Court Opinion

ID: 9473303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:25:50.976116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:26.631594
License: Public Domain

BREYER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
YEAR PRIME RATE (%) AMOUNT ($)
1975 7.86 296,956.80 320,297.60
1976 6.84 342,205.96
1977 6.83 365,578.63
1978 9.06 398,700.05
1979 12.67 449,215.35
1980 15.27 517,810.53
1981 18.87 615,521.38
1982 14.86 706,987.86
1983 10.79 783,271.85
1984 (1st qtr.) 11.07 804,968.48
Once the majority proves that the statute’s “reasonable cause to believe” language does not apply to this defendant, the case (in my view) is over, for the other words in the statute do not punish negligent activity. Those other words {see Appendix A) descend directly from an act passed by Congress in 1890 {see Appendix B), as the majority acknowledges, see ante, at n.' 10. Section 9 of the 1890 statute made the substantive offense grounds for both forfeiture and imprisonment for up to two years. And, several cases interpreting the words of section 9 specifically indicated that they require a criminal intent. United States v. Seventy-Five Bales of Tobacco, 147 Fed. 127, 130 (2d Cir.1906) (“Proof which is sufficient to uphold a forfeiture ... is also sufficient to justify a conviction, fine and imprisonment---Manifestly, [the Act] was not intended to apply to mistakes or errors in judgment but to acts ... which plainly indicate a willful and culpable intent to defraud the government of its lawful revenues. Fraud, whether the action be criminal or civil, must be proved; ... this is elementary.”); United States v. One Silk Rug, 158 Fed. 974, 976 (3d Cir.1908) (“[The] forfeiture clause requires a guilty scienter and ... criminal intent____ [I]f to properly construe the criminal clause we must, by reference, read into it the forfeiture provision coupled with a guilty intent, we must not exclude such intent when we enforce that clause to forfeit.”); United States v. 1,150 ½ Pounds of Celluloid, 82 Fed. 627, 633-34 (6th Cir.1897) (forfeiture provisions should not lightly be interpreted to dispense with “mens rea” requirement of “criminal intent”); United States v. One Bag of Crushed Wheat, 166 Fed. 562, 567 (S.D.N.Y.1908) (“The goods must not be taken away from [the owner] unless he has been guilty of an intent to defraud the revenues of the United States.”); see also United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 139 Fed. 961, 969 (8th Cir.1905) (“It is neither probable, nor reasonable, to sup*766pose that Congress intended to inflict the forfeiture of the merchandise involved, a possible fine of $5,000, and possible imprisonment for two years for the use of an innocent or mistaken statement that was made with reasonable care and without knowledge that it was not true.”), cert. denied, 201 U.S. 645, 26 S.Ct. 760, 50 L.Ed. 903 (1906).
The principle underlying these cases is as valid today as it ever was, namely that courts should not interpret a criminal statute to impose liability without fault, nor should they rest criminal liability upon mere negligence, without a reasonably clear indication that Congress so intended. Compare 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 59.01-59.04 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1974) with United States v. 1,150 ½ Pounds of Celluloid, 82 Fed. at 634 (citing Sutherland, Statutory Construction §§ 346-407 (1st ed.)). See generally Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 400 (1958).
The single statutory provision of 1890 was later modified and bifurcated into two separate sections — one imposing criminal liability, and the other forfeiture — but civil and criminal penalties continued to be triggered by identical predicate offenses {see Appendix C, compare Appendix A), and the legislative history reveals no intent to broaden the scope of the specific language taken verbatim from section 9 of the 1890 Act. H.R.Rep. No. 5, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. XLIV-XLV. (By contrast, that same passage of H.R.Rep. No. 5 announced that Congress did intend to broaden the scope of other sections of the 1890 Act, namely, those activities to which the “reasonable cause to believe” clause directly applies. Id. As the majority concedes, that clause is inapplicable here. See also ante, at n. 10.) Thus, before 1978 only the “reasonable cause to believe” clause embodied a negligence standard; the 1978 statutory change came too late to apply to this defendant.
The majority’s reasons for importing a negligence standard into the statute’s other words do not convince me. The majority points to a statement in one of the relevant ‘1890 statute’ cases, United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, that those other words mean “knowingly or intentionally or negligently false,” 139 Fed. at 968. But the word “negligently” here is at best pure dictum, for the court was busily engaged in showing that the statute did not impose strict liability and invoking rules of strict construction to do so. In fact, the preceding sentence in Ninety-Nine Diamonds and the following page make it clear that when the court says “negligently” it means “culpable negligence” — a term in context referring to recklessness or gross negligence or some form of aggravated behavior. The court said,
The use of a false statement invokes the same punishment and is enumerated in the same section with the use of a “fraudulent or false invoice, affidavit, letter, paper,” and the guilt of a “willful act or omission.” As the willful act or omission and the offense of the fradulent invoice, affidavit, letter, or paper could not be committed without knowledge or a reckless disregard of the means of knowledge, the reasonable inference is that Congress intended that knowledge of its falsity, or culpable negligence in ascertaining the answer to the question, whether it was true or false, should be an indispensable element of the offense of using the false statement____
139 Fed. at 969-70.
The other three ‘1890 statute’ cases cited by the majority use language that states still more clearly the statute’s requirement of a criminal state of mind. See United States v. One Silk Rug, supra; United States v. 1,150 ½ Pounds of Celluloid, supra; United States v. Seventy-Five Bales of Tobacco, supra. See also United States v. One Bag of Crushed Wheat, supra. And, the case of United States v. Wagner, 434 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.1970), upon which the majority also relies, dealt with an application of the “reasonable cause to believe” clause, which is inapplicable here.
The majority also relies on congressional statements, made in 1930 and 1978, which *767reflect a belief that the statute imposes liability for negligence. Many of these statements should be understood as simply referring to the “reasonable cause to believe” clause (which does impose liability for negligence where it applies). Sometimes congressmen, like the court below, do suggest that the “reasonable cause to believe” language applies literally to the entire statutory section. But, the court today rejects that view. Thus, there is nothing in the congressional debates to help it.
Finally, the court refers to considerable pre-1870 history and language suggesting a broad construction of customs statutes. Before 1870, however, the statute did not impose criminal liability; and it is the initial appearance of the relevant language in a criminal statute that triggers the relevant strict principles of construction and makes irrelevant the ‘broad’ customs statute interpretive canon. Regardless of the case law under earlier statutes, courts contemporaneously interpreting the 1890 Act were unanimous in saying that it was penal, and should therefore be strictly construed. United States v. 1,150 ½ Pounds of Celluloid, 82 Fed. at 634 (“The statute under consideration is highly penal, and as such falls within the general rule which requires a strict construction.”); United States v. Ninety-Nine Diamonds, 139 Fed. at 964 (“But a penal statute which creates and denounces a new offense should be strictly construed.”); United States v. Seventy-Five Bales of Tobacco, 147 Fed. at 130 (“Such a statute must be strictly construed.”).
Since the statute has been amended, and the case therefore has little precedential value, I shall say no more, but leave to the reader with an historical bent the task of examining the cases and legislative history I have cited to determine which reading is correct. Here I simply note my disagreement insofar as the court departs from the principle of strict construction, and my consequent disagreement with the result.
APPENDIX A
§ 1591. Fraud; personal penalties.
If any consignor, seller, owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person or persons enters or introduces, or attempts to enter or introduce, into the commerce of the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance whatsoever, or makes any false statement in any declaration under the provisions of section 1485 of this title (relating to declaration on entry) without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or aids or procures the making of any such false statement as to any matter material thereto without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, whether or not the United States shall or may be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement; or is guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States shall or may be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such person or persons shall upon conviction be fined for each offense a sum not exceeding $5,000, or be imprisoned for a time not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve imported merchandise from forfeiture by reason of such false statement or for any cause elsewhere provided by law. (June 17, 1930, ch. 497, title IV, § 591, 46 Stat. 750; Aug. 5, 1935, ch. 438, title III, § 304(a), 49 Stat. 527.)
§ 1592. Same; penalty against goods.
If any consignor, seller, owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person or persons enters or introduces, or attempts to enter or introduce, into the commerce of the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, *768or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance whatsoever, or makes any false statement in any declaration under the provisions of section 1485 of this title (relating to declaration on entry) without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or aids or procures the making of any such false statement as to any matter material thereto without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, whether or not the United States shall or may be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement; or is guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States is or may be deprived of the lawful duties or any portion thereof accuring upon the merchandise or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such merchandise, or the value thereof, to be recovered from such person or persons, shall be subject to forfeiture, which forfeiture shall only apply to the whole of the merchandise or the value thereof in the case or package containing the particular article or articles of merchandise to which such fraud or false paper or statement relates. The arrival within the territorial limits of the United States of any merchandise consigned for sale and remaining the property of the shipper or consignor, and the acceptance of a false or fraudulent invoice thereof by the consignee or the agent of the consignor, or the existence of any other facts constituting an attempted fraud, shall be deemed, for the purposes of this section, to be an attempt to enter such merchandise notwithstanding no actual entry has been made or offered. (June 17, 1930, ch. 497, title IV, § 592, 46 Stat. 750; Aug. 5, 1935, eh. 438, title III, § 304(b), 49 Stat. 527.)
Taken from 19 U.S.C. §§ 1591-92 (1940) (now superseded).
APPENDIX B
Sec. 9. That if any owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person shall make Penalty for making, or attempt to make any entry of imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or etc> ialse entry, false invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance whatsoever, or shall be guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States shall be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such merchandise, or the value thereof, to be recovered from the person making the entry, shall be forfeited, which forfeiture shall only apply to the whole of the merchandise or the value thereof in the case or package containing the particular article or articles of merchandise to which such fraud or false paper or statement relates; and such person shall, upon conviction, be fined for each offense a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, or be imprisoned for a time not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Taken from Customs Administrative Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, § 9, 26 Stat. 135-36.
APPENDIX C
“G. That if any consignor, seller, owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person or persons, shall enter or introduce, or attempt to enter or introduce, into the commerce of the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance whatsoever, or shall make any false statement in the declarations provided for in paragraph F without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or shall aid or procure the making of any such false statement as to any matter material thereto without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or shall be guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States shall or may be deprived of the lawful duties, or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchanPunishment for attempts to enter by false invoice, etc. Vol. 36, p. 97, amended. Ante, p. 182. *769Proviso. Forfeiture not affected. dise, or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such person or persons shall upon conviction be fined for each offense a sum not exceeding $5,000, or be imprisoned for a time not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve imported merchandise from forfeiture by reason of such false statement or for any cause elsewhere provided by law.
Forfeiture of goods for “H. That if any consignor, seller, owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person or persons shall enter or introduce, or attempt to enter or introduce, into the making false invoices, commerce of the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent statements> etc- or false invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or by means of any false statement, written or verbal, or by means of any false or fraudulent practice or appliance whatsoever, or shall make any false statement in the declarations provided for in paragraph F without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or shall aid or procure the making of any such false statement as to any matter material thereto without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or shall be guilty of any willful act or omission by means whereof the United States shall or may be deprived of the lawful duties or any portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise or any portion thereof, embraced or referred to in such invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper, or statement, or affected by such act or omission, such merchandise, or the value thereof, to be recovered from such person or persons, shall be forfeited, which forfeiture shall only apply to the whole of the merchandise or the value thereof in the case or package containing the particular article or articles of merchandise to which such fraud or false paper or statement relates. That the arrival within the territorial limits of the United States of any merchandise consigned for sale and remaining the property of the shipper or consignor, and the acceptance of a false or fraudulent invoice thereof by the consignee or the agent of the consignor, or the existence of any other facts constituting an attempted fraud, shall be deemed, for the purposes of this paragraph, to be an attempt to enter such merchandise notwithstanding no actual entry has been made or offered. Ante, p. 182. Extent of forfeiture. Attempt to make false entry construed.
Taken from the Underwood Tariff Act of Oct. 3,1913, ch. 16, § III, G, H, 38 Stat. 183-84.