Court Opinion

ID: 9619109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:22:02.962508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:36.926362
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
Upon the authority of our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Collins, 270 Ga. 42 (508 SE2d 390) (1998), I must concur fully in the majority’s opinion in this case.
I note, however, that following the Collins decision, the Georgia legislature amended the state’s rape statute to provide that the offense of rape is committed where a person has carnal knowledge of a female under ten without requiring that the act occur either forcibly or against the victim’s will. OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (2); Ga. L. 1999, p. 666, § 1. According to the testimony in this case, Minter began touching the victim when she was just eight or nine years old, and he had put his penis in her vagina about three or four times. Thus, proof of force may not have been necessary to establish a. charge of rape against Minter under the current law. Moreover, if he had been charged with statutory rape, instead of rape, the result here would *332have been different because no proof of force is required for the former offense. OCGA § 16-6-3. But the potential absurdity and tragedy of this case on the existing record are that Minter could have escaped punishment for his actions if rape had been the only charge filed against him. As it is, however, we are affirming his conviction and sentence on three counts of child molestation.
Decided July 26, 2000.
Virginia W. Tinkler, for appellant.
J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Robert M. Coker, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.