Court Opinion

ID: 9926171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 22:03:22.254857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:07.753787
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 230859-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                               NOTICE
 Decision filed 01/23/24. The
                                                                                    This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be                NO. 5-23-0859
                                                                                    Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                                    not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                    IN THE                             limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                                    under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                      )     Madison County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 23-CF-2330
                                                )
TREMAYNE D. TAYLOR,                             )     Honorable
                                                )     A. Ryan Jumper,
      Defendant-Appellee.                       )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Moore and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

                                                 ORDER

¶1       Held: We vacate the circuit court’s release order where the circuit court failed to consider
               and apply the proper statutory criteria in denying the State’s petition for pretrial
               detention.

¶2       The State appeals the September 22, 2023, order of the circuit court of Madison County

denying the State’s petition for pretrial detention and granting the defendant, Tremayne D. Taylor,

pretrial release with conditions. Pretrial release is governed by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1,

2023), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act

(Act),1 as codified in article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS

5/art. 110 (West 2022)). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various

         1
         “The Act has also sometimes been referred to in the press as the Pretrial Fairness Act. Neither
name is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or public act.” Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL
129248, ¶ 4 n.1.
                                                     1
provisions of the Code); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective

date as September 18, 2023). On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court abused its discretion

in denying the State’s verified petition; requests the circuit court’s September 22, 2023, order be

reversed; and that the defendant be detained pending trial. For the following reasons, we vacate

the circuit court’s order granting the defendant pretrial release and remand the matter for further

proceedings in the circuit court. 2

¶3                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶4      On September 20, 2023, the defendant was charged by information with one count of the

offense of home invasion in violation of section 19-6(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal

Code) (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2) (West 2022)), a Class X, nonprobationable felony, in Madison

County, Illinois. On the same date, the State filed a verified petition seeking to deny pretrial release

pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). The State alleged that

the proof was evident and the presumption great that the defendant committed a detainable offense

listed in section 110-6.1 (id.); that the defendant was charged with a forcible felony as described

in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5))—namely, home invasion; and that the

defendant’s pretrial release posed a specific, real, and present threat to the safety of any person or

the community. On September 21, 2023, on the defendant’s motion, the detention hearing was

continued to September 22, 2023. Also on September 21, 2023, a pretrial services criminal history

report was filed for the circuit court’s consideration.

        2
         Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(5) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023), our decision in this case
was due on or before December 26, 2023, absent a finding of good cause for extending the deadline. Based
on the high volume of appeals under the Act currently under the court’s consideration, as well as the
complexity of issues and the lack of precedential authority, we find there to be good cause for extending
the deadline.
                                                   2
¶5     On September 22, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on the State’s petition. The State

proceeded by proffer, stating first that the defendant was alleged to have committed home invasion,

a detainable offense under the Code. The State proffered that officers with the Collinsville Police

Department were dispatched to the address of a home invasion and a violation of an order of

protection. Upon arrival, they found the defendant engaged in a physical altercation with Phillip

Whitfield, who had injuries to his mouth and was spitting blood from the confrontation. The female

resident of the home, Sydney Dear, informed the officers that she and the defendant had been in

an on-again-off-again relationship, and that he was the father of her child. Dear had called 911

after the defendant, upon arriving at her home and finding another man in the residence, began

kicking the front door, eventually forcing entry by breaking through the front door, and

immediately attacked Whitfield, repeatedly punching him.

¶6     The State further proffered that the 911 call was recorded, and in the recording, someone

can be heard to be banging on the door, and the door can be heard breaking. At that point, the

recording revealed that someone said, “something along the lines of who you got in here,” at which

point the confrontation can be heard in the residence. The State tendered the defendant’s criminal

history, both by proffer and by offering the pretrial report which included the defendant’s criminal

history. The State indicated that the defendant’s criminal history included a felony for possession

with intent to deliver a controlled substance, as well as a domestic battery conviction for which

the defendant was on probation at the time of the current offense. The male victim in this case

reported that the defendant threatened to kill him during the confrontation and was concerned for

his ongoing safety.

¶7     The State proffered that in the 2020 aggravated domestic battery, the defendant was at the

same address when he kicked open the door and severely beat Sydney Dear, the reporting party in

                                                 3
the current case. She was found to have severe injuries to her face, including a broken nose, and

received multiple sutures to close her lip.

¶8     After the State’s proffer, the defendant called Dear to testify. Dear testified that she had

known the defendant for five years and that they are the parents of a three-year-old daughter. Dear

stated that the defendant had spent the night at the residence the night prior to the incident and had

stored belongings at her house, having been previously given a key. Dear testified that she had,

however, filed an order of protection against the defendant but had since filed to drop the order of

protection. Dear testified that she did not observe Whitfield having any injuries from the altercation

on the day of the incident and was not fearful of the defendant. On cross-examination, Dear

testified that Whitfield was at her residence to fix the front door, which was already broken. Dear

also testified that when she called 911, it was to report that someone who was not permitted entry

to her residence was trying to force entry into her residence. She testified that she provided a

statement to police, indicating that the defendant forced his way into her residence and

immediately punched Whitfield. Dear testified that she had an order of protection entered on April

27, 2023, and moved to dismiss it the day before the present hearing, September 21, 2023. When

Dear went to dismiss the previously entered order of protection, she was accompanied by the

defendant’s mother. Dear testified that she was not, as she sat in the courtroom that day, fearful of

the defendant. Dear testified that the reason that she wrote on her request to dismiss the order of

protection, protecting her from the defendant, was so that her daughter could see her father. She

wrote that the defendant could get angry at times, but that she really thought he was trying to do

better with his life and temper. Dear further testified that the defendant’s actions on September 19,

2023, were an example of the defendant’s anger getting the best of him, and that Whitfield had

done nothing to deserve getting punched in the face.

                                                  4
¶9      After considering the State’s proffer, the testimony of Dear, and the parties’ arguments,

the circuit court stated:

        “Okay. So having heard the evidence presented as proffer, the testimony, having

        considered all the statutory factors, the Court determines that although the proof

        might be evident, there is not enough here for probable cause that a crime has been

        committed, that the State has not met its burden with regards to proving that there

        is a real and present threat to the safety of either the witness here today or the other

        witness, Mr. Whitfield.”

The circuit court ordered the defendant released subject to the mandatory pretrial release

conditions, as well as the condition that, despite the finding that the defendant did not pose a danger

to any person or persons, the defendant have no contact with the two victims in the case, to which

the defendant did not object.

¶ 10    Also on September 22, 2023, the circuit court issued a written release order finding that

the State had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant posed a real and

present threat to the safety of a specific, identifiable person or persons or the community, and that

no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety

of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific and articulable facts of the case.

Notably, the circuit court’s written order did not indicate that the State had failed to prove that the

proof was evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed a qualifying offense listed

in section 110-6.1 (id. § 110-6.1). The circuit court’s written release order imposed the mandatory

pretrial release conditions and the additional conditions that the defendant not have contact with

the two victims, nor enter the premises of Dear. On October 6, 2023, the State timely appealed,

filing a Notice of Pretrial Fairness Act Appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Sept.

18, 2023) and a supporting memorandum on November 13, 2023. The Office of the State Appellate
                                                   5
Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent the defendant but did not file a responsive

memorandum.

¶ 11                                     II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12   On appeal, the State argues that (1) the circuit court’s finding that the State did not show

the proof was evident or presumption great that the defendant committed a qualifying offense was

against the manifest weight of the evidence, (2) the circuit court’s finding that the State failed to

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant posed a threat to any person or the

community was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (3) the circuit court’s finding that

the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of

conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the

community was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the State argues that the

circuit court abused its discretion in denying the State’s verified petition.

¶ 13   Pretrial release, including any conditions related thereto, is governed by the Act as codified

in article 110 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)). Under the Code, as amended by the

Act, a defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied in certain statutorily limited situations. Id.

§ 110-6.1. In Illinois, we presume all defendants are entitled to pretrial release. Id. §§ 110-2(a),

110-6.1(e).

¶ 14   Upon filing a timely verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the

burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great

that (1) the defendant committed a qualifying offense, (2) the defendant’s pretrial release poses a

real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and (3) less

restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the

community and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(e), (f). If

the circuit court finds that the State proved a valid threat to the safety of any person or the
                                                  6
community and/or the defendant’s likely willful flight to avoid prosecution, or the defendant’s

failure to abide by previously issued conditions of pretrial release, the court must determine which

pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as

required or the safety of any other person or the community and the likelihood of compliance by

the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” Id. § 110-5(a). If the circuit court

determines that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, the court must make written

findings summarizing the reasons for denying pretrial release, including why less restrictive

conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community,

based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from

prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(h)(1).

¶ 15    Our standard of review of pretrial release determinations is twofold. The circuit court’s

factual findings will be reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. People v.

Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence

only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary,

or not based on the evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). The circuit

court’s ultimate determination regarding pretrial release will not be reversed absent an abuse of

discretion. People v. Swan, 2023 IL App (5th) 230766, ¶ 11. An abuse of discretion occurs when

the decision of the circuit court is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or when no reasonable person

would agree with the position adopted by the circuit court. Id.

¶ 16    In support of its contentions, the State first argues that the circuit court’s finding regarding

the qualifying offense, that “although the proof might be evident, there is not enough here for

probable cause that a crime has been committed,” was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Based on the uncertainty inherent in the circuit court’s oral pronouncement and written order, we

find this issue dispositive.
                                                   7
¶ 17   The record reveals that the defendant was charged on September 20, 2023, with one count

of home invasion, a Class X felony. In order to be eligible for detention under the Code, the State

was required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the proof was evident or the

presumption great that the defendant committed an offense listed in section 110-6.1(a) (725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022). Home invasion is specifically listed in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5), which

defines a forcible felony, for the purposes of the section, as including the charge of home invasion.

Id. § 110-6.1(a)(1.5). To prove the offense of home invasion, the State must prove that the

defendant knowingly, and without authority, entered the dwelling of Dear, knowing Dear to be

present within that dwelling, and intentionally caused injury to Whitfield by striking him about the

face and body, causing injury, in violation of section 19-6(a)(2) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS

5/19-6(a)(2) (West 2022)).

¶ 18   The State contends that the circuit court’s statement at the hearing that “although the proof

might be evident, there is not enough here for probable cause that a crime has been committed”

was confusing. We agree. The circuit court’s use of the term “probable cause” was not the

appropriate standard to be applied under the Code when considering whether or not a qualifying

offense had been committed. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a), (e) (West 2022) (requiring the State to

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the

defendant has committed a qualifying offense).

¶ 19   Further, the record on appeal reveals that the defendant waived his right to a preliminary

hearing on September 22, 2023, the same day the circuit court entered the release order. The

purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether the crime charged was committed and,

if so, whether probable cause existed to believe that the defendant was the perpetrator. Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, § 7; People v. Puleo, 96 Ill. App. 3d 457 (1981). Thus, by the defendant’s own

                                                 8
admission, there was probable cause to believe that the charged crime was committed, and that the

defendant was the perpetrator.

¶ 20   Moreover, a finding of no probable cause, if intentional and not simply a misstatement,

should have ended the inquiry with the result that the State had not proven that the defendant

committed a qualifying, and thus, detainable offense. However, the circuit court entered a written,

form release order, but did not check the box indicating that the State had failed to prove that the

defendant committed a qualifying offense, and affirmatively stated that “the proof might be

evident.” It is well settled that “ ‘[w]hen the oral pronouncement of the court and the written order

conflict, the oral pronouncement of the court controls.’ ” People v. Willenborg, 2023 IL App (5th)

230727, ¶ 18 (quoting People v. Roberson, 401 Ill. App. 3d 758, 774 (2010)). Here, however, the

circuit court affirmatively recited the wrong standard, or a comingling of two different standards,

the result of which is indiscernible. The circuit court’s failure to check the box on its preprinted

release form order, indicating that the State failed to prove a qualifying offense, and then

proceeding to make further findings as to dangerousness and appropriate conditions of release,

further confuse the ruling.

¶ 21   Although the circuit court is presumed to know the law and apply it properly, when the

record affirmatively shows the contrary, that presumption is rebutted. People v. Kluxdal, 225 Ill.

App. 3d 217, 223 (1991). In the present case, the circuit court’s recitation of the wrong burden of

proof rebuts the presumption that the circuit court properly applied the law. See, e.g., People v.

Virella, 256 Ill. App. 3d 635, 638 (1993). Given that the circuit court did not conduct a proper

detention analysis, we will not undertake that analysis in the first instance. The appellate court is

not well suited to making fact-finding determinations. People v. Martin, 2023 IL App (4th)

230826, ¶ 25. In reviewing a pretrial release order, we must rely “on the trial court conducting a

full and fair evaluation of the evidence and showing its work.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
                                                 9
¶ 22   Accordingly, we remand this cause with directions to hold a new detention hearing

applying the proper statutory criteria. Specifically, the circuit court shall make express findings as

to whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the

presumption great that (1) the defendant committed a qualifying offense, (2) the defendant’s

pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or a

flight risk, and (3) less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety

of any person or the community and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.

725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e), (f) (West 2022).

¶ 23   Given this disposition, we deem it unnecessary to address the State’s remaining points of

error. While we note that the Code requires no written requirement for the circuit court’s factual

findings and credibility assessments where pretrial release is granted, on remand, we emphasize

that the basis for the circuit court’s findings and determinations is necessary for this court to

properly review the same under the deferential standards of review that are applicable to these

hearings.

¶ 24                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25   For the reasons stated, we vacate the circuit court’s judgment and remand the cause for

further proceedings consistent with this order.

¶ 26   Vacated and remanded.

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