Court Opinion

ID: 9901024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 22:11:46.286625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:24.467222
License: Public Domain

2023 UT App 111

                THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

                      SUSAN JEANNE CLARK,
                           Appellee,
                               v.
                       RICHARD LEE CLARK,
                           Appellant.

                             Opinion
                         No. 20210713-CA
                     Filed September 28, 2023

            Fourth District Court, Heber Department
               The Honorable Jennifer A. Brown
                         No. 184500153

               Karra J. Porter and Kristen C. Kiburtz,
                      Attorneys for Appellant
               Julie J. Nelson, Attorney for Appellee

  JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
    MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN D. TENNEY
                          concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1      Richard Lee Clark appeals from the district court’s decision
following a two-day divorce trial. Clark challenges several aspects
of the court’s ruling, including a discovery sanction for his failure
to timely disclose his trial exhibits under rule 26 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure; findings relating to his claim that his ex-wife,
Susan Jeanne Clark, dissipated the marital estate; and the court’s
division of the marital property. We affirm the district court’s
ruling with the exception of one aspect of the district court’s
marital property determination, which we vacate and remand for
additional findings.
                          Clark v. Clark

                        BACKGROUND

¶2      Richard and Susan 1 married in 2002, when Richard was in
his sixties and Susan was in her fifties. Richard was retired from
military service and from employment as an attorney with the
Department of Justice. Susan owned a wallpaper business when
she met Richard but quit working shortly after they married. For
the next six years, Richard and Susan lived off Richard’s
retirement income from both the Army and the Department of
Justice.

¶3    In 2008, Richard came out of retirement to work for a
government contractor in Afghanistan, where he lived for thirty-
eight months. During that time, Richard’s retirement and
employment income of $814,627 was deposited into a joint
account that Susan controlled. Richard returned home to find
“probably about $100,000 . . . had been saved” in the joint bank
account—much less than he expected—yet he said nothing to
Susan at that time.

¶4     Three years after his return, Richard moved into the
basement of the marital home. The following year, in 2016, Susan
transferred approximately $78,000 from their joint account into
her personal account, prompting Richard to confront her about
what he viewed as missing money from his time in Afghanistan.
Two years later, in 2018, Susan filed for divorce. Shortly
afterward, Richard purchased a Harley-Davidson motorcycle
with financing, which he paid off in 2020.

¶5     At the time of their divorce, Richard and Susan owned two
real properties—a condo in Norfolk, Virginia (Mooring Drive),
and a home in Kamas, Utah (Ross Creek). Richard had purchased
Mooring Drive before the marriage for approximately $205,000. In

1. Because the parties share the same surname, we refer to them
by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent
informality.

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                           Clark v. Clark

2003, Richard added Susan to the title of Mooring Drive, which
allowed her to vote at the condominium association’s meetings
and to join the board. The following year, Richard and Susan used
equity loans on Mooring Drive to finance the purchase and
construction of Ross Creek. From 2009—when Susan moved to
Utah and Richard was in Afghanistan—until June 2019, Richard
rented Mooring Drive out to others and the revenues were
deposited into his separate account that was designated to pay for
the property’s expenses.

¶6     During their marriage, the parties took out an equity loan
on Ross Creek that matured, along with one of the equity loans
from Mooring Drive, in 2019. With the divorce still pending,
Susan agreed to refinance Ross Creek’s mortgage to pay off the
two equity loans that were due, but only if Richard would
stipulate that Mooring Drive and Ross Creek were marital
property and were subject to equitable division in their pending
divorce. Richard agreed, and the parties stipulated that “the Ross
Creek and Mooring Drive properties shall remain marital
property and shall be subject to equitable division in the parties’
divorce notwithstanding that the Ross Creek home and Mooring
Drive property will no longer be jointly titled.”

¶7      In April 2019, the Mooring Drive tenants’ lease expired.
Richard decided he could only offer the tenants a month-to-
month lease until his divorce was over. When the tenants declined
to renew and moved out in June, Richard withdrew $30,000 from
the joint bank account, claiming that he needed the funds to cover
Mooring Drive’s expenses. After a hearing, the court entered
temporary orders in December 2019, permitting Richard to access
equity in Ross Creek to pay off debt on Mooring Drive but
denying his “request for financial relief based on the loss of rental
income because [Richard] ha[d] not made any attempt to secure
new renters.”

¶8   Trial was originally scheduled for June 2020, but when the
COVID-19 pandemic hit and courts were required to hold bench

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                          Clark v. Clark

trials virtually, Richard declined to proceed with a virtual trial,
and it was continued without a date. In February 2021, the court
held a pretrial scheduling conference and rescheduled the trial for
May 2021. The court’s pretrial order stated the parties must
produce pretrial disclosures on or before April 26, 2021, pursuant
to rule 26(a)(5)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

¶9     Richard missed the deadline. A week after it passed, he
requested a continuance to hire trial counsel. Richard had been
representing himself as a pro se litigant despite being eighty-four
years old and not having practiced law since 1988. According to
Richard, health issues arose that made him “no longer physically
and mentally capable of representing” himself. The court granted
the motion, rescheduling the trial for June. The new deadline for
pretrial disclosures became May 24, but Richard did not submit
his pretrial disclosures until June 10—eleven days before trial.

¶10 The two-day trial began with Susan’s objection to Richard’s
untimely pretrial disclosures. Susan contended that Richard had
“ample opportunity” to produce his pretrial disclosures given the
multiple continuances of the trial. In response, Richard claimed
his failure to meet the disclosure deadline was harmless because
he had previously produced as discovery responses the 339 pages
of financial documents—including check registers, paystubs from
2008 to 2009, and bank account information from 2011 to 2012—
that he sought to admit as exhibits 2 through 8. Yet Richard did
not file certificates of service for those responses, and neither
party’s counsel could confirm whether Richard had previously
sent the documents in exhibits 2 through 8 to Susan, leaving the
district court with only Richard’s testimony to support the claim
that he had previously disclosed the exhibits. The district court
sustained Susan’s objection as to exhibits 2 through 8, excluding
them from trial.

¶11 Both Susan and Richard testified at trial. Susan testified
Richard had transferred $30,000 from their joint account to his
personal account in June 2019 and contended she was entitled to

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                           Clark v. Clark

half of that amount. Susan also testified about her exhibits that
provided recent balances in her bank and retirement accounts.

¶12 On cross-examination, Susan admitted she had not looked
for work and was unemployed despite the court’s urging in 2020
for her to seek employment. Richard then peppered Susan about
numerous expenditures during his time in Afghanistan, to which
Susan replied that it “was a number of years ago” and she “ha[d]
no recollection at all” of the transactions. Susan did state,
however, that when Richard left for Afghanistan, she recalled
they “had very large credit card balances” that Richard instructed
her “to start paying off” while he was away.

¶13 First testifying as Susan’s witness, Richard answered
questions about some of the marital property. He testified about
a recent appraisal of Mooring Drive that valued it at $390,000, his
three life insurance policies that all list Susan as the beneficiary,
and his purchase of the Harley-Davidson in May 2019. Susan then
introduced a pleading Richard had filed with the court in
November 2019 that stated, in relevant part, he had “owned three
motorcycles, selling the last one when [he] moved to Norfolk,”
but he has “never ridden a Harley-Davidson.” Richard replied
that he had “misstated the fact,” both in that pleading and at a
hearing the same month when he told the court he did not own a
Harley-Davidson. Richard testified he should receive three-
fourths of the equity in Mooring Drive because he purchased it
before the marriage. Unable to provide a figure for what the
property was worth when he married Susan, Richard claimed that
“the[] prices have gone up and gone down a great deal” since their
marriage, but his best guess was that Mooring Drive appreciated
from $205,000 to $350,000 between 2000 and 2002. Richard
continued to do some impromptu math on the stand to clarify
how much equity he felt he was owed, asserting that since
Mooring Drive was recently appraised at $390,000 and had been
worth $350,000 in 2002—by his best guess—there is $40,000 of
equity for them to divide, but then he admitted such valuation “is
something I’m just not knowledgeable about.”

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                           Clark v. Clark

¶14 As his own witness, Richard testified about Susan’s alleged
dissipation during his time in Afghanistan. Richard’s excluded
exhibits went to the issue of dissipation, so without the financial
documents from that period, Richard sought to prove Susan
“dissipated money while [he] was in Afghanistan” through his
testimony about his earnings and typical expenses during that
time frame. Using the excluded exhibits to refresh his recollection,
Richard estimated their monthly expenses before he left were
approximately $10,000 to $11,000. Richard also challenged
Susan’s testimony about credit card balances, claiming that “there
weren’t any large credit card balances before [he] left.”

¶15 At the conclusion of trial, the district court asked both
parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
in lieu of closing arguments. After issuing an oral ruling, the
district court memorialized its decision in written findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The court found that Richard’s
“testimony was insufficient to establish his [dissipation] claim”
and that Richard had “failed to meet his burden of demonstrating
dissipation.” The court also found “problems with the credibility
of both parties,” specifically finding that Susan’s “credibility was
lacking with regards to the dissipation issue” and Richard’s
“credibility was lacking with regards to his motorcycle purchase.”
Susan was awarded Ross Creek’s equity, and Richard was
awarded Mooring Drive’s. The court awarded Susan $2,500 per
month in alimony and an offset of $43,474 (from Richard’s
purchase of the Harley-Davidson and his $30,000 withdrawal
from the joint account) “to achieve an equitable division of the
estate.” The court found Richard “withdrew $30,000 from the joint
account without [Susan’s] knowledge or consent and deposited it
into his own personal account,” but it made no findings as to how
Richard spent the $30,000.

            ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶16 Richard raises three main issues for our review. First,
Richard challenges the district court’s exclusion of his exhibits for

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                           Clark v. Clark

his failure to comply with rule 26(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. A district court “has broad discretion regarding the
imposition of discovery sanctions,” and when we apply “the
abuse of discretion standard to the district court’s imposition of a
particular sanction, we give the district court a great deal of
latitude.” Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, ¶ 35, 215 P.3d
933 (cleaned up).

¶17 Second, Richard contends the district court erred in its
application of the burden of proof on Richard’s dissipation claim.
A district court’s “allocation of the burden of proof is . . . a
question of law that we review for correctness.” Salt Lake City
Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2018 UT 62, ¶ 20, 435 P.3d
179.

¶18 Finally, Richard challenges the district court’s division of
the property, including the court’s finding that the marital estate
included Mooring Drive and the Harley-Davidson, and its
decision to deduct from the marital estate the $30,000 Richard
withdrew from the parties’ joint account. A district court “has
considerable discretion considering property division in a divorce
proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity,” and
“we will disturb the district court’s division only if there is a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law indicating an
abuse of discretion.” Beckham v. Beckham, 2022 UT App 65, ¶ 6, 511
P.3d 1253 (cleaned up).

                            ANALYSIS

                       I. Pretrial Disclosures

¶19 Richard asserts the district court abused its discretion in
excluding his exhibits 2 through 8 for failure to comply with rule
26(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because he
“produced the documents that comprised the exhibits” during
discovery and any “technical non-compliance with that rule” was
“harmless.” We disagree.

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                            Clark v. Clark

¶20 Rule 26 governs “disclosure and discovery” in civil matters
and requires parties to provide “a copy of each exhibit, including
charts, summaries, and demonstrative exhibits, unless solely for
impeachment, separately identifying those which the party will
offer and those which the party may offer . . . . at least 28 days
before trial.” Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5). A party who fails to timely
disclose exhibits “may not use the undisclosed witness,
document, or material at . . . trial unless the failure is harmless or
the party shows good cause for the failure.” Id. R. 26(d)(4). A
district court “has broad discretion in selecting and imposing
sanctions for discovery violations under rule 26,” and “appellate
courts may not interfere with such discretion unless there is either
an erroneous conclusion of law or no evidentiary basis for the
district court’s ruling.” Wallace v. Niels Fugal Sons Co., 2022 UT
App 111, ¶ 26, 518 P.3d 184 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1267
(Utah 2023).

¶21 Richard does not dispute that he failed to timely disclose
exhibits 2 through 8. Instead, Richard argues he produced the
documents in those exhibits to Susan in earlier discovery
responses, so his failure to timely file pretrial disclosures was
harmless, and he further argues that it was Susan’s burden to
prove she had not received them. In response, Susan asserts it was
Richard’s burden, not hers, to prove that he produced the
documents earlier in discovery, and the failure to file his pretrial
disclosures pursuant to rule 26(a)(5) was not harmless. We agree
with Susan on both fronts.

¶22 First, “the burden to demonstrate harmlessness or good
cause is clearly on the party seeking relief from disclosure
requirements.” Dierl v. Birkin, 2023 UT App 6, ¶ 32, 525 P.3d 127
(cleaned up), cert. denied, 527 P.3d 1107 (Utah 2023). Second,
Richard failed to carry his burden of demonstrating harmlessness.
Although Richard “assured [his counsel] that he [had] produced
records related to this 2008-to-2012 timeframe,” he did not file the
required certificates of service. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(f) (requiring
a party to file “the certificate of service stating that the disclosure,

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                            Clark v. Clark

request for discovery, or response has been served on the other
parties and the date of service”). Thus, Richard failed to prove that
the documents had previously been produced.

¶23 But even if he had proved prior production, excusing
pretrial disclosures if the documents were produced earlier in
discovery would “eviscerate[] the rule that explicitly requires
parties to” serve a copy of the documents they intend to use “in
their case-in-chief at trial.” Johansen v. Johansen, 2021 UT App 130,
¶¶ 19, 26, 504 P.3d 152 (rejecting argument to follow the spirit of
rule 26 rather than “the plain language of rule 26” regarding
pretrial disclosures); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5)(A)(iv)
(requiring pretrial disclosure of “each exhibit” the party will or
may offer at trial). And expecting a party to sort through
hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of documents that were
produced earlier by the other side during discovery and then
expecting the party to predict which ones the opposing party
might seek to admit at trial would be harmful and would violate
the intent of rule 26.

¶24 Ultimately, “a court’s determination with respect to
harmlessness . . . . is a discretionary call,” and our review of it “is
necessarily deferential.” Johansen, 2021 UT App 130, ¶ 11 (cleaned
up). Thus, the district court was well within its “broad discretion”
to exclude Richard’s exhibits 2 through 8 under these
circumstances. See Wallace, 2022 UT App 111, ¶ 26 (cleaned up).

                           II. Dissipation

¶25 Richard claims the district court erred in finding that he
failed to meet the burden of proof on his dissipation claim. We
disagree.

¶26 “The marital estate is generally valued at the time of the
divorce decree or trial.” Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 49, 299
P.3d 1079 (cleaned up). “But where one party has dissipated an
asset,” the “trial court may, in the exercise of its equitable
powers,” “hold one party accountable to the other for the

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                           Clark v. Clark

dissipation.” Id. (cleaned up). A court’s inquiry into a dissipation
claim may consider “a number of factors,” such as “(1) how the
money was spent, including whether funds were used to pay
legitimate marital expenses or individual expenses; (2) the parties’
historical practices; (3) the magnitude of any depletion; (4) the
timing of the challenged actions in relation to the separation and
divorce; and (5) any obstructive efforts that hinder the valuation
of the assets.” Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 2022 UT App 28, ¶ 69, 507
P.3d 385 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1259 (Utah 2022).

¶27 The burden of proof for dissipation initially falls on the
party alleging it. See Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ¶ 15, 996
P.2d 565 (stating that a party seeking to assert dissipation must
make an “initial showing of apparent dissipation”). The district
court correctly concluded that Richard bore the “burden of
demonstrating dissipation.” To meet the “initial showing of
apparent dissipation,” the party alleging dissipation must first
show evidence of dissipation. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. Only after
“present[ing] the trial court with evidence tending to show that
[Susan] had dissipated marital assets” does the burden shift to
Susan “to show that the funds were not dissipated, but were used
for some legitimate marital purpose.” Id. ¶ 13.

¶28 Richard’s documentary evidence on this issue had been
excluded by the court, so the only evidence he presented was his
testimony in 2021 that his income while in Afghanistan from 2008
to 2012 exceeded the estimated historical marital expenses from
before 2008, some thirteen years earlier. Richard asserts that his
testimony alone should suffice for an initial showing of
dissipation. In Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ¶ 15, 996 P.2d 565,
the husband “presented the trial court with evidence” that
detailed how the wife had dissipated marital assets—exact
beginning and ending balances for eight bank accounts, the
marital expenses during the time in question, and specific checks
the wife wrote to herself—thus shifting the burden to the wife. Id.
¶ 13. But Richard, like the wife in Parker, only “testified in

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                            Clark v. Clark

conclusory and cryptic terms,” and thus “wholly failed to meet
[his] burden.” Id. ¶ 14.

¶29 Therefore, the district court was well within its discretion
to decide that Richard’s uncorroborated testimony about Susan’s
spending that occurred many years before either party
contemplated divorce 2 was insufficient evidence to meet his
initial burden of proving dissipation. Accordingly, the district
court did not err in its finding that Richard failed to meet his
burden of proof on the dissipation claim.

                        III. Marital Property

¶30 Richard presents three challenges to the district court’s
division of the marital property. First, Richard asserts he is
entitled to his premarital contribution to Mooring Drive. Second,
he alleges the Harley-Davidson he purchased during the
pendency of the divorce is his separate property. Third, Richard
claims the court should not have deducted from the marital estate
the $30,000 that he withdrew from the joint account in June 2019.

2. Susan invites us to join some other states in drawing a bright-
line rule concerning the timing of a dissipation claim and limit
pre-separation dissipation claims to those occurring (1) in
contemplation of divorce or separation or (2) when the marriage
is in serious jeopardy or undergoing an irretrievable breakdown.
Under our caselaw, the district court is empowered to consider
the “timing of the challenged actions in relation to the separation
and divorce” as one of several factors when determining
“whether a party should be held accountable for the dissipation
of marital assets.” Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 33,
440 P.3d 757 (cleaned up). We see no need to alter this approach.
Assessing timing as one factor among many provides the greatest
flexibility to the district court to consider all the circumstances in
a particular case, and we believe the district court is in the best
position to evaluate the importance of such evidence on a case-by-
case basis.

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                           Clark v. Clark

We affirm the district court’s decision on Richard’s first two
challenges and vacate the decision on the third, remanding the
matter for additional findings.

A.     Mooring Drive

¶31 Although the district court awarded Richard the equity in
Mooring Drive when it divided the marital estate, it did not also
award Richard any premarital equity in the property for three
reasons. First, it found that Richard “formally stipulated that Ross
Creek and Mooring Drive were marital property subject to
division in this divorce action.” Second, it found that “through a
series of refinances, [Richard] transferred equity from Ross Creek
to Mooring Drive, and paid expenses associated with both
properties with marital funds.” Third, it found that Richard
“formally conveyed the property to himself and [Susan] in 2003”
when he added Susan’s name to the title. Because we affirm the
district court’s decision not to award Richard any premarital
equity on the basis of the parties’ stipulation, we do not address
the other two reasons the district court relied upon.

¶32 Richard and Susan stipulated that “the Ross Creek and
Mooring Drive properties shall remain marital property and shall
be subject to equitable division in the parties’ divorce,
notwithstanding that the Ross Creek home and Mooring Drive
property will no longer be jointly titled.” Richard now claims that
despite the language of the stipulation, he “never agreed that he
should not be compensated for his premarital and separate
contributions to Mooring Drive before the property became
marital.” Furthermore, Richard argues, “nowhere in the
stipulation did he agree that he was waiving his premarital equity
in that property.”

¶33 Richard’s argument is flawed. “Parties to a divorce are
bound by the terms of their stipulated agreement.” McQuarrie v.
McQuarrie, 2021 UT 22, ¶ 18, 496 P.3d 44. And according to the
“ordinary contract principles” that govern “contracts between
spouses,” see Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 UT 7, ¶ 21, 227 P.3d 246 (cleaned

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                           Clark v. Clark

up), “if the language within the four corners of the contract is
unambiguous, the parties’ intentions are determined from the
plain meaning of the contractual language,” Green River Canal Co.
v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶ 17, 84 P.3d 1134 (cleaned up). See also Mind
& Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6, ¶ 24, 367
P.3d 994 (holding that “the best indication of the parties’ intent is
the ordinary meaning of the contract’s terms”); Ocean 18 LLC v.
Overage Refund Specialists LLC (In re Excess Proceeds from the
Foreclosure of 1107 Snowberry St.), 2020 UT App 54, ¶ 22, 474 P.3d
481 (holding that where the “contract is facially unambiguous, the
parties’ intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the
contractual language . . . without resort to parol evidence”
(cleaned up)).

¶34 Richard essentially argues that the district court erred
when it refused to go beyond the stipulation’s language and infer
his intention from what he omitted. But the district court was
correct when it interpreted the parties’ intentions by what the
plain language of the stipulation does say and not by what it does
not. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it abided by the parties’ stipulation and included Mooring Drive
as marital property, “subject to equitable division.”

B.     The Harley-Davidson

¶35 “Prior to the entry of a divorce decree, all property
acquired by parties to a marriage is marital property, owned
equally by each party.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 126, 456 P.3d
276. Thus, the presumption is that property acquired during the
pendency of a divorce is marital, not separate. Richard failed to
rebut this presumption regarding the Harley-Davidson
motorcycle he purchased because he failed to present evidence
that he used separate funds.

¶36 Richard argued that he purchased the Harley-Davidson
from separate, rather than marital, funds in his proposed findings

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                            Clark v. Clark

of fact and conclusions of law. 3 To be clear, Richard does not assert
that the Harley-Davidson is separate property because he
purchased it after the parties separated or after Susan filed for
divorce. Instead, he argues the only funds available to him to
purchase the motorcycle came from his “separate premarital
retirement income.” Richard’s argument fails for two reasons.
First, Richard did not present evidence to support his argument
that the funds he used to purchase the motorcycle came from
separate, not marital, funds. Instead, Richard essentially places
his burden on the district court by asserting, on appeal, that
“[t]here was no marital account identified by the district court
from which [Richard] could have made that purchase.” But
Richard, not the court, bears the burden of identifying where the
funds came from that he used to purchase the motorcycle.

¶37 Second, the district court found credibility problems with
Richard’s testimony about the Harley-Davidson, concluding that
Richard’s “credibility was lacking with regards to his motorcycle
purchase.” 4 A district court “is in the best position to judge the
credibility of witnesses and is free to disbelieve their testimony”
or “disregard such testimony if it finds the evidence self-serving
and not credible.” Ouk v. Ouk, 2015 UT App 104, ¶ 14, 348 P.3d
751 (cleaned up).

¶38 In sum, as “property acquired during [the] marriage,” the
Harley-Davidson is presumptively “marital property subject to
equitable distribution.” Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 26. Richard bore the
burden of proof to rebut the presumption that the funds he used
to purchase the Harley-Davidson were not marital, and he
presented no credible evidence to the district court to support that

3. Because the district court directed the parties to submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in lieu of closing
arguments, Richard’s argument was preserved for our review.

4. Indeed, in its oral ruling, the court stated that Richard “lied to
the Court about the purchase of the motorcycle.”

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                           Clark v. Clark

position. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
including the motorcycle in the marital estate.

C.     $30,000 Offset

¶39 Finally, Richard challenges the district court’s decision to
include in the marital estate the $30,000 he withdrew from the
joint account. The district court agreed with Susan that because
Richard had made a unilateral withdrawal from the joint account
during the pendency of the divorce, he should be held
accountable for that withdrawal. Richard, on the other hand,
claims he used the money for marital expenses, paying costs
associated with Mooring Drive. Susan argues the money could
also have been spent on personal items including travel and
motorcycle payments and accessories. “How the money was
spent, including whether [the] funds were used to pay legitimate
marital expenses or individual expenses,” Wadsworth v.
Wadsworth, 2022 UT App 28, ¶ 69, 507 P.3d 385 (cleaned up), cert.
denied, 525 P.3d 1259 (Utah 2022), is a critical question that needs
to be resolved.

¶40 Divorce cases often require district courts to make
numerous findings of fact. And generally speaking, “for findings
of fact to be adequate, they must show that the court’s judgment
or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the
evidence” and such findings “should be sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.” Armed
Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶ 28, 70 P.3d 35 (cleaned
up). Moreover, when it comes to the “unequal division of marital
property,” a district court must “memorialize[] in . . . detailed
findings the exceptional circumstances supporting the
distribution.” Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ¶ 27, 993 P.2d
887 (cleaned up). “Without adequate findings detailing why [one
spouse] should be entitled to such an unequal split of the marital
estate, we cannot affirm the court’s award.” Fischer v. Fischer, 2021
UT App 145, ¶ 29, 505 P.3d 56; see, e.g., Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2023

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                            Clark v. Clark

UT App 50, ¶ 57, 531 P.3d 225 (concluding that “we simply do not
have enough information” to rule on whether the funds were
marital or separate, “let alone to conclude that the district court
. . . erred”).

¶41 We face the same dilemma here. The district court made no
findings as to how Richard spent the $30,000. The written ruling
merely states, “In June 2019, [Richard] withdrew $30,000 from the
joint account without [Susan’s] knowledge or consent and
deposited it into his own personal account.” “We will not imply
any missing finding where there is a matrix of possible factual
findings and we cannot ascertain the trial court’s actual findings.”
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025–26 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Without
“adequate findings” on whether Richard used the funds for
marital expenses or not, “we cannot affirm,” nor properly review,
the court’s decision to offset the $30,000 against Richard in its
division of the marital estate. See Fischer, 2021 UT App 145, ¶ 29.
Therefore, we vacate this portion of the decision and remand the
matter to the district court for it to enter findings on how the funds
were spent.

                          CONCLUSION

¶42 The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
excluded Richard’s exhibits for failure to comply with rule
26(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court
also did not err in its conclusion that Richard failed to meet the
burden of proof for his dissipation claim nor did it abuse its
discretion in how it divided the marital estate with respect to
Mooring Drive and the Harley-Davidson. We vacate the district
court’s decision to offset the $30,000 against Richard when it
divided the marital estate and remand the matter for the district
court to enter additional findings and to alter its conclusion as
may be necessary.

 20210713-CA                     16               2023 UT App 111