Court Opinion

ID: 9884748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:10:24.567689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:52.663449
License: Public Domain

ZENOVICH, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the conclusion that count eight of the information was not transactionally related to the offenses for which petitioner was committed. The lead opinion most correctly criticizes the Eitzen and Farley decisions for ignoring the transactional requirement enunciated in Parks and its progeny.
Nonetheless, I believe the suppression motion relating to the videomatic search warrant should have been granted. Thus, I dissent from the portion of the lead opinion which sustains the denial of that motion.
The lead opinion reasons that the lower court made an implied finding that Santellano had improperly penned “taken” in his police report, thereby rendering the affidavit valid (which used the correct word —“stolen”). There is no support for such a theory in the record of the *208suppression hearing. The court below discussed whether “stolen” and “taken” were synonymous or materially different in meaning. The lead opinion notes that we cannot draw actual inferences other than those reasonably drawn by the trial court. Given the trial judge’s focus on materiality of the transposition, the lead opinion gratuitously finds an implied finding which was probably not drawn by the lower court from the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing. Moreover, the lead opinion cites to McCaney for the proposition that intermediate statements made at the suppression hearing are disregarded when adjudging the validity of the final ruling. In McCaney, the court was faced with a case involving piecemeal rulings on a singular suppression motion, finding “tentative only all purported rulings on any part of the motion to suppress made prior to the final ruling thereon.” (People v. Superior Court (McCaney) (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 366, 372 [150 Cal.Rptr. 227].) McCaney does not preclude a review of the trial court’s intermediate statements for purposes of ascertaining the grounds of the final ruling. Since there is no indication that the trial judge found that Santellano made an error in his police report, I cannot agree with the implied finding which is purportedly sustained by the lead opinion.
The record of the suppression motion is, however, replete with suggestions that the lower court found that transposition of “stolen” for “taken” was not a material misstatement. The concurring opinion feels that the terms are synonymous in police parlance, making the transposition nonmaterial in nature. I respectfully disagree.
In discussing the materiality of the transposition, the trial judge and defense counsel engaged in the following colloquy at the suppression hearing:
“The Court: Well, what if the word taken was there?
“Mr. Gomes [petitioner’s counsel]: Pardon me?
“The Court: What if it did say taken? You don’t think that that would 'be grounds for issuing the warrant? I, myself, do not think that you can obtain a search warrant to search a house for property when you allege in an affidavit that you told the person who has it anything less than it was stolen, but he knows it, or has good reason to know that it was stolen. I think that’s the standard, probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.
*209“Wouldn’t the word taken, as opposed to bought—
“Mr. Gomes: Not if he was a dealer, not if he was an appliance dealer, ones that are consignment items are often taken in, not stolen.
“The Court: Does it state that Mr. Santellano represented himself to be a consignment dealer, or his brother? How was that?
“Mr. Beck [deputy district attorney]: No, there was no representation on either part. That was a speculation on—or—
“Mr. Gomes: Speculation on prelim testimony.
“Mr. Beck: Speculation on what the magistrate might speculate, I think is appropriate.
“The Court: I see.”
Thereafter, another exchange occurred after counsel for petitioner claimed that the mistake was material, factual and misled the magistrate. Petitioner’s counsel suggested the possibility that the magistrate based his finding of probable cause upon an affidavit that said “stolen” when, in fact, a different result might have attended if the correct word from the police report—“taken”—had been used. In response to this argument, the court stated:
“The Court: Yes. That’s correct, but in the light of all the circumstances, that was really a word that was being used synonymous with stolen.
“Mr. Gomes: What circumstances?
“The Court: Well, I have read the transcript.
“Mr. Gomes: Yes, Your Honor, but—
“The Court: And I know that that—this was in connection with that investigation that’s involved in the transcript. It wasn’t dealing with anything else other than a suspected crime of receiving stolen property.
“Mr. Gomes: Then that, the transcript information—
*210“The Court: They used the word stolen when they should have used the word taken. Now, the question, really, is whether they used the word taken; that there would be nothing there. It seems to me that there would be.
“Mr. Gomes: Your Honor, the events contained in the preliminary hearing transcript occurred months after this, the testimony of the events. You and I are privy to all that. The magistrate was not. The magistrate was only privy to the information contained in the affidavit.
“The Court: Yes, but, well—I mean—
“Mr. Gomes: They could have put in all that, but they didn’t. They relied solely on this one statement that Santellano told Ondarza that this tape recorder was stolen, and that is the basis they got their warrant, and they went and searched, and now I am saying that the tape recorder was not represented to be stolen.” (Italics added.)
The above discussion convinces me that there is a difference between the words “taken” and “stolen.” Language is “‘made up of a vast number of items, each of which has its own time, occasion, and effect.’” (Chomsky, Language and Mind (1972) p. 20, quoting William Dwight Whitney, italics added.) The trial court even alluded to the fact that the two words have their own divergent effects, although it erroneously found that they were synonymous based upon the preliminary hearing transcript. This reliance on the latter transcript was flawed, since the magistrate did not have the benefit of this record when reviewing affiant Means’ search warrant. Instead, the issuing magistrate merely had the affidavit which contained the misstatement in his presence.
In determining probable cause, the magistrate must have facts and circumstances from which he can reasonably determine that criminal activity is being committed. (Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 96 [104 Cal.Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234].) For the offense of receiving stolen property the facts and circumstances must show proof of the following three elements: the property was stolen, the accused received it in his possession, and the accused knew that it was stolen. (People v. Martin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 687, 695 [108 Cal.Rptr. 809, 511 P.2d 1161], cert. den. (1973) 414 U.S. 1113 [38 L.Ed.2d 740, 94 S.Ct. 844].) Although real party argues that the words “stolen” and “taken” are relatively synonymous, the word “stolen” has special significance in establishing that an offense might have been committed under Penal *211Code section 496. As petitioner aptly points out, the magistrate could base probable cause on the word “stolen” alone, since it showed that he had the requisite knowledge for one of the elements of the crime. Petitioner correctly notes that probable cause might have been insufficiently established if the word “taken” was used in the affidavit, since it merely shows that Santellano might have taken the items in as a consignment dealer and subsequently transferred them to petitioner.1 Since Theodor was designed to insure that accurate facts are given to the magistrate in order that he or she may determine probable cause (see Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 822, 831 [141 Cal.Rptr. 233]), I cannot assume that the substitution of the word “taken” was immaterial to the magistrate’s determination. Given the different context in which “taken” can be used, the magistrate would reasonably need surrounding circumstances before deciding that the term was equivalent to the word “stolen.”2
Since the affidavit contained a material misstatement, Theodor commands that the statement be excised from the warrant. “... when it has been established that the earlier finding of probable cause was based upon a broader set of ‘facts,’ some of which are now shown to be false, there is no longer any reason to give deterrence [¿7c] to that earlier finding. Thus, when a court reassesses a search warrant affidavit with the false allegations excised, a ‘doubtful or marginal case’ should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.” (2 LaFave, Search and Seizure (1978) Search Warrants, § 4.4, p. 68.) Once the excision is made, an examination of the warrant shows that the remaining facts and circumstances do not provide probable cause for believing that petitioner had committed criminal activity in regard to stolen property. When scrutinized with a neutral and detached perspective, the remainder of the affidavit merely shows that Santellano was conducting an undercover investigation, that he delivered a video player to petitioner, and that petitioner paid him for the delivery. These facts fall fatally short of establishing the elements of a sale of supposedly stolen property. As suggested by Professor LaFave, I believe that this situation is a proper one for resolving doubts in petitioner’s favor after excision of the misstatement.
*212Although words are not isolated crystals, I feel that there is a material difference between the words “stolen” and “taken.” It is my conviction that a substantial number of magistrates would find a special impact in the word “stolen,” since it is an essential element to proving receipt of stolen property. As Whitney observed about language in general, this misstatement has its own effect on the magistrate’s reviewing process; thus, I regard it as a material transposition.
For the above reasons, I would grant the writ for purposes of suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.

It is also plausible for the word “taken” to mean that the items were procured at a foreclosure sale or were obtained from a legal execution by the officer (who happened to be a creditor).

It is also clear that affiant Means acted negligently in not correctly quoting the word “taken” in his supporting affidavit. The importance of search warrant affidavits requires that officers accurately recite facts from other hearsay sources (such as police reports) to reviewing magistrates. (See Rodriguez v. Superior Court, supra, 87 Cal. App.3d at p. 831.)