Court Opinion

ID: 9898651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 21:05:17.823867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:38.141513
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/14/23 Juarez v. B & S Plastics CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

LILIANA JUAREZ,                                                2d Civ. No. B318909
                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 56-2018-
     Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       00515511)
                                                                (Ventura County)
v.

B & S PLASTICS, INC.,

     Defendant and Respondent.

      Plaintiff brought this action against her former employer
under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)
(Gov. Code,1 § 12900 et seq.) alleging unlawful employment
practices in terminating her employment based on disability.
The jury found for plaintiff’s employer. We affirm the ensuing
judgment.

       All statutory references are to the Government Code
         1

unless otherwise stated.
                                FACTS
       B & S Plastics, Inc., doing business as Waterway Plastics
(B&S), manufactures plastic parts for agricultural and pool use.
It employs approximately 700 workers. Liliana Juarez worked at
B&S as an assembler from July 18, 2017, to November 9, 2017.
       B&S has a leave policy that is included in a packet given to
all new employees. The leave policy provided:
       “Employees who request a Leave of Absence must have
more than one year of employment with the company to be
eligible for leave. The request must be made to the immediate
supervisor who will complete the Leave of Absence Request Form
and submit it to H.R. A copy of the approved or denied form will
be returned to the employee.
       “An employee with less than one year of employment will
be considered as a resignation with eligibility for rehire with
supervisor approval.” (Boldface omitted.)
       Juarez testified she had problems with her digestive
system that caused her great pain. On November 6, 2017, she
went to the hospital emergency room because of the pain. She
called her supervisor, Sergio Chico, to let him know and he
excused her from work. She had surgery on November 7, 2017.
She called Chico to let him know she was still in the hospital.
She was released from the hospital on November 8, 2017. She
called Chico on November 8, 2017, and told him she needed two
weeks off because of the surgery.
       Juarez testified she had emergency surgery in her stomach
area. It was not elective surgery that could be scheduled in
advance. She said the surgery interfered with her ability to work
and do normal things.

                                 2
        During the less than four months Juarez worked at B&S,
she called in sick nine times. When Juarez called Chico on
November 8, 2017, Chico told Juarez that she had no sick days
left and, per the leave policy, she had to resign. B&S processed
her employment termination as a resignation effective November
9, 2017.
        Juarez and her husband went to B&S on November 13,
2017, and brought a doctor’s note. Juarez did not speak with
Chico personally. Chico said he did not see the note until shortly
before his deposition in this case.
        The doctor’s note dated November 8, 2017, stated: “Please
excuse Ms. Liliana Juarez from work for up to two weeks. Ms.
Juarez has undergone surgery at our facility and would benefit
from recovery at home. If you have any questions, please
call . . . .”
        The doctor’s note was not admitted into evidence for the
truth of the statements made therein. It was admitted only as
evidence that B&S had notice of Juarez’s claim. The jury was
instructed accordingly.
        Chico wrote “disabled” on her payroll status change form.
He testified he wrote disabled because she told him she was
disabled, not because he believed she was disabled.
                               Damages
                        (a) Economic Damages
        Juarez admitted she had not worked since B&S terminated
her employment and had only applied for one job. She said she
had to care for her five children. She also said she did not apply
for jobs because she might have to disclose that B&S terminated
her. But she admitted she was terminated by her prior employer
and did not disclose the prior termination when she applied to

                                3
B&S. When asked if she was claiming lost wages for the past
four years, she answered no. When asked what she was
claiming, her counsel objected that the question infringes on
attorney-client and work product privileges.
                      (b) Noneconomic Damages
        Juarez testified at trial that her anxiety, emotional
distress, and fears were related to B&S. But in her deposition,
she said she has anxiety and headaches, but she does not know if
they are related to B&S. At trial she admitted that her
deposition testimony was truthful.
                               Procedure
        Juarez filed a complaint against B&S alleging disability
discrimination, retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination and
retaliation, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, failure
to engage in a good faith interactive process under FEHA,
wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and declaratory
relief.
        The jury returned a general verdict in favor of B&S.
                             DISCUSSION
                                    I
                                  FEHA
        Section 12940, subdivision (a)(1), provides that it is
unlawful for an employer to discriminate in the terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment on the basis of physical disability,
unless because of the disability the employee is unable to perform
the employee’s essential duties with reasonable accommodation.
Section 12940, subdivision (n), provides that an employer must
“engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the
employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations,

                                4
if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by
an employee . . . with a known physical . . . disability . . . .”
       FEHA covers not only actual disabilities, but also perceived
disabilities. (§ 12926.1, subd. (b).) A perceived disability is a
mental or physical condition or adverse genetic information that
is regarded or treated by the employer as a disability. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 2, § 11065(d)(5)(A).)
                                     II
                Disability Within the Meaning of FEHA
       The purpose of FEHA is to protect employees who have
long-term disabilities. (See, e.g., § 12926, subd. (i)(1), (2)
[“medical condition” means (1) health impairment related to
cancer; (2) genetic characteristics].) It is not a substitute for an
employer’s sick leave policy. (See § 12945.2, subd. (a) [mandating
medical leave only for employees with more than 12 months and
at least 1,250 hours of service with the employer].) A short-term
illness is not a disability; it is simply life. Almost everyone has
had brief illnesses that caused an absence from work.
       Because FEHA is based on the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) and
other federal law, decisions interpreting federal
antidiscrimination laws are relevant in interpreting FEHA’s
similar provisions. (Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th
228, 235.) Federal cases hold that a temporary injury with only
minimal residual effects is not a disability. (Sanders v. Arneson
Products, Inc. (1996) 91 F.3d 1351, 1354.) Even a four-month
absence from work does not qualify as a disability. (Ibid.)
       Juarez told Chico she did not feel well and had to go to the
hospital. She called in sick on two subsequent days; then she told
Chico she needed two more weeks to recover. There was no

                                 5
evidence she had any residual effects. The evidence shows
Juarez had only a brief illness, not a disability.
       In any event, even if Juarez’s brief illness could qualify as a
disability, the jury rejected her claim.
                                  III
                         Substantial Evidence
       Juarez contends the verdict is not supported by substantial
evidence.
       Juarez misapprehends the substantial evidence rule. In
viewing the evidence, we look only to the evidence supporting the
prevailing party. (GHK Associates v. Mayer Group, Inc. (1990)
224 Cal.App.3d 856, 872.) We discard evidence unfavorable to
the prevailing party as not having sufficient verity to be accepted
by the trier of fact. (Ibid.) Where the trial court or jury has
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence, we have no
power to draw different inferences even though different
inferences may also be reasonable. (McIntyre v. Doe & Doe (1954)
125 Cal.App.2d 285, 287.) The trier of fact is not required to
believe even uncontradicted testimony. (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc.
(1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1028.)
       As plaintiff, Juarez had the burden of proof. (Nadaf-
Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th
952, 977.) Where, as here, there is a general verdict in favor of
the defendant, the plaintiff cannot prevail on a claim that the
verdict is not supported by substantial evidence. It is the lack of
credible evidence that supports a verdict in favor of the
defendant. Under the substantial evidence rule, we must treat
all of plaintiff’s evidence as having been rejected by the jury for
lack of sufficient verity.

                                  6
       Moreover, Juarez gave the jury reason to doubt her
credibility.
                      (a) Disability Testimony
       Juarez testified she was disabled. But that was the only
evidence of a disability. She produced no expert testimony, no
hospital records, nothing to support her own inexpert testimony
that she was disabled. Her doctor’s note was not admitted for the
truth of the matter stated there. In any event the note did not
say she was disabled. It stated only that she would “benefit from
recovery at home.” Nor was there a perceived disability. Chico
testified he wrote “disabled” on her payroll document because
Juarez told him she was, not because he believed she was
disabled. Under the substantial evidence rule, we must conclude
the jury believed Chico. Indeed, it appears the only information
he had that she was disabled was her word.
       Lack of foundation was not the only flaw in Juarez’s
testimony. On cross-examination, B&S’s counsel elicited
numerous instances of conflict between Juarez’s responses to
discovery and her testimony at trial. She gave such responses at
trial as, “Perhaps I answered that, but that’s not the truth,” or
simply admitted that her prior statements were false. It appears
the cross-examination damaged Juarez’s credibility. Juarez’s
credibility was not assisted by her admission that she did not list
her previous employer on her application with B&S because her
previous employer terminated her employment.
       Juarez argues that the evidence here was undisputed, and
that we can make our own de novo determination as a matter of
law based on the undisputed evidence. But B&S vigorously
disputed Juarez’s claim of disability. Juarez’s credibility was a
question for the jury, not for this court on appeal.

                                 7
                      (b) Damages Testimony
       Juarez presented no credible evidence of damages. Her
counsel argued the jury should award her back pay for the four
years between her termination from B&S and trial. But there
was no evidence to support the argument. In fact, Juarez
testified she was not seeking four years’ back pay. When asked
what her claim was, her counsel objected, and neither party
pursued the matter further. That suggests it is highly unlikely
she would have kept her job for four years had B&S not
terminated her in November 2017.
       As to noneconomic damages, Juarez admitted she did not
know if her anxiety and headaches were related to her
employment at B&S. That does not carry her burden of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence.
                                 III
       Juarez contends B&S failed to engage in the interactive
process and provide reasonable accommodation.
       The contention presumes the jury found Juarez was
disabled. On appeal, we presume the jury made all findings in
support of the general verdict. (Philpott v. Mitchell (1963) 219
Cal.App.2d 244, 255.) We presume the jury found Juarez was not
disabled.
                                 IV
       Juarez contends the trial court’s response to the jury’s
question constitutes reversible error.
       During deliberations, the jury asked, “Is company policy of
requiring 12 months of service before mel. [sic] leave is granted
legal? Or not? What is the law regarding that?”
       The trial court replied:

                                8
      “As a general rule, employers in California may establish
their own policies with respect to medical leave; however, in some
circumstances the rules may be different with respect to
employees who have a disability or who are perceived by the
employer as having a disability. Please refer to the instructions I
provided you earlier for more information.
      “The rules concerning employees with actual or perceived
disabilities when applicable are not affected by how long the
employee has been employed by the employer.”
      Juarez does not complain that the trial court’s response to
the jury’s question was in any way inaccurate. Instead, her
complaint appears to be that the court’s answer led the jury away
from considering whether the three days’ leave B&S granted
Juarez was a reasonable accommodation for her disability. But
the jury did not ask about reasonable accommodation. The court
properly answered the question the jury asked, not the question
Juarez wished the jury had asked. In fact, the court’s response
was favorable to Juarez. It told the jury that B&S’s leave policy
does not apply if Juarez is disabled. The verdict shows the jury
found Juarez was not disabled.
      Juarez claims the jury’s question shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury failed to appreciate B&S
accommodated Juarez with three days’ medical leave under
FEHA. The question shows nothing of the sort. The jury was
unlikely to conclude that the three days’ leave was an
accommodation under FEHA. There is no evidence B&S had
notice during those three days that Juarez was claiming she is
disabled and seeking accommodations. She simply phoned in
sick day by day.

                                 9
       Moreover, if the jury failed to focus on the three-day leave
as an accommodation under FEHA, it was probably because
Juarez failed to raise the issue at trial. Juarez’s counsel’s
argument to the jury was entirely bereft of any reference to the
three-day leave as an accommodation under FEHA. Counsel
argued only that B&S’s refusal to grant Juarez two weeks to
recover from surgery was a failure to grant her a reasonable
accommodation for her disability.
       As to why the jury asked the question about the legality of
B&S’s leave policy, it was most likely because Juarez’s counsel
during argument to the jury constantly referred to B&S’s leave
policy as an illegal policy.
                                    V
       Juarez contends the trial court erred in refusing to give her
requested special jury instructions.
       Juarez argues the trial court erred in refusing to give
special instructions 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Her opening brief does
not supply the substance of those proposed instructions, only
their numbers. Nor does Juarez’s opening brief provide any
elucidation on why it was error to refuse the instructions. She
only provides the conclusory statement that the proposed
instructions are nonargumentative, essential to the theory of her
case, and supported by substantial evidence. We need not
discuss such conclusory claims of error on appeal. (In re S.C.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
       Juarez’s effort to make up in her reply brief for the
inadequacy of her argument in her opening brief is unavailing.
We do not consider points raised for the first time in the reply
brief. (Martinez v. State Dept. of Health Care Services (2017) 19
Cal.App.5th 370, 375.)

                                 10
       Finally, if the trial court erred in refusing to give any of the
special instructions, Juarez fails to show prejudice. The trial
court gave the appropriate Judicial Council of California Jury
Instructions.
       The California jury instructions approved by the Judicial
Council are the official instructions for use in state courts. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(a).) The goal of the instructions is to
improve the quality of jury decision-making by accurately stating
the law in a way that is understandable to the average juror.
(Ibid.) The use of Judicial Council instructions is strongly
encouraged. (Id., rule 2.1050(f).)
       Juarez points to nothing so unique about her case that
special jury instructions are required. The problem with Juarez’s
case was not the lack of special jury instructions, it was the lack
of Juarez’s credibility.
                             DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to
respondent.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                       GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

      YEGAN, J.                        CODY, J.

                                  11
                    Mark S. Borrell, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Employee Justice Legal Group, Kaveh S. Elihu, Victor R.
Ujkic and Steven Berkowitz for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      McCarthy & Kroes, R. Chris Kroes and Linda Elias-
Wheelock for Defendant and Respondent.