Court Opinion

ID: 9382489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 20:02:59.492197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.763645
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/27/23 P. v. Woolen CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.11 15.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                       B324099

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. TA070163)
           v.

 MICHAEL SHABOYA WOOLEN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed.
     Cheryl Lutz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
     No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     ___________________
                  MEMORANDUM OPINION1
                                  I
       On May 24, 2003, defendant and appellant Michael
Shaboya Woolen was walking with his cousin. The two men had
a brief conversation during which Woolen told his cousin that he
needed him to do something for him. His cousin replied that he
would not do anything that would violate his morals. Woolen
then shot his cousin in the head; the cousin survived.
       An August 12, 2003, information charged Woolen with
attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder (Pen. Code,2
§§ 187, subd. (a), 664,) and alleged he personally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). It
further alleged that he had a serious prior felony conviction
within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (b) and 1170.12
and that he had served four prior prison terms within the
meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). A jury convicted
Woolen of attempted willful, deliberate, premeditated murder
and found true the firearm enhancement. At a court trial on the
prior conviction allegations, the court found that Woolen had
served three prior prison terms. The court sentenced him to life
in prison for attempted murder, plus 25 years to life for the
firearm enhancement, and three years for the section 667.5,
subdivision (b) prior prison terms.

      1  We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“is determined by a controlling statute which is not challenged for
unconstitutionality and does not present any substantial question
of interpretation or application.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Amin., § 8.1(1).)
      2 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

                                 2
       In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which “eliminated natural and probable
consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and
abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule.”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) The legislation also
enacted former section 1170.95 3 which provided a mechanism for
defendants previously convicted of murder, but who could not be
convicted of murder under the law as amended, to petition for the
court to vacate their convictions and resentence them. In 2021,
the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) which, among other changes, extended the application of
then-section 1170.95 to defendants convicted of attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
       On February 15, 2022, pursuant to section 1171.1, the trial
court struck the three one-year priors and resentenced Woolen.
       On February 15, 2022, Woolen filed a petition seeking
further resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95. The
petition alleged trial errors, that Woolen suffered from mental
illness at the time of the crime, and that his attempted murder
conviction was based on malice that had been imputed to him.
Appellant attached a jury note and answer, psychiatric reports,
an investigator’s report, minute order summaries, and excerpts
from the trial transcripts to his petition.
       The court appointed counsel for Woolen and ordered the
prosecution to file a response. In its response, the District
Attorney argued that the trial court had not instructed the jury

      3  The Legislature subsequently renumbered this as section
1172.6, with no change in the text of the statute (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10, eff. June 30, 2022).

                                3
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or aiding and
abetting. The response attached the direct appeal opinion (People
v. Woolen (Jan. 31, 2005, B173587) [nonpub. opn.]) and the jury
instructions from Woolen’s trial. Woolen’s counsel filed a reply
brief, arguing the petition established a prima facie case.
       On August 26, 2022, the trial court denied Woolen’s
petition. The court noted that the record of conviction
established Woolen had not been convicted on any theory that
imputed someone else’s malice to him. Timely notice of appeal
was filed on September 6, 2022.
       We appointed counsel to represent Woolen on appeal.
Woolen’s attorney filed a brief raising no issues and requesting
that we exercise our discretion to independently review the
record for error pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216. In Delgadillo, the Supreme Court established procedures for
cases in which counsel determines that an appeal from an order
denying postconviction relief lacks merit. In such cases, “(1)
counsel should file a brief informing the court of that
determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing
on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with a
copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the
defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and
that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may
dismiss the matter.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.) If the defendant does
not file a supplemental brief, we “may dismiss the appeal as
abandoned.” (Id. at p. 232.) In that instance, we do “not need to
write an opinion but should notify the defendant when [we]
dismiss[ ] the matter.” (Ibid.) Because a defendant who has been
denied postconviction relief has no constitutional right to an
appeal, we are not required to conduct an independent review of

                                 4
the record before dismissing the appeal, but we may conduct such
a review at our discretion. (Id. at pp. 227-228, 232.)
      If the defendant does file a supplemental brief or letter, we
are “required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in
that brief and to issue a written opinion. The filing of a
supplemental brief or letter does not compel an independent
review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (People v.
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
      We followed the procedure outlined above and, on
February 22, 2023, sent Woolen a letter notifying him of the no-
merits brief and informing him that he had 30 days to file a
supplemental brief. Two days later, we received a copy of a
document from Woolen titled “Motion to Compel Pursuant to
[Assembly Bill No.] 2542,”4 which we treat as Woolen’s
supplemental brief.
                                II
      In his supplemental brief, Woolen makes several
contentions, only two of which relate to the denial of his section
1172.6 petition for resentencing. First, Woolen claims he

      4  Section 745 (California Racial Justice Act of 2020),
enacted pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 2542 (2019-2020 Reg.
Sess.) and amended by Assembly Bill No. 256 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.), applies to nonfinal judgments, to matters in which the
defendant was sentenced to death, and to matters involving
“immigration consequences related to the conviction or sentence.”
(See § 745, subd. (j)(2).) Woolen’s conviction became final in
2005; he was not sentenced to death; and there is no indication
his case concerns immigration issues. Thus, even if Woolen had
presented argument pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 2542 in the
trial court, he is not entitled to relief thereunder.

                                 5
“should’nt [sic] have the burden of proving who committed the
crime, pursuant to [former section] 1170.95[, subdivision] (d)(3).”
Second, Woolen appears to suggest he was not provided counsel
(or perhaps, adequate counsel) or the opportunity to file a reply
brief.
       Woolen’s arguments lack merit. Under section 1172.6, a
petitioner must first make a prima facie showing of eligibility for
relief, including that the petitioner was convicted of murder
under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and currently could not be convicted of
first or second degree murder as a result of amendments to
sections 188 and 189 pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a); former § 1170.95, subd. (a).) Only if the petitioner
makes such a showing must the trial court issue an order to show
cause and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the burden is on
the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d);
former § 1170.95, subds. (c), (d).)
       Although Woolen’s counsel argued to the trial court that
Woolen made a prima facie case, the record of conviction,
including the information and the abstract of judgment, refuted
the allegation that Woolen was convicted under a felony murder
or natural and probable consequences theory.5 Accordingly, the

      5  “[A] trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) At the prima facie
stage, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true
and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual

                                  6
trial court did not require Woolen to carry the burden of proof
under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). Rather, because Woolen
failed to make the prima facie showing required under section
1172.6, subdivision (a), the court properly disposed of the matter
prior to the burden shifting to the prosecution under subdivision
(d).
       Contrary to Woolen’s claim, the record also demonstrates
the trial court appointed counsel for Woolen and that his counsel
filed a reply to the government’s response to his petition. To the
extent Woolen is arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, “our
Supreme Court has steadfastly held that ‘there is no
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel’ in state
postconviction proceedings.” (People v. Cole (2020) 52
Cal.App.5th 1023, 1032.)

allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the
petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without
first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if
the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts
refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is
justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 971.)

                                  7
                          DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order denying Woolen’s former section
1170.95 petition for resentencing is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                          WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             CHANEY, J.

                                8