Court Opinion

ID: 9840446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 16:09:13.70128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:27.892133
License: Public Domain

J-S23014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  OMAR POWELL                                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2955 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 14, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0002378-2006

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                       FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2023

       Omar Powell appeals pro se from the order entered in the Lehigh County

Court of Common Pleas on November 14, 2022, dismissing his “Motion to

Rescind Judgment of Sentence” pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.1 For the reasons discussed below, we

find the PCRA court properly denied Powell relief and affirm.

       In 2007, after a ten day trial, a jury convicted Powell of first degree

murder. The trial court sentenced Powell to life imprisonment. We affirmed

the judgment of sentence on direct appeal. On November 13, 2008, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Powell’s petition for allowance of appeal.

____________________________________________

1 As discussed in further detail below, while Powell did not specifically title his

pro se filing as a PCRA petition, the court correctly treated this post-conviction
filing as a petition under the PCRA.
J-S23014-23

Since    then,   Powell   has   filed   numerous   petitions,   including   multiple

unsuccessful PCRA petitions.

        On May 11, 2021, Powell filed his sixth PCRA petition, followed by a

supplemental petition a month later. The PCRA court denied the petition and

Powell filed an appeal.

        On November 4, 2022, while that appeal was still pending, Powell filed

the instant “Motion to Rescind Judgment of Sentence Entered April 17, 2007”.

The PCRA court treated his petition as a PCRA petition subject to the PCRA’s

timeliness provisions. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291,

1293 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[T]he PCRA provides the sole means for obtaining

collateral review, and … any petition filed after the judgment of sentence

becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition”); see also Commonwealth

v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) (stating the PCRA incorporates the

remedy of habeas corpus if it offers the petitioner a remedy pursuant to that

Act). On that basis, the PCRA court determined that Powell’s petition could not

be considered due to the fact that Powell still had an appeal pending with this

Court from the denial of his sixth PCRA petition. Further, the PCRA court found

the petition was untimely. As such, the court denied the petition. This timely

appeal followed.

        Powell argues the PCRA court erred by treating his motion as a PCRA

petition. Specifically, Powell contends his claim involves a challenge to the

legality of his sentence, and that the PCRA court had authority to consider his

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claim under its inherent jurisdiction to correct patent errors in sentences. We

disagree.

      Whether a PCRA court has jurisdiction to correct allegedly illegal
      sentencing orders absent statutory jurisdiction under the PCRA is
      a question of law. Accordingly, our scope of review is plenary and
      our standard of review is de novo.

      The PCRA provides for an action by which persons convicted of
      crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences
      may obtain collateral relief. When an action is cognizable under
      the PCRA, the PCRA is the sole means of obtaining collateral relief
      and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies
      for the same purpose[.]

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

      Powell cites to Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57 (Pa. 2007),

for the proposition that the PCRA court has inherent authority, at any time, to

correct its patent and obvious mistakes evidenced by nonconformance with

the record, common sense, and black-letter law. Powell has misinterpreted

the holding in Holmes.

      In Holmes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court created a narrow

exception to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (“a court upon notice to the parties may

modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry ... if no appeal from

such order has been taken or allowed”), and recognized a trial court's

“inherent power to correct patent errors despite the absence of traditional

jurisdiction.” Holmes, 933 A.2d. at 65.

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      However, we have since clarified that while “Holmes [ ] recognized the

limited authority of a trial court to correct patent errors in sentences absent

statutory jurisdiction under section 5505; it did not establish an alternate

remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the jurisdictional requirements of

the PCRA.” Jackson, 30 A.3d at 521. Under the PCRA, “[w]hen the one-year

filing deadline of section 9545 has expired, and no statutory exception has

been pled or proven, a PCRA court cannot invoke inherent jurisdiction to

correct orders, judgments and decrees, even if the error is patent and

obvious.” Id. at 524. Accordingly, although illegal sentencing issues cannot

be waived, they must still be presented in a timely PCRA petition. See

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super. 2013).

      The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. See

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Because the PCRA’s time limitations implicate the court’s jurisdiction and may

not be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition, the

court here was required to start by examining the timeliness of Powell’s

petition. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883 (Pa. Super. 2014).

      A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be
      filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of
      sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the
      three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A
      judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this
      Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of
      the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness
      requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not
      address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not
      timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA

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      petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised
      therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden
      of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three
      exceptions.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations

and footnote omitted).

      Powell’s judgment of sentence became final in February 2009, ninety

days after his petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court, when time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the

United States Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3);

U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. The instant petition – filed more than a decade later – is

patently untimely. Therefore, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review

Powell’s petition unless he was able to successfully plead and prove one of the

statutory   exceptions   to   the   PCRA’s   time-bar.   See   42   Pa.C.S.A.   §

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

      The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar:

      (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
      interference by government officials with the presentation of the
      claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
      or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

      (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
      the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
      of due diligence; or

      (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
      by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
      of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
      has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Exceptions to the time-bar must be pled in

the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). Further,

      Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed
      by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special
      benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must
      comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania
      Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if
      an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in
      the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(citations omitted).

      Even liberally construed, Powell has failed to plead and prove that any

of his claims constitute a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar. In fact, Powell

failed to make any attempt to plead an exception in his filing. See Motion to

Rescind Judgment of Sentence, filed 11/14/22. Even on appeal, he makes no

attempt to argue that a time-bar exception applies. Instead, Powell asserts

his petition should not have been treated as a PCRA petition. The PCRA court

properly classified Powell’s petition as a PCRA petition. See Johnson, 803

A.2d at 1293; see also West, 938 A.2d at 1043. Therefore, the PCRA court

correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider Powell’s PCRA petition.

Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Powell’s petition.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/18/2023

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