Court Opinion

ID: 9632286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:08:36.454077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:52.504782
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice.
The primary issue to be resolved in this case is whether an encounter involving a police officer and Kelly J. Collins (Collins) amounted to a seizure of Collins, thus implicating his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Art. 1, § 4 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming.1 Collateral *690issues are presented including claims there was no factual basis to support the crime of burglary as defined in the statute; the court improperly refused to give the jury an instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal entry; the court improperly refused to instruct the jury on a definition of reasonable doubt; and the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a conviction of burglary. In addition, the State suggests an issue as to whether the jury instructions correctly stated the elements of the crime of burglary. We hold that not every encounter between police officers and citizens amounts to a seizure of the person of the citizen, thus implicating constitutional rights, and we conclude that none of the other claims by Collins or the suggestion by the State constitutes error requiring reversal. The judgment and sentence of the trial court is affirmed.
Collins sets forth these issues in his Brief of Appellant:
I. Did the trial court err when it failed to dismiss the charge against Appellant because there was no factual basis to support the crime of burglary as defined by Wyoming Statute § 6-3-301(a)?
II. Did the trial court err when it failed to suppress evidence obtained when Appellant was detained without reasonable suspicion?
III. Did the trial court err by refusing to give an instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminal entry?
IV. Did the trial court err by refusing to instruct the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt?
V. Was the evidence presented sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction of burglary?
In its Brief of Appellee, the State says the issues should be stated in this way:
I. Does the Wyoming burglary statute, § 6-3-301(a), make unlawful the unauthorized entry of a vehicle with intent to commit larceny?
II. Did the trial court correctly deny Appellant’s motion to suppress statements made by Appellant and items taken from Appellant’s person?
III. Did the trial court correctly refuse to give the lesser included offense instruction on criminal entry?
IV. Did the trial court correctly refuse to instruct the jury on a definition of reasonable doubt?
V. Was sufficient evidence presented to the jury to sustain Appellant’s conviction of burglary?
VI. Was the jury properly instructed on the elements of the crime of burglary?
On May 11, 1991, at approximately 11:20 P.M., a citizen and his wife, at their home in Cheyenne, received a telephone call from a neighbor who told them he had seen someone prowling around their car. The citizen telephoned the police, and an officer responded to the call. The officer learned from the citizen that the neighbor had described a male in dark clothing as having been observed prowling around the car, and the citizen also advised that this person had gone south on foot from the site of the reported prowling at 31st Street and Crib-bon Avenue. The officer began to look around the area and, in a short while, observed a darkly-clothed figure, who later was identified as Collins, walking a few blocks south of the citizen’s residence. As the officer approached Collins, he noticed a flashlight in Collins’ right back pocket. The officer also observed that Collins appeared nervous and was covered with sweat although the temperature that night was in the lower 40-degree range. The officer then saw that Collins had an object concealed in the left sleeve of his jean jacket, and the officer could see a handle sticking out of the sleeve. The officer was concerned the object in the jacket sleeve might be a weapon. Furthermore, the officer saw several cassettes in Collins’ pockets, but he did not see a cassette player.
While the first officer was talking to Collins, a second officer arrived, and both officers noticed that Collins was pushing something down into his left trousers pocket. When Collins was asked what was in his pocket, he told them “[njothing.” The first officer then patted down the outside *691of Collins’ pocket and felt a hard square-shaped object. He asked Collins to remove the object from his pocket, and Collins produced a cassette tape, an object different from the one the officer had felt when he patted Collins’ pocket. Collins then produced an ammunition dispenser and, at that time, the second officer noticed a prescription bottle in Collins’ left jacket pocket. A closer inspection of the prescription bottle disclosed it had been issued to a male person who was not Collins.
Once Collins produced the loaded ammunition dispenser, the second officer wondered if he might have a pistol to go with the ammunition. That officer then asked Collins to empty his pockets onto the hood of the police car. Collins produced a number of items including fourteen cassette tapes, two prescription bottles, which had the name of a female person on one bottle and the name of a male person other than Collins on the second bottle; a Marlboro stopwatch; a flashlight; a Bic lighter; an umbrella; a dial-a-shell .22 caliber cartridge dispenser, a yellow leather glove; and a man’s wallet. Some of these items later were identified by the female person as having come from her car which was parked in the vicinity of the citizen’s residence on the evening in question. The citizen also discovered an umbrella was missing from his vehicle, and he identified as his umbrella the one found on Collins by the two officers.
When Collins was asked how he acquired these objects, he first said they were given to him by a friend. Then he changed that story and explained he found them in an alley. During the investigation, it began to rain, and the second officer asked Collins to accompany him to the police station so they would be out of the rain. Collins agreed to go with the officer, and he also agreed to show him the alley in which he claimed to have found the items. Collins pointed out an alleyway a few blocks from the citizen’s residence, but a careful search of the alley by the police officer revealed no additional items.
Collins then was arrested. He was charged with, and convicted by a jury of, burglary in violation of Wyo.Stat. § 6-3-301(a) (1988).2 Upon conviction, Collins was sentenced to a term of not less than eighteen, nor more than thirty-six, months in the state penitentiary. This appeal is taken from the judgment and sentence imposed by the trial court.
The most significant issue in this case is whether the initial contact with Collins was a seizure of his person implicating his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or under the parallel provision of the Wyoming Constitution. The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the most cherished rights provided by both the federal and state constitutions. A comparison of the two constitutional provisions, quoted herein at n. 1, discloses substantial identity except that the Constitution of the State of Wyoming requires an affidavit to support the issuance of a warrant. Our concern in this case is to determine whether the fundamental right established by these constitutional provisions was implicated by the initial contact of Collins by the police officers.
In our view, this area of the law is persuasively summarized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir.1982):
We conclude, therefore, that Supreme Court holdings sculpt out, at least theoretically, three tiers of police-citizen encounters: communication between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention and therefore without the compass of the Fourth Amendment, brief “seizures” that must be supported by reasonable suspicion, and full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause. See, eg., United States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir.1981); United *692States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1041 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S.Ct. 2998, 64 L.Ed.2d 861 (1980).
In Berry, the court stated that the analysis begins with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), in which the Supreme Court analyzed the reasonableness of a seizure of an individual followed by a pat down and held that such a stop, though brief and short of a full-scale arrest, came within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. In Terry, the Supreme Court then balanced the interest of the government against the nature of the intrusion upon the individual and ruled that, in order to accomplish a stop followed by the pat down, “reasonable suspicion” was sufficient. The opinion of the court in Berry pointed out that subsequent cases, including Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), have extended the Terry doctrine to stops made merely for investigatory purposes. The court in Berry, 670 F.2d at 590, also said, however:
Although the Supreme Court has extended the doctrine it articulated in Terry to investigative seizures, it has not necessarily concluded that all contact between citizens and police in the course of an investigation is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s rigors. The Court has repeatedly stated that the Fourth Amendment neither does, nor should, inhibit voluntary interaction between police and citizens.
The ultimate holding in Berry, after a plethora of somewhat confusing and inconsistent precedents was discussed, with the notation that each case is factually specific and perhaps unique, was that the initial stop of Berry did not implicate any Fourth Amendment concerns. The Fifth Circuit Court ruled additional events in the totality of the circumstances had led to the presence of reasonable suspicion prior to any seizure, and further developments justified probable cause for an arrest. A significant body of federal law at all levels acknowledges and adopts, in different ways, the three-tier philosophy recognized in Berry3 Similarly, a number of states have adopted this analysis and applied it in the same way as the federal courts.4
*693In accepting this approach, one of the leading texts on search and seizure articulates the following theory:
What are needed and appropriate in this context are “selective investigative procedures” whereby seizures are made only of those whom there exists a “reasonable possibility” of their being the robber.
The central question, then, is what combinations of facts and circumstances will suffice to establish this reasonable possibility. No litmus paper test is available to resolve this issue, but yet it is possible to identify several factors which are appropriately taken into account in making this judgment. Generally, it may be said that consideration may properly be given to: (1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the vehicle in which he fled; (2) the size of the area in which the offender might be found, as indicated by such facts as the elapsed time since the crime occurred; (3) the number of persons about in that area; (4) the known or probable direction of the offender’s flight; (5) observed activity by the particular person stopped; and (6) knowledge or suspicion that the person or vehicle stopped has been involved in other criminality of the type presently under investigation.
3 Wayne R. LaFave, SEARCH and SeizuRE § 9.3(d) at 461 (1987).
An analysis of these factors as they appear in this case illustrates Collins’ constitutional rights were not infringed. The first factor relates to the particularity of the description given to the police officer, that the prowler was a teenager, of average size, possibly a male, in dark clothing. The question raised is the adequacy of this description to afford a sufficient basis for “selective investigative procedures.” The time was after 11:20 P.M.; the place was a residential street in Cheyenne; and Collins was the only person observed by police officers in the area. Collins was male, twenty-nine years old, and he was wearing dark clothing. Under these circumstances, an adequate description was available to the police officers as a sufficient basis to contact Collins for investigatory purposes. Authorities cited previously demonstrate the contact would have been appropriate in this instance without any description.
The second factor in the test is the size of the area. The car prowling occurred at 1222 West 31st Street, and the officers were advised that the prowler walked south on Cribbon Avenue. The officers encountered Collins some three and a half blocks away from the alleged burglary. The fact Collins was walking away from the site of the reported offense and had traveled a little more than three blocks leads to a conclusion the initial contact occurred within the range of possible flight.
A third factor is the number of people in the area. As illustrative of this factor, the text author cites People v. Juarez, 35 Cal. App.3d 631, 110 Cal.Rptr. 865 (1973), in which the court held that it was lawful to stop a person walking down the street near a recently-reported burglary when he “ ‘was the only pedestrian in the vicinity of the burglary that had occurred 10 minutes before.’ ” 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(d) 470.5 Collins was the only person the officers observed in the vicinity of the reported car prowling.
*694The fourth factor is the known or probable direction of the offender’s flight. When the police officers arrived at the citizen’s residence, they were informed the suspect had gone south on Cribbon Avenue. Using that information, the police officers drove about a block and a half south and a block and a half east where they encountered Collins. He was within three and a half blocks of the site of the reported burglary. Taking account of the fact he was walking away from the area of the citizens’ residence where the burglary had taken place together with the fact that he had covered approximately three blocks on foot supports the conclusion that the contact in this case occurred within the range of possible flight.
The next factor, number five, is the observed conduct of the person contacted. The first officer explained he stopped Collins because he was in the area; he was out at that time of the night; he was dressed in dark clothes; and he did not see anyone else in the area. These facts made it appropriate for him to contact Collins in the course of his investigation of the report of a car prowler. The officer then noticed Collins’ forehead was covered with sweat, and he appeared nervous when the officer called to him. Upon closer observation, the officer noted Collins had something stuck up “his left sleeve jacket of his coat.” This additional information made it reasonable for the officer to pursue the encounter with questions of Collins, even though the sixth factor, knowledge or suspicion that the person was involved in other criminality on an earlier occasion, has no application to this case.
In summary, the following factors are encompassed in the circumstances in this case. First, it was after 11:20 P.M.; second, a reported burglary of a vehicle had just taken place and been reported; third, within three and a half blocks of the scene of that reported burglary, police officers observed a male, dressed in dark clothing, walking away from the scene going in the direction reported; fourth, the male matched a description furnished by an observer of the burglary; and fifth, he was the only person observed in the area. Upon contacting the individual, the officers also noted his forehead was covered with sweat, and he had something stuck in the left sleeve of his coat. These several factors comprised the particular and objective basis for the initial contact with Collins as the officers pursued their investigation of possible criminal activity.
A strong line of authority in California supports our resolution of this case. The Supreme Court of California has stated their rule in this way:
It is well established that a temporary detention may be justified by circumstances falling short of probable cause to arrest a suspect. (People v. Mickelson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 448, 450, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658.) In amplification of this principle we recently explained, “[a] police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, * * * when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer’s duties. [Citations.] The good faith suspicion which warrants an officer’s detention of a person for investigative reasons is necessarily of a lesser standard than that required to effect an arrest. [Citation.] Where there is a rational belief of criminal activity with which the suspect is connected, a detention for reasonable investigative procedures infringes no constitutional restraint. [Citation.]” (People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91, 115 Cal.Rptr. 225, 228, 524 P.2d 353, 358; see People v. Gale (1973) 9 Cal.3d 788, 797-798, 108 Cal.Rptr. 852, 511 P.2d 1204; Irwin v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 423, 426-427, 82 Cal.Rptr. 484, 462 P.2d 12.) People v. Harris, 15 Cal.3d 384, 124 Cal. Rptr. 536, 538-39, 540 P.2d 632, 634-35 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1664, 48 L.Ed.2d 175 (1976).
Other cases from California consistently apply this articulation of the rule. E.g., People v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 85 Cal.App.3d 1020, 149 Cal.Rptr. 349 (1978); People v. Allen, 50 Cal.App.3d 896, 123 Cal.Rptr. 80 (1975); Juarez, 110 Cal.Rptr. 865. This reasoning has been *695accepted in Minnesota and New Mexico. Wold v. State, 430 N.W.2d 171 (Minn.1988); Appelgate v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106 (Minn.1987); State v. Watley, 109 N.M. 619, 788 P.2d 375 (App.1989), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 563, 787 P.2d 1246 (1990).
We choose to adopt the Berry analysis and, in applying it to the facts of this case, we hold police officers need neither reasonable suspicion, nor probable cause, to arrest in order to make contact with a citizen. The first officer and, later, the second officer initially contacted Collins in a first tier encounter, which does not implicate Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment was not implicated until reasonable suspicion justified his seizure. Any holding to the contrary would require our police officers to simply shrug their shoulders and allow crimes to occur or, in an instance like this, allow a suspect to flee. That result would not be compatible with previous cases from this court, particularly those in which we have stated that, in such situations, the police may make an investigatory stop. See Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo.1985).
After the first tier encounter, the reasonable suspicion, which justified detaining Collins for investigation, developed quickly. The investigation led rather promptly to probable cause for his arrest. Those various stages can, and it would appear often do, occur rapidly. For example, we cite Wright v. State, 418 So.2d 1087 (Fla.App. 1 Dist.1982), review denied, 426 So.2d 29 (Fla.1983), in which the court adopted the three-tier analysis of Berry for initial police encounters with citizens. The court, in fact, held it need not confront the validity of the initial contact because, in its view, the reasonable suspicion was present to stop Wright. Still, it held the initial contact, based on an anonymous tip followed by surveillance of the area by a trained detective, was activity within the first tier. Similarly, in Grant v. State, 55 Md.App. 1, 461 A.2d 524 (1983), cert. granted, 466 A.2d 39 (Md.1983), cert. dismissed, 299 Md. 309, 473 A.2d 455 (1984), the court approved an initial contact by an officer with the defendant and noted that, from the conversation, the answers raised an articu-lable suspicion which soon ripened into probable cause, eventually leading to a warrantless seizure of suitcases containing cocaine. The court there said:
The investigative behavior in this case was a model of both thoroughness and restraint. Had they done other than what they did, the police would have been derelict and the scourge upon our society that is the drug traffic would have gone on unabated. Grant, 461 A.2d at 525.
These two cases resemble this case, and it is clear the continuum described in Berry and the other cases following it is precisely what occurred with Collins.
Since we hold there was no seizure of Collins in violation of his constitutional rights, we then turn to the other issues he asserts in this appeal. The first of those is his claim that there was no factual basis to support the conviction of burglary which is coupled with his fifth issue relating to a claim of insufficient evidence to sustain the burglary conviction. Collins contends the evidence presented does not support a conviction for burglary under Wyo.Stat. § 6-3-301(a). He argues that the language of the statute requires a vehicle to be an “occupied vehicle” in order to be the subject of a burglary. We agree with the State, however, that the proper construction of the Wyoming statutory scheme includes unauthorized entry into vehicles with intent to commit larceny or felony therein, without regard to whether or not the vehicle is occupied.
More precisely, Collins’ argument is that, since no comma is present in the statutory language following the word “structure,” the legislature intended the word “occupied” to modify both “structure” and “vehicle.” Collins’ argument does not account for the definition of “occupied structure” found in Wyo.Stat. § 6-l-104(a)(v) (1988) (emphasis added):
“Occupied structure” means a structure or vehicle whether or not a person is actually present:
*696(A) Where any person lives or carries on business or other calling;
(B) Where people assemble for purposes of business, government, education, religion, entertainment or public transportation;
(C) Which is used for overnight accommodation of persons; or
(D) In which a person may reasonably be expected to be present.
Collins’ argument is that it is impossible to burglarize a vehicle, if it is not occupied. This contention completely eliminates the thrust of the definition of “occupied structure” as alluding to a vehicle, “whether or not a person is actually present,” but “[i]n which a person may reasonably be expected to be present.” In our judgment, Collins’ argument does not fit the requirement that statutes are to be construed in a way that gives meaning to all of the language and, further, it does not account for the very real difficulty one might encounter in entering a vehicle when a person actually is present. We are satisfied the legislature did not intend the word “occupied” to modify yehicle as it appears in the statute. The word “vehicle” stands alone. We also agree with the argument of the State that the legislature does not routinely invoke commas between the last two items in a series, as evidenced by other provisions in the Wyoming Criminal Code. Furthermore, we note that, in Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299 (Wyo.1991), we affirmed a conviction of burglary of two automobiles. Consistently, with that opinion, we hold that the crime of burglary as defined by Wyo.Stat. § 6-3-301(a) can be committed by the unauthorized entry of any vehicle, whether a person is present or not, with the intent to commit larceny therein.
With respect to Collins’ challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of burglary, we invoke our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence:
“ ‘[T]his court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence and appropriate inferences in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo.1991) (quoting Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo.1989)).
Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758, 760 (Wyo.1992).
The elements of the crime of burglary required the jury to find Collins guilty if the State proved that, in Laramie County, Collins entered the vehicle without authority and with intent to commit larceny. The primary thrust of the challenge by Collins is the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the element of entry without authority. Collins argues that the State failed to proved this element because trial testimony concerned only permission to take tapes without regard to permission to enter the vehicle.
We quote a colloquy from the record between the prosecutor and one of the victims, who had possession of the vehicle when Collins took certain items from it:
Q. Okay. Did anyone have any permission to go into that car and remove these tapes from that vehicle?
A. No.
In the same vein, the prosecutor also asked the owner of the vehicle the following question:
Q. Did anyone have any consent to take anything from your vehicle?
A. No.
The jury heard this testimony and clearly could infer from it that no one had permission to enter the vehicle. We hold the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude the crime of burglary had been established.
Certainly, there is no question Collins entered the vehicle. That is established by his possession of cassette tapes, prescription bottles bearing the names of the owner and the person who had possession of the vehicle, a flashlight, a Bic lighter, and a Marlboro stopwatch when he was contacted by the officers on the night of the alleged burglary. These were the same items reported missing from the car by the owner and the person in possession. With respect to intent to commit the crime of larceny at the time of entry, that element was not a *697disputed issue at trial. Collins simply denied entering the vehicle. The rationale found in Jennings is controlling on this issue:
“A reasonable mind recognizes that people do not usually break into and enter the building [or vehicle] of another under the shroud of darkness with innocent intent and that the most usual intent is to steal.” Minch [v. State] 593 P.2d [590] at 593 [ (Wyo.1979) ]. The same authority also stands for the proposition that direct evidence is not necessary to prove intent to steal since “[p]roof of intent is not a precise process.” Mirich, 593 P.2d at 593. The quantum of proof from which a jury is permitted to draw the required inference of intent to steal is dependent upon the totality of the circumstances. Mirich. Jennings, 806 P.2d at 1303.
Collins was found in possession of property that had been stolen. It certainly is permissible for a jury to infer from possession of stolen property that the person obtained it from a vehicle by entering it with intent to steal. We have no difficulty in concluding there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Collins guilty of burglary. The possession by Collins of the identical property reported missing from the vehicle within a short time after the report of prowling, together with the testimony of the victims that no one had been given permission to enter the vehicle or take anything from it, justifies the conclusion of the jury that Collins had the specific intent to deprive those people of their property and commit larceny when he unlawfully entered the vehicle.
In a second issue related to his apprehension, Collins contends there was no reasonable suspicion to detain him. In light of the analysis we have adopted concerning the initial contact, during which reasonable suspicion developed resulting in the seizure of the property and the ultimate arrest of Collins, we address this issue only briefly. Promptly after the initial contact, the officers reached a level of reasonable suspicion to justify a stop in accordance with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States said:
Each ease of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts. We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, wherein the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or other’s safety, he is entitled to for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
In Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682, 683 (Wyo. 1982), we adopted the following standard for determining the presence of reasonable suspicion to stop:
We must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine what cause is sufficient to allow law enforcement officers to stop a person. Based upon the whole picture, the detaining officers must have a particular and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).
In this case, the record demonstrates that, when the officers stopped Collins and questioned him, they quickly acquired the reasonable suspicion to detain him. We note the following articulable factors that support our determination: the first officer observed Collins was nervous and sweating, although it was a cool evening; Collins had some object stuck up his left sleeve with the handle sticking out; his jacket pockets were bulging; and he had a prescription bottle in his left pocket that had a name other than his on it. After that, both officers observed Collins shoving something into his left trouser pocket, and the frisk that followed, which was valid under Terry because the police officers then had *698a reasonable suspicion Collins might be armed, disclosed the other items that were seized. The first officer testified at trial about his belief that it was possible for the object concealed in Collins’ sleeve to have been a weapon. The totality of these circumstances supports reasonable suspicion and justifies the denial by the trial court of the motion to suppress the evidence and to suppress Collins’ statements.
In his third issue, Collins claims there was error on the part of the trial court in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal entry. Wyo.Stat. § 6-3-302 (1988) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A person is guilty of criminal entry if, without authority, he knowingly enters a building, occupied structure, vehicle or cargo portion of a truck or trailer, or a separately secured or occupied portion of those enclosures.
The difference between the crime of burglary and the crime of criminal entry is the specific intent to commit larceny or a felony, which is an element of the crime of burglary. Collins did not object to the refusal of the trial court to give the requested lesser included offense instruction and, therefore, this claim must be analyzed under the doctrine of plain error.
The standard required for review under the plain error analysis is well established:
First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially prejudiced.
Craney v. State, 798 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Wyo.1990) (citations omitted). Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594 (Wyo.1993); Derksen v. State, 845 P.2d 1383 (Wyo.1993); Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504 (Wyo.1977).
Our rule with respect to the requirement for instruction on a lesser included offense is that it must be given when:
(1) a proper request is made; (2) the elements of the lesser included offense are identical to some of the elements of the greater offense; (3) there is some evidence that would justify conviction of the lesser included offense; (4) the proof on the element, or elements, differentiating the two crimes is sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included offense; and (5) mutuality exists such that the lesser included offense charge can be demanded by either the prosecution or the defense. Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379, 383-84 (Wyo.1989).
Application of these criteria to the record in this case supports our holding that the trial court properly refused to give the instruction.
As we have noted earlier, there was no factual dispute as to whether Collins entered the vehicle, with or without the intent to commit larceny or felony. Collins’ theory of the case was that he never entered the vehicle at all. If sufficient evidence is not present from which a reasonable juror could find a defendant guilty of the lesser included offense, the instruction should not be given. Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244 (Wyo.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 270, 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986). Compare Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo.1988) (holding under the facts of that case, since the element which distinguished the two crimes, the age of the victim, was not disputed at trial, it was proper for the trial court to refuse to give the jury instruction on the lesser included offense of fourth degree sexual assault), and Warren v. State, 835 P.2d 304 (Wyo. 1992) (holding under the facts of that case, since no evidence was offered to prove that a shoe was not a deadly weapon, it was proper for the trial court to refuse to offer a lesser included offense instruction, a theory of the case instruction on simple battery). There was no error in this instance. The jury would have had to disregard completely the only evidence of the intent to commit larceny or a felony, which was the possession of the stolen property, in order to justify the conviction under the claimed lesser included offense instruction.
*699Collins also claims error with respect to the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt. We have held:
We said as early as 1913 that it is not error to refuse to give a definition instruction, and as late as 1971 (Alcala case) that trial courts would be well advised to avoid such an instruction. The phrase “reasonable doubt” is self-explanatory and definitions do not clarify its meaning but rather tend to confuse the jury. Instructions defining it are unnecessary and should not be given. Bentley v. State, 502 P.2d 203, 207 (Wyo.1972).
We made this proposition even more precise some two years later when we reversed a conviction relating to a confusing instruction defining reasonable doubt. We then said:
Our disposition of this case should make it clear that hereafter our court will consider it reversible error to give a confusing instruction defining reasonable doubt. Cosco v. State, 521 P.2d 1345, 1346 (Wyo.1974).
The trial court faced reversal if it gave the instruction on the definition in light of Cos-co. We hold the decision to withhold that instruction was not erroneous, but was a correct ruling by the trial court based upon Wyoming precedent.
The State raises a collateral issue of significant import. The elements instruction, Jury Instruction No. 10, did not correctly state the elements of the offense:
1. The crime occurred within the County of Laramie on or about the date of May 11, 1991; and
2. That the defendant intentionally entered;
3. A vehicle;
4. Without authority, and;
5. Did steal a flashlight, a Bic lighter, a stop watch and cassette tapes.
If you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.
This instruction omitted the necessary element of intent as a part of the instruction and substituted therefor the actual theft of property. This instruction is incorrect, and its import merits discussion, even though Collins did not assert this error. Collins concedes Instruction No. 10 does not include the element of intent for the crime of burglary. He contends it was plain error, and he was materially prejudiced in violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial. If the State had not raised this matter in its briefing, it is likely Collins would not have asserted it. We commend the State for bringing the matter to the attention of the court in the interests of justice; however, we do not find plain error.
The State argues any potential error is cured because the necessary elements were set forth in Instruction No. 9. Instruction No. 9 indeed does set forth all of the essential elements of the crime of burglary with the requirement that the prosecution establish all of the material allegations of the Information beyond a reasonable doubt. We accept the State’s position, but we caution members of the bar as well as our trial courts that an instruction such as this is a misstatement of the law and, if Collins had objected at trial, we might have been required to reverse. Since this irregularity was not noted, nor objected to at trial, nor briefed by Collins on appeal, it essentially is waived, and we apply the plain error doctrine to hold no error is present in this case.
In this regard, we note that, in addition to the requirement of instruction No. 9 that the State prove Collins unlawfully and felo-niously entered a 1984 Mercury Capri without authority and with intent to commit larceny or felony therein beyond a reasonable doubt, Instruction No. 12 sets forth the definition of specific intent:
The crime charged in this case is a serious crime which requires proof of specific intent before Kelly Collins can be convicted. Specific intent, as the term implies, means more than the general *700intent to commit the act. To establish specific intent the state must prove that the defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, specifically intending to violate the law. Such intent may be determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
An act or a failure to act is “knowingly” done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.
Our general principles relating to the construction of jury instructions is well known. The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the general principles of law applicable to the case. Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214 (Wyo.1982). Instructions must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not be singled out and considered in isolation. Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471 (Wyo.1983); Scheikofsky v. State, 636 P.2d 1107 (Wyo.1981). Furthermore, before a conviction will be reversed because of an incorrect instruction, prejudice to the defendant must be shown to have occurred. Craney v. State, 798 P.2d 1202; Ballinger v. State, 437 P.2d 305 (Wyo.1968). In addition, in Wyoming, an instruction which is erroneous becomes the law of the case unless a plain or fundamental error can be demonstrated. Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300 (Wyo.1988), followed in Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91 (Wyo.1988), appeal after remand, 810 P.2d 93 (Wyo.1991).
When Instructions 9, 10, and 12 are read together, they convey to the jury a requirement that Collins must have had the intent to commit larceny or felony at the time he entered the vehicle. We are not persuaded the jury was misled in this case by the erroneous instruction or that Collins experienced any prejudice. He did not raise the element of intent at trial as part of his defense, and there is nothing in the record to suggest he entered the vehicle without the intent to commit larceny. In closing argument, counsel for Collins stated, “I would submit the State has failed to prove this case beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Collins entered unlawfully this vehicle or any vehicle with an intent to deprive the owner of his property.” His claim of prejudice in this regard has a hollow ring. Collins did not object to this instruction at trial, and he has not demonstrated plain error in accordance with former Wyo. R.Crim.P. 49(b) (now Wyo.R.Crim.P. 52(b), effective March 24, 1992). See Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888 (Wyo.1983).
Collins’ conviction and the judgment and sentence are affirmed in all respects.

. U.S. Const, amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Wyo. Const. Art. 1, § 4 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, *690particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized.

. Wyo.Stat. § 6-3-301(a) (1988) provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein.

.Florida v. Bostick, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), on remand, 593 So.2d 494 (Fla.1992); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984), on remand, 462 So.2d 69 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1985); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984); League of United Latin American Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 923 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Tavolacci, 895 F.2d 1423 (D.C.Cir.1990); United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320 (4th Cir.1989); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928, 109 S.Ct. 314, 102 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988); United States v. Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Berryman, 717 F.2d 651 (1st Cir.1983), on reh'g, 717 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1594, 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984), reh’g denied, 466 U.S. 994, 104 S.Ct. 2376, 80 L.Ed.2d 848 (1984); United States v. Black, 675 F.2d 129 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068, 103 S.Ct. 1520, 75 L.Ed.2d 945 (1983); United States v. Steele, 782 F.Supp. 1301 (S.D.Ind.1992), judgment aff’d, 989 F.2d 502 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Roser, 724 F.Supp. 426 (E.D.La.1989); Floyd v. United States, 677 F.Supp. 1083 (D.Colo.1987), rev’d on other grounds, 860 F.2d 999 (10th Cir.1988); United States v. Galindo-Hernandez, 674 F.Supp. 979 (E.D.N.Y.1987); United States v. Pirelli, 650 F.Supp. 1254 (D.Mass.1986); United States v. Zapata, 647 F.Supp. 15 (S.D.Fla.1986); United States v. Moore, 625 F.Supp. 305 (W.D.N.C. 1985).

.Ex Parte Betterton, 527 So.2d 747 (Ala.1988); People v. Harris, 15 Cal.3d 384, 124 Cal.Rptr. 536, 540 P.2d 632 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1664, 48 L.Ed.2d 175 (1976); Wright v. State, 418 So.2d 1087 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1982), review denied, 426 So.2d 29 (Fla.1983); Aguero v. State, 169 Ga.App. 462, 313 S.E.2d 735 (1984); People v. Murray, 137 Ill.2d 382, 148 Ill.Dec. 7, 560 N.E.2d 309 (1990); Wold v. State, 430 N.W.2d 171 (Minn.1988); Appelgate v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 1987); State v. Perkerol, 77 N.C.App. 292, 335 S.E.2d 60 (1985), review denied, 315 N.C. 595, 341 S.E.2d 36 (1986); State v. Watley, 109 N.M. 619, 788 P.2d 375 (App.1989), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 563, 787 P.2d 1246 (1990); State v. Lopez, 109 N.M. 169, 783 P.2d 479 (App.1989); Mitchell v. State, 831 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.App.-Houston (1 Dist.) 1992); State v. Chisholm, 39 Wash.App. 864, 696 P.2d 41 (1985); Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91 (Wyo.1988), appeal after remand, 810 *693P.2d 93 (Wyo.1991); Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300 (Wyo.1988); Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888 (Wyo.1983). See Grant v. State, 55 Md.App. 1, 461 A.2d 524 (1983), cert. granted, 466 A.2d 39 (Md.1983), cert. dismissed, 299 Md. 309, 473 A.2d 455 (1984).

. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(d) 470-71, n. 273, which also cites the following cases:
See also People v. Herron, 89 Ill.App.3d 1048, 45 Ill.Dec. 641, 412 N.E.2d 1365 (1980) (no description of suspect, stop within minutes of robbery and within one and a half blocks, it after midnight “and there was no one else around” and defendant walking away from store robbed); State v. Fernandez, 691 S.W.2d 267 (Mo.1985) (where 1 a.m. phone call that armed persons at certain intersection, police could detain those in car there, as they [were] the only persons in the area); State v. Maya, 126 N.H. 590, 493 A.2d 1139 (1985) (officers without description of man who had burglarized jewelry store could stop defendant at 1 a.m. near scene 15 minutes later, as street virtually deserted).