Court Opinion

ID: 9396809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 18:08:22.416726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.965145
License: Public Domain

J-A05044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    STEVEN OLIEMULLER                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2479 EDA 2021

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 9, 2021
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
                  Criminal Division at CP-15-CR-0002916-2019

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                 FILED MAY 23, 2023

        Steven Oliemuller (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury convicted him of third degree murder.1 We affirm.

        The trial court summarized the following facts:

              On June 18, 201[8], at approximately 8:18 a.m.,
        Pennsylvania State Police [PSP] responded to a 9-1-1 call at 7245
        McFettridge Lane, Lower Milford Township, Lehigh County, for the
        report of a possible drug overdose. Upon arrival, Troopers
        observed an unconscious female, later identified as Alexus Quay
        [the Victim], on the floor of a first-floor bedroom. …

               [Appellant] informed police about his romantic relationship
        with the [Victim]. He admitted he was the only one at the
        residence with her and last saw [the Victim] the night before
        sitting on the deck of the[ir] residence. Trooper [Steven] Furlong
        testified that first-responders were concerned that the case was
        not a drug overdose because of the significant injuries found on
        [the Victim’s] body. Police observed significant physical injuries
        to [the Victim’s] head, stomach, back, arms, and legs. The
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1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).
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      injuries included open wounds and what appeared to responders
      as “drag marks.” Straw and other debris were observed on her
      body and her hair was wet.

            Troopers inspected the residence and discovered red stains
      on a second-floor bedroom mattress and pillow. A framing
      hammer was observed on the floor at the foot of the bed. The
      door to the bedroom was damaged and numerous articles of
      clothing were strewn across the side yard of the residence. Water
      was discovered on the kitchen, living room, and hallway floors
      leading to the bedroom where [the Victim’s] body was found. A
      prescription pill bottle and screwdriver were located on the deck
      where [Appellant] indicated he last saw [the Victim]. [Appellant]
      exhibited injuries to his hands, forearms, and face[,] which
      appeared to responders as scratches and a fat lip.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/20, at 2-3.

      The Commonwealth charged Appellant with murder by criminal

information filed August 1, 2019. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed notice

of intent to present prior bad acts evidence at trial. Appellant filed a response

seeking to preclude the evidence. The trial court entered an order granting

the Commonwealth’s request on November 10, 2020.

      Trial commenced June 8, 2021, and concluded with the jury’s guilty

verdict on June 17, 2021. Forensic pathologist Rameen Starling-Roney had

testified that the Victim’s manner of death was homicide, and the cause of

death was blunt-force trauma to various parts of the body. N.T., 6/9/21, at

201. Dr. Starling-Roney noted the presence of prescription medication and

methamphetamine (meth) in the Victim’s body, but ruled out drug overdose

as the cause of death. Id. at 201-05. He also opined that the blunt force

trauma could not have been caused accidentally. Id. at 204-05.

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       Multiple witnesses testified about Appellant’s meth use and the

behavioral changes it caused. See, e.g., N.T., 6/9/21, at 108-09, 127-33;

N.T., 6/10/21, at 42-83; N.T., 6/15/21, at 40-148; N.T., 6/16/21, at 123-59.

The witnesses testified that Appellant became paranoid and violent when using

meth. See id. The witnesses also testified that Appellant used meth on the

weekend of the Victim’s murder; this testimony was confirmed by drug test

results. See N.T., 6/14/01, at 204-05 (Appellant’s urine tested positive for

meth).

       Specifically, Appellant’s cousin, Chuck Gischel (Gischel), testified he and

Appellant regularly used meth. N.T., 6/15/21, at 274-75. Gischel testified

that he observed Appellant use meth in the late evening of Saturday, June 16,

2018, and/or the early morning of Sunday June 17, 2018. Id. at 278-79. He

also saw Appellant ingest meth later in the morning of June 17, 2018. Id. at

284.

       Appellant’s sister’s former boyfriend, Charles Price (Price), testified that

he and Appellant used meth (and other drugs). N.T., 6/10/21, at 50-51. Price

relayed that on the Saturday before the Victim’s death, the Victim and

Appellant attended a birthday party for Price’s daughter. Id. at 48, 50-51.

The next evening, Appellant called his sister, Haleigh Oliemuller (Haleigh), and

Price overhead Appellant state that he would “drag [Price] with a chain.” Id.

at 52.   Appellant threatened that if Price did not go to Appellant’s home,

Appellant would come to Price. Id. at 53. Price described Appellant’s voice

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as “irate, a little frantic” and “stressed and angry.” Id. Price explained that

Appellant acted this way when he used meth. Id. at 74. After speaking with

Appellant, Price took his family, sometime between 10:00 and 11:00 that

Sunday night, to a hotel because he “wasn’t taking any chances.” Id. at 56.

Price testified that Appellant “definitely sounded upset” and Price was afraid

of Appellant. Id. at 56-57. Price and his family spent two nights at a hotel in

Landsdale. Id. at 58-59. They then spent another two nights at a hotel in

Colmar, even though they had learned about the Victim’s death, because Price

“wasn’t taking any chances.” Id. at 58-59, 79. Price stated that he wanted

to “make sure [his] family was safe.” Id. at 80.

      Price further testified that Appellant had hit him with a closed fist while

using meth, and Price was “afraid” of Appellant “at times.” Id. at 60, 63-64.

After hitting Price, Appellant “shot a couple rounds into the wall [of Appellant’s

home]” with a .22 firearm. Id. at 65. On another occasion, when Appellant

was using meth and Price refused to lend him a car, Appellant slapped Price

across the face. Id. at 67-68. Price described Appellant as “very paranoid …

agitated[, and] thought everybody was out to get him.”       Id. at 75.

      Appellant’s sister, Haleigh, testified reluctantly; consequently, the

Commonwealth introduced her grand jury testimony. N.T., 6/15/21, at 40-

148. Haleigh stated that the Victim would stay at her house when Appellant

and Gischel were using drugs. Id. at 56-60. Haleigh admitted she, Appellant

and Gischel used meth the weekend of the Victim’s death. Id. at 61, 98-101.

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She agreed that Appellant’s behavior changed when he used meth and he

would experience hallucinations.    Id. at 65-70.    Through her grand jury

testimony, Haleigh corroborated Price’s testimony about getting “weird”

phone calls from Appellant on the night of June 17, 2018. Haleigh’s grand

jury testimony further confirmed that after warning Appellant’s former

paramour, Ashley Swartley (Swartley), about Appellant’s behavior, she, Price,

and their children quickly left their residence and stayed at two out-of-county

hotels for four nights. Id. at 123-42.

      Swartley testified that she had been involved with Appellant for over 15

years and they shared two children. N.T., 6/16/21, at 123-25. She averred

that Appellant’s meth use was a factor in the end of their relationship. Id. at

126. Swartley did not want the couple’s children around Appellant when he

was using drugs, so she would take the children and stay away from Appellant

for days at a time. Id. Swartley stated that when she started leaving with

the children, Appellant “would be very upset, aggressive, wanting us to come

home. If I wouldn’t bring the kids home[, he] threatened to kill me and kill

my family.” Id. at 127. She described that when Appellant used meth:

      He believed there were people outside on the property at times.
      He believed that there were drones flying over the property and
      watching us.

            At one point[, Appellant said] there was a box of puppies
      dropped off on our porch … and I went out and there was not a
      box of puppies on the porch.

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Id. at 128. Swartley testified that Appellant could become violent when using

meth, and described him grabbing her, shoving her against a wall, and

pushing her to the ground. Id. at 129. Swartley recalled an incident where

Appellant took her phone, disabled her car, and prevented her from leaving

the home because he believed people were watching. Id. at 129-30. Swartley

recounted incidents which occurred within two months of the Victim’s death,

when the Victim contacted Swartley and asked her to pick up the children

because the Victim was concerned about Appellant’s drug use and some of his

associates. Id. at 141-46. Lastly, Swartley testified that Haleigh called her

on the night of June 17, 2018 to ask if she and Price could stay with her

because Appellant was threatening to kill Haleigh and Price. Id. at 155.

      Michelle Halbsgut (Halbsgut), the Victim’s instructor at the Pennsylvania

Institute for Massage Therapy, testified to the change in the Victim’s behavior,

from being a model student in January 2018, to missing classes in March 2018.

N.T., 6/15/21, at 305-06, 309-10. Halbsgut explained that part of massage

training involves students practicing on one another, and in March 2018,

Appellant was often unable to be massaged because her body was covered

with bruises. Id. at 308, 316-21.

      Trooper Edward Prentice testified that upon seeing the Victim’s body, he

questioned Appellant, who did not give direct answers, and had a “shaky”

voice and “visibly shaking” hands. N.T., 6/9/21, at 109. Trooper Prentice

stated that Appellant agreed to go to the police barracks, where he was seated

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in an area with windows 6 - 9 feet from the ground. Id. at 131. Appellant

repeatedly said that he saw someone outside, even though it was impossible.

Id. Appellant also maintained there was someone in an air vent and he heard

“tapping” noises in the hallway. Id. Later, Appellant threw a book at Trooper

Prentice.   Id. at 132.   Trooper Prentice opined that Appellant was coming

down from a meth high.        Id. at 145.       Trooper John McGranahan also

encountered Appellant that day, and described him as “very combative.” N.T.,

6/10/21, at 113.

      April Cooper, a psychiatric evaluator at Lehigh Valley Hospital, evaluated

Appellant the evening of June 18, 2018.          N.T., 6/15/21, at 25-26.     She

described Appellant as having a “blunted affect.” Id. at 28. She relayed that

Appellant admitted to using meth that day. Id. at 29-30. Appellant told Ms.

Cooper the police brought him to the hospital because he was hallucinating,

but he believed the police “were messing with him and berating him. … [The

police] were hiding behind [] a curtain in a window, and [Appellant] … threw

something at the window.” Id. at 31. Ms. Cooper concluded Appellant did

not have a psychiatric disorder, and his hallucinations were the result of drug

use. Id. at 32.

      The   Commonwealth      also   elicited   testimony   from   two   jailhouse

informants, Jason Swiderski (Swiderski) and Daniel Santiago (Santiago). Both

men had extensive criminal records, and received favorable consideration in

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pending cases in return for their testimony. N.T., 6/14/21, at 92-95; N.T.,

6/15/21, at 212-14.

     Swiderski testified that Appellant told him he and the Victim were using

meth; Appellant was giving the Victim drugs to calm her down; and “he beat

her up, slapped her around[.]”   N.T., 6/14/21, at 106.    Swiderski claimed

Appellant admitted “he beat the living shit out of her and he gave her a hot

shot, mother of all shots ….” Id. at 108. Appellant then “found out after

seeing her on the ground that she was dead.” Id.    Appellant disputed these

claims, and his counsel cross-examined Swiderski extensively, implying that

Swiderski would say anything to get a favorable deal from the Commonwealth.

See id. at 118-86.

     Santiago testified Appellant told him and Santiago’s friend, “Huey,” that

Appellant “had an argument with his girlfriend because he slipped something

into her drink … he pushed her[,] and her head hit something[,] and she was

on the floor.” N.T., 6/15/21, at 226. Appellant related that he ”blacked out

and started hitting” the Victim, and “could not recall what he hit her with.”

Id. Defense counsel cross-examined Santiago, and suggested Santiago would

lie to get favorable treatment. Id. at 230-64.

     On June 17, 2021, the jury convicted Appellant of third-degree murder.

On September 9, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 20 — 40 years

in prison. Appellant successfully sought permission to appeal nunc pro tunc.

Appellant appealed and on March 8, 2022, this Court remanded the case for

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Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement as ordered by the trial court.

Appellant and the trial court have since complied with Rule 1925.

      Appellant raises three issues for review:

         1. Did the trial court err in admitting prior bad acts testimony
            about [Appellant’s] prior domestic abuse and prior drug use
            from [Swartley]?

         2. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellant’s] request for a
            mistrial when two PSP Troopers testified to his pre-arrest
            silence, his request for an attorney and invocation of his 5th
            and 14th Amendment rights under the United States
            Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
            Constitution as such evidence was used against [Appellant]
            as evidence of guilt?

         3. Did the trial court err in not giving the jury an instruction on
            involuntary manslaughter?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

      In his first issue, Appellant contends the trial court wrongly admitted

“character testimony” from Swartley.        Appellant’s Brief at 25.    Appellant

maintains

      all of her testimony except that small portion about her
      observations of [the Victim] on June 16th and 17th of 2018 should
      have been inadmissible as some of it was irrelevant but all of its
      probative value was outweighed by the prejudice, especially
      considering the sequencing of the witnesses called, Swartley was
      the last called by the Commonwealth right after the lead
      investigator from the PSP. Admissible [sic] of this testimony was
      error, and the Commonwealth cannot show beyond a reasonable
      doubt that the verdict would be the same even if such testimony
      was not admitted.

Id.

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      Our scope and standard of review concerning the admission of prior bad

acts is well settled:

      The admission of evidence is a matter vested within the sound
      discretion of the trial court, and such a decision shall be reversed
      only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. In
      determining whether evidence should be admitted, the trial court
      must weigh the relevant and probative value of the evidence
      against the prejudicial impact of that evidence. Evidence is
      relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case
      or tends to support a reasonable inference regarding a material
      fact. Although a court may find that evidence is relevant, the
      court may nevertheless conclude that such evidence is
      inadmissible on account of its prejudicial impact.

      Evidence of prior bad acts committed by a defendant is not
      admissible solely to show the defendant’s bad character or his
      propensity for committing bad acts. However, evidence of prior
      bad acts is admissible where there is a legitimate reason for the
      evidence, such as to establish: 1) motive; 2) intent; 3) absence
      of mistake or accident; 4) a common scheme or plan; and 5)
      identity. The evidence may also be admissible to impeach the
      credibility of a testifying defendant; to show that the defendant
      has used the prior bad acts to threaten the victim; and in
      situations where the bad acts were part of a chain or sequence of
      events that formed the history of the case and were part of its
      natural development.

Commonwealth v. Page, 965 A.2d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation

and emphasis omitted).

      Appellant has waived his claim that the trial court erred in admitting

irrelevant — and unspecified — portions of Swartley’s testimony.            In his

response to the Commonwealth’s notice of intent to use prior bad acts

evidence, Appellant did not challenge the relevance, but argued the evidence

was not proper Rule 404(b) evidence. Response to Commonwealth’s Petition

to Admit Prior Bad Acts, 10/20/20, at 1-7.         During Swartley’s testimony,

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Appellant raised a single objection to a portion of her testimony on relevance

grounds and the trial court sustained the objection. N.T., 6/16/21, at 156-

58.

      It is well-established that [a] party complaining, on appeal, of the
      admission of evidence in the court below will be confined to the
      specific objection there made. If counsel states the grounds
      for an objection, then all other unspecified grounds are
      waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

Commonwealth v. McGriff, 160 A.3d 863, 871-72 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(emphasis added). Because Appellant either failed to object or objected on

different grounds, he waived any challenge to Swartley’s testimony based on

relevance.

      Appellant also argues the trial court improperly admitted Swartley’s

testimony about his drug use because it did not demonstrate “a true distinct

pattern of crime” and was not “modus operandi.” Appellant’s Brief at 21; see

generally id. at 21-27. However, the trial court did not permit the testimony

to show a signature or pattern crime, but to demonstrate Appellant’s

      state of mind at the time of the Victim’s death, the lack of accident
      or absence of mistake, [Appellant’s] motive for the killing, as well
      as to show the natural progression of events leading up to [the
      Victim’s] death.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/20, at 12. With respect to Swartley’s testimony

about domestic violence, the trial court did not admit it as “pattern” evidence,

but because it “demonstrate[d Appellant’s] intent to kill and the absence of

accident or mistake at the time of the offense.” Id. at 13. Appellant does

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not cite any law or argue that the trial court erred in admitting Swartley’s

testimony for these reasons. See Appellant’s Brief at 21-27.

      Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Swartley’s testimony was

wrongly admitted, we would find any error harmless because Swartley’s

testimony was cumulative. The harmless error doctrine “reflects the reality

that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial.” Commonwealth

v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671 (Pa. 2014).

      Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates either: (1) the
      error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de
      minimis; or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely
      cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially
      similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly
      admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
      overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
      insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
      contributed to the verdict.

Id. at 671–72.

      As discussed above, the record demonstrates Gischel, Price, and Haleigh

testified about Appellant’s history of meth use, and in particular, his use of

meth in the days preceding the Victim’s death. N.T., 6/10/21, at 50-51; N.T.,

6/15/21, at 61, 98-101, 274-75, 278-79, 284. Price and Haleigh testified that

Appellant’s personality changed when he used meth, and he became paranoid,

hallucinated, and acted violently. N.T., 6/10/21, at 52, 56-57, 60, 64-65, 67-

68, 74-75; N.T., 6/15/21, at 65-70, 123-42.            Troopers Prentice and

McGranahan, as well as the psychiatric evaluator, Cooper, had observed

Appellant under the influence of meth shortly after the Victim’s death and

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corroborated the testimony of Gischel, Price, and Haleigh. See N.T., 6/9/21,

at 131-32; N.T., 6/10/21, at 113; N.T., 6/15/21, at 28-32.

       In addition, Price and Haleigh testified that Appellant threatened them

when he called the night before the Victim’s death, and as a result, they took

their family to stay at a hotel out of the county. N.T., 6/10/21, at 53, 55-59,

80; N.T., 6/15/21, 123-42. Haleigh testified that the Victim did not like to be

around Appellant when he and Gischel were using drugs and would stay at

Haleigh’s house. N.T., 6/15/21, at 56-60. Halbsgut testified about the Victim

having bruises on her body prior to her death.        N.T., 6/15/21, at 316-21.

Thus, Swartley’s testimony was cumulative of other witnesses’ testimony.

Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief. See Hairston, 84 A.3d at 671-

72.

       In his second issue, Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his

motion for a mistrial after Troopers Prentice and McGranahan testified that

while at the police station and served with search warrants for his clothes and

person, Appellant requested counsel. N.T., 6/9/21, at 129; N.T., 6/10/21, at

113.2 Appellant’s Brief at 27-30. Appellant argues the Commonwealth “used

____________________________________________

2 Appellant waived his claims regarding other purportedly improper testimony
by Trooper Prentice and psychiatric evaluator Cooper concerning his silence.
Appellant did not object to the testimony or raise it in his motion for a mistrial.
See N.T., 6/9/21, at 168-69; N.T., 6/15/21, at 31. Appellant sought a mistrial
on the basis that Troopers Prentice and McGranahan improperly commented
on his pre-arrest silence, not on the basis, advanced on appeal, that their
testimony Appellant was not acting like a grief-stricken person constituted
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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these refences … about [Appellant’s] pre- and post-arrest silence … as

evidence of guilt against him.” Appellant’s Brief at 29.

       Initially, the record does not support Appellant’s contention that

Troopers Prentice and McGranahan commented on his post-arrest silence. The

above incidents occurred at the police station prior to Appellant’s arrest. See

N.T., 6/9/21, at 129-34; N.T., 6/15/21, at 31-33. Thus, there is no basis for

Appellant’s claim regarding his post-arrest silence. To the extent Appellant

avers violation of his rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution, Appellant

waived the issue because it is not developed in his brief. See Appellant’s Brief

at 27-30. See also Commonwealth v. Wise, 171 A.3d 784, 791 (Pa. Super.

2017) (issue waived where appellant provided an undeveloped argument and

neglected to cite to controlling case law). Thus, we only address Appellant’s

claim that the trial court erred in denying a mistrial where Troopers Prentice

and McGranahan improperly commented on Appellant’s pre-arrest silence.

____________________________________________

improper comments on his pre-arrest silence. N.T., 6/10/21, at 117-21;
Appellant’s Brief at 29. “[O]ne must object to errors, improprieties or
irregularities at the earliest possible stage of the adjudicatory process to afford
the jurist hearing the case the first occasion to remedy the wrong and possibly
avoid an unnecessary appeal to complain of the matter.” Keffer v. Bob
Nolan’s Auto Service, Inc., 59 A.3d 621, 645 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also
Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (Pa. 2008) (to
preserve issue, party must make timely and specific objection to ensure the
trial court has opportunity to correct alleged error). Appellant cannot raise a
new legal theory on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592,
598-99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc).

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      We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381, 422 (Pa. 2011). We have

explained:

      In criminal trials, declaration of a mistrial serves to eliminate the
      negative effect wrought upon a defendant when prejudicial
      elements are injected into the case or otherwise discovered at
      trial. A trial court may grant a mistrial only where the incident
      upon which the motion is based is of such a nature that its
      unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by
      preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict.
      It is also settled that a mistrial is not necessary where
      cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome any
      potential prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249 A.3d 257, 274 (Pa. Super. 2021) (emphasis

added, citations omitted), appeal denied, 267 A.3d 1213 (Pa. 2021). Trial

courts “must consider all surrounding circumstances before finding that

curative instructions were insufficient and the extreme remedy of a mistrial is

required.”   Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 266 (Pa. Super.

2009) (citation omitted).

      “The Fifth Amendment was enacted to protect against self-incrimination,

whether [the suspect is] in custody or not, charged with a crime, or merely

being questioned during the investigation of a crime.” Commonwealth v.

Molina, 33 A.3d 51, 63 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). “[T]he

government may not use ... silence as substantive evidence of guilt when a

defendant chooses not to testify.    ... [That silence] may also not be used

against a defendant who remained silent during the investigation of a crime.”

Id. (citation omitted).

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        The Fifth Amendment “does not impose a prima facie bar against any

mention of a defendant’s silence.” Id. (emphasis added). Instead, the Fifth

Amendment protects against the prosecution’s exploitation of a defendant’s

right to remain silent. See id. “[A] mere reference to pre-arrest silence does

not constitute reversible error where the prosecution does not exploit the

defendant’s silence as a tacit admission of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Adams,

104 A.3d 511, 512-13 (Pa. 2014).

        Here, the Commonwealth asked Trooper Prentice about Appellant’s

demeanor during questioning immediately after police discovered the Victim’s

body.    N.T., 6/9/21, at 108-09.     As to Appellant’s demeanor at the police

barracks, the Commonwealth asked:

        Q. Would you describe for the jury anything you observed about
        [Appellant’s] behavior and demeanor during that time?

        A. For the search warrant to be executed on the clothing, he was
        argumentative about all of that. He requested private counsel.

              [Defense Counsel]: Objection. Can we approach, Judge?

                                       ***

              [Defense Counsel]: I believe that my client’s indication [sic]
        that his 5th Amendment rights is not permissible in this evidence.

              The Court: So what are you asking the court to do?

             [Defense Counsel]: I’m going to ask for a very strong
        curative instruction, Your Honor.

                                       ***

              The Court: Okay. I’ll give an instruction. Okay.

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            All right. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I’m going to
      sustain that objection. You are to totally disregard that response.
      Okay?

Id. at   129-30 (emphasis added).       Appellant did not object further or

otherwise seek relief.

      The next day, the Commonwealth questioned Trooper McGranahan

about Appellant’s behavior when the trooper attempted to serve Appellant

with a body search warrant:

      Q. Was [Appellant] cooperative?

      A. No.

      Q. What do you mean?

      A. He was very combative. He wouldn’t let us take any
      photographs of him. He kept arguing and fighting with us. He
      kept repeating he wanted to talk to a lawyer.

N.T., 6/10/21, at 113.

      Defense counsel objected, noting it was the second time a trooper

mentioned Appellant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, and

requested a mistrial. Id. at 113-14. After hearing argument, the trial court

denied the motion, stating:

      Okay.    I’m satisfied that a detailed curative instruction or
      cautionary instruction will suffice at this point, but I certainly
      respect defense counsel’s position on this.

            I would ask both of you just to instruct your witnesses
      before they get on the stand, don’t mention anything of that
      nature in the future. All right? Because the third time around,
      you may not be so lucky. Okay.

                                     ***

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      Just so the record is clear, I do not find that there’s a manifest
      necessity for a mistrial.

N.T., 6/10/21, at 121-22; see also id. at 114-22.         The trial court then

instructed the jury to disregard testimony about Appellant’s request for

counsel because,

      that testimony under the Pennsylvania and the United States
      Constitution, that any individual who is the subject of an
      investigation has that right; however, that’s not something that
      normally comes out in trial, and it should not come out in trial. So
      I am directing you to totally disregard that testimony. It’s not to
      be considered in your determination of whether [Appellant] is
      guilty or not guilty in this case. All right? So that testimony is
      stricken.

Id. at 123. Defense counsel did not object to the instruction or seek further

redress.

      Our review reveals the troopers did not explicitly reference Appellant’s

right to remain silent and the Commonwealth did not “exploit [Appellant’s]

silence as a tacit admission of guilt.” Adams, 104 A.3d at 513. The testimony

from Troopers Prentice and McGranahan was “contextual and brief.” See id.

at 518. There was no further mention of Appellant’s pre-arrest silence or his

invocation of right to counsel. See Adams, 104 A.3d at 515. Finally, the trial

court gave a sufficient curative instruction.   We presume a jury follows a

court’s instruction. See Commonwealth v. Speight, 854 A.2d 450, 458 (Pa.

2004). We cannot conclude that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s

request for a mistrial. Thus, Appellant’s second issue does not merit relief.

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      In his final issue, Appellant argues he was entitled to a jury instruction

on involuntary manslaughter. Appellant’s Brief at 30-31. Appellant contends

the evidence indicated the Victim

      may have been hit by her own car, or injured and moved through
      [Appellant’s house], or was moved by someone, multiple times.
      Furthermore, both jail-house witnesses presented [testimony]
      against [Appellant;] Santiago and Swiderski mentioned some type
      of incident where [Appellant] admitted to drugging [the Victim]
      shorty before her death. The science shows [the Victim] died of
      blunt force injuries, but it’s ultimately speculation as to what
      specifically caused them. Apart, or perhaps in conjunction with
      the drugging, Appellant could have assaulted [the Victim] and his
      further negligence and recklessness led to her death.

Id.

      Pertinently:

      In reviewing a jury charge, we determine whether the trial court
      committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which
      controlled the outcome of the case. We must view the charge as
      a whole; the trial court is free to use its own form of expression
      in creating the charge. A trial court has broad discretion in
      phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long
      as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the
      jury for its consideration. Moreover, it is well-settled that the trial
      court has wide discretion in fashioning jury instructions. The trial
      court is not required to give every charge that is requested
      by the parties and its refusal to give a requested charge
      does not require reversal unless the appellant was
      prejudiced by that refusal.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 314 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations

omitted, emphasis added).

      The Crimes Code provides:

      A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct
      result of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly

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     negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or
     grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another person.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a).

     Furthermore:

     Defendants are generally entitled to instructions that they have
     requested and that are supported by the evidence.
     Commonwealth v. Markman, 591 Pa. 249, 916 A.2d 586, 607
     (2007); Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 570 Pa. 263, 809 A.2d
     256, 261 (2002) (“Where a defendant requests a jury instruction
     on a defense, the trial court may not refuse to instruct the jury
     regarding the defense if it is supported by evidence in the
     record.”); Commonwealth v. Browdie, 543 Pa. 337, 671 A.2d
     668, 673–74 (1996) (“[W]e hold that a trial court shall only
     instruct on an offense where the offense has been made an issue
     in the case and where the trial evidence reasonably would support
     such a verdict.”). We have explained that the reason for this rule
     is that “instructing the jury on legal principles that cannot
     rationally be applied to the facts presented at trial may confuse
     them and place obstacles in the path of a just verdict.”
     Commonwealth v. Taylor, 583 Pa. 170, 876 A.2d 916, 925–26
     (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 490 Pa. 179, 415
     A.2d 399, 400 (1980)). A criminal defendant must, therefore,
     “establish that the trial evidence would ‘reasonably support’ a
     verdict based on the desired charge and may not claim
     entitlement to an instruction that has no basis in the evidence
     presented during trial.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carter,
     502 Pa. 433, 466 A.2d 1328, 1332–33 (1983)).

Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 668 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis

added). “An instruction on involuntary manslaughter is not required unless it

has been made an issue in the case and the facts would support such a

verdict.” Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759, 791 (Pa. 2009).

     Involuntary manslaughter was never at issue in this case. There is no

record support for Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth suggested the

Victim was hit by a car. While Santiago and Swiderski testified Appellant told

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them he gave the Victim drugs and she died while he was assaulting her,

Appellant strongly implied that both men were lying. See N.T., 6/14/21, at

106-08, 118-86; N.T., 6/15/21, at 226, 230-64.

         In his opening, defense counsel argued the Commonwealth, “zeroed in

on [Appellant] at the expense of what actually happened.” N.T., 6/9/21, at

19. Counsel asserted the “mess” in the house was not caused by a “great

brawl,” but because Appellant “had millions of projects going on, also while

on meth.” Id. at 21. Counsel argued:

         You’ll say, man, those photos, man, they didn’t match up, why
         didn’t [the Commonwealth] investigate this. Think about that, be
         intellectually curious. Why didn’t the detectives do this, why didn’t
         the trooper do this, and think about it and say, man, I wish they
         did more, and you’re going to say, why didn’t they do more? Well,
         they are focusing on [Appellant] because [Appellant] can be an
         asshole and he was an asshole to them that night.

Id. at 22. Counsel also pronounced that Appellant, “didn’t murder her.” Id.

at 23.

         Appellant’s defense was that he did not cause the Victim’s death, but

police focused only on him and thus conducted a tainted and shoddy

investigation. See, e.g., N.T., 6/9/21, at 244-78 (defense counsel implying

trooper did not properly investigate the case); N.T., 6/11/21, at 133-35

(defense counsel referencing lack of serious injuries to Appellant despite

Commonwealth’s claim that he beat the Victim to death); id. at 141 (defense

counsel criticizing investigators for taking videos only inside the home); id. at

146-47 (defense counsel criticizing investigators for not using drug dogs); id.

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at 156 (defense counsel implying investigators tampered with evidence at

crime scene); N.T., 6/14/21, at 85 (defense counsel criticizing serologist about

delays in testing items for blood); N.T., 6/16/21, at 77-78 (defense counsel

cross-examining lead investigator about failure to conduct a grid search of the

property or use metal detectors).

           Appellant’s defense was incompatible with the crime of involuntary

manslaughter. See Fletcher, 986 A.2d at 791; see also Commonwealth

v. Wright, 865 A.2d 894, 917 (Pa. Super. 2004) (defendant not entitled to

instruction on involuntary manslaughter where he denies committing any act

causing the victim’s death). Therefore, Appellant’s final issue does not merit

relief.

          Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023

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