Court Opinion

ID: 9961408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 17:01:14.972185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:42.675552
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11754    Document: 19-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11754
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        SAUL OTONIEL GASPAR-GASPAR,
        EDGAR GASPER-JUAN,
                                                                Petitioners,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                               Respondent.

                           ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A208-893-010
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11754

                             ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Saul Gaspar-Gaspar and his minor child, Edgar Gaspar-Juan,
        petition for review of a decision from the Board of Immigration
        Appeals affirming an immigration judge’s denial of Gaspar-Gas-
        par’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. In the pe-
        tition, Gaspar-Gaspar and his son argue that substantial evidence
        does not support the Board’s denial of the asylum claim and that
        the Board used the wrong standard to evaluate the withholding-of-
        removal claim. After careful review, we deny the petition.
                                          I.
               Gaspar-Gaspar and Edgar are citizens of Guatemala who en-
        tered the United States in 2016. After entering the country, Gaspar-
        Gaspar and his son were charged with being removable as nonciti-
        zens present in the United States without having been admitted or
        paroled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). In immigration proceed-
        ings, they conceded removability.
               Gaspar-Gaspar applied for asylum and withholding of re-
        moval. Edgar was a derivative beneficiary of his father’s asylum ap-
        plication. See id. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (providing that a child of an appli-
        cant “who is granted asylum . . . may . . . be granted the same status
        as the [parent]”).
               In his application, Gaspar-Gaspar alleged that he suffered
        past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution
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        23-11754                  Opinion of the Court                           3

        in Guatemala on account of his race, as an indigenous Mayan, and
        his membership in a particular social group. Gaspar-Gaspar as-
        serted that he was a member of the following social groups:
        (1) Guatemalan young men who were subjected to recruitment ef-
        forts by the Mara-18 gang but rejected or resisted gang membership
        because of their opposition to the gang’s values and activities,
        (2) indigenous Guatemalan Mayans who were targets of discrimi-
        nation and aggression from gang members, (3) young Guatema-
        lans who were actively recruited by gangs but refused to join, and
        (4) indigenous men from Guatemala who were beaten and threat-
        ened with death for being a minority and refusing to join the Mara-
        18 gang.
               The immigration judge held a hearing on Gaspar-Gaspar’s
        application. Gaspar-Gaspar testified at the hearing. He told the im-
        migration judge that before he left Guatemala, the Mara-18 gang
        had threatened and harmed him because of his Mayan race. He was
        afraid that if he returned to Guatemala the gang would kill him or
        his family.
               Gaspar-Gaspar described how gang members targeted and
        harassed members of the indigenous community where he grew
        up. According to Gaspar-Gaspar, gang members would come to his
        village every few weeks to “extort people” and sometimes “would
        burn people.” AR at 134. 1 Beginning in April 2010, when Gaspar-
        Gaspar was 16 years old, gang members sought him out when they

        1 “AR” refers to the administrative record.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                23-11754

        visited the village. On at least three occasions over the next two
        years, gang members threatened to kill Gaspar-Gaspar or his family
        if he did not join the gang. On the last occasion when gang mem-
        bers visited Gaspar-Gaspar in the village, they demanded that he
        pay them 60,000 quetzals.
               In 2012, fearing for his safety, Gaspar-Gaspar fled from his
        village to Guatemala City. Approximately 20 days later, gang mem-
        bers tracked him down in Guatemala City and attacked him. They
        pinned him against a wall and stabbed him in the leg with a knife.
        Although he was in severe pain and barely able to walk, he did not
        go to a hospital because he could not afford to pay for medical care.
        Instead, he wrapped his leg and let the wound heal on its own.
               Over the next few years, gang members threatened Gaspar-
        Gaspar several more times. During one confrontation, armed gang
        members struck him in the head with a pistol. Eventually he and
        his son, Edgar, fled Guatemala and came to the United States.
              At his immigration hearing, Gaspar-Gaspar was asked why
        the Mara-18 gang had targeted him. He answered that it was be-
        cause he was a young man and they wanted him to join the gang.
        He also said that it was because he was an “indigenous Mayan” and
        they wanted him “to join them.” Id. at 131.
               The record before the immigration judge primarily con-
        sisted of Gaspar-Gaspar’s testimony. The immigration judge also
        considered the Department of State country reports for Guate-
        mala. These reports noted that the “[s]ignificant human rights is-
        sues in Guatemala” included “crimes involving violence or threats
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        23-11754               Opinion of the Court                        5

        of violence targeting . . . members of indigenous groups.” Id. at 24–
        25. The immigration judge also found that there was a “very high
        level of criminality” in Guatemala. Id. at 88.
               At the conclusion of the hearing, the immigration judge de-
        nied Gaspar-Gaspar’s application for asylum and withholding of re-
        moval. To be entitled to asylum, the immigration judge stated,
        Gaspar-Gaspar had to show that he either had suffered past perse-
        cution or had a well-founded fear of future persecution. She ex-
        plained that he also had to establish a nexus by proving that a pro-
        tected ground, such as race or membership in a particular social
        group, was “one central reason” for the past persecution he experi-
        enced or future persecution he feared. Id. at 87.
               The immigration judge concluded that Gaspar-Gaspar was
        not entitled to asylum. She considered his claim that he was enti-
        tled to asylum based on his membership in a particular social
        group. She concluded that none of Gaspar-Gaspar’s proposed
        groups qualified as a particular social group, stating, “[r]esistance
        to gang recruitment is not a particular social group as defined by
        case law,” and “victims of gang violence are not considered to be
        members of a particular social group pursuant to case law.” Id. at
        88.
              The immigration judge also addressed whether Gaspar-Gas-
        par was entitled to asylum based on his allegation that he had been
        or would be persecuted because of his race. Because there was no
        evidence “that the gangs targeted him because he was Mayan,” she
        concluded that he failed to establish that his “Mayan ethnicity was
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11754

        the basis for the threats and the harm he received from the gangs.”
        Id. at 89. Thus, Gaspar-Gaspar failed to establish that “his race was
        central to” the past persecution he suffered or the future persecu-
        tion he feared. Id.
               The immigration judge also rejected Gaspar-Gaspar’s appli-
        cation for withholding of removal. She explained that to be entitled
        to withholding of removal, he had to show that his “life or free-
        dom” would be threatened in Guatemala “on account of” a pro-
        tected ground such as race or membership in a particular social
        group. Id. at 87. The immigration judge explained that Gaspar-Gas-
        par had to establish “a clear probability of persecution” based on a
        protected ground. Id. She concluded that because he had “not met
        the lower burden” for his asylum claim, he also had “not met the
        higher burden under withholding of removal.” Id. at 89.
               Gaspar-Gaspar and Edgar appealed to the Board of Immigra-
        tion Appeals. They argued that the immigration judge erred in
        denying asylum and withholding of removal because the record
        showed that Gaspar-Gaspar had suffered persecution in Guatemala
        “on the account of being an indigenous person.” Id. at 15. In their
        appellate brief, they acknowledged that both asylum and withhold-
        ing of removal “share[d] a core requirement,” which was “a nexus
        between the persecution and a protected ground.” Id. at 16. They
        stated that it was “well-settled” that an applicant established the
        “required nexus” when he demonstrated that a protected ground
        “was or will be a central reason for” persecution. Id. at 17 (emphasis
        added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nowhere in their brief
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        23-11754               Opinion of the Court                        7

        to the Board did they argue that a different, less-demanding nexus
        standard applied to a withholding-of-removal claim.
               The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s determination
        that Gaspar-Gaspar was not eligible for asylum or withholding of
        removal. It stated that to be entitled to either asylum or withhold-
        ing of removal, Gaspar-Gaspar had to establish, among other
        things, a “nexus” between the harm that he experienced or feared
        and a protected ground. Id. at 4. To establish the requisite nexus
        for both the asylum and withholding-of-removal claims, the Board
        explained, Gaspar-Gaspar had to show that a protected ground was
        “a central reason” for the claimed past or future harm. Id. (internal
        quotation marks omitted).
              The Board concluded that the immigration judge’s finding
        that Gaspar-Gaspar had failed to establish a nexus was not clearly
        erroneous. Because he had not established a “nexus between the
        harm he experienced and fears and a protected ground,” the Board
        concluded that he was not entitled to asylum or withholding of re-
        moval. Id. at 5.
                Gaspar-Gaspar and Edgar now petition this Court for re-
        view.
                                         II.
               “We review the decision of the Board.” Kazemzadeh v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
        marks omitted). We review the decision of the immigration judge
        “to the extent that the Board expressly adopted” the immigration
        judge’s opinion. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We review
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                23-11754

        de novo the Board’s conclusions of law. Id. And we review its factual
        determinations under a substantial evidence standard, which re-
        quires us to “view the record evidence in the light most favorable
        to the agency’s decision and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
        of that decision.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1026–27 (11th
        Cir. 2004) (en banc). Findings of fact may be reversed “only when
        the record compels a reversal.” Id. at 1027. “[T]he mere fact that
        the record may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to jus-
        tify a reversal of the administrative findings.” Id.
                                        III.
               On appeal, Gaspar-Gaspar and Edgar challenge the Board’s
        decision denying the application for asylum and withholding of re-
        moval. Regarding asylum, they argue that the record “compel[led]
        a finding” that Gaspar-Gaspar’s past persecution and fear of future
        persecution was on account of “his indigenous Mayan race or eth-
        nicity.” Petitioners’ Br. 12–13. And as to withholding of removal,
        they say that the Board erred because it applied the wrong standard
        to evaluate whether there was a sufficient nexus between Gaspar-
        Gaspar’s protected characteristics and the threats he faced if re-
        moved to Guatemala. We address each issue in turn.
                                         A.
               We begin with the challenge to the denial of the asylum ap-
        plication. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), an
        undocumented immigrant who is present in the United States may
        apply for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The government has the
        discretion to grant asylum if an applicant establishes that he is a
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        23-11754                Opinion of the Court                          9

        “refugee.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is a person “who is unable
        or unwilling to return to” his country of nationality “because of
        persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
        race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
        or political opinion.” Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
                To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must, “with specific
        and credible evidence,” show “(1) past persecution on account of a
        statutorily listed factor” or “(2) a well-founded fear that the statu-
        torily listed factor will cause future persecution.” Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
        omitted). Persecution is an “extreme concept, requiring more than
        a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation.”
        Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005) (al-
        teration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                We have described the requirement that an applicant must
        show that any past or future persecution was, or would be, “on
        account of a protected basis” as a “nexus” requirement. Perez-
        Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2019) (in-
        ternal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the nexus requirement,
        an applicant must show that a protected characteristic—for exam-
        ple, his race or membership in a particular social group—“was or is
        ‘at least one central reason’ for his persecution.” Id. (quoting
        8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). A central reason is one that “is essential
        to the motivation of the persecutor.” Sanchez-Castro v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 998 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
        omitted). “In other words, the protected ground cannot play a
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11754

        minor role in the [applicant’s] past mistreatment or fears of future
        mistreatment. That is, it cannot be incidental, tangential, superfi-
        cial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.” Id. (internal quo-
        tation marks omitted). Evidence showing the applicant was the vic-
        tim of criminal activity or acts of private violence does not establish
        persecution based on a statutorily protected ground. Ruiz, 440 F.3d
        at 1258.
               Gaspar-Gaspar and Edgar challenge the Board’s determina-
        tion that Gaspar-Gaspar failed to satisfy the nexus standard for the
        asylum claim. They argue that the record established that Gaspar-
        Gaspar’s status as an indigenous Mayan was one central reason for
        his persecution in Guatemala. We disagree.
               We cannot say that this record compels a conclusion that
        Gaspar-Gaspar’s Mayan race played a central role in the gang’s de-
        cision to target him. The record before us shows that (1) Gaspar-
        Gaspar is an indigenous Mayan person, (2) he was harmed by mem-
        bers of the Mara-18 gang in Guatemala, and (3) some criminals in
        Guatemala target indigenous Mayan people. The only evidence
        showing that Gaspar-Gaspar was targeted because he was Mayan
        was his testimony that he believed the gang members had targeted
        him because of his race. Even assuming a factfinder could conclude
        based on this record that there was a nexus, “the mere fact that the
        record may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify
        a reversal of the administrative findings.” Adefemi, 386 F.3d at 1027.
        We simply cannot say that the record required the agency to con-
        clude that when the gang targeted Gaspar-Gaspar it was motivated
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        23-11754               Opinion of the Court                        11

        by his race. We thus conclude that substantial evidence supported
        the Board’s decision.
                                         B.
               We now turn to the challenge to the denial of Gaspar-Gas-
        par’s application for withholding of removal. The INA prohibits the
        government from removing a noncitizen in the United States to a
        country where his “life or freedom would be threatened . . . be-
        cause of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
        social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). To be
        entitled to withholding of removal, an applicant must show that it
        is more likely than not that he would be persecuted or tortured
        upon his return to the country in question. Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 392 F.3d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 2004). We have recognized that
        to be entitled to withholding of removal, an applicant must meet a
        nexus requirement. See Perez-Sanchez, 935 F.3d at 1158.
               In their petition, Gaspar-Gaspar and Edgar argue that the
        Board applied too demanding a nexus standard when evaluating
        the withholding-of-removal claim. They say that to be eligible for
        withholding of removal, Gaspar-Gaspar needed to show only that
        his race would be “a reason,” as opposed to “one central reason,”
        for the threat he would face if returned to Guatemala. Petitioners’
        Br. 19. They acknowledge that this Court in a published opinion
        adopted the “one central reason” standard to evaluate nexus for a
        withholding-of-removal claim. But they urge us to reject the rea-
        soning of our precedent, saying that we overlooked that the nexus
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        12                         Opinion of the Court                         23-11754

        requirement for withholding-of-removal claims is “distinct” from
        the nexus requirement for asylum claims. Id. at 20.
               Before we reach the merits of this challenge, we must con-
        sider whether Gaspar-Gaspar and Edgar exhausted their adminis-
        trative remedies. 2 The INA provides, in relevant part, that a “court
        may review a final order of removal only if” the noncitizen “has
        exhausted all administrative remedies available . . . as of right.”
        8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). This exhaustion requirement is satisfied
        when a noncitizen “previously argued the core issue now on appeal
        before the” Board. Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297
        (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Requiring ex-
        haustion allows the [Board] to consider the niceties and contours
        of the relevant arguments, thereby fully considering the peti-
        tioner’s claims and compiling a record which is adequate for judi-
        cial review.” Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247,
        1250 (11th Cir. 2006) (alterations adopted) (internal quotation
        marks omitted).
               We cannot reach the merits of Gaspar-Gaspar and Edgar’s
        challenge regarding the nexus requirement that applies to with-
        holding-of-removal claims because they failed to exhaust adminis-
        trative remedies. Although they now argue that an applicant for

        2 We previously treated the INA’s exhaustion requirement as a jurisdictional

        bar. But the Supreme Court recently held that this exhaustion requirement is
        not jurisdictional but, rather, a claim-processing rule. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland,
        598 U.S. 411, 419 (2023). Because it is a claim-processing rule, we must enforce
        the exhaustion requirement where, as here, the government properly asserts
        it. See Kemokai v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 83 F.4th 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2023).
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        23-11754               Opinion of the Court                       13

        withholding of removal establishes the requisite nexus if he shows
        that a protected ground would be a reason—as opposed to a central
        reason—for any threats he would face if removed, they did not
        raise this argument to the Board. Instead, they told the Board that
        it was “well-settled” that the “one central reason” standard applied
        to withholding-of-removal claims. AR at 17 (internal quotation
        marks omitted). Because they did not raise this ”core issue” in their
        petition before the Board, we conclude that they failed to exhaust
        administrative remedies. See Indrawati, 779 F.3d at 1297 (internal
        quotation marks omitted); see also Murugan v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        10 F.4th 1185, 1196 n.8 (11th Cir. 2021) (concluding that petitioner
        failed to exhaust argument about the proper nexus standard when
        petitioner failed to raise the argument before the Board).
                But even if Gaspar-Gaspar and Edgar had adequately raised
        this issue before the Board and exhausted administrative remedies,
        we would have to deny their petition. As they acknowledge, we
        previously adopted the “one central reason” standard to evaluate
        whether an applicant established a sufficient nexus for a withhold-
        ing-of-removal claim. See Sanchez-Castro, 998 F.3d at 1286. Gaspar-
        Gaspar and Edgar argue that the reasoning in Sanchez-Castro is
        flawed because the panel overlooked an argument about why a less
        stringent nexus standard should apply in the withholding-of-re-
        moval context. But under our prior panel precedent rule, we are
        bound by Sanchez-Castro. See Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292,
        1303 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e categorically reject any exception to
        the prior panel precedent rule based upon a perceived defect in the
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11754

        prior panel’s reasoning or analysis as it relates to the law in exist-
        ence at that time.”).
              PETITION DENIED.