Court Opinion

ID: 9636775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:42:30.650646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:49.309950
License: Public Domain

FRANK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
I disagree with respect to affirmance of the decree in so far as it dismissed the action in rem.
1. In Carroll v. United States, 2 Cir., 133 F.2d 690, 692, 693, we recently said (per Judge Learned Hand) in a well-considered dictum that, notwithstanding the ship was not within the United States when the action commenced and not overlooking Blamberg v. United States, 260 U.S. 452, 43 S.Ct. 179, 67 L.Ed. 346, it would be enough to sustain jurisdiction in rem against the United States that the ship was within the United States at the time of trial, “since the filing of a second libel would be a mere matter of form.” It would indeed constitute a formality. For there need be, and can be, no attachment of a ship belonging to the United States. Libellant — -whether the suit be in personam, in rem, or both — need merely serve a copy of the libel on the United States Attorney, and mail a copy to the Attorney General. Here appellant had given such notices to both the United States Attorney and the Attorney General. And here the ship was within both the United States and the district nine times before the trial began.1
My colleagues, however, stress the fact that the libel as originally filed, did not contain an allegation of an “election” to proceed in rem as well as in personam.2 But my colleagues concede that, on the first day of trial, the libel was amended to include such an allegation. To what seems to me the obvious suggestion that the addition of this allegation could have had no practical effect on the United States, because it could not have altered its position *484as a consequence, my colleagues make this reply: No notice of this amendment was given to the Attorney General; had he been notified that libellants were asserting' an in rem liability, he might (say my colleagues) have wished “to designate one of his assistants to take part in- the trial, although quite content to leave defense of the suit to the United States attorney if an in personam liability were involved.” My colleagues do not — and I think cannot —explain why the Attorney General is more concerned with the defense of an in rem than with an in personam action, since the outcome of the suit, if a libellant wins, is precisely the same in either kind of action.
Accordingly, I think my colleagues’ decision rests on the sheerest formality, and is therefore out of line with pertinent Supreme Court decisions: In Nahmeh v. United States, 267 U.S. 122, 125, 126, 45 S.Ct. 277, 69 L.Ed. 536, the Court (rejecting a contrary view expressed by this court) said “that the rule as to a strict construction of the language of statutes providing for suits against the United States” was inapplicable to the Suits in Admiralty Act, the “liberal provisions” of which “should not be interpreted in a restricted * * * sense.” See also Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 215, 222, 65 S.Ct. 639, 89 L.Ed.. 901.3 With such admonitions I think we should not treat a person suing the United States under that Act far less liberally than if the respondent were a private person. Apposite therefore is F. E. Grauweiler Transport Co. v. Exner Sand & Gravel Corp., 2 Cir., 162 F.2d 90, 92, where we held that a libel in rem may be maintained against a privately-owned vessel even if it- is seized while an appeal is pending. As, in an .in rem suit against the United States, no seizure is permitted, the amendment of the libel, which is the substitute for seizure, should suffice.
My colleagues’ suggestion that the Attorney General, if notified of the amendment, might have desired to designate one of his assistants is, in this case, especially dubious in the light of the following: Counsel for appellee conceded at the oral argument in this court that the defense has been and is being conducted only nominally on behalf of the United States and by the United States Attorney. Joined with him are lawyers who admittedly are acting for the Chilean Line or the Chilean government; for, under the express terms of the. charter from the United States, the charterer and sub-charterer are obligated to the United States to pay any judgment which appellant may recover against the United States. It follows that the Attorney General had no interest in this suit.
2. This fact as to the real but hidden respondent has further significance. As the lawyers for the Chilean Line (or the Chilean government) were actually conducting the defense, we may justifiably assume that they prepared and filed the answer to the libel (although it bore not only their name but also that of the United States Attorney). That answer, as it stood until the opening of the trial, expressly admitted the “admiralty'and maritime jurisdiction of the United States,” and the jurisdiction of the court belwsr; it contained no reference whatever to the charter. When, on April 23, 1947, the trial opened, for the first time the answer was amended (1) to allege the existence of the charter by way of defense to an in person-am action and (2) to .deny jurisdiction in rem. But, by that time, the statute of limitations had run against the Chilean Line and the Chilean government. The existence of the charter destroyed the in personam-claim against the United States. Had the answer sooner disclosed the charter, appellants, before trial and during one of the nine occasions when the ship was within the district,4 could have amended the libel to add the talismanic words and could then have notified the Attorney General.5
I do not suggest that, because of these facts, the existence of the charter should be disregarded as a defense to the in per*485sonam action. I do believe that the strategem of belatedly asserting the charter should not be permitted to defeat the action in rem. I think that, as a condition of allowing appellee to amend its answer at the trial to set up the charter, appellants should have been granted leave to amend their libel nunc pro tunc as of the date of its filing. We set back the clock if we reward procedural wiles. “It has always been the practice,” says Benedict,6 “in American admiralty courts * * * never to allow a party to overcome his adversary by the mantraps and spring guns of covert chicanery, or by the surprises and technicalities of mere pleading and practice.” Even if the defense to the in rem action were actually asserted on behalf of the United States, I would think my colleagues were stretching it too far. Thus to stretch it to aid others, who cunningly employ it as here, is, I believe, peculiarly unjustified.
I would, therefore, reverse the order, in so far as it dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in rem, and remand for a decision on the merits.

The parties filed a stipulation which reads as follows:
“Stipulation Entered Into Between the Parties Showing the Dates When S. S. Tubul Arrived and Departed from the Port of New York—

Date of Depart-

Date of Arrival ure from New

Voy. No. at New York York

D-4 March 20, 1945 Apr. 12, 1945
E-l June 27, 1945 July IS, 1945
E-2 Sept. 24, 1945 Oct. 23, 1945
E-3 Jan. 20, 1946 Jan. 31, 1946
E-4 Apr. 20, 1946 May 8, 1946
F-l July 18, 1946 July 30; 1946
F-2 Oct. 21, 1946 Oct 27, 1946
F-3 Jan. 9, 1947 Jan. 14, 1947
F-4 Feb. 23, 1947 Returned to USA
It is further stipulated that S.S. Tubul was not in the port of New York or any territorial waters of the United States at the time the Libel was filed but was moored to a pier at Valparaiso.”
The trial court expressly found that the ship was present in the district from February 23, 1947 “to the date of trial.” This finding is, I think, supported by the stipulation between the parties showing the dates when the S.S. Tubul arrived at, and departed from, the Port of New York. The stipulation contains three columns, headed “Voy. No.,” “Date of Arrival at New York” and. “Date of Departure from New York.” The last entry lists under these headings in the same order, “F-4,” “February 23, 1947,” and “Returned to USA.” The inference reasonably to be drawn from this last entry is that from February 23, 1947, the last date of arrival in New York, to April 23, 1947, the first day of the trial, when the stipulation was received in evidence as an exhibit, the Tubul had remained in the Port of New York. The libel was amended on April 23, to add the elective words. The stipulation is undated, but appears to have been agreed to when it was offered in evidence; accordingly, absent evidence to the contrary, we should assume that the vessel did not leave the district in the interval from February 23 to the time of trial. This conclusion is aided by the so-called “presumption” of the continuance of a state of facts for a span of time reasonable in the circumstances. It is notable that appellee does not assert that the finding is erroneous. Were it to do so, we should, at most, remand for further evidence on this point.

“Election,” in this context, does not mean an exclusive choice, since a libellant may, in one suit, sue the United States both in rem and in personam.

Cf. Schnell v. United States, D.C., 69 F.Supp. 877, 879.

See the stipulation quoted in footnote 1, supra.

Appellee, in oral argument, contended that the existence of the demise charter was known to appellants when this suit was begun on April 13, 1945. In sup*485port of this contention, appellee refers to appellee’s letter of March 28, 1945, addressed to the Chilean Line, notifying the latter of appellants’ intent to hold it liable.
This letter will not serve that purpose. For, since the bill of lading was signed by the Chilean Line as agent for the ship’s master, it was not unnatural that appellants should notify the Chilean Line.

Benedict, Admiralty (6th Ed.1940) § 335; see also § 223.