Court Opinion

ID: 9850047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:51:30.678568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:30.879404
License: Public Domain

VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
dissenting.
I join in Richardson, P.J.’s, dissent.
I write separately to express my view that the trial court and the majority of this court misapprehends the standard of review in this case. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213, 236-37, 103 S Ct 2317, 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983), the Supreme Court stated,
*177“* * * we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate’s ‘determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.’ [Spinelli v. United States, 393 US 410, 419, 21 L Ed 2d 637, 89 S Ct 584 (1969)], ‘A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants,’ [United States v. Ventresca, 380 US 102, 108, 13 L Ed 2d 684, 85 S Ct 741 (1965)], is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; ‘courts should not invalidate warrants] by interpreting affidavits] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.’ Id., at 109.
“If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate, police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the Warrant Clause that might develop at the time of the search. In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring ‘the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.’ United States v. Chadwick, 433 US 1, 9[, 97 S Ct 2476, 53 L Ed 2d 538] (1977). Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrate’s probable-cause determination has been that so long as the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for . . . concluding]’ that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more. Jones v. United States, 362 US 257, 271[, 80 S Ct 725, 4 L Ed 2d 697, 78 ALR2d 233] (1960). See United States v. Harris, 403 US [573, 577-583, 91 S Ct 2075, 29 L Ed 2d 723 (1971)]. * * *.” 1
Considering the totality of the circumstances here, Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 US at 238, the probable cause finding of the District Judge was not “clearly erroneous” nor *178was it a “clear abuse of discretion.” On the contrary, reading the deputy sheriffs five-page affidavit2 in a realistic and common-sense manner, State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 415, 657 P2d 1223 (1983), the judge had a substantial basis for concluding that a search of defendants’ residence would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. But, even if his conclusion was doubtful or marginal, which it was not, I would uphold it. Illinois v. Gates, supra.3
The task of a magistrate is to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. The duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 US at 238.
Probable cause is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts— not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Clues and evidence coming to a policeman may vary greatly in both their value and reliability. Rigid legal rules, such as those suggested by the majority here, are ill-suited to an area so rich in diversity. Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 US at 232.
On the strength of the affidavit here, the issuance of a search warrant was legally correct under State v. Harp, 48 Or App 185, 616 P2d 564, rev den 290 Or 171 (1980), which was decided before the warrant was issued, and State v. Eaton, 60 Or App 176, 653 P2d 250 (1982), rev den 294 Or 460 (1983), which was decided after the warrant was issued. For that reason alone, I would dissent from the majority’s holding that the judge’s finding of probable cause not only was incorrect, but also lacked a “substantial basis.”4

See Spinelli v. United States, 393 US 410, 419, 89 S Ct 584, 21 L Ed 2d 637 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 US 102, 109, 85 S Ct 741, 13 L Ed 2d 684 (1965); State v. Ingram, 251 Or 324, 329, 445 P2d 503 (1968); State v. Tacker, 241 Or 597, 602, 407 P2d 851 (1965).
I find it incredible that the majority opinion fails to even address the standard of review. Gates’ demand for deference is not new. Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 US at 238.

The affidavit was supplemented by aerial photographs, a tax lot map and records from the Douglas County Assessor’s office showing the only residence on the property.

See n 1, supra.

Even if the majority is correct in its conclusion that the affidavit was insufficient, I have difficulty understanding why the exclusionary rule should be applied here. The fundamental and legitimate purpose of the rule — to deter illegal police conduct — is frustrated in a case such as this, where the evidence was obtained pursuant to and within the scope of a warrant and there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the police. Here, in the opinion of the majority, the magistrate blundered, not the *179constable. Perhaps it is time to reconsider whether the exclusionary rule should be applied in such a case.
The so-called “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule is currently under consideration by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon; Massachusetts v. Sheppard and Colorado v. Quintero. See also Illinois v. Gates, supra (White, J., concurring), 462 US at 246; Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 US 31, 99 S Ct 2627, 61 L Ed 2d 343 (1979); United States v. Peltier, 422 US 531, 95 S Ct 2313, 45 L Ed 2d 374 (1975); United States v. Williams, 622 F 2d 830 (5th Cir 1980).