Court Opinion

ID: 9832066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:35:43.179528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:41.712340
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The appellants, in their motion for rehearing, contend that we erred in holding that Mrs. McCall was not -entitled to testify with reference to the services performed by her for Mrs. Coates and particularly with reference to the services claimed to have been performed by her out of Mrs. Coates’ presence. They cite in support of their contention the following authorities: Wells v. Hobbs, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 375, 122 S. W. 451; Potter v. Wheat, 53 Tex, 401; Williams v. Neill (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 693; Hamilton v. Starr (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 587; Henderson v. Davis (Tex. Civ. App.) 191 S. W. 358; Buckler v, Kneezell (Tex. Civ. App.) 91 S. W. 367 (writ refused). According to the bill of exception, Mrs. McCall, if permitted, would have testified that practically every day for a period of two years immediately prior to Mrs. Coates’ death she rendered services for Mrs. Coates, such as cleaning house, making clothes, and preparing meals for her, and that such services were rendered away from and out of the presence of Mrs. Coates. The trial court excluded this evidence.
We recognize the rule that in actions to recover for services rendered to a decedent, where the employment has been completely proven by other evidence, a plaintiff may describe the things which he did in the performance of the contract, provided such acts were done in the absence of the deceased and without his immediate and personal participation and are such that the deceased, if living, could not contradict such testimony. Jones Commentaries on Evidence (2d Ed.) vol. 5, p. 4377; Potter v. Wheat, 53 Tex. 401; Buckler v. Kneezell (Tex. Civ. App.) 91 S. W. 367 (writ refused). But where the contract of employment is not fully proven by other evidence and the services claimed to have been performed were personal in their nature, or of such character that knowledge of the performance thereof must necessarily have come to the immediate attention of the deceased, and evidence of the rendition of such services under the circumstances will necessarily attribute to the decedent some act or attitude with respect thereto, then the incident to which the evidence relates amounts to a “transaction with the deceased” and plaintiff’s evidence thereof is inadmissible. Jones, Commentaries on Evidence (2d Ed.) vol. 5, p. 4371; 40 Cyc. 2319; Barnhill v. Kirk, 44 Tex. 589; Heath v. Moore (Tex. Civ. App.) 146 S. W. 709; Clifton v. Meuser, 79 Kan. 655, 100 P. 645; Cash v. Kirkham, 67 Ark. 318, 55 S. W. 18; Herring v. Herring’s Estate, 94 Iowa, 56, 62 N. W. 666; Newton v. Field, 98 Ky. 186, 32 S. W. 623; Lodge v. Fraim, 5 Pennewill (Del.) 352, 63 A. 233.
In the case at bar, Mrs. McCall was not suing to recover on an expressed contract of employment, but was asserting a right to recover on quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services rendered'in cle'aning house, preparing meals, and making personal weaving apparel for Mrs. Coates. The services claimed to have been rendered were such that knowledge of the performance thereof would necessarily come to the immediate attention of Mrs. Coates, and evidence of the performance of such services could not be detailed before the jury without thereby attributing to Mrs. Coates the attitude of know*1093Ingly accepting such services and impliedly agreeing to pay therefor. Mere proof of the performance of such services under the circumstances would be evidence of a “transaction” participated in by both Mrs. McCall and Mrs. Coates, in which the former served and the latter knowingly accepted and impliedly agreed to pay for the services rendered. Such evidence was inadmissible.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.