Court Opinion

ID: 9895164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-05 07:10:45.892437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:24.347956
License: Public Domain

Vacated and Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 31, 2023.

                                     In The

                      Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-22-00790-CV

                         SALVADOR NAJAR, Appellant
                                        V.
                         FILOMENA GARCIA, Appellee

                On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3
                              Harris County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. 1184556

                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this forcible detainer action, appellant Salvador Najar asserts that the
justice court and the county court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellee
Filomena Garcia’s claim for possession of the property. Because the record does
not contain any evidence of a landlord-tenant relationship between Najar and
Garcia, we sustain Najar’s jurisdictional challenge, vacate the county court’s
judgment as void, and dismiss Garcia’s forcible detainer action for want of
jurisdiction.
                                  BACKGROUND

      In May 2021, Garcia filed a petition for eviction in the justice court, seeking
possession of a condominium located in Houston, Texas. Najar filed an answer
and asserted that the justice court lacked jurisdiction over Garcia’s claim. The
justice court signed a judgment in favor of Garcia on April 21, 2022.

      Najar appealed the judgment to the county court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 509.8,
510.10(c). The county court called the case for trial on July 18, 2022. Garcia’s
counsel announced ready and informed the county court that he “believe[d]”
Najar’s counsel had a vacation letter on file in the district court. After conversing
with the court coordinator, the county court judge noted that neither “an email or
any filing” regarding the vacation letter was received by the county court and
instructed Garcia’s counsel to proceed with the case.

      Garcia’s counsel asserted that Garcia purchased the condominium in
question at a foreclosure sale and subsequently sent Najar notice to vacate the
premises. According to Garcia, Najar failed to vacate the condominium and an
eviction proceeding was pursued to obtain possession of the premises. The trial
court admitted three exhibits into evidence:

      •      An “Agent’s Assessment Foreclosure Deed” dated March 7, 2017,
             which states that the condominium was sold to Kensington Park
             Homeowner’s Association at a foreclosure sale held that same day.
      •      A March 12, 2021 special warranty deed conveying the premises from
             the Kensington Park Homeowner’s Association to Garcia.
      •      An April 7, 2021 letter to Najar from Garcia’s counsel, informing
             Najar that (1) Garcia was exercising her right to terminate his use and
             occupancy of the premises; (2) his right to stay on the premises was
             thereby terminated; (3) he did not have Garcia’s permission to occupy
             the premises nor did he “ha[ve] a lease for the Premises;” and (4) he
             had three days to vacate the premises.

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 The county court signed a final judgment on July 18, 2022, stating that Najar “did
 not appear and was duly notified” of the trial setting. The final judgment awards
 Garcia possession of the premises along with attorney’s fees and costs. Shortly
 thereafter, a writ of possession with respect to the premises was issued and
 executed.

       Najar filed a motion for new trial raising two arguments.           First, Najar
 asserted his counsel “had a valid vacation designation with the Harris County
 District Clerk” for the week of trial and attached the designation as an exhibit.
 Second, Najar argued that the county court lacked jurisdiction over the case. The
 motion was overruled by operation of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(c). Najar
 timely filed this appeal.

                                      ANALYSIS

       Najar raises two arguments on appeal:

       1.     the justice court and county court lacked jurisdiction over the case
              because (a) the eviction does not involve a landlord/tenant
              relationship, and (b) a district court case was pending challenging
              Garcia’s title to the property in question; and
       2.     the trial court, notified of Najar’s counsel’s vacation letter, abused its
              discretion by overruling Najar’s motion for new trial.

 Because we sustain Najar’s first issue, we need not reach his second.

I.     Standard of Review and Governing Law

       Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a
 case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex.
 1993). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we
 review de novo. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217,
 226 (Tex. 2004).

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       A justice court in the precinct where the real property is located has
jurisdiction over forcible detainer suits. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 27.031(a)(2);
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.004(a). A forcible detainer action is intended to be a
speedy, simple, and inexpensive means to determine which party has the superior
right to immediate possession of real property. Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of
San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006); Tellez v. Rodriguez, 612 S.W.3d
707, 709 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Accordingly, to prevail
in a forcible detainer action, “the plaintiff is not required to prove title but need
only supply sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to
immediate possession.” Tellez, 612 S.W.3d at 709.

       In contrast, a justice court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate title. See Tex.
Prop. Code Ann. § 27.031(b)(4).        A forcible detainer action therefore cannot
resolve title disputes; those types of claims may be addressed in a separate suit in a
court of proper jurisdiction. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e); Tellez, 612 S.W.3d at
709.

       But a justice court is not deprived of jurisdiction merely by the existence of
a title dispute — it is deprived of jurisdiction only if resolution of a title dispute is
a prerequisite to determination of the right to immediate possession. Jelinis, LLC
v. Hiran, 557 S.W.3d 159, 167 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet.
denied). Therefore, when a forcible detainer action presents a genuine issue of title
so intertwined with the issue of possession that a trial court would have to
determine title before awarding possession, the justice court lacks jurisdiction to
resolve the matter. Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

       A party may appeal the justice court’s judgment to a statutory county court
for trial de novo. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 509.8, 510.10(c). In a forcible detainer

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  appeal, the county court has the same jurisdiction as the justice court; accordingly,
  it also is prohibited from adjudicating title. Tellez, 612 S.W.3d at 709.

        To prevail in a forcible detainer action, a plaintiff has the burden to prove
  (1) she is the owner of the property, (2) the defendant is a tenant at will, a tenant at
  sufferance, or a tenant or subtenant willfully holding over after the termination of
  the tenant’s right to possession, (3) she gave proper notice to the tenant to vacate
  the property, and (4) the tenant refused to leave the property. See Tex. Prop. Code
  Ann. § 24.002; Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 478 (Tex. 2017).

II.     Jurisdictional Analysis

        On appeal, Najar asserts the justice court and county court lacked
  jurisdiction over Garcia’s forcible detainer action because the matter does “not
  involve a landlord-tenant relationship.”        In response, Garcia asserts that a
  foreclosed-upon deed of trust rendered Najar a tenant at sufferance, thus providing
  a sufficient basis for determining the right to immediate possession.

        We recently examined a similar issue in Guerrero v. Equity Trust FBO Jed
  Silverman IRA, No. 14-21-00136-CV, 2022 WL 11551139 (Tex. App.—Houston
  [14th Dist.] Oct. 20, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.). In that forcible detainer action,
  Guerrero argued on appeal that the justice court and county court lacked
  jurisdiction because “there is a lack of landlord-tenant relationship.” Id. at *3.

        Our analysis began by noting that “Texas courts have repeatedly observed
  that a forcible detainer action is dependent on proof of a landlord-tenant
  relationship.” Id. (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original); see also
  Jelinis, LLC, 557 S.W.3d at 167 (“A forcible detainer action requires proof of a
  landlord-tenant relationship.”); Goodman-Delaney v. Grantham, 484 S.W.3d 171,
  174 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“[A]n action for forcible

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detainer requires evidence of a landlord-tenant relationship because the lack of
such evidence would necessarily require a determination of who has title to the
property.”). Continuing on, we observed that courts often have found evidence of
this landlord-tenant relationship “by specific language in the document transferring
title of the property.” Guerrero, 2022 WL 11551139, at *4.

      For example, deeds of trust commonly include a “tenant-at-sufferance”
clause, which creates a tenancy at sufferance when a tenant wrongfully continues
to possess property after the tenant no longer has a right to that possession (such as
after a foreclosure). See, e.g., Jelinis, LLC, 557 S.W.3d at 167 (“In essence, a
tenancy-at-sufferance clause creates a landlord-tenant relationship when the
property is foreclosed”). This tenancy relationship provides a basis sufficient to
maintain a forcible detainer action. See Reynoso v. Dibs US, Inc., 541 S.W.3d 331,
337 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“If a deed of trust provides
that in the event of foreclosure, the grantor in the deed of trust will become a tenant
at sufferance if the grantor does not surrender possession, the trial court can
resolve possession without resort to title.”); Hossain v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n,
No. 14-14-00273-CV, 2015 WL 3751548, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
June 16, 2015, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (“Courts of appeals consistently have
allowed forcible detainer actions to proceed based on a tenancy at sufferance
clause in a deed of trust[.]”).

      But in Guerrero, there was no evidence of a tenancy at sufferance or any
other type of landlord-tenant relationship. See Guerrero, 2022 WL 11551139, at
*4 (“we conclude that Equity Trust failed to establish that Guerrero is a tenant at
sufferance”). Therefore, “[b]ecause of the lack of a landlord-tenant relationship
between Equity and Guerrero,” we held the justice court and county court lacked
jurisdiction to resolve the forcible detainer action. Id.; see also Haywood v. No

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Bull Invs., LLC, No. 13-22-00609-CV, 2023 WL 4940543, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi Aug. 3, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (because the appellee did not
produce evidence of the alleged deed of trust that created a tenancy at sufferance,
“the justice court lacked jurisdiction to consider the case”); Goodman-Delaney,
484 S.W.3d at 175-76 (because the appellee “conceded that she did not have a
landlord-tenant relationship” with the appellant, the justice court and county court
lacked jurisdiction in the forcible detainer action).

      Here, Garcia argues that the “foreclosed upon Deed of Trust” rendered Najar
a tenant at sufferance, thus providing a jurisdictional basis for her forcible detainer
action.   But neither the clerk’s record nor the reporter’s record contains any
evidence of this deed of trust. As recited above, the only exhibits in the record are
the “Agent’s Assessment Foreclosure Deed,” the 2021 special warranty deed, and
the April 2021 notice-to-vacate letter sent to Najar. None of these documents
include or reference a tenancy at sufferance clause applicable to Najar’s possession
of the condominium. Nor do these documents suggest any other type of landlord-
tenant relationship existed between Najar and Garcia. Without this basis, the
justice court and the county court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Garcia’s forcible
detainer action. See Guerrero, 2022 WL 11551139, at *4; see also, e.g., Haywood,
2023 WL 4940543, at *4; Goodman-Delaney, 484 S.W.3d at 175-76.

      We sustain Najar’s first issue.

                                    CONCLUSION

      “When a court’s void judgment is appealed, we have jurisdiction to declare
the judgment void and render judgment dismissing the case.” Goodman-Delaney,
484 S.W.3d at 175. Accordingly, we vacate the county court’s judgment as void
and dismiss Garcia’s forcible detainer action for want of jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Guerrero, 2022 WL 11551139, at *4; Goodman-Delaney, 484 S.W.3d at 175-76.
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                                      /s/       Meagan Hassan
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Bourliot and Hassan.

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