Court Opinion

ID: 9581346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:14:02.526021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:52.947898
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting in part.
As I cannot agree to the majority’s holding in Division 1 of the majority opinion, I must respectfully dissent as to that Division and reversal in part.
Relying upon Toussie v. United States, 397 U. S. 112, 114-115 (90 SC 858, 25 LE2d 156), the majority rejects the State’s contention that the statute of limitation should be tolled. The majority maintains that statutes of limitation should be applied strictly to protect defendants from having to defend themselves against stale charges. In my opinion, this principle has no application in this case for two reasons. First, “It fails to take into account the special circumstances of child molestation cases. [An 11] year-old victim does not ‘necessarily know’ that the acts of a trusted [stepfather] constitute a crime. As in most indecent liberties cases, the victim was quite young, naive and trusting. Though horrified by her [stepfather’s] actions and threats she did not realize until much later the offenses committed against her constituted a crime punishable by law.” State v. Bentley, 721 P2d 227, 231 (Kan. 1986) (dissenting opinion). Second, it fails to come to grips with the fact that the defendant himself frustrated the discov*485ery of the offense by intimidating the victim. The argument in favor of the strict application of the statute of limitation should not be applied where parental authority is used to frustrate the reporting of the offense. State v. Danielski, 348 NW2d 352 (Minn. App. 1984). Compare State v. French, 392 NW2d 596 (Minn. App. 1986).
Decided March 17, 1987
Rehearings denied April 2, 1987
David C. Jones, Jr., for appellant.
Timothy G. Madison, District Attorney, T. David Motes, John G. Wilbanks, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.