Court Opinion

ID: 9954555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 16:11:14.443397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:55.692501
License: Public Domain

J-A25040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  ADAM J. O'PATCHEN                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SAMANTHA THOMPSON                            :   No. 755 WDA 2023

                  Appeal from the Order Entered June 16, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                     Family Court at No(s): FD-20-007466

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                          FILED: March 26, 2024

       Adam J. O’Patchen (“Father”) appeals from the order granting Samantha

Thompson (“Mother”) legal custody of their two children, Z.O. and A.O.

(“Children”), for the limited purpose of selecting the Children’s school for the

2023-2024 school year. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.1

       Briefly, Father and Mother were married on October 8, 2011. Z.O. was

born in 2013 and A.O. was born in 2016 while the couple was married and

living together in the Baldwin-Whitehall School District. Z.O. attended both

kindergarten and first grade in this school district.
____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Neither party has requested that they be identified in the caption by their

initials due to the sensitive nature of this custody matter, and therefore, we
use the parties’ names in the caption “as they appeared on the record of the
trial court at the time the appeal was taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)(1)-(2). We will,
however, refer to the minors involved in this dispute either by their initials or
collectively as “Children” so as to protect their identities.
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      On March 5, 2020, Father filed a complaint in divorce. Father also

contemporaneously filed a marriage settlement agreement signed by both

parties. Pursuant to that agreement, both Father and Mother were to share

physical and legal custody of the Children. On August 13, 2020, the divorce

decree was granted.

      At or around the time the divorce decree was granted, Mother moved

out of the marital residence and located herself in the Chartiers Valley School

District, with both Father and Mother, themselves alumni, agreeing that the

Children would attend the schools in this new district. Subsequently, Father

moved into his parents’ home, which was in that same district.

      Mother remarried on February 2, 2022, and moved into a new residence,

located in the Upper St. Clair School District, with her husband. Having orally

notified Father in January 2022, the Children were subsequently enrolled by

Mother in Upper St. Clair.

      On August 8, 2022, Father filed a motion that sought a court order

requiring the Children to reenroll in Chartiers Valley School District. Ultimately,

the court granted Father’s motion and ordered the Children to be reenrolled

in Chartiers Valley for the 2022-2023 school year. After Mother filed an

emergency motion for reconsideration, the court scheduled a school choice

hearing on December 12, 2022, but denied Mother’s request for the Children

to attend Upper St. Clair schools.

      After two days of hearings, the court, on June 12, 2023, issued an order

awarding Mother legal custody for the limited purpose of choosing the

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Children’s school district for the 2023-2024 academic year when Z.O. and A.O.

would be in the fifth grade and second grade, respectively. Resultantly, Father

filed a timely notice of appeal, and he has complied with his obligations under

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b).

      On appeal, Father raises four issues for our review:

      1. Did the trial court err in entering an order providing Mother
         with sole legal custody for the purpose of selecting the
         Children’s school for the 2023-2024 school year?

      2. Did the trial court err in overruling Father’s objections to the
         submission of school rankings evidence into the record?

      3. Did the trial court err in not considering the best interests of
         the Children in rendering its order?

      4. Did the trial court err in not considering the preferences of the
         Children in rendering its order?

See Father’s Brief, at 5.

      As this is a custody determination, we note this Court’s well-settled

standard of review:

      In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type
      and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings
      of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of
      record, as our role does not include making independent factual
      determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility and
      weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge
      who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we
      are not bound by the trial court's deductions or inferences from
      its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s
      conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record.
      We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve
      an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable
      findings of the trial court.

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Graves v. Graves, 265 A.3d 688, 693 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

      Of relevance here, “[w]hen parties cannot resolve a dispute about where

to educate their children, the court may act as arbiter to decide that issue,

based on the best interests of the children.” S.S. v. K.F., 189 A.3d 1093, 1098

(Pa. Super. 2018); see also S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 403-04 (Pa.

Super. 2014). “The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis,

considers all factors which legitimately have an effect upon the child’s

physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being.” D.K.D. v. A.L.C., 141

A.3d 566, 572 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). We note that “[c]ontinuity

in an educational environment is an important, but not controlling, factor to

be considered by the court in making a school [ ] decision, and over-emphasis

on this factor may constitute an abuse of discretion.” S.S., 189 A.3d at 1098.

      When awarding custody, the trial court must consider the factors set

forth in Section 5328(a) of the Child Custody Act as part of its decision. See

23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a), (d); see also Graves, 265 A.3d at 694, 700. However,

we have recognized that when the trial court is called upon solely to resolve

an impasse over school choice and its decision does not otherwise affect the

custody arrangement, the court is not required to explicitly consider each of

the Section 5328(a) factors. See S.W.D., 96 A.3d at 403-04.

      Here, the court appropriately framed the issue before it in its Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a) opinion: “whether attending the Chartiers Valley School District or

the Upper St. Clair School District served the best interests of the Children.”

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Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/23, at 5. In reaching its conclusion that attending

schools in Upper St. Clair School District for the 2023-2024 school year was

in the Children’s best interests, the court considered “the reputations of the

schools, the proximity to the Children, the Children’s ability to adjust to

transferring schools, the needs of the Children, and the preferences of the

Children[.]” Id.

      The court then went through the underpinnings of its decision. First, the

court illuminated Mother’s testimony wherein, through her own research, she

ascertained that Chartiers Valley was a worse performing school district than

Upper St. Clair. The court noted that Mother submitted, and the court admitted

as evidence, “a chart of data she collected from the Department of Education,

and the respective ratings of Upper St. Clair and Chartiers Valley from a

website, Greatschools.org.” Id., at 6 (citations omitted). Conversely, the court

found Father’s testimony, as to the relative strengths of each district,

unpersuasive: “[w]hen pressed on how [Father concluded that Upper St. Clair

was not a better school district than Chartiers Valley], Father referred to

anecdotes from people who attended both schools.” Id.

      Mother also presented to the court school-performance reports from

Niche.com, which indicated that “Upper St. Clair received an overall grade of

A+ and was rated the 4th best school district in the Greater Pittsburgh Area.

Chartiers Valley received and overall grade of B+ and was rated the 32nd best

school district in the Pittsburgh Area.” Id. The court used these reports as

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“informative” guideposts: “[t]hey make it clear that Upper St. Clair School

District is one of the best school districts in the Greater Pittsburgh Area.” Id.

Conversely, Father did not rebut this evidence with anything more than

supposition, claiming the differences between the districts to be marginal.

      Second, the court considered which school district would provide a

better fit for the Children. The Children had attended Chartiers Valley during

the previous school year, but Mother evidenced “legitimate concerns” with

that District. Id., at 7. Specifically, the court heard testimony that:

            Z.O. is struggling with some of her subjects at Chartiers
      Valley. Mother testified that Z.O. doesn’t do well with the
      “standardized common core” because she “thinks differently.”
      Father submitted internet screen shots of Z.O.[’s] grades from
      November and the end of the school year. Father’s position was
      that [m]ath was Z.O.’s only issue. However, Father admitted that
      Z.O. could do better and struggled in other subjects at times. Z.O.
      has been evaluated for an Independent Education Plan (IEP).
      Z.O.’s grades in [m]ath and [r]eading are indeed behind her
      scores in other subjects.

            At Upper St. Clair, Z.O. would have the International
      Baccalaureate program (“IB program”) available to her. Mother
      suggested that the IB program would offer Z.O. an alternative
      style of learning.

             Beyond Z.O.’s academic issues, she has had social issues at
      Chartiers Valley. Z.O. has been in four … fights this year in school.
      Father discounted them as Z.O. reacting and suggested these
      fights would happen anywhere.

             Young[er] child, A.O., has done well academically through
      the first[]grade at Chartiers Valley. However, her time at Chartiers
      Valley has not been without issue. Mother testified about an
      incident where A.O. did not get off the school bus at her stop.
      Despite A.O. being on the correct bus, Chartiers Valley could not
      locate her for an hour. This was understandably upsetting to
      Mother.

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Id. (citations omitted).

      Third, as to the Children’s own testimony, both indicated that they had

friends at Chartiers Valley. Z.O. said that she loved her time in that district,

but also stated that there were some people who were mean. When asked,

Z.O., while not knowing which district she wanted to attend, indicated that

she leaned towards Chartiers Valley. See N.T., 5/23/23, at 12.

      In summarizing their testimony, the court found that the Children had

good experiences with both geographic communities: (1) both children liked

Chartiers Valley; (2) Z.O. liked cheerleading in Upper St. Clair; and (3) A.O.

was excited for a pool at the Upper St. Clair Community and Recreation

Center. See id., at 8. However, the court did not see an overwhelming

preference in school district from the Children.

      The court also noted that “Father does not [personally] transport the

Children to school, as he is not home when they leave[,]” id. (stating, further,

that Father’s brother ensures that the Children make it onto the school bus),

so Father’s custody would not be impacted by Children switching to Upper St.

Clair schools. See N.T., 12/12/22, at 45 (establishing, through Mother’s

testimony, that Father’s “work schedule prevent[s] him from being involved

in school[]”); N.T., 5/25/23, at 39 (Father indicating that he is already at work

when the Children are getting on the school bus). Relatedly, pursuant to the

custody arrangement, Mother is responsible for the Children’s transport to

school more than Father, with Mother having seven days of responsibility to

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Father’s three over a two-week period. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/23, at

8-9. Accordingly, with Mother residing in that district, “[a]ttending school in

the Upper St. Clair School District would be less of an inconvenience to the

Children’s morning commute.” Id. at 9.

      The court gave weight to Father’s “concern about transferring schools

again[.]” Id. Attendance at Upper St. Clair meant that Z.O. had attended three

different schools over a five-year period, and Father was concerned about her

academic performance and ability to make new friends. However, the court

ascertained that Z.O.’s issues were largely specific to virtual learning during

the COVID-19 pandemic. At Upper St. Clair, “she [would] be able to meet her

classmates and attend school in-person.” Id.

      Ultimately, “[t]he [c]ourt found that the Children’s best interest[s]

[were] served by attending Upper St. Clair.” Id., at 10. That district provided

the Children with “the best opportunity to take advantage of their intellect by

offering multiple approaches to learning[] and an education from the more

renowned school.” Id. Additionally, “[g]iven the custody arrangement, Upper

St. Clair is much closer to their primary residence[.]” Id. The court also

referenced the Children’s “academic difficulties with their prior school.” Id.

      We first address Father’s second appellate issue, in which he contends

that the lower court erred in overruling his objections to the admission of

school rankings evidence, claiming those documents to be hearsay. The trial

court admitted three documents over Father’s objection: a comparison chart

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of the two school districts that Mother prepared herself incorporating

Department      of   Education   data   and   the   respective   rankings    from

Greatschools.org for Upper St. Clair and Chartiers Valley School Districts. See

Exhibits 3-5; N.T., 12/12/22, 39-47. Father takes issue with the unknown

author and sources of data underpinning the reports. Father then avers that

“[t]here are no exceptions to the hearsay rule that would permit introduction

of these documents, and the documents were utilized by the [c]ourt to support

the [c]ourt’s determination that Upper St. Clair is a superior school [district].”

Father’s Brief, at 12.

      Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter

asserted and is generally inadmissible unless one of the hearsay exceptions

applies. See Pa.R.E. 801(c); Pa.R.E. 802. “[W]here the statement is being

offered to show its effect on a listener, it is not being offered for the truth of

the matter and is non-hearsay.” Schmalz v. Manufacturers & Traders Tr.

Co., 67 A.3d 800, 803 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2013). Further, an out-of-court

statement that is offered not for its truth but to explain a course of conduct is

not hearsay. See id.; Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 577 (Pa.

Super. 2003).

      Here, the court found that “[t]he exhibits were relevant evidence of

Mother’s attempts to discuss the merits of the schools with Father.” Trial Court

Opinion, 7/31/23, at 10. Mother indicated that she researched the school

districts “[f]or [Father], so [Father] can see the difference in the schools and

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because [she] was trying to explain to him what an [International

Baccalaureate] program was.” N.T., 12/12/22, at 40. When Father was

presented this information, which, to Mother, evidenced that Upper St. Clair

was a better school district, she believed that he did not care much. See id.

Of note, Mother testified that the International Baccalaureate program at

Upper St. Clair gave students an opportunity to learn in a distinct way, unlike

Chartiers Valley which was a “one size fits all” program. Id., at 44.

      We find that the court’s admission of the Greatschools.org printouts and

Mother’s school district comparison chart was proper as they were admitted

for the non-hearsay purposes of showing Mother’s course of conduct—her

attempt to initiate a discussion with Father on the merits of the two school

districts—and to demonstrate the effect of these documents on Father, or

rather Father’s lack of response. See Schmalz, 67 A.3d at 803; Dent, 837

A.2d at 577. The trial court did not rely on the factual assertions within the

contested exhibits as proof of the relevant merits of those exhibits. We note

that the lower court did rely on school district rankings submitted by Mother

from Niche.com for the truth of the matter therein, that Upper St. Clair was

one of the top ranked districts in the region. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/23,

at 6-7 (declaring, inter alia, that the Niche.com reports “make it clear that

Upper St. Clair School District is one of the best school districts in the Greater

Pittsburgh Area[]”). However, these exhibits, which were offered by Mother’s

counsel on cross-examination of Father, were not objected to, and Father does

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not challenge their admission in his brief. See Father’s Brief, at 11-12;

Exhibits 7-8; N.T., 5/25/23, at 68-69. Therefore, the question of whether the

trial court improperly relied on the school district rankings contained within

the Niche.com reports is not before this Court.2

       Father’s remaining three appellate issues concern whether the trial court

abused its discretion in awarding Mother sole legal custody to choose the

Children’s school district for the 2023-2024 school year.3 Father argues that

the trial court overemphasized the Children’s potential improved educational

opportunities at Upper St. Clair schools when the Children had friends, were

doing well academically, and are “having a positive experience in Chartiers

Valley.” Father’s Brief, at 10-11. Father contends that the trial court did not

sufficiently consider the Children’s “need for stability and continuity in [their]

educational life” which favored the status quo of Children remaining in

Chartiers Valley where they were already ensconced in both the district and

____________________________________________

2 We observe that this Court has previously determined that similar documents

offered in a custody matter involving school choice constituted hearsay. See
M.S. v. J.K., 2021 WL 3629972 at *8 (Pa. Super. Aug. 17, 2021) (affirming
a finding that a Pennsylvania Department of Education index demonstrating a
school’s academic performance constituted inadmissible hearsay, concluding
that “the report was offered to show the truth of its statements – the quality
of [a] school’s academic program”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (non-
precedential Superior Court decisions after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their
persuasive value).

3 While Father frames his argument as a claim of legal error, he does not argue

that the trial court deviated from applicable law, but instead that it improperly
weighed the relevant factors.

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related activities, and they had extended family on both sides of the family

within that district. See id., at 13-14 (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(4) (child

custody factor of “[t]he need for stability and continuity in the child's

education, family life and community life”)). Father additionally asserts that

the trial court did not place adequate weight on the preference of Z.O., the

elder child, to remain at Chartiers Valley. See id., at 14-15 (citing 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 5328(a)(4) (child custody factor of “[t]he well-reasoned preference of the

child, based on the child's maturity and judgment”)).

      Upon review, we conclude that the trial court thoroughly considered the

competing interests, juxtaposed against the Section 5328(a) precepts, and

reached a well-reasoned decision that Upper St. Clair was in the best interests

of the Children’s “physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being.”

D.K.D., 141 A.3d at 572. In addition to the court’s finding based on its review

of the Niche.com exhibits “that Upper St. Clair is academically superior to

Chartiers Valley,” which the court found to be a “relevant, [but] not

dispositive” factor, Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/23, at 6, the court noted multiple

additional circumstances particular to this case that support Upper St. Clair as

the “better fit” for the Children. Id. at 7. In particular, the court noted

“legitimate concerns” with Chartiers Valley, including Z.O.’s struggles in some

subjects, including math and reading, which Mother attributed to the Chartiers

Valley’s use of the “standardized common core” which does not benefit Z.O.

as she “thinks differently.” Id.; N.T., 12/12/22, at 32. To rectify this issue,

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Mother indicated that the Upper St. Clair School District offers an alternative

path to educational attainment in the International Baccalaureate program,

which she believed to be better suited to Z.O.’s needs. See Trial Court

Opinion, 7/31/23, at 7; N.T., 12/12/22, at 33, 42. The court also focused on

the fact that Z.O. had been involved in four separate fights at Chartiers Valley

during the previous school year. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/23, at 7; N.T.,

5/25/23, at 16-17, 44-45. As to A.O., the court relied on Chartiers Valley not

being able to locate her for an hour as indicia that safety could be a concern

if she were to continue her education in that district. See Trial Court Opinion,

7/31/23, at 7; N.T., 12/12/22, at 32-33.

      Contrary to Father, we find that the trial court appropriately considered

the Children’s testimony regarding which school they would like to attend. As

the court noted, “[n]either of the Children were steadfast in their desire to

attend one school over another.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/23, at 8. This

determination was based upon Z.O.’s testimony that she only was “lean[ing]”

towards Chartiers Valley, but she did not “know where [she] want[ed] to go,”

as well as additional testimony from the Children that they liked or were

excited about activities in the Upper St. Clair community. Id.; N.T., 5/25/23,

at 15. Furthermore, the lower court weighed Father’s concern with continuity

in schools, but noted that Z.O.’s previous struggles in attending a new school

related to virtual learning as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, a

circumstance that would not be present for the upcoming school year. See

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Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/23, at 9; N.T., 5/25/23, at 44. The court also found

that, based upon Mother having physical custody of the Children for the

majority of the school days, they would be less inconvenienced by attending

school in Upper St. Clair. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/23, at 8-9.

      In sum, we conclude that the trial court's findings of fact are supported

by competent evidence, and the conclusions drawn from the court's findings

are reasonable. See Graves, 265 A.3d at 693. While Father requests that this

Court reweigh the evidence and find in his favor on the question of the

Children’s school choice, as an appellate court, we may not usurp the trial

court’s primary authority as factfinder related to questions of custody. See

King v. King, 889 A.2d 630, 632 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“It is not this Court’s

function to determine whether the trial court reached the ‘right’ decision;

rather, we must consider whether, ‘based on the evidence presented, given

due deference to the trial court's weight and credibility determinations,’ the

trial court erred or abused its discretion in awarding custody to the prevailing

party.”) (citation omitted). We therefore affirm the trial court’s award of legal

custody to Mother for the limited purpose of choosing the Children’s school for

the 2023-2024 school year.

      Order affirmed.

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3/26/2024

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