Court Opinion

ID: 9385572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 14:06:00.82944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.964353
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-160

                                  HYEJIN KWAK

                                       vs.

                               SETH H. BOZARTH.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       This appeal stems from divorce proceedings in the Probate

 and Family Court between Hyejin Kwak (wife) and Seth H. Bozarth

 (husband).     The wife, a prosthodontist, is the sole owner and

 shareholder of a dental practice (the practice or business).

 The parties stipulated that the husband would receive as part of

 the property division an amount equivalent to twenty-five

 percent of the June 2017 fair market value of the dental

 practice, with the value to be determined by the trial judge.

 At trial, two opinions of value were presented to the judge:

 (1) the wife's own opinion that the practice was worth $662,452;

 and (2) the opinion of the husband's qualified business

 valuation expert, David E. Consigli, Jr., who opined that the

 practice was worth approximately $2,230,000.             The judge

 ultimately rejected the wife's valuation, largely credited
Consigli's valuation (with one exception), and concluded that

the dental practice was worth $2,074,000 (thus entitling the

husband to $518,500, pursuant to the parties' pretrial

agreement).    The wife appeals from the April 29, 2021

supplemental judgment of divorce nisi (divorce judgment),1

asserting that the judge erroneously overvalued the dental

practice.   We affirm.

     Discussion.    "Valuation of a business interest is a

question of fact," and we will not disturb the judge's findings

of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.2   Adams v. Adams, 459

Mass. 361, 380 (2011).    "When the opinions of valuation experts

diverge, a judge may 'accept one reasonable opinion and reject

the other.'"   Adams, supra, quoting Fechtor v. Fechtor, 26 Mass.

App. Ct. 859, 863 (1989).    The judge may also "arrive at a

valuation on other evidence."    Adams, supra at 381, quoting

Fechtor, supra.

1 The wife also appeals from orders dated April 29, 2021, denying
her separate motions to amend the divorce judgment and findings
of fact. The wife, however, makes no separate argument in her
brief on those motions and we need not address them. See Mass.
R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019)
("The appellate court need not pass upon questions or issues not
argued in the brief").
2 "A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence

to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed" (quotations and citations omitted). Kendall v.
Selvaggio, 413 Mass. 619, 620-621 (1992).

                                  2
     Here, the judge rejected the wife's valuation of $662,452,

finding that her methodology (which involved subtracting the

business's debt from sixty percent of its average gross

receipts) was not a "recognized business valuation method." By

contrast, the judge found Consigli's use of the income approach

(which involved a capitalization of earnings methodology

dividing the business's normalized cash flow by the risk-

adjusted rate of return) to be generally appropriate.     See

Adams, 459 Mass. at 381.   Consigli used data from three years

(2015, 2016, and 2017) to determine the business's future cash

flow, first determining the cash flow for each individual year

and then averaging that cash flow over a three-year period.

However, in averaging the cash flow over three years, Consigli

assigned the most weight to 2017, as he believed it was the best

predictor of the practice's future performance.3   The judge

credited Consigli's methodology and accepted all but one of the

input values used by him in determining the business's cash flow

and ultimate value.    Among the input values accepted by the

judge were officer salary normalization adjustments for 2015 and

2016; however, the judge rejected the salary normalization

adjustment for 2017.   The judge also credited Consigli's

3 The judge credited this testimony, which was consistent with
the wife's testimony that revenues had plateaued by the time of
trial.

                                 3
application of a twenty-one percent good will discount,

reflecting the estimated loss of clients that would occur if the

wife left the practice.

       On appeal, the wife does not challenge the judge's general

acceptance of Consigli's capitalization of earnings methodology.

Instead, she contends that the judge erred (1) in her treatment

of the salary normalization adjustments, and (2) in crediting

Consigli's "randomly pegged" twenty-one percent good will

discount, resulting in an impermissible overvaluation of the

business.    We address her contentions in turn.

       1.   Salary normalization adjustments.   When determining the

cash flow of a business using a capitalization of earnings

valuation methodology, "a reasonable salary expense for the

operator of the business" must be subtracted from the business's

income to avoid overvaluing the business.       Sampson v. Sampson,

62 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 375-376 (2004).     See Adams, 459 Mass. at

381.

       Here, during the relevant years in question (2015, 2016,

and 2017), the wife paid herself an average salary of $273,000.

She asserted that this was consistent with the industry standard

practice of paying prosthodontists between forty to fifty

percent of their collections.    Consigli, however, opined that

the wife was overpaid, thus requiring a portion of her

compensation to be added back into the practice's cash flow.

                                  4
Consigli applied a salary normalization adjustment for each year

to account for the difference between the wife's actual pay and

what he viewed as reasonable compensation for her services based

on the prevailing market rate for dentists in the Boston area.

Consigli testified that the wife's salary exceeded the "industry

average" by around $90,000 to $100,000,4 which he based on his

review of average salaries for dentists listed on Salary.com and

Indeed.com, acknowledging that he could not differentiate

between average compensation for dentists and prosthodontists.

The judge implicitly credited Consigli's testimony regarding the

salary normalization adjustments for 2015 and 2016, but declined

to credit the adjustment for 2017, finding that there was no

"reliable" evidence for determining the 2017 salary

normalization adjustment.

     The wife contends that the judge erred in (a) leaving

Consigli's normalization adjustments for 2015 and 2016 intact

when they were based on the same "unreliable" data as the 2017

adjustment rejected by the judge, and (b) ignoring the wife's

"uncontested" testimony that her salary was reasonable and

4 Consigli testified that the wife's 2017 officer compensation
was $270,000 as reported on tax return, and he made a
normalizing adjustment of $90,000, making the normalized officer
salary $180,000 for 2017. For 2016, her income was $284,000,
and Consigli made an adjustment of $107,600, making the
normalized officer salary $176,400 for 2016. For 2015, her
income was $265,000, and Consigli made an adjustment of $92,128,
making the normalized officer salary $172,872 for 2015.

                                5
consistent with the industry standard practice of compensating

specialists based on a percentage of their collections.

    a.   Consigli's normalization adjustments.    Although the

judge found that Consigli was unable to "determine the salary

difference between a dentist and a [p]rosthodontist" using

Indeed.com and Salary.com, the judge did not find those websites

to be wholly unreliable sources of information.   The judge

explained that she rejected the 2017 adjustment, which was the

most heavily weighted, because Consigli "determined a salary

range commensurate with [the wife's] education and experience by

looking at dentist salaries on Indeed.com and Salary.com," he

did "not make any distinction between the salaries of a general

dentist and that of . . . a [p]rosthodontist," "[n]or did he

review any industry specific information or government resources

such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics to arrive at an accurate

assessment of [the] [w]ife's salary for 2017."    The wife

contends that there was "no support" for leaving the 2015 and

2016 adjustments intact when they were based on the same

"unreliable" data regarding salaries for dentists, rather than

prosthodontists, that the judge rejected for 2017.    However, the

wife's own testimony reflected that the prosthodontics aspect of

the practice grew each year and that prosthodontics accounted

for a greater percentage of revenue in 2017, as compared to 2015

and 2016.   Moreover, the percentage of collections specifically

                                 6
attributable to the wife's prosthodontic work was the highest in

2017, as compared to 2015 and 2016.

    Based on this testimony, the judge could reasonably infer

that Consigli's inability to differentiate between average

salaries for dentists and prosthodontists did not render the

2015 and 2016 adjustments unreliable because (1) the wife, and

the practice as a whole, performed less prosthodontic work in

those years; and (2) those years were given substantially less

weight in Consigli's calculation of cash flow.     Likewise, the

judge could permissibly conclude that Consigli's use of a salary

adjustment for 2017 based on a dentist's, rather than a

prosthodontist's, salary was unreliable because the wife and the

practice overall were doing more prosthodontic work in 2017,

which was the most predictive and heavily weighted year in

Consigli's cash flow calculation.     See Demoulas v. Demoulas

Super Mkts., Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 541 n.47 (1997) (when

assessing trial judge's "finding of valuation . . . we will

accept a judge's findings based on the evidence or a reasonable

inference from it").   See also Clair v. Clair, 464 Mass. 205,

214 (2013), quoting Gabbidon v. King, 414 Mass. 685, 686 (1993)

(appellate court "may consider any ground apparent on the record

that supports the result reached in the lower court").

Accordingly, on this record, the judge's decision to reject the

2017 salary normalization adjustment, while crediting the 2015

                                7
and 2016 salary normalization adjustments, was not clearly

erroneous.    See Vedensky v. Vedensky, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 768, 774

(2014) (judge "was entitled to credit all, part, or none" of

expert's testimony); Child v. Child, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 78

(2003), quoting Fechtor, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 863 (in

determining value of marital asset, trial judge "may accept or

reject all or parts of the opinions offered," or "may reject

expert opinion altogether and arrive at a valuation on other

evidence").

    b.   The wife's testimony regarding compensation.       The wife

next contends that the judge, in accepting Consigli's salary

normalization adjustments for 2015 and 2016, impermissibly

ignored her "uncontested" testimony that her salary was

consistent with the industry standard practice of compensating

prosthodontists up to fifty percent of their collections.

Although the judge did not explicitly reject this testimony by

the wife, she implicitly found it not credible because she

allowed the normalization adjustment for officer salary for 2015

and 2016.    The judge was not required to credit the wife's

testimony, see Vedensky, 86 Mass. App. Ct. at 774, and we see

nothing in the record that warrants disturbing the judge's

credibility assessment in this regard.    See Johnston v.

Johnston, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536 (1995).

                                  8
    Insofar as the wife claims that Consigli's testimony

"unequivocal[ly]" confirmed that the industry standard for

compensating prosthodontists was forty to fifty percent of their

collections, we are unpersuaded.       Consigli testified that he was

aware that the specialists in the wife's practice were paid

forty to fifty percent of their collections, and that

"specialists [being] paid by measure of a percentage of their

collections" was "a regular practice in the field of

prosthodontics."   However, at no point did Consigli testify that

the industry standard compensation for all prosthodontists was

forty to fifty percent of their collections.

    We discern no error in the judge's treatment of the salary

normalization adjustments and her ultimate determination of the

wife's reasonable salary.   Cf. Crowley v. Communications for

Hosps., Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 756 (1991) (determination

of reasonable compensation is question of fact reviewed for

clear error).

    2.   Good will discount.   "Good will is necessarily attached

to a going business and relates to the name, location and

reputation, which tends to enable the business to retain the

patronage" of its customers (quotations and citations omitted).

Slate Co. v. Bikash, 343 Mass. 172, 175-176 (1961).      See In re

Corrugated Paper Corp., 185 B.R. 667, 670 (D. Mass. 1995); In re

Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 385 (1979).      Here,

                                   9
Consigli testified that for the purpose of his valuation, good

will represented the percentage of patients at the practice who

"come to just [the wife] and wouldn't go to anybody else" if she

were to leave the practice following a sale of the business.     He

determined that the appropriate good will discount was twenty-

one percent, and reduced the value of the business by $587,726

accordingly.   The wife contends that Consigli's calculation of a

twenty-one percent good will discount was "random[]," had no

"reasonable or reliable basis whatsoever," and was "nothing more

than a guess."

     Here, in accepting Consigli's application of a twenty-one

percent good will discount, the judge implicitly credited the

following testimony.   Consigli testified that he calculated

professional good will as the difference between (1) the fair

value of the practice using a capitalization of earnings

methodology, which he determined to be approximately $2.8

million (before applying the good will discount); and (2) the

value of the practice ($2.2 million) using an alternative

valuation methodology derived from multiplying the practice's

2017 adjusted pre-tax income by the average EBIDA5 multiple for

dental practices.   Consigli testified that the difference

between those two valuation figures was equivalent to

5 EBIDA is an acronym for "earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization."

                                10
approximately twenty-one percent of his calculation of the

business's fair value using the capitalization of earnings

methodology, and represented the good will attributable to the

wife.   He further testified that his calculation of good will

was consistent with the wife's representation that she was

responsible for approximately forty percent of the total

collections at the practice, and it was reasonable to estimate

that around half of her patients might not remain at the

practice if she left.6

     In light of the foregoing, we cannot agree with the wife

that Consigli's calculation of good will was random or "merely a

guess."   To the extent that the wife claims that the only

appropriate methodology for calculating good will was to use

"that percentage of revenue generated by her patients," she

cites to no authority for the proposition that this is the sole

manner for calculating good will, cf. In re Marriage of Nichols,

43 Colo. App. at 385 (good will often "difficult to value" and

"elusive in nature"), nor does she demonstrate that she provided

sufficient evidence for such a calculation to be made.     Although

Consigli testified that in order to calculate good will, one

would "normally" look at the client base to determine which

6 Again, we note that the wife did not proffer any expert witness
other than herself, and relied solely on her own, unrecognized
method of valuing the business.

                                11
patients specifically sought out the wife for their care and the

revenue attributable to them, see id. (whether professional "can

expect [her] patrons to return to [her]" is relevant to

determining good will value), he asked the wife for a list of

her clients, and for information regarding revenues collected

per patient, but she did not provide either to him.

Accordingly, where the wife failed to provide Consigli with the

requested information regarding revenues from her patients, she

cannot now complain that he resorted to an alternative

methodology to calculate good will.   Indeed, had he not used

that alternative method, it is unclear whether he would have

applied a good will discount at all, which would have resulted

in a higher valuation to the wife's detriment.   Accordingly,

based on the information available to Consigli, and the evidence

in the record, we discern no error in the judge's decision to

credit his calculation of a twenty-one percent good will

discount.

    Conclusion.   The supplemental judgment of divorce nisi, and

                               12
the orders denying the wife's separate motions to amend the

divorce judgment and findings of fact, are affirmed.

                                      So ordered.

                                      By the Court (Sullivan,
                                        Massing & Hershfang, JJ.7),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    April 7, 2023.

7   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                 13