Court Opinion

ID: 9663065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:26:57.881559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:45.029192
License: Public Domain

WILSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s application of the facts of this case to the controlling law, I respectfully dissent.
*610Following a denial of a defendant’s motion to quash a jury panel because of alleged prejudicial remarks made before the venire, a defendant must prove to show harm:
(a) other members of the jury panel heard the remark(s);
(b) those who heard the remark(s) were influenced by it to the prejudice of the defendant; and
(c) the juror in question or any other juror who may have had a similar opinion was forced upon the defendant.
Callins v. State, 780 S.W.2d 176, 188 (Tex.Crim.App 1986), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3256, 111 L.Ed.2d 766 (1990) (citing Johnson v. State, 205 S.W.2d 773, 774-75 (Tex.Crim.App.1947)).
I agree with the majority, and for the reasons the majority states, that we can infer from the record that other members of the panel heard the remark. However, I disagree with the majority’s opinion that there is no evidence in the record that the others who heard the comment were influenced by it to appellant’s harm, and that jurors so prejudicially influenced were forced upon appellant. I draw this conclusion from the character of the remark itself, not a statement of subjective prejudicial feeling as in Callins and Johnson, but one of hard fact from someone who apparently knew the appellant. In my judgment, the statement made was of such a character, and had such a prejudicial nature, that those who heard it were necessarily influenced by it to the harm of appellant.
In Callins, the prejudicial remark was a racial slur. 780 S.W.2d at 188. In Johnson, the damaging remark was the venire-member’s attitude about what to do with killers generally. 205 S.W.2d at 774. In both cases, the remarks flowed from subjective feelings and prejudices.1 An inquiry by the trial judge regarding the second prong of the test, whether other jurors would be influenced by the remarks, would be meaningful. Some jurors might share the Callins’ venire-member’s racial hostilities, but no one could assume that all would. In fact, I would argue that the most common response would be disgust.
Reason and human experience would also lead a trial judge to conclude that the venire would have many different opinions about the Johnson remarks. Again, an inquiry into the impact of the remark on the jurors would be fruitful to allow the trial judge to separate the prospective jurors who might share the prejudicial view expressed by the venire-member from those who were willing to hear the evidence impartially.
Here, Ms. McLean told defense counsel she knew appellant had prior convictions. Again, this statement was not an expression of subjective opinion that might affect members of the venire differently; it was a statement of fact that was damaging to appellant. Ms. Johnson, a prospective juror, told the trial court she was affected by what Ms. McLean had said.
Under the facts of this case, I would argue that Ms. Johnson’s remarks before the bench that she was impacted by Ms. McLean’s comments spoke for the whole venire. It is my judgment that Ms. Johnson’s reaction to the remark would be pervasive throughout the jury because it was a reasonable, understandable, and likely reaction to the facts expressed. Any further inquiry made by the trial judge regarding McLean’s facts could only repeat and further emphasize the prejudicial information.
I would hold appellant suffered harm and sustain point of error one.

. But see Ashcraft v. State, 900 S.W.2d 817 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi, 1995, no pet. h.). However, Ashcraft is distinguishable because, unlike this case, there was no evidence that other venire members heard the remark or were influenced by it.