Court Opinion

ID: 9735781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:30:37.670937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:01.490145
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. I would reverse the judgment of the appellate and circuit courts and remand the cause for further proceedings. While it is true that the opinions have not always been consistent, it is clear from an analysis of the cases that this jurisdiction long ago rejected the strict common law rule that a release of one tortfeasor releases all tortfeasors. The rule is well stated in Essington v. Parish (7th Cir. 1947), 164 F.2d 725: “However conflicting the authorities may be in respect to the proper construction of the instruments here involved, we think the law is now settled in Illinois that the substance of the agreement is the controlling factor, and that the essential fact to be determined is ‘what was the intention of the parties.’ Illinois looks to all the circumstances to determine whether or not the transaction was intended as, and was in substance, a settlement and satisfaction, or merely an agreement not to sue, and that, as was held in City of Chicago v. Babcock, supra, 143 Ill. 367, 32 N.E. 271, is a question of fact.” 164 F.2d 725, 729. There is nothing to indicate that at the time of the execution of the release it was contemplated, or even suggested, that there might be an action against Ford Motor Company. The briefs fail to suggest how it could have been intended to release a tortfeasor against whom no claim had been suggested or asserted. Furthermore, the document in question contains no all-inclusive language of the type frequently found in releases. It does not purport to release Rainwater, State Farm Insurance Company and “any and all other persons, firms or corporations who might in any manner be liable ***.” It releases only Rainwater, State Farm and “any person, firm or corporation liable in his stead ***.” This creates at least the possibility that the release was intended to include only those whose liability derived from Rainwater. There is an ambiguity sufficient to render the intent of the parties a question of fact. A second rule of law is applicable here. A release is a contract in which, for a consideration, a claimant releases a claim against a tortfeasor. There is nothing in the release which in any manner indicates that it was intended to benefit any other tortfeasor. A long-established rule in this jurisdiction is that a third-party beneficiary of a contract must show an intent on the part of the contracting parties that he be benefited thereby. (Altevogt v. Brinkoetter (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 44.) The intent here indicated is to limit the benefits to the parties named: Rainwater, State Farm Insurance Company, and “any person, firm or corporation liable in his [Rainwater’s] stead.” In my opinion the dismissal was error and the question of the intent of the parties was an issue to be determined by the trier of fact. The case should be remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. JUSTICE SIMON joins in this dissent.