Court Opinion

ID: 9712323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:51:27.12065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.504933
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Buchanan, P.J.
I dissent.
There is in my opinion no Indiana case holding or implying that an instruction covering reasonable doubt mmt1 contain a specific reference to the degree of juror certainty. Such certainty is implied by the explicit language of the instruction.
The degree of certainty that is required is that which excludes reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused ... no more. Preliminary Instruction 3P contains, as it should, a mix of directions to the jury concerning reasonable doubt, presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and duty to reason separately and together. Paragraphs two (2) and three (3) emphasize the presumption of innocence. Paragraphs four (4), five (5), six (6) and eight (8) emphasize reasonable doubt and what constitutes reasonable doubt. These paragraphs add up to the necessary certainty of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instruction 3P properly went ho further.
. There is no magic in the use of the word “certainty.” No particular formula is required to instruct on reasonable doubt. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1270, at 665 (1961).
The danger, of the use of the word “certainty” is. that the burden of proof is subtly changed to convey the impression that guilt must be shown to an absolute certainty or beyond all doubt. See 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1272, at 668 (1961)-. *242No case goes that far. To do so is to radically change the burden of proof required of the State in a criminal case.
Generally it is sufficient to charge the jury that they should not convict unless they believe the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. There have been cases in other jurisdictions, however, upholding instructions permitting statements of guilt to “moral certainty” or to “moral and reasonable certainty,” but in such cases this phraseology has usually been interpreted as the legal equivalent of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1275, at 670 (1961).
In Williams v. State (1974), 161 Ind. App. 57, 314 N.E.2d 764, (rehearing den.) (discussed in the majority opinion), both the trial court and the First District of this Court rejected “moral certainty” language. Neither Bradley v. State (1870), 31 Ind. 492, Baker v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 55, 138 N.E.2d 641, nor Vacendak v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 101, 340 N.E.2d 352 (all cited by the majority), include a statement of juror certainty; nor do I find any implication that juror certainty must be included as a part of the language of a reasonable doubt instruction. There is no such language in any of the three instructions involved in those cases.
Thus I conclude that the accepted definition of reasonable doubt does not require a statement of the degree of juror certainty; that certainty is supplied by the very nature of the language describing the presumption of innocence and what constitutes reasonable doubt. The juror’s certainty of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is implicit throughout Instruction 3P.
The language of juror certainty in defendant’s tendered instruction is surplusage which fails to add to the definition of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and tends to subtly introduce a requirement of showing guilt to an absolute certainty or beyond all doubt. It was properly rejected.
I would affirm the conviction.
Note. — Reported at 355 N.E.2d 856.

. Sullivan v. State (1876), 52 Ind. 309, 311, only holds that an instruction stating “A reasonable doubt arises when'the evidence is not sufficient to satisfy the minds of the jury to a moral or reasonable certainty of the defendant’s guilt”’ is correct, not that this particular language must be used.