Court Opinion

ID: 9572809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:44:51.248441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:23.458181
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting:
I cannot agree with the majority’s adoption of a “continuous custody” exception to the warrant requirement. The package which was the subject of the suppression hearing below was searched, without a warrant, five days after agent Ford received information which, as the majority holds, was sufficient to secure a warrant. The Fourth Amendment was violated because “[i]t was a search; there was no warrant; the owner had not consented; and there were no exigent circumstances.” Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 2400, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980).1
I.
Before delving into the majority’s “continuous custody” exception to the warrant requirement, I will briefly examine the nature of underlying privacy interest which was invaded by agent Ford’s search. An appropriate starting point is Walter v. United States, supra. As the majority correctly states, Walter involved a private party opening packages which contained what later proved to be obscene film. The films were turned over to the FBI, which viewed them without a warrant. The Court in Walter did not decide the question of whether an initial, valid search obviates the need for a warrant when a second search is conducted at a later date. In fact the lead opinion in Walter specifically states that “[sjince the viewing was first done by the Government when it screened the films with a projector, we have no occasion to decide whether the Government would have been required to obtain a warrant had the private party been the first to view them.” 100 S.Ct. at 2402 n. 9 (per Justice Stevens, with Stewart, J., concurring). Two other members of the plurality, however, were *98not so hesitant to express their views on that issue. Justice White wrote:
“I write separately, however, because I disagree with Mr. Justice STEVENS’ suggestion that it is an open question whether the Government’s projection of the films would have infringed any Fourth Amendment interest if private parties had projected the films before turning them over to the Government, ante, at 2402, n. 9. The notion that private searches insulate from Fourth Amendment scrutiny subsequent governmental searches of the same or lesser scope is inconsistent with traditional Fourth Amendment principles.” 100 S.Ct. at 2403 (per Justice White, with Brennan, J., concurring).
Even Justices Stevens and Stewart recognized that a privacy interest in packages delivered to a third party consignor does not “disappear” simply because a third party happens to view the contents of the package. “The fact that the cartons were unexpectedly opened by a third party before the shipment was delivered to its intended consignee does not alter the consign- or’s legitimate expectation of privacy.”2 100 S.Ct. at 2402-03 (per Justice Stevens, with Stewart, J., concurring).
Privacy is by definition a subjective right. Rules which attempt to treat that right as if it were a tangible item, with measurable dimensions and characteristics, appearing one moment and disappearing the next, run contrary to the basic principle that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). The reasonable expectation of privacy which both the consignor and the consignee had in the package which was entrusted to UPS in this case necessarily included the expectation that it would be delivered, unopened, to the person to whom it was addressed. While the UPS official may have had the right to open and inspect the package, regardless of anyone’s expectation of privacy, and while the agent in California may have had the right to view that which was plainly to be seen, regardless of anyone’s expectation of privacy in it, the privacy interest did not disappear, the privacy interest simply did not preclude conduct which was not constitutionally prohibited. In People v. Riegler, 127 Cal. App.3d 317, 179 Cal.Rptr. 530 (1981), the court held, as to the privacy interest in packages which had been legally searched by customs agents and then delivered:
“We reject for two reasons the argument that appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the packages because the packages had been subject to an earlier customs search. First, as explained by the United States Supreme Court in Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 2402, fn. 12, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (lead opn.): ‘. .. it is difficult to understand how petitioners’ subjective expectation of privacy could have been altered in any way by subsequent events of which they were obviously unaware.’ Second, even assuming appellant had a lesser expectation of privacy in the packages because they were opened in New York, the diminution of privacy ended when the packages were delivered by the police to the Merced address. The police fully understood this as evidenced by the fact they obtained a search warrant for the packages at the Merced address.” . 179 Cal.Rptr. at 535.
The California court’s reading of Walter is sound and that the Court refuses to follow it may be to some a bit startling.
II.
The majority, of course, does not assert that there was no legitimate expectation of *99privacy in the package. Rather it states that the package at all times remained in the “custody” of the law enforcement officials, and concludes that this fact somehow obviates the need for agent Ford, who had received his information only by telephone, to obtain a search warrant. The fact that agent Tellis in California had the authority to lawfully search and seize the package in California does not mean that the same authority somehow vicariously extended to all other law enforcement officials in the United States. Tellis’ authority arose out of, and was limited to, the facts that were present at the time that he viewed the package — the facts peculiar to that case.
The indiscriminate lumping together of law enforcement officials, as if each had authority identical to all others, is a dangerous approach to evaluating claims of constitutional violations. For example, if agent Ford had received his information from an absolutely reliable source who was not a police officer, would he have been justified in searching the package without a warrant? Certainly not. Does the fact that agent Ford received his information from a fellow law enforcement official change the outcome? Certainly not. See State v. Oropeza, 97 Idaho 387, 545 P.2d 475 (1976); State v. Gomez, supra note 1. It is the actions of agent Ford which are complained of, and those actions must be evaluated, not by a post-arrest comparison of events with the accuracy of the information which he received, but rather by an examination of whether he, as an agent of the state at the time that he made his warrantless search of the package, had a legitimate reason for proceeding without a warrant.
“[A] few ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ exceptions provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate.... But because each exception to the warrant requirement invariably impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the few situations in which a search may be conducted in the absence of a warrant have been carefully delineated and ‘the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.’ United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 [72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59] (1951). See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 [89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039, 23 L.Ed.2d 685] (1969); Katz v. United States supra, [389 U.S.] at 357 [88 S.Ct. at 514]. Moreover, we have limited the reach of each exception to that which is necessary to accommodate the identified needs of society.” Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2590-91, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979) (some citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
I can discern no compelling need for proceeding without a search warrant in this case, A compelling need is not demonstrated by the State, and the Court has neither found nor fashioned one. Both simply cite to a string of lower court cases which hold that, so long as a package or other protected item remains in “governmental custody,”3 there is no need for individual officers, acting on a telephonic communication from a person who alleges that they are acting on behalf of the government, to obtain a warrant prior to searching the package. While many of these cases can be distinguished on their facts, it would serve no purpose to do so here. Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of law enforcement officials acting in such a manner, and I am confident that when the Court does address this practice, it will strike it down. If it does not, the people are in for the same hard times that were visited on the unoffending Mrs. Gomez and her infant daughter. The cases, including this one, which uphold the “continuous custody” exception to the warrant requirement, run directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s announced position that searches which may be conducted without a warrant at one point in time may not be conducted without a warrant if sufficient time has elapsed to allow *100a warrant to be obtained. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra. As stated in People v. Riegler, 127 Cal.App.3d 317, 179 Cal.Rptr. 530, 536 (1981),
“Having the right under Belton to open the packages when appellant was arrested, the question naturally arises: why should the officers be required to get another warrant to open the packages at their later convenience? The answer, of course, is that the Constitution, as interpreted by the high courts of our land, mandates a warrant be obtained unless there are exigent circumstances. Probable cause, although it may be overwhelming, is not enough; it is a neutral magistrate and not the police that determines if private packages may be searched.”
Because I see no reason or excuse other than mere convenience for not obtaining a search warrant prior to searching the package in Garden City,

I dissent.

. Perhaps more important than the majority’s holding itself is the disturbing trend which it indicates. In State v. Gomez, 101 Idaho 802, 623 P.2d 110 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 1695, 68 L.Ed.2d 194 (1981), I voiced my strong objection to the Court’s sanctioning of the nebulous “securing the premises” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Today the Court takes another step away from its duty to safeguard individuals against abuses by the state of its police powers. Justice Bakes defended the terrible intrusion in Gomez on the basis that the “statute says nothing about the necessity of the warrant being present upon the initial entry. It requires only the presence of the officer or officers directed to execute it.” 101 Idaho at 809, 623 P.2d at 117. Doubtless, the same facile argument could be made as to the execution of an unserved death warrant, which most minds (including legal) would believe should be delivered to the warden prior to the warden’s taking the life of the prisoner, as I.C. § 19-2705 seems to read. It is beyond dispute that warrants authorizing arrest are the processes of the court. If there were no requirement that warrants be in hand in order to validate their execution — and possibly save the lives of peace officers and innocent victims as well — see State v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395, 454 P.2d 140 (1969) cited in Gomez, supra, 101 Idaho at 827, 623 P.2d at 135 (Bistline, J., dissenting) — the Court in its relentless and never-ending promulgation of rule upon rule on top of rule should adopt one, as I suggest in Gomez. However, with all due deference to the other members of the Court who joined in the relaxed Gomez views of Justice Bakes, I continue to believe it inescapable that common sense has already prevailed, in a legislative enactment which since 1864 has required that the officer exercising a warrant must upon request show it. I.C. § 31-2214. It is a mystery to me how the officer can show it (and perhaps save a life) if he doesn’t have it. As the condemned man said as he was led to the gallows, “I’ll be hanged if I know.”

. Justice Stevens goes on to add, in a footnote, that “[i]t is arguable that a third party’s inspection of ‘private books, papers, memoranda, etc.’ could be so complete that there would be no additional search by the FBI when it reexamines the materials.” 100 S.Ct. at 2403 n. 14. While this point may be “arguable,” to my mind it must be resolved in a manner that extends the maximum amount of protection feasible to the privacy interests involved. Thus privacy interests should be presumed whenever there is any question on that issue and the analysis should proceed to whether any recognized exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrantless search.

. This term apparently includes private individuals acting under “controlled circumstances.”