Court Opinion

ID: 9362909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 15:03:13.79163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.738731
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 21–0672

            Submitted November 17, 2022—Filed January 13, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellee,

vs.

ROYRIGUEZ PATTERSON,

      Appellant.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Christopher Kemp,

District Associate Judge.

      Royriguez Patterson appeals a restitution order that was filed in both a

felony case and a dismissed misdemeanor case. APPEAL DISMISSED IN CASE

NO. NTA0948898; CERTIORARI REVIEW GRANTED AND WRIT ANNULLED

IN CASE NO. OWOM088283.

      May, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

      Martha J. Lucey (argued), State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.
                                          2

MAY, Justice.

      Here we consider the proper forms of review for restitution orders.

Royriguez Patterson appeals a restitution order that was cross-filed in a felony

case (Case No. OWOM088283) and a dismissed misdemeanor case (Case

No. NTA0948898). In the dismissed misdemeanor case, we decline to grant

review. In the felony case, we grant certiorari review; we conclude the restitution

order is not illegal; and, therefore, we annul the writ of certiorari.

      I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      This case arises from a collision on Interstate 235 in Des Moines. On

February 12, 2020, a vehicle driven by Patterson rear-ended a vehicle driven by

James Tidwell. Tidwell suffered serious injuries. His vehicle sustained

substantial damage.

      On the same day, the State charged Patterson with failure to maintain

control, a simple misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 321.288(1)

(2020). This charge was assigned case number NTA0948898.

      On March 20, the State also charged Patterson in a three-count trial

information as follows:

      Count I: Serious injury by vehicle (OWI), a class “D” felony.1

      Count II: Serious injury by vehicle (reckless), a class “D” felony. 2

      1Iowa   Code § 707.6A(4).
      2Id.
                                        3

      Count III: Operating while intoxicated, a serious misdemeanor.3

This felony case was assigned case number OWOM088283.

      In October, Patterson reached a plea deal with the State. Patterson filed a

petition to plead guilty to count II, serious injury by vehicle (reckless). Through

his petition, Patterson admitted that “[o]n 2/12/2020 in Polk County, Iowa, [he]

unintentionally caused serious injury including a broken leg to James Tidwell

by willfully driving in a manner that was with wanton disregard for the safety of

others and in the process rear-ended Mr. Tidwell’s vehicle.” And Patterson

advised the court that in exchange for his plea to count II, the State had agreed

that “[c]ounts I and III and companion citation NTA0948898” should be

“dismissed at Defendant’s cost.”

      The court accepted Patterson’s plea. In December, the court sentenced

Patterson. Consistent with the parties’ agreement, the court adjudged Patterson

guilty of count II. The court sentenced Patterson to prison but suspended his

sentence and ordered probation. The court also ordered Patterson “to pay” victim

pecuniary damages (VPD) “in the amount of $TBD for the costs inflicted on the

victim(s) of this crime.” In the same paragraph, the court noted that “[i]f the

amounts of VPD are not available at the time of sentencing, a supplemental order

will follow.” In a separate paragraph entitled “DISMISSAL OF OTHER COUNTS

AND CASES,” the court dismissed counts I and III as well as the misdemeanor

      3Iowa   Code § 321J.2.
                                         4

case but still ordered Patterson “to pay court costs and any victim restitution

associated with these counts and/or cases.”

      In February 2021, the State filed a motion to amend Patterson’s sentence

to include restitution. The State asked for $42,100.92, consisting of $34,512.93

for Tidwell’s lost wages and the remainder for car damage. The same day, the

district court granted the State’s motion and ordered Patterson to pay

$42,100.92 in VPD. The order also said that “[i]f Defendant contests the victim

pecuniary damages amount ordered herein, Defendant must request a hearing

within 30 days.”

      Patterson requested a hearing, and the court obliged. Tidwell testified

about the accident and his resulting injuries—a broken humerus, dislocated left

shoulder, dislocated right hip, fractured acetabulum (hip socket), fractured L4–

L5 vertebrae, and a spleen injury. He was in the hospital for nineteen days, in a

wheelchair for four months, and had been doing physical therapy. He explained

that, based on what he had been told, it would take eighteen to twenty-four

months for him to recover from the hip injury.

      Tidwell also testified that he had not been able to work at all since the

accident. Indeed, he still struggled to walk.

      For the past sixteen years, though, he had worked a “very physical” job in

concrete leveling. In 2019—the year before the accident—Tidwell had worked for

A1 Concrete Leveling. The State introduced his 2019 W-2. It showed 2019

earnings of $34,512.93. Plus, Tidwell testified, he had made “6 to 7,000” dollars

more through a side job. He had received a 1099 but had lost it during a move.
                                        5

      The State also introduced a 1099-G form. It showed that Tidwell had

received an additional $6,600 in unemployment in 2019. Tidwell explained that

due to the seasonal nature of concrete work, he was typically unemployed

between November and April. Consistent with this pattern, Tidwell was laid off

in November 2019.

      As for 2020, Tidwell explained that he had received $6,000 from the

attorney general’s office because of the collision. He also received COVID-19

stimulus payments. And up until a few weeks before the collision, he was still

receiving unemployment benefits from his 2019 layoff.

      Tidwell also testified that, but for the accident, he would have worked as

a union journeyman in 2020. He believed that—even with COVID—he would

have earned more in 2020 than in 2019.

      Following the hearing, the court entered an order on restitution. The court

concluded that the State had not proven the claimed restitution amounts for the

car “by a preponderance of the evidence.” “From the testimony presented, it

appear[ed]” to the court that “the damage to the vehicle was covered” by a finance

company.

      Conversely, the court concluded that the State had proven “restitution for

lost wages by a preponderance of the evidence.” The court expressly found

Tidwell’s testimony to be “credible.” And the court believed that Tidwell’s “2019

W-2 wages are sufficient evidence of his lost wages for the year 2020, which he

was unable to earn because of” Patterson’s “actions.” Also, although Tidwell

received $6,000 from the attorney general’s office in 2020, this payment “would
                                        6

not fully offset the seasonal unemployment benefits” that Tidwell “annually

received.”

      So the court ordered Patterson to pay restitution in the amount of

$34,512.93—the amount shown on Tidwell’s 2019 W-2. The order was cross-filed

in both the felony case and the dismissed misdemeanor case.

      Patterson filed notices of appeal in both cases. Our court then entered an

order questioning whether we had jurisdiction in the misdemeanor case. We

directed Patterson to “file a statement regarding whether an appeal is allowed as

a matter of right in [the misdemeanor case], or whether some other form of

appellate review is appropriate and being sought.”

      In his responsive filing, Patterson addressed the court’s jurisdiction in

both cases. For the felony case, Patterson claimed a right of appeal. For the

misdemeanor case, Patterson asked the court to treat his notice of appeal as an

“application for discretionary review and/or petition for writ of certiorari.” The

State resisted, and Patterson replied. Our court then ordered the jurisdictional

issue to be submitted with the appeal. Our order instructed:

      The parties are directed to brief the issue of whether an application
      for discretionary review or a petition for writ of certiorari should be
      granted in [the misdemeanor case]. The parties are further directed
      to address whether the appellant has a right of appeal from the
      restitution order entered in [the felony case], or whether some other
      form of review is appropriate.

      The parties complied with this order. And counsel provided additional

insights at oral argument.
                                         7

      II. Issues on Appeal.

      Patterson’s brief presents three arguments. First, he argues that we should

grant discretionary or certiorari review in the misdemeanor case. Second, as to

the felony case, Patterson claims that (1) he has a statutory right to appeal;

(2) alternatively, even if he has no statutory right, equal protection and due

process require us to permit his appeal anyway; and (3) if we conclude that he

has no right to appeal, we should nevertheless grant certiorari review. Finally,

as to the merits, Patterson argues that the restitution award lacks substantial

evidentiary support. We address each issue in turn.

      III. Analysis.

      A. Review of Restitution Order in The Dismissed Misdemeanor Case.

Patterson begins by asking us to reverse the restitution order in the

misdemeanor case. Patterson concedes, though, that he has no right of appeal

from a simple misdemeanor. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(1). Instead, he suggests

that we should grant certiorari review or discretionary review. Patterson

emphasizes that “[e]ntry of a restitution judgment in dismissed cases is a

widespread on-going practice in criminal law.” And so, the question of whether

restitution judgments can be entered in dismissed cases is “important to the

judiciary and the profession.” Id. § 814.6(2)(e).

      We assume without deciding that Patterson has posed an important

question. But this case is a poor vehicle for answering it. “[T]raditional notions

of judicial restraint” counsel us to avoid answering important questions “without

the benefit of meaningful adversarial briefing.” State v. Young, 863 N.W.2d 249,
                                              8

283 (Iowa 2015) (Mansfield, J., concurring specially). And when it comes to the

misdemeanor case, we don’t even have adversaries, much less adversarial

briefing. Patterson contends that the restitution order cannot be enforced in the

misdemeanor case—and the State doesn’t disagree. In fact, the State claims that

restitution was “not [actually] ordered” in the misdemeanor case.4 Our review

supports this view.

        Accordingly, we decline to address the hypothetical question of whether it

is proper to order restitution in a dismissed case, misdemeanor or otherwise. We

save that question for a future case. We decline to grant certiorari or

discretionary review in the misdemeanor case. We proceed instead to the felony

case.

        B. Right to Appeal from Postsentencing Restitution Order. Next,

Patterson argues that he has a right to appeal the restitution order entered in

the felony case. We disagree. Instead, we believe certiorari is the proper avenue

for review.

        Under the Iowa Constitution, our appellate jurisdiction is subject to “such

restrictions as the general assembly may, by law, prescribe.” Iowa Const. art. V,

§ 4. Ordinarily, Iowa Code section 814.6 determines whether we have “subject-

matter jurisdiction for the review of a criminal defendant’s appeal.” State v.

Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 2017). Section 814.6 generally provides

criminal defendants with a “right of appeal” from:

       4The State also notes that Iowa Code section 910.1(3) excludes “simple misdemeanors

under chapter 321” from the “criminal activities” for which restitution can be imposed. Either
way, the State certainly doesn’t think restitution can be enforced in the misdemeanor case.
                                           9

      A final judgment of sentence, except in the following cases:
      (1) A simple misdemeanor conviction.
      (2) An ordinance violation.
      (3) A conviction where the defendant has pled guilty. This
      subparagraph does not apply to a guilty plea for a class “A” felony
      or in a case where the defendant establishes good cause.
Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a).

      But the legislature has also enacted special provisions that govern

appellate review of restitution orders. Our analysis must account for those

provisions. See id. § 4.7 (directing that “[i]f a general [statutory] provision

conflicts with a special . . . provision,” and if the conflict “is irreconcilable,” then

“the special . . . provision prevails”). See generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.

Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183–88 (2012) (discussing

the “general/specific canon”).

      We start with section 910.3(8). It provides that “[a] permanent restitution

order entered at the time of sentencing is part of the final judgment of sentence

as defined in section 814.6 and shall be considered in a properly perfected

appeal.” Iowa Code § 910.3(8) (emphasis added). But the appeal before us is not

about an order that was “entered at the time of sentencing.” The order “entered

at the time of” Patterson’s sentencing merely directed that restitution should be

determined later (“$TBD”). Patterson is not challenging that order. So section

910.3(8) does not govern.

      Instead, we think the better fit is section 910.3(10). It provides that “[a]

permanent restitution order may be superseded by subsequent orders if

additional or different restitution is ordered” and that “[a] permanent restitution
                                               10

order entered after the time of sentencing shall only be challenged pursuant to

section 910.7.” Id. § 910.3(10) (emphasis added).

       In this case, Patterson is challenging an order entered in April 2021—over

three months “after the time of sentencing”—that obligates Patterson to pay a

specific amount ($34,512.93) of restitution. This April 2021 order was a

“permanent restitution order entered after the time of sentencing.” Id. (emphasis

added); see id. § 910.1(7) (defining “permanent restitution order” as “an

enforceable restitution order entered either at the time of sentencing or at a later

date determined by the court”). So section 910.3(10) governs. As a result, the

April 2021 order may “only be challenged pursuant to section 910.7.” Id.

§ 910.3(10). And section 910.7(5) provides that “[a]ppellate review of a district

court ruling under [section 910.7] shall be by writ of certiorari.” It follows, then,

that Patterson’s avenue to “[a]ppellate review” is “by writ of certiorari,” not appeal

as of right.5

       But Patterson suggests that this approach is unconstitutional. For one

thing, Patterson notes that restitution proceedings are much like civil damages

actions. And in a civil case, there is usually a right to appeal. So, in Patterson’s

view, equal protection requires a right to appeal from restitution orders. See

       5Importantly,    Iowa Code section 910.7(4) precludes an appellate court from reviewing an
offender’s plan of restitution—including a permanent restitution order, see id. § 910.1(9)
(defining “ ‘Plan of restitution’ [to] mean[] a permanent restitution order”)—“unless the offender
has exhausted the offender’s remedies under [section 910.7] and obtained a ruling from the
district court prior to the issue being raised in the appellate courts.” Here, Patterson requested
a hearing to challenge the initial victim restitution award of $42,100.92; the district court held
a hearing, at which Patterson was represented; and ultimately, the court granted Patterson’s
challenge in part by reducing the restitution award to $34,512.93. So Patterson complied with
section 910.7’s requirements, and we may review the restitution order through a writ of
certiorari. See id. § 910.7(5).
                                              11

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 6. Moreover, Patterson suggests

that some provisions of chapter 910 could lead to due process violations. See

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 9. For instance, Patterson

argues that “[i]f Iowa Code section 910.3(10) . . . is interpreted to require a

defendant to request a hearing pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.7 to contest

the initial amount of victim restitution,” then section 910.3(10) “violates due

process.”6 From this, Patterson infers that he “must be granted an appeal of

right.”

       What we do not understand, though, is how Patterson could be harmed if

we grant certiorari review instead of permitting an appeal of right. Patterson does

not suggest that our process would be any different if we allow one instead of the

other. In fact, he suggests that our process should be the same either way. No

matter how we label our review, Patterson wants us to decide the very same

question: “Does        substantial     evidence     support     the   restitution    order of

$34,512.93?” So we cannot say that Patterson’s rights (much less his

constitutional rights) could be endangered by granting certiorari review (as

section 910.7 expressly permits) instead of permitting an appeal as of right

(which section 910.7 implicitly disallows). We proceed with certiorari review.

       C. Certiorari Review. “A writ of certiorari lies where a . . . court has

exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally . . . . ” Lozano Campuzano v.

Iowa Dist. Ct., 940 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 2020) (second omission in original)

       6For reasons explained, we do not reach the merits of Patterson’s constitutional concerns,

including his critiques of section 910.7.
                                                 12

(quoting Weissenburger v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 740 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 2007)). “We

have interpreted this standard liberally.” Bousman v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d

789, 794 (Iowa 2001). We have said that “illegality” occurs “when the court’s

findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly

applied the law.” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 828 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 2013)

(quoting State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 747 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa 2008)).

       Here, we consider whether the April 2021 restitution order “lack[s]

substantial evidentiary support.” Id. “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable

person would find it adequate to reach the given conclusion, even if a reviewing

court might draw a contrary inference.” Burns v. Bd. of Nursing, 495 N.W.2d 698,

699 (Iowa 1993).

       The ultimate question, then, is whether substantial evidence supports the

district court’s award of $34,512.93 for earnings that Tidwell lost because of the

February 2020 automobile collision.7 We think so. Tidwell’s 2019 W-2 showed

wage earnings of $34,512.93. Plus Tidwell testified that in 2019, he had made

“6 to 7,000” dollars more through a side job. But Tidwell’s work is very physical.

And the February 2020 collision caused him great physical harm. According to

Tidwell—whom the district court found credible—he could not work from the

date of the collision through the time of the April 2021 hearing. So there was

       7See Iowa Code § 910.2 (requiring sentencing courts to “order that pecuniary damages be
paid by each offender to the victims of the offender’s criminal activities”); id. § 910.1(6) (defining
“pecuniary damages” to include “all damages to the extent not paid by an insurer on an insurance
claim by the victim, which a victim could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out
of the same facts or event, except punitive damages and damages for pain, suffering, mental
anguish, and loss of consortium”).
                                       13

evidence to show that Tidwell lost at least a year’s worth of income—indeed,

more—as a result of the collision. This supported the district court’s award of

$34,512.93, an amount that matched Tidwell’s 2019 W-2 wages.

      Patterson complains that the State did not supplement Tidwell’s testimony

about his disability with any medical records or expert testimony. But Patterson

does not cite—and we have not found—authority that would prevent the district

court from relying on Tidwell’s testimony about his inability to perform

construction work—or to even walk without struggling—since the collision.

      Patterson also points to evidence that—even without the collision—Tidwell

would have made less in 2020 than in 2019. Patterson notes that Tidwell was no

longer with his 2019 employer, Tidwell may not have found equally lucrative

work in 2020, COVID would have reduced his earning potential, and so on. But

Tidwell testified that, despite COVID, he expected to make more in 2020 as a

union journeyman. In any event, we agree with the district court that Tidwell’s

2019 W-2 wages provided “a reasonable basis from which” his lost earnings from

2020 could be “inferred or approximated.” Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Burnett,

160 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Iowa 1968) (“If it is speculative and uncertain whether

damages have been sustained, recovery is denied. If the uncertainty lies only in

the amount of damages, recovery may be had if there is proof of a reasonable

basis from which the amount can be inferred or approximated.”). We also

remember that in a substantial-evidence review, “[t]he fact that others may have

reached a different conclusion or that an opposite result would have been fully

justified by the evidence is of no importance.” Vohs v. Dist. Comm’rs, 218 N.W.2d
                                        14

595, 596 (Iowa 1974) (en banc) (quoting Reisner v. Bd. of Trs. of Fire Ret. Sys.,

203 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1973) (en banc)).

      Patterson also points out that Tidwell received $6,000 from the attorney

general’s office. Although the record is thin, it appears that this was

compensation for Tidwell’s lost wages. Patterson believes that he should receive

a credit for this amount. The district court disagreed because $6,000 “would not

fully offset the seasonal unemployment benefits . . . that Mr. Tidwell annually

received.” This finding is supported by substantial evidence: Tidwell testified that

he regularly received seasonal unemployment, and tax documents showed he

received $6,600 in unemployment in 2019.

      All things considered, we conclude that the April 2021 restitution award

is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, it is not illegal.

      IV. Conclusion.

      In the misdemeanor case (Case No. NTA0948898), Patterson has no right

of appeal. Moreover, we decline to grant certiorari or discretionary review. That

appeal is dismissed.

      In the felony case (Case No. OWOM088283), we grant certiorari review

pursuant to Iowa Code sections 910.3(10) and 910.7(5). Following review, we

conclude that the challenged order is supported by substantial evidence and,

therefore, is not illegal. Accordingly, we annul the writ.

      APPEAL DISMISSED IN CASE NO. NTA0948898; CERTIORARI REVIEW

GRANTED AND WRIT ANNULLED IN CASE NO. OWOM088283.