Court Opinion

ID: 9711951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:42:47.310886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:08.625458
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
dissenting.
I do not agree that actual knowledge of suspension is a required element of the offense of driving a motor vehicle while suspended. As I see it, the intentional driving of a motor vehicle on a highway or other property specified by the statute, at a time when the driver’s license or privilege has been suspended in accordance with law, is all that need be shown. The concept of basic fairness to the defendant, which underlies the court’s discussion of mens rea, has been addressed by the General Assembly in its careful structuring of the steps that must be taken before a suspension can become effective, and in the guarantee of legally adequate constructive notice that is inherent in the statutory procedure.
This defendant’s driving privileges were suspended in April and May of 1987 because of his failure to pay two different fines imposed by the District Court of Maryland, and his failure to appear in that court on a third charge. Section 27-103 of the Transportation Article, Maryland Code (1977, 1987 Repl.Vol.) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) In general. — If a person fined under the Maryland Vehicle Law or under any federal traffic law or regulation for a violation occurring in Maryland does not pay the fine in accordance with the court’s directive:
(1) The court may so certify to the Administration; and
(2) On such certification, after giving the person 10 days advance written notice, the Administration may suspend the driving privileges or license of the person until the fine has been paid.
Section 26-204, dealing with the requirement that a person appear in court in response to a traffic citation, provides:
(a) Compliance required. — A person shall comply with the notice to appear contained in a traffic citation issued to the person under this subtitle.
*463(d) Suspension of driving privileges. — On receipt of a notice of noncompliance from the District Court, the Administration shall notify the person that the person’s driving privileges shall be suspended unless, by the end of the 15th day after the date on which the notice is mailed, the person:
(1) Pays the fine on the original charge as provided for in the original citations; or
(2) Posts bond or a penalty deposit and requests a new trial date.
(e) Failure to comply with subsection (d). — If a person fails to pay the fine or post the bond or penalty deposit under subsection (d) of this section, the Administration may suspend the driving privileges of the person.
Section 12-114, which deals with the method of giving notice, provides:
(a) Manner of notice. — Unless another method for giving notice is specifically required, the Administration shall give any notice that it is required or authorized to give under the Maryland Vehicle Law or any other law, either:
(1) By personal delivery to the person to be notified; or
(2) By mail to the person at the address of the person on record with the Administration.
(b) When mailed notice effective. — If notice is given by mail, the notice is effective at the end of the fifth day after its deposit in the mail.
(c) Proof of notice. — Proof that notice has been given may be made by the certificate of any officer or employee of the Administration or the affidavit of any adult, naming the person to whom the notice was given and stating the time, place, and manner of giving the notice.
Section 16-116(a) imposes upon every licensed driver the obligation to maintain a current address of record with the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA). That section provides:
*464(a) Notice required. — If any individual who has applied for or obtained a driver’s license under this subtitle moves from the address given in the application or shown on the license, the individual shall, within 30 days of the change, notify the Administration in writing of the former address and new address and the identifying number of any license issued to the individual.
The defendant’s MVA record discloses that on 14 April 1987, the MVA mailed two notices of suspension to him, for his failure to pay two fines. On 15 May 1987, the MVA mailed an additional notice of suspension to him for his failure to appear in the District Court of Maryland, and entered his suspension for failure to take action following the first notices.
The defendant does not contend that these letters were not mailed, or were not received at his address of record. He defends on the ground that he was not then residing at his address of record. Explaining that he was at the time incarcerated on unrelated charges, the defendant testified that “I never received a suspension letter in the mail because I don’t live at that address.” In my opinion, even if believed, that explanation does not constitute a defense.
It would be a sad state of affairs if a suspension of driving privileges could not be made effective until the State had given actual notice of the suspension to the defendant. Irresponsibility, failure to obey the law regarding notification of change of address, and a nomadic lifestyle would be rewarded. Only those who were conscientious in attending to their affairs would be affected by suspensions. The legislature has required that the MVA follow procedures which are reasonably calculated to give actual notice of suspension to licensees. It has specifically delayed the effective date of suspension in cases of this kind, to reasonably ensure that the licensee receives notice and has an opportunity to correct any oversight. This is a reasonable, and in my judgment lawful, compromise between the Utopian desire for actual notice in every case, *465and the practical realization that requiring such notice is unworkable.
In Ford v. State, 85 Md. 465, 37 A. 172 (1897), this Court upheld a statute making possession of lottery or policy slips a crime, rejecting a claim that the State could not constitutionally punish an unknowing or unintentional possession. The Court noted that “the statute has made the mere possession of the articles a crime because that is the most effectual way to break up the lottery business.” Id. at 480, 37 A. 172. The Court also noted the very practical problems inherent in making guilty knowledge or intent an element of the crime:
But if after a person has undoubtedly gotten into his possession one of the prohibited articles he is to be permitted, notwithstanding the language of the statute, to prove that he found it, or did not know what it was, it will make the statute practically useless, for if he swears that such was the case it will generally be impossible for the state to prove the contrary, and will be a great temptation to perjury, not only to the accused, but to others who might come to his assistance.
Id. at 477, 37 A. 172. Moreover, said the Court, in those rare cases where the judge is convinced that a person entirely free of any criminal knowledge, intqnt, or purpose was caught in the web of a necessarily broad statute, the judge could impose a nominal sanction.1 Id. at 477-78, 37 A. 172. Although this State’s policy with respect to lottery tickets has undergone a major revision since 1897, the rationale of Ford continues to be valid.
The entries on the official MVA record of “suspension letter mailed” were sufficient to show that notices of suspension were mailed to the defendant on the dates stated. There is a rebuttable presumption that public officers properly perform their duties, Lerch v. Md. Port Authority, 240 *466Md. 438, 457, 214 A.2d 761 (1965), and that presumption is sufficient to support a finding that the notices of suspension were properly addressed, stamped, and mailed. There is an additional rebuttable presumption that a letter properly addressed, stamped, and mailed reached its destination at the regular time. Border v. Grooms, 267 Md. 100, 104, 297 A.2d 81 (1972); Kolker v. Biggs, 203 Md. 137, 144, 99 A.2d 743 (1953). These are evidentiary rebuttable presumptions, well grounded in fact and human experience. The presumptions, although they may assist in proving necessary facts, do not relieve the State of proving an element of the offense, and therefore do not run afoul of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). Thus, by the entries on the MYA record, there was sufficient proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the notices were mailed to the defendant on the dates stated, at his address of record, and were received at that address.2
A person in the position of this defendant may, of course, offer evidence to rebut the presumptions. There may be proof, for example, that a copy of the notice letter retained in the files of the MVA shows that the original was mis-addressed. Or, a defendant might offer testimony which, if believed, would prove that the notice letter was never received at the address of record. Because the obvious legislative intent is to have the suspension become effective within a specified time after actual delivery at the address of record, proof that the notice was not received at that address would constitute a defense.
Although the burden of persuasion never shifts from the State, the presumptions fulfill the State’s burden of coming *467forward with evidence to show delivery, and thus to show an effective suspension. Once that has been accomplished, the defendant has the burden of coming forward with evidence to meet the presumptions. In this case, the defendant offered no such proof. He did not contend the notices had not been received at his address of record. He simply said he did not receive the notices because he was not there. Because the State did not have to show actual receipt by him of the notices, this was no defense.
The statutory scheme, as I interpret it, does place upon all licensees the duty to keep the MVA advised of their address of record, and to make such arrangements as might be required from time to time to ensure that they timely receive mail sent to them at that address. But this is not an unreasonable burden, and it is one that the law imposes in other situations.3 The legislature might have required, as it has in other situations, that notice be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, but it was under no obligation to do so. Indeed, in dealing with certain types of persons, first class mail may be more likely to achieve actual notice than certified mail.
As I read the Court’s opinion, a licensee who gives the MVA a fictitious address, or who refuses to notify the MVA of a change of address, and therefore does not receive notice of suspension, may continue to drive through any period of suspension entered pursuant to § 26-204 or § 27-103 without fear of conviction if caught. The approach suggested by Judge Chasanow in his concurring opinion would not necessarily change that result, because the State would still have to prove that the defendant believed it was probable that his license was suspended and that he deliberately avoided contact with the MVA to evade *468notice of that fact. I would follow the apparent legislative intent to have the suspension become effective at the expiration of the stated time following receipt of the notice at the address of record, and to punish those who thereafter drive during the period of that suspension.
The MYA record should not have been admitted in its entirety. However, the defendant’s objection was inadequate to preserve that question for appellate review. Defendant’s counsel objected only to the fact that certain portions of the record had been “highlighted,” and this problem was corrected before the exhibit was given to the jury. Moreover, even if defense counsel’s later comments were to be taken as a timely objection, the error in admitting the entire record was harmless. The defendant did not deny that notices of suspension were received at his address of record, or that he was driving the automobile during the period of suspension. Thus, there was no genuine issue of fact placing the defendant’s credibility before the jury, and consequently no possibility that the defendant was adversely affected by the improper admission of the extraneous portion of the record.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and direct that the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County be affirmed.

. Today, a trial judge enjoys expanded powers of disposition, and in an appropriate case may grant probation without judgment. Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27 § 641.

. Section 12-114(c), providing that proof of notice may be given by a certificate of any officer or employee of MVA, supplements but does not supplant the presumptions that arise from the official entry in the MVA record. The entry gives rise only to a presumption — the certificate contemplated by § 12-114(c) would provide actual proof, just as if a representative of the MVA had appeared and testified to those facts.

. For example, a party to court proceedings is required to keep the court and other parties advised of that party”s current address. Maryland Rules l-311(a) and l-321(a). Service of most pleadings may be made by mailing the pleading to the address last given by a party, and unless that party takes appropriate action, default may ensue or a bench warrant may issue.