that his own conduct was the cause of death.