Court Opinion

ID: 9756420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:27:43.127433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:21.780893
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
I dissent and would grant a new trial.
The majority relates that after appellant was taken into custody, the house was locked and an order issued that no one was to enter the premises. The majority continues: “During the ensuing weeks the police returned to the house involved on several occasions looking for evidence. Expended bullets, doors showing holes caused by bullets, and some flooring with blood marks thereon were seized and removed from the premises. At no time were the police armed with a search warrant. The guns, discharged bullets, doors and flooring seized, as before related, were introduced into evidence by the Commonwealth at trial.”
While the majority does not reach the issue, there can be no doubt that these items of physical evidence were taken in violation of appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Searches conducted without warrants are, with certain exceptions, unconstitutional, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966); Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 421 Pa. 169, 218 A. 2d 249 (1966), and the fruits thereof may not be admitted into evidence against the accused. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961). See also Commonwealth v. Pearson, 427 Pa. 45, 233 A. 2d 552 (1967).
The Commonwealth suggests that the search was conducted incident to appellant’s arrest, and hence per*254missible. However, the Commonwealth’s argument is without merit, for the record indicates that the illegal search occurred during the weeks after appellant was taken into custody. “[A] search can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.” Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486, 84 S. Ct. 889, 891 (1964). “Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest.” Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S. Ct. 881, 883 (1964). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4 (1925); United States ex rel. Clark v. Maroney, 339 F. 2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Whiting v. Cavell, 244 F. Supp. 560 (M.D. Pa. 1965), aff’d, 358 F. 2d 132 (3d Cir. 1966).
The majority dismisses appellant’s challenge to the admission of the seized physical evidence by noting that appellant did not object to its use at any time during the trial. If the Commonwealth had raised this point, I would be in complete agreement with the majority. The Commonwealth, however, has not asserted appellant’s apparent waiver, thereby failing to put him on notice of his statutory right to avoid waiver by proving “the existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify his failure to raise the [search and seizure] issue.” Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of January 25, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1580, §4, 19 P.S. §1180-4(b) (2). The Commonwealth has thus lost its right to rely upon appellant’s failure to make timely objections. See Commonwealth v. Frazier, 434 Pa. 36, 252 A. 2d 685 (1969); Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 431 Pa. 269, 245 A. 2d 446 (1968).
I therefore would remand the case for a new trial, and accordingly must dissent.