Court Opinion

ID: 9545351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:10:27.904305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:33.382612
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
dissenting:
I am disturbed by the action of the majority in this case which in effect is a disagreement with the jury’s view of the evidence. Prom time immemorial, juries have been instructed that they are the sole arbiters of the facts and that it is a jury function to assign credibility and belief to the testimony of any witness. While the defendant in this case offered explanations and excuses for his possession and ultimate sale of another’s property, the jury obviously did not accept that testimony as being meritorious. However, the majority does assign merit to that testimony and on that basis alone reverses.
In Idaho the necessary element of intent can be inferred from circumstances. State v. Gowin, 97 Idaho 766, 554 P.2d 944 (1976). See also State v. Smith, 48 Idaho 558, 283 P. 529 (1929); U. S. v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 85 S.Ct. 754, 13 L.Ed.2d 658 (1965); State v. Marren, 17 Idaho 766, 107 P. 993 (1910).
It is also clear that in Idaho circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Ferris, 48 Idaho 439, 282 P. 489 (1929); State v. Marren, supra. As stated in State v. McLennan, 40 Idaho 286, 231 P. 718 (1925), circumstantial evidence is often the only means of establishing guilt and such evidence alone will support a conviction.
Here, while admittedly the prosecution’s case was not overwhelming, nevertheless the evidence shows that Erwin had possession of the three calves on his ranch, he ordered them taken and sold, he was present at their sale, and he accepted the proceeds. Although Erwin was not in the habit of earmarking his calves, the three calves in question were earmarked and the brand inspectors at the sale noticed the earmarks and called them to Erwin’s attention.
The jury was correctly instructed that if they found two interpretations of the evidence, each reasonable and one pointing to Erwin’s guilt and the other to innocence, they should choose the interpretation supporting innocence. I can only conclude that the jury here found no reasonable interpretation of the circumstantial evidence which supported the view of Erwin’s innocence.
As stated in Dodge v. People, 452 P.2d 59 (Colo.1969), “The evidence, with reasonable inferences therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict; * * * and, the jury having found the guilt of the accused proved beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court will neither weigh the evidence nor appraise the credibility of witnesses.” See also People v. Sanchez, 184 Colo. 25, 518 P.2d 818 (1974); People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 (1973); State v. Hix, 58 Idaho 730, 78 P.2d 1003 (1938).
The majority relies on State v. Grow, 93 Idaho 588, 468 P.2d 320 (1970), as warranting its holding in the case at bar that the proof of the elements of the crime were not sufficient in law to warrant the conviction. I suggest reliance on Grow is misplaced since there the trial court itself viewed the proof, determined it insufficient, so advised *742the jury, and the jury entered a verdict of acquittal. In the case at bar, the converse is true. Both the trial court and the jury obviously deemed the proof sufficient and returned a verdict of guilty and a judgment of conviction.
In my judgment the majority’s reliance on State v. Wilson, 62 Idaho 282, 111 P.2d 868 (1941), is also misplaced. That opinion chiefly demonstrates a badly split court with the majority characterizing the evidence as “chiefly the merest suspicion, not worthy to enter the classification of circumstantial evidence.” On the other hand, the dissenters set forth the evidence in detail as supporting the conviction. Perhaps the diverse views of the evidence in Wilson is not unlike that of the Court today.
As the Court in State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 P.2d 727 (1972), noted after setting forth the requirement of proof of intent in the mind of the perpetrator:
“Because the jury returned verdicts of guilty, they are presumed to have found that when the grain in question was loaded at Sowards grainery, the appellants intended permanently to deprive Sowards of his property.”
The trial court in the case at bar could have directed a verdict or given an advisory instruction for an acquittal if he believed there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict. The trial court not only sent the matter to the jury without advisory instructions, but following the guilty verdict entered judgment of conviction and imposed a sentence of five years on the defendant who was a first time offender. I would affirm the judgment of conviction.
DONALDSON, J., concurs.