Court Opinion

ID: 9399047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 18:03:57.592816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:38.355781
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/1/23 In re Q.W. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

In re Q.W. et al., Persons Coming                             B321132
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_______________________________                               (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                            Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP03074C–D)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,
         v.

K.W.,
         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
      Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               _________________________
      K.W. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Q.W., and son,
K.W., Jr. Father contends the court misconstrued the evidence
and did not properly analyze the beneficial parental relationship
exception set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code1 section
366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), as required by In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). We affirm the order
terminating parental rights.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Events Prior to the Jurisdictional Hearing
      Q.W. (age six), K.W., Jr. (age 20 months), and two of their
older siblings2 came to the attention of the Los Angeles
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in late
March 2020 when S.W. (Mother) was reported to be acting
paranoid and speaking of suicide. According to the reporting
party, Mother usually displayed this behavior when using
methamphetamine; both parents had used it in the past. Older
sibling C.W. confirmed Mother’s conduct and also had seen
Mother choke Father. DCFS found the referral inconclusive.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2      Mother and Father have five children: Ke.W., C.W., Co.W.,
Q.W., and K.W., Jr. Ke.W. was an adult at all times relevant to
this proceeding. C.W. was 17 years old when the family came to
DCFS’s attention and reached majority during the pendency of
the dependency proceedings. Co.W., age 15 at the time the
investigation began, was not similarly situated to Q.W. and K.W.,
Jr., and ultimately was represented by separate counsel. Only
the youngest children, Q.W. and K.W., Jr., are subjects of this
appeal. The older siblings are discussed only when relevant.

                                2
       A few weeks later, in April 2020, Mother was reported to
have been driving erratically, speeding, and running red lights.
She reportedly attempted to hit Father with her vehicle while he
rode a motorcycle—all with the children in her car. The children
were visibly upset and emotionally distraught. Older children
C.W. and Co.W. reported Mother’s dangerous and frightening
driving, her attempt to strike Father with the car, and their
belief that they were going to die during the incident. Mother
denied the allegations and accused DCFS of fabricating them.
She was charged with child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a).
       During DCFS’s investigation, Father repeatedly promised
to get help for Mother, but she did not obtain mental health
services. The parents regularly failed to answer their phones,
and when they did communicate with DCFS, Mother
categorically denied any issues, while Father minimized Mother’s
conduct to the point of claiming Mother’s domestic violence had
been at his behest. C.W. and Co.W. continued to report the home
was unsafe, but Father denied their concerns.
       On June 4, 2020, the children were detained from the
parents and placed with the maternal grandmother. DCFS called
for law enforcement assistance in removing the children because
Father refused to cooperate with the process and possibly
threatened the maternal grandmother.
       Based on the driving incident, DCFS filed a petition
alleging the children were subject to the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious
physical harm) and (b)(1) (failure to protect). At the detention
hearing, the court granted the parents six hours per week of
visitation.

                               3
       In its report filed July 24, 2020, DCFS stated Mother
visited the children “approximately three times a week” after the
court authorized visitation on June 12, 2020. Father told DCFS
he had visited the children twice. On July 7, 2020, the maternal
grandmother reported the parents had not had contact with the
children since the week of June 29, 2020, because Mother and
Father went to Lake Havasu.
       In late June 2020, Q.W. and K.W., Jr. were moved to the
home of the paternal grandparents. C.W. and Co.W. visited their
younger siblings regularly. At first Q.W. cried when her sisters
left or when she went to bed without them, but after a few days
her crying declined. In July 2020, DCFS filed an amended
dependency petition adding allegations relating to Mother’s
domestic violence against Father and the parents’ substance
abuse.
       As of late July 2020, Mother and Father continued to live
together. Mother denied her driving endangered or traumatized
the children. Father seemed to understand and agree Mother
posed a danger to the children, but he minimized her violent
tendencies and the danger she presently posed. Neither parent
was receiving services.
III.   Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing
      On August 6, 2020, the court sustained the allegation
under section 300, subdivision (a) that Mother endangered the
children’s health and safety and placed them at risk of serious
physical harm, damage, and danger when she attempted to strike
Father with her car, as well as when she slapped and punched
Father in the presence of one of the children. The court also
sustained two allegations under section 300, subdivision (b)(1):
(1) Mother’s substance abuse and Father’s failure to protect the

                                4
children from her substance abuse placed them at risk of physical
harm; and (2) Father’s extensive criminal activity, history of
substance abuse, and recent use of alcohol placed the children at
risk of serious physical harm.
       The court removed Q.W. and K.W., Jr. from the parents
and ordered separate monitored visitation and reunification
services.
IV.   First Period of Reunification Services
      During the first period of reunification services, the parents
made no efforts to address case issues. Mother disputed the
legitimacy of the court, refused to discuss the issues underlying
the petition, and said she would not “give in” to DCFS bullying by
participating in unnecessary services. Father maintained DCFS
had unlawfully removed the children, and he neither complied
with court orders nor enrolled in services. Neither parent
submitted to drug testing.
      As of January 2021, Q.W. and K.W., Jr. were receiving
mental health services. K.W., Jr., age two, was reported to be
making progress at decreasing hitting.
      Also as of January 2021, neither parent had a set visitation
schedule. Mother visited “multiple times throughout the week,”
while Father visited the children “typically on the weekends or
his days off from work.” No concerns had been reported with
respect to the visits. DCFS reported Mother and the children
were sad when visits ended; there was no report of sadness when
Father’s visits ended. Father was described as “hands-on with
his children during visitation as they play.”
      The court held the section 366.21, subdivision (e) review
hearing on May 26, 2021. At the hearing, counsel for Q.W and
K.W., Jr. advised the court it was “very clear” from talking with

                                 5
Q.W. “that both children miss their parents and wish to return
home.” However, pursuant to section 317, subdivision (e),3
counsel could not advocate for their return to the parents because
they were not drug testing or participating in services.
      The court found the parents not in compliance with the
case plan and their progress had not been substantial. The court
ordered six more months of services and set the section 366.21,
subdivision (f) review hearing for November 19, 2021.
V.    Second Period of Reunification Services
      On June 9, 2021, the parents told DCFS they believed
DCFS and the court had illegally taken their children and they
threatened to take Q.W. and K.W., Jr. from their placement.
Later that day, the paternal grandfather advised DCFS that the
parents had taken Q.W. and K.W., Jr. DCFS reported the
abduction to the police, who found the children safe at the
parents’ home. The children were returned to the paternal
grandparents.
      On July 2, 2021, the parents again took Q.W. and K.W., Jr.
from their placement. DCFS was unable to locate the family. On
July 7, 2021, the court issued protective custody warrants for the
children and arrest warrants for the parents. After tracking the
family’s phones pursuant to a warrant, on August 25, 2021,
DCFS and law enforcement located the parents, Q.W., and K.W.,

3      Section 317, subdivision (e)(2) provides that if the child is
four years of age or older, the minor’s counsel shall interview the
child to determine the child’s wishes and assess the child’s well-
being and shall advise the court of the child’s wishes. However,
“[c]ounsel shall not advocate for the return of the child if, to the
best of his or her knowledge, return of the child conflicts with the
protection and safety of the child.” (§ 317, subd. (e)(2).)

                                 6
Jr. at a campground in Needles, near the California-Arizona
border. The children were retrieved and placed in a confidential
foster care placement on August 25, 2021.
       The children adjusted well to the new placement, although
K.W., Jr. “display[ed] concerning behaviors such as hitting,
biting, and tantrums. In addition, [K.W., Jr.] spontaneously
began to share with the foster mother that he has witnessed the
father hitting the mother. [K.W., Jr.] disclosed that father was
‘not nice to my mom’ and the mother was crying because ‘he just
hits her.’ ” K.W., Jr. said Father was “freaking out” Mother.
       At a September 1, 2021 hearing, counsel for Q.W. and
K.W., Jr. advised the court, “The kids are really hurting after
everything that’s happened with these parents,” and she
requested immediate therapy referrals. Counsel also informed
the court that despite the parents’ actions, Q.W. was “desperate”
for contact with them.
       The court said, “I . . . believe that the trauma that these
children went through are clearly held in the hands of the
parents who took these children from placement, refused to
cooperate, took these children out of state.” The court ordered
therapy for the children immediately and suspended the parents’
visitation until they appeared in court and were willing to follow
court orders.
       The court reinstated visitation on September 30, 2021, and
as of late October 2021, the parents visited the children by video
call twice per week. Father was not engaged in the video calls,
and when K.W., Jr. lost interest on a call, Father did not attempt
to reengage him.
       As of October 2021, the children were both receiving mental
health services, and K.W., Jr. was to be assessed soon for

                                7
additional services, including behavioral therapy to address his
biting, hitting, and tantrums.
       The parents had their first in-person visit with Q.W. and
K.W., Jr. on November 10, 2021. On November 24, 2021, as
Mother’s visit ended and Father’s began, she announced she was
taking the children home with her. The children cried and
appeared scared. Mother yelled for the children to come to her,
and told Father to grab the children, but social workers took the
children back into the office. Mother searched the office for the
children until the police arrived. The children were driven away
from the DCFS office with a police escort.
       After this incident, the children regressed. They woke up
with nightmares, and K.W., Jr., who had been potty-trained,
went back to using pull-up diapers.
       In December 2021, the children’s counsel told the court
Q.W. wanted to continue in-person parent visits. Counsel asked
that Father’s in-person visits continue because he had not been
involved in Mother’s confrontation at the DCFS office. The court
permitted both parents to continue in-person visits at the DCFS
office with a security guard.
       At the section 366.21, subdivision (f) review hearing on
January 5, 2022, counsel for Q.W. and K.W., Jr. advised the court
that Q.W. wished to return home, and if she could not return
home she wanted her parents to have additional reunification
services. The court terminated reunification services and set the
section 366.26 permanency planning hearing (.26 hearing) for
May 2, 2022.
       Q.W. wanted to keep visiting her family. The court
continued the parents’ in-person visits once per week, provided
they took place “at the DCFS office with security present. And

                                8
security needs to be outside the room, not just security in the
building.”
VI.   Termination of Parental Rights

       A.     Events Prior to Hearing
       In a report filed on April 20, 2022, DCFS advised the court
that eight-year-old Q.W. was intelligent, able to articulate her
thoughts and feelings, and capable of maintaining interpersonal
relationships with people outside her caregivers and family. She
was receiving mental health services; she was receptive and
enjoyed working with her therapist. K.W., Jr., age three, was
verbal and able to articulate when he was upset or needed
something; but he was struggling with behavioral issues, namely
biting, hitting, and throwing tantrums. He was also receiving
mental health services, and he was about to begin specialized
therapy targeting his behavioral problems.
       Q.W. told the social worker she would like to remain with
her caregivers if she could not return to her parents. She felt safe
with her caregivers, they were nice to her, and they made her feel
like part of the family. K.W., Jr., was too young to interview, but
DCFS reported he appeared comfortable and bonded with his
caregivers.
       The caregivers were willing to adopt Q.W. and K.W., Jr.,
although they were concerned about their family’s safety due to
the parents’ combativeness. They feared the parents would track
them and possibly harm or kidnap the children if parental rights
were terminated.
       DCFS submitted an addendum report on April 28, 2022,
informing the court the caregivers had been approved as
prospective adoptive parents. Q.W. had again stated she wanted

                                 9
to live with the caregivers forever and to be adopted if she could
not live with her parents.
       The following day, DCFS reported to the court that on April
27, 2022, the children had been subjected to an attempted
abduction. The DCFS monitor driving the children back to their
placement after a parental visit exited the freeway when a
vehicle followed her closely and activated police lights. A man
claiming to be an FBI agent approached and said his supervisor
and law enforcement would respond to the scene. The man
produced no identification, wore a Vans T-shirt, drove a Jeep, and
did not explain why he stopped the vehicle. He spoke into a
walkie-talkie, and a large white vehicle pulled up. The man told
the monitor the children were “Court ordered to be the property
of the State” who would not be returning to their placement. The
monitor began to question whether he was an FBI agent.
       The man demanded the children exit the car and attempted
to open the car door. The children were crying and said they
wanted to go back to their caregiver. When Q.W. told the
monitor she recognized the man as her parents’ friend, the
monitor immediately called 911, prompting the man and the
other vehicle to flee. The monitor and the children were escorted
home by police. After this incident, K.W., Jr. began to show
physical symptoms of distress, including diarrhea and a fever.
       On May 2, 2022, the court postponed the .26 hearing until
May 9 and suspended visitation. On May 6, DCFS submitted a
last minute report containing the caregivers’ description of
parental visits. The children became excited about visits with
their parents: Q.W. would pick out activities and crafts to do
with them, and K.W., Jr. would be energetic. On the way home
after visits, the children would describe what they had done.

                               10
They would still be happy and energetic on the drive, but once
home, K.W., Jr. would become defiant, throw tantrums, make a
mess of his bedroom, and throw his belongings.
      K.W., Jr.’s diarrhea and fever after the most recent
abduction attempt had gone away, but he woke up five to six
times per night with night terrors and crying. He was wearing a
pull-up diaper at night because he had started having accidents
and soiling himself.
      Q.W.’s therapist reported trying to discuss the incident
with Q.W., but she had “shut down” and did not seem ready to
process the trauma. Q.W. would discuss school, friends, and play,
but not her family.
      The social worker attempted to interview Q.W. about the
incident, but Q.W. was short in her responses and avoided detail.
Q.W. said she recognized the “FBI person” as her parents’ friend
because his daughter was her friend. The man wanted to take
her, and she felt “sad” and “scared” during the incident.
      Q.W. wanted to continue visits with her family. She denied
being afraid of her parents or being physically harmed by them.
Q.W. wanted to live with her parents, but if she could not, then
she wanted to live with her caregivers.

     B.    The .26 Hearing

            1.     Q.W.’s testimony
      Under examination by Mother’s counsel, Q.W. testified she
enjoyed her visits with Mother, during which they colored, made
bracelets, and discussed how she was doing in school. Q.W.
enjoyed the conversations. When asked if she missed Mother,
Q.W. said yes and began to cry.

                               11
       The court went off the record; when proceedings resumed,
the court noted Q.W. was sitting in the lap of the caregiver and
felt “more comfortable” that way. Father objected to Q.W. sitting
in the caregiver’s lap but agreed to her sitting next to the
caregiver while she testified.
       When testimony resumed, Q.W. testified she felt sad when
Mother left at the end of visits, and she would like to continue
visiting with Mother. Mother had never hurt Q.W. and she was
not afraid of Mother. She wanted to live with Mother at some
point. Q.W. also testified she missed Ke.W. and C.W, she enjoyed
visits with them, and she would like to continue the visits.
       When questioned by Father’s counsel, Q.W. testified she
enjoyed spending time with Father; they played with cars during
visits. If it were her choice, she would live with her parents. She
understood what adoption meant, and she wanted to be adopted
if she could not live with her parents. She understood she might
never see her parents or sisters again if she were adopted. It
would make her sad not to see her parents again. During her
testimony, Q.W. had to be instructed to stop holding the
caregiver’s hand.

            2.    Father’s Testimony
      Father testified he visited Q.W. and K.W., Jr. weekly for
two hours at a DCFS office. When asked why his visits were only
once per week, he said that was what the commissioner had
ordered, and when he asked someone about more visits, the
person said she would look into it but never responded.
      Q.W. and K.W., Jr. were excited to see Father at visits.
Father said he “bring[s] them their RC cars to play with, that’s
something that we’ve always done. [Q.W.] likes to play memory
and Uno, and games like that. My son likes [to] kick the ball.

                                12
We draw, watch [Q.W.] do gymnastics.” At the end of visits, the
children were “very sad and confused.” They would ask why they
could not go home, and Q.W. had written Father a letter begging
to come home.
       Ke.W. typically accompanied Father on visits. Father said
Q.W. and K.W., Jr. were very close to and bonded with Ke.W. and
C.W.
       In Father’s view, being removed from her parents “has
destroyed [Q.W]. She is—she has no idea why she was
removed. . . . .[S]he just doesn’t understand why she can’t come
home. [¶] And I can just tell by her, just her overall being that
she’s sad a lot. She puts on a good face, but I know that she’s
very sad.” Father said K.W., Jr. wanted to come home. He
emphasized that the family “did everything together. And we are
very family[-]oriented. We vacation an awful lot in our vacation
home . . . .”
       Father said it was not in Q.W. and K.W., Jr.’s best interest
to be adopted because, “I haven’t done anything. And to have my
kids taken. And I’ve done very—I’ve been very mindful not to
discuss the case with them. You know, so it’s hard when they ask
me. And, you know, I do my best to give them a comforting
answer. But at the end of the day, they just don’t understand.
And because, you know . . . my wife home-schooled [Q.W]. She
was—we were always together with [Q.W]. And like I said, my
son, you know, now has—you know, he was with me for
18 months. And then he was with my father. But the minute
that he sees me, he just—it’s just—it’s hard. [¶] I think family is
the most important thing. And I do appreciate the love and the
kindness that the caregivers appear to be providing for my
children. But at the same time, you know, no one is ever going to

                                13
love them like their mom and dad. [¶] And I know that my son
can be a handful. And I just want an opportunity to raise my
kids.”

               3.     Mother’s Testimony
       Mother testified that at no time on or before April 27, 2022,
had she instructed anyone to take the children away from DCFS.
Her counsel asked if anyone had ever told her they were going to
try to take the children from DCFS. The children’s counsel
objected to the question as leading, and the court found the
question irrelevant because, “[a]t a .26 hearing, the only relevant
factors are the relationship between the parents and the children
and the visitation, not any allegations or statements.”
       Mother had visited Q.W. and K.W., Jr. since they were
removed from her care. C.W. attended Mother’s visits. C.W.’s
relationship with Q.W. and K.W., Jr. was very close; they were
interactive, and they laughed and had fun. During visits, Q.W.
and K.W., Jr. were happy. Ending visits was hard because the
children wanted to come home.
       Mother believed the children would benefit from a
continued relationship with her “[b]ecause I love them and they
want to be home, they need to be home. This is killing
them. . . . [I]t is in their best interest and it is for their wellbeing
to be home.” Asked how the children would be better off at home,
Mother responded, “[W]e’re their family. We were a very close
family. We did everything together. And even when they were
with my dad and my mom, they were sad, they wanted to be
home.” Before removal, the family read, did activities,
vacationed, and spent time together and with friends.
       Mother believed Ke.W.’s visits with Q.W. and K.W., Jr were
beneficial to the children “[b]ecause they play with their RC cars,

                                  14
and I know that that makes them happy. And they hug them.
And when they do get there, I am usually clocking out, and I see
their interactions. And it’s good, it’s loving.”

             4.     Other Testimony
       The parents’ oldest child, 21-year-old Ke.W, testified she
had visited Q.W. and K.W., Jr. in person for two hours each week
since December 2021. She and Father visited the children
together. During visits, they played with toy cars, colored, and
played card games, and the children laughed and smiled. At
every visit Q.W. and K.W., Jr. told her they missed her. At the
end of visits, Q.W. and K.W., Jr. were sad to leave, wanted to
come home, and cried.
       Ke.W. loved Q.W. and K.W., Jr. and she believed they loved
her. Q.W. and K.W., Jr. would benefit from continuing the
sibling relationship because, Ke.W. said, “[F]amily is really
important. And you’re always going to have your family. I think
they should be able to be with their family. And we always had a
really close bond.”
       C.W. testified she had visited Q.W. and K.W., Jr. weekly
since the prior December or January. During visits, they colored
and read. Sometimes Q.W. did gymnastics, and C.W. played with
K.W., Jr. and his cars. The children were happy during visits but
became sad when visits ended.
       C.W. believed she had a bond with Q.W. and K.W., Jr.; she
loved them and believed they loved her. At visits the children
said they missed Mother and C.W., and they wanted to be home.
C.W. believed the children would benefit from a continued
relationship with her, testifying, “They are like my best friends.
And not being with them is so hard. So, seeing them would be
beneficial. Because like we make each other happy.”

                               15
       Mother called the social worker to testify about her report
that after visits the children were happy and energetic, but when
they returned home, K.W., Jr. was defiant, made a mess in his
room, and threw his possessions. The social worker testified the
caregivers reported this typically happened after virtual or in-
person visits with the parents. The social worker opined K.W.,
Jr.’s conduct “would be in regards [to] the trauma from a child
having to depart from his biological parents coming placement
[sic] with his current caregivers, acting out in that sense.” She
testified the behavior possibly was caused by the trauma of
separating from the parents.
      C.    Argument
       Counsel for Q.W. and K.W., Jr. told the court Q.W. “wanted
the court to know she loves her parents and her sisters, and this
is a very hard decision for her, but she wanted the court to know
that she would like to be adopted, and inform the court today
under very challenging circumstances that everyone has seen,
that if she cannot live with her parents, she would like to be
adopted.” Noting the question was not a return to parents but
the selection of a permanent plan, the children’s counsel argued
for the termination of parental rights. Counsel argued the
parents failed to demonstrate a relationship with the children
that met the Caden C. standard, and the benefits of permanency
and the adoptive home outweighed those of legal guardianship.
       Mother argued the beneficial parental relationship and the
sibling relationship exceptions to the termination of parental
rights applied. The parents’ regular visits evidenced their love
for their children. Mother asserted there was a “real
relationship” between the parents and the children: the children
were happy during visits, they played games and talked, and the

                                16
“parents have the ability to teach their kids things that others
would not.” Mother contended there was a strong bond between
Q.W. and K.W., Jr. and their siblings, and it was in their best
interest to continue the sibling relationship as well.
       Father argued the beneficial parental relationship
exception applied. He visited consistently, the children enjoyed
spending time with him, and there had never been problems with
his visits. Father contended, “There is more than sufficient
evidence . . . both children clearly love their father, love spending
time with him, and have asked him repeatedly that they wish to
come home and cannot. And they express that they did not
understand why they weren’t able to come home.”
       Father emphasized that Q.W. had testified she wanted to
live with her parents, the children “were raised in the family
home with both their parents, with all of their older siblings in
the same home before they were removed,” and there was a close
relationship among the children, their parents, and their siblings.
He argued Q.W.’s distress at the mere mention of missing her
mother and K.W., Jr.’s post-visit behavioral problems showed
their attachment to their parents. The evidence, Father argued,
also showed it would be detrimental to the children for their
relationship with their siblings to be terminated.
       DCFS argued no exceptions to adoption applied. DCFS
conceded the parents had visited consistently, but argued they
had not demonstrated a beneficial relationship with the children
or that any detriment would result from terminating parental
rights. DCFS maintained that contact with the parents caused
the children’s regression and negative behaviors and that the
children were torn between their parents and the stability of
their placement. DCFS acknowledged the older siblings’ strong

                                 17
feelings toward the children, but argued mere sadness from the
siblings and positive visits did not demonstrate the sibling
relationships outweighed the benefits of permanency.
      D.    The Court’s Ruling
       The court found the children adoptable. The court noted
they had been in their placement since August 25, 2021, and
therefore had been with the caregivers for close to one year.
       The court said it did not hear any evidence “the children
would be harmed if I were to terminate parental rights.” The
court saw “the tears of the parents and their older siblings about
the relationships that they will lose,” and it attributed Q.W.’s
emotional response during her testimony to the tremendous
pressure of testifying.
       The court continued, “But she has a relationship with the
people who live with her. But, again, that’s not the key factor
here. Whether or not the parents complied with the prior court-
ordered case plan is not a factor here. The factor is what are we
going to do today? If I were to order legal guardianship, would
that be in the best interest of the children?” The court said,
“[N]o. Because that will essentially put the children in the same
situation they are in now, but until they turn 18.” The court
believed it was not in their best interest to be “in a constant state
of flux”; based on their ages and the intent of the Legislature,
they should have “the right of permanency that’s appropriate.
And the permanency for their ages eight and three are adoption.”
       The court agreed the parents had visited consistently. The
court said the next question was whether an emotional bond
existed between the children and their parents, and this involved
consideration of numerous factors. One factor was how much of
their lives the children had lived with their parents. The court

                                 18
first said, “So this case has had the children in a foster home for
approximately two years,” which was incorrect because the
children were placed with grandparents for the first year of their
out-of-home placement. The court immediately said, correctly,
“So for approximately two years, the children were removed from
the care of the parents.” The court observed that as K.W., Jr.
was nearly four, “the approximate time that he spent with his
parents versus out of their care is even at this point.” Eight-year-
old Q.W. had spent “the majority of her life with her parents in
their home,” the court said, but then inaccurately stated “she
spent the last two years with [K.W., Jr.] in the home that they
are currently living” in. The court noted the parents’ visits had
been consistent but were once per week.
       The court noted the necessary emotional attachment and
bond flowed from the child to the parent, not from the parent to
the child. The court said it, “heard a lot from the parents today
about . . . how the family did a lot of things together and they did
what a family does and they went on vacations together.” While
that was important, “[t]here is always going to be some form of
benefit that is derived from a biological parent with a child.” The
issue was, “are they going to be harmed if I terminate the parent-
child relationship today?”
       The court rejected Mother’s argument that the parents
could teach the children “things that others would not,” stating
that although the parents had visited, “I don’t agree that they
taught the children things that they weren’t taught or they
couldn’t be taught by anyone else. I don’t think that they
developed a relationship with the children that was so important
that they had to continue that relationship or the children have
to see the parents in order to be able to function.” The court

                                19
thought counsel’s argument about the children’s behavior after
visits “was somewhat downplaying the trauma that they
experienced from some of the contact and also the difficult
feelings that the children are experiencing.” It concluded, “When
looking at all of the facts on a whole, the parents failed to meet
the burden by establishing that emotional attachment that is
compelling and that would provide the children with detriment if
I were to proceed today to terminate parental rights.”
       The court said it was not considering the facts of the
petition or the parents’ lack of cooperation. The court also found
the sibling relationship exception did not apply. Finding no
exceptions to adoption, the court terminated parental rights.
                          DISCUSSION
       Father contends the court misconstrued the facts and the
evidence, imposed an inappropriate consideration in its analysis
of the beneficial parental relationship exception, and therefore
failed to recognize that Q.W. and K.W., Jr. had significant
emotional attachments to their parents and would suffer
detriment if Father’s rights were terminated.
I.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      “To guide the court in selecting the most suitable
permanent arrangement” for a dependent child who cannot be
returned to a parent’s care, section 366.26 “lists plans in order of
preference and provides a detailed procedure for choosing among
them.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 630; see § 366.26,
subd. (b).) At the permanency planning hearing, if the court finds
that the child is likely to be adopted and that “there has been a
previous determination that reunification services be terminated,
then the court shall terminate parental rights to allow for

                                20
adoption. [Citation.] But if the parent shows that termination
would be detrimental to the child for at least one specifically
enumerated reason, the court should decline to terminate
parental rights and select another permanent plan.” (Caden C.,
at pp. 630–631; see § 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi), (c)(4)(A).)
       One of the exceptions, the beneficial parental relationship
exception, applies when (1) “the parent has regularly visited with
the child”; (2) “the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship”; and (3) “terminating the relationship would be
detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 629;
see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) “The first element—regular
visitation and contact—is straightforward. The question is just
whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the
extent permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C., at p. 632.)
       To establish the second element, that the child would
benefit from continuing the parental relationship, the parent
must show the child has a “substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The “focus is the child,” and “the
relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age
of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Id. at
p. 632.)
       “Concerning the third element—whether ‘termination
would be detrimental to the child due to’ the relationship—the
court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to
sever the relationship and choose adoption.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) “When the relationship with a parent is so

                                21
important to the child that the security and stability of a new
home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be
‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship
with a parent.” (Id. at pp. 633–634.)
       The parent bears the burden to show the statutory
exception applies. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th
823, 826.) When a parent meets that burden, the beneficial
parental relationship exception applies such that it would not be
in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights. In
that case, the court must select a permanent plan other than
adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636–637.)
       We review the court’s findings using a hybrid approach: for
the first two elements, which require factual findings (parental
visitation and the child’s emotional attachment), we apply the
substantial evidence standard of review; and for the court’s
weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating
parental rights, we use the abuse of discretion standard. (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) However, when a party
with the burden of proof did not carry that burden, “the question
for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a
finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.]
Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s
evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In
re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, disapproved on other
grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010,
fn. 7.)

                                 22
II.   The Juvenile Court’s Caden C. Analysis
       The first element of the exception, regular visitation, is not
in dispute; by all accounts the parents maintained regular
visitation and contact with Q.W and K.W., Jr.
       On the second element, whether the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship, “it is critical for the juvenile
court at the second step of the analysis to consider the evidence
showing whether the parent’s actions or inactions ‘continued or
developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child
to parent.’ ” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230.)
Father argues the juvenile court erred in multiple respects when
analyzing the second element.
      A.    Caregiver Relationships
       Father argues the juvenile court improperly relied on the
children’s relationships with their current caregivers in finding
the second element of the beneficial parental relationship
exception was not met. As Father notes, the second element does
not involve consideration of a child’s relationship with the
caregiver. “That a child may have more than one person who
stands in the role of parents does not defeat the exception; a
strong relationship with one parental figure does not negate the
harm the child would experience if the child were to lose a
significant and positive relationship with the parents.” (In re
M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 848.)
       Father has not demonstrated the court impermissibly
considered the children’s relationships with their caregivers in
evaluating the second Caden C. element. Although Father does
not identify in his argument the evidence on which he relies, it
appears he intends to refer to the juvenile court’s statement that

                                 23
Q.W. had “a relationship with the people who live with her,” the
caregivers.4 While the court did say Q.W. “has a relationship
with the people who live with her,” it immediately discounted
that fact, saying, “But, again, that’s not the key factor here.” The
court also noted the parents’ lack of case plan compliance was not
a factor to consider, identified the operative question as whether
legal guardianship was in the children’s best interest, and
concluded it was not.
       Next, the court performed the Caden C. analysis. At no
point in that analysis did the court discuss the children’s
relationships with their caregivers. The court did mention the
duration of the children’s placement with the caregivers, but it
did so in the course of calculating the portion of the children’s
lives spent in their parents’ custody, a consideration endorsed in
Caden C. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) Father has not
established the court relied on the children’s relationships with
the caregivers in finding the second element of the exception was
not met.
      B.    Visitation Frequency
      Father argues the court “misconstrued the evidence
regarding the nature of Father’s visitation over the life of the
case as having occurred once per week.” Father contends he
visited more than once per week “for the majority of the case.”

4     Father set forth the evidence for his arguments separately
from the arguments, and he did not always identify which
evidence pertained to his individual contentions. However, the
only statement in the evidence paragraph pertaining to the
children’s relationship with the caregivers is the court’s
statement that Q.W. had a relationship with the people she lived
with.

                                24
He asserts that during the first year of the children’s out-of-home
placement, when they were placed with their grandparents,
“Father visited the children multiple times per week, on the
weekends and on his days off.”
       We have reviewed the evidence in the record pertaining to
visitation. In a report filed July 24, 2020, DCFS reported Mother
visited the children “approximately three times a week” after the
court first authorized visitation on June 12, 2020. Father told
DCFS he had visited the children twice.
       On July 7, 2020, the maternal grandmother reported the
parents had not had regular visitation with the children since the
week of June 29, 2020, because Mother and Father had gone to
Lake Havasu.
       DCFS reported in January 2021 that Mother visited
“multiple times throughout the week.” Father was not described
as visiting the children multiple times each week: he visited
“typically on the weekends or his days off from work.”
       Father relies on two reports, prepared well after the first
year of the children’s out of home placement, that summarized
visitation during the first year. Those reports, filed in October
2021 and April 2022, state that before the parents took the
children from their placement in July 2021, “it was reported that
Mr. and Ms. W[.] visited the minors . . . multiple times
throughout the week . . . .” This does not appear to be consistent
with the contemporaneous reports of Father’s visitation.
Accordingly, it appears the evidence is at least unclear, if not in
conflict, as to the frequency of Father’s visits during the first year
of the children’s out-of-home placement.
       Father next states the children were with him from July 2,
2021 to August 25, 2021, “albeit in violation of court orders.” To

                                 25
any extent Father intends to suggest that removing the children
from their placement without court authorization constitutes
visitation or is relevant to determining visit frequency, we are
aware of no authority supporting such a proposition, and Father
supplies none.
       As Father notes, visitation was suspended during
September 2021; this was because the parents had absconded
with the children.
       Father asserts that virtual visitation resumed twice per
week after September 30, 2021, and that “beginning January 5,
2022 and through the hearing on May 9, 2022, visitation was
once per week in-person.” Father’s statements imply he visited
the children twice per week from the end of September 2021
through early January 2022. That is not the case. The twice-
weekly visits lasted for less than six weeks: on November 10,
2021, Father began visiting the children once per week. This
continued until May 2, 2022, when his visitation was again
suspended.
       Upon our review of the record, therefore, it appears that
from June 2020 through June 2021, Father may have visited the
children multiple times per week during some weeks, but he did
not visit at all during others. From early July 2021 to September
30, 2021, there was no visitation, first because Father and
Mother took the children from their placement, and then because
visitation was suspended. For approximately six weeks between
September 30, 2021, and November 10, 2021, Father visited the
children twice per week, but his visits were once per week from
November 10, 2021, until May 2, 2022, when they stopped
entirely. The evidence does not preclude, but neither does it

                               26
unequivocally establish, that Father visited the children multiple
times per week for the majority of the case.
       More fundamentally, we are not persuaded that the court’s
failure to perceive there were any periods of time during which
Father visited more often than once per week impacted its
evaluation of the second Caden C. element. Father claims that
“[h]ad the juvenile court understood the true nature of Father’s
visitation, it would have found that those visits continued the
significant emotional attachments that [Q.W.] and [K.W., Jr.]
formed while living with Father,” but this argument is conclusory
and speculative. He offers no argument demonstrating that if the
court had been aware of his possible multiple visits per week
during the first year of the children’s out-of-home placement and
his six weeks of twice-weekly virtual visitation in October and
November 2021, it would have found the children had a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to him such that they
would benefit from continuing the relationship (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 636), and on this record we cannot identify any
reason to conclude that would have been the case.
      C.    Duration of Placement with Caregivers
      At the start of its comments, the court accurately stated the
duration of the children’s placement: the court said, “They have
been living in the home with their current caregiver since about
August 25, 2021, so we’re going on close to a year that they have
been living in the same home with the same caregivers.”
However, as Father points out, the court later confused the
length of time the children had been out of the custody of their
parents with the duration of their placement with their then-
present caregivers. The court said the children had been in their
current placement for the past two years, when in fact they had

                                27
been placed with grandparents for just over one year, were
missing for approximately two months, and then were placed
with the caregivers from late August 2021 through the
.26 hearing in May 2022.
        Father argues if the court had understood this timing, “it
would have better understood the nature of the bond between
Father and the children,” but he does not argue the court would
have analyzed the second element any differently. Nor can we
envision any way the court’s inaccuracy impacted its analysis.
The court misstated the duration of the children’s then-current
placement in the course of evaluating a factor identified in Caden
C., “ ‘the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody.’ ”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632, italics added.) Despite its
misstatement, the court accurately calculated the relevant time
period, how much of the children’s lives had been spent in
Father’s custody.5
      D.     Evidence of Detriment
       Father argues the court’s analysis of the second Caden C.
element was flawed because it “misconstrued the evidence
bearing on the harm and/or detriment that would befall the
children if parental rights were terminated,” and the evidence
established they would suffer detriment from the termination of
their relationship with him. Father sets forth the evidence that
the children missed him, enjoyed visiting with him, were excited

5     To whatever extent Father intends to argue the time when
the parents absconded with the children should be counted as
time in parental custody, Father has not demonstrated that this
period of slightly less than two months would have shed any light
beneficial to him on the “nature of the bond between Father and
the children.”

                                  28
for visits and happy during visits, felt sad when visits ended, and
wanted to return home, as well as Q.W.’s statement that she
would be sad if she could not visit with him in the future. He
argues if the court had understood that “being ‘sad’ at the end of
visits, continuing to miss the parent despite being comfortable in
an out of home placement, and being sad at the thought of never
seeing the parent again can be evidence of detriment, it would
have realized there was evidence of harm and/or detriment to the
children.”
       Although Father claims the court misconstrued this
evidence in assessing the second element of the Caden C.
analysis, evidence bearing on whether the termination of a child’s
relationship with a parent would be detrimental to the child is
not considered when analyzing the second element. Detriment is
the third Caden C. element. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 633 [“Concerning the third element—whether ‘termination
would be detrimental to the child due to’ the relationship—the
court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to
sever the relationship and choose adoption]”.) Father’s
argument, therefore, fails to establish any error in the court’s
ruling that the parents failed to carry their burden on the second
element, that is, they failed to show the children would benefit
from continuing the relationship.
       Moreover, any error in the court’s evaluation of the third
element does not require reversal because the parents failed to
meet their burden on the second element. Only when a parent
establishes the first two elements of the beneficial parental
relationship exception does the court proceed to determine
whether terminating the attachment would be detrimental to the

                                29
child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a
new, adoptive home. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
III.   Conclusion
      As discussed above, Father’s arguments that the court
relied on an improper consideration and misconstrued the
evidence do not establish error in its analysis of the second Caden
C. element. Because the court determined the parents failed to
carry their burden of proving the beneficial parental relationship
exception applied, Father must demonstrate on appeal that his
“evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ”
(In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) Father has not
attempted to make that showing, and from our review of the
record, the evidence of the quality and nature of the children’s
relationship with Father did not compel a finding in his favor on
the second element or on the exception itself.
                          DISPOSITION
       The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                          STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.                   WILEY, J.

                                30