Court Opinion

ID: 9927046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 01:02:01.510008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:38.668945
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/25/24 Riaz v. County of Tulare CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 SAMREEN RIAZ,
                                                                                             F085100
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. VCU289294)
                    v.

 COUNTY OF TULARE et al.,                                                                 OPINION
           Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Bret D.
Hillman, Judge.

         Samreen Riaz, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Jennifer M. Flores, County Counsel, Kathleen A. Taylor and Stephanie R. Smittle,
Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent County of Tulare.
                                                        -ooOoo-
         Samreen Riaz (plaintiff) appeals from a judgment entered after a demurrer was
sustained without leave to amend. The ruling was largely based on plaintiff’s failure to
meet the prelitigation requirements of the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et
seq.). In addition, plaintiff’s allegations were held insufficient to support her purported
causes of action. We affirm.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Plaintiff is self-represented and a nonnative English speaker. She describes herself
as a Pakistani-born Asian American and “religious Muslim minority.” Her written
submissions are difficult to follow and at times unintelligible. In the interest of providing
a contextual background, we take judicial notice (on our own motion) of the records in
two of plaintiff’s numerous pending appeals: Riaz v. Family Health Care Network,
F085829, and Riaz v. Altura Centers for Health, F085852. Based on a careful
examination of the pleadings, including the exhibits, we understand the general
background and plaintiff’s factual allegations to be as follows.
Background
       Plaintiff practiced dentistry in the Central Valley. In 2018, she was terminated
from a position of employment with Altura Centers for Health (Altura). Plaintiff alleges
she was fired in retaliation for her complaints of “harassment” and “privacy breach” at
work. Soon afterward, during the latter half of 2018, plaintiff was allegedly “trolled,”
“harassed,” and “stalked” on the Internet by an unknown person or persons.
       In late 2018, plaintiff was employed by Western Dental in Hanford. However, she
allegedly “started getting stalked/harassed” again, and “privacy breach issues continue[d]
at [her] new job.” She eventually quit “[d]ue to harassment” and her employer “insisting
[she] move to Porterville.”
       In January 2019, plaintiff sued her former employer, Altura, for wrongful and
retaliatory discharge. During the same general time period, plaintiff obtained new
employment with Family HealthCare Network in Visalia. Family HealthCare Network is
reportedly classified as a “federally qualified health center,” and plaintiff refers to this
employer by the acronym FQHC. Her use of the acronym is often confusing, however,
because Altura is also a federally qualified health center. Plaintiff sometimes refers to
Altura as “FQHC Tulare” or simply “FQHC,” thus making it difficult to know whether
she is referencing Altura or Family HealthCare Network.

                                               2.
       Plaintiff was allegedly harassed, discriminated against, and “stalked” while
employed at Family HealthCare Network. By June 2019, the “[h]arassment at FQHC
was [so] severe” that she began seeing a psychiatrist. The alleged “harassment” was not
confined to the workplace. Plaintiff has given examples of being stopped by the
California Highway Patrol (CHP) and receiving speeding tickets. She has alleged the
CHP became involved in a large-scale conspiracy against her “due to [her] complaint to
FQHC.”
       In June 2019, plaintiff’s “hair turned green” during or after a visit to a salon.
Plaintiff alleges the person(s) responsible did it “because of [her] religion, country of
birth, … and not stopping to bring harassment and stalking complaint forward.” (Sic.)
Plaintiff has purported to believe the people at the salon were conspiratorial agents acting
in retaliation for her “filing [a] court case or complaint against FQHC.” Plaintiff has
further alleged that later in 2019, at another salon, someone “added a red tint to [her]
hair.” She characterizes both incidents as “hate crime[s] related to [s]talking,
[h]arassment, [and] civil right violation.”
       In October 2019, plaintiff’s employment with Family HealthCare Network was
terminated. She claims to have been fired for refusing to tolerate “harassment” and for
“[c]omplaining in writing to FQHC.” Plaintiff subsequently had difficulty finding
employment and experienced various forms of alleged “harassing and stalking” in her
daily life. An example of such harassment was people mispronouncing her name.
Plaintiff has professed to believe that unknown/unnamed conspirators who made her “a
target of harassment, stalking, vandalization, [and] civil right[s] violation[s]” are
responsible for “destroying [her] career.”
       In February 2020, plaintiff filed a small claims action against one of the above-
mentioned salons. By this point, plaintiff had begun to experience “‘coincidences’” that
she perceived as further “harassment” and “stalking” orchestrated by the

                                              3.
unknown/unnamed conspirators. The following example is excerpted verbatim from her
own narrative in an exhibit to her pleadings:

              “I went to the court library to make extra set of copies and
       approached a man who was at kiosk. He was a white man wearing Brown
       leather jacket very similar to mine and has long horizontal frown line on his
       forehead. I brought similar jacket that day to the Court. In the past I do get
       stalk by a white girl with similar jacket twice near famous foot wear. I was
       also harassed and stalked by woman with forehead lines.

               “Before I filed the case woman outside the counter sitting with grey
       and black hair. She is specifically placed there with ‘grey hair’ as woman
       or man who bring complaint forward go thru violence where one of the
       topic is ‘grey hair’. I either get followed by grey cars, random stalker at
       store with grey hair go out of the way talk to me, electronic harassment on
       internet with grey hair topic which I posted ob IC3 yelp review.” (Sic.)
The Present Case
       On July 15, 2020, plaintiff went to the courthouse in Visalia to attend legal
proceedings. (Two motions were scheduled to be heard that day in her lawsuit against
Altura.) After entering the building, she encountered a sheriff’s deputy (Deputy
Rockholt) at the security checkpoint. Deputy Rockholt instructed plaintiff to remove her
shoes and allegedly said, “We want to see your toes.”
       Plaintiff found Deputy Rockholt’s conduct offensive and reported the incident to a
“security supervisor” named Sergeant Bonilla. Sergeant Bonilla allegedly spoke in
defense of Deputy Rockholt and was reluctant to give plaintiff a “Tulare County Sheriff’s
Department Personnel Complaint Form.” But he did provide the form, which plaintiff
filled out by hand. The record contains copies of the completed form, but they are of
poor quality and only partially legible. The readable portion shows plaintiff accused
Deputy Rockholt of discrimination, making “sexual comments,” and being “involved in
harassment, stalking, and retaliation.”
       Captain Mark Gist of the administrative services division of the Tulare County
Sheriff’s Office allegedly contacted plaintiff by phone in response to her complaint and

                                             4.
apologized for Deputy Rockholt’s behavior. Plaintiff alleges Captain Gist also
“confirmed it is not [a departmental] policy to ask any one to show any body part while
reaching court to attend hearing[s].” Plaintiff subsequently received a letter from Captain
Gist dated July 20, 2020. It stated, in pertinent part:

       “Dear Ms. Raiz [sic],

       “This letter is in response to your complaint regarding the way a Security
       Officer conducted themselves and spoke to you on July 15.

       “A thorough investigation has been conducted into this matter and
       appropriate action has been taken. Thank you for bringing this matter to
       our attention.”
       On July 24, 2020, plaintiff returned to the courthouse and had another encounter
with Deputy Rockholt. This time he allegedly pointed at her, doing so while looking in
the direction of a colleague. Plaintiff’s description of the incident suggests Deputy
Rockholt was making the other staff member aware of plaintiff’s presence when she
entered the building. Plaintiff alleges he “pointed out his finger toward [her] face in close
proximity.” Plaintiff filled out another complaint form, alleging Deputy Rockholt’s
nonverbal conduct was an attempt to discourage her from attending court proceedings.
       Subsequent to the July 24 incident, strangers allegedly began pointing at plaintiff
in public places. In her words, she became a “regular victim of pointing finger at her face
by random stalker[s] on street,” and even during job interviews. The pleadings allege
plaintiff “also observed many people/stalker[s] with defect in eyes after [Deputy
Rockholt’s] gesture of pointing finger close to [her] face.” In essence, Deputy Rockholt
is alleged to have orchestrated a campaign of finger-pointing “harassment” carried out by
unknown conspirators.
       Between July 30 and August 5, 2020, plaintiff sent e-mails to the Clerk of the
Tulare County Board of Supervisors, the Tulare County Grand Jury, and the United
States Department of Homeland Security. These communications contained allegations

                                              5.
of stalking and harassment dating back to 2018. Much of the above background
information is drawn from the contents of these e-mails. We discuss the e-mails
elsewhere in the opinion in relation to the requirements of the Government Claims Act.
       On August 12, 2020, plaintiff was placed under a mental health evaluation hold
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. Visalia police officers detained
plaintiff at her home before transporting her to a hospital. According to police reports,
the detaining officers suspected she was “delusional” and “paranoi[d],” and had become
“gravely disabled.” Plaintiff discusses this incident in her pleadings in relation to the
requirements of the Government Claims Act. Plaintiff also acknowledges there is a
separately pending lawsuit in federal court based on this incident: Riaz v. Henry et al.
(E.D.Cal., No. 1:21-cv-00911).
       Approximately six months later, in February 2021, plaintiff developed an eye
problem. She alleges Deputy Rockholt and/or other unknown/unnamed conspirators
somehow caused the injury, and that it was somehow related to the July 2020 finger-
pointing incident. However, plaintiff does not allege Deputy Rockholt ever made
physical contact with her eye. The pleadings vaguely contend she “suffered from
permanent bodily injury with the potential use of a lethal military-grade precision
weapon.” Plaintiff alleges her condition was variously diagnosed as “esophoria,”
“exophoria,” and/or “strabismus.”
       In April 2021, plaintiff sought medical treatment for the eye problem. Multiple
doctors either declined to accept her as a patient or, after initially seeing her, declined to
provide further care. Plaintiff’s exhibits indicate at least one such rejection was due to
her own behavior. A physician’s letter dated April 6, 2021, states a reason for not
accepting her as a patient was because her “demeanor with our office was unacceptable.”
However, the pleadings allege plaintiff was denied medical treatment “[a]s a result of
[Deputy Rockholt] and organized covert stalking unjustified, excessive, illegal, use of
influence.” (Sic.)

                                               6.
       Between April 27 and September 27, 2021, plaintiff sent e-mails to the California
Department of Justice, the Public Information Officer for the Tulare County Sheriff’s
Office, the Tulare County Counsel’s Office, and the Clerk of the Tulare County Board of
Supervisors. The e-mails included complaints about Deputy Rockholt, but none asserted
a claim or demand for money or damages. An e-mail to the sheriff’s public information
officer did warn, “I may pursue eye damage claim and related event thru judicial branch.”
The e-mail to the board of supervisors on September 27, 2021, read as follows:

       “Good morning Tulare County board members.

       “Tulare Sheriff Rock Holt is involved in my organized stalking and
       harassment especially when I entered court for my hearing. I was harassed
       by Officer rock halt. Now after his threat my eye got damage and Tulare
       eye Drs due to probably influence from Law enforcement denying care to
       me. It seems like Tulare sheriffs has links to similar gang activities as la
       county sheriffs and using violence against minorities, whistleblower. Tull
       lookers sheriff brutality damage my eye permanently. Please look into
       matter.
       “Thanks
       “Dr Samreen Riaz” (Sic.)
Procedural History
       On November 1, 2021, plaintiff filed a civil complaint against the County of
Tulare, the Tulare County Sheriff’s Office, Deputy Rockholt in his individual and official
capacities, and Victor Bonilla in his individual and official capacities (collectively
defendants). The pleading was inexplicably labeled as an amended complaint. The
caption read as follows:

       “Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for: Conspiracy to Interfere With
       Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; Deprivation of Civil Rights Under 42
       U.S.C. § 1983[;] Deprivation of Civil Rights Under State Code §§ 51
       (Unruh Act) and 52.1 [¶] 2. Taxpayer Suit To Prevent The Illegal
       Expenditure of Funds (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 526A). [¶] 3. Failure To Take
       All Reasonable Steps To Prevent Discrimination [¶] 4. Harassment and
       Hostile Environment [¶] 5. Retaliation [¶] 6. Unlawful Retaliation: Labor
       Code § 1102.5 (Whistleblower Law); [¶] 7. Battery; [¶] 8. Assault; [¶] 9.
       Negligence; and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress [¶] 10. Racial

                                              7.
       Discrimination [¶] 11. Injunctive and declaratory relief and receivership (42
       U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985.” (Boldface and some capitalization omitted.)
       On April 5, 2022, defendants filed a demurrer to the complaint.
       On or about April 25, 2022, while the demurrer was pending, plaintiff filed a
claim with the Tulare County Board of Supervisors using a preprinted “Liability Claim
Report” form. In a box designated for describing the basis for liability, plaintiff wrote,
“Tulare Sheriff Dept, DA Tulare Office is ‘not investigating’ Tulare Sheriff Rockholt,
Victor Bonilla involvement in eye damage, violent organized stalking, harassment,
discrimination, retaliation and impediment of court participant.” (Sic.) In a box
designated for a description of personal injuries suffered, plaintiff wrote, “Racial
discrimination, emotional infliction of distress, harassment, [illegible] discrimination
violation of civil rights under 42 USC 1983, illegal expindeture of funds, battery, assault
not charged or investigated[,] Prevent Samreen Riaz [illegible] brought incident to
authorities.” (Sic.) Plaintiff stated the amount of her claim was $1 million.
       On or about May 3, 2022, plaintiff was notified in writing that her claim was
untimely under Government Code sections 901 and 911.2. She was advised that her only
recourse was to apply for leave to present a late claim pursuant to “Sections 911.4 to
912.2, inclusive.” The written advisement also cited to Government Code section 946.6.
       On May 17, 2022, the trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. The
ruling noted that plaintiff’s purported causes of action were not “expressly delineated” in
the complaint. Regarding the taxpayer action under Code of Civil Procedure section
526a, the demurrer was sustained for failure to plead “specific, detailed facts” in support
of the claim. As to all other state law claims, the demurrer was sustained for failure to
plead compliance with the Government Claims Act. The ruling did not explain why the
demurrer was sustained as to the federal claims.
       On May 19, 2022, plaintiff submitted an application for leave to file a late claim to
the Tulare County Board of Supervisors.

                                             8.
       On May 25, 2022, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. Defendants responded
by filing another demurrer.
       On May 26, 2022, plaintiff was notified that her application for leave to present a
late claim had been denied as untimely pursuant to Government Code section 911.4.
       In July 2022, defendants’ second demurrer was sustained with leave to amend. In
a six-page ruling, the trial court again determined plaintiff had failed to adequately plead
compliance with the Government Claims Act or sufficient allegations to support a
taxpayer action under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. Plaintiff was found to have
“abandoned” her previously asserted claim under title 42 United States Code section
1983, and to have asserted a “new” cause of action labeled as “First Amendment
Retaliation under Section 1983.” Plaintiff was also found to have added claims labeled
as “Harassment (Unruh Act),” “Fraud,” and “Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.”
As to the “new” causes of action, the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend
because plaintiff neither sought nor received permission to add any new claims.
       Plaintiff subsequently filed (1) a second amended complaint; (2) a petition under
Government Code section 946.6 for relief from the prelitigation claim requirement; and
(3) a motion to amend her pleadings to assert the “new” causes of action (plaintiff
disputed the characterization of those claims as new). Defendants filed a demurrer to the
second amended complaint and opposed the petition for relief and motion to amend.
       On September 27, 2022, the trial court issued a 12-page ruling. Defendants’ third
demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, and plaintiff’s requests for relief were
denied. Regarding all causes of action subject to the Government Claims Act, plaintiff’s
claims and requests for relief were found untimely based upon the six-month and one-
year deadlines established by Government Code sections 911.2, 911.4, and 946.6.
Regarding the purported taxpayer action, plaintiff was again found to have pled “only
allegations, innuendo and legal conclusions without specific, actual facts supporting the
allegations.” Plaintiff’s generalized conspiracy theories, including allegations of sheriff’s

                                             9.
deputies being “‘possible members of gangs’” and the existence of “‘a well organized
covert harassment system in place to discourage residents to reach the court,’” were held
insufficient.
       A judgment of dismissal was entered on October 6, 2022. Plaintiff’s notice of
appeal was filed on October 10, 2022.
                                      DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of Review
       “In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative complaint
de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under
any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)
The complaint is liberally construed, with “‘all material facts properly pleaded’” accepted
as true, but no weight is given to “‘contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law’”
therein. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “If the allegations in the
complaint conflict with the exhibits, we rely on and accept as true the contents of the
exhibits.” (SC Manufactured Homes, Inc. v. Liebert (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 68, 83.)
       “Where the demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, we consider whether
the plaintiff could cure the defect by an amendment. The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving an amendment could cure the defect.” (T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 162.)
II.    Untimely State Law Claims
       A.       Overview
       “As a general rule, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public
entity [or its employees] until a written claim, known as a government [tort] claim, is
presented to and rejected by that entity.” (Hernandez v. City of Stockton (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 1222, 1230; see Gov. Code, § 950.2.) As set forth in Government Code
section 910, the claim must provide the following information:

                                            10.
              “(a) The name and post office address of the claimant.

              “(b) The post office address to which the person presenting the claim
       desires notices to be sent.

              “(c) The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or
       transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted.

              “(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury,
       damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of
       presentation of the claim.

             “(e) The name or names of the public employee or employees
       causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known.

               “(f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars
       ($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the
       estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it
       may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the
       basis of computation of the amount claimed. If the amount claimed
       exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar amount shall be included
       in the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the claim would be a
       limited civil case.”
       A government tort claim “shall be presented … not later than six months after the
accrual of the cause of action.” (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) An application to
present a late claim may be submitted to the public entity “within a reasonable time not to
exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action.” (Id., § 911.4, subd. (b).)
Failure to present a timely claim or obtain permission to submit a late claim ordinarily
precludes the claimant from pursuing the alleged cause of action in court. (Id., §§ 945.4,
946.6, 950.2.)
       If an application to present a late claim is denied by the public entity, the claimant
may petition for a court order excusing him or her from the claim presentation
requirement. (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (a).) “The petition for relief must state that an
application under Government Code section 911.4 was made to the public entity and was
denied or deemed denied, state the reason for failure to timely present the claim as
required by Government Code section 911.2, and state the information required by

                                             11.
Government Code section 910.” (Ovando v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 42, 63, citing Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (b).) However, courts have no
jurisdiction to grant relief from noncompliance unless the plaintiff submitted the
application to present a late claim within the one-year deadline. (J.J. v. County of San
Diego (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1221; Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1767, 1779; see Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (c).)
         “‘Accrual of the cause of action for purposes of the government claims statute is
the date of accrual that would pertain under the statute of limitations applicable to a
dispute between private litigants. (Gov. Code, § 901.)’” (Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017)
3 Cal.5th 903, 906.) “A cause of action ordinarily accrues when the wrongful act occurs,
the liability arises, and the plaintiff is entitled to prosecute an action.” (Ovando v. County
of Los Angeles, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 66.) “‘A plaintiff has reason to discover a
cause of action when he or she “has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its
elements.” [Citations.]’” (Ibid.) Put differently, the accrual point is “when the plaintiff
suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, [i.e.,] that someone
has done something wrong to her.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103,
1110.)
         The claim presentation requirement is an essential element of a cause of action
against a public entity. (State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1234, 1244.) “[A] plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with
the claim presentation requirement. Otherwise, [the] complaint is subject to a general
demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Id. at p.
1243; accord, Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 906.)
         B.    Applicability of Claim Presentation Requirement
         The claim presentation requirement applies to all claims for money or damages,
including claims asserted pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.)

                                              12.
and the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (id., § 52.1). (Lozada v. City and County of San
Francisco (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1167; Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98
Cal.App.4th 744, 763–764.) Conversely, “the general rule [is] that the claims statutes do
not impose any requirements for nonpecuniary actions, such as those seeking injunctive,
specific or declaratory relief.” (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist.
(1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081.) The exemption for nonpecuniary claims does not
apply unless the cause of action seeks no money/damages or, according to some
authorities, if only “‘incidental money damages are sought.’” (Gatto, at p. 762.) Other
cases hold “the government claim requirement applies to any monetary claim even if it is
merely incidental to other relief sought.” (Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrigation Dist.
Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497, citing TrafficSchoolOnline,
Inc. v. Clarke (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 736, 742.)
       In her reply brief, plaintiff contends the “[p]rimary purpose” of her lawsuit “was to
press charges against the Sheriff’s employee involved in harassment, threat, assault,
organized crime, and intimidation of court witnesses to obstruct court proceedings and
requested investigate press charges and bring oversight to the sheriff’s department.”
(Sic.) She thus contends the damages sought are “incidental to the injunction” and,
therefore, presentation of a government tort claim was unnecessary. We are not
persuaded.
       Under the authorities recognizing a possible exemption for actions seeking both
monetary and injunctive relief, the claim presentation requirement “remains applicable
[where] money damages are not incidental or ancillary to any specific relief that is also
sought, but the primary purpose of the action.” (Gatto v. County of Sonoma, supra, 98
Cal.App.4th at p. 762; accord, Lozada v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 145
Cal.App.4th at p. 1168.) Here, as the trial court observed, plaintiff’s lawsuit “seeks
money damages, punitive damages, equitable relief, prejudgment interest, costs,
attorneys’ fees and civil penalties.” In both her government tort claim of April 2022 and

                                            13.
subsequent application for leave to file a late claim, plaintiff sought $1 million. Of that
sum, $500,000 was attributed to personal injury and none to property damage, thus
implying a demand of $500,000 for punitive or other noneconomic damages and/or
penalties. The pursuit of monetary recovery is more than “incidental” to plaintiff’s
request for injunctive relief. (See, e.g., Loehr v. Ventura County Community College
Dist., supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1081–1082.)
III.   Plaintiff Failed to Meet the Statutory Requirements
       A.     Claims Based on Events of July 2020
       All causes of action arising from the incidents involving Deputy Rockholt on
July 15 and 24, 2020, accrued that same month. This is evident from two e-mails sent by
plaintiff to the Clerk of the Tulare County Board of Supervisors on July 30, 2020. The
first message read as follows:

       “Hi,
       “I would like yo bring Tulare Sheriff department involvement in organized
       stalking, harassment, civil rights violation. Some of the incidents happens
       inside the court with Tulare Sheriff department. Tulare Sheriff Dept has
       not taken report seriously due to which I am having a difficult time to go
       court with feeling harassed.
       “Thanks
       “Samreen Riaz” (Sic.)
       The second message read, in pertinent part:

       “July 15 20 I went to Tulare Superior Court on Mooney Avenue, Visalia
       California and employee Rick Holt of Tulare Sheriff at security stated ‘we
       want to see your toes’ he let everyone else with close shoe passed by
       without showing desire to see anyone else ‘Toes’. I am reporting it to
       internal investigation. My suggestion to Rock Holt is who ever are ‘we’
       you can show ‘your mother toe’ to them. officer Nash witnessed
       discrimination/ harassment incident and stated let supervisor know.
       Sergeant Bonilla tried me to not report the incident but upon my insisting
       gave me document to complaint. Employee Rock Holt not only
       disrespecting minority women but Court also. Discouraging tactics so
       victim cannot seek justice is unacceptable. This kind of disgusting harasser
       should not be in law enforcement anyways[.]” (Sic.)

                                             14.
       Plaintiff’s statements reflect her belief defendants were responsible for misconduct
that included harassment and discrimination. Any causes of action arising from the
incidents involving Deputy Rockholt accrued no later than July 30, 2020, and the six-
month deadline to file a government tort claim expired in January 2021. (Gov. Code,
§ 911.2, subd. (a).) The one-year deadline for applying to present a late claim expired in
July 2021. (Id., § 911.4, subd. (b).) Plaintiff’s application for relief under Government
Code section 911.4 was not submitted until May 2022. Because the application was not
filed within the one-year deadline, the trial court had no ability to grant plaintiff’s petition
for relief under Government Code section 946.6 (which she filed in July 2022), and the
petition was appropriately denied. (See id., § 946.6, subd. (c); J.J. v. County of San
Diego, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1221.)
        In her briefing, plaintiff alleges substantial compliance with the requirements of
Government Code sections 910 and 911.2 based on the above-quoted e-mails and an
additional e-mail to the Tulare County Grand Jury on August 5, 2020. The argument
fails for multiple reasons.
       First, “[t]he claimant bears the burden of ensuring that the claim is presented to the
appropriate public entity.” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th
983, 991.) “If an appropriate public employee or board never receives the claim, an
undelivered or misdirected claim fails to comply with the statute.” (Id. at p. 992.)
Government Code section 915 requires a government tort claim to be hand delivered or
mailed to, or actually received by, the “clerk, secretary, auditor, or board of the local
public entity.” (Id., subds. (a), (e).) Plaintiff’s e-mail to the Tulare County Grand Jury
was insufficient. (See, e.g., Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220
Cal.App.3d 702, 714 [in a lawsuit against county office of education, plaintiff’s late-
claim application to the county board of supervisors did not constitute substantial
compliance].)

                                              15.
       Second, there is a two-part test for determining substantial compliance: “Is there
some compliance with all of the statutory requirements; and, if so, is this compliance
sufficient to constitute substantial compliance?” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 456–457.) Plaintiff’s e-mails to the board of supervisors and the
grand jury both fail under the threshold inquiry because neither included a request for
damages or monetary compensation, nor any indication whether a related lawsuit would
be filed as a limited or unlimited civil action as required by Government Code section
910, subdivisions (d) and (f). (See, e.g., Loehr v. Ventura County Community College
Dist., supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1083 [rejecting plaintiff’s substantial compliance
argument: “Nowhere in the letter is there a claim for money damages, nor, for that matter
is there even an estimate of the amount of any prospective injury, damage or loss”].)
       “‘The doctrine of substantial compliance cannot cure the total omission of an
essential element from the claim or remedy a plaintiff’s failure to comply meaningfully
with the statute.’ [Citations.] Thus, a failure to even estimate the amount of damages on
the claim document cannot be remedied by application of the doctrine.” (A.S. v.
Palmdale School Dist. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1097.)
       B.     Claims Based on Events Between February and April 2021
       Assuming plaintiff could otherwise state cognizable claims based on her eye
problem and the events of February 2021 through April 2021, such claims accrued no
later than April 27, 2021. The accrual date is established by an e-mail she sent to the
California Department of Justice. It read as follows:

       “Hi,
       “Please consider this official incident report related to likely involvement of
       Mr. Rock Holt in hate crime, eye damage/violence and harassment related
       to violence toward me. My eye got damage after threat on internet and
       physically by a stalkers related to eye violence about March-April 2021z
       Dr Chawla Ophthalmologist diagnosed in April 2021 strabismus and dry
       eyes and refer me to specialist for further treatment needed.

                                            16.
       “Thanks
       “Dr. Samreen Riaz” (Sic.)
       Based on plaintiff’s suspicion of injury and wrongdoing by defendants in April
2021, the six-month deadline to file a government tort claim expired in approximately
October 2021. (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a).) The one-year deadline for applying to
present a late claim expired in April 2022. (Id., § 911.4, subd. (b).) Plaintiff’s
application for relief under Government Code section 911.4 was not submitted until
May 19, 2022. Because the application was not filed within the one-year deadline, the
trial court had no ability to grant plaintiff’s petition for relief under Government Code
section 946.6, and the petition was appropriately denied. (See id., § 946.6, subd. (c); J.J.
v. County of San Diego, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1221.)
IV.    Plaintiff’s Tolling Arguments Fail
       Plaintiff argues the trial court erred “by not calculating (a) emergency rule 9 [and]
(b) mental [c]apacity for tolling.” She relies on the Judicial Council of California’s
former Emergency Rule 9 (Emergency Rule 9), which was issued during the COVID-19
pandemic, and certain provisions of the Government Claims Act. We reject both
arguments. Although it is not mentioned in the parties’ briefing, we will also discuss the
Governor’s Executive Order N-35-20 (Mar. 21, 2020) and explain why it does not assist
plaintiff.
       A.     Emergency Rule 9
       “As originally adopted on April 6, 2020, Emergency rule 9 tolled all statutes of
limitation for civil causes of action until 90 days after the Governor declared that the state
of emergency related to the COVID-19 pandemic is lifted.” (Committee for Sound Water
& Land Development v. City of Seaside (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 389, 401.) In May 2020,
the rule was amended to state, in pertinent part: “Notwithstanding any other law, the
statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days are tolled

                                             17.
from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Appen. I: Emergency
Rules Related to COVID-19, rule 9(a).)
        The Judicial Council has explained that Emergency Rule 9 “does not apply to time
limits on the submission of claims to government entities, such as those under
Government Code section 911.2.” (Circulating Order Mem. to Judicial Council of Cal.,
No. CO-20-09, May 22, 2020, p. 6, fn. 17.) As such, plaintiff’s reliance upon Emergency
Rule 9 is misplaced. Moreover, plaintiff’s government tort claim of April 2022 and late
claim application of May 2022 would still be untimely even if Emergency Rule 9 were
applicable.
        B.     Executive Order N-35-20
        Paragraph 11 of the Governor’s Executive Order No. N-35-20, issued on
March 21, 2020, declares: “The time for presenting a claim pursuant to Government
Code section 911, et seq., is hereby extended by 60 days.” As explained in Coble v.
Ventura County Health Care Agency (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 417, the Governor
subsequently ordered an additional 60-day extension, resulting in a total extension of 120
days. (Id. at p. 422.) “Pursuant to Executive Order N-08-21, the 120-day extension
applies to claims that accrued before June 30, 2021.” (Ibid.)
        The 120-day extension does not render as timely plaintiff’s government tort claim
of April 2022. Furthermore, the extension does not apply to the one-year deadline under
Government Code section 911.4 for presenting an application for leave to present a late
claim. (Coble v. Ventura County Health Care Agency, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 426–
427.)
        C.     Alleged Mental Incapacity
        In calculating the one-year deadline to apply for leave to present a late government
tort claim, any period during which the claimant was “mentally incapacitated” and did
not have “a guardian or conservator of his or her person” is not counted. (Gov. Code,

                                            18.
§ 911.4, subd. (c)(1).) Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by finding she had “not
established the requisite incapacity under [the applicable provisions].” Plaintiff relies,
inter alia, on the fact she was detained in August 2020 pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 5150 (the “5150 hold”).
       “[T]he type of disability which justifies relief … on the grounds of incapacity is an
all-encompassing disability which prevents the claimant from even authorizing another to
file a claim for the claimant.” (Barragan v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 1373, 1384.) As the trial court noted in its demurrer ruling, “‘a person who
is adjudged mentally ill and in need of hospital treatment under the Welfare and
Institution[s] Code may nevertheless be capable of transacting business and carrying out
his affairs, either during occasional lucid intervals or throughout his hospitalization.’”
(Quoting Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hosp. (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 562, 572–573.)
       According to the pleadings and exhibits, the 5150 hold was effectuated by Visalia
police on August 12, 2020. By September 2020, plaintiff had been released and was back
at home. Plaintiff alleges that on September 29, 2020, a “[d]istrict attorney investigator
came to [her] house [a] few minutes before [she] was leaving [home] to attend [a] court
hearing” and left his business card. The exhibits contain a copy of an e-mail plaintiff sent
to the investigator, wherein she apologized for having been in a rush and inquired about
the purpose of his visit.
       The pleadings and exhibits further indicate plaintiff interviewed for new jobs in
February 2021 and sought medical treatment for her eye in April of the same year. Next,
between April 27 and September 27, 2021, plaintiff sent e-mails to the California
Department of Justice, the Tulare County Sheriff’s Office, the Tulare County Counsel’s
Office, and the Clerk of the Tulare County Board of Supervisors concerning Deputy
Rockholt and the other defendants. We therefore agree with the trial court regarding
plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that her noncompliance with the statutory deadlines was
due to an all-encompassing mental incapacity.

                                             19.
V.     Plaintiff’s Equitable Estoppel Argument Fails
       Plaintiff argues defendants should be equitably estopped from avoiding litigation
based on the claim presentation requirements. “The elements of equitable estoppel have
been applied in the government claims context.” (J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High
School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648, 656.) “‘Estoppel as a bar to a public entity’s assertion
of the defense of noncompliance arises when the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance
of the evidence: (1) the public entity was apprised of the facts, (2) it intended its conduct
to be acted upon, (3) plaintiff was ignorant of the true state of facts, and (4) [plaintiff]
relied upon the conduct to his [or her] detriment.’” (J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School
District (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 323, 333.)
       “Equitable estoppel generally must be premised on some type of representation,
ordinarily false, about a set of circumstances.” (Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn.
v. Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1032, 1072.) At a
minimum, the party to be estopped must have “prevented or deterred the filing of a timely
claim by some affirmative act.” (John R. v. Oakland Unified School District (1989) 48
Cal.3d 438, 445.) A public entity’s general awareness of the plaintiff’s grievances is not
enough. (J.J. v. County of San Diego, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219.)
       In their briefing, defendants complain plaintiff’s estoppel arguments are
conclusory and insufficiently developed. We agree. “Claims of estoppel have been
rejected … where the plaintiff cannot show calculated conduct or representations by the
public entity or its agents that induced the plaintiff to remain inactive and not to comply
with the claims-presentation requirements.” (Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School
Dist. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1045.) Plaintiff corresponded in writing (e-mail) with
the Tulare County Board of Supervisors and other government agencies multiple times
during the relevant period. We agree with the trial court that she has failed to show or
explain how defendants did anything to prevent her from submitting a government tort
claim “in the proper manner.”

                                              20.
VI     Taxpayer Action (Code Civ. Proc., § 526a)
       Code of Civil Procedure section 526a “establishes the right of a taxpayer plaintiff
to maintain an action against any officer of a local agency to obtain a judgment
restraining or preventing illegal expenditure, waste, or injury of the estate, funds, or
property of said agency.” (Schmid v. City and County of San Francisco (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 470, 495.) However, “waste” in this context “does not encompass the great
majority of governmental outlays of money or the time of salaried governmental
employees, nor does it apply to the vast majority of discretionary decisions made by state
and local units of government.” (Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 472, 482–483.) “Rather, it is more readily understood as ‘a “useless
expenditure of funds.”’” (Collins v. Thurmond (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 879, 910.)
       “To state a claim, the taxpayer must allege specific facts and reasons for the belief
the expenditure of public funds sought to be enjoined is illegal.” (Coshow v. City of
Escondido (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 687, 714.) “A cause of action for waste of public
funds cannot prevail if based upon innuendo and legal conclusions. … Otherwise, public
officials performing their duties would be harassed constantly.” (Sagaser v. McCarthy
(1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 288, 310.) “Accordingly, ‘the statute should not be applied to
principally “political” issues or issues involving the exercise of the discretion of either
the legislative or executive branches of government.’” (Collins v. Thurmond, supra, 41
Cal.App.5th at p. 910.)
       The trial court’s demurrer ruling includes a lengthy analysis of plaintiff’s taxpayer
claim. We agree with its assessment, which is well stated in the following:

               “[The Second Amended Complaint pleads] only allegations,
       innuendo and legal conclusions without specific, actual facts supporting the
       allegations. For instance, the acts Plaintiff complains of[,] including
       harassment of her, ‘possible members of gangs’ ‘a well organized covert
       harassment system in place to discourage residents to reach the court,’
       ‘stalking,’ ‘the County has repeatedly settled lawsuits resulting from
       violence, harassment, women stalking and other forms of misconduct

                                             21.
       perpetuated by possible deputy gang members,’ that ‘Tulare County not
       investigated possible use infrared/ technology or military grade weapon in
       the Tulare county for physical violence on plaintiff,’ ‘negligently licensing
       firearms,’ and other allegations fail to meet the requirements necessary for
       a [Code of Civil Procedure section] 526a action.”

       “[And] there are no facts which support these claims, as required by 526a.
       Although Plaintiff pleads a list of dates [citation] and other allegations of
       actions by the County and specific law enforcement [citation], these remain
       the allegations, innuendo, and legal conclusion[s] that are insufficient to
       support this cause of action. The allegations generally state grievances by
       Plaintiff, disagreements as to policies and procedures, and the like, but do
       so in a conclusory manner (‘well organized Covert harassment, threat of
       violence, assault, potential use of illegal weapon, battery to target public or
       participant in the court proceeding in order to obstruct justice and made
       them fear of their safety for exercising right to seek court;’ ‘organized
       crime;’ ‘silencing residents unlawfully.’) Even the underlying facts of the
       July 2020 incident which form the starting point of this action are not pled
       with any specificity that would permit the Court to issue an injunction
       against such conduct in the future.”
       As stated in the operative complaint, “Plaintiff is alleging Tulare County taxpayer
or public funds are illegally expended on criminal and unlawful activities against the
public[,] particularly minorities [and] immigrants reaching Tulare superior court against
County or many other unlawful activities within the County with the goal to obstruct
justice.” (Sic.) The focus is on the July 2020 incidents involving Deputy Rockholt,
which essentially amount to one alleged instance of selective enforcement of security
screening procedures (demanding the removal of footwear), and one instance of allegedly
unprofessional conduct (finger pointing). Such allegations do not call into question the
legality of funding the Tulare County Sheriff’s Office.
       The remaining issue is whether the trial court permissibly denied leave to amend.
As noted, “the plaintiff bears the burden of proving an amendment would cure the
defect.” (Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.) Plaintiff merely submits
that she “will correct any defect as long as the defect [is] identified by the opposition,”
which is insufficient. “The plaintiff must identify some legal theory or state facts that can

                                             22.
be added by amendment to change the legal effect of his or her pleading.” (Ibid.; accord,
Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 520, fn. 16; HFH, Ltd. v. Superior
Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 513, fn. 3.) We thus conclude that leave to amend was
appropriately denied.
VII.    Federal Claims
        Although generally ignored by the trial court, the viability of plaintiff’s purported
causes of action under title 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983) and title
42 United States Code section 1985 (section 1985) must be considered in our de novo
review of the pleadings. Because they are based on federal law, these purported causes
of action are not subject to the claim presentation requirements of the Government
Claims Act. (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 842.) The legal sufficiency of
the claims is determined by federal law. (See Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1471; Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554,
563.)
        “The basic principles of federal law for pleading a cause of action are similar to
California’s. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.) provides that
a pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is
entitled to relief and a demand for the relief sought. A motion to dismiss may assert a
‘failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’ (Fed. Rules Civ.Proc., rule
12(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.)” (Martinez v. City of Clovis (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 193, 254.) “A
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b)(6) (28 U.S.C.)
is the equivalent of a demurrer.” (Metabyte, Inc. v. Technicolor S.A. (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 265, 274.)
        Federal law differs from the California approach insofar as “a pro se complaint,
‘however inartfully pleaded,’ must be held to ‘less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” (Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97, 106.) The

                                              23.
federal standard also requires that a complaint “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” (Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544, 570, italics added.)
“This facial plausibility standard is satisfied ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.’” (Martinez v. City of Clovis, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 254,
quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662, 678.) “Determining whether a claim is
plausible is a context-specific task requiring the court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” (Martinez, at p. 254.)
       A.     Section 1983
       Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States. To
state a claim under [section] 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that
the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.”
(Long v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 1178, 1185.)
       Plaintiff’s theory of liability under section 1983 is retaliation for the exercise of
her First Amendment rights. “[T]he right of access to the agencies and courts to be heard
… is part of the right of petition protected by the First Amendment.” (California
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited (1972) 404 U.S. 508, 513.) “To recover under [section]
1983 for such retaliation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he engaged in constitutionally
protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that
would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected
activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally
protected activity and the adverse action.” (Blair v. Bethel School Dist. (9th Cir. 2010)
608 F.3d 540, 543, fn. omitted, italics added.)

                                              24.
       Plaintiff’s claim fails based on the above-italicized requirement. “[M]inor
indignit[ies] and de minimis deprivations of benefits and privileges … do not give rise to
a First Amendment claim. Rather, … adverse, retaliatory actions … must be of a nature
that would stifle someone from speaking out.” (Blair v. Bethel School Dist., supra, 608
F.3d at p. 544.) This element is determined objectively, based on how “‘a person of
ordinary firmness’” would react, and without regard to the particular sensitivities or
fortitude of the plaintiff herself. (Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino
County (9th Cir. 1999) 192 F.3d 1283, 1300; Kariye v. Mayorkas (C.D.Cal. 2022) 650
F.Supp.3d 865, 901.)
       It cannot plausibly be alleged that “a person of ordinary firmness” would be
dissuaded from attending court proceedings or otherwise exercising their right of petition
merely because they were required to remove their shoes at a security checkpoint or
because somebody pointed at them when they entered the courthouse. (Cf. Kariye v.
Mayorkas, supra, 650 F.Supp.3d at p. 901 [allegations of two-hour detention at border
checkpoint, during which plaintiff’s belongings were searched and he was asked “his
religious beliefs, practices, and associations,” held insufficient to meet the “person of
ordinary firmness” pleading standard].) As such, we conclude the pleadings fail to state a
claim for relief against defendants Rockholt and Bonilla under section 1983.
       “A municipality or other local government may be liable under [section 1983] if
the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a
person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” (Connick v. Thompson (2011) 563 U.S. 51,
60.) But such entities “are not vicariously liable under [section] 1983 for their
employees’ actions.” (Ibid.) “Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local
governments under [section] 1983 must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal
policy’ caused their injury.” (Ibid., citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 691.)

                                             25.
       “A policy can be one of action or inaction.” (Long v. County of Los Angeles,
supra, 442 F.3d at p. 1185.) Both require “practices of sufficient duration, frequency and
consistency.” (Trevino v. Gates (9th Cir. 1996) 99 F.3d 911, 918.) In other words,
liability “may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents.” (Ibid.) A policy of
inaction, which is typically pleaded in terms of a failure to train or deliberate
indifference, “‘is a stringent standard of fault’” that ordinarily requires “[a] pattern of
similar constitutional violations.” (Connick v. Thompson, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 61–62.)
“Courts are required to ‘adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation,’
lest ‘municipal liability collapse[] into respondeat superior liability.’” (Marshall v.
County of San Diego (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1119.)
       The isolated incidents alleged to have occurred in July 2020 are plainly
insufficient to support a section 1983 claim against the County of Tulare. Plaintiff’s
remaining allegations of stalking, harassment, and various other wrongdoing are too
conclusory and attenuated to support a section 1983 claim against any of the defendants.
For example, accepting as true that Deputy Rockholt pointed at plaintiff in July 2020 and
plaintiff developed an eye problem in February 2021, those facts do not permit “the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 678.) “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. [Citation.] Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’
a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
“entitlement to relief.”’” (Ibid.)
       B.     Section 1985
       “Section 1985 proscribes conspiracies to interfere with civil rights.” (Sanchez v.
City of Santa Ana (9th Cir. 1990) 936 F.2d 1027, 1039.) Plaintiff’s attempted cause of
action under section 1985 fails for two related reasons. First, such claims “must allege

                                              26.
facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired together. A mere allegation of
conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.” (Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles
Police Dept. (9th Cir. 1988) 839 F.2d 621, 626.) Second, “‘[t]he absence of a section
1983 deprivation of rights precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on the
same allegations.’” (Thornton v. City of St. Helens (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3d 1158, 1168.)
       Because plaintiff does not explain how the complaint could be amended to state a
cognizable claim under section 1983, reversible error has not been shown.
                                    DISPOSITTION
       The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

                                                                       PEÑA, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

MEEHAN, J.

SNAUFFER, J.

                                           27.