Court Opinion

ID: 9645894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:39:17.515631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:32.677965
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
It is not correct to say that the Eastland Court of Appeals “improperly sustained appellant’s Speedy Trial Act claims on appeal,” as the majority does. The Eastland Court properly entertained appellant’s single ground of error complaining that the trial court had erred in refusing to grant his motion to dismiss in that the State was not ready for trial within the requisite period of time. Upon consideration of that complaint the Eastland Court found from the record that the State had not ever declared it was ready within that period, held that it had thus failed to comply with the Act and, therefore, reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the prosecution dismissed.
The decision of the Eastland Court disposed on the only ground properly presented to it. Constitutionality of the Act was never an issue in the case in the trial court or in the Eastland Court. The State failed to contest the sole reason for the decision or to challenge constitutionality of the Act by motion for rehearing or otherwise before the Eastland Court. Thus there is nothing in its decision for this Court to review. Prince v. State, (Tex.Cr.App. No. 763-82, delivered March 4, 1987).1
The general rule stated in the majority opinion is not without exceptions. 12 Tex. Jur.3d 548-549, Constitutional Law § 41. One is that equitable rights may be acquired before declaration of unconstitutionality is made such that they are not lost thereafter. For example, a judgment rendered under an unconstitutional statute nevertheless retains its binding effect. Ibid; 48 Tex.Jur.3d 399, Judgments § 351, citing King v. King, 291 S.W. 645 (Tex.Civ. App.—San Antonio 1927) writ dismissed w.o.j., viz:
“It is true and well settled by authority that an unconstitutional act confers no right, imposes no duty, and affords no protection [citations omitted]; but that is not the question here. The question here is that there is a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction in favor of appel-lee against appellant settling all the issues in that case that are involved here, unreversed and still in force. It makes no difference whether the court committed an error of law in its ruling or not that would merely go to the error of the court, subject to correction on appeal, and for that matter voidable, but not void ab initio, so as to render it assailable as a void judgment in a collateral attack.”
Id., at 648; see also Sharber v. Florence, 131 Tex. 341, 115 S.W.2d 604 (1938).
The exception is not reserved alone for judgments. “While as a general rule a law held unconstitutional is void from the beginning and was never valid and enforceable at any time, nevertheless those obeying the law before its invalidity was determined are not to be punished, but on the contrary their rights are to be protected.” Wichita County v. Robinson, 155 Tex. 1, 276 S.W.2d 509 (1955) (On Motion for Rehearing, at 515). “Equitable rights may be acquired though the statute is thereafter declared unconstitutional, [citations omitted].” Id., at 516. Thus, though the Supreme Court declared an act unconstitutional, it would be inequitable under the circumstances presented to require a tax collector paid compensation under the void act to repay that amount to Wichita County. Ibid.
Resort may be had to benefits of a statute until such time as it is declared uncon*512stitutional. Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, at 76 (CA5 1961).
The judgment of the Eastland Court of Appeals was correct when rendered, and this Court is not authorized to disturb it. Jefferson v. State, 751 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.Cr. App.1988) (Clinton, J., joining dissenting opinion by Duncan, J.). Accordingly, the petition for discretionary review should be dismissed.
I respectfully dissent.

. Disposition of this cause is not controlled by Robinson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 795, (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Robinson was before this Court on direct appeal and thus our discretionary review was not implicated. Moreover, unlike Robinson appellant has obtained a judgment in his favor from the court of appeals, which in the circumstances of this cause is binding on the parties.