Court Opinion

ID: 9394100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 14:04:46.110771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.450055
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 5, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                            Court of Appeals

                               NO. 2021-CA-1442-MR

SHANNON RAY FERGUSON                                                  APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE MARCUS L. VANOVER, SPECIAL JUDGE
                     ACTION NO. 18-CI-00446

CHAD TOY FERGUSON                                                       APPELLEE

                            OPINION
      AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING

                                    ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Shannon Ray Ferguson appeals from the Knox Circuit

Court’s order allocating assets between Shannon and Chad Toy Ferguson, a

formerly married couple. We reverse the trial court as to the maintenance award

(in both the amount and duration), and we reverse the circuit court’s division of

Chad’s retirement account and remand for further consideration of the date of

valuation but we affirm the trial court in all other respects.
                                       FACTS

             The parties married in 1994 and had three children, all of whom have

reached majority. The parties separated in September 2018. Shannon filed her

petition for dissolution of marriage the following month. Besides asking for the

marriage to be dissolved and an equitable division of the parties’ assets, Shannon

further requested temporary maintenance of $2,000.00 per month and temporary

possession of the parties’ marital residence. The circuit court allowed Shannon to

remain in the home. By agreement of the parties, the circuit court fixed temporary

maintenance at $750.00 per month, and also ordered Chad to make the mortgage

payments and other household bills (including insurance, property taxes, and

Shannon’s cell phone service). The parties were ordered to attend mediation; the

final hearing was scheduled for October 21, 2020.

             In the interim, Shannon’s attorney passed away. She hired new

counsel, who moved to withdraw representation prior to the scheduled final

hearing. Shannon was permitted twenty days’ time to hire replacement counsel.

Subsequent to new counsel’s entry of appearance, the matter was rescheduled for

final hearing in January 2021 (with mediation to occur before that date), and then

the circuit judge, for reasons not stated on the record, disqualified himself.

             A special judge was appointed shortly thereafter. He ordered the

matter continued, with a status conference to occur in April 2021. The final

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hearing was then set for the next month. Before that could occur, Shannon’s

counsel broke her ankle and requested a continuance of the final hearing. Soon

afterward, counsel submitted documentary evidence that Shannon’s medical issues

made it too difficult to participate in a hearing as well as information concerning

mold in the marital residence. Chad took issue with the latter allegation and

expressed his frustration over the numerous delays. He requested that the circuit

court bifurcate the petition and grant dissolution of the marriage, with all other

issues to be heard at a later time.

             A hearing was held on May 4, 2021, after which the circuit court

entered an order dissolving the marriage and setting the remaining issues for final

hearing on October 20, 2021. Shannon’s third attorney was permitted to withdraw

after Shannon fired her. Shannon represented herself after that; she renewed a

pending motion to hold Chad in contempt, addressed the circuit court directly to

complain about irregularities in her case, responded to Chad’s requests for

discovery, and filed a pretrial memorandum. However, less than one week prior to

the final hearing, Shannon filed an “emergency motion” to “withdraw” her pro se

representation; she asked the court to continue the hearing and allow her a

reasonable time to find new counsel.

             The court denied Shannon’s motion for continuance and went forward

with the hearing, during which Shannon represented herself. Both parties were

                                          -3-
afforded the opportunity to supplement the record within one week of the hearing

date. The final order was entered on November 8, 2021. Shannon, newly

represented by a fourth attorney, timely filed a notice of appeal.

                                          ANALYSIS

     1. MAINTENANCE

                Shannon first argues that the circuit court erred in both the amount

and the duration of maintenance awarded to her. She specifically insists that

$750.00 per month for eighteen (to possibly twenty-four) months is insufficient to

meet her reasonable needs, citing the factors enunciated in Kentucky Revised

Statute (KRS) 403.200(2)(a) through (f).1 Shannon asserts that she suffers from

1
    KRS 403.200(2) states:

         The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time as
         the court deems just, and after considering all relevant factors including:

                (a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance,
                including marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to
                meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a
                provision for support of a child living with the party includes a
                sum for that party as custodian;

                (b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
                enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate
                employment;

                (c) The standard of living established during the marriage;

                (d) The duration of the marriage;

                (e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the
                spouse seeking maintenance; and

                                                -4-
100% disability, that she only finished the ninth grade (although she does have a

GED certification), and that she has not been a member of the workforce for

almost thirty years, having stayed home to be a homemaker and raise the parties’

children. She states that the assets allocated to her (namely, $4,000.00 in cash, a

2005 vehicle, half the value of the marital property, and half of Chad’s retirement

account) are not sufficient to support herself for the rest of her life. Shannon

maintains that her reasonable expenses are approximately $2,000.00 to $2,200.00

per month. She further contends that Chad makes ample pay to support both her

and his new household.

              “The statutory test for granting maintenance is whether the spouse is

unable to support her own reasonable needs through her property, including her

part of the marital estate, and is also unable to support herself through suitable

employment.” Normandin v. Normandin, 634 S.W.3d 589, 602 (Ky. 2020), as

modified and superseded on denial of reh’g (Apr. 29, 2021) (citing KRS

403.200(1)). An award of maintenance, and the amount and duration thereof, is

within the circuit court’s sound discretion and will only be disturbed on appeal if

the appellate court “finds the trial court abused its discretion or based its decision

on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Powell v. Powell, 107 S.W.3d 222,

             (f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to
             meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking
             maintenance.

                                            -5-
224 (Ky. 2003). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the decision of the

circuit court was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.” Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Ky. App. 2001). This

Court is “not authorized to substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court on

the weight of the evidence where the trial court’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence.” Maclean v. Middleton, 419 S.W.3d 755, 775 (Ky. App.

2014). Simply put, the appellate court should avoid “usurp[ing] the discretion

which properly rests in the trial court.” Perrine v. Christine, 833 S.W.2d 825, 827

(Ky. 1992).

              While the trial court is afforded a wide range of discretion in

determining maintenance awards, it is also true that this discretion is not without

boundaries. As we have aptly stated:

              Abuse of discretion implies that the family court’s
              decision is unreasonable or unfair. Thus, in reviewing
              the decision of the family court, the test is not whether
              the appellate court would have decided it differently, but
              whether the findings of the family court are clearly
              erroneous, whether it applied the correct law, or whether
              it abused its discretion.

B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 219-20 (Ky. App. 2005) (footnote omitted).

              While the findings of fact made by the trial court were limited, there

appears to be the findings necessary for determining if an award of maintenance is

indicated. A trial court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it

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finds, pursuant to KRS 403.200(1), that the spouse seeking maintenance: “(a)

Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to

provide for his reasonable needs; and (b) Is unable to support himself through

appropriate employment . . . .” In any case, the fact that Shannon is actually

entitled to an award of maintenance is not disputed by either party, and is

supported by the record.

             It is the amount and duration of that award that is questioned. In that

regard, the trial court abused its discretion. While the appellate court is not free to

simply substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, it is also not free to simply

ignore the trial court’s own findings and ignore reasoned analysis and application

of the relevant statute.

             Upon finding that maintenance should be granted under KRS

403.200(1), section (2) states:

             (2) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and
             for such periods of time as the court deems just, and after
             considering all relevant factors including:

                    (a) The financial resources of the party seeking
                    maintenance, including marital property
                    apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his
                    needs independently, including the extent to which
                    a provision for support of a child living with the
                    party includes a sum for that party as custodian;

                    (b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient
                    education or training to enable the party seeking
                    maintenance to find appropriate employment;

                                           -7-
                      (c) The standard of living established during the
                      marriage;

                      (d) The duration of the marriage;

                      (e) The age, and the physical and emotional
                      condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and

                      (f) The ability of the spouse from whom
                      maintenance is sought to meet his needs while
                      meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.

               Again, while the findings of fact by the trial court are somewhat

sparse, the basic findings required are that the recipient spouse lacks sufficient

property to provide for his/her reasonable needs and cannot support him/herself

through appropriate employment. Drake v. Drake, 721 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Ky. App.

1986).2 Detailed findings regarding each relevant factor described in KRS

403.200(2) are not necessarily required.

               Even so, when the KRS 403.200(2) factors are considered, based on

the findings of fact the trial court did make in its order, then it is baffling how a

maintenance award of $750 per month is anything other than unfair and

unreasonable, the very definition of abuse of discretion. Also baffling is how the

2
  In Drake, this Court stated: “Kentucky law is clear that in order for an award of maintenance to
be proper, the elements of both KRS 403.200(2)(a) and (b) must be established. In other words,
there must first be a finding that the spouse seeking maintenance lacks sufficient property,
including marital property, to provide for his reasonable needs. Secondly, that spouse must be
unable to support himself through appropriate employment according to the standard of living
established during the marriage.” Id. at 730. However, it appears that we mistakenly cited KRS
403.200(2)(a) and (b) in Drake; it is actually KRS 403.200(1)(a) and (b) which refers to these
two basic elements required for an award of maintenance.

                                               -8-
duration of the maintenance award, for 18 months, or 24 months if Shannon

applies for disability, especially given this lengthy 27-year marriage, is anything

other than arbitrary; again, the very definition of an abuse of discretion.

              In today’s economy, $750 would not even cover a subsistence

standard of living. And although there were no specific findings of facts made by

the trial court as to the standard of living maintained during the marriage, there can

be no reasonable doubt that it was significantly greater than bare subsistence.

             While the court did not make specific findings as to the actual amount

of income Shannon would need to meet her reasonable needs, and whether Chad

had sufficient income to support Shannon’s need while meeting his own needs, that

fact is easily found in the parties’ temporary maintenance agreement which the

court referenced in its order. In the agreement, Shannon stayed exclusively in the

marital home even though Chad continued to pay the mortgage. Chad also

continued to pay the household bills and Shannon’s cell phone bill, while paying

Shannon $750 per month in additional maintenance.

             The trial court found that Chad made approximately $5,700 per month

and had been paying Shannon’s necessary expenses, and $750 per month in

maintenance, by agreement, through the pendency of the divorce. There was no

finding, nor any argument made, that Chad was unable to meet his own reasonable

needs while paying these expenses or this maintenance. Further, Shannon testified

                                          -9-
that she expected to need $2,000 to $2,200 per month to meet her reasonable needs

going forward as she would have to provide her own housing and household

expenses. There was no evidence presented to dispute this amount.

                 Also, Shannon has no real means of her own to support herself. The

evidence supports the family court’s finding that Shannon has always relied on

Chad for support. She lacks post-secondary education and has a G.E.D. She has

been deemed 100% disabled by her doctor. She currently has no source of income

and was awarded liquid assets of only $4000 and her 2005 truck from the marital

property.

                 While she was also awarded half of Chad’s retirement, to be divided

via a QDRO,3 she should not have to drain funds needed for her future to survive

now. Shannon is only in her early fifties and could easily live significantly longer.

Retirement funds should not be deemed a readily available source of income for

Shannon to meet her present-day needs. See Naramore v. Naramore, 611 S.W.3d

281, 288 (Ky. App. 2020). See also Daunhauer v. Daunhauer, 295 S.W.3d 154,

159 (Ky. App. 2009) (noting in dicta that retirement accounts are generally

intended to meet future needs in retirement rather than current needs for employed

persons) and Smith v. Smith, 503 S.W.3d 178, 185-86 (Ky. App. 2016) (noting

argument about the tax penalty consequences of withdrawing funds from

3
    Qualified domestic relations order.

                                           -10-
retirement accounts in upholding maintenance award for ex-wife who received a

share of ex-husband’s retirement accounts.).

              An award of maintenance of only $750 per month for a 27-year

marriage, where the spouse needing maintenance was the homemaker, primary

caregiver of the parties’ now grown children, and is otherwise disabled, is an abuse

of discretion. That the award should terminate after 18 months, or 24 months if

Shannon applies for social security disability, is arbitrary and a further abuse of

discretion.

              In Gripshover v. Gripshover, our Supreme Court held that “KRS

403.200 seeks to enable the unemployable spouse to acquire the skills necessary to

support himself or herself in the current workforce so that he or she does not rely

upon the maintenance of the working spouse indefinitely.” 246 S.W.3d 460, 469

(Ky. 2008) (quoting Powell, 107 S.W.3d at 224). However, it further held:

              We have recognized, however, that the statutory goal of
              rehabilitation will not always be attainable:

                           [I]n situations where the marriage was
                    long term, the dependent spouse is near
                    retirement age, the discrepancy in incomes
                    is great, or the prospects for self-sufficiency
                    appear dismal, our courts have declined to
                    follow that policy [rehabilitation] and have
                    instead awarded maintenance for a longer
                    period or in greater amounts.

Gripshover, 246 S.W.3d at 470 (quoting Powell, 107 S.W.3d at 224).

                                         -11-
             Perhaps it was the trial court’s intent, and certainly it is Chad’s

argument, that Shannon’s maintenance award should be ultimately ended because

she may be eligible for social security disability payments. And she may well be.

However, our statutory scheme already accounts for that contingency. While it

may not be out of order for the trial court to order Shannon to apply for social

security disability benefits, since it has made a finding that she is disabled and

unable to work, to reduce the amount and duration of her maintenance award based

on the speculation of what she might receive and when, is an abuse of discretion.

Should Shannon’s ability to provide for her own needs improve, whether via an

award of social security disability or other windfall, “KRS 403.250 and the civil

rules provide for mechanisms by which the maintenance award can be reduced or

eliminated.” Calloway v. Calloway, 832 S.W.2d 890, 894 (Ky. App. 1992).

However, on remand, the court shall enter an order of maintenance in an amount

and duration that considers all factors of KRS 403.200(2).

   2. PENSION

             We affirm the circuit court’s 50% division of Chad’s pension but

reverse and remand on the issue of whether the date of the pension’s valuation

should be the date of the parties’ separation or the date dissolution was granted. In

Thielmeier v. Thielmeier, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 2021-SC-0532-DG, 2022 WL

17726617 (Ky. 2022), the Kentucky Supreme Court clearly held that a party’s

                                         -12-
401(k) (a type of retirement account) had to be valued as of the date of the divorce

for purposes of determining the value of the marital estate, but that the family court

had discretion to divide the marital estate in just proportions (not necessarily

evenly) and also a duty to make findings explaining why its division was just under

KRS 403.190:

                    When dividing martial [sic] property in a
             dissolution proceeding, a trial court must perform the
             following steps: (1) categorize each piece of contested
             property as either marital or nonmarital; (2) assign each
             party’s nonmarital property to that party; and (3)
             equitably divide the parties’ marital property. Trial
             courts have broad discretion in dividing marital property,
             and this Court may not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the
             division of marital property unless it has abused its
             discretion. “The test for abuse of discretion is whether
             the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
             unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

                    Here, it was undisputed that Ken’s ACE 401(k)
             was marital property. The circuit court noted at the
             outset in its findings of fact and conclusions of law that
             “[t]he parties stipulate that all of their property is
             marital,” except for a non-marital piece of real estate that
             is not at issue. Even absent such a stipulation, the
             account was without question martial [sic] property
             under KRS 403.190 and applicable case law.
             Accordingly, the circuit court first erred by dividing the
             ACE 401(k) as of May 1, 2017. Instead, it should have
             divided it as of December 19, 2019, the date of the
             divorce decree.

                    The circuit court further erred in awarding Lisa
             nothing of the contributions Ken made to the 401(k)
             account after separation. The court agreed with Ken
             “that KRS 403.190(1)(a) permits him to retain 100% of

                                         -13-
                the post-separation to his 401(k) contributions.” But it
                did not engage in any analysis as to why it considered
                that division just under the facts before it. This alone is
                grounds for reversal, as a trial court must actually engage
                with the KRS 403.190(1) factors when dividing martial
                [sic] property; simply citing the statute is not enough.

Id. at *7 (footnotes omitted).

                Our Supreme Court further directed: “On remand, the circuit court

shall readdress the division of the . . . 401(k) as of . . . the date the divorce decree

was entered, and shall explain why its chosen division is just under KRS

403.190(1)(a)-(d).”4 Id. at *8.

                 In Thielmeier, the wife remained at home caring for a minor child,

which may work to distinguish the Fergusons’ situation. However, the unique

circumstances in this case (the wife’s automobile accident which required a year’s

4
    KRS 403.190(1) states, in relevant part:

         (1) In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage or for legal separation, . . . the
         court shall assign each spouse’s property to him. It also shall divide the marital
         property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions considering all
         relevant factors including:

                (a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital
                property, including contribution of a spouse as homemaker;

                (b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse;

                (c) Duration of the marriage; and

                (d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of
                property is to become effective, including the desirability of
                awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable
                periods to the spouse having custody of any children.

                                                  -14-
stay at the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, the pandemic shutdown which had an impact

over the court system, the death of the wife’s first attorney, and the recusal of the

original presiding judge) should weigh in the circuit court’s reconsideration of this

issue regarding the date the pension should be divided.

              Furthermore, the date of valuation used by the circuit court

(December 2018) was the date temporary maintenance was established, not the

date of the parties’ separation. The circuit court made no finding regarding its use

of that date rather than separation (September 2018), dissolution of marriage (May

2021), or the final hearing (October 2021).

             Generally, precedent indicates that pensions should be valued as of

the date of divorce rather than as of other dates, such as the date of a QDRO. See

Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 62 (Ky. App. 1990). But a circuit court has

discretion to divide pensions, like other marital property, in just proportions so

long as it explains why its division is just in light of the factors mentioned in KRS

403.190(1)(a)-(d). See Thielmeier, 2022 WL 17726617, at *7-8.

             On remand, we direct the circuit court to divide equally the pension as

valued on the date of dissolution unless the court makes a finding why it is just to

effectively divide the pension as of another date – such as explaining why it is just

not to give Shannon the benefit of Chad’s post-separation contributions to his

pension with specific findings discussing KRS 403.190(1) factors. See id. The

                                         -15-
presumption is that property acquired before a decree of dissolution or legal

separation is marital and must be overcome by showing that a portion of the

pension was acquired by a method listed in KRS 403.190(2). See KRS 403.190(3).

So, the circuit court must divide the pension equally as of the date of the divorce or

must explain why its division as of another date is just under KRS 403.190(1)(a)-

(d). See Thielmeier, 2022 WL 17726617, at *8.

             The judgment of the Knox Circuit Court is affirmed in part, reversed

in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Lori B. Shelburne                          Shane A. Romines
Lexington, Kentucky                        Corbin, Kentucky

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