Court Opinion

ID: 9718707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:31:08.453959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:01.809568
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE O’BRIEN, dissenting: Because I do not believe, as the majority apparently does, that in response to this appeal, we should adopt a position “directly contrary to that of other districts of the [Illinois] [A]ppellate [C]ourt” 375 Ill. App. 3d at 408, I respectfully dissent from the majority. Applying Illinois law to the instant case, I believe Harris’s juvenile record was inadmissable pursuant to the rule adopted in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971), and I do not believe his statements on the witness stand were sufficient to “open the door” to the State’s use of his juvenile record for impeachment purposes. As the majority notes, it is well settled in Illinois that a defendant’s juvenile criminal history is not admissible in another proceeding against that same defendant. People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 517-19, 268 N.E.2d 695, 699-700 (1971). This is true even when the prosecution seeks to use evidence of the defendant’s previous juvenile criminal history to impeach the defendant. People v. Kerns, 229 Ill. App. 3d 938, 940, 595 N.E.2d 207, 208 (1992). Moreover, the trial court has no discretion to admit juvenile adjudications for impeachment purposes when the witness is the accused in a criminal case. Kerns, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 940, 595 N.E.2d at 208. I am not persuaded by the majority’s attempt to deviate from this general rule based on the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 4-5, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645-46 (1971), where the Supreme Court held that a defendant may be impeached at trial by the introduction of prior statements that were obtained in violation of Miranda. Significantly, the evidence the State sought to use in Harris was not evidence of juvenile adjudications and the evidence was used by the State to directly contradict the defendant’s in-court statements. The court in People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 216, 317 N.E.2d 545, 548 (1974), in adopting the rational of Harris, narrowly tailored its own holding. The Sturgis court held “the testimony of a defendant or documents voluntarily attested to by him in conjunction with his motion to suppress evidence *** may be used for purposes of impeachment should the defendant choose to testify at trial.” Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d at 216, 317 N.E.2d at 548. Again, the evidence introduced in Sturgis was not of juvenile adjudications. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d at 216, 317 N.E.2d at 548. The law in Illinois does allow an exception to the general rule that evidence of a defendant’s juvenile criminal history is not admissible for the purposes of impeachment. The trial court may admit evidence of a defendant’s juvenile criminal record if the defendant “opens the door” by testifying on direct examination to some aspect of his criminal record. People v. Bunch, 159 Ill. App. 3d 494, 513, 512 N.E.2d 748, 761 (1987). An exception is recognized where “the witness admits convictions of both admissible and inadmissible kinds under the general rule and affirmatively states that this list of convictions is complete,” or the witness affirmatively states on direct examination that he has never been arrested. People v. Brown, 61 Ill. App. 3d 180, 184, 377 N.E.2d 1201, 1203 (1978). Under these circumstances, the prosecutor may then cross-examine the witness regarding any prior arrests or convictions. Brown, 61 Ill. App. 3d at 184, 377 N.E.2d at 1203. In the instant case, the State asserts Harris sufficiently opened the door for the admission of his juvenile record by testifying as follows: “No sir. There is no possible way that I could have committed this crime. I mean people who commit robberies, things like that, have a motive, have a reason for doing things like that. But I am a professional man. I work. I go to college. I went to Robert Morris, ICC, Midstate. I mean, it’s no reason — I mean I live a productive life. I live just like any of the 12 jurors, like you live. I don’t commit crimes.” The trial court found Harris’s statement opened the door to the admission of his adjudication for an offense which occurred in August 2000. I believe the trial court erred in admitting Harris’s juvenile record. I do not believe the trial court was correct in construing Harris’s testimony as a discussion of his criminal history. Harris was not making an affirmative reference to his criminal record, nor was he misstating or falsifying his criminal record. His statement “I don’t commit crimes,” was not in response to any inquiry about his criminal history and as such was not a sufficient statement to “open the door.” Harris made only generic, present tense statements regarding living like the jurors, going to school, not committing crimes. This is important to emphasize, especially in light of the fact that the evidence the State sought to use was the record of Harris’s last criminal conviction, a conviction that occurred four years prior to the offense at issue here. Because this was Harris’s third trial on the same charge and the first two trials ended in mistrials, the error committed by the trial court in admitting his juvenile court record cannot be deemed harmless error. See People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 310 (2007) (stating that a mistrial based on the jury’s failure to agree on a verdict was illustrative of the closeness of the evidence). This was plain error and it was presumptively prejudicial to Harris since his previous two trials, conducted without the use of his juvenile record (but in all other respects substantially identical), ended in mistrial. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I believe Harris’s conviction should be reversed and this matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Because I believe the trial court should be reversed, I do not believe we should reach the argument of whether Harris’s sentence was excessive.