Court Opinion

ID: 9493547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:11:25.267097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:54.030116
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This case presents an issue of first impression in this court: whether a defendant who has properly received a two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines may also obtain a twq-level departure under § 5C1.2, the Guidelines’ “safety valve” provision. Because I would answer the question in the affirmative, and because Mr. Harris meets the requirements for the two-level departure, I respectfully dissent.
There is no doubt that Mr. Harris possessed a firearm within the broad meaning of Sentencing Guideline § 2D1.1 (b)(1). This section provides for a two-level enhancement if a dangerous weapon was possessed in connection with a drug trafficking offense. Application Note Three to Guideline § 2D1.1 states that the adjustment should be applied “if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 comment, (n. 3) (1998); see also United States v. Chandler, 12 F.3d 1427, 1435 (7th Cir.1994). Section 2D1.1(b)(1) does not require actual possession of the weapon by the defendant. See United States v. Covarrubias, 65 F.3d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir.1995). A defendant is said to have possessed a firearm under § 2D1.1(b)(1) if he had actual or constructive possession of the weapon, see United States v. Wetwattana, 94 F.3d 280, 283 *1060(7th Cir.1996), or if co-conspirators possessed firearms in furtherance of jointly undertaken criminal activity, and their possession was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, see U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(l)(B) & comment, (n. 2) (1998); United States v. Taylor, 111 F.3d 56, 59 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Berchiolly, 67 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir.1995).
There is sufficient evidence that Mr. Harris’ co-conspirators possessed and used firearms in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that such possession was reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Harris. In fact, Mr. Harris was frequently in the presence of armed co-conspirators and, on at least one occasion, Mr. Harris was present when several members of the charged conspiracy exchanged gunfire with other individuals. Given these facts, the district court properly concluded that Mr. Harris possessed a firearm within the meaning of § 2Dl.l(b)(l). Not only was it reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Harris that co-conspirators were possessing firearms in furtherance of the conspiracy, but it was also within his actual knowledge.
Mr. Harris, nevertheless, asks this court to conclude that he is still eligible to receive the safety valve reduction because it was his coconspirators, not he, who possessed a firearm. Ordinarily, we review the district court’s determination that a defendant is ineligible to receive a reduction under § 5C1.2 for clear error. See United States v. Williams, 202 F.3d 959, 964 (7th Cir.2000). However, the failure to raise an issue before the district court results in a forfeiture of that argument unless the defendant can demonstrate plain error. See United States v. Davis, 121 F.3d 335 (7th Cir.1997). Because Mr. Harris failed to assert his eligibility for the safety valve reduction at the sentencing hearing, he must demonstrate plain error in order to prevail on this issue.1 This court has stated that such an error must be “conspicuous, at least in hindsight” and egregious enough that it would amount to a miscarriage of justice if allowed to stand. United States v. Marvin, 135 F.3d 1129, 1135 (7th Cir.1998).
Section 5C1.2 provides for a two-level departure if a defendant can show that (1) he does not have more than one criminal history point; (2) he did not use violence, possess a firearm, or induce another to possess a firearm; (3) his offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person; (4) he was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense; and (5) he has complied with the Government’s demands for information. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (1998). The only disputed issue is whether Mr. Harris possessed a firearm within the meaning of § 5C1.2(2), so as to preclude his eligibility for the two-level departure.
Until now, this court has not had the occasion to decide whether a defendant found to have possessed a firearm for purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(1) under a co-conspirator liability theory may be eligible to receive a safety valve adjustment. The majority of circuits that have addressed this issue, however, have held that defendants remain eligible for a downward departure under § 5C1.2 so long as they are not found to have actually or constructively possessed weapons for purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(1). See United States v. Clavijo, 165 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that possession of a firearm un*1061der the safety valve does not include reasonably foreseeable possession of a firearm by eo-conspirators); United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429, 432 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that possession of a firearm by co-conspirators is not attributable to the defendant under the safety valve); In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460, 1462 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that the doctrine of co-conspirator liability cannot establish possession under the safety valve); United States v. Wilson, 105 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that only the defendant’s conduct and not the conduct of his co-conspirators is relevant in determining eligibility for the safety valve); but see United States v. Hallum, 103 F.3d 87, 89 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that the defendant can be held liable for the foreseeable acts of his coconspirators under the safety valve). The majority view comports with both the language of the Guidelines and the application notes.
Section 5C1.2(2) states that a defendant is eligible for treatment under that subsection only if “the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(2) (1998). In accord, Application Note Four to Guideline § 5C1.2 states that the term “defendant,” as used in subdivision (2), “limits the accountability of the defendant to his own conduct and conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, comment. (n. 4) (1998). The Supreme Court has held that guideline commentary that interprets or explains a guideline is controlling unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, the guideline. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993); see also United States v. Bonanno, 146 F.3d 502, 509 n. 8 (7th Cir.1998); United States v. Rubin, 999 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir.1993). Because the Sentencing Commission drafts the Guidelines as well as the commentary interpreting them, courts should presume that the interpretations in the commentary “represent the most accurate indications of how the Commission deems that the guidelines should be applied to be consistent with the Guidelines Manual as a whole as well as the authorizing statute.” Stinson, 508 U.S. at 45, 113 S.Ct. 1913. Because Note Four is not inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, Guideline § 5C1.2(2), it should be given controlling weight.
The language of Note Four mirrors the wording of § lB1.3(a)(l)(A), one of the two principal provisions defining the scope of relevant conduct for which defendants are held liable under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (a)(1)(A) (1998). Under § lB1.3(a)(l)(A), the defendant is held liable only for those acts and omissions that he personally “committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.” Significantly, Note Four does not mention § lB1.3(a)(l)(B), the other principal provision defining the scope of relevant conduct, which holds a defendant liable for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(l)(B) (1998). Given the plain language of § lB1.3(a) and the specificity of Note Four to Guideline § 5C1.2, this omission could hardly have been inadvertent. Section lB1.3(a) provides that relevant conduct shall be determined by § lB1.3(a)(l)(A) and § lB1.3(a)(l)(B) “unless otherwise specified.” Applying the principle that the specific supersedes the general, I read Note Four to Guideline § 5C1.2, which addresses only the element of weapon possession, to restrict the meaning of relevant conduct for which defendants are otherwise held liable under the Sentencing Guidelines.
In fact, Note Four, by its own terms, expressly “limits the accountability of the defendant to his own conduct and conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 comment, (n. *10624). If co-conspirator liability were incorporated into the weapon possession element, then this limitation would be rendered meaningless. Furthermore, Note Four is entirely consistent with the plain language of Guideline § 5C1.2(2). A defendant is eligible for treatment under this subsection as long as he did not “possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense.” See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(2). If possession under this subsection encompassed foreseeable possession by a codefendant, then the inclusion of “induce another participant to [possess]” would be superfluous.
Given the measure of authority that the Supreme Court has accorded the Guidelines and their commentary, I am unwilling to conclude that this phrase was included in § 5C1.2(2) arbitrarily. I am no more willing to conclude that the omission of co-conspirator liability language from Note Four was inadvertent. Instead, I am convinced that § 5C1.2(2) and its commentary are consistent with the safety valve’s basic purpose: “to spare certain minor participants in drug trafficking enterprises from mandatory minimum sentences when imposition of the mandatory sentences would be disproportionate to the defendants’ culpability.” In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d at 1462-63; see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-460, at 5 (concluding that “the integrity and effectiveness of controlled substance mandatory mínimums could in fact be strengthened if a limited ‘safety valve’ from the operation of these penalties was created and made applicable to the least culpable offenders”).
Because Mr. Harris did not actually or constructively possess a weapon in connection with the conspiracy, he should not be precluded from receiving the benefits of the safety valve. All parties agree that Mr. Harris never actually possessed a firearm during the course of the conspiracy or directed anyone else to carry a firearm. However, the Government argues that Mr. Harris should be precluded from receiving the benefit of the safety valve because he had constructive possession of the firearms. To prove that Mr. Harris constructively possessed a dangerous weapon, the Government had to show that he demonstrated ownership, dominion, authority, or control over the weapons that were discovered in the drug houses. See United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. Hernandez, 13 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir.1990) (stating that constructive possession applies when “a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others”). The record before the court simply cannot sustain a finding that Mr. Harris constructively possessed a firearm.
Although Mr. Harris was frequently in the presence of armed co-conspirators, and firearms were routinely stored in the houses where he converted and repackaged cocaine into cocaine base, this court has held that constructive possession requires more than a defendant’s presence in the location of contraband. See United States v. Windom, 19 F.3d 1190, 1200-01 (7th Cir.1994). Undoubtedly, Mr. Harris’ proximity to the firearms is relevant to his ability to exercise dominion and control over the weapons. Control need not be exclusive; more than one individual can exercise dominion and control over contraband. See Richardson, 208 F.3d at 632; United States v. Hunte, 196 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir.1999); United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir.1997). Nevertheless, establishing dominion and control by a particular defendant requires more than proximity. See Windom, 19 F.3d at 1200-01; accord United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617, 619-20 (D.C.Cir.1992). The critical issue is whether Mr. Harris, at any time, had the intent and the authority to exercise control over the firearms. See United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir.1986).
*1063In a related, yet slightly different context, this court has suggested that a defendant only has dominion or control over contraband when he has the recognized authority within his “criminal milieu” to possess and determine the disposition of the contraband. See United States v. Ortega, 44 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir.1995); Windom, 19 F.3d at 1200 n. 21; Manzella, 791 F.2d at 1266 (stating that the defendant “must have the right (not the legal right, but the recognized authority in his criminal milieu) to possess them, as the owner of a safe deposit box has legal possession of the contents even though the bank has actual custody”). Although courts have characterized the legal fiction of constructive possession in various ways, this characterization is most instructive because it makes concrete what is otherwise evasive, and more accurately depicts the reality of the criminal setting.
Understanding constructive possession in this way, there is insufficient evidence that Mr. Harris personally possessed the firearms. Nothing in the PSR, the indictment, or testimony from Mr. Harris’ plea hearing suggests that he had dominion or control over the weapons at any time. Although Mr. Harris occasionally delivered cocaine or collected payments, it appears that his primary role in the conspiracy was to convert and repackage cocaine into cocaine base. As blameworthy as these actions were, Mr. Harris does not appear to have played an authoritative role in the conspiracy. The facts do not establish that Mr. Harris had the authority within his criminal milieu to possess and determine the disposition of the weapons that were discovered in the drug houses. The only finding that the record clearly supports is that Mr. Harris possessed firearms under a theory of co-conspirator liability. Mr. Harris’ codefendants possessed firearms in furtherance of jointly undertaken criminal activity, and such possession was reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Harris. See U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(l)(B) & comment, (n. 2).
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that in determining a defendant’s eligibility for the safety valve, § 5C1.2(2) only allows for consideration of the defendant’s conduct, not the conduct of his co-conspirators. Accordingly, I believe that Mr. Harris did not possess a firearm within the meaning of § 5C1.2(2) and therefore remains eligible for a two-level reduction under the safety valve. Because application of § 5C1.2 is mandatory, the district court’s failure to sentence Mr. Harris under the safety valve provision was plainly erroneous. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority characterizes Mr. Harris' failure to assert his eligibility for the safety valve adjustment as a waiver of the argument rather than a forfeiture. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). This characterization — which even the Government does not support — permits the majority to avoid reaching the merits on the ground that matters that have been waived, and not merely forfeited, are not subject to plain error scrutiny. See United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir.1995).
In my view, the Government's characterization of the situation as involving forfeiture and not waiver is correct. The record hardly reflects an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right" to the safety valve adjustment. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)); see also Davis, 121 F.3d at 337-38.