Court Opinion

ID: 2963814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:15:32.26309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:46.457050
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USCA1 Opinion

	

          January 23, 1996
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2221
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  WILLIAM R. TIBOLT,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

             The opinion of this Court issued on December 29, 1995, is amended
        as follows:

             Page 10, line 6, should read:  ". . . at the Tibolt residence."  

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2221
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  WILLIAM R. TIBOLT,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                               and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
                                        _____________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Anthony  M. Cardinale,  with  whom Nicholas  J.  DiMauro and  Law
             _____________________              _____________________      ___
        Offices of Anthony M. Cardinale were on brief for appellant.
        _______________________________
             William C.  Brown, Attorney,  Appellate  Division, Department  of
             _________________
        Justice, with whom  Donald K.  Stern, United States  Attorney, was  on
                            ________________
        brief for appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                  December 29, 1995

                                          2

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                          3

                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.    Following  his conviction  on a
                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.
                          _____________

          money laundering charge, 18  U.S.C.   1956, in the  United States

          District Court for the  District of Massachusetts, William Tibolt

          appeals two trial court  rulings relating to incriminating finan-

          cial records seized from his  residence in a warrantless  search.

          Finding no error, we affirm. 

                                          I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    Around mid-morning  on July 27, 1992,  a security alarm

          activated  in the  Dombrowski residence  located at 13  Old Salem

          Path in Gloucester, Massachusetts.  As the security alarm company

             JK Security    was  unable to make telephone contact  with the

          Dombrowski residence to determine whether  the alarm had been set

          off accidentally,  it telephoned the Gloucester  Police to report

          the alarm.   Officer Joseph Palazzola was  dispatched to investi-

          gate  the alarm report at the Dombrowski residence, which is next

          door to the Tibolt residence at 11 Old Salem Path.  

                    Both residences are set well  back from Old Salem  Path

          and largely concealed from view.  Two driveways    separated by a

          tree  and some shrubbery    lead to  the Tibolt home.  The Tibolt

          mailbox     bearing "11 Old Salem Path"    is located immediately

          to  the right  of  the first  Tibolt  driveway.   The  Dombrowski

          mailbox    marked "dombrowski   13"    is located a few feet left

          of  the  second Tibolt  driveway, more  than  60 feet  before the
                                            ____  ____  __ ____  ______

          driveway entrance  to the Dombrowski  residence at  13 Old  Salem

          Path.  

                                          2

                    Upon observing the mailbox  marked "13," Officer Palaz-

          zola mistakenly entered  the second driveway to  the Tibolt resi-

          dence.  He checked the exterior  of the residence for signs of an

          attempted break, or burglary  in progress.  Although he  noted no

          signs  of forced entry, Palazzola  found an unlocked  door on the

          rear deck.   He opened  the door and  called inside to  alert any

          occupant,  but received no response.   Given that  the police had

          been  requested to  investigate the  alarm, that  a door  was un-

          locked, and that Palazzola  had been unable to make  contact with

          anyone inside the  house, he  reasoned that the  alarm might  not

          have been activated accidentally.

                    Palazzola  promptly  called  for  backup,  and  Officer

          Thomas Williams  arrived within five minutes.   Williams likewise

          drove  to the Tibolt  residence rather than  the Dombrowski resi-

          dence,  because he saw Palazzola's  squad car parked  next to the

          Tibolt  residence.   Williams immediately  recognized the  Tibolt

          residence as having been the target of a prior investigation by a

          Gloucester  Police drug task force in which he had participated. 

          Williams was  unsure, however, whether the  target (viz., Tibolt)

          of the  task force  investigation still  owned the  residence, or

          whether it was still under investigation for drug-related activi-

          ties. 

                     Palazzola and  Williams decided  to make  an immediate

          warrantless  entry through  the unlocked  rear door,  then looked

          about for possible  explanations for the  alarm (e.g., any  occu-

          pants, a  burglar,  "whatever").   Their  search was  limited  in

                                          3

          scope, eschewing drawers, cabinets  and containers.  The officers

          "secured"  each room,  to  rule out  the  presence of  intruders,

          captives, or injured occupants.   After sweep-searching the upper

          floors,  the officers  discovered  a  well-established  marijuana

          growing  facility in the basement,  then left to  obtain a search

          warrant.1   Later,  armed with  a warrant, the  officers searched

          the Tibolt  premises and  seized incriminating financial  records

          which Tibolt subsequently  sought to suppress on the  ground that

          the  search warrant was invalid because the evidence relied on in

          the supporting  affidavit was  itself  the fruit  of the  earlier

          warrantless search.  After hearing, the district court denied the

          motion to suppress, without elaboration. 

                    Following the verdict,  Tibolt moved for a new trial on

          the ground that he  had uncovered "new" evidence relating  to the

          suppression motion  which would (1) impeach  Palazzola's suppres-

          sion hearing  testimony, (2)  suggest that the  Gloucester Police

          deliberately  planned to  search  the Tibolt  residence, and  (3)

          demonstrate a  Franks v. Delaware,  438 U.S. 154,  155-56 (1978),
                         ______    ________

          violation.  Gloucester Police Department "incident cards,"  which

          record  the time,  date,  desk officer,  and  location of  police

          assignments, disclosed that officers had been called to Old Salem

          Path on at least fourteen prior occasions to investigate security

                              
          ____________________

               1The warrant application related the following grounds:  (1)
          an intrusion alarm was reported by J.K. Systems to the Gloucester
          Police Department; (2) Officers Palazzola and  Williams responded
          to the  alarm report  and  found a  door open;  (3) the  officers
          entered the home to  check the premises for intruders;  and (4) a
          marijuana-growing facility was found in the cellar.  

                                          4

          alarms.  The cards reflect that there were three calls to "13 Old

          Salem Path" and ten others to "Old Salem Path."  One card, dating

          from 1990, indicates that Officer Joseph Palazzola had  been sent

          to the Dombrowski residence to investigate a security alarm.  And

          two cards indicate that  a desk officer with the  initials "J.P."

          had dispatched other officers to "Old Salem Path."          I   n

          addition, an affidavit by Officer Theodore Lemieux, dated January

          27, 1994     the day after the Tibolt suppression  hearing    and
                 _     ___ ___ _____ ___ ______ ___________  _______

          submitted  in  support of  a  search  warrant application  in  an

          unrelated criminal proceeding, stated that 
          _________

                    an  informant . .  . has provided information
                    __  _________        ___ ________ ___________
                    that led to the  arrest and indictment of one
                    ____ ___ __ ___  ______ ___ __________ __ ___
                    William  Tibolt.   In  the investigation  the
                    _______  ______
                    informant  provided  detailed information  in
                    regard to the  location of an  indoor growing
                    operation that Mr.  Tibolt had  in his  home.
                    The  informant provided the  name, address as
                    well  as other persons  that were involved in
                    the marijuana growing  operation.  The infor-
                    mants [sic]  also described the  home and the
                    interior as well as  a room in the  center of
                    the basement that [sic] the growing operation
                    was being conducted. (Emphasis added.)  

          But for the fact that it  contains no indication as to the timing

          of  the events  described  in  it,  the Lemieux  affidavit  might

          conflict with  the affidavit submitted  in support of  the search

          warrant application of  July 27,  1992, see supra  note 1,  which
                                                  ___ _____

          described JK Security's call to the Gloucester Police Department,

          the police  response, and  the officers' unexpected  discovery of
                                                   __________

          marijuana in  the Tibolt basement.   After hearing,  the district

          court denied the motion for new trial.   United States v. Tibolt,
                                                   _____________    ______

          868 F. Supp. 380, 381-83 (D. Mass. 1994).

                                          5

                                          II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

          A.   Motion to Suppress
          A.   Motion to Suppress
               __________________

                    Tibolt first challenges  the district court's  pretrial
                                                                   ________

          denial  of the motion to  suppress the primary  evidence of money

          laundering:  the financial  records seized from his residence  on

          July 27, 1992.  He contends that there was no objectively reason-

          able  basis for believing that a life-threatening burglary was in

          progress,  even assuming  that Officer  Palazzola reasonably  had

          mistaken the Tibolt residence for the Dombrowski residence.   But
                                                                        ___

          see infra Section  II.B.  And  he argues  that inspection of  the
          ___ _____

          exterior of  the Tibolt residence  revealed no signs  of forcible

          entry, and no open windows or doors.  See Brief  for Appellant at
                                                ___

          27-29 (citing United States  v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529  (9th Cir.
                        _____________     ________

          1993)  (suppressing  evidence  seized in  warrantless  search  of

          residence where officers investigating  burglar alarm observed no

          indication of forced entry)).

               1.   Substantive Law
               1.   Substantive Law
                    _______________

                    A warrantless search of a private residence is presump-

          tively unreasonable  under the Fourth  Amendment.  See  Payton v.
                                                             ___  ______

          New York, 445  U.S. 573, 586 (1980).    The  government therefore
          ________

          must prove that  the initial search  came within some  recognized

          exception  to  the Fourth  Amendment  warrant  requirement.   See
                                                                        ___

          United States v. Doward,  41 F.3d 789, 791 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.
          _____________    ______                                     _____

          denied,  115  S. Ct.  1716  (1995).   Generally  speaking, absent
          ______

          probable  cause and  exigent  circumstances the  Fourth Amendment

                                          6

          bars  warrantless, nonconsensual  entries of  private residences.

          See United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 1989).2 
          ___ _____________    _____

                    Probable cause  will be found  to have been  present if

          the  officers  at  the  scene  collectively possessed  reasonably

          trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent policeman

          in  believing that  a  criminal offense  had  been or  was  being

          committed.  See Hegarty v. Somerset Cty., 53 F.3d 1367, 1374 (1st
                      ___ _______    _____________

          Cir. 1995), cert. denied,  No. 95-629, 1995 WL 625553  (U.S. Dec.
                      _____ ______

          11, 1995);  United States v. Zurosky, 614  F.2d 779, 784 n.2 (1st
                      _____________    _______

          Cir.  1979)   (finding probable  cause where  police investigated

          possible "breaking and entering" at warehouse), cert. denied, 446
                                                          _____ ______

          U.S.  967 (1980) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
                                   ________    _____________

          175-76 (1949)).   "In dealing with  probable cause, . .  . as the

          very name implies,  we deal  with probabilities.   These are  not

          technical;   they are the factual and practical considerations of

          everyday  life  on which  reasonable and  prudent men,  not legal

          technicians, act."  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983).
                              ________    _____

                    Exigent  circumstances  exist  where   law  enforcement

          officers confront  a "compelling necessity  for immediate  action
                              
          ____________________

               2The government would have us  characterize this warrantless
          entry  as a  so-called  "community caretaker"  search, a  warrant
          exception  applicable  to  searches  "totally  divorced from  the
          detection, investigation, or acquisition  of evidence relating to
          the  violation of a criminal  statute."  Cady  v. Dombrowski, 413
                                                   ____     __________
          U.S.  433, 441,  447-48  (1973).   In  light of  our  alternative
          disposition, we  need  not  consider  the  "community  caretaker"
          exception.   But see id.  at 439 (noting  "constitutional differ-
                       ___ ___ ___
          ence"  between search of home and search of automobile); see also
                                                                   ___ ____
          United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 535 (10th Cir. 1994) (reading
          _____________    ____
          Cady as  applying only to  searches of  automobiles, not  homes);
          ____
          Erickson, 991 F.2d at  532 (same); United States v.  Pichany, 687
          ________                           _____________     _______
          F.2d 204, 209 (7th Cir. 1982) (same).

                                          7

          that w[ould] not brook the delay of obtaining a warrant."  United
                                                                     ______

          States v. Wilson, 36 F.3d 205, 209 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing United
          ______    ______                                           ______

          States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1980));  United States
          ______    _____                                     _____________

          v.  Almonte, 952 F.2d 20,  22 (1st Cir.  1991), cert. denied, 503
              _______                                     _____ ______

          U.S. 1010 (1992).  Although "exigency" determinations  invariably

          are  fact-intensive, see United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 34
                               ___ _____________    ______

          (1st Cir. 1992), "exigent  circumstances" commonly include:  "(1)

          `hot pursuit' of  a fleeing felon; (2) threatened  destruction of

          evidence inside  a residence  before a  warrant can  be obtained;

          (3) a risk that the suspect  may escape from the residence  unde-

          tected;   or (4) a  threat, posed by  a suspect, to  the lives or

          safety  of the public, the police officers, or to [an occupant]."

          Hegarty, 53 F.3d at 1374.  The "exigent circumstances" inquiry is
          _______

          limited to the objective facts reasonably known  to, or discover-

          able by, the officers at the time of the search.  See Illinois v.
                                                            ___ ________

          Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (upholding warrantless search
          _________

          where police officers  reasonably, but mistakenly, believed  they

          had obtained valid "third-party consent" to search residence from

          person with authority to consent) (citing Archibald v. Mosel, 677
                                                    _________    _____

          F.2d 5  (1st Cir.  1982) (invoking  "good faith"  principle under

          "exigent circumstances" exception)).

               2.   Standard of Review
               2.   Standard of Review
                    __________________

                    As  mixed  questions of  law  and  fact, the  "probable

          cause" and "exigent  circumstances" determinations require bifur-

          cated review:   whether a  particular set  of circumstances  gave

          rise to  "probable cause" or "exigent  circumstances" is reviewed

                                          8

          de  novo and  findings  of fact  are  reviewed for  clear  error.
          __  ____

          United  States v.  Goldman,  41 F.3d  785,  786 (1st  Cir.  1994)
          ______________     _______

          (probable cause),  cert. denied, 115  S. Ct. 1321  (1995); United
                             _____ ______                            ______

          States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 678 (9th Cir. 1993) (exigent circum-
          ______    _____

          stances).   Where, as here,  there are no  explicit factual find-

          ings, the record below is assessed in the light most favorable to

          the  trial court ruling.   See United States  v. Baldacchino, 762
                                     ___ _____________     ___________

          F.2d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1985). 

               3.   Application of Law
               3.   Application of Law
                    __________________

                    Tibolt does not challenge the factual findings implicit

          in  the  district court  ruling,  given  that the  evidence  most

          central  to the ruling    the police descriptions relating to the

          alarm  report, the locations of  the mailboxes, the unlocked door

              is undisputed.3   Moreover,  these implicit  findings unques-

          tionably  support the  challenged legal  conclusion that  Officer

          Palazzola had probable cause  to believe a breaking  and entering

          had been or was being committed at the Tibolt residence.  
                              
          ____________________

               3On  appeal,  Tibolt  asserts  no direct  challenge  to  the
          objective  "reasonableness"  of Palazzola's  putative  mistake   
          _________
          purportedly caused by the juxtaposition of the Dombrowski mailbox
          and the entrance to Tibolt's  second driveway    in investigating
          the Tibolt residence, instead of Dombrowski's,  for a burglary in
          progress.   Rather, he questions only  whether Palazzola, despite
          his protestations to the contrary, knowingly used this fortuitous
          circumstance as a pretext for conducting a warrantless search for
          drugs as  part of an  ongoing task force  investigation targeting
          the Tibolt residence.  The only evidence of such a ruse, however,
          was presented  in his post-conviction motion.   See infra Section
                                _______________           ___ _____
          II.B.   At the  pretrial hearing,  the  inquiry into  Palazzola's
                          ________
          state of mind necessarily turned, for the most part, on the trial
          court's observation of Palazzola's demeanor, and  its credibility
          determination, matters uniquely within  the province of the trier
          of  fact.  United  States v. Zapata,  18 F.3d 971,  975 (1st Cir.
                     ______________    ______
          1994). 

                                          9

                    A  security  alarm  had  been activated,  and  when  JK

          Security  placed  a call  to  the  Dombrowski residence,  it  had

          received no  answer.4  These circumstances  severely undercut any

          likelihood that  the security  alarm had been  activated inadver-

          tently by a resident.   Moreover, upon his arrival  approximately
                                                              _____________

          ten minutes later, Palazzola checked all windows and doors at the
          ___ _______ _____

          Tibolt  residence.5  Instead of finding all doors secured, as one
                              
          ____________________

               4Tibolt cites cases involving  various external indicia of a
          "break," see,  e.g., Commonwealth v.  Fiore, 403 N.E.2d  953, 955
                   ___   ____  ____________     _____
          (Mass. Ct.  App.) (upholding warrantless search  where outer door
          found  broken off hinges), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938 (1980), but
                                     _____ ______                       ___
          no alarm system  activation.  See Erickson, 991 F.2d  at 530, 533
          __ _____ ______  __________   ___ ________
          (noting that government, on appeal, had conceded that no "exigent
          circumstances" had been shown, given the absence of any activated
          security alarm; no visible sign of forced entry;  witness reports
          that  suspected  burglars had  departed  area  30 minutes  before
          police  officers' arrival;  and officers'  failure to  "knock and
          announce" before  entry); United  States v.  Moss, 963  F.2d 673,
                                    ______________     ____
          677,  679  (4th  Cir.  1992) (invalidating  search  because  "the
          Government  has formally  conceded  that  this  is not  an  'exi-
          gent-circumstances case' and does  not seek to uphold the  search
          here  on that  basis,"  given that  police  officer observed  "no
          [external] indication  that any illegal occupant  was inside" the
          cabin); Commonwealth v. Bates, 548 N.E.2d 889, 892-93  (Mass. Ct.
                  ____________    _____
          App. 1990) (invalidating search where police did not even suspect
          an  ongoing  crime,  but  were merely  investigating  a  "missing
          person" report, after waiting over three hours before investigat-
          ing missing person's apartment); State v. Morgavi, 794 P.2d 1289,
                                           _____    _______
          1292-93  (Wash.  Ct. App.  1990)  (invalidating  search based  on
          police observation of "a car  in front of the garage, opened  and
          partially broken doors  to the garage,  an open back door  to the
          house  and an open side  door to the  garage," but distinguishing
          cases where "the  police were  summoned to the  premises by  con-
          cerned  neighbors who had witnessed the burglaries and the flight
          of suspects").  We think it clear that the activation of an alarm
          system is an external "sign" of a possible forced entry.

               5Although  the  Dombrowski residence  bore  a "JK  Security"
          sticker,  and the  Tibolt  residence an  "ADT Security"  sticker,
          there was no  evidence that  Palazzola had been  informed by  the
          dispatcher that JK  Security had  reported the  alarm.   Further,
          while  dispatchers  sometimes write  the  name  of the  reporting
          security  company on the incident cards, see infra Section II.B.,
                                                   ___ _____
          the investigating officers do not receive these cards for comple-

                                          10

          might reasonably expect while the residents are away, he found an

          unlocked door on the  rear deck and received  no response to  his

          efforts  to communicate with anyone  who might be  inside.  These

          circumstances significantly enhanced the likelihood of an intrud-

          er.

                    For similar  reasons, we  conclude  that Palazzola  was

          presented  with "exigent  circumstances" permitting  an immediate
                                                                  _________

          warrantless  entry.  Without entering, he could not know but what

          an  intruder  had managed  to get  into  the residence,  and even

          injured or captured a resident, then fled; or had been caught off

          guard by the police and remained in the residence with a forcibly

          detained resident.  Even the authorities cited by Tibolt acknowl-

          edge the potential exigencies  attending such circumstances.  See
                                                                        ___

          Erickson, 991 F.2d at 533  ("In a wide variety of contexts,  this
          ________

          and  other circuits  have upheld  warrantless searches  conducted

          during  burglary  investigations  under  the  rubric  of  exigent

          circumstances.");  Commonwealth  v. Fiore,  403  N.E.2d  953, 955
                             ____________     _____

          (Mass. Ct.  App.) ("It  seems  clear to  us  that a  house  break

          without more as set  out in the affidavit raises  the possibility

          of  danger to  an occupant and  of the  continued presence  of an

          intruder and indicates  the need to secure the premises.  In such

          circumstances `(t)he right of the police to enter and investigate

          in an emergency without the accompanying intent  to either search

          or arrest is inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace

                              
          ____________________

          tion until after their investigation of the alarm report.  In any
                     _____
          event, Tibolt has not raised this matter.  See supra note 3.
                                                     ___ _____

                                          11

          officers.'")  (citation  omitted),  cert. denied,  449  U.S.  938
                                              _____ ______

          (1980)).   Hindsight  discloses,  of course,  that Palazzola  was

          mistaken.   Nevertheless, at the time, see Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at
                                    __ ___ ____  ___ _________

          186,  an officer confronted  with these  circumstances reasonably

          could  have concluded  that there  was an  imminent risk  "to the

          lives or safety  of the public," Hegarty, 53 F.3d  at 1374, or to
                                           _______

          an injured or immobilized resident.  See, e.g., Murdock v. Stout,
                                               ___  ____  _______    _____

          54  F.3d 1437, 1443 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding warrantless search

          of  residence  following  burglary  report,  where  investigating

          officers found some signs  that resident might have been  at home

          when an  intruder entered dwelling,  and received no  response to

          their calls, thereby creating  a "fair probability  that . . .  a

          resident might  be in need of  assistance") (distinguishing prior

          circuit precedent in United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529 (9th
                               _____________    ________

          Cir.  1993)).   Accordingly, the  district court  did not  err in

          denying the motion to suppress.

          B.   Motion for New Trial
          B.   Motion for New Trial
               ____________________

                    We  turn now to the district court ruling denying a new

          trial.   Tibolt contends  that the "newly  discovered" Gloucester

          Police  "incident  cards" and  the  Lemieux  affidavit support  a

          rational inference  that Officer  Palazzola committed perjury  at

          the  suppression  hearing,  in  explaining  that  the  misleading

          placement  of the Dombrowski mailbox at the opening of the second

          Tibolt driveway, and his own unfamiliarity with the two residenc-

          es, had caused him to  go to the Tibolt residence to  investigate

          the reported alarm at the Dombrowski residence.  Tibolt maintains

                                          12

          that  the  incident cards  show that  Palazzola  had been  to the

          Dombrowski residence at least  once before and, therefore, should

          have recognized  his  mistake  on  this occasion.    Further,  he

          argues, the Lemieux affidavit suggests that Palazzola's "mistake"

          was actually part of  an elaborate, conspiratorial ruse, manufac-

          tured by the Gloucester Police task force to enable a warrantless

          search of the Tibolt residence for drugs.  Cf. Curzi, 867 F.2d at
                                                     ___ _____

          43 n. 6 (noting that police may not justify warrantless search by

          manipulating  events to  generate "exigency").   Finally,  in the

          affidavit supporting the search warrant  application submitted on

          July 27, 1992    presumably premised solely  on the fruits of the
                                               ______

          warrantless  search    the police failed  to disclose their prior

          investigations of the Tibolt residence for suspected drug activi-

          ties.   Tibolt  insists that  the failure  to disclose  the prior

          investigations of  the residence constituted a  "clear violation"

          of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).  
             ______    ________

               1.   Substantive Law 
               1.   Substantive Law
                    _______________

                    A  motion  for  new  trial based  on  newly  discovered

          evidence will  not be allowed unless the  movant establishes that

          the  evidence was:   (i) unknown  or unavailable  at the  time of

          trial,  (ii)  despite due  diligence,  (iii)  material, and  (iv)

          likely to result in an acquittal upon  retrial.  United States v.
                                                           _____________

          Ortiz, 23 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v.  Natanel,
          _____                                  _____________     _______

          938 F.2d 302, 313  (1st Cir. 1991), cert.  denied, 502 U.S.  1079
                                              _____  ______

          (1992).  If, however,  the "new" evidence was within  the govern-

                                          13

          ment's  control and  its disclosure was  withheld, the  third and

          fourth criteria are less stringent:

                    The  usual  locution,   taken  from   Justice
                    Blackmun's  opinion in Bagley,  [473 U.S. 667
                                           ______
                    (1985)], is that the  nondisclosure justifies
                    a  new  trial  if  it is  "material,"  it  is
                    "material" only  if  there is  "a  reasonable
                    probability"  that  the  evidence would  have
                    changed   the   result,  and   a  "reasonable
                    probability" is "a probability  sufficient to
                    undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id. at
                                                           ___
                    682.  . . .  This somewhat delphic "undermine
                    confidence" formula suggests that  [a] rever-
                    sal  [and a  remand for  new trial]  might be
                    warranted in some cases even if there is less
                    than an even  chance that the  evidence would
                    produce  an  acquittal.   After  all,  if the
                    evidence  is close  and the  penalty signifi-
                    cant,  one might think  that undisclosed evi-
                    dence  creating  (for example)  a  33 percent
                    chance of a  different result would undermine
                    one's confidence  in the  result.   And while
                    Bagley appears to give little weight to other
                    ______
                    factors--such as the  degree of fault on  the
                    prosecutor's part and the specificity  of the
                    defense  request--it  is  not entirely  clear
                    that these variables must be ignored.

          United States v. Sepulveda,  15 F.3d 1216, 1220 (1st  Cir. 1993),
          _____________    _________

          cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2714 (1994). 
          _____ ______

               2.   Standard of Review
               2.   Standard of Review
                    __________________

                    The denial of a  motion for new trial is  reviewed only

          for manifest abuse of  discretion.  See United States  v. Wright,
                                              ___ _____________     ______

          625 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir.  1980).  The instant motion for new

          trial  triggers a  two-tier inquiry.   First,  to the  extent the

          "new" evidence pertains to the disposition of the pretrial motion

          to suppress financial records, wherein the district court was the
                                                     ________ _____

          trier of fact, Tibolt confronts the  daunting task of demonstrat-

          ing  that the district court committed clear error in determining

                                          14

          that  the  "new" evidence  would  not have  altered  its pretrial

          factual  findings.  Zapata, 18  F.3d at 975  (noting that factual
                              ______

          findings and  credibility determinations relating  to suppression

          issues  are normally for the trier of fact).  Second, Tibolt must

          show that the "new" evidence would so  undermine the government's

          case as to give  rise to a "reasonable" probability  of acquittal

          upon retrial.  Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1220.6 
                         _________

               3.   The Incident Cards
               3.   The Incident Cards
                    __________________

                    We cannot say that the district court ruling constitut-

          ed a manifest  abuse of  discretion.  The  district court  found,

          inter alia, that the police incident reports would not suffice to
          _____ ____

          undermine Officer Palazzola's credibility; hence, were not likely

          to result in an acquittal.  Tibolt, 868 F. Supp. at 382.  Nor are
                                      ______

          we persuaded  that Palazzola perjured himself  at the suppression

          hearing.   Rather, he testified simply that he could not remember

          having been at the  Dombrowski residence prior to July  27, 1992.

          In fact,  the incident cards show  that he was sent  there on but

          one  occasion     three  years  before  the pretrial  suppression
          ___               _____  _____

          hearing.  Further,  this incident  card did not  even compel  the

          conclusion  that Palazzola  went to,  or secured,  the Dombrowski

          residence on that prior  occasion.  Thus, the district  court was
                       ____ _____  ________

          entitled to  find  that  the incident  cards  did  not  undermine

          Palazzola's claimed lack of memory.  Cf. Natanel, 938 F.2d at 313
                                               ___ _______
                              
          ____________________

               6We assume,  without deciding,  that the "new"  evidence was
          within  the  government's  control  and  potentially  subject  to
          disclosure.  But see infra Section II.B.4 (noting that government
                       ___ ___ _____
          did disclose  essential information, later  reiterated in Lemieux
          affidavit, at pretrial suppression hearing).  

                                          15

          (noting somewhat lesser burden on new-trial movant where evidence

          shows witness's prior testimony was "deliberately false").  Given

          their marginal  direct probative value,  we cannot  say that  the

          incident cards  alone were sufficient to  generate a "reasonable"

          probability  that Tibolt would  be acquitted  upon retrial.   Cf.
                                                                        __

          Sepulveda, 15  F.3d at  1220 n.5  (noting  that newly  discovered
          _________

          evidence pertaining  exclusively to a government witness's credi-

          bility rarely warrants new trial).      4.   The  Lemieux Affida-
                                                  4.   The  Lemieux Affida-
                                                       ____________________

          vit
          vit
          ___

                    The district court found the Lemieux affidavit similar-

          ly inconclusive.   Although the  affidavit might contribute  to a

          plausible inference  of police  conspiracy, it certainly  did not

          compel such a finding, especially since its temporal relevance is
          ______

          so unclear.   For one thing, it is not unreasonable to think that

          Lemieux may have been  imprecise in recollecting the sequence  of
                                                               ________

          the events which had occurred a year and a half earlier.  That is

          to say,  there is nothing  in the affidavit  to suggest  but what

          Lemieux may  have been remembering  that Tibolt was  arrested and

          that  an informant's  tip simply  corroborated what  the officers
                                            ____________

          themselves accidentally discovered.  Nor does the Lemieux affida-

          vit, vague  as it  is, make it  probable that an  acquittal would

          result upon retrial. 

                    In  all events, we need not rest our decision solely on

          the "credibility"  ground, since the district court found also   

          with  respect to the information in the Lemieux affidavit    that

          Tibolt had not met  the first two prongs of the  Ortiz test.  See
                                                           _____        ___

                                          16

          Natanel, 938 F.2d at  313 (failure to  establish any of the  four
          _______                                          ___

          Ortiz factors defeats motion  for new trial).  The  court further
          _____

          found  that Tibolt  had not  shown that  this "new"  evidence was

          either  unknown or unavailable at  the time of  the pretrial sup-

          pression hearing, nor that Tibolt had exercised  due diligence to

          discover  the evidence earlier.  See  Tibolt, 868 F. Supp. at 382
                                           ___  ______

          ("What  is  more, the  government  proffered  at the  suppression

          hearing the  fact that Tibolt's  home had  been the subject  of a

          local drug investigation before the search, and made available to

          Tibolt  one of  the officers involved  in that  investigation for

          questioning.").   At the  pretrial suppression hearing, moreover,

          the  government disclosed  to the  defense that  Officer Williams

          participated in a  previous task force surveillance of the Tibolt

          residence,  and that  "at that  time there  were some  reports of
                                                           ____  _______

          possible  drug  activities  involving  that  house."    (Emphasis

          added.)  This disclosure certainly should  have alerted Tibolt to

          the probability  that  an informant  was  involved.   Yet  Tibolt

          failed to pursue information  relating to whether the warrantless

          search of July 27, 1992 was a mere "ruse" designed to fabricate a

          showing  of probable cause.  Since the finding that Tibolt failed

          to exercise due diligence was not clearly erroneous,  see Zapata,
                                                                ___ ______

          18 F.2d  at 975,  he may  not rely  on this  evidence to  mount a

          renewed
                attackonthewarrantlesssearchorthesearchwarrantapplication.7
                              
          ____________________

               7As  noted above, see supra p. 4, Tibolt not only challenges
                                 ___ _____
          the  pretrial determination  that Palazzola's  warrantless search
                                                         ___________ ______
          was valid, but cites Franks v. Delaware as authority for a direct
                               ______    ________
          challenge to  the subsequent  search warrant, which  was premised
                                        ______ _______
          entirely  on the  fruits of  the earlier  warrantless search.   A

                                          17

                    The district court judgment is affirmed.
                    The district court judgment is affirmed.
                    _______________________________________

                              
          ____________________

          defendant  is  not  entitled  to a  Franks  evidentiary  hearing,
                                              ______
          however, absent  a "substantial preliminary  showing  (1)  that a
          false statement [or material omission] in the affidavit [support-
          ing  the search warrant application] has  been made knowingly and
          intentionally,  and (2)  that  the false  statement [or  material
          omission]  is necessary for a finding of probable cause."  United
                                                                     ______
          States  v.  Scalia, 993  F.2d 984,  987  (1st Cir.  1993) (citing
          ______      ______                                         ______
          United  States v.  Rumney, 867  F.2d 714,  720 (1st  Cir.), cert.
          ______________     ______                                   _____
          denied, 491 U.S. 908 (1989)).   
          ______
               We discern no principled basis for treating the Franks claim
                                                               ______
          differently than  Tibolt's direct  challenge  to the  warrantless
          search.  To the  extent the "new" evidence underlying  the Franks
                                                                     ______
          hearing  request was available prior to  trial (i.e., the Lemieux
          affidavit) by the exercise  of due diligence, Tibolt's post-trial
          Franks request based  on that  evidence is untimely.   See  supra
          ______                                                 ___  _____
          Section II.B.4.   The  marginal probative  value of  the incident
          cards in undercutting Palazzola's  pretrial testimony is insuffi-
          cient, by itself, to  support a "substantial preliminary showing"
                                           ___________
          that the  evidence, if disclosed, would have altered the decision
          that there  was probable cause  to issue  a search warrant.   See
                                                                        ___
          supra Section II.B.3; see  also, e.g., United States  v. Hiveley,
          _____                 ___  ____  ____  _____________     _______
          61 F.3d 1358, 1360 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that "the 'substantial
          showing' requirement  needed to  obtain a Franks  hearing is  not
                                                    ______
          lightly met").  

                                          18