Court Opinion

ID: 9945398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 20:03:36.131781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:28.644032
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/24

                         CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                          FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
       Plaintiff and Respondent,             A166669
                    v.                       (San Francisco City & County
 JOSHUA JERECO PITTMAN,                      Super. Ct. Nos. SCN233607,
       Defendant and Appellant.              CRI20013179)

       Defendant Joshua Jereco Pittman appeals a postconviction order in
which the trial court ordered him to pay $6,700 in restitution for jewelry
taken from the home of victims Michael F. and Betty F. Pittman’s appointed
appellate counsel filed a brief asking this court to conduct an independent
review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.1
Counsel informed Pittman of his right to file a supplemental brief. Pittman
did not file one.
       After reviewing the record, we directed counsel for the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing (1) whether the court abused its discretion in

       1 We need not decide whether an independent review of the record is

required in this appeal, as we have exercised our discretion to conduct an
independent review in any event. (See People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216, 222, 224–225, 231–232 & fn. 5 [independent record review is not
required in appeals of certain postconviction orders; even if not required,
reviewing court may exercise discretion to conduct an independent review].)

                                        1
basing the $6,700 figure on victim estimates of property values contained in a
police report, and (2) questions related to whether there is sufficient evidence
of the replacement value of the stolen property to affirm the court’s order.
Having considered the supplemental briefs, we find no basis to reverse or
modify the restitution order, and we therefore affirm.
                              I. BACKGROUND
   A. The Charges, Plea, and Sentence
      The judgment of conviction was based on a negotiated disposition. An
information filed in February 2021 charged Pittman and codefendant
Deandre Quininne with multiple felony offenses committed on October 9,
2020, and November 4, 2020. As to Pittman, the information included four
charges of first degree residential burglary involving various victims (Pen.
Code,2 § 459; see § 460, subd. (a); counts 1, 5, 6, and 7) and one count of first
degree residential robbery committed against 16-year-old Allison S. (§ 211;
see § 212.5, subd. (a); count 2).
      The information alleged two of the burglaries (counts 1 and 5) were
committed while a person other than an accomplice was present (§ 667.5,
subd. (c)(21)). As to the count 2 robbery, it was alleged the defendants acted
in concert with two or more other persons (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)). The
information also alleged Pittman committed the charged offenses while on
bail (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)); he had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5,
subd. (a)); and he was on parole at the time of the offenses (§ 1203.085,
subd. (b)).
      On December 17, 2021, as part of a negotiated disposition, the
information was amended to include two counts of second degree burglary
(§ 459; counts 8 and 9), and Pittman entered a guilty plea to those two

      2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                        2
counts. The remaining counts and allegations were dismissed. The court
imposed concurrent two-year prison terms for counts 8 and 9 and released
Pittman to his parole officer because his pretrial confinement time equaled or
exceeded the length of his new sentence (see § 1170, subd. (a)(3)). A
restitution hearing was set.
      As we discuss further below, at the restitution hearing on August 17,
2022, the court ordered Pittman and Quininne to pay (with joint and several
liability) $6,700 in restitution to victims Michael F. and Betty F. (who are
spouses). Michael F. was the victim alleged in original count 6. The court
entered a written restitution order for $6,700 on September 14, 2022. An
amended order was entered on March 16, 2023, with no change to the
amount ordered.
      On October 12, 2022, Pittman filed a timely notice of appeal of the
restitution order.
   B. Facts Underlying the Count 6 Burglary
      At approximately 2:00 p.m. on October 9, 2020, San Francisco Police
Officer Chu investigated a residential burglary in San Francisco. Victim
Michael F. told Officer Chu that he saw two people leaving the house, and
that he then went inside to find it had been “ransacked.” Jewelry and a safe
were reported stolen, with an estimated combined value of $10,000.
      Victim Betty F. provided video footage, recorded from 12:50 p.m. to 1:30
p.m. on the day of the burglary, showing two men in front of the house. GPS
data from an ankle monitoring bracelet worn by Pittman (who was on parole)
showed he was at the burglarized house from 1:19 p.m. to 1:27 p.m. on
October 9, 2020.

                                       3
                             II. DISCUSSION
   A. Additional Background: The Restitution Hearing
      At the contested restitution hearing for both Pittman and Quininne on
August 17, 2022, the trial court stated there were “places in the police reports
that noted the items that were taken,” and the court had “the restitution
forms that the victims filled out as well.” Defense counsel confirmed they had
received the prosecutor’s briefing and exhibits filed in support of the
restitution request pertaining to Michael F. and Betty F. (As we explain
further below, however, the documents discussed by the court and the parties
at the restitution hearing are not in the appellate record for this appeal.)
      The prosecutor stated the restitution request included a number of
items of jewelry (for which there were no receipts), with the value of the
stolen property totaling $37,815. There was also damage “to the bathroom
floor and vanity” amounting to $5,500, as well as $85 for damage to the front
door. Counsel for the defendants did not put on evidence, but they raised
objections to the prosecution’s showing, including suggesting the victims
should have been brought to testify.
      Pittman’s counsel objected that the items and values claimed by the
victims at the time of the hearing differed from what was stated in the police
report, including as to the values identified for some jewelry items. As an
example, counsel stated “the five-carat sapphire diamond ring in the police
report is estimated at $5,000. Now it’s estimated at approximately $15,000.”
Counsel further objected that, “even for the items that are actually referenced
in the police report, I don’t believe there’s sufficient documentation or
testimony, such as actual witness testimony subject to cross-examination, to
support a restitution order here.” Quininne’s counsel raised similar
objections.

                                        4
      The prosecutor responded that a victim’s estimate of the value of stolen
jewelry provides a sufficient basis to award restitution. The prosecutor
stated that, because the victims received the jewelry as wedding gifts several
decades earlier, they did not have receipts. The prosecutor also argued that
the defense has the burden to disprove a restitution claim, and that
restitution may be based on documentary evidence rather than live
testimony, “such that victims don’t have to come to court in order to seek
restitution.” The prosecutor noted either side “could have issued subpoenas
in this case.”
      The court found it could base its restitution award “on what the victim
has stated in—both in the restitution report and to the police.” As to the
differing estimates in the two statements, the court stated it would award the
amounts first given by the victims and reflected in the police incident report.
The court stated: “[T]he Court finds that the discrepancy between what the
victim said something was worth at the time of the incident and said that—
and its noted in the incident report, and then later in a restitution form
changed those values, the Court would be more inclined to go with what the
[victim] first stated the value of those items were.” The court awarded a total
of $6,700, consisting of $150 for the safe, $5,000 for a sapphire ring with gold
bands, $500 for two pearl necklaces, $150 for two pearl earrings, $500 for a
bracelet, and $400 for a necklace and earring set.3

      3The restitutionary award was ordered for conduct underlying
count 6, even though count 6 was dismissed under the plea agreement.
This is permissible where the defendant has made a Harvey waiver.
(See § 1192.3, subd. (b); People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.)
Because there is nothing to the contrary in the record here, we presume
such a waiver was made.

                                       5
      As noted, at the restitution hearing, the court and the parties focused
on certain documents submitted by the prosecution with its restitution
request—specifically, the police incident report and the later restitution
forms—that reflected the victims’ estimates of the values of items taken from
their home. Those documents, however, are not in the record for this appeal.
      On January 4, 2023, Pittman’s appellate counsel filed with this court a
motion to augment the appellate record to include “[t]he People’s request for
victim restitution reviewed by the trial court” at the August 17, 2022
restitution hearing, as well as the written restitution orders later issued by
the court on September 14, 2022. We granted the motion on January 24,
2023, directing that the requested items be sent to this court and to appellate
counsel within 30 days. On February 23, 2023, the trial court clerk filed with
this court a record augmentation that included the September 14, 2022
orders, but stated in a declaration that it had not been possible to locate the
restitution request that the trial court reviewed at the August 17, 2022
hearing.
   B. Legal Standards
      Section 1202.4, subdivision (f) provides: “[I]n every case in which a
victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the
court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or
victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss
claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.”
Restitution “shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse
the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the
result of the defendant’s criminal conduct . . . .” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) “The
value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like
property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible.”
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A).)

                                        6
      The victim must make a prima facie showing of the loss, which the
defendant is entitled to rebut. “Once the victim makes a prima facie showing
of economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal acts, the
burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of losses claimed by
the victim. [Citation.] The defendant has the burden of rebutting the
victim’s statement of losses, and to do so, may submit evidence to prove the
amount claimed exceeds the repair or replacement cost of damaged or stolen
property.” (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1543 (Gemelli).)
      “ ‘The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion.
“A victim’s restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.”
[Citation.] “ ‘When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of
restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by
the reviewing court.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Ung (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 997, 1001.)
   C. Victim Estimates in the Police Report
      We asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing
whether the trial court abused its discretion by basing its $6,700 restitution
order on victim estimates contained in a police report. We directed the
parties to consider the differing views in appellate decisions (which we
discuss below) about relying on victim estimates contained in probation
reports. Having considered the parties’ briefs, we conclude the trial court did
not abuse its discretion.
      In People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 653, a panel in this
division concluded a victim’s claim in a probation report did not support a
restitution order. As we shall explain, however, the evolution of the case law
under section 1202.4, subdivision (f), persuades us to adopt a more flexible
approach. The defendant in Harvest was convicted of one count of first
degree murder and one count of voluntary manslaughter. (Harvest, at
p. 645.) The trial court ordered that the defendant pay restitution to each of

                                        7
the victims’ families for their funeral expenses. (Id. at pp. 645, 652.) We
reversed the restitution order in part, noting that the first victim’s family
“could support their claim with documentation and stood ready to testify, but
the [other] claim had neither of these supports.” (Id. at p. 653.) Rather
“[t]here was [just] mention of the . . . claim in the probation officer’s report.”
(Ibid.) We stated information in the probation report “may satisfy notice
requirements for due process [citation], but it cannot take the place of
evidence.” (Ibid.)
      Similarly, in People v. Vournazos (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 948, 953, 958–
959, the Court of Appeal reversed a $2,180 restitution order that was based
on a probation officer’s recommendation. The appellate court stated: “[T]he
trial court relied entirely on the recommendation of defendant’s probation
officer who, in turn, derived the figure solely from [the victim’s] statement of
loss and his discussions with [the victim]. Neither the statement nor the
testimony of the probation officer established that the sum claimed by [the
victim] for loss of property was based on the replacement cost of the
property. . . . While a defendant bears the burden of proving that the amount
of restitution claimed by the victim exceeds repair or replacement cost of lost
or damaged property [citation], defendant here was not required to meet that
burden inasmuch as the replacement . . . cost of [the victim’s] property was
not established.” (Id. at pp. 958–959; accord, In re Travis J. (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 187, 204 [citing Vournazos and Harvest; “The replacement or
repair cost of the victim’s property cannot be established simply by
statements made by the victim to the defendant’s probation officer.”].)4

      4 See also In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 665 (burden of

refutation is not imposed on defendant “merely by asserting that a stated
amount is sought as restitution”).

                                         8
      But a number of courts have held, contrary to Harvest and Vournazos,
that a trial court may accept, as prima facie evidence, a victim’s estimate in a
probation report, thus shifting to the defendant the burden to show the
requested amount exceeds the cost of replacement or repair. In People v.
Foster (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 943, 946–947 (Foster), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Sexton (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th
64, 69–71, disapproved on another ground in People v. Birkett (1999)
21 Cal.4th 226, 247, fn. 20, the Court of Appeal upheld a restitution order to
replace the value of items taken in the burglary of a cabin. The restitution
amount was based on the recommendation of the probation officer, which
incorporated the victim’s statement of loss. (Foster, at p. 944.) The Foster
court disapproved of requiring a victim to provide more than a statement of
losses to establish replacement cost, and the court criticized Vournazos,
stating that such a requirement “imposes an unwarranted burden on the trial
court, the prosecutor, and the victim.” (Id. at p. 946.)
      Similarly, in Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1543, 1541, the
appellate court affirmed a restitution order based on the probation officer’s
report with an attached statement from the victim of the burglary of a
restaurant about sustained losses. The court concluded this showing was
sufficient to shift the burden to the defendant to disprove the amount claimed
by the victim. (Id. at p. 1543; accord, People v. Holmberg (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1320 [“ ‘ “This is so because a hearing to establish the
amount of restitution does not require the formalities of other phases of a
criminal prosecution. [Citation.] When the probation report includes
information on the amount of the victim’s loss and a recommendation as to

                                        9
the amount of restitution, the defendant must come forward with contrary
information to challenge that amount.” ’ ”].)5
      We now conclude our broad statement in Harvest—that a victim
estimate in a probation report is not a sufficient showing of value for
restitution purposes—is unduly restrictive. We hold that, depending on the
circumstances and as a matter of discretion, a trial court may find a victim
estimate is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of loss, subject to
rebuttal by the defendant. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(1); Gemelli, supra,
161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543.)
      We are convinced that the approach taken in the Foster line of cases—
which now states the majority view—is more consistent with the public policy
and constitutional requirement that victims of crime be made whole. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13); § 1202.4, subds. (a), (f).) Implementing this
policy, section 1202.4 requires that the court order “full restitution,” and
provides broadly that a restitution order is to be “based on the amount of loss
claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.”
(§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) As noted, once a prima facie showing has been made, the
defendant may seek to disprove the amount claimed. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(1);
Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543.) In light of this statutory
language and structure, we conclude there is no basis to impose—at the
prima facie stage—a categorical rule that victim estimates of loss are

      5 Other appellate courts have reached similar conclusions.   (E.g., People
v. Collins (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 726, 734 [“ ‘When the probation report
includes a discussion of the victim’s loss and a recommendation on the
amount of restitution, the defendant must come forward with contrary
information to challenge that amount.’ ”]; People v. Keichler (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048; People v. Hove (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1266,
1275–1276; People v. Pinedo (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1406; In re S.S.
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 543, 546–547.)

                                        10
insufficient, particularly since such estimates may in some cases be the only
information reasonably obtainable to support a restitution request. (Foster,
supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 946 & fn. 5.) Instead, consideration of such
estimates is within the trial court’s broad discretion in making a restitution
order.
         Here, as noted, the trial court had before it victim estimates contained
in a police report, as well as in the restitution forms that were submitted
later. For the reasons discussed above, we find no abuse of discretion by the
trial court in considering the victim estimates in these documents.
         Pittman suggests the police report here may have lacked information
that was included in the probation reports discussed in some of the case law
addressing this issue, such as a detailed breakdown of losses or a
recommendation by the probation officer that restitution in a certain amount
should be ordered. (See, e.g., People v. Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1320; Gemelli, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1544.) But the record in this
appeal does not support Pittman’s argument. As noted, the appellate record
does not include the police report or the restitution forms that were reviewed
by the trial court. “[O]n appeal a judgment is presumed correct, and a party
attacking the judgment, or any part of it, must affirmatively demonstrate
prejudicial error.” (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881.) Having
rejected the view that victim estimates are categorically insufficient at the
prima facie stage, we have no basis on this record to conclude that the
particular estimates here were insufficient or that the trial court abused its
discretion by relying on them.
         We also note the record before the trial court here was not limited to
the police report. Instead, as the trial court stated, it could consider and base
its restitution order on the police report and the restitution forms. Although

                                         11
the court ultimately selected the lower estimates in the police report in
setting the amount of restitution, it could also consider the restitution forms
and any information they contained about the items taken and their
estimated values. As noted, since these documents are not in the appellate
record, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion based on any
supposed deficiency in the documents.
   D. Replacement Value
      In our supplemental briefing order, we asked the parties to address
questions related to the sufficiency of evidence of the replacement value of
the stolen property: (1) whether this court should address the sufficiency of
evidence of replacement value; (2) if so, whether the People were required to
present evidence of replacement value under the circumstances of this case;
and (3) if they were required to do so, whether there is sufficient evidence of
replacement value to affirm the trial court’s restitution order.
      Section 1202.4 provides that “[t]he value of stolen or damaged property
shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing
the property when repair is possible.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A); see People v.
Ung, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1002–1003; People v. Thygesen (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 988, 995–996.) In light of this governing standard, we agree
with the parties’ apparent view that it is appropriate for this court to address
the question of evidentiary sufficiency, and that the People were required to
make a prima facie showing of the replacement value of the stolen property.6
      As to whether there is sufficient evidence of replacement value,
Pittman contends that more than a victim’s “bare statement” in a probation

      6 We therefore need not address Pittman’s claim that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance by failing to argue specifically that the
restitution request was not supported by evidence of replacement value.

                                       12
report or police report should be required. Pittman argues that, during the
discussion of the relevant documents at the restitution hearing, the trial
court did not specifically refer to “anything in the [police] report indicating
that the victim had estimated replacement value of the lost items.”
      While the court (like counsel) did not use the terms “replacement
value” or “replacement cost” at the restitution hearing, we will not assume
the court did not have the applicable legal standard in mind. And, as
discussed above, we will not assume the documents reviewed by the court
(which are not before us) contained insufficient evidence of replacement value
to support the amount of restitution ordered. We reject Pittman’s argument
the restitution order should be stricken as not reflecting replacement value.
      For his part, the Attorney General contends the trial court erred by
ordering restitution based on the lower victim estimates included in the
police report. The Attorney General argues the revised, higher estimates
included in the restitution forms were more reflective of the replacement
value of the jewelry, so the court’s decision not to use those figures was
“arbitrar[y]” and resulted in an “unlawful” or “ ‘ “unauthorized” ’ ” sentence
that this court can and must correct on appeal. The Attorney General adds it
was arbitrary and unlawful for the court to decline to order restitution for
claimed damage to the bathroom floor in the victims’ home.
      But again, in the absence of the documents on which the trial court
relied, we cannot conclude some of the jewelry estimates are more reflective
of replacement value than others. We have no basis to find the amount of
restitution ordered is defective (let alone unlawful) on that ground.
      Nor is there a basis in the reporter’s transcript of the restitution
hearing to conclude (as the Attorney General urges) that the court’s decision
not to award restitution for damage to the bathroom floor was arbitrary or

                                        13
resulted in an unauthorized sentence. Although the Attorney General
asserts the court incorrectly based this decision on a belief the damage might
be covered by insurance, it appears the court was instead focused on the fact
the damage to the floor was not mentioned in the police report and was not
supported by an invoice for the repair amount.7 This was not an arbitrary or
irrational decision. Even assuming the Attorney General’s arguments on
these points are within the scope of our supplemental briefing order (which
directed the parties to address issues related to amounts that were included
in the restitution order), we find no basis to reverse or modify the trial court’s
order.
                              III. DISPOSITION
         The August 17, 2022 restitution order is affirmed.

                                                       STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
SMILEY, J.*

         7 The court differentiated the types of evidence it would expect to see in

support of the stolen jewelry on the one hand, and the damage to the floor on
the other. The court stated: “If they had a contractor come, that’s very
different than this jewelry. Jewelry that’s old and was from 45 years of
marriage, where they may not have retained receipts, that’s one thing. If
they had the bathroom floor repaired, there should be an invoice here.”
         * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                                         14
Trial Court: Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco

Trial Judge: Hon. Carolyn Gold

Counsel:        Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
                  Defendant and Appellant.

                Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
                  Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior
                  Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano and
                  Catherine A. Rivlin, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General,
                  for Plaintiff and Respondent.

People v. Pittman – A166669