Court Opinion

ID: 9555672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 19:03:00.619638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:16.974209
License: Public Domain

United States Tax Court

                            T.C. Memo. 2023-105

  GARY J. SINOPOLI, JR. AND MELISSA M. SINOPOLI, ET AL., 1
                         Petitioners

                                       v.

             COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
                         Respondent

                                 —————

Docket Nos. 10838-20, 10840-20,                       Filed August 14, 2023.
            26360-21.

                                 —————

Philip M. Anthony, Dustin R. Jeffords, and Thomas Walton Dallas, for
petitioners in Docket Nos. 10838-20 and 10840-20.

Dustin R. Jeffords, for petitioners in Docket No. 26360-21.

Andrew J. Lorenz, John K. Parchman, Emile L. Hebert, and Ardney J.
Boland, for respondent in Docket Nos. 10838-20 and 10840-20.

Andrew J. Lorenz, John K. Parchman, Aaron E. Cook, and Ardney J.
Boland, for respondent in Docket No. 26360-21.

        MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

       GOEKE, Judge: Respondent determined the following
deficiencies in these consolidated cases for 2015, 2016, and 2017: Gary
J. Sinopoli and Melissa M. Sinopoli, $53,928, $73,992, and $22,566,
respectively; Robert J. Siragusa, $51,208, $73,992, and $44,680,

       1 Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated herewith: Robert J.

Siragusa, Docket No. 10840-20; and Michael D. Hurring and Angela M. Hurring,
Docket No. 26360-21.

                              Served 08/14/23
                                            2

[*2] respectively; and Michael D. Hurring and Angela M. Hurring,
$51,208, $73,991, and $44,682, respectively. 2

        The deficiencies result from the disallowance of rent and
advertising expense deductions claimed by a subchapter S corporation,
Planet LA, LLC (Planet), jointly owned by Dr. Gary Sinopoli, Dr.
Siragusa, and Mr. Hurring (collectively, petitioners). 3 The issues for
decision are whether Planet is entitled to business expense deductions
for rent and advertising that respondent disallowed for the years at
issue. 4 We hold that Planet is entitled to deduct $6,000 in rent for 2015,
and the remainder of the expenses at issue is disallowed.

                               FINDINGS OF FACT

       Petitioners resided in Mississippi when they timely filed their
petitions. 5 Dr. Sinopoli and Dr. Siragusa are anesthesiologists and Mr.
Hurring is an orthopedic representative, and they met through their
work. In June 2011 petitioners formed Planet. Dr. Siragusa owned
33.34%, and Dr. Sinopoli and Mr. Hurring each owned 33.33%. Planet
used the accrual method of accounting and a calendar year to report its
operations for federal income tax purposes. During the years at issue
Planet’s principal place of business was in Mississippi.

        2 Mrs. Sinopoli, Mrs. Hurring, and Mrs. Jonica M. Siragusa each filed joint

returns with their spouses for the years at issue. Mrs. Siragusa is not a party in Docket
No. 10840-20. Mrs. Sinopoli and Mrs. Hurring did not participate in the trial.
        3 A subchapter S corporation is a “small business corporation for which an

election under [I.R.C.] section 1362(a)” has been made. I.R.C. § 1361(a)(1). Unless
otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code, Title 26
U.S.C. (I.R.C.), in effect at all relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
         S corporations are afforded special treatment under the Internal Revenue
Code. “One of the benefits of S corporation tax status is that income earned by the
entity escapes corporate-level taxation.” Mourad v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 1, 3 (2003),
aff’d, 387 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2004). “Thus, an S corporation’s income passes through the
entity and is, generally, taxed only at the shareholder level on a pro rata basis.” Id.;
see I.R.C. §§ 1363, 1366.
        4 In their Posttrial Briefs petitioners assert that they should not be liable for

section 6662 accuracy-related penalties. Respondent did not determine any penalties
in the notices of deficiency, and petitioners are not liable for any penalties. Any
remaining adjustments are computational.
       5 Mr. and Mrs. Hurring’s Petition, sent by certified mail dated July 23, 2021,

was timely under the mailbox rule of section 7502(a)(1).
                                     3

[*3] Planet was a franchisee of Planet Fitness, a national chain of
fitness centers, and owned multiple fitness centers in Louisiana. It
opened its first fitness center in May 2013 after some initial difficulty in
finding a location. In 2015 it had three fitness centers, and it opened two
additional centers by 2017. Sometime in mid-2017 Planet sold its
franchises and other assets.

       Petitioners reported income from Planet on Schedule E,
Supplemental Income and Loss, of their personal returns. Respondent
determined the above deficiencies by notices of deficiency dated January
23, 2020, issued separately to Dr. Siragusa and Mrs. Siragusa, a notice
of deficiency dated February 6, 2020, issued jointly to Dr. and Mrs.
Sinopoli, and a notice of deficiency dated April 29, 2021, issued jointly
to Mr. and Mrs. Hurring.

I.    Rental Expenses

       Before 2015 petitioners met occasionally at a hospital where they
worked or at Planet’s fitness center in Gretna, Louisiana, to discuss
Planet’s business. Because of the distance and petitioners’ work
schedules, it was difficult for them to schedule meetings where all three
petitioners could attend. Often one petitioner was absent from these
meetings because of scheduling problems. Beginning in 2015 petitioners
arrived at a plan to have Planet pay them rent for the use of their homes
for business meetings in their personal residences. When meetings were
actually held, they were generally the only attendees but occasionally
one of the wives attended. Other family members were home during
some meetings. Petitioners failed to produce any credible evidence of
what business was conducted at such meetings, and their testimony was
vague and unconvincing regarding the meetings.

       Planet paid rent to petitioners for the use of their residences.
Petitioners did not obtain an appraisal of the rental value of their
residences as meeting space. Dr. Sinopoli researched rental rates for
meeting spaces where petitioners lived and determined that meeting
spaces rented at a rate of $1.83 per square foot, which petitioners used
to calculate rent for the residences’ common areas. Initially, the monthly
rent to each petitioner (based on the size of the common space) was
different. Sometime in 2016 through September 2017 Planet began
paying $3,000 in monthly rent to each petitioner. During the years at
issue it paid rent and reported rent expenses as follows:
                                    4

[*4] Year       Dr. Sinopoli    Dr. Siragusa   Mr. Hurring       Total

      2015        $30,000         $36,000        $30,400        $96,400

      2016         40,000          33,000         40,500       113,500

      2017         27,000          27,000         27,000         81,000

      For each year at issue Dr. Sinopoli and Dr. Siragusa reported the
rent as income on Schedule E of their personal returns and excluded it
from their gross income pursuant to section 280A(g), which provides
that rental income from the rental of a taxpayer’s residence is not
included in gross income if the residence is rented for no more than 14
days in a taxable year. Mr. Hurring reported the rent for 2015 and 2017
and excluded it from gross income. He did not report it for 2016.

       Revenue Agent (RA) Jacob Burgess was assigned to examine
Planet’s S corporation returns and petitioners’ personal returns for the
years at issue. He researched the local rental rate for meeting space and
determined that locally available meeting space accommodating 500 to
1,200 people rented for approximately $500 for a full or half day. He
sustained a $500 rent expense for each meeting that they substantiated
with notes of an actual meeting. They did not provide any meeting notes
for 2015 but substantiated 12 meetings at Dr. Sinopoli’s residence
during 2016 and 9 meetings at Mr. Hurring’s residence during 2017.
Accordingly, respondent disallowed the rent deduction for 2015 in its
entirety and allowed rent expense deductions of $6,000 and $4,500 for
2016 and 2017, respectively.

II.    Advertising Expenses

       Planet engaged in national and local advertising as required by
its franchise agreement. It paid for national advertising through a
system in which the franchisor retained part of the membership fees
that it collected for Planet’s fitness centers, paid over part of the
collected fees to Planet, and retained part for various franchisee charges
including national advertising fees. Planet reported expenses paid in
this manner for national advertising, and those expenses are not at
issue.

      For local advertising petitioners primarily engaged the services
of companies that they met at Planet Fitness’s annual franchise
conferences. Local advertising included print and email marketing,
                                         5

[*5] corporate events, and radio and TV commercials. During the years
at issue petitioners decided to increase Planet’s advertising to attract
more gym members and to develop Planet’s business with the idea of a
potential sale of the business after learning that private equity groups
were interested in purchasing franchises.

       When Planet started its business, it paid local advertising
expenses directly to the local advertisers. In November 2014 Planet
changed this practice. Each petitioner organized a C corporation under
the laws of Mississippi. Dr. Sinopoli incorporated GJS Marketing, Inc.
(GJS), Dr. Siragusa incorporated RJS Marketing, Inc., and Mr. Hurring
incorporated MDH Marketing, Inc. (collectively, marketing companies).
The marketing companies used the cash method of accounting and a
fiscal year ending November 30 to report their operations for federal
income tax purposes. (We refer to the marketing companies’ taxable
years ended November 30, 2015, 2016, and 2017, as taxable years 2015,
2016, and 2017.)

       Petitioners were the sole officers of the marketing companies in
which they held ownership interests. Dr. Sinopoli was the sole
shareholder of GJS. Dr. Siragusa and Mr. Hurring owned small
percentages of their respective companies; and although they allowed
others to hold the remaining shares, they controlled the marketing
companies. 6 Petitioners instructed Planet’s local advertisers to bill the
marketing companies, and Planet began to pay fees to the marketing
companies (marketing fees). The marketing fees were the marketing
companies’ only source of income. The marketing companies did not
perform marketing or other services for other businesses. They did not
report any wage expenses on their corporate returns.

       RA Burgess examined the marketing companies’ corporate
returns for the taxable years 2015, 2016, and 2017. He determined that
the marketing fees exceeded the amounts that the marketing companies
paid to the local advertisers. He determined that Planet substantiated
the business purpose of part of the marketing fees equal to the amount
that the marketing companies paid to local advertisers and disallowed
its reported expenses for the remainder of the marketing fees (excess

         6 Although Dr. Sinopoli stipulated that he was GJS’s sole shareholder, he

testified that he did not own 100% of GJS. His testimony was inconsistent with the
stipulation. Furthermore, while petitioners controlled the marketing companies,
control and ownership are not the primary issues. Rather, the question we address is
whether Planet has substantiated the business expense deductions claimed for
marketing fees in excess of those allowed in the notices of deficiency.
                                     6

[*6] marketing fees). For the years at issue Planet’s returns claimed
advertising expense deductions including national and local advertising
and marketing fees paid to the marketing companies, which respondent
allowed and disallowed as follows:

    Year          Planet’s     Marketing fees   Paid to local   Disallowed
                  expenses                       advertisers

    2015          $676,544       $483,000        $202,757       $280,243

    2016           941,736        740,015         303,282        436,733

    2017          634,680         506,260         254,092        252,168

The disallowed expense deductions were not shown by petitioners to be
for actual marketing expenses in the record of trial.

       The marketing companies filed corporate returns and paid tax for
their taxable years 2015, 2016, and 2017. Respondent has not proposed
adjustments or issued notices of deficiency to them. The amount of the
marketing fees which Planet expensed as respondent determined
approximates the amount of combined gross receipts that the marketing
companies reported on their corporate returns for the taxable years
2015, 2016, and 2017: $498,960, $715,015, and $531,260, respectively.
Respondent allowed Planet to deduct marketing fees in an amount equal
to the marketing companies’ combined advertising expenses for 2016
and 2017, but for 2015 the marketing companies expensed $240,587,
and respondent allowed $202,757.

                                OPINION

      Petitioners bear the burden of proof to substantiate the corporate
expenses at issue in these cases. See Rule 142(a)(1). Taxpayers are
required to substantiate expenses reported on passthrough corporate
returns. I.R.C. § 6001; INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84
(1992).

        Section 162(a) allows a deduction for ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade
or business. Whether an expense is ordinary and necessary is a question
of fact. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943). An expense
is ordinary if it is usual or customary in the taxpayer’s trade or business.
Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). An expense is necessary if
                                   7

[*7] it is appropriate or helpful in carrying on the trade or business.
Heineman v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 538, 543 (1984). Even if an expense
is ordinary and necessary, the expense is deductible only to the extent
that it is reasonable in amount. Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251,
256–57 (5th Cir. 1970); Ciaravella v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1998-31. The requirement of reasonableness is inherent in the phrase
“ordinary and necessary” in section 162. Fuhrman v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2011-236, slip op. at 6. The reasonableness concept has
particular significance in dealings between related parties. Id.

I.    Rent Expenses

       Respondent argues that petitioners have substantiated only 12
and 9 meetings that occurred during 2016 and 2017, respectively, and
no meetings for 2015. He further argues that the amount of rent paid
for each meeting, between $3,000 and $4,000, was not reasonable.

       Petitioners have not presented any written documentation such
as minutes, agendas, or calendars showing that all the claimed meetings
occurred during the years at issue to substantiate rent deductions of
Planet. Furthermore, we find that petitioners’ testimony was not
credible as to the frequency of meetings during the years at issue. Their
testimony was inconsistent and included testimony that petitioners did
not recall the number of meetings that took place. Planet deducted rent
expenses for three meetings per month, once at each residence.
Petitioners have not established that meetings occurred at that
frequency. They have established only one meeting per month for
January 2016 through September 2017. Respondent has allowed in the
notices of deficiency a $500 rent deduction for each meeting. Petitioners
have also established with their testimony that some meetings occurred
during 2015. Accordingly, we will allow a deduction of rent for 12
meetings for 2015.

       Petitioners have not established the reasonableness of the rent
with documentation or credible testimony. Planet deducted $290,900 in
rent that it purportedly paid to petitioners over less than three years.
We agree with respondent that it seems that petitioners adopted a tax
savings scheme to distribute Planet’s earnings to petitioners through
purported rent payments, claim rent deductions, and exclude the rent
from their gross income relying on section 280A(g). While petitioners
argue that the $500 rent determined by RA Burgess was not reasonable,
we disagree and find to the contrary that $500 allowed per month is
actually generous. Obviously, only small portions of the residences were
                                     8

[*8] used for the meetings when they occurred. We hold that Planet is
entitled to deduct $6,000 for 2015 (12 meetings × $500) and has
previously been allowed an expense deduction for rent of $500 per month
for each month from January 2016 through September 2017.

II.   Advertising Expenses

       Respondent disallowed Planet’s advertising expense deductions
for the excess marketing fees on the basis that petitioners have not
substantiated the amounts paid for advertising. He argues that there
was no change in the local advertisers or the services provided after the
marketing companies were incorporated and Planet started paying the
marketing fees. He argues that the marketing fees, like the purported
rent payments, were a means to distribute earnings from Planet to
petitioners for their personal use.

       There is a total lack of evidence in the record to support the excess
marketing fees. The testimony regarding these fees was vague, self-
serving, and not credible. No applicable documentation was offered.
Petitioners did not establish through credible testimony or
documentation that Planet paid the excess marketing fees for
advertising services. They did not establish with credible evidence that
the marketing companies performed any services other than paying bills
or that they had employees. We do not find credible their testimony
about the marketing companies including the reason that they started
the marketing companies. There was no evidence in the record that the
marketing companies continued operations after Planet was sold.

       Petitioners did not substantiate the business purpose of the
excess marketing fees. Planet is not entitled to treat them as business
expenses, and respondent’s disallowance is sustained. The fact that the
marketing companies reported the excess marketing fees as gross
receipts and paid tax for the years at issue does not establish that Planet
has paid the excess marketing fees for advertising services as an
ordinary and necessary business expense.

       We have considered all other arguments that the parties made
and, to the extent not discussed above, find the arguments to be
irrelevant, moot, or without merit. To reflect the foregoing,

      Decisions will be entered under Rule 155.