Court Opinion

ID: 9887071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 17:03:37.509061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:02.416343
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/6/23 Head v. Dolch CA1/2
             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
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      IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                              DIVISION TWO

 RICHARD HEAD, as Trustee, etc.
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  A165084
 v.
 DEBRA J. DOLCH,                                                     (Marin County Super. Ct.
           Defendant and Respondent.                                  No. CIV2102573)

          The anti-SLAPP motion on appeal in this case relates to a
professional fiduciary caught in the middle of a dispute between two
sets of friends of Raymond Ross.1 Ross has a substantial estate, but
now suffers from dementia and lacks capacity.
          Back in 2016, Ross named his friend, appellant Dr. Richard
Head, as the successor trustee of the Raymond W. Ross Living Trust
(Trust). But according to a different friend, Abraham Mertens, Ross

          1 California law bars strategic litigation against public

participation, known as “SLAPP” lawsuits. (Equilon Enterprises v.
Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57 (Equilon).) Special
motions to strike SLAPP lawsuits, filed under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16, are often called “anti-SLAPP” motions. (Equilon, at
p. 58.) Unless otherwise indicated, the statutory references in this
opinion are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                                           1
amended the Trust in April 2021 by removing Head and directing
Mertens “to select a reputable, objective, third-party to handle my
affairs.” Mertens says he complied by finding a private professional
fiduciary, respondent Debra Dolch, to serve as “sole trustee” to
administer the Trust in May 2021. Head was unaware of Mertens’
efforts or of Dolch’s ostensible appointment.
      In his capacity as Ross’s conservator, Head filed a complaint
against Mertens and Mertens’ wife, Ivory Madison, in July 2021. Head
alleges, among other things, that the couple committed financial elder
abuse and exercised undue influence over Ross by taking a substantial
sum of money from the Trust. According to Head, Mertens and
Madison also procured the April 2021 amendment using undue
influence, knowing that Ross had dementia and lacked capacity.
      Central to this appeal, when Head finally learned that Dolch (the
professional fiduciary) claimed to be Ross’s successor trustee, Head
amended his complaint to add Dolch as a party. Head claims Dolch
aided and abetted financial elder abuse against Ross. He also seeks
cancellation of the May 2021 instrument appointing Dolch as trustee.
Dolch filed a special motion to strike these two causes of action under
the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court granted the motion in its
entirety.
      We reverse. Dolch failed to meet her burden to show that the
core alleged activity upon which these claims are based—Dolch’s

                                    2
acceptance of her appointment as successor trustee—is activity
protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.2
           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
   A. The Living Trust
      We begin with a brief description of the underlying trust and the
parties in this action as background. In the aftermath of his husband’s
death, Ross executed an amendment and restatement of the Trust in
2016. It stated that, in the event of Ross’s death, resignation,
incapacity, or failure to serve as the original trustee, Head “shall serve
as Successor Trustee of all Trusts hereunder.” According to Head, he
has been friends with Ross since 1980.
      Head stated that he began to notice Ross’s cognitive decline in
2017 and it continued to worsen. In late 2020 and early 2021, the
decline allegedly became pronounced. Testing in March 2021 revealed
“significant cognitive issues.” Head arranged for Ross to move into an
assisted living facility. According to Head, he became successor trustee
of the Trust on May 18, 2021, after Ross’s physician “confirmed” his
cognitive decline and dementia diagnosis relating to Alzheimer’s
disease.
      Mertens and Madison are also friends of Ross. With their help,
Ross purportedly dictated and signed a one-page document in April
2021. It began: “I, Raymond ‘Jeffrey’ Ross, being of sound mind, but
this being too long to handwrite, have asked my friend, Ivory Madison,

      2 Dolch asks us to dismiss the appeal on the basis of mootness or

lack of standing because, in the time since Head filed the appeal, the
probate court suspended Head as conservator and appointed a new
temporary conservator. We deny the motion for the reasons described
below.

                                     3
to type up my wishes as I dictate them, including revoking any Power
of Attorney enjoyed by Richard Head, and to make modifications to my
Trust.”
      The document said that Ross wished to remain at his home in
San Francisco, but believed Head was planning to have Ross “declared
incompetent” and then “put [him] in a nursing home in Marin.” It
stated: “If there comes a time when I am no longer able to make my
own decisions, I do not want any of my beneficiaries to be granted any
Power of Attorney nor to become executor of the Trust, instead, I’d like
Abraham Mertens to select a reputable, objective, third-party to handle
my affairs. [¶] I hereby remove Richard as executor of my Trust.”
According to the document, Ross did not want Head “to know about
these changes yet,” because he “would like to remain on friendly terms
with him and his wife.”
      Dolch is a private professional fiduciary. According to Dolch,
Mertens first contacted her about serving as trustee of the Trust in
May 2021. Mertens and Madison told Dolch about complaints and
concerns Ross (and others) had about Head. Dolch reviewed the April
2021 document, as well as other estate planning documents that
purportedly contained handwritten changes by Ross (including striking
out Head’s name in a power of attorney document) made at the same
time. Dolch later declared: “Based on my interactions with Mertens
and Madison and my review of the April 4, 2021 documents, it
appeared to me that Mertens and Madison had genuine concern for
Ross and his well-being and that Ross would benefit greatly from a
professional fiduciary serving as the trustee of his Trust.” Dolch told
Mertens that she would accept the trusteeship if appointed. On May

                                    4
26, 2021 (eight days after Head says he officially became successor
trustee), Mertens executed a document appointing Dolch as trustee.
Dolch accepted the appointment by signing the document that same
day. Head was unaware of any modification of the Trust or the
appointment of Dolch.
        A few days later, Head instituted conservatorship proceedings of
the person and estate of Ross in the Marin County Superior Court. The
probate court appointed Head as conservator in September 2021. The
conservatorship order also stated: “Any and all durable powers of
attorney, or other powers of attorney for asset management or for
health care decision-making, made or given by Raymond W. Ross, to
any other person after 2016 are suspended.”
   B. Head’s Civil Action Against Mertens and Madison for
      Financial Elder Abuse and Related Claims
        Head filed this civil action against Mertens and Madison on July
8, 2021 in his capacity as conservator of Ross’s person and estate. He
asserted claims for financial elder abuse and aiding and abetting in the
commission of financial elder abuse. Among other things, Head alleged
that Ross had loaned Mertens and Madison $450,000, but they had
refused to pay it back and asserted that Ross had gifted that money to
them.
        Dolch says she learned of this litigation in October 2021. She
contacted her counsel, who advised her “to take whatever legal action
was necessary to obtain instructions from the court and/or confirm my
status as trustee so I could obtain Ross’s financial records and prepare
an accounting.” Dolch’s counsel specially appeared on her behalf at a
November 16, 2021 hearing, where the trial court noted there were
“questions as to who is the successor trustee” of the Trust.

                                     5
      Counsel for Head and Dolch exchanged multiple communications
after that hearing. On November 17, 2022, for example, Head’s counsel
sent a letter stating that Dolch’s “proposed involvement in the
conservatorship and trust can only be made in reliance on documents
[sic] were drafted by Mr. Mertens in an effort to supplant his own
testamentary wishes for Mr. Ross’s” and “[a]ttempting to make these
defective documents legally effective in order to deprive Mr. Ross of his
right to make his testamentary wishes free of undue influence and
fraud would be assisting in the taking described in Welfare and
Institutions Code section 15610.30. We sincerely hope that Ms. Dolch
does not intend to engage in that sort of conduct because if she does,
she will be named as an aider and abetter in the commission of elder
financial abuse.”
   C. Head’s Probate Petition
      On November 23, 2021, Head filed a probate petition to “confirm”
his position as successor trustee and power of attorney.3 Head alleged
that the April 2021 document purporting to amend the Trust was void,
and the subsequent “ ‘appointment’ ” of Dolch as trustee was thereby
invalidated.

      3 Dolch requested judicial notice of the probate petition, response

to the petition, and dockets of the probate proceeding and this civil
action. We deferred ruling on the requests until the merits of the
appeal. (See People v. Preslie (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 486, 493–494.) We
now grant the request in full. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [permitting
judicial notice of court records]; Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist.
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1 [reviewing court may take judicial
notice of matters not before the trial, but need not do so].)

                                    6
   D. Head’s Second Amended Complaint Naming Dolch
      In January 2022, Head filed the operative second amended
complaint in the civil action naming Dolch as a defendant on the 9th
(aiding and abetting in the commission of financial elder abuse) and
13th (cancellation of written instrument) causes of action. On the 9th
cause of action for financial elder abuse, Head alleged that Dolch aided
and abetted in taking away Ross’s testamentary rights “by virtue of”
the April 2021 document “and her appointment as successor trustee of
[the Trust] under the Appointment of Trustee and Power of Attorney
for a wrongful use or with intend [sic] to defraud, and/or through the
use of undue influence over Mr. Ross and in bad faith.” Head alleged
that Dolch “knew” that Mertens and Madison’s conduct in procuring
the April 2021 amendment was a “breach of duty,” and that Dolch was
“providing substantial assistance or encouragement” to Madison and
Mertens by “acting” under the appointment and “claiming” she is now
the successor trustee.
      On the 13th cause of action for cancellation, Head alleged that
the May 2021 appointment of Dolch as successor trustee was void or
voidable because it was obtained through fraud, financial elder abuse,
and undue influence. Head further alleged that Dolch’s appointment
was invalid because the conservatorship order had suspended all
powers of attorney made after 2016, and accordingly Mertens had no
authority to make the appointment.
   E. Dolch’s Anti-SLAPP Motion
      Dolch filed an anti-SLAPP motion on the 9th and 13th causes of
action. The trial court granted the motion in its entirety. It concluded
that Dolch had met her burden to show the claims against her were

                                    7
based upon activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The court
reasoned that the “gravamen” of Head’s allegations against Dolch “stem
from her engagement in the judicial process by appearing, through her
attorney, at a hearing in this matter to assert her appointment as
successor trustee and fiduciary for the Ross Trust. Any
communications made by her in preparation or anticipation of asserting
her status as successor trustee prior to her appearance at the ex parte
hearing in November 2021, are likewise protected.” The trial court
then concluded that Head failed to meet his burden to show a
probability of prevailing on the merits of these claims.
      On April 14, 2022, the trial court issued an order striking the 9th
and 13th causes of action against Dolch and entering judgment in her
favor. The order also stated: “Dolch is entitled to a mandatory award
of her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16(c) against Plaintiff and, upon further motion,
the Court will consider the amount of the award and whether it has
authority to order Plaintiff, in his individual capacity, to pay Dolch’s
reasonable fees and costs awarded.” Head filed a timely notice of
appeal from the order.
   F. Consolidation of Probate Petition with Civil Action
      On April 25, 2022, shortly after the trial court’s anti-SLAPP
ruling, the court consolidated Head’s probate petition (to confirm his
status as successor trustee and power of attorney) with this civil action.
   G. Order Suspending Head as Conservator
      On July 14, 2023, several months after the parties had completed
their appellate briefing in this matter, the probate court entered an
order suspending Head as conservator of Ross’s person and estate

                                     8
pending an evidentiary hearing on removal set for February 2024. The
probate court found that the suspension was in the best interests of
Ross. The probate court identified several reasons for this finding,
including that the “extreme, unnecessary and unduly costly” litigation
of the conservatorship has resulted in “significant financial loss” to
Ross, and that there is “some evidence to suggest that Dr. Head is not
acting in the best interest of Mr. Ross” such that “[i]n an abundance of
caution, removing Dr. Head (and thereby also removing the animosity
between the parties) is in Mr. Ross’s best interest.” The probate court
appointed private professional fiduciary Rebecca Guyette as temporary
conservator.
   H. Dolch’s Motion to Dismiss the Appeal
      On August 22, 2023, Dolch moved to dismiss this appeal. Dolch
argues that (1) Head has lost standing because his conservator status
has been suspended; and (2) the appeal as to Head’s 13th cause of
action is moot because that claim is duplicative of his pending probate
petition. On August 29, 2023, temporary conservator Guyette filed a
one-paragraph response advising this court “that she supports Dolch’s
motion to dismiss the appeal” as “[p]roceeding with the appeal is not in
the best interests of Raymond W. Ross, conservatee.”
      On September 8, 2023, Head filed an opposition to the motion.
Head argues that his suspension does not deprive him of standing
because he has not been removed as conservator, and is “aggrieved for
the simple reason that [Dolch] has filed a pending motion for attorneys’
fees and costs” under the anti-SLAPP statute, and “the fee motion
makes clear that [Dolch] intends to pursue Dr. Head as conservator for

                                     9
fees.” Head also argues that the appeal is not moot because it would
determine the “viability” of Dolch’s pending fee motion.
      The opposition attached a copy of Dolch’s motion, file-stamped on
June 24, 2022. The motion requests that the trial court “award her
attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with her successful anti-SLAPP
motion in the total amount of not less than $68,594.19.” It contends
that “the judgment in Ms. Dolch’s favor, including any amended
judgment, will become a liability of Mr. Ross, his conservatorship, and
his living trust, and Dr. Head (or any successor fiduciary) will be
required to satisfy the judgment from either or both estates.” It also
cites case law and statutes that Dolch argues “provide the [trial court]
with ample authority to, at the very least, require Dr. Head to
reimburse Mr. Ross’s assets in satisfaction of the judgment in
Ms. Dolch’s favor.”
                             DISCUSSION
      Head argues that the trial court erred in granting Dolch’s special
motion to strike the 9th and 13th causes of action. Before turning to
this ruling, we address Dolch’s arguments on appealability.
                           I. Appealability
      Dolch’s motion to dismiss raises two issues of appealability.
First, Dolch argues that Head has lost standing because his
conservator status has been suspended. Head disagrees, citing the
non-final nature of his suspension and Dolch’s pending motion for at
least $68,594.19 in attorney fees and costs that expressly contemplates
any award to be a “liability” for Ross and his conservatorship, as well

                                    10
as a potential liability for Head personally. At oral argument, Dolch’s
counsel responded that these fees are “irrelevant” to the instant appeal.
         We disagree. Head took this appeal from the trial court’s anti-
SLAPP order. That order explicitly provides that Dolch was “entitled
to a mandatory award of her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs”
under the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1) [providing that “a
prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to
recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs”].) The order also
provides that the trial court would consider not only the amount of the
award, but “whether it has the authority to order [Head], in his
individual capacity, to pay Dolch’s reasonable fees and costs awarded.”
Both Ross’s estate and Head himself may be impacted by a fee award in
connection with the anti-SLAPP order. Given the scope of the order
and Dolch’s pending fee motion, we conclude that Head is sufficiently
“aggrieved” for standing purposes. (§ 902.)
         Second, Dolch argues that the appeal as to Head’s 13th cause of
action should be dismissed as moot because the claim seeks relief that
is duplicative of relief requested in his pending probate petition, which
is now consolidated with this civil action. Again, we disagree. “A case
is moot when any ruling by this court can have no practical impact or
provide the parties effectual relief.” (Woodward Park Homeowners
Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 880, 888.) A ruling on
appeal will have a practical and direct impact on Dolch’s ability to seek
fees and costs. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) Having rejected these
arguments, we turn to the merits of the appeal of the anti-SLAPP
order.

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                        II. Anti-SLAPP Ruling
      The anti-SLAPP statute is “designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak
and petition on matters of public concern.” (Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884.) Under this statute, a
defendant may file a special motion to strike claims “arising from any
act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue . . . unless the court
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability
that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
      We review the grant of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Park v.
Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057,
1067.) Resolution of such a motion requires the court to engage in the
now familiar two-step process. “First, the court decides whether the
defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of
action is one arising from protected activity.” (Equilon, supra, 29
Cal.4th at p. 67.) If the court finds the claim arises out of protected
activity in the first step, “it then determines whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Ibid.)
      We ask on the first step whether Head’s claims against Dolch
arise from activity “protected” by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Equilon,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67.) Section 425.16, subdivision (e) protects, in
relevant part, “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before
a . . . judicial proceeding,” and “(2) any written or oral statement or
writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review
by a . . . judicial body[.]” Dolch bears the burden “to identify what acts

                                     12
each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are
protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.”
(Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1011.) We
address the 9th and 13th causes of action asserted against Dolch in
turn.
        A. The “Aiding and Abetting” Financial Elder Abuse
           Cause of Action
        On the 9th cause of action, Head alleged that Dolch aided and
abetted the commission of financial elder abuse against Ross.
California law defines “ ‘[f]inancial abuse’ of an elder or dependent
adult” to include when a person “[a]ssists in taking, secreting,
appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of an
elder or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud,
or both.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30, subd. (a)(2).)
        The second amended complaint is not a picture of clarity. At oral
argument, counsel for Head represented that the 9th cause of action
was based on one injury-producing action by Dolch: accepting the
successor trustee appointment.
        “In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether
the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or
petitioning activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89; see
also Park v. Nazari (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1108 [movant must
“ ‘identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate
that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute’ ”].) We must
“respect the distinction between activities that form the basis for a
claim and those that merely lead to the liability-creating activity or
provide evidentiary support for the claim.” (Park v. Board of Trustees
of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1064.) “If the core

                                    13
injury-producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised
does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or
incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of
the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Hylton v. Frank E. Rogozienski, Inc. (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272 (Hylton).)
      Here, the 9th cause of action alleged that Dolch aided and
abetted in taking away Ross’s testamentary rights “by virtue of” the
April 2021 document and her appointment as successor trustee. While
we express no opinion on the merits of Head’s theory of Dolch’s liability
for financial elder abuse, Dolch’s acceptance of this appointment was
the alleged “core injury-producing conduct” upon which Head premised
his 9th cause of action. (Hylton, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272.)
      Dolch’s reference to the communications between counsel after
her special appearance does not compel a contrary conclusion. It is true
that a trial court “is not limited to examining the allegations of the
complaint alone but rather considers the pleadings and the factual
material submitted in connection with the special motion to strike.”
(Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394.) Here, Head’s counsel
sought to deter any “reliance” on the invalid April 2021 amendment
and May 2021 appointment. Such communications support the view
that the “core injury-producing conduct” action was the appointment
itself. (Hylton, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 1272.) Any efforts by
counsel to discourage Dolch’s attempts to make those “defective
documents legally effective” went to the manner in which this core
injury-producing conduct would be ultimately carried out. (See Gaynor
v. Bulen (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 864, 879 [allegation that the trustee
wasted funds on probate litigation was not a separate claim but was

                                    14
the manner in which trustee implemented allegedly wrongful plan to
alter trust].)
      Having determined that Dolch’s acceptance of the appointment
was the alleged core injury-producing conduct, we must decide whether
Dolch met her burden to show this conduct is protected under the anti-
SLAPP statute. We conclude she did not.
      Dolch declared that she accepted the appointment on May 26,
2021. The document states: “I, Debra J. Dolch, hereby accept this
appointment as Trustee of the Restated Raymond W. Ross Living Trust
and the Power of Attorney over any decisions regarding Jeffrey’s
finances, healthcare, and life decisions.” She does not argue, nor does
the document suggest, that any petitioning activity was required to
execute or effectuate the appointment. She did not immediately seek to
confirm the appointment via any filing with the court. Instead, she
waited five months before making a special appearance in this action
based on legal advice “to obtain instructions from the court” and/or
“confirm” her status as trustee.
      Nor are we persuaded by the suggestion that Dolch’s acceptance
of the appointment was “in preparation or anticipation of” her
involvement in this litigation. Pre-litigation conduct may be deemed
petitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute if it is “made
‘in anticipation of litigation “contemplated in good faith and under
serious consideration[.]” ’ ” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 1255, 1268; Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 [communications “ ‘preparatory to or in
anticipation of the bringing of an action’ ” are protected by § 425.16].)
Dolch, however, has not shown that litigation was contemplated in good

                                    15
faith or under serious consideration when she accepted the
appointment in May 2021. (Neville, at p. 1268.) On the contrary, she
declared that she contacted her attorneys in October 2021, based on
information she had “gathered and observed” since accepting the
appointment five months prior.
   B. Cancellation Cause of Action
      On the 13th cause of action, Head alleged that Dolch’s
appointment was void or voidable because it was obtained through
fraud, financial elder abuse, and undue influence. He also alleged that
the appointment was invalid because the conservatorship order had
suspended all powers of attorney made after 2016, and accordingly
voided any authority Mertens had to make the appointment.
Accordingly, the core injury-producing conduct was conduct by Mertens
(and Madison) in obtaining the appointment, not any conduct by Dolch.
Even if it also included Dolch’s acceptance of the appointment, Dolch
failed in her burden to show that such conduct is activity protected
under the anti-SLAPP statute as described above.
      In sum, we conclude that the trial court erred in its finding on the
first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Given this conclusion, we need
not and do not reach the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.4 The
trial court erred in granting Dolch’s special motion to strike the 9th and
13th causes of action against her.

      4 Having not reached this second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis,

we need not and do not address any of the parties’ arguments regarding
the merits of the 9th or 13th causes of action.

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                             DISPOSITION
      Dolch’s motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The trial court’s
April 14, 2022 order is reversed. Head is entitled to his costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

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                                            _________________________
                                            Markman, J.*

We concur:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Richman, J.

Head, as Trustee, etc. v. Dolch (A165084)

      * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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