Court Opinion

ID: 9494001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:26:05.713277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:09.582558
License: Public Domain

NOONAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The Speedy Trial Act explicitly excludes from the time in which an offense must be tried the following:
A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a code-fendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).
As the Supreme Court has expanded this provision, “All defendants who are joined for trial generally fall within the speedy trial computation of the latest codefendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).” Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 323 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). As we have put it, “If several defendants are joined, the 70-day limit is measured from the date the last codefendant is arraigned.” United States v. Butz, 982 F.2d 1378, 1382 n. 3 (9th Cir.1993). The government advanced this argument in its brief on appeal:
[A] new Speedy Trial Act clock began to run on February 27, 1995, when co-defendant Mary Cross was arraigned.... “When several defendants are joined for trial, the 70-day period begins to run on the date the last codefendant is indicted or arraigned.” United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1400 (9th Cir.1993), citing Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 323 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986), and United States v. Morales, 875 F.2d 775, 776 (9th Cir.1989).
As the government’s brief makes clear, Mary Cross, Hardeman’s co-defendant, was arraigned on February 27, 1995. Hardeman’s speedy trial clock then began to run. The 57 days counted prior to February 27, 1995, which the court counts as consuming speedy trial time, are totally irrelevant. In fact, at the most, as Harde-man himself concedes, only 26 days of countable time ran between February 27, 1995 and April 30, 1995, the start of his trial.
This point was not addressed by the court in its per curiam opinion filed March 21, 2000. There is no reason why it should not be dispositive now. If the Speedy Trial Act is followed, the government will not be required to retry or let go a defendant convicted of serious drug and firearm offenses in a trial that lasted fifteen days.
This court may affirm a district court on any basis supported by the record. See, e.g., Bibeau v. Pac. Northwest Research Found., 188 F.3d 1105, 1111 n. 5 (9th Cir.1999). The record in this case contains sufficient evidence to support a ruling that Hardeman’s co-defendants were fugitives. During a pre-trial hearing, the district court asked the government: “How many defendants are there still out there somewhere that haven’t been picked up?” The court continued: “Who’s still at large?” The government responded that defendants Lacy, Scott and Cross remained at large. The criminal pretrial minutes for both November 14,1994 and November 30, 1994 reflect that “[t]he 3-at-large defendants were addressed.” A motion filed by defendants’ attorney on September 29, 1994 states: “Of the 18 defendants, 14 are before the court, 3 are reported to be fugitives and 1 is reported to be dead.” A government motion entitled “Emergency Motion to Revoke Bail for Mary Cross” states that Cross was a fugitive until her *830initial appearance on February 27, 1995. A magistrate judge minute order of February 27, 1995 confirms that Cross was a fugitive to this date.
All of the above information is part of the record before the district court and before us. These are not “fleeting references” to the fugitive defendants; these are acknowledgments of the fugitives by the government and by the defendants and the date when Cross first appeared is confirmed by a judicial order. These are not “belated assertions of fact,” as the majority styles them, but undisputed parts of the record. There is no reason to offer opportunity to rebut such facts established by the record. If the usual rule prevailed, we would take the facts into account and affirm. It is extremely puzzling that our court is not willing to acknowledge what looms large when the record is reviewed.