Court Opinion

ID: 9676032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:12:46.073222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:42.905373
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear
Burnett, Justice.
We have for consideration a very courteous and dignified petition to rehear in this case. For all intents and purposes it is merely a reargument of the matters so *460ably argued before us and in briefs of counsel. The cases cited in support of this petition to rehear are either not controlling or were considered by us in reaching our original conclusion. We can only repeat again what Mr. Justice Story said in Jenkins v. Eldredge, Fed. Cas. No. 7,267, 3 Story 299, as follows: “During a pretty long period of judicial life, it has been my misfortune on many occasions to have differed widely from counsel on one side or the other, in important causes, as to the merits thereof. But this, although a matter of regret, could not, as it ought not, in any, the slightest degree, influence the duties or judgment of the court.”
 We in reaching our original opinion in this cause decided two propositions and two propositions only. Anything else that we said in the opinion was purely by way of argument in reaching these two conclusions which are: (a) that the operation of a swimming pool by a municipality is a governmental function notwithstanding the fact that a charge is made for admission or a profit is made on operation of the pool, and notwithstanding the fact that advertisements are made inviting persons from without the city to patronize the pool. A city under our authorities is engaged in a governmental function and is not liable for the negligence of its servants and agents; (b) the declaration filed in this cause does not charge (in our judgment) the creation or operation of a nuisance under the laws of this 'State rendering the city liable on the nuisance theory.
In reaching our conclusion we felt forced to follow the opinions of this Court as cited in the case of City of Nashville v. Burns, 131 Tenn. 281, 174 S. W. 1111, L. R. A. 1915D, 1108, and Rector v. City of Nashville, 23 Tenn. App. 495, 134 S. W. (2d) 892. In following these opinions we found ,and so stated that these opinions were based *461on opinions of other courts holding as we have held in this case. We feel that we are bound by these opinions because they have been the law in this State for a great many years and it would not be right for ns now to reverse them. Regardless of the merits of conclusions to the contrary and of the feelings of individual members of this Court as to the liability of a city under circumstances set out here we have felt bound by those decisions and it was for this reason that the conclusions reached by us were so reached.
The case of Johnson v. Tennessean Newspaper, Inc., 192 Tenn. 287, 241 S. W. (2d) 399, was cited originally and referred to in our opinion. This case does not extend the governmental immunity doctrine. The instant case is entirely different from the Johnson case. We cannot see anything, as set forth in this declaration, to place the instant case under the nuisance doctrine. The nuisance doctrine controlled the Johnson case entirely.
In the petition to rehear counsel cites Saulman v. Mayor of Nashville, 131 Tenn. 427, 175 S. W. 532, L. R. A. 1915E, 316; Conelly v. City of Nashville, 100 Tenn. 262, 46 S. W. 565, and Mayor etc., of City of Memphis v. Kimbrough, 59 Tenn. 133, 134, which were not cited in the original opinion. These cases are in no way in point.
The Saulman case held that in the operation of .an electric plant by the city it was engaged in a proprietary function and therefore was liable for negligence. In the Conelly case the court held that in operating a street sprinkler the city was engaged in a governmental function and therefore not liable for negligence, and in the Kimbrough case it was held that the city in operating a wharf was engaged in a proprietary function and therefore liable for negligence. Obviously none of these three *462cases, when studied closely, are in anyway in point in the present case.
The conclusion that we reached in the instant case does not in anywise overrule other decisions of the courts of this State but to the contrary is based entirely on the decisions of courts of this State as cited in the opinion.
The case of Beaman v. Grooms, 138 Tenn. 320, 197 S. W. 1090, L. R. A. 1918B, 305, cited for the first time in the petition to rehear is not a city case or a nuisance case but was a case against a private operator for the negligent operation of a private bathing* beach and is not in point.
The case of Cooper v. Overton, 102 Tenn. 211, 52 S. W. 183, 45 L. R. A. 591, cited in the petition to rehear is not in point because that case involved a claimed attractive nuisance on the property of a private person.
We have very earnestly and carefully considered the petition to rehear and given it much thought. Por the reasons stated in our original opinion we are forced to reach the same conclusion as we reached originally. The petition to rehear must therefore be overruled.