Court Opinion

ID: 9519270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:12:48.114809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:12.001359
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN, dissenting: There are no real distinctions between the contract involved in this case and the contract in American Buyers Club v. Grayling, 53 Ill. App. 3d 611, 368 N.E.2d 1057. In my opinion, the holding in this case is in direct conflict with our holding in Grayling wherein another panel of this court held that same contract to be void because it was in violation of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, commonly known as the “Truth in Lending Act” (15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq. (1976)) and Regulation Z promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board (12 C.F.R. §226.1 et seq. (1977)). In Grayling it was also held that this contract was subject to the defense of unconscionability because it was written in a manner to evade the State and Federal laws and to deceive the buyer. We said in Grayling: “Although unnecessary to the decision we reach we note that the trial court’s finding that the contract was unconscionable was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. It is obviously written in a manner to evade Federal law as the foregoing discussion indicates. It is also designed to lead the purchaser to believe that he is actually becoming a member of a club rather than arranging for the purchase of goods or services. The first payment is called an ‘initiation fee’ and the remaining payments are denominated ‘dues.’ The contract is termed a ‘member benefit agreement’ and speaks of a waiting period required before an ‘application’ can be ‘processed’ and ‘accepted.’ However, it is apparent that there are no club benefits involved and that the purchasers are members of a club in name only. The contract does not provide for membership participation in the election of officers or directors, nor in respect to the exercise of club powers or the cost of club services. The member, as he is called, may not resign if he is displeased with the operation of the club. There are no club activities described other than the right to buy something from the club. Further, the wording of the contract is obviously intended to conceal from the ordinary consumer that once he has signed the contract and promissory note he is obligated to continue to make payments without regard to whether he in fact makes use of the club facilities. The situation described in the instant case comes within the ambit of the developing doctrine of unconscionability as discussed in the cases collected at Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1305 (1968). The person signing the contract presented here receives a great many words and vague promises but little else for his *495.50. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Moran in American Buyers Club v. Honecker, 46 Ill. App. 3d 252, 361 N.E.2d 1370.” 53 Ill. App. 3d 611, 616-17, 368 N.E.2d 1057, 1061. Our holding in Grayling and other cases involving this identical contract became the law of the case so far as this contract is concerned. The holdings should be followed, even though the majority in this case might disagree with them.