Court Opinion

ID: 9698983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:05:52.813584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:45.084494
License: Public Domain

REILLY, Senior Judge,
concurring in the result:
While I concur in the en banc order affirming the trial court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing the claim of the mother of the co-plaintiff, I think we are making a serious mistake in refusing to adhere to the common law rule that there can be no recovery for emotional distress attributable to a negligent act unless such distress was the product of contemporaneous, direct and substantial physical injury caused by such action. This rule has prevailed in the District of Columbia since its formation almost two centuries ago. Neither Congress nor any local government legislative body has ever seen fit to change it.
When this case was first argued and decided by a division, we did note that numerous other jurisdictions overruled their own precedents. See Williams v. Baker, 540 A.2d 449 (D.C.1988). In my view, the reasons mentioned in that opinion, which justified the old rule, viz., that (1) fright or grief are such passing phenomena that lasting mental disability is not ordinarily foreseeable, and (2) that mental disability can easily be feigned as it is a disease defying diagnosis, are still compelling.
Although I am relieved to note that the zone of danger rule which the court is now adopting does place some limits on frivolous or dishonest law suits, I am unpersuaded that we should follow the example of other courts, which seem to be infatuated with the idea of “keeping up with the Joneses.”