Court Opinion

ID: 9636578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:33:47.366864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:47.005444
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Senior Justice,
concurring.
Less than three years ago in Commonwealth v. Jones, 530 Pa. 536, 610 A.2d 439 (1992), we held that:
“A defendant’s voluntary escape acts as a per se forfeiture of his right to appeal, where the defendant is a fugitive at any time after post-trial proceedings commence. Such a forfeiture is irrevocable and continues despite the defendant’s capture or voluntary return to custody.”
Id, 530 Pa. at 540, 610 A.2d at 441.
I agree with the Dissent that the Majority overrules Jones “without justification.”1 We have long recognized the importance of the doctrine of stare decisis. “Over and over again Stare Decisis has been recognized as the established rule and Law of Pennsylvania.” Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 442 Pa. 70, 86, 274 A.2d 182, 191 (Bell, C.J., opinion in support of affirmance), cert. denied., 404 U.S. 846, 92 S.Ct. 148, 30 L.Ed.2d 83 (1971), overruled in part on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914 (1976). *291We have stated that stare decisis is a “wise course of action.” Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 282, 365 A.2d 147, 152 (1976). “[SJtare decisis is essential if case-by-case judicial decision making is to be reconciled with the principle of the rule of law, for when governing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.” Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2192, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), overruled in part on other grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).
I believe that the Majority Opinion is such an “exercise of judicial will.” Three years ago in Jones we set forth a per se rule of forfeiture of appellate rights where a defendant escapes from custody or fails to appear for post-trial proceedings. Today, the Majority abruptly, and without reason, changes course and reverts to the rule found in Commonwealth v. Galloway, 460 Pa. 309, 333 A.2d 741 (1975). Such casual disregard for our prior decisions cheapens the currency of our precedent and threatens the stability of the rule of law in our Commonwealth. Certainly, no compelling reason or change of circumstance for overruling Jones in its entirety has been advanced by the Majority. In this instance, I fully agree with Chief Justice Nix when he stated in his dissent in Frame v. Sutherland, 459 Pa. 177, 327 A.2d 623 (1974) (Nix, J., dissenting) that “flagrant abandonment of ‘stare decisis’ without the slightest acknowledgement of the departure and absent any attempt to demonstrate its need, cannot be condoned and epitomizes the height of judicial irresponsibility.” Id. at 191, 327 A.2d at 630.
Despite my belief that our holding in Jones should remain intact under the well established principle of stare decisis, I concur in the result reached by the Majority. One year ago, in In the Interest of Gregory Thomas, 533 Pa. 572, 626 A.2d 150 (1993), a plurality of this Court applied the rule found in Jones to juveniles. I did not participate in the consideration *292or decision of that case. I now express my disagreement with the reasoning of the Plurality in Thomas.
In Thomas, the Plurality found that “our holding in Jones extends to juvenile defendants, making a juvenile defendant’s voluntary escape a per se, irrevocable feature of his right of appeal, where the juvenile defendant is a fugitive at any time after post-trial proceedings commence.” Thomas, 533 Pa. at 578, 626 A.2d at 153. The Plurality reasoned the forfeiture of an appeal should “not turn on whether or not the defendant is a juvenile.” Id. The Plurality justified the application of Jones to juveniles because “[t]hey are increasingly sophistical ed and responsible for a substantial number of violent crimes.” Id.
Despite the increasing sophistication of juveniles, our law distinguishes between juvenile offenders and adult offenders. The late Justice McDermott summarized the differences between juvenile offenders and adult criminal defendants in Commonwealth v. Davis, 526 Pa. 428, 586 A.2d 914 (1991) (McDermott, J., opinion in support of reversal):
Once, however, a juvenile is found delinquent and subject to the jurisdiction of a court, distinctions of purpose prevail. Distinctions founded on the nature of a juvenile and the duties of a state toward one not yet master of their life. Our law does not consider delinquency a crime, we conceive it rather a call and occasion for help. Delinquency is a term that eases and changes the focus of consequences. What for adults would be specific offenses sanctioned by specific penalty, is in delinquency proceedings converted into considerations dedicated to the best interests of the juvenile. Because we accept that youth has its excuses and its promise, we seek to teach, direct, help, and save the young whose troubles bring them to the courts. To do so, we neither hold them or our courts at a disposition hearing to the strictness of law that would prevent or hinder that saving purpose.
Davis, 526 Pa. at 438-39, 586 A.2d at 919.
Thus, the purposes of adult and juvenile criminal proceedings are substantially different. In a juvenile proceeding, the *293court stands in parens patriae in relation to the juvenile, and the focus of the proceeding is dedicated to the best interests of the juvenile. Whereas in a criminal proceeding, the court is concerned with meeting out criminal sanctions. This difference is more than one of academic interest; instead it directly undercuts the rationale for applying Jones to juveniles.
In Jones we held:
[A] defendant’s resort to escape constitutes a flagrant and deliberate bypass of the entire judicial process. The escape of a convicted defendant from confinement may properly be considered a rejection of the legitimate means afforded the defendant for challenging his conviction and imprisonment. Thus, by choosing to flee and live as a fugitive, a defendant forfeits the right to have his claims considered.
Jones, 530 Pa. at 540, 610 A.2d at 440 (quoting Commonwealth v. Passaro, 504 Pa. 611, 615, 476 A.2d 346, 349 (1984)).
However, in the case of a juvenile offender, an escape will often not be a deliberate rejection of the appellate process. Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1405(C), adult defendants are required to be notified of their appellate rights. Thus, for an adult, an escape acts as a knowing waiver of his appellate rights. However, our rules of criminal procedure do not apply to juveniles. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1 (“[Tjhese rules do not apply to juvenile or domestic relations proceedings”). Thus, juveniles are not required to be advised by the court of their appellate rights. In fact, the Appellant in the instant case was not notified of his appellate rights. (Notes of Testimony 3/13/92, 23-24) Therefore, the Appellant cannot be considered to have knowingly waived his right to appellate review by escaping.
Moreover, my experience on the family courts of this Commonwealth teaches me that the escape of a juvenile offender is most often not meant as “a rejection of the legitimate means afforded the defendant for challenging his conviction.” Jones, 530 Pa. at 540, 610 A.2d at 440. Instead, the child is frequently motivated by fear and loneliness, rather than thwarting the processes of the court. Often, the child runs away from a juvenile facility and returns home or to other familiar sur*294roundings. Thus, a rule that effects a per se forfeiture of an appeal in cases involving juvenile offenders strikes me as unduly harsh.
This is not to say that I believe that juveniles who escape should never face consequences for their actions. Instead, I believe it best to leave the decision to the discretion of the court in cases involving juveniles. I thus would reject the suggestion of the Appellant that the appeal of a juvenile should not be dismissed under any situation. Instead, in cases where the juvenile is an older and more sophisticated offender or has an extensive history of delinquency and contact with the juvenile court and the court believes that an escape was effected to deliberately bypass the appellate process, the court should have the discretion to refuse the appeal.2 However, where the court believes that the child fled because he was afraid, or homesick, and did not understand the seriousness of his actions, the court should have the discretion to take the appeal.
For these reasons, I concur in the order of the Majority remanding this case to the Superior Court to determine whether the appeal was quashed pursuant to Jones or pursuant to its discretionary authority.
NIX, C.J., joins in this Concurring Opinion.

. The Majority relies on our opinion in Commonwealth v. Chopak, 532 Pa. 227, 615 A.2d 696 (1992) to overrule Jones in favor of our prior decision in Commonwealth v. Galloway, 460 Pa. 309, 333 A.2d 741 (1975). It is true that in Chopak, shortly after deciding Jones, we cited Galloway favorably, without discussion. However, one year later in In the Interest of Gregory Thomas, 533 Pa. 572, 626 A.2d 150 (1993), a plurality of this court adopted the holding of Jones wholesale and applied it to juveniles. One Justice dissented in Thomas based on his dissent in Jones. No other Justice joined this dissent revealing that our court recognized that Jones was the controlling principle of law. Thus, Thomas demonstrates the continuing vitality of Jones well after our decision in Chopak.

. The Commonwealth, of course, retains the right to petition to transfer the proceedings to adult court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6533.