Court Opinion

ID: 9667033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:33:16.363471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:34.245144
License: Public Domain

Richard B. Adkisson, Chief Justice, dissenting. The majority has decided that 108 days is an excludable period for good cause under the speedy trial provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article VIII, Rule 28. More specifically, they have held that the excludable period began when court-appointed counsel moved to withdraw as counsel 42 days before trial, alleging he was unable to prepare for trial because the accused had not contacted him, and ended 66 days after the trial date when a second attorney was appointed. This decision marks the end of any pretense that this Court may have posed regarding enforcement of the speedy trial provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. At a time when most of the jurisdictions in this nation are requiring that trials be held in 90 days to six months from the time of arrest, this Court is unable to require a trial be held in 18 months, finding “good cause” for delay on the very flimsiest of reasons. This Court should realize that laws requiring a speedy trial are practically and ultimately for the benefit of the public — the accused seldom really wants one. Sanctions for failure to hold a speedy trial are deemed necessary for its enforcement; that is the concept behind Article VIII. If sanctions are not enforced, the rule will be meaningless. I am hereby authorized to state that Hickman and Purtle, JJ., join in this dissent.