Court Opinion

ID: 9956268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 17:11:01.453226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:16.141949
License: Public Domain

J-S47003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  NYJEAH JEROME WHITE                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1382 EDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 19, 2023
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-46-CR-0002381-2021

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                                FILED APRIL 1, 2024

       Appellant, Nyjeah Jerome White, appeals from his judgment of sentence

of life imprisonment for first-degree murder and related offenses. Appellant

contends, inter alia, that the court erred by denying his motion for a new trial

based on a text message sent after the guilty verdict from Appellant’s former

girlfriend claiming that another person committed the murder. We conclude

that the trial court acted within its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion

for a new trial, and accordingly, affirm.

       The trial court accurately summarized the evidence adduced during

Appellant’s non-jury trial as follows:

       On December 31, 2020, Officer Joshua Samuels, a Norristown
       police officer, responded to the 1200 block of Markley Street for a
       shooting. In an alleyway next to the house at 1238 Markley
       Street, he found the body [of] Rasheed Bundy with a gunshot
       wound to the head. The officer described the alleyway as dark
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S47003-23

     [and] pitch black. After clearing the alleyway of onlookers, he
     started asking questions but most of them were uncooperative
     and did not provide information.

     Another Norristown police officer responded to the shooting scene
     around 9:42 p.m. At trial, he described that the alleyway was
     between the residence at 1238 Markley Street and that of 1240
     Markley Street.

     Lee Burke, the victim’s younger brother, was spending time with
     his family at 1236 Markley Street on the night of the murder. The
     victim was also there at the residence. Mr. Burke received a call
     from Appellant [asking for] the victim to come outside to talk with
     him. [The victim] agreed but did not go out right away. Mr. Burke
     knew Appellant, a/k/a “Ny”, because Mr. Burke’s and the victim’s
     sister, Latrae Bundy, had been in a relationship with Appellant for
     about two years. Mr. Burke described his relationship with
     Appellant as cordial. Appellant called Mr. Burke a second time
     asking where the victim was and ask[ing] for the victim to come
     outside to talk. Mr. Burke and the victim went outside, walked
     towards the alleyway by 1240 Markley Street. Mr. Burke testified
     that only Appellant was in the alleyway when they approached.
     The victim walked into the alleyway and Mr. Burke stood on the
     sidewalk, facing Markley Street, about three feet away. He figured
     they were just going to talk, but there was no conversation and
     within less than 30 seconds, Mr. Burke heard gunshots. After
     checking his own body, he turned around and saw the victim
     laying on the ground, bloody. Mr. Burke was “freaking out” and
     yelling that he was going to kill Appellant. Appellant walked right
     past Mr. Burke towards his vehicle, got in his vehicle, made a U-
     turn, stopped by the scene for a moment, said something
     unintelligible to Mr. Burke, and then drove off.

     Detective Michael Crescitelli of the Montgomery County Detective
     Bureau—Homicide Unit, obtained surveillance video from the area.
     Specifically, one of the surveillance videos showed the Roosevelt
     School at 1161 Markley Street, about a block from the murder
     scene, just down the street. At 8:59 p.m. on December 31, 2020,
     Appellant’s vehicle was captured parking in front of the school.
     Two people exited the vehicle. The front passenger was seen
     removing a large object from the backseat. Appellant and the
     second person walk in the direction of 1236 Markley Street, the
     video show[ed] a vehicle pull up, which was later determined to
     be the pizza delivery driver, Br[y]an Davis, immediately after the

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     shooting, the video showed an individual run from the area of
     1240 Markley Street, cross the street to his vehicle. Appellant got
     into the driver’s side, made a U-turn, stopped, and then drove off.

     Dr. Khalil Wardak performed the autopsy on the victim [on]
     January 1, 2021. He determined that the cause of death was from
     multiple gunshot wounds. The gunshot to the neck had evidence
     of stippling from the gun powder residue. This indicated that the
     victim was within 3 feet of the firearm. This gunshot [wound]
     alone would have been fatal. Dr. Wardak also testified that he
     found two gunshot wounds to the victim’s head. This would have
     been immediately incapacitating. The doctor reviewed the records
     of a projectile recovered from Appellant. It had been recovered
     from the soft tissue area rear of his neck. It had not penetrated
     any bone. The shape of the bullet specimen was deformed with a
     flat surface, partially concave, it was smooth, and there was no
     jacket that ordinarily covers the bullet core. Dr. Wardak opined
     that the based on these observations of the deformations, the
     bullet ricocheted from a surface before striking Appellant.

     Bryan Davis, Jr., was delivering pizza and on the night of the
     murder, he was called to make a delivery to 1240 Markley Street.
     When he arrived[,] no one answered the phone from that location.
     He had already returned to the pizza store when someone from
     1240 Markley Street called him and asked him to return with the
     order. When he returned, two guys were waiting for him on the
     sidewalk to pick up their order. Because they could not carry the
     entire order in one trip, Mr. Davis waited for them to come back
     to get the rest. He waited for them behind his car, behind a black
     pillar, right by 1241 Markley Street. That was the closest he was
     to the alleyway between 1238 and 1240 Markley Street. From
     this vantage point, he testified that he saw four people in the
     alleyway. Because the alleyway was “not really lit,” he could only
     see figures and not faces. He heard about two or three gunshots
     go off. Afterwards he saw someone run out of the alleyway, past
     him, and to a vehicle across the street. Mr. Davis took two steps
     closer to the alleyway and heard someone yelling, “Ny, shot my
     brother.” That person came out of the alleyway and repeatedly
     said, “Ny shot my brother.”

     After the Commonwealth presented the remaining witnesses and
     rested, defense counsel, in part called Latrae Bundy, the victim’s
     sister, to testify. Ms. Bundy characterized her relationship with
     Appellant at the time of the murder as friends; but they had

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      previously been in a four-year relationship and was his fiancé at
      one point. Before the shooting, Ms. Bundy spoke to Appellant for
      about an hour-and-a-half but had no knowledge that Appellant
      was going to talk to her brother in the alleyway. Ms. Bundy was
      inside the residence at 1236 Markley Street at the time of the
      murder. She also spoke to Appellant after the murder and found
      out he was injured, and she met up with him a few days
      afterwards. They stayed in constant contact .

                                     ****

      The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Johon Ford, who
      at the time of trial was incarcerated in Chester County with several
      pending charges. He signed a proffer agreement in May of 2022,
      and in that agreement, Mr. Ford acknowledged that he was not
      promised anything for his testimony, and that the Commonwealth
      would only let his sentencing judge know the extent and nature of
      his cooperation. Mr. Ford testified that he grew up with the victim
      and had been friends with him and his family. He also knew
      Appellant, from being around the victim’s family. About a month
      after the murder, Mr. Ford met up with Appellant in the
      Germantown section of Philadelphia and they talked about the
      murder. During that conversation, Appellant told him that he
      killed the victim. Appellant didn’t tell him any other details of what
      happened.

      Mr. Ford knew about Appellant’s relationship with Ms. Bundy; he
      knew it was rocky and that Ms. Bundy moved on from him.
      Appellant told him that he “was certain he was getting played,”
      meaning Ms. Bundy had another boyfriend while still having a
      relationship with him. Appellant was hurt. Appellant believed that
      Ms. Bundy’s brothers knew about it, but they did not tell him what
      was going on. Mr. Ford spoke to Appellant about three or four
      times after the murder, prior to Appellant’s arrest. This Court, as
      fact-finder, found Mr. Ford’s testimony to be credible.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Opinion, 8/3/23, at 2-6, 16-17 (cleaned up; record citations

omitted).

      The court summarized the relevant procedural history of this case as

follows:

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      At the conclusion of the trial, [the trial court] found Appellant
      guilty of first-degree murder, persons not to possess [firearms],
      and possessing an instrument of crime.

      Following his guilty conviction, but prior to sentencing, defense
      counsel filed a Motion for Extraordinary Relief, alleging after-
      discovered/recantation testimony in the nature of a text message
      sent by Ms. Bundy to counsel on August 24, 2022. It was alleged
      in Ms. Bundy’s text that the fourth person in the alleyway [w]as
      Rashid Wallop and that he was the shooter. She stated that she
      told detectives Appellant was not the shooter but did not want to
      name the shooter because she was scared.

      On December 12, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a response. In
      part[,] the Commonwealth argued that this is an improper motion
      under Pa.R.Crim.P. 704, because this is an issue that should be
      raised by way of a post-sentence motion.

      On April 19, 2023, a sentencing hearing was held. The Motion for
      Extraordinary Relief was denied [because] counsel presented no
      extraordinary circumstances under Rule 704. Appellant was
      sentenced to life imprisonment.

      On April 28, 2023, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion which
      asserted a motion for judgment of acquittal and a motion for a
      new trial. The motion for a new trial was warranted, it was
      alleged, because the verdict was not supported by the weight of
      the evidence and based upon new[ly]-discovered evidence,
      namely Mr. Bundy’s text message.          The [p]ost-[s]entence
      [m]otion was denied on May 5, 2023.

Id. at 6-7 (cleaned up; record citations omitted).

      Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court, and both Appellant and the

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant raises the following issues in this appeal:

      1. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION
      FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON AFTER-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE[?]

      2. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT COMMONWEALTH
      PROVIDED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR MURDER[?]

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      3. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN THAT THE COURT’S FINDINGS
      WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (paginated as page “v” in Appellant’s brief).

      In his first argument, Appellant contends that the court erred in denying

him a new trial based on alleged after-discovered evidence, a text message

that LaTrae Bundy sent to defense counsel one week after Appellant’s guilty

verdict. The text message stated:

      Hi Quinn! It’s La Trae, I just wanted to reach out and apologize
      for not stepping up and telling you the honest truth regarding
      everything I know. As you could have seen my family has put this
      burden on me while being in the middle of this whole case. They
      know the real reason behind what happened to my brother
      Rasheed, and I know it’s too late but the guy that was the 4th
      person name is Rashid Wallop, he knew my brothers.

      I have told detectives when all this first happened it wasn’t
      [Appellant] it was somebody else and they asked for a name but
      I was scared because he is dangerous. I know me telling you this
      now doesn’t do anything for you because the case is over but I
      want to say from the bottom of my heart I am sorry for not being
      honest. And thank you for trying your hardest with [Appellant].
      I hope you have an amazing day and week, take care.

Appellant’s Motion For Extraordinary Relief, 9/6/22, at ¶ 8.

      To obtain a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence, the

defendant must show that

      the evidence (1) could not have been obtained prior to the
      conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2)
      is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used
      solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely
      result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted. The test
      is conjunctive; the defendant must show by a preponderance of
      the evidence that each of these factors has been met in order for
      a new trial to be warranted.

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Commonwealth v. Felder, 247 A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. Super. 2021).

      To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a post-sentence motion for

a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, the motion “must, at the very

least, describe the evidence that will be presented at the hearing.”

Commonwealth v. Castro, 93 A.3d 818, 827 (Pa. 2014). “Simply relying

on conclusory accusations made by another, without more, is insufficient to

warrant a hearing.”     Id.   An evidentiary hearing is for the presentation of

evidence, not the potential discovery of evidence. Id. at 827-28. Thus, the

motion must assert “actual discovery of actual evidence, not merely the

possibility of such evidence.” Id. at 828. The motion “is not to serve as a

preemptive means of securing a hearing that will itself comprise the

investigation. . .   [an appellant] need[s] to clearly articulate in his motion

what evidence he would present to meet the test.” Id. Further, the evidence

“must be producible and admissible.” Id. at 827.

      If the court does not grant a new trial, we review its decision for abuse

of discretion. Felder, 247 A.3d at 17-18. The court gave two reasons for

denying Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim. First, it held that the

proposed evidence was inadmissible hearsay:

      Although styled by counsel as “evidence” it is not actual evidence
      and Appellant was not entitled to a new trial or even a hearing on
      the basis of this text. This text is nothing more than inadmissible
      hearsay. At trial, Ms. Bundy testified that she was inside the
      house at 1236 Markley Street when her brother was murdered.
      (N.T., Bench Trial, V. III, 8/17/22, pp. 36-37). She did not see
      the murder happen. Therefore, her assertion that there was a

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      fourth person in the alleyway and that that person was Rashid
      Wallop, did not result from her first-hand observation. This new
      “evidence” would have had to have been told to her by someone
      else, making this inadmissible hearsay.

Opinion at 10. Hearsay is defined as a statement that (1) the declarant does

not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers

in evidence to prove truth of matter asserted in the statement.          Pa.R.E.

801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within an exception provided by

the Rules of Evidence, by statute, or by other rules prescribed by our Supreme

Court. Pa.R.E. 802. The testimony cited by the court confirms that Bundy

indeed was inside the house at 1236 Markley Street and did not witness the

murder. Thus, the claim in her email is hearsay because it had to have been

based upon a report from another individual and is offered for its truth.

Appellant fails to demonstrate that Ms. Bundy’s email falls within any

exception to the hearsay rule. Therefore, the court correctly determined that

her statement was inadmissible. Castro, 93 A.3d at 827 (after-discovered

evidence must be admissible to permit relief).

     The court also held that Bundy’s statement did not warrant relief

because it would only be used for impeachment purposes. Appellant argued

in the penultimate paragraph of his post-sentence motion, “The text message

and the belief that the family coerced her testimony and is aware of the 4th

person in the breezeway seriously undermines the reliability of the only

witness to the homicide.” Post-Sentence Motion, 4/28/23, at 5 (unpaginated).

Based on this assertion, the court deduced that the sole purpose of Bundy’s

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statement was to impeach Mr. Burke’s testimony that the only individuals in

the alleyway were Appellant and the victim. Opinion at 11. We find no abuse

of discretion by the trial court in rejecting this issue.

        “Whenever a party offers a witness to provide evidence that contradicts

other    evidence   previously   given    by   another      witness,   it   constitutes

impeachment.” Commonwealth v. Weis, 611 A.2d 1218, 1229 (Pa. Super.

1992). We see no purpose for Appellant to introduce Bundy’s statement other

than to “contradict other evidence previously given by another witness,”

Burke.     Thus, Bundy’s statement fails Felder’s requirement that after-

discovered evidence “will not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a

witness.” Id., 247 A.3d at 17. For these reasons, the trial court acted within

its discretion by rejecting Appellant’s request for a new trial based on after-

discovered evidence.

        In his second argument, Appellant contends that the evidence was

insufficient to sustain his conviction for first-degree murder. We disagree.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is

        whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
        favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to
        enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
        a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
        the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
        addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
        the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
        innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
        resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
        inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
        drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
        may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime

                                         -9-
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      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence.... Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Brockman, 167 A.3d 29, 38 (Pa. Super. 2017).

     The Crimes Code provides a “criminal homicide constitutes murder of

the first degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

2502(a). A conviction for first-degree murder requires the trier of fact to find

that “(1) a human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the person accused is

responsible for the killing; and (3) the accused acted with malice and specific

intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Hitcho, 123 A.3d 731, 746 (Pa. 2015).

“The Commonwealth may prove the specific intent to kill necessary for first

degree murder wholly through circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v.

Ovalles, 144 A.3d 957, 969 (Pa. Super. 2016). Moreover, the factfinder “may

properly infer malice and specific intent from the fact that a victim was shot

multiple times.” Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 151 A.3d 1117, 1122 (Pa.

Super. 2016).     In addition, “the Commonwealth must also establish the

identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes.” Commonwealth

v. Smyser, 195 A.3d 912, 915 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      The Commonwealth adduced the following evidence during trial: Burke,

who was present during the shooting, testified that Appellant was the shooter.

On December 31, 2020, Burke was present at 1236 Markley Street spending

time with his family, including his brother, the victim. Burke testified, and cell

phone records confirm, that Appellant called Burke twice within a short time

span asking to speak with the victim and asking that he come outside. After

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the second call, Burke went outside with the victim and walked to the

alleyway. Burke testified that he only saw Appellant in the alleyway. Believing

that the victim and Appellant were only going to talk, he turned his back to

the alleyway. Less than thirty seconds later, Burke heard gunshots mere feet

away from the alleyway. Burke immediately went into the alleyway to check

on the victim and saw Appellant run past him to his car down the street and

flee the scene. He cried out repeatedly, “Ny shot my brother.” N.T., 8/15/22,

at 53-63.

      Davis, the pizza deliveryman, testified that he saw four people, two on

each side, in the alleyway while he was behind his car nearby 1242 Markley

Street. He never got closer to the alleyway. Davis was only able to see figures

and not faces, the people were quiet and he heard no arguing or conversation.

He then heard two or three gunshots and saw someone run out of the

alleyway, across the street past him, and into a car, which fled the scene. He

also heard someone yell “he shot my brother” repeatedly and saw the speaker

exit the alleyway. On redirect examination, Davis testified that the speaker

said repeatedly, “Ny shot my brother.” N.T., 8/16/22, at 69-88.

      A surveillance video corroborated Burke’s and Davis’s testimony. The

video showed the arrival of Appellant’s vehicle one block away from the

murder scene at 8:59 p.m., N.T., 8/15/22, at 111-12, two people exiting the

vehicle, one of whom was carrying a large object, and both individuals walking

towards the alleyway, id., the arrival of Davis’s vehicle at 9:39 p.m., id. at

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113, and an individual fleeing from the alleyway at 9:41 p.m. and departing

in the vehicle that was parked one block from the murder scene, id. at 114.

      Ford, Appellant’s friend, testified that Appellant confessed to murdering

the victim because Appellant believed that the victim knew about Bundy’s

relationship with another man but did not share this information with

Appellant.   N.T., 8/16/22, at 90-100.        The court found Ford’s testimony

credible. Opinion at 17.

      Appellant insists that the evidence is insufficient because Burke testified

that three people were in the alleyway (Appellant, Burke and the victim),

whereas Davis testified that four people were in the alleyway. In our review

of the sufficiency of the evidence, however, we must view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth.          This standard requires us to

accept as true Burke’s testimony that (1) only Appellant, Burke and the victim

were in the alleyway, (2) Burke left the alleyway, (3) Burke heard gunshots,

(4) Burke observed Appellant flee the alleyway and drive off in a car, and (5)

Burke repeatedly said, “Ny shot my brother.”

      Furthermore, Davis’s testimony is consistent with Burke’s testimony

except for the number of individuals in the alleyway. In particular, Davis, like

Burke, heard gunshots and then saw an individual flee the alleyway and drive

away from the scene. Finally, Appellant confessed to Ford that he murdered

the victim, and video surveillance and cell phone evidence corroborated

Burke’s and Davis’s testimony. Construed in the light most favorable to the

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Commonwealth, this evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant’s murder

conviction. Brockman, supra.

      Appellant also argues that the evidence was insufficient because Burke

did not actually see him fire any shots at the victim.         We disagree.    In

Commonwealth v. Randall, 758 A.2d 669 (Pa. Super. 2000), this Court held

that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction for

first-degree murder even though the witness did not actually see the

defendant shoot the victim. The defendant in Randall was standing outside

smoking marijuana with the victim and a witness.         When the witness was

smoking the marijuana cigarette, he heard three gunshots and saw the victim

lying on the ground. He did not actually see the defendant pull the trigger or

the death of the victim.

      This Court stated that “[a]lthough [the witness] did not directly observe

Appellant shoot the decedent, [the witness], the Appellant and the decedent

were the only individuals present in the near vicinity at the time of the

shooting.” Id. at 675. The victim died of three gunshot wounds to the head.

Id. This Court held that “[u]nder these circumstances, the jury could have

reasonably inferred that it was Appellant who shot the decedent thereby

causing his death.” Id. This Court further held that “[a]ppellant’s deliberate

use of a pistol to deliver three bullets to the decedent’s head, one of the most

vital portions of the body, was ample evidence of his specific intent to kill [the

victim].”

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      In further support of this determination, the Randall court cited

Commonwealth v. Rios, 684 A.2d 1025, 1030 (Pa. 1996), in which our

Supreme Court found sufficient evidence to sustain a first-degree murder

conviction even though the witnesses did not actually see the defendant shoot

the victim, where (1) a witness testified that defendant wielded handgun, (2)

the defendant threatened to kill the victim and severely beat the victim while

his hands and feet were bound, (3) the defendant was in the room shortly

before the witness heard the shot that killed the victim, and (4) a firearms

expert testified that markings on bullet recovered from the victim’s body

indicated that it could not have been fired from the victim’s firearm that had

been taken by the defendant’s accomplice.

      Here, as in Randall and Rios, although Burke did not actually see

Appellant shoot the victim, the evidence recounted above—specifically, the

testimony of Burke, Davis and Ford—provides ample circumstantial evidence

that Appellant shot the victim. Furthermore, the evidence that Appellant shot

the victim multiple times in vital portions of his body provides ample evidence

of his malice and specific intent.   The evidence further demonstrates that

Appellant shot himself during the robbery because one of the bullets that he

fired ricocheted in the narrow alleyway and lodged itself in his neck.

      Appellant also claims that Bundy’s email undercuts the sufficiency of the

evidence. This claim fails because we evaluate sufficiency claims based on

evidence admitted during trial. Brockman, 167 A.3d at 38. Bundy’s email

was not admitted into evidence during trial. Moreover, it was inadmissible

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hearsay. Therefore, it does not affect our evaluation of the sufficiency of the

evidence.

      Finally, relying on Commonwealth v. Mosteller, 284 A.2d 786 (Pa.

1971), Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient because, in his

view, the reliability of Burke’s testimony is open to serious question.

Appellant’s Brief at 14.     In Mosteller, the defendant’s fifteen-year-old

daughter accused him of sexual assault.         Following the complainant’s

accusations, she was removed from her parents’ home and sent to live with

her grandmother.     She testified during trial that the defendant sexually

assaulted her.   A medical witness called by the Commonwealth testified,

however, that the complainant’s hymen was intact and uninjured, and that a

vaginal cotton swab and rectal examination were negative.           Thus, the

Commonwealth’s case rested entirely upon the complainant’s testimony.

      The jury found the defendant guilty.       After trial, the complainant

recanted her testimony, and the defendant moved for a new trial based on

after-discovered evidence.    The complainant testified during a post-trial

hearing that her grandmother and her uncle pressured her into testifying

against the defendant. She maintained her recantation despite being warned

of criminal charges for perjury and a substantial prison term. In addition, her

great-aunt testified that she had asked the complainant before trial whether

the defendant had done anything to her, and the complainant replied in the

negative.   The trial court and this Court held that a new trial was not

warranted, but our Supreme Court held that a new trial was necessary,

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reasoning, “[W]here as here the defendant’s conviction is based entirely on

testimony of the child [witness] and the truth of that testimony is open to

serious question because of the testimony of a disinterested medical witness,

a subsequent recantation of testimony as supported by this record

necessitates a new trial.” Id. at 789. The Court observed:

      [N]ot only is there nothing to contradict [the complainant’s]
      recantation, [but] there is evidence from her great aunt that [the
      complainant] had fabricated her story.              Additionally, [the
      complainant] persisted in her recantation despite having been
      informed that she was subject to criminal charges for perjury and
      a substantial prison term. This was a clear declaration against
      interest entitled to considerable credibility, unlike the normal
      retraction by a co-conspirator who is already in prison and
      realistically has little to lose by attempting to free his partner.

Id.

      Mosteller does not help Appellant’s cause for multiple reasons.          To

begin, Mosteller held that Appellant was entitled to a new trial due to after-

acquired evidence.     Mosteller does not address, let alone support, the

remedy Appellant seeks in his present argument, an arrest of judgment due

to insufficiency of the evidence.      Second, Appellant claims that Burke’s

testimony in the present case was equally as unreliable as the complainant’s

testimony in Mosteller.      This attack on Burke’s testimony is completely

unavailing.   As we said above, in this challenge to the insufficiency of the

evidence, we are required to construe Burke’s testimony and all other

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Construed in this

manner, we accept Burke’s testimony and the other evidence as true, and we

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reject Appellant’s invitation to deem it unreliable.1 Other distinctions between

Burke’s testimony and the complainant’s testimony in Mosteller deserve

mention as well. Unlike the complainant in Mosteller, Burke did not recant

his testimony. As well, the complainant’s testimony in Mosteller was the only

evidence against the defendant, but here, there were two other important

witnesses besides Burke—Davis and Ford—as well as video and cell phone

evidence.     Appellant does not dispute the reliability of Davis’s or Ford’s

testimony, the video evidence, or the cell phone evidence, all of which

provides important details that complete the web of circumstantial evidence

against Appellant. For these reasons, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence fails.

       In his third and final argument, Appellant contends that he is entitled to

a new trial because the verdict was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Our Supreme Court has instructed:

       A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
       the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
       trial court. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 319, 744
       A.2d 745, 751–52 (2000); Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa.
       410, 435, 648 A.2d 1177, 1189 (1994). A new trial should not be
       granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because
       the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different
       conclusion. Widmer, 560 Pa. at 319–20, 744 A.2d at 752.
       Rather, “the role of the trial judge is to determine that
       ‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater
       weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all

____________________________________________

1 We note that the trial court also rejected Appellant’s attack on Burke’s
credibility. See Opinion at 20 (“Burke was a credible witness”).

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      the facts is to deny justice.’” Id. at 320, 744 A.2d at 752 (citation
      omitted).

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 2013). “A motion for

new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the

evidence, concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.”

Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751. “[A]n appellate court’s role is not to consider the

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the

evidence.   Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court

palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.” Commonwealth

v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003).

      Appellant claims that the Commonwealth’s “only witness,” Burke, was

not credible.   As discussed above, Burke was not the only witness against

Appellant, and the trial court found Burke’s testimony credible, a ruling well

within the court’s discretion.   Appellant also claims that Bundy’s affidavit

entitles him to a new trial, but we held above that Bundy’s affidavit does not

entitle Appellant to relief. Next, Appellant argues, “No firearm was found or

retrieved from [Appellant]. Moreover, [Appellant] was also shot from behind

yet the Commonwealth presents some tale to suggest he shot a firearm and

it ricocheted off of something and hit him in the back of his neck without any

scientific certain[t]y despite testimony.” Appellant’s Brief at 18.

      The trial court did not address these issues in its opinion because

Appellant did not raise them in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement of matters

complained of on appeal. The closest that Appellant came to making these

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claims in his Rule 1925 statement was his statement that “Burke’s testimony

was insufficient to show that [Appellant] was the actual shooter.” Pa.R.A.P.

1925 Statement, 6/13/23, at ¶ 3(b). Arguably, therefore, these claims are

waived. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 262-63 (Pa. Super.

2013) (defendant’s claim that trial court erred in granting his motion to

withdraw guilty plea waived argument that trial court abused its discretion by

conducting plea withdrawal hearing while defendant was being represented by

counsel under an alleged conflict of interest, where defendant failed to raise

such issue in his statement of matters complained of on appeal).

          Even if they were preserved for appeal, they do not entitle Appellant to

relief.     Though no firearm was recovered, ample evidence proved that

Appellant was the perpetrator, including the testimony of multiple witnesses,

the video surveillance evidence and cell phone records. Regarding the detail

that a bullet struck Appellant in the neck, Dr. Wardak’s testimony established

that this bullet ricocheted off the pavement before striking Appellant. This

testimony suggests that Appellant fired the bullet, and that the bullet

ricocheted off the pavement and lodged itself in his neck.         Nothing in the

record contradicts this scenario, and in any event, other evidence points

squarely at Appellant as the murderer.

          For these reasons, the trial court acted within its discretion by denying

Appellant’s motion for new trial. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment

of sentence.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 4/1/2024

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