Court Opinion

ID: 9916986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 01:00:32.661881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:16.642077
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40248        Document: 00517028806             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/10/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                      No. 23-40248                          FILED
                                    Summary Calendar                  January 10, 2024
                                    ____________                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                            Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Fernando Fraga,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 2:11-CR-686-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Smith, Higginson, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Fernando Fraga appeals the sentence imposed upon the revocation of
   his supervised release, contending that the district court failed to orally
   pronounce the “standard” and “special” release conditions that appear in
   the written judgment, thus creating a conflict between the oral and written
   sentence pronouncements that requires reformation of the written judgment.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-40248      Document: 00517028806          Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/10/2024

                                    No. 23-40248

   The Government agrees except as to “standard” condition 10, which it
   argues is sufficiently similar to one of the statutory conditions in 18 U.S.C.
   § 3583(d) as to require only modification, not excision, on remand.
          A district court must orally pronounce a sentence to respect the
   defendant’s right to be present at sentencing, and the pronouncement
   requirement extends to some, but not all, supervised release conditions.
   United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). The
   requirement to pronounce supervised release conditions turns on “whether
   a condition is required or discretionary under [§ 3583(d)].” Id. at 559. Any
   condition that is not statutorily required, whether labeled special, standard,
   recommended, or otherwise, is discretionary. Id. at 558-59. “If a condition
   is discretionary, the court must pronounce it to allow for an objection.” Id.
   at 559.   Pronouncement may be achieved, even if not explicitly, by
   “adopti[ng] . . . a written list of proposed conditions,” such as in the PSR, so
   long as “the defendant confirms [his] review of the [document].” Id. at 560.
          The district court neither orally pronounced the challenged
   discretionary conditions nor referenced and adopted any document
   containing them. Because Fraga had no opportunity to object to the imposed
   conditions in open court, review in this case is for abuse of discretion. See
   United States v. Rivas-Estrada, 906 F.3d 346, 348-49 (5th Cir. 2018). For the
   same reasons, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
   imposing the challenged conditions in violation of Fraga’s right to be present
   at sentencing. See Diggles, 957 F.3d at 556-57. The district court’s error also
   creates a conflict between the oral pronouncement of Fraga’s sentence and
   the written judgment because the written judgment broadens the restrictions
   or requirements of his supervised release beyond those in the oral
   pronouncement. See United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir.
   2006). Consequently, the oral pronouncement controls. See United States v.
   Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001). As such, the challenged

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Case: 23-40248      Document: 00517028806           Page: 3   Date Filed: 01/10/2024

                                     No. 23-40248

   conditions must be stricken from the written judgment, see United States v.
   Illies, 805 F.3d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2015).
          With one exception. “Standard” condition 10 provides that Fraga
   “must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive
   device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was
   modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another
   person such as nunchakus or tasers).” Although this condition was not
   pronounced, it is partially consistent with the statutorily required condition
   that the defendant not commit another federal, state, or local offense. See
   § 3583(d). Federal law prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms,
   ammunition, or destructive devices. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). And statutorily
   required release conditions need not be pronounced in open court. See
   Diggles, 957 F.3d at 559. Accordingly, “standard” condition 10 need only be
   stricken in part by removing the reference to other “dangerous weapon[s].”
          We VACATE Fraga’s sentence in part and REMAND for the
   district court to amend its written judgment in accordance with this opinion.

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