Court Opinion

ID: 9777964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:29:02.484501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:02.820726
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Justice,
dissenting.
Finding myself in disagreement with the other members of the court, I would like to record my respectful dissent. In his first ground of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred in failing to grant his requested mistrial during the prosecutor’s argument to the jury during the guilt phase. I would sustain this ground of error.
There were two trials of this cause, the first resulting in a mistrial. In a pretrial motion and hearing, appellant sought to have the testimony of his ex-wife suppressed on the ground that she was his now common law wife. The trial court refused to hold as a matter of law that they were married. Appellant filed a supplemental motion to suppress again alleging that Mary Alvarado was his wife and therefore incompetent to testify against him. This second motion was also overruled. Although Mary Alvarado was called by the State to testify during the first trial, *343she was not called during the second trial. During jury argument, the following remarks were made by the Prosecutor:
(Prosecutor) Mary Alvarado did not testify. I think that you heard enough as to their relationship that you can see that probably there was a common law marriage at some point. At some point after the divorce and before this happened they were living together as man and wife and if she is a common law wife as I told you on jury selection, she cannot testify against her husband, but she is the only eyewitness, and they sure as heck didn’t call her to testify for him.
(DEFENSE COUNSEL) Your Honor, we object to that particular remark made by the State that thats not the law. Its an improper comment. We would respectfully ask the Court to instruct the jury to disregard that comment.
The court overruled the objection and refused to instruct the jury to disregard the comment.
Appellant’s first ground of error complains that the State’s jury argument quoted above “interjected new unsworn and untrue testimony, implying to the jury first that Mary Alvarado was the wife of the defendant, contrary to the Court’s prior rulings and secondly that the State cannot call her to testify, when in fact the Court had held otherwise.” The majority opinion states that this objection quoted above is not the same as that voiced at trial and therefore nothing is presented for review. I disagree with this conclusion.
A complete reading of the record reveals that after counsel’s objection was overruled, he then excepted and moved for a mistrial. A bench conference ensued during which counsel clarified his position and argued that the Prosecutor’s argument introduced additional evidence for the jury. During the conference counsel stated in pertinent part the following:
We have a second point of error. The State — in regards to counsel’s remarks, and the second point is that counsel attempted to state what Mary Alvarado would have said and that her attempt to state what she would have said is introducing additional evidence for the jury.
From a reading of the record, I find it clear that counsel adequately preserved error and that the objection voiced at trial comports with that raised on appeal. It is clear that counsel objected to the jury argument on the ground that it was improper in that it injected additional evidence before the jury contrary to the Court’s prior rulings on whether a common law marriage existed.
Turning next to the merits of this ground of error, I am of the opinion that the jury argument was improper as it impermissibly injected new and harmful facts into the case. The law is clear that there are four general areas of acceptable jury argument which include: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; and (4) plea for law enforcement. Denison v. State, 651 S.W.2d 754, 761 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). . Furthermore, jury argument is not reversible error unless it is manifestly improper, harmful and prejudicial when considered with the record as a whole. Burke v. State, 652 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).
In this connection I note that in the first trial of this cause the State, in accordance with the court’s pretrial ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress Mary Alvarado’s testimony, availed itself of the opportunity to call Mrs. Alvarado as a witness. This was done pursuant to the court’s ruling that a common law marriage did not exist as a matter of law. The first trial resulted in a mistrial when Mrs. Alvarado testified as to an extraneous offense. During appellant’s second trial the same ruling was in effect, therefore the State could again have called Mary Alvarado as a witness. The State did not call her, however, and the record does not reflect that the issue of the existence of a common law marriage was developed as a fact issue before the jury by either the defense or the State. Instead the record discloses only a few comments by appellant while he was testifying that *344he had lived with Mary after their divorce and that he liked her. These comments were not in response to the development of an issue of whether a common law marriage existed, but rather were in response to questions about what transpired on the night of the murder. Thus it is clear that the only time the issue was raised was during pretrial motions outside the presence of the jury. Since the State then opted not to call Mrs. Alvarado the defense had no need to attempt to exclude nonexistent testimony on the basis that a common law marriage existed. It was only during jury argument that the State raised the issue of common law marriage, the effect that the existence of such had on its ability to call Mary Alvarado, and the inferences to be drawn from appellant’s failure to call her.
Since the issue was not developed by either side during trial, I fail to see how it was proper for the Prosecutor to make the complained of comments during jury argument. It is true that the existence of a common law marriage is an issue of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Hightower v. State, 629 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Furthermore, it is true as the State asserts, that if a claim of common law marriage between a witness summoned by the State and the accused is raised, and some evidence of the foregoing elements is offered in a trial before a jury, then the issue should be submitted to the jury. Aguilar v. State, 658 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, pet. ref’d). In this case, however, the issue of the existence of a common law marriage was raised by a pretrial motion only. The court ruled as a matter of law that no marriage existed and testimony of Mrs. Alvarado would not be suppressed. The issue was not pursued further even though the State could have called Mrs. Alvarado as they did in the first trial.
The State tries to bolster its argument that a fact issue was developed as to the existence of a common law marriage by claiming that some evidence was presented to the jury on this issue. As discussed above, however, the few remarks made by appellant as to living with Mrs. Alvarado after the divorce and occasionally supporting her were not in the context of the development of the issue of a common law marriage. Furthermore, in order to raise the issue of common law marriage, it is necessary that the evidence developed during trial reflect all of the following: (1) an agreement presently to become man and wife and a living together pursuant to the agreement; (2) cohabitation as husband and wife; and (3) a holding out of each other to the public as husband and wife. Hightower v. State, 629 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). A complete reading of the record demonstrates that no predicate of this nature was developed by either side during the trial. The State also asserts that its jury argument is not inconsistent with appellant’s position during trial. This is true with respect to appellant’s contention during pretrial motions, but again it was not developed during trial as a fact issue for the jury. Certainly the defense had no need to develop the issue as the State opted not to call Mrs. Alvarado.
The standard by which to judge improper comments by a prosecutor has long provided that reversible error exists if: (1) the argument is manifestly improper, harmful and prejudicial, or (2) it is violative of a statute or, (3) it injects a new and harmful fact into the case. Williams v. State, 607 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Furthermore, in order to determine whether the argument is manifestly improper, harmful and prejudicial, a reviewing court must consider the comments in light of the record as a whole and in relation to the probable effect on the minds of the jurors under the facts of each case. See, e.g., Simpkins v. State, 590 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 328 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (emphasis added).
I am of the opinion that reversible error occurred as a result of the Prosecutor’s complained of jury argument. The issue of a common law marriage between appellant and Mrs. Alvarado was not developed as a fact issue during trial. The argument *345clearly injected a new and harmful fact into the case. I would sustain appellant’s first ground of error.