Court Opinion

ID: 9882258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 17:00:51.815534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:45.601921
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        OCT 5 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAMUEL TEJADA RAUDA,                            No. 22-583
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A206-633-146
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted October 3, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: McKEOWN, CALLAHAN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

      Samuel Tejada Rauda, a Salvadoran citizen, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final removal order affirming an

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. Because the parties

are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.

      Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Tejada Rauda

failed to meet his burden to establish past harm rising to the level of persecution.

See Padash v. I.N.S., 358 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Tejada Rauda argues

that the record established past persecution. Tejada Rauda introduced evidence

that members of the MS-13 gang threatened and extorted his extended family for

money and twice approached him to join the gang. Tejada Rauda also alleged that

his uncle was murdered in El Salvador and that an unnamed cousin was kidnapped

and beaten by someone dressed as a police officer, though he was not present for

either incident, did not identify any perpetrators, and did not claim that these

crimes were in any way related to him. In finding that these facts did not amount

to persecution, the BIA did not, contrary to Tejada Rauda’s contention, rely solely

on the fact that Tejada Rauda was not physically harmed by the gang. Though the

BIA rightly considered his lack of physical harm as a factor, it took into account

the totality of the gang’s actions against him and concluded that the facts, while

unfortunate, did not establish harm rising to the level of past persecution. See

Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2021) (a finding of past

persecution depends on an inquiry into “whether, looking at the cumulative effect

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of all the incidents that a [p]etitioner has suffered, the treatment he received rises to

the level of persecution,” wherein “[t]he first, and often a significant consideration,

is whether the petitioner was subject to ‘significant physical violence’” (first

quoting Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2004); and then

quoting Nagoulko v. I.N.S., 333 F.3d 1012, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2003))). As we have

“repeatedly held,” persecution is “an extreme concept,” and the record does not

compel a contrary conclusion. Id. at 1060.

      Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that Tejada

Rauda failed to show that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. “In the

absence of past persecution, an applicant may still be eligible for asylum based on

a well-founded fear of future persecution,” provided that the “well-founded fear

‘must be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.’” Halim v. Holder,

590 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1191

(9th Cir. 2007)). “The subjective component requires a showing that the alien’s

fear is genuine. The objective component requires a showing, by credible, direct,

and specific evidence in the record, of facts that would support a reasonable fear

that the petitioner faces persecution.” Diaz-Escobar v. I.N.S., 782 F.2d 1488, 1492

(9th Cir. 1986). The BIA found no evidence that Tejada Rauda would encounter

the same gang members if returned to El Salvador, and no direct or specific

evidence that he faces an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. See

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Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005) (fear of persecution

that is “too speculative” cannot support an asylum claim). This record does not

compel a contrary conclusion, and the BIA therefore properly denied Tejada

Rauda’s asylum claim.

      The BIA also did not err in its determination that Tejada Rauda’s proposed

social group is not sufficiently cognizable. “[A]n applicant seeking relief based on

membership in a particular social group must establish that the group is: ‘(1)

composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined

with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.’” Diaz

Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-

G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014)).

      Tejada Rauda states that the gang targeted him because of his membership in

the social group of young males actively opposed to gang membership or

recruitment. The BIA appropriately determined, however, that youth is not an

entirely immutable characteristic because by its very nature, it is a temporary state

that changes over time. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion

that Tejada Rauda failed to show that his proposed social group, which includes a

broad spectrum of Salvadoran society, “can be defined with sufficient particularity

to delimit its membership.” Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1215–16 (9th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2008));

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Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 745–46 (proposed social group of young men in El

Salvador who resist gang violence lacks particularity), abrogated on other grounds

by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Finally,

substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Tejada Rauda failed to

show that the group is socially distinct, i.e., that it “would be recognized, in the

society in question, as a discrete class of persons.” Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at

1091 (quoting Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008)).

Relatedly, no evidence showed that Tejada Rauda spoke out or took any action

against the gang other than refusing to join. See Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d

1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2020). The BIA thus did not err in concluding that Tejada

Rauda’s proposed social group is not cognizable. Because he presented no

evidence that the gang’s activities against him were “on account of” any other

statutorily protected grounds,1 his claim for asylum fails on this additional basis.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

      Because Tejada Rauda did not meet the lesser burden of establishing his

eligibility for asylum, he necessarily failed to meet the more stringent “clear

      1
        Tejada Rauda also argues, for the first time, that his membership in his
immediate family unit—which includes his murdered uncle—qualifies as a
particular social group. Because Tejada Rauda failed to raise this argument before
the BIA, we decline to consider it. See Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411,
418–19 (2023) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is a non-jurisdictional claim-
processing rule).

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probability” burden required for withholding of removal. Al-Harbi v. I.N.S., 242

F.3d 882, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2001). The BIA therefore properly affirmed denial of

his application for withholding of removal.

      Finally, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Tejada

Rauda is ineligible for protection under the CAT. To qualify for CAT relief,

Tejada Rauda carries the burden of establishing that it is “more likely than not that

he . . . would be tortured if removed,” and that public officials would either carry

out or “knowingly acquiesce[] in” the torture. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch,

846 F.3d 351, 361 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). Tejada Rauda

introduced evidence that Salvadoran authorities have been generally ineffective in

fighting criminal activity by gangs, as well as reports of incidents of police

mistreatment and corruption. But no evidence showed that Tejada Rauda suffered

any mistreatment amounting to torture while residing in El Salvador. See Nuru v.

Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Past torture is the first factor we

consider in evaluating the likelihood of future torture . . . .”). Tejada Rauda also

never filed police reports or informed authorities of his encounters with gangs, nor

did he express any particularized fear of being tortured by Salvadoran authorities.

On this record, the BIA did not err in concluding that Tejada Rauda failed to show

that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured by or with the consent or

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acquiescence of a public official in El Salvador. Denial of CAT relief was

therefore proper.

      PETITION DENIED.

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