Court Opinion

ID: 9667029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:33:12.027211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:34.234618
License: Public Domain

WIGGINS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the legislature’s comprehensive enactment of the traffic regulations and enforcement mechanisms contained in chapter 321 of the Iowa Code does not preempt Davenport’s Automated Traffic Enforcement ordinance. Although the majority recognizes the doctrine of implied preemption, it fails to follow our existing case law in its application of the doctrine.
Chapter 321 includes a uniform law provision. Iowa Code § 321.235 (2007). This provision provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein and no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly authorized herein. Local authorities may, however, adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter.

Id.

Chapter 321 also limits the power of ■local authorities to enact an ordinance that conflicts with the Code. Id. § 321.236. It states in relevant part:
Local authorities shall have no power to enact, enforce, or maintain any ordinance, rule or regulation in any way in conflict with, contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, and no such ordinance, rule or regulation of said local authorities heretofore or hereafter enacted shall have any force or effect....
Id. Although section 321.236 enumerates specific areas where a local municipality may regulate, it does not include automatic enforcement ordinances.
This court has applied these sections on two prior occasions and struck down local ordinances that were inconsistent with chapter 321. Central City v. Eddy, 173 N.W.2d 582, 583-84 (Iowa 1970); City of Vinton v. Engledow, 258 Iowa 861, 868, 140 N.W.2d 857, 862 (1966). In City of Vinton, the city enacted a local ordinance defining reckless driving as:
“Every driver of any vehicle upon any street in the city shall drive and operate such vehicle in a careful and prudent manner and with due regard and pre*546caution for the safety of pedestrians, persons, property and other vehicles. No person shall operate or drive any vehicle in a manner or at a speed greater or other than is reasonable and safe with respect to such vehicles, persons, pedestrians or property.”
City of Vinton, 258 Iowa at 864, 140 N.W.2d at 860 (citation omitted). Although a prior state statute defined reckless driving in this manner, the present state statute only allowed a finding of reckless driving when “[a]ny person [ Jdrives any vehicle in such manner as to indicate either a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property....” Id. at 865, 140 N.W.2d at 860.
There this court recognized the state of mind of the violator for committing the offense of reckless driving was lower under the city ordinance than the state statute. The city ordinance only required a finding of negligence to hold the driver culpable, while the state ordinance required a finding of “either a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” Id. In analyzing the city ordinance, the court first determined that this type of regulation was not contained as an exception to section 321.236. Id. at 865-66, 140 N.W.2d at 860-61.
Next, the court considered whether the city ordinance was consistent with the state statute, as required by section 321.235. The test set out by our court to determine whether a statute is valid under sections 321.235 and 321.236 is that “[a] city ordinance cannot be allowed to change the statutory definition either by enlargement or diminution.” Id. at 866, 140 N.W.2d at 861. The court went on to say, “ ‘[T]he test of the validity of a statute or ordinance is not what has been done under it but what may be done by its authority.’ ” Id. (quoting Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Liddle, 253 Iowa 402, 409, 112 N.W.2d 852, 856 (1962)).
In applying these principles, the court found the difference between the state of mind needed to hold violators liable under the state and city laws destroyed the uniformity required by sections 321.235 and 321.236. Id. The state of mind needed for holding a person culpable for reckless driving is a matter of legislative policy. Id. Because the laws in Vinton were not consistent with the rules of the road enforceable in other parts of the state, this court held the Vinton ordinance invalid. Id,
In 1970 the court was asked to revisit a similar issue. Central City, 173 N.W.2d at 583-85. There the city held drivers culpable for careless or negligent driving on public streets, alleys, and highways. Id. at 583. Our court recognized that the legislature only held a driver culpable for driving with either a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Id. at 584. Thus, the city’s ordinance holding a driver culpable for negligent driving was inconsistent with state law. Id. Accordingly, the ordinance was invalid. Id.
Applying established law to the facts of this case can only lead to one conclusion— Davenport’s Automated Traffic Enforcement ordinance violates sections 321.235 and 321.236. No one argues the ordinance is allowed under an enumerated exception to section 321.236. Thus, we must determine whether the Davenport ordinance is inconsistent with chapter 321.
The legislature has defined when an owner of a vehicle may be culpable for a violation of chapter 321. Iowa Code § 321.484. Under chapter 321, an owner can only be culpable for a driver’s moving violation if the owner of any vehicle requires, or knowingly permits the operation of such vehicle upon a highway in any manner contrary to the law. Id. Under Davenport’s ordinance, an owner is strictly *547liable for the actions of a person driving the owner’s vehicle. By requiring a lesser state of mind for an owner to be culpable of the same offense, the Davenport ordinance is inconsistent with the stated legislative policy regarding the culpability of owners under chapter 321.
It may be asserted that because the violation of the ordinance is a civil infraction, it is not inconsistent with chapter 321. I cannot agree with this premise.
In Illinois several municipalities passed local ordinances allowing traffic offenders to pay a civil settlement fee in lieu of court adjudication. People ex rel. Ryan v. Vill. of Hanover Park, 311 Ill.App.3d 515, 243 Ill.Dec. 823, 724 N.E.2d 132, 135 (1999). Like Davenport’s ordinance, a traffic violator in these municipalities would pay a fine to the municipality and the violation would not be reported to the state. Section 11-207, chapter 11 of the Illinois Code contains the same language as section 321.235 of the Iowa Code. Id. at 189.
The Illinois Appellate Court found this statute violated the uniformity requirement of traffic laws contained in section 11-207 of chapter 11 for two reasons. Id. at 143-44. First, the ordinance allows certain moving violations to be adjudicated administratively, while the Illinois Code requires moving violations to be dealt with judicially. Id. at 140. Second, by not reporting the violations to the licensing authority, the licensing authority cannot exercise its exclusive authority to cancel, suspend, or revoke a license. Id. at 141. I agree with the reasoning of the Illinois court.
The Iowa legislature has given Iowa municipalities the power to adjudicate parking violations administratively. Iowa Code § 321.236(1). The legislature has not given municipalities the authority to adjudicate other violations of our traffic code administratively. The judicial system must adjudicate all other violations. When law enforcement cites a person for a moving violation, the officer must arrest the violator or issue a citation. Id. §§ 805.1, 805.6. Court intervention is necessary so the violator cannot pay a civil settlement fee in exchange for “an opportunity to circumvent the potential consequences of committing the offense, namely, a chance to avoid an adjudication [by the court], a finding of guilty, and a guilty finding being reported to the [licensing authority].” People ex rel. Ryan, 243 Ill.Dec. 823, 724 N.E.2d at 140. Consequently, for the Davenport ordinance to be valid, it must treat its violators as the legislature treats violators in other parts of the state. The ordinance can only achieve the uniformity required by section 321.235 by adjudicating these moving violations judicially.
Another problem with the administrative adjudication under the Davenport ordinance is its failure to report violators to the department of transportation (DOT). The DOT is the sole agency designated by the legislature to administer the issuance, suspension, and revocation of a driver’s license. Iowa Code § 321.2. In carrying out these duties, the DOT has instituted various rules regarding the suspension and revocation of a license. Iowa Admin. Code r. 761-615. The action the agency takes is dependent on the nature of the violation. See, e.g., id. r. 761-615.9 (providing for suspension of habitual offenders). The DOT has also developed driver improvement programs as an alternative to license suspension. Id. r. 761-615.43.
In order for the DOT to administer the suspension or revocation of a driver’s license, it must receive a record of the conviction from the court system. Chapter 321 requires the court to advise the DOT of a conviction. Iowa Code § 321.491. The Davenport ordinance does not. The legislative intent behind the en*548actment of traffic laws is to keep the streets and highways of this state safe. One of the most effective means of doing that is to reeducate drivers who violate the laws through driver improvement programs. If a driver cannot be reeducated, then the DOT has the ability to suspend or revoke a license. For this legislative scheme to work, the DOT needs to have exclusive control over the administration, suspension, and revocation of drivers’ licenses so the consequences of committing a violation of chapter 321 remain uniform throughout the state.
The Davenport ordinance circumvents the DOT’s exclusive control, and undermines the goal set forth by the legislature that repeat offenders should be kept off our roads. Why would the legislature allow a person with five violations under the Davenport ordinance to continue to drive, when its stated legislative policy is to prohibit a driver with three moving violations in any other part of the state from operating a motor vehicle? An unsafe driver in Davenport is an unsafe driver anywhere else in this state. By not applying our suspension and revocation laws uniformly, our streets and highways become a more dangerous place.
I understand Davenport’s desire to decrease the occurrences of speeding without the expense of adding more officers for enforcement in these tough economic times. I also understand the city’s need to raise revenue from new sources. However, I cannot believe an ordinance that holds the owner strictly liable and does nothing to remove repeat offenders from the road furthers the legislative intent of sections 321.235 and 321.236. Sections 321.235 and 321.236 require the uniform applicability of chapter 321 and prohibit municipalities from enacting or enforcing any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of chapter 321 unless expressly authorized by the legislature. The uniformity of our traffic laws keeps the roads safe for all Iowans. The legislature never envisioned that municipalities could raise revenue under the guise of traffic law enforcement at the expense of safer highways.
Accordingly, without specific authorization by the legislature to hold owners strictly liable for the acts of a driver, without judicial adjudication, and without DOT authority to regulate who should not be on the roads, I would hold Davenport’s Automated Traffic Enforcement ordinance invalid.