Court Opinion

ID: 9394504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 17:07:21.337432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.444909
License: Public Domain

J-A04043-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: A.E., A MINOR :           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :                PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
    APPEAL OF: D.B.-M., MOTHER        :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :           No. 1368 MDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered August 23, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s):
                           CP-67-DP-0000159-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                   FILED: MAY 15, 2023

        Appellant, D.B.-M. (“Mother”), files this appeal from the order entered

August 23, 2022, in the York County Court of Common Pleas, adjudicating

A.E., born in February 2007 (Child), dependent and establishing subsidized

permanent legal custody1 (SPLC) as Child’s permanency goal with a

concurrent goal of adoption.2 After review, we affirm in part, vacate in part,

and remand to the juvenile court.

____________________________________________

1 See Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1)(3) (SPLC is one of the goals a court may consider
at a permanency review hearing). “SPLC transfers permanent legal custody
to the [dependent] child’s legal custodian without requiring the termination of
. . . parental rights. When deemed appropriate, the trial court has the power
to permit continued visitation by the [dependent] child’s . . . parents.” In re
B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. 2004).

2   Child’s father did not file an appeal and is not a party to the instant appeal.
J-A04043-23

        Mother and Father are the biological parents of Child. Mother and Father

separated in 2009 after a seven-to-eight-year relationship, and Father has not

seen Child since she was three years old. See N.T., 8/23/22, at 55.

        Pursuant to a 2011 order from Virginia, Mother was awarded custody of

Child. See Mother’s Exhibit 2. From 2010 to 2019, Child resided in Virginia

with Mother; her stepfather, D.-B.M. (Stepfather), whom Mother married in

2010;3 and her two older brothers. See N.T. at 41-43.

        Mother acknowledged issues with alcohol commencing in 2017. See

N.T. at 44. Following Mother’s arrest and incarceration in 2019 for her third

DUI,4 a felony, Stepfather placed Child with guardians, Sar.B. and Sam.B.5

(Guardians), in York County, Pennsylvania, who were his mother and cousin.6

Id. at 42, 44, 46-47, 60. Prior to her incarceration, in approximately May

2019, Mother had placed Child’s brother, Au.E., with Guardians.7 Id. at 38,

____________________________________________

3   Mother and Stepfather have since filed for divorce. See N.T. at 42-43.

4 Mother was arrested and incarcerated in December 2019 and eventually
released on bail. Id. at 6, 46. She then ultimately reported in February 2021
for a period of three months incarceration with a subsequent period of
probation that ends in 2026. Id. at 46, 51.

5   Sam.B. is now deceased. See N.T. at 42.

6 Stepfather is in the Navy and was leaving for a new command. His orders
did not allow Child to accompany him because he was not an adoptive parent.
See N.T. at 43, 46.

7 Mother placed Au.E., who had Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD), with Guardians as she understood Sam.B. had experience in special
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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43-44. As best we discern, other minor children resided in the home as well.

See Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 8/23/22, at 1.

       Mother allowed Child to remain with Guardians after her release from

incarceration, explaining, “[S]ince she was already there, I didn’t want to pull

her back down here and have her start school where we were and then go and

stay with a friend of mine and take the chance of starting another school, so

the plan was to leave her there. . . .”          N.T. at 47.   Mother testified to a

subsequent discussion in February 2022 about Child returning home where

Child was “very adamant about wanting to stay [with Guardians] because her

friends were there. She had a job. She does color guard, and she likes the

school that she’s in.” Id. at 39, 49. Not wanting to further “traumatize” Child

and “force her to come home,” Mother allowed Child to remain. Id. at 39-40,

58.

       Thereafter, York County Office of Children, Youth & Families (CYF or the

Agency) obtained emergency protective custody of Child on July 27, 2022,

following a report alleging sexual abuse of Child by Guardians. See Order of

Adjudication and Disposition at 1. As summarized by the juvenile court:

       On or about July 26, 2022, [CYF] received a referral regarding the
       minor child[] due to allegations of sexual abuse of [Child] by []
       Guardians, [Sar.B.] and [Sam.B.], now deceased. Allegations
       received were that the legal guardians[] coerced and encouraged

____________________________________________

education and working with children. See N.T. at 43-44. Au.E. returned to
Mother in February 2022. Id. at 38.

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       [Child] to engage in sexual acts and behaviors with other minors
       that were in the home.

       A prior minor household member, T.J., underwent a forensic
       interview at the Children’s Advocacy Center [(CAC)] and
       confirmed the allegations that the legal guardians[] were directing
       and observing the sexual abuse of the children in the home. T.J.
       is currently a dependent child and was previously removed from
       the home. It was previously believed that [Child] was an alleged
       perpetrator of abuse of T.J.; however, after the disclosures made
       in the CAC interview, [Child] is now believed to be a victim herself.
       After initial disclosures were made by T.J., [Sam.B.] committed
       suicide.[8]

Id. CYF placed Child in foster care, where she has remained since. See Order

for Emergency Protective Custody, 7/27/22.

       On August 9, 2022, CYF filed a dependency petition pursuant to the

Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301, et seq. The court held an adjudicatory and

dispositional hearing on August 23, 2022. Mother, who was represented by

counsel, Father, and Stepfather were present.        The court conducted an in

camera interview of Child, then 15 years old, who was represented by a

guardian ad litem (GAL). The Agency presented the testimony of R.M., foster

mother, and proffered Mother’s Exhibits 1 and 2, which were admitted without

objection.9    Mother presented the testimony of Agency caseworker, Nicole

____________________________________________

8The investigation received by CYF named Sar.B. as an alleged perpetrator
and a referral was made to law enforcement. See N.T. at 33. The record
does not provide information on the outcome of that investigation.

9 We observe that after the in camera interview with Child and testimony of
her foster mother, the court indicated it had heard enough to determine
dependency. See N.T. at 19-20 (“At this point[,] I’ve heard enough to find
the child dependent.”).

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Cuevas-Rios, who testified via Zoom. Mother additionally testified on her own

behalf.10

        Child testified to her desire to remain in her foster home. See N.T. at

6. She further indicated that she did not want to see or have contact with

Mother. Id. at 8. Likewise, in response to inquiry from the court, Child’s GAL

expressed her opinion that Child remain in her current placement. See N.T.,

8/23/22, at 62-63. Additionally, Cuevas-Rios recommended a primary goal

of SPLC and concurrent goal of adoption. Id. at 34. When asked why she

would not recommend a primary goal of reunification, Cuevas-Rios explained,

“The child does not want to have any type of contact with any of the family.

She stated she doesn’t feel comfortable with them, and she doesn’t want to

work with them. She wants no visits.” Id. at 35. Notwithstanding, while

arguing for continuing placement in the foster home, counsel for the Agency

stated as follows regarding Child’s permanency goal:

        As far as the goal goes, I mean, again we’re willing to do the
        [Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC)11]

____________________________________________

10   Father also testified, stating he “want[s] what is best for” Child. N.T. at 61.

11
     An ICPC has been explained as follows:

        As drafted, the [ICPC] provides for notification of appropriate state
        or local authorities in the receiving state before placement by out-
        of-state persons and agencies. The authorities in the receiving
        state are given the opportunity to investigate, and if satisfied,
        must notify the sending state that the proposed placement does
        not appear to be contrary to the child's interest. After a placement
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       request, I don’t know if reunification with Mother or Father or
       [Sar.B.] would be in this child’s best interest, but I know that is
       really right now the least of the agency’s worries. We just want
       to make sure she’s safe, and whatever goal is established we will
       work towards that.

Id. at 19.

       By order entered August 23, 2022, the court adjudicated Child

dependent and established SPLC as Child’s permanency goal with a concurrent

goal of adoption. The court determined Child was to remain in her current

foster placement. The court further granted therapeutic supervised visitation

and the commencement of the ICPC process. The court stated:

             I do find she’s dependent. Visits with either parent will be
       therapeutic only. I’m setting the primary goal as . . . SPLC. . . .
       That’s it. And the concurrent goal is adoption.

               In talking with [Child], she’s been independent for five years
       or close to it, so at this point to try to order reunification is like
       five years too late, and I just don’t see it being realistic,
       particularly given [Child]’s -- when I interviewed [Child], she was
       very timid and very afraid. It was clear that she was suspicious
       of all adults, afraid of everybody she has ever lived with, and super
       afraid of her mother. So reunification is just not realistic.

Id. at 63. In further clarifying its reasoning with respect to the permanency

goal and responding to Mother’s contention that it was merely pandering to

Child’s preference, the court explained:

____________________________________________

       has been made, the sending state continues to have financial
       responsibility for support and retains jurisdiction over the child.

McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 1991); see also 62 P.S.
§ 761; 55 Pa. Code § 3130.41. “Although not binding on us, we may cite
federal authority for its persuasive value.” Toppy v. Passage Bio, Inc., 285
A.3d 672, 690 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2022).

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       I appreciate your argument. I want to make a couple things clear.
       Number one, the agency is more than willing to seek an ICPC. I
       have no problem with that effort being made. Secondly, I want
       to make it very clear that it is not [Child]’s preference I’m
       honoring. I disagree. Her state of mind was that of someone who
       was frightened and traumatized, and it is that state of mind, not
       her preference, that has caused me to make the goal that I did.

Id. at 64.

       Thereafter, on September 20, 2022, Mother, through counsel, filed a

timely notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

       On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

       I. Whether or not the lower court erred when it adjudicated the
       minor child dependent without clear and convincing evidence[?]

       II. Whether or not the lower court abused its discretion when it
       established a primary goal of permanent legal custodian and a
       concurrent goal of adoption after adjudicating the minor child
       dependent[?]

Mother’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).12

       Our standard of review for dependency cases is as follows:

       [T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an
       appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
       determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
       record[] but does not require the appellate court to accept the
       lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we
       review for an abuse of discretion.

____________________________________________

12 CYF and Child’s GAL filed a joint appellee’s brief, arguing that there was
clear and convincing evidence to adjudicate Child dependent and competent
evidence to establish a goal of SPLC with a concurrent goal of adoption.

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In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted); see also In

the Interest of L.Z.,111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015).              As this Court

previously explained:

       In dependency proceedings our standard of review is broad.
       Nevertheless, we will accept those factual findings of the trial
       court that are supported by the record because the trial judge is
       in the best position to observe the witnesses and evaluate their
       credibility. We accord great weight to the trial judge’s credibility
       determinations. Although bound by the facts, we are not bound
       by the trial court’s inferences, deductions, and conclusions
       therefrom; we must exercise our independent judgment in
       reviewing the court’s determination, as opposed to its findings
       of fact, and must order whatever right and justice dictate.

In re S.J.-L., 828 A.2d 352, 355 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations & quotation

marks.

       [T]o adjudicate a child dependent, a trial court must determine,
       by clear and convincing evidence, that the child:

              is without proper parental care or control,
              subsistence, education as required by law, or other
              care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or
              emotional health, or morals. A determination that
              there is a lack of proper parental care or control may
              be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent,
              guardian or other custodian that places the health,
              safety or welfare of the child at risk.[13]

       42 Pa.C.S.[] § 6302. “Clear and convincing” evidence has been
       defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and
       convincing as to enable the trier of facts to come to a clear
       conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in
       issue.
____________________________________________

13 This includes “evidence of the parent’s, guardian’s or other custodian’s use
of alcohol or a controlled substance that places the health, safety or welfare
of the child at risk.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(1).

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             In accordance with the overarching purpose of the Juvenile
      Act[, t]o preserve the unity of the family wherever possible, a child
      will only be declared dependent when he is presently without
      proper parental care and when such care is not immediately
      available. This Court has defined “proper parental care” as that
      care which (1) is geared to the particularized needs of the child
      and (2) at a minimum, is likely to prevent serious injury to the
      child.

In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations & some quotation

marks omitted).

      Moreover, “a finding of dependency can be made on the basis of

prognostic evidence and such evidence is sufficient to meet the strict burden

of proof necessary to declare a child dependent.” In re R.W.J., 826 A.2d 10,

14 (Pa. Super. 2003). Further, in Matter of DeSavage, 360 A.2d 237 (Pa.

Super. 1976), this Court rejected the argument that a child cannot be

adjudicated dependent unless the child is actually in custody of the parents,

and they are shown unable to render care or control as defined in the Juvenile

Act. We stated:

      Obviously, state interference with a parent-child relationship is a
      most serious intrusion . . . such an intrusion is properly tolerated
      only in cases in which the Commonwealth sustains a very strict
      burden of proof. . . . The rule of law appellants request us to
      announce is overly restrictive.          The legislature defined
      [“dependent child”] in exceedingly broad terms precisely because
      it is impossible to foresee all the possible factual situations that
      may arise. Further the broad definition enables the experienced
      juvenile court judge to apply his training and compassion to the
      unique facts of each case. The proposition asserted by appellants
      would compel the juvenile court judge to place the child in the
      home of the natural parents to determine whether they are able
      to render proper care, and ignores the possibility that if the
      “experiment” proves unsuccessful, the consequences to the child
      could be seriously detrimental or even fatal.

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Id. at 241-42.

      As to an adjudication of dependency, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

has further explained:

            [I]t is the duty of the trial court to determine whether the
      non-custodial parent is capable and willing to render proper
      parental control prior to adjudicating a child dependent. If the
      court determines that the custodial parent is unable to provide
      proper parental care and control “at this moment” and that the
      non-custodial parent is “immediately available” to provide such
      care, the child is not dependent under the provisions of the
      Juvenile Act. Consequently, the court must grant custody of the
      allegedly dependent child to the non-custodial parent. Once
      custody is granted to the non-custodial parent, “the care,
      protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of
      the child” can occur in a family environment as the purpose of the
      Juvenile Act directs. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b).

In Re M.L., 757 A.2d 849, 851 (Pa. 2000), quoting In the Interest of

Justin S., 543 A.2d 1192, 1200 (Pa. Super. 1988). See also In re S.J.-L.,

828 A.2d 352, 355-56 (Pa. Super. 2003) (affirming order terminating

dependency and placing child with father without a hearing as the child was

not dependent as father was “immediately ready, willing, and able to provide

parental care and control”).

      With her first issue, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in

adjudicating Child dependent as Mother was ready, willing, and able to care

for Child.   See Mother’s Brief at 17-21.     Mother asserts that the court

adjudicated Child dependent without any investigation or verification of the

allegations against her. She raises a failure of the Agency to communicate

with her and obtain any information. See id. at 18-19. While admitting her

alcohol addiction was traumatizing for Child, Mother further challenges the

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juvenile court’s suggestion that Child was frightened and afraid of Mother.

See id. at 19-20. Mother also contests the court’s indication that reunification

would not actually be a reunification with Mother. See id. at 20-21. As such,

Mother asserts:

       There is no dispute that Mother was available, capable and willing
       to provide care to [Child]. She had stable housing, employment
       and was available immediately to take custody of [Child]. Further,
       no clear and convincing evidence was presented to suggest
       otherwise.    Therefore, [Child] does not meet the statutory
       definition of a dependent child, and the lower court erred in
       adjudging her dependent.

Id. at 21.

       Instantly, the record supports the juvenile court’s adjudication of

dependency, and we discern no abuse of discretion. Mother testified that she

is “ready and willing and able” for Child to return to her home. See N.T. at

56. Mother indicated stable employment and housing with a room available

for Child.14 Id. at 37-38, 40-41, 56. However, she admitted to having an

alcohol problem since 2017 for which she was ultimately incarcerated as a

result of a third DUI in 2019. Id. at 44-46. While engaged in outpatient

treatment, Mother suffered a relapse in February 2022 and was subsequently

____________________________________________

14 At the time of the hearing, Mother testified that she lived with a male friend
who permits her to stay at his six-bedroom house as his “caregiver.” N.T. at
40, 56. Mother indicated that there was “a room waiting for” Child. See id.
at 56.

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discharged due to inability to make appointments.15               Id. at 51-52, 59.

Moreover, Mother failed to exercise her custodial rights for almost three years

and had infrequent contact with Child.16           Id. at 8, 48-49, 58 (explaining her

contact with Child “was not that frequent because [Child] had color guard, and

she was with friends, and stuff . . . so she was very rarely home during the

times that [Mother] would be able to reach her, which is evening hours.”).

       Agency caseworker, Cuevas-Rios, testified in support of the Agency’s

request for an adjudication of dependency. She explained:

       I’m saying the child should be dependent because there are some
       concerns. She doesn’t have a relationship with [Mother], and
       [Mother] had her prior to the alcohol addiction problem, but the
       child stated last time she spoke to her in December she continued
       having that addiction problem and that [Mother] gets aggressive.
       Other concerns were brought in when I spoke with the other
       sibling.

Id. at 30. As such, as we discern no abuse of discretion, we do not disturb

the adjudication of dependency.

____________________________________________

15Mother indicated that she had not been to treatment for approximately three
weeks, noting issues with transportation expenses. See N.T. at 52, 59.
Mother confirmed that outpatient treatment was a requirement of her
probation. She testified to commencing a new program the following week
and that probation officials were aware of the brief break in treatment. Id. at
51-52, 60.

16 Mother testified to a discussion in February 2022 with Child returning home.
See N.T. at 39-40. Child testified that she last talked to Mother “within the
last year” and Mother cried. Id. at 8. The caseworker, however, testified that
Mother’s last contact with Child was in December of 2021. See N.T. at 30.

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       Next, we turn to Mother’s challenge of the permanency goal.           In so

doing, our standard of review is the same abuse of discretion standard as

noted above. See In the Interest of L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1174 (citing In re

R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190, for the proposition that the abuse of discretion

standard applies in a dependency matter); see also In re S.B., 943 A.2d

973, 982 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“Initially, our standard of review of an order

regarding a placement goal of a dependent child is the abuse of discretion

standard.”) (citation omitted).

       Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in establishing a

permanency goal of SPLC with a concurrent goal of adoption, highlighting a

lack of aggravated circumstances and the Juvenile Act’s objective of family

unity.17 See Mother’s Brief at 25-27. Mother states:

       Petitions can be filed, and goals can be changed during the life of
       a dependency case, but none of that negates the lower court’s
       abuse of discretion in this case by establishing an initial goal of
       anything other than reunification absent a finding of aggravated
       circumstances. . . . Any initial goal other than reunification,
       except in rare circumstances, flies directly in the face of the
       Juvenile Act’s purpose of promoting family unity.

Id. at 27.

       In support of its established permanency goal of SPLC, the juvenile court

indicated that “remaining in the foster care placement is best suited to
____________________________________________

17With her argument Mother addresses two recent unpublished memoranda,
In the Interest of K.C., 268 A.3d 438 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished
memorandum) and In the Interest of G.E., 284 A.3d 946 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(unpublished memorandum), which we address within. See Mother’s Brief at
24-25.

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[Child]’s safety, and her well-being.” Juvenile Ct. Op., 10/17/22, at 18. The

court stated, “At [15] years of age, [Child] is able to be consulted about her

permanency plan. The [c]ourt found [Child] to be a mature teenager, well-

capable of communicating her desired permanency placement to the court.

The [c]ourt has interviewed [Child in camera], and [Child] indicated she

wishes to remain with the foster parents.” Id. The court noted its focus and

concern for Child’s state of mind and mental well-being. Id. at 20. Further,

addressing Child’s desire for stability, the court then recounted Mother’s

enduring substance abuse, lack of exercise of custodial rights for an extended

period of time, and lack of communication. Id. As such, despite its support

of reunification, as reflected by its order related to ICPC and therapeutic

visitation, the court found neither reunification nor adoption appropriate

goals.18 Id. at 21. Rather, the court determined that remaining in her foster

care placement was in Child’s best interest because it will provide her stability

with respect to school, friends, activities, and employment.      Id. The court

concluded:

       Child has essentially been independent of Mother for around five
       years and has not seen biological father for twelve years. At
       Child’s age of fifteen, adoption may be difficult, and Child has not
       expressed a desire to be adopted. Given [Child]’s state of mind
____________________________________________

18While the court suggests that a reunification with Mother would not actually
be a reunification with Mother, as Mother would instead permit Child to reside
with another relative, see Juvenile Ct. Op. at 21, we believe the court
misconstrues Mother’s testimony, see N.T. at 48, 58 (Mother testifying that
her plan at the time she was incarcerated was to have Child stay with a friend,
but subsequently stating that she believed Child was family).

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       and her clear desire to remain where she is safe and feels
       supported, the [c]ourt stands by its adjudication of dependency
       and its primary goal of subsidized permanent legal custody.

Id. at 21-22 (record citation omitted).

       Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act controls the disposition of dependent

children. Preliminarily, a stated purpose of the Juvenile Act is “to preserve

the unity of the family whenever possible. . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1)

(emphasis added).19 Given this focus on reunification, “child welfare agencies

are required to make reasonable efforts to return a foster child to his or her

biological parent. When those efforts fail, the agency ‘must redirect its efforts

toward placing the child in an adoptive home.’”20 In the Interest of A.W.,

____________________________________________

19We have also acknowledged the spirit of reunification rooted in the federal
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), 42 U.S.C. § 671 et seq., to which the
Juvenile Act was amended in 1998 to conform. See A.W., 162 A.3d 1120
(Pa. Super. 2017), citing In re M.S., 980 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Super. 2009).

20 Notwithstanding, “all family reunification may cease in the presence of a
finding of aggravated circumstances.” M.S., 980 A.2d at 615. See 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6341(c.1); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(b)(2). “Aggravated circumstances”
have been defined as:

       “Aggravated         circumstances.”         Any   of   the   following
       circumstances:

       (1) The child is in the custody of a county agency and either:

          (i) the identity or whereabouts of the parents is unknown
          and cannot be ascertained and the parent does not claim
          the child within three months of the date the child was taken
          into custody; or

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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____________________________________________

          (ii) the identity or whereabouts of the parents is known and
          the parents have failed to maintain substantial and
          continuing contact with the child for a period of six months.

       (2) The child or another child of the parent has been the victim of
       physical abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, sexual violence
       or aggravated physical neglect by the parent.

       (3) The parent of the child has been convicted of any of the
       following offenses where the victim was a child:

          (i) criminal homicide under 18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 25 (relating to
          criminal homicide);

          (ii) a felony under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (relating to aggravated
          assault), 3121 (relating to rape), 3122.1 (relating to
          statutory sexual assault), 3123 (relating to involuntary
          deviate sexual intercourse), 3124.1 (relating to sexual
          assault) or 3125 (relating to aggravated indecent assault).

          (iii) A misdemeanor under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126 (relating to
          indecent assault).

          (iv) An equivalent crime in another jurisdiction.

       (4) The attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit any of the
       offenses set forth in paragraph (3).

       (5) The parental rights of the parent have been involuntarily
       terminated with respect to a child of the parent.

       (6) The parent of the child is required to register as a sexual
       offender under Subchapter H of Chapter 97 (relating to
       registration of sexual offenders)1 or to register with a sexual
       offender registry in another jurisdiction or foreign country.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. Here, there was no finding of allegation of aggravated
circumstances.

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162 A.3d at 1120 (internal citations omitted); see also In re D.C.D., 105

A.3d 662, 675 (Pa. 2014) (recognizing agencies are required to make

reasonable efforts to allow parents the opportunity to “work toward

reunification with their dependent children[.]”).

      With respect to disposition of a dependent child, we have stated:

      The trial court must focus on the child and determine the goal with
      reference to the child’s best interests, not those of the parents.
      [42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)]. “Safety, permanency, and well-being of
      the child must take precedence over all other considerations.”
      [In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2006)].

In re S.B., 943 A.2d at 978; see also In the Interest of A.W., 162 A.3d

1117, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2017); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.           Along with

reunification and adoption, the court may decide to place the child with a legal

custodian or a fit and willing relative if reunification and adoption are not in

the child’s best interests. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1)(1)-(4).

      This option of placement with a permanent legal custodian has been

explained by this Court as

      an arrangement whereby a juvenile court discontinues court
      intervention as well as supervision by a county agency, and
      awards custody of a dependent child, on a permanent basis, to a
      custodian. Parental rights are not terminated. The custodian is
      typically provided a financial subsidy for the child by the local
      county children and youth agency. The subsidy component is
      generally an integral component when permanent legal custody is
      considered a viable option.

In re S.H., 71 A.3d 973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal citation & footnote

omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a)(2.1) (“Subject to conditions and

limitations as the court prescribes, transfer permanent legal custody to an

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individual resident in or outside this Commonwealth, including any relative,

who, after study by the probation officer or other person or agency designated

by the court, is found by the court to be qualified to receive and care for the

child.    A court order under this paragraph may set forth the temporary

visitation rights of the parents. The court shall refer issues related to support

and continuing visitation by the parent to the section of the court of common

pleas that regularly determines support and visitation.”). While the use of the

term permanent ends court supervision, “[t]his language does not confer or

divest parents of any substantive rights but rather addresses the proper venue

for visitation and support matters following the grant of a permanent legal

custody arrangement.” S.H., 71 A.3d at 978-79.

         In In the Interest of L.T., 158 A.3d 1266, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2017),

this Court concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion in changing

the child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption after only

approximately two months of services. In so holding, we distinguished other

cases     involving   long-standing   agency   involvement    and    aggravated

circumstances, as well as indifference toward corrective measures. See id.

at 1279-80. In reversing the goal change order, we stated: “Plainly, this is

not a case where it is obvious that an uninterested parent is wasting

reunification resources while a child languishes in foster care. Mother made

some progress during the brief period of reunification, and it is in L.T.’s best

interest to grant Mother a legitimate opportunity to demonstrate that

reunification is viable.” Id. at 1283.

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       Further, in In the Interest of K.C., 268 A.3d 438 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(unpublished memorandum) at *2,21 this Court affirmed an adjudication of

dependency and reversed the juvenile court’s sua sponte change of the child’s

concurrent permanency goal from reunification to SPLC. The court noted that

reunification was a “fantasy,” after only three weeks and where the father had

been engaging in services. Id. at *5-6. As such, the father challenged the

court’s goal change as “premature.” Id. at *5. He pointed to the brief time

since the adjudication of dependency and the absence of aggravated

circumstances.      Given the lack of aggravated circumstances, he further

suggested a conflict with the Juvenile Act’s aim of family unity. Id. This Court

agreed with the father and concluded that the juvenile court abused its

discretion, stating:

       Upon review, we are constrained to conclude that the evidence
       does not sustain the juvenile court’s decision to terminate
       reunification efforts and change Child’s concurrent permanency
       goal. It is undisputed that Father had been receiving services for
____________________________________________

21  Pursuant to this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, this unreported
memorandum is cited as applicable, persuasive authority due to limited
precedent on the issue. See Superior Court Internal Operating Procedure
(IOP) § 65.37(B) (stating, “Non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019,
may be cited for their persuasive value, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b). An
unpublished memorandum decision filed prior to May 2, 2019, shall not be
relied upon or cited by a Court or a party in any other action or proceeding. .
. .”). By way of definition, “For purposes of these operating procedures, ‘non-
precedential decision’ refers to an unpublished, non-precedential,
memorandum decision of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019. All
references to a memorandum decision filed after May 1, 2019, within these
operating procedures shall be analogous to ‘non-precedential decision’ for
purposes of Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).” Superior Court IOP § 65.37(B).

                                          - 19 -
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      – at most – 22 days, and acted affirmatively by getting alcohol
      screens, attending supervised visits with Child, and completing
      intake with Pressley Ridge family services.

      Moreover, the juvenile court did not address Child’s best interests.
      “Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act focuses upon reunification of the
      family, which means that the unity of the family shall be preserved
      ‘whenever possible.’” [A.W., 162 A.3d at 1120] (citing In re
      M.S., 980 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. Super. 2009)). This Court has
      opined:

            Assisting parents with achieving the Juvenile Act’s
            goal of family unity in a timely fashion ultimately
            benefits children, as it will result either in a successful
            safe reunification or a clearer picture of the parents’
            inability to remedy the conditions causing the child to
            be out of their care, requiring movement towards an
            alternate permanency goal.

      In re C.K., 165 A.3d [935, 944 (Pa. Super. 2017)].

K.C., 268 A.3d 438, at *6.

      Turning to the present matter, the record supports the court’s continued

placement of Child with her foster parents. Moreover, Mother did not oppose

Child’s placement with her foster parents. However, we agree with Mother

that the court’s establishment of a placement goal of SPLC with a concurrent

goal of adoption was premature and contravenes the purpose of the Juvenile

Act of family unity and reunification, particularly as there was no finding of

aggravated circumstances. See K.C., 268 A.3d 438, at *6-7; see also A.W.,

162 A.3d at 1120; see also M.S., 980 A.2d at 615.

      We point out that although the court ordered therapeutic supervised

visitation as well as an ICPC, without a goal of reunification, the Agency is not

required to provide reasonable efforts and further assistance to Mother. We

also recognize that a goal of reunification would provide clarity as to Mother’s

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situation and ability to successfully reunify with Child. See C.K., 165 A.3d at

944. Notably, Cuevas-Rios testified to limited investigation and information22

regarding Mother and noted limited contact with Mother. See N.T. at 26-27.

Cuevas-Rios recounted that she had only obtained information regarding

Mother’s employment, housing, and probation. Id. at 26-27. She had not

spoken with Mother’s probation officer. Id. at 27. She had no verification as

to Mother’s probation or substance abuse treatment or testing. Id. at 29.

While stating that Child reported that Mother was “continuing drinking” and

becomes “aggressive,” Cuevas-Rios admitted that she and Child “didn’t go

into details.” Id. at 31-32.

       Notwithstanding its stated consideration of Child’s state of mind and

well-being above preference, the court acknowledged In the Interest of

G.E., 284 A.3d 946 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum).                   See

Juvenile Ct. Op. at 20. In G.E., this Court affirmed a disposition of permanent

legal custody with respect to a 14-year-old child, consistent with the child’s

preference.     G.E., 284 A.3d at *1.          Specifically, subsequent to reports of

sexual abuse, the child was removed from his father and placed with kinship

parents.    Id.    Thereafter, the court adjudicated the child dependent and

established an initial permanency goal of reunification with a concurrent goal

of permanent legal custody. Id. Approximately five months later, the court
____________________________________________

22We reiterate that the period between the July 27, 2022, order granting
emergency protective custody, and the August 23, 2022, adjudicatory hearing
was approximately four weeks.

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changed the concurrent goal to adoption. Id. Then, one month later, the

court held a dispositional hearing. The child’s guardian ad litem argued that

the child wanted to stay with the kinship parents and asserted that this would

maintain stability.   Despite finding that the mother had obtained stable

housing and sustained consistent visitation, the court awarded the child’s

mother and kinship parents shared legal custody, kinship parents primary

physical custody, and the mother partial physical custody. The court further

terminated the adjudication of dependency and court supervision. Id. at *2.

This Court affirmed the court’s disposition, in effect, permanent legal custody,

as the court found such disposition to be in the child’s best interest. Id. at

*5.

      Mother argues that G.E. is distinguishable as the court established the

initial permanency goal as reunification and did not enter its dispositional

order until the child had been in care for almost six months. See Mother’s

Brief at 24-25. We agree. As such, we conclude the court abused its discretion

in establishing a goal of SPLC with a concurrent goal of adoption.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order adjudicating Child

dependent. We vacate the portion of the order establishing a permanency

goal of SPLC with a concurrent goal of adoption and remand to the juvenile

court to file a new order establishing reunification as Child’s permanency goal.

      Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 05/15/2023

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