Court Opinion

ID: 9744449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:03:19.998533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:49.186700
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THEIS, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: J.M. testified he was born June 6, 1981. In July 1996, he testified to events occurring in the fall of 1993 and spring of 1994. Not surprisingly, he was unable to identify the specific dates on which those events took place, 34 months earlier when he was 12 years old. My reading of the record is that J.M. testified defendant penetrated him on at least six days. Although the assistant State’s Attorney at oral argument stated that multiple sex acts occurred on no more than two occasions, J.M.’s testimony was that there were three of these events. On the first date, defendant penetrated him both digitally and with his penis. On another occasion, when J.M. performed oral sex on defendant for the first time, he again digitally penetrated the boy. During a still later event, defendant placed his finger in J.M.’s anus and then penetrated the boy’s anus with his penis. Despite that testimony, my colleagues find the consecutive sentences imposed on defendant must be vacated because they believe it is impossible to determine whether the jury’s convictions relate to the occasions when multiple acts occurred in a single course of conduct. In support of their position, they rely on People v. Pence, 267 Ill. App. 3d 461, 641 N.E.2d 933 (1994). I disagree and join Justice Hartman in his dissent in Pence. See Pence, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 468, 641 N.E.2d at 938 (Hartman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The jury was presented with three sets of verdict forms, describing different types of sexual acts. If the jury had returned both guilty and not guilty verdicts, their meaning would have been unclear. However, the jury’s return of three guilty verdicts was not unclear, and can only be interpreted to mean the jury accepted the testimony of J.M. and rejected the' theory of defense — an attack on J.M.’s credibility. The majority here and in Pence apparently create two new requirements before mandatory consecutive sentences can be imposed for assaults committed over a period of time. Must the State charge in the indictment the specific dates on which criminal acts were committed in a single course of conduct? Must the trial court give special verdict forms requiring the jury to determine which acts occurred on which dates? These requirements have no statutory basis nor support in case law, other than the majority’s reading of Pence. It is well recognized that the date of an offense is not an essential ingredient in child sex cases. People v. Barlow, 188 Ill. App. 3d 393, 402, 544 N.E.2d 947, 953 (1989). This court has long held that, in sex offense cases, flexibility must be given to the requirement that a certain date be specified in the charging document. People v. Long, 55 Ill. App. 3d 764, 772, 370 N.E.2d 1315, 1321 (1977). Furthermore, proof of the precise date alleged in an indictment is unnecessary unless the allegation of a particular time is an essential ingredient of the offense or a statute of limitations question is involved. People v. Wheeler, 216 Ill. App. 3d 609, 619-20, 575 N.E.2d 1326, 1335-36 (1991). Additionally, Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 3.01 states: "The [(indictment) (information) (complaint)] states that the offense charged was committed [on) (on or about)]__If you find the offense charged was committed, the State is not required to prove that it was committed on the particular date charged.” Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.01 (3d ed. 1992). Also significant is that the statute does not impose the pleading and proof requirements created by the majority. The plain language is that "[t]he court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct *** unless *** the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12 — 13 or 12 — 14 of the Criminal Code *** in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(a) (West 1992). While the majority is concerned with the rule of statutory construction that an ambiguous statute must be interpreted in the defendant’s favor, our supreme court in People v. Bole has held the mandatory consecutive sentencing statute is "clear and unambiguous.” People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 197, 613 N.E.2d 740, 744-45 (1993). The result of the majority’s opinion here and in Pence is that a defendant who repeatedly assaults his victim in a single course of conduct and does so several times is punished less severely than one who commits a series of acts once. This is an absurd result. The jury’s unmistakable verdict was that defendant committed multiple acts of assault on at least three occasions. His convictions and consecutive sentences should be affirmed.