Court Opinion

ID: 9565146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:15:42.201843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:25.929882
License: Public Domain

Reed, C.J.
The State appeals an order suppressing the hearsay statements of an alleged victim of indecent liberties and dismissing the case following pretrial hearings. We find that proposed corroborative evidence should have been considered by the court and remand.
The complainant was the defendant's 4-year-old daughter, Sonia. She told a member of the Washougal Police Department that Jones had engaged with her in a practice that — we are told — euphemistically is dubbed "golden showers," by prostitutes who encounter it from time to time. The State sought to admit Sonia's statements via RCW 9A.44.120(1), which allows the use of such evidence if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided, That when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act.
The trial judge found Sonia's statements to be reliable but held that she would not be able to testify in a trial court setting and, thus, was unavailable. Corroborative evidence offered by the State included evidence about Sonia's *711nightmares and behavioral changes and testimony by three other people that Jones had requested or engaged in the same kind of activity with them. The judge rejected all of this evidence. He refused to consider the testimony about similar activities because he believed it would not be admissible at trial, ER 403, and held that the other evidence, alone, was inadequate to satisfy the statutory requirement. The State has not challenged the trial court's ruling pertaining to the behavior-related evidence, but it contends that the testimony about other "golden showers" activities was proper corroborative evidence, even though it could not be used at trial.1 We agree.
Clearly, the testimony about other similar activity was relevant. Corroborative evidence can include any evidence, outside of the complainant's testimony itself, which has probative value — any evidence which could convince the trier of fact that the crime was committed, United States v. Jones, 477 F.2d 1213, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Terry, 422 F.2d 704, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and which tends to connect the defendant with the crime. State v. Stewart, 52 Wash. 61, 100 P. 153 (1909). The evidence should be such as would support a "logical and reasonable inference" that the act of abuse occurred, State v. Hunt, 48 Wn. App. 840, 741 P.2d 566 (1987); evidence that "in some substantial degree tends to affirm" commission of the act, State v. Spronk, 379 N.W.2d 312, 314 (S.D. 1985). Corroboration may consist of circumstantial, as well as direct evidence. State v. John Doe, 105 Wn.2d 889, 897, 719 P.2d 554 (1986).
The evidence offered here concerned the same sexual aberration described by Sonia. Although we do not have the benefit of expert testimony in this regard, we can safely *712take notice that the type of behavior described is sufficiently unusual that few people would ever encounter it. The possibility that a small child would be familiar with the practice if she had not experienced it is extremely unlikely. Evidence that three other people had also encountered the same kind of behavior by the defendant would substantially increase the probability that the act against the child had occurred, and that Jones was the perpetrator. Assuming without deciding that such evidence would not have been admissible at trial because of its highly prejudicial effect, ER 403, we nevertheless hold that it properly could be considered as corroborative evidence in the pretrial hearing.
Without question, the defendant has a right to confront his accusers, guaranteed by both the United States and Washington Constitutions. State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 169-70, 691 P.2d 197 (1984). Therefore, the courts must be particularly careful when asked to admit hearsay statements when the child victim is unavailable, bearing in mind that rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent." 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 635 (1680).
However, the requirement for corroboration goes to the question of admissibility, rather than proof of the charge. It is a question for the judge. The defendant's rights are not violated by the court's consideration of supporting evidence, so long as that evidence is reliable and adequate.
Because the jury is not involved in pretrial matters, the potential for prejudice is not present. Thus, the rules of evidence do not apply to such preliminary determinations in criminal cases. ER 104(a), 1101(c)(3); and evidence which would be inadmissible at trial may be considered. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424, 100 S. Ct. 2406 (1980); State v. Tuffree, 35 Wn. App. 243, 666 P.2d 912 (1983). Thus, in the absence of the jury, the judge could consider evidence of prior sexual misconduct of the prosecuting witness. Tuffree, 35 Wn. App. at 248.
*713It also has been held that in a suppression hearing (clearly analogous to this hearing) the court could consider (1) hearsay statements of informants in determining whether there was probable cause to arrest, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312-13, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62, 87 S. Ct. 1056 (1967); (2) testimony by an officer other than the arresting officer about the circumstances of an arrest, United States v. Boyce, 797 F.2d 691, 692-93 (8th Cir. 1986); and (3) hearsay evidence to\ authenticate a phone call prior to its use as an admission by defendant. State v. Danielson, 37 Wn. App. 469, 471, 681 P.2d 260 (1984). This evidence is very similar to that discussed in State v. Tuffree, supra. In the absence of the jury, its prejudicial effect is nullified. Moreover, here the defendant would have the opportunity to cross-examine the corroborating witnesses. There is, therefore, no reasonable basis to bar consideration of the testimony.
Finally, proof of a sexual crime does not require corroboration of the alleged victim's testimony. RCW 9A.44.020(1). Therefore, there was no requirement that the prejudicial corroborative evidence be presented to the jury. The trial judge could have considered that testimony without violating either the defendant's constitutional rights or the rules of evidence. We remand so that he may do so.
Alexander, J., concurs.

The State also conceded the inadmissibility of this evidence at trial. For the purposes of this opinion only, we accept the correctness of that ruling. See infra, at 712. See also State v. Hunt, 48 Wn. App. 840, 741 P.2d 566 (1987), where this court considered a child victim's behavioral changes as additional corroboration.