Court Opinion

ID: 7950205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-08 23:25:39.98179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:34:06.512747
License: Public Domain

Ostrander, C. J.
(dissenting). The bill was filed July 6, 1916. It is charged therein:
“II. That at the time of his death the said Patrick Lynch was the owner in fee simple of certain, lands and premises situate and being in said county of Kent, known and described as follows, to wit: the southeast-quarter of the northwest quarter and the west half of the northeast quarter of section 31 in township 7 north, range 12 west, and of lot 24, in block 2 of Gunnison’s subdivision in the city of Grand Rapids, in said county.
“III. That the said Patrick Lynch, previous to the time of his death had executed an instrument which he intended as his last will and testament, which provided that all of his estate should go to his son, Jeremiah Lynch, the defendant in this case, subject to certain specific legacies and other directions. That among the specific legacies was one to Mary Wheeler for the sum of four hundred dollars, to Johanna Simonds for the sum of twelve hundred dollars, and to this plaintiff (then Margaret Lynch) for the sum of nine hundred dollars. That said amounts should be without interest for three years after the death of said Patrick Lynch and should draw interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum after that period of time.
“IV. That it was arranged and agreed by and between the heirs at law and next of kin of said Patrick Lynch, deceased, that it was unnecessary to have said will presented for probate; that they would arrange for a settlement of the estate of said Patrick Lynch, deceased, without probating said will, and it was further agreed by the said Jeremiah Lynch, that he would pay to the above named Mary Wheeler, Johanna Simonds and the said plaintiff herein, the several amounts which the said instrument provided that they should receive from the said estate for their interests *149in the lands and premises appertaining to said estate.
“V. That on the month of April, 1910, the said Jeremiah Lynch requested said Mary Wheeler, Johanna Simonds and this plaintiff to execute conveyance to him of said lands and premises, and agreed that if such conveyance were made he would pay to them respectively the several amounts of the legacies to them respectively provided for in the said will of Patrick Lynch, deceased. That on or about the 20th day of April, 1910, the said Mary Wheeler in pursuance of said request executed such a deed of conveyance to said Jeremiah Lynch, and on or about the' 20th day of April, 1910, this plaintiff and Johanna Simonds in pursuance of said request also executed a deed of conveyance of said premises to said Jeremiah Lynch, and said deeds were recorded in the office of the register of deeds of said county of Kent on the 11th day of July, 1910, in liber 386 of deeds on pages 442 and 443 respectively.
“VI. That each of said deeds expressed a consideration of one dollar and other good and valuable consideration, and that the other and good valuable consideration mentioned in said deeds were the promises of said Jeremiah Lynch to pay to this plaintiff and to said Mary Wheeler and Johanna Simonds the amounts provided for in the will of said Patrick Lynch, deceased, as aforesaid.
“VII. That the said Jeremiah Lynch has never paid to this plaintiff or to said Johanna Simonds or Mary Wheeler respectively the said sums of money or interest thereon or any part thereof, which it was provided in the will of said Patrick Lynch, deceased, that they should be paid by said Jeremiah Lynch.
“VIII. That the said Mary Wheeler and Johanna Simonds have each assigned, transferred and set over to this plaintiff all of their claims and demands against the said Jeremiah Lynch, and the above described premises and all of their claims and demands against the estate of Patrick Lynch, deceased, for and on account of the provisions so made for them in the will of said Patrick Lynch, deceased, and the said plaintiff is now possessed of the right to demand, receive and maintain suits for the purpose of recovering the sums and amounts which were made due and pay*150able to this plaintiff by the terms of the said will of Patrick Lynch, deceased, and of the said promises and agreements of said Jeremiah Lynch together with all liens that the said Mary Wheeler and Johanna Simonds, as well as this plaintiff, had upon the aforesaid lands and premises.”
It is further charged that Jeremiah Lynch has become and is mentally incompetent and that Mary Ellen Lynch is guardian of his estáte, having been appointed March 8, 1916, that the will of Patrick Lynch was allowed December 10, 1915, and that Mary Ellen Lynch has.been appointed to administer his estate. Upon information and belief it is charged that Mary Ellen Lynch has contracted with the other defendants to sell to them the said premises and that the vendees are in possession of them. Relief prayed for is an account of the amounts which the plaintiff and the said Johanna and-Mary “became and were entitled to receive from said Jeremiah Lynch .under the will of said Patrick Lynch,” and that it be decreed that plaintiff has a lien upon the land—
“for the amounts which became due and owing to this plaintiff and to said Mary Wheeler and said Johanna Simonds respectively under and in pursuance of the terms of the will of said Patrick Lynch, deceased, and the agreement so made by Jeremiah Lynch to pay the same as aforesaid.”
In default of payment, 'a sale of the land is asked for “to satisfy such lien.” There is a prayer for general relief. On motion to dismiss, it was held that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
The will of Patrick Lynch is not set out in or with the bill, nor is the value of his estate or of what it consisted. Upon a motion to dismiss, we must deal with the facts set out in the bill. The bill charges that the testator bequeathed and devised all of his estate to his son Jeremiah, subject to certain specific *151legacies. This imports that there was personal property. It does not import that the legacies were made a charge upon the real estate. Quite the contrary. It was agreed that the will should not be probated, and Jeremiah promised plaintiff and her assignors, the legatees, to pay them the amounts of their legacies. Apparently, this promise was made 33 years before the bill was filed. Jeremiah did not pay as he agreed he would, but when, in April, 1910, the will not yet Laving been probated, he wanted to secure apparent title to the real estate in himself, to make a sale of it, and for this purpose desired conveyances from the other heirs at law of his father, he renewed his promise to pay them their specific legacies. The plaintiff and her assignors conveyed their then apparent, but not real, title to the land. The will has since been admitted to probate. Nothing further than this can be gathered from the bill of complaint.
Assúming all charges made in- the bill to be true, what present enforceable right of plaintiff is disclosed ? Obviously, it is a right resting upon either (1) the will and the specific legacies therein given to them, or (2) upon the promises of Jeremiah. If upon the will, this is not the forum for asserting it, the estate being open and the probate court engaged in its administration. If upon the promises of Jeremiah, neither of them was made within six years before this suit was begun and neither is actionable in a court of equity. Plaintiff and her assignors do not claim that they ever had title, legal or equitable, to the land or ever sold it. Clearly, they never, in fact, had legal or equitable title to it. They never sold it, and it is not asserted that any portion of the purchase price, upon a sale, remains unpaid. They conveyed the land, in form, upon the repeated promise of Jeremiah to pay them, not the purchase price, but the amount of the legacies fixed in the will.
*152If we indulge the notion that upon the death of the ancestor plaintiff and her assignors had an equitable lien upon the estate, including the real estate, to secure payment of their legacies, the promises or denials of Jeremiah could not affect it, enlarge or diminish it, unless in relying upon them plaintiff and her assignors released the lien. If they did not release it, what has kept it alive for 34 years?
The decree should be affirmed, with costs to appellees.