Court Opinion

ID: 9738860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:04:36.500863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.869894
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
White, J.
Since I find myself in general agreement with the court’s opinion on the merit (or demerit) of appel-lee’s Instruction No. 2, I am reluctant to dissent. However, I cannot bring myself to the conclusion that a new trial should be ordered.
First of all, only a part of the evidence was brought to this court. I have not been shown enough to tell me whether either plaintiff made a prima facie case. The giving of the instruction could hardly be prejudicial to either appellant, no matter how erroneous, if neither were entitled to recover in any event.
Secondly, I am not satisfied that the trial court was given an adequate opportunity to discover whatever may be wrong with appellee’s Instruction No. 2. Here is what occurred by way of objection to that instruction:
“Mr. Crokin: The Plaintiff will object to Defendant’s tendered instruction number two in the Virginia Agnes Qualls case; and these will all be on the Virginia Agnes Qualls case, all of our objections; instruction number two on the grounds that it amounts to a mere accident instruction, and that there is no need to instruct the jury on mere accident and it is error to do so.
“Plaintiff also objects to Defendant’s instruction number ...
*284“The Court: Did you say number two? Defendant’s in-struc . . . uh, oh, Virginia Qualls you said, didn't you?
“Mr. Croltin: Virginia Qualls, yes. Uh, if the Court please, we have, I don’t believe, any objections to any of the instructions on the other case, on the Delbert.
“The Court: As to Delbert, all right.”
At oral argument, appellants’ counsel says it was his intention to object on behalf of both appellants, since the two cases were being tried together. However, he used the expression “in the Virginia Agnes Quail’s case”. Because the instruction was tendered only in that case and was “No. 2” only in that case. His objection, however, is quite easily understood as an objection by Mrs. Qualls alone and not an objection by Mr. Qualls.
The reason for the objection is even more ambiguous, or obscure, than whether one plaintiff or two plaintiffs were objecting. In my opinion the interpretation most favorable to appellants which the trial court could have put on the words “. . . it amounts to a mere accident instruction” would have been that those words were the equivalent of saying: “This instruction is objectionable for the same reason that the mere accident instruction in White v. Evansville American Legion Home Association, 247 Ind. 69, 70, 210 N. E. 2d 845 (1965), was held objectionable.” And perhaps if appellant had actually said that, citing the case, the trial judge may have had a duty to read the Supreme Court’s opinion before ruling on the objection. If he had that duty, he may have been in error in overruling the objection.
But if we are required to interpret the objection most favorable to appellee and the trial judge, I would say that the objection was patently unfounded because the instruction contained no word modifying “accident”, no word which was the equivalent of “mere” and did not, therefore, amount to a mere accident instruction. Furthermore, the objection did not tell the trial judge why a mere accident instruction was objectionable.
*285It has often been suggested by learned critics that courts at the appellate level often construe too narrowly the requirement that error be preserved by timely and adequate objection. Such criticism is actually a criticism of the adversary and advocate system and often underestimates the pressures and time limitations under which trial judges must operate. The assistance of trial counsel is essential to the orderly and efficient administration of justice in our system of justice.
Nevertheless, were the record such that it showed more than a mere possibility that a miscarriage of justice had occurred in the trial court, I would vote to reverse. And if I were thus able to resolve the ambiguity of the objection in favor of the appellant wife, I would also resolve it in favor of the appellant husband and reverse for him as well.
In my opinion appellee’s instruction No. 51 is a correct statement of the law and is applicable to the case and is not in conflict with appellants’ instruction No. 2.2
*286The escalator could have been “at all times under the control of competent employees” without each escalator step being under constant surveillance for the detection of a foreign substance or of a regurgitating rider.
As to appellants’ tendered instruction No. 43 which was refused by the court, we do not know, in the absencé of all the evidence, whether the failure to produce presumably favorable witnesses was satisfactorily explained. In fact, we cannot even know that they were not produced.
I would affirm both judgments.
Note. — Reported in 245 N. E. 2d 860.

. “The mere fact, if you find such to be the fact, that there was some foreign substance on the step of the escalator where Virginia Agnes Qualls fell does not of itself establish that the defendant was negligent. You must further find before you would find the defendant negligent that such foreign substance has been on such step for such a length of time and that such substance was reasonably obvious for such length of time that a reasonable shopkeeper should have known of its presence and made reasonable efforts to make the condition created by the foreign substance reasonably safe.” (Tr. p. 153.)

. “You are instructed that if the plaintiff Virginia Qualls, was shopping .in defendant’s store, and in the course of her shopping she had occasion to use the esclator (sic) in defendant’s store, then at the time she stepped upon that escalator for the purpose of being transported from one floor to another, she became a passenger on the escalator, and defendant then owed to her the same legal obligations as does any other common carrier of passengers, such as a railroad or bus line.
“Specifically, the duty owed by the common carrier of passengers toward its passengers is to keep its equipment in safe operating condition, and to take .every reasonable' precaution to make its conveyance safe, consistant with the practical operation of its business.
“This duty clearly contemplates that the moving machinery, used in the business of transporting passengers, should be at all times under the control of competent employees.
• “And if you find that Mrs. Qualls suffered an injury while she was a passenger on defendant’s excalator (sic), and that her injury, was proximately caused by defendant’s failure to live up to the above described legal duties and obligations that it had toward her, then, unless you also find that Mrs. Qualls injuries were also proximately caused *286by some failure on her part to act as a reasonable prudent person under the circumstances, then your verdict should be for the Plaintiffs.” (Tr. p. 166.)

. “Where a party has the power and opportunity of producing evidence of a witness or witnesses presumably friendly to him whose testimony would or could explain the transaction or enlighten the Court or Jury, then a failure to produce such evidence or witnesses or to make any effort to do so, entitles you to presume that such evidence or witnesses if produced would be unfavorable to the party or his position.” (Tr. p. 168.)