Court Opinion

ID: 9751946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:19:54.541731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:21.070228
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I do not agree that this Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Brion, 539 Pa. 256, 652 A.2d 287 (1994), should be given retroactive application. Further, I find the holding of Brion inapplicable to the facts of appellant Metts’ case.
*208Under the State and Federal Constitutions, retroactive or prospective effect for decisions expounding new constitutional rules affecting criminal trials is neither prohibited or required. Blackwell v. Commonwealth State Ethics Commission, 527 Pa. 172, 181, 589 A.2d 1094, 1098 (1991). This Court has applied several different types of analysis in determining whether a particular decision should be given retroactive effect or prospective application. The general rule is that a new rule is to be applied retroactively to cases where the question is properly preserved at all stages of adjudication up to and including any direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 503 Pa. 228, 233, 469 A.2d 146, 148 (1983). However, this Court has recognized that “although retroactivity is the general rule, a sweeping rule of retroactive application is not justified. Retrospective application is a matter of judicial discretion which must be exercised on a case by case basis.” Blackwell, 527 Pa. at 182, 589 A.2d at 1099.
This Court has adopted the approach which views the decision of whether to apply a new rule retroactively or prospectively as a function of three considerations: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (2) the extent of the reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice by the retroactive application of the new rule. Id. at 182-83, 589 A.2d at 1099 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969)).1 In Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457, 472, 417 A.2d 128, *209136 (1980), cert. denied, Miller v. Pennsylvania, 449 U.S. 1113, 101 S.Ct. 924, 66 L.Ed.2d 842 (1981), this Court stated that the purpose to be served by the new rule should receive primary consideration. “Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect.” Id., quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971) (plurality opinion). Conversely, the same standard “strongly supports prospectivity for a decision amplifying the evidentiary exclusionary rule.” Id., quoting Desist, supra, 394 U.S. at 249, 89 S.Ct. 1030 (emphasis added).
The threshold question is whether the decision announces a new principle of law. Cleveland v. Johns-Manville Corp., 547 Pa. 402, 413, 690 A.2d 1146, 1152 (1997). If it does, then it is proper for this Court to give the rule only prospective effect. Id. Here, there is no dispute that Brion enunciated a new principle of law. Additionally, the ruling in Brion was not foreshadowed by any earlier ruling of this Court. Rather, the holding of Brion was in stark contrast to this Court’s earlier decisions concerning warrantless, unilaterally consensual interception of conversations. See Commonwealth v. Blystone, 519 Pa. 450, 549 A.2d 81, (1988), aff'd on other grounds, sub nom, Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990) (holding that statements obtained through a warrantless, unilaterally consensual interception of outside-the-home conversations were properly admissible and did not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights under Article I, Section 8); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 519 Pa. 415, 418, 548 A.2d 1211, 1213 (1988) (citing Blystone to uphold interceptions of conversations where an informant with a body transmitter purchased drugs from the defendant); Commonwealth v. Barone, 520 Pa. 118, 552 A.2d 1048 (1989) (per curiam order citing Blystone to reverse the Superior Court’s Memorandum decision suppressing recordings that had been taped in the defendant’s residence). See also, Commonwealth v. Brion, 381 Pa.Super. 83, 552 A.2d 1105 (1989), rev’d, 539 Pa. 256, 652 *210A.2d 287 (1994) (citing Blystone, the Superior Court determined that police were not required under Article I, Section 8 to obtain prior judicial approval before sending an informant into a suspect’s home to record his conversations. In so holding, the Superior Court concluded that Blystone had overruled sub silentio its prior decision in Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 370 Pa.Super. 179, 536 A.2d 354 (1987) (en banc), which required police to obtain a warrant prior to recording a defendant’s conversations in his home using a wired informant.) Consequently, under the law in existence at the time that appellants’ inculpatory statements were intercepted, police were not required to first obtain a judicial probable cause determination before engaging in a unilaterally consensual participant interception. See Blystone, supra. On July 22, 1992, police intercepted a statement made by appellant Ardestani indicating that he wished to hire someone to kill his wife. Ardestani was convicted on January 8, 1993. In appellant Metis’ case, the interception of his statements admitting that he murdered a corrections officer occurred on January 27, 1992 and February 6, 1992. Metts was convicted on May 10, 1993, This Court did not decide Brion until December 30, 1994, long after both the interceptions of the statements and appellants’ subsequent convictions.
Application of the Blackwell factors leads to the conclusion that this Court’s decision in Brion should not be applied retroactively. First, under Blackwell, although the purpose of the new rule announced in Brion was designed to safeguard privacy, this purpose will not be enhanced or furthered by applying the new rule to cases where the interceptions previously occurred under constitutionally permissible circumstances at the time. Prior to Brion, a defendant could not establish that he was entitled to the benefit of a court order based upon probable cause prior to having his conversations recorded in his home, as this Court had not yet determined that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy under such circumstances. Even if a retroactive application of Brion could restore a lost privacy interest, which it cannot, there was no privacy interest in effect at the time police intercepted the conversations at issue. Thus, there is nothing to restore.
*211In a similar vein, retroactive application of the Brion rule will do nothing to further the primary goal of suppression: deterring police misconduct. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (protecting one’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures by depriving law enforcement officials of the benefits derived from using unlawfully obtained information). The police officers in the instant matters acted in strict conformity with the constitutional requirements in force at the time that the statements in question were intercepted. Evidence which was lawfully obtained should not be suppressed since there was no police misconduct to deter.
Under the second prong of the test enunciated in Blackwell, the extent of the reliance on the old rule, there is no question that the officers and prosecutors involved in the instant matters relied on the caselaw in effect at the time they intercepted the conversations at issue. Law enforcement officers should not be punished for conforming their conduct to the law in existence at the time that they investigate a crime. Here, it was reasonable for the officers involved to conclude that there were no constitutional impediments to taping the appellants’ conversations.
Finally, under the third prong of Blackwell, applying Brion retroactively does nothing to further the administration of justice. In fact, suppressing the inculpatory statements at issue, which were obtained under constitutionally permissible circumstances at the time of interception, hinders the administration of justice by placing law enforcement officials in the untenable position of being unable to rely on the validity of the caselaw in effect at the time of their investigations. Law enforcement officials should not be punished for their inability to predict the future holdings of this Court, especially where, as with Brion, a new decision represents such a drastic departure from past precedent. Furthermore, retroactive application of Brion would place a burden on the courts which would be forced to determine whether evidence which was obtained under constitutionally permissible circumstances should, in retrospect, be suppressed.
*212Finally, under Miller, the new rule of law announced in Brion did not cure a defect in appellants’ criminal trials which affected or substantially impaired the truth-finding function, nor did Brion correct a serious flaw in the fact-finding process at trial. Indeed, the evidence at issue undeniably enhances the truth seeking function, as the relevance of appellants’ inculpatory statements to the ultimate issues in the case is undeniable. Thus, retroactive application is not mandated. I agree with the Superior Court’s determination in the instant matter that Brion expanded the scope of the exclusionary rule; and therefore, under Miller, the preferred result is prospective application. See Commonwealth v. Metts, 447 Pa.Super. 275, 292, 669 A.2d 346, 355 (1995).
I am persuaded by the cases in which this Court has applied a new rule prospectively where the rule represented a clear break with the past. In Miller, 490 Pa. at 471, 417 A.2d at 136, this Court refused to give retroactive effect to the holding of Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A.2d 1177 (1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912, 100 S.Ct. 1843, 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980), which required police to obtain a warrant prior to arresting a suspect in his home absent exigent circumstances. Miller’s arrest occurred over two years before this Court’s holding in Williams. In evaluating whether the holding of Williams should have been given retroactive effect, this Court properly noted that the objectives of the exclusionary rule would not be furthered by suppressing evidence of fruits of arrests which were legal when made. This Court also found that law enforcement authorities justifiably relied upon preexisting caselaw, which did not require a warrant to arrest a suspect in his home. Finally, this Court determined that the holding of Williams did not implicate the truth determining process. Therefore, all the governing criteria ran in favor of prospective application of the Williams rule. Miller, at 473, 417 A.2d at 137; see also Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120, 454 A.2d 991 (1982) (plurality opinion) (applying the ruling of Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.2d 349 (1977) concerning the jury instruction in insanity defense cases, prospectively because the new rule was a clear break from the past).
*213Most recently, in Cleveland v. Johns-Manville Corp., 547 Pa. 402, 690 A.2d 1146 (1997), this Court refused to give retroactive application to Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 543 Pa. 664, 674 A.2d 232 (1996), which held that a plaintiff asserting a non-cancer, asbestos-related claim could not recover for any part of the damages relating to cancer, thereby eliminating claims for increased risk and fear of cancer where cancer was not present. Applying the Blackwell factors, this Court first determined that Simmons announced a new rule of law. Cleveland, 547 Pa. at 413, 690 A.2d at 1152. This Court further concluded that there had been considerable reliance on the old rule and that retroactive application of Simmons would place a tremendous burden on the courts. Id. at 414, 690 A.2d at 1152. Thus, although this Court found that the first factor of Blackwell supported a retroactive application due to the significant purpose of the rule to promote fairness, the second and third factors strongly favored only a prospective application of Simmons. In the instant matters, the relevant factors weigh heavily in favor of prospective application of the Brion rule; therefore, I disagree with the majority that the holding of Brion should be retroactively applied.
Finally, I find the holding of Brion inapplicable to appellant Metts’ case. Brion purports to protect persons from governmental invasions of privacy within one’s own home. Brion, 539 Pa. at 261, 652 A.2d at 289. Metts’ statements were recorded at the home of his sister, where he occasionally stayed. The trial court noted that Metts did not permanently reside in his sister’s apartment but was merely a “transient” occasional overnight guest. Accordingly, I do not believe that Metts had an expectation of privacy in his sister’s apartment where he sometimes spent the night worthy of the protection afforded in Brion.
For the aforementioned reasons, I dissent.2
This dissenting opinion is joined by Justice NEWMAN.

. In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a "clear break” with the past. Id. The holding of Griffith is not applicable to the question of whether this Court’s decision in Brion should be retroactively applied. The retroactivity principle of Griffith is certainly applicable to all questions concerning federal law. However, this Court need not apply the same standards to issues dealing with state law. State courts have the authority to determine the retroactivity of their own decisions when questions of state law are at issue. See Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 99, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). Brion was decided under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Accordingly, this Court is free to apply the Blackwell analysis concerning retroactivity.

. I further dissent as I do not believe that Brion was correctly decided. See Brion, 539 Pa. at 262, 652 A.2d at 290 (Nix, C.J. dissenting, joined by Papadakos and Castille, JJ.).