Court Opinion

ID: 9897935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:12.946511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:04.449044
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

CITY OF EDMONDS, a Washington                           No. 84712-1-I
Municipal Corporation,
                                                        DIVISION ONE
                     Respondent,
                                                        PUBLISHED OPINION
             v.

THE EDMONDS EBB TIDE
ASSOCIATION OF APARTMENT
OWNERS, a Washington Nonprofit
Corporation,

                     Appellant.

        FELDMAN, J. — Edmonds Ebb Tide Association of Apartment Owners (Ebb

 Tide Association) appeals a trial court’s final judgment and order granting

 declaratory relief in favor of the City of Edmonds (the City) under the Uniform

 Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA). The trial court’s judgment and order declares

 that an access easement (the Easement) that Ebb Tide Association’s

 predecessor-in-interest granted to the City provides sufficient real property rights

 to enable the City to construct a public walkway as described and specified by

 the City in the trial court proceedings. We reject Ebb Tide Association’s

 arguments and affirm.
No. 84712-1-I/2

                                          I

       Ebb Tide Association is the current owner of a five-story, twenty-unit

building (the Building), which was originally constructed in 1965. The Building is

located on the waterfront, and members of the public have for many years

trespassed over the Building’s private patio rather than walking on the adjacent

beach. Occupants of the Building have complained to the City, which led to

conversations about how to resolve the issue. Id.

       The City, in turn, owns the surrounding waterfront property and has

developed that property by creating parks and walkways. The City has for many

years wanted to build a continuous walkway along the waterfront connecting the

Edmonds-to-Kingston Ferry north of the Building to a park and fishing pier south

of the Building. The missing link in that walkway is on the waterfront side of the

Building.

       Olympic Properties purchased the Building in June 1983, renamed it the

Ebb Tide, converted the units into condominiums, and created the Ebb Tide

Association to comply with Washington’s condominium statute. Shortly after

purchasing the Building, Olympic Properties sought to eliminate public trespass

across the Building’s private patio. Olympic Properties and the City concluded

that this could be done by creating an access easement so that the City could

build a walkway that would redirect pedestrian traffic out onto the beach and

away from the patio.

       Signed in November of 1983, the Easement states in relevant part as

follows:

       That the said Grantor for and in consideration of one dollar to Grantor

                                         2
No. 84712-1-I/3

      in hand paid by said Grantee, mutual benefits accruing and other
      valuable, legal consideration, receipt of which is hereby
      acknowledged, do by these presents grant, bargain, sell, convey and
      confirm unto the said Grantee a right-of-way easement for public
      access, use and enjoyment, together with the right to construct and
      maintain public improvements, facilities, utilities, and necessary
      appurtenances, over, through, across, and upon the following
      described property, situate[d] in Snohomish County, Washington,
      more particularly described as follows:

             Commencing at a point on the Westerly margin of right-
             of-way of Burlington Northern Railroad 50.00 feet
             Northerly from the South line of Government Lot 2,
             Section 23, Township 27 North, Range 3 East W.M.,
             as measured along said westerly margin; thence North
             41°00'00" East along the Westerly margin of said right-
             of-way, a distance of 100.00 feet; thence North
             49°00'00" West, perpendicular with said right- of-way
             margin, a distance of 149,61 feet to the Government
             meander line of the waters of Puget Sound; thence
             North 51°19'24" East, along said meander line, a
             distance of 6.91 feet to the Easterlymost corner of
             Parcel A, as described on Sheet 1 of the Plat of Ebb
             Tide, a condominium, as recorded in Volume 44 of
             Plats, on pages 175 through 181 inclusive, records of
             Snohomish County, Washington; thence North
             38°37'00" West, along the Northeasterly line of said
             Parcel A, a distance of 60.00 feet to the True Point of
             Beginning; thence continuing North 38°37'00" West a
             distance of 10.00 feet; thence South 47°52'11" West, a
             distance of 99.60 feet to a point on the Southwesterly
             line of said Parcel A; thence South 38°37'00" East,
             along said Southwesterly line of said Parcel ·A, a
             distance of 10.00 feet; thence North 47°52'11" East, a
             distance of 99.60 feet to the True Point of Beginning.

             Situated in Snohomish county, Washington.

             The Grantee, its successors, agents, or assigns, shall
      construct, install, or erect no structures or improvements upon or
      within the above described easement right of way, whereby any
      portion thereof extends above a horizontal plane having an elevation
      of 17.00 as referred to City of Edmonds Datum (Mean Lower Low
      Water).

(Emphasis added.). The Easement thus allows the City to complete its

                                       3
No. 84712-1-I/4

continuous walkway along the Edmonds Waterfront—and thereby address the

ongoing trespass complaints—so long as the improvements, facilities, utilities,

and necessary appurtenances do not extend beyond the dimensions or above

the elevation prescribed by the Easement. 1

        The City did not immediately begin building the proposed walkway

because it lacked necessary funding to do so. Sixteen years later, in 1999, the

City formally proposed building an elevated walkway across the strip of land

designated in the Easement, but terminated the project because of Ebb Tide

Association’s sustained opposition. Seventeen years later, in 2016, the City

again proposed an elevated walkway, which was similar to the 1999 proposal

and was known as the “Planned Improvements.” Once again, Ebb Tide

Association opposed construction of the elevated walkway and argued, among

other things, that the Easement does not establish sufficient real property rights

to construct a walkway in accordance with the Planned Improvements.

        To address the Ebb Tide Association’s continued opposition, the City filed

a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that it “has the right to construct the

Planned Improvements within the easement area.” After a four-day bench trial,

the court granted the City’s request for declaratory relief. The trial court’s final

judgment and order states, “[t]he City has sufficient real property rights to

1 The trial court record conclusively establishes that (1) the easement area (“the following

described property”) is a 10-foot wide and approximately 100-foot long strip of beach roughly 6-
feet waterward from the patio seawall on the north end and 12-feet waterward from the patio
seawall on the south end, and (2) the height restriction (“an elevation of 17.00 as referred to City
of Edmonds Datum (Mean Lower Low Water)”) equates to 1.84 feet above the finished first floor
elevation of the Building. Neither point is disputed here.

                                                  4
No. 84712-1-I/5

construct a walkway within the easement area, the final design of which will [be]

materially consistent with the Planned Improvements . . . .”

       Ebb Tide Association appeals.

                                            II

A.     Ripeness

       Ebb Tide Association’s lead argument is that the trial court should have

dismissed the City’s claim on ripeness grounds. We disagree.

       Under the UDJA, “[a] person interested under a deed . . . may have

determined any question of construction . . . arising under the instrument . . . and

obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” RCW

7.24.020. The UDJA requires a justiciable controversy, which “encompasses the

concepts of ripeness.” Alim v. City of Seattle, 14 Wn. App. 2d 838, 847, 474

P.3d 589 (2020). The ripeness inquiry, in turn, is governed by a four-part test:

       In determining whether a claim is ripe for review, we consider [1] if
       the issues raised are primarily legal, and [2] do not require further
       factual development, and [3] if the challenged action is final. We also
       consider [4] the hardship to the parties of withholding court
       consideration.

Id. at 856 (internal citation omitted). “The justiciability of a claim is a question of

law we review de novo.” Am. Traffic Sols., Inc. v. City of Bellingham, 163 Wn.

App. 427, 432, 260 P.3d 245 (2011) (citing Coppernoll v. Reed, 155 Wn.2d 290,

299-301, 119 P.3d 318 (2005)).

       Each of the ripeness considerations is satisfied here. First, the issues

raised by the City’s claim are primarily legal. The City’s declaratory judgment

claim requires the court to interpret the Easement and determine whether it

grants sufficient real property rights to construct the proposed walkway as

                                           5
No. 84712-1-I/6

described and specified by the City. As with any written contract, the proper

interpretation of a written agreement regarding real property rights “is a question

of law.” Bloome v. Haverly, 154 Wn. App. 129, 137, 225 P.3d 330 (2010)

(interpreting restrictive covenant).

       Second, the issues raised “do not require further factual development.”

Alim, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 856. As explained in Thun v. City of Bonney Lake, 164

Wn. App. 755, 767, 265 P.3d 207 (2011), this consideration requires “the basic

facts underlying a dispute to be resolved before the dispute reaches court.”

Here, those basic facts include the Easement itself, design documents showing

the material structural components of the proposed walkway (the Planned

Improvements), the City’s stated intent to construct the walkway in accordance

with those design documents, and Ebb Tide Association’s opposition to the

project. Because these basic facts are known, factual development is not

required and the second ripeness consideration is satisfied.

       Third, the challenged action is final. The trial court’s final judgment and

order reflects and incorporates its prior rulings that the Easement is valid (CP

3049-51), that the height restriction in the Easement equates to 1.84 feet above

the finished first floor elevation of the Building, and that the phrase “public

improvements, facilities, utilities and necessary appurtenances” in the Easement

should be read to encompass some kind of improved walkway. Ebb Tide

Association does not challenge any of these rulings.

       The trial court’s declaratory judgment ruling is also final. The City

explained in its complaint that it had “engaged consultants to create a design for

a walkway that would be constructed within the easement area” and it attached

                                           6
No. 84712-1-I/7

to its complaint design documents showing the proposed walkway (the Planned

Improvements). The trial court, in turn, granted that limited relief, stating that “the

City has sufficient real property rights to construct a walkway within the easement

area, the final design of which will [be] materially consistent with the planned

improvements . . . .” (Emphasis added.) So limited, the trial court’s judgment

and order granting declaratory relief in favor of the City is final and thus the third

ripeness consideration is likewise satisfied.

       Fourth, Ebb Tide Association does not (and cannot) contest that

withholding declaratory relief to the City would create substantial hardship—thus

satisfying the fourth ripeness consideration. Our Supreme Court noted in Jafar v.

Webb, 177 Wn.2d 520, 525, 303 P.3d 1042 (2013), that “current hardship” is not

a strict requirement for ripeness. Here, if declaratory relief were withheld, the

City would be left without a determination of whether the Easement provides

sufficient real property rights to build the proposed walkway and progress toward

completing the project would be stifled.

       Notwithstanding the above analysis, Ebb Tide Association argues that

declaratory relief cannot properly be granted here because the design of the

proposed walkway is only 30 percent complete and omits certain features (such

as railings and a wider walkway) that might cause the walkway—as ultimately

constructed—to exceed the scope of the Easement as interpreted by the trial

court. Expressed in terms of ripeness, Ebb Tide Association contends that

further factual development is required (the second ripeness consideration) and

the trial court’s judgment and order granting declaratory relief in favor of the City

cannot be final (the third ripeness consideration) because the court’s decision to

                                           7
No. 84712-1-I/8

grant such relief is expressly premised on a “conceptual design” that is subject to

change.

       Ebb Tide Association’s argument misconceives and misapplies the

relevant ripeness considerations. The second ripeness consideration does not

ask whether a party opposing declaratory relief (like Ebb Tide Association here)

can hypothesize some factual development that could potentially affect or even

obviate a trial court’s ruling granting declaratory relief. Rather, it asks whether

“the issues raised . . . do not require further factual development.” Alim, 14 Wn.

App. 2d at 856 (emphasis added). As discussed above, no such development is

required here. And while the trial court’s judgment and order granting declaratory

relief in the City’s favor does not address any and all potential contingencies, it is

a final determination of each of the discrete issues discussed above, including

whether the Easement grants the City sufficient real property rights to construct

the walkway in accordance with the Planned Improvements. On this record, the

City’s claim is sufficiently ripe for judicial review.

       For similar reasons, Ebb Tide Association’s reliance on Bloome is

misplaced. Applying justiciability principles, the court in Bloome held that a trial

court cannot properly grant declaratory relief under the UDJA where “the record

does not contain facts necessary for a court to resolve the apparent underlying

dispute between the parties.” 154 Wn. App. at 141. As the court explained, the

record in Bloome did not contain those basic facts:

       Bloome has not put forth any construction plan over which the parties
       have had the opportunity to litigate as to its conformance with the
       covenant. Nor has he established that it is, in fact, impossible to
       construct a building on the downhill parcel without interfering with the
       view from the uphill parcel. In the absence of a dispute over whether

                                             8
No. 84712-1-I/9

        actual building plans satisfy the covenant or of other evidence
        establishing a necessary minimum degree of interference with the
        view from the uphill property, a declaratory judgment as requested
        by either party would not conclusively settle the controversy between
        them.

Id. at 141-42. The court also noted that “nothing in the record indicates that

Bloome either planned or plans to construct a building on the downhill parcel.”

Id. at 137. In the absence of such evidence, this court reversed the trial court’s

declaratory judgment on justiciability grounds because “the record does not

establish the existence of an actual, mature dispute that could be conclusively

resolved by the requested relief.” Id. at 147.

        Bloome is distinguished easily. Perhaps most important, the City here,

unlike the parties in Bloome, did not fail to “put forth any construction plan over

which the parties have had the opportunity to litigate as to its conformance with

the [Easement].” Id. at 142. As discussed above, the City attached to its

complaint design documents showing the material structural components of the

proposed walkway (the Planned Improvements). And in sharp contrast to

Bloome, there is no doubt that the City plans to construct the proposed walkway

in accordance with the Planned Improvements. Thus, unlike in Bloome, the

record here establishes the existence of an actual, mature dispute that could be

conclusively resolved by the requested relief. 2

2 Just prior to oral argument, Ebb Tide Association submitted a Statement of Additional Authority

citing Kruse v. Hemp, 121 Wn.2d 715, 722, 853 P.2d 1373 (1993), for the proposition that
“Washington courts . . . require clear and unequivocal evidence of the terms and character of the
contract before specific performance is awarded.” At oral argument, Ebb Tide Association’s
appellate counsel tied this authority to the ripeness issue. This argument is improper in two
respects. First, the “purpose of RAP 10.8 is to provide parties with an opportunity to bring to the
court’s attention cases decided after the parties submitted their briefs.” Whitehall v. Emp’t Sec.
Dep’t, 25 Wn. App. 2d 412, 419 n.3, 523 P.3d 835 (2023) (quoting Ghodsee v. City of Kent, 21
Wn. App. 2d 762, 782 n.16, 508 P.3d 193 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here,
Kruse was decided 30 years before the parties submitted their briefs. Second, there is no claim

                                                 9
No. 84712-1-I/10

        The City’s claim for declaratory relief is sufficiently ripe for judicial review.

The trial court did not err in deciding the claim on the merits, just as we do below.

B.      The Easement

        Regarding the merits of the City’s claim, Ebb Tide Association argues that

the trial court erred in ruling that “the City has sufficient real property rights to

construct a walkway within the easement area, the final design of which will [be]

materially consistent with the Planned Improvements.” The interpretation of a

contract regarding real property rights is a question of law, which we review de

novo. Bloome, 154 Wn. App. at 137. While we disagree with the trial court’s

ruling that the Easement is ambiguous, we affirm the trial court’s final judgment

and order granting declaratory relief in the City’s favor on additional grounds.

See Huff v. Wyman, 184 Wn.2d 643, 648, 361 P.3d 727 (2015) (“we may affirm

the trial court on any basis supported by the briefing and record below”).

        As noted previously, the principal issue below was whether the Easement

granted the City sufficient property rights to construct the proposed walkway. On

that issue, there is no dispute that the proposed walkway, as set forth in the

Planned Improvements, does not extend beyond the Easement right of way (“the

following described property”) or above the specified height restriction (“an

elevation of 17.00 as referred to City of Edmonds Datum (Mean Lower Low

Water)”). Instead, the dispute centers on whether the proposed walkway can

extend below the surface of the beach. Because the Easement does not

expressly address that issue (for example, it does not provide a lower elevation

for specific performance in this case, so even if we overlook the date that Kruse was decided the
opinion is not in any event helpful to the Court.

                                               10
No. 84712-1-I/11

restriction similar to the upper elevation restriction), the trial court concluded that

it is ambiguous.

       We disagree with the trial court’s ruling that the Easement is ambiguous.

The Easement grants the City “a right-of-way easement for public access, use

and enjoyment, together with the right to construct and maintain public

improvements, facilities, utilities, and necessary appurtenances, over, through,

across, and upon the following described property.” It then limits the space in

which those improvements can be constructed in two ways. First, through a

detailed description of the “following described area,” the Easement limits the

horizontal dimensions of the permissible improvements. See supra at n.1. And

second, through a detailed description of the “horizontal plane having an

elevation of 17.00 as referred to City of Edmonds Datum (Mean Lower Low

Water),” the Easement limits the height of the permissible improvements. Id.

Critical here, the Easement places no limitations on the depth of the permissible

improvements. The Easement is not ambiguous in that regard; the express,

unambiguous language of the Easement does not limit the depth of the

permissible improvements. The trial court mistook the absence of a limitation

regarding depth as ambiguity. See, e.g., Wash. Monumental & Cut Stone Co. v.

Murphy, 81 Wash. 266, 270, 142 P. 665 (1914) (“The contract itself would hardly

seem ambiguous, since, by particularizing the things included . . . it excluded all

things not enumerated.”).

       But even if we were to agree with the trial court that the Easement is

ambiguous with regard to depth, the result would be the same. When the

meaning of a contract affecting real property is unclear, “we must consider the

                                          11
No. 84712-1-I/12

surrounding circumstances that tend to reflect the intent of the drafter and the

purpose of [the agreement].” Bloome, 154 Wn. App. at 138 (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.1(1)

(AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“A servitude should be interpreted to give effect to the

intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument, or

the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the

purpose for which it was created.”). Having concluded that the Easement is

ambiguous, the trial court admitted extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intent and

purpose of the agreement. “When interpretation depends on factual

determinations such as the credibility of extrinsic evidence or a choice among

reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence, we review the fact

finder’s determinations of such matters for substantial evidence.” Dave Johnson

Ins., Inc. v. Wright, 167 Wn. App. 758, 769, 275 P.3d 339 (2012). While we

disagree with the trial court’s ruling that the Easement is ambiguous, we agree

with the City that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s analysis. 3

        Scott Snyder, a City attorney who was involved in drafting the Easement,

testified regarding two complementary purposes of the Easement. The first was

to provide “some sort of firm footing for seniors, moms with baby buggies, and

other people to cross the tide flat.” The second was “to have a designated

pathway” and thereby address residents’ trespass concerns. Id. These

3 Even if the Easement is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence is necessary to interpret it, this does

not affect the ripeness inquiry. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bronstein, 167 Wn. App. 1003, *5
(2012) (consideration of extrinsic evidence to interpret property settlement agreement did not
preclude judicial review on ripeness grounds, holding “While deciding the issue requires more
evidence, it does not require further factual development.”). While Bronstein is unpublished, we
may properly cite and discuss unpublished opinions where, as here, doing so is “necessary for a
reasoned decision.” GR 14.1(c).

                                                12
No. 84712-1-I/13

purposes cannot be achieved if, as Ebb Tide Association asserts, the Easement

does not permit the City to construct pilings below the surface of the beach. Two

witnesses so testified. Dr. Jeff Parsons, an environmental engineer, testified that

without below-ground pilings a walkway would fall apart shortly after installation.

Dr. Willie Ahn, an expert in marine structures, similarly testified that a walkway

built without pilings on the Easement right of way would deform, crack, and

eventually wash away because of the active currents in the area. Because

below-grade structures are necessary to achieve the intent and purposes of the

Easement, the trial court correctly interpreted the Easement to permit such

improvements.

        The trial court’s interpretation of the Easement is also consistent with

several principles of contract construction. We “must avoid construing contracts

in a way that leads to absurd results.” Grant County Port Dist. No. 9 v. Wash.

Tire Corp., 187 Wn. App. 222, 236, 349 P.3d 889 (2015). Additionally, “[o]ur goal

is to interpret the agreement in a manner that gives effect to all the contract’s

provisions” and “harmonize clauses that seem to conflict.” Nishikawa v. U.S.

Eagle High, LLC., 138 Wn. App. 841, 849, 158 P.3d 1265 (2007). 4 And lastly,

differences in contract wording indicate differences in intended meaning. See,

e.g., Sunbreaker Condo. Ass’n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 79 Wn. App. 368, 376-78,

901 P.2d 1079 (1995) (policy structure and language evidenced intent to treat dry

rot and wind-driven rain differently as distinct perils).

4 See also RESTATEMENT § 4.13, cmt. b (“the holder of an easement . . . is entitled to make any

use of the servient estate that is reasonable for enjoyment of the servitude, including the right to
construct, improve, repair, and maintain improvements that are reasonably necessary”).

                                                 13
No. 84712-1-I/14

        Each of these principles of contract construction supports the trial court’s

interpretation of the Easement. The Easement allows the City to construct and

maintain public improvements through the designated corridor so long as the

improvements do not extend above a “horizontal plane having an elevation of

17.00 as referred to City of Edmonds Datum (Mean Lower Low Water).” This

upper height limit is more than ten feet above beach level and would be rendered

superfluous if, as Ebb Tide Association asserts, the Easement does not permit

the City to construct a below-grade foundation. As the City’s witnesses testified,

such a walkway would fall apart and wash away. We should avoid that absurd

result. And while the Easement limits the area and height of the permissible

improvements, it does not similarly limit depth. Under Washington law, this

difference confirms, as the trial court ruled, that the Easement does not limit the

depth of the proposed walkway. 5

        Lastly, Coleman v. City of Everett, 194 Wash. 47, 76 P.2d 1007 (1938),

cited by Ebb Tide Association in support of its argument, is inapposite. The issue

in Coleman was whether the term “along” in an easement permitted projects to

be built above ground. Id. at 49. The court determined that the easement did not

permit water lines to be built above ground, in part, because the city first laid the

pipe under the surface of the easement and then later proposed constructing a

pipeline above ground. Id. at 49-50. Here, in contrast, the City has not yet

constructed any improvements on the Easement right of way, so there is no

5 Ebb Tide Association relies instead on the rule that a contract should generally be construed

against its drafter. But “a reviewing court should not resort to the rule of interpretation that
construes an agreement against its drafter unless the intent of the parties cannot otherwise be
determined.” Wash. Prof’l Real Estate LLC v. Young, 163 Wn. App. 800, 818, 260 P.3d 991
(2011). Here, the intent of the parties can readily be ascertained as indicated in the text above.

                                                14
No. 84712-1-I/15

conduct from which to derive the parties’ intent as the court did in Coleman.

Additionally, as discussed above, the essential purpose of the Easement cannot

be achieved in the absence of a proper foundation. For these reasons, Ebb Tide

Association’s reliance on Coleman is misplaced. 6

                                                   III

        The trial court correctly concluded that “the City has sufficient real property

rights to construct a walkway within the easement area, the final design of which

will [be] materially consistent with the Planned Improvements,” and granted

declaratory relief in the City’s favor. We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

6 Ebb Tide Association’s remaining arguments are insubstantial and can be addressed

summarily. First, Ebb Tide Association claims that “the trial court erred in granting the declaratory
relief because the Planned Improvements [would] create an exclusive use of a non-exclusive
easement.” An exclusive easement precludes the servient estate from using the easement area
and, in effect, passes fee simple title to the grantee. Johnson v. Lake Cushman Maint. Co., 5
Wn. App. 2d 765, 784-85, 425 P.3d 560 (2018). Here, in contrast, the walkway will be open to
the public and Ebb Tide Association and its members retain the right to use the land in ways not
inconsistent with the uses granted in the Easement. Second, Ebb Tide Association argues, “In
seeking to convert a non-exclusive easement to the City’s exclusive use, the City sought, and the
trial court effected, an improper taking without just compensation in violation of the Washington
Constitution.” Ebb Tide Association largely abandons this argument in its reply brief, which
clarifies that such a taking occurred (if at all) only if the trial court “misconstrue[d] the easement to
grant rights to the City not provided therein.” As explained in the text above, that did not occur
here. Ebb Tide Association’s takings argument thus fails.

                                                  15