Court Opinion

ID: 9852982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:40:34.278948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:38.998357
License: Public Domain

Judge BRIGGS
specially concurring.
I concur in affirming the judgment in favor of plaintiffs and in remanding for recalculation of interest. I write separately to emphasize the reasons why, in my view, the solution to perceived inequities in calculating interest under § 13-21-101, C.R.S. (1987 RepLVol. 6A) lies with the General Assembly.
I.
The General Assembly amended § 13-21-101 in 1982 because the statutory rate of interest a judgment debtor had to pay was lower than the interest that could be earned by withholding payment and investing the money during the appeal. The remedy provided is a variable rate of interest “roughly equivalent” to the rate of return on the open market. See Hearings on S.B. 140 before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 53rd General Assembly, First Session (February 17, 1982) and Hearings before the House Committee On Judiciary, 53rd General Assembly, First Session (March 2, 1982).
Plaintiffs assert that, while the General Assembly has accomplished its purpose of discouraging judgment debtors from filing appeals without merit when interest rates are high, it has unintentionally encouraged them to file appeals regardless of merit when rates are low in order to obtain the lower variable rate. They point out that, as a result of this appeal, they are deprived of some $25,000 in interest to which they would be entitled if defendant had not appealed.
Plaintiffs therefore argue we must construe § 13-21-101 to provide that the fixed rate of interest that applies when a judgment debtor in a personal injury lawsuit does not appeal establishes the minimum rate of interest that applies when a judgment debtor appeals. In my view, this reflects a misapprehension of our role in construing a statute.
II.
In construing statutes, courts do not in every case resort to legislative history. As recognized in Ackerman v. Power Equipment Co., 881 P.2d 451 (Colo.App.1994), when a statute is plain and unambiguous on its face, as it is in this case, resort to legislative history to determine intent is not only unnecessary, but inappropriate. In other words, we use legislative history to clarify, not create, ambiguity. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (W. Eskridge & Frickey eds., 1994).
This venerable principle of statutory construction derives from the role played by the courts in our system of government. It is true that, in acting as an independent but complementary branch of government, the courts supplement the legislative process by filling the gaps left by the legislative branch in making law. See A. Tate, Jr., The Law Making Function Of The Judge, 28 La. L.Rev. 211 (1968); B. Cardozo, The Nature *888Of The Judicial Process (1921). However, courts are not free to make their own laws.
If we are to claim the authority to construe statutes on a basis independent of the democratic process, then we must accept the responsibility to act only on a principled basis. See People v. Barry, 888 P.2d 327 (Colo.App.1994) (Briggs, J., dissenting). It is therefore often said we must seek out the “intent” of the General Assembly. However, this statement can be misleading. We, of course, cannot determine the subjective intent of each legislator involved in the process. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.06 (5th ed. 1993).
It may be more accurate to say that we must determine the legislative “aim,” or purpose, as evinced in the language of the statute and, if necessary, in light of other external manifestations of that legislative purpose. See F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Readings of Statutes, 47 Colum.L.Rev. 527 (1947). And, upon determining that purpose, our role in making law is still limited: We do not fill any perceived gaps in the legislative remedy by crafting additional remedies we consider appropriate; we can only add force and life to the remedy provided. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process, supra.
We can construe a statute to avoid an absurd result. See People v. Bowman, 812 P.2d 725 (Colo.App.1991). However, in doing so we cannot ignore the intent, or purpose, of the General Assembly. Rather, we are to presume that the General Assembly intended a just and reasonable result. Section 2-4-201(l)(c), C.R.S. (1980 Repl.Vol. IB). We therefore must seek to determine what just and reasonable result the General Assembly intended and allow such an intention to prevail. See People v. Bowman, supra.
Our role in this process is one that requires restraint. We must recognize that our function in construing statutes, though a form of making law, is to act merely as interpreters of a remedy created by a branch of government consisting of members duly elected through the democratic process. See generally, F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Readings of Statutes, supra.
III.
A division of this court in Ackerman v. Power Equipment Co., supra, articulated the legislative purpose of the 1982 amendment to § 13-21-101 to be the elimination of economic incentive for judgment debtors to appeal. It could also be inferred that the purpose was to ensure that judgment debtors could not use appeals as a mechanism to deprive judgment creditors of a fair rate of return. It cannot be said that the amendment fails to achieve this purpose. In any appeal a judgment creditor will receive the variable rate of interest, intended by the General Assembly to be “roughly equivalent” to the rate of return on the open market.
Plaintiffs argue the effect of the amendment is to discriminate unfairly against judgment creditors whose judgments are not appealed. However, all judgment creditors face the same risk of receiving interest on a judgment at a rate no greater than the rate of return on the open market.
Thus, although the remedy may be imperfect, the only “absurd” result is to encourage the use of appeals by judgment debtors to limit interest on judgments to a fair rate of return. This “absurdity” may negatively impact congested appellate courts, but it is not unjust to judgment creditors.
Moreover, the only alternative construction urged by plaintiffs — establishing the fixed rate expressly provided when a judgment debtor does not appeal as the minimum rate when a judgment debtor does appeal — is contrary to the plain wording of the statute. To so construe the statute, we would not be filling a gap resulting from ambiguity in its language. We would be stepping into the role of the General Assembly to supply a new and different remedy. However just that step may appear, it is not one that this court should take.