Court Opinion

ID: 9701553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:24:31.078865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:24.685214
License: Public Domain

*145Dissenting Opinion by
President Judge Crumlish, Jr.:
I must dissent. By its decision today, this Court has abrogated the intent of the legislature to shield officials of political subdivisions merely from negligent acts. By extending the meaning to encompass intentional torts, the majority has cloaked political subdivision officials with an unprecedented mantle of immunity and, by doing so, has granted these officials tyrannical powers.
In my judgment, this Act was never intended to shield these officials from liability for intentional torts.
Section 8542 of the Act imposes liability on a political subdivision if two conditions are satisfied: 1) the injury was caused by a person who would be liable if not for the general immunity conveyed by §§8541 and 8546 and 2) the injury was caused by the negligent acts of the subdivision or its employees acting within the scope of their duties. The Act then enumerates eight acts of negligence for which liability may be imposed.
Further provision is made that an employee will only be liable to the extent that his employer (political subdivision) is liable; however, the Act then removes the cloak of immunity when there is a judicial determination, §8550, that the alleged act “constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct....” These provisions of the Act, when read together, evidence an intent to impose personal liability on an employee when he commits an intentional tort.
Obviously, since the Act does not bar a suit against the Supervisors for these alleged intentional torts, the only immunity available as a defense to this suit would be in judicial concepts of immunity.
In Picariello v. Commonwealth,1 54 Pa. Common*146wealth Ct. 252, 421 A.2d 477, this Court, in addressing similar issues raised under the Sovereign Immunity Act, concluded that a suit against the Commonwealth and Department of Revenue was barred because the alleged defamation, invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress actions failed to fit within any of the enumerated exceptions to sovereign immunity. This Court then addressed the issue of whether the Secretary of the Department of Revenue would also be immune from suit. In doing so, this Court did not grant blanket immunity by asserting, as this Court had today, that these actions did not fit within the enumerated categories of liability. Instead, we applied the guidelines enunciated in DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 292 (1979), stating:
DuBree holds that a public official shall not be shielded by immunity where, three elements conjoin: (1) under analogous rules of law, involving a predictable standard of care, a right of action would lie; (2) available remedies have not been left unused by the plaintiff; and (3) no public policy would be promoted by a shield of official immunity. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 259, 421 A.2d at 481.
*147I would assert that this same reasoning is applicable here.2 Considering the reasoning of DuBree, I would hold that, as in Picariello, nothing in the pleadings3 has addressed the issue of whether public policy would be best served by shielding these officials. The pleadings are so general as to prevent a judicial determination as to the public policy issue.
I would overrule the preliminary objections of the Supervisors with leave to amend the pleadings.4

 See also, Swartz v. Masloff, 62 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 522, 437 A.2d 472 (1981), where this Court discussed the implications of *146the Supreme Court’s abolition of the doctrines of sovereign and official immunity. In examining the complaint in that case, this Court concluded:
[T]he factual allegations against the Appellees, even if true would not constitute willful misconduct under 42 Pa. C. S.; §8550 nor would they fall within the ambit of actions against public officials now permitted under DuBree. Rather, we are satisfied that the complained of conduct of the Appellees falls within the protection afforded by 42 Pa. C. S. §8546(3) and the mandate of DuBree that the policymaking discretion of public servants must be protected.
Id. at 527, 437 A.2d at 475.

 See The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act: Pennsylvania’s Response to the Problems of Municipal Tort Liability, 84 Dick L. Rev. 717, 750 (1980). This article discusses the very point raised before this Court, i.e., whether the Act was ever intended to allow immunity for intentional torts and also concludes that the legislature could never have intended the result reached by the majority.

 I believe the first two elements of the DuBree test are present here, i.e., a cause of action which may be measured against a predictable standard of care, and no other available remedy, because the suit against the Township is barred by the Act.

 See Pa. R.C.P. No. 1028(d).