Court Opinion

ID: 9561505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:10:50.850457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:50.604485
License: Public Domain

Britt, J.,
dissenting:
In my opinion the Industrial Commission erred in sustaining defendant’s plea of res judicata and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims instituted on 26 April 1968.
The Industrial Commission stated that the reason for dismissing the former claims was that plaintiffs alleged negligence on the part of K. M. Duncan, defendant’s maintenance supervisor in Durham County, and “[t]here being no evidence of a negligent act on the part of Duncan, plaintiffs’ claim must be denied.”
In Lumber Co. v. Hunt, 251 N.C. 624, 112 S.E. 2d 132, in an opinion by Parker, J. (later C.J.), and quoted with approval by us in Morris v. Perkins, 6 N.C. App. 562, 170 S.E. 2d 642, it is said:
“When a former judgment is set up as a bar or estoppel, the question is whether the former adjudication was on the merits of the action, and whether there is such an identity of the parties and of the subject matter in the two actions, and whether the merits of the second action are identically the same, as will support a plea of res judicata. Hayes v. Ricard, 251 N.C. 485, 112 S.E. 2d 123; McIntosh, N.C. Practice & Procedure, 2d Ed., Sec. 1236(7).”
In Shaw v. Eaves, 262 N.C. 656, 138 S.E. 2d 520, in an opinion by Moore, J. (Clifton L.), and quoted with approval by us in Morris v. Perkins, supra, it is said:
"In order for a party to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, it is necessary not only that he should have had an opportunity for a hearing but also that the identical question must have been considered and determined adversely to him. Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249 N.C. 167, 105 S.E. 2d 655.”
In the instant case, it is true that the former adjudication was on the merits of the claims as pleaded at that time and that there was an identity of parties and of subject matter in the two claims, *650but merits of the second claims were not identically the same as those of the first claims and the identical question presented in the second claims was not considered and determined adversely to plaintiffs in the first claims. In their present claims, plaintiffs contend that they were injured and damaged because of the negligence of Moore and Perry; that identical question was not considered and determined adversely to them in the former claims.
In many common law actions by an injured person against a principal based on the negligence of an employee, the providing of the name of the employee is not necessary. But, this is not a common law action; it is a remedy based entirely on statutes and one of those statutes, G.S. 143-297, provides, inter alia, that “the name of the State employee upon whose alleged negligence the claim is based”' must be provided along with other pertinent information in an affidavit filed with the Industrial Commission.
I vote to reverse the decision and order of the Industrial Commission from which plaintiffs appealed.