Court Opinion

ID: 9881935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 18:18:16.883472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.927007
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/4/23 P. v. Magana CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 2d Crim. No. B324975
                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 2020011737)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                (Ventura County)

 v.

 JESUS ANTHONY MAGANA,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       Jesus Anthony Magana appeals from the judgment entered
after a jury convicted him on two counts of sodomy with a child
10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code,1 § 288.7, subd. (a)), two
counts of oral copulation with a child 10 years of age or younger
(id., subd. (b)), sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or
younger (ibid.), three counts of aggravated sexual assault of a
child—oral copulation (§ 269, subd. (a)(4)), aggravated sexual
assault of a child—rape (id., subd. (a)(1)), and seven counts of

         1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to

the Penal Code.
committing lewd acts on a child (§ 288, subd. (a)). The jury also
found true allegations that appellant took advantage of a position
of trust or confidence (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11)); that
the victim of the offenses—his daughter K.—was particularly
vulnerable (id., rule 4.421(a)(3)); and that appellant engaged in
substantial sexual conduct with the victim (§ 1203.066, subd.
(a)(8)). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 175
years to life in state prison.
       Appellant contends (1) the trial court allowed the third
amended information to be filed in violation of section 1009; (2)
his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC)
by failing to object to the filing of the second amended complaint;
(3) the court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence;
and (4) his sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.
He also contends, and the People concede, that the abstract of
judgment should be corrected to reflect he was convicted in
counts 2, 4, and 5 of violating section 288.7, subdivision (b). We
shall order the abstract amended accordingly. Otherwise, we
affirm.
                     STATEMENT OF FACTS
       Appellant was convicted of repeatedly sexually abusing his
daughter K. over the course of five years. K., who was 17 years
at the time of appellant’s trial, testified that appellant began
abusing her when she was 9 years old and did not stop until she
was 14. During the first incident, K. awakened in appellant’s
room to find him removing her clothing. He then touched her
bare breasts with his hands and touched her vagina with his
finger.
       The abuse usually happened at night and followed the
“same routine” of appellant removing K. from her bedroom while

                                  2
she was sleeping and bringing her to his bedroom. The abuse
occasionally took place in K.’s bedroom or in the bathroom.
Appellant would tell K. that what he was doing to her was
“secret” and said “[d]on’t tell your mom.” K. feared that if she
challenged appellant “either she was going to get hurt or . . . [her]
sister or [her] mom possibly could get hurt.”
       The next incident K. recounted took place when she was 10
years old. Appellant had K. masturbate his penis with her hand,
then made her orally copulate him. Appellant thereafter
required K. to orally copulate him approximately five times a
week. Over the span of the next four years, appellant also placed
his penis between her butt cheeks once or twice a week. On two
separate occasions when she was 10 years old, appellant
sodomized her. After K. turned 11, appellant had anal
intercourse with K. again approximately 7 times. Appellant also
put his penis on the outside of K.’s vagina “trying to go in,” which
hurt her. On one occasion appellant’s penis penetrated K.’s
vagina “[a] little.” Appellant also took photographs of K.’s
vagina. When K. was 12 and 13 years old, appellant also sucked
on and licked her breasts. The abuse ended in March 2018 when
K. was 14 years old and told appellant she was a lesbian.
       Appellant’s sister S. testified that on April 18, 2020, K. sent
her a text message stating that she needed to talk to her about
“something really bad.” When S. met with K. several hours later,
K. seemed nervous and “possibly a little scared.” K. told S. about
the abuse and then told her mother, who called the police.
       That same night, K. was interviewed by Ventura County
Sheriff’s Detective Irma Andrade. During the interview K.
described the incidents of abuse, which began when she was in
the fifth grade. K. told the detective she was afraid of appellant.

                                  3
She recounted S. and her mother telling her that appellant broke
her arm when she was only a year old. She also added that
appellant was a “knife instructor” and that she had heard him
say he would not be afraid of killing someone “if it came down to
it.”
       On April 19, 2020, Detective Andrade and Detective Joseph
Preciado interviewed appellant at his residence. Appellant
initially denied K.’s claims of abuse, but subsequently admitted
that some of the incidents took place. He admitted that when K.
was 9 to 12 years old he would wake up with “an urge” that led
him to go into K.’s bedroom, pull her pants down, and place his
erect penis between her butt cheeks. Sometimes his penis
“accidentally” penetrated K.’s anus or vagina; the vaginal
penetration happened only once, while he anally penetrated her
several times. When appellant was interviewed again the
following day, he did not retract any of his prior admissions and
also admitted “push[ing]” his penis into K.’s mouth. During a
search of appellant’s residence, the police seized a computer and
cell phone that contained images of what appeared to be nude
and partially nude prepubescent females in provocative poses.
       Appellant testified in his own defense. On direct
examination, he admitted that he began molesting K. when she
was 12 years old but denied that his penis had ever penetrated
her anus or vagina. On cross-examination, he acknowledged his
prior confessions that he had “maybe” penetrated K.’s vagina and
that the tip of his penis had entered her anus. He also admitted
telling the detectives that the abuse began when K. was 9 years
old and that he had penetrated her anus approximately five
times.

                                4
                            DISCUSSION
                    Third Amended Information
        For the first time on appeal, appellant contends the trial
court erred by allowing the prosecution to file the third amended
information because it added counts for oral copulation that were
not shown by evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, as
required under section 1009.2 Appellant did not object to the
third amended information on this ground below, so his
contention is forfeited. (See, e.g., People v. Sorden (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 582, 606.)
        Moreover, appellant did not acknowledge in his opening
brief that he failed to make such an objection. He merely offered
that the third amended information was filed “[o]ver defense
objection,” but declined to inform us that he merely objected on
the ground that the prosecution was seeking to amend the
information at such a “late stage of the proceedings.” Although
appellant acknowledged the lack of a specific objection for the
first time in his reply brief and claims an objection would have
been futile, this claim is also forfeited. (See People v. Rangel
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218-1219 [claims raised for the first
time in reply brief are forfeited].)

      2 Section 1009 provides in pertinent part:  “The court in
which an action is pending may order or permit an amendment of
an indictment, accusation or information, or the filing of an
amended complaint, for any defect or insufficiency, at any stage
of the proceedings . . . . An indictment or accusation cannot be
amended so as to change the offense charged, nor an information
so as to charge an offense not shown by the evidence taken at the
preliminary examination.”

                                5
       In any event, we reject appellant’s claim that the third
amended information added charges that were not supported by
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, as provided in
section 1009. “‘[A]t a minimum, a defendant must be prepared to
defend against all offenses of the kind alleged in the information
as are shown by evidence at the preliminary hearing to have
occurred within the timeframe pleaded in the information.’”
(People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 317 (Jones).) “So long as
the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing supports the
number of offenses charged against [a] defendant and covers the
time frame(s) charged in the information, a defendant has all the
notice the Constitution requires.” (People v. Jeff (1988) 204
Cal.App.3d 309, 342.)
       The record belies appellant’s claim that “the preliminary
hearing testimony did not show more than two acts of oral
copulation.” Although there was testimony regarding K.’s
description of certain specific incidents of appellant’s sexual
abuse, Detective Andrade also testified that K. told her that
during the period in question the abuse occurred “continually
every day, maybe once or twice where it didn’t happen during the
week.” Because K. “describe[d] the number of acts committed
with sufficient certainty to support each of the counts alleged in
the [third amended] information (e.g., ‘twice a month’ or ‘every
time we went camping’)” (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 316, italics
omitted), appellant’s claim that the information was filed in
violation of section 1009 lacks merit.
                                 IAC
       Appellant next contends that his trial attorney provided
IAC by failing to object to the filing of the second amended
information on the ground it included “a charge based on a third

                                 6
act of oral copulation” that was not supported by evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing. Suffice to state that this
contention fails on the merits for the same reason that his first
claim does. (See People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 818 [a
defendant claiming IAC must show both deficient performance
and prejudice].)
                     Alleged Evidentiary Error
       Appellant next contends that the trial court prejudicially
erred in admitting K.’s statement that her mother and aunt had
told her appellant broke her arm when she was a year old. We
are not persuaded.
       Over appellant’s Evidence Code section 3523 objection, the
challenged evidence was admitted for nonhearsay purposes as
relevant to prove the duress element of the aggravated sexual
abuse charges and to assist in assessing K’s credibility and
explain her subsequent conduct. In concluding the probative
value of the evidence was not outweighed by its potential
prejudicial effect, the court reasoned: “[T]he only relevance is
what was weighing on the victim’s mind and I will give a limiting
instruction so that the jury understands that they are not to use
that information for any purpose other than evaluating the state
of mind of the victim.” The court added that K.’s understanding
that appellant had broken her arm was “germane to explaining

      3 Evidence Code section 352 states:  “The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.”

                                7
any of her conduct in terms of her reactions to the initial assaults
or maybe a failure to disclose timely, that type of thing.”
       The jury was instructed as follows: “During the trial,
certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. You may
consider that evidence only for that purpose and for no other.
[K.]’s statement to detectives that she had been told the
defendant broke her arm when [she was] one year old was not
admitted to establish that information is true, rather, only to
assist you in evaluating whether [K.] believed it was true and
whether she acted in conformity with that belief. It’s up to you to
decide what weight, if any, to give to the effect that information
may have had on [K.]”
       Appellant fails to demonstrate the court abused its broad
discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, i.e., that the
court “‘“exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage
of justice.”’” (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 270-271.)
Appellant did not dispute below that the evidence was relevant to
explain why K. might have been afraid of him and why she thus
waited so long to report his abuse. (See, e.g., People v. Burgener
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 869 [recognizing that “[a]n explanation of
the basis for the witness’s fear is . . . relevant to . . . credibility
and is well within the discretion of the trial court”].) Moreover,
the jury was given a limiting instruction that plainly and clearly
advised them to consider the evidence for a limited, nonhearsay
purpose. We presume the jury understood and followed that
instruction (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 575), and
appellant fails to persuade us otherwise.
       Appellant’s claim also fails for lack of prejudice. “[T]he
admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results

                                   8
in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally
unfair. [Citations.] Absent fundamental unfairness, . . . [t]he
reviewing court must ask whether it is reasonably probable the
verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant absent
the error.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439, citing
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
       Appellant makes no showing that the evidence rendered his
trial fundamentally unfair, i.e., that there were “no permissible
inferences” the jury could draw from the evidence. (People v.
Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 697.) Moreover, the overwhelming
evidence of appellant’s guilt included his own admissions to some
of the charged crimes. And as the prosecution persuasively noted
below, the challenged evidence was “no more prejudicial” than
the multiple sex offenses with which he was charged. Because it
is not reasonably probable that the result would have been
different had the challenged evidence been excluded, appellant’s
claim fails.
                 Cruel And Unusual Punishment
       For the first time on appeal, appellant also contends that
his sentence of 175 years to life constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. This contention is forfeited. (People v. Baker (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 711, 720 (Baker).) Appellant offers no persuasive
authority for his assertions that his sentence is “unauthorized”
and thus subject to our review notwithstanding the lack of an
objection below, or that an objection would have been futile.
       In any event, the claim lacks merit. “The Eighth
Amendment[, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments,]
contains a ‘“narrow proportionality principle” that “applies to
noncapital sentences.”’” (People v. Edwards (2019) 34
Cal.App.5th 183, 190, quoting Ewing v. California (2003) 538

                                9
U.S. 11, 20 [155 L.Ed.2d 108].) The Eighth Amendment “‘forbids
only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the
crime.’” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 60 [176 L.Ed.2d
825].)
       Punishment is cruel and unusual under the California
Constitution if it is “so disproportionate to the crime[s] . . . that it
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human
dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424.) In determining
whether a sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment,
“[w]e first consider ‘the nature of the offense and/or the offender,
with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to
society.’ [Citation.] Next, we compare the sentence to
‘punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for different
offenses which . . . must be deemed more serious.’ [Citation.]
Finally, we compare the sentence ‘with the punishments
prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions.’” (Baker,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 723, quoting Lynch, at pp. 425-427,
italics omitted.)
       Appellant offers that (1) he was only 39 years when he was
convicted; (2) his crimes were not committed with violence and
did not involve serious bodily injury; (3) his prior convictions
were remote and were for comparatively minor crimes; and (4) he
presented a relatively low risk of reoffending if released. He also
complains that “his aggregate sentence of 175 years to life is
grossly disproportionate to the punishments for a single crime
such as murder, attempted murder, mayhem[,] and torture.
[Citations.]” (Italics added.) Finally, he asserts that his sentence
does not serve any legitimate penological objective because it is so
long that no human could serve it.

                                  10
      Appellant fails to demonstrate that his sentence amounts
to cruel and unusual punishment. His argument downplays the
serious nature of his crimes. In sentencing him, the trial court
found the only mitigating factor was that his criminal history
was “not as significant as . . . we routinely see.” The court
declined to find that appellant presented a low risk of
reoffending. Moreover, appellant’s complaint that his aggregate
sentence is disproportionate to punishments for single offenses is
misplaced. (See People v. Christensen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
781, 808 [In determining whether a sentenced amounts to cruel
and unusual punishment, “‘[t]he penalties for single offenses . . .
cannot properly be compared to those for multiple offenses’”].)
      We also reject appellant’s assertion that his sentence must
be deemed cruel and unusual punishment because he could not
possibly serve the entire sentence during his lifetime. “In
practical effect, [appellant] is in no different position than a
defendant who has received a sentence of life without [the]
possibility of parole: he will be in prison all his life. However,
imposition of a sentence of life without possibility of parole in an
appropriate case does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment . . . . [¶] Moreover, . . . a sentence such as the one
imposed in this case serves valid penological purposes: it
unmistakably reflects society’s condemnation of [appellant’s]
conduct and it provides a strong psychological deterrent to those
who would consider engaging in that sort of conduct in the
future.” (People v. Byrd (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1383.)4

      4 Appellant’s briefs also discuss the concurring opinions in

People v. Johnson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 487, in which the court
found among other things that a sentence of 135 years to life plus

                                 11
      Courts have repeatedly found that lengthy sentences for
multiple sex crimes did not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment. (See, e.g., People v. Retanan (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th
1219, 1222, 1230-1231 [135 years for sex offense convictions
involving multiple victims]; People v. Cartwright (1995) 39
Cal.App.4th 1123, 1130, 1134-1136 [375 years to life plus 53
years for multiple sexual assaults involving three victims]; People
v. Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 531 [129 years for
sexual abuse of young stepdaughter]; see also Ortiz-Bravo v.
Smith (N.D. Cal., April 5, 2023, 2023 U.S. Dist. Lexis 60153, *45
[California state court “reasonably concluded that petitioner’s
sentence of 320 years to life plus 69 years and eight months was
not grossly disproportionate to his crimes” where “[t]he record

30 years on 9 counts involving sexual abuse of a child did not
amount to cruel and unusual punishment. The concurring
opinions urge the Supreme Court to address whether such a
lengthy sentence that cannot possibly be served in one’s lifetime
serves a legitimate penological purpose. (Id. at pp. 508-509
[concurring opn. of Streeter, J.], 509-510 [concurring opn. of
Pollak, J.].) Before appellant filed his reply brief, however, the
Supreme Court granted the People’s petition for review of
Johnson on a different issue, deferred the matter, and issued a
decision disapproving of the opinion on the issue upon which
review was granted. (See People v. Catarino (2023) 14 Cal.5th
748, 757 [disapproving Johnson’s holding that the trial court
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by finding he
committed lewd act on child on separate occasions and that was
subject to mandatory consecutive sentencing].) Johnson’s
petition for review challenging the decision that his sentence did
not amount to cruel and unusual punishment was denied.
Because the Supreme Court declined to address the cruel and
unusual punishment issue in Johnson, we decline appellant’s
request that we urge the court to take up the issue here.

                                12
show[ed] that petitioner subjected his daughter to heinous sexual
acts on a weekly basis from the time she was 7 until she was 14
years old”].) Appellant fails to demonstrate that a different
result must be reached here.
                      Abstract Of Judgment
       Appellant also contends, and the People concede, that the
abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that he was
convicted on counts 2, 4, and 5 of violating subdivision (b) of
section 288.7 rather than subdivision (a). We shall order the
judgment so modified.
                          DISPOSITION
       The judgment is modified to reflect that on counts 2, 4, and
5, appellant was convicted of violating section 288.7, subdivision
(b), rather than section 288.7, subdivision (a). The superior court
shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a
copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     CODY, J.

We concur:

      GILBERT, P. J.

      BALTODANO, J.

                                13
                    Derek D. Malan, Judge
               Superior Court County of Ventura
                ______________________________

      Matthew Alger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.