Court Opinion

ID: 9442431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:47:31.349152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:05.805629
License: Public Domain

KALODNER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The area of disagreement between the majority and myself is confined to the questions (1) whether the guarantee against excess outage is binding upon the defendant, and (2) assuming that it is, whether a judgment should be directed in favor of the plaintiff in this Court.
I do not dispute that the law of warranties pertinent to this case is in the process of renovation.- However far Pennsylvania will go, I think the learned trial judge has ■adequately presented the opposite view to that expressed by the majority, and I agree with him. But on the record, the solution of this case need not rest upon a choice of the two approaches. Thus, it is an equally justifiable conclusion that the rights of the parties to this litigation are governed by the declaration of the warehouse receipts, that the defendant would not be responsible for loss or damage resulting from specified causes “or any other cause beyond our control”. And if the plaintiff has a right of action, it must be founded on the warehouseman’s liability as such.
It should be noted that the District Court rejected, as does this Court, the contention of the plaintiff that the transaction involved here was other than a sale in the usual sense. But there was no finding by the District Court that the defendant’s letter to the original purchaser containing, inter alia, the guarantee, was intended to cancel the contrary clause in the warehouse receipts if they were transferred. Nor, indeed, was there a finding below that the general assignment referred to by the majority was intended to include the - guarantee. Although the majority has made factual findings on these issues, the District Judge may well have come to another conclusion, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case.1 Since this Court is not usual*547ly a fact-finding tribunal, it would seem proper, on the majority’s view, to remand the case for further findings, and if need be, additional evidence.
Finally, I believe the majority’s direction, in effect, of judgment for the plaintiff to be inappropriate at this time. The reasons given by the Supreme Court in two recent cases 2 for preventing the Court of Appeals from directing judgment when no motion under Rule 50(b) had been presented to the lower court are persuasive that under the circumstances of this case the trial court should have the initial determination with respect to making appropriate findings on the relevant factual issues, and amending the judgment, as he could have done under Rule 52(b).
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.

. Parenthetically, it should be stated that throughout it has been made to appear that the original purchaser from the defendant was ' “Old Wilson”, a Maryland corporation. However, the documents in evidence show that the president of “Old Wilson” was one Levin, who signed the “assignment” which .was, in effect, an agreement- with Distillers Corporation-Seagram’s Ltd., -to sell -to “New Wilson”, *547a Seagram subsidiary and forerunner of plaintiff. But “Old Wilson” had a subsidiary called in these proceedings, “Wilson of New York”. While there is testimony that this corporation had no assets, one Newman endorsed the warehouse receipts in the capacity of a president, and a protective assignment obtained from “Wilson of New York”, was signed by Newman as its president. It would seem, therefore, that the whiskey involved belonged to “Wilson of New York”.

. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 1947, 330 U.S. 212, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849; Globe Liquor Co., Inc., v. San Roman, 1948, 332 U.S. 571, 68 S.Ct 246, 92 L.Ed. 177.