Court Opinion

ID: 9557927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:00:34.520131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:44.025104
License: Public Domain

Gunderson, C. J.,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority here reverse a jury’s solemn verdict, made after assessing all the evidence in the light of their combined wisdom, because the district court declined to instruct the jury to accord special and continuing weight to one item of evidence, i.e., ownership of the vehicle all the travelers were using.
Concerning this, my brethren say that the “weight of authority” recognizes the existence of a presumption that the owner of the vehicle was driving, if such vehicle was involved in an accident. However, while I note that although the majority cite a total of seven cases, only three of those cases even colorably support'their position,1 and of those three at least one is based upon an express statute.2 Two of the remaining cases hold against any .owner-driver presumption whatever,3 and the others are not even remotely in point.4 My very limited *359research has revealed at least five cases wherein the existence of any owner-driver presumption was rejected.5 Thus, if. adding up the decisions for and against my brethren’s position is significant, I am not at all sure they gain support from the exercise.
Moreover, I note that at least some states which recognize an owner-driver “presumption” do so only in the context of another rule, which recognizes that such “presumption” evaporates when any contrary evidence is adduced.6 That is the case in two, if not all three, of the states upon whose decisions my brethren rely.7 However, it would not be the case in Nevada, for in Nevada, when a true presumption is recognized, it not only fixes the burden of going forward with evidence, but shifts the burden of proof.8
In the instant case, there was evidence that Privette, rathér than Burke, was driving.9 Thus, in Tennessee and Colorado, upon whose decisions my brethren rely, Privette would not be entitled to an instruction concerning an owner-driver presumption, because such presumption would have evaporated as soon as Burke met his burden of going forward with evidence. However, under the Nevada mutation of the Tennessee-Colorado rule, which my brethren here adopt, the case is otherwise; and as my brethren candidly state, despite Burke’s evidence, allowing Privette such an owner-driver presumption, “the result, very likely, would have been different.” (If my brethren adopted an “evaporating” presumption, like that recognized by the decisions they cite, the result would not be affected at all, of course.)
The Missouri Supreme Court has said: “The recognition of *360such a presumption goes too far and so interferes with the plaintiff’s burden of proof as to make its adoption unwise. In addition, the recognition of such a far-reaching proposition properly belongs to the legislature, rather than to the judicial branch of our state government.”10 Indeed, one even may question whether such a presumption is constitutional, or, rather, is so lacking in rational basis as to offend due process.11
Rationally, Burke’s ownership of the vehicle these travelers Were using was but one piece of evidence, having slight significance compared to other evidentiary matters considered by the jury. They obviously saw this, and accorded his ownership no more significance than it was worth, considered in the light of all other known facts. My brethren, however, would undo the jury’s work, exalt the fact of Burke’s ownership above all other facts, holding it significant not only as evidence, but sufficient in and of itself to shift, permanently, from plaintiff to defendant, the burden of proving who was driving, when the vehicle occupied by all left the road.
Mowbray, L, concurs.

 Brayman v. National State Bank of Boulder, 505 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1973); Sprader v. Mueller, 121 N.W.2d 176 (Minn. 1963); Moore v. Watkins, 293 S.W.2d 185 (Tenn.App. 1956).

 Moore v. Watkins, cited note 1.

 Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Western Gas & S. Co., 337 S.W.2d 566 (Mo.App. 1960); Campbell v. Fry, 439 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. App. 1969).

 Rocky Mt. Product v. Johnson, 78 Nev. 44, 369 P.2d 198 (1962); Zimmerman v. District Court, 74 Nev. 344, 332 P.2d 654 (1958).

 Fidelity & Casualty Co. of. N.Y. v. Western Gas & S. Co., cited note 3; Cambell v. Fry, cited note 3; Morris v. Bigham, 170 S.E.2d 534 (N.C.App. 1969); Greene v. Nichols, 161 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. 1968); Parker v. Wilson, 100 S.E.2d 258 (N.C. 1957).

 Brayman v. National State Bank of Boulder, cited note 1, in connection with American Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 70 P.2d 349 (Colo. 1937); Lawing v. Johnson, 355 S.W.2d 465 (Tenn.App. 1961); Rodney v. Staman, 89 A.2d 313 (Pa. 1952), in connection with Waters v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 144 A.2d 354 (Pa. 1958).

 Moore v. Watkins, cited note T, Brayman v. National State Bank of Boulder, cited note 1, in connection with American Ins. Co. v. Naylor, cited note 6.

 NRS 47.180(1) and NRS 47.200(3).

 Privette testified that Burke frequently turned the. driving .over to him when drinking. Carl Reese and Mrs. Burke testified similarly. Injuries sustained by Burke and Privette arguably might sustain a finding that Burke was not driving..

 Fidelity v. Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Western Gas & S. Co., 337 S.W.2d 566, 572.

 See for example: Western & Atl. R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929), striking a presumption which affected the burden of persuasion.