Court Opinion

ID: 9352450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 16:00:21.932637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:50.545175
License: Public Domain

20-3046
     Gautam v. Garland
                                                                               BIA
                                                                          Ruehle, IJ
                                                                       A209 161 081
                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
 3   States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
 4   on the 6th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
 8            STEVEN J. MENASHI,
 9            EUNICE C. LEE,
10                 Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   DIL PRASAD GAUTAM,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                       v.                                  20-3046
17                                                           NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20            Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                     Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New
24                                       York, NY.
25
26   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
27                                       Attorney General; M. Jocelyn Lopez
28                                       Wright, Senior Litigation Counsel;
 1                                    Jeffrey M. Hartman, Trial
 2                                    Attorney, Office of Immigration
 3                                    Litigation, United States
 4                                    Department of Justice, Washington,
 5                                    DC.

 6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

8    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

9    is DENIED.

10       Petitioner Dil Prasad Gautam, a native and citizen of

11   Nepal, seeks review of a decision of the BIA affirming a

12   decision     of    an   Immigration        Judge   (“IJ”)   denying     his

13   application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

14   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).                    In re Dil

15   Prasad Gautam, No. A 209 161 081 (B.I.A. Aug. 11, 2020), aff’g

16   No. A 209 161 081 (Immigr. Ct. Buffalo June 5, 2018).                    We

17   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

18   procedural history.

19       Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed

20   both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of

21   completeness.”      Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d

22   524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).            We review adverse credibility

23   determinations for substantial evidence, see Hong Fei Gao v.

24   Sessions,    891    F.3d   67,    76       (2d   Cir.   2018),   and   “the
                                            2
 1   administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

 2   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

3    contrary,”      8   U.S.C.      § 1252(b)(4)(B).             “Considering    the

4    totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

 5   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the

 6   demeanor,      candor,    or    responsiveness     of    the     applicant    or

 7   witness, . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or

 8   witness’s written and oral statements[,] . . . the internal

 9   consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of

10   such    statements       with   other       evidence    of    record[,] . . .

11   without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or

12   falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any

13   other relevant factor.”          8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).              “We

14   defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

15   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

16   reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

17   ruling.”       Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.

18   2008).

19          Here,     substantial      evidence       supports       the   agency’s

20   determination that Gautam was not credible as to his claim

21   that he and his family were persecuted because of his support

                                             3
 1   of the Nepali Student Union and the Nepali Congress Party.

 2   The agency reasonably relied on multiple inconsistencies

 3   within Gautam’s testimony and between his testimony and other

 4   evidence.      See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).                   The record

 5   reflects that Gautam was inconsistent regarding whether he

 6   was a member of the Nepali Congress Party, whether his wife

 7   and eldest son were beaten or just threatened by Maoists, and

 8   when he regained consciousness following an alleged beating.

 9   The agency was not required to credit Gautam’s explanations

10   that   he    was    nervous,    uneducated,     and    had     no   experience

11   testifying.        See Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 397

12   n.6    (2d   Cir.     2005)    (explaining      that     “an   alien’s    mere

13   recitation     that      he   was   nervous”   does    not     “automatically

14   prevent      the    IJ   or    BIA”   from     relying    on    inconsistent

15   statements); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d

16   Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible

17   explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief;

18   he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be

19   compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks

20   omitted)).

21

                                            4
 1          Gautam fails to make any specific arguments or identify

 2   how     the       agency        erred   in       relying    on   the     remaining

 3   inconsistencies.            He therefore forfeits any challenge to

 4   these aspects of the agency’s decision.                      See Yueqing Zhang

 5   v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (deeming

 6   applicant’s “claim abandoned” where he raised an issue in

 7   “only       a    single    conclusory        sentence”).         Inconsistencies

 8   between Gautam’s statements and his corroborating evidence,

 9   and the lack of evidence of country conditions demonstrating

10   Maoist violence in 2015, further undermine his credibility.

11   See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007)

12   (“[T]he         absence     of    corroboration        in   general      makes   an

13   applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already

14   been called into question.”).

15          In       short,    the    multiple        inconsistencies   and    lack   of

16   reliable corroboration constitute substantial evidence for

17   the agency’s adverse credibility determination.                     See 8 U.S.C.

18   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145

19   n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might

20   preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to

21   find    him       credible.         Multiple        inconsistencies      would   so

                                                  5
 1   preclude even more forcefully.”).       Moreover, the adverse

 2   credibility   determination    is   dispositive   of      asylum,

 3   withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three

 4   claims were based on the same factual predicate.         See Paul

 5   v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

 6       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

 7   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

8    stays VACATED.

 9                                 FOR THE COURT:
10                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
11                                 Clerk of Court

                                    6