Court Opinion

ID: 9662226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:03:31.722716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:37.929573
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority’s conclusion that a union’s unexplained failure to process a member’s grievance within the procedurally prescribed time limits constitutes a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation. I write separately because I do not agree that to consti*683tute a breach of the duty of fair representation a union’s acts or omissions in the course of processing a grievance must be more egregious than mere negligence.
The union’s unexplained failure to process the grievance in the instant case was at least negligent.1 In Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171, 185; 87 S Ct 903; 17 L Ed 2d 842 (1967), the United States Supreme Court said that where the union "has sole power under the contract to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure” a member may commence an action on the basis of the union’s "wrongful refusal to process the grievance.” (Emphasis in the original.) Wrongfulness was indeed said to include conduct that was "arbitrary,2 discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Id., p 190. The Court also said, however, that wrongfulness might include ignoring a meritorious grievance or processing it in a perfunctory manner. Id., pp 191, 194.
The duty of fair representation is rooted in the concept that a union owes a fiduciary duty to its members.3 The right to fair representation can be traced to Steele v Louisville & Nashville R Co, 323 US 192; 65 S Ct 226; 89 L Ed 173 (1944), and Tunstall v Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & *684Enginemen, 323 US 210; 65 S Ct 235; 89 L Ed 187 (1944). In Steele, the Court said that "[i]t is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf * * 323 US 202.
As a fiduciary, the union is required to exercise at least reasonable care in discharging the obligations it owes its members. The precise obligation owed to an individual member varies with the union activity involved. In contract negotiation, the union has a large measure of discretion to act for the common benefit of the entire membership. Less discretion is allowed in the administration of the contract; after the contract has been made, the duty of fair representation includes the responsibility of advancing and protecting the rights of individual members.4
Where the union is the exclusive agent of the member in a grievance proceeding, a failure on the part of the union to process a grievance will generally bar the member from enforcing his rights under the collective-bargaining agreement. As an exclusive agent, the union owes a fiduciary duty to its members. As a fiduciary, the union is required to exercise reasonable care in the processing of a member’s grievance. An unexplained failure to process a grievance indicates a failure to exercise reasonable care. On that basis, I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed.

 The hearing referee found that the reason for the failure to process the grievance was "a matter of conjecture”. The Michigan Employment Relations Commission characterized the union’s conduct as "apparent negligence”.

 There is some authority for the view that there is no distinction between "arbitrary” union action — which clearly violates the duty of fair representation — and "negligent” union action in the processing of employee grievances. See Buzicka v General Motors Corp, 523 F2d 306, 310 (CA 6, 1975), reh den 528 F2d 912 (CA 6, 1975) (Ruzicka I); see also Gorman, Labor Law,' ch 30, § 7, p 720. For the reasons stated in this opinion, I am of the view that negligent acts or omissions may violate the duty of fair representation although not properly characterized as "arbitrary”. See Ruzicka I, pp 315-316 (McCree, J., concurring).

 See Summers, The Individual Employee’s Bights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Bepresentation?, 126 U Pa L Rev 251, 253, 276 (1977).

 See Summers, supra, fn 3, p 257.