Court Opinion

ID: 9786242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:51:36.636098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:43.219849
License: Public Domain

Maupin, C. J.,
dissenting:
While the majority has developed a legal construct for dual representation in criminal cases that comports with Sixth Amendment standards, I see no abuse of discretion by the district court in relation to those standards.
To explain, it is readily apparent from this record that the attorneys seeking our embrace of their dual representation may have misperceived their obligation to ensure that petitioner’s decision was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This is underscored by the representation to the justice court below by one of these attorneys that “once he learned that [Ms.] Ryan sought to hire him as counsel, he immediately explained to her the ‘particulars’ of his firm representing both petitioner and her co-defendant at trial.” There is no indication in this record that this interaction involved access to independent counsel. The misperception is further underscored by counsels’ submission of the “conflict waiver letter” signed by petitioner, which was drafted by them and likewise obtained without any indication that independent counsel was retained in connection with petitioner’s execution of it. Of great importance is the fact that the letter affirms that neither petitioner nor her codefen*432dant intended to plead guilty or cooperate with the police. While acknowledging that petitioner and her codefendant had engaged in discussions with “multiple” counsel concerning this issue, the execution of the letter and the record is devoid of any indication that petitioner executed the letter based upon independent advice of an attorney with no interest in her codefendant’s defense. More problematic is the section of this letter that represented that “neither defendant has implicated the other in the crimes charged.”1 In short, petitioner’s ultimate agreement submitted to the court was a fait accompli, and was generated by her codefendant’s attorney at a time when the codefendant apparently needed petitioner’s cooperation.
Moreover, the letter acknowledges that conflicts requiring withdrawal of joint counsel could occur. While not of necessity a ground for denying the application for joint representation, counsel’s statement in this regard demonstrates that the joint approach may not last. This acknowledgment certainly justified the district court’s reliance on the following passage in Wheat v. United States:2
The District Court must recognize a presumption in favor of the petitioner’s counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict. The evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each case under this standard must be left primarily to the informed judgment of the trial court.3
Considering counsels’ acknowledgement of “trouble ahead” with their failure to have independent counsel involved at the time of their discussions of joint representation with petitioner, I cannot see how she can now ever appropriately waive her right to conflict-free representation. And, notwithstanding our majority’s statement that proper waiver can eventuate, under these circumstances, there will remain an issue to be resolved on post-conviction relief, in the event of a conviction at trial, concerning effectiveness of her counsel during the current proceedings.
I want to stress that there is no indication in the record that proposed joint counsel in any way intentionally set out to subvert the legal processes of the trial court. Rather, I believe that this attempt at joint representation has been mismanaged and that, had appropriate independent advice been provided at the outset, petitioner’s waiver of conflict-free representation could be approved.

 Petitioner has, at least to a degree, implicated her codefendant in these matters.

 486 U.S. 153 (1988).

 Id. at 164.