Court Opinion

ID: 9865377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:33:17.771149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:37.319920
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hilliard,
dissenting.
The statute governing the offense charged, is ’35 C.S.A., chapter 89, section 17. The pertinent provision reads: “It shall be unlawful for any person: * * * (d) To sell, serve or distribute any malt, vinous or spirituous liquors by the drink for consumption on the premises on week days between the hours of 12:00 o’clock a.m. and 8:00 o’clock a.m.; provided, that in cities having a population of fifty thousand (50,000) or more, between the hours of 2:00 o’clock a.m. and 7:00 o’clock a.m., * * * ” The scene of the alleged offense was in Jefferson county, and it was stipulated that if it occurred at all, it was before 2:00 o’clock a.m. In short, what was an offense in Jefferson county, would not have been an offense had it occurred across the imaginary line in the City and County of Denver.
While other errors are assigned, and I think some of them have merit, I confine my discussion to the claim that inasmuch as the law is not of uniform application throughout the state, it is unconstitutional, for, that, it is special legislation and in contravention of section 25, article Y, the Constitution. The controlling legal philosophy is well stated in Allen v. Colorado Springs, 101 Colo. 498, 75 P. (2d) 141; City of Denver v. Bach, 26 *278Colo. 530, 58 Pac. 1089; and In Re Senate Bill No. 293, 21 Colo. 38, 39 Pac. 522. The precise question was considered by the Supreme Court of Florida, in State ex rel. v. Coleman, 148 Fla. 155, 3 So. (2d) 802, where defendants in similar situation were discharged in a proceeding in habeas corpus. I commend the opinion of that distinguished tribunal.
The legislative enactment involved in this inquiry, necessarily of state-wide concern, but which, in effect, provides that a sale of liquor at a given hour in Jefferson county, shall constitute a punishable crime, while a like sale at the same hour in the City and County of Denver, or Pueblo, or Colorado Springs, shall not be a punishable crime, is, as I am convinced, violative of the constitutional inhibition that, “The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws * * *, where a general law can be made applicable,” and, as well, of every canon of common-law justice. It is consistent with constitutional safeguards, as I think, to construe the portion of the law of greatest license, or of least severity, as constituting the general act, and only in that regard and application may it be regarded as constitutional.
Mr. Justice Goudy concurs in this opinion.