Court Opinion

ID: 9915753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 15:05:24.645689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:27.034315
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13408
SJC-13409

            COMMONWEALTH    vs.   CASSANDRA L. BARLOW-TUCKER.

                COMMONWEALTH      vs.   MATTHEW J. TUCKER.

       Berkshire.          October 4, 2023. - January 8, 2024.

 Present:    Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                            & Georges, JJ.

Homicide. Reckless Endangerment of a Child. Grand Jury.
     Evidence, Grand jury proceedings. Probable Cause.
     Practice, Criminal, Grand jury proceedings, Dismissal.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on March 23, 2021.

    Motions to dismiss were heard by John A. Agostini, J.

     The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the cases from the Appeals Court.

     Jennifer K. Zalnasky, Special Assistant District Attorney,
for the Commonwealth.
     Joshua M. Daniels for Matthew J. Tucker.
     Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services,
for Cassandra L. Barlow-Tucker.
                                                                   2

     CYPHER, J.    In March 2021, a grand jury returned

indictments charging the defendants, Cassandra L. Barlow-Tucker

(Cassandra) and Matthew J. Tucker (Matthew) (collectively,

Tuckers), with one count each of involuntary manslaughter by way

of wanton or reckless conduct, G. L. c. 265, § 13, and reckless

endangerment of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 13L, in connection with

their alleged failure to seek medical treatment for Garrett,1 a

foster child who died in their care from complications of group

A beta hemolytic streptococcus (strep throat), bronchopneumonia,

and a collection of fluid in one of his lungs.2    Following a

nonevidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed the

defendants' motions to dismiss the indictments on grounds that

(1) the evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to

justify the return of the indictments, see Commonwealth v.

McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982); and (2) the integrity of

the grand jury proceeding was impaired by the Commonwealth's

presentation of improper evidence, see Commonwealth v. O'Dell,

392 Mass. 445, 446-447 (1984).    In so concluding, the judge

determined that the evidence was insufficient to support a

finding of probable cause to believe that the Tuckers were

wanton or reckless, or knew or should have known that Garrett

     1   We refer to children in this opinion by pseudonyms.

     2 For ease of identification, we refer to the defendants by
their given names.
                                                                    3

was in grave danger from his illness and failed in their duty to

seek medical care that could have saved his life; the judge also

determined that the grand jury were impaired by the admission of

improper evidence.   The Commonwealth appealed, and we

transferred the cases sua sponte from the Appeals Court.

    On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the motion judge

erred in dismissing the indictments because (1) viewed in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence provided

probable cause to support the indictments for involuntary

manslaughter and reckless endangerment of a child; and (2) the

integrity of the grand jury was not impaired where the evidence

presented was not untruthful or misleading, and where the

prosecutor provided limiting instructions before the grand jury

deliberated.   The Commonwealth also argues that the judge

incorrectly applied the McCarthy and O'Dell analyses in his

determinations.

    Because we conclude that the evidence before the grand jury

was sufficient to support the defendants' prosecution for

involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment of a child

and that the integrity of the grand jury was not impaired, we

reverse the order of the judge in the Superior Court.

    1.   Background.   We summarize the evidence presented to the

grand jury in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see
                                                                     4

Commonwealth v. Clinton, 491 Mass. 756, 758 (2023), reserving

some details for subsequent discussion.3

     On the morning of February 18, 2020, Cassandra discovered

their ten month old foster child, Garrett, nonresponsive in his

crib.     She immediately alerted Matthew to call 911.   Emergency

personnel responded but were unable to revive him.

     The investigation into Garrett's death revealed that he had

been sick with a severe respiratory cold in the weeks leading up

to his death.    Video footage from the Tuckers' home surveillance

cameras recorded his last night alive, February 17.

     a.    Video footage.   The Tuckers described February 17 as

the best day Garrett had had in a long time.    He had a better

appetite, drank more fluids, and was more active than he had

been recently.

     3 The grand jury heard testimony from five witnesses over
the course of three days: Detective Travis Cunningham, the
detective who first arrived at the scene after Garrett's body
had been discovered; Sergeant Ryan Dickinson, the lead
investigator on the case; Dr. Irini Scordi-Bello, the forensic
pathologist who conducted the autopsy; Dr. Sandeep Kumar,
Garrett's pediatrician; and Tracy (a pseudonym), a speech
language pathologist who asked Cassandra whether Garrett had
seen a doctor. The grand jury also saw recorded interviews of
Cassandra and Matthew that were conducted by the police, as well
as surveillance video footage of the children's room where
Garrett was discovered. The grand jurors were provided with
recorded interviews of four Department of Children and Families
(DCF) social workers, interviews of the Tuckers' two eldest
children, and various medical and DCF records to assist them in
their deliberations.
                                                                           5

        That night, Adam, the Tuckers' eldest son, put Garrett to

bed.4       The motion-activated video camera in the room showed Adam

put Garrett in his crib at 6:23 P.M.        From the video recording

(video), Garrett can be heard coughing prominently, wheezing,

and gasping for air.       Between 6:30 and 7:17 P.M., Matthew

entered the room to put Bobby, the Tuckers' adopted son, to bed.

In order to do so, Matthew walked by Garrett's crib to Bobby's

bed.        Matthew then left the room without checking on Garrett.

While Matthew was in the room, Garrett continued to cough,

wheeze, and gasp for air.       At around 7:30 P.M., the video showed

Garrett moving and making noise.       It appeared that the last time

Garrett moved was 7:34 P.M.       The camera next activated at around

12:30 to 12:44 A.M., when Adam got out of bed and left the room.

Garrett appeared on the surveillance video in the crib,

motionless and not making any noise, in the same position he was

in at 7:34 P.M.        Adam last activated the camera at 1:44 A.M.    At

around 8:30 A.M., Cassandra discovered Garrett and contacted

emergency officials.

        When interviewed by police, Cassandra provided a detailed

statement recalling how she had put Garrett to bed that night.

However, the surveillance video showed that it was Adam, not

       At the time, the Tuckers lived with their two biological
        4

children -- Darlene, an eleven year old girl, and Adam, a ten
year old boy -- as well as their two adopted children: Bobby, a
three year old boy, and Jessica, a two year old girl.
                                                                      6

Cassandra, who put Garrett into his crib.     She also stated that,

at around 3 or 3:30 A.M., she observed Garrett moving and

coughing on the surveillance video.     Officers noted that this

statement was inconsistent with the video footage, which showed

Garrett in the exact same position from 7:34 P.M. until he was

discovered the following morning.

     b.   Weeks preceding death.    According to the Tuckers,

around January 25, 2020, the household members became stricken

with a cold that their eldest daughter, Darlene, had brought

home from school.   Garrett's symptoms included a fever, cough,

dry diapers, noisy breathing, lethargy, mucus, and congestion.

His fever lasted for two weeks but fluctuated depending on the

amount of food he ate.   When he was able to drink fluids,

Garrett made a "gasping" type sound.    To treat Garrett's

illness, the Tucker's alternated giving him children's ibuprofen

and Tylenol, one as an anti-inflammatory and one as a pain

reliever; hydrated him by administering liquids into his mouth

with a syringe; gave him nebulizer treatments with albuterol;

and attempted to hydrate and feed him when he was able to

consume meals.5   At one point, the Tuckers called a doctor about

     5 On December 10, 2019, Garrett's pediatrician prescribed a
nebulizer with albuterol to treat a suspected environmental or
pet allergy from Garrett's former foster placement. The DCF
social worker who took him to the appointment, Helen (a
pseudonym), filled the prescription and returned Garrett to the
Tuckers with instructions about the nebulizer. Cassandra began
                                                                        7

their two year old daughter, Jessica, to inquire about treatment

for her illness, because she also contracted a cold during this

time and had preexisting medical conditions.     Her cold symptoms

included a cough and runny nose for a week, lethargy, and a

temperature that never exceeded 100.4 degrees.     The doctor

advised them to remain at home because he did not want to

introduce Jessica to the germs in the doctor's office.     The

doctor provided assistance over the telephone.

    While the other children recovered from the illness,

Matthew noted that Garrett was taking longer to recuperate.

Cassandra stated that she contacted people at the Department of

Children and Families (DCF) in the first week of February to

notify them that Garrett was sick and needed to see a doctor.

According to her, Helen, a DCF social worker, took Garrett to a

doctor's appointment in February and, after the appointment, was

told to continue the nebulizer treatments.     However, police were

unable to locate any information to corroborate that Cassandra

contacted DCF or that Garrett saw a medical professional.       Helen

stated she did not take Garrett to the doctor in February.

    On February 14, Tracy, a speech pathologist, visited the

home to perform services with the Tuckers' youngest daughter.

administering the nebulizer as needed and noted that Garrett
appeared to be responding well. By early January 2020, Garrett
was healthy and doing well.
                                                                      8

While in the home, Tracy saw that Garrett was ill and struggling

with a persistent cough and a respiratory cold.    She observed

Cassandra give him a nebulizer treatment.     Tracy recalled

inquiring whether Garrett had seen a doctor.    Cassandra

commented that if his condition worsened, she intended to call

or bring him to a doctor.    Between themselves, the Tuckers noted

that if Garrett did not improve, they should take him to see a

medical professional.     Cassandra "half-jokingly" mentioned on

Sunday, February 16, that they should take one of the other

children to the doctor and have the doctor examine Garrett while

at the office.   There is no record that Garrett was seen by a

medical professional between a December 10, 2019, doctor's

appointment and death.6

     c.   Autopsy and medical testimony.    Dr. Irini Scordi-Bello,

the forensic pathologist who performed Garrett's autopsy,

     6 For unknown reasons, Garrett missed a December 18 follow-
up appointment, and an administrative transfer of his medical
provider to a closer office was delayed and may not have
occurred. According to Cassandra, with respect to her other
foster children, depending on the social worker, either the
Tuckers or the social worker would take the foster child to
doctor's visits. In this case, according to Cassandra, either
the assigned social worker or a social worker on the unit would
take Garrett to his appointment. Cassandra stated that she
never took Garrett to the doctor. If Garrett required a
doctor's visit, the Tuckers would contact DCF to make the
arrangements. However, based on their training, the Tuckers
were aware that, in an emergency, they could take the child to
the emergency room or urgent care and possessed the authority,
delegated from DCF, to arrange for medical care on the child's
behalf.
                                                                     9

determined the cause of death to be complications from strep

throat, bronchopneumonia, and a collection of fluid in his right

lung.     She noted that he had a "massive overwhelming infection

in the right lung" and bacteria in his bloodstream indicating

sepsis, which meant that the bacteria had circulated to his

other organs.     The infection caused the right lung to be

"shrunken and collapsed," and pus filled the entire right chest

cavity.     A toxicology report indicated that no drugs or

medications were found in his system.7

     After reviewing Garrett's medical records, Scordi-Bello

suggested that a wheezing diagnosis from December was unrelated

to the cause of death.     She did not see evidence of asthma or

other changes that would suggest his condition at death was

related to wheezing, asthma, or other allergies he was diagnosed

with in December.     Similarly, she did not believe a

gastrointestinal rotavirus that he had had in December was

related to or caused the pneumonia and fluid collection in his

lung.     That Garrett was substance exposed at birth also did not

change the determination of the cause of death.     Scordi-Bello

noted that at the time of the December 10 appointment, Garrett's

     7 Tylenol would show on a toxicology report, although
Scordi-Bello was unsure whether ibuprofen or albuterol would.
Even if Garrett had been administered albuterol, she did not
believe that it would have made an impact, because Garrett's
improperly functioning lung was not able to receive air from the
airway that the albuterol opened.
                                                                  10

doctor described equal breath sounds on both sides of his lungs.

That finding was inconsistent with the autopsy results, which

showed that, in the days before his death, Garrett would not

have had equal breath sounds because no air would have been

circulating due to his shrunken right lung.

    Scordi-Bello could not state definitively how the symptoms

would manifest but believed that, in the days leading up to his

death, Garrett would have exhibited varying degrees of fever, a

cough, and difficulty breathing, which could "wax and wane."

    Scordi-Bello added that Garrett likely was lethargic

because of the overwhelming infection.   She could not comment on

whether he was improving or eating, but she thought that he

would have been ill in the days prior to death.   Last, she noted

that the condition was treatable by administering antibiotics

and draining the fluid from the lung and chest cavity.

    Dr. Sandeep Kumar, Garrett's pediatrician, testified that

he had not seen Garrett since his December 10, 2019, appointment

when Kumar prescribed albuterol for Garrett's wheezing with

instructions to the DCF worker to use the nebulizer for two more

days.   Kumar reviewed the autopsy report and noted that strep

throat was rare in infants Garrett's age but treatable with

penicillin.   Kumar stated that bronchopneumonia, also treatable

with antibiotics, commonly developed as a secondary infection

when a child had a cold and would cause the fever to spike over
                                                                  11

101 degrees after five to seven days of illness.   Based on

Garrett's laboratory results, Kumar would expect Garrett to have

had a worsened cough, poor appetite, difficulty breathing, and

lethargy.   Kumar opined that a lay person may see a nonstop,

persistent cough.   Further, if a child presented to his clinic

with Garrett's X-rays, Kumar immediately would have transferred

the child to the emergency room.

    Kumar also reviewed the video of Garrett in his crib the

night before he was discovered dead.   Kumar opined, based on his

medical expertise, that the persistent, nonstop coughing was

caused by the fluid in Garrett's chest pushing the breathing

tube to one side, narrowing the airway and forcing Garrett to

cough to breathe, which was also known as "air hunger."   Kumar

further opined that Garrett would have been exhibiting symptoms

of "air hunger" for at least five to seven days.   If Kumar had

seen a patient with the "air hunger" breathing combined with

Garrett's X-rays, Kumar would have called 911.

    None of these symptoms was present when Kumar last saw

Garrett in December.

    After a grand juror requested that a portion of the crib

video be played, Kumar stated that the nonstop cough exhibited

in the video was a sign that Garrett's airway was about to be

blocked, and that he was in obvious respiratory distress based

on the heavy breathing and head nodding that would be apparent
                                                                    12

to a caregiver whether or not the caregiver had child care

experience.     If a patient presented with these symptoms, along

with the symptoms described by the Tuckers, including fever over

the course of two weeks, dehydration, and an unproductive cough

that turned to a phlegmy cough, Kumar would have taken the child

to the emergency room.

     2.   Discussion.    "Our review of the propriety of any

indictment is limited to determining whether the grand jury

received sufficient evidence to find probable cause for arrest

. . . and whether the integrity of the grand jury proceedings

was impaired."     Commonwealth v. McGahee, 393 Mass. 743, 746-747

(1985).   "In considering a judge's decision to dismiss for lack

of sufficient evidence [to support an indictment], we do not

defer to the judge's factual findings or legal conclusions.

. . .   Rather, our review is de novo" (quotation and citations

omitted).   Clinton, 491 Mass. at 765.    Likewise, because the

judge decided the motions following a nonevidentiary hearing, we

review the judge's decision to dismiss for impairment of the

grand jury de novo.     See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 492 Mass. 36,

41-42 (2023).

     a.   Sufficiency of the evidence.    Although, in general, a

"court will not inquire into the competency or sufficiency of

the evidence before the grand jury" (citation omitted),

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 373 Mass. 591, 592 (1977), a "grand
                                                                       13

jury must hear sufficient evidence to establish the identity of

the accused . . . and probable cause to arrest him [or her]" for

the charged offense, McCarthy, 385 Mass. at 163.       "Probable

cause is a 'considerably less exacting' standard than that

required to support a conviction [beyond a reasonable doubt] at

trial."     Commonwealth v. Stirlacci, 483 Mass. 775, 780 (2020),

quoting O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 451.       It requires only "sufficient

facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing

that an offense has been committed."      Commonwealth v. Levesque,

436 Mass. 443, 447 (2002).

       i.   Involuntary manslaughter.   The elements of manslaughter

are derived from common law, as Massachusetts has not defined

the offense by statute.    See Levesque, 436 Mass. at 447.

Involuntary manslaughter is "an unlawful homicide,

unintentionally caused . . . by an act which constitutes such a

disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to

constitute wanton or reckless conduct" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Catalina, 407 Mass. 779, 783 (1990).       Wanton or

reckless conduct usually consists of an intentional act but may

be satisfied by an intentional omission where there is a duty to

act.    See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 482 Mass. 416, 421 (2019);

Levesque, supra at 448.     Wanton or reckless conduct "does not

require that the actor intended the specific result of her

conduct, only that he or she intended to do the wanton or
                                                                    14

reckless act," Hardy, supra, "which conduct involves a high

degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to

another," Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399 (1944).

See Commonwealth v. Dawson, 490 Mass. 521, 533 (2022).     Either

the defendant must have realized the risk of harm or a

reasonable person, who knew what the defendant knew, would have

realized such risk.    Hardy, supra.

    In concluding that the Commonwealth failed to establish

probable cause to support the indictments for involuntary

manslaughter, the motion judge stated that the evidence was

insufficient to believe that the Tuckers knew or reasonably

should have known that, by caring for Garrett at home without

seeking urgent medical care, they were putting him at risk of

substantial harm.     Our de novo review of the record convinces us

that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that Garrett was

gravely ill in the weeks preceding his death and that the

Tuckers' failure to take him to a medical professional put him

at risk that substantial harm would result.     Garrett, a ten

month old infant, exhibited symptoms of a persistent cough,

noisy, raspy breathing, a fluctuating fever that occasionally

exceeded 102 degrees, dehydration, loss of appetite, lethargy,

and congestion that lasted for at least two weeks.     Despite

these symptoms, the Tuckers failed to seek medical attention.
                                                                  15

Instead, the Tuckers treated Garrett by alternating ibuprofen

and Tylenol, hydrating Garrett with a syringe to put drops into

his mouth, administering albuterol with a nebulizer, and

providing extra liquids when Garrett could consume them.

Although Cassandra stated that she contacted DCF to arrange for

a social worker to take Garrett to the doctor, no evidence was

located to corroborate that Garrett was seen by a doctor in

February or that Cassandra contacted DCF.   Helen stated that she

never took Garrett to the doctor in February.

    The Tuckers were aware that Garrett required medical

attention -- they joked that they should take one of their

children to the doctor and bring Garrett along as an extra child

to be examined.   The grand jury also could infer that the

Tuckers had the ability to recognize when to seek medical care

but decided to forgo such care in Garrett's case.   When Jessica

became ill with symptoms less severe than Garrett's, the Tuckers

contacted her doctor for treatment advice but did not do the

same for Garrett despite knowing that he had a pediatrician in

Berkshire county.   Additionally, Tracy commented to Cassandra

that Garrett should be seen by a doctor.    Due to their foster

parent training, the Tuckers were aware that they could seek

emergency medical treatment, as needed.

    Last, the surveillance video footage of the children's

bedroom supports probable cause to believe that the defendants
                                                                  16

were wanton or reckless in their failure to seek medical

attention.   In the video, Garrett's pronounced breathing is

notable.   Kumar testified that the sound of the persistent

nonstop coughing was "air hunger" as Garrett struggled to

breathe.   The footage from the camera showed that Matthew walked

by Garrett's crib, put another child to bed, and walked back out

of the room without checking on him.   From this alone, a grand

jury could conclude that a reasonable person in Matthew's

position would have understood the high degree of risk and

responded to Garrett's gasping breath by seeking immediate

medical care.   The jury could infer, and Kumar testified, that

Garrett exhibited this symptom for a period of time preceding

the video footage and that the Tuckers were aware of the sound.

The grand jury were permitted to discredit the Tuckers'

statement that Garrett improved that day.   Additionally,

Cassandra's statements that she put Garrett to bed and saw him

moving at around 3 A.M. were contradicted by the surveillance

footage showing that Garrett had stopped moving at around 7:34

P.M. after Adam had put him in his crib at around 6:30 P.M.      The

grand jury heard sufficient evidence to support probable cause

for the indictment.   See Commonwealth v. Riley, 73 Mass. App.

Ct. 721, 727 (2009) ("The weight and credibility of the evidence

is wholly for the grand jury").
                                                                  17

    This determination is supported by our case law.    In

Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 416 Mass. 114, 116 (1993), we

recognized that a parent may be convicted of involuntary

manslaughter as a result of a wanton or reckless failure to seek

medical attention for a child in the parent's care.   In so

holding, we relied on Commonwealth v. Gallison, 383 Mass. 659,

665 (1981), where a conviction of manslaughter was upheld after

a parent made no effort to obtain medical help despite knowing

that her child was gravely ill, and the evidence supported the

determination that the parent's omission constituted a failure

to meet her duty to provide for the care and welfare of her

child.

    The Tuckers do not argue that they did not owe Garrett a

duty of care.   Rather, they argue that the evidence presented to

the grand jury was insufficient to show that the Tuckers or

other parents in their position would have been aware that

caring for a child at home created a high likelihood that grave

danger would result.   However, Kumar testified that a lay person

could see that the nonstop persistent cough was a sign of

respiratory distress that was not normal breathing.   For the

reasons stated above, the evidence provided probable cause to

believe that the Tuckers knew or reasonably should have known

that Garrett required immediate medical attention.
                                                                  18

    "To constitute wanton or reckless conduct, as distinguished

from mere negligence, grave danger to others must have been

apparent, and the defendant must have chosen to run the risk

rather than alter his [or her] conduct so as to avoid the act or

omission which caused the harm."   Welansky, 316 Mass. at 398.

However, "[w]hether certain behavior is properly categorized as

reckless or negligent is ordinarily left for the jury."

Levesque, 436 Mass. at 452.   Where, as here, the grand jury

returned indictments against the defendants and there was

sufficient evidence to support those indictments, we decline to

substitute our judgment for the grand jury's.   That is not to

say that the evidence will be sufficient to support guilty

verdicts at trial.   See Commonwealth v. Flynn, 420 Mass. 810,

815 (1995); Commonwealth v. Michaud, 389 Mass. 491, 498-499

(1983).   Rather, we conclude only that, in the unique

circumstances of these cases, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, the grand jury were presented

with sufficient evidence to support indictments for involuntary

manslaughter.

    ii.   Reckless endangerment of a child.   A product of the

Legislature, reckless endangerment of a child requires the

Commonwealth to prove that the child under the age eighteen

suffered a substantial risk of serious bodily injury and that

the defendant wantonly or recklessly (i) engaged in conduct that
                                                                    19

created the substantial risk or (ii) "failed to take reasonable

steps to alleviate that risk where a duty to act exists."

Commonwealth v. Coggeshall, 473 Mass. 665, 667-668 (2016).

Unlike involuntary manslaughter, which requires the Commonwealth

to prove that either the defendant or a reasonable person in the

same circumstances would have realized the gravity of the

danger, reckless endangerment of a child requires that the

defendant actually be aware of the risk.     Hardy, 482 Mass. at

421-422.    Because we conclude that the Commonwealth presented

sufficient evidence for probable cause to believe that the

Tuckers were aware that their conduct created a substantial risk

of harm and, therefore, to support indictments for involuntary

manslaughter, the evidence also was sufficient to support

indictments for reckless endangerment of a child.      See id. at

422.

       b.   Grand jury impairment.   In addition to finding

insufficient evidence to support the alleged offenses, the

motion judge dismissed the indictments because he concluded that

the Commonwealth improperly introduced evidence of DCF

overpayments, financial remunerations, and Cassandra's blog

posts with no purpose other than to portray the Tuckers in a

negative light.     On appeal, the Commonwealth asserts that the

dismissal constitutes reversible error because the financial

information and blog posts were relevant, were not untruthful or
                                                                  20

misleading, and did not impair the integrity of the jury, as the

prosecutor provided limiting instructions.   The Commonwealth

argues that the motion judge erred by ignoring the established

standard for grand jury impairment as outlined in O'Dell, 392

Mass. at 446-447, and Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615,

621 (1986).

    Matthew filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictments

on grounds that the integrity of the grand jury proceedings was

impaired by the Commonwealth's presentation of "irrelevant" DCF

financial records and blogs posts written by Cassandra.

Cassandra's pretrial motion to dismiss was confined to the

sufficiency argument.   On appeal, Matthew raises one argument

that was not raised below, and Cassandra raises multiple

arguments that were not made in the Superior Court.   Because

their arguments differ from those made before the motion judge

and each other, we address Matthew's and Cassandra's arguments

separately.

    An indictment may be dismissed when "the integrity of the

grand jury proceeding was impaired by an unfair and misleading

presentation to the grand jury."   O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 446-447.

"To demonstrate that such impairment occurred, a defendant must

establish that (1) the evidence was presented knowingly or with

reckless disregard for its truth; (2) the evidence was presented

with the purpose of obtaining an indictment; and (3) the
                                                                   21

improper evidence probably influenced the grand jury's decision

to indict."   Commonwealth v. Brown, 490 Mass. 171, 181 (2022),

citing Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621.    "Reckless disregard of the

truth leading to the presentation of false or deceptive evidence

could also warrant dismissal of an indictment" (citation

omitted).   Brown, supra at 182, quoting Mayfield, supra.

    i.   Matthew's arguments.    On the last day of the grand jury

presentation, the Commonwealth presented evidence that DCF

overpaid the Tuckers for Garrett's placement, that the Tuckers

reimbursed DCF, and that the Tuckers received payments for

Garrett and other adopted children in their care.

    The Commonwealth argued that the evidence was relevant to

establish that the Tuckers possessed a duty of care to Garrett.

Our review of the record establishes that Matthew has not

demonstrated that the integrity of the grand jury was impaired

by the evidence.

    Under Mayfield, Matthew was required to demonstrate that

the evidence was presented knowingly or with reckless disregard

for its truth, for the purpose of obtaining an indictment, and

probably influenced the jury.   Here, the financial records were

not false, as they accurately portrayed the financial history

between the Tuckers and DCF.    Nor were they introduced

recklessly.   Cf. Brown, 490 Mass. at 184.   As a whole, the
                                                                   22

financial information was relevant to establish that the Tuckers

possessed a duty of care to Garrett.

    However, information regarding the overpayments that the

Tuckers received and information that the Tuckers were required

to reimburse DCF could demonstrate improper prior bad act or

character evidence.   Assuming, without deciding, that the

overpayment information was improper, the brief mention of the

overpayment does not rise to the level of "recklessness" to

satisfy the first prong of Mayfield.   For example, in Brown, the

first prong was satisfied where the prosecutor introduced a

"voluminous" number of the defendant's and a possible

accomplice's Department of Correction records that demonstrated

prior bad acts, proclivity to violence, and other general bad

character of both defendants.   Brown, 490 Mass. at 182-184.

There, we agreed with the motion judge that the prosecutor "was

reckless in introducing such improper, unfairly prejudicial, and

irrelevant evidence to the grand jury in order to obtain an

indictment" without first weighing the fairness of the offering.

Id. at 184.   Here, the momentary mention of the overpayments

does not equate to the "voluminous" number of records introduced

in Brown, and thus does not constitute recklessness under the

first prong of Mayfield.   Therefore, the integrity of the grand

jury was not impaired by the introduction of the financial

records.
                                                                    23

    Similarly, the Commonwealth's introduction of blog posts

does not satisfy the "heavy burden" that the defendants must

demonstrate to establish impairment of the grand jury

proceeding.   See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 483 Mass. 1, 7

(2019).   After the presentation of the financial records, the

Commonwealth presented six blog posts that were read to the

grand jury; further, the Commonwealth provided the entire blog

as an exhibit to use in the grand jury's deliberation.      The blog

posts detailed Cassandra's frustrations and experiences as a

foster parent and, in the portion read to the grand jury,

exhibited her experience with the MassHealth system, obtaining

medical care for foster children, and dealing with a

noncommunicative sick child who had serious unknown medical

conditions.   Again, under Mayfield, Matthew is unable to

establish that the posts were presented falsely or recklessly,

or that they likely influenced the grand jury's decision.     The

posts were relevant to Cassandra's knowledge as a foster parent

and described her experiences with the foster care system and

medical providers.   Although an argument could be made that the

posts, written two years before Garrett arrived in the home,

were too remote in time to be relevant, at the grand jury stage

the rules of evidence are less stringent than at trial.     See

Commonwealth v. Kater, 432 Mass. 404, 412 (2000).   Even

assuming, without deciding, that the introduction of the
                                                                   24

entirety of the blog was improper, Matthew cannot show that the

evidence had an impact on the grand jury's determination.

    As the Commonwealth noted, by this time in the

presentation, the grand jury had reviewed the powerful video

footage of Garrett in his crib, had heard testimony from two

medical experts, and had posed thoughtful questions to the

witnesses about Garrett's illness and ability to breath.      As

there was substantial other evidence of probable cause, the

arguably improper evidence probably did not influence the grand

jury's decision to indict.   See Commonwealth v. Hall, 485 Mass.

145, 160 (2020); Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 175,

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1007 (1998).

    Matthew argues that the presentation to the grand jury of

the financial records and the blog posts, in contrast to the

inclusion of interviews with DCF social workers referring to the

Tuckers in a positive light only as exhibits on disc not

specifically played for the grand jury, created a negative

portrayal of the Tuckers.    Similarly, in stating that the

Commonwealth presented "one-sided" testimony by failing to

highlight the positive statements of a social worker

complimenting the Tuckers and the social worker's statement that

the blog posts had "nothing to do with kids," the motion judge

classified the evidence as "exculpatory."    However, this

evidence was not "exculpatory," as it did not contradict the
                                                                   25

evidence presented by the Commonwealth and thus was not material

evidence that the Commonwealth was required to highlight.    The

statements consisted only of information that was not a required

element of the offenses charged.   Cf. Commonwealth v. Washington

W., 462 Mass. 204, 212-213 (2012) (evidence withheld from grand

jury regarding necessary element of charged offense tainted

integrity of grand jury proceedings, as evidence was material to

question of probable cause for required element and likely

influenced grand jury's decision to indict).

    For the first time on appeal, Matthew raises a concern

regarding the impropriety of a statement made by Sergeant Ryan

Dickinson, the lead investigator on the case, that the motion

judge did not address in his decision.   Because this alleged

flaw was not "seasonably asserted" at the trial court level, it

is waived, and we review to determine whether there was error

and, if so, whether a substantial risk of a miscarriage of

justice resulted.   See Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 622 n.4;

Commonwealth v. Gant, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 314, 320-321 (2001).     "A

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice exists when we have

a serious doubt whether the result . . . might have been

different had the error not been made" (quotation and citation

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Curran, 488 Mass. 792, 794 (2021).

    Sergeant Dickinson testified that, when interviewed, the

Tuckers' eldest daughter, Darlene, stated that Garrett "had a
                                                                  26

slight cough" and was "struggling to breath."    However,

examination of the interview indicates that Darlene told police

that Garrett was getting better and was "coughing a little bit

and that's really what he was doing.   He was having a little

trouble breathing."8   The Commonwealth did not correct

Dickinson's statement.   The Commonwealth also omitted Darlene's

statement that Garrett "seemed fine, and pretty cheerful."

     Arguably, this is a slight mischaracterization of Darlene's

statements and could satisfy the first two prongs of Mayfield;

however, this is a minor misstep in the context of overwhelming

evidence concerning Garrett's condition, including the video of

him struggling to breathe and then stopping and remaining still

for hours.    See Brown, 490 Mass. at 184-186 (Commonwealth's

introduction of "inflammatory" evidence without responsibly

weighing its fairness satisfied reckless behavior prong but did

not require vacation of indictments where grand jury were

presented with sufficient evidence to establish probable cause).

Cf. O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 449 (distortion of defendant's

statements by omitting key portions of statement impaired grand

jury's understanding of facts, thereby impairing grand jury's

integrity).    Notwithstanding this possible impropriety, and that

     8 The Commonwealth did not play the interview for the grand
jury, but provided the videos as an exhibit that the grand jury
could review at their discretion.
                                                                    27

a grand juror commented on the daughter's ability to recognize

Garrett's health issue where Matthew seemingly could not, for

the reasons stated above, when viewed in the context of the

entire proceeding, the evidence probably did not influence the

grand jury's decision to indict.   Therefore, we discern no

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.     See Vinnie, 428

Mass. at 175.

    ii.   Cassandra's arguments.   For the first time on appeal,

Cassandra raises a litany of errors that, she alleges, the

Commonwealth committed in its presentation of evidence to the

grand jury.   In addition to the arguments raised by Matthew -–

namely, the prejudicial impact of the financial records, the

blog posts, Darlene's statement, and the failure to highlight

positive statements from the social workers -- Cassandra asserts

error in the Commonwealth's statement that DCF took

"disciplinary action" against the Tuckers because of the blog,

the presentation of the missed December 18 doctor's appointment,

and the Commonwealth's failure to correct a witness's testimony

about the medical condition of the Tuckers' youngest daughter.

The combination of these errors, she argues, requires an

affirmance of the dismissal of the indictments.     Again, because

these alleged flaws were not raised at the trial court level,

they are waived, and we review to determine whether there was

error and, if so, whether a substantial risk of a miscarriage of
                                                                     28

justice resulted.9    See Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 622 n.4; Gant, 51

Mass. App. Ct. at 320-321.

     We begin with Cassandra's argument that the "disciplinary

action" statement presented by the Commonwealth was false.     See

Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621-622.     The prosecutor asked Sergeant

Dickinson, "So, was there a point in time where [DCF] took

disciplinary action against the Tuckers during their tenure as

foster parents?"     The sergeant replied in the affirmative, and

the prosecutor asked, "And what was the reason for this

discipline?"   The witness then discussed the blog posts.

Cassandra argues that the Commonwealth was aware that DCF did

not take disciplinary action against the Tuckers, and thus

presented false questions and testimony to the grand jury.     See

Commonwealth v. Salman, 387 Mass. 160, 161, 167 (1982).

However, upon review of the transcript, the prosecutor expanded

on the "action" taken by DCF.     She asked, "So, Ms. Barlow-Tucker

did stop posting her blog after DCF raised their concerns with

her, correct?"     The witness replied, "I believe so."   Contrary

to Cassandra's arguments, the Commonwealth represented that the

action taken by DCF was to engage in a conversation about the

     9 For the reasons we set forth rejecting Matthew's
arguments, Cassandra's arguments about the impact of the
financial records, the blog posts, Darlene's statement, and the
failure to highlight positive statements from the social
workers, when viewed in the context of the entire proceeding,
probably did not influence the grand jury's decision to indict.
                                                                    29

appropriateness of the blog posts.   There was no attempt to

mislead the grand jury and thus no error.     See Commonwealth v.

Jewett, 442 Mass. 356, 364-365 (2004).

    Next, Cassandra asserts that the Commonwealth's

presentation of the DCF policy and Garrett's missed December 18

follow-up appointment, along with the Commonwealth's failure to

highlight her December 20 e-mail message to DCF checking on the

status of the December 18 appointment, created a false and

misleading impression that she could not be bothered to take

Garrett to the doctor, which prejudiced her.     She maintains that

the Commonwealth misled the grand jury by focusing on portions

of the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting manual that

stated the foster family agreed to schedule and keep any follow-

up appointments, despite the Commonwealth's knowledge that the

arrangement of who would take the child to the appointments was

an appointment-by-appointment or case-by-case basis.     We

disagree.   The portion of the manual read to the grand jury

stated that DCF delegated the authority to the foster parent to

arrange medical care on the child's behalf.     It did not state

that it was the foster parents' sole responsibility to arrange

the medical care.   In fact, the grand jury heard testimony

indicating the opposite.   The grand jury heard that the social

worker, Helen, took Garrett to his December 10 appointment and

knew about the December 18 follow-up appointment.
                                                                      30

    Although the Commonwealth did not present live testimony

about Cassandra's follow-up e-mail message to DCF regarding the

missing appointment, the Commonwealth did present discs

containing the information for the grand jury to review.

Further, through the recorded police interview, the grand jury

heard Cassandra's statements that the responsibility for taking

the children to the doctor's appointments depended on the social

worker, which was corroborated by Dickinson's and Kumar's

statements that a social worker took Garrett to his December 10

appointment -- which was after Garrett began residing with the

Tuckers on December 5.   Moreover, the issue presented in these

cases was not whether the Tuckers provided follow-up medical

care.   The issue was whether they provided medical care after

they became aware that he had a serious illness.   By all

accounts, in December 2019, Garrett was relatively healthy.      It

was not until late January or early February 2020 that he became

seriously ill and, as the Commonwealth argues, required medical

attention to address his ailments.   That the Commonwealth did

not highlight the December 20 e-mail message for a routine

appointment was neither false nor misleading.

    Last, Cassandra asserts that the Commonwealth's failure to

correct a witness's testimony about the medical condition of the

Tuckers' youngest daughter, Jessica, was prejudicial.     On the

last day of testimony, a grand juror asked the witness, a speech
                                                                    31

pathologist, whether the daughter had a certain medical

condition.    The medical condition that the juror mentioned was

not the accurate condition that the daughter had.    Nonetheless,

the witness replied, "Yes.    I mean, she has a lot of complex

medical."    The juror prodded, "And that's a respiratory issue,

right," to which the witness responded, "I don't think, yeah."

The juror inquired later, "So that one could assume that the

foster parents would have some understanding of a respiratory

ailment, toward like the sound of one?"    The prosecutor gave an

instruction that the witness provide only an answer from her

personal knowledge or medical expertise as a speech pathologist.

The witness responded, "Yeah.    So, I wouldn't know."   The

Commonwealth did not correct the misimpression regarding the

daughter's medical condition.

    "Evidence submitted in response to a question by a grand

juror . . . is less problematic than evidence submitted 'by the

prosecutor's design.'"    Brown, 490 Mass. at 185, quoting Vinnie,

428 Mass. at 174-175.    The grand juror's statements about the

medical condition, and the witness's response, were inaccurate.

Thus, arguably, the first prong of Mayfield, i.e., that false

evidence was presented to the grand jury, was met.    See

Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621.

    However, Cassandra is unable to meet the remaining two

prongs -- that the evidence was presented for the purpose of an
                                                                    32

indictment and probably influenced the jury.     "The record is

devoid of evidence that the . . . [witness's] responses . . .

were presented to the grand jury in bad faith.     Nor do we find

any evidence that the factual discrepancies were knowing or

purposeful."   Commonwealth v. Mathews, 450 Mass. 858, 876

(2008).   It appeared that the witness, a speech pathologist,

confused one ailment with another.     When the prosecutor realized

that the witness's responses to the juror's questions may have

been at the brink of the witness's personal knowledge or

professional expertise, the prosecutor provided a limiting

instruction, after which the witness stated that she did not

know the answer to the juror's question.     The evidence was not

presented for the purpose of an indictment, nor did it probably

influence the jury.      Additionally, given the evidence presented

against the Tuckers, the statement probably did not have an

impact on the grand jury's decision to indict, and thus did not

create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

Therefore, Cassandra has failed to show that the Commonwealth's

alleged misconduct created a substantial risk of a miscarriage

of justice.    See id.

    3.    Conclusion.    Based on the foregoing, we reverse the

order allowing the defendants' motions to dismiss.      We remand

the cases to the Superior Court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.
              33

So ordered.